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EUROPEAN SOCIAL HISTORY



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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL HISTORY

FROM 1350 TO 2000



VOLUME 1

Peter N. Stearns

Editor in Chief

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INTRODUCTION



Social history as a field developed in Europe. It is hardly surprising that some of the most striking discoveries and analyses in social history developed in application to the European past. French scholars first articulated some of the basic premises of the field in the early part of the twentieth century. Since then not only French but also German, Italian, and British social historians have pioneered in theoretical and methodological approaches, even as they have been increasingly joined by researchers elsewhere. Marxist contributions from eastern Europe have also played a significant role in social history's unfolding, particularly in relation to topics such as class structure. Correspondingly, social history has gained unusual stature in the discipline of history more generally in many European countries, though not without some contests—particularly in the field of teaching—about what purposes historical knowledge should serve.

European social history has often joined fruitfully with other disciplines, such as sociology, which are sometimes friendlier to historical inquiry than their counterparts in other regions. Dutch sociologists and English anthropologists have contributed important social history work. Finally, imaginative investigations of European social history, including such distinctive events as the formation of the world's first industrial proletariat, have attracted scholars from many places besides Europe itself, as the European experience becomes something of a seedbed for sociohistorical formulations more generally.

Wide agreement exists on what social history is as a particular approach to research concerning the past. Social historians explore changes and continuities in the experience of ordinary people. They pursue this focus on two assumptions: first, that groups of ordinary people have meaningful histories that help us better understand both past and present; and, second, that ordinary people often play a major, if unsung, role in causing key developments and are not simply acted upon. Further, for ordinary people and for more elite sectors, social historians probe a wide variety of behaviors and beliefs, not just political actions or great ideas. They argue that the past is formed by connections among behaviors, from family life to leisure to attitudes toward the state, and that we better understand current social concerns, such as crime or health practices, if we see how they have emerged from history. The effects of dealing with ordinary people and the sources of information available about them and of widening the facets of social life open to inquiry have generated an explosion of historical information and topics. Specialists in European social history may thus focus on kinship, sexuality, adolescence, sports, or rural protest—the range is staggering, as is the usable history now available.

While remaining true to its basic principles, social history has continued to evolve since its effective origins as an explicit field in the 1920s and 1930s. Changes have involved the use of new or revived theories. They have included varying degrees of interest in quantification. Intense concern for statistical probes, in the 1970s, has given way more recently to greater attention to cultural evidence and to links with anthropological approaches to deeply held values and rituals. Intense interest in the

working class and the peasantry has persisted, but attention has been directed to other topics including gender (first, women's history and, more recently, constructions of masculinity) and age groupings from childhood to old age. Facets of behavior have expanded to include ambitious investigation of the history of the senses, of gestures, and of humor. The evolution of social history transcends Europe, of course, but many key new developments, including new topics, are often first sketched in application to European patterns.

The definition of social history and its continued dynamism must include an ongoing tension between this field and some other types of historical inquiry. Social historians often reconsider familiar historical periodization, for example. The forces that shape developments such as the Renaissance, for example, may apply more to formal politics and intellectual life than to social structures or popular beliefs and behaviors. At least conventional periodization must be tested for its applicability to social history concerns. While social historians deal with chronology and certainly with change, they typically focus less on precise dates and events, more on shifts in larger patterns such as birthrates and beliefs about women's roles. Approaches to the causes of change may alter. Despite some early definitions that argued that social history is "history with the politics left out," the role of the state remains a key topic in European social history. But social historians do not assume that the state is the source of all major historical developments or that what the state intends to do, in forging a new law or a new activity, is what actually happens, given the importance of popular reactions in reshaping day-to-day activities. The rise of social history has downgraded certain topics for historical inquiry; diplomatic history is far less lively, as a field in European history, than was the case in the 1950s. But social history has also recast certain traditional fields, leading to new efforts to explore military behavior in light of conditions of ordinary soldiers, for example, or interest in examining the actual dissemination of ideas as part of a "new" intellectual history. Here too, social historians dealing with Europe have often played a leading role in bringing about larger redefinitions.

The richness of European social history continues to develop despite some obvious difficulties in applying the characteristic methods and topics to the Continent. Social historians frequently face challenges in uncovering sources, particularly for the centuries before modern times. Some parts of Europe—Scandinavia, for example, because of the record keeping of local Lutheran churches in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—have better records for studying literacy and demographic behavior than others. But problems of place go beyond differential qualities of evidence. For many topics, Europe is simply not a particularly good unit, and since social historians remain wedded to specific data deriving from place, they face some real barriers to Europe-wide generalizations. Family forms, for instance, vary significantly from one region to the next; some places have typically emphasized extended family units, others have been more commonly nuclear. Trends have sometimes moved in opposite directions: notoriously, eastern Europe was tightening its manorial system in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, just as western Europe was largely abolishing serfdom.

As a result of these kinds of these kinds of complexities, few social historians have tackled Europe as a whole, though there are important individual efforts, particularly concerning certain aspects of popular culture and popular unrest. But if Europe is not usually a logical empirical unit, what is? Europe in modern times developed a network of nation-states, and many social historians simply use this unit as a matter of convenience; where the state causes social patterns, more than convenience may be involved. But social historians may be edgy about national histories, because they too often assume coherences that should in fact be tested. Hence, some social historians deliberately look at larger regions, like the Mediterranean, or more commonly at small regions whose geography and traditions most

actively shape ordinary life. Given Europe's regional diversity, comparison is also a key methodology, and while social historians have been slow to pick up its challenge, important work has compared gender patterns or labor relations across regional and national boundaries.

A final place-related issue involves Europe's position in the world. European history has often been treated in considerable isolation, particularly after the Middle Ages when European dependence on ideas imported from Islam and the Byzantine Empire declined. European social history, focused on ordinary people and activities, might enhance the tendency to look at European patterns in isolation. Recent work, however, has partially reemphasized Europe's place in the wider world. European social patterns have often been influenced by beliefs, styles, and economic relationships involving many other areas. Correspondingly, social issues arising in Europe often spilled over to have wider impacts, including emigration to other parts of the world, imperialism, and other movements. Social historians have helped develop a new sense of Europe's wider international ties.

This Encyclopedia builds on several generations of social historical work involving Europe. It calls attention to social history dimensions for major places and periods. By discussing such topics as the relationships between state and society, the "new" military and labor history, and changes in technology and capitalism, the Encyclopedia relates sociohistorical findings to more familiar topics. The bulk of the Encyclopedia is given over, however, to examinations of central sociohistorical concerns, both groups and facets of social behavior. Sections thus bring together discussions of family history, gender, health and illness, population trends, social structure, childrearing and age relations, the body and emotions—these and other themes encompassing the range of knowledge that has developed since World War II. The opening section comprises a set of essays that explore major issues of theory and method that can be linked to more explicit topics such as social mobility or sexuality.

Essays in the Encyclopedia deal with Europe from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to the present. European society was hardly new at the end of the Middle Ages, but changes in family structures (the rise of the "European-style" family in some areas), the beginnings of a more commercial economy with attendant changes in class structure, and cultural shifts associated with the Renaissance and with religious change helped set a number of new social trends in motion. In addition to explicit discussions of periodization, topical essays devote careful attention to the major periods—the breaks in direction and causes of change—relevant to specific subjects such as crime or recreation. Topical essays also take into account the crucial issues of regional diversity, such as the extent to which various parts of Europe (south, east, northwest, and so on) and sometimes different nations need to be differentiated and compared, and the extent to which they can be subsumed under larger patterns.

European social history is a work in progress. Debates persist. Comparative work for many subjects is still in its infancy. New topics continue to emerge, along with new uses of source material and novel connections between the social history approach and other kinds of history, cultural analysis, and social science. The Encyclopedia emphasizes what is already known, but it also supports the further quest.

Encyclopedia of European Social History contains 209 articles arranged in twenty-three topical sections. The articles were contributed by nearly 170 scholars from twenty-nine American states, four Canadian provinces, nine European countries, and Australia. Each article is followed by cross-references to related articles and each article includes a bibliography. To aid the reader of this thematically arranged encyclopedia, an alphabetical table of contents appears in the frontmatter of each volume. A comprehensive index is included in volume 6.

INTRODUCTION

The illustrations were chosen by the Scribner staff, which was also responsible for the captions. The chronology was prepared by Greg Goodale of George Mason University and the Scribner staff. Biographies of nearly three hundred figures important in social history—historical figures, monarchs and government officials, contemporary interpreters of society, and social historians—in volume 6 are taken from publications of the Gale Group, available in the Gale Biography Resource Center and adapted for the Encyclopedia. Sincere thanks are due to Stephen Wagley, who coordinated and motivated this project with uncommon skill.

Peter N. Stearns
1 October 2000

CHRONOLOGY



The chronology is arranged by decade; the first section covers the first half of the fourteenth century. Most decades include a summary of general trends, a selection of notable events year by year, and important rulers and government officials. Some decades beginning in the late nineteenth century include notable publications and achievements in the study of social history.

1300–1350

Albigensian heresy is suppressed in France and Italy; Montaillou in southern France is one of the last strongholds. Growth of trade fairs, the largest of which are held in Lyon, Bruges, Antwerp, and Geneva. Italians develop shipping insurance to protect against losses that result from rough seas, pirates, highwaymen, and other hazards. Black Death kills approximately 25 million Europeans between 1346 and 1352; most regions experience two centuries of labor shortages and do not return to preplague populations until the mid-sixteenth century.

Popes begin residence in Avignon (1305). Beginning of Hundred Years' War (1337). Artisans briefly seize control of Nürnberg's government (1348). Giovanni Boccaccio sets his *Decameron* (1348–1353) in the plague years.

1350s

The concept of a public health commission evolves in Venice in order to combat further visitations of the plague. Travel accounts including John of Mandeville's are evidence of continuing curiosity of Europeans about geography even as exploration slows due to collapse of the Mongol Empire.

English Parliament passes the Statute of Laborers fixing wages in response to demand for scarce labor resulting from the plague (1351). Ottoman Empire expands into Europe (1353). Paris merchants briefly seize power from a weak monarch as rural peasants rise against the French nobility (Jacquerie of 1358).

1360s

Revolts against monarchs and nobles result from increased power of laborers during the decades following the Black Death. Rebellion of laboring classes in Ypres (Low Countries; 1366). Wool workers and other la-

borers in Florence, having established unions (1345), strike and attempt a revolution; they fail (1368). Brethren of the Free Spirit, Beghards, Beguines, and Konrad Schmid's flagellant movement in central Holy Roman Empire.

1370s

Working class rebellions continue throughout Europe. Playing cards are introduced into Europe. John Wycliffe criticizes papal authority and church's sacramental doctrine, defends England's decision to end payments to the pope, who is financing France's military campaigns against England during the Hundred Years' War.

Charterhouse, first English public school is established (1371). Dancing at festivals turns into mass manias in Aix, Cologne, and Metz (1372). Pope Gregory XI leaves Avignon and reestablishes the papacy in Rome (1377). Western Schism begins upon Gregory's death as competing popes are elected (1378); Urban VI remains in Rome, Clement VII settles in Avignon. Revolutionary governments in Florence (Ciompi, or wool-carders, revolt, 1378–1382) and Ghent (Low Countries; 1379–1382)

1380s

Nürnberg and Bruges (Low Countries) pay midwives out of city funds to assist poor women. Rapid European conquests by Ottoman Empire in the Balkans begin.

Riots occur in Strasbourg, Paris, and southern France over the imposition of new taxes (1380). Wat Tyler leads peasant revolt in England (1381) to protest the Statute of Laborers and high poll taxes; he is supported by followers of Wycliffe who preach egalitarianism and millenarianism. Nicole Oresme opposes astronomy and magic in *De divinatione* (1382).

1390s

Humanist scholarship and the revival of interest in classic Greek and Roman authors begins in Italy. Witchcraft trials are held in Boltinger (Switzerland).

University of Bologna awards a medical degree to a woman (1390). *Le menagier de Paris*, French handbook of household management (c. 1393). Wycliffites, now called “Lollards,” petition English Parliament to reform the Church by rejecting corruption, clerical misbehavior, transubstantiation, and auricular confession (1395).

1400s

Persecution of Lollards and other heretics in England. English Parliament prohibits the making of gold or silver by alchemy. Eustache Deschamps’ *Demonstrations contre sortilege* (Demonstrations against sorcery) argues against contacting the dead. Christine de Pisan’s *Livre de la cité des dames* (Book of the city of ladies; 1404–1405). University of Paris counts 10,000 students in 1406, nearly 20,000 by 1490. Bethlehem (Bedlam) Hospital in London becomes an asylum for the mentally disabled (1402). Similar asylum is founded in Valladolid, Spain (1409).

1410s

Teachings of John Wycliffe influence John Hus, advocate for church reform in Bohemia; Hus is executed at the Council of Constance (1415). Hus’s followers in Bohemia break from the Roman church and lift restrictions on serfs. After Emperor Wenceslaus IV dies (1419), they war with church and Empire. The war is partly based on nationalist antipathy toward Germans who have migrated into Bohemia. Western Schism ends with the election of Martin V (1417). Prince Henry of Portugal establishes a school of navigation at Sagres (1419).

1420s

Thomas à Kempis’s *De imitatione Christi* (*On the Imitation of Christ*) extols the virtues of humility and is rapidly adapted by French, English, Polish, and other translators. In Bohemia Taborites break from the Hussites to form egalitarian millennialist movement. In Würzburg (Germany), labor shortages and wage discrepancies result in the employment of more women than men in building trades during the next century.

Joan of Arc leads military campaign against England. *Catasto*, a form of income tax, is imposed in Florence (1427), the accounting for which indicates that 4.74 people live in the average rural household, while 3.91 people live in the average urban household.

1430s

Scotland and Florence require their citizens to conform to dress codes appropriate to class (sumptuary laws); England and German and Spanish towns adopt similar ordinances. Consumption of alcohol after dark is prohibited in Scotland (1430). Peasant revolts occur in Worms (Germany; 1431), Saxony, Silesia, the Rhineland, Brandenburg (1432), Norway, Sweden (1434), and Hungary (1437). Medici family dominates government in Florence that is favorable to learning and the arts. Utraquists (Hussites who wished to receive communion in both kinds, bread and wine) reconciled with the Catholic Church (1436). Reconciliation of Roman and Orthodox churches at the Council of Florence (1439).

1440s

Portuguese explorers sailing down the west coast of Africa make contact with black Africans; by 1448, 800 Africans are enslaved and living in Portugal. European explorations will lead to further questioning of Christianity and Europe’s centrality. Johan Gutenberg begins the development of a printing press; printing presses are introduced into much of Western Europe by the end of the century; initial output is mainly religious texts. Peasant revolt in Denmark (1441).

1450s

Hundred Years’ War concludes as France reconquers its territory from the English, except Calais. Gutenberg prints Vulgate Bible.

Jack Cade’s peasant revolt in England demands egalitarian reforms and forces the repeal of Statutes of Laborers (1450). Ottoman Turks capture Constantinople (1453). Siena enacts legislation to encourage marriages by denying bachelors employment in government positions (1454). Government of Florence pays dowries for poor women. Women demand and receive restrictions on unlicensed silk weavers in Cologne (1456). Salzburg (Austria) peasants revolt against the Empire as a result of a tax imposed on cattle; revolt spreads to Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola (1458).

1460s

Sforza family comes to power in Milan, beginning competition with Florence for cultural supremacy in Italy.

Franciscans institute an interest-free loan program, the *monte di pietà*, for the poor (1463). Bowling is banned in England (1465), football and golf in Scotland (1467) as part of new elites' attacks on popular culture. Catholics, in power again in Bohemia, return peasants to serfdom. The Church of the Moravian Brethren is founded (1457); its adherents will reject the authority of the Catholic Church in 1467.

1470s

Physicians begin to categorize epidemics scientifically as opposed to calling all outbreaks "the plague." Attacks occur in Spain against Jews who had recently been converted to Christianity.

Hans Bohm, preaching egalitarianism and millenarianism and demanding social justice and religious reform, leads a peasant agitation in Würzburg (Germany; 1470). Typhus appears in Europe (1477). The Spanish inquisition is placed under both clerical and state authority by the pope (1478).

Isabella, queen of Castile (1474–1504). Ferdinand II, king of Aragon (1479–1516) and, as Ferdinand V, king of Castile (1474–1504).

1480s

In Florence, 28 percent of boys receive education from formal schools. Spanish inquisition assumes authority to rule on heresy, apostasy, sorcery, sodomy, polygamy, and blasphemy. Cities in Aragon attempt to block inquisitors from entering their walls; rural peasants join inquisitors and the monarchy in demanding the cities yield.

Papal bull warns against dangers of witchcraft (1484). Women in France are prohibited from employment as surgeons (1485). *Malleus Maleficarum* (Hammer of witches; 1486). Bartolomeu Dias rounds the Cape of Good Hope (1488).

1490s

Syphilis appears in Europe. Antonio de Nebrija, *Gramática de la lengua catellana* (1492). Spain conquers Granada from last Muslim rulers in Iberian Peninsula (1492). Spain expels Jews (1492). Christopher Columbus sails west, lands in Western Hemisphere (1492). Bundschuh, organized peasant movement, revolts in

Alsace and southern Germany (1493). French under Charles VIII invade Italy. Girolamo Savonarola, Dominican friar and church reformer, dominates government of Florence (1494–1498). Poland restricts movement of serfs (1496 and 1501). Pawnshop opens in Nürnberg (1498).

1500s

Population growth in western Europe; populations of Spain, Naples, and Sicily will double in sixteenth century; population of London will increase from 40,000 to 200,000. 154 European cities have more than 10,000 inhabitants. Some city governments begin to buy food stocks for emergencies. Florence has seventy-three charitable organizations; England has 460 hospitals. In England, serfs constitute only 1 percent of the total population.

Pedro Alvares Cabral lands in Brazil (1500). In Speyer (Germany) antifeudal peasant revolt occurs (1502). Beginning in 1505, the newspaper *Zeitungen* is sporadically published. Nürnberg licenses prostitutes to counter unlicensed houses of prostitution (1508). Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly* (1509).

Henry VIII, king of England (1509–1547).

1510s

The bishop of London orders midwives to be licensed to practice. Women are permitted to practice surgery throughout England. Attempt to introduce the inquisition to Naples fails in the face of popular opposition. Tens of thousands of peasants successfully, though briefly, revolt in Styria and Carinthia (Austria) against feudalism. Publishing spreads rapidly in Germany as a result of religious controversies and the decline of publishing in Italy. 150 books are published in Germany (1518), 990 will be published in 1524. The City of Cracow opens a library for the public.

Peasants in Bern canton revolt during Carnival (1513). Hungarian peasants revolt against the Holy Roman Empire (1514). Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517) allows the Franciscans to charge interest in their pawnshops. Erasmus publishes New Testament in Greek (1516). Martin Luther posts Ninety-five Theses (1517). Erasmus, *Colloquies* (1518).

Francis I, king of France (1515–1547). Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor (1519–1558) and king of Spain as Charles I (1519–1556).

1520s

Communeros revolt in Spain (1519–21). Martin Luther's address to German nobles; he is excommuni-

cated by the pope (1520). He affirms the authority of ecumenical councils over the pope and publishes a German translation of the Bible (1522–1534). Peasants demand egalitarianism and religious reform during the German Peasants' War (1524–1525). The Swedish Diet of Vesteres, at which miners and peasants are represented, adopts Lutheranism (1527). Henry VIII of England applies to the pope for an annulment (1527). Imperial army sacks Rome (1527). Venice imposes censorship on its printers (1527).

1530s

Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier* (1528) becomes popular throughout Europe as a guide to proper elite manners. Plague, famine, and war have reduced Rome's population to 40,000; by 1600, its population will be 105,000. Radical Reformers (Anabaptists) gain adherents from Switzerland to the Dutch provinces and assume power in Münster and Lübeck. In Münster they are suppressed by allied Catholics and Lutherans (1534–1535). Act of Supremacy separates English church from Roman church (1534). Prussia restricts movement of serfs (1538). France institutes a public lottery (1539). The most popular books in France are the Bible, *The Imitation of Christ*, and *Gargantua* by François Rabelais.

1540s

Spain's Bolivian mines flood Europe with silver, causing economic instability. By 1542, Italian bankers are charging a 26 percent interest rate against Spain.

Society of Jesus (Jesuits) is sanctioned by the pope (1540). Nicolaus Copernicus, *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* (On the revolution of the heavenly spheres; 1543). Council of Trent begins its meetings (1545–1563). The Pitau rebellion seizes Limoges (France), demanding "public freedom and public repose" (1548). Ket's Catholic Rebellion in England, a response to religious conflict and the overabundance of labor; Ket briefly establishes a commune in Norwich (1549). Jesuits open their first school in Messina, Sicily (1549).

Edward VI, king of England (1547–1553). Henry III, king of France (1547–1559). Catherine de Médicis, queen of France (1547–1589).

1550s

Plans to divert sewers into the Seine River are thwarted because half of all Parisians drink from it. Bridewell Hospital creates a workhouse for London's

poor. Consumerism is reflected by the popularity of earrings in France, the existence of nineteen sugar refineries in Antwerp, the introduction of tobacco to Spain, and the licensing of alehouses in England.

Hamburg merchants create a stock exchange (1558). France prohibits abortion (1556). The Papal *Index Librorum Prohibitum* (Index of forbidden books) is instituted (1559).

Mary I, queen of England (1553–1558). Philip II, king of Spain (1556–1599). Elizabeth I, queen of England (1558–1603).

1560s

In Poland, 12 percent of boys attend school. London's Merchant Tailor's school designs a curriculum to provide similar education for girls and boys. Toledo counts 50,000 textile laborers. Martin Guerre is tried and executed in Languedoc (see Natalie Z. Davis's *Return of Martin Guerre*). Scotland burns 8,000 witches between 1560 and 1600. Johan Wier condemns the idea of witchcraft and is sent into hiding by severe criticism. Iced cream is introduced in Italy.

Beginning of Wars of Religion in France (1562). England enacts a law for poor relief (1563). England is involved in slave trading and piracy. A Papal Bull is issued against bullfighting (1567); it is ignored in Spain, where many fear prohibiting the popular pastime would lead to riots.

James VI, king of Scotland (1567–1625) and king of England as James I (1603–1625).

1570s

In Norwich (England), 80 percent of girls aged 6 to 12 work, while only 33 percent of boys do; another 33 percent of boys are in school. Dice and stage plays are popular in England; permanent theaters are constructed in London.

Christian naval victory at Lepanto (1571). Strikes against a new Spanish tax occur in the Netherlands (1571). England legalizes credit sales of necessities (1572). Thousands of French Huguenots are killed during the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre (1572). In Germany, the braziers' guild imposes a 92-hour workweek (1573). Confederation of Warsaw grants freedom of religion to all sects (1573).

Rudolf II, Holy Roman Emperor (1576–1612).

1580s

Russia restricts movement of serfs, a result of labor surpluses. Jesuits establish Sunday schools for child

laborers in the Netherlands. Compulsory and universal education is instituted in Württemberg. Puritan sects break from the Church of England. Potatoes, eggplant, tomatoes, and coffee are introduced in England, where prices for all goods double over next sixty years, while wages increase by only 20 percent (price revolution). The Catholic Jean Bodin and the Protestant King James VI of Scotland reaffirm the evils of witch magic, while astrology is condemned by the Spanish inquisition and Pope Sixtus V.

Pope Gregory XIII decrees new calendar (1582). Spanish Armada sails against England (1588). 100,000 Parisians stage a march against the Huguenots (1589).

Henry IV, king of France (1589–1610).

1590s

Amsterdam's population grows from 75,000 (1590) to 300,000 (1620). Artisans in Amsterdam develop magnifying lenses, resulting in the production of telescopes and microscopes that will prove the heliocentric system and discover microscopic life. Spain experiences famine, plague, and labor shortages (1599–1600). Theaters in England are ordered closed on Thursdays to avoid competition with bull baiting. New poor laws create workhouses throughout England.

Wars of Religion in France end with conversion to Catholicism of Henry IV, first Bourbon king (1594). After Jesuits are briefly expelled, the Edict of Nantes compels religious toleration in France (1598). The second inquisition trial of Menocchio results in his execution (1599–1600; see Carlo Ginzberg's *Cheese and the Worms*).

1600s

Spain's population declines while England's doubles during the seventeenth century. Ursulines advance the education of girls in Catholic Europe. In England, approximately 10 percent of women are literate. The regular use of knives and forks is introduced to England and France from Italy. France begins an ambitious road building program; peasants are forced to build roads without pay through the *corvée*. Tulips become a popular consumer good in the Netherlands.

German brothels are shut down for health reasons (1601). The English Cotswald games, a festival of rural sports, begin (1604), lasting until 1852. Peasants led by Ivan Bolotnikov revolt in Russia (1606–1607). Galileo constructs refracting telescope to observe the heavens (1609).

James I, king of England (1603–1625) and king of Scotland as James VI (1567–1625).

1610s

The growth of Jesuit influence over education is reflected by their 372 colleges (1615); by 1700, they will manage 769 colleges and 24 universities. In England, tobacco and alcohol are denounced; football is prohibited.

Bohemian towns revolt against the Empire (1609–1620). Religious and nationalist revolts in Russia expel Polish armies (1610–1611). Millenarian, egalitarian, and charismatic sects emerge in England. During an Estates General in France the third estate attacks the *taille* (headtax; 1614). Pope forbids Galileo to defend Copernican system (1616). Dutch Republic and Saxe-Weimar implement compulsory education (1618–1619). Beginning of Thirty Years' War (1618–1648).

Louis XIII, king of France (1610–1643).

1620s

In Spain, a book is published detailing a method of communication for individuals who are mute (1620). In the Netherlands Jan Baptista von Helmont uses magnetism to “cure” disease; he is tried by an ecclesiastic court for denying the cures are the workings of God (1621). Cardinal Richelieu becomes chief minister of king of France (1624). Publication of William Harvey's tract on the circulation of blood (1628) and successful blood transfusion. A plague kills approximately 1 million in Italy (1629–1631).

Charles I, king of England (1625–1649).

1630s

Advertising appears in Paris. Due to the availability of sugar, lemonade becomes popular in France. Tobacco sales in France are restricted to medicinal needs. Hotel Dieu Paris trains midwives.

Galileo, *Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo* (1633). Trial of Galileo before inquisition (1633). Theophraste Renaudot establishes a free medical clinic for Paris's poor (1635). King Charles I permits Englishmen to watch and participate in sports on Sundays (1636); Puritans condemn this and all festivals. Opera house is built in Venice (1637). Tulip market crashes, causing economic hardship in the Netherlands (1637). Antitax uprising in Perigord (1637–1641) establishes communes and briefly captures town of Bergerac.

1640s

Jansenism grows in opposition to Jesuits in France. Scotland bans scores of holidays.

English Civil War (1641–1649) ends in establishment of Commonwealth dominated by religious Dissenters (non-Anglicans), many of whom advocate universal suffrage, egalitarianism, and millenarianism. Neapolitans briefly remove the Spanish governor from power and rescind taxes during the Mansaniello Revolt (1647). Treaty of Westphalia ends Thirty Years' War (1648); Germany's population has fallen by one-third due to the war, famine, plague, and emigration; nobles appropriate "deserted" lands. Shabbetai Tzevi proclaims himself the Jewish Messiah (1648), gaining adherents throughout Europe. Fronde of the Parlement opposes royal government in France (1648–1649). Cossacks and Tartars revolt against Poland transferring the Ukraine to Russia (1648–1656). Russia places new restrictions on movement of serfs (1649). Execution of King Charles I of England (1649).

Louis XIV, king of France (1643–1715).

1650s

Commonwealth in England. Jews are allowed to immigrate to England. London's first coffeehouse opens; by 1700, 3,000 coffeehouses will have been established there. In England, introduction of postage stamps places the burden of paying on the sender; the penny post leads to stagecoaches and public intercity travel; hackney coaches, an early form of public transportation, had been introduced in the 1620s.

Second Fronde in France (1650–1653). A court in Cambridge punishes two preachers because they are women (1653). Picture book for children is published in Nürnberg (1654). James Harrington, *Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656).

Oliver Cromwell, lord protector of England (1653–1658).

1660s

France reduces festival days from fifty-five to twenty-one. Jean-Baptiste Colbert attempts to control arts, crafts, and industry in France. Cities throughout Europe in this period increase in size because of emigration from the countryside; urban mortality rates remain higher than urban birthrates.

Restoration of English monarchy with restrictions (1660). Amsterdam has sixty sugar refineries (1661). Omnibus service (*carosse à cinq sols*) estab-

lished in Paris (1662). Two-thirds of Englishmen migrate from their home parishes; many to London where the plague of 1665 and the Great Fire of 1666 kill tens of thousands. Salamanca University's student enrollment falls from 7,800 to 2,076 in 1700. Shabbetai Tzevi lands in Constantinople, converts to Islam (1666).

Charles II, king of England and Scotland (1660–1685).

1670s

Plagues in central Europe kill hundreds of thousands. Minute hands appear on watches. Peasant revolts occur in Bordeaux and Brittany over taxes and food shortages. Salons and participation by women in intellectual pursuits increasing among the upper classes in France.

Stenka Razin leads Cossacks and peasants in a rebellion along the Don and Volga Rivers in Russia (1670–1671). Craftsmen and factory workers in Amsterdam, Haarlem, and Leiden go on strike (1672). A fashion magazine appears in Paris (1672). François Poullain de La Barre in *De l'egalite des sexes* advocates equality for women, particularly in education (1673). Antoni van Leeuwenhoek develops microscope (1674). Laborers in England riot against modern looms (1675). Leeuwenhoek observes spermatozoa (1677).

1680s

Street lighting is introduced in London. The pressure cooker is invented in London, leading to better food preservation.

French court settles in Versailles (1682). Turks besiege Vienna and are repulsed (1683); Austrians begin advance against Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Peasants in England revolt against a new tax on gin, forcing the government to withdraw the tax; 537,000 gallons of gin are distilled (1684). In France, Louis XIV revokes the Edict of Nantes (1685); French and Savoyan Huguenots, Jews, and Waldensians are expelled or forcibly converted. Tottenham High Cross girls' school near London reforms its curriculum to include natural sciences, astronomy, and geography (1687). Isaac Newton, *Principia mathematica* (1687). Last execution of a religious heretic in Poland (1689). Act of Toleration in England (1689).

Peter I (the Great), emperor of Russia (1682–1725). James II, king of England and Scotland (1685–1688). William III (1689–1702) and Mary II (1689–1694), king and queen of England, Scotland, and Ireland.

1690s

English societies to improve manners, combat drunkenness, and fight immorality are established. Press censorship largely ends in England. Sweden and France follow (1766, 1796). Brandenburg, Anhalt-Dessau, and Russia require men to enter military service. Peter the Great imposes a tax on beards to raise money and requires that European fashions be worn.

A stream-driven pump is devised in France (1690). Bank of England established (1694). Scotland and France institute universal compulsory education for boys and girls (1696 and 1698). English manufactured goods exports rise from a value of 3,873,000 pounds (1699–1701) to 8,487,000 pounds (1772–1774). Over 100 fairy tales are published in France between 1690 and 1710.

1700s

English, Portuguese, French, and others ship approximately 6 million African slaves to the Americas during the eighteenth century. European grain production doubles or triples between 1700 and 1900. Aristocratic birthrates begin to fall. Physicians begin assisting normal births, replacing midwives. City of Berlin taxes unmarried women. In France, the average marrying age for women rises from 22 to 26.5 years by 1789. Denmark abolishes serfdom. Russia extends serfdom to industrial work; peasants revolt. Convicts are sent to Siberia. Mass opposition in France temporarily forces the government to withdraw plans for new taxes.

Peter the Great founds St. Petersburg, Russia (1703); 40,000 men are compelled to drain St. Petersburg's bogs. Epidemics kill approximately 1 million people in central Europe (1709–1711).

Frederick I, first king of Prussia (1701–1713). Anne, queen of Great Britain and Ireland (1702–1714).

1710s

Britain's periodical circulation reaches 44,000 per week.

English textile workers strike against looms (1710). A steam engine pumps water out of mines near Wolverhampton, England (1712). Executions for witchcraft end in England, Prussia, France, and Scotland (1712–1722). Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees* (1714). Lady Montagu inoculates her son against smallpox while in the Ottoman Empire (1717);

the practice spreads slowly in Europe. Prussia mandates school attendance (1717) and frees serfs on crown lands (1718).

George I, king of Great Britain and Ireland (1714–1727). Louis XV, king of France (1715–1774).

1720s

In England, approximately 25 percent of women are literate. Expansion of Freemasonry in Great Britain and Europe. The average Englishman consumes one ounce of tea per month (by the 1820s this figure is one ounce of tea per week). Consumption of sugar doubles in England between the 1720s and the 1820s; between 1700 and 1787 European sugar imports rise from 57,000 tons to 286,000 tons. Enclosure laws affect approximately 50 percent of agricultural lands in England; peasants and yeomen resist enclosure.

French authorities capture Cartouche and his 500 highwaymen (1721). Women lead a revolt against bakers in Paris (1725). *Gay's Fables* (1726) is a popular book for English children. Quakers advocate the abolition of slavery (1727).

George II, king of Great Britain and Ireland (1727–1760).

1730s

Brown rats spread throughout Europe, reducing the incidence of plagues; the house cat is an increasingly valued pet. Pet ownership in general is popular among the middle class. Russian peasants are responsible for the soul tax, recruiting levies, and *corvées* (required labor). French peasants lose one-third of their income in taxes and *banalités* (required labor) and must spend twelve to fifteen days a year repairing roads. Two centuries after English replaced Latin in religious ceremonies of the Church of England, English replaces Latin in court proceedings.

France prohibits barbers from performing surgery, setting a trend toward professionalization (1731). A woman earns a degree at the University of Bologna (1732). Invention of flying shuttle (1733), part of growth of technological changes that lead to accelerated domestic production in Britain. England's Parliament imposes high duties to discourage gin consumption (1736). John Wesley begins open-field preaching (1739).

Anna Ivanovna, empress of Russia (1730–1740).

1740s

Anti-Semitic pogroms occur in Russia. In Prussia, freedom of worship and the press is granted. Expansion of factories in England, requiring twelve to fourteen hours of work per day, six days a week and beginning the separation of work from home life. Cotton factories are built in Birmingham and Wolverhampton, and an iron rolling mill opens (1740s–1755).

First conference of Methodists (1744). In London, a clinic opens for treating sexually transmitted diseases (1747).

Frederick II (the Great), king of Prussia (1740–1786). Maria Theresa, Holy Roman Empress (1740–1780). Elizabeth Petrovna, empress of Russia (1741–1762).

1750s

Mortality rates fall rapidly leading to a doubling or tripling of populations of Russia, England, and Spain over the next century.

Voltaire in Prussia (1750–1753). Portugal restrains the activities of its Inquisition (1751). Jews are legally permitted to naturalize in Britain after 1753. University of Moscow founded (1755). Seven Years' War (1756–1763). A chocolate factory opens in Germany (1756). High rates of poverty and illegitimacy are reflected by the 15,000 children abandoned to the London Hospital (1756–60). A woman earns a degree at the University of Halle (1754). Portugal expels Jesuits (1759).

1760s

Freedom of the press granted in Sweden.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Émile* (1762) advocates children be taught "naturally." Rousseau's *Du contrat social* (1762). A woman becomes editor of the *Reading Mercury* (1762). Paris prohibits smallpox vaccinations (1763). Norwegians revolt against Danish taxation (1765). France expels Jesuits (1764). Cesare Beccaria, *Dei delitti et delle pene* (1764) espouses penal reform. Residents of Saragossa (Spain) revolt and sack their city (1766). Vienna's Prater Park is opened to all citizens (1766). Spain expels Jesuits (1769). Day care is provided in Alsace (1769).

George III, king of Great Britain and Ireland (1760–1820). Catherine II (the Great), empress of Russia (1762–1796). Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor (1765–1790).

1770s

Major plague in eastern Europe.

Pope Clement XIV suppresses Society of Jesus (1773); the closing of Jesuit schools disrupts education across Europe. Pugachev's Russian peasant revolt nearly succeeds (1773–1775). The industrial revolution advances in England where a spinning mill is built, a national hatters union forms, a court rules that slavery in the homeland is illegal, and Lancashire laborers destroy factories (1779). 18,000 spectators attend a English cricket match (1772). Savoy abolishes serfdom (1771); France abolishes provincial parliaments (1771). Price riots and "the Flour Wars" occur in Rouen, Reims, Dijon, Versailles, Paris, and Pontoise. Johann Pestalozzi founds an orphan school in Zurich advancing Rousseauian educational reforms and the kindergarten concept (1774). There are 77 hospital beds for Brussels' 70,000 inhabitants (1776). F. A. Mesmer expelled from Paris (1778).

Louis XVI, king of France (1775–1792).

1780s

In France, 40,000 children are abandoned every year of this decade. After Britain's loss of thirteen North American colonies, Parliament begins to enact political reforms, a process that ends because of the French Revolution.

Last execution of a witch occurs in Switzerland (1782). Revolt by disenfranchised Genevans briefly creates a representative government (1782). Thirteen British colonies in North America become independent as "United States" (1783). A school for the blind is established in Paris (1784). An English court rules that foxhunting cannot constitute trespass (1786). United States adopts constitution (1787–1788). Edict of Toleration for Protestants in France (1787). Britain begins transporting convicts to Australia (1788). Jeremy Bentham, *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789).

French Revolution begins as Louis XVI convokes Estates General; oath of the Tennis Court; fall of the Bastille; National Assembly abolishes feudal institutions; Great Fear in countryside (1789).

1790s

Continuation of French Revolution: republic established (1792); King Louis XVI executed (1793); Reign of Terror (1793–1794). Half of France's agricultural lands become peasant owned. Economic confusion and famine result in food riots; armed re-

sistance to Revolution in the Vendée. French Revolutionary wars (1792–1802).

France grants liberty to Protestants and Jews (1790). France legalizes divorce (1792). Denmark abolishes slave trade (1792). France abolishes slave trade and slavery (1794). Freedom of the press granted in France (1796). Illegitimacy rates reach 15 to 20 percent in western Europe partly as a result of urbanization. Combination Acts (1799, 1800) in Britain curb the ability of labor to organize. Paris Zoo opens (1793). Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humaine* (1795). Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798).

Francis II, last Holy Roman Emperor (1795–1806), and, as Francis II, first emperor of Austria (1804–1835).

1800s

360 cities have over 10,000 inhabitants. Accurate censuses reveal the populations (in millions) of Britain and Ireland, 15.6; France, 28; Germany, 27; Italy, 17–18. Population of London is 864,000; population of Paris is 547,756. Europe's annual population growth rate will be 7.6 percent during the nineteenth century.

In France, domination of Napoleon (to 1815). Concordat between France and the papacy restores Catholic Church (1802). Napoleonic Code codifies French civil law (1804). Napoleonic Wars (1802–1815). Spain's Latin American colonies take advantage of the situation and stage successful wars of independence (to 1820s)

Robert Owen creates a utopian factory town in New Lanark, Scotland (1800). Philippe Pinel, *Traité sur l'aliénation mentale ou la manie* (1801). Serbs revolt against the Ottoman Empire (1804–1813). Emancipation of serfs in Prussia (1807). Britain abolishes slave trade (1808).

Alexander I, emperor of Russia (1801–1825).

1810s

Continuation of Napoleonic Wars (to 1815). Restoration and reaction throughout Europe following defeat of Napoleon. Scottish mill workers are 69 percent female; 46 percent are under age eighteen. Transportation improvements include the rapid spread of macadamized roads, public omnibuses, steamship service (1819–1840s).

Canneries are built in London and Paris (1810 and 1811). Luddites destroy machines in Nottingham and Yorkshire (1811). Regency Act in Great Britain (1811). Friederich Ludwigh John establishes a gym-

nastic society in Berlin (1811). Prussia emancipates Jews (1812). One-fifth of Tuscans and one-third of Florentines require public assistance (1812); 35 percent of poor families here are headed by a single mother; *monte di pieta* (loan office and pawnshop) provides hundreds of thousands of small loans. First European steamship, Henry Bell's *Comet* (1812). Labor strikes in England (1818–1819) culminate in the Peterloo Massacre at Manchester; reforms improving conditions and establishing a twelve-hour workday are passed by Parliament. First crossing of Atlantic Ocean by a steamship, *Savannah* (1819).

1820s

Revolution in Spain reinstates the mostly liberal 1812 constitution, though it prohibits freedom of worship. Francis Place educates Britain's laboring classes about contraceptives.

200,000 Greeks die seeking independence from the Ottoman Empire (1821–1829). Britain's Parliament passes liberal reform legislation, including laws criminalizing the abuse of domestic animals, allowing labor to organize, and permitting Catholics to hold public office (1822–1828). First steam-powered passenger railway, the Stockton-Darlington Railway, in England (1825). Anthelme Brillat-Savarin, *La physiologie du goût* (1825). F. W. A. Froebel, *The Education of Man* (1826). Peasant revolts begin in Russia (1826); sporadic revolts to 1860s. Saint-Simon, *L'exposition de la doctrine de Saint-Simon* (1828–1830). Improvement of London's public safety is reflected by purification of water supply and the consolidation of its police forces (1829).

Nicholas I, emperor of Russia (1825–1855).

1830s

52,000,000 Europeans emigrate from the Old World between 1830 and 1920. Birmingham's death rate rises from 14.6 to 27.2 per thousand (1831–1844) reflecting squalid urban conditions.

German pig iron production increases 10,000 percent between 1835–1839 and 1910–1913. Revolutions in Switzerland, France, Belgium, Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, and Saxony. In Modena, Parma, Bologna, Ancona (Italy), and Poland, revolutions fail, but establish nationalism as a force.

Auguste Comte, *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830). Britain expands suffrage (though not to the working class or women) and weakens expensive poor laws (1832–1834). First railway on the Continent, between Budweis, Bohemia, and Linz, Austria (1832).

England requires birth registration (1837). Chartist movement in Britain (1838–1848), partly in protest against weakening of poor laws. The juvenile workday is restricted to ten hours in Prussia (1839). Britain abolishes slavery (1833).

Victoria, queen of the United Kingdom (1837–1901).

1840s

Across Europe, 3 to 5 percent of children attend secondary schools. 200,000 laborers are employed operating Britain's railroads. Manorialism abolished throughout central Europe.

Royal botanical gardens (Kew Gardens) near London opened to the public (1841). Edwin Chadwick's *Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain* (1842). Silesian weavers revolt against modern machinery (1844); Silesian peasants must work 177 days a year to fulfill feudal obligations. The alarm clock is invented in France (1847). Great famine in Ireland (1847–1854); Ireland's population falls from 8,175,000 in 1841 to 5,100,000 by 1881; famines throughout Europe produce hundreds of food riots. Austria-Hungary emancipates serfs (1848). 21,000 Norwegians join the Thrane labor movement (1848–1852).

Revolutions of 1848; liberal-nationalist revolutions throughout Europe are briefly successful in Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, and Austria-Hungary; suppressed in Spain, Britain, and Russia. Marx and Engels, *Communist Manifesto* (1848).

Francis Joseph I, emperor of Austria (1848–1916).

1850s

France institutes an old-age pension system (1850). Henry Charles Harrod buys a grocery store in London and begins selling consumer goods (1850). London hosts the Great Exhibition, leading to future world fairs and international trade fairs (1851). Peasants in southern France revolt (1851). Napoleon III establishes second French Empire (1851). Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau, *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (1854–1855). Britain permits civil divorces without the restriction of requiring parliamentary approval (1857). Jews are permitted to become members of Britain's Parliament (1858). Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Lourdes, France, give rise to major Catholic pilgrimage site (1858). Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (1859).

Alexander I, emperor of Russia (1855–1881).

1860s

Daily weather forecasts, a subway line, an association of football clubs, and a stoplight appear in London while debtors' prisons are abolished. In Paris, a bicycle factory opens and bicycle races are staged. Newly established department stores in England and France suggest that consumerism continues to grow.

Russia emancipates serfs (1861). Jean-Martin Charcot begins his association with Salpêtrière hospital, Paris (1862). Ferdinand Lassalle founds first workers' party in Germany (1863). World's first underground urban railway opens in London (1863). Romania emancipates serfs (1864). Pope Pius IX condemns liberalism, socialism, and rationalism in the *Syllabus of Errors* (1864). First International Workingmen's Association founded (1864). Switzerland's Nestlé introduces baby formula (1866). First French socialist party founded (1867–1868). Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, volume 1 (1867). École Pratique des Hautes Études founded in Paris (1868).

William I, king of Prussia (1861–1888).

Thorold Rogers, *History of Agriculture and Prices in England* (1866–1902).

1870s

Censuses determine the population (in millions) of Britain and Ireland, 31.5; France, 36.1; Germany, 41; Italy, 26.8. Labor unions are legalized in France.

Married Women's Property Act in Britain (1870). Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). Communes challenge the defeated French government in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille (1871). Beginning of *Kulturkampf* in Germany (1871). Germany expels Roman Catholic religious orders and mandates that marriage be a civil ceremony. Britain introduces the secret ballot for voting (1872). Public transportation carries 1.4 million passengers in Prague (1874); 50 million will use Prague's public transportation in 1910. German Socialist Labor Party founded (1875). First telephone exchange in London (1879).

William I of Prussia becomes first emperor of Germany (1871–1888).

J. R. Green, *A Short History of the English People* (1874).

1880s

Between 1881 and 1901, Italy's population increases from 29.3 to 33.4 million even as 2.2 million emi-

grate. London's population is 3.3 million; population of Paris is 1.2 million.

Pogroms (attacks on Jews) in Russia through the 1880s. France reinstates freedom of the press, permits divorce, and mandates education for girls. The telephone, vending machines, electricity, and typewriters are rapidly introduced throughout Europe.

Aletta Jacobs opens a birth control clinic in the Netherlands (1882). Second Married Women's Property Act in Britain (1882). Germany establishes a national health insurance program (1883) and is followed by Austria (1888). Fabian Society founded in Britain (1884). End of *Kulturkampf* in Germany (1887). Louis Pasteur becomes director of Institut Pasteur, Paris (1888–1895). John Dunlop manufactures first bicycles with pneumatic tires (1888). Emmeline Pankhurst founds Women's Franchise League (1889). Second International Workingmen's Association (coalition of socialist parties) founded (1889). Germany establishes compulsory old-age pension system (1889). The bra is invented in Paris, replacing corsets (1889).

Alexander III, emperor of Russia (1881–1894). William II, emperor of Germany (1888–1918).

English Historical Review founded (1886).

1890s

In Denmark, one-third of women over age 15 work outside the home; half work as servants, one-sixth work in industry, figures that are echoed throughout Europe.

Infant welfare clinics established in Barcelona (1890). Switzerland introduces a national social insurance program (1890). Leo XIII, *Rerum novarum*, encyclical on condition of workers (1893). Dreyfus affair in France (1894–1899). Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer, *Studien über Hysterie* (1895). London School of Economics founded (1895). In France, an audience pays to see a motion picture, *La sortie des ouvriers de l'usine Lumière* (Workers leaving the Lumière factory, 1895). Athens hosts the first modern Olympic games (1896); 250 athletes from fourteen nations participate. Lifebuoy soap, advertised as preventing body odor, appears in London (1897). Sigmund Freud, *Die Traumdeutung* (On the interpretation of dreams, 1899).

Nicholas II, emperor of Russia (1894–1917).

Émile Durkheim, *De la division du travail social* (1893). Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *The History of Trade Unionism* (1894). Émile Durkheim, *Les règles de la méthode sociologique* (1895). Émile Durkheim, *Le suicide* (1897). Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy* (1897).

1900s

The presence of fish and chip vendors in England is responsible for increased protein consumption among the working class.

Paris Métro begins operation (1900). Guglielmo Marconi transmits first transatlantic radio broadcast (1901). Emmeline Pankhurst founds Women's Social and Political Union (1903). First Tour de France bicycle race (1903). University of Manchester founded (1903). Strikes in the Netherlands and Milan end violently (1903, 1904). Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Peasant revolts, anti-Jewish pogroms, and riots after Russia's military defeat by Japan force the tsar to institute liberal reforms (1902–1905). France ends the official status of the Catholic Church (1904). Revolution of 1905 in Russia. France establishes voluntary unemployment insurance (1905). Finland grants women's suffrage (1906). Young Turk revolt in Turkey (1908). Sigmund Freud and others found Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society (1908).

Edward VII, king of the United Kingdom (1901–1910).

Revue de synthèse historique founded (1900). Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (1905–1906). Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *English Local Government* (1906–1909).

1910s

Sigmund Freud, *Über Psychoanalyse* (1910). Britain establishes national health insurance, unemployment insurance, and old-age insurance programs (1911). Italy (1912) and Norway (1913) grant women's suffrage. Balkan Wars (1912–1913). University of Frankfurt founded (1914).

World War I (1914–1918), with heavy casualties and civilian deaths from military operations, famine, influenza, and revolutions. After military reverses, Russia plunges into revolution and civil war (1917–1921). Breakup of German, Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian empires; independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.

Germany establishes eight-hour workday (1918). Membership of the Confederazione Italiano del Lavoro grows from 250,000 to 2,200,000 (1918–1920). Women gain the right to practice law in Portugal, England, Italy, and Germany (1918–1920). Third International founded (1919).

John and Barbara Hammond, *The Village Laborer* (1911). Émile Durkheim, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912). Lucien Febvre, *Philippe II et la Franche-Comté* (1912). R. H. Tawney, *The Agrar-*

ian Problem in the Sixteenth Century (1912). G. D. H. Cole, *The World of Labour* (1913). John and Barbara Hammond, *The Town Laborer* (1917). Alice Clark, *The Working Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century* (1919). John and Barbara Hammond, *The Skilled Laborer* (1919).

1920s

Radio stations established throughout Europe.

Establishment of Irish Free State (1922). Great Britain and Austria institute unemployment insurance (1920). France's anti-abortion law carries the death penalty (1920). 3,747 divorces are granted in Great Britain (1920); 39,000 in Germany (1921). 173,000 German children are born out of wedlock; in France, 65,000; in Italy, 49,000 (1921). German trade union membership is 9,193,000; British trade union membership is 4,369,000 (1923). Eight million man-days are lost in Britain due to strikes (1924).

Fascists come to power in Italy (1922). Italy revokes right to strike and women's suffrage, and criminalizes abortion (1925–1930). France establishes compulsory old-age and sickness insurance programs (1925). Collectivization of Soviet agriculture, which results in massive famines (1928–1932).

R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society* (1921). Marc Bloch, *Les rois thaumaturges* (1924). Georges Lefebvre, *Les paysans du Nord* (1924). G. D. H. Cole, *Short History of the British Working-Class Movement* (1925–1927). Economic History Society founded in Britain (1926). Dorothy George, *London Life in the Eighteenth Century* (1926); R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926). *Economic History Review* founded (1927). Lucien Febvre, *Martin Luther* (1928). Bloch and Febvre found *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* (1929).

1930s

Worldwide economic depression leads to massive unemployment; 5,660,000 in Germany (1931), 2,800,000 in Great Britain (1932). Economic conditions, anti-Semitism, and a reaction against modernist decadence elevate the Nazis to power in Germany (1933); they persecute Jews, suppress labor unions, and protect the environment. Nazis institute Nuremberg Laws in Germany (1935). Regular television broadcasts in Germany (1935). British Broadcasting Corporation begins television service (1936). Fascists assume power in Eastern Europe and in Spain, the latter after a three year civil war (1936–1939). France nationalizes arms factories (1937) beginning a nationalization trend that

will continue in Western Europe after World War II. Germany's economic recovery is reflected by its 350 movie theaters and 12,000 periodicals (1938). In the Soviet Union, Stalin's reign of terror results in millions executed or internally exiled and enslaved. Beginning of World War II (1939).

Ivy Pinchbeck, *Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution* (1930). Marc Bloch, *Les caractères originaux de l'histoire rurale française* (1931). R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (1931). Georges Lefebvre, *La grande peur* (1932). Hans Rosenberg, *Die Weltwirtschaftskrisis von 1857–1859* (1934). G. D. H. Cole and Raymond Postgate, *The Common People* (1938). A. L. Morton, *A People's History of England* (1938). Marc Bloch, *La société féodale* (1939–1940). Norbert Elias, *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation* (1939).

1940s

World War II (1939–1945). Nazis kill over 7,000,000, mostly Jews and Gypsies, in concentration camps (1941–1945).

Population (in millions) Britain, 46; France, 40; Germany, 66; Italy, 47 (1946). United States' Marshall Plan bolsters the economies of European countries in response to increased Soviet influence over Eastern Europe; where the "Iron Curtain" falls (1945–1949). Decolonization begins as Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands cede independence to Asian states (1946–1948). The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg form a customs union, "Benelux" (1948). Britain establishes National Health Service (1948).

Lucien Febvre, *Le problème de l'incroyance au XVIe siècle* (1942). G. M. Trevelyan, *English Social History* (1944). Marc Bloch shot by Germans (1944). Sixième Section of École des Hautes Études founded in Paris (1945). *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* changes name to *Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations* (1946). British Communist Party Historians' Group founded (1946). Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (1949). Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (1946).

1950s

European Coal and Steel Community is established by Germany, Italy, France, and Benelux (1951) as a limited trade union; it grows in terms of commodities covered and participating nations until it becomes the European Union. Strikes in Poland and Hungary against Stalinism result in suppression by the Soviet Union; Soviet Union invades Hungary (1956). De-

colonization continues: between 1956 and 1964, most of European colonies in Africa become independent; 9,000,000 immigrate from the colonies to European nations between 1958 and 1974) creating large minority populations in France, Great Britain, and Italy.

Past and Present founded (1952). G. D. H. Cole, *History of Socialist Thought* (1953–1960). Huguette Chaunu and Pierre Chaunu, *Seville et l'Atlantique* (1955–1959). George Ewart Evans, *Ask the Fellows That Cut the Hay* (1956). Dona Torr, *Tom Mann and His Times* (1956). Arbeitskreis für moderne Sozialgeschichte founded at Heidelberg, Germany (1957). John Saville, *Rural Depopulation in England and Wales* (1957). Henri-Jean Martin, *L'apparition du livre* (1958). Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy* (1958). Albert Soboul, *Les sans-culottes parisiens de l'An II* (1958). Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society* (1958). Asa Briggs, *Chartist Studies* (1959). Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels* (1959). George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (1959).

1960s

Foreign immigration continues, particularly in Germany where large numbers of Turks are invited to immigrate in order to fill vacant low-wage jobs. Televisions and automobiles become popular consumer goods and by 1970 Western Europeans will have 200 of each per thousand people. Legal restrictions on homosexuality ease.

Belgian doctors strike against a national health insurance law (1964). Popular protests in Czechoslovakia voice displeasure with neo-Stalinism; Soviet Union crushes the "Prague Spring" (1968). In France massive demonstrations by students and workers (1968). France permits contraception (1968).

Philippe Ariès, *L'enfant et la vie familiale sous l'ancien régime* (1960). Rudolf Braun, *Industrialisierung und Volksleben* (1960). Asa Briggs, *Essays in Labour History* (1960). Pierre Goubert, *Beauvais et le Beauvaisis* (1960). Michel Foucault, *Folie et déraison* (1961). Robert Mandrou, *Introduction à la France moderne* (1961). Raymond Williams, *The Long Revolution* (1961). Richard Cobb, *Les armées révolutionnaires* (1962). Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution* (1962). Asa Briggs, *Victorian Cities* (1963). E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963). Eric Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men* (1964). George Rudé, *The Crowd in History* (1964). Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (1964). Rudolf Braun, *Sozialer und kultureller Wandel in einem industriellen Landesgebiet* (1965). Richard Cobb, *Terreur et subsistances* (1965). François Furet, ed., *Livre et société dans la France du*

18e siècle (1965–1970). Peter Laslett, *The World We Have Lost* (1965). Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition* (1965). Center for the Study of Social History founded at University of Warwick (1965). Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses* (1966). Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Les paysans de Languedoc* (1966). Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *L'histoire du climat depuis l'an 1000* (1967). Hans Rosenberg, *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit* (1967). Michel Foucault, *L'archéologie du savoir* (1969). Eric Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire* (1968). Richard Cobb, *A Second Identity* (1969). Norbert Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft* (1969). Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (1969). Harold Perkin, *The Origins of Modern English Society* (1969). Hans Rosenberg, *Probleme der Sozialgeschichte* (1969).

1970s

Soviet Union's rapid economic growth ends and a decline begins. Economic malaise prompts the European community to continue its expansion adding Britain, Ireland, and Greece; it begins negotiations with Spain and Portugal.

Switzerland grants women's suffrage (1971). Britain is paralyzed by postal and coal strikes (1971, 1972). Arab oil embargo forces drastic energy conservation measures throughout Europe (1973). End of fascist regime Portugal (1974–1975). End of Franco regime in Spain (1975). Both countries grant women's suffrage and disengage from their African colonies (1975–1976). France legalizes abortion (1975). In Italy, women gain the right to sue for paternity (1975). Italy legalizes abortion (1977). Spain permits contraception (1978).

Maurice Agulhon, *The Republic in the Village* (1970). Richard Cobb, *Police and the People* (1970). First National Women's Liberation Conference in Britain (1970). Gareth Stedman Jones, *Outcast London* (1971). Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (1971). Richard Cobb, *Reactions to the French Revolution* (1972). *Dictionary of Labour Biography* (1972–). Sheila Rowbotham, *Women, Resistance, and Revolution* (1972). H. J. Dyos and Michael Wolff, eds., *The Victorian City* (1973). Sheila Rowbotham, *Hidden from History and Women's Consciousness, Man's World* (1973). Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism and Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974). Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (1974). Richard Cobb, *Paris and Its Provinces* (1975). Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir* (1975). Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital* (1975). Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou* (1975). E. P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters* (1975). Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation*

of the National States in Western Europe (1975). Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité* (1976–1984). Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (1976). Jacques LeGoff, *Pour un autre moyen age* (1977). Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England* (1977). Louise Tilly and Joan W. Scott, *Women, Work, and Family* (1978). Fernand Braudel, *Capitalisme et civilisation* (1979). Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Le carnaval de Romans* (1979).

1980s

Frustration with established parties grows in Western Europe. Massive antinuclear demonstrations and environmental concerns give rise to Green (environmental) parties while concerns over immigration and unemployment give rise to right-wing parties. Right-wing extremism is intertwined with skinheads, young, disaffected men, many of whom participate in football rowdiness and violent attacks on foreigners and individuals with disabilities. Solidarity labor union challenges the Polish communist government.

Spain permits abortion (1985). Glasnost and perestroika reforms liberalize Soviet communist regime (1985–1991). Soviet control in Eastern Europe slackens and communists are forced out of power in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and East Germany (1989–1991).

Jacques LeGoff, *La naissance du Purgatoire* (1981). Lawrence Stone, *The Past and the Present* (1981). E. A.


Wrigley and Roger S. Schofield, *The Population History of England and Wales, 1541–1871* (1981). Gareth Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class* (1983). Keith Thomas, *Man and the Natural World* (1983). Michel Vovelle, *Idéologies et mentalités* (1982). Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis” (1986). Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire* (1987).

1990s

Estimated population (in millions) of Britain, 58.6; France, 58; Germany, 84; Italy, 57.5.

Eastern Europe struggles to overcome the legacy of communism; after years of declining growth, economies slowly improve though Russia’s remains stagnant, partly due to corruption and organized crime. Some eastern European nations join the European Union. In western Europe, the spread of personal computers and the Internet revolutionizes consumerism, tourism, and other economic sectors. The economy experiences a long expansion though unemployment rates remain stubbornly high. European nations participate in international conflicts including wars in the former Yugoslavia. Biotechnology promises to extend human life spans and the quality of life. Europeans demonstrate against genetically altered foods.

EuroDisney amusement park opens near Paris (1992). Mad-cow disease ravages British herds (1995–1998). European Union adopts common currency (euro) and abolishes customs barriers (1999).



Europe, Physical Features

500 MILES



Europe in 1490







COMMON ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK



A.D.	<i>Anno Domini</i> , in the year of the Lord	i.e.	<i>id est</i> , that is
AESC	<i>Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations</i>	IMF	International Monetary Fund
ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic	MS.	manuscript (pl. MSS.)
b.	born	n.	note
B.C.	before Christ	n.d.	no date
B.C.E.	before the common era (= B.C.)	no.	number (pl., nos.)
c.	<i>circa</i> , about, approximately	n.p.	no place
C.E.	common era (= A.D.)	n.s.	new series
cf.	<i>confer</i> , compare	N.S.	new style, according to the Gregorian calendar
chap.	chapter	OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
CP	Communist Party	O.S.	old style, according to the Julian calendar
d.	died	p.	page (pl., pp.)
diss.	dissertation	pt.	part
ed.	editor (pl., eds.), edition	rev.	revised
e.g.	<i>exempli gratia</i> , for example	S.	<i>san, sanctus, santo</i> , male saint
et al.	<i>et alii</i> , and others	ser.	series
etc.	<i>et cetera</i> , and so forth	SP	Socialist Party
EU	European Union	SS.	saints
f.	and following (pl., ff.)	SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
fl.	<i>floruit</i> , flourished	Sta.	<i>sancta, santa</i> , female saint
GDP	gross domestic product	supp.	supplement
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)	USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
GNP	gross national product	vol.	volume
HRE	Holy Roman Empire, Holy Roman Emperor	WTO	World Trade Organization
ibid.	<i>ibidem</i> , in the same place (as the one immediately preceding)	?	uncertain, possibly, perhaps

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
EUROPEAN SOCIAL HISTORY



Section 1



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THE GENERATIONS OF SOCIAL HISTORY



Geoff Eley

As a recognized specialism, social history is still young—dating in most countries only from the 1960s. Of course, as a dimension of historical writing, social history has always been there. The classics of historiography may all be read for their social content. During the later nineteenth century, most European countries produced some indications of what “social history” might be in universities, by private individuals, and in alternative institutional settings like labor movements, where socialist parties quickly developed an interest in the archives of their own emergence. Specifically social histories were rarely produced inside the newly established academic discipline of history as such. The dominance of nationalist paradigms meant that statecraft and diplomacy, wars, armies, empire, high politics, biography, administration, law, and other state-focused themes occupied the agenda of teaching and scholarship to the virtual exclusion of anything else.

GERMANY AND BRITAIN: SOCIAL HISTORY OUTSIDE THE HISTORICAL PROFESSION

In Germany the new national state of 1871 wholly ruled the professional historian’s imagination. Bismarck’s role as the architect of German unification and the related processes of state-building inspired histories organized around statecraft, military history, and constitutional law, first under Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) and his contemporary Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884), and then under Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896). Other contemporaries, such as Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897), had no presence in this official Imperial German context. Karl Lamprecht (1856–1915) opened his work toward the social sciences, psychology, art history, and the study of culture, precipitating the *Methodenstreit* (conflict over methodology) in 1891, but without shifting the protocols of the discipline. Likewise, leading economists of the historical

school such as Gustav von Schmoller (1838–1917), or sociologists like Max Weber (1864–1920), produced historical work of enormous importance, but again from outside the historical profession per se.

A similar narrative applied to Britain, where a liberal cohort—Henry Thomas Buckle (1821–1862), James Bryce (1838–1922), Edward Augustus Freeman (1823–1892), John Robert Seeley (1834–1895), and others—celebrated the English political tradition, reinforced by Lord Acton (1834–1902), who founded the *English Historical Review* (1886) and conceived the *Cambridge Modern History*. Otherwise, pre-1914 British historiography’s achievements were in the medieval and Tudor-Stuart periods, in religious history, landholding, and law. Bryce set the tone when inaugurating the *English Historical Review*: “It seems better to regard history as the record of human action. . . . States and Politics will therefore be the chief parts of its subject, because the acts of nations . . . have usually been more important than the acts of private citizens.” Seeley concurred: “History is not concerned with individuals except in their capacity as members of a state” (quoted in Wilson, “Critical Portrait,” pp. 11, 9).

After 1918 openings occurred toward social history in Britain and Germany, partly with the founding of new universities less hidebound with tradition, such as the London School of Economics (1895), Manchester (1903), and Frankfurt (1914), partly as academic history consolidated itself as a discipline. In Britain the specialism of economic history helped, generating large empirical funds for later social historians to use, managed analytically by the grand narratives of the industrial revolution and the rise of national economies. The founding of the Economic History Society (1926) and its *Economic History Review* (1927) encouraged the practical equivalent of the German historical school of economists before 1914. R. H. Tawney (1880–1962) laid the foundations of early modern social history in a series of works—*The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century* (1912), *Tudor Economic Documents* (edited with Eileen Power; 1924), *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926),

Business and Politics under James I (1958), and his famous monographic article, “The Rise of the Gentry” (1941). “Tawney’s century” (1540–1640) was constructed with comparative knowledge and theoretical vision. *Land and Labour in China* (1932) was another of his works. In this broader framing of social and economic processes, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* was the analogue to Max Weber’s *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904–1905).

The main early impulse toward social history was a left-wing interest in the social consequences of industrialization. Like Weber, Tawney was politically engaged. A Christian Socialist, Labour Party parliamentary candidate, advocate of the Workers’ Educational Association, and public intellectual (especially via *The Acquisitive Society* [1921] and *Equality* [1931]), he practiced ethical commitment in his scholarly no less than in his political work. Sometimes such work occurred inside the universities, notably at the London School of Economics under Beatrice (1858–1943) and Sidney Webb (1859–1947), and political theorist Harold Laski (1893–1950), as well as Tawney. It reflected high-minded identification with what the Webbs called the “inevitability of gradualness”—the electoral rise of the Labour Party, but still more the triumph of an administrative ideal of rational taxation, social provision, and public goods. The Webbs’ great works—the nine-volume history, *English Local Government from the Revolution to the Municipal Corporations Act* (1906–1929), plus *The History of Trade Unionism* (1894) and *Industrial Democracy* (1897)—adumbrated the terrain of a fully professionalized social history in the 1950s and 1960s.

The Webbs were linked to the Labour Party through the Fabian Society’s networks, peaking in the LSE’s contribution to public policy, social administration, and the post-1945 architecture of the welfare state. Equally salient for social history’s genealogies was the Guild Socialist G. D. H. Cole (1889–1959), teaching at Oxford from the 1920s, in the Chair of Social and Political Theory from 1945. The radical liberal journalists and writers John (1872–1949) and Barbara Hammond (1873–1961), also should be mentioned. Their trilogy, *The Village Labourer, 1760–1832* (1911), *The Town Labourer, 1760–1832* (1917), and *The Skilled Labourer, 1760–1832* (1919), presented an epic account of the human costs of industrialization beyond the administrative vision of the Webbs. Their precursor was the radical Liberal parliamentarian and economic historian J. E. T. Rogers (1823–1890), who countered the dominant constitutional history of his day with the seven-volume *History of Agriculture and Prices in England* (1866–1902), which—like much pioneering economic history from



GEORGE DOUGLAS HOWARD COLE
(1889–1959)

G. D. H. Cole taught successively philosophy, economics, and social and political theory at the University of Oxford, and emerged between his first book, *The World of Labour; A Discussion of the Present and Future of Trade Unionism* (1913), and the 1920s as a leading British socialist intellectual. His ideas of Guild Socialism were shaped by the labor unrest of 1910–1914 and World War I, and informed his many histories of socialism, trade unionism, and industrial democracy, extending from *A Short History of the British Working Class Movement 1789–1925* (originally three volumes, 1925–1927), to the multivolume *History of Socialist Thought* (1953–1960). His co-authored *The Common People, 1746–1938* (1938) with Raymond Postgate remained the best general account of British social history “from below” in the 1960s. *Essays in Labour History, 1886–1923* (1960), edited by Asa Briggs and John Saville, which brought together Britain’s best practitioners of the field of the time, was a memorial to Cole.

Marx to Tawney—assembled rich materials for the social history of the laboring poor.

A true pioneer for such work was Rogers’s younger Oxford contemporary, John Richard Green (1837–1883), who left the Anglican clergy to become a historian in 1869. Eschewing the classical liberal celebration of a limited English constitutionalism, soon to be translated onto imperial ground by J. R. Seeley’s *Expansion of England* (1884), Green’s inspiration was a popular story of democratic self-government, realized in his *Short History of the English People* (1874). He rejected “the details of foreign wars and diplomacies, the personal adventures of kings and nobles, the pomp of courts, [and] the intrigues of favourites” in favor of the episodes of “that constitutional, intellectual, and social advance, in which we read the history of the nation itself.” The *Short History* counterposed the “English people” to the “English kings [and] English conquests,” or to “drum and trumpet” history. It established a line of popular history outside the universities, running through the Hammonds, and the Irish histories of Green’s wife Alice

Stopford Green (1847–1929), to *A People's History of England* (1938) by the Communist Arthur Leslie Morton (1903–), which drew inspiration from the antifascist campaigns for a popular front. Like Cole's work in labor history, and Tawney's in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this bridged directly to social history post-1945 in its concern with ordinary people, with the broader impact of social and economic forces like industrialization, and with its political engagement.

**THE INCLUSIVENESS OF DEMOCRACY:
THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC
POLITICAL CULTURE TO THE
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL HISTORY**

Social history began in political contexts effaced by subsequent professionalization. Women in particular disappeared from the historiographical record. One exception was Eileen Power (1889–1940), at the London School of Economics from 1921, whose works ranged from *Medieval English Nunneries c. 1275 to 1535* (1922) and *The Wool Trade in English Medieval History* (1941) to the popular *Medieval People* (1924). More typical was Alice Clark (1874–1934), who attended the LSE as a mature student, pioneered the study of women's work before the industrial revolution in *Working Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century* (1919), and then left academic life for social activism. Clark destabilized the progressivist account of industrialization by showing its narrowing effects on women's work and the household economy, in ways that "startle in their modernity" (Sutton, "Radical Liberalism," p. 36). Dorothy George's *London Life in the Eighteenth Century* (1925), Ivy Pinchbeck's *Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution, 1750–1850* (1930), and the contributions of Beatrice Webb and Barbara Hammond in their famous partnerships all retain their pioneering status. As Billie Melman shows in "Gender, History, and Memory," this reflected both women's social and educational advance and the political conflicts needed to attain it. By 1921, 91 percent of the British Historical Association were women, and 64 percent of the 204 historical works published between 1900 and 1930 by women born between 1875 and 1900 were in social and economic history. This work was linked to political activism, through Fabianism, the Labour Party, and feminist suffrage politics before 1914.

The importance of left-wing politics—identification with the common people—to early social history was even clearer in Germany. The foundations were firmer, through German sociology's pioneering



HANS ROSENBERG (1904–1988)

Hans Rosenberg's career became paradigmatic for the West German social history of the 1970s. His approach mirrored that of his contemporary Eckart Kehr—passing from the liberal history of ideas (in Rosenberg's earliest publications in the 1930s), through concern with deep structural continuities of the German past, to a model of the socioeconomic determinations of political life. His classic *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660–1815* (original German edition, 1958) was followed by influential essays on the Junkers, *Probleme der deutschen Sozialgeschichte* (1969), and a social explanation of Bismarckian politics by cycles of the economy, *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit: Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa* (1967). Each work had a long gestation, going back to an essay of the 1940s. His conception of economic conjunctures and their founding importance for politics was first explored in *Die Weltwirtschaftskrisis von 1857–1859* (1934). As he said in *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy*, his work "approaches political, institutional, and ideological changes in terms of social history, and it does not reduce social history to an appendix of economic history" (p. viii).

achievements before 1914 and in the Weimar Republic, the labor movement's institutional strengths, and the intellectual dynamism in Weimar culture. The works of Gustav Mayer (1871–1948), the Engels biographer (1934), remain classics, especially his essay "Die Trennung der proletarischen von der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Deutschland 1863–70" (1911). Mayer's career was blocked by nationalists at Berlin University in 1917. He was appointed to a position in the department of the history of democracy, socialism, and political parties under the changed conditions in 1922, and entered exile in Britain in 1933. Weimar democracy was a limited hiatus between pre-1918's exclusionary conservatism and Nazism after 1933, in which space briefly opened for alternatives to the nationalist state-focused historiography established post-1871.

One dissenting nexus surrounded Eckart Kehr (1902–1933), who died while visiting the United

States. His *Battleship Building and Party Politics in Germany 1894–1901* (1930) drew heavily on the social theory of Marx and Weber and related politics to socioeconomic structures, reinforced by a series of essays (later collected as *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy* [1965]). Kehr's associate Hans Rosenberg (1904–1988) also fled the Third Reich for the United States in 1936, eventually returning to Germany in 1970. They and others were rediscovered by West German social historians in the 1960s, and reinstated as the precursors of a long-interrupted tradition.

Just as vital in the 1920s was the flowering of German sociology, with a cohort of young exiles after 1933. Hans Speier (1905–) studied with Emil Lederer (1882–1939) and Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) in Heidelberg, worked at a Berlin publishing house, had links to the German Social Democratic Party's Labor Education department and the city's social services, and was married to a municipal pediatrician. His book on white collar workers, translated as *German White-Collar Workers and the Rise of Hitler* (1986), went unpublished until 1977. Speier taught at the New School for Social Research in New York, joined by his former teacher Lederer, whose studies of white collar workers went back to 1912. Hans Gerth (1908–1978), whose 1935 study of Enlightenment intelligentsia was eventually republished in 1976, went to the University of Wisconsin, and introduced Max Weber's works into English, while his coeditor of the famous selections *From Max Weber* (1948), C. Wright Mills, spread Speier's influence via his own classic *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (1951). Like the work of Kehr, Rosenberg, and other dissenting historians, this critical sociology was recovered by West German advocates of social science history in the 1970s. It traveled back to its country of origin via the post-1945 traditions of U.S. social science.

Until 1933 German and British historiographies developed roughly in parallel. In neither society were university history departments open to social history, with its connotations of popularization and political dissent. German conditions were better, given the extra supports for marxism and progressivism in the labor movement. But the disaster of Nazism in 1933–1945 scattered the progressive potentials into an Anglo-American diaspora, including younger generations yet to enter the profession, such as Eric Hobsbawm (1917–), Sidney Pollard (1925–), and Francis L. Carsten (1911–1998). With the conservative restoration of academic history after 1945, social history made little progress in West Germany before the 1970s. In Britain, by contrast, the foun-

dations were being assembled. The democratic patriotism of World War II then moved some historians away from the narrower state-focused work dominant in the profession.

Similar trajectories occurred elsewhere in Europe too. The potentials for social history coalesced in the initiatives of reform-minded sociologists, or in the internalist histories of labor movements, but with little imprint on academic history, where state-centered perspectives stayed supreme. This was true in central Europe (Austria, Czechoslovakia), the Low Countries, and Scandinavia, as well as Germany and Britain. Sweden, with half a century of virtually uninterrupted social democratic government from the 1930s, was a classic case. The progressivist public culture brought together converging traditions of historical work, sustaining the social history departures of the 1960s—on the one hand, the pioneering investigations of reform-driven social expertise (in demography, family policy, public health, and so on); and on the other hand, the popular institutional histories of the labor movement.

Elsewhere, the shoots were destroyed by fascism and dictatorship (Hungary 1920–1944, Italy 1922–1945, Portugal 1926–1974, Spain 1939–1975, most of eastern Europe from the mid-1920s and early 1930s), by Nazi occupation in World War II, or by Stalinization of Eastern Europe after 1948. Some national historiographies were disastrously hit. In Poland the signs were vigorous after 1918, with new universities, new chairs of history, new journals, and a general refounding of intellectual life under the republic. Beyond the older military, constitutional, and legal historiography, freshly endowed with resources under the new state, Polish historical studies saw the establishment of economic history by Jan Rutkowski (1886–1949) and Franciszek Bujak (1875–1953), new explorations in cultural history, and the first moves to specifically social history (as elsewhere, in medieval and early modern studies of landholding and religion). As such, Polish historiography showed similar potential to Germany and Britain. But Nazism obliterated these, by the most brutal wartime deprivations, destruction of libraries and archives, erasure of prewar institutional life, and the physical liquidation of the intelligentsia, including the profession of historians. After 1945 institutional supports were recreated remarkably fast by reestablishing the universities and founding research institutes, only to be compromised once again by Stalinization. This re-emphasized democracy's importance for social history in both the political changes of 1918 and the longer-run influence of labor movements and other progressive factors of intellectual life.

THE *ANNALES* PARADIGM IN FRENCH HISTORY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE MODEL

One case of social history's institutionalization inside academic history was France, where key interwar departures established unbroken lines of continuity down to the 1970s. Certain underlying conditions enabled this to happen. One was the well-known centralization of political culture, higher education, and the administrative state in France, where access to central resources, the levers of intellectual patronage and prestige, and the metropolitan matrix of knowledge production in Paris gave the academic elite far more power to set the terms of discussion than in the more dispersed intellectual cultures of Britain, Germany, and elsewhere. From early in the twentieth century, the *École Pratique des Hautes Études* (founded 1868) dominated scholarly research, and the new sixth section dealing with the social sciences after 1947 quickly overshadowed the older fourth section responsible for history and philology.

The French Revolution's place in the country's political life was inherently encouraging to social history, given popular insurrection and the presence of the masses in 1789–1793. From Albert Mathiez (1874–1932) to Georges Lefebvre (1874–1959) and Albert Soboul (1914–1982), the Revolution sustained a strong line of social-historical research lacking in Britain until Christopher Hill revived study of the English Revolution in the 1950s. Lefebvre, in *Les paysans du Nord pendant la Révolution française* (1924) and *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France* (original French edition, 1932), and Soboul, in *The Parisian Sans-Culottes and the French Revolution, 1793–4* (original French edition, 1958), produced innovative and inspiring classics of social history. Ernest Labrousse (1895–1988) pioneered the quantitative study of economic fluctuations. He situated 1789 in an economic conjuncture, for which the history of prices and wages, bad harvests, and unemployment gave the key (*La crise de l'économie française à la fin de l'Ancien Régime et au début de la Révolution* [1944]). His general model (comparing 1789, 1830, and 1848) worked upward from price movements and the structural problems of the economy, through the wider ramifications of social crisis, and finally to the mishandling of the consequences by government.

As in Britain and Germany, an early impulse to social history came from economic history or sociology, but with greater resonance among historians. For *The Great Fear*, which concerns peasant uprisings in the first phase of the French Revolution, Lefebvre read the crowd theories of Gustav Le Bon, the social theory

of Émile Durkheim, and the ideas of Maurice Halbwachs about collective memory. The influence of the economist François Simiand (1873–1935) was key. In 1903 he disparaged traditional *histoire événementielle* (history of events), and attacked the historians' three "idols of the tribe"—politics, the individual, and chronology. Simiand's essay appeared in a new journal, *Revue de synthèse historique*, founded in 1900 by the philosopher of history Henri Berr (1863–1954), which opened a dialogue with social science. Among Berr's younger supporters were Lucien Febvre (1878–1956) and Marc Bloch (1866–1944), who joined the *Revue* in 1907 and 1912 respectively.

Febvre's dissertation, *Philippe II et la Franche-Comté* (1912), was palpably indifferent to military and diplomatic events. He located Philip II's policies in the geography, social structure, religious life, and social changes of the region, stressing conflicts between absolutism and provincial privileges, nobles and bourgeois, Catholics and Protestants. He inverted the usual precedence, which viewed great events from the perspective of rulers and treated regional histories as effects. Region became the indispensable structural context, for which geography, economics, and demography were all required. Appointed to Strasbourg University in 1920, Febvre met Bloch, who rejected traditional political history under Durkheim's influence before the war. In 1924 Bloch published *The Royal Touch*, which deals with the popular belief that kings have the ability to heal the skin disease scrofula by the power of touch, and its relationship to conceptions of English and French kingship. This remarkable study freed historical perspective from simple narrative time, reattaching it to longer frames of structural duration. It practiced comparison. It also stressed *mentalité*, or the collective understanding and religious psychology of the time, as against the contemporary "common-sense" question of whether the king's touch actually healed or not.

These twin themes—structural history (as against political history or the "history of events"), and history of mentalities (as against the history of formal ideas)—gave unity to the Febvre-Bloch collaboration. In his later works Febvre switched to studying the mental climate specific to the sixteenth century, in *Martin Luther: A Destiny* (original French edition, 1928), and especially *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais* (original French edition, 1947). Bloch, conversely, shifted from the archaeology of mind-sets to the archaeology of structures in *French Rural History: An Essay on Its Basic Characteristics* (original French edition, 1931), and *Feudal Society* (original French edition, 1939–1940). With his holistic account of feudalism, combining

analysis of the “mental structures” of the age with its socioeconomic relations for a picture of the whole environment, Bloch departed radically from prevailing work. He insisted on comparison, making Europe, not the nation, the entity of study. He exchanged conventional chronologies (like reigns of kings) for epochal time, or the *longue durée*. He shifted attention from military service (the dominant approach to feudalism) to the social history of agriculture and relationships on the land. He moved away from the history of the law, landholding, kingship, and the origins of states in the narrow institutional sense. All these moves came to characterize “structural history.”

In 1929 Bloch and Febvre made their interests into a program with a journal, *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*. The journal quickly acquired prestige, as Febvre and Bloch moved from Strasbourg to Paris. But it was after 1945, with the founding of the sixth section for the social sciences of the École Pratique des Hautes Études, with Febvre as president, that *Annales* really took off, tragically boosted by Bloch's execution by the Germans in June 1944 for his role in the Resistance. His indictment of French historiography's narrowness now merged into enthusiasm for a new start, denouncing the rottenness of the old elites, who capitulated in 1940 and collaborated with the Nazis under Vichy. The change of name to *Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations* (1946) signified this enhanced vision. The sixth section also placed history at the center of the new interdisciplinary regime, in a leadership among the social sciences unique in the Western world. Sociology, geography, and economics were key influences for Bloch and Febvre, now joined by structural anthropology and linguistics, including Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–), Roland Barthes (1915–1980), and Pierre Bourdieu (1930–). The term *histoire totale* (total history) now became identified with *Annales*.

Febvre's assistant was Fernand Braudel (1902–1985), his heir as president of the sixth section (1956–1972) and director of *Annales* (1957–1969). Braudel's career was framed by two monuments of scholarship—*The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (original French edition, 1949), researched in the 1930s, and the three-volume *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century* (original French edition, 1979). In these great works Braudel schematized the complex practice of his mentors, distinguishing three temporalities or levels of analysis that functioned as a materialist grand design, shrinking great men and big events into the sovereign causalities of economics, population, and environment. Braudel's causal logic moved upward from the structural history of the *longue durée* (land-



ANNALES, 1950–1970

Attempts to replicate Braudel's *Mediterranean* included the twelve-volume *Seville et l'Atlantique (1504–1650)* (1955–1959) by Pierre Chaunu (1923–), and the three-volume *La Catalogne dans l'Espagne moderne. Recherches sur les fondements économiques des structures nationales* (1962) of Pierre Vilar (1906–). With Pierre Goubert (1915–) and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (1929–), demography then surpassed price series and economic cycles as the main technical concern, in *Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1600 à 1730: Contribution de l'histoire sociale de la France du XVIIe siècle*, two volumes (1960), and *The Peasants of Languedoc*, two volumes (original French edition, 1966) respectively. A collective project managed by Francois Furet (1927–1998) on *Livre et société dans la France du XVIIIe siècle* (1965–1970) applied quantification to patterns of ancien régime intellectual life, extending literacy into the statistical study of book production, reception, the sociology of the reading public and the provincial academies, content analysis, and so forth. It corresponded to Febvre's last work, prepared for publication by Henri Jean Martin, *The Coming of the Book: The Impact of Printing 1450–1800* (original French edition, 1958). Robert Mandrou (1921–1984) cleaved more to “historical psychology,” dissecting the “mental climate of an age” in various works, including *An Introduction to Modern France: An Essay in Historical Psychology* (original French edition, 1961), and *Magistrats et sorciers en France au XVIIe siècle, une analyse de psychologie historique* (1968). The independent scholar Philippe Ariès (1914–1984) pioneered cultural histories of the early modern era converging with *Annales*. His *Centuries of Childhood* (1960) was one of the most influential works of history in this early postwar time.

scape, climate, demography, deep patterns of economic life, long-run norms and habits, the reproduction of social structures, the stabilities of popular understanding, the repetitions of everyday life), through the medium-term changes of conjunctures (where the rise and fall of economies, social systems, and states became visible), to the faster moving narrative time of *l'histoire événementielle* (human-made events, the familiar military, diplomatic, and political histories *Annales* wanted to supplant). In this thinking, the “deeper

level” of structure imposed “upper limits” on human possibilities for a particular civilization, and determined the pace and extent of change. This was the historian’s appropriate concern, from which “events” were a diversion.

Braudel’s rendering of *Annales* ideals realized the goal of Green’s *Short History of the English People*—the dethroning of kings—but divested of all progressivist or “whiggish” narrative design. This uplifting quality was exchanged for a very different model of progress, rendering the world knowable through social science (economics, demography, geography, anthropology, and quantitative techniques). *Annales* history became counterposed to the historiography of the French Revolution, where progressivism and the great event remained alive and well. *Mentalité* solidified into an implicit master category of structure. Braudel’s project was imposingly schematic. His works were ordered into a reified hierarchy of materialist determinations, locating “real” significance in the structural and conjunctural levels, and reducing the third level to the most conventional and unanalytic recitation of events. Reciprocity of determination—so challenging in Bloch’s work on feudalism—disappeared. Major dramas of the early modern age such as religious conflict started by their absence. But Braudel’s magnum opus on the Mediterranean had few parallels in the sheer grandiosity of its knowledge and design.

In social history’s comparative emergence, *Annales* had a vital institution-building role, with (uniquely in Europe) long continuity going back to the 1920s, establishing both protocols of historical method and understanding, and a cumulative tradition of collective discussion, research, training, and publication. Interdisciplinary cohabitation with the social sciences was essential, with history (again uniquely) at the center. Quantification was hard-wired into this intellectual culture: “from a scientific point of view, the only social history is quantitative history,” in one characteristically dogmatic statement (François Furet and Adeline Daumard in 1959, quoted by Iggers, *New Directions*, p. 66). As it emerged into the 1960s, these were the hallmarks—history as a social science, quantitative methodology, long-run analyses of prices, trade and population, structural history, a materialist model of causation. Certain key terms—*longue durée*, *mentalité*, and of course *histoire totale*—passed into historians’ currency elsewhere.

Under Braudel *Annales* became a magnet for “new” history in France. Until the 1970s, it was mainly known in English for Bloch’s *Feudal Society* (translated 1961), although Philippe Ariès’s maverick history of childhood also appeared in English (1962).

Its influence extended into Italy, Belgium, and eastern Europe, especially Poland, where many connections developed. *Annales* also opened dialogues with historians in the Soviet Union.

BRITISH MARXIST HISTORIANS: POPULIST SOCIAL HISTORY AFTER WORLD WAR II

National historiographies move on varying times, with the dynamics of intellectual cultures and traditions, institutional pressures, and local debates, as well as the external exigences of national politics and contemporary events. While Germany experienced the catastrophe of Nazism, severing the shoots of historiographical growth, and France enjoyed institutional continuities around French Revolutionary studies and *Annales*, Britain experienced modest sedimentations of social-historical work. George Macaulay Trevelyan (1876–1962), Cambridge Regius Professor of Modern History from 1927, maintained the popularizing tradition with his classic *English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries, Chaucer to Queen Victoria* (1942), and also trained John Harold Plumb (1911–), a major influence on British social history between the 1950s and 1970s. In the 1950s a wider archipelago of activity appeared—with the economic historians Hrothgar John Habakkuk (1915–), Max Hartwell (1921–), and Peter Matthias at Oxford; George Kitson Clark (1900–1975) and Henry Pelling (1918–) at Cambridge; A. E. Musson (1920–) and Harold Perkin at Manchester; Arthur J. Taylor and Asa Briggs (1921–) at Leeds; F. M. L. Thompson in London. Asa Briggs was especially influential, through his early research on Birmingham and more general works like *Victorian Cities* (1963), and in the pathbreaking local research edited in *Chartist Studies* (1959) and *Essays in Labour History* (1960). Perkin occupied the first university post in social history (Manchester, 1951), took up the first professorial chair (Lancaster, 1967), and published the key general history, *The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780–1880* (1969).

Thus Britain saw the gradual accrual of a scholarly tradition, borne by an array of economic historians, pioneers like Briggs, the social policy nexus at the London School of Economics, and the networks of labor history (solidified by the Society for the Study of Labour History and its bulletin in 1960). The Communist Party Historians’ Group (1946–1957) had disproportionate impact in social history’s great 1960s expansion. Its members came to the Communist Party (CPGB) via antifascism, and most left in the crisis of communism in 1956, which ended the

Group's existence. Very few taught at the center of British university life (at Oxbridge or London). Some were not historians by discipline, like the older Maurice Dobb (1900–1976), the Cambridge economist, whose *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (1946) focused an important discussion. Others had positions in adult education.

These British marxist historians included Eric Hobsbawm (1917–), Christopher Hill (1910–), Victor Kiernan (1913–), Rodney Hilton (1916–), George Rudé (1910–1993), John Saville (1916–), Dorothy Thompson (1923–), Raphael Samuel (1938–1996), and E. P. Thompson (1924–1993). Their collective discussions shaped the contours of social history in Britain, with international resonance comparable to *Annales*. University history departments gave them few supports. Rudé and E. P. Thompson secured academic appointments only in the 1960s, Rudé by traveling to Australia. The main impulse came from politics, a powerful sense of history's pedagogy, and broader identification with democratic values and popular history. A leading mentor was the nonacademic CPGB intellectual, journalist, and Marx scholar, Dona Torr (1883–1957), author of *Tom Mann and his Times* (1936), to whom the Group paid tribute in *Democracy and the Labour Movement* (1954), edited by John Saville.

The Group aimed for a social history of Britain to contest official accounts, inspired by A. L. Morton's *A People's History of England* (1938). Some members specialized in British history per se—Hilton on the English peasantry, Hill on the English Revolution, Saville on labor history, Dorothy Thompson on Chartism. Others displayed extraordinary international range. Hobsbawm's interests embraced British labor history, European popular movements, and Latin American peasantries, plus the study of nationalism and his unparalleled general histories, from *The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848* (1962), through *The Age of Capital, 1848–1875* (1975), and *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914* (1987), to *The Age of Extremes, 1914–1991* (1994). Kiernan was another remarkable generalist, covering aspects of imperialism, early modern state formation, and history of the aristocratic duel, as well as British relations with China and the 1854 Spanish Revolution. Rudé was a leading historian of the French Revolution and popular protest, with *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (1959), *The Crowd in History* (1964), and his collaboration with Hobsbawm, *Captain Swing* (1969). Two others were British historians with huge international influence—Raphael Samuel as the moving genius behind the History Workshop movement and its journal; and E. P. Thompson through his great works, *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963),

Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (1975), and *Customs in Common* (1991).

This British marxist historiography was embedded in specifically British concerns. Several voices spoke the languages of English history exclusively—Hill, Hilton, Saville, the Thompsons. The broader tradition was intensely focused on national themes, as in E. P. Thompson's famous "The Peculiarities of the English" (1965) and first book, *William Morris, Romantic to Revolutionary* (1955), or the cognate works of Raymond Williams (1921–1988), *Culture and Society* (1958) and *The Long Revolution* (1961). British concerns were strongest in two areas. The Group decisively shaped labor history, in Hobsbawm's foundational essays in *Labouring Men* (1964), Saville's influence (institutionalized in the multivolume *Dictionary of Labour Biography* from 1972), and after 1960 in the Labour History Society. Labor history in Britain was linked to specific questions about the presumed failure of the labor movement to follow Marx's development model. It also shaped the history of capitalist industrialization in Britain, most notably through the standard of living controversy between Hobsbawm and Hartwell in 1957–1963 over whether industrialists had improved or degraded living standards of the working population. Saville's *Rural Depopulation in England and Wales, 1851–1951* (1957) was a counterpoint to the mainstream accounts of G. E. Mingay, *English Landed Society in the Eighteenth Century* (1963), and F. M. L. Thompson, *English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century* (1963). Several classics addressed this question, from E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*, and Hobsbawm and Rudé's *Captain Swing*, to Hobsbawm's general British economic history, *Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day* (1968).

In other ways, the marxist historians were the opposite of parochial. Rudé worked with Lefebvre and Soboul; Kiernan practiced an eclectic version of global history; Hobsbawm maintained wide connections with Europe and Latin America; Thomas Hodgkin (1910–1982) and Basil Davidson (1914–) vitally influenced African history, again from the margins in adult education and journalism. Hobsbawm interacted with Braudel and other *Annales*, and with Labrousse, Lefebvre, and Soboul. Internationally, Hobsbawm and Rudé transformed study of social protest in preindustrial societies. Rudé deconstructed older stereotypes of "the mob," using the French Revolution and eighteenth-century riots in England and France to analyze the rhythms, organization, and motives behind collective action, specifying a sociology of the "faces in the crowd." Hobsbawm analyzed the transformations in popular consciousness accompanying capital-



RICHARD COBB (1917–1996)

Richard Cobb was a contemporary of the British marxist historians, and trained under Georges Lefebvre with George Rudé and Albert Soboul. He taught in Aberystwyth, Manchester, and Leeds (1953–1962) before moving to Oxford. He exercised legendary influence in the 1960s as an inspiringly original social historian, with a penchant for reckless bohemianism. His *Les Armées révolutionnaires: Instrument de la Terreur dans les départements, avril 1793 (floréal An II)*, two volume (1962, translated as *The People's Armies*, 1987) was followed by *Terreur et Subsistances, 1793–1795* (1965), *A Second Identity: Essays on France and French History* (1969), and *The Police and the People: French Popular Protest, 1789–1820* (1970). In Leeds he was a friend of E. P. Thompson, whose article “Moral Economy” began as an intended collaboration with Cobb on grain riots. If social history implied identification with the common people, Cobb was one of its most charismatic practitioners. Traumatized by 1968, he shed this stance. The later works—*Reactions to the French Revolution* (1972), *Paris and its Provinces, 1792–1802* (1975), and a string of mainly personal writings—became ever more idiosyncratic and suffered as a result. But he re-created the world of the 1790s with remarkable eloquence, knew the archives like the back of his hand, and inspired a generation of French Revolutionary specialists—Colin Lucas, Peter Jones, Gwynne Lewis, Olwen Hufton, Alan Forrest, Martyn Lyons, William Scott, Richard Andrews, Colin Jones, Geoffrey Ellis, and others.

ist industrialization—in studies of Luddism and pre-trade-union labor protest; in *Primitive Rebels* (1959) and *Bandits* (1969), concerning “archaic” protests in agrarian societies (social banditry, millenarianism, mafia); and in work on peasants and peasant movements in Latin America. He pioneered the conversations of history and anthropology, and redefined politics in societies without democratic constitutions or a developed parliamentary system.

The Communist Party Historians’ Group’s biggest step was the new journal, *Past and Present* (a “Journal of Scientific History”), launched in 1952 to preserve dialogue with non-marxist historians when the Cold War was otherwise closing it down. The ed-

itor and instigator was the ancient history historian John Morris (1913–1977), joined by Hobsbawm, Hill, Hilton, Dobb, and the archaeologist Vere Gordon Childe (1892–1957), who were all marxists, plus a group of distinguished non-marxists, including ancient history historian A. H. M. (Hugo) Jones (1904–1970), Czech historian R. R. Betts, Tudor-Stuart historian D. B. Quinn (1909–), and generalist Geoffrey Barraclough (1908–1984). From the start, contacts with Europe were good, including eastern Europe (with early articles by the Soviet historians Boris Porshnev and E. A. Kosminskii, and the Czechoslovaks J. V. Polisensky and Arnost Klima), and France (not only Lefebvre and Soboul, but also *Annales*). In 1958 the board was broadened to lessen the marxist dominance, with early modernists Lawrence Stone (1919–) and John Elliott (1930–), medievalist Trevor Aston (1925–1986), archaeologist S. S. Frere (1918–), and the sociologists Norman Birnbaum and Peter Worsley. The subtitle changed to a “Journal of Historical Studies.”

In its first twenty years, *Past and Present* made vital contributions to the rise of social history. One was internationalism, for it brought European work into English, aided by its editors’ political networks, direct exchanges with France, and the 1950 International Historical Congress in Paris and its new social history section. Secondly, like *Annales*, it urged comparative study of societies within an overall frame of arguments about historical change, posed at the level of European or global movements and systems. This commitment, which crystallized from the agenda of the Communist Party Historians’ Group, recurred in the annual conference themes from 1957—early modern revolutions, the general crisis of the seventeenth century, origins of industrialization, war and society 1300–1600, science and religion, colonialism and nationalism. Thirdly, it opened interdisciplinary conversations with sociologists and anthropologists, encouraged by marxist acceptance of the indivisibility of knowledge, again paralleling *Annales*. Fourthly, social history went together with economics, whether via the *Annaliste* master category of structures, or via marxism and the materialist theory of history. Academically, where social history was disengaged from the “manners and morals” mode of popularizing, or projects of “people’s history,” it was coupled to economic history, as in departments of economic and social history created in some British universities in the 1960s.

“Social history” meant understanding the dynamics of whole societies. It was the ambition to connect political events to underlying social forces. In 1947–1950 the Communist Party Historians’ Group

focused on the transition from feudalism to capitalism and associated questions (rise of absolutism, bourgeois revolution, agrarian problems, the Reformation). Hobsbawm's two-part article on "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century" (1954) then prompted the salient discussion of *Past and Present's* first decade, collected as *Crisis in Europe, 1560–1660* (1965), edited by Trevor Aston. This debate energized historians of France, Spain, Sweden, Germany, Bohemia, Russia, Ireland, and early modern Europe generally, as well as historians of Britain. It connected the seventeenth-century political upheavals to forms of economic crisis graspable in Europeanwide terms, in "the last phase of the general transition from a feudal to a capitalist economy" (Aston, *Crisis*, p. 5). It built a case for studying religious conflict in social terms. It grasped the nettle of conceptualizing the histories of societies as a whole, with profound implications for their future historiographies, as in John Elliott's treatment of "The Decline of Spain" (1961). It reemphasized the convergence between *Past and Present* and *Annales*, for Hobsbawm relied on work sponsored by Braudel. One key essay by Pierre Vilar ("The Age of Don Quixote") was not translated until much later, in 1971. Above all, the debate demonstrated the "comparative method."

PROLIFERATION AND GROWTH: THE BOOM YEARS, THE 1960s TO THE 1980s

Annales and *Past and Present* laid the cumulative foundations for social history's rise in the 1960s. *Past and Present's* main strength remained medieval and early modern, where its international influence became sovereign. By 1987 only five of thirty-three titles in the *Past and Present Publications* series (Cambridge University Press) fell after the French Revolution. *Annales* also consolidated its influence, partly from Braudel's post-1962 base at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. Work was systematically translated, beginning with Braudel's *Mediterranean* (1972) and *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1600* (original French edition, 1973), plus Peter Burke's edition of articles, *Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe* (1972). Traian Stoianovich's *French Historical Method: The Annales Paradigm* (1976) gave a systematic guide, and in 1978 Immanuel Wallerstein founded the Fernand Braudel Center in Binghamton and its journal, *Review*. This further institutionalization, and concurrent transplanting to the United States, continued with Lawrence Stone's founding of the Shelby Cullom Davis Center at Princeton University (1969), which with J. H. Elliott's presence at

the Institute of Advanced Study became a transatlantic outpost of *Past and Present*.

By 1971, when Hobsbawm published his stock-taking survey, "From Social History to the History of Society," social history had already taken off, and the next decade saw a remarkable diffusion—with conferences, international networks, new journals, and special societies (like the British Social History Society, 1976). This was inseparable from events in the world at large. The big 1960s expansion of Western higher education created a brief buoyancy of funding for scholarly history on a freshly professionalized basis. The political ferment radicalized new generations of students toward new kinds of history, pushing on the discipline's boundaries in vital ways.

The best index was the launching of new journals. Anticipating and shaping these trends was *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, founded in 1958 by the medievalist Sylvia Thrupp, in a program of comparative social science. It was followed in the United States by *Journal of Social History* (1967–), *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (1970–), *Radical History Review* (1973–), and *Social Science History* (1976–). In Britain there were *Social History* and *History Workshop Journal* (both 1976–), plus *Journal of Peasant Studies* (1973–), and *Journal of Historical Geography* (1975–) beyond the discipline. The West German *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* was launched in 1975. Existing specialisms like labor history broadened their charge, turning from institutional histories of socialism and trade unions, and associated studies of working conditions, industrial relations, and strikes, to social histories of the working class. This was true of the British *Bulletin of the Labour History Society*, whose conferences reflected the new ambitions. The same applied to the U.S. Study Group for European Labor and Working-Class History formed in December 1971, whose newsletter became *International Labor and Working Class History*. In West Germany *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, a yearbook of socialist history (1961–), transformed itself in the early 1970s into a hefty annual of current social-historical research.

The influence of social science. Social history's arrival was borne by interdisciplinarity, which meant dependence on social science. In the United States, a one-sided dialogue continued between sociology and history, as a succession of Social Science Research Council Reports (1946, 1954, 1963) expounded the virtues of theory for historians. Programmatic publications appeared, including *Sociology and History: Methods* (1968) edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard Hofstadter, and Robert F. Berkhofer Jr.'s *A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis* (1969). In

France, by contrast, the sixth section's structure already placed history at the heart of interdisciplinary work, now reinforced by Braudel's *Maison des Sciences de l'Homme*. In Britain the relationship was more pragmatic. Marxism had lost self-confidence after the crisis of Stalinism in 1956, and *Past and Present* turned to dialogue with non-marxist sociology and anthropology, where sociologist Philip Abrams (1933–1981) and anthropologist Jack Goody were especially active. Hobsbawm's *Primitive Rebels* was conceived in a running conversation with Meyer Fortes, Max Gluckman (1911–1975), and other social anthropologists.

This first phase of interdisciplinarity saw the ascendancy of U.S. behavioral science, guided by modernization theory. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* held the vanguard place, followed by *Journal of International History*, *Journal of Social History*, and then *Social Science History* in the Social Science History Association. Other new journals, such as *Politics & Society* (1970–) and *Theory and Society* (1974–), published articles by sociologists and political scientists writing historically. The turning to sociology was eclectic, as historians sought to “learn” theory from their colleagues. The most self-conscious borrowings involved methodology rather than theory per se, with sophisticated quantification in demography, family history, mobility studies, migration, urban history, and more. An extreme version of such dependency developed in West Germany in the 1970s. The destructive effects of Nazism left an exceptionally conservative historiography commanding the 1950s, and despite the efforts of Werner Conze (1910–1986) and his *Arbeitskreis für moderne Sozialgeschichte* (formed in Heidelberg, 1957), little work in social history occurred before the 1960s. Without strong indigenous supports, Hans Ulrich Wehler (1931–), Jürgen Kocka (1941–), and others turned directly to U.S. social sciences, as well as to Max Weber. Their new journal *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* was the result.

One boom area for social science was family history, pioneered in Peter Laslett's *The World We Have Lost* (1965). Demanding a new “social structural history” embracing whole societies and the “structural function of the family in the pre-industrial world,” Laslett headed the Cambridge Population Group with evangelical zeal. But aside from extreme methodological sophistication, Laslett's main achievement became his “null hypothesis” for the nuclear family's continuity across industrialization, laying to rest the myth of progressive nucleation. Demographic historians became masters of falsification, dismantling ungrounded claims in dialogue with contemporary sociology (as in Michael Anderson's *The Family in Nineteenth-Century*

Lancashire [1971], a response to Neil J. Smelser's *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* [1959]). But their ability to retheorize social change beyond the technics of the immediate debates was far less. From the foundational conference of 1969, bringing twenty-two international scholars to Cambridge (Peter Laslett, ed., *Household and Family in Past Time* [1972]), to the apogee of the Cambridge Group's achievement, in E. A. Wrigley and Roger S. Schofield, *The Population History of England, 1541–1871* (1981), the broader implications were unclear. The strongest explanatory program for demographic history remained *Annales*, where population was the prime mover of social change, notably in Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's *The Peasants of Languedoc* (original French edition, 1966). Ironically (given Laslett's default cautions), the first two general histories of the family in the 1970s, Edward Shorter's *The Making of the Modern Family* (1976), and Lawrence Stone's *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500–1800* (1977), presented bold teleologies of modernization, expressed in Stone's “rise of affective individualism.”

Family history was integrated more successfully in studies of “protoindustrialization,” using work by Franklin Mendels (“Proto-Industrialization: The First Phase of the Industrialization Process,” in *Journal of Economic History*, 1972) and the Swiss historian Rudolf Braun's *Industrialization and Everyday Life* (original German edition, 1960) and *Sozialer und kultureller Wandel in einem ländlichen Industriegebiet* (1965). The pioneering book was Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick, and Jürgen Schlumbohm, *Industrialization Before Industrialization: Rural Industry in the Genesis of Capitalism* (original German edition, 1977), which reconnected family and demography to capitalism and production in a social history of industrialization. This continued through Charles Tilly's studies of proletarianization, and David Levine's *Family Formations in an Age of Nascent Capitalism* (1977), and *Reproducing Families: The Political Economy of English Population History* (1987). In German-speaking Europe, Michael Mitterauer and Reinhard Sieder, *The European Family: Patriarchy to Partnership from the Middle Ages to the Present* (original German edition, 1977), laid out a similar program, as did essays by Karin Hausen and Heidi Rosenbaum in the inaugural issue of *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*. Nonmaterialist aspects of family life remained neglected by comparison. David Hunt's *Parents and Children in History: The Psychology of Family Life in Early Modern France* (1970) seemed an idiosyncratic exception. On the other hand, Eli Zaretsky's *Capitalism, the Family, and Personal Life* (1976) explored territory feminist historians were about to map.

This story of social history's takeoff in the 1960s, sustained by social science, was replicated in other subfields. In 1971 Hobsbawm listed six of these: demography and kinship; urban studies; class formation; "mentalities" or "culture" in the anthropological sense; social transformations like industrialization or "modernization"; and social movements and social protest. Urban history was a good microcosm. Distinctive to the English-speaking world, it was forged in Britain by H. J. Dyos (1921–1978). Building on Leicester University's tradition of local history and studies of local government going back to the Webbs, Dyos formed the Urban History Group (1962–1963), whose newsletter was institutionalized as the *Urban History Yearbook* in 1974, becoming the journal *Urban History* in 1992. Dyos was a tireless proselytizer, combining social science rigor with eclectic thematics, from the city's political economy and spatial organization, through the social histories of the built environment, land sales, mass transit, labor markets, slum dwelling, and suburbanization, to urban images and representations. The two-volume showcase, *The Victorian City: Images and Realities* (1973), coedited with Michael Wolff, defined urbanization as a site where social scientists, humanists, and historians could meet. The memorial for Dyos, *The Pursuit of Urban History* (1983), edited by Derek Fraser and Anthony Sutcliffe, confirmed this transdisciplinary potential. The urban community study became the vehicle for studying class formation. Elsewhere (as in Sweden and West Germany in the 1970s), the subfield was slower and more narrowly convened around social science.

History of youth and childhood was also invented by social historians in the 1960s. Impetus came from historians of population and family, especially among early modernists. Most exciting were the deconstructive implications, turning the basic categories of the human life-course into historical creations, with childhood as an artifact of the specifically modern era. Philippe Ariès's *Centuries of Childhood* (original French edition, 1960) was key. Interest also focused on youth subcultures inspired by 1968 in freely cross-disciplinary ways—partly at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, partly in radical criminology and the sociology of deviance. Such work intersected with new social histories of crime, doubly moved by the positivist excitements of social science methodology (measuring change, establishing patterns, specifying causal relations) and populist identification with "history from below." The British marxist historians—Rudé's studies of the crowd, Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*, Hobsbawm in general—also provided inspiration. As so often, Hobsbawm's writings—on primitive rebel-



THE IMPACT OF CHARLES TILLY (1929–)

Charles Tilly was trained in sociology at Harvard (Ph.D. 1958), and taught for many years with a joint appointment in sociology and history at the University of Michigan, before moving to the New School for Social Research in 1984. His many books and essays across a wide variety of subjects, concentrating on nineteenth-century France and Britain, made him the preeminent sociologist and social historian of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s. He stood for quantitative and collaborative research on the grand scale, specifying the bases and rationality of collective action in relation to the impact of capitalism (including its demographic aspects) and the growth of national states. His impact on social historians trained in the United States since the 1960s was enormous, including William H. Sewell Jr. and Joan W. Scott, whose *Structure and Mobility: The Men and Women of Marseilles, 1829–1970* (1985) and *The Glassworkers of Carmaux* (1974) directly reflected the social science ascendancy of social history's growth in the 1960s. The wider cohort included Tilly's students at the University of Michigan, such as Michael Hanagan, author of *The Logic of Solidarity: Artisans and Industrial Workers in Three French Towns, 1871–1914* (1980), and Ronald Aminzade, author of *Class, Politics, and Early Industrial Capitalism: A Study of Mid-Nineteenth Century Toulouse, France* (1981). Another line of influence passed from Lynn Hunt, author of *Revolution and Urban Politics in Provincial France: Troyes and Reims, 1786–1790* (1978), to Ted W. Margadant, author of *Urban Rivalries in the French Revolution* (1992), which attempts to do for the towns what Tilly had done for the countryside in *The Vendée*.

lion, social banditry, social criminality—had defined the basic terrain.

In the 1960s identifying with the people and learning from social science (the doubled genealogies of social history, in British marxism and *Annales*) were not in serious tension. Charles Tilly's *The Vendée* (1964) was an exciting model of archivally grounded historical sociology, connecting political allegiance to socioeconomic patterns in the French Revolution. One strand of Tilly's later work concerned capitalism and state-making, from *The Formation of the National*

States in Western Europe (1975) to *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990* (1990). A cognate interest concerned demographic studies of proletarianization, in *Historical Studies of Changing Fertility* (1978) and in many essays. But Tilly was best known for his sociology of collective action. This required longitudinal research, with big resources, large teams, and huge machineries of quantitative production. After *Strikes in France, 1830–1968* (with Edward Shorter, 1974), and *The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930* (with Louise and Richard Tilly, 1975), Tilly produced *The Contentious French* (1986), and *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758–1834* (1995). These were quantitative histories of changing “repertoires of contention” and the rise of modern mass politics, in an argument summarized in “How Protest Modernized in France” (1972), and “Britain Creates the Social Movement” (1982). Tilly’s corpus included a programmatic textbook, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978), and the macroanalytical *European Revolutions, 1492–1992* (1993), rejoining collective action to capitalism and state-making.

The populist tradition: E. P. Thompson and his impact. Tilly prodigiously historicized theories of social change—as in *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (1984). The main alternative to social science history came from E. P. Thompson, whose *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963) inspired several generations of social historians. His work advanced an eloquent counter-narrative to gradualist versions of British history as the triumphant march of parliamentary evolution, grounding the latter in violence, inequality, and exploitation instead: “I am seeking to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the ‘obsolete’ handloom weaver, the ‘utopian’ artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity” (p. 12). *The Making* was also an antireductionist manifesto—attacking narrowly based economic history, overdeterministic marxism, and static theories of class. For Thompson, class was dynamic, eventuating through history—a relationship and a process, a common consciousness of capitalist exploitation and state repression, graspable through culture. Through *The Making* the move from labor’s institutional study to social histories of working people gained huge momentum, embracing work, housing, nutrition, leisure and sport, drinking, crime, religion, magic and superstition, education, song, literature, childhood, courtship, sexuality, death, and more.

Thompson wrote his great work outside the academy, working in adult education in Leeds, as a Communist (until 1956), New Left activist, and pub-

lic polemicist. He created the Centre for the Study of Social History at Warwick University in 1965, directing it until 1972, when he resigned. Beyond the networks of labor history and *Past and Present*, Thompson’s *The Making* was loudly attacked. But it energized younger generations. It also inspired the reviving marxisms so central to the developing social history wave.

Thompson’s impact helped two initiatives on the margins to form. One was the Social History Group at Oxford (1965–1974), including the marxist author of *Outcast London* (1971), Gareth Stedman Jones (1942–); the historian of Spanish anarchism, Joaquin Romero Maura (1940–); the historian of Nazism, Tim Mason (1940–1990); and especially Raphael Samuel (1934–1996), a schoolboy member of the Communist Party Historians’ Group, who taught at Ruskin, the Oxford trade union college, from 1961. Samuel’s annual History Workshops became a vital engine of social history, starting modestly, but soon mushrooming into an international event. The first thirteen Workshops met at Ruskin (1967–1979), before migrating around Britain. They inspired a series of pamphlets (twelve, 1970–1974) and books (over thirty, 1975–1990), a local movement, public interventions (in the debate on national curriculum, 1983–1990), and *History Workshop Journal*.

The second movement was women’s history. Originally via tense contention with History Workshop and older mentors like Hobsbawm and Thompson, pioneers like Sheila Rowbotham (1943–) drew important support from both. Future leaders of women’s history emerged from History Workshop’s milieu, including Anna Davin (1940–), Sally Alexander (1943–), and Catherine Hall (1945–). Rowbotham’s early works—*Women, Resistance and Revolution* (1972), *Hidden from History* (1973), *Woman’s Consciousness, Man’s World* (1973)—became markers of the future field. The first National Women’s Liberation Conference (Ruskin, 1970) originated as a women’s history meeting, and History Workshop 7 (1973) concerned “Women in History.” These political contexts, like earlier twentieth-century moments and the Communist Party Historians’ Group, shaped social history’s emergence.

In the 1960s Thompson moved back in time. His social history of property crimes and the law in eighteenth-century political order, *Whigs and Hunters* (1975), and the work of his Warwick students in *Albion’s Fatal Tree* (edited by Douglas Hay, 1975), explored customary culture’s transformations under capitalism. Two essays, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism” (1967) and “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Cen-

ture” (1971), appeared in *Past and Present* (whose board Thompson joined in 1969), and a third on “Rough Music” in *Annales* (1972). Two others followed in *Journal of Social History* (1974) and *Social History* (1978), plus a famous lecture on “The Sale of Wives.” Gathered in *Customs in Common* (1991), this work transformed perceptions of transition to industrial capitalism, dismantling the industrial revolution’s gross causality. *Albion’s Fatal Tree* made crime and punishment “central to unlocking the meanings of eighteenth-century social history” (p. 13), and a host of work now confirmed this claim, signaled by three collections of essays: J. S. Cockburn (ed.), *Crime in England, 1550–1800* (1977); V. A. C. Gatrell, Bruce Lenman, and Geoffrey Parker (eds.), *Crime and the Law* (1980); and John Brewer and John Styles (eds.), *An Ungovernable People: The English and their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (1980).

Thompson’s influence was international. *The Making* shaped North American, African, and South Asian agendas, no less than it did studies of class formation in Britain and Europe. His eighteenth-century essays had equal resonance, especially “The Moral Economy” (the object of a retrospective international conference in Birmingham, 1992). The 1970s internationalized social history through conferences, journals, and translation. Thompson, Hobsbawm, Tilly, and others joined a series of round tables on social history organized by the Maison des Sciences l’Homme, convening scholars from France, Italy, West Germany, and elsewhere.

Large areas even of the historiographies of Britain and France could not be included here. In France Maurice Agulhon explored the forms of political culture and working-class sociability in the first half of the nineteenth century, especially *The Republic in the Village: The People of the Var from the French Revolution to the Second Republic* (original French edition, 1970). The social history of the nineteenth-century French peasantry has been extraordinarily rich, a gold mine for the politics of the countryside. The proliferating social historiographies of West Germany in the 1970s might have been presented, likewise those in Italy, Scandinavia, and parts of eastern Europe. The historiographies of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland experienced exciting renaissance after the 1970s, and the intellectual cultures of smaller nationalities offered fertile territory for historiographical innovation.

Social history’s heyday was the 1970s to late 1980s. Greater self-confidence bridled against social science leadership, and the new journals—*Social History* and *History Workshop Journal* in Britain, *Radical History Review* and the short-lived *Marxist Perspectives* (1978–1980) in the United States—reflected these

tensions. The later 1970s saw several stocktaking essays—by Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene Genovese (1976), Gareth Stedman Jones (1976), Lawrence Stone (1977 and 1979), Tony Judt (1979), and Geoff Eley and Keith Nield (1980). Social historians emerged from the tutelage of the social science paradigms so appealing ten years before. A new generation was claiming its institutional space, flying the banner of a restlessly aggrandizing social history. This social history was more secure in its own autonomies, impatient with the authorizing function of social science. It professed an unproblematic materialism, often inspired by a marxist revival, open to other social theories, and confident of its own pedagogy. It was never a unitary phenomenon. But some notion of social determination, conceptualized on the ground of material life, aspiring to “society as a whole,” delivered a common framework. Hobsbawm’s 1971 essay, “From Social History to the History of Society,” much cited, translated, and reprinted, provided the characteristic argumentation.

DISPERSAL: SOCIAL HISTORY, FEMINIST THEORY, AND “CULTURAL TURN”

From the later 1980s social history lost its primacy as the acknowledged source of innovation, while the “new cultural history” became the main interdisciplinary site instead. An eclectic and anthropologically oriented cultural analysis took its cue from the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926–) and early modernist Natalie Zemon Davis (1928–), as well as from Thompson. It continued via an antireductionist British marxism, exemplified by Raymond Williams, the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, and sociologist Stuart Hall (1932–). It was further extended by the reception of Michel Foucault (1926–1984), whose philosophical works *The Order of Things* (original French edition, 1966) and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (original French edition, 1969), and highly original treatments of madhouses (1961), hospitals (1963), and prisons (1975), were systematically translated in the 1970s, as were the three volumes of his *History of Sexuality* (original French edition, 1976–1984), and various editions of essays and interviews. Finally, feminist theory became unavoidable for social historians in the 1980s, whereas women’s history had been more easily compartmentalized and kept at bay before.

The changes may be variously tracked. Between his 1960s polemics and essays of the mid-1970s, Gareth Stedman Jones stood for a “non-empiricist” and “theoretically informed history,” which was material-



CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND FOUCAULT

Histories of crime and punishment were an important barometer of changes in social history. During the 1970s, social history of crime, law, and imprisonment burgeoned in one of the most popular areas, British history ranging from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, affording an excellent handle on questions of social and political order. Important examples were the products of E. P. Thompson's time at the Warwick Center for Social History—*Whigs and Hunters* and *Albion's Fatal Tree* (both 1975)—and Michael Ignatieff's *A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution 1750–1850* (1978). Anthologies edited by J. S. Cockburn (1977); V. A. C. Gatrell, Bruce Lenman, and Geoffrey Parker (1980); and John Brewer and John Styles (1980) indicated the scale of activity. Then, from the late 1970s historians were reading Michel Foucault. The next major anthology, edited by Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull, *Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays* (1983), already revealed Foucault's impact, with two essays (by Ignatieff and David Ingleby) dealing directly with his ideas. During the 1980s, work on prisons, hospitals, asy-

lums and other places of confinement, social policy and public health; and all forms of governmentality became permeated by Foucault's arguments about power, knowledge, and "regimes of truth." Lynn Hunt's emblematic anthology on *The New Cultural History* (1989) marked this shift, with an essay by Patricia O'Brien on "Michel Foucault's History of Culture." By the 1990s, authors prominent in the 1970s discussions were taking a strong cultural turn, with superb results—from Peter Linebaugh's *The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century* (1991), through V. A. C. Gatrell's *The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People, 1770–1868* (1994), to Richard J. Evans's gargantuan *Rituals of Retribution: Capital Punishment in Germany 1600–1987* (1996). Foucault was not essential to the new directions taken by these authors—for instance, an excellent sampling of German work edited by Richard J. Evans, *The German Underworld: Deviants and Outcasts in German History* (1988), revealed little of Foucault's explicit presence. But it became impossible to imagine the field without him.

ist in social history's common understandings of the time. His *Outcast London* (1971) seemed a worthy successor to its British marxist precursors. Then, in *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832–1982* (1983), he proposed a linguistic analysis that left the familiar ground of social historians behind. This was followed in 1986 by Joan W. Scott's *American Historical Review* article, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," reprinted in her *Gender and the Politics of History* (1988), which presented more elaborate poststructuralist propositions. By questioning the assumptions around which social analysis was ordered, Foucauldian "discourse" theory destabilized social history's recently acquired self-confidence. Social history became one site of epistemological uncertainty in the humanities and social sciences. Leading voices were questioning social history's underlying materialism, including the determinative coherence of the category of "the social" itself.

Feminism was key to this turmoil. In social historians' earlier advocacy—from *Annales* and *Past and Present* through Hobsbawm's 1971 essay to the later

1970s—women's history played no part. When the latter's pioneering works appeared, they were consigned to a discrete subfield, conceptualized via "separate spheres" or subsumed into the history of the family, a pattern only partly broken by syntheses like Louise Tilly and Joan W. Scott's *Women, Work, and Family* (1978). Only the turning from women's history to gender, as the historical construction of sexual difference, made feminist work impossible to ignore. Much social history still continued unaware. Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg (eds.), *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* (1986), was a telling example. But cumulative studies of gender and work, and gendered critiques of the welfare state, paralleled Scott's theoretical intervention, and by the 1990s social history was examining its gendered suppositions. Works by Sonya O. Rose, *Limited Livelihoods: Gender and Class in Nineteenth-Century England* (1992), Anna Clark, *The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class* (1995), and Kathleen Canning, *Languages of Labor and Gender: Female*

Factory Work in Germany, 1850–1914 (1996), set a new standard in this respect, reinforced by the new journals—not just *History Workshop Journal*, *Social History*, and *Radical History Review*, but also those in women’s studies, including *Feminist Studies* (1972–), *Signs* (1975–), *Feminist Review* (1979–), and the newer *Gender and History* (1989–), *Journal of Women’s History* (1989–), and *Journal of the History of Sexuality* (1990–).

By 1990 some historians were speaking the language of “cultural constructionism.” The impact of deconstructive literary theory and British cultural studies was also felt, mediated extensively by feminism. As “race” pervaded social anxieties and political exchange, it also joined gender as a central category of historical analysis, strengthened by postcolonial studies. Empire returned to the domestic history of European metropolitan societies, initially via anthropology, literary criticism, and cultural studies, exemplified in the work of Ann Stoler, Ann McClintock, or Paul Gilroy. Historians gradually responded in kind, mainly by route of gender. Catherine Hall’s work, moving from the classically social-historical *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850* (with Leonore Davidoff, 1987) to more recent essays on the “racing” of empire, was especially important. In the future, works like Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late Nineteenth Century* (1995), Antionette Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865–1915* (1994), and Laura Tabili, *We Ask for British Justice: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain* (1994), can only increase.

Not all such works took the “linguistic turn” or disavowed a social analytic. But social history was now enhanced by attention to language and cultural histories of representation. The result was a mobile “culturalism,” not indifferent to social analysis or contextualizing, but far more drawn to the domain of meaning than before. This eased a rapprochement with intellectual history. It pulled history toward literary theory, linguistic analysis, history of art, studies of film and other visual media, reflexive anthropology, and theories of cultural representation. This threw open the agenda of possible histories. Another range of new journals made the point, all interdisciplinary (or perhaps a-disciplinary), and all containing historical work, whether the authors were formally historians or not—*Critical Inquiry* (1974–), *Social Text* (1979–), *Representations* (1983–), *Cultural Critique* (1985–), *Cultural Studies* (1987–), *New Formations* (1987–). An important programmatic volume was edited by Lynn Hunt, *The New Cultural History* (1989).

Hunt herself migrated from a previous identity. Having begun as a Tilly-influenced urban historian of the French Revolution, she emerged with the wholly culturalist *Family Romance of the French Revolution* (1992), and two related anthologies, *Eroticism and the Body Politic* (1991) and *The Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500–1800* (1993). This became a familiar pattern, contrasting W. H. Sewell’s *Work and Revolution* (1980) to his *Structure and Mobility: The Men and Women of Marseilles, 1820–1870* (1985, but begun many years before), and Scott’s *Gender and the Politics of History* (1988) to her *Glassworkers of Carmaux* (1974). Social histories addressed in Judith R. Walkowitz’s *Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State* (1980), shaped by the *History Workshop Journal* milieu, were now revisited in her *City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London* (1992), using the new post-Foucauldian and post-structuralist analytic.

The pattern was repeated many times. In German history feminism was again key, especially for work on Nazism, where studies of societal racialization became overdetermined by gender-historical perspectives, beginning with the benchmark volume, *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany*, edited by Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossman, and Marion Kaplan, (1984), and continuing through Gisela Bock’s *Zwangsterilisation im Nationalsozialismus: Studien zur Rassenpolitik und Frauenpolitik* (1986). In the 1990s gender history, explicitly uniting social and cultural perspectives, transformed the German field. Poststructuralist perspectives also entered discussions of the Holocaust via Saul Friedländer (ed.), *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution”* (1992), just as the social histories of Nazi genocide were being intensively addressed. In the field at large, Rudy Koshar’s *Germany’s Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century* (1998) brilliantly demonstrated the value of a poststructuralist analytic, enriching social history rather than superseding it—all the more eloquently given Koshar’s earlier *Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg, 1880–1935* (1986), conceived under Charles Tilly’s direction.

These departures scarcely lacked controversy, particularly in labor history, with demographic history the main materialist redoubt. In German history Canning’s work (combining gender theory with a critical poststructuralist approach) set the pace. In French history, Sewell and Scott shaped discussion, valuably mapped in Lenard R. Berlanstein’s anthology, *Rethinking Labor History: Essays on Discourse and Class Analysis* (1993), and further stimulated by Jacques



GERMAN WOMEN'S HISTORY

Women's history moved to the center of the most innovative work in German history during the 1980s, mirroring social history's main trends. Beginning with institutional studies of early feminism in books by Richard J. Evans (1976 and 1979) and Jean H. Quataert (1979), research moved quickly to women's social experience in work, the family, public health, charity, and so on. Ute Frevert delivered the first general account, *Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation* (original German edition, 1986), while anthologies edited by Karin Hausen (1983), John C. Fout (1984), Ruth-Ellen B. Joeres and Mary Jo Maynes (1986), and Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossmann, and Marion Kaplan (1984) surveyed the emerging activity. The last of these, *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany*, proved especially influential, building on early essays from 1976 by Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz ("Beyond *Kinder, Küche, Kirche*: Weimar Women in Politics and Work") and Tim Mason ("Women in Nazi Germany"). Claudia Koonz's *Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics* (1987) was a major intervention on the Third Reich, joining Gisela Bock's *Zwangssterilisation im Nationalsozial-*

ismus: Studien zur Rassenpolitik und Frauenpolitik (1986), and the earlier works by Dörte Winkler, *Frauenarbeit im "Dritten Reich"* (1977), and Jill Stephenson, *Women in Nazi Society* (1975) and *The Nazi Organisation of Women* (1981). Important books followed on Nazi marital policies (Gabriele Czarnowski, 1991), the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (Dagmar Reese, 1989), Nazi treatment of lesbianism (Claudia Schoppmann, 1991), women's work (Carola Sachse, 1987 and 1990), and Nazi family policy (Lisa Pine, 1997). Atina Grossmann contributed field-defining essays on the "new woman" in the Weimar Republic and a study of the movement for birth control and abortion reform, *Reforming Sex* (1995), joining Cornelia Osborne's *The Politics of the Body in Weimar Germany: Women's Reproductive Rights and Duties* (1992). In earlier periods, Isabel V. Hull's *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700–1815* (1996), and Dagmar Herzog's *Intimacy and Exclusion: Religious Politics in Pre-Revolutionary Baden* (1996) also shifted the German field's overall agenda, as did Kathleen Canning's *Languages of Labor and Gender: Female Factory Work in Germany, 1850–1914* (1996) for the later nineteenth century.

Rancière's *The Nights of Labor: The Worker's Dream in Nineteenth-Century France* (original French edition, 1981). In British history debates were fierce, as prominent figures moved polemically away from social history altogether. Patrick Joyce traveled from *Work, Society, and Politics: The Culture of the Factory in Later Victorian England* (1980), through the broadened culturalism of *Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class, 1848–1914* (1991), to a theoretically rationalized intellectual history in *Democratic Subjects: The Self and the Social in Nineteenth-Century England* (1994), a trajectory also followed by Stedman Jones. Other new work, like Robert Gray's *The Factory Question and Industrial England, 1830–1860* (1996), Anna Clark's *Struggle for the Breeches* (1995), or Sonya Rose's *Limited Livelihoods* (1992), negotiated the tensions between classical and poststructuralist approaches more creatively.

This new cultural history picked up the threads from Febvre and Bloch in *Annales's* founding years.

Lynn Hunt's new interest, "in the ways that people collectively imagine—that is, think unconsciously about—the operation of power, and the ways in which this imagination shapes and is in turn shaped by political and social processes" (*Family Romance*, p. 8), recalled the history of *mentalité*. Some *Annalistes* themselves took a cultural turn. In 1975 Le Roy Ladurie published *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error*, a study of medieval heresy, followed by *Carnival in Romans* (original French edition, 1979), exchanging the *longue durée's* epochal sweep for microhistorical snapshots of an intense event. A relative outsider to *Annales*, Michel Vovelle (1933–), in *Ideologies and Mentalities* (original French edition, 1982), took a more extensive approach, freeing cultural history from population's and the economy's structural hold and giving it a broader anthropological and psychological read. Jacques Le Goff (1924–), director of the *École* from 1972 to 1977, explored the perceptions and interior logics of the medieval world view, including



ORAL HISTORY

Oral history became a vital tool of the social historian, drawing on work by the Africanist Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology* (1965), community history projects, and a variety of literary and folklorist traditions, institutionalized via the British-based journal *Oral History* (1973–). The unquestioned pioneer was a nonacademic historian, George Ewart Evans (1909–1987), whose democratic commitment to the history of “ordinary people” produced a remarkable series of books, from *Ask the Fellows Who Cut the Hay* (1956) to *Spoken History* (1987). Paul Thompson (1935–) shaped oral history as an international field, with an early handbook, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (1978), and the first international conference (Essex University, 1979), editing the proceedings as *Our Common History: The Transformation of Europe* (1982). In the 1980s history workshop movements in Britain and West Germany inspired a boom of popular and scholarly activity, as did the Swedish writer Sven Lindqvist’s *Dig Where You Stand* (1978), which built on Scandinavian traditions of eth-

nology going back to the 1930s. Lutz Niethammer pioneered oral history in West Germany, presiding over studies of popular experience in the Ruhr between Nazism and the 1960s (1986) and in the GDR (1991), and editing the basic handbook, *Lebenserfahrung und kollektives Gedächtnis. Die Praxis der Oral History* (1980). In Italy oral history also began outside the academy (in the work of Gianni Bosio, Danilo Montaldi, Cesare Bermani, Rocco Scotellaro) in popular politics. In Luisa Passerini’s, *Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin Working Class* (original Italian edition, 1984), and Alessandro Portelli’s two volumes, *The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History* (1991) and *The Battle of Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art of Dialogue* (1997), Italian work addressed the dialectics of memory and forgetting. Here oral history connected to a huge preoccupation of the 1990s with history and memory, best approached via Patrick Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory* (1993), and the journal *History and Memory* (1989–).

Time, Work and Culture in the Middle Ages (original French edition, 1977) and *The Birth of Purgatory* (original French edition, 1981). Among the next generation, Roger Chartier’s (1945–) work on print cultures broadened into *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution* (original French edition, 1990) and the more general *Cultural History: Between Practices and Representations* (1988).

Yet *Annales* lost its distinctive place. For the 1970s the history of *mentalité* was a panacea for many social historians elsewhere. It seemed an alternative to high-cultural and canonical intellectual history, promising access to popular and everyday cultures, and inviting quantitative and anthropological methods. Above all, it was moved by the drive for “total history.” But while the conference that launched *Review* (1978) was still celebratory, a few years later some searching critiques appeared—in *Past and Present* (Stuart Clark, 1983), *American Historical Review* (Samuel Kinser, 1981), *Social History* (Michael Gismondi, 1985), *History and Theory* (Patrick Hutton, 1981), and *Journal*

of Modern History (in debates by Chartier, Robert Darnton, Dominick LaCapra, and James Fernandez, 1985–1988). These exposed the fuzzy determinisms in Braudel’s and Le Roy Ladurie’s work. While none of the *Annales* achievements were gainsaid, their primacy shrank back into a wider international discussion. Historians’ treatments of culture moved on, either beyond the old early modern heartland, or to the new ground of linguistic history and cultural studies, where the dynamism came from feminists, popular culture specialists, and intellectual historians, unmoved by the *Annales* paradigm, or directly critical of it. Literary texts, such as Peter Stallybrass and Allon White’s *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression* (1986), an imaginative use of the Soviet cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin, became more influential. While Chartier’s influence continued to grow, the triumphal codification of the *Annales* achievement in *La Nouvelle Histoire* (1978), edited by Chartier with Le Goff and Jacques Revel, started to resemble an epitaph.

GERMANY AND THE “HISTORY OF EVERYDAY LIFE”

West Germany in the 1980s was a fascinating case of creative acceleration. The historiographical deficits perpetrated by Nazism were compensated by adopting U.S. social science in the 1970s—by Jürgen Kocka and Hans Ulrich Wehler for the nineteenth century, Hans Mommsen (1930–) and Martin Broszat (1926–1989) for the twentieth, eclipsing the influence of Werner Conze, who had protected a place for social history in the earlier time. This social science history institutionalized a high level of methodological and theoretical sophistication, for which Wehler’s multi-volume *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (1987, 1995) was a continuing monument. But a new movement emerged to the left, unhappy with macrostructural analysis, and urging a more interpretive approach to ordinary people’s lives instead. By exploring social history in its subjective and experiential dimensions, the elusive connections between politics and culture could be concretely addressed. The “insides” of the “structures, processes, and patterns” of social analysis could be found. This “history from below” entailed “decentralizing” the approach by carefully constructed historical “miniatures” (“microhistory”). It involved a critique of the optimistic teleologies of modernization driving the social science approach. This new movement took the name *Alltagsgeschichte* (history of everyday life). Its main architects were Alf Lüdtke (1943–), Hans Medick (1939–), and Lutz Niethammer (1939–).

Alltagsgeschichte drew from the British marxist and *Annales* traditions via round tables in Göttingen and Paris in 1978–1982, which produced two volumes, Robert Berdahl et al., *Klassen und Kultur: Sozialanthropologische Perspektiven in der Geschichtsschreibung* (1982), and Hans Medick and David Warren Sabean (eds.), *Interest and Emotion: Essays on the Study of Family and Kinship* (1984). Pierre Bourdieu, the German philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885–1977), E. P. Thompson, and British anthropology were all influences. The turn to “ethnological ways of knowing” was a common theme. These perspectives were opposed by social science historians, confining *Alltagsgeschichte* to the margins of the West German profession. Like social history’s other innovations, it drew sustenance from a political movement, coinciding with the peace movement and the Greens, based in public sector pedagogies in museums, exhibitions, schools, adult education, city cultural offices, local publishing, and self-organized local research. A history workshop movement (“barefoot historians”) was inspired by its British precursor, stressing oral history,

popular memory, and public issues of dealing with the Nazi past. By 1990 the height had passed, but two new journals were launched, *WerkstattGeschichte* (1992–) and *Historische Anthropologie. Kultur, Gesellschaft, Alltag* (1993–), now rivaling *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* as a site of creative social-historical work.

Alltagsgeschichte took various emphases. One was early modern, in the work of Medick and David Sabean (1939–). Medick worked first on early modern political thought, but retooled for a village study of protoindustrialization, talking with the Cambridge Population Group and social anthropologists, E. P. Thompson, *Annalists*, and others. His *Weben und Überleben in Laichingen 1650–1900. Lokalgeschichte als allgemeine Geschichte* (1996), was conceived as a “total history,” combining approaches too often kept apart—quantitative and qualitative, structural history and anthropologies of meaning, history of the family and history of politics, the study of the case (micro-history) and analysis of societal processes of change. The program was laid out in Kriedte, Medick, and Schlumbohm, *Industrialization Before Industrialization* (1977). Sabean’s companion study, *Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700–1870* (1990), was a similar tour de force. Superficially, these works emulated the longitudinal community study of Franco-British demography. But the interpretive ethnographies made the difference, exemplified in Sabean’s earlier *Power in the Blood: Popular Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modern Germany* (1984). A key text was Medick’s article “‘Missionaries in the Rowboat’? Ethnological Ways of Knowing as a Challenge to Social History” (1984), now reprinted several times.

Alf Lüdtke also worked within local parameters of quotidian life, moving from the practices of early nineteenth-century state violence (*Police and State in 19th Century Prussia*, [original German edition, 1982]) to the ambiguities of working-class culture in its everyday expressions, from *Kaiserreich* to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In *Eigen-Sinn. Fabrikalltag, Arbeitererfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis in den Faschismus* (1993), Lüdtke pursued the ambivalencies of working-class survival under successive political regimes, through all the modalities of recognition, self-assertiveness, adjustment, and conformity. Lutz Niethammer moved from studies of denazification after 1945, through the social history of housing before 1914, to a collective project on popular experience in the Ruhr, the three-volume *Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebiet 1930 bis 1960* (1983–1985), based partly on oral history. This was followed by a similar study of industrial life in the GDR (with Alexander von Plato and Dorothee Wierling), *Die*



COMMUNITY STUDIES

Availability of local records (parish registers and their equivalents) and sophisticated demographic methods (like family reconstitution and census analysis) made village studies the classic setting for historical demography. While technically sophisticated, the resulting work could be indifferent to specificities of culture and place, encouraging much potential polarization between social science historians and “qualitative” ones. Social historians at the Max Planck Institute for History in Göttingen used the framework of protoindustrialization to transcend this division, beginning with Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick, and Jürgen Schlumbohm, *Industrialization Before Industrialization* (1977). David Sabean complemented his intensely technical *Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700–1870* (1990) with the imaginatively culturalist *Power in the Blood: Popular Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modern Germany* (1984), a richness also achieved by Medick in his companion study of Laidingen (1996) and the associated essays. Likewise, Thomas Sokoll’s *Household and Family among the Poor:*

The Case of Two Essex Communities in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (1993) was accompanied by advocacy of historical anthropology, as in his essay for Thomas Mergel and Thomas Welskopp (eds.), *Geschichte zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft: Beiträge zur Theoriedebatte* (1997). *Annales* treated social and cultural analysis as discrete projects, whether in Le Roy Ladurie’s books, *Montaillou* (1975) and *Carnival in Romans* (1979), as against the *Peasants of Languedoc* (1966), or in Braudel’s schematic separation of his three levels. British early modern studies more successfully integrated the two, as in Keith Wrightson and David Levine, *Poverty and Piety in an English Village: Terling, 1525–1700* (1979); Keith Wrightson, *The Making of an Industrial Society: Whickham, 1560–1765* (1991); and Barry Reay, *Microhistories: Demography, Society and Culture in Rural England, 1800–1930* (1996). The journal *Continuity and Change: A Journal of Social Structure, Law and Demography in Past Societies* (1986–) encouraged this dialogue across “quantitative and qualitative” work.

volkseigene Erfahrung. Eine Archäologie des Lebens in der Industrieprovinz der DDR (1991), conducted in the final years of Communist rule. *Alltagsgeschichte* was anthologized in Alf Lüdtke (ed.), *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experience and Ways of Life* (1995). Among monographs, Thomas Lindenberger’s *Strassenpolitik: Zur Sozialgeschichte der öffentlichen Ordnung in Berlin 1900 bis 1914* (1995) especially stood out.

PRESENT TENSE: SOCIAL HISTORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As the year 2000 approached, social history had acquired impressive diversity. It had moved from the pioneering qualities of the 1960s, through a period of exuberant growth and aspiring hegemony, to uncertainty and flux in the 1980s, and finally to the eclectic indeterminacy of the 1990s and later. For a while, social historians threatened to separate into camps, as convinced materialists and structuralists faced culturalists and “linguistic turners” across a hardening polemical divide. Such theoretical and epistemological

polarities were repeated across the humanities and social sciences, with varying connections to wider political debates. By the later 1990s, however, much of the passion had cooled.

All the forms of work established during the 1960s and 1970s continued in great profusion, from the technical specialisms of family and population history, to the social histories of class formation, and all the subfields described above, plus others barely mentioned, like the social history of religion, or the growth area of consumption. The huge proliferation of women’s history, and its rethinking via gender, stimulated many creative departures, not least in histories of masculinity and histories of the body. Other fields emerged more prominently for concentrated cross-national research, including most notably social histories of the bourgeoisie.

What disappeared, or had at least gone into recession, was the totalizing ambition—writing the history of whole societies in some integral and holistic way. Part of this was still alive. All phenomena (a policy, an institution, an ideology, an event) might still be placed in social context, or read for their social



THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The Soviet field revealed social history's development in a microcosm. In Britain Edward Hallett Carr (1892–1982) provided an imposing framework with his multi-volume *History of Soviet Russia* (1954–1978), while at Birmingham University Robert W. Davies (1925–) pioneered socioeconomic history of the Stalin years. Moshe Lewin (1921–) reached Birmingham from Vilna via the USSR, Israel, and Paris (where he studied with Braudel), moving later to the United States, with a string of influential books, from *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization* (1966) to *The Making of the Soviet System* (1985). Another ex-citizen of Vilna, Teodor Shanin, contributed *The Awkward Class: Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing Society, Russia 1910–1925* (1972). In the United States Leopold Haimson, author of a key two-part article, “The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905–1917” (1964–1965), inspired historians of the working class, who by the 1980s had energized the field. Reginald E. Zelnik mapped early industrialization through *Labor and Society*

in Tsarist Russia: The Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, 1855–1870 (1971) and *Law and Disorder on the Narova River: The Kreenholm Strike of 1872* (1995). William G. Rosenberg clarified 1917 itself in *Strikes and Revolution in Russia, 1917* (1989), with Diane P. Koenker. Ronald Grigor Suny shaped the general agenda with his “Toward a Social History of the October Revolution” (1983). A fourth figure, Sheila Fitzpatrick, took a more social science approach to the Stalin period. The advance of society-centered approaches against the Soviet field's traditional state-centered emphasis threatened to obscure questions of Stalinist rule, but Lewin, Rosenberg, Suny, and others kept them in view. Questions of political order were addressed in Fitzpatrick's *Everyday Stalinism. Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (1999); those of class formation in Lewis Siegelbaum and Ronald Grigor Suny's conference volume, *Making Workers Soviet: Power, Class, and Identity* (1994); and Soviet societal transformation in Stephen Kotkin's *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (1995).

meanings. But the stronger view, subjecting all facets of human existence to social determinations, was now harder to maintain. “Society,” as a confident materialist projection of social totality, had become much harder to find. Coherence was no longer derived as easily from the economy, or from the functional needs of the social system and its central values (or from some other ordering principle, like the mode of production and its social relations), because the antireductionist pressure of contemporary social and cultural theory had ruled this out. This was very empowering. As the hold of the economy became loosened, and with it the determinative power of the social structure and its causal claims, the imaginative and epistemological space for other kinds of analysis grew. The rich multiplication of new cultural histories was the result.

But there were also costs. The founding inspiration for much social history was a series of grand debates concerning the general crisis of the seventeenth century, the nature of revolutions, the connection between popular revolts and early modern state formation, the rise of absolutism, and so on. For a

while, this impetus carried over. In the mid-1970s, Robert Brenner's major article in *Past and Present* (1976) provoked a wide-ranging debate over agrarian class structure and the origins of capitalism. Rodney Hilton reedited the debate between Maurice Dobb, Paul Sweezy, and others during the 1950s over *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (1976). Perry Anderson published his two volumes, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* and *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (both 1974). Immanuel Wallerstein (a self-avowed Braudelian) published the first volume of *The Modern World-System* (1974). Charles Tilly edited *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (1975). Combinations of modernization theory and neo-Braudelian vision inspired other attempts to capture the structural transition to the modern world, as in the works of Keith Thomas (1933–), *Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century England* (1971) and *Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England, 1500–1800* (1983).

Among social historians (by contrast with historical sociologists), this ambition seemed to have



HISTORY AFTER THE “LINGUISTIC TURN”

After Gareth Stedman Jones’s *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832–1982* (1983) and Joan Scott’s poststructuralist challenge in *Gender and the Politics of History* (1988), social historians experienced a crisis of direction. Stedman Jones and Scott were identified with the breakthrough to social history in the 1960s and 1970s, including a marxist stress on the axiomatic priority of social explanation, but they now advocated forms of linguistic analysis and the primacy of discourse, which denied the former materialism. Debates occurred in many of the leading journals, including *American Historical Review* (1987, 1989), *Journal of Modern History* (1985–1988), *International Labor and Working Class History* (1987), *Past and Present* (1991–1992), and *Social History* (1992–1996), through which “postmodernism” became a catchall term for a variety of culturalist influences, from Foucault, poststructuralism, and literary deconstruction to cultural studies, postcolonialism, and forms of feminist theory. Many social historians accused postmodernists of apostasy—of abandoning social history’s calling, or retreating into playfulness, and even rejecting the historian’s normal rules of evidence. Self-described postmodernists such as Patrick Joyce accused

their critics of clinging to obsolete concepts and approaches, especially materialist conceptions of class. For a while debates became extremely embittered, and in western Europe historians dismissed the linguistic turn as a specifically U.S. preoccupation. However, the more extreme polemics, such as Bryan D. Palmer’s *Descent into Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of Social History* (1990), seemed to subside, leaving imaginative combinations of social and cultural history in place, including Kathleen Canning’s *Languages of Labor and Gender: Female Factory Work in Germany, 1850–1914* (1996), Rudy Koshar’s *Germany’s Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century* (1998), and Leora Auslander’s *Taste and Power: Furnishing Modern France* (1996). The debates were presented in Keith Jenkins (ed.), *The Postmodern History Reader* (1997), and a journal, *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* (1997–). Robert F. Berkhofer Jr.’s sympathetic exegesis, *Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse* (1995), contrasted poignantly with his earlier *A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis* (1969), a manifesto for social science perspectives at the inception of social history’s contemporary emergence.

gone. Hobsbawm—with his four *Age* volumes and *Nations and Nationalism since 1870* (1990)—remained an exception. In that sense, the power of forward motion, so energizing in the 1960s and 1970s, borne by what seemed the unlimited capacity of social explanation, had certainly departed. That amorphously aggrandizing desire for primacy in the discipline was replaced by a more eclectic repertoire of approaches and themes, for which the new cultural history and its very different kinds of interdisciplinarity became the key. The boundaries between different kinds of history became extraordinarily more blurred. Many

social historians continued to reproduce the distinctive (and legitimate) autonomies of their work, methodologically and topically. But many others were moving increasingly freely across the old distinctions of the social, the cultural, the political, the intellectual, and so on, allowing new hybridities to arise. The openness in these directions was the greatest single change in the stance of social historians in the 1980s and 1990s, and showed every sign of continuing. A continued willingness to participate in the conditions of its own disappearance may be the greatest mark of social history’s success.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL HISTORY



Mary Lindemann

Social historians exploit a variety of archival, manuscript, literary, and nonwritten sources. Indeed almost every historical source is grist for the social historical mill, thus a survey of the sources of social history must always be incomplete. Enterprising social historians over the decades have unearthed many new documentary treasures and devised novel ways of using old sources. This brief survey concentrates, therefore, only on the most common ways social historians have employed sources.

QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE SOURCES

An old but still functional distinction is that separating quantitative and qualitative information. Social historians who use principally quantitative materials apply the methods of the social sciences, in particular sociology, political science, statistics, and demography, to history, thereby writing social science history. Quantitative sources are generally those that allow historians to count or those that historians can analyze statistically. Historians who mine them work with large collections of data, frequently laboring in teams and using computers to correlate, aggregate, and evaluate the data accumulated. Many historians focus on discerning broad structural shifts and documenting secular, that is, century-long, changes. Their sources are habitually those generated by governments, for instance, censuses and tax lists, as well as parish records, price and wage data, hospital ledgers, and property deeds. These historians practice what they like to characterize as “history from the bottom up” and “history with the politics left out.” Such scholars—as, for instance, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie on the peasants of Languedoc, Georges Duby on medieval rural life, and David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber on Tuscans and their families—have typically dealt with masses of people and are concerned mostly with uncovering the structural forces affecting or even determining people’s lives.

One type of social history prefers what might be called qualitative sources, those that are either not quantifiable or that do not lend themselves easily or readily to quantification. Such were the sources of the “old” social history and of the narrative history that related the stories of entire peoples or whole groups. These authors usually based their judgments on the evidence in elite writings, novels, and other prose forms. Thomas Babington Macaulay’s splendid, multivolumed *History of England from the Accession of James II* (1849–1861) and Jules Michelet’s *The People* (1846) are classic examples.

Those historians who instead looked for the hidden mainsprings of history and searched for broader structures criticized “older” histories as impressionistic. Whether these dissenters were historians working in the *Annales* paradigm or were those driven by “grand social theories,” that is, the metahistorical narratives proposed by Karl Marx, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Georg Simmel, they accepted the existence and action of major determinant processes in history and rejected analyses based on the influences of “great men” and “great ideas.” This caused a turn to quantifiable sources as well as a search for what the *Annales* historian Fernand Braudel called the *longue durée* (long time frame). These scholars typically evinced a passionate curiosity about people, including peasants, women, the poor, transients, and heretics, often neglected by old-fashioned historians and traditional histories that highlighted political, intellectual, and diplomatic matters. In addition some, again like Braudel, suggested that the methods of geography and geology and their sources, such as measuring tree rings to determine climatic change or, as Georges Duby and others attempted, a minute analysis of field patterns to determine modifications in agricultural practices, had to be brought to bear on the historical experience.

The search for structures that lay deeply embedded in the society required attention to large sets of data. Some of these sources had been employed previously. Economic historians, for example, had es-

estimated long-term adjustments in prices and wages and located movements in standards of living. Still, not everyone was satisfied with detecting and examining structures. Others were displeased with the fastidious and sometimes boring or clumsy prose style quantifiers preferred. These scholars called for a return to narrative as Lawrence Stone proposed in *The Past and the Present* (1981).

Moreover macrohistorical movements or grand structures seemed to rob people of their agency in shaping history and denied them their own choices in life. Structural history has an unfortunate tendency to place people in socioeconomic “boxes,” where their actions were constrained if not dictated by huge impersonal forces that they could not perceive, control, or evade. Individual agency was lost, as was the political part of human experience. In reaction, some historians insisted, for instance, that knowing the sizes of families or households—understanding perhaps that one family type, described by John Hajnal, had persisted since the late Middle Ages—revealed little about what “went on” in those units. High levels of infant mortality might be interpreted as demonstrating that families invested hardly anything either materially or emotionally into very young children and that little true affection existed in families produced by marriages arranged by parents who based their decisions primarily on economic considerations. To discuss feelings and emotions, historians consulted other sources, including “ego-documents,” court rolls, administrative records, diaries, letters, and prescriptive literature like advice manuals.

Of course the division between quantitative “lumpers” on the one hand and qualitative “feelers” on the other is artificial, as is the split between those who supposedly look only for structures and those who prefer to stress the ability of individuals to manipulate their own situations. Rarely do “pure” types of any exist. Quantitative historians often turn to qualitative sources if only for illustrations. Historians who prefer qualitative or anecdotal materials always have been plagued by nagging questions of typicality, and few ignore the possibilities of counting when and where they can. Many historians have gracefully combined the two types of sources to great benefit, as, for instance, Stone did in his works on the aristocracy and on family, sex, and marriage in early modern England. It is also important that some sources, especially court records, have been used extensively both qualitatively and quantitatively in social history writing. Moreover, in the late twentieth century a renewed desire to return politics to the social historical agenda, a “linguistic turn” that emphasizes the methods of textual and literary criticism, the rise of a “new” cul-

tural history, and microhistory, encouraged historians to cast their source nets more widely and to adopt unfamiliar ways of exploring old standbys, such as wills, fiction, and court cases.

Besides the rough quantitative-qualitative split discussed above, sources can be further divided into four broad categories:

1. sources produced by government or administrative agencies, broadly defined;
2. nongovernmental sources or those created by private groups and individuals, including businesses;
3. researcher-generated sources, including interviews and oral histories; and
4. nonwritten sources and artifacts.

Many of these are deposited in archives and libraries, but they may also remain in private hands. Artifacts may not be “deposited” in any real sense at all, although of course archives, museums, and private collections preserve large numbers of artifacts. The first two categories have proven the richest sources for social historical studies.

GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES

The governing process at local, national, and international levels begets a range of sources and vast quantities of material suitable for historical inquiries. Archives maintained by government agencies house the bulk of these records. Although some scholars have criticized such sources for revealing only the perspective of elites, almost all historians plow these fertile fields. Despite frequent and extensive use by researchers over decades, their riches are far from depleted. While the variety of these documents is immense, social historians have most regularly and thoroughly mined tax rolls and censuses; criminal, civil, and ecclesiastical court cases; notarial records, especially wills; parish registers; property accounts; guild and union records; and police files. Obviously other sources that some might consider purely political or even diplomatic, such as the records of city councils or the military, can also yield vital information for the social historian. Indeed the social historian who probes issues of state and society, for example, ignores at his or her peril the actions of governing bodies, such as city councils and parliaments, or the inner workings of political parties as they discussed and molded social, welfare, economic, and cultural policies.

Historians and demographers who investigate population movements regularly use tax rolls, censuses, and parish registers to amass information about

the movement of peoples and to collect raw data for calculations of mortality, morbidity, nuptiality, and fertility. In the history of governance, however, the census is a relatively recent phenomenon. At least theoretically censuses make a comprehensive accounting of a specified population. The word “census” is of Latin origin, and the Romans took what they called censuses principally for computing tax burdens and for purposes of military conscription. Modern censuses, those meant to include all or almost all of the members of a given population, date from the eighteenth century and only became a normal and usual function of government in the nineteenth century. The U.S. census, for instance, began in 1790. Its purpose was explicitly political, that is, to calculate seats in the House of Representatives. Some European states had initiated censuses earlier, but they were rarely inclusive. Social historians and demographers use censuses to determine the movement of people; the composition of a population; employment patterns; the relative wealth and poverty of a population and its segments; racial and ethnic makeups; standards of living; settlement patterns; and types of housing.

Despite the wealth of facts they contain, censuses have proven less useful for historians and demographers in determining mortality, morbidity, marriage, and birthrates. In the nineteenth century most states mandated civil registers of births, marriages, deaths, and in some cases disease occurrences. The registration of the last pertained mostly to infectious or contagious diseases, especially to sexually transmitted ones. Civil records deliver to medical historians meaningful information about diseases, but they also permit scholars to develop perspectives on vital statistics and compare them synchronically and diachronically. Governments generally prepare aggregate data and publish it in printed volumes of statistics; in digitalized and machine-readable forms; on CD-ROMs; and on the Internet. These aggregations then serve as sources, rendering to researchers an abundance of analyzable material. Such database collections have also been compiled for earlier times.

Scholars doing demographic, population, and family reconstruction studies for periods before censuses and civil registers were introduced normally consult parish registers. Raw data for the quantitative analysis of the size and the health of populations first were generated in the sixteenth century, when some Protestant parishes began keeping track of births and deaths by recording christenings and burials as well as weddings. The Council of Trent (1545–1563) mandated that Catholic parishes record similar occurrences. Even before such specialized registers existed, the bills of mortality began recording deaths from

plague in Milan in 1452. The most famous of these bills date from the great plague of London in the mid 1660s. Historians of the family have often used such sources to reconstruct families and households. Louis Henry pioneered the method of family reconstruction in the 1950s to study fertility among French women. Subsequently family reconstruction re-created entire parishes and whole villages, as demonstrated in Arthur Imhof's *Die verlorenen Welten* (1984) and David Sabeau's two volumes on the Württemberg village of Neckarhausen (1990, 1998). The application of statistical packages and computer programs has facilitated and accelerated the task of family reconstruction.

Tax rolls, known as *cadastres* in the medieval and early modern periods, and tax records, including property, income, excise, and sales, furnish equally sustaining nourishment for knowledge-hungry social and economic historians. Historians who plot shifting patterns of wealth occasionally employ extremely sophisticated statistical techniques to discover and evaluate the rise or fall of real wages and to determine relative standards of living. They often work comparatively, linking societies chronologically, geographically, or both. The assemblage of prosopographies or collective biographies relies heavily on tax rolls as well as on censuses, parish registers, and wills. Real estate records and property plans, urban and rural, function in a like manner, allowing historians to determine patterns of landholding and uses and alterations in them over time.

Social historians have exploited court records, particularly criminal records, extensively and creatively and to many different purposes. Historians who ascertained secular developments in crime, for example, the striking decline in personal offenses and the equally striking rise in property crime after the Middle Ages, turned to court records, both secular and ecclesiastical. For the early modern period these documents are far more likely to exist for towns than for rural areas. Some cities possess enviable series of unbroken records. Amsterdam's, for example, run from the late sixteenth century through the early nineteenth century. These records have yielded valuable information on issues far removed from crime by revealing the lives of those who left little other evidence. Criminal acts frequently occasioned extensive, probing investigations that produced dossiers rich in details. In these records historians often recover the voices of those who otherwise would have remained mute. Court cases have permitted social historians to construct sophisticated studies of prostitution, such as that of Lotte van de Pol for Amsterdam, and equally fascinating treatments of other aspects of everyday life in major urban centers. The deliberations and decisions of ecclesiastical

courts disclose the dimensions of religious dissent of course but also broader morals, common attitudes, and daily routines. Historians have made astonishing discoveries in the annals of the various Catholic inquisitions. Heavily exploited in quantitative terms to trace, for instance, the numbers and characters of the persecutions of heretics, such documents also have been useful in building microhistories.

Microhistory arose as a reaction to a prevalent trend in social history, that is, the practice of studying large groups by evaluating masses of material and seeking to define overarching structures. Historians who practice the abductive method of microhistory turn instead to examining a few extraordinarily revealing documents, often those that record unique or sensational events, such as the incidents of early modern cannibalism studied by Edward Muir. These scholars seek to reinsert individuals and historical agency into history by revealing the contours of European popular culture. The most famous examples of a successful microhistorical approach are Carlo Ginzburg's story of a heretic miller in *The Cheese and the Worms* (1980) and Natalie Zemon Davis's brilliantly retold tale of *The Return of Martin Guerre* (1983).

Police files function in many of the same ways as court records. Police records per se developed when governments began to recast police forces as executory agencies and created policemen in the nineteenth century. Police records reveal much about those people society defined as criminals, yet their utility far exceeds that objective. Police agents also infiltrated trade unions and kept a watch on other groups considered suspicious or deemed deviant. Therefore much knowledge about early unions, such as the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) or the seemingly innocuous friendly societies in Britain, derives from police reports filed on groups and individuals.

Notarial records are of inestimable worth in reconstructing everyday lives. Notaries were legally empowered to compose, witness, and certify the validity of documents and to take depositions. In addition they drew up wills and marriage agreements. Their archives are voluminous but usually poorly indexed and thus cumbersome to consult. Notarial records, especially wills, have helped count and calculate wealth and family arrangements; document trends in religious beliefs, as Michel Vovelle traced the progress of dechristianization; prove affective relationships within families; follow the movement of property and goods among kin; and analyze the role of gender in familial and business relationships. The possibilities for the historical exploitation of notarial records are by no means exhausted by this list. Late twentieth-century studies used notarial records to

observe the dynamics of migrant communities in early modern Europe.

Finally, the records of guilds and unions can be included among administrative or governmental sources. Unions differ from guilds in that they represent laborers rather than all the members of a particular craft. A new phenomenon in the nineteenth century, labor unions generally kept their own records, which, along with the accounts of political parties, sometimes were placed in government safekeeping. At the end of the twentieth century many unions and political parties maintained their own archives distinct from government collections. Guilds (and unions, too, to some extent) were multifunctional organizations that exercised cultural, philanthropic, and religious functions as well as economic ones. Their records not only reveal details about economic structures and production methods but also trace religious, social, and cultural trends among nonelite groups. Those interested in the history of industrialization and the rise of free-trade practices have used guild materials and in particular disputes among apprentices, journeymen, and masters to follow subtle shifts in the business world, especially during periods of economic upheaval, depression, or boom. These records have been equally useful in documenting the early history of consumerism. The right to produce new commodities, such as umbrellas in the seventeenth century or porcelain in the eighteenth century, had to be negotiated among the various craft guilds. But guilds also formed defenses against new entrepreneurs, like the porcelain manufacturer Josiah Wedgwood, who worked outside the craft system.

NONGOVERNMENTAL SOURCES

Historians generally seek the more or less official records described above in archives and libraries, yet nongovernmental material frequently reposes in archives and libraries as well. Personal papers, memoirs, business records, and clipping files or scrapbooks are often deposited for preservation in archives even though they properly belong to the category of private and personal records. Newspapers, magazines, prescriptive literature, and fictional works are found more frequently in libraries than in archives, although many archives house extensive runs of newspapers.

Social historians have quarried newspapers for a multitude of reasons. Obviously newspapers, a novelty of the eighteenth century, help determine what happened. Yet the definition of "what happened" differs for the social historian as compared to the diplomatic or political historian. The social historian might be more interested in articles on society and culture or

in advertisements and letters to the editor than in so-called hard news. Of course newspapers reported on political issues that bore on social history directly or indirectly, for example, parliamentary debates on the implementation of social insurance schemes or old-age pensions. Other historians have looked at advertisements to document, for instance, the rise of a consumer culture, the proliferation of goods and services, the growth of pharmaceutical and patent medicine businesses, and a burgeoning book trade. The rise of the penny press has much to say about changing tastes among the reading public and about rates of literacy. The history of fashion, too, can be pursued in newspaper columns. Few social historical topics cannot but be enriched by a thorough survey of contemporary newspapers and magazines.

An early type of what might be called a general-interest magazine that lacked pictures and advertising was the moral weekly that appeared in manuscript in the seventeenth century and in print in the next century. Journals, like Joseph Addison and Richard Steele's *Spectator* (1711–1712), the most famous and the most widely imitated of the many moral weeklies, had literary pretensions. But more important for the purposes of the social historian, they also critiqued conventional morals and society. Akin to the moral weeklies but more practical in content, the publications of the many “beneficial” and “purposeful” organizations of the mid- to late eighteenth century were explicit attempts to stimulate improvements in agriculture, business, and commerce as well as manners and morals. Titles like *The Patriot (Der Patriot)* in Hamburg (1721–1723) were generally moral in tone and content. But the *Deliberations (Verhandlungen und Schriften)* of the Patriotic Society founded later in Hamburg (1765) focused on practical proposals for the best ways to relieve the poor, raise silkworms, or build and maintain urban hospitals. In the Netherlands *The Merchant (De Koopman)* discussed economic morality and proper commercial behavior in the 1760s but also detailed schemes for reawakening a flagging commerce and animating declining industries in the republic.

Journals shade over into another source that social historians have exploited quite lavishly and sometimes slavishly, prescriptive literature. This literature includes all publications that prescribe behavior, like catechisms, sermons, advice manuals, and articles in newspapers and journals, for instance, women's magazines. Prescriptive literature touches on practically every topic of concern to social historians. For example, women received advice on household management, on style, on “getting and keeping a man,” on sex, on the proper expression of emotions, and on the

choice of a career. Newly enthroned experts, such as physicians, addressed a plentitude of advice literature to parents about how to raise their children. Easy to find and use, such material provides a surfeit of information on social standards and behavioral expectations. Prescriptive literature is, however, less serviceable in determining what people actually did than in determining what they were instructed to do. Thus advice literature may produce a false picture of reality unless combined with other sources.

Social historians once used novels, poems, plays, and other forms of fiction as illustrative material or as contemporary “witnesses” of their times. These sources fell out of fashion as the new social history, with its tendency to emphasize masses or large groups of people and nonliterate persons or nonelites, took firm hold. In the early twenty-first century, however, under the impact of the new cultural history and after the “linguistic turn,” social historians returned to belles lettres, reading them as texts, often deconstructing them into their component parts, pinpointing where concepts and phrases originated, and identifying the extent to which they represented a cultural heritage that linked popular and elite cultures. Immensely influential both as a theoretical work and as an example, Mikhail Bakhtin's study of François Rabelais identified a culture of the grotesque that elites and nonelites shared.

Not only governments and organizations such as guilds assembled and maintained documentary collections. Various other organizations, voluntary, philanthropic, and mutual benefit, for instance, preserved their records as well. Moreover personal papers and “ego-documents” are indispensable aids if sometimes also lucky finds for historians in general and for the social historian in particular. Many social historians have expressed considerable skepticism about the value of government-generated sources for writing an informed and reliable history from the bottom up and therefore search for more personal and immediate materials in less-known and less-frequented archives.

Commercial records are invaluable in composing economic and business histories and in investigating the lives of laborers through personnel records. Historians have emphasized the utility of such sources in constructing collective biographies (or prosopographies, the technical term for early modern collective biographies) of several social classes or status groups. Yet much there is worthy of the attention of anyone interested in the development of business cultures or the involvement of business in matters of welfare and social insurance or for scholars studying patterns of production and consumerism.

A number of private groups, such as philanthropic and eleemosynary societies, for example, the Coram Foundling Hospital in London, clubs, ladies' charitable circles, suffragette groups, friendly societies, benevolent associations, and international leagues like the YMCA and YWCA, construct, staff, and maintain their own collections. Such sources form the nucleus for institutional histories but expedite or make possible other kinds of historical inquiries as well. Benevolent societies can reveal much about laborers' quotidian experiences, for example. An investigation of clubs might demonstrate how networks of sociability evolved and contributed to the creation of a public sphere, such as that postulated by Jürgen Habermas, or reveal the social and philanthropic activities that women dominated.

A wide range of what might be called nondeposited sources is also available. To some extent these include things that have not been identified as sources or whose existence is unknown to the historical community. Some ingenuity is required. Michael B. Miller, for instance, found and catalogued many of the business records of the Parisian *grand magasin* (department store), the Bon Marché, stored in the building, and he marshalled them into a history of marketing, consumerism, and bourgeois culture in late nineteenth-century France. Poking around in old edifices, attics, barns, and outbuildings has produced unsuspected cornucopias. Serendipity is not to be scorned; some of the most mesmerizing historical finds have been accidental. Judith Brown's lively account of a lesbian nun in seventeenth-century Italy (*Immodest Acts: The Life of a Lesbian Nun in Renaissance Italy*, 1986) rested on just such a fortuitous discovery. Historians sometimes judge it expedient to advertise in national or local newspapers or in more specialized journals to locate previously unsuspected caches. The diligent prying of historians has brought to light casebooks of physicians, surgeons, and midwives; bundles of letters and diaries; and annotated almanacs that had been left to molder away in attics or basements.

In the late twentieth century historians paid increasing attention to what Dutch and German scholars call "ego-documents." These are not traditional biographies or autobiographies but rather the writings of ordinary people, often those living on the edge of respectable society, who never intended to publish their manuscripts. The term sometimes is expanded to include contemporary narratives written about such people. A good example of such a contemporary account is F. L. Kersteman's *De bredasche heldinne* (The heroine from Breda, 1751). A number of these have been uncovered, edited, and published and have aided social historians in lifting individuals out of the mael-

strom of history by endowing ordinary lives with agency, dignity, and texture. Admittedly these documents have clarified the actions and thoughts of the idiosyncratic and the marginal more than those of the average person. Nonetheless, such works are equally precious for comprehending the choices ordinary people made and understanding why they embarked on their courses of action. Ego-documents have demonstrated how the rigid categories constructed by historians preoccupied with studying large groups and big structures might be less confining in practice and how even the *menu peuple* (lesser folk) exercised volition.

RESEARCHER-GENERATED SOURCES

Not all scholars, however, look at sources held in archives, libraries, or private hands. Many social historical documents are generated by researchers themselves. Interviews, oral histories, and photographs are excellent examples of common researcher-generated materials. Another such source might be the databases historians have built up from raw numbers that are evaluated either by the researchers or by others for further, often different forms of historical analysis.

Interviews and oral histories seem for the most part restricted to recent historical events and circumstances where the subjects are still alive and talking. Oral historians have sought ways to recover the lineaments of ordinary lives, probing aspects of sexuality and emotions, for example, that written records might fail to reveal or even conceal. Historians studying nonliterate societies employ anthropological techniques to reclaim knowledge about groups that left behind few or no written traces. While it is true that sometimes the oral recitation of legends, epics, and tales permits the historian to delve far back in history using sophisticated methods of recovery and regression, most oral histories focus on those who articulate their own stories. Not all oral histories or interviews, for that matter, are primarily researcher-generated. Oral history projects, the most famous of which is the American Federal Writer's Project of the 1930s that chronicled the memories of former slaves, assemble teams of interviewers to collect oral histories on tape, as interview notes, or from questionnaires. The tapes or transcripts are then deposited in archives and made available to others, who often use them for purposes entirely distinct from those the original collectors envisioned.

Another example of a generated source is the database. Databases are usually compilations of statistical materials or raw data that can be quantified. The material is arranged to make it easy or easier to search

and retrieve information. Large-scale projects, such as demographic studies extending over centuries or investigations of family size and composition, require enormous databases. Examples include the Demographic Database in Umeå, Sweden, an outstanding source for the study of mortality, morbidity, and fertility trends; and the database built by the Cambridge (England) Group for the History of Population and Social Structure for analyzing small groups, such as the household and the family, over time.

NONWRITTEN SOURCES AND ARTIFACTS

Photographs are another form of evidence that is sometimes researcher-generated but that, like artifacts, is not written. Most archives and libraries have large photographic and iconographic collections of photographs and other pictorial material, such as paintings, drawings, posters, lithographs, woodcuts, medals, and icons. Social historians have used iconography for a wide variety of purposes. While many historians are content to employ pictures as illustrations, others have used them more subtly and creatively in forging their arguments. Their depictions become evidence and proof. Caroline Bynum's study of female saints, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast* (1987), uses iconography portraying holy women and Christ figures to link physicality and medieval religiosity. Robert Scribner's *For the Sake of Simple Folk* (1981) made woodcuts an integral part of his portrayal of the faith of "simple folk" during the Reformation. Photographs have provided analytical material for many modern historical studies on family life, street culture, industrialization, technology, and the commercialization of leisure among others. Other nonwritten sources—moving pictures, films, advertisements, playbills, and fashions—can be employed similarly, although all require the mastery of techniques peculiar to the specific medium. Pictures are no more transparent than other media.

Maps and collections of maps are less integral to most social historical inquiries, although zoning maps, street plans, and field divisions have been effective in discussions of housing configurations, the construction of community, local patterns of sociability, agricultural change, and even the structuring of patronage-clientage axes in neighborhoods. Medical historians have deployed maps to demonstrate the relationships between diseases and socioeconomic factors, such as poverty.

Other nonwritten sources fall into the category of artifacts. While artifacts may be found in libraries and archives, they are just as often not. Museums, especially those devoted to representations of everyday

life, provide information for historians who study material culture as well as urban and rural lifestyles. Furniture; conveyances, such as carriages, automobiles, and airplanes; household items, such as dishes and cooking utensils; clothing; and even knickknacks illuminate the physical conditions of life among a range of social groups or classes.

Architecture, too, is important. Open-air museums contain real buildings or replicas that represent the types of housing people inhabited and often exhibit the physical layout of villages and neighborhoods. When older sections of cities and villages still exist, these living museums are critically important for giving historians a viscerally real sense of place. Nothing conveys the feel of a medieval city better than a stroll down one of its serpentine streets. The vistas of Georges-Eugène Haussmann's Paris convey the culture of the European belle époque, as do the paintings of Edgar Degas and Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec. In the last two decades of the twentieth century cultural historians "read" monuments, memorials, and hallowed sites for their historical content in efforts to construct histories of memory and commemoration. Likewise the concepts of display, representation, and self-fashioning have required historians to interpret statues and paintings as well as texts for information on how, for instance, regal figures like Louis XIV devised their special images of kingship and exerted authority.

The intriguing subject of social space and its construction leads historians to look at the layout of roads and places, especially where public spectacles such as executions and fireworks were staged, and to seek information on how class, status, and gender determined the allocation of space. Historians have also investigated the political implications of public spaces and performances, among them Lynn Hunt in her study of class and culture in the French Revolution and Mona Ozouf in her investigation of revolutionary festivals.

This brief survey of the sources of social history by no means exhausts the topic. Rather, it merely highlights the fact that almost no document is without its use for social history. Social historians have been and will continue to be imaginative in their application of sources and unflagging in their attempts to unearth new ones.

Social history once was termed the history of the "inarticulate." In fact, through discovery of new sources and innovative uses of familiar ones, social historians have advanced a host of topics previously considered unresearchable. Consequently the field has moved from areas with abundant records, such as protests, to cover a much wider range of topics and groups, many of which have gaps in data. For in-

stance, it is hard to document how children experienced childhood, or to pinpoint the frequency of adulterous behaviors, though qualitative evidence of divorce cases provides clues. The discovery of new

sources and the clever exploitation of older ones have allowed social history to remain fresh and innovative and have reduced the sense that some areas of life will be forever veiled to the historical gaze.

See also Printing and Publishing (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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THE ANNALES PARADIGM



Peter Burke

The phrase “the Annales Paradigm,” coined by the American historian Traian Stoianovitch in 1976, implies that the French journal currently entitled *Annales: histoire et sciences sociales* (but long known as *Annales: Économies, sociétés, civilisations*), offered or offers a model for a revolution in historical writing along the lines of the scientific revolutions whose structure was studied by Thomas Kuhn. To speak of a single model or paradigm, rather than a set of different paradigms, is something of a simplification. To identify a single journal or even the movement associated with it with the series of innovations described as “the new history” (*la nouvelle histoire*) is something of an exaggeration. All the same, the editors of the journal (which was founded in 1929 under the title *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* and has continued to publish important studies of social history in the wide sense of that fluid term) have always encouraged their readers to experiment with new approaches.

THE FOUNDERS

The founders of the journal, Lucien Febvre (1878–1956) and Marc Bloch (1886–1944), colleagues at the University of Strasbourg after World War I, were also collaborators in the project of reforming, if not revolutionizing historical writing in France and elsewhere. Their goal was a broader, “more human” history that would be less concerned with narrating political events and describing institutions. The new history would be problem oriented rather than story oriented. It would be particularly concerned with the analysis of economic and social structures and trends.

The new historians, as Febvre and Bloch envisaged them, would be consciously interdisciplinary, drawing ideas and methods from geography, psychology, sociology, social anthropology, linguistics, and so on. The editorial in the first issue of *Annales* (as it is generally known) amounted to a declaration of war on the artificial divisions between history and the social sciences and between the medieval and modern

periods. “The walls are so high that they often impede the view.” The editorial committee included a geographer, an economist, a sociologist, and a specialist in political science, and contributors were encouraged to write economic or social history in the broad sense of those terms. From the start, *Annales* was no ordinary journal but the flagship of a movement.

To understand the aims of Febvre, the senior partner and the movement’s charismatic leader (one is tempted to say “prophet”), and Bloch, his more moderate and constructive colleague, it is necessary to look at what they themselves had produced before the foundation of the journal. Febvre, a specialist on the early modern period, had written his doctoral thesis on his native province of Franche-Comté in the age of its ruler Philip II. He had worked on the French Renaissance but was best known for two interests, the history of religion and historical geography, on which he had published a lively textbook, *La terre et l'évolution humaine* (*The Earth and Human Evolution*; 1922), arguing strongly against the determinism particularly associated at that time with the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904). As for religion, Febvre had published studies of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Franche-Comté, a biography of Martin Luther (1928), and in 1929 itself, a typically aggressive and path-breaking article on the origins of the Reformation in France, castigating his colleagues for practicing a hidebound ecclesiastical history focused on institutions rather than what he advocated, a history of religion informed by social history and psychology.

Bloch, on the other hand, was a historian of the Middle Ages. Like Febvre, by 1929 he had produced two rather different kinds of history. He was best known as an economic historian specializing on the problem of serfdom and working more generally on French rural history—on which he would publish a major monograph in 1931. However, he was also the author of a remarkable study in what would later be known as “the history of collective mentalities,” a book about the long-lasting belief in the healing pow-

ers of the kings of France and England, *Les rois thaumaturges* (*The Royal Touch*; 1924). Bloch too had recently published an important article on historical method, “A Contribution towards a Comparative History of European Societies” (1928).

Annales d'histoire économique et sociale was an appropriate title for the journal in the 1930s. Economic history predominated, making the journal a French equivalent of the German, *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (founded in 1903), with which it deliberately competed, and the British *Economic History Review*. However, “economic history” was understood by the *Annales* group in a wide sense of the term, as two classic articles in the first volume show: one by the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (1862–1935) on the culture of medieval merchants, and the other by Georges Lefebvre (1874–1959) on the French Revolution as an event in agrarian history. In any case, the editors intended from the start to cultivate what they called “the almost virgin territory of social history.” In the 1930s they singled out three themes for particular attention: urban history, the family, and the comparative study of nobilities.

The publication of the first issue of *Annales* in 1929 was an important event in the history of historical thought, but the books and articles already mentioned suggest that Bloch and Febvre had begun their intellectual innovations much earlier. Nor were they completely isolated in their critique of the historical establishment of their time or in their attempt to renew historical studies. Economic historians in Germany, Britain, and elsewhere were rebelling against the traditional dominance of political history. A senior colleague who was something of a model as well as a friend to both of them was Pirenne, whom they had invited to edit the new journal. Another was the Frenchman Henri Berr (1863–1954), a historical entrepreneur whose editorship of the interdisciplinary *Revue de synthèse historique*, as well as of a series of book-length studies entitled *Évolution de l'humanité* (*The evolution of humanity*) gave Febvre, Bloch, and other historians of their persuasion the opportunity to make their ideas known to a wider public than that of their students and colleagues.

Among the books published in Berr's series, two especially deserve a mention here. Bloch's *La société féodale* (*Feudal Society*; 2 vols., 1939–1940) is an unusually original work of synthesis. It moves away from the traditional legal conception of feudalism, in terms of land tenure on condition of military service, toward what would later be described as a “total history” of a type of society dominated by warriors, which came into existence as a response to invasion. It was a history of social structures and collective attitudes (or “historical psychology”) as well as economic and political institutions. Febvre, who reviewed the book, found it a little too sociological for his taste in the sense that it privileged structures over individuals. Febvre's own contribution to the series, planned in the 1920s but published only in 1942, was *Le problème de l'incroyance au XVIIe siècle: La religion de Rabelais* (*The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais*). The book focused on a single individual in order to explore the problem of the limits to thought in a particular period of history. In this study, reacting with his usual vehemence against an earlier interpretation, Febvre argued that Rabelais was not an unbeliever. He could not have been an atheist because, according to Febvre, atheism was literally unthinkable at this time. There was no place for this idea in the mental structures of Rabelais and his contemporaries, or as Febvre preferred to say, in their *outillage mental*, which he understood in terms of the “pre-logical thought” that had been described by his former teacher, the philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939).

the twentieth century. The change of title, encouraged by Febvre, from “Philip II and the Mediterranean” to “The Mediterranean and Philip II,” was extremely significant. To the surprise of its early readers, this large volume began with some three hundred pages of historical geography, moving on to a description of economic, political, and social structures and trends (notably refeudalization and the “bankruptcy of the bourgeoisie”). Only in the third and final section did Braudel offer a relatively conventional account of the major events of Philip II’s long reign.

The division of the volume into these three sections was justified in the preface by what might be called Braudel’s historical sociology of time. In the first place, he distinguished what he called “unconscious history” or “the long term” (*la longue durée*), from the relatively superficial short term, the time of events and experience (*histoire événementielle*), which he described in one of his most famous phrases as “surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs.” Within the long term, Braudel went on to distinguish the time of social structures, changing gradually over the centuries, from geo-historical time, profoundest and slowest of all, which was measured in millennia.

Braudel’s ideas about time became paradigmatic, at least in certain circles in France, especially after their elaboration in one of his most important articles, “Histoire et sciences sociales: La longue durée” (“History and the Social Sciences: the Long-Term;” 1958; Trans. in Braudel, 1980). The effect of these ideas can be seen in a series of French doctoral theses, beginning with those of Pierre Chaunu (b. 1923) on Spain’s transatlantic trade (1955–1960) and Pierre Goubert (b. 1915) on the Beauvais region (1960). These theses were generally divided into two parts, under the headings “structures” and “trends” (*la conjoncture*).

This adaptation of Braudel, which virtually eliminated the events to which he had devoted the third part of his own dissertation, owed a good deal to the example and teaching of his older colleague, Ernest Labrousse (1895–1986). A Marxist, Labrousse had published two important studies in economic history in 1933 and 1944, at a time when Braudel was virtually unknown. He later turned to social history, including that of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, and became a kind of “grey eminence” of the *Annales* movement, a major influence not only on young historians working for their *doctorat d’État*—among them Maurice Agulhon (b. 1926), Pierre Chaunu, François Furet (1927–1997), Pierre Goubert, and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (b. 1929)—but also on Braudel himself, whose increasing interest in quanti-

THE SECOND GENERATION

World War II was a watershed in the history of the *Annales* movement. Bloch was shot by the Germans in 1944, while Febvre effectively became part of the establishment after 1945, as a member of the Institut de France, French delegate to UNESCO, and founder of the Centre des Recherches Historiques (1949) at what was then the École Pratique des Hautes Études. Aged sixty-seven in 1945, Febvre gradually left the direction of both the journal and the movement to his intellectual “son,” Fernand Braudel (1902–1985).

Braudel, who was already working on his doctoral thesis in the 1930s, was among the early contributors to *Annales*. Drafted in prisoner-of-war camps in Lübeck and Mainz, and defended as a thesis in 1947, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II* (*The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*; 1949) is viewed as one of the most important products of the *Annales* movement, as well as one of the most outstanding and original historical studies published in

tative history (most visible in the second edition of his *Mediterranean*, published in 1966) owed much to Labrousse's example.

The young historians mentioned above formed the second generation of the *Annales* group, together with the medievalist Georges Duby (1919–1997), the agricultural historian Jean Meuvret (1909–1971), best known for his emphasis on the recurrent “subsistence crises” of the old regime, and, on the edge of the group, the Marxist historian of Spain, Pierre Vilar. Duby, Goubert, and Le Roy Ladurie established the pattern of regional histories of the Maconnais, the Beauvaisis, Languedoc, Provence, Savoy, Brittany, and so on. Their studies began with geographical structures and ended with economic and social trends, which were usually studied over a century or more. They wrote what the French call “serial history” (*l'histoire sérielle*) and distinguished phases of expansion (“A-phases,” as the French economist François Simiand called them) from phases of contraction (“B-phases”). The trends this group of historians analyzed were social as well as economic. Indeed, one hallmark of the new generation was the interest it showed in a new subdiscipline, historical demography, virtually founded by Louis Henry (b.1911) and established at the Institut National des Études Démographiques but involving historians from the very beginning.

As for Braudel, his second major work, *Civilisation matérielle et capitalisme (Capitalism and Material Life 1400–1800)* (1967), originally commissioned by Febvre, was a highly original work of synthesis, joining economic to social history in the study of material culture and everyday life as well as placing pre-industrial Europe in comparative context by its frequent references to the Americas, China, and Japan. Braudel, ably seconded by Clément Heller, and partially supported by American funding, also reorganized historical research at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), and created and controlled an interdisciplinary Maison des Sciences de l'Homme.

THE THIRD GENERATION

In 1968, when Braudel was sixty-six and expected, if not exactly ready, to retire, the students of Paris went onto the streets. “The events” (*les événements*), as they were known, had their repercussions even on event-despising structural history. Braudel decided that the committee running *Annales* required new blood, and brought in Marc Ferro (b. 1924) and Jacques Revel (b. 1942). In the longer term, looking back from the end of the century, the movement of 1968, with its

slogan “the imagination in power,” now appears to be related to a major shift of emphasis in *Annales* history (as in historical writing elsewhere), the so-called “cultural turn.”

In France this turn had two successive phases. First was the attempt to apply quantitative methods to the study of the “third level”—as Chaunu called it in a memorable article published in Braudel's *Festschrift* in 1973—or what Marxists call the “superstructure,” in other words, the realm of culture and ideas, viewed as less “fundamental” than economic and social structures. What Chaunu preached, Michel Vovelle practiced in his *Piété baroque et déchristianisation en Provence au 18e siècle* (Baroque piety and de-Christianization in Provence in the 18th century; 1973), a study of attitudes toward death and the afterlife based on the analysis of some thirty thousand wills, comparing and contrasting the attitudes of rich and poor, townspeople and country people, males and females, and so on. The historical sociology of religion practiced by Gabriel Le Bras (1891–1970), a former colleague of Febvre's at Strasbourg, is a still earlier example of the serial history of culture, based on the statistics of confessions, communions, and vocations

to the priesthood, which the Church itself compiled. A similar approach was followed in studies of literacy in France based essentially on the evidence of signatures and published in book form as *Lire et écrire* (*Reading and Writing*; 1977) by François Furet and Jacques Ozouf.

Attempts to write the history of mentalities in a quantitative style reached their culmination, or their extreme, outside the *Annales* group in the so-called “Laboratory of Lexicometry,” which counted the occurrences of keywords in newspapers and other texts during the French Revolution. However, the revival of the history of mentalities or the historical psychology of Bloch and Febvre came to be associated with the second phase of the cultural turn, the reaction against quantitative methods. On the margin of the *Annales* group, the amateur historian Philippe Ariès (1914–1982), despite his training as a demographer, became increasingly interested in cultural variations in attitudes toward childhood and death. Alphonse Dupront (1905–1990), who like Labrousse supervised many doctorates and so exercised considerable influence on the next generation, studied the history of religion as a form of historical psychology, concerning himself in particular with crusades and pilgrimage and with viewing these phenomena over the *longue durée*. Georges Duby, turning away from his earlier work on agrarian history, examined the idea of the three estates of the realm as part of the history of the collective imagination in the Middle Ages. Jacques Le Goff (b. 1924) made a similar study of the development of the idea of purgatory.

Like Duby, Le Roy Ladurie turned from the study of agriculture to the study of culture in his best-selling *Montaillou village occitan* (1975), in which he used Inquisition records to reconstruct the mental as well as the material world of some peasants in the south of France at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The book owes its fame and its many translations to the author’s gift for bringing some forgotten individuals back to life, but it is important for other reasons as well. Like Febvre, Bloch, and Braudel, Le Roy Ladurie draws frequently on the ideas of scholars working in other disciplines, from the peasant studies of Alexander Chayanov and Teodor Shanin to the social anthropology of Edmund Leach and Pierre Bourdieu. *Montaillou* is also one of the most famous examples of what would be known a little later as “microhistory,” the attempt at the historical reconstruction of a small community, in this case on the basis of Inquisition records that had long been known and utilized by historians of heresy but had never been employed as the basis of a community study.

The return of the history of mentalities and the reaction against economic and social determinism of the 1970s and 1980s went with a rediscovery of politics and to a lesser extent with a rehabilitation of the history of events so strongly rejected in earlier phases of the *Annales* movement. Marc Ferro, for some years the secretary to the committee directing the journal, was at the same time a historian of the Russian Revolution and World War I. Le Roy Ladurie worked on the court of Louis XIV and the politics of the regency. Maurice Agulhon concentrated on the nineteenth century, examining political history at the village level and analyzing the political meaning of “Marianne,” the personification of France.

As for events, even Braudel believed that they were worthy of study as evidence for the history of structures, and Duby, who wrote a book on changing perceptions of the thirteenth-century Battle of Bouvines, followed him in this respect. Vovelle and Furet, who studied not only the old regime but also the French Revolution, took events still more seriously. Breaking both with tradition and his Communist past, Furet reinterpreted the Revolution in a controversial essay, not in social but in cultural terms, viewing it as a change that took place at the level of political culture and even of discourse.

Later developments in the movement are illustrated by the work of Roger Chartier (b. 1945), and Bernard Lepetit (1948–1996). Chartier approached cultural history, more especially the history of reading, as a history of practices and representations. In so doing he was indebted not only to the *Annales* tradition of the history of mentalities and the “book history” of Henri-Jean Martin (b. 1924; whose mentor was Lucien Febvre), but also to the social theory of Michel de Certeau and the new approach to bibliography developed by the New Zealand scholar Don Mackenzie. Lepetit was equally innovative. Making his name with a study of French towns, which awoke an interest in transport networks and urban systems, Lepetit went on to study social structures as networks of individuals in a manner reminiscent of the sociologists Luc Boltanski and Bruno Latour.

The change in *Annales*’s subtitle from “Économies, sociétés, civilisations,” to “Histoire, sciences sociales” in 1994 may be interpreted as an attempt to return to the origins of the movement. In similar fashion, over the long term the historian of *Annales* may detect a circular tour from the stress on agency (especially in the work of Febvre) to an emphasis on structure (in Bloch, and still more in Braudel) to the rediscovery of agency by Lepetit and others. Through all these changes, the *Annales* group maintained a distinct identity, thanks in part to the journal, and in

part to the concentration of historians following the paradigm in one institution, the *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales*, where they have the opportunity for daily contact with workers in neighboring disciplines such as anthropology and sociology.

THE RECEPTION OF *ANNALES*

It would be a mistake to identify French historical writing since 1929 with the *Annales* movement, however warm its reception has been in some quarters in France. The paradigm has always had its critics, from Charles Seignobos (1854–1942), against whose approach both Febvre and Bloch liked to define themselves, to Henri Coutau-Bégarie and François Dosse (b. 1950), who launched attacks in the 1980s on what they described as “the new history phenomenon” or the “fragmentation” of history.

The interest in the *Annales* outside France owes a great deal to the perception of the movement as offering some kind of “third way” of writing social and cultural history between Marxism on one side, with its emphasis on the economy, and traditional political history, in the style of the German, Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), on the other. However, the reception of the French paradigm and of the historians who contributed to it varied a great deal in both timing and temperature according to local interests and traditions. In Poland, for example, the movement was received with enthusiasm almost from the start by historians such as Jan Rutkowski (1886–1948). Later, when Poland was ruled by the Communist Party, it was precisely the difference between the *Annales* paradigm and Marxism that made the former so appealing. In Spain, on the other hand, the interest in the work of Bloch, Febvre, and, above all, Braudel, on the part of Jaime Vicens Vives (1910–1960) and his followers was associated with crypto-Marxism and with opposition to the Franco regime.

In Britain and the United States, as in Germany (where historians were long committed to the primacy of the political), the interest in *Annales* flowered relatively late. In Britain, it was above all the left-wing historians associated with *Past and Present*, notably Eric Hobsbawm and Lawrence Stone, who expressed sympathy for the French paradigm from the 1950s onward (Marc Bloch had long been appreciated by medievalists, but more, perhaps, for his substantive conclusions than for his innovations in approach or method).

In the United States in the 1970s, sympathizers with the movement, especially the work of Braudel, ranged from the world historian William McNeill to

the Marxist economic historian Immanuel Wallerstein. In a kind of intellectual leapfrog, Wallerstein learned from Braudel, while Braudel derived ideas from Wallerstein. It was Braudel, for example, who first used the term “world economy” (*économie-monde*) in 1949, but it was Wallerstein who analyzed this economy as a system of three interrelated parts, a “core,” a “periphery,” and a “semiperiphery.”

Another important distinction to make when speaking of the reception of *Annales* is between the periods studied by different groups of historians. The concentration of leading *Annales* historians, especially Febvre and Braudel, on the early modern period has meant that specialists on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have always been unusually interested in the French paradigm. Again, thanks to Bloch and Pirenne, medievalists were interested in the movement from the first and in the age of Duby and Le Goff they continued to find it inspiring. The Russian scholar Aaron Gurevich is a good example of a scholar who developed his own ideas in dialogue with the French.

On the other hand, relatively few members of the *Annales* group have written about the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The principal exceptions to this rule are Agulhon, Ferro, and Alain Corbin, who is close to the group in his concern to explore new territories, such as the lure of the sea and the history of smell and sound, even if he is not part of the *Annales* network. Conversely, foreign historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appear to be relatively little aware of the *Annales* paradigms. When they are aware of these paradigms, like Henk Wesseling, a Dutch scholar specializing on colonialism, these historians are often critical of the dismissal of the history of events, considering it inappropriate, if not completely misguided, for the period in which they are interested.

In the last few years, one of the most important channels of diffusion of the *Annales* paradigm has been via the multivolume collective histories of private life and of women, edited by Ariès, Duby, and Michelle Perrot. These histories appeal to ordinary readers as well as professional historians, they have been translated into a number of languages, and they have inspired similar projects on a national scale (for example in Brazil). At the same time as this diffusion, however, we have seen a proliferation of alternative paradigms for social and cultural history. Innovation is no longer identified with Paris. For their part, French historians associated with the journal remain open to ideas from abroad. For example, when the English classical scholar Geoffrey Lloyd published his *Demystifying Mentalities* (1990), criticizing some features of *l'histoire*

des mentalités collectives, it was welcomed by the leading *Annales* historian Jacques Revel and was quickly translated into French. The “cultural turn” of the last generation of historians developed in France, the United States, and elsewhere, in part independently and in part as a result of two-way exchange rather than one-way influence.

Although the founders of *Annales* emphasized interdisciplinary cooperation, the impact of the French paradigm on the social sciences is relatively recent. Even in the age of Braudel, who debated with Claude Lévi-Strauss and the sociologist Georges Gurwitsch, the intellectual traffic was mainly in one direction. Michel Foucault surely learned something important from the historians associated with *Annales*—from the history of collective mentalities for example—but he did not acknowledge this in public. Indeed, he was a severe critic of what he perceived as the exaggerated empiricism of the historians. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the situation changed.

In the English-speaking world, for example, scholars inspired by the *Annales* paradigm—or at any rate, by part of it—included the sociologist Charles Tilly, the social anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, the developmental psychologist Jerome Bruner, the geographer Alan Pred, and the archaeologist Ian Hodder. Bruner, for example, was attracted by the idea of “mentality,” and Hodder by serial history and the long term, while Sahlins was concerned with the interplay between events and structures (starting out from Braudel but going beyond him). Terms such as *mentalité*, *conjoncture*, and *longue durée*, whether they are translated or left in the original French, whether they are quoted with approval or disapproval, are no longer confined to the vocabulary of historians.

As might have been expected, it is not always the same part of the paradigm, or the same paradigm, that appeals to different scholars, and the relative importance of (say) the econometric and the mentalities approaches is not easy to assess. In similar fashion, it is difficult to measure the historical importance of the

journal itself compared with that of the monographs by leading historians associated with it. On this point, two suggestions spring to mind, one chronological and the other geographical. It is likely that the journal performed an indispensable function in building an intellectual tradition in the early years of the movement. However, it is probable that *Annales* gradually lost this function to exemplary works such as *The Mediterranean* or *Montaillou*. As for the geography of influence, it may well be the journal that has made the greatest impact within France itself. Outside France, on the other hand, the *Annales* “school” is widely identified with the monographs, some of them translated into six or more languages.

The placing of the term “school” in quotation marks is more than a whim or a sign of indecision. The hesitancy reveals a recurrent tendency in the history of intellectual movements, the fact that its followers sooner or later diverge from the ideas and ideals of its founders (hence Marx was not a Marxist, Luther was not a Lutheran, and so on). In the case of the *Annales* movement, one might argue that the intellectual distance between the generations has been unusually great. Braudel was close to Febvre in many respects, but his geographical determinism is in striking contrast to Febvre’s voluntarism, his emphasis on the capacity of humans to use their environment for their own purposes rather than letting it shape them. In similar fashion, the so-called “third generation” of *Annales*, with their cultural turn, rejected Braudel in their historical practice while continuing to respect him. That these major intellectual shifts should have taken place with relatively few personal conflicts suggests that the movement has been characterized by a style of leadership that is pragmatic rather than dogmatic. However authoritarian Febvre and Braudel may have seemed on occasion, they generally allowed their followers the freedom to diverge. The lack of a climate of orthodoxy helps explain the truly remarkable capacity for self-renewal that the group demonstrated.

See also The Population of Europe: Modern Demographic Patterns (volume 2); The Early Modern Period (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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MARXISM AND RADICAL HISTORY



Bryan D. Palmer

Marxism was born in European history. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels elaborated the materialist concept of history out of engagements with German philosophy, French socialism, and British political economy. In the mid-nineteenth century historical materialism—the radical contention that the production and exchange of things necessary to the support of human life, the process through which wealth was created and distributed, was the root cause of social change and the political revolutions of the eighteenth century—stood much of the interpretation of the European past, embedded in Hegelian idealism, on its head. For Marx and Engels the mode of production was the motor of historical process. Its movement was impossible to understand outside of the necessary frictions and periodic clashes of a society divided into irreconcilable classes, primarily the new social strata, the bourgeois and the proletarian. From the time of its birth marxism was inexplicable outside of the transformations associated with the rise of capitalism, a social formation defined by an accumulative regime driven forward by the extraction of surplus associated with the wage system and production for profit. Capitalism and its histories of class formation and struggle figured centrally in marxist histories, although the materialist concept of history also was applied fruitfully to precapitalist modes of production, as evident in G. E. M. De Ste. Croix's challengingly imaginative and elaborately researched *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (1981).

THE ORIGINS OF MARXIST HISTORY

The first marxist histories accentuated different analytic features of historical materialism. In his historical writings on France, for instance, Marx presented scathing indictments of the personnel of bourgeois power, exposing the contradictory nature of capitalist “progress” and of those, such as Napoleon Bonaparte, who would be called upon to lead its march. Such social histories were conscious assaults on the hypocrisies of bourgeois rule and parodies of the democratic order.

Fueled by a partisan analysis relentless in its use of oppositional language, Marx meant to convey to all concerned the powerful class divisions at work in historical process. Marx also commented on the failures of proletarian organization in the Paris Commune, while Engels reached back into the German experience to outline the social upheavals of the German peasant wars. In their later works of political economy, Marx and Engels were equally passionate but less attuned to the place of political rule or the mobilization of class resistance. These histories, such as Marx's *Capital* (volume 1, 1867), outlined capital's original accumulations (by means of dispossessing a landed peasantry, divorcing small artisan producers from the means of production, and pillaging new colonial conquests) and its relentless appetite for surplus (manifested in extending the length of the working day, suppressing working-class collectivity, elaborating ever more intricate divisions of labor, and charting new technological innovation).

These and many other writings formed the theoretical foundation on which marxist histories rested for the next century and more. Within what might be called “the classical tradition,” marxist histories were produced by intellectuals whose primary commitment was to the revolutionary movement. Their historical writing, seldom far removed from theoretical questions, was often a direct attempt to explore historical themes originally addressed by Marx or Engels. Thus Karl Kautsky, one of a small contingent developing the materialist concept of history in the late nineteenth century, produced a study of religion, *The Origin of Christianity* (1923), a staple of marxist critique in this period. Kautsky attempted to situate European and American agriculture in an 1899 publication, *The Agrarian Question*. His *Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation* (1897) returned directly to Engels's concern with the German peasant uprisings of the sixteenth century, as did Belfort Bax's *The Peasants War in Germany, 1525–1526* (1899). Early writing on the Paris Commune included Lissagaray's

History of the Commune of 1871 (1886), translated from the French by Marx's daughter Eleanor Marx Aveling.

With the increasing importance of revolutionary activity, most especially in Russia and culminating in the October Revolution of 1917, marxist histories intersected directly with the perceived needs and understood accomplishments of proletarian insurrection. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899) was a massive study of the rural economy. An investigation of the tsarist countryside, the book aimed to outline how varied modes of production coexisted to produce a specific historically contextualized social formation and to develop from this research strategic directions for a workers' revolution in a setting of "combined and uneven capitalist development." This theme also set the stage for Leon Trotsky's magisterial three-volume narrative *The History of the Russian Revolution* (1932), probably historical materialism's most elegantly executed chronology of class revolt in the first fifty years of marxist historical production. Trotsky's text was preceded by Louise Bryant's memoir *Six Red Months in Russia* (1918) and John Reed's more chronologically focused and journalistically inclined *Ten Days That Shook the World* (1919).

The revolutionary movement stimulated marxist research and bore rich fruit in the pre-World War I period. Subjects barely touched upon by the founders of historical materialism emerged out of the new global capitalism orchestrated by monopoly and threateningly powerful imperialist rivalries. Rudolf Hilferding's *Finance Capital* (1910) and Otto Bauer's *The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy* (1907) were both published, like Lenin's book, before their authors reached the age of thirty. They prefigured the concerns of Rosa Luxemburg, whose writings addressed the new regime of capital accumulation and accentuated the role of colonies. Luxemburg's politics breathed a vibrant internationalism and a particular resistance to national parochialism.

But troubling signs as well showed up on the marxist horizon in 1914. The fracturing of the Second International, the working-class organization of marxism at the time of World War I, suggested the powerful challenges to orthodoxy that emerged in this period, detailed in the French marxist Georges Haupt's *Socialism and the Great War: The Collapse of the Second International* (1972) and in Carl Schorske's *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism* (1955). The Russian Revolution failed to spread to the advanced capitalist economies of the West, and the ground receptive to Stalinist containments was being tilled. One seed was the rise of the

international Left Opposition, grouped around Trotsky and later organized in the Fourth International. The scant serious historical self-reflection on marxist theory and history produced in these years, such as Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going?* (1937), emanated from this dissident quarter. The Stalinist Comintern of the interwar years was notable for its mechanical practices and routinization of theory. As Perry Anderson argued in *Considerations on Western Marxism* (1976), the interwar years and beyond largely saw the relinquishment of historical, economic, and political themes in marxist intellectual production and the replacement of marxist activists at the writing center of historical materialism by university-based scholars of the left. The center of gravity of continental European marxism, in Anderson's metaphor, turned toward philosophy. Certainly the major marxist thought in this period was cultivated among a layer of what Luxemburg and Kautsky dubbed *Kathedersozialisten*, professorial socialists. From György Lukács to Jean-Paul Sartre, class consciousness was written about more as an aesthetic possibility than as a combative historical process.

Nevertheless, some marxist histories produced in the post-1920 period continued to conjoin the social and the political within a grounding in economic life. Much of this writing was produced by Communist Party (CP) intellectuals, among them the Russian émigré turned English journalist Theodore Rothstein, who wrote *From Chartism to Labourism* (1929), an important early account of the history of the British working-class movement. Something of a combination of Henry Mayhew, Charles Booth, and Engels, Jürgen Kuczynski authored a multivolume set of short histories of labor conditions in Germany, France, and Great Britain that prefigured, in its range of concerns and attention to periodization, the later approach of Eric J. Hobsbawm. But perhaps the most important marxist history in these interwar years was sustained by two British CP figures, Maurice Dobb and Dona Torr. Dobb returned to the themes of *Capital* in his *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (1947). Torr, in a series of largely party-circulated and often inaccessible publications, many of which were short educational or agitational pieces, stimulated interest and concern about the working class and its movements among a cohort of historians whose formative political years were spent in the struggles for colonial independence, the popular front organizations and cultural milieu of the late 1930s, the battle to defeat fascism both politically and militarily, and the postwar campaigns for peace and nuclear disarmament.

THE HISTORIANS GROUP

From the mid-century nursery of marxist history's perhaps most celebrated collectivity, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) Historians Group, emerged a contingent of historians later known simply as "the British Marxists." Among others, Christopher Hill, Rodney Hilton, Victor Kiernan, Eric J. Hobsbawm, Edward P. Thompson, Dorothy Thompson, John Saville, and a precocious Raphael

Samuel, the future founder of *History Workshop Journal*, literally were schooled in historical research in this informal but highly influential CPGB Historians Group. With economic history as the base, this contingent produced an eclectically rich superstructure of social histories. Individuals associated with this CP historiography of the 1940s and 1950s eventually dominated entire fields of social history and left their interpretive mark on generations of scholarship.

Hill's first book, *Lenin and the Russian Revolution* (1947), marked his communist commitments but was distanced from his actual area of academic specialization. He rewrote the social, intellectual, cultural, and political history of seventeenth-century England and its varied revolutions, both actual and threatening. Enconced in the Oxford of All Souls College and Balliol, Hill did much to give marxist history impeccable academic credentials. Relishing the historical moment when his fellow citizens repudiated monarchy and actually took the head of a king, Hill was indefatigable in poring over the sources of his period. He was perhaps at his creative best in the company of the precursors of marxist revolt, the Levellers, Diggers, and Ranters, who confirmed for Hill that class resistance was more of a factor in preindustrial capitalist England than many had acknowledged. In *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution* (1972), Hill explored the imaginative ideas of social transformation that germinated in the first third of the seventeenth century and were released into public debate in the two decades following the revolution of property of 1640. Over the course of more than fifty years of writing, Hill produced a massive body of research on subjects as varied as images of the Antichrist, John Milton, radical pirates, Oliver Cromwell, the place of the church and various dissident sects, and the socioeconomic shift from Reformation to industrial revolution. Even those not enamored of marxism, such as Lawrence Stone, acknowledged that "the age of Puritan revolution" was regarded by the mid-1960s as "Hill's half-century" and that Hill was one of a few historians who had managed thoroughly to dominate a field.

E. P. Thompson's impact was different but no less significant. Thompson, whose training was originally more in literature than in history, entered the academic world in ways distinctly different from Hill's entry. The unfortunate climate of tightening anticommunism in post-1948 Britain ensured that a younger Thompson did not get the foothold in university life that Hill had established in the late 1930s and the 1940s. Working in adult education, Thompson was active in the post-World War II politics of communism, especially the peace movement of the early 1950s, and later in the 1950s he was decisively antagonistic to the CP hierarchy. Along with Saville, whose work focused on the economic history, institutions, and biography of nineteenth-century labor, Thompson led many historians out of the CP and into the beginnings of the New Left. Their shift preceded developments in the United States by a number of years and had a more disciplined relationship to marxism than the American campus-led upheavals of the mid-

1960s. Thompson and Saville became the editors of the *New Reasoner*, an early journal of socialist humanism that published a number of importantly suggestive forays into the social history of nineteenth-century England.

At precisely this time Thompson wrote his first major book, *William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary* (1955), a pioneering and detailed exploration of Morris's marxism and the beginnings of organized socialist agitation in England in the 1880s. Thompson was also at work on *The Making of the English Working Class* (1964), which was originally conceived as an adult education primer on the history of the labor movement from 1790 to 1945. Led into the sources and complexities of class formation in England, he never got past the period leading up to Chartism, the subject on which his wife, Dorothy Thompson, wrote *The Chartists* (1984). His conceptualization of class as more than a static category of historical place, mechanically called into being by the dispossession of landed labor and the rise of the steam-powered factory, grew directly out of Thompson's understanding of Stalinism's distortions, both political and intellectual. His book was an engaged attempt to write working-class people and their consciousness of themselves, their aspirations, and their needs back into the history of the industrial revolution. Mainstream economic historians argued that historical progress was marked by rising standards of living measured out in calculations of the "mythical average" diet, wage rate, and housing stock. Certain marxist circles saw proletarianization as a "lawed" process in which working for wages necessarily produced a realization of the need for a working-class revolution directed by the vanguard party. Contradicting those positions, Thompson offered a rich tapestry of crowds and challenging ideas, midnight marches and purposeful machine breaking, radical artisans and the atrocities of child labor.

The fulcrum on which this presentation of experience's diversity balanced was resistance to the new amalgam of state power and the impersonal ordering of laboring life in the mills, factories, mines, and sweated outwork of early-nineteenth-century England. Thompson regarded the accomplishments of England's first workers as a "heroic culture." Polemical and passionate, he humanized history, and his tone was often irreverent and defiant of academic convention, stamping *The Making of the English Working Class* as perhaps the most influential radical social history produced in the last half of the twentieth century. Indeed a Thompsonian sensibility to class formation became an understood position within labor history by the 1970s and 1980s, and few histories of the

working class in any national context written in the last two decades of the century did not engage with Thompson in some way.

Thompson next branched out in many directions, but most importantly for social history he produced a series of controversial, stimulating, and broadly researched essays on time and work discipline, the bread riot, and folkloric customs, such as charivari, or rough music, and the wife sale. Their completion was delayed by Thompson's physically exacting immersion in the campaign for nuclear disarmament in the late 1970s and 1980s. Eventually published in *Customs in Common* (1991), these studies refocused attention on the layered meanings of plebeian life in preindustrial capitalist settings. At pains to read the recorded histories of common experience against their often class-biased grain, Thompson discovered reservoirs of adaptation and forms of resistance that previous historians, including himself, had dismissed because they were reported with the nonchalance, even hostility, of "superior" classes. Thus the wife sale was less a brutal and misogynist practice of the degraded patriarchy of the lower classes, as depicted in Thomas Hardy's novel *The Mayor of Casterbridge* (1886) and countless folkloric accounts, than it was a reciprocal recognition of the breakdown of a domestic union in an epoch that allowed the poor no access to divorce. If it bore the trappings of a patriarchal order, it nevertheless sustained mutual decision making and goodwill among laboring people that were statements of the human resources those people brought to the changing conditions of their times. Thompson indeed moved away from marxism as he finished his studies of eighteenth-century plebeian cultures. In his imaginative account of William Blake, commenced in the 1960s but not published until 1993, at which point Thompson was dying, he confessed that, while he thought himself a "Muggleonian marxist" in 1968, he had subsequently come to have less certainty about both halves of this coupling. His writing nevertheless sustained sensibilities and attachments, especially to the radical resistance to the abuses of property's power, that were not unrelated to the origins of Thompson's histories in communist scholarship in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Thompson's strengths as a historian were never in the realm of economic history, which he felt others in the Historians Group were more capable of developing. In pushing his studies back in time from the industrial revolution and the 1790s to the earlier eighteenth century and before, Thompson addressed popular culture during the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Marxist historians, led by Rodney Hilton, had in fact pioneered important studies of this tran-

sition, stimulating one of the most significant interpretive debates in the social and economic history of Europe. In Marx's writing the transition from feudalism to capitalism was posed ambivalently, placing accents first on the corrosive influence of mercantile activity and later on changing relations of production. Precisely because of that ambivalence, marxist histories debated the origins of capitalism, forcing mainstream historiography onto the terrain of marxist analysis. In the 1950s, in the first phase of this exchange, Paul Sweezy and Maurice Dobb adopted, respectively, the exchange and property-production positions. Their contentions led to series of essays in the American academic marxist journal, *Science and Society*, as well as a pivotal statement in the British publication *Past and Present*, a forum less tied to the Communist Party and more open to marxist-liberal dialogue.

THE TRANSITION DEBATE

The transition debate revived in the 1970s, witnessing significant marxist and nonmarxist interchange. Perry Anderson's *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974), which addressed state formation at the interface of Dobb, Sweezy, and an eclectic reading of nonmarxist historiography, prefaced this analytic cross-fertilization. But the critical challenge to marxist understandings of the transition came, by the 1970s, from neo-Malthusian scholarship that placed increasing emphasis on the demographically driven factors that influenced capitalism's emergence out of feudalism. Important reflections of that scholarship emerged in marxist social histories of family formation, of which the most compelling and elegant example in English was the two-volume statement by Wally Secombe, *A Millennium of Family Change: Feudalism to Capitalism in Northwestern Europe* (1992) and *Weathering the Storm: Working-Class Families from the Industrial Revolution to the Fertility Decline* (1993). In two highly influential articles responding to the new debate, Robert Brenner put forth, with panache and analytic sweep, a resolutely marxist presentation of agrarian class structure in preindustrial Europe, taking a critical approach to what he called neo-Smithian marxism. Brenner in turn stimulated responses from many quarters. Originally published in *Past and Present* between 1976 and 1982, they were collected by T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin in *The Brenner Debate* (1985). Brenner became associated with a structural appreciation of the class and property relations school of marxist history in terms of this debate over the relationship of feudalism's dissolution and capitalism's rise. Ironically he later explored the mercantile and

political sides of precapitalist experience in his powerfully detailed *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550–1653* (1993).

Like Brenner, Hobsbawm produced wide-ranging marxist histories difficult to pigeonhole. One of his earliest writings was an analytic tour de force of direct relevance to the transition debate. In a two-part *Past and Present* (1954) article that attempted to address the crisis of the seventeenth century, Hobsbawm explored why the industrial revolution did not proceed directly from the contradictions of sixteenth-century feudalism but stalled for a century, albeit in ways that provided the primitive accumulations necessary for capital's future explosive growth. A cosmopolitan intellect who, unlike most other communist historians, did not break from the CPGB in 1956, Hobsbawm was at home in many countries. His work was driven by an internationalism and a range that established him as an authority on bandits and primitive rebels, peasant revolts, the labor aristocracy, the new unionism of the late nineteenth century, and virtually all aspects of the histories of socialism. In his later years he turned increasingly to the production of sweeping syntheses of European and world history that gave comprehensive accounts of the modern world from the eighteenth century forward. Two collections of essays, *Labouring Men* (1964) and *Workers: Worlds of Labor* (1984), comprise something of a guidebook to the concerns of the social history of the working class as it developed from the 1960s to the 1980s. A fine critic and connoisseur of jazz as well as a regular commentator on public events, Hobsbawm was marxist history's Renaissance man.

Indeed the range of the British Marxist historians was striking. Kiernan wrote histories of imperialism and orientalism and treatments of Shakespeare and the romantics. Marxist historians, unlike their mainstream counterparts, rarely confined themselves to a resolutely narrow area of specialization. (Hill was something of an exception.) No other national culture produced a body of marxist historians of comparable range and depth. Hobsbawm, for instance, collaborated with George Rudé, whose histories of crowds and popular revolt in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France and England linked him to the impressive marxist historians of the French Revolution, headed by Albert Soboul.

DEBATES ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The class content of the world's most decisive bourgeois revolution, the French transformation unleashed with

the events of 1789, had long been a staple of radical socialist thought. François-Alphonse Aulard, Jean-Joseph Jaurès, and Albert Mathiez wrote histories of the economic determinations of this broadly social revolution, and Georges Lefebvre's important studies, including *The Coming of the French Revolution, 1789* (1947) and *The Great Fear of 1789* (1973), were illustrative of the social histories of the popular classes that began seriously in the 1940s and 1950s. As a chronicler of the urban *menu peuple* (petty people), Soboul wrote first of the Parisian sansculottes and eventually offered a comprehensive two-volume study, *The French Revolution, 1787–1799* (1974). Soboul and others in France rarely moved out of the focused appreciation of their specific subject matter. The detailed researches of Lefebvre and Soboul stimulated an evocative historical narrative that meshed well with national pride, producing the irony of a marxist interpretation of a bourgeois revolution attaining the status, for a time, of an "official" history within a bourgeois society.

Of course other marxist histories existed in France. Among them were some internationally acclaimed works of labor history, including studies by two influential women scholars, Rolande Trempe's *Les mineurs de Carmaux* (1971) and Michelle Perrot's *Workers on Strike: France, 1871–1890* (1987); studies of popular iconography, such as Maurice Agulhon's *Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789–1880* (1981); and rich tapestries of local experience, of which John Merriman's *The Red City: Limoges and the French Nineteenth Century* (1985), is a prime example. But if French marxists produced invaluable and influential works, their interpretive marxist eggs were generally concentrated in one basket. When new trends of historiography challenged the social analysis of the French Revolution, it was relatively easy for a focused mainstream criticism to appear successful in breaking the lot. In the 1980s and 1990s a revived antimarxist historiography of the French Revolution largely displaced the class-based analysis associated with Soboul. The British Marxists have been somewhat more resilient precisely because their collective and collaborative work has been wide-ranging.

MARXIST AND NATIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

Soviet and Chinese historiography in this period was largely formulaic and made few breakthroughs of an innovative sort in the realm of European social history. Because its purpose was to serve the Marxist-Leninist state, it tended to be polemical in nature, railing against inaccuracies and misinterpretations that rou-

tinely appeared in Western historical writing. On the whole marxist historians in the postrevolutionary states produced official Marxist-Leninist histories that served well the orthodoxies of the Communist Party. As a consequence social histories like those generated by the dissident communists in Great Britain did not appear in China or the Soviet Union, and accounts of the Russian Revolution, of necessity reproducing a specific Stalinist version of historical process, never broke out of mechanical molds. Among the most useful products were anthologies of documents, such as Y. V. Kovalev's *An Anthology of Chartist Literature* (1956). In a rare synthetic statement by an East German historian, Andreas Dorpalen presented an analytic sweep across centuries of the central European past in *German History in Marxist Perspective: The East German Approach* (1985).

Useful social histories of specific countries and the major left-wing upheavals associated with them are abundant. For Austria the divergent approaches to the history of socialism characteristic of the 1950s, when political history was more in vogue, and the 1990s, when social history's ascendance was a decade old, are evident in two texts: Joseph Buttinger's *In the Twilight of Socialism: A History of the Revolutionary Socialists of Austria* (1953) and Helmut Gruber's *Red Vienna: Experiment in Working-Class Culture, 1919–1934* (1991). The history of European socialism is the subject of Donald Sassoon's massive study, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (1996). Specific episodic struggles, such as the Spanish Civil War, have also received extensive treatment. Pierre Broué and Émile Témime's *The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain* (1972), a Marxist-Trotskyist overview, is heavily institutional and political in its treatment, while Burnett Bolloten's *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution* (1991) is unparalleled in its detail. The most succinct marxist account of the events in Spain in the 1930s, Felix Morrow's *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Spain* (1936) is a product of Trotskyist perspectives. In her appreciation of gender, anarchism, and popular culture, Temma Kaplan, in *Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868–1903* (1977) and *Red City, Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso's Barcelona* (1992), captures something of the concerns of social history in the 1980s and 1990s by giving attention to women, the representational realm, and socio-political mobilizations of resistance.

CLASS ANALYSIS AND GENDER

Kaplan's gendered approach exposed the long-standing presence of what Claire LaVigna called in her title

“The Marxist Ambivalence toward Women” (1978). While the “woman question” was indeed addressed in marxist histories and movements, it was subordinate to more class-based priorities, as suggested in Barbara Taylor's exploration of the importance of gender in early utopian socialism and the demise of its centrality with the rise of the “scientific” school associated with Marx and Engels. But marxist explorations of the woman question seldom moved much beyond Engels's *The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (1884), which is overly reliant on the non-marxist anthropology of Lewis H. Morgan. Not until so-called second wave feminism, one sustaining feature of which was the broad-ranging marxist approach in Simone de Beauvoir's pathbreaking *The Second Sex* (1949), did a revived socialist feminism produce histories sensitive to the complexities of women's experiences. Sheila Rowbotham was a major voice in this undertaking. Her *A Century of Women: The History of Women in Britain and the United States in the Twentieth Century* (1997) is a detailed look at women's place in twentieth-century Britain and the United States, a history of inequality in the political, economic, and social realms that produced struggles for the vote, equal pay, and reproductive rights.

THE IMPACT OF MARXISM ON SOCIAL HISTORY

Marxism's intersection with social history thus has been wide-ranging and highly influential, if at times constricting in what it seemed able to address. It has nevertheless actually charted particular spheres of study, such as important realms of the debate over the nature and meaning of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. In other areas, most obviously labor history but also particular chronological periods and topics, such as the English revolutions of the seventeenth century or the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century, marxist histories achieved, for a time at least, interpretive hegemony. The concerns of marxist histories always have been a fusion of the economic, the political, and the sociocultural. Hill, for example, believed that all history was intellectual history, but this did not prevent him from writing on matters that blurred distinctions between the material and the cultural, a crossover that produced or at least illuminated the social. It is inconceivable that European social history from the Renaissance to the modern period could have developed historiographically without the insights of marxist perspectives.

Equally important, marxist approaches highlighted for all historians—conservatives, radicals, femi-

nists, and liberals—significant themes in the historical process. Those themes include the relationships of economic life and social being; the appreciation of large-scale socioeconomic transformation and the making of class, gender, and national-ethnic identities; and the importance of “totality” in historical process and the reciprocity of mercantile, landed, protoindustrial, and capitalist relations in the emergence of the modern world. Indeed marxist histories stimulated and enlivened social history, assuring it a measure of intellectual tenacity by forcing reconsiderations and new appreciations of large issues. State formation, the subject of a stimulating synthetic statement by Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer that bridged the medieval and the modern, is one such area that marxist approaches have reinvigorated. It is impossible to think of social history in the 1990s, for instance, without acknowledging the weight of Thompson’s *The Making of the English Working Class*, not so much because of the persuasiveness of its research and argument, which have been contested, but rather because of its tone, vision, and sensibilities. This feel for a new kind of history, which became the enduring attraction of “the social,” was not the monopoly of the marxists, but they contributed mightily toward it. Consequently marxist histories affected the changing balance of historical thought as much as they grew out of the material circumstances and internal debates, polemics, and ruptures of the marxist movement itself.

The marxist movement was never a monolith, and sociopolitical and intellectual histories of marxism in the European past mark an evolution of uncommon diversity. The major early political studies of the marxist First and Second Internationals, including A. Müller Lehning’s *The International Association, 1855–1859: A Contribution to the Preliminary History of the First International* (1938) and James Joll’s *The Second International, 1889–1914* (1974), were later complemented by national surveys and specific accounts of particular countries in restricted chronological periods, many written by nonmarxists. Among these Tony Judt’s *Marxism and the French Left: Studies in Labour and Politics in France, 1830–1981* (1986) is notable for its breadth, and Gerald H. Meaker’s *The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914–1923* (1974) sets the stage well for an appreciation of the momentous conflicts of the civil war of the 1930s. The Italian communist experience proved fertile ground for a marxist engagement with the national question, especially acute in a country economically, socially, culturally, and politically fractured. The “southern ques-

tion” preoccupied major marxist thinkers, such as Antonio Labriola and Antonio Gramsci.

Germany’s unique politics of Nazism stimulated significant marxist engagements, such as those of Tim Mason, in which social histories of class intersect with the politics of a disturbing defeat of the left and open out into histories of class acquiescence and subterranean resistance. British communism’s eclectic origins in religious dissent, the autodidact Labour Colleges, the meeting of Lib-Lab consciousness, Fabianism, trade unionism, and the mythological power of the Russian Revolution have been appreciated by marxist historians, such as Raphael Samuel and Stuart Macintyre, while marxist explorations of various aspects of the Labour Party have sustained important intellectual engagements. The peculiarities of Scandinavian socialism have generated equal interest. In the nation-states won to marxism out of the dissolutions of World War II and through the contradictory “liberations” of Joseph Stalin’s Red Army, marxism as a social movement was suffocated at its potential birth, leaving it deformed and awaiting its overthrowers, the most illustrious of whom would appear, to Western eyes, to be Lech Walesa and Poland’s labor movement *Solidarność* (Solidarity).

No unity congeals this ongoing relation of social change and the dissenting tradition, but it is impossible to consider European history without addressing the marxist presence. No sooner had communism fallen in 1989, with marxism proclaimed dead and history and ideology supposedly at their end, than marxist ideas and movements began to reemerge out of the seeming wasteland of Stalinist decay. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, marxist thought and communist political organizations were down but certainly not out. The ills of capitalism—increasing economic inequality and its manifold oppressions and destabilizing violence—remained very much in evidence, especially in the new, wildly erratic, and war-torn frontier of acquisitive individualism’s market economies, Russia and its former eastern European satellites.

Marxist histories, as the site of new understandings of the social and as the lived experience of mobilizations attempting to transform society and politics, have greatly influenced European history. Their intellectual, cultural, economic, and social meanings have been profound, and, although their future at the turn of the century was perhaps more clouded than at any time in the previous hundred years, they have remained a force to reckon with.

See also **Capitalism and Commercialization; Communism (volume 2); Social Class; Working Classes; Collective Action; Revolutions; Labor History: Strikes and Unions (volume 3).**

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INTERDISCIPLINARY CONTACTS AND INFLUENCES



Louise A. Tilly

Contacts and influences between history and other disciplines are not new. Nineteenth-century economics was frequently historical, as the work of Karl Marx shows; Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and Marx, the classical sociological theorists, likewise found their problems in historical change; and political theory took as two of its central concerns how forms of government evolve or modify and how war or natural disasters may change opportunities for states. In short, shared subject matter has a long history. What is different in the interdisciplinary studies that came to the fore starting at the end of the nineteenth century is a self-conscious borrowing of methods and theories, which could only occur once methods were formalized.

Economics, demography, and statistics (and less so, sociology and political science) had developed both more theory and more formal methods by the end of the nineteenth century than had history. In the same period some historians had begun to conceive of history itself as a science. Its central method was finding reliable sources of information and verifying the authenticity of sources by their closeness to the actors, places, and times of the events, institutions, and persons being studied. In Germany, Leopold von Ranke was central to this development; in France, Charles Seignobos. Both of these scholars, as well as the major English historians, defined history as a verifiably objective description of political facts (events and the development of governmental institutions in particular) isolated from their economic and social context. There was also a local history more concerned with small-scale events such as the origins of towns and cities, local government, agriculture, trade, and religion, but it developed apart from academic history and was dismissed as nonscientific and naive. “Social” history, such as it was, focused on daily life, material culture, manners, and morals.

THE PATHS TOWARD INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Influenced by Émile Durkheim and his followers’ effort to apply the principles of the natural sciences to

social facts, the French economist François Simiand challenged the Seignobos school in 1903, attacking the “idols” of history: acceptance of periodization without consideration of its significance and focus on politics and powerful persons rather than on nonpolitical or apolitical groups, institutions, or phenomena. Simiand urged that historians adopt more scientific methods, rigorously defining their problems, collecting and measuring data, analyzing temporal change and spatial correlations, and studying causality rather than chronology. Simiand’s own monographs, on wages and social change and economic cycles “à longue période” (both published in 1932), were strictly quantitative, joining the established economic history of prices and wages, but much more ambitious in coverage and periodization. By this time the *Annales d’histoire économique et sociale*, founded by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre with the help of Henri Berr in 1929, was three years old.

Bloch and Febvre also urged the end of the disciplinary schism between students of past time and those of contemporary societies and economies among historians, economists, and sociologists. They called for a flow of methods and interpretive perspectives among scholars. Their prescription for breaking down barriers and surmounting schism was not methodological or theoretical discussion but exemplary practice (“*par le fait*”). The *Annales* would welcome and publish research in many fields and specialties, research unified by a commitment to impartiality. In their own scholarly research and writing, and in the journal, Bloch and Febvre practiced what they preached—Bloch borrowing from economics, geography, and sociology, and Febvre more commonly from social psychology and what later came to be called *mentalités*. Under their direction, the *Annales* gave little attention to the continuing theoretical debate about history as science, focusing instead on comparisons among social groups and interdisciplinary borrowings.

In the post–World War II period, the influence of Ernest Labrousse (whose first book, *Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenus en France au XVIIIe siècle* had come out in 1933) and Fernand Braudel

grew. The latter, whose encyclopedic survey of the Mediterranean over the *longue durée* and conceptualization of total history were admired but seldom emulated on the same scale, became editor of *Annales*. In the course of the 1950s, Labrousse began to send his doctoral students to regional archives to study the social and economic structure of France before and after the Revolution (1700–1850), thus incorporating Braudel’s evocation of the long period with his own quantitative approach. The apprentice historians of the Sixth Section (history) of the *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales*, where Braudel taught, also incorporated the *Annales* approach, drawing on human geography (the study of human interaction with the physical environment), reconstructing price and wage series, and incorporating rapidly developing demographic history in their densely documented regional studies from the 1960s onward. Demographic history had become more sophisticated statistically through Louis Henry’s development of family reconstitution—a method that could demonstrate changes in patterns of birth, death, and marriage for periods before vital statistics registration or censuses. Family reconstitution revolutionized knowledge of Old Regime demography and became a component of the regional and local studies of French social historians.

In English history, interdisciplinary approaches (other than economic history, which was well established by the beginning of the twentieth century) arrived by at least two paths. One was exemplified by the formation of a new journal, *Past and Present*, in early 1952. Its board of editors, which included several important Marxist historians, avowed that it would not shirk controversy. Echoing Karl Marx’s words from the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, the editors wrote in the first issue, “Men are active and conscious makers of history, not merely its passive victims.” They also objected to the indiscriminate borrowing of ideas from social science, specifically “the structural-functional approach as developed in contemporary sociology.” Their goal was to “widen the somewhat narrow horizon of traditional historical studies among the English-speaking public” and to follow the historical example of Bloch and Febvre, eschewing “methodological articles and theoretical dissertations” and making their point “by example and fact.” In the 1960s the initial Marxist perspective became less evident; in its place a variety of interdisciplinary approaches became customary.

The other English path to interdisciplinarity had been laid out earlier by Lewis Namier, who pioneered the interdisciplinary method of prosopography, or collective biography, a protostatistical approach. Through such an analysis, one could discover

variation along group characteristics like age, social class or status, family connections, origins of wealth, or political patronage. Interested in eighteenth-century politics, Namier chose to look closely at the House of Commons, “that invaluable microcosmic picture of England.” He gathered biographical detail about the men elected to the Parliament of 1761, their constituencies, and their political sponsors, as well as mentions in parliamentary or private records of other political figures great and small, and analyzed his data by simple statistical methods, mostly cross-tabulations. The information he generated about patronage and connections cast light on the politics of the government and Parliament in the period following the election.

In 1965 Lawrence Stone published his massive prosopographic study of members of the peerage in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, drawing on private archives that had recently been made available to historians. As a result his evidence was much richer than Namier’s. His goal was first to “describe the total environment of an *élite*, material and economic, ideological and cultural, educational and moral; and [second] . . . to chart the course of a crisis in the affairs of this *élite* that was to have a profound effect upon the evolution of English political institutions” (Stone, 1965, pp. 7–8). The crisis, of course, was the rising importance of the House of Commons in politics and the temporary eclipse of the peerage in the period of revolution and Commonwealth. The Restoration and Glorious Revolution restored the standing of the peerage, but its political influence was tempered by those events, with long-term consequences for the English political system and class structure.

Also in England by the 1960s, scholars interested in demography, such as E. A. Wrigley, Peter Laslett, and Roger Schofield—leaders of what became the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure—began family reconstitution methods like the French, which showed that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries typical households were small, consisting of a nuclear family and perhaps servants and including three generations or more distant kin less often than had been believed. They also found a surprisingly high degree of geographic mobility, especially of young people, including children, who moved to become servants or apprentices.

Much of the “new social history” of the 1960s and 1970s drew its inspiration from sociology and other social sciences, but not all of it was friendly to interdisciplinarity. E. P. Thompson’s *Making of the English Working Class* (1963) became one of the classics of modern social history and a model for labor

and social historians over the ensuing decades. But despite its innovation in seeking out new sources for English working-class history such as police records (cautiously utilized) and popular religious literature, *The Making* is less explicitly interdisciplinary in its approach than the studies already described. Indeed, Thompson's preface contains an irritable attack (echoing that of *Past and Present's* editors) on sociology and specifically on the sociologist Neil Smelser's study of cotton textile industrialization and family relations. Nevertheless, Thompson's affectionate exposition of the ways of life of various groups of workers can be seen as a kind of retrospective ethnography, and in later writings he acknowledged the relationship of anthropology to his work.

In the United States, economic historians such as Robert Fogel and Albert Fishlow, questioning the importance of railroads in American economic development, had begun to use computers to perform complex statistical analyses on historical data assembled from business and local government records. Political historians such as Lee Benson and Allan Bogue collected local electoral records and ecological data and analyzed them with the help of computers, and William O. Aydelotte began a similar project with British parliamentary voting records. American historians of Europe adopted the interdisciplinary methods of studying social structure, patterns of population change, economic conditions, and associational politics (parties, elections, labor unions, social movements, and reform). Questions about colonial demography and family life were explored by John Demos and Philip Greven. And Stephan Thernstrom pursued distinctively American questions about nineteenth-century social mobility with the help of computer-analyzed nominal census data. By 1966 the *Times Literary Supplement* could devote the larger part of three issues to "New Ways in History," highlighting the advances of interdisciplinary approaches. Interdisciplinary collaboration was promoted by the strong historical interests of many European sociologists, such as British researchers dealing with family sociology, which facilitated interaction beyond uses of quantitative methods.

Interdisciplinary work was not always welcomed by the established journals of the time, however. Rather, its publication depended on newer journals. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, the first United States journal of interdisciplinary history, had been founded by the economic historian Sylvia Thrupp in 1958. As suggested by its title, the journal's chief focus was comparisons, not interdisciplinarity, but as the title also indicates, both cross-sectional and temporal comparisons drawing on history and social sci-

ence fields like sociology and anthropology were envisioned by the editorial board, which included scholars in both those fields as well as historians. In 1967 the *Journal of Social History* was launched by Peter Stearns. The journal has been eclectic and open, and as definitions of social history have become more inclusive, new methods and subjects have been incorporated.

Interdisciplinary history received its name in 1970, when the *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* began publication. (The *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* [1968] discussed comparative method and studies but had no entry in its index for "interdisciplinary" method, theory, or studies.) The concept of interdisciplinarity had earlier been integral in teaching and research programs in area studies and American studies, but in the late 1960s and the 1970s it proliferated in black or African American studies, women's studies, religious studies, and numerous similar new programs. The declared intent of the founding editors (both historians and social scientists) of the journal was to be "catholic both conceptually and geographically," yet to "guard against faddishness, the all-too-easy appropriation of inappropriate techniques . . . ; the confusion of technical mastery with the effective use of such mastery; . . . the temptations of jargon," and so on (Rotberg and Rabb, 1970, pp. 4–5). The American journals devoted to the newly interdisciplinary history quickly found a place on historians' reading lists.

A group of historians and political scientists who specialized in United States history took the initiative to convene other interdisciplinary scholars to found the Social Science History Association in 1974 and its journal, *Social Science History*, the first issue of which was published in fall 1976. The purpose of the organization, the editors of its journal wrote, was to improve "the quality of historical explanation by encouraging the selective use and adaptation in teaching and in research of relevant theories and methods from the social science disciplines." They also welcomed historical comparisons, and declared their "total commitment to . . . systematic contact and interchange of ideas between kindred spirits in history and in the social sciences" ("Editors' Foreword," 1976, pp. i–ii). The organization, which began with a strong tilt within its leadership toward United States quantitative political history, encouraged wide participation in governance, including planning the program of the yearly conference. Over the years, the disciplinary distribution of the leadership and members has shifted away from American politics to a much more eclectic mix of interests. The association has drawn wide participation from European scholars, dealing with topics

like demography and crime, and from researchers concerned with European topics.

A DECADE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY AND A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE

In 1980 (its tenth anniversary), the *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* convened a conference, "The New History: The 1980s and Beyond"; articles reporting on the various subfields appeared in two issues (vol. 12, nos. 1 and 2, summer and autumn 1981). Overall, the articles on specific fields reflect a decline in interest in and use of quantitative methods in political and family history, but a reaffirmation of the importance of political history; continued confidence in the value of quantitative methods for periods in which qualitative evidence is scarce (medieval history and population history); a call for greater development of psychohistory; a flight from the most technically sophisticated type of econometric history, and new efforts to bring economic history closer to historians' concern with the diversity of human behavior; strong interest in anthropology and history but no consensus about possible approaches to interdisciplinary historical anthropological studies; linkage of concepts of "the construction by human beings of meaning" (formerly the concern of intellectual historians) with other histories and anthropology; and an understanding of science and its history as an aspect of culture.

The journal's coeditor Theodore K. Rabb concluded in "Towards the Future" that as a form of knowledge, history had lost its coherence, but that had been so for some time. What historians could agree upon, he continued, was that materialist concerns had shrunk compared to the previous decade and that there are different paths to meaning. Nevertheless, historians share standards for judging the quality of a historical work.

EXEMPLARY WORKS IN INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY TO THE EARLY 1980s

Some of the major works that were produced up to the early 1980s in interdisciplinary European history may be classified into three categories: major efforts to answer very large, basic questions in interdisciplinary ways that give the authors the opportunity to claim a place as the most general and powerful combination of disciplines; collaborations at the borders between social science and history, in which social science middle-level theories and methods are borrowed

with results that better address questions in both disciplines; and confrontations between history and social science disciplines, in which differences in perspective produce a dynamic tension that permits new insights. The last of these will not be discussed because it occurs less often in research projects than in teaching courses that aspire to interdisciplinarity.

Candidates for the first category, the imperialist claims of major works to be the do-all, end-all interdisciplinary combination, are relatively rare. *Time on the Cross* (1974), Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman's effort to answer many of the long-standing major questions about slavery in the American South, is a good example. The two volumes (one describing the findings, the second a technical exposition of methods and quantitative measures) were the result of an immense effort to collect, code, and analyze data from plantation and government records. Their provocative findings aroused controversy among both economic historians and southern historians, who challenged the results in book reviews, articles, and two volumes of collected essays. Similar claims for methodological superiority and definitive answers were made for behavioralist theories in political science and structural-functionalist sociology; most of the authors of these types of studies were social scientists, political scientists, and sociologists who tended to feature theoretical discussion, rather than historians. Robert Berkhofer's proposal in *A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis* (1969) that historians adopt behavioral theories and the methods developed to study human behavior in social science (psychology, sociology, and anthropology) was read by historians, but its recommendations were seldom adopted.

Studies in the second category are all from social history, which has been characterized by a concern with ordinary people in the past, or "history from below," as Peter Stearns put it. Its basic method has been collective "biography," the assembling of standardized descriptions of individuals into a set—like the pioneering English prosopographies—which can be analyzed for variation and commonalities. The units to be analyzed are not necessarily individuals; they may be events like strikes, groups like families, or categories like occupations. The earliest works in interdisciplinary family history, such as *The World We Have Lost* (1965), were demographically informed but offered little demographic analysis. In that study, Peter Laslett reminded his readers of some common misconceptions of the demography of the period, such as that youthful marriage was common (it was limited to the upper classes), and emphasized the fragility of life for young and old because of frequent epidemics. Laslett also edited the volume *Household and Family*

in *Past Time: Comparative Studies in the Size and Structure of the Domestic Group* (1972), which reported comparative studies of household size (based on census-type listings mostly from Europe). A chapter by the anthropologist Jack Goody raised a gentle warning based on his fieldwork in West Africa: notions in the past and in other cultures of a “household” were not necessarily equivalent to the later census concept of those eating and sleeping under the same roof. Others pointed out as well that the composition of the household would vary with the age of the head and of its members. Indeed, studies designed to investigate the questions raised by Goody later undercut the simple picture based on census-type listings.

David Levine’s comparative study of three English villages from 1600 to 1851, *Family Formations in an Age of Nascent Capitalism* (1977), based on family reconstitution for the earlier part of the period, discovered changes in demographic behavior such as an earlier age of marriage and higher fertility in one village when its economic base was transformed from agriculture to nonmechanized framework knitting. The other villages experienced less economic change and were characterized by correspondingly less modification in family formation and fertility. There, youths who could find no work in their native village migrated to find work.

The sociologist Michael Anderson’s study of industrialized England, *Family Structure in Nineteenth-Century Lancashire* (1971), examined the household economics of textile worker households in a small city during the twin processes of industrialization and rural to urban migration as an application of sociological exchange theory. Anderson traced the relationship between structural constraints and family relations. Although he used nominal census lists as his source, Anderson examined the internal dynamics of families, not simply their structure. He chose a historical moment in which families were experiencing far-reaching change in life both at home and work, so that the context would be part of the problem. He concluded that continuity marked rural families’ experience of industrial factory work. Newly industrial households cooperated in migration, job finding, and pooling income. Tamara Hareven’s *Family Time and Industrial Time: The Relationship between the Family and Work in a New England Industrial Community* (1982) added oral history to the kinds of economic and demographic structural evidence used by Levine and Anderson. Her work borrowed methods from anthropology as well.

Another large category of early interdisciplinary studies examined productive work and workers and their politics in the past. E. J. Hobsbawm and George

Rudé, well-known historians of labor and protest, collaborated in *Captain Swing* (1968), a study of the English agricultural laborers’ protest of 1830, drawing on an epidemiological model. They drew on geography as well to map the process by which protest spread among farm laborers and then to workers in rural manufacturing. Joan Scott’s *Glassworkers of Carmaux: French Craftsmen and Political Action in a Nineteenth-Century City* (1974) combined Marxist theory with social science methods, studying demographic change through family reconstitution, which indicated increased putting down of roots by glassworkers’ households at the end of the nineteenth century, as the men’s earlier customary craft migration was ended by changing technology and organization of work in the glass industry. Settling in Carmaux, glassworkers modified their forms of organization and of collective action, mounting a successful strike.

INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY, 1980 TO THE PRESENT

The post-1980 period was characterized by four changes in interdisciplinary history: the emergence

and rapid development of new subjects for investigation, in particular women's history, which itself was quickly supplemented by studies of gender; fewer purely materialist and structural interpretations and the rise of cultural ones, either supplementing the former or replacing them; a shift in the disciplines to which historians turned for methods and theory from demography, sociology, and economics to cultural anthropology, literary criticism, linguistics, and philosophy, in particular regarding questions about power and the construction of meaning; and vigorous and proliferating debate about historical method and theory.

A work in the prosopographic tradition of social history is Bonnie G. Smith's *Ladies of the Leisure Class: The Bourgeoises of Northern France in the Nineteenth Century* (1981), which also exemplifies an ethnographic approach. Smith portrayed the ideology of spheres as the sociocultural framework for bourgeois women's lives. Over the course of the century, these women came to be concerned almost exclusively with the family and home; these institutions shaped their values and behavior. Nancy Hewitt demonstrated, in *Women's Activism and Social Change: Rochester, New York, 1822–1872* (1984), also a prosopographic study, that there were cultural (religious) and subtle class differences even among middle-class women. Following up on calls for attention to gender (the social construction of sex), historians of working-class women looked at cooperation and rivalries between men and women workers at home and at work. Patricia A. Cooper's *Once a Cigar Maker: Men, Women, and Work Culture in American Cigar Factories* (1987) exemplifies this approach. Cooper distinguished between male work culture, which stressed autonomy, manliness, and control over the work process, and women's more isolated identity, often burdened as well with their obligations at home. As conditions of work changed, so too did women's identity, as they became conscious of common interests with men workers.

Parallel developments occurred in English women's history, exemplified by a major study, Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall's *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850* (1987), which ambitiously addressed not only gender relations but class formation. Focusing on family, Davidoff and Hall were alert to gender differences, showing how ambitious men were embedded in familial (usually female) support as they built careers and rose in the world. However, over the time period studied, the authors noted that because of women's disadvantaged position vis-à-vis accumulating capital and political participation, their world shrank to the domestic sphere exclusively. Davidoff and Hall also

examined middle-class women's roles as writers of popular fiction in prescribing the ideology of spheres and as church members in passing down religious values in the family. Gay Gullickson's *Spinners and Weavers of Auffay: Rural Industry and the Sexual Division of Labor in a French Village, 1750–1850* (1986) reconstructed families in order to understand the household division of labor by sex and explored the way of life of the village. All of these historians of gender combined social-structural investigations of the social history type and gender analysis, which drew more on anthropological, cultural, and philosophical concepts.

In "Gender: A Useful Category for Historical Analysis" (1986), Joan Scott made a case for abandoning social history altogether, at least insofar as it rests upon the analysis of social-structurally defined categories of historical populations. For her, gender as an analytical category centered on meaning, power, and agency: "Gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relations of power" (Scott, 1986, p. 1067). She called for "a genuine historicization and deconstruction of the terms of sexual difference . . . analyzing in context the way binary opposition operates, reversing and displacing its hierarchical construction, rather than accepting it as real or self-evident or in the nature of things" (pp. 1065–1066). Of the studies that have been published following Scott's prescriptions, one which made a particularly seamless argument combining a structural framework and cultural analysis is Kathleen Canning's *Languages of Labor and Gender: Female Factory Work in Germany, 1850–1914* (1996). Canning's presentation of evidence about the organization of work and how women were represented by their employers—in the way that they were disciplined, the hierarchies of skill and wages—and by philanthropic institutions effectively supported her argument.

Examples of combined methodologies can of course be found outside women's and gender history as well. William H. Sewell Jr.'s *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (1980), for example, combined an interpretive narrative account of the changing institutional framework around artisanal production in Old Regime, revolutionary, and nineteenth-century France with an anthropologically informed study of the language with which French workers discussed their work and themselves.

Growing use of anthropology showed also in a variety of projects dealing with early modern European social history, where anthropological models for studying rituals and phenomena such as witchcraft

were widely deployed. By the 1980s and 1990s, this interdisciplinary activity extended to the use of cultural studies theories and models, for modern as well as early modern social-cultural history. These developments both reflected and furthered the “cultural turn” in European social history.

Alf Lüdtke, Hans Medick, and David Sabean, who worked together at the Max Planck Institute for History in Göttingen, Germany, individually and together drew on similar concepts from anthropology. Although all three had written history strongly influenced by sociological theory, Medick and Sabean had become interested in the cultural context of family history and demography by the late 1970s and 1980s. The chapters in their coedited volume, *Interest and Emotion: Essays on the Study of Family and Kinship* (1984), combined structural and anthropological cultural approaches in different ways. Sabean also published three monographic works that continued the combined approach: *Power in the Blood: Popular Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modern Germany* (1984), *Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen* (1990), and *Kinship in Neckarhausen, 1700–1870* (1998). The first of these studies was the one most fully influenced by cultural approaches, while the second was rather more structural but still concerned with discourse and social relationships, and the last used formal procedures borrowed from the anthropology of kinship but generalized in its final chapters about relationships between kinship and gender.

Medick too published a village monograph, *Weben und Überleben in Laichingen 1650–1900: Lokalgeschichte als Allgemeine Geschichte* (1996), but he and Lüdtke rejected to a greater extent than had Sabean the social-structuralism of much German social history. In a sometimes angry debate with Jürgen Kocka and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the senior German academic exponents of structuralist, often quantitative social history, Medick and Lüdtke became advocates for *Alltagsgeschichte* (history of everyday life), which draws heavily on cultural anthropology. The debate has swirled around sensitive topics like the history of ordinary people in the Nazi period, but the essays in the one translated collection (edited by Lüdtke) of the group’s work, *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life* (1995), strongly resembled what in the United States might

be called politically left sociocultural history. The topic was ordinary people’s lives, but the framework was explicitly political. (The essays also have a good deal in common with articles published in the English *History Workshop Journal*, founded in 1976 with the subtitle “A Journal of Socialist Historians,” later modified to “Socialist and Feminist Historians.” *History Workshop* has not been discussed here because it has not been consciously interdisciplinary, nor have article authors usually drawn self-consciously on social science or other disciplines.)

The fourth characteristic of post-1980s interdisciplinary historical scholarship is the proliferation of articles and books discussing theory and method. One book may stand in for the long list of titles—*The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (1996), edited by Terrence J. McDonald. Although the title of this collection of essays reversed the turn of history to interdisciplinarity since the 1960s, the individual chapters by historians looked in both directions. To the degree that there was consensus among the authors, they detected (or recommended) a turning away among both historians and social scientists from scientific approaches. Illustrative of this point of view is the chapter by William H. Sewell Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology.” The three temporalities described here were teleological temporality (exemplified by Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system analysis), Charles Tilly’s temporal frame of the “master processes of history” (capitalist development and state formation), and Theda Skocpol’s “experimental temporality” (comparison of cases as a “natural experiment”). To these failed efforts Sewell opposed “eventful temporality,” which he illustrated by discussing works by two younger sociologists, Mark Traugott and Howard Kimeldorf, in which chronological explanatory narrative, contingency, and the recognition that “all social processes are path dependent” avoided the pitfalls of teleology. Sewell noted in his conclusion that both Wallerstein and Tilly had taken steps in this direction.

Sewell’s theoretical essay points to a potential for bringing sociology and history closer together again, but the work he advocated may seem too much like description for most sociologists to accept. What is needed now is greater experimentation with different epistemological approaches that fulfill Bloch and Febvre’s goal of writing history “*par le fait*.”

See also Social Class; Collective Action (volume 3); Gender History; Kinship (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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CLIOMETRICS AND QUANTIFICATION



Michael P. Hanagan

“Cliometrics,” a term invented by economic historians, refers to the use of social science approaches in the study of history. “Quantification” refers to techniques for rendering historical sources machine readable and to the application of statistical analysis to historical data; it is commonly used in cliometrics. History was one of the last fields affected by the cliometrics and quantifying revolution, inspired by the spread of logical empiricism, that swept the social sciences in the post–World War II period. The use of statistical techniques in the social sciences acquired considerable momentum in economics in the 1940s and in sociology and political science in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1960s many student radicals were suspicious of cliometrics and quantification, but others sought to turn the tools of established scholars against them. These cliometricians and historical quantifiers argued that the systematic study of classes and popular groups necessarily depended upon numbers and research designs as opposed to information about elites that could be culled from memoirs and contemporary writings.

Embraced by some younger radicals and some established historical scholars, cliometrics and quantification flourished in the 1960s and 1970s but have come under increasing attack by cultural and postmodernist historians; the eclipse of logical empiricism among social scientists reinforced the postmodernist attack. Despite the development of new and more powerful statistical techniques and the heightened access to these techniques that resulted from the spread of personal computers and the development of statistical software, the expansion of cliometrics and quantification methods has slowed. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a decline in the standing of cliometrics and quantification but, paradoxically, also witnessed the appearance of some of the most outstanding and important products of these methods and approaches.

SOCIAL SCIENCE ROOTS OF CLIOMETRICS

Cliometrics was largely a product of the 1960s and it emerged most powerfully in the United States, but important historians in almost every European country were influenced by or shared its perspective. At the time, the dominant methodological approach within the social sciences was the logical empiricism of Karl Popper (1902–1994) and Carl Gustav Hempel (1905–). Their approach emphasized the separation of theory and observation. According to Popper and Hempel, theories proposed universal natural laws generating testable statements about events. Empirical investigation confirmed these statements and thus corroborated the theory or disconfirmed them and falsified the theory.

True to its empiricist roots, logical empiricism was very little interested in causation. To say that “ x causes y ” was to say: (1) that x preceded y , (2) that x and y were highly correlated, and (3) that there was some plausible story explaining why x might produce y . Logical empiricists were not particularly concerned with the actual mechanisms connecting x and y and remained satisfied with very general explanations of the causal factors at work. For example, social scientists might investigate whether a father’s economic status or a child’s educational attainment better predicted the child’s occupational level, and they would see their work as addressing the question of whether family influence or intelligence was more important in explaining success. Very little attention was paid to the actual processes connecting job applicants to job markets.

The logical empiricist approach to the social sciences rapidly gained ground during the immediate post–World War II period, the era of the cold war when social scientists sought to develop social policies in response to a perceived communist threat and to the social and economic problems caused by colonial

revolution and decolonization. The development of what was called modernization theory in the social sciences in the United States focused on problems of industrializing and “modernizing” less-developed nations and on reconstructing a devastated Europe. In the United States, the application of statistical techniques to economics and psychology in the 1940s and 1950s, followed by sociology and political science in the 1950s and 1960s, pointed the way for social-science-oriented historians. Among the most important developments within the social sciences, particularly sociology, was the elaboration of powerful statistical techniques taught in courses required for graduate students. Far and away the most important of these formal methods was regression analysis and related techniques, more formally known as the general linear model (GLM). In simplest terms, GLM measures to what extent a straight-line relationship exists between two variables such that a given change in variable x corresponds to a consistently proportional change in variable y .

While always important in the social sciences, measurement played an especially important role in the logical empiricist understanding of science, for it was essential to verification. The statistical techniques that social scientists developed fitted well their conceptions of proof—the individualist assumptions of these techniques also reflected scholars’ concepts of the social world. In the 1960s great strides were made in developing GLM as a technique for comparing the variation of one or more different factors, independent variables, with the variation in another factor, the dependent variable. While GLM was indeed a powerful tool of statistical analysis and every student learned by rote its basic constraints, the analytical significance of these constraints was seldom discussed in any detail, probably because the individualistic assumptions of the statistical method so easily coincided with those of the dominant theories. One of these assumptions was “case-wise independence,” the condition that what happens in one case does not influence what happens in any other. For example, a GLM analysis of the role of a child’s educational level in explaining occupational level assumes that education exerts its influence separately and individually on each child. But one of the most basic understandings about the character of job markets, that they can constitute niches filled by groups who hire their own, violates the assumption of case-wise independence when each applicant is treated as an individual. The idea that clusters of individuals exert influence—that Ivy Leaguers hire Ivy Leaguers or Italian contractors hire Italian laborers—the basic argument of network analysis, presents special difficulties for GLM. The spread of personal computers

made GLM analysis widely accessible. The rapid development of statistical packages such as the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) made advanced statistical analysis accessible to a wide audience, and the adoption of interactive statistical programs for personal computers greatly increased the number of potential users. A characteristic feature of SPSS was that it was best adopted for dealing with “attributive data,” that is, with individual cases, each of which possessed distinctive characteristics—precisely the kind of data best suited for GLM. In the 1960s, GLM analysis of several thousands of cases often required access to computers and computer programs only available in a few dozen universities in the United States. By the 1980s the same analyses could be carried out at home on a personal computer and later via the Internet.

In the early 1980s cliometrics and quantification advanced rapidly in part due to the application and development of powerful new statistical techniques, the nonlinear probability models, known as “logit” and “probit” models. The introduction of nonlinear probability models greatly facilitated the application of familiar statistical techniques to entire new categories of data. While GLM techniques had some very desirable statistical properties and were widely available and easily interpretable, they were most effective when both the “dependent variable,” what was to be explained, and the “independent variables,” the explanatory factors, were expressed in continuous interval measures rather than in qualitative categories. GLM techniques could often produce statistically reliable estimates when using, for instance, years of education or father’s social status to predict adult income, but often yielded serious misestimates when used to explain, for example, how religion or marital status related to political party affiliation. New techniques replaced estimates of linear relations between dependent and independent variables with estimates of the probability of nonlinear relations. Thus, analyses of relationships among individual units of data were extended to a very large body of questions of great importance to historians and social scientists.

One of the reasons that it is important to distinguish between quantification, the application of statistical methods to historical data, and cliometrics, the application of social science research designs to historical analysis, is that different types of statistical analyses appealed to different groups. Analytical statistics that included GLM and probability models was often used by cliometricians, while non-cliometric quantifiers often favored descriptive statistics. GLM and nonlinear probability models were favored by cliometricians who emphasized the need to clearly define and measure both dependent and independent

variables and who often used sampling techniques and measures of strength and reliability. Non-social-science quantifiers were for their part most interested in descriptive statistics—the world of means, modes and averages—that made it possible for scholars to quickly summarize some phenomenon that interested them which might then be integrated into more traditional historical analyses. Computers enabled these scholars to deal with amounts of data undreamt of by previous scholars, but much of this work involved creating series of tables that compared one variable with others but did not search for complex relationships among explanatory variables and generally did not employ sampling techniques.

Relying heavily on quantification, the cliometric movement spread among historians in various specialties, who turned to their neighboring social science in search of useful techniques and research strategies. The wholesale borrowing of statistical methods and research designs from adjacent disciplines was a characteristic feature of the period. Political historians often turned to political science to learn techniques of analyzing voting, while social historians usually resorted to sociology and historical demography. During the 1960s, when population control was an important theme of public discussion, interest naturally arose in the causes and timing of population increase. Historical demographers not only addressed recognized social problems, but also confronted problems of missing data endemic to the historical profession. Unable to use the survey methods available to contemporary students of population, they were forced to develop a historical methodology. The development of historical demography clearly reflected different national approaches to historical analysis. French historical demographers influenced by Louis Henry remained largely descriptive, exploring the dynamics of fertility change in peasant villages. In contrast, the Princeton Fertility Project reflected the social scientific approach dominant in the United States. Princeton historical demographers were devoted adherents of modernization theory and sought to use demographic change to map the spread of modern social attitudes across Europe.

CRITIQUES AND NEW DIRECTIONS IN CLIOMETRICS

By the late 1970s, cliometrics came under attack from historians, but this was only part of a larger, general critique of social science methods and theoretical underpinnings. One of the most common criticisms was the failure of social science theory to account for agency. For social scientists including cliometricians,

it was alleged, variables and not human beings caused social phenomena. Of course the disappointing results of many of the larger cliometric projects, such as the Princeton historical fertility study, only reinforced the conviction that little was to be gained by large-scale interdisciplinary projects. Some leading advocates of social science history, for example Lawrence Stone, recanted and called for a return to narrative history. Many other historians became preoccupied with human agency and turned to cultural analysis and interpretive methods as a way of getting at human purposes. At the extreme, the French philosopher and historian Jacques Rancière rejected all historical generalization as a kind of authoritarian restriction on individual action. Most historians responded to this controversy by returning to traditional topics and methods.

Attacks on logical empiricism in cliometrics were not solely the weapons of opponents of social science history. Among those interested in applying social sciences to history, the leading methodological critics of logical empiricism were “realists.” Realists concentrated on the identification of explanatory mechanisms underlying social phenomena and maintained that the social sciences should not assume the burden of all-embracing explanation and search for a unifying causal analysis behind all social phenomena. Understanding the different causal forces at work was the major preoccupation of realist social scientists who argued that various models could often be usefully combined to present a more comprehensive explanation. Although there are many varieties, realist explanations tend to emphasize the study of processes rather than stable relationships or steady states. They emphasize the study of causal mechanisms and their variety tended to make precise measurement less important than it was for logical empiricists. Many social scientists turned to structured comparisons of two or a few cases. Prominent historical sociologists such as Theda Skocpol emerged who did not use quantitative methods.

Within the social sciences, realists and others have sought to develop techniques for measurement that enable them to uncover mechanisms rather than concentrating simply on measures of association. A major critique of GLM and the individualist explanations of social phenomena developed among those cliometricians and quantifiers who were involved in network analysis, sometimes styled a “relational realism.” A lot of the inspiration for the development of network analysis came from the United Kingdom, where scholars such as Elizabeth Bott had underscored the importance of networks in social analysis. The development of formal methods in network analysis, however, occurred largely in the United States, where



THE PRINCETON FERTILITY PROJECT

The study of historical demography was one of the most important areas in which American social science approaches influenced European researchers. Beginning in 1963 in Princeton, the demographer Ansley J. Coale assembled a Europeanwide research team to study the “demographic transition” one of the basic paradigms of modernization theory. Coale developed basic indices to measure trends in marriage and marital fertility and non-marital fertility from standard census material and Princeton demographers used these indices to measure fertility in major European administrative units such as French departments, Belgian arrondissements, and German administrative areas. The often used GLM to analyze the relationship between the decline in European fertility in the modern era and other regional characteristics such as secularization, industrialization, and literacy. Between 1971 and 1986, the Princeton European Fertility Project issued a series of volumes that reported on demographic change within most European nations including an overall survey of its findings published in 1986 and co-edited by Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins.

The Princeton project produced no clear answers but it did lead to a new understanding of the problems that needed to be explained. One of the established doctrines of historical demography, the “demographic transition,” was revealed as a myth. Long presented as an empirical description, the theory claimed that declining mortality initially promoted rapid population growth. Individual families only slowly distinguished a permanent mortality decline from normal short-term fluctuations and, initially, most families would continue their so-called “natural fertility” in the expectation that infant and child mortality would continue to keep population stationary or only very slowly increasing. As more children survived, however, and families found themselves strapped to support an unexpectedly large number of maturing children in an increasingly competitive environment, families would abandon traditional conceptions and turn to some form of birth control. Eventually, a new demographic equilibrium was attained based on decreased mortality and fertility. Unfortunately, the systematic comparison of European mortality and fertility figures showed no evidence that mortality declines preceded fertility declines. Sometimes mortality declines preceded fertility declines, but in other periods the relationship was reversed.

The Princeton group did discover a series of sudden, sharp declines in fertility that set in during the late nineteenth century in most of Europe (during the late eighteenth century in France) that proved to be lasting; once fertility had declined precipitously it never again reached previous heights. Princeton historical demographers tended to argue that the rapid decline in birthrates corresponded to the spread of modern attitudes, but they never managed to provide reliable indicators of modernization and fertility change. Persuasive explanations of the rapid fertility decline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not, however, forthcoming from Princeton.

In many ways the Princeton project revealed the strengths and weaknesses of logical empiricist social science approaches. The project was a relatively large-scale effort involving a variety of talented scholars over decades. It developed sophisticated measurement techniques that remain of considerable value. Yet the belief that the administrative divisions of European states provided relatively homogenous units in which the spread of modern attitudes from individual to individual could be traced proved illusory. With only a few exceptions, Princeton historical demographers made little effort to explore what was going on within departments, arrondissements, and other administrative areas. They did not examine how the presence of a military garrison with large numbers of unmarried males or a textile town with large numbers of single women, side by side with rural communities of small-holding peasants, might influence their findings, much less look at what was happening to selected households or individual families. When they carried out micro-studies of small units, they focused narrowly on such demographic factors as breastfeeding rather than looking at the larger cultural, social, and economic context. Coale and his collaborators were convinced that the spread of modern attitudes led to fertility control. Despite their blinkered conceptions, it is a tribute to their commitment to empirical investigation that, in the end, they admitted that their findings were largely negative.

Disappointment with the results of the Princeton project as well as the collapse of a number of other similar research efforts led to a disillusionment with quantitative social science approaches to history.

Harrison White and his students, such as Marc Granovetter, played a pivotal role in developing network analysis as method. The Toronto sociologist Barry Wellman is also an eloquent advocate. John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell's use of network theory to analyze the Medici rise to power in fifteenth-century Florence presaged a new approach to historical sociology. Network analysts collected "relational data" concerning ties and connections that linked individuals to larger units and could not be reduced to individual properties. Techniques such as GLM and non-linear probability models were of only limited value for analyzing relational data. Network analysts had to develop their own techniques for identifying and comparing networks and for measuring their distance, direction, and density.

Peter S. Bearman's work on the English Civil War, *Relations into Rhetorics*, presents important examples of the application of network methodology, statistical methods, and theories to historical analysis. In a study that focuses on Norfolk County between 1540 and 1640, Bearman challenges the established "revisionist" orthodoxy in the study of the English Civil War, which rejects class categories or indeed almost any variety of general categories as simply too general, obscuring the complexity of interests and allegiances on all sides in these social conflicts. The revisionists emphasize instead a host of more prosaic interests—intrigues at court, the war plans of the 1620s, plain economic interest, the pressure of local and country politics, the scramble for office.

Bearman shows how network concepts can effectively respond to such objections. He concedes that "categorical" terms such as "class," "aristocrat," or "merchant" are too large and embracing for the detailed analysis of concrete events. Belonging to a category such as a class does not, as Bearman reminds us, imply a self-conscious identity or even necessarily a typical set of behaviors. Just because the entire population of a modern country can be divided into class categories does not tell us whether any important section of the population identifies itself as a class or acts in a class manner. Instead of using "categories" to analyze collective action, he proposes to use "networks" seen as the "structure of tangible social relations in which persons are embedded." In contrast with such abstractions as categories, networks are real associations of people; they may be centered on kinship ties, religion, economic interests, patronage, or other relations, and they may take a variety of forms from hierarchical to egalitarian. Categorical social terms only make sense in terms of collective action when they can validly be applied to existing social networks, Bearman argues. Without being embodied in real so-

cial relations, individuals who comprise social categories can have only very limited opportunities to engage in collective action.

Bearman's study of Norfolk County between 1540 and 1640 reveals the impressive potential in such analysis. Concentrating on elite networks within Norfolk over four approximately twenty-five-year periods, Bearman looks at the state-formation process from the local level. He shows that the state was as much drawn into local affairs by the local power vacuum as by any wish of its own to assert predominance in local affairs. Bearman suggests that the progress of proletarianization and class formation was responsible for dissolving local kin-group solidarities. Gradually, in the first half of the seventeenth century, the consolidation of landholdings and the growing convergence of economic processes made the powerful less interested in drawing on kinship ties and more inclined to participate in national politics.

But the collapse of kinship ties in the county of Norfolk preceded the integration of elites into the monarchical system. By means of appointment to parish jobs, local elites could link themselves to powerful protectors at the national level. As a result, over the period, the basis for appointment to a clerical position changed. Unfortunately for the Crown, it did not have a consistent policy in place or the resources to accommodate these potential entrants on the political scene. In the early period, appointments had been made with a view to extorting church property from the candidate as a condition for appointment; in the later period, appointments were based on the candidate's religious convictions. Religious rhetoric provided the bases for acquiring standing in national politics, acquiring allies, and winning protection at the national level.

The accomplishments of Bearman's book are methodological as well as substantive. Some of his most important conclusions are derived from his use of block modeling, a statistical technique until recently relatively little used by historical researchers, to identify and define networks. Indeed, in the historical study of seventeenth century England, issues of network have come to the fore. In many ways Bearman's use of block modeling underscores the point that our choice of methods must flow from our arguments and the logic of our underlying analyses. As historians turn more to the study of real social relations embodied in networks, they will very likely find formal methods of network analysis more productive and rewarding than GLM.

While interest in cliometrics has declined greatly over the last two decades, nevertheless, under the influence of realist approaches to the social sciences, the

1990s have produced some of the most significant works employing both a sophisticated use of statistics and social science method of any time since the 1960s. These works include John Markoff's analyses of the French *cabiers de doléances* and the relationship between agrarian violence and state legislation, the remarkable study of postwar Italian strikes by Roberto Franzosi, the study of English riots by John Bohstedt, the study of English crowd protest by Charles Tilly, and the examination of the origins of the German welfare state by George Steinmetz. One of the characteristic features of these works is their movement between aggregate data analysis and microanalysis of cases whose significance is underlined by the findings of aggregate analysis. Research projects have been designed to accommodate specific historical contexts, and the integration between historical research and formal methods has become more intimate.

These recent works often combine the analysis of aggregate evidence that defines larger patterns with cases studies that explore causal forces. John Bohstedt's examination of the English food riots between 1790 and 1810 employs a research design that allows him to identify and to use the best evidentiary sources that he could locate in order to construct a persuasive general argument. His studies incorporate macro and micro levels of analyses in a structured way. First, the study outlines large-scale arguments that are then compared against aggregate evidence. A look at the patterns found in the aggregate analysis serves to focus attention on the behavior of microunits such as market towns and open field villages. Next, case studies of various towns and political movements, selected according to the patterns found in the aggregate evidence are used to reinforce and to extend the original arguments. The ability to move systematically between arguments on the macro and micro levels depends both on research design and on willingness to use primary sources.

Bohstedt's study looks at the way in which communities influenced food riots in the era of the Napoleonic Wars, and his strong research design, geared toward effective use of primary sources safeguards against the tendency to allow established models to dictate the course of research. Scholars such as E. P. Thompson have suggested that food riots were a response to the intrusion of commercialism in a preindustrial "moral economy," while others have argued that high corn prices produced discontent. Bohstedt's presentation of data from contemporary newspapers and Home Office files supplemented by a systematic examination of the geographic incidence of food riots by county shows that neither relationship provides much explanatory power. Although hard-pressed by

high prices and commercialism, neither the agrarian countryside nor London produced many food riots; however, such riots were endemic in regions dominated by small market towns, and some well-known riots occurred in emerging industrial cities.

Bohstedt's macro-evidence allows him to identify some important variations whose significance he pursues in detail at the micro level, examining two cases from areas where food riots did occur. He argues that community structure was fundamental to the character of riots. In areas with many small market towns such as Devonshire, the food riot was a bargaining process used as a popular protest against town-dwelling merchants that often persuaded farmers to lower the price of grain. But looking at the growth of large cities in Lancashire such as Manchester, he found that a Devonshire-type food riot was impossible there. No single marketplace existed, and rioters who lacked personal contact with merchants and landlord were unable to win concessions. In Manchester, the food riot was regarded as a disorderly protest and repressed. In the largely rural counties of England and Wales populated by village dwellers, the "food riot" was also impossible. The riot was a direct challenge to farmers who could easily retaliate against protesters familiar to them.

What is most remarkable about recent research in cliometrics has been the combination of a variety of approaches to history, both quantitative (or social scientific) and narrative, in a systematic way. Quantitative methods have been used to identify larger patterns and cases studies used to explore causal relationships within the patterns identified by quantitative analysis. Thus, the sharp dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative analysis so prevalent in the debates of the 1960s and 1970s has been rendered largely obsolete. The quality of recent works in cliometric history and the importance of their findings surely argues that they will not remain permanently out of Clio's favor.

QUANTIFICATION

While cliometrics made great progress in the 1950s and 1960s, the turn to quantification was still broader and more inclusive. A variety of historical investigators turned to quantitative methods as the only way to use important historical records. Many quantitative historical investigators did not necessarily see themselves as "testing" social science propositions but as seeking to understand a particular historical phenomenon such as the European fertility decline. They viewed themselves as pursuing traditional historical goals and using quantitative methods only because the natures of their

sources required it. In the 1960s and 1970s a sharp and clear distinction existed between cliometricians who used social science methods and quantification and those historians who used quantification but rejected logical-empiricist social-science methods. In the 1980s and 1990s, as social science oriented historians abandoned logical empiricism and many quantitative historians became more analytical, the distinction became less clear.

Inspired by the pioneering work of the economic historian François Simiand, French scholars were often in the forefront of the preparation and use of quantitative measures. The efforts of Ernest Labrousse to relate changes in the price of bread to eighteenth-century social protest depended on the gathering of both long and short term data on historical price fluctuations. Georges Lefebvre's work on the French Revolution was based on the systematic analysis of tax records. At the same time, the work of the most prestigious member of the *Annales* school, Fernand Braudel, relied heavily on comparative statistical material; all his life, Braudel remained a voracious consumer of statistical data. The efforts to define long-term patterns in history seemed to require the assembling of statistical documentation. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's classic work on the peasants of Languedoc depended on property records, and Yves Lequin's magisterial study of the working class of the Lyonnais was based on census material and demographic methods.

One of the most important European developments in this regard was the process of "family reconstitution" originated by Louis Henry in France in the 1950s. Essentially, Henry used parish registers of births, deaths, and marriages to "reconstitute" the population of French villages over relatively long periods of time and to derive basic estimates of fertility and mortality. Most of the efforts of Henry and his collaborators focused on small villages because researchers spent a great deal of time per family in preparing their estimates and also because migration posed serious problems; the presence of large numbers of single individuals or migrant married couples could lead to serious exaggerations. Small villages, it was assumed, would have less of these than larger communities.

Family reconstitution was the foundation of one of the most important historically oriented quantitative research projects of the 1960s and 1970s, the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure. Some of the most prominent members of the group were Peter Laslett, R. S. Schofield, Richard Wall, and E. A. Wrigley. Unlike many research projects oriented towards quantitative research, the Cambridge group was fortunate to find in Peter

Laslett not only a sophisticated demographer but a gifted popular exponent of quantitative historical research. In the English-speaking world his book, *The World We Have Lost*, remains a classic defense of social history and the quantitative methods on which it was based. That it has so few rivals in its field helps explain the relative decline of quantitative history. Quantitative historians employed techniques that were not readily understandable to most historians, much less the wider reading public. Too often, the temptation to employ pretentious jargon proved irresistible and ultimately brought discredit on the entire field.

While the Cambridge group generated considerable attention and produced important works on family structure, nonmarital fertility, and social structure, its single most important product was E. A. Wrigley and Roger Schofield's attempt to estimate English population trends between 1541 and 1871, and the efforts of the Institut National des Études Démographiques (INED) to estimate French population trends in the past. The great contribution of the Wrigley and Schofield book was to entirely reframe the question of fertility change. Instead of presuming a "natural fertility" that had remained almost constant right up to the fertility decline of the nineteenth century, Wrigley and Schofield showed long periods of fertility decline followed by periods of fertility increase. Their work seemed to rule out the possibility that fertility decline could be uniquely linked to modernity, and it drew attention to long-term processes of historical change.

Another area in which quantitative history made great strides in the 1960s and 1970s and continued to make important strides in the 1980s and 1990s was in the study of popular politics. One of the interesting developments in this field was that as their statistical methods became more sophisticated, students of collective action began to move in the same direction as network theorists, away from general universal explanations and towards locating theoretically interesting relationships within precisely historical contexts. In this area quantitative historians often benefited from the work of historical sociologists such as Charles Tilly or, later, Sidney Tarrow but often addressed their studies to fellow historians concerned with more single-mindedly historical issues. This work on collective action challenges the seemingly invincible conviction of many historians that quantitative analysis is necessarily biased in favor of the status quo or established ideas. Studies such as the recent work of John Markoff show that quantitative analysis can be a powerful critical tool.

John Markoff's study of protest and agrarian revolution, *The Abolition of Feudalism*, represents a

most important contribution to this literature, challenging central assumptions of revisionist historiography and proposing an important new perspective on the French Revolution. Belying revisionist claims that bourgeois and noble had grown alike in the years before 1789, he demonstrates substantial differences in approach to economic and social problems on the part of different elites; class differences remained important and were to prove crucial over the course of the revolution. More important than this concession to orthodoxy, however, is Markoff's exploration of the dialogic relationship between politicians and protesters between 1789 and 1794. Due credit is given to the anti-feudal discourse of the National Assembly in giving direction to agrarian protest, but the rooting up of the feudal regime only began with such sloganeering; waves of peasant protests in 1790 and 1793 successfully pressured legislators to make good on their promises. Older historiography showed peasant protest as the mobilization of preexisting agrarian interests. Markoff analyzes how peasant interests reconfigured themselves to take advantage of the political opportunities opened to them by the revolutionary legislature. His is a grand study of revolutionary process.

But Markoff's study is also remarkable in its attention to language and its analysis of the reforms that different groups proposed. Its power rests on the exploitation of three major sources using quantitative methods. The first, a major scholarly accomplishment, is the machine-readable sample of the *cabiers de doléances* assembled by Markoff in collaboration with Gilbert Shapiro and others at the University of Pittsburgh. These *cabiers* were reports from more than forty thousand meetings of noblemen, clergymen, and the Third Estate held in the spring of 1789 throughout France. They provide a view of what some important groups demanded on the eve of a revolution. The second important source assembled by Markoff is a collection of some 4,700 rural-centered protests between the summer of 1788 and 1793, allowing a comparison of protestors' demands with the list of reforms articulated in 1789 to see how they evolved over time. Third is the data collected by Jean Nicolas and Guy Lemarchand on rural protest between 1661 and 1789, which enabled Markoff to compare patterns of pre-revolutionary and revolutionary agrarian protest.

Unlike previous work on the *cabiers*, Markoff's study compares the demands articulated by each estate as well as the work of the parish assemblies. Nobles emphasized civil liberties and seldom used the language of hierarchy and divine entitlement, but rather stressed that their seigniorial rights were a form of property and tended to portray the nobility as a body of equals rather than an ordered hierarchy. As a body,

the Third Estate called for the abolition of status privileges and market impediments. It condemned the nobility's monopoly of military commissions, the heavy tax on noble land sold to commoners and the nobles' privileged legal access as well as seigniorial monopolies, their right to tolls and the *corvée*. Focusing on the demands of village assemblies, a subset of the Third Estate's demands reveal that peasants did not frame their demands in the discourse beloved of intellectual historians; without denouncing "feudalism," they reveal systematic hostility to clerical and seigniorial privilege. With regard to the clergy, they opposed the tithe, particularly its variability and accrual to tithe-holders, as well as charges for the major rituals of peasant life. With respect to nobility, they demanded the abolition of privileged dovecotes, rabbit warrens and fishponds, hunting rights, and such periodic dues as well as the end of monopolies, particularly oven and milling monopolies, although they were willing to see some reform of seigniorial courts. Interestingly, peasants were not happy about taxes, but except for such indirect taxes as the salt taxes and town duties, they called for reform rather than abolition. Evidently after centuries of defying state taxation, peasant communities had come to accept the state's right to tax, albeit in a more just form.

The most exciting and truly revolutionary aspect of Markoff's work is his examination of the evolution of peasants' demands and legislative responses during the years of revolution itself, revealing a dialogic relationship between peasant protestors and legislators, in which politicians responded to protest and in so doing also shaped its character. Revolutionary legislators responded to outbreaks of peasant rebellion by increasingly radical agrarian legislation. In turn, peasants learned that legislators were willing to grant them concessions in some areas and not in others.

This study is even more interesting concerning the seigniorial regime itself. While peasants may not have possessed a generalized vocabulary for describing the landed regime, they still had a relatively coherent view of what they wanted changed and abolished that amounted to a thoroughgoing reform. Markoff sides with those who portray the celebrated "abolition of the feudal system" on the night of 4 August 1789 as propaganda for mild reforms that took back almost as much as they gave. Yet Markoff shows that the adoption of antifeudal rhetoric by legislators was to have important costs in excess of its intended mild reforms, for it pointed out a direction for discontented peasants. Subsequent waves of peasant unrest would lead to legislation in March 1790, August 1792, and July 1793 that cumulatively abolished feudalism root and branch.

Markoff's work represents a major challenge to all efforts to portray the French Revolution as having relatively feeble social consequences or as devoid of genuinely social conflict. The strength of his argument depends on his use of extremely large bodies of evidence, in his case principally the *cabiers*, which can hardly be exploited in any other way than by sample and by statistical analysis. Indeed, Markoff demonstrates the extremely misleading character of many uses of the *cabiers* based on selective and narrow readings of very small sections. Although Markoff uses quantification and a clever research design, his major task is to evaluate existing historical analyses of the French Revolution rather than to test or fashion a general theory of social revolution or political mobilization. By the 1990s both a sociologist such as John Markoff and a historian such as John Bohstedt employed sophisticated research designs and quantitative methods to address essentially historical questions. The distinction between cliometrics and quantification, so clear at the beginning of our period, was eroding as social scientists acquired a new respect for historicity and historians paid more attention to research design and sophisticated quantitative methods.

By the 1990s quantitative techniques were often consigned to a niche within the historical profession. Demographic historians, family historians, and econometric economic historians continued to play an important role within their fields but had relatively little influence on adjacent areas of study. Econometric economic history embraced the individualist assumptions of traditional economics and tended to establish itself in economics departments. While some of the most rigorous justifications for cliometrics and quantification disappeared with the ebb of logical empiricism, new approaches to the social sciences developed, such as relational realism, that still employed sophisticated research designs and formal methods. New approaches to social science method eliminated many of the dichotomies that had divided social scientists from historians in the 1960s and 1970s. The Markoff study reminds us of the many existing historical sources that can only be fully exploited with quantitative methods. Tempered in adversity, a new cliometrics and quantification emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. More rooted in historical analysis, capable of moving between micro and macro history, they focused not simply on the analysis of individual properties, but also on the study of relations.

See also Modernization; The Population of Europe: Early Modern Demographic Patterns; The Population of Europe: The Demographic Transition and After (volume 2); and other articles in this section.

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CULTURAL HISTORY AND NEW CULTURAL HISTORY



Christopher E. Forth

There is little sense in searching for the concrete origins of cultural history, as every apparent intellectual inspiration may be shown to have been in turn inspired by some earlier development. As Peter Burke notes, in some cases the result is a “regress that leads us back to Aristotle, who discussed the internal development of literary genres such as tragedy in his *Poetics*, while his teleological views might entitle him to be called the first recorded Whig historian.” (*Varieties*, p. 21). This essay poses for itself a much more modest task, and situates classical and new cultural history within the context of intellectual developments in the western world since the eighteenth century. In light of its relevance in the twenty-first century, new cultural history is taken as the primary focus of the following discussion and attempts are made to articulate its theoretical and methodological ingredients in light of its relationships with cognate approaches and the critical debates that it has inspired.

One of the most obvious differences between these two approaches to the history of culture concerns the rather dramatic expansion of the term itself. As Raymond Williams has shown, the history of this complex idea reveals the interplay of several overlapping meanings, and since the eighteenth century “culture” has denoted: 1) a general process of intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual development; 2) a specific way of life, be it of a group, a period, or humanity in general; and 3) the works and practices of intellectual and artistic activity. In English the first and third understandings of the term refer to and reinforce one another, thus fueling the assumption that culture is something that certain societies (or at least their social elites) possess while others do not. Matthew Arnold’s 1869 definition of culture is often considered exemplary of this view: “a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world” (*Culture and Anarchy*, p. 4). Culture was a moral and exclusivist concept that sketched tacit

distinctions between social and ethnic groups by indicating culturally orthodox works of art and literature as well as the development of a sensibility capable of appreciating them. As we will see below, new cultural historians take as their point of departure the second definition of the word, and by developing it they seek to avoid the elitist and ethnocentric presumptions that inform the other two. This point of departure also brings them into the social historian’s field of reference.

The relationship between social and cultural history has been and remains somewhat complex, even with the more anthropological approach to culture. Many social historians were initially impatient with cultural evidence, preferring topics that could be quantified (for example, family structure rather than family values) or looking to non-cultural causes, as in the dominant trends in the history of protest. We will see below that the marxist approach to social history raised some particular issues, though there could be overlap with culture. But a larger shift to cultural issues occurred from the late 1970s onward, often called the cultural “turn,” though it to some extent built upon earlier social history traditions. Many social historians turned to cultural factors because they could not otherwise explain change: shifts in birthrates, for example, could be quantified, but their causes were more elusive. Interest in new topics such as gender, where cultural factors loom large, also played a role in the cultural turn. Strong interest in cultural topics and explanations persists in social history, though some social historians worry that quantitative methodologies and more “objective” issues like class structures or power relationships are being unduly downplayed in the process. Whether social history and the “new” cultural history are one and the same, or whether they continue to express different if overlapping orbits, is not yet fully resolved. The “new” cultural history reflects autonomous developments within the cultural field as well as a rebalancing within social history itself.

CLASSICAL CULTURAL HISTORY

Instances of what could be called cultural history have existed throughout the modern era, but most of these have tended to be rather journalistic accounts of day-to-day curiosities that struck the fancy of various amateur historians. There are also many examples of histories of cultural developments like music, art, literature, and ideas, that could be counted as cultural history defined broadly. For instance, Jacob Burckhardt's *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860) is often considered a founding work of modern art history. Yet, in its treatment of trends rather than events, this careful study of the art and literature of the sixteenth century also sought to access a broader shift in the European mind during a period of dramatic change. Johan Huizinga's *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (1919) is another famous example of classical cultural history. Yet such concerns were clearly peripheral to the reigning historiographical orthodoxy of the nineteenth century, an ethos traceable to the German historian Leopold von Ranke, who insisted on the careful consideration of documentary evidence with a focus on political leaders and nation states. As academic historical practice became more completely professionalized in the late nineteenth century, with many history departments modeling themselves after German examples, cultural history came to be generally considered the domain of "amateurs" with more of a literary than a "scientific" bent.

Nevertheless, such orthodoxies were increasingly challenged by the end of the nineteenth century by historians in Germany, France, and the United States, with many arguing that the scientific conception of history should meet the demands of modern society. In America, Frederick Jackson Turner's "frontier thesis" directed attention to the role of geography in the creation of national identity, while proponents of the "New History," such as James Harvey Robinson and Charles Beard, called for a shift toward a comparative social and cultural history capable of analyzing broader social processes rather than the agency of prominent individuals. In France, sociologist Émile Durkheim and historian Henri Berr launched a similar critique of conventional historiography, and thus paved the way for the 1929 founding of the journal *Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations*, a periodical that insisted on a cross-fertilization among the social sciences and that self-consciously refuted the primacy of individuals in history. German historians proved far more resistant to such innovations, however, and responded angrily to Karl Lamprecht's search for laws of social and political development in his multivolume *German History* (1891).

This transitional period suggests that it would be a mistake to draw a sharp break between classical cultural history and late-twentieth-century conceptions of this approach, largely because certain key practitioners of the former were also experimenting with broader definitions of culture. Huizinga himself represented a bridge between old and new cultural history by becoming interested in psychological factors in his later years. In addition, members of the so-called *Annales* school incorporated methodologies from a range of human sciences, from economics and demography to sociology and anthropology. One must also cite the example of Aby Warburg who, in Germany during the 1920s, pioneered a form of interdisciplinary cultural studies called *Kulturwissenschaft* that challenged earlier conceptions of a monolithic cultural tradition with the aid of anthropological models.

NEW CULTURAL HISTORY: INFLUENCES AND ENGAGEMENTS

Not only does the so-called new cultural history represent a more thoroughgoing application of anthropological understandings of cultural life, but it does so in a reflexive manner that problematizes the writing of history itself. Indeed, it calls into question at once the subject and the object of knowledge by asserting how deeply mediated all human life is by signifying systems that vary both from society to society and differ even within societies. For instance, where classical cultural historians like Burckhardt focused on elite culture and emphasized the autonomy of artistic and literary works, today one is likely to encounter treatments of culture that emphasize how such works are invested with significance by critics and audiences whose modes of perception and appreciation are shaped by broader social and cultural developments. Moreover, the broader conception of culture that is employed by new cultural historians often means less of an emphasis on elite culture than on collective structures of perception, emotion, and belief—in short, a consideration into the mental conditions that rendered such things as events and leaders possible.

This section outlines a number of theoretical and methodological precursors to new cultural history. In order to impose some coherence over a body of scholarship that is really quite heterogeneous, it treats new cultural history in terms of one of its most characteristic methodological features: its consideration of the objects of historical study in terms of their place in a wider cultural environment that not only frames them, but that in many respects allows them to exist in a certain way. Sometimes referred to as

social or cultural constructionism, for the sake of continuity it refers to this tendency as a new form of "historicism."

Historicism. It is interesting to note that the topical and theoretical innovations of new cultural history were implicit in the same historiographical orthodoxy that marginalized classical cultural history. Traditional or "old" historicism developed in eighteenth-century Germany as a reaction against British and French social contract theories that emphasized the formative role of rational individuals in social life. Utilizing the heuristic fiction of an originary state of nature (wherein men rationally consented to become a society for the mutual protection of life and property), these liberal theories assumed an atomistic view of society in which isolated individuals pursued their own self-interest without the mediation of anything beyond their own minds. Placing a premium on this presocial capacity to reason meant that theorists like John Locke also denigrated the role of "mere custom" as an obstacle to rational thought, and thus in some respects discouraged scholars from taking cultural and social factors seriously.

Many eighteenth-century German thinkers rejected this notion that society was reducible to the sum of its parts, and emphasized instead the emotional nature of the social bond as opposed to the rational calculation of individuals. Johann Gottfried Herder, for instance, emphasized the feelings and traditions that bind a people or *Volk* together, including common customs, common experiences, and most importantly common language. This *Volk* was viewed as a living totality greater than the sum of its parts, thus initiating a rival strand of European social thinking that emphasized organicism and custom. Arguing against "metaphysical" appeals to universal moral standards or assertions of the constancy of human nature over time, Herder proposed that all phenomena be judged only in relation to their historical contexts, and rather than lend his support to widespread assertions of the inherent superiority of western culture, he insisted on the specific and variable nature of cultures across the world and according to various economic and social groups within a single nation. This general historicist standpoint informed Ranke's celebrated claim that historians should not judge the past in moral terms, but should rather "show what really happened," an assertion that has been misunderstood in Anglo-American circles as an affirmation of a simple empirical view of the past. Maurice Mandelbaum's succinct definition of the historicist project is worth quoting: "Historicism is the belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of any phenomenon and

an adequate assessment of its value are to be gained through considering it in terms of the place which it occupied and the role which it played within a process of development" (*History, Man, and Reason*, p. 42).

Although German historicists theoretically validated the study of culture as being worthy of historical interest, in actual practice they narrowed their focus to the study of politics and nation states, thereby restricting themselves to topics supported by voluminous documentary evidence. Informed by more recent theoretical developments in scholarly fields like anthropology, sociology, literary criticism, and feminist theory, new cultural historians have tried to preserve the analytically useful aspects of "old" historicism while jettisoning what they consider its more questionable assumptions. Indeed, in addition to their recognition of the emotional nature of communal bonds and the need to consider all phenomena as the result of historical change, German historicists often glorified the state, insisted on the inherent unity of individual cultures, and envisioned the historical process as being powered by principles that were immanent to that process (and thus not subject to the contingencies of historical flow). While Karl Marx took issue with the idealist tenets of the historicist tradition (chiefly exemplified in the works of G. W. F. Hegel), he nevertheless reproduced many of its metaphysical tendencies in his theory of historical materialism. Looking back on a century that witnessed two world wars, the systematic extermination of millions in Nazi concentration camps, and Stalinist totalitarianism in the Soviet Union, many westerners are understandably skeptical of such overarching historical frameworks and, in the often quoted observation of French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, often manifest incredulity toward such grand narratives.

Marxism. Among nineteenth-century historicists, Marx was one of the few to observe that economic conditions and social hierarchies contribute to the predominance of certain ideas and institutions, and thus paved the way for many future historiographical innovations. Marxist-oriented social history therefore provided a fertile source for new cultural history, though the relations between these approaches have not always been amicable. Unlike their Soviet counterparts, western marxist social theorists have done much to develop this cultural dimension of Marx's ideas, often by complementing them with insights from Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, and Max Weber. Through his influential concept of "cultural hegemony," for instance, the Italian marxist Antonio Gramsci prompted a rethinking of the power that ideas can exercise over the minds of people, allowing

social elites to rule more effectively by securing the consent of the governed. Other notable theorists, especially Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and others associated with the so-called Frankfurt School, have proposed viewing mass entertainment as a veritable “culture industry” that neutralizes the potential for dissent in western societies and thus dominates populations through consent. In the hands of many marxist theorists, then, culture is a veritable handmaiden of class domination, and remains firmly tethered to the mode of production.

In addition to these developments in critical social theory, cultural historians have been inspired by the work of British marxist social historians like Eric Hobsbawm, George Rudé, and especially Edward Thompson, who pioneered the notion of a “history from below” partly as a means of restoring to the largely forgotten members of the proletariat a sense of having taken an active role in their own formation. In his epic work *The Making of the English Working Class*, Thompson emphasized the interplay between individual agency and social structure in the case of the proletariat, and thus attempted to reconcile two apparently contradictory aspects of traditional marxist theory. Class consciousness was not something that proletarians blindly attained, but actively cultivated: “the working class was present at its own making.” The call to explore “history from below” forms but one part of Thompson’s legacy to cultural historians, many of whom have also been inspired by his innovative forays into the world of workers’ beliefs and communal values that called into question longstanding understandings of crowd violence as mere irrational outbursts. Taking as his example the so-called “bread riots” of the early modern period, Thompson persuasively argued for the existence of a persistent “moral economy,” where grain and other staples were seized during times of hardship in order to be sold at a price considered reasonable to members of the community. In such instances collective outrage at hoarders and speculators were refracted through the cultural traditions already in place.

Despite the undeniable contributions that marxist social history has made to new cultural history, there is significant disagreement on a number of key theoretical points. One point of tension pertains to the status that traditional marxist theory has accorded culture in everyday life. In their treatment of the ideas and institutions that characterize any given society, marxists have generally grounded all such “ideological” phenomena in the dominant mode of production, thus maintaining that the determining role of the economic “base” determines the context of its

cultural “superstructure.” Marxism therefore usually views culture as an *expression* of underlying forces. Indeed, for all of his attempts to problematize a simple correspondence between consciousness and material life, Thompson too contended that “class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born—or enter involuntarily” (p. 9). A second point of disagreement concerns the knowledge claims implicit in the marxist practice of ideology critique. As an offshoot of nineteenth-century historicism, marxism too acknowledges that phenomena should be judged in relation to their historical conditions of development. Moreover, in its recognition of the formative role of economic and social conditioning over the world of ideas, marxism comes close to admitting that knowledge is itself contingent and shaped by historical factors. Yet despite these historicist tendencies marxism still tends to view itself as a science that can dispel cultural illusions or “ideology” to reveal the “truth” about economic domination. Whereas all other social actors are supposedly trapped in the web of ideological distortion, the marxist critic implicitly remains capable of perceiving reality in a more or less transparent manner. Finally, both marxism and social theory have often been less concerned with factors of gender and race, and frequently assume that instances of sexual and racial discrimination are ultimately reducible to an economic foundation.

None of this is to suggest that contemporary cultural historians exclude from their analyses a consideration of socioeconomic factors or that they fail to recognize instances of class domination. Rather, they contest the determinist claim that all forms of social control must necessarily be reflections of a material base. Indeed, sexual and racial discrimination have histories that do not rely solely on the means of production for their particular historical manifestations, and thus encourage us to question the marxist insistence on the predominance of economics in all forms of domination. One must also acknowledge that late-twentieth-century marxist theory proved receptive to critiques of the base/superstructure model, and one is now more likely to see more sophisticated analyses of the relationship among economics, culture, gender, and race. The British tradition of “cultural materialism” represents one example of this openness in literary criticism, while the “post-marxist” theories of Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and others also betray an engagement with theoretical developments. In fact, marxist social historians were among the first to apply new linguistic models of culture to the study of the past, though one may wonder to what extent one can do so while remaining marxist.

The Annales school. New cultural historians have also been inspired by the “history of mentalities” as practiced by French historians linked to the well-known scholarly journal *Annales*. Opposed to the conventional historical preoccupation with events and seeking to establish productive relationships with other disciplines, founding members Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch drew upon recent psychological and sociological insights in order to access a hitherto ignored dimension of historical experience. Marc Bloch’s classic study *The Royal Touch* demonstrated how popular beliefs in the king’s ability to heal scrofula represented a durable mental system that did not die simply because the much sought cure did not always occur. The *Annalistes* nevertheless failed to provide a rigorous theorization of the relationship between *mentalités* and other environmental factors, and some like Pierre Chaunu concluded that it represented a “third level” of historical inquiry more or less determined by developments taking place on the putatively more primary level of social and economic life. Hence, the *Annalistes* contended that culture was at heart an expression of underlying structures, and shared the marxist reluctance to accord it an autonomous status. Fourth-generation *Annalistes* such as Roger Chartier and Jacques Revel proved much more receptive to theoretical developments and conceived of culture as operating independently of social and economic determinants.

Semiotics. Most importantly, new cultural historians generally recognize the centrality of language to the production of cultural forms and human consciousness. By “language” these scholars do not mean individual words or phrases, but language as described by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure early in the twentieth century: a signifying system in which individual words acquire meaning through their differential relationships with other words. Concepts such as “white” or “male,” for instance, are only arbitrarily connected to their referents in reality, and their meaning is constructed through their *difference* from all other words in the system. Nor is the individual speaker the source of language and the guarantor of its meaning, for shared systems of signification may be shown to precede and mold individual consciousness. Partly inspired by Durkheim’s notion of “collective representations,” Saussure suggested that our views of the world are always shaped and constrained by the signifying system in which we have been socialized. Contrary to conventional thinking, language does not *express* a pregiven and independent reality, but constructs or *constitutes* it for members of specific linguistic communities.

Saussurean linguistics represented an essential component of the method of semiotic analysis known as structuralism, a manner of systematically studying a wide variety of “signs,” from conventional linguistic ones to cultural signs like wrestling matches, cuisine, kinship systems, and bird calls. French structuralists like the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss argued that myths are one example of the sort of “deep structures” of human existence that obey a common “grammar” possessed by all peoples. Such cognitive structures are, for Lévi-Strauss, collective and not reducible to individual consciousness, and illustrate the centrality of binary oppositions for the ordering and categorization of the world. In their extension of Saussurean linguistics into other areas, structuralists performed a double movement that had profound implications for later scholarship: they questioned at once the subject and the object of knowledge—the knower and the known—by showing the extent to which human experience is mediated by cultural or “discursive” structures.

Whereas structuralism focused closely on binary opposites that were considered to be stable and universal characteristics of cultural life, the next generation of French thinkers (dubbed “poststructuralists” by the Anglo-American world) undermined the putative stability of such structures to emphasize the fluidity and “play” that attend all instances of signification. What the philosopher Jacques Derrida termed “deconstruction” is a method of critical reading that demonstrates how all apparent oppositions are not really oppositions at all. Rather, in every instance of an “either/or” opposition, each side of the copula not only depends on the other for its very coherence, but the relationship is always implicitly hierarchical, with one side usually achieving predominance over the other. Some examples of this opposition/hierarchy include “white” and “black,” “male” and “female,” “center” and “periphery,” “healthy” and “diseased,” all of which can be deconstructed to reveal the implication of one in the other. The cognitive stability that collective mental structures seemed to ensure was now undermined by the tendency of cultural categories to slide into one another.

One result of this critical attention to language and the double bracketing of the subject and object of knowledge was an increased reflexivity on the part of many historians: if we are able to decipher the internal contradictions and hidden biases of our historical subjects, what then of our own attempts to make the past appear coherent? Although deconstruction is useful for thinking about the ways in which binary oppositions are put together, one is more likely to encounter the deconstructive method in the works of intellectual his-

torians who critically reread classic historical works and theorize the narrative nature of all historical writing. Hayden White is the undisputed pioneer in this field, and was one of the first historians to incorporate the insights of literary criticism in his well-known work *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (1973), which investigates how well-known historians have “emplotted” their works in one of four dominant western narrative styles. Today there are a number of prominent intellectual historians who study the “poetics” of historical writing, including Dominick LaCapra, Hans Keller, F. R. Ankersmit, Allan Megill, and Robert Berkhofer.

Anthropology. While more theoretically inclined and self-reflexive cultural historians have been informed by such insights into language, most seem to have followed the lead of social scientists who have applied such semiotic theories to the study of culture itself. Anthropology has proven an especially influential field for the elaboration of new theories of culture, and many historians have been inspired by Clifford Geertz, who in his approach to culture submitted that “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of a law but an interpretive one in search of meaning” (*The Interpretation of Cultures*, p. 5). Unraveling the many layers of significance that inform cultural formations is a hermeneutical operation akin to the interpretation of a literary text, and thus gives rise to what Geertz calls “thick description.”

Much new cultural history betrays the influence of semiotic and anthropological theories of culture. British social historians like Gareth Stedman Jones were among the first to experiment with such conceptions, but in so doing they ended up challenging earlier marxist reductions of social consciousness to material reality. Stedman Jones’s strong claim that we “cannot therefore decode political language to reach a primal and material expression of interest since it is the discursive structure of political language which conceives and defines interest in the first place” represents a definite departure from conventional marxist theory. Natalie Zemon Davis, an American social historian and former marxist, was also receptive to anthropological models of communal life, and likewise criticized a crude base/superstructure model in her work on peasant customs and rituals in early modern France.

Michel Foucault and historicism. A number of other theorists played a part in the elaboration of new

cultural history, including Pierre Bourdieu, Mikhail Bakhtin, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Lacan, to name but a few. Without a doubt, however, the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault exercised the most significant and durable impact on this historiographical approach. Inspired by the example of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, Foucault’s “genealogical” method historicizes that which has been considered “natural” or otherwise outside of the reach of historical influences. Where Nietzsche sought the subtle and forgotten beginnings of morality in violence and coercion (rather than in some absolute sense of the good), Foucault turns his attention to topics like sexuality, insanity, criminality, and illness to suggest not only that one can write histories of such phenomena (thus opening up new topics for historical study), but that such phenomena are themselves the effect of historical developments and cannot simply be considered “natural.” By refusing to search for the inherent meaning of things in their putatively stable essence or “origin,” Foucault insists that such things “must be made to appear as events on the stage of historical process” (“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 1977, p. 152).

Foucault advocates a strong version of historicism that questions the pregiven reality of a range of human experiences, from madness and sexuality to criminality and the body. One effect of this historicism is a radical questioning of the metaphysical concept of “Man” that has undergirded the western intellectual tradition. As Foucault asserts in a memorable passage: “Nothing in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men” (1977, p. 153). By challenging the “natural” aspects of human life, Foucault does not recommend that we deny the materiality of the body but, as he explains toward the end of *The History of Sexuality, Volume One*, that we “make it visible through an analysis in which the biological and the historical are not consecutive to one another . . . but are bound together in an increasingly complex fashion.” Hence, unlike an *Annaliste* history of mentalities that might consider only how the body has been perceived, Foucault calls for a “‘history of bodies’ and the manner in which what is most material and most vital in them has been invested” (pp. 151–152).

Questioning the conventionally understood relationship between knowledge and power was central to Foucault’s brand of historicism, and proved especially fruitful for many styles of new cultural history. Traditionally seen as committed only to truth and remaining “disinterested” in the pursuit of social status or professional accolades, knowledge has been often

seen not only as distinct from power, but as its veritable antithesis. Eighteenth-century intellectuals set the tone for such an understanding, suggesting that knowledge, reason, and public discussion could be used to unmask the mental domination of religious dogma and to critique the status quo. Although marxist social theory proved instrumental in situating the production of knowledge in its socioeconomic contexts (particularly by showing how accepted ideas frequently mirror the interests of the dominant class), Foucault rejects the marxist assumption that a more judicious use of critical reason may remain free of such constraints. In his thoroughgoing historicism, Foucault contends that knowledge must always be seen as inextricably embedded in its social and institutional context, and therefore denies the possibility that knowledge could ever sever its ties to various forms of power.

Rather in works like *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault argues for a much closer relationship between knowledge and power by asking us to reconsider what power means and how it operates. Though acknowledging the conventional understanding of power as a negative force that represses or prohibits (what he calls “juridical” power), Foucault suggests that power also operates in a more productive and subtle manner insofar as it is connected with knowledge. Following Nietzsche, Foucault claims that the will to know is a desire to order the world into categories and hierarchies that seek to effect control as well as create order. Here Foucault breaks with the common assumption that knowledge is the “other” of power. Homosexuality, he argues, shifted in the western imagination from a “sinful” deed that one performed (and for which one could atone) to the expression of one’s innermost person, thus chaining an individual to his or her sexual identity. Advances in knowledge about sexuality thus served to create new understandings of the “normal” and the “pathological” by casting nonreproductive desire as deviant and potentially dangerous, thereby classifying those who indulged in it as “sick” and in need of treatment. Foucault argues that the nineteenth-century scientific campaign against sexual vice was at base not so much an attempt to eliminate it altogether (an instance of power as prohibition) as it was a process through which ever-more complex categories of “perversity” were concocted to make it proliferate as the “other” of heterosexual coupling. Knowledge thus discursively constructed “the homosexual” and “the heterosexual” as specific types of persons, thereby defining “normal” desire through the elaboration of a multitude of opposites. In this sense knowledge and power are not opposed to one another but work together creatively.

The interdisciplinary and unconventional style of Foucault’s writings have proven to be obstacles to his acceptance among many historians who take exception to his eclectic combination of philosophical reflection, social theory, and historical research. Indeed, Foucault’s apt description of his works as “philosophical fragments in historical workshops” has done little to endear them to more conventional historians. Although one must admit the rather incomplete incorporation of his ideas to new cultural history—indeed, much of his radical philosophical agenda has failed to make it into these works—nevertheless Foucault’s primary contribution has been to suggest new topics for historical scrutiny along with a method (some say an “antimethod”) for analyzing them.

THE PRACTICE OF CULTURAL HISTORY

Some of the earliest and best-known practitioners of new cultural history distinguished themselves through their enthusiastic embrace of anthropological models of culture. A substantial number of such works focus on early modern Europe, thus to some extent extending the preoccupation of the *Annales* tradition with this period. Key early works in this vein include David Sabeau’s study of the duchy of Württemberg in Germany, *Power in the Blood*, and Carlo Ginzburg’s reconstruction of the cosmology of a sixteenth-century Italian miller in *The Cheese and the Worms*. In such matters interpretive history is perhaps best suited, largely because many of the traditional text sources are often not available for, say, everyday life in a peasant village during the Middle Ages. Robert Darnton’s *The Great Cat Massacre* is one of the classic examples of this type of scholarship insofar as it applies Geertz’s “thick description” to a number of topics, from early modern fairy tales to the tale about the trial and execution of cats told by printers.

Nowadays cultural historians are usually careful to emphasize the performative rather than expressive role of culture. A “performative” statement is one that at once describes and brings about (performs) the very thing it denotes, as in the claim “I now pronounce you husband and wife.” Many cultural historians agree with the linguist J. A. Austin’s claim that all language is in some sense performative in that it produces an effect as it signifies. In the form of official discourses of, for instance, medicine or criminology, culture plays a mediating role that creates and sustains social practices rather than simply mirroring or expressing them. Roger Chartier has described how this notion of culture must be distinguished from the idea of *mentalité* as a third level of historical experience.

Cultural representations are not dependent upon a pre-given material reality for their existence; rather, Chartier claims that “representations of the social world themselves are the constituents of social reality.”

This emphasis on the performative role of culture has encouraged new interpretations of key political events, notably the French Revolution. The contributions of cultural historians like Lynn Hunt, Roger Chartier, Mona Ozouf, and Antoine de Baecque often suggest that a fundamental shift in mind-set had occurred among the French during the eighteenth century that provided the conditions of possibility for radical change. As Chartier has argued in *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, the Revolution became possible because enough changes had taken place in the wider culture to make such a dramatic upheaval conceivable. Moreover, in *Festivals and the French Revolution* Mona Ozouf argues that the highly planned Festival of the Federation (held on 14 July 1790 to commemorate the unity of the nation in the revolutionary moment) was an opportunity to create a sense of national unity where anxieties about division were widespread. That is, such festivals were not so much expressions of a preexisting national unity as they were attempts to create such unity through festivity itself, thus “performing” the very unity whose existence they proclaimed.

The influence of Foucault is palpable in many areas of new cultural history, particularly in works that inquire into the relationship between systems of knowledge, and power relationships in various national contexts. The social history of medicine received a significant boost from the injection of Foucauldian thought, and has encouraged a close examination of the relationships between medical categories of pathology and broader sociopolitical processes whereby a culture constructs a definition of normality through the identification of a range of “others” such as women, criminals, perverts, non-westerners, proletarians, and the insane. Such investigations have also dovetailed with other areas that have been marked by the influence of Foucault, including the history of sexuality and the cultural history of the body, and frequently demonstrate a dialogue among these fields and developments in feminist theory and gender studies. Robert Nye’s *Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France*, for instance, explores the interconnection between medical discourses on insanity and criminality in the context of a pervasive concern with the decay of the French body politic at the end of the nineteenth century. Although they incorporate a more psychoanalytic framework, works such as Sander Gilman’s *Difference and Pathology* and *The Jew’s Body* have done much to expand our understanding about

how German-speaking cultures produced concepts of “health” and “normality” through medicalized conceptions of pathological otherness.

Few works in this vein have been as widely cited as Thomas Laqueur’s *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud*, a book that explores the gender politics behind a rather stunning reorientation in European medical thinking about male and female reproductive physiology. Laqueur argues that for much of the western tradition male and female bodies were viewed as essentially the same, except that the female was seen as an inversion of the male. That is, when doctors examined the womb and ovaries they saw an inverted penis and testicles, and even maintained that both sexes secreted semen. While this “one-sex” medical model hardly guaranteed equality among the sexes, it remained firmly in place until two sexes were discovered in the late eighteenth century. What is most fascinating about this “discovery” is that it was not grounded in new empirical evidence. Rather, the shift to the now prevailing medical belief in sexual dimorphism functioned partly as a means of grounding an emerging ideology of “separate spheres” in the bedrock of incommensurable biological difference. Far from standing apart from the world of interests, the language of science emerges in Laqueur’s work as being infused with the rhetoric of gender that marked other discursive fields.

New cultural history and its relations to neighboring fields. Given the impact of contemporary linguistic theories on most of the humanities and social science disciplines—and the fact that disciplinary boundaries were increasingly and productively blurred in the late twentieth century—it is difficult to argue that new cultural history has simply exercised an “influence” over neighboring fields. It is nevertheless possible to cite certain important intersections between new cultural history and developments in cognate disciplines. Edward Said’s influential *Orientalism*, generally considered the founding text of postcolonial studies, reveals many of the same Foucauldian concerns with power, knowledge, and history evident in works of new cultural history. Using a combination of Foucauldian discourse analysis and a Gramscian critique of cultural hegemony, Said powerfully shows how “the Orient” and “Orientals” were constructed as the “other” of the west by French and British intellectuals during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A similar use of contemporary cultural thinking is made by Benedict Anderson, who argues that national identity depends upon a collective imagining. This idea of the nation as an “imagined community” is central to postcolonial studies and also resonated in

the Subaltern Studies movement, which in its reconsideration of Indian history combined many of these insights with a more traditional marxist focus on the agency of subaltern groups.

Similar developments may be discerned in feminist scholarship, where a methodologically traditional women's history found itself complemented or challenged (depending upon one's viewpoint) by a new focus on gender as "a useful category of historical analysis," to use Joan Wallach Scott's phrase. Unlike women's history, which generally contributed to the recovery and insertion of women into the historical record without interrogating the bases of their exclusion in the first place, historians such as Scott have shifted the focus from agency to identity to show how gender identities, or one's identification with certain gender roles, are effects of broader cultural schema and practices. Invoking Foucault while pointing out the gender blindness in his work, gender historians contribute to a rethinking of selfhood by revealing the historical nature of a crucial dimension of personal identity. Finally, labor history too has felt the impact of these new ideas, with prominent practitioners like William H. Sewell Jr. and Donald Reid adopting linguistic models of social consciousness that avoid the reductionist tendencies of conventional social history.

These productive interchanges among such new areas of scholarship attest to the difficulty of separating new cultural history from its neighboring fields, and thus in a sense enacts in miniature the broader collapse of disciplinary boundaries in the humanities and social sciences. One may now expect to encounter works of history that are in fact hybridizations of social, cultural, feminist, and postcolonial methodologies, as in the case of Daniel Pick's *Faces of Degeneration*, which revises Edward Said's insights on Orientalism to suggest the simultaneous construction of a sort of "Orient" within European society during the nineteenth century that paralleled the constitution of an external "other" abroad. Pick shows how the conflict between Occident and Orient was not a tension between polar opposites; rather, medicalized discourses of hereditary degeneration and their elaborations in works of fiction and social policy suggest the troubling presence of "atavistic" traits at the heart of the very "civilization" whose achievements were so often counterposed to the "degeneracy" and "effeminacy" of Muslim, Asian, and African cultures. The direction of Pick's argument was modified somewhat by Ann Laura Stoler who, in her study of the unpublished fourth volume of Foucault's *History of Sexuality*, suggests that theoretical and methodological tools for thinking about Europe's inner "others" were first developed for and applied to colonial peoples, thereby

suggesting that "external colonialism provided a template for conceptualizing social inequities in Europe and not solely the other way around" (p. 75). Whenever one situates oneself on this intriguing issue, historicist arguments have contended that discourses of gender, class, and race are in fact "interarticulated"—one cannot construct a discourse of one without employing the terms and metaphors that are present in the others.

The same could be said for the relationship of new cultural history with its fellow-travelers in neighboring fields: insofar as these various approaches are informed by similar theoretical (especially semiotic) frameworks, each articulates its own project with tools that are already present in the other, albeit with different foci and more specific points of application. While it would indeed be an exaggeration to claim that new cultural history has exercised an *influence* over its neighbors, one must admit the current prominence of "the historical" as a widely held contention in the human sciences that one must situate the objects of study within historical frameworks of culture and discourse. In literary studies the so-called New Historicism amply demonstrates a shift away from purely textual analyses to contextual considerations in a manner that parallels the sort of thing many historians have done, while the fields of cultural studies and queer theory have also been marked by this historicizing turn.

CRITICAL DEBATES

Most innovative historical approaches generate some degree of controversy, often stemming as much from professional anxieties, political concerns, and generational tensions as from bona fide intellectual differences. Debates that have arisen around new cultural history have nevertheless been particularly frequent and often rather polemical. Some of the more vitriolic rejections of this approach lump it together with postcolonial studies, feminist theory, multiculturalism, and even marxism as part of a vaguely defined, yet nevertheless menacing, "postmodernism" that threatens to undermine professional historical standards or even basic morality. Some critics have gone so far as to describe proponents of such methodologies as "tenured radicals" who have continued the 1960s assault on western civilization by becoming university professors. Gertrude Himmelfarb, for instance, a high-profile critic of marxist-inspired social history, inveighed against the expansion of "postmodern" ideas in historical circles. Others challenge this approach from a traditional marxist perspective and, in keeping with the old or-

thodoxy of the base/superstructure model, accuse its proponents of ignoring the “materiality of the sign” in their focus on culture. Such controversies tend to generate more heat than light, however, and rarely betray much of an engagement with the theories that inform the approaches being condemned.

More careful critics are attentive to the disagreements among those who already profess and employ this approach, and are therefore able to enter into more sophisticated dialogues on key issues. If cultural historians disagree among themselves about the concept of historicism, it is less in regard to the general validity of the method than to the limits of its application. The issue of the physical body has proven a highly charged one for questioning the limits of historicism, and has generated some productive scholarly exchanges. Some historians seem to agree with Bryan Turner, a pioneer in the sociology of the body, that historicist arguments must not be permitted to thoroughly overrun the body’s basic materiality. Cultural historian Lyndal Roper echoes this point of view, albeit from a psychoanalytic perspective, and criticizes the overzealous historicism that allows one to make the “real” body disappear behind its various discursive formulations. Roper calls instead for a moderate historicism that facilitates a dialogical relationship between nature and culture without collapsing the former into the latter: “Bodies have materiality, and this too must have its place in history. The capacity of the body to suffer pain, illness, the process of giving birth, the effects on the body of certain kinds of exercise such as hunting or riding—all these are bodily experiences which belong to the history of the body and are more than discourse. . . . Bodies are not merely creations of discourse” (*Oedipus and the Devil*, p. 21).

This question about the limits of historicism also generated political debates about the status of human agency within the cultural networks described by some historians. A brief debate in the journal *Signs* (1990) between two prominent feminist historians, Linda Gordon and Joan Wallach Scott, placed in relief some of the issues that divide practitioners of social and women’s history from those who subscribe to arguments drawn from linguistic theories. Scott criticizes Gordon’s work about women and welfare agencies, *Heroes of Their Own Lives* (1988), for attributing to its female subjects personal autonomy that did not reflect the complexity of being situated within cultural and discursive networks. In a manner familiar to cultural historians, Scott challenges the idea that one can conceive of agency as existing outside of such frameworks, and recommends viewing it instead as “a discursive effect” in which the ways in which social workers represented the experiences of their clients

helped shape the range of options open to women. Far from denying women the capacity for action in their struggle against domestic violence, Scott claims, such a view recognizes “a complex process that constructs possibilities for and puts limits on specific actions undertaken by individuals and groups.” Gordon’s response and her subsequent critique of Scott’s *Gender and the Politics of History* exemplify the types of criticisms that women’s historians have leveled at the poststructuralist theory that informs much new cultural history. She argues that too much of a focus on “discourse” threatens to override agency and personal experience, and undermines women’s capacity for concrete political action.

Similar tensions attended the reception of new cultural history among labor historians. Prominent scholars like William H. Sewell Jr., Donald Reid, and Patrick Joyce embraced contemporary theory to challenge a number of tenets of labor history. Contesting the idea that economic factors are inherently “material,” for instance, Sewell argues for a “post-materialist labor history” that would consider the symbolic function of money and advertising as well as the intellectual origins of factory construction and the role of worker morale and expertise in production. Social consciousness is not viewed as springing from socioeconomic relationships, but emerges from discourses of social identity and interest that prefigure consciousness. While some labor historians welcomed the new insights such methodologies could bring, they questioned whether the study of culture should eclipse more conventional inquiries into mass movements and political structures. Others contended that discourses of class cannot be thoroughly severed from their extralinguistic referents, and insisted on the primacy of social relationships when it comes to thinking about consciousness.

CONCLUSION

As with any scholarly approach that boasts of being “new” when it bursts onto the scene, new cultural history was fairly well established as one among many ways of thinking about history by the twenty-first century. This is not to say that new cultural historians enjoyed the unanimous esteem of their more traditional colleagues, for the field still managed to draw the fire of critics from the left and the right who believed that after twenty years this approach still represented a mere “trend.” One could agree with Peter Novick that this attests to the fragmentation of the historical profession into a plethora of specializations that no longer cohered around shared principles and

whose denizens had little common ground for discussion. Yet much has changed in cultural history since its heyday in the 1980s. When new cultural history was actually “new” it provided innovations both in terms of the topics considered worthy of historical attention and in terms of the ways of theorizing such topics within their respective contexts. It is nevertheless apparent that a good portion of what was marketed in 2000 as “cultural history” reflected more of the topical rather than theoretical innovations entailed by this approach. In fact, some of these works even read more like conventional social histories with a few obligatory nods to one of many privileged theorists.

To some extent this state of affairs reflects the success of this approach in the academy and the willingness of historians to combine methodologies in a creative and eclectic manner. On the other hand, though, one might argue that cultural history lost much of its edge by becoming subsumed into a more or less nonreflective historical establishment. Some

historians see less fragmentation than the cooptation of erstwhile radical approaches back into a surprisingly resilient mainstream. “Whatever possibilities become evident,” notes Patrick Joyce, “something is needed to shake the hold of a history which continually reproduces itself, in the process sucking the erstwhile heterodox into its consensus, in much the way that ‘cultural history’ is slowly but surely becoming routinized as more methodology, yet one more subdiscipline in the house of history.” Joyce’s observation is astute, yet one wonders whether a historical approach that could successfully resist such cooptation is possible and, even if it were, whether it would still merit the name “history.” It seems evident that what makes history “history” has little to do with methodologies and innovations that are unique to it, and perhaps a more thoroughgoing interdisciplinarity would discourage the domestication of future innovations into mere additions to the mansion of conventional history.

See also other articles in this section.

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GENDER THEORY



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Gender theory developed in the academy during the 1970s and 1980s as a set of ideas guiding historical and other scholarship in the West. In social history it particularly thrived in the United States and Great Britain, with far fewer followers on the European continent. Essentially this theory proposed looking at masculinity and femininity as sets of mutually created characteristics shaping the lives of men and women. It replaced or challenged ideas of masculinity and femininity and of men and women as operating in history according to fixed biological determinants. In other words, removing these categories from the realm of biology, it made a history possible. For some, the idea of “gender history” was but another term for women’s history, but for others gender theory transformed the ways in which they approached writing and teaching about both men and women. To some extent it may be hypothesized that the major change brought about by gender theory was that it complicated the study of men, making them as well as women gendered historical subjects.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOURCES

Anthropology produced some of the first influential theories using the term “gender” when it began discussing “gender roles.” The background to this concept lay in post–World War I research. Margaret Mead, most notably, described non-Western societies where men performed tasks that Westerners might call “feminine” and vice versa. Mead described many variations in men’s and women’s tasks and sexual roles in her best-selling studies (such as *Coming of Age in Samoa*; 1928), opening one way for scholars to reappraise the seemingly fixed behaviors of men and women and to see stereotypes as contingent rather than determined by nature. Such a reappraisal, however, lay in the wings for much of the 1950s and 1960s.

Another source of gender theory was philosophical and literary. “One is not born, one is made a woman,” the French philosopher and novelist Simone de Beauvoir wrote in her 1949 best-seller, *The Second Sex*. This dense and lengthy description of the “making” of womanhood discussed Marxist, Freudian, literary, and anthropological theories that, according to Beauvoir, actually determined women’s behavior. In her view women, in contrast to men, acted in accordance with men’s view of them and not according to their own lights. This analysis drew on phenomenological and existential philosophy that portrayed the development of the individual subject or self in relationship to an object or “other.” Thus, as Beauvoir extrapolated from this theory, a man formed his subjectivity in relationship to “woman” as other or object, spinning his own identity by creating images of someone or something that was not him. Instead of building selves in a parallel way, women accepted male images of them *as* their identity. By this view, femininity as most women lived it was an inauthentic identity determined not inevitably, as a natural condition, but as the result of a misguided choice. This insight had wide-ranging implications for future scholarship, notably in suggesting a voluntaristic aspect to one’s sexual role or nature.

A second extrapolation from existentialism in *The Second Sex*, however, did touch on women’s biological role as reproducer. For existentialists, living an authentic life entailed escaping the world of necessity or biology and acting in the world of contingency. From this creed Beauvoir posited that women were additionally living an inauthentic life to the extent that they just did nature’s bidding by having children and rearing them. They should search for freedom and authenticity through meaningful actions not connected with biological necessity. The assertion that women could escape biological destiny to forge an existence apart from the family also opened the way to gender theory. A group of translators in the Northampton, Massachusetts, area working under the aegis of H. M.

Parshley made *The Second Sex* available to an anglophone audience in the 1950s, and in 1963 Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique* further spread Beauvoir's lines of thought to Americans.

Beauvoir's was not the only French doctrine to lay some of the groundwork for gender theory. During that same postwar period Claude Lévi-Strauss, an anthropologist, developed the theory called structuralism. According to structuralist theory, people in societies lived within frameworks of thought that constituted grids for everyday behavior. These frameworks were generally binary, consisting of oppositions such as pure and impure, raw and cooked, or masculine and feminine. Binaries operated with and against one another as relationships. One could draw from structuralism that in the case of masculine and feminine, these concepts or characteristics were mutually definitional because they shared a common border, which, once crossed, tipped feminine behavior into masculine and vice versa. Although Lévi-Strauss saw these binaries as fixed, the ground was laid once again for seeing masculinity and femininity both as interlocking and as a part of culture, even though a more fixed one, as well as a part of biology.

Lévi-Strauss developed these theories in *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (1949), in which he took kinship, as the fundamental organizing category of all society, to be based on the exchange of women. The American anthropologist Gayle Rubin elaborated on Lévi-Strauss in "The Traffic in Women" (1975), an article that further developed gender theory. Citing Marxist and Freudian deficiencies in thinking about women and men, Rubin essentially underscored the hierarchical character of the relationship between men and women as an ingredient of what anthropologists and sociologists were coming to call gender: "the subordination of women can be seen as a product of the relationships by which sex and gender are organized and produced." The second point Rubin extrapolated from Lévi-Strauss was that the most important taboo in all societies was the sameness of men and women. This "imperative" of sexual difference was what made "all manifest forms of sex and gender," which were thus "a socially imposed division of the sexes." This imposed sexual difference "transform[ed] males and females into 'men' and 'women.'" By 1980 the phrase "social construction of gender" was commonplace among anthropologists, sociologists, and some psychologists. To quote a 1978 textbook: "Our theoretical position is that gender is a social construction, that a world of two 'sexes' is a result of the socially shared, taken-for-granted methods which members use to construct reality" (Suzanne Kessler, *Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach*, p. vii).

INFLUENCES FROM PSYCHOANALYSIS, FRENCH FEMINISM, AND FOUCAULT

Rubin's article directed scholars to psychoanalysis, and for some, concepts drawn from psychoanalysis also contributed to gender theory, resulting in a limited number of historical applications by the 1990s. Rubin saw the Oedipal moment, as pinpointed first by Sigmund Freud, as being that moment when the societal norm of sexual difference was installed in each psyche. Her article publicized the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, whose writings fused the insights of Lévi-Strauss with an updated Freudianism. Rubin admitted that Freud, Lévi-Strauss, and Lacan could be seen as advocates for the sexism of the psyche and society, yet she also valued them and urged scholars to value them for the descriptions they provided of sexism as a deeply ingrained psychosocial institution. As a result of Rubin's and others' investigations into psychoanalysis and its relevance to scholarship, some gender theory came to absorb this ingredient too.

Freud's publications between 1899 and 1939 touched on questions of women's sexuality and identity formation. His formulations saw a psychosexual development for women that depended on imaginings of the male phallus, and of the female genitalia as in essence lacking one. Privileging the phallus, as did the little boy, the little girl understood her "lack" and that of her mother as somehow a devaluation of femininity. This drove her to appreciate male superiority and to throw herself eagerly into the arms of a man (first her father and then her husband) as part of the development of a normative, heterosexual femininity with marriage and motherhood—not career—as goals. Boys, in contrast, feared that they might become castrated like their mothers, whose genitals they interpreted as deficient, and thus came to fear their fathers, repress their normal, infantile love for their mothers, and construct an ego and sense of morality based on identification with masculinity and accomplishment. In the case of both boys and girls, however, there were many roads to adult identity based on a number of ways of interpreting biology and the parental imago. Thus, in two regards Freudianism became an important ingredient of gender theory: first, it posited an identity that, although related to biology, nonetheless depended on imaginings of biology in relationship to parental identities. Freeing male and female from a strict biological determinism, Freud furthermore saw psychosexual identity as developing relationally. That is, the cultural power of the male phallus was only important in relationship to feminine lack of the phallus or castration. This relativity of masculine and feminine psyches informed gender theory.

The theories of Jacques Lacan nuanced Freudianism and became both influential and contested in gender theory. Lacan described the nature of the split or fragmented subject in even stronger terms. Freud had seen the rational, sexual, and moral regimes within the self as in perpetual contest. In an essay on the “mirror stage” in human development, Lacan claimed a further, different splitting. The baby gained an identity by seeing the self first in terms of an other—the mother—and in a mirror, that is, again, in terms of an other. Both of these images were fragmented ones because the mother disappeared from time to time, as did the image in the mirror. The self was always this fragmented and relational identity. Lacan also posited language as a crucial influence providing the structures of identity and the medium by which that identity was spoken. In speaking, the self first articulated one’s “nom” or name—which was the name of one’s “father”—and simultaneously and homonymically spoke the “non,” the proscriptions or rules of that language, which Lacan characterized as the laws of the “father” or the laws of the phallus. Lacanianism added to gender theory a further sense of the intertwined nature of masculinity and femininity, beginning with identity as based on the maternal imago and fragmented because of it. Second, it highlighted the utterly arbitrary, if superficially regal, power of masculinity as an extension of the phallus, or cultural version of the male organ. Third, the fantasy nature of the gendered self and indeed of all of human identity and drives received an emphasis that became crucial to some practitioners of gender history.

Under the sign of what came to be known as “French feminism,” French theorists picked up on Lacanian, structuralist, and other insights to formulate a position that contributed to gender theory. For these theorists, such as Luce Irigaray, masculine universalism utterly obstructed feminine subjectivity. What Simone de Beauvoir called “the Other” had nothing to do with women but amounted to one more version of masculinity—male self-projection. Women thus appeared as erasure, as lack, and, in Irigaray’s *This Sex Which Is Not One* (1985), as unrepresentable in ordinary terms. The woman was the divided, nonunitary, fragmented self. The result for the writing of social history were such compendia as Michelle Perrot’s *Une histoire des femmes est-elle possible?* (Is a history of women possible?; 1984). The question of how one writes the history of fragments, “decentered subjects,” and other characters for whom there are no historical conventions was addressed in some writing derived from French feminism. To some extent, Joan Scott’s *Only Paradoxes to Offer* (1996) tried to execute that

project by eliminating biography and story from her account of French feminists.

The French philosopher Michel Foucault contested the standard interpretation of social and political power as a palpable force emanating from a single source. Rather, power was almost a Nietzschean life force circulating through society, thus constituting a mesh in which all people operated. The mesh or grid of power produced subjects or, more commonly, people as they articulated its principles. Thus, for instance, in his famous *History of Sexuality* (1977) Foucault maintained that speaking about sex or behaving in some flauntingly sexual way was not in and of itself a liberatory act but rather an articulation of social rules about sex and thus a participation in power and the law. Foucault saw the work of the modern state as an increasingly invisible implication of people in the exercise of power around bodily issues—thus the sense in his work of biopower present in the activities of doctors, the clergy, government officials, and ordinary reformers. Downplaying or even eliminating the traditional sense of human agency, Foucault’s work actually fit with some theories current in social history in the 1970s, notably that branch investigating people’s behavior as opposed to their subjectivity.

Many aspects of Foucault’s theories immediately fed into French social history of women. Arlette Farge, a French social and cultural historian, described the lives of eighteenth-century Parisians in a Foucauldian manner. That is, reading police and legal records, she saw those lives as “produced” and coming into being in this legal encounter (*La vie fragile: Violence, pouvoirs, et solidarités à Paris au XVIIIe siècle*; 1986). In presenting answers to questioners, they gave shape to their lives, as did neighbors and other witnesses. At the same time, they protested and resisted accusations and characterizations. Farge’s accounts also showed the production of gender by the law, although this theory had not yet taken on a definite shape in historical work. Similarly Foucauldian, Alain Corbin’s *Les filles de noce: Misère sexuelle et prostitution* (1978) interpreted legalized prostitution as arising from the state’s ambition to regulate and oversee even these sexual acts. Life in the brothel had its special textures, but these were sex workers’ experience of the state.

POSTSTRUCTURALIST GENDER THEORIES

Although many of these theories had more or less influence on the social history of women, in 1986 they came together when the historian Joan Scott issued a stirring manifesto about gender theory in *American*

Historical Review. Scott's "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis" asked historians to transform social scientific understandings of gender by adding Lacanian psychoanalysis, Jacques Derrida's deconstruction (a philosophical theory showing the difficulties in assigning definite meanings or truth to texts), and Foucauldian-Nietzschean definitions of power. In her view Marxist, anthropological, and psychological moves toward understanding gender had reached a dead end because they tended to see male and female as having essential or enduring characteristics. Marxism always saw women's issues as inexorably subordinate to issues of class, and feminists who believed in Marxism had no convincing way of explaining men's oppression of women. Nor, for that matter, according to Scott, did those feminist scholars who studied patriarchy or sought out "women's voices." Despite great progress, even those who now followed the lead of the "binary oppositions" of structuralist anthropology could not account for them. The rigidity of the male-female categories in any of these systems, especially in the work of those who sought out women's "voices" and "values," kept gender from being as useful as it could be.

As palliative, Scott considered the way the trio of French theorists could overcome the rigidities of gender theory as it had evolved to the mid-1980s. Lacanian psychoanalysis rested in part on the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure's understanding of language as a system in which words had meaning only in relationship to one another. It coupled this insight with revised Freudian ideas about the psychic acquisition of identity as a process shaped by the supremely high value placed on the phallus, and it was this value that the symbolic system of language expressed. For Scott, Lacanianism and all the psychic variation it involved were one key to understanding gender as an exigent, inescapable relationship. Foucault's theory of power as a field in which all humans operated offered another valuable insight. Scott suggested that using Foucault allowed for the introduction of gender issues into political history, thus overcoming the separation that historians had maintained between women's history and the political foundation on which most historical writing rested.

Scott also explained that gender could be a category or subject of discussion through which power operated. It could operate thus in several ways. For one, because gender meant differentiation, it could be used to distinguish the better from the worse, the more important from the less important. Using the term "feminine" articulated a lower place in a social or political hierarchy. Additionally, gender explained or assigned meaning to any number of phenomena,

including work, the body, sexuality, politics, religion, cultural production, and an infinite number of other historical fields. Because many of these were fields where social history had established itself and where Scott herself had done major work as well, gender theory of her variety found a welcoming audience.

The philosopher Judith Butler offered other poststructuralist versions of gender theory that influenced historians. In two highly celebrated books, *Gender Trouble* (1990) and *Bodies That Matter* (1993), Butler argued against talking of femininity in terms of an essential womanhood. Drawing on a range of theories, Butler proposed to discuss human action less in terms of the behavior of a knowing and conscious subject and more as an iteration of social rules. The fact that actions were the iteration of rules should not lead to fatalism, Butler maintained, for such iterations in appropriate settings could have upsetting consequences and even make for social change. *Bodies That Matter* made an important contribution to debates in gender theory that saw gender as "constructed" and sex or the body as somehow more "real" and determined by biology. Butler's response was to deny "sex" as a ground for the "construction of gender." "Sex" was as constructed as gender, especially the construction of "sex" as being more fundamental or real than gender.

By 1990 Scott, Butler, and other scholars had provided two critiques that shaped the use of gender theory in social history. The first was the critique of universalism, meaning the critique of narratives and analyses that took women as having their womanhood in common. Although social historians had been more conscientious than most in assessing class interests, Marxist tendencies in social history tended to see class as a universal too, one that overrode particularities such as race and gender. The critique of universals particularly brought to the fore women of color and women outside the Western framework of social history. Similarly, the critique of essentialism served to encourage more particularist studies because it denied an essence to womanhood. Denise Riley's *Am I That Name?: Feminism and the Category of "Women" in History* (1988) showed that womanhood as an essential category was constructed in the nineteenth century to represent the "social" and thus a unified essence. The critique of essentialism went even further, however. Joan Scott's "Evidence of Experience" argued that even the claiming of a group identity or essence based on one's own experience that was shared with others was impossible as an authentic or originary entity. Set in an already constructed world of language and culture, no identity could point to an originary and essential moment of self- or group-formation.

CRITIQUES AND NEW DIRECTIONS

While social-scientifically based theories of gender caused less stir, gender theories that incorporated ideas of Foucault, Derrida, and French feminists initially provoked incredible debate and tension among historians. For one thing, the theories raised hackles as elitist and not accessible to everyone. These were “theories,” it was charged, with little relevance to real people’s problems. In fact, the unabashed elitism associated with difficult theories made some charge that these theories were actually fascistic. Another parallel with fascism appeared in the contempt with which the traditional Left was often viewed by people who had seen the real “light” of postmodernist gender theory. From a variety of perspectives feminist “theorists” became a target; indeed feminist theory associated with this more psychoanalytical and linguistically oriented variant of gender theory attracted some of the heaviest antipostmodern fire.

Although many merely equated gender history with women’s history, to some within the profession it looked like a way once again to move women’s history to the back burner. Now that historians were dimly acknowledging the legitimacy of women’s history, the argument went, why should such progress be thrown aside to do gender history? In this argument gender theory seemed to be working against women’s history, and as people rushed to do the history of the more important sex—men—the old paradigms of eliminating women seemed to have been revived by feminist theorists themselves. Another objection focused on a still different aspect of gender history’s connections to postmodernism and especially to the theory of deconstruction as it affected women’s history. By this view the questioning of subjectivity and agency contained in postmodernist theory undermined one major goal of women’s history, namely, to have women figure as subjects and agents of history. The accomplishments and contributions that women’s history had taken such pains to accumulate lost their luster. Moreover, in positing a relational or split subjectivity (when such was allowed), gender theory undermined the positive, independent figuration of women. Whereas women’s history had struggled to free accounts of women from a history of the family and men, gender theory seemed to relegate them to the “relational” status that historians in general accorded them.

Finally, critics of gender theory interpreted Freudian strains of that theory as draining away the findings of social history that saw women as “rational” actors in, say, devising family strategies of fertility limitation, patterns of work, household management, or

social movements. For these critics the Freudianism in gender theory resexed women and relegated them to those libidinal, irrational, even hypersexual stereotypes that had heretofore characterized their rare appearances in history. The additions of Lacan were equally suspect to these critics, for his theory seemed less to question masculinity than to put it at the unquestionable heart of all power and value. Any attempt to question the power of the phallus or, by extension, of men was a delusion or sickness. Thus, those among the critics who were feminists—and most were—took the Lacanian aspects of gender theory as antifeminist, even misogynist. As cultural icons, Freud and Lacan became further examples of the automatic leadership awarded to misogynists, including most of the male theorists privileged in social thought.

Theorists of postcolonialism, led in particular by Gayatri Spivak, further altered gender theory when they began looking at the colonial-imperial relationship in postmodernist terms. Spivak asked whether the “subaltern” or colonial, dominated subject could “speak.” This question could run the gamut of possibilities, from whether a colonized person had the right to speak to whether the person might be so infused with the values of the dominator that she or he had lost the power to be an agent of his or her own culture. The term “subaltern” had special meaning to those who were both women and colonial subjects. From postcolonial theory, social historians began seeing gender as a product of imperial regimes, specifically as produced in the context of Western dominance and non-Western resistance, submission or both.

The sciences bolstered gender theory, most notably as they came to discuss the lives of those born with ambiguously sexed bodies. In “The Five Sexes,” the scientist Ann Fausto-Sterling demonstrated that if one determined “sex” by physiological and chromosomal characteristics, there were five sexes. Society, however, often tried by surgery or other means to pare bodily sex down to two—male and female. In addition parents, doctors, psychologists, and teachers reflected society’s inability to deal with more than two sexes. As a result they directed the behavior of those of the nontraditional among the five sexes into the well-established behavior of the standard “male” or “female” gender role. This scientific understanding provided still another reinforcement to the gender theory that claimed the arbitrary, social, and invented nature of gender. Exploring sexual behavior and gender identity in the eighteenth century, for instance, Randolph Trumbach has particularly focused on the transvestite male as a “third sex” social actor.

Not surprisingly, historians developed alternatives to gender history and women’s history. The Ger-

man historian Gisela Bock suggested that both were necessary, each having special virtues and contributions to make to history. The medievalist Judith Bennett suggested that the main goal of women historians should be less gender history than a concerted investigation of patriarchy. Motivated to investigate the sources of women's inferior treatment and status in society, Bennett argued that historians needed to chart the historical creation and operation of patriarchy in all its forms. The American historian Gerda Lerner worked along these lines in *The Creation of Patriarchy* (1986). While some historians of race and colonialism welcomed postmodern and gender theory for its commitment to breaking down wholeness and universals, others questioned the emphasis on fragmented and partial visions. People of color and colonized peoples, these critics argued, had already experienced fragmentation and subordination in their actual lives and in their histories. For them, the position of autonomous subject with a universal history would be a refreshing change, even an imperative one.

GENDER THEORY AND SOCIAL HISTORY

The many varieties of gender theory have shaped the writing of European social history. One of the first areas to feel the effects of gender theory was the history of working- and lower-class women. Judith Walkowitz's *Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class, and the State* (1980) demonstrated the ways in which the Victorians had shaped working-class women's recourse to casual prostitution during the off-season into an identity through state policy. Whereas in working-class communities women's seasonal exchange of sex for money or food did not mark them out, the state's policing of prostitution and the imprisonment and coerced medical exams converted these women from workers to outcasts. Instead of being intrinsic, these women's identity was constructed. After the work of Alain Corbin and Walkowitz, the social history of prostitution intersected with an increasingly sophisticated gender theory. Laurie Bernstein's *Sonia's Daughters: Prostitutes and Their Regulation in Imperial Russia* (1995) saw the regulation of prostitution as an enactment of gender by which female inferiority was expounded as disease and as subjection to a patriarchal state in the guise of doctors, police, and other regulators.

At the heart of postwar social history, the history of work has also gained insights from gender theory, as scholars have looked at agricultural, artisanal, industrial, and service work through its prism. Deborah Valenze's *First Industrial Woman* (1995) showed the

modernization of work during the transition in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as comprised of gender dimorphism. An expert chapter on dairying and gender illustrated this transformation, as women became less valued workers and men became the quintessential and valued ones, whether in agriculture or cottage industries. Taking on one of the staples of social history, Tessie Liu's *Weaver's Knot* (1994) demonstrated that one of the heroes of social history—the male artisan—only survived as an independent worker because of the proletarian labor of his daughters and wife in nearby factories. In a different work arena Francesca de Haan's *Gender and the Politics of Office Work: The Netherlands 1860–1940* (1998) provided a detailed instance of male–female relationships in the Dutch service sector. Highly skilled, hardworking, and in need of money, women office workers were also harassed, underpaid, limited in their job opportunities, and suspect as workers. Meanwhile men were seen as naturally entitled to office work, especially to promotions and managerial positions. The professions have been equally seen as gendered: Christine Ruane's *Gender, Class, and the Professionalization of Russian City Teachers, 1860–1914* (1994) described the special conditions that produced teaching as a gendered profession. Women could only teach in cities, had to remain unmarried, and were said to require extra training in order to be fit for the job.

Because gender theory called attention to language, social history even of the working classes or of ethnic groups took on many aspects of and sometimes merged with cultural history. For instance, worker autobiographies, seen as suspect in the 1970s because of their elite and exceptional nature, had new possibilities with the validation of language as a subject of inquiry. Mary Jo Maynes's *Taking the Hard Road: Life Course in French and German Workers' Autobiographies in the Era of Industrialization* (1995) explored expressions of gender difference in the life course of working women and men and used literary instead of statistical means. Paula E. Hyman's *Gender and Assimilation in Modern Jewish History* (1995) looked at the way Jewish men in Europe and the United States jettisoned their traditional role of publicly promoting Jewish culture. This reaction to anti-Semitism left Jewish womanhood redefined as the exclusive support of that culture, and the household rather than the public sphere as its locus. Such a change in culture reshaped gender and the social role of men and women.

Since E. P. Thompson's *Making of the English Working Class* (1963), religion had earned a place in social history, but gender theory made the religious experience of women as important as that of the men on whom Thompson had focused. Phyllis Mack's *Vi-*

sionary Women: Ecstatic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century England (1992) and Deborah Valenze's *Prophetic Sons and Daughters* (1985) showed popular Protestantism offering a place where gender roles could mutate somewhat in both the early modern and modern periods. Dagmar Herzog's *Intimacy and Exclusion: Religious Politics in Pre-Revolutionary Baden* (1996) looked at debates over gendered social issues such as mixed marriages, sexuality, priestly celibacy, and Jewish assimilation as central not only to social identity but also to the highest reaches of politics. Gender theory often played a unifying role in connecting social and cultural issues to politics.

Debates over the history of the middle class had started in women's history with scholarship on their daily lives—especially their contributions to philanthropy—religion, and feminism. Gender history opened other narrative and analytical possibilities. For example, Leonore Davidoff's and Catherine Hall's *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850* (1987) charted the formation of men's and women's roles, interests, and activities as gender-specific undertakings over the course of almost a century. In contrast, Anne-Charlott Trepp's *Sanfte Männlichkeit und selbständige Weiblichkeit: Frauen und Männer in Hamburger Bürgertum zwischen 1770 und 1840* (1996) claimed that there was less gender dimorphism among the Hamburg upper classes. Men and women shared child rearing, belief in romantic marriages and rational values, and participation in public causes. Such findings raised questions about the relationship among common social practices and legal and economic structures that generated and enforced male privilege and female inferiority.

The social history of women gained much of its early verve from the study of domesticity, child rearing, outwork—that is, paid labor done in the home—and other aspects of the so-called private sphere. However, when gender theory met studies of the public sphere in the guise of coffeehouses, cafés, academies, and other locations of communal life, social history made for a host of new kinds of studies. The work of Sarah Hanley on early modern France detailed the ways in which male privilege in the family shaped the laws of the state, while it also showed women in daily life and on a microlevel contesting these arrangements. Dena Goodman, among others, showed the salon as a gendered social space and thus gendered the “republic of letters.” Isabel Hull claimed that civil society and public space in eighteenth-century Germany was essentially male, leading to the gendering of citizenship. Unlike Goodman and Hanley, Hull put her emphasis on male rather than female activism in society.

Studies of World War I attracted intense gender analysis. Equally mixing social, cultural, and political history, Susan Kingsley Kent's *Making Peace: The Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain* (1993) looked at the war as crucial in reshaping the relationships among men and women and thus in producing new forms of gender and of gender politics. For Kent the issue emerging from the war was how to reconstruct gender relationships after men had been away killing for four years, while women had essentially led very different lives, imagining the war from afar for the most part. Depending on whether they had been at the front or stayed home, women had different views of soldiers and thus of gender relations in peacetime. Those who had remained at home implicitly or explicitly saw soldiers as killers, and the feminists among them espoused separate spheres after the war. Those few women who had actually seen maimed, hysterical, and infantilized soldiers had a more sympathetic view of men and of relations among them. The war thus complicated gender, with sexologists and other social experts playing a large role in “making peace.”

As gender theory absorbed ingredients of post-modernism, some historians picked up the thread by which gender was seen as a way of addressing issues other than gender, again in the context of World War I scholarship. Mary Louise Roberts's *Civilization without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927* (1994) showed the way in which battling over the behavior and characteristics of women allowed society as a whole to address the incredible pain suffered by the French in World War I. Gender was speakable, whereas responsibility for the war and unbearable loss were not. So instead of civilization being menaced by war, civilization was menaced by the loss of traditions of femininity. Those following this paradigm in gender theory tipped their accounts of society perceptibly to cultural history, although social history often formed an unspoken background.

The aspects of social history that focused on social movements and protest were affected in various ways by these changes. Early modern protest and riots came to have gendered components and differentials, producing women and men as social actors. The French Revolution (notably in the work of Joan Landes and Lynn Hunt) was seen as mapping familial relationships and fantasies onto the political landscape. *New Voices in the Nation: Women and the Greek Resistance, 1941–1964* (1996) by Jane Hart saw the gendering of national identity in social movements as well. The work of Atina Grossman and Donna Karsch saw the construction of social agency in gendered protests centered on abortion, birth control, and other

social rights. Kate Lacey's *Feminine Frequencies: Gender, German Radio, and the Public Sphere, 1923–1945* (1996) explored the relationship between technology, the public sphere, and women's social behavior.

One stream of gender theory has tried to distinguish between gender and sex, and this has coincided with an interest in sexuality and the body as components of both gender and social history. Some of the history of sexuality and the body has used these fields to show the growth of bureaucracy around sex and gender. James Farr's *Authority and Sexuality in Early Modern Burgundy* (1995) described the criminalization of various kinds of sexual behavior as the act of a patriarchal state creating and sustaining both gender order and its own power. Sabine Kienitz's *Sexualität, Macht, und Moral: Prostitution und Geschlechtererziehungen Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts in Württemberg* (1995) described post-Napoleonic bureaucrats asserting their prerogatives over a new district by criminalizing longstanding sexual and social practices. In the process women's economic use of their bodies, accepted in the particular town as part of social structure, succumbed to state-building.

Gender theory, while operating on the macro-level of social and political history, has also been successful in allowing for micro studies of the body that have large-scale social implications. Barbara Duden's *The Woman beneath the Skin: A Doctor's Patients in Eighteenth-Century Germany* (1991) used the transcribed words of patients to show a very different experience of a gendered body in relationship to the physician than that announced by Foucault for the modern period. Taking issue with the emphasis on discourse, Lyndal Roper's *Oedipus and the Devil: Witchcraft, Sexuality, and Religion in Early Modern Europe* (1994) argued that the body had a palpable and experienced reality that was prelinguistic but nonetheless gendered. On the basis of this individual experience congealing into collective movement, witchcraft, religious reformation, and other forms of social behavior took shape, especially gendered shapes.

A notable accompaniment to gender theory was the study of masculinity as a constructed, social, and not necessarily natural quantity. Among the first to write in this vein, in *Be a Man!: Males in Modern Society* (1979), the historian Peter Stearns detailed the ways in which manhood consisted of a set of unwritten rules backing explicit exhortations to masculinity. Using the case of nineteenth-century France, Robert Nye explored anxieties about normative masculinity. He examined legal and medical records to determine that "honor" was a central feature of this masculinity. However, he also showed that homosexuality had its constructed side as well, serving as a foil to the nor-

native. By the 1990s the exploration of masculinity added race and colonialism as variables. Gail Bederman's *Manliness and Civilization: The Culture of Gender and Race in the United States, 1870–1917* (1995) looked at turn-of-the-century masculinity in the United States, seeing whiteness and blackness intertwined in its definition and creating a model for studies in European social history. Mrinalini Sinha's *Colonial Masculinity* (1995) investigated British treatment of Bengali men and those men's internalization or questioning of those norms. Both Sinha and Bederman brought in the activism and responses of Bengali and black women. The opening of gender theory, and particularly that related to masculinity, allowed for breakthroughs in the study of fascism and Nazism. Totalitarianism came to be understood as a set of gendered practices and policies operating at the highest levels and affecting everyday life in society. By 2000 a range of masculinities had been charted for many historic places and eras.

Gender theory has been used to question the foundational practices of history itself. Combined with social history, gender theory applied to historiography and the philosophy of history reconsiders the announced objectivity and standards of the profession as it has evolved since the nineteenth century. Using psychoanalytical and anthropological lines of argument, gender theory looks at historical practices in a way that parallels the studies of science from a social point of view and thus finds a niche in social history. In other words, it explores the values of the profession by investigating its actual practices. These practices judged nonwhite people as inferior when it came to thinking objectively and rationally and put women in the same category. The modernizing profession of history, as a social institution, also relegated women to doing much unacknowledged work, even to the extent of writing histories for men who then got the credit. By these practices, the profession was gendered, creating men as a superior category of professionals and women as an inferior one of uninformed copyists, notetakers, and sometimes readers of men's work. Gender theory also allowed for an understanding of the way in which subject matter about men was featured, once the hierarchy of male to female had been established. Because men were important, the history of men was itself more "significant" than the history of women, who were already established as unimportant in the hierarchy of gender. Along with the objectivity and equality of opportunity in the profession came a constitutive gender bias. Gender theory also allows for a reading of why social history is seen as less important than political history, and an analysis of that hierarchization among scholars.

Gender theory is only of interest to a minority of historians. Many social historians also find it of little value, so that histories of social movements, work, religious behavior, crime, education, death, the professions, ethnic groups, sports, and other aspects of social life do not mention gender. Most of these works thus imply either that the male experience is the only important one or that it can stand for everyone's. Others do not discuss gender because they want to focus on class, race, or other issues, and do not see these categories as developed in tandem with gender, as many gender theorists believe. However, all denigrations of

gender theory can be read in a gendered way, in which class and race are seen as superior masculine categories, whereas gender is seen as inferior. Not all histories that deal explicitly with women, finally, use gender theory in any self-conscious way. They may proceed empirically, with few wider historical referents. The multiplicity and complexity of gender theories may encourage this gap. But since the mid-1980s use of theory in dealing with women (and sometimes men) in history has increased, providing a richer conceptual framework and a new means of linking specific historical topics to larger issues and comparisons.

See also other articles in this section and the articles in the Gender section in volume 4.

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MICROHISTORY



Karl Appuhn

Microhistory is a historical method that takes as its object of study the interactions of individuals and small groups with the goal of isolating ideas, beliefs, practices, and actions that would otherwise remain unknown by means of more conventional historical strategies. Microhistory emerged, primarily in Italy, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as a revolt against studies of large social groups and long, gradual historical transformations. The first microhistorians were especially dissatisfied with then predominant social history methods that concentrated on broad subjects over extremely long periods of time, the famous *longue durée*. The microhistorians also objected to the increasingly popular use of quantitative methods inspired by the French *Annales* practitioners, the Cambridge Population Group, and American cliometricians. The source of the microhistorians' frustration was the fact that quantitative approaches tend to reduce the lives of millions to a few economic and demographic data points. The microhistorians' response to these perceived weaknesses in social history, as it was then widely practiced, was to attempt to create a new method that would allow historians to rediscover the lived experience of individuals, with the aim of revealing how those individuals interacted not only with one another, but also with the broader economic, demographic, and social structures that traditional social history had taken as its subject matter.

The term "microhistory" was first coined by a group of Italian historians associated with the journal *Quaderni Storici* and, later, a series of books, *microstorie*, published by Einaudi. The most influential were Carlo Ginzburg, Edoardo Grendi, Giovanni Levi, and Carlo Poni. Together they began to define the theoretical underpinnings of what became known as microhistory. Some French and North American scholars soon followed suit, but their efforts lacked the programmatic dimension of the Italians' work. Thus it was the *Quaderni Storici* group that largely established the terms of debate and the boundaries of the method from an early date, and without them microhistory might not have become a distinct practice.

The Italian microhistorians' interest in the historic variations in people's lived experience of the world was heavily influenced by developments in cultural anthropology in the 1960s and 1970s. The work of Clifford Geertz was particularly important to the emergence of microhistory, even if some of the microhistorians, Giovanni Levi in particular, had reservations about Geertz's method. Geertz had popularized a concept of culture as a system of symbols that permits individuals to relate to and comprehend the external world. In his influential essays, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," and "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," Geertz had argued that the key to discovering how these various systems of symbols operated lay not in establishing general rules, but rather in observing the various parts of the system in operation and only then trying to fit them into a larger frame of reference. The rules of social interaction, according to Geertz, could only be reconstructed by inserting the behavior of individual actors into specific social contexts, from which far broader interpretations of a particular cultural group or system could then be derived. Geertz's method, therefore, has two equally important dimensions. On the one hand, the analysis must be grounded in the actions and understandings of individuals. On the other, it must seek to arrive at systemic explanations for group behavior based on rules that are reconstructed by careful analysis of those individual actions.

The quality and nature of the systemic explanations that can be derived from Geertz's method are very different from similar explanations generated by methods based on observing only the larger group. Close observation of individuals in action provides a better description of a particular social system, because it tends to emphasize the unique forces at work instead of relying on universal rules of human behavior to explain individual actions. Geertz was convinced that universal rules, whatever their apparent utility as explanatory tools, were flawed, because every system of social exchange is unique. His method was aimed

explicitly at recovering the unique features of different cultures and showing how these provide the foundations for group organization, not some supposedly universal feature of human behavior such as rational choice or self-interest. Geertz's admonishment to anthropologists in the field, therefore, was to studiously avoid starting with a general theory or hypothesis, and instead to allow the accumulated data to suggest the interpretive techniques to be employed in each particular case study. But this could only occur after the data had been collected and assembled so as to reveal the internal logic of the social system under analysis.

Geertz's definition of culture and his approach to fieldwork and ethnographic study were adapted to the needs of history by the microhistorians. Like Geertz, the microhistorians saw culture and social interaction as a complex system of rules and meanings. These rules and meanings were established, in part, by larger social and economic structures, the traditional focus of social history. But the system was also defined by the participants' interactions with each other, and by the particular ways in which they came into contact with broader economic and social structures. It was this experiential dimension of structure that the microhistorians felt social history had largely ignored with its volumes of statistics aimed at creating generalized understandings of historical change.

Like Geertz, the microhistorians were concerned that generalized rules eliminated the cultural distinctiveness of groups, making history the study of people who were, in the end, and in most ways that matter, like us. The microhistorians wanted to avoid this mistake by creating a conceptual and interpretive distance between the historian and the subjects of history. Social history had failed to do this, the microhistorians argued, and thus had often made claims about people in the past that had more to do with our own present conditions than they did with the lives of the people being studied. The microhistorians, therefore, began with the assumption that the past was completely foreign to them. Whatever similarities might appear to exist between the past and the present must be ignored in the interests of discovering the unique features and dimensions of past societies. Carlo Ginzburg summed the process up nicely, describing it as "making the past dead."

PRINCIPLES OF MICROHISTORY

Adapting an anthropological approach to the study of history presented the microhistorians with a number of challenges. The most obvious lay in the difference between ethnographic fieldwork and archival history:

the historian cannot directly observe, interact, or interview the individuals or groups being studied, which creates considerable evidentiary problems. The microhistorians' response was to define new ways of approaching documentary evidence and archival research. The program they developed was aimed at sifting through the evidence looking for traces, however small, of the sorts of social interactions that formed the basis of Geertz's anthropological method. The accumulation of tiny, seemingly trivial bits of evidence would eventually, the microhistorians hoped, enable them to assemble the data into coherent models of specific small-scale social interactions from which they could then, like Geertz, draw much broader conclusions.

The nominative approach. To meet the evidentiary challenge posed by their new method, the *Quaderni Storici* group established a handful of governing principles for microhistory. The most important method involved the reduction of the scale of historical investigation to accurately identifiable individuals. Ginzburg and Poni, in their 1979 *Quaderni Storici* article "Il nome e il come" (translated by Edward Muir as "The Name and the Game") argued that the fundamental unit of analysis for the microhistorian should be people's names, since these may be traced, compared, and confirmed through a wide variety of archival sources, including tax records, birth registers, notarial contracts, and court cases.

Tracing the names of individuals across different documentary sources, Ginzburg and Poni argued, brings into faint relief the outlines of their social world. In the course of an individual's documented lifetime, he or she would come into contact with countless other people as well as official institutions in ways that can be reconstructed by historians. Let us take a single, hypothetical individual as our example. Our subject might appear any number of times in a well-preserved archive, as many significant events in his or her life were formally recorded. Parish records would contain our subject's birth, marriage, and death. A notary's register might contain the terms of the dowry, if any; property transactions of various sorts; business dealings and practices in the form of contracts, partnership agreements, or even bankruptcies; and last, but not least, our subject's testamentary bequests. Tax rolls would provide some notion of our subject's total wealth, and court records would allow us a glimpse of what sorts of disputes, if any, our subject was involved in, as well as how they were resolved. Best of all, the chain of evidence could be picked up at any point along the line, allowing us to work outward to discover the rest.

Taken individually, these scraps of evidence do not seem to amount to much. Yet taken all together, it is possible to trace in broad outline many, if not most, of the important social connections in our subject's life, especially if other identifiable individuals appear often. Once we have assembled the data, we have not only one individual's life, but a significant portion of the social and economic networks within which that person lived. These networks, in turn, ideally reveal both the opportunities and constraints faced by our subject in the course of his or her life, in other words some notion of the person's lived experience.

This hypothetical case also reveals one of the major reasons why microhistory emerged in Italy and not elsewhere. To conduct a study based on the nominative methodology proposed by the microhistorians requires an archive, or in many cases a number of archives, containing many intact sources. Italian archives are by far the richest in Europe in terms of the size and chronological scope of their holdings, and also in terms of the variety of documents they contain, especially the court cases that have provided the most common starting point for microhistorical studies. The Italians had everything from parish birth records to tax rolls to notarial registers available to them in numbers that were often unimaginable elsewhere. Without a similar trove of documents, the nominative approach proposed by the microhistorians would have been inconceivable.

The evidential paradigm. Another microhistorical principle involves a standard of historical proof that Carlo Ginzburg termed the "evidential paradigm," sometimes referred to in English as the "conjectural paradigm." The evidential paradigm suggests that small-scale historical analysis requires not only different techniques of investigation than broader studies, but different standards of evidence and proof as well. The approach has most often been likened to the detective's search for clues at the scene of a crime, in which evidence such as fingerprints rather than the principle of human nature or the larger social conditions that helped create the environment for the crime is used to discover the identity of a particular guilty individual. In a similar fashion the microhistorian uses documentary evidence to uncover the particular motivations, beliefs, ideologies, and worldviews of specific individuals rather than of larger social groups.

As a method, the evidential paradigm is diametrically opposed to the techniques employed by most social historians. In quantitative analyses of historical phenomena the historian looks for statistically significant correlations that provide empirical proof of how most people acted in particular situations. Like

the detective, the microhistorian is hardly interested in how most people behaved. Rather, it is the statistically insignificant deviant who stands out. Ginzburg argued that the traces left behind by exceptional acts and behaviors can reveal previously unknown dimensions of human experience. At the same time, he admitted this necessarily requires a certain amount of conjecture on the part of the historian, because the conclusions that can be drawn from exceptional acts are rarely based on the same types of supposedly verifiable data as broader quantitative studies. Ginzburg posited that the degree to which research concentrated on the individual is inversely proportional to the degree that anything resembling a scientific method can be applied to the study of history. Therefore, the microhistorian must attempt to formulate a hypothesis based on incomplete evidence, rather than use large amounts of data to confirm or disprove some initial theory about past behavior. In essence, microhistory starts from a set of surprising facts and proceeds to seek out a theory that helps explain them. It does not, however, prove the theory, it merely suggests that a particular theory may provide the best available explanation.

CRITICISM AND DEFENSE OF MICROHISTORY

Not surprisingly, the inescapable need for creative conjecture is the feature of microhistorical analysis that has been most often criticized. Historians, especially quantitatively minded ones, have pointed out that the evidential paradigm allows for apparently boundless speculation, precisely because it often rests on conjecture rather than rigorous proof. Moreover, the argument goes, statistically insignificant occurrences are just that. Other Italian historians such as Angelo Venturi were particularly harsh, accusing the microhistorians of, at best, producing trivial history based on the study of trivial data, and, at worst, simply writing historical novels.

Conjecture and relativism. Although the Italian microhistorians defended themselves vigorously from such attacks, they were also quite aware of the dangers inherent in their method. Giovanni Levi advocated caution when employing anthropological techniques for historical research. His major concern centered around the inherent relativism of cultural anthropology. Within the discipline of anthropology a certain type of relativism has the important function of guarding against ethnocentric interpretations and hierarchical rankings of different cultures. Thus for the

anthropologist it is crucial to remain open to a wide variety of interpretations of human choices and actions. One effect of this approach that has already been mentioned is the notion that features of human behavior, such as human rationality, that seem to be universal are actually contingent upon the cultural systems that produce them. Such an assertion effectively prevents comparisons between different cultural understandings of the world, providing an effective safeguard against ethnocentric arguments. The obvious danger of such an approach, however, is that the scholar possesses a potentially uncomfortable degree of latitude in deciding what things mean in different situations, and can assign value and meaning to different human behaviors that they may not possess. For anthropologists this freedom is an essential feature of their discipline, which rests in some measure on the scholar's capacity for creative interpretation. For historians, on the other hand, too much interpretive freedom violates the empirical conceits that have been an essential part of historical practice since at least the nineteenth century.

Levi was keenly aware that an unconsidered application of the anthropological methods from which microhistory was derived would open the door to needless relativism. After all, the ability to draw explicit comparisons between different ways of understanding the world is an essential feature of historical practice. Without the ability to draw such comparisons, there would be no way of effectively describing historical differences and changes. Moreover, the type of creative interpretation prized by anthropologists would, if used without reflection by historians, give weight to the criticisms of Venturi and others that the microhistorians were merely in the business of producing historical fiction.

Levi's prescription against this eventuality was to reiterate the microhistorians' commitment to a more traditional historical understanding of human rationality. Levi insisted that while interpretive latitude may be acceptable in anthropology, historians had to employ more formal and restricted notions of social and economic structure, human behavior, and, most importantly, the relative value of rationality. Historians could not, in Levi's view, afford to engage in too much creative interpretation, but had to be constantly mindful that while humans' ways of understanding the world are historically and culturally contingent, they are bounded and restricted by hard realities such as social class and economic power. For example, a creative historical interpretation of raucous sixteenth-century carnival celebrations might see them as a way for peasants and artisans to invert the social hierarchy for a day. The careful historian, however,

would also recognize that this did not mean that the participants thought they were actually changing that hierarchy. In a purely anthropological interpretation based on a highly relative understanding of rationality, the capacity to produce a symbolic language of social inversion and changing the social order might be seen as nearly the same thing. For the historian these two things, thought and belief, or thought and action, had to remain separate. In other words, the symbolic language of culture may be an attempt by individuals to shape reality, but the historian must ultimately recognize that reality usually resists our best efforts to mold it. A restricted level of interpretation that recognizes this fact would, according to Levi, shield the microhistorians from their critics.

The normal exception. Another defense of the method mounted by the *Quaderni Storici* group attacked the critics through the quantitative methods they often favored. Edoardo Grendi suggested a corollary idea to the evidential paradigm based on the statistical concept of the normal exception. Because the individuals whose lives are unearthed by the nominative methods employed by microhistorians are most often exceptional in some way, they should be treated as statistically significant even though they do not appear at first glance to be representative. One of the easiest places in the chain of documents to find likely individuals for microhistorical inquiry has been in trial records, especially the proceedings of the Inquisition. Therefore, the microhistorian often ends up studying individuals whose behavior automatically places them on the social margins. The concept of the normal exception holds that while such statistically insignificant behavior is not representative of the majority of people, it may well be that it is representative of some smaller group whose existence remains hidden to standard data collection techniques.

It has been precisely for such marginal groups that microhistorical methods have proven most fruitful. However, while the most famous microhistories, such as Carlo Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms* or Natalie Zemon Davis's *The Return of Martin Guerre*, have dealt with obviously marginal or exceptional members of society such as heretics and criminals, some lesser-known studies have demonstrated the ability to uncover the existence of invisible groups and activities that might fairly be termed mainstream. For example, Edoardo Grendi, in his study of the small Ligurian town of Cervo, focused on the economic practices of the local elite to show how their decisions were governed by social connections that were almost completely extrinsic to market forces. In a similar vein, Giovanni Levi discovered that the real

estate market in a town he was investigating employed a socially established set of rules for fixing property values rather than a market-driven system. In both cases, the findings revealed the existence of elite groups whose business strategies were almost exactly the opposite of what one would normally expect to find based on typical studies of emergent early modern capitalism. In essence, the individuals that Grendi and Levi studied behaved in an apparently irrational fashion, at least if one starts from the hypothesis that the sixteenth century saw the birth of *homo economicus*. But in terms of the everyday social reality of their lives, their lived experience, their decision not to follow the market made perfect sense, for while it may not have been profitable, it helped preserve the social order. This is the promise of the evidential paradigm realized.

To the Italian microhistorians the evidential paradigm with its technique of extrapolating from small bits of evidence to reach broader conclusions constituted the crux of their new method. As individuals, they argued, we relate to the world through the particular, creating understandings of the larger world through the accumulation of small fragmentary pieces of data. The microhistorical method mirrors this aspect of human existence, attempting to reconstruct the sometimes peculiar ways in which individuals have tried to understand the larger world from within the confines of their personal experiences. However, while the Italian microhistorians were revolting against the broad structuralist work of the *Annales* school, they were in no sense antistructuralists. Nearly all of them were dedicated marxists who had brought to microhistory a strong commitment to structuralist analysis in history. In the broadest sense, they were simply trying to re-create the ways in which past people understood and reacted to social and economic structures, which, as the above examples make clear, is not always as obvious as the historian might wish. The microhistorians were particularly interested in the ways in which structure constrained individual choice, and the ways that people shaped their lives in response to those constraints. In other words, they wanted to escape the sometimes simplistic functionalism of the social historians without in any way denying the importance or power of social and economic structure.

The data dictate the method. One of the best examples of how this movement from individual experience to broader structure, with an eye toward the possibility of the far-reaching conclusion, works in practice remains Carlo Ginzburg's study of the trial of a heretic miller known as Menocchio in sixteenth-century Friuli: *The Cheese and the Worms*. Ginzburg first assembled Menocchio's often conflicting testi-

mony before the inquisition in which he tried to explain to his accusers why he held beliefs that seemed at odds with catholic orthodoxy, including the somewhat odd notion that God had created the world in the same way as peasants made cheese. Ginzburg showed how the relationships between Menocchio's various beliefs revealed how he had constructed a very personal cosmology that drew elements from local beliefs, Catholic doctrine, and a variety of books he had read over a period of many years, not all of which Menocchio could identify by title. Employing philological techniques, Ginzburg spent considerable time and care attempting to reconstruct Menocchio's reading list based on textual clues contained in his testimony before the inquisitors. His most surprising speculation was that Menocchio might have had access to a translated copy of the Koran. From this reconstruction Ginzburg then drew some much larger conclusions about the early spread of print culture to the lower classes and how peasants and other marginally literate people understood the new medium.

Ginzburg's study of Menocchio remains one of the classics of the genre, yet it also points to one of the central problems that historians have faced when attempting to formulate a satisfactory definition for microhistory. It remains very difficult to define, precisely because it is not a coherent set of practices or methods. The philological techniques and cultural model of the spread of print culture employed by Ginzburg bear little resemblance to the economic data and sociological model employed by Grendi in his study of the town of Cervo. Superficially at least, these two studies could easily be seen as belonging to two different genres entirely. Yet they are both microhistory. One might fairly say, therefore, that microhistory is the absence of any specific method, and a recognition that each individual historical case and each set of historical data demands a unique approach. The data dictate the analytical method to be employed, not the other way around.

While the absence of a consistent method has hampered attempts to provide a pat definition of microhistory, it has also allowed for an extremely wide variety of studies to be conducted under its banner. Microhistorical studies have been produced examining everything from legal practices, religious beliefs, and gender roles, to real estate markets, counterfeiting rings, and the economies of entire towns. And while the first microhistorical studies concentrated exclusively on the lives of otherwise obscure individuals or small groups, later studies by Carlo Ginzburg and Pietro Redondi reexamined the lives of famous individuals such as the artist Piero della Francesca and the astronomer Galileo Galilei respectively. But while the

fame of the individuals changed, the method did not. Redondi's study of Galileo, for example, used a previously unknown document from his trial to speculate that Galileo's belief in atomism was far more troubling to his accusers than his heliocentric astronomy, because atomism potentially undermined the doctrine of transubstantiation. While Redondi has been criticized for substituting an obscure and complicated explanation for a simple and obvious one, his analysis did reveal a dimension of the infamous proceedings that had not been recognized in any of the scores of previous studies.

DIVERGENCE FROM THE MODEL

Flexibility, as these examples illustrate, is perhaps the greatest strength of microhistory. It has, however, revealed itself to be an impediment as well, especially when it has come to fending off the critics. Because microhistory has few methodological limitations, once the idea had spread beyond the *Quaderni Storici* group, there were very few restrictions on how the new technique would be employed in practice. Indeed, subsequent historians from many different intellectual and methodological backgrounds have often made use of microhistory in ways its founders never intended.

Divergence from the Italian model has been most apparent in the North American context, where microhistory soon began to assume new and different forms. American practitioners of the new cultural history, who were engaged in their own revolt against large-scale social history, latched onto the method as a way of recovering individual agency in history. The differences between this approach and that of the Italians are important. Whereas the Italians were primarily concerned with the limits imposed on individual agency, Americans were concerned with the ways in which people were able to bypass or even subvert structure. In many ways such an approach more closely mimics the anthropological models on which microhistory was based. Many of the microhistorical studies produced in North America tended to ignore the ways in which structure operated to limit the choices of individuals and moved toward interpretations that saw individuals thwarting social structures through the creation of personal visions of reality.

Agency at the expense of structure. The increasing emphasis on agency at the expense of structure was precisely the development that Giovanni Levi had warned against in his discussion of Geertz's method. Indeed, Levi was also outspoken in his criticism of

North American works such as Robert Darnton's essay "Workers Revolt: The Great Cat Massacre of the Rue Saint-Séverin," which interpreted a slaughter of cats by a group of Parisian printer's apprentices and journeymen as both a symbolic and real revolt against the existing social and economic order. Levi argued that while such microhistorical studies may be interesting as interpretive exercises, they are of limited use as historical examples because they are ultimately imponderable and meaningless. Concentrating on agency rather than structure serves, in Levi's opinion, only to illuminate the case under scrutiny. In the case of Darnton's cat massacre, the example was revealing only of the dissatisfaction of a few individuals, and did not provide any additional insight into existing understandings of eighteenth-century French society. Agency alone, according to Levi, reveals very little. Only by focusing on structure can the microhistorian hope to formulate hypotheses that have meaning beyond the bounds of a particular moment or incident.

Criticisms of North American microhistory that were already familiar in the Italian context also began to surface. In 1988 the *American Historical Review* published a debate between Robert Finlay and Natalie Zemon Davis concerning her well-known microhistory, *The Return of Martin Guerre*, which analyzed the trial of a sixteenth-century French peasant accused of posing as someone else for the purpose of wrongfully claiming the other man's wife and property. Like Angelo Venturi before him, Finlay accused Davis of writing history that was little more than fiction. Historians, Finlay argued, have a responsibility not to distort the sources they work with. Davis's contention that the accused was in league with the wife was just such a distortion, Finlay claimed, because while he was found guilty, she was cleared of any wrongdoing by the court and her relatives. The documents contained nothing to suggest her complicity, and, therefore, Davis could not responsibly suggest otherwise, or she risked ascribing false motives to real people.

Davis defended herself by pointing out the degree to which she had created a context within which to situate her interpretations through painstaking descriptions of sixteenth-century legal culture and village life. Her conclusions were also justified, she claimed, because the chronicles she had used as her sources already contained significant distortions and interpretations of the events. The only way to discover what happened and what significance it had was to engage in an interpretive exercise aimed at eliminating the distortions contained in the sources. Finlay's overly literal reliance on the source material constituted its own kind of distortion, Davis argued, one that microhistorical methods can at least attempt to rectify.

The debate between Finlay and Davis suggests that despite the best efforts of the microhistorians to guard themselves against the criticisms of empirically minded historians, the problem may ultimately be intractable. While there have certainly been cases of interpretive excess, these have been limited to a few works, and serve more as a reminder of the dangers involved than as a condemnation of the method. Yet the critics remain convinced that any interpretive method such as the evidential paradigm constitutes a distortion of history. The microhistorians also remain convinced that empirical methods distort history by masking variety and difference. There is probably little to be done to reconcile these opposing views.

OTHER LIMITATIONS OF MICROHISTORY

The relentless attention to the interpretive issue has also distracted from other limitations of microhistory for which there may be no immediate solution. Historians are generally faced with the problem of describing phenomena in two, somewhat incompatible, dimensions. In the synchronic dimension most commonly associated with the discipline, the historian must tell a story of change over time. In the diachronic dimension, the historian must offer convincing descriptions of specific moments in time. Microhistory's strengths obviously lie in its ability to provide densely researched diachronic descriptions. This again reflects the use of anthropological methods, which are notoriously unconcerned with change. Likewise, microhistory does not lend itself to effective synchronic narratives. Often, this is the result of practical considerations. The microhistorian is required to spend so much time, effort, and space exploring the implications of a few painstakingly researched events that to expand the boundaries of one case study would be unwieldy.

Microhistory's apparent inability to account for change, however, is also the result of conceptual limitations. The limitation imposed by anthropology on comparative analysis has already been discussed in the context of Giovanni Levi's criticism of Geertz. Levi's proposed solution of employing a restricted interpretive technique, however, has not effectively addressed the issue of synchronic change. In part this is because his arguments were intended as a response to the empirical historians' criticisms of microhistory as much as they were to refining the technique itself. His argument, therefore, focuses on the ways in which culture can be described by the historian, not the mechanisms through which social change eventually occurs.

One potential solution has been suggested by William Sewell, whose analysis of Geertz's technique focuses on the categories employed for analyzing the functions served by culture. Geertz asserts that cultural systems provide "models of" and "models for" reality. The first type of model claims to provide a template for describing and reproducing reality. The second reflects the way that existing social and cultural conditions provide the basis for judging new productions. Scholars who have been influenced by Geertz, including historians, have not recognized, according to Sewell, the extent to which these two functions of culture are different. That is to say, there is often an obvious disjuncture between the reality that is being described in "models of" and the conditions that are being judged and reproduced in "models for." Sewell posits that it is this disjuncture that drives historical change, as people attempt to make the two models coincide in their lived experience.

In terms of microhistory, the original Italian technique may be said to concentrate on the "model of" aspect of culture, while North American practices have concentrated on the "model for" aspect. Sewell's analysis, therefore, not only offers a way of incorporating a mechanism for historical change into microhistorical analysis, but it also provides a way to bridge the gap between the social microhistory of the Italians and the cultural microhistory of the North Americans. There are already signs that this is happening, as Italian scholars employed in American universities have begun to incorporate features of both types of analysis.

Nevertheless, the general lack of synchronic analysis in most microhistories is not damning by itself. After all, the ability to describe change effectively is one of the great strengths of the traditional social history, and therefore need not be a major concern for microhistorians. In this sense it is important to recall that while the Italian microhistorians were critical of social history, they never envisioned their method as a replacement for *Annales* school studies, which they ultimately admired. Rather, the microhistorians wanted to expand the possibilities of social history by adding depth of analysis to the breadth of existing narratives. The synchronic dimension is, therefore, less important than might seem immediately apparent, as traditional social history already tends to provide the larger narrative within which the Italian microhistorians situated their own work. Indeed, microhistory's greatest success has been its ability to reveal the hidden mechanisms at work in social history and provide more subtle interpretations of group behavior. Thus, even if microhistory never manages to reinterpret the process of historical change, it has still provided a meaningful contribution to debates in social history.

See also other articles in this section.

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COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN SOCIAL HISTORY



Hartmut Kaelble

Since the 1970s comparative European social history has become a growing field of research by European historians. Comparative books crucial for history in general were published by European historians in fields such as family history, the middle class, the lower middle class, workers and labor movements, intellectuals and professionals, private and public bureaucracy, city planning, the welfare state, national consciousness and national ceremonies, religion and denominations, consumption, society at war, and the historical social peculiarities of Europe.

About twenty to thirty books and articles on comparative European history are published each year, with pronounced fluctuations from one year to the next. This may seem a small output, but, in fact, among the subdisciplines of history, works of comparative research in social history comprise a fair number. Comparative social history is built upon a long tradition of comparing societies in history. Notable classical historians and historical sociologists of the first half of the twentieth century, such as Max Weber, Otto Hintze, and Marc Bloch, had published in comparative social history and, in contrast to other historians of the period, were continuously read and discussed by historians. In spite of these encouraging classical texts, however, comparative social history was very rarely explored by historians until the late 1970s.

REASONS FOR THE RISE OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL HISTORY

The reasons for the rise of comparative social history have to do not only with the background of the discipline itself but also with social history in general. Without the international rise of social history since about the 1950s and 1960s—as documented by this encyclopedia—comparative social history is unimaginable. Comparative history must draw from a much larger body of historical research; it must ask similar questions concerning different countries. Only a large number of social historians will in the end produce

some comparativists. To be sure, the most influential pioneers of the first generation of European social historians did not produce influential models of comparisons. The first big debates in social history, such as on the living standard during the industrial revolution, on the labor aristocracy, and on the utility of the marxist concept of social class, were sometimes international but almost never comparative. The most widely read and sold books in social history were na-



DEFINING COMPARISON

Historical comparison is usually seen as the explicit contrasting of two or more societies to explore parallels and differences, convergence and divergences. Comparisons are mostly done only for specific themes. Societies as a whole are rarely compared. The main goal of historical comparison is the explanation or the typology of differences and similarities, as well as the better understanding of other societies. Comparisons are mostly international but sometimes also regional or local (in the same country or in different countries) and sometimes between civilizations. Historical comparisons are mostly synchronic but sometimes diachronic, comparing events and structures in different periods. Comparisons usually concentrate on a limited number of countries. Sometimes they might include all countries of one civilization. They almost never intend to explore general rules of human behavior, as the classical sociologists and ethnologists did. Historical comparisons are often limited to the confrontation between societies, but good comparisons should include also transfers, interrelations, and mutual images between the societies under comparison.

tional or local rather than comparative. The rise of social history was a necessary precondition but did not necessarily lead to comparisons.

Hence a second factor, the expansion of international research and scholarly contact since the 1960s, was of crucial importance. The work situation for scholars who wanted to do research in an international perspective clearly improved. Exchange programs for students as well as for researchers became more numerous. Library budgets improved, and history libraries became more international. International workshops, invitations, guest lectures, and visiting professorships increased. International meeting centers in the humanities were established in France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Comparative European social historians passed almost without exception through one or several of these institutions and programs, most of which did not exist in the Europe of the 1950s. To be sure, the new comparative social history was not purposely planned by these international meeting centers and exchange programs, but without them comparative social history would not have taken off in Europe, where most history departments lacked systematic regional studies.

However, not all European historians could profit from this new institutional cross-fertilization. For political reasons historians in Eastern Europe were largely excluded until 1989–1991, and for economic reasons historians in southern Europe, especially in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and to some extent also in Italy, rarely took part. It was mainly historians from the northern part of Europe and the United States who were brought together by these international meeting centers and exchange programs. Hence it comes as no surprise that European comparative social history has been mainly written by French, British, American, West German, Swiss, Austrian, Swedish, Norwegian, and Dutch historians.

Comparative social science was also a major encouragement for comparative social history. In the social sciences, empirical comparative research had a much longer and more solid tradition than in history. That historical social scientists had published major comparative work in a period in which social historians still hesitated to engage in comparison was of great significance. Historians read and discussed intensively the social science work of Europeans such as Stein Rokkan and Jean Fourastié, of Americans such as Charles Tilly and Barrington Moore, and of Americans who were exiled from Europe such as Reinhard Bendix, Seymour M. Lipset, and Karl Deutsch. Even if historians chose other themes and methods, these social science works were major reference points. It is

also clear, however, that social historians could respond to this encouragement more readily than could most other historians because themes in social history are often more transnational than in political history.

The rise of comparative social history is also associated with the general history of the second half of the twentieth century. The end of the traditional, secluded nation-state in Europe and the rise of European supranationalism as a reaction against two nationalistic world wars led to a new open-mindedness and to much greater comparative interest in other European countries and their history. It also led to a type of national consciousness that accepts or even seeks the comparative historical investigation of the dark sides of national history, such as dictatorships and their supporters. Moreover, globalization and the rising economic competition between countries led to more international and historical comparisons between neighboring as well as distant competitors. Finally, several factors—the internationalization of mass culture, consumption, and tourism, the rising knowledge of foreign languages, and the mass immigration by non-Europeans into Europe—render comparison an everyday experience, with changing borders between the domestic and the foreign. In this way international comparison became an attractive dimension of everyday life rather than only the privilege of an elite of scholars and a few international travelers.

DEBATES AND THEMES IN COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION

Three major debates and motivations among historians have become particularly productive for comparative work. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the rise of comparative social history without these debates: the debate on different paths of modernization, the debate on national ways or patterns peculiar to individual societies (which might foster the better understanding of other societies), and the debate on the social particularities of Europe. However, not all comparative studies of the social history of Europe are linked to these debates and motivations. The variety of motivations for doing comparative social history is extensive, and some work is focused on much more limited arguments.

The comparative debate about modernization. The debate on different national paths of modernization was particularly productive for comparative social history, and out of that debate grew many outstanding comparative studies of nineteenth- and twentieth-century social history. The comparative stud-

ies of modernization, such as *European Modernity and Beyond* (1995), by Göran Therborn, and *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (1981), edited by Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, cover a wide range of themes that can only be superficially touched on. Several key themes and topics are at the heart of comparative social history vis-à-vis modernization.

The first of these themes is comparative urban history. Subjects for comparison, in their great variation, include urban growth and the social crisis of the nineteenth-century city, the historical discourse on the modern city, and the rise of modern city planning, modern urban housing, and modern urban transport, especially during the long nineteenth century in Britain, France, the United States, and Germany. The role of the French, American, and German models and the transfers between the European and Atlantic societies were demonstrated by scholars such as Andrew Lees.

A second topic of the debate on modernization is social policy and the rise of the welfare state in Europe. This topic encompasses the reasons for the early and late beginnings of social policy, with Germany, Austria, Britain, and Sweden as pioneers and Switzerland as a latecomer; the reasons for the differences in the rise of the modern welfare state after World War II, with Britain and Sweden as the main models; the contrasts among the institutions of the welfare state within Western Europe and between Western and Eastern Europe from the end of World War II until 1989–1991; and the differences in public social intervention from the perspective of the clients.

The economic and political mentality and performance of elites and upper classes is a third topic in the modernization debate. Various studies were attached to the debate on the German *Sonderweg* (separate path), a subject discussed in detail below. But beyond the *Sonderweg* debate, other aspects of the social history of the elites were investigated comparatively, including the access to higher education and the ranks of the elites, which varied widely between European countries and the United States, among individual professions and schools, and among political systems. A related theme is the social preconditions of economic performance and the quality of schools. Another topic that developed in modernization studies involves professionalization in Europe. It has been shown that professionalization emerged either regulated by autonomous professional corporations, as in Britain, Italy, and sometimes in France, or under greater control by the state, as in Germany and partly also in France, or within an unregulated market of professional services, as in Switzerland. In the comparative history of the intellectuals, one study shows

that the rise of the intellectuals during the second half of the nineteenth century was a Europe-wide process. It was closely linked to the gradual rise of a political public sphere as well as to the rise of a cultural market for the products and services of intellectuals. However, distinct national differences emerged in the dynamics of the cultural market, in the stability of political liberties, and in the models for intellectuals.

An important subject of comparative social history is European revolutions and social conflicts. Several important books, including Jack Goldstone's *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (1991), Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966), Theda Skocpol's *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (1994), and Charles Tilly's *European Revolution* (1993), compared European and Atlantic revolutions, treating major factors and reasons behind revolutions, such as the social relationships and tensions in the rural societies. The differences among nations in international revolutions, especially in the European revolution of 1848, were also compared. Studies of the 1848 revolution compared the different historical contexts, supporting and opposing milieus, the different goals, and the contrasts in success and failure, but also the European commonalities. The international comparison of strikes and social protest demonstrated how much they depended upon the differing impact of economic modernization, the culture of protest milieus, and the reaction of the governments and employers. The different effects of strikes and social protests on social change were also treated. The international comparison of the social history of labor movements examined the strengths and weaknesses of labor movements, their relation to the state, and their contribution to democracy and social change.

Examining social institutions also entails the comparison of living standards, chances for upward mobility, and social inequalities. National and regional divergences of living standards, real income, real wages, housing, and hygiene standards in Europe were explored less often than one might expect, but some pioneering comparative studies were written. The clear national differences in educational opportunities, from basic learning to access to higher education, as well as national differences in chances of upward social mobility within Europe and in comparison with the United States, were investigated more frequently, leading to diverse interpretations of national differences, to much skepticism about any lasting international divergences or convergence, and to much interest in individual cases of advanced social mobility. The wide national differences in income and wealth distribution were the most frequently investi-

gated aspects of social inequality. Besides common trends of a mitigation of income and wealth disparities up to the 1970s and the reinforcement of disparities since the 1980s, distinct international differences emerged not only within Europe but also between Europe and other industrial societies, such as the United States and the Southeast Asian countries. These differences were often investigated by economists and sociologists rather than by historians.

International comparative studies of family focus on the regional or local level rather than on the level of national averages because of the large regional and local variations in demographic attitudes and family forms and because of the related rise of anthropological approaches. Studies in this field compare declining birth rates and rates of marriage, illegitimate births, child mortality, and family forms, but they also compare debates on family and family policy.

Several factors have contributed to comparative research in the social history of work and business. These are the debate on the national variations in the rise of the managerial elite in the United States, Europe, and Japan; the debate among sociologists on the impact of the professional training of skilled workers and white-collar workers on business hierarchies and the autonomy of skilled workers, especially in France, Germany, and Britain; and attention to the subject of different systems of communication in business corporations and different concepts of work.

In the 1980s and 1990s, new themes emerged in comparative social history. One new theme was gender history. Historians have investigated the national variations of European gender roles, women in family and kinship systems, the gender division of labor, the history of women's suffrage, and the impact of schooling, work, public administrations and civil law, churches, and the welfare state on gender roles in different societies. Another new theme was the social history of nationalism, which was reexamined through new approaches exploring the invention of identities in history. Scholars such as Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Charlotte Tacke, and Jakob Vogel have explored the comparative history of national symbols, ceremonies, and monuments, but also the more classical history of the national idea of specific social milieus. A related new theme was the history of immigration within and into Europe. Some sociologists and historians began to explore how immigration gave rise to new ethnic minorities and how historical conceptions of the foreigner and of citizenship have changed in Europe. Scholars have also addressed the great variations among European governments in immigration policy and immigration legislation, even in a period of harmonization of such policy in the European Union.

A further new comparative field examined the social debates and social languages peculiar to each nationality. For example, how might symbols of modernization like the big city or the United States color a society's debate over its own modernity? As new social terms—such as “social question” in the early nineteenth century or “work” and “unemployment” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—come into use, scholars examine just who invented them and their different national contexts. Studies of this topic by Rainer Koselleck and others also examine the transfers of terminology or concepts from country to country. The comparative history of consumption, in all its national variations, has also become a significant theme, covering the international impact of the American mass consumer society and changes in the American model wrought by other countries; the convergences and fundamental political divergences of consumption in communist and Western countries; the national varieties of consumer goods and pastimes such as cars, books, dining, and sports; and the ways in which consumption highlights national contrasts in social distinctions. Finally, the comparative investigation of the rise of modern social history is often seen as part of the modernization of European historiography. This investigation includes an account of the pioneering role played by French historians such as Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch in the rise of modern social history, the reasons why historians in other countries lagged behind, and what sort of social history developed in other countries given their particular circumstances.

The comparative debate on specific national patterns. A second type of debate that produced many comparative historical studies is the debate on historical national development patterns. One such national pattern is the German *Sonderweg* (separate path), the contradiction between rapid economic modernization and the persistence of traditional political values and elites, resulting in the peculiar weakness of political liberalism in the German middle class. To be sure, the origins of this debate were political in nature—that is, concerning the long-term preconditions of the rise of Nazism in Germany. Nevertheless, it eventually led to comparative studies to address implicitly comparative arguments. The comparative perspective prompted debates on the comparative distinctiveness of the *Sonderweg* phenomenon and various social explanations of it, such as the aristocratic model in the German middle class, the antimodernist model of the German *Bildungsbürgertum* (professional elites), the strong attachment of the German middle class to the conservative state, middle-class

anxieties surrounding the seemingly revolutionary German labor movement, and the limited homogeneity of the German middle class. The comparative explanation was partly reinforced and partly weakened by comparative studies of the middle class in Germany, France, Britain, Sweden, Italy, and Poland.

Another approach to the *Sonderweg* holds that specific social groups such as white-collar employees, the petite bourgeoisie, and peasants had particular difficulties coping with modern industrial society and hence were more inclined to follow extreme right-wing arguments and to vote for Hitler. This argument also led to various comparative studies in the social background of extreme right-wing voting. One comparative study of white-collar employees, Jürgen Kocka's *White Collar Workers in America, 1890–1940* (1980), argues that white-collar workers in Germany were more privileged by governments and employers over blue-collar workers than they were in the United States, Britain, and France. As a consequence, they were more afraid of losing social privileges in the modern market economy and therefore tended to vote for candidates on the extreme right such as the Nazis. Comparative studies of the petite bourgeoisie demonstrated that in spite of similarities in petite bourgeois values, mobility, and economics across Europe, clear differences emerged in the political culture, leading to a more liberal petite bourgeoisie in France or Britain and, gradually, to an extreme right-wing petite bourgeoisie in Germany.

Another controversial comparative argument maintains that the German labor movement was particularly isolated in social and political terms, creating a much weaker social base for a broader left-wing government in Germany than in other European countries such as France, Britain, or the Scandinavian countries. Historians have also argued that military values were supported more frequently and fiercely by Germans than by other Europeans, especially after the late nineteenth century, which paved the way for the German acceptance of Nazi propaganda and of World War II. The military values can be seen not only in the public image of the army, in the debate about war aims and about World War I, and in war monuments, but also in student dueling, German songs, and *Turnervereine* (gymnastics clubs). This argument has been criticized by other historians who maintain that the rise of militarism was a more general process in pre-1914 Europe and that military ceremonies were as frequent and as popular in France as in Germany before 1914. A final approach to the *Sonderweg* argues that family education in Germany was more clearly oriented toward values such as obedience, deference, and militaristic heroism, which weakened liberalism

and resistance against dictatorship more than in other western European countries and the United States.

The comparative study of particular national development patterns in social history is not limited to Germany. It has been argued, for example, that a particular Scandinavian pattern of nonrevolutionary transition toward a liberal, consensus-oriented democracy grew out of the weakness of Scandinavian aristocracy and the strength of independent liberal peasants. It was also argued that the political *exception française*, the continuous split of France into two political camps without much chance of general consensus, had important sources in social history. Similarly, it was argued that the nineteenth-century economic *exception française*, the lack of innovations and export orientation, was linked to the Malthusian mentality of French business—the tendency to see all resources as limited, underestimating the effects of growth and innovation—and to the peculiar immobility of French society up to the 1950s. One can expect that studies of distinct Italian, Spanish, and Dutch national patterns will also lead into comparative social history. Studies of Spanish social history have specifically linked developments there to broader European patterns, as against an older insistence on Spanish particularism. A great deal of work on Russian social history is implicitly comparative, on topics ranging from the peasantry to popular reading materials, though full-scale comparative efforts are rare.

The social particularities of Europe. A third debate covers the social particularities of Europe in history. To be sure, this is a long-running debate, starting during European expansion in the early modern period and resuming in the late nineteenth century. The twentieth-century discussion, however, is not simply a continuation of this older debate. It is not based on the assumption of European superiority and deals not only with the very long-term roots of European particularity but also with European social characteristics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It also touches upon social particularities not covered by the older debate, such as the European city, the European active population and work, the European managerial system, European social conflicts, secularization, social inequalities and welfare state institutions, and the European reorientation of values. Such issues have also taken on increasing importance among teachers of world history, a field where the peculiar place of Europe is much debated.

This debate has been most vivid regarding two fundamental themes of social history: the European family and European revolution. In the debate on the “European” family, one school maintains that a par-

particular European family emerged in the early modern period or before, with young families strongly independent from the families of origin, with few households consisting of three generations, with a late age of marriage for both men and women, and with low birth rates and high rates of unmarried people, but also with a specific European family mentality, a strongly protected private family sphere, and strong emotional ties between the members of the core family. Other historians believe that the concept of the European family is not consistent, either because comparisons show distinct divergences within Europe or because the comparison of Europe with Asia shows too many similarities.

The debate on European political revolutions has also gone on for many years. A central issue is determining whether the European revolutions, because they were original, unprecedented revolutions rather than imitations and because they were crucial for the particular role of Europe and the West as a pioneer of modern democratic institutions, were unique events very different from revolutions outside Europe. Historians have also debated whether these revolutions were purely national events or, at least in the case of the revolution of 1848, distinctly European events.

Limitations and omissions. In spite of these three related debates and numerous other studies less strongly related, comparative social history in general is not applied to the study of all countries, periods, and themes in the same way. Individual approaches have their clear virtues and distinct drawbacks. Given the disparate working conditions for research in international history and ongoing debates within the field of comparative historical research, it is natural that no single method is applied to all pursuits.

The clearest limitations to comparative European social history exist in the geographical dimension. European historians have rarely compared Europe with non-Western societies, though it would be highly instructive to do so with Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Arab, or black African societies in history. Jack Goody, who studied family history in Europe and Asia, is one of the few exceptions. Another example of such a fruitful comparison is Roy Bin Wong's work on economic and political development in China and central Europe. Only a few European social historians, such as Eric Hobsbawm and Paul Bairoch, have dared to work on global social history. The comparison of Europe with non-Western societies was more often carried out by a small number of American social historians and historical sociologists, such as Jack Goldstone, Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, and

Bernard Silberman. Moreover, even within Western societies, comparisons by European historians of European societies with the United States or Latin American countries are less numerous than one might expect. American historians have published a larger number of intercontinental comparisons of Western societies. Finally, even within Europe comparison in social history has followed distinct preferences. Most comparative research has been done on only three European countries, France, Great Britain, and Germany. Other European countries have been covered much less extensively and compared, if at all, usually with one of these three countries. Hence large parts of eastern and southern Europe, but also small countries in general, have remained almost untouched by historical comparison.

Preferences for certain periods are less distinct. In general, social history comparisons are clearly more numerous for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than for earlier periods. This emphasis came about because the phenomenon that has been the subject of most comparisons—distinct national societies—appeared in the full sense only during the nineteenth century. But even within the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a preference for periods characterized by gradual social change rather than by upheavals such as wars and revolutions is characteristic for comparative social history.

It might be surprising that preferences for themes are even less distinct. Although the wide variety of themes in comparative social history has been demonstrated, at the close of the twentieth century three major thematic lacunae remained. The first is the history of work—changes in types of work, in working conditions, and in unemployment. This is an astonishing omission in a period of fundamental changes in work, rising unemployment, and intense debate about a future new era of work. Second, the history of historical discourse itself, and of the historical changes in the social language, social imagery, and social interpretations, is another astonishing omission in what is undeniably a boom time for the analysis of historical discourses. A third area of neglect is the social history of the public sphere, the media, associations, the use of the public sphere by governments as well as by social movements, and the social side of citizenship and civil society.

THE FUTURE OF COMPARISON IN SOCIAL HISTORY

It is difficult to predict the future of the comparative method, which in the end strongly depends upon the

content and quality of the published work rather than upon the method itself. So one can present hopes rather than predictions. In the present situation one might hope that five preoccupations will inspire future comparative studies in social history. First, it seems likely that the comparison between civilizations, especially between European and Asian as well as African societies, will become a major interest of historians, including not only comparison with Japan and the other industrialized East Asian countries but also the revival of the classical comparison of Europe with India, China, and the Arab world. The political and economic rise of these societies will reinforce the need for historical comparison. The comparative rise and varying characteristics of civil society will be a major motivation for this comparison between civilizations. A second theme for comparison could be the migration within and into Europe, the rise of new ethnic cultures, and the policies toward these new immigrants—a theme that might lead to comparisons between Western societies, especially, and deal with the large variety of problems and solutions they produced in history. A better understanding of ethnic minorities will be a major task of historical comparison. Third, it seems likely that the transition in central and eastern Europe from communism and a state-controlled economy to democracy and capitalism will become a major theme for historians who compare the different paths of transition and different constructions of history in this area, often in comparative search of long-term historical roots of divergences. A fourth theme might be the comparison of new social problems in the historical context, such as the history of unemployment, social exclusion, rising disparities of income and wealth, and emerging limits of efficiency of the classical modern welfare state. This again will be to a large degree a comparison among Western countries and the different solutions they developed in history. A final theme of comparison might be the making of a European society, its convergences and divergences, and the transfers and mutual images among European countries, especially among the rising number of member states of the European Union. This comparison also has to include the long-term historical perspective, the long roots of divergences and the long history of convergences and commonalities within European civilization. One can hope that comparative



THE DEBATE ON METHODS

Methods of historical comparison have been discussed by a few historians and historical sociologists, most of them with practical experience in historical comparison. The discussion emphasizes two themes. The first is the question of whether historical comparison should mainly cover parallels, commonalities, and convergences, or contrasts, differences, and divergences between the cases under comparison. Since the 1960s contrasts and divergences have received increasing attention, while parallels received declining attention, though there are signs of growing interest in parallels. Moreover, most publications on comparative methods try to show intermediary ways of comparison between the extreme positions of a radically individualizing and a radically universalizing comparison. Charles Tilly describes two additional intermediary approaches: the encompassing comparison of different cases belonging to a system (e.g., an international empire, church, or market) in their relation to the system and the comparison that investigates variations in a global phenomenon which arise from different preconditions. The second question covered in the debate on methods is whether historical comparisons should confront only different historical cases or also cover transfers, mutual images, and relations between the societies under comparison. There is a clear tendency toward including transfers in the debate on methods. So far, the alternative between the analytical-historical comparison that tests arguments and the hermeneutic historical comparison that can lead to a better understanding of other historical societies is not much discussed in this debate.

social history in all these respects will be understood in a broad sense, not only comparing structures and institutions but also mentalities, experiences and emotions, codes and symbols, conversations and debates.

See also **The Industrial Revolutions; Migration; The European Marriage Pattern** (volume 2); **Social Mobility; Professionals and Professionalization; Revolutions** (volume 3); *and other articles in this section.*

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Section 2



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PERIODIZATION IN SOCIAL HISTORY



Peter Stearns

Periodization—deciding when one pattern ends and another begins in historical time—is a key component of the historian’s conceptual arsenal. Through periodization historians seek to identify coherences and breaks in the past, and therefore to indicate particular points that require causal explanations designed to determine why breaks occur. Not all historians deal with periodization, to be sure, and some who employ a periodization scheme do not justify it explicitly, using conventional labels without serious assessment of them. At best, however, careful use of periodization allows historians to explain why they start their chronology when they do—at the outset of some significant shift in the phenomenon under question—and why they end when they do as well, with possible internal junctures added to the mix. Periods can apply to a particular aspect of a society—the rise and fall of a single institution or idea—or to a whole society.

Changes in direction, that is, the makings of new periods, come in several forms in social history. Researchers on Russian peasants, to take one example, can at points use the new frameworks provided by shifts in the law, like the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 or Soviet collectivization beginning in 1928. Other directional changes, while no less real, do not provide comparable precision. It was around the 1770s, for example, that a dramatic increase in the percentage of all births that were illegitimate suggests a clear break—a new period—in popular sexual behavior in western Europe. (A similar new phase of sexual behavior occurred among Russian peasants in the 1880s.)

Overall, social historians use a variety of periodization schemes, like historians of any stripe. But because their topics are often unfamiliar, they cannot necessarily rely on established markers. Often, indeed, they are compelled to more explicit concern with periodization than are historians dealing with political or intellectual history, precisely because familiar frameworks do not work well. The options explored in European social history are numerous, and no single formula has emerged.

EUROPEAN HISTORY PERIODS

Conventional periodization in modern European history is well known. Of course there can always be debates—when, precisely, the Italian Renaissance began, for example. And familiar periods may overlap in confusing fashion; thus the Northern Renaissance continued, in many ways, even as the Reformation period began. But the list, overall, is unsurprising. Renaissance yields to Reformation. The seventeenth century is often categorized in terms of absolute monarchy. The eighteenth century as the Age of Enlightenment. A period of revolution follows, with an interim conservative reaction between 1815 and about 1830. After 1848 national unifications and then the alliance system may seem to set the tone for several decades. Conventional periodization almost always recognizes the basic importance of World War I. The twentieth century is then further divided by World War II and the rise and fall of the cold war. Some historians have tentatively argued that the end of the cold war marks the beginning of yet another period which will ultimately be seen as the first phase of the twenty-first century.

Periods of this sort are not only well established, but have the merit, usually, of cutting across wide swaths of European geography, because of the European-wide impact of diplomacy, imitation of key political forms like absolutism or the contagion of revolution, and the spread of key intellectual movements like the Enlightenment.

Before the rise of social history, when textbooks or other surveys embraced some social history materials, the periods were set by political or intellectual patterns. Thus the famous *Rise of Modern Europe* series, edited by William Langer, or the *Peuples et civilisations* series in France, used markers such as the French Revolution, the Napoleonic era, and so on, dealing with phenomena like urban growth or shifts in work patterns in discrete chapters within this framework. Obviously, the dominant assumption was that political or in a few instances intellectual develop-

ments set the basic tone for European history, and what social and even economic innovations there were could be fit within the resultant borders.

SOCIAL HISTORY AS ALTERNATIVE

Social history complicates standard periodization in European or any other history. Take a specific example. There is no reason to assume that changes in popular childrearing patterns in England—an obvious social history topic—follow the same rhythm as changes in the political party system, a staple of conventional English history. The key question is whether the causes of change in the two areas are shared. At the very least, this requires explicit determination.

Social historians do not assume that high politics or great ideas necessarily shape the phenomena that interest them. Work on the important contributions of peasants, workers, or women to the historical record deals with groups for whom the state may be a fairly remote force, and on whom Great Ideas may have little direct impact. Research on additional facets of social behavior—demography, or crime, or household functions—similarly must take into account factors beyond politics and intellectual life. The result, in principle at least, opens modern European history to a host of new periodization questions. E. P. Thompson's pathbreaking *The Making of the English Working Class* thus begins toward the middle of the eighteenth century, which few conventional historians would dignify with the inception of much of anything, and ends around the 1830s. Not only this, but key developments within the span, such as the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon, are not seen as significantly reshaping the phenomena in question. Even a historian dealing with protest itself over a long span of time, like Charles Tilly, may downplay the significance of the French Revolution of 1789, in favor of fitting it into a larger periodization scheme. Or a social history survey may jump over World War I, using a definition of a mature industrial society that begins around the 1870s and ends after 1945, within which the world wars had some impact that fell short of redirecting basic social processes such as class struggle or the domestic emphasis for women.

Social history compounds the periodization problem by rarely focusing primarily on events and specific dates. Events may matter occasionally as causes of social phenomena—thus any history of women's work will pause in each of the two world wars to note some impact in increasing women's employment, and the end of serfdom clearly matters in the chronology of peasant history. Or events may il-

lustrate some larger social trend, but they rarely form clear boundaries for the topics social historians study. Correspondingly, social historians are usually much more comfortable pinning the beginning of a new trend to a decade or so, rather than a specific year, much less a month and day. Thus the dramatic decline of infant mortality that is a key part of demographic transition began in western Europe (and the United States) in the 1880s—not 15 April 1881. The witchcraft furor drew to a close by the 1730s (though here, admittedly, the dates of the last formal trials can add some unwonted precision). The modern European-style family began to take shape in the later fifteenth century, not in 1483. Social history periodization focuses on new directions in collective behaviors, not tidy single occurrences.

In principle the rise of social history opens conventional European history periodization to a host of probing questions. What was long assumed must now be reexamined. The result is no small challenge to historians also busy with new topics, distinctive kinds of source materials, and so on. Challenge, in turn, explains why social history options have been varied, and variously satisfactory.

STICKING CLOSE TO HOME

Two choices minimize social history's disruption to established periodization. One involves using the periods already available; the other involves using no real periods at all.

In the first choice, for reasons both good and bad, many social history topics are placed within familiar chronological boundaries. Very few social history books that get to 1914 do not simply stop there or at least acknowledge a major break. Very few early modernists—people who concentrate on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—actually continue their work past 1789 or 1815. There are hosts of French social histories that fit within the framework of 1815 to 1848, a familiar political chunk.

Use of conventional periodization can be explained in several ways, with varying degrees of validity in consequence. Sometimes it simply reflects convenience. Dealing with new topics, it proved too demanding to think through fundamental beginnings and endings, so an acknowledged periodization was tacked on. The result might also help reader-historians who are not specialists in social history make more sense of the novel topic. Even if 1848 saw no major changes in the accelerating pattern of factory work in France, for example, stopping the study in 1848 would hardly be questioned. Archival materials might

also be organized according to established dates, which would provide further fuel. All these justifications are perfectly understandable, especially in the early years of the newer social history research, and the resultant periodization could frame exciting studies. But the result involved dates of convenience, not a really thoughtful approach to periodization in terms of basic change and continuity.

Conventional periodization could take on added importance when historians argued more directly that familiar phenomena, and their dates, related directly to social change, either as cause or effect. For example, many social historians use the Reformation as a legitimate beginning point for examination of changes in family life, though in most cases the studies extend well into the seventeenth century to catch the full impact of the developments involved. Studies of European society between the world wars may explicitly establish that the topics involved changed shape as the result of World War I and would change again with the advent of World War II; here, periodization may be conventional but it is explicitly applied. Without question, some conventional periods work better than others for social history topics, because the impact of political or intellectual developments varies.

The second way to minimize periodization issues while dealing innovatively with social historical phenomena is through what might be called postholing—exploring an aspect of the past for its own sake, without caring too much when the phenomena involved began or ended. Thus a social historian might explore mid-seventeenth-century rituals that shed light on marriage or the roles of women. The result might add greatly to the store of knowledge, but the task of fitting into a chronology or of explaining when the phenomena began and why would be left to others. Certain kinds of microhistory have probed exciting specific materials that illuminate the characteristics of a point in the past, but again without worrying about chronological boundary lines. At times, to be sure, this postholing approach is combined with some reference to how different all this is from what would come later—a “world we have lost” approach—but there is no explicit attempt to decide when the changes occurred or even what caused the patterns explored to lose their validity.

LONGUE DURÉE AND BIG CHANGES

At the other extreme, some pioneering social historians have urged a totally different approach, arguing that social history cannot be trapped within conventional periodization at all but also that the need to

address periodization questions cannot be evaded simply because topics and materials are unfamiliar.

Following the lead of Fernand Braudel and the French *Annales* school, many social historians argue that certain kinds of social phenomena change very slowly, if at all, across long stretches of time in the European past. Many of the structures of peasant life can be seen through this lens. Methods of work, or land tenure, or popular beliefs and values may long persist, often from the Middle Ages into modern times. There is a beginning to the phenomena, though sometimes shrouded in the mists of a remote past, and there may be an end, but there is no need for a periodization that would identify a few decades, or even a few centuries. Arguments in terms of long duration have been applied less often to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than to medieval and early modern European history, but survivals are not impossible even into recent times. Thus, without necessarily explicitly invoking *longue durée* (long duration), many historians of European witchcraft have noted important persistence of popular belief into the mid-nineteenth century, even though the formal trials period (dependent as it was on acquiescence of church and state leaders) ended more than a century before.

A *longue durée* approach often allows for identification of key regional patterns within Europe more generally, where persistent structures relate to some combination of geography and cultural tradition. Braudel himself explored particular dynamics in Mediterranean Europe. Others have identified durable structures in eastern Europe or elsewhere, sometimes related to land tenure patterns or other basic rural dynamics.

Periodization based on the *longue durée* framework is also open to criticism. Many social historians have challenged impressions of a stable, even changeless peasantry, noting that persistence sometimes reflects simply a lack of surviving information and that sharp, sudden changes in peasant behaviors and beliefs are common. On the whole, *longue durée* approaches have declined in popularity since the 1980s.

A second approach to social history periodization—not necessarily contradicting *longue durée* arguments about persistence, but offering a different emphasis—focuses on what Charles Tilly has called a quest for “big changes.” Here the assumption is that every so often, but not too often, European history tosses up some structural shifts that are so massive that they have a wide array of social consequences. Tilly sees two changes, which he dates back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as reshaping European society in some senses all the way to the present. Commercialization of the economy, and the attendant formation of a property-less proletariat, is one of his key

forces. The growth of the European state through the accumulation of new bureaucracy, new functions, and (gradually) new popular expectations, is his other great force. Tilly argues that the combined effect of his two big changes reshaped popular protest patterns in Europe in ways that can still be traced through the nineteenth century.

Other social historians might dispute Tilly's chronology or his choice of forces. For example, "big changes" in popular culture can also be traced back at least to the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The specific terminology of "big change" is not widely used, but the idea of major turning points gains ground increasingly in the more ambitious social history inquiries. The turning points may bear some relationship to conventional periodization, but they usually require separate definition, dating, and explanation. Thus the protoindustrialization concept, though disputed by some economic and social historians, argues that the spread of commercialized but domestic manufacturing in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ushered in important changes not only in work life, but also in consumption habits, gender relations, sexual behavior, and generational tensions—a kind of "big change," in other words, from which a host of other social shifts directly ushered. Many social historians see the industrial revolution in terms of sweeping social consequences—indeed, they are more comfortable with the industrial revolution concept as marking a whole set of social changes than are their economic historian counterparts, who variously debate the term according to a narrower set of economic indicators. Another big change point—perhaps the overused label "postindustrial" will turn out to apply—may enter in around the 1950s, associated with some familiar developments in the post-World War II state but also changes in family structure and popular values.

SPECIFIC PERIODIZATIONS

Along with long duration and big change, social historians increasingly contribute to periodization by dealing with specific chronological frameworks for specific sociohistorical phenomena. Examples here range as widely as social history itself. One historian, Eric Hobsbawm, sees the first key signs of instrumentalism among British workers in the 1850s; it was at this point, he argues, that some workers stopped viewing work in traditional terms and began to negotiate with employers in the belief that work should be an instrument to a better life off the job. The history of women and work notes the reduction of women's par-

ticipation in the western European labor force during the initial decades of the industrial revolution (while women did gain jobs in factories, they were pushed from domestic manufacturing work in greater numbers still) but then notes the dramatic reentry of married women into the labor force in the 1950s and 1960s. A new concern for slenderness and avoidance of overweight arose in western Europe in the 1890s. It was in the eighteenth century—probably between 1730 and 1770—that women, rather than the aristocracy, began to be seen as the group in European society that should be particularly associated with beauty, and therefore with particular attention to costume. It was also at this time—in a change that has yet to be fully explored—that dominant cultural assumptions began to shift away from traditional assumptions that women were more naturally sinful than men, to an argument that they were in crucial respects, particularly concerning sexuality, more moral. It was in the 1890s that targets for murder in several parts of western Europe began to focus more on family members than on barroom companions—a fascinating if very specific kind of periodization shift. It was in the 1920s that old people began to stop coresiding with younger kin (a pattern that had actually increased in the nineteenth century), a trend that has continued to the present day. It was in the late sixteenth century that modern prisons began to reshape ideas and practices of punishment in western Europe.

The list of specific periodization findings is vast. Some, of course, relate to wider claims; the boundary between specific periodizations and a "big change" argument is not hard and fast. One of the major periodization findings of social historians since 1980 has emphasized the origins of modern consumer society in the eighteenth century. In contradistinction to the older view that consumerism resulted from industrialization, we now realize that in western Europe it preceded it. Demographic historians urge a fairly basic periodization as well, with emphasis on the beginnings of a declining birth rate in the later eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries, measurable population ageing by the early twentieth century, and so on. The work of Norbert Elias, recently revived in several studies, has called attention to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a time of a change in manners and a growing insistence on self-restraint in a variety of aspects of life, from eating to emotion.

Specific periodizations in social history not only vary with particular topics, since clearly not all aspects of human behavior tidily change in concert, but also with regions. Choice of periods and change points for the history of manorialism, for example, obviously vary with each European region, but the same is true for

shifts in family structure or sexuality. At times, at least in recent centuries, regional differences in periodization reflect different dates of phenomena such as industrialization, so that the nature of periods is more similar than the specific chronology. Peasant sexuality in Russia, for example, which was beginning to alter in the late nineteenth century as a function of new contacts with cities, enters a new period somewhat similar to that which can be discerned in western Europe in the mid-eighteenth century. But regularities cannot be pressed too far: the regional factor adds further complexity to periodization in European social history.

CONCLUSION

No single periodization scheme currently dominates European social history. Useful approaches range from acceptance of familiar chronologies to a clearly alternative scheme such as long duration or big change, to the array of specific periodizations that have resulted from studies of social classes, gender, and popular behaviors. Add to this the different periodizations necessary for different regions of Europe—such as the decline of manorialism in early modern western Europe even as serfdom intensified in Russia and Poland—and the pattern is unquestionably complex.

And from this welter of approaches, three results stand out. First, while social historians have not fully replaced conventional periodization, they certainly tend to challenge it. Some staples survive better than others. While studies of social history during the Renaissance abound, particularly for Italy, the Renaissance is not usually highlighted as a basic social history period. As a largely elite cultural phenomenon, with some ramifications in politics and commerce, the Renaissance did not have wide enough social resonance to be terribly useful as a social history period overall. As indicated earlier, the Reformation has retained greater utility as a social history period, though only if extended in time. Correspondingly, some developments long linked uncomfortably to political periods, such as the industrial revolution, now gain greater prominence. The concepts are not entirely new, but

their priority shifts once the topics to be accounted for are redefined. Few late-twentieth-century social historians chop up the nineteenth century according to political and diplomatic shifts. Indeed, periodization based on diplomatic developments has survived particularly badly, except when diplomacy breaks down and society-shattering wars ensue. The social history periodization scheme, in sum, looks considerably different from the more conventional markers. The difference includes the need to focus more on transition points for social processes than on precise events and single dates.

Second, no fully agreed periodization has replaced the conventional markers. There are too many aspects of society, too many particular schemes, to yield substantial coherence as yet at least. To some observers or critics, the result is an unfortunate messiness or lack of coherence. One of the motivations behind the “big changes” push was a desire for synthesis, a hope that a few dramatic forces could unite a wide variety of social phenomena. At worst, a separate periodization scheme attaches to every major social history topic, and sometimes even this must be modified depending on the geographic region under examination.

Third, however messy, the ongoing exploration of social history has at its best made the search for appropriate periods more explicit, more open to assessment and debate, than was true for some of the older formulas. Determining when basic changes in direction occur (and what continuities survive them), and what caused them, is much of the stuff of history. Precisely because social history has redefined what the past entails, the need to seek out the appropriate chronology becomes part of the task. Whether some larger unities will emerge in future is anyone’s guess, though some clusters of particularly important changes are widely recognized already. For some the need to move into a topic with questions about appropriate chronology make the resultant history more exciting and more usable than when less-examined assumptions predominated. For researchers and history-users alike, the need to think about periodization unquestionably adds to the task of being engaged with social history.

See also other articles in this section.

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SECTION 2: THE PERIODS OF SOCIAL HISTORY

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THE MEDIEVAL HERITAGE



Constance B. Bouchard

The European Middle Ages, the millennium now considered to have lasted roughly from 500 to 1500, has long been a difficult period for historians. Ever since the term “Middle Ages” was first coined during the Italian Renaissance, the period has generally been treated as an anomalous gap between antiquity and the birth of the “modern.” Renaissance humanists of the fourteenth century rather self-righteously announced that they were reviving the learning and culture of classical Greek and Roman antiquity after centuries of neglect. However, scholars have come to agree that most classical learning and culture would not have been available for the Renaissance to embrace had they not been kept alive during the Middle Ages, and they put the break between the Middle Ages and the early modern period after the Renaissance rather than before it. As turning points, Columbus’s voyages to America and the beginnings of the Protestant Reformation, respectively just before and just after the year 1500, are considered more significant than the writings of the humanists a century and a half earlier.

Nonetheless, the humanists’ characterization of the medieval period as a time of ignorance and superstition has remained compelling. During the Enlightenment in eighteenth-century France, the church was identified as the source of many of humanity’s worst problems, at the same time as Protestant countries feared the plots of Jesuits. It was then but a short step from despising the Catholic Church to assuming that everything one hated about it had also characterized the Middle Ages. America’s Founding Fathers, themselves imbued with Enlightenment ideals, looked not to the Middle Ages but rather far earlier, to the Roman Republic (or at least, to the Roman Republic as seen by Renaissance humanists), for the model of what they were creating. Slaveholders who saw the conquest of “inferior” peoples as a desirable goal had no difficulty identifying with Roman society.

The first rehabilitation of the Middle Ages took place during the romantic movement of the nine-

teenth century. In France the churches that had been defaced during the Revolution were rebuilt and re-decorated; the architect Viollet-le-Duc (1814–1879) in particular created new heads for the kings on the facade of Notre Dame of Paris and added the grotesque gargoyles. In England at the same time, poems and novels, such as *Ivanhoe* (1819) by Sir Walter Scott, were inspired by ruined abbeys and castles, and the Middle Ages were nostalgically depicted as a time of chivalric virtue, pure spirituality, and the birth of sturdy English liberties. This romantic image was so strong that practitioners of scientific history in the early twentieth century felt compelled to debunk it in turn, invoking once again an image of a stagnant and priest-ridden era.

In the late twentieth century, however, medieval scholars managed to go beyond the rather pointless argument as to whether the Middle Ages was a dark age of oppression and ignorance or instead a lost golden era of faith and honor. Instead, they came to a new appreciation of how much of what we take for granted in modern Western society was created by the complex, far from stagnant society that existed in Europe between the sixth and fifteenth centuries.

The significance of the Middle Ages has always been more self-evident to Europeans than to citizens of the United States, a country that from its origins believed that the liberty its people sought was not just freedom from tyranny but freedom from the past’s hidebound traditions. In Europe, however, one cannot go about one’s business without being constantly reminded of the links between present and past. Shoppers and professionals in the center of cities walk down streets that have had the same layout since the end of the Middle Ages, and people are baptized, married, and buried in churches that date to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Most of the villages that dot the countryside of England are mentioned in the great medieval survey, the Domesday Book of 1086, and both in England and on the Continent many hilltops are crowned with grim towers that have stood for over eight hundred years.

But there is more to the importance of Europe's Middle Ages than its physical remains. In antiquity Western civilization was focused on the Mediterranean, the "Roman lake" as it was sometimes termed. The rise of Islam in the seventh century shattered the cultural unity of the Mediterranean basin, and from the time of the emperor Charlemagne (742–814) the center of European civilization was north of the Alps, in France and Germany, which over a thousand years later became the locus of the European Economic Union. Even national boundaries have remained roughly the same since the late Middle Ages, whereas none of the European countries existed as political units at the beginning of the medieval period. Property rights, privileges, and in England the unwritten constitution itself are all still anchored in medieval law.

MEDIEVAL CITIES

Modern Western urban civilization owes its origins not to antiquity, though indeed its great civilizations were city-based, but rather to the twelfth century. During the early Middle Ages, as Roman trade routes broke down and a much colder climate throughout Europe made regular harvests increasingly problematic, cities shrank drastically to little more than administrative centers for the bishops and the counts; most of the population scraped out a living in the countryside. Starting in the eleventh century, however, and picking up speed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, cities grew rapidly, even more rapidly than the overall population. In large part this urban growth was made possible by the warmer and drier climate, which meant that crops in the countryside could be harvested much more reliably. Thus overall population could rise, and farms produced enough excess beyond what a farm family or manor required for itself to allow selling to town.

The growth of the cities was due to immigration from the surrounding countryside. Young men especially came to town seeking their fortunes. Although the well-to-do, such as the guild-masters, set up houses for their families, most of the city population was initially male. Women could feel endangered in the rough-and-tumble environment of a rapidly growing city, and everyone agreed that, as chances for disease were much higher there, cities were poor places for small children. Indeed, well-to-do women living in town normally sent their infants out to wet nurses in the countryside. By the late Middle Ages most cities had something closer to a one-to-one sex ratio; nevertheless, there was always well-founded concern that cities were centers of infection—concerns that per-

sisted until the development of modern urban sanitation in the nineteenth century.

In Italy, Spain, and France, the cities of the twelfth century grew out of the administrative units that were all that survived of the Roman capitals of antiquity. Germany, however, had never experienced Roman rule, and thus its cities had to be founded completely anew. In England the Roman cities, along with most other remnants of Roman civilization, had been overwhelmed by Anglo-Saxon settlement starting in the fifth century, and thus the medieval cities grew out of the *burhs*, military centers first established by the Anglo-Saxon kings in the ninth century.

Whatever their origins, medieval cities quickly became centers of trade, commerce, and law. Goods from all over Europe, including wool from England, iron from Germany, leather and horses from Spain, and finely dyed fabric from Italy, were traded in the cities along with produce from the local countryside and silks and spices from fabled Asia. Early forms of capitalist investment flourished: those mounting an expedition to buy luxury goods from the East sold shares so that if disaster struck the loss would be spread out, and if the expedition were hugely successful a great many could share in the wealth. Urban craftsmen made their living not from farming but from creating and selling specialized products, whether shoes or jewelry or weapons. At the turn of the twenty-first century, Europe's major urban centers, with few exceptions, continued to practice trade and commerce in the same locations as those established in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

FREEDOM AND SERVITUDE

The cities of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were also considered centers of freedom, where someone from the countryside could escape the burdens under which he was born and where the city fathers generally obtained a charter of liberties spelling out their right to self-rule. The mayors and elected city councils of these cities especially sought the right to administer justice themselves rather than having to defer to the regional duke or count or to the city's bishop.

The freedom that these cities proclaimed for their citizens highlights one of the curious aspects of medieval history: it was a period in which there was essentially no slavery, even though it was framed at one end by the slave-based society and economy of Rome and on the other by the development of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Roman slavery had been predicated on the steady acquisition of new prisoners to force into slavery, and once Roman conquests ceased so did the influx of new prisoners. Agricultural slavery,

which in antiquity meant working slaves in large gangs, conditions under which they were very unlikely to reproduce themselves, thus became extremely uneconomical by the sixth century. Although Christianity did not condemn slavery per se, it did encourage freeing one's slaves and forbade enslaving a free person who was already a Christian. Thus by the seventh century slavery as an economic arrangement was essentially extinct in western Europe, although for the next two centuries household slaves might still occasionally be found.

With the decline of slavery in the early Middle Ages, the descendants of slaves mostly became serfs.

Although serfs were considered to be born into a state of servitude, and had to gain approval from their masters for their marriages or even to move to another village, they were still substantially better off than slaves. They could not be bought and sold, were not subject to arbitrary commands, and more or less regulated their own lives, having their own families, houses, and plots of land. The rent they paid to their masters for these houses was a combination of money, produce, and the requirement that they work in the lord's fields two or three days a week.

Medieval serfdom has sometimes been termed feudalism by marxist scholars, but among medievalists

of the late twentieth century the term has been jettisoned. After all, it is both confusing and misleading to use a single word to designate variously the agricultural practices of peasants in the sixth and seventh centuries; the landholding and ritualized loyalty of knights and lords of castles in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; and the legal privileges such as hereditary judgeships and noble dovecotes abolished in 1789 during the French Revolution, when the revolutionaries announced they were “ending feudalism.” Moreover, the serfdom established to replace agricultural slavery at the beginning of the Middle Ages did not persist unchanged throughout the entire period. By the eleventh century many serfs found that the rapidly improving economy of the time provided an opportunity for greater freedom. Some simply slipped off to the city, as suggested above, for a society without good communication or identification methods had no ready way to apprehend them. More frequently, serfs bought their own freedom. In France and Italy serfdom was essentially gone by the twelfth century. Free peasants were still substantially lower on the social and economic ladder than wealthy lords or successful merchants, but no longer were they considered bound by servitude.

In England and Germany, by contrast, serfdom continued in at least some form through the rest of the Middle Ages. In Germany, however, some men who were legally serfs might be much better off than some freemen, especially the *ministeriales*, the “serf-knights” who in many cases actually became the de facto aristocracy of their regions by the late Middle Ages. In England servile status was evoked most commonly in the thirteenth century to argue that one’s opponent in a legal case had no standing in court. In the fourteenth century, after the devastation and depopulation by the bubonic plague, many landlords attempted to impose harsh labor dues on any of the surviving peasants who they could claim were serfs. The resulting great peasants’ rebellion of 1381, although quickly suppressed, became a model for subsequent peasant rebellions in the following centuries. Fifteenth-century English peasants, in fact, had greater liberty than their grandparents, liberty that was quietly granted them once the worst of the rebellions were put down.

Slavery at this point had been absent from western Europe for more than half a millennium. However, during the Italian Renaissance household slaves began appearing again in small numbers, generally purchased from the eastern Mediterranean. After all, Roman law had had a great deal to say about slavery, and a people who thought of themselves as continuators of Roman culture found the practice perfectly

acceptable. In the sixteenth century, in the great age of exploration, Europeans discovered a number of peoples with whom they had so little in common that they were not even sure these people were entirely human, and began to enslave them with a brutality that medieval people would have found disquieting.

WOMEN AND THE FAMILY

Important developments also took place within the family during the Middle Ages, again creating institutions that we now accept as modern. The basic medieval family was founded on the nuclear unit of husband, wife, and children. Because child mortality was high in an era without modern medicine or infant formula, enough children died in their earliest years to drag down the life expectancy from the sixty or seventy years an adult could anticipate living—unless of course he or she died in war, in childbirth, or in an epidemic—to an average somewhere in the thirties. (An average life expectancy of thirty-five did not, of course, mean that people expected to die in their thirties; the number is the mathematical mean between those who died in infancy and the adults who lived to what the Bible termed a standard “three score years and ten.”)

Scholars at one time assumed that parents faced with the deaths of so many young children must have been hardened to the experience, even to the point of not becoming attached to their children. However, scholars studying medieval records have found overwhelming evidence that parents cared deeply for their children and grieved bitterly when they died; indeed, children were not merely the objects of parental affection but potentially an economic advantage, given that Europe was underpopulated for most of the Middle Ages. It should also be noted that high levels of child mortality were not unique to the Middle Ages; infants died at a high rate in Europe and North America until the early twentieth century.

Women played a much more independent role within the medieval family than they had within the family of antiquity. Christianity had always stressed that everyone, men and women alike, were equal in the eyes of God, and a Christian Europe gave women greater scope for action. Beginning in the ninth century, the church argued that a valid marriage could not be arranged solely by the male relatives but required the free consent of both the man and the woman. This argument, initially made on behalf of highborn and visible women, gradually worked its way down the social ladder. By the twelfth century, when marriage had come to be treated as a sacrament, it was clear that the heart of the sacrament was not

the words of the priest—whose presence was not required for a marriage to be valid—but rather the free oaths exchanged between the two principals.

Although married women with active husbands would not take the lead in dealing with the outside world, they nonetheless had property rights within marriage that were more extensive in the Middle Ages than they were subsequently in some parts of Europe, even in the nineteenth century. For example, in southern Europe even girls from modest backgrounds brought a certain amount of property, the dowry, to a marriage, and their husbands could not alienate it without their consent. North of the Alps, husbands normally fixed a certain amount of property, the bride-price, on their wives at the time of their wedding and were enjoined not to take it back.

In widowhood, a typical status for women given that men generally chose wives considerably younger than themselves, women had a great deal of autonomy in buying, selling, and even suing in court. Although inheritance of the family patrimony went preferentially to boys, in the absence of brothers girls could and did inherit everything from the family farm even to the Crown, and a girl with many brothers could still expect to receive something from her parents' inheritance. In the urban world of the late Middle Ages, wives and husbands normally worked side by side in guilds, and widows and daughters of guild-masters sometimes became guild-masters themselves.

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Culturally, modern language and literature have their origins in the twelfth century. Those who know modern French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Icelandic can still read, with only some difficulty, literature written in the medieval version of those languages. The language of the poet Dante (1265–1321) is the basis of modern Italian. The English language developed somewhat more slowly than the languages of the Continent, as the Anglo-Saxon of the early Middle Ages and the French of the Normans who conquered England in 1066 did not fuse into a single tongue until the fourteenth century; but with a little practice modern English-speakers can still read the poems of Geoffrey Chaucer (1342–1400).

Vernacular literature first appeared in the twelfth century, initially as stories intended for the entertainment of those who did not know the Latin of the church and the law court, but soon taking on a robust popularity among persons of every level of education, even churchmen. Ancient Greece and Rome of course produced works of entertainment, but the genre had fallen into oblivion for over half a millennium. The

epics and romances written in the twelfth century, however, established a long-running tradition. The direct descendant of medieval storytelling is the genre called fantasy—tales of swordfights and magic—which was demoted by the late-twentieth-century literary establishment to marginal status as a subgenre of science fiction. In the Middle Ages, however, fantasy constituted essentially all of literature.

By the thirteenth century, a somewhat rougher form of literature sprang up alongside the courtly literature evoking chivalric deeds and dangerous and honorable battles. Referred to as *fabliaux*, these tales often featured anthropomorphized animal characters and bawdy content. But high literature continued to be a literature of knightly culture, with romances and epics serving both as a critique of that culture and as examples of the kinds of virtue the authors wanted readers to emulate.

By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the most powerful nobles dearly wanted to imagine themselves as chivalric knights. While gunpowder and cannons came to dominate the battles of the final 150 years of the Middle Ages, converting the once formidable armored knight into a hopeless anachronism, leaders dreamed of the glorious days of King Arthur and began to form “orders of knighthood,” designed to separate the most courtly and honorable from everyone else. It is ironic that the tournament, which had originally been a way to practice battlefield techniques, had by the end of the Middle Ages become very different from the reality of battle, being instead a ritualized activity in which knights, wearing the heavy plate armor that had recently been developed to withstand musket fire, thrust at each other with wooden lances and were scored on style.

Even after the end of the Middle Ages, the image of a lost but possibly still attainable chivalric golden age lingered. In the sixteenth century all kings owned fine suits of tournament armor, and one French king was killed in a tournament. Dreams of chivalry were still strong enough for Cervantes (1547–1616) simultaneously to ridicule and celebrate them in *Don Quixote*. And of course, as noted above, such images animated the romantic movement of the nineteenth century.

CULTURE: RELIGION AND THE UNIVERSITIES

One of the Middle Ages' greatest contributions to later culture is the creation of the university. Antiquity had nothing similar, but an entity resembling what we call a university (from the medieval Latin *universitas*, meaning something done collectively) does appear in

the twelfth century. In France, for example, the schools attached to the various churches of Paris gradually merged into a single entity, its existence given formal recognition by a charter from the king in 1200. The titles still given to university officers, such as dean, chancellor, or provost, were originally the titles given to officers of the cathedral, and academic gowns are in origin priests' robes. The connection between training as a student and training for the priesthood persisted, even though most students never became priests. This connection meant that women, barred from the priesthood, were also barred from university training, a practice that persisted, both in Europe and in the Americas, until well into the nineteenth century.

With recognizable features such as a set curriculum and program of study, degrees granted to show mastery of complex subject matter, professionally qual-

ified teachers, and even students drinking too much, getting into trouble with their landladies, and writing home with plausible stories explaining why they needed even more money for books, the medieval University of Paris seems familiar. Because classes were conducted in Latin, all students had to speak the language; it was also the only easy way for students from all over Europe to communicate. The area of Paris around the university is still called the Latin Quarter.

Universities quickly multiplied, each specializing in a certain subject at the graduate level, although one could receive a B.A. at any. Paris was the pre-eminent university for both philosophy and theology, where the writings of the ancient Greeks, especially Aristotle, were pored over, debated, and incorporated into such theological treatises as the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). The University of

Bologna in Italy was Europe's preeminent university of law, where students could earn a J.D. in Roman law, in church law, or, most commonly, in both. Medicine was studied at Montpellier (in France) and Salerno (in Italy), while the English universities of Oxford and Cambridge were founded by English teachers and students who preferred not having to cross the Channel to Paris.

It should be stressed that the theologians at the University of Paris did not simply discuss well-accepted "truths" about Christianity. Rather, they argued and debated, often rather heatedly, over exactly what those truths might be. This debate was by its very nature rational and analytic. Theology was considered a vibrant and exciting science, and issues concerning the nature of God and Christian salvation were debated using approaches and ideas borrowed from the pagan thinkers of antiquity, even from Jewish and Muslim philosophers. By the end of the thirteenth century, the bishop of Paris, worried that this openness might lead some undergraduates astray, drew up a list of

works that were not to be taught to beginning students, though they were still read and discussed by the professors and advanced students.

These university-centered theological debates are but one of many indications that the medieval church and belief system were far from monolithic. Although by far the majority of the population was made up of baptized Christians, and kings felt that the protection and support of churches were sacred aspects of their rule, for the vast majority of the population no one either knew or cared exactly what they believed. Jews were tolerated, although by the later Middle Ages fairly grudgingly. For the most part, the only people accused of heresy were the learned and preeminent, who it was feared might infect others with their fallacious beliefs, or else those who tried to set up an entire alternative church, complete with its own bishops, as did the Albigensian heretics around the year 1200.

Even from among the most devout in the Middle Ages there emitted a fairly steady low-level criti-

cism of the hierarchical church, on the grounds of lapses from the purity expected of leaders of organized religion. But just as, in the modern United States, those who believe most strongly in democracy may be the biggest critics of a particular government, this medieval criticism of the church should not be seen as a rejection of Christianity. The consensus was that the church hierarchy had become corrupt by the fifteenth century; Martin Luther was preceded by a long line of would-be reformers, though the Reformation he began in 1517 was spectacularly successful in a way previous attempts had not been.

LAWYERS AND GOVERNMENT

Another popular misconception about the Middle Ages is that it was a period when violence was the only law. In fact, some of the most important products of the universities were the lawyers. Law became a trained, well-paid profession for the first time. University-trained lawyers served both at medieval Europe's royal courts and at the court of the papacy. Indeed, from the second half of the twelfth century onward, virtually all the medieval popes themselves were trained at the University of Bologna.

In England, university-trained lawyers were employed as judges as the kings developed their system of common law, with the fundamental understanding that a crime was an offense against the Crown, not merely against the victim, and thus ought to be investigated and punished by the royal courts. Grand juries, so called in contrast to the "petit" juries which might decide a case, assembled both to give and to hear testimony of possible lawbreaking (in a system directly ancestral to that of the United States). In France in the thirteenth century, a somewhat similar function was served by the *parlements*, courts that might be attached either to the Crown or to a particular region. In all of Europe's countries, the kings assisted by lawyers were not gods as in the empires of antiquity, nor even rulers with the special favor of the Christian God such as ruled Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; rather, at least through the thirteenth century, they were men whose authority originated in the consent of the governed.

University-trained lawyers could also serve as bureaucrats and record keepers. No government can function without some sort of record keeping, which was particularly challenging in an age before the printing press. When the Crown wished to keep a record of a grant or privilege made to someone, a clerk wrote out a copy for the records by hand. A government that does not keep good records is bound to find itself embarrassed, unable to account for where money has

gone, whether it is owed money, discovering that it has made contradictory rulings or promised the same office to two people. Although some record keeping has existed for as long as humans have used writing, the modern understanding that governments and judicial courts needed permanent staffs of bureaucrats dates to the Middle Ages.

Even operating under severe technical disadvantages, beginning around 1200 medieval courts managed to regularize their records. In France the decisive event was the disastrous Battle of Fréteval in 1194, in which the king lost not only his baggage train but all the royal records, which had customarily followed the king wherever he went. From then on he established a permanent group of administrators who kept the records in Paris. Similar developments took place in England and in the papal court. Even now researchers can peruse the registers that scribes struggled to keep tidy seven or eight centuries ago.

MEDIEVAL INVENTIONS

Economically and socially the final two centuries of the Middle Ages were a difficult time, marked by a cooler climate than that of the twelfth century. The cooling resulted in frequent famines; the bubonic plague broke out in the fourteenth century for the first time in western Europe in eight hundred years; and countries were torn by peasant unrest and governmental tyranny, as seen for example among the men who ruled the city-states of the Italian Renaissance. And yet, alongside the social and institutional innovations already noted, it was also a remarkably inventive period in the material realm.

Eyeglasses, which developed out of experiments with optics, first made their appearance at the end of the thirteenth century. Given that over half the modern Western population wears glasses, the development of this correction for nearsightedness was an important step forward, particularly for the literate. In the fourteenth century the invention of paper, which rapidly replaced parchment for all but the most formal documents, made books and writing substantially cheaper than they had been. The mechanical clock, developed around the same time and often equipped with dials for showing phases of the moon and of the zodiac as well as the hours, made it much easier for someone in business or a profession to plan and schedule his day. But perhaps the single most consequential invention of the fourteenth century was gunpowder. The Chinese had long used gunpowder for fireworks, but it took the West to find a way to use it to kill large numbers of people. As cannons were developed in the second half of the century, the face of war was

transformed. No longer was fighting glorious and chivalrous, with a few well-aimed cannons capable of bringing down a whole row of charging cavalry. Instead, late medieval wars were increasingly fought by common footsoldiers forced into the army or by mercenaries.

The most significant invention of the fifteenth century was the printing press, developed by Johannes Gutenberg (1400–1468) in Germany. Again, the Chinese had already produced something similar, but they had carved an entire page out of one block of wood, whereas Gutenberg's invention featured movable type. With this type a whole page could quickly be set up using metal letters, and after as many copies as desired were printed, the page could be broken down and the letters reused. As a result of improvements in metallurgy in the preceding century, a by-product of the search for better cannons, this type was crisp and clear. In addition, printing presses lowered the price of books drastically because books could be reproduced far more quickly and easily than had ever before been possible. Whereas earlier every copy of every book had been at least slightly different from the next, all copies were now the same. With cheaper, more widely available books, literacy increased rapidly. From the end of the fifteenth century onward, someone trying to argue a point or to rally public opinion could do so in part through leaflets and booklets.

Finally, the fifteenth century invented much better rigging and shipbuilding techniques. By the end

of the century European sailors were sailing hundreds and even thousands of miles down the coast of Africa in an attempt to find a passage to the East. By the time Christopher Columbus set off westward with the same purpose in mind, it was reasonable for him to expect his ships to hold together for weeks on the open ocean. But it was of course unreasonable for him to expect to find "India" as quickly as he did. Those who had mocked Columbus for his goal did so not because they expected him to fall off the edge of a flat Earth—the idea that Columbus's contemporaries thought the world was flat is a myth concocted in the nineteenth century. Both sailors and learned theorists in the fifteenth century knew that the Earth was a globe, as indeed had scholars in ancient Greece. What the naysayers believed, correctly, was that the globe was considerably larger than Columbus estimated, and they therefore feared that an insuperable twelve thousand miles of empty ocean lay before him to cross.

Although Columbus was convinced to the end of his life that he had in fact reached India, despite his frustration at never having found the silk and spices he expected, the Spanish Crown quickly realized he had discovered a hitherto unknown continent and claimed New Spain. The Middle Ages come to an end with Columbus, and with Europe's expansion into new territories a new era begins. But it was an era whose social expectations, government, and intellectual life had been formed in the Middle Ages.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE RENAISSANCE



John Martin

For a hundred years after the appearance of Jacob Burckhardt's *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, first published in 1860, scholars and their public alike imagined the Renaissance as the first chapter in the history of the modern. According to this view, it was in Italy in the age of Petrarch, the Medici, and Machiavelli that the shift from the medieval to our own world took place. The Italian, Burckhardt noted, "was the first-born among the sons of modern Europe." Historians who embraced this view stressed the importance of the period for the emergence of political, ethical, and cultural ideals that were central to the identities of nineteenth- and twentieth-century elites in Europe and the United States. The Renaissance from this perspective was the cradle of individualism and republicanism, of humanism and realism, of secularism and capitalism; it became a period of study in its own right, reaching from about 1300 to 1530 in Italy, and from about 1500 to 1650 in northern Europe.

Scholars no longer find the origins of the modern in the Renaissance, but they have by no means given up on the idea of a "Renaissance" as an important dimension of not only Italian but European society as a whole. In particular, they locate the Renaissance in a cluster of interrelated practices in which many painters, sculptors, architects, humanists, poets, and publishers, as well as courtiers and other political and economic elites—often with an eye to antiquity as a model for their cultural pursuits—creatively and self-consciously engaged. On a broader level, they associate it with shifts in political organization, family and collective life, the practice of religion, and new notions of the self and community; and they have raised important questions about the relation of non-elite groups (women, artisans, peasants, and the poor) to this larger movement. As a result, the "Renaissance" is less likely to be portrayed as a period in and of itself than as an important aspect of late medieval and early modern social, intellectual, and cultural history. Just as the Earth was no longer seen as the center of the cosmos in the teachings of the sixteenth-century Po-

lish canon and astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus, so the Renaissance—once the central organizing element in the history of Europe—has now been demoted to planetary status.

But no one disputes either the splendor of this satellite or that its own force—like that of other heavenly bodies—inevitably, and certainly by the sixteenth century, exercised some influence over the world it orbited. To be sure, the overwhelming mass of Europeans—the 90 percent that made up the peasantry—was virtually untouched by the Renaissance, but both the humanist's study and the artist's workshop were closely connected to the larger political and cultural life of the city and the court. Moreover, the history of Renaissance humanism and art followed a relatively clear trajectory. First emerging in Florence and Tuscany in the fourteenth century, this new cultural style, which involved not only the arts and literature but also ethical and political thought, spread rapidly throughout Italy in the fifteenth century, and then throughout Europe as a whole in the sixteenth century. In such cities as Florence, Venice, and Rome, these initiatives were pursued by large groups of humanists, artists, and poets. And later, in courts from Urbino and Milan in Italy to those of Francis I in France, Elizabeth I in England, and even Matthias Corvinus in Hungary, a similar pattern emerged. The extraordinary creativity of the period—represented by such emblematic figures as Petrarch, Niccolò Machiavelli, Albrecht Dürer, Desiderius Erasmus, Thomas More, Michelangelo, Michel de Montaigne, William Shakespeare, and Rembrandt—was never a matter of individual achievement alone. It was also a social fact, one closely related not only to the history of the city and the court but also to the whole of European society in the late medieval and early modern periods.

THE CRISIS OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

The social forces that underlay the Renaissance stemmed from a series of transformations that began

as early as the eleventh century, when Europe witnessed the revival of commerce and urban life. From the fall of Rome and the barbarian invasions down through the tenth century, European society had ceased by and large to be centered on the city, while commerce had been reduced to relative insignificance. Around the year 1000 this trend reversed. By the twelfth century the increasingly dynamic growth of the population led to the emergence of significant clusters of towns and cities, especially in northern Italy and the Low Countries. The same phase of medieval history was characterized by a robust growth in intellectual and cultural life. The twelfth century saw new initiatives in learning in monastic and cathedral schools; by the thirteenth century universities too had become centers of learning and scholarship. Much of the attention of medieval humanists and scholastics focused on classical writers, especially Cicero and Aristotle. Intellectual historians have correctly stressed the medieval antecedents (the *ars dictaminis*, for example, and other forms of “protohumanism”) to many of the cultural interests of Renaissance elites.

Yet a marked cultural shift did occur in the late Middle Ages. In the early fourteenth century, for example, the Tuscan painter Giotto (1266?–1337) invested the human figure with a sense of solidity and three-dimensionality that would become a much-emulated element of Renaissance art. And in the mid-fourteenth century, the Italian humanist Petrarch (1304–1374) demonstrated a new sense of historical distance and a new awareness of personality in the ancient authors (especially Cicero and Saint Augustine) whom he studied. By the early and mid-fifteenth century, these and comparable artistic and intellectual practices had become increasingly fashionable, especially among the urban elite of Italy. From the vantage point of social history, these shifts are of particular interest because they developed not in continuity with the expansionary phase of medieval society that had begun in the eleventh century but rather in the midst of a period of crisis. The fourteenth century began with famine and an evident slowing if not stagnation of demographic growth. In all likelihood, by 1300 if not earlier, Europe was in the grip of a Malthusian dilemma as the continent’s population, which was growing in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, began to outstrip resources. The exploitation of the peasantry within the feudal structures of the medieval economy also contributed to the malnourishment and general weakness of the great mass of Europeans. Then in 1347–1348 Europeans confronted an unprecedented catastrophe, the Black Death—the first strike of bubonic plague (*Yersinia pestis*).

The immediate effect of the Black Death was a precipitous drop in population. From 1348 to 1400, during which time there were several outbreaks of bubonic plague, Europe as a whole (east and west) witnessed a loss of between 22 and 28 million individuals out of a total population of some 73 to 74 million. In short, in a fifty-year period as many as one in three Europeans fell victim to the plague. In Florence the death rate was particularly high; in 1348 alone its population dropped from approximately 120,000 to some 40,000 souls, and losses were even greater in other parts of Tuscany. Italy as a whole probably lost one half its population in the latter half of the fourteenth century. Death became a dominant theme in the art of the period; new religious movements such as that of the flagellants, which placed particular emphasis upon repentance and the physical mortification of the body, attracted large popular followings; and there were outbreaks of hostility toward the poor and the Jews. At the same time, the plague appears to have influenced the direction of intellectual life. New universities—some, in response to the epidemics, with a special emphasis on the study of medicine—were established, certain traditional fields were deemphasized, and new ones, notably rhetoric, came to the fore, at least in Italy. In fact, the plagues may even have played a direct role in intensifying the growing sense that classical Latin was a language that required conscious imitation. Before the Black Death medieval academic Latin was organic, practical, and instilled in students at a very young age—in short, it was a living vernacular. The depletion of the ranks of university and Latin teachers and the disruption of the schools during the ravages of plague changed the equation. Suddenly Latin was a “foreign” language that needed to be mastered through the close study and imitation of ancient texts—a new linguistic attitude that would prove fundamental to the development of the Renaissance.

The social and economic consequences were equally decisive. In the short term, trade and industry were disrupted, family life was strained, and civility was frayed. But over the longer term, especially over the next few generations as recurrent visitations of the plague continued to restrict the population’s recovery, the fortunes of the survivors varied. Although the situation differed from one part of Europe to another, the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries in general witnessed a fall in rents for traditional landlords (the nobility), new opportunities for merchants and financiers, a rise in wages for urban laborers, the erosion of servile bonds in the countryside, and in general new agricultural regimes that at times benefited and at other times led to the further exploitation of the

peasantry. Cities especially needed new men in the crafts and the professions; this period was, as a result, one of relatively high social mobility. Once the economy began to stabilize under these new terms, the standard of living (at least in the cities) increased—one of the preconditions for the demand for luxury goods and commodities that fostered the material culture of Renaissance Europe.

The emergence of Renaissance culture, however, was far more than a matter of new levels of consumption. To be sure, the postplague prosperity of the urban patriciates and their desire to fashion themselves as deserving elites through the conspicuous display of culture were important factors. But so too were the anxieties inherent in a social structure in which the traditional hierarchies were never fixed and in which the family, especially in the aftermath of the Black Death, underwent profound modifications and adjustments. Urban life itself, given the density of the population, the squalor of the poor, the violent tenor of the night, the constant threat of plague, and of course, the need to maintain peace among so many disparate groups, made politics a major concern. Indeed, each of these facets of urban life inevitably played some role in connecting the artistic and cultural life of the period to the actual issues, problems, and anxieties that men and women confronted in late medieval Italy.

When humanists looked to the ancient world, their interests were rarely purely antiquarian or philological. To the contrary, they found in the writings of such figures as Aristotle and Livy important reflections on the constitutional histories of Greece and Rome—reflections made relevant by the deep analogies between the concerns of citizens in the ancient city-states and those of contemporary Italians, whether they were about political life, civic values, or moral questions. It was in this context that fifteenth-century writers in the Italian cities crafted a “civic humanism,” a program that stressed the importance of political and social engagement in the life of the Renaissance city.

Social historians have made it plain, however, that the ideals of the civic humanists were aimed above all at the urban elite. Like other aspects of medieval society, the Renaissance city was a profoundly hierarchical place. To a large degree the social structure of these urban environments had evolved out of earlier social systems. In twelfth-century Italy merchant-artisans had wrested power away from local aristocrats (often bishops) and established communal governments that represented their interests. Although many cities—among them Milan, Mantua, and Ferrara—eventually fell under the control of a single individual or family, in both Florence and Venice—as well as in Lucca, Siena, and Genoa—these new commercial elites established their dominance. In Venice the pa-

triciate was almost exclusively based on commercial wealth, whereas in such inland cities as Florence, the patricians included both great feudal families that had begun to invest in urban industries and wealthy merchant families that bought up land in the Florentine *contado*, the agricultural hinterland subject to the city's jurisdiction. In Renaissance republics these groups tended to hold political power. Beneath them in prestige were lesser merchants and skilled artisans (goldsmiths, tailors, silk weavers, masons). Many craftsmen and most workers led humbler lives, though even those who only managed to scrape by in poorly paying trades, either as carders or spinners or stevedores and day laborers, enjoyed a stability that set them off sharply from the very poor—the itinerant beggars and vagabonds who thronged the cities during a famine, and also a large underclass of servants and slaves, prostitutes, common outlaws, and con men. Finally, beyond the city were the peasants whose lives were increasingly linked to those living in urban centers through markets and economic exploitation. By the early fifteenth century in the Tuscan countryside, we know that approximately one quarter of the peasants had come to labor as sharecroppers (*mezzadri*) for landlords, often urban landlords. And it was from their labor that much of the wealth of the Renaissance city derived. The economic underpinnings of the social hierarchies of the period were brutal. In early-fifteenth-century Florence and the vast territories subject to it, there were some 60,000 families, nearly two-thirds of whom labored in the countryside. The richest 100 of these 60,000 households, moreover, controlled one-fifth of the wealth, and more than half of the riches in the region were in the hands of an elite 3,000 families, a mere one-half of 1 percent of the entire population. The hierarchy, therefore, was not merely a cultural construction: it was rooted in an economic system that kept most of the population poor and in debt. As Christiane Klapisch-Zuber observes in her *Women, Family, and Ritual*, “the glory of the Renaissance was built on the heightened exploitation of indigent sharecroppers and provincials short of capital” (1985, p. 13).

What is certain is that it was largely from the urban elites as well as from the nobility that the humanists who staffed the chanceries and the growing bureaucracies of the Renaissance governments were recruited. This is hardly surprising, as the educational program the humanists fostered placed a special emphasis on the liberal arts both at school and in the university, with particular emphasis on the study of Latin and rhetoric, a discipline closely related to the need in republics for leaders trained in public speaking and the art of persuasion. By contrast, painters, sculp-

tors, and architects generally came from slightly more humble though still relatively privileged origins. Their fathers tended to be artisans or shopkeepers, often with a close association to the arts. And indeed throughout much of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, artists themselves were viewed primarily as craftsmen who carried out their work according to the stipulations of their patrons. Urban environments such as Venice and Florence and, later on, Paris, London, and Amsterdam, with their relatively high concentration of highly skilled artisans, were especially suited to the development of the painting, sculpture, and architecture that was characteristic of the Renaissance.

Generalizations about the family are difficult for both late medieval and early modern history. What is clear is that the late medieval and early modern family did not follow a simple trajectory of progressive nuclearization, with a large, extended family or household giving way to a smaller conjugal unit. Rather, families varied enormously in structure both within and between regions. In Tuscany at the beginning of the fifteenth century, fewer than one in five households were extended in the technical sense of containing more than one conjugal family, though significantly more than one in five Florentines lived in such extended households at one point or another during their life cycles. In England, by contrast, the nuclear family appears to have been even more the norm, though there, too, many families, especially those at the extremes of the wealth spectrum, tended to be larger, with several couples (brothers and their wives) living under one roof. Among the wealthy the European family was also marked by a strong sense of lineage. The families of artisans and the working poor were more often nuclear, with less likelihood of integration into a larger kin network. Marriages in these strata of society were aimed primarily at economic survival, and women in such households often assisted their husbands in their trade.

Among rich and poor, however, the family played a decisive role in shaping the lives of individuals, regulating the births, marriages, and economic activities of its members. Humanist treatises from the period paint a portrait of a profoundly paternalistic institution, and many of the laws worked to keep the family under the control of a patriarch or at least the male lineage. While the wives of many artisans and workers continued to serve important economic functions in their households, the position of upper-class women deteriorated in the Renaissance city as a bourgeois family structure imposed new limitations on women's social and economic activities. At the same time, women often did find ways to protect themselves and their daughters, whom they often sheltered

from unhappy marriages or from the convent. Again historians have revealed significant gaps between humanist ideals and social realities. The fifteenth-century Venetian humanist Francesco Barbaro insisted that mothers nurse their own children, but women repeatedly chose to put their infants out to wet nurses, often in the countryside. Finally, about children in this age we know extremely little. To be sure, some sermons and treatises placed a new value on childhood, but infanticide and abandonment remained relatively common practices among the most destitute members of society.

In addition to the family, the lives of many late medieval and early modern men (and some women) were shaped to a large degree by guilds, which, like the city itself, had emerged in the eleventh and twelfth centuries as associations of merchants and craftsmen designed to protect their economic and social interests. In the late Middle Ages the guild had come to play a major role in urban politics as well. In Florence guild membership (especially the more affluent merchant guilds) enfranchised citizens to participate in the city's government. In German and Dutch cities too the guild was often the basis of political power. But even in towns and cities in which guildsmen were excluded from political participation, they often provided a basic framework for social activity and gave their members a

stake in the community, setting them off quite clearly from an underclass of day laborers and unskilled workers who had no such organization to protect their interests. The guild was the institution in which apprentices and journeymen were trained, often eventually becoming master craftsmen themselves. Membership in the guilds was widespread. In fourteenth-century Florence, probably 11,000 to 12,000 men (about 10 percent of the population) belonged to guilds; in sixteenth-century Venice, approximately 30,000 (or nearly 20 percent of the population) were members. Not all work was organized by guild. In Florence most of the workers in the textile industry, which employed as many as one in three adult men in the city, were *sottoposti*, unincorporated laborers who did piecework as carders and combers for local clothiers and drapers. It was these workers who participated in the famous revolt of the *ciompi* (the poorest workers) in 1378. They managed to gain some economic and political concessions (including membership in a guild of their own) from the Florentine government, but these concessions lasted for only a few weeks. At roughly the same time similar uprisings took place in Siena and Perugia.

The Renaissance city was characterized as well by a broad range of associations that extended beyond work and family and involved rich as well as poorer

residents. The most salient of these were confraternities, brotherhoods that brought together men (and sometimes women) from similar trades, social backgrounds, or neighborhoods, often around the devotion to a particular saint. Social ties were also forged through godparenting and other less formal forms of friendship. The structure of neighborhoods, too, often functioned to make urban life villagelike, bringing rich and poor face-to-face in the street and the marketplace. We can thus imagine the Renaissance city as a web of social networks in which the social hierarchy based on wealth and status was intersected by a complex of institutions—the family, the neighborhood or parish, the guild, and the confraternity—that both expressed and diffused social tensions in the city. Social tensions were also mitigated by the highly ritualized aspects of the late medieval and early modern city. Cities celebrated their social order and harmony through processions and allowed the lower orders to “let off steam” during such annual festivals as carnival.

Much of the art of the period was also closely related to this complex web of solidarities of Renaissance society. Patrician families, ecclesiastical institutions, guilds, and confraternities were the primary patrons of artistic works. The recurrence of bubonic plague in 1363 appears in particular to have prompted many Italians to attend more deliberately to their salvations and to the preservation of their identities as well as those of their families. They commissioned chapels, funeral monuments, and paintings to ensure the memory of themselves and their families. Such behavior was not limited to the wealthy—even relatively modest artisans and laborers participated in this quest for fame. Thus Renaissance ideas about fame percolated through more than the upper echelons of society, though how far they reached and the ways in which they blended with other aspects of the culture at the time are unclear. What is clear is that large numbers of city dwellers in this period occupied a paradoxical relation to Renaissance ideas. Alongside their interests in antiquity and art, they manifested a continuing fascination with magic and the occult as well as a deep core of piety that expressed itself in a rich array of social and religious beliefs and practices.

THE LONG SIXTEENTH CENTURY

The Renaissance was not an exclusively urban affair. Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, several courts—especially in Italy—had also served as the locus for the new cultural pursuits. As centers of political, ecclesiastical, and economic power, the

courts were ideally suited to attract some of the outstanding figures of the age; toward the end of the fifteenth and throughout the sixteenth century, the court became increasingly central to Renaissance culture. Throughout the fifteenth century, though in theory Florence remained a republic, the Medici in fact controlled most of the political appointments and policies of the republic before finally establishing themselves as the archdukes of Tuscany in the 1530s. Over the same period the papal court in Rome came to dominate not only much of Italian but also much of European culture. Even Venice, which remained a republic, witnessed a decided aristocratization of culture as its urban elites turned away from commerce, invested increasingly in rural properties, and constructed elaborate villas, a fashion that led to many commissions for the influential architect Andrea Palladio (1508–1580). The early Renaissance may have been a largely urban affair, but the aristocracy had never ceased to play a central role in the shaping of culture. Indeed, by the sixteenth century European nobles, empowered by the rising value of land (in a process that social historians refer to as “refeudalization”), were the major patrons of what is called Renaissance culture.

It was in this period that the Renaissance became an increasingly European movement. Probably the most decisive factor in this Europeanization was the shift of political power away from Italy to the new monarchies of Spain, France, and England. The political elites in these kingdoms were keen on importing Italian culture to their cities and courts; indeed we can see the sixteenth century as a period of translation of Italian art and ideas to northern Europe. Cosmopolitan by their very nature, courts attracted leading figures from the aristocracy and the cultural elite throughout Europe. Popes and princes competed for the most accomplished artists and humanists. The virtuoso painter and engineer Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) was active not only in his native Florence, where he was a member of the painter’s guild, but also at the Sforza court in Milan, the French court of Francis I, and, though fleetingly, the court of the Medici pope Julius II in Rome. Other factors also contributed to the Europeanization of the Renaissance. By 1500 the printing press, which had been invented in Mainz by Johannes Gutenberg in the 1450s, had led to a diffusion of classical and humanist works on an unprecedented scale. In the early sixteenth century, the Dutch humanist scholar Desiderius Erasmus worked for the printer Aldus Manutius in Venice, for Johann Froben’s press in Basel, and for Josse Bade in Paris. Thus the print shop, like the court, served to Europeanize humanist culture.

Social change also underlay this development. From the middle of the fifteenth to the early seventeenth century, with plague now a less frequent occurrence, most of Europe participated in a sustained demographic and economic recovery, a period that historians refer to as the “long sixteenth century.” The social consequences of this growth were dramatic. Though the precise chronology varied from one part of Europe to another, land and grain became dear, and the overwhelming majority of peasants saw their living standard erode while their landlords reaped the harvest of higher and higher rents. Also conspicuous was the growth of cities in this period. London, which had some 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants at the start of the sixteenth century, had doubled in size by mid-century and reached as many as 200,000 in 1600. Other major cities—Paris, Antwerp, and Amsterdam—saw comparable gains, with the result that in the sixteenth century northern Europe underwent a process of urbanization that was in some ways comparable to the earlier phase of urbanization that had taken place in Italy. And as in late medieval Italy, the growth of the city and the development of the new urban elites were closely tied to structural transformations in the rural areas, as more and more land was given to pasturage and as textile production was increasingly put out to peasant households often desperate to increase their incomes.

This process (which historians have variously called the putting-out system, *Verlagssystem*, cottage industry, and protoindustrialization) stemmed from the efforts of drapers and clothiers, who in their efforts to find cheap labor deliberately transferred even weaving to the countryside, bringing peasants and their families more fully into the “industrial economy” and further enriching the entrepreneurs who invested in this industry. The social consequences of such a system were widely felt in Europe, especially in highly urbanized areas. The system produced new social tensions but also created new opportunities. The encroachment of industry on the countryside as well as the increased demand for wool and the decision, especially by English landlords, to enclose their arable lands and turn them over to pasturage led to dislocations in traditional agrarian life, creating a new rural poor and contributing to the quickened pace of immigration to the cities, which quickly filled with impoverished migrants.

The cities were hardly able to absorb them. Both rising prices and the flood of workers on the market made it increasingly difficult for them to work their way up the guild hierarchies and establish shops and families of their own. Women who came in from the countryside often eked out an existence as domestic

servants. Not surprisingly, this very process was the source of much of the prosperity of London as well as such Dutch cities as Amsterdam and Leiden, whose elites based their wealth on both rising incomes from landed investments and from the new patterns of exploitation in early modern industry. To a large degree, it was these wealthy burghers who, alongside the aristocracy, became the patrons and consumers of art, luxury goods, and humanist education.

In northern Europe in this period, as had been the case earlier in Italy, much of the writing by humanists sought to respond to the new social problems of the early modern city. In the early sixteenth century, the Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives, addressing the problem of the widespread growth of poverty in Bruges, published his treatise *On the Subvention of the Poor* (1526). At roughly the same time in the Burgundian city of Lyon, poor relief was shaped by a

practical humanism that sought to apprentice boys to masters and to dower girls for marriages in ways that would save them from lives of poverty. In England, Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516) was, at least in part, a response to the harsh realities of his day.

The early modern Renaissance differed from the late medieval Renaissance in other respects as well. For one thing, as printing presses spread throughout Europe, the book was a far more important factor in the sixteenth century than it had been earlier, and, along with rising literacy rates, it brought the ideas of humanists and other writers—ancient and modern—into contact with an ever wider readership. The culture of reading (the ubiquity of the bookshop and bookstall, the circulation of books among friends and fellow workers, and so on) meant that in the sixteenth century the diffusion of ideas spread farther, perhaps at times into the countryside. The urban world of craftsman was highly literate, and even illiterate artisans must have often heard their fellow workers read from books and discuss them in the shop or over the loom. The book was not merely a cultural item but was itself an instrument of sociability, creating new solidarities and unexpected friendships. This new intensity of the printed word was made more significant by the religious struggles of the Reformation, and an increasingly literate population was a major force in

shaping the writings of humanists and reformers. Vernacular languages became a popular means of communication, though Latin remained important. Intellectuals competed with one another to shape the ideas of their public.

In addition, the period witnessed a veritable explosion in texts aimed at improving the reader's manners. From Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier* (1518) to Erasmus's *Manners for Children* (1530) and Thomas Elyot's *The Boke Named the Governour* (1531), writers laid down new rules of etiquette and comportment. Their most responsive readers were courtiers, but urban elites too began to internalize the new manners as well. This enterprise was viewed as a crucial one in the increasingly crowded urban spaces of the early modern city, for despite their pockets of prosperity, these urban spaces also overflowed with the poor and seemed to threaten the social order itself. Manners and discipline were therefore part of a perceived social need. Outside the court the new etiquette was not only a language about power, it was also a language about the social order, about *urbanitas* (urbanity) and a new civility. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to see the first part of the early modern period as one in which the ideas of the Renaissance, thanks to such factors as growing literacy, the Reformation, and the revolution in manners, began to have some influence on popular groups, at least in the city. The result of these cultural shifts was that the satellite of the Renaissance exercised a stronger gravitational force on the early modern world than it did on late medieval society.

CONCLUSION

The social history of the Renaissance should be seen as consisting of two phases, defined primarily by the demographic fortunes of the European population rather than by the more traditional designations of the Italian and the northern Renaissance. The first phase was the so-called crisis of the fourteenth century, which lasted from about 1300 to about 1450. This phase appears to have prompted social transformations that intensified, especially in the already highly urbanized environment of northern Italy, cultural practices that would become characteristic of the Renaissance as a movement: a growing interest in antiquity as a cultural model and a new emphasis on artistic consumption or the display of wealth by an urban as well as a courtly elite. The second phase is the long sixteenth century, which lasted from about 1450 to about 1620, and contributed, at least in part, to the consolidation of the new cultural interests and their

rapid diffusion throughout the cities and courts of western Europe as a whole. Social history therefore connects the Renaissance to the history of both the late medieval and the early modern periods. At the same time social historians have made it plain that the early Renaissance, which derived in important ways from developments in medieval culture, was primarily urban and Italian, while the later Renaissance, which had become a Europe-wide phenomenon increasingly centered on the court, can be fruitfully examined in relation to longer-term developments in early modern culture (most especially the Reformation and the scientific revolution), even down to the time of the French Revolution.

Despite the centrifugal forces inherent in such a distinction, cultural historians can make a strong case for the unity of the Renaissance as an object of study. It remains true that the new attitudes toward language, education, and the past that developed with particular intensity in Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries came to exercise an almost hypnotic influence on the elites of Europe as a whole in the sixteenth century. Thus, particularly from the vantage point of cultural history, with its emphasis on representations and practices, the Renaissance continues to bridge the late medieval and the early modern periods. In the end, its fascination lies at least in part in its inability to be reduced to (or explained by) social factors alone.

See also Protoindustrialization; The Population of Europe: Early Modern Demographic Patterns; Health and Disease; The City: The Early Modern Period (volume 2); Artists; Artisans (volume 3); Festivals; The Reformation of Popular Culture; Schools and Schooling; Printing and Publishing; Reading (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION AND THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION



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Traditionally interpreted as the watershed of western Christianity, the Protestant Reformation, together with the Renaissance, had been seen by many scholars as harbingers of a modern age. This classic paradigm, established on the authority of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, R. H. Tawney, and Max Weber in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, held sway until the 1970s. Since then, the social history of the Protestant Reformation and of early modern Catholicism has developed away from this stark contrast between traditional, static Catholicism and innovative, modern-looking Protestantism. Historians in particular are increasingly seeing the period from 1500 to 1750 as forming a long duration of historical change, with similar and common social and cultural impact on both Protestant and Catholic Europe.

THE CLASSIC PARADIGM

In *Capital*, Marx locates the sixteenth century as the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism. The Protestant Reformation, by loosening the “shackles of the medieval Church,” contributed in general to progress in history. However, Marx was interested in the Reformation only in connection with his general theory of history; it was Engels who elaborated a paradigm for a more detailed social interpretation of the German Reformation. Relying heavily on a book on the 1525 German Peasants’ War by Friedrich Zimmerman, a left-wing Hegelian active in 1848, Engels emphasized that the German Reformation transcended theological and religious reforms. The central action of the Reformation, according to Engels, was the uprising of peasants and townsmen in 1525. They pushed ahead a program of social revolution aimed at the total transformation of feudal society. Providing the ideological support for this social revolution were radical preachers, including Thomas Müntzer, who assumed the role of a prescient revolutionary. In this interpretation, Luther emerged in a relatively negative light, for although he challenged the authority of the

Catholic Church, in the end he turned against the social revolution of the plebeian masses and sided with the princes and ruling class in upholding the social and political order.

This socialist interpretation of the Reformation went largely unnoticed among professional historians of the Reformation in Germany for whom the dominant modes of interpretation remained theological and political. In France Marxist views attracted primarily economic historians of the sixteenth century like Henri Hauser, who argued that the Calvinist Reformation in France represented a bourgeois challenge to a Catholic feudal order. In Britain this Marxist view found an echo in the work of the socialist Ernest Belfort Bax, who introduced Engels’s study of the Peasants’ War and the Anabaptist movement to the English-speaking world.

Max Weber injected another element into the social interpretation of the Reformation. Impressed by the affinities between the asceticism and self-discipline in Calvinist theology and the work discipline manifest in capitalism, Weber postulated, in a now famous essay, the relationship between a Protestant ethic of asceticism and a spirit of denial that allowed for capitalist accumulation. Formulated as part of his grand schema in sketching the relationship between religious cultures and social modalities, Weber’s thesis of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism has a twofold significance: first, it reverses the order of importance between ideology/ideas and social/material structures as argued by Marx; and second, it affirms the centrality of the Protestant Reformation in articulating a modern *Weltanschauung* (worldview)—rational, ordered, disciplined, disenchanting from the religious spirit of the Middle Ages. Weber’s thesis met with a spirited critique from the British socialist R. H. Tawney, who argued primarily from English examples that a capitalist spirit of greed and accumulation predated the Reformation, implying that an ideological basis was a preexisting condition for the Reformation. Tawney’s contribution extended the scope of the discussion beyond central Europe and suggested the im-

portance of cross-national comparisons in the social history of the Reformation.

The impact of Marx and Weber was much more evident in the social sciences than in history, especially in the study of historical sociology, an approach heavily Weberian in methodology. Until the 1970s the practice of social theory among historians of the Reformation was largely limited to Marxists. The establishment of the German Democratic Republic created the institutional basis for the further elaboration of the Marx-Engels thesis of the Reformation. Coining the term “early bourgeois revolution,” East German historians published a whole series of studies in the 1960s and 1970s on the social character of the Reformation. Collectively, these historians argued for seeing the German Reformation, symbolized by the revolutionary year 1525, as the first stage in a long challenge to feudal society by the bourgeoisie, succeeding eventually in 1789 in overthrowing traditional order. In this vision the German Reformation represented an “early bourgeois revolution,” to be succeeded by the more successful examples of the English and Dutch revolutions of the seventeenth and the American and French revolutions of the eighteenth centuries. The failure of the German proletariat-peasant alliance was due to the treason of the bourgeoisie (namely Luther and the conservative forces of

reform) and its collaboration with the feudal ruling class in suppressing this revolution.

Rejected on the whole by western historians, and often theoretically heavy-handed, the thesis of an early bourgeois revolution nonetheless made a substantial contribution: by offering a clear periodization and a unified interpretation of the years 1476 to 1535, it draws in diverse topics of research hitherto treated in isolation—peasant revolts, millenarian movements, Martin Luther, the evangelical movement, the rise of Anabaptism, and so forth. The thesis of “early bourgeois revolution” challenged non-Marxist historians to find alternative models to explain the relationship between ideas and social movements in the Reformation. Moreover, by giving the radical reformers and the Anabaptist movement a central place in the interpretation of the Reformation, Marxist scholarship served as a refreshing antidote to the hegemony of Luther-scholarship in Reformation studies, that had tended to relegate dissident reform and sectarian movements to the fringes.

CHALLENGING THE PARADIGM

The dominant mode of interpretation—the Reformation originating in Luther’s theology and presaging

modernity—came under assault not only from Marxist interpretation. In intellectual history the trend shifted from stressing Luther's modernity to his indebtedness to late medieval scholastic philosophy and mysticism, an interpretive move represented primarily by Heiko Oberman and his students. Thus Luther appeared less "a modern man" than a Christian of his time, steeped in beliefs of the devil and the supernatural. This undermining of Reformation's modernity came also from historians of Catholic background, who have long objected to the unequal treatment of the Protestant and Catholic sides of the religious experience of early modern Europe.

Objecting to the equation of Protestant modernity and Catholic backwardness, isolated voices called for a reinterpretation in the late 1960s. A pioneer historian of Catholic Europe, Henry Outram Evennett objected to "dealing [with] the concept of the Counter-Reformation as essentially 'reactionary' and backward-looking." He and others were dealing with deeply entrenched images of Catholicism propped up by the violence of Spanish arms and the repression of the Inquisition, of a Catholic Church suppressing liberty of conscience and crushing dissent.

By the 1970s there was considerable interest in rewriting the history of Catholicism in the early modern period, a development that paralleled a growing interest in the social history of the Reformation. That latter interest was already sparked by a 1962 landmark essay, "Imperial Cities and the Reformation," by the German Reformation specialist Bernd Moeller. Sensing a fundamental difference between the theology of reformers in south Germany and the Swiss Confederation—such as Martin Bucer and Ulrich Zwingli—and that of Luther, Moeller argues that the experience of communal living in politically autonomous cities (namely, the imperial cities of the Holy Roman Empire) shaped the citizens' response to and adaptation of Luther's message of religious reform. Slowly, Moeller's ideas attracted the attention of historians in Germany and in the English-speaking world. A series of monographs published in the 1970s and 1980s furnished case studies to test his hypothesis in greater detail. This internal development of Reformation scholarship vastly enriched the field, bringing to it a variety of approaches and interpretations after toppling the hegemonic discourse of Protestant modernity. Four distinct approaches in the social and cultural interpretation of Protestantism and Catholicism in early modern Europe have emerged since the 1970s. These approaches may be described by the short-hand labels "communalism," "social discipline," "Catholic modernity," and "dechristianization."

COMMUNAL REFORMATION

The concept of the Reformation as a "communal Reformation" (*Gemeindereformation*) is associated with the German historian Peter Blickle and his students. The fundamental thesis of "communal Reformation" is to argue that the religious reforms of the early sixteenth century originated not only, or perhaps not even primarily, from the top—that is, from reformers and intellectuals—but from the bottom, from the common man—that is, the politically enfranchised peasants and townsmen represented in village and urban communes. One recognizes here an echo of Moeller's thesis of "Imperial Cities and the Reformation," but the origin of "communal Reformation" lies in a long tradition of German social and institutional history. The commune—a juridical, institutional, political, and social construct—shaped the experiences, visions, and actions of the common man, according to this argument. Embedded in oral traditions of rights, rural and urban charters, protest movements, and sometimes political representation in territorial estates, the political rights of commoners were very important in southwest Germany and Switzer-

land. Used to governing their daily affairs and unafraid to contest the impingement of those rights by feudal lords and territorial officials, the common men shaped the demands of religious reform according to their political and social experiences. Blickle and his students have revealed a high degree of popular participation in religious life prior to the Reformation, in the form of endowment of chantries, charities, and other pious foundations, not only in the numerous towns in this part of the Holy Roman Empire, but also in the village-communes.

It was thus not an accident that the center of unrest in 1525 lay in this region; it was also self-evident that the political, economic, and religious demands of the Revolution of 1525, as Blickle calls the Peasants' War, should be entirely intertwined. What the peasants and townspeople demanded, in the early years of the reform movement, was not less religion, but more; specifically, they wanted a clergy responsive to their spiritual needs and responsible to the communes. Although defeated in 1525, the political power of the common man was not vanquished, for south Germany remained the arena of peasant unrest into the early nineteenth century.

In the Swiss Confederation by contrast, the communal Reformation triumphed. In the Protestant German-speaking cantons religious reforms were enacted not contrary to but in conjunction with popular demands for greater social discipline and moral conformity. Influenced by the thesis of communal Reformation, Heinrich R. Schmidt, a student of Blickle, argues with the example of the moral court (*Sittengericht*) of Bern that a strict disciplinary reform of morals and religious practices was in conformity with the wishes of the common men. The criminalization of sin therefore represented both an act of self-discipline by the politically represented members of communes and an act of repression against the propertyless and unruly elements of rural society.

By arguing for the importance of the common man as an antithesis to the hegemony of the state, Blickle and his students opened up an original and suggestive interpretation for understanding the German Reformation and the development of early modern history in central Europe. The concept of communal Reformation, however, is not without its critics. Some pointed out the exclusion of women, landless cottagers, Jews, youth, and other politically disenfranchised groups in rural society. Others countered that the commune, in certain areas of the Swiss Confederation such as the Grison, had acted as an obstacle to the Protestant Reformation. Above all, the validity of this concept seems limited to a region coterminous with south Germany and Switzerland. One

critic objected that the communal Reformation does not work as a concept to explain the Reformation in northern Germany, where the territorial state played a much more interventionist mode, let alone in France or eastern Europe.

SOCIAL DISCIPLINE

The concept of "social discipline" traces its origins to the 1960s. The German historian Gerhard Oestreich introduced this concept to describe several changes in early modern Europe: namely, the emergence of neo-stoicism as a life philosophy (for prominent scholars such as Justus Lipsius) and as a philosophy of state (for Calvinist Brandenburg-Prussia and the Netherlands). In these Calvinist territories, neostoicism served to elevate the authority of the prince; military reform, state building, and church discipline went hand-in-hand. According to Oestreich, the rise of absolutism in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the creation of powerful military states, such as Prussia, rest upon this foundation of "social disciplining," by which the people became obedient, pious, and diligent subjects of their princes.

Two German historians, Heinz Schilling and Wolfgang Reinhard, later applied this concept, adapted retroactively to the sixteenth century, to the study of confessional societies formed as a result of the Reformation. They speak of the concept of "confessionalization," thus underlining the process of changes that involved the religious, political, cultural, and social structures of early modern Germany. This argument has a threefold implication: first, it points to the structural parallelism between Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic societies, with all manifesting "modern" traits of greater state and social coercion and self-disciplining; second, it argues that confessionalization created social groups, "the three confessions," by a variety of means, including the formulation of dogma, confessional propaganda, education, discipline, rituals, and religious language; and third, that confessionalization strengthened political centralization when the early modern state used religion to consolidate its territorial boundary, to incorporate the church into the state bureaucracy, and to impose social control on its subjects.

As a concept, social discipline has an appeal of universality. Developed out of German case studies, it was accepted, modified, and applied to studies in the Netherlands, France, and Italy. Above all, social discipline attempts to unite political history with social history by refocusing attention on the state as a major force that shaped social and religious contours. Its uni-

versality also stems from its emphasis on structures, almost to the point of effacing the differences between the different Christian confessions, according to some critics. It offers nevertheless a provocative, unified theory in place of the Marxist “early bourgeois revolution” to describe the synchronicity of political, social, and religious changes in early modern Europe.

While the theory of social discipline further refined its argument in the specific cases of Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic societies, its initial formulation was modified by a more nuanced dialectic between state intervention and social resistance. Critics of this approach emphasized the ever present importance of popular resistance to confessionalization and social discipline imposed by the state. The debate revived, in some measure, an interest in Max Weber, which seemed to have all but disappeared between the publication of his essay in 1905 and the 1960s. By focusing on the role played by Calvinist states (the Netherlands, Brandenburg-Prussia) in a perhaps enforced modernization, the theory of social discipline influenced late-twentieth-century work in historical sociology as well.

EARLY MODERN CATHOLICISM

The question of modernity, central to Weber’s original investigation, also underpins an ongoing reevaluation of the relationship between the Protestant Reforma-

tion and early modern Catholicism. As mentioned above, by the 1970s there was considerable interest in rewriting the history of early modern Catholicism, in recasting the stereotypes of a repressive Counter-Reformation and a modernizing Reformation. A major departure was in chronology. Whereas scholarship on the Reformation concentrates on the period 1517 to 1559, the diversity and multiplicity of historical currents linked to Catholic resurgence clearly cannot be captured within this narrow periodization. Both ends of this time frame were being stretched: while the American historian John C. Olin pushed back the origins of reform within the Catholic Church to late-fifteenth-century Spain and Italy, German and French historians were extending their vision forward to the eighteenth century. The new approach in German Catholic scholarship was not so much to contest the term “Counter-Reformation” as to elevate it to a par with “Reformation.” A landmark essay by Wolfgang Reinhard in 1977 rejects the antithesis of “progressive Reformation” and “reactionary Counter-Reformation” and “Catholic Reform” as inadequate concepts in understanding the totality of historical development. Reinhard, in fact, argues for the modernity of Counter-Reformation Catholicism, locating its modern characteristics in its disciplinary and Christianizing measures, its reforms of Church government, its undermining of kinship in favor of social control and a greater individualism, its emphasis on internaliza-

tion of values and activism, its extension of European Christianity to the non-European world, and in its creation of a new pedagogic system, new political themes, and a new ethos of political economy.

Other scholars see a similar modernity in early modern Catholicism. The German historian Ernst Walter Zeeden highlights the structural parallels between Calvinism and the Counter-Reformation, while the British historian John Bossy, in a series of studies on Catholic rituals and kinship, demonstrates just how different early modern Catholicism was in comparison with the Christianity of Europe during the Middle Ages. By contrasting a pre-Tridentine Christianity based on the natural allegiances of late medieval society—kinship, friendship, and locality—to one organized theologically and administratively from above by the official, centralizing Church, Bossy's research suggests interesting ways in which the period from 1500 to 1800 witnessed similar and general changes in all of Europe, Protestant and Catholic.

In extending early modern Catholicism beyond the Council of Trent, scholarship of the late 1990s points to the significance of Catholic missions and the encounter between European and non-European civilizations. This shift reflects a greater recognition that any history of Christianization in Europe—the subject matter of popular religion and the social history of Catholicism—would be enriched by a cultural history of Catholic missions. The Catholic world, floating as it were on the seaborne empires of Spain and Portugal, early acquired a world-historical dimension, in contrast to Protestant Europe and its late organization in the mission field.

THE SOCIOLOGY AND MENTALITY OF RELIGION: DECHRISTIANIZATION

The fourth general approach, one that characterized French and Italian scholarship, may be described as the structural investigation into the sociology and mentality of religion. Confessional conflicts between Catholic and Protestant are of less concern for these historians, whose works deal with longer durations. A key figure in this approach to the social history of religion in early modern Europe was the French sociologist Gabriel Le Bras, whose concern with declining rates of church attendance in early-twentieth-century France launched research into what may be called the sociology of ecclesiastical conformity. In studying records of diocesan visits mandated by the Council of Trent, Le Bras and his students began the systematic investigation into the history of all dioceses in early modern France. Producing impressive data on

church property, income, and figures of baptisms, communion, confessions, and so forth, this sociological approach provided a far sharper contour of the landscape of piety in early modern France than in any other European country.

The quantitative data provided by parish records and diocesan visitations also yielded interesting material for reconstructing the evolution of religious mentalities. Taking their clue from historians associated with the *Annales*, historians of religion have made interesting excursions into the history of mentalities. Studies of saint cults, attitudes toward death, and particular styles of Catholic piety were undertaken by detailed analyses of wills and donation records at pilgrimage shrines. A major finding in these quantitative studies is that Catholic piety increased in intensity from the second half of the sixteenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth, but was followed by a long and gradual decline in devotional fervor. Particularly striking was the increasing indifference or hostility of elites toward Tridentine and baroque Catholicism during the eighteenth century.

Describing this phenomenon as “dechristianization,” Jean Delumeau, a leading French historian of Christianity, saw little long-term structural distinction between Reformation and Catholic resurgence. In his 1977 book, *Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire*, he dismisses the significance of the Counter-Reformation altogether: “The Counter-Reformation existed . . . but it was not essential to the transformation of the Catholic Church from the sixteenth century.” Instead, Delumeau establishes a sharp contrast between medieval and early modern Europe: medieval Christianity (“the legend of a Christian Middle Ages” in his words) was magical and pagan; Tridentine Catholicism represented a massive attempt at Christianization, achieved by the training of new clergy, the catechizing of the common people, evangelizing the non-European world, and combating popular beliefs. Weaning the people away from their familiarity with medieval saints and folk beliefs, early modern Catholicism was in contrast a fearful, external, and coercive religion. For Delumeau both the Protestant Reformation and Catholic reform were subordinate to the even longer process of Christianization. But the people, faced with this alien, fearful religion, resisted the “culpabilization” of society, holding on to the familiar rituals and saints that gave them succor and consolation in an age of material want. Dechristianization during the eighteenth century represented, in Delumeau's view, a response to this program of coercive evangelization, and also to the gradual improvement of material life that alleviated fear and anxiety.

in deference to the state. The creation of a Catholic society of estates was in the making.

REFORMATION, SOCIETY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

These currents of scholarship challenged received notions of “Counter-Reformation” and “Catholic reform.” In the 1990s, works of synthesis spoke of Catholic renewal and early modern Catholicism to denote a distinctly “modern” nature to developments in the Catholic world between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. This, taken together with revisionist scholarship on Protestantism that stressed the survival of medieval Christianity in Lutheran rituals and symbols, reveals a remarkable convergence. Whether one speaks of “social discipline,” “confessionalization,” “Christianization,” or other concepts, scholarship on Protestant and Catholic Europe arrived at a general consensus: that the period 1500 to 1800 represents a distinct period in the history of religion, that parallel developments in Protestant and Catholic Europe in the terrain of social and cultural history outweigh the obvious differences in confession, and that the religious transformations of the period cannot be understood without an analysis of the larger trends of global expansion, state centralization, and social revolutions. There remain of course many points of disagreement and controversy; this brief sketch does not do full justice to the rich array of scholarship in the field. Transcending the four general approaches one can also identify clusters of themes that have received the most attention from social historians. These questions all revolve around the nature of religion and society: in other words, the relationships between religious crises and social change in early modern Europe.

Research on confessional societies has focused on two questions: First, how did religion account for differences in Protestant and Catholic societies? And, second, what was the precise relationship between social and religious change?

The first question addresses the notable differences in education, literacy, suicide rates, marital regimes, fertility rates, and social stratification between Catholic and Protestant societies. Two examples must suffice to illustrate the highly interesting research in this area. It has been demonstrated, for example, that in Oppenheim—a small German town on the Rhine with a confessionally mixed population during the early modern era—the Catholic community enjoyed the highest fertility rate and demographic growth, followed at a substantial distance by the Lutheran and Calvinist communities. Other case studies in histori-

The unmistakable implication of Delumeau’s work is to demonstrate the distinct character of Catholicism in early modern Europe. Historians no longer see the Counter-Reformation or the Catholic renewal as a revival of pre-Reformation Catholicism. Late-twentieth-century studies of the social history of Catholic Europe between 1500 and 1800 confirm this picture. The French historian Louis Châtellier investigated in turn the elites and the underclasses of early modern Europe. Drawing on sources from France, Spain, Italy, the Low Countries, and central Europe, Châtellier documented the emergence of a distinctly elitist Catholic piety that characterized the supporters of the Jesuits, who comprised nobles and urban elites. At the other end of the social spectrum, the many new Catholic religious orders created after the Reformation targeted the most backward rural inhabitants for evangelization, preaching a message of spiritual consolation

cal demography seem to confirm this general trend; the general pattern of demographic differences between Protestant and Catholic countries is of course well recognized for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Another example is the study of suicide, inspired by Émile Durkheim's classic study that suggested important confessional differences in rates of suicide. Markus Schär's study of the canton of Zurich between 1500 and 1800 demonstrates a remarkable effect of Calvinism: as the Calvinist Reformation took root, first in the city of Zurich and later in its rural hinterland, a successful effort at social discipline vastly reduced the rate of homicide. However this campaign against violence and for self-discipline came at a high price: the decline in the homicide rate reflected almost as a mirror image a sharp rise in suicide rates in the three centuries under study. Particularly telling is that the highest rates of suicide were found among the social and religious elites most responsible for the social disciplining. Until similar studies are undertaken for Lutheran and Catholic areas, it is too soon to draw firm conclusions; but the example of Zurich suggests that Weber's notion of a Protestant (i.e., Calvinist) ethic was connected to more than just the spirit of capitalism.

The second question, on the relationship between social and religious change, is obviously much more complex and ambiguous. Aside from the concept of class struggle, gone out of fashion with the demise of the German Democratic Republic, the term "social class" is still employed by social historians as an imprecise but unavoidable heuristic device. More precise research has instead focused on two social groups: the clergy and the elites.

Although Protestants decried the privileges of the Catholic clergy, the Reformation, particularly in Lutheran Europe, created a self-replenishing Protestant clergy. Recruited primarily from the middling social groups in towns, the Protestant clergy was in terms of social origins markedly different from the Catholic clergy: it was much more homogenous, characterized by endogamy (marriage within the group) and generational succession; it tended to be better educated, with a university training almost a prerequisite; and its origins were more urban, with the nobility and peasantry heavily underrepresented. Much of the research has focused on Lutheran Germany. Similar social histories of the Catholic clergy are less than abundant.

Study of elites. The study of elites tries to identify the social groups most responsible for religious change. In spite of numerous monographs, this issue is so complex and conditions differed so much from coun-

try to country or even from place to place that valid general conclusions are hard to come by. Nonetheless, research has established some general patterns.

First, it seems that the Reformation movement (in Germany, the Low Countries, France, and England) attracted among its first supporters primarily clerical dissidents, merchants, printers, and artisans; that it found the strongest support in cities, where literacy and modes of communication were the densest; that, aside from the Peasants' War in Germany and other isolated examples, it attracted few followers in rural areas; and that its success was often determined by power politics.

Second, the strongest support for confessionalization and social discipline seems to have been provided by the urban middle and upper classes and by rural elites. These social groups included lawyers, professors, officials, merchants, rich artisans, and village notables—the same social groups that provided most of the clergy for the competing Christian confessions as well. Many urban families apparently underwent a transformation from mercantile to judicial/official pursuits. This transformation seems to have taken place during the course of the entire sixteenth century and corresponded to what Fernand Braudel called "the treason of the bourgeoisie." What seemed clear is that the consolidation of confessional states and the attempt to exercise tighter social and religious control considerably expanded the apparatus of the state (in the form of larger administration, both secular and ecclesiastical) and provided the most significant means of upper social mobility for the urban middle classes. This process was at work in both Catholic and Protestant areas. With the notable exception of the Netherlands and England, service to the state and the church apparently replaced trade as the preferred ladders of social success in early modern Europe.

Women and gender. Instead of social groups, other researchers chose to analyze women and gender to investigate the relationship between society and religion. Perhaps more than other fields of history, the study of Protestant and Catholic Europe had neglected the role of women, mirroring the marginalization of women in the discourses of Protestant reformers and in Tridentine Catholicism. Research in the 1980s and 1990s filled many gaps: some of the topics include marriage, divorce, the reformers' attitude toward women, Catholic women and the Counter-Reformation, and so forth. Careful rereadings of sources and new research revealed that women were involved in all aspects of religious change, both for and against the Reformation.

The most significant impact of the Protestant Reformation on the family, as recent research argues,

was the strengthening of patriarchy. Reformers and magistrates reinforced patriarchal authority and household stability in two ways, by elevating the status of marriage and the family life, and by attacking the elements that threatened the patriarchal household. Along the first line, reformers praised the ethical and Christian status of holy matrimony, arguing that marriage and family provided the optimal institution for Christian instruction and a bulwark against sin. The second strategy aimed at imposing stricter moral discipline for unmarried women, youths, and wayward patriarchs. The keeping of parish records, admonition from pastors, and disciplinary measure from church and state resulted in a stricter disciplinary regime that regulated sexuality and property. While the research on women corrects a long-neglected topic, fewer studies have used gender as a theoretical tool, with the notable exception of works on witchcraft and sexuality.

The study of witchcraft reflects a strong current of interest in religious and social dissent that was rare in Reformation scholarship before the 1960s. This scholarly enthusiasm for popular religion mirrored the political activism of many practitioners, who identified the official church as one of the repressive institutions of society; it also represented a new interest in sources hitherto neglected by historians, namely the rich extant records of the Inquisition in Spain, Portugal, and Italy. While the *longue durée* and quantitative serial sources characterized the practice of the social history of religion in France, a legacy of the *Annales* paradigm, the study of religious dissent found its most interesting practitioners in Italy, in the works of Delio Cantimori and Carlo Ginzburg, among others. Taking Protestant dissent and popular religion as their subjects, these historians of the Left used the documents of the Catholic Church to demonstrate a variety of religious views and practices that were suppressed in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Witchcraft and magic constituted two fulcrums of research.

There have been three important conclusions in this research. First, magical beliefs and practices (the majority of which were associated with healing and

medicine) were extremely widespread before the Reformation and persisted, even after concerted efforts at their elimination by the official Church after the sixteenth century. Second, religion and magic often coexisted as complementary systems in popular religion: images of saints, statues of the Virgin Mary, and official prayers were all used for extralitururgical and outright prohibited practices in the rural societies of early modern Europe. It was precisely to draw a sharper line of demarcation that Tridentine Catholicism waged an unrelenting campaign against the cunning men and wise women of the villages. Finally, the battle against magic/witchcraft and the war against heresy merged into one great conflagration. The first examples predate even the Reformation, when Waldensians in the mountainous regions between Switzerland, France, and Italy were hounded as heretics and witches. Images of the witches' sabbath were applied with increasing frequency to charges of heresy; and the ferocity of trials against religious dissidents equaled those conducted against suspects of witchcraft during the course of the sixteenth century. It led to an ineluctible logic at the height of the great witch hunts in the early seventeenth century: the conflation of the heretic and the witch as one and the same.

It is evident from this brief survey that there exist strong national and methodological differences in the social history of Reformation and Catholic Europe in the early modern era. Some of these differences originate in national traditions of historical scholarship; others reflect the different historical sources and legacies of Protestant and Catholic Europe. While social historians of both Protestant and Catholic Europe search parish records and visitation reports to reconstruct histories of piety, specialists on early modern Catholicism have access to the unique documentation of the Inquisition. The fifty thousand dossiers from the Spanish Inquisition and the twenty-three thousand from the Portuguese, in addition to the newly opened records of the Roman Inquisition, have already yielded a rich harvest of scholarship and hold still greater promise for twenty-first-century scholarship.

See also Witchcraft (volume 3); Belief and Popular Religion; Catholicism; Church and Society; Protestantism; The Reformation of Popular Culture (volume 5).

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THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD



Jonathan Dewald

Few historical labels conceal so much uncertainty as “early modern Europe.” The authors of fifteen late-twentieth-century texts whose titles include the phrase date the beginning of the period variously between 1350 and 1650, with 1500 the plurality choice, and its end between 1559 and 1800. The three-century difference of opinion over when the period begins equals the length of the period itself, as most of these historians understand it; one historian sees the period ending almost a century before another’s starting point. The present article defines the period as extending from 1590 to 1720. Thus envisioned, it starts with the last spasms of Europe’s religious wars; these opened a period of extreme political violence across the continent, and coincided with a variety of other disruptions of Europeans’ daily lives. The early eighteenth century brought this period of instability to a close. By 1720 religion had declined as a factor in European politics, and the Enlightenment’s critique of organized religion had begun. The last of Louis XIV’s great wars ended in 1713, opening a period of relative peace, and by happy coincidence Europe’s most frightening disease, the plague, disappeared from the Continent after 1720. A series of other changes in European social organization added to the sense of relative security that would characterize the eighteenth century. Divergences of this order partly reflect historians’ use of “early modern” as a handy catch-all term for a confusing period, whose contours shift according to national and thematic perspectives; but they also result from important interpretive differences.

THE PROBLEM OF PERIODIZATION

Historians’ understanding of the early modern period has been affected by their different views of modernity itself, whose foundations are commonly seen to have been established at some point between the Renaissance and the French Revolution; differences of periodization reflect different ideas about the crucial moments in modernity’s unfolding. Such uncertainties

are the less easily resolved in that seventeenth-century men and women already believed in their own modernity. In 1687 the French writer and architect Charles Perrault launched the “quarrel of the ancients and the moderns” with the claim that recent artists and writers had advanced far beyond anything achieved in the ancient world. His claims with regard to the arts stimulated hot debate, but by that time recent advances had made modernism self-evidently persuasive in the domains of science and philosophy.

Especially since World War II, historians of the early modern period have interested themselves in a second set of interpretive concerns, in some tension with this interest in finding the roots of modernity. Europeans’ own experiences of industrialization and their interest in economic development elsewhere encouraged historians to reflect on the break between preindustrial and industrial societies, and to see in industrialization the crucial difference between modern and premodern worlds. Such interpretations set the early modern period within a much larger premodern era, and indeed suggested that the break between medieval and early modern mattered far less than the historical changes of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the early phase of the industrial revolution.

During the 1960s and 1970s, European historians working within several independent national traditions offered interpretations of this kind, seeing in the age of industrial and political revolutions around 1800 a break in human history more important than any since the invention of fixed agriculture. In France Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie used the phrase “immobile history” to suggest that society changed little between the mid-fourteenth and the mid-eighteenth centuries. Stagnant agricultural technology underlay this immobility, for food production set the limits to economic enterprise of all kinds. Population rose in good times, eventually approaching the limit of society’s ability to feed itself; since food prices rose with population, discretionary income that might have been spent on industrial products or long-term investments

disappeared. Famine, war, and disease (often conjoined) eventually cut population back, freeing resources and according the survivors a temporary prosperity, before the whole cycle of growth and crisis began again. Le Roy Ladurie was concerned mainly with France, but his work coincided with similar ideas that were developed in Germany by such historians as Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck. By comparison with the momentous changes around 1800, differences such as that between medieval and early modern periods could have little importance. During the same years, the English historian Peter Laslett likewise developed a vision of the early modern period as sharply set off from modernity, a “world we have lost” (in his famous phrase), governed by specific forms of social and familial organization, and therefore marked by specific worldviews as well.

Although these French, German, and British approaches to the early modern period differ in significant ways, if only because they deal mainly with their own national histories, they share an emphasis on the gap between the early modern period and our own and see that difference as extending to the most fundamental experiences of human life. Another feature common to all three approaches is an interest in the biological constraints on early modern lives. Muscle-power, whether human or animal, set the basic limits to agricultural and industrial production, and people had limited protection against either microbes, which brutally cut back population, or their own reproductive drives, which in good times led to rapid population growth. For these reasons, historical demography was a crucial companion science to the social history written in the 1960s and 1970s, promising insights into the workings of premodern social structures.

In many ways the historiography undertaken by Le Roy Ladurie and his contemporaries still sets the agenda for studies of the early modern period; but since 1975 historians’ interpretive stances have again shifted significantly in response to changes in several fields of research. Neither the industrial revolution nor the French Revolution seems so absolute a break as it once did. Economic historians have lowered their estimates of nineteenth-century economic growth, rendering images of economic “take off” inappropriate and drawing attention to the continuing importance of preindustrial modes of production into the twentieth century. Revisionist historians have similarly re-evaluated the French Revolution of 1789, which they present as having far less impact on European society than was once believed. While these scholars have downplayed the extent of change at the end of the early modern period, others have found evidence of

more change within the period itself than was once thought to have occurred. Historians have become more aware that even the period’s most powerful biological forces were mediated through complex mechanisms of social and cultural organization. As a result, the concept of a technological ceiling on early modern economic development has lost much of its persuasiveness, for early modern society operated far below whatever that ceiling may have been. Revisions and queries like these have made the early modern period seem more complex and much less static than it did to earlier historians.

AN AGE OF CRISIS

To historians of the French school, inspired especially by Le Roy Ladurie, social crisis dominated the period 1590 to 1720. Even historians who question his neo-Malthusian interpretation find crisis an important theme in the period, for early modern Europeans had frequent and horrific experiences of famine, disease, and war. Plague, which had reappeared in Europe in 1348 after several centuries’ absence, remained endemic and virulent, producing major epidemics in most regions every generation or so. The Milan epidemic of 1630–1631 killed 60,000 people, 46 percent of the city’s population; the London epidemic of 1664–1665 killed 70,000. For reasons that remain mysterious, however, the disease receded after the 1660s, and after a last, terrible epidemic in 1720–1722, centering on the French port city of Marseilles, it disappeared from Europe altogether. The history of famine followed a roughly similar chronology. Food shortages led to actual starvation as late as the mid-seventeenth century in England, and still later in France: the great famine of 1693–1694 is estimated to have reduced French population by 10 percent. Food shortages continued in the eighteenth century, and a last great subsistence crisis came in the mid-nineteenth century; but Europeans’ experiences of food shortage after 1710 were essentially different from that of the seventeenth century. Before 1710, for instance, French food prices might triple or quadruple in years of harvest failure; eighteenth-century crises led to a doubling of prices, still a serious burden for consumers, but far less likely to bring outright starvation. Freed from the experience of starvation and plague (though certainly not from many other natural catastrophes), eighteenth-century Europeans could view the world with significantly more confidence than their early modern predecessors.

An abrupt decline in military violence after 1713 meant that eighteenth-century Europeans also

had a fundamentally different experience of warfare. Organized violence had marked the early modern period to an unprecedented degree, with conflicts extending across the Continent from west to east and south to north. With truce only between 1609 and 1621, Spain and the northern Netherlands fought from 1566 until 1648, a conflict that also touched Spanish Italy (where troops were recruited and organized) and parts of Switzerland (through which they had to march to reach the northern battlefields). Spanish troops also attempted to invade England in 1588, assisted the Catholic side during the French Wars of Religion in 1589–1594, and invaded northern France in 1597; after some skirmishing in the 1620s and 1630s, Spain and France returned to all-out war between 1635 and 1659. Meanwhile the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) embroiled central Europe in the most destructive of the century's conflicts. The small German states fought one another, their overlord the Austrian Habsburg emperors, and a series of outside powers—Denmark, Sweden, France,

and Spain—that had joined in to secure territorial gain and to defend the European balance of power.

Relative peace prevailed during the mid-seventeenth century, despite the Anglo-Dutch Wars of the 1650s and 1660s and French territorial expansion in the 1660s. But Louis XIV's invasion of the Netherlands in 1672 opened a new round of Europe-wide conflict, which continued with only short breaks until 1713. Louis's armies were larger than any Europe had previously seen, and even the ethics of war seemed to have deteriorated. Under orders from Versailles, French armies systematically devastated the Palatinate in 1689, suggesting to horrified contemporaries that pillaging had become a tool of state policy, rather than a crime of angry soldiers. The financial, demographic, and psychological effects were so exhausting that most of Europe remained at peace for a generation thereafter. Only in 1740 did the principal European powers resume their warlike habits, and then, though armies remained large and destructive, newly effective military discipline protected civilians from their worst ef-

fects. Thus 1713 marked a genuine turning point in European social history.

Measuring the social effects of seventeenth-century warfare has proven a complex historical problem. In central Europe the destructiveness was enormous and clearly visible. Over the course of the Thirty Years' War, historians have estimated, the German population dropped by 40 percent in the countryside, and 33 percent in the cities; in some regions the losses were still greater. This war was the century's greatest military disaster, but even local conflicts might have comparable consequences: troop movements around Paris during the Fronde of the Princes in 1652–1653 brought a threefold increase in the region's death rates. Combatants died in great numbers (studies of one Swedish village during the Thirty Years' War show a survival rate after twenty years of 7 percent among conscripted troops); further deaths were caused by the spread of epidemic diseases. But war did much more damage by disrupting already fragile economies, as soldiers took food and livestock for themselves, destroyed farms and other capital, and disrupted trade circuits.

For this very reason, however, the impact of war might vary with the strength of the local economies that it touched. Since the thirteenth century, the Low Countries and northern France had included some of Europe's great battlefields, and—as they formed the border between the Habsburg and Bourbon empires—they witnessed almost continuous war during the early modern period. Yet these regions prospered, despite terrible destruction in specific regions and at specific moments. Even Spanish Flanders, which lost considerable population in the turmoil of the later sixteenth century, recovered amid the warfare of the seventeenth, and the highly vulnerable agriculture of the region continued to develop and innovate. Political organization also played an important role in this resiliency; Dutch garrisons were so well disciplined (in contrast to those of other states) that communities actually welcomed them as an economic resource. Conversely, peace was no guarantee of prosperity. Seventeenth-century Castile had almost no direct experience of war, but its economy stagnated and the region lost even its ability to feed itself. War's effects depended on its social context.

Violence probably also mattered less in the long run than war's secondary, indirect effects, particularly on state organization. The early modern period was the critical point in the process that historians have called “the military revolution,” a series of changes that began with the application of gunpowder to warfare in the fourteenth century. The implications of this military technology unfolded slowly and unevenly,

but by 1600 they were everywhere apparent. Armies had to be much larger and better trained, fortifications more substantial, military hardware more abundant and more carefully designed and managed. Warfare had to be better organized, with more efficient lines of command and greater subordination of individuals to collective purposes—in short something of a science. Ideally the warrior himself was to become a trained element within a bureaucratic system rather than the autonomous hero of feudal myth. The French peacetime army had numbered 10,000 in 1600; in 1681 it numbered 240,000, and during the last wars of Louis XIV it reached about 395,000.

Changes of this scale, in a period of constant international competition, required heavy governmental expenditures, and taxes rose with the size of armies. In France the nominal tax burden tripled within five years of Louis XIII's entry into the Thirty Years' War, though actual collection rates were much lower. Taxation at these levels was a heavy burden for most economies and an important cause of the economic stagnation that marked the period. After 1672 even the United Provinces, which had prospered amid the violence of the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, found the costs of fighting Louis XIV so overwhelming as to drive their economy into long-term decline. Well before then, Spain's international ambitions had exhausted it. Faced with such pressures, governments tended to reduce some forms of social privilege, notably the protections against taxation enjoyed by most nobles and many commoners. Spain's chief minister Gaspar de Guzmán y Pimental, Count-Duke Olivares (1587–1645) sought to end the fiscal exemptions enjoyed by the outlying provinces of Aragon and Catalonia—with politically disastrous consequences, for the regions rebelled in 1640 and retained their exemptions until the eighteenth century. In France Louis XIV established a form of taxation that hit nobles as hard as commoners. Efforts like these would receive full implementation only by the enlightened despots of the later eighteenth century, when tax immunities were challenged all across Europe, but state challenges to inherited social distinctions had already begun before 1700.

Rapidly rising taxation was the principal cause of a second form of violence that gave the early modern period its air of crisis, the wave of rebellions that extended into the 1670s. Both ordinary people and elites participated in these movements, in ways that historians have found difficult to disentangle. Low levels of popular discontent, producing assaults on tax collectors or other governmental agents, were commonplace, but the period was also marked by much larger movements, with elaborate ideological plans. In

France the Catholic League, a movement dominated by middle-class city dwellers, took over Paris and several other cities between 1589 and 1594 and called for radical social reforms, including an end to hereditary nobility and the institution of parliamentary controls on royal power. The 1640s witnessed rebellions across Europe, most dramatically in England, France, Catalonia, Portugal, and Naples, again mixing popular and upper-class participation and generating widespread calls for significant political change. The example of England, where revolutionaries finally toppled the monarch, tried him in Parliament for political crimes, and publicly executed him, provided an especially frightening example of how far rebellion might lead. Even the Dutch Republic, an apparent oasis of political calm in the seventeenth century, experienced some of the political violence characteristic of the age: in 1618–1619 the overthrow and political execution of the seventy-two-year-old Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, and in 1672 the mob lynching of the brothers Johan and Cornelis de Witt, whose policies were thought to have led to Louis XIV's invasion. Seventeenth-century men and women had a powerful awareness of society's explosiveness. Even the most apparently stable positions might be temporary, and ordinary people might turn savagely on once-respected leaders.

In this regard, too, the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries represented a significant break that paralleled the more secure living conditions and international peace that followed Louis XIV's reign: In the late seventeenth century, the wave of great rebellions came to an end. Governments had become much more effective in controlling crowd violence and had begun to treat their subjects somewhat more fairly, for example, by spreading tax burdens more evenly. At the same time, experiences like the English revolution and the Fronde had frightened elites everywhere. They were much more ready to obey governments and more wary of encouraging popular discontent. In the German states governments consciously involved even leading peasants in the powers and profits of government. During the eighteenth century local disorders remained common, especially in moments of food shortage, but contemporaries no longer viewed the social order as constantly subject to violent overturning. When violence returned with the French Revolution of 1789, it came as a devastating surprise to contemporaries.

SIGNS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Alongside its instabilities and sufferings, the seventeenth century also showed signs of important social

advances. These begin with the typical European household itself, which at some point in the later sixteenth century appears to have settled definitively into what historians have termed the “European marriage pattern”: late marriage for both men and women, nearly equal ages at marriage, limited numbers of children, autonomous households for most married couples, and, outside of marriage, substantial rates of lifelong celibacy. The pattern reached its fullest development in the later seventeenth century, with couples in many regions marrying only in their later twenties, and with about 10 percent of women never marrying. This set early modern Europe apart from most other preindustrial societies, and also from medieval Europe itself, which had been dominated well into the sixteenth century by early marriage and large, multigenerational households. Historians have noted both demographic and social effects of the European marriage pattern. It effectively limited births by reducing the number of childbearing years for many women and by excluding altogether many men and women from reproducing. Controlling natality through the social customs of marriage in turn gave European society an unusual capacity for saving, even during crisis-ridden periods like the seventeenth century, since society was not using all its resources on subsistence. As important, the European marriage pattern accentuated the economic and social freedom of the individual household at the expense of the community and the larger patriarchal family; marrying as mature adults, with the presumption of autonomy from their parents, couples formed highly flexible economic units, far more able than in medieval society to arrange both work and consumption to suit new circumstances.

Closely related to changes in household organization were increasing investments in human capital, especially in formal education. The seventeenth century was among Europe’s great eras for school foundation, as Catholic and Protestant churches competed to form educated, articulate believers. The number of Jesuit schools increased from 144 in 1579 to more than 500 by 1626, and more than 800 in 1749; and male literacy reached impressive levels, 70 percent in Amsterdam in the 1670s, 65 percent in the small cities near Paris. In England, the historian Lawrence Stone has estimated, a higher percentage of the male population attended university in the seventeenth century than at any time before World War I. This upsurge in education probably contributed to a change that scholars have noted in several European countries: by the end of the seventeenth century, Europeans of all social classes were becoming more skeptical about magical practices that had long been customary

and more ready to accept the worldviews proposed by physicians and natural philosophers.

A third critical change concerned the organization of space. At varying speeds, seventeenth-century governments succeeded in pacifying their realms, controlling local banditry and civil war, and starting the process of disciplining armies. In this as in many other seventeenth-century changes, the Dutch Republic led the way, establishing in the early seventeenth century forms of social discipline that other regions would still be trying to emulate a century later. England also moved quickly to control brigandage and (in the Puritan armies of the Civil War) to discipline soldiers. Castile had been largely freed of brigandage by the mid-seventeenth century, though other parts of Spain were pacified more slowly.

Such political successes had important social implications, for they allowed people, goods, cash, and information to circulate more freely, cheaply, and predictably, even without improvements in technology. But the technology for dealing with distance did improve in these years as well. Again, the most dramatic example is the Dutch Republic, where by the mid-seventeenth century an elaborate series of canals made movement throughout the country cheap and easy, and a regularly scheduled system of canal boats allowed people and goods to travel freely. Other regions had neither the social resources nor the geographic advantages that allowed the Netherlands this success, but these handicaps make seventeenth-century efforts all the more striking. Significant canals were dug in England and France, and land transport improved there as well. Road-building became a major preoccupation of the French government, starting with the appointment of Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, in 1599 as head of a government road-building service; such projects received further impetus from Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s interest in highways. New carriages, with steel springs, allowed people to travel these roads in relative comfort and speed; in the sixteenth century most people had had to travel on horse or mule.

Increased freedom of movement addressed what had been a critical weakness in the European economy, its fragmentation into a collection of nearly autonomous, self-sufficient local societies, dependent mainly on what they themselves produced. Such enclaves might be very small, given the difficulties of transportation and the uncertainties of relying on distant suppliers. Breaking down localism was an important step in economic development, for exchange over large areas allowed specialization and efficiency. The process of economic integration—and consequent gains in specialization—would continue through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and include much

more dramatic technological advances than the seventeenth century could display. Yet it can be argued that the seventeenth century represented a critical phase in this long process. The economic historian Jan de Vries has demonstrated that Europe first acquired an integrated system of cities in the seventeenth century, with cities for the first time fitting into clear hierarchies of scale according to local, regional, or national functions—functional specialization that reflected the era's increasingly effective networks of communication. Europe's ruling elites also first acquired national rather than regional orientations in these years, as capital cities and courts became the normal sites for at least part of their yearly routines. Yet another indicator of the same process was the seventeenth century's obsession with news. Europe's first daily newspaper, the London *Daily Courant*, appeared only at the end of the period, in 1702, but many other news products, like the weekly Parisian *Gazette*, founded in 1621, had preceded it.

Political stability and improving communications underlay two other critical changes that marked the seventeenth century as a period of decisive social advance. First, nearly everywhere capital cities grew dramatically, approaching modern dimensions that would have been unthinkable in the medieval world. By 1700 both London and Paris had more than 500,000 inhabitants, Amsterdam 200,000. As E. A. Wrigley has argued in regard to London, the very existence of such cities had important effects beyond their boundaries. Many more people had some experience of this urban life than population statistics alone indicate, because these cities were sites of continual population turnover, with rapid in- and out-migration. These very large concentrations of people also focused demand for products of all kinds, encouraging economic activities that expensive transportation rendered impossible in the more scattered, isolated economy of the sixteenth century.

Second, the seventeenth century witnessed the development of new institutions for mobilizing resources, again in ways not previously possible. The Amsterdam stock market opened in 1611, selling shares in the Dutch East India Company. The stock exchange was one of several Dutch institutions that mobilized the wealth of those outside the narrow world of commercial specialists toward economically productive, even adventurous purposes. The Dutch model spread slowly, but by the end of the period similar systems were in place in England and France, allowing both countries to experience stock-market booms and then collapses in 1720, England with the South Sea Bubble, France with the John Law affair.

SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATIONS

The ethics of economic life. The seventeenth century was an especially competitive era that divided winners from losers in fierce, unpredictable ways. The fields of social action had widened, depriving actors of the protections that localism once afforded against distant rivals, while political and social tumults disrupted even the most sensible economic plans, destroying capital and closing markets, but also opening opportunities for the aggressive or lucky. After the mid-seventeenth century, awareness of competition became widespread among European intellectuals, and ethical restraints on it diminished sharply. Changing views of lending money at interest illustrate this shift. During the Middle Ages, theorists taught that fellow economic actors should be treated first as Christians, to whom assistance should be freely offered, without payment of interest. In the seventeenth century both Protestant and Catholic theorists came instead to accept the idea that commercial transactions had their own laws that could not be subject to moral regulation, and condemnation of more basic moral failings was weakening as well. English writers after 1660 regularly argued that pride, greed, self-interest, and vanity formed necessary underpinnings of a successful economy. Still more dramatically, the Anglo-Dutch writer Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733), in his *The Fable of the Bees* (1714), summarized the argument that private vices would produce public prosperity, further eroding moral restraints on individuals' actions in the social realm. On the Continent even the Catholic moralist Pierre Nicole (1625–1695) argued that self-interest rather than altruism formed the basis of public life. Cultural changes conjoined with political and economic circumstances to intensify the era's economic and social competitiveness.

The rural social order. The period from 1590 to 1720 witnessed significant reshufflings of the social order. Peasants experienced these changes most brutally, an important fact given that they constituted the vast majority of seventeenth-century Europe's population, fewer than two-thirds of the total only in the Dutch Republic, at least three-fourths in most other regions. This group experienced a dramatic change in its relations to the most basic means of production, the land itself, essentially amounting to a process of expropriation. The process varied significantly from one region to another because medieval landowning patterns themselves varied. In England, most land belonged to nobles and gentry, but peasants enjoyed relatively secure long-term leases; in France and Germany peasants had direct owner-

ship of most land, subject to loose feudal overlordship. Whatever the initial arrangements, large landowners everywhere took much more direct control of the land during the early modern period, with the crucial change coming at its outset, between about 1570 and 1630. Other changes accompanied and magnified these changes in ownership. Real wages diminished, partly as a result of sixteenth-century population growth, and agricultural leases became more expensive; in central and eastern Europe working conditions deteriorated, with landowners exercising increasing control over peasants' movements and requiring of them several days of unpaid labor each week. The mid-sixteenth-century countryside had been dominated by nearly independent peasants, able more or less to survive from the produce of their own land. By 1650 most regions were dominated instead by large landowners and their economic allies, the large-scale tenant farmers who managed the actual business of farming and marketing. Most peasants had become essentially wage laborers, owning cottages and small amounts of land, but needing to work for others in order to survive.

Both the well-to-do farm managers and the agricultural laborers had been forcibly inserted into a market economy, with enormous attendant insecurities. The laborers now had to purchase their food on the open market and sell their labor, while the large tenant farmers had to market their produce and assemble the cash needed to pay rents and taxes. Indeed, the expropriation of the peasantry tended to advance fastest in regions that were especially open to commercial currents. These facts produced a seeming paradox in some regions of Europe. Precisely where capitalist and modernizing influences were strongest, around cities and in areas (such as east-Elbian Germany) especially open to international trade, peasants were most vulnerable to the era's extraeconomic shocks, notably to its harvest failures. During the seventeenth century starvation was more common in the most advanced regions of France, those nearest Paris, than in regions of poorer land and more backward agricultural technique.

Jan de Vries has drawn attention to a second paradox in this history, the fact that expropriation and declining wages accompanied a steady growth in the number and range of consumer goods that villagers purchased. By 1720 death inventories across Europe reveal villagers' purchases of coffee, tobacco, brightly printed cloths, even books and prints. De Vries explains this paradox by what he calls the "industrious revolution," a readiness to take on (or insist that familial dependents take on) paid work of all kinds so as to orient the household as fully as possible toward

the marketplace and its money-making possibilities, thereby diminishing the share of household effort devoted to domestic life. Businessmen responded to this widening of the rural labor pool by bringing some of their manufacturing work to the countryside, especially such easily transportable work as textile manufacturing. By the late seventeenth century, rural manufacturing had become commonplace in France, England, and parts of Germany. Europe remained overwhelmingly a rural society, with about the same percentage of urbanites in 1700 as in 1600, but manufacturing had acquired considerable importance. It counted for about one-fourth of French economic activity in 1700, and much more in England and the United Provinces.

Business and the cities. More intense competition came to characterize the world of urban business as well. Seventeenth-century business was especially vulnerable to the period's instability, for at its highest levels business was inextricably bound up with systems of political power. The connection was most direct in the case of state finance, among the most profitable sectors of early modern business. Governments had been poor credit risks since the early fourteenth century, and as a result soldiers, military suppliers, and other creditors would accept only cash; governments also had difficulty in moving money across long distances (necessary in an era of international warfare) and in assuring the regular flow of money over time (necessary since tax collections did not coincide with expenditures). Businessmen with established credit could meet all these needs, and their indispensability assured them enormous profits. The Dutch banker Louis de Geer (1587–1652) exemplified these possibilities when he took over large sectors of the Swedish economy, in exchange for lending money to Gustavus Adolphus (ruled 1611–1632). But the same governmental untrustworthiness that made the financiers' fortunes regularly unmade them as well, for governments had little hesitation about defaulting on loans as soon as competing bankers offered alternative sources of cash. In France these tacit bankruptcies were often accompanied by show trials in which financiers were prosecuted for their excess profits. After the most famous of these in 1661, the financier and official Nicolas Fouquet barely escaped with his life, and was condemned to lifelong imprisonment in an isolated fortress.

Faced with these risks, the business class could never cut itself off from leading aristocrats and officials, who supplied the political protection and introductions that bankers needed in such tumultuous times. Governments relinquished their reliance on

such financiers at very different rates. In the Netherlands reliable state finances were established in the mid-seventeenth century, and the English followed their model. The Bank of England (created in 1694) placed state loans on reliable foundations and diminished the need for the great financiers. France on the other hand continued to need their services until the revolution in 1789.

Power and commerce mixed in other ways during the seventeenth century, most directly in the exploitation of Europe's colonial empires. Already in the sixteenth century Spain and Portugal had organized imperial systems that sustained important mercantile networks. For the rest of Europe, however, profit-making imperialism was essentially a seventeenth-century creation. The first Dutch efforts to trade with the Far East came in 1595; in 1600 the monopoly Dutch East India Company began operations, with permission from the state to undertake such essentially political tasks as establishing a military and diplomatic presence in the regions where it traded. The company used these rights to the fullest, so that by the 1630s it held a string of fortresses and permanent trading centers across the Indian Ocean and had forced Asian rulers into a series of advantageous trade agreements. England attempted to keep up with its own monopoly East India Company, but above all launched concerted efforts to profit from the Americas. Until 1661 French efforts were much less impressive. Thereafter, Jean-Baptiste Colbert channeled state support to imperial ventures as well, financing a large French navy and encouraging French efforts in Canada, India, and the Caribbean.

By the end of the period, colonial products—tobacco, sugar, cotton cloth from India—had become crucial goods of European commerce. In the French case especially, state encouragement of imperial commerce was only part of a larger program of state economic intervention, designed to serve the state's political needs by ensuring success in overseas markets. This mercantilist program involved both state investment in factories and infrastructure like roads and canals and the close regulation of private business. Colbert established a group of commerce inspectors to ensure the quality of French goods, essential, he believed, for sustaining sales. The Dutch East India Company relied much less on state support, its strength lying ultimately in the vitality of Dutch commercial life, but even it owed something to political calculations. Dutch leaders encouraged its development and accorded it extensive powers partly in hopes of undermining Iberian monopolies in Asia and Brazil, an important advantage in the Eighty Years' War with Spain.

The seventeenth century thus offered extraordinary new opportunities to the minority of businessmen who enjoyed governmental connections. Contemporaries believed that they had never seen so much wealth, or wealth so conspicuously displayed, as that of the era's great financiers and merchants. Farther down the commercial hierarchy, however, the business atmosphere of the seventeenth century was much more difficult. Stagnant population and widening competition threatened what had once been comfortable markets, and cities suffered as trades shifted to the countryside, with its relatively cheap labor and freedom from regulation. For shopkeepers and artisans, the result was a contraction of business and a tendency for established families to protect their situations by every available means. In many regions this meant an enthusiastic turn to an institution inherited from the Middle Ages, the guilds. These organizations regulated activity within specific trades, controlling the entry of newcomers, setting prices and wages, and determining standards of training and work. The French government chartered a long series of new guilds in the later seventeenth century, partly for its own fiscal reasons (guild positions could be sold), but also in response to businessmen's eagerness for protection. For ordinary urban workers, this rise of regulation meant a significant worsening in conditions and a widening of class differences within the workshop. The movement of workers into masterships became significantly more difficult, as the guild structure hardened and new masterships were reserved mainly for those who already had familial connections within the trade. Workers who lacked these supports were likely to remain in subordinate positions throughout their lives, forming a permanent and often resentful working class.

The new bourgeoisie and traditional ruling elites. For embattled businessmen, an appealing response to the difficult times was flight from the marketplace into social realms that promised more stability. Land offered one such option, and the early modern period witnessed a rapid increase in land purchases by the urban rich. The later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries apparently were the focal point for such purchases, for after 1650 falling rents made landowning much less attractive, and new forms of safe investment had become more readily available. By that point, however, leading bourgeois in most European cities controlled substantial shares of the surrounding territories. A second possibility fitted well with this option, that of acquiring positions in the growing bureaucracies of the period. Civil services expanded everywhere during the early modern period,

giving bourgeois at all levels opportunities to abandon the uncertainties of commerce for the reliable income and social prestige of public office.

France, where public positions were bought and sold, demonstrates in quantitative terms the allure of this mode of life: Between 1600 and 1660, office prices there rose about fivefold, as monied families sought to secure for their sons the tranquil security of officialdom. Though less easily measured, there seems to have been similar enthusiasm for office in the other European states. Most of these new landowners and officials continued to reside in the cities, but they now resembled Europe's traditional elites, its military nobilities, and at their highest levels they began to claim noble status. At the French Estates General of 1614–1615, royal officials had sat with the commoners, but by 1650 the leading judges and officials were generally recognized as nobles, with the full range of noble privileges. In Spain, England, and the German states as well, society generally agreed that such figures counted among the gentlemen, whether the title was formal (as in most of Europe) or informal (as in England).

The accession of new families to noble status was one of several changes affecting Europe's ruling elites during the early modern period. By their very presence, the new nobles brought higher levels of education and urbanity to the nobilities, and in this their impact closely paralleled the growing importance of court life for many nobles. Seventeenth-century monarchs were eager to have their greatest nobles nearby and established elaborate courts for the purpose. Louis XIV's Versailles, to which he moved permanently in 1682, was only the most dramatic example of this policy. By 1700 imitations of Versailles had sprung up all over Europe, and even the court of the Dutch Republic had acquired a new prominence. As a result, the seventeenth-century nobility in general was far more urban than its sixteenth-century predecessors. In Spain and Italy nobles had always played a prominent role in city life, but in the seventeenth century northerners too were drawn to the entertainments and elegance of the city, and urban centers responded to their needs. In the years around 1600, a number of urban development projects were undertaken in London, Paris, Madrid, and other cities so as to make these cities more attractive to this new class of resident.

Nineteenth-century historians tended to view the nobles' urbanization and their increasing focus on the court as signs of weakness, indicative of declining political power and uncertainty about their proper social role. Twentieth-century scholarship, however, has stressed the nobility's continuing vitality despite these changes, and to some extent because of them. New

families of officials brought new wealth to the order and assured that aristocratic values would continue to shape governmental policies. If stronger governments eliminated some political powers that medieval nobles had exercised, they also created new ones. Nobles had numerous new positions available to them in the expanding armies and bureaucracies of the period, and they profited from the development of courts. More fundamentally, governments took their opinions seriously and tailored programs to meet their needs. Until about 1660 even economic circumstances tended to shine for the nobles. Food prices and land rents both remained high, so that nobles' estates remained profitable. There was one exception to this favorable situation, however. For Europe's poorer nobles, the early modern period represented a real social crisis—enough to provoke concerned governments into substantial policy innovations. The benefits of stronger government flowed mainly to nobles able to educate themselves for a public role, whether in the army, at court, or in the civil service. "Mere nobles," who had only their claims to high birth and privilege, could not keep up in this world, and significant numbers left the order.

GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENTIATION

By 1720 many Europeans had become aware that the Continent's center of social and economic geography had shifted from the Mediterranean to northwestern countries like England and the United Provinces. The establishment of New World colonies and Atlantic trade do not sufficiently explain the shift. A century after Columbus, Spain remained Europe's dominant political power, partly because of its control of the Atlantic, and Italy remained its leading commercial center. Genoese bankers were among the chief profiteers of the early Atlantic empires. After 1590, however, the United Provinces quickly established themselves as Europe's richest region, with a standard of living unheard of elsewhere. This wealth rested on economic modernity, a situation in which social structures encouraged entrepreneurship and innovation.

With few natural resources, the Dutch established not only the most productive agriculture in Europe—managing to export food even as Mediterranean regions experienced harvest failures—but a variety of novel industries as well. Their example suggested to contemporary observers that wealth derived from social organization, rather than nature, and that such wealth could allow surprising political successes. Despite its population of about only 1.9 million inhabitants, the Dutch Republic defeated the Spanish

Empire at the height of its power and in the 1670s fought Louis XIV to a stand-off. By that point, the Republic's lead over the rest of Europe had begun to diminish, and after 1720 the Dutch fell behind England in economic activity. Yet even then the Republic remained the center of European economic innovation, and its export industries continued to develop. The eighteenth century's great economic success stories, chiefly in England, would reflect the influence of this model.

The Dutch model had social and ethical as well as economic implications, for the United Provinces represented an anomaly among European societies. They formed a republic in which cities had the decisive political voice; they tolerated multiple religions, despite occasional flare-ups of intolerant Calvinist orthodoxy; above all, they accorded higher status to commerce than to warfare or noble birth. Over the years 1590 to 1720, this combination of social arrangements seemed to have been rewarded with ex-

traordinary success, even as Spain sank into economic troubles and French industrial development faltered. In his *Persian Letters* (1721), the French philosopher Charles Louis de Secondat de Montesquieu attributed some of this contrast to Protestantism itself, arguing that their religion encouraged Dutch and English merchants in especially vigorous pursuit of worldly advantage. Late-twentieth-century scholars have been skeptical, but they have suggested that the relative freedom of the United Provinces and England was more conducive to economic enterprise than the growing authoritarianism of seventeenth-century Catholicism. Thus the weakening of religious values during the eighteenth century, following what the French literary historian Paul Hazard termed "the crisis of the European mind," made emulating the Dutch easier for elites throughout Europe. Without renouncing monarchy, nobility, or warfare, European societies would turn in fundamentally different directions after 1720.

See also **The World Economy and Colonial Expansion** (*in this volume*); **Absolutism; Bureaucracy; Capitalism and Commercialization; The European Marriage Pattern; Health and Disease; Land Tenure; The Population of Europe: Early Modern Demographic Patterns; War and Conquest** (*volume 2*); **Moral Economy and Luddism** (*volume 3*); **The Household** (*volume 4*); **Journalism; Schools and Schooling** (*volume 5*).

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THE ENLIGHTENMENT



Brian Dolan

To refer to *The Enlightenment*, complained the eminent historian of the eighteenth century, J. G. A. Pocock, was to presume inaccurately that one could refer to “a single unitary process, displaying a uniform set of characteristics.” Many scholars of the post-Peter Gay world of Enlightenment studies share this grievance, and, at variance to Gay who considered “the Enlightenment” as a fundamentally unified movement involved in the “business of criticism,” have preferred to see “Enlightenment” as a dynamic and differentiated “long-eighteenth century” mainly (but not exclusively) European movement. Depending on the historian’s preference, “Enlightenment” becomes a period, a process, and/or a product. This article briefly considers how “Enlightenment” has been recently and predominantly defined in each of these frameworks.

Previous conceptions of the Enlightenment have undergone major transformations as a result of the new angles from which historians view the past. At issue is not only the scope of where Enlightenment was considered to have taken place, but accounts of how and through whose contributions as well. Rather than seeing the pursuits of select individuals, for example the editors of the *Encyclopédie*—Denis Diderot or Jean Le Rond d’Alembert—as emblematic of the quest for Enlightenment in a society that worshiped the sovereignty of reason over biblical revelation, recent scholarship has gone much further in altering the canon of central contributors to Enlightenment pursuits. Eighteenth-century gender studies, for example, has refashioned the image of Claudine-Alexandrine Guérin de Tencin as a matron of the Enlightenment, not because she was d’Alembert’s mother, but rather because she was bearer of a civilized state, running a highly respected salon on rue Saint-Honoré in Paris and acting as mentor to future salonnières, such as Marie-Thérèse Geoffrin. Madame de Tencin’s abandonment of her child, the rejection of the duties of maternity for which she has been so well known, raises uncomfortable questions regarding the Enlightenment’s attempt to reconcile the language of individual rights and autonomy with consistent attempts to con-

fine women in domestic settings and reinforce their role as mothers—as, for example, prescribed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in *Émile*. As an intellectually independent writer and salonnière, Tencin represented a challenge to social values that subsequent thinkers would use as a model to help forge a feminist philosophy. Here late-twentieth-century scholarship has not only illuminated the often contradictory Enlightenment debates about gender, but also the ways that new areas of knowledge were developed that expanded the opportunities for a wider band of people to participate in the pursuits.

But “Enlightenment,” as a *process* with which—many believe—we are still engaged in the twenty-first century, is also a pursuit filled with irony and paradox. The psychology of the pursuit—the analysis of what many previous historians preferred to call the “Mind of the Enlightenment”—is complex. This is because Enlightenment thinkers—both men and women—seized upon and then struggled to come to grips with a deep transformation in what were taken as fundamental beliefs and true knowledge about their world. One goal of any history of the Enlightenment—whether the historiography of the 1930s or 1940s, which played on the Enlightenment’s intellectual values, or later scholarship which stressed the mechanisms of enlightened practices—has been the attempt to capture some of the wonder and the reflexive pride that enlightened individuals felt when assessing the philosophical and material changes visibly occurring throughout Europe.

Everything was changing, and it seemed—many believed—to be changing for the better. In 1759 a forty-one-year-old d’Alembert leaned back and thought about his times. Putting pen to paper, he wrote his reflections at the beginning of his *Elements of Philosophy*:

If one examines carefully the mid-point of the century in which we live, the events which excite us or at any rate occupy our minds, our customs, our achievements, and even our diversions, it is difficult not to see that in some respects a very remarkable change in our ideas

is taking place, a change whose rapidity seems to promise an even greater transformation to come.

He thought the changes amounted to nothing short than a revolution: “all fields of knowledge have assumed new forms.” What was the root of such changes? New developments in natural science which ushered in “a new method of philosophizing,” prompting “the kind of enthusiasm which accompanies discoveries, a certain exaltation of ideas which the spectacle of the universe produces in us.” What were the consequences? D’Alembert could only wonder, but it was clear that “this general effervescence of minds” would “cast new light on some matters and new shadows on others.” Knowledge was shining bright in what his contemporaries were styling the first century of Enlightenment.

What were all these revolutionary changes in knowledge and methods of philosophizing that so impressed d’Alembert? The answer harks back to the activities of some of d’Alembert’s intellectual ancestors, whose work in natural philosophy and experimental science culminated in the scientific revolution and

helped establish new conceptions of cosmological structure, to readjust (or revolutionize) the foundations of knowledge, and to set the pace for how Enlightened pursuits (with emphasis on empiricism, experimentation, and secular rationalization) began to reshape modern beliefs about the natural world, human nature, and social organization.

CELEBRATING THE “NEW SCIENCE”

The theories, mathematical proofs, and writings of people such as the Polish astronomer (and church administrator) Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), the Danish nobleman and astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546–1601), Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), and Isaac Newton (1642–1727), to name only a select few, were crucial in constructing a new method of establishing facts about nature. Advocates of the “new science” (from the Latin *scientia*, meaning knowledge) emphasized that no traditional knowledge was to be

taken for granted. In fact, it was argued that one ought to be downright skeptical of all authority. Rather than rely on what was written in ancient books or what others said about the natural world, the best source of knowledge was to ask nature directly. Personal experience was to be the new arbiter of truth. Why not explore for oneself? Why not rely on one's own experiences, use one's own reason? Natural philosophers (as they were then called; the term "scientist" was not coined until the 1830s) were encouraging others to take seriously the plea by the English statesman and philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626) to "unroll the volume of the creation" and learn from the Book of Nature by observing and collecting facts from which one could induce greater knowledge and general truths. As a result, all areas of nature were beginning to be scrutinized through critical eyes, and eighteenth-century philosophers portrayed themselves as the inheritors of the radical changes in what were perceived to be the legitimate means of producing "natural" knowledge.

The seventeenth century ended with a crisis of unbelief. Previously, the Bible was read as the ultimate authority on all matters, metaphysical or moral. But it would be misleading to assume that the new sciences simply subverted the authority of the Bible, or that science was suddenly at war with religion. It was not science versus religion, but rather that natural philosophers defended the Book of Nature as an equally legitimate source of knowledge as the Bible. Why not explore all angles? If your beliefs are worth having, aren't they worth interrogating?

In the ancien régime, social and political organization was modeled on a divine order that enforced a social hierarchy (originally referring to an order of priests; the Greek *hieros* means sacred and is the root of *hiereus*, priest), and authorities attempted to quiet the voices of the new philosophers because of the challenge they presented to the literal truth of the scriptures. But the debates over who had the legitimate authority to speak on matters of divine order and "truth" (were philosophers seeking a status equal to that of priests?) took place among an educated elite. So what effect did the new philosophy have on the broader public? How did the average individual look upon the new science? Who had the knowledge to understand the debates? After all, the preface to Copernicus's *De revolutionibus* declared that mathematics was written for mathematicians, and historians figure that fewer than a hundred contemporaries attempted the whole of Newton's *Principia mathematica*, and only a handful could comprehend the mathematics that he used to prove that the earth's motion could be explained with reference to the same "universal

force"—gravity—that moved all other celestial (and terrestrial) bodies.

Here the role of Enlightenment thinkers was particularly effective. The philosophes saw the implications of the new science—its promotion of a new basis of knowledge and its elimination of the traditional hierarchical view of nature—as a platform for revolutionizing the political structures of the ancien régime. The towering genius of Newton was a posthumous construction. He and others such as Copernicus were celebrated not because of what they did, but because of what others thought they did. However few could understand the calculus, hordes could see the implications of having destroyed the distinctions between the terrestrial and heavenly realms.

After his death Newton's achievements were celebrated as a triumph for enlightened inquiry, and later philosophes made him into one of the first heroes of Enlightenment. The famous philosophe François-Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1694–1778), who visited England from 1726 until 1729 (where he befriended Newton's niece and even attended his funeral), was one of his most effulgent admirers. He wrote that Newton had taught philosophers to "examine, weigh, calculate and measure, but never to conjecture." Grounded were the lofty metaphysical theories of the seventeenth century; gone were the dubious tales of saints and miracle workers.

Experiment, observation, and secular reason distinguished an enlightened individual. Newton "saw, and made people see," continued Voltaire. His penetrating insight rendered visible the previously hidden mysteries of nature. His experiment of directing a beam of sunlight through a prism to show that it was actually comprised of a rainbow of colors has often been used to symbolize the pursuit of enlightenment. The message was articulated in the word chosen for this age: *siècle des lumières* (French); *illuminismo* (Italian); *Aufklärung* (German); *Upplysningen* (Swedish; *lyse* means light). Enlightenment signifies the process of coming out from the dark—as in "those times of darkness and ignorance, which we distinguish by the name of the Middle Ages," according to Voltaire. "We are all [Newton's] disciples now," he announced in 1776.

To boldly go . . . Throughout the eighteenth century a growing ensemble of admirers seized upon science as the route to progress and, perhaps, even perfectibility. Unlike Blaise Pascal who became frightened when he contemplated the possibility of an infinite universe, the preeminent German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) thought the concept "filled the understanding with wonder."

Kant was not afraid of the challenges presented by the new philosophy. In fact, he was one of the first to sloganize the achievements of the early natural philosophers by popularizing the phrase “Copernican Revolution,” albeit to imply that his particular philosophy of knowledge was as radically different from others as the heliocentric from the geocentric model of the universe! But his work is also said to have crowned the philosophy of Enlightenment in Germany. He lived his whole life in Königsberg, where he became professor of logic and metaphysics at its university. His chief works questioned the limits of reason in the advancement of human knowledge—the *Critiques* of pure reason, practical reason, and judgment (published in 1781, 1788, and 1790 respectively). However, it is significant that this leader of the German Enlightenment earlier wrote a work on natural philosophy and the history of the heavens: *General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755).

But in terms of defining moments in the history of Enlightenment, it is also significant that in 1784 Kant wrote an essay in answer to the question “What is enlightenment?” that was published in a Berlin monthly, *Berlinische Monatsschrift*. His answer was that enlightenment was the attainment of the ability to think rationally for oneself: “Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another.” Have no fear, he went on, borrowing a phrase from the Latin poet, Horace: “*Sapere aude!*” Dare to Know! ‘Have courage to use your own reason!’—that is the motto of enlightenment.”

However challenging the new philosophy, self-confidence and self-determination would help overcome vanity and foolishness. Kant believed that pursuing Enlightenment was worth the effort since the benefits it brought easily outstripped the perceived dangers. Yes, people would fall a few times before learning to walk alone, but better to do that than to labor in a life of perpetual tutelage. He, like many others, believed that those who learn to think for themselves “will disseminate the spirit of the rational appreciation of both their own worth and every man’s vocation.” But others remained cautious, fearing the power of authorities who ordered, “Do not argue!” Some of Kant’s colleagues lamented the resistance—or the inertia—of the masses to pursue the quest. The Göttingen professor of physics (and seventeenth child of a Protestant pastor) Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799) erupted in frustration over humanity’s inability to seize its opportunities. “People talk a great deal about Enlightenment and ask for more light. My

God! What good is all this light if people either have no eyes or if those who do have eyes resolutely keep them shut!”

Yet it seemed to others that the greatest irony of enlightenment was that the light it provided illuminated more harsh realities of humanity’s condition than havens of happiness. “Has it not always been obvious that the time of highest refinement is precisely the time of the most extreme moral rotteness?” asked the German poet and sardonic critic Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813). Was it not obvious “that the epoch of brightest enlightenment is always the very epoch in which all sorts of speculations, madness, and enthusiasm, flourish most?” Was one really to believe that man’s perfectibility was an attainable goal—the payoff of Enlightenment pursuits? Could one really overthrow one’s inner, savage, corrupting passions? It seemed to Wieland that for every individual who strove to attain enlightened liberty there were many others who were eager to suppress their attempts. “Just think,” he wrote, “against one man who actively advances true enlightenment, there are a hundred who work against it with all their might, and ten thousand who neither desire nor miss his services.”

Indeed one great paradox of the Enlightenment might be that for all the new meanings of liberty and freedom offered, the same period witnessed the rise of new disciplinary controls over the population and new mechanisms of surveillance. Talk about freedom, but play by the rules. Kant saw this irony when he repeated the words of a prince: “Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, but obey!” “Everywhere there is restriction on freedom,” he concluded. And while repression was not as draconian as in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, a number of philosophers who voiced their visions of a society liberated from a repressive political regime found themselves meditating over their next messages in prison.

Nevertheless, one of the major achievements of eighteenth-century enlightenment was to spread the word, to popularize the new philosophy through print, in new journals, or the celebrated *Encyclopédie* (published from 1751) and the British answer to it in the form of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (which began publication in 1771), through new public libraries and salons, and so forth. They were adept at playing up propaganda. Because of this, philosophers have often been regarded as mere spokespeople for the achievements of the seventeenth century, not sophisticates in their own right, and as a result critics regarded them as shallow. To various degrees either image—the hack writer or the high culture savant—can be defended.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT

RULING AND ORDERING NATURE AND SOCIETY

The few regularly cited philosophes, who are often criticized as being mere propagandists, represent a minority of those who contributed to Enlightenment pursuits. The term “philosophes” gained currency because it referred to a specifically French membership (a sort of brotherhood, as Voltaire suggested to d’Alembert), and because, unlike references to university or professionally oriented philosophers, philosophes were amateurs, whose society was formed in salons and who wrote for a nonprofessional public. But in common historical usage the term has come to represent far more than a restricted group of French intellectuals (as the term is often translated). Philosophes are no longer only French. Rousseau proudly declared that he was a citizen of Geneva (this before its upright magistrates condemned his philosophy and burned his books). David Hume and Adam Ferguson were Scottish, Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin were American, Immanuel Kant and Christian Wolff were German, and the Scandinavians Emanuel Swedenborg and Linnaeus’s pupil Daniel Solander (among many others) helped spread the Enlightenment in the Baltic. Among those in Italy (where, besides gouty tourists, Enlightenment principles were among the rare imports from the north) were Cesare Beccaria, Pietro Verri (editor of *Il caffè*, organ of the Lombard Enlightenment), and the Neapolitan experimenter Maria Angela Ardinghelli.

This, of course, names only a few, and proportionately fewer still were amateur polemicists—we find academicians, politicians, and other legal or medical professionals filling in the ranks. Perhaps equally variegated were the philosophes’ commitments to pursue different Enlightenment goals. As Simon Schama has remarked of the reformers in the Dutch Enlightenment, they rejected “a cosmopolitan, Francophone, universally applicable, rationally discerned set of natural laws, in favor of a highly particular, inward-looking, evangelical, proto-romantic cult of the Fatherland.” With regard to the crusade for religious and intellectual toleration, not all European Enlightenment activists rallied around Voltaire’s notorious cry to crush the infamous (*écrasez l’infâme*). Enlightenment philosophies of toleration emphasized that rational enquiry necessitated freedom of thought and expression, which usually did not mean abolishing God but recognizing that heterogeneous beliefs might legitimately coexist, something that enlightened Europe, largely through the work of its travelers, anthropologists, and orientalists, was forced to come to terms with.

State responses to this varied around Europe. In England the Toleration Act (1689) permitted freedom of worship for Nonconformists, if at the cost of continuing certain civil disabilities. Elsewhere some monarchs such as Frederick II of Prussia (ruled 1740–1786), Catherine II of Russia (ruled 1762–1796), and Joseph II of Austria (ruled 1764–1790) adopted an enlightened philosophy of conceiving of themselves as the servants, rather than the absolute masters, of their states, leading to the paradoxical way these rulers were referred to by nineteenth-century historians as “enlightened despots.” How enlightened and tolerant their rule was in practice is much debated. For example, Charles III of Spain has been described as a minor enlightened despot; nonetheless progressive members of the elite in the Iberian peninsula still faced a tough fight against the Spanish Inquisition.

But a new ruling philosophy was emerging. Social power was increasingly sought by philosophes who seized upon laws of nature as a guide to legitimate governance. One radical philosophy developed was materialism, with John Locke’s theory of thinking matter—the material, “corpuscular,” sensory origin of ideas—proving an influential model for later clandestine writers who appropriated materialistic arguments to support their theories of an immortal and immaterial soul, of free will, and a naturalistic philosophy of life. In his *Man a Machine* (1747), the French military physician Julien de La Mettrie wrote of how human physiology and behavior could be explained solely in terms of the organization of matter and with reference to the mechanical concepts offered in natural philosophy. La Mettrie, who after the publication of *Man a Machine* settled at the court of Frederick the Great, described the body as a sort of automaton that “winds up its own springs,” which physicians, rather than priests, were capable of repairing.

The influence of this philosophy was not, as some critics have emphasized, a matter of an Enlightenment drive to create a “modern paganism” where the so-called Age of Reason was one sustained attack on religious faith. To be sure, deism and natural theology emerged as mediators which postulated that the more rational nature was seen to be—that is, the more law-bound and organized—the more proof this offered of the wisdom and benevolence of God. More germane, perhaps, to Enlightenment pursuits were the ways in which innovators used the man-machine philosophy as a model for their systems of mechanized labor and manufacture.

Enlightened entrepreneurs. Enlightened entrepreneurs translated the concept that nature was mechanical and could be reduced to laws, its powers im-

itated in machinery and harnessed, into economic advantage. Nature provided not only material resources but sources of power, and the new “mechanics” (referring to people rather than machines) of industry, who became known by the end of the eighteenth century as “engineers,” not only used nature’s forces to operate their improved windmills, watermills, pumps and other types of machinery, but relied on conceptual tools that became the catchphrases of the Enlightenment: precision measurement, economy of power, environmental management, standardization, interchangeable parts, and so on. We know the ways that this led to the possibilities of mass production and entrepreneurial distribution of products to an expanding consumer market. But what is frequently overlooked is how these products—whether scientific instruments, books, maps, or Wedgwood pottery—encapsulated and distributed the values of the Enlightenment to the bourgeoisie, thus further releasing the Enlightenment from its predominately elite male grip. Consumption by the material culture of the Enlightenment expanded the range of those who were invited to think of themselves as sharing in its accomplishments. But the Enlightenment also commodified philosophic ideas and practices.

Part of the mantra of Enlightenment rationality was the refrain that, like nature which operated under regulated “laws,” the human economy—from labor processes to population health—could be reduced to mechanical operations that were rule-bound and controllable. Once this was accomplished, humanity was well on its way to realizing the Enlightenment goal of rendering laborers’ techniques visible and allowing entrepreneurs and projectors to assess and reproduce them anywhere. In this protoindustrial and capitalist enterprise, a mechanical, visible workforce was the key to social progress. To the philosophes, as Simon Schaffer has suggested, workers themselves figured as individuals who performed like the machines they managed.

Also accomplished would be the associated benefit of replacing a hereditary social hierarchy with a single strata of enlightened individuals who share knowledge of the mechanical principles that govern nature and society. One popular Enlightenment goal was for careers to be open to the talented, with the intent of introducing a professional meritocracy where status was earned rather than inherited, but proponents first needed to establish rules by which merit could be judged. An illuminating example is the way in which the eighteenth-century French artillery

corps—traditionally a second-class branch of the military—obtained new social status when it was recognized that their abilities as technical experts, organized around rigorous discipline and collaboration, could successfully “engineer” the French Revolution. In the Enlightenment, mechanist theories and rule-governed practices were equally as likely to be applied in factories as in prisons, hospitals, or on battlefields.

The links forged during the Enlightenment between manufacturers, entrepreneurs, and natural philosophers became part of the new area where the “business” of Enlightenment expanded, including factories and banks. In addition to the usual locales, such as universities or philosophical academies, late-twentieth-century scholarship has also focused attention on anatomy theaters, various intellectual societies throughout Europe, salons, and even Masonic lodges, whose habitués were allowed to espouse enlightened ideals. All were locales for an effusive Enlightenment rhetoric of liberty, equality, and fraternity. However, the Enlightenment also saw the expansion of areas central to the rapidly expanding and specialized pursuits in natural history—the collection and classification of specimens from the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms.

Spaces of natural history. The founding of the British Museum in 1753 came hot on the heels of the opening of the Luxembourg palace in 1750, the first public art gallery in France. But even earlier, the Enlightenment encyclopedic approach to the acquisition and classification of knowledge was manifest in cabinets of curiosities (such as Peter the Great’s in St. Petersburg, which proudly possessed the largest and most famous collection of “monsters”), or the archaeological and artistic collections that generated a thriving commercial economy in Italian cities, where dealers, dilettanti, connoisseurs, aesthetes, and antiquarians busily traded in enlightened taste.

As a descriptive science of forms and categories, natural history complemented mechanical philosophy by merging the living and the nonliving, banishing spirits and metaphysics in favor of empirical methods of classification, often based on external characteristics (such as Linnaeus’s use of the sexual organs of plants to classify groups down to the level of species), with the famous exception of Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon (1707–1788), who attempted to classify the whole of the natural world in his massive *Histoire naturelle* (1749–1804) using a uniquely historical approach (evidence from the fossil record, for example) and a theory of reproductive relationships to create a biological classification system. In either case, despite their epistemological differences, recognizing patterns

in nature was thought to be the key to understanding not only its operations but its organization, embracing the Enlightenment commitment to render the secrets of nature visible and to display its magisterial order openly to the public.

One Enlightenment pursuit was to set out to catalog nature’s diversity, with its contents named and classified accordingly. When Enlightenment pursuits turned to collecting exemplary specimens, the natural history community was vigorously mobilized. And one view of the “geography” of the Enlightenment appears expansive—Russia recruited naturalists particularly from France, Germany, and the Netherlands to help explore its vast natural resources; the Uppsala Royal Society sponsored various expeditions to the polar regions; and Linnaeus gave his pupils specific instructions for collecting specimens and recording information during their worldwide travels, a procedure later imitated by the president of the Royal Society in London, Sir Joseph Banks, when promoting voyages of exploration. Even if everything collected could not be comfortably classified (in an epoch of standardized descriptions, how does one account for “monsters?”), natural historical knowledge was considered useful because it summed up the Adamic process of establishing order from the confusion of the natural world.

Popularizing knowledge. The flip side to collecting and displaying nature’s curiosities in particular places was the spread and distribution of Enlightenment knowledge to more distant parts of Europe. Citizens in the eighteenth-century republic of letters followed new codes of sociability and enjoyed a discursive equality where women who participated in Enlightenment debate were seen as a civilizing force, promoting the philosophy of the Enlightenment in the public sphere. Correspondence linked enlightened communities—Voltaire’s vast network of correspondents, including Catherine the Great (who eventually bought Diderot’s and Voltaire’s book collections, which she added to the imperial library), made his estate at Ferney on the Swiss border a crossroads of enlightened Europe. But for many historians of the Enlightenment, the real achievements in spreading Enlightenment knowledge were linked to the production of inexpensive editions of books. As Robert Darnton has shown, “underground” printers, publishers, and booksellers who peddled the philosophes’ banned books at great risk were crucial to the popularization of Enlightenment ideas.

Above ground, the translation of scientific and medical tracts played a particularly important role in promoting Enlightenment ideas of utility to a wide-

spread public—the immense success of self-help health-care books such as William Buchan’s *Domestic Medicine*, first published in London in 1769 but issued in multiple editions and translated into a number of foreign languages, is testimony to the success of this enterprise. The intended audience for such “useful” works and their wide distribution is a measure of the ambitions of the Enlightenment to include previously marginalized social groups in its goals to educate and improve. In Buchan’s case it was the poor, but a similar point has been made about the pedagogic literature written for women, such as the Venetian writer Francesco Algarotti’s *Newtonianism for Ladies* (1737), or by women, such as the Bolognese *filosofesse* and critic of Cartesian thought Laura Bassi or the French translator of Newton, Émilie Du Châtelet.

Enlightenment advocates stressed that science served moral as well as utilitarian ends, which was a message most effectively presented to the public in the form of “popular” writing. But the rhetoric of Enlightenment “public science” was also crucial to establishing the natural philosophers’ social legitimacy by demonstrating that the improvements they were arguing for would serve the interests of the public. Therefore, “science” is often seen as the centerpiece to Enlightenment thought because, when placed alongside a number of other important implications of Enlightenment thought on society, science was considered the embodiment of reason and rationality, it spearheaded the assault on superstition and priestcraft, and it promised human progress and social improvement. These latter utopian dreams were a leitmotiv of the Enlightenment. Acquiring knowledge through enlightened pursuits, some believed, would conquer fear, perfect humanity, and even eliminate death. At least that is what Benjamin Franklin imagined, while lamenting that he was born a century too early to benefit. “It is impossible to imagine the heights to which may be carried in a hundred years, the power of man over matter,” he wrote to the English chemist and Presbyterian minister Joseph Priestley. “All diseases may by sure means be prevented or cured, not excepting even that of old age, and our lives lengthened at pleasure even beyond the antediluvian standard.”

THE HEALTH OF NATIONS

Progress was perhaps the key term of Enlightenment thought, the most celebrated, if also the most contentious, term. It embodies the tensions and paradoxes of Enlightenment thought, and an exploration of how the idea of progress was promoted and criticized re-

veals no consensus among philosophes. However, it does reveal the degree to which Enlightenment philosophes were “conductors” (in both senses) of debate between science and politics.

One point of disagreement among writers was how progress was related to the morally charged optimistic or pessimistic visions of future society. Rousseau wasn’t very optimistic. He argued that the more civilization progressed, the farther humanity was from happiness. The savage, he wrote, “breathes only peace and liberty,” while “civilized man, on the other hand, is always moving, sweating, toiling, and racking his brains to find still more laborious occupations: he goes on in drudgery to his last moment . . . and, proud of his slavery, he speaks with disdain of those, who have not the honor of sharing it.” This is from his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, which, in various ways, was an evolutionary tract explaining how the natural and social attributes of man affect *perfectibilité*, or the capacity for self-improvement. As was more forcefully stated in his direct attack on the notion of progress in *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, this capacity could be misdirected, and lead humanity down the road of self-destruction.

The Enlightenment analysis of “wealth” elaborated on its dangers. European economics, it has been widely noted, are future-oriented, a perspective rooted in Enlightenment theories of progress. In the eighteenth century, European economic thought asserted that the purpose of an economy was to increase national wealth—to “grow.” For the French physiocrats, this meant that economic and political administration should be based on the scientific, secular management of public welfare. They maintained that the distribution of goods and services operated under the same Newtonian “natural laws” as the rest of the universe. For them, wealth was dependent on free trade in agricultural products. Freedom from government interference (*laissez-faire* economics) would lead to greater profits, which would result in greater agricultural productivity, upon which “the success of all parts of the administration of the kingdom” depended, according to François Quesnay (a French physician and leader of the physiocrats). Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, a disciple of Quesnay, used physiocracy to attack mercantilism and its economic isolationism, which, he said, only “nourishes among nations a germ of hatred and wars,” destroying the wealth and happiness of the whole population.

But not all agreed with the physiocrats’ view of economic progress. Some eighteenth-century critics thought that too much wealth was far from “progressive” in the sense of improvement, but instead was a symptom of the “diseases of civilization.” Primitivists

such as Rousseau or physicians such as George Cheyne or Thomas Trotter argued that in the early stages of human development, “noble savages” had pursued healthy lifestyles—hunting and gathering, exercising in the open air—which were very different from modern, congested urban squalor. “The strength and vigor of body are found under the coarse homely coverings of the laboring peasant, not under the courtier’s embroidery,” wrote Rousseau.

Even though many eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers aspired to write “universal histories” of civilization that emphasized progressive “stages” of

social refinement, leading eventually to societies where even luxurious desires are catered to, others perceived in the accumulation of wealth (associated with over-indulgence in luxury, idleness, and inequality) a dissolution of morals. In various ways wealth did not lead to health.

Wealth, according to Adam Smith, was not merely the same as money. Wealth required new moral responsibilities. Smith wondered just how far prescriptions for individual responsibility to maintain public health would be implemented, believing that certain refinements of wealthy society made people

less interested in the welfare of strangers. The Enlightenment invention of the social sciences proposed new forms of collective organization to guarantee the health and wealth of populations. Since medical theory saw the health of individuals as bound to environmental concerns, civic environmentalism proved a profitable trade, spawning a host of commercial enterprises addressing problems of drainage, sanitation, and ventilation that were deployed in the eighteenth-century campaign to lessen disease.

In England the Enlightenment pursuit of environmental health was haphazardly implemented through philanthropic programs, while elsewhere in Europe the drive to quantify the size and strength of the state in terms of the health of its citizens was given more—if at the same time uneven—state support, such as through the efforts of the *Physici*, the state-salaried physicians in Protestant northern Germany. While statistical enquiries into population trends and patterns of epidemic disease were undertaken at least in Italy and Spain since the sixteenth century, the Enlightenment quantifying spirit is best represented in the state census bureaus set up earliest in Sweden (1749) and followed elsewhere, such as with France's bureaus of statistical investigation instituted during the Napoleonic era. As Dorothy Porter has pointed out, the Enlightenment pursuit of medical statistics and state accounting used the data it acquired either to prescribe preventative health measures to avoid epidemic disease or to introduce efficient state regulation of medical practice and the standardization of pharmaceutical preparations and sales, depending on which state is being examined.

Attitudes toward progress were often burdened with ambivalent feelings, oscillating between optimism and pessimism, with underlying uncertainties over humanity's new social and moral responsibilities. For every attempt made in the Enlightenment to reduce the natural and social world to a formulaic equation or neatly catalog all knowledge, a catastrophe seemed to threaten the entire enterprise. This led to further anxiety and a paradox of the Enlightenment. If nature was rational and law-bound, then why did earthquakes and floods occur? If government was best placed democratically in the hands of its citizens, then why the Reign of Terror?

Every pigeonholed piece of knowledge seemed to add to a mosaic of larger questions. Was nature really a mechanical entity that could be controlled? Was rationality the best guide to human happiness? Was the emphasis on scientific knowledge and rational pursuits really the key to unbounded progress? What were the limits to humanity's intellectual horizon? What were the limits of enlightenment?

LIMITS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

This sketch can only point to a few of the major “long eighteenth-century” trends that characterize Enlightenment pursuits. There have been many attempts to present a working definition of the Enlightenment—from its chronology to its geography as well as its intellectual and material representations. Some believe that the Enlightenment has not ended, that the attitudes of enquiry that probe the potential powers of human achievement, social improvement, and political reform continue to characterize even the early twenty-first century—spreading throughout the world. Other scholars have been far less sanguine in the analysis of the legacy of the Enlightenment. For Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, writing their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* in wartime exile in New York, Enlightenment worship of reason gave man sovereignty not only over nature but over humanity itself, creating a new totalitarian regime that ultimately led to fascism and new levels of human barbarism. Still others have argued that the Enlightenment ended with the withdrawal of confidence in the authoritarian regime of Napoleon Bonaparte. But late-twentieth-century scholarship also questioned the geographical limits of the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment was obsessed with geography, at once seeking to identify others who were thought to share Enlightenment values, searching for the boundaries of where rational, enlightened civilization ended and the yet unenlightened, savage world began. But precisely because the Enlightenment concerned itself with its own propagation under the banner of the “civilizing process,” precise boundaries can never be located. However, debates over who best embodied and applied the principles of the Enlightenment to civil duty and social improvement began to refine the general category of “European” to a narrower, national level. The Enlightenment vocabulary that gave birth to “civilization” also invented Eurocentrism, which by the end of the eighteenth century had turned into “enlightened nationalism.” This increasing fragmentation within Enlightenment geography has multiplied the number of sites that must be investigated in local context rather than by presuming a unified “European” Enlightenment, which is reflected in late-twentieth-century scholarship's attempt to analyze the Enlightenment in context and within a comparative framework (as pioneered, for example, by Roy Porter and Mikulás Teich).

Virtually all assessments of the Enlightenment have received their fair share of criticism, mainly because any attempt to delimit or define the results or pursuits of the Enlightenment appear to impose sta-



PURSUING THE MOOD OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Here are a few sources that can help capture some of the spirit of the Enlightenment.

Music

Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. *The Magic Flute*.
 Franz Joseph Haydn. Quartets
 Christoph Willibald Gluck. *Iphigénie en Tauride*

Museums

A visit to any museum is worthwhile, as Enlightenment pursuits often ended with the public display of all manner of “curiosities.” For background, read:

Yveline Cantarel-Besson, *La naissance du musée du Louvre*, 2 vols (Paris, 1981)
 Edward Miller. *That Noble Cabinet: A History of the British Museum* (London, 1973)

Poetry and Drama

Isobel Armstrong and Virginia Blain. *Women’s Poetry in the Enlightenment: The Making of a Canon, 1730–1820* (Basingstoke, U.K., 1999)
 Robert Marcellus Browning. *German Poetry in the Age of the Enlightenment: From Brockes to Klopstock* (University Park, Pa., 1978)
 Alan Bewell. *Wordsworth and the Enlightenment: Nature, Man, and Society in the Experimental Poetry* (New Haven, Conn., 1989)
 Denis Diderot. *Le fils naturel* (1757, various editions and translations)
 Carlo Goldoni. *Pamela nubile* (1751, a dramatization of Samuel Richardson’s famous novel)

Fiction

Jean-Jacques Rousseau. *Émile* (1762, various translations)
 Voltaire. *Candide* (1759, various translations)

Travel Writing

Voltaire. *Lettres anglaises et philosophiques* (1734, various translations)
 Denis Diderot. *Supplément au Voyage de Bougainville* (1772)
 Lady Mary Wortley Montagu. *Letters Written during Her Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa* (1763; reprinted 1790 and in various modern editions)

Painting

Johann Georg Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste* (1771–1774), for contemporary art theory and commentary on the German Enlightenment
 Charles Coulston Gillispie (ed.). *A Diderot Pictorial Encyclopedia of Trades and Industry: Manufacturing and the Technical Arts*. . . . (New York, 1959)
 On CD-ROM, *History through Art: The Enlightenment* (1994)

Contemporary reactions

Cyril O’Keefe. *Contemporary Reactions to the Enlightenment (1728–1762): A Study of Three Critical Journals, the Jesuit Journal de Trévoux, the Jansenist Nouvelles ecclésiastiques, and the Secular Journal des savants* (Geneva, Switzerland, 1974)

bility on what was, by most accounts, a dynamic movement. Hence defining the Enlightenment is yet another paradox scholars continue to confront.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND SOCIAL HISTORY

While scholars most often approach the Enlightenment as a chapter in European intellectual history, there are many important questions to be examined from a social history standpoint. Enlightenment

thinkers came from a variety of social backgrounds. They advanced and promoted technology and science, theorized about education and social change, and advocated ideas with great potential social impact. To what extent their ideas actually played a causal role in changing society remains open to debate. How much, for instance, did Enlightenment thinking contribute to the motivations and tactics of the budding entrepreneurs who would soon trigger an industrial revolution? How did Enlightenment thinking affect gender, if thinkers tended to downplay women while at

the same time expounding ideas that could inspire women to demand equal rights?

The links between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution have prompted particularly heated debate among historians. There is no question that Enlightenment ideas challenged the ancien régime and served to guide the revolutionaries. But historiography has shifted repeatedly in evaluating the importance of these ideas; while at one point social tensions—including unrest among peasants and artisans—prevailed over abstract ideas in historical accounts of the Revolution, in the 1990s the balance shifted back toward intellectual developments.

The Enlightenment had an impact on European societies insofar as its ideas were popularized. It was through the sale of books and pamphlets or through coffeehouse and tavern discussions that the thought of

Jean-Jacques Rousseau or Immanuel Kant managed to reach a wider public. For the first time in European history, some writers—such as Voltaire—were able to support themselves from the sale of their works. But just how deeply Enlightenment ideas penetrated society and how widely they spread has sparked much debate and inspired much imaginative historical research. The Enlightenment was most effectively popularized in western Europe. Even here, though, its forces faced competition, not only from traditional religions, but also from new faiths like Methodism in Britain and from popular writers who attacked Enlightenment rationalism, emphasizing a new, Romantic cultural approach. Finally, while the Enlightenment was an eighteenth-century movement, its impact continues well into nineteenth-century social history, where it may be traced both in politics and in popular scientific outlook.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE EMPIRE



Isser Woloch

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION

To most liberal writers looking back from the nineteenth century, the French Revolution seemed a historically ordained landmark on humankind's long, arduous, and honorable road to freedom. Its excesses were deplorable and gave serious pause but in the final analysis were incidental. In their view, agency in the French Revolution resided essentially in the middle classes, history's anointed avatars of freedom.

As marxist ideology ripened and spread at the end of the century, this emphasis on class received a new and powerful inflection. To Karl Marx and his followers the French Revolution was rooted in class struggle, its major protagonists a rising bourgeoisie (the hero in the liberal saga) and a declining but still powerful aristocracy. A subplot in the marxist drama offered a glimpse of the class struggle to come: the complex relationship during the revolutionary decade of the dominant bourgeois revolutionaries with and against the common people.

Liberal historians such as Louis-Adolphe Thiers and François-Auguste-Marie Mignet shared with the Marxists an assumption that the French Revolution had positive results of world-historic importance and had not originated from mere contingent circumstances, from mistakes of judgment, for example, by the royal court in the crisis of 1787–1789. Both perspectives saw it as a bourgeois revolution in its origins, course, outcomes, and significance. Both, in other words, provided a social interpretation of the French Revolution.

The anatomy of social class in the Old Regime.

During the first half of the twentieth century this social interpretation crystallized into a dominant historical paradigm, exemplified in the work of Georges Lefebvre, the respected dean of French revolutionary historians until his death in 1959. While the nobility of late-eighteenth-century France still maintained the highest rank and positions in society along with the

aristocratic upper clergy, Lefebvre wrote, “in reality economic power, personal abilities and confidence in the future had passed largely to the bourgeoisie. Such a discrepancy never lasts forever. The Revolution of 1789 restored the harmony between fact and law.”

This classic paradigm or orthodoxy later eroded. A growing body of research required new assessments of both the nobility and the middle classes. The stark line once presumed to have divided those social groups blurred, while internal divisions within each became more apparent. With its two traditional protagonists thus dissolving into a more complex and less tidy social landscape, the social interpretation of the revolution's origins lost its sway.

In the so-called revisionist view, one sees intra-elite jostling and conflict where once two armies of bourgeois and noble were girding for their titanic clash in 1789. Instead of a bourgeoisie we see various parochial groups at the top of the old third estate (the commoners). Merchants of course formed an important subculture; at their most dynamic they did indeed represent “money in motion,” the strategy of high risk in quest of high return, as against the minimal risk and secure if low return that funneled most people's capital into land or annuities. But such dynamic merchants were scarcely typical of the middle classes. Moreover, they often distrusted outsiders, and their “culture of the counting-house” must have seemed esoteric and arcane to others. The same was true of lawyers (barristers), attorneys, doctors, and other professionals. Meanwhile among the numerous middle-class rentiers, some identified their *état* (social status) as “bourgeois living nobly”—perhaps the most suggestive piece of social nomenclature in Old Regime society.

On the other side of the divide, the nobility formed a complex pyramid, with an enormously wealthy plutocracy at the apex whose sources of income and investments differed little from those of the wealthiest bourgeois. Nor can one legitimately see the Enlightenment as a bourgeois ideology, since many of its patrons, not to mention some of its leading writers,

came from the second estate (the nobility). Indeed, a convincing case can be made that the elites of both the second and the third estate were growing closer and more homogeneous even as their parochial rivalries and jealousies increased. While nobles assuredly retained a keener and more exclusive notion of honor, most of the elite respected the role of wealth, talent, and public service in society. Together they might well have constituted an incipient class of *notables* that would eventually render obsolete the constricting framework of first, second, and third estates. But we will never know, because the Revolution erupted in 1789.

Cultural origins? In a narrow sense, the monarchy's impending financial bankruptcy and political ineptitude in the period 1788–1789 opened the door to the French Revolution. But what deeper causes explain the explosive outcome in the summer of 1789? In the revisionist view the generative force for the French Revolution lies less in class conflict than in cultural ferment. The elites of late-eighteenth-century France constituted a cultural class. The growth of a civil society less tied to the state or to official hierarchies, the concomitant expansion of a public sphere of discourse and criticism, an expanding reading public, a publishing industry vigorously entrepreneurial

and skilled at the distribution of officially banned works—these were perhaps the incubators of revolutionary sentiment. A growing public consciousness might have eroded or “desanctified” traditional social values and political authority. Contributing to such ferment were barristers who published widely selling briefs (not subject to royal censorship) in which the private lawsuits and scandals of high aristocrats became public causes célèbres. Acrimonious controversies within and around the clergy did not help the cause of traditional orthodoxy. And in the best-selling underground books and pamphlets, the world of high royal politics was ridiculed as a sink of incompetence and corruption.

Elite elements from all three estates shared this consciousness and in 1789 constituted a self-styled “patriot party” that led the struggle first against absolutism and then against hereditary privilege. At that point the more traditional elements of the nobility balked and dug in their heels to defend the status quo. They fought to halt the transformation from its inception and at every point forward. By so doing, they set themselves apart as much-reviled “aristocrats” who stood against the interests of a virtuous people and a regenerated France. The early experience of patriot deputies to the Estates General in confronting this opposition is what made them “revolutionaries.”

SOCIETY, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE STATE

The French Revolution called into question and largely destroyed the juridical and institutional framework of traditional society. Social position and political influence would no longer correspond to divisions between the three estates. The first estate of the clergy lost its corporate standing, privileges, and special consideration, while the noble second estate lost its formal identity altogether. The nobles' fiscal and juridical privileges disappeared in 1789, and in the following year the National Assembly abolished their titles. Thereafter their situation deteriorated, as nobles became the most exposed aristocrats in an increasingly hostile environment. Their ranks were thinned by the executions of the Terror, while many who escaped by emigrating from France had their property confiscated and sold off as national properties (*biens nationaux*). In one sense this change was permanent. Nobles would never regain their full material or (except for a brief interlude between 1815 and 1830) political pre-eminence. Yet their aura of social superiority could not be entirely extinguished. The prestige of the Faubourg Saint-Germain (the neighborhood par excellence of the nobility) not only revived but flourished in the nineteenth century, as the most eminent noble families nurtured an almost racial sense of pride in their "houses," whether or not they still served the state. In this sense the Old Regime lived on in post-revolutionary France.

Revolutionary individualism. The traditional concept of liberty, however, expired almost completely. Before 1789 liberties had been understood as a series of customs, arrangements, and perquisites that conferred privileges on social groups, some corporations, and localities such as towns or provinces. In 1789 this tradition of liberty as privilege gave way to a universalized concept of liberty common to all citizens. In the economic domain this concept dictated the abolition of institutions that restricted individual initiative, such as guilds, chambers of commerce, and workers' associations. Revolutionary ideology extolled the notion of individual opportunity and competition (*émulation*). Even regulatory restrictions over the professions were reduced to a minimum or eliminated altogether to facilitate *émulation*. Instead, the competitive examination (*concours*) became a favored vehicle for achieving meritocratic selection in certain professions and branches of the armed forces.

Individualist thinking extended into family relations as well. Marriage, for example, came to be viewed as a contract between two free, consenting individuals rather than an arrangement between families

sanctified by the Catholic clergy. As a logical corollary, an unsatisfactory marriage could now be dissolved either by mutual consent or for cause, and after 1792 divorce became an option. Revolutionary legislatures lowered the age of minority while granting women greater rights in regard to property and to contracts. In the crucial matter of inheritance, regional customs and traditions favoring eldest sons gave way (at least in law) to an egalitarian individualism that required equal shares for each child, regardless of age or sex.

National integration. Lest French society be entirely atomized by such liberal individualism, however, revolutionary ideology simultaneously advanced extremely strong claims for the national state, continuing in a different register the centralizing work of the absolute monarchy. But where once the king had played both a substantive and a symbolic role in representing his people, the National Assembly stripped him of any claim to sovereignty and reduced him to a mere executive head of state with real but limited powers. The power to make laws devolved (on behalf of the sovereign people) to an elected legislature.

The National Assembly's first constitution achieved a subtle fusion of centralization and decentralization. On the one hand, it sought to establish uniformity across the variegated mosaic of French provinces and *pays*, so that French citizens, no matter where they lived, would have the same rights, powers, responsibilities, and obligations. The pyramidal and almost geometric structure of departments, districts, cantons, and communes became a blueprint for integrating villages into a new civic order, with the intention of bridging the mental and behavioral chasm between town and countryside. While this could be interpreted in the villages as an attempt by towns to impose their own interests on rural France and to dominate the countryside, it arguably inaugurated a modernizing process that proved beneficial to everyone, even if it took more than a century to complete. At the same time the revolutionaries provided for self-government—that is, for local administrative powers—so long as national law reigned supreme everywhere. As French political life grew increasingly polarized during the revolutionary decade, however, that supremacy was repeatedly challenged. Rebellion against Paris became commonplace, especially in areas hostile to the Revolution because of its religious policies or because of the imperious ways of urban revolutionaries in their departments and districts. But in the long run the design implanted by the National Assembly established a supple civic infrastructure for public services in France—an empowering framework for the collective life of the French people of town and country.

Gradually a set of normative provisions and public responsibilities entered the fabric of French collective life: the upkeep of local roads; the hiring of a rural constable (*garde champêtre*) in every village; a quasi-public poor-relief agency in every town; and (briefly in 1793–1794) a remarkable system of public-assistance entitlements paid by the national treasury. Arguably the most important public service that any state could provide to its people was primary education. Here the French Revolution made a precocious commitment to free, universal public primary education for boys and girls. The National Convention's Lakanal Law of 1794, calling for salaried male and female teachers in every commune above a certain population, was implemented in the districts for about a year before hyperinflation and a changing political climate aborted the effort. But universal public education remained a benchmark for subsequent regimes, all of which kept alive the commitment in some normative fashion.

THE REVOLUTION AND RURAL SOCIETY

If a social interpretation of the Revolution's origins has been undermined by modern research, does it still illuminate the course and consequences of the Revolution? For Marx, of course, it was all that really mattered: the Revolution marked the definitive transition from feudalism to capitalism, from the reign of the nobility to the era of the bourgeoisie. By implication at least, that interpretation grossly overestimates the role of capitalists in forwarding the Revolution; most merchants were reluctant revolutionaries who were left far behind by more aggressive lawyers, former royal officials, and the like. Similarly, the effects of the Revolution in stimulating, enabling, or advancing industrial capitalism are dubious. To be sure, the liberal ideology of 1789 and its legislative record are not inconsistent with that outcome. The revolutionaries abolished almost all privileged corporations; formalized the Old Regime's prohibitions against trade unions and strikes; abolished most forms of state intervention in the economy; and on paper at least, granted to individuals maximal freedom to pursue their economic interests. But for the most part the era of the Revolution and empire was an ordeal rather than a golden age for maritime commerce, capitalist innovation, and industrial entrepreneurs.

On the other hand, a strong case can be made for the impact of the Revolution on landed society. "The National Assembly hereby completely abolishes the feudal system": thus began the historic decree of 4 August 1789 that forever destroyed several key un-

derpinnings of the Old Regime social order. Technically, feudalism as a sociopolitical system of vassalage had long since disappeared in France, so the term "feudalism" is wildly misleading. But insofar as the word stigmatized France's pervasive skein of social, corporate, and regional privileges (and that was its most common contemporary usage), feudalism was very much alive in 1789. This was especially true of seigneurialism in the French countryside. The 4 August decree dissected seigneurialism, abolishing on the spot certain seigneurial prerogatives while leaving others to an uncertain fate, which popular mobilization eventually resolved.

The abolition of seigneurialism. Thus the Assembly without hesitation abolished seigneurial hunting rights. Previously, local lords (*seigneurs*) were free to hunt over any land in their jurisdiction, no matter who farmed it and without regard to the depredations they might cause; the right to hunt was more or less reserved exclusively to them. The Revolution's affirmation of a right to hunt on one's property in 1789 in fact led to an orgy of hunting and an ecologically dubious slaughter of game. (Later this right to hunt would be restricted by the imposition of steep gun-licensing fees.) Similarly, the Assembly suppressed seigneurial courts, previously the lowest tier of both criminal and civil justice in the French countryside.

Judges appointed by the lords had often used their powers in this system to further the interests of their employers in disputes with their peasants. The Revolution replaced these generally unpopular and incompetent officials with locally elected justices of the peace who brought a far more accessible, honest, expeditious, and inexpensive form of conflict resolution to the French countryside—a reform that endured through every subsequent political upheaval.

The Assembly also abolished other elements of seigneurialism that it stigmatized as personal or servile obligations, such as demeaning labor or transport services owed by peasants to their lords, and seigneurial monopolies over ovens, winepresses, and olive presses. But property dues and rights that the Assembly considered legitimate—deriving from concessions to peasants of land held originally by lords in exchange for payment of various kinds—were not abolished. True, the Assembly considered such obligations outmoded and regressive, in contrast to a straightforward contractual obligation to pay rent. It hoped ultimately to disentangle land from considerations of social status and thus to commodify land completely. The Assembly ultimately expected these seigneurial rights—quitrents (*cens*), harvest dues (*champarts*, *tasques*), and heavy transfer fees (*lods et ventes*)—to disappear. But it would promote that goal only by making such dues redeemable (at great cost) by the peasants subject to them, so as not to trample the legitimate property rights of the lords. (The Assembly approached the question of venal offices somewhat differently. Stigmatizing the purchase of public offices as obsolete and objectionable, it recognized existing offices as a form of property. In this case, however, the state simply abolished all such venal offices but generously indemnified their owners for the losses.)

The distinction between illegitimate “servile” seigneurial rights and legitimate if obsolete seigneurial dues as property made eminent sense to the learned jurists who framed this legislation. But their blueprint left an onerous burden on peasants who might hope to buy their way out of those obligations. In fact, the vast majority of peasants considered the distinction meaningless, condemned the seigneurial system, and were determined to demolish it—by lawsuits, by passive resistance (not paying any of these dues), and in many parts of France by direct action (specifically, resuming the “war on the châteaux” that had first erupted in the summer of 1789 and had provoked the 4 August decree). After France went to war in 1792 and the government in Paris needed to rally popular support, it finally bowed to this popular pressure and in 1793 abolished all seigneurial obligations without any compensation.

Agrarian innovation? The abolition of seigneurialism did not in itself modify the ownership of France’s arable land. Land owned by the lords, whether as part of their direct domain (*demesne*) or as parcels that they rented to peasants, remained their property, and the rents or crop shares continued to be paid. Whether the abolition of seigneurialism opened the way to a more capitalist agrarian system is another question. Some historians have argued that seigneurialism itself—by virtue of the lord’s enormous power over land and families—had permitted market-driven innovation in regions such as Burgundy. Hence, by strengthening the small peasant’s position, the abolition of seigneurialism retarded capitalist innovation, since most peasant smallholders sought security in habit and tended to resist the risk-reward enticements of serious innovation. A different kind of argument supports the same net conclusion. Many lords in France’s more backward regions (and even in places like Burgundy) had been content to extract income from their tenants without any interest in productive methods or innovation. After 1789 they simply continued to rent out their parcels of land under short-term leases that discouraged innovation, often under sharecropping (*métayage*) arrangements. In this respect the abolition of seigneurialism would have done little to stimulate agrarian capitalism.

But an alternative perspective would suggest that the Revolution brought a turning point in French agrarian history by favoring the large peasant-proprietors. Such men indisputably gained a more advantageous position in rural society after the abolition of seigneurialism. Operating with less constraint and more income at their disposal, they could better capitalize on market opportunities and in due course increase production by way of innovation. The other major agrarian change brought by the Revolution might have reinforced this effect.

Revolutionary land transfers. A great quantity of land changed hands as a direct result of the French Revolution. The church collectively owned approximately 10 percent of the land in France. The rental income from this land constituted one of the church’s two main sources of revenue abolished in the 4 August decree, the other being the tithe. The Assembly proceeded to nationalize the church’s property—to put its land “at the disposition of the nation.” The state would now take responsibility for maintaining the church and paying the clergy’s salaries. Meanwhile, it would gradually sell off the land and use the income to pay down the enormous state debt that had precipitated the crisis of the royal government and the calling of the Estates General.



DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL PROPERTY

The historian Georges Lefebvre tracked the sale of the *biens nationaux* in one department in the north of France, where the church had owned 20 percent of the land (an unusually large amount) before 1789. Altogether, 20,300 peasants purchased 52 percent of this property (totaling 71,500 hectares), while 7,500 bourgeois purchased 48 percent (65,700 hectares). But those raw totals do not tell the whole story. Lefebvre looked in detail at the land that ended up in peasant hands and found that the lion's share went to a very small number of already-wealthy peasants. During a brief interval when land was being sold in smaller plots or to syndicates of peasants, 90 percent of the peasant purchasers came onto the scene and acquired about 40 percent of the land that ultimately went to peasants. But another 9 percent of peasant purchasers bought up 39 percent of the total peasant acquisitions in parcels ranging from 5 to 40 hectares, while a mere 1 percent (or about 200 peasants) came away with 21 percent of the total, usually in lots greater than 40 hectares.

France had long possessed an active and complex land market—with ownership distributed across the social order: nobility, church, urban middle class, and peasants. This complexity resulted in great competitiveness for land—by far the dominant source of wealth and status as well as subsistence. Now up to a tenth of France's land was to come on the market. While some believed that this could be used to turn landless peasants into proprietors—that it could support a social policy of redistribution—most insisted that since the purpose of nationalization was financial, the terms of transfer had to maximize the inflow of revenue to the state treasury. Hence the *biens nationaux* (national properties), as this land was now called, were sold off in large rather than small plots and at auction in the district capitals rather than in the localities. Therefore, most of the former church land ended up in the hands of the wealthy urban middle class and the large peasants, while first-time peasant owners acquired relatively little. The same was true of a second component of the *biens nationaux*, the land of the émigrés confiscated by the state after they were

banned from returning to France on pain of death in 1793.

Although the *biens nationaux* were generally sold in large plots beyond the reach of small peasants, some of this land came back on the market when the original purchasers subdivided their acquisitions and resold them. In Alsace it would appear that the proportion of peasant purchasers thereby ultimately reached as high as 80 percent. Nonetheless, the typical purchaser was a wealthy middle-class person or a large-scale peasant. These purchasers, among other things, now had the most tangible interest in the success of the Revolution and in resisting counter-revolution, whose triumph would jeopardize their acquisitions.

The peasant community. Before the Revolution many regions of France sustained a strong peasant communalism. Peasant interdependence revolved around shared routines of husbandry and use of common land for grazing (when such property was not leased out to produce income for common village expenses). In open-field regions in the north and center all cultivators followed similar agrarian practices, including the right of “vacant pasture,” which opened fields to grazing by the livestock of all citizens in a village right after the harvest. Progressive thinking generally condemned such practices as a drag on individual initiative, innovation, and productivity. French agrarian reformers (*agronomes*) advocated changes comparable to the English model of agrarian modernization: the rearrangement of small scattered plots into large compact farms, the enclosure of those farms, and the division of common land so that it could be cleared and incorporated into the arable. The inertia of landlords and peasants, misgivings among some provincial royal authorities, and occasional resistance by peasants had defeated most efforts to introduce such changes before 1789.

With its ideology of liberal individualism, the Revolution promised new departures in this area. The National Assembly proclaimed that individuals should be free to use their land as they saw fit, without communal constraints. But it proved impossible to legislate such a notion. Communalism, vacant pasture, and the like were too deeply ingrained. The common lands (*biens communaux*), however, presented an especially inviting and tangible target. Considered by most political economists an unproductive, regressive use of resources, the common lands were also eyed by small or landless peasants in certain regions as a way of finally coming into possession of their own land. On the other side, wealthy peasants who maintained large flocks of livestock might favor the status quo in which the common land helped support their sub-

stantial grazing needs. The interests at play were complex and difficult to predict. In any case, in the same radical climate that abolished seigneurial rights, the National Convention passed a law in June 1793 authorizing the division of common land if one-third of a village's households voted to do so. Such a division would provide each household with an equal share of land, which could not be immediately resold. Some common land was duly divided under this policy, but local contention and indecision limited its effect. In 1795 the Convention suspended the law, which was annulled in 1797. The status quo of village communalism survived largely intact, perhaps above all because it provided security to most peasants.

THE SANSCULOTTES

After centuries of oligarchic rule under the sway of the monarchy, France's cities and towns vaulted toward democracy in 1789. In Paris and in twenty-six of the thirty largest cities, municipal revolutions ousted royal officials or traditional ruling cliques and installed broader-based local governments reflecting "patriot" sentiment. National legislation soon normalized this transformation, providing for the popular election of mayors and town councils in all towns and villages. Middle-class groups dominated the scene at first, but gradually the sansculottes—local businessmen, master artisans, journeymen, shopkeepers, white-collar employees, and wage earners—invaded the political arena as well.

Revolutionary crowds. Revolutionary crowds first appeared during the historic mass protests (*journées*) of 1789 in Paris, when spontaneous mobilizations saved an imperiled National Assembly by storming the Bastille in July and forcibly returned the royal family to Paris from Versailles in October. Subsequent mobilizations were less spontaneous but equally large and momentous: the Parisian insurrection of 10 August 1792 that drove Louis XVI from the throne; the armed demonstration of 2 June 1793 that forced the National Convention to purge the Girondins; and the menacing mass demonstration of 5 September 1793 that led the convention "to place terror on the order of the day." The Parisian crowd was arguably the most tangible force propelling the Revolution forward. At the least these crowds are remembered as the Revolution's most visible social phenomenon—the symbol or embodiment, at least in its own eyes, of popular will and the power of an aroused people. The last *journée* of the revolutionary decade came in the spring of 1795, at the height of the Thermidorian reaction, when embittered and desperate Parisian sansculottes stormed the Convention to demand food and to resuscitate the moribund democratic constitution of 1793. The repression that followed, coupled with an increasingly vigilant policing of the capital, put an end to the revolutionary crowd but not to its memory. In July 1830 and in 1848—not only in Paris but in several European capitals—revolutionary crowds, conscious of their historic antecedents, again made history.

The Paris sections. The sansculottes did not appear on the revolutionary stage solely in this spasmodic, episodic guise. In remarkable fashion they established an ongoing presence in municipal life, especially in the forty-eight sections, or neighborhood wards, of Paris. From the bottom up, and outside the prescribed framework of local government, the Parisian sansculottes built an unprecedented participatory infrastructure. Each section had a general assembly (much like a New England town meeting), an executive committee, a revolutionary committee to deal with “suspects,” a welfare committee, a force of national guardsmen, and an elected police commissioner and justice of the peace. Thus the sections resembled forty-eight small Rousseauesque republics where direct democracy seemed to be operative.

In reality, that image is deceptive. In each section small and shifting local oligarchies dominated. In social terms these leadership cadres have been aptly described as a “sansculotte bourgeoisie”—not the oxymoron it may seem. Many men who thought of themselves as sansculottes were property owners, often employers of artisanal labor, shopkeepers, or local entrepreneurs. Deeply rooted in their communities, they were advocates for their proletarian neighbors, whom they could mobilize for action. These cadres of sectional militants numbered no more than five or six thousand in a city of about 600,000, but they formed

a new kind of socially heterogeneous and populist elite. Intensely preoccupied if not obsessed with the issue of subsistence supplies and bread prices, ferociously antiaristocratic, and sentimentally egalitarian, they were pedagogues to their more plebeian neighbors in the revolutionary ideology of fraternity and civic equality. Believers in as much direct democracy as possible, they distrusted the National Convention even while serving as its fiercest partisans. They backed the war effort to the hilt on the home front and advocated redistributive Jacobin social policies, such as national pension entitlements for needy working families with children.

Provincial militants. While never as dominant or as well organized as in Paris, sansculottes could be found in many other towns, filling local Jacobinic clubs (*sociétés populaires*), staffing revolutionary committees, and manning ad hoc paramilitary battalions formed to provide “force behind the laws” of the Terror. Wary like their Parisian counterparts of the motivation and behavior of rural citizens, the provincial sansculottes were obsessed with the requisitioning of food supplies (on which urban consumers as well as the armed forces depended) and the imposition of price controls. They were also the staunchest partisans of the Terror and of the most radical “de-Christianization” initiatives of 1793–1794—harassment of constitutional

priests, rituals of blasphemy in church buildings, and the conversion of churches to “temples of reason.”

It has been easy to demonize the sansculottes for their fanaticism, violence, populist intolerance, and philistinism. But it has also been tempting to romanticize them, as Richard Cobb has done. As the historian of the sansculottes’ paramilitary battalions (*armées révolutionnaires*), a key instrument of the Terror, Cobb admired their spontaneous revolutionary enthusiasm. He defined them less by their mixed and largely popular social composition than by their temperament—imprudent, naive, dogmatic, fervent. In his mind they were the opposite of the “possibilists” and the calculating “revolutionary bureaucrats” (chief among them Maximilien Robespierre). While this is an interesting way to see the sansculottes, their significance is perhaps greater in more conventional social terms. In the sansculottes the chasm between elites and popular masses was briefly bridged. Their leaders may have been men of property, but that did not prevent them from fraternizing with ordinary workers, fulminating against aristocrats and *les gros*, and propagating egalitarian values.

The social amalgam of sansculottes would have been unthinkable before 1789, when men who worked with their hands had scarcely anything in common with the educated, propertied elites. And in 1848 scant possibility remained of resuscitating that amalgam. By then the social mix had disaggregated, notably by way of the national guard in the 1815–1848 period. Far more than the notorious plutocrats of those decades, the national guard drew a stark line through the social order between the working man who could not afford the uniform necessary for membership and the lower-middle-class master artisan or shopkeeper who could. Thus, the June days of 1848 provided the final epitaph for the remarkable phenomenon of sansculottism in the French Revolution.

THE NAPOLEONIC REGIME AND FRENCH SOCIETY

On 18 Brumaire Year VIII (9 November 1799) a group of disillusioned republican moderates joined forces with General Napoleon Bonaparte to overthrow the Directory. While the politicians did not desire or foresee the emergence of an untrammled dictatorship in France or a French empire stretching across Europe, they did envisage the pacification of a society fractured by a decade of revolution. First they eliminated the unpredictable annual elections and the governmental instability that ensued. While maintaining the republic in name, they put in place a strong centralized

government headed by General Bonaparte and a legislature that was little more than a co-optive oligarchy. Within two or three years the Napoleonic regime forged the outlines of a social settlement. Civil equality and the abolition of seigneurialism would stand as the fundamental social gains of the Revolution. The transfer of the *biens nationaux* would be irrevocable. Émigrés would be allowed to return and the Vendée rebels pardoned as long as they submitted to the laws. Social peace would be promoted by a reinstatement of the Catholic Church by a concordat negotiated with Rome in 1801.

The self-constituted governing oligarchy of Brumaire largely comprised moderate parliamentary veterans of the revolutionary regimes. Most moved directly from the defunct legislative houses of the Directory era into the new institutions created after Brumaire: a Senate; a bicameral, rubber-stamp parliament; an apolitical Council of State to draft laws at the behest of first consul Bonaparte; and a corps of appointed prefects who would replace the locally elected departmental administrations of the revolutionary decade. Continuity and consolidation brought an unprecedented degree of security, both political and financial, for these men of the Revolution. The vast majority of his collaborators proved so grateful to Napoleon that they readily supported him in his most extravagant ambitions.

Elite formation: Notables and nobles. What of provincial society under the Napoleonic regime? The government assembled lists of the six hundred largest taxpayers in each of the ninety-odd departments. The regime thereby identified the important local people who were likely to have networks of clients under their influence. Informally, at least, these men became the new *notables* of France and later of the non-French areas of the empire. The regime could confer tangible recognition on these *notables* in various ways, such as appointing them to honorific posts in departmental electoral colleges or local advisory councils.

This process of regime-sponsored elite formation reached a climax with the creation of a Napoleonic nobility in 1808. An emperor, after all, needs a nobility and courtiers to refract his own pretensions. But this was to be a nobility based on state service, military and civil, and solid wealth. (“Such titles will henceforth serve only to mark for public recognition those who are already noted for their services, for their devotion to the prince and the fatherland.”) The first cohorts were filled with the generals, senators, and counselors of state intimately associated with the regime. Later, however, Napoleon cultivated prominent Old Regime nobles by conferring new titles on them.

SECTION 2: THE PERIODS OF SOCIAL HISTORY

Thus the Napoleonic nobility was a novel amalgam reflecting the emperor's eclectic ideas about the basis for high status. By 1814, 3,263 citizens of the empire had received titles, with 59 percent bestowed on military officers and 22 percent on high state functionaries; over a fifth of the Napoleonic nobility came from noble families of the Old Regime.

While Napoleon's permanent legacies to modern France were institutional—the corps of prefects, the Council of State, the centralized university, the Bank of France, the civil and criminal codes—his concept of *notables* also proved durable. When the Old Regime nobility regained its titles and recovered its prestige after the Restoration, the Bourbon also recognized the titles of the Napoleonic nobility, perhaps giving the whole idea of a French nobility greater credibility. More important, the idea of provincial *notables* identifiable by their superior level of property and land taxes regardless of birth endured through much of the nineteenth century. Napoleon thereby helped realize the vision in progressive thought before 1789 of an amalgam of wealth and talent from across the three estates—a true elite in which birth alone would not be decisive.

Conscription. Another practice of the Napoleonic regime proved equally durable and of far greater consequence: the claim of the state on young men for military service. Initiated as a one-time emergency measure in 1793—the *levée en masse* in which all single, able-bodied young men were drafted into the army—military conscription was enacted on a formal basis by the Directory in 1798, but it was only under Napoleon that it was consolidated, rendered permanent, and integrated into the normative fabric of social life. At first the draft evasion that had plagued the troop levies of the Convention and the Directory continued under Napoleon. But gradually by persistence, intense commitments at every level, improved administrative methods, and sheer coercion, the Napoleonic state broke the back of this endemic resistance and made conscription a routine obligation throughout the empire. By winning this battle Napoleon assured a steady flow of manpower into his increasingly large and far-flung armies. But perhaps more important, by decisively establishing this power of the state over society, the Napoleonic regime created the prototype for the mass conscript armies and reserve forces that nearly destroyed European society a century later.

See also France (in this volume); Land Tenure; The Liberal State; Military Service; Peasant and Farming Villages; Serfdom: Western Europe (volume 2); The Aristocracy and Gentry; Collective Action; Revolutions; Urban Crowds (volume 3); Patriarchy (volume 4); Journalism (volume 5).

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY



Timothy B. Smith

Many historians, including Theodore Hamerow, argue that the period 1815 to 1914 marks a distinct epoch in human history—an age dominated by the spirit of industry and commerce, the rise of democracy, the triumph of science, and the emergence of an almost religious faith in the idea of progress. As Hamerow stresses, no comparable change in the way of life had occurred since the prehistoric era, when humans made the leap from nomadism to farming, permanent settlements, and animal husbandry.

In 1800, Europe was closer to the old world of enlightened despotism, monarchy, and preindustrial modes of production than it was to the modern world. Europe was overwhelmingly rural and, with the exception of England, identities revolved around the local community, not the nation. By 1914, much of Europe had industrialized, become urban, and embraced democracy, the ideology and practice of individualism, consumerism, and the ideal (if not practice) of social mobility. The state had been transformed from a provider of basic security to a provider of social welfare, at least in parts of Europe (Germany and Britain in particular). Social welfare legislation had been introduced by the 1880s, and by 1914 many European nations had crude forms of welfare states. Legal privilege was gone or under intense attack. Societies organized around birth and divided according to estates or orders gave way by 1900 to class-divided societies, in which the main fault lines were economic, not based on birth.

During the nineteenth century, Europe prospered as never before. From a population of just under 200 million in 1800, the continent grew to 401 million in 1900, at which point there were also 100 million North Americans and 40 million Latin Americans of European descent. Europeans constituted 25 percent of the world's population but produced more than 60 percent of the world's manufactured goods. (At the end of the twentieth century Europe represented less than 10 percent of the world's population and produced less than 30 percent of all manufactured goods.) Reliable food supplies, better diet, stricter

housing and public health regulations, and a period of prolonged peace and economic prosperity had conspired to lift many parts of Europe out of the age-old Malthusian trap. During the nineteenth century, the crop cycle was finally tamed even if the business cycle was not. A sign of Europe's prosperity was the sudden and dramatic drop in the birthrate in the two decades before World War I. The rate of death by infectious diseases—another sign of the relative health of European society—was also on the decline in the period 1880–1914. As people became richer and more children survived into adulthood, families became smaller and expectations of material comfort rose, as did hope for the future.

By 1900, no continent, no region of the world had been left untouched by Europe, for better or for worse. Each year between 1871 and 1914, the European imperialist powers added an area the size of France to their empires. European superiority in technology—weaponry, steamships, battleships, industrial production, and military organization—made this possible, backed by Europe's belief in its inherent superiority. This confidence was grounded in a faith that European science and rationalism were necessarily superior to superstition. Machines, Michael Adas writes, were seen as the measure of men. The imbalance between Europe (and its settlements in North America) and the rest of the world in scientific knowledge and industrial capacity is one of the most important developments in world history since 1800.

Having said this, Europe was by no means a monolithic bloc in 1900. Much of the European peasantry was still mired in poverty, superstition, and tradition. Typhus and tuberculosis still stalked the poor. Approximately one-third of the population of London was considered poor. More than half of the French population still lived in small rural villages and towns. Tens of thousands of Russian peasants starved in the 1890s and 1900s. More than half of all Italians were illiterate in 1900. As a whole, and in relation to the rest of the world, the continent was indeed very rich, having accumulated layers of wealth and knowledge

over the centuries in its urban banks, corporations, academies, and universities. But, generally speaking, in the countryside (and in several regions) things were often quite different.

The popular image of the nineteenth century, however, is dominated by two major themes: 1) this was the age of the industrial revolution across Europe and North America; 2) this was also the age of political revolution, the century that witnessed the rise of democracy. It is not difficult to find convincing evidence to support these obvious facts. But this image of the nineteenth century may be colored excessively by the English, French, and American experiences, which were anything but typical. In fact, a good case could be made that continental European countries, whose economic, political, and social development was slower, represented the norm. In other words, it was the English, in particular, who deviated from the European norm.

In the case of the industrial revolution there is a common view that it began in England in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and by the nineteenth century (and certainly by 1914) Europeans had moved to the mines, the mills, and the factories, or to the city. In fact, as Maxine Berg and others remind us, this was not even true for most English workers as late as the 1850s. Most Russians, Portuguese, Spaniards, and Italians were still peasants in the 1890s, and half of France was still engaged in agriculture. By 1850, there were still only 400,000 factory workers in

all of France—one tenth of the entire manufacturing labor force. In England, they constituted one-half of the manufacturing labor force. Not until the last two decades of the century did the French and Italian economies really take off and become more urban-industrial. But as late as 1900, some 60 percent of French workers still worked in units of under ten employees. Industrial change and urbanization was rapid where it occurred (especially in England, Belgium, and Germany) but in many nations, including France, Italy, and Russia, urban-industrial society was concentrated in only a few places.

The nineteenth century was thus a time of great social change, but not for all people and all places. Pockets of misery, traditionalism, and inertia persisted into the twentieth century, escaping the winds of industrial, political, and social change. This is as true for Sicily and Spain as it is for large regions of central Europe, Russia, the Balkans, and even parts of France. There is a danger, however, in overemphasizing what did not change. Viewed through the lens of social history, the picture can become nuanced to the point where one loses a sense of the greater whole. Even as we distinguish between the varying rates of social change in different parts of Europe, and as we distinguish between the period 1815–1870 and the period 1870–1914 (the age of the second industrial revolution and the age of rapid urban growth), the general argument holds true: the nineteenth century in Europe witnessed more important social, economic, sci-

entific, and industrial changes than all previous eras of history combined.

THE BOURGEOIS CENTURY?

For many scholars who have written general histories of the century, including Roger Magraw, Harold Perkin, William Reddy, and Geoff Eley and David Blackburn, the nineteenth century was the “bourgeois century,” the age of the middle class, the age of commerce and the pursuit of wealth. The idea that the middling classes took over European society during the nineteenth century has a long pedigree. In *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote these famous words:

the bourgeoisie has . . . since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. . . . [which] during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together.

Marx and Engels had a tendency to overstate their case. But certainly at some point in the nineteenth century the middle class exerted considerable influence on politics and in the realm of culture. In some nations, this occurred later in the century; in Britain, much earlier. Some of the key achievements of the century were: freedom of commerce, freedom of association, freedom of profession, an end to the key legal privileges of the aristocracy, free trade, freedom of religion, and written constitutions. Through the spread of such civic or cultural institutions as museums, the opera, zoos, and a flourishing press, the middling ranks set the tone for society.

Not everyone would agree with this argument. Some, like the historian Arno Mayer, would argue that in fact the aristocracy continued to dominate political and civil society right up to World War I. Others, such as Peter Gay, view the notion of a rising bourgeoisie as a “folktale” begun by Marx. In his influential study of the European and American middle classes during the nineteenth century, *The Bourgeois Experience*, Gay emphasizes the anxiety that permeated the middle classes: they knew they were not of the aristocracy above them, and they feared the workers beneath them. Everywhere the bourgeoisie attempted to reshape values, politics, and institutions in their image, all the while remaining a distinct minority of the population. In nineteenth-century Bochum and Barmen (Germany), only 10 to 12 percent of the population could claim bourgeois status. In Paris, per-

haps 15 percent could. The bourgeoisie had universal pretensions but not powers. Like Theodore Zeldin, Gay emphasizes the various fractured group identities within the middling ranks.

If the nineteenth century was indeed the bourgeois century, it nevertheless cannot be understood without reference to the continuing social, economic, and above all political power of the nobility. This is as true for England as it is for France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. The old French nobility still owned one-fifth of the land in 1815. They continued to wield their social and political influence in rural France, especially in the poorer areas of the center and the west. Patronage was dispensed and political influence flowed from it. The church also retained its strong social and political influence into the twentieth century in many parts of rural France. Politics took a turn toward social inclusiveness beginning only in the 1870s, when the *nouvelles couches sociales* (new social types, or layers) were finally admitted to the political nation. At precisely this time, in the three decades before World War I, the European nobility lost economic power as agriculture prices plummeted (due to overproduction and North American competition). The new middling ranks born of commerce and industry were only too happy to nudge aside the nobility and seize the reins of government. Arguably, they succeeded only at the local level.

This process was gradual: the aristocracy still dominated the upper houses of most European legislatures, as well as the military and foreign service. Likewise, the peasantry remained the dominant social group right up until 1900. The survival of a large traditionalist and semiliterate peasant sector engaged in subsistence agriculture was the key obstacle to faster economic growth. The peasantry owned nearly half the land in nineteenth-century France, and it retarded economic growth, as it did in Spain, Italy, and eastern Europe. This basic fact explains the general economic backwardness of several areas in 1914, compared with Europe’s two most dynamic economies of the time: Germany and Britain.

And yet, even as we accept these caveats, as well as Gay’s nuanced portrayal of a complicated situation, it cannot be denied that there was a segment of the population—the middle classes—that managed to have the entire legal and economic framework of society recast in its favor by 1914. One of the many merits of Gay’s work is his emphasis on the movement and uncertainty of a century that called myriad accepted truths to question.

Gay emphasizes that during the nineteenth century, everything was called into question: from the very foundations of religious principles to political princi-

ples, social ideals, and sexual morality. The century witnessed the rise of the worker's movement, the feminist movement, evolutionary biology, universal male suffrage, the end of slavery, and so on. The late nineteenth century, Stephen Kern reminds us, broke down the age-old barriers of distance, as fast steamships, the railroad, and the telegraph helped to link rural Europe to its capital cities and Europe to the world.

A CONTINENT ON THE MOVE

Between the 1820s and 1920s, over 60 million Europeans left for the New World. Globalization began in the nineteenth century, as Europeans carved up the world amongst themselves, linking it together with the "Victorian Internet" (the telegraph) and the steamship. Most European emigrants settled in North America, but several million headed for South America and Australia. Several hundred thousand French colonized Algeria. Within Europe, migration was equally important, as the countryside emptied into the cities. Paris had a population of fewer than 600,000 in 1800; by 1900, it had grown to well over 2.5 million. Most of this increase came from migration from the countryside. Similarly, Berlin grew from 170,000 in 1800 to 420,000 in 1850 to 2 million in 1900 and then 4 million in 1925. In Germany, the number of cities with a population of over 100,000 increased from 2 to 48 between 1830 and 1914. Most of this growth

occurred after 1870. Although the European population doubled between 1800 and 1900, its urban population increased by an unprecedented 600 percent. This created great strains on resources, but it also led to an effervescence of urban culture. Museums, public libraries, sports arenas, gardens, concert halls, and new parliamentary houses were erected across urban Europe. Rapid urban growth magnified social problems and brought them into sharper focus; collectivist remedies resulted.

The social impact of these movements of people was enormous. In 1830 the German town of Bochum was a sleepy town of 4,000. By 1900, it was a city of 65,000, and when neighboring industrial suburbs are included, an area with a population of 120,000 and an industrial labor force of 50,000. The vast majority of this population increase was due to immigration into the city. Nothing like this had ever happened before in history—to be sure, large cities had witnessed rapid growth (London in the eighteenth century, for instance), but never before had small towns been transformed into industrial cities in the span of one or two generations.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY

The French Revolution is traditionally designated as the turning point between "early modern" European

history and “modern Europe,” or Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. More and more, however, there is a tendency among historians to downplay the social impact of the French Revolution. It is still common to portray it as a political and legal revolution of the greatest magnitude, but it is less common to stress its immediate social impact. Similarly, far from being a shot in the arm for capitalism, as Marxist historians used to claim, the Revolution probably retarded capital accumulation, (at least in France), by confirming the division of the nation’s rural property into millions of smallholding plots. But in the long term, there is no doubt that the Revolution reconfigured the basic legal and political structures of France (and of parts of Germany, Italy, Belgium, and other parts touched by Napoleon’s armies) in a way conducive to the development of a more commercially vibrant and socially fluid society.

The impact of the Revolution was not necessarily immediate, but over the course of the nineteenth century, dozens of ideals and goals proclaimed during the 1790s came to fruition in France and across western Europe. After the Revolution, most major western European states introduced some form of semidemocratic forum or parliament, with some form of limited suffrage (voting rights) for men of property. The Revolution gave rise to the concept of “human rights,” and over the course of the nineteenth century political, civil, and human rights were gradually extended to all men (and to some women). Chief among these was the principle of equality before the law, the end of legal privilege for the aristocracy. Some feminist scholarship stresses the idea that political equality between the sexes, while proclaimed during the Revolution, was in fact set back several decades, and that, on the contrary, the nineteenth century witnessed the legal codification of *inequality* between the sexes, as in the Napoleonic Code. The lynchpin in the Napoleonic system, where male-female relations were concerned, was the concept of the *chef du famille*. Upon marriage, women became the property of their husbands. Formerly, of course, they were the property of their father or their brothers. The concept of the *chef du famille* forbade women to own property in their names, to make decisions concerning their children, where the family would live, and so on. Women could not serve on juries in many countries or even testify in court. If the Revolution created a more rigidly gendered legal system, it also provided for uniformity of other laws: henceforth there would be one legal system for one country.

During the nineteenth century, the old corporate order was demolished in nation after nation. A more absolute conception of private property rights

(that is, the end of feudal dues and obligations, and the end of the seigneurial system of property) was codified in the law. The ownership of property became the fundamental basis of the new bourgeois political order. In France between 1791 and 1848, holders of property generally had greater political rights than the propertyless. Property rather than privilege became, as Sewell says, “the symbolic and practical hinge of the new political order” (p. 138).

The economic ramifications of the abolition of legal and commercial privilege, and above all the abolition of the guild system, were significant. After the French Revolution (and by the 1850s in most of western Europe), relations between employer and employee were free conventions between individuals. There were no barriers keeping a journeyman from becoming a master craftsman; he could go into business by himself, for himself, as soon as his savings enabled him to do so. This was a great boost to competition, trade, and capitalism. Employers and em-

ployees were no longer superiors and subordinates, operating according to the traditional rules of a guild. Now they were either individual proprietors or propertyless proletarians, linked only through the free market, through the cash nexus. If the Revolution did not lead, overnight, to the modern industrial society of the late nineteenth century, it certainly cleared France (and its principles soon cleared most of western Europe) of what Marx called the “medieval rubbish” standing in the way of dynamic capitalism.

THE RISE OF THE WORKING CLASS

The rise of working-class consciousness is another key development in nineteenth-century social history, and it is directly related to the emergence of a more liberal-individualistic political order discussed above. The worker question dominated European politics until the 1950s, when the brightest flames of labor radicalism were finally extinguished by prosperity. In 1900, labor conflict was threatening to tear European society apart—or so many people thought at the time.

In 1800, most European workers had very few rights beyond a few paper, or legal, ones, which really had little impact on their economic well-being. Mistreatment by bosses was expected; there was no notion of workplace safety or worker’s rights (a rudimentary form of worker’s compensation emerged in France and Italy in 1898). When the century began, horizontal, cross-occupational class consciousness was in its infancy. Things changed in the 1830s as the urban artisanate was threatened by mechanization and deskilling, and by 1900 parts of Europe (especially Germany and northern Italy) were polarized into easily identifiable, hostile social classes. Scholars such as E. P. Thompson, Gareth Stedman Jones, Louise Tilly, William Reddy, and William Sewell have provided us with detailed studies of this topic. Urban uprisings and revolutions in 1830, 1848, and 1871 (the Paris Commune); 1905 (in Russia and Poland); and 1914 (Red Week in Italy) pit workers against the bourgeois state.

What were workers’ grievances? During the nineteenth century the law of supply and demand assaulted the traditional rights of labor, and displaced the traditional concept of “just” prices (for bread or wages). Liberal political economy replaced an older, apparently more humane (at least to many scholars) “moral economy.” New “time-discipline” techniques were introduced in factories; “Saint-Monday” was eliminated as workers were pressed into a new, more rigid mold. By 1900, traditional communal usage rights over the land—to glean the stubble of the har-

vest, to forage, to squat, to collect wood in the forest, to traverse properties—were eroded by the developing civil codes of central states. Property was increasingly protected by a thick layer of laws, to the benefit of owners.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the old webs of paternalism were unraveling at the local level or were simply broken as a matter of central-state policy, and peasants and workers were increasingly left to fend for themselves. The law was unabashedly biased in favor of property and sometimes in favor of birth (as with the three-tiered voting system in Prussia), but nowhere was it resolutely on the side of the common person. In France, labor law was blatantly biased in favor of bosses, against the interests of workers. The Napoleonic Code, copied in Italy, Belgium, and parts of southern Germany, declared that in disputes between bosses and employees, the bosses were to be taken at their word. Until 1890, French industrial workers were required to carry a sort of internal passport as a means of social control.

If the middle classes increasingly set the tone of civil and political life, the emerging working class increasingly resented this tone. By the late nineteenth century, the battle lines had been drawn clearly between the new classes called forth by industrialization. The old guard, the aristocracy, tried to hold the dyke. It was challenged by the middling ranks, who in turn were challenged by the growing ranks of the working classes. Charles Tilly has estimated that the number of urban proletarians in Europe increased from 10 million in 1800 to 75 million in 1900 (Tilly, in Merriam, 1979). Some industrial cities might be 80 to 90 percent proletarian. These new, “dangerous classes” stirred fear in the hearts of European elites. Henri Mendras and Alistair Cole argue that in nineteenth-century France a clear class structure emerged, which today has become blurred beyond recognition. Prior to 1914, France was clearly divided between the peasantry, the working class, the middle class, and the leisured upper-middle class (and remnants of the nobility) at the top. Class divisions and resentments were ingrained and a very real part of people’s lives.

FROM THE FAMILY ECONOMY TO THE FACTORY

The process was not linear and it did not occur overnight, but ultimately, in nation after nation, by World War I, the industrial revolution 1) removed most manufacturing work from the home; 2) segregated it by gender; 3) organized it into twelve-hour shifts (or some rigid length of time); 4) brought a new, less

rooted population to the city; and 5) eroded, to varying degrees, the old craft-based economy.

As Elinor Accampo argues in her detailed study of Saint-Chamond (France), the early-nineteenth-century urban economy was small-scale, cohesive, and artisanal. Work and family were inextricably linked. Wives and children often participated in the “family economy.” Fathers and mothers often passed on skills to sons and daughters. The family economic unit was characterized by relative stability, in that the ribbon maker’s son grew up knowing that he would most likely do what his father had done—and his father and mother would train him. In this system of domestic production, skills themselves became a sort of property. This shaped children’s worldviews, expectations, and determined whom they might marry. Few outside forces (schools, nationally disseminated cultural norms) competed with the authority and influ-

ence of the family and the neighborhood. Mechanization threatened this balance. From the 1830s and 40s, nail making and ribbon weaving declined. Domestic industry in general declined and eventually disappeared. Work once done at home either left the city or became mechanized. By the 1860s, then, most workers had to leave the home to work in factories for wages.

Much recent work stresses the ability of families to adapt to new urban and work conditions. Scholarship by Ellen Ross and others, for example, emphasizes the mutual-support networks established by the laboring poor in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their work, however, is centered on large, semi-artisanal cities. Accampo makes a good case for the sudden disruption to family life brought on by the factories in smaller industrial towns. With the division of home and work, women could no longer easily

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coordinate productive and reproductive capacities (worker-mother roles). Many married women had no choice but to leave the home for work since their husbands' wages were inadequate. Men were also affected by this shift to the factory. Their presence in the home was reduced. Their moral authority over children suffered. The parent-child training process was destroyed or weakened.

Mechanization not only led to de-skilling; it also eroded paternal power. In Saint-Chamond in the 1820s, 50 percent of sons took up their father's occupation. By 1870, only 25 percent did. Workers became less and less able to choose their line of work. The bonds of shared experience, between parents, sons, and daughters, were more or less gone by 1900 in heavy-industry towns like Saint-Chamond. Slowly but surely the generation gap was widening in western Europe on the eve of World War I. Families were dispersing at a faster rate than before, through migration, and through the gender segregation of the new factory economy. New everyday work rhythms dictated by the factory whistle replaced the older, more flexible family-centered work routines.

The mechanization process is illustrated well by the case of Limoges, whose history has been told by John Merriman. Limoges was the capital of the European porcelain industry. In 1892, there were 5,246 porcelain workers in 32 factories; by 1905, 13,000 workers in 35 factories. The standardization of production meant that plates began to be decorated by impression, not by hand. Female workers increased as the porcelain industry de-skilled: women workers increased from 24 to 35 percent of the industry's workforce between 1884 and 1901. Improvements in machines, like the Faure plate machine, meant that a worker could put out some 8,000 saucers in 15 days, compared to 1,500 earlier. A number of factors, including the concentration of capital, standardization, mechanization, larger factories, larger kilns, more workers, and above all more industrial discipline, transformed the work place.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND EDUCATION

One of the key promises of the nineteenth century was self-advancement, the opening of careers to talent. Significant social mobility, from the working class or the peasantry to the upper-middle class, however, was still very rare in the nineteenth century, although more and more exceptional individual cases could be found. Universities were reserved for the upper 1 percent of society until World War I. There were only 77,000 university students in Germany (population

65 million) in 1913. As late as 1938, there were still only 150,000 university students in Britain, France, and Germany combined. In the nineteenth century, higher education was a closed, male club. But at long last the idea of social mobility could no longer be seen as a myth, for there were enough prominent cases in the business world to give the ideal a basis in reality. Perhaps the twentieth century began, from a historian of social mobility's point of view, with the rise to power of a Welsh coal miner's son, David Lloyd George, to the position of chancellor of the exchequer in 1906.

Lloyd George's rise to prominence was made possible, to a certain extent, by a slow but significant expansion of the middling ranks and the lower-middle class in the three decades before the war. During the period 1870–1914, the lower-middle class, composed of clerks and modestly (but regularly) paid civil servants, mushroomed. People of modest birth were given more and more responsibilities, and gained more and more power in government, especially at the local level.

Social mobility was usually limited to the movement from the (poorly paid sector of) the working class up to the lower-middle class, or from the lower-middle class to the middle class. Scarcely was it possible to make the jump from peasant or proletarian status to respectable middle class. A significant barrier existed between manual and nonmanual labor. By 1890 only 7.7 percent of all manual workers in Bochum (Germany) had been able to cross into the nonmanual world. By 1907 the figure was still only 18 percent. By contrast, in the United States, in late-nineteenth-century Birmingham, 50 percent of manual workers crossed the barrier into the world of nonmanual work. In Atlanta, after one decade 20 percent, or 1 in 5, had crossed the line; in Bochum, only 1 in 13. The primary purpose of Bochum's gymnasium, and of secondary education in Europe in general, seems to have been to ensure status continuity of the middle class and professional class, not to aid social mobility. In France on the eve of World War I, only 5 percent of students went on to secondary education, to what we call high school (*lycée*). Less than 1 percent of European men went to university at this time. In Germany, 0.1 percent of the population went on to university in 1909.

Although the aristocracy continued to dominate the highest ranks of the army and the foreign service in most European countries, the nineteenth century did indeed witness the gradual spread of (official) civil and political equality. By the 1870s common people were entering the political arena, at least in local assemblies. In the period 1870–1890, western Euro-

pean society and politics opened up to new social groups. Politics became more inclusive; traditional social elites and the landed aristocracy saw their local influence wane. Peasants became active in local politics, and new job opportunities arose for those with a modicum of education: clerical positions, jobs in expanding municipal governments, nursing jobs, and teaching jobs (particularly for young women).

In the late nineteenth century major structural changes in the economy of Europe had widespread repercussions in the world of work and social relations. Beginning in the 1860s and 1870s, as the railroad began to create national markets and as the second industrial revolution boosted output and created massive new institutions, the world of work became more bureaucratized. A new army of white-collar clerks was spawned by the rise of the service sector and government bureaucracies. Schools, post offices, railroads, department stores, large companies, and burgeoning municipal governments required a new type of employee: semieducated, respectable, but modestly paid. Many of these new workers were young single women. In Britain in the 1870s, there were 7,000 female employees in local and central government; by 1911, there were 76,000. A new (but uncertain) class was born: the white-collar lower-middle class, situated uneasily between workers and the middle classes. To many social critics, this was a disturbing trend. But it signaled the emergence of a more fluid society; with a sort of passage between the working class and the middle class. Gradually, the social ladder was gaining more rungs.

Urban, economic, and social change was particularly intense and rapid in Germany. Industrial progress achieved over the course of two or three generations in England and France was achieved in one generation in Germany. No other nation was so thoroughly transformed by industry and cities: in 1907, only half of all Germans lived in their place of birth, and 40 percent of Germans worked in industry. Many historians would argue that there was a tragic lag between political change and social-economic change. Old elites clung to power at the expense of a more democratic and open society.

In general, however, across Europe the political world expanded, admitting more and more to the game. Accordingly, the tone of politics changed, and nationalism became a way to bind the nation together. Popular nationalism was not simply an elite conspiracy—it must have touched a receptive nerve with the general population. This was helped in no small part by the education and welfare systems, and mass-circulation newspapers (all of which date to the 1870s and 1880s), which made people see that they be-

longed to a larger whole. Educational and social welfare services were expanded in most major nations in the two decades before the war. One of German chancellor Bismarck's key goals in introducing social welfare legislation in the 1880s was to provide workers with a reason to support the newly forged German empire; the Liberals in Britain passed social legislation in the 1900s in order to steal the rising Labour Party's thunder; and in France radical republicans attempted to forge national "solidarity" and to ease class tensions with social legislation in the 1890s and 1900s.

Protective labor legislation, workday reduction legislation, and worker's accident insurance were introduced (the 1890s were particularly active). Some would argue that the advent of male suffrage was a political and social development of the utmost importance; others would argue that conservatives managed to contain the potentially revolutionary implications of universal male suffrage by rigging electoral districts, retaining property or wealth requirements for office, maintaining a multitiered electoral system (Prussia), literacy requirements (Italy), and so on. But in the decade before World War I, most of these restrictions were lifted. A slow democratization of political life and indeed of civic life in general was taking place on the eve of the war, particularly at the local level, where expanding municipal services necessitated greater input from people who had hitherto been excluded from power.

Rising living standards late in the century helped integrate workers into society. At precisely the moment when workers were uniting behind national parties of the left, the capitalist system was beginning to put more bread on their tables. Railroads created national markets for standardized goods, and prices of everyday staples dropped. Nominal wages increased in France by 50 percent between 1871 and 1913. In Britain, real wages rose by a third between 1850 and 1875 and again by 45 percent between 1870 and 1900. In Sweden, they rose by 75 percent in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; in Germany, by 30 percent. Diet became more diversified, with workers consuming more meat, vegetables, fruit, and wine. In the 1830s, bread alone consumed some 30 percent of a French worker's budget; by 1913, it required only 11 percent of monthly income to put bread on the table. By 1900, fewer children died before they reached the age of 5. Department stores tempted workers with new goods, although most were consumed by the expanding middling ranks. Cheap railroad tickets made it possible for the skilled working class to escape the city for a brief, modest annual vacation. In Britain, seaside resorts had become affordable for the members of the "labor aristocracy" by 1900. Workers now had

a bit of disposable income to spend at the pub, the tavern, the racetrack, or the soccer match when they were not toiling away at their 50–60 hour per week jobs. Thus, by 1900, for the first time in history, a society (western Europe as a whole) had managed to provide a regular and decent living for up to two-thirds of its citizens (in 1800, perhaps only one-third of Europeans lived in comfort).

THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH

Despite the immense social changes of the late nineteenth century, Europe remained a highly unequal place in 1900. Roughly speaking, the rich accounted for around 5 percent of any given nation; the middle class comprised perhaps 15 percent; the lower-middle class, the working class, and the poor comprised the remaining 80 percent of the population. In England in 1913, 10 percent of the population owned 92 percent of the nation's wealth.

Nowhere were the persisting class inequalities more evident than in death. The life expectancy of the wealthy was as much as ten years greater than that of the average manual laborer in England in 1900. The infant mortality rate in two London districts in 1901–1903 tells the story: in rich Hampstead it was 92 deaths per 1,000 live births; in poor Shoreditch, 186 deaths per 1,000 live births. In southern Europe (Spain and Italy) and eastern Europe (present-day Poland, Russia, etc.), life was much as it was in the feudal era. Serfdom was abolished in Russia in 1861 but the economic conditions associated with it remained for decades. In 1900 in the southern Spanish province of Andalusia, 2 percent of the population owned 67 percent of the land. One Hungarian family, the Esterhazys, owned 750,000 acres of land in Hungary. In parts of eastern and southern Europe, 5 percent of the population owned 90 percent of the land in 1900.

Yet the glass was half-full. By 1900, poor harvests no longer spelled disaster for most of Europe. A bad crop in Germany could be offset by imported grain from France or even Canada. By 1900 food supplies were stable around the western world. Beef and wheat from Canada, the U.S., Australia, and Argentina were shipped to Europe by steamship. Beef consumption among European workers doubled between 1880 and 1900. Tea, coffee, sugar, butter, chocolate, and half-decent wine were now within the reach of the common person.

Despite their relative prosperity, western workers were still haunted by the threat of illness or unemployment. Only in Germany did a significant por-

tion of the population have guaranteed access to health care, and sickness and accident insurance (four million Germans were covered by 1914). Working-class life was still fraught with risk and stalked by debt. As Ellen Ross recounts in her history of working-class London women, the local pawn shop was a sort of lifeline, without which many people would have had to seek charity.

Framed by political and industrial change in the nineteenth century, complex patterns emerged for women and gender relations. On the one hand, with the general separation of work from home, economic roles for women declined, particularly after marriage, and women came to depend on marriage for their economic well-being more than before (or since). Patriarchal assumptions in law and culture deepened this dependency. But women did gain ground in education. Among the middle classes, a powerful ideology arose emphasizing women's domestic virtue and their crucial role in the moral regulation of sexuality. With regard to morals, proper women were considered superior to men. The decline in the birthrate also affected women's opportunities, again particularly among the middle classes. And new political ideas spurred politically active women, and even some men, to push for voting rights and an end to legal inequality.

CONCLUSION

The vast political, social, and economic impact of World War I prompts most social historians to end consideration of nineteenth-century themes with 1914. On the eve of World War I, a powerful women's movement was threatening to overturn the sexual and political status quo. Some social historians would argue that this constituted one of the greatest threats to the stability of European society. Workers, who launched an unprecedented number of strikes in France and Britain in the 1890s and 1900s, and organized women were campaigning to overturn the cornerstones of nineteenth-century bourgeois society (or so it seemed). The Italian political system was in a state of crisis on the eve of the war, as were the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Britain was divided over the Irish question, France was deadlocked due to labor unrest, political stalemate over military spending issues, and the income tax. Germany seemed to be under siege from the socialist party. Beneath military and diplomatic rivalries, social tensions unnerved European aristocratic and big-business leadership.

As the genie of mass democracy was let out of the bottle, Europe's outdated political class (especially in Austria and Germany) feared for their futures, and

they may have decided that a Europe-wide war to distract the population was preferable to facing the necessity of domestic reform. Some historians argue that the social origins of World War I are just as important as the diplomatic origins. Others dismiss this as too simplistic, and impossible to prove. Most historians would probably agree that the desire to avert difficult

domestic reform played *some* small part, if not the overriding part, in the decision to risk a Europe-wide war. Political change in several nations had not kept pace with economic growth; Europe was divided by the labor question, ethnic tensions, and tensions between the sexes. After the war, these issues would be addressed, one way or another.

See also Capitalism and Commercialization; Civil Society; The Industrial Revolutions; The Liberal State; Nationalism; The Population of Europe: The Demographic Transition and After; Urbanization (*volume 2*); The Middle Classes; Social Class; Social Mobility; Working Classes (*volume 3*); and other articles in this section.

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THE WORLD WARS AND THE DEPRESSION



Jay Winter

The treatment and interpretation of major questions in the social history of Europe between 1914 and 1918 have been transformed since 1980. One way to characterize the shift of research interest and publication in this field is to summarize (and caricature) social history as the history of defiance and cultural history as the history of consent. This is a wild oversimplification, but like most, it has a grain of truth in it. Another formulation distinguishes social history as the study of social stratification, civil society, family life, and social movements; and cultural history as the study of language, idiom, representations, and images. However this distinction is nuanced, these two overlapping areas of study have increasingly diverged.

Divergence is not divorce, and it is critical to recognize the extent to which the social history of cultural life and the cultural history of social stratification overlap. It is probably best in a survey of relevant literature to mark out the terrain as described in the form of intersecting concentric circles of scholarship in which the mix of social and cultural history has become irreversible.

WORLD WAR I

Labor militancy: Social history as history of defiance. In World War I studies, the transition from an emphasis on social history to an emphasis on cultural history occurred between the 1960s and the 1980s. In the 1960s and 1970s, labor militancy was a subject of central importance to European historians of all periods. World War I was a terrain on which new forms of industrial militancy were played out because the war undermined the legitimacy of traditional political and economic structures. In Britain, James Hinton's *The First Shop Stewards' Movement* (1973) clearly anticipated a second movement—financial and electoral domination of the party—which, alas, never materialized. Ross McKibbin's *The Evolution of the Labor Party* (1974) showed what trade-union muscle meant, although he was careful to distance himself from claims made by others that clause

4 of the 1918 Labor Party constitution was a real statement of political will and aspirations rather than an electoral ploy to graft middle-class socialist sprouts to a pragmatic trade union tree. Clause 4 committed the party to work to secure the public ownership of industry. But this wartime commitment in principle did not bind the party to postwar action.

On the Continent, much seminal work in the history of labor militancy in wartime appeared at this time. Jean-Louis Robert began his path-breaking study of militancy among Parisian metalworkers. Leopold Haimson gathered together a wide group of historians interested in tracing the upsurge of agitation and protest during the war years. The study of the reemergence of revolutionary movements in central Europe grew in parallel, at times taking biographical form or, as in the case of Jürgen Kocka's powerful study of increasingly bitter class conflict in Germany, the form of an analysis of the compression of the class pyramid. Here the crucial issues were the emiseration of the lower middle class and the growing confidence and anger of workers about wartime inequalities in provision and entitlement. Barrington Moore made an important intervention in this field in a book entitled *Injustice* (1978).

"The dignity of defiance" is a phrase used to try to capture the essence of what these scholars were after (Winter, 1986). In their search, they provided us with powerful scholarship on the complex fissures in societies led by governments proclaiming national unity. But the emphasis on the history of labor militancy has not weathered well. The reasons for this are complex. Among them is the linkage between such scholarship and the more general, theoretical debate on Marxism that occurred at this time. Many historians doubted the validity of a model that "read" political militancy directly off data on social stratification and inequality.

The language of soldier writers. Marxist approaches to the history of World War I were still visible, but in their place there emerged a set of concerns the origins of which are elsewhere. Whereas diplo-

macy, strategy, political conflict, military mobilization, and war industry had long been staples of historical presentations of the war, these aspects of World War I had rarely been presented to the profession or to the general public as cultural phenomena, as having been encoded within rich and complex images, languages, and cultural forms. Now was the time for this kind of history to be told.

There was another set of reasons for the emergence of this kind of scholarship. By the late 1970s many scholars came to the subject of the cultural history of the 1914–1918 war through their reflections on the Vietnam War. For a number of American scholars, the debacle of Vietnam entailed a trajectory from innocence to experience, from anticipation to an outcome very remote from expectations. Where had this happened before? The question drew them to the battlefields of the Somme and Verdun and Passchendaele.

The bitter taste of war was a personal matter to some of these scholars, men who had served in World War II. It is no accident that two of the most important works in this field, Paul Fussell's massively influential *The Great War and Modern Memory* (1975) and Samuel Hynes's *A War Imagined* (1991), were produced by an infantry officer wounded in Alsace in 1945 and an airman who served in the Pacific War, both of whom also wrote powerful autobiographies about their war service.

Fussell and Hynes helped transform the social history of the 1914–1918 war. Fussell in particular set in motion an avalanche of studies, which gained momentum in the twenty-five years following the publication of his study. Fussell claims that the language of prose and poetry dominant in prewar Britain was unable to accommodate the experience of the trenches. A number of writers therefore turned older forms around and produced a language of ironic force that not only described the landscape of the 1914–1918 war, but also came to serve as the grammar of later literary imaginings of war. In effect, the way we saw war at the end of the twentieth century was through the prism provided by the soldier-writers of the 1914–1918 conflict.

War literature, Fussell posited, was located on the knife edge between the realistic mode of writing, in which the hero's freedom of action is the same as the readers', and the ironic mode of writing, in which the hero's freedom of action is less than the readers' and in which the hero is trapped in a world of unreason and mass death. Frequently, these ironic writers turned to myth to inscribe their view of betrayal, disenchantment, and loss.

Hynes spoke of the anger that soldier-writers directed at the older generation who had sent them out to a war they, the elders, never had to see. By spreading the range of cultural reference well beyond the small canon of war poets and writers discussed by

Fussell, he analyzed the power of memorials and anti-memorials to galvanize opinion about the conflict. Above all, his emphasis was on soldiers' language, bearing with it the authority of the witness, of the man who had been there, the authenticity of direct experience.

Women and gender, family, and commemoration. One facet of the achievement of these scholars was a direct departure from earlier writings on World War I. Fussell and Hynes wrote masculine history: the history of men at war and the language they developed to try to ascribe meaning to their world. Women rarely inhabited that world. Consequently, the power of this cultural history tended to move scholarly discussion away from a centerpiece of the earlier social history of war, namely, the history of women and gender.

A shift of emphasis did take place, but it should not obscure the development of robust and powerful scholarship on the history of women and war. Mary Louise Roberts's *Civilization Without Sexes* (1994) and Susan Kent's *Making Peace: The Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain* (1992) showed the cultural and political consequences of the war. The fluidity of gender roles was hard to deny: witness the critical part women played in agricultural work and the new positions they occupied in heavy industry. But as the Higgonets and others argued in *No Man's Land: Gender and the Two World Wars* (1987), a shift in women's roles rarely led to an increase in women's power, since war entailed a heightened sense of the significance of what were seen as "masculine" values. Thus the "double helix" of gender preserved the prewar distance between the degrees of freedom men and women enjoyed.

For no intrinsic reason these approaches tended to become antagonistic. Many studies of women at war concentrated on the munitions industries and the new array of tasks women had to accomplish under the pressure of war. They were responsible for the house or farm and employed in war-related production or as substitutes for male farm laborers. In central and eastern Europe, they had to cope with scarcity of a kind not registered in Britain or France that meant standing in endless lines for rations they might never see or scavenging in the countryside for food or fuel. In addition historians of the family contributed to our knowledge of the reconfiguring of gender roles in such a way as to preserve the patriarchal family the soldiers left behind.

What a different story there was to tell when the family in question was the brotherhood in the trenches. Important studies of trench newspapers,

produced by ordinary soldiers and speaking their own language about the war were produced for Italy, Britain, and France. This kind of fictive kinship—based on love and suffering, to be sure—endured in the interwar years and spread into the fields of veterans affairs and politics. George Mosse and Antoine Prost contributed seminal works on the ways in which what Mosse called "the myth of the war experience"—or soldiers' tales about their war—encapsulated prewar cultural and political traditions and came to fashion much of postwar representations of what had happened between 1914 and 1918.

One unsettled dispute about the nature of the soldiers' war concerns the degree of control they exercised over the conditions of their lives. Tony Ashworth, in an early study, *Trench Warfare: The Live and Let Live System* (1966), asserted that the war of position involved tacit truces and informal arrangement whereby both sides avoided shelling latrines or disturbing breakfast time. In an extension of this argument, Len Smith's *Between Mutiny and Obedience* (1994) showed how French infantrymen engaged in informal negotiations with their officers about what kind of gains in an offensive justified what level of losses. A sense of "proportionality" determined the extent and limits of soldiers' tolerance of orders. Thus the French mutiny of 1917 was an explicit statement of what had been implicit throughout the war. An entirely different approach is that of Eric Leed, whose *No Man's Land* (1979) documents soldiers' impotence in the face of a new kind of industrial warfare. The truth probably lies in a blend of these two interpretations.

The overlap between social history and cultural history in late-twentieth-century writing on World War I is perhaps most explicit in the discussion of commemoration, where comparative work dominated the field. Discussions of local forms of social agency and pilgrimage paralleled work on secularized religious language in rhetoric and sculpture. Most research moved away from national generalizations about commemoration as political manipulation and toward the decoding of messages frequently fashioned in de-centered ways that ascribed some kind of meaning to the disaster of the war.

THE INTERWAR YEARS

The capacity of social history to withstand the incursions of cultural historians is more evident in studies of the interwar period than in the case of the two world wars. Three areas of scholarly debate produced much of substance in the social history of interwar Europe. The first concerns the sources of the political

defeat of organized labor in the 1920s and 1930s; the second concerns the social consequences and costs of the interwar depression; and the third concerns the nature of family life and domesticity in this period. While all three subjects entail explorations of cultural issues, older paradigms relating to class structure and class struggle are still evident in the literature.

Labor in retreat. The spirit of the old Second International—the prewar Socialist confederation created by Marx and Engels—was smashed on the outbreak of war in 1914. After the armistice, some of the idealism at the heart of the European labor movement was reborn. But in the following two decades, caught between Stalinism on the one hand and Nazism on the other, that political and moral configuration of aspirations clustered under the heading of “labor movement” was defeated time and again. First came the counterrevolutionary movements in central Europe in 1919 and 1920; then came the eclipse of labor in Italy followed by the fascist seizure of power. Then came a host of struggles in the democratic countries to defend workers’ living standards and jobs in a period of chronic depression before 1929 and of acute depression between 1929 and 1933. The latter year saw the Nazis in power in Germany. Labor, and ultimately democracy itself, was defeated in Austria, in Czechoslovakia, and after a brutal three-year civil war, in Spain.

The question is, why so many defeats and so many setbacks? One set of answers relates to the evolution of communism and the relation between European communist parties and the Soviet Union. This is the domain of conventional labor history, which has replicated in scholarship many of the ideological conflicts of the period under review. Some scholars argued that defeat was built into faulty leadership; others countered that a vanguard became separated from the rest of the working class.

A second debate concentrated not on the organization of labor but on the social structure of the working class it purported to represent. Here considerable attention was paid to the decline of the old staple industries out of which much of the militant leadership of labor came. But it was not only the demise of the older industrial sectors that weakened labor, it was also the growth of the service sector, and of white-collar employment as a whole. Clerical workers did not have the same outlook as did manual laborers; it was very difficult to link up their grievances or to make common cause when one set of workers was threatened with job losses. The failure of the British General Strike of 1926 exposed these fissures in the world of labor; they remained exposed throughout the interwar years.

The costs of the Great Depression. The question of the effects of the onset of mass and sustained un-

employment has drawn much scholarly attention. Most of such work concentrates on urban poverty, despite the fact that a decline in the price of primary products devastated rural economies, in particular in eastern and southern Europe.

In the West, industrial decline was the key problem. Social policy initiatives were launched throughout Europe to try to soften the blow of unemployment. Their effects are disputed. One area of controversy is that of public health. There is a paradox to be resolved here. On the one hand, millions of working people lived on inadequate wages and social transfer payments. Deprivation was unmistakable in every European capital city. And yet some measurements of well-being that relate to health—infant mortality rates and life expectancy at birth—seem to have declined in a period of aggravated poverty and widespread distress. How was this possible? Some scholars have pointed to the difference between long-term economic trends, leading to higher survival rates especially at the earliest years of life, and short-term trends of grinding poverty. This position suggests that the onset of mass unemployment in the interwar years did not undermine fully the long-term trend toward better nutrition and better health in many parts of Europe.

Other scholars disagree. They point out that aggregate statistics rarely reflect lived experience. Furthermore, it is probable that some groups lived longer but with chronic illness as their fate. Populations can have deteriorating health conditions and increases in life expectancy at the same time.

When different age groups are analyzed, a possible resolution of these different interpretations emerges. Unemployment is not one phenomenon but many. There is considerable evidence that it damages the health of pregnant women and the unborn, who bring their deprivation with them, as it were, throughout their later lives. The capacity of adults to resist and survive deprivation is greater. For the elderly, unemployment brings increased vulnerability, since it diminishes the resources of the support systems—social agencies, family members, and other elderly people—on which they rely.

The effect of mass unemployment on the unemployed themselves is an area less well researched. Some scholars have followed the spiral of despair into crime and prostitution. Others have considered the possibility that a cycle of deprivation kept the less well educated and the less well nourished people trapped within areas of heavy joblessness. The better educated and fitter therefore were able to leave and find a better life elsewhere. Who was left in the old urban industrial belts? Only those with few chances and fewer hopes.

They intermarried and perpetuated the disadvantages of poverty.

Here is a possible resolution of another puzzle: why were there aggregate improvements yet no reduction of inequality? While overall survival chances increased in the population as a whole, the demographic disadvantage of being born into a manual working-class household as opposed to a professional household was maintained. Perhaps out-migration of the better educated and healthier helped maintain the demographic disadvantages of working-class life.

This position does not lack its critics either. Some have pointed out that there are undertones of eugenics in this form of reasoning. It suggests that there was a kind of propagation of disadvantage through selective migration and marriage patterns. The unfit stayed behind; the fitter and brighter got out of the old working-class ghetto. What was called “the residuum” before 1914—the bottom 10 percent of the population—appeared to be a self-perpetuating community. Blaming the poor for their own poverty is an old conservative gambit, critics say, and the explanation for persistent levels of inequality are located in the indifference of ruling elites to the fate of those most vulnerable to the swings in the labor market that

produced unemployment rates of between 50 and 90 percent in some depressed regions.

Family, marriage, migration, and gender. In interwar Europe, fertility rates dropped to record lows. Many commentators voiced fears of “race suicide”; some injudicious prophets posited that in the year 2030 there would be four people left in Britain. Even when we brush aside such panicked reasoning, there is still much left to explain. Why was it that family size was at an all-time low, and given the appearance in the mid to late 1930s of some resurgence in birth rates, why was the decline in fertility at an end?

At this point we enter a field in the history of the family and the history of gender in which cultural norms are crucial. Family life was not egalitarian in this period. If we want to know why fertility went down, we need to interrogate the evidence about the attitudes and behavior of men and women differently.

Here there are many unknowns. One of the most glaring is the propensity of women to resort to abortion. Illegality precludes accurate estimates of the practice, but throughout Europe, it must have been an important way in which women kept their family size at manageable levels. A second unknown is the range of contraceptive practices and the ways different sectors of the population resorted to them. We simply cannot conclude that there were national uniformities in contraception.

Patterns of nuptiality are also difficult to specify with any degree of certainty. It may be the case that with the closing of the gates to unrestricted immigration to the United States and with it the end of the vast movement of European out-migration of the period 1880–1920, millions of young marriageable men were “trapped” in Europe, thereby preserving marriage rates. The upheavals of the labor market and the downturn in world trade also made non-European receiver states less likely to welcome newcomers. Some minimal relief was offered to victims of persecution in the later 1930s, but most of those who wanted to get out of Europe were trapped there at the end of the interwar years.

There remains the question of a notable upward inflection of birth rates in the mid to late 1930s. Some argue that these changes were a reflection of the end of the world economic crisis. Others consider that they were responses to the appearance of population policies favoring families and a rising birth rate, in particular in Fascist Italy and Germany. The problem is that the period of slightly increasing fertility was too brief to reach any firm conclusions. It is perhaps safest to conclude that it is unlikely that the “baby boom” of the post-1945 period began before World War II.

WORLD WAR II

The social history of World War II is not as well developed professionally as is the social history of World War I. This difference may reflect the relative nearness of Hitler’s war. Time may rectify this imbalance.

The range of subjects central to the social history of the 1939–1945 war overlaps only in part with work done on World War I. There are similar studies of military and civilian mobilization. The activity of women in all corners of the war economy has been investigated too. Social policy in wartime has been the subject of extensive research, drawing on parallels and divergences with World War I literature.

But there are two features of the social history of the Second World War that break new ground. First is the issue of resistance and collaboration. Second is the matter of the social history of the Holocaust as seen through the eyes and lives of its victims. Both entail complex problems of interpretation and of commemoration.

Mobilization for total war. The social history of mass mobilization after 1939 describes terrain similar to that of the 1914–1918 war, but in Hitler’s war, everything was heightened and deepened. Both coercion and consent brought populations to a level of participation in war industry never before realized. The numbers mobilized and the numbers killed were higher than ever before. Aerial bombardment brought cities into the front lines. The occupation of virtually the entire European continent created administrative networks linking the German war effort and its requirements to the resources of conquered states.

Within wartime Germany, a remarkable degree of mobilization was maintained despite intensive Allied bombardment of German cities. Nutritional levels were higher for German citizens in the 1939–1945 war than in the 1914–1918 conflict, and many studies have pointed to the success of the regime in keeping together a society under increasing pressure the longer the war went on. Clearly, the regime operated through terror. But it also commanded respect and, among a part of the population, a degree of legitimacy that commanded consent.

Women at war. The mobilization of women on the land and in the factories was even more marked after 1939 than it had been after 1914. There is some dispute, though, as to the effect of women’s activities in wartime on their long-term status as citizens. To be sure, women did get the vote in France in 1946, and the role of women in the resistance was part of the background to this long-overdue development.

But the arduous effort required of women to balance child rearing, housework, and extradomestic employment may have impelled them back toward a more singularly domestic definition of their lives and aspirations. Thus a kind of “inner migration” toward family life and away from economic and political independence may describe women’s trajectories in the period during and after World War II.

Social policy in wartime. War entailed the invasion of the household by the state. Partly this was a reflection of the air war. When whole city blocks were flattened, emergency services had to rehouse and rehabilitate as best they could. In addition, the medical services had to be centrally organized and distributed, diminishing significantly the independence of medical practitioners. In the case of Britain, prewar anticipation of civilian casualties in air raids produced the first full survey of medical services in the country. This was a prelude to the creation of a National Health Service after the war.

Similar steps were taken in every wartime country. The state expanded to include areas of activity previously in private hands. Historians call this the “concentration effect” of war. Its consequence was a “threshold effect,” whereby the costs of social services rose to a level entailing permanent financial commit-

ments. In turn a threshold was passed in the tolerable level of personal taxation, a threshold that was maintained in the postwar years. Many local studies provide much of value on this theme.

Collaboration and resistance. These issues describe the social history of World War II as a continuation and intensification of the social history of World War I. But in two respects World War II was terra incognita for historians. The first was in the dialectic between collaboration and resistance within occupied countries. The second was in the social history of the extermination of the Jews.

The social history of collaboration with the Nazis has developed roughly along three lines. The first is the arrival at the center of social and political life of those who had been outcasts in the interwar years. Extreme right-wing groups flourished under the aegis of the Nazis in a way they could never have done on their own. The second is the study of how administrators, both high and low, tended to carry on running affairs within the framework of what was called the “new order.” Some of this activity was harmless, or even beneficial. Consider for instance, the ongoing work of the socialist Henri Sellier as mayor of the Paris suburb of Suresnes. Other administrators actively or tacitly aided the Nazis in the deportation of Jews. The

work of Maurice Papon in Bordeaux is in this category; he helped in the roundup of Jewish children and consequently has been condemned as a war criminal. The third area of inquiry is in the “normalization” of occupation and the degree of consent given by ordinary people to the new order.

Here we overlap with the social history of the resistance, for the vast majority of the population in occupied Europe lived in conditions that produced a mixture of resignation and submission, on the one hand, and rejection and resistance on the other. The life of François Mitterrand, later president of France, is a good instance of the blurring of distinctions between collaboration and resistance in wartime. He had a foot in both camps, as did many others.

Mythmaking after the war inflated the numbers of those who joined resistance organizations. We must discount much of the oral history gathered after the war about the heroism of the occupied. Heroism there was, but it was the exception and not the rule. This third area of research aims to explain why this was so.

There are moral problems in formulating the question of why resistance was so weak. Historians today have the moral luck to avoid such choices and risks, although some at the time, like the great medievalist Marc Bloch, paid with their lives for their work in the resistance. Can we judge those who did not follow the path Bloch chose? There is little consensus on an answer to this question.

The Holocaust. The same issues plague the social history of the victims of the Nazi plan to exterminate the Jews. Ever since Hannah Arendt provided a stinging indictment of Jewish submission to and (in some cases) complicity in their own demise in her account of the Eichmann trial, the analysis of Jewish responses to the Holocaust has been trapped in the culs-de-sac of justification, accusation, and vilification. Again, we are dealing with excruciating choices that careful scholars can treat only with diffidence.

The social history of the perpetrators has also produced a firestorm of debate. The problem is that some scholars, following Daniel Goldhagen’s approach in *Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (1996), use categories of national character or national traditions as if they were immutable features of historical processes. Blaming everyone who was German for the Holocaust is historical nonsense. But what are the alternatives? Here we return to the question of collaboration, since many of the killers were not German at all. Many of those who committed atrocities were what Christopher Browning in his 1992 study called “ordinary men.” The police battalion he studied was composed of men

who, when sent to the east, became murderers in no time at all. Jonathan Steinberg’s *All or Nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust, 1941–1943* (1991) showed that this mutation was not universal; Italian soldiers in Yugoslavia behaved quite differently from German units posted to the same areas. Why the difference? Evil retains its mysteries, still to be unraveled.

Commemoration. The eighth of May is celebrated in most parts of Europe as V-E Day—the end of the war against Hitler. The social history of this commemoration follows in most respects the scholarship surrounding public remembrance of the 1914–1918 war. Soviet war memorials are grandiose and romantic, a throwback to nineteenth-century representations of war, which had already been discarded in western Europe.

National rebuilding after World War II required myths of heroism and resistance. Many of these narratives have a kernel of truth, but little more than that. The need for stories of great achievements had one particularly negative consequence: until the 1960s and 1970s, the story of the extermination of the Jewish people was eclipsed by tales of uprisings and espionage elsewhere in Europe. It is as if the crime of the century was simply too horrible to contemplate. Other stories were easier to swallow, even when they entailed treason. But the problem with Auschwitz was that it could not be treated as if it were just another historical site. Something so monstrous happened there and at the network of camps it has come to represent that ordinary language falls away.

That silence, while understandable, could not be sustained indefinitely, for it threatened to bury the victims once again under a mound of historical indifference. But scholars have yet to formulate a consensus as to how to approach the problem of writing the social history of the enormity of this unique event. Similarly, political and social leaders risk a hail of criticism whenever they offer an idea as to how to commemorate the Holocaust. Debates during the 1990s on a national Holocaust memorial in reunified Berlin are cases in point. Silence will not do; but representations of an allegorical or metaphoric kind are inadequate as well. Since the subject itself brings us to the limits of representation, it is unlikely that any way out of this dilemma will appear in the foreseeable future.

CONCLUSION

By 1945 the outlines of a new Europe could be discerned beyond the rubble of war. It was a Europe drastically different from that which went to war in

1914. First, it was imprinted with the experience of mass death. Bereavement was a nearly universal experience, as families were torn apart by war. There were gaps in the age structure. Missing were men of military ages and the children they would have fathered; these lost cohorts would take seventy years to work their way through the age structure.

By 1945 Europe was a continent without a substantial Jewish community, leveled throughout Europe and wiped out in large parts of eastern Europe. Other population movements changed the face of the continent. Families of German origin were forced west by the millions. Other refugees found homes in other continents, where another element was added to the European diaspora.

As a result of the war, gender boundaries had been blurred and then reconfigured. The restoration of family life was of the highest priority after 1945, not primarily to politicians but to ordinary people. Given rapid economic recovery after 1945, the baby boom was the result.

The discrediting of the radical right gave a new lease on life to the European labor movement. Hard-

ened by war and essential to the organization of reconstruction, moderate labor leaders moved to the center of the political spectrum. The Communists entered the political mainstream too, largely on the record of resistance in wartime, but, except in countries occupied by the Red Army, they were blocked in their bid for power.

These developments were entangled in the cold war, but some developments superseded it. By the late 1950s there emerged a Franco-German power bloc in which a French political structure—later called the European Community—controlled and harnessed the economic strength of German industry. The aim was to put an end to the threat of war among European states. This it has done, though armed conflict in the Balkans, where war broke out in 1914, returned at the century's end.

The major nightmares of the social history of Europe from 1914 to 1945, war and economic collapse, slowly faded from the European landscape. But in bodies and minds, the scars and traumas of the earlier catastrophes lingered, some of them never to heal.

See also **Marxism and Radical History; The Jews and Anti-Semitism** (*in this volume*); **Health and Disease; War and Conquest; Migration; Fascism and Nazism;**

The Welfare State (*volume 2*); **Labor History: Strikes and Unions** (*volume 3*); **Gender and Work** (*volume 4*).

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SINCE WORLD WAR II



Donna Harsch

How have historians applied the methods and perspectives of modern social history to the postwar era, the historical period from whence the discipline itself sprang? The five and half decades that followed the war have, in fact, remained relatively understudied, if only because social historians, like historians in general, prefer to investigate the bona fide past rather than what has just passed. Moreover, it may seem that a foreshortened perspective does not do justice to social-historical subjects such as class formation, family structure, or mentality that tend to change only over a substantial stretch of time. In consequence, studies of the decades since 1945 do not fill bookshelves quite as lengthily as those occupied by the voluminous specialized literature on, say, the industrial revolution. Historical attention has also been distracted by prewar interpretive issues, such as the causes, social and otherwise, of the rise of Nazism, rather than centered on postwar historical issues or broader studies that would embrace postwar developments in a larger social history of the twentieth century. The resultant paucity of work makes it at once simple and difficult to assess the historiography of social history after World War II. The discipline can be easily overseen, yet a sparse field offers a thin selection of the detailed empirical research that, hard to synthesize as it may be, constitutes the raw material of historiographical trends. Nonetheless, enough literature exists to allow not only a summary of social historians' major conclusions about the era but also a characterization of the field itself. Furthermore, the pace of sociohistorical inquiry is speeding up, as the time elapsed since the war lengthens and as the urgent need to explain it diminishes. Some findings call into question the notion that the war itself was as complete a watershed, in social history terms, has been supposed. In some areas, such as gender, important changes and breaks may have occurred a bit later.

The social-science corner of the field of postwar social history has been, this essay argues, quite well-tended. Because the period is so contemporary, social historians of the postwar era have been particularly

influenced by the questions and quantitative research pursued by political scientists, sociologists, and economic historians. The social-science bent has also been fostered, no doubt, by the central place in all discussions of postwar Europe accorded the economic boom. Whatever the reason, scholars have produced a number of national and pan-European analyses of big social processes, including demographic, social-structural, educational, employment, consumption, and leisure trends. Working on this broad canvas, those in the field have arrived at an impressively wide consensus not only about the defining tendencies but about which ones represent continuity and which a break with the past. Historians also agree on periodization of the era, though, not surprisingly, their perceptions of the main dividing lines have shifted from the 1960s to the 1990s as new trends have been revealed or older ones reversed. The consensus on social trends even crosses deep political divides, especially those between authoritarian southern Europe and democratic northwest Europe.

Strong as it is on national and comparative syntheses of complex processes, trend-tracking, and periodization, the field has not agreed on a comprehensive theoretical construct for the era, hence the discussion here of the weaknesses and lacunae in the social history of postwar Europe. Having charted and labeled the key developments, historians have found it difficult to wrap them up as a single package. Certainly the period has earned several epithets, most of which append the prefix "post-" to a concept that characterizes the preceding era. Thus, scholars have bandied about "postindustrial," "postmodern," "post-Fordist," even "postcapitalist." Social historians, as well as other social scientists and humanists working on the period, have grown uncomfortable with their inability to confer an overarching identity on the era. Like historians in general, most have distanced themselves from modernization theory and so are left without an organizing principle that draws together the disparate and indisputably enormous changes that have occurred since 1945.

If it has not settled on a conceptual framework, the historiography of the era has at least grappled with this issue. Postwar social history remains weakest not at the high plane of theory but on the ground level of human experience. Not until the later 1990s did there appear a critical mass of historical studies that deconstruct general trends into their local variations or that examine social relations from the “bottom up” in this town or that industry. Social historians started only in the 1990s to mine qualitative, as opposed to statistical, archival collections to ascertain how individuals, villages, youth groups, women’s associations, male choruses, soccer clubs, and so on adapted to political, economic, and social change. Typical social-historical topics—organized protest, industrial relations, interactions between state officials and citizens—have remained, by and large, the stuff of good reporting or, sometimes, bad sociology, rather than becoming the object of in-depth historical investigation. Few historians have exploited the abundant opportunities for oral history that the recency of the era affords. The field has also not made the “anthropological turn,” that is, the shift away from a focus on social causes and effects and toward the interpretation of cultural practices and mentalities. Insofar as mentalities and their particular contexts have been explored, anthropologists themselves have done the work.

The historiography of the postwar era has not (yet) been etched with the distinctive methodological profile of either the “new” new social history of the 1970s or the sociocultural history that permeated the historiography in the 1980s. This essay ends with a brief consideration of why postwar social history has thus evolved. Like social history as a whole and indeed all historiography, postwar social history has been characterized by national differences in topic, method, and perspective. Thus the literature on each country has been shaped by the discipline’s particular style in, for example, Great Britain, France, or Germany. The nature of the field has in turn interacted with a structural “recency effect” and the meaning of “1945” in each country to produce a social historiography that was more or less developed by the 1980s. However, at least until the mid-1990s, it everywhere tended to focus on impersonal social change writ large rather than on human agency and the history of everyday life.

DEFINING THE MAJOR SOCIAL PATTERNS

Like many social historians, those who study Europe in the second half of the twentieth century have been especially interested in the relationship between social

change and economic development. In this case, they have asked about the impact of the extraordinarily steep, broad, and long economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s on living patterns, social structures, and class relations. Alongside other social scientists, they have explored, for example, the links between consumption patterns and rising incomes, social mobility and rising levels of education, or family organization and rising employment of married women. To address these issues, they have turned above all to the huge quantity, if not always unblemished quality, of statistics gathered on many aspects of life by every European regime since 1945. Their answers can be summarized in several categories that, taken together, constitute what are seen to be the main attributes of (Western) Europe’s “new society” as it emerged in the 1950s and 1960s: high rates of urbanization and the demise of a distinctly rural style of life; the attenuation of class antagonism and acceleration of social mobility; the extraordinary expansion of vocational, secondary, and higher education; the fall in the birth rate, rise of divorce, and semisocialization of child rearing; the emergence of a full-blown welfare state and its accompanying new relationship between government and citizen; and the triumph of “American-style” consumerism.

The postwar era, social historians have argued, witnessed not only the continuation of centuries-old European urbanization but, more significantly, the end of the sharp opposition between city and country that characterized large stretches of Europe in 1945. Rural areas, occupations, and people persisted; but after 1945 the lines between village and city blurred and the lives of villagers and city dwellers grew increasingly similar, thus blunting ancient mutual resentments. Historians and social scientists have written of the “death of a separate peasant culture” (Eric J. Hobsbawm) and the “end of the peasantry” (Henri Mendras), attributing its collapse to technological advances, urban migration, and the extension of consumer society into the countryside. The peasantry’s demise has been of particular interest to historians of France, presumably because peasant culture persisted so robustly there through the 1940s, only to decline precipitously by 1970. The peasant way of life virtually disappeared, however, in every Western European country—even in authoritarian Spain, where the regime was invested in its preservation—and, though not for all the same reasons, in Eastern Europe as well. Farmers continued to form a strong bloc in European politics, yet even their protests mimicked the tactics of urban dissident movements.

If the gap between rural and urban narrowed dramatically as prosperity, tractors, and television pen-

etrated the village, income disparities—another prominent topic in the historiography—remained wide in most Western European countries. However, inequality produced social and political consequences different from those that occurred before 1945. Class antagonism did not disappear but became milder and, when expressed, less likely to take violent, organized, or political forms. Social historians have associated this change with others: First, the gap between top and bottom did narrow to some extent. Moreover, mobility was rapid enough to assuage workers' sense of grievance. Full employment and, later, unemployment compensation also contributed to a change in workers' consciousness, as the social historian Eric Hobsbawm has argued. Workers were now linked to the bourgeoisie, as were farmers to city folk, by commonalities of consumption. Everyone shopped at chain stores and supermarkets and ever-increasing numbers of people owned expensive private goods such as a car, even if some drove a luxury vehicle and others a jalopy.

Expanding prosperity contributed to the decline of a distinct proletarian milieu. Even though workers continued to compose a plurality of most European populations, they were much less visible than before. Workers were ever less likely to hang out in pubs, cafés, or bars, not to mention union or political halls, and much more likely to go to the movies or watch television with their families. As working-class pursuits became more private, workers' lives became more like those of the middle classes. The decline of a separate, and politicized, proletarian milieu has particularly occupied the interest of historians of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), presumably because of the huge size, extraordinary network, and political significance of social democratic and communist organizations in Germany before 1933.

As the working-class way of life became less culturally distinct, bourgeois culture too grew less socially definable. Again, most authors contend that real changes underlay the decline of older social, cultural, and political distinctions. A different social structure emerged with the final disappearance of the aristocracy and the transformation of industrial barons into economic managers. The old middle class—shopkeepers, artisans, and other self-employed—shrank to a tiny minority of the European population and became, after a few last gasps, incapable of effective, usually reactionary, activity in defense of its interests. Social class was ever less defined by ownership of traditional kinds of property and ever more based on education and one's position within a bureaucratic hierarchy, whether corporate or governmental.

The social effects of economic changes were hastened, most analysts have argued, by the spread of

mass culture via the electronic media. As Peter Stearns observed in *European Society in Upheaval: Social History since 1750* (1975), tastes were converging across the urban-rural boundary, class divides, and national borders as ever greater numbers of Europeans enjoyed more leisure, participated in similar leisure activities and vacations, and labored in the increasingly indistinguishable environments of the large, automated office and big, mechanized factory. In *An Economic and Social History of Europe from 1939 to the Present* (1987), Frank Tipton and Robert Aldrich pointed to the high television ratings of the 1955 World Cup series, broadcast over all Western Europe, as a watershed event that revealed both the expansion of leisure in postwar Europe and the shared ways Europeans spent their free time.

Whether because the social gap narrowed slightly or because dress, demeanor, and possessions no longer blatantly expressed "class," the meaning of that social division faded. Social historians not only agree that this process occurred but rank it as one of the most significant changes in European society since World War II. They do not, however, see the attenuation of class antagonism as linear, much less absolute. Each country followed its own path, and nowhere did class distinctions disappear. If the class struggle was no longer a central theme of social relations, tensions still flared, especially during periods of recession or inflation, such as in France and Italy in the late 1960s and in Great Britain in the 1970s and early 1980s. In fact, the topic of class and its continuing significance has especially engaged historians of postwar Britain, presumably because the distinctions between "upstairs" and "downstairs" were understood to be especially sharp there before 1945. Surveying not only the British Isles but all Europe, Stearns and Herrick Chapman (1992) found class still to be a vibrant category of popular perceptions of society and criticized the "rosy view of homogenization" found in assessments of the "new Europe" from the 1960s.

Since the 1970s social historians have also become interested in the mass migration of workers between and into European countries as simultaneously a new source of social tension and a siphon of class antagonism. Initially that migration consisted mostly of southern Europeans going north; later, Europe received an influx of immigrants from former colonies and other countries. Although racism, not to mention chauvinistic nationalism, has an old, terrible history in Europe, largely new is its tendency to divide workers along ethnic lines in the factory and in the neighborhood. As a result, it has contributed, social historians have argued, to the decline of class-based politics and an increase in racial tension. In this way, as in so

many others, Europe has become more like the United States. Social historians have in fact manifested considerable interest in the Americanization of Europe as well as in Europeans' love-hate relationship with the United States.

Clearly, one path of European and American convergence has been the rising educational levels on both sides of the Atlantic. From a continent starkly divided between a mass of elementary-school graduates and a thin layer of academics, Europe—west and east, north and south—has become a society of high-school and college graduates, a change that has greatly interested social-science historians. A dramatic improvement in vocational training inaugurated the educational reforms of the postwar era, allowing the majority of working-class boys to enter skilled occupations and also providing many proletarian daughters access to a vocation. The expansion of secondary schooling and universities, for its part, provided a new means of recruitment into social elites. Social historians have argued that this second stage of the educational boom reversed the order of class and gender effects achieved by the first phase. The expansion of higher education functioned less well as a lever to lift workers' children into the middle class than as a formidable leveler of young women's historic educational disadvantages.

The historiography has generally associated the education boom with two other developments: first, the emergence of a youth culture that crossed national boundaries in its tastes, styles, and mores and, second, the rise of new social movements, often peopled by students or graduates who discovered their political cause while at university. As one might expect, social historians have attributed social significance to the explosion and spread across Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, and Germany of the student movement for university reform and against consumer capitalism. When it comes to actual research, however, they have tended to leave the investigation of the mass strikes of the 1960s and the terrorism of the 1970s to political scientists and sociologists such as, most famously, Alain Touraine. Though the feminist movement emerged later in Europe and never attained the same strength as in the United States, the struggles for women's rights and, especially, for reproductive rights have since the late 1970s inspired more social-historical research than has the student revolt.

Interest in the women's movement was heightened by the recognition that this social movement was associated with a major social change: the demise of patriarchal power and the rise of the two-earner family. As measured by social historians, changes in the European family were many and varied. After the

baby boom of the 1950s, the birth rate fell, reaching historic lows in virtually every country and approaching zero population growth in several by the 1970s. The institutionalization of a smaller nuclear family occurred along with changes in domestic gender relations. Wives' level of education rose, companionate marriage based on friendship and joint decision making spread, and both men and women expected sexual fulfillment in marriage; as a result of these tendencies, standards of marital happiness rose. As legal barriers to divorce fell in country after country, the divorce rate accelerated, accompanied by an increase in the percentage of single-parent families and of single-person households. Ever more married women entered the workforce, leaving only briefly to bear and raise children, although precise rates varied widely between countries like Spain and Portugal on the one hand and the Scandinavian countries on the other. The offspring of these women entered (usually public) daycare and kindergartens. Thus, the family declined as the primary institution for the socialization of young children.

The state increased its influence not only on the early-childhood development of Europeans but on every phase of their lives. Needy individuals, in particular, came to rely much less on family and much more on state intervention in periods of crisis. The European welfare states socialized many services and at least some industries, manipulated economic measures in order to create full employment, redistributed wealth via taxes and state programs, and provided health and other social insurance. After the flush days of the 1960s, state budgets were hard hit by the oil shocks of the 1970s and the aging of populations. A wave of privatization occurred in the 1980s, especially in Great Britain; but nowhere was the welfare state dismantled. Social historians concluded that people might grumble about taxes and bureaucracies but would not countenance a return to a society whose state did not guarantee at least social security, health insurance, and unemployment compensation.

One European postwar trend was of particular fascination to social critics and historians from the 1950s to the turn of the century: the triumph of consumer society in Western Europe and, after 1989, the extension of mass consumerism into Eastern Europe. Historians have attributed the breakthrough of mass, American-style consumerism, like other social changes, to the unprecedented prosperity generated by the long postwar boom. The boom, several historians have been at pains to point out, was founded on the continued and indeed rapid industrialization of European economies in the 1950s and 1960s. So, for example, industrial work relations spread quite dra-

matically among some subpopulations, such as women or southern Europeans. Yet social historians have not scrutinized their experiences, presumably because they did not constitute a break with the kind of work patterns already established in Europe. Rejecting the productionist bias of nineteenth-century studies, social historians have defined the “New Europe” instead by how, what, and how much it consumed—that is, by the market’s new status as the main means by which people satisfied their bodily, emotional, and even spiritual needs. In dubbing the era the “Age of the Automobile,” Hobsbawm referred not to “Fordism” and its mass-production methods but to mass accessibility to commodities on the one hand and to an individualistic, liberated, mobile style of life on the other.

WHAT’S NEW, WHAT’S NOT, AND WHY

The triumph of consumer society, then, stands at the heart of what is really different about the new age—and has, in turn, influenced the historiography of the era. Or does it—and has it? It is difficult, as Stearns and Chapman noted, to assess continuity and change in the postwar era because most of its major trends—including the spread of consumerism—continued prewar social tendencies. It is even more difficult to judge the nature of change because there occurred not a true recasting of the class structure, as in nineteenth-century western Europe, but a reformation of the occupational framework. Many historians maintain, nonetheless, that postwar changes, while neither new nor revolutionary, were so dramatic, profound, and transnational that their very quantity adds up to a qualitative shift toward a more open and dynamic society.

Hartmut Kaelble has taken the argument about the significance of a cross-national pattern of change one step further. In his *A Social History of Western Europe, 1880–1980* (1989), he argued that Western European societies have converged substantially since 1945. Pointing to the trends outlined above, he maintained, first, that this convergence was multifaceted. Second, it stood in contrast to a tendency toward political and even social divergence through the 1930s. Third, it occurred without turning Europe into a version of the United States but preserved distinctively European urban patterns and styles of life. Finally, Kaelble posited, the social integration of Europe since 1950 contributed appreciably to the new peacefulness of European relations and to the political and economic integration that is still under way. Rather than look at Kaelble’s converging metatrends, other historians have focused instead on differences in particular

tendencies or on different rates of change within a similar trend. Thus, historians of women have shown an interest in why the rate of women’s employment in Great Britain and especially the Federal Republic of Germany has lagged behind that in France and Sweden. They have pointed to the less advanced development of public child-care systems in the former two countries as one reason for the difference. Obviously, whether they support Kaelble’s convergence theory or not, social historians of the postwar era share a trait that is pronounced in the social historiography of postwar Europe: a strong proclivity toward the comparative analyses of social trends.

Social, along with political, historians of the postwar era have long been interested in why the effects of World War II were so profoundly different from those of World War I. Whereas the unprecedented carnage of 1939–1945 ushered in an age of greater (Western) European unity, peace, and prosperity, in the wake of World War I followed discordance, crises, and, finally, an even more terrible war. Social historians have not denied the significance of the political lessons learned from the interwar crises or, certainly, the division of Europe between the superpowers as spurs to solidarity within each camp; but in their view the major generator of the New Europe is the economic boom. Like political historians and experts in international relations, they attribute the boom in part to international conditions (fostered, again, by the cold war) that helped jump-start Western European industry in the 1950s. But social historians, especially of the Federal Republic of Germany, also point to certain social effects of the war and immediate postwar years that were internally generated and peculiar to Europe. They cite, for example, the destruction of aristocratic and landed elites and the migration westward of young populations with considerable skills as difficult transitions that eventually contributed both to the more liberal and conciliatory political climate and to the economic dynamism of the 1950s. As for the authoritarian southern nations, economic dynamism followed by liberalization came later.

PERIODIZATION

Social historians have constructed their periodization of the postwar era in Western Europe above all around its economic phases. The first period, from 1945 to 1950–1951, was one of dearth, social crisis, and mass migrations. The boom ushered in two decades of rising prosperity that was punctuated at the end (1966–1971) by a sudden and cross-European rise in social

unrest associated with the explosion in the student and working-class populations. The years from 1973 through the late 1980s are grouped together as a time of economic malaise, characterized by inflation, budget crises, stagnation, and high levels of long-term unemployment, although this was also a period of significant democratization. Finally, the 1990s are seen as a decade of partial economic recovery that was also distinguished by striking political developments. Social historians highlight, first and foremost, the end of communism in Eastern Europe, but also emphasize the rapid steps toward, on the positive side, European unity and, on the negative side, the resurgence of nationalism and instability, particularly in the Balkans.

This periodization, by attributing as much significance to the postwar economic boom as to the wars and political upheavals of the first half of the century, challenges the utility of the conventional periodization of twentieth-century history. It also diverges from perceptions of the postwar era that cast the 1950s as socially dull, conformist, conservative, and even retrograde rather than as a decade that harbored new social tendencies and so prepared the way for changes in the family, the position of women, and generational relationships in the 1960s and 1970s. Although at any given point scholarly definitions of both the intervals and the meaning of the periodization have tended to intersect, definitions have varied according to when the appraisals were written. Commentaries on the “golden years” of the 1950s and 1960s that appeared during those years were not mindlessly optimistic, but they did tend to overestimate the transformative impact of mass consumption and changes in class structures. Overviews of postwar development written in the late 1970s were not all retrospective gloom and doom, though their sense of postwar development—and emphasis on what had *not* changed—was clearly colored by the mood of crisis that gripped Europe during the decade’s oil crises and wave of terrorism. Their authors were more likely, for example, to highlight the devastating effects on certain regions of the decline of old industries such as textiles and mining than to trumpet, as had earlier writers, the rise of new industries such as petrochemicals and electronics.

THEORIZING CONSUMER SOCIETY

In *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (1994), Hobsbawm held that the postwar world had undergone a great social transformation. Yet simultaneously, he acknowledged the difficulty of characterizing this new world of constant change. Hobs-

bawm, as had Stearns and Kaelble in their own surveys of the era, rejected the term “postindustrial,” coined in 1959 by the American sociologist Daniel Bell (first appearing in his *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*), as a misnomer, at least for Europe. After all, the continent experienced not only greater industrialization into the 1970s but also the continuation of other classic trends of the industrial age. Other historians, though, have found the term useful. If not postindustrial or, in a subsequent variation, post-Fordist, they have often appended “postmodern” to at least the period after the 1970s. The sociological economist Amitai Etzioni in 1968 first applied this term to the radical transformation of the technologies of communication and knowledge after 1945. Recognizing that the social-structural effects of the technological revolution remain unclear, historians use the concept to refer to a vaguer, though palpable, shift in social mentality that has accompanied the movement toward a Europe dominated by the production of services of all kinds.

Other versions of “post-” mania have been less controversial. On the one hand, it is accepted that Eastern Europe became “postcommunist.” On the other hand, virtually no historian has embraced the term “post-capitalist,” put forward in the 1960s by the sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf as a label for Western Europe, if only because in the 1990s the market organization of the economy experienced a resurgence throughout Europe and, of course, in Eastern Europe in particular. Even the social democratic parties that came to power in Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and Britain in the 1980s and 1990s pursued economic policies more neoliberal than socialist.

Historians who have refused to see the world since 1945 as a postscript are at the same time increasingly reluctant to encompass it within the long-term and universalizing pattern of development encapsulated in the theory of modernization. Historians and other scholars have questioned the usefulness of the concept on several grounds. First, its normative and teleological assumptions have come under attack by historians who point out that, in the twentieth century, modernity’s dissonances tended to drown out the harmonious strains of its progressive march. Works on the postwar era that appeared after the 1970s highlighted the troubles in paradise such as environmental degradation, loss of regional diversity, and erosion of traditional culture. Second, ever more scholars have come to doubt the theory’s ability to describe social facts. Historians of the postwar era have argued that modernization theory cannot encompass the fragmentary and contradictory currents of social and cultural “progress” and “regression”—such as the renaissance

of regionalism and racist nationalism in Western and Eastern Europe—that characterize change in even the most highly industrialized and, indeed, postindustrial European societies. Thus one might say that social-historical interpretations often adopt a “postmodern” viewpoint insofar as they stand judgment on modernity, counting not its blessings but its costs. Yet this critical perspective cannot be assimilated to the postindustrial, postmodern camp, for its adherents see postwar European society as shaped by modern developments taken to their extreme, if not necessarily logical, ends.

A SOCIAL, BUT NOT YET A PEOPLE'S, HISTORY

The historiography of postwar Europe, distancing itself from modernization theory with its underpinnings in social-science methodologies, has also been moving away from its fascination with big social trends. An outline of a social history that is new to the study of postwar Europe has begun to take shape. This emergent history rests, like the familiar social histories of industrialization, on painstaking archival reconstructions of the evolution of one region, town, or industry across periods of economic expansion and contraction. Alternatively, its practitioners track the history of one social group's occupations, education, and living patterns, such as those of women or workers. Or they trace the development of a particular social activity, such as radio listening, or organization, such as sports leagues. Social-historical publications cover topics of interest including urban planning; nuclear power; tourism, radio, and other leisure pursuits; women's integration into the industrial labor force; and the assimilation of refugees after the mass migrations of the mid-1940s. Articles and books in the field offer social-historical versions of discourse analysis: they plumb the daily press, official records and decrees, written memoirs, and interviewees' memories to trace, to take two disparate examples, popular perceptions of American culture and GI's or the gendered construction of shopping in the new consumer economy. Findings have suggested that, just as national surveys and comparative syntheses of social change established, by the 1960s Europeans were already living tremendously different lives from those twenty years earlier. Yet these studies have also uncovered the persistence of the old within, around, and against the new—documenting, for example, continuities in male attitudes about the proper gender of industrial labor or in the socializing patterns and cultural beliefs of refugees. The goal of such research is to obtain a rich

picture of how Europeans actually used and interpreted their prosperity, greater social mobility, higher education, and more egalitarian family structures.

The attention to popular experience and local processes has not yet touched all the big issues. The decline of peasant culture, for example, needs to be addressed. The anthropologists Lawrence Wylie and Julian Pitt-Rivers produced classic treatments of villages after the war, but these date to the 1950s. The shrinking of the old middle classes and their demise as a sociopolitical force also remain understudied topics, with the exception of the 1956 book on the Poujadist movement, a right-wing French protest movement in the 1950s, by the political scientist Stanley Hoffmann. The social experiences and cultural adjustments of immigrants from Africa and southern Europe into Europe's northwestern nations since the 1960s also deserve greater attention. The social history of Eastern Europe is in general underresearched, including not just the fate of its peasant and lower-middle-class cultures but also the experience of workers during the Stalinist-style industrialization there in the 1950s. The opening of the archives in Eastern European countries in the early 1990s allowed graduate students from every European nation, the United States, and Canada to conduct research into myriad important social-historical topics. The emerging dissertations and books based on these researches mark an important stage in the social history of the period.

NATIONAL TRENDS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The country whose postwar social history has received the most attention is Germany, especially its western part (although comparative German history has become a growth field). German historians have, not surprisingly, played the prominent role in this research, but they have been joined by both Americans and Britons in the field. Several factors explain the preeminence of the German wing of postwar social history and the great interest in understanding German social development. Of all Western European countries, the political break across the 1945 divide was most dramatic in what became the Federal Republic of Germany. German historians have been eager to determine what exactly distinguishes, and why, the second postwar era from the first. Social historians, for their part, have a special interest in Germany's postwar evolution. Central causes of the character, popular appeal, and political-military course of National Socialism must be sought, they have argued, in German society and culture from 1900 to 1945—in

short, the “German question.” Similarly, they attribute German political stability since 1945 to the nation’s new social dynamics. To understand what changed in German political culture and whether it has become more like that of its western neighbors, they have been determined to establish the exact nature of social change and continuity after the war. Interest in social history was also motivated by the massive transfer and flight of Germans from the east after 1945, a topic that is probably better researched than any other social question in Germany.

The concentration on German social history in the postwar era derives, too, from the character of historiography in the Federal Republic. The German historians who inaugurated modern social history—called the Young Turks because of the challenge they posed to the conventional methods—in the late 1960s, such as Hans Ulrich Wehler, Jürgen Kocka, and Hans Mommsen, listed toward the social-science corner of the field and showed a keen interest in the comparative social development of Germany, western European nations, and the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They drew a sharp line between their comparative, structural perspective and the dominant tradition of national political history for which the German academy was once famous and, after 1945, infamous. Though Wehler and others directed their critical sights on Germany before 1945, some of their students chose to apply their training in sociological methods and issues to contemporary history.

German social history’s own history has been subjected, ironically, to the same critical questions about continuities with the pre-1945 and especially National Socialist past as those it posed concerning German society and traditional German historiography. In the late 1990s several scholars established that the deceased historians Werner Conze and Theodor Schieder, whose students in the 1950s developed into the 1960s generation of Young Turks, had written position papers during the war on the right of Germans to settle eastern Europe. These papers promoted a chauvinistic agenda and were suffused with National Socialist assumptions about ethnic hierarchies. The discovery unleashed a controversy about why their students, now famous historians in senior university posts, had failed to question them or other older social historians about their activity during the Third Reich. It also ignited a continuing debate about what came to be called the “brown roots of social history” in Germany (brown being the color associated with the Nazis because of their uniforms). Both Conze and Schieder conducted research on the postwar era. Schieder, in fact, directed the huge government-financed project of the 1950s that gathered statistics

and qualitative evidence on what happened to the German refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe. This controversy touched, if far from tainted, the history of postwar social history.

Into the early 1990s the social history of France in the 1950s and 1960s consisted of a relatively small number of syntheses of social, economic, and policy trends. Overviews of French development that appeared in the 1980s argued that 1950s policymakers had taken the country through a planned leap into modern life after the crisis of the Third Republic and the shock of German occupation. The results, they believed, clearly broke with decades of social and economic stagnation. Only in the late 1990s did there appear a specialized social-historical literature, mainly written by young American scholars, on particular aspects and local versions of French social change. Several reasons underlie the lagging development of postwar social history in France. First, 1945, dramatic though it was, did not, as in Germany, constitute the so-called zero hour, much less the end of an aggressive, murderous regime. Compared to German historians’ anxious scanning of their nation’s recent history, the French did not feel the need to establish exactly what was different about the New France in order to assure themselves and their readers that the Old France would not reemerge. In fact, the French were more invested in denying the French roots of the country’s own wartime regime. Second, modern social history in France was the child of the *Annales* school, famous for its interest in the *longue durée* of historical evolution and its contempt for short-term trends; in continuity rather than breaks; in slow-brewing popular mentalities rather than elite-driven “events”; and, finally, in medieval and early modern history. French social historians have, as a result, been inclined to shy away from contemporary history.

In Great Britain, too, the meaning of “1945” there and the character of the historiography conspired to reduce the interest of social historians in the postwar era. Whether looked at from a political or social angle, the break there was less dramatic than in any other major European combatant. The country was already highly urbanized and industrialized in 1945; changes in class relations were not very noticeable there until the 1980s, following the onset of rapid deindustrialization. Moreover, the economic boom was considerably weaker and shorter in the United Kingdom than in Germany, France, or Italy. Early postwar governments followed an assertive socialization policy and created a well-developed welfare state, but the social effects of these policies emerged only over several decades. Finally, British social historians have generally concentrated on the industrial revolu-

tion as the most important era of social change in modern British history. Thus, the British historiography, even more than the French, has been characterized by synthetic treatments of national social development over the entire postwar era or the twentieth century as a whole.

As the postwar era in Europe—defined by political scientists and historians as having ended with the fall of communism—recedes in time, research into the social and sociocultural aspects of its history will most certainly flourish, as has the field's knowledge of earlier historical periods.

See also Immigrants (in this volume); Modernization; Migration; Birth, Contraception, and Abortion; The Welfare State (volume 2); Social Class; Social Mobility; Student Movements (volume 3); Consumerism; Schools and Schooling; Standards of Living (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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PRINCIPLES OF REGIONALISM



John A. Agnew

The nation-state as the fundamental geographical unit of account has been at the heart of the social sciences as a whole since the late nineteenth century. The origins of fields oriented to the “solution” of such public problems as wealth creation (economics), state management (political science), and social order (sociology) lay in providing services to the nation-state. Yet the “view from below,” or that of social groups marginalized in orthodox political history and often associated with social history as a field of study, rests on the premise that the national scale typically represents the privileging of attention to the institutions associated with the interests and outlooks of modern political elites more than the reality of a homogeneous and enclosed society conforming to the political boundaries imposed by the modern system of territorial states. Moreover, not only have Europe’s political boundaries been unstable over even relatively short periods of time, the geographical patterning of social life is by no means successfully captured by a singular focus on the national scale.

Of course, this is not to say that national processes of political and economic regulation are without substance in European social history. One study shows how a coherent rural region in the Pyrenees divided into separate Spanish and French national areas with the growth of effective monarchies as early as the seventeenth century. And, since the nineteenth century in particular, nation-states have played influential roles both in reinforcing and in changing various social phenomena. Rather, it is to suggest that the national is only one geographical scale among several in terms of relevance to understanding the long-term structuring of such phenomena as household and family organization, literacy, social protest, social-class formation, and political ideologies. Consequently, depending on the phenomenon in question, regions at a subnational level and regions at a supranational level are often invoked by social historians to provide more appropriate territorial units than the putative nation-state upon which to base social-historical investigation. As Otto Dann expresses it in *Gli spazi del potere*:

With the region, social history, liberated for some time from the weight of the national state, finally has found a more adequate concept of space. The region is the territory of the social historian, varying in its size and structure depending on the object of research. (p. 117)

The term “region” is often used without much conscious motivation other than either to group together nations that are apparently similar and thus to simplify complexity or to ground local studies within a larger geographical field of reference. The drawing of regional differences above and below the national scale also frequently involves deploying such familiar, and often theoretically unexamined, conceptual oppositions as modern-backward, commercial-feudal, and core-periphery, depending upon the theoretical orientation of the social history in question. The region, whatever its precise geographical and social parameters, seemingly cannot be avoided in social history, even when it is not rigorously defined as an inherent feature of a particular study. In the 1990s, however, there was a resurgence of studies explicitly engaging with subnational regions, not least because of the regional-ethnic revivals going on around Europe, from Spain and the British Isles to the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Regions as geographical units with which to define the contexts of study of a wide range of social structures and processes are therefore important both implicitly and explicitly in European social history.

Some “schools” of social history, particularly that associated with the *Annales* in interwar and immediate postwar France, have been explicitly devoted to avoiding the privileging of the state as the primary unit of geographical context. Perhaps the close link between geography and history in France led to a greater recognition by social and economic historians of the importance of assumptions about the spatial units used in research—recognition that is largely missing in the English-speaking world where an abstract sounding but usually nationally oriented sociology has tended to be more influential than geography among historians. Fernand Braudel’s classic study,

La Méditerranée (1949), is an excellent example of the use of a geographical frame of reference, in this case an ocean basin, as an alternative to the nation-states that had dominated historical research during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century. For Braudel's long-term total history the relatively short histories of European states posed a significant barrier to the historical understanding that only a larger regional entity, such as the Mediterranean world, could adequately convey. Of course, even Braudel eventually succumbed to the allure of national history in his *L'identité de la France* (1986), though this work remains more sensitive than the typical national history to the physical geography and regional distinctions of the territory that later became France as we know it today. In addition, according to Lynn Hunt:

Despite the enormous prestige of *La Méditerranée*, Braudel's example did not elicit many works within the French historical community on cross-national networks of commercial exchange. Rather, French historians of the third *Annales* generation focused largely on France, and usually on one region of France. The best known of these great *thèses* were *Les Paysans de Languedoc* (1966) by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and *Beauvais et le Beauvaisis* (1960) by Pierre Goubert. (p. 212)

Since the 1960s, world-systems frameworks such as that of Immanuel Wallerstein, based on distinguishing dynamic economic-geographical core macroregions, such as northwest Europe after 1700, from relatively peripheral or exploited ones, such as eastern and southern Europe; theoretical frameworks such as that of Edward W. Fox (*History in Geographic Perspective*, 1971), posing an opposition between "commercial" and "feudal" regions within countries such as France; and internal-colonial or mode of production arguments such as those of Michael Hechter (*Internal Colonialism*, 1976) and William Brustein (*Social Origins of Political Regionalism*, 1988), identifying different types of regions within states with respect to political and social characteristics, represent different ways of explicitly incorporating regions into social-historical analysis. Even greater emphasis on the role of regions as contexts for social invention and political affiliation can be found in the work of the economic historians Sidney Pollard (*Peaceful Conquest*, 1981) and Gary Herrigel (*Industrial Constructions*, 1996), and in that of economic sociologists such as Arnaldo Bagnasco on local economic development and the social construction of the market (*Tre Italie*, 1977). Demographers like Peter Laslett have found regional principles in typologies of family structure, such as East European extended families versus West European nuclear families. Much research, however, tends to operate on an implicit rather than an explicit

conception of region. Even as they adopt regional frameworks in their research, social historians are not necessarily very aware of the nature of the geographical divisions that they use.

Europe, of course, is itself a region in the most macro-scale sense of the term. It serves to define the territorial space with respect to which European social history is practiced. Yet, analyses of Europe as a whole in social history are relatively recent, notwithstanding the tendency to make generalizations about "Europe" on the basis of studies of only small parts of it. The principles of regionalism must take this wider context into account so as to identify the various and sundry geographical divisions of the continent. Such principles, or rules, for defining the geographical basis to European social-historical variation must also pay attention to intellectual disputes about the nature of regions and to how regions have been used by social historians. The four sections of this article present, first, a discussion of Europe as a world region; second, a recounting of disputes over the character of regions as meaningful entities in social-historical research; third, a survey of some ways in which regions have been used in European social history; and, fourth, a review of the principles upon which a geographical division must rest, drawing from both the practice of social history and recent work by geographers interested in the ways in which Europe can be thought about in terms of its internal geographical divisions.

EUROPE AS A REGION

"Europe" can be thought of in geographical, historical, and institutional terms, if in practice its various meanings are often conflated. With respect to physical geography, the ancient Greeks used the term "Europe" to denote the lands to their west and north as part of a threefold division of the world that distinguished Europe from Asia to the east and Libya (Africa) to the south. Writers such as Herodotus and Strabo regarded these terms as conventional or arbitrary ones, open to systematic questioning. But, for most of the two millennia or more since they wrote, the continental scheme has been largely taken for granted as betraying some sort of essential geographical division of the world (Lewis and Wigen, 1997). Controversy has flared up over the precise delimitation of Europe from its continental neighbors, with the Ural Mountains replacing the Don River and the Sea of Azov as its eastern border by the early twentieth century, and religious, racial, and civilizational criteria increasingly substituting for physical criteria as the basis for identifying Europe in opposition to other world regions. However, Europe is still largely seen as a self-

evident unit whose history has a unity too as a result of a collective destiny created by its global location and the physical attributes (physiographic range, temperate climates, location relative to oceanic wind belts, internal environmental diversity, and so forth) associated with it. One effect of this reasoning, seen in so many global histories (for example, Paul Kennedy's *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 1987; and David Landes's *Wealth and Poverty of Nations*, 1998), has been to exempt Europe from the rule of absolute environmental determinism, seeing it as distinctive among the continents in offering the environmental possibilities out of which European "inventiveness," "inquisitiveness," and, finally, justifiable domination of the rest of the world, including the identification and naming of world regions, are seen as arising. Nevertheless, the logic underpinning Europe's claim to distinctiveness is still a physical-geographical one.

To most social historians, however, it is not the physical character of the continent that lies behind the appropriate use of the term. Rather, Europe's existence is understood as that of a geographical entity with a set of common or overlapping historical experiences (Wilson and van der Dussen, 1993). Thus, much of southern and western Europe was a part of the Roman Empire for at least several centuries. After the collapse of the empire, a much larger part of Europe became the global stronghold of Christianity, if with increasing sectarian divisions creating geographical ones (such as that of the tenth century A.D. between the western Catholic and eastern Orthodox traditions and the later-fifteenth-century division between Catholic and Protestant Christianity). The growth of merchant capitalism beginning in the eleventh century reintroduced city trading networks into the fabric of European society after the long retreat of trade during feudalism. With the decline of royal dynastic authority, the rise of city- and then territorial states as the premier and totalistic means of organizing political sovereignty was initially peculiar to Europe and led to political competition that then spilled out into the rest of the world and brought about the various European-based world empires.

Among other forces at work in producing a common European experience must be included the geographically differential impact of the French Revolution's (1789) call to overthrow the established aristocratic political order, the explosion of industrial urbanism from the mid-eighteenth century on, the spread of nationalist and socialist ideologies in the nineteenth century, and, above all, the slow secularization of society from the singular hold of religious authority in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that created a Europe-wide experience of competing

social allegiances and political ideologies that then distinguished the region as a whole from all others. As a result, according to the historical demographer Emmanuel Todd in *L'invention d'Europe* (1990), and with respect to political ideologies:

European religious and ideological passions are written in space. Each nation, each region [within Europe] adheres either to the Reformation or to the Revolution, to social democracy or to anarchism, liberalism, communism, fascism, or nazism. Each confronts its neighbors in the name of values equally absolute and undemonstrable. (p. 9)

The menu of political choices, therefore, is determined by experiences particular to the space labeled "Europe." The same goes for all manner of other phenomena that have been influenced by the common social, political, and economic experience of the region. As social history has turned more to cultural sources, a few efforts have attempted to describe how popular myths and beliefs have originated and spread across Europe.

Finally, today Europe is increasingly thought of in institutional terms, reflecting the rising importance within segments of the geographical and historical Europe of such entities as the European Union and its affiliated organizations such as the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament (Lévy, 1997). With the removal of the Iron Curtain, the ideological frontier within Europe established after World War II, the project of European unification, initiated by the Treaties of Rome in 1957 between the original six members of the post-1993 European Union, is potentially available to a large number of countries both to the east of the original core members and around the Mediterranean. The Maastricht Accord of 1992 offered a calendar for European political and monetary unification. The introduction in 1999 of the new currency, the euro, by eleven of the fifteen member countries of the European Union represents an important step in the institutional construction of a Europe with a common citizenship, political economy, and policymaking apparatus. The term Europe has become the basis for deciding which countries can be eligible for membership. Rather than singularly geographical or historical, however, the criteria are largely economic and political. Above all, conformity to a neoliberal political economy and to the practices of electoral democracy are now necessary prerequisites for joining the European Union. The project of creating a "common European home," therefore, represents a break with preexisting ways of defining Europe. Now it is a set of common values arising out of the European past but without precise geographical limits that defines who can be "inside" and who is left

“outside” the European “project.” Neither the physical barrier provided by the Urals nor the influence of common European experiences, such as that of Christianity, can tell who is inside and who is outside of Europe. From the institutional perspective, therefore, Europe now has a culturally virtual rather than a geographically actual existence.

WHAT ARE REGIONS?

The term “region” typically conjures up the idea of a homogeneous block of space that has a persisting distinctiveness due to its physical and/or cultural characteristics. Yet, many regions are more networks of connections between concentrations of populations and places than simply uniform spatial units. An allied claim is often that regions exist “out there” in the world, notwithstanding the prior necessity on the part of an observer of thinking that the world is in fact divided up into regions. Over the years, six disputes about regions have episodically flared up both to challenge and enliven the generally consensus view in the social sciences of regions as homogeneous, self-evident blocks of terrestrial space.

The first controversy has been about the ways in which the areas designated as regions are integrated and/or exhibit homogeneous characteristics. Typically, regions are thought of as areas exhibiting uniformity with respect to one or more characteristics. This view has been challenged by scholars who claim that such regions are often purely formal, in the sense that they are the result of aggregating smaller geographical units (census districts, municipalities, provinces, and so forth) according to statistical similarity without attending to what it is that binds the region together with respect to functional ties. Functional ties include the network or circulation linkages (transport, migration, trade, and capital flows) and central-place (settlement hierarchy) links that create distinctive regions and from which their other characteristics are derived (as described, for example, in Paul Hohenberg and Lynn H. Lees, *The Making of Urban Europe*, 1995). Of course, regions are often politically defined by governments (Patriarca, 1994) and political movements (such as separatist ones). They can also have affective meaning for local populations (Applegate, 1999). In such cases, the absolute formal-functional opposition fails to account for the subjective identifications that people can have with formal regions, even if it continues to serve a useful analytic purpose more generally.

Another dispute concerns the belief that regions are real in the sense of marking off truly distinctive

bits of the earth’s surface versus the view that they are the product solely of political and social conventions that impose regions on a much more geographically variegated world. There is a visceral tension between the idea that something is real and that is constructed. But are these ideas indeed as mutually exclusive as the dispute suggests? On the one hand, the real is like the body in philosophy’s mind-body problem. It is tangible, touchable, and empirically visible. On the other hand, the constructed is like the mind making sense of itself and the body. Each of these positions rests on the same confusion between an object (a region) and an idea about that object (regional schemes). Regions reflect both differences in the world and ideas about the geography of such differences. They cannot be reduced to simply one or the other (Agnew, 1999).

A third controversy has focused on the tendency to see regions as fixed for long time periods rather than as mutable and subject to reformulation, even over relatively short periods. Leading figures in the *Annales* school, such as Marc Bloch and Fernand Braudel; world-systems theorists; and demographic historians have been particularly drawn to the idea of macro-regions as the settings for long-term structural history. At the same time others, particularly local historians and regional geographers, have invested heavily in the idea of fixed regional divisions and unique regional entities within countries, owing their uniqueness to “internal” characteristics. However, with the increased sense of a world subject to time-space compression, following the opening of national borders to increased trade, capital, and labor mobility and the shrinkage of global communication and transportation costs, regions are increasingly seen as contingent on the changing character of the larger contexts in which they are embedded rather than dependent on unique features of a more-or-less permanent nature (Johnston, Hauer, and Hoekveld, 1990; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997).

Less noted but perhaps more important with respect to the meaning of regions for social history, a debate has periodically erupted over regions as fundamental contexts for social life as opposed to mere accounting devices or case study settings taken as examples of national or Europe-wide norms and standards. With respect to industrialization, for example, Sidney Pollard has argued that regions are the relevant entities for considering the processes whereby different industries developed. Each region has different combinations of attributes crucial to the establishment of specific industries. In like manner, social and political processes relating to household structures, class formation, and political movements can all be thought of as embedded in regional and local contexts, “the physical arenas in which human interaction

takes place” (Weitz, 1995, p. 291), rather than as abstract or national-level processes only manifesting themselves regionally, as presumed by the idea of the regional case study.

A fifth controversy has involved the tendency to represent the character of regions by locating them along a temporal continuum from the backward, or traditional, at one end and the advanced, or modern, at the other. This conversion of time into space has been particularly important in historicizing certain subnational regions (such as the Italian south, the Scottish Highlands, and Andalusia) and countries as a whole (such as Italy or Ireland) into a schema representing the historical trajectory of Europe as a whole (Agnew, 1996). Thus, presumably isolated and remote regions with lower levels of economic growth than more central regions are viewed as lagging behind the more advanced ones, notwithstanding the long-term ties that bind such regions into their particular nation-states. This tendency has given rise to a contending view that poorer regions are poor because the richer ones have become rich at their expense (as in Hechter, 1976, on the British Isles)—in other words, it is not a temporal lag but rather spatial exploitation that lies behind regional differences in economic development and social change.

Finally, perhaps the dominant sense of social historians about regions, particularly regions at the subnational level, has been of entities destined to fade in significance with the creation of national markets, the emergence of national political parties with more or less uniform support across all regions, and the spread of national cultures robbing local and regional identities of their specificity. This nationalization or modernization thesis, articulated in works ranging from Eugen Weber’s general study of late-nineteenth-century France, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (1976), to Susan Cotts Watkins’s survey of demographic indicators (fertility rates, women’s age at marriage, and so forth) across western Europe between 1870 and 1960, *From Provinces into Nations* (1991), relies on the premise that social organization in Europe has undergone a fundamental shift from local and regional levels to the national scale. This premise is a shaky one, however. Some of the data in a study such as that of Watkins can be interpreted to indicate reprovincialization after a period of nationalization, and nationalization of demographic indicators need not indicate the substitution of regional sources of social influence by national ones. Rather, demographic behavior may still be mediated through the regionally specific routines and institutions of everyday life yet yield increasing similarity of behavioral outcomes across regions. The same goes for religious affiliations, voting, con-

sumption, and other types of social behavior (Agnew, 1987; Cartocci, 1994).

REGIONS IN EUROPEAN SOCIAL HISTORY

Four modes of usage of regions dominate social histories of Europe. The first consists of macroregions as units for the pursuit of total history. The locus classicus of this approach is Fernand Braudel’s *La Méditerranée* (1949). The claim is that over long periods of time regions emerge based on functional linkages that then continue to distinguish one from the other. Such regions need not be ocean basins such as the Black Sea, the Indian Ocean, or the Mediterranean. They can be units determined by their relative orientations toward certain modes of production and exchange. Edward W. Fox’s *History in Geographic Perspective: The Other France* (1971) may be used to illustrate this case briefly, as the logic of the argument need not be restricted to a single national setting.

The second and perhaps most common mode of use is that of dividing up Europe into functional regions to examine specific phenomena such as class transitions and transformations of rule, the nature of landholding and manorialism, industrialization, urbanization, and trade. Sometimes these regions are at a macro scale, as with the divisions between western and eastern Europe (or between western, central or middle, and eastern Europe) in such works as Barington Moore Jr.’s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966; although this study extends in scope well beyond Europe per se), Perry Anderson’s *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974), and William McNeill’s *The Shape of European History* (1974). Sometimes the regions are more fine-grained and subnational, as in Gary Herrigel’s study of German industrialization, *Industrial Constructions* (1996), Charles Tilly’s work (for example, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1992*, 1992) on the logics of coercion and capital in European urbanization and state formation, and work on regional differences in artistic production as in Enrico Castelnuovo and Carlo Ginzburg, “Centre and Periphery” (1994), on Italy. Stein Rokkan’s geographical template for Europe as a whole with respect to rates and degrees of state formation (for example, Rokkan and Urwin, *Economy, Territory, Identity*, 1983) serves as an example of work that brings together the main west-east division of the continent with the center-periphery differences that have developed within the emerging states.

The third use is to aggregate together lower-level units (counties, departments, and so forth) without much regard for national boundaries to identify per-

sisting patterns of demographic, social, and political behavior. Regions are thus geographical areas of similarity extending across space and time. This inductive approach to regionalization is most common in studies of demography, literacy, land tenure, economic growth, and the development of political ideologies. Emmanuel Todd's *L'invention d'Europe* (1990) is an example of this genre of usage.

Finally, the explosion of regionalist and separatist movements in Europe has stimulated considerable interest in the emergence and roots of regional identities in relation to national ones. Charlotte Tacke's comparison of the regional bases to German and French national identities, "The Nation in the Region" (1994), serves as an example drawn from a now vast and diverse literature because of its emphasis on regionality as a source of political identities.

Macroregions. Struck by a France that seemed to repeatedly divide itself since the Revolution of 1789 into two sociopolitical divisions around "order" and "movement," Edward W. Fox writes, "For an American, it was natural to begin by seeking to identify these societies in sectional terms" (p. 13). Unlike the United States, however, France has had nothing like a regional-sectional civil war since at least the medieval Albigensian Crusade. Fox finds the regional division in the different communications orbits that have emerged down the years between a Paris-oriented interior France and an externally oriented commercial France along the coasts. He gives the argument a transcendental appeal by claiming that the opposition between an agricultural-military society, on the one hand, and a commercial-seagoing society, on the other, can be found in ancient Greece and in medieval Europe as much as in the modern world. Fox is distinguishing between a subsistence society dependent on control of territory and a waterborne commercial society dependent on access to flows of goods and capital. The two "types" of society achieved their most characteristic forms during the "long" century between the revolutions of the sixteenth century and the French Revolution. The social commentators of the time, such as Montesquieu, clearly recognized them. Fox uses the dichotomous model as a framework for exploring the course of French social history since 1789, but accepts that by the Fifth Republic the opposition between two societies had largely run its material course, even if the legacy of the two Frances still "left its imprint upon the political preferences of their members" (Fox-Genovese and Genovese, 1989, p. 237).

Fox's regionalization rests on what can be called a fixed spatial division of labor between two different modes of production which though present within the

boundaries of the same state nevertheless have both fractured that state and led to distinctive social orders (class struggles, inheritance systems, religious and political affiliations, and so on) within it. Thus, the history of France (and, Fox suggests, many other states) cannot be understood satisfactorily as a singular whole but only in terms of the opposition and interaction between "two Frances" based upon competing principles of social and economic organization. Though articulated in the setting of a specific (perhaps the quintessential) nation-state, Fox's argument is similar to other macroregional ones in pointing to the persistence of regional patterns of social and political behavior as the foundation for interpreting other social phenomena. Whether such phenomena can be invariably reduced to the opposition is, of course, another thing entirely.

Functional regions. The late Stein Rokkan's research enterprise was oriented to understanding the varying character (unitary versus federal, democratic versus authoritarian, and so forth) of Europe's modern states (see Rokkan and Urwin, *Economy, Territory, Identity*, 1983). Among other things, he noted that adjacent states tended to develop similar forms of government and that there was a fairly systematic north-south and east-west dimensionality to this variation. He represented spatial variation between states in a series of schematic diagrams transforming Europe into an abstract space by drawing on crucial periods and processes in European socio-political history. Three periods or processes are seen as crucial. The first is the pattern of the peopling and vernacularization of language in the aftermath of the Roman Empire. This produces a geo-ethnic map of Europe based on the south-north influence of the Romans and a west-east physical geography—ethnic geography of the settlement of new groups and their differentiation from one another. The second is the pattern of economic development and urbanization in medieval to early modern Europe, distinguishing a south-north axis drawn largely with reference to the impact of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation and an east-west axis with strong seaward states to the west, a belt of city-states in the center, and a set of weak landward states to the east. The third is the way in which democratization has produced different responses in different regions with smaller unitary states in the extreme west, larger unitary states flanking them to the east, a belt of federal and consociational states in the center, and a set of "retrenched empires" and successor authoritarian states yet further to the east.

This geographical template draws attention to systematic geographic variation in the forms of Eu-

European states and how they arose out of different combinations of social and economic processes. It is particularly original in pointing out the distinctiveness of a long-established urbanized region running from Italy in the south to Flanders in the north. But this use of regionalization neglects the ways in which the social divisions to which Rokkan refers (ethnic identities, city-states versus territorial states and empires, religious affiliations) are translated into political power and how this in turn affects the character of state formation. An entire stage in the process of creating the political map of Europe is missing. As Charles Tilly puts it, perhaps a little too forcefully: "It is hard to see how Rokkan could have gotten much farther without laying aside his maps and concentrating on the analysis of the mechanisms of state formation" (Tilly, 1992, p. 13).

Supranational regions. A very different approach to the use of regions is to use local government areas in different countries as the basis for identifying clusters of units that can cross national boundaries and that define formal regions sharing particular attributes to one degree or another. Maps can be made of such phenomena as family types, fertility and mortality rates, rates of suicide, types of landholding, modes of agrarian organization (sharecropping, peasant proprietorship, capitalist agriculture, and so forth), literacy, religious practice (for example, attendance at Catholic mass), levels of industrial employment, civic culture, and levels of support for ideological parties of the right and the left (see, for example, Goody et al., 1976; Le Bras, 1979; Graff, 1981; and Putnam, 1993). These maps can also be correlated to see to what extent the various phenomena covary spatially with one another. For example, high suicide rates do correlate highly in some places with high rates of illegitimate births and high female autonomy (for instance, much of Sweden and Finland), but elsewhere, as in southern Portugal, they seem to correlate more with something absent in the rest of Europe, perhaps going back to the recovery of the region from Islamic conquest, matrilineal inheritance of names, equal relations in families between parents, and a nuclear ideal of family (Todd, 1990, pp. 56–61).

Various hypotheses about secularization of European society, the impact of industrialization, and the persisting effects on politics and social life of historic forms of household and family organization have been investigated by Emmanuel Todd and others taking this approach. Todd is perhaps the most forceful in his claim for basing the incidence of a wide range of social phenomena on the prior spatial distribution of family types. He shows quite convincingly that family

types (communal, nuclear, stem, and so on), inheritance customs, parent-child relations, and certain features of fertility in Europe do not conform to national-level patterns. Rather, there are both localized clusters within countries and regional groupings that criss-cross national boundaries. What is less convincing is the degree to which other social phenomena are truly the outcome of the "underlying" demographic and familial characteristics rather than mediated regionally by a range of economic and social pressures that have extraregional rather than historically accrued local sources. The tendency is to rigidly interpret regional patterns of "higher-level" phenomena (such as political ideologies or civic cultures) as arising from long-term regional patterns of familial and demographic features (see Sabetti, 1996).

Subnational regions. Finally, subnational regional identities have become the focus for social historians and others concerned with the history and restructuring of European political identities (for example, Applegate, 1999). Nations and regions are typically understood as categories of practice that are reified or given separate existence by people struggling to define themselves as members of this or that group. Much work seeks to identify the diversity of group identities in contemporary Europe and how they have arisen. A distinctive current, however, tries to relate regional to national identities as they have arisen over the past several hundred years. The basic premise is that regional and national identities are often intertwined rather than necessarily oppositional. In comparing the historical construction of French and German national identities, Charlotte Tacke claims that "the individual's identification with the nation . . . rests on a large variety of social ties, which simultaneously forge the links between the individual and the nation" (Tacke, 1994, pp. 691–692). The most important ties are those constituted in regions, which serve as "cultural and social space" for "civic communication" (p. 694). Local bourgeoisies in both countries created renewed regional identities at precisely the same time that the symbols they selected (honoring ancient heroes in statues, for example) were made available for appropriation by nation-building elites. In these cases, therefore, regional identities fed into the national ones and were thus lost from sight.

Elsewhere in Europe, however, regional identities appear more as acts of opposition than of accommodation to national ones. This is the message not only of the internal-colonial and mode of production approaches but also of constructivist approaches that emphasize the tendency of region and nation to become synonymous in some social-cultural contexts.

Resistant regional identities, such as the Irish and Basque ones, have taken shape around claims to nationhood. Unlike the French and German cases, they have tried to develop spatial mythologies alternative to the dominant nations within their respective states (the English and the Castilian, respectively) but are

often forced into terms of debate and the use of institutional forms that signify the inevitability of at least a degree of accommodation to the territorial status quo. Of course, the resistant regional identities suggest that the word “region” in political usage is itself dependent on the prior existence of nation-states

of which the regions are presently part but from which they could possibly separate to become their own nations in the future. One lesson is clear. If all of the other meanings of the term discussed previously are neglected in pursuit of the currently fashionable interest in political regionalism, then we are left with thin intellectual gruel indeed: regions are only potential nations-in-the-making. The attempt to find an alternative regional accounting system to that of the dominant national one would then have come full circle.

PRINCIPLES OF REGIONALISM

The division or partition of Europe into regions cannot be reduced to one best way or a single overarching parameter. Usage is so diverse and disputes over the substance and philosophy of regions are too contentious to allow for application of a single principle of division. This being the case, it makes more sense to tailor usage to specific needs. In this spirit, I want to explore four principles of regionalism that can be applied to the analysis of different research problems based on current practice among social historians and geographers.

The first principle is that of distinctive regional communities that can share identities as well as other sociopolitical characteristics. This principle is most useful for those focusing on the vagaries of subnational political regionalism as well as the persistence of sociopolitical traits from the past. Europe has long been divided in complex ways with respect to language, religion, urbanization, the persistence or reinstatement of feudalism, agrarian systems, and the experience of industrialization. These are all symptomatic of the patchwork of social and place identities and interests that define Europe's varied communities. Nomadic and immigrant groups, most importantly, Roma (or Gypsies), Jews, and non-European immigrants, have had to fit themselves into this kaleidoscope of local and regional communities. With nation-state formation from the eighteenth century on, such groups have had to cope with the tension, and sometimes the conflict, arising between regional identities (known as *Heimat* in German) and national ones (represented in German by the word *Vaterland*). In different countries the tension has resolved itself, at least temporarily, in different ways. If in Germany identification with a *Heimat* has not proved inimical to the growth of a *Vaterland* identity, elsewhere the "resolution" has been to the advantage of one or the other.

The second principle is that of geopolitical territories under construction and challenge, often on the peripheries of states. Apparently less relevant to

the interests of many social historians, this one is useful for those concerned with the tensions and conflicts associated with state formation and disintegration. As authors such as Stein Rokkan and Charles Tilly have suggested, historically based lines of geographical fracture both between and within states have emerged due to differences in state organization and the divergent histories of capitalism in different parts of Europe. Such fractures, typically involving center-periphery cleavages across the political map of Europe, have been reinforced by the popular memory of wars and the territorial claims these have entailed (such as Alsace-Lorraine in the Germany-France conflicts from 1870 to 1945). Within-state regional divisions were dampened by the growth, uneven and partial, of redistributive mechanisms associated with the growth of the European welfare state. With the advent of potentially Europe-wide organizations, such as the European Union, the fractures between states have receded somewhat as the ones within states, largely because of the perception that power now flows increasingly from Brussels as the site of the governing European Commission, have become increasingly important.

The third principle is that of geographical networks that tie together regions through hierarchies of cities and their hinterlands. This is most relevant to studies of industrialization, urbanization, and trade. The European settlement hierarchy has long been one of the most important integrative factors in the continent's history. Linking cities and their hinterlands into a network of centers organized by size and specialization, the European urban system has always worked against a singular territorial organization of Europe into national-state territories. Of course, this system has waxed and waned relative to the significance of national boundaries in channeling flows of goods, capital, and people. In the late twentieth century it was once again in ascendancy after a long period of relative subservience to the regulatory activities of Europe's states. Its recognition led to an emphasis on Europe as a set of connected functional regions rather than the tendency of the other principles to highlight the role of adjacency in creating formal regions homogeneous with respect to one or more social characteristic.

The fourth and final principle is that of regional societies that share a wide range of social and cultural characteristics. This fits the needs of those interested in associating social indicators to examine hypotheses about trends in social phenomena such as classes, family types, secularization, and political activities by identifying formal regions. With industrialization and urbanization since the nineteenth century, the more or less settled dimensions of social life, associated pri-

marily with the relative social stability of rural life, have been disrupted in major ways. Initially the growth of the industrial working class was the most significant development. How this happened differed between different subnational regions, the primary geographical scale at which industrialization took place in Europe. Important social trends, also differing regionally, include the relative decline of social class as a marker of identities, the rise of so-called postmaterialist values

(environmentalism and the like), growing secularization, and the development of new social identities as women and immigrant minorities acquire distinctive social imaginations. Above all is the increasing tension between established commitments to larger groups, on the one hand, such as families, occupational groups, or religious sects, and the growth of consumer and personal values that celebrate the choices of the individual, on the other. Given their divergent histo-

ries, regions, both sub- and cross-national, can be expected to differ with respect to how they cope with such social change.

Each of the four principles is recognizably related to the existing main categories of the research agenda of European social history. The first focuses mostly on the regional social inheritance from the past whereas the second is concerned with the mutual roles of regions and states in creating social and political identities. The third principle of regionalism identifies the functional regions of European urbanization as lying at the heart of the geographical organization of European economic development, notwithstanding the historically important roles in economic policy conducted by national-state governments. The fourth and final principle is directed at understanding the regional impacts of social change by means of how regions provide the contexts of everyday lives, on the one hand, in which the effects of larger-scale changes are mediated, on the other.

CONCLUSION

The point of thinking about European social history in terms of regions is not to use them, whether supra- or subnational, as a totalizing alternative to the geographical template provided by Europe's national-state boundaries. This is missed by commentators who wrongly think that nations and regions are simply opposite ways of dividing up Europe and, typi-

cally, that the former invariably, at least since the nineteenth century, trump the latter (for example, Hobsbawm, 1989). Of course, "nations" are in fact a type of region, albeit of a highly institutionalized variety. Rather, the purpose of regions is to consider the geography of Europe in a more complex way than that usually adopted: the simple coloring in of a map of Europe on the basis of its national boundaries, as in Émile Durkheim's now infamous use of national boundaries to represent a much more variegated pattern of the incidence of suicide. These national boundaries have been both too unstable over the medium term and too unimportant for representing the incidence of a wide range of phenomena (family types and agrarian systems, for example) to justify their dominating the practice of social history.

Regions are themselves obviously contestable. Hence the need to carefully adumbrate the principles upon which a given exercise in regionalizing should rest. That said, the emplacement of social phenomena is inevitably fraught when the phenomena themselves elude placement, as is increasingly the case in a world characterized by flow more than by territorial stasis. Increasingly, "social identities, geographical locations, and national allegiances all tend to be out of sync, at least more so now than in the recent past" (Rafael, 1999, p. 1210). This does not license abandoning regionalism, only attending to the potential dislocations of existing schemes of regions in a world in which a global field of forces is increasingly disrupting the territorial status quo in Europe.

See also other articles in this section.

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BRITAIN



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NATION BUILDING

Britain was neither a state nor a nation during the Renaissance period, and the histories of the English, the Welsh, and the Scots need to be considered separately. The medieval English state was notable for its precocious cohesion. Monarchs might be insecure tenants of the throne, and rival claimants might do battle for it, as the Norman Conquest of 1066, the Anarchy of Stephen of the mid-twelfth century, and the Wars of the Roses of the fifteenth century amply demonstrated. But once each monarch was firmly ensconced, the ruler's writ traveled to the borders of the kingdom uninterrupted by regional jurisdictions or powerful localist forces. The expanding administration and the monarch's itinerant judges extended across the realm, while counties and boroughs from all parts sent representatives to Parliament to consent to royal taxes.

Linguistic cohesion was also established at an early date. The languages of church and state after the Norman Conquest were French and Latin, but these made little impact on the bulk of the population except for foreign words spicing the vernacular English. Intermarriage, the loss of Normandy in the early thirteenth century, the tendency of the church to use English in prayers and sermons, and a patriotic distaste for all things French during the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453) gradually encouraged the use of English even at the highest levels of society. "Standard English," the English of London and the southeast, owes much to the decision of William Caxton, who introduced the printing press to England around 1476, to print in that dialect. While spoken English remained strikingly diverse, written standard English, the English gloriously embellished by William Shakespeare over a century later and disseminated to the population in the austere beautiful prose of the King James Bible (1611), has had no real rivals.

Wales was divided politically into three major regions. The principality of Wales, conquered by Edward I of England toward the end of the thirteenth

century, was subjected to a substantial measure of English-style administration and was held in check by an impressive series of castles. Some of the great Norman barons established the Marcher lordships along the border with England, and some independent lordships remained, chiefly in the south. Resentment at misgovernment found an outlet in the rebellion led by Owain Glyndwr from 1400, the most formidable manifestation of the chronically troubled relationship between the English crown and the Welsh. Henry VIII sought to overcome the division of powers and jurisdictions by pushing through the Acts of Union between 1536 and 1543. These incorporated the whole of Wales into the English system of government and law, making it barely distinguishable from any of the regions of England. Its towns remained tiny until the nineteenth century. Its population was only 200,000 in 1500; its regional markets were the English towns of Bristol, Shrewsbury, and Chester; and its gentry thoroughly intermarried with the neighboring English gentry. Only one thing marked Wales as a potential nation, its language. By ordering the translation of the Bible and Prayer Book into Welsh in 1563, Elizabeth I helped ensure the survival of the language, and as late as 1800 over 80 percent of the Welsh still used it as their first language. They tended to regard the English, the *saxons* (Saxons), as a different people.

Scotland was divided into three main cultures: a Scandinavian fringe in the north and in the Orkney and Shetland Islands; the Gaelic-speaking Highlands of the west, where the clan system predominated and which had close cultural ties with Gaelic Ireland; and the Lowlands of the south and east, the area mostly strongly influenced by the Anglo-Normans. Here the Gaelic language lost out to Scots, a cognate to English that survives in the poetry of Robert Burns. In contrast to Wales, Scotland was an independent state that successfully resisted the attempts by Edward I and Edward II to claim the Scottish crown as the thirteenth turned into the fourteenth century. During the Hundred Years' War and in later Anglo-French confron-

standards of northern Italy or the Low Countries. But London, as the funnel for the wool and other trades to the Continent, was an exception, and its leading merchants were already establishing themselves as men of considerable wealth and power. Their role was enhanced by the most important change in the English economy in the late Middle Ages, the development of cloth manufacturing for the domestic and foreign markets. England was emerging as a manufacturing nation. It is worth emphasizing that for many centuries most manufacturing was domestic and rural and that women and children fully participated in it.

Lower down the social scale, demographic shifts proved crucial. The population reached an unsustainable high of maybe 5 million in the early fourteenth century, but the impact of the Black Death (1348–1349) and successive plagues scythed that figure down to a half or less by the 1440s. Such a severe population contraction had its beneficial side for the peasantry in lowered food prices, cheaper rents, and increased wages. Landowners bore the brunt, but the mightier magnates sought to compensate through the pursuit of heiresses, patronage at court, and the profits of war. Certainly the visual evidence of fifteenth-century England—the nobility’s fortified houses with a new emphasis on domestic comforts, rebuilt towns and villages with impressive parish churches in the perpendicular style, and the increasing number of peasants’ stone houses—suggests a considerable amount of surplus wealth.

The population figures began to recover from the late fifteenth century and surged back to over 5 million by 1640. The rise had been the product above all of younger and more frequent marriages. These were rough years of soaring prices, tumbling wages, underemployment, and land hunger for the common people, many of whom eked out a marginal living through pawning and borrowing, poaching and pilfering, gleaning corn, and reliance on poor relief. The perception and fears of greater lawlessness in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries generated a two-fold response: the construction of “houses of correction” across the country and the codification of the Elizabethan Poor Laws (1598 and 1601), which aimed to prevent the “deserving poor” from starving by a modest redistribution of income through local taxation. More positively for some, population growth stimulated demand and increased available labor, encouraging the expansion of commercialized agriculture to an unusual degree by contemporary standards. Not only did major landowners, capitalistic farmers, and urban mercantile elites prosper during these years, but improved agricultural productivity was sufficient to stave off a recurrence of catastrophic subsistence

tations, the Scottish crown looked to the French to guarantee independence from England, and the English-Scottish border became a subsidiary theater of war. The crown’s reliance on the nobility to raise sufficient troops enhanced noble power in parliament, the church, and the boroughs, while the focus on the border allowed Highlanders considerable latitude. The Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century intertwined with the Anglo-French dynastic struggles, noble ambitions, and stark regional variation in explosive ways. A critical moment came in 1567, when a noble faction forced Mary, Queen of Scots, a French-backed Catholic, to abdicate in favor of her son James VI. He was brought up as a staunch Protestant and succeeded to the English throne in 1603 on the death of the childless Elizabeth I. This was a union of crowns under the House of Stuart, nothing more.

Economically, the island’s principal wealth derived from farming, especially the production of wool. Socially, the large landowners—the crown, the church, the monasteries, and above all the lay magnates—predominated. Towns, serving as markets for their rural hinterlands, remained small and unimpressive by the

crises. Plague, pestilence, and famine diminished in intensity in England and Wales during the seventeenth century, again to an unusual extent by the standards of the rest of Europe and even of Scotland, where a substantial number perished in the dearth of 1695–1698.

The Protestant Reformation played out against this socioeconomic backdrop. It was the product of a political compromise in the 1530s to overturn the authority of the pope so Henry VIII could divorce his first wife. The consequent dissolution of the monasteries amounted to a huge land grab by the crown. But Henry and his successors squandered their opportunities, selling off much of the land to pay for continental wars and thus handing a significantly larger share of the ownership of the country to the nobility and gentry. The Reformation did not have broad appeal outside intellectual elites. The Church of England that emerged under Elizabeth was a hybrid of reformed theology and episcopal authority. Its appeal was above all to the literate, and its bibliocentrism helped stimulate literacy in turn. Its godliness and awareness of omnipresent sin rubbed uncomfortably against popular pastimes, rituals, and beliefs, and it required the rest of the century to become firmly established across the country as the common religion of the people. Even then plenty of scope remained for those who preferred a more rigorous set of beliefs or

alternative forms of church governance. The tumult of events in the 1640s and 1650s, when parliamentary forces took up arms against Charles I, executed him, and established a republic, gave an opportunity to those English and Scots who favored Presbyterian or Independent forms of godly worship. The breakdown of established authority allowed a voice to a rich profusion of socially modest religious and political radicals, including Quakers, Baptists, Ranters, Levellers, Diggers, Muggletonians, and Fifth Monarchy Men. The Restoration of Charles II in 1660 saw the world turned the right way up again, reestablishing the authority of the gentry and the episcopal Church. The English Revolution's social impact was therefore modest, but it undermined belief in the Church's pretensions to uniformity, ensuring a future significant role for Protestant Dissent. It also left a memory of anti-establishment rhetoric for later radicals to exploit and transform.

GREAT TRANSFORMATION

Between the late seventeenth century and the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 Britain was transformed from a second-rate state on the fringes of European power politics into the leading colonial, economic, and military great power of the age. It achieved this

through warfare, mainly against the French, who had a clear advantage on paper in terms of resources and manpower. The British proved more effective at mobilizing the sinews of war, but without a massive increase in direct governmental power and with rights and liberties still comparatively intact, contrary to the typical continental pattern. The Glorious Revolution of 1688, which displaced the Catholic James II in favor of the Protestant William of Orange, locked the country into a struggle against Louis XIV of France. The political nation in Parliament, committed both to the Protestant succession and to bettering the nation's commercial interests by picking off neighbors' colonies, supported an unprecedented level of taxation, the underwriting and servicing of a national debt, and the building of a small but efficient bureaucracy. This parliamentary consent, tempered by a vigorous tradition of "Country" opposition to Court intrigue, was a key means of keeping a check on executive authority. A second critical factor was that Britain's "island moat" and its policy of maritime colonial expansion meant that it could pour its resources into the Royal Navy, "the wooden walls of Old England," and subsidize allies and mercenaries where necessary rather than rely on a large, potentially oppressive standing army.

The ability to mobilize sufficient resources depended on a rise in national prosperity after the Restoration. A traditional interpretation posited a landlord-led "agricultural revolution" from the mid-eighteenth century, in which improved breeds, better crop rotation, and greater field enclosure produced more food with fewer people. This enabled the country to survive the population increase of the late eighteenth century without demographic crisis and also released workers for rural industry and the towns. This fed into a traditional interpretation of an "industrial revolution" from the late eighteenth century, a takeoff into self-sustained growth due to widespread application of steam power in proliferating factories.

Most historians have rejected this chronology. The transition from an agrarian to an industrial world of unimagined wealth for ordinary citizens is not in doubt and is revolutionary by any standards, but the nature and timing of key changes have been controversial. Late-twentieth-century scholars placed more emphasis on the period between 1660 and 1740, when the burgeoning London market demanded and received more and better grains and animal products. These came increasingly from arable regions, where temporary pastures had become the normal way to feed crop, beast, and soil, allowing a virtuous spiral of improvement. Many historians call the expansion of

trade before steam a "commercial revolution." Certainly the rise in real incomes after 1660 stimulated demand both for foreign imports and domestic industry. The Navigation Acts of the 1650s and 1660s, which stipulated that trade with the colonies must be in English ships, rapidly turned the merchant fleet into the largest in Europe and English ports, above all London, into entrepôts for the import, export, and re-export trades. The development of the Atlantic economy and trade with India and the Far East, as Europeans acquired a taste for luxury commodities and the British exported textiles and metalware to the colonies in return, gradually eclipsed the long-standing export leader, textiles to Europe. Many merchants in Liverpool and Bristol made fortunes from the "triangular trade." The first leg took manufactured goods to West Africa to be exchanged for slaves; the second, the notorious and deadly "middle passage," transported the slaves to be sold in the Americas and the West Indies; and the third shipped tobacco, sugar, rum, and molasses back to England.

But the expansion of domestic trade may well have been even more important. Small, permanent shops began to dot the country, competing with fairs, village markets, and itinerant peddlers. The threading of a network of turnpike roads across the island from the late seventeenth century, improvements in river navigations, the construction of canals from the 1750s, and better harbor and dock facilities for coastal shipping reduced transaction costs and gradually integrated the nation's markets. This encouraged regional specialization in handicraft manufacture and the development of a new economic geography, including pottery in Staffordshire, metalware in the West Midlands and South Yorkshire, worsted manufacture in the West Riding of Yorkshire, and toward the end of the eighteenth century, cotton in Lancashire. The growth of towns reflected this vibrant commercial economy, and London's dominance was extraordinary. It had a population of 575,000 in 1700, 10 percent of the people of England. Norwich, the second biggest city, had a mere 30,000. London handled the lion's share of the country's foreign trade, provided an enormous economic stimulus for a market in provisions, services, and manufactured goods, and was the site of the court, the political life, and the fashionable world of the ruling elite. As London's population rocketed to 900,000 by 1800, making it by far the largest city in Europe, other cities had overtaken Norwich and were making inroads. These included the mercantile towns of Bristol, Liverpool, and Newcastle, which supplied coal by sea to London from northeastern mines; Royal Navy dockyard towns, like Portsmouth and Plymouth; and the manufactur-

ing towns of Birmingham, Sheffield, Leeds, and Manchester.

Why did Britain undergo such rapid economic change in comparison with the western European continent? Britain's role in colonial trade, based in turn on its advantageous geographical position, was surely an element in its success. So was its relative speed in expanding consumer outlets and expectations in the eighteenth century, which both reflected economic change and promoted further expansion. The British aristocracy was less hostile to trade than its continental counterparts, and the guild system was looser, so that there was less resistance to the adoption of new technologies. The economic position of the lower classes may have deteriorated more markedly than elsewhere, creating a source of unusually cheap labor. Child labor, for instance, was exploited in early industrial Britain to an extent never matched on the continent. There were other factors, environmental and political. Exhaustion of forests made it harder to supply charcoal for traditional metallurgy, promoting the use of coal. Both coal and iron were in abundant supply, and Britain's waterways facilitated access and transport for industry. Limited religious tolerance allowed numerous minority Protestant groups to flourish but denied them political participation, leading them to emphasize business success as an alternative means of advancement. Success in India taught the British the advantages of cotton textiles early on, and Britain soon limited Indian industry to the advantage of its own manufacturing. Through the convergence of these various factors, Britain for a considerable time led the world in economic development.

Throughout the eighteenth century the landed elite—the aristocrats and gentry who owned most of the country—remained socially, economically, and politically preeminent, their income swollen by agricultural improvements, extraction of minerals, and urban expansion on their property. Their extravagant country houses, surrounded by landscaped gardens and parkland, were emphatic declarations of wealth and power, as were the desirable urban areas this amphibious ruling class developed for their town sojourns. But nonlanded wealth was increasingly important as well. The leading London merchants rubbed shoulders with aristocrats and especially their younger sons. Provincial merchants and professional men, especially physicians, barristers, and clergymen, intermarried with the lesser gentry and mingled with them socially in the “polite society” of the assembly rooms and the theaters in the county towns. Lower down, the “middling sort,” the master craftsmen in the towns and the yeomen and husbandmen in the countryside, enjoyed a modest if precarious prosperity

in these years and could hope to spend their surplus disposable income on better food or household furnishings. But bankruptcy always lurked close at hand, and solvency often depended on the goodwill of relatives and other creditors.

For those at the bottom of the social pyramid, the relative improvements earlier in the eighteenth century seem to have retreated toward the end. Population expanded rapidly after 1740, as female marriage ages fell again. Adam Smith in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), T. R. Malthus in *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), and even later classical economists believed that the economy had almost exhausted its potential for expansion. The landed elite, to maintain their rental incomes, compounded the demographic pressures and consequent immiseration by moving to the piecemeal dismantling of a “moral economy” of communal and customary rights in favor of the freer operation of the “laws” of the market. Local elites throughout the eighteenth century had tolerated the occasional riot and the boisterousness of the crowd at elections, patriotic celebrations, and the rituals of public punishment since this was a way of legitimizing their rule without recourse to wholesale repression. Better that, they argued, than a French-style absolutism or a repetition of Oliver Cromwell's regime of the 1650s, both of which would undermine local elite power. But from the 1770s, as the gap widened between the patricians and the plebeians, the authorities relied more on troops to control rioters, used spies to curb the contagion of revolutionary ideas from France in the 1790s, and clamped greater restrictions on freedom of expression. The space between polite, refined, literate culture and rough, popular, oral culture seemed to increase as well. Only the “vulgar” still believed in witches, magic, and malign forces. A movement of evangelical renewal, which found its first expression in the late 1730s in John Wesley's Methodist movement, targeted not only upper-class self-indulgence and the complacency of the Church of England but also campaigned against popular pastimes, such as drinking, cockfighting, and wife “sales,” in favor of prayer, sobriety, and hymn singing.

Whatever the socioeconomic divisions, the constituent parts of the island became more integrated. The Scots joined in a parliamentary union with England in 1707 from a variety of economic, security, and corrupt motives but only on condition that the new Great Britain should be a union, not a unitary state. Scotland would retain its Presbyterian Established Church and its distinctive legal, local government, and educational institutions. Since only a dwindling number, clustered in the western Highlands and

islands, still spoke Gaelic, these institutional concessions were important in keeping Scotland distinct. But the overall tendency in the following decades, in spite of persistent hostile caricaturing on both sides, was toward convergence of identity. The defeat of the Jacobite insurrections of 1715 and 1745, when the Catholic, Stuart descendants of James II attempted to reclaim the throne from the Hanoverians by recruiting the support of Catholic and Episcopalian Highland clan chiefs, gave the government the opportunity to begin taming the Highlands by building military roads and dismantling the symbols and substance of the clan system. The persistent wars against the Catholic French helped forge a joint sense of Britishness against a foreign “other.” Scottish troops and administrators joined enthusiastically in empire building, and the spread of transportation and market networks aided in the blending of the British nation. The intellectual elites in Edinburgh and Glasgow who led the “Scottish Enlightenment” from the 1760s, people like Smith and the philosopher David Hume, saw themselves as part of the greater entity of Britain and Scottishness as backward and conservative. When the novelist Sir Walter Scott helped invent and popularize a “cult of tartanry” in the early nineteenth century, it was in a safe and sanitized form, devoid of political content. It seemed to suggest that a Scot could be a committed Briton as well as a proud Scot. George IV gave this interpretation the royal imprimatur when he visited Edinburgh in 1822 and wore tartan, kilt, and tights.

SHOCK CITIES

Malthus and the other pessimistic political economists failed to predict the transition from an organic to an inorganic economy. In other words, they did not foresee what would happen once a highly commercialized, market-integrated country turned to coal-fueled steam power. The steam engine, from unpretentious beginnings mostly in the cotton industry, transformed the industrial landscape and introduced railway locomotion in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Urban populations exploded at a staggering rate as they absorbed surrounding rural labor. The collapse of domestic arable farming from the 1870s accelerated the pace still more. Twenty percent of people lived in urban areas in 1800, and by 1900 it was 80 percent. London ballooned sevenfold to 6.5 million, and in 1900 Britain boasted five out of the ten largest cities in Europe: London, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, and Liverpool.

The dislocating effects of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815), the rate

of population increase, and recurrent economic crises in rural communities, manufacturing villages, and factory towns made the period up to midcentury particularly traumatic. The lower orders hurled a succession of overt and covert, radical and revolutionary, peaceful and violent challenges at employers and governments, who responded by sending in troops and building permanent barracks next to the manufacturing districts. Part of the lower-class anger was economic, for example, the 1811–1812 protests of the Luddites, the framework knitters and handloom weavers who wrecked new machinery to protect their livelihoods. Part of it was political, the beliefs that the old notion of a just price and a fair wage had been demolished by rapacious and corrupt elites supported by a repressive state apparatus and that the only recourse was political reform to get workingmen into Parliament.

Scholars once saw in these repeated encounters the making of a working class whose class consciousness found full expression in the Chartist movement of the 1830s and 1840s, a nationwide campaign for political change based on the six points of the People’s Charter. By the late twentieth century few historians set much store by the class interpretation of history, preferring to stress multiple forms of identity and oppression, none of which can automatically or ultimately be reduced to class. Class of course remains important as a category of description, self-understanding, and political mobilization. Some Chartists made use of class terminology of capitalists against workers, but more deployed a language of “productive classes” against “idle aristocrats,” of political liberties and “the rights of freeborn Englishmen,” reaching back to the rhetoric of the 1790s and even beyond to the English Revolution of the mid-seventeenth century.

The radical threat was one part of the famous “Condition of England” question of the 1830s and 1840s; another was the deterioration of the towns. To keep pace with the influx of migrants and at a time of high land prices and rising building costs in the early decades of the century, speculative builders had hastily crammed shoddy housing into every available space. Observers like Friedrich Engels, a mill owner turned communist, described in horrified detail the wretched dwellings, the overcrowding, the lack of sanitation, and the open-sewer rivers of cities like Manchester. Statistics demonstrated that in a typical cotton mill town like Blackburn, Lancashire, the average working-class life expectancy was under twenty years. Partly because of such woeful figures and the all too visible signs of grime and squalor and partly because of a fear that the masses’ festering resentment would

break out in revolutionary upheaval, ruling elites, local and national, began to see towns as pressing problems requiring solutions.

The bluntest instrument for dealing with popular unrest was the military. But this was only a temporary expedient, its use infrequent and low-key in comparison with continental Europe and Ireland. Britain had a long history of suspicion of a standing army. The “Peterloo Massacre” of 1819, when the local yeomanry waded into a peaceful crowd in Manchester and killed eleven people, turning them into radical martyrs, showed that its actions could be counterproductive. It was no help at all in dealing with crime. The new vogue for collecting statistics produced figures for lawlessness and larceny that seemed to indicate an alarmingly disorderly society. Sir Robert Peel introduced the Metropolitan Police Force in London in 1829, marking the beginnings of a policed society, a significant step beyond the previous rudimentary assortment of parish constables and night watchmen. Borough police followed in 1835 and county forces in 1839. The police were initially widely unpopular—too much like the French gendarmerie, deemed to be inconsistent with British liberties—and from the start they were unarmed as a sop to libertarian fears. But slowly they established a permanent presence and proved their worth to the propertied majority, threatening the liberty only of the unruly in the streets and those the law held to be criminal. People at the receiving end of policing might seethe with resentment, but it is a remarkable fact that a flattering image of the British police constable—the bobby on the beat, flat-footed and rather slow but resolutely impartial and incorruptible, an honest upholder of the rights and values of decent, respectable citizens—came to be widely admired, almost a national icon.

More thorough policing accompanied new methods of imprisonment, which replaced both transportation to convict colonies and the “Bloody Code,” the two hundred hanging crimes on the statute book. Humanely intentioned but chilling experiments with the “separate” and “silent” systems of incarceration, loose interpretations of the “panopticon” model suggested by the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, generally failed to reform the inmates, many of whom were less the hardened criminals of middle-class lore than the simply desperate who turned to petty theft as a perfectly logical means of survival. As the initial optimism about rehabilitation waned, hard labor and harsher conditions became the staples of the late-nineteenth-century prison regime.

These were the coercive aspects of the state. Another such feature was the New Poor Law of 1834, which attempted to replace the relatively generous

provision of poor relief with a system designed to reduce costs and improve labor discipline. In a more benign fashion, government enquiries into hours worked in factories and into the governance and sanitary states of towns resulted in piecemeal legislation that, in the face of much opposition, began to improve working and health conditions and to increase central oversight of local affairs. Around midcentury most towns began to coordinate their fractured forms of local government and to acquire some of the necessary powers to lay down adequate sewerage systems and provide sufficient potable water; to regulate the construction of the row houses characteristic of late-nineteenth-century England and Wales; and to open municipal parks, town halls, libraries, and market halls in a flowering of civic pride.

Still Britain remained a lightly governed society until the twentieth century, and much of the work of social cohesion depended on other agencies. In response to the demographic boom, the religious denominations launched the last major crusade in British history to reclaim the kingdom for Christ. The Protestant Dissenters led the way, expanding rapidly

with unpretentious chapels to keep pace with the population shifts; the different sects of Unitarians, Quakers, Independents, Presbyterians, Baptists, and Methodists appealed to different social strata. Catholicism found new strength in the 1830s, mainly because of Irish immigration and in spite of the vociferous anti-Catholicism that helped define British national identity. The Church of England was hampered by its inflexible parochial structure, but it too began to reform and launched an energetic church-building spree after 1815. With the spread of churches and chapels came the spread of denominational schools, the primary means by which the bulk of the population learned reading, writing, arithmetic, and the social values of their superiors. This missionary zeal helped postpone the secularization and dechristianization typical of the western European urban experience.

British towns developed a rich associational culture. The middle-class voluntary association was a self-governing organization funded by the subscriptions of its members. Its main function was to mobilize support and resources for collective action, often across divisions of sect and party. Some of these associations were cultural, ranging from literary and philosophical societies to cricket clubs, designed to provide leisure activities for ladies and gentlemen of the middling ranks or to enhance the aesthetic image

of dingy towns. Others were charitable and philanthropic, intended to distribute resources to the “deserving poor” in times of economic distress. Still others, such as mechanics institutes, set out to teach bourgeois morals to the lower ranks of society. The working classes had a vibrant self-help and associational culture of their own in the form of friendly societies, labor unions, and cooperative societies worked out and refined over the protracted period of British industrialization and providing a basic safety net of support to tide individuals and families over the bad times of unemployment and sickness.

All of these state-led, local governmental, and associational initiatives help explain how the British created a relative stability and learned to cope with city growth. For some families, taking an individual approach, the flight to suburbia was the solution to urban ills. The suburb was one of the most notable features of the developing English city. Most continental European cities retained the well-off in their cores in desirable, high-rise apartment buildings. Scottish cities such as Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen, which have a strikingly different look from English cities, followed the continental pattern. In England the process of suburbanization began first in London in the early eighteenth century, spread to larger towns by 1800, and increased dramatically from the second half of the nineteenth century with the

development of the omnibus, the suburban railway line, and then the car. First the wealthy middle classes then the armies of lower middle classes in the expanding service sector escaped from the city center workplace to detached and semidetached suburban homes with small patches of garden, strung out along winding avenues or crescents.

One of the explanations for the English drive toward suburbanization dwells on a pervasive ideology of domesticity inspired chiefly by evangelical Christianity. Suburbia ideally suited notions of the “naturally” separate spheres of gender with men in the sordid public world of business and politics and women confined to the private, domestic world as “angels of the house.” It is clear that the overlap between public and private was greater than moralists would have liked. Nevertheless, women were shut out of the important arenas of power, and respectable middle-class ladies did not work except in charitable endeavors or maybe as writers, safely in the home. The celebrated radical writer Mary Wollstonecraft in the 1790s and the gender-egalitarian commune movement of the 1820s to 1840s inspired by the mill owner Robert Owen challenged this. But the early labor and trade union movement, aware that poorly paid women could undermine male earnings, reinforced the separate-

spheres ideal by campaigning for a decent family wage for the husband so the wife need not work. A number of higher-class women from the mid-nineteenth century fought for and secured important gains, including the greater possibility of escape from an abusive marriage, the right to retain their property within marriage, entry into the medical profession, the establishment of women’s colleges of higher education, and in 1918, after a long campaign led by moderate and militant “suffragettes,” the right to vote. Britain was one of the sites where organized feminism developed particular strength and importance in the decades around 1900.

WELFARE STATE

While Britain was helping carve up Africa and creating the biggest empire the world had ever seen, it experienced an atmosphere of crisis at home. The mid-Victorian economic boom faltered. Social investigators in the 1880s rediscovered poverty, especially in London, speaking in aghast tones of “darkest England,” the cramped courtyards and “rookeries” of the East End, a concentration of 2 million working-class people who were as unknown to the respectable classes

and as uncivilized as the natives of “darkest Africa.” Slum housing seemed to have worsened over vast acres in large cities as more people, often displaced by slum clearance or the construction of buildings and railways elsewhere, crowded into deteriorating housing stock. A gulf grew between the better-off working classes in regular jobs, living in bylaw housing, furnishing their homes moderately well, spending money on soccer matches, the music hall, and a couple of weeks each summer in seaside resorts like Blackpool and Southend, and the physically stunted, badly nourished, casually employed slum dweller. Anxieties about national weakness in an increasingly competitive international climate found expression in fashionable languages of social Darwinism and of racial and sexual degeneration.

One answer to poor living conditions was for the central government to take more vigorous measures. Mindful of the establishment of small socialist parties and of the stirrings of the union-backed Labour Party, which aimed to attract working-class votes on the left, progressive thinkers in the Liberal Party began advocating a more interventionist strategy. Some of their ideas found expression in the famous 1909 and 1911 budgets of David Lloyd George, Liberal chancellor of the exchequer, that introduced old-age pensions and social insurance schemes. In simultaneously attacking unearned, landed wealth, the Liberal measures gave an extra push to the sociopolitical decline of the aristocracy and gentry. Aristocratic social, economic, and political power during the twentieth century remained too substantial for radical tastes, but it was a mere shadow of its former self.

Both world wars boosted the living standards of the poor even at a time of intense rationing because full employment enhanced lower-class purchasing power, thereby improving nutritional intake. Equally significantly, total mobilization during World War I habituated the public to an unprecedented degree of government intervention in social and economic affairs and brought the labor movement into the heart of government. Lloyd George, wartime coalition prime minister, combining his earlier progressivism with wartime state interventionism and a rhetorical appeal to the men fighting in the trenches of Flanders, promised to build “a land fit for heroes.”

For many this did not come to pass. The war did serious damage to Britain’s place as the top trading nation, and the interwar decades were years of severe contraction for the staples of the British economy, the textile industry, shipbuilding, and coal mining. Persistently high unemployment, exacerbated by the worldwide slump after the Wall Street crash in 1929, had a devastating impact on the old industrial regions

of the country. Nonetheless, beginning in 1919 governments made serious commitments to slum clearance and to building new public, subsidized rental housing for the working classes. This council housing, built by local authorities with subventions from the central government, was largely semidetached, “cottage”-style dwellings on suburban estates, unadorned variations on the middle-class suburban ideal. They were not always well built or easy to maintain and were often far from jobs and amenities. It was difficult to recreate the alleged neighborliness and community values of the old streets. But for many families this generously proportioned public housing with indoor plumbing provided unprecedented amounts of space, light, privacy, and hygiene.

World War II unleashed in government circles a passion for planning. Once again a coalition government coordinated the entire country for total war, with a remarkable degree of efficiency. Civil servants, economists, and academics, in drawing up bold plans for postwar reconstruction and the rebuilding of blitzed cities, were determined not to repeat the failures after 1918 and the misery of high unemployment. After 1945 Clement Attlee’s Labour government introduced the sweeping nationalization of public utilities and major industries, the taxpayer-funded National Health Service, and the comprehensive scheme of social insurance “from cradle to grave” advocated in the famous report drawn up in 1942 by a Liberal intellectual, William Beveridge. Subsequent governments, Labour and Conservative, held steady to a commitment to the welfare state, to full employment, to massive defense spending, and to other variations on the interventionist economic-management ideas of John Maynard Keynes.

Rebuilt town centers not only repaired the damage done by the Luftwaffe but also replaced much of the despised legacy of Victorian industrialization with a predominantly concrete landscape of modern, functional, clean, well-lit buildings, shopping precincts, internal road networks, and pedestrian underpasses. Labour and Conservative governments competed with each other in encouraging council housing, which accounted for almost 60 percent of the new housing in Britain between 1945 and 1970, a percentage closer to the Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe than to the Western European norm. More local authorities heeded the call of modernist architects to economize on space and to avoid the unsightly errors of the past by building light, airy tower blocks, a significant departure in English architectural history.

The Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan’s statement in a speech in 1957, “Most of our people have never had it so good,” was more than

political hyperbole. Full employment, a generous social safety net, universal access to health care, and affordable public housing went hand in hand with a consumer spending boom. More working-class families could afford washing machines, televisions, and cars. Teenagers had sufficient disposable income to buy the clothing and records suitable to a succession of exotic youth cultures. This was in retrospect a golden age of capitalism and of social stability. The 1960s added a “permissive moment,” a number of liberal social measures, to the picture. The abolition of capital punishment (1965) confirmed a trend toward a more humane criminal justice system. The introduction of the contraceptive pill and the legalization of abortion (1967) gave women much greater reproductive freedom, and with the help of the new feminist movement women advanced significantly toward equality by the end of the century. The decriminalization of sex between consenting men (1967) overturned sixteenth-century statutes against sodomy and an amendment of 1885 that outlawed all homosexual acts. Gays and lesbians made enormous advances over the next three decades in perhaps the most important civil rights crusade of the era, galvanized rather than set back by the AIDS epidemic and backlashes from self-described family-values moralists. Governments rapidly granted independence to most of the colonies, and the arrival after 1948 of sizable black and Asian immigration from the Caribbean, Africa, and the Indian Subcontinent presaged a much more thoroughly multicultural society.

In spite of these advances, all was not well. Economists repeatedly pointed out that the British economy was underperforming in comparison to other advanced economies. Their checklist of reasons for slower growth ranged from the price of sustaining imperial and world-power pretensions to blaming too-powerful trade unions or an antibusiness ethic in elite circles or a too-expensive welfare state. Some on the political left were frustrated that this era of social democracy and public ownership had given little control to ordinary people. Workers had no say in running nationalized industries, and tenants played small roles in decision making regarding their flats and houses. Residual poverty, racial tensions, the rapid decline of some of the new housing, the destruction of much of the architectural legacy of towns, and the alleged inadequacies of new forms of comprehensive state education drew sharp critiques.

The “stop-go” rhythm of the economy, the oscillation between growth spurts, balance of payments crises, and slowdowns, entered a new phase in 1973 with the Middle Eastern oil crisis. The 1970s proved to be a troubled decade of high inflation, rising un-

employment, and repeated confrontations between governments and trade unions, culminating in the “winter of discontent” of 1978–1979, when public sector unions created havoc in their pursuit of higher wages and acted as inadvertent midwives for the Thatcher government. Margaret Thatcher, a self-styled “conviction” politician, abandoned what was left of the postwar consensus. During the next decade the Conservative government sold most of the nationalized industries and public utilities; allowed council tenants to buy their houses in a bid to increase individual responsibility; humbled the trade unions, most spectacularly in the miners’ strike of 1984–1985; and attempted to tame public institutions and to roll back public expenditure. The commitment to full employment, already crumbling, vanished during the recession of the early 1980s. The service and white-collar sectors rose rapidly, and U.S. business and policy models exerted strong influence. The jobless totals climbed to over 12 percent, and once again in the older industrial areas of the country a bleakness descended similar to that of the 1930s. For those in secure jobs these were relatively prosperous years of rising real wages, low inflation, and maybe the opportunity to buy a council house at a bargain price along with cheap shares in the formerly nationalized companies. But a growing underclass was left behind. Some of the resulting anger found expression in race riots in the large cities in the early 1980s, some in white, male, racist soccer hooliganism, and some in the larger crime statistics, to which the government’s response was more police and prisons, one of the few favored areas of public expenditure.

The United Kingdom was a casualty of these years. Since the onset of industrialization, the Welsh and the Scots had proved adept at reinventing their cultural identities, even as the national economy became more integrated and the original cultural markers, such as the Welsh language, declined. But separatist, nationalist parties made little headway before the 1960s. With many of the symbols of Britishness like the empire being dismembered, the economy on a roller coaster, and the rise of the European Economic Community questioning the notion of national sovereignty, more Scots and Welsh began to question the usefulness of the union with England or at least to suggest a greater degree of self-government. The Thatcher government, in charge in Scotland and Wales but with little support outside England, made a powerful but unintentional case for devolution. The Labour government of Tony Blair introduced a Scottish parliament with strong Scottish endorsement and a Welsh assembly with lukewarm Welsh support in 1999. In many respects the mood of the country was

more buoyant, tolerant, and optimistic than in the recent past, and the impact of these far-reaching constitutional changes on English and British national

identity remained to be seen. Few as yet seemed unduly worried about how much longer Britain would be a nation or a state.

See also other articles in this section.

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SECTION 3: REGIONS, NATIONS, AND PEOPLES

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IRELAND



David W. Miller

Although recent students of modern Irish social history have concentrated on topics which reflect the country's peripheral position vis-à-vis England, their conclusions have highlighted the differences within the Irish experience as often as the contrasts between Ireland and its powerful neighbor. This essay uses spatial differentiation within Ireland to explicate both continuity and change since the Middle Ages.

LAND, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, AND THE STATE

At the end of the Middle Ages Ireland was divided into two zones with different social systems, each dominated by overmighty subjects able to frustrate the ambitions of the centralizing English monarchy. In the south and east of the country much of the English lordship (see map 1) had been organized on the pattern of feudalism since the Norman invasion of the twelfth century, and a small portion of this zone (the "Pale") was actually governed by an English administration based in Dublin. The remainder of the country, including most of the north and west, retained the lineage-based Gaelic social system. That system was distinguished from feudalism by, for example, rules which might allow a number of kinsmen to contend for succession to a chieftaincy and which sometimes provided for periodic redistribution of landholdings. It was better adapted to the lifestyle of transhumance—the seasonal movement of livestock between upland and lowland pastures, which still prevailed in some parts of the Gaelic zone—than to the settled agriculture which underlay classic feudalism.


The differences between the two social systems and the geographic boundary separating them had become blurred by more than three centuries of contact. The distribution on map 1 of sites occupied for at least some part of that period by Anglo-Norman settlers, however, reflects the latter's preference for the well-drained, fertile soils of the south and east over the more oceanic north and west. Some such division

between those two areas remained a feature of the social landscape even after both the systems which it demarcated had disappeared.


Military conquest of Gaelic territory by the Crown was sometimes followed by "surrender and regrant," the process by which a defeated chieftain might surrender the lands under his jurisdiction and receive them back from the Crown as a fief in which his rights and duties as an English-style nobleman would be clearly spelled out. Another mechanism for getting rid of the old order was plantation, the process of inducing English (and, after 1603, Scottish) gentry to settle on confiscated lands with British tenants. Both mechanisms often led to disappointing results, but in one spectacular instance of surrender and regrant the former chieftains inexplicably abandoned their new fiefs, and the government seized upon their default to launch the most ambitious and successful of its plantations. The resulting settlement in Ulster left another enduring mark upon the social landscape, which can be seen in map 2.

When the English state became Protestant in the sixteenth century, the state church in Ireland followed suit, but virtually the entire native-born population, including most members of both the English and Gaelic elites, remained Catholic. As politics in the three kingdoms became increasingly polarized along religious lines, both Gaelic and "Old English" Catholic landowners in Ireland became especially vulnerable to confiscations of their property for disloyalty. The political upheavals throughout the British Isles in 1638–1660 and in 1688–1692 resulted in huge transfers of property to "New English" Protestants. Although in 1641 Catholics still owned about 59 percent of the land, by 1688 their share had been reduced to 22 percent and by 1703 to 14 percent. Except in parts of Ulster, the class division between landlord and tenant corresponded to an ethnoreligious distinction between English Protestant and Irish Catholic. Even in Protestant districts of Ulster, Scottish Presbyterian tenants usually had members of the (Anglican) established church for landlords.


SECTION 3: REGIONS, NATIONS, AND PEOPLES




Map 1. Gaelic and English territory at the end of the Middle Ages.



Map 2. The Ulster plantation (area of settlement) of the seventeenth century as reflected in a nineteenth-century religious census.



Map 3. Attendance at Mass in 1834.



Map 4. The “underclass”: proportion of families “chiefly dependent on their own manual labor,” 1841.

In the years following the defeat of Jacobite forces in 1691, the “Ascendancy,” as the Protestant landed class came to be known, consolidated its position by anti-Catholic legislation in the Irish parliament known as the “Penal Laws.” If strictly enforced, the Penal Laws might theoretically have stamped out the Catholic religion entirely. The conversion of the Catholic population, however, was not a serious objective in the enforcement of these laws. Rather, they were used to exclude the Catholic elite from the polity by denying them access to military resources and the franchise and by preventing them from increasing their much-diminished landed property. Students of the period have been impressed by the extent to which members of the Catholic elite managed to retain status and power by husbanding their resources, by winning assistance from well-disposed Protestants (including relatives who had at least nominally converted), and by entering mercantile careers in the major towns.

Whether eighteenth-century Ireland should be treated as an example of colonialism or as a European *ancien régime* is a subject of debate. Proponents of the colonialism model are impressed by similarities between the dominance of a settler elite in Ireland and power relationships in modern colonialist societies. Certainly the confiscations contributed to the relatively early modernization of agrarian economic rela-

tionships. Nearly everywhere land was owned by landlords under clear modern titles and held by tenants for cash rents. (Indeed, one of the difficulties in making the plantations work as planned had been the willingness of native occupiers to pay higher rents to be left undisturbed than potential immigrants from Britain would offer.) There were relatively few feudal anachronisms left to be swept away in Ireland compared, for example, with the country from which the concept “*ancien régime*” was borrowed.

Advocates of the *ancien régime* model, notably S. J. Connolly in *Religion, Law, and Power*, point to evidence of vertical ties of patronage between landlord and tenant despite differences of both religion and ethnicity. Although the decades after 1760 were marked by recurring waves of rural violence, the perpetrators—who adopted such names as Whiteboys and Rightboys—were usually reacting to innovations such as the enclosure of common pasture and were appealing to the landed class to restore their traditional rights. As the use of force by both the rioters and the authorities seems to have been markedly less lethal than in England, one can reasonably speak of a “moral economy” until the 1790s, when, as Thomas Bartlett argues, the panicked response of the governing class to widespread disturbances generally severed reciprocal ties of patronage and deference between Protestant landlords and Catholic tenants.

Indeed, during the last two decades of the eighteenth century the exclusion of various nonlanded and/or non-Protestant groups from the Irish polity was being actively challenged. The culmination of these excitements in a 1798 rebellion backed by France persuaded the British government to abolish the separate Irish polity by the Act of Union (1801), which created a new polity with a parliament in London for the entire British Isles. The delay of full membership for respectable Catholics in the new polity until 1829, when they were finally permitted to hold parliamentary seats, no doubt contributed to the rise of Irish nationalism, but ironically the landed Protestant class were the long-term losers from the union. After the famine of the 1840s, the Irish land tenure system was blamed by British elite opinion for many of Ireland's ills, although economic historians now doubt various components of that diagnosis. Irish landlords were unable to prevent a series of land reforms which ultimately made Irish land such an unattractive investment that they welcomed land purchase legislation in 1903 which converted Irish farmers from tenants into owner-occupiers.

The fact that land agitation was closely connected to nationalist politics in the late nineteenth century has tended to obscure stratification and even conflict within the agricultural labor force. Agrarian "outrages," especially common during the decades immediately prior to the famine, were often committed against Catholic farmers by Catholic agricultural laborers. The sharp contraction of this "underclass" from the time of the famine no doubt facilitated the mobilization of farmers in disciplined and effective nationwide agitation for land reform from the late 1870s. The holders of substantial farms—say fifty acres or more—together with Catholic tradesmen in provincial towns emerged as the main political elite which overthrew the old landlord class and dominated the politics of the southern Irish state for more than a generation after its formation in 1922.

SETTLEMENT, POPULATION, AND THE FAMILY

To the extent that the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century shift in land ownership had led to market-oriented agriculture, it tended to promote dispersed settlement in isolated farmsteads with individual tenancy of farms. However, the large-scale Ordnance Survey maps of 1824–1846 reveal that nucleated settlement was common, especially in the area where Gaelic social structures had been dominant in the late Middle Ages (map 1). Early students of these settlement clusters saw them as a direct survival of Gaelic communal practices of tillage and pasturing. Further research suggests that many of the particular settlement clusters extant in the early nineteenth century are postenclosure outcomes of population pressure rather than relics of continuous practice in situ of rundale (a system of joint tenancy under which each landholder cultivates a collection of noncontiguous strips) dating back to medieval times. Such spatial discontinuity, however, may well be consistent with substantial temporal continuity in the mentalities associated with collective agrarian decision making. An important task confronting Irish social historians, as Robert Scally suggests in *The End of Hidden Ireland*, is to tease out the mentalities which this settlement pattern may have sustained in a huge underclass whose creation and destruction were the primary social consequences of modern Ireland's peculiar demographic experience.

Ireland's population rose from perhaps 1 million in the mid-sixteenth century to something over 2 million in the early eighteenth, with especially high rates of growth in the latter part of this period compensating for the devastations of mid-seventeenth-century conflicts. Growth slowed during the second quarter of the eighteenth century, but from mid-century the population increased at extraordinary rates which outpaced even those of England until the decade or so prior to the great famine of the 1840s. Unlike En-

gland, however, Ireland experienced far too little industrialization to provide new sources of employment for its increased population. The potato, which had hitherto been used mainly to supplement a cereal diet, could be grown in sufficient quantities on a very small plot of land to meet the caloric requirements of a family. The smallholder might subdivide a modest farm to provide subsistence for several heirs and the more substantial farmer carve out several subtenancies, each consisting of a cottage and a garden, to accommodate agricultural laborers (cotters), all of whom depended for nutrition almost exclusively on the potatoes they could grow. The result was the emergence of an agrarian underclass.

Earlier demographers' reliance on high fertility resulting from extraordinarily low marriage ages to explain the pre-famine rise in population has generally been rejected (though differences in nuptuality between the underclass and better-off farmers remain an important area for investigation). Current explanations rely on relatively low mortality rates made possible by the nutritionally complete, if dull, regimen of a diet composed almost solely of potatoes and dairy products. Mortality was driven even lower by the fact that such a small proportion of the population was subject to the bacteriological hazards of urban life. Until around 1830 rates of emigration remained low among Catholics, though not among Protestants, for whom migration to a frontier was already an option validated by tradition. The slowing of population growth after 1830 raises the possibility that Irish society was beginning to respond to the dysfunctions of rapid population growth unsupported by new sources of employment. Whether a less traumatic transition to a new demographic regime was possible must remain conjectural, however, for the 1845, 1846, and 1848 potato harvests were virtually destroyed by *Phytophthora infestans*. The 1851 census reported a total population of 6,552,385, nearly a 20 percent decline from the 1841 population of 8,175,124, and 2 million fewer than would have occurred if the previous decade's growth rate had continued. Deaths in excess of normal mortality probably totaled about 1 million.

Much famine research has focused on British government policy. In 1838 an Irish Poor Law had been enacted on the model of the new English Poor Law. A board of guardians in each of 130 districts would levy local taxes to support the destitute in workhouses under principles of "less eligibility"—conditions sufficiently severe to ensure that no pauper would prefer workhouse life to the least attractive employment available. The new system failed its first serious test, for when the famine struck the number of starving soon far exceeded the total capacity of all the

workhouses. Sir Robert Peel's Conservative government had prepared "outdoor" relief plans before it fell in the summer of 1846. The new Liberal government of Lord John Russell was so wedded to classic liberal ideology reinforced by a providentialist evangelicalism that, despite a second harvest failure, it initially refused to take actions which political economy might condemn as incentives to indolence or as interference with a divinely ordained free market.

Within a few months officials realized that their policy was having catastrophic consequences, and they began to implement outdoor relief and other departures from liberal orthodoxy. It was too late, however, to prevent massive mortality in the terrible winter of 1846–1847. The popular belief that the government had deliberately sought to exterminate the Irish people was generally dismissed, along with many other nationalist verities, by "revisionist" historians beginning in the 1950s. In the 1990s the sesquicentennial observances called forth "postrevisionist" accounts, which document official thinking that certainly seems callous to modern sensibilities. There is no serious challenge to the argument that official policy was wrongheaded. Postrevisionists, however, have failed to persuade many of their colleagues that policymakers were motivated by such malice as would justify the term "genocide" or "holocaust."

The continued decline of population for another century had two principal components. First, emigration became a routine part of Irish life; between 1851 and 1920 an average of more than sixty thousand persons left for overseas destinations each year, in addition to substantial migration to Britain. The fact that males and females went in approximately equal numbers distinguished Irish emigration sharply from the male-dominated emigrant streams of various other European countries. What was left of the underclass after the calamity of the 1840s was steadily depleted by emigration. Second, although age at marriage rose only slowly, the proportion who never married doubled between 1851 and 1911, at which time more than one quarter of those aged 46 to 55 had never been married. In consequence, despite quite high levels of marital fertility, overall birth rates were moderate.

Since urban growth remained sluggish, these two factors—emigration and permanent celibacy—should be understood in the context of the rural economy. Throughout much of the country in the aftermath of the famine, the tiny subsistence holdings of the agrarian underclass were eliminated, farms were consolidated into commercially viable units, and the practice of subdivision was permanently abandoned. In some northern and western areas of marginal ag-

riculture, however, seasonal migration of agricultural laborers to Britain and to more prosperous parts of Ireland enabled some families to retain possession of otherwise unviable holdings and thus resist for a time the trend toward population decline.

Generally the standard of living of country people rose over the two generations after the famine. A demographic regime which had probably governed the behavior of better-off tenants before the famine became the norm for most of rural society. Since the farm was to be maintained intact at all costs, all but one son and probably all but one daughter would typically face a choice between migration and staying at home as an unmarried member of the farm's labor force. Timothy Guinnane, in *The Vanishing Irish*, argues that we should understand the workings of this regime not as a set of inflexible rules but as a framework within which the individual negotiated and made choices in accordance with his or her preferences and personal circumstances. Thus, for example, it could happen that the son favored with succession to the family farm was not the eldest but the one left after more ambitious and adventurous brothers had chosen other alternatives. Even substantial rates of celibacy among those males who did inherit holdings can be explained as rational choices in a culture which construed marriage much less as an opportunity for sexual expression than as an economic transaction. Joanna Bourke documents in *Husbandry to Housewifery* the resourcefulness with which women carved out a distinctive economic role, for example in poultry rearing, within this domestic regime.

TRADE, COMMUNICATION, AND INDUSTRY

In the late Middle Ages, towns were confined mostly to the English lordship. There was an arc of ports around the southern half of the island: Drogheda and Dublin on the east coast facing Britain; New Ross, Waterford, and Cork on the south coast; and Limerick and Galway at the head of great western harbors facing the open Atlantic. As the New World was colonized by Europeans, these towns, several of them Norse foundations from about the tenth century, were well positioned to participate in the resulting long-distance trade.

The existing urban system was less well suited to the commercialization of the countryside. Within the English lordship some local markets did exist, but only in the southeast—where there was one inland town, Kilkenny, comparable to the major ports—was a classic central-place hierarchy beginning to develop. In Gaelic areas most exchange consisted of goods extracted by chieftains from their subjects in return for such services as military protection and redistributive rituals of feasting. To the extent that a chieftain participated in the global market, it was mainly through barter with the occasional captain who sailed into a coastal haven in his territory. The transformation of the Gaelic peasantry from tribute-rendering “freeholders” to rent-paying tenants in a cash economy in consequence of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century confiscations was an important step toward a fully monetized market economy in the countryside.

Towns were Anglophone islands in a sea of Irish (Gaelic) speakers. There was a significant body of literature in the Irish language; indeed, the old Gaelic social system had well-established roles for the learned classes. Hereditary jurists (*breithiúna*, brehons) arbitrated disputes under Gaelic law. The poets (*filid*) not only sang the praises of their patrons but also had the shamanlike role of issuing curses against enemies. Readers of this volume will be pleased to learn that even historians (*seanchaithe*) enjoyed special status. The literate elite, however, were generally the first to acquire English in a given locality. By the end of the eighteenth century, therefore, only a minuscule number of Irish speakers were literate, even though about half the population still spoke Irish. Most country folk who acquired literacy did so in English, though whether literacy was acquired in the same generation as the spoken language varied according to local conditions. The spread of literacy was greatly accelerated by the establishment of the national education system, which provided state-funded primary education starting in the 1830s, four decades earlier than the comparable innovation in England. The movement to revive the Irish language beginning in the 1890s was primarily composed of townfolk whose families had been monoglot English speakers for some time.

The erection of a network of planned towns as part of the Ulster plantation not only accelerated commercial development in that region but also provided the marketing infrastructure for protoindustrialization. Partly because of mercantilist legislation to exclude Irish woolens from the English market, a vigorous domestic linen industry developed during the eighteenth century in various parts of Ireland. Only in Ulster, however, did protoindustrialism evolve into successful factory-based industry. A catalyst of this process was the importation of cotton, which began in the late 1770s. Between 1800 and 1830 cotton-spinning mills in Belfast attracted many handloom weavers from the countryside to continue plying their craft in an urban, but still domestic, setting. After 1825, when the invention of the wet-spinning process made machine spinning of linen possible, the Belfast textile industry abandoned cotton for the region's traditional fabric.

In the absence, prior to the 1850s, of a satisfactory power loom to produce the fine linens in which Ulster specialized, weaving continued to be done on handlooms in workers' homes both in the Belfast area and in the countryside. Very low wage rates prevailed and country weavers still spent part of their time cultivating their tiny agricultural holdings. These weavers were nearly as vulnerable as the potato-dependent underclass in other parts of Ireland at the time of the

famine of the 1840s. Indeed, a sharp rise in wages, resulting from scarcity of weavers after the calamity, prompted rapid investment in power looms, which completed the transition to factory-based production.

Throughout most of its domestic phase, linen manufacture had been a highly gendered process—women spun and men wove—though a “Rosie the weaver” phenomenon did emerge during the Napoleonic Wars. At least in Belfast itself, most of the linen mill workers were female, but this gender imbalance was complemented by a predominantly male labor force in the engineering and shipbuilding industries, which grew rapidly during the second half of the nineteenth century. Belfast was transformed from a commercial center of about 20,000 in 1800 to the only industrial city in Ireland. By the turn of the century its population (about 350,000) was comparable to that of Dublin and its suburbs, though Dublin remained the commercial and cultural capital of the country even after partition.

Industrial development has been an important priority of the southern Irish state since its formation in the 1920s, but until the 1960s its efforts had disappointing results. Analysts disagree over whether those results were due to structural factors such as the heritage of colonial dependency or to cultural factors reflected, for example, in the antimaterialist values which President Eamon de Valera expounded. Since 1960 the agricultural sector has become relatively less dominant in the overall economy of the state. Some of this change resulted from manufacturing growth, but as in much of Europe, the service sector has grown even faster. Although Dublin and its immediate hinterland has experienced much of the service-driven growth, many new industrial enterprises, in response to government incentives, have located in less developed western districts. A striking feature of the manufacturing labor force is its recruitment of many small farmers who continue part-time agricultural work and retain possession of their holdings as a hedge against job insecurity.

RELIGION, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY

In the early Middle Ages the Irish church was notorious for its noncompliance with Roman norms of morality and organization, and indeed a papal commission to redress the situation was the pretext for Henry II's assumption of the title “lord of Ireland” in the twelfth century. Especially within Gaelic territory (map 1) the situation was still quite unsatisfactory in the early sixteenth century. Neglect of sacraments, lack of preaching, and failure even to conduct regular

religious services were all common. Vocations had decreased and the requirement of clerical celibacy was widely disregarded. At least among the Gaelic elite, Celtic secular marriage—which permitted divorce—was much more common than Christian marriage.

Thus the failure of the new state church to gain the adherence of any significant group living in Ireland in the mid-sixteenth century was not the result of extraordinary Irish devotion to Rome. Indeed, in its early years the Reformation did gain some adherents, at least among those members of the Old English elite who were in contact with government officials. It is clear, however, that by the early seventeenth century the state church had lost whatever opportunity it may have had to convert either the Gaelic or the English elite, not to mention the general population. The established “Church of Ireland” would draw its constituency essentially from New English officials and from the beneficiaries of the land confiscations and the settlers whom they brought with them from England. A third religious system, Presbyterianism, emerged among the Scottish settlers in the north and assumed permanent institutional form after the Restoration.

Outside the elite, three ethnic groups—English, Scottish, and Irish—distinguishable by such factors as speech, diet, and dress, became the constituencies of three religious systems—Anglican, Presbyterian, and Catholic. For most of the eighteenth century each of the three churches was content to

minister to its ethno-religious community and made little serious effort to win converts from the other two. Internally, each of the three religious systems, as Raymond Gillespie argues in *Devoted People*, was shaped by a dialogue between elite theological ideas and popular supernatural beliefs which had evolved to meet the needs of ordinary folk.

To the extent that the resulting syntheses helped validate and sustain popular magical and providentialist beliefs, they contributed to the forms of eighteenth-century collective action. In *Aisling Ghéar* (Bitter Vision), Breandán Ó Buachalla documents the rich messianic, millenarian, and prophetic traditions through which Catholic country folk made sense of their past and future. Such traditions informed the Whiteboys and other agrarian movements which flourished from 1760 as well as, significantly, the Defenders—the rural Catholic component of the rebel coalition of the 1790s. I. R. McBride, in *Scripture Politics*, provides a complementary analysis of the rural Presbyterian mind. He demonstrates how an active expectation of providential action, together with the obvious millennial implications of the downfall of the Catholic Church in revolutionary France, might lead country Presbyterians into alliance with those very Catholics in Ireland whom the Almighty, in his inscrutable wisdom, had invited to lend a hand in laying low the Antichrist.

The excitements of the 1790s could not have risen to the revolutionary level, however, without the

leadership which came from critical groups within or at least on the margins of the polity: members of the Belfast Presbyterian elite, certain wealthy Dublin Catholics, and some descendants of the dispossessed Catholic elite (notably in the extreme southeast of Ireland), together with a few radicalized members of the Ascendancy. These elements created the initially reformist but ultimately revolutionary societies of United Irishmen. The abortive nature of the United Irish rebellion in 1798 reflected harsh repression during the preceding year, but the geography of the principal outbreaks is nevertheless significant. Major insurrection under local leadership occurred only in the north-eastern and the southeastern corners of the country. In the northeast a sophisticated, enlightened Presbyterian elite successfully mobilized at least some of their country cousins. The rising in the southeast used to be depicted as a spontaneous peasant *jacquerie*, but L. M. Cullen and Kevin Whelan have established that it benefited from crucial leadership by relatively well-off local Catholics. The only important 1798 insurrectionary activity in the Gaelic zone (map 1) occurred not in response to indigenous leadership, but as a result of a belated landing in County Mayo by a small French expeditionary force.

These events of the late eighteenth century are central to all interpretations of identity formation in modern Ireland. In traditional nationalist history the participation of northern Presbyterians on the same

side as Catholics in 1798 demonstrated their membership in the Irish nation, and their stubborn refusal in the twentieth century to accept the consequences of their own nationality was treated as a kind of false consciousness induced by the British. Many professional Irish historians in recent decades, in keeping with the view widely held by social scientists that every nationality is a social construction, have doubted the supposed continuity between the “colonial nationalism” of late eighteenth-century Protestants and late nineteenth-century Irish nationalism, which had an almost totally Catholic constituency. These revisionist interpretations are challenged by postrevisionist authors who stress, for example, the “politicization” of elite Catholics concurrently with the flowering of colonial nationalism.

Pre-famine peasants were seen by revisionist authors as identifying more strongly with local communities than with an imagined national community. Postrevisionist accounts have attended to expressions of national consciousness in Gaelic popular literature prior to the nineteenth century and to the politicizing role of the Defenders and of a successor secret society, the Ribbonmen, in the early nineteenth-century countryside. What gave Irish Catholics their standing with respect to nationalism, however, was not rebellion but electoral politics. Although the land question was useful in mobilizing the Catholic electorate for nationalism, the settlement of that question

did not diminish the remarkable electoral solidarity among Catholics for the claim to national autonomy. Although the political process which led to that outcome is beyond the scope of this article, its social origins are to be found in demographic, class, and religious change.

On the eve of the famine the Catholic Church was still struggling to attain the standard of canonical practice prescribed by the Council of Trent nearly three centuries earlier. As map 3 illustrates, compliance with the requirement of weekly Mass attendance was substantially higher in the area which had been within the English lordship at the end of the Middle Ages than in the north and west. During the nineteenth century Catholic Ireland underwent changes which Emmet Larkin has called a “devotional revolution” and associated with reforms of discipline and devotional practice initiated by Paul Cardinal Cullen between 1850 and 1878. Population decline no doubt facilitated the process, not only by relieving the strain on the church’s resources for providing pastoral services, but perhaps also by virtually eliminating the underclass, whose members may well have been the least observant stratum of Catholics (see maps 3 and 4).

From the late nineteenth century until the 1960s there seems to have been virtually universal observance of Tridentine norms within the Catholic ethno-religious community. In recent decades this pattern has been significantly eroded, to the point where one journalist has entitled a book *Goodbye to Catholic Ireland*—though she was unaware that the “Catholic Ireland” to which her generation has been saying “Goodbye” had said “Hello” only slightly more than a century earlier. As Lawrence Taylor has argued in *Occasions of Faith*, the religious consequences of the devotional revolution are closely intertwined with the consolidation of Irish nationalism as a fundamentally Catholic identity. The direction of any causal arrow which might relate extremely observant Catholicism to nationalism (like that of one which might relate it to the unusual nuptiality patterns of the same period) is difficult to determine. Such relationships, however, were no doubt mediated by the formation of a respectable class of Catholic farmers and townfolk in the wake of the departed underclass.

The obverse of the rise of an essentially Catholic Irish national consciousness (which liberal-minded Protestants were welcome to adopt, but not to chal-

lenge) was the development of a Protestant identity which replaced the separate—indeed, mutually hostile—identities of Church of Ireland members and Dissenters which were so evident in the 1790s. The Loyal Orange Order, which now reflects a pan-Protestant identity, originated between 1795 and 1798 in the Anglican zone south of Lough Neagh (map 2). The shift among Presbyterians to emphasis on their Protestantism rather than their Dissent has usually been explained as a reaction to the better-understood rise of nationalism on the Catholic side during the nineteenth century. An explanation grounded in the social realities of the Protestant communities themselves would be more satisfying. In “Irish Presbyterians and the Great Famine” David Miller suggests the beginnings of such an explanation in the transformation of Presbyterianism in the nineteenth century from a communal to a (middle) class church which by mid-century had already lost much of its own underclass of handloom weavers. The origins of the system of ethno-religious identities so central to the Northern Ireland conflict of the past generation, however, remain poorly understood.

CONCLUSION

Casual observers of Irish affairs often surmise that nothing much ever changes in Irish history. In fact, despite many continuities largely dictated by the country’s peripheral position, Irish society has experienced sharp discontinuities in several important domains of social history during the period since the end of the Middle Ages. Will the late twentieth century come to be seen as a new moment of fundamental discontinuity in Irish social history? Certainly the striking and rapid secularization occurring among the Catholic majority will not easily be reversed. But will the end of the devotional regime which began in the nineteenth century erode the nationalism which that regime did so much to foster? Net population decline has ended, but there is still significant emigration, notably among skilled professionals. Nonagricultural employment has been growing briskly, but risk-averse agrarian mentalities continue to shape work patterns. Enthusiasm for the European Union remains high, but whether EU membership will ultimately transform Irish society or lead to a new form of peripherality remains uncertain.

See also other articles in this section.

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FRANCE



Jeremy D. Popkin

From 1500 to 2000 the societies of France and its European neighbors evolved in the same general direction. Populations that had been overwhelmingly composed of peasants dominated by a class of noble landowners became predominantly urban, made up of workers and members of the middle classes. Societies characterized by an elaborate hierarchy were replaced by ones in which all citizens theoretically enjoyed equal rights. France's path to modernity had many unique features, however, of which the most important was the Revolution of 1789, the most sweeping attempt deliberately to change social relations undertaken in any European country up to that time. The Revolution had long-lasting effects on all levels of French society; but, paradoxically, it did not make France a leader in the transition to the social patterns that have come to characterize Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century. France provided the paradigm case of modern social revolution and yet experienced a slow, evolutionary pattern of social change from 1800 to the mid-twentieth century, a paradox that makes the country's modern social history a challenge to investigation.

FRENCH SOCIAL HISTORY UNDER THE OLD REGIME (1500–1789)

Drawing on documentary sources—parish registers, long series of grain prices, and royal tax and judicial records—unmatched in Europe, the French historians of *Annales* school social history, beginning with Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre in the 1920s, made this period their special focus. In contrast to social historians inspired by the marxist tradition, the *Annales* scholars deemphasized class conflict and the teleological notion that the history of the early modern period could be summed up as “the transition from feudalism to capitalism.” Borrowing freely from other social-science disciplines—demography, geography, economics, and anthropology—the Annalistes tried above all to understand how the population of the

past supported itself without the benefit of modern technology and medicine. Bloch's classic *French Rural History* (1930; English translation, 1966) depicted the farming arrangements of the period, such as the two- and three-field crop rotation systems and collective constraints on individual owners, not as evidence of backwardness but as a coherent system functioning to provide a dependable food supply without exhausting natural resources. Thanks to the *Annales* school historians, a clear picture emerged of the period's remarkably stable demographic system. Its key feature was an unusually late average age of marriage for both men and women: first marriages normally involved partners in their mid- to late twenties. Only at that age were the partners likely to have inherited a farm that would enable them to set up an economically independent household. Coupled with strict regulation of premarital sexuality, late marriage reduced the number of children a woman was likely to bear and thus limited the overall growth of the population. The high infant mortality rates characteristic of premodern societies were an additional drag on population growth.

France's population growth during the Old Regime was also held down by periodic demographic crises. At least once a generation, a major epidemic, famine, or other disaster devastated major parts of the kingdom, creating a dismal peak in the death statistics. The seventeenth century especially was marked by a succession of such catastrophes. In the aftermath of each crisis, marriage rates and birthrates rose above normal levels and the population eventually recovered; but these periodic setbacks ensured that the country's overall population, which was probably around 19 million in the mid-1500s, did not grow steadily thereafter but instead fluctuated with only a slight tendency toward growth until after 1700.

In the early modern period, France was among the largest of European states. Farming patterns, family structures and inheritance systems, dialects, and cultural practices varied from region to region, making generalization risky. Nevertheless, it is clear that by 1500 most French peasants had the legal status of

freedmen, able to own and bequeath property and to migrate in search of new opportunities. New patterns of trade and the steadily growing power of the French monarchy fostered the growth of a bourgeois elite, whose richest members, like the court banker Jacques Coeur, had wealth and influence to rival those of the greatest nobles. The social structure of the country was still heavily influenced by the seigneurial system, however. Even free peasants still owed their landlord—usually a noble, though the seigneur might also be the church or a bourgeois from a nearby town—a variety of dues, obligations, and marks of honor that reinforced a sense of hierarchical inequality.

Peasants, nobility, and clergy. After 1500, French society settled into a fairly stable pattern whose main features would endure until the second half of the eighteenth century. Labeled by the revolutionaries of 1789 *ancien régime*, it was an overwhelmingly rural and agricultural society: the percentage of the population living in towns of two thousand or more was about 15 percent in 1600, and still under 20 percent in 1750. Peasants lived in village communities of five hundred to fifteen hundred persons. Households typically consisted of nuclear families, although extended-family households were common in some regions of the center and south. French peasants usually owned some land but not enough to support themselves fully. They supplemented the produce of their own plots by leasing additional land from a local seigneur or working as hired laborers. All members of the peasant household contributed to the family economy, although tasks were divided by gender and age. Peasant houses usually had only one room, which served for shelter, indoor work, meals, and sleep. The peasant diet was simple and monotonous, based on bread or gruel made from one or another of the cheaper grain crops—rye, barley, buckwheat, or millet—so as to save the more valuable wheat for sale. Meager as French peasants' existence was, their standard of living was still better than that of villagers in most other regions of Europe.

Most Old Regime peasants' horizons were bounded by their village and its local region. Villagers chose marriage partners from their own community or a neighboring one. Although individual families farmed their own land, the village community dictated crop rotation patterns and set dates for sowing and harvesting. The village council, usually dominated by the wealthier families, allocated taxes and looked after other community concerns. Few peasants received any formal education. The local curé was often the only educated person in the village, and the post-Reformation church accommodated the peas-

antry by translating basic religious texts into their dialects. Those peasants who could read served as cultural intermediaries for their communities, often by reading aloud from almanacs and chapbooks carried by traveling peddlers.

Although peasants formed the majority of France's population under the Old Regime, other groups also played an important part in the country's life. The hereditary nobility was a small minority—some estimates suggest they numbered less than 1 percent of the population—but they loomed large in its affairs. Nobility was in principle a hereditary status characterized by the possession of certain legal privileges, particularly exemption from many of the most important taxes. In practice noble status was almost always accompanied by ownership of a seigneurie or landed estate. Not only were seigneurs' landholdings usually considerably larger than those of even wealthy peasants, but they also enjoyed the right to maintain a court, to collect dues and labor services from tenants, and to compel peasants to use the seigneur's oven and mill; they also enjoyed a variety of honorific privileges, such as special seating in church.

In the early modern period, most French nobles were the descendants of commoner families that had enriched themselves and elevated their status over a period of several generations. Starting in the 1500s the French monarchy institutionalized this process through the sale of venal offices; these were administrative and judicial positions whose exercise conferred noble status, either on the purchaser or on his heirs if the post stayed in the family for a specified number of generations. The possibility of buying noble status meant that the group was never a closed caste but instead regularly absorbed the descendants of the most successful and ambitious commoners. This wealthy and educated office-holding *noblesse du robe* (nobility of the robe) often looked down on poorer members of the *noblesse d'épée* (nobility of the sword), whose status depended on military service. During the sixteenth century, and especially during the disorders resulting from the country's long religious civil war (1562–1598), local nobles often exercised considerable autonomy. As the kings of the Bourbon dynasty, established by Henri IV in 1594, consolidated their authority in the course of the seventeenth century, ambitious nobles increasingly realized that the road to individual and family preferment ran through clientage ties with powerful figures at the royal court, and ultimately with the king himself. The court, permanently established at Versailles under Louis XIV, became a magnet for the wealthier and more influential nobles, as well as a center for the propagation of new models of aristocratic behavior.

Like the nobility, the Catholic clergy enjoyed a number of special privileges, including tax exemptions and the right to be judged in special courts. The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century had challenged the church's position in French society. Henri IV's Edict of Nantes (1598) granted the Protestant Huguenots the status of a protected minority, but also ended any real threat to Catholic predominance; the gradual implementation in France after 1600 of the reform program laid down earlier by the Council of Trent consolidated the church's position. Parish clergy received better training and tightened their control over the laity's behavior. The period's religious enthusiasm fueled the spread of new religious orders, many of them created by women, such as the Filles de la Charité and the Ursulines. Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 marked the triumph of this Catholic revival. A substantial number of Huguenots emigrated—the one significant instance of emigration from France during the early modern period—while those who remained were driven into clandestinity.

Urban and rural social structures. France's cities grew slowly during this period. The Paris population reached 400,000 during the reign of Louis XIV, but regional metropolises such as Lyon, Bordeaux, Mar-

seille, and Rouen had fewer than 100,000 inhabitants until the end of the eighteenth century. Cities served as administrative centers for the monarchy and the church, as market and cultural centers, and as homes to specialized artisans and professionals such as lawyers and doctors. The dense crowding of urban habitats and the lack of sanitation facilitated the spread of disease. Death rates in cities were higher than in most rural areas, and city populations were sustained only by a steady flow of immigrants. In France more than in any other European country, the custom of entrusting newborns to wet nurses became widespread, both among artisan families, to whose economy the wife's labor was essential, and among elites, whose female members did not want to be burdened with childrearing. Because wet nurses often neglected their charges, this practice led to very high rates of infant death.

Urban social structures were more complex and hierarchical than those found in rural areas. Urban society was usually dominated by wealthy commoners, especially merchants. In smaller towns, prosperous artisans, organized in guilds, played a significant role. By the early sixteenth century, city governments had usually taken over from the church such functions as providing aid to the poor and running schools. Local elites struggled to maintain their autonomy from the

encroaching royal government. Louis XIV perfected a system of exploiting cities by converting municipal positions into venal offices and forcing towns to buy back the right to name their own leaders. At the same time, urban elites imitated the nobility in waging protracted struggles over matters of honor and prestige. Urban leaders spent much time and energy dealing with the poor, who made up the vast majority of every city's population. Below the level of the skilled artisans was a mass of apprentices and journeymen, casual laborers, beggars, criminals, prostitutes, and groups in need of assistance, such as orphans, the aged, the sick, the insane. City governments tried to maintain the authority of guild masters over their workers. Knowing that high food prices provoked disorder, they worried incessantly about supplies and sought to regulate market procedures. They also sought to control and sometimes confine the unemployed, the sick, the insane, and criminals.

Tensions and instability. Social tensions were always present in Old Regime France, and collective violence was no rarity. The religiously inspired violence of the second half of the sixteenth century often had social overtones. Protestantism found a following among some nobles and among artisans and educated elites in urban areas; it was less successful in the countryside, outside of a few specific regions, and among the urban lower classes. The seventeenth century saw a number of important regional uprisings by peasants, who often turned to local seigneurs for leadership. These uprisings were directed primarily against the royal government's relentless drive to collect ever more tax revenue to pay for the wars that marked the reigns of Louis XIII and Louis XIV. These movements were significant signs of the social cost imposed by the growth of the absolutist state, but their impact was limited by their focus on local issues. Considerable social disorder also accompanied the series of revolts against royal authority known as the Fronde (1648–1653), but these movements, too, failed to coalesce into a coherent challenge to the existing social order and collapsed when their elite leaders made peace with the king. The centralized administration developed under Louis XIV and perfected over the course of the eighteenth century was more effective both in preventing conditions from degenerating to the point where revolts were likely and in repressing protests before they could spread.

From 1500 to around 1750, the social system of the French Old Regime thus maintained itself largely intact. The slow pace of technological and economic change and the absence of an alternative to the traditional hierarchical order ruled out any

radical alterations. Around the middle of the eighteenth century, changes that undermined this social order began to occur. One of the most significant of these, although contemporaries were only dimly aware of it, was the beginning of a sustained growth in population. By 1740 the population had risen to an unprecedented level of over 24 million; after a brief setback in the following decade, it grew even more rapidly over the next four decades, reaching a figure of about 28 million by 1789. The causes of this marked increase are unclear. Population growth was well under way before any significant changes in agriculture occurred. Changes in medical practices had at best a marginal effect; infant mortality remained high. A shift in climate—the “little ice age,” with its many cold, wet summers and bitter winters and a cycle of warmer weather that resulted in good harvests—may have been one factor; the cumulative effect of slight improvements in farming methods, birthing practices, and sanitary arrangements may also have contributed.

The eighteenth-century population increase—which, although substantial, was more gradual than that in other European countries—had important social effects. With more peasants competing for opportunities to farm, landlords were able to raise rents, and the larger number of mouths to feed meant more demand for their marketable surplus. The gulf between rich and poor thus tended to grow. Some developments, however, slowed the growth of discontent. Although fewer peasants had enough land to maintain themselves, the gradual spread of rural manufacturing industries organized on the putting-out system provided many peasant families with a second source of income. Since most of the increased income from agriculture ended up in the hands of urban landowners—nobles and bourgeois—who spent it on fancier homes, additional servants, and other forms of consumption, France's cities absorbed some of the surplus rural population.

The rising tension between rich and poor was one important aspect of the growing instability in eighteenth-century France; changing relations among the country's elites was another. The country's growing economy benefited especially members of the urban bourgeoisie. Merchants in port cities grew rich off the booming colonial trade, which flourished after the end of Louis XIV's wars; manufacturers profited from the growth of the textile industry and other enterprises. As they enriched themselves, members of the bourgeoisie adopted a lifestyle that increasingly resembled that of the privileged nobility. Nobles, for their part, found ways around the traditional restrictions that prevented them from engaging in commerce;

through their investments, they increasingly shared the same economic interests as the bourgeoisie. As the real differences between the two groups diminished, the special privileges that set nobles off from bourgeois commoners came to seem unjustified. The spread of the rationalist ideas of the Enlightenment, adopted both by many nobles who saw themselves as cosmopolitans above petty class prejudices and by educated members of the bourgeoisie, provided an ideological rationale for criticism of traditional social arrangements.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1789–1815

The social history of the Old Regime poses the question of how a highly inegalitarian society managed to maintain itself intact over a long period. The period of the French Revolution, the broadest social upheaval European society had witnessed in many centuries, raises very different questions: what forces led to the sudden overthrow of the earlier system, and which social groups gained and lost from the new order? The social history of the Revolution, in contrast to that of the Old Regime, was long dominated by scholars working in the marxist tradition, who emphasized the “bourgeois” character of 1789 and the importance of socioeconomic conflicts in determining its outcome. The last two decades of the twentieth century saw a strong revisionist reaction against this social interpretation of the Revolution. Even historians who retained an interest in social history radically redefined its content. Historians of women challenged a definition of the social that ignored gender, and cultural historians looked at forms of symbolic behavior rather than trying to identify distinct social classes.

The social tensions that had been building up in the second half of the eighteenth century exploded when the threat of insolvency forced the king to summon the Estates-General, a representative assembly that had last met in 1614. The Estates-General was traditionally divided into separate chambers for the nobility, clergy, and commoners, or third estate; its convocation immediately posed the question of the privileged orders’ special rights. Bourgeois deputies such as the abbé Sieyès called for the elimination of all social privileges that divided the “nation” and the restructuring of the Estates-General as a single body, the National Constituent Assembly. To ensure their triumph over the king and the privileged orders, the deputies needed the support of a popular insurrection. The storming of the Bastille on 14 July 1789 and the subsequent wave of antiseigneurial peasant violence known as the Great Fear guaranteed the Revolution’s success.

The National Constituent Assembly now had a unique opportunity to legislate sweeping social changes. Its declared intent was to eliminate all group privileges and all vestiges of the feudal regime, leaving a society composed of equal individuals who would be rewarded on the basis of merit. At the same time, the revolutionaries guaranteed the right of property and accepted the economic inequality that this was bound to perpetuate. In its first, or liberal, phase (1789–1792), the Revolution abolished noble status and the clergy’s special privileges, as well as those of guilds, towns, and provinces, and gave minority groups such as Protestants and Jews full rights. Obstacles to market capitalism, such as internal customs barriers and guild restrictions, were wiped out. The 1791 Le Chapelier law forbidding workers’ organizations consecrated the triumph of employers. Nobles retained their land, however, and when the church’s extensive holdings were put up for sale, the procedures favored wealthy bidders over peasants. The new constitution enacted in 1791 restricted voting rights to wealthier taxpayers. This favoritism toward the wealthy produced a reaction, as the popular classes realized that the new order offered them few tangible benefits. Confronted also with a domestic counter-revolutionary movement and, after April 1792, with a foreign war, the largely bourgeois revolutionaries split. Their more radical, or Jacobin, wing turned to the urban populace.

The most militant members of that group, the famous Parisian sansculottes, a mixture of shopkeepers, artisans, and workers, led the crowd that stormed the royal palace on 10 August 1792, setting off a “second,” or “radical,” revolution. Their actions forced the summoning of a new assembly, the National Convention, elected on the basis of universal manhood suffrage. Still composed primarily of bourgeois deputies, the Convention nevertheless enacted measures designed to eliminate the last vestiges of class privilege and distribute wealth more widely. It also bowed to popular pressure for drastic action against enemies of the Revolution, resulting in the Reign of Terror. The alliance between the radical bourgeois Jacobins and the popular classes disintegrated as external threats to the new regime receded. Under the leadership of Robespierre, the Convention brought the sansculottes under control. This alienated the Jacobins’ poorer supporters, however, and when Robespierre himself was overthrown by more conservative bourgeois politicians on 27 July 1794—in the revolutionary calendar, 9 thermidor, year II—the masses abandoned him. The result was the “thermidorian reaction” and the installation of the Directory, a regime dedicated to the narrow defense of bourgeois interests.

Social effects. The changes in property distribution and social conditions brought about by the Revolution were less dramatic than its rhetoric suggested, but they were still substantial. Noble families were often surprisingly successful in restoring their landholdings in the years after the Terror, but nobles as a group never regained their privileged status. The Revolution opened many new opportunities to educated commoners, thereby creating a self-conscious bourgeoisie who would never again allow themselves to be reduced to subordinate status and a landowning peasantry that fiercely defended its interests and prevented an English-style enclosure movement. The Revolution did not immediately put France on the road to a modern capitalist industrial economy—in fact, the disorder it caused set economic development back considerably—but revolutionary legal reforms, codified in 1804 in the Napoleonic Code, eliminated restrictions on the use of property inherited from the seigneurial system and cleared the way for further changes in the nineteenth century. By selling off church lands and confiscated noble properties, the Revolution caused a significant redistribution of wealth. The numerous landholding peasants became a distinctive component

of France's social structure into the mid-twentieth century.

One of the Revolution's major social effects was a redefinition of gender roles. Men enjoyed many legal advantages over women in the Old Regime, starting with French law's prohibiting a woman from inheriting the throne; but the complex nature of privilege before 1789 allowed some women considerable prerogatives. Noblewomen had greater rights than male commoners', guild masters' widows could inherit and run their enterprises, and some women's guilds did exist. The Revolution's assault on the notion of special privilege raised the question of gender privileges, and some radicals, both female and male, argued that true equality between the sexes was a necessary consequence of the movement's principles. Women participated in revolutionary uprisings, and legislation such as the egalitarian divorce law passed in 1792 gave them increased rights. Other revolutionaries contended, however, that the equality of all males necessarily implied the subordination of all women. In 1793 the National Convention put itself firmly on the side of those who claimed that "nature" militated against any female participation in public affairs. In

the Jacobin republic, women were to tend the home and raise patriotic children.

The Napoleonic period (1799–1815) was marked by a return to a more hierarchical social order, particularly with respect to gender. The Napoleonic Code deprived women of the right to own property in their own name and gave full control over the family to its male head. Poorer male citizens lost ground, too. Workers had to carry a *livret*, or work book, and could not change jobs without a favorable report from their previous employer; wealthy men could buy exemption from military service. Napoleon claimed that the Legion of Honor he created in 1802 did not mark a return to aristocracy, since any citizen could theoretically earn admission by outstanding service to the state and membership was not hereditary; but in 1808 he established a new nobility, rewarding his most loyal supporters with titles and landed estates. A highly centralized system of specialized national schools, begun during the revolutionary decade, was consolidated as a mechanism for training an educated elite for state service. The “Napoleonic settlement” guaranteed the land purchases made during the Revolution, but returned unsold noble properties to their original owners. Although he encouraged the growth of some industries, Napoleon still envisaged France as an essentially agricultural society, with the peasantry as the reservoir from which he would fill his army’s ranks; the populations of some major cities actually fell during his reign. At the time of Napoleon’s final defeat in 1815, it was not yet evident that France was launched on the processes of urbanization and industrialization that were to mark the nineteenth century.

URBANIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION (1815–1968)

The first half of the nineteenth century saw the beginnings of the changes that would eventually transform France from a rural, agricultural society to an urban, industrial one. The rural population peaked in the 1830s; after that date population growth shifted to the cities. New forms of wealth derived from industry and commerce displaced landownership. Compared with most other European countries, France experienced these changes slowly: on the eve of the 1914 war, 40 percent of the population still lived in the countryside, versus 6 percent in England. Thus it may be misleading to talk about an “industrial revolution” in France. Historians have actively discussed causes for the French lag, ranging from resource disadvantages (in coal, for example) to a conservative business culture to the slow population growth, which limited

consumer demand and the available labor force. But change did occur, as even artisanal sectors became more commercial. And by the 1830s and 1840s, the introduction of power-driven machinery and the building of the first French railroads were making an impact. There was an acute consciousness that the country faced a critical “social problem” in its major cities. Middle-class writers described the poverty, overcrowding, disease, and social breakdown that characterized slum neighborhoods in Paris and in provincial manufacturing centers such as Lille and Lyon. Early socialist theorists—Henri de Saint-Simon and his followers, Charles Fourier, Étienne Cabet, and Louis Blanc—identified capitalism and individualism as the causes of these ills and offered various prescriptions for healing them. The Saint-Simonians were especially sensitive to the fact that the growth of industry depended heavily on the exploitation of female labor, and that overcoming the challenges of modernity required re-examining established gender roles.

In 1830, after several years of economic distress and political confrontation, opposition to the conservative Restoration regime set up after Napoleon’s defeat boiled over into another revolution. Although the urban crowd played a major role in the insurrection, rural protests were minor compared with those in 1789, and middle-class liberals were able to keep control of the country’s institutions. Proclaimed as a “citizen king,” Louis-Philippe, duc d’Orléans, a relative of the deposed Restoration king, took the throne. His period of rule, from 1830 to 1848, was categorized even at the time as a “bourgeois monarchy.” This reflected in part the king’s deliberate policy of adopting the lifestyle of a wealthy bourgeois in contrast with his predecessors’ efforts to revive aristocratic court practices. The label also reflected, however, the sense that the new regime was dominated by bourgeois interests. The right to vote was extended, giving more members of the middle classes a voice, and government policies such as subsidies for railroads promoted industrialization.

The bourgeois social order that took shape after 1830 was often depicted, in the novels of Honoré de Balzac and Gustave Flaubert and the biting caricatures by the artist Honoré Daumier, as one in which money was the measure of all things. In fact the French bourgeoisie also put a high value on honor and reputation, sometimes adopting what had been aristocratic practices, such as dueling. One hallmark of bourgeois life was the withdrawal of women from economic activities. Although working-class and peasant women had to contribute directly to family income, the bourgeois “lady” increasingly restricted herself to the household, overseeing servants who did the actual domestic chores.

The bourgeois July Monarchy initiated public elementary schooling for boys, but religiously inspired conservatism prevented the creation of public schools for girls until the early 1880s. Secondary education remained a privilege of the wealthy; the school system was one of the main means by which France's bourgeois social hierarchy perpetuated itself.

Although a social order dominated by bourgeois values was firmly in place after 1830, political stability remained elusive. A severe economic crisis in 1845–1847 alienated much of the population from Louis-Philippe's regime, which was overthrown in February 1848. As in 1830, the Paris crowd played the leading role in the movement, and the provisional government that took power made important gestures to the working classes, including the creation of the Luxembourg Commission to hold public hearings on their problems. The February revolution set off an unprecedented outburst of popular demonstrations and political activity; socialist and feminist groups actively spread radical ideas. The entire male population was allowed to vote in elections for a constituent assembly. Peasant voters generally backed conservative candidates, however, and the Assembly took a confrontational attitude toward urban workers. The result was the bloody June Days uprising in 1848 in the working-class neighborhoods of Paris, put down at a cost of perhaps some two thousand lives. Its defeat strengthened the conservatives' hold on the assembly, which later passed the Falloux law allowing religious education in public schools for the first time and an electoral law disenfranchising much of the urban population.

The Assembly's conservatism worked in favor of the country's elected president, Napoleon I's nephew Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, who ousted the deputies in December 1851 and restored the Napoleonic empire in 1852. Resistance to his takeover in parts of rural southern France showed that the brief republican interlude had convinced many members of the lower classes that they deserved political rights. Taking the title Napoleon III, the new ruler initially followed a conservative social policy. His regime benefited from a renewed surge of industrial activity in the 1850s; general prosperity and an authoritarian police quelled unrest. As economic growth slowed in the 1860s, however, social protest resurfaced. Napoleon III sought to broaden the base of his regime by making some concessions to the labor movement. Self-proclaimed working-class candidates ran in Paris municipal elections in 1864, and unions were legalized. The period also saw an important resurgence of feminist activity. Napoleon III's faith that rational social engineering, firmly directed from above, could produce improved

living conditions for all classes was exemplified by the remodeling of Paris under Baron Georges Haussmann, prefect of the Seine. Slum neighborhoods were cleared away, modern water and sewer systems built, and broad new boulevards eased traffic problems. As a result, however, the city's poor were increasingly forced out to the suburbs: the elegant new spaces of the city center were largely reserved for the well-to-do.

That social tensions still ran high became obvious when Napoleon III's regime collapsed after defeat by Bismarck's Prussia in 1870. In March 1871 the Parisians revolted against the conservative assembly that had replaced the emperor. They set up a directly elected council, the Commune. During the two months of its existence, the Commune launched numerous social experiments. Women played a major role in the movement. Conservative reaction against the Paris "reds" was violent. Some 20,000 to 25,000 were killed when government troops retook the capital in the "bloody week" of fighting in May 1871. The Commune uprising generated long-lasting myths on both sides: to bourgeois conservatives, it showed the danger from the unruly masses; to workers, it demonstrated the possessing classes' implacable enmity. Ironically, however, the real victors after 1871 proved to be the moderate republican representatives of France's middle classes. Led by Leon Gambetta, the republicans appealed to the "new social strata," the lower middle class and a now republicanized peasantry. These groups became the social basis of the Third Republic (1875–1940). This regime proved remarkably stable, suggesting that it satisfied the wishes of a strong majority of the population that wanted a regime respectful of property but willing to take some steps to benefit the poor.

The Third Republic. With the consolidation of the Third Republic's institutions in the early 1880s, the social program elaborated in 1789 seemed at last to have been accomplished. The new regime guaranteed the civil equality of all male citizens, provided a uniform (but gender-specific) elementary education for all children, and protected property and order. The century between the French Revolution and the definitive installation of the republic had seen important social changes, however. The industrial working class's place in French society remained a controversial issue. An 1884 law legalized strikes, and a general trade union federation, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), was created in 1895. The socialist movement, damaged by the defeat of 1871, recovered in the 1880s and attracted the support of many workers; working-class families also provided the base for a flourishing network of consumer cooperatives. French

socialism was weakened by its division into several competing parties, but all expressed workers' dissatisfaction with a society in which they remained largely marginalized. The growth of large industry and of new forms of commerce, such as department stores, put pressure on artisans and shopkeepers, who looked to the government for protection. As in other European countries, a "new middle class" of salaried clerks, teachers, and professionals developed; some of them embraced trade unionism to defend their interests.

The place of women in French society was another major social issue in the Third Republic. Women were still denied voting rights, but their civil rights expanded. Divorce, banned since 1816, was legalized in 1884, and single women gained control of their own income and property. By the 1880s France had become the first country to experience the demographic transition to low birthrates. Fearing that a stagnant population endangered the country's future, even social conservatives supported "maternalist" welfare measures designed to encourage women to have children and to improve the health of the babies they

did have. France was thus in some respects a pioneer in the development of the modern welfare state. The low birthrate meant a demand for labor that gave France the highest rate of female participation in the labor force of any industrialized country. Partly as a result, the country was also in the lead in providing daycare through a system of public nursery schools (*écoles maternelles*) founded in 1886. The late nineteenth century also saw the beginnings of women's entry into the educated professions. In 1870 a medical degree was granted to a woman for the first time. The creation of public schools for girls in the 1880s created a demand for trained schoolteachers, and women were also hired as inspectors under many of the welfare laws created during the period. The emergence of these "new women" provoked a vocal conservative backlash, and many women themselves, particularly those loyal to the Catholic Church, denounced these developments.

The world wars. In France, as in all combatant countries, World War I caused profound social

changes. Because of the country's low birthrate, the staggering casualties—1.3 million men—had a lasting effect on its demographic structure, leaving a population disproportionately elderly and female. The needs of war production dramatized industrial workers' role in the country and gave them an increased sense of their importance. Inflation devalued the savings and investments that undergirded middle-class families' status. Women moved into many jobs that had formerly been reserved for men, causing further tension over gender roles; but France did not follow Britain, the United States, and Germany in giving women the vote. A conservative backlash followed the war, marked by a law banning contraceptives. Immigration, already significant before the war, continued afterward as employers and the government systematically recruited workers from Poland and Italy to fill the ranks of the country's depleted labor force. French industries followed American models in rationalizing their workplaces and trying to establish paternalist discipline over employees, whose militance diminished after the defeat of a widespread wave of strikes in 1919–1920. Industrial workers' living conditions continued to be worse than those of other population groups, especially in the desolate suburbs of Paris's "red belt" of communist-dominated suburbs and other urban areas.

Compared with more industrialized countries, France was not hit as hard by the world economic depression that started in 1929; but its effects were still significant. Together with fear of fascism, protest against economic conditions fueled a mass movement that swept the Popular Front coalition of Socialist, Communist, and middle-class Radical parties to power in 1936. Immediately after the elections, workers staged the largest wave of strikes the country had ever experienced, occupying factories to demand better pay and working conditions. The most long-lasting of the Popular Front's responses was France's first law on paid vacations, generalizing to the entire population what had been a bourgeois privilege. The Popular Front era allowed the Communist Party to implant itself solidly in working-class neighborhoods. The reunification of the French union movement in 1936 extended Communist influence. The party would dominate French labor politics until the 1970s. Some middle-class groups responded to the surge of left-wing radicalism in the 1930s by backing France's numerous quasi-fascist movements.

The military defeat of 1940 ended the Third Republic and brought to power the Vichy government of the authoritarian, conservative World War I hero Philippe Pétain. Under Pétain's aegis, conservative and fascist ideologues tried to remodel French

society, often in contradictory ways. Vichy glorified the peasant and artisan traditions of the past but also accelerated industrial modernization to meet the production demands of the occupying Germans. Vichy propaganda talked of replacing the unregulated capitalist economy and its conflicts with a corporatist system, but the organizations it created heavily favored employers. Vichy's paternalist tendencies led to the continuation of prewar trends toward a more comprehensive welfare state: it was Pétain's government that implemented the system of family allowances passed just before the war. Hostility to foreign immigrants, already heightened by the depression, played a role in Vichy's decision to pass anti-Semitic legislation and to turn many of France's Jewish residents over to the Germans.

Opposition to Vichy and the Germans grew steadily as the war progressed. Discredited in 1939 by its support for the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the Communist Party recovered once the Germans invaded Russia in 1941; its working-class base became a stronghold of resistance. Other resistance movements brought together trade unionists, intellectuals, feminist activists, Catholics, and a cross-section of patriots from other social groups. From exile, General Charles de Gaulle established himself as the leader of this opposition, but the government he established at the moment of the Liberation in 1944 had a strong left-wing slant. The constitution of the new Fourth Republic, adopted in 1946, included a long list of social rights that laid the basis for a comprehensive welfare state, embodied in the creation of a comprehensive social security system. Although the Communist Party was ousted from the post-Liberation government in 1947, its strong support among workers, especially those in the greatly expanded government-owned sector of the economy, gave it considerable influence. World War II did not cause as many changes in the position of women as had the previous war, but they finally received the right to vote in 1944.

Postwar developments. Economic reconstruction was high on the national agenda after the war, spurred by a centralized planning system and by generous American aid. France's version of the baby boom, evident in statistics as early as 1942, continued into the early 1960s and also stimulated growth. During the "thirty glorious years" from 1945 to the early 1970s, France became a consumer society. Urban centers grew rapidly; the more technocratic government of the Fifth Republic, established in 1958, deliberately encouraged the conversion of small farms into more efficient units and a shift of population from country to city. Increasing prosperity did not end social ten-

sions, however. Workers continued to feel excluded from French society, and the large cohorts of young people born after the war chafed at its rigidity and conservatism. The marked decline in birthrates that followed the introduction of the birth control pill in 1965 was a sign of a widespread shift in social values. Even more spectacular were *les événements de mai* (the events of May) in 1968, a nationwide wave of strikes by students and workers that completely paralyzed the country. Although this movement did not result in any institutional changes, it profoundly changed the social climate. After 1968 France would become more individualistic, more concerned with consumption than production, and less respectful of hierarchical authority structures.

In retrospect it also became clear that 1968 marked France's move into the era of postindustrial society. The 39 percent of the workforce employed in industry that year was an all-time high. The international economic slowdown that began in the early 1970s hit the country's traditional heavy industries hard and led to a decline of the classic factory proletariat that had been the basis for Communist support. Unemployment, almost unknown during the postwar decades, became a major issue, remaining above 10 percent from the early 1980s to the end of the century. The economic slowdown of the 1970s, like the Great Depression of the 1930s, led voters to turn to the left. The Socialist François Mitterrand, elected as the country's president in 1981, initially took measures

similar to those put through by the Popular Front and the Liberation. The minimum wage was raised sharply, workers' rights were increased, and the government promised a break with the world capitalist system. When this policy proved impossible to reconcile with France's increasing integration into the European Community and the world economy, however, Mitterrand changed course. His subsequent policies, often damned by critics as neoliberal, reduced inflation and favored economic growth, but at the cost of high unemployment and the disappearance of many traditional industries.

The most prosperous sectors of the workforce in France, as elsewhere in the developed world, became those in white-collar managerial and bureaucratic jobs, the educated cadres whose consumer-oriented lifestyle has increasingly become the country's social model. Women have succeeded in moving into this group, but only with difficulty; France has lagged behind other industrialized countries on gender issues. Another social problem highlighted once economic growth slowed was the increasing population of non-European immigrants, often from France's former colonies. Many immigrants successfully assimilated into French society, but the poorest found themselves confined to ghettos in the suburbs of large cities, where riots have broke out on several occasions after 1980. As unemployment rose, so did resentment against these groups, particularly those from North Africa; in elections in the late 1980s and 1990s, the vociferously

anti-immigrant National Front party regularly claimed up to 15 percent of the vote.

French society at the turn of the century has increasingly come to resemble those of the other nations of western Europe. Like them, France came to be characterized by a very low birthrate, an aging population, a high average per capita income, and an overwhelmingly urban society. The rising costs of France's extensive welfare system have posed major problems, as have the integration of postcolonial immigrants and the achievement of greater equality for women. Some traditional social problems have per-

sisted: neither poverty nor substantial inequality between social groups has been banished from French life. Nevertheless, France's problems can unmistakably be seen as those of a prosperous society protected from the hunger and disease that dominated its life in earlier eras. France's history shows that there has been more than one route to modernity in western Europe. Increasingly ready to merge into a larger European community, the French can take pride especially in having been the first to articulate the principles of individual freedom and social equality that have become the bases of modern European social life.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE LOW COUNTRIES



W. P. Blockmans

THE POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL FRAMEWORK

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Low Countries were gradually united into a dynastic union. In 1548–1549, Emperor Charles V secured the autonomy of the so-called Seventeen Provinces as the Burgundian Circle within the Holy Roman Empire. Only his son Philip II profited from the concession that this union should remain under one ruler, because the Dutch Revolt, which started in 1566, led to a definitive split between the northern and southern Netherlands—roughly, present-day Netherlands and Belgium—formalized in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. However, the principalities that constituted the former Seventeen Provinces cherished their centuries-old institutional traditions and identities. Two of them, the counties of Flanders and Artois, had belonged to the kingdom of France until 1529, while the others had formed part of the Holy Roman Empire. Neither of these sovereign powers had been able to impose its authority effectively on this peripheral and relatively prosperous region. Until the end of the eighteenth century, regional autonomies prevailed over the sovereignty of the Dutch Republic in the north, and of the Habsburg dynasty in the south. After the revolutionary movements of the 1780s and the French occupation, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 created the kingdom of the Netherlands, reuniting most of the territory of the former Seventeen Provinces, with Artois and parts of Flanders lost to France but including the previously independent prince-bishopric of Liège. The Belgian Revolution of 1830 divided the region again, forming the kingdom of Belgium, formally recognized in 1839. In the opinion of Belgian historians, the very progressive, liberal character of the new Belgian constitution of 1831 gave the secession a revolutionary character; Dutch historiography sees the 1830 events only as a “Belgian uprising.”

There has been a lot of discussion about the factors uniting and dividing the Low Countries. The absence of natural external borders, the decentralized

political structure, and the relative prosperity made the region an easy and tempting target of invasion throughout the centuries. Political integration was slow, and resistance against centralization was one of the issues in the revolt against Philip II. In the Dutch Republic, local and provincial magistracies enjoyed the same sovereign power as the States General. In the Spanish (later Austrian) Netherlands, the Habsburgs had learned to respect the local and provincial privileges and did not impose centralization until the last decades of the eighteenth century. The kingdoms of the nineteenth century insisted on the formation of national identities, but in Belgium the imposition of nationhood as defined by the French-speaking bourgeoisie provoked a reaction from the majority of the population, who spoke various Dutch dialects. They slowly saw their cultural and political rights confirmed constitutionally, culminating in the transformation of Belgium into a federal state in 1993. The linguistic border, which cut through all the southern principalities of the ancien régime (Flanders, Hainaut, Brabant, Liège), had not caused serious problems until it became a divisive factor in the development of the nation-state.

If there are no external natural borders to the Low Countries, there are internal ones—large rivers separate provinces—and they formed a frontier. Spanish troops were unable to cross reliably during the Dutch Revolt (1568–1648). As a consequence, south of the rivers, the Spaniards maintained control and continued to impose Catholicism. When the Spanish withdrew in 1648, the Dutch Republic respected freedom of religion but did not grant the newly acquired territories the same sovereign rights as the seven United Provinces north of the great rivers. Therefore, the Catholic regions in the south developed a distinct cultural pattern, including the perception of being second-rate citizens. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century did Catholics in the Netherlands obtain rights fully equivalent to those of Protestants.

The river delta was also a unifying factor. In preindustrial economies, ships were the easiest means

of transport for bulk cargos. The dense network of river-mouths, including the Rhine, Meuse, and Scheldt, created opportunities for commercial linkages with distant regions in northern France and western Germany. Along these rivers larger cities developed earlier than in landlocked regions. Thus, rivers facilitated the development of the transport-oriented economy that typified the region from the early Middle Ages to the late twentieth century.

The decentralized political structure, distant sovereigns (and, until 1559, distant bishops, except in Utrecht), an economy oriented toward long-distance trade over rivers and seas, and a high level of urbanization: these factors gave the Low Countries their special character through the centuries, and help us to understand the strength of local and regional power, especially that of citizens. With the exception of northern and central Italy, before 1800 no other region in Europe was so highly urbanized and commercialized; this concentration of men and capital was the source of an extraordinary degree of freedom for citizens and of political rights for artisans.

During the last eight centuries, the southern and northern areas of the Low Countries have alternately spearheaded the European economy. From around 1200 to around 1600, the southern Low Countries formed the core of the northwestern economy, with Bruges and, from 1480 onward, Antwerp as its metropolises. The former, a city of around 45,000 inhabitants at its zenith, served as the economic center of northwestern Europe, while the latter, with around 100,000 inhabitants in the 1560s, integrated markets throughout the continent and Europe's overseas colonies. At the end of the sixteenth century, the locus shifted to Amsterdam, which attained yet another level of integration as a world market. From the late eighteenth century onward, the innovative role shifted again to the south, thanks to the early industrialization in Wallonia, intensive husbandry and the textile industries in Flanders, and the growth of the Antwerp harbor. After World War II, the harbors of Amsterdam and especially Rotterdam took the lead, with rapidly developing chemical industries. Dutch companies grew into important multinationals and their financial sector proved exceptionally dynamic. This remarkable continuity of core functions is directly related to the natural infrastructure of coasts and rivers.

PROTOINDUSTRIAL DEMOGRAPHY

Around 1500, the Low Countries counted some 2.3 million inhabitants, of whom 32 percent lived in cities. The population density reached 72 per square kilometer in the county of Flanders and 63 in the

county of Holland. In Spain, repression provoked the emigration to the Dutch Republic of some 150,000 persons, mainly Protestants, two-thirds of whom settled in the north; others fled to Germany and England. Most of the migrants belonged to an elite of entrepreneurs, skilled artisans, artists, and intellectuals, who greatly stimulated the boom of the Dutch Republic, which counted 1.5 million inhabitants in 1625 and 1.9 million from 1650 to 1750. The province of Holland was by far the most populated and the most urbanized of the Seven Provinces. In 1625, 675,000 lived there, and by 1680, 61 percent of its population was urban, while in the rest of the republic it was below 25 percent, though still far higher than the European average. Amsterdam had 220,000 inhabitants, Leiden 80,000. Religious tolerance attracted those persecuted in other countries, such as French Huguenots after 1685 and Portuguese Sephardic Jews. In 1675, the latter formed a community of 4,000, mostly wealthy merchants, in Amsterdam. Later, crowds of poor Ashkenasi from central Europe found a safe haven there as well. In 1797, the Jewish community in Amsterdam counted 20,000 persons, who had their synagogue but were restricted in their intercourse with Christians. Amsterdam also attracted numerous landless laborers from rural regions in the southern Netherlands and western Germany, who found employment mainly as sailors. Given the high mortality on the ships making intercontinental journeys, Dutch people voluntarily left these jobs to these *Gastarbeiter*, whom they labeled *Moffen*, a discourteous expression used for Germans in later times as well.

The strong immigration during the seventeenth century probably brought about a relative overrepresentation of younger age groups and, as a consequence, lowered the death rate. At any rate, a series of death- and birthrates for Rotterdam shows a birthrate increase until 1700. Between 1700 and 1730 there was a sharp decline in the birthrate, which afterward stabilized at 3 to 4 percent. In 1626–1627, brides at first marriage in Amsterdam were on average 24.5 years old, with 60.9 percent marrying at an age below 25 and another 28.2 percent from 25 to 30. In 1676–1677, the average age climbed to 26.5, and one century later it was 27.8. Bridegrooms were 25.7 in 1626–1627, 27.7 in 1676–1677, and 28.6 in 1776–1777. This pattern demonstrates clearly the demographic stagnation from the middle of the seventeenth century onward. The household composition in Gouda, a city of 15,000 to 20,000 inhabitants, confirms the break in the secular trend around 1650. In 1622, the average number of household members was 4.25, while in 1674 it had decreased to 3.55 as a consequence of the reduction of the number of chil-

dren (2.07 to 1.71) and of other people living in (0.28 to 0.06). In 1749, households in Delft and Leiden counted 3.47 and 3.62 persons, with even fewer children (1.27 and 1.42, respectively) but more servants and others living in. The figures for the countryside are only slightly higher: 4.68 in 1622 Rhineland (the region between Haarlem and The Hague) and 4.9 in 1775 northwestern Brabant.

The dominance of the nuclear household in the preindustrial Netherlands has been explained by the high level of urbanization as well as by the high number of nonagrarian activities in the countryside. In the early sixteenth century, a great variety of artisanal activities were located in villages. Small households could combine fishery with the cultivation of tiny plots of land. More often, linen bleaching, weaving, shipbuilding, hunting of waterbirds, ground work for the upkeep of the drainage system, and many other crafts provided wage incomes that allowed small households to survive as long as they observed a controlled reproduction pattern.

GUILDS

One of the most particular features of the social history of the Low Countries is the early emergence of class struggle in large Flemish cities. The earliest date from around 1250 in cities like Douai, and from the 1280s onward in Ypres, Bruges, and Ghent. These cities numbered at least 30,000 inhabitants, the latter two even more, up to two-thirds of whom were artisans in the textile industry. Flemish cloth, produced mainly from English wool, was exported to all parts of the continent and to the Near East. Merchant-entrepreneurs introduced a putting-out system that threw the risks of the international trade on the workers. The social tensions of the later thirteenth century arose as a consequence of major shifts in the international division of labor, which provoked large-scale unemployment in traditional industrial cities.

In Flanders, social antagonism was heightened by a political conflict between the urban political elites (merchant-entrepreneurs), the count of Flanders, and his suzerain, the king of France. When the latter occupied the county in 1297 and 1300, the count's relatives mobilized as many craftsmen and peasants as they could. Together with a relatively small army of mounted noblemen, they destroyed the French mounted knights in 1302. This battle marked the breakthrough of the infantry on European battlefields; it also implied that the count had to recognize the social and political rights of the artisans. In all the major cities of the county of Flanders, dozens of craft guilds were organized; they were awarded autonomy in the regulation

and control of their trade and given rights of participation in the new political structure. In the larger crafts in the textile sector, with thousands of workers, the journeymen—salaried artisans working for a master who owned his shop and his tools—could vote in the election of the dean and the board, and could even be elected themselves. The deans of all the crafts formed, together with the delegation of the bourgeoisie, a large council, which voted on taxes and other main issues of the city.

The Flemish guild revolution was an exceptionally early and radical breakthrough made possible by the huge scale of the industry, its vulnerability to international business cycles, and the confluence of economic problems with a major political conflict. In the main cities of other principalities, similar guild revolutions took place, but they were mostly beaten back by more coherent elites. Only in Liège, Dordrecht, and Utrecht did the guild organizations last until the early modern period. The reality of the new power structures differed from one town to another as a consequence of local conditions. The most extreme case was that of Ghent, the largest industrial city of its time, with about 65,000 inhabitants around 1350. After protracted and bloody struggles between the largest crafts of weavers and fullers, the latter were excluded from political power and guild autonomy in 1360. Twenty of the twenty-six seats of aldermen were earmarked for particular crafts, the six others, including the two chairmen, were reserved for members of the bourgeoisie. All delegations of the city, as well as the whole of the city's personnel, were neatly proportioned to reflect each of the sociopolitical sections of the community. This extreme case illustrates the harshness of the class conflicts, even among the small entrepreneurs in the textile sector itself who held the rank of guild masters. At the same time it shows how pacification could be installed through a complicated system of power sharing, which functioned until its abolition after another revolt in 1540. In other cities, more moderate forms of participation and autonomy survived until the French occupation of 1794.

STANDARD OF LIVING AND IDEOLOGY

Guild power helped shelter the employment and income of urban artisans from the effects of depressions. Its aim was purely protectionist: solidarity never reached further than one's own guild or one's own city. Labor mobility was considerable, thanks to the relatively high wages paid in cities. During the prosperous years from 1400 to 1450, the Bruges building industry recruited high numbers of laborers from outside the city; 75 to 80 percent of the outsiders even came

from outside the county of Flanders. After 1450, the economy of Bruges stagnated, which led to a shift in labor migration toward fast-growing Antwerp, and later toward Amsterdam. Considerable differences in real wages continued to exist between town and countryside and between cities. Further, a laborer's income fluctuated heavily depending on variations in employment, since most were paid on piece rates, or were engaged for a number of days only. Because the purchasing power of nominal wages depended on fluctuations in the price of bread, which was the primary household expenditure, real wages can best be expressed in liters of rye, which allows comparisons. In Bruges, in the bumper years 1463 to 1468, a master craftsman could purchase with his theoretical maximal income some sixty-four liters of rye, while his counterpart in Leiden could purchase only thirty-eight liters, or 40 percent less. Real wages in the 1460s in Bruges were the highest of the preindustrial period. During the sixteenth century, real wages declined generally. In Bruges, they were at twenty-seven liters of rye from 1500 to 1505 (still more than the 23 in Ghent and 21 in Antwerp), but in the crisis years 1548 to 1557 they reached only 44 percent of that level in Bruges, while in buoyant Antwerp they were at 81 percent.

Generally, artisan households needed more than one salary to survive, and even then they suffered in the periods of high food prices, which occurred either as a consequence of weather conditions, political blockades, or a combination of both. In any case, the Low Countries were so highly populated that they could

not feed their inhabitants and needed the constant import of grains. Until the mid-sixteenth century, most grain came from Picardy and Artois; later Prussia became the main rye supplier. During the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries Amsterdam built its position as a staple market entirely on this so-called mother trade, from which all other trades in the Baltic were derived. Blockades of the Sund Strait created serious problems for the grain supply of the Low Countries. Riots resulted, for example, in 1530 and 1565–1566. Poor relief normally helped up to 25 percent of the population through the most difficult months, but it remained insufficient when grain prices tripled, as they did in 1565–1566. In this so-called hunger year, the iconoclast movement, which spread in three weeks in August 1566 from western Flanders to Leiden, Amsterdam, and Utrecht, made clear the relationship between living conditions and the propensity for Protestantism.

Lutheran ideas had been spread in word and print through Antwerp since the early 1520s. The first victims of the persecution of Protestants were two Augustinian monks from Antwerp, who died at the stake in 1523. Anabaptism also found supporters in Antwerp, as well as in Amsterdam. From the 1540s onward, a new wave of Protestantism spread through the Low Countries. The rural textile industries in southwestern Flanders had created a proletariat, which gave the impetus to the iconoclast movement in 1566. Most Calvinists were found among the middle classes in the major cities, including some French-speaking ones such as Tournai and Valenciennes. Calvinist re-

publics took over local government in Bruges, Ghent, Mechelen, Brussels, and Antwerp in the late 1570s and early 1580s until Spanish troops subdued each of these after sieges. In 1585, the largest city, Antwerp, fell; one-third of the population had declared itself in favor of Protestantism, and only one-third was said still to be Catholic.

The massive emigration of Protestants, combined with the reconversion of those who stayed under the Spanish repression, explains how the Spanish Netherlands became exclusively Catholic again. The Spaniards introduced there all the tools of the Counter-Reformation, including Jesuit schools, episcopal visiting of parishes, and new charitable institutions. Society was disciplined back into its former pattern. This rapid shift all too often makes people forget that, before the massive military repression of the 1580s, Protestantism had been disseminated predominantly in the more urbanized and more commercialized south, including rural regions with a high level of industrialization. In Holland, it had until then mainly been an elitist movement, and the outlying provinces remained entirely Catholic. In 1650, half of the population of the Dutch Republic was Catholic, and it was only around 1700 that the Reformed Church became the largest among the official churches. It never was, however, a monopolistic state church. Religious tolerance had been one of the main motives for the Dutch Revolt, and it remained embedded in the society of the Dutch Republic. As long as services were not held publicly, they were tolerated, and even Catholic and Anabaptist churches continued to function, albeit it hidden behind discrete facades.

A BOURGEOIS OLIGARCHY

In the Dutch Republic (the United Provinces) sovereignty was dispersed among three levels: the local community, the province, and the confederation. For example, nineteen cities had a vote in the assembly of the local estates of Holland. Each of the Seven Provinces also had sovereign rights; a majority could not impose its decisions against the will of a minority. The confederal representative system made intensive consultations necessary to seek consensus wherever possible, especially on the third level of sovereignty, that of the States General. Nevertheless, the fact that the province of Holland alone paid for 58 percent of the expenditure of the national government had some consequences. Informal pressure, patronage and clientage, the sale of offices, and corruption were widespread practices. The whole governmental system recruited its personnel exclusively among the wealthy regents, who directly served their class interests as

merchants, bankers, and rentiers. Although the absence of a monarchy prevented the creation of new nobility, while the old noble families died out, the regents developed an aristocratic lifestyle, which combined luxurious houses along the prestigious canals in Amsterdam with lordship and a country residence.

One may wonder why this obviously oligarchic government provoked relatively little social unrest. One reason is that ordinary people in the Dutch Republic were generally better off than in other countries. There was full employment, wages were relatively high, and upward mobility was possible. Second, the guild organization helped to defuse social tensions. Artisans had a place in the political culture of the public sphere, even if they had no direct impact in the daily government, as had been the case in medieval Flanders. Third, the churches, private persons, and public authorities competed in the foundation of charitable institutions, which by the late eighteenth century sustained about one-quarter of the population of the major cities. Fourth, the preachers in the Protestant churches were very good at moralizing. Churches exercised control over their members and promoted the acceptance of the social order as divinely ordained. In a probably less intensive way, public authorities also used symbolic means to convey their message of an ideal orderly state.

Guilds are usually viewed as antithetical to commercial capitalism and as obstacles against all kinds of modernization. Recent research has stressed instead that, already in the Middle Ages, the putting-out system prevailed not only between great merchants and artisans, but also between master artisans themselves. Some masters employed other craftsmen, provided them with credit in the form of raw material, and made them dependent on piece-rate salaries. Entrepreneurs reduced both costs for fixed capital goods and marketing risks by employing artisans. Already in the middle of the sixteenth century, some brewers and building entrepreneurs used their capital accumulation in combination with political power to establish *de facto* monopolies. Therefore, the guild system continued to function as a means to absorb social tensions, but it did not prevent the full development of commercial capitalism nor the steady modernization of production techniques.

DRAINAGE DEMOCRACY

One of the most striking features of the history of the Netherlands is that about half of its territory is situated a few meters below sea level. This is because marsh soils sank as they were drained for cultivation. This process has been going on for centuries, and so-

lutions have been incremental. To keep the river waters out of the land dikes were built beginning in the eleventh century. Canals were dug in a systematic rectilinear way to evacuate the water from the land into the same rivers. Sluices were needed to take advantage of the tides. By around 1400, the soil in Holland had sunk to a level below the lowest tide. Evacuation of the superfluous water could therefore only be done by mechanical means, that is, by pumping it up to the level of the river behind the dike. By 1408, the first windmill for this purpose had been built near Alkmaar. The system was then generalized and elaborated: in the deepest marshes, a series of windmills pumped the water up step by step. In the seventeenth century, new polders were created using these devices. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the lake south of Haarlem was drained by a major steam engine. In the 1970s, a new province, Flevoland, was created by draining a large section of the interior sea, the IJsselmeer.

This drainage system had a social dimension because it required collaboration. Local communities took the first protective measures; when these interfered with opposing interests of neighbors, cooperation had to be negotiated or higher authorities had to intervene. Large drainage authorities were officially recognized by the count of Holland in the thirteenth century, and a number of small authorities continue to coexist in the north of Holland. The construction, control, and steady upkeep of the system of canals, dikes, sluices, and windmills could work effectively only with the full participation of all people having an interest in the protected area. Not only their funds

were needed, but also their labor and continuous vigilance. Only a public system that granted rights of protection in strict proportion to duties could foster the solidarity on which the life and property of all depended.

The public authority developed for this purpose is unique, as it combined direct participation in decision making with responsibility. Residents and owners of the land were charged with the execution of the common decisions in proportion to the size of their plots. Every inhabitant was obliged to comply with the decisions commonly taken. The authority had the power to tax and even to prosecute negligence. The land still reflects its systematic clearance; fields are rectangular, divided by the straight canals. A particular political culture grew from the constant concern surrounding this man-made environment. Its elements were solidarity, working toward the common interest, the rational evaluation of purposes and means, freedom of speech during the discussion of a project, and strict adherence to agreed actions. Many of these features are still typical of Dutch political culture.

The nineteenth century saw relatively little economic change in the Dutch Republic. Indeed, this slowness to industrialize is an important topic in the Republic's social history. Although it had sufficient capital for industrialization, the Republic lacked other components—including natural resources (in contrast to coal-rich Belgium)—and fell into a rentier mentality. The hold of religion also intensified, counter to the trend in most other parts of western Europe. Not all areas of the Dutch economy, however, were immune to innovation: for instance, some Dutch farm-

ers actively converted to market agriculture, especially after 1850, producing vegetables and milk products for Europe's growing urban markets.

BELGIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION

The situation in Belgium was more dynamic. In the 1780s, the population of the southern Low Countries was between 2.4 and 2.6 million, considerably more than the 2.1 million in the Dutch Republic. Agricultural innovations had increased the profits of the landowners and stimulated population growth. Various traditional crafts had been transformed. Linen weaving and especially cotton processing flourished in new manufactures in Ghent, while coal mining and iron industries prospered in Liège and Hainaut. The combination of accumulated capital, artisanal traditions, transport facilities on the rivers, the availability of raw materials, sympathetic authorities, and daring entrepreneurship made Belgium the first industrial nation in Europe. Before 1843 railways were constructed connecting all major cities of the country; later, the network became the world's most dense. In the 1846 census, only 23 percent of the population in the provinces of Liège and Hainaut were still active in agriculture. A very unequal income distribution resulted from the industrial boom: by 1880, the business class, 10 percent of the population, possessed two-thirds of the country's real income. Predominantly agrarian Flanders suffered greatly in the potato crises of 1846–1849. Many smallholders starved and had to seek employment in the coal mines in the region of Douai or in Wallony. The first industrial survey of 1846 revealed that the average yearly income of a cotton worker was only 88 percent of the official minimum cost of living. Working time was eighty hours a week. Underpaid female and child labor was widespread in the factories and mines. These observations stimulated the young Karl Marx, who lived as an émigré in Brussels from 1845 to 1848, to write his *Communist Manifesto*. Only after mid-century did economic growth bring a 49 percent increase in real wages (between 1853 and 1875).

The first labor organizations arose around 1850; they were strongly reminiscent of medieval and early-modern guilds. Ghent textile workers established a union in 1857; under the prohibition of unionization, which was lifted only in 1867, they presented themselves as associations for mutual aid. In the Walloon industrial centers, a more activist revolutionary socialism was popular, and a syndicalistic form of organization developed. The formation of the Belgian Socialist Workers' Party in 1885 made universal manhood suffrage the main goal of the movement. In Wal-

lony, strikes underscored this aim; when they escalated into a general strike and the police shot some demonstrators, Parliament accepted general male suffrage in 1893, albeit with extra votes for rich and educated men. In 1896, the number of workers in the industrial sector had grown to 934,000, and in 1910 to 1,176,000.

The effect of universal manhood suffrage was not that socialists won a parliamentary majority, but that the liberals, of whom many favored social reforms, were reduced to a tiny minority. The Catholic party held power for thirty years. During this period, labor productivity increased dramatically, but real wages increased by a poor 4 percent between 1896 and 1910. The Catholic party was firmly led by conservatives, although it claimed to include all "orders." As the workers' movement gained importance, the Catholic Church, inspired by the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, tried to recuperate it by organizing Catholic unions, newspapers, health insurance, and other parallel institutions. While in Wallony the rapid urbanization had led to massive secularization because the Church could not expand adequately, in Flanders the majority of the workers was attracted by the moderate Catholic workers' movement. The contrast between the two regions remained until the general strike of 1960–1961; even then, Wallony was near revolution, while the Flemish socialists remained loyal to parliamentarism. The Belgian workers' movement was thus divided between a reformist tendency prevailing in Flanders and Brussels and a revolutionary tendency with strongholds in Hainaut and Liège; further, Catholic unionism functioned to moderate the working class as a whole. In this it was most successful in Flanders, where Catholicism remained strong until the 1970s and where industrialization triumphed only after World War II.

WOMEN AT WORK: A COMPARISON

Early industrialization required the participation of women, which reduced their fertility. The declining birthrate perpetuated the need for more female workers. The greater demand for women to be available for factory work helped to spread bottle-feeding of babies much earlier in Belgium than in the Netherlands. Institutional arrangements were created earlier in Belgium for child care in crèches, kindergartens, and primary schools with day care after the class hours. The participation of the Belgian Workers' Party in the government since 1919 favored the early introduction of such measures, which became generally accepted and valued. In the Netherlands, industrialization was generalized only after 1945, when the

new industries demanded fewer workers. Until then, the Social Democratic Party had been relatively small and very moderate. As a new participant in coalition governments from 1945 onward, it saw no reason to insist on measures to change the role of women, who happily stayed at home, where especially the dominant Christian parties had always wanted to keep them.

Female participation in higher education lagged far behind in the Netherlands until the 1970s, because both institutional arrangements and cultural prejudices worked against professional activity by women outside the home. Also, while the Netherlands remained neutral during World War I, in Belgium women had to take over tasks of the absent soldiers. The early introduction of female labor, and its generalization during the war, helped its continuation under new conditions. The growth of the service sector (which already counted 784,000 employees in 1910) and the emergence of the welfare state after the World War I required more female work in offices, schools, and hospitals. In most countries, female suffrage logically followed shortly after the war. Paradoxically, this happened in the Netherlands, but not in Belgium, where female suffrage was granted only in 1949. The reason is mainly political: the socialists opposed it because of their fear of conservative (that is, Catholic) voting by women. Indeed, a Catholic majority was elected in 1949, albeit only for one parliamentary term.

PILLARIZATION

The institutional buildup of Catholic organizations to keep the sheep within the herd was long successful. Not only workers, but also peasants, entrepreneurs, housewives, shopkeepers, youth, and many other categories were labeled as “orders,” which in a harmonious vision of society were supposed to collaborate under the aegis of Mother Church. Catholic power was widespread, especially in Flanders, where it was dominant until late in the 1990s. Most of the hospitals and charitable institutions, education, the press and private mass media, health insurance, the largest trade union, important banks, insurance companies, the Peasants’ League, middle-class organizations, and many other institutions belonged to the Catholic “pillar,” which cooperated with the Catholic Party, which governed the country for all but four years between 1884 and 1999. All sectors had to be kept in balance in order to secure continuity of power in as many sectors of society as possible. Secularization could be slowed down and the labor movement kept under control by dividing it. The socialist movement reacted by em-

ploying similar measures: it erected cooperatives, unions, health insurance companies, newspapers, a youth movement, and so on. The idea was to offer an ideological haven from cradle to grave. However, socialists lacked almost per definition the support of capital, and therefore they needed the state to provide the resources for their action.

In Wallony, the socialist pillar dominated society, in Flanders the Catholic. The two pillars needed to collaborate in order to govern the country smoothly. They did so by privileging their own organizations in performing numerous public tasks at the expense of the state budget. Their grip on society was so tight that it was difficult, after the 1950s, to obtain any appointment to an office in the public sector or any public service without the intervention of one of the pillars. A system of clientage was established in which citizens had to pass through pillar organizations to obtain public employment. The most successful politicians were those who managed to do a maximum of favors for people who would in return vote for them. Electors had become clients, and politicians became brokers of state power and fiscal resources.

The pillarized system in the Netherlands was analyzed first by the political scientists Arend Lijphart and Hans Daalder. They argued that the emancipation of the Catholics in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the Protestant organization in reaction to that, plus the demands of the workers’ movement tended together to form a system aiming at the pacification of these claimants on the state. Protestants and Catholics wanted to control their own hospitals, charitable institutions, schools, and universities, but also wanted the state to pay for them. The liberals were the least interested in these organizations, but they were pushed by the competition for public funds to participate in some way. Thus, Dutch society became pillarized in four columns. The differences with Belgium are immediately clear and significant: only in the southern Catholic provinces—the “generality lands” from the time of the Republic—was one pillar, the Catholic, dominant; elsewhere, each of the pillars had to collaborate. The absence of a tradition of violent political or social action, and the tradition of consensus seeking, helped the elaboration of a political culture in which power was shared in deals between the leaders of the four pillars, who aimed at “sovereignty in their own circle” and proclaimed in their public rhetoric to be essentially different from all the others. As in Belgium, the pillars used public funds to finance their private organizations. At variance with Belgium, no one of the pillars was regionally dominant—not even in the southern provinces, where all the others jointly kept an eye on the Catholics. So,

none was able, as the Belgian pillars were, to act as the corrupt gatekeepers of the public domain.

DEPILLARIZATION AND MODERNIZATION

During the late 1960s and 1970s, a rapid depillarization occurred in the Netherlands, while the pillars remained strong in Belgium until the 1990s. Why the difference? In 1945, both countries had around 8 million inhabitants. In 2000, the Netherlands counted more than 15 million, Belgium 10 million. Population growth was much higher in the north as a consequence of the continued high natality in Catholic and Protestant communities, at least until c. 1970, and the strong intercontinental immigration of people with a high fertility (Portuguese, Spaniards, and Turks), numbering up to about two million in 2000. On the other hand, the political culture and society had remained very traditional since industrialization had remained geographically and socially a marginal phenomenon. Only the fast postwar growth of the harbor economy, the third wave of industrialization, had a great impact, especially in the regions of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. The old pattern of extremely high population density in Holland continued, but now the concentration of various ethnic groups raised new tensions.

In the sixties, international examples provided new models of social protest, propagated by the new mass media. In Belgium, these tensions were much smoother, since the population pressure was much less and since modernization had taken place gradually in many sectors. Moreover, the particularity of the linguistic problems focused the tensions on that issue. In the Netherlands, however, the new generation, led by young journalists and academics, demonstratively broke away from the traditional norms and values imposed by the pillar organizations. The media pro-

claimed their independence and encouraged further criticism of the old order. New forms of democracy were legally introduced in the universities and in many other public organizations. The most dramatic breakdown occurred in the Catholic pillar, which faced massive desertion of the Church after conservative reactions from the hierarchy to demands for modernization. The Catholic Party, which had been very influential, disappeared in a fusion with two Protestant parties. This may all be more apparent than real in the sense that in the late 1990s institutions still bore names referring to one or the other pillar, and still handled public money under the control of their private boards. Still, hardly any of them could claim exclusivity since only a small minority of the population strictly observed a "pillar" ideology. Secularization was certainly the main underlying factor in this process. The first so-called "purple" cabinet (a combination of socialist red and liberal blue) in 1995 was followed by a second in 1999, demonstrating the effects of massive secularization and depillarization in the public sphere. The "social market economy" fit extremely well with the buoyant economic opportunities the country enjoyed.

In Belgium, the two major pillars, with their regional dominance, were stronger. They managed to divert most of the dissatisfactions to linguistic tensions, which they certainly exacerbated for short-term political purposes. They could even strengthen their positions in the federalized state structure, which was gradually elaborated between 1963 and 1993. However, the "end of ideologies" came to Belgium as well. Church attendance sank to 13 percent in Flanders and 11 percent in Wallonia in 1998, and the Catholic Party lost votes in each successive election. The socialist party lost credibility in a series of corruption scandals. A "purple plus green" cabinet governed beginning in 1999 and launched a new political and social climate free of political clientage.

See also Revolutions (volume 3) and other articles in this section.

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THE IBERIAN PENINSULA



Montserrat Miller

The Iberian Peninsula is a landmass situated at the mouth of the Mediterranean Sea in southwestern Europe. Its southern tip represents Europe's nearest approximation to Africa and borders on the only western entrance into the sea, known in Roman times as the *mare nostrum*. Constituting roughly 230,000 square miles of territory, the Iberian peninsula is marked by important regional differences in culture, history, and socioeconomic structure. The area is characterized as well by a significant degree of linguistic variety. Currently comprised of the nation-states of Portugal and Spain, the Peninsula also includes the Basque Country and Catalonia as subject nationalities with autonomous statutes that offer a modicum of home rule within Spain.

The Iberian Peninsula has generated considerable social history scholarship. Even though in Spain through the 1960s and 1970s open discussion of the legitimacy of Francisco Franco's (1892–1975) regime was not permitted, studies of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Spanish economic and social patterns, and of regional processes, especially those pertaining to Catalonia, contributed to a corpus of social history work before the dictator's death in 1975. Since the transition to democracy and increased exposure to historiographical developments outside Spain, the social history work on Spain has expanded its chronological and thematic foci and grown in methodological complexity.

Portugal, too, spent much of the twentieth century under an authoritarian dictatorship that limited full and open inquiry of its social and political past. Since the 1974 revolution that ended the Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (1889–1970) regime, however, social history work on Portugal has flourished. As in the case of Spain, much of this work is explicitly comparative in its orientation.

The Iberian Peninsula has long been treated by historians as exceptional within a larger European framework; much of the recent scholarship, however, stresses the degree to which the region adheres at least in broad outline to the social, cultural, economic, and

political patterns found north of the Pyrenees Mountains. Attention to deeply rooted ideological and social conflict and regional agricultural problems notwithstanding, the newest interpretations argue that Spain's economy from 1700 on was characterized by a long-term vitality which, though interrupted at various points, has born fruit in the second half of the twentieth century's industrial growth and democratization.

MEDIEVAL STATE-BUILDING AND CONSOLIDATION OF TERRITORIES

When the Carolingians began their push southward across the Pyrenees into Islamic territory in the 770s, the Iberian Peninsula had already experienced more than a millennium of invasion and settlement by outside peoples. Phoenicians, Celts, Greeks, Romans, Visigoths, and Muslims had all contributed to shaping the culture and economy of the peninsula. No group was more influential than the Romans. Having colonized Iberia for more than six hundred years, they left a firm linguistic imprint. Of the numerous languages spoken on the Peninsula before Roman conquest, only Basque survived. Elsewhere dialects of *latin vulgar* remained deeply entrenched, and even the Muslim invasion of 711 did not permanently eradicate the linguistic and religious patterns established under Roman rule. Over the course of the Middle Ages, three distinct languages developed on the Peninsula: Castilian, Portuguese, and Catalan.

Frankish overlordship in northeastern Spain during the early middle ages led to the establishment of three historic kingdoms: Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia. Navarre, located on the western half of the Pyrenees and eastern Cantabrian Mountains, included Basque territories and remained deeply entrenched in French power struggles until the early sixteenth century. Aragon and Catalonia were joined in the late twelfth century by a dynastic union that permitted a considerable degree of autonomy for both. The Catalan-Aragonese kingdom grew quickly

into a regional powerhouse. By the thirteenth century, Catalan-Aragonese society featured an emerging commercial stratum of colonizers and merchants who enjoyed broad privileges set forth in a series of charters.

In the northwestern region of the Peninsula, a second state-building process had gotten underway in the ninth century. Largely free of Frankish influence and shaped by Visigothic ideals, Christian kingdoms emerged in Asturias and León, which further dashed Muslim aspirations to control the Peninsula. The Kingdom of Asturias-León scored a series of military victories over the forces of Al-Andalus and then repopulated the Duero River tableland with Christian peasant farmers in the tenth century. Still, Asturias-León was not fully capable of carrying out the Reconquista on its own. It was rather the emerging Kingdom of Castile that seized the initiative and spread its control over the interior *meseta*. Then in the first half of the thirteenth century both León and Asturias were definitively joined to Castile under the rule of Ferdinand III (c. 1201–1252), and with the aid of the Crown of Aragon succeeded in driving the recently established Almohad authorities out of Andalusia and eliminating Muslim rule from all of the Peninsula save Granada.

Also taking shape on the Iberian Peninsula during the medieval period was the Kingdom of Portugal. Rebelling against the feudal overlordship of León and Castile in the twelfth century, Portugal achieved independence in 1140. Initially consisting of the northern half of the contemporary state of Portugal, the kingdom extended its boundaries to the south by driving out Muslim forces in 1297. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Iberian Peninsula consisted of three powerful kingdoms: Castile-León, Aragon-Catalonia, and Portugal.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN MEDIEVAL IBERIA

In the wake of the victories against Islamic forces, Castile extended administrative control over Andalusia in a manner that would have profound social and economic consequences for Spain's historical development into the twentieth century. The Castilian crown distributed large tracts of land to the aristocracy and thus left intact the latifundia system that had developed under Islamic rule. Out of this landholding system arose a social system comprising a minority of large landowners and a majority of landless laborers, or *braceros*, which survived well into the twentieth century and which contrasted with the small peasant holdings of northern Spain. The emerging bourgeoisie of Castile,

concentrated in the northern cities of the kingdom, was unable to exert a counterbalancing role. With a reliance on livestock rather than commerce or productive agriculture, and without access to merchant fleets that linked the region to the markets of Europe, the economy of Andalusia collapsed under Castilian rule.

This stood in sharp contrast to the Catalan-Aragonese administration of the newly conquered region of Valencia. There, nobles were given only mountainous land near Aragon and the rest was distributed among Catalan knights and farmers who adopted the productive Muslim agricultural techniques and enjoyed broad freedoms through royal charters and semi-autonomous governance. Valencia flourished economically under Christian rule, and it developed as Spain's most prosperous commercial agricultural region into the modern period. These distinctive patterns of administration thus contributed to a growing economic and social differentiation between the periphery and hinterland of the Peninsula.

Castilian society was transformed by the efforts to repopulate Andalusia. The lack of manufacturing coupled with high levels of demand for luxury goods on the part of an aristocracy led the Castilians toward a dependence on the sale of wool. The *mesta* emerged as a powerful influence within the Castilian state. The *mesta* was an association of sheep and cattle owners whose council taxed the whole wool industry on behalf of the crown and whose political influence grew as the economy stagnated. With a population that was stretched thin, the northern part of Castile lost much of its earlier character of social egalitarianism, and in the fourteenth century town councils came under the influence of knights. Rounds of inflation and debasement of the coinage contributed to the weakness of the Castilian economy as it extended over the new territories of the peninsula. This socioeconomic stagnation contrasted sharply with well-known periods of cultural brilliance during which the intellectual fruits of the "School of Translators" in Toledo disseminated the classics of antiquity and of Islamic science to the rest of Europe.

Still, the contrast between the Kingdom of Castile and the Kingdom of Aragon in the High Middle Ages was a sharp one that was reflected in the nature and extent of each realm's relationship to larger European trade networks. The Crown of Aragon, with its dynamic Catalan economic base that rested on the production of woolen textiles, cast iron, and leather for export, experienced the consolidation of an urban patriciate whose membership was open to successful manufacturers, merchants, and bankers of humble birth. But the strain resulting from the effort to repopulate new areas also contributed to social tensions

within Aragon. In the oldest part of Catalonia, the peasantry, which had historically held land under limited seigniorial obligations, increasingly suffered legal servitude by the thirteenth century under what came to be known as the *remança* system. Uprisings began in the countryside in 1388 and laid the groundwork for rupture.

Aragonese social and economic development followed the general western European pattern much more closely than did Castile. Whereas Castile was industrially stagnant, aristocratic, and pastoralist, Aragon-Catalan society featured an urban middle class that dominated the politics of privileged towns and an expanding trade network in the Mediterranean. Portugal lay somewhere between the two. The Portuguese solution to the economic challenge of absorbing new Muslim territories had been to turn toward the sea. Lisbon emerged as an important port and fueling station for maritime traffic between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and Portugal developed early commercial links to west Africa. Still, there was less manufacturing there than in Aragon and southern areas of Portugal remained largely unproductive.

In the fifteenth century the Iberian Peninsula experienced a crisis similar to that which took place in other areas of Europe. Many of the problems were the direct result of the Black Death, which depleted the labor force. In Castille, the aristocracy used the economic contraction to secure greater privileges from the crown. In Catalonia, the *remança* peasants rose up against landlords; artisans came into direct conflict with the urban patriciate; and the patriciate itself rebelled against the authority of the crown. Particularly noteworthy is the outcome of the peasant uprisings and war that extended from 1388 to 1486. Nowhere else in Europe did peasants so successfully achieve relief from seigniorial obligations through royal intervention on behalf of their cause (Freedman).

Popular unrest in the fifteenth century also manifested itself in the first intense wave of pogroms against the Jews. Beginning in the south, they spread to the north and led to the looting of Jewish neighborhoods in major cities. Fueled by clerics and the Castilian aristocracy, this wave of violence set the stage for the more concerted effort to impose religious orthodoxy that began under Isabella I (1474–1504).

EMPIRE BUILDING IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: CASTILE'S PATH TO POLITICAL HEGEMONY

These were the circumstances under which the dynastic union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile was

forged in the late fifteenth century. Economic and social dislocation coupled with conflicts over succession in Castile and revolution in Catalonia served as a backdrop for the emergence of a new Spanish polity under the rule of Ferdinand of Aragon (1452–1516) and Isabella of Castile. From 1479 to 1504 these monarchs pursued a coordinated policy of foreign and domestic affairs. Though the historic charters of the Crown of Aragon were held as inviolable in this union, the administration of the conjoined kingdoms was increasingly carried out from, and in the broad interests of, Castile. The larger territory and population of Castile, along with the limited constitutional restrictions on monarchical rule there, contributed to this shift in the epicenter of political power away from the periphery of the peninsula.

At the close of the fifteenth century, the Iberian Peninsula's role in European and global politics and economics expanded dramatically. The newly broadened powers of the Catholic monarchs led to a series of important military victories and effective diplomatic strategies vastly increasing the territories under their domain. In 1492 Spanish forces conquered Granada. Not long afterward, Ferdinand was able to annex Navarre and thus curtail French power in the Pyrenees altogether, though the historic charters or *fueros* were, as in the Crown of Aragon, held as legal limitations on expanding royal power. In Italy, the Spanish were able to retake Naples and then use it as a strategic military and political outpost. By negotiating crucial marriage alliances, the Catholic kings produced a grandson, Charles (1500–1558), who was heir to these territories and to the Hapsburg royal line as well.

By 1550, the new Spanish state's holdings in Europe were enormous and included the Low Countries, Austria, Hungary, and most of Italy. In 1580 Philip II (1527–1598) seized Portugal, and Hapsburg control of the Peninsula was completed. Added to all these holdings were new territories in the Americas and the impressive riches and prestige derived from colonial domination and being the first colonial power. Indeed, with the rise of the Hapsburg monarchy, the kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula entered into a new period marked by an intensification of demands for religious orthodoxy and Castilian aspirations for political hegemony.

THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN "GOLDEN AGE" SPAIN

The drive toward the imposition of religious orthodoxy in this period had its roots in the Christian fervor that accompanied the political aims of the Reconquest

and was particularly potent in Castile. Though Christians, Muslims, and Jews had coexisted through most of the period of Islamic rule and much of that of Castilian, Portuguese, and Aragonese, Isabella secured papal authorization for the establishment of a state rather than an ecclesiastically based Inquisition. The persecution of heresy began in 1478. The first targets of the Inquisition were the converted Jews or *conversos*, many of whom had advanced socially and economically and were suspected of being insincere in their Christian beliefs. Then in 1492, the persecution intensified when the Jewish population was ordered en masse by the Crown to convert or leave Spain; some fifty thousand became *conversos* while another one hundred thousand departed. In 1502, the Catholic kings issued a similar order regarding the Muslims of Castile. As a consequence, large numbers of Muslim peasants left the Peninsula, though three hundred thousand stayed and converted to Christianity, becoming known as *moriscos*. As the Spanish Crown worked itself into position as defender of the Catholic faith in Europe, popular support for the imposition of religious orthodoxy grew. In 1609 under Philip III

(1578–1621), the *moriscos* were expelled altogether. Over the course of three centuries the Inquisition brought about the execution of some three thousand persons suspected of various forms of religious heresy. Still, the inquisition was by no means a wholly centralized program. Regional courts carried out their repression in varying ways. In some areas, such as Aragon, there was shifting popular support and opposition to the Inquisition, and acts of sexual transgression were punished just as harshly as spiritual heresy (Monter, p. xi).

ECONOMIC DECLINE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

This pattern of religious persecution involving expulsion, forced conversion, trial, and torture, though modest in its scale in comparison to the deaths resulting in the religious wars of France and Germany, had a considerable impact on the economy of Castile. Most of the confiscated wealth ended up in the hands of the nobility and government officials who put the

policies into effect. While the short-term benefit was the financing of some of the Catholic kings' and Habsburgs' foreign policies, the long-term effect was to stifle the economic development of many Castilian towns by depleting the very population whose commercial and manufacturing activity was greatest. The impact of *morisco* expulsion, however, was greatest in the countryside of Aragon, Valencia, and Andalusia, where a vital force of productive agricultural workers could not easily be replaced; rural economies foundered as a result. Though wealth poured into Castile from the Americas, and the cities of Seville and Madrid emerged as major urban centers, old weaknesses in the agricultural base and problems resulting from the aristocratic dominance of the social and economic structures counterbalanced the modest gains made in manufacturing and market development through the sixteenth century.

Ultimately Castile under Habsburg rule did not succeed in effectively exploiting the wealth from the Americas and in using that wealth to invigorate the domestic economy. The well-known bankruptcies and ultimate collapse of the Spanish economy in the seventeenth century resulted from a number of causes. The balance of state policies continued to favor the aristocracy, whose real economic privileges had barely been touched by the consolidation of royal power. The influence of the *mesta* in this period grew, and so too did the quantity of uncultivated land and the threat of famine. The enormous financial burdens that the Habsburgs assumed in fighting Protestantism on the Continent coupled with poor fiscal policies further undermined the interests of the middle classes.

Also a factor in the intensification of the financial collapse that set in after 1600 was the rise of Madrid itself. Growing from 35,000 inhabitants in 1560 to 175,000 in 1630, Madrid's rapid development further upset the Castilian economy by accelerating the demand for and prices of subsistence goods needed to feed its vast population of poor residents (Ringrose, p. 67). Without a viable middle class to bolster demand from regionally produced manufactured goods and wine, the bulk of the city's discretionary income remained in the hands of the aristocracy, whose preference in consumption leaned toward luxuries produced abroad. Many of the specialized economies of towns surrounding Madrid fell into ruin in the seventeenth century as a result (Ringrose, pp. 71–73).

While Castile under Habsburg rule faced tremendous economic challenges, it was certainly not entirely rigid in its social character. The renowned seventeenth-century Spanish accomplishments in elite culture included elements, such as popular theater, that were accessible to those of modest means in the

towns and cities of the realm. The theater of the *siglo de oro*, though produced largely for and subsidized by the dominant social elements, did not unilaterally reinforce existing hierarchies: many of the comedies, in fact, ridiculed aristocratic values and some even portrayed female assertiveness in a sympathetic light (McKentrick, pp. 196–201). Saints Day feasts, festivals, and *autos de fe* (religious pageants) provided more broadly shared leisure for the rural population.

POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION AND “ENLIGHTENED” REFORM

In terms of political centralization and bureaucratization, the Iberian Peninsula in the early modern period followed many general western European patterns. The Catholic kings and then the Habsburgs put into place a system of royal councils to govern the state and a new civil service began funneling university-educated administrators into government for the first time. Still, the move toward a modern centralized state was thwarted by the continued insistence by Catalonia, Navarre, and the Basque Country that their ancient *fuero* liberties be respected by the Crown. Questioning the practicality of their union to an increasingly bankrupt Castilian Kingdom, both the Catalans and the Portuguese in 1640 rebelled against Spanish rule. While Portugal achieved independence, Catalonia was forced to settle for the Crown's renewed recognition of the region's historic liberties.

By the time that the Spanish Habsburg line came to an end at the close of the seventeenth century, Portugal's independence was firmly established and Catalonia made another attempt to free herself. The Bourbon Philip V's (1683–1746) triumph in the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714) resulted in a dramatic advance in the project of political centralization. Catalonia lost her medieval liberties and was severely punished for having opposed the Bourbon ascendancy to the throne. The final battles preceding Barcelona's surrender in 1714 remain among the most commemorated episodes in Catalan historical consciousness today. In the Basque Country the *fueros* remained intact as a reward for having supported the Bourbons in the war. The Bourbon Kings completed the process of politically integrating Aragon into the Castilian state by suspending the latter's *cortes* and drafting a new constitution that included none of the Aragonese-Catalan liberties.

Equipped with greater centralized powers, the new Bourbon rulers of Spain implemented policies engendering economic revitalization and middle-class growth. During the reign of Charles III from 1759 to

1788, reform endeavors were undertaken in agriculture, the church, education, and the finances of the state. The long-term problems of Andalusian agriculture were addressed through measures to control peasant rents, state-sponsored irrigation projects, and efforts to repopulate uncultivated lands. The *mesta* was disbanded as well. The Crown also made some progress in limiting the power of the church and in increasing the educational preparation of the priesthood. The government encouraged the development of secondary schools and established new academies for the training of engineers and surveyors, and implemented fiscal reforms, including the establishment of a national bank, standardization of coinage, and the introduction of paper money. Bourbon Spain in the eighteenth century clearly reflected the currents of enlightened despotism that moved through much of the continent, despite tendencies in earlier historiography to discount the influence of the Enlightenment in Spain.

Among the most important triggers of economic growth in the eighteenth century was the opening of ports throughout Spain to trade with the Americas. In the first decade of the new policy, trade increased

tenfold. The process of industrialization in northeastern Spain gained full force in the eighteenth century. In Catalonia the agricultural economy underwent increasing conversion to viticulture, and the profits from the export of brandy were re-invested in the mechanization of cotton cloth production. Barcelona's expanding commercial activities placed it at the head of a western Mediterranean urban trade network that extended from Málaga to Marseilles (Ringrose, p. 44). Other trading networks also expanded on the Peninsula in this period and laid the foundation for two centuries of economic growth. With Bilbao as the dominant city, a northern Spanish urban network consolidated from Vigo near the Portuguese border to San Sebastián. In the interior of the Peninsula, a third urban network emerged with Madrid at its center. Composed of trade with specialized market towns and seaports, and fueled by the demand generated by the government administration and the military, luxury goods continued to figure as an important component of Madrid's overall commerce. A fourth network in the south included two economically powerful urban centers in Seville and Cádiz (Ringrose, pp. 46–50).

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: LIBERAL REVOLUTION

The French Revolution (1789) and then Napoleon's (1769–1821) invasion (1808) disrupted the economic and demographic expansion of the first century of Bourbon rule in most of the peninsula. Between 1790 and 1820, Spain lost population, and trade and manufacturing dropped off sharply, partly as a result of the loss of the bulk of her American colonies. The conflict was complicated, with diverse factions opposing and supporting France for different reasons. Still, the subsequent portrayal by political and cultural elites of the War of Independence (1821) as a moment of Spanish unity contributed to the War's use as a rallying point of nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century and remained viable in the decades leading up to the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) (Alvarez Junco).

The nineteenth century was politically and socially tumultuous, and was defined by a liberal revolution that transformed political, property, and church-state relations. Inspired by a range of liberal ideas emanating from France, the forces favoring sweeping change coalesced in Cádiz to produce a constitution in 1812 that limited monarchical power more extensively than anywhere else on the Continent. When the Bourbon Ferdinand VII (1784–1833) re-assumed the throne in 1814, these precepts, and indeed the constitution itself, were cast aside in favor of monarchical privilege. Through the reign of Ferdinand VII the polarized political factions adamantly favoring and opposing the ancien régime gained momentum. At one extreme were liberals who supported the 1812 constitution and significant limitations on monarchical power; on the other were traditionalists who viewed Ferdinand as the epitome of all that was wrong with the vacillating monarchs of the modern world. One traditionalist faction supported Ferdinand's more pious brother Charles over the succession of the King's daughter Isabel. This Carlist movement was centered in the rural mountainous regions of Navarre, the Basque Country, Aragon, and Catalonia. Carlists launched several protracted uprisings in the nineteenth century and remained a force of reaction emanating from the north of the peninsula up to and during the Spanish Civil War. However, by the 1840s the liberals had gained control of the political system.

The rest of Spain's nineteenth-century political history reflected the struggle of contesting liberal visions of the constitutional terms that would govern the relationships between state and society. Certainly a broad consensus in favor of the concept of constitutional limitations on the power of the monarchy

had spread widely through the Peninsula over the course of the century.

As in France, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe, Spain in the nineteenth century was also involved in a contested social struggle to democratize the emerging liberal order. New groups entering the political arena included army officers adhering to shades of liberal ideology and intervening in government through the use of a tool known as the *pronunciamiento* (military coup) and urban mobs who variously supported and opposed the military officers' leads. Added to these were Catalan factory workers who had organized collectively by the 1850s and Andalusian peasants, who, as a result of population pressure and the underpinning of the *latifundista* system that resulted from the 1837 nationalization and sale of church lands, were experiencing worsening living conditions. The liberal revolution in property relations had failed to create a new nation of stable farmers along French lines. It instead reinforced existing landholding patterns.

The Portuguese state, too, underwent dramatic change in the century that followed the Napoleonic invasion. After a long period of economic decline that had set in over the course of the sixteenth century, Portugal's colonial empire shrank, and in 1822, even Brazil was lost. Liberal ideologies had gained ground and experiments with constitutional limitation of monarchic rule eventually gave way to authoritarianism. A resurgence of liberalism ushered in a sixteen-year Republic that collapsed in 1926 and was replaced with what would become Europe's longest dictatorship.

The struggle to democratize the liberal order, 1876–1939. After a tumultuous six years of revolution (1868–1874), the period in Spanish history known as the Restoration (1876–1931) featured a modicum of political stability alongside economic growth and social polarization. Though the 1876 Constitution called for universal manhood suffrage, in fact the commitment to democracy was an empty one. Elections were quite openly subverted through the use of political bosses in the countryside who collaborated in the Liberal and Conservative parties' agreement to simply take turns in power. The loss of Cuba in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War (April–August 1898) came as a painful blow to Spanish confidence, setting off an intellectual movement that sought to define the essence of Spain and the best future path for the recovery of her grandeur. Ironically, the Generation of 98's reflections coincided with the assertion of regional political aspirations, which questioned the viability of Castilian dominance of the Spanish polity.

Regional nationalism. In both Catalonia and the Basque country, modern political nationalism took shape in the late nineteenth century. Emerging somewhat earlier, and serving as a model for the Basques, Catalan nationalism had its roots in the linguistic continuities of everyday life, but also in a varied number of other factors and circumstances. The Catalan language, though sharing much with Spanish and other Romance tongues, was distinct and remained the dominant if not exclusive language in the majority of households in every social stratum of the region through the nineteenth century. Catalan predominated especially among the popular classes, which responded favorably to the elite-driven romantic cultural movement of nationalist rediscovery that began in the 1830s and was known as the *Catalan Renaixença*. By the end of the nineteenth century a series of explicitly Catalanist groups emerged, but none as powerful as the *Lliga Regionalista* that was founded in 1901. At first representing a broad coalition, it was soon reduced to its core of support among the upper ranks of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie and Catalan Carlists. Still, Catalan nationalism was broad based and its forms varied along the political spectrum from radical to reactionary.

Basque nationalism also had its roots in historical experience. The three Basque provinces, Álava, Vizcaya, and Guipúzcoa, along with Navarre, retained their *fueros* as they were incorporated into the Spanish state. It was the formal abolition of the *fueros* in 1876 followed by the Spanish state's attempt to raise tax quotas in 1893 that set off Basque nationalism and led to the creation of the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, the PNV. Much more explicitly Catholic in its orientation than the Catalan variant, Basque nationalism was also distinct in its emphasis on the construct of race over the much more linguistically oriented identification of Catalanism. The growth and intensification of collective identities based upon social class and ideology fueled the emergence of these nationalist identities in the periphery of the peninsula during the Restoration.

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND WORKING-CLASS PROTEST

Modern working class protest took shape in Spain over the course of the nineteenth century in response to industrialization and the commercialization of agriculture and as an outgrowth of the larger European movement. Since industrialization developed in distinct regional centers, working-class organization began as a local and regional phenomenon. Thus, the

first trade unions appeared among textile workers in Catalonia in the 1830s and contributed to a broad-based labor movement in the 1850s. In 1879, the Spanish Socialist Party (P.S.O.E.) was founded in Madrid. Though the Socialist federation of trade unions (General Union of Workers) was formed in 1888, in Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia, the labor movement that developed was much more explicitly anarchist in its orientation. This was especially the case among the landless peasants of Andalusia, where the ideas of Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876) spread widely. While Spain remained behind the leading nations of Europe in its agricultural productivity, considerable increases in the output of the rural economy accompanied industrial growth and the urbanization of the nation's most important cities. Migration from rural Andalusia to industrialized Catalonia added to the fervent mix of ideological currents among the working classes. By the turn of the century, Spain was embroiled in class warfare, especially in the industrial centers of Vizcaya and Asturias, where industry was based on mining and metallurgy, in the textile region of Catalonia, and in the latifundia areas of the south. Some of the most bitter battles were fought, as in 1909, on the streets of Barcelona where anarchism mixed with violent strains of anticlericalism. In 1910, the anarchosyndicalist trade union, the CNT, was formed and began quickly to gain widespread support among workers.

Through the second decade of the twentieth century, especially as World War I inflation far outstripped wages in Spanish cities and Andalusia, labor unrest intensified. The dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja (1870–1930) from 1923 to 1931 temporarily forestalled further conflict by suspending the constitution, repressing labor organizations, and reversing the very limited Catalan regional autonomy that had been achieved over the course of the previous two decades. Still, the Primo regime's political repression only resulted in further ideological polarization between left and right. When municipal elections in 1931 swept Republicans into office, King Alfonso XIII (1883–1941) abdicated and the Spanish Second Republic was born.

Reflecting the profound shifts in political culture that had taken shape over the course of the previous century, the Second Republic moved to contain spreading anticlericalist violence and worker unrest by implementing policies of secularization and reform. The Second Republic instituted freedom of religion and the church was separated from the state. Other efforts included a modest restructuring of the Spanish army and a program of land reform to address the problems of the Andalusian peasantry. The Second Republic also granted women's suffrage and instituted

out behind Republican lines between anarchosyndicalist and communist militias. The conflict was a bloody one that ended in anarchosyndicalist defeat. The Spanish Fascist Party, the *Falange*, took a leadership role in the uprising against the Republic, and General Franco's forces were aided by Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) and Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) in the struggle. The Republicans, internally divided and aided by Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) and by the volunteer International Brigades, were outmatched, and met defeat in 1939 after three long years of war. The struggle to democratize the liberal order had ended in defeat.

THE FRANCO REGIME: DICTATORSHIP AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION

The Spanish Civil War brought the Franco Regime to power and an abrupt change, through repressive dictatorship, to Spanish society. A single-party state, featuring a fascist-inspired system of vertical syndicates, was designed by Franco as an “organic” alternative to supposed “inorganic” marxist and liberal-capitalist political models. Under Franco, all power rested in the dictator's hands and a program of ideological mobilization was effected through propaganda organizations that targeted youth, university students, and women. All of the rights accorded women under the Republic were rescinded and pronatalist policies were promulgated. Trade union activities outside the vertical syndicates were extinguished, strict press censorship was instituted, and autonomous regional structures of the Republic dismantled. The regime also outlawed the public use of Catalan in the professions, in education, and in the arts. Expressions of Basque nationalism and culture were likewise forbidden.

In the first ten years of the Franco regime, real wages and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell to levels as low as 50 percent of those obtained before the war. Everywhere economic misery was the order of the day with rationing remaining in effect throughout the 1940s. The Franco regime's policy of economic autarky sharply limited the prospects of recovery. Only after the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945 did the regime begin to distance itself from fascist rhetoric. It was not until 1957 that Franco embraced an alternative to the fascist ideal of national economic independence and replaced Falangist advisors with neoliberal technocrats committed to economic modernization. The technocrats' 1959 Stabilization Plan, after an initial recessionary period, bore fruit in a spectacular economic recovery extending from 1961 to 1973, the so-called “economic miracle.” During those years Spain's

civil marriage laws and the right to divorce. Though essentially moderate, these reforms failed to go far enough to satisfy the left, while they were perceived by the right as extreme and dangerous to the future of the Spanish state. The election of a Popular Front government that included communists coalesced the disparate forces positioned against the regime. The church, the army, large landowners, and a host of rightist groups, including the Spanish Fascist Party, threw their lot together to overthrow the democratically elected government. The conflict was heightened by the European context of fascist victories and democratic decay.

The Nationalist uprising of July 1936 led by General Francisco Franco marked the beginning of a protracted and complex struggle. The Spanish Civil War involved considerable fragmentation on the Republican side and desperate struggles on the part of Spain's *de jure* government to maintain control of a social revolution set off by military revolt. Competing militias formed around trade union groups, and anticlerical violence pulsed through major cities. In Barcelona in May of 1937, a smaller civil war broke

industrial sector grew dramatically and the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita more than doubled (Maxwell and Speigal, p. 7), partly funded by a booming tourist industry that brought cultural revolution as well as hard currency. Spain moved quickly in the 1960s to participate in the general expansion of consumer society that was taking place across western Europe. Moreover, the economic boom led to broad social changes, from the transformation of peasant into farmer in the north to the exodus of landless laborers from the rural south.

Such changes had not come about without pressure on the regime. Though Franco normalized relations with the west in the 1950s by playing its anti-communist Cold War card, the Catholic church began to distance itself from the regime and even defend the Catalans and Basques against linguistic and more generalized cultural repression. Censorship was eased somewhat in the early 1960s and proconsumerist policies were designed to dampen student and worker unrest. Still, opposition to the regime built, and clandestine political and trade unionist activities spread widely. Political imprisonment and violations of human rights in Spain remained common throughout the final decades of the dictatorship.

The Catalans and the Basques mounted some of the strongest movements in opposition to the Franco

regime in its final years. The regime's policies of cultural and linguistic oppression had unintentionally strengthened the collective identities of Basque, Catalan, and other regional groups within the Spanish polity. Regionalist nationalist symbolism served as a potent rallying point for demonstrations of opposition to the dictatorship. Regionalism's mass appeal played an important role in the formulation of a consensus among Spaniards that Spain after Franco should become a pluralist state. Still, an important exception to the overwhelmingly peaceful and federalist aims of regional nationalist movements in late-twentieth-century Spain was the appearance in this period of the Basque separatist terrorist movement, ETA, which began a campaign of assassination designed to de-stabilize the regime. Several other terrorist groups emerging in the final years of the regime contributed to an atmosphere of political and social tension.

POLITICAL TRANSITION AND DEMOCRATIZATION

The transition to democracy after the death of Franco in 1975 was facilitated by his successor, King Juan Carlos I (1938–) who favored liberal reform. In 1978, the Spanish Cortes ratified a new constitution that

created a parliamentary monarchy featuring broad freedoms and a guarantee of autonomy to historic subnationalities and regions. Apart from a failed military coup attempt in 1981, Spanish political culture since the transition has exhibited respect for pluralism and the rule of law.

In 1982, a moderate European-style social democratic party, the P.S.O.E., won an overwhelming majority in Spanish parliamentary elections. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Felipe González, a process of political decentralization took place as autonomy was granted to a series of Spanish regions, including Catalonia and the Basque Country, and military reform placed the armed forces under civilian control. Spain joined the European Community (now part of the European Union) in 1986 and became a leader of the poorer nations of western Europe within that structure. Dramatic economic growth in the late 1980s brought the further spread of consumerist values, the growth of the middle class, and the rapid expansion of the tertiary sector of the economy.

The European-wide economic recession of the early 1990s led to a sharp rise in business failures and unemployment. Under investigation for financial cor-

ruption, the P.S.O.E. lost the parliamentary elections of 1997 to the center-right *Partido Popular* (PP), which formed coalition government with the Catalan nationalist *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) Party, creating an alliance that cut across the divides of the Civil War and early Franco periods. Still, significant problems persisted, especially with respect to the achievement of European Union fiscal goals and the definition of the constitutional limits of regional autonomy. In addition, the profound disagreement between the Spanish state and those who supported the ETA terrorist movement remained a particularly violent and unresolved problem.

Portugal's history has in many ways paralleled Spain's in the twentieth century. The Portuguese First Republic, established in 1916, was never fully democratic and depended on the support of liberal army officers. In 1926 a military coup that drew simultaneously upon ideas of regeneration and millenarianism brought the Republic to an end. From 1932 to 1969 Antonio de Oliveira Salazar ruled as an authoritarian premier. Salazar, like Franco, sought above all else to preserve traditional Catholic values and began his rule by pursuing policies of economic autarky. By

the late 1950s, though, Salazar had begun to accept foreign capital as a means to accelerate industrial growth. Yet the economy continued to lag behind that of Spain and Europe. Significant waves of outmigration in the 1970s contributed to slow demographic growth in a nation that was still largely agricultural.

In Portugal, too, by the time of the dictator's death, the transition to democracy occurred with relative ease. The 1974 "Revolution of Flowers" brought a parliamentary democracy to power, though one that included a continued role for the military in government. Since the establishment of democracy, centrist and rightist parties have dominated national politics.

CONCLUSION

The social history of the Iberian Peninsula has followed a course that in a great number of ways mirrors that of western Europe. Participating in the urbanization processes and vibrant Mediterranean commercial capitalism of the Middle Ages, the peninsula played a leading role in the creation of the transatlantic world economy. The financial and imperial collapse of the early modern period, previously used to

mark the start of Spain's long decline, did not in fact forestall the emergence of powerful regional economic networks and the beginnings of industrialization in the second half of the eighteenth century. Middle-class growth and the spread of liberalism in the nineteenth century roughly paralleled the social and political course followed by a number of western European nations, though some differences, of course, remain.

Much of the Iberian Peninsula's twentieth-century history has featured more variation from the western European pattern, at least in political terms. Remaining neutral in both World Wars and experiencing a much longer period of right-wing dictatorship, economic recovery and the growth of postwar European consumer society came later to the Peninsula than to those regions of Europe participating in the Marshall Plan (1948–1952). The liberalization of social and sexual mores was delayed until the transition to democracy in both Spain and Portugal in the mid-1970s. Though in the last quarter of the twentieth century the Iberian Peninsula came to share in all of the main characteristics of western Europe's economic, social, political, and cultural structures, the region continues to adhere to more specific Mediterranean patterns of leisure, public sociability, and culinary practice.

See also **The World Economy and Colonial Expansion** (*in this volume*); **Fascism and Nazism** (*volume 2*); **Catholicism** (*volume 5*); and other articles in this section.

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ITALY



Lucy Riall

Diversity is possibly the most enduring feature of Italy's history from the Renaissance to the end of the twentieth century. Variations in geographical regions, each with its own distinctive system of agriculture; in climate, depending on latitude and altitude; and in peoples and societies, with a gamut of cultural and linguistic forms, contribute to a remarkable array of competing and overlapping identities and economic and social structures. These variations, moreover, do not always conform to the established patterns of historical analysis, as they occur at times within regions and localities and within families and ruling elites; some differences disappear or are altered, only to be reestablished over time.

For the social historian, such diversity can be frustrating, as it works against meaningful generalizations. Yet it also makes Italy a fascinating subject for the study of social behavior and interaction. The social history of Italy offers particular examples of broader trends such as the structure of family life, the emergence of middle classes and the decline of the nobility, the crumbling of feudal jurisdictions, the process of refeudalization, and the road to modernity. Its complexities have consistently challenged historians' assumptions and forced them to reformulate both their explanations and the models on which these explanations are based.

To the reality of social diversity must be added the unevenness of scholarly attention: Italian social history has long been overshadowed by the country's cultural and political past. Thus Italy's social structures in the early modern period have tended to be neglected in favor of Renaissance art and learning; in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, historians have traditionally focused on the Risorgimento or Mussolini's Fascism, or have concentrated on the emerging sense of "Italianness" (*italianità*) in the same period, rather than examine underlying social change. The popularity of the Renaissance, Risorgimento, and Fascism as subjects for study has meant that the almost two hundred years between the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of the eighteenth-century Enlight-

enment—the "forgotten" centuries of so-called baroque Italy—remain relatively understudied.

FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE RISORGIMENTO (c.1250–1860)

The perception of early modern Italy as a "dreary interlude" (in Benedetto Croce's memorable phrase) between the Renaissance and the Risorgimento is itself the product of nation-building during the nineteenth century. At the time of national unification in 1860–1861, Italian political leaders appealed to and spoke about the nation's resurgence (*risorgimento*) after centuries of decline. Academics presented Italy's recent past as an experience of unremitting decay and backwardness. According to this interpretation, the high point of the Renaissance in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—when Italy led Europe in economic and cultural achievements—had given way to foreign invasion and internal divisions, with Italy succumbing to Spanish and, later, Austrian despots and the influence of a Counter-Reformation clergy. Languishing in the cultural, political, and economic doldrums of European life, Italian patriots saw it as their duty to rescue Italy and restore it to its former status. This view of Italian history as a frustrated nation persists in political rhetoric; but it is almost entirely useless for understanding the course, chronology, and rhythms of the peninsula's social development between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Environment and populations. From the late Renaissance to the nineteenth century, Italy's cities and countryside attracted wealthy outsiders in search of beauty, art, or sheer escape. Yet northern Europeans seem rarely to have taken note of the lives and activities of the Italian people themselves, and they failed to see the landscape as the product of an interaction between Italians and their environment. The empty, open grainfields of southern Italy and Sicily were largely the product of deforestation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—itsself a response to rapid

rises in the price of wheat. The physical appearance of the Lombardy plain, an intensively cultivated land of corn, rice, and animal husbandry, was the result of vigorous land reclamation, of irrigation and drainage, during the same period. Italians had fled to the hilltop towns of the southern Italian interiors and drained the marshlands largely to avoid malaria (“marsh fever”). Thus behind the beauty that visitors enjoyed lay Italians’ responses to the difficulties of everyday life.

Malaria proved, until the mid-twentieth century at least, the deadliest scourge of the Mediterranean plains. But it was only one of several factors, including war and environmental change, behind the dramatic fluctuations in the population of the Italian peninsula between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. From an estimated 7.3 million in 1150, the population rose to 11 million by 1300 and then fell dramatically with the so-called calamities of the fourteenth century—the Hundred Years’ War, the Black Death of 1348, and four famines between 1339 and 1375—to about 8 million. In contemporary accounts the Black Death alone was said to have killed some 70 percent of Venetians and Genoans, and while historians have revised these figures to an estimated third of the total population, its impact on urban centers—emptying cities like Florence and leading to the disappearance of smaller towns and villages—was devastating. Although after 1400 Italy’s population gradually increased again, reaching 11.6 million by the mid-sixteenth century, this trend was frequently interrupted by wars (Rome, Brescia, Pavia, Ravenna, Prato, and Genoa were all sacked by invaders between 1510 and 1530), by the return of major outbreaks of the plague in the 1520s, and by the arrival of syphilis from the New World. Affected by these pressures, the population of, for example, Verona fell from 47,000 in 1501 to 26,000 in 1518, and that of Pavia from 16,000 in 1500 to under 5,000 in 1535. Interestingly, however, the halt to Italy’s population growth was only temporary. It continued to increase steadily until the two great demographic crises of the late sixteenth century: the plague of 1575–1576 and the crop failures of 1590–1592. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Italy had become one of the most densely populated regions in Europe. Then, during the seventeenth century, the pace of population growth slackened once more, affected as it was by famines and by the outbreak of bubonic plague in northern Italy in 1630 and in southern Italy in 1656, which caused mortality rates of 30 to 40 percent in the affected areas.

These fluctuations in population affected the cities and countryside differently; they also varied from one part of Italy to another and were sometimes

accompanied by a process of internal migration. In the eighteenth century, however, emerged the entirely new demographic trend of sustained population growth. In approximate figures, from 13 million at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Italy’s population increased to 18 million at its end, reached 24 million by 1850, and stood at just under 26 million in 1861. The huge population increases in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Italy correspond to, although lag behind, the more general European trend, attributable to a decline in the mortality rate probably caused by changes in diet and improvements in hygiene, which in turn halted the spread of disease.

Nevertheless, the decline in the mortality rate did not signal the end of demographic crises. Outbreaks of plague recurred until the early nineteenth century (notably in Messina and Reggio Calabria in 1743), malaria increased along with the rural population, and tuberculosis accompanied the process of urbanization. The peninsula was affected by famine and subsistence crises in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Improvements in diet were not all they seemed. Pellagra, a disease of malnutrition caused by a diet based exclusively on corn, became endemic to much of the Lombardy plain. Indeed, differences in diet and nutrition among the poor may explain why in this period population growth in the southern half of the peninsula, where the diet was varied, consistently outstripped that of the center-north, where diet was almost exclusively polenta and potatoes. Finally, cholera, a new and deadly epidemic disease, swept through the cities of Italy in the mid-nineteenth century. An estimated one-sixth of the population of Palermo died in 1837. A widespread popular panic led to the temporary abandonment of cities, disrupting economic activity. Encouraged by antigovernment conspirators, the poor came to believe that cholera was a poison deliberately spread by their rulers, so that the epidemics also sparked off waves of political disorder and popular revolt.

City and countryside. During the Renaissance cities dominated the countryside, as is suggested by the formation of powerful city-states in northern and central Italy and by the centrality of urban areas to cultural, religious, and economic life. Hence Italian cities, especially those of the center-north, have long been associated with Italian civilization and with the banking, trade, and manufacturing activities for which Italy became famous during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. Not surprisingly given this perspective, Italy’s supposed economic, political, and cultural decline thereafter is allied to the process of ruralization and to the increasingly agrarian character

of Italian society, a characteristic that did not alter substantially until well into the nineteenth century. Whereas much of Europe outside Italy became increasingly urbanized during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in Italy the proportion of those living in towns of 100,000 or more fell to just 13 percent of the total population, while some medium-size towns like Pavia and Cremona lost between 20 and 40 percent of their inhabitants.

However, this juxtaposition between urban and rural life is a false one. Renaissance society was not in fact urban but largely rural: the rural population greatly outnumbered that of cities, many of which incorporated fields and orchards within their territory. Renaissance elites developed a taste for rural retreats and the rural aesthetic even as they mocked the crudeness of rural life. An idealized vision of the countryside as a place of escape and respite from the rigors of urban life persisted into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (and, of course, beyond). Furthermore, the economy of the countryside (*contado*) was closely integrated into urban life in Renaissance Italy. The countryside was a source of food, raw materials, revenue, and manpower for the towns; especially after the population decline of the fourteenth century, urban dwellers invested heavily in land, for example through sharecropping contracts in Tuscany and elsewhere. Moreover, the ruralization of the sixteenth century was accompanied by considerable prosperity, investment in agriculture, land reclamation, and the growth of textile production in parts of southern Italy. In the north the economic bust of the seventeenth century was also followed by a rural boom: by the recovery of agriculture, rural industrialization, and a further round of investment and innovation by energetic and innovative landowners.

In much of southern Italy and the islands in the early modern period, the relationship between city and countryside developed differently. Apparently unaffected by the demographic problems of the sixteenth century, the city of Naples grew rapidly from 100,000 in 1500 to an astonishing 245,000 less than fifty years

later to become the largest city in Europe. By the mid-eighteenth century its population numbered 337,000. Although the growth of Naples was unusual, the result in part of incorporating the economic and political privileges of an administrative capital with the advantages of a Mediterranean port, it was not unique. Seventeenth-century Palermo grew substantially too, and for similar reasons.

The pattern of settlement within southern Italy shows considerable variation, notably a strong contrast between the market-oriented coastal areas and the more isolated interiors. In general, however, urban settlements in the south were fewer and much larger. Particularly in the remote and often mountainous interior, people tended to live concentrated in substantial nucleated centers occupying the high ground; they rarely took up residence permanently in the countryside. The lack of integration between city and countryside—indeed, the economic and cultural rift between them—was striking. This pattern of settlement in the south was partly a response, as has been noted, to the flight from the malarial plains. It was also the result of the deliberate “colonization” of the interior in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the purposes of grain cultivation: many of the towns were newly created and their inhabitants originally migrant labor. Hence, the separateness of city and countryside in southern Italy reflects social and economic relations, specifically, the concentration of a great deal of farmland in the hands of relatively few, powerful landowners. In these southern grain-estates (*latifondo*), rural life was far from idealized; hardly bent on improvements and innovations, many landowners tended to be absentee rentiers. Unlike Lombard agriculture, the southern grain-estates were not subjected to the process of modernization that took place in the late seventeenth century.

Throughout the Italian peninsula, population growth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was accompanied by a renewed process of urbanization, initially in the administrative centers and the ports and subsequently in areas of early industrialization.

Once again, however, this pattern was uneven. Turin, the capital of Piedmont, grew rapidly in the course of the eighteenth century, from 44,000 in 1702 to 92,000 by the 1790s and 138,000 by 1850. Milan grew from 123,000 in 1750 to 193,000 in 1850, by which year the population of Naples reached 416,000. Some cities grew much more slowly: from 1750 to 1850 Rome increased its population by only 13,000 (from 157,000 to 170,000), while the population of Venice stalled at about 138,000.

At around the same time, politics and economic change disrupted the traditional balance between city and countryside and between different cities. The modernizing and reforming rulers of eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Italy began to dismantle some of the financial and political prerogatives, such as trade guilds, tax concessions, and industrial and administrative monopolies, with which cities had traditionally dominated the countryside and on the basis of which some cities did better than others. One major nineteenth-century victim was the city of Palermo, the administrative capital of Sicily; after the Bourbon monarchy's restoration in 1814–1815, the city saw its economic and political privileges eroded so that, by the time of national unification, its status had been reduced to that of a provincial town. Other Sicilian towns benefited from the administrative changes, while some ports profited considerably both from the increase in the volume of trade and the decline of Palermo. The societies of eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Italy remained predominantly agrarian. In 1800 less than 5 percent of the country's population lived in cities of over 100,00 inhabitants; in England and Wales the figure was 10 percent, in the Netherlands 11.5 percent.

Social orders and social classes. Before the mid-nineteenth century, Italy's system of social stratification is best described as one of orders. The hierarchy was defined in terms of reputation, honor, and birth. A class system, in which the role played in the process of production or, more simply, income and wealth determined an individual or family's position, did not exist. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to assert that money played no role in deciding collective alignments and identities.

Even during the most stable periods, this society of orders was never entirely static. An important distinction must be drawn between the feudal nobility, associated especially with the southern kingdoms, and the urban ruling class, or patriciate, which, triumphant after the struggles of communal Italy, emerged in cities like Florence, Siena, Venice, and Genoa. Yet the status and internal composition of both groups

was often quite confused; by the sixteenth century the distinctions between them had become blurred by intermarriage and by the pursuit of common economic interests. Relations between urban and rural nobility, on the one hand, and the ruler, on the other, and between both and the church, also varied considerably over time, enhancing or undermining the predominance of the nobility. In the countryside feudal privilege persisted almost everywhere. Moreover, if at the apex of the social hierarchy stood the nobility, jealously controlling entrance to their ranks, their status, and their privileges, there was also more than one way to become ennobled—through service to the ruler, through professional qualifications, or, in a simpler and increasingly popular route, through money. In addition, access to power for the non-nobles was provided by vertical networks of friendship and patronage, and further avenues of influence were provided by guilds, religious confraternities, and community organizations.

On the whole, the Italian nobilities were remarkable for their success. Although scholarly opinion is divided on the long-term impact of this success, the defense of noble privilege, from the Renaissance to the eighteenth century, is uniformly regarded as no small achievement. Many historians of the Renaissance have pointed to the persistence of feudal jurisdictions long after the end of the Middle Ages, even in the more “capitalist” north; they argue that such persistence was often the result of an enduring legitimacy, popular loyalty, and “good lordship” rather than merely of coercion and exploitation. Feudal privileges and feudal lords survived, in other words, as an integrated part of a changing and progressive Renaissance society. Other historians write more negatively of a process of refeudalization during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of the reappearance at this time of feudal prerogatives, enabling the nobility to reassert both its political position “above the law” and its economic control of the countryside. The baroque seventeenth century also saw the strengthening of an ideology of nobility, of the growth of a cult of genealogies and a code of chivalry pursued sometimes obsessively for its own sake. The increasing tendency of urban patriciates, previously involved in trade and manufacturing, to invest in land and engage in agriculture as an occupation more fitted to their noble status, seems further proof of the (re)consolidation of feudal power.

This refeudalization thesis seems to explain both the relative industrial decline of Italy in the baroque period and the apparent capacity of the nobility, especially in the south, to smother the progressive middle class and exploit the rural poor. However, this

thesis is perhaps too simple. In the crucial area of relations with the ruler, some nobilities were more successful than others. During the expansion of state power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some nobilities, most obviously where there was a preexisting tradition of state service among the urban patriciate, adapted relatively easily to the growth of the state; they negotiated a new and profitable status quo whereby they cooperated with the ruler as administrators or tax collectors and were allowed to exercise considerable autonomy in local affairs. This pattern can be observed in cities like Florence and Milan. By contrast, the feudal nobility, which enjoyed extensive political and economic power in the countryside, was much more threatened by the process of state formation. Attempts to make the nobility accept the sovereignty of the state in fiscal affairs and in matters of law and order, and to push through a program of land reform and commercialization in the countryside, led to open confrontation with the state.

Resistance to reform was especially strong in Sicily and the kingdom of Naples, where in the late eighteenth century reformers attempted a direct assault on baronial privileges, and in the Papal States. In all these states the nobility successfully frustrated most of the major reforms. Yet the price of their success was a more or less permanent breach with the state and hence both the breakdown of the old status quo and the failure to arrange a new one. The con-

sequences of this breach became all too clear in the first half of the nineteenth century, when the Bourbon monarchy in Naples made a renewed and more fortunate attempt to dismantle noble privileges and undermine the noble monopoly of landholdings. This second round of reforms had particularly devastating effects on the Sicilian nobility, who by the time of unification in 1860–1861 had lost a great deal of their economic and political power.

The extent to which the middle orders, or middle classes, were effectively smothered by the nobility is also open to question. The middle orders were a remarkably mixed group—merchants, professionals, bureaucrats, and magistrates—often internally divided and varying considerably in composition from region to region and from city to city. Before the industrialization of the late nineteenth century, it is probably more accurate to think of the middle orders in “humanistic” terms, as a group whose social formation was determined by participation in public institutions rather than by economic activity. From the Renaissance onward they seem to have been especially keen to acquire titles and other trappings of noble status and to ape the cultural styles and social habits of the nobility, despite attempts by the nobility to maintain their political and cultural distance. When they acquired spare capital, they tended to invest it in land rather than in industry or commerce, and, as the nobility’s wealth and economic privileges were eroded

in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they also tended to intermarry with the nobility. Does this evidence suggest, therefore, that the “middling orders” were never a distinct social grouping with a separate identity, value system, and ideology and were largely incapable of challenging the aristocratic domination of society and the state?

First, it must be remembered that mingling with the nobility was far from unusual, and such behavior can be found equally among German or British counterparts. Second, the attitudes and habits mentioned above can be somewhat misleading, and may mask entrepreneurial skills and a process of accumulation and upward mobility in which land ownership and even marriage were the most appropriate outlets. Considerable evidence also points to the emergence of a bourgeois identity and a separate bourgeois sphere in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: clubs formed theaters and cafés proliferated where middle-class men (but not women) could mingle and associate. These circles of sociability were a particularly prominent feature of Milan, Florence, and, to a lesser extent, Turin; they seem to have been less common in the cities of the south, although the scarcity of research makes it difficult to reach definitive conclusions. In other words, the reforms of the eighteenth century, the upheavals of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, and the economic and political changes of the Restoration era (1815–1860) contributed to the formation of a vigorous new elite, composed roughly of rich middle orders and the (perhaps less wealthy) nobility, an elite that was neither wholly aristocratic nor wholly bourgeois.

At the other end of the social spectrum were the urban and rural poor. The political, cultural, and economic gulf that divided the elites from the rest in Renaissance, baroque, and Risorgimento Italy was immense: it was the poor who were undernourished and more prone to disease and who, being close to destitution even in the best of times, suffered and died in times of war and famine. Yet research into the lives and conditions of the poor in early modern Italy has revealed that the poor too were divided by an internal hierarchy. Rural communities show considerable social differentiation among well-to-do farmers, tenants, sharecroppers, and landless laborers, just as in urban areas an acutely felt rift between a “labor aristocracy” of artisans, organized into and protected by guilds, and dependent wage earners caused friction and conflict.

The internal composition and definition of the poor was also affected by the political reforms and economic developments of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For example, the transformation

of agriculture in the Po Valley and Lombard plain, and the development there of capitalist relations of production, led to a diminution in the number of sharecroppers and independent farmers and a corresponding increase in landless wage earners, or *braccianti*. In the large grain-estates of the south, where the peasant economy had always been precarious, many peasant families were rendered destitute by changes in the system of land tenure. In particular, government attempts to convert feudal domains to private property, in part by abolishing common-use rights and common land, resulted in what Emilio Sereni in *History of the Italian Agricultural Landscape* has called “a true and proper mass expropriation of the rights of those who farmed the fiefs” (Sereni, 1997, p. 283). Elsewhere, for example on the Po Delta and in the Tuscan Maremma (marshlands), land reclamation programs deprived traditional farmers of their means of subsistence and way of life.

For rural people, an obvious response to such expropriation was to migrate to the towns. Rural migration partly explains the increasing numbers of urban poor in cities like Milan, Turin, and Naples during the eighteenth century and afterward; once in town, rural men, women, and children came to form a hungry, underemployed mass of casual and easily exploitable labor. Indications of the mounting strain this placed on urban areas include the greater visibility of vagrants and prostitutes, the rising numbers of illegitimate births and abandoned infants in cities throughout Italy, and perhaps most tellingly, the increasing anxiety among urban elites about a tide of criminals and the threat from “dangerous classes.” Especially in traditional urban centers, this situation also brought the rural poor into conflict with artisans and craftsmen, whose own status, skills, and earnings was threatened by imports of cheap, foreign-made goods and by government attempts to dismantle barriers to trade and the labor market. Thus, it is possible, to write about a certain proletarianization of the labor force in the first decades of the nineteenth century—that is, the loss of economic independence, the perceived erosion (if not the disappearance) of internal differentiations, and in some cases a deterioration in their material conditions. One direct consequence was a rapid escalation of social tensions.

Stability and conflict. The family played a crucial role in early modern Italian societies. Patrician families, such as the Gonzaga of Mantua and the Medici of Florence, could dominate a city’s political and ecclesiastical life from generation to generation. The structures of family life also served as a safeguard and transmitter of wealth, and marriage served to increase

wealth and cement personal alliances. There is also some evidence that the value placed on family life gave women a status and role not afforded them in public: the central role played by women within the family in Renaissance Italy, and especially their role in the upbringing of children, may have given them an economic and even spiritual leverage within society as a whole. For poorer families, kinship ties could offer both economic protection and security in hard times and a ready source of labor in others.

Yet for all the recognition of the family's persistent importance in Italian societies, there was little permanency about its internal structure. The historian of Renaissance Italy, for example, is struck above all by the enormous variety of family structures, by the coexistence of conjugal and multiple households, by the possibility of frequent change in family structures over time and of fluctuations according to economic circumstance, as well as by the distinctions between noble and non-noble families. In the course of the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, following a general European trend, the number of conjugal households seems to have increased; this trend can be linked both to urbanization and to the proletarianization of the rural workforce, as wage laborers tended to live in nuclear families. Nevertheless, rural families in the center-north bucked this trend (and did so not merely where sharecropping and tenant farming survived); extended families of three generations and of several conjugal units living under one roof remained a common occurrence.

Arguably, the prominent role played by the family in Italian societies also left its mark on the public sphere of politics and the economy. On the one hand, both the affective ties of love and friendship and the emphasis within the family on hierarchy and obedience gave stability and sometimes legitimacy to the prevailing social and political order. On the other hand, the family remained a world apart, an alternative source of loyalty and identity to that of the increasingly powerful state. For example, as new forms of social stratification emerged in the course of the nineteenth century, and especially as the new middle orders began to merge with the old nobility, the family could become a means of retaining a sense of distinctiveness, a way for the nobility to maintain their cultural and ideological distance, if only on a personal level.

Of course, the family was not the only alternative source of stability and loyalty. Another central pillar of the social order in early modern Italy was the Catholic Church. During the Counter-Reformation of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the confused and self-promoting systems of the Catholic Church were reformed. In their place emerged a much more absolutist and monolithic hierarchy, claiming for itself the sole right to decide doctrinal truth and define religious discussion and maintaining itself as rigidly separate from and superior to lay society. Repression of heresy and persecution of minorities (the virtual elimination of Protestantism and the expulsion or marginalization of Jews) also followed. In terms of its social impact, however, this change is perhaps less significant than what accompanied it—that is, a new commitment by the church to spreading the message of reform and an engagement with feelings of popular religiosity. This new mission manifested itself in the proliferation of cults, sanctuaries, and pilgrimages. It was so successful that by the eighteenth century religious fervor and the use of religious symbolism had become one of the most striking, and indeed persistent, features of Italian popular culture.

Family, church, and state, the pillars of the social and political order in early modern Italy, came in-

creasingly into conflict with each other in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as secular rulers sought to establish absolute power through a series of administrative and economic reforms. A main target of this reform program was, as has been noted, the privileges and prerogatives of the nobility; but the church's economic and political powers were similarly challenged (and it should be remembered that the church hierarchy was made up largely of the nobility). Like the nobility, the church resisted this attack on its position in many ways. Two of the most important were by mobilizing popular religiosity and by posing as the defenders of the rural poor, whose livelihood was threatened by land reform. In the Jacobin period (1798–1799), the church actively encouraged and organized popular discontent against the new revolutionary order, notably in the violent counterrevolutionary movements in Tuscany, the Papal States, and in the bloody Sanfedist rising of Cardinal Ruffo in Calabria. Earlier agitation over land issues and the later revolts against the Napoleonic regimes in Italy (1801–1814), were also partly the result of church attempts to direct peasant unrest for conservative purposes.

Given the extent of political and economic upheaval, foreign wars, famines, and epidemic diseases affecting the Italian peninsula between the sack of Rome in 1527 and national unification in 1860–1861, the number of rebellions during this period is surprisingly limited. In fact, popular unrest did become a mark of Italian society, but not until the mid-to late nineteenth century. Before then, banditry was a fairly widespread, even infamous, feature of the Italian countryside. There were only two periods of urban revolt that resonated beyond their immediate areas: the first occurred during the seventeenth century, above all in southern Italy (Naples in 1647, Messina in 1671); the second occurred during the European revolutions of 1848–1849, affecting all the states of the Italian peninsula. The 1647 revolt in Naples, preceded by revolt in Palermo and followed by one in Messina, was a popular revolt with a strong religious dimension, led by a charismatic fisherman known as Masaniello (Tomasso Aniello), against taxation and against the Spanish government. It spread rapidly to the countryside and to provincial towns and, in the struggle between peasants and nobility, acquired something of a class character. The 1848–1849 revolutions followed a prolonged period of economic deprivation and were led mostly by artisans and craftsmen in the cities demanding democratic rights of suffrage and association. Like the revolt in Naples, the later revolutions were undermined and eventually defeated by internal divisions, by the gulf between the

elite and the masses, and by huge differences separating the city from the countryside. The 1848–1849 revolutions also revealed the mounting health, housing, and employment crisis within Italian cities, a crisis that neither the welfare systems nor the police proved able to control or withstand.

FROM NATIONAL UNIFICATION TO THE REPUBLIC (1861–c.1990)

It is a truism of historical research that Italy in 1860–1861 was united in name only. Geography, culture, economic activity, and regional and local loyalties continued to separate Italians after national unification as before. National unification was nevertheless a climactic moment in the long transition from a traditional to a modern society, a process that extended from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries throughout the Italian peninsula and that affected different areas and different groups in different ways. Yet perhaps the greatest social changes took place only after 1945, during the “economic miracle” of the 1950s and 1960s and as a result of the “cultural revolution” of the 1970s.

The transformation of landscape and populations. Between 1861 and 1981 the Italian popula-

tion more than doubled, from just under 26 million to 56.5 million. At the time of unification, Italy’s birth and mortality rates (38 percent and 30.9 percent respectively) were high relative to Britain and France, and life expectancy, at 30.5 years, was more than ten years shorter. By 1981, however, these trends had been completely reversed. Compared with figures for Britain and France, Italy’s birthrate (10.1 percent) and mortality rate (9.5 percent) were lower, and its life expectancy (77.3 years) was higher. Particularly noteworthy is the decline in the birthrate, which in 2000 was the lowest in the world.

The link between these demographic shifts and rising living standards is hard to pinpoint. Between 1870 and 1900, because of overpopulation leading to unemployment, the standard of living in rural Italy probably worsened, and many wage laborers fell below subsistence level. Population increase also led to the spread of endemic disease (pellagra in the north, malaria in the south). The Fascist years (1922–1943) saw a stagnation in wages and consumption. In reality the real transformation of living standards and lifestyles took place after the end of World War II, when real per capita income increased by a factor of 4.4. The number of cars, telephones, and televisions increased hugely between 1951 and 1987, as did the number of hospital beds, university students, and airline passengers. Housing and diet improved dramatically, the

average height of Italians shot up (an Italian born in 1949 reached an average height of 1.69 meters; one born in 1955 reached 1.71 meters), and malaria was wiped out. The old-age pensioner became a common figure in Italian society. Yet an estimated one-seventh of Italians still lived below the poverty line in the 1980s, although income distribution in Italy was rather less unequal than in the other advanced European economies.

Hence, the transformation of Italian society took place at an uneven pace, reflecting in part the irregular rhythms of economic development. Undoubtedly the most striking and well-known aspect of Italy's uneven transformation is its regional imbalance, in particular, the gap between north and south. Notions of a north-south divide are, in social and economic terms, an oversimplification (economic historians refer to three Italies—northwest, center and northeast, south), and

perceptions of southern backwardness tend to underestimate both the economic dynamism and the extent of social diversity within the south; nevertheless, one constant of Italian history since 1861 has been the south's lower living standards, lower per capita income, lower per capita GDP (gross domestic product), higher unemployment, and higher rates of illiteracy as compared with the north. The process of industrialization—after unification in the triangle of Piedmont, Liguria, and Lombardy, and after World War II in central and northeastern Italy—together with the partial shift to a service economy after 1945, has led to marked changes in the composition of the Italian labor force. The percentage of those employed in agriculture fell from 52 percent in 1936 to 11 percent in 1981 and in industry rose from 25.6 to 41.5 percent during the same period. But the number of those employed in agriculture in the south has remained far greater than in the north (in 1981, 28 percent in Basilicata versus 3.8 percent in Lombardy), reflecting a weaker process of industrialization. The modernization of agriculture, moreover, has proceeded at a much slower pace in the south.

Another feature of the transformation of Italy's population was the acceleration of both internal migration and emigration. Emigration came first, reaching a peak in the decades between 1880 and 1910, when roughly 14 million applied to the government to leave. The majority of those who left were young men, often illiterate peasants, and while initially they came from the north, after the 1880s huge numbers left from the south. Interestingly, Italians dispersed more widely than other European migrants, arriving in the United States and Canada, Argentina and Brazil, Africa, Australia, and northern Europe. Although a significant proportion of migrants returned (an estimated 50 percent from the Americas between 1905 and 1920) and peasant households and whole villages could be enriched by emigrants' remittances, emigration also caused social upheaval, perhaps especially for the women who waited behind.

After 1945 came a further wave of emigration, notably to Argentina and Australia, but the 1960s and 1970s saw an unprecedented migration within Italy. The migration from the south to the northern cities was probably helped by the rapid improvement in communications and the construction of motorways, but it also reflected the rejection of a rural way of life by many southerners. The huge population influx placed the cities of the north under a terrible strain—the proliferation of squalid housing on city peripheries dates from this time—and led often to the bitter resentment and bad treatment of southern migrants (called *terroni*, bumpkins). It also emptied southern

towns and villages of young men and, later, young women. Another demographic trend emerged after the 1980s, that of Italy as “receiving nation.” Migrants to Italy, often from north and east Africa, some of them illegal (that is, without residence or work permits), have tended to concentrate in the larger Italian cities and in Palermo and Naples almost as much as in the north.

The challenge of a changing society. Perceptions of the Italian middle class as economically and politically backward relative to their counterparts in northern Europe, and as subordinate to the nobility, pervade the historiography of modern Italy. This analysis of middle-class weakness, particularly as applied to the social structures of southern Italy, is used to explain the so-called peculiarities of Italy's political development, above all the collapse of parliamentary government and the rise of Fascism after World War I. However, a subsequent analysis that has replaced the older one stresses the vitality of the Italian middle class, the rapid pace of social change, and the marginalization of the nobility from the mainstream of Italian life.

Research has shown that considerable social mobility, whether through education, public employ-

ment, or commercial and entrepreneurial activity, produced an increasing number of middle-class Italians in the decades after national unification. A distinct bourgeois identity was defined through sociability, marriage, and political activity. In many regions of Italy, the process of amalgamation with the old nobility—in terms of politics and economics if not always culture—also continued. One unusual feature was the tendency of this new elite to keep to their immediate regions and cities, to marry those from nearby, to form clubs confined to their own area, and to maintain a strictly local focus on national politics. However, this too was to change, if only gradually, beginning in the years before 1914 but especially occurring during the Fascist period and above all in the postwar decades. Yet notwithstanding the growth of a national identity among the middle classes, that identity has continued to coexist with a strong sense of local or regional loyalty.

Some of the greatest changes affecting Italian society after 1861 were felt by the poor in urban and rural areas, but their impact varied greatly. A major spurt of industrial development took place after 1896, concentrated in the engineering and automobile sectors, but only in the provinces of Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria. Milan in particular saw the pioneering of methods of the “second industrial revolution,” and its inhabitants experienced the first developments of

mass consumption and leisure. Still, older industries, notably textiles, continued to be important, and they continued as in the past to employ unskilled, often underpaid female workers. Although real wages in industry rose by 40 percent from 1900 to 1913, it was mainly the “labor aristocracy” of skilled workers whose lifestyles perceptibly improved.

The industrial cities also became a focus of political and social radicalism and remained so throughout most of the twentieth century. There were violent riots in Milan in 1898, and Milan and Turin were the focus of much strike activity in the years before 1914 and in the *biennio rosso* (two red years) of 1919 and 1920. The unexpected labor radicalism of the late 1960s and early 1970s were also partly centered on Milan. Indeed, radical and socialist movements tended to concentrate their organizational activities in the north and were disinclined, especially in the 1890s and in 1919–1920, to take an interest in peasant unrest in the southern half of the peninsula.

The Italian peasant world changed in fits and starts. In truth it was never as unchanging or unvaried as outsiders liked to think, but in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was subject to unprecedented commercial pressures and to greater government intervention. Peasants in the south, already a rural proletariat at the time of unification, continued to suffer badly as a result of the privatization of com-

mon and church land in the 1860s. Popular revolt first erupted in southern Italy in the decades preceding unification, and it expressed the anger and desperation of peasant families excluded from land and the means of subsistence. This situation reached a climax after 1860 in the “brigands’ war” on the mainland and in the spread of unrest and general lawlessness through the western provinces of Sicily. Demands for land redistribution and for the negotiation of new, less unequal contracts between landlord and peasant resurfaced again in Sicily during the 1890s, and this time peasants formed agricultural unions (*fasci siciliani*) to press their case. Like the protests of the 1860s, however, these movements were repressed by the state. Arguably, greater benefits may have been gained from emigration which, starting in the 1890s, caused a scarcity of labor and may have resulted in higher wages being paid to rural workers.

The situation in the north was equally complex. The agricultural revolution of the 1890s in Lombardy, Venetia, and Emilia-Romagna was spearheaded by large tenant farmers and limited companies employing day laborers; the system of sharecropping further declined. Great wealth was in other words achieved through the proletarianization of the labor force, which bore the brunt of seasonal unemployment; huge disparities in wealth became a dominant feature of northern agriculture. It was also in this area, the Po Valley, that rural strikes spread during the turbulent early years of the century and after World War I. Throughout the Fascist period peasant landownership continued to decline in the north and made little headway in the south. Despite efforts by Benito Mussolini, the Fascist dictator, to encourage both rural smallholdings and extol the virtues of a rural way of life, a process of deruralization (migration to industry and the towns) was under way. Some steps were taken to establish a rural society peopled by small peasant farmers in the huge land reform of 1950, aimed mainly at the southern grain-estates, and in the local seizures of land led by communist activists, which took place in central Italy. However, as mentioned above, the flight from the land accelerated during the 1950s and 1960s, and, in the south at least, many peasants lacked the money or skills to farm their newly acquired plots. Southern peasants also found that in the setting up of state agencies to administer the reform, they had merely swapped one landowner for another, equally powerful one.

Nationalization and politicization. The eighty or so years between national unification and the establishment of the first Italian Republic were years of immense political upheaval. The elitist parliamentary structures of the first decades, when less than 2 per-

cent of the population had the vote, gave way reluctantly to a broader-based, but arguably more corrupt, system prior to World War I. After 1922 came the years of the Fascist dictatorship, which in its turn collapsed into the turmoil of 1943–1948. This period also marks the emergence, often contested and sometimes reversed, of mass participation in politics in Italy and accompanied by successive waves of popular and political protest.

To what extent does this process of mass politicization point to the creation of a national culture in Italy? After unification the task of *fare gli italiani* (making Italians) was seen as one of the most pressing facing Italy’s rulers, not simply because of the huge cultural and social disparities within the peninsula but also because the only truly national institution at the time, the Catholic Church, had declared itself openly hostile to the new political order. The aim to make Italians from Sicilians, Calabrians, Neapolitans, Florentines, and Venetians lay behind the educational and infrastructural programs of liberal Italy (1861–

1922). It also produced statues and monuments in every Italian city, the organization of festivals and demonstrations, and, under Mussolini, more explicit attempts at social control through cinema, radio, and the organization of mass leisure. The extent to which these efforts were crowned with success is open to question. Especially in the liberal period, efforts at nation building were compromised by political resistance, by the opposition of the Catholic Church, and by the glaring gap between the myth of national unity and the reality of *campanilismo* (localism). Although the importance of nationalist sentiment among the elite should not be underestimated, local loyalties and identities continued to predominate.

Postwar trends seem to point in another direction entirely. The 1960s saw the rise of a mass or consumer society, in part the result of the “economic miracle” and of migration to the cities. The rising tide of cinema, television, and pop music, of automobile travel and mass publishing, among other expressions of modern life, led to a decline in local peasant cultures, traditions, and dialects; this trend continued

during the 1980s and 1990s with the creation of national newspapers like *La Repubblica* and the concentration of ownership in the mass media. A number of countertrends should also be noted. The creation of a national culture was accompanied by its Americanization, especially in cinema and music, while at the same time Italy began to export its own distinctive lifestyle—cars and scooters, coffee and Chianti, women’s shoes and men’s suits. The creation of a consumer society was opposed by a vigorous counterculture, which found its fullest expression in the protest movements of the late 1960s and 1970s. And despite the secularization of Italian culture, a striking feature of the postwar period, religious symbols and icons did not disappear. All in all, the creation of a national culture from the different regions, cities, and localities of the Italian peninsula has been one of the slowest and most compromised processes of social change in the modern period. But it has also been one of the most remarkable. It has helped to produce a culture that is as varied as it is vibrant, and this not least because of its open-ended character.

See also Emigration and Colonies (in this volume); Fascism and Nazism (volume 2); Banditry (volume 3); Catholicism (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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CENTRAL EUROPE



Mary Jo Maynes and Eric D. Weitz

Central European social historians can never “leave the politics out.” From the sixteenth century through the twentieth, and to a degree uncommon elsewhere in Europe, the role of the state has loomed large in shaping key social-historical developments. In such realms of social history as class formation, the evolution of the public sphere, family life, gender relations, religious and educational institutions, migration, urbanization, and communications, the state has played a constitutive, at times determining, role.

Complexities of scale, related to a persistent regional pattern of decentralized state building, have also been significant. Central Europeans have retained local loyalties because of both localized state building and other localizing institutions such as craft and merchant guilds, splintered dialect and religious communities, and land tenure patterns. At the same time, links to other parts of Europe and the wider world have also played a historical role. Commercial ties and shared culture linked the central European bourgeoisie with counterparts in England, France, and elsewhere. Catholics of course retained loyalties to a church with universal claims. The notably large number of central European socialists and communists claimed that loyalties should be class-based and international in scope. Jews, also numerous in this part of Europe, had far-flung religious, family, business, and social ties. Over the course of several hundred years, nationalist ideology and the nation-state became superimposed upon the local, regional, and transnational, but these other levels of social relations nevertheless persisted.

CENTRAL EUROPE: THE REGION AND ITS DIVERSITY

“Central Europe” denotes the lands bordered on the west by the Rhine River basin and in the east by a topographically unmarked line running roughly from just west of Warsaw to Budapest and then, swinging further west, to Trieste. In the north, the Baltic and North Seas mark its bounds; in the south, the south-

ern descent of the Alps. Central Europe is a region marked by a high level of diversity—political, religious, and regional—as well as by the more common European divisions by class and gender.

Linguistically, German speakers have dominated central Europe; even in those parts of central Europe where German was a minority language it was usually the language of commerce, governance, and high culture. But German speakers often lived among speakers of Polish, Czech, Danish, Yiddish, French, and other languages or dialects. Significantly, for its entire modern history, central Europe has been politically decentralized, and borders have shifted frequently. In the early modern era there were several hundred virtually sovereign states in the region (over two thousand if the tiny enclaves ruled by Imperial Knights are added). Napoleonic consolidation and national unification in the nineteenth century reduced this number dramatically. Yet political consolidation has never been a one-way street; as empires collapsed in the twentieth century, smaller political units reemerged—an Austria shorn of its possessions further east, an East Germany, a Czech Republic.

Central Europe has also been divided along religious lines. Since the Reformation, the Main River has marked the border between a largely Protestant north and a Catholic south. Jews were once present in communities all across central Europe, in greater numbers as one moved further eastward. But even in some small villages in the rural southwest, one could find significant Jewish communities until the 1940s.

Still another divide has persistently marked central European history—an economic one. Here the Elbe River border has played a persistent role. To its east lay large estates worked by a peasant labor force subject to the “second serfdom”—that is, a system of labor control established around 1500 in conjunction with the rise of export agriculture. This newer form of servitude appeared even as medieval serfdom was waning to the west, where small-scale peasant farms predominated. With industrialization the east-west divide reemerged in a new form when industry de-

veloped earliest in the Ruhr and Saar basins and in Saxony, southern Germany, and Switzerland, leaving eastern Prussia and Austria relatively underdeveloped. Patterns of social-class formation and political divisions reflected this economic divide. East of the Elbe, the Prussian landed nobility, the Junkers, secured local autonomy in return for their loyalty to the Prussian Hohenzollern dynasty. A few reformers emerged from their ranks in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but for the most part, the Junkers remained firmly committed to an authoritarian and aristocratic order. In the west, a more developed middle class, broader commercial and industrial activity, and substantial influence from France created more fertile ground for the emergence of liberalism in the nineteenth century.

EARLY MODERN SOCIAL HISTORY AND THE CONFESSIONAL STATE

The heavy hand of the state in central European society dates back to the early modern era. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), the last of a series of wars launched by the Lutheran Reformation. The treaty reaffirmed the distinctive central European pattern of decentralized state building in the Holy Roman Empire. “Dual power” was confirmed. That is, political authority remained divided between the Holy Roman Emperor ruling from the Habsburg capital in Vienna and the nearly four hundred fairly autonomous “estates of the empire,” including princes of the huge *Länder* of Brandenburg-Prussia and Bavaria, representatives of city-states like Frankfurt and Hamburg, and prince-bishops like those of Cologne and Mainz. In addition,

roughly two thousand Imperial Knights lorded over tiny territories of a few acres or square miles. The settlement at Westphalia was a definitive acknowledgment that the Holy Roman Emperor would continue to exist as the highest level of authority in the region, but with few effective powers. Real governance, the settlement confirmed, was based in the capitals of the territorial rulers.

This particular pattern of political development was enormously significant in social-historical terms. Social-historical development—religious life, of course, but also economic growth in agricultural, industrial, and commercial sectors; family and gender relations and demographic growth; bureaucratization, education, and literacy; migration and urbanization—was penetrated and to some extent organized by the territorial states. Moreover, the intensity of governmentality—the particularly elaborated mechanisms of political authority—meant more state intervention into and more record keeping about the activities of everyday life.

Confessionalization. “Confessionalization”—the establishment of an official territorial religion based on a creed and binding on all subjects—became characteristic of post-Reformation state building throughout the Holy Roman Empire. Beginning in the early sixteenth century, confessionalization dramatically extended the reach of the state. The threat to social order manifested not only in Luther’s revolt against Rome but also in the widespread rebellions of peasants and urban underclasses between the 1480s and the 1520s gave territorial rulers the impulse to discipline. The Reformation offered the vehicle. Starting first in the

Lutheran territories—where the lure of a state takeover of Catholic Church properties usually figured along with religious ideals into the conversion strategies of princes and city-states—the confessional state eventually was established to some extent even in territories such as Bavaria where the ruling dynasty remained Catholic.

Henceforward, state bureaucracies supervised religious matters. Branches of this bureaucratic structure expanded beyond the administration of church buildings, properties, and staff to include the teaching of religious doctrine, parish visitation, the establishment of primary schools, the supervision of some aspects of secondary and higher education, the regulation of marriage, the enforcement of morality through church consistory courts, and the oversight of charity. In other words, through confessionalization, state-church bureaucracies not only took over many of the functions previously performed by the Catholic Church but also brought state authority into many more aspects of everyday life. Historians have pointed to the ways in which these innovations served to subject the population of central Europe to unprecedented state discipline.

Historians have also argued that confessionalization exacerbated aspects of patriarchal domination. Under the slogan “Gottesvater, Landesvater, Hausvater,” the Christian God, the territorial prince, and the male household head were linked in a hierarchical and explicitly patriarchal order. Arguably the Lutheran cri-

tique of clerical celibacy and Catholic views of marriage opened a new approach to gender relations. In contrast with Catholic teachings, Lutheran writings exalted marriage as superior to celibacy; marital sexuality was seen as natural and not sinful. But the abolition of female religious orders also removed an honorable alternative to marriage for women. Moreover, the disappearance of female saints as objects of veneration masculinized religious vision and practice. According to the Protestant gender order, adult women belonged in male-headed households under the supervision of a husband whose authority reflected divine and princely authority. Ironically, even where the Protestant Reformation did not come to dominate, women were also brought under tighter male authority. In the wake of the Catholic Reform, nuns had to be cloistered and their convents supervised by male spiritual authorities. The intensification of witchcraft persecutions that were particularly virulent in central Europe in the centuries after Reform was another mark of the epoch’s misogyny and need to control women.

It is worth noting that this new discipline, though generalized, did not operate identically in all territories, nor was it as effective as proponents had hoped. Certainly there were differences between the oligarchic governments of the city-states and the more autocratic monarchies like Prussia. Size also mattered; it was in many respects easier to administer smaller

than more sprawling and divided territories. Moreover, state authority was more complete over Protestant Germans than over the Catholics and Jews of Central Europe. Catholics continued to hold both international and local religious allegiances, and they took more seriously the tie to the Catholic Habsburg emperor. German Jews continued to reside on sufferance, mostly in cities, where they paid annual *Schutzgeld* (literally, “protection money”) for residence rights but maintained ties with kin and business associates all over the map of central and eastern Europe. The so-called *Hofjuden* (literally, “court Jews”) played a special role in central European state building by putting their wide credit networks and commercial ties to the service of territorial overlords in the hopes of gaining protection and profit for themselves and their communities. While individual Jewish financiers were often immensely powerful, the legal status of Jews was little improved before the nineteenth century; moreover, their association with moneylending and the aggressive fiscal policies of the courts reinforced anti-Semitism.

Fiscal planning. State fiscal planning, with bankers and financiers playing a key role, was crucial to success in the competitive and belligerent arena of central Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia ended one phase of civil war, but European dynastic wars and the new wars of global commerce and colonization continued to involve many central European states. Standing armies became the pattern after the Prussian rulers decided not to disband the armies they had raised during the Thirty Years’ War. The Prussian army, the largest in the region, grew from 8,000 troops in 1648 to 200,000 by the mid-eighteenth century. Less ambitious princes satisfied themselves with fewer troops; the duke of Weimar had an army of only thirty-three guards in the eighteenth century! But nearly all of the states of the region invested heavily in armies and armaments throughout the early modern period, and the costs involved drove state governments toward further bureaucratic expansion, fiscal planning, and tax increases.

Beyond the realm of religion and morality, then, states also intervened strongly in the economy of central Europe beginning in the seventeenth century. Arguably, the princely state builders of the Holy Roman Empire created the modern notion of “the economy” as a specific terrain of state activity. Standing armies, courts, and bureaucracies required funds in excess of the income from the ruling family’s estates and from secularized church properties. Permanent tax levies, along with policies designed to increase population and taxable wealth, became hallmarks of effective gov-

ernance. By the eighteenth century, most German universities had newly established chairs in *Cameralwissenschaften*—university-based studies in the legal, political, and economic sciences of managing the state’s population and administration with the goals of rationalizing governance and enhancing tax revenues.

Agriculture and early industry. In the early modern era, most of this wealth still came from agrarian pursuits. In the western and southern parts of the empire (including the Rhineland, Württemberg, Baden, and parts of Bavaria) peasant tenure was fairly secure; holdings were often quite small because of generations of division among heirs. Landlords—sometimes aristocrats, but sometimes towns or merchants or religious establishments—typically relied on rents for their income rather than farming their lands directly. Dense settlement patterns and large numbers of towns and cities in these areas supported small-peasant agriculture as well. Population growth toward the end of the eighteenth century put pressure on land. In some villages, new crops and more intensive farming methods brought marked increases in productivity by the century’s end.

But these regions, along with parts of Switzerland, also emerged as classic zones of protoindustry or “putting out”—a form of industrial organization whereby merchants advanced raw materials such as wool to rural households whose members would then work them up into finished products for sale by the merchant. State authorities were interested in increasing farm productivity and in tapping into the newer sources of wealth. They drew on the advice of men of academic education to found “industry schools” that taught rural children work discipline and handicrafts. Model farms disseminated new agricultural techniques. States granted monopoly concessions to entrepreneurs to establish and regulate rural putting-out industries, and they also established state “manufactories”—large-scale handicraft workshops—for the production of luxury goods such as porcelain, tobacco, and silk. Growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors brought wealth visible in new consumption habits documented, for example, by Hans Medick’s research on the Württemberg weaving village of Laichingen. But these changes brought new problems as well. The intensification of agricultural labor and the introduction of putting-out work disrupted traditional gender and generational divisions of labor and brought increasing conflict to overcrowded households and communities. Even though some peasants, artisans, and putting-out workers prospered during the economic expansion of the late eighteenth century, the social costs

of growth were manifested in rising rates of infant mortality, divorce, and pilfering of firewood and fodder.

Further east, especially in the eastern provinces of Brandenburg-Prussia, the pattern was different. A much larger proportion of the land was farmed by large estate owners who had been shipping grain north through Baltic ports to the cities of western Europe since the sixteenth century. On these large estates, labor supply was the landlord's main concern. The political compromise struck here allowed the Junker landowners a relatively free hand on their own estates in exchange for their loyalty and military service to the Prussian state. There were few nearby cities to lure them or their peasants off the land or to provide an alternative marketing strategy. To be sure, there were attempts in the eighteenth century to reform peasant-landlord relations or at least to reduce the worst abuses. Peasant smallholders fared better on Crown lands than on the typical Junker estate. Labor resistance in a few regions pushed wages higher. But the generally pro-aristocratic tenor of the state, the practice of filling the upper echelons of the military and civilian administration with Junkers, meant relatively little change in agrarian social relations until the twentieth century.

Cities. The urban economy of early modern central Europe grew around commerce. Urban locations recalled the medieval trade routes along which cities had been founded. Many medieval cities survived into the early modern era, although they had been economically and politically weakened by centuries of warfare and by shifting patterns of global trade that favored Atlantic over northern European ports. The Baltic port cities belonged to the Hanseatic League, whose power in the Middle Ages had been built upon the trade linking eastern Germany and Russia with western ports. Buildings in the proud town of Lübeck recalled its fourteenth-century centrality to the Hanseatic network. Its city hall, like those of other commercial cities, served as the site of both city-state government and commercial transactions, so closely intertwined were the fates of merchants and towns. Urban social and political visions challenged those prevailing in the countryside. By way of illustration, in the city hall of the North Sea port of Hamburg, a painting of the Day of Judgment showed knights and princes being tossed into hell, while merchants were raised to God's right hand.

Other cities were sited on the overland routes that linked the Mediterranean with northern Europe. Leipzig, the largest of these, flourished as a reshipment point. The Leipzig fairs had become the most active in central Europe by the end of the Middle Ages.

Local residents even called their city "eine kleine Paris" (a little Paris). Because its merchants had persuaded the town's overlord, the elector of Saxony, that toleration was good for business, the city was open to foreigners of all kinds at fair time. (However, Glückel of Hameln, the wife of a Jewish merchant, did report being fearful for her husband's safety when he traveled to the Leipzig fair.) Leipzig was famous for its inns and coffeehouses—coffee and cocoa were both relatively new products in Europe, first imported in the early sixteenth century—and most of all, for its flourishing book trade.

Despite originally democratic impulses in the constitutions of the cities, by the early 1600s most central European cities were oligarchies ruled by men from the town's wealthiest families. The older egalitarian spirit diminished as evolving social and political structure sharpened distinctions among the urban citizenry. By 1500 most towns had several legally defined citizenship classifications, usually distinguishing among patrician families whose male members qualified for election to the council, citizens with full civic rights, resident noncitizens, and protected residents without guaranteed residence rights. Women were active in gender-specific sectors of the urban economy, but they (along with children) held civic status only by way of their relationship to male citizens; among women only widows and licensed female retailers could operate with a degree of freedom from male legal authority.

Moreover, cities that princely territories had absorbed, or that were founded as capitals, had little basis for democratic institutions. These cities—such as Berlin, first a garrison town and later the Prussian capital, or Karlsruhe, the baroque capital of Baden designed so that the grand duke could see every street in town from his palace windows—were policed by state governments desiring order and revenue. Princes generally suppressed the traditional liberties of towns with a medieval heritage of freedom. For example, in Munich, the capital of the Bavaria, residents lost their rights to trade freely, to elect representatives to the town council, and to grant citizenship.

THE BOURGEOISIE AND THE EMERGENT PUBLIC SPHERE

Still, the cities of early modern central Europe were important as sites of formation of middle-classes and a bourgeois public sphere. As was true elsewhere in Europe, the new institutions of communications and sociability associated with the "the public" were dominated by urban, educated, middle-class men. Such men were attracted to Enlightenment notions of free

and rational inquiry, self-cultivation, and social and scientific progress. Historians have argued that German Enlightenment writers, in comparison with British or French, tended to put more faith in reformist princes than in representative governments as the engine of social improvement, although this was a contested notion throughout the “republic of letters.” Participants in the emergent public sphere of central European cities met in scientific societies, agricultural reform organizations, reading groups, theaters, cafés, and literary salons. They made their living as bureaucrats, rentiers, pastors or university professors, in a few cases from their literary or artistic works, and from trade and commerce. They were more likely than in other parts of Europe to be in state employ. The newspapers, journals, and books through which they communicated were published at rates that increased exponentially in the eighteenth century.

They were a group particularly defined both by *Bildung*, education and self-cultivation, and by *Besitz*, the possession of wealth. The education on which they based their expertise and participation in public discussion was a highly masculine enterprise. Although literary salons and a few of the reading and other clubs did include a few bourgeois and aristocratic women, the gender ideals that characterized this urban middle-class milieu restricted women’s access to formal education and to the public sphere. According to Marion Gray’s analysis of German economic treatises and manuals, the change was apparent by the mid-eighteenth century. Whereas in earlier epochs household enterprises had rested on the specific economic contributions of the *Hausmutter* as well as the *Hausvater*, the modern economic experts, academically trained in the *Cameralwissenschaften*, relegated women and their tasks to the margins of the economy. Moreover, the female domestic realm was increasingly separated conceptually, legally, and in practice from the masculine world of the economy and politics. This gender dichotomy was most exaggerated in milieus first built around the male career pattern—namely, professionals and civil servants. University education was advocated for sons as a means toward broad cultivation rather than merely narrow professional training. Nevertheless it also came to be a prerequisite for the practice of the professions and for many state administrative offices. The exclusion of women and most lower-class men from access to *Bildung* was one of the many unacknowledged limits upon the supposedly open public sphere.

The political upheavals brought by the French Revolution and Napoleonic rule in central Europe had a decisive influence on middle-class formation and political culture. Liberals who were the product of the German Enlightenment initially welcomed the

Revolution. Its promise of progressive reform, its admiration for the world of antiquity, and its hostility to repressive monarchical and religious institutions echoed their commitments. Later, in reaction to the more radical turn of the Revolution and the conquest of large swaths of central Europe by French revolutionary armies, many came to oppose developments in France, but at the same time remained influenced by revolutionary ideals.

During the Vormärz era (1815–1848, so named by historians because it preceded the March 1848 revolts), a liberal political culture matured. Throughout the German Confederation, established in 1815 by the reactionary Congress of Vienna, repressive laws precluded outright party formation. Still, liberal ideas circulated in the associations of bourgeois civil society—singing clubs, gymnastic societies, Monday clubs, literary groups, and student fraternities. These were mostly local organizations, reflecting the character of urban bourgeois sociability, but they were replicated in cities throughout central Europe. The growth of commercial capitalism and the first glimmers of industrialization provided a new basis for middle-class fortunes and careers built more on *Besitz* than *Bildung*. Liberalism and the articulation of middle-class political perspectives were most at home in city governments and parliamentary bodies in those few states where constitutional rights to representation existed—most notably in the southwestern grand duchy of Baden.

In the lower house of Baden, elected by limited male franchise, an increasingly outspoken group of liberal deputies played a key role in the articulation of German liberalism. As Dagmar Herzog has demonstrated, however, their political vision was limited by the social and cultural context in which they operated. Their parliamentary battles with the neoorthodox Catholics who came to power in Baden in reaction against the French Revolution were fueled as much by views on marriage and sexuality as they were by constitutional ideals. The liberals’ attacks on clerical celibacy as “unnatural” and antipathetic to the emergent bourgeois gender order were crucial to liberals’ notions of manhood and citizenship. Reawakened religious conflict linked liberals with anti-Catholic hostilities that would persist throughout the nineteenth century. Moreover, it was their hostility to orthodox Catholicism rather than an embrace of pluralism that pushed reluctant Badenese liberals toward advocating Jewish emancipation as well. In short, the implicitly Protestant, masculine, and middle-class character of early German liberalism resulted in tacit exclusions (of women, Jews, men without property) that contradicted universal ideals.

THE 1848 REVOLUTIONS

The contradictions of liberalism came to the fore in the revolution of 1848. Paralleling the French Revolution, the revolts that began during the “March Days” of 1848 resulted from the convergence of political challenges and socioeconomic crises.

The political challenge involved clamor for reform on several fronts. Since the 1820s student fraternities and other bourgeois associations had called for a single German state. At the same time treaties creating a Zollverein, or customs union, among many central European states, had also promoted unification. The nation-state became the focus of liberals’ hopes as well; by the late 1840s, liberals from the smaller states in the south and west were increasingly speaking to allies throughout central Europe. A unified German state based on principles of constitution-

alism, representation, and civil liberties would end divisiveness and princely autocracy. This challenge was coming to a head by late 1847, when liberals issued a call for a convention to make plans for a national constitution.

Meanwhile, social and economic hardships intensified among peasants and artisans throughout central Europe. Rising population growth put pressure on land prices. Peasants had been emancipated from serfdom in Austria in the late eighteenth century and in Germany during the Napoleonic era. But emancipation was costly; often it required reimbursing landlords with substantial parcels of land or cash outlays. By the 1820s, many peasants were heavily indebted and land-poor. The golden era of protoindustry was also waning as overproduction and falling prices impoverished putting-out workers. The worst hit were the linen weavers of Silesia, who rose up

against their employers in 1844, only to be crushed by armed intervention. Urban artisans also suffered with the increased competition brought by open markets and the first entry of factory goods into the region. The final straw came at the end of the decade of the “Hungry Forties,” when crop failures drove food prices upward. The poor were hardest hit; potatoes, upon which their diet increasingly depended, were hit by blight in 1846 and 1847. Food riots ensued and supplies were low at the end of the winter of 1847–1848. The actual rebellion was sparked by peasant revolts; peasants attacked landlords’ castles or burnt the books that held their records of debt. Liberal reformers were quick to seize the opportunity to forward their cause. Alarmed princes began to incorporate reformers into their cabinets and to grant constitutions. Plans for unification moved into full gear; deputies from all over central Europe were elected to the Frankfurt Assembly, which convened in May 1848, to write a constitution for a united Germany.

But of course liberal visions and the aims of peasants and handicraft workers were quite divergent. Some of the very reforms sought by parliamentarians—for example open markets—undermined the livelihood of artisans. The peasants’ attacks on landlords’ property violated the interests of bourgeois property owners as well. The Assembly proceeded apace and indeed wrote a constitution, but as it deliberated the revolutionary forces collapsed or were defeated around it. The princes still commanded armies, and once they realized the weaknesses of the revolutionary coalition, they were able simply to quash the revolutionary governments and assemblies—in Vienna in October 1848, in Berlin in November, and in Frankfurt in May 1849. The strongest army, that of Prussia, played a key role in the repression not only in Berlin but also in Frankfurt and in the last revolutionary holdouts in Baden and Saxony. Military courts-martial sentenced and executed rebels. The lucky ones fled abroad, joining the growing streams of emigrants who had been leaving central Europe since the 1830s in search of better economic conditions in North America and elsewhere.

CREATING THE NATIONAL SCALE, BROADENING THE PUBLIC SPHERE

National unification was created in the end with help from these same Prussian armies. The Second German Empire was forged under the leadership of the Prussian state, led by the conservative chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Social, economic, and political trends favoring unification had been developing for decades

(including communications networks, the Zollverein market region, and nationalist organizations). Bismarck had been a reactionary in 1848, but by the 1860s he had come to recognize the powerful potential of the nation-state. Industrialization (already advanced in Prussia’s western provinces), nationalism, and a limited form of popular sovereignty could be harnessed by the Prussian state in the service of the monarchy and the Junkers. Bismarck, the classic “revolutionary from above,” recognized that to preserve the existing social and political hierarchies, Prussia needed to adapt. Through three short wars between 1864 and 1871, he defeated Austria and rallied the remaining German states behind Prussia as the architect of national unification. Many Germans rallied behind Bismarck and Prussia, including liberals who were joyous that their goal of national unity had been realized, even if in a politically awkward form.

The new German Empire that emerged was a strange hybrid of liberal and conservative elements. The government and the army were responsible to the Crown, not to the Parliament. The inner circle of the emperor (also the king of Prussia) wielded immense powers. As part of the unification compromise individual states retained substantial political autonomy; they even had their own armies and, in some instances, their own foreign ministries. The federalist solution was, in many ways, a persistent central European pattern, one that also characterized Switzerland and the Austrian Empire. The German system was distinctive in its dualism: Prussia, the largest and most conservative state, exercised inordinate powers in the empire. Prussia’s authoritarian and aristocratic traditions were carried into the new Germany.

At the same time, the German constitution did not simply reflect the authoritarian proclivities of the Prussian aristocracy. Importantly, the constitution provided for universal manhood suffrage and an elected, if weak, national parliament. The imperial political structure encouraged the development of a national public sphere because it mandated periodic parliamentary elections. Because of the broad suffrage, political parties had to move beyond their practice of “notable politics,” whereby community elites controlled party affairs. By 1900 Germany presented the curious spectacle of an authoritarian state with actively contested elections and the most highly mobilized voters anywhere in Europe. Moreover, Bismarck’s constitution had established equality under the law, rights of association, and other liberties. Despite periodic and serious harassment of socialists and Catholics, the constitutional prerequisites for a national public sphere did exist.

In terms of religion, the unified nation was very much a Protestant one. Although the southern Catholic states had agreed to unification in 1871, Catholics still had reservations. These suspicions were confirmed when Bismarck, joined by liberal reformers in localities throughout Prussia, launched an attack on Catholic schools and other institutions in the so-called Kulturkampf of the 1870s. These efforts to weaken German Catholicism ultimately failed; the persecution of Catholics helped fuel the expansion of the Catholic Center Party and of educational, social, and welfare organizations that provided the institutional basis of a persistently strong German Catholic social and political identity. For Jews, the new nation offered great promise. The constitution accorded Jews full equal rights under the law. Social discrimination remained immense. The army and bureaucracy proved largely impregnable, the professorate only slightly less so. But in the rapidly growing professions of law, medicine, journalism, and the arts, Jews were able to find places and to advance significantly. Jews invested their hopes in the nation since the end of legal discrimination and economic subordination accompanied unification. Later, these hopes would be tragically disappointed.

In terms of social historical development, the unification process allowed for the survival of powerful nobles, the Prussian Junkers in particular, who continued to predominate in sectors of the bureaucracy and the army. The idealization of Crown and army, conveyed through court ceremonies, military parades, and in schools and the press, contributed an authoritarian and militaristic strain to German society. German employers mimicked the military hierarchy by adopting military discipline over their workers. Even the forceful role of the father in the family was sustained, in part, by the larger culture of authoritarianism. Nevertheless, the German Empire arguably reflected the interests of the professional and entrepreneurial middle classes as well. In the economic sphere, the constitution provided the legal framework for the full development of a capitalist market economy, measures that had been long demanded by businessmen and liberals. The German Empire created a vast market with a single currency, a single system of weights and measures, and eventually a coordinated system of transportation and communications.

Moreover, political unification and the new institutions of the empire contributed to an unprecedented phase of economic growth that despite intermittent recessions lasted until 1914, creating new patterns of wealth. In one generation, Germany became an urban, industrial society and an economic powerhouse. The total value of industrial and crafts

production increased more than fivefold between 1871 and 1913, the export of finished products, fourfold. Germany soon became the world leader in the production of coal, steel, and chemicals, and later in electro-technical manufacturing and electrical power generation. German industrialization was distinctive for more than its speed. Military needs and available resources produced an emphasis on heavy industry and a prevalence of large corporations and cartels. Moreover, the state played a broad role in promoting industrial development and forged links with big industrialists. Finally, industrial advancement in some ways outstripped other kinds of social and cultural change, leaving Germany somewhat disjointed and also prompting, from various quarters, resistance to modern developments. Some historians have designated this as part of a special German pattern—termed *Sonderweg*, or separate path—in modern social history.

Nevertheless, with industrialization, the social structure shifted dramatically, and many changes resembled those in other parts of industrial Europe. Germans became more urban and their livelihood was very much more dependent upon industry. Overseas migration slowed dramatically as employment opportunities expanded within Germany. Instead of sending land-starved emigrants abroad to the United States and elsewhere, regions like the Ruhr attracted eastern Germans and Poles to mine coal and tend blast furnaces. In 1881, 4.89 percent of the German population emigrated abroad. In 1910, only 0.39 percent did so. In 1871, only 4.8 percent of the population lived in cities with a population of over 100,000. In 1910, 21.3 percent of the population did so. The proportion of the population that worked in agriculture declined between 1882 and 1907 from 41.6 percent to 28.4 percent; that which worked in industry increased from 34.8 percent to 42.2 percent.

Social developments fed back into politics. The society of the empire—urban, industrial, mass—proved deeply unsettling to state officials, priests and pastors, middle-class reformers, and ordinary citizens. While migrants to the cities usually found or established networks based upon extended family, village, and religious communities, the very fact that so many Germans were uprooted accentuated fears of urban anomie. The immiseration of a substantial segment of the population living in shanties or crowded tenements, working fourteen-hour shifts, and lacking clean water and sanitation, conditions publicized by investigative journalists and reformers, seemed to threaten the very survival of the German people. The expansion of female factory labor aroused fears that gender proprieties and the family itself were being subverted.

The “social question,” the general label for these responses, charged politics in the new empire, leading to new forms of state intervention. In the 1880s Germans pioneered the modern welfare state with three key programs: old-age pensions, accident insurance for work-related injuries, and health insurance. Bismarck had viewed these programs as a way of binding workers to the state and undermining the appeal of socialism. He was right on the first count, wrong on the second. By and large, German workers came to appreciate the benefits they received, however minimal at first. The programs did little to undermine the appeal of socialism, but they did help convince leaders of the German labor movement that improvements for workers would have to come from the state. Moreover, these programs were geared toward male industrial workers and their dependents. As such they helped constitute workers as a class structured by gender, since women workers were either barred totally from the programs or received reduced benefits. Social-welfare programs normalized the patriarchal male breadwinner, even when very few working-class families could subsist solely on one male wage. At the same time, working women were subject to ever increasing supervision by employers and state officials, who sought to ensure that workplace and living conditions would not detract from their roles as housewives and mothers.

The rise of socialism marked another major response to the crisis of industrialization and a new form of the politicization of social conflicts. Never solely political, German socialism grew out of the networks

of sociability that workers created in pubs, courtyards, and street corners of working-class neighborhoods and in the factories and mines in which they labored. The close links, spatial and social, between work and community created the substratum for successful socialist organizing. The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) helped accentuate a consciousness of class among people who already shared similar working and living conditions. While most of the SPD’s specific activities were local—demonstrations at the market square, voting, paying dues—they were replicated all over Germany and reported in the nationally circulated socialist newspapers.

Mass political organizing was facilitated by new technologies of transportation and communications. A newspaper culture had also emerged throughout central Europe; dailies espousing varying perspectives competed for readership in the big cities. The pace of travel quickened. In Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, it was possible to travel easily by rail. Train stations in all of the major cities of central Europe were simultaneously symbols of a modernized local civic pride and links to the national and international realms. The Leipzig train station, the busiest in Europe, was the major connector between east and west and north and south. It was a magnificent soaring steel skeleton framed by glass panels and boasting over thirty platforms.

By around 1890, these social and economic transformations together allowed for the full-blown emergence of a public sphere on a national scale.

Moreover, the public broadened as virtually all segments of society, from workers to women, businessmen to peasants, became more vocal and organized; the public sphere was far more multidimensional, far less exclusively liberal, bourgeois, and male than it had been in the first half of the nineteenth century. For the most part in Germany, the national scale became accepted as the locus of effective political organization. To win support for their interests, groups could no longer operate solely on the local or regional level. In contrast, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where ethnically based nation building countered centralizing impulses, the construction of a national public sphere was more uneven.

Central European socialists pioneered many of the techniques of modern political mobilization, but their opponents used these techniques as well. The 1890s also saw the emergence of a populist right, evident especially in the founding and expansion of a large number of nationalist pressure groups like the Naval League, the Colonial Society, the Agrarian League, and others. Typically, these were organized by people from the middle and upper classes, who sought to influence workers, employees, and peasants. They lobbied, sponsored leafleting campaigns, demonstrations, and petition drives, and engaged in electoral politics. These groups espoused an ideology of extreme nationalism and anti-Semitism; they promoted military expansion and the acquisition of colonies, and they supported an authoritarian political system.

Through their appeals to antifeminism and racism they radicalized conservatism and moved the right, including traditional conservatives of the Protestant middle and upper classes, toward a rhetoric and politics of nationalism that emphasized race and biology.

This tendency was exacerbated as well by international developments. By the 1890s, Germany had joined the European rush to establish colonies in Africa and the Pacific. The hunger for raw materials like cotton and the competition for markets were among the lures that led German businessmen to join with naval proponents and argue for global empire. A hungry public lapped up imperial exotica that became part of a new, commercial culture: African people were put on display at carnivals; Asian dance groups performed in Berlin. Karl Peters's memoir, *New Light on Dark Africa*, was an 1890s bestseller that described Peters's use of guns, whips, and fire to teach Africans "what the Germans are." The notion of *Bildung* was now supplemented by an imperialist and racialized understanding of the cultural order; German civilization contrasted with the primitive world encountered in overseas empire.

THE RENEGOTIATION OF STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS: WORLD WAR I AND THE 1920s

The next stage of renegotiation of state-society boundaries came in World War I, which required an un-

precedented mobilization of society. The army drafted men and reoriented resources, human and material, into the war economy. Beyond its intensified control over the economy, the wartime government found it necessary to maintain morale at home and at the front, a task fraught with contradictions. The state moved into even the most intimate spheres of life. While the army provided soldiers with prostitutes, women at home came under increasing moral scrutiny. Since the state provided soldiers' wives with allowances, it also claimed the right to supervise their conduct.

But increased state intervention into the economy and everyday life also politicized these spheres. As conditions deteriorated drastically by 1916, both at home and the front, unrest grew exponentially. The workplace became an extension of the public sphere. Workers in munitions plants, including women drawn from other industrial sectors or the countryside, talked among themselves about the difficulties of work and the loss of loved ones. Leaflets composed by more radical socialist workers circulated surreptitiously. They demanded adequate food supplies, less onerous working conditions, and, most defiantly, an end to the war and the establishment of democracy. By 1917 there was shoptalk about the Russian Revolution, or of gains to be won by a strike. Strikes for food, pay, and peace multiplied in the summer of 1917. Another site of public debate, a primarily female one, emerged in the course of the war. In marketplaces and city squares and in the nearby countryside, women demonstrated and rioted against merchants whom they accused of charging exorbitant prices for food; together they foraged and stole from the fields.

All these actions—food riots and strikes, demonstrations, and foraging trips—were directed not just at employers and merchants but ultimately at the

state itself. The massive popular upsurge against desperate wartime conditions contributed to the state's collapse in the face of military defeat. Some of the wartime innovations in the public sphere became institutionalized in the local workers' and soldiers' councils that seized power throughout Germany in the fall of 1918. In these councils, trade unionists, workers, officials, and employers attempted to lay the groundwork for a new social order to arise out of the revolutionary situation. The councils—as their name indicated—gave political authority to associates from military units and workplaces, especially in the heavy industries of coal and steel. They were thus overwhelmingly masculine in character. The visionaries could not so easily incorporate the new female forms of activity. Under the interim government and in the Weimar regime established in 1919, the marketplace with its mainly female consumers was a sphere to be regulated, not a site for the exercise of power.

During the Weimar Republic (1919–1933), the state became more interventionist, though its activities were increasingly subject to critique. Industrial development reached a certain plateau, but not stability, as labor and management battled for control over the workplace. Gender and the family became highly politicized sites as women's rights, sexuality, and reproduction were opened to discussion, experimentation, and contest.

In many ways, Weimar fulfilled the liberal promise; it was a parliamentary nation-state. But more open political contention made social and cultural rifts even more apparent. The unending round of elections provided focal points of political activism, as did mass campaigns like the one to repeal restrictive abortion laws. Strikes were a frequent occurrence in the first half of the decade. The socialist movement fractured, resulting in two leftist parties, Social Democratic and Communist. In their competition for workers' loyalties, these two parties recruited a higher percentage of the working class than ever before, and organized more deeply in workplaces and working-class communities. Hundreds of thousands of workers participated in choirs, theaters, sports clubs, hiking groups, and other associations sponsored by the labor parties.

On the far right a plethora of groups emerged—extreme nationalist, racist, and anti-Semitic. They foisted the problems of the 1920s onto Jews and socialists, who were portrayed as betrayers of the nation. The right gave a highly charged, violent tenor to social and political life in the 1920s. But the communists and, less consistently, the socialists also contributed to this trend. Both the right and the communists extolled violence as the path to the future and built paramilitary groups. The style of both political groups

drew upon the long-standing idealization of the military in German culture, but took on a new, mass form in the 1920s, legitimizing everyday political violence.

Economically, the 1920s demonstrated the perils of both autarky and international linkages. Germany's territorial losses had disrupted the steel industry; subsequent domestic reorientation, designed to foster German self-reliance in coal and steel, brought only limited success. The chemical industry lost its monopoly of the world synthetic dyes market. Agricultural producers were battered by deflated prices caused by worldwide overproduction. Following American leadership, "rationalization" of the labor process became a slogan of the 1920s and was applied to everything from factory to farm to household. Its success in strict economic terms is much debated; socially, it led to speedup, further diminution of workers' control over their own labor, and substantial unemployment.

Hyperinflation in 1923, rooted in war debt and government efforts to undermine reparations, undermined security. In the autumn of 1923, one dollar could purchase almost 14 billion marks. The middle class suffered as savings became worthless, while workers again experienced the misery of wildly escalating prices, shortages, and unemployment. The agreements that ended the inflation tied Germany more firmly to the international, largely American, economy. At first, the benefits were substantial, as American capital flowed into Germany. But when the American economy crashed, American banks called in their loans, spreading the depression rapidly and forcefully to Germany. Like the hyperinflation, the depression beginning in 1929 caused intense political disorientation, which ultimately redounded to the benefit of the radical right.

Cultural innovations, many of them building on prewar precedents, also added to political polarization. The cinema came fully of age in the 1920s, and movie palaces were built all over central Europe. This cheap entertainment brought the world of film stars and glamour to even small-town audiences. By the end of the decade, the radio brought news, sporting events, and music into homes. Cultural modernists among the communists deployed the new media. The brilliant Willie Münzenberg adapted the bourgeois medium of illustrated magazines for working-class audiences with the highly successful *Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung* (Workers' Illustrated Magazine).

Among the cultural icons of the 1920s, the "new woman" was of particular political significance. Slender, active, sexually emancipated, employed, and childless, she was touted in popular magazines, posters, and films. She was also a focal point of intense political conflicts, especially as it became possible for

real women to claim aspects of the emancipated life the cultural images promised. Not only were young women going to dance halls and wearing short skirts, they also sought birth control. Left-wing health care professionals and social workers even provided sex counseling and contraceptives to working-class women in clinics that were subsidized by the municipalities. To more conservative elements, the new woman was the symbol of everything that was wrong in German society. In the 1920s the hostility aroused by the new woman fed into radical nationalism, as women's supposed lack of devotion to family and fatherland were seen as the root of social conflicts. Sexuality became a major topic of public discussion. Sexual politics became one of the right's major weapons against the Republic, and in both Germany and Austria antifeminist crusades facilitated the transition of conservatives from nationalist political parties to the fascist right.

Weimar also brought real social change and new opportunities for women. Granted the vote in 1919, women were initially courted by all the political parties, and a substantial number held office. In city councils and social-welfare agencies professional women played prominent roles. More women attended universities than ever before. In other social arenas, cities under social democratic leadership made great gains in building new housing for workers and expanding access to health care. One of the great milestones of social-welfare legislation, a national unemployment insurance program, was created in 1927. These mea-

tures undoubtedly improved the quality of life. They were, however, accompanied by enhanced supervision of daily life. In the Frankfurt housing developments, for example, models visited by municipal leaders from all over Europe, each apartment had a speaker wired to the director's office, from which he delivered announcements and speeches to residents. The legacy of the Weimar period was thus ambiguous. The state's interventionist tendencies remained, but Weimar's liberal constitution protected civil liberties and the autonomy of institutions like the family, churches, and the associations of civil society. The Nazi state would overthrow these limitations.

STATE OVER SOCIETY IN NAZI GERMANY

The Nazis assumed power in 1933 with the backing of a substantial segment of the German population (they had won 37 percent of the vote in 1932), but they were not voted into power by an electoral majority. Instead, the Nazis were brought into government by a camarilla of powerful individuals around President von Hindenburg. These army officers, nobles, big businessmen, and state officials made Hitler chancellor not because they were enthralled with him and his party but rather because they had exhausted the other political possibilities acceptable to them and the interests they represented. No chancellor or government had been able to fulfill their program to move Germany out of the depression, restore its great-power status, repress socialism and communism, and establish an authoritarian order in place of Weimar democracy. They agreed with Hitler's extreme nationalism and anticommunism; they either agreed with his anti-Semitism or found it unworthy of concern. The roughly one-third of the electorate that supported the Nazis had similar views. Some radical anti-Semites supported the Nazis for this reason. But most Germans were not mobilized by Nazi anti-Semitism. Compared to other European nations, Germans were not remarkably anti-Semitic in 1933. All that would change drastically in the ensuing twelve years.

There are certainly lines of continuity that connect the Third Reich to earlier German regimes. But the central reality of the Third Reich is that a radical right-wing political party assumed power and adapted the resources and techniques of a highly modern state and society to a new end: the creation and advancement of a racially pure German nation. In so doing, the Nazis broke radically with previous patterns of state and society in German history. The "racial state" threw overboard all previously existing limitations—

ethical, religious, legal, and constitutional—on state power. The Nazi state banned political opposition, sought to diminish and ultimately eliminate the Christian churches, abolished the traditional lawfulness of state bureaucracy, radically limited the powers of businessmen and managers, and subjected the army to Hitler's personal command. The fact that so many people—pastors, industrialists, army officers, and state officials—supported or acquiesced to Nazi policy does not in any way undermine the contention that they departed from historical precedent to do so. The racial state offered visions of greater glory; on a more mundane level, it offered collaborators, professionals in particular, career advancement and wealth; most simply took advantage of the opportunities. The racial state was also a "total state," at least in ambition. In return for the advantages and benefits bestowed upon them, Nazi supporters acquiesced to the Nazi state's assertion of its right to intervene and regulate every aspect of life.

Racial politics constituted the core of the Nazi program. Its aim was a *Volksgemeinschaft*, an organically unified and racially select community. Nazism always envisaged a society of domination and subordination, with the inferior races allowed to survive to provide menial labor for Aryans, the racially elect Germans. This racial utopia could only be established by struggle. Jews constituted the preeminent enemy, the people who threatened the very existence of Aryans. Nazi rhetoric was infused with biological and sexual metaphors; Jews were the "cancer" or the "bacillus" that threatened the healthy Aryan body and had to be eliminated. The physical annihilation of Jews was certainly not planned at the outset of Nazi rule; the initial plans usually called for elimination through deportation. The exigencies of war—itself a manifestation of racial politics—and the internal dynamics of the Nazi system radicalized the solution, leading to the physical extermination of close to 6 million European Jews.

While the Holocaust was the ultimate and most radical manifestation of Nazi racial politics, an array of other racist measures laid the groundwork. The Nazis implemented programs of compulsory sterilization and killing of the mentally and physically handicapped. They isolated, interned, sterilized, and executed large numbers of Roma and Sinti (Gypsies). "Asocials," a highly elastic category that could include everyone from political opponents to alcoholics, the work-shy, promiscuous women, jazz fans, and homosexuals, were packed off to concentration camps. In all of these programs, the Nazis moved the management of society and everyday life to the epicenter of state policies in the most radically interventionist state program ever seen.

But for the vast majority of Germans, the experience of Nazi society was very different. By promoting war-related industries, the Nazis revived the economy, eliminating the burden of unemployment. By 1936 full employment returned. While wages were kept at a low level, more family members were working, so household income increased. The Nazis honored workers and Aryan mothers, enhancing their status in society. The German Labor Front offered workers social amenities that few had enjoyed before, like Rhine cruises and vacations in the Alps. The Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls provided youth with the pleasures of peer-group companionship, and an escape from church and parents. All of these developments of the Nazi “social revolution” helped the regime win the loyalty of the German population. There were, of course, opponents, but Gestapo repression was largely successful in eliminating organized communist and socialist resistance. Discontent was rife when food shortages appeared, or when Nazi officials received preference from the local butcher or baker. By the late 1930s, workers were complaining about low wages. But none of this grumbling gelled into active resistance. Overall, the Nazis had largely succeeded in destroying the old solidarities of class, replacing them with the solidarity of race and the promise of national and racial aggrandizement.

POSTWAR RESTRUCTURING

At the end of World War II, Germany lay devastated, the country divided and occupied by the victorious Allied powers. Ultimately the national scale would survive, but in altered form. Two distinct German nation-states, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), joined Austria and Switzerland, whose prewar borders were preserved. Both German states and Austria were subordinated in an international system marked by the rivalry of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In the postwar political order of central Europe, the international scale took on a new significance.

In the FRG (developments were similar in Austria), the basic structures of the liberal state and the market economy were firmly in place by 1949. The Allies, especially the Americans, repressed any radical plans for either social restructuring or widespread de-Nazification. Indeed, many old elites, businessmen, army officers, and state officials made an easy accommodation so long as they abandoned overt affection for Nazism. Through international monetary arrangements, the Marshall Plan and others, West Germany's

“social market economy” became firmly integrated into the U.S.-led international system. The benefits of the ensuing economic boom trickled down by the late 1950s. West Germans largely retreated into the private realm, experienced as a refuge after the incessant claims of the Nazi state and the economic hardships from 1943 to 1949. West Germans worked hard, saved, and spent on consumer goods. The automobile became the symbol of the age, the icon for which they worked and which enabled them to vacation all over Europe. Probably more than anyplace else in Europe, Germany was becoming “Americanized,” even while many traditional features of German society remained strong. Social historians are devoting increasing attention to postwar Germany, finding some surprising continuities in social and gender structure into the 1950s, but afterward, in West Germany, more substantial change.

The West German postwar system, liberal and capitalist in its essentials, was marked by a higher quotient of welfare measures and more active labor union participation than many other Western societies. Social-welfare programs had survived through all the regime changes of the twentieth century, and benefits became more generous. The strictures of the programs continued to reinforce the gender hierarchy, as they had in the nineteenth century, with women disadvantaged and sometimes completely excluded from benefits. Despite the large number of households headed by single women, the nuclear family with the male breadwinner quickly reemerged as the norm. The formal labor participation rate of women remained low in comparison to other European countries, although it crept up throughout the 1950s.

A very different pattern developed in the GDR. While the Western Allies sought to reestablish elements of the pre-Nazi social structure in their area of influence, the Soviets pursued a radical transformation. Controlling the region of Junker estate agriculture, they quickly collectivized land, finally eliminating the social basis of noble power. State control of industry eliminated the powers of entrepreneurial and managerial classes. With an entirely new governmental and security apparatus in the East, the leading members were anything but old elites. As a self-proclaimed “workers’ and peasants’ state,” the GDR actively promoted social mobility. Thousands of citizens from lower-class backgrounds were given opportunities for advanced training and education, enabling them to move up the occupational ladder. Yet a kind of retreat to the private developed in the GDR as well, as many lives were structured by a determination to get ahead coupled with a feeling that the intimate world of

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family and friends was the only safe place, a refuge from the unceasing claims of the state.

As a Soviet-style state, the GDR tightly controlled its citizenry. The Ministry for State Security became a vast apparatus that spied on the population. Tied to the Soviet rather than the American economy—and subject to Soviet reparations into the 1950s—living conditions were quite straitened well into the 1960s. The GDR had the highest labor force participation of women in the world. While women were accorded formal equality with men, the labor market remained segmented, with women largely con-

finned to low-paying jobs. Women also managed the vast bulk of household labor even while they worked full-time jobs. At the same time, they did have broad educational opportunities. Beginning in the 1970s, when state and party leader Erich Honecker proclaimed the “unity of economic and social policies,” women were granted important social benefits, like extensive maternity leave.

In the aggressive international economy of the 1980s, the GDR fell further and further behind. When Mikhail Gorbachev introduced economic and political reforms in the Soviet Union, the communist

world quickly crumbled. In the GDR, discontent had been on the rise through the 1980s; dissident groups founded a protest movement that demanded democratic socialism. In the context of the international changes initiated in Moscow, the public sphere re-emerged in East Germany. Moreover, by summer 1989 East Germans crowded into the Federal Republic's embassies in Prague and Budapest, demanding the right to settle in the West. In the fall of 1989, the combined force of protest demonstrations and exodus led to the collapse of the government, an exhilarating moment for people until then resigned to a heavy-handed state.

The exhilaration did not last long. The moment was dominated, and ultimately limited, by West German visions of state and society, which promised East Germans instant prosperity in return for reunification.

The transition has proven difficult. Germans, indeed all central Europeans, now live in a world of intense economic competition, regional disparities, and multiculturalism. The region's population is increasingly diverse. Some communities, like the Turks, are seen as immigrants despite three generations of residence. In Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, the definition of the nation and the relation between state and society continue to be debated. The nation-state remains significant, though borders altered once again in 1990. Since then the international scale has become ever more important. Negotiating the relationship between state and society, a persistent problem of central European history, will become more complex in the new century as international economic developments, international migration streams, and international organizations have an ever greater impact on social life.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE NORDIC COUNTRIES



Panu Pulma

The principalities of Sweden and Denmark-Norway took their shape in the sixteenth century. Gustavus Vasa of Sweden ascended to the throne in 1523, while Christian III became king of Denmark in 1534, bringing the independent kingdom of Norway to an end. The consolidation of monarchy gained further momentum from the incipient Lutheran reformation, but a centralized state power did not, however, come about swiftly or suddenly in either kingdom nor were its consequences similar. Sweden (including the Finnish provinces) became a unitary state with a unitary legislation and a fairly uniform administration. Exceptions to the rule were the conquered lands south of the Baltic Sea (such as Swedish Pomerania), but Swedish law and administration were imposed on another conquered land, Scania, immediately after it was won from Denmark in 1658. The Scanian peasantry was integrated into the state system as one of the four estates—the Swedish diet was an assembly for the nobility, clergy, burgesses, and peasants—and given power at the local parish level.

In contrast, the kingdom of Denmark-Norway was a typical European conglomerate state. The sovereignty of the Danish king covered areas with different systems of administration and legislature: Norway applied its own law, also in use in the Faroe Islands, whereas Iceland was ruled centrally from Copenhagen, but as a separate legislative unit. The duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, too, were entities of their own. The Scandinavian kings ruled over large and sparsely populated areas with heterogeneous economies and social structures.

Seventeenth-century European history was about war and state-building. The two were linked, and the Scandinavian countries did not escape either. Sweden and Denmark-Norway fought over supremacy in the Baltic, and Sweden became embroiled in a struggle against Russia's growing influence. To succeed in the contest, the Scandinavian countries, mainly dependent on agrarian production, needed resources that could only be produced through a reliable military and bureaucratic machinery. The creation of this ma-

chinery—the centralized state power—was key in molding the Scandinavian social order.

While important variations exist in the social histories of the individual regions in Scandinavia, there are some unifying themes. Scandinavian society in the early modern centuries was distinguished from other parts of western Europe by its highly agrarian character, as well as by the extent of the government's impact on society. Aided by pervasive Lutheranism, government efforts led to high literacy rates beginning in the early modern period. In many cases, this resulted in exceptionally good record-keeping, which has allowed social historians to undertake detailed studies of such topics as demography.

The nineteenth century in Scandinavia was marked by rapid population growth and high rates of emigration. Industrialization brought many familiar features, but by the late nineteenth century Scandinavia began in some ways to set itself apart from most of industrialized western Europe, particularly with its rapid development of a reformist welfare state and with changes in women's rights and, later, family forms. In these areas many Scandinavian countries anticipated trends that subsequently played themselves out in the rest of Europe, and they took these trends farther than most countries. As a result, foreign attention repeatedly turned to Scandinavian social history—whether as a model or as a target for criticism.

PEASANT SOCIETY UNDER PRESSURE

The population of the Nordic countries was small and unevenly distributed, estimated to have risen from 1.6 million to 2.6 million in the course of the sixteenth century. The population concentrated in the heartlands, but the fastest growth took place on the fringes: there were three times more Danes than Norwegians in the early sixteenth century, but three hundred years later the Danes outnumbered the Norwegians by only 10 to 20 percent. The population of 1.9 million in Denmark-Norway in 1800 included a million Danes,

just under 900,000 Norwegians, and 50,000 inhabitants in Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Among the subjects of the Swedish crown, there were three times more Swedes than Finns in the sixteenth century, five times more in the early eighteenth century but only two and a half times more in the year 1800 (2.3 million in Sweden; 830,000 in Finland). The population and economic importance of Norway and Finland grew considerably in the eighteenth century in particular.

Scandinavia was predominantly rural throughout the early modern era. Only the capitals, Stockholm and Copenhagen, stood out in European terms: the population of Copenhagen grew from 70,000 to almost 100,000 in the eighteenth century, while Stockholm's population almost doubled from more than 40,000 to more than 70,000 people. Except for the busy trading port of Bergen in Norway, other Scandinavian towns remained commercially stunted and under close state control. The principalities relied on the countryside instead.

The core agricultural lands in Denmark (including Scania), mid-Sweden, and southwestern Finland had mostly passed to the hands of the nobility as early as the Middle Ages. However, the countryside took different routes of development. Noble estates

and a peasantry tied to their lords became common in southern Scandinavia. Burdened with strict labor services, peasants were forbidden to leave the estates without permission. Where 15–20 percent of Danish peasants had been independent at the beginning of the sixteenth century, only 2 percent retained their independence in the 1680s. Until the late eighteenth century, the conditions of serfdom in Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were similar to those found east of the river Elbe. The economic, social, ecological, and political pressures of the eighteenth century finally spurred an agrarian reform that gave birth to an independent peasantry also in Denmark. The transition from *Gutherrschaft* (in which the landlord's economy is based on the work of dependent peasants on the manorial lands) to *Grundherrschaft* (in which the landlord receives rent or other revenue from peasant landholdings) is a peculiar and much-debated process, which nevertheless made the social structure of the Danish countryside more typically Nordic. Manorial estates were few in Norway and nonexistent in Iceland.

Swedish peasantry could be divided into three categories: freehold tax-paying peasants (*skattebönder*); peasants on crown land (*kronbönder*); and peasants

on noble estates (*frälsebönder*), whose owners enjoyed tax-free status in return for services rendered to the crown. Lacking all political rights, the *frälsebönder* were in the weakest position, but they never lost their personal freedom and, in contrast to Denmark, the Swedish lords of the manor did not have the right to administer justice over their peasants.

The nobility in seventeenth-century Scandinavia grew stronger, as the state needed ever more revenue to maintain growing armies. At first, the crown allowed for an expansion of tax-free *frälse* land, thus gaining much-wanted manpower in the army. In the eastern parts of the Swedish realm, and in Finland, the number of *frälsebönder* tripled as early as the end of the sixteenth century. In 1655, the nobility held 65 and 58 percent of the arable land in Sweden and Finland, respectively. However, in the seventeenth century the crown counteracted its previous policy, because the large-scale transfer of crown land to the noble estates was eating away at the tax base. When royal absolutism was introduced in Denmark (1660), it became possible for any man of wealth to own a manorial demesne, irrespective of his birth. In Sweden, the Crown carried out a large-scale cancellation of donations to the nobility in the late seventeenth century, transferring great numbers of peasants from the category of *frälsebönder* to that of crown peasants. Out of the Finnish peasant holdings, as many as 70 percent were crown estates. By the mid-eighteenth

century, a third of the Swedish farms, but only 7 percent in Finland, were on tax-free *frälse* land owned by the nobility.

The need for officials in the much-expanded state machinery shifted the emphasis from a landed nobility to a service nobility, whose economic interests were not as immediately tied to the land as they had been in the early seventeenth century. In Denmark, the large estates began to be transferred into the hands of the nonnobility in the 1600s, in Sweden a century later. Norway and Sweden underwent an even bigger change: crown estates and church tenant estates were increasingly being bought as independent tax-paying estates. In the course of the eighteenth century, this strengthened the economic, social, and political status of the peasantry, although land was obviously ceded to other groups in the society as well. The absolutist Swedish king Gustavus III was forced to buy the support of the lower estates in 1789 by granting them the right to own tax-free land and by improving the state of the crown peasants. At the time, the transfer of tax-free land from the nobility, often badly in debt, to the clergy and the burghesses, but also to wealthy peasants, was in full swing in Sweden, too. In Iceland, where agriculture was possible only on a narrow coastal strip, the biggest landowner was the church, but the clergy and officials also owned estates in large numbers, occupied by tenant farmers.

Peasant households. Whether Scandinavian agriculture was based on manorial estates or (semi)independent peasant farms, farming nevertheless relied on peasant families, whose lives were bound by restrictions on farm ownership and the demands imposed by coping with increasing responsibilities. As in northwest Europe, the typical Scandinavian family type was the three-generational stem family. One of the sons would inherit the estate or tenure to it, but the old farmer and his wife would still live on the farm. Normally, the peasant household also had one or more maids or farmhands. Because the transfer of farm ownership was governed by many administrative restrictions (permission from the lord of the manor or crown official), the son would get to his inheritance fairly late in life, which in turn raised the average marriage age. The families therefore remained fairly small: three to four persons made for an average Danish peasant household in the eighteenth century, while the average size in Norway and Iceland—where peasants were free from such restrictions and thus could marry earlier—was seven persons, and households there often included more distant relatives.

As a rule, the family structure and size in the old Scandinavian rural society reflected the economic and social status of the family. The households of the nobility and clergy could be very large indeed, making room even for unmarried relatives, whereas the landless families were typically nuclear. This is evident in the development of the Åland archipelago, part of the heartland of the Swedish realm: in the seventeenth century, when most of the population were peasants with their own land, the number of extended families could rise to more than 30 percent of households. With the rapid rise in the number of landless households in the eighteenth century, the family structure became simpler and the share of large extended families decreased to less than 10 percent.

Family size was also affected by the system of production. Before their landless population grew in the eighteenth century, the Åland islanders, living off fishing and the sea, and the tar-burning inhabitants of Finnish Ostrobothnia could live well in complex family systems. In eastern and southeastern Finland, where labor-intensive slash-and-burn agriculture and haulage of goods to St. Petersburg were increasingly important, the extended family was the common family type. The different partnership-type households typical of the region ensured an adequate workforce on the farms, which functioned like conglomerate companies. Each family was allotted certain responsibilities, which were outlined in a legally binding document; disputes between families were often resolved in court. People married earlier than elsewhere in the

Nordic countries, because marriage was not tied to land tenure or to the division of the inheritance. The old farmer or his widow was head of the farm until his or her death. Likewise, there were fewer landless people and births outside wedlock than in the rest of the Nordic area. Even if the prevalence of the large and complex households in these eastern and northern parts is easiest explained in socioeconomic terms, we cannot completely overlook cultural factors. Complex families were also common in Russia, the Baltic countries, and eastern central Europe as far as the Balkans.

Loose population and other vagrants. People relegated to the margins for one reason or another were an integral part of the old society. In an estate society, “official” status was only granted to those unable to work and to the infirm and poor, who ended up being the responsibility of parish poor relief. Among the marginalized were also different travelers’ groups, vagrants, prostitutes, and people engaged in despised trades. The state resorted to ever-tightening vagrant restrictions and forced labor for the Crown to control the marginal population.

In the seventeenth century, when life was burdened with continuous wars and army recruitments, vagrants able to work had little chance to escape the control machinery of the state, even if estate owners and peasants facing labor shortages were willing to employ them and could to a certain extent protect them. A new category emerged in vagrant restrictions as early as the sixteenth century—the “Egyptians,” who were beginning to be known as *zigenare* or *tattare* in the seventeenth century. The Roma (or Gypsies) were kept under close surveillance because of their foreign origin and traveling way of life. Apparently, in the other Nordic countries, the Roma started to mix with other marginal vagrant groups in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they called themselves the “travelers.” In Finland, however, where the wilderness was out of reach of state control and where there was a demand for the services of the traveling Roma among the sparse population, no such mixing took place. When Finland was annexed as an autonomous region to the Russian empire in 1809, the Finnish Roma population joined that of Russia and the Baltic area.

Birth of the rural proletariat. The need to secure an adequate workforce led to the birth of a new type of worker. Tenant farmers on manorial estates could not increase their daily workload indefinitely, so the lords of the manors started to set aside land in order

to establish small crofts. In Denmark, the crofters were called *husmaend*, in Norway *husmann*, and in Sweden they were known as *torpare*. Where new settlements could be established, the peasants, too, increased their cultivation by setting up crofts. The Danish *husmaend* already outnumbered the peasants in places at the end of the seventeenth century, while elsewhere in the Nordic countries the crofter class started to grow vigorously in the mid-1700s. This coincided with the rapidly increasing population growth in general. Many peasant farms resorted to setting up crofts to settle the sons' inheritance.

The *husmaend/husmann/torpare* were an intermediate category of sorts between the landowners and the landless population. Their social status varied dramatically according to whether the croft was part of a manorial demesne, established to alleviate a labor shortage; a new settlement on a peasant holding; or part of an inheritance settlement, in which case the croft could have significant cultivation of its own.

Underneath the crofters there grew even more vigorously a heterogeneous landless class. This new proletariat was separate from the servant population, who were hired for a year at a time and whose time in service usually finished with their getting married. The new proletariat were often already married and lived in their own cottages on somebody else's farm or on the village common land. They paid their rent mainly in work and had no cultivation of their own, at most only a small vegetable plot and a couple of livestock, grazing on common village grounds. Members of this class went by several names: *inderster* and *indsittere* in Denmark; *gadehusmand* in Denmark and Scania; *arbeidhusmann* and *strandsittere* in Norway; *backstugusittare* and *inhysing* in Sweden; and *itsellinen*, *loinen*, and *kesti* in Finland. The poorest among them did not even have a cottage of their own, but would live under other people's feet, in the drying-houses and saunas of the peasantry.

Rather than hiring a large workforce year round, the peasant household needed a reliably available seasonal workforce. This is where the landless population, reasonably stationary, proved vital. It was also this section of the population that grew quickest from the late eighteenth century onward.

The rapid population increase, the growth of the rural proletariat, and the agricultural reforms changed the social structure of the countryside. The peasantry started to form an intermediate group in society, a rural middle class that, together with the clergy, civil servants, and other burgesses, was in charge of local administration. Ever more conscious of its own estate and status, the peasantry demanded a say in the political processes either through the po-

litical system (Sweden and Finland) or through protest and rebellion (Norway).

Sami regions squeezed by population growth.

The Sami people, also known as Lapps, differ from the Scandinavians both genetically and linguistically. The Sami region, known as Sameännam, consisted of different ecological environments that left their mark on Sami sources of livelihood, ways of life, and culture. The Skolt and Kola Peninsula Sami relied on hunting and trading for their livelihood. Their life was inextricably tied to the Russian Orthodox cultural sphere. The sea Sami of the North Atlantic and Arctic Sea coasts lived off hunting, fishing, and trade. The fell (pelt) Sami used to occupy areas in both Norway and Sweden, and in Sweden in particular they adapted their way of life to the annual reindeer migrations between the Swedish woods and the Norwegian coast. The forest Sami of Sweden and Finland drew their livelihood from the wilderness, living in a more confined area than did the nomadic fell Sami. It was the forest Sami who came to bear the brunt of the population growth, as there was a persistent migration of Finns from the southern parts of Finland to the north. The slash-and-burn farming, fishing, and hunting Finns pushed the forest Sami ever farther north. With the colonizing push, the Sami increasingly started to settle down, tending the reindeer and farming their small farms. Communication and intermarriage with the colonists was common.

State-building processes at first interfered little with the Samis' largely nomadic way of life, although their taxation began already in the Middle Ages. When the consolidation of centralized states began, however, there emerged a need to draw the borders more clearly. This proved especially harmful to the fell Samis. The states were primarily concerned with tax collection, and the Lapp Codicil enclosed in the border agreement between Sweden and Denmark in 1751 regulated this matter. The agreement also guaranteed the Sami right to their traditional livelihoods and free passage across the borders, and even made provision for Sami officials to supervise the passage. However, the agreement that the Sami have called their Magna Carta failed to protect them against the pressure later caused by the migration of Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish populations to traditional Sami regions. The Sami in Finland found it especially hard that Russia, of which Finland was then part, canceled the Lapp Codicil in 1852. This stopped the free passage of Finnish Sami over to Sweden and Norway. At the same time, nationalistic policies all over the Nordic countries were starting to make ever more significant inroads into the Sami language, culture, and way of life.

BREAKUP OF THE SOCIETY OF ESTATES

Population growth was rapid in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as mortality rates, and infant mortality in particular, kept falling and birthrates remained high. The Nordic countries went through a “revolution of life,” followed by decreasing birthrates from the late nineteenth century onward, first in towns and central areas, and then, in the early years of the twentieth century, on the peripheries, too. The populations of Denmark and Finland almost tripled in 1814–1914, and the populations of Sweden and Norway doubled despite the fact that almost three million Scandinavians emigrated before 1920, mainly to North America. Some of the emigrants did return, but the emigration from Norway, in particular, was truly large-scale. In relative terms, the only countries to see off more emigrants than Norway were Ireland and Italy. There was also sizeable immigration to the New World from Sweden, but less from Denmark, Finland, and Iceland. Emigration from these countries also started later than from Norway and Sweden, where the massive emigration of young men left its mark in the demographic and labor force structure.

The rapid population growth in the country and the beginning of the massive migrations of the nineteenth century were part of a fundamental change

in society. Urbanization, emigration, and internal colonization all took place at the same time. Toward the latter part of the nineteenth century, the wood and paper industry also gave rise to new growth centers in previously sparsely populated areas. Still, industrialization did not cause the breakup of the society of estates, although it did speed up the process.

The Nordic society based on the hierarchy of four estates had begun to crumble while still at its peak. Outside the stilted estate structure, there was a power base of nonnoble officials and entrepreneurs known in Sweden as *ofrälse ståndspersoner*, people of wealth, position, and “quality.” As tax-free land was increasingly granted to nonnobility, the traditional landed gentry found its status weakened. The various elite groups began to mix, and their financial discrepancies evened out.

An even bigger change took place among the rural laborers. The peasantry grew stronger economically, socially, and politically, first in Sweden and Norway, and then also in Denmark, in the nineteenth century. In Norway it was only in the 1800s that the number of peasant farms grew substantially, but there was a rapid increase in all other Nordic countries in the number of crofters and landless peasants. By mid-century, the rural proletariat was the biggest population group in the Nordic countries. The social gap between them and the peasants, who were decreasing in relative terms and getting richer in absolute terms, opened up in more ways than one. The peasantry closed the doors of upward mobility to the landless population, but sought their own ways of moving up the social ladder through education and political involvement.

The change in the peasants’ social status was also seen in the powerful religious awakenings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These movements drew part of their strength from a self-pedagogical and educational strain in evidence throughout Scandinavia (Grundtvigianism in Denmark, Haugeanism in Norway, free-churchism in Sweden, Laestadianism in the north of Sweden and Finland) and shared a critical attitude toward the elite and the Lutheran state church.

Economy, industrialization, and urbanization.

Scandinavian economic and social development were influenced by the changes in European economic structures and international trade. Industrialization in Europe opened up expanding markets to agriculture in western Scandinavia in particular. Agriculture in Denmark and fishing in Norway and Iceland underwent a boom, while forestry in Norway, Sweden, and Finland benefited from a growing demand in Britain

and Germany. The Nordic home market remained undeveloped, leaving economic expansion mainly dependent on export production. This led Nordic industrialization in different directions: the industrial development in Denmark served dairy and cattle farming, while the forest resources in Norway, Sweden, and Finland found their utilization first in sawmills, then in the pulp and paper industry. The Swedes had long made use of their iron ore supplies, which gave them a head start in metal industries and technical engineering, whereas Danes and Norwegians rose to be important seafarers with a shipbuilding industry that also opened up markets for other branches of industry.

Export-led and boosted by industrialization, economic growth leaned on overseas demand and extensive indigenous labor force reserves. The migration from the country to the towns gathered speed, and the social structures of the Nordic countries were shaped by urbanization and industrialization from the 1840s onward. The share of the rural population was already under 60 percent in Denmark in 1840, and in 1870 agriculture employed 44, 54, and 72 percent of the population in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, respectively. In Finland, urbanization had speeded up but did not yet affect the population distribution, be-

cause the growth in rural population continued to exceed the urban growth rate as late as the end of the nineteenth century. Nor did migration to the New World or St. Petersburg, large as it was at times and in places, decrease the growth of the rural proletariat. In Iceland, too, the share of the rural population remained high until the early twentieth century, when the "industrialization" of fishing finally pushed for a change in the economic structure.

Industrial development in Scandinavia gained momentum in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Before World War I, industry employed more than 30 percent of the employable population in Sweden, just under 30 percent in Denmark and Norway, but only 10 percent in Finland. Danish industries were typically small in size, while in the other Nordic countries economic development was led by large-scale industries such as metal and wood processing.

Rise of the urban population. The urban population boom was the result of growth in trade, crafts, industry, construction, and administration and services for the expanding middle class. In 1914, one in every four Swedes and two-fifths of the Danes were town-dwellers. Even in agrarian Finland the urban population made up almost 15 percent of the popu-

lation, and there were tens of thousands of Finns living in St. Petersburg. The capitals were the seats of the most rapid growth: at the beginning of the twentieth century, Copenhagen already had more than half a million inhabitants, while Stockholm had a population of 380,000; Christiania (Oslo) a quarter of a million people; and Helsinki more than 100,000 inhabitants. The trade centers of Gothenburg and Bergen also grew significantly. The development of inland towns and the building of railroads typically went together. The railroads also gave rise to a new type of population center.

Rapid urbanization left the towns heavily segregated. Those who had left the countryside settled on the outskirts of the towns or outside and beyond the town administrative boundaries, in areas that grew into slums. Housing policy turned into an object of speculation: housing costs were high, housing standards poor. The new working-class areas were densely populated, with poor hygienic conditions and a high infant-mortality rate. The situation swiftly improved, however, with the introduction of municipal waterworks and public health care at the turn of the twentieth century. The administration of the urban centers had been rationalized, though not democratized, in the nineteenth-century local government reforms, but national legislation was often used as a stick—and state subsidies as carrots—to make the local bodies carry out effective reforms. Little by little, local self-government was beginning to be controlled more closely by national government.

Urban life and restructuring of the society.

What the urban middle and working classes found in common was the growing separation of work and home. Those who had moved to town from the country were often young and about to be married. In towns, the nuclear family became the norm, even if the middle class kept their servants, and the working class often shared their homes with others. The increasing mass production of consumer goods began to take over from the production of homemade goods, which decreased the need for servants. The middle-class husband worked outside the home, while the wife devoted her life to looking after home and children. The ideal of a family wage was kept alive in working-class families, too: the husband was supposed to provide for his family, but practice usually proved otherwise. The wife and children had to supplement the husband's earnings by working outside the home or by taking in work such as sewing, laundry, and child minding.

The growing social problems in towns—the “dangerous liberty” of working-class children and the

high extramarital birthrates in particular—had been cause for concern to the middle classes and the elites ever since the early nineteenth century. One of the first manifestations of civil society were the philanthropic organizations. Charitable work, teaching, and poor relief were considered suitable areas of social engagement for middle-class women.

Women's organizations and the fact that single women from the upper classes increasingly took up white-collar positions fostered a wider debate about women's status, duties, and rights from the 1840s onward. At the core of practical charitable work and of the social and national debate was the significance of the family, particularly of the mother as the backbone of social and moral upbringing. In societies geared around family farms it was difficult to justify the tradition of male supremacy with a peripheral female status. The man might be the head of the farm, but the wife still held the keys to the larder. The status of boys and girls as inheritors was brought into line without much opposition. Women had started their march toward a public role. The universities opened their doors to them in the 1870s and 1880s. The 1906 parliamentary reform in Finland—enacted in a euphoria of national self-defense against Russian inroads against Finnish autonomy—earned women equal and universal suffrage and the right to stand as candidates in national elections. Other Nordic countries followed suit later.

There were many ways to get involved in civic organizations. National and cultural associations, voluntary fire brigades, savings associations, and agrarian organizations grew more popular in all the Nordic countries from the 1830s onward, and political organization was boosted by the crises that stirred political life and reforms throughout the Nordic countries. The reorganizing and consolidation of the civil society tied in with the diminishing significance of the monarchy, the expansion of political participation, the growing importance of public debate, and the bureaucratization of the state.

The birth of the labor movement was part of this social mobilization. The basis of working-class organization lay in the old trade guilds, extinct in all the Nordic countries by the mid-nineteenth century. Run by middle-class liberals, the first phase of the labor associations was mostly pedagogical in nature, aimed at educating and civilizing the masses. Socialist doctrine began to be widely debated in the press in the 1840s, and the ideas were examined by both middle-class and working-class organizations, although workers' associations did not adopt the socialist line until much later—in the 1870s in Denmark, the 1880s in Sweden and Norway, the 1890s in Finland,

and only in the 1910s in Iceland. Behind the decision to adopt a socialist line lay the reorganization of labor relations, the breakup of patriarchal ties, and the increased frequency of industrial action such as strikes. It was not surprising that trade unions should grow into strong national organizations in early-nineteenth-century Scandinavia. In a limited democracy, the trade unions became even stronger than the political (Social Democratic) movement. In Finland, however, where all political forces were united in national self-defense against Russia, the position of the political labor movement was stronger by far than that of the trade unions.

In the Nordic countries, the agrarian population and the workers typically organized at the same time. This was especially well demonstrated in the breakthrough of the cooperative movement. The Danish peasant movement and production cooperatives gained a prominent status both economically and politically. The working class and in part the rural and urban middle classes, too, favored the consumers' cooperatives, which tied political movements to economic and business life. The cooperative movement grew to be a significant economic power base.

BASIS OF THE WELFARE STATE

The course of nineteenth-century Nordic societies was determined by urbanization and the political involvement of the proletariat. At the local level, the changes meant higher taxes, because one of the core duties of autonomous municipal administrations was to look after the ever-increasing poor relief costs. Attempts to reduce these costs had failed: neither the efforts to create British-style workhouses nor the classically liberal poor relief laws of the 1860s and 1870s, which stressed individual responsibility, had succeeded in bringing down the costs. A crucial factor in the widening economic and social gap between the middle classes and the lower classes was the tightening grip on power at the local level by the middle class. Local government was practiced—and its autonomy boosted by reforms—in all Nordic countries in the nineteenth century. But the rural and urban middle classes did not content themselves with wielding increasing power locally; they wanted their share in national politics as well.

Health insurance and pension reforms in Denmark in the 1890s and Sweden in the 1910s relied on state funding. Rather than stemming from abstract egalitarian ideals, they were born out of the struggle between agrarian parties, the urban middle class, and the conservative elites who had traditionally ruled the

state. The competition was about power, customs duties, and taxation. The labor movement had little initial impact on the reforms, although the status of the working class was an important political argument. When the Nordic countries adopted social security systems, ideals of solidarity and egalitarianism took second place to the old statist traditions. The state-centered nature of politics fostered the aim to create large political coalitions—a politics of consensus—which further reinforced the legitimacy of national politics. With the rise of the labor movement in the twentieth century as a political player of the first degree through reformist Social Democratic Parties, it was natural to continue the egalitarian and universalistic social policy, usually supported by the strong agrarian movements and the middle class. The depression of the 1930s further spurred welfare measures, amid lower levels of political polarization than occurred elsewhere in Europe.

The Nordic countries grew to be important industrial states, albeit at varying dates and rates. Relying on metal and engineering industries, Sweden changed quickest, whereas Finland retained an agrarian character until the 1960s. Agriculture employed 20 percent of the Swedish workforce in 1950, some 25 percent in Denmark and Norway, and almost 50 percent in Finland. The difference was less marked in industry: 40 percent of the Swedish workforce was employed in manufacturing, 35–37 percent in Denmark and Norway, and 28 percent in Finland. The biggest differences in 1950 were in the service sector, which accounted for as much as 47 percent of the workforce in Norway, around 40 percent in Sweden and Denmark, and only 25 percent in Finland. The differences evened out in the years following World War II, which saw the birth of the “Nordic welfare state” as we know it. In 1970, the service sector employed a little more than 50 percent of the workforce in the Scandinavian countries, and 46 percent in Finland.

WELL-ORGANIZED SOCIETY

Twentieth-century Nordic societies were characterized by the high organization rates of the occupational groups. Blue- and white-collar workers' trade union membership and the extent of organization among farmers were among the highest in the world. This corresponded with intense class loyalty in political involvement, which is explained by the ethnic and religious homogeneity of the Nordic countries. National politics has built on a hegemonic tradition guided by prevailing ideological conceptions of the

common good or the interest of the nation, and starting from the 1930s, on coalitions between the labor movement and the agrarian parties in particular.

Another important component of Nordic social policy is the politics of consensus, institutionalized in many ways. The collaboration between labor market organizations and interest groups was elevated to an official policy, particularly in times of crisis and war. After World War II, a special form of consensual politics was seen in so-called social corporatism: social, employment, and tax aims and resolutions were jointly settled by the trade-union movement, employees, and the government. Political settlements were made in conjunction with collective-bargaining agreements.

There are of course differences between the countries, but the fact remains that ever since the 1950s the social conditions in the Nordic countries have been brought into line by joint institutionalized state policies. These helped create a joint labor market for the Nordic countries and a broadly uniform social policy at an early stage. Nordic cooperation also shaped common principles into more or less official “national programs.” These principles include universal social rights; government responsibility in ensuring general welfare; equal opportunities for both sexes and in income distribution (including redistribution through taxation); and (in varying degrees in different countries) the target of full employment and high employment participation.

NORDIC GENDER SYSTEM

Women have gained a prominent position in the Nordic societies, both at work and in public life. This was possible because industrialization came late and because the countryside was dominated by family farms. The wife’s role was determined by the division of labor in family farms and would change according to whether the household was dependent on jobs, such as fishing and logging, that necessitated the husband’s being away. In these cases, it was the women who bore the main responsibility for agriculture and animal husbandry. The division of labor between the sexes was ecologically determined and flexible, but it was socially determined as well, because the low wages of the landless population and urban working classes meant that both sexes and even their children had to earn their share of the family’s living. These structural terms become especially evident, if we compare Finland, where industrialization came last, to the Scandinavian countries. The Finnish level of industrialization was the lowest in the Nordic countries between 1860–1970, the pay rates were two-thirds of those in

Sweden, but the women’s employment rates were the highest.

The sovereignty of single women and their right to dispose of their property became established between the 1840s and 1880s. This was especially important to the growing urban middle classes, whose ranks were swelling with single women to be recruited as teachers, nurses, and office workers in the expanding service sector. These urban middle-class single women were also the basis of the women’s charitable organizations and the women’s movement that kept the flag flying for women’s issues. What came into being in the Nordic countries was a singular concept of bipartite female citizenship: the fact that she was expected to raise the future generation determined the woman’s role within the family and in the society at large. Voting rights for women were granted earlier in the Nordic countries than in any other European region.

The family mother fulfilled her social responsibility in raising the children and in promoting rational housekeeping, whereas a single woman’s duties were done in civic organizations, in schools and various childcare institutions. Education was a prerequisite for women to be able to optimally fulfill their parenting and housekeeping roles. Because the married woman’s dependency on her husband was considered a problem, the marriage law reforms of the 1920s and 1930s defined paid employment outside the home and work within the home as equal functions for the benefit of the family. Women were released from needing a man to speak and act for them.

The gender bias in the welfare systems goes back to how welfare services were developed. Charity and child rearing were considered women’s jobs. This view became entrenched when the state expanded its services. A case in point is the statutory municipal daycare system, the expansion of which helped women work outside home toward the latter part of the twentieth century and also provided tens of thousands of jobs. The public sector employed between 25 and 34 percent of the Nordic workforce in 1975, and 52–62 percent of public-sector employees were women.

The development of wide-ranging social service systems in the latter half of the twentieth century was based on the aims of high employment rates and equality. The high employment rate was a necessary condition for taxation and social security contributions, which laid the basis for the development of the service systems. These were justified both in terms of equal opportunities and labor policy. Women’s integration in the labor market was linked to the individual nature of the rights of both sexes. In the individual model, both spouses were seen as equal

providers and caregivers. Social security benefits applied to all citizens as individuals, irrespective of their family status. The fact that spouses were taxed independently was also an incentive for women to work outside home.

There are both differences and similarities among Nordic countries in the women's employment participation. Part-time work in Scandinavia was clearly more common than in Finland, where women traditionally worked full-time. The similarity lies in a persistent difference between men and women: in 1960, women in industry were paid less than 70 percent of men's wages; in the 1980s, women received 90 percent of the men's earnings in Sweden, 85 percent in Denmark and Norway, and 77 percent in Finland. These were much higher figures than in Germany or Britain at the time. In sectors dominated by women (such as textile industries and public services) the pay rates are usually lower than in male-dominated sectors. In the public sector, however, the internal sex hierarchy, or glass ceiling, has grown more fragile. Women have been employed in senior positions more often than before.

The twentieth century saw the consolidation of female participation in public life. That the Nordic welfare model has helped to improve the lot of women is a widely accepted political truth, which has also slowed down the tendency to erode the welfare state. Changes in women's status, along with a steady decline in religious influence, accounted also for significant shifts in family forms in the later twentieth century, including a rapid growth of sexuality outside of marriage and, particularly in Sweden, a decline in the marriage rate altogether.

Old and new minorities. Social and political development in the Nordic countries has been determined to a great extent by the extraordinary ethnic and religious homogeneity. There are, however, endogenous minorities, both nation-specific and multinational minorities. The more than 300,000 Swedish speakers in Finland gained linguistic equality in the 1920s and 1930s, and they see themselves not as a national or ethnic minority but as a linguistic minority only. The status of the German-speaking population (some 15,000 of them) in southern Denmark was also established in the twentieth century. A little more complicated is the status of the Finnish-speaking minorities in Sweden and Norway. The Finnish-speaking minority in northern Sweden (some 50,000 people) is part of the indigenous population, whereas the Norwegian Finns, known as *kveenit* (totaling around 7,000) moved to the area in the nineteenth century. Both groups were the targets of nationalistic

pressure, and their linguistic rights were given due consideration only at the end of the twentieth century.

The biggest endogenous multinational minorities include the Sami (totaling some 45,000), the Roma (some 10,000), and the Jews (around 25,000). The Sami came into conflict with the majority population and the state apparatus when traditional reindeer herding became harder in the structural economic changes. Sami status has been granted on the basis of varying criteria: in Finland, with a population of 4,000 Sami, they were classified on ethnic-linguistic grounds, whereas in Norway and Sweden, with a Sami population of 25,000 and 15,000, respectively, only reindeer herders qualified, even if most Sami were engaged in other trades altogether. Ever since the 1960s, the Sami have applied for a special linguistic, cultural, and economic status. Their efforts have been rewarded by the granting of the status of an indigenous people, ratified by the United Nations. Sami-language schools, political bodies for self-rule, and cultural institutions were granted official status on a pan-Nordic level and in each individual country in the 1990s. The struggle for the privilege of utilizing certain natural resources in Sami areas goes on.

Among the minorities in the Nordic countries, those in the weakest position are the Roma. Assimilation attempts have been overpowering, but Roma resistance has proved stubborn. The largest Roma population is in Finland, which has more than half of all the Roma in the Nordic countries. There was little official discrimination, but unofficial discrimination and pressures were tangible until the 1960s. It was then that the Roma became organized and made themselves heard as part of the international racial discrimination debate. Officially, the discrimination of Roma, as of all other minorities, was banned throughout the Nordic countries, but there was little positive action to improve their social status. A similar awakening as an "ethnic minority" took place toward the end of the 1990s among the "travelers" of Sweden and Norway. They have demanded that the sterilization policies and the many incidents in which their children were forcibly taken into care be reexamined and that they be compensated. Since the Roma were granted minority status, ratified by the European Union, the "travelers" have started to identify themselves as Roma, something they still refused to do in the 1970s.

Attempts at assimilating the Roma to the majority population may have come to nothing, but the opposite is true in the case of the Jews. They were tolerated between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, but their position grew more secure in the twentieth century. Also, neither the Nordic governments nor their peoples went along with the anti-

Semitic Nazi agenda, even when Denmark and Norway were under German occupation. The most recent additions to the Jewish population in Sweden (numbering some 15,000) came from those escaping the Nazis and Stalinist terror after World War II, but in the other Nordic countries the Jewish population is so small that their being assimilated out of existence was a real threat until the final decades of the twentieth century.

While the Nordic countries learned to accept their endogenous minorities and even safeguarded their position in many ways in the twentieth century, the composition of the societies was at the same time changed by new minorities who arrived as immigrants. In Sweden in particular the rapid economic growth and labor shortages in the 1960s led to a widespread recruitment of labor from abroad. Finland was at the time in the throes of an economic upheaval, and as many as 400,000 Finns moved to Sweden. The Finnish immigrants still numbered some 300,000 by the mid-1970s. Sweden also got its share of the *Gastarbeiter* ("guest workers"), typical of the west European labor market after World War II. A particularly large number came from Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, some 50,000 people altogether.

The labor migrations slowed down in the 1970s but, instead, growing numbers of refugees flowed to

the Nordic countries from Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The biggest cities in Sweden and Denmark in particular but also in Norway became multicultural communities. Official policies and public practices were antiracist and adhered to international regulations. There have been no serious political demands to weaken the minority rights and status. However, the tensions between minority groups and parts of the majority population had grown by the end of the twentieth century.

The relatively high degree of internal homogeneity in the Nordic countries has been tested in the face of expanding international integration, but the responses to these challenges have changed. Sweden would not let the Roma settle in the country between 1914 and 1954, and by refusing to let the Norwegian Roma return to their homes via Danish territory in the 1930s, Denmark sent them to the Nazi concentration camps. In contrast, the Nordic countries in the era of the European Union deal with immigrants and minority groups in accordance with common European norms. What used to be a historical European periphery has become part of the Western European core in economic, social, political, and ideological terms.

Translated from Finnish by Pirkko Hirvonen.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE BALTIC NATIONS



Alfred Erich Senn

In the course of European history, the term “Baltic” has had various meanings. To a philologist, it refers to the language family that includes Latvian and Lithuanian. In nineteenth-century Imperial Russia, the Baltic Provinces included only the territory now called Latvia and Estonia. At the same time the term “Balt” referred to the German nobility in the region. Only in the nineteenth century did the masses of Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians become a factor in the politics of the region, and only in the twentieth century, when the independent states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania appeared on the European scene, did observers link them together as the Baltic States.

The eastern shore of the Baltic Sea constituted a major crossroads of military, mercantile, and cultural currents. Although Latvians and Lithuanians speak related languages, the history of the Latvians is more closely tied to that of the Estonians, who speak a non-Indo-European language akin to Finnish and, more distantly, to Hungarian. First Germans and then Swedes dominated the northern part of the eastern Baltic littoral until the Russian Empire incorporated the territory in 1721. The Lithuanians, on the other hand, lived in close union with Poland until their incorporation into the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century.

Between World War I and II, independent statehood allowed all three nationalities to consolidate their distinct identities, which then carried them through half a century of Soviet rule until they again emerged as independent states in the 1990s.

THE MIDDLE AGES

In the historic division of Europe between Latin Christianity and Eastern Orthodoxy, the Baltic region lay on the eastern frontier of western Europe. Crusading Teutonic knights brought Latin Christianity in the thirteenth century, when they conquered the lands inhabited by the ancestors of the Estonians and Latvians. The ancestors of the modern Lithuanians re-

sisted, establishing the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Lithuanian grand duke Mindaugas accepted Latin Christianity in 1251, but the Lithuanians soon reverted to their pagan practices. Between 1386 and 1387, the Lithuanians officially returned to the Catholic Church as the result of a political union with Poland.

The Teutonic conquerors drew the northern part of the region into the Hanseatic League, imported the Magdeburg Law for the cities, and established a ruling German upper class. The Lithuanian Grand Duchy, on the other hand, moved into the void created by Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century and incorporated territories that eventually became Belarus and Ukraine, where the population was Slavic in language and Eastern Orthodox in religion. On its western frontier, however, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania controlled only what became known as Lithuania Major, including the cities of Kaunas and Vilnius. Lithuania Minor, the seacoast of present-day Lithuania, including the city of Klaipėda (Memel), lay under German rule until the twentieth century.

In the fourteenth century Jews began to immigrate into the region, primarily coming from Germany, and their numbers grew rapidly. Winning the right to maintain their own traditions and ways, Jews found that they could establish stronger communities in the eastern, less-developed lands of the grand duchy, which in 1386 became part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and therefore they sank particularly deep roots in Lithuania. Vilnius (or Vilna), the capital of Lithuania, became a major Jewish cultural center.

On the eve of the modern era, the indigenous people of the region lived and worked primarily as peasants. As such they were caught up in the process of intensifying enserfment and were excluded from any political or economic power. In the north the landowning nobility was mainly German, and German merchants together with some Germanized locals dominated urban affairs. In Lithuania, Polish or Polonized nobility, church officials, and merchants dominated the cities and towns, but a significant por-

tion of commerce and banking came into the hands of the growing Jewish population. In the sixteenth century all three native peoples—Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians—developed their own written literature, largely as a result of the religious controversies arising from the Reformation.

THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

In the sixteenth century the Reformation drastically changed the nature of the region's cultural development, and the emergence of the Grand Duchy of Moscow as an eastern European power radically changed the course of the area's political and economic history. By the end of the eighteenth century the region had fallen under the control of the Russian Empire.

In 1525 the Livonian Order of the Teutonic Knights secularized its landholdings and formed the state of Livonia with Lutheranism as the official religion. In the middle of the century the Lithuanian nobility, which over time accepted Polish language and customs, showed considerable sympathy for Calvinist teachings. But the Catholic Counter-Reformation, led by the newly formed Jesuit order, restored the grand duchy and Poland to the dominion of Rome.

In 1558 Tsar Ivan IV of Moscow attacked Livonia to extend his realm to the Baltic Sea. Moscow had already begun driving the Lithuanians back from Belarusian and Ukrainian territories. The so-called Livonian War lasted twenty-five years. Although Ivan failed to reach the Baltic, the conflict radically changed the political face of the Baltic region. The Livonian state collapsed. Sweden occupied the northern part of the Livonian lands, while Poland-Lithuania took in the southern part.

The social structure of the Baltic changed little as a result of this conflict. In occupying the northern part of the former Livonian lands, the Swedish government guaranteed the rights of the German nobility. While most Estonians came under Swedish rule, Latvians found themselves split between Sweden and Poland-Lithuania. In the eastern section, Inflanty, or Latgallia, Polish nobility and Catholic influences dominated. In the western section, the Duchy of Courland, the dukes were nominally vassals of the Polish Crown, but they maintained considerable autonomy, adhering to the Lutheran Church and even briefly establishing colonial holdings in Africa. In Lithuania, Polish influences intensified, especially after the Union of Lublin in 1569, which tightened the administrative bonds between the two states. By the terms of this agreement, Poland took over the Ukrainian territories that had previously been a part of the grand duchy.

In the seventeenth century the population suffered grievous losses as warring Swedish, Polish, and Russian troops marched through the territory. These losses culminated in the devastation wrought by plague from 1708 to 1711. Lithuanian historians estimate that the plague reduced the Lithuanian population by one-third. Estonian and Latvian historians calculate that by 1721 the population count was at most 150,000 to 170,000 Estonians and some 220,000 Latvians. The original population of Prussia, which spoke a language akin to modern Latvian and Lithuanian, died out almost completely, and an influx of German and Swiss settlers gave this region, centered on the city of Königsberg, its historic German character.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century Tsar Peter I of Moscow drove the Swedes from the region. He crowned his efforts to expand the Muscovite state by proclaiming it the Russian Empire. As provided by the terms of the Treaty of Nystadt (1721), the Baltic German nobility maintained their privileges. Constituting a privileged caste, they obtained ever greater

authority over their peasants, who at times mounted violent resistance to the landlords.

In the eighteenth century Russian influences in Lithuania grew. The tsarist court established control over the Duchy of Courland, which it formally incorporated in 1795. In the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian state in 1772, the Russian Empire incorporated Inflanty (Latgallia), and in the second and third partitions it incorporated most of Lithuania. Prussia took the Lithuanian region of Suvalkai/Suwałki in the partitions. Napoleon subsequently incorporated it into the Duchy of Warsaw, then at the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) Russia took the territory as part of the Kingdom of Poland.

At the time that the Russian Empire occupied this territory, the indigenous population had yet to express any voice in its public affairs or in its future. In the middle of the eighteenth century German romantics, to be sure, discovered these peoples, and the German writer Johann Gottfried von Herder paid special note to the particular genius of all national cultures as he wrote about his discovery of the Latvian peasantry. Baltic intellectuals later cherished these thoughts, but they objected that their German visitors often seemed to want to preserve the past as a collection of relics rather than to contribute to the future development of these cultures. It was by no means clear that these local peasant cultures would ever emerge from foreign domination and develop to the level of national statehood.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

After the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814–1815, the Baltic region, for the first time together under one government, experienced a century without foreign invasions. Under the Russian administration, Estonians and Latvians lived in the Baltic Provinces of Kurland (Courland), Livland, and Estland, while most Lithuanians lived in the Northwest Province centered around the city of Vilnius/Vilna. Under these relatively stable conditions, the population recovered, and according to the Russian census of 1897, the population of the Estonian region stood at about 1 million and the population of the Latvian region at almost 2 million. Calculating the geographic and demographic dimensions of Lithuania is more difficult for reasons explained below.

The major social and economic change the nineteenth century brought to life in the three Baltic peoples was the emancipation of the peasants. In the Baltic Provinces between 1816 and 1819 the peasants were freed from serfdom without land. They gained

new rights as individuals, but delays in the implementation of the new order and legal restrictions on their right to migrate meant that remnants of the serf system lingered until the middle of the century. In the Lithuanian lands and Latgallia emancipation came in 1861. Since the Russian government wanted to weaken the Polish nobility in the Northwest Province, the peasants received relatively favorable terms in obtaining land. Even so, the population did not feel the full economic and social impact of the emancipation until the 1880s.

Freed from the bonds of serfdom and emerging from their history as the peasants in a region dominated by landowners who represented strong neighbors, all three peoples entered new phases of their national development. Latvians and Estonians enjoyed a more diversified economic life and a more active political life than did the Lithuanians. Riga, an important entrepôt for the Russian Empire, drew migrants from the countryside, and by the end of the nineteenth century Latvians were important participants in Russian Socialist politics. Lithuanians lagged behind for several reasons. The Russian government limited economic development in the region because it lay on the border with Germany, and the local Russian authorities, seeking to weaken Polish influences on Lithuanian culture, banned the use of Latin characters in printing Lithuanian texts—in effect a ban on the Lithuanian press. (The Russian authorities lifted the ban in 1904.) Latvians and Estonians developed a lively public press, discussing social issues at a time when Lithuanians had to publish materials abroad, mostly in East Prussia and later in the United States, and smuggle them into the empire at great risk.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, as a result of the peculiar economic and political conditions, Lithuanians emigrated from the region in much greater numbers than did Latvians or Estonians. Lithuanians wanting to leave rural life for jobs in cities could not expect to find work in Vilnius, which, restricted by Russian government policy, had little industry and remained predominantly a city of artisans. Lithuanians looking for urban work had to think of Riga, St. Petersburg, or other Russian cities, and in growing numbers they chose to go abroad. Those seeking only seasonal work might settle for jobs in Germany or the Scandinavian countries, but those seeking long-term prospects set off in growing numbers for North America. As a result Vilnius, which the Lithuanians claimed as their capital, looked like a Polish city, and according to the Russian census of 1897, Jews constituted a plurality of the city's population (39 percent).

Lithuanian emigration to the United States had far-reaching repercussions on Lithuanian development. Many émigrés, who were mostly young men, nurtured the idea of returning home after they had accrued a sufficient nest egg, usually thought of as perhaps \$500. But in America, working primarily in industry and in mining, they found a completely new life that both confused and absorbed them. Upton Sinclair's novel *The Jungle* (1906) focused on one such Lithuanian immigrant to Chicago. The majority of these young men in fact did not return to Lithuania but sent considerable amounts of money back to their relatives at home. Lithuanian nationalist leaders despaired of this emigration, believing that the nation was losing its hope for the future.

By the beginning of the twentieth century nationalist leaders in the Baltic had to define their national existence against a complicated background of circumstances. Although they lived under Russian rule, leaders of all three nationalities saw the greatest threat to their national identities in their own landowners, Poles and Germans. Latvians and Estonians, who could not claim to have had a historic state, talked of the right of national self-determination, but they had to free themselves of the historically entrenched power of the German nobility, who had provided many military figures and diplomats in the Russian government. For both Estonians and Latvians, language was the major factor in their national identities. The Estonians were mainly Lutheran, as were the Germans. But the Latvians found their religious preferences split between the Lutherans in the west and the Catholics in the east.

The Lithuanians faced a different set of circumstances in defining their national identity. They claimed to be the heirs of the historic Lithuanian Grand Duchy, but the heritage of that state was confusing. The ancestors of the modern Lithuanians had constituted only a minority of that state's population. The Poles had dominated the culture of the state, and a person Polish in culture might well use "Lithuanian" as a designation of the territory in which he or she lived. As a result, even the name "Lithuanian" was subject to confusing interpretations. Lithuanian nationalists nevertheless insisted on their historic right to national self-determination, founding their identity on their language and the Roman Catholic religion. Historically, however, the Roman Catholic Church had been a vehicle for the Polonization of Lithuania, and therefore some Lithuanian freethinkers objected to idealizing the role of the church in Lithuanian culture.

On the eve of World War I, despite the obvious growth of national consciousness among all three Bal-

tic peoples, none of them occupied a significant place in the tsarist Russian government's consideration of "national questions" in its empire. Poles, Finns, Armenians, and Jews posed much more visible problems. The particular circumstances of the military conflict from 1914 to 1918 created a situation that suddenly allowed these three peoples to create their own political systems and to emerge as independent states.

INDEPENDENCE

World War I brought the opportunity for independence but at a high price. In the course of the conflict, German forces occupied most of the Baltic region. The Bolshevik government, which took power in Russia in 1917, announced that it had no claim to the territory, but Moscow nevertheless attempted to impose Communist governments on the three Baltic peoples. By 1920 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had established three national republics, and in turn their independence contributed greatly to the development of national societies and cultures in each.

All three newly independent Baltic States considered the strengthening of their respective national cultures as imperative for their new governments. This in turn necessitated consideration of the interests of national minorities. In Latvia minorities constituted 20 to 25 percent of its almost 2 million inhabitants, of which Russians, including Belorussians, represented the largest group (about 12 percent). Estonians made up two-thirds of the 1 million inhabitants of Estonia.

Because of Lithuania's boundary conflicts, calculating the republic's minorities was more difficult. The 1923 census did not include Vilnius, which Poland had seized in 1920, and Memel/Klaipėda, which the Lithuanians occupied from 1923 to 1939. That census reported that minorities constituted 16 percent of Lithuania's reported 2.5 million inhabitants and that Jews made up almost half of the minorities (7.6 percent). Jewish leaders had almost idealized the Lithuanian state at its creation, expecting to play a major role in its affairs, therefore they resented the government's efforts to strengthen the Lithuanian role in society while restricting Jewish participation in public affairs. During the period that Lithuania controlled Memel, the republic had a larger minority population because of the number of Germans living in that region. In 1939 the Soviet Union, after occupying eastern Poland, turned the Vilnius region over to Lithuania, greatly increasing both the Jewish and the Polish minorities in that state. The uncertainty of Lithuania's borders was a troublesome consideration in relations between the three republics.

The majority of the population in all three republics was peasants, and the first concern of the new governments was land reform. In Estonia 86 percent of the expropriated land had belonged to Baltic Germans, who were not permitted to keep any land. The Latvians and the Lithuanians permitted the expropriated landowners to keep small estates. In Latvia the landowners affected were mostly German, Russian, and Polish, and in Lithuania they were Polish and Russian. Expropriated Latvian Germans appealed to the League of Nations in protest, but in 1925 the League Council declared that the reforms constituted acceptable agrarian reform and not national discrimination. In all three republics authorities encouraged agricultural cooperatives as a means of relieving the disruption to production efficiency resulting from the breakup of large estates. All three republics reported population increases but declining birth rates during the period between the two world wars.

Throughout the period between the two world wars, the economies of all three republics were primarily agricultural. As of 1934, 60.2 percent of the Estonian workforce was engaged in agriculture, 17.8 percent in industry, and 5.1 percent in commerce. Latvia in 1930 reported 66.2 percent of its workforce in agriculture, 13.5 percent in industry, and 5.2 percent in commerce. Lithuania in 1936 estimated that 76.7 percent of its workforce was in agriculture, 6.4 percent in industry, and 2.5 percent in commerce. Lithuania was self-sufficient in grain production, while Estonia and Latvia normally had to import grain. Lithuania was an important exporter of flax. All three republics significantly expanded their output of dairy products in this period.

The era of independence gave the people of each society the opportunity to develop their national culture to new dimensions. Besides creating new educational institutions and broadening economic life, this involved standardizing and modernizing the native language to meet the new demands of business and technology and building a broader and stronger national self-consciousness as a nation. Although the democratic institutions in each republic gave way to authoritarian rule—Lithuania in 1926, Latvia and Estonia in 1934—by 1939 the society in each of the republics had a clearer collective identity than it had in 1918 and 1919. This sense of identity played a vital role in each nation's survival during the half-century of Soviet rule.

THE SOVIET PERIOD

In 1939 the Soviet Union signed agreements with Nazi Germany whereby the Germans recognized the

Baltic region as part of the Soviet sphere. In 1940 Soviet troops overran the three republics, and the USSR annexed them as constituent republics. Soviet historians called the process a simultaneous social revolution in each republic. In reality envoys from Moscow restructured institutions to mirror the Soviet system. Although the authorities did not at first collectivize agriculture, they carried out extensive land reforms.

Soviet authorities also struck at the bases of the national self-consciousness by closing national institutions and religious organizations. Some individuals of the old order joined the new, but the authorities, aiming at discrediting the period of independence, put greater effort into winning the support of previously dissatisfied groups, particularly among the minorities. At the same time, through an agreement between Moscow and Berlin, the German population of the Baltic could emigrate to Germany, thereby essentially ending the historic role of local Germans in the lives of the Estonians and the Latvians.

Just a week before Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet authorities carried out massive arrests and deportations in all three Baltic republics. As Soviet forces retreated, Lithuanian activists proclaimed the reestablishment of the Lithuanian state, and in many areas Lithuanians indiscriminately attacked and killed Jews, who, they declared, had served the Soviet regime. German forces suppressed the provisional Lithuanian government and then carried out their own systematic campaign of arresting and executing Jews. By the end of 1941 the Jewish population constituted only a small portion of what it had been at the beginning of the year, and only some 5 percent survived the war.

The Baltic region remained under German occupation until 1944. Partisan resistance, first orga-

nized by Communists, developed and helped prepare the way for the return of Soviet troops. The Soviet Red Army brought the Soviet system back, and this time Moscow tolerated even fewer local peculiarities than it had in 1940. The local populations faced the choices of complying, resisting, or fleeing. A great many city dwellers chose flight. Since the Western powers, led by the United States, had not recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States in 1940, Baltic refugees in Western Europe were considered “displaced persons” (DPs). As émigrés they struggled to construct a new diaspora to keep their national cultures alive. The resistance in the Baltic, supported mainly by the peasantry, continued into the early 1950s.

Under Soviet rule the population of the Baltic republics underwent considerable social change. In the late 1940s the authorities collectivized agriculture, doing away with the private farming that had prevailed up to that time. They deported hundreds of thousands of locals. They introduced new industries, which in turn brought in workers from other parts of the Soviet Union, especially to Latvia and Estonia. In contrast, the Lithuanians limited the influx of workers from other regions and even established Lithuanian majorities in the populations of both Vilnius and Klaipėda (Memel). By agreement with Warsaw, Poles in Lithuania could leave the republic for Poland.

Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians participated actively in the scientific and intellectual lives of the Soviet Union. Whenever Soviet authorities considered reforms aimed at improving the general welfare, the Baltic republics joined in enthusiastically, and at the time of the collapse of the Soviet system, the Baltic peoples enjoyed a higher standard of living than other parts of the Soviet Union. In the late 1970s, as part of a plan to “merge” the nationalities of the USSR, Soviet educators introduced a new policy called “bilingualism,” in accordance with which local children began studying Russian in school before they received any instruction in their native languages. Many Western observers expected rapid assimilation of the Baltic populations into the great mass of the Soviet population.

Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) opened the way for new developments. Given the opportunity to raise social and cultural concerns, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians reacted quickly. Gorbachev responded by encouraging the non-Baltic minorities—Russians, Belorussians, and Poles—against the eponymous nationality in each republic. Baltic national leaders nevertheless persisted. The Baltic example gave focus to considerable national discontent throughout the rest

of the Soviet Union and ultimately constituted a major factor in the collapse of the USSR. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia won general recognition as independent states in the fall of 1991.

THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD

The post-Soviet societies in the Baltic nations were very different from those of the 1920s. In 1989 only 12 or 13 percent of the workforce in the three republics was engaged in agriculture, 32 to 41 percent in industry. The metalworking industries obviously depended on Soviet supplies and markets, while food and timber enterprises used local resources. Institutions of the 1930s could not be revived easily. The countries faced difficult decisions on returning socialized property to former owners and on privatizing enterprises established in Soviet times. Behind these general questions lay even more difficult ones concerning guilt, atonement, and punishment of individuals and groups for collaboration with the Soviet authorities. In any given dispute, all of these factors interlocked in varying ways, both rational and emotional.

The question of minorities arose in new dimensions. Russians, who had been part of the majority in the large Soviet state, now resented being a minority in a much smaller state. In Lithuania, where the eponymous nationality constituted 80 percent of the 3.6 million inhabitants, the government accepted the so-called “zero-option,” granting citizenship to any persons living in Lithuania on a given date. Latvians, only 52 percent of the 2.5 million inhabitants in their state, and Estonians, 60 percent of the 1.5 million inhabitants of their country, adopted more restrictive laws, thereby evoking strong protests from Moscow. That the three Baltic republics continued to enjoy higher living standards than Russia mitigated the complications of this continuing problem.

Another aspect of citizenship laws concerned the rights of émigrés to return to their homelands. A number of those who had settled in the West wanted to return and to participate in public life. Some nationals who had not previously returned from Siberian exile came back. Many émigré institutions and publications moved to the homelands. At the same time it became obvious that the various branches of the national culture had grown apart, carrying differing and even conflicting intellectual baggage with them. In addition, to limit the potential problems posed by their Russian inhabitants, the states hesitated to make every émigré a citizen automatically, and they forbade their citizens from holding citizenship in another state.

The social history of the Baltic nations has been heavily dependent on the kaleidoscope of its political history. The original inhabitants of the region fell prey to the ambitions of neighbors. In the first phase, the upper classes of the native peoples assimilated into the predominant foreign cultures, German in the north and Polish in the south. The three Baltic nations began to emerge as political factors in the region during the Russian Empire. They enjoyed a brief period of

independence between the two world wars, when they developed their national cultures with the support of their administrations. The half-century of Soviet rule, extending from the 1940s to the 1990s, threatened their continued existence as ethnic-territorial units. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, they received the opportunity to start again, this time with considerably stronger foundations than they had commanded in the 1920s.

See also other articles in this section.

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EAST CENTRAL EUROPE



Steven Béla Várdy and Emil Niederhauser

The four states that make up East Central Europe appeared in their current form only in the twentieth century, but the political history of three of them—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—reaches back to the tenth century. The fourth state—Slovakia—had no separate identity until 1918, and even then only as part of Czechoslovakia until the end of 1992. It had been part of Hungary from the tenth century until after World War I. Thus, Slovakia's social development has to be discussed within Hungary's and Czechoslovakia's historical evolution. This essay uses the term *Czechia* (*Česky* in Czech) to refer to the Czech state.

East Central Europe was for centuries a transitional region between western Christendom and the Orthodox Christian world (Russia, Ukraine, and the Balkans), although because it was Christianized by Rome (not by Constantinople), its countries always constituted what the Polish historian Oscar Halecki called the "borderlands of Western civilization." As such, its political, constitutional, and social development had much more in common with western than with eastern Europe and the Balkans. At the same time, from the western European point of view the region represented the "eastern frontier," beyond which lay the lands of "invisible Barbary."

The region's most important characteristics that distinguished it from both western and eastern Europe included:

1. its relative backwardness as compared to western Europe and its relatively advanced development as compared to eastern Europe and the Balkans
2. its persistent agrarian socioeconomic structure, and the resulting preponderance of the peasantry, which did not really change until the nineteenth century
3. the large size of its nobility (5 percent in Hungary and perhaps 10 percent in Poland), compared to less than 1 percent in many of the western countries, which had an impact even upon developments in the age of nationalism and
4. its highly mixed ethnic composition, wherein ethnic differences often manifested themselves as class distinctions, and vice versa (e.g., Polish nobility versus Lithuanian and Ruthenian peasantry, and Hungarian nobility versus Slovak, Romanian, and Serbian peasantry)

EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN SOCIETY AROUND 1500

The social structures of the region's three longstanding states—Poland, Czechia, and Hungary—were similar. This was the result of a number of factors that affected them simultaneously. All three emerged from tribal federation into feudal statehood simultaneously, accepted Christianity in its western form about the same time, and fell under German socioeconomic influences. As a result, most of the local peasantry acquired their own plots of land and moved from collective to individual cultivation. Following this transformation, only the meadows, grasslands, and forests were held in common.

The landowning classes came from the nobility divided into two categories: the higher, or titled, nobility (usually called barons, magnates, or *pans*) and the lower nontitled nobility. The relationship between these two subclasses resembled western feudal relations, the lower nobility serving the magnates in various civil or military capacities.

By the end of the fifteenth century, the nobility's political organization had been fully formed in all three countries. Poland and Hungary were divided into smaller administrative units called *comitats* (counties) or voivodships, each having considerable autonomy. The members of the nobility were represented in their respective feudal diets, which had evolved in the course of the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries. The representatives of the clergy were likewise present. In all three countries Catholicism was the established state religion, but Poland's eastern provinces (modern Ukraine and Belarus) were populated mostly by Orthodox Christians. To a lesser degree, this was also true



EAST CENTRAL EUROPE'S POLITICAL MAP AROUND 1500

At the end of the fifteenth century Poland was part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth formed by the Union of Krewo of 1385 and consolidated fully by the Union of Lublin of 1569. It was a federated dual state of about 315,000 square miles, whose territory also included what in the twentieth century became Belarus and Ukraine. Only one-third of this vast country was Poland proper, but it held 60 percent of the country's population of six million.

The Czech Kingdom, or Czechia, was the smallest of the three states of East Central Europe. Its territory was only one-seventh and its population only about one-third of that of Poland-Lithuania. It consisted of the core provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (30,000 square miles) and, since the mid-fourteenth century, also of Silesia (15,000 square miles). In contrast to Poland and Hungary, however, the Czech Kingdom was part of the Holy Roman Empire, and its rulers were among the seven electors of the Holy Roman Emperors. Its membership in the Empire had placed limitations upon Czech sovereignty, but it also held certain advantages. By virtue of being

part of the Germanic world, Czechia became the most urbanized, most industrialized, and most advanced of the three states, although much of this urbanization and industrialization was in the hands of German settlers.

With a territory of about 130,000 square miles, Hungary was two-fifths the size of Poland-Lithuania but almost three times the size of Czechia. Around A.D. 1500 its population was between 3.5 and 4 million. It had two autonomous regions, Croatia and Transylvania, as well as a few frontier *banats* (provinces) in the northern Balkans. Croatia was an associated kingdom in personal union with Hungary. Transylvania was a province with minimal autonomy under an appointed governor called *vajda* or *voievod*. The small defensive *banats* in the northern Balkans were buffers in Hungary's struggle against the Byzantines, the Venetians, and later the Ottoman Turks. Today's Slovakia was also part of Hungary, but it had no separate identity. This also holds true for Carpatho-Ruthenia (now part of Ukraine) and Voivodina (now part of Serbia).

for Hungary's eastern provinces, particularly among the ancestors of present-day Rusyns and Romanians.

At the end of the fifteenth century, all three countries had a significant number of cities and towns. In Poland-Lithuania their number reached five hundred, while in Czechia and in Hungary they numbered about half as many. The majority of the walled cities had been established by western (mostly German) settlers, who had migrated during the twelfth through the fourteenth centuries. Originally these cities were regarded as royal property and were classified as "royal free cities." Their founders had acquired directly from the king privileges that included city autonomy, the right to live under their own laws, and the right of taxation. These privileges had been incorporated into their founding charters. Only a minority of the inhabitants held full citizenship rights, and only "citizens" had the right to vote. Even fewer were the number of those who could run for office, a right usually reserved for affluent citizens.

The royal free cities were free from all feudal control, and at times they could also send represen-

tatives to the feudal diets. Not so the "agricultural towns" (*oppidum*, pl. *oppida*), whose inhabitants, well-to-do peasants, had been given limited autonomy by their lords. They paid their feudal obligations collectively in money. In appearance they were more like overgrown villages. Most of the royal free cities, and occasionally even the *oppida*, controlled a number of villages in their vicinity. Serving in effect as their feudal lords. The city of Prague, for example, controlled over one hundred villages beyond its walls. Prague in those days was the largest city in East Central Europe, and at times also the capital of the Holy Roman Empire.

None of the countries was ethnically homogeneous, and each was inhabited by a number of nationalities. The citizens of the most important royal free cities were mostly Germans. In the Czech Kingdom, the inhabitants of many of the mountainous mining regions were also Germans—the ancestors of the Sudeten Germans. In the case of Poland, the most numerous of the non-Polish nationalities were the Lithuanians and the east Slavs (ancestors of the Ukrain-

ians and Belorussians). Hungary also had a significant non-Hungarian population. In addition to the Croats, who had their own associated kingdom, these included the ancestors of the Slovaks in the north, the Rusyns in the northeast, the Vlach (the ancestors of the Romanians) in the east, and various south Slavic elements.

EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN SOCIETY IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought many political and territorial changes to East Central Europe. The Union of Lublin of 1569 merged Poland and the grand duchy of Lithuania into a single state, the Czech Kingdom became an autonomous part of the Habsburg Empire, while Hungary fell victim to Ottoman Turkish expansion and was divided between the Turks and the Habsburgs.

The late fifteenth and the sixteenth century witnessed a major economic transformation of East Central Europe. It became an exporter of agricultural



EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN CITIES AROUND 1500

In addition to Prague (Praha) in Bohemia and Breslau (Wrocław) in Silesia, whose population may have been close to 100,000, East Central Europe's largest cities around 1500 included Cracow, Buda (later part of Budapest), Brünn (Brno), Pozsony (Pressburg, Bratislava), and Kassa (Kaschau, Košice), with populations ranging between 7,000 and 25,000. Most of the other cities with urban characteristics and urban governments had populations of 3,000 to 5,000. Among the villagelike *oppida* it was not uncommon to find some with a population of over 8,000. The best example of this is Szeged in southern Hungary, which—although one of the country's largest settlements—retained its rural appearance right into the late nineteenth century.



LAND OWNERSHIP IN POLAND-LITHUANIA, THE CZECH KINGDOM, AND HUNGARY AROUND 1500

Around 1500, the average peasant plot in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was about fifteen hectares, while in Czechia and Hungary it was only slightly smaller. The serfs paid their feudal obligations both in kind and in money. In the Czech Kingdom, many of the serfs held their lands in perpetuity, which was not the case in Poland-Lithuania and Hungary. Agricultural lands were divided into two categories: dominical lands (*terra dominicalis*) and rustical lands (*terra rusticalis*). The former were held by the lords and the latter by the serfs. In practice, however, many of the dominical lands had also been parceled out to the peasants. The legal differences in ownership rights, however, had no significance until serf emancipation in the mid-nineteenth century. Originally, all peasant families had enough land to supply their needs, but the growth of population soon necessitated the division of the original plots into smaller entities, which gave rise to the category of increasingly impoverished half-plot-peasants and quarter-plot-peasants.

products to western Europe, a role that profoundly altered the region's economic life and social relations. This situation was the direct result of Europe's expansion into the Americas and Southeast Asia, which also increased western Europe's needs for agricultural products. This need was filled with Polish-Lithuanian grain and Hungarian cattle.

The resulting economic boom was more beneficial to the lords than the peasants. The former took direct control over most of the lands and extended their power over the peasants. The latter's right of free movement was terminated and their work obligations (*robot*) increased. Obligatory *robot* varied from region to region and from time to time. Most commonly, however, it amounted to three days per week for a full peasant lot (the total area allocated to the peasant family by the lord), two days per week for a half lot, and somewhat less for a fragment lot. Laws binding the peasants to the land were passed in the Czech Kingdom in 1487, in Poland in 1498, and in Hungary in 1514. The latter came in the wake of the region's most violent peasant war under the leadership of György Dózsa (c. 1470–1514), himself a member of the Hungarian lower nobility. Known as the "second serfdom," this bonded serfdom survived until the mid-nineteenth century.



East Central Europe, Fifteenth Century

East Central Europe, Fifteenth Century. Adapted from Paul Robert Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).



East Central Europe, 1570. Adapted from Paul Robert Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

The role of the higher nobility remained unchanged in seventeenth-century Poland and Hungary. Their numbers also remained small. In Hungary the number of aristocratic families varied between forty-nine and sixty-four. In contrast to the aristocracy, the lower nobility increased significantly. This was the result of perpetual warfare on the southern frontiers and the consequent growth of military forces. A significant number of these fighting men were ennobled, although only a few of them received grants of land. In Hungary these newly ennobled landless elements were known as the *armalists* (*armalisták*), and their numbers soon reached 4 to 5 percent of the population. By 1840 they numbered 680,000 out of a population of 13 million. They were even more numerous in Poland, where they constituted 8 to 10 percent of the population.

In addition to these ennobled servicemen, there were also various freebooters, who reached a seminoble status. Among them were the Cossacks of the Polish-Lithuanian state and the *hajdús* of Hungary. The former were escaped serfs, who constituted themselves into Cossack hosts, and then entered the services of the Polish-Lithuanian state. Later, many of them were acknowledged, as of a seminoble rank. This was also true for the *hajdús*, who were given collective nobility and then settled on the Great Hungarian Plain by Prince István Bocskay of Transylvania (ruled 1605–1606).

Changes also took place in the ethnic composition of these countries after the Battle of White Mountain. Poland saw the influx of many Ashkenazi Jews from the Holy Roman Empire. In the Czech lands, the population of Germans increased markedly, both in the cities and in the mining regions. Turkish Hungary saw a progressive influx of South Slavic elements, and Transylvania witnessed a similar influx of Vlachs from the Balkans. This process continued into the eighteenth century, ultimately altering Hungary's ethnic composition.

The Protestant Reformation had a significant impact on all three countries. The urban centers, with their large German population, gravitated toward Lutheranism, while the nobility favored Calvinism. In Poland, anti-Trinitarianism (known as Arianism) became popular, as it did in Transylvania under the leadership of Ferenc Dávid (c. 1510–1579), the founder of Unitarianism.

Led by the Jesuits, the Counter-Reformation was able to reconquer much of the population for Catholicism. In the Czech Kingdom the Counter-Reformation triumphed after the defeat of the Hussite nobility in 1620. In Hungary, it was somewhat less successful. Among the ethnic Hungarians in the coun-

The nobility and the burghers. The nobility became increasingly polarized, as the higher nobility acquired more land at the expense of the lower nobility. In early-seventeenth-century Bohemia about 150 families (fifty aristocratic and one hundred noble families) owned most of the large estates. In Moravia eighty aristocrats owned half of the land and 58 percent of the serfs. After the Battle of White Mountain secured both Habsburg domination and the victory of the Counter-Reformation in the Czech lands in 1620, however, the old Czech aristocracy and nobility disappeared. Those who did not fall in the battle left the country permanently. Their estates were appropriated by the Habsburgs and then distributed to a new pro-Habsburg nobility, recruited from the empire's multinational armies. At this time the title "count" became commonly used by the aristocracy.

try's eastern regions, Calvinism remained the dominant religion.

The Reformation had a positive impact on education in all of East Central Europe. Its emphasis on literacy in the vernacular languages necessitated the establishment of a great number of primary schools headed by the clergy. In Poland, the number of parish schools rose to four thousand. The number of secondary schools, usually under the control of the Jesuits, also increased. A number of new institutions of higher learning were also established.

AGRARIAN RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Through much of the eighteenth century the Habsburgs engaged in settling southern Hungary with German, Dutch, and French peasants of the Catholic faith. These western settlers—whose numbers reached 200,000 by the end of the century—were enticed by grants of land, houses, draft animals, agricultural implements, and temporary exemption from taxation. At



POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND-LITHUANIA, THE CZECH KINGDOM, AND HUNGARY IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

The Union of Lublin of 1569 merged the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into a single state. This restructured Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (commonly referred to simply as Poland) became a significant regional power. From the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century it was a powerful rival of the rising Muscovite state. Although weakened in the 1650s, it survived in this form until the late eighteenth century, when it was partitioned by Russia, Prussia, and Austria (1772–1795), and then wiped off the map of Europe until 1918.

The fortunes of the Czech Kingdom and Hungary were somewhat different. Following the Battle of Mohács in 1526—which witnessed Hungary's defeat by the Ottoman Turks and the death of Hungary and Bohemia-Moravia's common ruler, King Louis II (ruled 1616–1526)—both of these states lost some of their full sovereignty. By electing Ferdinand of Habsburg (ruled 1626–1564), the Czech and the Hungarian kingdoms became component units of the ever-expanding Habsburg Empire. In 1547 the Czech nobility was forced to give up its right of free election, and had to accept the Habsburg dynasty's hereditary right to the Czech throne. They rebelled against this in 1618, but after their defeat at the Battle of White Mountain in 1620, they lost even more of their sovereignty. The Czech nobility was decimated, expelled, and replaced by a new pro-Habsburg nobility, and the Czech state was relegated to the position of autonomous province of the Habsburg Empire. It remained in that position right up to the end of the nineteenth century.

The case of Hungary was complicated by the Turkish conquest of the country's central regions and the election of John Zápolya (ruled 1526–1540) as a rival to King Ferdinand. The result of this situation was the country's fragmentation into three parts, which lasted until the early eighteenth century. Hungary's eastern third developed into the principality of Transylvania, nominally under Ottoman suzerainty, but actually headed by Hungarian princes, who were elected to their post by the principality's three recognized nations: the Hungarians, the Székelys (another tribe of the Hungarians), and the Saxons (Germans who had settled there in the thirteenth century). The Vlachs (later called Romanians) did not have a role in this selection process, because, lacking a nobility, they had no political elite to represent their cause.

Hungary's central section, including the capital city of Buda, was conquered by the Turks and then integrated into the administrative system of the Ottoman Empire. Its western and northern sections developed into Habsburg-controlled "Royal Hungary," where the city of Pozsony (Pressburg) served as the kingdom's temporary capital until the mid-nineteenth century. Only the expulsion of the Turks in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries brought about the reestablishment of the country's unity, but even then only as a component state of the Habsburg Empire. Hungary retained that autonomous position until 1867, when it became a partner in the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary (1867–1918).



EDUCATION AND LITERACY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE (FOURTEENTH TO EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES)

Up to the early sixteenth century—when the Protestant Reformation altered the situation completely—education in East Central Europe was controlled by the Catholic Church. On the lower and the middle levels, teaching was in the hands of religious orders and larger parishes, many of which had their own schools. By the end of the fifteenth century Poland had over three thousand parish schools. The number in the Czech Kingdom and Hungary was somewhat smaller.

Several universities had also been established before the end of the fifteenth century—usually at the initiative of the ruling monarchs. The earliest of these institutions of higher learning were founded in the middle of the fourteenth century in Prague (1348) and Cracow (1364) as well as in Pécs (1367) and Óbuda (1388/95) in Hungary.

In the sixteenth century they were followed by numerous other institutions of higher learning, largely in consequence of the spread of Protestantism and the resulting Catholic Reformation. These include the famed Calvinist colleges of Sárospatak (1531), Pápa (1531), Debrecen (1538), and Gyulafehérvár (1629) in Hungary, as well as a few new universities. Among the latter were those of Vilna (Vilnius; 1578) in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Olmütz (Olomouc; 1576) in Moravia, and Nagyszombat (Tyrnau; 1635) in Hungary. The latter eventually evolved into the University of Budapest.

It should be noted here that in the Middle Ages and early modern period all universities used Latin as their language of instruction. This makes it difficult to classify them by their language, and makes it possible for the University of Prague to be claimed by both the Czechs and the Germans. In contrast to the universities, Hungarian Calvinist colleges functioned only in Hungarian from the very start.

By the end of the seventeenth century, about 70 percent of the nobility and 60 percent of the burghers of East Central Europe were able to read and write.

Progress in education also continued in the eighteenth century. In Poland a college for the training of noble military officers was founded in 1740 (*Collegium Nobilium*); and in 1773 a National Educational Commission was established as Europe's first Ministry of Education. At the same time the Jesuits began to revive their schools first established in the sixteenth century.

In Hungary, Maria Theresa promulgated the *Ratio Educationis* in 1777. This law called for the establishment of a series of basic schools for the teaching of the *trivium* (reading, writing, and arithmetic) and several normal schools for the training of teachers. In light of the absence of the needed funds and teaching personnel, however, compulsory mass education had to wait for another century.

the same time the Habsburgs also encouraged a large number of Serbs to settle in the Hungarian territories freed from Turkish control, thereby changing the ethnic composition of the area later called Voivodina. A similar population change also took place in Transylvania with the rapid influx of Vlach peasants and shepherds from the Balkans, who came because of better economic opportunities. There were also population shifts within Hungary itself, manifested by the movement of many Slovaks down to the Great Hungarian Plain. In 1781 the population of the Czech lands was about 4 million (2.5 in Bohemia and 1.5 in Moravia). At the same time, according to the census of 1784–1787, the population of the kingdom of Hungary was 9.3 million (6.5 million in Hungary

proper, 1.45 million in Transylvania, 650,000 in Croatia, and 710,000 in the Military Frontier District).

During the second half of the eighteenth century, the position of the serfs generally improved as a result of reforms instituted in the spirit of enlightened absolutism under Maria Theresa (ruled 1740–1780) and Joseph II (ruled 1780–1790). These reforms, most of which followed peasant uprisings in Hungary (1735, 1767), Silesia (1771), and the Czech lands (1775), gave the state a basis for intervention into the relationship between lord and peasant. Initially, the state separated the rustical lands (the lord's own lands, sometimes parcelled out among the serfs) from the dominical lands (the lands allotted by the lord to peasant families for their own use), defined the serfs' spe-

cific obligations, and adjusted these obligations to the size of the peasants' plots. The work obligations of serfs with full plots was set at three days per week; a landless serf with a house had to work twenty-six days per year, and those without houses only thirteen days. Moreover, if the stipulated *robot* was not sufficient to complete the needed labor, the serfs were also obliged to work for wages, which amounted to seven to fifteen *kreutzers* per day. Previously, they had often been obliged to work with no compensation. The next step in this process of improvement of the peasants' lot was Joseph II's peasant reforms, promulgated in 1781 and then gradually implemented throughout the Habsburg Empire. The serfs became personally free and could also hire themselves out for wages. Joseph II was planning additional reforms that would have abolished work obligations altogether, but he died before he could implement these reforms.

After the Jesuit Order was dissolved in 1773, their lands in the Czech kingdom were parceled out among the peasants, who, it was hoped, would eventually purchase them. This experiment resulted in a significant increase in the productivity of the former Jesuit estates. The government hoped that this experiment would serve as a model for the noble landowners.

In Poland-Lithuania agricultural conditions changed very little during the eighteenth century. At the beginning of the century a new wave of western settlers arrived from the Low Countries called *holender* (Holländer). They brought with them the newest methods of land cultivation, but their impact on Polish society was minimal. In 1768 there was a major peasant rebellion in the country's Ukrainian-inhabited eastern provinces. At the end of the century, about 70 percent of the country's population was still engaged in agriculture. Only 20 percent of the serfs possessed full plots, while nearly one-third of them were completely landless.

The most significant event in eighteenth-century Polish history was the partitioning of Poland by Russia, Prussia, and the Habsburg Empire. While the first partition of 1772 still left the Poles with a sizable state with nine million inhabitants, the second and third partitions of 1793 and 1795 wiped the country off the map of Europe. The three sections of Poland became part of three different socioeconomic systems. The northwestern section came under the influence of advanced German socioeconomic developments. Habsburg-controlled Galicia remained backward until the very end of the empire. The largest and least developed eastern part of Poland was integrated into the even more backward Russian Empire.

During the late eighteenth century the Czech lands experienced a government-inspired industrial-

ization drive. The loss of most of Silesia in the War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748) prompted the Habsburgs to develop Bohemia-Moravia as the new center of their manufacturing industry. Many of the factories were established by Habsburg aristocrats, who recruited their workers from the ranks of the landless peasantry.

SERF EMANCIPATION AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

The nineteenth century saw the transformation of a feudal society into a civil society in East Central Europe. In light of the region's fundamental agrarian nature, this transformation affected most of all the peasants. In the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1815) the emancipation of the serfs occurred in 1807. The serfs received their personal freedom, but the lands remained in the hands of the nobility, and the peas-



MILITARY FRONTIER DISTRICTS IN THE HABSBURG EMPIRE

The Military Frontier District (*Militärgrenze, Határvidék*) was an anti-Ottoman defensive belt established by the Habsburgs between 1699 and the 1760s. Its inhabitants consisted of free peasants, who, in return for their plots, were obliged to perform military service. Most of these peasant soldiers were south Slavs, but in the mid-eighteenth century a number of Hungarian and Romanian Vlach districts were also established in southern and eastern Transylvania. Those who were settled there or who remained in these military districts received free lands. Their tax obligations were also reduced by two-thirds, and in times of war they were free from all taxes. In return for this, all healthy adult males were obliged to participate in military training on a regular basis. In case of a war, they were the first to be mobilized. With the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish danger, the military districts lost their usefulness. Those in Transylvania were disbanded in 1851, while those in Croatia-Slavonia and southern Hungary were liquidated between 1871 and 1885. Following their dissolution, all of the military districts were integrated into the regular civil administration system of the Kingdom of Hungary.



TRIPARTITIONED POLAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Only twelve years after the final partitioning of Poland in 1795, Napoleon established the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which survived for less than a decade (1807–1815). After Napoleon's defeat, the Congress of Vienna (1815) partitioned Poland again, with most of its territories of about 227,000 square miles going to Russia. This included the autonomous Congress Kingdom, with about 49,000 square miles and a population of 4 million. Habsburg Austria received 30,000 square miles of Galicia with a population of 4.2 million, while Prussia received 11,000 square miles of Pomerania with 776,000 inhabitants. The city of Cracow and its vicinity was made into a free city of 444 square miles and 88,000 people until 1846, when it was attached to the Austrian Empire. The autonomy of the Congress Kingdom was cut down after the anti-Russian uprising of 1830–1831 and then completely eliminated—creating the Warsaw Province—after the second anti-Russian uprising of 1863–1864.

ants were obliged to pay for their use with money and agricultural produce.

At the Congress of Vienna (1815) Poland was partitioned again, with most of its territories (including the autonomous “Congress Kingdom”) going to Russia and the rest to Prussia and Habsburg Austria. Of these three sections, Prussian Poland had the most progressive social structure. Serf emancipation was begun there in 1823 and completed in 1850. All serfs received their personal freedom, and the landlords were compensated for the lost services with government bonds. In the Austrian Empire, including Czechia but excluding Hungary, serf emancipation was carried out by the Act of the Imperial Council on 7 September 1848. The serfs were personally freed and received the plots they had been cultivating. In the Czech lands, one-third of the compensation was paid for by the peasants, one-third by the government, and one-third was abolished in lieu of the termination of the lords' obligations to the serfs.

Serf emancipation in Russian Poland came after the anti-Russian Polish Revolution of 1863–1864. The Russians wished to turn the peasants against their Polish lords, so they carried out this emancipation un-

der generous terms. In addition to personal freedom, the peasants also received the lands under their cultivation, plus an additional one million hectares taken from the nobility. Redemption payments made by peasants to the Russian government, which in turn paid the lords in government lands, were extended through many decades, and then abolished in 1905.

Hungary had a much broader autonomy within the Austrian Empire, wherefore the serf question was solved internally. The emancipation decree was passed by the last feudal diet and made part of the so-called April Laws of 11 April 1848. The serfs received their personal freedom and all the rustical lands in their possession. The lords were compensated by the government. But, as many of the serfs held dominical lands—which legally belonged to the lords—two-thirds of the Hungarian peasantry became landless. The outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848–1849 intervened, and much of the emancipation was carried out by the imperial government in 1853.

Serf emancipation was the most important development in the birth of a modern civil society, going hand in hand with industrialization and the rise of the factory system. This was particularly true for Prussian Poland and the Czech lands, both of which developed a large textile industry. The textile workers of Prague were in the forefront of collective action when they protested against the lowering of their wages in 1844.

The modernization process produced two new classes: the bureaucracy and the proletariat. Bureaucracy was a necessary byproduct of the administrative efficiency and centralization aspired to by enlightened absolutism. The growth of bureaucracy was paralleled by the rise of a new intelligentsia, consisting of the clergy, educators, lawyers, physicians, and engineers. The last of these professions was particularly present in Hungary, where it was needed for large public projects, such as the regulation of rivers, land reclamations, and the construction of dams, dikes, and railroad lines. The latter activities also gave birth to the category of ditchdiggers (*kubikusok*), whose number reached 100,000 by the end of the century.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

From the mid-nineteenth century to the end of World War I, the borders of the East Central European states did not change, but in 1867 the Austrian Empire was transformed into Austria-Hungary, with an additional dualistic arrangement between Hungary and Croatia in 1868. Transylvania was fully reintegrated into Hungary, but the future Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia

still had no separate identity. Lands of the Czech Crown (Bohemia, Moravia, and portions of Silesia) remained autonomous within the Austrian half of the dual monarchy. After 1864, the Congress kingdom of Poland was reduced into the Warsaw Province of the Russian Empire.

If national borders did not change during this period, population did grow markedly. In 1870 about 10 million Poles lived on the territories of the tripartitoned Polish state. By 1914 their numbers had increased to 18 million, with nearly 16 million of them living within the Russian Empire. During the same period, the population of the lands of the Czech crown increased from 7.6 million people to 10.3 million. Of these, however, close to one-third were Germans. During the same period, Hungary's population increased from 13.3 million to 21.5 million, but of these only slightly over half were Hungarians. The rest were Slovaks, Romanians, Croats, Serbs, Rusyns, and Germans.

During the same period ethnic conditions changed only slightly. The most important change was the migration of Yiddish-speaking Jews from Galicia to Hungary. In the period between 1780 and 1840, their number increased from 78,000 to 250,000, and by World War I it reached 911,000. The Jews gradually replaced the Greeks and the Armenians in commerce, industry, and the development of the market economy. They were able to do so partially because they filled a void that the peasants were unable, and the nobility unwilling, to fill.

Migration within the region had been going on for many centuries, but intercontinental migration was a new phenomenon. It was the result of new economic developments connected with the rise of capitalism. In the period between 1870 and 1914, 3.5 million Poles, 2 million Austrian citizens (among them 50,000 Czechs), and 1.8 million Hungarian citizens emigrated to America. Of this 1.8 million over one-third were Hungarians, under one-third were Slovaks, and the remaining one-third was divided among the Rusyns, Romanians, Croats, Serbs, and Germans.

The region's growing population was divided into several social classes: The peasantry, the new industrial working class (proletariat), the growing professional middle class, and the still prominent nobility. Numerically the largest social class was the peasantry, but it was not evenly divided among the various countries and provinces. In 1870 peasants made up 65 percent of the population of Russian Poland and 42 percent in Prussian Poland. The peasant population of the Czech and the Hungarian lands was somewhere between these two extremes. Population growth compelled peasants to divide their lands, until many holdings were not large enough to support a family. These peasants were forced to supplement their income by becoming seasonal workers in the better-endowed provinces (e.g. Prussian Poland), by turning into industrial workers (in Prussian Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary), or by emigrating to America. The Hungarian scene was slightly different. There, two-thirds of the serfs (those on dominical lands) were emanci-



Austria-Hungary after 1867.

pated without land. From their ranks came the above-mentioned ditchdiggers and agricultural laborers. Some of the latter were seasonal workers (*napszamosok*), while others became attached to large estates (*cselédék*).

One of the most significant developments in the second half of the nineteenth century was the appearance of the modern industrial working class. Small-scale industry and handicrafts continued to survive, but their place was increasingly taken by large-scale industry. By World War I, the number of factory workers in Prussian Poland reached 350,000. In the Czech lands, they and their families numbered around 3.1 million, or about 600,000 workers. In Hungary their number was 1.4 million, of whom 500,000 worked in large-scale industry.

The new industrial working class derived its membership from two sources: the peasantry and the lower urban classes. Among the latter were those artisans who had lost their traditional livelihood in consequence of industrialization. In the Polish territories,

they were joined by the lower members of the rural nobility, who were simply too numerous to maintain their noble status.

Working conditions in industry were harsh and dangerous. But the social welfare measures introduced by Bismarck in Germany also affected conditions in East Central Europe. Thus, in the western half of Austria-Hungary a number of protective laws were introduced after 1884, including a ten-hour work day and obligatory health insurance.

The coming of capitalism signaled not only the birth of the proletariat, but also the genesis of labor movements and political parties, often divided along ethnic lines and over the complex relationship between socialist and nationalist politics. Polish socialists in the last decade of the nineteenth century founded two separate Marxist parties, one placing social revolution before national independence. Both were legalized only after the Russian Revolution of 1905. In the Austrian half of Austria-Hungary, the Social Dem-

ocratic Party, founded in 1888–1889, soon splintered into several “national” parties, although outwardly retaining its unity. After the introduction of universal manhood suffrage in 1907, it was represented in the imperial Parliament. The Socialist Party of Hungary was founded in 1890 and immediately established several nationality divisions, although officially it favored unity and assimilation. As Hungary did not introduce universal manhood suffrage until 1919, the Socialist Party failed to become a parliamentary party. But it did direct labor activism and was also involved in the great labor strike of 1912. The turn of the century also saw the rise of several peasant parties in all of the countries under consideration. These parties were more traditional and closer to established religions than the socialists.

At the pinnacle of East Central European society stood the members of the landed aristocracy. Following serf emancipation, most of them retained their estates, and controlled about one-third of the land in each of the three countries. In the Czech lands and Hungary, the members of the traditional aristocracy were joined by newly titled industrial magnates, many of them with the rank of baron.

Under them was a middle layer. In Russian Poland, the members of this class came almost exclusively from the ranks of urban merchants and artisans, and perhaps a few were well-to-do farmers. In the Czech lands, this middle layer was made up of civil servants and white-collar workers in private enterprises. In Hungary, it comprised rich merchants and artisans. By the turn of the century they and their families numbered about 100,000. They were joined by an equal number of professional intelligentsia, and also by about 30,000 to 35,000 nontitled middle nobles who owned moderate size estates (200–1,000 *holds* = 284–1,420 acres). These sublayers collectively made up the Hungarian gentry class. Their mentality and attitude displayed many features of the bygone feudal age. As such, notwithstanding their middle-class status, in mentality they were close to the Polish nobility.

National consciousness and national assimilation. The rise of national consciousness in East Central Europe was the direct result of the impact of the Enlightenment and the Napoleonic wars that spread this ideology far and wide. National revival began among the region’s “historic” nations—the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs—in the second half of the eighteenth century. It gradually spread in the nineteenth century to such nationalities as the Slovaks, Romanians, and various southern and eastern Slavic peoples.

At the start, these national revivals were elitist movements, for only the intelligentsia were involved. Among the Poles and the Hungarians this intelligentsia came from the ranks of the nobility, among the Czechs from the ranks of the burgher class, and among the rest of the nationalities from the ranks of the clergy, with peasant roots. Historians of East Central Europe tend to distinguish between “aristocratic nationalism,” “middle-class nationalism,” and “peasant nationalism.”

In general, these national revival movements remained confined to the literate classes until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Then they were spread by mass education and mass journalism to the ranks of the peasantry. In the case of the Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles, however, the mid-nineteenth-century revolutions (1848–1849 and 1863–1864) had already aroused national consciousness in a sizable segment of the rural classes.



RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

Most ethnic Poles were Catholic, but historical Poland also contained large Orthodox Christian and Jewish populations. The Czechs were 95 percent Catholic, although they were much more lax in their beliefs and practices than the Poles, as many of them perpetuated certain Hussite traditions.

The population of historical Hungary was about 50 percent Catholic, 14 percent Calvinist, 13 percent Orthodox Christian, 11 percent Greek Catholic (Uniate), 7 percent Lutheran, 5 percent Jewish, and 0.4 percent Unitarian. The ethnic Hungarians themselves were two-thirds Catholic, and the remaining third Calvinist, Lutheran, Jewish, and Unitarian. The Slovaks were about 80 percent Catholic and 20 percent Lutheran. The Rusyns and the Romanians were evenly divided between Orthodox Christianity and Greek Catholicism (Uniates). The Serbs were all Orthodox Christians, while the Germans were two-thirds Catholic and one-third Lutheran.

The situation in Hungary changed significantly after World War I, when the country, reduced in size by the peace settlements, lost all of its Orthodox Christian population. Two-thirds of the remaining citizens were now Catholic, 20 percent Calvinist, and the remaining 14 percent divided evenly between Jews and Lutherans.

As national consciousness spread, late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century East Central European society also underwent a process of national assimilation. This occurred throughout the whole region, although there were individual differences, which depended on the historical past and the social makeup of a particular nationality, as well as on its position within the hierarchy of nations. For example, the Slovaks lacked traditions of independent statehood, and most of them were peasants, with only a smattering of artisans and merchants. They also lacked an aristocracy, nobility, and even upper-level urban elements. A number of Slovaks had been ennobled in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries by the Habsburg kings of Hungary, but by this act they immediately joined the ranks of the *Natio Hungarica* (in effect, the Hungarian nobility). They thereby lost touch with their own ethnic group, and following the rise of modern nationalism, virtually all members of the *Natio Hungarica* opted to become members of the Magyar-speaking modern Hungarian nation.

When the Austrian Empire was transformed into Austria-Hungary, the successive Hungarian governments engaged in various levels of Magyarization through administrative means. This was done in violation of the progressive laws passed during the early years of the Dual Monarchy (e.g., Law of Nationalities and the Education Law of 1868). Much of the success of Magyarization, however, was not due to administrative pressures. Rather, it was the result of rapid urbanization and industrialization affecting primarily the country's inner regions. Slovak peasants, turned into construction workers, were heavily involved in turning Buda and Pest into the modern metropolis of Budapest. But once they settled in the interior, they remained there and became assimilated into the Hungarian majority. By 1914, as many as 100,000 had changed their nationality.

During the same period, the Russian imperial government also pursued a policy of Russification in Russian Poland. In contrast to Hungary, however, where thousands of primary schools functioned in several languages, the Russians did not tolerate the existence of Polish schools. This extreme policy produced a widespread reaction, which ultimately undermined Russification. Assimilation was much more successful in Prussian Poland, in spite of the constant influx of Polish Peasants in search of better working conditions. This success was due to the improved quality of life in German society.

In contrast to the other governments, the Austrian Imperial Government did not pursue a policy of Germanization in the Czech lands. For this reason, and because of the spread of Czech nationalism, in

many of the Bohemian and Moravian towns it was the German burghers who became assimilated into the Czech nation. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Prague was virtually a German city. By the end of the century, however, it already had a Czech-speaking majority. A similar process occurred in Hungary, where in the course of the nineteenth century, the city of Budapest (until 1872 Buda and Pest) was transformed from a German into a Hungarian city.

The process of modernization also produced a new intelligentsia, many of whose members had non-noble roots. In Russian Poland, a Polish intelligentsia hardly existed. Most of them were concentrated in Austrian Galicia, where two Polish universities (Cracow and Lemberg/Lwów) and a Polish Academy of Sciences functioned, as well as a whole series of Polish primary and secondary schools. Moreover, in the province's eastern section, there were also Ukrainian schools. As a result, Galicia became the main breeding ground for Polish and Ukrainian nationalism.

The birth of modern society also sped up the spread of literacy. During the first half of the nineteenth century, literacy was still limited in the region. Progress was made only by the Polish and Hungarian nobility, and the Czech burghers. The situation changed in the second half of the century, when in Bohemia and Moravia education in Czech and German was made available at all levels. True, until 1882 the University of Prague functioned only in German. But in that year a Czech-language university was also established. A number of specialized colleges were likewise founded, which after World War II developed into full-scale universities.

The situation was similar in Hungary. The Education Law of 1868 introduced compulsory universal education, and by 1912 there were 16,861 elementary schools, of which 3,408 functioned in Romanian, German, Slovak, Serbian, Rusyn, and Italian. Secondary schools were more elitist and fewer in number. In 1879, the study of Hungarian was made mandatory in all non-Hungarian secondary schools, and then in 1907 in all primary schools. The non-Hungarian nationalities resented this, leading to increased nationality squabbles. In contrast to Bohemia-Moravia, higher education in Hungary was available only in Hungarian. In addition to the University of Budapest (1635), three new universities were established: Kolozsvár (1872), Pozsony (1912) and Debrecen (1912).

WORLD WAR I AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

World War I had a very disruptive impact upon the region, breaking up old empires and creating several new and small states. Although established in the



East Central Europe, 1930. Adapted from Paul Robert Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

name of national self-determination, with the exception of the rump Austrian and Hungarian states, all of the new states were multinational. Poland was re-established after 123 years, put together from Russian, Prussian, and Austrian-held territories. It became a state of 150,000 square miles, with a population of 27 million, of which nearly one-third were Ukrainians, Jews, Lithuanians, and Germans. Czechoslovakia was formed from the three Czech provinces (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia) plus the Slovak- and Rusyn-inhabited regions of Hungary. It became a state of 54,000 square miles, with a population of 13.6 million. It had no majority nationality, for the Czechs and the Slovaks together made up only 64 percent of the population. The remaining 36 percent included Germans, Hungarians, and Rusyns.

Hungary suffered the most in this new arrangement, losing 71 percent of its territory and 63 percent of its population. It became a small state of 36,000 square miles with a population of only 8 million. At the same time 3.5 million Hungarians were left on the other side of the new borders, creating unending conflicts with its new neighbors.

In addition to nationality conflicts, the most pressing issue faced by the new or reestablished states was their outdated agrarian structure. Czechoslovakia introduced the most comprehensive land reform, but it was motivated partially by the desire to undermine the German and Hungarian landed nobility. About 4 million hectares were nationalized, of which 1.2 million were divided among 634,000 peasants. After Slovakia's separation in 1939, all lands in Jewish ownership were likewise nationalized and distributed, but only to former Slovak legionnaires and bureaucrats.

Polish land reform was less drastic because it was directed against Polish landlords. All landholdings above three hundred hectares in western Poland, or five hundred hectares in eastern Poland were nationalized and distributed. But implementation was so slow that it was still in process when World War II broke out.

Land reform in Hungary was first initiated by the Hungarian Socialist Republic in 1919, but the regime's rapid collapse ended these plans. On the basis of the new land reform law of 1920, 640,000 hectares were nationalized and 400,000 hectares were distributed among 427,000 peasants. Completed in 1929, this reform altered very little about Hungary's traditional social structure.

There were many similarities and dissimilarities in the social makeup of these states. In the early 1920s, 63.8 percent of Poland's population worked in agriculture, in contrast to Hungary's 55.7 percent and Czechoslovakia's 37.2 percent. But in the two north-

ern states there were major regional differences: the agricultural sector in eastern Poland engaged 87 percent of the workforce, and in eastern Czechoslovakia (Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia) 58.5 percent.

The Czech provinces of Czechoslovakia had the most advanced social structure. In 1921, the industrial sector in the country as a whole was 34 percent, the commercial sector 5.5 percent, transportation 3.7 percent, and the bureaucracy and professionals 4.3 percent. Naturally, the situation was much worse in the eastern provinces.

Czechoslovakia was followed by Hungary, where in 1920 the industrial sector embraced 19.1 percent of the population, and the bureaucracy and professionals 4.6 percent. The nonagricultural economy was less developed in Poland, where the industrial sector was 16.5 percent, and the heavy industry only 4 percent. By the end of the interwar years, however, these ratios had risen significantly.

The upper middle class constituted a relatively small portion of the population of these countries. In 1930 it was about 1 percent in Poland, 5.8 percent in Czechoslovakia, and 8 percent in Hungary. This higher percentage is derived from the fact that many of Hungary's lower nobility became integrated into the gentry-dominated bureaucracy. But of this middle layer only about 2,200 families belonged to the "historic middle class" that consisted of well-to-do noble families. Above them were the landed aristocracy (745 families) and the nouveaux riches leaseholders (350 families), who had acquired their wealth from various commercial and industrial activities.

Jews in interwar East Central Europe. The Jews occupied a special position in interwar East Central Europe, although there were considerable differences in their position in these three countries. Whereas in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia they were considered Hungarians or Czechoslovaks of the Jewish faith, in Poland they were treated as a distinct nationality. For this reason, in Hungary it is not even possible to tell the exact number of Jews. In the period between 1867 and 1938 (from the Law of Jewish Emancipation to the First Jewish Law) census takers counted practicing Jews as Hungarians of the Jewish faith. Their number in 1925 was 477,000. Along with the converts and the nonpracticing Jews, however, their numbers may have been as high as 600,000, or close to 8 percent of the population. After the territorial revisions of 1938–1940 their numbers grew to nearly 800,000.

After Poland's reestablishment as an independent state, its Jewish population numbered over two million, or about 8 percent of the population of twenty-seven million. At the same time they num-

bered around 250,000 in Czechoslovakia, half of whom were former Hungarian Jews who had been attached to the new state after World War I.

A significant portion of the Jews in these states were involved in business activities and thus made up a major portion of the commercial middle classes. This was more true in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia than in Poland. In each of these states Jews also made up a major portion—perhaps as much as one-third—of the intelligentsia, including physicians, lawyers, journalists, and literary and cultural figures. Their role was even more pronounced in Hungary, where in some professions they constituted half or more of the practitioners. Not even the quota law (*numerus clausus*) of 1920, which limited their number at the nation's colleges and universities to their ratio in the population, altered the picture. Thereafter, many Hungarian Jews simply went abroad to study and returned with highly rated western European degrees to join the Hungarian labor force.

In contrast to the Jews of Hungary and of the Czech lands, those in Carpatho-Ruthenia (within

Czechoslovakia) and Galicia (within Poland) were much poorer and much less educated. They were generally engaged in handicrafts, small-scale industry, shopkeeping, and peddling.

Just before and during World War II, Jews were singled out for persecution in all three (after 1939, in all four) of these countries. In German Poland, Bohemia-Moravia, and Slovakia they were liquidated during the early phase of the war. In Hungary—although their rights had been curtailed by three separate laws in 1938, 1939, and 1941—they were able to survive until after the country's German occupation on 19 March 1944. Among them were also many Polish, Czech, and Slovak Jews who had fled to Hungary's relative safety in 1939. Following the German occupation, however, most of the Jews were collected and taken to German death camps.

According to recent estimates—which vary significantly—the Jewish population of Poland was completely annihilated. Those killed in Czechoslovakia numbered between 233,000 and 260,000 (90,000 Slovakia), those in Romania between 215,000 and



INTERWAR POLITICAL PROCESS IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

As in industrialization and modernization, so in the development of democracy, Czechoslovakia was the most advanced among the states of East Central Europe. Universal suffrage for those twenty-four years of age or over was introduced after the establishment of the state. In Poland and in Hungary the right to vote was limited not only by age, but also by property and educational qualifications. Whereas in Czechoslovakia even the Communist Party was permitted to function until October 1938, it was outlawed both in Poland and in Hungary. Moreover, whereas in Czechoslovakia the Social Democratic Party was a member of the ruling coalition, in Poland and in Hungary it remained permanently in opposition.

As beneficiaries of post-World War I territorial changes, Poland and Czechoslovakia wished to preserve the status quo. Hungary, on the other hand, had lost territories inhabited by Hungarians and therefore advocated revisionism. Thus, while the first two states became victims of German expansionist aggression in 1938 and 1939, Hungary was a temporary beneficiary of those territorial changes. In return for its gains, how-

ever, it was bound to Germany in a master-vassal relationship.

In September 1939, Poland was again partitioned between Germany and the Soviet Union. Both conquerors aspired to eradicate the Polish military and political elite to prevent the resurgence of the Polish state. Under German rule even Polish secondary schools were disbanded, and university personnel were interned. Under Russian rule Polish elites suffered persecution, incarceration, and extermination—as was the case with the thousands of Polish military officers who were massacred at Katyń. The eastern segment of the interwar Polish state remained under Soviet rule even after World War II, and Poland was compensated with eastern German territories.

Like Poland, Czechoslovakia was also dismembered in 1938 and 1939. German-inhabited Sudetenland was annexed to Germany, and the remaining Czech lands were made into the German protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. Slovakia emerged as a German vassal state, while Carpatho-Ruthenia was returned to Hungary.

530,000, those in Hungary between 220,000 and 450,000. In all probability, the higher figures are closer to the truth.

WORLD WAR II AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

World War II produced significant changes in all three countries. Hungary lost all the territories it had regained in the course of 1938–1941, plus three additional Hungarian villages in the vicinity of Bratislava. Czechoslovakia was reestablished, but had to relinquish Carpatho-Ruthenia to the Soviet Union. Poland was shifted westward at the expense of Germany. This resulted in massive population shifts, with many millions of Germans expelled from the ceded territories. Their place was taken by Poles who left the eastern territories given to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics of the Soviet Union. Germans were also removed from Czechoslovakia, which expelled about 3.5 million of them. Czechoslovakia also wished to expel its nearly one million Hungarians, but the victors agreed only to a voluntary exchange of population. About 70,000 Slovaks left Hungary and 100,000 Hungarians left Czechoslovakia—a third of the latter having been evicted.

In consequence of these massive population shifts, all of these countries had lost much of their multinational character. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary remained with 3 to 4 percent minori-

ties, and Slovakia with about 14 percent—most of them Hungarians. These calculations do not take into consideration the special case of the Gypsies (Roma), who were never counted as national minorities until after the collapse of communism.

The war's impact on the region's population was harsh and all-embracing. It made no difference whether the individual countries were victims (Poland and the Czech Republic) or "unwilling satellites" of Nazi Germany (Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, and Romania). Poland and Hungary, in particular, became major battlegrounds for the German and Soviet armies during the latter phase of the war. Most of the cities, towns, industrial establishments, livestock, and rollingstock were destroyed and the population terrorized and decimated by both combatants. The two capitals were nearly totally annihilated during the Warsaw uprising (1 August–2 October 1944) and the siege of Budapest (25 December 1944–13 February 1945). A large percentage of the women were raped (according to one source, 600,000 in Hungary alone), and a sizable percentage of the male population was taken to the Soviet Union. Many of them never returned. Others did so after several years of slave labor in Siberia.

East Central Europe under communist rule.

Next to the territorial changes and population displacements, the most significant factor in the region's post-World War II history was that all three countries became part of the Soviet bloc. For about three years

all of them had coalition governments and nurtured the hope for democracy, but by 1948 they had all become communist-dominated Soviet satellites. The parliamentary system and some of the elements of democracy (including universal suffrage above age eighteen) were preserved, but these turned out to be meaningless trappings in these one-party states.

The initial steps of postwar social transformation included the elimination of the former elite and upper-middle classes. Through radical land reforms, landed estates and later even small farms were nationalized. These were distributed among the peasantry or made into state farms. Peasant lands were later collectivized. In Czechoslovakia and in Hungary, this collectivization began soon after the communist takeover. In Hungary, the Revolution of 1956 reversed this process temporarily, but in the 1960s collectivization was resumed. By 1970, 82.9 percent of Hungary's agricultural lands were either collectives or state farms. In Czechoslovakia this figure was 85.1 percent. Poland followed a different path. In 1970 only 15.6 percent of the Polish lands were collectives or state farms.

As a consequence of the economic liberalization (New Economic Mechanism) initiated in 1968, Hungary introduced private ownership of household plots. These plots constituted less than 10 percent of the agricultural lands yet produced one-third of all agricultural goods and one-half of all the produce going to foreign markets.

Land reform was paralleled by the nationalization of all financial institutions, industrial establishments, and commercial concerns. By 1948 even small-scale industry, handicrafts, and retail were nationalized. This process was most thorough in Czechoslovakia. Initially, Poland and Hungary also moved in that direction, but later they gradually restored the autonomy of the small craftsmen and shopkeepers.

With the disappearance of the old elite (whose surviving members either emigrated or were declassed), the communist-controlled governments began to reshape society. They emphasized social egalitarianism and industrial development. The former resulted in a thorough social transformation, while the latter brought about the artificial development of heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods and agriculture. The consumers were simply forgotten, and the agricultural sector declined to the point where by the 1980s it encompassed only about 10 to 15 percent of the population (higher in Poland than in Hungary or Czechoslovakia). The majority of the peasantry was transformed into the industrial proletariat.

In light of the need for an expanded bureaucracy, the number of white-collar workers also increased significantly, but their overall quality declined. Traditional elitist education was rapidly transformed into mass education. Literacy increased radically, more in quantity than in quality.

By 1948, Marxism-Leninism became the only acceptable ideology in communist-dominated East



EDUCATION ON THE SOVIET MODEL

Following the communist takeover, the educational system of East Central Europe was transformed in accordance with the Soviet model. The German-influenced gymnasium system, which emphasized classical studies, languages, and the natural sciences through eight years of study (ages ten through eighteen), was abandoned. It was replaced by a four-year high school type of education that rejected cultural elitism and geared the curriculum more to the needs of modern socialist society. The new secondary schools concentrated on specific practical fields and became so specialized that they began to approximate the trade schools of the interwar years. The goal of producing well-rounded, cultured individuals was replaced by the goal of teaching useful practical skills.

This also applied to a large degree to institutions of higher learning. Their number and size increased significantly, due in part to new foundations and in part to the dismemberment of comprehensive universities into numerous specialized institutions. Students gained a thorough knowledge of certain limited fields, but they acquired less general knowledge. Progress in education was more quantitative than qualitative. In point of fact, the introduction of mass education, without making some universities into intellectually exclusive institutions on the American model, lowered the overall quality of education. This applied both to secondary schools and to institutions of higher learning. Moreover, in spite of this mass education, functional illiteracy remained a major problem in the increasingly industrialized societies of East Central Europe.

Following the collapse of communism, some of the Soviet-inspired experiments ended, while others continued. There was a partial return to precommunist models, but at the same time there were also borrowings from the West, especially from the United States. At the end of the twentieth century, the educational infrastructure of East Central Europe was in a state of flux.

Central Europe. This destroyed the position and influence of the established churches. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary the majority of the population was alienated from mainstream denominations and became skeptics or even atheists, but few of them became dedicated marxists. The situation was different

in Poland, where the majority of the people remained faithful Catholics; the Catholic Church there retained its influence over society and played an important role in the opposition movement.

The communist regimes were more successful in popularizing social welfarism than communist ideology. In point of fact the most positive feature of communist rule was the creation of the welfare state, where a citizen was taken care of by the omnipotent state from birth until death. Initially, the most important social welfare measures affected only industrial workers. By the early 1970s, however, this system was also extended to the rural population. By that time, education, health care, social care, and all the other social welfare measures (including the right to a job, the right to an apartment, and the right to a state pension) were free and available to all, although their quality was increasingly questionable. Even so, both literacy and average age increased significantly, while the retirement age was kept low (55 for women, 60 for men). This policy brought many benefits, but also resulted in an inactive aging population. Moreover, full employment (the right of every adult to a job) resulted in hidden unemployment and much inefficiency in the industrial, commercial, and agricultural sectors, as well as in the burgeoning bureaucracy. In consequence of rapid and massive industrialization, the number of unskilled and semiskilled workers increased markedly. The full employment policy worked for a while, but by the 1970s it began to fail. Rapid technological innovations and automatization made the unskilled and semiskilled workers increasingly superfluous.

The size of the state and party bureaucracy also increased manifold. Along with the administrators of large industrial establishments, party and state officials made up the highest level of the *nomenklatura* that had replaced the old elite and came to constitute what the Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas called the “new class.”

Quality of life began to improve during the 1960s, but per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and living standards were still far below those of the West. This, of course, did not apply to the members of the *nomenklatura*, who enjoyed much higher incomes and many privileges, including the right to buy in special stores and to travel abroad.

The Polish and Hungarian Revolutions of 1956—although suppressed—ultimately had an ameliorative effect upon conditions in those two countries. Political control and ideological rigor eased and life generally improved. Eventually even Western travel became easier. At the same time, the population was firm in its belief that Soviet control was there to

stay. Thus, while paying lip service to the Soviet Union and to communist ideals, they concentrated on improving their personal lives. This was particularly true for Hungary under the Kádár regime, but less so in Poland, where the late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed a clash between the Solidarity labor movement (led by Lech Wałęsa) and a political regime, led by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, that feared Soviet intervention.

The situation was different in Czechoslovakia, where strict political control and ideological orthodoxy continued. The Prague Spring of 1968, only a momentary break in this orthodoxy, was followed by a more severe regime in which all dissent was stifled. Progressive party leaders, such as Alexander Dubček, and liberal intellectuals, such as Václav Havel, who had been leaders in the events of 1968 and in the dissident movements that followed, were barred from public life and often forced to make their livings through physical labor.

The collapse of communism and the transition to capitalism. Convinced of the indestructibility of Soviet communist control, the people of East Central Europe were not prepared for the radical changes of 1989–1990. Nor were they ready to deal with the intricacies and challenges of true democracy. Conse-

quently, the euphoria that accompanied the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was followed by a short period of great expectations followed by a longer period of disenchantment. By the mid-1990s, this disenchantment had reached the point where people began to vote the restructured and renamed communist parties back into power.

The change of political regimes was followed in all three (since 1993, when Slovakia became an independent state, all four) countries by a massive privatization of state assets. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, this was done by giving the population shares in the former state-owned enterprises. In Hungary, however, state-owned companies were sold off to private investors—many of them Westerners with little appreciation for the social problems faced by the population. By virtue of their social connections, the members of the former party elite were able to seize the lion's share in this privatization process. Many of them transferred themselves from the political elite to the new financial elite. At the same time they also avoided being called to account for their past deeds.

This fact alone would have been enough to produce mass disillusionment. But even greater was the disenchantment with the economic and social developments. The formerly all-encompassing social wel-



East Central Europe, 1992. Adapted from Paul Robert Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

fare network collapsed. This was accompanied by mass layoffs, growing unemployment, pressure to produce more, and also an end to the notion that having a job is everyone's natural right.

The coming of capitalism also produced an increasingly visible social and economic polarization. By the late 1990s, this process had reached the point where the average income of the lowest tenth of the population was only one-sixth of that of the highest tenth. Those who were able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by raw capitalism became wealthy and openly flouted their newly won social and economic positions. At the same time, the standard of living for the population declined. This was particularly true for the large number of pensioners and fixed-income employees, who became pauperized and dreamed about the "good old days" of socialism.

These changes were most drastic in Poland, whose postcommunist leaders adopted policies of rapid transition to a free market economy, or "shock treatment." The result was temporary despair, but the promise of a more rapid solution. This path may have paid off, because at the end of the second millennium, the Polish economy appeared to be healthiest. At the same time, however, Western assessments judged Hungary's economy to be the most promising.

Privatization of industry, banking, and trade was accompanied by the privatization of agriculture. This affected Hungary and Czechoslovakia more than it did Poland. In the first two, one-third of the agricultural lands remained in the hands of the restructured cooperatives, one-third went into the hands of private owners (peasants or speculators), and one-third was acquired by agricultural corporations.

The collapse of communism also affected the region's educational system. During the 1990s, much of the Soviet system was dismantled. There was a partial return to the precommunist system, and a partial adjustment to the American educational system. This applied both to the universities and to the secondary schools. Many of the former religious schools were restored to the churches or religious orders, and sev-

eral new institutions of higher learning were also established. These included a number of Catholic and Protestant universities, as well as private institutions. Among them were a few business schools and the Central European University, based in Budapest and Prague (1991). Sponsored by the Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros, this English-language postgraduate institution espoused the principles of "open society."

The emergence of the English language as the region's dominant international language was another important byproduct of the collapse of communism. English replaced Russian almost immediately, and several secondary schools and universities created programs in English, and in a few cases also in German. As an example, by the late 1990s, one could acquire an M.D. degree in English at all four of Hungary's traditional universities (Budapest, Debrecen, Pécs, and Szeged).

Soon after the collapse of communism, Czechoslovakia fell apart, giving birth to two distinct states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1 January 1993). Following their divorce, the difference between these two parts of former Czechoslovakia became immediately apparent. The Czech Republic emerged as a more uniform and balanced country, with a strong industrial base, and a cadre of skilled workers and bureaucrats. Slovakia, on the other hand, sank back into the position of an agricultural-industrial state. Of the four countries in today's East Central Europe, Slovakia is the most multiethnic, with a minority population of 14 percent, of whom most are Hungarians who live next to the Hungarian borders, with all the problems which that entails.

In 1999 Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic became members of NATO, with the hope that they soon would also be admitted into the European Union. Slovakia trailed significantly behind them. With the strong support of the other three, however, it may also make it into NATO and the European Union during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

See also other articles in this section.

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RUSSIA AND THE EAST SLAVS



Rex A. Wade

The East Slavs comprise three closely related peoples, who between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries emerged as distinguishable linguistic-cultural groups: the Great Russians (usually called Russians), the Ukrainians (in earlier times often called Little Russians), and the Belorussians (Byelorussians, Bielorusians, White Russians). The Great Russians (hereafter simply Russians) are numerically the largest and have been politically and culturally dominant. Occupying the area around Moscow, they are the people around whom the state of Russia (and the Soviet Union) was built, and most histories of the area focus on them and their political, social, and cultural patterns. The Ukrainians and Belorussians followed a separate historical course from the thirteenth to seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, during which time they were under the political domination of the Grand Principality of Lithuania or the Kingdom of Poland; these groups, western Ukrainians especially, drew some special cultural and social traits from that association. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Belorussian and most of the Ukrainian lands and peoples were incorporated into Russia as the latter defeated Poland in a series of wars.

As the Russian empire expanded beyond the ethnically Russian homeland over the course of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, it went from having a largely homogeneous population of Great Russians (who themselves probably resulted from the intermingling of early East Slavs and Finnic peoples) to being an enormous multiethnic empire comprising over twenty major ethnicities and about a hundred smaller ones. By the last census of Imperial Russia in 1897, when the state was perhaps at its most extensive and diverse, people who identified themselves as Russian (by native language) constituted only 44.3 percent, Ukrainians 17.8 percent, and Belorussians 4.3 percent of the population, so that East Slavs were 68.4 percent of the total. In the former Soviet Union, Russians were about half the population and East Slavs collectively nearly 70 percent. Although tsarist Russia generally tolerated the continuation of local customs,

some minorities and especially their elites and educated population underwent full or partial cultural "Russification," a process that accelerated with the spread of education in the Soviet era. The following discussion focuses primarily on the social classes and traits of the Russians, the dominant group within a diverse social universe.

Russian and East Slavic society of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and to a significant degree even the nineteenth century, was based on agriculture and military activity. It is therefore easy to view its social structure as a simple dichotomy of peasant and noble landlord, with only insignificant other classes. While these certainly were the two most important classes, such a view obscures what was in fact a much more diverse society divided into a large number of recognized groups by social-economic functions, legal classifications, wealth, geography, gender, and ethnicity. In Russia all belonged to legally defined social estates (*sosloviia*): nobles, serfs, state peasants, clergy, various and changing urban classifications, slaves, Cossacks, and many others. At the same time almost all fit into one of two larger categories, the privileged and the tax-paying. The latter were subject to the head tax, to military and labor conscription, and to corporal punishment, whereas the former were exempted from the head tax and corporal punishment and, in return for personal military or civil service to the state, received various privileges, most notably land and the right to own serfs. Despite important divisions within these categories, the distinction between privileged and nonprivileged (tax-paying) divided society in a fundamental way and continued to influence social attitudes and realities into the twentieth century. At the same time, the state's military and economic needs shaped many social features and changes.

THE NOBILITY

Nobility was defined by heredity and service to the ruler. The function of the nobility through the sev-

enteenth century was to provide the cavalry army that was the mainstay of battle on the east European plain; in the eighteenth century military service still predominated as a defining function of the class, but nobles served as officers in a new type of army. The nobility also provided most of the officialdom of the state. It was a highly diverse group, ranging from extremely wealthy and powerful aristocrats to impoverished noblemen who held little or no land and struggled to keep from losing their status altogether.

At the top of Russian society (apart from the royal dynasty) stood the small number of elite noble families originally termed “boyars,” who resided in or near Moscow and provided the tsars’ major advisors and top government officeholders and army commanders. Below them were another group of families who held important, but lesser, state and military offices. Both of these descended mostly from either the old princely families or the personal military retinues of the early Moscow princes. Below them came the great majority of nobles, who made up the bulk of the army and who held modest estates. Originally the nobility held their land as *votchina*, or pure inheritance without service obligations, but in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Moscow rulers managed to convert landholding to *pomestie* or land held on condition of service, although it still tended to be hereditary in practice.

The Russian nobility had several special features. First, except for a few titles such as prince and, later, count and baron, individual nobles did not carry titles but were simply registered as noblemen. Second, all sons and daughters inherited noble status, including any titles. Third, the elaborate *mestnichestvo* system served to register and accord precedence to noble families according to the time of their entry into Moscow’s service and their status at that time. This system allowed families and individuals to claim offices and military command by right of family precedence and to refuse service under a person of a lower place. The *mestnichestvo* practices were an important part of a complex social system, lasting until 1682, that stressed family honor and status. Yet another special feature of the nobility was the large number of Tatar, Ukrainian, Baltic German, Georgian, Polish, and other nobilities that were absorbed as the Muscovite-Russian state expanded territorially from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries.

The nature, structure, and role of the nobility changed during the eighteenth century, the result of the state’s changing military and service needs combined with Peter the Great’s measures to make service more regular and to tie it more closely to status. Changing military practices made the traditional noble

cavalry obsolete while requiring a new type of army and new government apparatus. To address these needs, Peter created a new army and in 1722 instituted the Table of Ranks, which created fourteen parallel ranks of military and civil officers. All nobles now had to serve in a regular, bureaucratized system of duties and ranks. The new system also provided a mechanism whereby men of non-noble status could enter state service and, by advancement in rank, acquire personal and even hereditary nobility, a practice that increased in importance and frequency over time. Moreover, social status came to be defined in significant part by acquired service rank, so that even when the requirement of noble service was abolished in 1762, it was so ingrained that entering service and acquiring a respectable rank remained an important part of noble life, identity, and social status through most of the nineteenth century. At the same time, the abolition of the requirement for state service by nobles severed the traditional link between service and rights on which the Muscovite social-political system had been based. Previously, all subjects served in various capacities, and some, especially nobility, received privileges in return for their service. After 1762 the nobles retained their privileges but no longer were required to serve in return. This created an elite distinguished primarily by its legally defined privileges rather than by functions or service. Moreover, as the constantly reiterated justification for serfdom was that the serf served the noble so that the noble could serve the state, serfdom itself was cast into question; the essential link between noble and serf was now broken.

The Ukrainian and Belorussian nobility under the Polish-Lithuanian state shared many of the general characteristics of the Russian nobility: in a hereditary system based on traditions of military service, the great noble families were of princely descent, with the wealth of the broader nobility varying widely. In the sixteenth century, however, the Polish nobility gained greater political authority at the expense of the monarchs—the opposite of the situation in Russia—and Ukrainian nobles shared in that gain. Among other things the Ukrainian nobles successfully reduced their military obligations while increasing their control over the land and peasantry earlier than did nobles within Muscovite territory. After the Russian acquisition of almost all of the Ukrainian and Belorussian territories in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Russian service and social characteristics applied to almost all East Slavic nobles, who functioned within a largely homogeneous noble system, including the Table of Ranks. Indeed, the Ukrainian and Belorussian elites, primarily nobles, had been largely Russianized during the eighteenth century, so that to be Ukrainian or

Belorussian came to be associated with being peasant. The Russianization of the elites also meant that Ukrainians and Belorussians were deprived of a natural national leadership, which presented problems in terms of nation-building in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Wealth remained a significant divider among the nobility. The truly rich, with more than a thousand male serfs, composed only about 1 percent of the hereditary nobility (and less of the total nobility), while 17 percent owned a hundred to a thousand serfs, four-fifths owned less than a hundred, and most of these had fewer than twenty, if any. By the nineteenth century many nobles did not own any serfs, either for economic reasons or because as “personal nobles” they did not have the right. State service and its salary were essential for the poorer nobles, who in each generation were continually threatened with impoverishment because the system of equal inheritance meant that property was constantly divided into smaller holdings and thus smaller income.

PEASANTRY

The peasantry collectively made up 85 to 90 percent of the population of the sixteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries and was the core of the tax-paying population. Within the peasantry, the largest group of the population by the end of the sixteenth century was the serfs, peasants who lived in bondage to private landowners and whose personal freedoms were curtailed. Until the fifteenth century most of the agricultural population had been “black peasants,” free men living in small villages, paying taxes to the rulers, but increasingly also paying dues—cash, crop shares, labor—to noble and church landowners. They were, however, legally free, with the right to change residences. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries they were driven into bondage by economic factors and the state’s military requirements. Economic need (resulting from bad harvests, wars, disease, or other factors) caused peasants to borrow from landlords; they were then prohibited from moving as long as the debt was unpaid. That debt often became hereditary and permanent, tying the peasant to the land and the master. The needs of the state formed an even more powerful force in establishing serfdom. Constant warfare meant that the state needed military servitors, whom it compensated by grants of land. That land was of value to nobles only if it had peasants to work it; because peasants could leave and seek other land, the nobles appealed to the state for help to curtail their movement. The Muscovite state responded by re-

stricting the right of peasants to move, originally during a period around St. George’s Day (November 25), then during certain years, and finally prohibited it entirely. The peasantry was permanently tied to the land and could not move. The final fixing of serfdom in Russia is usually dated to the law code of 1649, which abolished time limits on recapture of runaway serfs, imposed penalties on those who received runaway serfs, and generally considered as serfs all peasants living on private landholdings.

Serfdom among Ukrainian and Belorussian peasants, carried out under Polish and Lithuanian political authority, was similar to the Russian. Although they paid dues to noble landlords, the peasants originally controlled their own land. In the sixteenth century the nobles asserted their ownership of the land and the right to restrict peasant movement, reducing peasants to serfdom, especially in the western Ukrainian and Belorussian regions nearer Poland. In the sparsely settled southern and eastern areas, especially the area east of the Dnieper River known as Left Bank Ukraine, peasants managed to evade serfdom longer and were fully subjugated to it only in the eighteenth century, when the area became more settled and came under Russian control. On a comparative note, serfdom developed in Russia and the East Slavic lands just as it was disappearing in western and central Europe.

Serf owners held extensive power over serfs. Through their judicial and other state-granted authority they could beat and punish serfs, banish them to Siberia, order them into the army (a twenty-five year obligation), pressure them through increased dues and fees, force arranged marriages, use women serfs sexually, and in other ways abuse them. Serfs could leave the village area only with the lord’s permission. Their condition generally worsened in the eighteenth century, as nobles for a time acquired the right to move them about and to sell them. Serfs came close to being slaves, which probably facilitated the melting of the slave category into the peasantry in the eighteenth century. Nobles, however, had a vested interest in not abusing their serfs, for they required their cooperation for tilling the land, but many did nonetheless, and the threat of maltreatment always hung over the heads of peasants (as the threat of peasant rebellion hung over the nobility). On the other hand, the serfs retained traditional practices of communal self-government and action and a sense that they had “rights,” often defined in economic terms (what rents they owed, use of woodlands, and so on), that the landowner could not rightfully or morally infringe. They also retained three characteristics of “free” men but not of slaves: they paid taxes, were subject to military conscription, and could go to court (sue and be

sued). Serfs differed from slaves also in that, through the communal system, serfs organized their own labor rather than working under an overseer.

The second largest part of the population, making up most of the rest of rural society, were the state peasants, agriculturalists on land owned or administered by the government. This category grew dramatically as miscellaneous groups of peasants and other rural elements were so classified, and especially with the addition of most of what had been church and monastic peasants after those lands were secularized in the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they collectively made up about half of the peasantry. State peasants were bonded to the land and their position but in the service of the state rather than a private landlord. Their condition generally was slightly better than that of serfs, but they otherwise shared the same general characteristics. They could be transformed into serfs when the ruler gave the land on which they lived to a noble as reward for his service. Other small categories included the crown peasants, those on land belonging to the royal family.

Russian peasant society was characterized by its communal structure and periodic land repartition, important features that many historians have deemed peculiarly Russian developments. By the communal system, the peasants as a group (village, several small villages, part of a large village) were organized for certain administrative functions, with elders elected by household heads. The commune's collective respon-

sibility was to make tax payments, provide military conscripts, deal with state officials and landlords, exercise limited self-government functions, organize cooperative labor, and oversee land repartition. Repartition, the system by which the land available to a peasant community was periodically redivided among its members for use, was strongest in central Russian areas around Moscow and along the Volga and weakest in Ukraine and Belorussia.

Peasant society and families were patriarchal and hierarchical—that is, all members had a right to share in the common resources (of the village or family), but not equally. Senior males dominated in both, while “stronger” families, measured in wealth or manpower, dominated “weaker” ones. The authority of the senior males was reinforced by the role of the heads of households in electing the communal officials and participating in the key communal decisions. While agriculture was the main activity of most peasants, especially serfs, many engaged in other work. During the winter handicraft activity was common. Many hired themselves out as seasonal labor, rural or urban, and some engaged in seasonal trade, while others took to trading activity or urban labor on a full-time basis. They remained, however, bonded to the noble landowner or the state and paid cash dues on their labor accordingly. Some were household servants. A special category of possessionary serfs applied to serfs attached to factories as a permanent, hereditary workforce. In the central and northern regions,

population density on poor land induced increasing numbers of peasants to work away from the land. In the more fertile lands of the south and Ukraine, peasants remained more fully engaged in agriculture and were less inclined to seek seasonal or other employment outside of the village.

CITIES AND URBAN POPULATIONS

In the East Slavic, especially Russian, lands of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, urban dwellers constituted only about 4 to 6 percent of the population and, excepting the ruler and his chief officials, were relatively unimportant. Russian towns were characterized primarily by their administrative-military functions, with commercial activity playing a lesser role than in Western towns and cities. Among Russian cities only Moscow was truly a large city: in 1689 the population of Moscow was 150,000 to 200,000, a significantly smaller number than that of such cities as Paris, London, or Rome at the time.

In the towns, as elsewhere, the population was divided into legally defined estates. The law code of 1649 defined townsmen as those employed in trade and artisan activities within the town. At the top were the elite merchants (*gosti*), important personages who received some privileges and thus were in some ways part of the privileged element. Below them were categories of lesser merchants, artisans, and the lower class of miscellaneous laborers. During the early eighteenth century the townsmen were redefined into three groups according to capital resources: a higher "guild" of important merchants and other upper-economic urban dwellers; artisans, minor merchants, and others of middling property; and the urban poor. In the late eighteenth century the state redefined urban estates again, this time into six categories. These urban classes, especially the merchants and artisans, were often organized as communes with collective responsibility for payment of taxes and management of city services. In return the town estates received the right to engage in certain trades and, at the upper levels, some privileges such as exemption from corporal punishment and the right to ride in carriages. In addition to the legally defined townsmen estates, there resided in the cities and towns various numbers of people of other social estates, including nobles, government employees, clergy, peasants, and slaves, who in fact made up the majority of town dwellers.

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, towns grew in number and size, and the new capital, St. Petersburg, joined Moscow as a genuinely large city (the capital was moved to St. Petersburg in

1712–1713 and was returned to Moscow in 1918). In the Ukrainian and Belorussian lands the towns were influenced by Germanic and Polish traditions, especially in the western regions, and had more corporate autonomy from Polish and Lithuanian rulers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This was lost after incorporation into Russia. A notable feature of Ukrainian and Belorussian towns was that they were populated primarily by non-Ukrainians and non-Belorussians (Jews, Poles, Russians, others); this was true into the twentieth century, as Ukrainians and Belorussians remained even more rural than the Russians.

OTHER SOCIAL GROUPS

Although the noble-peasant dichotomy was predominant, Russian society was diverse. The clergy was a special category. The white (parish) clergy was required to marry before taking up posts, and in practice they became a mostly hereditary estate, with sons following in their fathers' steps. The village clergy was quite poor, living at about the same level as their peasant parishioners. Higher church officials came almost entirely from the black (monastic) clergy, including nobles who had entered monastic life. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, because of their access to seminary education (however limited), members of the clerical estate became an important source of the new professional, bureaucratic and middle-class population.

Until the eighteenth century slaves were a significant social category (perhaps 10 percent of the population as late as 1649). Slavery in the East Slavic lands reached far back into antiquity. Slaves derived from a variety of sources, primarily war prisoners, descendants of slaves, and people who, faced with economic or other catastrophe, sold themselves (and their families) into slavery in return for food, shelter, and protection. Slaves performed a variety of functions as agricultural labor, household servants, artisans, merchants, estate managers, and even as soldiers. The state's constant search for tax revenues eventually led it to forbid people to sell themselves into slavery, a practice that represented a loss of taxpayers. Thus over the course of the eighteenth century slaves as a category disappeared into the serf population.

A few other examples illustrate the social diversity. Two rural social categories occupied a space between peasants and nobles. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Cossacks, people of primarily Russian and Ukrainian origins who had fled from serfdom and other troubles into the wild frontiers between the Muscovite, Polish, and Tatar states, emerged

as self-governing military communities. They were incorporated into Russia as a special military caste that, although tax-paying, retained limited privileges of land-ownership, self-government, and exemption from some taxes in return for military service. Another special group was the *odnodvortsy*, literally “one-householders” but perhaps better called “homesteaders,” who were descendants of minor service people who claimed noble status because they had provided personal military service. The state sometimes subjected them to the head tax, like state peasants, into which most eventually were folded. In the towns, the term *raznochintsy*, “people of diverse ranks,” emerged in the eighteenth century to refer to a variety of low-ranking government officials of non-noble and nonmerchant estate origins, retired soldiers, soldiers’ children, and others. This category acquired importance in the nineteenth century as a pool from which the new, non-noble educated elements were drawn. There also were wandering minstrels (*skomorokhi*), against whom the church railed, vagrants, fishermen, and others, both inside and outside the estate (*soslovie*) system. The expanding Russian state also contained an ever-growing number of minority ethnic groups with their own unique social patterns, such as Lutheran Latvian peasants, Armenian merchants, nomadic herdsmen of both the frozen north and desert south, large Muslim populations, and tribal groups of the Caucasus and Siberia, to name only a few examples of the increasingly diverse ethnic population.

THE STATE AND SOCIETY

In the East Slavic world, and Russia in particular, the state had a powerful impact on shaping and reshaping the social structure, more so than in western Europe. It created and abolished social categories, redefining people’s legal identities, functions, status, obligations to the state, privileges, property, economic activity, and lives in general. Decrees affected who could live in towns and what they could do there. It turned peasants into serfs and later emancipated them, defined and then ended slavery, and redefined groups of minor servicemen in or out of the nobility. Through its decrees and tax demands the state affected such diverse social features as the size and generational shape of households (a response to tax policies), the communal system (which it enforced in some areas), and alcoholism; vodka being a state monopoly, the state encouraged alcohol consumption to boost receipts, a practice that continued into the Soviet era. Rulers, especially after Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century, held that they had the right and ability to

reshape society by decree. The most conspicuous of many examples of government’s consciously altering social behavior and structures were the Table of Ranks and the decrees calling for Western styles of dress. Moreover, the system of legally defined estates profoundly affected people’s self-identity; indeed, one’s estate was one of the identification entries on the internal passports used in Imperial Russia.

WESTERNIZATION

Western influences also shaped Russian society in fundamental ways, beginning haphazardly in the seventeenth century and accelerating in the eighteenth, when Westernization became government policy under Peter the Great as part of his attempt to restructure society so that it could better serve the state, especially militarily. The new military methods required education and new values and attitudes as well as new weapons and organization. Such external actions as forcing nobles to shave their beards and wear Western-style clothing and ending the seclusion of elite women were part of a campaign to change social behavior and mentalities. The new capital in St. Petersburg was consciously built to resemble a western European city,

as were the palaces that soon surrounded it. Despite some resistance, Westernization of the nobility and most of the urban classes was remarkably successful within only a generation or two. Before the end of the eighteenth century, the elites were speaking French or other Western languages and as a result of formal schooling were beginning to absorb Western intellectual and cultural values as well, including the new rationalist attitudes of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The peasantry, however, was left alone, thus creating a growing cultural division between a Westernized upper stratum and the mass of traditional peasantry.

THE GREAT REFORMS, INDUSTRIALIZATION, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Dramatic social and economic changes took place during the last half-century of Imperial Russia, from 1861 to 1917. Emancipation of the serfs in 1861 shook the social system to its roots. Emancipation made serfs “free rural inhabitants,” although much of the landlord’s control over property rights, economic activities, movement, and so on was simply transferred to the commune rather than to individual peasants, who were still subject to restrictions on movement, special taxes, and corporal punishment. Peasants collectively, through the commune, now jointly owned the land and were responsible for taxes and many obligations and self-government activities. The Stolypin reforms of 1906–1914, initiated by Pyotr Stolypin, premier of Russia, attempted to break down the communal system in favor of individual, consolidated farmsteads held in full title by individual peasant families; but these reforms were short-lived, and after 1917 the peasant villages reverted to their traditional communal structures and practices.

This did not mean that peasant life remained entirely unchanged. Expanding industry, coupled with rural overcrowding, led growing numbers of peasants to take up seasonal, temporary, or permanent work in the cities, while retaining their ties to the villages in most cases (most urban workers were still legally classified as peasants). This introduced a new awareness of the outside world into the village, as did the army reform of 1874, which subjected peasants to universal military service and thus exposed most males to life outside the village and its traditional values. Schooling began to produce a growing literacy rate in the village, especially among younger males. At the same time growing trade affected the villages, introducing factory-made textiles and other goods, including books. Slowly the village was changing.

The nobility was also undergoing change. Landowners lost about half of the land during emancipation and had to deal differently with the peasants to obtain labor for the land they retained (while the peasants resented having to rent land or do sharecropping labor on it). Although some noble landlords sought to introduce machinery and other modern agricultural practices on their remaining land, most were forced, by habit or circumstance, to continue with traditional peasant agricultural practices. The nobility remained highly diverse in wealth, education, and function, even as its importance slipped. Some remained landowners in terms of self-identity and ethos, others became professional bureaucrats (the government bureaucracy increased fourfold after mid-century), and some entered the newly flourishing professions. At the same time sons of the nobility found themselves in competition for both state and private positions with the offspring of the new, educated middle classes. State efforts to aid the nobility and preserve them as a viable class had mixed results, although the extent of that before 1917 is much disputed.

The beginnings of an industrial revolution and urbanization in the nineteenth century started a fundamental social transformation that continued to the turn of the twenty-first century. This industrialization grew in part out of government policy—the imperial regime confronted the need to industrialize to ensure that Russia would maintain its great-power ambitions in a world where military power and industrialization were ever more closely linked—and in part out of the steady movement eastward across Europe of the industrial revolution. Russia averaged an annual industrial growth rate of over 5 percent between 1885 and 1914, with even faster growth rates in the 1890s. Trade, both domestic and foreign, grew significantly. The new economy changed Russian society fundamentally and permanently, creating two largely new urban classes while reducing the significance of some old ones. The old legally defined estate classifications, still used by the government and still an important part of self-identity, became increasingly irrelevant to the actual social-economic class structure.

Industrialization produced, for the first time, a significant urban and industrial working class. This was a deeply discontented class. The factories demanded long hours at low pay amid unsafe conditions, a harsh and degrading system of industrial discipline, and a total absence of employment security or care if a worker became ill or injured. Housing was overcrowded, unsanitary, and lacked privacy. Families often shared single rooms with other families or single workers. The conditions of industry not only left workers poor but robbed them of personal dignity.

Labor unions, strikes, and similar ways of banding together for mutual improvement were prohibited or strictly limited by the government, which usually supported employers in labor disputes. Government-sponsored improvements in the decade before 1914 only slightly mitigated conditions. All this made the industrial workers a fertile ground for revolutionary agitation, which grew with the new century. Moreover, although industrial workers were not more than 2.5 percent of the population in 1913, their concentration in large cities—especially the “two capitals,” St. Petersburg and Moscow—and their organization by the factory process put them in a position to play a role in any revolutionary upheaval far out of proportion to their numbers (as they in fact did in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917). Moreover, once revolutionary disturbances began, they usually could draw support from the much larger laboring class of railwaymen, longshoremen and boatmen, construction workers, day laborers, and others, who together made up about 10 percent of the total population and a much larger percent of the urban population.

The industrial revolution accelerated the growth and increased the importance of the new educated “middle classes” of professionals and commercial-industrial white-collar employees—doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, entrepreneurs, managers, office workers, accountants, and others—that had arisen after the Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s. They initially found employment in the growing government bureaucracy and in the new organs of limited local self-government, the *zemstva*, which employed large numbers of doctors, teachers, agronomists, and other professionals. The judicial reforms of the 1860s created a new demand for lawyers, and the expanding educational infrastructure opened opportunities for teachers. These and other professions flourished in the growing commercial and industrial sectors, as did the increasing urban population of merchants, shopkeepers, salaried employees, and artisans. Although by the early twentieth century they made up only a small part of the total population, the new middle classes were a large part of the major cities. Moreover, their education and concentration in the major cities, especially

the capitals, gave them an importance beyond their numbers. They had for the first time become a significant element in society.

Along with some of the old nobility, the new middle classes made up an "educated society" that provided the basis for a liberal political movement focused on changing the political system through reform. This educated society produced the important, and at the time specifically Russian, phenomenon of the intelligentsia. This primarily intellectual element had evolved out of small circles of mid-nineteenth-century nobles discussing public issues to encompass the most politically involved portion of educated society. The intelligentsia was generally characterized by opposition to the existing order in Russia and a strong desire to change it; out of its radical wing emerged the revolutionary parties, and out of its more moderate wing came the political reformers and liberal parties.

WOMEN

What of the status of women within this society? Traditional Russian and East Slavic society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had a complex, even contradictory attitude toward women, seeing in them the image of both Mary (Mother of God) and Eve (temptress), of good and sin. The Orthodox Church looked upon the sexuality of women with suspicion and regarded sexual activity, even within marriage, as impure. Both descriptive literature and folk sayings denigrated women and emphasized male domination, suggesting that a woman be regularly beaten for her own and the family's good, while she was enjoined to obey her husband silently and in all matters. At the same time, however, especially among the upper classes, women did have legal rights, including the ability to sue in court to defend their property rights and honor and to divorce their husbands for adultery or other sins. By the sixteenth century upper-class women in Moscow were largely secluded, living in the women's quarters (*terem*), for reasons debated by scholars but most probably having to do with maintaining family honor and prospects for desirable marriage alliances. Seclusion was impractical among the provincial nobility, as wives managed estates while their husbands were away on military campaigns, and among peasants, as women labored in the fields. Seclusion was not practiced in Ukrainian and Belorussian areas. Marriages were arranged by the families among all classes. Pregnancy and child-rearing consumed much of the energy of women of all classes.

The situation of upper-class women changed dramatically in the eighteenth century because of

Western influences. Peter the Great abolished seclusion as part of his overall Westernizing policies and ordered women of the elite to participate in mixed social gatherings and to wear Western-style gowns to match the Western clothing styles imposed on men. Elite and then noble and urban women generally became much more Westernized, at least in fashion, a process facilitated by the series of women rulers who dominated the eighteenth-century throne after 1725. Nonetheless, Russia remained a highly patriarchal society. Both folk sayings and law emphasized the husband or father's authority, including the right to inflict corporal punishment, and commanded the woman to "unlimited obedience." Although during the nineteenth century Western ideas about the wife as companion and cultured person changed gender relations and softened patriarchy among the upper classes, among the lower classes, the great bulk of the population, gender relations changed little.

Among the peasantry it remained common for two and three generational households to live together in a single small hut. In such situations younger women, daughters and daughters-in-law, were subject to the authority of the patriarch of the family and to senior women as well as husbands, and often were seen primarily as a source of labor. Peasant women's low status was reflected in numerous folk sayings, such as, "a hen is not a bird and a woman is not a person." Nonetheless, peasant women wielded significant authority. They not only managed the house and performed essential economic activities such as animal care, crafts, and some fieldwork but collectively maintained the essential social rituals of the village: match-making, birth and upbringing, community morals and behavior.

During the nineteenth century the situation of upper-class women continued to diverge from that of their lower-class sisters. Increasing numbers gained an education and some began to enter certain professions, such as teaching and medicine, although they were still excluded from most professions and from state service. Educated women also became more involved in civic affairs, including the revolutionary movement. In turn, equal rights for women was a central part of the programs of all revolutionary movements and parties, although socialist parties generally emphasized that "women's issues" could be resolved only after the overthrow of autocracy and a sweeping social revolution. A feminist movement patterned on Western feminism appeared among educated women late in the century and pressed for a variety of legal rights and educational opportunities. The All-Russia Union for Women's Equality added the franchise to feminist demands after men received the vote follow-

ing the Revolution of 1905. Still, only a minority of women worked outside the home, the management of which was their responsibility, and often a taxing one.

Among lower-class women a different evolution took place. As industrialization took men off to the factories, women took more responsibility in the village. Some joined the migrations to the cities to work as domestics, shop clerks, menials, and factory labor. For most this led only to miserable conditions and a degraded life, but a minority managed to use their newfound economic independence to expand their horizons and forge a new identity. For most women, however, whether peasant or urban working class, life remained harsh, traditional, and patriarchal.

REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET ERA

Russia at the opening of the twentieth century was a rapidly changing society. In addition to industrialization, urbanization, and the growth of new social classes, the era saw a rapid expansion of education and literacy, new directions in art and literature, the appearance of social, economic, and professional clubs and associations, the emergence of a feminist movement, nationalist stirrings among some of the non-Russian half of the population, a broader contact with the Western world, and many other changes. The percentage of nonhereditary nobles and commoners increased at all levels of both the army officer corps and the government bureaucracy except the very highest. Children of the clergy, the merchant class, and the new professional classes increasingly held these government and military positions, which formerly had been the preserve of the nobility. At the same time there was a dramatic population growth, from about 73 million in 1855 to around 168 million in 1913, the result of improved medical care, food, and other factors that produced a longer life expectancy, especially fewer deaths in infancy and childbirth. During the same period urban population grew from 10 to 18 percent of the population, and the largest cities grew extremely fast, tripling or quadrupling their size. Political and social-economic discontent was also growing, producing a potentially revolutionary situation that erupted first in 1905 and then, more profoundly and successfully, in 1917.

The February Revolution of 1917 that overthrew the Russian monarchy also initiated a far-reaching social upheaval. In the new political freedom all classes of society were able to assert themselves as never before and to organize to fulfill their varied aspirations. Thousands of public organizations, reflecting class,

occupation, gender, ethnicity, residence, beliefs, and other human characteristics, emerged and competed in the marketplace of ideas and in the political arena. Swiftly, those representing the interests of industrial workers (and urban lower classes generally) and peasants asserted their dominance, displacing the old middle and upper classes in control of effective power. The October Revolution was, in an important sense, only a confirmation of this successful social inversion, with the Bolshevik Party providing its political articulation and leadership.

After the Bolsheviks took over in the October Revolution, the civil war of 1918–1921 extended the social upheaval even further. The peasants by mid-1918 successfully expropriated noble and other non-peasant lands in the countryside. The nobility as a class disappeared in the maelstrom of 1918–1921, a remarkable social transformation, far exceeding what had happened in the French and English revolutions. The rest of the educated and propertied classes were not so extensively destroyed as identifiable social elements, but they lost their status in society and much of their property (such as houses or apartments). Even the civil war's "victors" were profoundly affected. In 1921, with the devastated industrial economy at only about 13 percent of prewar levels, factories were largely closed, major cities half emptied, and industrial workers scattered. The peasants achieved their main aspiration, possession of all the land, but the famine of 1921–1923 claimed about five million of them and left millions more permanently impaired in health; even their control of the land proved short-lived. Overall, nine years (1914–1923) of war, revolution, civil war, and famine had killed about 25–30 million people and uprooted millions more, who roamed the countryside or squatted in towns and villages. An estimated seven million children were homeless. Two to three million people, mostly of the best educated classes, fled the country permanently. The social upheaval, and its impact, beggars the imagination.

This was, however, only the beginning. The new political rulers were not content to take the society they found but were determined to transform it even further according to their own socialist vision. Central to this was the so-called Stalin revolution. Begun about 1929, it was a dual program to industrialize the Soviet Union at an extraordinary speed while also creating a socialist society, all under the direction and control of the Communist Party. In this process society was to be reshaped on a scale matching or exceeding Peter the Great's Westernizing effort two centuries earlier.

The new industrialization drive accelerated the social revolution that had begun with the earlier in-

dustrialization of the 1890s. Cities grew at a tremendous rate as millions of peasants poured off the land and into the new industrial world. The Soviet Union shifted from being less than 20 percent urban in 1914 to about half urban at Stalin's death in 1953 to about two-thirds by 1989 (higher in the Russian areas). By the 1980s the Soviet Union had twenty-three cities with populations exceeding 1 million (mostly in the Russian and Ukrainian areas), and Moscow exceeded 8 million. Along with urbanization came horrendous problems, as had accompanied such changes in other societies, of overcrowded housing, inadequate sanitation, and the psychological and social traumas accompanying the shift from rural to urban, agricultural to industrial. The family changed from extended to nuclear, and the number of children per family dropped among the newly urban. Industrial workers became the symbol of the new society, as the Communist government declared itself based on a "proletarian revolution" and to be building a "workers' state." At the same time, the traditional tie of industrial workers to the village was broken, not only because of generational change but because the traditional village, and with it the old peasant culture and safety net, was simultaneously being destroyed.

The peasants, who had appeared to be the most successful of all social groups in achieving their aspirations (land and control of their lives) out of the revolution, became the great losers in the new Stalinist social upheaval. Beginning in 1929, collectivization of agriculture took the land and destroyed the ancient patterns of village relationships and life. The peasants resisted—about ten million lost their lives in collectivization and in the famine that followed—but by the mid-1930s they had become collective farmers. Peasants saw the collective farms as the new serfdom, and indeed heavy taxation, restrictions on movement, and subordination to party and state officials (the new "lords"), gave it that essence. The peasants' condition declined by almost every social and economic measurement, even more so than for other parts of the population, and recovered slowest when things got better after the death of Stalin in 1953. At the same time their numbers dropped: by the 1980s only about a fifth of the population made a living in agriculture, although that figure was still high by Western standards.

The new Soviet class system evolved in unexpected ways. Stalin declared in 1936 that the "exploiting classes" had been liquidated and that there now existed only three classes in society: workers, peasants (collective farm members), and intelligentsia. This obscured a more complex social reality. Although the old upper and middle classes were gone, a new class of factory and other managers assumed many of

the functions and status of the old commercial and managerial class. The professions also quickly reassembled, in altered form, within the new society. Assorted white-collar elements grew in number and diversity. At the same time the Soviet Union abandoned its early egalitarian theories, introducing significant wage differentials as well as differential access to the scarce food and consumer goods. It allowed de facto class stratification to evolve based on education, occupation, income, and access to goods, as well as the new factor of Communist Party membership.

A new elite quickly developed, made up of Communist Party officials and high-ranking government, military, economic, and even artistic and cultural figures. This elite was marked both by power and by access to material goods. The latter was the special feature of the new political-social system in that many goods and services were not available for money but only by regime allocation: large private apartments, dachas (summer houses in the countryside), access to special food and other merchandise stores, use of special medical clinics, choice vacation spots, differential access to news and information, use (and later ownership) of automobiles, and other privileges. This new elite was able to ensure preferential admission to the best schools (and then jobs) for their children, thus handing down its advantages. A new, partially inherited class system of privileged and unprivileged evolved. The Soviet regime initially made an effort to conceal social stratification and the elite's privileges, but during the era Leonid Brezhnev's rule (1964–1982) it was much more open about them. The social hierarchy took on more formal characteristics, some reminiscent of the old legally defined estates of tsarist Russia. Probably the most significant of these was placement on the *nomenklatura* list, the list of important positions the filling of which was controlled by a party official, central or local; assignment to these positions made one by definition a part of the elite and participant in its own graduated schedules of privileges and access rights. Other signs of regime-designated hierarchy appeared, such as enterprises (usually defense-related) authorized to give their workers special benefits and the residency permits required to live in certain cities (such as Moscow), which carried with them better access to goods and other opportunities.

The Soviet system introduced other changes in the life of the population as well. One of the more important was the broad range of social welfare and public services—free universal medical care, guaranteed employment, old-age pensions, cheap public transportation—which softened the impact of the new social stratification on citizens. Education expanded

dramatically, producing a generally well-educated population. On the other hand, state-sponsored terror and lawlessness, reaching its height in the Great Terror of the 1930s but continuing at varying levels of intensity throughout the entire Soviet era, had an enormous and traumatic impact on society. Even at its mildest, in the 1960s to 1980s, it fostered a distrust in interpersonal relations and artificial public behavior that affected all social relationships. Organized religion, which formerly played a central role in both public and private life, was mercilessly attacked and largely disappeared from the East Slavic scene until the 1990s. Adding to the complex social picture was a new problem, the immense environmental damage done by decades of industrial policies indifferent to ecological concerns, and an old one, heavy drinking and alcoholism, which became ever more of a major social problem.

Overall the standard of living declined after 1928 and then began to improve again in the late 1950s, with increases in available food, clothing, consumer goods, and appliances. Even the traditionally wretched housing situation improved, although in the 1980s a fifth of the population still resided in communal lodgings (dormitories or apartments with multifamily shared kitchen and bath). Because of the regime's control over allocation of the scarce consumer goods, the quality of life tended to be much better in the cities than in the countryside and to differ significantly among cities (Moscow had more of everything than other cities, Leningrad, formerly St. Petersburg, and republic capitals more than other cities). There is no doubt but that the standard of living improved in Russia, especially from the late 1950s to the 1980s; but whether that offset the terrible losses and traumas inflicted by the regime, or even if living standards were higher than would have occurred under a different kind of regime (they went up, after all, everywhere in Europe during the period from 1918 to the 1980s), remains debatable. The standard of living, in any case, still lagged well behind Western countries (the measurement used by both government and people) and even behind Eastern European bloc countries. Moreover, by the late 1970s there was a growing popular belief that conditions were getting no better, as well as an increasing sense of relative poverty.

Elements both of continuity and of change affected the condition of women in the Soviet era. In 1917, before the Bolshevik Revolution, women received the vote and also entered public life in unprecedented numbers. The Bolsheviks, however, came to power with a vision of a transformed society in which women would become fully equal by becoming fully employed wage earners. Indeed, despite sometimes

utopian debates about transformed social and familial relationships, and some social legislation, perhaps the most important impact on women's condition was the massive industrialization and urbanization. The need for workers drew millions of women into factories and other employment, and the need for technical and professional skills opened up educational opportunities. Women entered the professions and managerial ranks in unprecedented numbers. At the same time, however, traditional Russian patriarchal values continued to apply. Women generally held lower-paying jobs, continued to carry the burden of household work and family care alongside full-time employment, had few modern conveniences with which to ease that burden, and suffered especially from the housing and other shortages. Men held most supervisory and higher-ranking positions, even in professions (such as medicine and teaching) and factories that were numerically predominantly female. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the Soviet regime emphasized the "proletarian" and public aspects of life, areas traditionally considered "masculine," whereas the traditional "female" spheres of life—family, private life, housing, food and consumer goods—were downgraded and under funded.

POST-SOVIET SOCIETY

After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia struggled with the problems of simultaneously creating new states, new market economies, new political systems, and new pluralistic and open societies. The result was renewed social upheaval for all three East Slavic peoples. Privatization on top of an already collapsing economy led to massive unemployment, declining real income, and hardship for large parts of the society, even as a minority thrived in the new conditions. Conspicuous and extravagant wealth contrasted harshly with new depths of poverty and hardship, creating sharp social tensions. Salaried people (most of the population), went for long periods without being paid. The elderly, women, and children suffered especially, while the younger urban population and those already part of the old elite prospered the most. Health and public services declined precipitously. The death rate exceeded the birthrate, while life expectancy dropped sharply, falling from a high of about 67 to 58 years for men in 1995 (women's expectancy was higher but also fell). Crime rose dramatically, creating insecurity in a population unaccustomed to it. Education opened up intellectually but suffered loss of economic support. Personal freedoms, including literary, artistic,

political, religious, and others, expanded dramatically. Creating new national identities has proved more difficult than expected for all three peoples and states.

Clearly, the East Slavic peoples have embarked on yet another period of social turmoil and dramatic change, the outcome of which remains uncertain.

See also Collectivization; Communism; The Industrial Revolutions; Military Service; Serfdom: Eastern Europe; The Welfare State (volume 2); Aristocracy and Gentry; Peasants and Rural Laborers; Revolutions; Slaves; Working Classes (volume 3); Patriarchy (volume 4); Eastern Orthodoxy (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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THE BALKANS



Maria Bucur

Definitions of the Balkans employ a variety of criteria. Geographically, the Balkans occupy the lands south of the Danube and Sava Rivers to Istanbul, encompassing the peninsula bordered by the Black, Aegean, and Adriatic Seas. Current political definitions include Romania, located north of the Danube, but often leave out Slovenia and sometimes Turkey. Historically, the Balkans have been identified with the expanse of the Byzantine and later the Ottoman Empire in Europe. However, parts of the western Balkans (Croatia, Slovenia) never came under the control of the two empires. Therefore, any single definition according to geography, political frontiers, or even cultural influences falls short of encompassing all the lands and people within the area. If anything, the staggering variety of languages, religions, social customs, and cultures in this area, and their ability to coexist for hundreds of years, seems the one unifying feature of the Balkans. Though many similarities exist between this area and east-central Europe, the following discussion is limited to the lands currently within the borders of Romania, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and the small European portion of Turkey.

BALKAN SOCIETY BEFORE THE OTTOMAN CONQUEST (1453)

Between 1345 and 1453 the Ottoman Empire advanced steadily into the Balkans, finally to control most of the peninsula after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. During this period Balkan society was marked by a few important characteristics. Over the previous thousand years the Eastern Roman Empire, Byzantium, had been the most important political-administrative state structure in the area. The Byzantine Empire developed its own form of Christianity that eventually led to the creation of Orthodox Christianity. In the western Balkans, incursions by various Catholic missionaries during the late Middle Ages led to a battle over religious allegiance. The territories of what today are Slovenia, Croatia, and parts of Bosnia

were converted to Catholicism. Along with these two main churches, other smaller religious sects developed regionally, some considered heretical, like the Bogumils, and others tolerated by the main churches. By and large, however, most inhabitants of the Balkans considered themselves Orthodox Christian.

Religious institutions had an important position in Balkan society, both in terms of spirituality, morality, and customs and in terms of economic and political power. The Orthodox Church, especially its monastic orders, acquired large estates because of the custom among the aristocracy and rulers of making large donations to the church as a sign of social prestige and a means to salvation. By 1453 the clergy was one of the two privileged estates in Balkan society, alongside the nobility, but it was far more secure than the latter in its social prestige and economic power.

An important difference between the development of religious institutions in the West and the Balkans was the greater dependence of the Orthodox Church on secular authority. In the Byzantine Empire the Orthodox Church had evolved as fundamentally a state religion, and the higher clergy had for a long time the status of employees of the emperor. But even the Catholic Church was more dependent on the generosity of secular rulers in the western Balkans than in the rest of Europe.

Another important element of Balkan society before 1453 was its ethnic diversity. During the Middle Ages, the Balkans had been a territory crossed and occupied by many successive nomadic tribes. The Slavs and the Bulgars were the most important ones, as they settled and transformed not only the linguistic map of the Balkans but also the material culture and traditions of these lands.

By the fifteenth century, these populations were predominantly settled, rural, and engaged in agriculture. The geography of the Balkans, mostly broken up by mountains and small rivers crossing it both north-south and east-west, generally did not favor the development of large areas for cultivation. Small holdings dominated much of the territory. The landholding

system varied in the area, with larger estates more prevalent in areas like the Albanian plains and Thrace. The Orthodox Church controlled a great portion of the larger landholdings, while a class of semihereditary nobility controlled the rest of the large estates. But no elaborate and centralized system of vassalage and feudalism comparable to western Europe developed in the Balkans. In fact, while some forms of serfdom existed on large estates, there were many areas, such as the mountainous zones of Albania and Bosnia and the Rhodope Mountains, where peasants lived in free communities, as taxpaying subjects of the local and central authorities.

Life even for free peasants was increasingly difficult during the fourteenth century. The political disarray of the Byzantine Empire facilitated the emergence of local warlords, who threatened the stability of the local population, increasingly subject to both higher taxes and irregular violence that threatened their livelihood. Thus, some of the areas that had been more densely populated, especially where large estates existed (in the plains and large valleys), became partially depopulated as the rural population sought refuge in more protected areas, such as mountains. There was already a long tradition of transhumance in the area. Many shepherds had long lived isolated on top of the mountains in the summer, descending to the lowlands in the winter and then returning to their isolated abodes after selling their products to the seasonal spring and summer markets. Now a larger population was retreating into the isolation of the transhumant lifestyle in order to save themselves from the larger taxes and mounting disarray.

In other areas larger family units organized as clans and, through strong kinship links, remained relatively stable during this period of disintegration. Generally patriarchal, these clans existed in parts of Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, and Bulgaria, especially where animal husbandry was more widespread than crop agriculture. Such extended families usually included male siblings, their children, and often their parents. Female siblings married into another clan and lost any rights in their birth family. They could, however, acquire power in the clan of their husband, especially if they married the eldest brother. Sometimes these extended families included four generations of one clan, but more often it was two generations.

The function of these extended families was both to secure the social status and welfare of the individual members and to consolidate and help increase the economic power of the clan. Such arrangements were clearly patriarchal and nondemocratic even with respect to the male members. Age hierarchy was very important in internal decision making. This struc-

ture had great strengths in withstanding economic hardship and other challenges that came from the outside, such as war, but was also vulnerable to weaknesses from within. The power that came with being the oldest brother was easy to abuse, creating discontent among the other siblings. The quarrel between two brothers could precipitate the breakup of the family, bringing misfortune for all its members. Yet the primary victims of this patriarchal family structure were most often the wives and daughters in the clan, who could only exercise power through their husbands. They were otherwise open to sexual and physical abuse from all the elders in the family, both men and women. This type of family structure survived in the Balkans with some minor modifications into the nineteenth century, and in some isolated areas, such as the mountains of Albania and Macedonia, into the twentieth century.

Though most people lived in rural communities, the Balkans also had a small urban population. The largest city in the area was Constantinople, while Athens and Belgrade were rather small towns. Most historians consider the Balkans as increasingly ruralized over the last century before the Ottoman conquest, partly because of the political disarray and partly because of the accompanying economic disarray. The two elements that had brought about the development of cities—local administration and commerce—were in decline. During the Middle Ages, Byzantine cities had developed not only as places of commerce between Europe and Asia but also as centers of artisanship. A guild system to protect and regulate such enterprises had developed, not unlike those in the rest of Europe. In fact, the increasing control of Venice over commerce in some of the important coastal cities also translated into influence over the occupational and social makeup of these ports. Yet Balkan cities did not follow the trend toward self-government that became an important element of urban development in west and central Europe during the same period. They were dependent on the local landowning aristocracy and the administrative interests of the Byzantine Empire.

THE BALKANS UNDER THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1453–1804

By 1453, when they finally took Constantinople and turned it into the capital of their empire, the Ottomans already controlled much of the Balkans. However, the occupation, settlement, and thorough transformation of an enemy land into a *dar al-Islam* (house of Islam) territory took several centuries.

Social and religious organization. Several important theological, institutional, and geopolitical factors helped this process, but the most important element was the *millet* system of social organization. Since the Qur'an already recognized the "people of the book" as a privileged category of infidels, with whom Muslims were allowed to coexist without being constantly at war, the Ottomans created a system that divided the population of the empire into four basic religious categories: Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Armenian Christians, and Jews. Populations in each of these categories would be allowed to live basically according to the precepts of their religion, and their welfare would be the responsibility of their respective religious heads.

This was a unique arrangement in Europe and had far-reaching consequences for the social development of the Balkans over the next four centuries. To begin with, the *millet* system institutionalized religion as the most important element of individual and social identification, surpassing regional, ethnic, occupational, or linguistic criteria. In the eyes of the Ottoman authorities, a peasant from Serbia had the same status as a patrician urban dweller from Athens if they were both Christian Orthodox. However, two Bosnians, speaking the same language, living in the same village, and sometimes with kinship ties, would be treated as two distinct types of subjects of the sultan if one were Muslim and the other Orthodox. This was a very common situation in the Balkans. No other state in Europe made religion as essential to defining its subjects as the Ottoman.

The *millet* system was relatively tolerant toward each of the recognized religions. The sultan generally

did not interfere in the administrative affairs of the Orthodox Church (at least in the first centuries), in quarrels between Orthodox subjects, over whom the church had jurisdiction, in the development of church-based education, or in the social networks that developed around local parishes. However, the Muslim *millet* was clearly superior to the others in terms of the possibilities for social advancement in the service of the sultan. Members of the other *millets* were clearly second-class citizens, a fact that was inscribed into public life, among other ways, through the clothing codes imposed by the Ottomans and by the interdiction against any non-Muslim and *reaya* (anyone who was not in the service of the sultan) to ride a horse.

The *millet* system allowed a great deal of continuity in the social and cultural practices in most of the Balkans after the Ottoman conquest. In the first centuries of Ottoman rule, the rural peasant population was left largely undisturbed by the changes in the system, especially with regard to family structure, occupations, and daily life. This situation contrasts greatly with the general worsening of the rural population's lot during the same period in central and western Europe, which saw the height of feudalism and several religious wars that were particularly disastrous for the peasantry.

Land tenure. Until the end of the sixteenth century, the main form of land tenure was the *timar* system. The military servants (*spahis*) of the sultan received the right to draw income from agricultural areas in the form of various taxes regulated by the state. The *spahis* were thus administrators and had a temporary right over some of the products of those

lands, but could not keep them in the family. A much smaller percentage of the land was part of a different type of tenure system, which allowed the right of inheritance. A more important category was the *vakıf*, which were lands granted in perpetuity to servants of the sultan (e.g., spahis and the ulema) for the purpose of almsgiving. These lands could not be taxed by the state, but a tax was levied on agricultural production in order to fund specific public works such as a hospital or inn. These lands could be inherited and used to sustain the family who donated the land.

Overall, peasants living on any of these estates initially had an easier time than before the Ottoman arrival because taxes were relatively fixed, based on a census, and the *timarlis* were not entitled to exploit the peasants for profit. This was even more the case on *vakıf* property. Instead of generating an economy based on the incentive for profit or wealth, as was the case under the feudal system in western Europe, the *timar* system encouraged stability and the status quo, which was socially less disruptive for the rural population. But it also became generally deleterious to the economic well-being of the empire once population grew and external market forces began to create an increasing gap between the empire and the outside world.

Starting in the late sixteenth century, this system changed under the pressure of demographic and external economic factors, corruption of the system, and the desire of the civil servants to have right of inheritance over the lands they were granted for use. More lands were turned from *timars* to *vakıf*, and a new form of land tenure emerged, the *çiftlik*, a hereditary private estate. *Çiftlik*s were a semi-illegal form of land tenure because during this period they extended far beyond what was accepted under the law—a plot small enough to feed the family of the peasant living on the land. But the Ottomans tolerated this illegality because of the rising corruption among *timarlis*. The *çiftlik* system seemed to provide more reliability in terms of actually collecting the taxes needed for the state and enabling more social stability at the local level. For the peasants living on these lands, however, the system allowed greater abuses and a form of sharecropping that in practice, though not by law, turned a large portion of the population into serfs.

The worsening of peasants' socioeconomic standing was paralleled in the lands outside of direct Ottoman control. In the vassal states of Walachia and Moldavia, the local aristocracy began to exercise more control over the rural population and to impose taxes and labor obligations that amounted to a form of serfdom. This process is often identified as the "second serfdom," though it was not preceded by any similar

practices in the Balkans and eastern Europe at large. It was, in fact, a form of "late" serfdom, in response to demographic regional changes and external economic forces such as trade. Thus, as central and western Europe was slowly emerging from the feudal system, the Balkans were starting to implement it. Serfdom was not legally abolished until the mid-nineteenth century and continued in some areas of the Balkans in the form of sharecropping practices until the twentieth century.

Social changes. Alongside continuities, Ottoman occupation brought about some important social changes. The Ottomans not only controlled the Balkans militarily and politically but also viewed this area as a land that could be colonized by Muslims. Overall, the Ottomans did not seek to convert the Orthodox, Jewish, or Catholic populations, but there were some important exceptions in this regard, in Albania and Bosnia. Because of the religious diversity in these two areas, where Orthodox, Catholic, and other Christians often coexisted in the same family, religious affiliation was not as strong an element of identification here as in the rest of the Balkans. The socioeconomic advantages presented by conversion to Islam, given the already well-recognized military qualities of the Albanians and Bosnians, led to a campaign by the Ottomans to recruit many of the local nobles or chiefs as members of Islam and the Ottoman army. Thus, by the eighteenth century, these areas became some of the mainstays of Islam in the Balkans.

Another important change introduced by the Ottomans was a different set of criteria for vertical social divisions, in accordance to the state's fundamentally religious nature. The subjects of the sultan were divided into those who served him—the military/administrative servants and the clergy, the *askeri*, who were the privileged estates—and the rest of his realm, the *reaya*, or taxpaying subjects. In some ways, this social division was similar to the three estates that existed in western Europe under the old regime—clergy, nobility, and the rest of the population. But the roles of the two privileged estates were different and linked much more closely to the sultan's personal power than in western Europe. The clergy were the interpreters and administrators of justice, which was by and large based on the teachings of the Qur'an, while the nobility were exclusively an aristocracy of the sword, the spahis. Unlike France or England, the Ottoman Empire did not have a hereditary nobility. The spahis gained and maintained their power through military prowess on the battlefield and sometimes by serving as administrators of various imperial functions at the local level, such as levying taxes.



Ottoman Territories in Europe. Adapted from *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, edited by Halil İnalcik with Donald Quataert, volume 2: 1600–1914 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), map 5.

The *reaya* encompassed the whole non-Muslim population and a large portion of the Muslims as well, including the peasants but also much of the urban population, such as artisans, entrepreneurs, or urban workers. These populations served the sultan by paying taxes and in exchange received some forms of protection against the abuses of local administrators, at least in principle. By and large, abuses were greater against the Christian population, especially since in quarrels between Muslims and non-Muslims the law always placed the word of a Muslim above that of an infidel.

Another form of abuse against the Christian population was the practice of *devshirme*, a blood tribute of young Christian boys, which was levied by the Ottomans between the last half of the fourteenth century and the end of the seventeenth century. Every year the Ottomans collected young Christian boys, who became the sultan's personal slaves and had to renounce their parents and religion. However, these boys also gained access to the empire's highest positions. They received a superior education and military training. Later they often joined the infantry (janisaries) or the spahis. Some of the most prominent

military men and administrators of the empire, even grand vezirs (de facto administrators of the whole empire), had been *devshirme* children. It was a way for the sultan to refresh the ranks of his army and ensure the loyalty of his closest servants. Yet in Balkan folklore this practice remains depicted as barbaric.

The practice of slavery continued in the Ottoman Empire until the nineteenth century. Trade in white slaves was abolished in 1854, while the practice of trading black slaves continued until 1895, having been legally abolished in 1857. There were great variations in the status and actual socioeconomic position of different categories of slaves. Born Muslims could not be slaves, and the offspring of slaves converted to Islam were automatically born free. Some slaves rose to positions of great status and economic power. Many others, however, were confined to a very low position in Ottoman society, performing menial tasks with little if any hope for a decent lifestyle. The situation of male and female slaves was similar, though women's roles were overwhelmingly confined to domestic duties. A racial hierarchy also existed among slaves, with white Circassians ranked as the most "noble" and black Africans as the most "barbaric." After the end of the seventeenth century, the practice of slavery did not involve the Balkan population itself, even though many slaves lived in this area, especially in cities. One should also keep in mind that the definition and function of slavery were qualitatively different from that of slavery in North America, as Ottoman slaves did not have the same essential economic function.

The Ottomans did not utilize slaves in the type of labor-intensive capitalist economy that developed in the American South. The land tenure system makes that self-evident. Slaves were utilized more in household chores and their presence in a Muslim house was a matter of social status. There were also far fewer slaves present in the Ottoman Empire than in the United States. By 1800 there were at most twenty thousand slaves in the whole empire and only a small fraction of them in the Balkans.

Cities. Aside from reshaping the religious landscape and social hierarchy of the Balkans, the Ottomans also brought about important changes in urban development. Balkan cities saw a revival during this period, but as a particular hybrid between Muslim cities and European administrative and commercial centers. In fact, cities were one of the most important sites for Muslim settlement in the Balkans, so much so that the 3 to 1 ratio between Christians and Muslims in the fifteenth century was 1 to 2 by the end of the sixteenth century.

Overall, the Ottomans built upon the already existing urban centers in the Balkans and did not have an active policy of displacing non-Muslim populations to introduce Muslims. In fact, Sephardic Jews found a haven in Thessaloniki under Ottoman rule after their expulsion from Spain in 1492. Yet the architecture and structure of cities did change dramatically during this period. Balkan cities reflected in many ways the general divisions in Ottoman society. The living quarters were divided into *mahalles* (boroughs), each representing a particular *millet*. Thus Jews lived together but separate from Muslims. The Muslim *mahalles* were easy to identify in any city because they were dominated by the presence of tall minarets and mosques, and overall had the right to build higher walls and buildings. They were also located more centrally than other *millet*'s quarters. Christians were not able to build towers for their churches, but they developed a distinct style of ecclesiastical architecture, which enabled both inhabitants and visitors to easily identify a Christian *mahalla*. The presence of synagogues and their own unique architecture was often the marker of Jewish *mahalles*. Each *millet* was relatively self-governed, and though non-Muslims paid an additional head tax as *zimmi*s (tolerated infidels), all urban inhabitants were taxpayers.

Another important new feature of Balkan cities was the public institutions created by various Muslim philanthropists as part of following one of the five pillars of Islam, almsgiving. Many wealthy subjects created *vakıfs* to build and maintain at no public cost hospitals, inns, schools, bathhouses, and public fountains, all to the benefit of the general population. These were located mostly in the commercial center of town, which also contained the government buildings and famous *bazaars* (markets).

Though people lived in quarters divided along religious lines, they most often worked together in the central commercial *mahalles*. For instance, all silversmiths had shops on the same street, and all carpet weavers had their workshops in the same district. Ottoman cities had a strong guild system that adapted to already existing practices in the Balkans and accepted as members individuals from all *millet*s. It was similar in many ways to the associations that were developing during the same period in the rest of Europe. Yet some important differences exist between western European and Ottoman guilds in their long-term social and economic role. While in western Europe guilds became an engine of growth in terms of economic production, technological innovation, and capital accumulation, to the point where the guild system was rendered obsolete, in the Ottoman Empire guilds contributed to stagnation.

As in many other areas of economic and social life, the Ottoman Empire instituted strict guild regulations that would enable the state's splendor to remain unspoiled by greed, rapid growth, or corruption. Yet those regulations rendered the state unable to deal with important external pressures on Ottoman society. Guilds were closed and were not allowed to grow in any significant fashion. In a period of increased consumption and commerce, unofficial artisan associations were formed and helped corrupt the system in place. In addition, the Ottomans placed a ceiling of 10 percent profit for almost all artisans, which certainly hampered their transformation into a powerful social group. Artisans remained numerically small and their economic power less significant than their counterparts in western Europe.

One group that was able to take advantage of these strict regulations and the growing markets were commercial entrepreneurs, the middlemen, who had far fewer restrictions placed on their markups. Thus, by the eighteenth century, Balkan cities had an urban patrician class, still officially *reaya*, many of them non-Muslims, especially from among Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Serbs. Many of these Greeks and Serbs were able to transfer their economic power into landholding, though officially all territories controlled by the Ottoman state were the property of the sultan. Thus important avenues developed for the empow-

erment and social advancement of certain members of all *millets*, many of them tolerated by the Ottoman Empire because these subjects were still taxpayers whose activities benefited the state, and others went unpenalized because of the increasing corruption of local administration.

Family structure. Non-Muslim families retained the structure they had before the Ottoman conquest, with virtually no interference from the Ottoman authorities. Muslim families, both those of the colonizers and of the converts, followed practices already existing under Islam. Polygamy was widespread, especially among servants of the state. Also, because the military obligations of the *spahis* forced them to be absent for prolonged periods of time from their families, women often assumed more authority in managing the household, though the presence of several wives sometimes created tensions absent from most Christian homes. Muslim rural families were generally smaller than urban families and much more similar to those of Christian peasants. One important effect of polygamy, birth-control practices and related sexual customs of the Islamic population, and the spread of venereal diseases was the gradual slowing down of the birthrate by comparison with the Christian population. For instance, though at the end of the sixteenth century Muslims made up the great majority of the

urban population, the ratio shifted back in favor of the Christian population by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

THE BALKANS BETWEEN 1804 AND 1948

While the industrial revolution and the political aftereffects of the French Revolution helped bring about a dramatic change in western European societies, Balkan societies remained only indirectly and somewhat marginally affected by these developments. During the nineteenth century, changes in the Balkans were largely political, military, and administrative. One cannot speak, for instance, about the development of a civil society here, as one can in the case of France or Germany. Still, the rise of nationalism as the most important ideological movement of the century was the product of intellectual movements and social shifts that occurred in the Balkans, and it helped in turn to introduce some broader social changes in the area.

The nationalist movements in the Balkans arose out of the interaction of a small but active intelligentsia with the ideas of the French Revolution and the “springtime of nations” in 1848. This group was a relatively recently developed social cluster of either merchants (especially in Greece and Serbia) or entrepreneurial young landowners (in Romania), who had made their fortunes through the Ottoman system but perceived it as decaying and fundamentally anachronistic. Another important characteristic of many of these individuals was their critical view of the Orthodox Church. Though most of the young intellectuals were churchgoing Christians, many viewed the practices of the church hierarchy as compromised and antiquated. Although this was a small group of individuals, their activities proved influential beyond their numbers.

To begin with, they conceptualized for the first time for their own conationals the concept of national identity based on a common language, religion, and cultural traditions. Initially, such ideas reached an insignificant portion of the population, but over the course of the nineteenth century, with the creation of more educational institutions, cultural nationalism became one of the founding principles of education. By the end of the century, the gospel of nationalism was internalized by the educated population, still a minority but now a sizable portion of Balkan society.

The intelligentsia also introduced new concepts of social justice into their discussion about national rights and the oppression of their conationals by the ruling empire (the Ottomans in most of the Balkans and the Habsburgs in Transylvania and the northwestern Balkans). They defined the poor conditions

in the countryside and the persistence of serfdom less as the result of class exploitation at the hands of the aristocracy than as the inevitable outcome of imperialism. Their call for justice found a limited echo among the peasantry (most prominently in the Habsburg lands) until the end of the nineteenth century. But it did lead to the abolishing of serfdom.

Otherwise, life in the rural areas changed very little. The structure of families remained relatively unchanged, while the size of families decreased somewhat because of both lower mortality rates and new birth-control practices among both Muslims and non-Muslims. There was also minimal migration to urban areas, unlike western Europe, where the relationship between urban and rural areas changed dramatically.

Still, some notable changes took place in most Balkan cities. To begin with, the ratio between the Muslim and non-Muslim population continued to shift toward the non-Muslims, with Orthodox Christians making up the overwhelming majority of urban inhabitants by 1914. This change was a function both of different natality rates among Muslim versus non-Muslim populations and of political developments. Most prominently, with the retreat of Ottoman authority from Greece (1833) and Serbia (1829), and with the end of Phanariot rule in Romania (1829), the Ottoman administrative apparatus and its representatives gradually left the capitals of the emerging new states. Athens, Thessaloniki, Belgrade, and Bucharest became important administrative centers. The leadership that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century focused on rebuilding them as European cities and creating a native bureaucracy as the backbone of the new nations.

With the emergence of national educational, cultural, and administrative institutions by 1914, the new national bureaucracies in the Balkans produced an important social class, generally well educated, with ambitions to a middle-class lifestyle comparable to that of their counterparts in western Europe, and at the same time entirely dependent on the state for their employment and social status. This development somewhat resembled the rise of the educated middle class in Germany. But it was not accompanied by the development of a significant native entrepreneurial middle class.

The interwar period saw a continuation of trends already described. The Ottoman and Habsburg presence disappeared, and the new states operated under the principle of national sovereignty, though they all had significant ethnic minorities. Greece alone tried to solve this issue by the resettlement of massive numbers of Greeks and Turks. Elsewhere, minorities were legally protected, though they were everywhere at a

disadvantage in terms of access to the economic, political, educational, and other cultural resources provided by the state. Nationalism in fact became a stronger force in Balkan society, with more aggressive populist, exclusivist overtones. The outcomes of this trend were dramatic during World War II and con-

tinued through the communist period: Great human losses during the war and Stalinist years and a continued splintering (though mostly muted) of Balkan societies due to ethnic-nationalist animosities.

The most significant change in Balkan societies brought about by World War II was in the realm of

demography. The ethnic map of the Balkans was drastically altered through the elimination of most Jews, either victims of internal anti-Semitic movements or as a result of the German occupation. Likewise, the Turkish population suffered at the hands of the Bulgarians and Greeks. The Croat *ustase* (a fascist movement) and Serbian partisans (a communist group) were merciless in their decimation of each other. By and large, the human losses in the war were tremendous, especially in Yugoslavia. Likewise, both the German occupation and the Soviet “liberation” greatly damaged the existing economic base.

THE BALKANS DURING THE COMMUNIST PERIOD (1948–1989)

The most important period of change in Balkan societies during the modern era took place after World War II. Because most of the developments described here are the result of the communist takeover that was accomplished by 1948, they are more specific to the communist bloc, in the south and north of the Balkans, than to the Balkans as a whole.

The communist regimes transformed the overwhelmingly rural, peasant societies in the area into much more urbanized, industrial ones. The structural transformations that accompanied industrialization in western Europe happened over more than a century, but in the communist bloc this was accomplished in two generations. By the 1970s, most people in the Balkans were urban workers and lived in cities.

By the same token, rural life changed dramatically with the collectivization of much of the agricultural land (accomplished less thoroughly in some parts of Yugoslavia than elsewhere). The peasants became a rural proletariat, many seeking seasonal employment in urban industries. Thus a pattern of seasonal migrant labor developed in the entire region, as well as a permanent movement of rural population to urban areas. As a result of the quick and large-scale transplantation of peasants to the cities, one can speak of a process of ruralization of Balkan cities, where peasants tried to replicate their rural lifestyle in the new high-rises. Many new urban dwellers tried to preserve family and kinship relations in the new environment through various living arrangements and by preserving various symbolic links. For instance, many families chose to live in multigenerational living arrangements (grandparents, parents, and children together), although this practice was sometimes also motivated by economic constraints. Some of these families often returned to their countryside residence for any important rites of passage events, such as baptisms, weddings, and funerals.

In addition to the newly created proletariat, another important new class emerged as a result of the new regime—the *nomenklatura*. In order to generate the kind of economic growth required by the five-year plans, the new state bureaucracies had to educate increasing numbers of technical specialists and managers. Though nominally also workers, these specialists soon developed a sense of their authority and became the new elite of the communist regime, more entrenched in their statist loyalties than the bureaucracies under the pre-1948 regimes.

The communist regimes also transformed the state into a welfare state, albeit with rather poor performance on most of the services provided, but still a paternalist form of state that came to replace the traditional safety nets in Balkan societies. Now that women were emancipated in order to become full members of the proletariat, the role of nursing, socializing, and educating children fell on the shoulders of the child-care system. The young could no longer take care of the elderly, as they were engaged in working and generally unable to provide for more than the immediate family. A system of state pensions was to take care of the elderly.

The development of these and other social programs resembled many of the projects of the postwar welfare states in western Europe. The major difference, however, was that in the Balkans these services were constructed and implemented entirely in a top-down fashion, as a gift from the paternalist state. All inhabitants came both to expect these services and to depend on them heavily, to the point where, after 1989, when some of this safety net disappeared, a wave of nostalgia for the communist regime grew strong among many sectors of society.

Overall, what the communist regimes accomplished was equalization of standards of living and of expectations among most inhabitants. The members of the *nomenklatura* lived marginally above this level, and a handful among the party elite had a truly extravagant lifestyle. Yet most people’s expectations of professional success, comfort, and pleasure were made to fit a strict standard. This equalization was supposed to represent social justice. Thus members of all different ethnic groups became equal, men and women were treated equally, and young and old had the same expectations. At the same time, this procrustean measure of social satisfaction hid important injustices, such as the discrimination against national minorities by the welfare state and the saddling of women with the double burden of home and professional responsibilities. In this regard, the faults of the egalitarian socialist system resembled the weaknesses of the western welfare states.

An important result of this equalization of society was the growing emigration of people from this area to western Europe, Israel, and the United States. Aside from Yugoslavia, where many people had a chance to work as guest workers in the west and then return, a sizable portion of the educated professionals found ways to leave their countries behind, leading to a damaging brain drain. By 1989 this exodus had produced serious holes in many of the industries and professions essential for the economic performance of their countries. This exodus has not stopped or reversed significantly since 1989.

POSTCOMMUNIST DEVELOPMENTS

During the period of postcommunist transition, one can speak of very little improvement in the standard of living or level of satisfaction in Balkan societies. In areas that have not been plagued by war, the impoverishment of the general population, the disappearance of social services considered essential by the population, and the appearance of other social problems such as crime, prostitution, and various diseases

have been the somber legacy of postcommunism. Still, though there is some nostalgia for the communist period among the older population, most people are simply interested in becoming more like Greece, with political and economic standards closer to those of western Europe. One important development in the area has been the revival of religious institutions and the growth of the Orthodox Church, which has again become an important center of authority in society.

Another important development since 1989 has been the explosion of nationalist violence that brought about the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. All ethnic groups of that country have been hurt tremendously in terms of personal human losses, economic losses, and prospects for social advancement in the future. The young are fleeing from Yugoslavia, desperate and cynical about the possibilities for peace and prosperity in their country. It is difficult to estimate today the long-term impact of the decade-long conflict in Yugoslavia, but one can be certain that the ethnic map will remain forcibly redrawn to keep the different groups separate, with virtually no hope for reconciliation.

See also Serfdom; Eastern Europe; Welfare State; Nationalism; Communism; Military Service (volume 2); Slaves (volume 3); Kinship; The Household (volume 4); Eastern Orthodoxy (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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THE JEWS AND ANTI-SEMITISM



Michael C. Hickey

INTRODUCTION: DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF EUROPEAN JEWISH SOCIAL HISTORY

The Jews' status as a diasporic people has shaped their social history. Expulsions from western and central Europe, settlement in Poland and the Ottoman Empire, then later resettlements in the West reinforced transnational characteristics of Jewish life. Common faith, languages (Hebrew, Yiddish, and Ladino), culture, and kinship networks linked distant communities and allowed the transmission of ideas, people, and trade. This held for both linguistic-cultural branches of European Jewry, the Sephardi (Hebrew for Spain) and the Ashkenazi (Hebrew for Germany), at once fostering Jews' integration and reinforcing their segregation.

The problems of integration and segregation are central to Jewish social history. Some Jewish communities remained segregated from Christian society into the nineteenth century. Segregation both constrained and nurtured the internal development of Jewish society. Jewish communal associations (*kehil-lot*) negotiated relations with Christian society and regulated Jewish community, family, and devotional life. Communal authority, although under constant strain, remained a feature of Jewish life into the twentieth century. Segregation meant Jews were enmeshed in and apart from European social history. Jewish social history intertwined, for instance, with the rise of the nation-state, modern commerce and capitalism, professionalism, urbanization, individuality, and mass politics. Yet it often followed a different chronology or revealed different characteristics. Jewish emancipation strained but did not dissolve communal institutions, opened paths of acculturation, and threw the nature of Jewish identity into question. Yet even where acculturation was most pronounced, the question of Jews' "otherness" remained, particularly in the form of anti-Semitism.

State-imposed repression and anti-Jewish popular violence punctuate Jewish social history. The na-

ture of popular anti-Semitism is a matter of scholarly contention. Some elements of popular anti-Semitism transcend historical periods, such as the hatred of Jews as alleged enemies of Christianity and as dangerous economic competitors or exploiters. Increased Jewish population and economic integration often precipitated popular violence. But the emergence of modern nationalist and racial consciousness and, in particular, mass politics, grafted onto traditional anti-Semitism the specter of Jews as malignant aliens, which lay at the core of Nazi racial doctrine.

EXODUS WITHIN THE DIASPORA (1450–1570)

In the century before 1450, Jewish populations across Europe collapsed, Jewish economic activity severely contracted, and anti-Jewish violence was widespread and frequent. Jewish life in Europe reached a nadir in the late fifteenth century and the early sixteenth century with expulsions from the Iberian Peninsula and most of central Europe. Jewish communities already had been forced from England (in 1290), France (1306 and 1394), and many Germanic cities (in the mid-1400s). Jews remaining in Germany were restricted to ghettos or dispersed to small villages. In the late 1400s Jews in Spain, home to Europe's largest Jewish community, were subjected to state extortion and forced conversion to Catholicism. Conversion offered little protection, as the Spanish Inquisition made Conversos its special target. Expulsions from Spain in 1492, from Portugal in 1497, and from Italian and German principalities forced the massive resettlement of Jews and "new Christians" on Europe's eastern periphery in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire.

Expulsion transformed Jewish economic life, reversed demographic trends, and reinforced transnational characteristics. Polish magnates encouraged Jewish settlement in underdeveloped territories, where Jews became intermediaries between landlords and

peasants (managing estates and collecting taxes) and facilitated East-West trade. Jews in Poland-Lithuania engaged in artisanal crafts, from which they had been excluded in the West. Similarly the Ottomans encouraged Jews to engage in a range of economic activities, and Jewish communities quickly dominated critical trade routes through the Balkans. Resettlement had profound demographic consequences. Large Sephardic communities arose in the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the community in Salonika grew from a few families in 1492 to more than fifteen thousand people by 1520. In contrast to the West, the relatively secure standard of living and minimal restrictions placed on Jews in the East facilitated population growth. Diffusion to hundreds of small settlements in Poland set the stage for Jewish demographic recovery in the next century, which far exceeded the growth of the general population. In 1500 Jews accounted for some 30,000 of Poland's roughly 5 million inhabitants. By 1600 the Jewish population had increased by almost 500 percent and the population as a whole by only 50 percent. Expulsion also isolated Jewish communities linguistically from their neighbors. But Ashkenazic and Sephardic communities developed cultural and kinship ties that spanned the East, facilitated an impressive degree of cultural exchange, and built trade networks that transformed European commerce.

Expulsions added a racial dimension to religious charges against Jews. Conversion, inquisitors argued, did not cure Jews' "bad blood." While religious and racial charges emanated from clergymen, anti-Jewish violence and demands for expulsions also came from guilds in German and Italian towns, that is, from merchants and tradespeople who saw Jews as an economic threat. The social ferment of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation accentuated these antagonisms.

During the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, ecclesiastic authorities became a principle force behind expulsions and anti-Jewish agitation. In the 1530s Martin Luther, having failed in his efforts to win Jews over to Christ, called on Christians to expel them. Vehement anti-Jewish sermons fomented anti-Jewish riots and expulsions across Protestant Germany from the 1530s to the 1570s. The Counter-Reformation proved no less dangerous. Papal policy toward Jews was inconsistent, but from 1553 on it favored pressuring them into conversion and quarantining them from Christian society. In Italy, as in Protestant Germany, the clergy sometimes encouraged anti-Jewish violence involving guilds that feared Jewish competition. The Papal States, employing the model of Venice, confined Jews in ghettos to segregate them from the general population. While the ghetto has been a symbol of oppression and its overcrowding

has been linked with poverty and disease, in Italian and German cities Jewish numbers increased at a far greater rate than did the general population. The Jewish population of Prague doubled from 600 to 1,200 between 1522 and 1541. Like expulsion, ghetto life reinforced the importance of Jewish communal associations.

State and ecclesiastic authorities strictly limited the size of Jewish communities and circumscribed Jews' occupations, movement, and contact with Christians through Jewish communal associations. *Kehillot* collected taxes, sustained the ghetto infrastructure, and regulated Jewish social, economic, and devotional life. Elected boards of elders maintained cemeteries, synagogues and prayer rooms, slaughterhouses, schools and talmudic academies, charitable societies, and rabbinical courts. They also hired and supported rabbis, teachers, and doctors to treat the poor. To raise funds they levied taxes and fines. *Kehillot* oversaw markets and business practices and ensured proper attention to devotional activities. They regulated personal behavior and family functions, from granting permissions for marriage to supervising forms of dress and public deportment, and were particularly concerned with sexual conduct, especially that of women, who as a rule were secluded. The authority of rabbis declined in central Europe beginning in the mid-1500s with the emergence of a professional rabbinate, often appointed by state authorities to circumscribe community autonomy. Like communal boards, state rabbis coordinated the collection of taxes in the form of fines, which generated hostilities among the laity.

Ghetto overcrowding created social tensions. Divorce increased in German and Italian communities, and complaints of fraying sexual morality were common. Many communities responded by lowering the marriage age while mandating the deferment of childbearing, simultaneously protecting public morality and limiting population growth. Economic stratification increased, and along with an elite of wealthy merchants, a poor stratum of domestics and menial laborers who lived outside the formal legal and tax ordinances emerged. As class differentiation increased, fraternal societies and voluntary associations dominated by the economic elite subsumed charitable activities, burials, and other community functions. As in Christian communities, debate over the function of the laity accompanied social change. Lay officials displaced rabbinical authority on communal boards, and in several cities lay courts began hearing civil cases. Other aspects of Jewish community life paralleled broader social phenomena despite Jews' segregation. The printing of Hebrew books increased, popular as well as religious literature flourished, and

secular concerns became more integrated into intellectual life.

**REINTEGRATION AND SEGREGATION
(1570–1750)**

In the 1570s Jewish life recovered rapidly across western and central Europe. The readmission of Jews to western and central Europe and the growth of their communities were tied to political and cultural phenomena in Christian society and to the strategic networks Jews had formed in the East. Secular statecraft, mercantilism, and radical skepticism justified princely and imperial reversals of the previous century's expulsions. Because Jewish trade networks made resettlement a tool of economic development, the revival of Jewish communities was intertwined with the rise of nation-states, the growth of modern commerce, and preindustrial urbanization. This revival integrated Jews into European economic life, and new social strata emerged in Jewish communities, which contin-

ued to experience demographic expansion until the early 1700s.

Readmission of Jews, expansion of Jewish economic life, and growth of Jewish communities occurred simultaneously across western and central Europe. In 1577, for instance, the Holy Roman emperor Rudolf II allowed Prague's Jews to practice trades previously denied them, like gold and silver work. Jewish artisans, shopkeepers, and merchants prospered, and Prague's Jewish community grew to three thousand by 1600. Relaxed restrictions fostered economic and demographic expansion in Frankfurt, where the Jewish population grew from 419 to 3,000 between 1540 and 1615. Official toleration was extended also to smaller settlements; the majority of German Jews, as many as 90 percent, lived in small towns. In Italian cities dependent on the Levantine trade, readmitted Jews formed thriving communities. The population of the Venice ghetto grew from 900 in 1552 to 2,500 in 1600 as Jews came to dominate trade with the Balkans.

Jewish demographic recovery outstripped that of Christian communities throughout the seventeenth century, even during the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). Both Protestant and Catholic forces relied on Jews for loans and services, and Jewish victuallers supplied both the Habsburg and the Swedish armies. In return both sides granted concessions to Jews, reduced economic restrictions, and permitted new Jewish settlements. During the war Jewish populations generally remained stable or even grew, while the general population declined. A similar dynamic held for the Jewish communities in Alsace, the Dutch Republic, and Italian cities like Livorno, where the war enhanced Jewish trade and the ghetto escaped the ravages of the great plague of 1630–1631. Jewish population growth and economic expansion extended into eastern Europe. When Poland pushed eastward into Belorussia and Ukraine, Polish magnates encouraged Jewish colonization. In these territories Jews played a variety of economic roles, from artisans to estate managers, and Jewish numbers grew more rapidly than did those of the native populations.

Jewish population growth and economic integration produced violent backlashes. With the end of the Thirty Years' War, the clergy and guilds in German towns demanded expulsion of the Jews, and anti-Jewish violence erupted in several Austrian settlements. Resentment against Jewish economic encroachments was a common theme. The worst violence occurred in Polish territory when Ukrainian peasants and Crimean Tartars led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky rebelled against Polish rule between 1648 and 1651. Besides attacking Polish nobles and Catholic clergy, Khmelnytsky's followers slaughtered thousands of Jews. Religious hatreds blended with economic grievances, and Jews were attacked as the intermediaries between nobles and peasants and as instruments of Polish domination. The massacres sent streams of Jewish refugees to the West.

The violence of the mid-1600s did not deter Jewish demographic growth or economic integration, which actually accelerated. Jewish birthrates exceeded those of Christians. With notable exceptions, like Prague, where three thousand Jews died in an epidemic in 1680, the Jewish population increased, while the general population stagnated. In Amsterdam the economically influential Jewish population grew from three thousand in 1650 to over six thousand in 1700. Similar statistics exist for German, Austrian, and Italian communities, and Jewish population growth was even greater in eastern Europe.

Demographic success followed economic integration. By 1700 Jews were prominent in international and colonial trade, and they were active in industry

across most of the Continent. Again, ties between communities helped facilitate this trade. Jews exercised great geographic mobility, and merchants and tradespeople moved across international and continental borders. A new elite, "court Jews," provided loans and other services to royal houses. In rural districts in central and eastern Europe, Jewish peddlers linked peasants to urban commerce. Jewish crafts thrived in places where Jews suffered few restrictions on artisanal activities or where Christian guilds were weak.

Economic integration had strict limits. Jews were still banned from landownership in most states. Craftspeople could not compete for Christian customers, and new restrictions arose when they threatened Christian guilds, as in the Dutch silk-weaving industry. Moreover changing state policies undermined Jewish economic life. In eighteenth-century Prussia export prohibitions and high tariffs crippled Jewish trade and produced widespread poverty. Despite economic integration, Jews remained segregated. State authorities circumscribed their settlements, controlled their contacts with Christians, and denied them the legal status afforded Christians. From the early 1700s state control over Jewish communal life increased, as did internal tensions. Enlightenment absolutist principles dictated that states weaken Jewish self-government, and economic thought de-emphasized Jewish-dominated areas of international commerce. States attacked the autonomy of *kehillot* and Jewish regional associations, and most German states limited the power of Jewish courts in the eighteenth century. For example, in Hamburg a 1710 regulation gave Christian courts power over Jewish divorce cases. The Polish Commonwealth also weakened Jewish communal autonomy in the 1740s.

The assault on communal autonomy coincided with the deterioration of Jews' economic and demographic positions. Beginning in 1713 Jewish populations grew more slowly than the general population in all of Europe except Poland, where Jewish numbers continued to soar. Most estimates set the number of Jews in Poland in 1700 at 350,000, whereas by 1750 the Jewish population there neared 750,000. Population growth in Poland was accompanied, however, by a wave of anti-Jewish violence and accusations of ritual murder, peaking in the 1740s to the 1760s. In some places, such as the Balkans and Holland, the reversal of demographic trends was linked to the contraction of trade. Elsewhere, such as Prussia and other German states, it stemmed from changes in governmental economic policies and the new restrictions on the size of Jewish communities. Simultaneously, Jewish communities in western and central Europe faced

accelerated economic stratification and rising rates of poverty and indigence. More than half of all German Jews lived in poverty by the mid-1700s, and 10 percent were vagrants. The situations in Italian, Dutch, Bohemian, and Moravian communities were no better. Social problems like crime worsened, and communal and voluntary associations had difficulty raising revenues for charitable and other institutions. Jews responded by dispersing to smaller communities. In this social context and in light of the growing number of Jews conversant with the secular culture of the Enlightenment, rabbinical and communal authority declined.

THE QUESTION OF EMANCIPATION (1750–1815)

The partitioning of Poland carried out between 1772 and 1795 had a great impact on Jewish social history. The partitions divided Europe's largest Jewish population among three states that would follow very different Jewish policies. Around 1 million Polish Jews became subjects of the Russian Empire, which had banned Jewish settlement. Russia granted Jewish communal institutions limited autonomy but imposed new civil disabilities. Over 200,000 Galician Jews came under Austrian rule, joining the 70,000 Bohemian and 80,000 Hungarian Jews in the Habsburg Empire. In 1781 Emperor Joseph II reduced legal disabilities but left residency restrictions in place. Jews in western Poland were put under the authority of Prussia, where a debate had arisen over transforming Jews into useful members of civil society by ending legal disabilities. But the question of emancipation was put most forcefully in France, which had only a small Jewish population.

In December 1789 the French national assembly considered the question of Jewish emancipation. Debate over the civil status of France's forty thousand Jews ended in September 1791 with recognition of their equal rights, and emancipation forced the problems of integration and Jewish identity to the foreground. Were Jews a separate nation or simply adherents of a different religion? Now that law no longer required segregation, would Jews assimilate or remain ghettoized?

Emancipation relaxed external constraints, but reactions varied. France's two principle Jewish communities, the Sephardim in Bordeaux and Bayonne and the Ashkenazim in Alsace, had developed along different lines. Sephardim had resident status and had formed a prosperous merchant community with close ties to Amsterdam and London. In Alsace, Jews lived in small ghettoized communities of poor tradespeople.



JEWISH MESSIANISM

One transnational response to violence in the sixteenth century was the strengthening of mystical currents in Jewish life. The mystical teachings of Rabbi Isaac Luria in the late 1500s, for instance, spread quickly from Safed (in Galilee) to the ghettos of Vienna, Amsterdam, and other centers of European Jewish life, as did the teachings of Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague. Messianism promising redemption and justice—a common current of seventeenth-century European popular religious culture—reflected growing social tensions in the ghetto and the constant threat of violence. Anti-Jewish violence contributed to Jewish messianism, which found its greatest popular expression in the Sabbatian movement. Shabbetai Tzevi of Smyrna was one of several self-proclaimed messiahs to appear in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Shabbetai declared himself the Messiah in 1648, but his movement had little impact in Europe. In 1665, though, news of the Messiah's arrival spread from Salonica, the epicenter of Sabbatianism, through Jewish communities across Europe. The movement had broad appeal, and popular messianic fervor lasted for nearly a year, triggering anti-Jewish riots in several cities in Poland and Germany. Arrested in Constantinople by the sultan in 1666, Shabbetai's subsequent conversion to Islam halted the movement but did not destroy the underlying basis of popular Jewish mysticism, which reemerged, for instance, in Hasidism in eastern Europe.

During the French Revolution prosperous Jews in Bordeaux defined themselves as French citizens of the Jewish faith and identified with the new national state. Alsatian Jews, in contrast, retained communal associations and traditions and identified with their own communities. Emancipation introduced many individual and community responses, from assimilation (exiting the community) to radical assertion of Jewish differences.

SOCIAL UPHEAVALS IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY (1789–1914)

During the nineteenth century the movement of people and ideas across borders still contributed to cultural homogeneity among Jews, even as they integrated



HASKALAH AND HASIDISM

The Jewish encounter with modernity produced complex social tendencies toward both acculturation and the re-negotiation of community and identity. These tendencies were evident even before 1789 in two social phenomena born of the late eighteenth century, the *Haskalah* (Enlightenment) and Hasidism (the doctrine of piety).

The Enlightenment spread to Jewish society only in the late 1700s in the form of the *Haskalah*. In Berlin a circle of scholars around Moses Mendelssohn embraced the scientific and universalistic worldview of the German Enlightenment and rejected religious obscurantism but not Judaism. A second, independent center of Jewish Enlightenment developed in Prague. Enlightened Jews (*maskilim*) argued for Jewish renewal through reform and integration into European society. In the 1780s *maskilim* began calling for an end to Jewish legal disabilities. The *Haskalah* emphasized self-understanding and the cultivation of individuality, which like its universalism deemphasized communal identity. These principles, particularly attractive to elites, spread primarily through literature and the founding of new Jewish schools. The *Haskalah* penetrated a broader strata of German Jewish society only after the French Revolution.

Hasidism posed a more immediate threat to traditional authority though from a different theological, sociological, and geographical position. With roots in seventeenth-century mystical currents, Hasidism emerged in the mid-1700s in southern Poland. Its progenitor, Israel Bacal Shem Tov (the Teacher of the Good Word), merged cabalism with the elevation of wholehearted devotion over talmudic scholarship. In practice Hasidism combined this doctrine with the veneration of charismatic rabbis in dynastic “master-disciple” communities. The movement spread far more rapidly than did the *Haskalah*, had great currency with poor Jews, and was enormously successful in rural districts of eastern Europe. Its penetration into Lithuania and Belorussia and into urban areas created conflicts with *kehillot*, as Hasidim rejected communal oligarchs and established their own separate courts and schools. This challenge coincided with the Polish assault on Jewish autonomy and the partitions of Poland.

into European life. A greater proportion of Jews than non-Jews rose into the middle class, and resentment of Jewish social mobility and the public’s association of them with the dislocations of capitalism blended with anti-Semitism. Embourgeoisement, though, was more typical of communities of western and central Europe than of the larger populations in eastern Europe, where the majority clung to petty bourgeois status or hovered between the working class and abject poverty. Political contexts shaped the differing paths open to Jews, and divergent social trends manifested themselves along an east-west axis. Demographic stagnation held in western and central Europe, while the Jewish population continued to rise more rapidly than the general population in eastern Europe. Overpopulation and poverty fueled an exodus westward in the late 1800s, creating new tensions within communities and feeding popular anti-Semitism.

Prior to the late twentieth century historians juxtaposed Jewish assimilation in western and central Europe against Jewish traditionalism in the East. According to this paradigm, emancipation destroyed communal authority, assimilated Jews, and either redefined Jewishness as a solely religious attribute or rejected it. Historians of the late twentieth century distinguished between assimilation and acculturation and recognized that communal structures proved tenacious. In Britain communal associations actually strengthened. By 1860 thirty-five thousand publicly acculturated Sephardic and Ashkenazic British citizens privately supported Jewish communal institutions, synagogues, schools, and welfare agencies; lived on predominantly Jewish streets; and maintained Jewish homes, the significance of which differed between Orthodox and Reform Jews. Debates over communal authority, Jewish identity, and integration intensified in the late 1800s as a consequence of immigration from the East. French Jews did not routinely abandon their Jewish identity when affiliating with the French nation. Some wealthy Jews broke ties with communal institutions, which were then voluntary, but most Jews did not. Acculturation began to affect rural Jewish life only when the village economy declined and state educational institutions penetrated the Alsatian countryside in the late 1800s.

In Germany and Italy the piecemeal process of emancipation culminated with national unification. Individual German states granted partial Jewish legal and economic integration, which sped acculturation. One of the most significant measures was the inclusion of Jewish children in compulsory state schooling. Although acceptance into the German middle class required assimilation, in the 1840s most Jews remained at least partially segregated and practiced en-

dogamy. Legislation in the 1860s eliminated legal disabilities, and the unified state abolished compulsory membership in *kehillot* in 1876. Emancipation and Germany's rapid economic growth accelerated embourgeoisement and acculturation but did not eradicate Jewish identity. Middle-class Jews, while subscribing to the German emphasis on moral education and self-cultivation, formed new Jewish mutual aid, reading, and insurance societies, clubs, and associations. The renegotiated German Jewish identity united an otherwise religiously and socially fragmented community, and politicized hostility toward Jews reinforced this sense of identity. While tensions between German, Czech, and Magyar cultural loyalties complicated acculturation in the Habsburg Empire, Austrian and Hungarian cities underwent similar processes.

Although Jews could be found at all levels of the nineteenth-century economy, from wealthy bankers like the Rothschilds to laborers at the margins of poverty, most Jews in western and central Europe rose into the middle classes. Relatively few, though, entered the industrial bourgeoisie, instead benefiting from the expansion of commerce and the professions. In Germany, where over half of all Jews had lived in poverty in the mid-1700s, tax records indicate that nearly 80 percent were bourgeois by 1870. Germany's 470,000 Jews constituted only 1 percent of the country's population but accounted for nearly a quarter of its bankers and 10 percent of its merchants. Jews in Britain, France, Italy, and the cities of Austria-Hungary also rose into the middle class. In Budapest, Jews dominated the liberal professions, journalism, and the arts and occupied a disproportionate number of places in the secondary schools and universities.

Rapid urbanization and declining birthrates accompanied embourgeoisement in most of western and central Europe. As states lifted residency restrictions and education and economic opportunities opened, Jews gravitated toward cities. Jewish urban populations rose most dramatically in Austria-Hungary. Only 290 Jews lived in Vienna in 1806, but 146,926 Jews lived there in 1900 (9 percent of the population). In Budapest between 1870 and 1900 the number of Jews rose from 44,747 to 166,198 (24 percent of the population). But like the middle class in general, western and central European Jews had begun limiting family sizes, and their birthrates and death rates remained lower than those of the general population. The nineteenth century's massive Jewish population expansion, from approximately 2.7 million in 1825 to 8.7 million in 1900, resulted entirely from demographic trends in eastern and southeastern Europe.

By the late nineteenth century most Jews lived in the Russian Empire, where government policies re-



WOMEN AND ACCULTURATION

Public acculturation into the dominant culture and private renegotiation of Jewish identity were manifest in women's roles. Bourgeois Jewish women in Germany, for example, ensured that their children dressed, spoke, and carried themselves as Germans. They insisted that Jewish communities recognize the shifts in gender roles taking place in German society as a whole. Yet they still participated in exclusively Jewish women's organizations; transmitted Jewish cultural traditions to their children, although not always by observing Jewish rituals; maintained Jewish family networks; associated Jewishness with a respectable family life; and socialized primarily with other Jews.

stricted them to western provinces known as the Pale of Settlement. The state initially recognized *kehillot* but also required that Jews, like all other subjects, enroll in a social estate. Most Jews belonged to the town-dwellers' estate, although a few were registered as peasants, merchants, honorary citizens, and even nobles. Until 1880 most restrictions placed on Jews applied to all nonnoble subjects, who were denied freedom of movement and, as town-dwellers, could not reside in rural districts. In the Pale, though, Jews provided the trade nexus between town and country. The state periodically expelled them from rural districts, then subsequently relaxed restrictions out of economic necessity.

Early-nineteenth-century Russian-Jewish social history reached its nadir under Nicholas I, who in 1827 rescinded Jews' exemption from the military and began conscripting Jewish boys, who were removed from their homes and pressured into conversion. Between 1827 and 1854 about seventy thousand Jews were conscripted, of whom nearly fifty thousand were minors. Consequently conflicts within the Jewish community amplified as resentment grew against the privileged elite, who dominated communal boards and arranged for their own sons' exemptions. State policies and economic differentiation accentuated these tensions. In 1844 the state weakened the *kehillot* by abolishing communal boards but did not abolish the communal association itself. Communal associations still governed most aspects of Jewish social and devotional life, although under stricter state supervision, but antagonisms against communal leaders festered as com-

munities were torn between acculturation and the reassertion of tradition.

Historical generalizations about the traditionalism of eastern European Jews require qualification. In the mid-nineteenth century a minority of Russian Jews followed a path of embourgeoisement and acculturation similar to that occurring in the West. This process accelerated in the 1850s through the 1870s as industry and trade expanded and the state liberalized its Jewish policies. In the 1860s child conscription ended, and the state permitted Jews in professions and in state schools to live beyond the Pale. By 1880 Jews accounted for less than 4 percent of the empire's total population but 12 percent of its students and 14 percent of its university students. Growing numbers of Jews entered the professions, where they were disproportionately represented in law, medicine, and banking, and a handful of Jewish entrepreneurs amassed large fortunes. By 1897 nearly a quarter of the empire's Jews could read Russian, and the percentage was higher in cities. Embourgeoisement and acculturation increased conflicts between *maskilim* (enlightened Jews) and traditional rabbis, both of whom claimed to speak for the community.

But in the 1880s state policies constrained Jewish embourgeoisement in Russia. In the wake of pogroms, the government in 1882 issued laws banning new Jewish settlements outside of towns and cities, which debilitated the already declining Jewish trade in the countryside and contributed to urbanization. The state also imposed quotas on Jews' access to higher education. In 1887 Jews could constitute only 10 percent of students in state schools in the Pale, 5 percent outside the Pale, and 3 percent in Moscow and St. Petersburg. In 1889 Jews were banned from legal practice.

Most eastern European Jews remained poor. In 1897 about a third of Russia's Jewish males were petty traders with small shops or stores or were peddlers. At least 300,000 Jews, including several thousand women, worked in small plants concentrated in the consumer sector, and a much greater number toiled in artisanal shops. Another 10 percent of adult Jews were day laborers or domestics, while nearly a tenth had no regular employment. Fewer than 3 percent of Jews farmed. Population growth, restrictions on movement and occupations, and changes in transport and trade that undermined traditional Jewish rural occupations contributed to growing poverty. By 1900 nearly 20 percent of all Jews in the Pale relied on charity from either the commune or Jewish philanthropic associations.

Jewish demographic patterns in eastern Europe resembled those of western and central Europe in two regards. The Jewish population became increasingly

urban as people migrated in search of economic and social opportunities, and Jewish death rates fell below those of the general population. But unlike western and central Europe, the Jewish population in eastern Europe rose more rapidly than the general population. Between 1772 and 1897 the Jewish population of the Pale grew from 1 million to over 5 million people, and Jews constituted 11 percent of the Pale's population and over half the population of many urban districts. Similarly, between 1825 and 1900 the Jewish population grew in Galicia from 275,000 to over 800,000 (11 percent of the total population) and in Hungary from 200,000 to 852,000 (5 percent of the total population). Overpopulation, poverty, government repression, and anti-Jewish violence prompted mass emigration, and between 1880 and 1914 over 3 million Jews left eastern Europe. While the majority resettled in the Americas, nearly a million moved to western and central Europe.

This exodus changed Jewish communities, creating new internal tensions and feeding popular anti-Semitism. In Germany, in 1880 foreign-born Jews accounted for 3 percent of the Jewish population, but immigrants constituted 13 percent of all Jews there by 1910. In Britain immigration brought a surge in Jewish residents, from 60,000 in 1880 to 300,000 by 1914. Bourgeois Jews generally considered poor, Yiddish-speaking immigrants to be backward, excessively traditional, a burden on the community, and a threat to acculturation and acceptance. Anti-Semites cited the immigrants as evidence of Jewish racial inferiority. The alleged threat posed by poor Jews competing for low-paying jobs and cheap housing became a staple of anti-Semitic rhetoric and thereby contributed to popular anti-Semitism, especially in Britain.

Modern, political anti-Semitism arose later in the century, built on religious and economic hatreds, resentment of Jews' upward mobility, fear that Jewish influence corroded the national culture, and new racial theories. Political anti-Semitism was also based on traditional views, of course, but they involved new arguments, groups, and manifestations, though historians debate how much change occurred. Following the 1873 stock market crash, mass politics, particularly but not exclusively on the right, commonly identified the Jewish middle class with corporate capitalism and charged that Jews exercised undue influence. Scapegoating blamed Jews for a variety of ills, from department stores and banks to socialism. Political anti-Semitism was a complex social phenomenon that drew support from those who felt threatened by economic and cultural change, including elements of the middle classes, the working class, the aristocracy, and the peasantry. As a force in German politics, it reached

its apogee in the 1880s, supported by several popular intellectuals as well as a political party. But in Austrian cities, where the Jewish middle class was most prominent, anti-Semitism based on resentment of Jewish social mobility remained a mass political movement through 1912. In Britain the influx of cheap Jewish labor, the identification of Jews with big business, and the political influence of Jewish grandees fostered political anti-Semitism in the 1890s. In France those same factors plus the rise of Jews into state service contributed to political anti-Semitism at the end of the century. False accusations of spying charged against a Jewish army officer brought the surprisingly strong Dreyfus movement to a head in the 1890s. But in nineteenth-century western and central Europe political anti-Semitism rarely translated into anti-Jewish violence.

Popular anti-Semitism was more intense and more violent in eastern Europe. In 1882 pogroms broke out in Hungary, where resentment of Jews' social mobility was compounded by their association with the Magyar elite. Anti-Jewish violence was recurrent in Romania, where virulent anti-Semitism cut across the political and social spectrum. To peasants Jews were parasitic agents of the landlords, the weak Romanian middle class considered Jews dangerous economic rivals, and intellectuals argued that immigrant Galician and Russian Jews threatened Romanian nationhood. Russia experienced waves of pogroms in 1881–1882, 1903, and 1905. Government policies and anti-Semitic instigation fomented violence, but savage attacks on Jews, like that in Kishinev in 1903, were complex social events. Peasants who associated Jews with economic exploitation participated in attacks, but so did members of the middle class, who saw Jews as competition, and workers, for whom Jews represented both the class enemy and rivals for work and housing. Workers perpetrated most of the violence in Odessa, for instance, where more than three hundred Jews were killed in 1905.

Jews actively participated in mass social movements and mass politics. They enrolled in national parties across the political spectrum. Jewish intellectuals, often assimilated, were heavily represented in leftist movements. Specifically Jewish mass movements developed as well, as emancipation and acculturation failed to end discrimination and anti-Jewish violence. The General Jewish Workers' Bund, a social democratic party promoting Jewish cultural autonomy, attracted broad support among Jewish factory workers and artisans in the Russian Empire. Political Zionism proved even more important as a trans-European movement. Jewish nationalism united a diverse range of Zionists, from secular liberal members of Theodor

Herzl's World Zionist Organization, to Zionist socialists, to Orthodox supporters of the religious party *Mizrachi*. Zionists argued that antagonisms against Jews would not disappear and Jews must therefore emancipate themselves by creating their own national state or territory. The events of 1914 through 1945 seemed to prove the Zionists' point.

EUROPE'S JEWS IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR (1914–1945)

World War I severely disrupted Jewish life. In every country charges proliferated that Jews profited off the war and lacked loyalty to their homelands. Yet Jews volunteered and were conscripted for service, often in percentages higher than the general population. In Britain 14 percent of the Jewish population served, compared with 11 percent of the total population. Nearly 18 percent of Germany's Jews served, as did 20 percent of France's Jews and 11 percent of the Jews in Austria-Hungary. Some 300,000 Jews served in the Russian army. Jews accounted for roughly 1 percent of the total population of the countries engaged in the war but made up 2 percent of all conscripted soldiers.

The majority of Europe's Jews lived within major war zones in the East and suffered deprivations along with the general population, including devastation, hunger, and epidemics. Some 400,000 Galician Jews fled to western Austria during the war, creating a refugee crisis in cities like Vienna, where largely acculturated local communities swelled with waves of traditional Orthodox and Hasidic Jews. In Russia popular anti-Jewish sentiment was matched by the government's fear that Jews would sympathize with Germany. In 1915 the Russian military expelled more than 600,000 Jews from the Pale into the country's interior, creating another mass refugee crisis. As the war dragged on economic hardships increased, and so did anti-Semitic agitation and outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence, particularly in central and eastern Europe. This was especially true in regions devastated by fighting and occupation, such as Galicia and western Ukraine. But popular anti-Semitism raged in Germany and Austria as well. The collapse of old regimes in central and eastern Europe in 1917 and 1918 then loosed mass anti-Jewish violence.

Revolutions in Russia, Germany, and Hungary resulted in greater civil equality for Jews, but the association of Jews with leftist upheavals added another dimension to political and popular anti-Semitism. In Russia the provisional government formed in March 1917 recognized Jewish civil equality, ushering in a brief but fruitful period of Jewish political and social organization. But deteriorating economic conditions

again heightened resentment toward Jews, whom nationalist parties charged with profiteering and promoting Bolshevism. Charges that Jews controlled the Bolshevik (Communist) Party became a rightist commonplace after the October 1917 Revolution, but anti-Jewish violence knew no political boundaries during Russia's civil war, from 1918 to 1921. Communist and anti-Communist forces both carried out atrocities in Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine alone experienced more than two thousand pogroms at a cost of as many as forty thousand lives. Most Jewish communities eventually sought accommodation in Vladimir Ilich Lenin's government, which proved less hostile than its military opponents. Because of that relationship and the number of assimilated Jews in the Bolshevik leadership, political anti-Semites equated the Communist regime with Jews. Similarly Jewish participation in and support for the Social Democrats in the 1918 German revolution and during the Weimar Republic fed into political anti-Semitism, as did the prominence of Jews in Béla Kun's short-lived Communist regime in Hungary in 1919.

In the wake of the war, declining Jewish birthrates, which characterized demographic trends in western and central Europe, extended to the ravaged communities of eastern Europe. The birthrate among Polish Jews, for instance, dropped by nearly 50 percent between 1900 and 1934. Most social patterns prevailing before the war continued, often at an accelerated rate. Inter-marriage became increasingly common across Europe, especially among working-class Jews and in urban districts. In Germany more than half of all Jews who married between 1926 and 1929 chose non-Jewish spouses. The pace of urbanization accelerated, so by 1925 more than a quarter of Europe's Jews lived in cities with populations of 1 million or more. In Germany, where some 550,000 Jews accounted for less than 1 percent of the population, two-thirds of the Jewish population lived in six large cities. Acculturation remained complex. Increases in out-marriage and declining religious observance came with expanded Jewish political, social, and cultural activity and a revived interest in Jewish culture and history in the 1920s. This continuing renegotiation of Jewish identity took place not only in major centers for Jewish learning, like Berlin and Vilna, but also in the USSR, where the state tried to detach Jewish cultural identity from its religious foundations and encouraged Jews to take up "useful labor."

Jewish acculturation, though, did not prevent the rise of anti-Semitism during the interwar period of instability and cultural change. In most of Europe in the 1920s, Jewish social mobility and influence in politics, the economy, and cultural life escalated pop-

ular resentments. The 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression spurred mass mobilization of popular anti-Semitism. In Romania the Iron Guard, which called for the destruction of Romanian Jewry, emerged as the third largest political party. But the Nazi movement in Germany most effectively mobilized anti-Jewish sentiment and transformed anti-Semitism into a central aspect of state policy.

From 1933 to 1937, Nazi Jewish policy reversed the achievements of Jewish emancipation and integration in Germany. Historians debate the extent to which Nazi racial theories resonated with the general public, but it is generally agreed that Nazi anti-Semitism tapped into the popular association of Jews with social disruption. While prohibitions on marriage or even intercourse between Jews and non-Jews elicited little enthusiasm, laws stripping Jews of citizenship rights, removing them from government service and educational institutions, attacking their participation in the media and cultural activities, and circumscribing their economic activities were popular. The 1935 Nürnberg Laws establishing strict racial classifications of Jews similarly elicited virtually no public opposition. By 1937, though, only 130,000 of Germany's 540,000 "racial Jews" had emigrated. Restrictions in the West deterred the flow of refugees, and many acculturated Jews preferred to remain in their homeland. Nazi disruption of Jewish public and economic life in a sense strengthened Jewish communal institutions and structures. Jewish welfare and educational institutions became essential as the Nazis isolated Jews from public life, and new forms of communal representation took shape.

From 1938 until 1941, the stated goals of Nazi Jewish policy were the removal of all Jews from greater Germany and, pending that outcome, their complete isolation and segregation. Historians debate whether the Nazis followed a deliberate program (the "intentionalist" perspective) or whether the "Final Solution to the Jewish Problem" developed piecemeal (the "functionalist" view). Nazi policy clearly became radicalized in 1938, as the regime faced flagging popular support and embarked on an expansionist foreign policy. Annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939 brought more than 400,000 Jews into the Nazi orbit. In 1938 the Nazis openly encouraged pogroms; repealed the legal status of *kehillot* and dissolved most Jewish public organizations; stripped Jews of property and the rights to engage in labor, trade, or professional activities; and imposed other punitive and restrictive measures. Still, previous to 1939 public expectation that the state would maintain law and order constrained the regime's use of overt violence against Jews. In the meantime the Nazis endorsed the

creation of a national Jewish communal organization. The organization facilitated the emigration of another 100,000 Jews, created a network of Jewish schools, and provided welfare for the masses of Jews impoverished by Nazi policies, in part by taxing those who still had property. The extent of Jewish poverty in the prewar Nazi realm is illustrated by conditions in Austria, where 32,000 of 58,000 Jews relied on communal welfare in fall 1939.

The September 1939 German invasion of Poland and the onset of war initiated a new stage in Nazi policy. The regime began deporting Jews from greater Germany to occupied Poland, where it concentrated Jews in ghettos. It also began using Polish Jews as slave laborers and in 1940 established the first concentration camps in Poland. The overcrowded ghetto populations of Warsaw, Łódź, and other cities suffered from hunger, disease, and grinding poverty. Once again communal councils bore the responsibility for social welfare, education, and the conduct of ghetto residents, and mediated relations with Nazi officials. Research emphasizes the variety of Jewish responses to ghettoization and divisions in the ghetto community, and there is controversy among historians particularly over the extent and significance of collaboration with the Nazis by communal councils struggling to create a modicum of social stability in desperate conditions. In occupied western Europe the Nazis imposed discriminatory laws on Jews in 1940, but a number of factors, including Nazi administrative difficulties, manpower shortages, and the high level of integration of Jews into society, prevented them from implementing reconcentrations, or roundups, for forced labor until 1942.

Nazi policy toward Jews became openly genocidal with the June 1941 invasion of eastern Poland and the USSR. Mobile killing units slaughtered well over a million Jews, often in mass actions, like the murder of 33,000 people at Babi Yar outside Kiev in September 1941. In December Nazi forces began using gas to kill Jews at extermination camps like Chełmno. By spring 1942 the Nazis had murdered some 1.5 million Jews. As the 1942 offensive in the east bogged down, the genocide escalated. Mass exterminations began at Auschwitz, Majdanek, and other labor camps, and the Nazis began mass deportations of Jews to camps and began killing Jews in ghettos. German military and police units, together with local collaborators, killed masses of Jews in smaller eastern European cities and towns. In summer 1942 the Nazis and collaborating local officials began relocating western European Jews to ghettos and concentration camps in the East. In the camps those incapable of work, in particular children and the elderly, were murdered di-

rectly; those who could work starved or were worked to death. By February 1943 the Jewish death toll had risen to over 4 million. As the war on the eastern front turned against Germany in 1943, the Nazis “liquidated” most remaining eastern European ghettos, killing residents outright or sending them to camps, while deportations to the camps continued in occupied territories across Europe. The last mass deportations, commenced in April 1944, removed the Hungarian Jews. In November 1944 gassing in the camps ended, but mass deaths in the camps continued as the Nazi war effort collapsed. Tens of thousands of Jews died of starvation and disease in the war’s final weeks. By the end of the war the Holocaust had claimed the lives of between 5,596,000 and 5,860,000 Jews, approximately 60 percent of Europe’s Jewish population. The death tolls were highest in eastern Europe—in Poland, the USSR, Hungary, Romania, and Lithuania.

No general social-historical interpretation of the Holocaust has emerged, although social-history methods have been applied to questions ranging from the social order in the ghettos and concentration camps to the brutalizing effects of war on the eastern front. Three issues reveal the difficulty of generalization: the social basis of support for genocidal policies in Germany, the social basis of collaboration with Nazi extermination policy in occupied territories, and the nature of Jewish resistance. Although it has been argued that the German populace as a whole shared “eliminationist” anti-Semitic attitudes, most Germans welcomed the exclusion of Jews but remained passive and silent in the face of Nazi genocide. Policemen and soldiers involved in mass killings relied on anti-Semitism to rationalize their atrocities, but the brutality and dehumanization of war on the eastern front and the pressures toward conformity were equally important factors in their actions. In much of western Europe, Nazi sympathizers and local officials collaborated in the deportation of Jews. Even in France and Holland, though, where collaboration was greatest, local officials were more willing to deport foreign Jews than natives. In both western and eastern Europe collaboration in Nazi atrocities transcended social categories. Peasant cooperation was especially common in eastern Europe, the product of long-standing anti-Semitism and antipathy toward Jewish middlemen in the countryside, accentuated by wartime hardships. Finally, the lack of widespread, armed Jewish resistance to the Nazis was a function not simply of passivity but also of the difficulty of obtaining arms and mounting resistance in the ghettos and camps. Even though few ghetto councils prepared for resistance and armed rebellion meant annihilation, revolts occurred in the Warsaw ghetto (April–May 1943) and

at the camps at Sobibor (October 1943) and Auschwitz (October 1944). Moreover thousands of escaped Jews joined armed resistance movements, and an armed underground formed in several ghettos.

A VANISHING DIASPORA? (1945–2000)

In the first few years following the war, at least a third of Europe's surviving Jews lived in displaced-persons camps, where they struggled to rebuild shattered families and community structures. The experience of the Holocaust cast a shadow over all aspects of Jewish life, in particular survivors' family lives. In general, though, the dominant patterns in post-1945 Jewish social history continued or elaborated pre-Holocaust dynamics.

Demographic trends in postwar Europe continued patterns established in the late 1800s. The first and most dramatic trend was mass emigration. The main destinations of emigrants were the Americas and Israel, established in 1948. By 1967 nearly a million Jews, a quarter of Europe's surviving Jewish population, had emigrated. Emigration increased after the period 1989–1991, as Jews fled eastern Europe and the former USSR. A second trend was continued declining birthrates among Europe's aging Jewish population, though the birthrates were no longer lower than those of the general populations. Between emigration and declining birthrates, Europe's Jewish population declined steadily. In 1946 Europe's surviving Jewish population was just under 4 million. By 1967

that number had fallen to just over 3 million with declines of over 300,000 in Romania, 200,000 in Poland, and 120,000 in Germany. By 1994 fewer than 2 million Jews remained, and the number in the former USSR fell by a million between 1967 and the end of the century. Only in Spain and France did Jewish populations rise. At the close of the twentieth century France's Jewish community numbered over 500,000, nearly a third of Europe's Jews. Many were immigrants from North Africa. Two other nineteenth-century social patterns, the paired processes of acculturation and embourgeoisement, also continued, and the meanings of Jewish identity and community remained contested.

Anti-Semitism, too, remained a factor in postwar Jewish life regardless of the decline in Jewish populations. Jews in Eastern Europe faced waves of state-sanctioned anti-Semitism in the first decade after the war, especially in Poland and the USSR. In periods of political or social tension, communist regimes sought to manipulate popular anti-Semitism. Ironically, one of the major elements of Eastern European popular anti-Semitism was the belief that Jews controlled the Communist parties. While a high percentage of Jews participated in several Eastern European Communist parties, most were later purged, as in Poland in 1967 and 1968. The most overt anti-Jewish violence was in Poland, where pogroms took the lives of as many as 1,500 Jews between 1945 and 1947. During the post-communist social disruption of the 1990s, nationalist

movements in eastern Europe and Russia sought to manipulate popular anti-Semitism by associating Jews with both communism and rapacious capitalism. In western and central Europe ultranationalist movements played on the established themes of popular

anti-Semitism. In France and Germany expressions of political and popular anti-Semitism were most common during periods of economic stagnation. Still, popular anti-Semitism remained a complex social phenomenon.

See also **Judaism** (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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ROMA: THE GYPSIES



David M. Crowe

The Roma, or as they are more commonly known in the English-speaking world, the Gypsies, entered Europe in the late Middle Ages from India. Many early chronicles referred to the Roma as “Egyptians,” which is the basis for the term “Gypsy.” In the non-English-speaking parts of Europe, the Roma are known as *cigán*, *cigány*, *tsiganes*, *Zigeuner*, and similar terms. These words come from the Byzantine Greek word *Atsinganoi*, which means itinerant wanderers and soothsayers. The Roma prefer a name of their own choosing, since “Gypsy” and derivatives of *cigán* are riddled with negative stereotypical meanings. In the Roma language, *Romani* (Romany) or *Romanes*, *rom* means man or husband and is singular; *romni* is singular for a female. *Roma* is plural and is used to refer to the group as a whole. The term “Romani” can also be used as an adjective to refer to someone who is a Rom or Romni.

ORIGINS AND STATUS IN EUROPE

Three different phenomena have dramatically affected the Roma since they entered Europe from India: nomadism; non-Roma (*gadžé* or *gadje*; singular, *gadžo*) mistreatment and prejudice; and enslavement in Romania’s historic provinces, Walachia and Moldavia. The Roma entered Europe in the late Middle Ages after a long, slow journey from India that began several centuries earlier. Ian Hancock uses linguistic evidence to argue that the Roma are descendants of India’s Rajput warrior caste. Other Roma specialists are skeptical of these roots, though most agree that the Roma originally came from India. Regardless of their origin, the Roma picked up characteristics of a number of peoples as they migrated from India to the Balkans, which gave them the unique cultural and social traits that remain a very important aspect of Roma ethnic identity.

Nomadism has probably had the greatest impact on the Roma. Nomadism was a very common practice among peoples in the Ottoman Empire and

the Balkans. What made Roma nomadism unique was its link to Roma skills and crafts. From the time that the Roma entered the Balkans, they traveled seasonally, plying their skills as metalsmiths, gunsmiths, equine specialists, and musicians. Roma women and children also played an important role in Roma economic life. Children were taught food-gathering skills, which meant occasional begging, while Roma women practiced fortune telling and small trade. Given the tenuous nature of this nomadic lifestyle, particularly after post-Reformation European states began severely to restrict Roma movement and settlement patterns, Roma women and children came to play an important role in any family’s basic survival.

The Balkans were the first area in Europe that the Roma entered; they soon moved into central and eastern Europe. Most of Europe’s Roma still live in these regions. Initially, the Roma were highly valued for their skills. Towns and villages looked forward to the seasonal arrival of Roma craftsmen and women fortune tellers. However, with the gradual Turkish move into the Balkans and parts of central Europe in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, attitudes toward the Roma began to change. In the early sixteenth century, local and regional officials in the non-Ottoman parts of the Balkans and central Europe implemented laws that placed severe restrictions on Roma movement and settlement patterns. Increasingly, the dark-skinned, impoverished, nomadic Roma came to be viewed as something of a Turkish fifth column. And while it was true that some Roma did work for the hated Muslims and even converted to Islam, most Roma in the Balkans were Christians. Roma tradition was to adopt the religion and language of the majority ethnic group in the region where they lived while remaining close to their own ethnic traditions within the Roma family and clan. In Bulgaria, for example, Turkish census and tax records indicate that many Roma converted to Islam because it meant they would be taxed at a lower rate than Bulgarian Christians. In multiethnic areas such as Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Bulgaria, and Serbia, there were Muslim and Christian Roma.

The increasing linkage of the Roma to the Turks, particularly when combined with the upheavals triggered by the Protestant Reformation, saw the Roma pushed to the edge of Balkan and central European society. The new legal restrictions locked the Roma into a nomadic way of life that kept them marginalized and deeply impoverished. Because the nomadic Roma were almost completely illiterate, there is little information about their life and social customs from the Roma themselves at this time. The first written evidence of Romani surfaced in England in 1547. These early writings were little more than scraps of spoken Romani. It would not be until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that serious efforts were made by non-Roma linguists to transcribe the rich, diverse Romani dialects scattered across Europe. Since there was no body of Roma writings to detail their almost seven centuries in Europe, much of what we know about Roma life in Europe during most of this period is drawn from non-Roma sources.

Unfortunately, some of these sources are riddled with many of the negative stereotypes that have haunted the Roma. They do, though, give us a glimpse into Roma life and society. The Hungarian Slovak *Book of the Execution of the Lords of Rozmberk* (1399) notes that one Rom worked as a groom for a nobleman, Andrew. Travel documents given to Roma nomads by King Sigismud of Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire several decades later indicate that the monarch awarded these privileges to the Roma *voivode* (Romanian; prince or lord) Ladislaus because he felt the Roma had important military information on the Turks and could work as metalsmiths and musicians. Hungarian rulers so valued the Roma that in the sixteenth century the Hungarian Crown appointed a chief of the Roma to oversee a number of Roma *voivodes* in counties throughout Hungary. The Roma *voivodes* served as judges for their respective clans.

Habsburg rulers continued this tradition of appointing a Roma chief, known as a chief provisor, well into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Polish kings followed similar practices, though by the eighteenth century non-Roma assumed these roles. Zoltán Zsupos describes a similar arrangement for eighteenth-century Hungarian Aurári or “gold-washing” Roma in Transylvania:

Many of our rivers and brooks carry smaller or greater amounts of gold, which are usually a grain of sand in size. . . . The collection of this gold dust has always been a concern of our country: the closer we come to the childhood of mining, the more prosperous this branch of mining seems to be. In our old books, all

the Gypsy folks are described as people making a living by washing gold. It is unambiguously proven by the data on the gold-washing Gypsies living legally in a separate voivodeship between 1747 and 1832, without any overlord.

Not only single Gypsy families, but also whole villages or settlements depended on this thankless job. . . . By the way, gold-washing does not need much expertise. The gold-washer goes to the riverbank especially after floods, placing his long table so that one end is high above ground, the other almost lying on it. He places a blanket on this table, takes his hoe, puts sand in his basket, pours it on the tables, then pours water on it until all sand is washed away. He goes on with this Sisyphean work all day. When he feels like checking on his luck, he washes his blanket, which gives him sand with iron, copper and gold dust. This he puts in a separating bowl with an opening in front. He keeps shaking it until first the sand, then the iron and the copper get out, leaving a few gold dust grains behind. These he unites with aqua fortis and takes to his exchanger, because they must deliver it officially. (Zsupos, p. 25)

Records from the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Republic of Ragusa in what is now Croatia provide us with another view of Roma life. In 1362 a local judge ordered a jeweler in Dubrovnik to return a number of silver coins to two “Egyptians,” Vlachus and Vitanus. Most of the Roma referred to in this Venetian-controlled kingdom over the next century had Slavic surnames, indicating that they came to Ragusa from other parts of the Balkans. Ragusan records also show that though the Roma were free, they rested at the lowest rung of the republic’s socioeconomic ladder. Most Roma lived on the outskirts of towns and cities and worked as servants, musicians, and craftsmen.

Deep impoverishment became the hallmark of Roma existence throughout Europe. In an early seventeenth-century account, György Thurzó, the royal governor of Hungary, described the desperate lifestyle of a Roma clan that passed through his kingdom. According to Reimer Gilsenbach, Thurzó, who had granted the Roma chieftain Franciscus and his clan a travel permit in 1616, was less driven by sympathy toward the Roma than the desire to exploit their considerable skills as arms craftsmen.

While the birds of the sky have their nests, foxes their earths, wolves their lairs, and lions and bears their dens, and all animals have their own place of habitation, the truly wretched Egyptian race, which we call *Czingaros*, is assuredly to be pitied, although it is not known whether this was caused by the tyranny of the cruel Pharaoh or the dictate of fate. In accordance with their ancient custom they are used to leading a very hard life, in fields and meadows outside the towns, under ragged tents. Thus have old and young, boys and children of this race learned, unprotected by walls, to bear with rain, cold and intense heat; they have no inherited goods on this earth, they do not seek cities, strong-

holds, towns or princely dwellings, but wander constantly with no sure resting place, knowing no riches or ambitions, but, day by day and hour by hour, looking in the open air only for food and clothing by the labour of their hands, using anvils, bellows, hammers and tongs. (Crowe, p. 72)

These observations, particularly when combined with the practice of Roma slavery in Walachia and Moldavia, underscore the desperate plight of the Roma throughout much of their history in Europe. The first concrete evidence of Roma slavery dates from 1385, when the *voivode* Dan I confirmed an earlier gift of forty Roma families to the Monastery of St. Anthony at Vodita. Most of the early Roma slaves or *robi* were captives of war. Over time, their skills became so valuable to Romania's nobility that the institution became widespread. Roma slaves provided the nobility or boyars and monasteries with skilled labor that the serfs and free peasants could not provide. In most instances, the Romanian nobility treated their Roma slaves like cattle. In fact, it was growing embarrassment in Walachia and Moldavia over their harsh treatment that led to the emancipation of Romania's *robi* in 1864.

CLANS AND FAMILIES

Since Romania remains the home to the world's largest Roma population, it should come as no surprise that the names of many Roma slave occupations became the names of Roma clans throughout Europe. Among the groups who trace their origins to these occupations are the Aurári (gold washers), the Rudari (miners), the Ursari (bear leaders), and the Lingurari (spoon makers). Roma Lăieși (members of a horde)

were multitalented and gave their names to a number of modern Roma clans such as the Vlach or Vlax (Walachian or Danubian), the Kırpači (basket makers), the Kovači (blacksmiths), the Čurari (sieve makers), and others. These occupations of enslavement became valued professions to the Roma that were passed from family to family and modernized over time.

These groups or tribes, which the Lovara (horse dealers) call a *rása* (race) and the Kalderása (English Kalderash, coppersmiths) a *natsia* (nation), are subdivided into *vitsi* (clans; singular, *vitsa*) or *tsérba* (Lovara for tent). Very often clan names come from the name of an ancestor, an animal, or another object of respect. Relations within the *vitsa* are familial, and marriages are encouraged as a way to strengthen these relationships. Ideally, a male should marry a cousin from within the *vitsa*, though there are occasional marriages outside of the clan. Marriages are arranged by the two fathers, and traditionally the father of the groom had to pay a significant bride-price to secure the marriage.

Below the clan is the *familia* or extended family. Individual family units are known as *tséra*. Separate from these categories is the *kumpánia* (company), which can be made up of Roma from a number of clans and families who have joined together for a common economic or other purpose. The *kumpánia* is led by a *rom báro* (big man) who deals with the *gadžé*. Disputes within the *kumpánia* are usually resolved by the *kris*, a Roma court made up of male leaders from various clans. The *kris* is headed by one or more judges, and its decision is binding on all involved in the dispute.

Although many Roma social, linguistic, and cultural traditions would remain rooted in their Roma-

nian and Balkan past, the adaptive Roma took on new social and cultural traditions as they migrated westward and northward to other parts of Europe. There were Roma in France by the early fifteenth century, and over the next hundred years Roma groups appeared in England, Scotland, Wales, the German states, and Scandinavia. The bulk of European Roma, though, remained in the Balkans and central Europe. Some of the most important migratory groups were the Vlach Roma, who were known through the end of the twentieth century for their close adherence to traditional Roma practices such as the *kris*; the Kaldërása; the Lovara; and the Čurari. The Kalderása moved to Russia, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. Over time, other Roma groups settled across western Europe: the self-styled Romanichaals settled in Britain, where they are called Travellers; the Calé in southern France and Spain, where they are known as Gitanos; the Kaale in Finland; and the Sinti and Lalleri in Germany and Austria.

SOCIAL BOUNDARIES AND FORCED ASSIMILATION

As the Roma moved out of the Balkans to escape persecution, enslavement, war, and hunger, they faced prejudice and official abuse that deeply affected Roma social values and culture. To the Roma, the *gadžé* became an object of defilement and disgust. In discussing Roma fear of pollution and contamination, it is important to emphasize that the Roma are not a monolithic group. What is a common practice for one Roma group is not necessarily true for another. Many Roma groups, though, do have strong practices concerning pollution and contamination. According to Angus Fraser, these codes tend to define and set boundaries for the Roma in their relations with non-Roma. Many Balkan Roma use the term *marimé* or *marimo* (unclean), while those in western and central Europe have similar terms that define relations between males and females and between Roma and *gadžé*. According to Fraser, the worst fate to befall a Roma male is to be declared polluted. This means “social death” for the Roma male and his family. Such codes apply not only to individuals but to language, parts of the body, inanimate objects, and food. *Marimé* codes automatically make *gadžé* unclean because of their ignorance of such codes and enforce Roma distrust of the *gadžé*.

The ongoing discrimination and mistreatment of the Roma tended to fortify such practices. From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the Roma became so despised that their very survival was

in question. In some of the German states and the Habsburg empire, officials threatened the Roma with branding, torture, and death for moving through their kingdoms.

Official policies toward the Roma began to change during the Enlightenment. The Habsburg rulers Maria Theresa (1740–1780) and her son Joseph II (1780–1790) tried to halt Roma nomadism and forced the Roma in their vast domains to adopt the lifestyle of sedentary Catholic peasants. Maria Theresa, who worked hand-in-hand with the future Joseph II during the second half of her reign, also tried to destroy the traditional Roma family by forcing Roma children into foster Catholic homes. Other decrees struck out against traditional Roma professions such as metalworking and music. A detailed series of censuses were taken on the Habsburg Roma in Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia from 1780 to 1783, which provided the Crown with a unique glimpse of Roma life. The censuses indicated that though a growing number of Roma fit into the new category of *Neubauern* (new peasants) or settled Roma, they did not accept their new status very well. Many Roma found ways around Habsburg policies. Some left their settlements to avoid paying taxes, while most of the Roma children in foster homes soon ran away and returned to their families. Moreover, many Hungarian noblemen resented the high costs of trying to assimilate the Roma into their local communities. Consequently, by the time that Joseph II died in 1790, many Roma were already beginning to return to their nomadic way of life. Yet Roma censuses in Hungary and Transylvania a century later indicate a much higher degree of Roma assimilation and settlement than in any other part of Europe.

ROMA MUSIC

At the very time that Maria Theresa and Joseph II were trying to force the Roma to assimilate, in some parts of Europe a new appreciation of Roma contributions to European society began to develop, particularly in the field of music. In Russia, for example, a court favorite of Catherine the Great (1762–1796), Count Aleksei Orlov, organized a Roma chapel choir on his estate that became the rave of St. Petersburg, the Russian capital. Soon no respectable nobleman of any consequence was without his private Roma choir. Over the next century, Roma themes became a constant fixture in Russian literature, drama, and music.

Aleksandr Pushkin, Russia’s Shakespeare, did the most to promote the romantic image of the Roma in his lyric poem and play “The Gypsies.” In certain

sections of his poem, Pushkin captures the romantic image that many Russians had of the nomadic Roma.

The Gypsies Bessarabia roam
 In noisy crowds . . . Above a river
 In tattered tents they make their home,
 From night's cool breeze seeking cover.
 In open air calm is their sleep;
 Like freedom glad their rest is . . . Under
 The rug-hung caravans there leap
 A fire's bright flames whose shadows wander
 And lick the wheels; close to the blaze,
 A family for supper gathered,
 Prepare their meal; a tame bear lies
 Behind the tent; nearby, untethered,
 The horses graze . . . The steppe all round
 Is full of life . . .

"Go, proud one, leave us! We are led
 By different laws and want among us
 No murderer . . . Go where you will!
 By your black deeds and foul you wrong us
 Who do not like to wound or kill.
 Your love of freedom—how you flaunt it!
 Yet for yourself alone you want it,
 This freedom, and a stranger dwell
 Here in our midst. We're kind and humble;
 You're hard; where you dare tread, we stumble—
 So go in peace and fare you well."
 (Pushkin, "The Gypsies," pp. 65, 82)

The great Russian writer, Lev Tolstoy, the author of *War and Peace*, was fascinated by Roma music and women. His brother, Sergei, was married to a former member of a Roma chorus. Three distinct types of Roma Russian music emerged during the nineteenth century. The first was the *polevuiye tsiganskiye peisny* (Gypsy songs of the fields), which were quite simple and could be performed by a group or an individual. Another type of Roma music, the "Road House" music, was only for choral groups. The third type, the "Gypsy romances," was not Roma music at all, but music composed by Russians who copied Roma musical traditions. This type of Russian "Gypsy" music was commonly found in the home of most educated Russians.

The influence of Roma music extended beyond the confines of tsarist Russia. Franz Liszt, who once delayed a concert at the famed Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow because he was visiting with some local Roma, laid the soul of Hungarian music at the feet of the Roma. Two other Hungarian musical giants, Béla Bartók and Zoltan Kodály, strongly disagreed with Liszt's claim. In his 1924 study of Hungarian peasant music, *Magyar népdal* (The Hungarian folk song), Bartók concluded that Roma music was shallow and had a limited repertoire; in his view Roma music was not innovative and simply adapted to the musical currents of a particular period.

Yet what Bartók and other non-Roma musicologists have missed in their analysis of Roma music are the private songs and tunes of the non-*gadžé* world. As Michael Stewart and Isabel Fonseca have both pointed out, music is the traditional form of expression of the Roma, and embedded in that music, whether it be instrumental or choral, are all of the deeper Roma traditions of a traditionally nomadic people. The "Gypsy" music heard in a Russian café, in a Budapest restaurant, or in the Flamenco *cafés cantantes* in Seville was quite different from that performed by Vlach Roma in their *mulatšago* (celebration) or by other Roma groups. According to Stewart, Roma music performed at the *mulatšago* was the principle vehicle for the expression of Roma feelings and personal associations. Strong traditions of gender segregation, hospitality, and respect for one another were the central themes of the music performed at the Vlach *mulatšago*. Most important, this music was sung in Romani, the purest means of Roma self-expression.

THE "GYPSY PROBLEM"

Unfortunately, the fact that Roma music fascinated European *gadžé* did little to temper the prejudice that haunted the Roma. Deep hatred toward the Roma thrived not only in the Balkans throughout the nineteenth century but also in other parts of Europe. A new wave of Roma migrations westward began in the second half of the nineteenth century as Balkan Roma fled the region to escape upheavals caused by war, revolution, and the emancipation of Romania's Roma slaves in 1864. In 1868, for example, officials in the Netherlands initiated policies designed to stop Roma from settling there. Soon after the creation of Ger-

many three years later, the state's first chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, encouraged local officials to do everything possible to force non-German Roma out of his new Second Reich. Those allowed to remain in Germany were forced to give up their nomadic way of life.

In 1899 the Bavarian police formed a special anti-Roma squad, headed by Alfred Dillman. Six years later, Dillman published the infamous *Zigeuner Buch* (Gypsy book), which centered around the investigation of five thousand Roma, who Dillman felt were innately criminals and a societal disease. In 1906 the Prussian minister of the interior issued a directive, *Bekämpfung des Zigeunerunwesens* (Combating the Gypsy nuisance), that linked anti-Roma agreements with a number of countries throughout Europe with domestic Prussian efforts to stop Roma from continuing their nomadic way of life. In 1911 the Bavarian police sponsored a conference in Munich with delegates from other German states that discussed the "Gypsy problem." The conferees agreed to work more closely together on this matter and to add information to the *Zigeuner Buch*.

In 1922 the German state of Baden ordered that all Roma be photographed, fingerprinted, and required to carry travel permits at all times. Four years later a Bavarian law required that all Roma adopt a sedentary way of life. Those who refused could spend up to two years in a state work camp. Other German states passed similar legislation, and in 1928 a new German law placed all Roma under police surveillance. The following year the German government transformed Bavaria's special Roma bureau into the Zentralstelle zur Bekämpfung des Zigeunerunwesens (Central office for the fighting of the Gypsy nuisance), headquartered in Munich. This bureau established ties with an international police organization in Vienna to share information on the Roma throughout Europe. In 1938 the Nazis moved this office to Berlin and renamed it the Reichszentrale zur Bekämpfung des Zigeunerunwesens (Reich central office for combating the Gypsy nuisance).

When the Nazis came to power in Germany in early 1933, they considered the anti-Roma legislation and the Zentralstelle sufficient to deal with the Third Reich's thirty to thirty-five thousand Roma. The Germans also used other laws that were not Roma-specific to force foreign Roma out of the country or to sterilize those that remained in the Third Reich. However, by 1935 local pressure prompted German officials to begin to force Roma into special camps known as *Zigeunerlager* (Gypsy concentration camps). They also did a special roundup of Roma before the 1936 Berlin Olympics to hide them from international visitors.

Nazi officials also strengthened the 1935 Nuremberg Laws, which outlawed sexual relations and marriages between German Aryans and Jews, to include Roma, who they felt had *artfremdes Blut* (alien blood). The Roma were seen as a threat to German society, an asocial criminal element. Yet the Germans were not satisfied with such general designations. Robert Ritter, a German child psychologist, became the Third Reich's principle Roma expert. Ritter headed several Nazi research institutes and spent much of his time doing genealogical surveys of thirty thousand German and Austrian Roma. He and his assistant, Eva Justin, developed categories for Roma based on ancestry. These five categories ranged from *Vollzigeuner* (full-blooded Gypsy) to four different categories of *Zigeunermischling* and finally a non-Gypsy category for someone who exhibited stereotypical Gypsy "traits."

Though German officials struggled with efforts legally to deal with the Third Reich's "Gypsy problem," their solution came not through any specific law but through their dealings with the Jewish population of the countries they conquered from 1938 onward. Once the General Government was created out of what remained of the Polish state in 1939, this area became a dumping ground not only for Jews but also for Roma. Yet as late as 1941, the German failure legally to come to grips with the "Gypsy problem" meant that there were still some German and Austrian Roma (the Sinti and the Lalleri) registered for the draft, married to non-Roma, or attending public schools. As German forces swept into the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, Nazi leaders began to lay the foundations for the Final Solution, the plan to exterminate the Jews of Europe. New anti-Roma restrictions were also put in place. At the end of 1942, Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS and the architect of the Final Solution, ordered that all Roma in the Greater Reich (Germany, Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and parts of western Poland) be deported to Auschwitz. Himmler tried to protect pure Sinti and Lalleri Roma, whom he felt were original Aryans, though Martin Bormann, Hitler's private secretary, tried to stop this. Although Himmler convinced Hitler to side with him, few German Roma survived the Holocaust. Estimates vary, but it is reasonable to assume that between 250,000 and 500,000 European Roma were killed during the Holocaust.

STATUS SINCE WORLD WAR II

Like many other people in Europe, the Roma were devastated by the horrors and dislocations of World



DEATHS AND PERSECUTION OF ROMA DURING THE HOLOCAUST

	<i>Prewar Roma Population</i>	<i>Roma Deaths/Persecuted Roma</i>
<i>The Greater Reich</i>		
Germany	20,000	15,000/5,000
Austria	11,200	6,500/4,700
Bohemia & Moravia	13,000	6,500/6,500
Poland	44,400–50,000	28,200–35,000/9,400–21,800
Slovenia	No figures available	
<i>German or German Satellite Occupation</i>		
Albania	No figures available	
Belgium	500–600	500/100
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Figures included in Croatian deaths and persecutions	
Denmark	No figures available	
Estonia	1,000	1,000/
France	40,000	15,000–18,000/22,000–25,000
Greece	No figures available	50/
Latvia	5,000	2,500/2,500
Lithuania	1,000	1,000/
Luxembourg	200	200/
Macedonia	Included in Serbian figures	
Moldova	Included in Romanian figures	
The Netherlands	500	500/
Norway	60	60/
USSR (Russia)	200,000	30,000/170,000
Belarus & Ukraine	42,000	30,000/12,000
<i>German Satellite States</i>		
Bulgaria	100,000	5,000/95,000
Croatia	28,500	26,000–28,000/500–2,500
Finland	No figures available	
Hungary	100,000	28,000/72,000
Italy	25,000	1,000/24,000
Romania	300,000	36,000/264,000
Serbia	60,000	12,000/48,000
Slovakia	80,000	1,000–6,500/73,500–79,000
<i>Totals</i>	<i>1,072,360–1,078,160</i>	<i>246,010–263,310/809,200–832,100</i>

War II. In central and eastern Europe, they seemed to disappear. In the regions' first postwar communist censuses, few Roma identified themselves as such. But by the mid-1950s, leaders throughout the Soviet bloc began to see dramatic increases in Roma population statistics. As usual, the Roma rested at the lowest rung of central and eastern Europe's socioeconomic ladder. Many still lived a life of nomadism, poverty, and illiteracy. Over the next three decades, states across both regions mounted major campaigns designed to improve Roma literacy, job skills, and living conditions. Governments from Prague to Moscow outlawed Roma nomadism and began to force Roma children into the public schools without any concern about their ability to speak the language of instruction. Administrators usually regarded Roma children without such skills as retarded and put them into special schools for the mentally challenged. Roma settlements were often destroyed without any regard for replacement housing. When Roma were given precious housing, little was done to help them adjust to a new, urbanized lifestyle away from the traditional Roma nomadic camps.

Over time, people in central and eastern Europe came to view the Roma as a privileged group that lived off special funds not available to the average citizen. These new stereotypes blended with the traditional prejudices toward the Roma and help explain the tremendous outpouring of anti-Roma sentiment in the region after communism collapsed in 1989. With democratization came a proliferation of anti-Roma prejudice that saw gangs of miners in Romania and skinheads in Hungary, Czechoslovakia (after 1 January 1993, the separate Czech and Slovak republics), Bulgaria, and elsewhere devastate Roma settlements and beat or murder individual Rom. The Roma became scapegoats in both central and eastern Europe for all societal problems. Efforts by groups such as the International Romani Union, Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International, the Gypsy Research Centre, the European Community, the United Nations, and other organizations to publicize the mistreatment of the Roma helped ease their plight. The Roma themselves also began to take advantage of the new democratic rights in some of the countries in both regions to form political, cultural, and other organizations to help enhance the quality of Roma life and draw national and international attention to their problems.

The Roma in post-1948 noncommunist Europe suffered from some of the same economic and social problems, though government efforts to deal with them have been a little more enlightened and humane. The largest Roma populations outside the former Soviet bloc were in Spain, France, Greece, Italy,



ESTIMATES OF THE ROMA POPULATION (1999)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Population</i>
Romania	1.35 million–2.5 million
Bulgaria	500,000–750,000
Spain	650,000–800,000
Hungary	550,000–800,000
Slovakia	458,000–520,000
Rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)	400,000–600,000
Turkey	300,000–500,000
Russia	220,000–400,000
France	280,000–340,000
Czech Republic	150,000–300,000
Greece	160,000–200,000
Italy	90,000–110,000
United Kingdom	90,000–120,000
Albania	90,000–100,000
Macedonia	110,000–260,000
Portugal	40,000–105,000
Ukraine	50,000–60,000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	35,000–80,000
Poland	15,000–50,000
The Netherlands	35,000–40,000
Croatia	30,000–40,000
Switzerland	30,000–35,000
Germany	110,000–130,000
Ireland	22,000–28,000
Austria	20,000–25,000
Moldova	20,000–25,000
Sweden	15,000–20,000
Belgium	10,000–15,000
Belarus	10,000–15,000
Slovenia	7,000–10,000
Finland	7,000–9,000
Lithuania	3,000–4,000
Denmark	1,500–3,000
Latvia	2,000–3,500
Norway	500–2,500
Estonia	1,000–1,500

and the United Kingdom. Nomadism was the biggest issue for officials in these countries. Most of Europe's non-Soviet states put laws in place that made Roma nomadism difficult, though never specifically illegal. In Great Britain the government created special campsites for the officially designated Travellers, though the number of sites, which were the responsibility of local officials, was never adequate for the thousands of Roma caravans that traveled throughout the country. Many of Germany's states fell back on legislation from the 1920s to deal with the Roma. French officials used an old system created in 1912 that required all nomads to carry a *carnet anthropométrique*, an identity card with personal information and fingerprints. Local French communities also put up signs that read *interdit aux nomades* (nomads prohibited) that were specifically aimed at Roma nomads. These regulations remained in force until 1969, when officials replaced the 1912 *carnet* with a *carnet de circulation*, which police review monthly. France has created some sites for nomadic Roma, though they do not meet Roma needs. The same is true in Italy.

Most governments in western Europe have given significant lip service to educating Roma children, though the implementation of such programs, which often falls on the shoulders of local officials, has been far from successful. There have been few centralized national efforts to enhance the educational opportunities for Roma children, which vary from region to region and country to country. According to Jean-Pierre Liégeois, who used 1988 statistics, only 30 to 40 percent of the children in the ten European Community nations attended school regularly. Another 50 percent never went to school. Very few of the Roma children who did attend school got beyond the primary level. According to Liégeois, over half of the

European Community's Roma were illiterate, and in some places Roma illiteracy was as high as 80 to 100 percent. When combined with similar figures from central and eastern Europe, the resulting picture is of a large, growing, impoverished, illiterate people that remains at the edge of European society.

The fact that over half of Europe's Roma became sedentary does not seem to have dramatically improved their quality of life. What Roma leaders throughout Europe call for are opportunities for integration that open doors for the Roma while respecting their unique history and culture. Many oppose assimilation, which some Roma leaders feel forces the Roma to give up these age-old traditions.

See also Racism (in this volume); Migration (volume 2).

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Section 4



EUROPE AND THE WORLD

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EXPLORERS, MISSIONARIES, TRADERS



Steven S. Maughan

European trade, cultural contact, and colonization, following the geographical discoveries and maritime innovations of the fifteenth century, profoundly altered non-European societies throughout the world. European exploration was inevitably followed by penetration of markets by traders and the establishment of Christian missions, if not always by formal imperial control and colonization. Aggressive venturers, seeking personal, national, and religious advantage, were at the forefront of new encounters with non-European peoples. Explorers, traders, and missionaries were thus crucial to the construction of European systems of commercial and cultural exchange as they negotiated and interpreted European contacts with other world cultures. From the sixteenth century Europeans engaged the world in increasing numbers, motivated by variously mixed ambitions for wealth, fame, honor, and the advancement of Christian spirituality, authority, and philanthropy. European society was itself significantly altered by these material and cultural exchanges as it acted in every region of the world as an aggressive force for the transformation of economies and societies.

Exploration, trade, and proselytizing often shaded into each other, and were frequently entangled with the use of military force and the establishment of colonial rule. Traders carried European technologies of warfare and production as well as goods, while missionaries often advocated European social organization and education as well as religious beliefs. All had the power to profoundly alter traditional patterns of non-European society. In Europe itself, new wealth generated through seaborne trade contributed to increasing urban cosmopolitanism, while access to colonial markets significantly shifted patterns of consumption. Visions of the world abroad, filtered through Christian belief, supported assumptions of European spiritual and cultural ascendancy that were eroded only in the twentieth-century era of decolonization.

However, explorers, traders, settlers, soldiers, and government officials often came in conflict with missionaries over European “vices” and the mistreatment

of non-Europeans. Additionally, competition from the mid-sixteenth century between Roman Catholics and Protestants, as well as between traders and other agents of emerging European nation-states, generated considerable friction between Europeans of differing national and religious identities. Thus the history of European trading and proselytizing in the world since the Renaissance has been characterized by complex and rapidly changing patterns of coercion, resistance, opportunism, collaboration, cooperation, and competition between many European and non-European groups.

Both trading and missionary activity are inherently transcultural with objectives that are advanced by an understanding of, if not always an empathy with, their target societies. Militant belief in the universal import of their religious message drove missionaries to surprisingly persistent activity in the midst of foreign, and often hostile, cultures. Missionaries frequently operated at the forefront of the production of knowledge for and about foreign societies as influential educators, social reformers, language scholars, and medical providers. While missionaries often sought to strip their message of salvation from European cultural trappings, just as traders often adopted the guise of the cultures in which they operated, both nevertheless carried the ideological, political, and social baggage of their particular cultures.

THE “FIRST” EUROPEAN IMPERIAL AGE: THE IBERIAN POWERS AND THEIR EMULATORS

European overseas expansion grew out of fifteenth-century Iberian crown-sponsored expeditions of discovery designed to open ocean trading routes to Africa and the East. In the “first” age of European expansion, spanning the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese and Spanish were the pioneers, although they were effectively challenged within a century by the Dutch, English, and French. Portuguese (and later

Dutch) commercial domination of the Indian Ocean trading economy, and Spanish, Portuguese, French, and English exploitation of resources and colonization in the “New World” of the western hemisphere were the hallmarks of this era. Iberian exploration shattered the cultural isolation that characterized past ages by inaugurating an intercontinental world trading economy.

The growth of European overseas trading was dependent upon earlier European developments: with the late-medieval emergence of a cash economy based on expanding internal trade, the growth of cities and population, and the emergence of an aggressive class of investors increasingly experienced in organizing trading ventures, the social and financial resources to support commercial ambition were in place. Additionally, continuing conflict with Islam—expressed from the eleventh century in crusading in the Holy Land and on other frontiers—when combined with the emergence of popular mendicant religious orders committed to Christian education and evangelism, most notably the Franciscans and Dominicans—produced both strong military and moral stimuli to Christian expansion. Thus, when in the fifteenth century waning Mongol rule in central Asia and waxing Ottoman power in the eastern Mediterranean disrupted trade routes carrying eastern luxury goods and spices, Europeans had both the incentives and means to seek new lines of commerce.

The relative poverty and peripheral location of Europe limited knowledge of Asia and Africa to the geographies of the ancients, notably Ptolemy (c. 100 C.E.), and the travelers’ accounts of moderns, notably the Venetian trader Marco Polo (1254–1324). Many reports of the East, including those of missionary embassies sent by the papacy to China and India from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, provided glimpses of lands containing gold, silks, and spices, and reputed to hold mysterious realms, such as the legendary Christian kingdom of Prester John.

Early exploration. Iberian exploration vastly enlarged this knowledge. Iberians, utilizing their advantageous geographical position on the Atlantic seaboard, sought to circumvent Mediterranean commerce dominated by Italians and Arabs by employing the martial skills of a crusading aristocracy and gentry seasoned in the conquest of Iberia from Moorish Muslims while drawing on the experience of both local and Italian (particularly Genoese) seamen and pilots.

The Portuguese and Spanish crowns, confident in their possession of the true religion, received papal sanction to establish monopolies in overseas trade and

missions, and promoted ecclesiastical expansion as official state ideology. By the sixteenth century, Portuguese trading networks and Spanish territorial conquests provided poorly connected men, often from the tough, ambitious lower gentry, opportunities to escape the limitations of hierarchy and poverty. Increasingly independent private traders grew rich. Missionary orders—including by the mid-1500s the newly founded Jesuits, who operated as specialists in expansion as part of a larger commitment to oppose the “heresies” of northern European Protestantism—offered overseas challenges to the piously devoted. The Portuguese and early Spanish empires absorbed thousands of men, and in both, partially because Iberian society included substantial numbers of female slaves, miscegenation was common. These practices resulted in large mixed-blood communities, from which new generations of powerful local traders and ambitious priests were drawn.

From the 1420s the Portuguese royal dynasty systematically supported exploration of the western African coast, encouraging innovations in ship design and navigation to support the search for Christian allies, slaves, gold, and spices. A large Portuguese seafaring population and an Atlantic seaboard commercial class that included many aristocratic shipowners aided exploration that by the early 1500s revealed a rich network of ancient seaborne trade lanes in the Indian Ocean. Through piracy, interdiction, and licensing of existing trades, control of the critical Spice Islands (Indonesia and Sri Lanka), and seizure of most of the important trading entrepôts from Arabia to India, the Portuguese crown and its trading servants wrested control of the seas from ubiquitous Arab and Asian traders. These latter were too ethnically, religiously, and regionally diverse to effectively oppose a heavily armed and single-minded opponent. Dynastic rivalry also led the Spanish crown to sanction exploration to open an eastern trade; its servants arrived in the Caribbean in the 1490s to discover a continent and a range of societies, from simple and nomadic to sophisticated and urban, hitherto unknown in any records available to Europeans. Portuguese and Spanish explorers were essentially predatory, seizing what trade and territory they could. That lightly populated Portugal encountered sophisticated, militarily powerful, and populous Asian societies where Europeans suffered high mortality from endemic fevers meant that, after limited initial conquests, the crown focused on creating a trading monopoly in spices (pepper, cloves, cinnamon, nutmeg, and others), drugs, and dyes for the European market. That more heavily populated Spain, recently unified as a kingdom and just entering a period of European imperial ascendancy, encour-

tered societies lacking military technology based on iron and the horse and resistance to European epidemic disease meant Spanish rule in the New World was characterized by widespread territorial conquest and Christianization.

Trade drove the Portuguese empire: royal officials and trading agents dominated a system theoretically controlled from Lisbon, but in which government agents, sailors, ex-soldiers, priests, and even proscribed foreign traders like Spanish-speaking Jews (expelled from Spain in 1492) enriched themselves through private trade in Asian textiles, porcelain, gems, and bulk commodities. Europeans profitably inserted themselves into preexisting Asian trading networks, expanding trade from fortified trading enclaves known as factories and aiding the rapid diffusion of European knowledge and technology in gunnery, shipbuilding, astronomy, and navigation.

The impact of early encounters: populations, material goods, and trade. Where the Portuguese seized territory, as at Goa, they created Christian communities of Europeans, indigenous people, and their Eurasian offspring from which an aggressive, independent, and increasingly indigenized class of traders developed. Similar racial mixing occurred in Portuguese Brazil (discovered in 1500 and developed as Portugal's only major settlement colony) where extensive slave holding and contact with Amerindians produced large multiracial populations of mulattos and mestiços that grew into an officially Portuguese, yet multiethnic, polyglot civilization, from which farmers, clerks, and traders were drawn. In a more rigidly controlled Spanish empire, where administration and extensive landholding was vigorously reserved for those of European blood, large mestizo populations were relegated to poverty and living off of Amerindians, many adopting trade as the best route to social advancement.

The shape of the Spanish empire largely resulted from the profound and extensive consequences of the "Columbian exchange" between the old and new worlds of previously separated diseases, plants, and animals. When amplified in effect by relentless Spanish warfare and brutal forced labor, Old World diseases (smallpox, measles, and influenza among others) devastated Amerindian populations, which declined from perhaps 80 to 8 million within a century of European contact. Throughout the western hemisphere, those who would resist European aggression were depopulated and demoralized while European assumptions of the superiority of European culture, religion, and socioeconomic models were reinforced.

Old World animals (horses, cattle, pigs, sheep) revolutionized American food production by intro-

ducing carting and heavy plowing, widespread herding and ranching, and equestrian mobility to nomadic frontier cultures. Old World plants (sugar, coffee, wheat, barley, and others) provided export commodities, often produced on Mediterranean-patterned slave plantations, and food crops able to sustain European settlement. New World crops like tobacco, chocolate, and dyes made from brazilwood and cochineal, could also be effectively developed for trade to Europe, but of greater impact was the introduction of New World food crops like potatoes, beans, and maize, which had a powerful, stimulating effect on European population growth, especially among the lower social classes. New World wealth, in the form of thousands of tons of looted and mined gold and silver, flowed to Europe, fueling economic growth (and inflation) already underway in Europe as Spain, resource poor and lacking manufacturing capacity, spent freely on essential supplies in northern European ports. Similarly, as trade to Asia grew, gold and silver flowed eastward, accelerating the use of currency, and the pace of commercial activity, thus creating new, mostly urban, centers of power in Asian societies.

In the New World, as early exploration quickly gave way to plunder, warfare, and the seizure of indigenous peoples as slaves and peons—processes that overtook the Aztec, Maya, and Inca empires—a trading economy grew fueled by emerging European markets for New World agricultural goods. Crucial to this emerging order, rationalized, export-oriented agriculture, especially of sugar cane, spread rapidly throughout the Caribbean. Worked increasingly by African slaves, the sugar economy stimulated a transatlantic trade that transformed European habits and nutrition while enriching Atlantic seaboard ports and their merchant elites. With traders working furiously throughout the Iberian empires to supply products demanded by colonial settlements and the populations that surrounded them with household goods, food, wines, luxury items, and slaves, the range and volume of European trade expanded as never before.

This trade began to shift the centuries-old center of European economic weight from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, as northern European port cities rose to economic preeminence. And with demand for sugar came a parallel demand for slaves, largely supplied by Portuguese slave traders, operating out of Guinea and Angola under crown-licensed contractors and subcontracting independent traders. Here alliances with African tribes and an emerging Afro-Portuguese community that took grain, cloth, beads, iron goods, and horses in exchange for slaves supplied a market that grew rapidly after 1550, inaugurating the forced migration, over three and a half centuries,

of approximately 10 million African slaves, mostly male, to the Americas.

Missionaries and their impact in the East. Missions spread rapidly along the routes of Iberian trade and conquest, as priests and friars frequently accompanied exploration and trading voyages. The nature of missionary practice was strongly determined by its relationship to colonial power, with coercive methods employed more frequently in areas of strong political control. In the East centers like Goa, Macao, and Nagasaki rose rapidly as missionary as well as trading hubs, but only in strongly controlled port enclaves like Goa could religion and governance be melded in crusading style through forced conversions.

Outside these enclaves missionaries in the eastern empires—many recruited from urban and cosmopolitan Italy as well as Portugal—adopted accommodationist strategies; notably, Jesuit missionaries embraced indigenous dress and customs, allowed converts local rituals, and developed indigenized Christian rites and sympathetic responses to eastern religious beliefs. In China Jesuits were able to exchange knowledge in western science at the imperial court for the opportunity to convert, by the seventeenth century, approximately thirty thousand followers; in southern India missions more successfully drew perhaps a quarter million converts, many from lower castes seeking Portuguese protection; and even more spectacularly in Japan, some 300,000 were converted in a period of internal Japanese turmoil.

Many converts appear to have been attracted by the ethical content of Christianity; however, inducements to conversion, including commercial favoritism and bribery, and extensive missionary trading generated vigorous criticism among priests and friars of different nationalities and orders, as well as from Asian elites. State persecutions in China and Japan largely extinguished missionary influence in these regions by the eighteenth century. Despite the problems of penetrating eastern societies, however, Catholic missions secured as many as a million converts (from populations of tens of millions) in the lands surrounding the Indian Ocean, many linked to trading communities associated with Eurasians and the Portuguese. In the process of contact, excellent, detailed missionary reports of China, Japan, the Pacific, and other areas (including pioneering studies of eastern languages like Chinese and Vietnamese) generated a much greater knowledge of the East.

Spanish missions in the Americas. Spanish missions faced similar problems in the Americas: in fron-

tier regions accommodationist measures were attempted, while in heavily settled areas, coercion and social advantages to conversion aided missions. The Spanish secular church was rapidly swept up in trade and exploitation of the Americas, sharing the contempt and impatience with unfamiliar foreign cultures of Spanish colonists intent on re-creating an essentially feudal social hierarchy of noble landowning rulers commanding dependent agricultural laborers. Expectations of social hierarchy, including widespread acceptance of slavery for black Africans, also characterized the ideas of most missionaries, who were recruited from a culturally confident Spanish population.

Nevertheless, it was primarily missionaries who condemned the brutal results of the virtual enslavement of Amerindians and, however imperfectly, cooperated with the Crown (which was interested in ordering colonial society) to protect them. Often finding themselves at odds with settler communities that habitually defied royal authority to violently conscript indigenous labor, missionary policy developed, as in Mexico, for example, on the logic of separating Amerindians into town communities, where protective mission institutions (church, school, orphanage, hospital), prohibitions on European contact, and Christianization were mixed with attempts to re-create traditional agricultural and artisanal self-sufficiency. In mission compounds, proselytes were taught Christianity and Latin, and often compelled to adopt European customs such as domestic architecture and manners, western dress, and monogamy.

Missionary reservations were the most developed form of this latter policy. The first was established by the Franciscans in Guatemala in the 1540s, and later Jesuits favored this strategy, most famously applied in the nearly autonomous Jesuit state that arose in Paraguay. In one Asian Pacific area, the Philippines, Spanish colonization (following territorial claims made in 1521 by the explorer Magellan in his circumnavigation of the globe) also led to widespread conversions. In hostile and economically unproductive regions, however, like California and many rugged inland South American areas, while mission communities were established with a zeal that produced martyrs, few conversions resulted owing to the absence of widespread Spanish social power.

As culturally aggressive institutions allied to state power, Spanish missions offered social structure and economic opportunity in return for at least the outward forms of Christian practice. The ritual of Catholic worship was often readily syncretized with previous beliefs, especially in the Aztec and Incan lands where subject populations already accustomed to paternalistic priestly religion and inured to docile agri-

cultural toil came rapidly under control of the Church. Because missions baptized freely and parishes were often enormous in their extent, missionaries in reality contributed to the creation of a set of local cultures that were wide-ranging amalgams of Christianity and the cultural forms—music, dance, and iconography—of ancient religions.

European religious zeal produced a population of around 5,500 missionaries in the Americas by 1600, nearly 75 percent of them Franciscans and Dominicans. Early idealism faded as missions became routinized and adopted European monastic practices, including heavy involvement in trade and the management of indigenous labor (especially in agriculture and textiles). Widespread criticism of apparent greed resulted as missionary trading extended to virtually every form of colonial product and missions acquired enormous land holdings. The Church and its missions also succumbed to the growing racial consciousness of colonial society, ordaining few indigenous bishops

(and none at all in its first century), and increasingly denying European education to converts. Thus, while missionaries could be important preservers of indigenous languages and certain cultural forms, the effective spread of Roman Catholicism and Spanish and Portuguese as dominant languages must be considered the single greatest unifying influence in the creation of cultural identities throughout Latin America.

Spanish and Portuguese experience in the New World and the East commanded educated attention throughout Europe. The accounts of explorers, traders, travelers, and missionaries—Columbus, Bartolomé de Las Casas, Amerigo Vespucci, Bernal Díaz del Castillo, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, Matteo Ricci, Jean de Léry, and others—were repeatedly published throughout Europe and stirred wonder at lands and peoples unknown to the ancients and productive of abundant wealth. With rare exceptions, Europeans, with their technological power in ships, warfare, and writing, strongly expressed their sense of superiority



BARTOLOMÉ DE LAS CASAS

Spanish missionaries in the New World faced the enormous challenge of converting entirely unknown cultures of people that had been immediately and brutally exploited by conquistadors for tribute and labor. The most famous and influential of the early Spanish churchmen and missionaries advocating more enlightened treatment of the Amerindians was Bartolomé de Las Casas (1474–1566).

Born in Seville to a minor merchant family, Las Casas sailed to Hispaniola in 1502, and as a conquistador participated in numerous expeditions, for which he was granted an *encomienda* (a royal grant of land and Indian laborers). Following the colonial pattern, Las Casas established a large estate, worked many of his Indian serfs in local mines, and participated (as a priest, having been ordained in 1512) in the bloody subjugation of Cuba, for which he received additional *encomienda*. Evangelistic work among “his” Indians led to a radical change in his outlook; relinquishing his *encomienda*, he became a champion of the rights of Amerindians and leader of a small but vocal group of churchmen crusading for the general improvement of Indian conditions.

When he returned to Spain, Las Casas advocated the natural rights of Amerindians in the Barcelona Parliament and received royal support for a utopian plan to build towns where free Indians and carefully selected Spanish farmers would create harmonious mixed Christian communities. The failure of a model South American settlement in 1522, in the face of opposition from *encomenderos* and violent resistance from local indigenous inhabitants, led Las Casas to join the Dominican order and begin writing the first of several historical and prophetic exposés on the oppression and injustice of Spanish colonialism. He also expressed the growing uncertainty in church and government circles concerning the enormous human costs of Spanish colonization, yet royal attempts to regulate abuses largely failed in the face of fierce resistance from *encomenderos* in the distant, expansive empire. The weight of reforming opinion led the papacy in 1537 to declare all humans deserving of freedom, property, and true religion. A successful peaceful mission led by Las Casas and several Dominicans in the still-unconquered region of Tuzutlan (in present-day Costa Rica) induced Las Casas to again return to Spain in 1540 to condemn worldly lust for wealth as an indefensible basis for Spanish expansion.

Rejecting the views of contemporaries that all native Americans were “naturally lazy and vicious, melancholic, cowardly, and in general a lying shiftless people,” Las Casas instead characterized Amerindians as “a simple

people without evil and without guile . . . most submissive, patient, peaceful and virtuous,” lacking only true religion. His arguments induced the Spanish crown in 1542 to pass the New Laws, outlawing the *encomienda* system, yet when Las Casas returned to the Americas as bishop of Chiapas in Guatemala, his uncompromising application of these laws and the attempt to again create model mission villages brought widespread and violent Spanish resistance, including that of governing officials and his brother bishops.

Armed attacks forced Las Casas to return to Spain in 1547 where as an influential courtier he sought to defeat popular Aristotelian arguments that Amerindians were naturally inferior and thus could be justly conquered and enslaved. Arguing from classical texts that Indians, as rational and charitable peoples, did not fit the category of slaves “by nature,” he characterized Spaniards as the true barbarians in the colonial encounter. Nevertheless, the practice of slavery continued in Spanish America, although waning slowly over the eighteenth century. The wide publication of Las Casas’ works in translation throughout Europe, however, brought him to notice in northern nations where his view that the Spaniards brought destruction, not salvation, and that their methods of colonization were fundamentally unjust armed Protestant propagandists to justify aggressive opposition to Spanish control in the New World.

and a confidence that their religious truths and established social hierarchies should and would be universally adopted. The wonderful strangeness of the New World in particular led first generations of observers to fall back on traditional allusions, envisioning the Americas as an Arcadia or Eden, abounding in simplicity, innocence, and abundance. Strongly influenced by millenarianism and Erasmian humanism, many mystical Catholic friars believed an evangelized America could answer the moral corruptions of Europe. However, because Catholic missions were carried out as state policy by specialized orders, missionary perspectives had little popular resonance or impact among the laity and clergy of Europe.

The first northern European encounters: the logic of trade.

Iberian overseas successes drew north Atlantic nations into maritime exploration. Failing the discovery of northern passages to the East or lands of abundant gold, northern Europeans, including Swedes and Danes but dominated by the Dutch, English, and French, engaged first in parasitic activities against Iberian trade. Early smuggling and privateering, however, quickly gave way to competitive trade, settlement, and agricultural production. Religious passions arising from the conflicts of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of mercantilist economic attitudes, with their stress on acquiring bullion and enhancing exports, led to new exploration, trading ventures, and settlement. The French, for example, after widespread privateering against Iberians (often launched from Protestant Huguenot Atlantic ports) established backwoods traders at widely dispersed trading posts reaching into the North American Great Lakes region. From these they established contacts with the fiercely independent North American Indian tribes to exchange blankets, brandy, steel weapons, and other manufactured goods for beaver and otter skins for the European luxury market. As traders from other nations entered the field, the growing trade and availability of weapons led to increased indigenous warfare, making missionary work treacherous. Following the pattern of Catholic Iberian powers, French Canada was dominated by a monopolistic church that in 1636 gave the Jesuits control of missionary activity and sent hundreds of “Black Robes” inland. Their efforts resulted primarily in stirring accounts of missionary courage and martyrdom, but few conversions.

From the late sixteenth century, Protestant Dutch traders with more efficient ships and single-minded commercial intensity successfully seized the bulk of Spanish Caribbean trade while simultaneously stripping Portugal of most of its Indian Ocean empire. Organizing themselves under speculative joint-stock

trading companies that were given monopolies and rights to act with diplomatic and military authority, the Dutch established traders as quasi-governmental agents pursuing profitable trade at minimal cost in the name of religious and commercial war. In the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic the Dutch displaced the Portuguese from their most important factories, ruthlessly seizing the high-profit trade in spices and slaves. The Dutch pushed the English and French into the less profitable Indian trade in pepper and cotton textiles and into settlement colonies on islands like Barbados (1627) and Martinique (1635) where sugar was produced by Dutch-supplied slaves. In India, operating at the sufferance of the powerful Mogul empire, English and French company traders established factories, hoping to survive high mortality from disease long enough to amass fortunes. In the Caribbean significantly expanded production of sugar brought forth a flourishing economy in which European adventurers, half-castes, and escaped slaves engaged in opportunistic trading and piracy in a roiling, underpoliced area of multiple colonial frontiers.

The Dutch and the English combined strongly anti-Catholic religious attitudes with a secular profit motive. However, because Protestant religion rejected religious orders, lacked central leadership, and possessed a theology emphasizing predestination, they produced few foreign missionaries. Instead, the logic of trade and the society of the trader defined northern European contact with the outside world, reflecting the strength of the urban commercial classes in Amsterdam and London. The result of northern European entry into international trade was a rapidly expanding Atlantic economy in which imperial consumption patterns—driven by a growing emulation of elite fashion—fed an emerging consumer revolution. As Britain, following a series of successful wars with the Dutch and French, established itself by the 1760s as Europe’s most powerful trading nation, rapidly rising demand throughout western Europe for sugar, tobacco, Indian fabrics, coffee, and tea meant increasing standards of material and social existence, even for ordinary western Europeans.

At the center of this economy was an expanding slave trade shared by traders from the Dutch Republic, Portugal, France, Prussia, and Denmark, but dominated in the eighteenth century by the British, that expanded from an average of seven thousand to sixty thousand slaves per year between 1650 and 1760. Individual traders, trading dynasties, and absentee plantation owners made fortunes out of slaving. Accelerating internal demographic and economic pressures in Africa supported the growth of warrior states, which fed and were supported by the trade.

**THE “SECOND”
EUROPEAN IMPERIAL AGE:
THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN POWERS**

In the eighteenth century Europe slowly entered the era of its “second” empires, dominated at first by the English and French, joined later in the nineteenth century most prominently by the Germans, Belgians, and Italians, as European hegemony was extended into Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Cultural frontiers were eroded in these centuries of intimate and sustained contact with Old World societies. European traders penetrated more deeply into regions opened by treaty or direct rule (as in China and India) and exploration (as in the Pacific Islands and Africa). Of profound importance to Christian missions, Protestant churches, under the influence of German pietism and English evangelicalism, launched a second wave of proselytizing that had deep impact in these areas.

The often independent activities of traders could have substantial impact in this environment. In India, which became a crucial possession in the second British empire, the first bridgehead was seized in Bengal, where success was due in part to the effective infiltration of Indian states by rival English and French company traders acting to capitalize on local rivalries in an era of declining Mogul power. Led by a company trader turned soldier, Robert Clive, the British East India Company emerged in the 1770s as the dominant Indian power, able to plunder Bengali government revenue. Fantastic enrichment of company traders generated debate in Britain over how a “legitimate” empire should be administered and the inauguration of more strictly controlled imperial governance. A similar process also led to the opening of China to western trade in the 1840s when independent traders built a flourishing market for smuggled opium in China, and convinced the British government to bombard Chinese ports in the name of “free trade” when Chinese authorities seized their illegal stocks from Guangzhou (Canton) trading factories. The Opium Wars (1839–1842; 1856–1860) forced open more ports to western traders and missionaries from France, Germany, and North America, as well as Britain, while the humiliations suffered by the Chinese government helped initiate the catastrophic civil war known as the Taiping Rebellion.

“Scientific” exploration and imperial systems of knowledge. Continuing European rivalries, particularly between the French and English, ushered in an era of state-sponsored “scientific” exploration designed to establish geographical knowledge in the service of imperial ambition. Louis-Antoine de Bougainville’s

1766–1769 exploratory surveys of the South Pacific were a model followed by Captain James Cook’s 1768 voyage to the South Pacific where he discovered and claimed the eastern coast of Australia and several islands, including New Zealand, for Britain. Rationalized programs to compile economic and strategic inventories of geographical, botanical, and anthropological information were sponsored by learned societies—most notably the Royal Society in London—which not only pressed for exploration of the South Pacific, but also the Arctic and Africa. Despite the high casualty rate of early African explorers owing to disease, from the 1790s African exploration engaged many British, French, and German adventurers. Exploration spurred new interest among secular intellectuals to examine the nature of humanity. Prominent philosophes in France, like Denis Diderot and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as well as Scottish realist philosophers, employed visions of the “savage” that were gleaned from reports of South Seas explorations and the rediscovery of the writings of many earlier Spaniards to criticize European social and political structures.

Additionally, attempts were made to identify attributes that distinguished “civilized” social organization. These invariably favored Mediterranean cultures, followed by the Chinese, Indians and Arabs, pastoral peoples such as Mongols and Turks, and the hunter-gatherers of North America, Africa, and Australia. By the late eighteenth century these classifications were increasingly associated with presumed biological differences of race; by the mid-nineteenth century, the catalog of races was largely fixed along a color line, with the capacity for civilization descending through white, yellow, brown, red, and black. This catalog remained contested, however, particularly by missionaries, who, despite tendencies to ethnocentrism, were disposed to argue that all peoples could be raised to a common level of civilization. One important arena for the contest lay in the widely publicized exploration of Africa where the paternalistic evangelical argument for development articulated by missionary and explorer David Livingstone was implicitly pitted against the “scientific” racism characteristic of many secular explorers, like the scholar and adventurer Richard Burton, though all European travelers constructed African exploration as a narrative of “manly” European actions and “native” inferiority.

By the nineteenth century many European explorers and missionaries, although profoundly convinced of the superiority of Western civilization, were also deeply influenced by anxieties connected to emerging industrial and urban conditions at home. The growth of the factory system, crowded cities, the social challenges of poverty and class, and new standards of

“respectable” conformity could all encourage individuals to seek independence and a sense of usefulness or adventure in colonial exploits. Over the course of the century increasing numbers of missionaries found contact with “primitivism” and the challenge of native conversion preferable to growing secularism in Europe itself.

Protestant missionaries and colonialism. The expansion of traders into Asian and African interiors brought rapid, often disruptive, changes to indigenous societies, not least because the staples of those trades were often guns, cash, and drugs like liquor and opium. Increasingly, traders came under the intense criticism of burgeoning numbers of Protestant missionaries. By the end of the eighteenth century the rise of evangelicalism unleashed a religious emotionalism that stressed freely chosen conversion, spiritual equality, and activism. Protestant missionary societies emerged suddenly in Britain, led by the Baptists (1792), Congregationalists (1795), and evangelical Anglicans (1799), to be followed by other denominations and in other nations like Switzerland and Germany. As part of a larger evangelical humanitarianism, missionary activity and the campaign to abolish slavery both emerged most strongly in northwestern Europe, especially Great Britain, and the northern American states—urbanizing and industrializing regions characterized by free contract labor and growing na-

tional identities emphasizing the legal rights of free citizens. Conservative reactions to the French Revolution helped direct evangelical attention away from domestic populations and into distant areas of exploration and European expansion: the South Seas and the recently seized Indian territories were the first places to receive missionaries.

Protestant missionary societies, operating predominantly from nations where the state had ceased enforcing religious conformity, were organized as voluntary associations that while often willing to accept state aid, rejected state control. William Carey (1761–1834), the pioneer Baptist missionary to India, was the most important theorist to the Anglo-American missionary movement. He urged that missionary organizations embrace “the spread of civil and religious liberty” as a reality and opportunity that among the western churches necessitated new methods of organization to secure mass lay and clerical support.

By the mid-nineteenth century, public meetings and rallies, often featuring returned missionaries, and the mass publication of books and periodicals (disseminated in Britain by the millions through a national network of local parish and chapel associations) emphasized the violence, subjugation, and ignorance purportedly bred of “heathen” religions, and the desperate need of non-Christians for European tutelage. Support for missions crossed class lines but was strongest, as was the recruitment of missionaries, among

artisans, tradesmen, clerks, manufacturers, professionals, and other “respectable” classes. Leadership came from the educated middle classes (many university trained by century’s end) and societies relied heavily on activist women both as organizers and financial supporters. By the first decade of the twentieth century approximately ten thousand voluntarily supported European Protestant missionaries (about 80 percent British, 15 percent German, 5 percent Scandinavian, French, Dutch, and Swiss, supplemented by a rapidly increasing American force of about four thousand) were concentrating their efforts in Africa, China, and India; a parallel revival of Catholic missions, strongly French and newly aided by voluntary organizations, fielded some eight thousand missionary priests.

European missions continued to have an ambivalent relationship with colonialism. Often operating in conjunction with imperial power, as in the founding of French missions in the Congo and Tahiti or British missions in New Zealand and Uganda, missions nevertheless often had strained relations with colonial authorities, while many missionaries expressed doubts about the value of western culture to evangelization. However, the continuing problem of communication meant considerable effort was spent on linguistic work that produced pioneering grammars and dictionaries for virtually every world language. Educational work resulted in the founding of over twenty thousand mission schools by century’s end.

While such efforts did support colonial administration, as in India, missionaries were often highly

critical of the religious neutrality practiced by their governors. Major social problems, especially those associated with slavery and “destructive” western trades in weapons and drugs, elicited missionary condemnations of imperial policy. Early in the century British missionaries encouraged trade in “legitimate” goods—especially cotton—envisioned as supporting working and trading communities of indigenous Christians. The failure of attempts to create such missionary communities in the West Indies (following Parliamentary abolition of British slavery in 1833) and both West and East Africa—and reinforced by the shock of colonial rebellions in India (1857) and Jamaica (1865)—caused some missionaries, especially charismatic evangelicals like those of the China Inland Mission (1865), to reject westernization strategies in favor of itinerant evangelization and the adoption of indigenous dress and manners. Many others reaffirmed commitments to strategies that had been designed to “leaven” indigenous societies in preparation for widespread conversion: the creation of orphanages, schools, and colleges (higher education being especially emphasized in India and China) was supplemented with the tutoring of women by women and medical work in dispensaries and hospitals.

As professionalized strategies increased, so did a “social work” emphasis in missions, to which women, and especially after 1885 unmarried women, were of growing importance; by 1899 women accounted for at least 56 percent of all British missionaries in the field, while as many as forty thousand Catholic sisters

worked in charitable and educational missions. Overall, the variety of missionary responses to trade, colonial governance, and non-western cultures produced variable results. But as the century progressed, missionaries displayed an increased willingness to lobby for standard colonial governmental protections to safeguard their converts and institutions.

The impact of Christian missionaries in the modern world. The Christian message, with its strong egalitarian strains, had the potential to fundamentally subvert hierarchies and authority built on ethnic, historical, or racial arguments. Yet paternalistic missionary attitudes, which frequently assumed the superiority of Western economic and social organization, often supported colonial dependency. Indigenous responses varied widely. In India, for example, churches grew with late-century converts from the lowest castes, but more importantly both Hinduism and Islam were spurred to major reform movements and revivals by the religious and ethical challenges presented by Christianity and Western power. Africa, by contrast, saw missions evolve into flourishing African churches, but only after separatist African-led churches split from missions or charismatic leaders founded syncretic Christian sects that embraced traditional African beliefs. In

every field, missions and their resources were used for local purposes, as in South Africa where in Methodist and Congregationalist missions indigenous chiefs retained considerable powers over local life while adopting market agriculture and accepting imperial protections lobbied for by missionaries. In these ways the self-supporting churches that had been the stated goal of missionary policy throughout the nineteenth century were achieved over the misgivings of white missionaries.

European missionaries were largely ineffective in responding to anti-imperialist critiques in the twentieth century. Missionary education served to shape educated elites and produced nationalist leaders in India, China, and Africa. However, the many real and imagined connections of missions to white power were emphasized by nationalists. In some areas missions met with disaster—in China, missionaries were expelled after the 1949 communist seizure of power. In others, like India, missions produced small minority communities, but failed at any meaningful dialogue with organized majority religions. In yet others missions could be succeeded by large indigenized churches, as in Africa, Korea, and Indonesia. European missionary societies remained active in the late twentieth century, but had little of the public profile



MARY KINGSLEY

Nineteenth-century European empires provided increasing opportunities for women in travel and professional pursuits. In missions women worked as educators and nurses, but outside of these religious institutions, because imperial structures excluded women, their primary roles were as writers and social observers, capable of delivering powerful commentaries on foreign peoples to a wide readership. European exploration from the eighteenth century onward became an increasingly publicized endeavor, and in the nineteenth century narratives of exploration, like those of David Livingstone, sold impressive numbers of books and spawned a growing market for travel writing. In this market women were increasingly able to compete, providing narratives of vicarious female intrepidity. From the 1870s onward, larger numbers of women journeyed abroad to ever more remote destinations: some few, like Florence Baker, were married to famous explorers, but most were single women freed financially and socially for travel by the deaths of male relatives.

Perhaps the most influential and extraordinary of these was the British traveler Mary Kingsley (1862–1900). After a life of duty to the care of her ailing parents, Mary Kingsley—self-educated (in the sciences and anthropology) and following the interests of her widely traveled father—embarked in 1892 upon a series of journeys in West Africa as “a beetle and fetish hunter.” Her widely read *Travels in West Africa* (1897) and *West African Studies* (1899) were reinforced in their impact by her extensive and popular public lecturing.

Kingsley adopted the identity of pragmatic scientist—naturalist and anthropologist—but also embodied the profound ambivalence about gender roles that female travel evoked in her insistence on maintaining respectable Victorian attire throughout her African journeys. In a further elucidation of gender difference, she relinquished the vigorously domineering voice of the self-actualized male

travel writer for self-deprecation, humor, and a willingness to credit the assistance received in her travels from traders and Africans alike. Coming to see the central conflict in West Africa as lying between missionaries and traders, Kingsley sided with the traders, decrying the attempts of missionaries to transform Africans, whom she saw as different in kind from Europeans, as naive and ignorant.

Supporting herself by trading with Africans in rubber and palm oil, and relying on the assistance of various trading “agents,” Kingsley supported the imperial endeavor but lobbied the Colonial Office to leave the governance of West Africa to traders, who supplied Africans with necessary goods while allowing their “development” along more autonomous lines. Her expression of sympathy for the efforts of traders—such as her comment on the “terrible . . . life of a man in one of these out-of-the-way factories, with no white society, and with nothing to look at . . . but the one set of objects—the forest, the river, and the beach”—reinforced notions of the stoic European persevering in primitive environs. Yet her equal sympathy for Africans, their “remarkable mental acuteness and large share of common sense” and serious interest in their lives reinforced the exhortations from professional anthropologists that a clearer understanding of the integrated structure of indigenous societies was necessary. Her view that racial and cultural differences were to be appreciated rather than decried was set against common missionary assumptions that Europeanization and reform of “childlike” indigenous manners were an essential part of the “civilizing” colonial process.

Thus, despite antipathy to missionaries, Kingsley and late-century anthropologists advanced a general European change in attitudes that also brought increasing numbers of missionaries to more sophisticated and sympathetic attitudes to indigenous cultures.

and support or sense of cultural mission that characterized the nineteenth century. Instead, they evolved a philosophy of partnership and outreach, partially as a result of the postcolonial rise of independent churches throughout the world and the decline of activist European religiosity, partially through the growth of

theological liberalism that spawned an ecumenical movement of world Christian cooperation. In the twentieth century, the educational, developmental, and humanitarian activities carried out by missions were extended by transnational nonprofit charitable corporations. However, the primary effect of the mis-

sionary movement from the Renaissance on has been the transformation of Christianity from an almost exclusively European faith to a far more eclectic world religion, with hundreds of millions of adherents in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The twentieth century, then, largely brought to an end the era of exploration, independent trading, and missionary activity as European pursuits carried out with almost complete cultural self-assurance. With the exploration of the polar caps in the first decades of the twentieth century, few frontiers remained that

did not require the resources of a modern nation-state to explore. At the same time, the rise of modern multinational corporations and the creation of major communication and transport networks allowing retail marketing throughout the globe largely ended the age of the independent freebooting trader. Though the era of European world dominance has passed, the modern world has been significantly shaped by the economic, social, and cultural forces transmitted through the activities of exploration, trade, and proselytizing.

See also other articles in this section.

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EMIGRATION AND COLONIES



Kenneth J. Orosz

Shortly after the first European voyages of discovery brought news of the New World back to the Old, settlers and conquerors began flocking out to the newly claimed territories to begin the process of extracting colonial wealth for the benefit of the metropole. Although the desire for profit remained a constant for the duration of the European colonial endeavor, as the various imperial powers expanded their holdings beyond the Americas, the process of colonial emigration took on new forms and led to the creation of profoundly different social structures in each of the colonial regions. It is these differences that provide the groundwork for a social history of colonial settlement by European emigrants. This essay will address four major regional cases in which colonization was accompanied by significant European settlement: South America, North America, the antipodes, and Africa.


In the Americas different economic imperatives resulted in the transportation of racially homogenous settler populations to the British and French holdings in the north while their Iberian counterparts in the south created colonies comprised of relatively small settler groups ruling over much larger populations of Amerindians, imported African slaves, and mixed-race groups. The eventual loss of its American colonies in the late eighteenth century forced Britain to open up new settlement colonies in the antipodes as a means of divesting itself of growing numbers of convicts. Despite its origins as a penal settlement, over the next several decades growing numbers of free settlers from northern Europe flocked to the region to set up farms and ranches in Australia and New Zealand. Subsequent efforts to shed the region's violent and brutal convict past in favor of middle-class Victorian respectability were complicated by the existence and poor treatment of aboriginal populations, who stood in the way of European-style economic progress. No such problems affected the European settlement colonies in Africa. As the final region of colonial emigration, most of which occurred in the nineteenth century, Africa enjoyed the least complicated colonial society. The advent of social Darwinism and visions of the

“white man's burden” necessitated the creation of racially segregated colonial societies in which white settlers unabashedly enriched themselves by systematically divesting Africans of land, wealth, and political independence. Despite the different social structures, in all cases European emigration created new forms of social hierarchy in which Europeans displaced existing ruling elites.

COLONIAL EMIGRATION IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA

The completion of the Reconquista in 1492 and the end of hostilities in Spain and Portugal eliminated the prospects for the accumulation of loot and social advancement in the Iberian Peninsula via service on the battlefield for a whole generation of Iberians. The Muslim presence had, however, exposed the Spanish and Portuguese to tales of African gold fields and the lucrative Asian trade. In an effort to profit from and possibly control these resources, both powers began equipping a series of merchant vessels for voyages of trade and discovery. Central to these voyages was the search for faster, more lucrative trade routes that would propel the mother country to the forefront of European commerce. These efforts, which focused primarily on attempts to discover shortcuts to Asia, quickly led explorers and conquistadors to the Americas, where a limited number soon found wealth beyond their wildest dreams in the form of plantations and gold mines.

The bulk of these activities fell to Spain, which took an early lead in conquering and exploiting the New World. As news of Inca and Aztec wealth reached Spain in the early sixteenth century, scores of individual conquistadors, including some who lacked royal authorization or approval, flocked to the Americas. Aided by firearms and disease, these small bands of European soldiers quickly defeated the indigenous peoples and began looting their treasures of gold, silver, and gemstones. As they conquered Inca and Aztec



Emigration from Britain, 1815–1914. Adapted from A. N. Porter, ed., *Atlas of British Overseas Expansion*, London, Routledge, 1991.

villages in pursuit of profit, the conquistadors also turned their attention to reopening local gold and silver mines. This process was greatly facilitated by the creation of the *encomienda* system. Eager to both reward conquistadors and to secure larger shares of tax and tribute, the Spanish crown granted soldiers serving in the New World an *encomienda*, or license that allowed the holder to direct and exploit the labor of all native peoples living within the borders of his grant. While some of these forced laborers were put to work growing food on haciendas, the vast majority found themselves performing backbreaking work in mines and coastal plantations for the benefit of their Spanish overlords.

Social hierarchies in Spanish America. The earliest of these overlords were the conquistadors themselves, most of whom stayed on in the colony to oversee their land grants. As a result they formed a new landed colonial aristocracy that quickly came to dominate local politics and economics. Over the next three centuries the conquistadors were joined by an average of twenty-six hundred new emigrants every year. Since labor in the form of Amerindians, African slaves, and mixed-race populations was so readily available in Spanish colonies, there was no need to import a white proletariat. Consequently, the vast majority of the 750,000 Spaniards who eventually emigrated to the

colonies were lower-middle-class young men in search of social mobility and economic opportunity. On arrival, these emigrants took up support roles as artisans, clerics, merchants, and civil servants. Since they came from a largely urban environment, the new arrivals tended to join the conquistadors in newly built colonial towns, thereby recreating the social hierarchy of Castile in which an urban upper class lived off the profits of landed estates worked by peasants.

Although this upper-class settler community presented a largely uniform facade, it was actually beset with a wide variety of internal social divisions. Within the settler community of Spanish America, social order was highly stratified according to class, occupation, birthplace, and race. Settlers born and raised in the colonies, known as Creoles, were generally looked down upon as ignorant, backcountry yokels by more recent arrivals who were better versed in current metropolitan culture. Offensive as this was, the Creole population was even more bitter about the Crown's tendency to ignore them, despite their obvious wealth, knowledge, and experience, in favor of candidates from the metropole when it came time to fill the upper echelons of colonial administration. This situation was further compounded by the tendency of royal appointees, most of whom arrived in the colony knowing little of local affairs, to retire to Spain once they had served out their term of office. As a result, tensions between the

two groups grew steadily throughout the colonial period and eventually helped contribute to the Creole population's declaration of independence in the early nineteenth century.

As important as geographical origin was to the social hierarchy in the colonies, Spanish settlers were even more interested in the racial background of community members. The dearth of white women, who made up 6.2 percent of sixteenth-century emigrants before peaking at 28.5 percent a century later, made miscegenation common. Despite the prevalence of this practice, children born of such unions (known as mestizos) represented the lowest levels of settler society and faced significant social discrimination. Efforts to avoid this stigma led settlers to carefully document their racial origins via elaborate genealogies based on marriage and baptism records. While this suggests a fairly rigid color bar within Creole society, in practice things were much looser, particularly for richer community members. Wealth not only bought greater social acceptance, it also enabled individuals to bribe priests and government clerks in an effort to alter official records to hide Indian or, eventually, African bloodlines.

Social hierarchies in Portuguese America. As the Spanish presence in the Americas solidified, Portugal began pressing its own claims to the region and set up a rival settlement colony in Brazil. Although some aspects of Portuguese emigration patterns mirrored those of their Spanish counterparts, colonial society in Brazil contained some notable differences, particularly in regard to racial issues. Part of the reason for this was economic. While Brazil lacked readily accessible mineral resources, its climate lent itself to the creation of sugar plantations, something that the Portuguese had already experienced in the Azores. Despite the lucrative nature of sugar plantations, Portugal's chronic lack of resources and the brutal tropical climate in Brazil meant that emigration to the colony was destined to lag far behind that to Spanish America. This in turn meant that Portuguese settlers were more accustomed to interacting with Amerindians and, eventually, African slaves than were their Spanish counterparts.

Mirroring Spanish colonial emigration, most Portuguese settlers were young men in search of economic opportunity in the New World. While a lucky few created large landed estates and plantations hacked out of the countryside at the expense of native peoples, the majority of Portuguese settlers became small ranchers and farmers concentrated along the coast. This remained true even after the brief population boom generated by the discovery of gold and dia-

monds in the 1690s. Disturbed by the slow population growth within the largely male settler society, the Portuguese crown began openly encouraging intermarriage with the indigenous peoples. Consequently, and in stark contrast to the Spanish colonies, the Portuguese welcomed the arrival of mixed-race children and easily assimilated them into the larger settler community. As color lines faded, Brazilian colonial society found itself split more by socioeconomics and Creole-metropolitan rivalries than by physical appearance.

Amerindians and African slaves in colonial society. As conscious of their own internal hierarchies as the settlers and mestizos in both Spanish and Portuguese America were, they all agreed that the Amerindian population ranked still lower on the social scale. From the very beginnings of the European presence in the Americas the indigenous peoples were exploited for land, treasure, and, most importantly, manual labor. Amerindians, however, quickly discovered that work on Spanish and Portuguese plantations, haciendas, and mines was harsh and had a high death toll due to poor conditions, exhaustion, mistreatment, and disease. Consequently, many resisted European

demands for labor by staging uprisings, fleeing into the bush, and engaging in sabotage. To their extreme frustration, both the Spanish and the Portuguese discovered that the combination of these factors led to chronic labor shortages and delayed the all-important process of extracting wealth from their colonial holdings.

This situation was further compounded by the presence of missionaries and the creation of official native policies. Although all missionaries focused their efforts on converting the masses to Christianity, the missionary presence in the Iberian colonies changed over time. Like their settler counterparts, the first generation of missionaries in Latin America tended to destroy and denigrate indigenous culture, customs, and society. As colonial society took root, however, the missionaries came to believe that the only way to truly root out pagan beliefs and win converts over to Christianity was to study and fully understand the indigenous peoples. As a result of these efforts, missionaries became better informed and often sympathetic about the plight of the indigenous peoples. This in turn gave birth to a running debate in both the Spanish and Portuguese holdings about the nature and extent of Amerindian rights. According to the conquistadors and large landowners, the indigenous peoples were not only uncivilized heathens who had lost the right to govern themselves, they had to be tamed and transformed into useful members of society by the settlers for the good of all concerned. Such lofty goals, so the argument went, justified any and all means, including the brutal slavlike working conditions in the mines and plantations. Missionaries sympathetic to the plight of the indigenous peoples argued instead that they were childlike innocents that could be converted if shown the right behaviors and values. Consequently, in both the Spanish and Portuguese holdings, missionaries set themselves up as protectors and defenders of Amerindian rights, exerting constant pressure on the crowns back in Europe to follow their lead.

In the Spanish case this led Charles V (1500–1558) to finally abolish Indian slavery in 1542. Although the Portuguese rulers were generally sympathetic to the missionary point of view, pressure from wealthy plantation owners and their lobbyists at court delayed them from taking similar action until the mid-1700s. In both cases, however, abolition was in name only. While Indians were transformed from slaves into wage laborers, they were crushed by heavy taxes, demands for tribute, poor wages, and work conditions. These pressures collectively forced the indigenous peoples into debt peonage—they took on the role of serfs. Consequently, despite the change in their legal status, Amerindians enjoyed no corresponding

changes in their socioeconomic position for the duration of the colonial period.

When the Spanish and Portuguese discovered shortly after their arrival in the New World that the indigenous peoples were incapable of and unwilling to provide sufficient labor for the process of extracting wealth from the colonies, both powers resorted to the importation of large numbers of African slaves. While insufficient records make it impossible to determine exactly how many Africans suffered this fate, by 1810 some 10 million had been enslaved and shipped to the New World. Most were sent to South America where they were expected to spend their lives toiling in European-owned economic enterprises. Treatment of slaves, while better than that meted out during transatlantic journeys, was still poor. In addition to the loss of their liberty, harsh working conditions, and mistreatment, slaves faced brutal punishments and short life expectancies. Since few women were brought to the New World as slaves, and since those who did make the journey were often the victims of unwanted sexual advances from their white owners, most blacks either lacked family lives or found them by intermarrying with the Amerindian population. The result was the creation of a mulatto community, which, along with slaves and free blacks, made up the lowest echelons of colonial society and faced constant discrimination and exploitation.

COLONIAL EMIGRATION IN NORTH AMERICA

While both France and England also relied to some extent on slave labor in their American possessions, they encountered far fewer racial problems and were able to construct more homogenous settlement colonies built primarily around small farmers. France and England were relative newcomers to colonization; this in part explains why they created colonial societies so different from those of their Iberian counterparts. When news of the wealth pouring into Spain and Portugal from their American holdings finally roused the British and French into action, the most lucrative pieces of the New World had already been claimed. The remaining pieces of North America lacked readily accessible mineral wealth, easily exploitable supplies of Amerindian labor, and, with the exception of the Caribbean and the southernmost portions of the mainland, climates suitable for plantations. Britain and France therefore contented themselves with piracy and occasional forays into North America for furs, timber, and fish.

This situation swiftly changed in the early seventeenth century due to changing conditions at home

in Europe. The resumption of steady population growth as the religious wars of the Reformation wound to a close made land increasingly scarce. At the same time the rise of political and religious dissenters presented intolerable challenges to increasingly absolute central governments. Political leaders in both France and England quickly came to see the creation of colonies in the remaining portions of North America as simple solutions to both problems. The wide-open spaces and temperate climate of North America not only provided ample opportunity for quenching the masses' thirst for land, but they could also serve as dumping grounds for religious and political opponents. Moreover, once established, these resident populations could further serve the state by providing the metropole with markets and raw materials.

French versus British settlements. France began the process of colonization in 1609 when Louis XVI (1754–1793) shipped four thousand peasants from western France to Quebec at crown expense. Over the next century and a half, they were joined by an additional six thousand men and women, including soldiers, convicts, orphans, and free settlers. Although the French hoped that emigration to Canada would take off and lead to the creation of a large colony capable of serving as both a guaranteed market for metropolitan manufactured goods and a supplier of cheap timber, furs, and other colonial commodities, the region's cold climate and the existence of more lucrative Caribbean colonies discouraged many potential emigrants from making the journey. The bulk of those who did emigrate were landless young men who signed on for three-year contracts as indentured servants working to clear land, cut timber, farm, and trap animals for their furs. Most saw their time in the colony as temporary and tried to return home as soon as their period of service ended. When coupled with the small number of women present in Quebec, this trend ensured that the French colony remained small and widely dispersed.

Although similar motives lay behind the creation of Britain's North American colonies, local climatic conditions ensured that the resultant settler societies were much more complex than their French counterparts. Like its scattered Caribbean holdings, Britain's southern colonies possessed climates suitable for the creation of a plantation economy. Instead of sugarcane, however, the southern colonies focused their efforts on harvesting cotton and tobacco with the help of indentured servants shipped out from the metropole in large numbers. Indentured servants were similarly responsible for helping the middle colonies of the Chesapeake region produce timber, grain, and

other farm products. Unlike their French counterparts, British indentured servants included both craftsmen and landless farmers. Moreover, most chose to stay on in the colonies after their service was up in hopes of attaining social mobility and access to cheap land. Nevertheless, population growth in the early years of colonial development was slow due to high death rates and the relative lack of female emigrants. Reductions in the number of emigrants after 1680, caused by changing economic conditions back in Britain, also took their toll on population growth. As the supply of labor began to dry up, the southern plantation colonies turned to the use of imported African slaves to make up the difference. Although large, the size of this slave population never approached that of either the Carribean or Iberian colonies in South America.

The final pieces of Britain's colonial puzzle in the Americas were New England and Canada. While emigration to other colonies was spaced out over a century and a half and frequently was composed of young male indentured servants, the Puritan migration to New England was limited to 1629–1642 and consisted of whole families fleeing religious persecution and economic hardship in England. On arrival, the Puritans created small, religiously based independent farming communities mirroring those they left behind in England. Canada, on the other hand, was more diverse, particularly since it was acquired as the result of Britain's ongoing wars with France. After seizing the last vestiges of French Canada during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), the British decided that they had spent too much time and money just to give it all back. While most French settlers chose to emigrate to other colonies in the New World rather than fall under permanent British political control, a sizeable portion remained, thereby presenting their new rulers with the difficult and delicate task of absorbing them into Britain's American Empire. Early efforts to buy the loyalty of these French settlers by granting them local autonomy and accommodating their cultural, linguistic, and legal differences quickly broke down, particularly after loyalists flocked northward into Canada in the wake of the American Revolution. The resultant Anglo-French tensions gradually intensified over the course of the nineteenth century as Britain opened the rest of Canada to settlement by emigrants eager to flee land shortages and poverty in Europe.

Despite their different origins, the British and French settlement colonies in the Americas shared a number of important similarities. In each case, the nature of the climate and the resultant colonial economy meant that the slave population remained small

and was confined largely to the Caribbean and southern colonies. When coupled with the small and widely dispersed Amerindian population in North America, this presented very few opportunities for either miscegenation or the creation of racially stratified colonial societies. Instead, the British and French settlement colonies in the Americas were composed almost exclusively of European emigrants bent on recreating metropolitan style communities of yeoman farmers. As a result, colonial communities imported European social hierarchies in which social status depended almost exclusively on the accumulation of landed wealth. Those who managed to acquire this wealth were accorded deference, respect, and quickly came to dominate both local politics and society. As in the Iberian colonies of South America, however, these Creole gentlemen farmers were denied representation in Parliament and had to submit to governors sent out from the metropole.

Although Canada proved to be an exception, by the end of the eighteenth century settlers in the British and Iberian colonies were chafing under the economic restrictions of mercantilism and the lack of political representation. Tensions eventually rose to the breaking point, triggering a series of successful political revolutions. Despite new-found independence, the emigration and basic social patterns of each former colony remained largely unchanged throughout the nineteenth century.

EMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

The winning of independence by the American colonies presented Britain with a major social problem. Prior to the revolution Britain had sold convicts to its American colonies as cheap sources of labor. When the newly independent United States made it clear that it would no longer accept shipments of convicts, Parliament began contemplating the creation of a penal colony as a means of coping with Britain's dangerously overcrowded prison system. After toying with several potential sites in Africa, the British finally settled on Australia, possibly in hopes that it would yield a wide variety of colonial spin-offs, ranging from timber and lucrative cash crops to strategic military and trading bases.

Settlement in Australia. Britain's first shipment of 750 convicts arrived in New South Wales in January of 1788 and immediately fell on hard times. Although they were expected to create a self-sustaining farming community shortly after arriving in the an-

tipodes, most convicts were urban dwellers with no farming or construction experience. Worse still, they were ignorant of the southern hemisphere's seasons and rain patterns. As a result, the colony faced disease and chronic shortages until subsequent fleets arrived bearing more convicts, supplies, and the first in a growing wave of free settlers.

As the new colony took shape, it quickly assumed a highly stratified social structure. At the apex were the free settlers, colonial administrators, and soldiers sent to guard the convict population. These figures not only regarded themselves as paragons of civilized society and looked down upon all other social groups, but they also took advantage of their position to acquire and develop the largest and most lucrative land grants, which they worked with convict labor. After serving out their sentences, former convicts took on the title of emancipists and occupied the middle level of Australia's settler society. Although many became quite wealthy and eventually acquired large land grants and positions of authority within the community, their social mobility was generally restricted by their convict past. Finally, Australia's large convict population naturally occupied the lowest level of white society where they faced extensive discrimination, hard labor, and brutal punishment for any additional offenses committed in the penal colony. Paranoid personal feuds, drunkenness, brawls, floggings, and public hangings were all common features of early colonial life and served to create an atmosphere of violence and social division. Further divisions came in the form of Anglo-Irish and Protestant-Catholic rivalries imported from the metropole.

The aboriginal population, a group that received the worst treatment meted out to any indigenous people in the entire British empire, constituted the very bottom of Australia's social hierarchy. While Lachlan Macquarie (1761–1824), who served as governor of New South Wales (1810–1821), made some early efforts to assimilate the aborigines and transform them into European-style farmers, the bulk of settlers concentrated on dispossessing the aborigines of their land as quickly as possible. Resistance was met with military reprisals and forced relocations. As settlers expanded deeper and deeper into Australia's interior, they initiated a campaign of genocide in which the aborigines were denied access to water holes, shot, driven off their land, given poisoned food, and deliberately infected with smallpox. While most survivors retreated even further into the interior, some drifted into the newly created towns to beg or take jobs as prostitutes or menial laborers.

By the early 1840s the influx of free settlers, which had risen to fifteen thousand 15,000 per year,

and the introduction of sheep and cattle changed the nature of Australian society. The impatience and intense land hunger of most new arrivals led many to bypass the colonial administration's land-grant system, preferring instead to raise sheep and cattle on illegally occupied crown lands. Government efforts to halt the proliferation of squatters led to the abolition of land grants in favor of leases and land auctions. Proceeds from these auctions and leases were then put toward assisted emigration in the hopes that subsidized tickets to Australia would enable the administration to exert some control over who was permitted to emigrate to the colony. While well intentioned, this effort proved to be a dismal failure. Most new arrivals lacked the necessary funds to purchase or lease crown land and chose instead to squat illegally. In the process they deprived the colonial administration of both income and the ability to control the nature and pace of colonial emigration.

In addition to creating squatters, the settlers' intense land hunger drove many of them into other regions of the Australian continent where they set up independent and autonomous colonies alongside New South Wales. Although some of the new colonies were founded exclusively by free settlers, the chronic shortage of labor forced some of them to begin accepting shipments of convicts. Others turned instead to the policies of the English colonist Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1796–1862), who in 1829 proposed colonization by the sale of small farms to ordinary citizens.

According to Wakefield, the solution to Australia's labor shortage was to make land prices so high that new arrivals had no choice but to obtain paying jobs in order to earn the necessary funds to buy land. As in the government's assisted emigration schemes, the proceeds from these land sales were to be used to pay for the passage of the next wave of emigrants. In theory this would not only ensure a constant labor supply, it would also allow the settlers to choose a better, more suitable class of migrants. Although the preponderance of squatting and the general lack of funds rendered Wakefield's schemes a failure, they did help to attract increasing numbers of lower-middle-class farmers and ranchers. As they grew in number, these free settlers increasingly sought to shed the region's jail-house image and to create more respectable colonial societies.

Settlement in New Zealand. While Australia's free settlers began to struggle with the continent's convict past, a few chose instead to move to nearby New Zealand. From the beginning the growing European presence disrupted the lifestyle of New Zealand's indigenous Maori population. Settlers and merchants from Australia not only brought their arrogance, brutality, and lawlessness with them, they also alienated the Maori by cheating them in trade negotiations. The presence of rival missionary societies and denominations further confused and alienated Maori converts. Finally, and of even greater importance, was the de-

cision of early settlers and merchants—motivated by the pursuit of profit and the desire to support those Maori seen as potential allies—to provide their Maori neighbors with firearms, leading to the eruption of a series of deadly and highly destructive civil wars among the Maori.

News of these events scandalized the British public and led to calls for immediate government intervention to protect the Maori from further brutality and exploitation. Intervention was also justified on the grounds that it was necessary to protect Europeans from possible massacre at the hands of alienated and enraged Maori warriors. These calls for action eventually led Britain to formally annex New Zealand in February 1840 via the Treaty of Waitangi with some of the Maori tribes of North Island. According to the terms of the treaty, Britain assumed full administrative control and acquired a monopoly on land purchases in exchange for granting the Maori full citizenship and recognition of their land rights.

Shortly after the treaty was signed, settlers began flocking to North Island, site of the largest Maori settlements. In addition to land grants and travel subsidies provided by the Crown, settlers were also assisted by private ventures. As the Crown was in the process of negotiating the Treaty of Waitangi, Wakefield and his followers established the New Zealand Land Company to promote emigration of free settlers to North Island. Within a decade he convinced the Anglican and Presbyterian churches to follow suit and found denominational settlements in South Island. As in Australia the idea behind each of these private ventures was to sell land bought from the government at high prices so that the proceeds could be used to subsidize the travel of respectable lower-middle-class settlers eager to recreate an English-style farming and sheepherding community in the South Seas. Although Wakefield's schemes failed just as dismally in New Zealand as they had in Australia, they did help to attract large numbers of educated lower-middle-class settlers to the colony. Thus, unlike Australia with its convict population and propensity for violence and brutality, New Zealand's settler community tended to be more peaceful and "civilized." This image not only affected their relations with the Maori, it also enabled the settlers to obtain local self-government in 1852.

The position of the Maori within New Zealand's colonial society was ambiguous at best. Thanks to the protection of the Crown, their status as full citizens, and their reputation as fierce warriors, they avoided becoming the victims of genocide. Nonetheless they were still regarded by most settlers as "noble savages" to be civilized and as common laborers to be exploited. As a result, the Maori became the targets

of ongoing assimilation campaigns as early as the mid-1840s. These campaigns, which attempted to teach the Maori to become farmers and adopt British culture, instead left them hostile and bitter about the growing European colonial presence. While the Maori were also upset about settler violations of Maori law and customs and the high property qualifications that denied them a voice in New Zealand's new governmental structures, their greatest complaint by far stemmed from the issue of land ownership and sales. The Maori argued that the Treaty of Waitangi confirmed their ownership of all the land and consequently felt betrayed when the British disagreed. According to the British, the Maori owned only the land that they physically occupied. All remaining lands were considered unoccupied and hence under governmental control. The Maori also came to resent the government's monopoly on land purchases and the poor prices that it paid for undeveloped Maori land.

The last straw came in the 1860s when the government, responding to settler demands that Maori land be seized and sold, sent teams of surveyors to map out all land plots. Feeling that they had been pushed too far, the Maori rose up in open revolts known as the New Zealand Wars, which raged intermittently for the next decade. During the course of this conflict the colonial government punished Maori rebels by seizing and selling their land. The government also abolished its monopoly on land purchases and established Native Land Courts to resolve disputes arising from land sales. Over the next few decades, the bulk of Maori land fell into European hands as the result of sales or legal action, or as payment for taxes and other fees.

Colonial society after the gold rush. While the basic structure of British colonial society in the antipodes seemed to have been set by the mid-nineteenth century, the discovery of gold in both Australia (1851) and New Zealand (1861) had profound effects on both colonies. News of the discoveries triggered a massive influx of settlers eager to try their luck in the gold fields. Among these settlers was a contingent of foreign laborers, many of whom were Chinese, imported by mining companies. As miners began competing for lucrative claims, xenophobia and racism rose dramatically, resulting in violent pogroms against foreign laborers and calls for immigration quotas. In Australia the gold rush was further compounded by an upsurge in violence, vigilantism, and chaos that amounted to a class war between squatters and land prospectors eager to invest their gold profits and secure access to new potential claim sites. Observation of the effects of the Californian and Australian gold

rushes prompted the colonial administration in New Zealand to take prompt regulatory action that enabled it to avoid a similar bout of lawlessness.

Overall the gold rushes created wealth, urbanization, limited industrialization, and furthered the impulse to create respectable Victorian societies in both colonies. In Australia this included both the end of its status as a penal colony and new efforts to protect the aborigines from possible conflicts with the growing settler population. The result was an official ideology of protection, segregation, and control that reflected contemporary social Darwinism and its vision of the “white man’s burden.” Central to this new campaign were efforts to force aborigines onto reservations, ostensibly to provide them with a safe haven free from European interference. In reality the reservation movement, which peaked in the 1890s, pushed the aborigines even further onto the margins of Australian society. Poor conditions on the reservations increasingly forced aborigines to hire themselves out as wage laborers; as such, they faced constant discrimination and had no control over their working conditions.

In New Zealand the gold rush sparked a new population boom as European emigrants flocked to the colony in the hopes of striking it rich. The land hunger of the European population intensified as the new arrivals settled in. Having learned from the New Zealand Wars that armed force only made their plight worse, many Maori chose to retreat into the interior. Others turned toward assimilation and accommodation with the settlers, reasoning that cooperation would give them some protection from loss of their land and rights. This policy quickly paid off in the form of four seats in New Zealand’s parliament that were reserved for Maori candidates. The Maori used this parliamentary representation in conjunction with an ongoing series of lawsuits to try to prevent further land seizures and loss of their rights. While they still faced discrimination and hostility at the hands of settlers, who perceived the Maori as annoying obstacles to land development, overall the Maori emerged from the nineteenth century much more independent, affluent, and politically powerful than the Australian aborigines.

In addition to affecting the treatment of the indigenous peoples, the wealth and population booms triggered by the gold rushes enabled both Australia and New Zealand to demand increasing degrees of independence from Britain. In Australia this process occurred gradually, with each of the independent colonies gaining local autonomy in the 1850s. This was followed in the 1890s by calls for federation, resulting in the end of British imperial rule in January of 1901.

These events were mirrored in New Zealand, which gained its independence in 1907. Although emigration to both former colonies continued throughout the first half of the twentieth century, little changed in their social makeup until the end of World War II.

EMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT IN AFRICA

European settlement in southern Africa dates from the mid-seventeenth century, when the Dutch decided to establish a permanent base at the Cape of Good Hope in order to resupply passing ships with food and water. While the original settlement consisted of only a few hundred whites, by the 1680s the Dutch were actively recruiting settler families. Within a hundred years these Dutch settlers, also known as Boers (a Dutch term meaning “farmers”), had grown in number to almost twenty thousand. Since the best farmland around the Cape had long since been claimed by their predecessors, most new arrivals moved into the interior where they seized cattle and land from the indigenous peoples to create small European-owned farms and ranches. As the Boers pressed deeper and deeper inland, they not only aroused increasing waves of hostility among the displaced native peoples, they also developed a reputation as highly individualistic and quarrelsome people.

Boers versus English in South Africa. By the dawn of the nineteenth century, the Napoleonic wars caused control over Cape Colony to shift from the Dutch to the British. Eager to exploit the colony’s strategic location, Britain quickly dispatched five thousand settlers to the Cape to bolster their ownership claims. The Boer population viewed these arrivals with some alarm. In addition to being forced to adopt a new language, customs, and legal system, the largely pastoralist Boer population was suspicious of the British settlers’ predominantly urban background. The biggest source of tension between the two settler groups was, however, their different approaches to native relations. The Boers had long held the view that Africans were not only inferior, but were ordained by God to serve South Africa’s white population as poorly paid manual laborers. As allegedly inferior competitors for pasture land and cattle stocks, Africans were also subject to repeated Boer seizures of their land and livestock. While the British were tainted by their own racism and belief in social Darwinism, they were uncomfortable with the naked exploitation of the African masses perpetuated by the Boers and worried that it might erupt into racial violence. These fears became

particularly apparent when the migrating Boers came into contact with the fierce and expanding Xhosa and Zulu peoples.

British attempts to legislate better treatment for Africans in the 1830s and 1840s infuriated the resident Boer community and unleashed the Great Trek in which some ten thousand Boers gathered their belongings and migrated into the interior of the African veld in search of pasture land. After taking up residence in Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State, the Boer migrants declared these areas independent republics. While Boer expansion and independence ran contrary to British aims for the development of the colony, official responses repeatedly vacillated between accommodation and demands for immediate annexation of the self-styled republics. In particular, the British demonstrated their conciliatory attitude toward the Boers when the Boers' chronic demand for land and labor provoked the indigenous peoples into further armed insurrections. Fearful that the resultant conflicts might spread and engulf the entire tip of southern Africa, the British repeatedly stepped in militarily to aid their fellow Europeans. For their trouble, the British met with renewed colonial expansion by the Boers, who fled even deeper into the African interior.

While the Boers were moving inland during the Great Trek, the Cape itself was becoming increasingly prosperous, urbanized, and populous. As in other settlement colonies, rising prosperity led to the creation of local self-government and desires for social respectability. This in turn helped give rise to the position termed Cape liberalism, which sought to educate and gradually integrate Africans into colonial society. This provided a stark contrast to the treatment that Africans received in Boer-controlled areas, where they were second-class citizens with no prospect of ever acquiring the right to vote or to hold political power. Worse still, in Boer-run areas, Africans continued to be treated as a labor force to be exploited and stripped of its land. Clear though these goals were, the relatively low density of the resident African population resulted in chronic labor shortages that were only partly relieved by importing indentured servants from India. This naturally served to further complicate the racial landscape by adding a new "colored" group to the mix.

Indians were brought into South Africa in the 1860s. Most were sent to Natal, which, although officially annexed by the British, was dominated by Boer settlers. The Indians were brought in for five-year terms during which they were supposed to work in "industrial" sectors. This included railroad construction, coal mining, and other forms of heavy labor. When their term of service was up, Indians were free

to sign contracts with any employer for a further five years. After a total of ten years in South Africa they were entitled to free passage back to India or a land grant worth an equivalent amount. Most chose to stay despite the fact that they were routinely given the poorest land, forcing many to find work as tenant farmers or domestic servants. At the same time, growing numbers of Indian businessmen paid their own passage to South Africa and set up shop as merchants, small traders, and low-level government clerks.

The discovery of diamonds in the latter half of the nineteenth century compounded South Africa's increasingly complex racial hierarchy by bringing in large numbers of European prospectors and shifting the financial balance of power to the Boer Republics. The need for increased agricultural output to feed this growing settler population led to new rounds of land seizures in the 1880s and 1890s. While the Boer farmers and ranchers prospered, Africans were progressively impoverished as they lost land and were forced into poorly paid positions as manual laborers on Boer farms. Similar scenes unfolded in the newly discovered gold and diamond fields, where Africans toiled as diggers and unskilled laborers on white-owned claims. As monopolies were created in the mining industry, Africans' wages plummeted still further, causing them to spend even more time away from their families in a desperate bid to make ends meet. The resultant labor patterns, which kept men out of the villages and prevented them from practicing or passing on their local traditions and ancestral way of life, eventually had a catastrophic effect on the structure of South African family life, culture, and society.

Eager to continue and expand the gold rush, settlers in southern Africa began migrating ever deeper into the interior in the hopes of finding even richer veins of ore. Led by agents of the great financial titan Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902), these settlers found their way blocked by the increasingly restrictive Boer Republics, which sought to limit the financial and civil rights of all non-Boer inhabitants. Frustrated, Rhodes eventually tried to topple the Republics in the ill-fated Jameson Raid (1895), which ruined his own political career and finally convinced the Boers that the British would stop at nothing short of permanent annexation. The resultant Anglo-Boer tensions eventually erupted into the short but brutal Boer War (1899–1902). A scant eight years after the war's end, all of South Africa's settler communities were finally united in an independent, albeit Boer dominated, Union of South Africa. Once free of London's control and oversight, the new Union's government began passing a series of discriminatory laws to force Africans and mixed-race populations into clearly defined professions, relocate

them onto reservations, and restrict their movements via the creation of internal passports. The restrictive nature of these policies enabled the settler community to continue their exploitation of African laborers and greatly facilitated South Africa's ongoing industrialization campaign. In the process, however, they sowed the seeds of the post-World War II apartheid regime.

French settlement in Algeria. While the British were solidifying their hold on South Africa, France was busy promoting emigration to its new settlement colony in Algeria. Initially invaded by Charles X (reigned 1824–1830) in 1830 in an effort to divert the Parisian masses from his bid to restore absolutist power, Algeria quickly came to be regarded by both the Second and Third Republics as a potential breadbasket, a source of labor, and a dumping ground for the more radical elements of French society, where it was hoped their revolutionary zeal would be blunted by the availability of cheap land. As settlers moved in, however, their plans to assimilate the local Arab-Berber population met with resistance, which quickly took on the form of an anticolonial jihad (holy war). Over the next half century the French army, convinced that its honor was at stake, insisted on pushing ever deeper into the Algerian interior in hopes of defeating the indigenous rebels. The result was a costly and bloody guerilla war, which the French met with scorched-earth tactics and systematic terrorism.

Despite the hostilities that continued to rage on the frontier, thousands of French settlers, known as *pieds-noirs* (black feet), began pouring into Algeria, eventually constituting 10 percent of the colony's total population. They were soon joined by equally large numbers of foreigners who migrated into the new colony from all over Europe. As they arrived in Algeria these settlers, including the newly assimilated foreigners, forcibly evicted the Algerians from the fertile coastal region and relocated them in poorer lands deeper in the interior. Within a few years, however, most settlers moved from their purloined farmlands into urban coastal communities where they set about recreating metropolitan French society. These efforts were ultimately paid for by the labor of displaced and impoverished Algerian farmers, who worked the otherwise empty landed estates for their absentee French landlords.

France's official revolutionary doctrine of assimilation assured that the settler community, although composed of diverse elements, was transformed into a homogeneously French one that saw itself as a distant French province. To this end, Algeria was subject to the same parliamentary decrees formed in Paris as the rest of France. It also enjoyed parliamentary rep-

resentation in the form of deputies elected by all those holding French citizenship. While citizenship was theoretically open to the colonized Algerians, few acquired it despite official efforts to "uplift" the indigenous people. These efforts included compulsory French language education and official discrimination against natives who failed to assimilate in the form of heavy taxes, forced labor, and the *indigénat*, an arbitrary legal code that allowed colonial officials to impose nonjudicial fines and short prison terms on colonial subjects for a host of minor offenses. The only escape from these oppressive measures was to abandon Islam, traditional Algerian customs, and the Arabic language in favor of assimilation into French culture and society. While some tried, most Algerians preferred instead to resist, both passively and militarily.

By the turn of the century the French, responding to social Darwinism and the racist atmosphere prevalent throughout late-nineteenth-century Europe, abandoned the colonial policy of assimilation in favor of accommodation. While the distinction between the two policies was frequently blurred in practice, in theory accommodation was geared toward the economic development and exploitation of colonial areas, while leaving their indigenous populations free to operate within their own cultural and social patterns. While this may seem a benevolent effort to safeguard indigenous cultures and traditions in the face of European cultural imperialism, it was in fact motivated at least as much by the desire to insulate French culture from foreign and allegedly inferior influences. In Algeria this shift in colonial ideology manifested itself by 1918 in the decision to allow native rulers in the southern sections of the colony to exercise complete local autonomy, provided that they followed the general outlines of official French policy. This decision granted long-simmering Algerian nationalism what appeared to be a harmless political outlet. In practice, however, it spelled doom for French colonial rule in north Africa.

The collapse of France and its occupation by the Nazis in World War II sent shockwaves through both the metropole and the colonial empire. When the war finally ended, nationalist leaders all over the French Empire began to claim that the war had proved France's weakness and unsuitability to rule any foreign possessions. For their part, the French just as loudly demanded the retention of their colonial empire as a means of reviving their shattered economy and retrieving their national honor. By the mid-1950s these conflicting impulses finally erupted into a nasty and brutal war for independence in which both sides frequently resorted to torture and terror. The war weariness of the French, coupled with the realization

that they could not win, finally forced them to give in and grant Algeria its independence on 3 July 1962. Although they felt betrayed by the French decision, most settlers seized the opportunity to flee back to France, leaving behind an enormous economic and political vacuum from which Algeria has yet to fully recover.

CONCLUSION

From the beginning of the European colonial endeavor, settlers migrated to the colonies in pursuit of new economic opportunities and social mobility. Ef-

forts to realize these dreams invariably entailed interaction with racially diverse groups of indigenous peoples, imported slaves, and other foreign laborers, resulting in varying degrees of accommodation and exploitation. In the process, settlers created highly complex colonial societies that were curious and unique mixtures of rigid social stratification and upward mobility. These trends, while best demonstrated in the Iberian colonies of the Americas, are also evident in subsequent settlement efforts by Europeans in Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, thus proving that the more colonization and emigration changed, the more it remained the same.

See also War and Conquest Migration (volume 2); Social Mobility; (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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IMPERIALISM AND DOMESTIC SOCIETY



Laura Tabili

A persistent feature of the historiography of Europe has been a bifurcation between European histories and identities and imperial ones. Yet in fact imperialism has been intrinsic to European expansion, European identity, and European history.

SOURCES OF IMPERIAL CULTURE

Scholars have traced the origins of European imperialism at least as far back as the Middle Ages. Through the expansion of Latin Christendom, doubling European territory between 950 and 1350, Europe became “a colonizing society and the product of one” (Bartlett, p. 314). Frankish, Germanic, and English territorial conquests secured institutional hegemony over a periphery then as now encompassing the Celtic lands, the Baltic and Scandinavia, eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean. Institutional mechanisms and ideological predispositions that prefigured later imperialisms took shape on these European frontiers through the often violent and seldom complete imposition of cultural, ethnic, racial, linguistic, and legal hierarchies, patriarchy and primogeniture, social stratification, militarization, feudalism and tributary agriculture, urbanization, standardized educational and religious practice, and, with the Cistercian monastic order, international organization. European identity itself was constructed through these processes, among them the abortive Crusades, based not on cultural homogeneity or affinities but imposed through conquest and terror. The Catholic Church participated in these colonizing processes, its universalistic professions masking territorial and ethnic agendas. Thus European societies were readied, institutionally and culturally, for the period of exploration and colonization beyond Europe that began in the fifteenth century.

Ideological justification for this new expansion was provided by Orientalism, the dialectical unity of ideas and institutionally reinforced practices subordinating the colonized and depicting them as inferior to and polar opposites of Europeans. In European lit-

erary artifacts from the Renaissance onward, colonized “Others” were viewed and constructed so as to maintain the illusion of European superiority. Even anti-Semitism toward European Jews has been interpreted as the projection inward of imperialistic impulses first directed outward in the form of the Crusades. The demonization of Islam, a product of binary thinking that may be uniquely European, thus became the “strange secret sharer” (Ballard, p. 27) of European anti-Semitism. Anti-Islamic Orientalism helped to define European identity by defining what Europe was not. “The Orient” itself was arguably a construction of the Western imagination, its deficiencies demanding political and economic domination. It originated and was sustained, therefore, in Europe rather than in the colonized world.

Continuities from the Crusades through the Christian reconquest of Spain to European overseas exploration suggest that the mechanisms and practices of colonization, including aggression and exploitation, were intrinsic to European social formation and economic and political development. It follows that imperialism was inherent in domestic societies even before overseas colonization, an artifact of European patterns rather than of these new worlds. Yet imperialism assumed new forms in response to indigenous resistance. The European predisposition was to frame human attributes and cultural processes in terms of dichotomies and hierarchies, thereby justifying relations of dominance and subordination. This predisposition then interacted with colonizing processes: colonial racial discourses, for example, were dialectically and mutually constitutive of European class and gendered discourses. Empire and colonization gave Europeans a vocabulary in which to express and legitimize domestic class and gender relations. Dichotomies such as home/empire, colonizer/colonized, white/black, familiar/foreign, and civilized/savage were explicitly developed out of the colonial experience. They helped to shape and were in turn shaped by other dichotomies that structured ruling class males’ consciousness and actions, including man/woman, lady/woman,

middle class/working class, control/chaos, purity/pollution, clean/dirty, culture/nature, intellect/emotion, rationality/sensuality, self/Other, and subject/object. These in turn were assigned unequal value as good/evil, superiority/inferiority (Davidoff, 1979).

European aristocratic notions of blood infused developing colonial definitions of racial hierarchy and practices of racial exclusion with overtones of rank, status, and class. These in turn were reimported to Europe. Representations of the colonized mirrored, as they helped to reinforce and justify, European cultural processes and social hierarchies such as gender and class. In concrete terms, many attitudes and practices developed in the colonial setting were reimported to European societies and applied to socially marginal populations. Poor people and their neighborhoods, for example the East End of London, were portrayed and treated as an unruly and primitive “dark continent,” in need of pacification and even “colonization,” in the words of Judith Walkowitz (p. 194). “Urban explorers” or *flaneurs* satisfied their taste for the

exotic and prurient with forays into working class neighborhoods. Certain categories of domestic populations were “racialized”—portrayed as inferior based on apparent physical attributes. That prostitutes, for example, were born to their profession rather than driven to it by poverty was allegedly detectable in overdeveloped secondary sex characteristics such as large buttocks. Dirt, darkness, degradation, physicality, sexuality, and immorality were multiply and symbolically conflated to portray poor people, like colonized people, as morally wayward and in need of discipline and uplift. Homeless or unsupervised children were called “street Arabs” in apparent reference to their peripatetic existence. On the other hand, lower class as well as colonized men were “feminized”—portrayed as less than men to justify ruling class measures of coercion and control. Intensified social class stratification in mid-nineteenth-century Britain, for example, coincided with enhanced racialization of social inequalities in British colonies. In the Darwinian discourses of the end of the century, in-

equalities were viewed through the lens of biology and nature so as to justify them.

Europeans projected a variety of fears and fantasies onto disparate colonized Others that originated in their own minds, rather than any place in the colonized world. Orientalists purveyed spurious privileged “knowledge” of the colonized to bolster their cultural authority while justifying colonial rule. Nineteenth-century European literature reproduced as it simultaneously enlisted popular collaboration in what Edward Said called “paternalistic arrogance” toward colonized people. Although this focus on empire at home provides a valuable perspective, it can degenerate into a sort of historiographical navel-gazing, enabling scholars of Europe to continue their longstanding neglect of colonized people and overseas empires while claiming to support the more challenging historiographical task of integrating empire back into the history of the metropole.

IMPACT OF THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER

Overseas colonization and colonized people’s agency and resistance had dramatic effects on European societies. Contacts with the world beyond Europe not only reproduced imperialist patterns of aggression, subordination, and exploitation but introduced Europeans to new and disturbing ideas and practices. The encounter with the Americas helped to destabilize the hegemony and credibility of the Christian church, indeed of the European worldview, speeding secularization by introducing knowledge unforeseen in biblical or classical texts. The European way of life was transformed and its burgeoning population simultaneously sustained and menaced by the introduction of new foods such as maize, tomatoes, squashes, tapioca, peanuts, and especially cacao and potatoes; new crops such as tobacco and rubber; new animals such as llamas, buffalo, jaguars, and other beasts real and mythical; and new diseases such as syphilis.

The inflow of New World bullion produced the massive European inflation and resultant economic and social dislocations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Europe’s commercial bourgeoisie gained wealth and power at the expense of the aristocracy, and a stronger bargaining position globally: Mexican silver offered European merchants something the Chinese would accept in exchange for their coveted silks and porcelain. Indigo, annatto, and fustic supplied the textile industries until the development of aniline dyes in the late nineteenth century, and sisal supplied the maritime industries sustaining northwest Europe’s global power. The related evolution of a global capi-

talist system with Europe at its financial and geographical core had profound effects on Europe as well as on the non-European world.

By the eighteenth century, colonial products such as furs and sugar warmed the backs and graced the tables of the well-to-do, becoming symbols of privilege and social distance. Ginger, allspice, nutmeg, mace, coffee, chocolate, sugar, rum, arrowroot, and sago became staples of the middle-class larder. Elite women’s participation in shaping demand for colonial products such as Indian cotton, coffee and tea from Asia and South America, Caribbean sugar, Chinese and Japanese porcelain and lacquer goods, and objects made from exotic woods implicated them in projects of empire and of slavery.

European identities themselves were forged in the process of overseas colonization: Scottish merchants, for example, came in the colonial context to recognize the profit to be derived from being British. The Enlightened superiority of eighteenth-century Europe was constructed not only in relation to the imputed barbarism of the Middle Ages but also to the innocence of the Amerindian “noble savage” and the alleged brutishness of the African.

CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY

The slave trade that supplied labor to the New World colonies contributed in many ways to Europe’s social transformations. Enslaved Africans, replaced after 1834 by indentured or otherwise coerced colonized workers, provided the cheap labor that brought erstwhile luxuries such as sugar, tea, coffee, and tobacco within reach of middle-class consumers. Slaves produced the cheap raw materials such as cotton that fueled the industrial system by keeping its products affordable and its profits high. West African slave traders accounted for a high proportion of the demand for early British industrial goods such as textiles—“shirts for Black men” (Williams, p. 133)—and for iron ingots, used as currency. Colonies were virtually captive markets for European and colonial products, including slaves themselves.

Profits from this “triangular trade” flowed mainly to Holland, France, and Britain, contributing to the rapid capital formation that made them commercial and industrial leaders. Wealth derived from slavery and colonialism financed infrastructure such as roads, canals, factories, and warehouses throughout Europe. In *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944), Eric Williams showed how slave trade profits were used in Britain to capitalize James Watt’s steam engine, Isambard Kingdom Brunel’s Great Western Railway, Britain’s metallurgi-

cal industries, the Welsh slate industry, numerous banks, notably Barclay's, and the marine insurer Lloyd's of London. Thus industry and empire went hand in hand. Yet deep involvement in the trade in human beings shook Enlightenment thinkers' confidence in the superiority and rationality through which they distinguished their societies from those of the past or of the non-European world.

British high politics were preoccupied with slavery and emancipation for decades during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Wealthy Caribbean planters, "the West India interest," purchased parliamentary seats, further threatening and displacing the landed aristocracy. One of these, the owner of plantations in Guiana, was the father of William Gladstone, Liberal prime minister in the Victorian era. Gladstone's maiden speech was in defense of slavery. On the other hand, antislavery was a defining issue in reform, Chartist, and socialist politics in Britain as well as in French republican and revolutionary movements.

Africans and other colonized people were not found only in the colonies, however; many were found in European metropolises and were commonly depicted in the works of such artists as William Hogarth and Joshua Reynolds. Their widespread appearance in domestic painting of the period suggests the prevalence of black house servants and slaves in eighteenth-century western European societies, and estimates place between ten thousand and thirty thousand in London alone. In the nineteenth century an Indian ayah or nanny became an upper-class status symbol. Some slaves or former slaves, such as Ignatius Sancho, Olaudah Equiano, and Francis Barber, became prominent in public life as spokesmen for emancipation. Like nineteenth-century elite travelers from India, such as Pandita Ramabai, Cornelia Sorabji, and Behramji Malabari, they brought empire home, embodied in their persons, while contributing dissenting voices to metropolitan conversations about empire.

SOCIAL AND CLASS RELATIONS: THE STRUCTURE OF POWER

The bulk of scholarship on the domestic effects of imperialism has concerned the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the period climaxing in the "new imperialism." Much of the literature focuses on Britain, the most powerful empire of the industrial period. The focus on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may be a result of the preponderance of scholars working in the modern period. Until 1953, when Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher traced the continuities between "old" and "new" imperialism, scholars such

as Joseph Schumpeter viewed the apparent reemergence of imperialism in the 1880s as an alarming atavism from Europe's barbaric past. Framed as a problem demanding explanation, it thus generated a substantial literature. This "new imperialism" was so called because it followed an apparent hiatus in the formal acquisition of overseas possessions. It was an effect of renewed competition among European powers, as continental industrial systems expanded to challenge Britain. That the hiatus was more apparent than real was exposed by Robinson and Gallagher, who found that British "free trade imperialism" involved exerting control "informally if possible"—that is, in the absence of competition, as was the case in the period between the "old" and "new" imperialism—but "formally if necessary" (p. 13).

John Hobson and Vladimir Ilich Lenin put imperialism at the center of their critiques of industrial societies at home. Although they have been much maligned, it was they who initiated the discussion of the dialectical relationship between overseas expansion and domestic economic, political, social, and cultural relations. Hobson argued that imperialism was an irrational strategy that stood in the way of domestic social reform. Lenin, conversely, saw imperialism as a rational strategy for a system that was not reformable but inexorably doomed. In 1916, in *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin argued that the monopoly stage of capitalism, which corresponded with and stimulated the new imperialism, had undermined the allegedly progressive characteristics of industrial capitalism, such as individual ownership, independent, autonomous producers, consumer choice, and the decentralization of power: "private property based on the labour of the small proprietor, free competition, democracy, *i.e.*, all the catchwords with which the capitalists and their press deceive the workers and the peasants—are things of the past" (Lenin, 1939, p. 10). The late nineteenth-century renewal of aggressive overseas territorial expansion corresponded to, because it flowed from, the restoration of domestic economic and political oligarchy. Both Lenin and Hobson agreed that the profit-making agendas of finance capital drove overseas expansion to the detriment of the European majority, both middle and working class. As Hobson put it in 1902 in his *Imperialism: A Study* "While the manufacturing and trading classes make little out of their new markets, paying . . . more in taxation than they get out of them in trade, it is quite otherwise with the investor" (p. 53). Hobson denounced these rentier elements for using "public policy, the public purse, and the public force to extend the field of their private investments" (Hobson, 1965, p. 53).

Subsequent investigation seems to support these conclusions. Although efforts to calibrate precisely the rhythms of “old” and “new” imperialism to the “phases” of industrial capitalism failed, the connection of domestic economic and political agendas with imperial expansion has endured. Making much of evidence that British imperialism “did not pay” overall, extensive economic and statistical analysis reinforces the more damning conclusion: as Hobson argued in 1902, the imperial system was a vast money-laundering mechanism lining the pockets of private investors at public expense, transferring wealth from middle-class taxpayers to the superrich, thus enhancing class disparities and entrenching a financial oligarchy.

This conclusion is consistent with a broader revision minimizing industrialization’s destabilization of British class stratification. Scholars have further argued that while the self-made upwardly mobile captains of British industry may have benefitted from imperialism, old and new, they did not control it. Imperial expansion was directed by an entirely different social group, a cultural, political, and financial oligarchy of “gentlemanly capitalists,” who maintained their control over the empire from 1688 through 1945. Personal contacts and information exchanges among networks of such men, formed in the public schools and Oxford and Cambridge and continued via London club life, sustained the hegemony of a limited ruling-class fragment over several generations of dramatic political, economic, and social change.

The important shift in British domestic politics, and thus overseas expansion, was therefore not from the dominance of the landed aristocracy to the industrial bourgeoisie in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, but from one group of gentlemanly capitalists, the commercially progressive landed interest, to another: the financiers in the City of London. Financial and by extension political power resided not with the moneygrubbing merchants and factory owners of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but with this infinitely adaptable upper-class stratum. Whoever was “on top” politically—whether the landed aristocracy or public school-educated bankers—had the power to influence both politics and the investment of national wealth. Thus imperial expansion was “rational” for those who possessed the wherewithal to influence Parliament and stood to gain financially from it.

This analysis seeks to detach industry from empire in British historiography, arguing for continuity rather than abrupt change in British economic development, in political institutions, and in ongoing processes of overseas expansion. Formal and informal imperialisms appear as merely pragmatic responses to

new global demands rather than the outcomes of dramatic shifts in ideology or changes in economic structure or political culture. The continuity argument is consistent with revisions of the Whiggish or progressive view of the industrial bourgeoisie, which envisions a more complete, uniquely British, transformation of social structure. It also contests the Marxian view of the industrial bourgeoisie as the gravediggers of feudalism, and of industrialization as the primary motor of modern history.

Yet this interpretation, stressing persistence over change in the identity of a flexible, pragmatic imperialist class, does not challenge the view that overseas expansion was an extension of domestic politics and economic arrangements. In fact the continuity argument corroborates other scholars’ emphasis on continuities between the personnel and practices of informal and formal imperialism, old and new imperialism, protection versus free trade, commerce versus industry, and home versus empire. It also deflates assumptions about British exceptionalism relative to European class systems, industrialization processes, and imperialist projects—the view that British precocity stemmed from an early and decisive bourgeois triumph. While perhaps slighting the degree of upheaval industrialization inflicted on the lower end of the social formation, this interpretation also appears to corroborate the view that empire’s impact on domestic populations was deleterious, draining wealth away to pay for colonial infrastructures from which a handful of financial insiders reaped massive profits. It was these elites, operating as a manipulative oligarchy outside of popular control or awareness, who had the political and economic wherewithal to affect outcomes. A historiography that emphasizes the role of the oligarchy—whatever “attitudes” might have been prevalent at the time—asserts a conceptual and perceptual chasm between colonies and metropolises marked by popular indifference and ignorance toward empire. It also absolves metropolitan populations from responsibility for imperialist abuses.

Such an explanation challenges the fundamental premises undergirding social history: the emphasis on class struggle as the engine of history; on the efficacy of mass action, resistance, and agency “from the bottom up”; and on popular participation as a precondition for historical change. Social historians’ contribution to the analysis of empire at home has been to explore how metropolitan populations as well as colonized people participated in, negotiated, and contested imperial projects, albeit on varying terms and with competing agendas. This is a necessary corrective both to the longstanding historiographical compartmentalization between empire and metropole, and to

the stress in later scholarship on imperialism as a top-down imposition on credulous or passively receptive domestic populations.

POPULAR PARTICIPATION

Scholars seem to agree that the burdens and benefits of empire were unequally distributed among metropolitan populations according to class, gender, region,

culture, and other social dynamics. Middle-class consumers appear to have benefited more than the poor from overseas colonization. Middle-class women created demand for colonial products, thus integrating colonial artifacts and cultural practices into metropolitan societies. European matrons in India spurned colonial foods and home furnishings, but once back in Europe they imported these goods, presenting them as gifts and creating demand for them. Evidence from

cookbooks, advice columns, newspaper articles, and ladies' magazines indicates that Kashmir shawls valued at up to a hundred pounds and Rampore (Rampur) chudars (a type of shawl) were highly prized status symbols among the well-to-do ladies of early nineteenth-century Britain. These fashion leaders stimulated upper-middle-class demand for affordable domestic imitations from Paisley, Norwich, Edinburgh, and Lyon, establishing shawls as women's wardrobe staples for the balance of the century. Indian shawls and dresses, lushly draping muslins and silks, cloaks, scarves, peacock feathers, jewelry, and artifacts such as carved wood and ivory figured in trousseaux and inheritances. They embodied a form of capital that a returning memsahib or a soldier's widow could barter for necessities in the metropole. Similarly, returnees from the colonies introduced Indian cuisine into the drab British diet, importing and creating demand for turmeric and curry powders and proffering recipes for curries, kedgeree, mulligatawny soup, dal, chapatis, and pickles. In the absence of mangoes, a hybrid emerged—gooseberry chutney.

In contrast, European working classes survived in spite of rather than because of the impact of empire at home. By the late nineteenth century, the prevalence of colonial products such as tea and sugar, cheap jams and treacle in the northern European working-class diet linked even the poorest to the colonized world, to the detriment of nutritional standards and the despair of their social "betters." Sidney Mintz has argued that, although considered temperance beverages, colonial drug foods or food substitutes such as heavily sugared tea, coffee, and cocoa—like tobacco, another colonial product—served sinister purposes: as convenience foods freeing housewives for industrial labor; to "provide a respite from reality, and deaden hunger pangs" of workers, who might imbibe the illusion that "one could become different by consuming differently" (Mintz, 1985, pp. 186, 185). As John Burnett observes, "a cup of tea converted a cold meal into something like a hot one, and gave comfort and cheer besides" (Mintz, 1985, p. 129). Arguably, refined cane sugar, a colonial product and what Mintz calls "an artifact of intraclass struggles for profit," became and remains a symbol of quintessentially European modernity. (Mintz, 1985, p. 186). Increases in these colonial products coincided with a decline in consumption of dairy products and other fresh foods. Deterioration in the stature and general health of populations introduced to these products in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries echoes the physical deterioration that accompanied the shift toward cereals in agriculture, and thus diet, on the medieval frontier.

SOCIAL IMPERIALISM

The rubric of social imperialism has described a number of competing interpretations, agendas, and practices. The advent of social imperialism was originally understood as the moment in the late nineteenth century when socialists and the working-class movement became collaborators in imperialism. Its origin has been linked to the depression of the 1870s and 1880s and efforts by governments to recuperate economic losses while simultaneously frustrating socialist and labor agitation. Advocates of imperialism such as Jules Ferry and Joseph Chamberlain justified it by arguing that the fruits of empire would subsidize social reform, remedy the stagnation and instability of late-nineteenth-century European economies, and ameliorate the plight of the poor—"the cry of our industrial population," in Ferry's words—by affording steady employment producing goods for captive colonial markets. Hobson debunked such arguments: overseas investment, whether in formal colonies or informal spheres of influence, he argued, drained resources from European domestic economies. More cynical politicians such as Otto von Bismarck merely invoked imperial "crisis ideology," using overseas military adventures and a focus on external enemies to divert popular attention from the deficiencies of domestic political and economic arrangements. Privileging the pursuit of empire enabled the German state to postpone the democratization of political power and evade redistribution of wealth.

Perhaps because, unlike Britain, France lacked a substantial informal empire in the mid-nineteenth century, French imperial gains in the "scramble for Af-

rica” late in the century did succeed in generating markets and profits unavailable in the domestic economy. This success afforded France economic parity with Germany, the Ottomans, and Russia. But in the course of the twentieth century the importance of these economic resources diminished.

WHO SUPPORTED IMPERIALISM?

Scholars continue to debate the degree to which various social groups supported or opposed imperialism. The culture of imperialism, many have argued, was not only ethnocentric and racist but narrowly class-based in origin and profoundly gendered and misogynist. The construction of the Manichaean or polar dichotomy undergirding imperialist and Orientalist discourses involved fabricating historical, cultural, and national identities for hegemonic ends. Almost invariably, the effort by elites to retain power and influence in changing structural contexts entailed representing themselves as arbiters of imagined or invented collective interests. All of this suggests that European populations’ alleged innocence of participation in empire-building is a myth, for they were continually exposed to imperialist propaganda.

Yet scholars have differed as to the effectiveness of state or ruling-class strategies to enlist popular support for imperialism. Abundant artifactual and documentary evidence has been produced to illustrate employers’, social workers’, and military men’s propagandistic efforts to recruit lower-class people into support for empire, jingoism, and other nationalist projects, especially through implicit promises of economic reform and political participation. Artifacts from schoolbooks to cigarette cards, biscuit tins, and boys’ magazines, as well as performances in music halls, on radio, in cinemas and via imperial exhibitions, show that popular culture was saturated with triumphalist images of empire and its benefits to colonizers and colonized alike. Jam pots and tea packets adorned with fantasies of the tropics—palm trees, elephants, and odalisques—allegedly constructed popular perceptions along Orientalist lines.

Literary and cultural artifacts of empire articulated ideals of “imperial masculinity”; effeminacy was seen as a danger to empire, and women were held responsible for imperial decline and dissolution. Public schoolmasters promoted a shrill ruling-class ideology in which “warrior patriots” were encouraged to heroic physical sacrifice on behalf of a nation invari-

ably feminized in popular song and verse as Britannia, or “she.” The Boy Scouts mobilized the lower middle class for imperialism in a specifically masculine form. There was nothing covert about the link between scouting and Edwardian imperialism: they were both explicitly promoted as vehicles of class conciliation, patriotism, citizenship, and militarism, vehicles that encouraged nonruling groups to identify with the imperial state.

Feminist scholars were among the first to address metropolitan women’s involvement and culpability in imperial projects. British “feminist Orientalists” have been criticized for participating in and reproducing imperialist discourses and practices as a means of challenging gender hierarchies within their own class. In striving for equal participation with European men, European women reproduced class and racial hierarchies by representing themselves as spokeswomen for allegedly downtrodden indigenous or colonized women, perpetuating the women’s marginalization, silencing, and erasure, while at the same time deepening the stigma of colonized societies as barbaric and backward.

Perhaps because of the minimal benefit working people actually derived from imperialism, there is little unequivocal evidence to suggest that the bulk of working people were successfully coopted into supporting imperialism. Popular support for displays of jingoism such as “mafficking” appears to have come instead from the lower middle class, which, threatened with proletarianization, bargained desperately for status and inclusion by identifying with the state through jingoism.

Although scholarship about popular resistance to empire is not copious, critics of empire were never absent from the metropole. European critics included the theosophist Annie Besant and the socialists Karl Marx and James Keir Hardie. Colonial subjects living in Europe for educational or professional reasons also formed vocal if numerically small networks of opposition to empire and imperial abuses. C. L. R. James, a West Indian-born activist, was prominent in the Pan-Africa movement; a series of Pan-African Conferences brought well-articulated anti-imperial agendas to the heart of empire. Figures such as Olaudah Equiano, Dr. John Alcindor, and Ho Chi Minh spent substantial time in Europe and intervened in debates about empire.

GENDER AND RACE

Metropolitan class and gender relations were infused with imperialist agendas. When the near loss of the Boer War prompted belated scrutiny of the physical

debility of Britain’s poor, working-class mothers became subjects of surveillance and pronatalist regimentation. Sexism, classism, and racism were combined in the eugenic effort to rehabilitate an “imperial race” without modifying class relations or material inequalities. The first steps toward assisting poor and unmarried mothers in France were taken, similarly, in the name of invigorating the French nation for its imperial strivings. Fears of physical unfitnes and deterioration in metropolitan populations interacted with definitions of racial qualities formulated in colonial contexts. The origin of European welfare states was thus deeply implicated in imperial projects.

If the Nazi drive for *Lebensraum* (living space) in eastern Europe may be considered a dimension of imperialism, then Nazi racial engineering and eugenics must also be considered in assessing the impact of imperialism on domestic populations. The impact of measures to breed a “master race” by bribing or manipulating ordinary Germans—with marriage bonuses,

mothers' medals and mothers' pensions, as well as surveillance, coercion, eugenic sterilization and forced motherhood—was of a profoundly classed and gendered character. In light of Nazi expansionist and colonialist aims, the massive displacement of and genocide against central and eastern European populations in the course of World War II must also be traced to European imperialism. Programs of eugenic sterilization, coerced breeding, and ethnic cleansing, under the aegis of what Foucault called “the biopolitical state,” illustrate the racial dimensions of empire as they operated within and between European societies.

AFTER EMPIRE

While some scholars have argued that a popular cultural “retreat” from empire occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, structural interdependence continued and even intensified. Although Europe's formal empires all but disappeared after 1945, informal imperialism continues to shape the world European empires made; European societies and landscapes are ineluctably marked by the imperial past and the postcolonial present.

Economic and cultural interdependence between former colonies and metropolises persists in spite of formal autonomy. Through the extraction of raw materials and food by means of cheap labor, European industrial economies in effect remain parasites, benefiting at the expense of postcolonial ones. Colonialism's destabilization of colonized societies has produced an unforeseen legacy: empires have come home in the form of migrants and guest workers from former colonies, disrupting Orientalist and imperial dichotomies between “home and away.” As in the colonial period, the metropolitan economy benefits from a labor force reproduced “offshore” at minimal cost and denied many social benefits. European states invoke national boundaries, redefinitions of citizenship, and other legal and state structures to keep this industrial workforce vulnerable, subordinated, and on the verge of exclusion.

The culture of imperialism has survived in new guises, betrayed in contemporary xenophobic notions of “fortress Europe” (Pieterse, p. 5) and “Western

civilization.” Renewed embrace of Christendom and the Enlightenment embodies continued Eurocentric arrogance, elitism, and chauvinism. Contemporary emphasis on a common European culture, increasingly reinforced institutionally by the European Union, excludes the non-European world in an implicitly hierarchical and Manichaean dichotomy. Simultaneously it obscures internal diversity and lingering internal marginalizations, such as the Celtic fringe. Continued Franco-German domination of the European Union reproduces imperial relations within Europe that are a millennium old.

Islam has reemerged as an immediate and visible threat in the form of migrants from the colonies and of the collective power of Middle Eastern oil producers. The collapse of one “evil empire” in the East has demanded a new Oriental adversary in Islam. Consistent with a thousand years of Orientalism, immigration controls have sought to repulse the enemy at the gates, while prurience about Muslim gender relations—a horrified fascination with “those poor downtrodden women”—remains a projection of Western sexual fantasies that simultaneously reassures Westerners of their cultural superiority, and the depiction of Muslims as a whole as violent and fanatical “fundamentalists” supports the discursive construction of a European self that is free of these qualities.

European landscapes and cultures remain imprinted with imperial aspirations and attainments. From the West India Docks and Jamaica Bridges that mark British commercial estuaries to the Mafeking Streets (named for the siege put down in Mafeking, South Africa, in 1900) and imperial monuments, to the rhododendrons adorning European gardens and the elephants and golliwogs decorating the jam pots and tea packets on European tables, the iconography of empire continues to saturate the physical geography of the metropole. Yet European societies are being transformed and enriched by African, Asian, and Caribbean people and cultures. In 1996 curry surpassed roast beef and Yorkshire pudding as the meal most frequently prepared in British households. The historical experience of empire has thus left Europeans with a common history shared with much of the globe.

See also other articles in this section.

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IMPERIALISM AND GENDER



Nupur Chaudhuri

In European imperial discourses, scholars usually discuss colonizers' foreign or economic policies. Some scholars have shown that the lasting images of the latter half of the nineteenth century are those associated with the achievements of empire and colonizing societies. While such studies shed light on the public roles of the colonizers and consequently on the most obvious aspects of colonial domination, this public sphere constitutes only part of the Western colonial experience.

Among all the European imperialist nations, Great Britain controlled the largest colonial empire until the end of World War II. Imperialism, as many scholars argue, became the foundation of British national identity after the mid-nineteenth century, and India became the jewel in the crown of the British Empire. With its long history, India was the empire's most important possession and the major component of Britain's political and economic prominence in the world. The contours of colonial construction in India provide a model shape of the inner and outer dynamics of British colonialism and of colonial rule more generally. Thus this essay focuses on the specific example of British imperialism in India to raise general questions about gender and imperialism.

Scholars of British imperialism followed the general trend of neglecting the social history of imperialism. With few exceptions, systematic studies of the social history of British imperialism were not produced before the mid-1960s. Only a handful of historians after that time focused solely on women's history. Much work has yet to be done on the private sphere and on the intersection of public and private spheres in a colonial setting. As gender is key to the construction of imperial hierarchies, the experiences of women offer especially important insights. Gender is essential to an understanding of the social impacts of colonialism on the rulers as much as on the ruled and thus to the social history of empire.

The British imperial system in India functioned by means of direct and indirect rule. Direct rule was created to maximize imperial interests by abolishing

indigenous administrative institutions and establishing others that were maintained by a small number of salaried British at higher echelons along with selected indigenous men hired at the lower echelons. Indirect rule let some traditional political or administrative units and social practices remain intact, subject to treaties or agreements with the traditional rulers and resident agents whose aim was to accomplish colonial objectives through the façade of indigenous leadership. The British government gradually expanded direct rule, as it proved impractical to work first through existing traditional agents and institutions and then increasingly through chartered British East India company agents. It is important to keep in mind that neither the colonizers nor the colonized were homogeneous groups, as both were bound by inherent hierarchies of class, gender, and status.

BRITISH WOMEN AND THE EMPIRE

Since the dawn of European imperialism, the "masculine" element, emphasizing the cardinal features of authority and rule and entailing structures of unequal power, remained ever present in all social and political organs of colonialism. One of the prevailing ideologies of imperialism was that colonies were "no place for a white woman." But women had an undeniable role in the empire. British women were the guardians of spiritual and moral values for the families in the colony, where they embroidered ideas of motherhood, homemaking, and spirituality on the tapestry of imperialistic ideology. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the swelling impetus of the imperial mission began to draw women in great numbers—for instance, over one thousand arrived in 1875, and over sixteen hundred in 1895. Their colonial experiences increasingly became sources of fascination for people at home, and indeed those experiences helped redefine the contours of British women's public and private lives. The views of British women in India made their way into contemporary domestic discourses

within Britain, helping to fashion a gendered legitimation of British rule in India. British women in colonial India, by enabling the widespread dissemination of an imperial identity of superior race, had a visible impact on British political, social, and cultural life.

The nineteenth-century British empire in India provided unique opportunities for British women to compare their social positions to those of the indigenous population of the subcontinent. Victorian feminists viewed Indian women both as passive subjects and as examples against which to gauge their own progress. Although Indian women of the period were pursuing their own paths of social reform and feminist causes many British feminists insisted on devising alternate causes. They portrayed Indian women as passive colonial subjects partly so as to imagine and to realize their own feminist objectives within the context of the imperial nation into which they sought admission. The empire, far from being outside the sphere of women, was central to it. In insisting upon their right to citizenship, suffragettes not only claimed their right to be part of the political nation but also demanded to take their part in the political empire.

India provided British men not only with career opportunities; in metropolitan society men gained influence and prestige because the British government viewed them as contributing to Britain's international eminence and power. Imperialism, as has become clear, was also beneficial to British women. In India they were able to go out freely, to assert greater independence, to shape and control their life situation, to increase their personal power, and to become socially more mobile than they were in Britain. However, it was only in the 1990s that feminist scholars acknowledged the contradictory positions of British women—subordinate at home yet wielding the power of their imperial position to subordinate the colonial “other.” White women as homemakers and mothers maintained and promoted the domestic sphere of the empire in India. By writing about both domestic and public lives in India, British women also adopted an identity of specialists on Indian life and in the process participated in the British imperial ethos. They assumed the role of the authors of Indians and the Indian world, thus contributing to the ideological reproduction of the empire.

British women frequently shared the ethnocentrism of their male counterparts and acted in condescending and maternalistic ways. Many British women felt that Indian women were not like English ladies. In England ladies had some degree of rank, wealth, and education; as British women saw it, that rank implied either personal achievement or inherited re-

finement and a place in civilized society. During a short stay in India to visit missionary friends, one British woman, who signed her book *Overland, Inland, and Upland: A Lady's Notes of Personal Observation and Adventure* (London, 1873) with the initials A.U., recorded that, despite having many opportunities to adorn themselves with jewelry and fragrance, Indian women seemed powerless to elevate their minds or to bridge the enormous gulf that separated the mere female from the lady. In India, as A.U. noted, only very poor women moved around freely while the movements of women from higher classes were restricted, a situation contrary to the one at home. A.U. observed that wealth provided opportunities for British women to gain education, to travel in foreign countries, and to cultivate tastes for everything beautiful and refined in nature and art. To British women the faceless, nameless Indian women blended into the landscape, thus further distinguishing British women's own identity in the imperial scene.

British women's contacts with Indian domestics further shaped their construction of images of indigenous people. For British women the negative connotations of dark-skinned people were embedded in their social consciousness. They therefore found the new experience of employing dark-skinned domestics unsettling. The religious and social customs of both the Hindus and Muslims confused them, and they felt that India was a conglomerate of different cultures without a stable center. To avoid dealings with Indian servants, some memsahibs (the wives of British officials) chose Indian Christian domestics with at least partial European heritage. But Christian servants also posed problems. For one thing, being descendants of the Portuguese settlers and Indians, a substantial number of the Christian servants were Roman Catholics rather than members of the Anglican, Scottish, or Evangelical sects, to which most British colonists belonged. But above all many British women felt that the common ground of Christianity might set the masters and servants on similar footings, blurring the class and social distinctions between them.

Motherhood and the family. A new dimension of British familial relations arose in the colonial setting. British parents in India felt a unique psychological stress when faced with an inescapable choice: the health and educational needs of children compelled many British families to send their children to Britain by the time they were about seven. The departure and long separation of children from their parents in the colony caused a major disruption in familial happiness. British mothers in India had to make a painfully difficult choice between their duties as wives and as

mothers by either staying with their husbands in India or returning to Britain with their children. Although separation of British children from their parents was not uncommon, as many upper-class or upper-middle-class Victorian parents sent their children away to boarding school, what was unusual for the British wives in India was that they were unable to see their children for periods extending over many years. It was a very long and expensive journey from India to Britain, and in some instances parents saw their children only after an interval of nine or ten years. (And some very unfortunate mothers and fathers who sent children home died without ever seeing them again.) Separation of parents and children created psychological tension for the families. The family disunions that were so common among British families in India clashed with the Victorian emphasis on a stable home and family. A British woman went to colonial India as a wife, her aim and duty to establish a British home for her husband and children in the subcontinent. But when in fact she became a mother, her roles as wife and mother came into conflict.

REFORM

It was women more than men who pushed for reforms in the situation of Indian women out of a commitment to improving the lot of women generally. Given that male foreign missionaries had little access to indigenous women, female British missionaries played a special role in Indian societies, offering education to Indian women in the homes of prominent upper-caste families and providing public school lessons for lower-caste women. Christian teachings and handicrafts dominated the content of early women's education.

Despite their central role in the missions, British women operated under certain constraints within the patriarchal structure of the churches and missionary societies that oversaw their work. For example, the Ladies Association for the Promotion of Female Education Among the Heathen, established in 1866, had to convince its male colleagues that Zenana Education—education of small groups of girls at home (in the women's quarters or *zenana*) by missionary women—was important and that women themselves could organize it, teach it, and pay for it.

Other prominent British Victorian women in India also took active interests in improving the social conditions of Indian women. Lady Harriot Dufferin, wife of the Indian viceroy, established the Fund for Female Medical Aid in August 1885. The Dufferin Fund was closely associated with the National Indian Association, originally founded by Mary Carpenter to

promote Indian female education in the 1870s. The Dufferin Fund was created specifically to provide female medical aid to Indian women because social custom prevented them from being treated by male doctors.

In the 1890s British female missionary doctors began to arrive in India. Having been sent to India as part of the Zenana Mission Movement, they added medical education to the curriculum. Dr. Edith Brown, who stayed for more than thirty years, founded the North Indian School of Medicine for Christian Women to train Christian women as nurses and assistants. Dr. Ellen Farer established a hospital near Delhi. But this charitable work had other consequences. In nineteenth-century India European women, especially British women, displaced educated indigenous women and men in employment. While colonialism induced some Indians to seek Western medical treatment, *purdah*, the seclusion of women by Muslims and some Hindus, created a demand for female physicians. Some Westernized middle-class Indians responded by educating their daughters to become doctors. But priority was given to female British doctors, who often came to India to avoid discrimination at home. Thus the arrival of British female doctors to India caused a loss of medical employment for indigenous female doctors.

British women tended to have more social interaction with Indian men than with Indian women. Nineteenth-century British feminists frequently formed working relationships with Indian male reformers. Yet they varied considerably in the extent to which they responded to Indian values and life. Unusual among British feminists, Margaret Noble, also known as Sister Nivedita, adopted Indian culture, in part to teach Hindu women more effectively. Noble, who established a school for Hindu girls in 1898, joined the neotraditional monastic community of Swami Vivekananda. Active in a wide range of religious and welfare work, she also participated in Indian nationalist politics in India and Britain, to which she returned in 1907 to escape arrest in India. At times the feminism of these British reformers collided with indigenous culture. Annette Ackroyd Beveridge came to India in 1872, drawn by the personality and teaching of Keshub Chandra Sen, the leader of the Brahmo Samaj, a progressive Hindu reform movement. Breaking with Sen because of his rather conventionally Victorian notions of education for women, she founded a girls' school in Calcutta in 1873. The curriculum of the school slanted heavily toward British culture. Although Beveridge knew the language, she had little knowledge of Bengali culture, and because of that insensitivity her attempts to educate Bengali girls were unsuccessful.

British society, in its prismatic view of the positions of women, always saw Indian women as oppressed and as having an inferior position compared to that of Western women. This view seemed to many to be a justifiable moral ground for British imperial policies and rules. In an effort to lift the oppression of Indian women, educated Indian male social reformers, many of whom were Western-educated, joined in with the reform efforts of Christian missionaries and British officials. Education for girls, later marriages, prohibitions on sati, or widow burning, and on female infanticide, and relaxation of purdah restrictions, allowing intra- and intersocial mobilities for women became the major goals of the reform movement driven by this emerging collective force. Educated Bengali middle-class men, led by many with Western education, conceived of an Indian domestic ideology of modesty, humility, and self-sacrifice, influenced by British Victorian ideas about the roles of women. The reformers emphasized secular education for girls, designed to prepare them to be good wives (especially to Western-educated men) and mothers and to have some voice in public life. Reform of marriage practices, reflecting Victorian beliefs about marriage, was also an important component in implementing this new ideology. The Civil Procedure Code of 1859 asserted that, contrary to the Hindu tradition permitting a woman to leave her husband—at great cost to her reputation—and to return to her natal family, a husband could sue his wife for restitution of conjugal rights. Widow remarriage, another tenet of the domestic ideology promoted by Indian reformers, was intended to give widowed women the opportunity to continue their lives as wives and to avoid becoming financial burdens to their families or those of their deceased husbands.

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, British and Indian women began to be noticeably visible in the social reform movement on behalf of Indian women. A contemporary notion was that British women played a key altruistic role in shaping the women's movement in India. But later scholarship has been more ambivalent about that altruism, implying that British women were maternal imperialists who, so as to enhance their own social and professional positions, presented a picture of the pitiable plight of Indian women in need of liberation from social, political, and economic oppression.

The imperial power in India attempted to create a legislative framework for the social improvement of Indian women, but forces opposed to such reform prevented full implementation of the laws. In 1856 the Widow Remarriage Act, which allowed Hindu widows to remarry by forfeiting their rights to their

deceased husbands' estates, was enacted, but its impact was at best limited and in some cases negative. Lower-caste widows who by customary law had previously been able to remarry without loss of property would now, according to the terms of the Act, lose their rights to their deceased husbands' property upon remarriage. The British selectively upheld customary law, such as that practiced by the Hindi-speaking population in Haryana in Punjab. This practice permitted a widow to marry a close relative (often a younger brother) of her deceased husband to prevent the division or loss of landed property. In these instances, the British sought to regulate and formalize customary law in order to reinforce their political control. Indian women themselves, including those in the reform movement, had little to do with the implementation of the Widow Remarriage Act and other reform legislation, in part because Indian reformers failed to mobilize them. And since the British failed to actively enforce their legislation, the reform had minimal effect on the lives of Indian women.

The Age of Consent Act of 1891, which raised the age of consent to sexual relations for married and unmarried girls from ten to twelve and thereby provided a statutory foundation for later marriage, was also ineffectual. British officials and Indian nationalists, both reformers and traditionalists, joined forces to limit the terms of the Act and its implementation. Although a marital rape clause had been included in the Act, it was never enforced. Male control over female sexuality prevailed, as Indian men opposed to changes in women's status were successful in drawing British officials to their side; as a result, reforms enacted by the British had little impact. The imperial power failed to substantially affect Indian gender relations, its reform impulses—never wholehearted or unequivocal—losing their force in the face of indigenous anti-reform pressures. Attempts to improve their lot through legislation under the British empire left Indian women themselves in the position of objects rather than initiators and active participants.

EUROPEAN GENDER STANDARDS IN THE MAINTENANCE OF EMPIRE

It is not only the impact of British women abroad that made gender relevant to empire. Gender distinctions operated on a more metaphorical level to define the relationship between ruler and ruled. Casting the ruled into a feminine image and identifying the ruler with masculine power became a path of imperial ethos. Nourishing a masculine ethos, British men and women had long held a view of Indian men as weak or ef-

feminate. The masculinity-femininity contrasts were often painted in sociocultural contexts. Aesthetic judgments of Indian and colonial clothing styles, for instance, often served as the basis for judging Indian society. The clothing of Indian women, for instance, was seen as slovenly and revealing to a degree inappropriate for ladies, and was thus, in British eyes, indicative of Indians' lack of the refinements of civilized society. The British author A.U. remarked after visiting a middle-class Indian home: "The *ladies* [A.U.'s italics], naked to the waist, or with only a loose piece of muslin thrown over their shoulders, stood or sat on the floor. . . . I could rather have fancied myself in some spot beyond the limits of civilization than among members of the respectable middle class of a great capital." British women saw Indian men as effeminate, and this view began to have a widespread effect through remarks about India made in articles in popular women's periodicals of the mid-nineteenth century. For example, the *Englishwoman's Domestic Magazine* in 1854–1855 created an effeminate image of Hyder Ali by describing his vest being fashioned much like the gown of a European lady. Hyder Ali was a ruler of Mysore State in southern India in the second half of the eighteenth century and a formidable opponent of the British, and as such would have been a familiar figure to many of the readers of this article. The article further enhanced the image of effeminacy by noting that in India men and women devoted much time to embroidery and that it was not unusual to see several men engaged in such work, seated cross-legged on a mat—a position and an activity that in Europe would be considered quite below the dignity of any man.

The profile of the people of India as effeminate dates back to the early days of British colonialism. One Richard Orme wrote in the 1760s that all natives displayed effeminacy, a quality especially evident among the Bengalis, who lacked firmness in character and physical strength. Time and again over a hundred years, British rulers and elites projected this notion of the absence of integrity in the traits of the Indian people. In the 1820s Reginald Heber, bishop of Calcutta, found the Bengalis to be cowards. The Scottish philosopher James Mill echoed that view with his characterization of Bengali Hindus as passive and effeminate. The English writer Thomas Babington Macaulay, member of the Supreme Council of India in the 1830s, called Bengalis feeble.

The British used the same terminology to discredit anticolonial activists, who emerged in the late nineteenth century. Among the Indian intellectuals who surfaced to dispute the legitimacy of the grounds of colonialism, many were Western-educated and a large majority were Bengalis. The British now began to derogate the *babus*, the term for Indians with education in English, as "effeminate *babu*," a term later used against all middle-class Indians.

CONCLUSION

While the British interaction with India has been particularly well studied from the social history standpoint, other cases have been examined as well. In Africa, for example, as in India, Europeans tended to portray indigenous men as effeminate. Images of African women differed somewhat from those of Indian women, with more emphasis on potentially dangerous sexuality. But here, too, colonial experiences interacted with gender standards back home.

Many points remain open to further analysis. The social and cultural backgrounds of colonial administrators and missionaries suggest that there was some degree of divergence from social norms back home. Many aristocrats and Christian leaders were uncomfortable with social trends in Europe and therefore sought status and adventure elsewhere—even though they asserted European superiority wherever they went.

The impact of imperial experiences on Europe itself is another complex topic. In the years of the empire, particularly around 1900, individual women gained a sense of independence. But what effects did this have on the larger development of feminism? The hypermasculinity displayed in the colonies reverberated in European sports culture and in the enthusiastic embrace of military causes by an ever-widening segment of the male population in Europe. But the importance of empire for ordinary Europeans, its role in daily life in the home country, has yet to be established. For some, surely, the latest news of imperial victory would bring a brief surge, quickly forgotten in the routine of industrial life.

What is clear, however, is that the story of European empire is not just an account of military actions and diplomatic decisions. The imperial experience related closely, if in complex ways, to developments at home and may have affected these developments in turn.

See also **Feminisms, Gender and Education, Gender History, History of the Family, The Household** (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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AMERICA, AMERICANIZATION, AND ANTI-AMERICANISM



Rob Kroes

What kind of “ism” is anti-Americanism? Like any “ism” it refers to a set of attitudes that help people to structure their worldview and to guide their actions. It also implies a measure of exaggeration, a feverish overconcentration on one particular object of attention and action. Yet what is the object in the case of anti-Americanism? The word suggests two different readings. It could refer to anti-American feelings taken to the heights of an “ism,” representing a general rejection of things American. Yet it can also be seen as a set of feelings against (anti) something called Americanism. In the latter case, we need to explore the nature of the Americanism that people oppose. As we shall see, the word has historically been used in more than one sense.

Yet whatever its precise meaning, Americanism—as an “ism” in its own right—has always been a matter of the concise and exaggerated reading of some characteristic features of an imagined America, as a country and a culture crucially different from places elsewhere in the world. In that sense Americanism can usefully be compared to nationalism. In much the same way that nationalism implies the construction of the nation, usually one’s own, in a typically inspirational vein, causing people to rally around the flag and other such emblems of national unity, Americanism helped an anxious American nation to define itself in the face of the millions of immigrants who aspired to citizenship status. Particularly at the time following World War I it became known as the “one hundred percent Americanism” movement, confronting immigrants with a demanding list of criteria for inclusion. Americanism in that form represented the American equivalent of the more general concept of nationalism. It was carried by those Americans who saw themselves as the guardians of the integrity and purity of the American nation.

There is, however, yet another historical relationship of Americanism to nationalism. This time it is not Americans who are the agents of definition, but

others in their respective national settings. Time and time again other peoples’ nationalism not only cast their own nation in a particular inspirational light, it also used America as a counterpoint, a yardstick that other nations might either hope to emulate or reject. Foreigners, as much as Americans themselves, therefore, have produced readings of America, condensed into the ideological contours of an “ism.” Of course, this is likely to happen only in those cases where America has become a presence in other peoples’ lives, as a political force, as an economic power, or through its cultural influence. Again the years following World War I were one such watershed. Through America’s intervention in the war and the role it played in ordering the postwar world, through the physical presence of its military forces in Europe, and through the burst of its mass culture onto the European scene, Europeans were forced in their collective self-reflection to try to make sense of America and to come to terms with its impact on their lives. Many forms of Americanism were then conceived by Europeans, sometimes admiringly, sometimes in a more rejectionist mood, often in a tenuous combination of the two. The following exploration will look at some such moments in European history, high points in the American presence in Europe, and at the complex response of Europeans.

To be sure, certain European attitudes toward the United States formed before 1918. Various European travelers commented admiringly on American democracy and religious freedom, or else they voiced distress about American commercialism or the absence of an appropriate hierarchy in American family life. The United States was widely seen as a land of prosperity and economic opportunity, aspirations to which spurred many European emigrants. But larger reactions to Americanism awaited the growth of global influence of the United States in the twentieth century, though some earlier themes (particularly on the more critical side) continued.

AMERICANISM AND ANTI-AMERICANISM

“Why I Reject ‘America.’” Such was the provocative title of a piece published in 1928 by Memo ter Braak, a young Dutch author who was to become a leading intellectual light in the Netherlands during the 1930s. The title is not a question but an answer, assessing his position toward an America in quotation marks, a construct of the mind, a composite image based on the perception of current dismal trends that ter Braak then links to America as the country and the culture characteristically—but not uniquely—displaying them. It is not, however, uniquely for outsiders to be struck by such trends and to reject them. Indeed, as ter Braak himself admits, anyone sharing his particular sensibility and intellectual detachment he is willing to acknowledge as a European, “even if he happens to live on Main Street.” It is an attitude for which he offers us the striking parable of a young newspaper vendor whom he saw one day standing on the balcony of one of those pre–World War II Amsterdam streetcars,

surrounded by the pandemonium of traffic noise yet enclosed in a private sphere of silence. Amid the pointless energy and meaningless noise the boy stood immersed in the reading of a musical score, deciphering the secret code that admitted entrance to a world of the mind. This immersion, this loyal devotion to the probing of meaning and sense, to a heritage of signs and significance, are for ter Braak the ingredients of Europeanism. It constitutes for him the quintessentially European reflex of survival against the onslaught of a world increasingly geared toward the tenets of rationality, utility, mechanization, and instrumentality, yet utterly devoid of meaning and prey to the forces of entropy. The European reaction is one that pays tribute to what is useless, unproductive, defending a quasi-monastic sphere of silence and reflexiveness amid the whirl of secular motion. Here was a combination characteristic of European anti-Americanism: a real concern about new levels of American influence plus a rejection of real or imagined Americanism as symbolic of developments in contemporary social and economic life.

This reflex of survival through self-assertion was of course a current mood in Europe during the interwar years, a Europe in ruins not only materially but spiritually as well. Amid the aimless drift of society’s disorganization and the cacophony of demands accompanying the advent of the masses onto the political agora, Americanism as a concept had come to serve the purpose of focusing the diagnosis of Europe’s plight. The impulse toward reassertion—toward the concentrated retrieval of meaning from the fragmented score of European history—was therefore mainly cultural and conservative, much as it was an act of protest and defiance at the same time. Many are the names of the conservative apologists we tend to associate with this mood. There is Johan Huizinga, the Dutch historian, who upon his return from his only visit to the United States at about the time that ter Braak wrote his apologia, expressed himself thus: “Among us Europeans who were traveling together in America . . . there rose up repeatedly this pharisaical feeling: we all have something that you lack; we admire your strength but do not envy you. Your instrument of civilization and progress, your big cities and your perfect organization, only made us nostalgic for what is old and quiet, and sometimes your life seems hardly to be worth living, not to speak of your future”—a statement in which we hear resonating the ominous foreboding that “your future” might well read as “our [European] future.” For indeed, what was only implied here would come out more clearly in Huizinga’s more pessimistic writings of the late 1930s and early 1940s, when America became a mere piece of evi-

dence in Huizinga's case against contemporary history losing form.

Although the attitude involved is one of a rejection of "America" and Americanism, what should strike a detached observer is the uncanny resemblance with critical positions that Americans had reached independently. Henry Adams of course is the perfect example, a prefiguration of ter Braak's "man on the balcony," transcending the disparate signs of aimlessness, drift, and entropy in a desperate search for a "useless" and highly private world of meaning. But of course his urgent quest, his cultural soul-searching, was much more common in America, was much more of a constant in the American psyche, than Europeans may have been willing to admit. Cultural exhortation and self-reflection, under genteel or not-so-genteel auspices, were then as they are now a recurring feature of the American cultural scene. During one such episode, briefly centered on the cultural magazine *The Seven Arts*, James Oppenheim, its editor, pointed out that "for some time we have seen our own shallowness, our complacency, our commercialism, our thin self-indulgent kindliness, our lack of purpose, our fads and advertising and empty politics." In this brief period, on the eve of America's intervention in World War I, there was an acute awareness of America's barren landscape, especially when measured by European standards. Van Wyck Brooks, one of the leading spokesmen of this group of cultural critics, pointed out that "for two generations the most sensitive minds in Europe—Renan, Ruskin, Nietzsche, to name none more recent—have summed up their mistrust of the future in that one word—Americanism." He went on to say "And it is because, altogether externalized ourselves, we have typified the universally externalizing influences of modern industrialism." Here, in the words of an American cultural critic, we have a crisp, early version of ter Braak's and Huizinga's later case against Americanism, against an America in quotation marks. American culture no more than "typified" what universal forces of industrialism threatened to bring elsewhere.

One further example may serve to illustrate the sometimes verbal parallels between European and American cultural comment. In a piece written in honor of Alfred Stieglitz, entitled "The Metropolitan Milieu," Lewis Mumford spoke of the mechanical philosophy and the new routine of industry and the dilemmas this posed to the artist whose calling it was "to become a force in his own right once more, as confident of his mission as the scientist or the engineer," yet, unlike them, immune to the lure of mindless conquest. "In a world where practical success canceled every other aspiration, this meant a redoubled

interest in the goods and methods that challenged the canons of pecuniary success—contemplation and idle reverie" (it is almost as if we hear ter Braak), "high craftsmanship and patient manipulation, . . . an emphasis on the ecstasy of being rather than a concentration on the pragmatic strain of 'getting there.'"

Yet, in spite of these similarities, the European cultural critics may seem to argue a different case and to act on different existential cues: theirs is a highly defensive position in the face of a threat which is exteriorized, perceived as coming from outside, much as in fact it was immanent to the drift of European culture. What we see occurring is a retreat toward cultural bastions in the face of an experience of a loss of power and control; it is the psychological equivalent of the defense of a national currency through protectionism. It is, so to speak, a manipulation of the terms of psychological trade. A clear example is Oswald Spengler's statement in his *Jahre der Entscheidung* (Years of Decision): "Life in America is exclusively economic in its structure and lacks depth, the more so because it lacks the element of true historical tragedy, of a fate that for centuries has deepened and informed the soul of European peoples." Huizinga made much the same point in his 1941 essay on the formlessness of history, typified by America. Yet Spengler's choice of words is more revealing. In his elevation of such cultural staples as "depth" and "soul," he typifies the perennial response to an experience of inferiority and backwardness of a society compared to its more potent rivals.

Such was the reaction, as Norbert Elias has pointed out in his magisterial study of the process of civilization in European history, on the part of an emerging German bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the pervasive influence of French civilization. Against French *civilisation* as a mere skin-deep veneer it elevated German *Kultur* as more deeply felt, warm, and authentic. It was a proclamation of emancipation through a declaration of cultural superiority. A similar stress on feeling, soul, and depth vis-à-vis the cold rationality of an overbearing foreign civilization can be seen in an essay entitled *Ariel*, written in 1900 by the Urugayan author José Ednrique Rodó. He opposed the "alma" (the soul) of the weak Spanish-American countries to the utilitarianism of the United States (although, tellingly, he at the same time admired America's democratic form of government). In his critique, once again cultural sublimation was the answer; in what would become known as the Arielista ideology, Rodó's ideas would inspire several generations of Latin-American intellectuals.

Americanism, then, is the twentieth-century equivalent of French eighteenth-century *civilisation* as

perceived by those who rose up in defense against it. It serves as the negative mirror image in the quest for a national identity through cultural self-assertion. Americanism in that sense is therefore a component of the wider structure of anti-Americanism, paradoxical as this may sound.

AMERICANISM, UN-AMERICANISM, ANTI-AMERICANISM

Let us dwell briefly on the conceptual intricacies of such related terms as Americanism, un-Americanism, and anti-Americanism. Apparently, as we have seen, Americanism as a concept can stand for a body of cultural characteristics deemed repugnant. Yet the same word, in a different context, can have a highly positive meaning, denoting the central tenets of the American creed. Both, however, duly deserve their status of “isms”: both are emotionally charged code words in the defense of an endangered national identity. In the United States, as “one hundred percent Americanism,” it raised a demanding standard before the hordes of aliens aspiring to full membership in the American community while threatening the excommunication of those it defined as un-American. Americanism in its negative guise fulfilled much the same function in Europe, serving as a counterpoint to true Europeanism. In both senses, either positive or negative, the concept is a gate-keeping device, a rhetorical figure, rallying the initiates in rituals of self-affirmation.

Compared to these varieties of Americanism, relatively clear-cut both historically and sociologically, anti-Americanism appears as a strangely ambiguous hybrid. It never appears to imply—as the word suggests—a rejection across the board of America, of its society, its culture, its power. Huizinga and ter Braak may have inveighed against Americanism, against an America in quotation marks, but neither can be considered a spokesman of anti-Americanism in a broad sense. Both were much too subtle minds for that, in constant awareness of contrary evidence and redeeming features, much too open and inquiring about the real America, as a historical entity, to give up the mental reserve of the quotation mark. After all, ter Braak’s closing lines are: “‘America’ I reject. Now we can turn to the problem of America.” And the Huizinga quotation above, already full of ambivalence, continues thus: “And yet in this case it must be we who are the Pharisees, for theirs is the love and the confidence. Things must be different than we think.”

Now where does that leave us? Both authors were against an Americanism as they negatively constructed it. Yet it does not meaningfully make their

position one of anti-Americanism. There was simply too much intellectual puzzlement and, particularly in Huizinga’s case, too much admiration and real affection, too much appreciation of an Americanism that had inspired American history. Anti-Americanism, then, if we choose to retain the term at all, should be seen as a weak and ambivalent complex of anti-feelings. It only applies selectively, never extending to a total rejection of both Americanisms. Thus we can have either of two separate outcomes: an anti-Americanism rejecting cultural trends which are seen as typically American, while allowing of admiration for America’s energy, innovation, prowess, and optimism, or an anti-Americanism in reverse, rejecting an American creed that for all its missionary zeal is perceived as imperialist and oppressive, while admiring American culture, from its high-brow to its pop varieties. These opposed directions in the critical thrust of anti-Americanism often go hand in hand with opposed positions on the political spectrum. The cultural anti-Americanism of the interwar years typically was a conservative position, whereas the political anti-Americanism of the Cold War and the war in Vietnam typically occurred on the left wing. Undoubtedly the drastic change in America’s position on the world stage since World War II has contributed to this double somersault. Ever since this war America has appeared in a radically different guise, as a much more potent force in everyday life in Europe than ever before. This leads us to explore one further nexus among the various concepts.

The late 1940s and 1950s may have been a honeymoon in the Atlantic relationship, yet throughout the period there were groups on the left loath to adopt the unfolding Cold War view of the world; they were the nostalgics of the anti-Nazi war alliance with the Soviet Union, a motley array of fellow travelers, third roaders, Christian pacifists, and others. Their early critical stance toward the United States showed up yet another ambivalent breed of anti-Americanism. In their relative political isolation domestically, they tended to identify with precisely those who in America were being victimized as un-American in the emerging Cold War hysteria of loyalty programs, House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) inquiries, and McCarthyite persecution. In their anti-Americanism they were the ones to rally to the support of Alger Hiss and of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. Affiliating with dissenters in America, their anti-Americanism combined with un-Americanism in the United States to form a sort of shadow Atlantic partnership. It is a combination that would again occur in the late sixties when the political anti-Americanism in Europe, occasioned by the Vietnam War, felt in unison with a

generation in the United States engaged in antiwar protest and the counterculture of the time, burning American flags along with their draft cards as demonstrations of their un-Americanism. As bumper stickers at the time reminded them: America, Love It or Leave It.

The disaffection from America during the Vietnam War, the un-American activities in America, and the anti-Americanism in Europe at the time may have appeared to stand for a more lasting value shift on both sides of the Atlantic. The alienation and disaffection of this emerging adversary culture proved much more short-lived in America, however, than it did in Europe. The vigorous return to traditional concerns in America since the end of the Vietnam War never occurred in any comparable form in countries in Europe. There indeed the disaffection from America had become part of a much more general disaffection from the complexities and contradictions of modern society. A psychological disengagement had occurred that no single event, such as the end of the Vietnam War, was able to undo. The squatters' movement in countries such as Germany, Denmark, or the Netherlands, the ecological (or Green) movement, the pacifist movement (particularly in the 1980s during the cruise missile debate), had all become the safe havens of a dissenting culture, highly apocalyptic in its view of the threat that technological society posed to the survival of mankind. And despite the number and variety of anti-feelings of these adversary groups, America to each and all of them could once again serve as a symbolic focus. Thus, in this more recent stage, it appears that anti-Americanism can not only be too broad a concept, as pointed out before—a configuration of anti-feelings that never extends to all things American—it can also be too narrow, in that the “America” which one now rejects is really a code

word, a symbol, for a much wider rejection of contemporary society and culture. The more diffuse and anomic these feelings are, the more readily they seem to find a cause to blame. Whether or not America is involved in an objectionable event—and given its position in the world it often is—there is always a nearby MacDonald's to bear the brunt of anger and protest, and to have its windows smashed. If this is anti-Americanism, it is of a highly inarticulate, if not irrational, kind.

The oscillations and changes in focus of anti-Americanism have social as well as political dimensions, though the social history has yet to be fully explored. Most commentary between the wars was not only conservative but elitist. It was not clear that the attacks on American cultural and commercial influence resonated with ordinary people. But the discussion could have social effects, as in debates over whether French retail shops should imitate American “dime stores” or have a more distinctively French devotion to style over mass marketing. Political attacks on American diplomacy in the Cold War enlisted large working-class followings, but the older cultural criticisms persisted as well, often (particularly in France and communist countries) with some government backing against American commercial inroads.

GLOBALIZATION, AMERICANIZATION, AND ANTI-AMERICANISM

As American culture spreads around the world, American emblems, from Marlboro Country ads to MacDonald's franchises, tend to be found more places. They testify to Americanization while at the same time providing the targets for protest and resistance against Americanization. Many are the explanations of the worldwide dissemination of American mass culture. There are those who see it as a case of cultural imperialism, as a consequence of America's worldwide projection of political, economic, and military power. Others, broadly within the same critical frame of mind, see it as a tool rather than a consequence of this imperial expansion. Behind the globalization of American culture they see an orchestrating hand, whetting foreign appetites for the pleasures of a culture of consumption. Undeniably, though, part of the explanation of the worldwide appeal of American mass culture will have to be sought in its intrinsic qualities, in its blend of democratic and commercial vigor. In individual cases the particular mix of these two elements may differ. At one extreme the commercial component may be well-nigh absent, as in the worldwide dissemination of jazz and blues music. At

the other extreme the commercial rationale may be the central carrying force, as in American advertisements. While trying to make a sales pitch for particular products, advertising envelops these in cultural messages that draw on repertoires of American myths and symbols that find recognition across the globe.

In a series of posters made by a Dutch advertising agency solely for the Dutch market, a particular brand of cigarette produced by a large Anglo-American tobacco company is being promoted. The posters combine visual and linguistic messages without apparent coherence, each a disjoint marker of larger semiotic repertoires. The only direct reference to the product being advertised is the picture of a packet of cigarettes, its flip-top open, with two cigarettes protruding as if offered to the viewer. Otherwise, there are no signs of a hard sell in the classic manner, no references to taste, to tar content, or other qualities of the product. The jumble of other messages on the poster all serve to illustrate its central slogan: "There are no borders." Remarkably, although the market addressed is Dutch, the slogan is in English, as if to illustrate its message of internationalism. That message, apparently, is the subtext of the entire poster. It is meant to evoke a world culture of leisure and pleasure, mentioning the names of places and hotels where the jet set congregates, and graphically showing the sensual pleasures they indulge in.

Yet this is only one way to read the slogan. It does evoke a global culture of consumption, assembling its attractions for the creation of an image attached to this particular brand of cigarette. A second way to read the message is in terms of the echoes it contains of more narrowly American dreams and images. In spite of the relative absence of patently American markers that, for example, characterize the worldwide advertising campaign for Marlboro cigarettes, the Stuyvesant posters do evoke repertoires of American images, known the world over, where "America," and more particularly the American West, symbolizes a world without borders. The established imagery of America as open space, a land that knows no limits, sets no constraints, allowing all individuals to break free and be the agents of their own destinies, has a venerable pedigree as an ingredient for the construction of commercial images.

Some of the oldest traceable examples go back to the early 1860s. Two tobacco brands, the Washoe brand and a brand called "Westward Ho," already used images of the West, in addition to more general American imagery, embodied in representations of the Goddess Columbia. We see vast stretches of open country, a pot of gold brimming over, an American eagle, a bare-breasted Columbia, loosely enveloped in

an American flag, galloping forth on elk-back. Westward Ho, indeed. This is not Europa being abducted by Jupiter; this is a modern mythology of Columbia riding her American elk. At the time, clearly, an abundance of mythical markers was needed to tie Virginia tobacco to the beckoning call of the West. Today we no longer need such explicit reference to trigger our store of images concerning America as a dream and a fantasy. A simple slogan, "There are no borders," is all it takes. It is no longer the cryptic message it may seem at first glance. We know the code and have learned how to crack it.

In its dual reading, then, the Stuyvesant slogan illustrates two things. It evokes a world increasingly permeated by a culture of consumption, geared toward leisure and pleasure. At the same time it illustrates the implicit Americanness of much of this emerging global mass culture. It is a point to bear in mind when we engage in discussions concerning the globalization of culture taking place in our day and age. Too often in these debates the point seems to be missed when people try to separate the problems of an alleged Americanization of the world from the problems of the globalization of culture. A closer reading will reveal that in many cases it is a matter of American cultural codes being picked up and recycled for the production of meaningful statements elsewhere.

Students of Americanization broadly agree that semantic transformations attend the dissemination of American cultural messages across the world. Depending on their precise angle and perspective, some tend to emphasize the cultural strategies and auspices behind the transmission of American culture. Whether they study Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show when it traveled in Europe, Hollywood movies, or world's fairs, to name just a few carriers for the transmission of American culture, their focus is on the motifs and organizing views that the producers were trying to convey rather than on the analysis of what the spectators and visitors did with the messages they were exposed to. All such cultural productions taken as representations of organizing worldviews do tend to lead researchers to focus on senders rather than receivers of messages. Yet, given such a focus, it hardly ever leads these researchers to look at the process of reception as anything more than a passive imbibing. Whatever the words one uses to describe what happens at the point of reception, words such as hybridization or creolization, current views agree on a freedom of reception, a freedom to resemanticize and recontextualize meaningful messages reaching audiences across national and cultural borders. Much creativity and inventiveness go into the process of reception, much joy and exhilaration spring from it. Yet making this the

whole story would be as fallacious as a focus centered solely on the schemes and designs of the senders of messages. Whatever their precise angle, researchers agree on the need to preserve balance in their approach to problems of Americanization.

Furthermore, some researchers tend to conceive of Americanization as tied to an American economic expansionism early on and then, more recently, to an emerging global economy structured by the organizing logic of corporate capitalism, still very much proceeding under American auspices. The main area in which they see Americanization at work is in the commodification of culture that colonizes the leisure time of people worldwide. World's fairs and other transmitters of America's commercial culture conjure up a veritable "dream world" of mass consumption, a simulation through spectacle of the good life afforded by the technological advances associated with modernization. One could go on to contrast this simulacrum of the good life with the ravages wrought by corporate capitalism in many parts of the globe. It would be one good reason to keep the concept of Americanization in our critical lexicon as a useful reminder of what American economic expansionism has meant in terms of advancing the interests of American corporate culture overseas.

It is important to note also that the American influence in many ways continues to expand. This is true in consumer culture, as witness the success of Euro-Disney (near Paris) in the 1990s after some initial resistance and necessary adjustments to the preferences of European visitors. It is also true in terms of business practices, where, again in the 1990s, consulting firms of American origin, American management texts translated from English and specific American fads such as Total Quality Management gained unprecedented attention and prestige.

Yet others take a different tack. They would argue that one should not look at the autonomous rise of global corporate capitalism as due to American agency. It is a common fallacy in much of the critique of Americanization to blame America for trends and developments that would have occurred anyway, even in the absence of America. From Karl Marx, via John Hobson and V. I. Lenin, all the way to the work of the Frankfurt School, a long line of critical analysis of capitalism and imperialism highlights their inner expansionist logic. Surely, in the twentieth century, much of this expansion proceeded under American auspices, receiving an American imprint, in much the same way that a century ago, the imprint was British. The imprint has often confused critics into arguing that the havoc wreaked by an overarching process of modernization, ranging from the impact of capitalism to pro-

cesses of democratization of the political arena, was truly the dismal effect of America upon their various countries. From this perspective the critique of Americanization is too broad, exaggerating America's role in areas where in fact it was caught up in historic transformations much like other countries were.

From a different perspective, though, this view of Americanization is too narrow. It ignores those vast areas where America, as a construct, an image, a phantasma, did play a role in the intellectual and cultural life of people outside its national borders. There is a repertoire of fantasies about America that even predates its discovery. Ever since, the repertoire has been fed in numerous ways, through many media of transmission. Americans and non-Americans have all contributed to this collective endeavor, making sense of the new country and its evolving culture. Especially in the twentieth century America became ever more present in the minds of non-Americans, as a point of reference, a yardstick, a counterpoint. In intellectual reflections on the course and destiny of non-American countries and cultures, America became part of a process of triangulation, serving as a model for rejection or emulation, providing views of a future seen in ei-

ther a negative or a positive light. America has become a *tertium comparationis* in culture wars elsewhere, centering on control of the discourse concerning the national identity and the national culture. When America was rejected by one party in such contests, the other party saw it as a liberating alternative. Writing the history of such receptions of America is as much American studies as it is an endeavor in the intellectual history of countries other than the United States. It also should form part of a larger reflection upon processes summarily described as Americanization.

Undeniably, though, in the course of the allegedly “American Century” America assumed a centrality that one might rightly call imperial. Like Rome in the days of the Roman Empire, it has become the center of webs of control and communication that span the world. Its cultural products reach the far corners of the world, communicating American ways and views to people elsewhere, while America itself remains relatively unaware of cultural products originating outside its national borders. If for such reasons we might call America’s reach imperial, it is so in a number of ways. It is imperial in the economic sphere, in the political sphere, and in the cultural sphere. If it is still possible to use the word in a relatively neutral way, describing a factual configuration rather than the outcome of concerted effort and motive, we might speak of an American imperialism, of its economic imperialism, political imperialism, and cultural imperialism. Trying to accommodate themselves to their diminished role and place in the world, European countries have at times opted to resist particular forms of America’s imperial presence. Thus, in the most telling case, France chose to resist political imperialism by ordering NATO out of the country, it warned against America’s economic imperialism through Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s *Le défi américain*, (which nonetheless urged imitation of management styles), and it briefly considered preventing *Jurassic Park* from being released in France, seeing it as a case of American cultural imperialism and a threat to the French cultural identity.

Yet, suggestive as the terms are of neat partition and distinction, the three forms of imperialism do in fact overlap to a large extent. Thus America, in its role as the new political hegemon in the Western world, could restructure markets and patterns of trade through the Marshall Plan, which guaranteed access to the European markets for American products. Political imperialism could thus promote economic imperialism. Opening European markets for American commerce also meant preserving access for American cultural exports, such as Hollywood movies. Economic imperialism thus translated into cul-

tural imperialism. Conversely, as carriers of an American version of the “good life,” American products, from cars to movies, from clothing styles to kitchen apparel, all actively doubled as agents of American cultural diplomacy. Thus trade translated back into political imperialism and so on, in endless feedback loops.

Many observers in recent years have chosen to focus on the cultural dimension in all these various forms of an American imperial presence. American culture, seen as a configuration of ways and means that Americans use for expressing their collective sense of themselves—their Americanness—is mediated through every form of American presence abroad. From the high rhetoric of its political ideals to the golden glow of McDonald’s arches, from Bruce Springsteen to the Marlboro Man, American culture washes across the globe. It does so mostly in disentangled bits and pieces, for others to recognize, pick up, and rearrange into a setting expressive of their own individual identities, or identities they share with peer groups. Thus teenagers may have adorned their bedrooms with the iconic faces of Hollywood or rock music stars in order to provide themselves with a most private place for reverie and games of identification, but they have also been engaged in a construction of private worlds that they share with countless others. In the process they recontextualize and resemanticize American culture to make it function within expressive settings entirely of their own making.

W. T. Stead, an early British observer of Americanization, saw it as “the trend of the twentieth century.” He saw Americanization mostly as the worldwide dissemination of material goods, as so many signs of an American technical and entrepreneurial prowess. It would be for later observers to look at these consumer goods as cultural signifiers as well, as carriers of an American way of life. An early example of an observer of the American scene with precisely this ability to read cultural significance into the products of a technical civilization was Johan Huizinga. In his collection of travel observations, published after his only trip to the United States in 1926, he showed an uncanny awareness of the recycling of the American dream into strategies of commercial persuasion, linking a fictitious world of self-fulfillment—a world where every dream would come true—to goods sold in the market. High-minded aesthete though he was, forever longing for the lost world of late-medieval Europe, he could walk the streets of the great American cities with an open eye for the doubling of American reality into a seductive simulacrum. He was inquisitive enough to ask the right questions, questions that still echo in current research concerning the reception of

mass culture in general and of commercial exhortations in particular. He wondered what the effect would be on everyday people of the constant barrage of commercial constructions of the good life. "The public constantly sees a model of refinement far beyond their purse, ken and heart. Does it imitate this? Does it adapt itself to this?" Apposite questions indeed. Huizinga was aware of the problem of reception of the virtual worlds constantly spewed forth by a relentless commercial mass culture. More generally, in

these musings, Huizinga touched on the problem of the effect that media of cultural transmission, like film and advertising, would have on audiences not just in America but elsewhere as well. In these more general terms, the problem then becomes one of the ways in which non-American audiences would read the fantasy worlds that an American imagination had produced and that showed all the characteristics of an American way with culture so vehemently indicted by European critics.

See also other articles in this section.

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SECTION 4: EUROPE AND THE WORLD

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IMMIGRANTS



Panikos Panayi

The movement of people to Europe from beyond its shores does not represent a new phenomenon. Indeed, an attempt to trace the history of the peoples which now form the dominant ethnic population of individual nation-states would reveal that they all have origins outside the boundaries of the territories in which they currently live. For some nations, such as the English, who originated in north Germany, the original settlers did not have to travel far. Other groups, including the Hungarians and Finns, migrated over vast distances from their homeland in central Asia. Many of the peoples who now control European countries originally migrated one or more millennia ago.

MIGRATION TO EUROPE SINCE THE MIDDLE AGES

With the emergence of settled societies and monarchical states during the Middle Ages, migration into Europe from further east became highly problematic, as the Roma (Gypsies) discovered. Arriving in the Balkans in the thirteenth century, by the end of the sixteenth they lived throughout Europe. They faced intense hostility wherever they settled, resulting in deportation, murder, and enslavement. In contrast, the Turks, who arrived in the Balkans at about the same time as the Roma, did so as conquerors, which meant that they did not face the persecution endured by the Roma. By the sixteenth century they had settled throughout the Balkans, although not as immigrants in the contemporary understanding of the term.

From the close of the Middle Ages until the end of World War II, migration into Europe did not take place on any significant scale. This does not mean that people from beyond European shores did not settle on the continent. One of the main influxes consisted of African slaves, who differed from subsequent immigrants because the latter had some degree of choice in their decision to move. Significant numbers of Africans appeared in Britain during the eighteenth century because of Britain's centrality in the slave trade,

although they had assimilated by the beginning of the nineteenth.

Imperial expansion after 1800, especially involving Britain and France, brought non-Europeans to these two states. In the case of Britain the numbers remained small, so that it is unlikely that the total of ethnic Chinese, Africans, Afro-Caribbeans, and Indians ever exceeded 20,000 before World War II. In contrast, by 1931 102,000 North Africans were living in France, which had a higher proportion of aliens within its population than any other nation in the world. The vast majority of the immigrants in France consisted of other Europeans, pointing to the dramatic increase of migration within the continent during the nineteenth century, as a result of industrialization and population growth.

More immigrants have made their way to Europe since the end of the World War II than all previous immigrants since about 1500, due to a combination of reasons which have transformed modern Europe and its relationship with the rest of the world. Demographic factors have played a central role in this development. Population growth beyond Europe's shores has created pressure on shrinking land resources, resulting in rural and urban unemployment. For instance, Turkey, one of the main sources of labor supply for western Europe from the late 1950s, sending over 2 million workers abroad, has had one of the highest birthrates in the world since 1945, peaking at forty-four per thousand in 1960. In 1972 the country had a population of 36,500,000, which had increased to 55,000,000 by the end of the 1980s, when it was growing by 1 million a year. Economic development did not keep pace with the population explosion, which meant that the country may have counted 5 million unemployed by the early 1970s.

Overpopulation and underemployment beyond Europe has combined with the continuing economic growth of the continent, creating a demand for foreign labor for much of the postwar period. Most states made use of workers from their immediate periphery: for instance, over a million Irish people moved to Brit-

ain, while the main origins of newcomers to France have included Spain, Portugal, and Italy. But as these southern European states became wealthier, they needed to retain their own labor power, which necessitated the search for workers from beyond European borders. Colonial states such as France, Britain, and the Netherlands simply allowed the entry of people from the areas of the world which they currently on formerly controlled, which generally had much lower living standards. In 1967 the per capita gross national

product was 125 dollars in Pakistan, 250 dollars in Jamaica, but 1,977 dollars in the United Kingdom. Those countries which did not have foreign possessions had to turn to other sources of labor. The Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, tapped the exploding Turkish population. By the middle of the 1970s, western Europe had stopped the relatively free admission of people from overseas. This has meant that Africans and Asians in particular started making their way to the Mediterranean. While those who


moved to western Europe during the 1950s and 1960s generally did so with the full knowledge of the states to which they moved, a large percentage of immigrants to southern Europe have entered states such as Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Cyprus illegally, without the knowledge of the government. Relatively little immigration took place into the Soviet bloc before 1989, although East Germany did import people from other Soviet-backed regimes both within and beyond Europe, the latter including Vietnam, Cuba, and Mozambique.

Technology, more specifically its application to transport, has also made population movement easier. Before the advent of canals, modern road-building technology, railways, and steamships, movement of people over any sort of distance proved a hazardous process. Trains, ships, and, during the twentieth century, cars and airplanes have meant that human beings can travel over distances of all ranges extremely quickly.

Since the 1960s political factors have increasingly pushed people out of Africa, South America, Asia, and Turkey to European states, which have obligations toward refugees under the 1951 United Nations Geneva Convention. Consequently, despite increasingly tight immigration controls, people migrating from repressive regimes grew in numbers, including Kurds, Vietnamese, Iranians, Iraqis, Chileans, Afghans, Ni-

gerians, Ethiopians, and Sri Lankan Tamils. While European policymakers have increasingly tried to distinguish economic migrants from political refugees, in reality most population movements have always occurred due to some combination of economic and political reasons in the homeland.

The concept of the immigrant and immigration has increasingly become an issue in industrial Europe as state power has grown. Just as the modern nation-state controls all aspects of the lives of those who live within its borders, so it also displays concern about the people it allows to enter its borders. "Immigration" (as a formal phenomenon) only exists where states become organized and, through the use of passports and nationality and immigration laws, can admit or exclude people. Since World War II, and especially since the 1970s, European states have increasingly tried to control and, more recently, keep out people from beyond the continent, especially as the European Union allows free movement of all citizens within its territories, therefore lessening the need for workers from other parts of the world. This reflects an increasing tendency to divide Europeans from other peoples and demonstrates a racial exclusion of people with black and brown skins. Before 1945 such implicitly or explicitly racist policies had not been necessary because few Africans and Asians wanted to move to Europe.



Origins of Immigrants in Amsterdam. Adapted from A. Segal, *An Atlas of International Migration* (London: Hans Zell, 1993), p. 72.

IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPEAN SOCIETY

With few exceptions, immigrants who have made their way to Europe since the Renaissance have remained, in the short run at least, distinct from the dominant populations. While their physical difference has played a large role in this process, their place in European society has also confirmed their differences. Newcomers to Europe have, initially at least, lived separately from the dominant populations, usually in worse accommodations, carrying out jobs which members of the dominant ethnic groupings shun, especially after 1945.

Immigrants in any European society have usually become ghettoized, largely because of their occupational patterns but also because of the hostility of members of the dominant society toward them. The Chinese community in nineteenth-century Britain, which evolved mainly from sailors, concentrated in London, Liverpool, and Cardiff. Similarly, black people, who also consisted largely of seamen, settled in Cardiff, Liverpool, Bristol, and North and South Shields. These groups remained concentrated in enclaves within these locations, as did the Algerians who settled in French cities from the late nineteenth century.

Such patterns intensified further in the postwar period. In the case of some states, including both West and East Germany, the housing policies of employers and the state made concentration inevitable. In both

of these countries, many immigrants from all parts of the world found themselves initially accommodated in company barracks, in mostly all-male surroundings, with virtually no space or privacy. In France the lack of housing meant that shantytowns (*bidonvilles*) sprang up on the outskirts of many cities. One official inquiry from 1966 counted 225 of these concentrations of foreign workers, 119 of them in Paris. Altogether they housed seventy-five thousand people. In the British case immigrants from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent initially found accommodation in some of the worst inner-city areas, but many have subsequently made their way into wealthier suburban locations. The Japanese offer an exception to the above picture of immigrants confined to the poorest parts of cities. Arriving as professionals, they have settled in wealthy parts of European cities, as the example of the Japanese in Düsseldorf indicates.


Immigrants have tended to move to urban areas. Only 8.1 percent of foreigners in France lived in rural areas in 1981, compared with the 27.3 percent of the French population living outside towns. Immigrants often gravitate to capital cities. In 1982 Paris housed 39 percent of France's Tunisians, 37 percent of its Algerians, and 28 percent of its Moroccans. North Africans have also moved to many of the other large French cities, including Marseille, where they made up 6.9 percent of the population in 1982. Surinamese immigrants to Amsterdam have concentrated in two particular areas of that city. South Asian and West

Indian immigrants to Britain have focused exclusively in urban areas, especially inner London but also many of the largest cities, notably Birmingham and Manchester, together with smaller cities such as Bradford and Leicester. In the latter, Asians form over a quarter of the population.

Immigrants from beyond Europe have clearly changed the demography of many European states, both because of the number of arrivals and, in the short run at least, their higher fertility. In this sense a vast difference exists between the few individuals who made their way to Europe before 1945 and the communities who arrived subsequently. By 1995 ethnic minorities in Britain totaled 3.2 million people, or 5.7 percent of the population. Most European states have a foreign population of between 5 and 10 percent, although in many of these the bulk of the minorities consist of other Europeans.

Most people who have moved to Europe from beyond its borders have been men. This was certainly

true of colonials in Britain and France before 1945. This pattern continued after 1945, especially in the early postwar decades, because labor importation involved the exploitation of people to carry out some of the most unpleasant physical tasks, which also meant that mainly young people entered European states. In the longer run these patterns changed because many men who had migrated for the purpose of earning money to send back to their families eventually decided to bring over their wives and children instead. Thus the proportion of Turkish women to men in Germany increased from 6.8 percent in 1960 to 65.8 percent by 1981. Turks in Germany have certainly had a younger age structure than natives. In 1976 Berlin contained just 211 Turks over the age of sixty-five among the total population for this minority in the city of 84,415. In the short run immigrants had much higher fertility rates than natives, although these have evened out over time. Thus, while Algerian women in France produced an average of 8.5 children during



Bidonvilles in the Paris Region, 1 January 1970. Adapted from B. Fitzgerald, "Immigrants." In *France Today*, 7th ed., edited by J. E. Flower (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993).

the early 1960s, this figure had declined to 3.2 by 1990, although this was still higher than the figure of 1.8 for French women.

The majority of immigrants into Europe since 1945 have found themselves working in manual occupations, reflecting European countries' reasons for encouraging immigration and the racism expressed against immigrants. Many of the West Indians who made their way to Britain during the 1950s had qualifications of some sort, but these usually proved useless because racism forced them into employment such as factory work and bus driving. The same applied to immigrants from South Asia. A similar situation has existed in France and West Germany. In 1976 a total of 89.2 percent of foreigners in France worked in unskilled, semiskilled, or skilled manual employment. In the Federal Republic of Germany the majority of Turks worked in metal and textile manufacture and construction. Similarly, those who have immigrated to southern Europe since the 1960s have worked in manual occupations. In 1981, for instance, 47.6 percent of Tunisians in Italy labored in seasonal occupations connected with fishing, while 14.3 percent were employed in agriculture. In Greece immigrants from Egypt and the Philippines have worked in domestic service, cleaning, tourism, construction, and harvesting.

Some changes have taken place in the employment patterns of those who moved to western Europe in the decades directly after World War II. In the first place, many have seen a deterioration in their position due to the rise in unemployment caused by the oil crisis of 1974 and subsequent increasing mechanization. Racism has also ensured that their offspring have had more difficulties in securing employment than natives. Thus, in 1985, while the unemployment rate for Bangladeshi and Pakistani males between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five in Britain stood at 39 percent in 1985, the figure for whites was 18 percent. In 1990, when the total unemployment rate in France stood at 10.9 percent, the rate for Africans in France stood at more than a quarter.

While most immigrants in postwar Europe have experienced working conditions worse than those of natives, opportunities have presented themselves for social mobility in two areas in particular. The first of these is sport, especially for those who have grown up in Britain, France, and Holland. The most obvious illustration of this is the French soccer team that won the World Cup in 1998, which included many people of African origins. On a more mundane level, immigrants throughout Europe have opened their own, usually small, businesses. These often simply cater to people of their own community, where ethnic econ-

omies develop. In addition, foreign restaurants have also taken off, including those serving Indian food in Britain, Turkish establishments in Germany, and Chinese restaurants throughout the continent.

ETHNICITY

Most non-European immigrants who have moved to the continent have differed from the more established populations in terms of their appearance, language, or religion. While these three factors naturally distinguish foreigners from natives, ethnic leaders have used them to create communities since the Second World War. Those overseas migrants who moved to the continent before 1945 would have been marked by the same differences, but small numbers, as well as a less politicized climate and the absence of omnipresent and omnipotent states, meant that ethnic minorities did not organize themselves to the same degree as their successors.

During the past five hundred years, appearance has distinguished most overseas immigrants from the more long-term populations of the European continent. In terms of skin color, those who have arrived in Europe from Asia, Africa, and the West Indies are clearly darker than Europeans. Newcomers to Europe have also worn different clothing, at least at first. Islamic women, in particular, who have moved to all

western European states since World War II, have introduced their distinctive dress into these countries. Similarly, many Sikh men and women, as well as Hindus, have continued to wear their traditional clothing. Furthermore, newcomers to Europe since World War II have brought their own food with them, which also marks their difference from the dominant groups. This applies especially to Muslims with dietary restrictions, but also to groups such as vegetarian Hindus. The development of ethnic concentrations has meant that such minorities can continue their dietary practices.

Language has also played a large role in distinguishing immigrant communities from dominant groups in modern European history. A large percentage of newcomers to Europe have little or no command of the language of the state in which they settle. In the early 1970s only 7 percent of Turks in West Germany described their command of German as very good. Ten years later over 50 percent of Turks still reported speaking bad German. The percentages had changed partly because, in the intervening years, Turkish children had gone through the German education system. But because so few immigrants have command of the language of the state in which they settle, they naturally bring their own form of discourse with them, which they can use when large communities develop. This has meant the introduction of all man-

ner of languages into Europe since World War II. Among Asians in Britain, for instance, these have included Gujarati, Punjabi, Urdu, and Hindi.

Postwar immigrants have brought new religions to Europe, to which many of them have turned even more than before because of the trauma involved in residing in a foreign land. During the nineteenth century the few colonial sailors living in British ports had great difficulties in practicing their religion due to their numbers, the temporary nature of their stay, and the activities of local Christian missionaries interested in converting them. Since 1945 larger numbers, more permanent settlement, and greater toleration from established Christian churches have helped immigrants to establish sophisticated systems of worship.

While religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism have made their first significant appearance in Europe since 1945, the faith which has really stood out in much of western Europe for the first time is Islam. In Britain, where the first mosque opened in the southern town of Woking in 1889, the number of mosques had reached 5 in 1966 and 452 by 1990. By 1991 Britain counted 1,133,000 Muslims, including 476,000 Pakistanis, 160,000 Bangladeshis, and 134,000 Indians. These Muslims, who do not form a homogeneous group, had established their own schools, which began receiving state support in 1998. By the middle of the 1980s France contained 3 million Muslims. A total of 1.7 million Muslims lived in Germany a decade later, 75 percent of whom were Turks. Mosques began to appear during the 1950s, often in flats, although minarets have subsequently been constructed. The Netherlands counted 450,000 Muslims in 1991, mostly Turks, Moroccans, and Surinamese. The Dutch government had actually constructed the first mosque in 1953. By 1989 the Netherlands contained about three hundred mosques and prayer halls spread over about a hundred urban locations throughout the country.

Immigrants to Europe have established their own politicized ethnicities which have gone beyond the religious basis of their distinctiveness. These developments largely represent a reaction against the all-embracing nationalism in the states in which immigrants settle, to which the newcomers cannot relate. Consequently they develop their own cultures and even form their own political organizations.

Early West Indian settlers in Brixton set up associations devoted to cricket, drinking, and dancing, as well as informal groups focusing upon unlicensed drinking, gambling, and ganja smoking. The size of the Turkish community in Germany has facilitated a wide range of cultural developments. Eleven newspapers existed by the early 1990s; the oldest of these,

Hürriyet, had a circulation of 110,000, followed by *Türkiye*, with 35,000, and *Milliyet*, with 25,000. Since 1964 the German regional radio station WDR, based in Cologne, has broadcast radio programs in Turkish, which, in 1990, attracted an audience of 52 percent of Turks in the city on a daily basis. Turks also watched television programs provided for them by the regional broadcasting companies, and, with the development of satellite television, many tuned in to TRT-International, a station broadcasting from Turkey for Turks settled abroad, which made a third of its programs in Germany.

Immigrants into Europe have also become politically active. Before 1945 both African and Indian nationalists in Britain established all manner of associations. One of the most significant of these was the Pan-African Association, established in London in 1900. After 1945 some West Indians became involved in antiracist organizations. Asians established a variety of groups, according to their ethnic identification. Thus the Indian Workers Association, founded in Coventry in 1938, essentially represents a Punjabi working-class group. Meanwhile, a Supreme Council of British Muslims came into existence in 1991. North African immigrants in France have also become involved in a variety of organizations. In the first place, their homeland governments established associations for the immigrants. The Algerian state set up the Amicale des Algériens en Europe, with the aim of preventing the assimilation of those of its citizens who had gone overseas. The Moroccan government founded a group called the Amicale des Commerçants Marocains en France, with the aim of maintaining the loyalty of emigrants. More recently, a series of Islamic organizations aimed at North African immigrants have developed in France, including the National Federation of French Muslims and the Union of Islamic Organizations in France. Latin American refugees who moved to France during the course of the 1970s continued the activities which had caused their expulsion from their native lands. The political bodies which they established also had *peñas*, or social clubs, attached to them, where friends could meet and listen to music. In Germany Turkish immigrants have organized themselves across the entire political spectrum. One of the best-known organizations, formed by ethnic Kurds in Turkey, is the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which may have counted up to fifty thousand members in Germany by the middle of the 1990s.

While many immigrants in Europe have turned to formal methods of political activism, others, especially younger people, have resorted to street protest, including violence, in order to make themselves heard.

This happened in Britain during the 1980s when West Indians combined with other groups to protest against inner-city poverty. In the same decade SOS-Racisme organized huge marches in France. After racist violence took off in Germany during the early 1990s and skinheads targeted the Turkish community, Turks participated in civil disobedience.

RACISM

All immigrants to Europe have faced hostility from the dominant community, although the interaction between natives and newcomers does not simply manifest itself in a negative manner. Overall the relationship largely consists of indifference, which, however, historians have difficulty in measuring. Fewer difficulties exist in documenting hostility toward immigrants, largely due to the attention which scholars have devoted to this subject. The development of European racism during the course of the nineteenth century has shaped attitudes toward non-European people. Negative views of non-European peoples had existed from the Renaissance, evidenced, for instance, by the destruction of indigenous civilizations by conquering Spaniards in Central America and the organization of the black slave trade by the British. Such hostility became ideologically racist from the middle of the nineteenth century in connection with two major developments. First, the transformation of Charles Darwin's theories of evolution into social Darwinism applied his ideas of natural selection among species of animals into natural selection among races of human beings, developing a hierarchy of different races. The other development which helped this process was the first major encounter of Europeans with Africa and its inhabitants as a consequence of imperial expansion, which reinforced ideas of a hierarchy of races.

Consequently, those people with darker skins who have moved to western Europe have faced a native population with preconceived opinions about them, even after the decline of overt ideological racism following World War II. In Britain, for instance, nineteenth-century popular literature presented negative stereotypes of Chinese, African, and Asian people. More seriously, anti-Chinese violence broke out in south Wales in 1911, while riots against black people occurred in nine locations at the end of World War I.

Since 1945 immigrants from beyond Europe have faced hostility in virtually all of the states in which they have settled. Responsibility for this situation lies largely with the nationalistic, xenophobic, and racist ideologies which continue to exist in European states. While overt racism has become unfashionable since the Nazi period, the actions of European

nation-states toward immigrants and their offspring point to the centrality of an exclusionary ideology toward foreigners. Indeed, the very concept of a nation-state, with borders delimiting a "nation" as well as a "state," reinforces the will and ability of those within the boundaries to keep people out. As the twentieth century progressed, immigration laws became increasingly racialized, with the aim of excluding groups from the developing world. Nationality laws supported immigration controls, especially in states such as Switzerland and Germany, where people inherited their citizenship, which meant that individuals born of foreign parents on Swiss or German soil remained outsiders.

Throughout western Europe, immigrants have also been victimized by the police and judiciary. In Britain these issues reached the national stage in the early 1980s following the inner-city riots, while the murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence also brought the issue to the fore in the following decade. In Denmark during the late 1980s and early 1990s many blacks in Copenhagen were warned to stay away from public places because of a suspicion, common throughout western Europe, that they were involved in drug smuggling. In Germany during the 1990s some police officers participated in acts of violence against minorities already facing attack from the population as a whole. Similarly, in France police officers have mistreated people whom they perceived as foreign. In fact, one of the worst instances of racism toward non-European immigrants occurred in 1961, when, in the context of the Algerian War of Independence, the Paris police murdered at least two hundred Algerians protesting against the implementation of a curfew against them.

Not surprisingly, European natives have followed the lead of their governments, especially as a racist press has also legitimized their actions. During the late 1950s and early 1960s newspapers in Britain regularly carried stories claiming that too many immigrants from Asia and the Caribbean had entered the country. In these decades immigrants faced regular hostility in their search for employment and accommodation. This hostility continues to exist in Britain and elsewhere.

The development of extreme right-wing political parties throughout Europe has given further credibility to racist attitudes. One of the most enduring of these groups is the Front National, a seemingly permanent fixture on the French political spectrum during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Its central aim consisted of keeping France free from foreign, especially African, influences. Similarly, the most successful of the German postwar racist groups, the National Democratic Party and the Republikaner,

devoted much attention to Turks. In 2000 the anti-immigrant Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria) became part of a coalition government in Austria, a development that provoked concern and protest within Austria and abroad.

Racist violence has become endemic in postwar Europe. The 1958 Notting Hill riots against West Indians were the largest such incident in Britain, but since that time murders of members of ethnic minorities, taking place on a regular basis, have replaced rioting. The worst incident in France occurred in 1973, following the murder of a bus driver by a mentally disturbed Arab and resulting in death or serious injury to fifty-two people. The reunited Germany experienced an explosion of racist violence just after the new state came into existence in the early 1990s. More recently, murders of Africans have taken place in Spain and Italy.

MULTIRACIALIZATION

Immigrants and their offspring in postwar Europe have remained outsiders, whether because of social status or legal exclusion. But their position is not all negative, as most European states have made efforts to deal with overt racism, even if they continue to practice it. At the same time, immigrants have had a deep impact upon European life.

Most European states have signed the various international guarantees which protect the rights of

minorities, including the United Nations-sponsored International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified in 1965. Some states have their own antiracist legislation. Britain, for instance, introduced a series of acts during the 1960s, superseded by the Race Relations Act of 1976. Other states, such as Germany, have constitutional guarantees protecting everyone within their borders from discrimination. Such legislation does not eliminate prejudice, but it does make members of the dominant group conscious of their actions and therefore lessens animosity toward minorities.

Evidence of positive attitudes toward minorities is more difficult to trace than negative manifestations. Nevertheless, positive attitudes clearly exist. Mixed marriages represent one indication of acceptance. In Germany, for instance, 9.6 percent of marriages in 1990, 38,784 out of 414,475, involved a German and a foreigner. Similarly, while racist organizations have come into existence, so have associations to help newcomers. In Britain, for instance, virtually all of the refugee groups which entered the country during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have received some degree of assistance from natives.

Since World War II immigrants have had a profound impact upon European life. In Britain they have transformed culinary practices, dress codes, and popular culture. At the end of the twentieth century, virtually every high street in Britain had an Indian and a Chinese restaurant. At the same time, big super-

market chains and brand labels have jumped onto the bandwagon of ethnic food. Similarly, the presence of Turkish immigrants in Germany has meant that their cuisine has become widespread throughout the country. Furthermore, European women have taken up some aspects of the dress of the immigrant minorities, although this multiracialization of clothing is largely inspired by the international fashion industry. In Britain Afro-Caribbeans, taking their lead from America, have profoundly influenced the music and club scene.

CONCLUSION

Any overall assessment of the relationship between native white Europeans and overseas immigrants would have to note that newcomers have always retained an unenviable position in comparison with more established populations. The experience of many immigrants before the twentieth century does not offer very much hope to those who entered the continent after 1945, especially if the Roma are used as an example. In other cases, such as that of black people in Britain, they have either faced assimilation or deportation. Increasing multiracialization certainly suggests growing acceptance, although the greater influence of the state means that people from beyond Europe's shores have increasingly had problems entering the continent.

Ultimately, the relationship of European states with people from outside the continent's borders remains similar whether Asians, Africans, West Indians, and South Americans reside in Europe or remain in their homeland. Part of the problem lies in the legacy of imperialism—the underdevelopment and exploitation of many areas of the globe that had been controlled by Europeans. Once the colonial states left, many of the areas they ruled faced almost insurmountable political and economic problems. At the same time the racist mentality and ideology of imperialism has continued to affect the states and peoples of Europe and determines their attitudes toward foreigners moving to the Continent. The exclusion of black and brown people from European shores simply reflects the desire of European states to fix world markets in their own favor by controlling the world's resources. Allowing such people into Europe would, in the eyes of European policymakers, threaten the well-being of their own citizens.

How long this policy of exclusion will continue seems questionable for two reasons in particular. First,

the continuing poverty of much of Africa and Asia compared with Europe makes the continent attractive as a destination for immigrants. In 1990 the developed world had a per capita gross national product twenty-four times greater than that of poor countries. Unequal birthrates also make future migration likely. On the one hand the faster growth of non-European peoples creates land pressure and consequent unemployment and poverty in the countries in which they originate. At the same time the increasingly aging and infertile population of Europe will need people to work and care for them, which, however, means that foreigners will continue to move to the Continent as a disadvantaged manual work minority. In this sense the unequal relationship between Europe and the rest of the world will continue.

See also Migration (volume 2); Labor Markets (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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FROM 1350 TO 2000



VOLUME 2

Peter N. Stearns

Editor in Chief

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MODERNIZATION



Peter N. Stearns

The concept of modernization was developed primarily by historical sociologists, and primarily in the United States, during the 1950s. The theory derived in part from earlier work by seminal social scientists, such as Max Weber, dealing with cumulative historical developments such as bureaucratization and organizational rationalization. In addition to these credentials, modernization took from Marxism the idea of progressive historical change while denying the need for revolution as its motor. Modernization provided a more optimistic, less violent view of major change. The theory's sweep and implicit optimism were seen as an alternative to Marxist formulations and took root in the context of the cold war. It also put economic change, including industrialization, in a wide political and social context. Major scholars who outlined the theory and organized empirical studies on its base included Daniel Lerner, Alex Inkeles, and Myron Weiner. Cyril Black and Gilbert Rozman took the lead in historical applications and comparisons.

Modernization theorists contended that there were fundamental differences between modern and traditional societies involving changes in outlook and in political, economic, and social structure. Western Europe (and perhaps the United States) first developed these modern characteristics, which would, however, become standard in other societies over the course of time. Finally, in many formulations the key features of modern society were not only different from but preferable to those of traditional units: they involved more wealth and better health, more political freedoms and rights, more knowledge and control over superstition, and even more enlightened treatment of children.

Modernization theory was widely utilized for two decades, by social historians as well as social scientists. Social historians in the 1970s could easily refer to such developments as the modernization of the European family. Modernization of child rearing, for example, included new levels of affection for children and a reduction in harsh discipline, and historians found evidence of this process in the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries. A cluster of scholars worked on patterns of modernization in social protest, from rioting in defense of older, threatened standards to articulate political movements on behalf of newly claimed rights. These imaginative extensions of the theory added to the more obvious uses of modernization such as the expansion of education or greater geographic and social mobility.

Modernization theory also required definitions of traditional society, now sometimes called premodern. Shared characteristics of premodern societies ranged from lack of widespread literacy to an inability to conceive of political issues in abstract terms; premodern people, so the argument went, could only attach politics to the persons of particular monarchs or representatives. "Traditional" personalities looked to the past for guidance and, oriented to groups, lacked a commitment to individual identity. Sweeping generalizations about traditional societies, not always supported by careful research, proved to be one of modernization theory's greatest vulnerabilities.

Attacks on modernization emerged by the mid-1970s, led by critics like Dean Tipps, who argued against the use of purely Western models to measure modern world history. The concept fell into increasing disfavor; but it continues to have partisans and, more broadly, it often slips into untheoretical historical discourse. No longer widely debated or formally utilized by European social historians, modernization nevertheless deserves attention not simply as a relic but as an attempt to link various processes of change during the past several centuries.

MEANINGS AND USES OF THE CONCEPT

As a term "modernization" can be used with many meanings. It can refer simply to technological change: during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries military modernization, in this sense, can mean little more than updating weaponry. Economic modernization, though a bit broader in implication, can be little more

than a synonym for industrialization. Thus one could say that the French economy began to modernize in the 1820s, or the pace of modernization accelerated under Napoleon III in the 1850s.

However, the core meanings of the modernization concept, beyond surface descriptions, are twofold, with both aspects closely related. First, modernization often is used to describe patterns outside western Europe that are replicating patterns previously manifested within western Europe, or patterns that will or should develop in future. Thus Kemal Atatürk (first president of Turkey) attempted to modernize Turkey from the 1920s onward, mainly by attempting to introduce social forms that were already part of western European social history, broadly construed, a more secular society, wider education, industrial development, family planning, changes in the roles of women, and so on. This use of modernization treats modern European social history as a template for measuring or predicting developments outside of western Europe. Global modernization, particularly in optimistic 1960s formulations, assumed that all societies could ultimately modernize—that the social history of all civilizations would ultimately draw them closer to the trajectories of western Europe. But the formulations could also be used to identify lags: Why did Turkey modernize more slowly than the Soviet Union? Would India be able to modernize? In addition, the model could be used as a framework for comparisons of different modernization patterns, such as Soviet versus Western.

This first use of modernization theory, to summarize western European patterns as a predictive or at least descriptive model, assumed that such patterns could be agreed upon. Familiar components included industrialization, urbanization, the demographic transition (dramatically lower birth rates but also lower infant death rates), the rise of science, mass education and literacy, the growth of government and business bureaucracies, and changes in political structure, including wider suffrage. But there were areas of debate: Did modernization involve growing secularization or could/should it include new kinds of religious interests? Did it necessarily expand political participation and freedom? And there were areas of extension that went beyond some of the staples of modern European history: some modernization theorists thus posited the emergence of a modern personality type, contrasting with more traditional personalities in being more individualistic, more committed to a belief in progress, and less fatalistic.

The second meaning of modernization applied more directly to western European social history, though it undergirded the global application as well:

modernization theory suggested an intertwining of otherwise discrete processes, so that somehow (it was not always clear how, save in rough chronological lockstep) the processes supported each other and conjoined. Thus economic modernization—in the sense of industrialization, technological change in agriculture, and the growth of business units—occurred in relationship to several other major, parallel changes: the spread of education; the diffusion of more scientific outlooks; changes in the state, such as new levels of political participation, shifts in governmental function (more promotion of economic growth, less promotion of particular churches), and bureaucratization; changes in family structure, such as new levels of birth control and growing emphasis on the nuclear as opposed to the extended family; and a decline of privileges of birth and a rise of legal equality and opportunities for social mobility. The range of interconnections could be awesome, particularly when modernization involved not only structural changes—like the spread of factories or urbanization—but also shifts in outlook, including new attitudes toward children or, at its most ambitious, the new personality types. In both its meanings, modernization theory obviously assumed major and mutually related changes between traditional and modern societies.

The theory had a number of potential advantages. It could provide a shorthand: rather than running through all the discrete developments that made a modern society different from a traditional one, modernization theory would sum them up. It suggested attention to process: modernization took place over decades or possibly centuries in cases, such as western Europe, where there was no established model to imitate. The emphasis on interrelationships was attractive not only to social scientists interested less in history in detail than in history as a source of large, intelligible trends, but also to social historians concerned about linking their special topics—like family history—to more general developments, including some of the staples of modern political and intellectual history. Modernization theory made it possible to integrate more easily. Changes affecting ordinary people—the social historian's preferred focus—related to more familiar shifts in elite policy and behavior, if the whole society ultimately was heading in a common, modernizing direction. Changes in one facet of behavior, such as sexuality, could be linked not only to shifts in other clearly sociohistorical facets, such as attitudes to the body or health, but also to trends in political or intellectual life.

Finally, many historians of Europe who dealt with areas outside the western European core and with periods before the nineteenth century found modern-

ization theory useful. Russian experts, for example, were able to link some of the major trends in Russian history to apparently common, if earlier, modern patterns in Britain or France. Students of early modern European history, dealing with what might otherwise seem a rather remote seventeenth century, for example, gained new salience by suggesting that in order to understand the European modernization process, one had to go back to its prior stages, to patterns first shaped three or four centuries ago. The emphasis on process and interrelationship in modernization theory encouraged broad thinking yet at the same time could generate new claims for the significance of specialized areas of study.

Discussing modernization theory in the context of European social history involves three stages: first, defining what the theory implies in greater detail; second, noting some of the questions the theory inherently raises, to which social historians have supplied varying answers; and third, probing the various objections to the theory that have so dramatically reduced its acceptance among social historians (without, however, fully eliminating its use).

STRUCTURAL AND BEHAVIORAL MODERNIZATION

Western and eastern Europe obviously underwent a series of transformations in the framework for social and personal life, mostly beginning in western Europe in the eighteenth century. These changes include industrialization—with its conjoined features of expanded manufacturing, rapid technological shifts, and alterations of the organization of work, particularly through factories—and ultimately the increase in available wealth, however inequitably distributed. They also include the growth of urban influence and then the rapid growth of cities themselves. Change in basic social structures also involved the expansion of governments, including larger and more specialized bureaucracies, and, by the nineteenth century at least, the redefinition of government functions. The state's gradual assumption of responsibility for the education of all children, public health activities, mass military conscription, and some preliminary regulatory and welfare functions fall in the category of structural modernization, in altering the relationship between state and society.

The modernization of social frameworks could include at least three other facets. First, with industrialization and also the legal changes encouraged by the French Revolution (including equality before the law and the abolition of guilds), social class, based on

property, earnings, and to a lesser extent education, began to replace social order or estate, based on legal privilege as well as property, as the structure for social relationships. With this shift also came new popular definitions of, and interest in, social mobility; it seemed possible and desirable for more people to acquire schooling and money and so move up in status. Earnings replaced inherited legal status as the building block for social hierarchy.

Second, many modernization theorists were also comfortable with the idea of cultural modernization, whereby Europeans increasingly embraced a belief in progress and science and a growing interest in individual identities. These changes were associated with the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, particularly as now understood by cultural-social historians eager to probe popular beliefs as well as more formal intellectual activities. The decline of credence in magic, or at least public approval of beliefs rooted in magic, and their replacement by more rational calculations such as insurable risk would be part of a cultural modernization that redefined the structures of life as much as the fundamental alterations in government functions did. In a similar vein, though less strictly tied to the Enlightenment, the rise of national identities, replacing or modifying more traditional local and religious loyalties, were taken by some historians as signs of a modernizing mentality in western Europe. This development, beginning around the time of the French Revolution, was actively encouraged by expanding networks of newspapers and state-sponsored schools in the nineteenth century.

Finally, the idea of a modernization of health continues to appeal to some scholars. At first gradually and unevenly, then by the later nineteenth century quite rapidly, health conditions improved in western Europe. Measures such as vaccination, gains in food supply and the reliability of food transportation, the ultimate impact of public health programs such as sewage systems, and in the long run the results of more sanitary and effective medical procedures did improve longevity—while at the same time tolerance for traditional high levels of mortality decreased.

With structural modernization defined, some modernization theorists turned to related (perhaps resultant, perhaps merely concomitant) changes in people's behaviors, particularly in private areas over which they have greatest control, and in the values they apply to their behaviors and their environment. Here is where the modernization of the family entered. The concept of family modernization included growing emphasis on the nuclear unit as opposed to more extended family relationships. It also included, ultimately, a commitment to unprecedented levels of

birth control, designed both to protect the family's economic standing and to permit greater attention to, and expenditure on, individual children. It could include reevaluation of traditional child discipline. In some formulations, family modernization also meant the transition of the family from a unit largely intended as the basis for economic production, and formed with this goal in mind through arranged marriages and dowries, to a unit more focused on emotional and recreational satisfactions, with production increasingly moving out of the domestic setting.

Some social historians applied the idea of behavioral modernization, within the framework established by cultural modernization, to other developments they identified in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, especially in the west. Naming was one example. We know that by the late eighteenth century western Europeans had changed practices of naming infants in at least three respects, on average. First, they named infants relatively early, rather than waiting, as some Irish peasants once did, as much as two years to make sure the infant survived. Second, they no longer reused a name after a child died: new names were attached to each child born. Third, they gradually began to favor names based on criteria other than family tradition or religious figures, a shift that began to generate a certain faddism in name popularities that has continued to the present day. This set of changes can be taken as a sign of secularization in outlook and also of individuation, as parents came to see children as individual figures and to seek names that would encourage each child to do the same.

Similarly, historians of crime and historically minded criminologists explored the application of modernization theory to their area of interest. They examined how modernization brought a reduction in the ratio of crimes of violence to those of property, along with changes in policing and crime techniques. Some scholars, noting the unquestionable decline in murders per capita in western Europe from the Middle Ages at least until the late twentieth century, also discussed more effective social control and personal restraint and the link between these social and behavioral changes and broader processes of political and economic modernization.

The modernization of protest, particularly when it involved new beliefs about the relevance of political rights and a new capacity to raise novel demands, even more clearly linked behavioral changes to the larger patterns of structural modernization, including the redefinitions of the state. New state functions increased popular belief that the state should be a target of protest and that overtly political means could be used to obtain new rights.

On another, personal front, heightened consumer interests, now traced clearly to the eighteenth century in western Europe, seemed to signal a new commitment to materialism and material progress and also a new capacity to express personal meaning and identity in the acquisition of objects such as clothing—another possible sign of personal modernization. Few social historians have shared the sociological theorists' enthusiasm for a sweeping modernization statement that would attribute crime, education, protest, and consumerism to a modernized, as opposed to traditional, personality, but obviously social history findings have established ingredients that seem to reflect significant shifts in this direction.

QUESTIONS ABOUT MODERNIZATION

The above presentation of the main lines of structural and associated behavioral modernization suggests a tidy package—which is what advocates of the theory seek. Modernization, according to its advocates, should link a variety of major changes that distinguish a traditional from a fully modern society, and its clarity in summing up changes in western Europe should permit application of an empirically derived modernization model to other areas.

Yet, even in its most successful formulations, modernization theory has some obvious weaknesses and raises several crucial questions—some would add, like any very ambitious social-historical theory. Most obviously, causation was unclear. Modernization theory was primarily descriptive, talking about linkages whose concomitant occurrence could be traced. Unlike Marxism, it does not really seek to assess what would cause the whole process to start. Yet the interconnections among trends that modernization theory insists upon imply causation. The problem is that the theory itself does not clearly stipulate priorities; it does not clearly indicate what factors came first in launching the whole process. To the extent that most social historians, confronted with some of the big changes in modern history, also seek to explore the factors that prompted them, modernization tantalizes more than it satisfies.

What, for example, was the role of education in the European modernization process? Many non-European observers, looking in the nineteenth century at Europe's industrialization, felt that education was a key factor in causing economic change. Thus Muhammed Ali, the reform leader who seized power in Egypt in the 1820s and 1830s, sent students to European technical schools. Japanese reformers in the 1860s, like Yukichi Fukuzawa, saw educational reform

as the key means of introducing Western-like commitments to science and innovation into Japanese culture. But actual educational change occurred very slowly in European social history. Literacy had advanced by the later eighteenth century, though often to rudimentary levels, but exposure to formal schooling was in most places haphazard and incomplete until after the 1860s. Further, several social historians have shown that until the late nineteenth century the connection between educational achievement and industrial development was loose at best—as witnessed by the individual success of relatively uneducated workers or, at a more macro level, the industrial achievements but educational lag of Great Britain. So the question of where education fits in the causation stream of European modernization goes unanswered.

The issue of technology change is another example. Modernization theory obviously assumes major changes in industrial and military technology, and technology levels form one of the most obvious contrasts between traditional and modern societies. But modernization theory does not indicate causal priorities, whether new technology causes or results from basic initial modernization. Once again, the theory invites causal analysis—from what stage of structural or behavioral modernization did a key invention like the steam engine flow, for example—but offers no clear resolution.

Linked to the problem of causation is modernization theory's chronological imprecision, particularly when applied to European social history. When, in time, does modernization definitively begin? Unlike Japan after 1868, western Europe made no explicit decision to reform in modernizing directions. The above discussion suggests the eighteenth century as seedbed, but many historians would place key changes earlier. Was the Renaissance, with its more secular outlook and commercial emphasis, part of the modernization process? Some medievalists, eager to claim their period's role in ongoing trends, have argued that the inception of the modern European state goes back to the twelfth century, when greater centralization, expansion of governmental function, and the beginnings of bureaucratic specialization can clearly be traced. How can this claim, empirically accurate, be assessed in terms of modernization theory? Because the criteria for the inception of modernization are vague, answering chronological questions of this sort is difficult. Yet, without the capacity to deal with these issues, can the theory be of use in European social history?

Problems of chronological origins are not necessarily irresolvable. Because modernization theory insists on the cooccurrence of major changes, it is pos-

sible to argue that a single strand of development, such as the expansion of the central monarchies in the high Middle Ages, does not constitute the process, however much such changes may unintentionally prepare the way. But the theory remains vague, and this kind of sorting out has not occurred.

The same problems of definition, causation, and chronological precision apply when the theory is extended to other parts of Europe. Russia provides a classic example. Peter the Great's selective Westernization program, initiated around 1700, brought major change to Russia. Military technology and organization, aspects of economic production (particularly in metallurgy and arms), and elite culture and education all shifted significantly. Virtually all surveys of Russian history refer to Peter's major role in Russian modernization. But is this when modernization began in Russia? Did Peter's forceful changes merely accelerate earlier developments, or were his initiatives too lopsided and forced to initiate a broad modernization? Again, the answer to when modernization begins may be sought in the coherence of change, particularly in terms of social history. A historical setting like eighteenth-century Russia, in which commerce and merchant groups did not significantly advance, mass culture was unaltered, and conditions of serfdom became more rigorous, is not a setting that clearly suggests modernization. Dissociation of Peter's reforms from modernization would not downgrade the reforms' significance, but it would remind us that not all major change, even within the last three centuries, can be lumped under a single heading. Yet modernization theory is not in fact historically precise enough to permit a definitive response to this aspect of the Russian case: the issue of when modernization begins opens more questions than answers.

The same issue of definition applies to the end of the modernization process. At what point, and by what criteria, can one say that a society is modernized, such that further major change no longer attaches to a modernization process? When a society is urban, industrial, bureaucratized, individualistic—is it modernized? Current theoretical formulations that refer to postmodern societies, as in western Europe after World War II, suggest an end to the modernization process and its replacement with another set of basic trends. But the postmodern concept, outside of specific realms such as art and architecture, is itself rather vague. Some basic modernizing features seem to persist, in western Europe and elsewhere, for example, in the changes in peasant habits that see peasants become avid consumers, eager for complex technology, with reduced interest in the land. The result is another incompletely resolved problem for analysis: Is the con-

cept of modernization useful in dealing with advanced industrial societies in the twenty-first century and, if not, when and by what criteria did its utility cease?

Issues of causation and chronology are joined by those of geography. Here, to be sure, modernization theory is quite clear: basically similar processes should occur when a society modernizes, regardless of where it is located. Yet most European social historians remain attached to older historical habits that insist, to some degree at least, on peculiarities of place. They are thus inclined to point to significant distinctions between the modern history of, say, France and that of England—even though in modernization theory the two nations should be readily coupled. French industrialization emphasized craft products more than British industrialization did, it relied on a larger female labor force, and it generated a more politically radical working class. Modernization would insist on the common elements in the industrialization process, and perhaps rightly so; but many social historians would be uncomfortable with dismissing these important regional differences. And if this problem applies to two close Western neighbors, the comparative issues loom even larger if eastern and western Europe are to be seen sharing a historical dynamic (if at slightly different times), or if the United States (a clearly modernizing society) is amalgamated with western European history. Modernization theory can make allowance for differences in specific context in terms of when the basic process of change begins, but it does not so readily accommodate other distinctions.

This problem of geography relates, in turn, to a final general set of questions, this one about the traditional society from which modernization departs. At an extreme, modernization theorists, in their enthusiasm for common processes of change, might imply an undifferentiated traditional society, which change will itself gradually erase. Comparative scholars more commonly noted the importance of different traditional contexts, caused, for example, by religious distinctions: thus Russia's Christianity contrasted with Japan's cultural heritage, leading to sensitive discussions of different paths to modernization. Even with these allowances, however, the emphasis on common processes remained strong.

Yet most social historians, looking at parts of Europe before the eighteenth century, remain far more interested in regional patterns. Guild structures, for example, loomed far larger in eighteenth-century Germany than in England. Would this difference be wiped away by a common modernization, or would it produce deep differences in the process of change in both countries? Family systems, too, varied considerably. In many parts of Europe, social historians have discov-

ered that the nuclear family was the predominant unit by the later Middle Ages. Thus the assumption by some modernization theorists that a common traditional extended family pattern everywhere inevitably yielded to nuclear family organization loses accuracy in the case of western Europe and much of North America. In other words, empirically "traditional" societies varied greatly, and to the extent these variations continued to affect aspects of modern social history, the resulting diversity seriously compromises modernization's accuracy and claim to universality.

OBJECTIONS TO MODERNIZATION THEORY

Modernization theory not only raises huge historical issues, it also has provoked ringing dissent and attack. Social historians were reacting vigorously against the theory by the early 1980s: while one held out for "better than no model at all," other comments included "too big and slippery for deft manipulation," "historically crude," "elusive," and "inadequate . . . for comprehending the diversity of the human experience during several centuries of social transformation."

By this point, modernization theory ceased to be applied to many aspects of historical change. Historians who had used modernization to describe changes in protest or family patterns, for example, dropped the reference. Models of changes in protest forms and goals persisted or, as in the case of the family, the links between traditional and more recent patterns might be reevaluated and made more complicated; but either way, modernization no longer seemed to help. Modernization theory seemed irrelevant to major new discoveries, such as the existence of an active consumer culture in western Europe in the eighteenth century. Even when this early culture was directly linked to more recent consumer patterns, analysts no longer made modernization references at all; the links were evaluated and explained more discretely. New findings in the history of crime—for example, that violence shifted in the late nineteenth century from attacks against relative strangers to attacks against family members—similarly implied no new facet of modernization.

Three basic objections emerged by the mid-1970s. First, and most vigorously, scholars from various disciplines objected to modernization's ethnocentric qualities: that all societies should be measured and all predictions should be founded on western Europe as a standard model. This critique was an extension of the geographical homogenization questions about modernization, and it has proved very powerful. Mod-

ernization references still are applied to “non-Western” societies such as Latin America and China on the basis of presumed previous Western trends, but all-out partisans are now few in number.

Second, modernization’s characteristic optimism drew criticism, even when applied to western Europe. The blanket notion that modern people are in all ways better off than premodern people is not now widely accepted. Here social historians like E. P. Thompson have contributed powerfully, though earlier theories such as Marxism already constrained optimism. Studies of the relationship between modern work and premodern work, in terms of stress and satisfaction alike, call linear progressive models into question; many features of work have arguably deteriorated with greater time pressures, de-skilling, and removal from community life. The same applies to aspects of leisure, or community cohesion, or even child rearing (which once was seen as a dramatic area of modern advance). Ironically, these evaluative objections do not destroy other features of the theory: a society might modernize and get worse, or at least generate mixed results. But in practice, greater skepticism about the benefits of modern life has contributed to modernization’s fall from grace.

Finally, and most important in terms of European social history, modernization’s implications of ultimate, basic uniformity in the direction of change have drawn attack. Precisely because social historians see societies composed of radically different groups, they have trouble accepting common ultimate dynamics. What does modernization mean, for example, when the experiences and values of workers and the middle class vary so? Where modernization theory once assumed that, ultimately, peasants would modernize (technologically, politically, and culturally) and so merge with urban groups, social historians are now more prone to note persistent distinctions, based on differences in power and prior class culture.

The new levels of attention historians paid to gender called forth similar objections, along with an obvious empirical problem. Modernization theory had focused very little on the issue of gender. Historians now asked, did men and women “modernize” in the same ways? If modernization meant individuation, for example, how can this apply to the special domestic, subservient ideology created for women in the most “modern,” middle-class families in western Europe during the century of industrialization? More fundamentally, does modernization mean more or less formal participation for women in the workforce? The answer is clearly less (except for key cases like Russia, where industrialization proved compatible with continuing high levels of women’s work). But if the mod-

ernization process persists into the mid-twentieth century, then it embraces a massive reinsertion of women into the labor force. Applying the modernization formula is immensely complicated, precisely because of the diverse experiences of different social classes and of men and women.

The combined force of these objections accounts for the waning commitment to modernization theory; its moment of glory in social history has thus far proved brief. In the international arena, world economy theory, arguing for the durable importance of economic relationships first set up in the fifteenth century, is now far more widely used than modernization; it stresses diversity between dominant and subordinate international trading areas and is often pessimistic about outcomes, in marked contrast to the modernization model.

For European social history itself, no model with modernization’s sweep has arrived to reclaim the power of synthesis: no overarching framework unites various facets of social change. Important theoretical statements have been devised or revived: considerable work on personal habits and family relationships, for example, utilizes Norbert Elias’s theory of the “civilizing process,” in which, beginning with the European upper classes, people gained and expected greater restraint over the body and over emotions. But this theory’s range of application is more limited than modernization’s.

Yet modernization theory has not perished. A group of staunch partisans, mainly survivors of the ambitious cluster of sociologists who first delineated the theory in the 1950s, continues productive work, in general statements and also in using the theory to frame the modern social and political history of places like Russia or China. Gilbert Rozman’s syntheses are a case in point. A second locus of the theory involves the casual references to a city “becoming modern” or peasants “responding to modernization” in social history studies that shy away from larger theoretical pronouncements. This second use suggests the ongoing momentum of the theory in summing up related changes in societal structure, and perhaps some ongoing utility as well.

Finally, though hesitantly, a few social historians have tried to refine the theory by noting the key difficulties attached and urging a more selective application. Here, the basic approach is twofold. First, addressing both western European and world history, these cautious advocates urge a clearer agreement on what did, in fact, change very widely—the commitment to mass education is a case in point—where modernization really can describe seemingly universal social impulses. At the same time, areas of greater di-

versity or complexity must simply be dropped, in an admission that modernization cannot accurately cover all facets of social change and continuity. Thus it is silly to talk of the “modernization of women” without immediate restrictions and complications—even in western European society alone. The second component of the refinement of modernization theory involves urging social historian critics to see the forest as well as the trees, to look at longer-run patterns as well as short-term complexities. For example, critics argue that talking about a shared modernization process makes little sense for middle-class owners and factory workers in the 1870s, despite some common involvements in new levels of schooling, work organizations, and the like. But others would respond that looking at a broader picture, as class differentiations ultimately moderated somewhat, may provide greater

support for the idea of participation in common processes—processes that would not produce identical cultures or behaviors, but that would bring some genuine convergence.

Since 1980 modernization theory has inspired relatively little new work in social history. References are infrequent, sometimes dismissive, casual at best, beyond the core of true believers. Yet the need and, perhaps, the possibility for some overarching linkages among major facets of social change over the past three centuries is hard to deny. This, surely, is why modernization continues to crop up as a subliminal scholarly shorthand, in dealing with huge processes such as technology and culture—both in western European history and in the history of places like Russia and Spain, whose relationship to Western history forms part of the essential analytical framework.

See also Generations of Social History (volume 1), the section The Periods of Social History (volume 1), and the other articles in this section.

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TECHNOLOGY



Kristine Bruland

The relationship between technology and social history raises two kinds of considerations. The initial section of this essay takes a conceptual approach, examining the nature of technology itself. Is technology a separate force, as is often assumed by historians of technology, or does it interact with society in more complex ways, such that social forces may help explain technological developments and vice versa? The second category of considerations involves the actual development of technology as part of European social history, which is taken up in the second section of this essay. In terms of chronology, the conventional division between technology before and after the industrial revolution forms the main organizing principle.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

What are the relationships between processes of technological change and the social context? Until very recently technological change has usually been viewed primarily in terms of hardware: impressive, ingenious and increasingly sophisticated engineering solutions to the problems posed by production tasks. For a long time these solutions tended to be seen as rather autonomous in character, so that they could be understood without much in the way of social context. For example, the five-volume *History of Technology* edited by Charles Singer and collaborators and published between 1954 and 1958 follows technology from the earliest stages of human evolution to the twentieth century. Its 4000 pages cover technical developments (in terms of hardware and specific operative practices) in metalworking, textiles, pottery, and other areas in considerable detail but contain only one brief article by Gordon Childe on technology in terms of social practice.

The role of social factors in the history of technological change gives rise to a range of explanatory problems at different levels. There is, for example, a quite abstract level at which the general propensity of an economic system for such change is explored; this

is the level that David Landes (1998) has explored. Then there are questions about why particular sectors of the economy exhibit a propensity for technical change; here one would have to consider questions of how technological opportunity emerges as well as questions of industrial structure; the development of markets, patterns, and levels of demand; the structure and capacity of producer goods industries; state economic policy; and so on. Finally there are questions about why specific technologies develop and what factors shape their diffusion. All of these levels have been researched, in one way or another, from a social perspective. But it is probably this last which has formed the most important focus of recent research. Social factors have been to the forefront in the analysis of how technologies originate and diffuse. As a recent study covering aircraft, fluorescent lights, steel, atomic energy, and electricity production and distribution claimed:

Technologies do not, we suggest, evolve under the impetus of some necessary inner technological or scientific logic. They are not possessed of an inherent momentum. If they evolve or change, it is because they have been pressed into that shape. . . . Technology does not spring, *ab initio*, from some disinterested fount of innovation. Rather it is born of the social, the economic, and the technical relations that are already in place. A product of the existing structure of opportunities and constraints, it extends, shapes or reproduces that structure in ways that are more or less unpredictable. (Bijker and Law, 1992, pp. 5, 11)

The more traditional and still to some extent dominant view is that technology is something that might have profound social effects but which has developed and spread on the basis of rather autonomous processes of artisan development or, in the modern era, scientific and engineering advance. This kind of determinism has in recent years been supplanted by approaches that seek to set technical or engineering processes against the background of the social environments in which they are generated and put to work. From this perspective, technology immediately begins to look more complicated, and we can begin

to see ways in which the social environment shapes technological evolution, as much as it is shaped by it.

Modern perspectives begin by conceptualising technology in ways that move beyond the level of material technique. Of course technology does involve hardware (machines, tools, infrastructure) and technique (in the sense of routines of technical practice), but it also involves at least two other primary dimensions, namely knowledge and organisation, both of which are social phenomena. Technology involves, for example, the production and maintenance of knowledge, both in terms of formal scientific and technical disciplines and also as an equally important array of tacit knowledge. These human skills—sometimes codified, but equally often developed gradually by individuals and taking the form of acquired skills—are an integral part of all processes of production and work. Then there are the crucially important processes of organisation and management through which hardware and technique are set to work. On the one hand these organisation and managerial issues involve decisions about how production processes are to be subdivided, operated, integrated, and supervised; this element of technological practice has a complex history of its own. The publication in 1974 of Harry Braverman's *Labor and Monopoly Capital* was a key event in this area. Braverman argued that the history of modern capitalist production is characterised by a consistent attempt to separate conceptual aspects of production (in terms of human skill and control) from the actual process of work; technological change in the modern era thus involves a persistent “degradation of work,” and modern management is essentially a method for organising this. There is now a wide literature on the history of work organisation and its links to technological change and society. However, there are also equally important managerial issues involved in integrating technological aspects of production with the wider processes of commercial calculation, marketing, financial organisation, and so on, which firms must undertake. Finally, these elements of knowledge, hardware, and organisation at the firm level occur within a much broader and extremely complex social framework of economic, political, and cultural relationships. This social environment both facilitates and constrains the development, use, and spread of technologies in many ways: for example, through cultural attitudes that affect levels and types of education or that place different valuations on technical or economic achievement.

Central to modern conceptual approaches, therefore, is the idea that the histories of technologies should be seen in their economic and social context and that the focus should extend wider than to em-

brace just technical artefacts. The point here is that the evolution of technologies involves complex social processes of conflict, negotiation, compromise, and adaptation, and technological change cannot be understood in isolation from these social dimensions. In these approaches, society is not seen as adapting to a deterministic process of technological change, but rather it is social values and decisions that shape the path of technological development. It is a short step from this to the idea that differences in technological performance between societies have at least some of their roots in social structure and social forms, although how these differences operate is as yet far from clear. Nonetheless, technological developments have important impacts on the social world, on the environment, the way we work, and on our general social interrelations. So understanding the evolution of technology in the long run is in part a process of understanding the history of the wider society in which technology is embedded. Socio-technical interplay has only recently emerged as a systematic theme in historical studies. While study of technical and social interaction has frequently been found in historical work, there has also often been a strain of technological determinism, which has raised considerable problems in understanding technological dynamics and their relation to the social context.

Society and technology in the very long run.

The link between human society and technology goes back a long way. The evolution of human societies and even the dominance of *homo sapiens* as a species are intimately joined with the evolution of technology. Early hominid fossil records, for example, are usually found in close proximity to remains of stone implements, and the extension of human society over the earth's surface seems to be founded on mastery of a number of apparently simple (but arguably rather complex) technologies: stone weapons, the management of fire, and the construction of shelter, for example. These technologies emerged in the distant past and characterised the paleolithic and neolithic periods, in which humans evolved complex understandings of animal behaviour, pyrotechnology, weapons manufacture, medical practice, materials, and so on. It has been argued that even these distant technologies can be analysed in terms of evolutionary sequences; the archeological record of such tools exhibits considerable variation, which led George Basalla to argue that

The modern technological world in all its complexity is merely the latest manifestation of a continuum that extends back to the dawn of humankind, and to the

first shaped artefacts. Stone implements may not offer a crucial test for the evolutionary thesis, but they provide the best illustration of continuity operating over an extended period of time. (Basalla, 1988, pp. 30–31)

From the neolithic period (from ca. 5000 B.C.) this very slow evolution developed into a number of very profound technological revolutions, of which probably five are especially significant, apart from those mentioned above: the domestication of animals, cultivation of food and “industrial” plants (such as plants used for vessels, construction materials, fibres, and so on), the development of pottery, the development of textiles, and the evolution of metallurgy.

The evidence for the emergence and use of these technologies is primarily archeological, but over this period we have the first sustained phase of what can reasonably be called “radical” change. H. S. Harrison remarks that

The centuries following the development of the initial features of Neolithic culture, during which the hunter and gatherer first became a farmer and stock breeder, were the most significant in the history of human progress. Steps were taken then that were essential to the building of civilizations upon which later cultural revolutions depended. . . . the evidence indicates that the ferment leading to the development of the new culture was in progress before 5000 B.C. Centuries, and not years only, were consumed in the processes which led to the cultivation of cereals and the domestication of hoofed animals. New opportunities and stimuli emerged that led into other fields of discovery and invention. (Harrison, 1958, p. 79)

Harrison points to three further key features of these technological revolutions, which are found persistently in the historical literature and are relevant also in understanding modern large-scale technological change. First, the time periods involved in these shifts are long—the development of radically new technologies is slow, and therefore for long periods new techniques (such as metal implements) co-exist with the old (such as implements of wood and stone). Second, technical advance has an evolutionary character with new developments opening up further opportunities and thus gradually speeding up the overall process of change. Third, there is a close relationship between large-scale technological change and the social context. The emergence of new technological regimes interacted in significant ways with technical divisions of labour, productivity, and patterns of exchange. In particular, historians have emphasized the fact that increasing productivity raises the question of the distribution of the gains from growth; this is central to questions of the emergence of hierarchy, order, and power in human society. In the very long run, shifts

in technological regime cannot therefore be separated from the evolution of social forms as such.

Early social conflict and technological change: the case of the water mill.

With respect to modern and premodern eras, it has long been recognised by historians that the diffusion of major technologies is often closely linked to social factors such as patterns of ownership, economic organisation, and income distribution. A classic analysis of such factors was developed by Marc Bloch in his study of the diffusion of water-powered mills in England. The grinding of corn in England, as in all medieval societies, was an activity of key economic significance; the technological alternatives were handmills, which operated on a very small scale with human muscle power, and water mills, which operated with considerably greater speed and efficiency. Yet water mills diffused very slowly as a technique for corn grinding in the period after the eleventh century. The reason for this lies not in the technique itself but in the way the technique was integrated with particular patterns of ownership and social control. After the Norman Conquest of England control of rivers and streams became part of an attempt to impose a new social system based on manorial rights through which landowners claimed income and services from other social classes:

Manorial rights were not an institution native to England. The Norman conquerors had imported them from the continent as one of the principal elements in the manorial system which after the almost total dispossession of the Saxon aristocracy they methodically established. (Bloch, 1985, p. 75)

The watermill was in effect monopolised by the seigniorial class and used as a method of revenue extraction. As part of this process, handmills were proscribed, with a wide variety of attempts to eliminate their existence and use, often by force. This attempt to facilitate use of the water technology by direct suppression of the competing technology failed in the long run, and the consequence was a very slow spread of the apparently superior technology. Bloch’s key point in analyzing this process was the deep interconnection between social power, embedded interests, and the processes of use and diffusion of a technology. The fates of the competing technologies were therefore shaped by the fact that different social classes championed them for different economic ends, and the diffusion of the technologies depended on the outcome of sustained social struggle.

Comparative technological development across societies.

Social factors have also been deployed

around the major historical problem of differences in the rates and direction of technological change across societies. There can be no doubt that many societies are capable of sustained and ingenious invention. Joseph Needham's magisterial *Science and Civilisation in China* showed beyond any doubt that China pioneered a wide range of technical advances; similar points can be made with respect to the Arab world in such key areas as written texts, mathematics, and so on. Yet, as Joel Mokyr has remarked, "The greatest enigma in the history of technology is the failure of China to sustain its technological superiority." Mokyr surveys a plethora of explanations for this but ultimately supports the view that a constraining social order was the core of the problem:

The difference between China and Europe was that in Europe the power of any social group to sabotage an innovation it deemed detrimental to its interests was far smaller. First, in Europe technological change was essentially a matter of private initiative; the role of the rulers was secondary and passive. Few significant contributions to non-military technology were initiated by the state in Europe before (or during) the Industrial Revolution. There was a market for ideas, and the government entered these markets as just another customer or, more rarely, a supplier. Second, whenever a European government chose to take an actively hostile attitude towards innovation and the nonconformism that bred it, it had to face the consequences. . . . the possibilities of migration in Europe allowed creative and original thinkers to find a haven if their place of birth was insufficiently tolerant, so that in the long run, reactionary societies lost out in the competition for wealth and power. (Mokyr, 1990, p. 233)

Although serious histories of technology have been written around the centrality of social forces in technological evolution for many years now, it would be a mistake to think that technological determinism is dead. It is common for writers and analysts (with the notable exception of James R. Beniger) to speak as though the revolution in information and communications technologies is autonomous and is reshaping society, but it is hard to doubt that this area too will come to be seen in the kind of context outlined above.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY

Medieval and Renaissance technology. Most approaches to the development of technology in European culture stress the inventiveness of medieval and renaissance Europe, combined with relatively slow or limited diffusion and use of new technologies. Historians such as Bloch, Lynn White, and Bertrand Gille have shown the medieval development or adoption of

a wide range of technologies, such as new forms of plow and harness in agriculture, the open field system, moveable type, and powered machinery. In a recent overview, Frances and Joseph Gies showed the importance of complex infrastructural developments, such as bridges, cathedrals, and fortifications on the one hand and on the other hand, of commercial innovation such as milling, textiles, glass, double-entry bookkeeping, and general accounting techniques. But it really cannot be claimed that these technologies came into widespread use. Mokyr makes a similar point with respect to Renaissance technologies. Clearly we should be cautious about using catchall terms such as the "Renaissance" to describe such a wide and differentiated period, but however we label it the period 1500–1750 generated a wide range of new technical developments in agriculture, mining pumps, precision instruments, tools, and other technologies. But the period is at least as interesting in terms of what did not happen, namely the widespread application of these technologies in a context of technical and productivity advancement. This is primarily a matter of the social and institutional context. Europe was only in the early stages of evolving the social framework which would sharply stimulate not only the development of technologies but their widespread application.

Still, the early modern period did see steady technological evolution in major branches of the European economy. It was in this period that western Europe gradually shifted from being a borrower of Asian technologies such as explosive powder, the compass, and printing, to being a technological leader. Gradual changes in mining and metallurgy boosted European technology by 1600. Adaptations in the printing press, with the use of movable type, propelled Europe to a clear advantage in printing even earlier. By 1700 new technologies in many branches of textiles made Europe a world leader in that area.

The decades from the late seventeenth century to the advent of James Watt's steam engine (1765) saw an accelerating pace of technological change spurred not only by Europe's lead in world trade, but also by growing artisanal freedom from guild restrictions in England and Scotland and by some spillover from the scientific revolution. Social and cultural causes, in other words, explain technological change along with world economic position, while the technological changes in turn fed further social shifts. For the first time since the Middle Ages agricultural technology received attention (at the same time that Europeans were introduced to New World crops like the potato). New methods of drainage expanded available land in places like Holland, while the seed drill and even wider use of the scythe instead of the sickle for

harvesting led to modest increases in productivity. The other main sector in which there was significant technological advance was domestic manufacturing, where new techniques such as the flying shuttle for weaving (1733), while still relying on manual or foot power, partially automated processes and so increased productivity. These developments soon proved compatible with water or steam power, combining to generate the technological basis for the industrial revolution proper. In the interim, new technologies fed the rapid commercial and manufacturing expansion of rural and urban areas in western Europe and fostered other changes such as the growth of consumerism.

Industrialization and the new technological era.

Many of the issues involved in the interaction between society and technology become critical in the modern period, characterized as it is by incessant technological change and continuous productivity growth. What is often referred to as the industrial revolution began in England in the late eighteenth century and is usually and rightly regarded as a technological watershed, yet

its interpretation gives rise to major problems of technological determinism.

Influential explanatory accounts ascribe the industrial revolution to the effects of the deployment of new techniques as the primary agent of economic advance. The strongest version of this argument is written around the steam engine:

If we were to try to single out the crucial inventions which made the industrial revolution possible and ensured a continuous process of industrialization and technical change, and hence sustained economic growth, it seems that the choice would fall on the steam engine on one hand, and on the other Cort's puddling process which made a cheap and acceptable British malleable iron. (Deane, 1965, p. 130)

In effect, the rise of the Watt steam engine has long been treated in British historiography as a decisive event in industrialization. The heroic approach began with the first systematic work on the industrial revolution, *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century*, by Arnold Toynbee (1852–1883), which focused on the Watt steam engine and the “four

great inventions” which revolutionized the cotton textile industry—the spinning jenny (1770), the water-frame (1769), Crompton’s spinning mule (1779) and the automatic mule (1825) of Richard Roberts. Toynbee took an essentially determinist view of technology; for example, in seeking to explain the rise of urban industrialization and the decline of the outwork system, he suggested that the emergence of the factory was “the consequence of the mechanical discoveries of the time,” and indeed that the steam engine was the basic permissive factor in economic liberalisation. Toynbee had a major impact on subsequent economic history. His technological emphases were repeated in Paul Mantoux’s classic *Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century* and in a wide range of later works up to and including Landes’s *Unbound Prometheus*, which remains the major work on technological development in Western Europe. Mantoux focused the second part of his work, titled “Inventions and Factories,” on exactly the same sequence of textile inventions to which Toynbee drew attention, plus Henry Cort’s iron process (1783–1784) and the Watt engine. Landes did likewise, adding a discussion of power tools and chemicals. It is only in recent years that a counteremphasis has emerged in which small scale innovation has been placed in the forefront of analysis. Donald McCloskey, for example, emphasized that by 1860 only about 30 percent of British employment was in “activities that had been radically transformed in technique since 1780” and that innovations “came more like a gentle (though unprecedented) rain, gathering here and there in puddles. By 1860 the ground was wet, but by no means soaked, even at the wetter spots. Looms run by hand and factories run by water survived in the cotton textile industry in 1860.” G. N. von Tunzelmann (1981) argued that “the usual stress on a handful of dramatic breakthroughs is seriously open to question,” and that what mattered was the variety and pervasiveness of innovation.

This general account has not gone without challenge, however. For a start it runs into serious problems of chronology: in the words of G. N. von Tunzelmann, “if the Industrial Revolution was to be dated from around 1760, as Toynbee believed, then the Watt engine can hardly have triggered off industrialization, since it was not being marketed commercially until the mid-1770s.” Even where there is a clear temporal correlation between expanded output and technical change, as in cotton and in the period 1760–1800, the causal relations are not at all obvious. Others have pointed out that the large factory was uncharacteristic in the eighteenth century; that historians of industrialization have seriously neglected agriculture, “the dominant sphere of the economy at

this time, and also the most intensively capitalist of any sector,” as Keith Tribe has called it; that hand techniques persisted in sector after sector until well into the nineteenth century, and that it is therefore, according to Raphael Samuel, “not possible to equate the new mode of production with the factory system.” All of these considerations suggest a need for a closer look at the social aspects of technological change during the industrial revolution.

Social determinants of innovation in the industrial revolution. Although economic historians have, on the whole, a much more complex understanding of the industrialization process than economists, they have nonetheless followed economists in focusing on aspects of the economic environment (entry conditions, for example, or the structure of factor prices), or the impact of technological change on, for example, productivity growth, rather than on the sources and character of technological change as such. The approach taken by much of the literature on the social dimensions of industrialization has been similar in that it focused on the impacts of technology but not on the dynamics of innovation itself. This was probably because of the long lasting influence of the first systematic examinations of industrialization, the Parliamentary Select Committee hearings that began in the early nineteenth century, and the substantial literature on industrialization to which they gave rise. Within this literature the emphasis was on working conditions, health effects, mortality, and other impacts on the new working class. This type of approach was followed through in the classic sociological study of industrialization, Neil J. Smelser’s *Social Change in the Industrial Revolution* (1959), and then in modern social history.

The approaches of social and economic historians have said little about the technologies themselves. So although technological change is treated as a major factor in early industrialization, it is rarely itself explained in any systematic way. In some cases this occurs because of an explicit or implicit technological determinism, as noted above, which sees technology as an autonomous explanatory force. It is quite common in the literature to find arguments to the effect that the transition to the factory, the rise of new forms of enterprise, or the development of cost accounting, for example, are responses to technological change. It is rare, on the other hand, to find detailed or systematic treatments of the evolution of specific technologies.

Indeed, with the exception of the literature on steam power, we have no systematic histories of the core technologies of early industrialization. Instead

what we have had until very recently is *Hamlet* without the Prince: an economic historiography written largely around the impact of new technologies, but with little analysis of the processes that produce specific areas of technological development, or that determine why some technologies succeed and some fail.

Where we have had attempts to explain the development of technological change in the industrial revolution, the explanations have emphasized the new social context of commercial calculation. Landes, for example, in *Unbound Prometheus*, writes of technical change in European industrialization as an effect of a conjunction of Western “rationality” (by which is meant means-end calculation) and a “Faustian spirit of mastery.” Samuel Lilley, on the other hand, emphasised the causal effectivity of the control, decision-making capacity, and incentives to innovate that characterize the capitalist entrepreneur:

The capitalist entrepreneur is aware—to a degree that no previous exploiter is aware—of how much he stands to gain from this or that technical change. He probably also has enough technological knowledge to judge the practicability of an invention, perhaps even to invent for himself. And the cold steel of competition reinforces this awareness and eliminates those who do not possess it. Hence derives the extreme sensitivity of response to technological opportunity that eighteenth century entrepreneurs repeatedly exhibited. (Lilley, 1978, pp. 219–220)

It should be emphasized that these aspects of the new technological environment are essentially social: they rest on new powers of ownership and control in production. However, we can go beyond these general factors into accounts of the determinants of specific lines of technical change. Modern analysis suggests that the technological change process is not general but focused, and that this is one of the primary explanatory problems which technological advance presents. Against this background the history of technological change is in fact one of advance in quite specific directions, often concentrated not just on particular sectors of the economy but on particular processes within sectors subject to change. In a word, there appear to be priorities. The theoretical problem here has been most succinctly outlined by Nathan Rosenberg:

In the realm of pure theory, a decision maker bent on maximising profits under competitive conditions will pursue any possibility for reducing costs. . . . What forces, then, determine the directions in which a firm actually goes in exploring for new techniques? Since it cannot explore all directions, what are the factors which induce it to strike out in a particular direction? Better yet, are there any factors at work which compel it to look in some directions rather than others? (Rosenberg, 1977, pp. 110–111)

If the explanation of technological change should be understood in terms of explaining the direction of technological change, then we should seek to explain why technological advance has specific trajectories. This is in large part a matter looking at the social and technical problems which the innovator seeks to solve. Rosenberg has proposed three such “problem areas”: technological complementarities, in which imbalances between technical processes induce correcting innovations; supply disruptions of various kinds, leading to innovations to provide substitute products and processes; and labour conflict, in which strikes or plant-level struggles generate “a search for labour-saving machines.”

The latter issue was particularly important during the industrial revolution; it gave rise to Marx’s famous remark that “it would be possible to write a whole history of the inventions made since 1830 for the sole purpose of providing capital with weapons against working class revolt.” This claim has in fact been researched in terms of the sources of innovation during industrialization, and a number of confirming instances have been found. Kristine Bruland (1982) described three important technologies deriving from an attempt to “innovate around” labor conflicts, showing that a number of key innovations in textiles (including the first fully automatic machine in history) could be ascribed to the desire of entrepreneurs and engineers to automate their way around persistent conflicts with powerful shop-floor operatives. Conventional interpretations of industrial technology, in other words, do not deal adequately with the pace and extent of adoption of new technologies or the nature of social and cultural, rather than “great inventor,” causation. More recent interpretations have revealed the role of social forces in the construction of “heroic inventors,” as in Christine MacLeod’s study of Watt and the steam engine.

By the mid-nineteenth century the pace and extent of new technologies unquestionably accelerated. Railroads and steamships transformed transportation from the 1820s onward, and the telegraph began to do the same for communication. Metallurgy was revolutionized by the substitution of coal for charcoal and the invention of the Bessemer process (1850s) for making steel. Printing was automated and larger printing presses were introduced. By the 1870s, use of electrical and gasoline motors anchored the set of new technologies sometimes referred to as the second industrial revolution.

The basis for invention increasingly shifted from individual tinkerers, usually of artisanal background, to organized, collective research in large companies, government agencies, and universities.

German firms pioneered the formal research and development approach. The United States became a significant innovator where previously it had borrowed; its contributions included the introduction of interchangeable parts, which speeded the manufacture of weaponry and machinery, and the expansion of looms and other equipment later in the nineteenth century. The second industrial revolution also involved the application of new technology outside the factory, to agriculture (harvesters and other implements), crafts (loading equipment, mechanical saws, and the like), and office work (typewriters and cash registers). Even the home became the site of technological change with sewing machines and vacuum cleaners, among other conveniences.

The modern industrial era. The emphasis on social forms as a central explanatory element of technological change does not stop with the industrial revolution. Many researchers have pushed it into the modern technological epoch, a field of study which developed rapidly in the 1990s, especially focusing on analyses of technology which conceptualise technologies not as artefacts but as integrated systems, with supporting managerial or social arrangements. A particularly influential body of work has been that of Thomas P. Hughes, whose history of electrical power generation and distribution emphasizes that the development of this core technology of the “second industrial revolution” must be understood in terms of

“systems, built by systems builders.” His work encompasses the electrification of the United States, Britain, and Germany between the 1880s and 1930s. As Hughes shows, the evolution of electric power systems was different in each country, despite the common pool of knowledge to draw on. Reasons for these differences are found in the geographical, cultural, managerial, engineering, and entrepreneurial character of the regions involved. The “networks” which he studies refer not only to the technology but also to the institutions and actors involved. Such an approach, treating technologies as complex integrated systems of artefacts and social organization, has been carried out with regard to a wide range of technologies such as radio, jet engines, and railways.

Interest in the process of technological change crested again with the final decades of the twentieth century. New procedures of genetic engineering, computation, and robotics transformed the technological landscape in what some observers termed a third industrial—or postindustrial—technological revolution. Europe now participated in a literally international process of technological innovation, lagging in some areas (in computerization, behind the United States) but advancing rapidly in others, such as robotics. The full effects of this latest round of technological upheaval have yet to emerge, but the complex relationship between technological and social dynamics will surely remain a major topic for European social history in the future.

See also other articles in this section.

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CAPITALISM AND COMMERCIALIZATION



Robert S. DuPlessis

The rise of capitalism, one of the formative influences on modern Europe, is the subject of an enormous and contentious scholarship. The new economic and social order formed over many centuries, but historians have long devoted much attention to the two and half centuries from the Black Death to the onset of the seventeenth-century crisis. In this period, from about 1350 to about 1620, two of capitalism's central attributes became firmly and widely entrenched: the market as the fundamental economic institution, or "commercialization," and a polarized class structure. Analysis of these traits began with the founders of modern economics and sociology. Adam Smith held that market development promoted division of labor, specialization, and productivity-enhancing innovation that engendered continuous economic growth. For Karl Marx the origins of capitalism lay in "original" or "primary" accumulation. This process transformed existing land, labor, tools, and money into capital by dispossessing peasants and artisans, simultaneously turning them into proletarianized wage laborers and the landlords and merchants who accumulated this productive property into capitalist entrepreneurs. Max Weber argued that a novel mentality to motivate both capitalist classes stemmed from the theology of the sixteenth-century Reformation.


Over the many decades, these interpretations have been fiercely debated, elaborated, and modified, and important new explanatory factors introduced. No scholarly consensus exists on how to account for the rise of capitalism. Nevertheless, the critical nature of this period is widely accepted. This discussion first examines the appearance of the marketized economy and then turns to the social relations of commercial capitalism.

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND COMMERCIALIZATION

After about 1000, European population and economy underwent brisk growth. Colonists settled and im-

proved large territories; new towns were founded and existing ones greatly expanded; crafts flourished; and local, interregional, and long-distance trade burgeoned, most of all on overland routes that spread across the Continent. Time-honored interpretations postulate that the traumatic Black Death (1347–1351), which killed up to half of Europe's population, put an abrupt end to the expansion of the High Middle Ages, but research in commercial, demographic, political, and price history has forced considerable interpretive revision. Instead of a unique catastrophe, most scholars have come to postulate a broader, protracted "late medieval crisis" extending from the early fourteenth to the mid-fifteenth century. Heralded by poor harvests, extensive famines, and destructive warfare around 1300, the troubles touched their nadir with the catastrophic great plague. Worse, they were perpetuated by several decades of recurrent epidemics; interstate conflicts, most famously the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453); and social strife, notably the French Jacquerie (a peasant insurrection) of 1358, the Florentine *Ciompi* (wool workers) revolt of 1378–1382, and the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381, all of which cut short population recovery, stoked inflation, depressed farm and craft output, and disrupted trade. From about 1400, the worst problems eased, but the next half century was a time of slow revival marked by demographic stagnation, the constant threat or, all too often, reality of war, and steep deflation.

It also turned out to be a period of gestation. During the "long sixteenth century"—beginning in 1450–1470 and continuing to about 1620—earlier economic and social trends were renewed, extended, and consolidated. Until at least 1570 nearly all of Europe experienced vigorous demographic recovery, reoccupation of vacant holdings along with notable urbanization, intensified agricultural and industrial output, and the extension of trading relations across much of the globe. But thereafter the long expansion petered out. Population growth slowed, agricultural productivity stagnated, industrial output stalled or dropped, and both overseas and intra-European trade



The Plague in Europe, 1347–1350. Adapted from Wilhelm Abel, *Agricultural Fluctuations in Europe*, 3d ed. (London: Methuen, 1980), p. 42.

languished. Bitter and prolonged strife in France and the Low Countries was followed by wars elsewhere on the Continent, marking the return of disruption and high taxes, which sucked money out of the economy. After about 1620 most of Europe entered the “crisis of the seventeenth century.” Yet the dominance of the market economy had been established, so whereas before the late fourteenth century most peasant output was directly consumed by its producers or taken by lords as tribute, by the end of the long sixteenth century the majority went to the market.

The late medieval crisis. Market exchange played a larger role in medieval Europe than traditionally assumed. Although overwhelmingly agrarian, Europe was not a nonmonetized, autarkic “natural economy.” Commerce developed after the dawn of the new millennium and centered initially in northern and central Italy. Together with the early decline of serfdom, the precocious revival of towns fostered market production by urban artisans and by peasants encouraged or compelled to supply food, raw materials, and funds to city-states. The peninsula’s middleman position between the flourishing Middle East and transalpine Europe, stimulus provided by the Crusades and consequent establishment of trading colonies in the Levant and around the Black Sea, and expansion of the papacy’s fiscal apparatus prompted Italians to organize commercial, financial, and transport networks

throughout the Mediterranean and adjacent areas and on into northern and eastern Europe. Italian commercial dominance was firmly grounded in stable currencies and in innovations such as permanent partnerships, bills of exchange, insurance, and double-entry bookkeeping that reduced transaction costs and enhanced efficiency. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, demographic recovery, urbanization, conversion of labor services and other feudal obligations into cash payments, and textiles and other crafts spread across Europe. As a result markets became particularly active along Europe’s “dorsal spine,” extending from Florence to southeastern England, and on related networks like the Hanseatic League, organized by merchants of Baltic and North Sea towns.

The late medieval crisis complicated commercialization but did not provoke a general retreat from markets. Warfare’s attendant lawlessness, destruction, inflation, taxation, and coinage debasements disorganized commerce, especially long-distance trade in cheaper items whose transport and security costs exceeded potential profits. As John Munro showed, a once-flourishing transcontinental trade in inexpensive Flemish woolens ceased. Demographic collapse reduced both the supply of and the demand for industrial goods and provoked the abandonment of land or, in some areas, entire settlements. In Germany, perhaps the most severely affected, about one-quarter of the villages in existence before the crisis were deserted by its end.

These problems proved surmountable. Once the hyperinflation of cereal prices subsided in the 1380s, not only workers enjoying high real wages due to a tight labor market but most other Europeans had more income to spend on nongrain foodstuffs and manufactures. Richard Goldthwaite argued that Italian towns prospered on the basis of demand for luxury goods, notably works of art, which expanded because wealth concentrated in the hands of those who survived the ravages of the era. What from one perspective was the late medieval crisis from another was the celebrated Renaissance. Many Flemish towns that could no longer profitably export cheap textiles turned successfully to fine woolens—whose high selling price absorbed stiff transportation and insurance rates on unsafe routes—and then revived inexpensive lines when demographic, social, and political circumstances stabilized after 1400.

The evolution of agrarian specialization suggests that many peasants took their cues from the market. For much of the fourteenth century, the price of grain remained high, so it enjoyed pride of place in European fields. But when relative prices changed, farmers quickly switched to dairying, livestock raising, and the cultivation of wine, fruits and vegetables, flax, and

other foodstuffs and industrial crops. Landlords, too, contributed to commercialization both inadvertently and intentionally. To be sure, some initially sought to exploit disarray and reintroduce labor services, even serfdom. But their offensive met intense resistance and succeeded only in limited regions, so trends toward commutation of feudal obligations into monetary payments and rents in cash and kind redoubled. Along with rising levies imposed by churches and states, these changes forced more farmers to sell a larger part of their produce. Many poorer peasants and full-time agricultural laborers also found jobs on large market-oriented estates established by landlords—noble, ecclesiastical, and bourgeois—who dispensed with tenants altogether, or on the farms of more substantial peasants.

High mortality, low birthrates, and rents and land values that fell by one-third to one-half, central features of the crisis era, combined to provoke an active land market for proprietors and tenants alike. These factors also spawned both subdivision and amalgamation of properties from individual holdings to entire estates. In this environment a novel attitude toward land arose. Rather than a patrimony to be carefully husbanded for transfer over generations, landed property became an exchangeable commodity valued by and in the market. The new mentality was still strongly attached to land but no longer identified a specific plot or manor with an individual family. Any piece of land was a capital asset to be put to the most lucrative use for a contractually stated period of time and disposed of if economic conditions warranted.

By the mid-fifteenth century the European economy was smaller than a century before. Some areas, notably uplands and regions of low fertility; producers distant from urban markets or trade routes; and artisans in crafts that failed to adapt to new market conditions continued to suffer. Guilds, village communities, landlords, laws, and customs often hampered experimentation with new procedures, crops, and tools. Many Europeans were too poor and the output of their farms or shops was too meager to enter the market regularly as either producers or consumers. But all economic sectors were much more vigorous than in the early fourteenth century, and per capita productivity and income were higher thanks mainly to agricultural and industrial specialization in response to relative market prices. Despite manifold signs of decline in the period, economic historians view the late medieval crisis as an era of adjustment and enhanced commercialization.

The long sixteenth century. The forces undergirding the robust growth that began about 1450 and

became general before 1500 powerfully spurred commercialization. As epidemics waned and destructive warfare receded, lower death rates interacted with rising natality, initially reflecting higher incomes and the greater availability of land at affordable rents, to lift Europe's population from no more than 50 million in 1450 to nearly 80 million in 1600, boosting aggregate demand and enlarging the labor supply. Pronounced urbanization raised the proportion of Europeans living in towns of more than 10,000 people from about 5.5 percent in 1500 to 7.5 percent a century later, magnifying the numbers of people whose livelihoods depended on market involvement. The growth of cities also promoted economies of scale that by cutting prices helped widen the market. As commercial opportunities multiplied, merchants throughout Europe adopted commercial and financial innovations pioneered in Italy that decreased transaction costs and thus final prices to consumers, further quickening markets.

The declining incidence and destructiveness of intrastate and interstate conflicts lowered the cost of goods and eased tax burdens, giving consumers more disposable income. Additional market stimulus came from a budding new commercial network, even if it did not yet, in the opinions of most historians, constitute "the modern world-system" proposed by Immanuel Wallerstein. Overseas exploration, settlement, and trade grew exponentially. Seville, the staple port for Spain's New World possessions, shipped seventeen times as much by volume in the years 1606–1610 as it had in 1511–1515. Imports from Asia as well as America likewise developed smartly. One of the leading commodities, New World bullion, provided much of the enlarged money supply needed to keep the wheels of commerce turning. Production for the market motivated the establishment, in Europe's American colonies, of plantations staffed by indigenous peoples or, increasingly, enslaved Africans in what Wallerstein has aptly termed "coerced cash-crop" agriculture.

Expanding market production resuscitated old centers and launched new ones all across Europe. Long-neglected fields were plowed up, and forests were felled. By the 1530s the forest of Orléans, France, had contracted to a third of its former size. In many areas, particularly along the North Sea coast, new land was created. In a half-century more than 100,000 acres were drained and diked in the northern Netherlands alone. All this activity was made possible by massive capital investment, much by townspeople who sold the reclaimed land once it was ready for cultivation. The new owners, specialized commercial farmers who shed all auxiliary tasks to improve efficiency, pur-

chased inputs from livestock to implements to additional labor. Under such conditions, peasants had to be closely attuned to market conditions. Thus as relative cereal prices again consistently exceeded those for other produce, farmers reversed course from their medieval forebears and increased grain growing. Landlords behaved similarly. Many English manors enclosed for sheep grazing in earlier years were plowed up and sown with wheat or rye. The proportion of western European landowners' income provided by feudal sources, such as seigniorial privileges, dues, and commuted labor services, tumbled, while income from capitalist activities, such as the sale of produce and market-determined rents, mounted. Witnesses—and handmaidens—to the ever-spreading commercialization were legions of market towns, amounting to four thousand just in Germany, so most farms were only a few miles from at least one of them. Agricultural advance also sustained the lively land market, for rising demand translated into mounting rents and related charges, making pasture and arable land excellent investments.

Industrial development had a broader impact. The city of Lille and its nearby countryside in Flanders illustrate the processes at work. Its once-thriving woolens industry devastated by the late medieval crisis, sixteenth-century Lille took up various forms of light textiles, which experienced a remarkable boom thanks to sales in much of Europe and in Spanish America. Eventually entrepreneurs, many of them Lillois, hired workers in neighboring villages, some of which became formidable competitors of the metropolis. Feeding the swelling industrial population and supplying it with raw materials greatly enlarged and enriched Lille's merchant class, developed a vigorous carting trade, and employed farmers in the immediate outskirts of town, in grain-growing districts in adjacent Flanders and northern France, in vineyards in Burgundy and the Bordelais, in grazing regions from Germany to Spain, and even on Polish serf estates.

The achievements of commercialization should not be exaggerated, however. Although wider and deeper market participation and specialization had occurred, relatively little capital had been invested in technical development that would have allowed productivity to outpace population. Why this was so is a matter of considerable dispute. To some historians, capitalists' preference for commerce, land acquisition, moneylending, and various types of conspicuous expenditure is evidence of a "traditional" mentality that valued consumption above production and placed social and political objectives above economic ones. But other scholars contend that such behavior was economically rational given the prevailing conditions of

constantly expanding commercial opportunities, high rents and interest rates, lower industrial prices than agricultural prices and fluctuating markets for manufactures, cheap unskilled labor, and costly innovations with low rates of return.

Still, the results stopped economic advance. Inflation became sufficiently severe that many scholars speak of a sixteenth-century "price revolution." Because grains were central to diets and thus to budgets in nearly all of Europe, demand shifted away from other foodstuffs and especially away from industrial goods, heightening the damage to workers, who saw their real wages fall in tandem with work opportunities, and to specialized agriculturists. Florentine woolen output, for example, which had mounted from 10,000 to 12,000 pieces a year in the 1430s to 30,000 in the 1560s, dropped to 14,000 in the 1590s and just 6,000 by the 1630s. Across the last period sales of raw wool from Castile's vast herds were cut in half.

The effects of commercialization were unevenly distributed across Europe. Three distinct but interrelated zones are discernible. In the Mediterranean basin, agriculture and industry initially conquered foreign markets but were harmed by low levels of investment. Despite a few notable exceptions, like Catalonia and Lombardy, the Mediterranean region underwent a process of relative decline marked by a partial retreat from commercialization and specialization. Eastern Europe experienced the wide imposition of "second serfdom," which had dual origins in the late medieval crisis and in sixteenth-century commercialization. Despite resembling medieval serfdom by virtue of heavy obligations and restrictions placed on the peasantry, neoserfdom was market-oriented. Perhaps three-fourths of all the grain, cattle, wine, and other items produced by peasants performing compulsory, unpaid labor services on the lords' demesnes or appropriated from the surplus gathered on their individual plots was marketed in western Europe and locally. But commercialized serfdom obstructed development. Lords saw little reason to innovate, whereas peasants lacked the time and capital to improve their own holdings and had no inclination to improve their lords'. Industries making cheap goods emerged, but the narrow, impoverished market discouraged new methods.

Western Europe, particularly the quadrant comprising southeastern England, the Low Countries (Belgium and the Netherlands), northern France, and the German Rhineland and North Sea coast, reaped the most benefits. There Europe's highest rate of demographic expansion, rapidly growing town populations atop already elevated levels of urbanization, and a thick nexus of dynamic, increasingly efficient markets

provided many incentives to innovate and the institutions and capital to do so. By the early seventeenth century, an area that had traditionally been on the periphery of the European economy was poised to become the core of a capitalism that was taking its first steps toward creating a global economy.

SOCIAL POLARIZATION

While few historians think that Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's notion of "motionless history" accurately represents the preindustrial world, many emphasize the continuities that marked it. From the Black Death to the seventeenth-century crisis—not to mention before and after the period—the basic farming unit over nearly all Europe remained the holding worked by an individual household or, notably in some sharecropping and upland areas, by several usually related and coresident households. Analogously, the small artisan workshop operated by a household produced most manufactures. Both farms and shops were integrated into larger institutions. Village communities supervised many aspects of cultivation, crop rotation, grazing, and access to common resources, such as woodlands, waterways, and waste. Corporations (guilds) regulated artisanal production and organized collective social and religious observances. All these structures retained broad ideological sanctions as the desirable means of ensuring not only acceptable livelihoods but also, through inheritance, provision for the next generation. In addition they fit snugly into the hierarchic image that ordered social perceptions and obligations.

Yet across the period these structures were undermined, and the ideal and reality diverged notably as the sixteenth century proceeded. Larger units emerged. In agriculture landlords and peasants enlarged and consolidated their properties. In manufacturing capitalists assembled urban and rural "putting-out," or domestic, networks by employing artisans, peasants seeking additional income, and women and children to process raw materials supplied on credit by the entrepreneur. Smaller units proliferated as well, especially in regions where peasant families subdivided their holdings to bequeath to all their children. All these changes reflected the weakening of village and corporate institutions as capitalists—commercializing landlords and rich peasants, putting-out organizers, and merchants—became more influential. Domestic systems, for instance, often existed in defiance of corporate privileges. As the period went on, advocates touting the benefits of the new arrangements to the economy and society claimed and sometimes acquired a degree of legitimacy for them.

These developments did not occur uniformly or steadily, and they were often interrupted, particularly during the late medieval crisis, when stabilization succeeded initial upheaval. But the transformation proved broad and persistent, as evidenced by the social polarization—most of all the extensive proletarianization—that accompanied sixteenth-century commercialization.

The late medieval crisis: Social upheaval to social stabilization. Echoing contemporaries, historians long believed that the Black Death severely and permanently disrupted European social institutions and behavior. Ever since Wilhelm Abel charted a close concordance between agricultural and population movements, however, scholarship has played down the singular importance of the plague, pointing instead to a host of problems that accumulated after the late thirteenth century. Chief among them was the demo-

graphic growth that exhausted much land, thereby reducing productivity, pushing up prices, engendering famine and disease, and allowing landlords to increase rents while also encouraging them to commute feudal bonds and obligations into more easily adjusted and thus more lucrative payments in cash and kind. But population pressure had such strongly negative effects, historians now contend, only because of three additional factors: frequent and destructive wars and civil conflicts, excessive state and lordly levies that further burdened the populace while taking from it the resources needed to satisfy them, and rigid tenurial structures that discouraged innovation. In the 1990s David Herlihy and other scholars attempted to rehabilitate a version of the earlier catastrophic view. Agreeing that Europe suffered from a late medieval crisis, they regarded the Black Death and the recurrent epidemics of the next few decades as chiefly respon-

sible for the duration and magnitude of the troubles and for their most significant outcomes.

On the basis of this rich but contentious historiography, the outlines of another synthesis can be proposed that distinguishes two phases in the social history of the late medieval crisis. The first, which comprised the three decades or so after the Black Death, deeply shook European society, whereas the second, which roughly coincides with the end of the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth century, was characterized by stabilization.

In the immediate aftermath of the plague, drastic inflation engendered by the wide abandonment of fields and the disruption of trading networks created golden opportunities for astute and unscrupulous merchants, landlords, and peasants. Further, the vagaries of survival and inheritance contributed to unprecedented individual social mobility, for many agricultural holdings and artisanal shops suddenly became available to rent or purchase on favorable terms. The same processes also encouraged geographical mobility, most notably among rural residents attracted by the new occupational positions that opened up in towns. The easing of access to mastership in craft guilds symbolized the new opportunities. Florence's silk guild, for instance, admitted just 16 new members in 1346 and 18 in 1347, the last preplague years, whereas in 1348, 1349, and 1350, 35, 69, and 67 matriculants, respectively, were accepted. Moreover in stable periods half or more of the neophytes had close relatives in the silk guild, but in the quarter century after the Black Death, the proportion was a third or fewer.

If this was a period when fortune smiled on "new men," women formed the group that probably saw the most improved conditions. The particularly lucky among them became substantial propertyholders upon inheriting assets that previously would have gone to their brothers. Because of labor shortages, gender divisions of labor were widely relaxed, and women were allowed entry to numerous jobs and guilds that formerly had barred them. For the same reason women who had been employed but suffered from discrimination saw their wages rise dramatically, particularly in relation to men's. Female grape pickers in Languedoc, for instance, paid just half the rate of their male coworkers before the Black Death, received 80 to 90 percent as much immediately after. Both men and women, however, experienced a big jump in nominal wages.

Not everyone benefited from the upheaval. Many men, of course, lost relatively, a sore point at a time when patriarchal power was widely taken as natural and inevitable. Those who bought grain in the

market were harmed as wars and epidemics that repeatedly interfered with farming and distribution kept cereal prices high for at least a generation after the great plague. These same occurrences also interrupted manufacture and trade, so workers were unable to profit fully from their higher wages. Worse, improved nominal rates may disguise declining real wages consequent upon elevated grain prices and the practice, adopted by many employers, of paying with depreciating copper coins. One of the grievances of the rebellious *Ciompi* (wool workers) in Florence in 1378 was precisely that they received wages in debased pennies.

As the postplague troubles played out by 1400, a new equilibrium took shape. Attention to the effects of gender ideologies and relations reveals that for women the new order entailed a clear decline in opportunities and material conditions. As population and production stabilized, albeit at below preplague levels, labor shortages eased or rather were redefined to restore male preference. The female presence on lists of property owners diminished considerably. Many corporations statutorily prohibited female membership. Forced into gender-restricted labor pools, women experienced at least a relative drop in the market value of their labor. Thus Languedoc grape pickers' wage hierarchy returned to early-fourteenth-century levels. Landlords with fixed rents and long leases or those who employed sizable numbers of farm laborers also faced the prospect of hard times. But unlike women, they had socially approved and economically lucrative ways to cope. Many switched to in-kind or sharecropping rents that yielded consumable as well as marketable produce. Titled landowners frequently found salvation in marriage to members of wealthy, upwardly mobile commoner families. The most powerful acquired offices, monetary grants, or other forms of state assistance.

For most males, at least, and perhaps for families as a whole, the first half of the fifteenth century was a golden age. What is often termed the "wage-price scissors" favored the majority of the population. Food prices finally fell, grain most of all (see table 1). Yet average farm size had grown. On Redgrave Manor in England, for example, the mean holding had twelve acres in 1300, twenty in 1400, and more than thirty in 1450. Consequently marginally productive land had been abandoned. Because peasants shifted from grain to higher-priced foods, their earnings were healthy. With land cheap and plentiful but tenants scarce, farmers and their communities enjoyed enhanced bargaining power. To attract them, landlords offered lower rents. In a sample of thirty-one Brandenburg villages, for instance, rents fell at least a third

from the fourteenth century to the mid-fifteenth century. Landlords also offered longer leases, better tools and seed, and even expensive teams of oxen. Many of these improvements further enhanced productivity and encouraged greater commercialization, again augmenting farm income. Ongoing labor shortages in crafts and on the land, where vineyards, vegetable gardening, hop raising, and many other types of specialized agriculture were labor-intensive, kept employment and wages up.

Lower food prices and higher real wages, not to mention the return of more peaceful conditions that allowed the reopening of transcontinental trade routes, quickened and smoothed out both the supply of and the demand for industrial goods. Thus for the first time in over a century, many Europeans experienced rising incomes, which they used to rent or buy more land and new equipment and for training for better jobs—that is, they invested in capital that would sustain their incomes. They also improved their standard of living. Although they stuck mainly to moderately priced items, they purchased some luxury consumer goods, undaunted by aristocratic disdain and sumptuary laws, and once again traded widely across Europe.

Herlihy proposed that this material progress and the realistic expectation of its continuation had fundamental effects on demographic behavior. Previously, forces like disease or famine beyond an individual's control had been the chief determinants of population trends. Now, however, Europeans embraced new inheritance conventions that concentrated property into fewer hands, married later and increasingly did not marry at all, and perhaps practiced birth control. Taken together, these steps limited the birthrate, allowing families and individuals to achieve or maintain greater degrees of prosperity. Concomitantly, the new

low-fertility pattern delayed population recovery, which ironically helped sustain better material conditions.

In sum, despite all its tribulations, the late medieval crisis was a time when social divisions diminished. As the power and in many cases the wealth of landlords and employers of labor decreased, at least in a relative sense, material and tenurial conditions improved for the mass of the populace. In Languedoc, for instance, where rents, taxes, and tithes took about one-fourth of peasants' gross yield, down from a third or more in the High Middle Ages, a comfortable middling group constituted the majority of villagers. Rich peasants and the landless formed distinct minorities. As seigneurial levies and obligations were commuted into payments, peasant-controlled village communities took over most collective tasks from landlords. States bolstered them as useful counterweights to aristocrats and as tax-collecting entities. In a particularly dramatic manifestation of the power of village communities and the peasant solidarity they embodied, numerous rebellions shook rural Germany in the late fifteenth century, culminating in the Peasants' War of 1524–1525. In towns organized artisans supported by municipalities guided by ideological commitments and concerns about public order and tax revenues firmed up their dominance over craft production. But brisk demand for goods and services in a time of labor shortages also benefited workers outside guilds through higher wages and steadier employment.

The long sixteenth century: Polarization and proletarianization. Strong growth, in contrast, gen-

erated social polarization. Historians influenced by Abel and the so-called *Annales* school favor a neo-Malthusian explanation, that is, swelling population in a context of technological immobility leads to opulence for the few but misery for the many. As numbers increased, the land-labor ratio tilted in favor of property owners, permitting them to raise rents and associated levies. Commercial farmers benefited from strong demand and rising prices. Both urban and rural employers of labor found the labor supply growing, allowing them to stabilize wages. The same processes disadvantaged the many people who were at once suppliers of labor and purchasers of food, for competition among them drove pay down and prices up. In England agricultural laborers saw their real wages cut in half between 1500 and 1650. But that was not the worst situation: in 1570 the wages of reapers near Paris had just a third of the purchasing power of a century before.

Other historians consider commercialization largely responsible for the increasing poverty. Growing market activity favored merchants, financiers, landed proprietors, big farmers, industrial entrepreneurs, and certain artisans who possessed capital and skills. But by drawing more of the population into labor and commodity markets, this activity put them increasingly at the markets' mercy. Thus the sixfold or sevenfold rise in grain prices that prevailed across Europe during the long sixteenth century had a disastrous im-

pact on wage laborers. As their pay went up only three or four times, the wage-price scissors cut against them. They suffered additionally from unsteady employment as the populace was forced to spend more of its income on grain and less on other produce and manufactures. The same circumstances also damaged much of the middling peasantry. Its members had formerly achieved an adequate standard of living by combining agricultural and industrial wage labor with work on their holdings, which typically comprised a few acres that they owned and rather more that they leased. But as the sixteenth century proceeded, their additional sources of income yielded less while their costs climbed. Obligated to borrow to make ends meet, many finished in bankruptcy and dispossession. The same fate awaited numerous artisans. Modest output and minimal productivity gains kept costs high, while relative industrial prices lagged behind agricultural prices and market swings intensified. Many artisans came to depend on credit and on work provided by merchant capitalists or rich artisans.

As Robert Brenner pointed out in articles that reignited the transition debate in the 1970s, neither demography nor commercialization accounts sufficiently for early modern socioeconomic developments, most of all in the countryside. Underlining disparate outcomes across Europe, Brenner argued that social relations and social conflicts determined how demographic and commercial forces played out. Vigorous village institutions, secure tenures, and various types of collective action from negotiation to rebellion best enabled peasants to hold on to their land and to enjoy continued access to common woodlands and pastures

that were vital to the survival of middling and small farms. Conversely, short tenures, weak occupancy rights, and communities that had lost common resources and solidarity proved vulnerable to landlord initiatives that hiked rents and related charges frequently or even evicted tenants.

Subsequent studies moderated some of the sharp contrasts, notably between English and French agriculture, that Brenner drew and broadened the analysis to include political and military developments along with the industrial sector. Many princes, particularly in France and Germany, sought to defend peasants and their communities from excessive lordly levies and the loss of collective property so they could serve as counterweights to aristocratic power and shore up the fiscal foundation of expanding state bureaucracies and militaries. Yet because government finances relied mainly on taxing the countryside, village communities became fatally indebted and were forced to mortgage or sell common property to landlords or well-to-do peasants. Privatization of resources meant the exclusion of villagers, who had relied on common property to provide a margin of survival. Some authorities, prodded by guilds, supported petty artisan producers, but most permitted entrepreneurial initiatives. Women, almost entirely excluded from any sort of institutional protection and herded into overcrowded labor pools, saw their already unenviable position sink further. In Languedoc their wages fell to less than 40 percent of men's. Warfare returned with a religiously inspired vengeance in the sixteenth century, ruined many villages and towns, and dealt a crippling blow to many peasants and workers already on the edge.

In consequence the social order of commercial capitalism became ever more sharply divided. A small minority of the populace accumulated wealth and capital assets. In the textile center of Nördlingen, Germany, in 1579, the top 2 percent of the citizens controlled at least a quarter of the assets. In Lyon, the French silk and commercial metropole, more than half of all wealth belonged to 10 percent of the taxpayers, and just ten individuals, all merchants, owed 7 percent of the urban tax bill in the mid-sixteenth century. At a time when the average artisan had a loom or two, 220 looms were controlled by two merchants. A few decades later two others employed nearly one thousand people between them. Infrequently attempted, big centralized workplaces almost invariably failed because no technologically generated savings offset their high cost and financial vulnerability in the always fluctuating markets. The picture was much the same in the countryside. In Poland serfs worked a quarter of the cultivated area, and lords received, at no cost, up to half of the gross output of



RESPONSES TO CAPITALISM

The effect of the plague. All this year [1348] and the next, the mortality of men and women, of the young even more than the old, in Paris and in the kingdom of France, and also, it is said, in other parts of the world, was so great that it was almost impossible to bury the dead. . . . Many country villages and many houses in good towns remained empty and deserted. Many houses, including some splendid dwellings, very soon fell into ruins.

Source: Jean de Venette, *The Chronicle of Jean de Venette*. Edited by Richard A. Newhall. Translated by Jean Birdsall. New York, 1953, p. 49. Venette, a Carmelite friar, was a theology professor at the University of Paris.

The poor of Norwich. Theis be the names of the poore within the saide Citie [Norwich, England] as they were vewed in the year of our Lord god 1570. . . .

The Parishe of St. Stevenes

Robert Rowe of the age of 46 yeres, glasier, in no worke, and Elizabeth his wyfe that spinne white warpe and have five children, 2 sonnes the eldist of the age of 16 yeres that kepe children, and the other, daughters that spinne, and have dwelt here ever. . . .

John Hubburd, of the age of 38 yeres, butcher, that occupie slaughterie, and Margarit his wyfe of the age of 30 yeres that sell souce, and 2 young children, and have dwelt here ever. . . .

An Bucke of the age of 46 yeres, wydowe, souster and teatcheth children, and hath two children, the one of the age of 9 yeres and the other of 5 yeres that worke lace, and have dwelt here ever. . . .

Thomas Pele of the age of 50 yeres, a cobler in worke, and Margarit his wyfe of the same age that spinne white warpe, and have 3 children, the elldist of the age of 16 yeres that spinne, and the other of the age of 12 and of 6 yeres that go to scoole, and have dwelt here 9 yeres and came from Yorkeshere.

Source: R. H. Tawney and Eileen Power, eds. *Tudor Economic Documents*. Vol. 2. London, 1924, pp. 313–314. The census, which includes nineteen more entries, reveals the poverty of the working poor in the late sixteenth century despite the labor of most family members.

Enclosure.

A Consideration of the Cause in Question
before the Lords Touching Depopulation
5 July 1607

[Enclosures result in]

1.2. Increase of wealth and people, proved (i) *a contrario*: the nurseries of beggars are commons as appeareth by fens and forests, of wealth people the enclosed countries as Essex, Somerset, Devon, etc.; fuel, which they want in the champion, is supplied by enclosures. And labourers increased as are their employments by hedging and ditching; (ii) *a comparatis*: as Northamptonshire and Somerset, the one most champion, more ground, little waste, the other all enclosed but inferior in quantity and quality, yet by . . . choice of employment exceeding far.

Source: W. Cunningham, *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times*. Part 2. Cambridge, U.K., 1903, p. 898.

The speaker in this parliamentary debate sought to show the superiority of enclosed farms over open fields.

Defending the commons.

The Twelve Articles of the Upper Swabian Peasants
27 February–1 March 1525
Article Ten

Tenth, we are aggrieved that some have appropriated meadowland as well as fields which belong to the community (as above, Luke 6). We will take these properties into our hands again, unless they have in fact been legally bought. But if someone has bought them unfairly, the parties involved should reach a benevolent and brotherly agreement, according to the facts of the case.

Source: Michael G. Baylor, ed. and trans. *The Radical Reformation*. Cambridge, U.K., 1991, p. 237.

This complaint, from a widely circulated manifesto of the German Peasants' War, indicates the wide resentment caused by landlord and rich peasant appropriation of common lands.

peasant plots. By 1600 city people owned half of the best land around Pisa, Italy, and Castilian nobles held even more, some two-thirds when holdings of aristocratic-dominated ecclesiastical institutions are included. Some of the property on expanding estates had traditionally formed part of the lords' demesnes or was usurped from village communities. However, the greater part was bought from churches, in Catholic as well as Protestant lands, or, more often, from indebted peasants.

While artisans and peasants in general were losing control of productive property, a minority accumulated assets in ways similar to and often linked with those followed by merchant and landlord elites. Before the mid-sixteenth century a few Antwerp ribbon makers had shops with several dozen looms. In 1584 nine cartels, the biggest run by merchants and financiers, comprising just twenty-four master builders performed 80 percent of the work on Antwerp's massive citadel. An affluent top tenth at most likewise formed in the peasantry. In a village near Toledo in Castile, 9 percent of the residents held 54 percent of the peasant land in 1583. In a Norman community the upper 5 percent occupied a sixth of the arable peasant holdings in the early fifteenth century but three-fifths in the 1630s. Often starting with substantial amounts of inherited property, these yeomen (the English term is widely applied elsewhere) bought more land, usually from their poorer counterparts, to whom they also extended credit, or served as tenants on big consolidated farms that the landlords assembled across Europe. Such substantial commercial-minded farmers could count on significant landlord investment in tools, buildings, and drainage systems, and many earned additional income as lords' agents.

Although these elites separated from the mass of their fellows, a degree of mobility into and among them existed. Rich peasants and artisans joined the ranks of merchants and entrepreneurs, and these latter groups purchased land and titles. The entry of a new family was often sealed by marriage. Yet each elite also developed into a kind of caste, rooted in intermarriage that helped build up patrimonies preserved by impartible inheritance, practiced even in the face of local custom. Caste members enjoyed enhanced power in critical institutions that advanced their interests. Landowners and some merchants found places in rising princely governments, and merchants solidified control of many municipalities, usually at the expense of all but the wealthiest artisans. For their part, the top craftsmen dominated guilds, and yeomen dominated the village communities.

Consumption also helped these groups define and distinguish themselves. In the European country-

side a massive rebuilding of lordly houses incorporated modern conveniences, from separate rooms to glass windows. Leading farmers, too, upgraded their dwellings and added capacious new barns. Probate inventories reveal that rural and urban elites accumulated silver, glassware, additional servants, and other markers of affluence and difference. Finally, elites developed a certain ethic. Cutting across creedal boundaries, their emphasis on hard work, orderliness, and propriety demarcated them from both lavish-spending grandees and what they saw as the shiftless, drunken, and rowdy poor.

The mass of the population faced worsening conditions that increasingly distanced them from both the elite and the better times of the fifteenth century. Despite possibilities of upward mobility for a few, the predominant movement was down. As rich craftsmen used their guild authority and wealth to reserve positions for their sons, the status of journeyman was converted from the penultimate rung on the ladder to coveted mastership to a synonym for permanent, albeit skilled, wage laborer. Once-autonomous small and middling artisans were hard-pressed by putting-out entrepreneurs with access to markets and the resources to weather hard times. Most domestic workers owned their tools, toiled in their homes or shops, and retained some ability to change employers or at times to produce and sell wares in the market on their own account. Nevertheless, they were well on the way to becoming proletarians who had only their labor to offer. Long a feature of certain centers, putting-out spread both geographically and among more industries in the sixteenth century, enabling a growing throng to earn little more than a bare subsistence, even when a whole family was employed. Already by the 1520s more than 85 percent of the population in a Suffolk, England, district noted for its high degree of rural industry was classed as poor. Deteriorating conditions were not restricted to domestic workers. Whereas mason's assistants in Lyon earned a living wage in all but three years between 1525 and 1549, between 1575 and 1599 their income fell short seventeen times.

Farm populations experienced similar polarization. Sometimes well-to-do farmers were pushed to the wall when landlords, eager to recoup their investments, raised rents excessively or when a meager harvest, accident, or ill health struck. But middling peasants were most affected. During the sixteenth century in Languedoc, the proportion of arable land located on farms of less than about 12 acres doubled, but that on holdings of 12 to 25 acres dropped by a third. Similar results were recorded across Europe. As the ranks of small peasants swelled, the ongoing subdivi-

sion of holdings, privatization of commons, and high rents due to skyrocketing demand for modest-sized farms impoverished and all too often dispossessed them.

Some downwardly mobile peasants recovered farms—but as sharecroppers. A larger group became cottagers, forced to eke out livings from gardens attached to their dwellings in tandem with agricultural and industrial work. Cottages with gardens multiplied from 11 percent of English holdings in about 1560 to 40 percent around 1620. Many other farmers lost any holdings and became full-fledged wage earners. In Spain, across Castile perhaps half the rural population owned no land in 1570; in Andalusia the proportion approached three-quarters. Many of the landless stayed in the countryside, grouped into large impoverished villages or squatting on wastelands, otherwise left to pigs for foraging, where they erected flimsy shacks. But farm labor scarcely provided a tolerable living. English data, which seem representative, indicate that agricultural workers' real wages were sliced in half between about 1500 and 1650. Many villagers headed for towns, where they swelled the ranks of the urban poor and beggars, or became the wandering vagrants who preoccupied authorities.

Like the elites, proletarianizing Europeans developed distinctive attributes. By the late sixteenth century, they had to devote 70 to 80 percent of their meager incomes to food in a normal year, half just to rye bread. (Wheat was considered more desirable but was usually too expensive.) No wonder that meat consumption in Sicily fell to less than half of earlier levels. What with rent, heat, and light, little money remained for consumer goods apart from cheap textiles and metalwares, and inventories indicate the sparseness of the material environment in which the majority lived.

Unlike elites, impoverished Europeans had few institutional means to promote their interests, although journeymen in a few towns formed collective associations. For the most part, however, corporations or municipalities, in whose decisions workers did not participate, dictated their wages, mobility, and labor conditions. Similarly, richer villagers manipulated communal assemblies to shift the tax burden onto the shoulders of their less affluent neighbors or to monopolize communal pastures for their own large herds. In fact, new institutions like centralized municipal welfare offices and workhouses were established to provide for but also to manage the poor.

CONCLUSION

Social divisions widened least in poorer agricultural regions that offered few opportunities to landlords and affluent peasants, in areas where resilient villages maintained communal resources, in districts where unspecialized agriculture rode out hard times, and in towns where corporate and municipal leaders defended traditional production. Great variety in exposure to commercialization, even in closely neighboring regions, continued through the eighteenth century. Holland and adjacent provinces evolved a unique, commercialized agrarian order that likewise minimized social differentiation. It was characterized

by family farms, weak landlords and village communities, and employment of the landless in crafts and services oriented to the specialized holdings. But the dominant trend was toward polarization and proletarianization, whether on productive enclosed English farms or lagging Mediterranean latifundia and eastern European serf estates, and whether in urban crafts or in rural industrial districts. The late medieval economic crisis brought good times to the majority of Europeans. The concomitant of economic growth and commercialization during the long sixteenth century was material and social advancement for the few, impoverishment and wage laborer status for the many.

See also The Annales Paradigm; The World Economy and Colonial Expansion (volume 1); The Population of Europe: Early Modern Demographic Patterns; The City: The Early Modern Period (in this volume).

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PROTOINDUSTRIALIZATION



Gay L. Gullickson

In 1971 the historians Charles Tilly and Richard Tilly questioned the prevailing portrait of the industrial revolution. They did not doubt that the changes associated with industrialization had been important and dramatic: work had moved out of the home; peasants had moved off the land and into the cities; families had ceased to be production units; daily life and work had been altered by technological developments; and new classes had come into existence. What they doubted was that these changes had happened abruptly and swiftly. They were led to these doubts by the research of historians on early modern rural Britain and Europe. Most important of all for the Tillys was the work of a young historian named Franklin Mendels. Based largely on his findings of economic and demographic change in Flanders, they called for historians to study “protoindustrialization, demographic change, and industrialization as life experience” (Tilly and Tilly, 1971, p. 186). They defined protoindustrialization as “industrialization before the factory system” (p. 186), and they freely acknowledged having “lifted” the term from Mendels (p. 187).

Mendels immediately found himself in an unusual position for a young historian. In 1969 he had used the term “proto-industrialization” in his doctoral dissertation; in 1970 he had delivered a paper based on his dissertation; and now, one year later, the Tillys were calling for historians to devote themselves to the study of protoindustrialization. Worried that the term needed precise definition, Mendels hurriedly wrote and published a summary of his dissertation research. In this 1972 article he defined protoindustrialization as “the rapid growth of traditionally organized but market-oriented, principally rural industry” (p. 241). The process, he said, was “accompanied by changes in the spatial organization of the rural economy” (p. 241), and it “facilitated” industrialization proper by creating a class with entrepreneurial experience, market connections, and investment capital (p. 245). Most controversially, he suggested that protoindustrialization and industrialization were two phases of the same process.

Historians connected to the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure in England and to the Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte in Germany and individual American, English, French, Dutch, Swiss, Irish, and other social historians began to consider the questions posed by Mendels and the Tillys. As historians worked, they found they could agree on several things but not everything. The definition of a region remained fuzzy, but they agreed that protoindustrialization was a regional rather than a national phenomenon and needed to be studied region by region. They agreed that cottage manufacturing expanded in the eighteenth century and employed a majority of the population in various areas. They agreed that it was important to understand why and how this expansion occurred and how it affected rural behavior and values. And they generally agreed on the distinguishing characteristics of protoindustrialization. What they ultimately could not agree on was a simple characterization of regions that protoindustrialized; the effects of protoindustrial employment on demographic behavior; the social and economic impact of protoindustrialization on families and, in particular, on women; and the relationship between protoindustrialization and industrialization. What became most controversial was the causal relationship implied in Mendels’s identification of protoindustrialization as “the first phase of the industrialization process” (1972).

DEFINING PROTOINDUSTRIALIZATION

Mendels’s first concern was to distinguish protoindustrialization from traditional cottage manufacturing. If this could not be done, the concept would be redundant and unnecessary. The difficulty of transporting manufactured goods and agricultural produce made cottage manufacturing a common feature of rural life. Fabric, household goods, and farm and building implements were produced everywhere, as was a panoply of crops. Regardless of terrain and climate, families raised everything from grain, to vines and

fruit trees, to cows and other livestock. During planting and harvesting men, and to a lesser extent women, worked in the fields. (More generally, women cared for animals and men for the fields, except during the harvest, when everyone helped bring in the grain crops.) During the winter or dead season in agriculture, the same men and women produced fabric, clothing, baskets, stockings, ribbons, and other small items for themselves and for sale. Local artisans, who helped with the harvest but otherwise did not engage in farming, produced shoes, ropes, barrels, plows, bricks, and furniture for local use. If the raw materials were available, they also produced nails, tanned leather, and glass.

Sometimes entire families participated in the production of a single product. In the textile industries, for instance, women and children often cleaned, combed, and spun fibers for men to weave. In other cases women and men worked at unrelated tasks. Given the sexual divisions of labor throughout western Europe and Britain, women often spun thread, wove ribbons, made hats, or knit stockings for sale, while their husbands worked in the fields, forged iron, milled flour, and cut wood.

In the simplest form of these cottage industries, farm families produced the raw materials from which they made goods to sell in local markets. Linen weavers and cord or rope makers wove flax or braided hemp from their own plants. Wool spinners and weavers washed, carded, spun, and wove wool from their own sheep. In some places merchants distributed raw materials to farmers and artisans who turned them

into finished products. Sometimes raw materials came from nearby villages or farms, other times they came from greater distances. All over Europe weavers who produced high-quality woolens worked with wool from Spain's merino sheep. Silk weavers throughout France worked with silk produced in the Rhône Valley, where mulberry trees and hence silkworms could be raised. Cotton spinners and weavers worked with cotton from Asia and North America.

Protoindustries resembled cottage industries in many ways. Rural families alternated work in cottage manufacturing with work in the fields. They worked in their own homes, using traditional technology (like spinning wheels and hand looms) or newer but still small machines (like knitting frames) to produce goods for putting-out merchants, who provided them with raw materials and paid them for completed goods. Thus they no longer worked with raw materials that they produced themselves. And the items they produced were no longer destined for local markets. Instead, they were sold in regional, national, and international markets. Perhaps most distinctively, protoindustries dominated local labor markets, employing a large number of rural residents (or, given the sexual division of labor, a large number of either the men or the women) in a region. For a region to qualify as protoindustrial, a majority of its population needed to be employed in cottage manufacturing.

The system was controlled by urban merchants whose desire to increase production (and profits) had led them to employ rural workers. (Before the technological innovations associated with the industrial

revolution, production could only be expanded by increasing the labor force.) To a certain extent, the decision to turn to rural workers was inevitable. Urban populations were relatively small, and new workers were hard to find; wages were higher than those of rural workers; and guilds continued to control the production and sale of manufactured goods. Potential rural workers existed in large numbers, produced much of their own food and therefore could work for low wages, and were often desperate for income; in addition, no one controlled the quality of the goods they produced. Such advantages outweighed the transportation and time costs involved in sending raw materials and finished products from town to country and back again.

The intensification of rural manufacturing did not occur in isolation from other economic changes. Sometimes dispersed cottage work was directly related to centralized workshops or protofactories. Even in the era of cottage industry fabric was always dyed and printed by urban craftsmen. The same was true of the fulling of wool fabric (Pollard, 1981, pp. 78–79). In the late eighteenth century, when spinning was mechanized and moved out of homes and into mills, textile merchants supplied rural weavers with mill-spun yarn (Gullickson, 1986; Levine, 1977). In the nineteenth century, when clothing and household linens began to be mass-produced, precut pieces were still sewn together by rural workers, who vastly outnumbered the factory labor force (Collins, 1991). In metal regions centralized operations produced copper and brass that were then put out into the countryside for the production of small items (Berg, 1994, p. 71).

In the short run the wages paid by the putting-out merchants improved life in rural villages, and other social changes resulted. Cafés and taverns began to appear in villages that had never seen such things before, a sign that those who combined farming and manufacturing now had some disposable income. Population grew, and more and more families became partially dependent on the merchants, even as it became increasingly unlikely that cottage workers would know the individual merchants for whom they worked. Their contact was with the porter who brought them materials to work and paid them for their labor. This development may have meant little to the peasants who worked for the merchants, as long as they were regularly paid, but anonymity was a step toward the impersonalization of work and the proletarianization of labor that is identified with industrialization.

As the invention of machines moved work into factories, peasant-workers' incomes declined precipitously. In some areas former cottage workers commuted on a daily or weekly basis to nearby mills. This

strategy worked best when the mills employed women, who could walk to and from the mills, while their husbands and brothers continued to work in the fields. In the best-case scenario women might also bring home "out work" for other members of the family to do. In other places workers tried to hang on even in the face of mechanization, but the machines were hard to compete with, and even when workers like hand-loom weavers produced fine fabric, they still had to confront declining demand. In still other places entire families migrated permanently to cities, where men, women, and children sought work in a variety of occupations. Eventually, many protoindustrial regions became more purely agricultural than they had ever been.

LOCATING PROTOINDUSTRIES

While traditional cottage industries were ubiquitous, protoindustries were not. Initially, Mendels suggested that protoindustrialization occurred in areas of subsistence and pastoral farming, where bad soil made peasants very poor and in need of additional sources of income. Flanders was a classic case. In the interior regions, where peasants eked out a living on small plots of land, the linen industry became a major source of winter employment and income. In the maritime regions, where large commercial farms produced wheat, butter, and cheese for foreign and domestic markets, traditional cottage industries died out and were not replaced (Mendels, 1972).

In his 1960 study of eighteenth-century Switzerland (part of which appeared in English in 1966), Rudolf Braun had found a similar situation. The area of flat, fertile land that lay between Zurich and the Highlands had no cottage industry, while the steep and sparsely settled "back country" with "wood glens 'of forbidding aspect,' inconceivably bad communications, and a rude climate" produced large quantities of cotton thread or yarn for the Zurich merchants (p. 55). (Unlike in other textile regions, weaving was not done in the Zurich highlands because the transportation of warps and cloth up and down the mountains was far too difficult.)

Other studies bore out Mendels's predictions about the location of protoindustries. David Levine discovered that Shepshed, in Leicestershire, England, where the land was "rocky and stony," had a large framework knitting industry while neighboring villages with better land did not (1977, p. 19). James Lehning found that peasants living in the Stephanois mountains combined subsistence farming, sheepherding, and dairying with ribbon weaving for Saint-Étienne putting-out merchants who sold the ribbons

in national and international markets (1980). Pat Hudson revealed that the Halifax area in the West Riding of Yorkshire, where the land was suited only to “livestock grazing and the cultivation of a few oats,” became protoindustrialized, while the valleys and hills, where the soil was better and farms produced a variety of crops, did not (1981, p. 42–43).

What made the work offered by the putting-out merchants so desirable in these regions was the sheer poverty of the peasants, poverty made worse in some cases by the beginnings of a geographic sorting out of agriculture. Poor-soil regions found themselves unable to compete in the grain markets with richer-soil areas that were enclosing fields and intensifying production. As a result peasants in the poor-soil areas became even poorer than they had been and turned to cottage industry to prop up sagging income (see Jones, 1968).

Most historians were content with the notion that subsistence- and pastoral-farming areas were prime territory for the putting-out merchants. Mendels himself went further, moving toward a more determinist model than he had first proposed. By 1980 he was arguing that large-scale cottage industries were most likely to occur where commercial and subsistence agricultural zones abutted each other and lay near a city. He envisioned a three-way symbiotic relationship. Merchants could easily put work out into the countryside and increase production. Peasants in the subsistence area eagerly accepted their offers of work and wages. With their earnings they purchased food from the commercial zone. The farmers in the commercial agricultural zone acquired a market for some of their produce and did not have to search far for harvest labor.

While Mendels was developing this model, Peter Kriedte, working in conjunction with Hans Medick and Jürgen Schlumbohm, was suggesting that protoindustrialization was “relegated” to “harsh mountainous areas,” although his subsequent discussion indicated that he did not mean this statement to be quite so categorical (pp. 14, 24, 26–27). Both of these predictive models had flaws, as historians quickly pointed out. Only Flanders seemed to fit Mendels’s model. The Zurich Highlands certainly did not, nor did Shephed, the Stephanois mountains, or the West Riding. And only the Zurich Highlands and the Stephanois mountains fit Kriedte’s model. Worse yet, Gay Gullickson’s work on the Caux in Upper Normandy revealed that the intensification of cottage industry was not confined to areas of poor soil. The Caux was a fertile area with large grain farms *and* a large cotton industry, a situation that most historians had thought would not occur. The same was true in Scotland, as Ian Whyte subsequently demonstrated. Rural textile production was concentrated not in the Highlands but in the Lowlands, where cereal crops were produced on large farms.

If protoindustries appeared in some but not all subsistence regions *and* if they appeared, at least occasionally, in zones of commercial farming, then subsistence and pastoral farming could not be the sole explanation for their presence. No one doubted that areas of poor soil and steep terrain were in desperate need of the work the putting-out merchants offered, but what determined the location of protoindustries was not just poverty. Other factors were decisive. Proximity to a merchant city advantaged some areas over others. A large landless or poor population made some regions more attractive than others. Weak communal or manorial controls made it possible for people to accept work from merchants and, as population grew, to clear land and build houses. Regions that were tightly controlled by lords or communal agreements could exclude merchants, restrict building, and force excess population to migrate. Partible inheritance customs that fragmented landholdings and impoverished regions could make industry attractive. Impartible inheritance that concentrated land in a few hands and created a poor landless population could do the same, as could enclosure. Any one of these phenomena could make cottage manufacturing an attractive proposition to peasants and merchants.

PROTOINDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOR

One of the first questions that interested historians about protoindustrialization was its relationship to

population growth. The picture that emerged early on was that the income from cottage manufacturing led to considerable and often dramatic breaks in the “traditional” marriage and childbearing patterns of rural families. The traditional pattern was revealed by the work of historians like Micheline Baulant, John Hajnal, Olwen Hufton, and Peter Laslett. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the population of Britain and western Europe was fairly constant. This homeostatic demographic system resulted from high marriage ages for men and women and a relatively high percentage of both sexes who never married. These high marriage ages and celibacy rates were the results of economic constraints, cultural practices, and inheritance systems. The common pattern was for a man and woman to set up housekeeping in their own dwelling as soon as they married. To do so, they needed a place to live, some household goods, and a source of income. It took time to achieve these things. A woman had to work and save for years to acquire the requisite dowry of a mattress, pillows, sheets (one or two sets), eating and cooking utensils, and a storage chest. A man usually had to wait to inherit farmland or an artisan business. He also needed a place for the new family to live and rudimentary furniture. Not all sons inherited land or an occupation, and not all daughters were able to acquire a dowry. As a result the average marriage age for women was between twenty-four and twenty-six; for men it was between twenty-six and twenty-eight; and on average, 10 percent of adults never married. Even in the wealthy elite, as Laslett memorably pointed out, boys did not marry at age fifteen or sixteen or girls at twelve or thirteen as Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet* did.

Childbearing began quickly after marriage, but women bore only four to six children, and most people did not live long enough to know their grandchildren. Life in these small families was hard, and everyone worked—men, women, and children. If a husband or wife died young, the remaining spouse needed to remarry as quickly as possible to survive economically.

The employment and income provided by protoindustrialization, many have argued, made it possible for cottage workers to marry at younger ages and with greater frequency than their peasant counterparts. A woman no longer had to acquire a dowry and a man no longer had to inherit a small piece of land or occupation before they could take their wedding vows. When protoindustries provided employment for children as well as for adults, some historians have argued, cottage workers had an incentive to bear more children. Whether this was the case or not, the overwhelming majority of children born in the mid-eight-

teenth century were born to married women, and a decrease in women’s marriage age or an increase in the number of women marrying would inevitably increase the number of children in these communities that did not practice contraception.

In many areas population growth entered an upward spiral. In Flanders, years in which the income provided by the merchants was high in comparison with the price of grain were followed by years in which the number of couples marrying increased. Perhaps most important for population growth, the reverse was not true. Bad economic years did not result in fewer marriages. Developments in Shepshed were even more dramatic. During the eighteenth century, when the vast majority of villagers knit stockings for London merchants, the average age at first marriage for both men and women fell by over five years. As a result population rose rapidly. In the Zurich Highlands marriages were more numerous and earlier than in purely agricultural regions. Contemporaries called these “beggar marriages” because the bride and groom had not acquired the dowry, economic skills, and property commonly regarded as prerequisites for marriage.

Other studies found less dramatic changes. Myron Gutmann and René Leboutte (1984) found that female marriage ages remained high and stable in three protoindustrial Belgian villages. Lehning discovered that protoindustrialization did not inevitably lead to lower marriage ages and higher marriage frequency in the Stephanois region of France (1983). Gullickson found that the number of women not marrying in the village of Auffay was very low when spinning occupied the majority of women and high in the subsequent era when spinning moved into factories and it became more difficult for women to find employment. Women’s marriage ages, on the other hand, remained stable and high, dropping only from just above twenty-six to 25.3, while men’s marriage ages fell from almost twenty-nine to just below 27.5. (1986, pp. 133–144). Many regions without protoindustries were also experiencing a decrease in women’s marriage ages and population growth in this period (Houston and Snell, p. 482). Clearly, employment in rural industry was not the only factor affecting marriage behavior, but it certainly was a factor in many places.

WOMEN AND PROTOINDUSTRIALIZATION

Early in the discussion of protoindustrialization Hans Medick argued that the intensification of cottage manufacturing produced more egalitarian male-female

relationships than had been the case before. The key developments, in his view, were the increasing importance of women's earnings and the return of men's work to the house. As a result, he argued, the sexual division of labor was eased, both in paid work and in the household. Women and men worked alongside each other, and men took over previously female house-keeping tasks. Being able to choose among the entire group of people who worked for the merchants increased the range of marriage partners. Moreover, Medick argued, working together within the confined space of the peasant house led to greater eroticism. As evidence he cited the lowering of marriage ages, middle-class observations about the "shameless freedom" of young men and women, and men's and women's joint participation in the consumption of alcohol and tobacco at home and in the taverns and cafés that followed in the wake of the putting-out merchants (1976, pp. 310–314). Medick might have added, but did not, that protoindustrialization also made it unnecessary for men to migrate during the winter months to find work (Collins, 1982, p. 140; Braun, 1966, p. 64).

Medick's statements addressed a question that women's historians had been asking for a long time: have economic changes improved or impaired women's lives and raised or lowered their status or power in the family, the workplace, and the community? Medick's answer was clearly that protoindustrialization improved women's lives and raised their status, but it is not an answer that further research has sustained, even though virtually all protoindustries provided jobs for women.

Women were employed in whatever manufacturing work was available in rural areas, although a sexual division of tasks was maintained in most, if not all, places. Women worked in large numbers across the English metal trades. They participated in the manufacture of buttons, toys, farm implements, cutlery, swords, and guns. In and around Birmingham they polished, japanned, lacquered, pierced, cut, and decorated metal. In the West Midlands they worked with hammers and anvils and pounded hot metal into nails (Berg, 1987, p. 85–). The industry in which they were most likely to be employed, however, was textiles in their many varieties. Textiles is the proto-industry about which we know the most and in which the importance of women's work is most clearly documented.

In the eighteenth century women spun and performed other preparatory tasks for men who wove. This division of labor produced more jobs for women than for men. The Flemish linen industry employed four female spinners and one and a half workers in

ancillary tasks (performed by women and children of both sexes) for every male weaver (Mendels, 1981, p. 200). In peasant families of northwestern and western Ireland women spun and men wove flax for the merchants. The imbalance in labor demand for these tasks was so great that groups of single women moved around the countryside, working for one weaving family after another in return for room and board and a small amount of money. In those cases where the family grew its own flax, women were responsible for harvesting the plants, which further increased their workload. Children worked with their parents and often took responsibility for winding yarn onto shuttles for the weavers (Collins, 1982, pp. 130–134). In the Sheshed hosiery industry women spun yarn and men knit stockings. Boys and girls learned to perform ancillary tasks as young as age ten. There are no precise figures for the numbers of men and women who performed these tasks, but there is no reason to believe that the spinning-knitting labor ratio was lower than the spinning-weaving labor ratio, and it seems safe to assume that more women than men were working for the putting-out merchants (Levine, 1977, pp. 28–32). In the twenty-one villages in the canton of Auffay in Upper Normandy, 75 percent of adult women spun yarn for the cotton merchants. In contrast, only 15.6 percent of the men were employed in weaving (Gullickson, 1991, pp. 209–210).

The one place where a sexual division of labor was apparently not maintained in textiles was in the Zurich Highlands, although even here more women than men may have worked for the merchants. In the Highlands young men as well as young women spun yarn for the cotton merchants. (Both sexes also appear to have engaged in weaving, but their fabric was apparently sold only in local markets, which, by definition, means it was not a protoindustrial occupation.) Braun provides no count of the number of men and women who worked for the merchants, but because of the division of labor in agriculture, it is possible that women still were more likely than men to work for the merchants. This assumption fits with Braun's observation that in poor, but nevertheless landowning, families, daughters were more desirable than sons because they could produce more income (1966, p. 62).

When spinning was mechanized and moved into mills in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, much of the work that women had done for the merchants disappeared. The economic impact of the loss of these jobs was devastating in areas like northern Ireland and the Zurich Highlands, where they were not replaced by an increased demand for weavers. As one Swiss pastor observed in the eigh-

teenth century, “These people came with cotton and must die with it.” If they did not literally die, they confronted two basic choices—celibacy or migration (Braun, 1966, pp. 61, 64). In other areas like the Caux, north-central Ireland, Shepshed, and the Stephanois mountains, increased yarn production encouraged putting-out merchants to seek additional weavers and knitters, and women were able to move into occupations from which they had previously been excluded.

In Shepshed women continued to do ancillary tasks like winding and seaming, but they also became knitters. In the mid-nineteenth century 56 percent of the wives under age thirty-five were seamers or knitters (Levine, 1977, pp. 28–29). In many of the villages of the Caux the entry of women into weaving was far more dramatic. In the village of Auffay three times as many women as men were employed in weaving. In neighboring villages the ratios were as high as 8 to 1 (Gullickson, 1991, pp. 217–218). Farther south in the Stephanois mountains almost 88 percent of the ribbon weavers were women (Lehning, 1980, pp. 28–30, 40).

With the exception of north-central Ireland and perhaps the Zurich Highlands, the employment of women in protoindustries appears to have had little, if any, effect on their status within the family. In the eighteenth century the sexual division of labor made it easy to pay women less than men. In the nineteenth, when women entered weaving, the opportunity for

equal pay for equal work came into existence in at least some places. In north-central Ireland the availability of mill-spun yarn made it possible for almost everyone—girls, boys, the aged, and the infirm—to weave the coarse fabric desired by the merchants and to earn as much as adult men (Collins, 1982, p. 140). But in the Caux merchants hired women and men to weave different fabrics. Women were assigned to calico production, for which the demand was growing, and men to heavier fabrics, for which demand was not growing. The decision provided more employment for women, but it also made it possible for merchants to continue to pay women less than men. Despite the importance of women’s earnings, there is little basis on which to argue that this work improved women’s status within their families or communities. Sexual divisions of labor were maintained more often than not, and employing women to do “men’s work” did not necessarily entail equal pay.

There also is no evidence, other than that of the contemporary observers cited by Braun and Medick, that men took over women’s domestic tasks so women could work for merchants. The same is true for Medick’s statements about the impact of protoindustrialization on the affective and erotic aspects of male-female relationships. The contemporary criticisms of the peasant-workers’ behavior that led to Braun’s and Medick’s conclusions that protoindustrialization broke not only the homeostatic demographic system but also the constraints society had imposed on erotic

behavior may reflect a change that actually occurred in many areas. But the observations may not apply broadly or, worse yet for historians, may be off the mark. What church and government officials represented as seductive and lewd behavior may have been common among peasant women and men regardless of whether they worked in cottage manufacturing, or it may have been rare. Unfortunately, there is no good way to find out what the emotional and affective lives of peasants and peasant-workers were like. The evidence, however, does not substantiate the argument that women's earnings led to dramatic behavioral changes or to greater gender equality.

PROTOINDUSTRIALIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

Protoindustrialization ended with the invention of machinery that was too large, too expensive, or too in need of a nonhuman source of power to be placed in people's homes. This development began, in essence, with the invention of spinning machines in Britain in the late eighteenth century and continued for at least a hundred years. Different tasks were mechanized at different times, and even when one task moved into a factory, associated tasks often continued to be put out into rural areas. But ultimately, anything resembling the massive putting-out industry known as protoindustrialization, where men, women, and children alternated agricultural and manufacturing work, came to an end.

In 1972 Mendels argued that protoindustrialization facilitated industrialization by creating a class with entrepreneurial experience, market contacts, and investment capital. These entrepreneurial merchants, he believed, became the builders of factories and the founders of industrialization proper. In some cases what Mendels and others (most notably, Kriedte, Medick, and Schlumbohm) expected did happen. The capital for building and equipping factories was often provided by the putting-out merchants, especially in textiles. They built textile mills and continued to compete for national and international markets and customers. The Rouen merchants who organized the rural cotton industry in the Caux are a case in point (Gullickson, 1981), as are the Manchester merchants who put work out into Lancashire (Walton, 1989).

But in many cases the urban merchants who had organized protoindustrial production did not succeed in transforming their putting-out businesses into modern industries. Instead, protoindustrialization was followed by deindustrialization. The mechanization of linen and cotton spinning destroyed both cottage weaving and cottage spinning in northwestern coun-

ties of Ireland (Collins, 1982, pp. 138–139). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rural workers in the Weald of Kent, Surrey, and Sussex Counties in England produced large quantities of glass, iron, textiles, and timber products for markets in London and abroad. By the third decade of the nineteenth century all but the timber industry had died (Short, 1989). The same deindustrialization process occurred in early-nineteenth-century Silesia, which had been the scene of a thriving linen industry for two centuries (Kisch, in Kriedte, Medick, and Schlumbohm, pp. 541–564).

The deindustrialization of the towns and regions associated with protoindustrialization had many causes. In some cases, as Leslie A. Clarkson has pointed out, merchant capitalists invested their money not in the mechanization of their own trade but in other trades, some of them mechanized, some of them not. In East Anglia and western England merchants invested in farming, brewing, innkeeping, and retail trading, not textiles (p. 32). In other places a shortage of fuel, absence of raw materials, competition from other regions, and failure to keep up with intermediate developments prevented a transition to factory manufacturing. All of these factors spelled doom for manufacturing in the Weald (Short, 1989). In Silesia the Napoleonic wars disrupted markets, and local landlords refused to invest in the linen industry when mechanization called for it. In other places changes in fashion spelled doom to textile and lace industries (Coleman, 1983, p. 37).

CONCLUSION

Historical research has not upheld all aspects of Mendels's original notion of the role protoindustrialization played in the growth of the European and British population and economy, and debate about the concept continues. But the studies devoted to this topic have replaced the dichotomous pairings of rural and urban, traditional and modern, stagnant and dynamic that dominated historians' accounts of early modern Europe with a more varied and complex view. Industrialization seems a less abrupt development than it did before, as the Tillys predicted it would. We no longer see peasants as invariably devoted exclusively to farming, or manufacturing as an entirely urban activity. The urban and rural worlds no longer appear isolated from each other, and lines of influence no longer appear to have run in one direction only; developments in either place affected the other. Protoindustrialization may not have determined exactly where industrialization would occur, but it constituted a major transition in rural life and rural-urban relation-

ships in the final decades of the old economic, social, and demographic regimes. It enabled regions to support a far larger rural population than agriculture alone could have done, cities to grow gradually rather than rapidly, and merchants to increase production for a long time without technological change. It made it possible for many rural men to cease short-term mi-

grations in search of work, for women to make even larger contributions to the family's well-being than their work on farms and in small cottage industries had, and for many merchants to acquire the expertise and capital that would serve them well when it came time to build factories and increase production once again.

See also The Population of Europe: Early Modern Demographic Patterns (in this volume); Artisans (volume 3); Gender and Work; Preindustrial Manufacturing (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS



Patrick Karl O'Brien

Throughout history men and women manufactured commodities for use or for trade and sale. No society (family, village, urban, regional, or national) has operated without producing some range and levels of industrial output.

INDUSTRIALIZATION

Industrialization refers to economic change that is recent and different in scale and scope from the manufacture of artefacts. As a socioeconomic process, industrialization includes the rapid transformation in the significance of manufacturing activities in relation to all other forms of production and work undertaken within national (or local) economies. Following the seminal work of Simon Kuznets, economists, historians, and sociologists have measured and compared industrialization in statistical form as it appeared in national accounts and evolved historically for a large number of countries. Their data shows that as industrialization proceeds, shares of workforces employed in and national outputs emanating from primary forms of production (agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining) decline, while shares of employment and output that is classified as industrial increase.

Output and employment emanating from the third macro sector of national production, services, can go up or down in relative terms. Services include all forms of noncommodity output that are sold (and/or supplied) either to consumers (for instance, health care) or utilized as “inputs” (e.g. distribution, legal advice, accountancy, etc.) in order to sustain both manufacturing and primary forms of production. Clearly, when industry grows more rapidly than other forms of commodity output then the allocation of services changes toward manufacturing and away from farming, fishing, forestry, and mining. Indeed macroeconomic analyses now emphasize the considerable degree of overlap between services and industry. Trends in the shares of services sold directly to consumers are,

however, difficult to explain. As development proceeds, final service output becomes a more important component of national product and employment but it can also increase in preindustrial economies as well, due to population growth, urbanization, and the slow growth of jobs in manufacturing. Thus, there is no exclusive correlation between industrialization and the service sector.

For sustained development there is no substitute for industrialization, which can also be measured as the reallocation of a nation’s stock of capital (embodied in the form of buildings, machines, equipment, tools, infrastructure, communications, and distribution networks) away from primary and toward industrial production. Macro data, available for the foreign trade of nations, allows observers to track the progress of industrialization over the long run in the form of predictable shifts in the composition of a country’s exports and imports. Sales of domestically produced manufactured exports normally grow in significance and purchases of foreign manufactures diminish as a share of total imports.

Thus economic data has been classified in heuristic ways and disaggregated into numerous activities and functions in order to expose the extent, pattern, and pace of industrialization over time across regions and among European and other countries. These essentially taxonomic exercises help to define and to make concrete a process that has proceeded on a global scale for nearly three centuries. They expose national variations from more general or regional patterns and contribute to the understanding of major economic variables that historically have fostered or restrained industrialization in Europe and other parts of the world.

Industrialization has been a highly important process for the welfare of mankind because the reallocation of labor, capital, and other national resources toward industry has usually been accompanied by technological and organizational change, which has led to higher levels of output per hour, rising living

standards, population growth, urbanization, cultural changes, and shifts in the balance of power among nations. Thus, industrialization can also be defined in social, cultural, and political terms. For example, Parsonian sociology depicts the rise of industrial societies in terms of a set of interconnected characteristics, hegemonic values, and legal systems represented as functional for the development of modern industry. How, when, and why particular societies moved from pre-industrial to industrial norms, motivations, status family systems, and modern institutions that characterize industrial society is not, however, explained in Parsonian models.

Other sociological taxonomies elaborate on the type of changes required in individual behavior and social institutions for modern industry to succeed. They contrast “traditionalistic patterns of action” that are defined as ascriptive, multidimensional, communitarian, familial, and authoritarian with the types of individualistic, achievement orientated, mobile, entrepreneurial attitudes and behavior that somehow became more dominant in national or local cultures as industrialization took hold. This approach to industrialization depends on the vocabularies and concepts drawn from sociology, psychology, and cultural anthropology and analyses, inspired by Max Weber, that continue to be preoccupied with value systems (derived ultimately from religions) that have “motivated” the “drive to industrialize” in different national and cultural settings.

Alas the historical record is not clear on whether social changes precede or accompany industrialization. Until recently, sociological approaches to industrialization have, moreover, been more concerned with its disruptive, dislocative, and potentially negative consequences for families, communities, villages, and regions, than with its nature, origins, and positive effects on living standards. Read as a social process, industrialization often leads to differentiation flowing from the division of labor, class formation, and uneven regional development. As industry diffuses from country to country, it becomes associated with diminishing returns, deindustrialization, unemployment, and the economic decline of some nations. The inspiration for writing in a pessimistic way about industrialization is often derived from Marx.

Fortunately, sociological understanding of industrialization is now changing to combine several schools of theory with historical inquiry and a more process-centered global perspective. Modern research has exposed how complex, multifaceted, and variable the process of industrialization has become since Marx, Comte, Durkheim, and other canonical social scientists wrote their critiques. There seem to be numerous

paths to an industrial society and no foreseeable end of capitalism. Several social sciences, as well as national historical narratives, are recognized as relevant, indeed as necessary, for the analysis of the process as a whole. Alas a “general theory” of industrialization at anything other than a meta level, focusing on structural changes in output employment and the allocation of resources (pace Kuznets) and obvious changes concerned with the “modernization” of societies (pace Parsons) still seems unattainable.

Vantage points on the industrial revolution vary. In the discussion that follows, emphasis is placed on issues of European versus global perspective and on related questions of causation. Many studies of industrialization emphasize technological change or measurements of economic growth. From the standpoint of social history, discussions of industrialization must include its impact on social culture and class tension and on gender and family life (including characteristic reductions in women’s work roles and the removal of work from the family setting), as well as changes in work and leisure life. From whatever vantage point, discussion of industrialization is complicated by significant regional variations and also by the protracted quality of change. Industrialization was a revolutionary process (though some economic historians have disputed this point), but it stretched over many decades and might have also varied its shape in some crucial respects.

THE HISTORICAL PROCESSES AND STAGES

“Modern industry” (i.e. industrial activity concentrated in particular regions and towns, organized in factories, firms, and corporations, and using machinery and inanimate forms of energy) evolved gradually over the past five centuries. It appeared in some European economies before others. Industrialization, considered as a long-term process, has occupied generations of economic and social historians who have analyzed major forces that carried the growth of different national industrial sectors forward from one stage to another. In general their writings concentrate on the epoch that opens with the beginnings of the British industrial revolution in the mid-eighteenth century and closes with the end of the long boom after World War II (1948–73).

Nevertheless, a considerable literature has also been concerned with “preconditions” for industrialization that appeared in some regions of Europe over the centuries between the Renaissance and the first industrial revolution, while “late industrialization”

characteristic of Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans has generated another distinctive body of writing. For example, North and Thomas provide a succinct reminder about private initiatives and enterprise as structural preconditions for industrialization. The accumulation of capital in industry, the acquisition of skills needed for manufacturing, the diffusion of improved forms of organization for industrial production, and the funds needed for research and development into the scientific knowledge and technologies that raised productivity all required sustained private investment. That investment emerged as a response to incentives in the form of predictable material gains for the investors and entrepreneurs involved. It required politically enforced rules to mitigate the risks of instability, breakdown, and failure that often occurred during the buildup of modern industry. Such incentives, together with insurance against avoidable risks, rested in large part on institutions and laws for the conduct of all forms of economic activity (including industry) that were put in place and enforced more or less efficiently by some European governments and by private voluntary as-

sociations between the late Middle Ages and the era of the French Revolution, 1789–1815.

Once efficient institutions and legal systems were in place, protoindustrialization developed in many regions across the European continent. When it emerged after 1750, mechanized industry did not spread randomly across the map but located within established protoindustrial regions. Insights can be gained into industrialization by explaining the circumstances that led modern manufactures to grow and decay in some places before others, provided it is realized that there is no linear progression from proto to modern forms of industry.

Linear progression is too often the leitmotiv in writing about long-run economic development, an approach derived from Marx and scholars from the German Historical School, who explored the origins of European capitalism over several centuries from the High Middle Ages through to the nineteenth century. Rostow adhered to the basic position taken by that famous school, namely, that European economies had evolved in comparable ways but at different speeds through well-demarked stages of growth.

In the early modern period an evolutionary accumulation of capital and knowledge carried them to the point of discontinuity, or “take-off,” from which they industrialized at a speed and on a scale that took societies forward into “self-sustained” and irreversible growth. Critiques of Rostow’s famous model are convincing; particularly Gerschenkron’s essays, which represent European industrialization as a process of “unity in diversity.” Unlike Rostow (and Kuznets) he is more interested in explaining variations than similarities across nations. Gerschenkron expected that the study of carefully delineated contrasts in the methods used by now affluent societies to build up modern industry could help to explain the time they took to converge toward the highest attainable (i.e. British) levels of industrialization and per capita income.

European industrialization might, at the cost of simplification, be represented as a homogeneous macroeconomic process, but differentiation in the composition of output, great diversity in methods of production, and variety in the modes and styles of organization actually characterized the development of European industry between the French Revolution and World War I. Viable alternatives to mass-mechanized production prospered not only in numerous regions on the mainland but also within Britain, the leading industrial economy of that period. They survived because technology only provided substitutes for handicraft skills within a constrained (if ever widening) range of industrial production and because markets, particularly the quality end of consumer and capital goods markets, required flexible adaptations to changes in demand. Mass, large-scale factory-based industrial production never became necessary and efficient for all manufactured artefacts. Considerable segments of traditional industry survived. Sharp discontinuities with more handicraft and proto forms of production never emerged. Instead, while industry became the dominant sector in economy after economy, change and expansion within industry continued to represent a process of continuous adaptation and redesign. New technologies, tools, forms of power, and modes of organization extended the range of skill required and qualities of products available. No American (or British) paradigm for industrialization based on large-scale corporate forms of organization producing homogenized products for sale on mass markets emerged across the industrial regions of Europe until after World War I. Even then that particular model only prevailed for five decades or so before Asian comparative advantages in small-batch, flexible, and differentiated production appeared in the late twentieth century.

PAST TENDENCIES, PRESENT TRENDS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS DURING THE FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS

After the onset of the first industrial revolution in Britain (c. 1750), global industrial output took more than a century to double. Between the mid-nineteenth century and World War I it quadrupled. Over forty years dominated by depression and war, 1913–1953, output trebled and then trebled again over the two decades that followed to the peak of the long boom in 1973. Thereafter, the annual rate of growth of global industrial output declined but it still remained rapid by historical standards. However, there are dramatic regional differences in this output.

Although industrial production in third world countries probably doubled over the two centuries after 1750, down to World War I, total output per capita may well have declined in both relative and in absolute terms as the population of Africa, Asia, and South America purchased a rising share of the manufactured goods they consumed in the form of imports from the industrializing countries of Europe and North America. Over the long run the share of world industrial output emanating from production located in Third World economies declined from around 70 percent, 1750–1800, down to the 10 percent range around 1950. It began to rise again during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Historically, for two centuries from 1750 onward, industrialization (particularly if it is measured as industrial output per capita) was essentially confined to Europe and its settlements overseas in North America (Bairoch, pp. 269–333).

Thus, until recently, discussions about the course and causes of industrialization have been overwhelmingly concerned with the scale, efficiency, and development of modern (i.e. technologically advanced) industries within Europe and North America. For a long time, indeed for roughly two centuries before 1900, Britain remained the world’s leading industrial economy (conspicuously so when measured in terms of industrial output per capita) before it was superseded by the United States around 1900–1914 as a result of the “second industrial revolution,” and then by other European economies and by Japan as the twentieth century progressed. European and North American industries attempted to converge toward and to surpass the standards of labor productivity, technological advance, and organizational efficiency displayed by many (but not all) British industries. After 1900–1914 (and during the second industrial revolution) the standards set for convergence shifted to

the United States and to league tables, which ranked national industries and industrial sectors in terms of a battery of productivity indicators purporting to tell businessmen and governments how well or badly a particular economy was performing within global industry as a whole. Britain's relative decline, the rise of America, Germany, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, latterly Japan, and the newly industrializing countries of East Asia, can be traced and analyzed in relation to a range of indicators of industrial power and efficiency.

What stands out for most of the twentieth century is the overwhelming size of American industry and its persistent dominance, measured in terms of manufactured output per head of population, but less so in terms of productivity (i.e. manufactured output per man hour of labor employed in industry). That particular advantage, which the United States certainly retained for longer than would have been the case without two global wars (1914–1918 and 1939–1945), diminished during the long boom when productivity growth in several European economies exceeded that of the lead country. The history of this phase of “convergence” exposed how interactions between technological opportunities, social capabilities, scale economies, initial natural endowments, and underemployed labor operated as key variables behind the accelerated rate of industrialization achieved by European economies, and Japan, during and since the long boom, 1948–1973. Since 1950, within the developed market economies of Europe and North America industrialization has proceeded by exploiting and adopting the potential for productivity gains already embodied and clearly functioning in the technologies, organizational forms, and institutions of the lead (or leading) industrial economies.

Attempts to represent that process in terms of a rather bland conceptual vocabulary of convergence drawn from economics and sociology carry less conviction when transposed to the Asian and Latin American cultures of newly industrializing countries. For these so-called late industrializers, the roles their governments play and the strategies and organizational structures adopted by their firms, as well as distinctive processes of industrialization that have emerged, may represent a “new paradigm,” or perhaps a “third industrial revolution.” That paradigm embodies the adaptation to the opportunities provided by new technologies and to competitive challenges arising from the diffusion of industry to more and more locations and countries around the world. A new revolution in information technologies, high speed transportation, biochemicals, genetic engineering, robotics, and computerized control systems, as well as the relocation,

diffusion, and integration of industries on a global scale, confront earlier (European and American) as well as late (Asian) industrialists.

For economic and social historians, who take a very long-run view, there may be little that seems novel in the current phase of restructuring, reorganization, and relocation of industry, or indeed in the rediscovery of sources of industrial innovation and of efficiency gains among the skills and motivations of workers on factory floors. It all seems reminiscent of the phase of regional economies and protoindustrialization in Europe between 1492 and 1756.

INDUSTRY'S LINKS TO AGRICULTURE, TRANSPORT, AND FINANCE

Although industry is usually represented as the “key sector” behind the long-run development of national economies, the history of when, where, how, and with what effect industrialization emerged to play that “leading role” depended on support from other sectors. Before nations industrialize, their resources are usually heavily concentrated within and upon agriculture. In the absence of inflows of foreign resources, the primary sector is called upon to supply much of the labor, capital, raw materials, and markets that industry requires for long-term growth. These connections have been formally modeled by economists but the basic linkages can be understood and their significance measured by comparing the experiences of particular countries (cases) during the early stages of industrialization when agriculture could nurture or constrain the development of towns and industries.

Forward and backward linkages between industry and transport are almost as important to appreciate. Demand for transportation widens and deepens when industries purchase inputs and sell final outputs over wider spaces. The coordination of specialized, regionally concentrated but spatially dispersed centers and sites for industrial production depended on the services supplied by an extended, and increasingly efficient, network of transportation. Industrialization has been accompanied and actively promoted by a long series of innovations in transportation (surfaced roads, canals, railed ways, steam, oil, and jet propelled engines), which lowered the costs, and speeded up and regularized the delivery of the final outputs and the inputs required for the expansion of manufacturing industry. Transportation declined in price and grew more rapidly than commodity production. It not only provided a final output, travel, but investment in transportation networks is connected through backward linkages to several major industries, including

iron and steel, engineering, and construction. Without rapid and continuous technological changes in transportation, industrialization on a regional, national, and global scale would have been severely constrained.

No set of institutions supporting industrial firms (particularly smaller firms) are as important as banks and other financial intermediaries. They collect savings and provide the loans that industrialists borrow as threshold capital, as well as the credits required to sustain the day-to-day operations of manufacturing enterprises. Industrial entrepreneurs and firms do not emerge and function unless they can be provided with ready and sustained access to finance. Unfortunately, the framework of rules and regulations promulgated by governments in order to avoid inflation and maintain the international value of currencies has operated to repress the emergence and distort the necessary activities of financial intermediaries. Regulating the money supplies and the national exchange rates, while providing for access to loans that are helpful for industry, presents governments with difficult choices as they try to balance the competing claims for industrial growth with price and balance of payments stability.

Monetary and fiscal policies cover an important subset of a whole range of connections between the state and the industrialization of national economies.

Famously for Russia and Eastern Europe, the creation of modern industrial sectors was actually planned and executed by their central governments. For most other European economies, states undertook a less comprehensive and dictatorial role. They financed and set up certain sections of industrial production, and subsidized others, but in general provided infrastructures of communications, energy supplies, education and training, information and technical advice, and security in order to promote private investment in and to support the private management of national industries.

Debates about connections between governments and industry have tended to become suffused with ideological preconceptions about the effectiveness of private compared to political initiatives and management for the promotion of modern industry. Thus, histories of industrialized economies have been written purporting to demonstrate the benign, as well as the malign, effects of state “interference” with the operation of market forces and private enterprise. Late (Cold War) industrialization also became a confusing battleground of claims and counterclaims for market failures versus bureaucratic ineptitude behind the performance of different countries in the late twentieth century. Fortunately, a more balanced view has emerged which seeks to analyze the kind of governmental strategies for industrialization that have proved

either helpful, neutral, or hindrance for long-term industrial development; and to expose structural and historical conditions that have in large measure predetermined successes and failures in national economic policies. The intellectual discourse about the role of the state moved from mere ideology into the realism of empirically based histories, analyses, and theories.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Generalizations can also be drawn from a wide range of historical accounts of paths or patterns of industrial growth about the links between domestic industry and the international economy. While endogenous (internal) intersectoral connections matter, no country has ever industrialized without rather considerable recourse to assistance from societies beyond its borders. The buildup of national industrial sectors can often be traced to the stimulus of profits obtainable from the sale of manufactures on world markets; it also came from successful attempts to escape from the constraints of small or slowly growing home markets. In nearly every case some proportion of the inputs of raw materials, capital, skilled labor, professional know-how, and technology required to establish and sustain industries emanated (at least in the initial stages) from places beyond national frontiers. International flows of commodities (exports and imports), services (transportation, distribution, insurance, and other commercial assistance), and the factors of production (capital, credit, technology, and useful knowledge) have always been integral to the spread of industrialization around Europe and to the rest of the world, even before Britain emerged as the first industrial nation in the late eighteenth century.

The significance of trade and commerce across countries for the timing, pace, and pattern of industrialization can be captured by looking at a country's balance of payments accounts. International migrations of capital and labor have also been analyzed in order to reveal the pull and the push of foreign and domestic markets, as well as political and other forces involved in the diffusion of industrialization during the past three centuries and also (but alas, without much help from hard data) for several centuries before.

Between 1846 and 1914 globalization and industrialization went hand in hand, at least among European economies and European offshoots overseas in the Americas and Australasia. Dramatic declines in the costs of transportation integrated commodity markets and stimulated trade and specialization. Massive migrations of labor, followed by capital, reallocated re-

sources efficiently across frontiers and sectors of national economies. In the absence of governmental impediments to trade or to labor and capital flows, underemployed and cheap labor moved out of the countryside toward the cities into employment in industry and related urban services. Alas, between 1914 and 1948, this benign process of globalization was restrained by tariffs, by immigration controls, and by two World Wars. It picked up again during the long boom, 1948–1973. At the end of the twentieth century, the diffusion of industrialization through trade, capital, and labor flows across frontiers was endangered by the resurgence of a “new protectionism.”

Debate about the significance of “endogenous” versus “exogenous” forces in the industrialization of otherwise sovereign and ostensibly autonomous countries has persisted and covers the entire spectrum of national “cases” from Britain (site of the first industrial revolution) to the “Asian tigers” industrializing at far greater speed in the late twentieth century. Some commentators see commodity trade as the “handmaiden” rather than as the “engine” of growth, but the role of exports and imports probably varied from place to place and also depended from cycle to cycle on the underlying buoyancy of the world economy as a whole and upon the freedom of international economic relations.

Everywhere industrialization required high and increasing levels of investment not simply in buildings, machinery, inventories, and other assets that supported manufacturing activity, but, on a greater scale, in the infrastructural facilities needed for the transmission of energy, for urbanization, housing, transport and distribution networks, and public services that accompanied the buildup of modern industries. Internally generated savings could be inadequate, particularly when businessmen and governments wished to finance a rapid development of modern industry. Furthermore, the import content of local industrialization (particularly the machinery, but also raw materials, intermediate inputs, and the recruitment of foreign professional and skilled labor) had to be funded in the form of foreign exchange, which also became scarce and expensive when countries began to industrialize at any speed.

Loans and credit from abroad then became necessary to fill these two gaps, particularly in the early phases of industrialization, when local investors and financial intermediaries regarded industrial enterprises as risky, and/or when balance of payments constraints dominated the allocation of investable funds for industrial development.

Foreign capital often became available at prices that governments and local businessmen found exces-

sive and on terms they regarded as constrictive of national autonomy and as potentially prohibitive for longer-term industrial development. Before the era of decolonization (which occurred rapidly after World War II) an “imperial component” surely entered into payments made for inflows of metropolitan and foreign capital. Thereafter, bargains continued to be struck between investors and borrowers from more or less dependent, but nominally sovereign, economies, that the debtors have persistently regarded as intrusive and “exploitative.” Yet most countries continued to rely heavily on international capital markets and in the twentieth century numerous industrializing economies in Eastern Europe (as well as the Third World) accumulated levels of foreign debt that reached crisis proportions in relation to their capacities to earn the foreign currency required to satisfy contractual obligations to creditors from overseas.

Long-term growth in output and productivity in manufacturing continues to rest upon the discovery, improvement, and development of scientific and technological knowledge that can be profitably applied to industrial production. Most industrialized and industrializing countries (and to some extent this observation applies even to first industrial nations) borrowed, emulated, adapted, and built upon manufactured products and industrial techniques initially developed outside their frontiers. Although there are certain competitive advantages to be reaped from being the locus of inventions and as a “first mover” in new product lines, industrialization as a global process depends more on adaptation, improvement, and further development of technically and commercially viable industrial technologies moved from place to place

and across countries. Thus it is the diffusion rather than the “discovery” of industrial technology that is at the “core” of industrialization.

Over the last half of the twentieth century multinational corporations (MNCs) assumed a leading role in facilitating the movement of investable funds and managing the transfer of industrial technologies around the world. These corporations and conglomerates were usually privately owned companies that were centrally controlled by an executive located in and recruited from a single country (overwhelmingly the United States, but including Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Japan). Multinational corporations produced and sold manufactured goods on a global scale, but in origin such organizations were not new. In form, structure, and purpose their antecedents can be traced back to Dutch, English, and French corporations trading with the Americas and Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

An impressive list of European and American corporations, making and trading in industrial commodities well beyond the frontiers of their own “national markets,” certainly appeared well before 1914. Their range and reach spread between the wars. They soon encompassed the globe and assumed control over a large share of transnational trade, capital flows, and technology transfers before the end of the long boom, 1948–1973. American multinationals diffused modern technologies, new products, good managerial practices, and improved forms of industrial organization and thereby contributed positively to the recovery of European industries from World War II.

Yet the role of American, European, and Japanese multinational corporations in the development of industry in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe remains controversial. They stand accused of diffusing inappropriate products, exporting obsolete technologies, and recommending hierarchical, or culturally biased, managerial systems to underdeveloped countries. They are said to underinvest in the training they provide in order to upgrade local workforces. They are perceived to exploit cheap labor around the globe and retain monopoly rights over modern technologies and best-selling product lines. Even in developed countries of Europe and North America multinationals are regarded by some as unpatriotic agencies of deindustrialization and unemployment.

EUROPE'S INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS

In earlier centuries Europe derived from Asia and the Middle East a considerable body of technological, scientific, and agrarian knowledge, which it adapted and embodied in commodities, artefacts, machines, and commercial practices, crops, and agrarian techniques, associated with the industrialization of the continent that occurred at an accelerated pace after 1750. Just as there has been considerable investigation into the extra-European origins and contributions of Asia, Africa, and the Americas to European industrialization as it evolved before 1815, so too the nature and antecedents of the British industrial revolution have been vigorously debated in interpretations of that famous transition to industrial society.

A key question for this illuminating discourse is why the Netherlands did not evolve into the first industrial nation. All the preconditions seemed to be in place: well functioning (competitive) factor and commodity markets, a productive agriculture, high levels of urbanization, a skilled workforce, good internal order, merchants poised to mature into industrial entrepreneurs, and so on. Yet during the eighteenth century the Netherlands entered into relative and perhaps into absolute economic decline and its interest as a case for students of industrialization resides more in the discourse of the rise and relative decline of a commercial and protoindustrial economy.

Nevertheless, that discourse remains as interesting to contemplate as Britain's protracted but still seminal discontinuity in global economic history. Thanks largely to the research and analysis of economists (who have encapsulated its major features and key variables in statistical form) modern conceptions of the first industrial revolution can now distinguish general from unique characteristics and allow us to

clarify and to weigh the really significant determinants at work, which include: a productive agriculture, the slow accumulation of stocks of skilled labor, and military success in the competition for international commerce with its leading European rivals, including Holland, France, Portugal, and Spain.

National and particular contrasts in the pace and pattern of industrialization, as and when it occurred on the European mainland, are now perceived to be more analytically interesting than traditional accounts, based essentially on a British paradigm emulated in a chronological sequence (through a process of technological diffusion) by Belgium, France, Switzerland, Germany, Holland, Italy, Austria, Russia, and Iberia. For example, France, a much larger and more populous country than Britain, probably achieved higher rates of industrial growth down to the time of the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, which then disrupted and delayed the industrialization of Britain's main rival, as well as other regions of western Europe such as Spain for some three to four decades. Less favorable natural endowments, a constricting heritage of agrarian property rights, and a persistent lack of military success in mercantilist competition with British commerce and industry for access to global markets in the Americas, Africa, and Asia seem to be the central components of modern explanations for France's different path.

Europe's "Mediterranean economies" (Italy, Spain, Portugal) also lost ground to British industry and commerce in the competition for international markets during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nevertheless, (and central to any understanding of their "failure" to undertake the structural changes required for industrialization over long stretches of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) there was a lack of support from low-productivity agricultures; inadequate rates of investment in education and skill; and governmental policies that protected the cultivation of grain and failed to reform a constricting system of property rights and tenurial contracts within the agrarian economy. Agrarian preconditions, natural resources, and governments were not helpful in Italy or the Iberian Peninsula.

By contrast (and along with the Nordic countries) Germany included within its frontiers a range of skills and accessible supplies of coal and minerals, as well as concentrations of protoindustrialization within several regions that were economically integrated early in the nineteenth century and eventually politically united into a large and growing national market. Although modern industrialization cannot (in contrast to Russia) be presented as organized, managed, and funded by the state, in several ways the Ger-

man process can be plausibly depicted as “stimulated” from above. That promotion by the state included: the very important project for the establishment of a railway system, the formation of the Zollverein (a customs union), the unification of currencies and prudential monetary policies, selective protection, and, to an outstanding degree for the times, public investment in education.

Like Japan later in the century, Germany started to industrialize from a basis of literacy, commercial sophistication, and technological know-how that added up to an accumulation of social capabilities that far exceeded anything available within, say, the Russian empire. By the 1860s German industrialists could call upon skills, professional management, scientific knowledge, as well as an infrastructure of transportation, financial intermediation, and public services that could not be taken for granted except within a few large cities and the western regions of the Habsburg empire to the east.

Recent and more optimistic interpretations of industrialization within that empire before its dismemberment in 1918 are surely a necessary corrective to the older history of stagnation. Nevertheless, regional variations remained pronounced and the kind of acceleration and diversification of industrial production achieved by Germany did not occur. After a good start in the eighteenth century, the Habsburg state seems to have failed to build up the efficient framework of laws and institutions required to promote a more impressive widespread process of industrialization over the succeeding century.

Within the spectrum of European powers, Russian industrialization started from a position of the greatest backwardness. Before the Revolution of 1917 the Romanov regime had, however, introduced a range of institutional reforms that facilitated the more efficient operation of that empire’s labor and capital and commodity markets. In 1861, in the name of freedom, the tsar emancipated the workforce from serfdom, which thereafter allowed agriculture to make a more positive contribution to the growth of modern urban industry. Russian agricultural output increased at rather impressive rates. From a low base, industrial production responded and grew steadily from the 1840s down to World War I. With a substantial measure of assistance from overseas investment, from foreign managers, engineers, and technologies, a more diversified and capital-intensive structure of industrial production emerged in Russia between 1880 and 1914. At every stage the tsarist state, in partnership with foreign and local enterprise, attempted to force the pace of industrialization in order to overcome the empire’s backwardness and geopolitical weakness.

That drive intensified under the Bolsheviks, who took over the ownership and control of the Russian economy in 1917. The new Communist regime erected the political and institutional structures required for a new style “command economy”; and in the face of an entirely hostile international political and economic order, succeeded in increasing the labor participation rate and the share of the country’s resources devoted to fixed capital formation, particularly in heavy industry, to an extraordinary degree. Between 1917 and 1989 the domestic product of the Soviet Union multiplied by a factor of ten and its per capita product five times. Its record for state-inspired and driven industrialization is impressive but not that extraordinary and it might, counterfactually, have been achieved by a less authoritarian regime. The achievement is, moreover, one of “extensive growth” and owed very little to technological and organizational changes, which enabled rival economies to raise the productivities of labor and capital deployed to produce industrial output. The strategy and concomitant organizational and command structures meant that productivity gains became steadily more difficult to obtain. By the early 1980s, the Soviet economy had clearly run into sharply diminishing returns and by 2000 the Russian state was attempting to move the system toward some version of capitalism that could raise industrial productivity to levels that might gradually converge towards Western European and American standards.

EUROPEAN INDUSTRIALIZATION IN A LONG-RUN GLOBAL SETTING

Since Paleolithic times people have been engaged in making artefacts for use, decoration, and exchange. Supplies of industrial commodities increased in volume, range, and sophistication when settled agricultures emerged and generated the surpluses of food and raw materials required to support towns, specialization, trade, and the order associated with a succession of “empires” or “civilizations,” which rose, flourished, and declined in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and in Mesoamerica between the onset of the Neolithic era and the industrial revolution. Global historians periodize and divide this epoch of some five millennia from Sumerian civilization to the Middle Ages into a succession of ancient empires and have been preoccupied with the political, military, and cultural factors in their rise and decline.

For historians of industry (who tend to periodize in terms of the millennia before and the centuries after the industrial revolution in the eighteenth cen-

ture), the interest in ancient civilizations resides in understanding the range, amount, design, and above all the costs or values in exchange of the manufactured artefacts these empires bequeathed to posterity. Archaeologists have collected and arranged a great deal of the evidence required to appreciate the evolving variety and volume of industrial production that originated from urban sites that seem to have been spatially concentrated and specialized in manufacturing as far back as the Sumerian Empire, which flourished in the Tigris and Euphrates Valley between 3800 and 2000 B.C.E.

They have classified and recorded the durable artefacts these empires produced and exchanged or acquired from other civilizations. The lists are long, variegated, and increasingly sophisticated, and testify to the existence of long-distance trade in manufactures within and across Asia, Europe, and Africa long before the heyday of the empires of Greece and Rome. Although diffusion of industrial products and the knowledge involved in their design and manufacture clearly occurred for millennia before the industrial revolution, it is impossible for historians to offer even conjectures about the amount of trade in manufactures or to begin to measure the volume of industrial production on national, let alone global, scales much before the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Yet industrial production and trade in industrial goods must have been important. Thus depictions of the industrial revolution in Europe as an unpredictable, sudden, and rapid transition from national or regional economies based overwhelmingly on agriculture to industrial economies are now regarded as simplifications. Not only were significant volumes of industrial products manufactured and traded in many parts of the world long before the industrial revolution, but machinery, some of it driven by windmills and waterwheels, had been used for centuries. Examples of concentrations of labor under the roofs of workshops and factories or within the walls of yards and organized in order to collaborate in the making of particular products can be found in numerous towns and cities of many empires and states in Europe, the Middle East, India, and China, as far back as Sumeria. Workmen, specialized and proficient in defined and evolving ranges of skills, crafts, techniques, or processes required to manufacture industrial goods, had formed a recognizable part of national and urban workforces in most ancient civilizations.

In short, features of industrialization that have transformed the potential for rapid economic growth over the past three centuries (including the manufacture of expanded ranges of useful artefacts, trade in industrial commodities, mechanical engineering, in-

animate forms of energy, specialization, factories, and spatial concentration of industrial activity) can be found in archaeological and historical records that go back in many parts of the world to Neolithic times. Furthermore, and although such impressions cannot be validated with reference to hard statistical evidence, narrative histories of “rapid” and “impressive” growth in industrial production and trade that accompanied the rise of cities, towns, and regions in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Mesoamerica also convince us that the question of what may be new about “European” industrialization of the past three centuries has remained heuristic to contemplate.

That is why essential contrasts between the recent past and previous epochs can only reside in the pace, pattern, and the global diffusion and integration of industrialization. For example, since the late seventeenth century the volume and range of industrial commodities used, consumed, and enjoyed by masses of people in nearly every part of the world has increased at a rate that must simply be unprecedented in history. Before the modern era, upswings in the amount and variety of manufactured goods made for the affluent populations of particular empires and cities may well have been equally rapid but remained geographically confined, and the consumption of manufactures, even within favored sites and places, was restricted to minorities of their population with the money or the power to appropriate something more than the food, shelter, and clothing required for subsistence.

Furthermore, nearly all the towns and polities that contained significant concentrations of industrial activity remained vulnerable to political and natural disasters (including breakdowns of internal order, warfare, plague, disease, and natural disasters of every kind). Industry and trade could be destroyed and permanently depressed by exogenous shocks. Declines (serious and absolute), as well as dramatic accounts of the rapid rise of industry and commerce, seem to be omnipresent features of the histories of industrialized, commercial, urbanized societies right down to the sixteenth century. Short of a nuclear holocaust, nationwide vulnerability to political and natural disasters that afflicted the very survival of urban industry and commerce for past millennia seems to have been replaced by those altogether less catastrophic problems of shocks and relative economic decline that have punctuated the history of industrialization since the eighteenth century.

Thus, something akin to a major discontinuity seems to separate the history of industrialization considered as a global phenomenon from the growth of pockets of industrial activity as they appeared and dis-

appeared around the world for millennia. That is why a distinguished succession of famous scholars from economics, history, sociology, and anthropology began to investigate the origins and to reflect on the positive and negative outcomes of the industrial revolution even before the first example of that famous transition had run its course in Britain and diffused onto the European mainland over the century after 1750.

Students are well advised to read these classical analyses of modern industrialization, referenced in the bibliography to this essay, before they turn to the more recent attempts to depict and explain the grand themes. Canonical texts are always instructive; they expose how many seminal concepts, insights, and approaches to the study of industrialization are included in the writings of the classics, but also how repetitious and circular many of the discussions that attempt to explain and to generalize about the long-run pace and pattern of modern industrialization in various parts of the world have now become. Nearly three centuries of empirical investigation and reflection by a succession of the very best minds in history and the social sciences have not produced any kind of general theory of industrialization.

As the leading sector in modern economic growth, accompanied by structural change, the process is, however, well understood. Sensible taxonomies and vocabularies defining the inputs and the intersectoral connections required to generate accelerated rates of industrial production have also been formulated and refined. Although the mechanisms through which these inputs' impact on growth are now understood, the sense in which they are separable and quantifiable components of a discernable historical process of sustained industrial development remains elusive. Net capital formation, the recruitment of better-skilled and more highly motivated labor, improved management, more efficient technology, optimal scale, and rational organization, aggressive marketing, and closer integration into a competitive international economy, an enhanced framework of supportive governmental policies, and so forth, will all be included in any discussion of the "preconditions," "requirements," or "proximate determinants" for industrial growth. Yet how, when, and why they all interacted and generated sustained industrial growth remain key questions for historians and social scientists pondering the very large fact that, after roughly three centuries of industrialization, the highest levels of industrial output per capita remain concentrated in roughly twenty to thirty national economies and support satisfactory standards of living for but a minority of the world's population.

Although several newly industrializing countries in the late twentieth century clearly entered the "club"

of industrialized market economies and their levels of industrial productivity began to approach standards set by the leading industrial powers in Europe, North America, and Japan, there is no statistical evidence for any sustained worldwide process of convergence in levels of real wages or output per worker employed in manufacturing industry. On the contrary, divergence between an admittedly larger group of national economies that can be represented as industrialized and economically successful and those that are still "underdeveloped" may be increasing.

Given that a great deal has been revealed about the process of industrialization and the proximate factors required to promote it, the frequently posed question of why the whole world is still not industrialized deserves to remain high on the intellectual agenda; particularly as the industries of "follower countries" would seem to possess competitive advantages as and when they attempt to catch up. For example, countries with small and/or less efficient industrial sectors emulate and adapt the technologies and modes of organization that are demonstrably successful elsewhere in the world economy. They can borrow the funds and hire the technicians and managers required to establish modern industry on established international capital and labor markets. Their workers are cheap. Their natural resources are often underexploited. Their governments remain keen to promote and to subsidize the development and diversification of national industry. With misgivings they even welcome the plants and branches of multinational corporations. And yet, these advantages have not been enough.

It is now more than two to three centuries since Britain passed through the first industrial revolution, yet convergence has been slow, painful, and geographically constrained. Except at a rather banal level of generality, there is no short explanation of why many more countries are not industrialized. Students can and will be told that the small selection of national economies that followed Britain's lead (and particularly the twenty or so cases that eventually surpassed Britain's standards of industrial productivity) possessed or quickly built up something referred to as the "social capability" required to industrialize. Manifestly most other countries (which include within their borders the majority of the world's population) did not and have not acquired the requisite social capabilities.

Social capability is, however, little more than a portmanteau category that refers to cultures, values, family systems, political and legal institutions, religions, motivations, education, and skills embodied in national populations that, in combination, operated to inhibit or to facilitate the development of modern

and efficient industrial sectors. Obviously at any point in time they appear as a heritage of national and/or local histories. Social capabilities can be pushed in required directions by governments, by other institutions, such as churches, schools, and industrial firms, and altered by material incentives to invest, develop, and work in industry. As a result of this link to the particular historical context, there is no substitute for studying successful cases of industrialization country by country and contrasting them with cases that came later to the endeavor and found greater difficulty in converging toward the macroeconomic structures and productivity levels of leading industrial powers. That is, there is no substitute for history.

At a global level the general models (largely from economics and sociology) that claim to account for the limited spread of modern industrialization are schematic and taxonomic. Yet, even working inductively from individual case studies it is difficult to expect a functioning general model of industrialization.

That pessimistic reflection is strengthened, moreover, by the observation that difficulties for the formulation of any general theory of industrialization have been compounded because the international context within which regions and countries industrialized has changed profoundly since the eighteenth century. This has occurred first of all because the knowledge base and range of technologies used to manufacture industrial commodities has evolved at an accelerated rate since British industry pioneered the development of steam power, coke smelting, and mechanical engineering to raise the productivity of labor employed in the production of consumer goods, machinery, and transportation.

Secondly, the geopolitical parameters for industrial development based on trade, imports of investable funds from abroad, for the diffusion of technology, and for the hire of skilled and professional manpower on international labor markets has also changed dramatically. For example, a liberal international order from 1846 to 1914 succeeded the ag-

gressive and war-prone mercantilism of previous centuries. Neomercantilism and the era of global warfare reappeared from 1914 through 1948. Thereafter, American hegemony, decolonization, and the rise of multinational enterprise reduced the obstacles to the spread and relocation of modern industry around the globe. Since 1989 the collapse of command economies, committed to forcing the pace of industrialization in Russia, Eastern Europe, and China, has severely further reduced the powers of states to control the geographical spread of industry.

Capitalism, assisted by positive help and incentives from governments, has triumphed as a so-called end to history. States everywhere seem committed to free enterprise, but it remains difficult to prescribe the right mix of policies for all national cases. Unless the current wave of protectionism intensifies, long-established trends in the interdependence and integration of industry on a global scale look set to continue, and industries will become ever more cosmopolitan and dispersed in their locations. Although the range of technologies now available to late industrializers provides opportunities for unprecedented rates of struc-

tural change and rates of increase in labor productivities, perhaps no particular illumination can be derived from labeling industrialization as it proceeded at the end of the millennium as qualitatively different, or as a third or fourth industrial revolution.

For more than three centuries modern industry has adapted to opportunities provided by flows of new knowledge. Telematics, biotechnologies, robotics, and other novel technologies are just the latest wave requiring industries to restructure, to relocate, and to readapt to possibilities to satisfy mankind's seemingly insatiable demands for manufactured commodities. In this current phase of technological development, knowledge, human skills, capacities for coordination, and flexible responses to volatile, global markets seem to carry the kind of competitive advantages required during an earlier phase of industrialization, before that process became synonymous with large-scale corporations, fixed capital, and mass production. Nowadays success involves new and different political and social capabilities that are already shifting the concentrations of industrial activity away from Europe and North America and back to Asia.

See also Cliometrics and Quantification (volume 1); Agriculture (in this volume); Factory Work (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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WAR AND CONQUEST



Jeremy Black

War has been central to European history and to the history of the European world. It is not a sphere separate from social history, remote in the details of operational activities, but rather an integral part of it, and the military itself has been a society of great interest and importance. Furthermore, military organization is an aspect of wider social patterns and practices, with which it intersects and interacts. Attitudes toward hierarchy, obedience, and discipline and the readiness to serve all partake of this interaction. The first crucial dimension of the dynamic of social change in and through war occurred when the military ceased to be coterminous with society, more specifically with adult male society. The origins of this process of specialization varied over time. The society of modern war can be understood primarily as a force of trained troops under the control of sovereign powers, with those powers enjoying a monopoly of such forces; the chronology and explanation of this development varies greatly from place to place depending on social and political circumstances.

The absence of developed statehood and powerful sovereign authority across much of the world from the beginning of the Christian era to about the year 1500 was such that it is generally more appropriate to think of tribal and feudal organization rather than a state-centric pattern. Yet, in areas of developed state power, such as imperial Rome and China, professional, state-controlled forces that reflected a functional specialization on the part of a portion of the male population were in place long before 1500. The relatively low productivity of agrarian economies was not incompatible with large forces at the disposal of such states, while the constraints that primitive command-and-control technology and practices placed on centralization did not prevent a considerable measure of organizational alignment over large areas. Thus, sophisticated military systems did exist in Europe prior to the second half of the second millennium, and there is no clear pattern of chronological development such that modernity can offer an appropriate theory or description. Aside from the analytical prob-

lem of assessing capability and change, there is also the more general moral issue, for the notion of “progress” toward a more effective killing and controlling machine is not one with which modern commentators are comfortable.

Any understanding of military organization must be wary of a state-centered, let alone Eurocentric, perspective, whether in definition, causality, or chronology. Many military organizations have not been under state control. Caution is advised before assuming a teleological, let alone triumphalist, account of state control of the military. It is questionable how far such a monopolization should be seen as an aspect of modernity.

Furthermore, modernity itself is a problematic concept, whether descriptive or prescriptive. Aside from the role of modernization as a polemical device in political debate, there is, in analytical terms, a difficulty in determining how best to define and dissect the concept. A series of critiques, from both within and outside the West, has eroded the triumphalist view of modernity as the rise of mass participatory democracy, secular or at least tolerant cultures, nation-states, and an international order based on restraint. Such critiques have a direct bearing on the understanding of military organization. Thus, for example, conscript armies could be seen in progressive terms in the nineteenth century as an adjunct of the extension of the male franchise. Both symbolized a new identification of state and people in countries such as France, Germany, and Italy, but not in Britain or the United States. Conscripted was also important in the ideology of communist states; and after 1945, as a new politics was created in what had been fascist societies, conscription was seen, for example in Germany and Italy, as a way to limit the allegedly authoritarian and conservative tendencies of professional armies, particularly their officer corps.

In the more individualistic Western cultures of the 1960s, however, conscription as a form, rationale, and ideology for the organization of the military resources of society seemed unwelcome. Military service

was presented less in terms of positive images, such as incorporating ideology and social mobility, and more as an unwelcome chore and a form of social control. Conversely, in Latin America, conscription had a more (though far from universal) positive image, in part because military service was seen as a means for useful training and for economic opportunity and social improvement, both for individuals and for society.

That the purpose of the military is to win wars is no longer a self-evident proposition; nor is the notion that military organization—the social systematization of organized force—is designed to improve the chances of doing so. Such propositions fail to note the multiple goals of military societies. Even if the prime emphasis is on war-winning, it is necessary to explain the processes by which such an emphasis affects the operation and development of such organizations.

THE PURPOSE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETIES

Military organizations and societies serve a number of functions, some of which are publicly defined and endorsed, while others are covert, implied, or implicit. One public function is national security, while an implied function is employing people and providing possible support for policing agencies. These functions did not develop uniformly, but rather varied, in an objective sense, by state, period, and branch of the military, and, in a more subjective sense, with reference to the views of leaders, groups, and commentators within and outside the military. Thus French army operations against large-scale smuggling gangs in the frontier region of Dauphiné in 1732 could be classed as policing or national security or both. The instrumentality of the military is not only a matter of defining its purposes but extends to the character of the military organization in a particular society. In other words, its purpose may not be that of achieving a specific military outcome; the prime objective of the creators of the organization may be the pursuit of certain domestic sociopolitical goals.

Political objectives. Military organization has two aspects: the internal structure and ethos of armed forces, and the relationship of the armed forces to the rest of society, specifically with reference to recruitment and control. Politicians may be more concerned to ensure “democracy” in the armed forces, or republican values, or revolutionary zeal, or commanders who will or will not automatically obey the government, than they are to consider the war-making potential and planning of the armed forces. Indeed the

latter may be left to the professional military, provided the desired control culture and value system are in place.

The central feature of British military organization arising from British society was that it answered to civilian control and did so in war as well as in peace. Similarly, in 1924 the left-wing government that gained power in France was more concerned about the ideological reasons for shortening conscripts’ terms of service than about preparing for war with Germany. In the modern West operational military control and political direction are largely disaggregated, although the distinction is hard to maintain, as was discovered in peacekeeping work, for example in Bosnia.

Opposite armies. A consideration of the chronological development of military society must be prefaced by a discussion of the sociology of different military systems. The evolution of specialized forces—of trained regulars under the control of states—occurred initially against the background of a world in which there was a general lack of such specialization. As has been noted, before 1500 there was an absence of powerful sovereign authority. A tribal pattern of organization lent itself particularly to a system of military membership, such that male membership in the tribe meant having warrior status and knowledge and engaging in training and warrior activity. Diversity was evidence of the vitality of different traditions rather than an anachronistic and doomed resistance to the diffusion of a progressive model. Diversity owed something to the interaction of military capability and activity with environmental constraints and opportunities. For example, cavalry could operate easily in some areas, like Hungary, and not in others, like Norway.

The prestige of imperial states, especially Rome and China, was such that their military models considerably influenced other powers, especially the successor states to the western Roman Empire. However, much of the success of both imperial states rested on their ability to co-opt assistance from neighboring “barbarians.” Any account of their military organization that offers a systematic description of the core regulars is only partial. Indeed, both imperial powers deployed armies that were in effect coalition forces. Such was the case with most major armies until the age of mass conscription in the nineteenth century, and even then was true of their transoceanic military presence. Such co-option could be structured essentially in two different ways. It was possible to equip, train, and organize ancillary units like the core regulars, or to leave them to fight in a “native” fashion. Imperial powers, such as the British in eighteenth-century India, followed both methods.

The net effect was a composite army, and such an organization has been more common than is generally allowed. The composite character of military forces essentially arises both from different tasks and from the use of different arms in a coordinated fashion to achieve the same goal: victory on the battlefield. Such cooperation rested not so much on bureaucratic organization as on a careful politics of mutual advantage and an ability to create a sense of identification. In imperial Rome the native ancillary units commonly provided light cavalry and light infantry to assist the heavy infantry of the core Roman units. The Ottoman Turks were provided with light cavalry by their Crimean Tatar allies, their Russian enemies by the Cossacks and, in the nineteenth century, by Kazakhs also. Thus, cavalry and infantry, light and heavy cavalry, pikemen and musketeers, frigates and ships of the line, tanks and helicopter gunships combined to create problems of command and control that affect organizational structures. Indeed, “native” forces operated as a parallel force with no command integration other than at the most senior level. The frequent combination of “native” cavalry and “core” infantry suggests that, in part, such military organization bridged divides that were at once environmental and sociological. This linkage complemented the symbiotic combination of pastoralism and settled agriculture that was so important to the economies of the pre-industrial world.

THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

The period 1490–1700 was one of increased interaction among areas of the world. Most active in this process were the Atlantic European powers, along with a number of other expansive powers, including in Europe the Ottomans and Russia. Military success was as much a matter of political incorporation as of technological strength, and incorporation depended on the successful allocation of the burdens of supporting military structures. The raising of men, supplies, and money was the aspect of military organization most important to the states of the preindustrial world, and the ease of the process was significant to the harmony of political entities and thus to the effectiveness of their military forces. Organization must be understood as political as much as administrative, and indeed the political nature was paramount. Rulers lacking political support found it difficult to sustain campaigns and maintain military organization. This was a problem for Charles I in his conflicts with Scotland in 1638–1640.

The use of agencies and individuals outside the control of the state to raise and control troops and

warships was so widespread that it cannot be seen simply as devolved administration. This point lessens the contrast between a medieval warfare based on social institutions and structures and an early modern system based on permanent organizations maintained and managed by the state. The notion of war and the military as moving from a social matrix—most obviously feudalism—to a political context—states in a states system—is too sweeping. In both cases the bellicose nature of societies was important, as was the accentuated role of prominent individuals that was the consequence of dynastic monarchy. A habit of viewing international relations in terms of concepts such as glory and honor was a natural consequence of the dynastic commitments and personal direction that a monarchical society produced. That view reflected traditional notions of kingship and was the most plausible and acceptable way to discuss foreign policy in a courtly context. Such notions also matched the heroic conceptions of royal, princely, and aristocratic conduct in wartime. Past warrior-leaders were held up as models for their successors: the example of Henry V was a powerful one at the court of Henry VIII of England, Edward III’s victories over France were a touchstone, and Henry IV of France was represented as Hercules and held up as a model for his grandson, Louis XIV.

Similarly, aristocrats looked back to heroic members of their families who had won and defended nobility, and thus social existence, through glorious and honorable acts of valor. These traditions were sustained both by service in war and by a personal culture of violence in the form of duels, feuds, and displays of courage, the same sociocultural imperative underlying both the international and the domestic sphere. This imperative was far more powerful than the cultural resonances of the quest for peace: the peace-giver was generally seen as a successful warrior, not a royal, aristocratic, or clerical diplomat.

The pursuit of land and heiresses linked the monarch to his aristocrats and peasants. As wealth was primarily held in land, and transmitted through blood inheritance, it was natural at all levels of society for conflict to center on succession disputes. Peasants resorted to litigation, a lengthy and expensive method, but the alternative, private violence, was disapproved of by state. Monarchs resorted to negotiation, but the absence of an adjudicating body, and the need for a speedy solution once a succession fell vacant, encouraged a decision to fight. Most of the royal and aristocratic dynasties ruling and wielding power in 1650 owed their position to the willingness of past members of the family to fight to secure their succession claims. The Tudors defeated the Yorkists to win England in

1485, the Bourbons fought to gain France in the 1580s, the Austrian Habsburgs to gain Bohemia in 1621, the Braganzas to gain Portugal in the 1640s, William III to gain the British Isles in 1688–1691, and the Romanovs to hold Russia in the 1610s.

More generally warfare created “states,” and the rivalries between them were in some fashion inherent to their very existence. Examples include the importance of the *reconquista* of Iberia from Islam to Portugal, Castile, and Aragon; of conflict with the Habsburgs for the Swiss Confederation and with England for Scotland; and the importance to the Dutch Republic of the threat from Spain and then France. State-building generally required and led to war and also was based on medieval structures and practices that included a eulogization of violence. War was very important, not only in determining which dynasties controlled which lands or where boundaries should be drawn but in creating the sense of “us” and “them,” which was so important to the growth of any kind of patriotism.

From 1490 to 1700 professionalization and the rise of standing (permanent) forces on land and sea created problems of political and military organizational demand. Structures had to be created and cooperative practices devised within the context of the

societies of the period. It is unclear how far professionalization and the rise of standing forces created a self-sustaining dynamic for change, in an action-reaction cycle or synergy, or to what extent effectiveness was limited, therefore inhibiting the creation of a serious capability gap in regard to forces, both European and non-European, that lacked such development. This is an important issue, given modern emphasis on organizational factors, such as drill and discipline, in the rise of the Western military.

Another important factor in change and professionalization was the development of an officer corps responsive to new weaponry, tactics, and systems and increasingly formally trained, at least in part, with an emphasis on specific skills that could not be gained in combat conditions. Although practices such as purchase of military posts limited state control (or rather reflected the nature of the state), officership was a form of hierarchy under the control of the sovereign. However, most officers came from the social elite, the landed nobility, and, at sea, the mercantile oligarchy. An absence of sustained social mobility at the level of military command, reflecting more widespread social problems with the recruitment of talent, was an important aspect of organization and a constraint on its flexibility.

European forces were not the only ones to contain permanent units and to be characterized by professionalism, but the degree of development in this direction in different parts of the world cannot be readily compared because of the lack of accurate measures and, indeed, definitions. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider how best to weight the respective importance of peacetime forces and larger wartime establishments.

In accounts of global military history, the early modern period is generally presented in terms of a European military revolution defined by the successful use of gunpower weaponry on land and sea. The onset of late modernity follows either in terms of greater politicization and resource allocation and an alleged rise in determination beginning with the French Revolution, or in terms of the industrialization of war in the nineteenth century, or in both. Such a chronology, however, due to its failure to heed change elsewhere, is limited as an account of European development and flawed on the global scale.

1700–1850

In searching for periodization, it is best to abandon a Eurocentric chronology and causation. The period 1700–1850, the age before the triumph of the West, closes as the impact of the West and Westernization was felt in areas where hitherto the effect was limited: Japan, China, Southeast Asia, New Zealand, inland Africa, and western interior North America. Beginning the period in about 1700 distinguishes it from that of the initial expansion of the “gunpowder empires.” It also focuses on the impact of flintlocks and bayonets, which were important in India, West Africa, Europe, and North America. Furthermore, the socio-political contexts of war after the seventeenth-century general crisis affected much of the world’s economy, with accompanying sociopolitical strains.

The study of war in the period 1700–1850 generally focuses on war within Europe under Charles XII (king 1697–1718), Peter the Great (tsar 1682–1725), the Duke of Marlborough (1650–1722), Frederick the Great (king 1740–1786), and Napoleon (1769–1821). However, conflict within Europe was less important in raising general European military capability than the projection of European power overseas, a projection achieved in a largely preindustrial world. To this end it was the organizational capacity of the Atlantic European societies that was remarkable. The Duke of Newcastle, secretary of state for the British Southern Department, claimed in 1758, “We have fleets and armies in the four quarters of the world and hitherto they are victorious every-

where. We have raised and shall raise more money this year than ever was known in the memory of man, and hitherto at 3½%.”

Warships themselves were the products of an international procurement system and of what were by the standards of the age massive and complex manufacturing systems. Their supply was also a major undertaking, as was their maintenance. Neither was effortless, and any reference to the sophistication of naval organization must take note of the continual effort that was involved and the problems of supplies. Naval supply and maintenance required global systems of bases if the navies were to be able to secure the desired military and political objectives. Thus, the French in the Indian Ocean depended on Mauritius and Réunion, the British on Bombay and Madras, the Portuguese on Goa, and the Dutch on Negapatam. When in the 1780s the British considered the creation of a new base on the Bay of Bengal, they acquired and processed knowledge in a systematic fashion and benefited from an organized process of decision making.

The globalization of European power was not solely a matter of naval strength and organization. The creation of powerful syncretic Western-native forces, especially by the French and then the British in India, was also important. A different process occurred in the New World. There the Western military tradition was fractured with the creation of independent forces. Their organizational culture and practices arose essentially from political circumstances. Thus, in the United States, an independent part of the European world, an emphasis on volunteerism, civilian control, and limited size, for both army and navy, reflected the politics and culture of the new state. This could be seen in Jefferson’s preference for gunboats over ships of the line.

Within Europe there was also a process of combination. Armies were largely raised among the subjects of individual rulers, but foreign troops, indeed units, were also recruited; alliance armies were built up by a process of amalgamation. Furthermore, recruiting, in some cases forcible, extended to foreign territories. The Prussians were especially guilty of this process, forcibly raising troops for example in Mecklenburg and Saxony. Amalgamation could involve subsidies and could also be motivated by operational factors, specifically the recruitment of light cavalry from peoples only loosely incorporated into the state, such as Cossacks for Russia and Crimean Tatars for Turkey.

THE WEST AND THE REST

A notion of different and distinctive European and non-European military societies, and of their related effectiveness, is visually encoded in the art and im-

agery of (European) empire. The image of the “thin red line,” an outnumbered and stationary European force, drawn up in a geometric fashion and ready to fire, is meant to suggest the potency of discipline and the superiority of form. Charging the line—or, as the case may be, the square—of the European force is a disorganized mass of infantry or cavalry, lacking uniform, formation, and discipline. Such an image is central to a teleology of military society, a notion that organization entails a certain type of order from which success flows. As an account of the imperial campaigns of the second half of the nineteenth century and of European success, such an image is less than complete and is in some respects seriously misleading. The error is even more pronounced prior to the mid-nineteenth century. European forces won at Plassey, in India (1757), and the Pyramids (1798), but they lost on the Pruth River, then in Romania (1711). The organization of forces on the battlefield was only one element in combat; some non-European forces had sophisticated organizational structures, both on campaign and in battle, and European armies themselves frequently did not fulfill the image of poised, coiled power.

Organization and tactics. The nature of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic battle was traditionally presented by British historians as an object lesson in the superiority of disciplined organization. The traditional view of Wellington’s tactics in his victory over Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815 is that his infantry, drawn up in line, simply blasted away at the oncoming French columns and stopped them by fire alone—in short that an organization geared to linear forma-

tions was most successful on the battlefield. The history of successful military organization in the nineteenth century is thus in part an extension of similar formations and practices of control by the Europeans to other parts of the world and emulation by local powers, although later in the century in Europe such formations were abandoned as they represented easy targets for opposing fire.

The conventional view of the interaction of organization, discipline, and tactics on the Wellingtonian battlefield has been revised. Wellington’s favored tactic was for his infantry to fire a single volley, give a mighty cheer, and then charge. The key was not firepower alone but a mixture of fire and shock. This tactic was not as uncommon elsewhere in the world as might be believed. The role of morale comes into focus as an important element of shock tactics (and also, of course, where there is reliance upon firepower). Shock tactics were not simply a matter of an undisciplined assault in which social and military organization played a minimal role, as is evident from the columnar tactics of European forces in the period. They can be presented as the organizational consequence of the *levée en masse*, the addition of large numbers of poorly trained conscripts to the army of Revolutionary France.

Columns could also be employed on the defensive, a deployment on the battlefield that required a more controlled organization. The formation was appropriate in several ways. First, it was an obvious formation for troops stationed in reserve. Thus, infantry brigades and divisions stationed in the second line would almost always have been in column, this being

the best formation for rapid movement, whether it was to plug a gap, launch a counterattack, or reinforce an offensive. Columns, it can be argued, were not merely the product of a relatively simplistic military organization, a regression from the professionalism and training of the army of Frederick the Great, but an effective improvement over what had come before. A sudden onslaught by a line of columns on an attacking force, and particularly an attacking force that had been shot up and become somewhat “blown” and disorganized, was likely to have been pretty devastating. Furthermore, columns could still fire, while they could also be placed side-by-side to present a continuous front. Columns gave a defender weight, the capacity for local offensive action and solidity, for troops deployed in line came under enormous psychological strain when under attack by columns.

The danger in presenting one form of tactical deployment as necessarily weaker than another is of obscuring what actually happened in combat. Organizational structure was clearly related to tactical deployment, although the extent to which there was a causal correspondence varied. Moreover, sources reveal the limitations of effective diffusion of tactics and weaponry, both within Europe and farther afield.

1850–1945

From the mid-nineteenth century the world was increasingly under the sway of the West, directly or indirectly. The organization of the Japanese army, in response first to French and then to German models, and of the navy, under the inspiration of the British navy, was a powerful example of this impact. Such emulation, however, was more than a matter of copying a successful military machine. There was also a sociopolitical dimension that focused in particular on the impact of nationalism but also on other aspects of nineteenth-century “modernization.”

Nationalism and conscription. Although systems of conscription did not require nationalism, they were made more effective by it. Nationalism facilitated conscription without the social bondage of serfdom because conscription was legitimated by new ideologies. It was intended to transform the old distinction between civilian and military into a common purpose. Although the inclusive nature of conscription should not be exaggerated, it helped in the militarization of society and, combined with demographic and economic growth, provided governments with manpower resources such that they did not need to turn to military entrepreneurs, foreign or domestic. The political

and ideological changes and increasing cult of professionalism of the nineteenth century also made it easier for the states to control their officer corps and to ensure that status within the military was set by government.

Nineteenth-century national identity was in part expressed through martial preparedness, most obviously with conscript armies. These in turn made it easier to wage war because the states were always prepared for it, or at least less unprepared than in the past. The scale of preparedness created anxiety about increases in the military strength of other powers and a bellicose response in crises. The process of mobilizing reservists also provoked anxiety, for mobilization was seen as an indicator of determination, and once it had occurred, there was a pressure for action.

These factors can be seen as playing a role in the wars begun by Napoleon III of France, Bismarck’s Prussia, and the kingdom of Sardinia during the *Risorgimento* (the nineteenth-century struggle for Italian unification). These regimes had policies they considered worth fighting for but that were to some degree precarious; it was hoped that the successful pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy and war would lead to a valuable accretion of domestic support. The regimes of nineteenth-century Europe were operating in an increasingly volatile milieu in which urbanization, mass literacy, industrialization, secularization, and nationalism were creating an uncertain and unfamiliar world. The temptation to respond with the use of force, to impose order on the flux, or to gain order through coercion was strong. A growing sense of instability encouraged the use of might to resist or channel it and also enabled “unsatisfied” rulers and regimes to overturn the diplomatic order.

Nationalism was both a genuinely popular sentiment and one that could be manipulated to legitimize conflict. It encouraged a sense of superiority over others. Politicians and newspapers could stir up pressure for action. In societies where mass participatory politics were becoming more common, public opinion played a role in crises; in 1870 in France and Germany it helped create an atmosphere favorable for war. A political leader profited from a successful war by gaining domestic prestige and support, although the desire for such support ensured that *realpolitik* was generally less blatant than in the eighteenth century. Napoleon III found it easier, more conducive, and more appropriate to seek backing by waging wars or launching expeditions in Russia, Italy, China, and Mexico rather than by broadening his social support through domestic policies. These expeditions coincided with a period of domestic peace after 1848; civil war in France, in the shape of the Paris Commune,

did not resume until after serious failure in foreign war. Having demonstrated and sustained a role by leading the Risorgimento, Vittorio Emanuele II, king of Sardinia and then of Italy (1861–1878), found it useful to declare war on Austria in 1866 in order to head off pressure for reform from left-wing politicians. Similar domestic problems encouraged Wilhelm I of Prussia to press for war that year and had the same effect on Franz Joseph of Austria.

Indeed, Austrian policy can in part be viewed in terms of the relationship between domestic politics and war. Success in the latter encouraged a more authoritarian politics, as in 1849 and 1865. War in 1866 seemed the only solution to the domestic political and financial problems of the Habsburg state and the sole way to tackle fissiparous nationalism, most obviously in Venetia. In the case of Prussia, but not Austria, success in war encouraged a reliance on force, a repetition of the situation in France under Napoleon I.

In the twentieth century, because of nationalism and the attendant increase in the scale of mobilization of resources, war became a struggle between societies rather than simply armies and navies. This shift affected military organization. If society was mobilized for war, as was indeed the case in both world wars, then large sections of the economy were directly placed under military authority and became part of the organization of the militarized state. Other sections were placed under governmental control and regulated in a fashion held to characterize military organization. The ministry of munitions that was created in Britain in World War I was as much part of the military organization as the artillery. Other sections of society not brought under formal direction can be seen as part of the informal organization of a militarized state. World War I saw the expansion of universal military training and service, with conscription introduced in Britain (1916), Canada (1917), and the United States (1917). This pattern of military organization not based on voluntary service was central to the armed forces of the combatants in both world wars.

SINCE 1945

An account of military organization as a product of politics is not intended to demilitarize military history; but the notion and understanding of “fit for purpose” are essentially set by those who control the military. In some situations this control is vested in the military. That is the case when the political and military leadership are similar. This is true of military dictatorships, both modern ones and their historical

progenitors, such as those Roman regimes presided over by a general who had seized power, such as Vespasian, and the regime of Napoleon I.

In some societies, such as those of feudal Europe, it may not be helpful to think of separate military and political classifications of leadership. In addition, in wartime generals may be able to gain control of the definition of what is militarily necessary, both in terms of means and objectives. On the whole, however, they have had only a limited success. In dictatorial regimes, such as those of the Soviet Union and Germany during World War II, the generals were heeded only if their views accorded with those of the dictator. In democracies generals have also been subject to political direction, although with less bloody consequences.

The demise of compulsion. The situation altered after World War II, largely in response to the impact of individualism in Western society. Other factors were naturally involved in the abandonment of conscription, not least cost and the growing sophistication of weaponry, but they would not have been crucial had there not been a major cultural shift away from conscription. This shift is the most important factor in modern military organization because it has opened up a major contrast between societies that have abandoned conscription and those where it remains normal. Again, however, it is necessary to avoid any sense of an obvious teleology. Thus the pattern in Britain was one of a hesitant approach toward conscription, even when it appeared necessary.

In the West, war in the twentieth century became less frequent and thus less normal and normative. Instead, war is increasingly perceived as an aberration best left to professionals. There has also been a growing reluctance to employ force in domestic contexts. Governments prefer to rely on policy to maintain internal order, and the use of troops in labor disputes is less common than earlier in the century. Britain phased out conscription in 1957–1963, and the United States moved in 1973 to an all-volunteer military that reduced popular identification with the forces.

It has become unclear whether a major sustained conflict in which such states were attacked would lead to a form of mass mobilization. That seems unlikely, for both political and military reasons; but were another world war to occur it might lead to mobilization designed to engender and sustain activism as much as to provide military manpower. The abandonment of conscription reflects the determination of the size and purpose of the military by political factors that are subject to political debate.

Control and the military. Any theory of military organization must take note of problems of internal and external control. Organization is not an abstraction: the armed forces are too important in most societies to be left out of political equations. From 1500 to 2000 in the West, external control became less of a problem. The military became an instrument of the state, most obviously in the United States. There, the most powerful military in world history never staged a coup and had relatively little influence on the structure, contents, or personnel of politics. A cult of professionalism was central to the ethos of the American officer corps, and their training is lengthy. This model was influential in Western Europe after 1945, in part due to the reorganization of society (and the military) after World War II, especially in defeated Germany and Italy, and in part thanks to the influence of the American model through NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and American hegemony.

Eighteenth-century intellectuals struggling to create a science of society, or to employ what would be termed sociological arguments so as to offer secular concepts for analysis, understood the importance of political control over the military. The character and disposition of force within a society is integral to understanding that society's dynamics. In 1776, for example, the Scottish economist Adam Smith offered, in his *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth*

of Nations, an analysis of the sociology of warfare in which he contrasted nations of hunters, shepherds, husbandmen, and the "more advanced state of society" in which industry was important. These were seen as providing a hierarchy of military organization and sophistication in which "a well-regulated standing army" was vital to the defense of civilization (Smith, 1976, p. 699). Smith argued that firearms were crucial in the onset of military modernity:

Before the invention of fire-arms, that army was superior in which the soldiers had, each individually, the greatest skill in dexterity in the use of their arms. . . . Since the invention . . . strength and agility of body, or even extraordinary dexterity and skill in the use of arms, though they are far from being of no consequence, are, however, of less consequence. . . . In modern war the great expense of fire-arms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best afford that expense; and consequently, to an opulent and civilized, over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times the poor and barbarous find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized. (p. 708)

Smith exaggerated the military advantages of the "opulent and civilized," but he captured an important shift. Those he termed "civilized" were no longer on the defensive.

See also **Military Service** (in this volume); **The Military** (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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SCIENCE AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION



John Henry

Although it remains to some extent a contested historiographical conception, most historians of science agree that the designation “scientific revolution” refers in a meaningful way to a period of comparatively rapid and radical change in the understanding of the natural world. During the scientific revolution the world picture shifted from a geocentric, finite cosmos of nested heavenly spheres, which allowed no empty space, to a heliocentric solar system in an infinite universe that was void except where it was dotted with stars. There arose a new worldview in which nature and all its parts were regarded as a giant machine, capable of being understood almost entirely in physical terms. Going hand in hand with this were new theories of motion and of the generation and organization of life, a revised human anatomy, and a new physiology. Use of the experimental method to discover truths about the natural world and of mathematical analysis to help in understanding it, led to the emergence of new forms of organization and institutionalization of scientific study. In particular this period saw the formation of societies devoted to the understanding of the natural world and the exploitation of natural knowledge for the improvement of human life.

THE RENAISSANCE AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

The scientific revolution resulted from such a huge range of causal factors that it is impossible to give a precise account of its causes. To speak in very general terms, however, it can be seen as a period in which the intellectual authority of traditional natural philosophy gave way to new conceptions of how knowledge is discovered and established with some degree of certainty. Accordingly, it is easy to see that the scientific revolution constitutes an important part of the wider changes in intellectual authority that were characteristic of the Renaissance, and so it can be said to share the same general causes as this major change in Eu-

ropean history. A full account of its causes would, therefore, have to encompass the decline of the old feudal system and the rise of commerce, together with the concomitant rise of strong city-states and national monarchies, during a period of increasing decline of the Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire.

Also relevant was the discovery and exploration of the New World and other parts beyond Europe, producing the beginnings of an awareness of cultural relativism as well as a realization that traditional wisdom, such as the impossibility of life in the antipodes, could be, and was, misconceived. The invention of paper, printing, the magnetic compass, and gunpowder also had major cultural and economic repercussions, which can be seen to have had a direct bearing on changes in attitudes to natural knowledge. Furthermore, at a time when natural philosophy was seen as the handmaiden to the “Queen of the Sciences,” theology, the fragmentation of western Christianity after the Reformation could hardly fail to have a major impact. Similarly, the recovery of ancient learning by secular humanist scholars, and the emphasis of the humanists themselves on the belief that knowledge should contribute to human dignity and the *vita activa* (active life) lived *pro bono publico* (which they held to be morally superior to the *vita contemplativa* or contemplative life), directly effected the acquisition of knowledge of nature and beliefs about how that knowledge should be used.

Skepticism and empiricism. The humanists’ discovery of works like *The Lives of the Philosophers* by Diogenes Laertius (fl. 3d century A.D.) and *De natura deorum* (On the nature of the gods) by Cicero (106–43 B.C.) made it plain that Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), who had become the supreme authority in philosophy during the Middle Ages, was by no means the only philosopher, and was not even the most admired among the ancients themselves. Furthermore, the discovery of writings by other philosophers, including Plato (c. 428–347 B.C.), the neo-Platonists, Stoics,



HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

The historical reality of the scientific revolution has been vigorously contested. In some cases, however, the contention focuses merely on the suitability of the phrase “scientific revolution.” Can a revolution take two centuries to be accomplished? Can it be called a revolution if it did not overthrow, against vigorous resistance, something that was there before? Since there was nothing corresponding to what we think of as science before this period in what way was it a *scientific* revolution? Objections of this kind can be dealt with simply by expressing a willingness to call it something else. But no other designation has ever caught on and, for all its faults, “scientific revolution” seems as good a name for this historical phenomenon as any. There is one much more substantial criticism, however, which claims that the term “revolution” is seriously misleading because of its implication that this period marks a disjunction with the past. Promoting what is called the “continuity thesis,” critics who take this line argue that all the seemingly new developments in scientific knowledge were foreshadowed in the medieval period, or can be shown to have grown out of earlier practices or ways of thinking in an entirely continuous way. It seems fair to say, however, that subscribers to the continuity thesis tend to be concerned almost exclusively with developments in the technical and intellectual content of the sciences, where continuities can indeed be shown, and pay scant regard to the social history of science, where discontinuities with the past are much harder to ignore.

Indeed, the continuity thesis can be seen as an outgrowth of a major historiographical division between historians of science. During the early period of the formation of history of science as a discipline, from the beginnings of the cold war, historians of science formed into rival groups, dubbed internalists (who concentrated exclusively upon internal technical developments in science) and externalists (who looked to the influence of the wider culture to explain scientific change). Neither approach was satisfactory. The analyses of the externalists were often too far removed from the actual practice of science to fully understand historical developments. Internalists might have been right to suggest that we can learn

more about Newton’s work by looking at the work of Johannes Kepler or Galileo Galilei than we could by looking at the Puritan Revolution, but their analyses suggested that history was driven by great men, individual geniuses different from their contemporaries. Internalism completely failed to explain why change was seen to be necessary and how consensus was formed about the validity of new knowledge claims. It also suffered from a built-in whiggism, focusing on ideas or ways of thinking that clearly foreshadowed modern scientific ideas and failing to acknowledge the historical importance of blind alleys, misconceptions, and superseded knowledge.

In the later twentieth century there was something of a rapprochement, largely as a result of the influence of the historian and philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn (1922–1997), and the new sociology of scientific knowledge that grew out of his work. The best of this work in the history of science pays proper attention to both the context within which the science in question is produced and the demands of technical and theoretical restraints and procedures. It is now possible to understand how even the most recondite and technical developments in science must owe something to the social context from which they emerge, although in many cases the relevant context will not be the wider context of the society at large, but the more local context of particular specialist or professional groups and their working milieu. From this perspective, the claims of the continuity thesis are much harder to sustain. Although technical developments in the early modern period can be shown to have a continuity with much earlier theories and practices, the contexts within which these ideas and practices were upheld and used, whether on the macrosociological or microsociological scale, can be seen to be radically different. In the end, then, whether we call it the scientific revolution or not, it remains undeniably true that the means used to acquire and establish knowledge of nature, the institutional setting within which that knowledge was validated and valorized, and the substantive content of that knowledge was vastly different in 1700 from the way it was in 1500.

and Epicureans provided a fund of alternatives to the all-pervasive Aristotelianism. One of the revived ancient philosophies was the skepticism of the later Academy, the much-admired school founded by Plato in Athens. Eclectic attempts to combine the best features of the ancient philosophies met with some success in moral and political philosophy, but were less

successful in natural philosophy. One alternative, therefore, was to switch allegiance from Aristotle to Plato, or some other ancient sage. Other natural philosophers, however, perhaps more disoriented or more dismayed by the overthrow of traditional intellectual authority, or perhaps more sympathetic to the revived skepticism, tended to reject recourse to any authority

and turned to personal experience as the best means of acquiring knowledge of nature.

This new attitude to the acquisition of knowledge gained further momentum, certainly among Protestant scholars, when Luther rejected the authority of the pope and the priest in religion, and encouraged everyone to read the Bible for themselves. The natural world was often regarded as God's other book, and just as the faithful were now expected to read the Book of Scripture for themselves, so it seemed to devout natural philosophers that God could be served by reading the Book of Nature. Where once natural philosophy had served as "handmaiden" to the doctrinal theology of the Church of Rome, it immediately became more important and more controversial when arguments raged as to who held the true faith. Although the traditional close affiliation between Aristotelianism and Roman Catholicism (brought about largely through the efforts of Thomas Aquinas, 1225–1274), meant that many, especially Catholics, continued to support Aristotelianism, for others it was seen as a Catholic natural philosophy, or a pagan one, and in either case was deemed unsuitable as a support for Christianity.

The time was ripe, therefore, for the development of a new experiential or empiricist approach to the understanding of the physical world. This new attitude was clearly exemplified by the radical Swiss religious, philosophical, and medical reformer known as Paracelsus (1493–1541). He not only wrote reformist works, developing a uniquely original system of medicine, but he also explicitly defended his new approach on empiricist grounds. In an announcement of the course he intended to teach at the University of Basel in 1527, for example, he rejected "that which those of old taught" in favor of "our own observation of nature, confirmed by extensive practice and long experience."

Another revolutionary empiricist was Andreas Vesalius (1514–1564), professor of surgery at Padua University. His reputation was based not only on his superbly illustrated anatomical textbook, *De humani corporis fabrica* (1543), but also on his new method of teaching. Where previously anatomy lecturers read from one of Galen's anatomical works while a surgeon performed the relevant dissections, Vesalius dispensed with the readings and performed his own dissections, talking the students through the procedure and what it revealed. It helped that Vesalius also had an anatomical lecture theater specially built with steeply raked tiers of seats, allowing all students a clear and not-too-distant view of the cadaver. It was easy to justify such detailed anatomical studies on religious and intellectual grounds. Human anatomy revealed the supreme

handiwork of God, the great artificer of the world, and knowledge of it was important for the medical practitioner. A number of new discoveries by Vesalius and his successors at Padua, as well as their emphasis on the importance of comparative anatomy for the understanding of the human body, led to William Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood.

Harvey was a student at Padua between 1597 and 1602, and continued with the kind of anatomical study he learned at Padua upon his return to England. Although resisted at first, Harvey's experimental demonstrations of his discovery (published in 1628) were so elegant, and his audience so used by now to the relevance of experiment in revealing truths about nature, that his theory soon became accepted. This meant that the whole system of Galenic physiology, which was based on the assumption that the venous system and the arterial system were separate and unconnected (the former originating from the liver and the latter from the heart) had to be recast. The result was a marshaling of effort by anatomists and physiologists throughout Europe, leading to numerous new discoveries.

Perhaps the most significant outcome of this, from the point of view of the social historian, was an increased respect for medicine that seemed to be based on the latest specialist knowledge of the working of the body and of the physical world. Following Harvey, a vigorous movement known as iatromechanism sought to explain health and disease in terms of the body as a machine consisting of levers driven by hydraulic systems, and the like. Iatromechanism went hand in hand with the mechanical philosophy—the most successful system of natural philosophy developed to replace traditional Aristotelianism, which had become increasingly untenable throughout the seventeenth century. When the mechanical philosophy was subsequently revised in the light of Newton's doctrines, there developed a Newtonian version of iatromechanism. This clear foreshadowing of the more successful scientific medicine that began to be developed in the nineteenth century, essentially owed its origins to the demands of medical students in Padua and throughout Europe for better opportunities for anatomical study. These developments clearly suggest a belief among the early modern public that knowledge of nature is useful for improving medicine, and a willingness among doctors to exploit not only their knowledge of nature, but also their knowledge of public expectation.

Magic and pragmatism. We have seen how the Renaissance revival of skepticism, together with a new awareness that Aristotle was never the unique

philosophical giant that the Middle Ages had taken him to be, led to a rejection of authority and increased attempts to establish the truth about things for oneself. The revival of magic during the Renaissance had a similar effect. As a result of church opposition to its more demonological aspects, magic tended to be excluded from the medieval universities and became widely separated from natural philosophy, both intellectually and institutionally. The only exception to this was astrology, which was taught in the medical faculties as an essential aid for the medical practitioner in prognosis and diagnosis. Unfortunately, as with the other aspects of natural magic (that is, magic supposedly based on the natural but occult powers of physical bodies), astrology also attracted the attentions of mountebanks and frauds seeking only to make money out of a gullible public. The result was that magic in general seemed disreputable to most natural philosophers. The image of magic dramatically changed, however, as a result of the Renaissance recovery of various ancient magical texts, especially the Hermetic corpus, a body of magical writings attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, who was taken to be an ancient sage, contemporaneous with or perhaps even older than Moses. It is now known that the Hermetic writings date from about the first century A.D. or later, but because they were held to be written at about the same time as the Pentateuch they were regarded as one of the earliest records of human wisdom. It seemed that magic was a respectable pursuit after all and its study enjoyed a huge revival in the Renaissance.

This in turn provided a further boost to the rise of empiricism. The natural magic tradition was always based on empirical, or trial and error, methods for bringing about particular effects. Critics of the magical tradition, indeed, decried its excessive empiricism and its lack of theoretical, explanatory grounding. According to Aristotelian natural philosophy physical phenomena should be explained in terms of the four causes and the four manifest qualities. Occult qualities were those which defeated efforts to reduce them to the manifest qualities and could not, therefore, be accommodated in Aristotelian explanations. The failure of occult qualities to fit in with Aristotelian theory was once seen as damaging criticism, but by the end of the sixteenth century it began to be seen as so much the worse for Aristotelian theory. From Francis Bacon's (1561–1626) suggestion that astrology, natural magic, and alchemy are sciences of which "the ends and pretences are noble," to Isaac Newton's (1642–1727) insistence that the cause of gravity remained occult in spite of his mathematical account of the universal principle of gravitation, natural magic came to

be amalgamated with natural philosophy. The resulting hybrid is recognizable to us today as being closer to modern science than scholastic Aristotelian natural philosophy could ever have been. Certainly the empiricism and the practical usefulness which we regard as characteristic of science today were never features of traditional natural philosophy before the scientific revolution, but they were taken-for-granted aspects of the magical tradition. Traditional natural philosophy was concerned to explain phenomena in terms of causes, the new natural philosophy could forgo causative explanations in favor of a reliable knowledge of facts and how they might be exploited for human advantage.

If the rise of magic was made possible by its newly acquired respectability after the recovery of the Hermetic corpus, its adoption in practice owed more to its promise of pragmatic usefulness than to any Hermetic doctrine. The same concern for the pragmatic uses of knowledge can be seen in the increasing attention paid by scholars and other intellectuals to the techniques and the craft knowledge of artisans. Some notable individuals took pains to discover the secrets of specific areas of craft know-how and to communicate them to scholars, while others remained content to talk in general terms of the potential importance of craft knowledge. The Spanish humanist and pedagogue, Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540), for example, acknowledged the importance of trade secrets in his encyclopedia, *De disciplinis* (On the disciplines; 1531). Francis Bacon, lord chancellor of England, similarly, wanted to include the knowledge and techniques of artisans in a projected compendium of knowledge which was to form part of his *Instauratio magna* (*Great Restoration*), a major reform of learning. Bacon's influence in this regard can be seen not only in various groups of social reformers in England during the Civil War years and the interregnum, but also in the Royal Society of London for the Promotion of Useful Knowledge, one of the earliest societies devoted to acquiring and exploiting knowledge of nature (1660). The Society made a number of repeated attempts, using specially produced questionnaires, to ask its members to return information about local craft techniques and artisans' specialist knowledge in and around their places of residence. The idea was to produce a "History of Trades" to supplement the usual natural histories.

PATRONS, COLLECTORS, AND SOCIETIES

The emphasis upon the pragmatic usefulness of knowledge found further support from the increasing num-



SCHOLARS AND CRAFTSMEN

From the sixteenth century onward the Aristotelian natural philosophy, which dominated the curricula in university arts faculties all over Europe, came increasingly under attack. One focus of that attack was the contemplative nature of the Aristotelian philosophy (as it was taught), and the lack of any concern with practical knowledge. Some scholars sought to correct this by deliberately seeking out craft knowledge and reporting it to their fellow scholars. One of the major examples of this can be seen in the increasingly economically important area of mining and metallurgy. The first printed account of Renaissance mining techniques, including instructions on the extraction of metals from their ores, how to make cannons, and even how to make gunpowder, was *De la pirotechnia* (1540) of Vannoccio Biringuccio (1480–1539). Written in Italian by a mining engineer who rose to the rank of director of the papal arsenal in Rome, it was evidently intended as an instruction manual for others working in similar circumstances to Biringuccio himself. This can be compared with *De re metallica* (1556) of Georgius Agricola (1494–1555). Agricola was a humanist scholar who taught Greek at Leipzig University before turning to medicine. Practicing in a mining area, and initially interested in the medicinal uses of minerals and metals, he soon developed a compendious knowledge of mining and metallurgy. The fact that *De re metallica* was published in Latin shows that it was aimed at an audience of university-trained scholars, not at miners or foundry workers. Furthermore, the book's numerous editions and wide dissemination throughout Europe show that Agricola did not misjudge the audience.

A similar interest in the smelting of ores and the recovery of metals can also be seen in the first systematic study of magnets and magnetism, *De magnete* of 1600, published by a royal physician to Elizabeth I of England, William Gilbert (1544–1603). Although principally concerned to use the spontaneous movements of magnets

to show how the earth itself might also move (Gilbert was the first to realize that the earth was a giant magnet), in order to support the Copernican theory, Gilbert also took the opportunity to report on all the practical know-how associated with magnets. As well as the metallurgical aspects, therefore, he also wrote at length on the use of the magnet in navigation, with a great deal of extra information on navigation besides. In this he explicitly drew upon the work of Robert Norman (fl. 1590), a retired mariner and compass maker who had recently discovered a way of using magnets to determine longitude even when the heavenly bodies were obscured by clouds or fog.

Although there undoubtedly was an increased awareness of craft know-how and a willingness to accept and exploit its practical usefulness, it is important to avoid overstating the case. During the 1930s and 1940s a number of marxist historians seemed to forget the role of the scholars in this and to suggest that modern science owed its origins to the working man. The historian Edgar Zilsel (1891–1944) even went so far as to argue that the experimental method was developed by artisans. This in turn led more conservative historians of science, no doubt concerned to deny the validity of marxist approaches, to reject the role of craft knowledge altogether and even to deny that early modern natural philosophers had any concern with practical matters. In the post-cold war age it is easier to see, however, that the knowledge of craftsmen and artisans was taken up by scholars during the scientific revolution but it was chiefly the scholars' idea to do so; it was not something that was imposed upon them by the craftsmen. This, and the fairly obvious fact that there was indeed very little of any immediate practical consequence that resulted from the new collaboration, suggests that the main concern of scholars was to discover new ways of establishing certain knowledge to replace the newly realized inadequacies of ancient authority.

ber of secular patrons in the Renaissance period. The earliest groupings of empiricist investigators of nature all seem to have been brought together by wealthy patrons, particularly by sovereigns and princes. Indeed the royal courts must have been one of the major sites

for bringing together scholars and craftsmen, which we have already seen was one of the characteristic features of the scientific revolution. The amazingly elaborate court masques and festivals, conceived in order to display publicly the magnificence and glory of the

ruler, required a huge team of facilitators. Learned scholars would devise appropriate themes, combining traditional notions of chivalry and honor with more fashionable lessons taken from newly rediscovered classical stories, while architects and engineers would design the elaborate settings intended to illustrate the moral themes, and a vast array of other artisans and craftsmen would be brought together to make it all a breathtaking physical reality. It is hard to imagine a comparable site during the period for the creative collaboration of scholars and craftsmen. Unless, of course, it was one of the many sites where the arts of war were conducted.

If festivals and wars were only occasional affairs, the offer of more long-term patronage to alchemists and other natural magicians, engineers, mathematicians, natural historians, and natural philosophers was obviously done with the aim of increasing the wealth, power, and prestige of the patron. Usually this meant that the patron was most concerned with some practical outcome from the work of these servants of his court. Even in the case of seemingly more remote and abstract physical discoveries, it is possible to see such practical concerns in the background. When Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) discovered the moons of Jupiter and called them the Medicean Stars, after the ruling Medici family of Florence, he was immediately associating his patrons with celestial and divine significance as well as putting them onto the star maps. But he did not stop there. By trying to produce tables of the motions of the moons of Jupiter, which he hoped would provide a means of determining longitude at sea, Galileo was potentially turning his discovery into one of the utmost practical benefit, from which the Medici could hardly fail to gain.

The political potential of natural knowledge was a major reason for Francis Bacon's concern to reform the means of acquiring knowledge and of putting it to use, as described in his various programmatic statements and illustrated in his influential utopian fantasy, *The New Atlantis* (1627). The most prominent feature of Bacon's utopia is a detailed account of a research institute, called Salomon's House, devoted to acquiring natural and technological knowledge for the benefit of the citizens. Charles II of England and Louis XIV of France clearly recognized the potential of this too, offering their patronage to what were to become the leading scientific societies in Europe, both of which were explicitly modeled on Salomon's House. In the French case at least, the Académie Royale des Sciences (1666) can be seen effectively as an arm of the state. The Royal Society, founded in the year of the restoration of the English monarchy, never gained direct state support from an administration that was

preoccupied with more pressing matters. It had to be much more apologetic, therefore, in its attempts to demonstrate its usefulness to the state. Even so, it can be seen from the propagandizing *History of the Royal Society of London* (1667) and other pronouncements of the leading fellows that the most committed members of the Society, at least, saw their experimental method as a means of establishing truth and certainty and so ending dispute. This, in turn, was presented as a model which could be used to bring an end to the religious disputes that had divided England since before the Civil Wars, and to establish order and harmony in the state. The existence, to say nothing of the success, of the Académie and the Royal Society shows that the new natural philosophy was far more directly concerned with political matters than the natural philosophy of the medieval period.

Another important feature of the interest of wealthy patrons in natural marvels was the development of what were called cabinets of curiosities, collections of mineral, vegetable, and animal rarities and oddities, or of elaborate or allegedly powerful artifacts. Originally envisaged, perhaps, as nothing more than spectacles symbolizing the power and wealth of the collector, the larger collections soon came to be seen as contributing to natural knowledge, providing illustrations of the variety and wonder of God's Creation. The curator of Archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol's (1529–1595) collection, Pierandrea Mattioli (1500–1577), for example, became one of the leading naturalists of the age. Focusing particularly on the botanical specimens in the collection, Mattioli greatly superseded the work of the ancient authority on botany, Dioscorides (fl. 1st century A.D.), in the influential commentaries included in his Latin edition of Dioscorides's herbal (1554). Part of the success of this work derived from the accurate illustrations, supplied by craftsmen also under Ferdinand's patronage. The larger and more successful collections soon became early tourist attractions, drawing gentlemanly visitors on their "Grand Tours." Perhaps more significant for the spread of natural knowledge was the fact that acquisition of new specimens for the collections demanded extensive networks of interested parties, communicating with one another about the latest discoveries and where to acquire them. Eventually, of course, these collections and their obvious pedagogical uses inspired the formation of the more publicly available botanical gardens, menageries, and museums. Indeed in some cases, the larger collections formed the nucleus of the first public museums. The collection of the Tradescant family, acquired by Elias Ashmole (1617–1692), formed the nucleus of the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford, while Sir Hans Sloane's (1660–1753) collection

provided an impressive beginning for the British Museum in London.

The new appearance of formal societies or academies devoted to the study of nature is another characteristic of the scientific revolution. In what Bernard de Fontenelle (1657–1757), secretary of the Académie Royale des Sciences from 1697, called the “new Age of Academies,” groups of thinkers came together to collaborate in the new understanding of the natural world. In some cases the group was called together by a wealthy patron with an interest in natural knowledge and its exploitation. One of the earliest of these was the group of alchemists, astrologers, and other occult scientists brought together at the court of Rudolf II (1552–1612) in Prague, another was the Accademia dei Lincei (Academy of the Lynxes), founded by the marchese di Monticelli, Federico Cesi (1585–1630). The evident attractiveness of such collaborative enterprises can also be seen in the astonishing interest shown by scholars all over Europe in the Brotherhood of the Rosy Cross, whose intended reforms of learning, based on alchemy, Paracelsianism, and other occult ideas were announced in two manifestos which appeared in 1614 and 1615. In fact, to the disappointment of those like René Descartes (1596–1650) who tried to make contact with them, the Brother-

hood seems to have been as fictitious as Salomon’s House. If Rosicrucianism came to nothing, however, Bacon’s vision, as we have already seen, had profound effect.

The self-consciously reformist attitudes of the early scientific societies, and their public pronouncements of their methods and intentions in journals and other publications, mark them out as completely different from the universities. It used to be said that the universities during this period were moribund institutions, completely enthralled by traditional Aristotelianism, and blind to all innovation. This has now been shown to be completely unjustified, and the important contributions of some members of university arts and medical faculties to scientific change have been reasserted. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that it was usually individual professors who were innovative, not the institutions to which they belonged. If there were exceptions to this it was in the smaller German universities, where the local prince might hold greater control over the university by his patronage. A number of such universities introduced significant changes in their curricula. In particular, the introduction of what was known as *chymiatría* or chemical medicine (embracing Paracelsianism and rival alchemically inspired forms of medicine) as a new academic

discipline radically transformed a number of German universities. Even so, for the most part European universities were slow to change and were institutionally committed to traditional curricula. In the case of the new academies or societies, however, the institutions themselves seemed innovatory, and they had a much greater effect on changing attitudes to natural knowledge.

MATHEMATICS, INSTRUMENTS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF NATURE

Another important aspect of the scientific revolution was the rise in status of mathematics and mathematicians, and the increasing use of mathematics to understand the physical world. There had always been mathematical practitioners of various kinds throughout the Middle Ages but their disciplines were regarded as inferior to natural philosophy. Mathematicians were able to dramatically revise their roles during the decline of Aristotelianism, capitalizing on their claims to be able to offer certainty at a time when previous intellectual authorities seemed unreliable, and on their claims to be able to fulfill the demand for practically useful know-how.

Like the occult arts, the use of mathematics was always intended to have practical consequences. With the increased opportunities provided by secular patronage, and demands for surveyors, military engineers, navigators, cartographers, and the like, mathematicians were increasingly admired, and held themselves in higher intellectual esteem. This provides the social background for even so technical an innovation as Copernican astronomy, in which the earth, previously held to be stationary at the center of the world system, was held to rotate around its own axis every twenty-four hours and to continuously revolve around the sun. For all but a tiny handful of people, when Nicholas Copernicus's (1473–1543) book appeared in 1543, it simply showed how the geometry of the heavens might be reimagined in order to facilitate the calculations of planetary position demanded for astrology, navigation, and the establishment of church feast days. For Copernicus himself, however, and a few mathematically minded followers, the mathematics was sufficient to reveal the truth of the way things are. For Aristotelians, the mathematics was incapable of explaining how the earth could move. Only physics could do that, and physics made it clear that the earth is incapable of motion through the heavens. Copernicus and his followers accepted that they could not provide a physical explanation of the earth's motion but insisted, against all reason as far as traditional nat-

ural philosophers were concerned, that the mathematics was sufficient to show that it must be moving.

The practical success of Copernican astronomy compared to the traditional geocentric astronomy, increasingly held sway and eventually led to the development of a new physics, developed by mathematicians like Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. It is important to note, however, that these developments cannot be properly understood without paying attention to the changing status of mathematics and mathematicians during the scientific revolution. Without those social changes, Copernican theory might have remained merely an instrumentalist way of calculating planetary movements, while the physics of the world system remained the intellectual province of the natural philosopher and, therefore, remained steadfastly geocentric.

The change in status of the mathematician was brought about not only by the mathematical superiority of the new astronomy over the old. Mathematicians were proving increasingly successful in many different areas, usually to great practical benefit. One aspect of this was the development of perspective techniques, which had such an impact on painting and bas-relief. Another was in the development of algebra, which allowed the solution of previously intractable problems. There seem to be two major strands to these developments. On the one hand, thanks to an increasing availability of elementary mathematical education, useful mathematical techniques increasingly found their way into the crafts. This in turn was picked up by those humanist scholars who recognized the importance of craft know-how and its techniques. On the other hand, more elite mathematicians, such as astronomers, increasingly sought to remove the barriers between mathematics and natural philosophy. The subsequent rapid development of algebra strongly suggests that these two strands easily came together. Elite mathematics tended to be concerned with classical geometry, while algebra, being an arithmetical art, seems to have developed first among more lowly practitioners coming out of the more arithmetical elementary abacus schools. It was not long, however, before algebra was increasingly taken up by elite mathematicians.

The difficulty and tedium of many mathematical procedures ensured the invention and promotion of numerous instruments intended to provide much-needed shortcuts for practitioners in the field. Some of these, like the astrolabe, had a long history, but new ones, some more successful and long-lived than others, were continually appearing. (The slide rule, for example, developed out of various calculating devices invented in the seventeenth century and was an es-

sential element in any practical mathematician's kit until the advent of the pocket calculator in the late twentieth century.) Arising out of the mathematical instrument trade came what was called the philosophical instrument trade. The labeling seemed to perpetuate the old distinction between mathematics and natural philosophy but the evidence shows that these new instruments were developed by more elite mathematicians concerned to show the relevance of mathematical know-how to natural philosophy. The model was undoubtedly the magnetic compass, an instrument which worked by the occult power of the magnet but which was clearly an aid for the mathematical art of navigation. Perhaps the most powerful and exciting philosophical instruments were the telescope and the microscope, but there were others which proved to be extremely important, such as the barometer, the air pump, and the thermometer. In all cases the increasingly routine use of such instruments further reinforced the validity and superiority of the empirical approach to the understanding of nature. Similarly, they provided further dramatic evidence of the usefulness of the new science. The barometer, originally produced to demonstrate a theory about the nature of the void and the working of pumps, quickly became useful for indicating changing weather conditions, and the telescope was never confined to looking at the stars but was immediately put to more mundane uses.

SCIENCE IN A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY

The medieval belief that natural philosophy should be a handmaiden to theology thrived throughout the scientific revolution. For the most part, assumptions that natural truths and truths about religion could not be incompatible with one another (both being established by God) meant that natural philosophy and religion could keep a healthy distance apart. The Roman Catholic Church was unconcerned about the implications of Copernican astronomy, for example, until the highly ambitious Florentine mathematician, Galileo, made a public issue of its relevance to Church doctrine. The Church had been happy to regard Copernican astronomy as a hypothetical system used only to facilitate calculations, but Galileo's telescopic discoveries dramatically showed that the traditional Aristotelian world picture could not be physically true. Furthermore, Galileo was among the first to bring to the attention of other intellectuals that some mathematicians were upholding the physical truth of Copernicanism. If it was true, a number of Biblical statements which clearly implied the motion of the sun and the stillness of the earth would have to be

cautiously reinterpreted. Since the Roman Catholic Church had recently taken a strict line on scriptural interpretation at the counter-reforming Council of Trent, this was bound to be a delicate matter. Galileo's own amateur efforts to show how these Biblical pronouncements should be treated, in his *Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina* (1615), only succeeded in getting him into bigger trouble with his church. The subsequent history of the "Galileo affair," up to his condemnation in 1633, must be seen as a series of unfortunate circumstances, often exacerbated by Galileo's own thoughtlessness and misjudgment of others. It cannot be seen, however, as a clear sign that religion and science were fundamentally opposed to one another. Galileo's condemnation by the Congregation of the Holy Office was the result of an unfortunate series of historical contingencies, not the inevitable result of some supposed inherent antagonism between a powerful church and the study of nature. For the majority of Renaissance and early modern thinkers, the study of nature continued to be a way of worshipping God.

In spite of the continuity of the science-as-handmaiden tradition and the continuing efforts of orthodox natural philosophers to show the usefulness of their natural philosophies for supporting religion, there can be no doubt that the new natural philosophies also contributed to the rise of atheism from the late sixteenth century. The first signs of the rise of atheism can be seen in the thought of a number of rationalist Aristotelian thinkers who, stimulated by the Renaissance recovery of more reliable texts of Aristotle's works than those known to the Middle Ages, denied God's providence and the immortality of the soul. The rediscovery of ancient Epicureanism, thanks to the discovery of a single copy of Lucretius's (c. 99–c. 55 B.C.) *De rerum natura* in 1473 and the three letters of Epicurus included in the edition of Diogenes Laertius's *Lives of the Philosophers* published in 1475, proved to be another major source for would-be atheists. This had major implications for subsequent developments, since the new mechanical philosophy was clearly based upon the atomistic theory of matter, which was the most prominent feature of Epicureanism. The mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century rapidly came to be recognized as the only system of natural philosophy capable of replacing the compendious and comprehensive natural philosophy of Aristotle. Although there were subtly different versions of the mechanical philosophy, they were all based upon the atomistic materialism of Epicureanism.

Atheism and natural theology. All the promoters of the mechanical philosophy, with the possible ex-

ception of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), took pains to insist that their philosophy was based entirely upon theistic assumptions. There can be little doubt, however, that a significant number of their readers ignored these theistic claims and embraced a mechanistic philosophy that was to all intents and purposes atheistic. It is not easy, before the eighteenth century, to find individuals who can be singled out as atheists, but it seems clear from the vast anti-atheist literature emanating from the pens of churchmen and the more devout natural philosophers, that growing numbers of atheists seemed to the faithful to pose a threat to morality and social order. The mechanical systems of Hobbes and Descartes were usually seen to offer the easiest footholds for atheists. Hobbes was an extreme materialist and seemed to imply that God too must be a material being. This was usually taken at the time as a not-too-subtle way of hinting at atheism without actually putting one's head in the noose, but a few historians now claim that Hobbes was in fact a subscriber to a recognized form of radical Calvinism. Although Descartes's system was clearly based on theistic presuppositions, it no longer required God's intervention after the initial Creation. According to Descartes, God established the laws of nature which particles of matter had to obey, then set the whole world system

in motion. From then on, the system wheeled on and on as the result of the collisions and interactions of particles of matter in a vast cosmic clockwork. Given that a prominent argument of early-sixteenth-century Aristotelian atheists had been that, contrary to Judeo-Christian claims, the world has always existed throughout eternity, it was an easy matter for Cartesian atheists to dispense with the Creation and suppose that the Cartesian world had always been turning in accordance with the blind laws of nature.

Attempts to avoid, or scotch, these atheistic interpretations of the new philosophies account for numerous prominent characteristics of the systems and the way they were presented. Underlying the dispute between Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) about the nature of God's Providence, for example, were different sensitivities to the social threat of atheism. Leibniz was willing to uphold a rationally based Cartesian approach, in which God's omnipotence enabled him to create a cosmic clockwork that never needed subsequently to be wound up or adjusted. For Newton (represented in this clash with Leibniz by his friend, Samuel Clarke, 1675–1729), more conscious of the excesses of the interregnum period in England, which were often attributed to irreligion, this was to provide a hostage to atheists.

Newton, accordingly, insisted that God must occasionally intervene in his Creation, and be seen (by the right-thinking natural philosopher at least) to do so. Unappreciative of the political fears underlying Newton's position, Leibniz regarded Newton's vision of God as a scandal, seeing God as a cosmic tinker incapable of getting his clockwork to function smoothly.

Such examples could easily be multiplied. The general point to note is that, in all cases where theology seems to be playing a prominent role in early modern natural philosophy, what might seem like entirely abstract arguments of philosophical theology can be seen to reflect real social concerns about the threat to society supposedly presented by those who have no moral restraints imposed by religion.

It is easy to see, therefore, that throughout the period of the scientific revolution, natural philosophy had to take account of and often defer to religion and its institutions, and that this shaped the nature of early modern science. Some historians have gone further than this, however, and have suggested that it was religion itself which somehow stimulated an increased interest in and social sanctification of the study of the natural world. The active stimulation of religion can readily be seen in the work of very devout individuals, like Robert Boyle (1627–1691), and more generally in certain fields, such as comparative anatomy and other detailed extensions of more traditional natural history, especially those made possible with microscopy. For example, the entomological studies of Jan Swammerdam (1637–1680), based on the meticulous dissection of insects, were largely pursued for the glory of God. His studies of comparative anatomy appeared posthumously under the title *Biblia Naturae* (*Bible of Nature*) in 1737. The belief that nature was God's other book, the study of which was a religious duty equivalent to reading the Book of Scripture, found its fullest expression in the tradition of natural theology (using nature to prove the omnipotence and benevolence of God), an almost exclusively British tradition which originated in the seventeenth century and flourished throughout the eighteenth century and up to the advent of Darwinism in the nineteenth.

There is another more controversial aspect to this claim about the positive stimulus provided by religion, however, and that is the suggestion that the sudden burgeoning of science in seventeenth-century England was closely associated with, if not caused by, the rise of Puritanism. First suggested in the 1930s, most influentially by the sociologist Robert K. Merton (b. 1910), this has always been a highly contested thesis. The debate has certainly led to a vastly improved historical understanding of the relations between science and religion in seventeenth-century England but

it is immediately obvious that it is too Anglocentric to provide a satisfactory account of the rise of science in general, which was a Europe-wide phenomenon.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

The scientific revolution was not a revolution in science, since there was nothing recognizable as science in the period before it. What has made the period seem revolutionary to historians of science is the fact that the beginnings of modern science could clearly be discerned for the first time. The use of the experimental method and the techniques of analyzing the world in mathematical terms are now entirely characteristic of science. It is now taken for granted that scientific knowledge is, or should be, useful for the amelioration of the human condition. Before the Renaissance, these features of modern science were not sufficiently closely allied to the study of natural philosophy to contribute to an understanding of the natural world. The goal of natural philosophy before the scientific revolution was to understand nature in abstract philosophical terms, *not* to exploit it. By contrast, the exploitative nature of naturalistic concerns during the scientific revolution is so marked that it has been singled out by feminist historians as a major feature of the revolution itself and the beginnings of another characteristic aspect of western science, its use for the subjection of women. What made the scientific revolution, then, was the bringing together of these separate elements and approaches to make out of traditional natural philosophy, the so-called mixed mathematical sciences, natural magic, and other more utilitarian concerns, something very like modern science. In the process, each of the ingredients became impressively extended and radically transformed, some beyond recognition, and the resulting combination formed something entirely new.

The major impetus for these changes can be seen to lie principally in the demand for practically useful knowledge from wealthy patrons or other clients, or the perception of that demand from would-be incipient professionals, seeking to make a living. It is important to note, however, that the promise of utility ran far ahead of what was achieved in practical terms. The major achievements of the scientific revolution, the establishment of heliocentric astronomy, Newton's laws of motion, the circulation of the blood, and the like, were not ones which could immediately be put to use in any practical way. This is one reason why some historians of science have denied the importance of the social changes underlying the scientific



PURITANISM AND SCIENCE

Alphonse de Candolle (1806–1893), a leading Swiss botanist, became a pioneer of quantitative social history in 1885 when he compared the proportions of Protestant to Roman Catholic scientists in the Académie Royale des Sciences and the membership of the British Royal Society with the proportion of Protestants to Catholics in the general population. He concluded that Protestantism was much more conducive to science than Catholicism was. A link between Puritanism and the encouragement of science was suggested as an explanation for the remarkable burgeoning of science in seventeenth-century England by two American historians, Dorothy Stimson (1935) and Richard Foster Jones (*Ancients and Moderns*; 1936). This claim was most influentially stated, however, by the sociologist Robert K. Merton (*Science, Technology, and Society in Seventeenth-Century England*; 1938), who presented it as a special case of the link between the Protestant ethic and the “spirit of capitalism,” which had been proposed in 1904 by one of the founding fathers of the discipline of sociology, Max Weber (1864–1920). Although remaining a controversial thesis, it received influential support from the eminent historian of the Puritan Revolution, Christopher Hill (*Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution*; 1965), and perhaps its most powerful support in the work of the English historian of science and medicine, Charles Webster (*The Great Instauration*; 1976).

Proponents of the thesis are careful to deny a simple causal relationship between the rise of Puritanism and the rise of science. It is readily acknowledged that only a multicausal explanation can adequately account for the sudden rise of English science, and that the rise of Puritanism is only one factor. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that the rise of Puritanism itself must be seen as being caused by a range of social and economic factors, many of which also stimulated increased interest in, and valuation of, scientific study. To some extent, therefore, wider changes led to the rise of both Puritanism and science, but this is not to diminish the relevance of Puritanism to the rise of science, since, as Merton pointed out, the dominant means of cultural expression at this time was through religious values. Inevitably, therefore, study of the natural world would tend to be directed by and justified in terms of religious beliefs. Stated in these general terms it seems impossible to deny that the rise of science in England paralleled the dramatic changes in English religion following the rise of English Calvinism from the reign of Edward VI (1547–1553) to the Parliamentary Rebellion of 1642, and continued to do so right into the Restoration period when English science could be said to have led the world.

revolution, preferring to look at the actual achievements and seeking explanations in purely intellectual terms. It is certainly true that erstwhile marxist claims, for example, that Newton wrote the *Principia mathematica philosophia naturalis* (1687) in response to economic demands for a better science of ballistics, are almost entirely overstated. Nevertheless, it remains impossible to understand Newton’s scientific achievement without considering the social changes in the relationship between mathematics and natural philosophy, which were largely brought about by increasing awareness of the potential utility and certainty of mathematical results. In the age previous to Newton’s there was natural philosophy, based on speculative principles of physical causation, and there was math-

ematics, based upon completely abstract principles of numbers and lines. By the time Newton wrote his great book, he could refer easily, even in his title, to the mathematical principles of natural philosophy, something that would have made no sense a century before. Those mathematical principles, together with other aspects of the scientific revolution, pointed the way to modern science.

Science and society since the seventeenth century. The perceived success of Newtonian mathematical physics had astonishing and unprecedented effects. A new faith in the power of science led not only to major reforms of traditional subjects like alchemy and optics, but also to the formation of new branches of



WOMEN, SCIENCE, AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

Modern science has been a major focus of concern for feminist philosophers, sociologists, and historians. Once declared by a leading feminist philosopher to be “an unexamined myth,” the belief that science was somehow an exclusively masculine pursuit has been exposed to extremely illuminating critical assessment by feminists since the 1980s. This scrutiny has been directed at three aspects of the relationship between gender and science. Feminist historians have looked on the one hand at the way women have been studied by male scientists, and on the other at the roles that women have managed to play in science as a vocation, a profession, or a pastime. Meanwhile, feminist philosophers of science have looked at the grounds for, and sought to correct, all-too-common assumptions that science is gendered, and that its gender is masculine.

One of the earliest historical treatments of these themes was Carolyn Merchant’s profound historical attempt to trace the roots of the modern belief that science was an essentially masculine pursuit. Significantly, in her book *The Death of Nature* (1980), she traced those roots back to the origins of modern science itself during the scientific revolution. Although a number of aspects of her book are contested, it remains an important, groundbreaking work. In particular she was the first to point to the increased use of sexual metaphors by the new natural philosophers who wanted to insist that knowledge of nature ought to be exploited for the benefit of man. Standard masculine assumptions about sexual politics came to be applied figuratively to “Mother Nature.” Those who wished to join the ranks of the new kind of natural philosophers were urged by the vanguard to capture and ravish Nature, to penetrate her inner chambers. One way or another, the relationship between man and knowledge of nature was likened to the relationship between man and woman. For Francis Bacon, lord chancellor of England and would-be reformer of knowledge, it was important “that knowledge may not be as a curtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as a bond-woman, to acquire and gain to her master’s use; but as a spouse, for generation, fruit and comfort.” Such talk clearly reinforced, if any reinforcement were needed, assumptions about the passive nature of women and their role in serving men, but it also engendered an influential view of the study of nature as a masculine enterprise.

Merchant’s work was followed up by others, focusing on different aspects of the story. The close links between natural philosophy and theology, for example, led

to claims that western science was always “a religious calling,” pursued throughout the Middle Ages within a clerical culture, and maintaining the image of the scientist as a priest of the Book of Nature even into the modern era. Accordingly, just as women were excluded from the priesthood, they were also excluded from the ranks of those deemed fit to mediate between the commonalty and God’s Creation. It seems that even the courtly origins of the new scientific societies were insufficient to overcome such prejudice against women. Although noble women seem to have played some minor roles in learned circles at court, when such informal groupings became academies or societies, women were excluded (except in the Italian academies at Bologna, Padua, and Rome, where a few exceptional women were admitted as fellows). If these were the beginnings of the exclusion of women from science, in succeeding ages, as other historians have shown, women came to be considered mentally and constitutionally unfit for scientific research. By the late eighteenth century, the science from which they were excluded had turned its attention to women as scientific subjects, and male scientists established, to their own satisfaction, that women did not, and could not, measure up to men.

In spite of the barriers raised against them, a few women did manage to make their mark in the scientific revolution. Although earlier suggestions that Lady Anne Conway (1631–1679) was an influence upon the great German philosopher G. W. Leibniz may be exaggerated, her credentials as a thinker are ironically suggested by the fact that it was once assumed that her book, *Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophies* (1690) was written by a man. The authorship of Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673), duchess of Newcastle, was never in doubt for any of the six books of natural philosophy that she wrote, but perhaps for that reason they were treated with condescension at best, and ridicule at worst. Émilie du Châtelet (1706–1749), a gifted mathematician who helped to introduce the work of Leibniz and Newton to French philosophical audiences by her translation of Newton’s *Principia* into French (1759), and by her own popularizing *Institutions de physique* (1740), died of childbed fever before managing to overcome the diffidence that kept her from original work. Unfortunately, therefore, the remarkable achievements of these women, and one or two others like them, serve as impressive but only partial indicators of what women might have been able to do if the sociological and cultural position of women had been anywhere near comparable to men’s.

science, such as the study of electricity, and even to new sciences, geology and biology for example. Biology was envisaged as an attempt to explain the workings of the organic world in accordance with laws of nature, analogous to Newton's laws of motion, and was completely different from the merely descriptive natural history that had gone before. Newtonianism even inspired the new sciences of man which developed in the late eighteenth century. Philosophers believed that morality and political economy could also be established in a mathematically certain lawlike way. It was no accident that the morality of utilitarianism, developed in Britain by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and James Mill (1773–1836), was believed to derive from a “moral calculus” analogous to the mathematical calculus developed by Newton and others. In late eighteenth-century France, thanks to Voltaire (1694–1778) and other Anglophiles, even the much-admired constitutional monarchy established after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was seen as an outcome of the rational empiricist tradition in English science heralded by Francis Bacon, and triumphantly established by Robert Boyle (1627–1691), Newton, and John Locke (1632–1704). Newtonianism or perhaps some rather more scientific debasement of it can be seen, therefore, as a major aspect of the intellectual background to the French Revolution. Certainly by the nineteenth century, scientific knowledge was rapidly becoming the new intellectual authority in an increasingly secular world. Accordingly, the natural sciences took an increasingly large place in education at all levels and came to be recognized as having a major role to play in more and more aspects of life and culture. This in turn stimulated specialization in different fields of science and led to professionalization.

The culmination of increasing tension between secular science and the traditional authority of religion occurred with the announcement of the theory of natural selection by Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913) in 1858. This theory grew out of the tradition of moral calculus and the inexorable workings of laws of nature which were inspired by eighteenth century Newtonianism. Darwin and Wallace independently arrived at the principle of natural selection after reading Thomas Malthus's (1766–1834) *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), a work of political economy in the Newtonian mold, which had been written to oppose a reform of the poor law proposed by Prime Minister William Pitt (1759–1806). Malthus warned that poor relief would only allow the poor to propagate and place an even greater burden on the state. Better to let the poor starve now, he suggested, than that

greater numbers should have to die later. The two experienced naturalists recognized straight away that the doctrine of “survival of the fittest”—a slogan first coined by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), a Malthusian social theorist—fitted the natural world as well as human society.

Although meeting with vigorous opposition from a number of quarters, the theory was so closely linked to earlier traditions of Newtonian political economy, including the influential laissez-faire principles developed by Adam Smith (1723–1790) and his followers, and so well supported by data from the natural world that it eventually carried the day. The established religions for the most part had to accommodate themselves to Darwinian evolution, while a number of aggressively secular movements in the social sciences used the theory to promote Social Darwinism, eugenics, and other supposedly scientifically based means of social control. The intellectual authority of science was by now so powerful that the moral acceptability, even desirability, of eugenics was routinely embraced by both the left and right of the political spectrum.

The growth and success of the physical sciences took off exponentially after World War II when government organizations, especially the military, and large industrial concerns, particularly among the growing number of multinational corporations, began to fund scientific research. This was to lead to what has been called “Big Science,” a massive change in the social organization and political significance of science. The result of this was not only that the late twentieth century became a period of incredibly rapid scientific advance, but also that science and scientific values permeated every aspect of daily life.

The ensuing tendency to let scientific values determine moral and political choices has certainly not been free from problems. Although the great success of the physical sciences led to the technological developments which have enabled Western culture and capitalism to dominate the world, it has also led to real fears as to whether the world as a whole can sustain these phenomenal changes. In the middle of the twentieth century humankind saw its very existence threatened by the nuclear weaponry which had developed indirectly out of Albert Einstein's (1879–1955) attempt to resolve problems in late nineteenth-century physics. By the end of the century, however, the danger seemed to come less from the threat of a sudden cataclysm and more from the gradual destruction of the ecological balance of the world system brought about by our thoroughly scientific society. The result of these developments is that an increasing amount of hostility has been directed towards science

in recent decades. Those who wish to defend science, however, point to the obvious fact that it is science which has alerted us to the dangers of global warming

and other ecological threats, and that if a solution to these dangers is to be found, it is as likely to come from science as from political economy.

See also **The Enlightenment; The Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Reformation; The Renaissance (volume 1); Medical Practitioners and Medicine (volume 4); Church and Society; Magic (volume 5); and other articles in this section.**

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SECULARIZATION



Hartmut Lehmann

In his famous speech “Intellectual Labor as a Profession,” delivered in Munich on 7 November 1917 and subsequently published as *Science as Vocation* in 1919, Max Weber explained that increasing intellectualization and rationalization, the hallmarks of the modern world, had caused not only the growth of science but also that of disenchantment (*Entzauberung*). In his 1954 Cambridge inaugural lecture, “De descriptione temporum” (Description of the course of the ages), C. S. Lewis spoke eloquently of the “un-christening” of Europe as a fundamental process of change that had occurred sometime between the age of Jane Austen and his own time and that surpassed the kind of change Europe had undergone “at his conversion,” or, as he called it, the “christening.” As a result, Lewis considered most of his contemporaries “post-Christian.”

Weber introduced the term “disenchantment” as a synonym for “secularization,” and Lewis used the term “un-christening” for the same phenomenon. Historically the roots of the term “secularization” are the Latin noun *saeculum*, which translates as “age,” “epoch,” or “century,” and the Latin adjective *saecularis*, which means “long-lasting,” that is, lasting for a whole century. In the Middle Ages, under the influence of the theology of St. Augustine, the meanings of *saeculum* and *saecularis* became more specific. Both terms were applied mainly to worldly or secular matters as opposed to the realm of the spiritual and the divine. As a result, “to secularize” began to mean to liberate certain areas of life from the influence of the church, of the clergy, of theology, or of an attachment to the divine. With these different and in some aspects vague meanings, the term “secularization” was used in a special sense to describe the transfer of property from ecclesiastical to civil possession. Specifically the term represented the view that public education and other matters of civil policy should be conducted without the introduction of religious elements or theological considerations. Moreover, between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries “secularization,” in many similar linguistic variations, became an integral part of western European languages.

In the course of the twentieth century, “secularization” acquired new and specific meanings as it was linked to specific theories of modernization. As the terms used by Weber and Lewis indicate, “secularization” joined a distinct group of terms that try to define and describe the various aspects of the liberation of modern science from theology, modern ethics from the Ten Commandments, and therefore modern lifestyles from Christian tradition—in short, the modern world from a world shaped and governed by the teachings and examples found in the Old and New Testaments.

Many synonyms for secularization are closely related to terms that attempt to define the opposite. Therefore, the concept of secularization includes “sacralization.” Accordingly, terms such as “christianization” or “rechristianization” are linked to the notion of “dechristianization,” a term mainly used in modern French scholarship. “Anticlericalism” is a special term for opposition to the clergy, mainly within Catholicism, and “profanity” is a special word for disrespect for God and things holy. Furthermore, the verb “demythologize” characterizes skepticism vis-à-vis all things religious, and related verbs are “deconfessionalize,” “despiritualize,” and “desacralize.” Terms describing the forces opposed to secularization include “revival,” “awakening,” “spiritual awakening,” and “reawakening.”

ORIGINS OF SECULARIZATION

The respective range of the synonyms for secularization has no precise definition, and to complicate matters further, the terms have somewhat different meanings in the various western European languages. This is true even for “secularization” itself, which cannot be translated into French or German without an additional specification of the precise meaning.

The rapidly changing scholarship on the processes of modernization in the fields of sociology, economics, and history accounts for the difficulty in de-

fining secularization. For a scholar like Weber at the beginning of the twentieth century, secularization or disenchantment was mainly a topic of intellectual history; but research later in the twentieth century located the processes, causes, variations, and consequences of secularization in the everyday lives of common people as well as in economics and politics. What had been a problem of intellectual history, that is, the philosophy and the literature of the cultural elite, was transformed into a problem of the history of behavior and mentalities of all social strata. In the same manner, what had been defined as a matter related to theology and the church only became a matter of religiosity in a wider sense.

Interesting debates about the nature and the meaning of secularization emerge. First, where are the beginnings of this process? Leaving aside the view that Europe was never fully christianized in the early Middle Ages and remnants of a pre-Christian worldview were present in European society throughout the Middle Ages, two main theories address the origins of the secularization of Europe. Some scholars have argued that the Western world started to become more secular during the Renaissance, particularly in relation to Renaissance court life, the rise of modern science in the era of Francis Bacon, and the rapid changes in economic development, technology, and warfare in the Thirty Years' War. According to this view secularization commenced in the late sixteenth century, but other scholars have pointed to the eighteenth century and the enormous impact of the Enlightenment. For them secularization was caused by the new philosophical outlook propagated by thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, John Locke, and Voltaire, by new secular subjects introduced into university curricula, and by political theories that advocated the basic rights of the people over the divine right of kings. The first to argue explicitly that the modern world began in the eighteenth century was the theologian and philosopher Ernst Troeltsch, a friend and colleague of Weber at Heidelberg. In the years before 1914, almost all scholars, German and non-German alike, were convinced that Martin Luther and the Reformation had led the way to the modern world. Much to their dismay, Troeltsch insisted that the Middle Ages had lasted well into the eighteenth century and that it was the Enlightenment that had brought about the decisive change.

The causes and chronology of secularization are further complicated by the vantage point of social history. While the rise of science had some impact on popular views of religion even during the eighteenth century, other developments also competed with religious concerns. Thus growing interest in material consumption could be part of a popular secularization

process. But other developments, like increased sexual activity, did not, in the minds of those who participated, necessarily indicate a renunciation of religion, even when clerics attacked the behaviors in question as irreligious. Working-class disaffection from formal churches during the throes of nineteenth-century industrialization did not always mean secularization. The transitions from religion to socialism were often complex and incomplete.

PROGRESS OF SECULARIZATION

After the 1950s scholarly opinion held almost unanimously that secularization, once started, had progressed continuously until its culmination in the twentieth century. By the end of that century another argument proposed that the theological view of secularization was much too simple, a self-assertion out of the mouths of secularized people. Instead of the steady progress of secularization, the argument suggested a complicated scenario of phases of secularization and sacralization or dechristianization and rechristianization. The forces that supported secularization coexisted with others that advanced sacralization in the Western world after the eighteenth century.

Understanding the impact of these forces requires complex models. According to this theory, secularization of European society and culture did indeed commence in the Renaissance, but early secularization met much resistance. The Renaissance and the baroque period that followed were also characterized by movements such as Puritanism in Britain, Jansenism in France and Italy, and Pietism in Germany, Sweden, the Baltic countries, and Switzerland. These revival movements were redefined in the context of this interpretation as the first major forces of the rechristianization of post-Reformation, pre-Enlightenment Europe. With the Enlightenment, however, another tidal wave of secularization swept through most countries of Europe, only to be countered by another wave of Christian revivalism in Methodism, the success story of the Moravians or *Herrnhuter*, and the First and Second Great Awakenings. In this sense early nineteenth-century missionary societies and Bible societies in Britain and elsewhere were Christian efforts to turn back the tide of radical rationalism in the late Enlightenment and to overcome the secularizing effects of the French Revolution. This struggle between pro- and anti-Christian elements continued throughout the nineteenth century and well into the second half of the twentieth century.

This interpretation has some major problems, however. Perhaps most vexing, secularization was vastly

different in most countries of Europe and North America. While in North America politics and culture seemed firmly in the grip of Fundamentalist pressure groups in the last decades of the twentieth century, in Europe the scales seemed to tip from interest in the sacred to interest in the secular. In contrast to North America, twentieth-century Europe appeared largely secularized if not dechristianized. Within the European context, forces such as urbanization and industrialization seemed to result in secularization. By contrast, the same factors seemed to support rather than hinder the triumph of Fundamentalism in the New World.

Without doubt, the juxtaposition of Europe and North America may be much too simple. Explanations of the variations of secularization in the Western world need a closer look at the development of individual European nations and even certain regions within those nations. The Netherlands, for example, became the most secularized country of Europe, but that occurred late in the twentieth century. All through the nineteenth century the Dutch people considered theirs a Protestant nation with a Catholic minority. By the end of the nineteenth century, most people in the Netherlands adhered to one of three political camps, neo-Calvinism, Catholicism, or socialism. In the 1970s these “columns,” as they were called, dissolved, and at exactly that time secularization started to progress rapidly. In another instance, Ireland experienced rising religiosity in the nineteenth century, delaying secularization until the late twentieth century.

France seems to offer a different case. Following the French Revolution the French people divided into a progressive, anti-Catholic camp, with strong anti-clerical and laical feelings, and a conservative camp, with close ties to popular Catholicism and the Catholic hierarchy. Remarkably, for many decades neither camp made gains in relation to the other. Representatives of both camps attempted to occupy public spaces with prominent buildings and signs of symbolic value, and they tried to fill public time with processions and other rituals. But neither made advances over the other side. In Poland—which had been divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the late eighteenth century—during the nineteenth century Catholicism and nationalism formed such a close union that it became almost synonymous to be Catholic and to be a Polish patriot.

VARIATIONS OF SECULARIZATION

In order to give some sense to what may otherwise appear as a play with casuistic distinctions, Hugh

McLeod proposed a typology with five different categories distinguishing between

- (1) “nations or regions with a dominant church, closely linked with traditional élites and conservative political parties,” including France and Spain;
- (2) “nations or regions with a pluralistic religious structure, but where ethnicity is relatively unimportant,” including the Netherlands, Britain, and the Scandinavian countries;
- (3) nations “with a pluralistic structure, where ethnicity is the main determinant of religious affiliation,” such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand;
- (4) nations “where the population is polarized between two antagonistic religious communities,” for example, Ireland and Germany in the *Kulturkampf* (cultural war); and
- (5) nations “where the dominant church has become the major symbol of national or regional identity in the face of alien rule,” such as nineteenth-century Poland (McLeod, pp. 21–33).

Each of these categories is a different form of secularization with a different story of the history of secularization.

Even though the typology developed by McLeod represented an important step forward, it was still far removed from a comprehensive explanation of the causes, variations, and consequences of secularization in Europe. Some problems deserve special attention as they have not yet been convincingly solved. Certainly the relationship between secularization and nationalism is the most sensitive issue, encompassing several aspects. First, one opinion is that nationalism is a kind of religion that, if fully implemented, replaces other forms of religion. Accordingly nationalism explains the past, defines the contours of the present, tells the people what the future holds for them, and spells out the sacrifices that will be necessary to achieve a brighter future. Through nationalism, with the help of rituals, episodes of the national past are sacralized, sites attain a sacred meaning, and persons appear to have performed sacred tasks for the cause of the nation. Interpreted this way, nationalism fulfills all the functions of religion. Disregarding the question of whether nationalism carries a certain amount of transcendental values and perspectives, one could call nationalism an “innerworldly” religion.

It is then a matter of further debate whether nationalism is the logical result of secularization, that is, the product of secularization carried to extreme conclusions, or nothing but a transformation or an

aggiornamento of religion. This is a complicated issue that becomes even more so, considering the fact that in all European countries many people with strong religious feelings participated actively in national movements. This is true of people with progressive, liberal views and a critical distance from traditional Christianity as well as of people with strong conservative, orthodox feelings, that is, people who abhorred the ideas of 1789.

Similar difficulties confront attempts to interpret the relationship between Christianity and fascism and discussions of the role of religion in Adolf Hitler's Germany. On the one hand, the obvious pagan character of national socialism frustrates explanations of why Christians with some understanding of Christian tradition accepted the message of men like Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg, particularly why they accepted Nazi racism and anti-Semitism. On the other hand, most German church leaders, Protestant and Catholic alike, welcomed Hitler's rise to power and actively supported Hitler's regime well into the late 1930s, some even until 1945. The Catholic Church had special relationships with Benito Mussolini's Fascist Italy, Francisco Franco's Spain, Vichy France, and Fascist regimes in Portugal, Hungary, Romania, and other countries in Eastern and southern Europe.

The answer regarding communism, the other type of totalitarian rule, seems somewhat more simple. With few exceptions, under Communist rule churches were persecuted. It was only in the 1970s and 1980s that political pressure was reduced and that in some countries, like East Germany, attempts were made to develop a kind of coexistence between socialism, as it was called, and Christian churches. No doubt communism can be understood as an extreme form of secularization that possessed the qualities of an innerworldly religion. It promised salvation to all who believed in the ideas of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and who were ready to make sacrifices toward the victory of those ideas.

In all countries that had been under Communist rule for several decades, Christian traditions were weakened and in some cases severed. After 1989 the new generation of people in those countries knew practically nothing about Christian teachings. At the same time those people had a strong interest in all things religious, especially in esoteric doctrines and practices. Sectarian groups claimed impressive missionary successes. Therefore, secularization does not adequately describe these developments, but dechristianization is certainly appropriate for some aspects.

Another matter complicates a comprehensive theory of secularization. Secularization and sacralization attempt to describe processes of transformation,

that is, short-term and long-term linear change. While it is relatively easy to describe the transfer of property, the transfer of buildings and land, from the church or religious orders into nonecclesiastical possession, it is extremely difficult to analyze and interpret changes of religious mentality, that is, changes in worldview, belief, and conviction. How can religiosity be measured? What indicators provide insight into the degrees of religious belief and the variations of religious practice? Where is the historical material that is suited for quantitative analysis?

One strategy for finding answers is the analysis of the books people possessed. The assumption is that the more books with a religious content people owned, the more likely it is that they felt strongly about religion. But did people in fact believe in the contents of the books in their possession? Perhaps some of these books were given to them as gifts or were inherited. How can the people whose libraries were not preserved be included? Another possible measure is the analysis of religious formulas in the last wills of people. The assumption is that the more often such formulas were used, the stronger was the attachment of those people to the church. But last wills are a special kind of document, more defined by the notaries than by the persons who signed. Moreover, they are formalistic documents that, in view of impending death, are open to religious formulas.

Other scholars tried to measure secularization using the records of church attendance or the records of persons who took part in the holy communion. However, whether those materials are valid proof of the acceleration, slowdown, or reversal of the process of secularization is questionable. Furthermore, people who felt strongly about religion went to holy communion only very seldom, that is, only when they were convinced that their souls were pure enough to confront God. Those pious men and women are statistically in the same category as those who did not attend church regularly and who refused the Sacraments because they did not believe in their value. Each case lacks sufficient historical records to trace the rise and fall of secularization.

When David Martin published *A General Theory of Secularization* in 1978, sociologists of religion were convinced that they had successfully deciphered one of the major mysteries of modern history. That optimism was short-lived. Historians puzzled over why secularization advanced in a remarkable manner in the era of urbanization and industrialization in Europe while the opposite occurred in North America, where fundamentalism gained strength in the late twentieth century. Equally puzzling were the factors that trace and explain the success, failure, and varia-

tions of secularization. Religious energies that in the twentieth century were no longer firmly embedded in the Christian tradition might have transferred into other kinds of belief. Strong indications suggest that the mentalities and practices of “Western” men and women did not become more rational than they were, for example, in the eighteenth century.

Is secularization, therefore, one of the main characteristics of modern Europe or a temporary phase of European history? Immigration into Europe increased during the final decades of the twentieth century. Many of those immigrants came from non-Christian cultures and had strong attachments to religion. Even those immigrants who were “uprooted” from their native soil and were without a clear religious orientation did not convert to Christianity or embrace the blessings of a sceptical, enlightened world-

view. Rather they rediscovered the value of their own indigenous religious tradition as a means of stabilizing their identity in an often hostile environment.

The secularized post-Christians of Europe did not react with a new religious fervor of their own. Europeans engaged in charitable activities based on enlightened humanism on the one hand and xenophobic behavior, sometimes even racism and violent hostility, on the other. The difficult path to a multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multireligious Europe has unpredictable cultural conflicts and confrontations and may result in the final triumph of secularization or a multifaceted coexistence of secular and spiritual norms and practices. A secularized Europe would be unique in a world dominated by several hegemonic cultures in which religion seems to play an ever more important part.

See also Church and Society (volume 5).

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SECTION 5: PROCESSES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

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COMMUNICATIONS, THE MEDIA, AND PROPAGANDA



Thomas C. Wolfe

“Communications” has long been a subject of interest for historians of European societies: from the printing press to the Internet, technologies of communication have had a decisive impact on the politics, government, economies, and cultures of Europe. This essay will provide a framework for thinking about this enormous topic by discussing three distinct but related issues. First, it will make the obvious but important point that any history of communications relies on an idea of what communications “is.” Historians have often—usually implicitly—understood communications as primarily a product of technology, something produced by a machine. But in recent decades social scientists have begun to argue for more anthropological understandings of communications, ones that stress how any act of communication takes place within a prior matrix of cultural meanings.

Second, it will present in compressed form what communications scholars have stressed when they look at the broad sweep of European and Western history. Such an account will be necessarily partial, but the goal is less to present a synoptic vision of historians’ understandings than to view some of the dominant themes in modern history in light of communication as a cultural and social practice.

The third part of this essay will address an argument made by a number of philosophers and critics, that “communications” is by no means simply an academic subject, separated off behind the dense walls that seem to divide the present from the past, but is rather a crucial part of our present. Media institutions are intimately bound up with many of the predicaments that European societies, as well as those societies all over the globe shaped by “Western” ways of life, are facing today. Here we will consider just one of these predicaments, the problem of the public. Since the seventeenth century, the public has been a key idea in the evolution of democratic societies, and in order to think about the vicissitudes of the contemporary public, it is indispensable to have some idea of how the idea of the public appeared in Europe in the early modern period and what happened to it in the

course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the European context, this history is particularly relevant now, as the leaders of the European Union seek to create a European public as the foundation of the single European state.

APPROACHING COMMUNICATIONS

If there is a foundational understanding of communications that has guided the research and thinking of many historians, it is that communications involves the transport of a message from a sender to a receiver. The message traverses time and space more or less intact, sent on its way by a mechanism that fixes language in mobile form. The history of communications thus addresses the evolution of means by which messages have been fixed and moved across time and space. This is a familiar history centered upon inventions and the inventors, businessmen, and patrons who developed and promoted them. In the temporal scope that is our interest here, the printing press stands out as the first in a long line of such machines, a line that culminates today in the latest software offered on the World Wide Web.

Many writers have argued that this model of communications is simply too narrow, and that communications history should not be a subfield of the history of technology. They stress that communication in its more general sense is a phenomenon of culture, and therefore communications history is in fact cultural history and should integrate the insights of anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies into its analytic vocabulary. For example, Armand Mattelart uses the term “communication” to denote broad social processes involving “multiple circuits of exchange.” The objects exchanged include not only messages but also goods and people that together form a continuous kind of cultural “flow.” This expansive definition makes the study of communications a vast field on which a multitude of seemingly disparate objects are mapped and related to each other, like the

Suez Canal and the utopian novel, nineteenth-century German anthropology and theories of naval power.

Another contemporary French writer, Régis Debray, criticizes the message-based model not for being narrow but for being simply mistaken. Building on the insights of many linguists and anthropologists, he argues that messages should not be considered as things separate from the social and cultural networks from which they emerge. Instead of being instantaneous, interpersonal, and peaceful—traits implied by the sender-message-receiver model—communication should be reconceived as acts of transmission that are historical, collective, and conflictual. The simplest text is but a moment in a historical process: no single person is ever the “author” of any message; rather, the message is the product of the social worlds to which individuals belong, worlds that are organized in terms of hierarchy and unequal power. Authors are certainly one part of the creation of messages, but it is a mistake to see them as the sole or even the most important part. Debray, like Mattelart, seeks a greatly expanded role for communication in organizing and in fact grounding our approaches to history, for the historical discipline’s internal division in terms of military, diplomatic, social, and intellectual history is, he thinks, itself an artifact of the predominance of the sender-receiver model. The separation between social and intellectual history is particularly problematic: ideas and the social contexts that produced them are for Debray not separable, distinct phenomena; both need to be conceived as parts of the most concrete, material processes. “The Enlightenment,” for example, “is not a corpus of doctrines, a totality of discourses or principles, that a textual analysis could comprehend and restore; it is a change in the system of manufacture/circulation/storage of signs” (p. 19).

Yet another group of historians has approached communication in culture by examining the connection between the dominant mode of communication in a society and the state or condition of consciousness of the members of that society. They work from the premise that the ways human beings experience themselves is in part a function of the nature of the communication mediums that define and connect them to their world. The Canadian writer Marshall McLuhan raised these broad questions most artfully and philosophically in the 1960s and 1970s, arguing that the history of media is the history of the transformation of the senses, first as space and time are overcome by writing and print, and then as new forms of presence are created by radio and television.

In terms of the long historical terrain that is our subject here, historians of communication and consciousness have described two significant shifts in Eu-

rope over the course of the last five hundred years. The first was the gradual movement from orality to literacy that occurred in the modern period, and the second is the shift beginning in the twentieth century from print to visual culture or to a culture of the image. Historians of the transition from orality to literacy, such as Walter Ong and Michel de Certeau, have suggested that the printing press and the growth of communities based on literacy brought a qualitatively new kind of power to European societies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The capacity for imaginative thought and expression ceased to be conceived as being closely bound to and in some sense a part of nature, and became viewed as the possession of a creative self who writes from outside nature. Certeau suggests that printing involved the “discovery” of the blank page, upon which early modern scientific systems of astronomy, anatomy, and even music, could be written. This transformation made the concepts of imagination and creativity core cultural values for European civilization, and at the same time entailed a distancing from nature, from God, from an “enchanted” state in which all creatures were connected with each other in a harmonious universe.

With regard to the second transition mentioned above, a number of scholars have suggested that electronic technologies are today reshaping our consciousness in ways as profound as the print revolution reshaped the consciousness of Europeans centuries ago. In contrast to the disenchantment of the world caused by the systematizing nature of print, observers like the sociologist Michel Maffesoli today perceive the outlines of the reenchantment of the world, based on the ability of contemporary media to create new communities of faith. He argues that all kinds of cultural signs—industrial, personal, political, artistic—everything that is circulated as meaningful units of human culture, are taking the form of icons, of sacred images, which illustrate and concentrate belief, trust, and passion. He suggests that it is in the nature of the blank video screen to bring forth the proliferation of images and icons in the same way that it was in the nature of the blank page to demand systematic accounts of natural phenomena. The implication is that people are coming to know themselves and the world as images rather than as objects or ideas developed in the course of grappling with systems preserved and elaborated in print.

It is obvious that historians of communication and consciousness speak in a very different register from historians who study the details of communications technologies and the pace of their adoption in various societies. Social historians remind us, for example, that the movement from orality to print to

image did not involve the supplanting of one medium by another, but rather the addition or overlaying of one by another. Similarly, they criticize simplistic claims about a second transition from print to image by arguing that electronic technologies since the nineteenth century have above all disseminated the printed word; in fact the computer and the Internet have brought about another print revolution, in which anyone with a personal computer becomes a printer and publisher. This is not quite fair, however, since at the heart of the interests of historians of consciousness is not the fabrication and circulation of the printed word but rather the creation of a subjective and affective power that shapes how readers and viewers interpret the world. Electronic technologies that transmit words and images have obviously not destroyed print, but they suggest that the printed word has itself become more powerful as an image than as a conveyor of verbal meaning. Paradigmatic examples are the ubiquitous logos of corporations, sports teams, and of commodities themselves.

A further point should be made concerning the messiness of the very concepts of orality and literacy. In the first place, anthropologists who have studied oral societies and historians who have studied the evolution of literacy in Europe show convincingly that neither orality nor literacy exist in any kind of pure state readable from the historical record. Members of oral cultures have many more means for knowing the world than simply what is told to them by their elders; these cultures encode knowledge in the nature world they inhabit as well as transmit meanings in the "written" form of art and design. Literacy is an equally difficult object to discern in the past. Even though the literacy rate has been a standard gauge for at least two centuries to mark the progress or stage of advancement of a society, historians remind us that the measurement of literacy is an extremely complex problem. Can we accurately call those farmers of an English county in the eighteenth century who managed to scratch out their name instead of simply marking an X in the parish register "literate"? In addition, they caution us against too rashly extrapolating literacy from the presence of educational institutions. There is little evidence, for example, that many young peasants in southern Italy who went to school for eight years at the end of the nineteenth century actually learned to read.

This condensed account of concepts of communications has been necessary to make the point that the historical study of communications includes a vast number of disparate topics and approaches. What follows will draw from a number of these approaches in order to describe how the printed word

became the chief solvent for breaking down the institutions of medieval society and the constituting medium for modern social and cultural forms.

COMMUNITIES AND CULTURES OF PRINT

Scholars of communications have contributed a great deal to our understandings of the major turning points in the broad sweep of European history. In particular they have furnished insights that help us understand two of the most important issues that historians have debated for several centuries: first, the dissolution of the medieval world and the rise of early modern society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and, second, the later transition to the modern world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From the perspective of communications scholars, these questions concern the revolutionary impact of print on medieval society and secondly the place of media in the establishment of industrial, democratic, and capitalist states since the consolidation of absolutist regimes in the eighteenth century.

As to the first transformation, there is broad historical consensus that the invention of the printing press was one of the most significant events of the early modern era. While books had of course existed since antiquity, they were both expensive and rare, and they circulated within relatively small circles of the clergy and nobility. Yet by the middle of the sixteenth century, so many books, pamphlets, chapbooks, ballads, newsletters, newsbooks, and corantos (single-sheet collections of news items from foreign sources) began to appear that the scarcity of books seemed to contemporaries a thing of the distant past. Printed material poured from presses based on Johannes Gutenberg's design at a fraction of the cost of manuscripts, and these inexpensive books were adopted into the rapidly expanding networks of marketing and distribution that constituted the commercial revolution of the early modern period.

We can summarize the social impact of this process by saying that it enabled communities of print to compete with and eventually supplant the communities of kin and faith that comprised medieval societies. Most dramatically, these new kinds of communities founded in and by print challenged prevailing conceptions of religious faith and political governance. Printed works were sources of beliefs, arguments, and claims to fact that reconfigured the bonds of belonging to social, cultural, and political collectivities. Print made possible new forms of communities based not on social and cultural rituals but on the basis of agree-

prayer books enabled Protestant theologians to construct a style of worship based on direct access to the word of God as it was preserved on the printed page. Access to the divinity was no longer dependent on or a function of interactions with the human representatives of God on earth, who according to the reformers were members of a corrupt hierarchy, but was there for all those who could read. This was an early modern instance of a phenomenon that historians of communications have noticed repeatedly in the modern era: new forms of communication circumventing established hierarchies and thereby eroding the legitimacy of traditional institutions. In short, the printing press made possible a new kind of religiosity that absorbed and transformed existing religious institutions and ideas.

The printing press and the communities of print it made possible had an equally decisive impact on another major process in European history, the consolidation of the nation-state as the dominant political unit of the modern era. This appearance also dates to the sixteenth century, when the late medieval system of fluid political units based on the fluctuating fortunes of aristocratic families and alliances began to weaken, to be replaced by a system of nation-states. Scholars of communication have argued that the key trait of this new political unit was its dependence on networks of print culture that gave this abstract idea immense power. Historians of nationalism have referred to this new kind of cultural and political entity as an “imagined community”; they argue that any nation-state is above all an idea endlessly replenished by texts that restate and redefine its power over its “readers.” In terms of the evolution of this idea, the scholar-bureaucrats of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gave European nation-states existence by disseminating in identical copies authoritative descriptions of these new bounded territories. They began in the seventeenth century to study the inhabitants of their territories; they began to think of occupants of territory as populations and went on to measure and decipher regularities and consistencies in matters of birth and death rates, agricultural production, and trade. Later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the romantic movement produced writers whose philosophical essays, novels, plays, and poetry described the profound emotional tie between a state and its people, a tie so enduringly strong that it produced the virulent nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In their works, nation-states became entities that, like people, suffered and triumphed, had ineluctable fates and unavoidable destinies. Other kinds of texts gave meaning to the nation-state as the bearer of political power; elite segments of society

ment with views first put forth in printed form and then referenced in other texts. Books not only gave factual claims durability and longevity but also gave speed and momentum to ideas, as they were passed from hand to hand and from generation to generation. Contrasting accounts of reality could endure over time and be taken up by new readers, who then became new articulators of argument and belief. People separated in time and space could base their relationship on the stability of identical copies of texts, and through the printed word could feel a new kind of bond and imagine a new kind of sympathy.

In the area of religion, the Reformation—the central religious, political, and cultural event of the early modern period—can only be fully understood by noting the ways the leaders of the reform movement constructed radically new forms of Christian community by exploiting the unique characteristics of print. Cheaper Bibles, collections of sermons, and

formed around the consumption of print began to think of states as possessing their own “national” interests that demanded brilliant statecraft on the part of leaders as well as the most noble sacrifices on the part of citizens. Viewed through the lens of communications, the entire history of national cultures and conflicts emerged because of the imaginary identifications made possible by print.

The importance of print communities to the process of secularization that steadily eroded medieval institutions and worldviews has led many writers to argue that the print revolution set Western civilization on a course of unending and limitless progress, and in the middle of the twentieth century many argued that for the rest of the world to join us on this path, they had to develop modern systems of communication. Progress depended on doing away with traditional forms of community and making new ones, and the European historical record showed there was no better solvent than print.

Scholars of communications have shown, however, that there is another side to this story. If it is possible to gloss the exit from the medieval world as unequivocally progressive, it is difficult to maintain that optimism in the face of another cultural entailment of print, which we might summarize with the observation that after the printing press, everything becomes a matter of opinion. The printing press made possible the growth of an international community of scholars dedicated to establishing the truth of their opinions by means of observation from experience; but it also made possible the establishment of a mode of social conflict in which communities of belief fought wars of words that led with depressing regularity to wars of cannons and bullets. No social group could defend itself or seek power for itself without the articulation of heresies and orthodoxies. In this sense the printing press early on took its place as one of the most effective weapons in European history.

The earliest manifestation of this new kind of conflict can be noted again in the sphere of faith. The Catholic Church’s attention to threats to its authority posed by heretical texts of course predates Gutenberg, and yet it viewed the flood of written material that began in the sixteenth century with mounting alarm. The church felt an urgent need to keep back this tide of heretical texts from both inside and outside Christendom, and so promulgated more and more decrees defining and monitoring heresy in all its varied forms. The church paid attention to both the ideological side of things, enlarging the elaborate bureaucracy that scrutinized texts for the opinions they held, and the social side, increasing the surveillance of printers, booksellers, and authors who were in a position

to organize the creation and circulation of heretical texts. Thus we should remember how this new Protestant form of religiosity was itself influenced by the new kinds of responses it elicited on the part of the established religious authorities. There is nothing like being called heretical to give power to a text.

But scholars of communication have argued that this ambiguous and conflictual quality of print had its most enduring effects in the field of politics. The most famous early example of this was the upheaval in English society beginning in the 1640s that lasted for over four decades, culminating in the revolution of 1688. This was the first major political conflict in Europe in which the question of the control of print became itself a point of political debate and contestation. Beginning in the 1640s, pamphlets and broadsheets became the vectors of sustained political criticism of the monarchy, and the monarchy in turn introduced measures to control print, measures that bear striking similarities to the Catholic Church’s innovations of the previous century. This restriction provoked John Milton’s essay of 1644, *Areopagitica*, which attacked the Crown’s action as an unjustified curtailment of a fundamental right. This essay has been read as a document founding the idea of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, although some scholars of communications history have pointed out that other readings are possible, ones that see Milton’s text as itself partisan politics cloaked in high principle. Whatever Milton’s own contribution to these events was, the upheavals in seventeenth-century English political life demonstrated how the printing press created new patterns of political conflict.

The English revolution was thus the first instance of what appears as a repeated pattern in the course of modern European history. First print helps to destabilize traditional political arrangements by fostering revolutionary actors who literally create their own forms of political power through print. Next these actors succeed in taking power, and as part of their new and more just vision of rule, they proclaim the liberalization of the sphere of print. Oppressive restrictions of the past are with much fanfare lifted and an era of freedom is inaugurated. But in the course of time the new regime generates a new opposition who themselves organize around print; clandestine networks of readers form, repressive measures are enacted, and the sphere of print becomes again a terrain of political conflict. Finally, what was once a revolutionary regime is denounced by new actors as traditional or feudal, a revolutionary situation emerges, and the cycle begins again.

The most conspicuous events that conform to this pattern are the French Revolution of 1789 and

SECTION 5: PROCESSES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. In all these cases power flowed to those who organized themselves around print most effectively, articulating the most persuasive case against what they considered a stifling autocracy and establishing the most passionate conviction for change among their circles of readers. In both these cases, regimes that understood the proliferation of opinions in print as dangerous to the stability of the state were brought down by actors whose specialty was the dissemination of argument and belief in print. After these revolutions, the problem of tolerance and difference emerged again, as the revolutionaries attempted to control the very conditions that had made their seizure of power possible. In the French case this led to the autocracy of Napoleon, and in the Soviet case to the autocracy of the Communist Party. The harsh policies of these new governments then generated their own forms of critical, revolutionary politics, which themselves generated new instances of print insurgency. In this light, the print revolution was at the same time the propaganda revolution, for it was in the early modern period that idealism, censorship, and propaganda became welded together to form the unique cultural alloy that we still refer to today as “politics.”

And yet an even stronger definition of propaganda is possible. Some writers have argued that the ambiguous legacy of the printing press is best seen not in these dramatic moments of revolutionary upheaval,

but rather in the evolution of daily life over the course of the last three centuries. Sociologists like Jacques Ellul have argued that propaganda—the dissemination of one-sided messages intending to convince the reader or listener of the rightness of the sender’s interests or opinions—is best understood as a cultural force whose ultimate effect has been to create distracted, decentered, unthinking publics, unable to tell the difference between philosophical principle and naked self-interest. The printing press was not primarily a vehicle of progress or upheaval, but rather the primary instrument by which powerful groups supplied common people with a steady diet of permitted thoughts. Ellul inverts the entire Enlightenment narrative of progress and improvement and sees the modern period as that era when Western societies gave themselves entirely over to the forms of unfreedom that derive from the sea of slogans, jingles, and images that compel us to behave in ways consonant with the powerful.

We do not have to look hard for evidence that seems to support this strong view of propaganda. In the first edition of Richard Steele’s *Tatler* of 1709, the author writes that he is providing the paper for “the use of Politick Persons” because they, “being Persons of strong Zeal and weak Intellects,” need to be told “*what to think*” (Steele’s italics). The same view is unabashedly acknowledged by Edward L. Bernays, one of the pioneers of advertising and public relations in

italist, democratic societies beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, and the rise of mass political parties in the early twentieth century and their post-World War II versions today, the expansion of propaganda is unmistakable. For Ellul, who fought in the French Resistance and experienced firsthand the Nazi control of French journalism and broadcasting, it is imperative to realize that the term “propaganda” should not be restricted to the political programs, publications, and press of fascist or totalitarian regimes, but that it accurately captured the way that order is maintained in any modern state. No social or political group could constitute itself without propaganda, nor could it survive without engaging in intense propaganda struggles with other groups.

Ellul’s argument was particularly disquieting in the context of the Cold War, when two political and economic systems appeared to be locked in mortal conflict. And given this struggle, his point that both Soviet and Western societies lived in conditions of unfreedom because in both the individual is conceived as an empty vessel to be filled with the interests of the powerful was not particularly welcome. Some concerned observers even took Ellul’s history of propaganda as a prophetic kind of warning because in the 1960s the new technology of television was beginning to appear in both Western and Eastern parts of Europe as an even more efficient disseminator of messages than print. Television, after all, created a new social kind of interaction, an immediate but mediated co-presence, in which the voices of the powerful could be heard in your own living room appealing directly to your thoughts and manipulating your emotions.

the United States, who had immense influence on the development of these disciplines in Europe. Bernays wrote in *Propaganda*, his 1928 primer of public relations, “The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.” Between these two writers was two centuries’ worth of institutional growth dedicated to perfecting communications so that the people would act as they were told.

While this is certainly another “strong” view, polemical and critical of the way capitalist industrial societies took shape in the nineteenth century, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that propaganda is less a political than a cultural fact in European history. From the civil religion of the French Revolution and its postrevolutionary incarnations in the programs of Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte to the establishment of advertising agencies as essential institutions in cap-

THE PUBLIC PROBLEM

While the above discussion has argued that “communications” has a central place in both the positive and negative “grand narratives” about the modern era, another history cuts productively between these two polemical views, one that has provided a framework both for thinking about the past and for formulating approaches to contemporary political life, a history that takes up the evolution of European institutions as well as the shaping of consciousness by technologies of communication. This is the problem of the “public,” one of the most intricate issues in Western culture, and a concept deeply bound up with the development of communications. If the Renaissance meaning of the word “public” still owed much to the classical sense that referred to the male landowners of a given city-state gathered together to discuss public (i.e., their own) business, the early modern sense of

the term was wrapped up in new forms of *publicity*, that is, in the new means of making something public in print. In the seventeenth century “the reading public” came to refer to the collectivity of readers who consumed the periodicals and newspapers available in the coffeehouses, taverns, and inns of Europe’s major cities. Some historians have suggested that from this early reading public and from the discussions carried on in print about pressing issues of the day a “public sphere” came into being, an institution that was, according to Jürgen Habermas, absolutely vital for the creation of popular government. Print became a “place” where individuals could gather for the purpose of applying their reason to matters that affected them all. Crucially, the anonymity of print levelled all social differences so that arguments could be examined outside of the context of social hierarchy and status, and it enabled the emergence of a procedural base for democratic practice: the early newspapers and periodicals instructed the growing groups of literate businessmen, lawyers, bureaucrats and teachers how to deliberate about their own interests, how to consider the implications of social and political problems, and how to compromise.

The complicating factor present at the birth of this early modern society of letters was capitalism, and more specifically the tension between the survival of

the medium—the newspaper or periodical itself—and the state of the cultural institution, the public sphere. In the early modern period, the public sphere was sustained by publications that were erratically published and short-lived, and by printers/writers/publishers who were often harassed and prosecuted by the authorities. Paradoxically, however, the ephemeral nature of these early newspapers gave vitality to the nascent public sphere as new printers and publishers joined the ongoing discussions, staking both their careers and their often meager resources on the growth of this peculiar public that constituted itself in the act of reading.

The problem, according to historians like Habermas, was that journalism and the entire public sphere became corrupted by the transformation of these publications into business enterprises that sought profits before they sought the public good. The public sphere was invaded by private interests to such a degree that by the end of the eighteenth century the stereotype of journalists as venal, self-interested scribblers who sold themselves to the highest bidders was fixed in popular culture. The public sphere’s transformation was furthered with the industrial revolution and the growth of Europe’s cities in the first half of the nineteenth century, when papers became intertwined with the promotion, advertising, and distri-

bution of a style of life based on the consumption of leisure goods and experiences. The problem was not only that the public use of reason took a back seat to the production of propaganda. Just as serious was that the strategies that newspapers used to compete with each other in the crowded, competitive sphere of periodicals ended up distorting readers' perceptions of the world. According to Richard Terdiman, print media was another site where we can note the imprint of the commodification of everyday life: in the press the world was broken up into the briefest items that were strewn across the page without order or reason, in exactly the same ways as early department stores jumbled together dresses and umbrellas, wallets and underwear. The readers of these mass newspapers were shown a world without order and were offered nothing to help them supply order to it. The readers no longer constituted a public but were rather treated as a *mass* whose opinions were to be supplied and whose consumption was to be molded.

Such a history of the public sphere does not aim to provide a full account of the development of journalism as a profession, much less the development of political institutions in democratic societies. It says nothing, for example, about other public spheres that appeared in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, like the proletariat public sphere formed by guilds, trade unions, and other working-class organizations. Neither does this story attend to the complex role played by women in both the formation of the public sphere and the processes that supposedly led to its transformation. The history of the public sphere is more like a framework that provides a useful starting point for thinking about the development of Western societies in the modern era, and it is a history that emerged again after World War II as particularly relevant to the task of rebuilding European societies. The question faced by European leaders in 1945 was how to give democracy a deep and enduring foundation so that the cataclysm of total war would never happen again. Propaganda systems and institutions were to be destroyed and broadcasting was to be decentralized; the press was to be democratized, and television was to serve the public as a new kind of pedagogical tool, teaching the viewing public Enlightenment values of tolerance, compromise, and respect.

In the 1960s and 1970s, however, many European intellectuals were still waiting for the creation of a responsive and effective public sphere. They argued that while the two sides in the Cold War held conflicting views about property and the creation of wealth, in one respect they were unmistakably similar: governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain had no interest in fostering the appearance of informed,

active, and concerned publics. Governments in Eastern Europe refused to allow any kind of open political space in which the public's voices could be heard, and in Western Europe, postwar governments substituted economic priorities for political ones. Political debates were to be managed by technocratic experts, while the public devoted its energies toward consumption and the creation of national prosperity. By the 1980s, however, the postwar consensus was exhausted, and the public sphere appeared again as a useful idea with which to map out social change. The power of the idea was demonstrated most immediately in the revolutions in Eastern Europe of 1989, where socialist governments were brought down by groups claiming to act in the name of the public. The terms "public sphere" and "civil society" became catchwords of new governments in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, and in the West too new groups appeared that shook up the conservative social landscape of the 1980s. Green parties challenged the political orthodoxy that states existed above all to foster economic growth; antinuclear activists challenged the common sense of international politics; and, in a considerably more ambiguous development, groups on the radical right appeared who villified the conservative, materialistic middle class with the same racist and violent messages used by the Nazis half a century before.

As the post-Cold War era has unfolded, however, the resurgence of the public sphere seems to have been of brief duration. Since the 1980s there has been a decisive push in a number of Western European states to privatize formerly state-run media institutions. These transnational media conglomerates tend to conceive of the public as a vast amalgamation of different market niches, while the major political parties turn steadily toward the American model of politics as entertainment heavily dependent on the orchestration in media of public debate and discussion. By contrast, in most Eastern European societies television remains under state control and in moments of political crisis is fought over as the only instrument that can guarantee political survival, as it did for the Russian president Boris Yeltsin on more than one occasion. Clearly the public sphere is still only a framework, valuable above all because it insists on a connection between the nature of a society's communication system and the quality of collective life lived by its citizens.

This essay has provided a sense of the diversity of ways to think about the history of communications in European societies, but it has also suggested how thinking about this history is a matter of some urgency, especially in the context of the remarkable so-

cial and technical transformations underway at the beginning of the twenty-first century. From advances in Internet and satellite technology that make more and more parts of the world visible and audible to other parts, to the steady progression of media mergers that produce enormous international conglomer-

ates, communications institutions will continue to shape the lives not only of Europeans but of everyone who takes up media forms to explore the world around them. We participate in it, we observe it, but to change it we need to know how to think about it. And here histories are crucial.

See also The Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Reformation (volume 1); Printing and Publishing; Literacy; Journalism (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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THE ENVIRONMENT



Richard H. Grove

The Renaissance marks a major watershed in the environmental history of Europe. It was itself at least in part a development inextricably intertwined with a new view of the world engendered by the maritime travels of Europeans far beyond the Pillars of Hercules. The literature about the Renaissance voyages permitted the evolution of a new self-consciousness among Europeans about themselves and the countries, landscapes, and societies they came from. In truth, we cannot really disentangle the history of landscape, environmental perceptions, and social history that go to make up the environmental history of the European landscape. All were transformed by the rapidly emerging new relationship between Europe and the rest of the world, philosophically, socially, and economically. Biologically, too, the encounter with the rest of the world after about 1300 was reflected in enormous transitions in Europe itself. From the Renaissance onward Europeans constructed themselves and their landscapes in terms of their new relationship with the non-European world. As Europe came increasingly to dominate a world economic system, the landscape of Europe was itself increasingly affected by the transformations that new economic forces and the concentration of capital brought about. These changes can be read, to varying degrees, in the evolving landscapes of Europe in the last half of the second millennium, five hundred years that saw much of the continent experience agricultural and industrial revolutions and a degree of urbanization that largely transformed the modes by which people used and shaped the landscape.

We should not, however, exaggerate the changes that took place in those five centuries. Arguably, and especially in Britain and France, much of the modern-day cleared agrarian landscape is in essence the landscape created during the Roman Empire. By 1300 a very high proportion of the original woodland cover of Europe had been cleared and, locally, resource shortages had stimulated the emergence of elaborate systems of management and common-property resource allocation. Some of these shortages may have helped to provoke the kinds of new fuel use that ac-

companied the beginnings of industrialization and protoindustrialization, especially in England. For this reason a careful examination of the historical geography and environmental history of England is especially relevant to understanding the changes that went on in the rest of Europe later on, as the effects of industrialization and urbanization made themselves felt. So too, the often hostile social responses to industrialization in England and France were pioneering and vital to the revolution in environmental perceptions that took place elsewhere in Europe after the mid-eighteenth century. These reactions, some of which took the form of a growing environmental concern and environmental consciousness, were strongly associated with physiocratic and romantic responses to capitalism and industrialization and are especially relevant in understanding the way in which environmentalism in the modern period has responded to contemporary European and global notions of environmental crisis.

Major environmental transformations took place in Europe between 1400 and 2000 in connection with six major phenomena: the clearance of woodlands and the draining of wetlands for agriculture, urbanization, and industry; changes in agriculture, field systems, crops, and the form of the landscape; urbanization and industrialization and pollution, especially during the nineteenth century; the impact of epidemic diseases and climate change; landscape design coupled with the growth of urban-stimulated environmentalism and pollution control; and roadbuilding and the industrialization of agriculture. In this period a demographic transition associated with agricultural and industrial revolutions and urbanization led to an intensification of resource use (especially fossil-fuel use) and agricultural production that was historically unprecedented, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The period was also coterminous with the Little Ice Age, a distinct climatic period that lasted from 1250 to 1900, approximately, and which was characterized by an unusual frequency of extreme climatic events involving prolonged periods of cold or

high temperatures, drought, and heavy precipitation events. The severest of these events, especially those which articulated with global El Niño and La Niña events, gave rise to periods of economic and social crisis in Europe that lasted several decades in some instances. The most dramatic environmental changes, however, involved the continued transformation or disappearance of the post-Ice-Age natural vegetational cover of the continent, as clearance for agriculture took place, and as a consequence of growing demand for wood for industrial and urban fuel.

THE LITTLE ICE AGE IN EUROPE AND ITS SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT

The Little Ice Age was a period several centuries long during which glaciers enlarged. The term refers to the behavior of glaciers, not so much to the climatic circumstances causing them to expand. The Little Ice Age was not a period of prolonged, unbroken cold; in Europe certain periods within it, such as the years 1530–1560, were almost as benign as the twentieth century. European mean temperatures varied by less than two degrees centigrade, although particularly cold years or clusters of years occurred from time to time. Very cold decades in the 1590s and 1690s, for instance, saw prolonged snow cover, frozen rivers, and extensive sea ice around Iceland. The characteristics, meteorological causes, and physical and human consequences of this period, which was global in its impact, can be traced in most detail in Europe. Recently, the availability of historical data and concentrated field investigations have permitted reconstruction of many glacier chronologies. Documentary information ranging from ice cover around Iceland, sea surface temperatures, and the state of the fisheries in the North Atlantic to the timing of the rye harvest in Finland and the incidence of drought in Crete is unusually substantial.

The Little Ice Age has commonly been seen as occurring during the last three hundred years, during which glaciers from Iceland and Scandinavia to the Pyrenees advanced, in some cases across pastures or near high settlements. However, evidence is now accumulating that these advances, culminating in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, were preceded by others of comparable magnitude, culminating in the fourteenth century. The intervening period was not sufficiently long, or the effect of loss of ice volume great enough, to cause withdrawal to positions held in the tenth to early thirteenth centuries. It is therefore logical to see the whole period from about the mid-thirteenth century to the start of the recession in the

late nineteenth century as one Little Ice Age. The Little Ice Age was in turn simply the most recent of several century-scale fluctuations to have affected Europe since the beginning of the Holocene ten thousand years ago.

The extent to which century-scale climatic events such as the Little Ice Age are manifestations of periodic adjustments in the interaction between oceanic and atmospheric circulation or responses of the global climatic system to external forcing caused by factors such as variation in geomagnetism or decreased solar input remain to be clarified. A full explanation must involve the combined influence of several factors, including the part played by volcanic eruptions, whose effects we know have been considerable, although generally short-lived, in European history. The end of the Little Ice Age cannot be attributed simply to anthropogenic warming following the industrial revolution, in view of evidence of comparable warming in the Medieval Warm Period. Just as the Little Ice Age consisted of decadal and seasonal departures from longer-term means, it was itself but one of several fluctuations within the Holocene, each lasting several centuries.

The physical consequences of Little Ice Age climatic conditions affected both highlands and lowlands, as well as coastal areas. Snow cover extended, and semipermanent snow appeared on midlatitude uplands, as in Scotland, and on high mountains in the Mediterranean, including the White Mountains of Crete. Snow lines fell, avalanches and mass movements increased greatly, as did floods, some caused by damming of main valleys by ice from tributary valleys. Periods of glacial advance were generally associated with increased flooding and sediment transport. Regime changes of streams and rivers flowing from glaciers led in the short term to both degradation and aggradation, according to the balance between meltwater load and stream competence.

In the longer term increased flooding and glacial erosion led to enhanced sedimentation rates and deposition of valley fills and deltas. Greater storminess caused flooding of low-lying coasts and the formation of belts of sand dunes, as at Morfa Harlech in northwest Wales. Little Ice Age climatic fluctuations were sufficient to have biological consequences, ranging from shifts in tree line altitude to changes in fish distribution in response to displacement of water masses. The disappearance of cod from the Norwegian Sea area in the late seventeenth century, associated with the expansion of polar water, is attributable to the inability of cod kidneys to function in water below 2 degrees centigrade. The northward extension of the range of European birds during the twentieth-century

warming, such as the establishment of starlings in Iceland after 1941, implies that more substantial changes in the distribution of birds and insects must have occurred during the most marked phases of the Little Ice Age.

The consequences of the Little Ice Age for European populations ranged from ice advance onto farms and farmland, such as the obliteration in 1743 of Tungen Farm in Oldendalen, west Norway, and the overwhelming of sixteen farms and extensive farmland by the Culbin Sands in Scotland in 1694, to the fourteenth-century loss to the sea by Christchurch, Canterbury, in England, of over a thousand acres of farmland, together with many oxen, cattle, and sheep. The human consequences of the Little Ice Age climate were particularly marked in highland regions and areas near the limits of cultivation. When summer temperatures declined and growing seasons shortened, both grass and cereal crops suffered, and upper limits of cultivation descended. The viability of upland farming decreased as the probability of harvest failure

increased. If harvests failed in successive years, leading to consumption of seed grain, the results were disastrous. Failure of the grass crop limited the number of cattle overwintered, thus decreasing the quantity of manure, then essential for successful arable farming. Farm desertion was especially common in Iceland and Scandinavia, though it was not confined to such northern regions. In Iceland migration out of the worst-affected north, in the seventeenth century, caused increased economic impoverishment in the south. Gradual decline in resource bases could increase sensitivity to other factors, including disease and unrelated economic problems, making the impact of a sequence of particularly hard years, such as occurred in the 1690s, much more serious. Crop failure was most dire in its effects if several staples were affected simultaneously, or if alternative supplies were unobtainable.

The human consequences of the Little Ice Age climate were generally coincident with other social and economic factors from which they have to be dis-

entangled if they are to be assessed. In the early fourteenth century the impact was enhanced, even in lowland areas of southern England, by the population growth that had been encouraged by the rarity of harvest failures in the preceding Medieval Warm Period. Sequences of adverse weather in Europe between 1314 and 1322, coinciding with the rapid advance of Swiss glaciers, had major economic and social effects, including famine, their severity varying from place to place and class to class. More resilient societies or those in prosperous regions, such as the Netherlands, were less affected. Even so, throughout the Little Ice Age much of Europe was indeed affected by a variety of extreme climatic episodes, some of which lasted for several years, even up to a decade.

EL NIÑO EVENTS AND SOCIOECONOMIC CRISES IN EUROPE

Most of the severest of these episodes were, in fact, global climate events that also impinged on Europe. These global events took place when a weak phase of the North Atlantic Oscillation (bringing cold high-pressure weather to Europe and central Asia) coincided with and reinforced a strong El Niño event. Such articulation created climatic episodes (Mega-Niños) that in Europe typically produced a very cold winter followed by a long cold spring and a summer of alternating extreme wet and dry periods. In southern Europe El Niño episodes often produced very severe drought, sometimes leading to famine, especially in Spain, Greece, the Mediterranean islands, and Turkey. El Niño events were also linked to disease epidemics across Europe, which exacerbated or prolonged existing crises. So, for example, between 1396 and 1408 Europe experienced a series of very cold winters, with sea ice persisting in the North Atlantic and preventing trade with Iceland and Greenland. These coincided with major drought events in Egypt and India. In 1630 global El Niño-induced droughts affected southern Europe, while Italy experienced serious plague mortality.

These global El Niño-related climate crises were especially frequent and severe between 1570 and 1740 and again between 1780 and 1900. They appear to have led to the kinds of economic crises that have long been collectively referred to as the “seventeenth-century crises” in European and Asian economic history. Examples of other El Niño-related global climatic crises that affected Europe took place in 1578–1579, 1694–1695, 1709, 1769–1771, 1782–1783, 1812, 1877–1879, and 1941. All of these involved severe winters followed by late springs, unusual sum-



THE “GREAT EL NIÑO” OF 1788–1795, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, AND THE CATALONIAN REVOLT OF 1787–1789

While further archival research is needed to characterize more fully the 1789–1793 event, the evidence of a strong global impact already indicates that it was one of the most severe El Niños recorded. In more temperate regions of the Northern Hemisphere, highly abnormal weather patterns were making themselves felt as early as 1788 in western Europe. There are some indications that an early precursor of the 1788–1793 event may have been an unusually cold winter in western Europe in 1787–1788, followed by a late and wet spring and then a summer drought, resulting in the severe crop failures that critically helped to stimulate the explosive social pressures that culminated in the French Revolution.

In France the hard winter and late, wet spring of 1787–1788 came at a time when free trade in grain had been allowed by an edict of the previous year, leading to empty granaries and a sharp increase in grain prices. Grain prices rose by about 50 percent—that is, the general price index rose from about 95 in late 1787 to 130 in the summer of 1789. The only peasants who profited from high prices were the big landowners and tenant farmers. The rest of the peasant population suffered severely from the rising price of bread. The small peasant who had to sell in order to pay his taxes and dues was short of grain by the end of the summer. The sharecropper, too, was hard-hit, and so was the day laborer who had to buy grain in order to feed his family. The dwindling of their resources also brought about a crisis in the vineyards of Champagne, Beaujolais, and the Bordelais: sales of wine were reduced because people gave up buying it in order to buy bread, and winegrowers were thus reduced to poverty. In fact, in many parts of France a previous drought, probably associated with an El Niño event of 1785, had already seriously damaged the vital winegrowing industry, especially in Normandy and Picardy. The drought of the summer of 1785 had resulted in heavy losses of livestock and a slump in the supply of wool. After 1785 the loss in disposable income led to a continuous slump in the sales of wine in parts of the country where much of the population had to buy its bread.

Warm, dry spring-summers are favorable to grain in northern France and northwestern Europe. But even in

the northern areas of the Paris basin warmth and dryness can in certain cases be disastrous. A spell of dry heat at a critical moment during the growth period, when the grain is still soft and moist and not yet hardened, can wither all hope of harvests in a few days. This is what happened in 1788, which had a good summer, early wine harvests, and bad grain harvests. The wheat shriveled, thus paving the way for the food crisis, the “great fear,” and the unrest of the hungry, when the time of the *sou-dure*, or bridging of the gap between harvests, came in the spring of 1789. No one expressed this fear better than the poor woman with whom Arthur Young walked up a hill in Champagne on a July day in 1789:

Her husband had a morsel of land, one cowe, and a poor litte horse, yet they had 42 ibs. of wheat and three chickens to pay as a quit-rent to one seigneur, and 168 ibs of oats, one chicken and one sou, to pay another, besides very heavy tailles and other taxes. She had 7 children, and the cow’s milk helped to make the soup. It was said at present that something was to be done by some great folks for such poor ones, but she did not know who or how, but God send us better, *car les tailles et les droits nous ecrasent*. (Young, 1950, p. 173)

These kinds of conditions led in late summer 1788 to what we can now see as the first serious rural unrest prior to the revolutionary movements of 1789. Serious unrest and small-scale rural revolts took place in the areas worst affected by the summer droughts, in Provence, Hainault, Cambresis, Picardy, the area to the south of Paris, eastward in Franch-Comte, around Lyons and Languedoc, and westward in Poitou and Brittany. So the extreme summer droughts and hailstorms of 1788 were decisive in their short-term effects. The conditions are well described in the journal of a peasant winegrower from near Meaux:

In the year 1788, there was no winter, the spring was not favorable to crops, it was cold in the spring, the rye was not good, the wheat was quite good but the too great heat shrivelled the kernels so that the grain harvest was so small, hardly a sheaf or a peck, so that it was put off, but the wine harvest was very good and very good wines, gathered at the end of September, the wine was worth 25 livres after the harvest and the wheat 24 livres after the harvest, on July 13 there was a cloud of hail which began the other side of Paris and crossed all of France as far as Picardy, it did great damage, the hail weighed 8 livres, it cut down wheat and trees in its path, its course was two leagues wide by fifty long, some horses were killed. (Le Roy Ladurie, 1972, p. 75)

This hailstorm burst over a great part of central France from Rouen in Normandy as far as Toulouse in the south. Thomas Blaikie, who witnessed it, wrote of stones so monstrous that they killed hares and partridge and

ripped branches from elm trees. The hailstorm wiped out budding vines in Alsace, Burgundy, and the Loire and laid waste to wheat fields in much of central France. Ripening fruit was damaged on the trees in the Midi and the Calvados regions. In the western province of the Beauce, the cereal crops had already survived one hailstorm on 29 May but succumbed to the second blow in July. Farmers south of Paris reported that, after July, the countryside had been reduced to an arid desert.

In much of France and Spain a prolonged drought with very high temperatures then took place. This was followed by the severest winter since 1709, which had also been a severe El Niño year, when the red Bordeaux was said to have frozen in Louis XIV’s goblet. Rivers froze throughout the country and wolves were said to descend from the Alps down into Languedoc. In the Tarn and the Ardeche men were reduced to boiling tree bark to make gruel. Birds froze on the perches or fell from the sky. Watermills froze in their rivers and thus prevented the grinding of wheat for desperately needed flour. Snow lay on the ground as far south as Toulouse until late April. In January Mirabeau visited Provence and wrote “Every scourge has been unloosed. Everywhere I have found men dead of cold and hunger, and that in the midst of wheat for lack of flour, all the mills being frozen.” Occasional thaws made the situation worse, and the Loire in particular burst its banks and flooded onto the streets of Blois and Tours.

All these winter disasters came on top of food shortages brought on by the droughts of the 1787 summer and the appalling harvests of summer 1788. As a result the price of bread doubled between summer 1787 and October 1788. By midwinter 1788, clergy estimated that a fifth of the population of Paris had become dependent on charitable relief of some sort. In the countryside landless laborers were especially affected. Exploitation of the dearth by grain traders and hoarders made the situation steadily worse. It was in this context that the French king requested communities throughout France to draw up *cahiers* of complaints and grievances to be presented in Paris. From February to April 1789 over twenty-five thousand *cahiers* were drawn up. From these we can not only assess the accumulation of long-term grievances but also get some idea of the intense dislocation of normal economic life that the extreme weather conditions of the 1780s and especially 1788–1789 had brought about. Decreasing access to common resources, timber shortages, excessive taxes, and gross income dis-

(continued on next page)

 THE “GREAT EL NIÑO OF 1788–1795” (continued)

parities were all compounded by bad weather, and together created the new political demands and anger that spilled over into active rebellion during 1789.

The excessive cold and food shortages of early 1789 soon overthrew any hesitation to break antipoaching laws or customs. Rabbits, deer, and other game were all slaughtered irrespective of ownership or regulation in many parts of France. Any gamekeepers or other symbols of authoritarian structures who opposed such actions were soon killed. Many sectors of the populace became accustomed to these kinds of resistance, which would soon develop into broader reaction and violent protest. Attacks on grain transports both on road and river followed the same pattern. Bakeries and granaries were also assaulted. Anger at the price of grain and bread in Paris soon found suitable targets for rioting and violence, particularly where the large population of rivermen and quayside laborers remained workless due to the Seine’s still being frozen by April. The riots at the Reveillon factory, in which many hundreds of fatalities took place, were an example of this, and set the stage for a growing cycle of revolutionary violence in Paris. A number of pamphlets printed at this time made the very specific point that the supply of bread should be the first object of the planned Estates General and that the very first duty of all true citizens was to “tear from the jaws of death your co-citizens who groan at the very doors of your assemblies.”

These connections between an accumulation of unusual and extreme weather events and popular rebellion were by no means confined to France. In Spain, the cold winter of 1788–1789 was, if anything, even more unusual than in France. Here too, persistent summer droughts were followed by a winter of intense cold and heavy snowfall. One observer wrote:

Autumn this year was colder than normal . . . and no one alive has ever experienced the weather so cold in El Prat. It was extraordinary, both what was observed and the effects it caused. . . . On the 30th and 31st December the wash of the waves on the beach froze which has also never been seen or heard of before. Likewise it was observed that the water froze in the washbasins in the cells where the nuns slept at the Religious Order of Compassion. . . . The rivers channels froze and the carriages passed over the ice without breaking it.

Between August 1788 and February 1789, cereal prices in Barcelona rose by 50 percent, in spite of the city’s being accessible by sea. Between February and

March 1789 there was a revolt in the city, known as Rebomboris de Pa. Part of the population set fire to the municipal stores and ovens. The authorities attempted to pacify the population by handing out provisions and taking special measures so that supplies could be sold at reasonable prices. The privileged classes, it is said, also provided money and contributions in kind to pacify the underprivileged. The military and police authorities adopted a passive attitude, letting events run their course. The authorities then took refuge in the two fortresses that controlled the city, and powerful defenses were put up in case events got out of control. Despite these measures chaotic rioting took place, and in the aftermath six people were executed. Similar riots took place on other parts of Catalonia when the poor outlook for the 1789 harvest became clear and profiteers and hoarders made their appearance. Revolts and emergency actions by municipal authorities took place both on the coast and inland, with documentary reports being made in cities such as Vic, Mataro, and Tortosa. The fact that these social responses to cold and crop failure did not lead to the same degree of social turmoil and rebellion as in France should not disguise the fact that they were highly unusual.

In the summer of 1789 much of France rose in revolt, and crowds rioted in cities. How far the resulting course of revolution had its roots in the anomalous climatic situation of the period is open to debate, but the part played by extreme weather events in bringing about social disturbance during the French Revolution simply cannot be neglected. It may be, as Alexis de Tocqueville put it, that had these responses to anomalous climatic events not occurred, “the old social edifice would have none the less fallen everywhere, at one place sooner, at another later; only it would have fallen piece by piece, instead of collapsing in a single crash” (Tocqueville, 1952, p. 96). One of the advantages in trying to understand the French Revolution in terms of the succession of prior climatic stresses is that it contextualizes it, rather than isolating it as a historical phenomenon. To quote Tocqueville again, “The French Revolution will only be the darkness of night to those who see it in isolation; only the times which preceded it will give the light to illuminate it” (Tocqueville, 1952, p. 249). Today one can merely speculate. But the fact is that the whole social edifice of ancien régime France did collapse at a single blow, in the midst of one of the worst El Niño episodes of the millennium.

mer conditions, and harvest failures. Sometimes, as in the severe conditions associated with military retreats from Moscow in 1812 and 1941, the political consequences were incalculable. In 1878–79 El Niño conditions led to a series of crop failures in Europe that have sometimes been referred to as the “great agricultural depression.” However, possibly the most extended and serious El Niño event to affect Europe in the last six hundred years was the “Great El Niño” of 1788–1795. Reconstruction of the effects of this climatic episode is instructive in understanding how other major El Niño events might have affected Europe in earlier periods.

THE CLEARANCE OF THE WOODLAND IN EUROPE AFTER 1300

The deforestation of the European plain after 1100 was, wrote Karl Gottfried Lamprecht, the great deed of the German people in the Middle Ages. In all its complexity it has attracted an enormous literature. But over most of central and western Europe agrarian effort had passed its maximum by 1300, and the great age of expanding arable land was succeeded in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by one of stagnation and contraction. Much of this decline may have been due to increasingly severe weather conditions after the onset of the Little Ice Age and to the associated incidence of famine (especially in 1315–1317) and episodes of disease, including the Black Death. During the hundred years between 1350 and 1450 this decline was still more marked. The causes of this recession are obscure and involved, and among the agencies invoked to explain it are the destruction caused by war, great pestilences, falling prices, and a basic decline in population. Abandoned holdings and depopulated or deserted villages were to be found not only in the “old lands” of the south and west but also in Mecklenberg, Pomerania, Brandenburg and Prussia. In the south and west of Germany the acreage of these abandoned lands, or *Wüstungen*, has been placed as high as one-half of the area once cultivated; the statistical reduction for Germany as a whole has been placed at 25 percent. These figures probably overemphasize the contraction because some abandoned holdings may represent no more than temporary withdrawals or changes in use of land; but, when all reservations are made, the decline is still striking.

To what extent the woods advanced upon the untilled fields we cannot say, but there is no doubt that they did in many places, and traces of former cultivation are to be found in wooded areas even today. The abandonment took place at various dates, but in the main it is a medieval phenomenon. Com-

paratively recently it has been shown how many large forests in Germany have come into being since the Middle Ages. From such evidence as this we must not assume that the area under cultivation was at one time greater than it is today, because the phenomenon may in part be due to the more complete separation of forest and farmland. But more investigation is necessary before we can be clear about these matters. The ravages of war and pillage bore particularly hard upon some localities. The cultivated land that had been brought into being in Bohemia was very adversely affected by the Hussite wars (1419–1436), and it has been estimated that one-sixth of the population either perished or left the country. In the west Thomas Basin, the bishop of Lisieux, writing about 1440, described that vast extent of uncultivated land between the Somme and the Loire as all “overgrown with brambles and bushes.” Population fell in places to one-half, even to one-third, of its former level. Some of the accounts may have been exaggerated, but there is no doubt about the widespread desolation and about the growth of wood on the untilled fields. In southwest France, in Saintonge, between the Charente and the Dordogne, for a long time people said that “the forests came back to France with the English.”

The clearing that had taken place in the Middle Ages, epic though it was, still left western and central Europe with abundant tracts of wood. But soon, in the sixteenth century, in many places there were complaints about a shortage of timber, and the shortage developed into a problem that occupied the attention of statesmen and publicists for many centuries. It was not only that the woods were becoming smaller but that the demand for timber was growing greater. There had been signs toward the end of the fifteenth century that the recession in the economic life of the late Middle Ages was merging into a recovery and a new prosperity that brought with it an ever increasing appetite for wood. The pace of industrial life was quickening. Glassworks and soapworks needed more and more wood ash. The production of tin, lead, copper, iron, and coal depended upon timber for pit props and charcoal for fuel; the salt industry in the Tirol and elsewhere also needed wood for evaporating the brine. It was the iron industry that made the greatest demand, and, particularly in the wooded valleys of the upland blocks of France and central Europe, an endless series of small metal establishments were to be found, often run by men who divided their labors between forge and field. As the clearing progressed, the huts of the charcoal burners moved from one locality to another, and there appeared new mounds of small logs, covered with clay to prevent too rapid a combustion.

Early fears of timber shortage in England were expressed in a commission appointed in 1548 to inquire into the destruction of the wood in the iron-making area of the Weald. But this commission and a number of parliamentary acts passed during the sixteenth century failed to slow the rate of destruction. The resulting shortages encouraged the search for a substitute, so that during the seventeenth century ironworkers were encouraged to turn to coal instead of charcoal, following the lead of domestic urban consumption, especially in London. In 1709 Abraham Darby started to smelt ore with coke at Ironbridge in Shropshire, and by 1750 the use of coal for smelting had become common. These kinds of transitions took longer to take place on the Continent, where the supply of wood was much greater and industry less developed. But shortages were being felt. In France, Jean-Baptiste Colbert introduced strictures on forest-cutting in 1669, and in 1715 attempts were made to limit the number of forges.

The increase in French and English trade and shipbuilding in the context of overseas expansion

started to impose a new scale of demand for timber during the seventeenth century. The Dutch Wars of the seventeenth century, the maritime wars of the eighteenth, and then the Napoleonic Wars were a heavy pressure on timber resources. By the time of the English diarist Samuel Pepys in the second half of the seventeenth century, the crisis in supply had already developed and a worldwide search for new sources began in the Baltic and Scandinavia, India, North America, and South Africa. After the English Restoration the Royal Society commissioned John Evelyn to study the problem, and in October 1662 he presented his recommendations in *Sylva, or a Discourse of Forest Trees*, starting a series of attempts at replacement tree planting and encouraging attempts to slow down deforestation in Europe.

Throughout the period from about 1500 to 1900 agricultural production intensified, leading to several new phases of deforestation and wetland drainage. Some of this expansion led to soil erosion in upland regions, especially in central France and the Alps. However, in Germany the population losses resulting

from the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) may have prevented the level of deforestation that took place in much of the rest of Europe. By contrast, during the eighteenth century large clearances took place on the Polish plain, the Slovakian uplands, and the Carpathians. Despite this, the development of forest conservation systems in a number of countries meant that as late as 1900 substantial forested areas remained in Europe. In 1900 about 18 percent of Belgium was wooded, 19 percent of France, 27 percent of Germany, 23 percent of Poland, 37 percent of Austria, 33 percent of Czechoslovakia, 29 percent each for Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and 28 percent for Romania. On the Hungarian plains the level was only 11 percent. However, the forest present in 1900 was very different in character from the dense natural woodland of a millenium before. It had been repeatedly cut over, managed, and replanted, much of it with conifer rather than deciduous species, and had become plantation rather natural woodland. Large areas of previously unforested sandy soils were reclaimed by artificial planting in the Kempenland of Belgium, the Landes region in France, Breckland in Britain, and on sand dune regions of the German Baltic coast.

In eastern and northern Europe, and in Russia, the transitional forest steppe was extensively deforested by colonists moving southward during the seventeenth century. After 1478 the expansion of the

trading interests of Novgorod had ensured extensive deforestation. Even so, eighteenth-century Muscovy was still essentially one large forest, with infrequent clearings for villages and towns. Metallurgical industries founded under Peter the Great increased the rate of clearance. Further north, rotational burning and cultivation were practiced in Finland and parts of Sweden until World War I. After 1918 many of these northern forests were turned over to industrial wood production.

Since World War I the decline in forested area has largely been halted due to increasingly stringent forest reservation, the increased use of fossil fuels, and the decline in rural population and peasant agriculture. Since about 1960 some parts of Europe have actually experienced an increase in noncultivated marginal land and woodland as small-scale agriculture became less economic and state subsidies for upland and peasant agriculture fell away.

NEW CROPS AND SOIL EROSION

Much of the initial impetus for forest clearance after 1500 resulted from a demographic transition enabled to a large extent by an intensification of agricultural production fostered by new agricultural methods and the introduction of non-European crops, especially

from the Americas. The most important of these were maize and the potato. Maize spread quickly after the Columbian voyages; in 1498 Columbus noted that “there is now a lot of it in Castile.” By 1530 it was grown throughout Iberia, North Africa, and the Middle East, spread by Muslim refugees fleeing persecution. Population pressure in southern Europe may have encouraged the spread of maize in the sixteenth century, but it spread rapidly in France and elsewhere only during the climatic and economic crises of the seventeenth century. In Burgundy and southern France maize entered the food cycle in the same era, and by 1700 it was growing in every district south of a line from Bordeaux to Alsace and was the chief food of the poor peasant. In Italy the cultivation of maize rose after the plague and famine of the 1630s. Major rises in population in the eighteenth century in Spain (from 7.5 million in 1650 to 11.5 million in 1800), France, and Italy were accompanied by formidable rises in the areas of maize under cultivation. During the century maize production spread to eastern Europe in the Danube basin and into Russia. The population of Iberia, Italy, and the Balkans doubled to 70 million from 1800 to 1900, much of it sustained by a maize staple. These extraordinary expansions in maize plantings and population brought about widespread environmental damage and soil depletion throughout southern Europe.

The rise of the potato was even more dramatic than that of maize, especially in northern Europe. In the wetter maritime north, wheat and rye were at the northern end of their range and prey to molds and fungi, frequently producing ergotism and other diseases. Enormous population rises in such countries as Ireland and Norway were enabled by the potato. However, this kind of crop innovation, as well as encouraging a dangerous dependence on a single crop (a dependence that culminated in the Irish famines of the 1840s and 1850s), also produced severe soil degradation. As early as 1674 gullying and soil erosion were being reported from the Moravian states, leading to claims for tax remissions. Some of these instances may have been related to excessive heavy rains and snowmelt in and after severe Little Ice Age winters. But new crops such as maize and potatoes provided very little protection for soils and made them vulnerable to extreme rainfall events. A number of systematic surveys of soil conditions took place in France during the eighteenth century. Typically hundreds of *cahiers de doléances* written in the 1790s deal with soil erosion as a major hazard even in areas of relatively slight topography such as Champagne and Lorraine. Consciousness of erosion hazards also led to popular rural protests against private forest cutting. As con-

solidation of landholdings took place in many parts of France, Germany, and Britain during the late eighteenth century and large fallow fields were planted with new crops, the incidence of serious soil erosion quickly increased.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATION AND ENVIRONMENTALISM, 1600–1900

The environmental changes brought about in Europe by deforestation, agricultural intensification, industrialization, and urbanism after 1400 were unprecedented in world history. But the structured social reactions and narratives that those changes engendered were also remarkable. Regulations and legislation attempting to address smoke pollution problems in cities date back to the fourteenth century in a number of parts of Europe. In the seventeenth century John Evelyn was a vociferous critic of coal smoke pollution in London. Rapid urban growth was an initial reason for stress on the wider resources of the European countryside, especially in the growing demands of cities for fuelwood in the period between 1500 and 1750, when fossil fuels started to become more important. Throughout Europe a variety of local regulatory systems governed the use of some woodland areas by local communities. In countries such as the Netherlands and England, where the proportion of wooded land had been small since late Roman times, these regulations were often elaborate and involved heavy penalties.

Statewide attempts at forest conservation were stimulated less by domestic demand and more by shortages of strategically important ship timber or by the needs of mines and metal, glass, or other mineral-working industries, especially in the context of what Joan Thirsk has called the protoindustrial revolution. Some early attempts at large-scale forest protection to ensure timber supply rather than for traditional hunting reserves were made in south Germany, especially in Nürnberg, as early as 1309 under the Nürnberg Ordinance. But it was in the territories of the Venetian Republic that attempts at state forest conservation were first begun in Europe, especially after the Venetian defeat in the sea battle of Euboea in 1470. Shipbuilding and glassworking in Venice consumed huge amounts of wood. Venetians also recognized that deforestation and soil erosion were silting up the lagoon of Venice. However, attempts to restrict local timber cutting in the vital ship-timber forests of Montello brought the state into direct and long-term conflict with the local population. The failure of Venetian conservation measures contributed to the decline of

Venice and its displacement by maritime powers that had easier access to relatively unworked forests. The kind of crisis that Venice experienced was delayed in Britain, for example, as it started to draw on the Irish forests for industrial and naval sustenance, while the Netherlands, another precocious maritime power, drew on the Norwegian forests.

By the mid-seventeenth century even England, France, and the Netherlands were compelled to adopt much more stringent forest regulations for strategic reasons. In France Colbert was compelled to declare a temporary moratorium on timber getting in 1661 as a prelude to his famous Forest Ordinance of 1669. This ordinance set in place a governance for French forests that subsisted well into the nineteenth century and was widely imitated in Europe. By the mid-seventeenth century, too, the combined effects of population pressure, timber demands, and agricultural intensification were leading to serious social contests over lands and forests in many parts of Europe. In Cambridgeshire, England, riots broke out in the 1660s when attempts were made to fell local woodlands. Large-scale capital projects to drain the East Anglian Fenland were also vigorously opposed by those who saw their grazing and common-property rights threatened. These contests became sharper as states became more involved in attempts to conserve forests, enclose commons, and drain wetlands and marshes. In France, for example, the twenty-two thousand hectare Forêt de Chaux was the scene of increasingly savage battles after the 1750s between fifty-four villages that held customary forest rights and forest guards employed by the state to safeguard supplies for a growing number of rural industries. These contests, before and after the French Revolution, became increasingly violent, lasting until the 1870s and sometimes involving assassination attempts on forest guards.

The chaotic conditions of the French Revolution had themselves produced significant ecological changes. Believing themselves released from feudal and state regulation, rural people, especially in south-east France, embarked on an orgy of deforestation, much of it on steep mountain slopes. The disastrous torrents, floods, and landslides that this felling brought about led in turn to a body of conservationist and engineering literature and opinion that formed much of the foundation of the sophisticated French forest conservation movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, reinforced by a German forest conservation ideology that was already well developed by the late nineteenth century in the works of men such as Jean Fabre (1797) and Michel Blanqui (1846). Similar moves toward both forest conservation and higher intensity of land use developed in most European

countries during the period between 1670 and 1870, especially in the latter part of the period.

Landscapes were also increasingly transformed or modified for reasons of prestige and ornament, especially in England, France, and Italy. Some of them echoed the landscapes of tropical colonies and oceanic islands or romanticized wildernesses. In England and Italy artificially drained landscapes became the subject of elaborate planning projects and of early exercises in agricultural economic theory.

Interest in the aesthetics of the rural landscape in metropolitan France and Britain was already well developed by the end of the eighteenth century, as the writings of John Clare, Robert Southey, Thomas Gilpin, and others demonstrate. Poets such as Clare were deeply sensitive to the social and landscape traumas wrought by enclosure, while William Blake wrote of the "dark satanic mills" and William Wordsworth and the Lake Poets and their imitators fed notions of the romantic sublime to be found in wild landscapes to an increasingly receptive urban public. Much of the inspiration for these powerful sensibilities originated in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Bernardin de St. Pierre, many of which were deeply hostile to the Enlightenment project and its implications and, in the case of the latter writer, were rooted in the circumstances of the colonial experience, specifically on the island of Mauritius. The rise of what the British literary critic Raymond Williams called the "green language" corresponded to the emotional commitment that had developed in relation to the threat perceived to the old landscape pattern in the context of the industrialization of agriculture, a phenomenon explored especially well in the novels of Thomas Hardy. As early as the 1840s what had been a minority interest at the time of John Clare had flowered into a major literary cult. Sir Robert Peel, for example, collected wild landscape paintings and frequently commented on the solace they offered him. In spite of this, when individuals did campaign against landscape despoliation by the forces of capital and the spread of railways, mines, and urban housing, they were largely unsuccessful, as the campaigns of William Wordsworth testify. Concerns about species extinctions in Europe developed much later than the preoccupation with rural landscape. The efforts made by Charles Waterton to turn his private estate into a nature reserve were an interesting precedent and an indication of the level of awareness of human destructive potential that had developed, in Britain at least, by the 1840s.

Embryonic worries about the destruction of rural landscapes and about species extinctions remained the concern of a largely ineffective minority until the 1860s, however. Only the cause of animal protection,

strongly advocated by the Quakers, had resulted in serious legislation. This was a cause closely associated with antislavery campaigning and was strongly identified with an emerging urban public health and housing movement in several European countries. In 1842 the publication of Sir Edwin Chadwick's "Inquiry into the Sanitary Condition of the Laboring Population of Great Britain" highlighted the need to radically reform the environments of the new overcrowded, disease-ridden, and polluted cities. This and similar initiatives in France, Germany, and Italy helped to stimulate the growth of wider environmental reform movements, many of which took a long time to come to fruition. In the 1840s serious efforts also began to reduce the industrial pollution that was making many European rivers lifeless.

After the mid-nineteenth century the sheer scale of the transformation and modernization of the landscape invigorated an already nascent conservation movement that had many of its roots among French and English painters and artists as well as in statist moves toward forest and water conservation. The publication of two books, Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (1859) and George Perkins Marsh's *Man and Nature* (1864), highlighted the role played by extinctions in the affairs of men and appear to have stimulated early environmentalism in a very profound way.

In England the first environmental lobby group, the Commons Preservation Society, founded in 1865, originated in a movement to protect the London Commons, threatened by enclosure, railway building, gravel extraction, and urban expansion. This group, headed by Quakers, biologists, urban liberals, lawyers, and feminists (among others), encouraged in turn the formation of the National Trust in 1891, an organization dedicated to the conservation of historic buildings and landscapes. The National Trust became a global model for future environmental organizations and provided much of the impetus for conservation in twentieth-century Britain. As far as species protection was concerned, the British Birds Protection Act of 1868 was a pioneer in Europe, and the brainchild of Alfred Newton, a close associate of Charles Darwin. Newton had made a careful study of the natural history of the great auk, a flightless seabird that had become extinct in the late 1840s. He had also been particularly influenced by the researches of his brother Edward Newton on the paleontology of the dodo, on Mauritius.

The nineteenth century saw important innovations in European environmental history, in two senses. First, new forms of environmental degradation occurred as a result of urban growth—with its atten-

dant sewage and other issues—and industrial development, which created new levels of air and water pollution. These problems were particularly acute in areas around industrial cities, and urban waterways, especially, became increasingly foul. In the face of these developments, however, and due to independent cultural factors, a more explicit environmental concern arose as well. In the nineteenth century itself environmental reform was mainly associated with beautification movements such as those which promoted the establishment of urban parks. Though limited in scope and objectives, these reform movements provided a basis for the development of the more sweeping environmental regulations characteristic of the twentieth century, which managed to undo some of the worst consequences of industrialization in western Europe.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: RESPONDING TO OLD AND NEW HAZARDS

Although many of the environmental impacts of industrialization and agricultural intensification continued to develop in a more extensive way in the twentieth century, many aspects of artificially induced environmental change after 1900 were almost entirely new. So, necessarily, was the strength of the environmentalist reaction to the systemic changes that now appeared; small-scale environmental lobby groups became mass movements and eventually even political parties. Nevertheless, the twin sources of environmental change, especially destructive change, were the same as they had been in the previous two centuries. For the first half of the century, European human populations continued to expand. Second, human economic activity continued to accelerate and to substitute inanimate for animate energy. Since 1850 the burning of coal, oil, and natural gas has released some 270 billion tons of carbon into the air in the form of heat-trapping carbon dioxide. At least half of this amount derived from combustion that took place in Europe, although the relative European contribution since about 1980 has been somewhat reduced. Between 1900 and 2000 carbon dioxide outputs from Europe increased by approximately thirteenfold, and energy use expanded by about sixteen times. The atmospheric changes generated by the new scale of outputs of "greenhouse" gases are now thought to have substantially increased rates of global warming since about 1870. The end of the Little Ice Age in about 1900 has itself brought about a considerable natural cyclical warming, although the relative extents of these

dynamics remain unknown. The twentieth century was also marked by the rapid industrialization of Russia and other parts of Eastern Europe through ambitious, often forced programs of industrial development. Lacking in capital but eager, for economic and military reasons, to bring their countries to Western levels of industrialization, communist regimes proved impatient with environmental concerns. The consequences for Eastern Europe included rampant pollution, chemical and otherwise.

Unlike most of the rest of the world, however, the noncultivated, especially scrub and forest, area of Europe has started to increase instead of declining. The switchover in this process took place just prior to World War II. From 1860 to 1919, 27 million hectares of land were converted to arable use, of which at least half was woodland and the other half grassland and wetland. But from 1920 to 1978, only 14 million hectares were converted to arable use, while 12 million hectares moved out of arable use, much of it back into forest, with a certain amount to industrial-urban use. Some of the most rapid parts of this reversal took place in marginal land in upland regions and in the economically marginal parts of southern Europe and the Mediterranean islands, as a rural-urban drift of peasantries took place to cities in Europe and outside it. The advent of the European Common Market and (later) Union may have temporarily slowed this move away from arable land use. Despite the slowdown in conversion to arable land, many old-growth forests were still clear-cut in Europe in the second half of the century, especially in England.

The two most destructive and significant kinds of environmental change have been the rise in industrial, chemical, and nuclear pollution of air and waters, and the deaths and pollution caused by the massive growth in vehicles powered by internal combustion engines. Indeed, it is the use of oil fuel that has created the most significant changes in environmental quality and quality of life in the twentieth century. The largest site of air and water pollution in Europe was the Ruhr basin in Germany, the biggest industrial region of Europe. Between 1870 and 1910 the region grew rapidly, both industrially and as a pollution source for both human and industrial waste. By 1906 the Emscher River had become an open sewage canal seventy miles in length. Industrial pollution, the worst in the world by 1914, was checked only by the impact of postwar reparations in 1923. It was then that the pioneering Siedlungsverband-Ruhrkohlenbezirk (Ruhr coal district settlement association) stepped in to try to save the remaining woods and trees from pollution damage and to attempt to control further growth of the region. In 1928

the damage caused by acid rain was first announced and propagandized, as the beginning of a long fight against acid rain and other industrial pollution in Germany that has lasted to the present day, but which was only revived in the period since World War II by Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1969.

The spread of the automobile in western Europe in the 1920s and 1930s led to the development of arterial road systems and low-density urban sprawl that quickly reached into the countryside, along coasts, and beside seaside resorts. The growth was most rapid in Britain, where road-served suburbs spread rapidly west and south of London and along once beautiful parts of the Sussex coast. Similar developments took place on the outskirts of large cities such as Berlin, Paris, and Rotterdam. In England these unsightly and uncontrolled developments, driven jointly by car ownership and land speculation, soon led to an outcry in favor of planning control and "green belt" legislation, led by such organizations as the Council for the Preservation of Rural England and propagandized in books such as *Britain and the Beast*, edited by John Maynard Keynes in 1937. World War II temporarily ended these interwar conservation campaigns against the effects of the automobile. However, the impact of wartime planning psychology, especially in Britain, quickly led in the postwar period to the innovative and extensive growth of a government conservation and planning bureaucracy in the form of the Nature Conservancy and the Town and Country Planning Act, both legislated in 1949 to systematize a nationwide form of conservation and planning control.

Increasing anxieties over pesticide use and industrial pollution surfaced strongly in the late 1950s all over Europe, influenced to some extent by a parallel campaign against nuclear weapons, epitomized in England by the Aldermaston marches. Government and nongovernment organizations now started to collaborate to some extent in framing new legislation to control long-standing pollution risks. In England public anger at government failure to control London "smogs" peaked in the mid-1950s after a run of winters in which over four thousand people, mainly elderly, had died directly from the effects of air pollutants made from a cocktail of coal-fired power station emissions and petro- and diesel-chemical exhausts. The wholesale closure of the London tramway system in 1951 and the introduction of thousands of new diesel buses had seriously exacerbated the problem. Strict controls on coal burning and the Clean Air Acts of the late 1950s partially solved the problem; the episode also alerted European governments to a rising tide of public environmental awareness. In Germany a growing concern developed during the 1970s about

developing in the 1960s. The risks from nuclear energy became a particular focus of attention for the emerging environmental movement. However, a very internationalist interest in saving endangered animal species, especially the whale, and in protecting tropical rainforests started to characterize European environmentalism. During the 1970s these preoccupations were transmuted into overtly political interests and specifically into the Green political parties, which by 1990 were present in every European country.

The Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Ukraine in 1986 was a watershed in this respect. Green movements had been one of the few modes through which any form of political protest could take place behind the Iron Curtain. The failure of the state that the Chernobyl incident symbolized was a vital constituent of the decline in credibility of the communist governments in Eastern Europe and Russia during the 1980s. But the accumulation of evidence of the wholesale failure of the communist states to regulate pollution exerted an aftereffect that was not confined to the East. It also helped to destroy the last shreds of the popular European confidence in science that had flourished in the immediate postwar period in the West, and contributed to popular mistrust in the ability of conventional political parties and governments to protect the European environment, the climate, and the quality of life of European citizens. An initial result of this new level of distrust was the emergence of a far more confrontational style of radical environmental politics. Groups such as Earth First! (which had originated in the United States) and the loose coalitions that made up European antiroads movements began in the 1990s to fight through low-level, prolonged, and largely nonviolent direct actions against road-building and airport projects. These coalitions modeled themselves on activist animal protection groups and, more importantly, on resistance groups such as the Greenham Common Women, who had fought so apparently successfully against the installation of cruise nuclear missiles in eastern England. It remains to be seen whether these kinds of activist environmental groupings will be successful in encouraging European governments to move closer to the agendas of radical environmentalism. The failure of most European governments to move away from the established models of growth economies and continued erosion of habitats and biodiversity do not augur well in this respect.

the effects of acid rain. This kind of pollution had cross-border impacts throughout central Europe and crystallized many of the concerns of a powerful new green movement now headed, significantly, by a woman, Petra Kelly.

Europewide student and labor protests in 1968, associated partly with the anti-Vietnam War movement and partly with structural and political problems especially endemic to France, had already given a major boost to the environmental movement. In the years after 1968 such movements as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth articulated European and North American environmentalist themes and reflected the growth of a mass movement that had already been

See also **The Annales Paradigm** (*volume 1*); **Protoindustrialization** (*in this volume*); **The Industrial Revolutions** (*in this volume*); **Urbanization** (*in this volume*); **Agri-**

culture (in this volume); *New Social Movements* (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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MIGRATION



Leslie Page Moch

Human mobility has been fundamental to European societies throughout their histories, yet the role it has played has changed with each era. By the eighteenth century, the social organization of migration took recognizable forms that remain useful in observing migration through to the twenty-first century.

Coerced migrations oust people from home against their will (for example, enslaved Africans and persecuted European Protestants) and forbid their return.

Settler migrations move people (like the English settlers in North America) far from home who were unlikely—but not completely unable—to return.

Career migrations move people at the will of their employers, who determine the movement and the possibility of return home (for example, Spanish and Portuguese Jesuit priests in Central America and Brazil).

Chain migrations link people from a common hometown or village with a particular destination. Operating through human contacts, especially people from home who, once settled at the destination, would help newcomers, this may be the most common organization of migration in peacetime history.

Circular migrations are undertaken by people who mean to return home after a period of time (such as their years as a servant or apprentice in town or their months away at seasonal harvest work).

Local migrations keep movers (like the bride from a neighboring village or worker born in the outskirts of the city) close to familiar faces and routines.

Although both men and women moved, migration was distinct for each sex. More men than women left Europe for the Americas until the twentieth century; moreover, men dominated the large teams of migrant harvesters that circulated through regions in the summers. Most migrants were young, single peo-

ple, and men and women almost always worked at different occupations—this meant that they often chose different destinations, and even in a large city with work for all, young women were often domestic servants while young men were apprentices or laborers. Because women were more likely to travel short distances to marry or to work as servants, women may have actually been more likely to leave home than young men. In addition, noneconomic motives for migration, such as marriage, family difficulties, and a pregnancy to keep secret played a more significant role for women than for men.

LATE MIDDLE AGES AND THE RENAISSANCE

European society in the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance was primarily rural, yet people were not immobile. Indeed, inquiry into rural mobility has substantially changed our view of European rural history. Trade, exchanges of land, and human relations dictated certain kinds of movements. This remained the case for the coming centuries, to varying degrees. Beggars and pedlars brought news to isolated villages; peasants bought and sold property and moved in freeholding areas. In addition, merchants moved across long distances products that eventually reached elites everywhere: leather from central Spain, wool from England, cloth from Flanders, metals from central German areas, furs and timber from Scandinavia, grain from the north-central European plain, olive oil from the Mediterranean littoral. Finally, social life and church marriage regulations meant that men and women often sought mates outside the confines of their village.

The Protestant Reformation, beginning in 1517, opened a period of wars, repressions, and feuds that marked patterns of mobility. The Peasant Revolt of 1524–1525 marked the beginning of religiously based conflicts that developed into civil wars, the French Wars of Religion, the Dutch Revolt, and the Thirty

Years' War (1618–1648), all of which emptied out regions, destroying farmlands and families. In addition, religious struggles led Protestant refugees—the Huguenots—to seek shelter in safe havens such as Calvin's Geneva, England, or the Netherlands. Intolerance moved people through the end of the seventeenth century; when Louis XIV terminated tolerance for Protestants by revoking the Edict of Nantes in 1685, for example, some 160,000 Protestants are estimated to have fled France.

With the European—initially Iberian—explorations of the sixteenth century, Spain and Portugal sent thousands of people (almost all men) across the Atlantic and Indian oceans as soldiers, seamen, priests, and traders. As the spice trade with India developed into the extraction of gold and silver in Mexico and Peru, more Europeans went to seek their fortune and many died abroad. These early explorations had two consequences for the mobility of European peoples. First, the seaports thrived; port cities such as Seville and Lisbon grew as they attracted seamen and potential expatriates from surrounding regions. In addition, men and women served as artisans and servants in these unusually prosperous cities; they came from the regions surrounding the seaports as well as from farther afield. Thus, even the earliest European explorations set off movements within Europe.

This is also true of the trade with Africa, which began as a gold trade under Portuguese auspices in the fifteenth century. This trade turned to a trade in enslaved Africans sold initially to work the mines and

sugar plantations of the Americas. To date this was the largest single coerced migration in human history. About 8 million enslaved Africans arrived in the Americas before 1820, dwarfing the 2.3 million Europeans who by then had crossed the Atlantic. At least 9.5 million enslaved Africans arrived between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. About half of these went to the Caribbean, a third to Brazil, and only about 6 percent to what became the United States. Not until 1840 did more Europeans than Africans cross the Atlantic.

Nonetheless, the empires and explorations of early modern Europe increasingly affected seaports, small towns, and villages as the Iberian empires gave way in importance to those of the Dutch, English, and French. Both London and Amsterdam, for example, grew fivefold between 1550 and 1650, and more than doubled in the seventeenth century. Amsterdam was fed by people fleeing the Spanish Netherlands after 1550, and its imperial trade attracted immigrants from Germany and Norway as well as rural Dutch. A third of the people married in Amsterdam in the seventeenth century and one fourth of the eighteenth-century marriage partners were from outside the Dutch Republic. Many were Norwegian seamen, but German immigrants were most important: over 28,000 German men married in the city in these centuries, and over 19,000 German women. Many newcomers joined the ranks of seamen, but others—like the German women who were domestic servants—joined the labor force of the

booming seaport. The same is true of London: it grew despite being the departure point for thousands of sailors, colonials, and indentured servants in the seventeenth century; moreover, it was the most important vocational training center for apprentices from throughout England as well as the workplace for young women servants and seamstresses from the surrounding regions. Thus, the early European empires affected not only world political and economic patterns, but also patterns of migration and settlement within the continent. Often, the number of people who entered the city far outnumbered its actual increase in population for two reasons: first, many subsequently went to sea as sailors, indentured servants, traders, or adventurers, never to return; second, many worked in the city and then left again to return home or to try another destination. Turnover and temporary migration were incalculably important to early modern cities.

Aside from the mobility affected by overseas exploration and settlement, the European continent was enlivened by continuing patterns of chain migration, circular migration, and local migrations that stirred the countryside and fueled cities. Many more people moved within Europe than left its shores. Chain migrations linked towns and villages to regional and national capitals as, for example, a sister joined her domestic servant sibling in town or village construction workers joined their experienced compatriots in a growing capital. Circular migrations not only sent workers—and elites—to cities and home again, but also organized harvest work. Local migrations characterized most marriage markets and land transfers.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Two shifts modified the ongoing migration patterns in the eighteenth century. First, around 1750 the population began to grow throughout Europe in a trend that continued until the late twentieth century. In the 1750–1800 period alone, the population increased by 34 percent. Earlier marriage and fewer disastrous epidemics (such as the bubonic plague) meant that more children survived to need work and food; households and villages were fuller than they had been since the fourteenth century. At the same time, the production of goods in domestic settings—called rural industry, domestic industry, or cottage industry—expanded dramatically, increasing to unprecedented volumes as villagers produced products such as yarn, thread, silk, linen, cotton, ship nails, socks, watches, lace, and shoes in their homes. These fundamental

demographic and economic developments affected migration so that two distinct patterns of geographic mobility emerged.

On one hand, rural industry enabled villages, small towns, and certain urban centers to thrive—those that coordinated, finished, and exported domestic products. Precisely the small towns that coordinated this production were the kinds of urban areas to grow in this period, and industrial villages also attracted and retained people more than others. Many rural workers were women because the production of lace and fabric depended on women's work. The Austrian cotton firm Schwechat illustrates the size and composition of the labor force: in 1752, 408 workers worked in and around Vienna finishing cloth, 49 distributed raw material, 436 wove cloth (men's work), and 5,655 women were spinners. Rural production had the general effect of supporting people in industrial regions at home.

On the other hand, not all members of the new generations of the eighteenth century were supported by local economies. For more people, leaving home to work became routine. Indeed, by the end of the eighteenth century, seasonal, circular mobility expanded. In western and southern Europe, seven massive migration systems engaged at least 20,000 people each by 1800, most of whom were men. The greatest number of workers in the north traveled to the Paris basin where harvest work in the Ile-de-France and the city created a double attraction; they came from throughout France to work as laborers, traders, and harvest workers. The system that brought men to Holland was next most important, including up to 30,000 men at its peak; they came from Germany and France to work as sailors, servants, and harvesters. A third system in the north brought some 20,000 people to work in London and the home counties; from Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, they divided between urban laborers and harvest workers. The largest system in the south drew about 100,000 workers per year to Corsica, Rome, and Italy's central plain; harvest workers in vineyards and wheatfields and construction workers hailed primarily from Italy's mountainous provinces. The Po Valley engaged about 50,000 people; mountain-dwellers came to its rice fields and construction sites in Turin and Milan. Madrid and Castile attracted not only 60,000 workers from Galicia in northwest Spain, but also an army of upland French; these two groups of workers performed urban work as well as grain harvesting. Finally, the Mediterranean littoral, from northeastern Spain to Provence in eastern France, brought some 35,000 people out of the highlands every year to harvest grain and grapes, and to perform tasks in Barcelona and Marseille. These

seven systems were essential to the workings of eighteenth-century European economies, and forecast future systems of circular migration by their size and importance.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

During the one hundred years between the fall of Napoleon and the opening shots of World War I (1815–1914), demographic and economic shifts again reshaped patterns of human mobility. The first of these is the astonishing growth of the population of Europe. The population of 187 million in 1800 grew to 468 million by 1913, increasing 42 percent in the first half of the century and another 76 percent by World War I. Behind this population growth lay high birth-rates, a decrease in deaths from disease, and improved production and distribution of food. Consequently, European populations expanded more rapidly than those of Africa and Asia. In fact, Europeans and people of European origin were 22 percent of the world's population in 1800, and such people were 38 percent of the global population on the eve of World War I.

The second shift is the collapse of rural livelihoods, which began in Britain, to the west, and moved, unevenly, by region, to the east and south. Small farms and subsistence agriculture increasingly gave way to large-scale cash crops, such as the sugar beet. Crops failed: the potato famine in Ireland in the early 1840s is the most disastrous example of food shortages that were widespread, especially in the “hungry forties.” Rural industries failed in region after region under the pressure of competition from mechanized industry; they had allowed hundreds of thousands of country people to survive.

Third, mechanized industry took hold in Britain, then on the continent, expanding not only industrial productivity and trade, but also the service sector of urban society. Relatedly, changes in transportation technology furthered long-distance movement, although much mobility, including urbanization, occurred in short regional moves. In the long run, these changes produced an urban society in Europe. By 1900, over half the British lived in towns of over 20,000, as did one-quarter of Belgians and Dutch and one-fifth of Germans and French. Urbanization, the growth in the proportion of people living in cities, is a central characteristic of this period when village society lost its preeminence as urban growth outstripped rural growth.

The collapse of rural livelihoods and the insecurity engendered by these collapses is at the heart of migration shifts, which left millions of people (par-

ticularly young people) with few alternatives to departure. Employment as farm hands (farm servants), which had engaged young men and women in annual contracts, was reduced as farm routines were increasingly dictated by the rhythm of cash crops; this meant that fewer people had year-round employment and more joined the teams of sugar beet workers, grain harvesters, and potato diggers that increasingly traveled to large farms to work for a period of weeks or months. The great systems of circular migration of 1800 described above gave way to larger systems of rural workers. For example, at midcentury 50,000 Irish per year worked in England between the time they planted their potatoes in February and harvested them in November. Over 264,000 male and 98,000 female agricultural workers in France moved in seasonal migration circuits, not counting the foreign harvesters like Belgians who harvested grain in northern France. The number of people working the vine harvest—intense, short-term work—reached nearly 526,000 men and 352,000 women. After 1850, when sugar beet cultivation became more important, 50,000 Belgians cut sugar beets in France and over 100,000 international workers (Russians, Poles, and Scandinavians) worked in Saxony. Poles—many of them women—from Galicia went east to Russia and west into German territories to work sugar beet and potato fields. Germany regulated the movement of its international workers to ensure their temporary status, especially Poles, who were required to return home from December to February. Thus, the agricultural labor force was international and mobile in 1914.

This is also true of the labor force that constructed the new transportation infrastructure of the nineteenth century, the railroad. Begun in England in the 1830s and 1840s, then Belgium, the Low Countries, then France, Germany, and Italy in the rest of the century, this was seasonal, outdoor work blasting out tunnels, building bridges, grading railroad beds, and laying rails. Railroad construction employed people willing to live in makeshift barracks in remote areas; these were often foreign workers: the Irish in England, Poles in Germany, and Italians in Germany, France, and Switzerland.

If temporary work was the hallmark of the countryside, it was also true for cities. Most important, the expanding cities of Europe were built by seasonal labor; housing, commercial spaces, public facilities, and urban infrastructures such as streets, sewer systems, tram lines, and subways were based on the summer work of men in the construction trades. Workers from Spanish Galicia and northern Portugal built Madrid, construction workers from Poland and Italy labored in the Rhine-Ruhr zone, masons from central France

built Paris and Lyon. By 1907, over 30,000 Italians were at work in excavation and masonry in Germany, over 57,000 in construction—this in addition to the 14,000 German brickmakers from Lippe, whose migrant labor shadowed the construction season.

After the countryside, cities were the second great destination of the nineteenth-century European migrant. Millions of men and women moved to cities and—due to insecurity, a desire to return home, or a new opportunity—moved on. It is the net number of people who stayed on who ultimately created an urbanizing continent. Some cities mushroomed where there had only been small towns before; this enormous growth was the hallmark of the industrial age. Many newcomers were women, drawn to the textile towns that offered so much employment in spinning mills in the early industrial period. Manchester, for example, the first city of the industrial revolution, was home to over 41,000 people in 1774, nearly 271,000 by 1831, and over 600,000 in 1900. On the other hand, men outnumbered women in the metalworking and coal towns of the Ruhr Valley. Duisburg, at the confluence of the Rhine and Ruhr rivers, grew from 8,900 in 1848 to nearly 107,000 in 1904. Most cities with a longer history were commercial and administrative centers, and added some industry on their peripheries; their newcomers were proletarian laborers, domestic servants, dressmakers, artisans, clerks, and other service workers. Paris, for example, grew from 547,000 to over 2.5 million during the century; more typically, the provincial town of Nîmes in southern France grew from 40,000 to 80,000.

The third great destination of nineteenth-century migrants lay beyond the Atlantic Ocean. Transoceanic migration was not new, but greatly expanded on previous trends. For example, about 1.5 million people had emigrated from Britain to North America in the eighteenth century; some 125,000 German settlers in North America had been increased by about 17,000 mercenaries who stayed on after the American Revolution. After 1815, 30,000 to 40,000 European migrants came to the Americas annually. Then in the 1840s, mass migrations began, fueled by two trends. On one hand, the demand for labor exploded in the farmlands and cities in North America and the sugar and coffee plantations of Latin America. Particularly in Latin America, the abolition of slavery was behind this demand for plantation workers. For example, Brazil, which had absorbed 38 percent of enslaved Africans since 1500, outlawed slavery in stages, from the abolition of the African slave trade in 1851 to the Golden Law of full abolition in 1888; consequently, it recruited Europeans (especially Italians) in hopes of replacing its field workers. On the other hand, Eu-

rope's "hungry forties," political struggles, and huge population growth exacerbated suffering and employment and thereby encouraged emigration. Transatlantic departures pushed into high gear as 200,000 to 300,000 Europeans departed in the late 1840s. Most dramatically, during the worst years of the potato famine in Ireland (1846–1851), a million Irish perished and another million set out for England and the United States; at this time the Germans and Dutch, also hard-hit, set out for the United States. Even this number increased so that an estimated 13 million embarked between 1840 and 1880 and another 13 million between 1880 and 1900. About 52 million migrants left Europe between 1860 and 1914, of whom roughly 37 million (72 percent) traveled to North America, 11 million (21 percent) to South America, and 3.5 million (6 percent) to Australia and New Zealand. About one-third of the emigrants to North America returned home.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

By the eve of World War I, mobile Europeans crossed the countrysides in work teams, entered the growing cities of the continent, and tried their fortunes abroad; at every destination, many men and women returned home or tried another destination. In many cases, they were part of an international labor force in city and countryside—whether in Europe or the Americas—laboring in factories, fields, offices, and middle-class kitchens. On the continent in 1910, there were over one million foreign workers in Germany, among them nearly 600,000 Poles and 150,000 Italians; foreigners were about 2 percent of the population. France, too, harbored over a million foreigners, over 400,000 Italians and nearly 300,000 Belgians; foreigners constituted about 3 percent of the population. Foreign immigrants were even more important in Switzerland, where nearly 15 percent of the population and 17 percent of the labor force were foreigners, with over 200,000 each of Germans and Italians. Most foreign laborers in western Europe were Polish, Italian, Belgian, or German, but the working reality of the immigrant labor force was more complex than that. Consider the frustrated foreman in the Ruhr Valley in 1901 who could not understand any of the thirty workers under his supervision—despite the fact that he spoke five languages! His work crew were Dutch men from the northwestern Netherlands, Poles from eastern German territories, and Croatians.

World War I. These vast flows of migrants changed suddenly with the outbreak of World War I, heralding a century of dramatic shifts in patterns of mobility

and increasing state control—at least attempted control—of migration. With the outbreak of hostilities in the summer of 1914, overseas migrations nearly ceased, and in 1915, many Europeans returned home to fight. In Europe, the majority of Germans returned to their country. Not everyone was free to go home, however, and wartime meant labor recruitment and coerced migration. In the interests of the German state, over 300,000 Russian-Polish seasonal industrial and agricultural workers were kept on; where they had been forced to return home annually before the war, they were now forbidden to return. Russian Polish men of military age were retained so that they could not join enemy armies. Germany also used prisoners of war and recruited Belgian workers by force in the winter of 1916–1917, when over 100,000 Dutch and Belgians worked behind German lines. France used similar tactics, expanding its wartime labor force with prisoners of war and contract labor from Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Algeria, Indochina, and China.

The twentieth century was an age of coerced migration for Europeans and for people worldwide. With the end of the war came the first great refugee movement of the century. The war, then revolution and civil war in Russia set off a stream of 500,000 refugees and exiles into Germany, 400,000 into France, and 70,000 into Poland; this stopped only when the border of the USSR closed in 1923. The years of war

had forced migration from Polish territories, so that about 700,000 Poles were repatriated by 1923. An estimated 200,000 Germans were repatriated, many from the eastern provinces of the Reich that were returned to a reconstructed Poland after the Versailles settlement. In the west, about 120,000 Germans from Alsace-Lorraine fled into the Rhineland, and 50,000 French moved into Alsace-Lorraine as it once again became part of France. This war, then, not only killed 10 million, but was also the impetus for the flight of Russians, Poles, and Germans to the west and the resettling of people around Alsace and the Rhineland.

After the war, the United States restricted immigration by passing laws in 1921 and 1924 that instituted restrictive national quotas on southern and eastern Europeans, especially cutting off the immigration of Poles and Italians that had been so significant before 1918. Immigration to Germany was reduced as well, since it was plagued by inflation and unemployment in the 1920s; the 2 million foreigners in 1918 were reduced to 174,000 by 1924. (Nonetheless, Germany continued to regulate foreign labor, especially in agriculture, where some 50,000 Polish workers came for the beet and potato harvests in 1920.)

By contrast, the state of France encouraged immigration. It allowed Russian and Polish political émigrés to build communities and also encouraged for-

eign workers for the rebuilding of war-destroyed areas and repletion of its labor force. The state eased the entry of a million reconstruction workers between 1919 and 1924; commercial recruiters brought many Poles—33,000 for sugar beet and wheat harvests, and 139,000 for the mines of northern France—who formed a cohesive and important minority. In addition, an increasing number of Spanish and Italians entered southern France. On the eve of the Depression, France had an unmatched number of foreign workers, 1.6 million, including, in order of importance, Italians, Poles, Spaniards, Belgians, Germans, Swiss, Algerians, Russians, Yugoslavs, Czechs, and Romanians.

With the Depression of the 1930s and the unemployment it engendered, the flow of workers throughout Europe altered dramatically. Most countries encouraged repatriation and restricted entries of foreigners. Germany closed its doors; by 1932, only 108,000 foreign workers remained, most of whom were longtime residents with permanent visas, and only 5,000 were agricultural workers. Only France was needy enough to require a significant bedrock of foreign workers, because its labor force had been so depleted by World War I and because its birthrate had long been low.

The movement of refugees began again between the wars, as fascist victories ousted political enemies and specific ethnic groups. For the victims of fascism in Italy, Germany, and Spain, France was the most

important asylum on the continent. The first to exit were Italians who left in the wake of Mussolini's ascension to power in 1922. With Hitler's appointment as chancellor in Germany in 1933, 65,000 Germans left the Reich, about 80 percent of whom were Jews. Refugees of the 1930s faced restrictions, bureaucratic sluggishness, and anti-Semitism. Between 1933 and 1937, over 17,000 Germans, 80 to 85 percent of whom were Jews, found asylum in the United States. The Jews of Poland, Romania, and Hungary, who far outnumbered German Jews, were also in flight, because their home states increasingly persecuted Jews. As conditions in Central Europe deteriorated, Polish Jews predominated among the nearly 62,000 who found refuge in Palestine in 1935. By the eve of World War II, 110,000 Jewish refugees, many of whom were attempting to leave the continent altogether, were spread throughout Europe—about 40,000 in France, 8,000 in Switzerland, and many among the 50,000 people who found asylum in England in the 1933–1939 period. In 1939, France was literally awash in refugees, as some 450,000 Spanish republicans who came in the wake of Francisco Franco's victory in the Civil War joined those fleeing fascism in Italy, Germany, and Central Europe.

World War II. With the outbreak of war, the uprooting and displacement of peoples began on a monumental scale. On the western front, refugees fled before the German armies; by the end of May 1940, 2

million French, 2 million Belgians, 70,000 Luxembourg, and 50,000 Dutch were displaced and destitute in northern France. One-fifth of the French population fled toward the south. That summer, 100,000 French left Alsace-Lorraine as Germany repossessed this territory.

These upheavals in the West were less severe than those in the East, where masses of people were deliberately uprooted by Nazi policies and Soviet displacements. For example, Germany divided Poland into a western zone that was incorporated into the Reich and an eastern zone (the “General Government”) for unskilled slave labor. Quickly, 1.5 million Poles, including 300,000 Jews, were deported to the General Government to make room for the favored German ethnics, like those from the Baltic states, who were uprooted with equal speed. European Jews who were trying to flee were caught in two forces by the end of 1941, when the final solution became defined as the murder of all European Jews: on one hand, avenues of escape dried up as the United States and Palestine both resisted entrants; on the other, Nazis began to round up Jews and send them to the General Government.

Other Europeans were pulled into the German Reich to be part of its wartime labor force. Early on, two million workers from the defeated nations and two million prisoners of war were coerced or persuaded to work in German fields and factories; by 1944, one worker in five was a foreign civilian or prisoner of war and Germany’s forced laborers numbered over 7 million, primarily Soviets, Poles, and French.

With the war’s end in 1945, millions of people took to the road. Forced laborers and prisoners of war returned home, and by the time the winter of 1945–1946 closed in, most of 11 million people moving west were repatriated. With the German retreat from the east, came two major, permanent shifts of European people and the second great refugee crisis of the century. The first shift was a move from east to west, as the advance of the Soviet army sent Germans fleeing into Germany—even long-established German minorities in central and eastern Europe. This marked the end of the historic eastward movement of Germans. The second shift was the destruction of European Jewry. The Allies anticipated that at least a million Jewish refugees would be found at the end of the war, but the number fell far short of that; for example, of Poland’s Jewish community of greater than 3 million people, only some 31,000 (2.4 percent) survived. (Of those remaining, many Jews chose to leave Europe after the war, including some 340,000 who settled in Israel in the 18 months after its founding.) All told, the number of people displaced by the 1939–1945

war in Europe amounted to 30 million—men, women, and children of Eastern, Central and Western Europe who were displaced, deported, or transplanted in wartime.

The dramatic coerced migrations of wartime and large-scale prewar labor migrations occurred against a backdrop of ordinary movements that had long animated the lives of Europeans, such as moves to another village, regional city, or capital. By the end of World War II, however, fundamental changes at work in Europe since about 1880 altered the nature of migration for the second half of the century: levels of education and literacy had increased; European birthrates had declined; and European states were regulating foreigners with greater care. After 1950, the continent increasingly sought foreigners for unskilled jobs in agriculture, production, and services. Such people were in demand especially as smaller generations came to maturity. States sought them out, recruited them, and attempted to control their movements.

The immediate postwar period marked a fundamental shift in migration patterns that endured for the remainder of the twentieth century: there was adequate work in Europe for its people so that relatively few departed; indeed, the days of mass labor migration to the Western hemisphere had definitively ended. Concomitantly, Europe became a continent of immigration, and northwestern Europe a core attraction for Asians and Africans, as well as for Europeans from the south and east. The work of postwar rebuilding occupied the surviving population—and much of the new population. In the case of Germany, newcomers included 12 million *Volksdeutsch* refugees, who reached western Germany between the end of the war and 1950. From farther away came Asian Indians, members of now-independent nations of the New Commonwealth who numbered 218,000 by 1951; they joined England’s immigrants of long standing, the Irish. These immigrants of the late 1940s and 1950s signal two demographically vibrant sources for newcomers to northwestern Europe: former colonies (which increased with decolonizations in the 1960s and 1970s), and the nations of southern Europe and the Mediterranean basin.

The foreign workers of postwar Europe echoed historical patterns and processes. These men and women entered the labor market at times when the deaths and low birthrates required new workers to substitute for a demographic lacuna; the twentieth-century migrants filled places left by the World War II dead and by the low birthrates of the depression just as previous migrants filled places left by the Thirty Years’ War and other disasters. The newcomers complemented the place of the native-born in the labor

force by taking the difficult, low-status jobs that Europeans avoided. Like the migrants in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, most postwar immigrants came from regions short on capital and long on population, regions much poorer than northwestern Europe. Moreover, the migration processes were similar to those of the past: most postwar migration streams were pioneered by men, but came to include a significant proportion of women. Like earlier migrants, the men who founded these migration streams to northwestern Europe intended to maintain or enhance their lives at home with money earned abroad; they came for months or years, but they did not intend to remain in Europe. As they had in the past, however, many stayed, sent for their families, and became a permanent part of European society.

Immigration into northwestern Europe increased dramatically between 1950 and 1972 as postwar rebuilding gave way to a prolonged economic boom. Like the 1880–1914 period, the postwar economic success created a time of intense capital formation, which engendered massive international migration. New Commonwealth nations (former British colonies in the Caribbean, the Indian subcontinent, and Africa) and East Germany both sent a flood of immigrants until they were cut off by the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of 1962 and the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961. Western Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany, FRG) recruited workers through bilateral agreements with Italy and then with Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. By 1971, over 3.2 million residents of the FRG, about 5 percent, were foreign born. These included over a million Turks, nearly 750,000 Yugoslavs, and over 500,000 Italians. At the same time, France housed about 3.3 million immigrants, approximately 6.7 percent of its population. The largest group of new arrivals were Algerians (nearly 850,000) who came to France in the wake of Algerian independence in 1962, in addition to 1.8 million southern Europeans from Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Although their numbers were fewer, foreigners also flocked to Switzerland, where 750,000 immigrants made up 16 percent of the population; the majority (500,000) came from Italy, but also from Spain, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.

All in all, the northwestern European countries of the FRG, France, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands hosted nearly 8 million nationals from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco in the early 1970s. With the exception of Algerians in France and other former colonials, most foreign nationals were thought of as temporary residents by host nations, or “guestworkers” (*Gastarbeiter*) as they were called in Germany.

The majority were men who had come to work, and especially in Switzerland (where foreign workers from the south lived in barracks as they rebuilt the infrastructure of Geneva) had limited rights to stay. There the language problem on work sites could be like it was in 1910 because labor teams combined men of different nationalities; ironically, although the city of Geneva specialized in international communications and hosted a well-educated corps of diplomatic, professional, and clerical employees, the construction workers—from central Spain, from southern Italy, from Bosnia—shared only a few words.

The expectation that foreign residents were temporary migrants was tested—and proven wrong—in the wake of the oil crisis, inflation, and recession that began in 1973. Over half of the eight million foreigners in northwestern Europe were wives, children, and other relatives who were not working (or did not report employment). Like circular, temporary, migrants in past centuries, the workers of the 1960s were willing to distort their lives considerably—to work at difficult, demeaning, and dangerous jobs; to tolerate very bad housing—as long as these conditions were temporary. However, migrant workers had not been willing to forego all hope of a family life. They had arranged periodic returns home, married at destination, or had sent for their wives. Some wives had been recruited as laborers in their own right, and many children were brought along or born in the host country. In any case, migrant communities had changed, and their demographic structure by 1973 more resembled immigrant communities than temporary labor groups.

Nonetheless, host countries made vigorous efforts to stop immigration altogether. In November of 1973, the FRG banned entries of workers from non-European Community nations and within a year several other governments did the same. France banned the entry of dependents as well as of workers, then offered a repatriation allowance. The Netherlands and Germany began assistance plans for Yugoslavia and Turkey to increase employment in workers’ home countries. No country except Switzerland, however, instituted the stringent measures necessary to keep foreigners out, efficaciously barring the entry of dependents. The attempt to shut off immigration was fundamentally unsuccessful, and more dependents joined their relatives in northwestern Europe. The absolute number of foreign residents increased by 13 percent in the FRG between 1974 and 1982, by 33 percent in France (1969–1981) and by 13 percent in Britain (1971–1981). Although the flow of newcomers was reduced from the 1960s, the total numbers of foreign residents did not diminish and they appeared to be “guests come to stay.”

The economic crises of the early 1970s sharpened hostility to foreign workers and gave birth to several anti-immigrant political movements that retained their energies through the end of the century. European prejudices—irritated by the phenotypical distinctiveness of many foreigners, their visibility in local labor markets, and their numbers in many cities—fed off social stress and fueled antiforeign incidents. Algerians were murdered in southern France and their wives were denied residence permits in the north. Similar actions against Pakistanis in Britain and against Turks in Germany reflected growing hostility to immigrants, particularly to those who were distinct in race or ethnicity. Resentment was fueled as foreigners became more visible as their children entered school systems, social welfare programs attended to their families, and public housing attempted to eradicate the shantytowns that had spread on the edge of many a metropolis. Organized racist groups such as the National Front in Britain, and neo-Nazis in the FRG, and anti-immigrant political parties such as the Front National in France, and the Centrum Partij in the Netherlands, expanded in the anti-immigration politics of the 1970s. The large proportion of Muslims among newcomers in Europe called forth a particularly strong response, as an anti-Muslim bias was

deep-rooted and of long standing in Europe. Like many migrants throughout history, Muslims who entered European urban society brought distinct patterns of gender relations, fertility, and labor force participation.

Migration to Europe of significant, but stable, ethnic minorities and immigration patterns shifted again shortly before the European Union was to be finalized in 1992. The opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989, followed by the unification of Germany in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, put Germany at the center of a host of migration streams, including East-West movement of labor migrants, asylum-seekers, and ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, and other Eastern European countries. Under German law, ethnic Germans have rights to citizenship; 397,000 of these *Aussiedler* arrived in 1990, 148,000 from the Soviet Union, 134,000 from Poland, and 111,150 from Romania. Fears proved groundless that an open Europe, shut off from the East by Cold War policies, would become a “Fortress Europe” implementing exclusionary policies to keep out East Europeans; although Germany received great numbers of ethnic Germans and refugees, by the end of the twentieth century there was no great flood of Eastern Europeans to the west. Rather, Poland and Hungary were becoming nations of immigration. Refugees from the Balkan wars of the 1990s were part of a formidable contingent of asylum-seekers from countries such as Eritrea, Afghanistan, Chile, Argentina, and Vietnam, as well as from eastern and southern Europe.

The close of the twentieth century, then, found Europe transformed by the human mobility of the century, which showed no signs of slowing in a global age of migration. The foreign-born, and their children, were an important contingent in the increasingly diverse societies of this continent. In 1990, there were 1.9 million foreign citizens in the United Kingdom (3.3 percent of the total population). European Community nationals made up nearly half the foreign-born, signaling the fruits of free movement among members of the European Union; the largest single groups in Britain were the 638,000 Irish, followed by 155,000 Asian Indians. Foreign residents made up 6.4 percent of France’s total population, where the most significant groups were 646,000 Portuguese, 620,000 Algerians, and 585,000 Moroccans. The 4.6 percent of the Dutch population that was foreign came largely from Turkey (204,000) and Morocco (157,000). In Switzerland, where 16.3 percent of the population was foreign born in 1990, the largest groups were the 379,000 Italians, 141,000 Yugoslavs, and 116,000 Spaniards. It is difficult to discern the foreign-born in

Germany, where newcomer Germans are counted as citizens, but in 1990, Turks remained the largest immigrant group at 1.6 million people, followed by Yugoslavs.

The reception of newcomers continued to be ambivalent at the opening of the twenty-first century. Although Europe needed laborers, the parties set against immigration, such as France's Front National

and Austria's Freedom Party, were political forces to be reckoned with, German conservatives urged people to have more children rather than to accept immigrants, and Britain marshaled laws against the tide of asylum seekers. On the other hand, some children of immigrants enrolled in universities and others held skilled positions. Human mobility and intrepid migrants were, as ever, at the heart of European society.

See also Emigration and Colonies; Immigrants; Nineteenth Century (volume 1); Urbanization (in this volume); Gender and Work (volume 4).

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THE POPULATION OF EUROPE: EARLY MODERN DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS



David Levine

Most of what is known about the early modern demography of Europe is derived from the analysis of parish registers. The following discussion primarily relates to the northern and western parts of Europe, and even then it is not exhaustive. Scandinavia and the northern Netherlands are completely neglected, as is the “Celtic fringe” of the British Isles. Rather than look at any particular example in detail, this article explains how parish register studies assist interpretations of reproductive patterns in the period 1500–1800.

Parish registers were the products of Renaissance and Reformation state formation. The earliest ones date from the fifteenth century, but the longest series comes from England, with some surviving from 1538, the year in which Henry VIII made it mandatory for all parishes to maintain registers of vital events celebrated in the local branch of the state church. These parochial records have been the subject of two main forms of analysis: aggregative analysis, which provides an overview of the total numbers of baptisms, burials, and marriages; and family reconstitution, which examines demographic statistics in fine detail but is limited by the reliability of the registration of vital events as well as the necessity of having long, unbroken series of primary data.

While the English record series are the longest, they are by no means the most complete. Indeed Belgian, French, and German parochial registers provide much greater detail, although these continental documents are rarely available in continuous series from much earlier than 1660. The relatively short time span of the continental documents means that the demographic profiles of only two or three cohorts can be successfully reconstituted from them for the early modern period. This is a problem because the secular trend in population growth poses difficulties in interpreting the continental results, but bearing this point in mind, it is possible to make use of the family reconstitution evidence.

Looking at the subject from another perspective, it is probably most useful to adopt a heuristic

framework, in which the uniqueness of any particular study is sacrificed in getting at an understanding of the organization of the larger system to which the various national and subnational components belonged. The elements of demographic history must first be placed in a broader perspective so that the unique characteristics of the northwestern European system of family formation can be appreciated.

POPULATION GROWTH

Between 1500 and 1750 the European population doubled from about 65 million to around 127.5 million. Most of this growth occurred before 1625. After 1750 a new cycle of expansion began, and the European population more than doubled to almost 300 million in 1900. It should also be noted that the 1750 to 1900 figures underestimate growth because they take no cognizance of mass emigration from Europe. Perhaps 50 million Europeans went overseas from 1840 to 1914. Migrants, their children, and their children’s children were removed from the demographic equation. If they had stayed to contribute their fecund powers, quite likely Europe’s population would have been more than 400 million in 1900. Thus, a study of early modern demography begs some important definitional questions about chronological boundaries. This discussion is confined to the period 1550–1800, but these boundaries are neither hard nor fast.

This early modern epoch includes two periods of rapid growth that bookend the several generations who lived between 1625 and 1750, when population levels were stable or, as was the case for short periods in some places, even falling. Generalized statistics are the product of a compromise, which sees compositional complexity as an essential part of the nature of early modern population dynamics.

While debate about the mechanisms of growth has been considerable, it is evident from even the briefest perusal of demographic statistics that the experience of life in the modern world is radically different from that prevailing in, to use the historian

Peter Laslett's phrase, the "world we have lost." The premodern life cycle was compressed by the weight of reproductive imperatives. People born in 1750 had a life expectancy of around thirty-five years. Of 100 children born alive, almost one-half either died before marrying or never married. Survivors spent most of their adult lives with little children underfoot, so the typical woman was usually either pregnant or nursing a child from marriage right through menopause. People born in 1750 expected to die about twelve years before the birth of their first grandchild, whereas in the late twentieth century people usually lived twenty-five years after the birth of their last grandchild.

For women in particular changes in life expectations radically altered experience. In contrast to the eighteenth-century world in which women were continually a part of a family, about two-thirds of late-twentieth-century women's adult years were spent in households without children, while for nearly 60 percent of their adult years women lived without a husband.

The early modern social system adjusted to compensate for unwieldy dependency ratios. Children began working at an early age, and they and their labor were often transferred away from their family of origin around the time they reached puberty. Leaving home was a more protracted process that started earlier and ended later than in the late twentieth century because children did not move out to found their own households before they married. But they did move away from their parental homes. Perhaps one-quarter of the fifteen-year-old males born as late as 1850 lived in someone else's household, whereas in the 1990s that applied to about one in twenty. At all ages between seventeen and twenty-seven, more than 30 percent of all males were classified as neither dependent children nor household heads. It would appear that teenaged females were as likely as their brothers to leave their natal homes, some going into domestic service but most leaving to work as farm servants, apprentices, or janes-of-all-work. Initially at least, girls rarely moved outside networks described by family, kin, and neighborhood. As they grew older, women strayed farther afield. Social class and local employment opportunities also played significant roles in determining the ways in which individuals experienced systemic structures.

The demographic keystone of the early modern system of marriage and family formation was that, uniquely, northwest Europeans married late. More precisely, the link between puberty and marriage was dramatically more attenuated in northwestern Europe than elsewhere. The identification of this austere, Malthusian pattern was the greatest achievement of

the first generation of scholarship in early modern historical demography. Basing his conclusions on fifty-four studies describing age at first marriage for women in northwest Europe, Michael Flinn showed that the average fluctuated around twenty-five. While Flinn did not provide measurements to assess the spread of the distribution around this midpoint, other studies determined that the standard deviation was about six years, which means that about two-thirds of all northwestern European women married for the first time between twenty-two and twenty-eight. The small number of teenage brides was counterbalanced by a similar number of women who married in their thirties. Perhaps one woman in ten never married; in the demographer's jargon, that tenth woman was permanently celibate. These statistics provide a single measure which distinguishes the creation of new families in northwestern Europe from that in other societies.

THE ADJUSTMENT OF POPULATION AND RESOURCES

Perhaps the closest analogy to the European experience is nineteenth-century Japan, where a fault line divided the early-marrying eastern half of the country from the later-marrying western parts. Marriage among young Japanese women was not linked to puberty. In the eastern region Japanese women married in their late teens and early twenties, while in the west brides were more likely to be in their early to middle twenties. The control of fertility in early modern Japan was, however, only partly the result of this gap between puberty and marriage; it was also partly the result of deliberate infanticide. Taken together the slightly later ages at marriage and stringent controls within marriage kept the population from overwhelming a slow incremental gain in per capita income. A larger proportion of the Japanese population was released from primary food production to work in rural, domestic industries than in any other preindustrial social formation outside northwestern Europe. In contrast, historical demographic studies of pre-1900 China established that the age at first marriage for Chinese women was close to puberty.

A uniquely late age at first marriage for women, that is, in relation to puberty, seemingly was a part of northwestern European family formation systems for most of the millennium. The origin of this system of reproduction is the key unanswered question arising from several decades of intensive statistical studies. Yet paradoxically, further statistical studies cannot yield an answer. Rather, the answer lies within the social contexts of marriage and family formation.

The early modern marriage strategy was vitally important for two reasons. First, it provided a safety valve or margin of error in the ongoing adjustment between population and resources that characterized the reproduction of generations and social formations. Second, it meant that women were less dependent and vulnerable insofar as they were marrying as young adults, not older children.

As noted above, early modern Europe experienced not one constant rate of population growth but an oscillation, that is, fairly rapid growth of about 1 percent per annum between 1500 and 1625 and again after 1750 interrupted by more than a century of rough stability. Yet it is not likely that the outer limits of growth were ever approached. Even during the periods of fastest growth, a prolonged period of celibacy existed between puberty and marriage; premarital intercourse and pregnancy were the experience of a minority, albeit a large minority at the end of the eighteenth century; and the cultural practice of prolonged breast-feeding (which is associated with anovulation during the first six months after giving birth) meant that intervals between pregnancies were hardly shorter than in the intervening generations of population stability or decline.

The safety margin may have bent, but it never came close to breaking. In comparison with what we know is humanly possible in terms of reproductive rates, the fastest early modern growth levels pale into insignificance, around 1 percent per annum as opposed to over 3 percent per annum in parts of the Third World at the end of the twentieth century. The early modern population grew, but it grew slowly.

In a stable population, about three-fifths of all families were likely to have an inheriting son, while another fifth had an inheriting daughter. About one-fifth of all niches became vacant in the course of each generation. In a growing population, marginal groups, such as noninheriting children, felt the full force of the nonlinear implications of population growth. This is a crucial point. Increasing population produced a disproportionate rise in their numbers. In a schematic way, this fact suggests that villagers who were over and above replacement were presented with two stark alternatives: they could either wait in the hopes of marrying into a vacated niche, or they could emigrate, that is, they could move socially down and physically out of their native land. This second alternative was the stark reality presented to generations of their predecessors, for whom noninheritance meant downward social mobility and demographic death.

Cottage industries were a godsend for these noninheriting, marginal people. The luckiest ones subsidized the formation of a new household without

having to leave their native hearths. Others not as lucky moved to the villages and towns where proto-industry was located. There they set up on their own and supported themselves with income derived from their labor and with common rights to keep a cow, a pig, and perhaps even a garden where, after 1700, they grew potatoes. With a little money they built their new homes, usually one-room shacks called "one-night houses" because they sprang up overnight.

Many marginals moved to the cities, where charitable endowments were concentrated. But early modern urban migration was something of a zero-sum strategy because the urban counterweight played a significant role in the early modern demographic equation. Early modern cities ate up the surplus population of the countryside because they consistently recorded more deaths than births. The seventeenth-century London growth, for example, consumed more than one-half of the surplus sons and daughters produced by the rural population of England. Only in the second half of the eighteenth century did London replenish its native population without immigration. As cities cleaned up and virulent epidemics lost their potency, the urban populations of the industrial era grew by leaps and bounds.

In the early eighteenth century, London's population was about equal to the population of all other English cities combined. By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, sprawling conurbations existed in the West Midlands around Birmingham, on Merseyside around Liverpool and Manchester, in the West Riding of Yorkshire, and on Tyneside. These new conurbations sprouted up in hitherto rural areas. Manchester, for example, had 2,500 inhabitants in 1725, when Daniel Defoe rode through, and nearly 1 million in 1841, about the time that Friedrich Engels moved there. In addition many older cities, like Leicester, Nottingham, Bristol, and Norwich, doubled or trebled in size. This broadly based growth was possible because the urban death rate began closely to approximate its birthrate. By the end of the eighteenth century, indigenous populations grew not only in the cities but also in the countryside, whose surplus population had previously been the sole source of urban population increase. The push from the countryside and the pull of the cities were as important as the ability of the cities to nurture their native populations and free themselves from their dependency on immigrants.

For marginal people lifetime moves into the proletariat comprised the dominant social experience. While their actions may have consisted of efforts to retain or recapture individual control over the means of production, they were swimming against a power-

ful historical current that ultimately pulled most of them down into the ranks of the landless. If boom times were like a siphon sucking population out of rural cottages, then protoindustrial communities were like sponges soaking up these footloose extras. Overall, with a few notable exceptions like Amsterdam and London in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or the industrializing regions in the eighteenth century, the rate of urbanization was not much greater than the overall rate of population growth. On the eve of the French Revolution in 1789, for example, Paris contained about 3 percent of the French population, which was hardly different from its proportional significance at any point in the previous 250 years.

WOMEN'S INDEPENDENCE AND FAMILY FORMATION

The second aspect of this early modern system of family formation to some extent has been doubly obscured, first by a scholarly emphasis on early modern prescriptive literature and later by the historiographical concern with the gendering actions put into discursive practice by historical patriarchs. While it is true that all women were denied equality with men in early modern society, an emphasis on this inequality has eclipsed a comparative appreciation of the relative independence and self-control northwestern European women experienced. Their marriages were almost never arranged; their choices of partners resulted from courtship and negotiation rather than parental dictates. A large proportion of the population was landless and therefore unlikely to need parental approval except insofar as those people retained connections with their families. Furthermore, most of these landless young women moved away from the parental home after reaching puberty, and many lived away for a decade or longer before marrying. While landless women were not freed from either poverty or a dependent status, they were independent in the sense that parental authority was neither a constant nor a supervening day-to-day reality in their lives. They were not masterless to be sure—almost all such women lived in man's household—but it stretches credulity to assert that men unrelated to them took a paternal interest in their courtship activities.

Women were theoretically free to choose their mates according to the dictates of their consciences, as was the rule of the Christian church, but they were also free to choose within the dictates of the social reality of their lives. They were not subject to the veil, nor were their public movements kept under surveillance by chaperones. They largely controlled their own destinies by deciding on their own partners. The

prescriptive literature of the time took cognizance of this dimension of early modern women's independence only so as to castigate those who prenuptially became pregnant and to blame the victim for the crime. The literature regarded these women with a mixture of fear and loathing because their independence threatened to turn the patriarch's domestic world upside down. Prescriptive literature is always a better guide to the concerns of the social controllers than to the social reality of control. The well-attested fact that early modern women were courting and marrying when they were adults means that the prescriptors' discursive vision of helpless dependency is an inadequate guide to social behavior. Furthermore that vision tells us nothing about the motivation of the women in question. Women were proactive in deciding whom they married, where they married, and at what age they married. This proactivity is strikingly different both from the marital arrangements common for most women in most other parts of the world and from the more restricted range of actions allowed their social betters, whose marriages were often social alliances in which they were not always willing players.

The early modern demographic system turned on women's late age at first marriage, and like the spokes on a wheel, other aspects of early modern demography were arrayed in relation to the hub. Geographic mobility was largely a premarital matter. Fertility was largely a postmarital matter, as was mortality in that one-half of all deaths were those of infants and young children. Of course, epidemic mortality was unconnected to this system of family formation, while density-dependent mortality, characteristic of urban areas and rural regions with polluted water supplies, was only indirectly linked to it. Before unraveling the interconnections between marriage, fertility, and infant mortality, it is helpful to examine the issue of mortality in more detail.

EPIDEMIC MORTALITY: DISEASE, FAMINE, AND WAR

For more than half of the early modern period, epidemic mortality was directly connected to the recurrent outbreaks of plague that had been a deadly scourge since 1348. The final plague visitation occurred in southern France at the beginning of the 1720s. The plague did not simply peter out; its destructiveness persisted at a high rate almost until the eve of its disappearance. The great London plague of 1666 bears witness to the continuing impact of the bacillus more than three centuries after its first appearance. Quarantine was effective, but seemingly bacteriological

changes were even more important in its disappearance, just as similar bacteriological mutations between the plague bacillus and its host had signaled its onset in southern Asia in the 1330s.

Plague was the most prominent and most deadly epidemic disease. But a veritable portfolio of epidemic diseases—“ague,” bronchitis, chicken pox, convulsions, croup, infantile diarrhea, diphtheria, “dropsy,” dysentery, “fevers” of many types, “flux,” gonorrhea, influenza, malaria, measles, pneumonia, smallpox, syphilis, tuberculosis, typhus, and whooping cough, to mention some of the worst offenders—attacked the population of early modern Europe. What is most peculiar about this onslaught is that peaks in mortality occurred unpredictably. Unlike the plague, which killed its victims, most of these other diseases undermined people’s general health, with relatively few deaths attributable to their direct impact. Still the population’s resilience was severely tested. When infectious epidemics occurred in tandem with famine or warfare—conditions of social disintegration—death rates skyrocketed.

The Black Death was the worst microparasite in early modern times, but warfare was the most deadly form of macroparasitism. Nowhere was this more true than in Germany, where the Thirty Years’ War brought spectacular devastation. Estimates vary, especially locally, but the carnage appears to have been especially intense in the duchy of Württemberg, where the population dropped from 450,000 in 1618 to 166,000 in 1648. No single experience can be generalized to the German population as a whole; rather, different regions suffered different disasters at different times. Analysis of local studies from early modern Germany explains how the causal arrows flowed from mortality to family formation and therefore structured the operation of the demographic system.

In the Hohenlohe district the net loss of 33 percent during the Thirty Years’ War underestimates the massiveness of population movements. By 1653 few families could trace their ancestors back to the sixteenth century in their native villages. Some fell victim to war-related plague and famine, while others were bled white by taxation and their farms bankrupted, causing them to flee from the region. While the upper sections of the rural social structure remained intact, the social pyramid lost its massive base. The marginal elements in society played a key role in the first cycle of early modern population movements. Growth was concentrated at the bottom of the social pyramid in the century after 1525, and during the Thirty Years’ War, when this excess population was lost, the marginal lands on which they had squatted reverted to waste.

Another Württemberg village, Neckarhausen, was similarly devastated during the Thirty Years’ War. Its population was over five hundred at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but by 1650 it had fewer than one hundred villagers. The early-seventeenth-century level was not reached again until the 1780s. In fact Neckarhausen’s post-1648 evolution was a reversal of pre-1618 Hohenlohe. Late-seventeenth-century Neckarhausen was dominated by respectable *hausvaters*, or heads of families, but the systemic tendency for growth to create a subpeasantry and a significant number of wage laborers became the hallmark of its eighteenth-century population. This systemic tendency gave free rein to the emergence of “minifundia” (dwarf holdings) because subdivision of the land had created a pool of surplus labor. To some extent this labor was engaged in land reclamation projects and was deployed on the commons, but mostly it was drawn into rural weaving and other crafts. These people were progressively marginalized. Although they were fully integrated into the village power structure in 1700, by 1780 only two of twenty-three officers were petty commodity producers, and all local officials were in the top quartile of taxpayers.

Indirectly, then, disease and warfare created or took away opportunities for family formation. The system tottered but never cracked. Indeed, this play within the system is the crucial point. Late age at first marriage for women made it possible to adjust the population and resources equation in the face of massive devastation without abandoning the prudential character of delayed marriage. No evidence suggests that German patriarchs responded to these massive population losses by marrying off their daughters at puberty or that German matriarchs abandoned their practice of prolonged breast-feeding.

The population dynamic was kept in an exquisite balance through the prudential check of delayed marriage. If circumstances warranted, that is, if age at first marriage for women dropped a year or two or if more women ultimately married, then over the course of a couple of generations small shifts could lead to monumental changes in the rate of growth. Who decided if circumstances warranted? Not makers of social policy or prescriptive patriarchs. Anonymous women and men for their own reasons decided to marry a few months or a few years earlier than their parents had. On an individual level this was small stuff. On a broader level, when individual behaviors in warranted circumstances are aggregated, the scales on the balances shift to search out a new equilibrating point. But those involved in this social drama made choices consciously without cognizance of their demographic implications. Moreover their choices were

essentially traditional in the sense that they were made with reference to expectations that depended upon the contingencies of the time.

At the end of the early modern period, Germans policed the marriages of the poor. The poor continued to court and to initiate sexual relations at much the same ages as their parents and grandparents, but while their relationships were consummated, they were not consecrated. Consequently the rate of illegitimacy rose sharply. By the next generation the meddling ceased, and the illegitimacy rate plummeted. The rate of reproduction was hardly changed by the administrative dynamics, which were significant to policymakers but were largely ignored by the objects of their policies.

FERTILITY AND THE BIRTHRATE

Birthrate is itself the product of length of marriage and fertility rates per year of marriage. Even small changes in those variables, when aggregated and allowed to multiply over several generations, had profound implications.

The most astonishing aspect of the early modern system of family formation comes from the evidence pertaining to fertility. In analyzing fertility, fe-

cundity, and sterility, historical demographers use the concept of “natural fertility,” which is at best a tendentious abstraction. It is also misleading. Louis Henry’s original formulation of the concept was aimed at determining a precontraceptive equilibrium, but he emphatically recognized that this equilibrium had almost nothing to do with maximum fertility levels. According to Henri L  ridon, the biological maximum for women who remain fecund and exposed to risk from their fifteenth to their forty-fifth birthdays and who do not breast-feed their children is seventeen or eighteen children. Any population would have some sterile women. But most of the difference between L  ridon’s biological maximum and observed total fertility rates can be accounted for by referring to cultural and historical factors, such as the age and incidence of nuptiality; breast-feeding practices; abortions, both spontaneous and calculated; starvation-induced amenorrhea; coital frequency; rates of widowhood; remarriage; and separation or desertion.

So-called natural fertility in early modern Europe was the product of starting and spacing methods of regulation. This measurement is better called “cultural fertility,” since the historical demographers’ statistics show that childbearing was well within the calculus of conscious choice throughout the quarter-

millennium of the early modern period for which demographic statistics are available.

Starting and spacing are also important methods of fertility control. In premodern populations stopping, that is, contraception, was probably the least-chosen method. Indeed, little evidence of the practice of systematic contraception exists. On the other hand, the early modern period yields a great deal of evidence of deliberate attempts to control fertility through starting at later ages. It seems age at marriage was consistently a decade or more later than menarche. Absolutely no evidence confirms the onset of puberty among early modern women, which presents a problem in discussing early modern marriage and fertility patterns, especially the hiatus between puberty or menarche and marriage. Most people writing on the subject simply ignore their own ignorance.

Historical demographers' statistical analysis of fecundity and birth intervals testifies to the fact that spacing was widely practiced as fertility control. A crucial component of this spacing behavior, the lengthening of birth intervals, was prolonged breast-feeding, which, as has been noted, inhibits ovulation during the first six months after a woman gives birth. While its contraceptive protection declines thereafter and unexpected pregnancies become increasingly more common, it is a fairly reliable method of birth control for the group if not for individuals. The demographic implications of breast-feeding have rarely been studied outside the narrow confines of statistical measurements, particularly regarding connections between early modern breast-feeding practices and the exercise of domestic power by women. Curiously, historians of nineteenth-century women have been more interested in this subject as it pertains to arguments about the principles and practices of "domestic feminism."

The early modern population, therefore, tended to control its fertility by means other than stopping, which is not to say that this population had no stoppers. Fecundity ratios measure the proportion of fecund women who bore a first child, a second, and so on. Some women stopped bearing children before they reached age forty, which is considered the average age of menopause, although evidence for the physiological end of fecundity is as scarce as for its beginning at menarche. Why did these women stop bearing children? In most family reconstitution studies that have investigated fertility profiles, women who married in their early twenties were on average under forty when they gave birth to their last child, whereas women who married for the first time when they were over thirty gave birth to their last child when they were several years older. Was this difference a matter of physiological sterility or cultural choice?

MODEL POPULATION DYNAMICS

Demographers employ complex formulas to analyze population dynamics. For historians it is enough to know that a given rate of population growth can be the result of a number of different combinations of marriage rates, fertility, and life expectation at birth. For example, an early modern population with a total fertility rate of 5.5 and a life expectation at birth of thirty yields the same growth rate as a modern one with a total fertility rate of 2.1 and a life expectation at birth of seventy-five. In both cases births and deaths cancel one another, resulting in neither growth nor decline.

After a reasonably long period of time, even a minute shift in the birthrate, which includes marriage ages for women, marriage frequencies, and premarital and postmarital fertility, or the death rate could yield significant results. Substantial shifts could have explosive results in the short term. In another example, an unchanging total fertility rate of 6.0 combined with a doubling of life expectation at birth from 24 to 48 would instantaneously transform a population from no-growth into doubling every thirty years. Such is the prolific power of compound interest.

Two model populations, peasant and proletarian, illustrate the dynamics of population growth. No allowance is made for illegitimacy in these model populations. In the observed conditions of the 1750–1880 period, the proletarian population was supercharged by the additional impetus for growth provided by premarital births and bridal pregnancies.

The main characteristic of the peasant population was that the age at first marriage for women was almost a decade after puberty, 25. Their husbands were usually about the same age. In this peasant population model, life expectation at birth ["e⁰"] was 39.32 years, which corresponds to an infant mortality rate of 188 per 1,000 and a 61 percent survival rate from birth to the average age at first marriage for women. The "life expectation at birth," "age-specific mortality rates," and "survival ratios" draw information from Sully Ledermann's collection of life tables (Ledermann, 1969, p. 155).

The average woman and man, having survived to marry at 25, could expect to live to about 60. For calculating the rate at which these populations reproduced, adult survival is nearly as important as the fertility of those who remained in fertile conjugal unions. The prospect of a marriage being broken by death was the product of two adult mortality experiences, those of the woman and the man, interacting with each other. The result was far greater than would at first seem to be the case. Of course, the actual situation

was immeasurably more complicated since desertion cannot be measured but obviously represented a form of “marital death.” Anything that kept husbands and wives together had a stimulating impact on the birthrate.

In each of the five-year marriage intervals, about 5 percent of women and a similar number of men died. Combining male and female chances of survival produces an estimate that 90.7 percent of marriages survived this first five-year period. Of these survivors, 95 percent of both men and women survived the next five-year period, so 81.8 percent of the original marriages remained intact for ten years, until the woman was 35. In the third five-year period, 89.1 percent of the surviving marriages made it through, so 72.9 percent of the original marriages remained intact after fifteen years.

The implications of this mortality regime are apparent when connected with fertility levels. In this peasant population married life is divided into three five-year stages, from marriage at 25 to menopause at 40. Demographers usually calculate marital fertility as the number of live births per thousand years lived by women in each age cohort. Thus, among 1,000 women aged over 25 and under 30, the expectation is for 450 live births, which is translated as an age-specific fertility rate of 450/1000. Among the next two stages the potential age-specific fertility rates are as follows: 30–34 = 340/1000; 35–39 = 167/1000. As with all the demographic information set forth, these age-specific fertility rates are guesses based on reported results from family reconstitution studies, with the following points in mind. The women between 25 and 29 presumably breast-fed their children, and the contraceptive effects of suckling combined with other factors to yield a birth spacing of three years. Further arbitrary adjustments to the age-specific fertility of more mature women gave weight to the duration effect that had an impact on coital frequency and secondary sterility. For this reason, fertility in the second and third cohorts was lowered by 25 percent and 50 percent respectively.

If this average woman lived in a fecund conjugal union from marriage to menopause (from 25 to 40), she had the potential to give birth to 4.79 children. However, the above exercise in survivorship suggested that not all women lived from marriage to menopause in a fecund conjugal union. Allowances for the impact of adult mortality on marital fertility can be made first by establishing a midpoint marital survival for each five-year cohort and second by adjusting the potential age-specific fertility by allowing for fertility depletion caused by adult mortality and the interruption of a fecund conjugal union. Remarriage is not considered


in this schema because men were more likely to remarry than women, and the salient issue in this exercise is the experience of adult women. In addition, no allowance is made for children born out of wedlock. The adjusted fertility is:

Age	Potential Fertility	Marital Survival Ratio	Children Born
25–29	2.25	.943	2.13
30–34	1.70	.849	1.44
35–39	.84	.755	.64
25–39	4.79		4.21

In this peasant population mortality not only cut deeply into the potential fertility of adults but also sharply curtailed the life expectations of those children born to surviving married couples. Almost 61 percent survived to twenty-five, reducing the adjusted fertility figure of 4.21 to 2.56 surviving children. No allowance is made for the fact that men were less likely to survive to their average age at marriage, twenty-six. In a certain sense, ignoring the sex-specific character of survival compensates for not incorporating some allowance for remarriage into the algorithm. Of these survivors, 90 percent probably married, suggesting that 2.30 children in the next generation would marry.

Given the parameters of mortality, nuptiality, and fertility outlined above, at what rate did this peasant population reproduce? The length of each generation can be determined by finding the midpoint in an adult woman’s fertility career, that is, her median birth, which was somewhat earlier than the middle of her childbearing years. Each first-generation couple had 2.3 marrying children, so every 30 years this model population grew by 15 percent. The first generation of 1,000 marriages, that is, 2,000 adults, had 2,020 children after 24.5 years ($2020/2000 = 101$ percent = 1 percent above replacement). In turn this suggests an annual rate of growth of something on the order of 0.47 percent and a doubling of the original population every 150 years.

In contrast to the peasant population, the proletarian population married earlier and more frequently and remained in stable fecund unions longer, so that they had more children. These differences are important because marriage was the linchpin in the demographic system of early moderns, although it was a flexible system that could accommodate divergent interpretations. Why did proletarians marry earlier, or why did European peasants marry at late ages? For both proletarians and peasants living in northwestern Europe, marriage was decisively separated from puberty, even though marriage continued to be closely connected with the formation of a new, independent


TABLE 1
HYPOTHETICAL EFFECTS OF
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES ON RATES OF
POPULATION GROWTH

	<i>Peasant</i>	<i>Proletarian</i>
e° (Ledermann)	39.32 (153)	39.32 (153)
Marriage age ♀	25	22
Marriage—Menopause ♀ Survival Ratio	.85	.84
Potential Fertility (Rate per Thousand)		
15–19	n/a (n/a)	n/a (n/a)
20–24	n/a (n/a)	1.40 (450)
25–29	2.25 (450)	2.25 (450)
30–34	1.70 (340)	1.70 (340)
35–39	.84 (167)	1.25 (250)
Total Fertility	4.79	6.60
Marital Survival Ratio		
15–19	n/a	n/a
20–24	n/a	.975
25–29	.907	.887
30–34	.818	.798
35–39	.729	.710
Children Born		
15–19	n/a	n/a
20–24	n/a	1.365
25–29	2.04	2.000
30–34	1.39	1.355
35–39	.61	.890
Total 15–39	4.04	5.61
Survival Ratio (Birth—♀ Marriage)	.61 = 2.56	.62 = 3.48
% Marriage	90% = 2.30	95% = 3.30
Generational Replacement	115%	165%
Generational Interval	30	27.5
Annual Growth Rate	0.47%	2.4%
Doubling (in Years)	150	29.1

household. So both peasants and proletarians married as young adults, and they married as independent individuals. It is imperative to connect these cultural parameters with the opportunities for household formation so as to understand the factors that made marriage relatively difficult for peasants, who had to wait to inherit a niche in the local economy, and relatively easy for proletarians, who married earlier and more frequently because wage laboring afforded them freedom from patriarchal intervention. The vast secular boom of the late eighteenth century, the product of industrialization and population growth, radically increased the demand for wage labor. Hence the likelihood increased that a young couple could begin life together without hindrance from patriarchal authorities. If young people waited until they were in their twenties to begin courtship, they did not have to wait to inherit a niche. Proletarians were better able to take advantage of opportunities to begin their married lives according to the dictates of their own reason and social experience.

Table 1 represents a highly schematic simulation exercise that demonstrates the massive shifts in annual rates of growth resulted from relatively small demographic changes. The exponential power of compound interest is so cumulatively overwhelming that, had the annual rate of reproduction of the proletarian population prevailed from the Neolithic to the industrial revolutions, the human population of the world in 1750 would have been far greater than the ants on the earth, the birds in the air, and the fish in the seas. In fact the rates of growth suggested by the proletarian population model have approximated reality during only two periods in human history. The first was in Europe and its overseas colonies during the first half of the age of mass modernization, between 1750 and 1870, and the second was in the late-twentieth-century Third World. Possibly something similar occurred in the two centuries before the Black Death.

If in 1750 the European population had shifted completely from the peasant model to the proletarian one with its propensity to double in number every 29.1 years, the original 127.5 million Europeans living in 1750 would have been replaced as follows:

1750	127.5
1779	255
1808	510
1837	1,020
1866	2,040
1895	4,080

Obviously not all Europeans conformed to the model, and only 70 percent might be classified as proletarians. Even if only the proletarian component of the 1750

population had conformed to this model, the replacement would have occurred in the following way:

1750	89
1779	178
1808	356
1837	716
1866	1,432
1895	2,864

Many European proletarians changed their behavior. The study of Shepshed captured one such community (Levine, 1977). It would be a mistake to generalize, but even if only a fraction of the original 89 million proletarians completely took on these characteristics or if all took on some of the changes outlined in the two simple models, that would explain the observed growth within the parameters of the model propounded by the so-called theory of proto-industrialization.

In Shepshed the age at first marriage for women dropped more than in the simulated populations. Seventeenth-century brides in this Leicestershire village were, on average, almost 28.1 years old, whereas their great-granddaughters, who married framework knitters in the early nineteenth century, were 22.3 years old. This 5.8-year fall in the age at first marriage for women is almost twice the size of the drop suggested in the simulation exercise. Furthermore age-specific fertility rates rose slightly, while illegitimacy levels skyrocketed. On the other side of the vital equa-

tion, adult mortality levels improved in the period after 1750 over those before 1700. Infant and child mortality rates rose noticeably, so life expectation at birth dropped from about 49 before 1700 to 44 after 1750.

Franklin Mendels and others argued for the “prolific power” of protoindustrial populations. Not all the European peasants who were displaced from their *pays* or *heimat*—their land, their home—took on the characteristics suggested by this simple model. But even if only some of them did so it would account for the impact of new forms of social production on systems of reproduction and family formation, which by itself completely explains the growth of the European population. That is all Mendels claimed, in a modest version.

Finally, the crucial lesson of this schematic simulation is that the key issue confronting the student of early modern demography concerns the ways in which population growth was thwarted by its imbrication in the social world. Therefore, rather than adopting a modernist perspective that focuses on growth and studies its individual components at the expense of understanding the operation of the whole mechanism, early modernists would do well to give attention to the interaction of late marriage, culturally controlled fertility, the urban counterweight, recurrent warfare, and swinging bouts of epidemic mortality. Those factors combined to keep population and resources in a rough balance during the early modern period.

See also Protoindustrialization; The City: The Early Modern Period (in this volume); Patriarchy; The Household; Courtship, Marriage, and Divorce; Illegitimacy and Concubinage (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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THE POPULATION OF EUROPE: THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND AFTER



Michael R. Haines

Every modern, high-income, developed society has undergone a shift from high to low levels of fertility and mortality. This is known as the demographic transition, and it has taken place, if only partially, in many developing nations as well. It is part of the more general process of modern economic growth and modernization, which includes other features such as rising levels of education and skill (human capital); structural transformation from low-productivity, predominantly agrarian societies to high-productivity manufacturing and service economies; increasing innovation and application of new technologies; significant relocation of the population from rural to urban and suburban places; and increasing political and administrative complexity, accompanied by deepening bureaucratization.

Europe and its direct overseas offshoots (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) were pioneers of the demographic transition. An immediate result of this process was the acceleration of population growth. Table 1 presents data on the size of the population of Europe (not including Russia) and selected European nations at dates between 1750 and 1990 and calculates the implied growth rates for the subperiods. Especially notable was the acceleration of population growth in the nineteenth century, with a slowing down in the twentieth century. Consequently, the population of Europe rose from about 16 percent of the estimated world total in 1750 to about 20 percent in 1950. But slower European growth relative to most of the rest of the world (especially many developing nations) after 1950 had reduced that share to 14 percent by 1990.

In the nineteenth century several nations that underwent rapid industrialization and urbanization also experienced high population growth rates, most notably England and Wales and Germany. But this was not always the case, as the example of France shows. Rapid growth sometimes preceded industrial and urban development, as in Germany and the Netherlands. The slower population growth in the first half of the twentieth century (relative to the nineteenth

century) was due especially to declining birthrates but also to the effects of two catastrophic wars. Europe suffered almost 8 million battle deaths (including Russia) and over 4 million civilian casualties in World War I. World War II was even worse, with over 10 million battle deaths and over 25 million in civilian losses.

The acceleration of population growth in the nineteenth century was a direct consequence of declining death rates and stable or even rising fertility rates. In England rising birthrates produced much of the growth, and these were, in turn, the consequence of increased incidence of marriage and earlier age at marriage and not of rising marital fertility. Birthrates rose in Germany in the nineteenth century as well. In other cases declining mortality played a more central role.

The standard model of the demographic transition has four stages. First is the premodern era of high fertility (for example, a crude birthrate [births per 1,000 population per year] in the range of 45 to 55) and mortality that is both high (for example, a crude death rate [deaths per 1,000 population per year] in the range of 25 to 35) and fluctuating. This is the world that Thomas Robert Malthus depicted in his *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), in which population growth was checked by periodic mortality crises caused by famine, disease, and war. The second stage is the mortality transition, in which death rates stabilize and fall but birthrates remain high. The effect is a significant rise in natural increase (the excess of births over deaths) and population growth. The third phase is the fertility transition, leading finally to a decline in natural increase and population growth. The final stage is that of the demographically mature society with low birth and death rates.

There are a number of problems with this model, not the least of which is that it predicts poorly the timing and speed of both the mortality and fertility transitions in many cases. Whether the mortality tran-



TABLE 1
ESTIMATED POPULATION (000s) AND IMPLIED GROWTH RATES (%) IN EUROPE,
1750–1990 (CONTEMPORARY BOUNDARIES)

<i>Approximate year</i>	<i>Europe (without Russia)</i>	<i>England and Wales</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>The Netherlands</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Russia</i>
<i>Estimated Population</i>									
1750	125,000	5,739 ^(a)	15,000	25,000	1,900	15,700	8,400	1,781	42,000
1800	152,000	8,893	22,377	27,349	2,047	17,237	10,541	2,347	56,000
1850	208,000	17,928	33,413	37,366	3,057	24,351	15,455	3,471	76,000
1900	296,000	32,588	56,637	38,451	5,104	32,475	18,594	5,137	134,000
1950	393,000	44,020	68,376	41,736	10,114	47,104	28,009	7,047	180,075
1990	498,000	50,719	79,364	56,735	14,952	57,661	38,969	8,558	281,344
<i>Implied Growth Rates^(b)</i>									
1750/1800	0.39	0.81	0.61	0.18	0.11	0.19	0.78	0.55	0.58
1800/1850	0.63	1.40	1.11	0.62	1.22	0.66	0.64	0.78	0.61
1850/1900	0.71	1.20	1.10	0.06	1.03	0.59	0.43	0.78	1.13
1900/1950	0.57	0.61	0.38	0.17	1.34	0.76	0.82	0.63	0.59
1950/1990	0.59	0.35	0.37	0.77	0.98	0.51	0.83	0.49	1.12

Source: Durand, 1967; Mitchell, 1998; United Nations, 2000; McEvedy and Jones, 1978; Livi-Bacci, 1992.

(a) England only. Implied growth rate 1750/1800 also computed for England only.

(b) Growth rates adjusted for differences in census or population estimate dates.

sition precedes or occurs simultaneously with the fertility decline is also debated. It fits the historical experience of Europe well in only some cases, and it does not deal with migration. Nonetheless, it does provide a convenient framework for discussion.

THE FERTILITY TRANSITION

The fertility transition in Europe is now well documented by a substantial study, the European Fertility Project, completed in the 1980s. The study provides a set of standard measures of fertility and nuptiality for over twelve hundred provinces of Europe from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1960. The standard measures are the indices of overall fertility (I_f), marital fertility (I_g), nonmarital fertility (I_b), and the proportions of women married (I_m). The indices compare the actual number of births in a nation or geographic subunit with the number that would be pro-

duced if all the women had the birthrates of the highest fertility population ever observed—married Hutterite women (members of an Anabaptist sect) in North America in the 1920s. Specifically, I_f gives the ratio of actual births for a given population of women to the births that the same group of women would have experienced if they had had the fertility of married Hutterite women. I_g measures the same for married women in the given population, and I_b provides an index for unmarried women. The fertility indices thus furnish a form of indirect standardization with a value of 1.0 being historically close to maximum human reproduction. I_m is different, being ratios of the weighted age distributions of married women in the given population to the weighted age distribution of total women in the given population. While these indices are merely a form of indirect standardization, their modest data requirements, easy intuitive interpretation, ease of calculation, and current wide utili-

zation are real advantages. Also, it is useful to note that when nonmarital fertility is low (as it was in most of Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), I_f is approximately equal to I_g multiplied by I_m .

Table 2 provides measures of fertility and mortality for a set of European nations selected because of their size, historical importance, and regional representativeness. The table gives one measure of marital fertility (I_g), one measure of nuptiality (I_m), and two commonly used measures of mortality, the infant mortality rate (infant deaths per thousand live births per year) and the expectation of life at birth ($e[0]$). The upper three panels describe the fertility transition. Several things are noteworthy. First, the transition in overall fertility (I_f) was due to declining marital fertility (I_g) and not changes in nuptiality (I_m). Marriage actually increased, at least after 1900. Second, France by 1870 already had relatively moderate levels of overall and marital fertility (with an I_g of .494). In contrast, other nations still had high levels, such as Germany (.760), Sweden (.700), and the Netherlands (.845). Third, Russia (and most of eastern Europe and the Balkans) had a delayed decline, though not by too much. Finally, although not seen in this table, there was a nuptiality “frontier” in Europe in the late nineteenth century, running from southwest to northeast from around Trieste at the northern end of the Adriatic to the eastern end of the Baltic. Areas north and west of this line were dominated by what John Hajnal has called the “western European marriage pattern.” It was characterized by late ages at first marriage (23 to 28 years) and high proportions of the population never marrying (often above 10 percent of the population aged 45 to 54 years). South and east of the line, first marriage was much earlier (18 to 22 years) and the rate of permanent nonmarriage significantly lower (below 10 percent of the population aged 45 to 54 years).

Summarizing the main results of the European Fertility Project, John Knodel and Etienne van de Walle (1982) drew six major conclusions. First, the modern fertility transition in Europe was caused proximately by reductions in marital fertility and not by changes in marriage or nonmarital fertility. Second, prior to the transition, Europe’s populations were characterized by natural fertility, that is, by fertility not subject to deliberate limitation. Third, once under way, the decline was irreversible. Fourth, with the exception of France, the irreversible decline commenced roughly in the period 1870 to 1920. Fifth, the transition took place within a wide variety of social and economic conditions. Sixth, cultural settings exercised a significant influence.

Socioeconomic and cultural explanations. These data raise the issue of what causes families to decide whether, when, and how to have fewer children. The conventional explanations emphasize structural factors associated with socioeconomic development. The decline of infant and child mortality reduced the need for as many births to generate a target number of surviving children. The costs of children rose and their direct economic benefits fell for a variety of reasons, including the relative decline of agriculture and self-employment, the improved status of women (increasing the opportunity cost of their time, including the care and rearing of children), increased female employment outside the home, laws restricting child labor, compulsory schooling laws, the rise of institutional retirement insurance (reducing the value of children for that end), and rising housing and subsistence costs associated with urbanization. As more education brought higher returns, parents were led to invest in more quality per child and to reduce the numbers of children to make this possible. In addition, the cost, availability, and technology of family limitation methods improved from the late nineteenth century onward.

There is now evidence, however, that these explanations are insufficient. One finding of the Euro-



TABLE 2
FERTILITY AND MORTALITY IN EUROPE, 1870–1980 (CONTEMPORARY BOUNDARIES)

<i>Approximate year</i>	<i>England and Wales</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>The Netherlands</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Russia</i>
<i>Index of Overall Fertility (I_f)^(a)</i>								
1870	0.369	0.396	0.282	0.384	0.389	—	0.319	—
1900	0.273	0.373	0.228	0.347	0.369	0.383	0.302	0.540
1930	0.154	0.157	0.182	0.227	0.255	0.291	0.152	0.428
1960	0.214	0.202	0.222	0.252	0.200	0.228	0.172	0.207
1980	0.154	0.122	0.165	0.133	0.135	0.217	0.137	0.145
<i>Index of Martial Fertility (I_g)^(a)</i>								
1870	0.686	0.760	0.494	0.845	0.646	—	0.700	—
1900	0.553	0.664	0.383	0.752	0.633	0.653	0.652	0.755
1930	0.292	0.264	0.273	0.446	0.471	0.540	0.303	0.665
1960	0.289	0.293	0.323	0.394	0.338	0.403	0.241	0.356
1980	0.209	0.170	0.235	0.203	—	0.351	—	—
<i>Index of Proportions of Women Married (I_m)^(a)</i>								
1870	0.509	0.472	0.529	0.438	0.568	—	0.409	—
1900	0.476	0.513	0.543	0.450	0.549	0.559	0.411	0.696
1930	0.503	0.534	0.613	0.499	0.513	0.504	0.422	0.628
1960	0.699	0.644	0.646	0.630	0.578	0.553	0.626	0.581
1980	0.656	0.615	0.626	0.632	—	0.605	0.461	—
<i>Infant Mortality Rate^(b)</i>								
1870	158	232	189	210	224	200	131	266
1900	156	217	155	151	165	195	105	255
1930	67	88	88	53	115	119	57	173
1960	22	36	28	18	43	38	17	36
1980	12	13	10	9	15	13	7	27
<i>Expectation of Life at Birth^(c)</i>								
1870	40.8	37.0	41.4	39.6	35.3	—	45.0	27.7
1900	47.4	46.5	46.8	49.0	42.8	34.8	52.9	31.8
1930	60.2	61.3	57.2	64.0	54.9	50.3	63.1	44.4
1960	69.0	69.7	70.5	73.5	69.8	69.6	73.4	68.3
1980	72.1	72.6	74.4	75.6	74.4	75.6	75.8	69.4

Source: Coale and Treadway, 1986; Keyfitz and Flieger, 1968; Dublin, Lotka, and Spiegelman, 1949; United Nations, 2000.

(a) For a description of the index, see text.

(b) Infant deaths per 1,000 live births. Three-year averages when possible.

(c) In years. Both sexes combined. For Russia before 1960, data given for European Russia only; for 1960 and 1980, data given for the Russian Federation.

pean Fertility Project was that the irreversible decline in marital fertility began under a wide variety of socioeconomic conditions. For example, England and Wales, taken as a single nation, was the most modernized nation in Europe in the late nineteenth century, but its sustained decline in marital fertility only began around 1890. At that time it had an infant mortality rate of 149, 15 percent of the male labor force in agriculture, 72 percent of the population urban (and 57 percent living in cities of twenty thousand or more), and low illiteracy. In sharp contrast, Bulgaria began its sustained transition around 1910 (merely twenty years later) with a similar infant mortality rate (159), but at a much lower level of socioeconomic development: 70 percent of the male labor force in agriculture, only 18 percent urban (and only 7 percent in cities of twenty thousand or more), and 60 percent of the adult population illiterate. France, the most unusual case, began its transition very early (from at least 1800), with an infant mortality rate of 185, 70 percent of the male labor force in agriculture, 19 percent urban (and 7 percent in cities of twenty thousand or more), and high illiteracy. These examples can be multiplied. In other words, the standard structural variables did not predict when the European fertility transition would set in.

Furthermore, this process occurred in different ways for different groups, and other factors could be involved. Middle-class groups were often among the first to reduce birthrates because of their early commitment to higher levels of education and therefore to the ensuing costs. Too many children jeopardized the fairly high standard of living that middle-class families sought to maintain. Peasants usually made the turn to lower fertility later, for children's work continued to seem useful. But in special cases where concern for the preservation of property against inheritance divisions was a factor, as in France, peasant birthrate reductions could begin early. Urban workers, under pressures of economic insecurity, usually began to reduce birthrates after the middle class.

Another finding of the European Fertility Project was that cultural settings made a difference. This is illustrated by several examples. Belgium is divided by a linguistic boundary, with Flemish predominantly spoken on one side (roughly northern and western Belgium) and French on the other (roughly south and southeast Belgium). Along that boundary, socioeconomic conditions were similar, but fertility was demonstrably higher on the Flemish-speaking side. It was also found that excellent predictors of early fertility decline among the arrondissements of Belgium were the proportion voting socialist in 1919 (a positive predictor) and the proportion making their Easter

duties in the Roman Catholic Church (a negative predictor). This phenomenon was titled "secularization" by Ron Lesthaeghe. In France, also, areas of religious fervor long displayed higher-than-average birthrates. Similarly, a map of marital fertility in Spain around 1900 bears a strong resemblance to a linguistic map of the same country. The rapid spread of the idea of family limitation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries across a variety of socioeconomic settings supports the notion that it was as much a change in worldview as a change in underlying material conditions that initiated the fertility transition. Ansley Coale (1967) has noted that three preconditions are necessary for a fertility transition: first, fertility control must be within the calculus of conscious choice; second, family limitation must be socially and economically advantageous to the individuals concerned; and third, the means must be available, inexpensive, and acceptable. Much of the research has focused on the second condition. But the cultural explanation asserts that the first condition was not fulfilled in most of Europe until the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.

In the long run, of course, birthrate reductions also responded to the drop in infant mortality, but the latter usually occurred after the former had begun. Some historians argue that, having fewer children, families became more alert to protecting the health of those who were born.

Birthrate reductions were often initially based on sexual restraint (this was true for workers into the twentieth century, in places like Britain). In some cases women may have taken the lead, out of a concern for their own health and also because, since they were responsible for household budgets, they were particularly aware of children's costs. The impact of this part of the demographic transition on family life and on the self-perceptions of mothers and fathers have stimulated further analysis. The process was clear, but not necessarily easy.

Declining reproduction rates. Birthrates by the end of the twentieth century had declined to the point that many populations in Europe were not, in the long run (fifty to seventy years), reproducing themselves. The gross reproduction rate is a measure of that reproductive capacity. A value greater than 1.0 indicates that, in the long run, natural increase (the surplus of births over deaths) will be positive; a value of 1.0 means that natural increase will eventually be zero; and a value less than 1.0 points to eventual negative natural increase. The gross reproduction rate by the 1990s was below 1.0 in most western European nations: England and Wales (.856 in 1985), Germany

(.629 in 1996), France (.828 in 1996), Italy (.581 in 1994), the Netherlands (.730 in 1996), Spain (.552 in 1995), Sweden (.916 in 1994), and the Russian Federation (.633 in 1995). In several cases (Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Ukraine) natural increase is already negative. Without net immigration, these nations will have declining populations (and several do). This decline has occurred despite the “baby boom” that many of these countries experienced after World War II. Peak gross reproduction rates came in the early 1960s: England and Wales (1.66), West Germany (1.18), France (1.37), Italy (1.22), the Netherlands (1.52), Spain (1.38), Sweden (1.18), and the Russian Federation (1.21).

The reasons for this fertility “boom” and “bust” since 1945 are complex, and consensus is still not fully achieved. But the small age groups (age cohorts) of young adults in the prime childbearing years (ages eighteen to thirty-five) experienced very favorable labor market conditions in the 1950s and early 1960s: high wages, low unemployment, growing real incomes. This interacted with their modest consumer aspirations, created during the lean years of depression, war, and postwar recovery in the 1930s and 1940s, to produce a desire for more goods and services as well as more and better-educated children. The result was rising birthrates from the late 1940s to the early 1960s in many European societies (as well as in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). The “baby bust” began in the mid 1960s as real wages and income failed to keep pace with consumption aspirations and has continued to the present.

There are now strong concerns about possible population declines and also about the rapidly aging population. A proportionately older population creates greater strains on currently funded retirement systems as it adds more recipients and fewer net contributors. The systems of medical facilities and insurance are also burdened with greater care for the elderly and similar erosion of the tax base. Population analysis shows that the demographic age structure depends (in the absence of significant international migration) largely on fertility and not on mortality. Although mortality does have some effect, especially in the last decades of the twentieth century as death rates declined rapidly among the elderly, it really operates at all levels of the population age pyramid. Fertility, in contrast, works only at the bottom of the age pyramid, among the youngest age cohorts. Low and declining birthrates produce a proportionately older population. For example, in 1861 Italy had 5.7 percent of its population aged sixty and over. By 1951 this figure was 12.2 percent, and it had risen to 20.9 percent in

1991. It is projected to be about 30 percent in 2025. Similarly, England and Wales had an elderly population (aged sixty and over) of 7.3 percent of the total in 1851. This had risen to 15.9 percent in 1951 and 20.9 percent in 1991. The projection for the United Kingdom for 2025 is about 27 percent. Approximately the same is true for all other European nations. One of the most important population welfare challenges of the twenty-first century will be to find ways to fund retirement and health care for these aging populations despite a relatively shrinking tax base.

THE MORTALITY TRANSITION

The mortality transition is the other part of the European demographic transition. This has become known as the “epidemiological transition,” following Abdel Omran (1971), who divides the history of mortality into three broad phases. The first is the “age of pestilence and famine,” in which the expectation of life at birth ($e[0]$) is in the range of about twenty to forty years and the annual death rate is quite variable. This was true for Europe before about 1750 or 1800. The great variability is characteristic of a Malthusian world in which population growth is checked by periodic mortality crises caused by epidemics, famines, wars, and political disturbances. However, not all areas experienced these crises. France did in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, but English population growth was more often checked by adjustments to fertility via marriage in the same period. The second period is the “age of receding pandemics,” in which the $e(0)$ rises to the range thirty to fifty years and during which the extreme mortality peaks diminish in both frequency and severity. This era began in Europe in the late eighteenth century and predominated by the late nineteenth century. Finally, we are now in the “age of degenerative and man-made diseases,” in which the $e(0)$ rises above fifty years. Europe entered this period in the twentieth century. Similarly, work by Richard Easterlin (1999) dates the modern mortality transition in Europe from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: England and Wales from 1871 with an $e(0)$ of 41 years, Sweden from 1875 with an $e(0)$ of 44.9 years, and France from 1893 with an $e(0)$ of 45.4 years.

Mortality rates. The course of the modern mortality transition in the eight countries used as examples here is outlined in the last two panels of table 2. They present the infant mortality rate (deaths in the first year of life per thousand live births per year) and the $e(0)$ for both sexes combined. Although mortality had already been declining from the eighteenth century,

the modern transition commenced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. So, for example, $e(0)$ rose from about thirty-seven years around 1780 in Sweden to about forty-five years around 1875. But it then increased to approximately seventy-five years by 1975. Sweden thus gained only 4.6 years of $e(0)$ in the fifty years prior to 1875 but 17.2 years in the fifty years thereafter. England and France also experienced accelerations in the rate of mortality decline in the late nineteenth century, England from about 1870 and France from about 1890.

The transition in the infant mortality rate accompanied this decline, although the modern transition was often delayed by several decades. (Note that infant mortality is an important component of $e[0]$.) The basic factors affecting infant mortality were often quite different from those affecting general mortality rates: practices of infant feeding (including breastfeeding), weaning, and infant care as well as the types of diseases were wholly or significantly unrelated to the factors affecting survival for older children, teenagers, and adults. The infant mortality transition was truly dramatic. Around 1870, between 13 and 30 percent of all infants did not survive their first year of life. By 1980 this was down to between .7 and 2.7 percent, and it has continued to improve. But it is also apparent that in some countries (England and Wales, Germany, Spain) little progress was made until after 1900. Interestingly, a country's level of development was not decisive in predicting either the initial level or the timing of decline: England and Wales and Germany were quite economically advanced but did poorly. Sweden was not especially developed by the 1870s but did quite well in terms of lower levels of infant mortality and an early transition. England and Germany were impeded to some degree by their high and growing levels of urbanization.

Causes of death. The model of the epidemiological transition emphasizes causes of death. The earliest period is dominated by infectious and parasitic diseases, whether epidemic or endemic. These would include smallpox, measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria, cholera, malaria, typhoid fever, typhus, whooping cough, tuberculosis, pneumonia, and such generic conditions as bronchitis, gastritis, and enteritis. Causes of death then progressively shifted to so-called degenerative diseases such as cancer, heart disease, cerebrovascular disease (of which stroke is the most prevalent), and diabetes. Unfortunately for historical research, cause of death information is neither abundant nor often of good quality. Systematic collection of cause of death data did not commence until the mid-nineteenth century, and then medical theories most often suggested

causes based on symptoms rather than on underlying disease processes. Some designations were uninformative or even absurd (such as senility, teething, failure to thrive). The First International List of Cause of Death (ICD-1) was not accepted until 1899. Since then there have been eight revisions, moving more in the direction of disease processes rather than symptoms. Thus the categories have had shifting boundaries over time.

Nevertheless, a pioneering effort to look at the modern mortality transition from the perspective of cause of death was undertaken by Samuel Preston, Nathan Keyfitz, and Robert Schoen (1972; also Preston, 1976). They documented two of the earliest populations in Europe with acceptable data: England and Wales from 1861 and Italy from 1881. For England and Wales, the share of diseases demonstrably caused by pathogenic microorganisms (respiratory tuberculosis; other infectious and parasitic diseases; influenza, pneumonia, bronchitis; and diarrheal diseases) declined from 69 percent of known causes (for both sexes combined) in 1861 to 13 percent in 1964. Correspondingly, the share of degenerative diseases (neoplasms [cancer], cardiovascular, and certain other degenerative diseases) rose from 17 to 80 percent over the same period. For Italy, the decline in the share of infectious disease was from 70 percent in 1881 to 11 percent in 1964 (of known causes), and the increase in the share of degenerative disease was from 16 to 78 percent for the same time span. Some of this shift was due to the aging of the population, but most of it was a change in the underlying cause structure of mortality. (As an indicator of problems with the data, however, the share of causes in the category "other and unknown" fell from 31 percent of all deaths in 1861 to only 8 percent in England and Wales over the hundred years from 1861 to 1964. Italy experienced a similar improvement in data quality, with a decline in the share of "other and unknown" causes from 23 to 11 percent from 1881 to 1964.)

Causes of the transition. The causes of the mortality transition are complex and operated over a longer time period than the factors affecting fertility decline. Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, some changes did take place that improved the chances of human survival. The bubonic plague ceased to be a serious epidemic threat after the last major outbreak in southern France in the years 1720–1722. The reasons are unclear, but exogenous changes in the etiology of the disease probably occurred (that is, the rat population changed its composition). The role of effective quarantine made possible by the growth of the modern nation-state and its bureaucracy must also be

considered. Another development was the progressive control of smallpox, first through inoculation in the eighteenth century (which gives the patient a case of the disease under controlled conditions) and then vaccination in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

But gains in longevity from medical and public health advances and improvements in the standard of living were often offset by the growth of urban environments that accompanied modern economic growth. In England and Wales and in France, the expectation of life at birth was about ten years lower in cities than it was in rural areas in the early nineteenth century. Although the underlying relationship between development (and especially real income per capita) and mortality was probably positive by the early nineteenth century, the correlation might not have been very strong, partly because of urbanization and also because extra income could not “buy” much in terms of extra years of life. Urban mortality rates did not converge with rural death rates until the interwar period, although today cities often have better longevity because of superior health care.

The origins of the “epidemiological transition” in Europe were influenced by a variety of factors. They may be grouped into ecobiological, public-health, medical, and socioeconomic factors. These categories are not mutually exclusive, since, for example, economic growth can make resources available for public-health projects, and advances in medical science can inform the effectiveness of public health. Ecobiological factors were generally not too important. Although there were favorable changes in the etiology of a few specific diseases or conditions in the nineteenth century (notably scarlet fever and possibly diphtheria), reduced disease virulence or changes in transmission mechanisms were not apparent. One important new epidemic disease, cholera, made its appearance in Europe for the first time in the 1820s and early 1830s.

The remaining factors—socioeconomic, medical, and public-health—are often difficult to disentangle. For example, if the germ theory of disease (a medical-scientific advance of the later nineteenth century) contributed to better techniques of water filtration and purification in public-health projects, it is not easy to separate the role of medicine from that of public health. Thomas McKeown (1976) has proposed that, prior to the twentieth century, medical science contributed little to reduced mortality in Europe and elsewhere. His argument basically eliminated alternatives: if ecobiological and medical factors are eliminated, the mortality decline before the early twentieth century must have been due to socioeconomic

factors, especially better diet and nutrition, as well as improved clothing and shelter (that is, standard of living). These conclusions were based particularly on the experience of England and Wales (and the available cause-of-death data back to the mid-nineteenth century), where much of the mortality decline between the 1840s and the 1930s was due to reductions in deaths from respiratory tuberculosis, other respiratory infections (such as bronchitis), and nonspecific gastrointestinal diseases (such as diarrhea and gastroenteritis). No effective medical therapies were available for these infections until well into the twentieth century. However, to cite an example of the problems with this account, the bronchitis death rate in England and Wales actually rose while that for respiratory tuberculosis was falling, indicating better diagnosis. Such results certainly vitiate McKeown’s contentions.

Impact of medicine and public health. It is true that medical science did have a rather limited direct role before the twentieth century. In terms of specific therapies, smallpox vaccination was known by the late eighteenth century and diphtheria and tetanus antitoxin and rabies therapy by the 1890s. Many other treatments were symptomatic. The germ theory of disease was arguably the single most important advance in medical science in the modern era. It was put forward by Louis Pasteur in the 1860s and greatly advanced by the work of Robert Koch and others in the late nineteenth century. But it was only slowly accepted by what was a very conservative medical profession. Even after Koch conclusively identified the tuberculosis bacillus in 1882 and the cholera vibrio in 1883, various theories of miasmas and anticontagionist views were common among physicians. Hospitals, having originated as pesthouses and almshouses, were (correctly) perceived as generally unhealthy places to be. Surgery was also very dangerous before the advances in antisepsis and technique in the 1880s and 1890s. Major thoracic surgery was rarely risked and, if attempted, patients had a high probability of dying from infection or shock or both. Amputations were best done quickly to minimize risks. Although anesthesia had been introduced in the 1840s and the use of antisepsis in the operating theater had been advocated by the British surgeon Joseph Lister in the 1860s, surgery was not considered reasonably safe until the twentieth century.

Although the direct impact of medicine on mortality in Europe over this period may be questioned, public health did play an important role and thereby gave medicine an indirect role. After John Snow identified polluted water as the cause of a cholera outbreak in London in 1854, pure water and sewage disposal

became important issues for municipal authorities. William Budd correctly identified the mode of transmission of typhoid fever in 1859. The specific causal agents for a number of diseases were found from about 1880 onward, and therapies and immunizations were developed. A notable example was a diphtheria vaccine (in 1892 by Emile Adolph von Behring). And the twentieth century saw the development of specific therapies (such as Salvarsan for syphilis) and general antimicrobial drugs (sulfanomides and broad-spectrum antibiotics) from the 1930s onward.

A pattern was emerging in the late nineteenth century: massive public-works projects in larger metropolitan areas provided clean water and proper sewage disposal. But progress was uneven. As time went along, filtration and chlorination were added to remove or neutralize particulate matter and microorganisms. This was a consequence of the acceptance of the findings of the new science of bacteriology. Public-health officials were often much more cognizant of the need to use bacteriology than were physicians, who sometimes saw public-health officials as a professional threat. Marshaling resources and political support to pay for many of these public-works and public-health projects could slow their development. Much of the development was locally funded, leading to uneven and intermittent progress toward water and sewer systems, public-health departments, and so on. A famous case that convinced many of the skeptics took place in Hamburg during the cholera epidemic of 1892. The city of Hamburg, which had a somewhat antiquated water system not equipped to protect the city from water-borne disease, experienced a devastating epidemic, while the adjacent Prussian city of Altona, which had a sanitary system, had no dramatic increase in deaths.

Progress in public health was not confined to water and sewer systems, though they were among the most effective weapons in the fight to prolong and enhance human life. Simply by reducing the incidence and exposure to disease in any way, public-health measures improved overall health, net nutritional status, and resistance to disease. Other areas of public-health activity from the late nineteenth century onward included vaccination against smallpox; use of diphtheria and tetanus antitoxins (from the 1890s); more extensive use of quarantine, as more diseases were identified as contagious; cleaning urban streets and public areas to reduce disease foci; physical examinations for school children; health education; improved child labor and workplace health and safety laws; legislation and enforcement efforts to reduce food adulteration and especially to obtain pure milk; measures to eliminate ineffective or dangerous medications; increased knowl-

edge of and education concerning nutrition; stricter licensing of physicians, nurses, and midwives; more rigorous medical education; building codes to improve heat, plumbing, and ventilation in housing; measures to alleviate air pollution in urban settings; and the creation of state and local boards of health to oversee and administer these programs. The new knowledge also caused personal health behaviors to change in effective ways.

Public health proceeded on a broad front, but not without delays and considerable unevenness in enforcement and effectiveness. Regarding the case of pure milk, it became apparent that pasteurization (heating the milk to a temperature below boiling for a period of time), known since the 1860s, was the only effective means of ensuring a bacteria-free product. Certification or inspection of dairy herds was insufficient. Pasteurization was resisted by milk sellers, however, and it only came into common practice just before World War I.

Public health and public policy can thus be seen as having played an indispensable part in the mortality transition. The role of nutrition and rising standards of living cannot be discounted, but applied science was much more important than allowed by McKeown. Work by Preston (1976, 1980) has demonstrated that up to three-quarters of the improvement in $e(0)$ in the twentieth century was not due to economic development (that is, improvements in real income per capita) but rather to shifts in the relationship of development to mortality, much of which can be attributed to public-health and medical intervention.

But there were interactions between reduced incidence of infectious and parasitic disease and improvements in general health. An indicator of health status is final adult stature. A population may have reasonable levels of food intake, but a virulent disease environment will impair net nutritional status—the amount of nutrients available for replacement and augmentation of tissue. Repeated bouts of infectious disease, especially gastrointestinal infections, impair the body's ability to absorb nutrients and divert calories, proteins, vitamins, and minerals in the diet to fighting the infection rather than to tissue construction or reconstruction. Research in the 1980s and 1990s indicated increases in stature (based largely on military records) since the nineteenth century. For example, between the third quarter of the eighteenth century and the third quarter of the nineteenth, adult male heights increased by only 1.1 centimeters on average in six European nations (Great Britain, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Hungary). But after the mortality transition had begun, stature grew by an average of 7.7 centimeters in the following century.

MIGRATION

An issue not usually addressed by the demographic transition is migration. Historically, the movement of peoples was very important in Europe. By the early nineteenth century, large numbers of Europeans began leaving their countries, in many cases destined for the United States and other overseas areas (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina). This was a major factor in reducing population growth rates. Between 1820 and 1970, Europe sent approximately 36 million people to the United States alone. After the potato famine of the 1840s Ireland lost so many people to migration (4.5 million to the United States between 1840 and 1970) that the population declined for over a century, from over 8 million in 1841 to about 4.3 million in 1951. Lesser known is the fact that Norway had the second highest out-migration rate in Europe. By 1910, 14.7 percent of the population of the United States (and 22 percent of the Canadian population) was foreign-born.

By the late twentieth century Europe had changed from a region of net emigration to one of net immigration. People from the Third World and from areas of Europe outside the foci of rapid economic growth (the Balkans, eastern Europe, Russia) migrated

to western Europe in substantial numbers. Besides exacerbating a number of social issues, it made more difficult the maintenance of the modern welfare state. But these new residents provided what the receiving nations needed—their labor. And the trend will continue as long as sharp wage and income gaps exist between the prosperous nations of Europe and these sending areas, as long as serious economic and political dislocations continue in the former East European bloc, and as long as the receiving nations do not close their borders to migrants.

CONCLUSION

In the past two hundred years, Europe has undergone the demographic transition from high levels of fertility and mortality to low, modern levels of birth and death rates. This led to lower rates of population growth and the aging of the populations. Increased longevity, very low infant and child mortality, and remarkably improved education and health have all been part of this modernization process. Nonetheless, the low population growth rates and progressively older populations now pose new challenges for public policy.

See also Modernization (in this volume); Public Health (volume 3); Medical Practitioners and Medicine (volume 4); Standards of Living (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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THE EUROPEAN MARRIAGE PATTERN



David Levine

The demographic keystone of the northwestern European system of family formation was the prolonged hiatus between puberty and marriage. Certain statistics provide a measure which distinguishes the creation of new families in northwestern Europe from that in other societies: Only a tiny minority of girls married as teenagers, and an even smaller number of all brides were mature women who married for the first time in their thirties. Perhaps one woman in ten never married. The identification and description of this particular pattern of family formation is among the great achievements of scholarship in historical demography. The marriage system is called “neo-Malthusian” advisedly. Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) theorized that population grows at a faster rate than its resources; if that growth is not checked in some way—disease, war, moral strictures—disintegration and poverty follow. Malthus stressed the prudential check as a factor of crucial importance. In Malthus’s eighteenth-century England, the check was late marriage: women usually married for the first time when they were in their mid-twenties.

Much of the force of H. J. Hajnal’s pioneering 1965 study came from his singular insight that northwestern Europe was different, although he reminded his readers that the idea was hardly novel. Indeed Malthus had made that idea one of the cornerstones of his *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798), which itself built on the arguments of previous commentators. Hajnal’s achievement, though, was to subject the Malthusian rhetoric to systematic analysis using statistical information. In so doing he opened a doorway to new research and theorizing.

Historical demographers have provided evidence regarding the northwestern European practice of deferred marriage among women. Secondarily, the northwestern European family apparently lived in nuclear households without kin. Marriage was almost always the occasion for forming a new household. Family formation, therefore, was a double-sided process in which the new couple not only left their parents’ residences but also founded their own household.

This system of family formation was quite unlike the systems that prevailed among Mediterranean, eastern European, or non-European populations. Few girls in these other populations seem to have delayed their marriages much beyond puberty, and residences often contained joint families composed of two or more married couples. The families sometimes extended horizontally, as when brothers lived in the same household, and sometimes they extended vertically, as when fathers and sons lived together under the same roof.

Hajnal noted that early ages at first marriage for women continued to be a characteristic of eastern Europe as late as 1900. Three-quarters of western European women were unmarried at age twenty-five, whereas east of a line running from Trieste to St. Petersburg three-quarters of the women were married by age twenty-five. Alan Macfarlane suggested that it is impossible to explain the differences between demographic zones in Europe before the nineteenth century by physical geography, by political boundaries, or by technology. Where the age at first marriage for women was high, the northwestern and central regions, that later age correlates with a low proclivity for living in complex, multiple-family households. In contrast, where the age at first marriage for women was early, the Mediterranean and eastern zones, the propensity was high for residential complexity.

Macfarlane thus rejected a materialist explanation of the relationship between family formation and household organization or modes of reproduction and modes of production. Instead, he concentrated on the role of broad cultural and ethnic regions that coincided with the spatial distribution of distinctive family systems. Macfarlane derived his explanation by grafting Hajnal’s studies of household formation, which stressed an east-west division, onto Jean-Louis Flandrin’s findings about a similar north-south line that split France in two. Macfarlane recognized that this tripartite cultural division seems to find a deep resonance in Peter Burke’s 1978 sketch of the geography of popular cultural regions in early modern Europe.

In the 1970s Peter Laslett, who pioneered work on household structure, suggested another partition. He added a fourth region comprising central Europe, where female marriage was late but household structure was complex rather than nuclear as in northwestern Europe.

These divisions in systems of domestic organization, Hajnal's two, Macfarlane's three, and Laslett's four, have clarified that the age at first marriage for women is the keystone in the arch of family formation strategies. They also ask another question: What happened to the young women who did not marry at puberty? Adolescent and young adult servants were common in the later-marrying northwestern and central regions but were uncommon in the Mediterranean and irrelevant in the east. The age at first marriage of women, therefore, not only had profound demographic implications but was also a pivot on which the reproduction of different cultural systems turned.

How did this distinctive family culture of nuclear households and deferred marriage take root in the northwestern corner of Europe? While research has uncovered much about the distribution and shape of this system of reproduction, its origins remain an unanswered question. Paradoxically, this key question cannot be answered with more statistical studies. Rather, its answer lies in the social-historical contexts of marriage and family formation and nonstatistical sources.

FROM SLAVERY TO FEUDALISM

Ancient concepts of family and household reflected the social realities of a slaveholding society that was also fundamentally sexist. Patriarchal dominance was characteristic of the immensely influential Aristotelian tradition, which envisaged a hierarchically ordered body whose highest form was an independent, property owning, adult male. The rise of Christian society brought changes in domestic life, but the break with antiquity was by no means complete in terms of the moral economy of patriarchy since, in the New Testament, the father of the house is the despot or absolute lord over the house. Paul, in particular, was outspoken in his misogyny. In combination with the demise of slavery, the Christian model of marriage created a social mutation of profound importance. Christianity broke away from its Judaic and pagan inheritance in separating descent from reproduction. As a religion of revelation, it linked salvation neither with lineage nor with ancestral achievements. Christians were not enjoined to maintain the patriline as a

religious task, nor were they expected to continue the cult of the dead through physical or fictitious descendants. However, Christianity's negative view of human sexuality developed into a new set of taboos regarding marriage and incest.

In contrast with the decentralized organization of the ancient church, the Carolingian church embarked on a new ecclesiastical strategy that touched on every aspect of conduct, especially with regard to economic, family, and sexual relationships. The Carolingians' ambitious plans to remodel Christian society in the image of a secular monastery failed, but this model provided the inspiration for the Gregorian Reformation, which occurred in the eleventh century when the Carolingian Empire disintegrated and power slipped from the central monarchy into the hands of the territorial nobility. In feudal families, unlike in their Carolingian predecessors, primogeniture and the indivisibility of the patrimony became the keys to their lineage strategy.

Georges Duby has argued that the man responsible for a family's honor tried to preserve its prestige by exercising strict control over the marriages of the young men and women subject to his authority. He handed over the women quite willingly but allowed only some of the men to contract lawful marriages, thus forcing most of the knights to remain bachelors. Of particular importance in this process was the shift from horizontal to vertical modes of reckoning kinship. The male line was imagined to stretch back to reach a single progenitor. Kings and great feudal princes further tightened the bond of vassal friendship by using marriage to make alliances and to provide their most faithful followers with wives. Above all marriage was a way of striking out on one's own. Some knights, by taking a wife or receiving one at the hands of their lords, escaped from another man's house and founded their own. A new organization of family life was thus a major characteristic of the feudal revolution that turned the ruling class into small rival dynasties rooted in their estates and clinging to the memory of the male ancestors. In this political disintegration, mirrored in the sexual and dynastic tensions that circulated through the great houses, ecclesiastical reformers sought to enhance the social role of the church and make it the arbiter of legitimation. Elevating marriage into a sacramental status removed men and women from the sphere in which unions were free, unregulated, and disorderly. Marriage was seen as a remedy for sexual desire, bringing order, discipline, and peace.

While much attention inevitably devolves upon the marital alliances and strategies of the upper class, the post-Gregorian church's marriage policies had a

significant resonance for the lower orders, too. In establishing the centrality of consent in a Christian marriage, the canon law of marriage made the marital union easy to create, endowed it with serious consequences, and made divorce difficult. This was exactly the opposite of the situations in Roman and barbarian law. The Christian desire to evangelize the servile population, drawing it into the cultural domain of the church, was founded on a remarkably democratic principle, that all men and women, whether free or servile, were morally responsible agents whose sins were an abomination in the sight of God.

The preeminent meaning of *familia* in the early Middle Ages did not refer to “family” in the twentieth-century sense but rather to the totality of the lord’s dependents. It was in relation to the orderly maintenance of stable domestic government among his dependent population that a lord extended regulation beyond the immediate tenant to include the peasant family. However, it is important to note that surveillance was most likely not conducted on a daily basis but rather as a more generalized maintenance of frontiers and boundaries within the social formation. In 1967 Marc Bloch pointed out that the slave was like an ox in the stable, always under a master’s orders, whereas the villein or serf was a worker who came on certain days and who left as soon as the job was finished.

Around the year 1000 the rural population in northwest Europe consisted mostly of peasant farmers who lived in nuclear families. A marriage joined two individuals, not their families, and created a conjugal family, not a family alliance. In northwest Europe, marriage was tied to household formation, which was in turn connected to the young couple’s ability to find an available niche in the local economy. By no means a homogenous social group, these nuclear families differed among themselves in the amount of land to which they had access. Additionally, over the course of their lives their households changed according to the rhythms of their family cycles. It seems that, when a household had too many mouths, it brought in servants as extra hands. According to Hajnal’s analysis of spatial variation in household formation systems, the northwestern European households characteristically included a large number of coresident servants.

Because households in northwestern Europe were nuclear, youthful marriage on the Mediterranean model (the creation of joint households) was not an option. Why did peasant men marry women who were well past puberty, often in their mid-twenties? Why did they not marry teenagers, as in Mediterranean Europe? The answers require consideration of the socially constructed characteristics of a good wife

and the role and responsibilities of a housewife. The deeper expectation was that a peasant woman would be more than a breeder. It may have been the case that a married woman’s fecundity was her most valuable asset, but it is a different matter to suggest that her fecundity was more valuable than the labor she might contribute to the maintenance of the household or the property she brought into the marriage. From an early time a majority of the population was either landless or free from seignorial control. Among this group, subsistence rather than feudal modes of patriarchy was the main impediment to the marital freedom of young women and men.

MALTHUSIAN MARRIAGE

Scholars working on English feudal documents, called manorial court rolls, of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries denote an age at first marriage for women that was as much as a decade after puberty. The revisionists further suggest that the post-Black Death (after 1348) age at first marriage for women was a continuation of an earlier system of marriage and family formation whose essential outline is detectable in the populations surveyed in the manorial court rolls. The social world of marriage that the revisionists espouse is a “low-pressure” demographic regime that continued for centuries and that has been identified in demographic studies of parish registers. This low-pressure demographic regime was the same one that Malthus associated with the prudential check that he believed was the primary method of population control in his society. Indeed, he took that regime’s existence for granted, never asking how or why it came into being.

A parochial system of vital registration began in the Renaissance. From this point forward the statistical record is reasonably complete and quite irrefutable in its conclusions regarding age at first marriage for women. Surviving parish registers from early modern northwestern Europe have been analyzed according to a method known as family reconstitution to provide a large database. Michael Flinn analyzed fifty-four village studies describing age at first marriage for women. They showed that the average fluctuated around twenty-five. The standard deviation in this sample was about six years, which means that about two-thirds of all northwest European women married for the first time between twenty-two and twenty-eight.

In the sixteenth century it was widely understood that an appropriate age at first marriage was well beyond puberty. In the “hometowns” of Reformation

compass, so that by one means or another they do utterly undo themselves, in such wise that most of them do hardly recover the same while they live. Of all and which things many mischiefs and inconveniences do rise, grow, and daily increase in the common wealth, which might be easily avoided by binding young apprentices until their ages of 24 years.

Access to marriage was thus a part of an interconnected ensemble of social relations in which life-cycle stage, political entitlement, and material resources were poised in a fine balance.

People who deviated from these rules were identified and punished for their transgressions to prevent beggar-marriages based on nothing more than the fleeting attraction of two people. This, too, was the subject of legal attention. In 1589 an English statute prohibited the erection of cottages with less than four acres of attached land, which spoke directly to the patriarchal concern that feckless, landless youths would take serious matters of family formation into their own hands. Ministers of the state church alerted poor-law authorities whenever they were approached to perform marriages between such youths, and in a number of instances, the couples were forcibly separated. In a great many cases such marriages were prevented as the forces of patriarchal discipline closed ranks against the star-crossed lovers. If the young woman was pregnant, she was disowned and severely punished. Underlying these disciplinary actions was a pre-Malthusian sense that marriage was not only a noble estate but a socially responsible one not to be entered into lightly. These unspoken assumptions orchestrated the surveillance of marriage and family formation and remained unspoken because they were considered natural and right.

Parish register studies or family reconstitutions have revealed oscillations in the ages at which women first married. In England, for example, women's age at first marriage fell from an early eighteenth-century high point of over twenty-five to an early nineteenth-century low point of under twenty-three, coincidental with the expansionary phase of the first industrial revolution. The later period never experienced a preponderance of teenaged brides even though illegitimacy rates skyrocketed and bridal pregnancies became very common. The long hiatus between puberty and marriage, the central characteristic of the northwestern European family system, was not seriously challenged.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS

During the twentieth century researchers relegated explicit statistical comparisons to a secondary role and

Germany, craft guilds limited access to marriage among their apprentices and journeymen and also linked marriage to acquisition of the skills and material resources that a master controlled. Young men's personal freedoms were formally regulated, and their energies were displaced into youth groups, *Wanderjahre*, and male sociability centered on the alehouse. Patriarchs kept respectable females under domestic surveillance. These practices were not peculiar to Germany or small towns, however. It is evident from the 1563 English "Statute of Artificers" that similar concerns were part of the Elizabethan state formation initiative:

Until a man grows unto the age of 24 years, he (for the most part though not always) is wild, without judgement, and not of sufficient experience to govern himself, nor (many times) grown unto the full or perfect knowledge of the art or occupation that he professes, and therefore has more need still to remain under government, as a servant and learner, than to become a ruler, as a master or instructor.

Some take wives and before they are 24 years of age, have three or four children, which often they leave to the parish where they dwell to be kept, and others fall to chopping, changing, and making of many unadvised bargains and more than they are able to en-

inquired into the motivations for behaving in the manner identified. In postfamine Ireland, for example, the decision to marry was the result of a complex interplay between the wider family network and socioeconomic opportunities related to the operation of the family holding, the provision of security, and the need for support in old age. Thus in postfamine Ireland the rising number of people who never married included those who controlled households and were tied down by obligations and also their siblings, who would have renounced their claims upon marriage. Each subgroup, for its own reasons, was more likely to remain permanently celibate. In balancing all the various aspects of their social stations, their decisions concerned whether or not they wanted to marry instead of whether or not they could afford marriage.

Understanding the social actors' own reasons is of crucial importance, and one person's reasons were not necessarily the same as another's. Hardly an earthshaking concept, it does, however, demonstrate that the northwestern European marriage system deserves further study. Such a revisionist approach complements Hajnal's original strategy rather than subverting it.

In an original approach, Wally Seccombe in 1992 developed a scenario in which marriages among landholding peasants were negotiated freely by the four sides in the exchange, that is, the couple acting in their own interests and for their own reasons and the two sets of parents, who were trying to cement intrafamily alliances as matchmakers. In Seccombe's

account each actor had a veto over the choices of others. This double veto dovetailed with the clerical concern that couples freely enter into marriages. Seccombe's scenario is perhaps less compelling in accounting for the marriage strategies of the landless sectors of the population, for whom parental agreement was of emotional but not economic importance, and, even in the heyday of feudalism the population included a substantial landless component. In the sixteenth century these landless people significantly outnumbered landholding peasants, and during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the ratio rose yet again.

Expanding economic opportunities made it possible for landless people, who had to live by their wits and by their labor, to contemplate early marriage, whereas stagnation left them on the outside looking in. External contingencies were in this way incorporated into the internal dynamics of family formation. The preindustrial epoch experienced a labor surplus, and wageworkers usually married later and married older women than did peasants. During the industrial revolution these proletarians frequently were able to found independent households much earlier than their forebears had. For this reason above all others, a few generations of northwestern Europeans reinterpreted the prudential check during the first industrial revolution. At exactly this time women's age at first marriage fell to the lowest level recorded in English family reconstitution studies. Was it merely coincidental, then, that in 1798 Malthus published his famous *Es-*

say extolling the restraint inherent in the prudential check and bemoaning its recent weakening?

The marriages of the landless represented a degree zero of the system's deep-rooted cultural hold. The landless were essentially free agents who conformed to the practices of deferred marriage and nuclear household formation, but the system left room for interpretation. Social change led the landless proletarians to reinterpret deferred marriage and nuclear household formation without abandoning the cultural heritage of family life. The changes are statistically interesting, yet the landless proletarians did not marry at puberty or form extended, multiple-family households. This corollary reemphasizes Malthus's original arithmetic argument that small changes, when aggregated over a long period of time, can have massive structural implications.

While an increase in residential complexity accompanied massive urbanization in the nineteenth century, the larger social ambition to found nuclear-family households at marriage was essentially unchallenged. Urban-industrial proletarians were likely to live in consensual, common-law unions only because they were unwilling or unable to pay the various taxes on marriage demanded by the church and the state. Those consensual, common-law unions mirrored the nuclear households formed by their more respectable contemporaries in all essential statistical parameters. The only exception was that many new urban industrial centers had such serious housing problems that sometimes single men and women or poor young couples were forced to spend some time as lodgers in the households of established families. But as soon as they could afford to, these youngsters conformed to the cultural type and established their own nuclear-family households.

Rural and urban differences also resulted from sex-specific migration processes. Capital cities filled with female domestic servants, while mining towns and heavy industrial towns had a huge surplus of young males. Overseas emigration left some regions with an overabundance of females. Between and within local social systems a fair bit of heterogeneity developed in the ways the so-called Hajnal-Laslett rules were incorporated into daily life. Some subgroups clustered around earlier marriages, some were more likely than others to defer marriage longer, others lived in more residentially complex domestic units.

The Hajnal-Laslett thesis has also been fruitfully explored by those who study marginal regions, places that were arrayed along the borders between one system and another. Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Spain, for example, exhibited the widest range of marriage patterns in western Europe. Demographic

and economic variables did not efface the strong cultural differences between Spanish regions. In areas of partible inheritance, marriage was earlier and more universal. Impartible inheritance was associated with later marriage and male out-migration, which left the remaining females in the parlous situation of outnumbering their potential mates.

North-central Italy was a stronghold of sharecropping, which during the Renaissance was associated with its own peculiarities of family formation in the hinterland of Florence. At the beginning of the twentieth century when the death rate was plummeting, survival of extra mouths and extra hands put new pressures on the traditional system of social reproduction. For centuries sharecroppers had lived in multiple-family households, but their children's marriages were now connected with other avenues of employment. Some continued as sharecroppers, others became agricultural proletarians, others worked in the factories that were attracted to the large pools of available labor, and still others emigrated to Florence, Bologna, Milan, or overseas. Each of these new subgroups had its own reasons for embarking on family formation. Within each of these sociological categories were familial factors that made marriage more or

less likely, but in contrast to their Renaissance forebears, the north-central Italians of 1900 married long after puberty.

The Italian case is interesting because the documentary record traces its evolution over a half-millennium. The censuslike enumerations, such as the fifteenth-century Florentine *catàsto* or land registry, show that age at first marriage for women was the mid-teens, which was about ten years earlier than in the northwestern European parish register populations. Tuscan men were on average ten years older than their brides. In the cities this difference was more marked than in the countryside, but the essential ten-year gap was still evident along with the link between the female age at first marriage and puberty. Among the Florentine upper crust, grooms were often in their middle thirties, and they married nubile girls who had just reached puberty. The identified difference between rural and urban populations stemmed from the fact that male sharecroppers seem to have married earlier than other peasants and townsmen, but their wives were still likely to have been pubescent teenagers.

Seeing matters in this long-term perspective, Richard Smith in 1981 raised questions about the Renaissance system. Was it “Mediterranean” or “medieval” in the sense that early female marriage ages and residential complexity were responses to the conjuncture occasioned by the Black Death, which hit the Tuscan population savagely and repeatedly? If the Re-

naissance family system described in the Florentine *catàsto* was “medieval,” why was it so different from the English response that Smith and his revisionist colleagues inferred from their analysis of the fourteenth-century poll tax registers?

CONCLUSION

Hajnal and Laslett developed the basic parameters of the northwestern European marriage system in the 1960s. Apparently the system’s hegemony stood uncontested for the best part of a millennium and this deeply entrenched system of marriage and household formation was very supple. It bent but did not break during the nineteenth-century urbanization and industrialization. Twentieth-century scholarship, however, notes profound structural changes. Marriage and reproduction were no longer tightly conjoined. Marriages were broken by divorce, and in some places more than half of all children were not living with their biological parents, even when both were still alive. Furthermore, the definition of “family” was stretched so far that a twentieth-century sociologist in England counted 126 different patterns. The ideological carapace of family life proved extremely durable, but close inspection has revealed profound redefinitions taking place as the patriarchal powers of fathers, subjected to legal challenge, disintegrated.

See also other articles in this section and the section The Family and Age Groups (volume 4).

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BIRTH, CONTRACEPTION, AND ABORTION



John M. Riddle

Historians long avoided analyzing private lives, partly because matters of conception and birth were just that—private. Even if such knowledge were to be regarded as worth the effort, what went on in peasant and burgher bedrooms was believed to be beyond possible scrutiny. How people were conceived and born escaped scholarly attention, but, in avoiding the investigative enterprise, questions arose that urgently needed reflection. Prior to the advent of the modern era in the nineteenth century did people (in distinction to the elites who were presumed to know what they were doing) reproduce like rats in hay or did they engage in practices that resulted in control of their reproduction? How can we explain the low birth rates in the early modern periods and the attention that leaders gave to population increase incentives? Was the corpus of common obstetrical knowledge safe, natural, effective, and practiced by women whose arts were separate from male inspections and influence? How do we evaluate the processes of modernization by which women were increasingly pushed away from controlling birth and even their pregnancies?

Most Europeans in the early modern period were born in an overheated room, their parents' room, with neighboring women and female relatives hovering in the background, while an experienced midwife assisted the parturition process. If rural and poor, the husband may very well have eschewed a midwife's service, either unwilling or unable to pay the relatively small fee. In those cases, an experienced neighbor or friend would substitute. In almost all cases, the mother-to-be would be either seated on a birth stool brought for the occasion by the midwife, especially if they were in central Europe, or on a chair or squatting on the floor or even, infrequently, on another woman's lap. Depending where they were geographically, few women remained in bed once the water burst and the contractions began. Known since classical antiquity, the birth stool received extensive usage among German midwives, but its use extended over most of Europe. A familiar scene was the midwife

with her bag of instruments and drugs hurrying to her next delivery and carrying her stool with her.

Many of the women present at childbirth helped in various ways, such as making sure that the birth amulet—eagle stones, haemites, agate, and oriental or occidental bezoars being common—remained on the stomach. Meanwhile, the expectant father was apt to be with male friends in a nearby room or tavern awaiting congratulations. Some fathers practiced the *couvade*, an ancient, bizarre ritual of posing as the woman in labor by going through the moans, contortions, and ordeal of birth and, when the birth parody was over, pretending to suckle a newborn. Anthropologists and historians disagree over the *couvade's* meaning, offering such interpretations as sympathetic magic, aversion of dangers, and protection for the newborn. The entire birth scene raises a number of questions about early modern society.

EARLY MODERN MIDWIVES AND OBSTETRICS

As idealized in historical perspective, midwives were schooled through the experienced guidance of an older practitioner and generally knew more about obstetrics and even gynecology than male physicians. During the parturition process, they assisted the natural course whenever intervention was necessary. Recent interpretations modify this image. Up until approximately 1750, midwives generally provided safer and better services than physicians could have done given their training and knowledge. Still, midwives intervened from the moment of arrival and in ways modern science considers either harmless superstition or dangerous interference. Examples of meddling included breaking the waters with nails or a pointed instrument, massaging the vagina with an herbal preparation, widening the birth canal with manipulations even before the cervix opened, and placing women on birth stools before the water broke. The overheated room dates back to pre-Christian notions that cold

drafts are harmful to the newly born. The medical skills of early modern midwives were substantially unchanged from classical times, save for additional Germanic folk practices whose utility from the modern perspective was confined to the psychological province. Few received training or experience in handling obstetrical emergencies or in when to call a physician. All too often, when a physician arrived it meant the death of either the baby or the mother.

Another form of intervention now considered harmful was the retrieving of the placenta immediately after birth. Normally the placenta will be expelled naturally within a half hour, but often midwives, perhaps desiring to conclude the ordeal, entered and pulled it out, causing an occasional hemorrhaging or inverted uterus, sometimes fatally. Following a delivery the woman was prescribed bed rest for nine days. Even bed linens were not expected to be changed during this period for fear of disturbing the mother. Reports of foul and smelly rooms were standard. Economic and family circumstances did not always allow what was considered to be the best therapy. When physicians in the late twentieth century supported “natural

births,” the historians followed by stressing the wisdom of old midwives who witnessed and helped natural processes unfold. Clearly such romantic notions were overdrawn because midwives and experienced older women were not reluctant to intervene. This attitude, however, has another side: western European birth practices called for intervention in obstetrical emergencies, unlike some other traditional societies, and many a mother and child were saved by skillful applications of therapeutic procedures.

Medieval terms for midwives, such as *rustica* (rustic), *vetula* (old woman), *mulier* (woman), *obstetrix* (midwife), and *herbala* (herbalist), reveal their informal origins. As late as the eighteenth century, a French word for midwife was *sage-femme* (wise woman). By the second half of the fifteenth century, various attempts were begun throughout Europe to control by an oath abuses of midwife behavior. Oaths varied according to time and region, but three elements were essential: helping any patient, rich or poor; preventing the murder of a neonatal; and dispensing no miscarriage or abortion medicines. Women received from other women advice and direction concerning the en-

tire regimen of women's health and reproduction, including irregular menstrual cycles, breast-feeding, sterility, rape, venereal diseases, fertility enhancement, contraception, and abortion. Barbers, physicians, and, less frequently, midwives bled women at least three times per pregnancy in the fifth, seventh, and ninth months. But the knowledge and practices of women outside the birth scene also caused many troubles for women who knew about women's health and reproduction.

The diagnoses of pregnancy were little changed from antiquity. The signs of pregnancy were explained, mostly for the benefit of men, in a seventeenth-century work attributed to Albertus Magnus, called *Aristotle's Masterpiece*: they included cessation of menstruation; fullness and milk in the breast; strange longings, especially for foods; a slight greenness of veins under the tongue; swollen veins in the neck; and a tightly closed cervix. Urine examination, so-called uroscopy, took account of smell, sediments, suspensions, color, and taste. Because a pregnant woman's albumen in her urine is highly elevated, it is possible that skilled practitioners were detecting a sign. Midwives claimed abilities to detect the sex of the unborn. Until the witchcraft suppressions, women seemed to have trusted midwives, as judged by their prestige in their communities.

The seventeenth century saw the beginnings of bringing the "secrets of women" to the high medical and learned culture through developments in gynecology. Ambrose Paré (1510–1590) described one development, a manipulation to shift the fetal position for a feet-first movement through the birth canal. Paré was first to record the procedure but said he learned of it from two Parisian barber surgeons. Eucharius Rösslin (c. 1500–1526) published, first in German, a work entitled *The Pregnant Woman's and Midwife's Rose Garden*, in which he disclosed much that had been mysterious to men. He recommended abortion only for cases where the woman's life would be imperiled through delivery. More information, perhaps none innovative, was disclosed in works in German by Walter Ryff (1545); in Italian by Scipione Mercurio (1595), a practicing obstetrician; in Spanish by Luis Mercado (d. 1611), who wrote four large books on diseases of women; and in French by François Rousset, whose description of a cesarean section in 1581 was outstanding. Thus what happened in birth rooms was becoming the subject for academic examinations. The primary question facing historians is to what degree were the sixteenth-century gynecology and obstetrics writers innovative and how much critical modification they made to traditional knowledge. Even though women orally transmitted much information, there are sufficient medical and anecdotal

writings to analyze early modern popular knowledge, as social and medical historians are beginning to do.

EARLY MODERN BIRTH CONTROL

The subject of birth control is a complex one in early modern Europe. Prior to the beginning of the eighteenth century, the birthrates were low even considering external factors, such as wars, celibacy, famine, plagues, land use, and nutrition. Birthrates were well below the biological potential, even leaving aside the probably 20 percent of all couples in which one person was infertile. We know from other data that, if left unchecked, average per-couple birthrates will total sixteen to eighteen children from the onset of female puberty to menopause. European rates were well under half this total. The precise reasons are complex and ultimately escape historical confidence. Assuredly important factors include a delayed marriage age, relatively prolonged lactation after the birth of each child, probably a decrease in sexual activity within marriage as couples reached their mid-thirties, and bastard infanticide. Of these, delayed marriage age is best documented and undoubtedly an important element. The medical and anecdotal data from the early sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries indicate artificial birth control on top of these arrangements. The effectiveness of birth control and even family planning is the subject of debate among historians, demographers, and scientists.

The nature of artificial birth control on top of these arrangements is debatable, though there were definitely a number of methods (some linked to beliefs in magic) and probably some successes. Until recently historians and demographers believed that, prior to the late eighteenth century, women did not possess sufficient knowledge for dependable birth control, although midwives, witches, and old women were accused of engaging in practices that led to fewer children. Older historians such as Henry Lea regarded these kinds of accusations as a vast conspiracy by the inquisitors to accuse innocent people. In contrast, Margaret Murray, Thomas Forbes, and Barbara Ehrenreich observed that a disproportionate number of those accused of witchcraft were midwives. Murray said that "in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the better the midwife the better the witch." An English midwife oath, typical in its sentiments, prohibited not only the administration of birth control drugs but the giving of counsel about "any herb, medicine, or poison, or any other thing, to any woman being with child whereby she should destroy or cast out that she goeth withal before her time." A church dictum stated, "If a woman dare to cure without having stud-

ied she is a witch and must die.” Witches and midwives, whether the same or different, were accused of engaging in various practices, usually involving “poisons,” that interfered with reproduction, ranging from impotency for men to contraception, abortion, and sterility for women and death for the newly born, notably those born and not yet baptized. Social historians and historians of science are more inclined toward accepting the accusations, at least to the degree that women possessed knowledge that allowed them to exercise effective and relatively safe birth control.

Clearly, various forms of artificial birth control were known or attempted, but primarily drugs were used. Coitus interruptus was seldom employed as a contraceptive measure, to judge by the paucity of references to it, although in Italy there are a number of anecdotal allusions to it. The act requires strong male cooperation and, in general, males are less strongly motivated in restricting conceptions. Those few references, however, indicate that the procedure was known. Barrier methods were not known. Some pessaries prepared as drug prescriptions with specific ingredients and administered on wool pads could possibly have resulted in mechanical blockage of sperm progression. Gabriel Fallopio is credited with the first medical description of the condom, in a publication in 1563. The name of the device comes from a Dr. Condom, physician in the court of Charles II of England (ruled 1660–1685), and it was popularized by Casanova (1725–1788), who called it “the English riding coat.” In its original form, made of animal skins, it did not receive widespread usage.

The primary means of contraception and abortion were drugs, mostly herbal. A number of plants that, usually taken orally, contracepted and/or aborted were known from classical times and recorded by medical writers such as Hippocrates, Dioscorides, and Galen. Prominent among the contraceptives were white poplar, *asplenium* (a fern), juniper, barrenwort, the chaste plant, squirting cucumber, dittany, and artemisia; among the abortifacients were rue, pennyroyal, tansy, and birthwort. Modern scientific studies, especially in the realm of animal science, have shown that these plants interfere hormonally in a variety of ways with the reproduction processes. The chaste plant (*Vitex agnus-castus*) affords an intriguing example. Not only was the plant used historically as a female contraceptive but, in modern testing on dogs, the bark of this small tree reduces spermatogenesis to infertility. The opposite of the new drug Viagra, it was taken by ancient priests to prevent erections. Witches or midwives were accused of tying a ligature, or invisible string, around the penis to prevent erections. Formerly we assumed these allegations to be either

malicious or illusionary. Now, on the basis of scientific data, we can reassess entire aspects of sexually related charges related to old women, witches, and midwives.

Interspersed with pharmaceuticals were amulets, charms, and various practices that we today consider superstitious. Medical, ecclesiastical, and municipal authorities sought to eliminate these vulgar practices. A part of a Parisian midwife oath in 1560 was “I will not use any superstitious or illegal means, either in words or signs, nor any other way.” As with the fertility-enhancing medicines, modern evaluators of the early modern period give various explanations of the role of magic and the occult and the importance that psychological factors could have played. Modern investigators’ uncertainty about that role applies to the entire spectrum of fertility, gestation, and birth.

Credence can be given to the substance of some of the accusations aimed at midwives or supposed witches, but many questions are unanswered. Among them, if women possessed effective means of birth control, why did early modern medicine not recognize what was happening? How could knowledge once widely held be diminished and restricted to a few marginalized practitioners, most of whom were women? If the birth control agents were effective, what about the fertility-enhancing herbal preparations that were perhaps even more prominently mentioned in midwifery and medical accounts? The short answer to the last question is that modern science has not sufficiently studied the actions of these preparations to begin addressing the question historically.

A large factor in the loss of knowledge was how birth control learning was transmitted. As medical education became formalized within the universities, the curriculum did not include “women’s medicines.” Practicing physicians working within their guilds eschewed folklore while combating irregular, informally trained practitioners. That distrust continued throughout the twentieth century.

WITCH-HUNTS AND CONTRACEPTIVE “POISONS”

Another reason for the diminution in birth control information is that such knowledge was dangerous in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As a woman revealed before the Inquisition in Modena in 1499, “Who knows how to heal knows how to destroy.” A version of Pseudo-Aristotle’s *Secrets* in 1520 advised men “never to confide in the Works and Services of Women” and to “beware of deadly poison, for it is no new thing for Men to be poison’d.” And what did these poisons do? They were said to destroy a fetus or to make men either impotent or sterile and women

unable to conceive. Thus the focus of witchcraft persecutions on midwives came to center on birth control “poisons” and other preparations that to some were poisons and to others medicines.

Two German investigators, Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger, connect the poisons, witches, and midwives with economic policy and demography. Heinsohn and Steiger see a direct relation between the women persecuted as witches and the steady increase in population that began in the sixteenth century. As proof they provide statistical evidence that in areas where virulent witch-hunts were conducted there followed a population upswing. Juxtaposing their thesis with the evidence for a decline in effective birth control measures, we can hypothesize that the targets were women who knew the “poisons” that were contraceptive and abortifacient plants. Town and ecclesiastical leaders who promoted witch-hunts may genuinely have been concerned with devilish activities by “weisen Frauen” (wise women) that they saw as preventing babies from being born and baptized.

Critics of Heinsohn and Steiger are not persuaded by their data. The medical and pharmaceutical literature, especially from the official dispensaries employed by apothecaries, indicates that the preparations were still known and sold but in a different form. The herbs and minerals were compounded, mixing twenty or more “simples,” for retail distribution. Early modern women became dependent on purchased drugs, rather than gathering the plants for themselves. In order to know the plants, harvesting, morphology of site for extraction, amounts, frequencies, and when to take them, they needed information formerly taught by their mothers and the “wise women” of the community. To gather the plant “simples,” or even to know how, was dangerous because it would make one a suspect in procedures where proving innocence was difficult and failure to do so was often fatal. Approximately half a million people died at the stake, the overwhelming majority being women, most of whom were old. Heinsohn and Steiger’s thesis has challenged social historians to view birth and population controls during the early modern period in a different way.

Laws on infanticide were tightened throughout most of Europe in the early modern period. Between 1513 and 1777 in Nürnberg eighty-seven women were executed for killing their babies, and all but four were single. Nürnberg’s town council enacted an ordinance that prohibited midwives from burying a fetus or stillborn child without informing the city council. In Essex, England, between 1575 and 1650 fifty-one women were tried for the offense, and two-thirds were convicted and executed. In comparison, during the same period in Essex 267 women were

tried for witchcraft, and only one-fourth were found guilty. Clearly, these figures are relatively low, so that infanticide cannot be considered a major factor in population size, even acknowledging that many crimes were undetected by authorities.

ABORTION AND THE BEGINNING OF LIFE

Knowledge of effective birth control measures continued to appear in medical, pharmaceutical, and anecdotal accounts, but normally it was carefully circumscribed.

Abortifacients were referred to in early modern medical literature as menstrual stimulators. When a woman took an emmenagogue (menstrual stimulant) because of a delayed monthly period due to pregnancy, she would have committed an abortion in modern terms but not in the early modern era. Based on classical Greek concepts, it was thought that the male sperm remained in a woman’s body until her womb accepted it and a fetus was formed. This period was not defined but could be a number of weeks. The question of “when does life begin” was not examined in the way it is today prior to the nineteenth century in European society, either in high learning or popular culture.

Knowing that an accident or cesarean section could result in a live birth, Aristotle asked when the fetus developed independent life. When the fetus had all of its form, Aristotle said that it had *psyche*, meaning “life.” The Stoics developed the notion of “soul,” and, by employing the word *psyche*, they altered its meaning. Learning from the Stoics, the Christians read Aristotle’s question about the beginning of independent life as a discussion of ensoulment. The only explicit reference to abortion in the Bible or Torah occurs in Exodus 21:23, in answer to a question about the fault of a person assaulting a pregnant woman and causing a miscarriage. The question’s answer was “life is for life.” The Hebrew word for life, *nefesh*, was translated by the Greek Septuagint as *psyche*, thus suggesting that a “soul for a soul” was the punishment decreed for the act. Most of the church fathers adapted Aristotle’s views and agreed that ensoulment came at that point in a pregnancy when there was fetal movement. The popular term in English, with equivalents in other vernaculars, was “quickening.” They envisioned the soul to have come from God, not the parents, and the divine act came when the fetus was formed. Christian doctrine ultimately incorporated Aristotle’s assertion that there was a single act (or, as Aristotle said, a relatively short period) from which time the fetus goes from “un-

formed” to “formed.” Prior to ensoulment a woman was free to terminate her fertility by returning to her menstrual cycle. There was a notable restriction to this freedom, however. Roman law, Judaic pronouncements, and early medieval law codes held that a woman did not have the right to deny a child conceived in wedlock if the husband wanted the child.

The medieval and early modern churches, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic alike, condemned abortion, contraception, and, indeed, any agent or means that interfered with fertility. In practice, however, as John Noonan has demonstrated, both contraception and abortion were practiced prior to fetal movement or quickening. But several trends in the early modern period began to restrict even more reproductive practices and so-called rights.

Following the Black Death and the resultant economic distresses, medieval town councils recognized a connection between population growth and economic prosperity. Consequently medieval towns on the Continent became more involved in legislation declaring pregnancy terminations criminal by punishing those who assisted a woman. To rectify abuses medieval towns first regulated and licensed midwives. The laws of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in 1532 essentially took the provisions of some towns and promulgated them into state law. The Caroline laws regarded one who assisted a woman in an abortion as guilty of homicide and a woman who performed the act on her own as guilty of a lesser although severely punished felony. A woman who terminated a fetus “not yet living” (not formed or quickened) or a person who assisted her was to be punished by penance, a physical punishment (such as pillory), or exile. In 1556 French law condemned as a criminal any woman who concealed her pregnancy and allowed a fetus to be killed or a child to die prior to baptism. In contrast, a review of English common law in a relatively few trials reveals that juries would not punish anyone, assistant or woman, who aborted a fetus prior to birth.

The strongest stance against abortion came in a bull issued by Pope Sixtus V (1585–1590) that condemned abortion of a “conceived fetus” with “severe punishments” for both the woman and anyone who advised or assisted her. It is unlikely that the bull had any effect on European practices and may have been intended primarily for prostitution in the city of Rome. Some Catholic theologians, such as Thomas Sanchez (1550–1610), argued for a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy in cases of rape or threat to her life. Nonetheless, a woman sinned who terminated a pregnancy to protect her reputation or prevented conception in order to protect an estate from being divided among too many heirs. In response to liberal

views by some theologians, Pope Innocent XI (1676–1689) reaffirmed the medieval church’s stance against any interference with fertility and birth but left vague the so-called therapeutic abortion to save the life of a woman. Few differences regarding birth or birth control practices appear in Protestant communities. Luther and Calvin both spoke out against the “sin of Onan,” a biblical passage, Genesis 38:8–10, now considered misinterpreted as a condemnation of contraception and masturbation.

MARRIAGE AND PREGNANCY

Studies comparing marriage dates and birth or baptism dates in England and Germany have shown that roughly one-fifth of the brides between 1540 and 1700 were pregnant at marriage. In later centuries the number rose to two-fifths. A major reason was the delayed marriage age in the early modern period. These data indicate that women engaged in premarital sexual relations as a marriage strategy.

Surprisingly few illegitimate births occurred in early modern Europe, however, which greatly reduced pressures for abortion or infanticide. Community controls discouraged young adults to engage in outright sexual intercourse before marriage. The effectiveness of these controls is surprising, given late average age at marriage. Some cities even sponsored prostitution houses, especially for foreign, single workers (or so they said), so that their daughters would receive fewer pressures for favors. Some women who did not marry would deliver a child out of wedlock, but they were too few for demographic significance. One set of figures shows that illegitimate births were 2 percent of total births in 1680 and rose to 6 percent by 1820, a trend that may have horrified the contemporary custodians of morality but, in comparison to modern times, is startlingly low. Given the data on the number of brides pregnant at the time of marriage, what happened to those women who were rejected for marriage? Given the low illegitimacy rates, some must have resorted to abortion.

Anecdotal information portrays women who failed to receive a bridal offer and who then had to seek clandestine means to procure abortions. Because surgical abortions were considered more dangerous than chemically induced abortions, most of the anecdotal and medical data emphasize drugs taken orally. For example, a woman reproved another because she had delivered a “base child,” thus soiling her reputation and the community’s as well, all because she was “not acquainted with it [the medicine] in time.” As late as the nineteenth century, a man commented that

juniper had saved the reputation of many young women.

Many factors affected childbearing in the early modern period: late marriage ages, time intervals for births, wars, immigration and migration, economic opportunities to establish work and living space, infanticide, famines, diseases (especially in the sixteenth century), illegitimacy, and altered life styles (such as the rise of factory workshops, wet-nursing, prostitution).

CHANGES IN MODERN EUROPE

The eighteenth through the twentieth centuries saw the development of several broad themes: attention of formal, "high" medicine to obstetrics and gynecology; numerous technical improvements; scientific developments in the understanding of physiology, pharmacology, and the mechanics of reproduction that altered age-old concepts and attitudes toward contraception and abortion; diminished importance and involvement of women in birthing procedures and decisions; dependence upon apothecaries for birth control drugs; intervention by secular governments in abortion laws; and revised Christian and, to a lesser degree, Judaic canons concerning sexuality and reproduction.

Women and male medicine. Changes in birthing procedures and the involvement of newer kinds of experts were gradual. The movement that ultimately led to less control for women can be ascribed to a woman, Jane Sharp, who in 1671 wrote *The Compleat Midwife's Companion*, with the aim of helping women: "I have often sat down sad in the consideration of the many miseries women endure in the hands of unskillful midwives." She sought to correct abuses, but in doing so she disclosed practical information unknown to men of science, thereby making the issues of the birth scene a matter for public view.

In 1668 the French physician Francis Mauriceau published a book on obstetrics in French that was translated into English, Dutch, German, and Italian. Among his achievements were the treatment of *placenta previa* (expulsion of the placenta), the condemnation of cesarian section (as too dangerous to be performed), and the assertion that fetal development is gradual, with no difference in male and female development times. Women who enjoy sexual intercourse, he claimed, are less fertile because their orifices are more closed to seminal fluid. In England Nicholas Culpeper wrote a *Directory for Midwives* in 1651, whose purpose was to take away the mysteries of reproduction and correct abuses. Culpeper followed this work with an immensely popular pharmaceutical guide because he lambasted the proprietary control of drugs

by druggists. Growing in yards, parks, and woodlands were the sources for drugs that people needed, and, strangely, he included thinly disguised contraceptives and abortifacients.

One technological invention greatly assisted women in childbirth but, at the same time, opened the birth scene more to males. In 1647 Peter Chamberlen constructed a practical obstetric forceps based on an earlier instrument made by a family member. The manufacture of the cleverly designed instrument remained a monopolistic secret for about 150 years. The two halves could be separated, inserted, and reassembled inside the pelvis, allowing the fetal head to be grasped safely and extracted. The Chamberlen family said that when a doctor was called, they did not want him to make the decision on whether to save the mother or the child. Probably the most critical technological innovation was the invention of the stethoscope in 1816 by René-Théophile-Hyacinthe Laënnec because it enabled a physician to hear the heartbeat. There are individual variations in when the heart can be heard, but by the 1840s and 1850s physicians could determine pregnancy by no later than the fourth month. Heretofore pregnancy was either determined and declared by the woman or, late in the pregnancy, obvious to all. With the now familiar stethoscope around their necks, physicians declared when a woman was pregnant.

Prior to around 1720 most births involved exclusively women as attendants and supporters. After that time male midwives, formally trained and licensed, began to appear and gain popularity. Heretofore males were called for obstetrical emergencies, but as the eighteenth century progressed, males, as midwives and physicians, were increasingly involved at the beginning of the birth process. Adding to the loss of prestige as a result of the association with witchcraft, the publication of many new works on the subject vulgarized midwifery "secrets." Women were being pushed aside in a world that they had controlled for thousands of years. Changing attitudes toward sexuality contributed to women's losses. Seventeenth-century English works on pornography portrayed women as eager and aggressive for sexual contacts, but when intercourse was described, the man jumped on the woman and pushed her around. The new industrial order altered vocabulary. A new term "opposite sex" implied that women were opposite, separate, unequal, just not men.

Scientific discoveries and technical innovations such as the vaginal speculum, introduced early in the nineteenth century to allow more effective examinations before childbirth, encouraged expanded roles for physicians in the birthing process. (Fathers, too, were

more likely to be present at births beginning in the late eighteenth century, at least in upper-class households.) The introduction of anesthetics in the mid-nineteenth-century greatly increased the benefits physicians might offer to women. Childbirth increasingly became a physician-dominated event, and then in the twentieth century, a hospital-based event. Infant and maternal mortality rates did drop in the process, though there was a period in the 1860s and 1870s when physicians, scorning sanitary procedures, actually introduced new infections. But the big mortality reductions after the 1880s were due in part to improved medical knowledge and the new interventions. Whether the cultural experience of giving birth suf-

fered in the same process is something historians and feminists have debated.

Science and abortion. In 1651 William Harvey (1578–1657) discovered the “eggs” in deer and declared that “all living things come from an egg.” To this he added that the fetus developed “gradually,” not in stages, as Aristotle implied. Marcello Malpighi (1628–1694) and Jan Swammerdam (1637–1680) examined fetal development in eggs, and Swammerdam declared that the black spot in a frog’s egg is “the frog itself complete in all its parts.”

The hypothesis was that each ovum contains the individual seed of the entire species that is to come

afterward. The preformationists regarded the egg as central to reproduction, while the male triggered the process. But with the invention of the microscope, the debate was enriched. Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632–1723) saw first that each drop of seminal fluid contained millions of “worms” or, in the less dramatic term, “animalcules.” Contemporaries were fascinated by the news, but they were baffled by all those worms. The preformationists and epigenecists—the egg-people and the sperm people—debated what they saw murkily. The debate spilled from the drawing rooms to the public arena. Europeans saw that older theories about fetal life were wrong, and the new ideas caused them to reexamine their positions on abortion. Even though it was not until 1876 that Oskar Hertwig actually saw a sperm fertilizing an egg, the event was known to science and to much of the public.

France made abortion criminal in 1792 with words based on the provisions of medieval town ordinances. In 1803, through Lord Ellenborough’s bill, Britain declared anyone who administered an abortion a criminal, specifying only drug-induced abortions. The same act defined abortion as a procedure performed on any woman “being quick with child.” In 1810 Napoleon’s Penal Code declared criminal any act whereby someone gave “food, beverage, medicines, violence or any other means” to procure an abortion. By the 1830s it was recognized that the concept of quickening, based on Aristotle, was untenable. The question was when was an abortion an abortion? In 1837 abortion was defined as eliminating pregnancy at any period, thereby dropping reference to quickening. In 1851 Pope Pius IX declared as subject to excommunication anyone who procured “a successful abortion.” Even though conception per se was not specified, gone were concepts such as ensoulment and “formed fetus” (quickened). One by one the nation-states of Europe defined abortion as occurring anytime after conception that pregnancy was deliberately terminated: Austria, 1852; Denmark, 1866; Belgium, 1867; Spain, 1870; Zürich Canton, 1871; Netherlands, 1881; Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1881; Norway, 1885; Italy, 1889; and Turkey, 1911.

The actual history and context of abortion both explained and defied legal patterns. Sexual activity was rising, particularly among young people and the lower classes. Many women found themselves pregnant before marriage, and while rates of illegitimacy increased, there was also a new desire to terminate pregnancy. Wives might also seek means of reducing the threat of unwanted children in overcrowded, impoverished families. The desire for abortion increased, at least in some quarters. This helps explain the new efforts at legislation, but also their considerable inef-

fectiveness. Many women experienced illegal abortions—one estimate held that a quarter of working-class women in Berlin had had at least one abortion by the 1890s. Even in the twentieth century, when more effective birth control limited the need for abortion within marriage in Western Europe, premarital sexual activity among youth maintained considerable demand. In Eastern Europe, where available birth control devices remained limited or poor quality into the late twentieth century, abortion was even more common, serving as a basic means of birth control, even though here too it was frequently illegal. Only in the later twentieth century did most European countries move to legalize abortion, thus reducing the often dangerous gap between law and practice.

Birth control. Even so, and far more than with abortion, there were huge gaps between legal and cultural prescriptions on the one hand, and actual developments in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on the other. Need for and rates of birth control both increased.

The need was clear. Beginning with the middle classes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, European families redefined the pluses and minuses of children. Middle-class parents, eager to provide some education for boys and dowries for girls, were hard-pressed to meet their obligations without reducing the birthrate. A bit later, working-class families, affected by child labor laws and technical changes that reduced the earning power of children, in addition to schooling requirements and frequent poverty, also discovered the desirability of reducing traditional birthrates. Peasant families varied in their movement in this direction. Overall, however, the burdens of rapid population increase plus changes in work meant that, during the nineteenth century, most groups in western Europe found children becoming more an economic liability than an asset and reduced birthrates accordingly. Similar patterns set in in eastern and southern Europe by 1900.

Methods of birth control varied. Initially, there were few new methods available and widespread legal and cultural constraints on artificial measures. Many families resorted to coitus interruptus or abstinence; this was true in working-class families into the twentieth century. In the long run however, new devices, made possible and affordable by developments such as the vulcanization of rubber (1840s), increased the artificial means available and permitted increasing recreational rather than procreational sex, both within marriage and without. Middle-class families gradually turned to the use of diaphragms (called pessaries in the nineteenth century), while workers more often

used condoms. Knowledge spread gradually; condoms were seen as exotic—called “Parisian articles”—by German laborers as late as the 1870s. But the development of new levels of artificial birth control was steady and involved major changes in family life and sexuality alike.

Well into the twentieth century, most governments, whether communist, fascist, or democratic, continued to promote population growth and oppose birth control. The gap between policy and widespread practice widened. Even in Nazi Germany, birth control levels receded only briefly. By the 1960s, faced with new levels of adolescent sexual activity, most European governments moved toward legalizing the availability of birth control devices. Concerns about disease supported this move. One result was a far greater decline in adolescent pregnancy in Europe than in the United States, where the legislative framework differed considerably and where programs to promote abstinence won greater favor.

The control of birth. In the nineteenth century a woman’s body was opened to the public in ways held private in early centuries. To learn whether she was pregnant a woman would go or be sent to a physician, whose eyes would observe the darkening of the areola and view her vagina. His hands would feel her breasts and his fingers the cervix for the so-called Hegar’s sign, enlargement and softening of the uterus and cervix. Male midwives increased in numbers and importance, partly because they received formal education for licensing. In eighteenth-century France male *accoucheurs* (midwives) were said to be driving women from the profession. In England it was said that female anatomy was designed to fit the male midwives’ fingers.

The late nineteenth century witnessed important events for birth in what Angus McLaren calls the medicalization of procreation. Increased attention on

germ theory made the environment of the birth chamber increasingly important. The result was the move to hospitals for delivery. The “lithotomy position” (the woman on her back) for childbirth replaced the standing or squatting position. “Twilight sleep,” or the use of anesthesia, pioneered by Bernhard Krönig in Germany in 1899, promised the removal of pain. These gains, undeniably beneficial for women, brought with them the price of men and the state controlling their reproductive processes. The womb was made public.

Birth control drugs once known by women, learned from mother to daughter, came to be dispensed by druggists, many of whom did not know proper preparations or even the correct plants and their amounts. Proprietary menstrual regulators were peddled and some women relied on them. The concerns by nineteenth-century political and ecclesiastical leaders about declines in birthrates resulted in more rigorous legislation and enforcement about birth control laws relating to contraceptive and abortion drugs and surgical procedures for abortions. Thomas Malthus, famous for his dismal pronouncement about population increase, said that he was even more worried about dangers of population decreases. Reproduction was too important to be left in the control of women.

By the twentieth century, in what Barbara Duden calls the iconography of pregnancy, the fetus was spoken as having “life” and as being “human.” The question of theologians about when ensoulment occurs was altered to when does life begin, and the answer was at conception. The controversies swirled around these issues of the age-old right of women to employ birth control techniques and the right of society to protect its newly formed definition of life. Procreation was safer for women, but safety was purchased with freedom.

See also sections 15, 16, and 17 (volume 4), and other articles in this section.

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THE LIFE CYCLE



Sherri Klassen

A society's vision of the life cycle plays a major role in determining the life choices individuals make and how they portray these choices to others. Drawing together social and cultural history, a history of the life cycle examines both behavior and its relationship to ideas about aging and the structure of life. Demographic, economic, political, religious, and technological change all influenced the way Europeans understood their lives. The experiences Europeans anticipated in their various life stages and the relationships they formed with their contemporaries and with people in differing life stages depended on their life-cycle expectations.

Between the Renaissance and the late twentieth century, three major changes occurred in Europeans' perception of the life cycle. First, the passage of time within a human life came to be viewed less as cyclic than as progressive: whereas once life and lives were imaged as continuous, following cyclic patterns through time, lifetimes came to be seen as finite and involving an individual's passage through rising and declining status. Second, Europeans saw a growing stratification of the stages of life and an effort to define these stages more precisely. This feature of the life cycle developed slowly over the course of the early modern period, reaching its apogee in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Finally, European history has seen a slow disappearance of diversity in life-course patterns, a trend that began reversing itself in the latter half of the twentieth century.

THE LIFE SPAN: FROM A CIRCLE TO A STAIRCASE

In both the early modern and modern eras, Europeans recognized that the span of human life involved some elements that were best understood in terms of repeating cycles and others that were better understood as linear development. While the two models co-existed, the circular model predominated until the seventeenth century, after which the model of linear

progress and decline came to the fore. These developments are apparent in artistic representations of the life cycle, narratives of individual lives and biography, and behavior as seen in demographic and notarial records.

Circles and stairs in art and theory. The term "life cycle" reflects an understanding of life as continuous and circular. Seen in late medieval pictorial representations of the life cycle, this appreciation of life depicts all ages as equal before God and influenced more by divine intervention than by the sheer passage of time. Paintings and prints from before the sixteenth century show different epochs of life along the spokes of a wheel with no apparent hierarchy of ages. Predictable differences exist between the epochs, but the differences are not shown as essential and do not appear to have emerged from experience or development. The appearance of Christ in the center of some of these wheels confirms the place of Providence in holding together the different ages of the life cycle. Other paintings feature women and men of different ages brought together to demonstrate contrast and also the continuity and fullness of time.

Theoretical writings of the Renaissance toy with the meaning of cycles as well. Niccolò Machiavelli's writings, for example, discuss cycles in political lives. Other prevalent notions show fortune as a wheel in which periods of prosperity follow upon periods of misfortune. Fortune governs both the individual's life course and the course of human history. These cycles allowed premodern thinkers to draw analogies between the individual and the societal.

Prints portraying the life cycle became both more common and more linear after the sixteenth century. Rather than the purely circular image, these representations display the increasingly familiar image of the life cycle as an ascending and descending staircase. Middle age stands firmly at the apex of the staircase, showing a clear indication of the hierarchy of ages—individuals ascend through time to middle age and then descend toward death.

By the time prints of the life cycle gained widespread popularity, they had also become much more secular in their content. The images show domestic and professional developments up and down the stairway, only occasionally portraying spirituality. Divine orchestration no longer controls the life cycle. Instead, each step follows upon the earlier in a progression determined by the passage of time, accumulated human experience, and biological change.

The secular life cycle as portrayed in these prints gained popularity in the eighteenth century as Enlightenment thought began to see aging as a primarily biological process. As fascinated as their forebears with the passage of time, the Enlightenment writers saw the distinctions between life-course stages as rational and natural distinctions that contrasted with the irrational social distinctions of rank. The secular life cycle emerging in the eighteenth century saw life's turning points as predictable and rational, as necessarily following one another, and as developing not

from divine intervention but from human experience or laws of nature.

Scientific developments over the course of the nineteenth century show a tension between the tendencies to see the life course as linear progression and as cyclic continuity. Medical science before the eighteenth century accepted elements of progression alongside the cyclic reversals of human aging. The hope for progress in the medicine of the Enlightenment at once encouraged a more linear vision of the life course and set medical minds seeking a cure for aging. Theorists intent on overcoming aging emphasized the regenerative capabilities of the body, seeing life not as one large cycle but as a conglomeration of many small cycles of decay and regeneration. In 1788 James Hutton described the geological notion of deep time by comparing the earth's history with the human body and claiming that both followed continuous cycles of decay and regeneration—evidenced in the body by the circulation of the blood and the body's capacity

to heal itself after injury. In commenting on Hutton's theories, the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould was able to mock them since twentieth-century approaches to the life cycle assert that aging brings necessary, and irreversible, elements of change.

Cycles and progression in narrative forms. Biographical writings were rare before the modern era, but those extant, especially the lives of the saints, demonstrate the circular-life course model. The thirteenth-century collection of saints' lives known as the *Golden Legend* contains two major life-course patterns. One pattern shows a lack of change. The saint's miracles and unusual virtue begin at an early age and continue throughout his or her life. Neither the passage of time nor the saint's many experiences effect either growth or regression. The second life course pattern involves conversion from a life of sin to one of sanctity. One such case of a major change in lifestyle is St. Mary of the Desert, a woman who converted from a prostitute to a hermit because of a miraculous act of the Virgin Mary. The change in her life occurs not out of accumulated experience, tempered by the passage of time, but rather from providential revelation. St. Mary of the Desert's life fits with an awareness of life as a circle of redemption where a soul is brought from a state of sinfulness back into one of grace. The saint's life is embedded within a circle of grace that began with creation rather than with the saint's life on earth and frequently continues after the saint's bodily death.

Although these patterns remained evident after the sixteenth century, the linear model of the life course grew more common in various forms of biographical writings. Thomas Cole (1992) traces these developments to a competing ideology in Christianity that envisioned life as a pilgrimage or journey. As the idea of the pilgrimage gained popularity in the later middle ages, so did the idea of life as a pilgrimage. Written in 1678 by John Bunyan, *Pilgrim's Progress* represented the fruition of this development by depicting life as a spiritual journey in which an individual achieved salvation by learning from experiences along the pathway. Saints' lives written after the sixteenth century likewise demonstrate an awareness of personal development, often portraying a more gradual progression toward sanctity.

Emerging narrative forms such as novels, memoirs, and biographies also demonstrate a growing appreciation of life as structured by development across time. Starting in the seventeenth century, these genres depicted individual lives that changed as a result of influences and human experiences. The narrative form itself came to force a structure onto the telling

of human lives such that life stories became chronological arrangements of events with clear beginnings and conclusions (a structure that had very rarely been in place in pre-Reformation life stories). The trend toward life narratives structured to show linear development across time continued with the explosion of publishing in these genres in the nineteenth century. While biography writing, and to a large degree memoirs, continued to hold to this structural form in the twentieth century, fiction showed a greater latitude in its portrayal of time's role in the life cycle.

Linear growth in lived experiences. The full impact of an ideological switch from life as composed of recurring patterns to life as composed of linear progression was not felt by the majority of Europeans until the early twentieth century. Many of the changes were gradual, affecting child-rearing practices, the regard for seniority in work environments and institutionalized retirement, the treatment of the elderly, and consumption habits.

The growth of the social welfare state facilitated the spread of some of these changes. Mandatory primary schooling for children, first introduced as legislation in seventeenth-century Germany, instilled the notion that childhood was a period for growth. The idea of legislation of this sort spread well before it could truly be implemented or enforced. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, such legislation existed in most of Europe and dictated childhood education as a life-cycle choice for whole populations. Through pension legislation, the state also spread the notion that old age represented a period of decline. Poor laws from at least as early as the seventeenth century had recognized old age as a condition precipitating want, but age was only one of many factors. Universal old-age pensions affirmed a belief that old age in and of itself marked decline.

The effects of industrialization on the life course are still debated. They were most certainly gradual, as older patterns persisted despite the demands of a new work schedule that drew workers out of a familial setting. Elements of progression in working lives had been prevalent in some aspects of the economy well before the modern age. A successful master artisan developed from a lowly apprentice and was rewarded for skill and hard work. As industrial enterprises began to specialize the tasks performed, workers could move from one position to another along a progressive career path. The industrial workplace may have discouraged older workers because the tasks could not be modified to fit individual needs, but at the same time industrial employers sought to reward seniority as a means of retaining workers. Autobiographies of

working men and women from the industrial era suggest that men quickly saw their lives as containing progressive career trajectories whereas women saw their working lives as containing different but non-progressive segments.

The changing perceptions of life-cycle patterns affected the tenor of family dynamics as well. A model of life emphasizing cycles and repetition encouraged a sense of reciprocity between parents' care of young children and the care of parents by those children as adults. A common folk tale told of a young child observing his father mistreat an elderly parent. The child then innocently proclaims his intention to follow his father's example and the father, chagrined, mends his ways. Popular as a moral tale, the story also demonstrates the cycles upon which care for the elderly rested. Individuals cared for their elderly parents because the next turn of the cycle would require that they receive care. Likewise, parents instilled in their children a sense of indebtedness that would be called upon when they required care as elders.

By the end of the eighteenth century, duty toward children and the elderly came to be based less on indebtedness than on personal attachment. Treatises on education and child rearing attest to the belief that care of children was important in that it affected their developmental capacities. A parent, therefore,

had the important task of steering the child's development into a responsible adult. Child-rearing beliefs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries heightened the role of personal attachment; this emotional context then grew as the basis for filial duty toward the elderly. Only this context of personal attachment could serve the needs of the family within the paradigm of the linear life course as perpetual generational indebtedness had once served those needs in a worldview based on cycles and repetitions.

The linear life course, in addition to revamping the family and workplace, also created new consumer preferences. A fascination with youth was not new in the modern era, but previously Europeans were more interested in seeking elixirs that would allow them to return to a period of youth after old age than in forestalling the affects of aging. Tales of fountains of youth or special elixirs that could transform an elderly individual into a youthful one reflect a popular dream of perpetuating the cycles within a single lifetime. Common from the Middle Ages through the seventeenth century, the dream of repeating the cycle of youth inspired both serious inquiry and fantasy. By the twentieth century, neither medical science nor fantastic literature was exploring the possibility of returning an old body to its youthful state. Beginning in the eighteenth century, elixirs claimed more fre-



MME DE GENLIS ON REJUVENATION

Stéphanie Felicité Ducret de St.-Aubin, comtesse de Genlis wrote her memoirs shortly after the French Revolution. Here she remembers her encounter with a man she believed to have found a cure for aging. She was twelve years old at the time of her meeting.

I was persuaded—and my father believed it firmly—that M. de Saint-Germain, who appeared to be forty-five years old at most, was in fact over ninety. If a man has no vices, he can achieve a very advanced age; there are many examples of this. Without passions and immoderation, man would live to be a hundred years old and those with long lives would live to one hundred and fifty or sixty. Then, at the age of ninety, one will have the vigor of a man of forty or fifty. So, my suppositions regarding M. de Saint-Germain were in no way unreasonable. If one admits as well the possibility that he had found, by means of chemistry, the composition of an elixir (a particular liquor appropriate to his temperament), one would have to admit that even without belief in a philosopher's stone, he was older than I had thought. During the first four months I knew him, M. de Saint-Germain said nothing extraordinary. . . . Finally, one night, after accompanying me to some Italian music, he told me that in four or five years I would have a beautiful voice. And, he added, "And when you are seventeen or eighteen, would you like to remain fixed at that age at least for a great number of years?" I answered that I would be charmed. "Well then," he replied seriously, "I promise it to you." And immediately spoke of other things.

Source: *Mémoires inédits de Madame la Comtesse de Genlis, sur le 18ème siècle et la Révolution Française*. (Paris, 1825), 109–110. (Translation is my own.)

quently to prevent the onset of old age than to reverse the process. The twentieth-century cosmetics industry continued a tradition of selling a dream of postponing the linear process of aging. With the ascendancy of the linear life-course model, the idea of complete rejuvenation lost credibility. Yet the dream did not completely fade; while many of the "anti-aging" cosmetics are aimed at postponing the affects of age on the skin, others claim to reverse the process. Furthermore, drugs that induce hair growth or stimulate male virility reflect a hope of returning to an earlier phase rather than simply preventing the onset of age.

STRATIFICATION OF THE LIFE STAGES

As conception of the life cycle grew linear, it also became more highly stratified in the eighteenth century. Placed along a hierarchy, each life stage grew more distinct from any other and the transitions that marked the changes more highly ritualized. Numerical age grew more significant in determining life patterns as the modern era advanced, and in combination, the separation of life stages and the heightened importance of age led to a shift from communal and task-related rites of passage to familial and age-related ones.

Age awareness. Age grew more important in signaling transitions from one life stage to another as Europeans grew more aware of their own ages. The simplest means of gauging the extent of this awareness is to analyze the precision of ages, which individuals were asked to supply, reported in census, civic, and church records. Research in this area has been less than systematic, but it suggests that both governments and individuals increasingly valued precise numerical ages from the seventeenth century onward. Previously, ages were reported infrequently in death and marriage records. Through the course of the seventeenth century, ages came to be recorded regularly in death registers, and in the course of the eighteenth century, marriage registers began to include the precise ages of the spouses.

Even in the eighteenth century, however, the numbers supplied in the records were often inconsistent and imprecise. Demographers use the term "age heaping" to describe the pattern of age recording that could be found in premodern Europe (see figure 1). Examined in the aggregate, each year shows certain ages being reported far more frequently than others. Premodern Europeans appear to have rounded their ages to the decade, half decade, or less. While the ages reported might have approximated the chronological age, they may also have been used as an indication of status. If this was the case, the numerical age was descriptive rather than causative: one did not become old by turning sixty years of age; by turning old, one became sixty. A decrease in age heaping over the course of the eighteenth century suggests that Europeans had begun to award greater significance to age and were interpreting it more literally.

Not only were Europeans reporting their ages to bureaucrats with greater precision in the eighteenth century, they were also making note of the ages of their friends and relatives. Individuals writing memoirs in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries show a fascination with chronological age, making special note of the specific ages of their friends

and family members. They frequently commented on individuals who appeared younger than would be expected for their age and on people who acted “inappropriately,” and took care to mention the exact age of the person they were either deriding or praising. Numerical age had a meaning apart from, and sometimes at odds with, the physical and social characteristics of aging.

Age awareness emerged unevenly across the European landscape. Both France and England saw heightened age awareness in the course of the eighteenth century. Russian documentation, on the other hand, suggests that age awareness there was spotty even at the end of the nineteenth century. Regions with high levels of age awareness also displayed high levels of literacy and stronger government bureaucracies than the parts of Europe with low levels of age awareness.

Atomized life stages and age grading. Europeans combined their earlier notions of a life cycle composed of many equal stages with their new awareness of precise age differences by envisioning the stages of life as composed of categories of precise ages. Age became the determining factor for passage between a rapidly increasing number of stages.

The prints of the life cycle that portrayed a double staircase not only show the move from a cyclic to a progressive life course but also demonstrate the growing stratification between stages. As a step along the life span, each life stage was as distinct as it was dependent on the one before it. In the nineteenth century these prints showed a greater number of dis-

tinct life stages and greater distinctions between the life patterns of men and women.

Developments in medicine helped to partition the population according to age. As physicians developed specialties in the nineteenth century, they created two—pediatrics and geriatrics—that were defined by the age of their patients. Pediatrics emerged as its own discipline in the early nineteenth century, with children’s hospitals opening in Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna. While geriatrics did not develop as a discipline with the same speed as pediatrics, treatises, booklets, and pamphlets devoted to medical discussions of the ailments of the elderly proliferated in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Even more than medicine, the national schooling systems that emerged in the nineteenth century encouraged stratification according to age group. Two models of education dominated the European public schools in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first, the monitorial system, mixed ages of children in a classroom, utilizing the skills of the more advanced students to assist in teaching the others. This model was largely overtaken in the nineteenth century by schools modeled on the theories of the Swiss educational reformer Johann Pestalozzi (1746–1827). Pestalozzi argued that children developed in clearly definable stages and that an educational system should anticipate these stages. Rather than mixing children of various ages and achievements, Pestalozzi proposed placing all pupils of the same stage together and separating them from other children. Given the same educational influences, the children would develop as a cohort from one stage to the next. Compulsory ages for school attendance quickly linked age to academic developmental stages. The Prussians were the quickest and most diligent pupils of these theories, and the Prussian school system became a model that other European states emulated.

If age grading within the schools defined the ages in childhood, old age pensions and retirement legislation instilled age grading at the other end of the life cycle. Entitlement to the earliest pension schemes depended on work status and disability as much as old age. The pensions became strictly age graded when governments universalized the pensions in the early twentieth century. Once the pensions included middle-class as well as working-class recipients, need and ability to work were dropped from the qualifications for receipt, and age alone stood as the definition of the appropriate time for retirement.

While many of the trends in age stratification accelerated throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a number of novelists, scientists, and theorists at the turn of the century critiqued atomized

life stages and universalistic understandings of time. In literature, the works of Marcel Proust, James Joyce, and Virginia Woolf saw an individual's personal past conflated with the present and portrayed the passage of time as elastic rather than rigidly divided into parcels. The writings of Sigmund Freud, on the one hand, theorized universal stages of human development but, on the other, weighed the stages disproportionately. Instead of neatly ordered, equal divisions of time, Freud saw the first step in the double staircase of the life course as overshadowing all the others that would follow it. Education reformers in the early twentieth century saw the stages as highly variable, arguing that individual children progressed along their own paths of development, which could not be easily compiled into universal stages of educational development.

Life course transitions and rites of passage. Rituals marked life-stage transitions in both the premodern and modern European experience, but in the nineteenth century age played a heightened role in defining the timing and content of the rites of passage—a trend that began to be reversed only in the last three decades of the twentieth century. Rituals of life-course transition also became family occasions rather than religious or institutional rituals in the course of the nineteenth century.

The rituals of pre-Reformation Christianity marked several of the life-stage transitions. Baptism marked the entrance of a child into the world and into the Christian community of souls; marriage marked adulthood for the majority of Europeans. Extreme unction and funeral rites marked death as a transition in the spiritual life cycle. With the exception of extreme unction, both Protestant and Catholic churches retained religious rituals to mark these life-stage transitions. Confirmation grew in importance as a ritual in seventeenth-century Catholicism and in the Church of England, marking a transition into youth.

In addition to church rites, work status played a role in defining life-course transitions. Both peasants and city dwellers passed from youth to adulthood when they either inherited land or accumulated enough wealth to allow them to establish independent households. In many areas marriage marked the transition to adulthood largely because it had marked the couple's economic independence. The life-course transitions of artisans also grew out of guild and city regulations. City and later royal governments dictated the minimum age for apprenticeship in the early modern period. The duration of apprenticeship varied more widely. Rituals marking the passage from apprentice to journeyman or journeyman to master signaled

work transitions. Retirement was generally ad hoc and frequently gradual; the transition out of the workplace often blended physical infirmity with plans to prepare the next generation for its inheritance.

In the nineteenth century, religious work, and education rites developed a more familial character than had previously been the case. Marriage, for example, remained a religious occasion but developed a very strong family component in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Weddings emerged at this time as events of enormous emotional and financial expenditure on the part of families. Likewise, graduations and retirements became occasions for family celebration as they became more regular, predictable, and associated with specific ages.

Work and family life-cycle transitions became occasions for family rituals especially when they represented movement from one sphere of activity to another. The life cycle that emerged in the nineteenth century placed different spheres of activity clearly in different epochs of the life cycle. If early childhood was nurtured within the private, domestic sphere, the next phase of childhood and adolescence was assigned to education. Work for economic gain in the public sphere, rather than marriage, marked adulthood for men while the older pattern of marriage as a transition marked adulthood for women through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. Age marked numerous transitions that signaled acceptance into diverse spheres of social and occupational activity. Once property and gender qualifications were eliminated, voting rights became a strictly age-graded transition. Limitations on child labor caused the beginnings of paid employment to stand as an age-graded transition as well. While these two cases show transitions allowing youths to move out of the domestic sphere and into the public, the age of retirement signified a move out of commercial space and into the private sphere.

The celebration of the birthday is perhaps the most illustrative of life-course rituals in that it demonstrates both the importance of chronological age and the value of the family as the site for modern rituals of life-stage transitions. The birthdays of kings and nobles were celebrated from at least as early as the seventeenth century as festivals that reiterated the honor due to the individual and reinscribed the loyalty of the subjects. Before the eighteenth century, nonruling people rarely celebrated their birthdays; the events were not occasions on which to dwell upon the passage of time and levels of accomplishment.

For many Europeans before the modern era, only one birthday—that which marked the age of majority—held significance. In a land-based econ-

omy, this age marked the date of inheritance, allowing the young adult to establish an independent household. The passage of inheritance could depend upon proof that a minor heir had come of age. The proof came in the form of testimony from village elders. In these cases elders oversaw the passage from youth to adulthood within their communities. The age of majority was important as a rite of community recognition of adulthood as much as it was recognition of age as relevant in defining status.

In the eighteenth century literary works first began to mention ordinary birthdays. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe thought enough of the coincidence of sharing a birthday with his rival in love to refer to the birthday in his novel *The Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774), in part based on his experiences. Goethe apparently celebrated his birthday together with his rival in 1772. In her memoirs of her bourgeois Paris girlhood, Mme Roland recounts celebrating the birthdays of her grandparents with visits and gift exchanges in the 1760s. Gifts passed in both directions at the elders' birthdays, but she makes no mention of her own birthdays. Queen Victoria is credited with having brought the custom of family celebrations of the birthday from her German relations to England and with popularizing it there, but the origins of the traditions in France and Germany remain obscure.

THE CAUSES OF CHANGE

The conditions that prefigured these developments in the meaning of age and the life cycle were gradual and manifold. Altered perceptions of time, religious change, a growing state bureaucracy, and the spread of literacy in European society all contributed to the emergence of a linear life course stratified by age. Developments in the perceptions of time can be traced back to the invention of the mechanical clock in the fourteenth century. The growing efficiency and mass production of the clock beginning in the seventeenth century accelerated the process whereby Europeans thought of time as finite, composed of uniform parcels and proceeding in a uniform manner.

Religious change and the invention of the printing press are the most plausible causes for the distinct shift toward a life-course model emphasizing linear rather than cyclic patterns. The message of religious reformers in sixteenth-century Germany was heavily laden with eschatological references that stressed the apocalypse as the completion of a linear development of history rather than the fruition of a cycle. Protestantism, moreover, argued against a vision of the individual's life as composed of cycles of sin followed by absolution. In arguing that good works were irrelevant to grace, Martin Luther removed the cycles involved in human salvation. The printing press prop-



BIRTHDAYS AND UN-BIRTHDAYS

By the end of the nineteenth century, the celebration of birthdays was an established ritual for marking the passage of time, especially in childhood. At the same time, scientists and literary figures alike were questioning the nature of time and its impact on human lives. When Lewis Carroll created a world with inverted temporal and spatial laws, he included several discussions of the meaning (or lack of meaning) of age and one discussion of birthday gifts. In the looking-glass world, one particular day could have no more meaning than any other; dividing time in this fashion was, in itself, complex mathematics.

“They gave it to me—for an un-birthday present.”
 “I beg your pardon?” Alice said with a puzzled air.
 “I’m not offended.” said Humpty Dumpty
 “I mean what *is* an un-birthday present?”
 “A present that’s given when it isn’t your birthday, of course.”
 Alice considered a little. “I like birthday presents best,” she said at last.
 “You don’t know what you’re talking about!” cried Humpty Dumpty. “How many days are there in a year?”
 “Three hundred and sixty-five” said Alice.
 “And how many birthdays have you?”
 “One.”
 “And if you take one from three hundred and sixty-five, what remains?”
 “Three hundred and sixty-four, of course.”
 Humpty Dumpty looked doubtful.
 “I’d rather see that done on paper,” he said.
 Alice couldn’t help smiling as she took out her memorandum book, and worked out the sum for him:

$$\begin{array}{r} 365 \\ 1 \\ \hline 364 \end{array}$$

Humpty Dumpty took the book and looked at it carefully. “That seems to be done right—” he began.
 “You’re holding it upside down!” Alice interrupted.
 “To be sure I was!” Humpty Dumpty said gaily, as she turned it around for him. “I thought it looked a little queer. As I was saying, that *seems* to be done right—though I haven’t the time to look it over thoroughly just now—and that shows that there are three hundred and sixty-four days when you might get un-birthday presents—”
 “Certainly,” said Alice.
 “And only *one* for birthday presents, you know. There’s glory for you!”

Source: Lewis Carroll, *The Annotated Alice* (New York, 1974), 267–268.

agated Protestant thinking as well as the pictorial representations of the life cycle, stimulating thought and awareness of life cycle images.

The printing press also encouraged the spread of literacy, which seems to have influenced the development of age awareness. A correlation between the two developments has been found in numerous societies, and early modern Europe was no exception. The reasons for this correlation have not been explored extensively; it may be that age awareness relied more on an ability to read numbers than actual literacy but that this ability accompanied literacy in the cultures studied.

Some of the credit for a heightened awareness of age of the populace as a whole must also go to the record keepers themselves, who made strong efforts at keeping accurate records that included precise ages. The growth and rationalization of state bureaucracies ensured that the population was frequently asked to report ages and, thus, that specific chronological age entered more deeply into the consciousness of the European population.

DIVERSE PATHWAYS

The dominant shifts in life-cycle attitudes reflect the dominant sectors of society. Both individual life-cycle patterns and the ideology that frames them vary for peoples who were not dominant in their societies because of gender, class, or race. Research has begun to look at the impact of gender or class on attitudes toward aging and life-cycle decisions in Europe’s past. Historians of twentieth-century Europe will need to pay greater attention to racial diversity to understand the development of life-cycle patterns in Europe’s increasingly multicultural population. The late twentieth century marked a growing awareness of diverse life patterns. This awareness may break apart the notion of a dominant life-course pattern that had become seemingly less diverse in the early twentieth century.

Until the mid-twentieth century, the female life cycle held certain marked differences from the male. Evidence of women’s life-cycle patterns from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries shows a divergence from the vision of a progressive life-course pattern. Rather than advancing to midlife and then retreating, women slowly increased their activities and social networks into advanced old age. Neither cyclic nor linear, this pattern reflects a vision of the life course as expansive or elastic. Nineteenth-century women defined their life-cycle transitions more frequently by biological events such as childbirth and menopause than by

strictly age-graded events. Supported by scientific biases that emphasized the power of the physiological on women, women developed their own rituals surrounding female biological transitions. The life-cycle patterns of working women were functions of both gender and class. Working women tended not to see movement in and out of the workplace as marking significant life-course transitions. The significant points, instead, were related to family dynamics and composition: marriage, the death of parents, or the activities of children among the transitional life-course events.

The life cycles of the working classes and peasantry were consistently more variable and less age stratified than the pattern set by the bourgeoisie and elites. Adult family life for members of all classes before the nineteenth century involved the presence of small children for approximately twenty years—between a relatively late marriage and the woman's menopause. Middle-class patterns over the nineteenth century abbreviated the childbearing period by limiting family size at the same time as they lowered the age of marriage. Working-class women and men also got married at lower ages when industrialization opened up new avenues of independence, but they bore larger families, each member contributing to the family economy. Childbearing, then, became a trait associated with youth for middle class women and remained more variable for peasants and working-class women until the twentieth century. Economic prosperity relied on a smaller number of children for the middle classes and a larger number for the workers since, in all stages of childhood, children in middle-class households were economic dependents, whereas older children were economic assets in working-class families. Working-class families, thus, deeply resented the introduction of child labor laws.

While middle-class couples passed from youthful parenthood into a period of childless independence, working-class couples saw their households expand to include both young children and much older unmarried offspring. Education drew middle-class adolescents from the family hearth to boarding schools that offered discipline but independence from parents. Working-class youths, on the other hand, remained in their parents' homes longer in industrialized Europe than before as apprenticeship and domestic service declined in the late nineteenth century. Previously, youth employment in these two sectors had

required the youth's residence in the place of employment. Once industrial labor offered better opportunities, youths resided with their parents. The spread of mandatory education had a much smaller effect on working-class and peasant adolescents than on the members of the bourgeoisie. Though they complied with the law, children of both the peasantry and the urban working classes ceased studies at the earliest legal age. Though mandatory school attendance lengthened childhood by delaying work, economic employment, rather than schooling, continued to define the life-stage transition. While the middle class recognized adolescence as a period of transition between childhood incompetence and adult work responsibility, working-class youths assumed adult work responsibilities as soon as they were able. The creation of adolescence occurred for the working class only after World War I, half a century after the middle class had initiated it.

On the other hand, working-class autobiographies demonstrate patterns consistent with a linear life-course model. Workers aimed at advancing their careers and generally present their lives as cohesive narratives. Turning points in their lives acted as catalysts for linear growth rather than revelations resulting in a cyclic return or rebirth. By the mid-twentieth century, the working class and the middle class accepted the same basic traits in the life course, both agreeing on the various life stages—that they were based on chronological age, that the family life course was distinct from the workplace, and that life progressed along a trajectory. For a brief period, one model prevailed.

The late twentieth century, however, heralded the onset of the postmodern life course, which is defined not by any unifying factors but by a diversity of patterns and a shift away from using age as a criterion for status. Ages of first marriage and childbearing grew more variable, and work involved less a single career trajectory than several trajectories following upon each other. Early retirement practices and a resistance to mandatory retirement resulted in an increasingly imprecise definition of retirement age. Rejecting sharp stratification, the postmodern life course is neither linear nor cyclic. It defies the temporality of the life span by dismantling the chronological, socially constructed stages of life upon which both the life cycle and the life course models have for so long rested.

See also other articles in this section.

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HEALTH AND DISEASE



Kenneth F. Kiple

Studies centered on political, economic, military, or church affairs are very old avenues of historical investigation in Europe. By considerable contrast the study of disease and history is quite new.

In part this is because until the beginning of germ theory in the late 1800s, people did not know what caused them to be sick and to die. When court chroniclers and historians felt pressed to account for the presence of diseases, “God’s will” was a handy explanation—a “will” that was routinely credited with epidemics that delivered misery and death to thousands, even hundreds of thousands, of individuals. Perhaps because God might be credited but never blamed, this explanation was also generally laden with the suspicion that divine will had gotten a helping hand from secular sources such as the ragged and dirty poor, or outsiders, or Jews, all of whom came to comprise the usual scapegoats during epidemics.

However, the study of disease in history is also a phenomenon of the last two centuries or so because the writing of history was an enterprise that tended to deal with the affairs of a highly visible elite as opposed to the murky masses. Hence epidemics—the most dramatic manifestation of disease—which as a rule fed on those masses while sparing the elite (whose wealth separated them physically and nutritionally from the masses and permitted flight from epidemic sites), were often not counted as very noteworthy events for those in a position to record them.

It was the birth of both germ theory and social history that changed this state of historiographical affairs by clearing the way for twentieth-century historians to focus on the role of human health in history. These historians, in turn, have made the study of the impact of disease on societies indispensable to any holistic understanding of those societies. This article looks at the march of a number of diseases across Europe from the Renaissance to the present. It attempts to do so in chronological order, but sections of the article sometimes overlap because an effort has also been made to present diseases in categories. Most of these categories feature diseases of an epidemic or pan-

demic nature. However, the less dramatic endemic diseases are also discussed, as are those caused by foods and nutritional deficiencies.

As for nomenclature, “epidemic” is defined as a disease suddenly appearing to attack many people in the same region at roughly the same time and “pandemic” as an epidemic disease that becomes widely distributed throughout a region, continent, or the globe; “endemic” refers to a disease that is always present in a population.

DISEASE AND THE RENAISSANCE

Somewhat ironically, given its connotation of “re-birth,” a distinctive feature of the Renaissance was widespread death, much of it caused by bubonic plague, which had become pandemic. It is generally said (but not without dispute) that the disease originated east of the Caspian Sea, then followed the caravan routes westward to burst upon Europe in 1347–1348, just as the Mediterranean Renaissance was getting under way. The disease, however, apparently failed to establish an endemic focus in Europe, meaning that it had to be reintroduced if Europe was to experience another epidemic; indeed it was reintroduced with an awful regularity, reappearing somewhere every quarter of a century or so until 1720—almost four hundred years of plague that began in the Renaissance and ceased only in the modern period.

The initial wave of plague, which we call the Black Death, lasted a terrible seven years, beginning with its appearance in Sicily in 1347. It subsequently reached the Italian peninsula, then marched through the Iberian Peninsula in the summer of 1348 and northward to reach Paris and the ports of southern England. The following year saw the British Isles devastated; then plague plunged into northern Europe and by 1350 was moving through eastern Europe. This first European tour of the plague culminated with an assault on Russia that saw Moscow under siege in 1353.

Although its trajectory was such that no region suffered plague for more than a few months, historians generally agree that the mortality it inflicted was in the 20 to 50 percent range. In the Mediterranean, in urban areas where people lived in close proximity to one another, such as Florence, Venice, Rome, Milan, and Barcelona (which were nurturing the early Renaissance), mortality rates were probably the highest. But it was in the myriad towns, villages, and hamlets, which contained the vast bulk of the population of a Europe still lingering in the late Middle Ages, that the plague harvested the overwhelming majority of its victims.

The impact of the Black Death, combined with that of the recurrent plague epidemics that followed, is difficult to comprehend in both breadth and magnitude. Populations that had been enjoying a period of sustained population growth were drastically pruned practically overnight, and a Europe that had been relatively crowded was so no longer. Whole villages were empty and fields deserted save for equally deserted sheep, cattle, and hogs. A great shortage of labor meant that patterns of landholding and land use had to change. Although not always without strife, landlords became easier to deal with, and many peasants became landowners. Population pressure on food supplies was reduced, and prices fell because of a lack of demand. Animal protein—suddenly abundant—began to grace even the tables of the poor, and the pace of urbanization quickened as individuals no longer needed in the countryside found nonagricultural jobs in cities and towns.

In addition to these significant changes, the onset of plague seems to have wrought some curious microparasitic alterations in Europe's disease ecology beyond the obvious introduction of the rodent disease *Yersinia pestis*, which we call bubonic plague. For reasons not fully understood, leprosy—a disease present in Europe since at least the sixth century—went into an abrupt recession while, at the same time, pulmonary tuberculosis began an ever increasingly prosperous career that would elevate it to the status of a major plague by the eighteenth century. One explanation offered by the American historian William McNeill for the decline of leprosy at this time takes note of the fact that the arrival of plague coincided with climatic change that saw average temperatures falling precipitously in Europe. Prior to the Black Death, with most of Europe put to the plow, firewood was scarce, and people doubtless kept warm on cold nights by huddling together, thereby increasing the ability of leprosy to spread. But in the wake of the Black Death there would have been less need to huddle, with some 40 percent fewer individuals putting pressure on the firewood supply; such a population reduction also meant that wool (and hence clothing) was more readily available. All of these factors may have acted in concert to interrupt leprosy's pattern of skin-to-skin transmission. As for the rise of tuberculosis (TB), the growth of crowded urban areas encouraged by the plague would have proven a fine incubator for this illness, which most frequently spreads from person to person by infected droplets from the lungs.

Populations did begin to recover with the improved conditions of life ushered in by the plague, and despite renewed appearances of this disease, urban areas did grow to support still other illnesses. Indeed, although it is difficult for historians to put a name to most epidemic diseases prior to the sixteenth century, there is no question that their pathogens were ricocheting about inside the walls of the swelling cities and towns, whose rivers and wells festered with human waste, whose markets swarmed with flies, whose dwellings were alive with rodents, and whose human inhabitants avoided bathing and seldom changed woolen clothing and bedding even though they harbored lice, bedbugs, and other assorted vermin.

EPIDEMIC DISEASE DURING THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

While Europeans were cultivating pathogens at home, they were also importing them from abroad. The Crusaders have been suspected of returning home with some novel microorganisms as well as exciting new plants and an enhanced *weltanschauung*, but it was the Portuguese, in leading the expansion of Europe with their century of African exploration, who brought many in Europe into contact with tropical ailments for the first time. Yaws—a disease caused by *treponemas*, a genus of spirochetes—may or may not have been present in an earlier and warmer Europe, but the illness began regularly reaching Iberia via a Portuguese-run slave trade and, according to epidemiologist E. H. Hudson, could have evolved into the syphilis that would soon engulf the Continent.

Falciparum malaria was another African contribution to Europe's pool of pathogens. Europeans had suffered from other types of malaria that were widespread during the Middle Ages; but *falciparum malaria* is by far the most lethal of the malarial types, so deadly in fact that it summons genetic defenses against it through the process of natural selection—defenses such as the sickle-cell trait and blood enzyme deficiencies that hold down the level of parasitization in the human body. The disease had been present in the eastern Mediterranean for thousands of years—long enough to have encouraged the development of such defenses (as discovered by the Crusaders, who did not possess them)—and in some nearby Greek and southern Italian populations as well. But the Iberians had had no opportunity to develop protection against this illness now arriving directly from Africa, which took root in the peninsula and even depopulated the Tagus Valley for a time. Indeed, the extent of that root can be seen in the fact that today, like Italians and Greeks

of the Mediterranean, some southern Iberians also carry evidence in their blood of the beginnings of genetic defenses against *falciparum malaria*.

Meanwhile, typhus is thought to have first reached Europe via Granada in 1489–1490 with Arab reinforcements for those Moors locked in combat with the forces of Ferdinand and Isabella—the final spasm of centuries of a reconquest that saw Spain ultimately triumphant in 1492. Typhus, however, proved a staunch ally of the Moors by killing some seventeen thousand Spanish soldiers—six times more than the Moors themselves managed to dispatch. And this was only the beginning of a series of typhus epidemics erupting on European battlefields throughout the centuries that followed.

It was in the same year that the Moors were defeated by the Catholic monarchs that their emissary Christopher Columbus and his men arrived at the New World. Shortly thereafter syphilis turned up in Naples, where the French and Spanish armies were contesting control of that kingdom. Initially known as the “disease of Naples,” syphilis burned with such a fury among the French forces—ecumenically recruited from all corners of Europe—that they were compelled to withdraw, and the disbanded soldiers carried this new pox to all of those corners. It was now called the French disease (by most everybody but the French); yet some took note of the coincidence of its outbreak with the return of Columbus and suggested that it might better be called the Spanish disease.

Many medical historians and bioanthropologists lean toward the view that syphilis was probably a relatively mild New World *treponemal* infection that became virulent when transferred to the Old World (perhaps by fusing with other *treponemas*), and thus it was, technically, a new disease for the Europeans. Certainly it seemed like a new disease loosed on a people with little in the way of immunological defenses. It spread with such extraordinary speed that it was reported from all over Europe by 1499; it was also extraordinary in its virulence, producing hideous symptoms and high rates of mortality. Yet a few decades later, syphilis began to relent in its ferocity and to lose its epidemic character, evolving into the relatively mild disease known in the late twentieth century. But it is worth noting that what the disease lost in malignancy it gained in its ability to stigmatize those who contracted it; the syphilitic came to personify vice itself.

In England, however, as the fifteenth century came to a close, people had more in the way of pestilence to contend with than just syphilis. In 1485 a mysterious disease dubbed *sudor anglicus*, the “sweat-

ing sickness,” or simply the “Sweat,” swept parts of that country and killed up to a third of the populations of the towns and villages it visited. The Sweat made return visits to England (but not Scotland or Ireland) in 1506, 1517, 1528, and finally, 1551. Then it apparently vanished forever, leaving one of the most intriguing mysteries of historical epidemiology in its wake. What was the disease and where did it come from?

The 1485 outbreak took place during the War of the Roses, which changed the status of the victorious Henry Tudor, duke of Richmond, to that of Henry VII, king of England, and it was suspected that the Sweat had entered the country with some of Henry’s mercenaries returning from France. But no single factor, including military movement, seems able to account for the other outbreaks. Only once did the Sweat apparently strike outside of England, when in 1528–1529 it was reported as epidemic across northern Europe all the way to Russia. However, in an area also under siege by syphilis and typhus, it is difficult to disentangle Sweat morbidity and mortality from that caused by these other two epidemics (not to mention the myriad other infections afoot). Influenza, malaria, typhus, and streptococcal infection have all been put forward as candidates, and in 1981 the medical historians John Wylie and Leslie Collier proposed that the disease was caused by an arbovirus (any of a group of viruses transmitted to humans by mosquitoes and ticks) harbored by small animals and carried to humans by insects. Since arboviruses are generally tropical in residence, this raises the intriguing (but probably epidemiologically remote) possibility that the close connection of the English with the Portuguese during the years of the Sweat outbreaks had put them in touch with some virus of tropical Africa.

One reason for dismissing typhus and influenza as candidates for the Sweat is that the English, like the rest of the Europeans, had become painfully familiar with both of them and thus were not likely to view them as novel. Beginning in 1522 at Cambridge, typhus had started making courtroom appearances and became the scourge behind the famous Black Assizes. The disease—also known as “jail fever”—was carried by prisoners into the courtroom, where it infected spectators, judges, and jurors.

Typhus made its second great battlefield appearance in 1528—this time in Naples—and became the second disease within thirty-two years in that disputed kingdom to wreck great French plans of state. The troops of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, which were under French siege near Naples, had been decimated by bubonic plague to the point where a French victory seemed assured, and all of Italy stood

ready to acknowledge the rule of Francis I. But then the power of pestilence suddenly sided with imperial ambition as typhus launched a counterattack that destroyed some thirty thousand soldiers in the French army. Like syphilis before it, typhus engineered a French defeat that opposing troops could not.

Given that bubonic plague was now intermingling with the new plagues of syphilis and typhus, sixteenth-century Europe was a pathogenically perilous enough place without smallpox, an old disease now suddenly acting like a new and virulent one. There were two types of this disease, which medicine believes it finally killed off in the last half of the 1970s. One was *variola major* (major, because it produced mortality rates of up to 25 to 30 percent); the other was the much milder *variola minor*, with mortality rates of 1 percent or less. Doubtless, there were strains intermediate between the two, but until the first decades of the sixteenth century, it seems to have been mostly a relatively mild smallpox that Europeans had known. Yet, beginning in that century, smallpox increasingly became one of Europe’s biggest killers, so that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it accounted for 10 to 15 percent of all deaths in some countries and as much as 30 percent in some cities.

There is no satisfactory explanation for this mysterious increase in virulence, only intriguing speculation that involves the Americas on the one hand and Africa on the other. Smallpox reached the Caribbean by at least 1518 and was carried onto the American mainland in 1519, where it began a devastating march north and south that brought demographic disaster to Native American populations wherever it appeared. The deadliness of smallpox for them has generally been explained in terms of their lack of experience with the malady and thus their lack of resistance to it. But it is also possible that in this human crucible the smallpox virus became increasingly venomous as it passed through tens, even hundreds, of thousands of inexperienced bodies and was thus transformed into the virulent disease that would soon replace plague as the most important check on European populations.

Alternatively, it could be that the smallpox unleashed on Native Americans was already a killer. It is generally assumed that India was the cradle of smallpox, but long ago August Hirsch, the great German epidemiologist, pinpointed regions of central Africa as other foci. The year 1518, when smallpox entered the Caribbean, was also the year that Charles I of Spain permitted the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade, and it is not impossible that the smallpox that fell on the Native Americans was a malignant disease of Africa rather than the relatively mild one of Europe.

Certainly it was the case that later explosive smallpox epidemics appear to have reached the Americas from Africa via the Atlantic slave trade. But either way, as a new strain of smallpox from Africa or a newly mutated disease that had incubated in the New World, this “new” smallpox easily reached the European Old World to settle in there as well.

EUROPEAN ENDEMIC AND FAMILIAR EPIDEMIC AILMENTS

These major plagues were regularly joined by other diseases to prune continental populations. Influenza made sufficiently regular appearances in the fifteenth century to precipitate detailed descriptions of the disease, and three large-scale epidemics ravaged Europe in 1510, 1557–1558, and 1580. The latter was actually a pandemic that made itself felt in Asia and Africa as well, and the high rates of morbidity and mortality it produced among young adults suggests a strain similar to that which caused the world-shaking pandemic of 1918.

Typhoid, which travels the oral-fecal route, generally in water, was obviously widespread in Europe’s fouled water supplies, where there was little or no separation of sewage and drinking water. Indeed, because in the absence of effective antibiotic treatment, typhoid (or putrid malignant fever, as it was called) can kill 10 to 20 percent of those it infects, one might wonder why anyone was alive to experience the other diseases under discussion. One ready answer, however, is that exposure to the typhoid bacillus provides a relative immunity to future attacks. Another is that, on the whole, people drank water that had been processed into alcoholic beverages and thus purified. Later they added nonalcoholic beverages to the list, such as coffee, tea, and cocoa—all of which were generally made with boiling water.

Measles, which was often confused with smallpox and frequently operated in concert with it, also struck alone, and numerous measles epidemics were reported in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Scarlet fever, diphtheria, rheumatic fever, and mumps were other diseases to be endured, especially by the young, which brings us to the issue of urbanization and childhood illnesses.

THE DECLINE OF THE OLD EPIDEMICS

Perhaps paradoxically, even though Europe was awash in a sea of pathogens, the continued growth of cities slowly began to stem that pathogenic tide. It is not that cities and towns were healthy places. Quite the

contrary, they were, as already described, squalid strongholds of pestilence. But as they grew larger they rendered themselves capable of taming some of that pestilence by transforming epidemic diseases into endemic diseases. Epidemic diseases such as smallpox and measles tended to roll over an area, either killing or immunizing victims as they did so. Then they disappeared because of a lack of suitable hosts and only reappeared when these were again present in the form of a new generation of nonimmune individuals. But as urban populations grew larger, they eventually produced a sufficient number of new hosts through births to retain diseases on a year-round basis and keep them from disappearing, whereupon they became essentially childhood diseases. In other words, pathogens that had periodically slaughtered young and old indiscriminately were now confined mostly to the young. Much life was saved by this arrangement because many diseases tend to treat the young more gently than they do adults while providing them with immunity against a future visitation.

FOODS, NUTRIENTS, AND ILLNESSES

Europeans also suffered from ailments that were food and nutrition related. One was ergotism—a fungal poisoning caused by the ergot fungus, which can form on cereal grains and especially on rye ears to poison heavy consumers of breads and porridge made from affected grains. Needless to say these consumers were usually the poor. August Hirsch listed 130 epidemics of the disease in Europe between 591 and 1879, while acknowledging that these were only a fraction of the ergotism outbreaks that had taken place. Also known as St. Anthony’s fire, when the disease affected the central nervous system it was called convulsive. In its other, gangrenous form, the cardiovascular system is affected. Either form could and did kill relentlessly. Data has revealed, for example, that during ten ergotism epidemics in nineteenth-century Russia, those who were afflicted experienced a mean mortality rate of 41.5 percent. But ergotism is also of interest because the convulsive type of the disease causes victims to experience hallucinations and convulsions. Interestingly, research has linked years favorable to the growth of ergot with the hallucinations and convulsions that were a part of religious revivals and even with the “Great Fear” that swept the French countryside in 1789, just prior to the French Revolution.

Europeans also had their share of deficiency diseases. Scurvy, arising from a lack of vitamin C, must have seemed like another new disease as the maritime nations of Europe put together the technology to keep

ships away from shore long enough for it to develop. In 1498 Vasco da Gama lost perhaps as many as half of his crew to the affliction, and from that time until about 1800, estimates would have as many as a million sailors dying from scurvy—probably more deaths than were generated by naval warfare, shipwrecks, and all other shipboard illnesses combined. Yet scurvy was not confined to seamen. It tormented the inmates of prisons, workhouses, hospitals—indeed anyone without access to foods containing vitamin C. People living in Europe’s northernmost regions, characterized by long winters, in early spring began searching out the first green shoots of those various plants they called “scurvy grass” to heal their bleeding gums. Scurvy was also a regular visitor to battlefields, especially when a siege was under way. But despite the experiments of James Lind, James Cook, and others, which had shown the efficacy of lime juice in preventing or treating the disease, and despite the British navy’s making lime juice a part of the rations of its seamen (hence the name “limeys”), scurvy continued to break out among other navies and especially armies, from Napoleon’s army during its retreat from Moscow to those forces engaged in the Crimean War, right up to the combatants in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871.

Another deficiency disease, pellagra, arose in northern Spain, Italy, southern France, and the Balkans, where the peasants had planted maize from the Americas and then centered their diets on the grain. Native American populations had lived for millennia on maize but treated it with lime (calcium oxide), which not only made the kernels pliable but broke the chemical bond to release the niacin they contained. Without such processing, a consumer whose diet rests heavily on maize will become niacin deficient and pellagra prone. The disease produces diarrhea to aggravate malnutrition, dermatitis, and dementia, finally resulting in death. In France, where a physician successfully urged his government to curtail maize production and encourage the peasants to cultivate other crops and eat more animal foods, the disease was virtually wiped out by the end of the nineteenth century. Elsewhere, it continued to haunt the poor in maize-growing areas well into the twentieth century.

Rickets occurs when the growing bones of the young (the adult form is called osteomalacia) do not receive sufficient calcium—generally because of a lack of vitamin D, so necessary for the utilization of calcium. The bulk of our vitamin D is the result of bodily production that takes place when the skin is stimulated by the ultraviolet rays of sunlight reflecting from it. Thus, the bowed legs and bossed skulls left in the wake of bouts with rickets were especially

prominent in northern Europe and England, which frequently experienced long, overcast winters. In fact, the disease was such a feature on England’s medical landscape during the seventeenth century that in 1650 it received what has been called its classic description in the book *De rachitide* (On rickets) by Francis Glisson. A few years later, in 1669, another physician, John Mayow, followed with his own *On Rickets*, claiming that the affliction had first appeared in England only around 1620. Whatever the reasons for its abrupt appearance, rickets was not likely to wane as England began the industrialization process, filling the air with coal smoke and smog that screened out the sun’s ultraviolet rays and closed off working-class children in urban slums hardly constructed with healthy exposure to sunlight in mind. In 1789 an English physician discussed the efficacy of cod-liver oil in curing and preventing rickets, but another century and a half would elapse before science, in discovering the vitamins, would learn why it was effective.

The year 1789 also effectively marked the end of a curious practice begun half a millennium before, when Louis IX, newly returned from the Crusades, began administering the “king’s touch” to cure scrofula. Outward symptoms of scrofula were swellings in the neck. When these swellings were enlarged neck glands that frequently became putrid, they were mostly the result of primary tuberculosis of the cervical lymph nodes caused by the ingestion of milk from tubercular cows. Because most cases of primary tuberculosis resolve themselves over time and the unsightly symptoms disappear, the king’s touch must doubtless have seemed miraculous—not only to the king’s subjects but also to the monarch himself, through whose hands supposedly passed the healing power of the Almighty.

Not to be outdone, monarchs in England soon followed suit to show that they, too, were ruling by divine right, and the touch was increasingly used and then widely administered by the Stuart kings. Indeed, in 1684 there was such a mob of applicants for the touch that many were reportedly trampled to death in a vain attempt to reach the hand of a restored Charles II. Perhaps the record for touching, however, belongs to Louis XV of France, who reportedly touched more than two thousand individuals at his coronation in 1722.

Scrofula could also mean goiter—an enlargement of the thyroid gland caused by iodine deficiency—and since these cases do not resolve themselves, they would not have been good advertisements for the king’s touch. Both England and France seem to have had goiter sufferers, but fortunately for the reputation of the royal touch in the latter country, the

real centers of goiter were far from the throne in the remote mountains and valleys with their iodine-leached soils in and around the Alps and the Pyrenees.

MORTALITY AND ITS DECLINE

In the seventeenth century typhus continued to stalk Europe and especially its battlefields so that during the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) battle casualties were minimal when compared with the ravages of typhus, not to mention those of plague, scurvy, and dysentery. But typhus was also carried to civilian populations: Germany was said to be so devastated in some places that wolves roamed empty streets. Typhus entered Scandinavia during the Baltic wars, was in the thick of the struggle between Crown troops and Huguenots in France, and became a major player in the English civil wars, reportedly converting the island into one huge hospital by 1650.

By this time tuberculosis mortality also had begun to increase considerably in countries undergoing urbanization, such as England, where at midcentury, despite typhus, TB was accounting for some 20 percent of all deaths and London was contributing a disproportionately large percentage of the victims. Perhaps by way of compensation, the Great Plague of London in 1665 marked the final visit of this pestilential scourge to Britain, and by the beginning of the

eighteenth century, all of northern Europe was protected by the famous Cordon Sanitaire—the Austrian barrier manned by 100,000 men to keep plague from reaching Europe from the Ottoman lands. To the south, however, plague seemed unrelenting. It besieged Naples in 1656, where it reportedly killed some 300,000 people, and Spain, which had been buffeted by epidemics of plague in 1596–1602 and 1648–1652, continued to suffer from it during the nine long years from 1677 to 1685. Mercifully, however, plague's career also came to a close in the European Mediterranean countries after a last furious parting shot, between 1720 and 1722, that killed tens of thousands in Marseilles and Toulon. Eastern Europe and Russia were the last areas of the Continent to become plague free, following severe epidemics in Kiev in 1770 and Moscow in 1771.

Prior to the nineteenth century, medicine was powerless against plague and other epidemic pestilence, and any success people enjoyed against disease was because of measures undertaken by health boards. The quarantine was invented in Ragusa (Dubrovnik) in 1377 and was subsequently employed from time to time by cities, with varying degrees of success, against potentially infected outsiders and especially against maritime shipping. The pest house, or *lazaretto*, provided a way of isolating the sick and the poor (regarded as purveyors of pathogens) during an epi-

demic while the wealthy followed the path of flight—“flee quickly, go far, and return slowly.”

Despite their heavy burden of disease, as the eighteenth century got under way, some European populations were beginning to experience what the English physician Thomas McKeown (1976) terms “the modern rise of population.” The reasons why this occurred—why an age-old cycle of population growth spurts, brutally reversed by soaring mortality, followed by demographic collapse, came to an end—has been and still is vigorously debated. Factors like the recession of plague and some positive steps in public health seem straightforward enough. Other factors put forth, such as a change in the nature of warfare, are a bit less convincing—especially in a century that began with Europe at war over the question of the Spanish succession and closed with France and England locked in a global struggle, with a series of almost countless struggles in between. One can grant that, up to a point, armies were more disciplined than in the previous century, that they were frequently more isolated from civilian populations (which better distanced the latter from typhus and other diseases carried by armies), and even that advances were made in military hygiene, and yet still wonder if what has been granted might represent any significant decline in mortality.

McKeown, who sorts through the various possibilities, argues that improved nutrition was the key to understanding the process of mortality decline—an argument that has summoned numerous detractors, most of whom concede that this might be part of the answer but hardly the whole story. Undeniably, nutrition did improve for many, in no small part because of crops from America. Potatoes, introduced to Europe in the sixteenth century, had caught on (also squash to a lesser extent) by the end of the seventeenth century in Ireland and England and would soon do the same on the Continent. They not only provided a rich source of calories for the peasants along with a year-round supply of vitamin C, but were also an important hedge against famine. Maize, as we saw, brought pellagra to southern and eastern Europe where the grain was consumed by humans. In northern Europe, however, it became an important crop for feeding livestock, permitting more animals to be carried through the winter and thus ensuring a greater availability of animal protein year round in the form of milk, cheese, and eggs, as well as meat.

Among other things, more protein in the diet, so crucial to combating pathogenic invasion, would have helped in significantly reducing infant and especially child mortality in an age that had previously seen between a third and a half or more of those born

fail to reach their fifth birthday—often because of protein energy malnutrition (PEM). This comes about when malnutrition and pathogens work together, as they frequently do, in a process called synergy, whereby the pathogens enhance a protein-deprived (and hence malnourished) state, which, in turn, leaves the body even more defenseless against the pathogens. Thus the greater availability of protein would have altered one side of the synergy equation, while a general reduction of pathogens would have done the same for the other.

The protein intake of a population can be judged, to some extent, by the average height of that population, and although there is dispute over places and times at which populations began to grow taller in Europe, there is no argument that European populations of the eighteenth century would have towered above their predecessors of a couple of centuries earlier. The armor of the warriors of those chivalrous days was, as a rule, constructed for much smaller people, suggesting that nutrition (especially protein intake) had, indeed, improved as Europe passed through its century of Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment was an age of increasingly strong states, a factor that affected the other side of the synergy equation because strong states were frequently able to compel pathogen reduction, albeit often serendipitously. Strong states, for example, were better able to regulate maritime commerce, and such regulation, with its delays and red tape, often became a quarantining device in itself, even when quarantines were not officially imposed—although, of course, strong states were better able to accomplish these as well. They were also able to insist on cleaner cities, not because monarchs and their officials were ahead of their time in grasping the nature of pathogens and their vectors, but rather because clean cities without raw sewage in the streets alongside decaying bodies of dead animals were considerably more pleasing aesthetically. The consequences, however, would have been a substantial reduction in disease vectors—especially flies, with their dirty feet. Such measures, along with the attention of the state to other matters such as drainage, could only have had a positive impact on public health.

This was also the case with more efficient agricultural practices that released more and more individuals from the countryside to enter the rapidly growing cities, where ever greater portions of populations became immunized in the process of converting epidemic and pandemic diseases to childhood ailments. And then, at the end of the eighteenth century, with the advent of the Jenner vaccine to replace haphazard and often downright dangerous variolation

techniques, medicine finally made a significant contribution to population growth that would ultimately lead to the eradication of smallpox (save for that which remains in laboratories) some two centuries later.

IMPORTED PATHOGENS: THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Two more new plagues struck Europe during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. One of these was yellow fever, a tropical killer to which Europeans had already proven themselves remarkably susceptible in Africa and the West Indies. The same susceptibility was apparent at home during periodic epidemics that had first begun striking Europe during the eighteenth century and continued to do so in the nineteenth. Yellow fever reached the Continent circuitously, moving first from Africa (via the slave trade) to the New World, whereupon Europeans carried it back to the Old. During the nineteenth century, however, after the legal slave trade had been abolished, the focus of the now contraband slave trade was narrowed to just Brazil and Cuba, and the mother countries of the Iberian Peninsula became especially vulnerable to yellow fever. The coastal cities of Oporto, Lisbon, and Barcelona bore the brunt of its assaults, although the disease did venture inland, even reaching Madrid in 1878. England, France, and Italy also saw yellow fever outbreaks on occasion as the disease radiated outward from Iberia.

A few yellow fever epidemics, however, were insignificant when compared with Asiatic cholera, which was by far the biggest epidemic news of the nineteenth century. Just as yellow fever was an African plague with which Europeans had no prior experience, cholera was an Indian disease that had been confined to the Indian subcontinent, where it had festered for some two thousand years or more. The Portuguese in India had described it as early as 1503, but a number of conditions had to be met for Europeans to confront epidemic cholera—a usually waterborne disease—on their own soil. Among these were transportation improvements in the form of railroads and steamships that could whisk cholera pathogens from city to city and port to port after another requirement had been met: an increased movement of people who could carry the disease away from its cradle on the Ganges. Still another condition had already been satisfied. The ever increasing crush of people in Europe's cities meant a huge demand for water from nearby lakes, rivers, and reservoirs, and in an age before san-

itation procedures, such demand was generally met with water fouled by those swelling populations—an ideal situation for pathogens that traveled the oral-fecal route and were easily transmitted in water.

In 1817–1818 British troop movements in India widened the range of cholera within India, and in the 1820s the disease was extended beyond that subcontinent and into Russia, where it reportedly killed over two million individuals. This time cholera spared the rest of Europe, but in 1830–1831 it again reached Russia and, instead of pausing, marched across most of Europe by 1832. In Paris, gravediggers threw aside their shovels and fled, letting bodies pile up in the streets; in England, frantic mobs assaulted authorities attempting to enforce sanitation regulations and destroyed hospitals, even attacking physicians they suspected of somehow engineering the epidemic to ensure a better supply of bodies for dissection. From Europe cholera hurdled the Atlantic to reach the Americas even before it invaded the Iberian Peninsula in 1833 and Italy in 1835.

Cholera reached Europe again in 1848, 1852, 1854 (the disease was sufficiently widespread to make this the worst of the cholera years), and yet again in 1866. During the fifth pandemic (1881–1896) cholera at first only touched the Mediterranean shores of Europe, but it later became widespread in Russia and Germany. During the twentieth century, however, only eastern and southern Europe experienced the disease, and these outbreaks were sporadic.

In terms of overall mortality, cholera was not so great a killer as the bubonic plague that preceded it or the massive influenza epidemic that followed it. But it did spur important developments in public health, especially in the area of sanitation, and with the arrival of germ theory at the end of the nineteenth century, the causative organisms of many diseases, including cholera, became known.

PLAGUES OF THE MODERN ERA: THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

In the case of tuberculosis, however, knowing the pathogen that caused it did little to slow the course of this illness, which was already in decline. TB had become epidemic in Europe in the seventeenth century, beginning to peak at about midcentury and continuing at a high level of activity for the next quarter century or so. Then it receded until the following century, when it again surged around 1750 to become the major cause of death in most European cities for the next hundred years. About 1850, however, the

disease began a decline that (save for a surge during World War I) continued until chemotherapy was introduced after World War II, finally giving medicine its “magic bullet” against this plague that had already been so mysteriously tamed.

In the eighteenth century, according to Hirsch, scarcely a year elapsed without typhus epidemics in one part or another of the Continent. It marched with troops, who scattered the disease about in the wars of the Spanish, Polish, and Austrian successions during the first half of the century, and in the Seven Years’ War and the French Revolution during the second half. It was in 1812 at the battle of Ostrowo that typhus once again became decisive in warfare by joining the Russians and the weather in decimating Napoleon’s forces. Of the close to 500,000 soldiers that marched on Moscow, only 6,000 made it home again.

Following this epidemic, typhus seems to have deserted the west and settled into the eastern portion of the Continent for good. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, for example, spawned no typhus ep-

idemics, but the disease was omnipresent in the eastern European revolutions of 1848 and the Crimean War of 1854–1856. Similarly, during World War I there was no typhus on the western front, but it was absolutely rampant in the east among soldiers and civilians alike. During the first six months of the war, Serbia alone experienced some 150,000 typhus deaths—a horrendous toll, but nothing like the two and a half million typhus deaths estimated to have occurred during Russia’s retreat of 1916, the revolutions of 1917, and the subsequent onset of civil war.

It was at this juncture that influenza also began to play a considerably larger role in world affairs. Barely active in the seventeenth century, the disease swept Europe with three pandemics in the eighteenth century (1729–1730, 1732–1733, and 1781–1782), along with several epidemics. In the nineteenth century, there were at least three more pandemics in Europe—those of 1830–1831, 1833, and 1889–1890—with the latter killing at least a quarter of a million people. This pandemic was diffused swiftly by the ongoing transportation revolution, providing something of a preview of what was to come; but none of this was preparation enough for the wave of influenza that began to roll in the late winter and spring of 1918.

The 1918 influenza seems to have arisen first in the United States but soon swept over Europe and its battlefields, and then reached out to almost all corners of the globe. The morbidity it produced was staggering, as hundreds of millions were sent to their sickbeds, but it was an ability to kill young adults as well as its usual victims—the very young and the old—that made this disease so deadly for so many. Global mortality has been estimated at over 30 million, of which Europe’s share was placed at a little more than 2 million. Then, just two years later, another wave of the disease washed across the globe, after which it somehow dissipated.

The next apparent epidemic threat to a world badly shaken by influenza was poliomyelitis. It is very difficult to spy polio in the distant past because its major symptoms—fever and paralysis—are hardly distinctive. Many individual cases were described in the eighteenth century that could have been polio, and one is mentioned in England in 1835. However, the first clearly recognizable victims of epidemic polio are said to have hosted the disease in Norway in 1868. But cases that were regularly reported throughout the nineteenth century in Scandinavia as well as in Italy, France, Germany, and the United States are now understood to have been polio. At the turn of the century polio reached epidemic proportions in Scandinavia and continued to surge in these proportions well into the twentieth century. England, too, began to expe-

rience polio cases and by 1950 was second only to the United States in case incidence.

At this point, however, medicine began to assume its well-known role in the matter with first the Salk and then the Sabin vaccines; once these became available, in 1955 and 1960, respectively, they were widely administered throughout the United States, Europe, and much of the rest of the world, and fears of a global epidemic such as the influenza of 1918 quickly subsided. Humankind seemed to be entering a new era in which epidemic disease was no longer to be an important health factor. Antibiotics were controlling venereal diseases, tuberculosis appeared on the verge of extinction along with smallpox and most other killers of the past, and death rates from all causes had plummeted throughout the century, even though those subsumed under the rubrics of “diseases of the circulatory systems” and “malignant neoplasms” had more than doubled. The chronic diseases were seen to have replaced epidemic diseases as the real enemy, and medicine began training its guns on them, especially lung cancer, breast cancer, and heart related diseases, which, although not contagious, appeared to be assuming epidemic-like proportions.

Part of this development was explicable in terms of medicine’s success against contagious illnesses: people were living longer, and many more than ever before were reaching ages when such illnesses were most likely to develop. In no small part longer lifespans were attributable to preventive medicine, which had been remarkably successful in fostering good general health, especially among infants and children. But in addition to lifespan, lifestyle was also implicated, and the concept of risk factors was introduced following epidemiological studies that established a causal relationship between the inhalation of tobacco smoke and both lung cancer and heart disease. A positive relationship was also found between high blood cholesterol, triglyceride levels, and coronary events (with high blood pressure and diabetes also risk factors), and the high fat content of Western diets was linked not only to elevated rates of heart disease but to some cancers as well—especially breast cancer.

Lifestyles, however, change slowly. Many people keep an eye on their diets, but many do not, especially those who find frequent comfort in traditional, often fat-laden, regional cuisines. And tobacco smoke has continued to spiral upward into European air. Something of an anomaly, however, has been discovered in the diet of people in Mediterranean countries, which is based on olive oil and wine and little in the way of animal fat; consumers of this diet enjoy relatively low levels of the chronic diseases despite cigarette smoking—suggesting that medicine, having identified risk

factors, may still have much to learn about their modification.

Medicine also learned abruptly that it was not done with epidemic disease, for in 1977, at just the time when that profession was congratulating itself for apparently snuffing out smallpox forever, another global epidemic was in the making. The acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) began to surface during the late 1970s, as physicians in the United States reported a number of unusual disease conditions among otherwise healthy homosexual men. By 1981 the illness had been formally described, and by 1983 research in laboratories in the United States and France had identified its cause as a previously unknown human retrovirus, HIV-1. It was determined that the virus passes from person to person through bodily fluids. The disease had seemed at first to be an exclusively American problem that was centered in the country’s gay communities and among injection drug users who shared needles, but it quickly became apparent that Caribbean populations and Africans south of the Sahara were also afflicted with this horrifying ailment, which causes the immune system to collapse. Then in 1985 a related virus, HIV-2, which passes through heterosexual activity, was discovered to be widespread in Africa.

With many of its citizens having contacts in the United States, the Caribbean, and Africa, Europe had no chance of escaping AIDS; in addition, many of its hemophiliacs were infected with blood from America. By the early 1990s the disease had spread throughout the world, and in 1996 the number of cases was estimated to exceed 22 million. In 1997 the European

Centre for the Epidemiological Monitoring of AIDS pointed out that the fifteen countries of the European Union had 93 percent of Europe's AIDS cases and predicted a rapid case increase in the rest of Europe, with much of this the result of heterosexual contact.

Although about 90 percent of the more than 22 million cases in the world are in developing countries, some 2 million are not—and these patients have found themselves subjected to the same kind of cruel stigmata that plague and syphilis victims experienced centuries before. Indeed this latest plague, which at one time was regarded as the Black Death of the twentieth century, came not only at a time of medical complacency but also at a point when any social or political experience in confronting such a widespread public health crisis had long since been forgotten. In the West medical science at the turn of the century

began at last to have some success in grappling with the disease—at least in increasing survival time—and the din of stigmatism faded somewhat. But the epidemic is far from over, and sequels such as a sharp increase in the incidence of tuberculosis also remain to be dealt with.

AIDS administered a number of brutal lessons, and one stands out starkly. The disease showed how, in an age when one can travel to almost any place on the globe in a matter of hours, the West is now vulnerable to diseases that break out anywhere in the world. Globalization of pathogens seems as inevitable as the globalization of food and economies, and as a consequence, it appears doubtful that we can hope to experience any reprieve from epidemics of the kind that ranged from the influenza of 1918 to AIDS.

See also other articles in this section.

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DEATH



David G. Troyansky

Death is a phenomenon both universal and profoundly personal. Its history takes many forms. It may be written in terms of a familiar presence in people's lives, a series of catastrophes resulting from epidemics and wars, a challenge to be overcome by science and medicine, a private event giving meaning to life, and an occasion for religious or secular ritual. It is about humanity at its most vulnerable and life at its most meaningful—and meaningless. Approaches range from historical demography and family history to the history of disease, religion, and the state. Histories of death tell tales of horror, medical triumph, continuity and discontinuity of religious belief, and shifts in the relationships between individuals, families, and communities.

In the last three decades of the twentieth century, social historians and historical demographers contributed mightily to the body of knowledge on certain aspects of the history of death. Much of the quantitative work, illustrating a remarkable demographic triumph over mortality, is summarized in Jean-Pierre Bardet and Jacques Dupâquier's three-volume *Histoire des populations de l'Europe* (1997–1999), from which some of the demographic data in this essay is drawn. The field of the history of death, however, has been dominated by two French historians whose writings of the 1970s and early 1980s combined social and cultural history and remain the only European-wide overviews from the late Middle Ages to the contemporary era. The better-known work remains that of Philippe Ariès, but perhaps more influential among specialists, both in terms of argument and method, is the scholarship of Michel Vovelle. Ariès told a story of growing individualism and large-scale sociocultural change. Vovelle identified changes in mentalities associated fundamentally with secularization. Historians working in the 1980s and 1990s have developed variations on those themes. This essay addresses those fundamental works as well as the themes raised by a generation of social-historical scholarship. It first provides an overview of demographic knowledge of death since the Renaissance.

DEMOGRAPHY

The most notable demographic feature in the long history of death from the Renaissance to the twenty-first century is the reduction in mortality rates and the increase in life expectancy from birth. Death rates in sixteenth-century cities fluctuated around 35 to 46 per thousand, exceeding 100 in periods of epidemic disease. In 1996 the rate for most European countries was between 8 and 11 per thousand. The timing of the mortality change varied from place to place, but the most dramatic improvements occurred from 1880 to 2000. Some reduction in mortality was seen beginning in the eighteenth century, but even then rates of death fluctuated in a range that was reminiscent of medieval conditions; and in the contemporary period, for reasons that have to do with politics and warfare, it would be fair to say that Europe's history has been played out against a background of death.

Beginning in the 1340s the Black Death decimated the European population. Even a century later, Europe was without one third of its preplague population, having fallen from 73.5 million inhabitants in 1340 to 50 million in 1450. Plague mortality in England ranged from 35 to 40 percent. Its 1310 population of 6 million was not seen again until 1760. Cities were devastated. Hamburg lost 35 percent of its master bakers and 76 percent of its town councilors in the summer of 1350. Florence lost 60 percent of its population, Siena 50 percent. The population of Paris fell from 213,000 in 1328 to 100,000 in 1420–1423, that of Toulouse from 45,000 in 1335 to 19,000 in 1405. People fled the cities, but large areas of the countryside were touched as well. Upper Provence saw a 60 percent decline in numbers of households from 1344 to 1471; eastern Normandy lost 69 percent of its households from 1347 to the middle of the fifteenth century; and Navarre lost 70 percent from the 1340s to the 1420s. Most villages in some territories of the Holy Roman Empire were deserted.

Population decline was actually multicausal, with increased mortality documented even before the arrival of the Black Death, but plague was terrifying, as it hit rich and poor, young and old. Historians disagree about the cultural impact of the Black Death. Some describe a religious turn, others document a release in sensuality, but the next wave of plague in the 1360s seems to have led to a morbid literary and visual culture. Fear led to assault on those considered “other,” especially Jews. Survivors saw an increase in per capita wealth and a weakening of feudalism in western Europe. Some historians describe the plague as putting an end to a demographic and economic deadlock and forcing the renewal of intellectual and spiritual life.

Recovery began in the period 1420–1450 and was even more dramatic after 1500; but until the eighteenth century, plague was endemic in Europe, and it joined famine and warfare as a major cause of death. Several outbreaks decimated local populations and terrorized survivors. The 1651 plague in Barcelona was particularly well documented. Nonetheless, Europeans had learned a lesson from the Black Death and limited population growth to a generally manageable level. They lived in greater equilibrium with the environment than they had done in the late Middle Ages.

Such equilibrium did not rule out great demographic shocks. Early modern Europe was characterized by broad fluctuations in mortality due especially to epidemic disease. Mortality rates (per thousand) in

England in the mid-sixteenth century provide a good example (Table 1). In the eighteenth century, fluctuations were less dramatic, and gradual improvement was evident in the nineteenth (Table 2). Famines still occurred in the early modern period (and as late as the 1840s in Ireland, and even later in Russia), but they tended to be local and often prompted by war. There was not a year without war in Europe from 1453 to 1730. The Wars of Religion of the sixteenth century and the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) were particularly deadly, but even then more people died of disease than of battle wounds. Movement of troops across Europe spread disease with alarming speed and destroyed crops and homes. An army of fewer than ten thousand could cause more than a million deaths by plague.

Population growth stagnated during the various crises of the seventeenth century but then continued in a significant way after 1720. From 1400 to 1800 the European population tripled, from 60 to 180 million inhabitants. Indicative of that progress is the emergence of scientific thinking about mortality and life expectancy in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Graunt and Edmund Halley in the seventeenth century and Nicolaas Struyck, Willem Kersseboom, and Antoine Deparcieux in the eighteenth were among the founders of the modern demographic study of mortality; their work gave the lie to the early modern truism, appearing in many testaments, that the moment of death is completely unpredictable.

Before the demographic transition, or Vital Revolution, as some historians describe it, life expectancy at birth ranged from 25 to 35 years. It was higher in northern and western Europe than southern and eastern Europe. Until the eighteenth century, 40 to 50 percent of children did not reach the age of 5. Rates of survival varied geographically. In the 1750s life expectancy at birth was 28.7 in France, 38.3 in Sweden; the difference was narrower at age 10: 44.2 in France, 46.7 in Sweden. "National" figures, however, are misleading, as regional variation was striking. Within France, among those born between 1690 and 1719, 61 percent of children in the southeast failed to reach age 10, while the figure was only 46 percent in the southwest. Mary Dobson (1997) finds great mortality differences among southeastern English parishes separated only by ten miles and by elevations of four and five hundred feet. Even as late as the 1870s, infant mortality ranged from 72 per thousand in a



FROM A JOURNAL OF THE PLAGUE YEAR

And as I have written above, God took our little girl the day after her mother's death. She was like an angel, with a doll's face, comely, cheerful, pacific, and quiet, who made everyone who knew her fall in love with her. And afterwards, within fifteen days, God took our older boy, who already worked and was a good sailor and who was to be my support when I grew older, but this was not up to me but to God who chose to take them all. God knows why He does what He does, He knows what is best for us. His will be done. Thus in less than a month there died my wife, our two older sons, and our little daughter. And I remained with four-year-old Gabrielo, who of them all had the most difficult character. And after all this was over I went with the boy in the midst of the great flight from the plague to Sarrià to the house of my mother-in-law. I kept quarantine there for almost two months, first in a hut and then in the house, and would not have returned so soon had it not been for the siege of Barcelona by the Castilian soldiers, which began in early August 1651.

James S. Amelang, ed. and trans. *A Journal of the Plague Year: The Diary of the Barcelona Tanner Miquel Parets, 1651*. New York, 1991, p. 71.

rural area of Norway to 449 per thousand in the most deadly districts of urban Bavaria.

During the demographic transition, the greatest shift in death rates concerned infants and children. The farming out of babies to wetnurses often had disastrous consequences. Among infants kept by their mothers, mortality was lower for those who were breast-fed than those who were fed by bottle, but the choice of method sometimes depended upon the mother's work environment or upon regional and cultural patterns that are still poorly understood. In the nineteenth century, central and northern German mothers tended to nurse, while Bavarians often had recourse to the bottle. Religion was one of the factors at work, and higher infant mortality rates were often found among southern European Catholic populations than among their northern European Protestant counterparts. Some historical demographers explain such divergences by positing a Catholic resignation about death and a more active Protestant, particularly Calvinist, pattern. But it would be hazardous to argue for such a simple explanation.

Differential mortality rates resulting from social inequality were greater in cities than in the countryside. They would be dramatic in the era of industrialization, but they were already visible in the early modern period. Table 3 illustrates life expectancy at

birth and at age thirty in Geneva according to the social status of the father.

Industrialization in the nineteenth century made cities even more dangerous, particularly for the laboring classes. Insalubrious living conditions, inadequate nutrition, and dangerous workplaces, combined with unprecedented concentrations of people, increased mortality rates for a generation or two. Among the Danish working classes in the period 1820–1849, mortality rates in Copenhagen were 230 per thousand, in provincial cities 160 per thousand, in rural regions 138 per thousand. But eventually municipal authorities, often with the collaboration of the medical profession, addressed problems of drinking water and sewage.

DISEASE

Historians have debated the causes of the demographic transition, from general improvement in health resulting from greater nutrition and resistance to infectious diseases to medicine and public health measures. Quarantining populations worked effectively in responding to plague. Environmental factors and more effective provisioning may have caused the early decline in mortality in the period 1750–1790. Greater decline occurred from 1790 to the 1830s and 1840s, when the smallpox vaccine, discovered by the English phy-

sician Edward Jenner in 1798, had an important impact. There followed a period of stagnation until the 1870s and 1880s, with dramatic changes coming from Louis Pasteur's research into infectious disease in the 1880s. Still, different parts of Europe were on different schedules. Western and central Europe saw progress in the early part of the century, southern Europe registered change by the middle of the century, and eastern Europe entered the transition around the end of the nineteenth century.

For Europe as a whole, 1895–1905 represented a great turning point in infant mortality. But causes of death still varied geographically. Southern Europe had many deaths from diarrhea and gastroenteritis. In industrialized England tuberculosis was the more pressing problem. Historians have offered both ecological and climatic explanations and socioeconomic ones for the timing of the mortality change. Lower temperatures seem to have encouraged lower mortality. The turn of the century saw a combination of better climatic conditions and improvement in public and private hygiene.

Causes of death shifted from infectious diseases to cardiovascular illness and cancer. The nineteenth century as a whole saw an epidemiological and sanitary transition. Plague was gone, smallpox was greatly reduced, and public health measures eventually dealt with epidemics of cholera, typhoid, measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria, whooping cough, and gastroenteritis. Cholera coming from Asia reached central and eastern Europe in late 1830 and early 1831. It continued west to Poland, Germany, Scandinavia, and

Great Britain, reaching Belgium and France in early 1832 and southern Europe by 1833. More pandemics hit in 1848, 1865, and 1883. Intervention by public health officials protected cities by the late nineteenth century. The great exception was the cholera epidemic of 1892 in Hamburg, the destructiveness of which, killing almost ten thousand in about six weeks, was a result of the failure of the municipality to filter the city's water. As presented in Richard Evans's massive study (1987), it was a classic example of resistance by the business class to medical intervention. Cholera affected young and old more than adults. It was a shock to European opinion, as Europeans imagined they no longer had to fear epidemic disease. The quick progress of the disease and its high rates of mortality were terrifying, and the experience of 1892 indicated the importance of clean water and effective sewer systems.

A major triumph for medicine was the defeat of smallpox, a disease of childhood that was painful to behold. Mandatory vaccination had its impact, yet as one disease was conquered, another seemed to take its place. Tuberculosis, the most deadly epidemic disease in the nineteenth century, became endemic, with cases doubling in cities in the first half of the century. Curiously, the disease took on a fashionable image in the European upper and middle classes, who portrayed its victims, slowly wasting away, as romantic sufferers. The reality was greater incidence among the working classes and the poor, who lived in crowded conditions and suffered from poor nutrition. Suburbanization and improved nutrition probably helped reduce the incidence of the disease at the end of the nineteenth century.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: MASS DEATH AND A NEW VITAL REVOLUTION

The twentieth century began and ended with significant reductions in mortality. It might be said to constitute a second Vital Revolution, but the twentieth century also witnessed the death of 80 million Europeans as a result of war, deportation, famine, and extermination. World War I had at least 8 million victims, with another 2 million succumbing to the influenza epidemic of 1918–1919. World War II saw 43 million deaths in Europe and the Soviet Union, including 30 million civilians. The Soviet Union lost 26.6 million, 7.5 million of whom were soldiers. Poland lost 320,000 soldiers but 5.5 million civilians, including 2.8 million Jews. Germany lost 4.7 million people. The bloodletting was unprecedented, but declining mortality accelerated after the war. Progress was continuous in western Europe. In the east mor-

tality rates actually went up after the collapse of communism.

Death took on a different meaning with the genocides of World War II. The ghettos, to which many Jews were confined, were already places of very high morbidity and mortality rates; then the Nazis moved to mass shootings and mass extermination by gas. Some 60 percent of Europe's Jews were killed. One third of the Roma (Gypsy) population was killed. The Eastern Front saw racial war, as 3.3 of 5.7 million Russians imprisoned by the Germans died in captivity. Central and Eastern Europe were more touched than the West. Poland lost 15 percent of its population. Whereas World War I had killed young men, World War II killed men and women of all ages.

Mass death—the influenza epidemic of 1918–1919, the Soviet famine of 1933, and, of course, the world wars—has been one of the major characteristics of the twentieth century. It was an essential part of the political processes of the era. The idea of the two world wars' constituting Europe's second Thirty Years' War brings to mind the way in which the events of 1618–1648 represented a major crisis in European history. The resolution of that war saw the achievement of stability and rationality. The resolution of the conflicts of 1914–1945, even if it took the rest of the century and a cold war, also represented the achievement of a kind of stability and, in the history of death, an unprecedented turn.

Mortality had declined in Europe since the eighteenth century, and the process accelerated in parts of Europe in the 1880s. The two postwar periods saw even greater progress, especially the antibiotic revolution after World War II. The most common age for dying was displaced. Death had always clustered in childhood and youth and then been fairly evenly distributed across the life course. By the second half of the twentieth century, it clustered in advanced age, and thus the image of death was transformed.

Life expectancies around 1900 still varied greatly from one part of Europe to another. Over the course of the twentieth century, they increased by 50 and even 100 percent, and by the end converged, for most of Europe, around ages in the late 70s and early 80s. Death rates were cut in half. Infant mortality fell from 190 per thousand in 1900 to 9 per thousand in 1996. Causes of death also changed. Respiratory infections were defeated by medicine, gastrointestinal ailments by public health measures, climatic change, and better nutrition. Tuberculosis had been a major killer of young people; it was surpassed after 1960 by violent death in traffic accidents. The emergence of AIDS proved that infectious disease was not thoroughly defeated.

It is clear that the medical triumph over death has left inequalities. Women's life expectancy continues to increase faster than men's. The female advantage, having disappeared completely for a time in some nineteenth-century cities, was 3 years in 1910, 5.1 years in 1960, and 8 years in 1995. Socioeconomic inequalities before death were noticeable in early modern cities but increased with industrialization. The spread of health insurance and public health measures reduced such inequality, but continued differences in standards of living, dietary habits, exercise, and the use of tobacco are among the factors encouraging inequality. Regional inequalities have evolved. At the start of the twentieth century, northwestern Europeans were used to living longer than southeastern Europeans, for the north and west had begun the sanitary transition relatively early. That distinction was reduced by 1960, but soon the major difference occurred between east and west, as life expectancy continued to increase in the west but stagnated in the east.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORIES OF DEATH

The history of death requires measures of mortality, but numbers alone do not tell us how people faced death. The historical literature on death has examined a huge variety of sources and addressed a wide range of questions, from cultural representations and social attitudes to ritual, ceremony, and bedside practices. Ritual tends to resist change, but even traditional patterns undergo significant modifications over time and reveal social and cultural transformations.

Ariès's work on the history of death came after his influential history of childhood and before his project on the history of private life, and it shared a major concern of those works: an emphasis on individualism and its relationship to families and communities. He observed that contemporary European society, greatly influenced by developments in the United States, had increasingly serious problems dealing with death but could learn much from historical experience. He borrowed the English author Geoffrey Gorer's notion of the "pornography of death"—the idea that death replaced sex as the great taboo subject—and looked for the various ways premodern people seemed to face death more successfully. Of course, they had more experience with death, but for Ariès changes in mortality were not as important as changes in culture. In four essays (1974) that appeared before his magnum opus with individualism as his great theme, he laid out the argument that medieval and some fortunate

modern people saw death as "tamed," something to be approached with equanimity and in public and to be managed comfortably by the dying individual surrounded by others. He used cultural representations of the deaths of knights and monks, along with an assortment of literary characters, to paint a picture of death as an event provoking little anxiety. Death then became less tame, and Ariès claimed that a new religiosity, beginning in the High Middle Ages but developing significantly in the era of the Reformation, encouraged a new focus on "one's own death."

Death, as Ariès saw it, came to be governed by religious concerns, by the struggle between God and the Devil, by a shift from a cultural focus on Final Judgment and the end of time to concern for the individual soul and its separation from the body. The cultural fascination with death prompted a widespread literature of the *ars moriendi* (art of dying). Guides for dying well proliferated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and indicated a new sense of individual fear and responsibility. Out of that individualism emerged a concern for the death of loved ones, what Ariès called "thy death." It included an eroticization of death as early as the Renaissance, but it developed more fully and in a more secular fashion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially in the culture of romanticism and a Victorian cult of death. A subsequent rejection of that cult followed, according to Ariès, and developed into a profound discomfort around reminders of mortality, the "forbidden death" that he thought marked the second half of the twentieth century.

Ariès's larger work employed the same basic argument as the four essays on death. Yet whereas the essays proceeded with elegant simplicity, the book amassed a weight of evidence demanding a more complicated structure. Archaeological sources, artistic, literary, religious, and philosophical representations, scientific and medical treatises, and sheer interpretive daring made *The Hour of Our Death* the benchmark against which subsequent works would be measured. Ariès's sometimes naive use of a limited sample of high cultural sources led him to propose cultural changes more dramatic than those subsequent scholars could identify, but his ideas have continued to appear in the scholarly literature.

Have people died comfortably or anxiously? Have they died alone or in public? Have they spent long periods of time in preparation for death? Have they been accompanied by religious or medical authorities? Have they been buried with great pomp or simplicity? Has the body been treated individually or buried in mass graves, the bones dug up and placed in ossuaries? All such questions sprang from the pages

of his book, and his answers have served as hypotheses for subsequent historians of death.

BETWEEN RENAISSANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT

The question of pomp versus simplicity and the related issue of secularization lay at the heart of Michel Vovelle's investigations into the history of death. His first major work (1973) was essentially a study of testaments in Provence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It took secularization or, as he put it, de-Christianization as its major theme and proposed a transition from a time of baroque piety to one of Enlightenment simplicity and secularism. It also represented a major methodological contribution to modern historiography, for it brought a "serial" method from social and economic history to the study of culture. Vovelle understood that Enlightenment thinkers doubted the received wisdom of religion and found medical and public health issues in the realm of death, but he wondered how far down in French and European society new ideas, beliefs, and practices might be found. The serial study of testaments permitted such analysis. The testament is a document that expresses religious faith and property concerns. Clauses invoking the Virgin Mary or the various saints went into decline, and religious bequests gave way to more secular directives, making the testament a more profane document in a world in which property took precedence over matters of the soul. By employing large numbers of wills that represented a broad area of Provence and a socially diverse population, Vovelle could trace the spread of new mentalities and social practices across space and time.

Vovelle had used archival traces of preparation for death to explore popular beliefs and practices, but his study of wills was limited to one part of southern France and one period, from the end of the Catholic Reformation to the end of the Old Regime. A literature developed concerning other times and places. Pierre Chaunu (1978) demonstrated a somewhat earlier cultural shift in Paris, Bernard Vogler (1978) explored differences between Catholics and Protestants in Alsace, and Jacques Chiffolleau (1980) discovered significant changes in the uses of wills in Papal territories in southern France in the late Middle Ages. Chiffolleau identified the creation of the culture of death that Vovelle saw unraveling. In other words, he wrote of the Christianization of death, describing residents of Avignon who, cut off from traditional village solidarities and family lineages, forged new ways of dealing with death. Against a background of devel-



FROM THE WILL OF A SIXTEENTH- CENTURY SPANISH NOBLEMAN

I, Don Martin Cortés, Marquis of the Valley of Guaxaca, residing in this city of Madrid, beset by infirmities and lacking in health, but unaffected in my intellect, fearing that since death is a certainty but its hour an uncertainty, I might be taken while I am unprepared in those things that are necessary for salvation, and wishing to make perfectly clear to my wife and children how they are to inherit my belongings, so that there will be no discord or quarreling among them, do hereby order and execute this my last will and testament in the following manner.

Quoted in *Eire*, p. 19.

oping trade and urban growth, people of Avignon spent their wealth on "flamboyant" funerals and religious bequests, the cultural practices that Ariès had called "one's own death." The most ambitious work on testaments was undertaken by Samuel Cohn, who in one book (1988) traced them over the course of six hundred years (1205–1800) in the city of Siena, finding dramatic changes in attitudes and practices, and in another (1992) compared testamentary practices in six Italian cities from the twelfth century to the fifteenth. In the Siena study, Cohn found late medieval testators dividing their wealth among pious causes, practicing a selfless religious devotion in preparation for death, until the second wave of plague in the fourteenth century, when they concentrated their donations and made long-term demands of their heirs. The dying were using their wealth to make a lasting impact on earth. Late Renaissance donations turned secular and familial, and subsequent Counter-Reformation and Enlightenment-era trends corresponded with some of Vovelle's findings. Vovelle's use of serial sources was also taken up by his own students, including Bernard Cousin (1983), who studied voice paintings of life-threatening events.

Critics of Vovelle, including Ariès, argued that he may have mistaken privatization of religious belief and practice for full-blown de-Christianization. Vovelle supplemented his work on long-term change with a study of de-Christianization in the French Revolution. He demonstrated the importance of sudden

death and political death, and other scholars have followed that path. In his own synthetic study of death since the late Middle Ages, Vovelle offered a picture that was somewhat more complicated and more careful than that of Ariès, but, unlike the latter, it never had great impact on the broader public, perhaps because it never appeared in English translation. Both synthetic works told a story of secularization and individualism, but subsequent scholarship recognized no simple transition from medieval to modern attitudes.

The study of testaments was one approach to the topic of religion and death. Historians have also looked at the twists and turns of religious ritual, the idea of death as a rite of passage, and the ways in which Europeans faced death, disposed of the dead, and mourned. Some of those practices had to do with religious doctrine. Even during times when much evidence indicates change in religious attitudes, traditional religious practices provided solace.

Most Europeans for most of the period approached death with an arsenal of Christian ideas, beginning with the notion that death was the consequence of original sin. They learned to expect a separation between body and soul, to prepare for an individual judgment, and to hope for Final Judgment at the end of time. Catholics were encouraged to see the time before death as a trial, and the last rites, including prayer, anointing with oil, the administering of Communion (the viaticum), and the commen-

dation of the soul, were essential parts of the process. Multiple editions of the *Ars moriendi* warned against the five temptations of the dying: unbelief, despair, impatience, spiritual pride, and excessive attachment to things of this world. Illustrations show competition between terrifying devils and an inspiring Christ. The passage from life to death involved changing patterns of emotional and financial investment by family and ritual behavior by community. Sharon Strocchia's study (1992) of Renaissance Florence described a double agenda for the death ritual, which recognized the honor of individuals and families, distinguishing them from others, and the need to reaffirm the community's sense of order. The funeral was the setting for demonstrating an individual's or family's power and status; the funeral procession demonstrated and legitimated the city's social hierarchy. Their increasing flamboyance revealed competition among old and new elites. On the other hand, the requiem was designed to bring people together. It affirmed communal and spiritual ties, as friends, neighbors, coworkers, kin, and public officials joined together in commemorating the dead.

The flamboyance of Renaissance funerals had social and political functions, but the culture of death evolved in religious contexts. Charitable bequests, processions, masses, and prayers eased the journey of the soul in Catholic Europe, as the actions of the living were thought to shorten the stay in purgatory and encourage the passage to heaven. Carlos Eire's book

on sixteenth-century Madrid (1995) is the most detailed study of the testament, of ways of approaching death, and of cultural models for dying. Eire described how, when someone was thought to be dying, the notary and priest would be called for, kin and neighbors would arrive to help the dying person, and members of religious confraternities would attend. All those participants would help the dying person in the final battle. The testament itself narrates a process of identification before God and one's neighbors, supplication, meditations on death and judgment, profession of faith, deliverance into God's hands, and then instructions concerning the disposing of the body, the saving of the soul, and the dividing up of the estate. In sixteenth-century Madrid one was buried in a parish church, a monastery chapel, or occasionally a cloister. Clergy to be buried wore their religious garb, but so did many in the laity. The Franciscan habit was the most popular item of clothing for the dead laity in Madrid. Some even wore two habits and called explicitly for the advocacy of Francis. Early in the century the vast majority of testators provided detailed instructions for the funeral. Later many left the planning to their executors. A similar evolution had occurred a century earlier in Valladolid, and it might be interpreted as an increased codification of ritual by status rather than a loss of interest. The funeral procession began with the clergy; the coffin followed, with family, friends, and acquaintances next, and the poor and orphans, who were paid for their trouble, taking up the rear. Processions became more elaborate over the century; in the second half large numbers of mendicant friars joined the cortege, and participation by confraternities grew. Demands for masses in perpetuity (literally forever) increased as well. Eire concludes that people of Madrid pawned their earthly wealth to shorten their stay in purgatory.

Eire also presented two elite models of Catholic death: Philip II (1527–1598) and Teresa of Ávila (1515–1582). Philip, who built the Escorial as his place of death and as a gathering place for religious relics, taught a lesson in how to die. His was a slow, painful death, one that demonstrated publicly that even a king could not escape mortality; it affirmed also the centrality of the sacred in public life in Catholic Spain. The saintly paradigm was even more important than the royal one, and Saint Teresa of Ávila became the great exemplar of Counter-Reformation death. As a mystic she combined ecstasy and death. Her body after death was said to have become smooth as that of a child and to emit a healing fragrance. The buried body was associated with miracles. After nine months it was dug up and described as uncorrupted. But it was then cut up and parceled out for relics and

the continued working of miracles. As the example of Saint Teresa suggests, Catholic approaches to death had grown more intense during a time when the Church was being challenged by Protestantism.

PROTESTANT DEATH

Protestantism rejected the Catholic emphasis on the last hours—the outcome had already been decided—but important elements of the “good death” carried over. Preparations mattered, and the behavior of the dying might indicate where the soul was headed, but confession, absolution, and extreme unction disappeared. The Protestant on his or her deathbed played an active role, offering good advice to family and demonstrating acceptance of the inevitable. The good death survived as a familial event for the bereaved. The Protestant Reformation, by eliminating purgatory, whose existence Martin Luther denied in 1530, focused attention on the faith of the dying individual and the grace of God, and Protestant thinkers claimed that the passage to heaven was immediate. It called into question and indeed placed limits on efforts by the living to intercede. Prayers for the dead would be of no use.

Such a dramatic change in doctrine had major repercussions for the ways in which people behaved when in mourning. As described in Craig Koslofsky's study (2000) of early modern Germany, a separation was made between the living and the dead both in terms of the decline of purgatory and the relegation of cemeteries to less populated areas. That process had to do with interpretation of doctrine but also the practical problems of residing in growing cities. The rejection of Catholic tradition, which Luther described as trickery, did not automatically result in the elaboration of a Protestant model. Radical Reformers buried their dead with utter simplicity, but Lutherans developed a new ritual that eventually included communal processions, funeral hymns, and honorable burial in a communal cemetery rather than a churchyard. Funeral sermons became the central element by 1550. Religious and secular authorities valued the use of ceremony to reinforce social hierarchies. Burial at night, reserved for criminals, suicides, or dishonorable people, or any burial without the participation of pastor and community was seen as irreligious. The possibility of denying Christian burial meant an emphasis on the individual's relationship to the living rather than to the dead. The sermon was the occasion to use the dead to honor the living.

The Lutheran model did not hold for all Protestants. Lutherans and Calvinists battled over matters

of ritual, and by the late seventeenth century Lutheran nobles opted for nocturnal interment, which now was seen as honorable, and by candle-lit processions. Pietism and the preference for private devotion provided a context in which non-noble people also participated in nocturnal burial, which remained a common way of dealing with death throughout the eighteenth century. When daylight funerals once again became common in Germany, they retained a private, familial nature.

David Cressy (1997) has demonstrated that in England men and women maintained long-standing death rituals long after the Reformation. Traditional ways of dealing with the dead, such as sprinkling with holy water, wakes, the ringing of bells, and elaborate processions, continued in some parts of Protestant England into the seventeenth century; but vestiges of Catholic practice began to be seen as heathen superstition, and memories of purgatory may have survived in the form of belief in ghosts. Elaborate ceremony certainly continued, as the wealthy dressed and confined their dead in more ostentatious fashion, but it may have been a necessary substitute for the older actions on behalf of the soul. What had previously been done for the dead had obviously functioned effectively for the grieving. The proliferation of individual graves provided new sites for such activities. Inscriptions had more to do with earthly memory than with old beliefs in resurrection. The era of the Protestant Reformation saw a separation of life-course ritual from participation by the entire community, an assertion of privacy. Ralph Houlbrooke's study (1998) of early modern English death demonstrated that family and neighbors replaced clergymen at the deathbed and, as ritual support diminished, had more to do. Some traditional practices, including of course rites and gestures associated with belief in purgatory, were strongly reaffirmed in Catholic Europe, but even there elites gradually moved away from a public culture of death. The poor were no longer invited. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, communal care for the dead in some places even began to give way to the professional services of undertakers, although their dominance would not come until the nineteenth century.

ENLIGHTENMENT

Seventeenth-century thought played on fears of damnation, but belief in hell fell into decline among significant numbers of Catholics as well as Protestants. In the eighteenth century, Enlightenment thinkers sought a non-Christian way of dying and ridiculed

their fellows who opted at the last minute for a Christian exit. Stories circulated of the deaths of philosophers, the French Enlightenment thinkers and writers; Voltaire's managing to die (in 1778) "in the Catholic religion" but not of it and not as a Christian represented an Enlightenment triumph. Form and dignity mattered; serenity and the metaphor of sleep replaced the agony of the religious death; in response to the question of whether he recognized the divinity of Jesus Christ, Voltaire said, "Let me die in peace." Belief in a non-Christian Supreme Being, the emergence of a protoromantic cult of melancholy, the development of more secular funerary sculpture, and public health concerns about overcrowded urban cemeteries led to new ways of thinking about death. The pilgrimage to the tomb was itself an important activity even as faith in reunion after death was shaken. A late-eighteenth-century cult of death encompassed deists, agnostics, and Christians.

Posterity, an earthly form of immortality, replaced heaven in much Enlightenment thought. Practical contributions to society and expressions of public virtue would yield a post-Christian form of immortality. Serving the nation or even humanity became the new ideal. Late Enlightenment and French Revolutionary funereal architecture, with its neoclassical plans and structures, embodied a secular and often nationalized way of death. The draped urn, the willow, the broken column, and the veiled mourner were all part of the neoclassical vocabulary of death. Secular ceremonies honoring revolutionary martyrs replaced Christian practices in the 1790s; hymns, processions, and eulogies emphasized civic virtue rather than Christian spirituality. The citizen's political death provided a new model for a republican public.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Secularization was hardly complete. High cultural sources indicate a Romantic turn that involved a good deal of spirituality. Sentiment and sorrow replaced the serenity of the previous period. New levels of attention were devoted to grief and to mourning rituals. Romantic burial grounds and a literature evoking them provided an alternative to the neoclassicism of the eighteenth century. The afterlife made a comeback, but the new emphasis was on a heaven where loving families would reconstitute themselves. Religious and secular beliefs and ritual combined in the nineteenth century. Alternative cults of the dead proliferated; their creators included the liberals Victor Cousin and Charles-Bernard Renouvier and the socialists Charles Fourier and Pierre Leroux. Less po-

1990s calls that assumption into question. Victoria was, in fact, criticized for excessive mourning; her own subjects saw her as depressed. But formal mourning practices, rules, and schedules certainly were important in Victorian society. In France widows mourned for a year and six weeks in Paris, two years in the provinces; men mourned six months in Paris, a year in the provinces. Fashionable widows spent the first months in the black woolen dress, hood, and veil of high mourning, the next stage in black silk, and the last in alternate colors. In high society mourners wrote on black-bordered paper, widows continuing the practice until remarriage or death.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

litical but equally mainstream was the spiritism of Allan Kardec and Camille Flammarion, encouraging communication between the living and the dead. Spiritism, like the occult more generally in Europe, was largely a middle-class phenomenon, a response to the decline of formal religious practice and an expression of enthusiastic hopes for science.

A focus on the legacy of the Enlightenment, on declining church attendance, and on movements toward separation of church and state may lead one to disregard the survival of religious practices for the majority, particularly when marking life-course events. In Victorian England, a continuity can be detected until the 1870s in the Evangelical style of dealing with death, which perpetuated the notion of the good death but added great intensity in the expression of grief. But there was already a good deal of secular influence. Throughout Europe the doctor played a more important role at the bedside. His administration of opiates eased the passage. The doctor's bedside presence in nineteenth-century votive paintings demonstrates his intervention in even the most devout Catholic contexts. Large suburban cemeteries took the burial ceremony away from the churchyard and into secular space. The cemeteries came to resemble cities of their own, with streets, alleys, and addresses. Burials increasingly fell into the hands of commercial enterprises.

When twentieth-century Europeans looked back at the nineteenth century, they criticized what they took to be elaborate Victorian rituals of death. They assumed that what appeared to be excessive mourning by Queen Victoria for Prince Albert was considered normal by her contemporaries. Scholarship of the

Nineteenth-century formality was already giving way before World War I, but the mass slaughter that ensued transformed the setting if not the content of the cult of death. The difficulty of finding bodies and, once found, of transporting them raised practical problems. Bereavement in some ways became more difficult, and recovery from a loved one's death was seemingly more challenging. Such developments occurred across Europe, and in every country monuments sprang up quickly. Monuments to the war dead placed local contributions within a national narrative, and the key to their success was the listing of names. Whereas previously war memorials had honored rulers and officers, now they were democratized. Veterans' groups were often heavily involved, thus taking some responsibilities out of the hands of families. Sometimes local sculptors crafted original monuments, but most towns and villages opted for mass-produced works which they ordered out of catalogs. In some cases the meaning of memorials was contrary to the received wisdom. Among a few small pacifist monuments that stand in rural France, one shows a schoolboy in Gentioux with raised fist and the inscription, "Cursed be war." But most monuments of that era represent the soldier or an allegorical female embodying the nation.

World War II called for further commemoration of mass death, but the working out of memory and the design of monuments were in some ways more difficult. Death in the Holocaust, in particular, was long described as unrepresentable. Yet as survivors reached old age at the end of the century, efforts were made to collect their stories, to encourage them to speak, and to create monuments and memorials not only in Europe but in countries all over the world. Commemorating the deaths of those who fought in colonial and postcolonial wars involving Europeans

also took some time. In France, the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962) began to be memorialized in a serious way that recognized French defeat and Algerian victory only in the 1990s.

After World War II, European countries moved against the death penalty. The Nuremberg tribunals in the war's immediate aftermath resulted in the executions of Nazi war criminals. But 1948 saw the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaimed a right to life. Although the declaration did not explicitly call for the outlawing of the death penalty, it served as the basis for a series of international covenants. The death penalty was abolished in Italy in 1948, in West Germany in 1949, in Britain in 1965, and in France in 1981. In 1989 the European Parliament adopted a Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which announced the abolition of the death penalty.

The post–World War II period also saw the transformation of the cultures of death in the most traditional regions of rural Europe. In Brittany Catholic ceremony and Breton folklore coexisted with modern individualism. Until the 1960s traditional notions of purgatory predominated, mourning was still a communal experience, and supernatural connections between the living and the dead were central to people's worldviews. But by the end of the century,

even Brittany participated in the more general “denial of death.”

In the twentieth century people chose alternative methods to the traditional disposal of the body by burial. By the latter part of the century, 72 percent of English people in 1998 opted for cremation. For some religious and ethnic minorities that choice was more difficult to make, as it raised the question of assimilation. Some immigrant communities also engaged in reflection on the meaning of being buried in Europe rather than in their countries of origin. Generations born in Europe questioned their elders' attachments.

SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA

Suicide and euthanasia, specialized themes in the history of death, offer perspectives on the processes of secularization and medicalization. In English the word for suicide did not exist until the seventeenth century. Until then the act was called self-murder, and those who committed it were assumed to be criminals, madmen, and sinners. Suicide was an affront both to God and to the social order. Suicides were tried posthumously, their property was forfeited, and their bodies, denied Christian burial, were buried away from the

community. In England suicides were buried face-down with wooden stakes driven through them so as to prevent their ghosts from wandering. The incidence of suicide is difficult to measure, but it has elicited scholarly interest during the Renaissance and serious investigation during the Enlightenment. The Renaissance saw the revival of classical cases of elite suicide. Taking one's own life could be construed as an act of freedom. Literary representations of suicide proliferated in the period 1580–1620, notably in the 1600 example of *Hamlet*. Seventeenth-century thinkers tried to repress the practice, but the numbers seem to have been fairly constant. By the late seventeenth century, as officials and the public grew more sympathetic, attitudes toward suicide had begun to change; evidence suggests that in England after 1750 suicide was seen not as diabolical but as the result of mental illness. Coroners' juries increasingly refused to punish severely; where they did convict, they undervalued self-murderers' goods. Among Enlightenment thinkers, the right to commit the act was supported by those favoring individual liberty, but the fact of suicide was seen as an attack on social solidarity. Although the French Revolution decriminalized the act and Romantic suicide in the wake of Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774) gave it some cachet, Enlightenment ambivalence toward it continued. Self-sacrifice for political reasons might be seen as an ideal or, alternatively, as an act of cowardice. In the first half of the nineteenth century, suicide became less a philosophical subject than a social scientific one. The practice, of course, continued, but by the second half of the twentieth century attempted suicides were seen as calls for medical help, not acts requiring legal responses.

Euthanasia represents a related phenomenon. It originally meant a gentle death, such as that which may be the desire of suicides seeking to end unendurable pain. Since the work of the English philosopher Francis Bacon in the seventeenth century, the assumption has been that euthanasia, as the alleviation of the suffering of the dying, must be administered only by a doctor, although doctors have ethical obligations not to end life. Beliefs about euthanasia began to change in the 1890s, when Adolf Jost wrote of voluntary euthanasia (a right to die) and the idea of negative human worth. In 1920 Karl Binding, a professor of jurisprudence, and Alfred Hoche, a professor of psychiatry, developed the idea of "life unworthy of life." What began as a discussion of psychiatric reform in line with cost-effectiveness ended up as a program for the killing of the mentally and physically handicapped. Euthanasia came to be seen as a eugenic method for "improving" the population and elimi-

nating those deemed unworthy of life. The early euthanasia program in Nazi Germany focused on the young. In 1940–1941 70,273 people were killed, many in gas chambers. Some of the killers would soon use the same methods on the Jews of Europe.

Postwar opinion recoiled at the crimes of the Nazis. Yet as long life became the norm in subsequent generations, and the incidence of degenerative diseases in old age increased, doctors and patients returned to the issue of mercy killing. Questions of the withholding of medical care that would prolong the lives of the terminally ill accompanied debates over medical coverage in the world of the welfare state. Rationing of medical care and notions about the overconsumption of medicines were on the public agenda in the turn to neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s.

CONCLUSION

The contributions of social history have challenged the understanding of changes and continuities in the experience of death. It is not always easy to pinpoint the relationship between physical and cultural change. For example, nineteenth-century grief, particularly over the death of children, may have contributed to greater attention to measures designed to reduce mortality levels; but shifts in mortality levels affected attitudes toward death and mourning practices in turn.

The history of death is about the present as much as it is about the past. It permits us to address painful issues at a distance. Yet clearly those issues are not in fact all that distant. Some historians seem to be looking for a better way of dying and dealing with uncertainty. In that spirit, the German historian Arthur Imhof (1996) turned from historical demography to the kinds of cultural and religious questions raised by Ariès. He asked why life had become so difficult despite a dramatic medical triumph over death, and devised a chart that illustrated the history of life expectancy as a decline from hope of heavenly immortality to knowledge of earthly mortality. Like Ariès, he claimed that as Europeans have conquered death, they have lost the ability to deal with it. For example, the response to the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, on 31 August 1997 prompted studies of the hunt for new ways of mourning. In that case, mass mourning became a media event and vice versa, as multicultural mourners, in the role of both participants and spectators, explored new ceremonies and rituals. Death was far from hidden, and the ways in which media death might influence ordinary Europeans' approach to dying remained to be seen.

See also other articles in this section.

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Section 7



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URBANIZATION



Alexander Cowan

The key to much of the social change experienced in Europe between the Renaissance and the present lies in the process of urbanization. This may be defined in three separate but linked ways. It is the process by which individual urban centers grew larger, both in terms of numbers of inhabitants, and in terms of the total space occupied. Secondly, urbanization is the process by which the proportion of the population of a given region engaged in urban economic activities and living in urban centers increases. Lastly, it is the process by which the urban becomes the dominant feature of all landscapes: physical, economic, political, social, and cultural.

The process of European urbanization was neither new in the sixteenth century nor did it progress at the same rate and in the same way in every part of Europe. Much depended on economic and demographic change, and on the size, character, and location of individual urban centers. Some general trends can be identified. By contrast with conditions in 1500, when a relatively small proportion of the European population lived in urban centers and carried out activities that were identifiably urban (with the exception of northern and central Italy and the Netherlands), the map of Europe at the end of the twentieth century was dominated by networks of urban centers, whose collective populations represented a high proportion of the continent's total inhabitants. Most of this change had taken place since the middle of the nineteenth century and was linked in some way with the economic growth associated with industrialization.

Since the middle of the twentieth century, however, two developments may be said to have signaled the end of the urbanization process in the classic sense. The first is the development of metropolitan areas. These were first seen around the great European capital cities, London, Paris, and Berlin, toward the end of the nineteenth century, but later came to characterize whole regions, within which individual urban centers close to each other expanded to such a degree that their economic functions, and sometimes even

their individual identities, merged to become part of a greater urban whole. The Ruhr valley in Germany, the agglomeration around Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing in France, and the region based on the Rivers Tyne and Wear in the northeast of England all exemplify this trend.

The second development is associated with the first and may be called de-urbanization. This process is a form of reversal of the urban growth of earlier periods, which had taken place in the form of an expansion of the urban core within a rural context. De-urbanization, by contrast, places the focus on the simultaneous expansion of urban housing and economic activity in a number of locations that are related to the old urban center but are no longer part of it. Suburbs, industrial estates, science parks, and new out-of-town shopping centers designed to meet demand from regional customers with their own transport have all changed the role of the classic urban center. Population figures for the urban core have signaled a downturn, while those for the outer suburbs continue to rise. Between 1921 and 1931, the population of Paris fell from 3 million to 2.89 million. It is now more appropriate to refer to an urbanized society rather than to urban society, and for this reason, this article will focus largely on the period between the Renaissance and the middle of the twentieth century.

Social historians have approached the urbanization process in several different ways. Many have chosen to emphasize a break between the premodern and the modern urban center, brought about by industrialization. In these terms, all sense of community was lost when the majority of the urban population was subjected to the disciplines of capitalism, the scale of the urban area had grown to such an extent that it was no longer possible to conceive of the town as a single entity, and the leadership of the social elite and organized religion no longer exercised a strong influence over townspeople. Others have sought to identify the aspects of urban society that have persisted in spite of changes in the scale and organization of industrial

production, particularly in their exploration of changes in urban culture.

Some of these contrasting approaches may be explained by the comparative speed with which industrialization affected urban centers in different parts of Europe. It began intensively in Britain and the Low Countries at the turn of the eighteenth century, extended more slowly to France and Germany during the nineteenth century, and reached Italy, Spain and central Europe only toward the end of the 1800s. As a result, changes to social organization, social interaction, and the use of space in individual urban centers varied according to the size of the population, the scale and timing of economic and political pressures, whether or not a center carried out a specialized rather than a generalized urban function, and where a particular center belonged within its regional hierarchy. In many urban centers, some of which had been at the forefront of economic development between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries, little changed in terms of their size, their use of space, and their prevailing architectural appearance until the later twentieth century or until they experienced extensive damage during World War II. They had been left to one side by industrialization.

THE URBAN CENTER IN A BROADER CONTEXT: NETWORKS AND SPECIALIZATION

The organization of any urban society is shaped by the size of the urban center and by its role within a wider urban network. This applied as much to the twentieth century as it did to the sixteenth, with two important differences. The first is one of scale. A small town in the 1500s could have a population as low as two thousand or less, but, like the Sicilian town of Gangi, still house a range of artisans, shopkeepers, rentiers, and merchants, all of whom provided the basic elements of industrial production and commercial exchange necessary to define it as an urban center. A modern equivalent, Carpentras, in the south of France, with twenty-four thousand inhabitants in the late twentieth century, may have been many times larger but offered little more in terms of economic functions. The same contrasts of scale can be seen by comparing Venice (190,000 at the end of the sixteenth century), with Birmingham, at present England's second city (roughly 1 million in 1991). In terms of its economic complexity, and still more of its international cultural importance, Venice ranks far higher than Birmingham, but on a much smaller demographic base.

The second difference in context relates to the organization of urban networks. All urban centers in premodern Europe were part of urban networks, usually local or regional. Within these networks, towns were placed in a hierarchy, usually determined by their size, the complexity of their economic activity, and their distance from other centers of similar size. Towns at the head of regional networks belonged in turn to looser collections of international trading centers through which they exported and imported goods, money, ideas, and people. They were the intermediaries between the rural hinterland, the population of smaller towns, and other parts of Europe and beyond. The role of hierarchies and networks differed little in the twentieth century, except for their scale, now worldwide, the speed of communications, and the size of urban hierarchies, which often extended far beyond the traditional region across national boundaries. Differences in the quality of facilities and the range of opportunities within these groupings remained.

The experience of individual towns was also shaped by specialization levels. While commercial exchange, supported by some industrial production, remained the *raison d'être* for all urban centers throughout the period, many towns belonged to specific categories, which, at different times, contributed to their rapid growth or stagnation, and by requiring particular kinds of labor force not only engendered particular kinds of elites, but also gave a specific character to their economies. Some categories remained important, such as port cities like Genoa and Hamburg, and administrative centers like Toulouse, once the home of one of France's regional parlements, now the capital of the region of Midi-Pyrénées. Other categories grew in importance: centers of industrial production such as Hondeschoote in the Netherlands were comparatively rare before industrialization, but came to typify the towns of the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Others were quite new. Spa towns, such as Evian-les-Bains (France), Baden-Baden (Germany) and Spa (Belgium), where the wealthy from town and countryside came to settle for the season under the pretext of taking the mineral waters for their health, flourished in the later nineteenth century.

Changing patterns of tourism moved the focus away from cultural visits to the big city such as Vienna, Venice, Paris, or London, to new centers dependent for their economic well being on the seasonal arrival of visitors. From the 1930s, resorts catering to a working-class market, such as San Sebastian and Blackpool, joined Nice and other towns on the Côte d'Azur, which had become a source of winter sun and entertainment for the wealthy of northern Europe two generations earlier. Finally, capital cities, which brought

together almost all these specialized functions, not only grew in proportion to the expansion of the territorial states of which they were the administrative and political centers, but in many cases came to dominate the urban organization of the entire state. Berlin, which became the German capital only in 1870, exceptionally shared some of this power with other cities which earlier had exercised a dominant regional role.

THE CHANGING USE OF SPACE

The process of urbanization was frequently expressed by changes in the use of urban space. Naturally, the overall surface occupied by urban activities expanded as a response to demographic growth and changes to the economy, but the most striking changes in the use of space took place in the old medieval urban core.

Changes to the medieval core, sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The medieval core was frequently defined by the presence of fortifications, both walls and waterways, separating the physical concentration of urban housing and activity from the countryside. Within this core, street patterns had developed in a haphazard way, interrupted by occasional attempts at formal planning. People and goods moved between marketplaces, gates, and harbors and between their homes and key buildings such as churches, civic buildings, and guildhalls as best as they could. There was much competition between livestock, the transport of goods and people, and the appropriation of spaces outside shops and workshops as extensions of places in which to work, store goods, or sell commodities. Occasionally, this could lead to violence, as in the case of a Barcelonan silversmith who was arrested in 1622 for throwing a knife at the driver of the inquisitor's coach because the latter had brushed against him as he worked in a very narrow street. Larger spaces, such as market squares and the areas in front of public buildings, accommodated multiple activities which either overlapped, or monopolized the spaces at predetermined times, such as the annual assembly of burghers to take the civic oath in German towns, or the twice-yearly race of the *palio* in Siena.

Social zoning was partial at best. Some preindustrial cities largely conformed to Gideon Sjoberg's model, in which the wealthy lived in the center, close to a concentration of markets and religious and political institutions, while the artisans lived in their own quarter, often close to a river, which provided them with motive power, washing, and waste disposal, and the poor lived on the periphery. Other cities did not follow this model. The wealthy lived cheek by jowl

with the poor, differentiated not only by the spaciousness of their housing but also by their presence on the first and second floors of buildings, while those below them in the social hierarchy lived higher up, or behind the main streets in a labyrinth of alleys and courtyards. Spatial discrimination was vertical, not horizontal. Timber buildings with straw roofs, interspersed by the occasional structure in stone, roofed with tiles or slates, remained the norm, with the consequent dangers of fire, such as the conflagration of 1666, which destroyed 13,700 houses in London. These buildings remained relatively low, giving prominence to those few structures whose height could be seen from outside the walls: churches, castles, and civic buildings.

Early pressures arising from the demographic increase of the "long sixteenth century" created few changes to urban spatial organization. Traffic became worse. Buildings were subdivided, and there were attempts by jerry-builders to accommodate tenants in unsafe structures. The main forces of change were not demographic. Demand for housing from the poor brought little income to entrepreneurs.

On the other hand, the individual demands of the wealthy, and the collective needs of the urban authorities and of the developing territorial states from the 1600s succeeded in introducing changes of some importance, even if they did not alter much of the fabric inherited from the Middle Ages. The demand for more comfortable housing in brick or stone with slate or tiled roofs in a style that would convey high social status and enable its inhabitants to travel by coach or on horseback with ease was met by the construction of new quarters, often on land made available by the extension of urban fortifications or, increasingly through the eighteenth century, in areas where the threat of military attack was a distant memory, in suburbs. These new houses were particularly favored by members of the administrative elite. It took much longer for wholesale merchants to give up the traditional links between their homes and their places of work, something graphically illustrated by the spatial distribution of merchant and administrator subscribers for seats in the major theater of eighteenth-century Lyon.

The ideas expressed in the new urban quarters were also superimposed on the old, in the form of new streets cut through the medieval fabric to link key buildings with gates, ports, or barracks, such as the Via Toledo in Naples, constructed to enable soldiers from the Spanish garrison to move into the city at times of unrest, or the construction of the Uffizi palace in Florence by the Medici grand dukes of Tuscany. These new streets were interrupted by squares decorated with neoclassical monuments and statues,

whose main purpose was to increase the visual impact of the imposing buildings beyond. All commercial activity was rigorously excluded.

Turin experienced this kind of redevelopment on the largest scale, but these developments were gradually introduced all over Europe, first in capital cities and major trading and administrative centers, later in smaller towns on a scale determined by the ability of the municipal authorities to finance their aspirations. Most towns and cities therefore entered the nineteenth century with a combination of the old medieval core, increasingly inhabited by the poor, and more spacious buildings set along broader streets, interspersed with squares. Early attempts at street lighting and the provision of reliable water supplies had met with only limited success.

The nineteenth century: City planning and Haussmanization. The demographic expansion of Europe's capitals and commercial centers later in the nineteenth century placed strains on the urban fabric of a kind hitherto unknown. Most of the surplus population was housed in new suburban areas, some of which were also initially places of refuge for the

wealthy from the smell, congestion, and disease of the old town centers, but the biggest changes to the use of space took place within the centers of towns themselves. This reflected two trends. The first was the gradual adoption of the urban core as a central business district, in which residential housing and small-scale industry gave way to buildings associated with commerce (banks, stock exchanges, shops, and offices), entertainment and cultural improvement (theaters, music halls, cinemas, restaurants, museums, and art galleries), and, usually to one side of these other services, railway stations, whose architecture signaled their high economic and social importance. Within this complex, many of the old public buildings inherited from the past—churches, cathedrals, town halls, and guildhalls—retained their place, if not their centrality.

The second trend reflected a new interest in town planning, which brought together moralists, architects, engineers, and the urban authorities in a common project to create a center that could accommodate the new needs of the economy and society. They were driven both by fear and by ambition. The rapid rise in the population of cities like London,

Paris, and Berlin created a spectre of unrest and social upheaval. The new industrial workforce, mostly living and working on the edge of the urban area, not only outnumbered the wealthier members of society, but had demonstrated its power in unrest across Europe from the end of the eighteenth century. Epidemic disease (bubonic plague from the Middle Ages until the early eighteenth century, and cholera for much of the nineteenth) was a constant worry, not only because of the high mortality levels during outbreaks, but also because of its capacity to spread throughout the urban area. In two successive days in July 1835, 210 and 173 cholera victims were buried in Marseilles alone.

This ambition to create a new urban environment to match the wealth and power of its rulers was shared throughout Europe, but found its greatest expression in the Paris of Emperor Napoleon III, whose prefect, Baron Haussmann, transformed the city. Haussmann's guiding principle was to facilitate the circulation of people, money, goods, and traffic. This required the construction of broad new streets, the boulevards, to link key points in the city, cutting through old residential areas and leveling inclines in

order to bring this about. These new streets were designed to create better circulation of the air to combat disease and pollution, to introduce more greenery, and, below ground, to ensure an effective system of fresh water and sewers. They also opened up the possibility of building comfortable new housing for the wealthy.

Haussmann's plans were emulated elsewhere, with varying degrees of success. Often the money, the political will, and the willingness of landowners and investors to participate were lacking. New streets such as Kingsway and Oxford Street in London were driven through older housing to open up the area to commercial development. In many smaller centers, the Parisian model was only realized in the form of a square or a single new street. Even in Paris, the overall plan was never fully effective. The areas between the boulevards, such as the district of the Arts-et-Métiers in the third arrondissement, retained much of their earlier form.

The movement to "clean up" the old town centers also elicited a response around the end of the nineteenth century, which can now be seen as the

birth of heritage awareness. A major debate was opened in Florence in 1900 by an open letter to the municipality, signed by the heads of leading British museums and art galleries and drawing attention to the dangers to the city's cultural heritage and the potential loss of income from a growing tourist industry if the construction of new streets and buildings continued to bring about the loss of its architectural glories.

The twentieth century. New responses to the continued growth of the urban population developed in the 1920s and 1930s. Late-nineteenth-century developments in iron-framed building design were extended as a result of the widespread use of reinforced concrete. The work of the French architect Le Corbusier popularized the concepts of concentrating the population into tower blocks surrounded by green spaces and served by roads linking different parts of the city. It was not, however, until the widespread destruction caused by bombing by both sides during World War II that these new ideas were put into practice on a large scale. In England alone, the centers of Coventry, Plymouth, Exeter, Hull, and Southampton required complete reconstruction.

From the 1960s, one of the most important factors in altering the use of space was the increasing use of the car to move into and around town centers. New buildings were planned to incorporate underground parking spaces for residents and office workers. Many of London's squares retained their external appearance while masking car parks below. Additional tunnels,

expressways, and elevated motorways were also constructed to increase traffic flow through town centers, such as the expressway constructed along the right bank of the Seine in Paris.

The planners' dream of separating pedestrians from wheeled traffic, which had been first considered in sixteenth-century projects for ideal cities by Leonardo da Vinci and Serlio, came several stages nearer to reality with the introduction of pedestrianized shopping precincts. The initial concrete plazas set back from the older street plan at different levels were followed by extensive covered precincts, which attempted to reproduce the atmosphere of the marketplace while retaining all the benefits of air-conditioning. Later, motor traffic was excluded from large parts of town centers, and the streets paved over in order to encourage undisturbed shopping in competition with large out-of-town developments. Often, it was those remains of the preindustrial center which had fortuitously survived, such as the quarter of St.-Georges in Toulouse, which became a new pedestrian focus of recreational shopping.

SOCIAL HIERARCHIES

Social historians define the composition of European urban society in several overlapping ways. Statistical analysis of taxpayers provides the evidence for a hierarchy of wealth and for a partial correlation between sources of income and income levels. Occupational

analysis offers a measure of economic and social complexity, but its utility is limited by the superimposition of categories by government and municipal agencies, by the use of similar terms over long periods of time to describe forms of work that had changed in terms of both the technology used and dependence levels of the worker, and by the absence of distinctions between one practitioner and another.

Changing definitions of citizenship. Contemporary perceptions of the nature of urban society constantly prove their value but require an understanding of the ideological basis within which they evolved. Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, it was members of urban elites, with a patriarchal and top-down view of society, who uniformly generated perceptions of urban society. Consequently, there is a mismatch between the idea of “society” developed by the early sociologists, who attempted to provide models of the entire urban population, and the view of urban society inherited from the medieval jurists, which limited its membership to the citizens or burghers of a particular urban center. These citizens were all part of a corporate body. They not only belonged to the town, and demonstrated this by paying taxes, taking part in the urban militia, and participating, at least in name, in the political process; collectively they were the town.

A definition of this kind excluded large numbers of the urban population, who by modern conventions would conventionally be considered to be part of the urban society. Very few women were allowed to take up citizen status. When they did so, this was frequently for a limited period of time, until a widow's son came to the age of majority, for instance. In any case, women were only given limited citizen status. They could pay taxes, but they were excluded from the political process, did not swear oaths of allegiance to the city, and could not bear arms in its defence. Many others did not or could not become citizens. It was necessary to be economically independent. Apprentices and servants had neither the means nor the autonomy to fulfill this criterion. The poor and the indigent were socially invisible and often exposed to expulsion in times of crisis. Foreigners were suspect and required lengthy residence before being accepted as citizens. Many, particularly merchants, showed little interest in becoming citizens, whether or not their involvement in their host community was long-term. Religious sensitivities during the Reformation also placed a barrier before outsiders practicing a different faith from the official religion of each town or region. In Strasbourg, non-Lutherans were prevented from becoming burghers. Jewish communities in particular

were excluded from full engagement in urban economies, for fear that they would compete with local artisans. Many towns, particularly in Germany and Italy, reinforced this by enclosing Jews in ghettos.

The fiction that urban society comprised only those adult males who had been granted the privileges of citizenship was eroded still further by demographic growth and by a shift in urban government from consensus to authoritarianism, characterized, in many German cities at least, by a change in vocabulary distinguishing members of city councils from other burghers. Pamphlets published during the constitutional crisis in Lübeck in the 1660s now spoke of “rulers” and “subjects,” replicating the terms of the ancien régime state. While the concept of citizen unity remained a powerful influence well into the nineteenth century, as urban populations grew larger, the realities of political power led to a tripartite view of society. As before, this emanated from the elite, but was often driven by external value systems shared by all parts of the state. In general terms, the elite feared the threat represented by the poor, many of them recent arrivals, whose behavior and numbers potentially lay outside well-tried systems of control and whose

location on the edge of the urban area as well as in its center placed the wealthy in a vulnerable position. The third group identified by the elite was never well defined, using values such as respectability and reliability to associate them with the forces of stability. Such individuals were believed to have a stake in the well-being and peace of their towns, expressing a willingness to oppose the forces of instability, without threatening the position of the elite. The introduction of universal male suffrage in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century was believed to reinforce this role. In the course of the twentieth century, the growing sophistication of social analyses, coupled with the disappearance of a visible elite, and the growth of the middle classes modified views of urban society to an extent that they do not lend themselves easily to clearly identifiable models.

The role of urban elites in urban society. The impact of urban elites, small groupings of wealthy families at the top of the social hierarchy, was considerable on all sizes of urban center until the early years of the twentieth century. Collectively and as individuals, they were responsible for the economic and political organization of each town, the organization of

space and the buildings around it, the setting of cultural and charitable norms through patronage, and the integration of each urban center into wider national and international cultural networks. Initiators of substantial change at times, urban elites could also marshal the forces of social conservatism, both in the face of perceived internal threats, such as drinking, gambling, and prostitution, and external threats, such as the railway. A newspaper in Bordeaux, which closely reflected elite opinion, pronounced in 1842 that railway construction was “too advanced for France.” The first station opened in the city only in 1902.

Europe’s cities experienced many political changes after the Middle Ages but there was substantial continuity in the persistence and organization of urban elites. There were regional variations. The participation of the landed nobility was always much stronger in the towns of Italy, France, and the Iberian Peninsula than it was in the Netherlands or the British Isles. The role of merchants and entrepreneurs in urban elites reflected the extent to which individual urban centers owed their economic expansion to commerce and industry. Mercantile elites were prominent in seventeenth-century Amsterdam and Hamburg, while in those cities whose earlier commercial success they

had overtaken, such as Lübeck and Venice, there was a growing rentier element, based on income from land and housing. Some similar comparisons can be drawn from France in the nineteenth century, where merchants dominated Marseilles and Caen, but Nice moved in the opposite direction from its earlier German counterparts, changing from a rentier town to a wine-exporting port and tourist center.

New administrative centers, such as Valladolid, Dijon, and Barcelona, brought lawyers and other officeholders to prominence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, relegating merchants to a subsidiary position within the elite. In the case of the capital cities, this process was both stimulated and distorted by the presence of princely courts, whose members comprised a kind of parallel elite. Their role within the city as consumers, patrons, and trendsetters is not to be underestimated. In seventeenth-century Paris it was preeminent. The new quarter of the Marais was constructed to meet the housing needs of leading members of the French aristocracy who attended on the Bourbon kings. Much the same could be said of the Paris of Haussmann, where the courtiers of Napoleon III joined the city's bankers and entrepreneurs to construct new houses along the city's boulevards, and of Habsburg Vienna, where the old ramparts were replaced by the stately splendor of the Ring.

Less complex urban elites acted in order to safeguard their economic and social interests by ensuring that outsiders were excluded or only allowed in according to strict criteria. Unrestricted access was bad for business. Much occupational and professional solidarity was buttressed by a network of intermarriage, a pattern which gave rise to long-standing dynasties, like the Sicilian Muscatello family of Augusta, notaries for five generations between 1774 and 1904, and the merchants and lawyers of the Hamburg Ausinck family, active between 1752 and 1831. Social and economic power was maintained through inheritance by ensuring that the patrimonies of elite families remained within the same circles as much as possible. Certain cultural practices also ensured that only a small minority of newcomers could join the elite. These varied from one century to another. The *Tanzstatut* (dance law) passed by the Nürnberg city council in 1521 established a list of the families whose members were permitted to attend the dances in the basement of the Town Hall, and whose younger members were consequently admitted to a restricted marriage market. In early-nineteenth-century Sicilian towns, certain cafés, clubs, and reading groups were established, whose membership was open only to the descendants of men whose social privileges had once been established by law. Social unity within urban

elites was not always paralleled by political uniformity. In many towns, politics was colored by factional divisions on local—or, in the case of England, national—lines. The long-standing monopoly of the right to participate in politics, however, ensured the exclusion of others.

Such a concentration of social, economic, and political power could not survive the triple processes of industrialization, rapid demographic growth, and electoral reform. The early twentieth century was marked by the introduction of widespread municipal socialism. In any case, urban government had become far too complicated to be undertaken by the representatives of a few wealthy families. They found new roles, or developed existing nonpolitical positions as the leaders of philanthropic or cultural organizations. The rising costs of building and the reorganization of industrial, financial, and commercial enterprises also transferred the role of dominant urban builders from members of the elite to anonymous banks, insurance companies, and industrial conglomerates.

URBAN CULTURE: THE CULTURE OF THE DAY AND THE CULTURE OF THE NIGHT

The growing scale of urban life and its impact on the population brought two contrasting cultural responses. One, identified by Émile Durkheim as anomie, was the loss of any sense that the individual was part of a larger community, leading ultimately to a loss of shared values and to an emphasis on day-to-day survival.

Associational culture. The other response was the growth of associational culture. Associational culture never embraced everyone—its participants were predominantly male and from the stable core of society—but it was an important feature of urban society from the later seventeenth century until the television age. Its roots lay even further back in guilds and religious organizations. Guilds, confraternities, and parishes had provided their members with a sense of common identity, a sense that they differed from nonmembers, a focus, usually a meeting place, rules that regulated their lives, a hierarchy within which they could hope to advance over time, and a set of rituals, which included communal eating and drinking. But membership in a guild or confraternity was also a link with the community as a whole. Both organizations took part in processions and were recognized as part of either the body politic or the ecclesiastical organization of the town.

An overlap between these groups and more specific forms of associational culture began in the sev-

enteenth century. One did not replace the other, unless the journeymen's organizations are included, which developed as a response to the concentration of power among master craftsmen. Early groups developed among the elite and those with aspirations to be seen as gentlemen. They met at coaching inns, where the latest newspapers and pamphlets were first delivered, in order to talk about politics, literature, and science. Others took over the administration of charity from guilds, whose resources had declined, and from the church, particularly in Protestant areas. Religious fragmentation and the growth of secularism also gave rise to groups exhibiting the characteristics of a common focus, rituals, common meeting places, and a sense of distinctive identity. Often these were part of much larger networks, such as the freemasons.

The expansion of the industrial city brought an explosion in associations. Seventy-two patriotic and military groups alone were listed in the eastern French center of Nancy in 1938. There was some correlation between the social status of association members and the extent to which groups emphasized local concerns. The further up the social scale, the more associations embraced members from different parts of the city, with central meeting places. Local meetings were more convenient for those who did not wish to travel. Hence we find the *Cercle de la Treille*, founded in a restaurant in the Parisian suburb of Bercy in 1881 by a group of wine and spirit retailers, who declared that they wished to meet in the evenings close to their businesses. Employers' organizations were only one type of association. As before, one could join philanthropic groups, some of which were focused on helping the needy, while others, such as the English Literary and Philosophical Societies, organized lecture series and developed libraries in the hope of acculturating the working class. Common interests in sports—cricket, tennis, fishing, and, in the early twentieth century, cycling—engendered other groups. And of course trade union organizations appealing to workers formed dense associational networks that brought members together for everything from entertainment to education. Each association depended on voluntary leadership and on the willingness of its members to devote time to meeting and common activities. Such culture remained an element of urban society throughout the twentieth century, but the increasing competition of other forms of recreation eroded its base. Consumerism had taken over from voluntarism.

Informal and alternative cultures. Associational culture was only one dimension of the urban culture or cultures to which townspeople belonged and which

gave them a sense of belonging. There were many other cultural foci with unwritten rules, whose rituals were as recognizable to their members as the dinners celebrated by churchwardens in sixteenth-century London, the initiation rites of the masons, or the minutiae of the annual general meetings of gardeners' clubs or chambers of commerce. The exclusion of women from politics, organized labor, and much religious activity for most of the period was compensated for by other kinds of informal association. Many of these centered on key gendered tasks: childbirth, washing clothes at the communal laundry, collecting water from the well, and shopping at the market or, later on, at the corner shop. While each activity had its own immediate importance, its cultural importance cannot be exaggerated. By engaging in practical activities which led to meetings at a given focus—the bed of the woman giving birth, the river or laundry, the well, the market, or the corner shop—women exchanged information and reinforced given social values just as effectively as all the sermons given to confraternities or the moral blackmail practiced by journeymen and apprentices on their fellow guild members. As economic organization changed so did some of these foci. Middle-class women, in particular, whose main occupations were associated with the home, but for whom the presence of live-in servants provided more leisure, met in each other's houses, in cafés, and in the new department stores.

Immigrant groups provided a constant alternative cultural focus to the cultures of established townspeople. Most of the demographic growth of the urban population, whether in the sixteenth century or the twentieth, was dependant on in-migration. Mortality levels were too high to permit natural replacement, let alone sustained growth. New arrivals often congregated in the same districts as others from the same region and engaged in the same occupations. This contiguity of home and employment reinforced pre-existing similarities of language, culinary customs, dress, courtship, religious observance, and daily routine. If migration was intended to be temporary, there were few incentives to alter these practices. The men from the Limousin in central France who came to Paris in the early nineteenth century to work as builders continued to maintain an agrarian routine, rising at five or six in the morning and walking to their place of work. Even when they spoke French instead of their own dialect, they punctuated their words with long silences.

On the other hand, there was a constant tension between the persistence of immigrant customs brought into a town and the integrative mechanisms enabling newcomers to be accepted. Inter-marriage with part-

ners of different origins, economic success, and opportunities to live away from immigrant areas all contributed to the dilution of specific immigrant cultures, particularly where there were comparatively few contrasts between the immigrants and the host community. New waves of postcolonial migration to European urban centers during the last third of the twentieth century replicated both patterns of integration and of segregation, with one important difference. The integrative mechanisms came to operate in two directions, enabling elements of immigrant culture, primarily music, dress, and food, to become accepted as part of mainstream urban culture.

The distinction between popular culture and the culture of the wealthy and literate, which had developed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, widened still further as a result of industrialization. At the time when “high culture” (classical music, painting, books, scientific collections, and ideas) was moving out of the private houses of the wealthy into buildings dedicated to the edification of the general public, the conditions of factory work, the location of more and more housing away from the central business district, and a general absence of possibilities for self-improvement prevented more than a minority of workers from taking advantage of the new cultural institutions. Free time was at a premium. There were few incentives for a Viennese jeweller’s apprentice working in the suburb of Friedrichstadt in the early twentieth century, for instance, to make the journey into the center of the city to view the shops in the Kärntner Strasse or to admire the works of Klimt and Schiele in the galleries. It was only when the regulations in Berlin that required all shop windows to be shuttered on Sundays (in order not to disturb the Sabbath) were relaxed that thousands of workers walked in from the suburbs in order to window-shop and visits to city centers became common again.

Night culture. During the Renaissance, the Venetian Republic created a magistracy, the *signori della notte*, with special responsibility for keeping order between dusk and dawn. This action was a recognition that there were important distinctions between the activities that took place in the city by day and those by night, and consequently between the culture of the day and the culture of the night. The distinction has continued to be one of considerable importance. To its detractors, the culture of the night has always been illicit. The day was to be devoted to work, both practical and intellectual, while the night was to be spent in sleeping or in domestic tasks. Only Sundays and feast days were open to alternative forms of behavior,

and these were strictly circumscribed. In the absence of reliable street lighting, travel by night was dangerous and unusual. Any nocturnal activities were consequently beyond the usual social norms and required control. The Venetians arrested men for brawling in the streets, kidnap, rape, and even suborning nuns during Carnival. This suspicion of the culture of the night remained even when working hours had become shorter and many streets were illuminated by gas or electricity. Some anxiety was justified. The night was a time for crime—theft, murder, and prostitution—but as the case of prostitution shows, the illicitness of the culture of the night owes much to its role as a meeting place between the respectable and the suspect. Without the complicity of the young and wealthy, who derived a thrill from visiting certain “dangerous” parts of the city after nightfall, much of the culture of the night, with its drinking haunts, market stalls, and places of entertainment, would not have developed. On the other hand, although the culture of the night can be easily distinguished from the culture of the day, the culture of the day was most important in breaking down differences between the sexes, between people of different social status and origin, or at least to facilitate a common cultural experience, which did much to create a single urban culture in the later twentieth century.

The process of European urbanization serves to emphasize the contrasts between urban and rural social organization both before and after industrialization. Within urban centers, however, the continuities between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries dominated the urban experience. For most of the time, urban dwellers lived in a society whose scale was too large for them to relate to in its entirety, but whose composition enabled them to belong to multiple groupings based on neighborhood, occupation, place of birth, gender, religious affiliation, political or sporting allegiances, or voluntary activity. Each created its own cultural constructs but shared enough of them with others to enable society to function effectively except in times of crisis. This society was constantly shaped on the one hand by the immigrants whose arrival helped to fuel the demographic increases associated with urbanization, and on the other by organs of local and national government, whose priorities reflected the concerns of dominant urban elites. Urbanization reached its peak in the course of the twentieth century, leading to conditions of social overload in terms of population density, demand for services and housing, and an erosion of long-standing social relationships. Since then, urban centers have become even more socially confused as a process of formal or informal deurbanization takes place.

See also **Housing** (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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THE CITY: THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD



Christopher R. Friedrichs

Throughout the early modern era, cities and towns played a vastly greater role in shaping the character of European society than the number of their inhabitants might suggest. European society in the early modern era was predominantly rural. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, only about one-tenth of the total population of Europe inhabited urban centers, and by the end of the eighteenth century this proportion was not substantially larger. Yet cities and towns (the terms are almost interchangeable, with American usage generally preferring “cities” and British usage favoring “towns”) had an economic, political, and cultural impact out of proportion to their collective size.

Cities were bigger than villages. What defined them as cities, however, was not mere size, for they had specific characteristics and functions that made them fundamentally different from the rural communities in which most Europeans lived. Cities were centers of exchange. They always had frequent markets that served the needs of the surrounding region and often had annual or semiannual trade fairs that attracted merchants from much farther away. They were also centers of production, for handcrafted goods were manufactured and sold in every European town. Often this craft production was highly specialized. Distinct trades with their own techniques and traditions were devoted to the production of particular varieties of textiles, clothing, leather goods, metalware, ceramics, and wooden products. Larger urban centers also played an important role in organizing long-distance trade and providing financial services. Often the inhabitants of cities enjoyed the exclusive right to carry out these various urban functions.

The special character of the European city had emerged gradually during the Middle Ages, when feudal rulers granted charters that gave town dwellers special economic and political privileges in return for benefits, usually financial, that the towns could offer the rulers. A typical privilege was the right to hold markets and fairs. Another was the right to construct

a wall, which would enable the town to regulate the flow of people and goods through its gates. Often towns also obtained rights of self-government, under which interference by the ruler’s officials was sharply restricted. Only a few cities were fully independent city-states, but many enjoyed a high degree of political autonomy.

The social organization of towns was also distinctive. Each European city had a body of adult male householders—citizens, burghers, freemen, bourgeois, or the like—who collectively embodied the political community. Membership in the citizenry was passed on to male descendants, though newcomers might also be admitted. In theory, though not always in practice, only citizens could participate fully in the city’s economic life as merchants or craft masters. Economic life was organized largely around guilds, which were typically but not always made up of individuals who practiced the same occupation. Membership in the relevant guild was often a prerequisite for engaging in a particular trade or craft. Authority in all its forms was exercised on a collective basis. Virtually every city was governed by a council or group of councils made up of prosperous male citizens. Power was always gendered. Women could inherit and own property and engage in certain forms of economic enterprise, but they were excluded both from decision making in the guilds and from membership in any of the governing councils.

These basic parameters of urban life remained largely constant during the early modern era. Yet urban society was by no means static. Some cities acquired an entirely new role in the early modern era, as hitherto minor towns like Madrid or Berlin turned into major administrative capitals for the absolutist states which emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Even cities whose functions remained largely commercial also underwent significant changes between the end of the Middle Ages and the eve of the industrial era. But urban historians continue to debate the pace, extent, and character of these changes.

FUNDAMENTAL THEMES

Writings on the history of cities in early modern Europe can be grouped into three main categories. The first group examines cities from the perspective of urbanism. This approach emphasizes changes in the design and layout of cities and the character of buildings and urban infrastructures. Though drawing heavily on the history of architecture and urban planning, the urbanist tradition is ultimately concerned with the relationship between the physical structures of cities and the quality of urban life. The most influential work in this tradition is Lewis Mumford's *The City in History* (1961). Mumford valued what he perceived as the organic and intimate character of the medieval city and viewed the attempts by early modern rulers to redesign cities along more grandiose lines as alienating—a view adopted, with modifications, by some of his disciples.

A second approach looks at cities from the point of view of urbanization. This approach is concerned less with specific cities than with the relationship among cities within broader urban networks and attempts to delineate or measure changes in the size and economic importance of urban society as a whole. Notable works within this group include the important survey by Paul M. Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees, *The Making of Urban Europe, 1000–1950* (1985), and the pioneering summary and analysis of demographic data by Jan de Vries, *European Urbanization, 1500–1800* (1984).

The third approach, which might be called urban history as such, is founded on the description and analysis of the social, political, economic, or cultural history of particular cities. The earliest publications in this tradition belong to the genre of local history, works whose main purpose is to inform inhabitants or visitors about the history and heritage of individual cities. But the most important works of urban history are those whose authors examined individual cities as case studies to cast some light on the character of urban society as a whole. French historians of the early postwar era established a benchmark for such studies with their attempts to study the *histoire totale* of particular cities. Only a few historians have attempted to achieve the same breadth that Pierre Goubert did in his pioneering study of Beauvais and its region, but many have emulated his commitment to understanding early modern society by examining individual urban communities in depth.

In fact most of the great themes of early modern European history are closely linked to the urban experience. Inevitably, then, urban historians have striven to determine both the extent to which cities played a

role in causing fundamental changes and the extent to which the cities themselves were transformed by these changes.

One major theme involves the religious division of Europe brought about by the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. Cities played a key role in the emergence of Protestant ideas, and some cities became arenas of bitter religious conflict. But cities also served as templates for religious compromise when Europeans began to experiment with the concept of confessionally divided communities.

A second theme relates to the growing power of centralized states, especially in western and northern Europe. Cities inevitably felt the impact when monarchical regimes tried to expand their administrative reach. But the process of state expansion was irregular, and the way in which cities responded was far from uniform. In some cities local elites firmly resisted any attempts to diminish local autonomy, but in other cases urban leaders cooperated with state officials and welcomed the opportunity to integrate themselves into broader structures of authority.

A third great theme has to do with the cluster of economic changes generally referred to as the growth of capitalism. Historians have debated exactly what capitalism is or was. To some, notably those in the marxist tradition, capitalism is an economic system in which the dominant form of production is manufacture and the means of production are mostly owned by bourgeois entrepreneurs. To others, influenced by Max Weber, capitalism is a system of economic practice characterized by the rational pursuit of sustained profit. To yet others, capitalism is virtually synonymous with market relations, the free exchange of goods and services, with prices and wages determined by supply and demand rather than traditional expectations or state controls. Yet no matter which of these definitions is preferred, substantial evidence indicates that economic transactions in early modern Europe increasingly took place in a capitalistic way. Less self-evident is the role that cities played in this process. Traditional marxist historiography presupposed that capitalist enterprise was based in cities and was controlled by members of the urban bourgeoisie. Yet analysts emphasized the extent to which capitalist practices were also applied to agricultural production. Some also argued that the emergence of large-scale rural manufacturing during the early modern era—the process generally referred to as protoindustrialization—diminished the importance of cities in the transition to a modern industrial economy. There is little question, however, that even if dramatic increases in production took place in the countryside, cities continued to supply much of the capital invested

in rural enterprises. Of course cities, especially strategically located ports, were the conduit through which the profits generated by European conquests in the New World were funneled back to the Old.

Some historians have posited a fourth major theme of early modern social history, the growth of what is generally labeled “social discipline.” This refers to the efforts by social elites to impose habits of obedience and regularity on the rest of society to make members of the lower orders more pliant to the authorities and more accustomed to the work routines required by the capitalist system. The pervasiveness of this program and the degree to which cities were involved have been matters of dispute, but attempts by urban magistrates to streamline systems of poor relief and to diminish the number or visibility of people they regarded as social undesirables have been cited as manifestations of this undertaking.

Finally, the early modern era was characterized by cultural transformations in which cities played an important part. High culture—literature, music, theater, and the visual arts—continued to depend heavily on royal or aristocratic patronage, but artists, composers, and writers were generally of urban origin. Throughout the early modern era cultural consumption was broadened to include many patrons among the urban bourgeoisie. Even more important, however, were the invention of printing in the fifteenth century and the explosive diffusion of printed matter from the sixteenth century onward, which in turn stimulated and reinforced the spread of literacy among ever larger circles of the European population. Almost

all printed matter was produced in cities, and much of it was consumed there as well. Literacy rates varied sharply between regions and countries, but almost everywhere literacy was higher in cities than in the rural hinterland. Though firm measurements are lacking, it is apparent that by the end of the eighteenth century, at least in northwestern Europe and Germany, the great majority of men and women in cities were able to read and write. Cities were thus the pacesetters for the diffusion of print culture throughout Europe as a whole. Beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, European cities also experienced a proliferation of organizations, societies and clubs devoted to the presentation of scientific findings or the discussion of political, cultural, and literary topics. All of these typically urban institutions, which ranged from scientific academies established by royal charter to informal salons run by aristocratic hostesses, eventually contributed to the ferment of new thinking associated with the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EARLY MODERN CITY

Nobody knows exactly how many cities existed in early modern Europe or exactly how many people lived in them. Comprehensive census data did not exist before about 1800. Furthermore, despite the generally clear distinction between cities and villages, the legal status of a number of market communities remained ambiguous. The overall picture, however, is



DONAUWÖRTH

Donauwörth, situated at the junction of the Danube and Wörnitz Rivers in southern Germany, was by any measure a small town. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the city had about 4,000 inhabitants, and the population declined to less than 3,000 as a result of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). But the city's physical layout, depicted in the 1640s by the celebrated topographer Matthäus Merian, had many elements characteristic of European cities large and small. The city was surrounded by a wall and some additional fortifications, which enabled it to keep out unwanted visitors and fend off small-scale raiders. The wall was not adequate, however, to discourage a truly determined foe, as the citizens discovered in 1607, when the city was seized by the duke of Bavaria. The city did not have a formal market square, but it did have an unusually wide central street, the *Reichsstrasse* or Imperial Way, which served as the marketplace and the site of ceremonial events. At the eastern end of this street stood the relatively modest city hall. Toward its western end was the large Fugger House, from

which the powerful South German dynasty of the Fuggers administered its properties in the surrounding region. Far more imposing than these secular buildings, however, were the city's major ecclesiastical structures, notably the parish church in the city center and the large monastery of the Holy Cross in the southwestern corner. One of the major trades of Donauwörth was the production of woolen cloth. After the cloths were woven and fulled, they were hung out to dry on huge racks just outside the city's western wall. Gardens and orchards were located both within and outside the walled area. The city retained this appearance until it began to raze the walls in the early nineteenth century.

Matthäus Merian and Martin Zeiller. *Topographia Bavariae: das ist, Beschreib: vnd Aigentliche Abbildung der Vornembsten Stätt vnd Orth, in Ober vnd Nieder Bejern, der Obem Pfaltz, vnd andern, zum Hochlöblichen Bayrischen Craisse gehörigen Landschafften*. 2d ed. Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 1657. Illustration facing page 106.

clear. Most cities were small by modern standards. In 1500 only three or four cities in Europe had populations of more than 100,000, and by 1800 the number remained less than twenty. Jan de Vries estimated that in 1500 Europe had about 500 cities with populations over 5,000 and by 1800 Europe had roughly 900 such places. But the pace of urbanization was uneven, with more growth in the sixteenth century, a slower rate in the seventeenth century, and a sharp increase in the eighteenth century. Many cities experienced only a moderate increase in size during the early modern era, and some even lost population as their economic importance declined. Yet a few cities, especially national capitals that were also major centers of commerce, experienced spectacular growth. Naples, whose population of about 150,000 made it the largest city in Europe in 1500, almost tripled in size by 1800. Paris grew from about 100,000 to 600,000 during the same three centuries. By far the most dramatic increase, however, was experienced by London, which went from less than 50,000 in 1500 to almost 900,000 by the end of the eighteenth century.

The factors that accounted for the growth of cities have long been the subject of debate by historians. In the long run many cities must have experienced some natural increase caused by an excess of births over deaths. But the balance was precarious, for cities were often subject to sudden increases in mortality as a result of harvest crises or epidemic diseases. Until the late seventeenth century, for example, cities all over Europe faced periodic visitations of the bubonic plague, which could wipe out a third or more of a community's population within a matter of months. A key element in the growth of cities was undoubtedly immigration from the surrounding hinterland or more distant regions. But not all immigrants contributed to the demographic growth of the city, for many of them were ill-paid laborers or servants who never accumulated enough resources to get married and establish families. Altogether, despite the exceptional growth of a few major cities, the pace of urbanization in Europe during the early modern era was modest compared to what occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

At the beginning of the early modern era towns of every size had certain structural characteristics in common, and many of these features remained intact until the end of the eighteenth century. Inevitably some of the great metropolitan centers began to diverge from the general norms, but even in cities like London or Paris much of the institutional and physical legacy of earlier times remained firmly entrenched.

Almost every early modern city was surrounded by a wall punctuated by gates and watchtowers. If a city grew, the new districts were supposed to be enclosed by extensions of the wall. This did not always happen, for the fastest-growing cities were ringed by suburbs and faubourgs outside the walls, often populated by newcomers who were only partially integrated into the city's administrative system. In cases like these, the walls became increasingly irrelevant and were gradually broken through or allowed to decay. In other cities, especially in areas that faced sustained military activity, the walls were not just preserved but were transformed into elaborate systems of fortifications, with bastions and outerworks designed to thwart all but the most determined siege.

The internal layout of almost all cities had certain elements in common. The typical city had an array of gently curving streets supplemented by a confusing network of hidden alleys, lanes, and courtyards. Every city had a number of open squares or wider streets that served as marketplaces. In ports and riverside cities the streets were generally intersected by a system of moats and canals. The largest buildings were

usually ecclesiastical. At the beginning of the early modern era this category included parish churches, chapels, monasteries, and nunneries. If the city was the seat of a bishop, it also had a cathedral. In cities that went Protestant the monastic houses disappeared, but the churches remained. Major public buildings included city halls, granaries, warehouses, hospitals, and almshouses. A few cities also had castles left over from medieval times. Larger cities often had mansions or palaces occupied by particularly prominent families. No matter what other structures a city might have, most of the building stock consisted of houses. Virtually every house served a dual function as a residence and as a workshop or place of business. The later differentiation between industrial, commercial, and residential zones was unknown, but generally the very center of the city was considered the most desirable neighborhood. The city's greatest merchants typically lived in houses clustered around the main marketplace or near the largest church. Poorer inhabitants were more likely to live farther from the center or even outside the walls. Sometimes a city's unique topography created its own rules. In canal-webbed Venice, for example, streets were used only by pedestrians, while vehicular traffic was exclusively waterborne. The grandest palazzi were not clustered in the city center but stretched out along both sides of the Grand Canal. But most cities conformed to a more familiar pattern of spatial organization.

This traditional pattern, however, was not attractive to Renaissance theorists of urban planning or

absolutist rulers whose vision of perfect cities involved broad avenues radiating uniformly from great central plazas. Not many new cities were founded in early modern Europe, so few opportunities to apply notions of urban planning to entire communities arose. But these visions did find increasing expression in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when, in contrast to the usual haphazard growth of suburbs, carefully planned neighborhoods were laid out on the peripheries of existing towns. By the end of the eighteenth century, many of Europe's larger cities thus had a modern district with elegant new squares and broad boulevards awkwardly conjoined to a more traditional city center.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CITIES

Despite regional variations and the inevitable differences between large and small communities, the basic social structure of most European cities followed a common pattern. Every city had a core group of established householders. In some places almost all of these householders were citizens; but even where the formal rights of citizenship were confined to a more exclusive group, noncitizen householders still had a recognized status with clearly defined rights. The adult male householder was likely to be the master of some craft and thus a full member of the relevant guild. The master carried out his trade with the assistance of his journeymen and apprentices and some help from family members and unskilled servants. In theory each master was economically independent, buying raw materials and selling finished products on the open market. In practice things were never so simple, for poor masters often found themselves doing piecework for wealthy entrepreneurs on whom they were economically dependent. Furthermore the master's wife, or sometimes even the master himself, might seek to supplement the household income by engaging in retail activity or other work outside the home. Some householders were not artisans but worked in the service sector, for example as innkeepers, teachers, or clerks. Nevertheless, the traditional image of the urban community consisting largely of households headed by artisans who plied their own trades under their own roofs never lost its validity.

Every city, large or small, also had a highly visible social elite. The wealthiest craftsmen or practitioners of the most prestigious trades might belong to the lower fringes of this elite group. The core of the elite, however, was normally made up of merchants and some professionals, notably lawyers. The largest cities might also have an even higher stratum of pa-

trician families, whose members were no longer active in trade but lived off their investments and strove to be regarded as members of the aristocracy. Some towns attempted to define formally who belonged to the social elite, usually by specifying which families had the right to be represented in the city's highest political bodies. Such cases were rare, however. Most cities required some flexibility in defining membership in the elite, if only to replace old families that had died out. Even those municipal elites whose members made the most stringent attempts to bar any newcomers from joining their ranks, such as the patricians of Venice or Nürnberg, eventually found it necessary to bend the rules and admit a few particularly wealthy or well-connected families.

At the other end of the social spectrum, every city harbored a large population of individuals who were too dependent, poor, or transient to be counted among the regular householders. Many of these people lived as journeymen, apprentices, or servants in the households of their employers. Others were unskilled laborers who lived in small rented quarters and supported themselves by performing the menial tasks that abounded in a premechanized society, such as carrying, digging, transporting, and animal tending. Even further down the scale was a floating population of paupers and thieves with no fixed homes or legitimate means of sustenance. Some Iberian cities also had slaves, both white and black. A special social niche was occupied by people regularly employed in occupations that placed them outside the margins of respectable society, such as executioners, carrion removers, and dung porters. The status of prostitutes declined in the early modern era. In the late Middle Ages prostitution was an acknowledged occupation, and its practitioners generally lived in carefully supervised establishments. By the end of the sixteenth century, however, almost all of those houses had closed, and prostitutes unavoidably slipped into the urban underworld.

The presence of ethnic or religious minorities complicated the social structure of some communities. Occasionally ethnicity determined a resident's legal or social status. In some cities in the Baltic region, for example, people of Slavic origin were barred from political rights and occupations that remained open to people of German descent. Religious minorities were even more common. Most of these religious subgroups arose during the Reformation, when some town dwellers insisted on adhering to a religious faith different from the one approved by the authorities. Sometimes adherents of a persecuted religion arrived as refugees in cities and were given rights of residence. In many cases members of religious minorities were

allowed or even encouraged to participate in lucrative economic activities even though they were not accepted as full members of the community. Often this meant that members of a religious subgroup became quite wealthy while remaining socially and politically marginalized.

The most extreme case involved the Jews. By the early sixteenth century Jews had long since been barred from living in England and France and had more recently been banished from various places in central Europe and from the Iberian Peninsula. But Jews were allowed to live as members of self-contained, socially isolated communities in cities in Italy, Germany, and much of eastern Europe. Some Jews became wealthy as moneylenders and merchants, and by the eighteenth century "court Jews" were deeply involved in helping European princes finance their regimes. Even so, wherever they lived the Jews remained socially segregated until the beginning of emancipation in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century.

Early modern government officials were assiduous record keepers, and in many cities substantial data survived, making possible statistical reconstructions of urban social structure. Among the most informative sources are the records of property taxes paid by citizens or other established householders. Despite significant differences between various types of communities, wherever these data survive they demonstrate huge disparities in wealth among the householders of any given city. The great south German city of Augsburg is typical. In 1618 just under 9,000 citizen households were inscribed in the tax registers of Augsburg. Almost half of the householders were listed as "have nots," meaning not that they were entirely without resources but that their real and liquid property was not substantial enough to be taxable. Another quarter of the citizens paid an annual tax of not more than 1 *gulden*, corresponding to taxable assets worth up to 400 *gulden*. Above them were ranged an ascending scale of ever wealthier taxpayers. At the pinnacle were ten merchant princes, whose annual tax payments were over 500 *gulden*, representing fortunes of 100,000 *gulden* and up.

Disparities like this help explain why urban elites were so insistent on seeing the social structures of their communities in hierarchical terms. Some cities issued tables of ranks showing who could march where in public processions or clothing ordinances specifying what forms of adornment could be worn by which social groups. Yet no attempts to perpetuate the existing social hierarchy were ever able to resist the ceaseless pressure of social mobility. Urban patricians sometimes pretended they constituted a virtual caste, but in fact they belonged at best to an unstable status

group. The upper reaches of urban society were constantly replenished by new families made rich by marriage, inheritance, or success in business. Prosperous immigrants from other communities also had to be accommodated and shown the respect that their wealth commanded. Some experienced downward mobility too, as the fortunes of wealthy families decayed or even, in some spectacular cases, rich men went bankrupt. In fact movement up and down the ladder of wealth and prestige took place throughout all ranks of urban society. Significant change often occurred within one or two generations. It was not unheard of for poor men to have rich grandchildren or, conversely, for rich men to have poor descendants.

URBAN GOVERNMENT

Urban government was always conciliar in structure. Cities often had a number of councils, but most of them were merely consultative. Real power was typically invested in a single council that combined executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Cities like Venice or Strasbourg with complex systems of interlocking councils were rare. Mayors might rotate in and out of office, but council members generally served for life. Occasionally the councilmen were elected, and sometimes a certain number of seats were reserved for particular constituencies, such as guilds or neighborhoods. In most cases, however, when a seat on the council became vacant through death or retirement, the existing members chose the replacement themselves. Thus many city councils were in effect self-sustaining oligarchies. On the whole urban constitutions were highly conservative. Occasionally changes were introduced, most often when rulers intervened to restructure the municipal government or to install their own clients in positions of authority; but whenever possible the magistrates resisted such changes and preserved the form of government that had been established during the Middle Ages.

Research on the composition of councils in European cities has shown that, no matter how the members were chosen, the end result was almost always the same: council members tended to be drawn from among the wealthiest members of the community. This was already the case in the late Middle Ages, but the tendency was steadily reinforced during the early modern era, when city councils became increasingly exclusive in their memberships. Yet the fact that wealth rather than pedigree was the most common ingredient in appointing new councilmen insured that political power could become available to emerging members of the social elite. Some changes occurred

in the occupational profile of councils. Late medieval councils were typically composed of merchants and wealthy craftsmen, but during the early modern era craftsmen gradually disappeared from councils except in the smallest cities. At the same time more seats were held by rentiers who were not active in trade. The role of the legal profession in urban government shifted. In the late Middle Ages lawyers were influential in municipal affairs as advisers to the magistrates, but in the course of the early modern era more lawyers actually came to occupy council seats. By contrast, members of the clergy did not hold municipal office, though in some Protestant cities they sat with council members on consistories that formulated and enforced policies about marriage arrangements and personal conduct.

Changes in the composition of the urban political elite were closely linked to a gradual transformation in the relationship between cities and broader political structures. In the Middle Ages urban leaders struggled to assert their autonomy from kings and princes. By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, greater financial and military resources made it easier for rulers to assert or reassert their authority over cities. A few cities, such as Venice, Geneva, and the free cities of the Holy Roman Empire, managed to resist this trend. Other cities struggled against the rulers' power only to be forced into submission by military action. Most urban oligarchies soon perceived the advantages of cooperation with princely governments. Often the traditional municipal elite and the corps of royal officials slowly merged into a single urban oligarchy of wealthy and well-educated men whose families were intermarried with each other and increasingly isolated from the rest of the community.

Yet although civic leaders were drawn from an ever narrower fraction of the population, a number of factors prevented them from becoming entirely self-serving. City governments never commanded police power in the twentieth-century sense. They employed a few bealdes or constables, but in attempting to maintain order the council depended chiefly on the cooperation of civic militias and neighborhood watches made up of the citizens themselves. The existence of an armed citizenry aware of its latent rights as members of the political community was a significant constraint on the exercise of arbitrary power. From time to time, when excessive taxes or unwelcome policies suggested that the magistrates had too blatantly ignored the wishes of their fellow citizens, uprisings flared. Sometimes council members were actually deposed, but more often they got a serious fright. Magistrates did not have to wait until they faced an armed crowd in the marketplace to know that they could govern ef-

fectively only by heeding the interests of the established citizen householders.

GUILDS AND THE URBAN ECONOMY

Numerous groups in urban society voiced the concerns of adult male citizens, including militia companies and parish councils. But the most significant interest groups in European cities were generally the guilds. Although guilds sometimes had religious and social functions, their major purpose was always economic, that is, to guarantee the uniformity and quality of the goods and services their members provided and to protect their members' livelihoods by regulating the process through which apprentices became journeymen and journeymen became masters. A persistent objective of the guilds was to prevent the manufacture of goods by nonmember craftsmen in the surrounding countryside or in the city itself. This occasionally brought the guilds into conflict with aristocrats who patronized rural craftsmen or with entrepreneurial merchants who employed the cheap labor of nonguild artisans. But guilds also experienced internal conflict, typically between poorer masters, who might want to limit the number of journeymen permitted to work in any one shop, and richer masters, who wanted no restrictions.

The tensions between guild artisans and merchants or among the craftsmen themselves arose largely from developments associated with the spread of capitalism. When merchant entrepreneurs gained control of the sources of raw materials or the markets for finished goods, they made it impossible for masters to function as independent economic actors and effectively reduced the masters to wage laborers. Such trends were by no means new to the early modern era, having already become evident in some late medieval cities. But the trends accelerated in early modern times and triggered in turn more aggressive efforts by craftsmen to preserve their traditional rights.

In the struggle to protect their interests, guild members often voiced their faith in the legitimacy of economic monopolies, but this faith was by no means confined to traditional artisans. For urban capitalism in early modern Europe was also largely dependent on monopoly rights. Certainly some merchants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries tried to break guild monopolies by articulating the case for freedom of exchange in particular branches of production. But many of the most significant capitalist enterprises in early modern Europe, notably the overseas trading companies that pioneered in the extraction of wealth from the New World or the Indies, depended on royal

charters or other privileges that granted their members the exclusive right to deal in specific goods or to trade in specific regions.

To the liberal or physiocratic thinkers of the eighteenth century, guilds, like chartered trading companies, were obstacles to economic freedom that stood in the way of economic growth. The assumption that guilds were backward-looking organizations that hindered social and economic progress persisted through the twentieth century. Many historians have recognized, however, that this is an oversimplification. Guilds never uniformly opposed technological innovation or entrepreneurial activity, though they consistently protected the ability of their members to earn a living as independent economic actors. In fact the guilds often played an effective and useful role in promoting the interests of their members and preserving the autonomy and integrity of skilled craft production throughout the early modern era.

Journeyman were integral to the guild system of production without being actual members of the guilds. A young journeyman was expected to spend some years traveling from town to town, enriching his experience and honing his skills by working on a contract basis for a succession of masters. Eventually the journeyman would hope to settle down in one city, often his town of origin. In theory journeymen were thought of as masters in the making who could ascend to full mastership once they met such customary requirements as the payment of a fee, presentation of an acceptable masterpiece, and engagement to a suitable bride. But often masters attempted to limit their own ranks by imposing stiffer fees or tightening the standards for admission. Journeymen had organizations of their own—*compagnonnages* in France and *Gesellenvereinigungen* in central Europe—whose importance increased as more of their members faced the prospect of never ascending to mastership. These organizations not only helped the journeymen to locate work and lodgings when they arrived in a new town but also provided the fellowship and solidarity that emboldened journeymen to protest or strike against inadequate wages or unfair conditions. Guilds are occasionally but inaccurately described as an early form of trade unions. In fact it was the journeymen's associations rather than guilds that served as prototypes for the labor unions that emerged in the nineteenth century.

RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL ISSUES

Though urban magistrates were repeatedly called upon to adjudicate the disputes that arose among various

groups with conflicting economic interests, the challenge of settling even the most bitter economic disagreements often paled before some of the other problems confronting urban rulers. Beginning in the sixteenth century, many of these problems had to do with religion. Religious tensions had not been unknown in medieval cities, especially when the authorities faced destabilizing outbursts of religious enthusiasm fueled by charismatic preachers. But an entirely new situation was introduced by the Protestant Reformation, which began when Martin Luther issued his Ninety-five Theses in 1517. The Protestant cause, which challenged some of the most fundamental beliefs and practices of the traditional church, found early support in the cities of central Europe, where widespread anticlerical sentiments merged with the humanist values of some educated citizens. The changes the early reformers demanded—a transformed structure of worship, a married clergy, an end to monasteries and nunneries, and a rejection of the traditional veneration of saints—required not just a new religious outlook but also a different relationship between the institutions of secular and religious authority. Some municipal leaders bowed to popular pressure and openly embraced these changes, while others adamantly opposed them. But many urban authorities took a more cautious line and ended up simply implementing the religious policies and preferences formulated by their princes.

By the middle of the sixteenth century, Protestant ideas in various forms had spread from Germany and Switzerland to much of the rest of Europe. In some areas, especially in northern Europe, Protestantism was imposed by royal or princely fiat. Authorities in Italy and the Iberian Peninsula prevented it from ever taking root. Communities in some countries, notably France and the Netherlands, were split by religious differences that led to bitter tensions and occasional riots. Historians have struggled to find a social basis for the religious allegiances of Protestants and Catholics in sixteenth-century cities, usually with little success except to note that urban men and women with some degree of education were more likely to be attracted to the new faith than those with no education. Municipal leaders, themselves often divided along religious lines, struggled to retain their authority while balancing the conflicting demands of their fellow citizens or of rulers and other powerful outsiders. Mostly the magistrates succeeded in retaining power, though sometimes new elites representing a different religious outlook took their place.

By the seventeenth century the confessional complexion of European cities was generally stabilized. There were numerous exceptions—notably En-

gland, where religious and political struggles within the Protestant camp in the mid-seventeenth century divided many cities into Puritan and Anglican factions. But sooner or later in most cities one confession came to predominate, and through a process of steady “confessionalization,” the differences between Protestant and Catholic cities became fixed and permanent. Protestant communities, for example, had a small core of highly educated pastors primarily concerned with preaching and religious leadership. Catholic cities, by contrast, continued to have large ecclesiastical establishments with substantial numbers of priests and members of religious orders who provided spiritual, educational, and charitable services. Religious practices not just in churches but also in schools and households assumed distinctly Protestant or Catholic forms.

Although only a handful of cities, mostly in Germany, formally granted equal status to members of more than one Christian confession, the tumults of the sixteenth century left a residue of religious minorities in many communities. Often the members of a minority developed far-flung business contacts within their own subgroup or became noted practitioners of a particular craft. Some urban leaders, especially in dynamic port cities that tended to attract religious

refugees, tried to take advantage of the economic services such groups provided while still upholding the concept of religious uniformity. In the great north German entrepôt of Hamburg, for example, the Lutheran clergy struggled throughout the early modern era to keep the city solidly Lutheran, while the more pragmatic, business-minded leaders of the municipal government repeatedly extended residential rights and even some religious freedoms to Calvinist, Catholic, Mennonite, and Jewish subcommunities. Although the number of religious subgroups in Hamburg was particularly large, the presence of such groups and the issues they raised for the urban authorities were far from unique.

The capacity of some urban leaders to put economic interests ahead of religious purity was linked, at least in some cases, to their mounting concern with an issue that confronted the authorities in every European city, namely the problem of poverty. Of course there had been poverty in the medieval city, but it was generally viewed in religious rather than social terms. Guided by the biblical maxim “the poor are always with us,” lay and religious leaders of the Middle Ages stressed the obligation to help the poor but never felt challenged to eliminate poverty as such. Good Christians were encouraged to perform acts of charity more

for the sake of their own souls than for the benefit of those whom they helped. The sixteenth century, however, witnessed a markedly heightened concern with poverty as a social issue, particularly in cities. A widespread notion emerged that the number of poor people in cities was increasing. In fact the demographic upsurge of the sixteenth century seems to have caused more men and women who could not sustain themselves in their own villages to head for urban centers. There was also a shift in attitudes. Beginning in the early sixteenth century, one city after another adopted ordinances to outlaw begging in the streets and replace it with centralized mechanisms to collect and distribute charity. In theory only the “deserving” poor, local inhabitants who had fallen on hard times, were to be aided, while “sturdy beggars” from outside were to be excluded. These ordinances owed something to the new Protestant doctrines that rejected good works as irrelevant to salvation; but the new approach to urban poverty was adopted, with some modifications, in Catholic cities as well. The real mainspring was the growing conviction among Protestants and Catholics alike that idleness in general and begging in particular were contrary to divine command and to earthly productivity. Those who could no longer work should be given assistance, but everyone who could work should be required to do so.

By the seventeenth century institutions such as orphanages, workhouses, and hospitals, in which people who did not belong to households would be provided for and the able-bodied among them would be put to productive labor, proliferated. To some historians this development amounted to a “great confinement” of the urban poor as part of a grand program to subject them to social discipline. In fact these institutions housed only a small fraction of those in need, and many of the inmates, resentful of having to work long hours for negligible pay, chose the first opportunity to escape. For most of the poor the first line of assistance in times of trouble was the informal system of self-help provided by family and friends supplemented, especially in Catholic cities, by church-based philanthropy. Only when these means were inadequate would they turn to municipal charity or, despite all prohibitions, resort to open begging. Unified schemes to deal with urban poverty on a citywide basis almost always failed because their proponents repeatedly confronted an unbridgeable gap between the extent of the need and the amount of available resources. Despite their unremitting attempts to deal with the problem, urban leaders always found it impossible to eliminate poverty or even sweep it off the streets. The poor were indeed always with them.

CONCLUSION

By the end of the early modern era, significant changes had taken place in European urban life, yet the elements of continuity were still preponderant. Though a few cities were approaching a size unknown in Europe since Roman times, the spatial organization and even the physical appearance of most cities were little changed from what had prevailed in the Middle Ages. The urban skyline was still dominated by steeples. Most cities were still walled, though progressive-minded thinkers increasingly urged that the walls be razed so as to integrate suburbs more effectively into the urban core.

The basic structure of economic life also showed significant continuities. Early modern Europeans were enthusiasts for technological innovation, and the early modern era saw the introduction of numerous improvements and refinements in the way goods were manufactured or transported. Yet the basic processes of production and distribution in the key sectors of the economy, including food, textiles, and metalworking, changed little. Except in England, where they steadily lost importance during the eighteenth century, guilds remained influential in the organization of economic life. Capitalist entrepreneurs who engaged in long-distance or overseas trade or who found ways to circumvent guild restrictions by organizing large-scale production continued to make huge fortunes. Rural manufacture of goods by peasants outside the guild system expanded significantly during the early modern era, but the capital that made this production possible normally came from wealthy men in the cities. Urban craftsmen continued to dominate the production of more complex, delicate, or refined goods.

The social organization of cities also remained fundamentally constant. Urban society was still strongly patriarchal. Men exercised authority in the community, shop, and family, though women had some influence over the property they inherited and some opportunities to earn an independent living. Power in cities belonged to a small oligarchy of wealthy men who dominated municipal councils, but places were always available for “new men” whose families had recently become rich. The old antagonisms between cities and princely regimes were largely forgotten as members of the urban elite worked with officials of the regime and the regional aristocracy and their families socialized or even intermarried. The broad mass of ordinary householding citizens, though generally excluded from real political decision making, exercised some influence through their seats on lesser councils, their participation in guild

affairs, or their membership on parish or neighborhood committees.

Urban society in the early modern era was never static. The city offered endless opportunities for ambitious men and, in a more limited way, ambitious women to move up the social ladder by increasing their wealth or by finding useful patrons or spouses. The city offered pitfalls as well, for misfortune or miscalculation could cause rapid downward movement. The overall contours of urban society were modified as new forms of capitalistic enterprise and changing visions of culture and comfort created new occupa-

tions and opportunities. Religion, which had generated intense hopes and fearful conflicts in cities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, began to play a slightly less dynamic role as it competed for allegiance with the rationalist culture of the eighteenth century. Yet none of the changes in urban life during the early modern period could rival the transformations that lay ahead in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The emergence of modern industrial society would transform urban life in ways that could never have been envisioned or imagined during the three centuries of the early modern era.

See also **Marxism and Radical History**; **The Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Reformation** (*volume 1*); **Capitalism and Commercialization** (*volume 2*); **Charity and Poor Relief: The Early Modern Period**; **Social Class**; **Social Mobility** (*volume 3*); and other articles in this section.

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THE CITY: THE MODERN PERIOD



Josef W. Konvitz

The modern world is an urban one. Within a few years after the beginning of the twenty-first century, more than half the world's population will be living in cities. Because Europe was the first region where the transformation from a predominantly rural to an overwhelmingly urban society occurred, the modern European city since 1800 has a wider significance. Will massive urban growth in many developing countries, given conditions of poverty and political instability, recapitulate the worst in the European experience of urbanization? Historians are justly suspicious of models which blur the specificities of time and place. There is no simple model or series of stages of urban development which every society recapitulates. Progress is neither linear nor cumulative but is rather the result of economic circumstances, social values, and political choices which necessarily vary according to place and time. But an emphasis on the differences between countries and periods which emerges from the multiplication of local studies can also obscure some of the recurring patterns associated with urban development, patterns which give some policy relevance to a better understanding of urban history.

FROM EARLY MODERN TO MODERN CITY

The biggest differences between the early modern and modern eras of urban development are the easiest to measure, namely demographic growth and the increase in economic production. But even the sense of rupture which accompanies the industrial revolution belies a continuity with an older pattern of urbanization. Of course the economic differences between the preindustrial, early modern city and the city since the onset of industrialization are dramatic and have had far-reaching social and environmental consequences. However, the explosive growth in productive capacity did not represent the emergence of fundamentally new urban functions, but rather elevated the

importance of economic activity as an urban function. Because the industrial economy was itself located predominantly (but not exclusively) in cities, it can be said that the expansion of urban economic capacity, which has sustained urban growth more generally, was itself organized and rooted in cities.

The most important continuities are also the most difficult to measure, namely, cultural attitudes and social systems broadly open to novelty and change, migration, and defense of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. The fact that the historic cores of many European cities have survived successive economic and political regimes is itself symbolic of what was carried over from the early modern to the modern era. Today, the identity of Europe is being shaped explicitly as a civilization of cities, symbolized by the selection each year of one or more cities as a City of Culture, and by the growing recognition on the part of the Commission of the European Communities (which does not have legal competence on urban policy according to the Treaty of Rome, 1957) that urban issues must be addressed if progress toward European unification is to be made.

URBAN STUDIES

Given the high degree of urbanization characteristic of Europe in the modern era, the study of the modern city is inseparable from a dozen or more topics covered elsewhere in this encyclopedia. If the city touches on everything, then what is its specificity? Urban specialists try to isolate the urban variables, those factors which appear to explain how and why certain events or trends evolved as they did because they took place in cities. This task is inherently difficult, not only because it is difficult to disentangle cause and effect when so many factors are in play, but also because urbanization itself has made urban life and behavior normative in society at large.

It is no surprise that many of the scholars who study urban phenomena have disciplinary roots in lit-

erature, sociology, economics, cultural studies, history, and the like. Support for research on urban issues is irregular, and university departments of urban studies often have an uncertain status, neither fully assimilated into the social sciences and humanities nor entirely independent as a professional field. The study of the city is essentially an interdisciplinary effort, but the integration of different disciplinary perspectives, and especially of the economic and the social, is elusive. Moreover, urban spatial phenomena are often marginalized in urban studies, treated as a branch of architecture and physical planning rather than as an independent factor of change. As a result, cities and urban phenomena more generally are not well integrated into larger syntheses of economic and social studies, which continue to focus on the nation-state as the unit of analysis. The national census collects vast amounts of data, but if one looks for information about social and economic conditions in a region as large as Paris-Île-de-France, with a population smaller than that of the Netherlands but with a gross domestic product as large, the gap between national and regional data collection becomes stark.

Antiquarian studies of individual cities began to be written in the nineteenth century, and local history remains an important aspect of scholarship. The major journals are *Urban History Yearbook*, *Journal of Urban History*, and *Urban Studies*. Broad interpretive syntheses are often organized thematically, with evidence coming from any of a score or more of cities. Important examples with a spatial-social focus are by Sir Peter Hall and Lewis Mumford. They are concerned with explaining the interaction between individuals and the urban milieu, and therefore, with a sense of optimism based on the potential for collective action without coercion, they also try to identify those aspects of urban development which promote better social outcomes. In this they echo many of the great novelists who have tried to show how the lives of people in cities are interconnected by physical pathways and by invisible social networks, thereby emphasizing the ability of individuals to shape their identity in relation to the rest of society. The English novels of Charles Dickens and John Galsworthy, the French novels of Honoré de Balzac, Victor Hugo, Émile Zola, and Jules Romains, and the German works of Theodor Fontane and Thomas Mann come to mind. Given the parallel growth of photography as a medium and of cities, it is not surprising to find that some of the greatest and most innovative photographers were also some of the most important recorders and interpreters of cities: Charles Marville, Eugene Atget, August Sander, Berenice Abbott, Bill Brandt, Robert Doisneau.

SOCIALIZATION AND THE CITY

In the early modern city, major events such as wars, even revolutions, and such cultural movements as the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment left basic social structures intact. The very mode of life in cities in the mid-eighteenth century would have been broadly familiar to anyone who could have stepped back in time to the early sixteenth century. By contrast, there can be a debate about the relative rate of change today compared to, say, the 1820s or 1910s, but not about the impact of change, nor about the importance of cities as places which make change manifest.

The ability of successive generations of people—most of them migrants from the countryside or small towns—to adapt to life in cities helps to explain the survival of the city as the most complex social unit in the history of civilization. Because cities are so dynamic, even after a society reaches a high degree of urbanization, the capacity of people to adjust to change remains important. Indeed, one of the functions of the modern city involves facilitating the adjustment of individuals and groups to change. Cities do this by supporting formal institutions such as schools and libraries and informal ones such as philanthropic and community organizations, by making information widely available at minimal cost, by providing a context for social interaction and consumerism which fosters fluidity and the appreciation of novelty, and above all, by supporting large labor markets which give people opportunities to use and improve their skills as technologies evolve. Adaptability is a complex phenomenon, involving the ability of people to learn, to improvise, to innovate, and to imagine how things could be different. It is culturally contextual, because people are not sensitive to the same things—a change which is easily accepted in one place at one moment may be resisted elsewhere. What matters is that the mental and social habits of people be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes which are often profound and irreversible in such things as technology, scientific concepts, social relationships, political institutions, and economic regulations and norms.

Until the late nineteenth century, much of the discourse about cities was part of a larger cultural undertaking to describe and define the social and cultural workings of civilization. Urban sociology emerged from this mode of thought when Ferdinand Tönnies, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, and Robert Park began to dissect the workings of social systems in cities by interpreting behavioral patterns against a model of urban society. A major theme of

this work involved how large social systems cohere and function given the high rate of individual mobility, meaning that the population of any group in a given place is unstable. Their explanatory framework tended to emphasize abstract value systems and role models which diffused expectations of normative behavior in respect to personal and social goals. In this context they explored how the city, as a social and spatial environment, affected individual behavior. Paradoxically, therefore, the greater autonomy of the individual in a city was explained, not as a reaction against or as independence from large social systems, as was the case in the romantic era of the early nineteenth century, but as a reflection of very powerful sets of ideas and pressures to conform which emphasized individuality as compatible with social goals such as enterprise, cooperation, professional ethics, and public service.

The debate today about what is happening in cities, and to cities, often appears in the media in articles about “the urban crisis” which lack a historical perspective. If cities become less able to help people acculturate, then the likelihood of social problems on a wider scale increases. Concern about crime, terrorism, and drug trafficking are responsible for the spreading use of closed-circuit television cameras and electronic surveillance, instruments of control more passive but more pervasive than anything known before. The potential for centralizing control over urban populations, which was limited in the past by the fluidity in urban society which overwhelmed systems of information and communication, has been strengthened by the introduction of networked systems linked to huge data bases that operate in real time. Urban problems emerge unexpectedly; urban policy, which evolves slowly, is more often remedial than proactive. Cities are more diverse than before: places with 500,000 inhabitants may have immigrant groups from a hundred different nations. But lacking the administrative capacity and resources of nation-states, cities are often hard-pressed to promote cohesion and integration. The balance between freedom and constraint has always been difficult to set in cities, even if their scale, density, and complexity make the issue unavoidable.

THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN CITY

In contrast to the early modern city, the history of the modern city is one of dynamic change which requires a chronological framework to be understood in its broad pattern.

Before 1800, with the possible exception of the Netherlands and parts of northern Italy where the

spread of cities was greater, only about 20 percent of Europe’s population was urban. That figure rose to over 50 percent in England by 1850 and in France by the early twentieth century. The post-1945 era has seen the level of urbanization reach 80 percent on average across Europe. A comparably high degree of urbanization can be found today in North America, Australia, and Japan, raising questions about the degree to which generalizations about the modern city in Europe can be extended to other continents. In countries with an indigenous urban tradition, such as Japan, the European city was seen in the nineteenth century as the model to be imitated; in countries colonized by Europeans (particularly Canada, the United States, and Australia), European cultural and legal influences had a major influence on urban spatial form, social structure, and economic functions. In the twentieth century non-European cities (principally American) have influenced European ideas about architecture, social welfare, culture, and so on, sometimes negatively, sometimes positively. But the status of Paris, London, and Rome at the top of the list of the most visited cities in the world, and indeed the importance of cities as a category of tourist destination across Europe, are signs that European cities are still admired as unique environments, even in a world of cities.

Given the high population density of cities, as much as 80 percent of the land of Europe has remained rural, even though as little as 3 percent of national employment involves people engaged in agriculture. Urban regions are characteristic of the British Midlands and southeast England, of a broad band extending from the North Sea coast of the Low Countries and France across the Rhineland to northern Italy, a Mediterranean crescent from Catalonia across France to Italy, and a Baltic archipelago including parts of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Most Europeans have easier access to more than one city than do most Americans: on average, the distance between cities in Europe is only 16 kilometers, against an average distance of 29 kilometers in Asia, 53 kilometers in America, and 55 kilometers in Africa.

The largest European city in 1800 was London, with over 1 million inhabitants; Paris, which had been larger than London from the Middle Ages until about 1700, had a population of about 900,000. Most cities were smaller, however, and the gap between the largest and the smallest (five thousand inhabitants) in cultural terms was enormous. At the end of the twentieth century, the largest cities—taking account of their metropolitan area—were again London and Paris, with about 16 million. (By then, however, the largest cities in the world, with populations of 20 million or

more, were all in Asia or Latin America). Put in other terms, 20 percent of the people live in cities larger than 250,000 inhabitants, 20 percent in medium-sized cities of between 50,000 and 250,000 inhabitants, and 40 percent in smaller cities of between 10,000 and 50,000. Life in very large cities is still more often the exception than the rule, which should make us beware of generalizations based on conditions in them. The sheer size of large cities, combined with an interest in local history which is very widespread in more modest places, means that historians have studied small and medium-sized cities more than their individual importance in urban history might suggest.

1800–1880. The history of the modern city can be divided into four periods, all shaped by the interaction between cities and larger political and economic events. From the late eighteenth century until around 1880, the outlines of the modern city emerged in two different kinds of places, the new industrial cities such as Manchester and older capital centers such as London. The industrial cities were strikingly different due to a large number of factories and the associated pollution and slum housing. At this time, however, the older centers did not acquire heavy industry; their change was more a function of their growth in size and of the ways of life of people. Capitals retained, and indeed enlarged, monumental spaces which conformed to their elite functions, but they also supported large numbers of small workshops, some devoted to the luxury trade which was both local and

for export. What emerges from a survey of London or Paris is the sheer range or diversity of skills and crafts practiced in the city. It is this period which is studied in depth when the transition to the industrialized economy and a society of classes is investigated.

1880–1914. From 1880 to 1914, heavy industry based on a new wave of innovations (electricity, automobiles, chemistry, media) settled in capital cities (Berlin, Budapest, London, Paris); cities in many parts of Europe such as Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Sweden which had grown modestly before began to grow at a very rapid rate; and new modes of planning and management—as well as new urban technologies such as the streetcar and modern systems for water and waste—became widespread regardless of the size and age of the city. During this period, academic departments for planning and architecture were established; frequent meetings and a stream of publications created an international, transatlantic culture about cities. At this time, widespread concern about crowd control and criminality led to the introduction of modern, scientific methods of identification of individuals (measurement and photography). Many of the problems of rapid industrial urban growth came under control as new professions in public health, education, engineering, and administration applied scientific methods and developed new institutions.

1914–1950. The era of the two world wars, 1914–1950, was characterized by the role of the city in war

production and in the control of large social systems. This period is less well understood than other periods of urban development, notwithstanding its enormous importance for the second half of the twentieth century. Increasingly, the city was the arena of conflict, either when directly attacked or when torn by the struggle between totalitarian and democratic ideologies. From the uprisings of St. Petersburg of 1917 and of Vienna and Berlin in 1919 through such events as the Popular Front in France in 1936 and the wave of destructive attacks on synagogues in Germany on 9 November 1938, cities were the sites of riots which had the potential to provoke revolutionary change. Not since the seventeenth century had riotous activity been so widespread and intense; with good reason, this era can be called the second Thirty Years' War. The trauma of violence and sacrifice among civilian populations (including severe malnutrition and epidemics) and the profound scale of political and social change gave rise to the construction of many major monuments, provoked debates about historic preservation and reconstruction, and created new myths of civic survival for the epicenters of conflict (Verdun, Ypres, Louvain in World War I; Rotterdam, Hamburg, Leningrad, Warsaw, Berlin, Coventry, Dresden, Hiroshima in World War II).

Dependence of urban populations on technological infrastructure for daily living made cities appear vulnerable if the level of physical destruction was high enough, or attacks precise enough, to destroy the complex systems providing clean water, removing waste, generating power, and supporting communication. The assumption of strategic bombing was that modern city dwellers are so dependent on sophisticated technology that they are no longer capable of initiative if disoriented and displaced. However, this negative judgment of urban society was contradicted by the behavior of people in almost every city subject to annihilation—for the most part, people coped within the boundaries of civilized life. Although on the margins black markets, thievery, and rape were evident, the destruction of cities did not bring about a collapse of civilization.

The era of world war was decisive in several respects. It brought about a period of inflation which lasted virtually for the rest of the twentieth century, shifting influence from creditors to debtors and wiping out the savings of small investors in the short run; it caused the disappearance of such social groups as the Jews from many cities in Germany, Austria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, where they had lived in large numbers, often in communities that were centuries old; it gave rise to large migratory movements as prosperous northern economies recov-

ered by absorbing surplus labor from eastern and southern Europe and, increasingly, from former European colonies as well. And it gave rise to the movement for European unification, which has been the basis for peace and growth since the 1950s and for the growing importance of supranational institutions on domestic matters which had previously been the monopoly of the nation-state.

The economic and political pressures of the world wars, and especially of World War I, had other effects which often go unrecognized for their urban significance: the collapse of the small family firm in many medium-sized commercial cities due to rapid changes in world economic conditions and to inflation, thereby encouraging people to seek careers in government or in large corporations, and the enormous wartime expansion of productive capacity, which helped to validate scientific management and large capital-intensive factories as the model of production. Only in the 1970s and after has this been corrected by the growing emergence of small and medium-sized firms and by the growth of the service sector, both of them predominantly urban in character, which have created new job opportunities for people.

The economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s limited the extent to which popular demands for a better quality of life could be satisfied in terms of improved housing, transport, and public services. During this period, control over urban economies passed decisively from the local to the central level. The imperatives of social and economic control during wartime, justified during the emergency, and the difficult adjustment to peacetime propelled central governments to expand their influence into spheres of domestic policy from which they had often stood apart in the past.

1950 to the present. The era 1950–1990 involved reconstruction along two different lines, the welfare state in Western Europe and centrally planned economies in communist-controlled Eastern Europe. As a result, the pattern of convergence in urban society which had been characteristic of the 1880–1914 period, and which made life in Budapest and in Stockholm fairly comparable, mutated into two different trajectories. In both East and West, cities had to cope with massive rural-to-urban migrations and with a lack of resources to add social facilities on a scale envisioned by enlightened planners. But it is the contrasts which matter more. Freedom and prosperity leading to the consumer revolution of the 1950s through the 1970s in the West stood in contrast to the uniform and repressed system of life in the East. The fracture line in Europe no longer ran within ur-

ban societies, separating classes and parties, but between them, along the Iron Curtain.

While the West had more freedom, its cities were faced with a growing burden of national regulation and with an inadequate tax base and limited borrowing power, making them dependent on provincial and central governments for an appreciable proportion of their finances. National trade, tax, transport, health, and especially economic policies have far more influence over cities than any strategy designed at the city level, or even any explicit urban policy at the national level. Although most people live in cities, provincial and national legislatures often are overrepresented by rural areas. In a hierarchy of national administration, the city may be the lowest level, but to many citizens it is the highest level of government with which they have regular contact.

The symbols of municipal office, the debates in the city council, the routine functions of civic administration, and mayoral elections play a vital, irreplaceable role in democracy. This role, however, is under pressure due to decreasing participation in local elections. Increasingly, cities are exploring the limits of their freedom of action, especially in the international arena, through developments such as the twin city movement, direct representation abroad, international marketing, and positions on issues of international importance. Decentralization in the 1990s was not so much a response to demands from cities for more autonomy as a response by central governments to pressures in the financial markets to reduce their expenditures and limit their exposure to potentially very high levels of social transfers and welfare payments. Cities are taking advantage of the opportunities provided by decentralization and globalization to develop cooperative international networks, economic development strategies, and local environmental initiatives.

Three issues highlight a positive trend toward an urban renaissance in Europe: sustainable development, which calls attention to social cohesion and environmental quality in cities; decentralization, which highlights the importance of strong regional and local institutions capable of guiding the development of cities; and civil society, which calls for greater public participation in decision making, a role for community and nonprofit organizations, and a culture of trust and understanding in an increasingly diverse society. The survival and reinforcement of cities is a more conspicuous objective of public policy in western Europe than in Australia, Canada, or the United States. The pursuit of a more balanced form of development, a priority in Europe, is increasingly accepted as the objective for cities everywhere.

BUILDING AND REBUILDING THE MODERN CITY

No one foresaw the rate of urban growth or its consequences. The gap between the goals set to improve cities and the means applied to meet those goals has often been very wide. At first, urban conditions had a bigger impact on society, depressing living standards. Only from the mid-nineteenth century onward has society made substantial progress in remaking the city. In the final analysis, however, the burden of urban problems associated with rapid urban growth and with the management of very large cities has not undermined the city.

The modern city differs from the early modern in the nature of its physical expansion, which had enormous consequences for social organization. (The importance of city building in economic terms is captured by the percentage of a country's capital stock that is invested in urban buildings and infrastructure, which often reaches 25 percent.) The early modern city (with rare exceptions, such as Paris after the 1660s) was enclosed by walls which provided defense and served as a fiscal barrier. New districts within or without the city were realized only when the city walls needed to be modernized, new public squares built, or when part of a city destroyed by fire needed to be reconstructed (all too frequent a phenomenon until fire regulations and insurance spread in the most commercially sophisticated cities during the eighteenth century). There was always a tendency toward social segregation within the early modern city based on wealth and family or ethnic affinities, but it was never total in a given area or along a particular street. Cities in the nineteenth century were refortified, and remained so until after 1918 (Paris regained walls after the 1840s), and population growth quickly filled in whatever open land was left. Population pressure on housing therefore maintained a pattern of social heterogeneity, with the exception of the worst tenements and rooming houses, often in areas already known to be unhealthy or adjacent to industrial facilities. The breach in the walls was the railroad, whose construction toward the center of the city and whose capacity to absorb land brought irreversible change. Efforts in the twentieth century to provide an outer limit to a city, through regional planning measures such as new towns and a green belt, have been of limited success, partly because they are difficult to sustain over long periods of time, and partly because development can leapfrog around them.

The rebuilding of the city is most often associated with Baron Georges Haussmann (1809–1891), whose administrative control over Paris for nearly

twenty years gave him the opportunity to execute redevelopment projects on an unprecedented scale. These projects called for the rebuilding of the center to accommodate more people and activities, the construction of new linear traffic arteries, and new building codes allowing larger buildings while creating an impression of uniformity at the street level. Haussmann also annexed many suburban communities, thereby extending the limits of the city far beyond its then current needs in 1860, a model for management which has been followed elsewhere. The transformation and enlargement of Paris, and of other cities on this model such as Vienna, Berlin, and many smaller provincial centers, led to more homogenous residential areas; the creation of functional zones devoted to retailing, wholesaling, legal and administrative activities, and cultural and leisure facilities; the construction of new broad, long avenues for circulation (which often involved the demolition of much of the existing urban fabric along their path); and the extension, through engineering on a large scale, of urban facilities into the countryside, to meet urban needs (canals, reservoirs, etc., as well as places for relaxation, such as parks and forests). The organization of agriculture to supply cities, the construction of modern transport,

and the growth of large markets in cities as distribution points were parts of a single process by which commerce and government worked to assure a supply of food at low cost to a large urban population.

Imagination and considerable managerial skill were needed to build water supply and sewer systems, underground or elevated inner-city rail networks, electricity generation and distribution facilities, and so on. Indeed, some of the modern techniques of large-scale organization management, including personnel policies, differential pricing to consumers, in-house research laboratories, market research, and the like either originated in or were developed on a large scale in relation to these networked systems by which technology reshaped not only the city and its environmental impact but also the daily lifestyles and temporal rhythms of its inhabitants. These interrelated technological networks compressed space, permitting densities to rise and buildings to soar, but they also expanded the use of time, enabling people to undertake more activities stretched over more hours. A key result, visible in European cities by the 1870s, was a marked decrease in urban death rates, thus breaking the dependency of cities on in-migration for growth—a truly historic change.

The specialization of architecture accompanied this process. New structural forms were based on iron, steel, glass, and concrete, thereby giving rise to debates about whether traditional structures such as churches and theaters could be given radically new architectural expression. Factories were often monumental structures, dominating urban form and the cityscape. The debate between traditional and modern views of architecture was often linked to broader political, ideological divisions.

In the nineteenth century the vast majority of urban residents, whatever their incomes, were tenants; most landlords were small investors, though some were large-scale property developers whose ambitions often created spectacular fortunes but could lead just as easily, when a downturn in the economy came, to bankruptcy. Row houses for the middle and upper classes were built by the same methods as tenements for the poor, the difference being the quality of construction and space per inhabitant. Because the quality of housing was linked to incomes, many poor people were condemned to overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, which prevailed until the post-1945 era. Suburbs connected to cities by rail lines (beginning with Bedford Park in London) gave middle-class people a wider range of options, but until the 1920s and the expansion of mass transit and the construction of social housing on a large scale, cities continued to grow faster than suburbs. Rising levels of home ownership are only characteristic of the post-1945 era, and are associated with a decline in the population size of cities relative to suburbs.

The principal civic structures of the modern city mix opulence with utilitarian purposes: libraries and museums, department stores, theaters, hotels, hospitals. The proliferation of such facilities has been accompanied by the expansion in numbers of people working in the cultural and service sectors (health, education, and culture are often the largest single employment sectors in cities today), and it reflects the capacity of strong local cultures to survive and modernize, often with an impact felt far away (theater in Munich, music in Milan, architecture in Glasgow and Barcelona). The growth of dedicated vacation towns by the sea (Brighton, Deauville) or of spas (Vichy, Aix-les-Bains, Baden-Baden) also represented a form of specialized urban space, produced to stimulate a certain kind of consumption, in this case fashion, health, and entertainment. Civic art, especially in the form of decorations on the facades and in the interiors of buildings, gave visual delight and beauty a pervasive presence in many parts of the city, whereas before aesthetic design had been associated only with churches and great public buildings, which people did not frequent on a daily basis.

MODERN URBAN SOCIETY

Although social segregation increased in housing, the city streets remained a part of the public realm, characterized by great heterogeneity. For most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even after the introduction of mass transport (horse-drawn omnibuses, cabs, streetcars, rapid-transit trains), people walked considerable distances daily, and walking remained the most common form of movement. People also mingled in concert and music halls, pubs and cafés, parks and churches. The nighttime illumination of the city, first by gas and then by electricity, coupled with the extension of police patrols, transformed the hours after dark into a time of recreation. But as literature and drama reveal, the interaction in the city at night was often an occasion for lonely people to witness others enjoying a good time from which they were excluded. Émile Durkheim, in his famous study of suicide, found that the people who were most likely to take their own lives were those who had the fewest connections or networks with other individuals. Solitude led to death. Today, however, people are increasingly likely to live in cities alone, either as a lifestyle choice when young or as a circumstance of old age. Is this a sign of greater individuality? Or a failure of social communication and organization? Whatever the answer, this is a novelty in urban society, leading in turn to a need for more dwelling units for a population of a given size, and for more social and commercial services outside the home.

Social mixing in the nineteenth century, when associated with high density, and at a time when contagious diseases such as cholera, tuberculosis, and syphilis accompanied a lack of sanitation and considerable overcrowding, also gave rise to public debates about promiscuity. The ability of strangers to meet—a cultural pattern promoted by so many migrants coming to the city—was linked to the ease with which people in the city could become anonymous or create a new identity. This was a factor in the rise of racist ideology designed to keep people apart in separate ethnic groups. Debates about whether city living enhanced civilization or lowered morals—debates which had their origin in the Enlightenment—were carried forward in an urban culture in which religion appeared to be declining.

Thus the city has been depicted by some as a place where society fragments and by others as a place where individuals can come together into a larger, more unified body. Disaggregation or unity? Individual autonomy or collective solidarity? Is the city a fluid, dynamic environment which can be shaped by individuals, or a rigid, structuring container which

imposes choices and limits options? These pairings represent, not judgments on cities as a whole, but a range of social choices which the city, more than any other settlement, can provide.

CITY PLANNING AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The problem for city planners has been that the scale on which they work is far greater than the scale which individuals inhabit and use on a daily basis. As a result, the techniques for giving form to urban space, to prepare them for development, have tended to shade the differences between people, to standardize around the average. This was above all typical in the Fordist era of mass production, when building and planning by rules and norms made possible the progressive expansion of the city while eliminating a range of environmentally unsound and unsanitary practices. The result, however, was a city zoned into single-purpose districts, each of which lacked the diversity to evolve as circumstances changed. Uniform monofunctional buildings and land use patterns on this scale risk becoming prematurely obsolete, expensive to modernize but difficult to use otherwise. In recent years, the concept of mixed-use planning (which always survived for historic urban cores) has become a goal. This involves new problems of combining different uses, and buildings and spaces created and modified over time. Many historic urban cores, a product of the preindustrial, early modern era, have characteristics more suitable to the postindustrial, knowledge-based service sector economy than areas built to serve a manufacturing labor force and urban economy twenty or even sixty years ago.

Modernism emerged during this period (approximately 1880–1960) and was often applied to city planning. Modernism was grounded in the assertion that there are principles and rules by which buildings and cities can be ordered. One can in fact talk of a tradition of modernity: a spirit of reform linked to an architectural and planning vocabulary suitable in a great variety of places and at many different scales, based on principles of reason and the criterion of meeting human needs. From this perspective, the Gothic revival of the mid-nineteenth century was just as much a phase of modernism as was the neoclassical revival of the late eighteenth. The most common understanding of modernism, however, which relates most clearly to the period from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, involved a strenuous dismissal of decorative elements, especially if superimposed on a structure, and a celebration of a form which expresses its function and structure.

The problem is now how to change the city as it exists to meet the social and economic opportunities and needs of the twenty-first century. The lessons of the modernists are often forgotten now that technology provides many of the physical elements needed to make life in cities comfortable, but the historical effort to renew modernism is still important: modernism emphasized the need to improve environmental conditions and to give people access to light and space; it created public spaces appropriate to large urban crowds yet still often intimate enough for people to be alone; and above all, it asserted that people must understand the city to make best use of it—hence the pursuit of a visual language designed to communicate clearly and meaningfully. Postmodernism, by contrast, rejects the very idea that design can meet the needs of different people in a coherent manner, based on the argument that people are too diverse, and that any effort to develop a coherent style involves a relationship of power.

This discussion about modernism raises the question of for whom the city is made. This is an important issue because many of the problems of sustainable development, including social disparities and environmental degradation, require a high level of technical expertise to solve. How much will people be willing to learn, in order to participate in decision making? If decision making is centralized, how can it remain democratic? What decisions and investments should be taken today, to assume better living conditions in ten or twenty years? These questions are not new, but animated political and community life during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The debates around critical planning issues and urgent social problems are now read by historians to better understand the distribution of power within urban societies, the role of gender and class in decision making, and the social construction of technology and space.

There are those for whom the city is, in effect, a residual, the product of social and economic forces. This argument is frequently coupled with an assertion that in the market economy, the spatial structure of cities represents what people want. From this point of view, there is nothing necessary about a city center: centers may have been important for technological and economic reasons during certain phases of economic development, but they can be dispensed with in the current era of globalization and information technology. Taken to an extreme, this approach to urban development does not consider the location of economic activity to be a significant variable in national economic performance. Planning has fallen into disfavor, largely, no doubt, because it is perceived as a

bureaucratic exercise devoid of imagination, and because it is associated with an economy of scarcity, not of abundance.

The opposing view is held by people who believe that the future of cities is not to be shaped entirely by market forces and technological trends, but should rather be guided by an understanding of what they contribute to economic life and democratic society, and by a vision of what cities can become. This approach is far more sensitive to the contribution of different kinds of urban spaces and networks to economic innovation and production, and to the interrelationship among social, environmental, and economic conditions. Increasingly, economic development strategists recognize that the best investment cities can make in their own economic development is to enhance the quality of life that they offer. This is linked to an understanding of the role that city centers play as places necessary to the well-functioning of the city as a whole, and thus to its sustainability.

The perfect society, ever since the days of Plato and Thomas More, has commonly been represented in urban terms. Utopian writers have tried to show perfection in cities as a matter of a regular street pattern, buildings of uniform shape and with a high standard of comfort, and an adequate disposition of civic spaces and cultural facilities. In the perfect city, different groups would all find their place, without pressuring one another. As a mirror image of reality, utopian representations showed that the urban norm was overcrowded and conflictual, that living conditions were inadequate, streets uneven, and civic culture weak—in other words, dystopian. There was a tension implicit in the exercise of writing and drawing utopian cities, however: how to get from the way things are to the way we want them to be. Was it necessary to reform society to build a better city? Or if a better city could be built, would the environmental and social conditions in such a place improve individuals, communities, and the state? During the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the physical means to build better cities were quickly exhausted on a small number of princely towns of very modest size, or on a few distinguished urban squares or complexes. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the sheer rate of urban growth as well as the increasingly large role of the state (or in some cases, of benevolent industrialists) made possible the design and construction of large residential and commercial areas which were very progressive in style and quality. It was only a short step further to argue that a reallocation of resources could transform cities. The economic failure of the centrally controlled economies, together with the sheer cost and complexity of building planned

towns in western Europe after each world war, have damaged the utopian aspects of planning.

THE URBAN ECONOMY IN SOCIAL TERMS

A brief examination of the urban economy is needed, not only because the modern city is devoted to economic production and consumption to an unprecedented extent, but also because the creation of wealth has been one of the foundations of efforts to improve quality of life. Given the fact that the wealth of European cities was at a much lower level than it is now—and that wars and depressions have destroyed capital—how can a poorer society become richer? The neomarxist argument holds that capitalism exploits the city, first by using speculative investment in land to accumulate capital but also by promoting a lifestyle based on the consumption of commodities and prematurely obsolete fashion. Development theory, on the other hand, calls attention to saving, investment in education and in improvements which lengthen the average lifespan and improve health in the productive years, and institutions of trust which reduce conflicts and enhance problem solving—all factors found first in European cities, and often well developed by the middle of the nineteenth century. Countries undergoing the transition from rural to urban accompanied by a rise, not a fall, in living standards include Sweden in the interwar era and Spain after the 1970s—both influenced by atypical policy environments, the former by a countercyclical economic policy, the latter by integration into the European Union. In these cases, redistribution mechanisms helped to overcome a situation which in the nineteenth century had been marked by immiseration. A virtuous cycle may even exist: when wealth is applied to the creation and diffusion of knowledge and the improvement of living standards, health, and housing, people are more productive and social capital is enriched, thus enabling society to achieve further economic growth. This cycle is difficult to initiate and difficult to sustain. It does not just happen by chance.

This cycle implies three points: first, that the modern economy rests on an essentially urban way of life; second, that efforts to make cities more efficient and productive have always given rise to questions about how wealth is distributed and shared; and third, that the solution of urban problems related to power, sanitation, communications, etc., have led to significant innovations in services and technology which have become the basis of major industries on their own. In other words, not only

was society being reshaped to serve economic systems, it can also be said that social processes have influenced economic growth.

For example, the classic narrative of industrialization omits the fact that urban growth impelled many facets of industrialization, beginning with the manufacture of building supplies and the raising of agricultural productivity. From the perspective of social history, what matters is that the organization of the city's own economy to meet the daily needs of people, as well as the production of goods and services to pay for goods imported from other places, involved the creation of opportunities based on individual initiative in an economic system that absorbed migrants. Fear of a vicious circle—that success of a city will lead to its growth, adding to the scale of problems which must be solved if the city is to remain viable—has sometimes led to efforts to limit city size, but these have always failed. Instead, we need to talk of a virtuous cycle, whereby urban problems generate innovations and solutions which improve efficiency and the quality of life.

Communication between people from different walks of life and professional fields (cross-fertilization) has long been, and remains, an ingredient in economic development. Examples of cross-fertilization which helped to solve urban problems include the growth of the insurance industry, which grew out of fire prevention codes in London in eighteenth century; electrification, as a response to the pollution associated with coal and gas; and telephony, as a response to the traffic congestion and sprawl of the late nineteenth century. A socially grounded element of the modern city which was fundamentally shaped by its economic needs is therefore the reliance on coordination and cooperation rather than on command and control systems of organization. Coordination and cooperation depend on the ability of people to trust one another and to rely on unwritten rules or norms as well as on formal modes of communication such as books and newspapers to solve problems.

Cities therefore provide markets where standards of quality, price, and availability promote trade and innovation. The management of urban density is itself a factor in making markets work, helping to reduce the risks and costs of doing business in cities, expanding capacity, and eliminating bottlenecks. The introduction of new modes of production and of better methods of financing credit and identifying risks all implied a flexibility in organization which stood in contrast to the formal and rigid order of guild-based economic activity in the early modern era.

It is possible to categorize cities by their economic functions, not only because their spatial struc-

ture may reflect these differences but because their social structure may as well (affecting the relative distribution of professional, managerial, employed, and unskilled workers). With the emergence of the post-industrial, service economy, categories which proved useful in the past no longer apply. In the past, however, seaports, provincial capitals, and manufacturing cities were all very different kinds of places.

The port city as a type can illustrate this phenomenon. Because ports were connected to wider networks of trade, they were places where exotic goods—and contraband—could be found more easily and visibly. They were also places where foreign foods could be sampled, where zoos displayed the animals of Africa and Asia, where the flags and shields of consulates were visible in the city center, and where hospitals had specialists who could treat tropical diseases. Ports were cosmopolitan in ways that other cities, even capitals, were often not. The imperatives of freight handling and warehousing gave them a distinctive appearance (London docks, Hamburg warehouses)—highly congested. This specificity has now been lost. The commercial buildings of the port—now vacant because containerization has displaced port functions to huge, capital-intensive sites, often far removed from the city center, where large volumes of containers can be moved between ship, rail, and truck efficiently—have been reclaimed as leisure centers and as housing and office space. The river, once polluted and crowded with ships, is now often clean, but barren of human use.

The specialized functions of different cities, once reflected in a unique blend of institutions, buildings, social categories, and cultural patterns, have now been dissolved. Cities still specialize economically to varying degrees, but their specializations no longer lead to differences which are so visible to visitor and resident alike. When the famous market “les Halles” was torn down in 1972, a victim of the huge growth of Paris and congestion in the city center, which had made the distribution of foodstuffs difficult, it was replaced by an underground shopping center directly accessible to suburbanites by a series of high-speed rail links.

In this context, speculation has begun about the impact of information and communication technology and of the new networked economy on the social, economic, and spatial characteristics of cities. One early concern relates to the phenomenon of exclusion, whereby some individuals or groups lack the skill or access to participate in the new economy. Another concern relates to the possible relocation of people and activities far outside cities as the cost of communicating over distance diminishes. On the other hand, the networked economy highlights the importance of creativity and innovation in cities as an ele-

ment in economic growth, cultural change, and new modes of social life.

The specificity of the city has been raised in connection with the study of innovation and creativity. Why, in a largely urbanized world, and one in which cities are more alike than different, are some places uniquely more important as creative “milieus”? This is a social and spatial phenomenon—spatial because interaction, especially unplanned and spontaneous, is often a matter of how people interact in public places, and social because new ideas often emerge when people of different backgrounds observe each other and find opportunities to meet. The key factors seem to include migration, a social mix, and some pressures in the form of mild political constraints, economic limitations, and so on which lead to polarized debates and anxiety about the future. The most important cities for cultural creativity are not necessarily those where economic innovation is strongest, and vice versa, although the distinction between commerce and culture is breaking down now that cultural activities are themselves recognized as a major source of employment. Still, the network or map of creative cities does not reproduce a single urban hierarchy, but multiple ones. Where will the creative urban centers of tomorrow be?

CONCLUSION

The modern city, in terms of social history, shows urbanization to have been a process based on the interaction between material circumstances and economic conditions, on the one hand, and social aspirations and political objectives on the other. Synchronization between what people wanted and what they could achieve has been elusive. But over time, and certainly from the perspective of the present, enormous progress has been made, especially in terms of living conditions and the formation of social capital (health, education, safety). Social cohesion, even in favorable economic circumstances, still appears fragile, giving rise to retrospective assessments of community life in the past, which can take on the aura of a golden age. Life in cities has never been easy, in part because the city is itself the largest and most complex social unit developed by man. Cultural creativity—long held to be the final measure of the potential of urban life—is perhaps the most problematic basis by which to measure change. On the one hand, there has been of late a marvelous expansion in the number of patents and in the number of titles of books in print; on the other hand, questions can be asked about the endur-

ing value of what is produced. Comparisons with 1900 are not flattering to ourselves.

Ultimately, the problem of urban policy is a problem about how political advances can keep pace with economic change. Each of the three major periods of urban development since the Renaissance expanded political rights and economic opportunities, albeit through a process of change that was often highly conflictual. The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the creation of capital and commodity markets for the first major metropolitan centers of the Atlantic world, but also checks on arbitrary government and on the dominion of the military over cities, as well as the emergence of individual rights enshrined in law. Urban growth in the period 1880–1920 accompanied the introduction of modern telecommunications, urban infrastructures, electrification, mass production, and retailing, as well as modern social welfare systems and universal suffrage. The economic opportunities of our era, combining globalization, environmental gains, high technology, and urban growth, are fairly clear to see. But their implications for the exercise of democratic rights and for the protection of the rights of the individual are difficult to grasp. Without a concerted effort to strengthen representative government at the local and regional levels, however, it is difficult to see how the competitiveness and sustainability agendas can be implemented.

The role of the city in a highly urbanized society is unclear today. Against what point in time should progress be measured? And according to which criteria? The number of millionaires in a city, or the percentage of adolescents completing secondary school? The murder rate, or the rate of bankruptcy? Why should people want to live in cities? Traditionally, the existence of cities has been justified on the basis that they allow individuals and groups to fulfill their social and intellectual potential in ways that no other social environment can. This potential can be expressed in commerce and the economy just as well as in the creative and performing arts, or in the conduct of civic and public affairs. The past is full of examples of people who have engaged themselves with their city as much or more than with any other unit of social organization. The beginning of the twenty-first century, however, appears to mark the end of the era of the modern city as much as the end of the eighteenth century marked the end of the early modern city. A time of transition has clearly begun: its outcomes depend in part on whether people still care to shape the cities in which they live according to their aspirations and values.

See also *Civil Society* (volume 2) and other articles in this section.

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THE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE



Nicholas Papayanis and Rosemary Wakeman

The urban infrastructure is analogous to the internal frame of a building: as the frame is the underlying structural support for the building, the urban infrastructure is the underlying structural foundation of a city. Cities from the earliest times have had infrastructural amenities—roadways and sewers, for example—and all infrastructural development involves the provision of public services and the use of public spaces that are deemed essential for the ability of people to live in the city. Over time an increasingly accepted notion was that circulation of air, sunlight, commerce, vehicles, water, waste matter, people, and even knowledge was as essential to the healthy operation of the city as, to employ another analogy, blood circulating through the human body. What marks the development of the modern infrastructure since the nineteenth century is its close association with technological development, industrialization, and the dramatic growth of city populations. While definitions of the urban infrastructure may include any and all public services, the essential elements of the urban infrastructure during the nineteenth century, the formative period of the modern city, consist of new streets and boulevards, mass transit, new sewage systems, and the provision of gas, water, and electricity. The net effect of these infrastructural developments is the creation of the modern city as a circulatory system designed to move people and material products rapidly and efficiently, both above- and belowground.

THE STREET

Streets are the most basic element of the urban infrastructure. Traditionally they are designed to carry vehicular and pedestrian traffic, transport merchandise, and provide public spaces for social interaction. They also function as conduits for waste matter and, in modern times, house sewage, gas, electrical, and water systems below their surface. On a more fundamental level, streets are essential for access by city dwellers to work sites, markets, and homes. Because streets are

public spaces, political, social, and ideological considerations figure in their construction and control. Government authorities are always concerned with street activities as a function of public order and safety. The health of the city is closely related to the street: for example, narrow streets do not permit the circulation of air or the diffusion of sunlight, and streets without effective drains breed disease from stagnant water and waste matter. Thus, whether the construction of streets is financed privately or by the government, control over the street rests with public officials.

Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, London set the standard for street improvements. The Westminster Paving Act of 1762 shifted responsibility for street maintenance from home owners to paving commissioners. The latter had a paid staff and the right to tax abutters for street improvements. By 1800 London had extensive gutters, paving using smooth stones rather than pebbles, sewers, storm drains, piped water, and sidewalks. Street planning also involves aesthetic considerations and social consequences. This is evident in the construction of London's Regent Street, a south-north thoroughfare designed by John Nash and built mostly from 1817 to 1823. The most significant visual transformation of London at that time, Regent Street was cut in the West End, extending from Portland Place in the north to the Carlton House at the south end. Regent Street was conceived essentially as a magnificent formal street for rich strollers and shoppers, a physical conduit for the wealthy. Thus its placement conformed to existing patterns of social division in London. Given the limited access routes to Regent Street from the poorer East End, the latter was cut off from the more elegant West End, thereby reinforcing social separation. Only between 1832 and 1851, following a series of parliamentary reports, did London planners and government officials begin to address health issues and working-class morals when cutting new streets as part of slum clearance programs.

French government administrators were impressed with English infrastructural advances, and in

1823 G. J. G. Chabrol de Volvic, the prefect of the Seine Department from 1812 to 1830 and the official in charge of administering Paris, paid an official visit to London to study that city's water distribution system, sewers, and sidewalks. In France he proposed the extension, widening, and paving of Paris streets and roads. His first aim was the creation of a communication network linking all parts of Paris. His second priority was to reform those streets that were important, in his words, "to public security, to sanitation, or to the needs of commerce." Beautification was his last consideration. He also devised a system for delivery and distribution of water throughout Paris that would assure, he correctly believed, the health of the city. The French government lacked the resources or the political will at that time to implement Chabrol's vision of a modern Paris. Nevertheless, as Nicholas Papayanis observed in *Horse-Drawn Cabs and Omnibuses in Paris* (1996), that vision must rank as an important forerunner of Georges Haussmann's sweeping reforms of the urban infrastructure and therefore of the idea and shape of the modern city.

Although not much progress was made during the French Restoration (1814–1830) in building sidewalks, sixty-five new streets were opened during this regime. The prefect of the Seine Department under the July Monarchy (1830–1848), Claude Rambuteau, began applying English reforms to the rebuilding of the Avenue of the Champs-Élysées and other large boulevards. The pace of street construction accelerated with a total of 112 new streets, including the rue Rambuteau in the center of Paris and intense building speculation on the Right Bank. It remained for the authoritarian empire of Napoleon III and for Haussmann, his chief planner and prefect of the Seine Department, to construct the modern network of Paris roads. Haussmann completed the "great cross" of Paris boulevards that bisected the city in a north-south (the boulevards Saint-Michel and de Sébastopol) and east-west (the rue de Rivoli and the avenue Doumesnil) direction. Built to address strategic, health, economic, and aesthetic considerations first anticipated by Paris intellectuals and administrators before the Second Empire, Haussmann's neobaroque boulevards also reinforced spatial segregation in Paris. Slum clearance forced workers out of the city center toward the eastern and northern parts of Paris and its suburbs, while the well-to-do concentrated in the northwest of Paris and neighboring suburbs.

By the mid-nineteenth century the link between narrow streets and the health of the city was widely recognized in Europe. At this time Germany, too, adopted the principle of the wide boulevard. Aesthetic and symbolic considerations, however, were the

primary factors in the construction of Vienna's most famous road, the Ringstrasse. As Austria industrialized during the nineteenth century, Vienna, whose upper classes had never abandoned the capital, remained a city for the well-to-do; industry and workers occupied the suburbs. When Austria adopted a constitution in 1860, the bourgeoisie replaced the aristocracy as the governing elite of the country and of Vienna and, as Carl E. Schorske noted in *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna* (1981), proceeded to shape the capital in its own image. The medieval walls that had surrounded the old city were destroyed. Central to the new image was the city's first grand boulevard, the Ringstrasse, whose monumental public buildings (the opera house, the university, the courts of justice, the houses of parliament, the municipal theater, and the art history and natural history museums) were linked symbolically and architecturally to secular liberal ideals. The massive and ornate apartment houses that occupied the greater length of the Ringstrasse were intended by the Viennese middle classes to suggest the opulent life of the aristocracy. Middle-class planners gave no consideration to social programs for workers.

Two other developments transformed European streets. From the late 1880s streets throughout Europe (and the United States) were paved with asphalt, a smooth, water-resistant surface ideally suited to the automobile. The increased use of automobiles on city streets was a major factor in the demise of the mixed use of streets (for strolling, shopping, and the like), as the requirement for rapid vehicular movement became the street's principal function. This in turn promoted new forms for streets closely associated with modernism, the urban expressway and the multilevel interchange. The modernist aesthetic was summed up by the architect Le Corbusier in his famous dictum that the street had become "a machine for traffic, an apparatus for its circulation."

URBAN TRANSPORT

The street as an instrument for vehicular circulation has a long history. From the seventeenth century on, horse-drawn cabs and private coaches became a common feature of urban life in capital cities. Their increased use in Paris and London, the two leading capitals of early and modern Europe in terms of infrastructural advances, corresponded to the physical expansion of the European city, the increase in its population, and the desire of the well-to-do for greater comfort in their daily rounds. The first hackney coaches appeared on London streets in significant numbers in the 1620s. The first regular Paris horse-

drawn cab service began operating around 1630. In both cities municipal authorities established strict regulations governing the operation of coaches for hire. Early modern Paris even had a kind of omnibus service briefly. Between 1662 and 1677 a Paris firm owned by three court nobles operated a vehicle, whose invention is commonly ascribed to the philosopher Blaise Pascal, designed for the transportation of a large number of unrelated people. This rectangular coach, the *carrosse à cinq sols* (five-penny coach), so called because of the price of a single ride, traveled along fixed routes, cost relatively little, and had regular departures whether full or not. Unlike the modern omnibus, however, the law expressly forbade common people to ride in this coach. The cost of all forms of urban transportation limited their regular use to the upper classes until well into the nineteenth century. For the most part the lower classes worked and socialized within walking distance of their homes.

Although the circulation of people and vehicles was becoming a quintessential element of modern urban life, it was only during the eighteenth century that a sophisticated theory of urban communication flow emerged, related both to Adam Smith's writings on the necessity of capital circulation for a healthy economy and William Harvey's discovery that blood freely circulates through the healthy body. Urban intellectuals and public officials increasingly saw the ability of people and commerce to circulate freely through the city as a mark of its health.

The great age of public transportation was the nineteenth century, however. New and dramatic ur-

ban demographic pressures, significant industrial and commercial expansion, and the continued physical expansion of the city increased the demand for and the supply of public transportation. In Europe, including Great Britain, France led the way in the organization of urban public transit in the first half of the nineteenth century. The number of horse-drawn public cabs in Paris increased from 2,542 in 1819 to 13,655 in 1907. After 1907 the number of horse-drawn cabs began to decline significantly as the number of motor cabs increased. But the first substantial transformation in urban transit in Europe during the horse-drawn era was the introduction in France of the omnibus, a closed, rectangular vehicle with seating capacity initially for fourteen people. Designed to travel along fixed routes for relatively low fares, the modern omnibus admitted people from all classes without restrictions except for those rules governing proper behavior. Omnibuses began to operate in the French provinces before they did in the capital. Nantes had omnibus service in 1826, Bordeaux in 1827. Paris officials, having determined the safety of the vehicle, permitted omnibuses on the central streets of the capital in 1828. In June 1854, in a move later copied in London, Second Empire officials created a unified municipal transit operation by placing all omnibuses under the control of one firm, the *Compagnie Générale des Omnibus*. In February 1855 they also created a virtual monopoly, which lasted until 1866, of cab service under the control of the *Compagnie Générale des Voitures à Paris*.

Not everyone was served equally by public transit in Paris. Cabs, with their high fares and small car-

rying capacity, were never intended for the general populace; but they were ideal vehicles for tourists or the Parisian bourgeoisie. The omnibus initially served the middle classes more than Parisian workers. The first omnibus routes ran in the heart of the well-to-do residential parts of Paris, the Right Bank center and the Left Bank just opposite. At mid-century omnibuses did not begin operating until eight o'clock in the morning, too late for most workers to start off to work, and the two-zone fare of central lines made the omnibus too expensive for most workers. Workers did benefit, however, from increased working opportunities in urban transport.

For urban transport Parisians also had a small circular rail line, *la petite ceinture*, that tied together the disparate rail stations, none of which penetrated the city center. Beginning in 1867 steam-powered boats operated on the Seine River for travel outside Paris. A small number of horse-drawn trams began running in the 1870s, and one cable car line opened in 1891. Public coaches in France and elsewhere in Europe began converting to motor traction in the 1890s.

London was just behind Paris in the development of mass urban transport. George Shillibeer, who had worked for a Paris coach maker, was impressed with Paris omnibus service. Returning to London, on 4 July 1829 he began operating an omnibus route

between Paddington and London. Only after 1832, when the hackney coach monopoly that had governed the operation of London coaches for hire ended, were omnibuses permitted to service the center of London. In 1855 French financiers, along with English associates, took the lead in forming a concentrated omnibus firm that ran about six hundred of the approximately eight hundred omnibuses in London at the time. It was replaced by a largely English firm, the London General Omnibus Company, in 1858. Concentration of urban transport in London, as in Paris, became a characteristic of the industry. Also in Paris, initial fares in London were too high and starting times too late for the omnibus to be of use to workers. Until the 1850s, when fares on larger omnibuses began to drop, it was a vehicle largely for the middle classes, tradespeople, and clerks, allowing them to live farther out from the center of London. People could also get about or to and from London by steamships on the Thames, although these were not all-weather vehicles, by railroads, and, from the 1870s, by horse-drawn trams. Trams ran from the inner suburbs to the London periphery and were prohibited in the central London districts; but because they could carry more people, they charged low fares.

In an additional breakthrough with respect to mass urban transit, tram service throughout Europe was electrified during the last two decades of the nine-

teenth century. By the early twentieth century the technology had spread unevenly but had become widespread on the Continent and in Great Britain, with important social consequences. As John P. McKay demonstrated in *Tramways and Trolleys* (1976), the electric tramcar marked a genuine revolution in urban mass transit, as electric trams covered far greater distances than horse-drawn trams and were far less expensive to operate. These trams contributed far more dramatically than their horse-drawn counterparts to suburbanization, reduced fares, and the opening up of leisure activities for all classes outside the city. They were also important instruments for highly concentrated capital investment.

A second important development in urban transit occurred in London on 10 January 1863, when the line of the world's first underground urban railway opened. Within six months over 26,000 passengers were riding the underground daily. Fast and comfortable, the London underground railroad also provided special fares for workers. Budapest and Glasgow became subway cities in the 1890s. The Paris Métro, after the London Underground the second most important and extensive European subway, opened on 19 July 1900. Its construction was delayed by a political dispute, between the central government and railway companies on one side and municipal officials on the other, over whether it would be linked to the national rail system or serve only Paris, and by public debates over whether it should be above- or below-ground. The city won, but as a result the Paris Métro did not begin to service suburban communities until the late 1920s. Its primary function was to transport all classes quickly and cheaply within Paris. Between the beginning of the twentieth century, the inaugural era of European rapid mass transit, and the 1960s, many more European cities, among them Berlin, Madrid, Rome, Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), Kiev, and Frankfurt, also became subway cities.

STREETLIGHTS

Not only did electricity power Europe's subways after 1900, it was also the means by which the darkness of night was illuminated by powerful, permanent, artificial light. Street lighting, like other infrastructural developments, was a characteristic of the early modern city. Lighting streets and home exteriors by candle was common in the sixteenth century. By the seventeenth century street lanterns, as Wolfgang Schivelbusch showed in *Disenchanted Night* (1988), became a matter of government policy. This development coincided with the formation of the centralized state and points to a

cardinal function of street lighting, namely the state's control and surveillance of public spaces. Gas lighting, in use in English factories by 1800, moved out onto London streets by 1814. Paris first experimented with gas lighting for streets in 1829, but only after the 1840s did its use become general. German cities began using gas lighting in the 1820s, but its extensive use there dates from the 1850s. Electricity as a source of lighting was introduced in the late 1880s, a great improvement over gas in that it did not consume oxygen, was odorless, and could be turned on and off at will. As Schivelbusch observed, electricity's use also coincided with and was made possible by the great concentration of capital at that time. Only huge capitalist enterprises could construct and operate the central power stations needed for the city's supply of electricity for streetlights, homes, and factories. The circulation of electricity throughout the city became a key element, therefore, in creating the circulatory network of infrastructural amenities aboveground, in stimulating the capitalist economy, and in linking homes to central power sources. It integrated those elements more deeply into the urban fabric and opened the night to shopping, theatergoing, and other leisure activities pursued in safety and under the watchful eye of the state.

THE UNDERGROUND CITY

Water, in the urban setting closely associated with health, also circulated in the city. In 1850 basic urban utilities and sanitary conditions were about the same as they had been for centuries. Water was a precious resource, available only to those who could afford it. The overwhelming majority of urban inhabitants were dependent on river or pump water for domestic use. The London water supply, for example, came mainly from the heavily polluted Thames River. Inadequate amounts were supplied by private companies to wealthier households through rudimentary, leaky wooden pipes that extended only into the basements of houses. The poor took what they could get from local wells or outside taps, which ran only a few hours or a few days each week. In the new industrial towns whole neighborhoods were sometimes without water even from local wells. Most of the water for Paris originated from the Ourcq Canal and was used to supply public wells and fountains. In 1840 neither the kitchen nor the privy in a middle-class Parisian flat had running water. Water carriers sold from the streets, but the poor filled their pails from public outlets or scooped water from the gutters. In Vienna, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, insufficient water remained a serious prob-

lem. Street sellers hawked bucketfuls to residents until well into the nineteenth century. In Moscow water was so scarce that it was rationed to institutions. Only in Berlin, where the groundwater level was a few meters below the surface, did inhabitants easily supply themselves with well water.

Cities did not have adequate waste removal systems until the second half of the nineteenth century. Few towns had sewers, and storm water mixed with animal excrement and other wastes flowed through street gutters directly into rivers. The most commonly employed methods of disposing of human waste products were the belowground privy and the cesspool system. Night soil was carted beyond the town limits and used as fertilizer on nearby farms, or it was dumped into watercourses or onto vacant land. Even along the most elegant streets of Berlin, such as the Leipzigerstrasse, the contents of privies were emptied at night by brigades of women, filling the air with appalling odors. London and Paris had rudimentary disposal

systems that had originally been constructed only for the drainage of storm water. While solid waste stored in cesspools or casks was carted away, liquid waste was emptied directly into the street gutters. In Paris the twenty-six kilometers of drainage ditches kept up by private contractors often overflowed in a downpour. The city's stench and filth invariably horrified visitors. Enterprising businessmen appeared with planks during rainstorms and charged pedestrians a small fee to cross open sewers on their boards. London's sewer system was composed of a hodgepodge of gutters, underground drains, and open drains administered by eight different commissioners. Even in the capital cities with rudimentary utilities, the size and quality of drains varied widely. Large drains emptied into smaller ones, and few were built with any incline. The plans and locations of ancient networks of conduits and water pipes were often long forgotten or lost. Europe's towns and cities fell into a crisis of basic services with every storm or dry spell.

THE URBAN HYGIENE MOVEMENT

The modern underground circulatory system of the European city began to take shape with the urban hygiene movement of the mid-nineteenth century. Chronic cholera and typhoid epidemics during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had thoroughly shaken both the public and the authorities. In particular the cholera epidemic that swept through Europe's cities in 1832, claiming 5,300 victims in London and 20,000 in Paris, provided the impetus for sanitary reform and prodded the redesign and expansion of underground drainage systems dur-

ing the 1850s and 1860s. The increased interest in urban hygiene was also stimulated by massive increases in population. Between 1800 and 1850 the population doubled in some cities. The population of Paris went from 547,000 to 1,053,000, that of London from 1,117,000 to 2,685,000, and that of Berlin from 172,000 to 419,000. It was difficult to supply the growing population with services from wells, river water was increasingly polluted, and sewer systems were already inadequate and overtaxed. Cesspools overflowed. Common drainage ditches became elongated cesspools filled with uncovered, stagnant excrement. With industrialization, factories along the water's edge in-

creased the demand for pure water used in manufacturing but at the same time pushed water pollution to the extremes of crisis.

Perhaps the most important reason for the increased awareness of hygienic problems in Europe was the sanitary movement in Great Britain. Edwin Chadwick's reports on hygienic conditions in urban areas, published as *Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain* in 1842, brought to light the inadequacies in the provisioning of basic urban utilities. The streets, courts, and alleys where cholera and typhoid first broke out and were most deadly were invariably in the immediate vicinity of open sewers, stagnant ditches and ponds, gutters filled with putrefying waste, and privies. Disease and ill health in Chadwick's opinion were a major cause of destitution and pauperism and a burden on the taxpayer. Conditions could improve only with investments in urban sanitation, the removal of waste, and an improved water supply.

Chadwick and his group of social reformers known as the "sanitary school" argued that clean springwater could be steam pumped, as the heart of a new urban circulatory system, through pipes or veins into every tenement, which would be supplied with a water closet. Each tenement would be connected to a sloped sewer system that used gravity to flush out waste. The sewers or arteries would then conduct their contents to sewerage farms for fertilizer. Filtered through the soil, the waste would be collected by a drainage system that flowed to the nearest river and eventually to the sea. Chadwick's urban reformers believed that their arterial sanitation system—decades ahead of its time—was a cure-all for the social question.

Within the next few decades a complete reconsideration of the dual questions of water supply and waste removal led to a revolution in public utilities. By the beginning of the twentieth century, most towns and cities in northwestern Europe had comprehensive water systems under public ownership that supplied the urban population with clean water. Sewer systems, built at enormous cost and designed for the removal of storm water, wastewater, and human waste products, had been built or were being planned.

However inadequate and overtaxed, London remained the standard against which continental cities measured their own shortcomings. Early urban renovation projects, such as the construction of Regent Street and Regent's Park, provided opportunities to open the underground and install new networks of drains and sewers, waterworks, and a canal. The City Commission of Sewers constructed some forty-four miles of huge sewers. With the manufacture of cheap metal water pipes and improved methods of steam

pumping, private companies supplied water from the Thames to first- and second-story water closets. Running water and the invaluable new water-closet appliance made dwellings in London's favored districts an unimaginable luxury in comparison to contemporary Vienna and Paris. Fixed baths came somewhat later, but as early as 1840 they were frequently found in London's newer houses. Nonetheless, tens of thousands of the city's poorer inhabitants remained without access to any services at all, even communal water spigots. Long lines of people, pails in hand, stood for a turn at the nearest outdoor faucet the few hours the water supply was turned on. In winter the faucets froze. Private companies had no obligation to provide piped water to the poor, and few landlords were willing to invest in utility improvements. Only half the buildings in London were connected to sewers in 1848.

The City Sewers Act of 1848 required installation of water cisterns and drains connected to sewer lines in all new houses in London. The city could also compel owners of existing buildings to provide them. The Metropolitan Water Act of 1852 required that private water companies obtain their water supplies from unpolluted sections of the Thames River, cover their reservoirs, filter their water, and furnish a constant supply of water in those districts that demanded it. In 1855 the indirectly elected Metropolitan Board of Works was established with responsibility for managing public works, and sewerage, paving, cleansing, and supplying water came under general public control. Joseph Bazalgette, leader of the board's engineers, designed a sewer system that relied on underground sloping conduits connected to the old drainage pipes that would flush waste west to east across London and then deposit it into the Thames far below the built-up area. However, during the very hot summer of 1858 the board deadlocked over the location of the sewer outlets. The pollution in the Thames became so intolerable that it was known as the "great stink" of 1858 and became a national scandal, eventually pushing the government into breaking the impasse. Bazalgette's metropolitan sewer system, completed in 1865, was one of the greatest engineering feats of the nineteenth century. Sewers eighty-two miles in length were built in or tunneled beneath London and washed away 420 million gallons of waste and rainwater daily almost entirely by gravity. Circular or oval in shape, the brick sewers varied from four to twelve feet in diameter. The most notable addition was the Victoria Embankment along the Thames, built essentially as a lid to cover both the main sewer conduit and the underground Metropolitan Railway. The ongoing excavations for Bazalgette's work, which continuously dis-

rupted the streets and traffic of London, provided visible evidence of the radical transformation taking place underground.

THE SUBTERRANEAN ORGANS OF PARIS

Spurred by the shock of cholera and the example of the British public health movement, a new approach to sanitation practices took shape in Paris as well. The city began building new systems to distribute water and evacuate waste that would help, according to urban reformers, cleanse the city not only of its sewage but of the underlying causes of social and revolutionary turmoil. H. C. Emmerly, the head of the Paris sewer system from 1832 to 1839, placed fountains at the heads of streets in northeastern, working-class districts. Water from the fountains washed into new gutters under sidewalks and emptied into sewer drains. While traditionally sewers had been built with hewn stone, engineers began substituting millstone and cement mortar, which allowed the introduction of curved sewer floors that made flushing easier, as did construction on a regular incline. Like all later sewers, they were large enough to allow a man to move around standing up. The conduits flowed into central collec-

tors that drained directly into the Seine River. In 1852 the Paris prefecture ordered installation of direct sewer hookups for wastewater in all new buildings. When the last open sewer was covered in 1853, Paris already had 143 kilometers of sewer lines. But serious problems remained. New building construction strained even these improvements, and the sewers continued to overflow into the streets with every downpour. Twice daily, after the public fountains opened and the sewers emptied into the Seine, the river darkened, and the two pumps that siphoned water from the river for Parisians' use were clogged with fetid liquid.

During the Second Empire, Napoleon III saw the continued modernization of the sewage and water systems as fundamental to the transformation of Paris into an imperial city. According to Haussmann, the excavations for street building were an unparalleled opportunity to construct an underground urban circulatory system free of blocked arteries and foul orifices. They would function like the organs of the human body, and fresh water, light, and heat would circulate like the fluids that support life. He proposed an expanded dual water-supply system for the city. Water for domestic consumption would be brought via aqueducts from distant springs. New waterways and portions of ancient Roman aqueducts were in-

corporated into the extensive system that brought water to Paris from the Dhuys, the Vanne, and the Marne Rivers. Water from the Ourcq Canal and the Seine River would be used only for industrial purposes and to supply public fountains.

While the length of Paris streets doubled during the Second Empire urban renovation projects, the sewer system grew more than fivefold. Old sewers were rebuilt to meet new standards. Haussmann's engineers continued the earlier practice of making the sewers large enough to permit workmen to repair and

cleanse them. In the plan developed by the government engineer Eugène Belgrand, the narrower drains flowed into three main outfall collectors (five by the turn of the century) that served as the large intestine of the system and discharged waste into the Seine northwest of Paris rather than in the city. Belgrand realized that a constant flow of water would be far less effective as a means of cleansing than periodic concentrated purgings. Water for this purpose was trapped in small reservoirs fed with river water throughout the system. The reservoirs numbered more than four thou-

sand at the turn of the century, and sluice carts and boats in the collectors facilitated the flushing.

Between 1788 and 1907 the length of sewer per inhabitant increased eighty-fourfold. The extension of the sewer system contributed significantly to the decline of waterborne epidemic disease in Paris. The sewer tunnels housed two sets of water mains, one for drinking water and one for water from the Seine River used to clean streets and to water city parks. Telegraph and telephone wires, pneumatic tubes for the postal service, tubes carrying compressed air, and later the traffic control electrical system stretched across the roofs of conduit galleries. By the turn of the century, tours of the sewers were offered every two weeks during the summer; six hundred curious visitors took the voyage each time.

In the early 1850s modern urban hygiene also began in Berlin. In 1852 a privately owned water supply system was constructed, although no facilities were provided for sewer drainage. The sewage question was turned over to a municipal commission, which after years of study recommended the plan of Police President James Hobrecht, a German engineer whose social ideas closely matched those of Chadwick. Hobrecht's plan included a combined water-carriage system, dividing the city into small drainage areas, and pumping urban sewage through an underground pipe system to numerous sewerage farms on the city's outskirts. Work on the project began in 1873, and plans were also made for a new, municipally owned water supply. The Hobrecht plan remained in force virtually unaltered until 1919.

Throughout the nineteenth century Europe's capital cities, especially London and Paris, led the way in sanitation reform. National governments cared more about their capital cities, which more easily found money for the massive investments required for sanitation improvements. Other towns and cities lagged far behind, especially in southern and eastern Europe. At a time when Paris had already built new water and sewerage systems, the population of Marseille still drank polluted water from the Durance River. As a result Marseille was the site of the last major cholera epidemic in France in 1884. Lyon began to construct modern water and sewage facilities in the 1880s. Even in Vienna running water, central heating, and fixed baths reached only a small proportion of residential buildings in the late nineteenth century. In 1910 no more than 7 percent of all dwellings had bathrooms, and only 22 percent had private water closets. Kitchens in all but luxury flats rarely had a water supply but instead depended on the water basin in the public corridor. Italian cities, including Naples, Turin, Bologna, and Venice, in the 1880s

began civic improvements such as street renovations, sewer systems, and slum clearance. Not until the 1930s were water and sewage taken over by public management in Italy.

EXTENDING SERVICES TO THE SUBURBS

The later reform programs were also shaped by the vast processes of suburbanization that drastically changed the form and landscape of the city. The great underground networks of services that were constructed during the nineteenth century transformed the central districts of Europe's great cities. But little was done to alleviate the dearth of services in the slum districts and squatter settlements spreading from densely built, working-class quarters into the outlying districts. Water supplies from wells and latrine services were shared at common sites far from dwellings, and residents were at the mercy of speculators. Although cholera and typhoid fever had largely been conquered, tuberculosis, which was directly linked to squalid living conditions, remained a major scourge. Slum clearance was consistently offered as the solution to the continued public health and social crisis.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the garden city ideal was promoted by architect-planners, such as Ebenezer Howard in England, Tony Garnier and Henri Sellier in France, and Ernst May in Germany, as slum replacement. Garden cities, made up of cottages and modest apartments outfitted with gas, electricity, and modern kitchen and bathroom facilities and surrounded by green space, would create a utopian working-class environment. The ideal emphasized gas and water municipal reform that would provide utilities on a nonprofit basis. Engineering systems were to constitute the largest set of municipal services in new towns designed for working-class suburbs. Although only a small number of garden cities were constructed, they provided the model for the extension of the vast underground gas, water, and sewer systems later deemed a vital part of urban life. Public housing projects along the peripheries of London, Paris, and Berlin carried out the ideal in the 1920s with solidly built structures supplied with modern utilities. But the extension of the underground services was long and costly and required the incorporation of vast suburban areas under a unified administrative jurisdiction. The difficulties involved in providing basic services to the growing suburbs was one important reason why planners turned away from the garden city ideal. Instead, by the 1940s Le Corbusier's vision of vast apartment towers

and complexes was seen as a more efficient way to build and provision the water, sewage, gas, and electricity networks required for the growing numbers of families calling metropolitan regions their home. The inner workings of the human body no longer

served as the metaphor for urban infrastructure and planning. The new image was the Corbusian machine for living, the the efficient, geometrically designed and engineered corridors and networks of the harmonious city.

See also **The Environment; Health and Disease** (*volume 2*); **Public Health** (*volume 3*); **Cleanliness** (*volume 4*); and other articles in this section.

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SHOPS AND STORES



Montserrat M. Miller

One of the most pervasive structures in the history of retail commerce has been the small urban shop. With origins dating back to the classical period and before, small shops have been a characteristic feature of the geography, economy, culture, and sociopolitical fabric of towns and cities since the eleventh-century revival of urban life in the West. Eastern Europe's towns and cities, while following a somewhat distinct economic and historical pattern, also featured shops as one of the main vehicles for the retail sale of goods even during communist rule. The term "stores" is generally used by historians to denote larger retail entities that sold a wider variety of goods. Department stores, known in France as *grands magasins*, first became established in the mid-nineteenth century, introducing important changes in the way many city dwellers acquired clothing, textiles, and other household and personal articles. Likewise, self-service grocery stores and supermarkets, appearing in European cities in the post-World War II period, have over the course of the last half of the twentieth century profoundly altered the way in which most households are provisioned.

European social historians have mainly been interested in shops and stores because their past is deeply intertwined with that of the guild system and the emergence of the bourgeoisie, because they reveal much about how municipal corporations controlled economic exchange, because they are crucial institutions for the study of consumerism, because they raise important questions about the nature of women's work in the past, and because of the range of political and economic responses to industrialization and the emergence of mass consumer society that their owners exhibited. Thus the history of shops and stores is particularly significant to historians concerned with urban life, social structures, work and gender, retail business, and political movements in the industrial era.

THE RISE OF THE SHOP

The rise of shops in Europe was deeply intertwined with the revival of urban life in the eleventh century.

Throughout western Europe, the growth of towns involved increases in the numbers of artisans and traders. At first finding room within existing town walls, the expansion in numbers of artisans and traders was soon accompanied by the growth of new neighborhoods, frequently known as burghs, outside of the increasingly limited fortified space. Most items were sold to the urban populations of eleventh-century western Europe at markets, usually located in church squares and long regulated by ecclesiastical authority; the new commercial districts of towns were the site of the first actual shops. Most frequently, these early shops consisted of windows through which artisans such as blacksmiths, butchers, cobblers, and bakers could sell to passersby on days and at times when the town's periodic markets were not in operation. It appears that in many areas, local authorities discouraged such commerce because it was more difficult than open-air markets to regulate on behalf of the consumer. Still, through the twelfth and thirteenth centuries more and more artisans sold from their windows, thus increasing the amount of commerce taking place in the burgeoning towns and establishing the legitimacy of the workshop as a point from which retail trade could be conducted.

These early artisanal shops, many of which featured shutters that folded down by day to serve as sales counters but whose windows eventually became doorways through which customers passed in order to make their purchases, were distinct from the retail merchandise shops that would appear and proliferate later on. The earliest artisanal shops only sold goods that were made on the premises and linked consumers directly with producers. These shop owners frequently offered their wares at the town's markets as well and, along with other prosperous townspeople, participated in guild organizations and the development of local commercial codes. The earliest artisanal shop owners, then, were among the groups central to the formation of the urban polity. Attached to individual residences, these shops were family operations with both husbands and wives participating in the commercial enterprise.

From approximately the thirteenth century forward these first shop owners began to be joined by a new group: itinerant traders eager to settle in towns and engage in retail commerce. These newcomers were distinct from the artisanal shopkeepers in that they were essentially middlemen, selling goods they had purchased elsewhere, sometimes second- or third-hand. The successful among these new merchants joined town guilds and imitated artisanal shop owners by establishing points for the retail sale of merchandise that were part of a permanent residence and that had an opening on the street, either a window shutter sales counter or a door through which customers could pass in order to make a purchase. Few members of this new group participated in town markets, preferring instead to concentrate their sales in the vibrant burghs and take advantage of the lively flow of foot traffic that characterized urban spaces through the high Middle Ages. So while markets of various types remained important elements of the urban retail structure in most areas until the late nineteenth century, shops began to compete effectively with markets for customers from at least the early twelfth century forward, becoming a crucial part of town commerce.

Shops quickly caught on in the new urban centers of Europe, and their numbers and variety proliferated. The generally favorable individual living standards of the mid-fourteenth through the mid-

sixteenth centuries contributed to this growth. In addition to grocers (who tended to sell by weight), tailors and drapers (who generally sold by measure), shops that sold artisanal objects, and shops that sold secondhand goods, a plethora of shops that offered services were added. Scribes, notaries, pawnbrokers, apothecaries, wine merchants, and tavern keepers of numerous varieties all opened shops in large towns and cities and added to the expansion of urban commerce. Steep hierarchies accompanied this growth in retailing. At the top of the economic order were wealthy merchants concentrating in profitable long-distance trades while at the bottom were peddlers without so much as a market stall from which to sell. Small shop owners occupied a vast middle ground and succeeded in consolidating their position within the urban polity.

While municipal authority in many western European cities was dominated by wealthy merchants who formed a patriciate, the interests of modest shopkeepers were reflected in commercial law and, of course, in the corporate regulation of the guilds. Most of the rules governing exchange were designed to prevent unbridled competition, maintain quality, and control prices. Both the nature of the product being sold and the process of retail exchange were also governed by municipal codes and/or guild rules. Shop owners were authorized to sell particular goods and could not expand their line without a new permit. Purity, weight, price, and workmanship were also frequent targets of regulation. Hours of operation, weights and measures, and working conditions were all subject to corporate controls. Even the nature of communication between shopkeepers and customers fell under the regulatory purview of municipal and guild authority. Craftsmen, for example, were sometimes forbidden to call out to passersby or engage in any other method of attracting consumers to their wares. The history of shops shows quite clearly that western European urban polities of the Middle Ages offered opportunities to accumulate capital through the profits derived from small-scale retail commerce, although enterprises that sought to do so certainly operated within a context that maintained relatively tight controls over the act of economic exchange.

Still, it would be erroneous to conceptualize shops as isolated and autarkic enterprises operating within towns characterized as closed systems. Urban history has in recent years emphasized the dynamic relationship between medieval towns and cities and the regions within which they were located. Studies of individual shops illustrate the complexity of the relationships linking urban and rural areas in the Middle Ages. Shopkeepers, and especially grocers of vir-

tually all varieties as well as market vendors, had to maintain ties with rural suppliers in order to serve their urban customers. Town life may have been quite distinct from country life in the Middle Ages, but as the relationship between shops and their sources of supply clearly indicates, the boundaries were permeable.

The history of shops can also reveal much about the emergence of the bourgeoisie, the relationship of work to family life in preindustrial cities, and gender divisions of labor. At the core of the earliest bourgeoisie was the population of urban artisans and shopkeepers. The growth and development of their enterprises and their efforts at self-regulation and self-government illustrate how this crucial urban social group carved out a place for itself in the hierarchy of classes. Examining the way that shops operated allows us to understand how central family labor was to the emergence and economic consolidation of the bourgeoisie. Shops, attached to households, were family enterprises, and often a simple curtain was the only barrier that separated living from retail spaces. Husbands, wives, and children each contributed to the economic survival of the family, and thus boundaries between work and home were blurry indeed. Though the precise nature of the gender divisions of labor appear to have changed somewhat over time, with women losing ground in terms of artisanal production as the Middle Ages waned, shops were clearly business enterprises in which women's labor was ubiquitous and essential. Whether women were engaged in some element of production, in providing food and lodging for workers, or serving customers who came through the doors, the social history of shops sets in bold relief their very active and direct participation in the economy of preindustrial cities.

By the close of the Middle Ages shops had become a tremendously important element of the urban morphology of western Europe. Frequently arranged by specialty, shops of given varieties lined particular streets, giving them distinct flavors and personalities. Avenues dotted with jewelers and silk merchants, for example, exuded a greater air of prestige than did streets whose shops specialized in cheese and other edibles. These arrangements certainly shaped the lives of urban residents. One of the legacies of this pattern is that many western European cities still have, in their old quarters, street names and a certain flavor derived from the types of commerce that municipal authorities allowed. On the other hand, some types of shops, such as bakers, butchers, and greengrocers, were seldom grouped together and were more frequently distributed by authorities throughout the urban landscape in order to provision more efficiently the city's distinct quarters. However distributed in specific instances, shops and the nature of the commerce taking

place in them gave town and city districts distinct characters.

RETAILING IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

The numbers of shops in many areas of western Europe, including England, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, grew dramatically in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This growth appears to have occurred throughout the retail hierarchy: luxury shops became more abundant but so too did marginal secondhand shops, as did crude inns and taverns catering to lower-ranking members of society. In many cities, the conversion of residential buildings into shops on prominent streets caused a shortage of rental property for the wealthy. Such a proliferation of retail outlets, while both contributing to and reflecting the growth in complexity of the distribution network, was not indicative of any sort of golden age of shops in the early modern period. In fact, shopkeeper bankruptcy became quite common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In some places the number of retail outlets proved to be larger than the economy could sustain.

The widespread use of credit was one factor that contributed to the growth in the number of shops but also increased economic precariousness. By the seventeenth century shops were using credit extensively: they frequently relied on the extension of credit to them by wholesalers, paying for their stock in installments over time, and they extended credit to their customers, wealthy and humble alike (although the rich were always extended credit more generously and leniently than the poor). Failure to receive credit from suppliers and delays or customer refusals to settle outstanding accounts were typical ongoing fears for shop owners. While allowing the economically marginal to obtain materials to sell, the increasing reliance upon credit by shops could, and frequently did, prove disastrous to the survival of small retail enterprises.

But the growing reliance upon credit was only one of numerous changes occurring in this period: it now appears that the eighteenth century in particular witnessed a transformation in the way that many shops presented and displayed their goods. A great many shops in the towns and cities of western and central Europe became more elaborate. Shops selling luxury goods led the way by adding crystal chandeliers, mirrors, and elegant furnishings. The use of glass increased tremendously, both in the fixtures holding merchandise and in display windows, which became the objects of competition between shop owners. In

addition, shop signs began to incorporate greater elements of artistry with the use of new materials chosen to announce more explicitly the elegance and prestige of the enterprise in question. More humble establishments imitated these changes as best they could, while shops on main thoroughfares gave increased attention to aesthetic issues. Such transformations only reinforced the already existing hierarchy of shops, more firmly differentiating so-called backstreet shops, whose resources and pretensions were more limited, from elegant shops in fashionable districts.

The early modern period also featured, first and most notably in England, the emergence and growth of a new type of retail shop catering to the increasing consumption of sugar, caffeine drinks, and tobacco between 1650 and 1750. The growing demand for these items, imported from abroad and not traditionally available in village markets, contributed to the appearance of small general grocery stores, mostly in rural areas. In addition to the new stimulants and various provisions, these retail outlets tended to sell semidurables such as clay pipes, glass, and ceramic tableware. While preexisting shops in large towns and cities took up the sale of these items, new retail outlets came into existence in the countryside to meet growing demand for groceries and housewares, and became quite common in rural England and America by the close of the eighteenth century.

Alongside these physical and structural changes, and the overall growth in the number of shops in the

early modern period, social historians have identified a shift in the attitudes of ordinary people toward the act of purchasing and consuming material goods. From their outset shops had been sites for more than just economic exchange: literary and artistic evidence along with extant personal testimony illustrate the lively and ongoing sociability between shopkeepers and customers that took place as part of the process of buying and selling. But the research on this subject now shows quite clearly that something new was afoot as early as the seventeenth century: a form of consumerism was emerging among the popular classes in many areas of western Europe long before industrialization. Consumerism, social historians maintain, involves new levels of personal satisfaction from acquiring goods, as well as new assertions of social standing through purchasing and displaying material objects. The early modern variant of consumerism seems to have focused on clothing and housewares. Though the bulk of the research deals with England, studies indicate that other areas also became increasingly consumerist, thus helping to explain the expansion in the number of secondhand clothing shops and shops selling semidurable household goods. Changes in the way that shops presented and displayed merchandise, the growth in their numbers, and the new financial arrangements through which they operated are all of significance because they constitute one of the external manifestations of the early emergence of consumerism. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,

shopping began to take on new meanings, beginning its transformation into an important new leisure-time activity for the middle and working classes alike.

THE AGE OF THE DEPARTMENT STORE

Building on early modern shifts, considerable changes also occurred in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century history of shops and stores. It was in this period that guild controls over urban commerce came to an end in most places, thus lifting impediments to organizational innovations in commerce. With industrialization maturing and urbanization advancing, the long nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of large-scale, highly capitalized retail structures along with an enormous increase in the variety of manufactured goods for sale. With wages and leisure time gradually increasing and mass advertising becoming more common, the second half of the nineteenth century in particular featured the spread and deepening of consumerist values. From the early modern focus of demand on clothing and housewares, nineteenth century consumerism widened to include children's toys, novels, holiday decorations, items such as oriental rugs, pianos, and bicycles, plus popular entertainment such as dance hall performances. Department stores, chain stores, and mail-order companies emerged and expanded rapidly to meet the new mass demand for manufactured goods and commercial services.

Of all the new forms of highly capitalized large-scale retailing, the department store has received the most systematic scholarly attention. Originating in the 1850s and 1860s, the *grands magasins* of Paris were the first real department stores. These grew in size and number until the eve of World War I, quickly spreading to England and then other parts of Europe, including tsarist Russia. In many ways department stores could not have been more different than the small family shops that had long dotted the urban landscape. Scale was the most obvious characteristic distinguishing department stores from shops. These new stores offered expanding and diversified lines of merchandise that drew, by the 1880s, some ten thousand customers a day into the Bon Marché alone. By 1911 the twelve largest department stores in Paris employed more than nine hundred persons each, contrasting sharply with the vast majority of retail enterprises whose average number of employees was ten or less. In some instances, nineteenth-century Parisian department stores offered on-site dormitories as well as organized and respectable leisure activities for their employees. It was not uncommon for department stores also to provide free medical services, accident insur-

ance, and pension plans. In terms of sheer volume of customers and employment of wage labor, small family shops had little resemblance with *grands magasins* in the nineteenth century.

Another sharp point of contrast between small shops and department stores can be found in the manner in which stocks and supplies were acquired for sale. Nineteenth-century shops tended to order their merchandise on credit through intermediaries and frequently used sample books from which customers could select items to be ordered. Markups were high and volumes were low. Department store merchandise ordering was on a much larger scale, so much so that they could frequently dictate production schedules. Selling directly to department stores for cash on delivery, manufacturers could save warehousing costs by timing production to coincide with delivery commitments. These savings could be passed on to consumers, who found a wide array of goods in the department stores on sale at relatively inexpensive prices.

Department stores featured important innovations in retailing. Customers were encouraged to enter the building even if they had no intention of making a purchase; managers considered browsing to be perfectly acceptable. The bulk of the merchandise was displayed in such a way that consumers could directly inspect it for quality and workmanship. In the event of some dissatisfaction with a purchase, returns could be easily effected. Department store clerks were trained to distinguish themselves from the sales techniques of shopkeepers: customers were not to be needled into making a purchase, and clerks were to offer information about the products for sale without the concomitant pressure that took place in small shops. The social relations that accompanied shopping assumed a distinct form in these new retail outlets.

Still, it is important to note that not all of the department stores' most salient features were original innovations in retailing. Often laden with luxury fixtures and featuring elaborate decors, department stores were not the first to use fantasies about wealth and opulence to promote sales. Early modern shops had certainly moved in this direction prior to the nineteenth century, and glass and iron arcades, similar in form to train stations and covered markets, had become common in a number of cities well before the appearance of the department store. Shopping arcades typically housed small upscale boutiques and featured gas—later electric—lighting that lent an air of fantasy to enclosed shopping promenades. Department stores merely elaborated on the techniques that shopkeepers had earlier devised to add an exciting and dreamlike quality to the experience of material acquisition. And neither did the *grands magasins* invent the concept of

department shopping itself. This, too, was an innovation traceable to small and medium-sized family shops. With guild control over commerce suppressed, new shops featuring fixed prices and expanded lines of merchandise began to appear as early as the late eighteenth century and became relatively common by the 1830s in Paris. Known as *magasins de nouveautés*, these commercial entities emphasized turnover and volume, an approach quite different from that of traditional shops. Department stores seized upon these innovations in retailing, implementing them on a grand scale and developing new managerial systems appropriate for their dimensions.

SHOPS AND SHOPKEEPERS IN THE AGE OF THE DEPARTMENT STORE

Social historians have been especially interested in the emergence of new forms of retailing such as department and chain stores because of the reactions of shopkeeping populations to this change. While many small nineteenth-century shop owners perceived department stores as a threat to their livelihood, the nature of the competition between these two forms of retailing is less clear. Many small shops thrived in the immediate environs of department stores, and sales of upscale items such as jewelry and haberdashery were

quite slow to shift away from small family firms. The wealthiest shoppers usually disdained the environment of the department store, designed to enthrall the consuming masses, and preferred instead the exclusivity of traditional shops. In the face of department store competition some shops turned toward greater emphasis on luxury merchandise, some expanded their lines and adopted new retailing strategies, while others, especially ones dealing in increasingly mass-produced items such as gloves, umbrellas, and underwear, struggled to survive. The relevant point is that while the emergence of new forms of large-scale retailing posed a significant challenge, small shops were not necessarily reluctant to adapt to changing economic circumstances or even slow to embrace new commercial strategies.

In some respects the nineteenth century offered new opportunities for small family-owned retail shops, and in many places the expansion in their numbers outpaced population growth. Rapid urbanization made new space available for shops as well as increasing the pool of potential customers. Gradually rising wage levels after 1850 meant that working-class families had more to spend in the market economy, with small shops taking their share of consumer dollars along with department stores. And throughout northern Europe, municipal governments ceased constructing food markets to provision the urban population in the late nineteenth century. As existing urban market halls decayed and fell into disuse, neighborhood shops increased their share of the retail distribution of provisions. With food having become the fastest-growing sector of the nineteenth-century economy, small neighborhood shops stepped in where markets had once dominated, establishing themselves as crucial venues for the sale of provisions through the next century. So while both the early modern period and the nineteenth century featured considerable innovations in the retailing sector of the economy, small shops survived these changes as important elements of the retail distribution structure of European towns and cities.

One of the main reasons that historians study the relationship between shops and new larger-scale forms of retailing has been to explore the cause and nature of shopkeeper activism. Initial interpretations holding that shopkeepers embraced nationalist, conservative (and often anti-Semitic) ideologies in the late nineteenth century have given way to more nuanced and variegated assessments of their political ideologies and impulses. Likewise the presumption that shopkeepers, because they longed for a return to protectionist policies of the preindustrial economy, were everywhere at the heart of fascism's popular support has also come under increasing scrutiny. Small retail or-

ganizations and institutions in Barcelona, for example, strongly supported the Republican municipal government in the final days before the outbreak of rebellion, and were not drawn toward the fascist organic model of the state offered by the Falange. And in Italy and Germany, support for or acquiescence to fascist authority now appears to have been more a result of calculations of opportunism than blind obedience. The overgeneralized conservative proclivities of the European petite bourgeoisie had largely been predicated on a presumption of desperation and dupability. Crucial to the reevaluation of late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century shopkeeper political ideologies has been a growing recognition that small retail and artisanal enterprises were not necessarily doomed to extinction by the process of industrialization, and indeed possessed a considerable amount of historical agency. Thus, much of the twentieth-century work on the history of shops and stores seeks to explain how small and medium-sized firms have remained viable and have achieved, as the cases of Italy and Germany so clearly illustrate, an important degree of political power.

New large-scale forms of retailing continued their expansion in Europe over the course of the twentieth century. The pre-World War I years mainly featured the growth of chain stores, mail-order concerns, consumer cooperatives, and, of course, the further spread of department stores. The pace of change was not even, though. Consumer cooperatives, which were in many ways a creative reaction to the capitalization of commerce, came into existence virtually everywhere but took hold especially in England and the Scandinavian countries, where they came to make up a considerable part of the retail provisioning sector. Mail-order companies were particularly successful in Germany, quite possibly due to the economy of the postal service and the facility of its COD collection. Department and chain store growth prior to World War I was somewhat slower in central Europe than in England and France, though all major European capitals featured their own variants of the *grand magasin* on the eve of the Great War.

THE AGE OF THE SUPERMARKET

While the 1919–1945 period brought a disruption to the expansion of the retail sector, the postwar period featured a renewed surge in its growth as well as the appearance of a distinctively twentieth-century retail innovation: the self-service supermarket. The National Cash Register Company, an American firm, played an active role in promoting the adoption of self-service

across western Europe in the 1950s and beyond. While many food shops that converted to self-service never increased their size, others grew into supermarkets and supermarket chains. The European country quickest to adopt American-style supermarkets was Switzerland. By 1955, the Swiss Migros chain, founded by Gottlieb Duttweiler, had in operation 150 self-service food stores, including seven large supermarkets. Consumer cooperatives in Britain and Scandinavia were also among the earliest and most eager converts to this new form of retailing, most likely because of the economies of scale and consequent reduction of prices that nearly always accompanied the shift.

Still, the spread of supermarkets in western Europe was distinct from that of the United States. Beginning somewhat later in the 1950s than in America, self-service supermarkets became established in European cities where space was at a tremendous premium and where individual establishments tended to be smaller and parking space much more limited than in their North American counterparts. Essentially dependent on the consumer use of the automobile to transport multiple bags of groceries from the point of retail to the point of residence, supermarkets could not expand to North American dimensions without large parking lots and widespread automobile ownership. Instead, though car ownership continued to increase through the postwar decades, supermarkets took their place in western Europe in the 1950s, 1960s, and up to the mid-1970s within a preexisting retail provisioning structure that featured a balance between neighborhood food shops, chain stores such as the British company Lipton's, consumer cooperatives, and, in parts of southern Europe, networks of public or private covered markets. Industry analysts in the immediate postwar period cited a number of other factors that slowed the spread of supermarkets in Europe. Among the impediments they perceived were inadequate refrigeration and packaging facilities, inadequate brand consciousness, and the (presumably negative) force of deeply seated commercial traditions.

European retailers were accustomed in the mid-twentieth century to much higher levels of competition than their American counterparts. In contrast to the 2½ food retailers per 1,000 population in the United States in the mid-1950s, Europe ranged from a low in France of 6 per 1,000 to a high of 26 per 1,000 in Belgium. In addition, American supermarket missionaries to Europe complained about the pervasive commercial organizations with local, regional, and national units that pursued policies of trade and territorial protection. As had been the case at the end of the nineteenth century, large-scale, heavily capitalized retail firms made significant inroads in the first

three decades of the postwar period, though without eliminating more traditional forms of commerce such as small family-owned shops.

Though their density varies according to region, with southwestern Europe seemingly leading, small and medium-sized retail enterprises have fared well over much of the second half of the twentieth century. To an important degree this can be attributed to the ability of these firms to adapt to changes in both demand and production, but shop owners' effective political activism within their national polities also helped maintain their viability. Here the Italian and German cases are both noteworthy and most clearly outlined in the social history literature. German artisans in the post-World War II period adapted successfully to the industrial capitalist system, as evidenced by the fact that in 1994, 17.4 percent of the economically active population there was employed in independent *Handwerk* shops. Forty-seven percent of those firms employed five or fewer persons. Recent work has shown that the continued viability of *Handwerk* within the advanced industrial economy of Germany has in no small part been due to the connections between its institutions and the major political parties, to its maintenance of training programs and systems, its organization of purchasing and retailing cooperatives, its investment in research and development, and to its functioning as an effective organ of interest-group representation. Likewise in Italy, a national commercial organization established in 1946 and known as the *Confcommercio* has succeeded in defending the interests of firms engaged in retail commerce. Representing roughly one-seventh of the electorate, the postwar Italian retail sector mobilized to maintain commercial licensing policies because of the protection they offered to small and medium-sized enterprises. Especially in comparison with other regions of the world, the interests of small shops have tended to carry considerable weight within the electoral constituencies of several western European polities in the postwar period.

More recent trends have indicated a shift in the closing years of the century. Large-scale, heavily capitalized retailing enterprises have made new inroads since 1975. One indication of this has been the appearance of hypermarket stores in peripheral urban areas of western Europe. Larger than most Walmarts and K-Marts in the United States, the hypermarket combines provisions, clothing, housewares, furnishings, and heavy appliances on a heretofore unknown scale. A single enterprise under one roof, the hypermarket began draining consumer dollars away from small urban supermarkets and shops as early as the 1980s. In the 1990s western European cities also be-

came the sites of large-scale, multistoried commercial malls. In some ways resembling their American counterparts, these retail centers often include hypermarket anchor stores and have posed a significant threat to older forms of neighborhood-based retail activity.

Since the revival of urban life in the eleventh century, privately owned retail firms have constituted a ubiquitous presence in western European cities. Though only some portion of the sector has undergone revolutionary changes in scale, organization, and potential for profitability, the political power wielded by the owners of retail concerns has remained considerable. Essential to the maintenance of urban populations, retail shops and stores continue to represent a crucial part of the economy and morphology of western European cities.

The history of shops and stores in eastern Europe has followed a somewhat different trajectory but has received remarkably little attention from social historians. While experiencing both urban growth and an expansion of retail commerce, eastern Europe did so somewhat later on account of the greater strength

of rural aristocrats and the Tatar suzerainty in Russia, which extended into the fourteenth century. Urban shop owners never developed the political power in eastern Europe that they established in the west during the Middle Ages. Still, in the nineteenth century, most eastern European cities experienced growth in the number of shops and the establishment of new large-scale, highly capitalized stores, similar to their western counterparts. The communist period, quite obviously, represents a stark departure from western patterns, though political authorities did use both shops and stores to distribute what consumer goods the state-controlled system of production made available, rather than devising a new conceptual model for retail distribution. Scholars from the fields of political science, marketing, and to some degree urban planning are turning their attention to eastern European cities and raising important questions about the economic and political cultures that best foster commercial enterprises. Eastern Europe remains a fertile field for social historical inquiry into the nature of retail distribution.

See also Capitalism and Commercialization (in this volume); Fairs and Markets (in this volume); The Lower Middle Classes (volume 3); Gender and Work (volume 3); Consumerism (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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URBAN INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICS: THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD



Christopher R. Friedrichs

The institutional structure and political practices of European cities during the early modern era were products of the Middle Ages. The framework of institutions and customs by which European town dwellers regulated both their internal affairs and their relations with the broader society took shape roughly from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries. Despite significant pressures for change, this framework remained relatively constant throughout the early modern era. Only with the gradual emergence of mass politics following the French Revolution (1789) and the acceleration of urban growth following the industrial revolution did this framework fully fall apart.

Not only was the institutional structure of European cities during the early modern era highly stable, it was also remarkably uniform. The names of urban institutions and the details of their organization varied enormously from place to place, but the fundamental forms and functions did not. In many ways Europe had a common urban political culture.

The institutional structure of early modern European cities is well documented and widely known. By contrast, the character of political interaction within European cities is less well understood. Because city councils normally conducted their deliberations in secret, exactly how urban rulers arrived at their decisions is often hard to reconstruct. But historians are increasingly aware of the complexity of urban politics. Cities were normally governed by a small stratum of wealthy men who expected deference and obedience from those over whom they ruled. Yet even the most well entrenched urban elites always had to respond to pressures exerted by an array of rival authorities and interest groups inside and outside the city.

INSTITUTIONS

The most fundamental urban institution was the citizenry. Whether known as freemen, burghers, bourgeois, *Bürger*, or even (as in Rome) the *populo*, the citizens represented an identifiable segment of every

city's total population. They were that portion of the adult male householders who comprised the city's political community. In almost every city, membership in the citizenry could be obtained in two ways: by inheritance or by purchase. Typically citizenship was activated when a young man married and established his own household. At that point he paid the necessary fees and took an oath of allegiance to the community. As a citizen he had the right to live and practice a trade in his city and the obligation to pay taxes and to bear arms in the city's defense. Citizenship was gendered: only an adult male could fully hold this status, though wives and daughters of citizens might enjoy a latent form of citizenship, which protected their right to live in the city and to carry on certain businesses. Many—often most—of a city's adult inhabitants were not citizens at all: the broad mass of servants and unskilled or unemployed laborers generally had no political status and lived in the city only as temporary or tolerated residents with no recognized rights.

Although in formal juridical terms citizens formed the city's political community, their actual level of involvement in political decision making was often limited. An assembly of all citizens might meet from time to time to hear decrees or voice opinions, but the actual power to rule the community was normally invested in a small council or, in certain cities, a group of councils. Occasionally the citizens played some role in the election of council members, but in many cities the council simply filled any vacancy in its ranks without broader consultation.

The political structure of cities was not democratic. But at the same time it was not autocratic, for political power in cities was almost always collective, exercised by councils rather than individuals. Most cities had mayors, but their powers were usually limited. Typically they were senior or former council members who held the highest office on a rotational basis. Even in Venice, where the elected prince, or doge, served for life and enjoyed enormous prestige, real decision-making authority was still exercised primarily by the senate and its various committees.

The council (or councils) typically regulated almost every conceivable aspect of the city's economic, social, and cultural life. Yet the council was normally answerable to some higher authority—the overlord who had granted or confirmed the city's charter of rights and privileges. Only a handful of cities were truly autonomous city-states. Almost every city owed allegiance and taxes to its overlord—typically an emperor, king, or prince, but sometimes a bishop or even a collective entity like the council of a larger city. Relations with the overlord were rarely stable. During the Middle Ages urban leaders had struggled to expand their own powers and to limit the role of the ruler's officials in administering the city's affairs. But as the feudal states of the Middle Ages gave way to the absolutist states of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, sovereigns steadily reasserted their authority over cities and their officials intruded ever more deeply into the day-by-day details of urban administration.

Every city had an administrative structure of municipal officials appointed by the council. At the pinnacle were the city's legal advisors. Then came the clerks and scribes who codified the council's decisions and an array of market inspectors, constables, beadles, and watchmen who regulated economic activities and maintained order. Some administrative functions were carried out by the citizens themselves, often on a part-time basis in their capacity as neighborhood or parish officeholders. Citizens everywhere were expected to participate in defending their city from intruders or invaders. In some cities, the structures for maintaining civic self-defense evolved into highly organized militia companies, whose members gathered regularly for purposes of drill or conviviality.

For many town dwellers, the institutions that had the most significant impact on their everyday lives were the guilds. The medieval origins of these organizations are somewhat obscure, though they seem to have filled a combination of economic and devotional functions. By the early modern era, guilds had assumed a clear form in almost every part of Europe. The guild was typically an association of all the adult male householders engaged in a particular craft or branch of trade. These masters ran their own home-based shops, often supervising the labor of a few journeymen and apprentices. Though economically independent, each master was bound by his own guild's collective decisions about the way in which shops should be run, goods produced and new members trained. Each guild, in turn, was answerable to the city council, which confirmed the craft's by-laws and issued decrees about prices, wages, and the quality of goods.

Other institutions of urban life reflected the city's connections to broader systems of authority. In many cities one might find representatives of the overlord, though the number of such officials and the degree to which they were involved in urban administration differed substantially from one country to another or indeed from one town to the next. In France, for example, a handful of major towns had royal courts of justice known as *parlements*, which often intervened directly in running the affairs of the cities in which they were located. In other French cities the council might have to share its authority with a royal governor or *intendant*. Yet there were many cities, in France and elsewhere, where the overlord's involvement was far less heavy-handed. In a few cities, especially in Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy, the overlord's authority had become greatly attenuated or even—as in Geneva after the 1530s—disappeared altogether.

A universal presence in European cities was provided by the institutions of the Christian church. Every city in Europe had parish churches. In the late Middle Ages larger cities also had monasteries and convents, and any city that served as the seat of a bishop had an episcopal bureaucracy. Often the ecclesiastical institutions enjoyed administrative autonomy: their property and buildings within the city functioned as enclaves over which the city officials exercised little or no control. This changed radically in certain parts of Europe in the sixteenth century, for in those cities that underwent the Protestant Reformation monasteries and convents were dissolved and the parish clergy came under the direct authority of the secular officials. In Catholic countries and communities, however, the autonomous status of ecclesiastical institutions was largely preserved. Indeed, the intense spiritual revival of the Catholic Reformation led to the establishment of new religious orders and lay organizations, which were added to the institutional structure of Catholic cities.

In some cities, notably in Italy, Germany, and parts of eastern Europe, a parallel set of urban institutions emerged: the self-administrative structures of Jewish communities. Only in economic affairs were the Jews allowed to interact with the surrounding Christian community; in every other sphere of life, the Jewish community was expected to remain separate. If Jews were granted residential rights, they not only lived in their own neighborhoods and maintained their own religious, educational, and welfare institutions, but they also had their own council, their own officials, and their own mechanisms for resolving conflicts.

POLITICS

The mainspring of the urban political system was always the city council or, in some large cities like Venice or Strasbourg, the cluster of interconnected councils. In modern urban politics, a city council is typically a body in which representatives of different parties or viewpoints openly debate the issues that divide them and then arrive at decisions by majority vote. In early modern Europe, discussions and votes were held in secret. Occasionally there was some evidence of factional disputes among the council members; more often, however, the magistrates papered over their differences so as to appear to contemporaries as a unified body that embodied supreme authority within the community.

A significant element in the political system of any city was the process by which individual citizens became council members—a process whose importance was heightened by the fact that once they were chosen, the successful candidates often served for life. Every city prided itself on maintaining its own customs for the nomination or selection of council members. Some cities had rules or traditions according to which only the members of certain families were eligible for seats on the council. Sometimes guilds or neighborhoods had a constitutional right to council representation. Often, however, the only formal criterion for council membership was status as a citizen. In some cities the selection process involved vigorous public contests between hostile families or factions. More often choices were made behind closed doors in a carefully orchestrated process of consultation and

compromise. Yet despite these differences, the analysis of urban elites in early modern Europe has shown that in the end council members in almost every city were drawn from the ranks of the community's wealthiest families. In a deferential society, people expected to be ruled by their superiors.

Urban magistrates were proud of their rank. They wore robes of office to denote their authority and filled town halls and other public buildings with portraits of themselves to perpetuate their memory. Sometimes they voiced sweeping claims of complete authority over their communities. Yet in actual fact the magistrates were constrained in their powers, and they knew it.

In the first place, most city governments were subordinate to the authority of a king or some other overlord. If he was dissatisfied with a city's response to his demands for revenue or political cooperation, an angry sovereign might send troops or arrive in person to compel obedience or install more pliable magistrates. Ecclesiastical institutions or members of the regional nobility might also enjoy rights and privileges that restricted the magistrates' freedom of action. Though less likely than overlords to use military means to enforce their will, bishops or nobles might apply economic pressure or engage in litigation to achieve their aims. And no matter how proud the magistrates might be of their city's legal autonomy, they generally knew that it was wiser to respond to pressures of this sort than to resist.

Yet the most important forms of political pressure exerted on the magistrates often came not from outside the community but from within. Most city

councils had very limited means at their disposal to enforce their decisions. Typically the magistrates commanded only a small number of soldiers or constables. The maintenance of order depended largely on the cooperation of the inhabitants themselves—especially the citizens, who were often armed and always opinionated. For even when citizens were excluded from direct participation in decision making, they retained a strong sense of their identity as part of the political community and they rarely hesitated to give expression to their point of view.

Almost any aspect of urban life could become politicized, but certain issues were recurrent sources of contention. Economic issues were perpetually on the council agenda. The city council regulated every aspect of economic life and was often called upon to adjudicate between the competing claims of different economic actors: craft masters versus merchants, journeymen versus masters, artisans in one trade versus artisans in another, visiting traders versus local retailers, consumers versus producers. At certain times, however, religious issues became paramount. During the sixteenth century, for example, the Protestant groups that emerged in countless cities often pressured magistrates to accept or adopt the new religion. At such times the magistrates were often faced with agonizing choices, for they had to consider not only the religious passions of the city's own inhabitants but also the preferences of the city's overlord and of other powerful political and ecclesiastical stakeholders outside the community.

Often the citizens' dissatisfaction with the way in which the magistrates had dealt with economic, religious, or other issues led to deeper conflicts over the way the city was being governed. Suspecting the magistrates of mismanaging the city's finances or endangering the city's well-being, the citizens might insist that the council be made more accountable for its actions. They might even call for changes in the constitutional arrangements under which the council exercised its powers. In modern cities dissatisfaction with the current administration is often resolved by elections, which can put new people into office. This option hardly existed in a system under which council members would often remain in office until they died. But there were other means by which the citizens—and other inhabitants—could put pressure on the magistrates. These included petitions, litigation, agitation, or, in extreme cases, violence.

The one political right shared by all inhabitants of the community was the right to submit petitions to the council for the granting of some benefit or redress of some grievance. All petitions had to receive due consideration, but special attention had to be paid to those submitted by members of the citizenry. Women or servants or laborers whose petitions were rejected had no formal means by which to demand reconsideration. But male citizens did. Their experience as members of guilds, militias, parish councils, or other interest groups not only heightened their political awareness but also taught them the potential value of collective action. A faction of citizens might form a committee or deputation to pursue their objectives. If thwarted by the magistrates, such opposition groups might appeal to the city's ruler, who could respond by revoking the city's old charter and granting a new one that reduced the magistrates' authority. Alternatively, citizens who opposed the actions of the current magistrates might take their complaints to some court of law that claimed jurisdiction over the city's affairs. There were always lawyers willing to argue such cases and judges willing to hear them. The city's magistrates, of course, could also appeal to the ruler or to the courts. But in many cases it was wiser to make concessions to disaffected citizens rather than to run the risks that outside involvement might entail.

Sometimes there were public demonstrations or even outbreaks of violence. The most vigorous expressions of popular protest in cities often took the form of food riots. To insure that the community had an adequate supply of grain or bread was one of the most fundamental obligations of urban leaders, and their failure to do so could trigger violent outbreaks. Groups that normally remained politically passive— notably women—often played a leading role in such

episodes. Yet the actual frequency of such riots was small, precisely because magistrates knew how dangerous it was to let granaries become empty or to let bakers charge too much for bread.

But violence could also break out over constitutional issues. Occasionally when groups of disaffected citizens felt they had exhausted all other means of achieving their aims, they resorted to force. Council members might be overpowered, imprisoned, or forced into exile, and a new group of council members representing the opposition group would take power. This was high-risk behavior, for the ousted magistrates would try to convince the ruler or other powerful authorities that such insubordination had to be repressed by force. Yet such episodes recurred sporadically throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in cities all over Europe. Rare as they were, these events were widely publicized and long remembered.

A particularly dramatic rash of civic uprisings broke out in the second decade of the seventeenth century. In the German city of Frankfurt am Main, a citizens' uprising of 1612–1614 was directed simultaneously against the city's patrician magistrates and the local Jewish community. Not only the ruling magistrates but also the Jews were banished from the city until intervention by the Holy Roman Emperor brought about the restoration of the old regime, the return of the Jewish community, and the execution of the citizen leaders. In La Rochelle, on the west coast of France, an equally dramatic uprising in 1613–1614 led to the overthrow of the existing magistrates, many of whom were confined to dungeons for almost a year. The new government formed by the citizen rebels remained in power for more than a decade. Other urban uprisings, with various outcomes, occurred during the same decade in places like Utrecht in the Netherlands, Wetzlar and Worms in western Germany, Stralsund and Stettin on the Baltic, and elsewhere. In the 1680s a civic uprising in the German city of Cologne lasted for almost six years until the movement was finally suppressed and the ringleaders executed.

Food riots and other spontaneous surges of popular protest continued into the eighteenth century, as

did litigation against urban rulers. But sustained uprisings of citizens against their own magistrates did not. The growing power of centralized states had much to do with this. As standing armies grew and towns became the seats of permanent garrisons, it became steadily easier for magistrates to summon the help they needed in suppressing disorder. At the same time, and even more importantly, the administrative reach of the state increasingly penetrated into the city. The traditional distinction between city and state officials declined as members of the urban elite moved into positions of service to the state. The extent to which magistrates and citizens alike focused on the city as the primary source of their political identity steadily diminished.

Many cities grew larger during the eighteenth century, but this did not necessarily transform urban politics. As population growth overwhelmed existing resources, city governments in many regions grappled with growing problems of poverty and the provision of poor relief. But most urban regimes stuck to traditional assumptions and arrangements for dealing with such problems and continued trying to send poor people back to their (often rural) place of origin.

Until the end of the eighteenth century the outward forms of urban politics remained remarkably constant. Magistrates and citizens alike clung stubbornly to the traditional institutions of urban life and rituals of urban governance. And despite growing criticism from Enlightenment thinkers who regarded guilds as obstacles to economic growth, almost everywhere in Europe the guild system remained intact. Major changes in the institutional structure of urban life only came about with the onset of the French Revolution and the wars to which it gave rise. In 1797 Napoléon Bonaparte swept away what had once been the grandest and most self-confident urban regime in Europe: the doge, senate, and Great Council of Venice. His action prefigured the less dramatic but no less thorough changes that lay ahead for the institutional structure of countless other European cities in the early decades of the nineteenth century.

See also **Absolutism** (*in this volume*); **Moral Economy and Luddism**; **Urban Crowds** (*volume 3*); **Church and Society** (*Volume 5*); and other articles in this section.

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URBAN INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICS: THE MODERN PERIOD



Theresa M. McBride

The nineteenth century remade cities into new and strange places that challenged conventional political and social categories. Industrialization and intensified urbanization drastically renovated the physical layout of the preindustrial city. What had been the seat of administrative, commercial, and religious power in the traditional topography of royal palaces, town halls, and church spires increasingly gave way to the geography of manufacturing, commerce, and parliamentary politics. In Vienna, like many other older cities, the old city walls were torn down during the nineteenth century, when the enemy ceased to be a foreign invader—like the Turkish armies that had menaced the Habsburg imperial capital for centuries—and came to be an enemy within—the revolutionary people who were demanding constitutional protection and political rights. With a huge tract of open land made available by the demolition of the old defense works, the face of a new city was constructed on the the Ringstrasse, the ring road that replaced the line of the old fortifications. Across a small park, the parliament building (the Reichsrat, site of the legislative assembly) directly faces the Hofburg (residence of the emperor and center of the hereditary and authoritarian monarchy), symbolizing the autocratic emperor's resistance to liberal and nationalist demands for political reform. While the centuries-old Habsburg empire managed to survive until 1918, the traditional elites increased their political power at the regional and local level. Clustered along Vienna's Ringstrasse were the institutions so cherished by nineteenth-century liberals in their struggle against the autocratic empire: constitutional government, embodied in the Reichsrat; the power of the municipal government of Vienna, expressed in the medieval Gothic style of the Rathaus; education, intellectual life, and high culture, represented by the university and the Burgtheater.

The rebuilding of Vienna in the mid- to late nineteenth century parallels the transformation of countless European cities as a result of political events and of demographic and economic pressures. Vienna, Paris, Berlin, and London were all substantially rebuilt

in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and absorbed millions of new residents. Suburbs were added outside the old city walls; broad boulevards cut through the old city center; new administrative and cultural buildings were constructed. And as the topography of the city changed, so did its politics.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY URBAN POLITICS: IN THE HANDS OF THE ECONOMIC ELITES

The traditional politics of European cities was not democratic, but was based rather on the exercise of collective political power by the urban elites. The core of the elite continued into the modern period to be composed of merchants, those no longer active in business but living off their investments, and many professionals, especially lawyers. Urban political power remained firmly in the hands of this elite of upper-middle-class notables (called *notables* in France and *Honoratioren* in Germany) because of the property requirements for participating in local elections, the qualification of voters according to taxes paid, and the unpaid nature of local administrative positions such as those in city councils. The relative autonomy of urban governance, counterposed to the autocratic power of the monarchy, allowed for the evolution of a sense of citizenship and of a political identity that was focused on the city. When the French Revolution swept away the institutional structures of countless European cities after 1789, this tradition of urban governance helped to shape the development of liberal politics. By abolishing the remnants of feudalism throughout Europe, the French Revolution and Napoleonic Empire accomplished a revolution from above. To take one example, the promulgation of a Prussian constitution in 1808, after the Prussian defeat by the French, gave Prussian cities representative institutions and a degree of self-government. The result was a dramatic shift in the political climate in

these cities. The urban elites became active in demanding constitutional government, economic modernization, national unification, and new forms of citizenship.

City governments often played an active role in the struggle for liberal reforms in the nineteenth century. They did so in order to perpetuate their own power and to promote the economic interests of citizens, who still made up a small percentage of the adult male population even with the beginnings of liberal constitutionalism. Through such institutions as chambers of commerce, employers' associations, and parliamentary lobbies, as well as through social and familial relationships, the economic elites who dominated urban institutions successfully influenced state policy, particularly in areas that affected them. Local politics was the chosen arena of the urban elites because politics was more loosely organized and freer of the control of landed property owners, and because informal contacts and social relationships retained their importance. Their political constituency did not reach downward toward a popular base, but instead stretched outward through the network of family, social, and business relationships that tied together the urban elites. They often resisted democratization and preferred to perpetuate the political tutelage of the urban lower classes. In this way, the nineteenth-century elites survived the transition to parliamentary government and electoral politics remarkably un-

scathed until the early twentieth century, despite the expansion of formal citizenship over the course of the century.

Urbanization promoted a sense of urban identity and local patriotism. People were proud of their cities, and rivalries between cities were frequent. Local elites tried to endow their cities with institutions and services that would serve the inhabitants well, and they implemented improvements that would give their cities distinction. A city's reputation might well be associated with its cultural institutions, such as museums, which could be the linchpins in the reconstruction of the city center. The Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, the National Gallery in London, and the Alte Pinakothek in Munich, all built between 1800 and 1830, helped enhance the reputation of the cities in which they were constructed and drew tourists to the city as leisure travel increased. Although most were state museums, the attachment of the bourgeois elites to these cultural institutions could be very strong, because they represented a means to fulfill the elite's aspirations for cultural leadership and social legitimacy. Such institutions replaced early modern civic organizations like guilds, which had provided a public identity for earlier cities.

Poor relief was provided at the municipal level throughout most of the nineteenth century. With the rapid growth of cities and industrialization in the first half of the nineteenth century, demands on city agen-

cies increased along with the growing populations of indigents from among those arriving in search of work in urban industry. Most cities sought to cut costs, and they often tried to expel poor migrants. Even as national welfare legislation took shape in the later nineteenth century, city governments retained a substantial role in the provision of poor relief and health services, such as they were. The city's role was particularly important in countries like France that emphasized a decentralized approach to social welfare.

URBANIZATION AND THE EXPANSION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE

Urbanization could be experienced as a very rapid and disorienting process in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as modern cities swelled by population growth and migration. Intense urban growth had significant implications for urban politics. Class antagonisms were sharper in the nineteenth-century cities than in the countryside and there was a widespread belief that urban crime rates were higher. Middle-class observers (our only sources for this) considered the urban poor and working people "the dangerous classes." Incidents of civil strife were interpreted by the elites as symptoms of social breakdown; under new conditions, formerly innocuous popular festivities could seem threatening, when thousands of people crowded into the narrow streets of the city. Police forces were created or expanded across Europe to replace the traditional use of the state's army to keep order. Suppressing crime and urban disorder supplied the rationale for extending the power of municipal authorities. Crowd control and regulation of popular leisure became prime concerns, along with crime fighting. Some urban elites attempted to outlaw begging.

The demands on city governments extended well beyond the need to control crime and civil strife. Local postal services, fire protection, sewers, water, streets, schools, and the administration of poor relief were all areas in which nineteenth-century cities became increasingly involved, long before national governments saw fit to do so. Berlin's first postal service was set up in 1800 by the tradesmen's guilds; messengers walked through the streets announcing themselves with handbells to collect and deliver mail. Probably because of the mail service, houses in Berlin were numbered for the first time and street names were posted at street corners.

With urbanization came the formation of an identifiable metropolitan culture by the turn of the twentieth century. This urban identity was not as

strong in eastern and southern Europe where the links between the town and country remained strong because rural workers migrated seasonally to find work in industry, but maintained a political and social identity as rural people. The new urban culture did not obliterate other identities based on class, ethnicity, or gender, but it did define a common way in which city dwellers related to the city and shared patterns of leisure and consumption. A clear separation developed between urban and rural peoples. City people were considered to be typically "modern" and they viewed rural people as ignorant, narrow-minded, and suspicious. Perhaps no city underwent quite so dramatic a transformation as Berlin. What had been only a provincial capital for the Prussian kingdom reinvented itself as a major metropolis over the course of only a few decades. Between 1848 and 1905, the population of Berlin leaped from 400,000 to 2 million, developing huge suburbs around the city, which added another 1.5 million. Berlin outstripped its rivals to become, by 1920, the world's third-largest city. The dizzying pace of development in the span of a lifetime fixed the city's identity as quintessentially "modern," unfixed, and dynamic, and Berlin became synonymous with the avant-garde in the arts and with a glittering urban culture in the first quarter of the twentieth century.

Britain was the most rapidly industrializing area of Europe in the nineteenth century, and British cities faced the challenge of meeting new urban needs early on. Reform legislation in the 1830s opened cities to control by middle-class elements, and this furthered on expansion of urban government functions, including the police. The London sewer system, established in 1848, was generally regarded as the model of an integrated sewer system, and Glasgow became the first city to harness a natural resource in this way by bringing highland water to its citizens in 1859. But the supply of new services did not transform urban politics in the early Victorian years. Local government in both England and Scotland were characterized by administrative confusion: the number of parochial boards (dominated by local property owners) with responsibilities for sewerage, water supply, public works, transportation, schools, housing, and welfare multiplied, their overlapping jurisdictions creating a chaos of private interests and weak public authority. Order was imposed on this welter of conflicting responsibilities by the creation of popularly elected county councils around the turn of the twentieth century. The largest cities of England, Scotland, and Wales became largely self-administering, with wide powers over police and education. The industrial city of Glasgow earned a reputation for dynamic government

with effective action against urban overcrowding, slum clearance, and the early municipalization of water and gas supplies, but such municipal activism came late to London until the long overdue unification of municipal administration in the elected body of the London County Council in 1888.

By the end of the nineteenth century, frustrated by the poor quality of private services available or provoked by public health crises, such as periodic outbreaks of cholera (known to be spread by infected water supplies), urban administrations across Europe were pushed to expand their authority over previously unregulated spheres of urban life. Urban governments had to expand to meet the demands arising from their control over public utilities and the appropriation of public services for their citizens. Believing that municipalization of its water supply would provide higher quality and lower cost than the market, the French city of Lyon finally municipalized its water in 1900. Even though the city paid a yearly compensation to the private water company and increased the size of its workforce, it was turning a profit within two years. By 1904, nearly 2,000 English cities had municipalized their waterworks, 152 their gasworks, and 118 their tram systems. After an Italian law in 1903 that permitted municipalization of public services, most major cities in southern and central Italy started running their own trams and water and electricity boards. Local government expanded further into the lives of its citizens. Until World War I, municipal governments had a far greater impact on the daily lives of city dwellers than did the central government. Cities not only took over the provision of water and gas, but implemented universal schooling, police and fire protection, and welfare services, and built streets, sewers, and housing.

As the functions of municipal government expanded, control of city hall was jealously guarded by the urban elites. For the most part, increasing democratization as a result of the extension of the suffrage by the end of the nineteenth century and in the aftermath of World War I, mass politics, and ideological conflict emerged at the national level. Local politics could be a refuge in which the political ambitions of the urban elite still could be fulfilled. While there was some change of the social composition of French city councils, for example, with the increase in representatives from the middle and lower-middle classes, the urban elites continued to dominate city councils through the 1920s and 1930s. In spite of the reform in 1884, which mandated the free election of French mayors, the majority of city councils continued to be made up of professional men and important merchants. No industrial worker was elected mayor even

of an industrial city until the interwar period. Enormous political power was vested in the mayor, who exercised extensive authority as the registrar of births, marriages, and deaths; as judicial officer entitled to prosecute breaches of the law; and as president of the local council, as well as the agent of the state for implementing national laws. In this “regime of the elected mayor,” which extended into the 1950s in France, political parties of all persuasions, including reformist strains of socialism, focused on control of local government in their political tactics. In other countries, like Spain, where national politics were less democratic, local politics could be more dynamic. Thus antidynastic parties began to establish populist urban political machines that took over city governments and disrupted old patterns of patronage after the turn of the century. From the late nineteenth century onward, city governments in many industrial regions were increasingly captured by socialist or (after World War I) communist majorities. In Germany, no local city councils were dominated by the Social Democratic Party until 1918, when universal suffrage led to the sharing of power by liberals and socialists. The resultant control of urban administrations provided key power bases for the parties, even when they were excluded at the national level. Reformist city governments characteristically sought to expand urban social welfare and housing efforts to secure their political power.

THE DECLINE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S AUTHORITY AFTER WORLD WAR I

After World War I, the depression and political turmoil produced further changes in urban politics. In theory, fascism in Italy and in Germany espoused a strong, centralized state. This could mean the nationalization of public services and the usurpation of local authority. In Italy in the 1920s, the imposition of fascist governance introduced powerful, appointed local leaders to implement state policies in the regions. Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) dissolved local councils and dismissed elected mayors in 1926; regional authority was assumed by the prefect, who was often a member of the old ruling elite of property owners rather than of the middle classes. In effect, the fascist “reform” simply meant that the provincial nobility regained control of local government. In Germany in the early 1930s, Nazism took local government very seriously, building a political movement out of the economic distress of the middling and lower middle classes by promoting economic revival and vigorous

leadership. The Nazi electoral surge between 1930 and 1933 and the Nazi seizure of power were accomplished to a large extent at the local level. However, after 1933 the Nazification of local government brought cities under the direct control of the central authority: Hitler's second-in-command Josef Goebbels (1897–1945) was given the title of Gauleiter (district leader) for Berlin even before the Nazis came to power there. In both Italy and Germany, the fascist era resulted in generally greater centralization of public authority, even though fascists used local politics to come to power.

World War II accelerated the process by which the central government took on previous municipal functions. Under postwar governments, the central government played the major role in rebuilding after the destruction of the war, removing decrepit structures and constructing new housing, building new avenues and squares, installing the infrastructure to provide for public health and transportation, and many other amenities. Housing has remained perhaps the greatest challenge for governments in the twentieth century. In the postwar era, the provision of adequate housing was too great a burden for local governments and was increasingly taken on by national governments. In Britain, subsidized housing provided fully a third of all housing stock by 1939. In France few cities rushed in to provide public housing, in spite of the need, before the national government assumed responsibility for the construction of public housing. Migration and urbanization have been dramatic features of postwar life in capitalist Western Europe, and the older urban centers have been ringed by public housing or new working-class suburbs. Growth of the urban population generated even faster increases in the demand for housing and other services.

Where national governments were unresponsive to the needs, municipal governments had to assume responsibility. Reformist local governments emerged in France in the 1920s, especially in the urban "red belt" of working-class suburbs that ringed Paris and other cities in France, and in Germany in the Weimar period after 1918, when political power passed from the upper middle classes to the newly enfranchised citizenry at large. After World War II, reform became the agenda of both Christian Democrats and the Social Democratic Party in Germany, spurred by the process of de-Nazification and the need to construct safeguards against the weaknesses of the Weimar government. But political and administrative reform took second place to the extraordinary physical reconstruction of German cities after the destruction of the war.

In Italy, with its long history of city-states, political reform was more likely to be achieved on the

local level in the postwar era. For example, the central Italian city of Bologna became a showpiece of reformist local government in the 1950s and 1960s, earning a wide reputation for efficiency and honest administration. Building schools and housing, providing better street lighting, public transportation, and new sewers, the communist-dominated city council avoided budget deficits, in the same era when the Italian national government was monopolized by the Christian Democrats, who directed an increasingly corrupt system of political patronage. Thus, political reform and the objectives of the Italian left were realized on the local level while remaining blocked at the national level.

URBAN POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE POSTWAR ERA

The economic miracle experienced by Western Europe since 1950 revived the cities of London, Paris, and Vienna. These cities remained at the center of their country's national lives as the hubs of service and commercial economies and the centers of vast transportation networks. But at the same time, urban politics and urban governments were transformed by the expansion of suburbs, which changed the very nature of city life. The effects of suburbanization seem to defy attempts at a unified administrative structure for city governance. European cities experienced a widening gulf between an "inner" city and an "outer" one, as the challenge of controlling growth and providing basic services to the spreading "conurbations" have foundered on deep social, racial, and economic divisions.

Europe's major cities were marked by increasing social polarization and a tidal wave of political terrorism and civil unrest in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Migration into Europe from outside the prosperous capitalist western states revived the urban elites' fear of the "dangerous classes" who inhabit the working-class suburbs and inner-city neighborhoods. At the end of the twentieth century, the immigrant and working-class populations continue to live at the outskirts of the city, marginalized by de-industrialization, high unemployment, social and racial differences, and the high rents of the New Europe. These suburbs are seen as tinderboxes, ready to explode and ungovernable, as demoralized, unemployed youths loiter and form gangs. The marginalization of these urban populations jeopardizes political solutions to urban problems. The prosperity of postwar Europe has remade European cities, and the urban nature of life in the New Europe has lent a particular immediacy to the problems of urban society.

See also **The Liberal State; Fascism and Nazism** (*in this volume*); **Police** (*volume 3*); and other articles in this section.

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STREET LIFE AND CITY SPACE



W. Scott Haine

The topic of street life and city space is burgeoning at the forefront of social history. Its vast scope embraces the gestures and actions of people—vendors pitching their wares, patrons conversing in taverns or elegant cafés, children playing on back streets, dandies promenading on fashionable boulevards, beggars cowering from the gaze of affluent shoppers. Streets may be host to the explorations of tourists; the daily routines of people walking, driving, or taking mass transit; the carnivals that echo medieval sites of sociability and festivity. The study of city space has recently led historians to ask about the functions and meanings of buildings—from majestic cathedrals, imposing city halls, and banks, to factories, residences, hospitals, and asylums. Streets and other open spaces also reflect the history of transportation (from walking to the use of horses, carriages, subways, cars, and in-line skates) and communication (from the gossip of neighbors to television and other electronic media).

For most of history, streets and their places of commerce, their squares, and their parks have comprised a large part of any city, often one-third of a city's area. Why has it taken social historians so long to focus on these central urban spaces? The anthropologist Gloria Levitas offers one of the best explanations, quoting the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857): “We reserve till last research into subjects closest to our social selves.” Another probable cause is that face-to-face interaction on streets or in cafés and bars, once a given in all societies, has become rare, fascinating, and exotic in the contemporary developed world and endangered in developing countries. Telephones, cars, and televisions—and now various computer technologies—have rendered much face-to-face interaction optional rather than mandatory in daily life. Those coming of age after the year 2000 may not realize that streets are not simply traffic routes, that home and work are not always separated, and that the street can be a center of sociability as well as mobility.

Streets and the spaces intimately dependent on them, such as bars, taverns, and cafés, are in essence

the interstitial spaces of a city, at the intersections of public and private life, home and workplaces, and male and female spaces. Not only are such spaces at the center of the recurring patterns of daily life, they have also played a vital role in wars, rebellions, and revolutions. What would the Middle Ages have been without its street vendors, singers, and magicians? Carnivals and processions were central to Renaissance life. Much of the fighting of the French and Russian Revolutions occurred on the streets of Paris and Saint Petersburg, respectively. And how could the social and intellectual life of Paris, Vienna, or London have been as vibrant, from the seventeenth century onward, without cafés?

THE MULTIFUNCTIONAL MIEVEAL STREET

The origin and foundation of modern European street life and city space emerged during the Middle Ages. In general, medieval cities developed without the elaborate planning characteristic of urban growth during and after the Renaissance. Weak and undeveloped national and local governments did not have the power to design, decree, or enforce specific street layouts, much less to regulate the activities that went on within them. Instead, urban communities built their houses around the principal buildings of the powerful, the holy, and the wealthy: the castles of the warrior nobility, the monasteries and churches of the Catholic clergy, and the markets and fairs of the merchants and traders. Those who built medieval towns had in mind shelter, commercial activity, and military or religious protection rather than a rational street plan. Across Europe, the typical medieval house had a ground floor shop or workshop (production and retail usually shared the same space), with living quarters on the second floor. Houses lacked halls or corridors, so rooms simply opened one upon another, and windows tended to be small and primitive. The best facades, often with porticos and balconies, usually faced the

street, and the best and biggest rooms opened onto the public realm. As one scholar has noted, the medieval house “forced the members of an extroverted society into the street.” (Contemine, p. 443).

Apart from churches, however, few truly “public” buildings existed. During the medieval (A.D. 400–1500) and Renaissance (1300–1600) eras, tav-

erns and inns were virtually the only enclosed spaces where the public gathered. Untamed countryside reigned outside the city walls, and often inside as well, for wolves often ravaged cities during the winter. Parks were nonexistent; the only green or open spaces were small gardens or the cemeteries next to the churches.

Streets, an afterthought in medieval construction, became the center of urban expression in the medieval and Renaissance periods. Aside from a few main thoroughfares devoted to horse-and-cart traffic, most medieval streets were more like footpaths, residential and haphazard. With living and working quarters in the same building, people met on the street, and a dense fabric of sociability developed. Bakers, butchers, carpenters, apothecaries, and craftsmen often sold their products at their own doorsteps. In addition, the streets swarmed with a wide variety of vendors hawking products and services: old clothes, food and wine, haircuts and shaves, medical and dental services. Letter writers and knife grinders mingled with magicians, cardsharps, mimes, and minstrels.

Each crier tried to create a distinctive call. As a result, medieval streets reverberated with sounds and songs, and scholars down through the ages have found much musical, artistic, and theatrical merit in these street trades. Indeed, the mid-nineteenth-century French scholar Georges Kastner believed that the polyphonic quality of medieval music was inspired, in part, by these street vendors. Modern research has shown that traveling vendors played a vital role in linking long-distance trade networks and allowing the poor of the countryside or mountainous regions of Europe to make a living.

The romantic image of conviviality and song wafting through narrow medieval streets would be quickly dashed, however, if one looked downward. Cobblestones or bricks were reserved for main streets, and lesser routes were not only unpaved but lacked any efficient means of waste and water disposal. Medieval streets thus had a horrifically pungent smell in summer and became swamps or ice rinks (depending on latitude) in winter. At best, a gutter running down the middle of the street served as a sewage system, and in some cities pigs ran loose as all-purpose garbage eaters.

City space in medieval cities showed little of the segregation by class that became prevalent later. In Italian cities, such as Florence, powerful families often staked out a section of the city and would be surrounded by their own retainers and servants rather than by other wealthy families. Any segregation in these densely packed cities was based upon trade rather than economic status. Artisans, such as jewelers or carpenters, often organized into associations called guilds, which protected the skills and economic status of their members by fixing prices and standards of quality, and setting the terms of apprenticeship. During the medieval period, guildhalls became vital centers of economic and social life for these artisans, and some guilds remained influential into the nineteenth century.

Gender differentiation in the use of space was clearly defined. Paintings and illustrations reveal women at home; in a favored scene, a woman is portrayed at the window. Other female spaces included churches, markets, ovens, water wells, and flour mills, as well as courtyards and alleys around the home. When venturing out into the street, women often traveled in groups. Historians have found that during the course of the Renaissance, upper-class women lost much of the access to street life they had had during the Middle Ages. Women from the lower classes continued to be a vital part of the street trades and the markets throughout early modern and modern European history.

The distinction between public and private life was blurred in medieval cities, and interactions within the family blended into a broader sociability encompassing the neighborhood. Street and tavern life was subject to a detailed series of customs enforced by designated groups. Social drinking, for example, was often governed by rituals surrounding the passing of a common cup. Groups of young unmarried males in their late teens and early twenties known as youth abbeys often organized festivities and monitored morality in their neighborhoods. Especially strong during the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries, these associations of young men led the celebrations at the end of Lent, for example, and censured husbands who were too submissive to their wives or couples who could not produce children. In addition, guilds and groups of lay Catholics joined together in confraternities and also sponsored street processions and entertainments.

All told, medieval urban society, accustomed to vendors hawking their wares in markets and streets, did not make rigid distinctions between work and leisure, freedom and constraint, or individual and group. The notion of a lone, detached observer walking the streets, reflecting on the crowd and the urban spectacle (the French “flaneur”) was inconceivable in this age of customary, constraining, and obligatory sociability. Instead of the artistic individuality that would prevail in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the medieval world spawned a convivial communality, especially in the marketplace. Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975), one of the most penetrating and influential interpreters of the role of the marketplace and carnival in medieval and Renaissance life, discerned in the rough, foul, jocular, and boisterous language of the marketplace and carnival, as exemplified in François Rabelais’s (c. 1483–1553) *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, a language freed from social norms and hierarchies, a language that created a solidarity among the poor and commonplace people. Not merely verbal, this communication also included

the gestures, singing, and hawking of the marketplace. Indeed, this festive “grotesque body” eluded the spatial and moral constraints and decorum embodied in churches, palaces, courts of law, and the homes of the wealthy. Confirmation of Bakhtin’s thesis can be found in a description of London’s fish market as “the college of bad language.” (Schmiechen and Carls, p. 16). On the other hand, groups widely developed rituals and rules to govern various social occasions and interactions. Popular spontaneity thus had its limits.

The marketplace was not simply a place of ribald revelry, as Bakhtin has himself acknowledged. In the popular mind, market transactions were supposed to embody what E. P. Thompson called a “moral economy.” This concept, found across Europe, held that there was a “just price” for staples. When the price of bread soared, for example, whether from poor harvests, economic dislocation, or war, the populace suspected merchants of hoarding staples in order to make excessive profits. In such an instance, people would stage grain riots, seizing the stock of grain or bread and distributing it to the people at the “just price,” then giving the money to the merchants. Public authorities did not usually view such riots as a threat to public order, but rather as a safety valve or what might be called a primitive public opinion poll. The prevailing assumption was that after the poor had had a chance to act out their power—during a carnival, for instance—they would return to their lowly position.

RENAISSANCE URBAN TRANSFORMATION

As far back as the fourteenth century, more orderly sites for commercial transactions began to emerge. First commercial exchanges and then stock markets were a vast improvement over exchanges on streets, courtyards, porticos, churches, or taverns, permitting merchants, traders, wholesalers, and insurance brokers to conduct their transactions with greater efficiency. When the Amsterdam stock market was completed in 1631, it set the standard with its modern, freewheeling form of speculation and its spatial layout, in which each banker, broker, or trader had a numbered spot. Moreover, only those deemed to have sufficient capital were permitted into this temple of enterprise and speculation.

The latter part of the Renaissance was more important for ideas, ideologies, and innovations concerning street life and city space than for a radical change in the texture of urban life itself. The consolidation of monarchical and papal bureaucratic gov-

ernments (new monarchies), the increasing wealth of the urban merchant and commercial elite, and a rising cult of antiquity combined to produce ambitious plans to redesign cities along Renaissance notions of perspective. Straight and broad streets, on either a grid or a radiating axial, provided dramatic vistas for monumental buildings and easy access for troops and military supplies to the more elaborate fortifications needed to resist increasing cannon power. These broad streets also allowed for easier surveillance and repression of urban disorder.

The most dramatic example of Renaissance urban transformation occurred in Rome under the popes. Following the sack of Rome (1527) and the rise of the Protestant Reformation, the papacy was determined to recreate Rome, building a more secure and imposing capital of Catholicism. The project culminated in the papacy of Sixtus V, who ruled from 1585 to 1590, and employed such Renaissance artists as Michaelangelo (1475–1564) and Bernini (1598–1680). A new network of streets connected the Holy City’s myriad monuments, from Roman ruins to Saint Peter’s Basilica. A series of fountains and obelisks also brought coherence and unity to the urban plan. Along the new streets, typical of Rome and other Renaissance cities, construction conformed to the street pattern rather than dominating it. In Florence, which pioneered these new trends in urban planning during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, merchants and bankers built sumptuous townhouses along the broad new avenues. These neighborhoods were among the first in which segregation by income and status became the norm.

Although this wealthy urban elite also built social welfare institutions such as hospitals and founding homes, the growing wealth of cities was most prominently expressed in the construction of purpose-built sites for leisure activities. As had happened in the case of markets and exchanges, more of the activities that had once occurred on the street now found their own individual spaces. After 1650 theaters, tennis courts, opera houses, cockpits, bullrings, racecourse tracks, and an assortment of pleasure gardens arose across the European urban landscape. Although these places of amusement and recreation were primarily intended for the upper classes, they were frequented by a wide spectrum of urban society. Class distinctions were nonetheless maintained: in theaters, for example, the upper and middle classes sat in side loges, apart from the lower classes who were relegated to the pit in front of the stage. These centers of diversion initiated the process by which communities tied to specific neighborhoods and streets became more fully integrated into the larger urban environment.

CONTROL AND DECLINE OF STREETLIFE IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the historian Philippe Ariès has argued, produced a wide variety of social institutions based upon friendship and affinity: clubs, intellectual and scientific societies, reading rooms, academies, bookstores, art galleries, and freemasonry. Ariès also noted a proliferation of taverns and the arrival of coffee and chocolate houses, thanks to coffee from the Middle East starting about 1650 and the new chocolate beverages from the Americas. (Ariès, 1989, pp. 2–17). Italy stood in the forefront of the new street patterns, and England was home to many of the associations based on friendship and affinity. The fifteenth-century Court of Bone Compagnie was one of the first clubs, and Masonic lodges emerged a few centuries later. The emergence of these sites of sociability reflected the gradual decline of street life, owing in part to the increased ability of national and local governments to regulate street life and in part to the creation of structures (as noted above) that absorbed some of the street's functions. A small but telling indicator of the decline of the intimate and sometimes promiscuous medieval community is the declining use of communal cups during these decades and the smaller number of youth abbeys willing to counter governmental regulation and repression.

Although streets remained remarkably “cluttered” by modern standards, important changes resulted from the growing power of monarchical and urban governments. For one thing, streets became increasingly and truly “public,” that is, unencumbered and open to any pedestrian or vehicle. The French town of Limbus, for example, banned chicken pens and the parking of hay carts in the street, while within the premises of numerous other cities and towns, pigs were forbidden to run free. Civic authorities prohibited the dumping of garbage in the street. By the end of the eighteenth century, Paris and other cities had begun to place numbers on buildings, the better to identify and to regulate them. Police forces became more organized and elaborate. In an attempt to impose order on streets and other urban spaces, Louis XIV (1638–1715) created the position of Lieutenant General of Police in Paris in 1667 and established a network of asylums for the insane, the poor, and the idle. As policing of the street increased, public life began retreating into shops, taverns, and parks. For instance, capital-poor Amsterdam traders transacted their business in cafés near the stock exchange, such as the Café Rochellois, the Café Anglais, and the Café de Leyde. In London, the famous Lloyds of Lon-

don insurance firm first conducted its business in a coffeehouse.

Growing segregation by neighborhoods led to increasingly differentiated street life. The upper classes, in their luxurious townhouses on broad avenues, used the street to display their elaborate sartorial fashions and their carriages and fine horses. Esplanades were developed on both sides of city walls, which had their original military importance, and became fashionable places for upper-class promenades and also, unfortunately, for depredations by the city's youth. The lower classes, out of necessity rather than pleasure, continued to use city streets as they had in the Middle Ages—as extensions of their cramped living quarters and as work and leisure spaces. The middle class, on the contrary, retreated increasingly into their homes. Bourgeois children were not allowed to play on the street, young women were severely restricted to the home, and even the males felt out of place among both aristocratic display and what they perceived to be lower-class depravity. In England, where middle-class domesticity was most fully developed, Georgian terrace houses were built with the servants' quarters and kitchen on the street side and the bedrooms and living areas in the interior. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, English Protestant Evangelicals—among them William Wilberforce (1759–1833), Hannah Moore, and Sarah Stickney Ellis—were advocating a rustic domesticity in newly emerging English suburbs outside of London. In these verdant enclaves, virtuous middle-class families could avoid the immorality and drunkenness of the city streets.

THE RISE OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE

The growing reach of central governments and the decreasing pull of local communities led to the emergence of modern politics in urban space. The expanding literate stratum of urban society, which included the middle classes as well as the nobility, became concerned with governmental actions and demanded that their own views be considered in what is today called public policy. Private individuals gathered in the coffeehouses that were spreading across Europe along with the popularity of this beverage introduced from the Middle East. They discussed public matters, with reason rather than status as the main criterion for the validity of their arguments. The emergence of newspapers in England, Holland, France, and Italy in the later seventeenth century added another morning ritual to these spaces. Still too expensive for most of the literate population, newspapers relied on cafés for subscriptions and circulation among their clientele.

London and Paris developed two of the most important café societies of this era. During the early 1700s, such writers as Joseph Addison (1672–1719), Sir Richard Steele (1672–1729), Henry Carey (1687–1743), Eustace Budgell (1686–1737) met at a coffeehouse in Russell Street known as “Button’s,” were Addison and Steele published their influential newspapers, the *Tatler* and the *Spectator*. Later in the century, the Paris café La Procope in particular was frequented by the central figures of the French Enlightenment: George-Louis Buffon (1707–1788), Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (1717–1783), Paul-Henri-Dietrich d’Holbach (1723–1789), Denis Diderot (1713–1784), Nicolas-Joseph-Laurent Gilbert (1751–1780), Henri-Louis Lekain (1729–1778), Jean-François Marmontel (1723–1799), Alexis Piron (1689–1773), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), and Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet [1694–1778]).

In one of the most influential studies fusing social and intellectual history, Jürgen Habermas has termed such spaces and intellectual critical conversations the “public sphere.” Habermas believes that the rationality and equality in evidence in coffeehouses also surfaced in clubs, debating societies, and other academic and scientific associations that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Montesquieu (1689–1755) captured well the ambiance of these cafés in his *Persian Letters* (1721): “It is a merit of the coffeehouse that you can sit there the whole day and half of the night amongst people of all classes. The coffeehouse is the only place where conversation may be made to come true, where extravagant plans, utopian dreams and political plots are hatched without anyone even leaving their seat.” In one of his most memorable images, the nineteenth-century French historian Jules Michelet (1798–1874) imagined café philosophers peering into their coffee cups and seeing the approaching 1789 French Revolution.

POLITICS AND URBAN SPACE FROM THE FRENCH REVOLUTION THROUGH THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

At the end of the eighteenth century, political upheaval in France and the industrial revolution in England inaugurated a century of contestation, dislocation, and transformation in street life and city space. The storming of the Bastille fortress in eastern Paris in July 1789 and other riots across France redefined the market riot and politics in public spaces. No longer could collective popular demonstrations be dismissed as periodic expressions of frustration and excitement bound to dissipate. Now they had the po-

tential to overthrow monarchies and replace them with republics. This new concept of popular street mobilization became enshrined in the French word “journée,” literally “day” but also carrying a new revolutionary connotation. The specter of revolution in the streets has haunted Europe ever since.

The French Revolution created new urban spaces and rituals. A series of monuments, holidays—centering on 14 July, the day that the Bastille fell—and parades celebrated and made concrete the new French nation, founded, according to its ideology, upon the will of the people. This “national liturgy” was adopted by the other nations of Europe during the nineteenth century. National holidays became important modern festival days, celebrated with speeches, fireworks, dancing, eating, and drinking.

Two new institutions, at the nexus between taste and leisure, also emerged during the French Revolution: the museum and the modern restaurant. After the fall of the French monarchy in 1792, the revolutionaries turned the former royal palace of the Louvre, in the center of Paris, into the first modern museum. As for restaurants, chefs who had recently catered to royalty and aristocracy now found work in their own commercial establishments, satisfying the appetites of the Paris middle classes. Soon restaurant critics such as Anthelme Brillat-Savarin (1755–1826) emerged to evaluate the new culinary marketplace.

An innovative type of drinking and eating establishment also emerged for the Parisian lower classes. The working class café, introduced newspaper reading, working-class organization, and political agitation into public drinking establishments and other sites of traditional boisterous and bacchic plebeian sociability, fusing the old tradition of popular revolt, dating back to the grain riots of the Middle Ages, with the radical politics (and newspaper reading) of the Enlightenment and the Revolution. Often these places hosted meetings of labor militants, striking workers, and political radicals. In the nineteenth century, formalized labor unions, socialist and labor political parties, and workers’ clubs continued to meet in the café, which had become a veritable working-class institution. In 1890 Karl Kautsky (1854–1938), leader of the German Social Democratic Party and disciple of Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), well summed up its role as “the proletariat’s only bulwark of political freedom” under the politically repressive conditions of that era, concluding that “the tavern is the only place in which the lower classes can meet unmolested and discuss their common affairs. Without the tavern, not only would there be no social life for the German proletariat, but also no political life.” This type of working-class drinking establishment spread to England and

later to Germany and Russia. In contrast, the labor movement in the Scandinavian north relied more on the temperance movement than on café sociability for its growth and consolidation.

Industrialization intensified the links between politics and urban space. English cities grew at an unprecedented rate between 1780 and 1850, and by 1851 England was the first nation in the world to have a majority of its population living in cities. French, German, Italian, and Russian cities echoed this growth and soon contained an explosive mixture of disoriented rural laborers, overworked and underpaid in workshops and factories, living in squalid slums and subject to periodic economic crises.

Marx and Engels believed that these new industrial cities were producing a new revolutionary class, the proletariat, that might overthrow the capitalist class. In his study of Manchester and other English industrial areas, Engels noted that the class conflict hidden behind factory walls appeared in all its raw, unvarnished intensity on the city streets in the form of poverty, begging, and theft. The street was also the site of organized working-class demonstrations and protests. For this reason workers and their allies fought throughout the nineteenth century to maintain access to the street, often in the face of police and military repression. Though they had cafés and meeting halls, the workers realized that in terms of space they were still at a disadvantage, vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie. The following editorial from a radical Parisian paper, *L'organisation du travail*, during the 1848 Revolution is eloquent on this point: "The street is the first, the most sacred of all the clubs. What do you want, *Messieurs les bourgeois*? The people do not have access to your gilded, ornate salons."

The street during the nineteenth century was the crossroads of hope and despair for the working class. While the French Revolution of 1789 created the modern political demonstration (*journée*), the subsequent Revolutions of 1830, 1848, and 1871 (the Paris Commune) brought street barricades. After an initial entrance into history during the Fronde rebellion (1648), barricades returned to Parisian streets in 1827 and their use spread to the rest of Europe during the continent-wide 1848 revolution. The space inside the barricade embodied the communal society so many of the revolutionaries wished to create, and often cafés became the headquarters of these incipient revolutionary republics. Although barricades reappeared after World War I and again at the end of World War II, Engels was largely correct when he wrote in the late 1880s that widened streets and improvements in military firepower had rendered barricades obsolete for revolutionaries.

NINETEENTH CENTURY URBAN RENOVATION: ORGANIZING AND DISCIPLINING THE STREETS

Bourgeois response to the threat of revolution and disorder was threefold. One strategy envisaged the physical improvement of the street to make it a safer, cleaner, and more efficient space. Another strategy concentrated on creating new disciplinary and welfare institutions that would moralize deviants or remove them from the street. A third strategy involved a revived emphasis on urban renewal (inspired by the Renaissance example of Rome) or suburbanization (following the example of the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century middle-class Protestant evangelicals in England).

After 1800 the introduction of the sidewalk—virtually unknown before then—addressed the need to alleviate the increasingly crowded and chaotic streets of rapidly growing cities. The sidewalk (with a convex road for cart, carriage, and other horse traffic) provided gutters, underground drains, sewers, and water and gas mains for sanitation. Lighting, bathroom facilities, kiosks, benches, and newspaper stands reflected an extraordinary rationalization of street functions. (Bedarida and Sutcliff, 1980, p. 386). Street renovation also helped London, Paris, and other cities cope with an unprecedented rise in traffic, seen even before the arrival of the automobile. While the population of inner-city Paris grew by 25 percent between 1850 and 1870, its traffic leaped as much as 400 percent (Berman, 1988, p. 158). After 1850, further improvement was made by paving the street with natural asphalt, a better surface than the earlier British macadam. These new methods were an essential part of the urban renovations that transformed many, especially continental, cities.

The two most dramatic examples of nineteenth-century urban renovation were Paris and Vienna. The transformation of the French capital under the Second Empire of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte (Napoléon III [1808–1873]) and his Prefect of Paris, Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann (1809–1891), resulted in an updating of the Renaissance principles of urban beautification. Broad, straight boulevards appeared, along with uniform facades and the latest innovations in sewers, water supply, and lighting. In addition, department stores, terrace cafés, sumptuous music halls, and an ornate opera house made Paris the showpiece of nineteenth-century European cities and insured that its international fairs, especially those of 1889 and 1900, were the most spectacular of the world expositions. A similar transformation occurred in Vienna when, after 1850, the old fortifications were demol-

ished and a new circular boulevard, the Ringstrasse, surrounded the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with a range of public buildings, stately residences, and impressive recreation sites. The broad boulevards also provided ample room for armies to repress demonstrations and destroy barricades.

On these new domesticated and shimmering boulevards, the bourgeoisie felt at home. Especially in Paris and Vienna but also in London, the middle class no longer disdained display on public thoroughfares. The protected semipublic arcades, passages, and galleries of Paris and London, popular during the first half of the century, fell into disfavor with the advent of the bright new boulevards (Bedarida and Sutcliff, 1980, p. 386). Those known as ramblers or idlers in London became known in Paris as flaneurs or boulevardiers. These detached observers of the street scene might be wealthy and discriminating bourgeois or journalists, writers, and painters. The French writers Victor Hugo (1802–1885), Charles-Pierre Baudelaire (1821–1867), and Émile Zola (1840–1902) all used “flaneur” to encapsulate the strange mixture of rootlessness, disorientation, exhilaration, and freedom that seemed to be part of the fabric of the “modern” city. Walter Benjamin’s (1892–1940) insightful reflections on commodification, alienation, and identity formation under modern capitalism were inspired by the writings of these authors. He dubbed the Paris of that era as “capital of the century.”

Anthony Vidler and Thomas Markus (inspired by Michel Foucault [1926–1984]) designated the nineteenth century as essentially the age of confinement and discipline. Hospitals, prisons, schools, reformatories, asylums, dispensaries, orphanages, and workhouses emerged by the hundreds across Europe. “Crippleages” incarcerated disabled people—those who, in past centuries, had lived and begged on the street but who were now judged to be impediments to efficient movement or flow.

Marketplaces and their raucous ambiance remained a vital part of urban life through the early nineteenth century in most European countries. Then growing concerns about public morality, sanitation, and street congestion surfaces, particularly in England. Markets were moved off the streets and into specially built facilities that often resembled churches or Greco-Roman temples, an architecture the Victorians believed would ennoble the act of buying and selling. As in exchanges and stock markets, each vendor had his own booth, stall, or shop. Rationalized commerce led to fixed pricing, which diminished the tradition of bargaining at the market. The “grand age” of these market halls lasted from 1830 to 1890.

The nineteenth century also accentuated the trend of spatial segregation by class. England’s system of class separation was the most overt: not only did the bourgeoisie now live in exclusive suburbs, but they also frequented cafés, now transformed into exclusive

gentlemen's clubs, admitting members only. The continental bourgeoisie, for the most part, stayed in the city, in the newly renovated districts. Instead of turning their cafés into English-style clubs, the bourgeoisie of Vienna and Paris relied on the high cost and fashionable ambiance of their establishments to keep out the proletariat. They also chose western sections of their cities for these establishments, where prevailing easterly winds blew any bad odors toward proletarian areas.

WORKING-CLASS URBAN CULTURE IN THE LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

More than ever before, working-class districts were pushed to the periphery of cities. On working-class streets, vendors remained central suppliers of commodities, and most shops catered to a population that could seldom buy more than what they needed for each day. Street life still centered on sociability rather than self-display or spatial mobility.

During the second half of the nineteenth century and first quarter of the twentieth, a distinctive working-class subculture evolved. Although still possessing minimal purchasing power compared to their social and economic superiors, workers nevertheless developed a unique pattern of social life. For instance, they were increasingly able to own several sets of clothes, including the famous "Sunday best." After work, they often changed into clothes that diminished the sartorial distance between the classes. Hats, however, continued to signal class difference: the bourgeois wore the formal top hat while the proletariat stayed with the cap. The laboring population also adopted the bourgeois ritual of promenading, usually not on the fashionable central boulevards and parks but rather on the outer boulevards and fortifications of their own parts of town. With the advent of cheap train trips to the seaside or riverside, workers began to develop their own limited notion of the "weekend."

The central institutions of proletarian culture, however, were the café, the dance hall, and the music hall, often combined in one shop. To the chagrin of labor leaders, these institutions remained much more popular than labor halls, workingmen's clubs, or universities. The number of cafés in France and pubs in England provides an indication of the popularity of these establishments. In France the number of cafés jumped from some 365,000 in 1870 to 482,000 in 1913 and to 507,000 in 1938. In England and Wales, the number of pubs and alehouses stood at around 40,000 in 1800 and more than doubled by the 1860s

through the 1880s (105,552 in 1860 and in 1880, now including beer houses, 106,751).

TWENTIETH CENTURY URBAN SPACE: THE DECLINE OF STREET LIFE

After the turn of the twentieth century, new technologies and new urban and architectural theories led to radical changes in the urban fabric. London had developed its underground subway system by the 1870s, and mass-transit systems in most other major cities became fully operational after 1900. These forms of rapid transit began to break up the solidarity of working-class neighborhoods. This process of social fragmentation would proceed much more quickly after it finally became feasible for the working classes to own automobiles in the 1960s, some forty years after the middle classes had become car owners. The most important impact of mechanized mass and individual transportation was the definitive separation of work from home; with cars, even the lower classes could now contemplate living outside the city. (This trend, towards a separation of work and home life, incidentally, began to reverse with the rise of Internet communication.) The English reformer Sir Ebenezer Howard (1850–1928) was an early and influential proponent of the proletarian urban exodus. His vision of "garden cities" purported to moralize the workers through a return to the country, taking much the same course Protestant Evangelicals had advocated for the middle classes a century earlier. Variants of Howard's ideas helped shape suburbanization throughout Europe, especially after World War I.

Although influential, Howard's pastoral vision paled in comparison to a set of radical new theories developed by a generation of architects and urban planners who came of age after 1900. This cohort included the Swiss-born and French-based Charles Édouard Jeanneret (1887–1965), who became famous under the adopted name of Le Corbusier; the Bauhaus school in Germany, including Ludwig Miès van der Rohe (1886–1969) and Walter Gropius (1883–1969); the Italian Antonio Sant'Elia (1888–1916); and the Spaniard Arturo Soria y Mata. These visionaries were inspired by leftist ideologies, such as anarchism, socialism, and communism, and their projects were often imbued with utopian zeal. Although each proponent developed nuanced and complex theories of space, their basic goals were similar: to overcome crowding, congestion, dirt, disease, and lack of ventilation and sunlight, all factors they saw as typical of the nineteenth century. They urged the building of new towns, cities, or districts with broad highways to

accommodate the automobile and high-rise housing, thus supplying sufficient space, sunlight, and hygiene for the masses. “Form must follow function,” they declared, and denounced architectural ornamentation and embellishment as decadent and bourgeois. This purely functional approach included separating home from work space and creating separate but integrated sites for shopping and leisure.

Traditional street life was doomed to disappear in the face of these heady futuristic visions. According to Le Corbusier, the street was “no more than a trench, a deep cleft, a narrow passage.” Few of these architects received commissions to build or redesign cities during the 1920s or 1930s, although they propagated their theories through various organizations and in manifestos and books. Le Corbusier was especially active as an organizer. In 1930 he promulgated the Athens Charter and formed the International Association of Modern Architects (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne, CIAM). Neither the Russian Revolution (1917) nor the rise of European fascism, first in Italy then in Germany, produced any distinct practical or theoretical breaks in street life or city space. The radical right in Europe adapted to their own purposes such left-wing tactics as street demonstrations and café organizing. Revolutionary workers in Russia created a new type of workers’ organization, the soviet, or council, to take over and run the factories. Under the Popular Front government in France during the interwar era, radical social movements achieved a unique development in the use of public space. After the left-wing electoral victory in the spring of 1936, French workers, rather than taking to the streets as they had done traditionally, commandeered and occupied factories and forced employers to grant unprecedented concessions.

The unparalleled destruction of the European urban fabric during World War II provided a golden opportunity for the architectural and urbanist visionaries to implement what became known as the modernist or international style of architecture. Old city centers were rebuilt and “new towns” emerged on the periphery. The spare and functional style of modern architecture ensured a clear visual and social distinction between buildings devoted to home and those designed for work. Zoning ordinances consecrated this rigid distinction in law. Increasingly streets were given over exclusively to cars. As a result, the old-fashioned working-class neighborhood disintegrated or was bulldozed into oblivion. Face-to-face interaction on streets or in cafés, once a given of city life, became ever rarer. This decline in sociability was exacerbated by the arrival of television in the 1950s and 1960s.

New suburban developments or satellite cities tended to be built without any commercial establishments or, indeed, any type of shop within walking distance. English Mark I and Mark II new towns did not even include such intermediate spaces between public and private space as porches or porticos. High-rise apartment complexes were especially stark in their juxtaposition between home space and the newly emerging distant shopping center. Many workers, clerks, supervisors, and managers adapted and enjoyed this novel lifestyle oriented around work, the commute, and the now-affordable panoply of new consumer durable goods (refrigerators, washing machines, stereos). Even in areas where traditional street and café life remained an option, neighborhood sociability became much less dense due to the faster pace and greater variety of options brought about by affluence.

THE REVALORIZATION OF THE STREET IN THE LATER TWENTIETH CENTURY

A profound alienation came to plague a significant number of the inhabitants of these new towns, and by the end of the 1950s some urbanists and architects called for a renewed orientation toward street life, neighborhood values, and sociability. The researchers Michael Young and Peter Willmott in England and Henri Coing in France, finding that even gossip networks could not develop in high-rises, documented an increase in alienation and a decline in mental health. During the 1950s two other researchers, Allison Smithson (1928–) and Peter Smithson (1923–), argued that the more traditional street life of inner-city London’s East End exhibited a liveliness and effervescence that could be an antidote to the excesses of technological changes. These observations were confirmed subsequently by a number of American scholars, such as Jane Jacobs and Herbert Gans (1927–). Inspired by these sociological findings, a new generation of architects and planners, some from Le Corbusier’s CIAM, started an architectural and urban movement concerned with reviving the social functions of streets and cafés. In 1962 the Danish architect Jan Gehl promoted the prohibition of cars on Copenhagen’s Stroget, thus initiating an international movement to create pedestrian walkways in downtown areas.

The revalorization of the street also found advocates among social movements that emerged in Europe, as well as in the United States, during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The most utopian postwar vision of the streets found expression during the events of May 1968. Paralyzing France for several

weeks, students and workers in this revolt proclaimed that retaking the street for life and freedom could transform society. Of the thousands of slogans and graffiti this popular explosion produced, one of the most famous was “Under the street, the rage.” A new wave of feminism also developed during this time, declaring that women could not be fully liberated unless they had as much right as men did to explore the street. During the last decades of the twentieth century, such English feminists as Elizabeth Wilson and Doreen Massey even explored the possibilities of a woman as flaneur (that is, as a flaneuse?) in the contemporary city.

After 1970 the movement to restore a social dimension to street and urban life became incorporated into the plans of many developments. For instance, English Mark III towns incorporated city centers, and Cergy-Pontoise, a satellite town in the region of Paris, created intermediate zones for sociability between the residences and the freeway. In 1985 the socialist Mitterrand government in France initiated a cultural and architectural program for suburban enrichment (“Suburbs ’89–Banlieues ’89”) aimed at constructing cafés, libraries, and other public amenities for housing (often high-rise apartments) built after 1945. Gehl’s concept of pedestrian malls also became popular across Europe. For example, the southern French city of Toulouse renovated old marketplaces, as London did with Covent Garden. In general, street life revived more successfully than café life. The number of cafés in France and England, respectively seventy-five thousand and fifty-five thousand at the turn of the twenty-first century, continued to decline. Currently, the largest number of drinking establishments in Europe is found in Spain, where urban renovation never reached the level achieved in the rest of western Europe.

By the 1990s a new generation of critics had begun to argue that the attempt to rebuild urban communities was often elitist and artificial. Most of the renovation had led to gentrification that benefited the tourist and upper classes more than the working class. In addition to being drained of all historic association with the popular culture once at the heart of street and café life, many of these new city centers had become subject to a new technological form of surveillance. Great Britain led the way in the installation of closed-circuit television cameras. Indeed, Great Britain had more public closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems than any other advanced capitalist nation: by August 1996 all major British cities except Leeds had them. Such systems can pose severe threats to civil liberties and to the simple enjoyment of urban space. On the other hand, television surveillance does respond to the perception of many government, busi-

ness, and public establishments that urban spaces, especially streets and malls, are no longer safe. Nan Ellin, in his *Postmodern Urbanism*, summarized this approach as “form follows fear.” How to balance recreation of urban community and the latest techniques of surveillance is one of the dilemmas facing the twenty-first century.

CONCLUSION

This summary of the social history of street life and city space challenges any simple notion of “progress” in social and cultural history. On the one hand, innovations that removed sewage, dirt, and dust from the streets and sidewalks that separated pedestrians and terrace café and restaurant customers from carriage and then car traffic on the street were significant improvements in terms of sanitation, safety, and sociability. On the other hand, especially since World War II, changes that have turned streets over to cars and to an unprecedented degree separated the spaces of work, family, and leisure, have spawned as much alienation as efficiency. The result has been, since the

1980s, an attempt to restore multifunctionality, the hallmark of city life in the medieval and Renaissance eras. An opening and welcoming urban environment will be crucial during the twenty-first century, as European cities will undoubtedly accept millions of new immigrants—now, however, not from the hinterlands of their own nations but from the rest of the world. It is on the streets and in the public places that the process of cultural assimilation, expression, and creation will continue.

The popular French singer Edith Piaf (1915–1963) captured the vitality of the street when, in a reflective moment, she told a friend:

Life is not given to you as a gift when you come from the street. You learn to live at the maximum at each instant as it passes, before it bids you bye-bye! You also learn how to cry and to laugh and to play. This is a rough but good school, a thousand times more worthwhile than the schools of the rich. You learn to give to the people what they want without too much fuss.

See also Civil Society (in this volume); Social Class; The Middle Classes; Working Classes; Moral Economy and Luddism; Urban Crowds (volume 3); Festivals; Holidays and Public Rituals (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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SUBURBS AND NEW TOWNS



Alexander Cowan

SUBURBS, NEW TOWNS, AND URBAN CORES: SHIFTING BOUNDARIES AND CHANGING MEANINGS

No single definition of the suburb fits all circumstances. Suburbs have existed for as long as humans have lived in urban centers, but their sizes, forms, and demographic and social importance changed almost out of recognition between the sixteenth century and the twenty-first century, outstripping the changes to the urban core around which they are located. Traditionally the medieval suburb was an area of housing beyond the physical boundaries, usually fortifications of some kind, that marked out the limits of an urban center. Its location gave it a number of characteristics. It was unprotected, and it was neither urban nor rural but contained elements of both. Its legal status and that of its inhabitants was ambiguous. Its population consisted of recent arrivals from elsewhere and former residents of the urban center. The latter included some who chose to leave the urban center in search of a better quality of life, who tended to be well off, and some who were forced to leave it because their presence was unacceptable, who were generally poor.

Even at this comparatively early stage of urbanization, the diversity of suburban form and organization underlined the fact that the only feature shared by all suburbs was a negative characteristic. Suburbs were agglomerations of housing not perceived as part of the urban core. Definitions of the urban core changed from the area within a fortified enclosure to an area of dense housing on a street plan inherited from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, containing centers of commerce, government, religious practice; public buildings; and a mixture of housing for the rich and the poor and to the twentieth-century central business district. Along with those definitions the nature of the suburbs surrounding the core also changed.

The distinction between urban core and suburb altered over time. The core expanded, and new suburban growth took over many of the functions of older suburbs, which in turn took on new roles. The construction of new fortifications for fiscal and defense purposes enclosed areas that once were suburbs and incorporated them within the urban core. Similarly the outer expansion of suburbs incorporated existing villages and settlements within the suburban area, changing their status but providing new nodes for commerce and sociability. The introduction of mass transport, such as the tram, the railway, and eventually the bus, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries facilitated the construction of suburban housing outward along the transport network and further afield as satellites of the towns providing employment.

Until the early twentieth century Europe exhibited a clear distinction between suburbs and new towns. Suburbs were extensions of the urban core, and their development was partly organic and partly the result of planned expansion. New towns, on the other hand, were urban centers developed on entirely new locations to carry out one of a range of specialized functions, commercial, industrial, military, recreational, or administrative. New town construction in the twentieth century also took place as a distinctive exercise. New towns were developed in response to the continuing growth of the urban population, much of which was expected to locate in the suburbs of large cities. To control and direct this demographic and economic growth, national governments and town planners alike proposed to channel it into planned locations away from existing urban areas but connected to them. The alternative was, as one commentator wrote about London in the 1930s, that the extensively decentralized urban area would become a “confluent pox.” Ironically, these desired distinctions between suburbs and new towns subsequently eroded to the point that it became scarcely possible in some cases to distinguish the functions of one from the other or even to distin-

guish a new town from a recent satellite or commuter suburb. For this reason these two forms of urban organization have been combined in a single article that discusses them separately.

The history of suburbs can be studied in terms of urban policies and transportation, while new towns often are examined through the schemes of idealist reformers and urban planners. Social history looks more at the types of people involved in both settings and at the functions the settings served. Not surprisingly nineteenth-century industrialization marks a sharp break in the histories of both types of community and an expansion of their importance.

SUBURBAN GROWTH SINCE THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: PUSHING BEYOND THE URBAN CORE

The biggest physical change to the suburb after the sixteenth century was the ratio between populations of the suburb and the urban core. The population showed considerable diversity even at the end of the Middle Ages. Only one person in four of the population of Tudor York lived in the suburbs, but over a third of the inhabitants of Carmona, Spain, did so in 1528 and half the population of Winchester in 1600. A majority of the population of Ubeda, Spain, lived beyond the walls in 1595. Suburban growth was particularly marked in Europe's largest cities, setting the pattern for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By 1700 London's suburbs contained three times as many people as the population of the City itself. In many towns population growth may have been accommodated within the walls. Suburban expansion was often a sign that an individual urban economy had continued to expand.

The shape of suburban development was closely related in many towns to the construction, modification, and later demolition of fortifications. Medieval suburbs developed in the shadow of city walls because these fortifications were not expected to fulfil a major defensive role. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries many preexisting suburbs were demolished to make way for fortifications of a new design, particularly in areas of endemic warfare, such as the southern Netherlands. New systems of citadels, earthworks, and bastions required much more space than the old curtain walls, and they also depended on the retention of open spaces beyond to allow for an open line of fire against advancing troops. On the one hand, this removed existing suburbs. On the other, the enlarged urban space enclosed by new fortifications enabled construction of new quarters as extensions of

the existing urban core. The new fortifications built in Marseilles in 1666 effectively doubled the surface available for urban development and consequently met the demand for houses to accommodate incomers and the wealthy in search of comfortable, well-designed housing. Both of these demands later fueled European suburban expansion.

From the late seventeenth century the decline in siege warfare encouraged towns to remove their fortifications altogether, but this did not in itself facilitate suburban development. In many towns the walls were replaced by promenades, tree-lined areas designed to allow a socially exclusive minority to walk or ride away from the noise, smell, and congestion of the urban core. These in turn became boulevards for wheeled traffic. In Vienna the final removal of the walls permitted the city to construct "The Ring," a broad boulevard flanked by major public buildings imitating the old fortifications, as a way of delimiting the urban core. Similarly the line of fortifications in Milan separated the *circondario esterno* (outer ring) from the *circondario interno* (inner ring), although it was not built on in the same way, and marked an important boundary for tax purposes. Suburban growth was often shaped and encouraged by the construction of boulevards. Both Barcelona and Valencia, for example, in the last third of the nineteenth century constructed new quarters that stretched out beyond the line of the old fortifications.

The major impetus to suburban growth came in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century as a result of industrialization and widespread population movements. In parts of Europe other than England the construction of multistory tenement blocks within the urban area prevented decentralization on a large scale. By the mid-nineteenth century, more markedly in England than elsewhere in Europe, the pattern of a small proportion of the urban population inhabiting the core while the large majority lived in some form of suburban housing was already visible. This movement was accompanied by an absolute decline in the populations of the central core in capitals such as London, Paris, and Berlin. Over 1.25 million new houses were built in Greater London between 1921 and 1939, and the population of the metropolitan area rose from 7.5 million to 8.7 million. The population of central Paris fell from 3 million to 289,000 between 1921 and 1931, while the suburban area grew from 1.5 million to 2 million. In other French cities the proportion of suburban inhabitants was around 80 to 90 percent. Living outside the central core had become the norm, but the continuous and often unexpectedly rapid growth of the suburbs meant that this norm was constantly redefined.

TRANSPORT, COMMUTING, AND SATELLITE TOWNS

The key to all suburban expansion after the beginning of the nineteenth century was the combination of migration and increasingly efficient forms of transport. The development of trams, buses, suburban trains, and the motor car transformed the shapes and sizes of urban centers, making it possible to commute to work over increasing distances and bringing satellite towns within the orbit of urban areas. Transportation also facilitated the zoning of urban areas so schools, hospitals, recreational facilities, and commercial centers were located at points accessible by public or private transport. Above all it created a new kind of urban space, in which entire neighborhoods functioned as dormitories, leaving a small population of the elderly, the very young, unpaid mothers, and the unemployed to inhabit the streets during working hours.

Unrestricted private enterprise in transport in the late nineteenth century led to patchy coverage of the suburbs. High rail and tram fares encouraged the wealthy to move further out but were a disincentive to working people. Where new access was granted the results were striking. The tram reached the Parisian suburb of Bobigny in 1902, and within ten years the population had more than doubled. In the late nineteenth century a circular railway was constructed in Berlin some five kilometres from the center, linking all the

lines from outside the city. The construction of the metropolitan line in London encouraged suburban development to the northwest. Railways and developers established close links once they shared an interest in moving a new and affluent population into the suburbs.

The new forms of transport increased the development of satellite communities. As a suburban phenomenon, however, they predated the great population expansion of the late nineteenth century. Vienna's complex fortification system in the late seventeenth century displaced its suburban expansion to separate communities such as St. Ulrich. A number of villages north of London, such as Somerstown and Pentonville, were linked to the capital by ribbon development in the eighteenth century and gradually became integrated into the suburbs. To the south of London the development of the railway and a number of local factors encouraged the growth of existing centers, such as Bexley and Bromley, in the mid-nineteenth century. Their expansion eventually met suburban growth moving out of the city, and they were incorporated into the metropolitan area. Similar developments took place around Berlin. After World War II the development of better road networks and an exponential growth in the use of the motor car brought many other towns into the orbit of major metropolitan areas. Some were centers of considerable age, others were entirely new, and some were a hybrid of the two.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION

Suburbs and the poor. A long association has existed between poverty and suburbs. The medieval suburb provided an opportunity for subsistence migrants to find work and cheap accommodations in the town free from regulation by the urban authorities. The suburbs were often their first point of contact and offered the most opportunities for unskilled employment, both industrial and agricultural. For the indigent poor, too, the suburbs provided shelter and partial protection from exclusion policies practiced by the urban authorities. By the late twentieth century the suburbs were home to some of the poorest of the urban population, who had been displaced there by changes to the organization and the housing stock of the urban core. In earlier years the same three factors, inward migration, displacement from the core, and employment opportunities, constantly brought the poor to the suburbs.

As social zoning among the suburbs developed in the nineteenth century, the poor lived in two contrasting parts of the suburbs, those areas closest to the core and those on the extreme periphery of the suburbs. In the first case, the poor moved out of the center of towns into suburban housing originally constructed for the wealthy several generations before. These “walking suburbs” had lost their attraction as more modern and comfortable housing became available further out and their proximity to the countryside was removed. Such houses, often lacking the most desirable facilities, were subdivided into rooms and tenements to accommodate a high-density population in search of work nearby. Developments in transport in the late nineteenth century also ensured a heavy concentration of the poor close to the urban core. Railway lines cut off many of the older suburbs from the business center. Their viaducts and marshaling yards left islands of housing that rapidly degenerated into slums. When cheap transport for unskilled workers was introduced in the early twentieth century, more suburban housing further out came within the economic capacities of workers employed in the center.

For the poor employed on the periphery, on the other hand, housing on the edge of the suburbs was essential. This pattern was established in the late Middle Ages, when early economic zoning ensured that certain economic activities took place outside the walls, such as tanning, fulling, washing and dyeing cloth, glassmaking, slaughtering, and activities with a high fire risk. Many industries required water, and most produced unpleasant by-products. Hence tanning and cloth dyeing took place in the Parisian Faubourg St.-Marcel, across the Seine in an area bordered

by little housing. Gunpowder factories operated on the outskirts of many Dutch cities in the seventeenth century, and soap was made in Triana, a Sevillian suburb on the right bank of the Guadalquivir. The textile industry in particular moved out from the centers to the suburbs. During the eighteenth century the growth of the silk industry was a major force in suburban expansion in Nîmes and Lyon. In Lyon the physical appearance of the early nineteenth-century suburb of La Croix-Rouge was shaped by the weavers’ need for buildings to provide enough daylight and space to operate a Jacquard loom.

Agricultural workers and gardeners experienced the same need to live on the edge of the housing area. Agriculture continued to occupy large proportions of the urban population well into the eighteenth century. In the seventeenth century 15 to 20 percent of the population of Vienne in the Dauphiné worked on the land, mostly in vineyards. The numbers of market gardeners and fishermen in Strasbourg were high enough to justify guilds of their own. Most rural employees chose to live as close as they could to their work.

Industrialization came comparatively late to many urban centres, but once large-scale urban industrial production was established, access to transport for raw materials and for distribution of the finished product, in addition to the need for large sites to accommodate production, dictated sites on the edge of the town. Housing soon followed. The Italian companies of Breda and Pirelli, which had initially chosen to build factories in Milan behind the main railway station, moved out to the Sesto San Giovanni for more space. Fiat did the same in Turin. The attractions of the periphery also drew out many smaller enterprises, hoping to benefit from conditions that paralleled those in the preindustrial suburb, such as lack of unionization, little external regulation, and a cheap labor force.

In a common pattern throughout Europe, many migrant industrial workers moved to the suburbs in search of cheaper housing at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, a development that brought with it uncontrolled suburban growth of the most chaotic nature. Some suburbs, such as the quarter of Campo Fiesa in Brescia, began with municipal housing but were effectively abandoned as factories developed around them. Others, like the Parisian suburb of Bobigny, were initially collections of shacks without proper foundations, paved streets, water supplies, or sewers. By contrast, interwar and post-1945 planning policies organized outer suburbs for the poor. Municipal estates were built to let to the inner-city poor, whose homes were demolished in slum clearance programs. These estates

varied among low- and medium-rise blocks, particularly in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and high-density, high-rise blocks set in green spaces on the edge of other continental cities. But all improved the material conditions for their first inhabitants. Toulouse constructed ten thousand buildings between 1948 and 1961, providing more than thirty thousand new homes, each with several bedrooms, its own WC (toilet), and bathroom.

Suburbs and the wealthy. In spite of the heavy concentration of the poor population outside the urban core, the words “suburb” and “suburban” became synonymous with homes for families of medium to high incomes. These suburban quarters were in marked contrast to housing for the poor. In the early modern period they were a hybrid between developments within the urban core and areas of housing beyond the walls, but they shared much with the later suburban developments after industrialization. New quarters were built between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries to accommodate wealthy townspeople, members of the elite, merchants, administrators, and professionals. These people generally desired to escape from the dif-

ficulties of life in old, cramped housing on narrow streets increasingly choked with wheeled traffic, market stalls, pedestrians, and artisans. Specifically they were motivated by a new sense of the urban lower classes as “dangerous” and by a real drive to find a healthier environment free from the contagion and smoke of urban sectors. Thus wealthier suburbs often located to the west of major cities, so the prevailing winds would protect the residents from urban smoke.

The motives for suburban development were articulated in several ways. New quarters such as the Marais in Paris and Covent Garden in London featured large, regular buildings to reflect the high status of their inhabitants and the sense of order the elite wished to impose on the city. They included frequent squares and other open spaces. London developed the area between the old walled City and the royal palace in Whitehall, and in Paris the Marais originally was a swamp. Elsewhere the new buildings either appeared in open areas within the existing walls or in areas created by the extension of fortifications.

While these buildings represented one element of the flight from the old urban core, a second trend also played a part in early suburban development. The

use of the area beyond the walls for semiagricultural activities diversified to meet the recreational needs of wealthy townspeople. Some of the space was used for gardens and promenades, where townspeople could take the air on long summer evenings and Sundays or grow fruit and vegetables for their own use, introducing an element of the rural into their lives. The richest of all divided their lives between the urban and the rural by using summer houses further afield. The wealthy of Amsterdam constructed country houses on the Isle of Walcheren and in the Vechte Valley. Venetians built villas along the Brenta River and much further away. The merchants of Lübeck spent time on farms several hours ride from the city. The semirural aspect of preindustrial suburban development was accentuated by the presence of ecclesiastical institutions, charitable buildings, and hospitals surrounded by gardens and other green spaces.

From the eighteenth century suburban development for the wealthy followed divergent patterns. While much housing in the urban core in Scotland and in continental Europe was remodeled to meet middle-class demand, considerable suburban development extended English towns, a pattern not followed elsewhere until much later. The earliest were the so-called “walking suburbs” built so their inhabitants could easily access activities in the town center. Many, like Jesmond in Newcastle upon Tyne and Camden in North London, reproduced the urban terraces of the eighteenth century on a smaller and less ornate scale. Gardens were kept to a minimum, but an element of the rural was introduced by planting trees along streets. Elsewhere landlords capitalized on a demand for a protected semirural environment, permitting the wealthy to live away from their work, surrounded by greenery, and far from the pollution of the industrial city. During the middle third of the nineteenth century Manchester, Glasgow, Oldham, Nottingham, Liverpool, and Birmingham built estates of detached and semidetached houses with gates and park keepers.

In succeeding generations the exclusivity of such enclaves was threatened by the introduction of comparatively cheap transport, permitting families of lesser means to move into and beyond these suburbs. The wealthy attempted to distance themselves from their more modest neighbors by moving outward. Increasing numbers of semidetached houses with small gardens along roads, tramways, and railways accommodated a rising demand from the middle classes and the labor aristocracy. Other European urban centers also experienced suburban expansion but with the important difference that the middle classes in areas such as Grünewald, Friedenau, and Lichterfelde near Berlin

lived in apartment blocks rather than in semidetached houses. After the 1970s an interesting inversion of trends occurred, in which high-rent luxury accommodations became available in the urban core of many English towns, while demand grew on the Continent for small houses on estates surrounded by lawns and greenery.

REGULATION OF SUBURBS

The suburbs began as unregulated urban growth, and the social, political, and economic problems of urbanization in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought attempts to regulate housing, public services, and the urban environment. The largest metropolitan areas created new local administrations, such as the London County Council established in 1888. The new authority of *Grossberlin* united Berlin with its suburban neighbors in 1920. Together with radical governments in Vienna and elsewhere, these authorities put forward plans to coordinate road and rail transport, develop low-cost housing, and provide water, gas, electricity, and sewers. Many of these plans reached their full potentials in the mid-twentieth century. National legislation increasingly controlled the provision of low to medium cost rented accommodations, such as the French Ribot Law of 1922.

CULTURAL RESPONSES TO THE SUBURB

Suburbs always have received a bad press, much of it arising from their ambiguous status. For many in the early modern period the rural world represented an unknown series of threats. Fortifications, whatever their state of repair, reassured those who lived within them that they were protected from such threats. The presence of housing beyond them and its tendency to attract immigrants who took unregulated employment or engaged in activities that threatened the social and moral order made the suburbs a source of anxiety for the more established members of urban society. Miguel de Cervantes referred to Triana, a suburb of Seville, as a rendezvous for dishonesty. John Graunt described the suburbs of seventeenth-century London as places where “many vicious persons get liberty to live as they please.” Neither writer was entirely wrong.

As time went on many fears were transferred to urban areas as a whole. The nineteenth century was full of literary warnings about the iniquity of urban life, but few explicitly mentioned the suburbs. Emile Verhaeren’s description of a world characterized by

the smell of sulfur and naphtha, the rumble of factories, and the sound of the crown owed much to the experience of the industrial suburb. New criticisms of the suburbs largely were written by observers who lived elsewhere. One French senator called the suburbs of nineteenth-century Paris “a great stain of ugliness on the beautiful face of France.” A mid-twentieth-century polemic—LeCorbusier’s *Charte d’Athènes*—went even further, saying, “The suburb symbolises the union of urban detritus with urban planning.” The suburbs have found few defenders. One was the English poet John Betjeman, whose work celebrated “Metroland,” the suburbs on the northwest edge of London along the Metropolitan Line. His images of tennis clubs, fresh-smelling lawns on summer evenings, and amateur dramatics conjure an inimitable picture of middle-class life between the wars.

**THE GROWTH OF NEW TOWNS
FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
THROUGH THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY**

The sixteenth century through the eighteenth century: military and princely towns. All new towns shared one characteristic that differentiated them from suburbs: they were planned towns. They were created in response to a perceived need and reflected a well-defined set of ideals about what a town should be and how its inhabitants should live. Such ideals were also influential in shaping urban changes in existing towns but were most well developed where everything was planned from the drawing board. Unlike the previous wave of urbanization in the twelfth century, the new towns of sixteenth- to eighteenth-century Europe were not marked by a search for economic prosperity.

Commercial and industrial expansion tended to take place in established centers. Instead, the driving force in new-town creation was political, reflecting new forms of warfare in the developing territorial states and new needs of self-expression by princely rulers.

Military new towns, such as Philippeville in the Spanish Netherlands, Venetian Palmanova close to Habsburg territory, and Neuf-Brisach in the Rhineland, were expansions of the citadels built alongside cities close to sensitive borders. These symmetrical, star-shaped urban fortresses were designed to house soldiers, supplies, and support institutions. They were not planned to expand, and the absence of any voluntary civilian population prevented them from adapting to changing political conditions, nor did they take on new economic functions. They survive as relics of their time. Unlike the inland fortresses, towns established to house naval dockyards, such as Rochefort and Brest in France and Portsea on the south coast of England, flourished well into the eighteenth century, but likewise rarely took on new economic functions.

The princely town expressed contemporary concepts of the ideal city more fully. Towns like Karlsruhe, Versailles, and Mannheim were built when a newly powerful ruler chose to move away from his existing urban residence and start afresh on a new site. These princely towns had two overlapping functions. They were concrete expressions of the ruler's power and, unlike the military new towns, they were conceived of as centers of prosperous economic activities, supplying the needs of the prince and his household and

functioning of their own accord. To ensure their rapid success, immigrant artisans and merchants, often fleeing from religious persecution, were encouraged to settle on condition that they brought useful skills and injections of capital. Some princely centers flourished, but many did not. Often the original plans were subverted by the unwillingness of new residents to conform to what was expected of them. The three streets in Versailles, designed to meet at the royal palace as a focal point, never fully developed along the monumental lines of their original plans. But the planners' failure was Versailles's success, leading to the organic development of an urban center that resembled its older neighbors.

Nineteenth century: industrial new towns. In each phase of urbanization the sponsorship of new towns reflected the distribution of political and economic power. The predominance of the territorial state in early modern Europe encouraged princely residences and military or naval centers, but as industrial activity grew during the nineteenth century, the impetus passed to industrialists and landowners. Much industrial activity took place in extensions of existing towns, but several new towns took advantage of favorable locations to develop factories and housing close to raw materials and transport routes. Their exponential growth and the dominance of their industrial enterprises soon swept away any attempts at planning or regulation. Middlesborough's tenfold growth between 1841 and 1891 swallowed its original grid

plan. The coal-mining town of Le Creusot, France, whose population rose from four thousand in 1841 to twenty-five thousand in 1911, was entirely controlled by industrialists until the latter part of the century, when its size became too big to handle. It had no local administration and no forces to keep order.

Twentieth century: new towns as antidotes to the suburbs. The new towns of the twentieth century were both a new phenomenon and a continuum with their predecessors. They were born out of several influential groups' concerns about the rapid growth of the industrial city. Town planners, municipal authorities, and national governments alike were affected by the prospect that the industrial city would continue to grow at an uncontrolled rate. The experience of the suburbs was particularly instructive. Living conditions in poor suburbs were perceived as even worse than in the remains of the historic urban cores. The pressure of newcomers and the poor quality of housing materials created major sanitation problems. The rapid occupation of all available open spaces by housing, workshops, and factories excluded schools, hospitals, and recreational facilities. The weight of the population also posed potential threats to the political order. The modern new-town movement arose from the belief that urban organization had reached its limits. Further progress was only possible by starting again with planned, controlled constructions that offered space, light, and greenery. In a way, too, the new town offered town dwellers a kind of rural dream.

The early phases of new-town development began in England toward the end of the nineteenth century, under the influence of Ebenezer Howard, whose concept of the "garden city" shaped much suburban development in England and on the Continent, especially in Holland and Scandinavia. The garden city was an attempt to remove housing from a linear, high-density environment. It proposed instead a semirural but still intensely regulated network of curving roads, parks, and gardens, in which houses located on estates were linked to major access routes. Early garden cities provided a new environment for the wealthy, but they were also models for new towns. Welwyn Garden City and Letchworth were built north of London in the interwar years; Le Vésinet, close to Paris, had seventy kilometers of roads; and the *Kolonien* were built outside Berlin. These new towns experienced similar problems of economic attachment to their preindustrial predecessors. They flourished primarily because they were located close to major urban centers that provided them with their populations, but they also filled a new role as commuter towns. Welwyn grew largely because of its proximity to London.

The postwar period saw a boom in new-town development, particularly in England and France. National legislation encouraged developments that benefited regional and national economies. These new towns were not entirely new in the sense that they incorporated existing urban communities. Although others were located in several regions, including Stevenage and Harlow close to London, Telford in the West Midlands, Corby in the East Midlands, Washington, Peterlee, and Killingworth in the northeast, and Cumbernauld close to Glasgow, Milton Keynes came to characterize the new town in the United Kingdom. The original plan for Milton Keynes incorporated several small towns, but the town generated green spaces, water recreations, and a shopping and business center. For a long time known only for the concrete cows in its fields, an early attempt at public art, Milton Keynes eventually established an art gallery.

The new towns initiated in France in the 1970s are also difficult to distinguish from others linked to existing towns. At the end of World War II the outer suburbs of many French towns were augmented by *grands ensembles*, high-rise groupings of low-rent accommodations, followed by even more ambitious projects. Toulouse–Le Mirail was planned for 100,000 inhabitants with a university campus and a mixture of public and private housing, schools, green spaces, and shops. It failed to live up to its planners' expectations. Private developers took little part. The shopping center was unable to compete with a nearby hypermarket, and the university had an air of living in exile. Other new towns of the same period, such as Évry, Corbeil, L'Isle d'Abeau, and Le Vandreuil, shared the same objective of creating a social mix as did Le Mirail, and to some extent they achieved it at the expense of slower growth. High-density, low-rent developments were delayed in an attempt to attract wealthier residents, some of whom chose to settle in nearby villages and use their cars to benefit from the new town's extensive facilities.

As time passed the expectations that European new towns would become mature communities came to pass. The age mix eventually resembled that of older towns. The young families who were the original inhabitants grew older and put down roots, and other, younger families moved from the cities to the new towns.

CONCLUSION

The modern history of suburbs and new towns reflects the burdens, real and imagined, of the industrial city and the new transportation facilities. Both settings, though particularly the suburbs, raise questions about the human impact of commuting and about the relationships among the different social groups spread along the suburban-urban continuum. Suburbanization, for example, decreased the visibility of poverty with obvious implications in terms of policy responses.

On the whole, suburbs and new towns differ in terms of top-down versus bottom-up development. Suburbs arose mainly from changes in the numbers and motivations of suburban residents, reflecting social issues such as evolving attitudes toward the lower classes and toward disease. Although attitudes and conditions changed, major continuities can be found between pre-industrial and industrial suburbs. This is not the case with new towns, which depended more on formal planning and expert initiatives. While the needs of armies and princes shaped the work of early modern town planners, industrialization created new problems arising from the scale of the accompanying demographic and urban expansion. Accordingly, the impetus behind the planning of new towns changed. The social history of new towns and suburbs embraces inherent complexities; however, the study of these two developments has often addressed social issues common to both.

See also Migration (volume 2); Social Class (volume 3); Housing (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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AGRICULTURE



James R. Lehning

Agriculture has until the last two centuries occupied most of the population of Europe, and this has made it a topic of major significance for social historians of virtually every historical period. Its study has required the use of a variety of primary sources, such as leases, registers of feudal obligations, notarial archives, landholding records, inquiries into rural conditions, and records from markets for agricultural goods. Historians of medieval and early modern societies see agriculture as the principal source of subsistence and wealth, providing the basis for human existence. It also served as a determinant of social and political relations in society, with institutions such as the family and local community organized around exploitation of the land. Political institutions were also organized to extract surpluses produced by agriculture to support other activities, such as warfare and religion. Agricultural production also is viewed as an important constraint on the possibilities of economic, social, and political transformation. While social historians would disagree on the rigidity of the relationship of agriculture to these other aspects of historical processes, few would deny the necessity of considering them as possibilities and of exploring their particular expressions in different times and places.

Agriculture in Europe at the end of the Middle Ages was characterized by great diversity from region to region and by dependence on farming practices that limited its productivity. Beginning in England and western Europe in the sixteenth century, production of grains increased due to expansion of the area of land under cultivation and the introduction of the intensive farming techniques of convertible husbandry, replacing fallow with legumes that restored the soil and provided pasture for livestock. These methods increased the productivity of the soil and diversified agricultural products, creating a model of agricultural revolution that other parts of Europe attempted to adopt, but with only mixed success in some parts of the Continent in the twentieth century.

AGRICULTURE IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

From the perspective of the rural village, Europe in the sixteenth century was made up of a combination of arable fields, natural pastures, woodlands, and wastelands. From the English Midlands across northern France, southern Denmark and Sweden, northern Germany, Poland, and into Russia these lands were often combined into an agrarian regime known as open field or champaign, in which the arable was cultivated in open fields in which each household held strips or furrows. South of this great European plain, the open fields were often divided into small irregular plots. In other areas, such as the enclosed fields of western and central France, in Walachia, and in parts of Lower Saxony, Westphalia, Bavaria, Schleswig, the Baltic lands, Brandenburg, and Hungary, isolated individual farmsteads existed with barriers of trees, hedges, or stone walls separating them from their neighbors.

The cultivation of grains, the principal foodstuff of Europe, took place in a system of crop rotation intended to avoid depleting the mineral content of the soil. In much of northern Europe this was a three-field system: in early autumn a winter cereal such as rye or wheat was planted in one field; in the spring, a second field was sown with barley, oats, or another small grain; the third field was left fallow to restore minerals, and especially nitrogen, needed to grow crops. In early or mid-summer the winter grain was harvested, followed by the spring grain in late summer. Then, in the autumn, the fallow field was planted in a winter cereal, beginning the process again. Farther south a two-field system, alternating grain and fallow, was used.

Rotation systems were maintained in areas of open field by customary rules enforced by the village community, which set common dates for planting and harvesting crops and which also allowed customary rights such as gleaning, which permitted the village

poor to gather grain fallen on the ground after the first cut of the harvest. Gleaning, rights to pasture animals on the village common lands, and rights to fallen wood in communal forests were important supplements to the incomes of those in the village who lacked adequate land for subsistence. But while most families were able to keep barnyard animals such as chickens, and occasionally a goat, ownership of livestock such as cows or pigs was unusual. In most of the plain of northern Europe, the plow used was a heavy wheeled one, with a coulter in front to cut the

turf, and a moldboard to turn the furrow to the side. In southern Europe, the plow used was a lighter one, without wheels, coulter, or moldboard, that only scratched the earth. Harvesting was occasionally done with a scythe, but more often the more labor-intensive sickle was used, since it did less damage to the ears of the grain and left a higher stalk, providing more straw for the villagers.

The productivity of this agricultural system was low in modern terms. The restoration of soil fertility by fallowing took one-third or one-half of the arable

land out of cultivation each year. The principal fertilizer used was animal manure, produced by grazing animals either on natural meadow and pasture or on fields left fallow, but the small number of livestock limited its availability. In these conditions yields were relatively low: Slicher van Bath's compilation shows medieval returns on seed planted for wheat of about four to one, rising by the late eighteenth century to between six and seven to one on the Continent and to nine or ten to one in England. Rye and oats were also important cereal crops, producing slightly higher returns on seed than wheat (pp. 328–333).

In many parts of rural Europe the community itself was in an uneasy relationship with a lord who possessed ultimate control over the land. In medieval and early modern Europe land tenure was rarely in the form of a fee simple, in which the cultivator possessed complete control over the land. More often, some form of leasehold was the case, in which the tenant was restricted in the cultivation of the land and was required to pay rents, entry fines due when the land was inherited, and other obligations, such as the requirement to use the lord's court, to grind grain in his mill, to provide a number of days of labor service, and to pay the tithe in support of the parish church. These requirements could be very severe, as in eastern Europe where serfdom gave peasants few avenues of recourse against their lords; in other areas, however, customary law or centralizing monarchies protected peasant communities against the excessive demands of their lords, especially after the Black Death in 1348 had removed the late-medieval labor surplus in rural Europe.

These institutional aspects of agrarian society affected the ways in which the soil was cultivated. In an economy whose principle purpose was the production of foodstuffs, one form of agricultural household economy in early modern Europe consisted of a peasant family attempting to produce enough to feed its members, leading to a polyculture with an emphasis on grains. But dues, fines, and services owed by the peasant to his lord, and the tithe owed to the Church, also shaped production. Where these were paid in kind, peasants could be required to produce crops stipulated by the lord, and lords who were oriented toward the markets of towns and cities in their region or even in other parts of Europe could insist on the planting of more salable crops. Peasants could also be forced into the market themselves. Where dues had been commuted into money payments, peasants had to sell a part of their crop to gain the money to pay these dues. Especially in the more commercialized areas of western Europe, these markets could be very significant forces in agriculture, spurring practices such as those in the Upper Rhine, where the multiple governments of the region followed a policy intervening in the markets for meat and grain to ensure an adequate supply for the cities and towns of the region.

THE ORIGINS OF AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT

Beginning in the sixteenth century, especially in England and Holland, the low returns that characterized European agriculture began to increase. While solid

data is lacking, and there has been disagreement among historians over its interpretation, this increase apparently occurred in two long phases: slow growth in the second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, then again in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the nineteenth century. These increases occurred as a result both of more intensive farming and of bringing more land under cultivation. Improved crop and rotation systems increased the productivity of the land, breaking the closed circuit of traditional agriculture by the introduction of new crops, especially clover and turnips. These crops replaced fallow with a useful crop, increasing the supply of fodder, and allowing more livestock and greater manure production. They also helped the fields: clover fixed atmospheric nitrogen into the soil, replacing the nitrogen depleted by the growth of cereals; and turnips smothered weeds in fields, improving later cereal harvests.

To some extent, although how much is subject to debate, these increases in production took place within the existing agrarian system. For example, swamp drainage, as in Holland and eastern England, increased available land, and open-field systems adjusted in some places to changing economic circumstances. M. A. Havinden showed that, in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Oxfordshire, in the middle of English open-field country, improvement took place through subtle changes in the open-field system. The area of grassland was increased through planting sainfoin and clover as winter feed for livestock. Combined with the increased supply of manure provided by larger herds, these crops increased the fertility of the soil and allowed elimination of some, but not all, fallows. Pulses, planted as a part of more intensive cultivation, increased the feed supply for livestock. Arable land planted in grain decreased, but the higher productivity of the soil not only maintained the previous level of production, but also allowed a shift from rye, barley, and oats to wheat. Thus, without a significant modification of the landscape, an ascending spiral of increased productivity and production occurred.

ENCLOSURE: THE ENGLISH MODEL

Individual ownership of fields allowed for even more rapid improvement. Especially in England and northwestern Europe, increased security of tenure allowed yeomen and peasants to increase the productivity of their fields by adopting some aspects of convertible husbandry. More controversially, improvement also came about through the enclosure of common fields, a practice that especially marked English agricultural

history. Enclosure took place by common agreement in many English villages in the late Middle Ages and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and much of England outside of the Midlands had already been enclosed in this fashion before 1700 or had never been cultivated in open fields. But while about three million acres may have been enclosed by private agreement, another six to seven million acres were enclosed by parliamentary act, a technique that dominated enclosure after 1700 and was especially prevalent after 1750.

Enclosure by agreement could be a time-consuming and expensive process, requiring the consent not only of property owners but also of those with only use rights to the land. Enclosure by parliamentary act was easier, since it required the approval of the lord of the manor (who might be the instigator), the tithe owner, and the owners (but not those holding only use rights) of four-fifths of the land. Following passage of the act, the lands of the village were surveyed and redistributed as private holdings to the property owners. The result by either method could be a dramatic transformation of the lands of the village. Great Linford in Buckinghamshire, for example, was enclosed by agreement in 1658; new hedges were planted, roads and ditches were built, and enclosed pastures, most of them eventually rented to tenants supplying the London market for meat and dairy products, replaced the old open fields.

In classic histories of English agricultural development, such as Chambers and Mingay's *The Agricultural Revolution 1750–1880*, enclosure provided the basis for the implementation of convertible husbandry and for increases in labor and crop productivity, a necessary step toward agricultural revolution. This has been criticized by scholars such as Robert Allen, and it must be recognized that increases in production in some places were more the result of bringing more acreage under cultivation than of higher yields from existing arable lands. In County Durham, for example, studied by R. I. Hodgson, parliamentary enclosure in the late eighteenth century brought commons, moors, and wasteland under grain cultivation, and while some of this was farmed under improved rotations incorporating clover and turnips, much of it was cultivated under the older three-field system. David Grigg's study of south Lincolnshire showed that production was increased in the late eighteenth century by bringing marginal land under cultivation and by improving drainage. While the high grain prices of the Napoleonic era spurred production increases, they worked against the adoption of intensive farming techniques. But when prices fell after 1814, these techniques became necessary for farmers to survive, and,

in what later came to be called high farming, sheep-rearing, fertilizers, root crops, and claying were used to increase returns on seed.

Enclosure took place because of the prospect of increasing income by bringing unused land under cultivation, gaining higher productivity through more intensive farming, and charging higher rents for more valuable land. But it brought costs, both public and private, associated with the passage of the act itself, and with the physical changes to the land. The costs of enclosure may have been high and charged disproportionately to smaller estates, and enclosure created some farms that were too small to be economically viable. One consequence therefore was the sale of smaller farms and estates at or shortly after enclosure. This might mean consolidation of larger estates, but there is also evidence of an increase in the number of owner-occupiers, especially during the most intense period of enclosure, the Napoleonic Wars.

English agricultural development was therefore a very complex process, with both intensive and extensive aspects. But for most commentators on agriculture it has served as a model against which agricultural systems in other parts of Europe and, in the twentieth century, the world are measured. This English model emphasizes the efficiency and higher productivity of larger farms over peasant smallholders because of their ability to make use of better crop and rotation systems, to increase animal husbandry, and to implement new farming techniques. It therefore points to the necessity of consolidating landholding, as occurred in England through enclosure, as the avenue to agricultural growth.

While it is increasingly doubtful, as we have already seen, that England itself followed only this path to agricultural development, it is certainly true that Continental Europe (except Holland) has had diffi-

culty meeting the expectations of this model of supposedly successful "agricultural revolution." It has instead seemed hindered by peasant cultivators focused on autoconsumption rather than production for a market, the ability of the peasant community to resist innovation, and the absence of improving landlords. While, as in England, the Continent saw a slow recovery of agricultural production in the two centuries after the Black Death in 1348, it also experienced the long seventeenth-century depression marked by low prices and declining rents on land. In Spain and Italy the decline appears to have begun early in the century, perhaps as early as 1600 and accelerated after the 1620s. In France, the reign of Louis XIV (1643–1715) was marked by initial stagnation and then, beginning around 1660 or 1670, a sharp decline in regions as different as the Beauvaisis, Provence, and the west.

THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION

The eighteenth century, in contrast, was a period of rising prices in much of Europe as market demand rose for agricultural products, stimulating attempts to increase production. A slow increase in population began with the recovery after the late fourteenth century, increased into the seventeenth century, and then accelerated in the eighteenth. Rural smallholders in some parts of Europe living through both agriculture and by employments such as spinning and weaving cloth for urban merchants were unable to produce enough to feed themselves and, along with growing urban populations, this created increased demand for agricultural products. The first quarter of the century saw only minor indications of the transition from depression to growth, but Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse's *Histoire économique et sociale de la France* shows that after 1726 prices steadily increased until they leveled off in the 1780s (pp. 329–405). Further east, in the Baltic and North Sea area, the demand for grain and cattle also came from international trade with England and northwestern Europe.

Increased demand was only one of the factors in the late eighteenth century stimulating agricultural improvement in continental Europe. The dissemination of literature advocating scientific farming, and the foundation of schools to teach these methods, began the process of spreading the methods imported from Holland and England. The physiocratic doctrines elaborated in France beginning in the 1750s argued that land and agriculture were the sole sources of wealth, and combined with mercantilistic doctrines in central and eastern Europe these theories encour-

aged rulers to adopt policies improving agriculture. Anglomania among the educated classes in eastern and central Europe did the same. There were therefore numerous attempts by rulers and their administrators to enclose communal lands and consolidate landholdings in the states of the Holy Roman Empire, in Scandinavia, in the Habsburg Empire, and in Russia and Poland.

The effects of these changes on agricultural production and techniques, however, have been difficult to establish. Cultivation by peasants of crops that fell outside of the rent system was one possible response to increased market demand for agricultural products. Landlords might have difficulty exploiting the opportunity through more intensive farming because of problems in obtaining adequate effort from peasant laborers, competition with peasants for common lands, and a shortage of manure.

In France, the first part of the eighteenth century saw a shift from earlier abandonment of arable to clearing wastelands for cultivation, a trend that became more pronounced after mid-century but that may have added only about 2.5 percent to the arable of the country by 1789. There was also a slow decline in fallowing and a shift from rye to wheat production. But only in the second part of the century is there evidence of any significant increase in agricultural production, the result not only of these modest improvements in agricultural practices but also of more favorable weather in the last few decades of the Old Regime.

When placed against the English model, especially the intensive farming that seemed to contribute so much to the increased agricultural production of that country, continental Europe has therefore seemed marked by agricultural stagnation. But the regional diversity of the early modern economy, pre-eighteenth-century attempts at expansion in the agricultural sector, and the multiple routes, outside of enclosure, toward this expansion are becoming increasingly apparent to historians. This is especially the case in northwestern Europe, where yields around 1800 seem to have been as high as in England. Philip Hoffman has argued that in some parts of France, such as Normandy, the area near Paris, and parts of southeastern France, there were spurts of growth in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These were the result of both intensive and extensive improvements. New crops were planted, meadow and arable increased, and market-oriented vineyards developed. But political crises such as the Wars of Religion and state tax policies disrupted these growth spurts. There is also evidence from Basse-Auvergne and Dauphiné showing the ability of smaller farmers to adopt diversified crop rotations.

Thus, in this revisionist view, increases in agricultural production occurred, and it was not so much small farms, immobile peasants, or weak markets that hindered agricultural growth as it was events outside of agriculture that disrupted this growth when it did occur.

Commercialization also was an important factor in increasing agricultural production in central Europe in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Increased fodder made more livestock possible, increasing as much as 150 percent between 1750 and 1800 in parts of Prussia. This enabled farmers to decrease fallowing and increase grain production, and specialization in commercial crops, especially wheat for export to western Europe, became more common.

But even as production increased, agriculture in much of continental Europe continued to use older rotation and cropping systems; livestock and artificial fertilizers were rare, and returns on seed remained low. Improvement continued to be slow into the nineteenth century. Gabriel Désert and Robert Specklin claim that in France, in spite of the turmoil and disruptions of the Revolution and empire, fallows were reduced by 20 percent, the amount of arable planted in wheat increased by 10 percent, and, following an estimate made by the Société d'économie politique, the gross agricultural product increased by 11 percent in the quarter century between 1789 and 1815 (pp. 107, 138). But in many parts of the country techniques remained unchanged. In 1840 fallowing and wasteland remained common, especially in the south and west, where more than 30 percent of the land area was unused; only in the north and east, and some parts of the southwest, had significant progress been made in bringing more land under cultivation.

Division of common lands in France also occurred slowly, in spite of pressure from agricultural reformers. Increasing production in the first half of the century was made difficult by one long period of price decline until the early 1830s and another at mid-century, and by increases in land rents and labor costs. Nonetheless, by mid-century, cereal production had increased by more than 40 percent over the beginning of the century, and an increased part of this was wheat, replacing rye as the principal grain for market. Other crops, such as potatoes and sugar beets, had also been introduced, and this greatly increased food supply. Livestock increased by a quarter to a third, especially during the 1830s and 1840s.

Land reforms carried out in Prussia and some west German states in the first half of the nineteenth century provided opportunities for division of commons and consolidation of landholding. At the same time, improvements in transport made commercial

agriculture more attractive. Agricultural production in central Europe slowly increased in the decades before 1840: cereal production in Prussia rose from 4.6 million tons in 1816 to 6.8 million in 1840, the weight of livestock increased, and other parts of German Europe witnessed similar gains. As in France, these gains were in many places the results not only of the implementation of scientific farming methods but also of the reduction of fallow and cultivation of former wastelands and meadows. But across Europe these increases in production were fragile: the crisis of the late 1840s dropped production back to close to the levels of the turn of the century, reminding Europeans how closely they lived to bare subsistence.

THE GROWTH OF COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE AFTER 1850

It was during the two decades after 1850 that the countryside in western and central Europe, spurred by transport and market improvements, truly opened toward great increases in production. Secondary roads were improved, making it easier for products to get to markets and for manufactured equipment, such as

scythes and the improved Dombasle plow, to reach peasants. The railroad, especially secondary lines, created national markets for agricultural products: grain and livestock could be sent to major cities, ending the threat of famine there, and fertilizer could be shipped to peasants anxious to increase the productivity of their land. Prices rose after 1850, as did both rural wages and emigration from the countryside to cities, increasing rural incomes and stimulating agricultural production for the market. Gabriel Désert has shown that while in France the expansion of the area planted in cereals ceased in 1862, other crops, such as potatoes, beets, and vines were in full expansion, as was livestock (pp. 247–251), and Maurice Levy-Leboyer estimated that the value of French agricultural production increased by 80 percent between 1852 and 1882 (p. 803).

It is not clear that these increases were due to substantive changes in agricultural practices. In France, rising prices certainly contributed to the increased value, and production increased by only 25 percent. The productivity of the soil increased only slightly, and, for cereals, remained 38 percent behind that of Great Britain. France lagged far behind other Euro-

pean countries in the production of livestock. A similar pattern is found elsewhere. In Prussian Upper Silesia grain production had increased rapidly between 1846 and 1861, growth due to increases in both acreage under cultivation and yields. These slowed after 1861, and from the 1860s to the 1890s growth in production continued but at reduced rates. Only after 1890 did yields again rise, generating growth in production even though acreage under cultivation stagnated.

The weaknesses of continental European agriculture became apparent in the twenty-five years after 1870, when a long decline in agricultural prices occurred. This was the consequence of the development of a global market that created competition, especially in cereals, with producers in other parts of the world. Unless protected by tariffs, many European grain producers, aristocrat and peasant alike, had trouble dealing with cheap imports from the Americas. Although prices improved somewhat in the 1890s and after the turn of the century, the ability of wheat producers in the North American Midwest to undersell European farmers even in European markets pointed out in glaring fashion the limitations imposed by the low productivity of European agriculture at the end of the nineteenth century. The depression forced difficult choices on many of the small peasant farmers in western and central Europe, and for some a retreat from the market and a return to production aimed primarily at autoconsumption was a logical strategy. For others, however, the depression forced rapid adoption of means, such as chemical fertilizers, that increased land productivity. Concentration on commercial dairy farming was a key recourse in Holland and Denmark. While agricultural production stagnated in some countries, such as England, it increased rapidly in Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Scandinavia.

In parts of central Europe and farther east the development of agriculture was complicated by the survival into the nineteenth century of serfdom, a system that left many peasants in servitude to their lords, with little incentive or resources to increase the productivity of the land they worked. The end of serfdom in these lands came in the course of the nineteenth century. But creating free peasants was one thing and increasing agricultural productivity another. Agricultural reformers in the bureaucracies of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia sought to improve agricultural productivity, but without launching major reforms of landholding and without great success. Eastern European agriculture remained marked by farms composed of scattered plots of land, a low level of investment, poor links to markets, and a low level of productivity.

These problems were especially evident in the Russian Empire, the world's largest exporter of cereals at the end of the nineteenth century. Emancipation of the serfs in Russia in 1861 did little to increase output or change methods of cultivation. After the turn of the century, there was some consolidation of landholding, encouraged by the Stolypin reforms of 1906, which attempted to divide communally held lands into individual farms. These farms, it was hoped, would use improved rotations, plant grass crops, and become more productive, creating the exportable surplus on which the Russian economy depended.

But by the eve of World War I Russian agriculture had made only slight improvements in production. Heavy taxation and unequal terms of trade between towns and countryside limited investment in agriculture. Russian agriculture was still focused on cereal production and often used three-field rotation systems that left much land fallow each year. Even after a decade the reforms of 1906 had only affected a small proportion of the countryside. Russia suffered from increased competition from American wheat in its traditional export markets of northwestern Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, and like all European wheat producers it faced declining prices from 1873 until the 1890s. Its most important crop remained grain, and the continuation of communal agriculture in most villages into the 1920s, with its periodic redistribution of land, meant that individual peasants had little ability or incentive to improve the land that they farmed.

WESTERN EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The development of a global market for agricultural products in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries conditioned developments in the agricultural systems of all countries in Europe. The uneven improvement in productivity that characterized the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in different abilities to compete in the global market, leading to different strategies in the twentieth century to increase production and productivity. The inability of agricultural systems to compete even in their own domestic markets led in the 1890s to protective tariffs in many countries. But while this protection may have limited the social effects of competition and preserved small peasant farms, it also reduced incentives to increase agricultural productivity.

Social experiments, such as collectivization in the Soviet Union and in eastern Europe, were intended to increase production, as were policies of con-

solidation and of intense cultivation of smaller farms. The record of these policies is inconsistent, but it appears that peasant family farmers were able to raise productivity while large collective farms struggled to meet production goals.

In France, for example, the many small farms of less than 5 hectares that existed in the nineteenth century declined dramatically from more than half of landholdings in 1929 to about one quarter in 1983. Very large farms, of more than 100 hectares, increased only slightly, but medium-sized farms of 5 to 100 hectares came to dominate French agriculture (60 percent in 1983). The poorer regions of the south and the Massif Central followed the north and east in reducing fallowing and the use of artificial fertilizers. Falling farm prices that began in the late 1920s and continued through the 1930s accentuated the rural exodus that began in the late nineteenth century, and after World War II the shortage of labor encouraged the adoption of labor-saving machinery not only on the large cereal farms of the north and east but even on the poorer family farms of the south and west, where after 1945 a “tractor revolution” mechanized production.

These developments were widespread in western Europe. The years of prosperity between the end of World War II and the recession of 1973–1974 transformed western European agriculture through a combination of increased competition and state management. The most important aspect of this was the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community formed in 1958. This policy was highly controversial, but the EEC took some steps toward accomplishing its goals of creating a single market for agricultural goods with common prices, protecting the farmers of the member countries against foreign competition, and promoting rationalization of agricultural production. Its pricing mechanism tended to set prices higher than market because of political pressures, and the result was not so much rationalization as overproduction, whose costs are borne by the member nations through a system of price subsidies that limited the market impetus for change in the structure of agriculture.

The EEC did open new markets within Europe for farmers in its member countries, although for some products, such as wine, it removed the protection that tariffs had provided since the 1890s. Some governments passed measures, such as French laws of 1960 and 1962, encouraging the retirement of older farmers and the consolidation of property holding. Greater organization and cooperation among farmers improved crops, livestock, and farm management. Productivity increased to the point that surplus, rather

than shortage, became the major problem in agricultural policy making.

Many of the changes in western European agriculture over the twentieth century could be seen in Buzetsur-Tarn, a village in southeastern France that in the nineteenth century was dominated by small family farms either owned, sharecropped, or leased by their cultivators. Agricultural improvement during the nineteenth century came about not through dramatic increases in the productivity of wheat fields, but through the development of crops—hay, vegetables, and wine—that could be transported to market on the railroad that came to the town in 1864. But the phylloxera infestation of the 1880s and 1890s hurt the vineyards, and by the period between the World Wars market gardening was also in decline. Peasant polyculture revived, with farms again producing primarily wheat, fodder, and a little wine. There was some mechanization of harvesting between the wars, the result of the rural labor shortage. Fertilizer was used, but only in small quantities.

Significant increases in agricultural productivity came only after 1950. Between 1950 and 1962 most farmers acquired tractors. Dairy products replaced vegetables as a market crop, and by the 1960s a new generation of farmers adopted intensive methods to increase crop yields. Combines and seed drills came into use. Dairy farming increased the amount of manure available, but new seed varieties required intensive artificial fertilizing. In the 1970s the use of herbicides and fungicides became common. To maximize their ability to use these new methods of cultivation, the young farmers of Buzet took advantage of the French government-sponsored process of *remembrement*, the consolidation through exchanges of scattered landholdings into large fields. Irrigation projects were developed to deal with summer drought, and improvements in drainage, made cooperatively with European Economic Community assistance, increased the production of winter crops and made it possible to work in the fields without getting stuck in the muddy clay.

AGRICULTURE IN EASTERN EUROPE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Such success stories remain tenuous in western Europe because of the threat of declining crop prices to the newly efficient and productive family farmers in villages such as Buzet. But they remain a different experience than that of eastern Europe in the twentieth century. The emancipation of serfs in Russia and elsewhere in eastern Europe in the nineteenth century

opened the possibility of reforms of the agricultural systems there by developing private landholding and improving rotation systems, but in the twentieth century the hopes of agricultural reformers remained only imperfectly fulfilled.

While most of eastern Europe was agricultural prior to World War I, the great landed estates of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and present-day Poland had not been able to increase their productivity. Throughout the region, land reforms were carried out in the aftermath of World War I. Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia became countries of small peasant proprietors. Ambitious plans for reform in Hungary and Poland were delayed and then moderated for political reasons. Both countries had many large landowners, especially in eastern Poland and central and eastern Hungary, who produced cereals or other products, such as timber, for national and international markets.

The motives for land reforms were political, social, and national, and little thought was given to their

economic consequences. Increasing production was difficult for small peasant farmers who lacked capital to invest, technical knowledge and equipment, and efficient transportation. For example, wheat raised in Hungary was unable to compete against American wheat in the Munich market because of high relative production and transportation costs, even though only a few hundred miles separated Hungary from Munich. East European agricultural production therefore stagnated between the World Wars, in some instances actually declining in the 1920s before recovering in the early 1930s. There was some mechanization in the 1920s, but in the 1930s, with declining prices and cheap labor, many tractors stood idle for lack of economic incentives to use them.

Bumper wheat and rice crops around the world created a glut of basic foodstuffs in the world market in the late 1920s, cutting farm incomes across eastern Europe. As the Great Depression spread, prices for manufactured goods remained relatively high, creating a “price scissors” for peasants, in which they contin-

ued paying high prices for manufactured goods while receiving less for the crops they sold. This was especially severe in 1932–1934, striking smallholders particularly hard because, unlike large landholders, they were not protected by government export policies. Peasant purchasing power did not recover significantly in the 1930s, leaving them not only with a declining standard of living but also unable either to make improvements to increase productivity and become more competitive, or to repay loans drawn in the 1920s to improve farms or carry operating expenses from one year to the next. Many of the peasants who had received land in 1919 were forced to sell it back to their former landlords to pay debts, and agriculture throughout eastern Europe became divided into large farms of over fifty hectares and peasant smallholders with less than five hectares.

In Russia, the disruptions caused by the Revolution of 1917, the civil war that followed, the collectivization of agriculture in 1929–1930, the Nazi invasion during World War II, and Soviet pol-

icies aimed at managing agricultural production and organization transformed the country from the largest exporter of grain in the world at the beginning of the century to the world's largest importer of grain and livestock products by the 1980s. Particularly devastating was the policy of forced collectivization, in which individual farms and communally held lands were brought into either collective farms (*kolkhozy*) or the more disciplined state farms (*sovkhozy*).

While one aspect of collectivization was the creation of a rural landscape in which mechanization and other modern farming techniques could be used, it nevertheless proved disastrous. In the short run, collectivization destroyed independent family farmers, the kulaks; led to the slaughter of horses, cattle, and other livestock by peasants to avoid turning them over to the collective farms; and created a famine in the early 1930s. In the long run, the modest gains of the Stolypin era (1906–1916) and the market-oriented New Economic Policy (1923–1928) in the produc-

tivity of arable land were reversed. The total grain harvest of the former imperial territory only regained its 1913 level in 1952–1954; the number of livestock returned to its 1928 level only in 1956.

A Virgin Lands program begun in 1954 brought under cultivation previously unused lands throughout the USSR, especially in eastern Kazakhstan. This program began to pay off in 1956, helping produce a record grain crop in that year. But these lands did not initially require fertilizers, and while wheat production increased initially, problems remained in other parts of the agricultural sector, such as vegetables and livestock. The diversion of equipment and expertise to the virgin lands in the east led to decreased returns in older agricultural areas in the western areas of the USSR. A goal set in the 1950s of matching American diets was never met because of low production of meat and dairy products. By 1963 the natural fertility of the virgin lands was exhausted, harvests declined, and a drought made grain shortages again a part of Soviet life. In 1963, for the first time, the Soviet Union became an importer of wheat.

The Soviet experiment in managing agricultural production through collectivization was extended after World War II to the countries of eastern Europe that became Peoples' Democracies. A first collectivization drive occurred immediately after the consolidation of Communist power in the late 1940s, but met with resistance from peasants seeking to maintain control of the farms they had only recently gained through the breakup of landed estates at the end of World War II. But there were significant variations from country to country. Private agriculture remained the rule in Yugoslavia, which after its political break with Moscow in 1948 ceased to emulate the Stalinist economic model, and in Poland, where only about 23 percent of the land was put into collective and state farms during the Stalinist phase from 1948 to 1956. During the October 1956 revolt in Poland 80 percent of collective farms were dissolved by their members, and by 1970, private farms still made up 86 percent of the arable land in that country.

In other parts of Eastern Europe, a second collectivization push, in 1958–1961, was more successful and often brought most of the land into state or collective farms. In Czechoslovakia, for example, only 15 percent of the population worked in agriculture by 1968, but over 95 percent of agriculture was collectivized. In Hungary, where peasant opposition to the regime had been an important part of the unsuccessful 1956 revolution, a drive begun in 1959 nevertheless brought virtually all land into the state sector by 1961. The German Democratic Republic also collectivized most of its agricultural land in this period.

But collectivization was no more successful in Eastern Europe than in the Soviet Union in raising productivity. Only the German Democratic Republic matched western European increases in productivity. In most of the Peoples' Democracies, economic planning focused on industrializing what were, except for Czechoslovakia, primarily agricultural economies. These policies siphoned investment away from agriculture, making improvement in productivity difficult and, in many of the Peoples' Democracies, minimal. In Hungary, the collectivized ownership structure was not questioned, but by the late 1960s more importance was given to market forces for collective farms, and production increased as prices were allowed to rise. Private plots, which were the most productive form of agriculture in all of the Peoples' Democracies, were actively encouraged and, as producers of livestock, dairy products, eggs, vegetables, and fruits, became important parts of the agricultural sector. In Poland, the 1970s saw, perversely, attempts to reduce the importance of private agriculture: state investment went into the inefficient state sector, while private farmers found it difficult to obtain supplies. As a result, the proportion of land privately farmed had fallen to 75 percent in 1980. But agricultural supplies had also decreased. The government was forced to pay increased price subsidies to maintain urban food prices at a reasonable level, and there were a series of political crises triggered by government attempts to reduce the gap between prices at the point of supply and those in urban markets.

After the fall of the Peoples' Democracies of Eastern Europe in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the countries of Eastern Europe moved at varying speeds toward more market-oriented economies and greater integration into the world market. In countries where private landownership was already widespread and where producer and consumer prices for agricultural products quickly were turned over to the market rather than state policy, such as Hungary, this occurred rapidly. The results of these changes were a movement of population from agriculture to other sectors of the economy (in Hungary farm labor dropped from 19 percent in 1992 to 8 percent in 1997 as a share of employment) and increases in labor productivity. Elsewhere, as in the Czech Republic or Russia, reforms were slower, accentuating long-term shortfalls and decreases in agricultural production. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc also disrupted market systems throughout eastern Europe. Even in the most advanced countries, the search for adequate markets and prices for agricultural goods remained a major task, and became even more difficult as the more advanced countries moved into the European Union,

leaving their former trading partners behind. Agriculture in Eastern Europe therefore continued to face its long-standing problems of raising production and productivity, while facing new challenges of finding markets for its products.

CONCLUSION

The histories of European agriculture since the Renaissance emphasize both the prominence of a specific model of agricultural change, an agricultural revolution in which large enclosed estates allowed the implementation of intensive farming practices and increased the productivity of the land and overall agri-

cultural production, and the rarity with which that model appears to have actually occurred. In England, the basis for the model, increases in production were the result of extensions of cultivation as well as improvements in productivity, and these improvements were achieved by yeomen farmers as well as on large estates. On the Continent, well into the twentieth century, placing more land under cultivation was often as important as increases in productivity in raising agricultural output, and many parts of Europe remain unable to increase productivity levels to those attained at the end of the English model. The history of European agriculture remains marked by uncertainties paralleling those of soil, weather, and blight that mark the cultivation of the land itself.

See also Capitalism and Commercialization (in this volume); Peasants and Rural Laborers (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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LAND TENURE



Liana Vardi

Types of property and patterns of landownership might, on the surface, seem to belong less to social history than to economic history, describing the distribution over time and space of small and large farms, or to legal history as a branch of contract law. Land tenure, however, is woven into the very fabric of society, reflecting concepts of property, hierarchy, and individual rights. Describing changes in land tenure thus involves describing changes in the society at large. This makes understanding land tenure both interesting and challenging.

Land tenure in preindustrial Europe has long been the focus of historiographical debate. Painstaking research into landholding has been driven by more than antiquarian curiosity. The resulting information has figured prominently in scholarly debates about distribution of land and about peasants' need for and attachment to the land. Those who equate country life with rural idiocy might not view the peasants' dispossession of their land with as much distress as those who imbue rural life with rustic virtues. If owning land is linked with independence and dignity, then dispossession will seem a cruel blow. The study of land tenure has thus been able to evoke strong feelings: a desire to do justice to the dispossessed; a drive to understand the process of modernization, associated (until recently) with large-scale farming and treating small properties as hindrances to progress; and a wish to go beyond generalizations to recover the full complexities of the past with its variations, exceptions, negotiations, and multiple agencies. Until the 1970s, historians tended to equate country life with land, meaning that gradations in landownership were taken to represent gradations in wealth, disregarding the import of secondary or alternate sources of income. Thus, forms of property and tenure were profoundly intertwined for much of European history. In fact, in its simplest and most reductive form, the history of land tenure in much of Europe might be taken as the emergence and eventual victory of private property over previous forms of tenure.

As the defining feature of rural life, land tenure holds much less sway than it used to. Historians used

to fasten on the constraints that antiquated land tenure imposed. They attached importance to both legal and cultural constraints. First, the excessive "surplus extraction" by lord, church, and state left the peasant with the bare minimum. Second, the terms of tenure were so rigid that they allowed peasants and farmers little room to innovate, and should they manage to get around those, they would be trapped by the demands of communal farming and grazing. Third, peasant value systems were geared toward family survival rather than economic profit. To that end, peasants were always struggling to get more land or to hold on to their small properties, rather than concentrating on making these commercially viable.

Late-twentieth-century scholarship focused more on how peasants, be they freeholders, or long-term or short-term tenants, took advantage of economic opportunities, negotiating loopholes or disdaining constraints altogether. The collection, *The Peasantries of Europe* (1998), edited by Tom Scott, is a case in point. Its authors view the organization and accessibility of markets as far more important than legal categories and treat peasants as responding to market forces, by choice or of necessity. Rare is the author who still clings to the notion of a downtrodden peasantry crushed by feudal oppression or to a "romantic" view of the past with its moral economy of mutual aid and communal institutions. In the same way, gone is the notion that peasants were backward and routine-bound, living in self-sufficient worlds (even if they paid state taxes) or "part-societies" (a term favored by rural anthropologists in the wake of Robert Redfield and updated by Eric Wolf).

LAND TENURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE SEIGNEURIE

Any discussion of land tenure involves by implication a discussion of feudalism and seigniorialism (manorialism for British historians, *Herrschaft* for German ones), for they imparted to land tenure much of its

complexity, including a superfluity of attributes that centuries of practice and resistance whittled down and finally abolished. The history of land tenure in Europe must therefore begin in the Middle Ages, when these systems originated.

Land has always been important, of course. Until the mid-nineteenth century, because of its low yields, agriculture was the major occupation of Europeans and 80 percent of the population, and in some cases more, were engaged in the cultivation of the fruits of the soil, edible and nonedible. To own land, therefore, meant the ability to feed, house, and clothe oneself and one's family. It also meant creating the surpluses that allowed other social groups to survive without working the land, be they nobles, churchmen, or city dwellers. Except in extreme circumstances, agriculture was always capable of producing such surpluses so that the possession and marketing of this produce was a profitable proposition. Ownership and control over land therefore provided the most obvious form of wealth and prestige, and this is why it was not left to the people who worked it.

In the Middle Ages all the land in any given country belonged in theory to the Crown, although actual ownership had devolved, via land grants, to the nobility in return for military services, to the church in recognition of its spiritual services, and to commoners by dint of immemorial possession that no one chose to contest and that the Crown, at some point,

agreed to recognize. Such full-fledged peasant owners were always a minority. Noble recipients of land granted domains to other nobles, in turn, so that the countryside became a patchwork of properties of different sizes, whose possessors were arranged hierarchically and linked by a chain of allegiance. Land thus expressed one's place in society. It symbolized, first and foremost, military might as lords were required to support their superiors in battle, and, likewise, to protect the people who worked their land against aggression. This was the primordial contract struck between lord and commoner. Just as the priest was meant to pray for his salvation, so the knight was meant to offer him protection, in return for which the peasant granted both a share of his produce. For some historians, this contractual relationship was real and all benefited from the arrangement. Others argue that the relationship was exploitative and rested not so much on mutuality as on an unequal distribution of power.

In addition to military power, land signified access to economic resources, and ownership brought with it administrative, judicial, and policing powers. When a lord obtained a tract of land (a *seigneurie*), sometimes in one large chunk, sometimes in several, he also obtained rights of justice over it. The peasants who were settled and working the land, or whom he brought to the land, were under his jurisdiction and subject to his law. Even if the lord could not act totally

arbitrarily and was bound, to some extent, by customary or civil law, he had the right to judge, fine, and condemn his peasants as if they were his subjects. Where the state remained sufficiently organized and strong, the peasants could take their cases before this higher authority. But the devolution of power from the Crown to the lords in the Middle Ages reduced that capacity, until that time when the state began to reconsolidate and reclaim these rights. The high point of the seigneurial system in any given country was when most peasants fell under its dominion.

Before the Middle Ages some peasants had owned land outright, but, except for a few pockets where such independent owners survived for centuries (this land being known as alodial), most peasant owners eventually came under the control of a lord, and had to pay him a fee in recognition of his superior ownership of their properties. In one way or another, then, most peasants were tenants and owned tenancies. The full-fledged owner or seigneurial lord was not necessarily a nobleman. The Crown, the church, and wealthy burghers also owned seigneuries.

Besides the judicial and military powers it conferred, a seigneurie was viewed as an income-producing unit, subject at all times to fluctuations in prices, and the vagaries of supply and demand. Although landowners did not subscribe to some medieval version of the *Financial Times*, they were acutely aware of where profits lay and eager to make the most of them. Thus, depending on the region, they might view it as more sensible to lease as much of their land as possible, or on the contrary to hold on to it or “buy” it back from the peasants (whether peasants were coerced into selling or driven to sell by poverty and debt remains open to debate). A landowner might hire laborers or, even better, retain a steady supply of workers by granting them some land and demanding, in return, that they work his land three, four, and even in extreme cases six days a week. Feudalism granted the lord the power to enforce such decisions, which is why feudal economics cannot be separated from power.

Western European lords, as a rule, did not till their domains themselves. Their estates were divided into two distinct parts: the demesne, that part of the land that remained under their direct control, and tenures allocated to peasants. When the lord divvied up his domains or settled peasants on new land he insured himself a ready supply of workers who either worked part-time on his fields, or paid him a rent with which he hired servants. In Germany this system was called *Grundherrschaft* to distinguish it from *Gutsherrschaft* (most common in eastern Europe), where most of the estate remained under the lord’s direct control.

Late medieval tenures were either long-term or perpetual leaseholds (emphyteutic), where the peasants received one or several plots, a garden, orchard, perhaps vineyard, or any combination or fraction of these to treat as their own and pass on to their heirs or even sell in return for a number of fixed dues, services, and fees that they owed the lord. The peasants were the de facto owners, having the use value of the land, but the lord remained the final proprietor and peasants continued to owe him dues and/or services in recognition of that fact.

Under the most oppressive conditions of tenure, serfdom, peasants were bound to the estate and forced to work the lord’s domain in return for their allotments. Their servile status could be based on personal bondage—known as *Leibeigenschaft* in German, *mainmorte* in French, *Remença* in Spain, and *neifty* in England—or it could be a condition attached to the land, meaning to the peculiar demands of tenure on a seigneurial estate: the type of relationship that the English called villenage. In western Europe as of the later Middle Ages, personal bondage had been superseded by land based bondage and greater personal freedom. Labor services were commuted to cash, hold on tenures became more secure, and some of the more humiliating seigneurial rights were dispensed with. Peasants recovered their mobility, their ability to bequeath or to marry outside the seigneurie without the consent of their lord. Most important, most tenures became hereditary. Whenever possible, the lord converted previous constraints into payments. Thus, seigneurial relations were transformed into primarily economic transactions. Personal serfdom, on the other hand, was introduced into eastern Europe at the time when it was disappearing in the West, a process known as the second serfdom.

TENANT FARMING AND SHARECROPPING IN THE PREMODERN ERA

Most peasants and serfs, that is free and unfree rustics, possessed tenancies. The terms and nature of tenancy varied. They ranged from quasi ownership to full-fledged economically based rentals. Along with emphyteutic leaseholds, which were either perpetual or lasted up to ninety-nine years, there existed tenures of one to three lives (that of the husband, the wife, and their son, who could upon their death renegotiate for himself three further lives), medium-length tenures of eighteen to twenty-four years, and short-term rentals of one, three, six, or nine years; multiples of three were the most common for they reflected the three-field rotation cycle. Shorter leases were, much like modern

rentals, gauged economically on the basis of market prices—in England this was called rack rent—rather than having the fixed fees of hereditary rights of tenure. The tenant-farmer typically paid a high entry fee (or fine) and an annual rent based on the anticipated returns from the land during the length of the lease. From the late Middle Ages onward this became the most common way of leasing the demesne, that part of his domain that the lord did not parcel out as tenures, especially in continental Europe (except east of the Elbe). From the demesne the practice eventually spread to other tenures as lords tried to increase their profits by reducing the number of emphyteutic tenures and making peasants pay returns proportional to their produce. This might happen, for example, when bad economic conditions coupled with high state taxation drove peasants into debt and forced them to relinquish their holdings. The lord might then buy the plots and rent them back under new terms. The progression in the types of tenancies, that is, the changing demands and needs of lords, can be reconstituted through surviving leases, grants, litigation, and sometimes legislation.

Rentals came in two basic forms: the fixed rents described above, which were adjusted with each new contract, and sharecropping agreements, where the landowner and renter supposedly shared the produce equally, hence the terms *métayage* in French and *mezzadria* in Italian from the words meaning “half.” Although this terminology was most common, sharecropping agreements might only involve the payment of one-fifth or one-third of the produce, fitting better the Spanish usage of the term *aparcería*, or partnership. But in Spain also sharecropping ranged from one-third to equal shares in the produce. Sharecropping prevailed in some parts of Europe but not in others. It was, for example, unknown in England and much of northern Europe, but common in Italy, France, Spain, and parts of the Rhineland throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.

Sharecropping contracts have generally been taken as a sign of poverty: the tenant, being unable to furnish any capital, relied on the owner to provide the seeds, animals, and running capital to work the farm, in return for which he offered his labor and tools and handed over half his produce. Sometimes, the landlord agreed to pay state taxes. In parts of north and central Italy, where sharecropping emerged in the twelfth century as a substitute for serfdom, small landholders with a few parcels took on sharecropping contracts, which augmented what they grew on their own plots (this combination of ownership and rental seems most typical of Piedmont). These farms of about ten

to thirty hectares produced a little of everything: cereals, fruits, vegetables, and wine. As S. R. Epstein explains, this arrangement suited landlords, whose main concern was to reduce labor costs. Unlike specialized cash crops, the mixed production kept the workforce busy all year round, but was also less profitable in the long run. In Lombardy and in the south, where farms were much bigger, from 50 to 130 hectares, tenant-farmers (*masseri*) either hired laborers or sublet the less fertile parts of their land. By the eighteenth century tenant-farming had become more common in north and south Italy than sharecropping, which however survived in central Italy until the nineteenth century. Another arrangement that became widespread was the grouping of farms under common management (*fattoria*) worked either by tenant-farmers or day laborers. Sharecropping was slow to disappear from areas where it had existed for centuries. For example in 1862 there were still 400,000 tenant-farmers and 200,000 sharecroppers in France.

In the later Middle Ages, peasants did not lease for brief periods but had hereditary rights to tenancies, which were recognized by customary law (or the custom of the manor, hence in England peasants were known as customary tenants). As territorial states began to consolidate in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, rulers upheld this customary law. In the case of England, unfree peasants came to be called copyholders because they were given a copy of the documents attesting their right to their tenure. The revival of Roman law, favored by centralizing rulers, was at first detrimental to peasants because Roman law defined much more bluntly the difference between free and servile status, and serfs were forbidden recourse to public courts and were left at the mercy of their masters.

Yet, because it was not in the long-term interest of most rulers to relinquish control over vast numbers of their subjects, territorial lords sided with peasants against seigneurial lords. Where once a “contract” had bound lord and peasant, with the first protecting the second in adversity in return for labor and rent, now the state inserted itself as the protector of the peasants against the demands of the lords. The Germans had a name for it: *Bauernschutzpolitik*, peasant protection policies. Peasants could once again appeal to public courts, and were liberated from the most onerous of seigneurial exactions. Instead they became liable to the public fisc. In France, as of 1439, the king forbade seigneurs from levying taxes and replaced them with his own. To put it bluntly, in this “trade” one blood-sucker replaced another. Seigneurial payments had not all been extinguished and continued to be a drain on peasant incomes. The demands of the state, how-

ever, represented the most onerous fiscal burden from then on.

SEIGNEURIAL DUES

Hereditary tenures owed periodic, usually annual, payments in cash or kind. The amounts were fixed at the time of the agreement. By the twelfth century inflation had reduced cash payments to insignificance, even if they were supplemented by a capon or some eggs. Where an additional rent was paid in kind (in France this was called a *champart* or *terrage*) it could be onerous: as much as 8 percent of the peasant's crop in France (likewise in Spain) levied right after the harvest. In the Middle Ages, lords derived as much as 90 percent of their income from various seigneurial payments. This amount diminished substantially over the next centuries, as lords came to depend primarily on rents and on income from royal and princely courts. By the late eighteenth century, seigneurial payments commonly represented 15 to 30 percent of revenues, although in some Germanic lands they might still amount to 50 percent, as they had in 1500. Payments varied from place to place because tenures were created at different times under different circumstances. No one can do justice to the multiplicity and variety of fees that might be asked of European tenants. Jerome Blum reports that a seigneurie in northwest Germany listed 138 different obligations. Such a variety defies generalization, and few scholars attempt it. Faced with a baffling array of incommensurable data, they are more likely to focus on dynamics within a specific region.

Lords not only charged a quitrent, or fixed fee, they were also entitled to collect a series of incidental fees, called casualties. Some related directly to their "eminent" possession of the land and were levied when a tenant sold his tenure (these went by different names: *lods et ventes* in French, *laudemium* in Latin, *Lehns geld* in German) or when he bequeathed it (in English, heriot). This fee might be trivial or rise to one-quarter of the value of the holding. Other payments had once signified the peasants' servile status: their lack of mobility, their inability to marry out of the seigneurie without the lord's consent (the fee known as *marchet* or *formariage*), or their obligation to support the lord's expenditures in war, contribute to his ransom, or help pay for his daughter's wedding. Lords could reclaim the land if a peasant died intestate, and had the right to forestall a sale (*retrait seigneurial*). In Catalonia, lords went so far as fining servile peasants whose wives committed adultery (*cugucia*). Paul Freedman has reminded us how deeply peasants

resented such degrading payments, how hard they fought for their abolition, and how much they spent on manumissions, that is, the release from bondage. The bundle of offensive payments known as *mals usos* (bad customs) were rescinded in Catalonia in 1486 after a successful peasant rebellion.

By the eleventh century lords throughout Europe charged fees for the use of various services they monopolized: flour mills; bread ovens; wine and olive presses; local markets; passage on roads, bridges, and rivers; weights and measures; and forests or fishponds; and they fined anyone found poaching or bypassing their facilities. Casualties and *banalités* (seigneurial monopolies) were a way for lords to get additional moneys from their tenants, especially those tenants who had secure holdings with fixed rents, which brought lords little revenue. These payments could be changed or increased at will, although they tended to be governed by the custom of the manor/seigneurie. Labor services, which had been the hallmark of serfdom, were generally commuted into rent. Where they survived into the early modern period, they amounted to two or three days' labor a year, although sometimes as many as fourteen. Service days fell at harvest time, and peasants highly resented this interference with their own farming. But for the most part, payments that pertained to servile status were either abolished outright or withered into insignificance as part of the liberties western European peasants gained in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. That made payments directly linked to land and various *banal* monopolies all the more important to lords. These survived for centuries in most of continental Europe, to disappear only in the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century.

Despite the clear coercive power of lords, the balance of power between them and their tenants was also governed by economic forces and demographic factors. The support of the state played an important role, and peasant resistance should not be underestimated. Rural communities fought excessive seigneurial exactions with lawsuits and uprisings. Moreover, seigneuries did not always coincide with villages, but could be spread over several, or cover only a part of any given village, depending on how and when they had been constituted. Thus, most peasants lived in villages with multiple owners and lords. As time went on, peasants could also appeal to a reconstituted central state. Everywhere, there were multiple, competing authorities, and peasants learned quickly how to play one against the other.

Although there is no uniformity, scholars estimate that by the eighteenth century peasants paid half of their net profits to the state in taxes, to the church

as tithes, and to the seigneurs in rents and dues. In Germany, 60 percent of peasant payments went to the state (representing 25 percent of average output), 30 percent to the lords, and 10 percent to the church. In the mid-eighteenth century the French physiocrat François Quesnay believed a similar distribution to be true of France. Taxes, dues, and tithes might take from one-third to one-half of peasant produce in France and Spain, but only one-third in Switzerland and Austria. These figures sometimes include rent and sometimes not. State taxation increased everywhere, rising to intolerable amounts in wartime, and hitting peasants especially hard since they bore the brunt of the burden. Rents also fluctuated depending on economic circumstances. They rose during the eighteenth century, cutting into tenant-farmer profits. The difficulty in assessing the weight of such exactions is not merely that demands might fluctuate from year to year, but that no one can say for certain how much peasants produced. Payments were either tendered in coin or kind, meaning primarily wheat, the most valuable of cereals. Average yields in Europe before the agricultural revolution have been estimated to lie anywhere between 2:1 and 10:1, although 4:1 seems the most likely. Peasant expenditures have been calculated on that uncertain basis. Given the uncertainty about peasant incomes, estimates reinforce both bleak and sanguine views of the peasant estate.

SERFDOM AND THE STATE

Historians assess the factors that were most significant in altering agrarian relations in the fourteenth century differently. Some (*Annales* school historians in particular) have emphasized demographic factors. Others (particularly marxists) have argued that the crisis was political and signified a long-term transformation of the feudal economy and its mode of surplus extraction into its absolutist version. These arguments were particularly ferocious in the 1970s, culminating in what is known as the Brenner debate, after Robert Brenner's attack on neo-Malthusian interpretations. Research on peasant resistance in the 1980s and 1990s has bolstered the Brenner side of the debate by fastening on local power relations. While few contest the significance of the demographic crises of the fourteenth century, they disagree about the peasants' ability to profit from them, which, not surprisingly, varied from place to place.

The late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries witnessed population explosion, land hunger, and rising prices with concomitant declining wages, followed by a series of catastrophes—crop failures, wars, and

epidemics, of which the worst was the Black Death of 1348. These disasters drastically reduced population, lowered demand for food, collapsed agricultural prices, and raised wages. While lords had been eager to take advantage of favorable economic conditions to regain control of the fields, peasants after the plague were able to improve their lot significantly. Lords who had acquired vacated farms were looking to rent them. Depopulation put peasants in a position of strength, and many won freedom from serfdom, reduced rents, and secure tenures from lords eager to attract them. This was not the universal response, however.

Lords, conscious of their power, tried at first to compel peasants to remain on their land by reinstating a harsh serfdom that severely restricted their mobility. They failed in this because peasants fled to more welcoming terrain or openly rebelled. Lords were successful in England and Catalonia, where serfdom was reintroduced with the support of temporarily weakened states. By the late fifteenth century, however, serfdom had been officially abolished in Catalonia and had disappeared from England. Italy also underwent a form of refeudalization between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, which consisted primarily in the landowners' recognition of the overlordship of territorial states rather than in the enserfment of the peasants.

In eastern Europe, which is a case apart, serfdom was successfully introduced in the sixteenth and seventeenth century by lords who controlled large estates and wanted them worked by compulsory labor services. In Germany east of the Elbe, Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, the Danubian Principalities, and Russia, serfdom became the norm at a time when it disappeared almost completely from western Europe. In those regions, lords' control over a servile population was ratified by state legislation and survived until abolished in the nineteenth century.

The reinstatement of serfdom in England and Catalonia in the fourteenth century, and later in eastern Europe, was achieved with the collaboration of recreated territorial states, whose rulers needed the support of their nobilities, and whose royal decrees upheld seigneurial law. State formation had two major consequences: the introduction of civil law that competed with customary law, and taxation that vied with the lord's exactions.

COMMUNAL ASPECTS OF LAND TENURE

One factor that made tenure so complex was that no owner or renter in pre-modern times had the exclusive usufruct of his property. All land had a communal

dimension, and most villages also owned land communally. These should not be conflated.

Villages consisted of arable fields and pastures and areas that were considered too sterile to till—wastes, swamps, roadways, and fields that had been abandoned and never reclaimed. Often, the barren lands were turned into communal meadows; in some places they belonged to the seigneur, in others to the village community by dint of immemorial possession or documentary evidence. In northern France where the adage “*nulle terre sans seigneur*” (no land without a lord) obtained, the land was presumed to belong to the lord unless the community could prove otherwise. In the south the opposite was true, for there it was the seigneur who needed to show proof: “*nul seigneur sans titre*” (no lord without a title). This distinction became especially important in the eighteenth century, when both seigneurs and villagers claimed to own such communal land or “commons.” This land was used primarily for grazing cattle and, while extremely important to all peasants, was crucial for smallholders who had no other way to pasture their animals. A vast literature examines that question for England during the period of enclosures, when the commons vanished. Communal properties were important in Spain, Italy, Alpine regions, and elsewhere where pasturing was a major activity. The privatization of the commons in early modern Europe (usually by state decree), to feed a growing population, went hand in hand with an expansion of the arable at the expense of pasture.

Besides this unclaimed/communal land, all land became at some point communal, notably in regions of open-field farming. The village arable was divided into large sections—two in the case of biennial rotation and three in triennial—that were planted at the same time with the same crop or left fallow. These fields, either when fallow and overgrown with weeds or after the harvest, would be turned into grazing grounds, primarily for sheep. Given the lack of fodder, grazing on the stubble made the possession of animals possible. Also, manure was the principal form of fertilizer before the advent of chemicals, making pasturing a necessary part of farming. All land was declared “open” to pasturing after the harvest, including artificial meadows where the community shared in the second crop. The lord, whose estate might be separate from or mingled within the peasant fields, was also entitled to graze his flocks on the stubble.

It was long presumed that lords were opposed to communal forms of farming and wished them replaced with enclosed private properties; but by the eighteenth century it was they, more often than not, who profited most from communal lands. Villagers

benefited from the *quid pro quos* such as the right to scavenge for berries or wood in seigneurial and communal forests. As long as one was a village resident with some land, whether owned or rented, one was entitled to send one’s animals on the communal grazing grounds, be they fallow or waste (the number of animals that could be pastured was sometimes prorated), and to share other use rights. For this reason, “closed” villages in Germany and Austria carefully controlled residence and membership in the village community.

Such seasonal devolution of fields into the common domain, such rights of pasture (which, if they spread beyond the village boundaries, were known as intercommoning), and the entire series of use rights came under severe attack in the eighteenth century, and they were replaced—sometimes easily, sometimes after a hard struggle—with enclosed farms and individual property rights. French Revolutionaries who decreed individual property rights and abolished feudal tenures as of the summer of 1789 could not agree about the fate of communal properties, and allowed Old Regime practices to stand. In Spain and Italy, restrictions on property rights eroded in the early modern period as communities sold their commons, usually to settle communal debts. Liberal reformers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries made privatization a byword for liberty and progress.

In England, where philosophers had linked independence with individual property since the late seventeenth century, agricultural development was equated with big compact farms liberated from communal servitudes, where each farmer could grow what he wanted, when he wanted, without interference. Land was removed from common cultivation and en-

closed as of the sixteenth century, though the pace quickened in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. English scholars continue to argue the benefits and drawbacks of enclosures, assessing its effects on productivity and on a small peasantry deprived of communal grazing grounds. Elsewhere in Europe, the survival of communal practices into the modern period was taken, until recently, as a sign of economic backwardness.

FRAGMENTATION OF LANDHOLDINGS

A farm of twenty to twenty-five hectares had since the Middle Ages been taken as the basic unit of taxation, going by the Latin name of *mansus*, or “hide” in English, *Hufe* in German, *mas* in Spanish, and *manse* in French (but also *charrue* as the unit of land that could be cultivated with one plow). Smaller properties were assessed as proportions of the basic unit. Whether owned or leased, this was the amount considered necessary for self-sufficiency, for living off farming alone.

Yet, as of the twelfth century fragmentation became the norm, and the majority of peasants lived on far less, putting their survival at risk in times of dearth. The drop in population in the fourteenth century allowed the reconstitution of larger farmsteads but the process of fragmentation began as soon as population rose once more. That is why some seigneurs and territorial rulers insisted on impartible inheritance, which maintained viable farms and thus more secure bases for taxation and dues. In England, as in Catalonia, nobiliary models of primogeniture, favoring the eldest son, spread early to the peasantry (in Spanish, *hereu*). In the rest of Spain, however, all heirs shared in the inheritance. In the Hohenlohe region of Germany, the counts in 1562 and again in 1655 forbade peasants to divide their holdings. Regimes of impartible inheritance governed four-fifths of Germany, much of Austria, and a few regions of France. There, the child who inherited the farm had to compensate siblings with cash. In areas of partible inheritance, such as Castile, most of France, southern Germany, and Italy, patrimonies were split among all surviving children, although, there too, one heir could opt to buy out his siblings by common agreement. Peasant choices depended on family strategies for survival. The more one delves into what peasants actually did with their properties, the more complicated things look. One should keep in mind that the amount that peasants owned was not necessarily the amount they farmed. Early modern European peasants owned about one-third of the land directly, either as freeholders with full prop-

erty rights or as seigneurial tenants with de facto ownership. But they tilled the remainder by leasing it from noble, ecclesiastical, and absentee urban landlords. The most successful, as we shall see, were the tenant-farmers of vast estates. But below them were plowmen (*laboureurs* in French, *labradores* in Spanish, and what Germans usually mean by *Bauer*) with some land of their own, and the farming implements (plows, horses, or oxen) to take on additional rentals. In most places in Europe, the best land had been granted to the privileged, so that rentals were generally more fertile and thus more profitable than peasant plots. Even peasants with only a few acres might rent a plot or two from other villagers—those too old to till it themselves or those who had moved away while keeping property in the village—or from the parish church. This land was not usually of high quality, but it provided a supplement. A mix of property and leasehold was therefore quite common.

Nonetheless, there was evident growing fragmentation and in the early modern period land tenure became more and more polarized between big holdings on the one hand and small or even tiny tenancies on the other. Demographic upsurge accounts for increased fragmentation at a time when it was no longer possible to extend the arable by cultivating the wastes or by clearing and colonizing new land. Several mitigating factors might explain why peasants would be willing to subdivide tiny plots: access to the commons, the availability of rental property, supplementary work on large estates, the option of planting vines (which necessitated little land for a decent return), and cottage industry. Although the result could be pauperization and eventually “proletarianization” as peasants made do with only a house and selling their labor, it is wrong to think of peasants as lemmings, accepting misery as their lot.

Everywhere, near-landless peasants became a majority. Spain in 1792 reported 16.5 percent peasant owners, 30.5 percent renters, and 53 percent day laborers. In early modern Italy, farms in the central regions covered 10 to 30 hectares, whereas in Lombardy they ranged from 50 to 130 hectares and were surrounded by subdivided smallholdings, as were the *latifundia* in the south and in Sicily. In England, near-landless squatters and cottagers made up 20 to 90 percent of the rural population, depending on the region; overall they amounted to 20 to 30 percent in the sixteenth century, but close to 50 percent in the seventeenth century. The same was true of France where three-quarters of peasants tilled less than 5 acres (2.2 hectares). Fragmentation occurred even in areas of compact farms. In Austria in 1600, big, middling, and small peasantries represented respectively 9, 61,

and 31 percent of the rural population. By 1700 the proportion was 18, 29, and 53 percent. In Saxony full holdings fell from 50 percent of tenures in 1550, to 25 percent in 1750, and 14 percent in 1843.

While tiny peasant holdings multiplied, large farms increased in size. In France, especially around Paris, tenant-farms grew from an average of 50 hectares (or two *charrues*) in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, to 80 hectares in the seventeenth century. The disruptions of the Fronde, the demands of the fisc, and the long drop in prices in the late seventeenth century caused havoc among middling peasants. Their abandoned holdings were integrated within existing farms, so that the average farm covered 135 hectares by the second half of the seventeenth century, and 210 hectares in the eighteenth century. Farms were much bigger in England than in France. In the eighteenth century, a large English estate was reckoned at 10,000 acres, or 4,000 hectares—ten times the size of the biggest French equivalent. In France, Jean-Michel Chevet reports, farms of 50 to 100 hectares grew at the detriment of farms in the 10 to 50 hectare range or smaller. The ranks of middling peasants thinned everywhere, although they fared better in Germany than elsewhere. There, rich farmers grew richer and poor ones poorer, but some middling peasants managed to hold onto their family farms, often with the help of landlords who extended them credit in difficult times.

Farms increased in size as lords consolidated their domains in order to profit from price rises (or, as happened in England, Spain, and parts of Germany,

to convert their estates from arable to pasture when food prices dropped, and then back again to cereals when market conditions changed). In Italy, France, and England, the richest peasants were not substantial landowners in their own right. Rather they farmed the new, enlarged demesnes for the lords and owned only a few plots of their own. Such tenant-farmers prospered, especially where they managed to stay in place for generations. They intermarried, controlled village councils and vestries when they could, collected dues for the seigneurs and tithes for the church, acted as moneylenders to other peasants, and marketed grain on distant markets or dealt with urban grain merchants. Nicknamed *coqs de village* in France, they were a tight-knit oligarchy and for eighteenth-century agronomists they figured as the acme of rural society and hopes for future developments.

Historical revisionism has not downplayed the importance of rich tenant-farmers. Rather, scholars have examined more closely the “losers” in this trend toward bigger and bigger farms: the middle and small peasantry. In doing so, they have altered our picture of agrarian change. Thus, Robert C. Allen has argued that the agricultural revolution in England owed much to the middling groups of landowners (the yeomen) with 60 to 100 acres (25 to 40 hectares). They prospered in the sixteenth and especially the seventeenth century, introducing new crops, doubling their productivity, and laying the ground, so to speak, for the eighteenth-century large-scale improvements on big estates. Yet, by the eighteenth century large farms had the clear advantage over middling and small peasantry,

although many more survived into the mid-nineteenth century than had been supposed.

Not too long ago, farm size was taken as the indicator of economic health: the bigger, the more efficient. The European ideal had once been the small, intensive, and highly productive family farm of medieval and early modern Flanders. By the eighteenth century this model had been superseded by the extensive farming (preferably of a specialized sort) using hired laborers—full-time servants, seasonal migrants, or local small peasants—which prevailed in Britain. This version governed analyses of economic growth from the eighteenth century onward. England was the model, France and other European countries poor replicas. Few people contest that the agricultural revolution began in England (though they disagree as to when) but they balk at the implicit value judgements. Local studies have shown that English progress was slower and more sporadic than once thought. Studies have also demonstrated that open-field farming could be as productive as enclosed properties. Concomitantly, research has revealed far more complicated and often advanced patterns on the Continent. The common understanding is that there was no right or wrong way to “modernity,” but rather a multiplicity of paths. Regions once considered backward (Spain, for example), appear to have been as responsive to economic stimuli as “capitalist” England. If historians now uncover blockages in the way of economic growth, it is more in state taxation and the organization of markets than in seigneurial exactions, customary constraints, or forms of land tenure.

CONCLUSION

Land tenure, the historian Jerome Blum argued, can be divided into “good” and “bad.” Good tenures made

the least financial demands on peasants and their hold on them was most secure; bad tenures were accompanied by high demands for labor or rents and were revocable at will. Michael Bush has challenged that view, claiming that the best tenancies were in fact those that owed labor services, since peasants could spare the extra hands, profit from the security of tenure, be spared the fluctuations in prices, and avoid the dispossession of disinherited siblings that most western Europeans suffered. It is perhaps safest to say that peasants both lost and profited from agrarian regimes. The advent of private property in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, which abolished feudal eminent possession and made peasants the true proprietors of their holdings, freed peasants from irksome and sometimes onerous payments. At the same time, the concentration of land in a few hands—which progressed at different rates in different regions—meant that small and middling peasants were unable to compete in the long run, and had to abandon for good the small-scale part-time farming that had ordered peasant lives for centuries.

The mechanization of agriculture at the end of the nineteenth century, the important capital outlay that it required, and the vast properties that made it worthwhile transformed the European countryside yet again. Peasants, unable to compete, sold out, though in some parts of Europe not until after World War II. In Eastern Europe collectivized farms were imposed by Communist regimes, and briefly attempted by left-wing governments in the West, for example in Spain in the 1930s. Yet, it was the resilience of small-scale mixed farming that saved some Third World countries from total destitution in an era when foreign experts and the World Bank imposed on them the model of large-scale cash cropping. Such realizations are bound to complicate further our approach to and understanding of land tenure in the West.

See also The Annales Paradigm; Marxism and Radical History (volume 1); and other articles in this section.

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SERFDOM: WESTERN EUROPE



Liana Vardi

Serfdom is a form of bondage. Unlike slavery in the Roman Empire or in the American South, where the slave was considered chattel for the master to treat as he or she pleased and had no legal recourse, serfdom came in many variants, and the rights and obligations of serfs differed from place to place. Serfdom was primarily a means of attaching peasants to the land, restricting their mobility and choice of how, where, and when to dispose of their own labor, and of extracting payments in return for services over which the landowner had a monopoly. Hence serfdom, like slavery, was predicated on the use of power by one group over another, but unlike slavery it rested on a modicum of consent because, despite the unequal distribution of power, the system was more responsive to peasant pressure and needs.

In the medieval West serfdom was a way of organizing agricultural production and governing people. In its latter function, and marxists would argue in the former as well, serfdom was thus linked to the fragmentation of power associated with the breakup of the Roman Empire and its successor states and the devolution of public powers to local lords. This process, known as feudalism, took centuries to evolve and then centuries to decline, so the history of serfdom becomes a pendant to western European state building. This article examines the social, economic, and political aspects of serfdom and reviews its cultural ramifications.

EMERGENCE OF SERFDOM

In the middle of the nineteenth century Karl Marx posited three stages of economic development: the ancient or slave mode of production, the feudal mode of production, and the capitalist mode of production, which he envisioned as eventually superseded by communism. Feudalism, in this schema, was a political system in which the ruling class extracted agricultural surpluses from peasants through the use of extra-economic coercion. The survival of the ruling class

depended on this oppression of the peasantry, an oppression most clearly displayed in the institution of serfdom. What was serfdom in this marxist model? In an era of extremely low yields, crops had to be grown on vast tracts of land to produce surpluses and required armies of laborers. Slavery was one answer to this problem but, with the disintegration of the Roman Empire and the disappearance of steady supplies of slaves, a homegrown version was devised that took some though not all the elements of slavery by evolving new ways of tying labor to the land. The decay of the state and its replacement with autonomous lordships was the natural consequence of this localized, low-level productivity. This version privileged the inner logic, the imperative dictating the forms both of serfdom and feudalism. The economic limitations of the era imposed the system most suited to surplus extraction.

Historians have not totally abandoned this interpretation but have introduced nuances and chronologies that render the process more diffuse, haphazard, and uneven. Local circumstances and local arrangements have become more important than abstract models in explaining how feudalism and serfdom actually worked. Moreover, the association between Roman slavery and medieval serfdom, once commonplace, has been challenged by interpretations that posit a break between the two in the ninth and tenth centuries and the full emergence of serfdom only in the eleventh.

Roman agriculture relied on slaves both on large estates and on small farms. On the bigger estates, slave gangs housed in dormitories cultivated the crops, while family farms might use one or two slave helpers. In the late Roman Empire, slaves were settled on estates divided into two sections: the reserve of land retained by the landowner and a series of plots given to the slaves to till as their own, hence their name *servi casati* (hutted slaves) or *coloni* (colonists), growing enough food to sustain themselves and their families. To remedy the labor shortage, slaves were permitted to marry. They were given a stake in the estate through

plots, which they farmed and could pass on to their heirs. In return for these plots, the slaves owed the landowner rent, dues, services, and most importantly labor on their domains. Some slaves were not given land but were retained on the estate as servants. They were called *mancipia* to differentiate them from the landed serfs. Slaves passed on their servile status to their children. Later those enserfed by dint of their birth, a condition referred to in English as neifty, were known as bondsmen and bondswomen. In other languages they were *nativi per corpora*, *nativi domini de sanguine*; *hommes de corps*, *Leibeigene*, and *Erbuntertanen*. The historian Michael Bush has considered medieval serfdom an amalgam of this settlement of slaves and another late Roman development, the tying of peasant tenants to an estate by imperial decree. Those who rented land were forbidden from moving away, reducing them to bondage because of the land they occupied. They came to be called tenurial serfs, tenants of lands in villeinage, *serfs à la glèbe*, *Gutsunternanen*, and *servi terrae*. The origin of enserfment, via blood or via land tenure, continued to differentiate types of servility. Descendants of settled slaves generally owed more services than tenurial serfs who retained a higher status.

In the cases described above, slave and peasant were turned into serfs without their consent. Yet from the seventh to the tenth centuries, one finds repeated instances of peasants giving themselves into bondage, apparently willingly, and most frequently to churches and monasteries, to whom they donated their land, renting it back as bonded laborers. The reasons were manifold: piety, desire for protection in unsettled times, debt, and in some cases crime. These voluntary enserfments demonstrate that serfdom is a complicated process with numerous causes and ramifications that do not readily yield to simple schema.

SERVILE OBLIGATIONS

Whatever the means of their enserfment, over time serfs became liable to a range of payments and were expected to perform labor services for their lords. The most important services were agricultural labor on the demesne or that part of the estate the lord retained as his own, haulage and cartage, military aid or its equivalent, upkeep of the lord's castle, and food and lodging for the lord's men when they visited the area. Serfs remained at the master's mercy, meaning that he could dictate to them the terms and nature of their obligations at will. This arbitrariness, mainly the lot of bondsmen, was one of the most resented aspects of serfdom and the most combated. By the late Middle

Ages serfs demanded and gradually obtained fixed dues and services, a situation that most tenurial serfs already enjoyed, except in those places and times when lords extended their demands and imposed harsher terms on all their dependants, a process examined below.

Although the system was predicated on labor services on the demesne, the trend in Western medieval serfdom was to reduce this forced labor. In region after region labor services fell by the thirteenth century from an initial three to six days a week to a maximum of a couple of weeks a year known as *corvées*, boons, or *noctes*. Since the several days they owed consisted of plowing and harvesting, the most important phases in the agricultural calendar, this continued service to the lord interrupted the serfs' work on their own plots. The reduction of labor services and their commutation into cash arose from the lords' increasing need for revenue. Over time they gave up tilling their properties directly and leased more of the demesne since collecting rent from serfs was more lucrative than feeding them. What is more, the rise in population in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries provided cheap seasonal labor for lords who continued to farm their domains.

Initially serfs paid symbolic annual rents on their tenures, a few coins supplemented by a fowl, eggs, a piece of linen, or another gift in kind, that

expressed the lord's continued primary ownership of that land. The commutation of labor services to cash created an additional rent due either in cash or kind depending on the time and place.

Different types of tenures developed. While most serfs enjoyed long-term or perpetual leases known in Roman law as *emphyteutic*, other tenures were leased for shorter periods ranging from three to twenty-four years and rents were adjusted at the termination of each lease. One of the perceived advantages of serfdom for the peasant, historians reckon, was that it ensured long-term tenure, in the best of circumstances at fixed rents.

Since the system was predicated on the control of labor, serfs could not leave the estate, dispose of their land, or marry out of the lord's jurisdiction without his consent and the payment of a fee. They remained bound to the land with the greater independence that came from "owning" their plots and passing them on to their heirs and from the symbiotic relationship that made the landowners dependent on their work and their rent. This arrangement of demesne and peasant tenures with their array of labor services and rents, commonly referred to as the manorial system, spread throughout Europe in Carolingian times.

Attached to the manor or living alongside it was a free peasantry that survived the Roman Empire and the reconfiguration of barbarian tribes into small kingdoms in the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries. These peasants owned farms large enough for a family to till, roughly the area worked by one plow, called *mansi*, *manses*, hides, or *Hufen*, that later became units of taxation. Free peasants answered to their territorial ruler, whether a king, duke, or count. They could appeal to his law, and they paid him taxes. To benefit from common pastures and woods, these free peasants might also pay a fee to the local landowner or lord. Their land, however, remained their sole property and was known as allodial. The debates about serfdom and its extent rest on divided opinions about the resilience of this free peasantry or its reduction, gradual or abrupt, to servitude around the eleventh century.

Debates about this process arise in part from the lack of documentation in an age when record keeping was decentralized and haphazard and invading Vikings, Saracens, and Magyars plundered monasteries and dispersed their archives. Debates also hinge on the changing meanings of terms inherited from Rome. Latin terms for slave, such as *servus* for men and *ancilla* for women, came to suggest different levels of dependency and were applied to serfs and freemen alike. At this juncture the new word "slave" (*esclave*, *esclavo*, *schivo*, or *Sklave*) emerged in Europe from

the Slav merchants who provided actual slaves in medieval times. The coexistence of personal and tenurial forms of servitude complicated matters because servitude was tied to individuals in some cases and to land in other cases. Over time free peasants might rent land on which they owed servile services, whereas serfs might till free land. Mixed marriages raised further questions about status. Did they enslave the freeman or free the slave? In Germany, for example, children's servility derived from the status of their mother. Roman law did not recognize slaves as it did free peasants, though research suggests that the law in the late empire did. In other words, slaves could not appeal to the royal or comital courts that supplanted the Roman ones. Membership in village communities was initially denied to personal serfs though it might be extended to tenurial serfs. In time, however, the community came to accept and integrate them all.

Historians who question the continuity between Roman slavery and medieval serfdom point to a decrease in slavery in the ninth and tenth centuries. In Spain, for example, the upheavals caused by the invasions and the weaknesses of the post-Carolingian state allowed many to gain their freedom. When serfdom was imposed in the eleventh century, it fell on a free peasantry whose independence had deteriorated because of poverty. Subdivision of plots among heirs made successful farming difficult. Growing indebtedness forced many to forfeit or sell their land and to rent instead. In this version, only a minority of European peasants owned land by the eleventh century. What differentiated the remainder was the range of obligations attached to their tenures. Free tenants paid rent and owed services specified in leases, contracts, or by local custom. Serfs owed services and rent at the discretion of their lords. Since it was not in the interest of lords to alienate their tenants, conditions for serfs usually followed the custom of the manor, so in England these were sometimes called customary tenants. Changes in the nature of lordship in the eleventh century granted lords increased powers.

NEW FORM OF LORDSHIP

Roman and barbarian law codes defined person and status clearly, differentiating a citizen from a slave. The dilution and gradual erosion of these law codes into local customs as royal and public powers weakened in the aftermath of new invasions and the disintegration of the Carolingian state makes it extremely difficult and controversial to reconstruct a linear progression in rural relations and to generalize its extent. It is as if rural society disappeared into a tunnel to

reappear several centuries later with a different configuration. In some cases, slaves and freemen became serfs. Generic terms for “peasant,” including *rustici* in Italian, *Bauer* in German, and *vilain* in French, entered the languages, although the equivalent term “villein” in English was confined to the unfree. Historians have associated these phenomena with two trends. As early as the ninth century, society was viewed by jurists and clerics as divided into three groups: those who prayed and those who fought supported by those who worked. All rustics were thus treated as part of the laboring class, one strain in the leveling process. More pertinent was the devolution of power lower down the social hierarchy from monarchs and counts to their knights and supporters, who were granted or who seized territories and legal and pecuniary rights over them. What had once been public authority was converted to and confused with private authority. These new lords, ensconced in castles their estates, acquired banal (pronounced bay-nal) lordship in English, *seigneurie banale* in French, and *Grundherrschaft* in German. The fact that free and unfree peasants lived on territories designated as banal lordships merged their status, for all became subject to the lord’s law.

For some historians this process of dissolution began in the ninth century if not earlier. For others the transformation occurred around the year 1000. This latter thesis was put forward by the French medievalists Marc Bloch and Georges Duby, who posited a mutation in the eleventh century that significantly altered social relations in the French countryside. In this version, lords enjoyed uncontested authority for perhaps a century and a half. Then a hierarchy was reestablished and power accrued once again to counts, dukes, and as of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to monarchs. The overall thesis has been challenged by historians who question the date and the extent of the transformation. These scholars argue that changes in the eleventh century were neither clear-cut nor drastic, that lords did not obtain absolute authority, and that terminology is too uncertain to support wholesale assertions.

For Bloch, moreover, serfdom was characterized by three payments known in French as the *chevage*, a poll tax levied arbitrarily; the *formariage* (merchet), a fee to the lord for the right to marry a woman from outside the seigneurie by which the bride became a serf; and the *mainmorte* (heriot), which limited the serf’s freedom in allocating his inheritance. All those liable to these restrictions and the fees that accompanied them were considered serfs, meaning the majority of peasants. Further research has demonstrated that the distinction between free and unfree loosened

as of the eleventh century, so even freeborn peasants might be liable to some of those fees. Consequently the payments did not necessarily indicate free or unfree status, at least in France. Common subjection to banal lordship became the defining criterion for payments and services. Categories such as “free” and “unfree” disappeared, yielding instead the mixture of independence and dependence that typified all medieval social relations.

ASPECTS OF BANAL LORDSHIP

The confusion of public and private powers allowed lords to prosecute, levy taxes on, and collect dues from their tenants, servile or not, and from the surviving free peasantry. The lord’s role in defending the peace at a time when no other public authority existed meant that peasants of all stripe had to rely on the protection of his law court and his castle. This also meant that the lord had the means at hand to police his territory and to secure his peasants’ obedience and, as long as neighboring lords cooperated, the power to pursue runaway serfs. In return for protection, peasants helped build and maintain castles and fortifications, and they might be asked to perform guard duty. As weaponry became more sophisticated and costly, they were no longer expected to follow their lord into battle, a drop in status in this warrior society. Yet they were expected to help him defray its costs. The commutation of physical services to monetary payments became more common as seigneurs needed more money to fight their wars and to provide their households with luxuries.

The Austrian historian Otto Brunner has suggested that protection lay at the heart of the system. The lord ensured the safety of the inhabitants against marauders and protected their “rights” to their land against intruders. His authority resembled that of a head of household. Although the undisputed master, he was supposed to act for the benefit of his tenants and not arbitrarily. As lord he defended and upheld local custom, which devolved from old tribal law. The relationship between lord and peasant was not merely paternal but mirrored that between lord and vassal. The peasant, serf or free, who held a tenure from a lord owed him aid and fidelity, in some cases sealed by an oath. The lord bestowed on the peasant protection in times of war, food in times of famine, and at all times intercession with outside powers.

German historical tradition is more firmly attached to this feudal model than the English or the French. Werner Rösener, for example, attributes reciprocal obligations to the fact that both serfdom and

feudalism originated in the Roman estate system and in Teutonic tribal customs, which stressed clientage and oath taking. This similarity between serfdom and the feudal ceremonies of vassalage can be clearly perceived in the ritual of seisin, which took place at the death of a serf and the transfer of his holding to his heir. With a symbolic gesture, sometimes in the form of a rod passed to and fro, the lord “recovered” his land and then “granted it anew” to the heir, who thus acknowledged the lord’s primary ownership and hence his right to dues and services.

The fee on marriage (merchet) gave rise to a peculiar legend built around the ritual accompanying the lord’s agreement to a serf’s marriage. In some places he gestured toward or even crossed over the marriage bed. Over time this practice expanded into the myth of the “lord’s first night,” the right of the lord to deflower the bride. In the eighteenth century, thanks to plays by Voltaire and Pierre-Augustin Beaumarchais and to Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s opera *The Marriage of Figaro* (1786), this so-called right encapsulated for contemporaries all the horrors and humiliations of serfdom.

Banal lordship gave unscrupulous lords a free hand to increase their demands from their tenants, who lost their capacity to appeal to outside authorities. What is more, the distance from or dissolution

of public justice meant that it became increasingly difficult for peasants to prove their original freedom by a court writ, in the case of England, to demonstrate that they held allodial land protected by the king. The lord’s main asset was his law court. Although the devolution of public and royal power meant that some lords obtained what is known as high or blood justice allowing them to judge criminal cases, symbolized by a gallows, real profits came from low and middle justice, that is, civil suits and the settlement of local disputes, and in particular from fines for contravening the lord’s orders and decrees. Peasants were fined for every breach of the peace, for quarrels and insults, for petty thefts, for indecent behavior, for scavenging, and for planting and harvesting before the official date. Judges in these cases were the lord’s appointed stewards, who received a portion of the fines. Interestingly, although slaves had no legal existence and could not be called as witnesses, serfs, whatever their origins, were treated as full members of the community and served on the lord’s court.

Banal power gave the lord the further right to monopolize some basic facilities and to force his peasants to use them. These monopolies most commonly consisted of the flour mill, the communal oven, and the winepress. The lord also charged tolls on markets, duties on goods crossing his territory,

and fees for the use of his forest and for the right to hunt and fish.

Banal authority therefore could prove extremely remunerative. The weight of these exactions varied from place to place since, by definition, banal authority was local and private. It could even vary from one manor to another, depending on the particular terms granted a tenant, serf, or peasant. At its harshest, banal authority yielded one-third of the lord's revenues above and beyond rent and taxes. Lords were eager to maintain such prerogatives and only desisted when peasants fled en masse or when an outside authority intervened to challenge the legality of lordly demands. Banal lordship was eventually defeated by peasant resistance and by the development of state power, which staked its claims to peasant revenues.

PEASANT RESISTANCE

Banal lordship gave lords power over their peasants, serfs and free alike, that exceeded the presumed compensation for their use of the lord's land in perpetuity or for limited time periods. Excessive or new demands, the subjection to a humiliating string of payments, and arbitrary treatment already were decried by peasants as "bad customs" (*mals usos, mauvaises coutumes, malos usos*) in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Their grievances often went unheeded by lords and rulers, even if they were duly noted by clerics. Some historians have even posited that the worse abuses only existed in the minds of monks.

Peasants resisted in big and small ways. They dragged their feet, performed services perfunctorily, pilfered, were late in their payments, or fled. The village community, once it became better organized, provided some autonomy from the lord and mutual support in case of conflict. When conditions grew intolerable, peasants rebelled. In a society controlled by landowners with full policing powers, intolerable conditions often were imposed by lords seeking to increase their revenues and to reduce all peasants to the status of serfs. Rebellious peasants might succeed in convincing their lord to rescind some of the worst abuses or, most likely, to let them buy them off. Commutation of services to rent was one such result. Peasants neither rebelled constantly nor fled their lords at the slightest provocation because the system provided them with some important benefits. They were given protection in insecure times but more importantly they owned their land, even if in return for rent and services, and could pass it on to their heirs. This made it hard to pick up and leave. Lords for the most part wanted to keep good tenants, even servile ones, and

so did not always treat them harshly, even if they had the authority to do so. In fact another cause of peasant rebellion in the late Middle Ages and certainly one of its most common justifications was the perceived decline in mutualism, the sense that the system was breaking down and that lords were no longer fulfilling their obligations. When lords failed to render services and merely demanded them, the peasants felt justified in rebelling.

Peasant rebellions became more common in the late thirteenth century and the fourteenth century with worsening economic conditions. Population growth had fragmented holdings, increasing peasant demand for land and encouraging landowners to raise rents, even on plots where rents were fixed. The drop in population by one-third in western Europe as a result of the Black Death in 1348 caused the retreat of serfdom in some regions as lords facing depopulated villages granted peasants franchises to induce them to stay. In England, on the other hand, the Black Death made lords apply legal constraints more severely, tying peasants to their estates. A peasant rebellion in 1381 demanded the end of the lords' arbitrary powers, asking the king to force lords to follow local customs and to provide fixed terms. Although the rebellion failed in the short-term, as of 1400 serfdom was on the decline, and it soon disappeared altogether from England. In 1525 German peasants rebelled against the reintroduction of serfdom as lords began once more to tie peasants to their estates. Although the revolt was brutally put down, western German peasants managed to regain their freedom, whereas their eastern German counterparts saw their liberties extinguished.

THE END OF SERFDOM

How widespread was banal lordship? What proportion of peasants were enserfed? Historians can provide only vague estimates. When historians relied principally on legal definitions of the free and the unfree, they concluded that most European peasants were serfs in the Middle Ages. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, historians turned to regional studies to understand how feudalism and serfdom functioned at the manorial, village, or county level. This has yielded a much more complex picture of the phenomenon, blurring distinctions. Serfs and the freeborn recombined in different configurations depending on the time and place. Few therefore are able or willing to hazard overall conclusions. Still, it appears that servitude did not exist in most of Scandinavia but was widespread in Denmark. It was weak

in Spain except for Catalonia. In Italy serfdom was commuted into payments early as townspeople helped peasants gain franchises from lords. Seigneurial dues disappeared altogether in the fourteenth century from central and northern regions of Italy but lasted longer in the south. The Normans introduced serfdom into Sicily and England when they conquered those areas in the eleventh century. Serfdom prevailed in northern France, Flanders, southwestern Germany, and England and gradually vanished from these areas between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. At its height in England, in the fourteenth century, 40 percent of peasants were serfs. In France, on the other hand, by the end of the twelfth century only 20 percent of peasants remained in servitude. In those areas in France, Germany, or Switzerland where serfdom survived into the fifteenth century, it was not abolished until the French Revolution or its aftermath. Out of 27 million total inhabitants, several hundred thousand serfs still existed in France in 1789, located mainly in Burgundy and Franche-Comté, whose serfdom derived from the type of tenure. Their servile payments varied from severe to light, depending on the locality. Moreover, lords throughout France retained most of their monopolies and their right to levy feudal dues on peasants, serf or free, through the early modern period. All such vestiges of feudalism were swept away during the Revolution.

From the first, individual serfs could buy their freedom, although the price of this manumission varied from place to place. The more general process of liberation, on the other hand, required the connivance of the state with the peasants. This happened when territorial rulers began to rebuild their authority and to reclaim from lords their rights to peasant incomes and taxation. This process went hand in hand with the right of appeal to the king's law courts. In England freemen recovered this privilege as of 1200. Reference to Roman imperial law helped late medieval territorial rulers justify their claims to power. One of the consequences of this reintroduction of Roman law was that it brought back sharp distinctions between the free and the unfree, meaning freeman and serfs, where medieval practice had blurred these distinctions. Some peasants therefore were relegated to the status of the unfree, increasing their lords' arbitrary powers over them. If monarchs wanted to liberate peasants and serfs from the lords and turn them into taxable subjects, they needed to support peasants against their lords, heed their grievances, and reduce the lords' capacity to levy dues and taxes and to have full legal powers over them. Except for Catalonia, such emancipation occurred piecemeal and not by general decree. French peasants, for example, bought their free-

dom in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries with payments to the crown.

Rulers' collusion with lords, on the other hand, retarded such liberation. Servitude was enforced in England in the eleventh century and again in the fourteenth century because the developing state sided with lords. Lords, moreover, agreed to support each other by not granting asylum to runaway serfs. In Catalonia lords also managed to dictate terms, and the king permitted the introduction of serfdom there in the thirteenth century, much later than elsewhere. Servitude was abolished when a stronger monarch backed the peasants' demand for redemption in 1486, after a series of local rebellions.

Since serfdom disappeared in western Europe gradually, unlike in eastern Europe, where it would be abolished officially in the nineteenth century as in Catalonia, in the sixteenth century, the process has been ascribed to

- (a) the blurring of free and unfree under banal lordship;
- (b) peasant resistance and the support of the state;
- (c) changes in husbandry and development of the village community;
- (d) land clearance, new settlement, and the granting of franchises; and
- (e) changes in mentality.

Of these causes, the last three still need discussion in this article.

Changes in agricultural practices altered the way the village community functioned and transformed the place of the peasants within it. The most important changes in agricultural practice were the introduction of the heavy plow triennial rotation, improved husbandry, and what is known as open field farming sometime between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. These contributed to a rise in crop yields from the measly 2.5 to 1 in the sixth and seventh centuries to 4 to 1 on the poorest soils and 10 to 1 on the best by the thirteenth century, allowing a significant rise in population. The western European population tripled between 1000 and 1300, growing from about 15 million to 45 million. In England, where the Domesday Book (1086) provides information for the eleventh century, estimates are that the population quadrupled between 1086 and 1348, the year of the Black Death.

The new plow allowed the tillage of heavy northern soils, best suited to cereals, where the light Roman plow had been next to useless. These improved plows were pulled by oxen and, in the richest areas, by horses, who were more effective but also more expensive. Given the expense of the plow and

SECTION 8: RURAL LIFE

especially of the team of oxen or horses, only the richest peasants, free and unfree, could afford them. They owed more labor services than the poor as lords demanded that they plow their demesnes. In villages the distinction between rich and poor peasants became more important than that between the freeborn and serfs.

Another innovation was triennial rotation. Given the lack of adequate fertilizer, soils were exhausted quickly. To allow the land to rest and recover some of its fertility, farmland was usually divided into two rotations. Half of the land was planted while the other half remained fallow, and the following year the order was reversed. The introduction sometime in the twelfth century of triennial rotation complicated this arrangement. A third rather than half of the land lay fallow, one-third was sown in the fall with the main cereal crop, usually wheat, and another third was sown in spring with oats to feed horses and cattle. This system increased crop yield, and it also led to a realignment of the fields. Although no one knows when the system emerged exactly or why, by the thirteenth century most villages had switched to open field farming. The entire village arable was divided into three sections rather than each farm, and peasants owned segments in each of the sections. This arrangement required the cooperation of all villagers. Dates for sowing, plowing, and harvesting had to be set so one peasant would not trample another's crop entering the fields. The lord's ban often regulated this communal farming, setting the dates and policing the fields to make sure no one contravened them. This merger of plots was yet another element that diluted the difference between serfs and freeman.

The third factor in transforming the status of serf and peasant was the reclamation of land and the extension of the arable that began in the eleventh century. In some cases peasants just cleared bits of the forest to extend their own plots and to settle their children. This was done with or without the consent of the lord. More important were the colonization schemes undertaken by lords, who sought to increase the number of dues-paying tenants. Opening up land was costly. Trees had to be felled and marshes drained. Lords invested heavily in such enterprises, providing tools and materials, sometimes in association with other lords. Attracting settlers became so important to the future income of lords that they were willing both to pay the initial price and to grant these new settlers, known in French as *hôtes* or guests, advantageous terms, such as personal freedom and fixed rents. Some scholars have argued that extending their banal authority was sufficiently lucrative for lords to offset the loss of servile duties. Lords were coming to rely

on monetary rents and on the casualties of the ban for their income. Release from serfdom was granted to new settlers on old manors or to new settlements, and these franchises were gradually extended to older peasant communities lest all the tenants flee.

Given these developments and the importance of the peasant community in regulating economic life and in creating new solidarities, some historians have minimized the importance of legal categories such as free and unfree in defining peasants, focusing instead on their economic status and on the internal functioning of the community. Yet, as other scholars point out, serfs were eager to buy their freedom and found the taint of servitude humiliating, even where it was not onerous in practice.

SERFDOM IN MEDIEVAL CULTURE

Granting that serfdom arose out of the debris of the Roman Empire and disappeared from most of western Europe in the sixteenth century yields about seven hundred years during which serfdom was not only practiced but also theorized. Christian theology made its peace with the physical bondage of slavery and serfdom by stressing the freedom of the soul. Yet, as Paul Freedman's 1999 study shows, the issue was not clear-cut, and debates about serfdom abounded in the Middle Ages. Although medieval thought accepted inequality as a matter of course, ancient justifications of slavery were difficult to transpose because serfs, unlike slaves, were Christian and native-born. Instead, servitude was treated as the consequence of sin. A life of toil was Adam's curse but also his means of redemption. Serfdom was considered the product of another sin. Noah's son Ham laughed at his father's nakedness and was condemned along with his descendants to serve his brothers. This biblical explanation for the origin of serfdom was especially popular in Germany. In France and Spain another legend served the same purpose. Serfs were said to be the descendants of those cowards who had refused to follow Charlemagne into battle against the Saracens in the eighth century, choosing bondage or the payment of a servile tax instead. In England serfdom was attributed to the Norman conquest, before which all Englishmen had supposedly been free. Hence serfs in the fourteenth century believed that records existed that might prove their original liberty.

Everywhere rustics were mocked, reviled, and depicted as no better than beasts. Be they wealthy or poor, medieval characterizations reduced all peasants to the level of serfs. Although nobles and ecclesiastics depended on peasant labor, agricultural work was con-

sistently debased. The struggle against serfdom, from the peasants' perspective, involved fighting its arbitrariness and burdensome payments and asserting their humanity and the dignity of labor. Stories like that of the Swiss peasant-hero William Tell challenged the notion of the cowardly peasant. Parts of the scriptures and classical authors such as Virgil and Horace showed that peasant labor could be associated with rustic virtue. More importantly, peasants argued that Christ had liberated all human beings from sin, including from Ham's curse.

During the Middle Ages, in the words of Freedman, "freedom was understood not as a release from all bonds to others but as immunity from the arbitrary will of others."

Peasants denounced lordship, which consisted in this power, as unjust, capricious, and degrading. By the fourteenth century in France, the fifteenth century in England and Spain, and the sixteenth century in western Germany, territorial rulers were ready to heed those complaints and to liberate the peasants from this thrall. The most demeaning aspects of bondage were eliminated seigneurie by seigneurie. Peasants became free to move, to marry as they pleased, and to sell their plots without the lord's intervention. Rents, fixed dues, and obligations took the place of serfdom. The days of the lords and the economic system that bolstered their authority had passed.

See also The Medieval Heritage (volume 1); Peasants and Rural Laborers; Slaves; Rural Revolts (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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SERFDOM: EASTERN EUROPE



Boris B. Gorshkov

Serfdom was a system of relations between the owners of land and the peasant tenants who resided on it. These relations involved a variety of social, socio-psychological, cultural, economic, legal, and political aspects that together made serfdom a complex societal institution. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, just when serfdom had begun to decline in many parts of western Europe, a similar institution based on servility emerged in eastern Europe. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, east European serfdom matured and approached its climax; by the mid-nineteenth century it had declined and was abolished. Serfdom in eastern Europe was influenced by a multiplicity of political, economic, cultural, and intellectual developments that occurred in the world and the continent in general, and in each east European state in particular, throughout its existence. Although it reflected many similar economic and legal characteristics, such as its agricultural orientation and the juridical rights lords enjoyed over peasants, east European serfdom was by no means identical to its west European counterpart. Serfdom in eastern Europe was not monolithic; it differed from one state to another. The varied geography, ecology, and climate of eastern Europe lent strong regional variation to this institution. During the period of its existence, east European serfdom also experienced important social changes. Historians of east European serfdom traditionally emphasize its political or economic aspects; they concentrate on the consolidation and centralization of state power or focus on the development of master-serf economic and labor relations. Some of these studies are monochromatic in their portrayal of east European peasants as slavelike, dark, passive, and isolated. Although this essay does not ignore these traditional approaches to serfdom in eastern Europe, namely in Austro-Hungary, East Elbian Germany, Poland, Prussia, the Baltic States, and Russia, its analysis turns on a discussion of relatively dynamic social and economic factors and, where appropriate, on regional variations.

ORIGINS OF SERFDOM

Before the sixteenth century, when serfdom became a legally established institution, east European peasants, unlike the majority of the peasantry of western Europe, enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom. They lived on the land in settlements known as communes. Although sometimes these lands belonged to the peasants themselves, the majority of communes were settled on lands that belonged either to an individual landlord, to the church, or to the state. A peasant village and the landlord's lands on which it was settled constituted the landlord's estate, known as the manor. Peasant-tenants who resided on landlords' lands were free to move and to act, for the most part, subject to their own will. Peasants either worked the landlord's fields or paid annual fees for the land they utilized. Reciprocally, the landlord administered justice and provided his peasants with certain legal and military protections. Thus, traditions of lord-peasant relations originated long before serfdom became a legally established institution.

The process of enserfment in eastern Europe consisted of the gradual economic and legal binding of free peasant-tenants to the land and in some cases to the lord; this process took several centuries. Enserfment was not a result of a single factor but a product of a combination of many complex historical forces. Internal political, economic, and social developments within the east European states (such as centralization and expansion, warfare, epidemics, and so on), as well as the general political and economic situation outside the region, were perhaps the most important key factors in the development of serfdom. Yet, the gradual binding of the majority of the east European population to the land was also a product of the mentality of the early modern aristocracy of eastern Europe. The aristocracy viewed enserfment as the only solution to the political, economic, and social changes it faced.

The deterioration of the status of free peasant tenants, the earliest stage in the enserfment of peas-

ants, began in eastern Europe by the fifteenth century. Landlords, who were gaining political and economic strength, exerted more and more power over the subjects who populated their lands by increasing their economic and juridical subjugation. Political factors played a role, where weak governments encouraged landlord control for lack of other measures; this was compounded in Russia by the steady expansion of territory. But economic factors loomed larger. These included the expansion of markets and the sixteenth-century price revolution, processes that intensified this protoenservment. The growth of cities, and towns and the development of nonagricultural villages provided new demands for agricultural production. Willing to seize these new economic opportunities, the lords sought to expand the size of their estates. The export of cereals became a basic element of the agricultural economy of the southeastern, central, and Baltic regions of Europe. For example, during the sixteenth century grain exports from Poland increased as much as tenfold. The Netherlands, England, Spain, and Portugal became major consumers of east European grain. Although agricultural productivity in eastern Europe was relatively low, the inexpensive labor of economically dependent peasants kept agricultural production cheap. In order to secure the labor force, landlords shifted their peasants from traditional rent in kind (agricultural commodities) to labor duties. In areas where nonagricultural activities predominated (such as in the northern and central areas of Russia), peasants usually paid rent in kind (various products of cottage industry). Later on, as the money economy expanded, rent in kind was largely succeeded by money rent.

The desire of the landlords to increase estate production put increased economic pressure on the peasants, resulting in indebtedness and economic dependence upon landlords. The indebtedness tended to fix peasants for lengthy periods of time on landlords' estates. Landlords viewed these long time residents as bound to the estates. Others, the more active and energetic peasants, preferred to flee from the estates. The increasing indebtedness, along with the devastation from warfare, famine, epidemics, and pestilence that beset the early modern east European landscape, caused mass peasant migrations from the old settled areas to the peripheries. In order to prevent these migrations, the emerging and consolidating state power sought to eliminate the territorial mobility of peasants.

Political consolidation and centralization of some east European states, as well as the integration of new lands into the existing states, accompanied and, indeed, accelerated the process of enservment. The ties

between the landlord and the peasant, with the latter's waxing economic dependence upon the former, were juridically strengthened. For example, in Poland, a 1496 statute introduced, and later the 1501 law code reinforced, limits on peasant mobility. By 1540 Polish peasants were tied to the land and could not migrate without authorization from landlords. In 1538 the Brandenburg Landtag prohibited unauthorized migration and bound thousands of Brandenburg peasants to the land. During the 1580s and onward a series of decrees heavily restricted peasant movement in Russia (early limited restrictions originated in the late fifteenth century). The 1649 law code finally tied millions of Russian peasants to the soil. Additionally, in order to provide financially for their bureaucratic and military needs, the consolidating states introduced various taxes and duties on the peasantry. During this period, similar processes occurred in most parts of eastern Europe. The legislation not only restricted peasant mobility and increased the economic burdens upon peasants but also gave landlords legal, juridical, executive, and police powers over them. On their estates, landlords became tax collectors, judges, and policemen, on behalf of the state. The state transformed the economic dependence of the peasant upon the landlord into the peasant's legal dependence, indeed subordination, thus almost completely destroying peasant freedom.

Another factor that stimulated the deterioration of the position of the peasantry was slave labor. Although slave labor had declined by the sixteenth century, a small number of slaves still existed in some parts of eastern Europe. On the one hand, as the bondage of economically dependent peasants increased, their status gradually fused with that of the slaves. On the other hand, slaves were included in taxation, which eventually eliminated their slave status. Thus, as a result of all these factors, by the mid-seventeenth century serfdom became a legally established institution in eastern Europe. Legal restrictions on their mobility reduced millions of peasants to the status of serfs tied to the soil and to the lord.

SERFDOM AND THE LAW

Originating from the economic needs of the land-owning nobility and then bolstered by the politics of the state, east European serfdom was a social institution that lasted over two hundred years. Perhaps the most important social feature of east European serfdom, like any other serfdom, is that it occurred in a society numerically dominated by the peasantry. At the time serfdom was established, the peasantry ac-

counted for about 80 to 90 percent of the population of the region. Approximately half of the peasants lived on individual landlords' lands and thus were serfs, whereas the balance who lived on church and state lands did not fit into the category of serfdom. Landlords constituted only about 1 percent of the population and owned lands populated with large numbers of peasants who performed agricultural or other labor. An average landlord's estate held several hundred peasants, with individual estates running from a handful to tens of thousands of peasants (several Polish, Hungarian, and Russian magnates owned hundreds of thousands). East European landlords thus lived in an overwhelmingly peasant society. With a few exceptions (the Baltic regions, Polish-Ukrainian lands), most peasants and landlords were of the same ethnicity and shared common cultural and religious roots. Peasants constituted the very essence of their respective nations, being the major social element and the principal source of the national economy and culture.

The complexities and ambiguities of east European serfdom require emphasis. Despite the essential oppressiveness of serfdom, the legislation that enforced it also enabled peasants to sustain their basic economic and social needs. The laws that tied millions of east European peasants to the land at the same time provided the peasantry with the ability for temporary employment outside the ascribed place of residence, as well as for various trading, commercial, and even entrepreneurial pursuits within and away from the village. On the one hand, serfs were sometimes bought and sold at the will of their landlords; on the other, they were protected by laws against personal insult and unreasonable corporal punishment. In Russia, despite bans on serf complaints against their lords, peasants often sued the lords in state courts and sometimes succeeded in bringing to trial those who violated their rights. Serfs also frequently applied to legal institutions seeking emancipation. Having the goal of preserving hierarchy, serfdom simultaneously and somewhat paradoxically opened the door to a certain social mobility for peasants. These legal loopholes constituted a basis for maintaining a certain balance between the interests of the state and the nobility on one side and these of the peasantry on the other.

In fact, neither the state nor the landlord had an interest in totally attaching the peasants to the land. In order to sustain the economic needs of the state and of the landlord, peasants had to have a certain freedom to move (this was particularly crucial in those areas where agriculture was not a primary occupation or where nearby urban centers offered greater earning possibilities). None of the laws in eastern Europe that restricted peasant freedom provided for com-

plete bondage. For example, the notorious Russian 1649 law code indeed heavily restricted the peasant's ability to move. Not commonly realized is that, at the same time, the law granted the peasant the right to migrate temporarily, with proper authorization, in order to seek employment outside the estate. No authorization was required for those peasants who temporarily migrated within thirty-two kilometers of the estate, a legally sanctioned unofficial and uncounted migration. (By the end of the eighteenth century about a quarter of the serfs of Russia's central provinces officially temporarily migrated each year.) Thus, east European serfs were never completely bound to the land; they could be and in fact often were on the move. This provided peasants with opportunities to establish a certain degree of autonomy from their lords.

The social, economic, and cultural importance of the peasants thus allowed them to stretch the boundaries of serfdom. Nevertheless, because legislation in east European states established the authority of the lord over the peasantry, in Russia and Poland the lords came to view and treat peasants as their private property. In estate surveys peasants were listed under the heading of private property. Contemporary legal documents disclose that serfs were sold, mortgaged, and given as gifts. The sale of serfs occurred throughout eastern and central Europe and approached its high point in the eighteenth century. For example, during the American War of Independence (1775–1783) German landlords sold about 29,000 young peasants to the British as soldiers. Russian rulers authorized the sale of serfs to encourage mining and industry. In Russia, the sale of peasants reached its apogee during the reign of Catherine the Great, as attested to by newspaper advertisements of such sales. In most cases, east European peasants were sold with the land they populated and farmed. In other words, these transactions simply signified the transfer of entire villages or large parts of villages to new owners. The sale of serfs without land, which did occur in some cases, provoked contemporary social critics to condemn this practice as the most inhumane and brutal feature of serfdom.

In order to restrict such sales, some states introduced minute regulations into existing laws on the possession of peasants. Eventually, laws banned outright the sale and mortgage of peasants without land, as well as newspaper advertisements of such sales. Some state legislation restricted unreasonable punishment and mistreatment of peasants. Strict sanctions and penalties awaited lords who transgressed the new rules. For example, the Polish law of 1768 provided the death penalty for lords who deliberately caused

the death of serfs. In Russia, during the reign of Catherine the Great (1762–1796), about twenty landowners were tried for causing the deaths of their serfs. Two were exiled to Siberia for life and five were sentenced to hard labor for life. Although the number of lords tried and sanctioned was modest, the fact of their harsh punishment arguably served as a lesson to other landowners. New laws increased state regulation of the lord-peasant relationship in such a way as to place sterner limits on the lord's authority. This legislative tendency accelerated toward the end of the eighteenth century and continued until the final abolition of serfdom.

THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF SERFS: FAMILY AND COMMUNE

More important than legal restrictions of the landlords' power, peasants themselves deployed a wide array of extralegal means to dilute the lords' influence. Peasants developed and maintained cultural values, customs, traditions, and institutions that enabled them to survive by maintaining a balance between external forces and their own communal and individual needs. When conditions became unendurable, peasants protested, withheld their labor, rebelled, and even murdered offending authorities and lords. Hallowed tradition and indigenous institutions, plus a hint of threat, enabled peasants to set limits on the landlords' power and authority, as well as to achieve a certain independence from them.

The family. The family was one such institution. In most cases regarding family affairs and strategies, as well as actual decision making, the family enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy from the landlord. The family was headed by its eldest member, usually the grandfather, known as the patriarch. Patriarchs had a dominant role in making decisions about and supervising the daily activities of other family members and represented the family in communal institutions. Some historians argue that the position and authority of the patriarch in the family was unchallengeable and that this arrangement simultaneously contributed to the development of patriarchal culture among the peasantry. In contrast, some anthropological researchers emphasize the patriarch's responsibility to the family and point out that all major family matters, such as the household economy, property, and the marriage of children, were usually settled in family meetings that consisted of all adult family members, males as well as females. In certain cases the family meeting could displace an inept patriarch and appoint

a new family head. For these scholars, the authority of the patriarch was not unlimited; the process of decision making resulted from discussion and compromise among all concerned parties rather than exclusively from the authoritarian will of the patriarch.

Many peasants, particularly in Russia, spent a considerable part of their lives in structurally complex, two- and three-generational households. The family ties of peasants were usually extensive. Structural complexity, however, is not peculiar to households in eastern Europe. Family systems throughout preindustrial Europe were widely diverse depending upon local patterns of political and economic settlement, demography, culture, and ecological factors. Anthropological research illustrates that in preindustrial eastern Europe peasant household structures varied. For example, in southern Estonia extended households were common, whereas nuclear family households prevailed in northern Estonia. In Hungary complex households were more typical for serfs than for other categories of peasants. In Russia, as well as in other parts of eastern Europe, extended families often reflected a certain stage of family development and were quite changeable. For example, young couples lived under the same roof with their parents until they had saved enough money to start their own households. Some historians note that the household size of serf families slightly increased between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus, family structures among east European serfs were varied, while usually fitting one or another definition of extended or complex family.

Peasant marriages, performed according to local tradition and custom, received full legal sanction. A marriage contract was usually agreed upon by the couple's parents. Landlords rarely intervened in marriage contracts and usually did not separate serf families. The marriage age of serfs was relatively low in comparison to that of nonserf peasants and to west European peasants of that period. For example, in mid-nineteenth-century Russia, the average marriage age for men was twenty-three and for women nineteen. The pattern of low marriage age for serfs to a certain degree reflected the economic pressures of serfdom because the newly married couple constituted a work unit with its own share of communal land and property. Each couple had the legal and common right to establish its own household.

The commune. Most east European peasant families lived in villages (settlements with households, small stores, mills, communal buildings, a church, and a cemetery); one or more of these villages constituted the peasant commune. The peasant commune was the most important economic and social feature

of east European serfdom. Through the commune's assembly, represented by the family heads (the patriarchs), the peasants managed village resources, directed economic and fiscal activities, and maintained internal order. The authority of the commune over the village varied, depending upon local custom and the degree to which the landlord restricted its autonomy. The serf commune was a site for interactions between the landlord and the village; the communal elders consulted the lord about appropriate taxes, duties, obligations, and recruitments into the military. The commune controlled land redistribution where it occurred; coordinated agriculture (for example, made decisions about suitable crops and determined the dates of sowing and harvesting); sold, exchanged, or leased lands; and rented or bought additional land as needed. The profit from the sale and lease of communal property was deposited in the communal treasury or divided directly among the households. The commune checked weights and measures, determined the quality of bread and beer, and set the wages of day laborers. The commune often supervised the moral behavior of its members and regulated the religious and social life of the village.

Community assemblies also had important juridical functions, such as resolving intra- and inter-village conflicts and representing the community's interests in all legal institutions. In Austria, Germany,

and Lithuania, village community courts settled internal disputes and levied sanctions against guilty parties. In seventeenth century Russia, village commune representatives participated directly in the landlord's court, whereas in eastern Germany they acted as advisers to it. Additionally, in some regions communal assemblies filed suits in courts seeking adjudication when deprived of their interests and rights by their own lords or anyone else. Some even won their cases.

Scholars debate the role of the commune in the agricultural economy, the degree of its autonomy from the landlord, and many other specific aspects that cannot reasonably be addressed here. Some specialists argue that serf communes carved out a certain autonomy primarily because they served as instruments of the landlords. In this interpretation, the communes upheld the landlords' interests, ensuring that every household fulfilled its manorial and state obligations. In contrast, other observers comment that the commune did not always act in the landlords' interests. Communal obligations were usually agreed upon with the lord in advance, with firm commitments from both sides. When lords unilaterally increased already negotiated and fixed duties, communes often protested vociferously and refused to comply.

The commune's practice (in Russia and to some extent in other parts of eastern Europe) of periodic redistribution of arable land among households also

remains a subject of scholarly controversy. Some historians claim that redistribution was largely a result of serfdom. In this interpretation, landlords required peasants to redivide their lands in order to coordinate each household's landholdings with its labor capability based upon the number of hands in the family, with the overall goal of maximizing the household's labor effectiveness and productivity. Other historians suggest that land redistribution was not an innovation of the state or of the landlord but rather a traditional peasant practice aimed at maintaining a rough land equality among households based upon their size. Whether land redistributions originated from the commune or were imposed by landlords, it is clear that this practice occurred in parts of Russia up until the turn of the twentieth century and even beyond. Land redistribution was common in areas in which agriculture dominated the peasant economy and especially where soil quality was varied (for example, in the Black Earth regions of southern Russia). In areas where agriculture was not important, land redistribution fell into disuse. The periodicity of land redistributions, where they occurred, varied from one to five, ten, or even more years.

In addition to its important economic, social and juridical functions, the commune, indeed village life as a whole, fostered a collective consciousness among the serfs. Through village life, rich in tradition, custom, religious and national holidays, as well as innumerable communal celebrations, serf peasants maintained a sense of solidarity and cohesiveness. Overemphasis on intravillage conflicts has led some observers to question the sense of communality among the peasants. Private conflicts among peasants, however, did not undermine village solidarity. Indeed, one of the chief functions of the commune was to contain and adjudicate conflict. Furthermore, peasants who migrated into cities for employment sustained themselves in the unfamiliar urban environment by forming fraternal associations (in Russia the famous urban *zemliachestvos*) directly based upon the respective peasants' village and district origins. In essence, at the first opportunity many peasants who had left the village recreated familiar communal mores, hardly a practice consonant with reflexive mutual hostility.

Solidarity among the serfs expressed itself in numerous cases of collective insubordination, refusal to work, disturbances, and rebellions large in size and duration. Popular protest usually broke out when the quality of justice, as it was understood by the peasants, deteriorated. The village commune was a crucial element in initiating popular protest. Serfs first presented their disagreements and complaints collectively to their lords or local officials. If the latter failed to resolve the

disputes, the serfs resorted to one or another form of protest, which was often accompanied by customary collective rituals and symbols of misrule. Naturally, serfs showed the greatest concern about increases in duties and demands upon them. From 1800 to 1861, for example, 371 out of 793 (47 percent) disturbances in the central Russian provinces were caused by increases in feudal obligations. In addition to collective forms of protest facilitated by the commune, serfs actively used various forms of individual protest, such as work slowdowns, deception, manipulation of legal norms, and fleeing. These latter forms of protest were primarily associated with the serfs' unfree status. (Although most eastern European cities could not guarantee their freedom, for peasants running away was the primary means to escape serfdom.) Thus, the strong collective consciousness noted above among serfs did not undermine their individual motivations, as also witnessed by their individual economic pursuits (trading, temporal migration, and so forth).

Thus, although often organized by local communal institutions, most peasant revolts had no concrete political or generalized economic goals. Rather, the recurrence of peasant insurrections in eastern Europe throughout the centuries of serfdom reflected the structural changes of east European society, such as the growth of population, state centralization, imposition of new heavy taxes and obligations, the development of a market economy, and the transformation of popular mentality.

THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF SERFS

The degree of autonomy that east European serfs carved out for themselves within the contexts of familial and communal life also aided the serfs' independent economic activities. In areas where agriculture was the basic element of the economy, serfs worked roughly half of their time for the landlord and the balance for themselves. For example, in the 1740s an average peasant household of Silesia had to work for its lord 177 days a year or approximately three days a week, along with some payment in kind. Three days a week was the usual amount of time most east European serfs had to give their lords, although some were faced with even higher requirements. In non-agricultural areas, where serfs usually paid rent in kind or in money, they could spend the greater part of their time working for themselves. In the 1840s, in order to meet all obligations and pay all feudal dues and state taxes, east European peasants spent from 17 to 86 percent of their income, depending on region and the economic conditions of the household. An

average serf household paid out in dues and taxes from 30 to 50 percent of its annual income.

Although the agricultural economy predominated in eastern Europe, serfs, as well as other categories of peasants, were usually multioccupational. The local economy and the serfs' occupations depended largely upon regional characteristics such as soil fertility and climate. In Prussia, the Baltic region, and the southern regions of Russia and non-Russian eastern Europe, the national and local economies were based mainly on agriculture and specifically on grain production. The microeconomy of the northern regions of eastern Europe usually combined various nonagricultural and agricultural activities. With economic expansion during the late eighteenth century, this regional specialization became more notable. In fact, in certain regions agriculture became a seasonal occupation, and the nonagricultural pursuits largely dominated the peasant economy. One study of peasant economic activity in the central nonagricultural Russian provinces shows that from 60 to 93 percent of the regions' peasants engaged at least part-time in one or another nonagricultural activity. For example, in Moscow province the peasants devoted only 3.5 months a year to agriculture and the rest of the year to domestic industries and commerce.

Serf peasants engaged in various nonagricultural activities. About a half of those so employed were hired workers, whereas others were small traders, craftsmen, self-employed in services, and even, though rarely, rich merchants and entrepreneurs. The degree to which east European serfs engaged in various trading, manufacturing, and commercial activities is striking. Large numbers of peasants maintained cottage industries as a seasonal business for the entire family that produced not only for the local market but for the national and international ones as well. Textile making was the dominant type of domestic industry. Millions of peasants spun, wove, and finished various kinds of fabrics in their villages. For example, in 1780 in Tver' province of central Russia, about 280 thousand female peasants wove canvas during the non-growing season. Peasants sold their products to traveling traders and merchants (themselves often serf peasants), who sold them in various national and regional markets and fairs. Trading peasants, composed of serfs and nonserfs, were often the dominant force in national and local markets throughout eastern Europe.

The peasants' protoindustrial activities during the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries energized many serf villages, providing a basis for the economic and social advancement of those who availed themselves of the opportunity. The peasants' role in

the development of east European national economies likewise expanded. After starting out as artisans, craftsmen, and small traders, the more able serfs founded manufacturing concerns and textile mills. Perhaps the single most striking example of serf entrepreneurialism was Ivanovo Voznesensk, a textile city in central Russia's Vladimir province. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, several serf traders established textile mills in the small village of Ivanovo on the Sheremet'ev family estate. Eventually the former quiet village transformed itself into the bustling textile city that Friedrich Engels later called "the Russian Manchester." Similar developments occurred in many parts of eastern Europe.

The expansion of the peasantry's economic activities had wide-ranging repercussions. For example, it had an impact on education, on the social mobility of the serfs, and on state laws that regulated the peasantry. New laws eased peasant entry into nonagricultural activities, in part by restricting the lord's authority over serfs. In Russia and elsewhere, statutes enabled serfs to engage in virtually all kinds of economic activities and regulated those activities. The Russian laws of 1827, 1828, 1835, and 1848 progressively limited the power of the lords over peasants engaged in licensed commercial and business enterprises and introduced private property rights for serfs. These laws ultimately applied to many tens of thousands of serfs. Simultaneously, numerous technical and other schools opened their doors to peasants. By learning and engaging in various crafts and trades, peasants became acquainted with the national economies of their respective states. Through economic advancement and education, some serfs even entered the upper social echelons. Although the number of such fortunate individuals was modest when compared to total serf populations, the phenomenon impressed contemporary observers. One mid-nineteenth-century Russian wrote that self-made peasants were forging to the head of merchant communities and emerging as leaders in public affairs.

THE END OF SERFDOM

The abolition of serfdom differed sharply from one east European state to another. In Prussia the royal edict of 1807 ordered the emancipation of that nation's serfs, and that same year Napoleon emancipated the serfs of Poland. Imperial Russian decrees of 1816 and 1819 freed the peasants of the Baltic states. The peasants of the Austrian Empire gained freedom as a direct result of the revolutions of 1848–1849. In Russia, the famous imperial edict of 1861 abolished serf-

dom there. Romanian peasants, the last European serfs, were freed in 1864, bringing to an end centuries of European peasant bondage.

Although serfdom ended as the immediate result of social revolutions, political developments, or juridical decisions of state authorities, the process of abolition had begun long before these final decisions. As noted, new laws had begun to restrict the authority of the lord over his peasants. Serf involvement in commercial and entrepreneurial activities and the social advancement of some wrought new attitudes in society toward serfs and serfdom itself. Contemporaries increasingly viewed serfs as an active societal and economic force. For most contemporary intellectuals and enlightened statesmen (not to mention various rulers of east European states), serfdom was a malign anachronism. Many tracts and discussions attacked serfdom, sometimes invoking the western European example and Enlightenment ideals. Even the archconservative Nicholas I of Russia (1825–1855) blamed his Romanov ancestors for this “unmitigated evil,” which, unfortunately, he could not bring himself to eliminate. Although serfdom did

not completely block significant social and economic changes, informed east European society long viewed it both as a moral evil and an obstacle to rapid societal development. In Russia, defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856) served as a final impetus to end an outmoded institution that hindered Russia’s economic and military development.

State decrees effected the various emancipations but the roots of emancipation lay in long-term east European economic and social changes. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the accelerating tempo of population growth, economic expansion, and the peasants’ protoindustrial activities shed an increasingly harsh light on serfdom’s petty and major oppressions. Progress, more limited than it could have been, took place not because of serfdom but despite it, in large measure because of the independent activity of millions of serfs who, in the face of their unfree status, exerted an influence on their nations’ affairs. In this regard, we might recall that in announcing the emancipation of Russia’s serfs, Alexander II stated only that it was better that they should be freed from above than from below, that is, that they should free

themselves by force. We would be wiser to view the peasants as actors rather than as ciphers. Serfdom was an indisputable social evil but serfs were not hopeless

victims who passively submitted to that evil. Instead, many took a more active stance than we have realized in influencing their own history.

See also Absolutism; Protoindustrialization (in this volume); The Aristocracy and Gentry; Peasants and Rural Laborers; Rural Revolts; (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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PEASANT AND FARMING VILLAGES



Palle Ove Christiansen

Peasants and villages are among the most studied themes in social history, but researchers have always had difficulty finding general definitions able to cover the forms, in time and space, in which agrarian people have organized and localized themselves under political conditions and those given by nature.

WHAT IS THE EUROPEAN VILLAGE?

The European village normally carries associations of a small consolidated agricultural community, in the ancien régime sometimes consisting of only a few farms. But especially in central and southern Europe villages could appear as built-up areas with five to ten thousand inhabitants. The basic difference between village and town, before the widespread abolition of town and commercial privileges in the 1800s, could seldom be expressed in area or population but was more of a legal and cultural character. The usually modest structures built to shelter shepherds and for cheese production, and so forth, in the various systems of transhumance from European mountain regions, are normally not considered independent villages, as pastures that are exploited in this manner usually belong to village in the lowland. The same applies to so-called satellite villages used for seasonal lodgings or wine production, for example. The concept of the village never refers only to the permanent, dense, rural settlement, but to the entire surrounding area legally available regardless of how much of it is exploited. Large areas with scattered farmsteads can also constitute villages.

The village was the most common form of habitation for the greater part of Europe's population far into the 1800s, and as an organized food producing unit it goes back to around 7000 B.C. for southeast Europe, and around 500 B.C. for northwest Europe. The village has always been characterized by cattle raising and farming in the broadest sense, and since the late Middle Ages, by relations to population groups who did not themselves take part in the pri-

mary production of foodstuffs. Investigators like Eric Wolf, Teodor Shanin, and Frank Ellis have spoken of peasants as traditional agriculturists, who run their family-based farms, organized in villages or other co-operative units, to satisfy their own consumption, but who also through production of a surplus are dominated by outsiders and thus are part of larger political and economic systems.

RELATIONS TO MANORIAL ESTATES AND TOWNS

Most European peasant villages from the Middle Ages up to the 1800s and 1900s can be best viewed in relation to the manorial estate and the market town respectively. The relationships between the village and the lord's estate and between village and town have constituted basic conditions shaping villages and village life that cannot be explained solely through scrutiny of the individual village.

The relation to manorial estates. The peasant's praxis in the village in historical Europe should be understood in light of the demand on one hand to perpetuate his own farm and family, and on the other to feed other social estates such as the seigneurs, the church, and the king. Georges Duby (1968) has pointed out that village-estate relations existed both before and after European feudalism, and that the seigneur's close protection of the peasant and the king's outer defense continued in various configurations up into the 1800s.

In the medieval social structure the village lord, through his right to the peasant's or the village's dues, allocated land to the peasants or the village. This was this case regardless of whether the relation between lord and peasant was one of sharecropping, lease, rent, or lifetime *faeste* (a Scandinavian form of semi-feudal dependent tenancy) combined with varying types of personal legal ties to the land, the estate, or the peasant occupation itself. In some places private manorial

estates also administered the tax to the supreme prince and the tithe to the church.

To obtain the village resources necessary to sustain himself economically the non-free peasant had to pay dues to the lord, who was responsible for administration over the peasants as a social category. It was especially in the collection of dues in the form of produce, money, or *corvée* (labor service) to the lord that the estate exerted influence over the village's internal affairs. Where the dues included *corvée* a large part of the village's labor force was used outside its own area, as a rule in the direct cultivation of estate's demesne lands. From the 1400s and 1500s up to the 1800s, this demand was most pronounced in the great grain-growing regions in central and eastern Europe and the Baltic countries. The manorial dues to the lord assumed very different forms according to the natural conditions and local tradition. In the Mediterranean region dues in olives and fruit were not uncommon. In grazing and mountain regions the dues were often paid in cows, goats, sheep, and wool. Along the Atlantic coast dues were often paid in fish. And special products of almost every kind, such as poultry, honey, hides, and textiles, have also been used. Most familiar, however, are grain dues in the form of rye, barley, and wheat (for bread, porridge, and beer). Dues were normally assessed on the individual farm, but especially early on and in eastern central Europe collective dues have existed, for example in the form of a head of cattle paid by the peasants of a midsized village.

Just as the married male peasant at the head of his household was a nucleus of village's organization, in the *ancien régime* he was accorded a place together with his fellow villagers in the society's hierarchical structure as producer of food and taxpayer. It was this position of villages and peasants within a hierarchical society of fixed social estates, a relation absent in so-called primitive societies and ones without seigneurialism, which made peasant and village societies specific historical categories in Europe.

The relation to market towns. If the seigneur was able to demand dues in the form of money, or if the king, the duke, or the feudal overlord demanded taxes paid in cash, the peasant was forced to convert some of his products to money at the market. In regions with great distances between the market towns rural markets were periodically held for small producers to exchange products. Where the towns were close together, as in northwestern Europe, the peasants often had to retail their most important commodities in the market towns or else sell them to the town's merchants. With Poland as the best known exception, the market towns were often outside the seigneurs' juris-

dition and were instead protected by the country's prince. In areas where the peasant had no natural access to salt and iron, these basic needs also forced him into contact with the commodity market, in other words the town. This stable market commerce did not mean, however, that production activities in the old village were governed by market principles of supply and demand.

Even though market dependency increased quantitatively from around 1500, the village-town relationship is of long standing. This relationship is significant for understanding the regional variations in domestic utensils, clothing, dyes, and small metal goods, which in differing quantity and composition have been a fixed element in the mode of life of European peasant villages, and which probably attained their greatest diversity in the 1800s. Börje Hanssen's studies of the Österlen region in southern Sweden (1952) describe villages in the 1600s and 1700s as part of a complex network with both market towns and rural fairs. Hanssen also shows that frequent town contact does not necessarily lead to changes in the peasant or folk culture. This was implied in Robert Redfield's (1941) criticized but nonetheless widely used continuum model of social change, based on his early studies of Central America. Although the isolated peasant and the self-sufficient village have by and large never existed in Europe, spatial contact has not automatically led to cultural adaptation.

Ferdinand Tönnies's classical dichotomy between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society) has greatly influenced the modern public's stereotyped conception of city versus country (village). All concrete investigations show, however, that the small village is not exclusively homogeneous and the great city differentiated. Studies have also demonstrated that there have always existed rather large contingents of village people in cities, such as servants, small tradespeople, carters, fishermen, and laborers, some of whom moved back to their villages after a few years. At the same time many villages have been home to culturally urban people such as clergymen, estate functionaries, and regional technicians like surveyors and officers.

DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY OF VILLAGES ACROSS EUROPE

Within Europe's boundaries innumerable forms can be found under which village peasants have lived and still live, which because of their variety are nearly impossible to discuss in general terms. This diversity stems from factors ranging from geopolitical circumstances, state administration, and landlord policies, to

market access and local ecological conditions. Attempts have been made to speak of differences on the basis of varied forms of European estate systems, the topographical adaptation of peasant village structure, and variations in the cultivation systems in the old village, that is, the village prior to land consolidation reforms.

Many features of present-day European village structure have roots in an earlier dependency on nearby manorial estates, and even in estate structures and settlement patterns that were developed in the 1500s, a period of population and price increase. In European estate organization the distinction is often made between indirect cultivation, in which the lord lives off dues in the form of foodstuffs or money from the peasants on the tributary tenant land, and direct cultivation, in which the lord himself engages in large-scale production on his demesne land. Under indirect cultivation the distance between the peasants' own places of habitation and the estate is not especially important. Before the 1500s and 1600s this type of estate organization was found especially in thinly populated areas in the east, and in the west on scattered tracts such as crown land, in areas with dispersed peasant settlements and interior soil, and in regions where the early feudal estates were, after the 1500s, unsuccessful in reestablishing an effective direct cultivation based on serfs or hard *corvée*.

With direct cultivation the distance from the demesne to the agricultural laborers or the peasants who through their labor dues cultivated this land had to be as short as possible, which as a rule necessitated that the farms be more closely grouped. This also made easier the lord's supervision of the labor force. Because of recruitment of the village population for *corvée*, this estate cultivation in northeastern Europe could result in a considerable density of villages in regions that earlier had more scattered settlement. In these otherwise agrarian areas, the estates also produced goods for export to western Europe, largely by compulsory labor dues. In some places all the way up to the 1900s the manorial exploitation resulted in pauperized village societies. Research has shown that even though the pressure from lords on peasants intensified in Mecklenburg, Swedish Pomerania, East Prussia, Poland, the Baltic countries, and the Russian regions, as compared to most places in western Europe, there were far greater differences in both east and west than hitherto assumed.

Scholars have long been tempted to discern a pattern in the innumerable typologies of European village forms. Historians, geographers, and linguists have examined the geographic distribution of settlement patterns, systems of succession, village names,

and number of farms per village. Some have distinguished between street villages, terrain villages, round villages, and dispersed settlements. A particularly important aim has been to set up frameworks describing the establishment and physical structure of villages, but it has been difficult to find patterns. Nonetheless, research has demonstrated some regularities; for instance, people settled to form villages where there is fertile soil, sufficient water and forest, facility of clearing land, and lines of communication.

Hamlets, that is, small clusters of houses with no actual historical village organization, are found everywhere in Europe. There are also the agro-towns and villages surrounding *Kirchenburgen*, or fortified churches. Agro-towns have evolved from the Middle Ages well into the 1800s in Southern Italy, Sicily, Andalusia, and in southeastern Hungary. There are examples of very large villages of this kind, sometimes with over thirty thousand inhabitants, which besides their peasant and agricultural laborer population include urban social categories and have urban institutions. In the Mediterranean area the inhabitants of agro-towns prefer to be associated culturally with an urban ethos, whereas agro-towns on the Great Hungarian Plain have always had a more rural character. The fortified church is primarily a phenomenon of eastern central Europe. Best known are the Saxon villages in Transylvania (Romania), where from the 1400s many churches were fortified and encompassed by ramparts and ring walls as protection against the Turks and roaming Vandals, giving the villages a striking physical appearance.

Particularly before the post-World War II mechanization, climate and soil differences have also produced great disparities in conditions between Mediterranean and transalpine agriculture, and consequently

in village configuration and organization in these two regions, relative to available resources. Some investigators speak of the transalpine ecotype as compared to the Mediterranean, and Lynn White (1962), extending Marc Bloch's theories as presented in his *French Rural History* (originally published in 1931), has endeavored to summarize some of the main characteristics of villages and village production and their evolution in southern and northern Europe respectively. Since the Middle Ages Mediterranean peasant agricultural practices adapted to a dry climate and light soil, as distinct from the northern European practices adapted to heavy soil in a humid climate. According to White and other investigators, the respective conditions determined whether people settled in small or larger villages, used light or heavy plows, and tilled equilateral versus long fields; they also accounted for differences in village organization and location.

Despite the fact that even at the end of the twentieth century great differences existed between the two parts of Europe, the variations present in either period cannot be explained solely on the basis of ecological adaptation or technological diffusion. Before mechanization, and particularly in the early open-field village, it is the village and not the individual farm that is the relevant unit for analysis of the overall exploitation of nature and the relationship of peasants and their livestock to historically determined scarce resources. In modern farming, however, both in the south and the north, it is the farm which is the pivotal unit.

VILLAGE ORGANIZATION IN THE ANCIEN RÉGIME

According to Jerome Blum, the European village community arose in the Middle Ages as a corporate body

managing communal resources, directing certain common activities, and supervising certain aspects of the communal life, and it persisted for as long as the open-field village was in existence, and as far as certain communal interests such as the exploitation of peat bogs were concerned, all the way up to the modern era. Formally the village community was run by the village assembly headed by the village headman. In some places this post was rotated among the farms in the village, and in certain regions the seigneur had to approve the choice of new headman. The village assembly decided important internal matters in the village and often acted as a go-between for the individual farm or inhabitant and the seigneur, the church, and the state, especially in areas of central and eastern Europe where the dues were assessed collectively on the village as a whole.

Generally the village had a large degree of independent authority which could, especially in areas of Switzerland, Austria and Southern Germany, include its own local court. The village assembly in some freehold areas could also sell, buy, rent, and rent out communal land. Even in those parts of Europe where the seigneur could sell or reallocate both peasants and village land, and thus intervene in all internal village relations, he often let the village take care of itself so long, as he got his dues punctually.

The village assembly gave guidelines for how communal areas with grazing land, forest, bog, meadow, or lakes should be exploited, and how fences and roads ought to be maintained. It decided when sowing and harvest should begin or be concluded, which of the two cultivated territories under the widespread three-field rotation system should be laid out the next year and with which crops, and which zone was to be opened for grazing. The village assembly moreover

could hire village herdsmen, decide which of the peasants was to feed the communal bull each year, assist in firefighting, and issue petty fines for disturbing the peace.

The formal farm-village relationship functioned on the basis of the so-called village law, which dates from the Middle Ages but which worked on the basis of oral tradition until the 1800s or even longer. Perhaps all households, or at any rate all households with land, originally had a vote in the village assembly, but in the 1600s and 1700s in many places less than one third of the households in the village were represented, and the most prosperous village inhabitants enacted statutes that stripped the landless or those with limited land of influence. This phenomenon is often interpreted in connection with the general population increase since the 1500s and especially the 1700s, when there was greater competition for the village's resources. As a rule only male farm representatives could sit in the village assembly but in some areas in Russia widows also had a vote, and in certain places in France both women and men took part in the meetings of the village assembly. In these areas the local priest and even the seigneur could be members, but otherwise the village assembly was reserved exclusively for the peasant estate. In the 1800s, representative democracy in some countries resulted in the creation, as the lowest administrative unit, of parish councils in which persons from all social estates could have a seat.

In many places the village assembly's earlier rather sovereign position had already been undermined before the abolition of the open-field system eliminated its most pivotal functions. Particularly in north-eastern central Europe—when from the 1500s to the beginning of the 1800s much peasant land was incorporated in the demesne lands and the inhabitants made into cottagers or day laborers (a process termed *Bauernlegen* in German)—the village assemblies were depleted of their traditional functions and authority. Under intensive large-scale production in both east and west, the seigneurs were in many places successful in eliminating some of the village headman's functions. They were able to replace the headmen with so-called peasant bailiffs or with headmen who were also estate functionaries of a sort, since besides administering the village's own affairs they were supposed to summon their fellow villagers to *corvée* on the demesne farm. However, in western and central Europe with the Enlightenment of the 1700s the state endeavored to safeguard some of the peasants' rights vis-à-vis the seigneurs, perhaps not for the peasants' sake alone, but to secure for the nation a more solvent tax basis, a greater number of inhabitants, and more—and more loyal—soldiers. This state intervention in

village affairs could not help but standardize the functions of the village assemblies.

The best known example of the village assembly or commune's regulating function, in which the commune acted as the de facto owner of the peasant land, is found in Russia in the 1700s and 1800s. Under this system the peasants had permanent right only to their house and outbuildings, to communal areas such as commons and forests, and to only a little cultivated land. In return, at regular intervals the village assembly (*mir*) apportioned shares of the village land to the individual peasant household, usually in relation to how many mouths it had to feed or how many adult workers it contained. Where in most peasant communities the household had to adapt its domestic size and consumption to the amount of land, in Russia it was the village assembly which redistributed the village land to the households according to their size and need. This system is known in different variants in a number of areas in both eastern and western Europe.

Corporative organization of various forms existed in European villages into the twentieth century. Best known are the southern Slavic brotherhoods, where the dangers of isolation rendered collaboration among rural inhabitants necessary, and the non-family-based guild in Germany, the Nordic countries, and England, which had a role in organizing large work projects in the village.

OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS, STRATIFICATION, AND LIFESTYLE

The old village has often—in national ethnography from the late 1800s and in discussions of equality and national character—been held out as a democratic unit to be emulated. Recent research has shown, however, that the preindustrial village was often strongly socially differentiated, often strayed from the communal ethos, with its norms of mutual cooperation, suggested by its formal organization.

The village has nearly always been compounded of more occupational groupings than peasants, even though the peasants were originally predominant. From the 1600s great inequality of resources and affluence prevailed within the old peasant category, alongside which there often lived smallholders, cottars, artisans and small tradesmen, landless laborers, servants, and hired hands. The latter population elements increased markedly in the 1800s. Often they did not have independent representatives in the village assembly even though in numbers they might constitute the majority of the village population. The occupational designations were not necessarily attached

permanently to the individual person or family; a young couple might start out as day laborers, later become peasants for twenty to twenty-five years, and end as cottars or lodgers. Nor was being a servant a permanent occupation in continental Europe, but rather a phase in the life cycle of young people, before they got married and perhaps took over an independent cottage or a farm. For smallholders and cottars the combination of farming and wage labor is very old, but in the 1900s it became widespread among the ranks of small farmers as the lower limit for viable farming was pushed upward.

In the case of southwestern Germany, the historical-anthropological studies of Hans Medick (1996) and David Sabean (1990) have shown what a variety of social and cultural forms existed in the villages of the 1600s, 1700s, and 1800s, and how women and men acted in their preoccupation with material interests, social position, and religious norms. In areas with partible inheritance where both sons and daughters were heirs, as Sabean in his book on Neckarhausen in Württemberg revealed, clashes between parents and adult children, between fathers and sons-in-law and between brothers-in-law over inheritance

of plots of land could be an immediate part of daily life in the village. Under these conditions family and blood relations were apparently of far greater significance in the village than often assumed.

In a study of east Danish villages Palle O. Christiansen has shown how in the 1700s the villagers' different interests and the estate's economic policy toward the villages as dues payers led to almost constant conflict in estate villages even where peasants otherwise had large adjoining lands. The everyday life of the villagers was remote from the commonplace notions of a corporate community. Village life was rather to be perceived as a conflictual coexistence between two essentially different peasant lifestyles, one lived in an often rather jolly day-to-day perspective and the other more ambitious and provident. The village can thus be understood as a kind of unity of opposites, in which the two lifestyles with a basis in the estate's praxis contributed mutually to reproducing each other. The balance between the two lifestyles might vary according to the estate's administrative praxis and the village's resources, particularly forest, but this duality was found in all villages belonging to the estate.

Differences in behavior among villagers may be perceived even into the twenty-first century. These differences result from the modern division of labor and the new presence of culturally urban people in the village, and also from the multiethnic composition of many villages, which often has roots both in late-medieval colonization in eastern central Europe and state-directed population movements of the 1700s and 1900s. In Hungary and Romania, especially until 1945, there were many German (Swabian or Saxon) minorities who lived in the same villages as Magyars, Romanians, and Roma (Gypsies), each speaking its

own language. In the Balkan countries the diversity of nationality, language, and religion could be even greater, and has persisted into the twenty-first century.

**AGRARIAN REFORMS:
VILLAGE CONSOLIDATION AND
FARM DECENTRALIZATION**

An extensive complex of state-directed agrarian reforms, implemented especially in the 1700s and 1800s, aimed to modernize the old open-field village and



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emancipate the peasant families as individual and independent citizens by means of the abolition of serfdom, conversion of *corvée*, and transition to peasant freehold. The earliest examples come from small countries like Savoy, Switzerland, and Denmark. The most important physical changes in the village have to do with the so-called technical reforms, that is, the conversion of open fields, divided into scattered strips, into consolidated, enclosed holdings, and the decentralization of individual farms. These reforms disturbed irrevocably the classical farm-village relation, though in most cases without resolving the inequalities that had arisen between big and small peasants.

In some areas in France and Southern Germany since the 1500s, villages have carried out consolidations of scattered strips themselves, and similar consolidations occurred in eastern Schleswig-Holstein. The first and most systematic centrally authorized consolidation, the English enclosures of the shared pastures and common fields, were organized in the 1500s and 1600s. The most extensive governmental enclosures of villages, however, took place in the following century, mainly in the Midlands. The most significant visual changes were the fences between the plot owners' main parcels, which also made it possible to put together the smaller tilled strips, particularly from the late 1700s. On many estates consolidated land that was not leased out was traditionally left for sheep farming and hunting.

On the Continent consolidations took place generally much later than in England. Except for a few precursors in the 1600s and early 1700s overall most consolidations in Schleswig-Holstein, Northern Germany, and Denmark began in the mid-1700s, and through the following century in other parts of Europe. In large parts of Russia, Poland, and what later became Czechoslovakia, as well as in areas of Switzerland and southern Germany, consolidation did not gather momentum until the 1900s.

Consolidation as a rule apportioned the village's communal areas such as commons and forests among the individual farms, and gathered each farm's often innumerable small fields into a single large parcel or a few bigger parcels which the peasant himself could decide when and how to cultivate. This led to a greater emphasis on the individual peasant within the village. He no longer had to wait for his neighbor in communal projects, and he saved time driving and walking to his fields and back. The peasant could obtain much cleaner and better manured soil, and by effective personal fencing keep neighbors and their livestock out of his fields and avoid the danger of contagion that came with earlier

communal grazing. The great expense of consolidation notwithstanding, the governments and proprietors tended to reckon that the individual peasant, through his hopefully greater initiative, would become more solvent and that he would exploit resources like forest and grazing land less ruthlessly. They also hoped that the village could better support an augmented and more affluent population.

In many places consolidation was followed by the removal of farmsteads from the old village nucleus to the new field which the peasant had been allotted. A single large quadrangular parcel with the farmstead in the middle was considered the most effective setup but was not always possible, because of both the natural contours of the land and the expense involved in moving many farmsteads out onto the fields.

There is hardly any doubt that consolidation combined with the gradual introduction of more effective crop rotation raised productivity, though the old village was not nearly as inefficient as some of its modern critics have asserted. The improved yield from the consolidated lands—in hay production especially—did not occur until after old boundaries and ditches were slowly adjusted to the new field contours and otherwise untitled land was brought under cultivation, which took several years. Thereafter the productivity and commodity production per farm could be increased, which was reflected in augmented dues, more cows, and larger sales. Most important, perhaps, was that the new individual and farm-centered production held a very great potential in that the clearly defined, assembled parcels, often quite large and making more efficient use of the land than scattered strips, for many years henceforth allowed hitherto uncultivated areas to be brought under the plow. This was the case in Denmark and southern Sweden, for example, as well as in northwestern Germany and France.

The pattern of village transformation described above was not universal, however. In some areas peasants have always dwelled on their field plots rather than in village centers, although the cultivation of these fields over time has not always resulted in field contours which are suitable for modern motorized production. This is true in southwestern England, Ireland, all of southwestern France, Holland, Belgium, and the district west of Bremen in Germany, plus in Latvia and Serbia. Conversely there exist places, particularly in southern Europe, where peasants have no wish to move out of the village center, either so as not to reduce their already diminutive plots or because it is considered more urban and therefore finer to live in the village center than on the open land.

THE MODERN PEASANT-FARMER AND THE VILLAGE

In the consolidated village the village assembly's primary activities were eliminated, but in many places the organization remained in existence but with fewer and other tasks under its province. The removal of many farms from the village center could also change the physical configuration of the village. The old village changed its character rather than merely disintegrating. Even though the big, communal projects vanished and many families, particularly in transalpine Europe, moved out onto the fields, family, neighbor, and cooperative relations continued to exist. Moreover, many villages in the 1800s and especially the 1900s became small service centers, with artisans and shops for daily necessities.

The modern peasant-farmer, on his separate parcel of a size able to feed his family at the minimum, is inconceivable without a local service network and access to the larger market for both purchases and sales. Actually it is only in its modern form that it is possible to speak of the farmstead as both an economic unit and a home (see Eric Wolf, 1996, p.13). Although some European peasant farms have very low productivity, family farms have simultaneously turned out to have a far greater potential than was believed by reformers. The extinction of European family farms has often been prophesied, without their disappearing. Even though family farms face problems, and even though many have been combined, the structure itself continues to be reproduced.

The larger family farm's strength appears to be connected with the fact that in continental Europe it never became a small capitalistic enterprise. That is to say that the agriculturist often did not behave like the English tenant farmer or perform farm labor, even though modern agriculture involves large commodity production and is also dependent upon operational investments and loans. The independent peasant freehold of the 1800s and 1900s made it possible for the family-based farm at the end of the twentieth century to invest and become involved in the market, while at the same time the farm did not always have to pay interest on its own equity or include the family's labor in calculating the production price relative to the market wage. Just as in the case of smallholdings earlier, family members often supplemented their income with domestic industry or wage labor with the aim of keeping the farm and the home intact. This nucleus of agricultural activity contributed to the continued functioning of many villages. Simultaneously, some governments and the

European Union also subsidized family production and services in villages, so as to maintain a degree of activity in marginal areas.

LAND REFORM MOVEMENTS AND NEW VILLAGES AFTER 1918 AND 1945

The parcelling out of land to peasants with the aims of stemming social unrest among agricultural laborers, limiting overseas emigration, and securing the necessary labor force for farmers and estates, began at the end of the 1800s. The land reforms after World War I in Czechoslovakia, Prussia, Finland, and part of Denmark, and after World War II in Yugoslavia and Italy, had the direct aim of reducing the extent and power of the still existing great estates, while at the same time obliging a rural but landless population's demand for land. The governments also sought to prevent a large-scale influx to the cities, which were rarely able to supply jobs to both a growing population and men returning from war. State land reform and the laying out of smallholdings in new so-called rationally planned villages has often paralleled the appearance of social movements of a populist character, which in opposition to both estate production and urban proletarianization have argued for healthy rural work and the small independent family farm. It was often pointed out that productivity per area unit in these small farms was greater than on estates, whereas the productivity per time unit was disregarded, inasmuch as surplus time in the village was seldom able to be used productively in other ways.

Many of the smallholdings which through centralized land reforms were portioned out in the 1900s have been so localized that the often extensive rural settlements can be spoken of as villages. These new villages came to function as intended in many places, but in others problems of various kinds arose. In southern and central Europe plots were never inhabited or farmed because they were too small or inexpedient from the outset, roads or water mains were never laid, people did not venture to move out of the old villages, or cattle thefts proliferated. These settlements, alongside the deserted villages, stand today as ghost towns. Other smallholdings were combined and new families moved into the houses, but particularly up until around 1960 these new smallholder villages had a symbolic progressive and antifeudal aura about them in those sections of Europe historically characterized by extensive seigniorial estates.

COLLECTIVIZATION AND DECOLLECTIVIZATION IN THE 1900s

A very different kind of land reform took place in parts of eastern Europe in the twentieth century. The collectivization of village peasants which took place from 1929 to 1938 in the Soviet Union and in all socialist countries after 1948 with the exception of Poland and Yugoslavia fundamentally changed conditions in rural areas in that part of Europe. In socialist agriculture the distinction must be made between conditions on the collectives proper and state farms, which are more reminiscent of large estate production with a paid labor force. The collectivization of large amounts of village land meant combined production on a large scale on former peasant farms, which thus were not modernized as individual family enterprises. At the same time the peasants got the right to personally farm so-called private plots. Despite the fact that these personal plots often were only one-third and one-half hectares, through their occupiers' intensive cultivation they had a very large yield. Mechanization took place primarily on the often very extensive state farms and on the collective fields, whereas production on the small personal plots was intensified mostly through comprehensive allocation of family labor and low-technological equipment. Thus, in much of eastern Central Europe the socialist experiment often not only preserved but also developed a classical

peasantlike cultivation which characterized village life in the otherwise strongly industrialized societies.

Socialist agricultural and industrial planning also had other conspicuous consequences. In Romania in the 1970s and 1980s, many villages in the plains districts were completely depopulated and the peasants relocated in large central towns engaged in either large-scale farming or the State's high-priority industries.

Following the anticommunist upheavals in 1989–1991 in eastern central Europe decollectivization has taken place. Peasants have divided the former collective fields, often according to the land division that applied before the forced collectivization. Many small family farms were reestablished in the villages in this way. The result has been a large difference in the exploitation and possession forms in the countries in question. In some places financial magnates have tried to buy up land to combine into large private farms, while simultaneously small peasants have collectively sold the large machines from the former collectives, which are useless on their own small holdings, and instead have bought a horse and a couple of cows. In such villages it is possible to see peasants build small timber stables for their newly acquired livestock in the same style as at the beginning of the twentieth century. The family's reestablished agricultural enterprise supplements other sources of income such as wage labor and other small production.

DEPOPULATION AND URBAN NEWCOMERS

Much of Europe, particularly in the 1900s, saw a migration from the country to the city, gradually draining many villages of young people. Frequently the lands have been so small and inaccessible, and the prestige in living in a rural area so low, that families have not been able to sell their property in the villages, which are therefore gradually depopulated. After 1991 this has also been the case in villages in the former socialist countries, where the ethnic German inhabitants moved to Germany. Remaining are only old people and empty houses, possession of which is in some cases eventually taken by Roma.

Partial depopulation is not a new phenomenon, though the background for deserted villages always has to be perceived in a specific historical context. Rural depopulation was known in the Middle Ages (due to epidemics), in the Thirty Years' War in the 1600s, in the 1800s due to the great waves of emigration, and after the two world wars and in the Soviet Union and Romania due to deportations and forced migrations. The problems in many villages at the beginning of the

twenty-first century are not only connected with young people leaving for urban centers to get education and jobs. The dwindling of the population bases is exacerbated by the fact that many small tradespeople have to close shop and that schools are amalgamated; in addition, state policies that are poorly suited to rural conditions can contribute to depopulation.

At the same time, since the 1960s, especially in northwestern Europe, a change has occurred in the pattern of migration in that numbers of people are moving away from the large cities in order to settle in villages and small rural towns. This is not only a result of the late modern anti-industrial attitude among well-educated population groups, but also has to do with better transportation possibilities (roads and private automobiles), cheaper homes in the country, and new forms of electronic communication. The increased demand for rural houses (including vacation homes) in such areas, often close to large well-functioning centers, has also resulted in planned expansions of many older farm villages. These villages exhibit a wholly new form of discourse characterized by both traditional agrarian viewpoints and strong culturally urban interests.

See also other articles in this section.

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COLLECTIVIZATION



Lynne Viola

The collectivization of agriculture was a central feature of twentieth-century (mainly) marxist regimes in countries ranging from Eastern Europe to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Although Marx never fully or explicitly envisioned collectivization, marxist regimes deemed collectivized agriculture an essential condition of socialism following the example set by the Soviet Union in its collectivization drive of the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932). Collectivization proved to be a transformative experience for many regimes and their people, resulting in violence, repression, population dislocation, and food shortages, while simultaneously increasing the political rigidity of administrative controls in the countryside.

The aim of collectivization was to create a large-scale socialized agricultural economy, based on modern techniques of agronomy and animal husbandry and organized into state and collective farms. While state farms were to replicate the conditions of nationalized industry with state ownership and a salaried rural workforce, collective farms were to be profit-sharing organizations, in which farmers tilled the land collectively and governed and managed the farm through a collective farm assembly and elected officers. Collectivization was meant to transform the rural sector, replacing communal forms of peasant land tenure and small, private farms, as well as ridding the countryside of a rural bourgeoisie, capitalism, and the market.

The idea of collectivization was founded upon ideological, economic, and political factors. The tenets of Marxism-Leninism judged collectivization to be not only a more just and rational economic system than capitalist modes of farming based on market forces, but also presumed collectivization to be the logical outcome of the progressive dynamics of class forces in the countryside. Marxist-Leninists grafted urban concepts of class and class struggle onto the peasantry in what was, at best, an awkward fit. They divided the peasantry into poor peasants and rural proletarians (the natural allies of the working class), middle peasants (a large and politically wavering in-

termediate stratum sharing features common to both proletariat and bourgeoisie), and kulaks (a rural bourgeoisie with social and economic power disproportionate to its relatively small numbers). They assumed that poor peasants and agricultural laborers would rally to the side of the collective farm on the basis of their class interests, swaying the middle peasant to their side and defeating the kulak in the process. In practice, peasants rarely performed according to class principles, instead uniting together in defense of com-

mon interests—subsistence, ways of life, and belief—threatened by the theory and practice of collectivization. The poor peasant in most cases failed to come to the aid of the working class (in the concrete form of mobilized urban Communists and factory workers who implemented collectivization), and the regime's inability to provide a clear and consistent definition of the kulak most often meant that politics rather than social or economic status determined who was classified as a kulak.

Collectivization was viewed as an essential ingredient in the “construction” of socialism. In the Soviet Union and elsewhere, socialist construction meant not only the eradication of rural capitalism, but also the industrialization and modernization of the country. The collectivization of agriculture would facilitate the control and transfer of economic resources from the rural to the heavy industrial sector in a process the Soviet Communist theorist E. A. Preobrazhensky labeled in the 1920s “primitive socialist accumulation.” By increasing grain production and mechanizing agriculture, collectivization was expected to free up capital and labor for industry, and food resources for a growing urban industrial workforce. And although most historians agree that collectivization did not pay for industrialization, at least in the short-term, it is clear that this expectation was an important motivation behind collectivization, particularly in conditions of economic isolation.

Finally, collectivization was a central aspect of state building, as regimes sought to expand political and administrative controls to the countryside, where in the Soviet Union and most of Eastern Europe (with the exception of Czechoslovakia) the majority of the population lived. The peasant commune and scattered, small private farms represented semiautonomous loci of power. Through the mobilization of urban forces, an expansion in rural party membership, and the creation of new, Soviet organs of power (the state farm, collective farm, machine-tractor stations, and so forth), the Communist Party endeavored to offset its relatively weak base of power in the countryside. Auxiliary policies aimed against religion and the kulak sought to eliminate the alternative power centers of the church and local authority figures.

In reality, the Soviet Union in the 1930s and the countries of Eastern Europe after World War II faced a largely resistant peasantry and smallholding farming population, uninterested in collectivized agriculture and generally impervious to marxist class principles. Collectivization consequently was a top-down, state-initiated transformation based on coercion and the mobilization of outside forces and animated by a fiercely urban bias and anti-peasant prejudice.

While collectivization in Eastern Europe generally occurred with less violence, and in some cases more in the breach, collectivization in the Soviet Union represented an upheaval of cataclysmic proportions.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, COLLECTIVIZATION, AND THE PEASANTRY

The peasantry presented the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with the most formidable challenge of the revolution. Communist definitions generally sought to explain away the peasantry, to see it as a transitional class that would disappear with the advent of socialism. Communists expected the peasantry to dissolve into the working class—as indeed had been the case elsewhere in Europe—as the industrialization of the country expanded and siphoned off labor from the countryside. Until that time, however, the peasantry represented a glaring social, economic, and political contradiction to the premise and reality of the revolution.

Soviet power was based upon a “dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry.” In 1917, when the Bolsheviks championed peasant revolutionary goals as their own, V. I. Lenin claimed that “there is *no* radical divergence of interests between the wage-workers and the working and exploited peasantry. Socialism is *fully* able to meet the interests of both” (Lenin, vol. 35, p. 102). In fact, the dictatorship, and the “alliance” it derived from, combined mutually irreconcilable aims and quickly broke apart in conflict. It could not have been otherwise given the contradictory nature of the October Revolution, a “working-class revolution” in an agrarian nation in which the industrial proletariat accounted for little more than 3 percent of the population, while the peasantry constituted no less than 85 percent. In fact, there were actually two revolutions in 1917—an urban, socialist revolution, and a rural, bourgeois or antimanagerial revolution. The two revolutions represented different and ultimately antithetical goals. Following its forced expropriation and partition of the nobility's lands in 1917, the peasantry desired no more than the right to be left alone: to prosper as farmers and to dispose of their produce as they saw fit. Although some peasants may have shared the socialist aims of the towns, most were averse to principles of socialist collectivism.

The 1917 Revolution had the unintended consequence of reinforcing many aspects of peasant culture and, specifically, a number of important features underlying and strengthening community cohesion. Although human and material losses from years of war and the famine that followed in the wake of the Rus-

sian Civil War (1918–1920) took a tremendous toll on the peasantry, the revolution, in combination with this time of troubles, had the effect of revitalizing the peasant community. Peasants engaged in massive social leveling during the revolution and civil war. The percentages of poor peasants fell from a prerevolutionary level of some 65 percent to around 25 percent by the mid-1920s, while the proportion of wealthy peasants declined from roughly 15 percent (depending on calculation) to about 3 percent in the same time span. The middle peasant became the dominant figure in Soviet agriculture as a result of wartime losses; social revolution and redivision of wealth; and the return, often forced, of large numbers of peasants who had quit the commune to establish individual farmsteads in the prewar Stolypin agrarian reforms, Prime Minister Petr Stolypin's post-1905 "wager on the strong," whereby the tsarist government endeavored to weaken communal land tenure by encouraging individual, hereditary forms of land ownership and the emergence of a stratum of strong, individual farmers in order to create a conservative base of support for the regime in the countryside.

Socioeconomic differentiation remained fairly stable through the 1920s, showing only very slight increases at the extremes. Leveling reinforced village homogeneity and cohesion while strengthening the position of the middle peasant. The kulak never regained his prerevolutionary economic status or social standing in the village and was by no means the dangerous counterrevolutionary described in the Stalinist rhetoric of the collectivization era. The commune itself was bolstered as most of the individual proprietors among the peasants (many of whom had benefited from the Stolypin reforms after 1905) returned to communal land tenure, which constituted approximately 95 percent of all forms of land tenure in the mid-1920s, thereby standardizing the peasant economy. And although peasant households splintered as the liberating effects of the revolution encouraged and enabled peasants' sons to free themselves from the authority of the patriarchal household, most peasants, especially women and the weaker members of the community, clung all the more tenaciously to customary and conservative notions of household, family, marriage, and belief in order to survive the crisis of the times. While the revolution no doubt dislodged and altered significant aspects of peasant lives, historians increasingly believe that the basic structures and institutions of the village demonstrated considerable continuity over the revolutionary divide, in many cases becoming stronger as a defensive bulwark against economic hardship and the destructive incursions of warring governments and armies.

The strengthening of homogeneity and the endurance of peasant culture in the 1920s should not imply that the peasantry was a static, unchanging rustic fixture. Profound processes of change had long been at work in the countryside, accelerating in particular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Alternative patterns of socialization appeared at this time as peasant-workers and soldiers returned permanently or on visits to their home villages. Urban patterns of taste and, to a lesser extent, consumption also began to make an appearance in rural Russia as personal contacts between town and countryside became more common. A market economy made inroads into the prerevolutionary countryside, altering the economy of the peasant household as well as the internal social dynamics of the commune. Family size declined as extended families slowly began to give way to nuclear families, and marriages began to be based less exclusively on parents' choice. Peasant culture did not stagnate, but evolved over time, absorbing change and pragmatically adapting what was of use. Fundamental structures and institutions of peasant community persisted, demonstrating the durability and adaptability of the peasantry as a culture.

Similar patterns of change persisted into the Soviet period, coexisting, sometimes peacefully, sometimes not, with the prevailing patterns of peasant and community relations and dynamics. Although many interactions between village and town were disrupted during the revolution and civil war, the town and state continued to have an enormous impact on the countryside. Tens of thousands of peasant-workers returned to the village during the civil war, bringing with them new ways and practices not always in line with those of the community. A vast number of peasants served in the army during the world war and civil war, and they, too, returned with new ideas, sometimes at odds with their neighbors. From some of these groups emerged the village's first Communists and members of the Young Communist League (Komsomol). The Communist Party, in the meantime, although in practice generally neglectful of the countryside through most of the 1920s and preoccupied with industrial and internal party politics, was, in theory, committed to remaking the peasantry, to eliminating it as an antiquated socioeconomic category in an accelerated depeasantization that would transform peasant into proletarian. The party, the Komsomol, peasant-workers home on leave, groups of poor peasants, and Red Army veterans all became dimly lit beacons of Communist sensibility in the village. Efforts at socialization and indoctrination occurred in periodic antireligious campaigns, literacy campaigns, election campaigns, campaigns to recruit

party and Komsomol members, campaigns to organize poor peasants or women, and so on, as the state attempted to build bridges into the countryside in the 1920s. The state succeeded in establishing pockets of support in the village, which would serve not only as agents of change but also as new sources of cleavage and village disjunction as new political identities emerged and interacted within the peasant community.

Collectivization was to destroy most of these “cultural bridges,” leaving what remained of the state’s small contingent of supporters entrenched against a hostile community. Most of the natural cleavages and fault lines that crisscrossed the village in ordinary times receded into latency during collectivization as the community found itself united against a common and, by this time, deadly foe. During collectivization, the peasantry acted as a class in much the way Teodor Shanin has defined class for peasantry in *Peasants and Peasant Societies*: “That is, as a social entity with a community of economic interests, its identity shaped by conflict with other classes and expressed in typical patterns of cognition and political consciousness, however rudimentary, which made it capable of collective action reflecting its interests” (p. 329). The era of the New Economic Policy (NEP), a relative golden age for the peasantry, came to an abrupt end with the collectivization of Soviet agriculture.

Collectivization encapsulated the original fault lines of the revolution, between a minority class in whose name the Communists professed to rule and the majority peasantry whose very reality appeared to block the revolution. Stalin’s collectivization was an attempt to eliminate the fault line, to solve the accursed peasant problem by force, to create a socialist society and economy from above. It was a campaign of domination that aimed at nothing less than the internal colonization of the peasantry. Collectivization was intended to ensure a steady flow of grain to the state to feed the nation and to pay for industrialization. It was also intended to enable Soviet power to subjugate the peasantry through the imposition of administrative and political controls and forced acculturation into the dominant culture.

COLLECTIVIZATION IN THE SOVIET UNION

In November 1929, Stalin proclaimed that the middle peasant had begun to flock to the collective farms. In fact, collectivization had increased dramatically by this time, surpassing the relatively modest rates projected for the socialized sector of agriculture after the Fifteenth Party Congress of December 1927 placed col-

lectivization on the immediate agenda. At the Sixteenth Party Conference in April 1929, in its First Five-Year Plan on agriculture, the central committee of the Communist Party had projected the collectivization of 9.6 percent of the peasant population in the 1932–1933 economic year, and 13.6 percent (or approximately 3.7 million households) in 1933–1934. These projections were revised upward in the late summer and fall of 1929, when first *Gosplan* (the state planning commission) called for the collectivization of 2.5 million peasant households in the course of 1929–1930, and then *Kolkhozsentr* (the central agency at the head of collective-farm administration) resolved that 3.1 million peasant households would be incorporated into collective farms by the end of 1929–1930 (Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*, pp. 112, 147).

In actuality, by 1 June 1928, 1.7 percent of peasant households were in collective farms; and between 1 June and 1 October 1929, alone, percentages rose from 3.9 to 7.5. The increase was especially marked in major grain-producing regions. The Lower Volga and North Caucasus surpassed all other regions with percentages of collectivized peasant households reaching 18.1 and 19.1, respectively, in October (Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*, p. 442). The high rates achieved in the regional collectivization campaigns lay behind Stalin’s statement that the middle peasantry was entering collective farms. By arguing that the middle peasant was turning voluntarily to socialized agriculture, Stalin was claiming that the majority of the peasantry was ready for collectivization. In reality, it was mainly poor peasants who were joining collectives. And, although there was apparently some genuine enthusiasm “from below,” the regional campaigns had already begun to resort to coercion to achieve their high percentages.

Even at this stage, collectivization was largely imposed “from above.” Orchestrated and led by the regional party organizations, with implicit or explicit sanction from Moscow, district-level officials and urban Communists and workers brought collectivization to the countryside. A volatile antipeasant mood in the cities—especially among rank-and-file Communists and industrial workers and based on bread shortages, continuing news of “kulak sabotage,” and long-simmering urban-rural antipathies—infected these cadres and other, newer recruits from urban centers. This combination of official endorsement, regional initiative and direction, and unrestrained action on the part of lower-level cadres intertwined to create a radical momentum of ever-accelerating collectivization tempos. The “success” of the regional campaigns then provided the necessary impetus for Moscow to push up collectivization rates even higher

in what became a deadly and continual tug-of-war between center and periphery as reality exceeded plan, and plans were continually revised to register, keep pace with, and push forward collectivization tempos.

The Politburo commission, December 1929.

The November 1929 Communist Party plenum formally ratified the policy of wholesale collectivization, leaving the specifics of policy implementation to a Politburo commission that would meet the next month. The commission called for the completion of collectivization in major grain-producing regions in one to two years; in other grain regions, two to three years; and in the most important grain deficit regions, three to four years. The commission also resolved that an intermediate form of collective farm, the *artel*—a cooperative that featured the socialization of land, labor, draft animals, and basic inventory—would be the standard, and that private ownership of domestic livestock needed for consumption would be maintained. Any movement to extend socialization of peasant properties beyond the *artel* would depend on the peasantry's experience and "the growth of its confidence in the stability, benefits, and advantages" of collective farming. The kulak faced expropriation of his means of production (which would then be transferred to the collective farms) and resettlement or exile. The subcommittee on the kulak recommended a differentiated approach to the elimination of the kulak as a class. Finally, the commission warned against any attempt either to restrain collectivization or to collectivize "by decree."

The Politburo commission published its legislation on 5 January 1930. The legislation stipulated that the Lower Volga, Central Volga, and North Caucasus were to complete collectivization by fall 1930, spring 1931 at the latest; all remaining grain regions were to complete collectivization by fall 1931, spring 1932 at the latest, thus accelerating yet again the pace of the campaign. No mention was made of remaining areas. The legislation also specified that the *artel* would be the main form of collective farm, leaving out any particulars from the commission's work. Stalin had personally intervened on this issue, ordering the editing out of "details" on the *artel*, which should, he argued, more appropriately be left to the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Agriculture. The kulak would be "eliminated as a class," as Stalin had already noted in his 27 December 1929 speech at the Conference of Marxist Agronomists, and excluded from entry into the collective farms. Stalin and other maximalists in the leadership were responsible for radicalizing further an already radical set of guidelines by revising the work of the December commission, keep-

ing the legislation vague, and including only very weak warnings against violence.

By the time this legislation was published, collectivization percentages in the Soviet Union had leaped from 7.5 in October to 18.1 on 1 January 1930, with even higher rates in major grain regions (Lower Volga, 56–70 percent; Central Volga, 41.7 percent; North Caucasus, 48.1 percent). Through the month of January, reality continued to outpace planning. By 1 February 1930, 31.7 percent of all households were in collective farms, with rates still higher in individual regions (Moscow, 37.1 percent; Central Black Earth Region, 51 percent; Ural, 52.1 percent; Central Volga, 51.8 percent; Lower Volga, 61.1 percent; North Caucasus, 62.7 percent; see Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*, pp. 442–443).

Dekulakization. Dekulakization—the elimination of the kulak as a class—had also spread far and wide through the country as regional party organizations enacted their own legislation and issued their own directives in advance and in anticipation of Moscow. A Politburo commission led by V. M. Molotov, Politburo member and Stalin's right-hand man, met from 15 to 26 January in an effort to draw up central legislation on dekulakization. Like collectivization, dekulakization had gone far beyond the initial plans of the December Politburo commission by now, in what had become a melee of violence and plunder. The term "kulak" was defined broadly to include not only kulaks (an ambiguous term to start with) but (using the parlance of the day) active white guards, former bandits, former white officers, repatriated peasants, active members of church councils and sects, priests, and anyone "currently manifesting c[ounter]-r[evolutionary] activities." Following the policy recommendations of December, the commission divided kulaks into three categories: counterrevolutionaries, those refusing to submit to collectivization, and the remainder. The first, most dangerous category was limited to some 60,000 heads of households who faced execution or internment in concentration camps, while their families were expropriated of their properties and all but the most essential items and were sent into exile in remote parts of the country. The second category—primarily the richest kulaks, large-scale kulaks, and former semilandowners—was limited to 150,000 families; deemed somewhat less dangerous but still a threat, they also faced expropriation and exile to remote regions. The main points of exile for these two categories were the Northern Region (scheduled to receive 70,000 families), Siberia (50,000 families), the Urals (20–25,000 families), and Kazakhstan (20–25,000 families). The third cate-

gory, well over one-half million families, was to be subjected to partial expropriation of properties and resettlement within their native districts. Overall numbers of dekulakized peasants were not to exceed 3 to 5 percent of the population. The OGPU (the political police) was charged with the implementation of arrests and deportations. The operation was to be completed in four months. District soviets, in combination with village soviets, poor peasants, and collective farmers, were responsible for drawing up lists of kulaks and carrying out expropriations.

Collectivization and dekulakization had long since jumped the rails of central control. Brigades of collectivizers with plenipotentiary powers toured the countryside, stopping briefly in villages where, often with guns in hands, they forced peasants, under threat of dekulakization, to sign up to join the collective farm. Intimidation, harassment, and even torture were used to exact signatures. Collectivization rates continued to rise through February, reaching 57.2 percent by 1 March, and the hideously unreal regional percentages of 74.2 in Moscow Region, 83.3 in the Central Black Earth Region, 75.6 in the Urals, 60.3 in Central Volga, 70.1 in Lower Volga, and 79.4 in North Caucasus (Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*, pp. 442–443). The high percentages belied the fact that most collective farms at this time were “paper collectives,” attained in the “race for percentages” held among regional and district party organizations. Collectivization often amounted to little more than a collective farm charter and chairman, the socialization of livestock (which might remain in former owners’ possession until appropriate collective space was provided), and the terror of dekulakization.

Dekulakization was no fiction. Although deportations often did not begin until later, peasants labeled as kulaks found themselves evicted from their homes or forced to exchange homes with poor peasants; fleeced of their belongings, often including household items, trinkets, and clothes; and shamed, insulted, and injured before the community. Dekulakization was sometimes carried out “conspiratorially,” in the dead of night, as cadres banged on doors and windows, terrorizing families who were forced out onto the street, half-dressed. Often, everything was taken from these families, including children’s underwear and earrings from women’s ears. In the Central Black Earth Region, a county-level official told cadres to “dekulakize in such a way that only the ceiling beams and walls are left.”

The countryside was engulfed in what peasants called a Bartholomew’s night massacre. As state repression increased, peasant violence increased, and as peasant violence increased, state violence increased,

leading to a seemingly never-ending crescendo of arrests, pillage, beatings, and rage. The crescendo came to an abrupt halt, however, when, on 2 March 1930, Stalin published his article “Dizziness from Success,” which blamed the outrages on the lower-level cadres—who were indeed dizzy from success—but failed to admit any central responsibility. Soon collectivization percentages began to tumble as peasants appropriated Stalin’s name in their struggle against the cadres of collectivization. Peasants quit the collective farms in droves, driving down percentages of collectivized households from 57.2 in March to 38.6 in April, 28 in May, and further downward until hitting a low of 21.5 in September. The decline in regional rates was equally drastic. Between 1 March and 1 May, percentages of collectivized households fell in Moscow Region from 74.2 to 7.5; in the Central Black Earth Region, from 83.3 to 18.2; in the Urals, from 75.6 to 31.9; in the Lower Volga, from 70.1 to 41.4; in the Central Volga, from 60.3 to 30.1; and in the North Caucasus, from 79.4 to 63.2 (Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*, pp. 442–443).

Collectivization resumed in the fall of 1930 at a slightly less breakneck speed. The major grain-producing regions attained complete collectivization by the end of the First Five-Year Plan in 1932; other regions climbed more gradually to that goal, generally reaching it by the end of the 1930s. In the meantime, over one million peasant families (five to six million people) were subjected to some form of dekulakization during the years of wholesale collectivization. Of these, some 381,026 families (totaling 1,803,392 people) were exiled in 1930 and 1931, the two key years of deportation. The deportations were perhaps one of the most horrendous episodes in a decade marked by horror and, through the vast expansion of the use of internal exile, the concentration camp system, and the political police, helped to establish the foundations for the Stalinist police state.

CONSEQUENCES AND AFTERMATH OF SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION

Collectivization posed a profound threat to the peasant way of life. Peasants of every social strata responded to this threat by uniting in defense of their families, beliefs, communities, and livelihood, and overcoming their ordinary and multiple differences. In 1930, more than two million peasants took part in 13,794 mass disturbances against Communist Party policies. In 1929 and 1930, the OGPU recorded 22,887 “terrorist acts” aimed at local officials and peasant activists, more than 1,100 of them murders

(Viola, 1996, pp. 103, 105, 110, 112, 140). Peasant resistance was rooted in peasant culture rather than in any specific social stratum and was shaped by an agency and political consciousness that derived from reasoned concerns centered largely on issues of justice and subsistence, and supplemented by retribution, anger, and desperation. The peasant rebellion against collectivization was the most serious episode of popular resistance experienced by the Communist Party after the Russian Civil War.

In the end, peasant rebels were no match for the vast police powers of the state, and, like most other peasant rebellions, this one was destined to fail. The main element in the peasantry's defeat was state repression. Millions of peasants were arrested, imprisoned, deported, or executed in the years of collectivization. The state dismantled existing authority structures in the village, removing and replacing traditional elites. The devastating famine of 1932–1933, caused by collectivization and the state's inhumanly high grain requisitions, complemented state repression, first robbing peasants of their grain and then depriving perhaps as many as five million people of their lives as starvation and disease took their toll. Repression and a one-sided war of attrition effectively silenced peasant rebels.

Yet repression alone could not and did not end peasant resistance; nor could it have served as the only mechanism of control in the long term. For reasons of sheer necessity, the state largely gave up its revo-

lutionary aspirations in the countryside after collectivization, choosing, pragmatically and cynically, to exert its domination over the peasantry through the control of vital resources, most especially grain. The peasant household continued to be the mainstay of the peasant—if not collective farm—economy, and homes, domestic livestock, barns, sheds, and household necessities were deemed peasants' private property. The private plot and a limited collective farm market remained alongside socialized agriculture to guarantee a minimum subsistence for collective farmers and to supplement the nation's consumer needs. Peasants were co-opted into positions of authority, and in the decades following the death of Stalin, the state gradually extended more of its admittedly paltry benefits from the urban to the rural sector. The Soviet agricultural system became a hybrid system, based on peasant private plots and collective farms, all in the service of the state, but offering the peasantry something in the exchange.

In the long term, the social by-products of industrialization and urbanization proved as efficacious in securing peasant acquiescence as the brute force of the state. Continued outmigration and permanent resettlement in cities of males and young people spread extended families between town and village, bringing peasant culture to the town and fixing in place urban bridges to the village more firmly than ever before. Education, military service, and improved transportation and communications facilitated a certain degree

of sovietization in the countryside, or, at the very least, some homogenization across the urban divide.

The Stalinist state and the collective farm system triumphed in the end, but their triumph did not spell the end of peasant culture. The peasantry re-emerged, not unchanged to be sure, from within socialized agriculture. Passive resistance and other “weapons of the weak” became endemic mechanisms of coping and survival for the peasantry within the collective farm. Agriculture stagnated, becoming the Achilles’ heel of the Soviet economy, a ceaseless reminder of the ironies of the “proletarian revolution” in peasant Russia. Like the peasant commune before it, the collective farm became a bulwark against change and as much a subsistence shelter for peasants as a control mechanism for the state. Over time, the collective farm became the quintessential risk-aversion guarantor that peasants had always sought. Socioeconomic leveling, a basic and insured subsistence, and some degree of cultural independence, demographic isolation, and feminization of the village maintained and even strengthened aspects of village culture.

To the extent that it was possible, peasants made the collective farm their own. State attempts at de-collectivization after 1991 provide ample evidence for this. Decollectivization was blocked by a peasantry grown accustomed to the collective farm. This seeming intransigence was less the result of backwardness, or a “serf mentality,” as some interpreters see it, than a simple continuity of peasant needs, values, and ways of living. Decollectivization, moreover, demonstrated continuity with earlier state efforts to remold the peasantry. Its implementation was top down, based on some measure of force (although nothing like that of collectivization), and relied counterproductively on a tradition-bound equalization of small land parcels in cases of privatization, revealing all the usual elements of the cultural manipulation and imperialism of state modernization. Peasants in post-Communist Russia and other former Soviet republics have responded to decollectivization with skepticism and hostility, having molded the collective farm at least partially to their own needs.

COLLECTIVIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Collectivization in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe (defined here as the former German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania) followed similar patterns to Soviet collectivization. Following occupation by Soviet military forces at the end of World War II, these countries were subject to a pro-

cess of sovietization, which, in the years before the death of Stalin in 1953, was tantamount to Stalinization. Political repression, the nationalization of industry, and the beginnings of agricultural collectivization were carried out in the years between 1948 and 1953. As in the Soviet Union, collectivization was a state-directed policy and met with little or no support from the peasantry. Collectivization in Eastern Europe also entailed the elimination of a rural bourgeoisie, leading to national policies of dekulakization. By 1953, collectivization in most of Eastern Europe had only been partially implemented. The brief “thaw” in policy following the death of Stalin meant in most cases a respite for the peasantry and a temporary halt in collectivization. The second stage of collectivization came in the late 1950s, with the result that collectivization was completed throughout Eastern Europe by 1962, with the notable exceptions of Poland and Yugoslavia, which did not experience a second collectivization drive and had largely abandoned collectivization after the initial drive of the late Stalin period.

The motivations behind collectivization were fairly uniform through Eastern Europe. Following Soviet patterns of ideology and economic and political development, Eastern European collectivization was based on theories of rural class struggle, the idea of “primitive socialist accumulation,” and the extension of political and administrative controls to the countryside. Most important, Eastern European collectivization came with Soviet hegemony, as an imported by-product of military occupation and sovietization.

Eastern European collectivization exhibited patterns of national variation. While the initial collectivization drive in Poland was relatively moderate, collectivization in Bulgaria, for example, was brutal and much closer in style to the Soviet drive of 1930. And in spite of initial collectivization campaigns, private agriculture continued to dominate the rural economies of Poland and Yugoslavia. In Hungary the policies of the New Economic Mechanism after 1968 gradually introduced market forces into the socialized agricultural economy, diminishing the intensity of collectivization. And, as in the case of the Soviet Union, a private sector based on the household economies of collective farmers played an important role in both collective farmers’ income and the nation’s consumer needs throughout Eastern Europe.

Peasants often resisted collectivization in Eastern Europe. Although peasants and farmers sometimes offered active forms of resistance to collectivization, the more widespread and long-term reaction of the rural population to socialized agriculture was passive resistance in the form of foot-dragging, pilfer-

ing, and the like. Eastern Europe also experienced patterns of demographic change similar to the Soviet Union, with population movement between rural and urban sectors.

After 1989, with perestroika and the end of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, policies of decollectivization and property restitution were initiated in much of Eastern Europe. These policies were not entirely successful. In most cases, reform policies were

hastily constructed and implemented in the more general context of a complex economic restructuring of the system entailing myriad economic problems and disruptions. In general, where collectivization was most entrenched (Bulgaria, Romania, Albania), decollectivization was most problematic. As of the late 1990s, decollectivization was a continuing process, necessitating new policies, new legislation, and the re-writing of legal codes.

See also Peasants and Rural Laborers (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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ESTATES AND COUNTRY HOUSES



Priscilla R. Roosevelt

Since the Renaissance, Europe's country residences have fallen into two categories. Foremost were the vast rural, income-producing estates that the aristocracy of preindustrial Europe controlled and administered. Some of these medieval fiefdoms persisted well into the modern period. Powerful landowning families sought to intermarry, creating dynastic alliances to increase family status and landholdings. The second form of country dwelling arose in Renaissance Italy: the suburban villa or country house, a rural pleasure ground intimately linked to urban life, as the city was usually the owner's major source of income. But owners of both villas and estates exported urban comforts to the countryside. Hence all country residences were oases of sophistication in a rural setting, and country house owners were fundamentally different from their farmer or peasant neighbors.

The country house reached its apogee in eighteenth-century England through a successful fusion of these two types of country life. In England landownership was synonymous both with wealth and political power; nowhere else was there a similarly self-confident, independent elite. The architecture, furnishings, and gardens of country seats throughout the British Isles advertised the political authority, social status, and cultivated taste of the landed gentleman, who shot game, rode to hounds, and roamed his tenant farms in tattered tweeds by day but dressed in tails each evening. Because of their significance, these country houses have prompted numerous social histories.

English country life gave rise to a widespread aristocratic Anglomania on the Continent. But in most instances, the conditions for a similar culture of country life were absent, and hence social (as opposed to architectural or economic) histories of continental country life are rare. Whereas the English lord ignored court life, absolutism focused attention on it. The French elite, for example, were thoroughly tied to Versailles. As the nobleman Jean de La Bruyère explained it, "A nobleman . . . at home in his province lives free but without substance; . . . at court he is taken care of, but enslaved" (Ford, 1953, p. vii).

Only in the reign of Louis XVI (1774–1792) did French court life lose its significance. Other continental elites also reached their zenith of power and independence in the same period, the era of enlightened absolutism, under Frederick the Great of Prussia, Joseph II of Austria, and Catherine II of Russia. The model of country splendor at Frederick's Sans Souci in Potsdam found echoes in suburban villas near Berlin and Vienna, though the traditional strongholds of Prussia's nobility remained, in essence, medieval, as did those of great Austrian landowners. Russia lacked comparable medieval manors; the vast majority of its country houses were built in a single century, between 1762, when Catherine the Great ascended the throne, and 1861, when the serfs were emancipated. Although the Russian elite spoke French, as estate owners they too were Anglophiles. Some Russian country estates were major sources of income; though the country house had little political impact, it played an enormous role in Russia's cultural development.

THE IDEOLOGY AND ARCHITECTURE OF THE COUNTRY HOUSE

As James S. Ackerman points out in *The Villa*, the country house of Renaissance Italy embodied a radical ideological innovation. Heretofore, country grandees had been surrounded by armed retainers. Their sparsely furnished and intermittently occupied castles and châteaux were grand symbols of territorial hegemony. Well into the English Renaissance, many great houses, among them Longleat (1568–1569) and Wothorpe Lodge (1610), retained the great chambers, turrets, and towers signifying authority in medieval times.

Renaissance Italy contained politically ambitious and economically prosperous city-states whose leading citizens identified easily with their Roman forbears. The rediscovery of the works of classical Roman authors such as Virgil, Pliny the Younger, Horace, Cato, and Vitruvius, whose poetry and prose idealized

the long-vanished arcadian retreats of Roman statesmen and intellectuals, gave rise to a cult of country life centered on the bucolic leisure activities available at a country house. Classical writers had used the word *otium* to describe their country pursuits. The antithesis of *negotium*, a preoccupation with business, *otium* could mean either the informality and arcadian relaxation Virgil described in his *Eclogues* or the pursuit of salubrious mental and physical activity he praised in his *Georgics* (which also contained practical farming advice). In the fourteenth century the seminal work *Vita solitaria* by the great classical scholar Petrarch, along with his letters extolling the many pleasures of country life, gave new life to the ancient pursuit of *otium*. But for the owner of a country house, labor was not the backbreaking, monotonous routine of the rural poor; rather, it was seen as the reinvigoration of soul and spirit. Voltaire designing his garden at Ferney, and Marie Antoinette in her Versailles dairy serving guests fresh milk from prize cows, were both pursuing this ideal.

Villa architecture and landscaping, paintings of country houses and paintings within their walls, and a rich literature about country house life soon enshrined the new cult. Renaissance villas sprang full-blown from readings of the ancient texts, since no Roman country houses had yet been excavated to

provide concrete models. The earliest Medici country residences, at Trebbio (1427–1433) and Cafaggiolo (1443–1452), demonstrated the lingering influence of medieval towers and battlements. The Medici villa at Fiesole, by contrast, situated on a commanding height with sweeping views of the Arno valley and Florence, reflected the new aesthetic of Leon Battista Alberti's *De re aedificatoria* (On the art of building; completed 1452, published 1485), which attacked the fortress as incommensurate with the values of the peaceful citizens of a republic. As Ackerman notes, the Fiesole villa was the first modern country house, designed solely on the basis of aesthetic and humanistic values. Slightly later, Lorenzo de' Medici commissioned Giuliano de Sangallo to design a grand country house at Poggio (1485). With its templelike portico resting atop a colonnade spanning the entire main facade, and its imposing split staircase, the Poggio house expressed the sense of dynastic grandeur that informed later structures such as the new Hardwick Hall, built in England at the end of the sixteenth century. This imposing, symmetrical house had a stone facade pierced by countless windows and parapets adorned with the initials of Elizabeth Hardwick, countess of Shrewsbury. Her contemporaries, the Maignarts of Normandy, far more modest French provincials, likewise highlighted family status through

Latin inscriptions glorifying their ancestors along the Italianate galleries of the facade of one estate house, and they built a new, more magnificent house on another estate in the early seventeenth century. During the next two centuries countless country houses were built or remodeled throughout Europe, as the stylish country residence, complete with coat of arms and family tree, portraits of ancestors and mementos of their achievements, became a necessity for families wishing to assert their high social standing.

No architect had a more profound impact on the form of Europe's country houses than Andrea Palladio (1508–1580). Palladianism provided an international architectural vocabulary for Europe's elite, making neoclassical grandeur synonymous with authority and good taste. The eighteen country houses Palladio designed for wealthy patrons from Venice, Padua, and Vicenza innovatively adapted the elegant forms of classical Roman architecture to the practical functions of a country house. The stables, storerooms, and other service areas of a working farm were all incorporated into a single balanced architectural plan, often as elegant pavilions attached to the main house by covered colonnades. The enormous variety of Palladio's houses made them a particularly rich resource for later designers. The long, low Villa Barbaro at Maser (1557–1558), its salon walls enlivened by Paolo Veronese's frescoes of romantic landscapes and evocative Roman ruins, was one model. The Villa Rotunda (1560–1591) has an entirely different aesthetic. Designed as a pleasure palace, its cubic form, crowned with a dome and with Roman porticoes on each facade, dominates the landscape. Palladio described his creations in his *I quattro libri dell'architettura* (Four books on architecture; 1570), an illustrated compendium of advice and plans for country house builders that found scores of devotees throughout Europe.

In Holland, Palladian villas appeared alongside their baroque precursors in the republic's golden age, the seventeenth century. Enclaves of elegant mansions arose around the major cities of Leiden and Haarlem, and along the banks of the river Vecht between Utrecht and Amsterdam. Their names, such as Hofwijk, "away from court," or Zorghvliet, "fly from care," were expressive of the country house ideology. The Dutch spent immense sums on the building and furnishing of these houses. Visitors found them sumptuous, with large, well-tended parks and all the leisure activities—hunting, gardening, or playing the squire among tenant farmers—that jaded courtiers might find physically and morally restorative.

In England, Palladianism found its first convert in the architect Inigo Jones (1573–1652), but others appeared after 1715, when two source books appeared

simultaneously: the first volume of Colen Campbell's *Vitruvius Britannicus*, and a two-volume edition of Palladio. Richard Boyle, third earl of Burlington, a passionate adherent, borrowed freely from the Villa Rotunda for the design of his suburban Chiswick House (1727–1729). The rotunda, however, never gained the popularity of Palladio's columned porticoes and symmetrical room arrangements. In Russia and in Ireland, the Palladian combination of a central block linked to two wings by curved colonnades was particularly fashionable. The refined simplicity and balance of Palladianism suited Enlightenment ideals far better than the excessively decorative baroque. But it was more widespread in countries without older indigenous secular architectural traditions, such as Russia or the United States, than in England, where it competed from the mid-eighteenth century onward with a revival of the Gothic and, later, with a diffused historicism embracing numerous earlier styles.

In the heyday of estate building (in England, from 1660 to 1730 and from 1790 until well into the nineteenth century), architects also designed interior decor and furnishings, and decorators doubled as landscapers. Charles Cameron (1730s–1812), a Scottish architect whose treatise on Roman baths won him commissions from Catherine the Great, not only designed the central complex (a Palladian bridge, gallery of worthies, and Roman baths) of Tsarskoe Selo, the summer palace of the Russian imperial family, but also sketched designs for its interior decor and furnishings. Eighteenth-century designers worked in many styles as well as forms, including rococo and chinoiserie, which added grace, variety, and fantasy to their vocabulary. Robert Adam (1728–1792), famed for his neoclassical interiors, was also renowned for his Gothic villas and castles.

In eighteenth-century Russia, European styles came in rapid succession. The earliest country houses, along the road to Peterhof, the royal residence outside St. Petersburg, were predominantly Italian baroque, like St. Petersburg itself. Like the Dutch villas that perhaps inspired them, these courtiers' houses had playful names such as Neskuchnoe, "not boring," and Mon Plaisir, "my pleasure." In 1762 Catherine the Great commissioned Antonio Rinaldi to design a small palace with rococo and chinoiserie interiors at Oranienbaum. But in 1764 she embraced neoclassicism, Russian courtiers followed suit, and the great age of Russian estate building (1762–1825) saw grandiose neoclassical houses proliferate throughout central Russia. Both foreign and Russian architects, such as the self-taught Nikolai Lvov (1751–1803), who translated and published Palladio's *I quattro libri*, designed country houses, some of which, such as Lvov's

own Nikolskoe-Cherenchitsy and Gavrila Derzhavin's Zvanka, were clearly modeled on the Villa Rotunda. Russian Gothic was rare, reserved for outbuildings as a decorative contrast to the main house, until the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855), a period when, throughout Europe, romanticism encouraged historicism in architecture. Nicholas's Gothic "Cottage" initiated the search for a Russian national style and opened the doors to stylistic experimentation, culminating in the fanciful, symbolic, and eclectic architecture of late-nineteenth-century Russian country houses, some Gothic, others neoclassical, still others Swiss chalets or grandiose variations on traditional Russian village architecture.

LANDSCAPE DESIGN

In Renaissance Italy the landscaped surroundings of the villa had been rigidly geometrical. Clipped hedges and topiary, geometrically arranged paths, a profusion of statuary, and fountains remained in vogue through the seventeenth century, culminating in the magnificent designs of André Le Nôtre for the formal gardens of Versailles, widely imitated by country house landscapers. But during the eighteenth century, talented English landscapers imbued with a new sensibility to nature devised changes that altered the entire concept

of the landscape. Batty Langley, in his *New Principles of Gardening* (1728), suggested the straight garden path be replaced by sinuous designs he termed "artificial." Charles Bridgeman left plantings untrimmed and created vast expanses of lawn at Stowe, his most renowned commission. By mid-century, in the work of the most noted practitioners such as William Kent, who designed the Elysian Fields at Stowe, the garden became indistinguishable from the idealized, untrammelled landscapes of fashionable painters such as Claude Lorrain and Nicolas Poussin. Walls were replaced by the ha-ha, a deep invisible ditch with a sunken wall that kept farm animals out of the garden. In the second half of the century Lancelot "Capability" Brown (who worked on 188 gardens) emphasized water in the landscape, and Humphrey Repton in his 220 commissions enthroned the picturesque.

The English, or informal, garden was as demanding as its predecessor on owners' resources and designers' ingenuity. Tenant farms were sacrificed in a competition for vast landscaped parks that by the early nineteenth century sometimes encompassed thousands of acres. Throughout Europe, legions of workers were set to resculpting garden terrain, creating natural-looking ponds and lakes, brooks and waterfalls, and sloping hillsides, or moving full-grown trees to function as accents in the landscape. Areas of light and

shade, hills and plains, open spaces and verdant glades alternated to inspire particular moods or emotions. The best designers emulated the four levels of association—the philosophical, the allegorical, the historical, and the picturesque—found at showplaces such as Stowe.

Evocative garden structures—Palladian or rustic bridges, Grecian temples, obelisks, mosques, pagodas, shell-encrusted grottoes, and ruins—enhanced the sense of communication with other times and places. The much emulated landscape of Stowe boasted a neoclassical Temple of British Worthies and a Gothic Temple; Alexander Pope's Twickenham had a *paradiso* (an artificial hill) taken from Italian models. Ruins, whether Roman bridge or Gothic abbey, had historical allusions but were also frankly picturesque, as were other inventive or extravagant follies such as one pavilion shaped like a pineapple. (A folly is a small fanciful building designed exclusively for picturesque effect.) Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Polish magnates engaged in competitive folly building. Princess Izabela Czartoryska's garden at Powazki outside Warsaw had the usual ruins, grottoes, temples, and waterfalls. In addition, various small thatched huts were built for family members, humble on the outside but inside sporting luxuries such as the Sèvres porcelain tiles used on the princess's bathroom walls. A rival, Princess Elzbieta Lubomirska, favored exotic structures at her Mon Coteau, "my hillside," including a pagoda, a Turkish pavilion, and a North American Indian tepee. In Russia the landscaper Andrei T. Bolotov designed numerous amusing surprises for the grounds of Count Alexei Bobrinskoi's estate, Bogoroditsk. Visitors were temporarily trapped on the *paradiso* when a hidden sluice opened and water filled a moat. The grotto, sunk into a hill and decorated with many different types of stone, had a mirrored interior. Bolotov also constructed ingenious shams, among them a ruined monastery on a nearby hillside. In western Europe by this time, the taste for exotic structures in the garden had waned, spurred by Jacques Delille's influential poem of 1782, titled "Les jardins, ou l'art d'embellir le paysage" (Gardens, or the art of embellishing the landscape), which warned against their excessive use. The picturesque garden, emulative of a wilder, more unadorned nature, now came into vogue in England and France.

The eighteenth-century revolution in landscaping enlarged the private space around the European estate, increasing its distinction from its surroundings. Yet at the same time, the notions of grandeur and taste embodied in these private paradises escaped their boundaries to reach a wider audience. Owners of famous English houses and gardens began opening

them to touring continental aristocrats, who picked up ideas for their own houses and pleasure grounds at Stowe, Blenheim, Chatsworth, and a host of lesser properties. In addition, by mid-century not only country house architectural guides but illustrated works on park design and decoration circulated widely. These "how-to" manuals aided the many estate owners who wanted fashionable garden paradises but lacked the financial means to hire expert landscapers.

ESTATE INTERIORS AND OCCUPANCY

As Mark Girouard demonstrates in his *Life in the English Country House* (1978), the alterations in country house interiors over time provide a guide to changes in customary practices and in the role of the house. The Elizabethan and Jacobean house was the setting for elaborate rituals attending the lord's daily activities. The ceremonial center of the house moved from the medieval, ground-floor great hall to the great chamber on an upper floor, used for welcoming visitors, dining in state, masques, dancing, and other public activities. Long, elegant galleries provided space for indoor exercise and for increasing numbers of family portraits. Bedchambers (private spaces) were entered through withdrawing chambers (semiprivate), which were also used for small dinners, as were informal sitting rooms or parlors. In the "formal house" (1630–1720), the ceremonial space grew. The great chamber, now called a salon or saloon, remained central. Surrounding it were suites of apartments: withdrawing chambers and bedrooms, now much more public. The ejection of servants from the great hall and the revolutionary invention of a backstairs with servants' rooms off it made the staff less visible. Libraries, studies, and pictures other than portraits made their debut.

In the early eighteenth century, a great increase in travel and country entertaining brought the "social house" into being. The great hall shrank, and the main floor of the house now consisted of a series of high-ceilinged drawing rooms, their walls hung with landscapes as well as portraits. The largest saloon was used for balls; other rooms, diversified by function, might include a library, billiard room, music room, dining room, and often a separate breakfast room near a winter garden or conservatory. A state bedroom, long obligatory for a grand house, was retained as part of the entertaining space, though in most instances it was never occupied by royalty. The furnishings of these public rooms reflected the collecting habits of generations of scions on the grand tour: antique furniture and sculptures, rare books, collections of coins,

minerals, and weapons. Suites of private apartments for family members were now relegated to the floor above the reception rooms, or in the aboveground rusticated floor below.

In most country houses until the nineteenth century, the public rooms opened into each other, creating linear axes of enfilades along the facades of the house. Furniture was often placed stiffly along the walls, and guests promenaded along the enfilade. As the nineteenth century progressed, formality waned and the sphere of intimacy and privacy grew. A circular arrangement of rooms became more normal for new houses, as did circular seating for gatherings. In Russia the enfilade was deliberately interrupted by closing doors and placing barriers such as bookcases against them. Rigidly symmetrical architecture also went out of fashion; in England the Gothic style saw a second revival in the Victorian age.

The eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries marked the heyday of the great country house in part because of gradual improvements in travel: first, asphalt paving and carriages fitted with springs, then railway lines. Whereas in Elizabethan England owners had traveled from town to country not only with most of their servants but most of the furniture, by the late eighteenth century it was possible to migrate from a well-staffed and furnished city house to an equally welcoming country estate for the summer. As with so many aspects of country house life, occupancy patterns varied enormously. Throughout this period, some houses were occupied year-round, others rarely visited. A few eighteenth-century Russian grandees, for example, built lavish country mansions on lands granted by the Crown, entertained the empress once, and then returned permanently to St. Petersburg.

MASTERS AND SERVANTS

The proper functioning of a great house depended on a large and well-trained staff. As early as the sixteenth century, important English houses had books of regulations to guide staff in matters of dress and deportment. The size of these staffs varied considerably. In a large house such as the earl of Dorset's Knole in the seventeenth century, 111 servants regularly dined in the servants' hall. In parts of eastern Europe, staffs for considerably smaller houses regularly exceeded this number. The Wilmot sisters, who visited Princess Dashkova's estate, Troitskoe, in Russia in the early nineteenth century, reported that Russian nobles considered staffs of two or three hundred quite normal. This huge number of retainers usually had its own village, close to the great house, with separate quarters for male and female servants, a bathhouse, kitchen and dining hall, and laundry. Russian serfdom (a de facto form of slavery abolished only in 1861) partially explains the huge numbers of servants. House serfs appeared to cost little, as their cash wages were small; moreover, positions tended to multiply as the supply swelled due to natural increase. The typical Russian staff also included resident serf artists, artisans, and entertainers, who in western Europe would have been temporary employees.

In medieval England, upper servants (who were frequently poor relations) often fraternized with the masters, and others bedded down haphazardly in the great hall or outside their masters' apartments. By the mid-eighteenth century, this informality had vanished, and a rigid upstairs-downstairs division of life in the house was standard in much of western Europe. The steward and housekeeper were at the top of the servant hierarchy; beneath these major chatelains were a host of underservants, ranging from ladies' maids and footmen to chars and scullery maids. The elaborate ranking system ruling the servants' hall extended to personal servants of visiting guests: the higher one's master's position, the higher one's own place at the servants' table.

In eastern Europe, by contrast, particularly in countries such as Russia and Austria until the abolition of serfdom, the household remained more medieval. The hierarchy was less formalized, and well into the nineteenth century maids and valets slept on pallets in the hall. In every household there were residents of indeterminate status: not family members, not really part of the staff. Certain staff members were privileged, particularly nannies and fools (anachronistic west of the Rhine). But maids and footmen, foreign visitors noted, sometimes danced alongside their masters during a ball. As in western Europe, the upper

staff was sharply distinct in dress and deportment from the lower staff and groundsmen, stable hands, and agricultural laborers. Russian memoirists speak of the existence of "two kingdoms" on the estate, one centered on the life of the estate house, the other the domain of the bailiff, embracing all the working portions of the estate.

OCCUPATIONS AND DIVERSIONS

Historians like Girouard warn against the widespread myth of the benevolent squire, devoted to his servants and tenant farmers, possessed of a strong sense of public service and duty, and leading a halcyon existence in a finely appointed country house with a first-class library. Many owners fell well short of this mark. Some were boorish, or bad managers, or perpetually drunk; others were willful eccentrics. In mid-nineteenth-century Russia, N. E. Struisky, a former governor of Penza province, amused himself by interrogating and torturing his serfs. In contemporaneous England, the main occupation of the equally demented duke of Portland was the construction of elaborate tunnels beneath his Welbeck Abbey.

Custom and economic necessity induced more quotidian landowners to spend a portion of each morning consulting with bailiff or accountant, ordering purchases or repairs, visiting the stables and inspecting livestock, supervising the sowing or harvest, or in other activities promoting their domain's economic well-being. English landowners began to take a serious interest in model farming in the early nineteenth century and to supervise agricultural practices on the estate more closely. Meanwhile their wives attended to the smooth functioning of household and family, giving instructions to cooks, housekeepers, nursemaids, and governesses, and checking the pantry and storerooms. In nineteenth-century England wives and daughters often visited the village sick and needy; in Russia landowners built, and wives and daughters frequently ran, the peasant hospital. In economic respects, Russian landowners' practices were comparatively backward. Although many Russian nobles imported prize livestock and took pride in their stud farms, agricultural affairs were usually left to the bailiff, and model farming was considered eccentric. Only the early twentieth century saw major attempts at improved agricultural equipment and methods.

The manor house was the center of the rural community, and throughout Europe owners sponsored traditional entertainments to strengthen and reaffirm the sense of social cohesiveness. The early

nineteenth century saw an increase of landowner paternalism toward tenant farmers or peasant villages and the local lesser gentry, and an upswing in entertainments on their behalf. In Russia landowners (who habitually justified serfdom by referring to their paternal care of the “souls” in their keeping) regularly celebrated major religious and agricultural landmarks such as Christmas, Lent, Easter, and the harvest with ceremonies or festivities involving their peasants. Long tables were set up in the courtyard, and the master’s family broke bread with their peasants. The earl of Egremont was famed for his annual feasts at Petworth, to which hundreds of locals were invited; at other country estates, festivities including games and dancing as well as food and drink lasted into the night or even for several days. Celebrations of landmarks in the landowning family’s history—weddings, births of heirs, christenings, and funerals—also involved the whole community.

Entertaining one’s peers was another important aspect of country house life, for through it patronage connections, advantageous marriages, and enhanced community standing could be achieved. On the most basic level, entertaining consisted of receiving one’s neighbors according to well-established protocols. In England new country house owners received visits from the community; in Russia they were expected to make calls on their neighbors. Other types of country house entertaining changed enormously over time and varied from country to country. The lavish balls and spectacular illuminations of a royal progress in Elizabethan England might be compared to the similarly spectacular balls, fireworks, and theater staged for Catherine the Great’s journeys across Russia some two centuries later. Throughout Europe by the eighteenth century, rather than all do the same thing at an evening party guests instead chose between dancing, cards, or conversation. In the 1770s a visit to the magnificent château of the duc d’Harcourt, four miles south of Caen, offered a wide variety of diversions: walks in his delightful English garden, hunting in his game-filled forests, elevated conversations with philosophers and seductive women, dancing, and music.

From the eighteenth century on, amateur theatricals or musical entertainments were a staple of country evenings. A few English aficionados built private theaters on their estates, and theater in billiard rooms or libraries was widespread. But estate theater and extravagant entertaining reached their apogee in eighteenth-century Russia, where noble amateurs trod the boards but where talent could also be bought and sold. Renowned actors such as Mikhail Shchepkin began their careers as serf entertainers. Most talent was

homegrown, but one magnate sent a serf boy to Europe to study the violin, and many prided themselves on troupes of expensively trained entertainers. By the 1820s such ostentation was frowned upon, and with the emancipation of 1861 it vanished entirely. Yet to the end of the old regime, amateur country theater of the type described in Anton Chekhov’s *The Seagull* flourished in estate living rooms.

Across Europe outdoor activities also became progressively less formal. In England foxhunting was the exception to this rule; the nineteenth-century cult of vigorous outdoor exercise transformed it into an organized sport of considerable social importance. But in general houseguests were increasingly left to devise their own patterns of daily amusement. Shooting game, from deer and partridge in Scotland to wild boar and bears in Russia, was a perennial favorite for men. On many estates, boating, bathing, lawn bowling or croquet, and, at the end of the nineteenth century, tennis were available. A bracing stroll or ride, sketching in the park, or reading in the garden became more popular. In Russia picnics in the woods and mushroom hunting were favorite diversions.

The reach of country hospitality altered over the centuries as well. In England it progressed from a feudal casualness and inclusiveness embracing anyone who dropped by to the select guest lists for nineteenth-century house parties, the most celebrated of which were published in the newspapers. Farther east on the Continent, the feudal model obtained well into the nineteenth century, partially due to the infinitely greater distances between town and country and to the inferior transportation system. Even in the early twentieth century, although the railway network had vastly expanded, many east European estates remained too remote to visit without spending the night. In Russia the presence of thirty or more for daily dinner was considered quite normal, and estate owners were accustomed to entertaining and lodging all well-born passersby, there being virtually no inns. For Russian nobles, estate hospitality was not merely a tradition but an important part of their identity, and the most wealthy pursued it on a grand scale. In the 1770s Count Peter Sheremetev invited anyone “in decent dress” to enjoy the grounds of his suburban estate twice a week throughout the summer. They could boat on his artificial lake, stroll the grounds, play games, or enjoy outdoor theater and fireworks. At Prince Alexei Kurakin’s estate near Orel in the 1820s, every guest who arrived, bidden or unbidden, was automatically assigned quarters and a carriage. Many stayed for weeks on end, some for months or even years. Only economic necessity put an end to these practices.

COUNTRY HOUSES AND ESTATES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The extent to which European landowners' fortunes declined in the late nineteenth century has been much debated. In England and Russia agricultural recession and mounting maintenance expenses led the aristocracy to sell a large percentage of its lands, but some historians argue that the proceeds were profitably re-invested. There can be no doubt, however, that in England the elite's monopoly of landownership and the link between land and political power were broken as the peerage accommodated itself to the new commercial class. In 1868 Benjamin Disraeli's lack of a country estate almost disqualified him for the portfolio of prime minister. But between 1886 and 1914, of two hundred new peers in the House of Lords, only 25 percent were from the traditional landed elite, and only 30 percent of the remainder bothered to acquire country estates.

Marriage to American heiresses solved the economic woes of some English and French aristocrats. In Russia clusters of dachas—country villas for week-

end or summer use—sprang up as some landowners became developers. At Serednikovo outside Moscow, for example, the Firsanovs built not only a profitable dacha settlement, Firsanovka, three miles from the manor house, but a railway station to provide access. Just prior to the Great War, peasants owned 40 percent of Russia's arable land, yet vast estates in central and southern Russia were still owned by landowners whose agricultural innovations were bringing profits, and who were immersed in local political, economic, and social activities. Elsewhere in eastern Europe, aristocrats also held onto their estates. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where twenty-four families owned more than 250,000 acres each, there existed small kingdoms such as the Esterhazys' 735,000 acres in Hungary or the Schwarzenbergs' 360,000 acres in Bohemia.

At the turn of the century, the European aristocracy was one large family, its country houses united through generations of advantageous marriages. A single family might have estates in Bohemia, Poland, and Russia, administered through a central accounting office in Vienna, and move between these residences

tates. In Russia revolution supplied the coup de grâce. Owners were dispossessed and many houses looted or destroyed. The 10 percent that survived were put to new public use as orphanages, insane asylums, sanatoriums, or agricultural institutes.

The interwar years did little to halt the decline in England and France, though Girouard argues that the English country house enjoyed an Indian summer between 1900 and 1940 similar to that in Russia between 1861 and 1917. However, just prior to World War II the English country house was so visibly at risk that in 1939 the government approved a plan to offer owners tax and other relief in exchange for public access to their houses. Known as the “Country House Scheme,” the plan was administered by the National Trust (founded 1895) and saved numerous endangered houses. Elsewhere, little changed until the post-World War II period, when the pattern of Soviet Russian takeovers of houses was repeated in communist Eastern Europe.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, although very little remains of the original substance of country life, both the great houses themselves and the symbols of grandeur associated with them have shown remarkable tenacity. In England the highly successful National Trust has collaborated with owners in promoting tourism as a survival mechanism. Throughout Europe many historic houses are now schools, foundations, corporate retreats, country clubs or spas, or, in Spain and Portugal, government-run tourist destinations. They have been joined by countless weekend villas. Some of these are “manors” fashioned from humble older structures such as Cotswold cottages or Burgundy farmhouses. Others are new, with design elements—porticoes and columns, gazebos and “great halls”—appropriated from earlier symbols of country magnificence. Those elements, and the frequency with which such suburban dwellings, regardless of the size of house or lot, are called “manors” or “estates,” seem calculated, nostalgic appeals to the earlier forms and ideals of country life.

with little sense of national boundaries. But the nostalgic tone of some articles in new illustrated publications such as *Country Life* in England or *The Capital and the Estate* in Russia shows that Europe’s aristocratic arcadias were already on the defensive. World War I permanently altered this way of life. In England, Ireland, France, Germany, and Italy, many owners perished or lost their means of support for their es-

See also The Aristocracy and Gentry; Servants (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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FAIRS AND MARKETS



Montserrat M. Miller

Although their origins are much older, fairs and markets of one form or another have been important components of Europe's commercial economy since the eleventh-century recovery of urban life. Emerging wherever surplus was great enough to stimulate exchange, markets nearly always involved the retail sale to urbanites of staple goods, especially food, produced in the countryside. Fairs, on the other hand, which could be much larger than markets, more frequently featured the sale of costlier items such as cloth, livestock, and agricultural implements, as well as wholesale trade in a range of goods. And while markets were usually weekly or daily, fairs tended to be held less often. Both fairs and markets proliferated through medieval Europe, expanding and contracting in response to economic cycles linking regions together in relationships that involved the production, consumption, and exchange of goods, money, ideas, and cultural practices. While the importance of fairs declined after the 1300s, a highly complex, specialized, and hierarchical network of markets continued to develop and by the eighteenth century was operating at the foundation of Europe's dynamic economy.

During industrialization, fairs and markets were neither entirely eclipsed by shops and more formalized arrangements for high-level wholesale exchange nor rendered insignificant within the economy. Indeed markets in the nineteenth century were reorganized by governing authorities to better serve the conditions of crowded cities and were often covered with impressive iron and glass roofs that signaled new levels of municipal efficiency and pride. Likewise, mammoth fairs became symbols of industrial might or, on a smaller scale, deliberate expressions of the regional folk culture that was so important to emerging nationalist identities. Although interest in building new markets dwindled in the early twentieth century, in some areas there was resistance to the larger, and ultimately preponderant, trend toward shops and stores and then super and hypermarkets. While specific social and cultural practices appear to have been transformed by these structural shifts in the commer-

cial system of distribution, parallels remain between the consumer megacomplexes of the late twentieth century, and even internet shopping, and the older forms of exchange in Europe's fairs and markets of the past.

In its treatment of fairs and markets, the social history literature emphasizes a number of themes. When focusing on the earlier period, empirical research on fairs and markets frequently tests the limits of economic models postulating the inexorable workings of supply and demand. Another theme involves the emergence and operation of the central place and network systems of exchange upon which the industrial economy was built. Scholars have also frequently used markets to explore the social relations that linked peasant societies to the more elite and formalized expressions of the dominant culture. The nineteenth and twentieth century work is more focused on the relationship of fairs and markets to the state and questions of gender and social class within an urban, industrial context. So fairs and markets are of significance to historians working on a number of specific questions related to Europe's economic, political, cultural, and social past.

MARKETS IN THE MIDDLE AGES

In the early Middle Ages, markets existed in some form everywhere that economic life teetered above complete self-sufficiency. Wherever towns survived there were markets to supply the population with the relatively small surplus of agricultural goods available. Though villages tended not to have markets, all towns certainly did. In this period before Europe's economic recovery, markets were frequently small, and their offerings quite limited. Typically, peasants brought their extra foodstuffs to sell to passersby, and in some places they were joined by artisans selling locally manufactured goods such as pottery and baskets. Seigniorial or ecclesiastic authorities set the market days and often regulated such elements as pricing. Lining up along a

church wall, or in some other specified place within or just outside the town, vendors traded goods for money, and markets thus operated as one of the only venues for local exchange in an economy otherwise marked by subsistence.

All of the late-ninth- and tenth-century changes in the European countryside that stimulated agricultural productivity also acted to expand market operations. More surplus translated into more goods for sale, more hawkers and vendors on town streets, more market days, and longer market hours. Expanding markets thus stimulated urban growth. Where new markets emerged, villages often grew into towns; where towns expanded, the process of growth usually involved the construction of new defensive walls encompassing peripheral areas where successful new markets had become established. So the simpler, smaller markets of the early Middle Ages were transformed by the tenth-century rise in agricultural productivity, and then population, into clamoring centers of economic and social exchange.

By the late Middle Ages, markets had become much more crowded and lively, characteristically featuring a cacophony of sights, sounds, and smells. Vendors, usually women, competed for the attention of customers as crowds of people milled through the market's array of open-air stalls, each specializing in

particular goods such as meat, fish, eggs, poultry, bread, vegetables, cheese, and sausage. Although artisans and merchants operated market stalls as well, they were more often drawn toward sedentary points of sale from within shops attached to or near production or storage. Retail food vendors, on the other hand, were slower to move to the more permanent quarters of the shop, although bakeries, and in some places butchers, were exceptions to the rule.

While some trade was certainly spontaneous and unregulated, markets were in general tightly controlled. Initially operating under ecclesiastic or seignorial auspices, emerging royal authorities were quick to claim their right to charter markets. In fact, more royal market charters were issued in some areas than the number of actual markets that operated; it was one thing to receive a market charter and quite another to invest in stall construction and management of a successful operation (Matte, 1996). Whether seignorial, ecclesiastic, or corporate, market authorities determined the hours of operation; charged vendors stallage; set prices and tolls; and monitored weights, measures, and the terms of exchange. Authorities usually operated public scales so that weights could be independently verified. There are innumerable instances of vendors receiving severe punishment for violations that were interpreted as transgressions against

the common good. Indeed most historians who study markets maintain that vendors and customers shared a set of “moral economy” precepts about the way in which markets should operate and that these community standards of fairness were reinforced by market authorities as part of their claim for popular legitimacy.

Although the growth of marketplaces was deeply intertwined with the process of urbanization, markets also served as one of the several complex and dynamic links that bound villages, towns, and cities to the countryside that surrounded them. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, town life, and in many ways town culture, became increasingly differentiated from that of the countryside. The towns, where free men could engage in commerce, featured greater opportunities for mobility than the countryside, where the social order was more static. And characteristic elements of town life such as guild corporatism, which came to permeate town culture, were largely foreign in the rural world. Yet markets constituted the most quotidian and direct link between urban and rural life through this period. Urban marketplaces distributed goods produced in the countryside, and urban demand shaped rural agricultural production. Markets drew a segment of the rural labor force, mainly composed of women, into towns to work in their stalls, and market sales injected money into the rural economy. Along with coins earned on trade and the odd goods that peasant vendors may have purchased in town, news, information, and wide-ranging cultural practices traveled back into rural areas at the end of the market day. An ongoing flow of humanity from countryside to town and back was part and parcel of successful markets everywhere.

Attention to the nature and dimensions of the catchment zones that extended outward from urban nodes into the rural countryside has led historians to conceptualize Europe in terms of the development and growth of a series of central places: villages, towns, and cities ringed by the overlapping areas within which money was directly exchanged for goods and labor. Indeed the central-place functions of towns were to a great extent reflected in the number, size, frequency, type, and scope of markets that were held within the corporate boundaries. Increases and decreases in the size and number of urban markets were directly linked to the expansion and contraction of central-place catchment zones. Markets are therefore one of the key places where historians look to observe the nature and extent of rural/urban interplay during the preindustrial period. So while markets were physically located in urban settings their connections to the rural world were extensive and complex.

FAIRS IN THE MIDDLE AGES

Like markets, some of Europe’s fairs had origins that dated back even to Roman times, but much more than town markets, fairs, especially the larger ones, often linked far-distant regions together in a network. In their twelfth and thirteenth century heyday, especially, performers and entertainers, peddlers, specialized merchants, and financiers spent much of their year traveling the circuit of fairs that extended across Europe. Frequently sponsored by municipal corporations and trading houses, fairs stimulated economic growth by periodically bringing a concentration of buyers, sellers, performers, and onlookers together in one specific physical place. Fairs were festive occasions that combined entertainment, wholesale exchange, banking, and the retail sale of agricultural implements, farm animals, and manufactured goods.

From the late middle ages until the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the network of fairs that reached from the Low Countries through France to northern Italy, with branches extending outward in various directions, served as the main western European institutions for high-level finance and credit. This stimulated economic growth and urban specialization in both north and south. The old Champagne fairs, which reached their zenith in the thirteenth century, drew in practically the whole commercial and financial capitalist elite. Such fairs were the venues for international trade between merchant houses, and they were the points at which currencies and bills of exchange were settled. Beginning in the fourteenth century, however, the royal authorities more frequently extended exemptions from duties and tolls to high ranking merchants and merchant houses, causing fairs to decline. Such exemptions made fairs less attractive. By the seventeenth century, fairs had lost many of their highest-level economic functions in western Europe and had been largely replaced by banks and the establishment of more sedentary structures for wholesale trade. Perhaps the foremost historian of European fairs and markets in the early modern period, Fernand Braudel, called fairs archaic forms of exchange (Braudel, p. 93). In eastern Europe, for example, where the economic trajectory was less dynamic, fairs flourished much longer, reflecting the later emergence of modern financial capitalist structures.

In western Europe the likes of the Champagne fairs were replaced in the economic system by an essentially new form of higher-level market. Frequently called exchanges or *bourses*, these institutions had become established in the Mediterranean cities of Genoa, Florence, Pisa, Venice, Barcelona, and Valencia by the

fourteenth century (Braudel, p. 99). Usually housed in special buildings, *bourses* of various types emerged not long afterward in the commercial cities of northern Europe as they increasingly dominated long-distance trade. The exchanges of Bruges, Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London had taken their place within the highest ranks of the economic order by the early 1500s. As was the case with many markets and fairs, the exchanges of Europe became more specialized as the economy expanded. Major cities opened exchanges that concentrated on the sale of grain, cloth, insurance, merchant company stocks, and government shares. These *bourses* incorporated many of the wholesale and banking functions that had earlier been the province of fairs.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD

Both fairs and markets persisted through the early modern period, with some noteworthy modifications. Fairs, shorn of many of their highest-level financial functions in western Europe, remained much-anticipated cultural and economic events on a regional level. In other words, although fairs lost some of their network functions, they retained much central-place importance. Many small-scale manufacturers organized production around the temporal rhythm of the fairs, still usually seasonal and periodic, and depended on them for much of their annual sales. Alongside the crowded calendar of religious holidays, fairs continued to represent one of the main secular institutions for regional sociability and cultural diffusion. Urban markets remained important through the early modern period as well. They grew in number and size, especially from 1450 and 1650, while population growth and urbanization were linked. During these centuries towns and cities had to devote more attention to market regulation and policing and to find new places within the walled environs where markets could be held. While market management came to represent an ever more urgent problem for municipal authorities, the expansion of markets heightened their cultural impact on the urban quarters where they were held.

Because scholars have generally come to view culture as a body of shared ideas and practices that is always in the process of being created and recreated when individuals interact, the complex exchanges taking place within fairs and markets have assumed great social historical significance. The discursive exchanges and behaviors associated with fairs and markets can be interpreted as forces acting to create, re-create, reinforce, or undermine the various rural and urban cultures that existed in Europe at any given time. In just

one morning, a single vendor might have spoken directly to and/or exchanged looks with hundreds of other participants in the fair or market. Female consumers would most likely have only rarely come into close contact with as many people at one time as they did when they went about the process of shopping for food at town markets. Because fairs and markets were nuclei of commerce and thus places where face-to-face contact was concentrated, they were among the most intensive points for the generation and recreation of popular culture. Indeed, the atmospheres of fairs and markets, easily read by the regular participants, reflected collective attitudes of optimism or fear. News traveled fast from one stall to another, and a failure to comprehend the cultural rules governing exchange in fairs or markets could carry with it grave economic consequences.

In song and folk tales regional fairs appear over and over as much-anticipated occasions for status display and entertainment, as well as places to buy colored ribbons and other minor luxuries of a festive nature. Through performances, ceremonies, and economic exchange, rural groups came into contact with one another at fairs, observing local differences and absorbing cultural elements that ranged from new variations on old stories and songs to changes in styles of dress. Moreover, because fairs brought rural and urban groups into contact with one another, they represented points at which popular traditions intersected with more formal and dominant cultural expressions. The differences in dress, speech, and behavior between urban and rural groups could easily be observed at fairs, and, as a consequence, broader diffusion of dominant cultural forms was effected.

Regional fairs also remained occasions for the display and reinforcement of social hierarchies. Because among other things they were the sites of servant hiring and the livestock trade, fairs drew in the most successful farmers. There the lowest-ranking members of the agricultural order could see crisp representations of the rural hierarchy and their place within it. Fairs also always featured women and children, explicitly engaged in displays of social rank, wearing their finest clothes and seeking to spend a bit of money on something that would be perceived as fun. Fairs offered the opportunity for children and women to see how their economic means placed them in relationship to others, and thus refined their sense of place within the social hierarchy. So in a number of ways fairs offer abundant historical insight about the social and cultural context of rural life in early modern Europe.

Regular urban markets operated as important social institutions through the early modern period as

well. Markets were hierarchically arranged and both reflected and reinforced the urban social order. The most prosperous vendors, frequently butchers, had the largest or best-positioned stalls. Butchers defined themselves as skilled laborers, required apprenticeships, and operated their stalls from within a well-established tradition of guild membership. Poulterers, sausage and cheese vendors, and fishmongers sometimes created similar guild associations as well. Vendor groups with guild membership and using artisanal language to define themselves wielded greater influence with market and corporate authorities than those traders who sold bulk produce such as cabbage, or, later on, potatoes. Making no claims to skilled labor, vegetable vendors of all varieties were much less likely to belong to guilds. The relatively low level of prestige associated with their trade was reflected in the size/or location of their stalls within the market. At the bottom of the market and social hierarchy were ambulatory or itinerant vendors, operating legally or illegally, in a range of goods. Ambulatory trade was often carried out by the most marginalized members of society and frequently raised the ire of both established vendors who paid stallage and the law enforcement authorities. So

while market vendors represented a category of urban retail merchants, they were also a group within which sharp hierarchical relationships existed.

As at fairs, the cultural dimensions of urban markets were rich, complex, and shaped by rank and hierarchy. Through the butchers and other types of vendors holding guild membership, markets were drawn into the festivals and ceremonies of the artisanal community. Because markets sold food, they were starting points for the celebration of all Saints days and other holidays that involved the preparation of special family meals. In extending credit, individual vendors often determined whether the poorest of households would mark holidays with any type of special foods at all. By the early eighteenth century, even modest European cities held a half dozen food markets daily. With dense urban settlement clusters around them, markets had become one of the most crucial types of public spaces in the city, especially for women. Neighborhood reputations could be made or broken through behavior in the markets, and markets were places within which female consumers often sought to defend the honor of their homes. In fact, markets had come to rival churches, government build-

SECTION 8: RURAL LIFE

ings, and public squares as the most-frequented sites of social and cultural exchange.

INDUSTRIALIZATION

The long process of industrialization brought tremendous change in the scale and functions of urban places in Europe. After a lull of approximately a hundred years, the mid-eighteenth century ushered in a period of major urban growth and demographic expansion. The technological and organizational shifts necessitated by the factory system of production urbanized new areas, often with chaotic results that strained inadequate infrastructures. England's midland cities in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries exemplify this. Industrial growth accelerated the urbanization of older cities as well, presenting civil authorities with real problems of provisioning an expanding population. Municipal governments all across the continent understood the connection between revolutionary fervor and the availability of food at what were popularly held to be just prices. Bread riots, after all, were not uncommon, and such spontaneous outbursts had been known to set off much larger uprisings. Issues of provisioning thus were often urgent.

Although the towns and cities of Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries certainly featured many shops, most foods other than bread and sometimes meat, were sold in the daily markets, the vast majority of which were still held in squares with no protection from the elements. Industrialization forced authorities to face the task of making the old urban market system work under conditions of greater density and changing social composition. Most cities first pursued a strategy that involved expanding the number of stall permits and extending the length and number of vendor rows in already-existing markets. As a consequence, food markets simply became larger and more crowded. In many places, such expansion reached the limits of the possible during the first half of the nineteenth century: where city walls remained in place and population density high, streets became impassable during market hours and neighbors complained about piles of garbage and raucous noise. Problems of sanitation led to outbreaks of disease and caused considerable additional concern on the part of municipal authorities. Another solution had to be found. Nearly everywhere in this period city governments sought to expand the provisioning system by establishing new markets. But space within old urban cores was scarce. In Barcelona, new markets were built on the lots made available as a result of the popular anticlerical attacks

that led to the destruction of several convents in the 1840s. Elsewhere space for markets was made either where port facilities were being expanded to meet the needs of the industrial system of maritime transport or in the areas beyond the defensive walls that were being developed as new bourgeois residential districts.

One of the principal characteristics of nineteenth-century cities was an increase in scale, especially with the emergence and extension of the rail network that facilitated the transport of raw materials to the burgeoning factories located in close proximity to the source of labor. Cities spread over what had been fields and peasant cottages, and new districts with streets laid out in grid patterns often became fashionable areas. In these areas, cities were built from the ground up in relatively short time, and room was nearly always reserved for new markets. In fact, the general physical appearance of most nineteenth-century cities underwent considerable transformation. In addition to the new peripheral bourgeois neighborhoods, broad boulevards, monuments to national figures, and larger public squares and parks became characteristic parts of the industrial city. These new elements in the physical appearance of cities were promoted by the political authorities, who sponsored them as tangible evidence of progress, efficiency, and both municipal and national pride. The Hausmannization of Paris is just the best-known example of a much larger trend in nineteenth-century urban makeovers. All across Europe, from Vienna to Madrid, the results of the nineteenth-century urban transformations remain visible to even the most casual of observers.

Alongside triumphant arches and grand boulevards the older organizational arrangement of urban public markets often represented discordance and incongruity. No matter how large markets grew or how many were authorized by municipal authorities, as long as they were held in the open air they remained sloppy and noisy affairs that were increasingly less acceptable to emerging middle-class aesthetic sensibilities. The solution that many municipal authorities chose was to build market halls and move market sales indoors, where consumers and vendors alike could escape the elements and engage in exchange under more permanent, hygienic, and rationalized conditions. Market-hall design ranged from sturdy one-story poured-concrete structures with arched porticoes along exposed walls to grand iron-truss halls with glass roofs and elaborate decorative elements. By the 1860s, both London and Paris had constructed a series of new covered market halls linked to the rail network. Berlin did not begin its market-building project until twenty years later, and there, the results were less successful (Lohmeier, p. 111).

More generally, the new combination of municipally operated covered markets located near train stations worked well, allowing for a more efficient and larger-scale wholesaling system that linked the city directly to both its immediate catchment zone and to distant sources of provisions. European municipal authorities built such structures as part of a larger strategy to expand the provisioning system and to rationalize the use of urban space. The inauguration of market halls, such as the one which took place in Barcelona in 1876 to mark the opening of the *Born* structure, were often accompanied by much fanfare and ceremony glorifying both the modern state and the progress that governing authorities could bring through their stewardship of the industrialization of the economy.

The second half of the nineteenth century also marked a new era in the history of fairs. London's 1851 *Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations* set the standard. In the following decades mammoth fairs became more common. Designed as international exhibits of modernity, nineteenth-century fairs involved large-scale construction projects that often looked like fairylands of light, water, and space. London's Crystal Palace from the 1851 Exhibition is one such example. The Ciutadella Park in Barcelona, built for the 1888 *Exposición Mundial*, is another. Inaugurated by the highest-ranking political authorities, nineteenth-century fairs drew in tens of millions of visitors and put the host region's highest cultural ex-

pressions on display while serving to lift bourgeois confidence in progress to new heights. Like the old Champagne fairs, they brought together potential buyers, sellers, and onlookers and established the tone for trading relations that operated at the uppermost levels of economic exchange. Most historical interpretations of the nineteenth-century European world's fairs also emphasize the important role they played in diffusing popular criticism of the established political and social order.

In eastern Europe, where urbanization and industrialization proceeded more slowly, large state-sponsored international exhibitions were organized less frequently; nonetheless, the region certainly had its vibrant nineteenth-century fairs. Those held at Leipzig and Novgorod were especially well known for bringing European and Asian merchants together to exchange a wide variety of goods. Moscow also held a series of larger fairs, international in scope, but not industrial exhibitions in the same sense as the western European and American varieties.

A second era of world's fairs in western Europe began with the 1925 *Paris Exposition Internationale des Arts Décoratifs et Industriels Modernes* and was followed by a number of others during the years of the Great Depression. Here, too, the European industrial world's fairs of the twentieth century promoted consumer confidence in a future that promised to be much brighter than the difficult present in which they were set.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In most areas of Europe, but especially in the northwest, municipal authorities stopped building covered markets in the early twentieth century, when the number and variety of food shops and stores increased while many of the covered markets began a process of long and slow decline. The growing capitalization of the distribution system and technological advances in the food-processing industry drove much of this shift. Increases in the scale of agricultural production, mechanical refrigeration, and the food-processing industry had stimulated the expansion of wholesale distribution networks for several decades. Food retailers able to buy in larger quantities could reduce costs and increase profit margins. Individual market vendors with small retail establishments found themselves at a disadvantage.

While grand covered markets moved toward extinction in most places, some municipal authorities undertook great efforts to facilitate the adaptation of public food markets to twentieth-century economic conditions. The best example of this is Barcelona, where the city government issued a new municipal market code in 1898 that prevailed with only minor modifications over the course of the next half century. Modern refrigeration chambers were added to all of the city's markets, and individual vendors were allowed to double and triple the size of their stalls and eventually to bequeath their vendor licenses as real property from one generation to the next. Such measures facilitated the social and economic consolidation of urban-dwelling retail vendors who purchased wholesale from middlemen, privileging them over rural producers who had long traveled into the city on a daily basis to sell the surplus from their small family plots. Under such conditions, market stalls came to resemble small shops, and indeed the shopkeeper and vendor population became difficult to distinguish. Barcelona's urban retail market vendors took their place in the ranks of the new lower middle class alongside telephone operators, department store clerks, and minor office workers. Where public policy explicitly protected vendors, daily food markets stood a better chance of enduring through the middle of the twentieth century and beyond.

More generally through western Europe in the postwar period, supermarkets and self-service stores, and then suburban hypermarkets, gradually laid claim to the bulk of retail sales in food. Outside the communist block, Europeans increasingly chose to make fewer, albeit bigger, provisioning excursions, and as in the United States, the weekly grocery-shopping trip became a domestic ritual. Daily shopping in public

markets in most places became the province of older women who maintained the traditions followed by their mothers. Most historians of markets, in fact, assert that their ultimate demise was set in motion by the combined effects of higher levels of female employment outside the home, mass marketing of electrical refrigeration, and the spread of the automobile. All undermined the need for daily shopping trips as part of a household routine. Nonetheless, the vast majority of European cities had at least one or two public markets still in operation in the late twentieth century, although many of these featured a significant number of small shops aimed at tourists alongside stalls that catered to neighborhood consumption. Again, the city of Barcelona is noteworthy in that forty-one food markets remained in operation there at the close of the twentieth century, with significant modernization undertaken by a public-private governing body.

The decline of public markets in twentieth-century European cities brought changes in urban sociability patterns. As long as every household in the city was provisioned daily through a trip to a public market and to specific shops neighborhood women were linked together in a network of commercial and social relationships. With vendors often living in the immediate environs, markets were hubs of neighborhood news and information and places where face-to-face contact was maintained in an otherwise densely populated and largely anonymous setting. Going to market daily had been one of the main ways that women in the burgeoning industrial cities got to know

who their neighbors were, heard about their neighbors' affairs, and found out about some of the goings on in other apartment houses of the district. The decline of public markets reduced levels of neighborhood social exchange among women and dried up a crucial pool of local gossip and information. The structures through which urban cultures and subcultures were created and re-created among women were changed as a result.

While self-service stores, supermarkets, and hypermarkets proved to be profitable enterprises that created new employment, their expanding share of the retail sale of food reduced women's independent entrepreneurial opportunities in many areas. Women, held in Western culture to inherently possess verbal skills useful in petty trade, had dominated the ranks of market vendors since time immemorial in most regions. Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, operating a market stall was a reasonably accessible option for women from the lower ranks of the social order. Market-stall operations required little capital and could usually be undertaken alone and combined with the responsibilities of household and children. With the eclipse of markets by shops, stores, and supermarkets, women's independent opportunities in the retail commercial sector were narrowed.

CONCLUSION

Although by the end of the twentieth century the fairs and markets that operated all across the European landscape from the eleventh-century revival of urban life through the nineteenth century remained in most places only as relics of the past, a degree of persistence and continuity was still identifiable. Small regional fairs remain common, and some cities' provisioning systems, such as Barcelona's, feature a combination of municipal markets, shops, and super/hypermarkets. In many ways the European variant of the late-twentieth-century shopping mall, and even internet dotcoms, can be viewed as larger scale versions of traditional markets. Their distinction from the older institutions for retail commerce lies more in scale, capitalization, and technological foundation than in fundamental arrangement. Likewise, trade fairs and exhibitions, common in virtually every area of the economy, are distinctly reminiscent of the old European fairs whose role in high finance and wholesale trade had been crucial in the process of economic expansion. Fairs and markets have been integral parts of Europe's history, and their study promises to reveal much about the way the economy works today.

See also other articles in this section.

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Section 9



STATE AND SOCIETY

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ABSOLUTISM



David Parker

First used at the end of the eighteenth century, the term “absolutism” is loosely employed by many historians as a synonym for absolute monarchy. It is most commonly associated with the personal rule of Louis XIV of France (1661–1715) and his contemporaneous rulers: Peter the Great (1682–1725) of Russia; Frederick William, the Great Elector of Brandenburg (1640–1688), and his son Frederick (1688–1713), who became the first king of Prussia in 1701; Charles XI of Sweden (1660–1697) and his son Charles XII (1697–1718). To these names may be added the so-called enlightened despots or absolutists of the eighteenth century, notably Catherine the Great of Russia (1762–1796), Frederick the Great of Prussia (1740–1786), and Joseph II of Austria (1765–1790).

Despite this unavoidable reference to particular monarchs, it is generally understood that absolutism cannot be equated with complete or total control by the ruler. Such a form of rule was beyond the reach of early modern states, where a ruler’s effectiveness was limited by poor communications, constant difficulty in mobilizing adequate resources, and, above all, the need to satisfy the interests and aspirations of the nobility. Continued use of the term “absolutism” can, however, be justified to describe monarchical systems of government that were largely unrestrained by national or local representative institutions. The disappearance or weakening of these institutions, marked by the demise of the French Estates General in 1614–1615, the Castile Cortes after 1665, and the Brandenburg Estates after 1685, was the practical counterpoint to the increasingly powerful idea—clearly articulated and debated at the time—that monarchs were accountable to no one but God.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ABSOLUTIST STATE

In absolutist as opposed to constitutional systems, representative institutions played no part in the law-making process; lawmaking was the prerogative of the

king, who could override custom and the laws of his predecessors. Nor did absolute monarchs require consent for taxation. The growth of royal authority was frequently accompanied by a decline in municipal autonomy and in the independence of the church, while there was a tendency for seigneurial jurisdictions to be subsumed within a national legal framework. Paradoxically, the elevation of the personal authority of kings went hand in hand with the bureaucratization of their regimes as ever greater numbers of fiscal, judicial, and administrative officers were required to sustain them. Absolute monarchs also had at their disposition armies of ever greater size and firepower—to finance them was the essential reason for the expansion of the machinery of state.

These generalizations should, however, be applied with care. In Castile the disappearance of the Cortes was accompanied by a strengthening of seigneurial jurisdictions together with noble tax-raising powers as the Crown alienated many of its regalian rights. In Sweden, where the members of the Riksdag explicitly recognized in 1680 the Crown’s legislative sovereignty and its powers of taxation, the curiously consensual nature of the process allowed the Riksdag to survive and to reassert its constitutional role within fifty years. Even in Louis XIV’s France the survival of important provincial estates meant that representation and consent to taxation were not entirely emasculated; and in the half century after his death the parlements, although far from representative of anybody except their venal officeholders, were able to resurrect their right to remonstrate against objectionable royal edicts. In doing so, they severely dented the monarchy’s absolute pretensions. Thus while absolute monarchies may be clearly differentiated from those that formally limited the power of the Crown—notably in England, Poland, and Hungary—absolutism was a tendency with considerable variations rather than a defined structure.

Only in France, for instance, had there developed by 1700 a practice of direct ministerial responsibility for the great departments of state (finance, war,

and foreign affairs). Elsewhere a collegial style of administration, largely inspired by Axel Oxenstierna's reforms in Sweden in 1634, found favor. Between 1717 and 1720 Peter the Great established no fewer than eleven collegial departments falling into three groups: war and foreign affairs, financial affairs, and trade and industry. Each college was theoretically controlled by eleven high officials headed by a president; the presidents came together in the senate, which had earlier replaced the old privy council as the supreme administrative body under the king. There were clear parallels with the emerging structures of the Prussian state, where, at almost the same time, the General Directory was established as an umbrella body for four departments but with a limited degree of functional specialization. Even in France the emergence of functionally defined royal councils did not ensure a clear demarcation between the business brought before them.

Reorganizing the central government, however, was a relatively easy task compared with that of effec-

tively directing local agencies. In Spain the monarchy was dependent on eighty or so *corregidores* (royal appointees), who presided over town councils and acted as chief magistrates. But because they were not career bureaucrats and were often drawn from the municipal oligarchies they were supposed to control, their commitment to royal interests was uncertain. They did not exist in at least half the country, where primary jurisdiction belonged to the local seigneurs. Not until the following century, with the disappearance of the provincial Cortes and the development of a system of royal intendants on French lines, did the Spanish monarchy begin to remedy this situation. However, as French experience itself showed that intendants were unable to fulfill their responsibilities without *subdélégués* (subdelegates) drawn from the local officeholders, the significance of their replication in Spain should not be exaggerated. In Prussia coordination of local government was improved by integrating the administration of the royal domains with the military-fiscal administration that had evolved during the wars of the seventeenth century; the resulting provincial chambers were then subordinated to the General Directory. Nonetheless, the regime's effectiveness continued to depend on the rural commissioners, or *Landräte*, nominated by the county squirearchy. Under Frederick II they acquired extensive administrative, judicial, fiscal, and military responsibilities.

Not surprisingly, in the vast and growing spaces of the Russian Empire the coordination of local and central administrations posed particular problems. Between 1708 and 1718 Peter the Great introduced a degree of decentralization, by transforming the old military provinces into eight sometimes vast *guberniyas* headed by governors with a full range of fiscal and judicial powers. Subordinate officials seem to have been displaced by military commandants. The resulting slippage of power in turn led within a decade to a renewed strengthening of upward lines of authority; in theory, all local agencies were subordinated to the new central colleges. However, the governors, appointed by the tsar, retained significant powers, and the military commandants soon gave way to civilian *voevodas* appointed by the senate. After 1728 Russia was governed by nine governors, twenty-eight provincial *voevodas*, and about seventy local *voevodas*. The resulting uncertainty about the chain of command contributed to tensions between local and regional authorities, and from 1764 there was a return to decentralized modes. The number of *guberniyas* increased while the police and fiscal powers of the colleges were redistributed to provincial chambers. Only in small and homogeneous Sweden was the integration of central and local control effected without noticeable un-

certainty; but even there, royal governors and judges increased their presence by an accommodation with older, more egalitarian institutions, notably the jury system.

VENALITY OF OFFICE

In contrast to those in central and eastern Europe (with the exception of the Prussian judiciary), institutional structures in France and Spain were dependent on sale of office. By the end of Louis XIV's reign the total number of venal offices, if those in the tax farms, municipalities, and army are included, may have been as high as seventy thousand or more, compared with around five thousand at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Information from Spain is less complete, but by the 1630s the sale of senior administrative offices together with those in the municipalities, which were vital to the financial and social stability of the body politic, was commonplace. It has been suggested that in Castile there were twice the number of offices per head of population as in France. In both countries the resulting patrimonial nature of the system was further reinforced by the practice of using private financiers to sell offices, tax concessions, and alienated regalian rights.

Venality was both a means of getting the bureaucracy to pay for itself and a source of additional revenue. In its absence other means had to be found to sustain expanding civilian and military establishments. The Swedish Crown partly solved the problem through the *reduktion*, by which, in diametric opposition to French and Spanish practices, it exercised the regalian right of calling in lands alienated to the nobility. This was accomplished in an increasingly comprehensive and aggressive manner in 1655, 1680, and 1682. The most influential of Sweden's reforms, however, was the cantonal, or allotment, system of maintaining an army. The government negotiated contracts with each province for the supply and maintenance of infantry soldiers, who were given either a cottage or accommodation on a farm. The advantages of this practice were considerable, enabling an army to be kept in permanent readiness at minimal cost while reducing more brutal methods of conscription, heavy war taxation, and the billeting of unruly troops on resentful communities; in the short term, at least, it helped a small country compete with, and even inflict military defeats on, their wealthier or more populous rivals.

In 1727 the cantonal system was introduced in Prussia with remarkable results. Although Prussian revenues increased by only 44 percent between 1713

and 1740, the size of the army more than doubled to 83,000. The annexation of Silesia in 1745 and West Prussia in 1772 took the population from 2.2 to 4.76 million. By 1786 it was 5.4 million, and the size of the army had correspondingly grown to 200,000. With about 4 percent of the population in arms Prussia exceeded all its rivals in the militarization of the populace. However, neither Prussia nor Austria, where a similar system was adopted in the 1770s, was able to emulate Sweden's success in controlling costs, for military reform in Sweden had been accompanied by the introduction of an audit department with the aim of adhering to a balanced budget, which placed it decades ahead of its rivals.

The variation in the incidence of venality has encouraged Thomas Ertman to postulate a typological difference between the "patrimonial" absolutisms of Latin Europe and the "bureaucratic" ones of the east. Yet bureaucratic absolutisms also displayed powerful patrimonial characteristics. In Russia the payment of salaries for local government officers was withdrawn in 1727, leaving them to "pay themselves" from the proceeds of their business. Not until 1763 were all officials salaried. The Prussian *Landräte* were paid a modest salary, but it came from the provincial chamber, not from the king; moreover, these were key positions much sought after by the more powerful nobles, who used them to establish patronage networks, which they deployed in the interests of family and allies. As far as military posts were concerned, no country emulated French practice, which by the 1770s had generated 900 colonels to 163 regiments. Even so, the Prussian officer corps grew dramatically during the reign of Frederick the Great, and many hundreds of captains supplemented their salaries by taking a cut of the company expenses and soldiers' pay made over to them by the state. The patrimonial character of the absolutist regimes was not, therefore, a simple consequence of venality. It might be more accurate to suggest the opposite—that venality was but one expression of the patrimonial dynamics that shaped absolutist regimes.

ABSOLUTISM AND WAR

If it is indisputable that the emergence of absolutist regimes was a response to the bellicose turmoil of the seventeenth century, it is equally apparent that this was not the only possible outcome. In Sweden the military difficulties of the 1670s produced a lurch toward absolutism, but those of the Great Northern War (1700–1721), notably the military debacle at Poltava in 1709, led directly to a reassertion of con-

stitutional rule; indeed in 1719 the Riksdag ended the hereditary monarchy established in 1544. During the same period, pressures of the War of the Spanish Succession on England accentuated rather than diminished parliamentary control of the burgeoning bureaucracy, the army, and the navy. The modern state may, in the most generic sense, be a product of warfare, but this is an insufficient explanation for the divergent forms of its development and cannot convey the full array of conditions required to produce a specifically absolutist variant.

Attempts by modern historians to address this problem have largely concentrated on the conditions under which states set about maximizing revenues. According to Charles Tilly early modern states were shaped by the interaction between their coercive capacities and their capital accumulation and concentration. Venice (capital intensive) and Russia (coercive) are positioned at opposite ends of the spectrum, with England, France, and Spain somewhere in the middle. Ertman, noting that Tilly's model can accommodate neither Hungary nor Poland, which despite being "militarily exposed" produced constitutional rather than absolutist regimes, has offered an explanation based on the prior character of representative and local government. Assemblies encompassing the three estates (nobility, clergy, and commoners), which could easily be divided, were less well equipped to survive than territorial-based assemblies, which tended to be more strongly rooted in local government. Brian Downing, on the other hand, relates the survival of constitutional practices to a plurality of factors: the capacity to exploit foreign territories; the protection offered by difficult terrain; diplomatic skill; or simple good fortune.

THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF ABSOLUTISM

While these modern interpretations reject oversimplified connections between war and absolutism, they confine themselves largely to the dynamics of state finance, giving little weight to socioeconomic matters. This perhaps reflects the fading power of older class-based analyses of absolutism, which, in either Whiggish or marxist terms, fastened on the rise of the middle classes or the bourgeoisie. By the end of the twentieth century most historians, marxists included, had abandoned Friedrich Engels's notion that an equilibrium between nobles and bourgeois allowed the monarchy to rise above both. Indeed the longevity of such ideas is surprising since absolutism was most securely rooted in Prussia and Russia, where the bour-

geoisie was insignificant, and positively rejected in the United Provinces and England, where it was most powerful.

If the association of absolutism with the bourgeoisie is to have any credence, one would expect it to be established in western Europe, where the urban populations were larger and commercial activity more vigorous. Yet even there the connection is doubtful. The Spanish monarchy's dependence on the compliance and resources of privileged urban centers is deceptive, for these towns had effectively become the patrimony of the *caballeros* (noblemen). State investors also made up the middle and upper cadres of the judiciary, the army, the church, the royal governors of the cities, and the king's secretaries and councillors. These noble urban oligarchs had little resemblance to a bourgeoisie. The entrenchment of their position was echoed in the countryside, particularly in the south, by the consolidation of seigneurial authority. During Philip IV's reign (1621–1665) some fifty-five thousand families—no less than 5 percent of the population—were sold into seigneurial jurisdiction, and at least 169 new *señores* (lords) were created with the right to appoint village magistrates and officials. One telling consequence of this process was a dramatic reduction in appeals to the royal courts at Valladolid and Granada.

Similar observations may be made about the social foundations of absolutism in France, where, despite the intendants, who held office by virtue of revocable commissions and not by purchase, the realm continued to be administered, taxed, and judged by rentier officeholders who at the higher levels formed the ranks of the *noblesse de robe* (judicial nobility). While much of the capital for the purchase of office came from trade, this diversion of merchant wealth into rentier and usurious investments inhibited the progress of capitalism. It is thus not possible, as some historians have suggested, to attribute urban patricians' royalism to the support of a bourgeois class for the economic protection offered by the Crown. Such royalism is better explained by the deep social conservatism of urban elites, who aspired to advance their families through the purchase of office, land, and title. In any event, the bourgeoisie played no significant part in formulating the mercantilist policies that Richelieu (Armand-Jean du Plessis) presented to a handpicked assembly of notables (nobles, magistrates, clergy) in 1627. Not until 1700, with the establishment of the Council of Commerce, did the trading bourgeoisie achieve a modest level of influence at the highest levels. Even then, the Council's proceedings reveal a persistent attachment to local interests, traditional social values, and a corporate mentality.

Traders and manufacturers were frequently hostile or indifferent to government economic initiatives yet without a principled basis for their opposition that might have suggested a developing sense of class interest.

Only about Sweden is it possible to argue that absolutism rested on some equilibrium between classes. But here it was the peasantry, not the diminutive bourgeoisie, that acted as the counterpoise to the nobility. Not only was the Swedish peasantry largely composed of freeholders but, uniquely in Europe, it was recognized as a separate estate of the realm with an autonomous political role. Although diminished as Charles XI gathered power to himself and an inner circle of councillors, the peasants' influence ensured the nobility would bear the brunt of fiscal retrenchment by relinquishing many of its lands. True, this was not accomplished without consolidating royal support among the lesser nobility, who, reinforced by an influx of newcomers, dominated the *reduktion* commission. But what is remarkable about the recovery of alienated lands was the extent to which it was carried through; even the president of the council was not spared significant losses, despite his personal appeals to the king. However the unusual balance of social forces in Sweden did not, as events were to show, provide the most propitious basis for an enduring absolutism.

ABSOLUTISM AND THE NOBILITY

Elsewhere in Europe the absolute state consolidated its position at the expense of the peasants, partly by increasing their tax burden and partly by reinforcing their subordination to landlords. Perhaps the most famous landmark in this process was the Russian law code of 1649, which bound the Russian peasant to the soil, a plight aggravated in 1722 by the imposition of the poll tax, from which the nobility was exempt. By comparison the Prussian peasantry was well-off. Nevertheless, in addition to providing or finding the labor to cultivate the lords' demesnes—up to sixty days per year in a fifth of cases and twenty-six days in another two-fifths—it also met the largest part of the tax burden. Even in western Europe, where estate ownership and jurisdiction were no longer coterminous, the landed classes retained a remarkable ability to extract taxes, seigneurial dues, and tithes from a legally dependent peasant population. In both Castile and France half the peasants' product was consumed in payments that sustained non-peasant classes. Inevitably, there was a certain tension between the demands of the central state and landlords for the

peasants' surplus. Indeed during the massive endemic unrest in the 1630s and 1640s it was not unknown for French tax officials to encourage their tenants to resist the demands of the fisc, or royal treasury. Yet this curious situation also indicates that the absolute state was not, as is sometimes suggested, an *independent* competitor against the seigneurs but a state managed by them.

All this suggests that the dynamics of absolutism were generated by noble society itself. From at least the mid-sixteenth century the European nobility had been badly shaken and divided. In part this was due to the soaring costs of war, but warfare was itself the outcome of internecine conflicts within the nobility. The centuries-long struggle between the Valois and the Bourbon against the Habsburgs was the ultimate expression of noble rivalry. Such rivalry was also manifest in the civil wars that, compounded by religious passions, tore France and Germany apart. In Russia the governing boyar elite was terrorized, depleted, and left reeling by the onslaught of Tsar Ivan IV between 1565 and 1572, and when the ruling dynasty died out in 1598, Muscovy slid into chaos. Claimants to the throne set up rival governments within a few miles of each other, while Sigismund III Vasa of Poland, who had previously been deposed as king of Sweden by his uncle (Charles IX of Sweden), invaded the country in 1610 and had his son elected tsar by a group of boyars. Only the opposition of other nobles finally secured the throne, in 1612, for Michael Romanov, a member of a distinguished but non-titled family related to the previous dynasty. The Russian throne was to remain prey to adventurers, among whom one might count Catherine the Great, who had no claim to it whatsoever. Sweden, too, in the last years of the sixteenth century was destabilized by deep factional rivalries, accentuated by religious division. Having seized the throne, Sigismund's uncle subsequently ordered the execution of his leading aristocratic opponents.

The assertion of regal authority was accompanied by a growing differentiation within the ranks of the nobility and the emergence of a handful of very powerful and influential families. In Brandenburg, for instance, on the eve of the Thirty Years' War thirteen families had already achieved an extraordinary concentration of both office and wealth, holding between them one-third to one-half of seigneurial land. As historians have long suggested, this may in part have been due to a decline in noble revenues, a decline compounded for some by the catastrophic effects of decades of war on rural economies. Many lesser nobles found themselves little better off than their tenants, while others consolidated large fortunes. But the po-

larization was also an outcome of the jostling for place and favor, to which monarchs contributed with measures that simultaneously recognized noble aspirations and strengthened their own powers of patronage. As early as 1520 Charles V of Spain created four distinct noble ranks, with a tiny handful of grandees at the top and large numbers of often very poor *hidalgos* (yeomen) at the bottom. All expanded significantly in the 150 years that followed, with the number of titled nobility rising from 69 in 1530 to 212 a century later. In Russia new ranks within the boyar elite were created in the sixteenth century to accommodate pressure from social upstarts, although Ivan IV tripled the number of service gentry, much to the chagrin of some of the magnates. In Sweden the monarchy began to recover from the turmoil of the early seventeenth century by incorporating the nobility as a formal estate of the realm and introducing grants of hereditary status. The order was further divided into three: the titled nobility (twelve families), members of the council of state (twenty-two families), all other untitled nobles. This process, however, excluded four hundred families.

Having consolidated their position, European monarchs were able to exploit divisions between and within noble ranks and deploy their own powers of patronage further to restructure the relationship with the nobility. This process was particularly evident in the last decades of the seventeenth century, when the Brandenburg Junkers, the Swedish inner circle, the Russian boyars, and the overmighty French subjects all had their grips on the levers of power reduced. Between 1640 and the 1670s aristocratic domination of the Russian Duma fell from 70 to 25 percent. Most dramatically, in Denmark the almost overnight establishment of absolutism in 1661 was rapidly followed by the effective dissolution of the old nobility as a distinct social group; not only did it lose its monopoly of important offices, but its numbers and its wealth collapsed. In 1660, 95 percent of privately owned manors were in the hands of the old nobility; by 1710 that had been reduced to 38.5 percent.

However, in every case, these developments were only a phase in the integration of noble and monarchical interests. In Denmark the absolute monarchy almost immediately set about creating a new nobility by introducing in the 1670s the titles of baron and count, expressly designed to enable Crown officials of common origins to acquire noble privileges and status. Their land was also protected from market forces, making it subject to primogeniture and entail. Entailed estates made up one-fifth of agricultural land in 1800. A similar renewal of the nobility took place

in Sweden, where the number of noble families rose from 150 in 1627 to 556 in 1700; half of these families owed promotion to Charles XI. In Russia a hereditary nobility did not exist, save for the princes, until the reign of Peter the Great. His extraordinarily elaborate Table of Ranks—with its fourteen grades; 262 functions, from general admiral to court butler; and tripartite classification into military, court, and civil nobility—was intended to create a Western-style noble estate. The process was not complete until 1785, when Catherine the Great's Charter of Nobility confirmed its legally privileged status. Matters followed a slightly different course in Prussia, where the Great Elector turned to the German imperial nobility to replace the Junkers. However, despite having to contend with an influx of newcomers, the Junker's never lost their virtual monopoly of the key posts in the provincial administration.

The refashioning of the nobility increased rather than diminished the preoccupation with rank and the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few families. Everywhere access to the highest councils was facilitated by family connections, which were constantly reinforced by the head of the clan, who secured advantageous marriages, offices and pensions, and other favors for kin and clients. Where patronage was bolstered by hereditary officeholding, as in France, the upper echelons of the state became the preserve of dynasties of ennobled officeholders. In Russia the 180 or so nobles who occupied the first four ranks were a self-perpetuating elite collectively described as the *generalitet*. Moreover, two-thirds came from old aristocratic families, who showed a remarkable staying power, particularly if connected to the royal family. While power and wealth were not perhaps as closely linked as in France, the political hierarchy was certainly underpinned by economic differentials. In 1797 four-fifths of landowners owned fewer than 100 serfs each, and a mere 1.5 percent of them had over 1,000 each, accounting in aggregate for 35 percent of the serf population. Moreover, as in western Europe, the monarchy was on hand to reward favored and influential families; Catherine the Great gave away 400,000 serfs, three-quarters of whom were acquired by the partition of Poland.

To a greater or lesser extent, nobles, which it is worth stressing rarely exceeded 1 percent of the population except in parts of Castile, were the managers and beneficiaries of the absolute state. But playing the power game could be dangerous. No fewer than 128 Russian nobles had their estates confiscated between 1700 and 1755, and a number of ministers were either executed or exiled. French absolutism was less brutal, but dissent could lead to prison or exile, and financiers

were always vulnerable to the government's periodic investigations into their wealth. In the years before Louis XIV's accession the resentment felt by those who lost out in the intense competition for power and wealth threatened to plunge France back into civil war. The success of Richelieu and Jules Mazarin, both from relatively modest noble backgrounds, in achieving supreme public office, ducal status, and unrivaled fortunes in the process offended old grandees and the new officeholding elite alike. Resistance to ministerial tyranny and corruption erupted in the War of the Fronde (1648–1653). Fortunately for Mazarin, the Fronde largely served to expose the divisions between grandees, lesser nobles, parlements, tax officials, municipalities, and others, all of whom claimed to be the most loyal and suitable servants of the king. The chief minister's clientele also proved, as had that of Richelieu, more resilient and effective than those arrayed against him. However, Louis XIV's decision to dispense with a first minister was perfectly in tune with the public mood. Ironically, in doing so, he inherited not only a governmental machine but also a vast patronage system, which he manipulated with consummate success.

At the same time the French upper classes began to realize that they could ill afford to engage in perpetual conflict and that they might benefit from a king strong and prestigious enough to bring some order. This conviction was reinforced by three decades of tax revolts—themselves facilitated by upper-class rivalries, which both set a bad example and created opportunities for revolt. There is an evident parallel with the situation in Russia, where repeated waves of peasant resistance provoked demands from the service nobility for the suppression of the peasants' right of movement.

Versailles, to which the court moved in 1682, was the ultimate expression of all these pressures. Both the seat of government and the residence of an ever growing royal family, the very building embodied the inseparability of the public and the private. It served also, in the words of Françoise Bertaut de Motteville, as "a great market," made seemly by elaborate rules of etiquette, where courtiers jostled for position, pensions, and marriages. Through its preoccupation with rank and privilege the court gave renewed vigor to the social hierarchy, legitimating the privileged position of those who attended on the king. Not least Versailles created a dazzling stage for the king's deification as a great sun god whose rays brought light and order where there was darkness and confusion, a ruler systematically and consciously portrayed in prose, verse, painting, and music as the bringer of war, peace, abundance, and justice.

THE LEGITIMATION OF ABSOLUTISM

As these observations suggest, the absolute state even in the west was hardly a progressive or modernizing force. Despite the growth of centralizing bureaucracies and a degree of functional specialization, the elevation of royal authority reflected its success in recovering control of patrimonial systems that had sometimes appeared to be on the verge of succumbing to their inherent instability. Ideologically, too, the elevation of royal authority was a largely conservative response to the disorders afflicting the body politic. Although some historians have seen in French absolutism a manifestation of the modern idea of legislative sovereignty enunciated by Jean Bodin in 1576, it was largely legitimated by essentially traditional ideas. Bodin himself harnessed the concept of sovereignty to Thomist and neo-Platonic teleologies, which had by no means been vanquished as overarching ideologies by the end of the seventeenth century. Absolute power replicated that of God and was in harmony with the divinely ordained cosmos.

The overriding need, according to Bodin, was to restore the integrity of the monarchical order and

the social hierarchy on which it depended. In fact his conception of the social hierarchy was not merely idealized but also very French. In most of the countries discussed here, hereditary monarchs and nobilities, titles, and estates of the realm were recent creations, but this did not prevent monarchs and nobles from asserting an ancient and imprescriptible role as the mainstays of a universal order. Heightened religious feelings also bolstered monarchical ideology by encouraging kings to assert their divine authority. If the Protestant kings of Prussia and Sweden did not radiate the sacral aura of Louis XIV, an “austere concept of divine providence” served Charles XI and the Great Elector just as well in imparting a sense of duty to those around them (Melton, p. 87). Protestant and Catholic authorities alike did not doubt that the rebellion and disorder of the age were results of man’s inherent sinfulness, even signs of divine displeasure. Historians have also emphasized the way in which an increasingly neostoical and classical culture put a premium on both general good order and personal self-discipline. This went along with the progressive abandonment of the constitutional ideas and rights of resistance that had been espoused by many nobles in the sixteenth century.

THE LAST STAGE OF ABSOLUTISM: ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM

After 1760 the equilibrium of the absolutist regimes was once more disturbed. The Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), sparked in part by Prussia’s annexation of Silesia from Austria, ushered in several decades of intense great-power rivalry. Poland was wiped off the face of the map. The French monarchy, debilitated by fighting in Europe and overseas, never recovered. By dint of a massive debasement of the coinage and its plunder of Silesia and Poland, the Prussian regime managed somewhat better. Even so, the war chest bequeathed by Frederick II to his successor was rapidly exhausted in the turbulent years between 1787 and 1794. In 1795 Prussia was forced to sue for peace with France, ceding all territory on the west bank of the Rhine. Russia, while jostling to assert its position as a major European power, was also pushing up against the Turkish Empire in the east with three bouts of open conflict (1768–1774, 1783–1784, 1787–1792). The pressure exerted on rudimentary financial systems, inelastic economies, and a resentful population had a predictable effect. New peaks of unrest were reached in the revolt of the Cossacks under Yemelyan Ivanovich Pugachov in 1773 and in Bohemia two years later, when a forty-thousand-strong army was

required to restore order. In France a run of poor harvests brought an end to years of relative calm in the countryside and prepared the way for the peasant uprising in the summer of 1789.

It is difficult to characterize the highly ambivalent and often contradictory responses of the absolute states to the worsening situation as simply enlightened. The administrative centralization of Joseph II, the rigidly mercantilist regime of Frederick II, and Catherine’s Legislative Commission, which for the first time gave the nobility a role as an estate of the realm, are among the many policies of conservative hue. Nor was this surprising, given that the impetus for reform was precipitated by pressures similar to those that had ushered in the absolutist regimes a century earlier. Even Joseph II’s determined attempts to abolish labor services and reduce the burdens of seigneurialism may be construed as efforts to generate more state revenue.

On the other hand, absolutism had brought into being a class of now experienced and educated nobles, state servants who began to see that reform was necessary if their regimes were to survive as great powers. This realization was heightened by an awareness of the immense technical superiority of English agriculture, industry, and commerce, to which these regimes repeatedly turned for expertise and practical assistance. Even in Prussia, where the University of Halle was a bulwark of opposition to physiocratic ideas, Frederick the Great understood that the rural world ought to be freed from its burdens, although he achieved almost nothing outside the royal domains. In this changing intellectual climate, many nobles had by the 1770s absorbed utilitarian assumptions about the origins, purpose, and nature of government that had little in common with the religious teleology of their predecessors. Ideas of natural equality and meritocracy gained ground.

However, there was a self-evident contradictoriness in absolutist regimes attacking the hierarchical society of which they were so much part. When Joseph II died, his reforming program was in tatters. In France resistance to reform precipitated a chain of events that led to the destruction of absolute monarchy and the entire privileged order. Even then, although revolution and industrialization accelerated the pace of change and hastened the transformation of the nobility and the emancipation of the peasantry, the political superstructures of central and eastern Europe displayed an extraordinary resilience. Not until the 1870s was Prussia absorbed into a quite different type of state, and not until the twentieth century did the Russian regime finally disintegrate under the impact of a classic combination of war and social unrest.

ABSOLUTISM

See also **The Enlightenment** (*volume 1*); **The Aristocracy and Gentry**; **The Military** (*volume 3*); and other articles in this section.

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THE LIBERAL STATE



Adrian Shubert

Liberalism as a political philosophy has a long history and incorporates complex influences from a number of countries. The word was first applied to a political movement in Spain in 1812, referring to the advocates of constitutional government. This use then extended to other countries. The political systems intended by their founders to be liberal incorporated this intellectual tradition but not it alone. They were also informed by traditions of eighteenth-century enlightened absolutism and the experience of popular revolution that began in France in 1789 and touched virtually all the Continent by 1848.

The European liberal state was a product of the coming together of these influences. Local circumstances guaranteed differences in emphasis and detail among countries, but the fundamental features of the liberal state were strikingly consistent. The hallmark of all liberal states was the creation of written constitutions that established representative governments based on highly restricted suffrage determined by wealth, literacy, or both. The right to vote was characteristically limited to between 1 and 10 percent of the population. The liberal state was also far removed from any conception of a “minimum” or “night watchman” state. Indeed once liberals came to power, state building was among their primary objectives. The liberal state was much more extensive in its reach across Europe and directly touched more of its citizens than had its *ancien régime* predecessor.

The watchwords of the builders of Europe’s liberal states were centralization and homogenization. In large part these concerns derived from the experience of eighteenth-century enlightened reformers, whose goals were to enhance national military and economic power and to strengthen the Crown and bring it into closer contact with its subjects. Such a program meant that reformers and the liberals who succeeded them were simultaneously engaged in eliminating state intervention in a number of areas, primarily economic; in building the power of the state by weakening the multiplicity of privileges, intermediate institutions, and private jurisdictions that stood between govern-

ment and subjects (or citizens); and in increasing the number of the state’s own agents. This perspective was forcefully expressed by Pablo de Olavide, a reforming official in Spain under Charles III (1759–1788), when he described the *ancien régime* as:

A body composed of other and smaller bodies, separated and in opposition to one another, which oppress and despise each other and are in a continuous state of war. Each province, each religious house, each profession is separated from the rest of the nation and concentrated in itself . . . a monstrous Republic of little republics which contradict each other because the particular interest of each is in contradiction with the general interest.

Before liberals could build they had to destroy many of the institutions that characterized the *ancien régime*. These institutions did not always surrender quietly, especially religious institutions, which were often the most significant targets of such changes. Olavide ended up in the clutches of one of those intermediate bodies, the Inquisition. Across much of Europe and especially Catholic Europe the churches were the liberals’ most persistent and most dangerous opponents.

The great era for the construction of liberal states was between the Restoration and the revolutions of 1848. Even Britain, which already had a parliamentary form of government with highly restrictive suffrage, saw an attack on a range of customary economic practices that had constituted breaks on the free play of market forces and had offered some form of protection to ordinary men and women. The regimes established under the Restoration were subject to a series of conspiracies and military coups that sought to restore or install parliamentary government. These were most frequent in southern Europe, where liberals wanted rulers to proclaim the Spanish Constitution of 1812. Few of these uprisings were successful, although the Spanish revolution of 1820 was defeated only by French intervention in 1823. Dynastic conflicts provided the opportunity for liberals to achieve definitive victories in Portugal and Spain

in the 1830s, while in Belgium independence from the Netherlands, achieved with the aid of foreign intervention, was accompanied by the creation of a constitutional system. Greece became a constitutional monarchy in 1843, and Denmark and the Netherlands did so in 1849. In Italy, Piedmont became a permanently liberal state in 1848, and it imposed that liberalism on the rest of the peninsula between 1860 and 1870.

While most of western Europe had liberal political systems by 1848 or 1849, this was not the case in other parts of the Continent. Austria did not establish a constitutional government until 1860, Sweden until 1864, northern Germany until 1867, and Germany as a whole until 1871.

The circumstances that produced liberal states in Europe have been the subject of long-standing and ongoing debates. The central issue undoubtedly has been the extent to which the revolutions that did away with the *ancien régime* of Europe can be identified with a specific social class, the bourgeoisie. The marxist interpretation, which holds that liberal states were the product of bourgeois revolutions, has been particularly influential. In this view industrial development produced a bourgeois class that eventually seized power from the feudal aristocracy. The classic examples of bourgeois revolutions were England and France, and the influence of these interpretations was such that they became normative. Scholars assessed the histories of other countries in terms of how closely they matched these models. Those countries with significantly different patterns were frequently deemed “peculiar” or to have “failed.” Moreover in countries such as Germany, Italy, and Spain the “failure” of the bourgeoisie to make its revolution was frequently asserted as the reason they succumbed to dictatorship in the interwar period. This was, for example, the central thrust of Antonio Gramsci’s analysis of Italian unification, his concept of “passive revolution,” and the thinking behind Germany’s *Sonderweg* (special path).

After the 1960s and especially after the 1980s the concept of bourgeois revolution and the identification of liberalism with a specific class were increasingly questioned. In country after country historians were unable to locate an industrial bourgeoisie that seized power and recast state and society to its specifications. These changes were most striking in the French Revolution. The classic marxist view of Georges Lefebvre was challenged by historians such as Alfred Cobban, G. V. Taylor, and above all François Furet. Research uncovered not a new class tied to industry but a composite elite of nobles and commercial and professional bourgeois who were similar intellectually and culturally. Historians began to locate the causes

of the revolution not in the economy but in the realms of politics, ideology, or culture. Similar trends have been present in the historiographies of England, Germany, and Spain. Perhaps the extreme example of this trend was Arno Mayer’s controversial claim that, far from a bourgeois revolution, the aristocracy remained the dominant class across Europe on the eve of World War I.

BUILDING THE LIBERAL STATE

The architects of Europe’s liberal states had an expansive vision of the proper areas of state activity. The first continental liberal state was created in France during the Revolution (1789–1815). The revolutionaries quickly abolished the institutions of the *ancien régime* and replaced them with new ones that brought the state into a direct relationship with its citizens. War was the single greatest impetus to the construction of this new centralized state. The French pioneered many institutions and structures that were widely copied across Europe, and not just by liberals.

TERRITORY AND ADMINISTRATION

Under the *ancien régime* national territory was characteristically divided into units of significantly different sizes that, more important, enjoyed different relationships with the Crown. In France the *pays d’état* and in Spain the Basque Provinces and Navarre had special privileges regarding taxation and military service that were not shared by other parts of the realm. Such a situation offended liberals, for whom legal privilege of any sort was anathema and who sought to bring all parts of their country and all its citizens into equal relationships with the central state. Thus one of the first measures liberals undertook was the division of the national territory into new units of roughly equal size that did not enjoy any privileges.

A new division of the national territory into units of roughly equal size was considered a pressing need by early governments of the French Revolution. In January 1790 the country was divided into eighty departments, an arrangement retained by all the régimes that followed. France became the model for other countries. Portugal and Spain were divided into provinces in 1833, Piedmont divided in the 1850s, and Italy divided following unification in 1861. Where they existed, internal customs barriers were also eliminated.


In addition to the unequal division of national territory under the *ancien régime*, the individuals who lived there held unequal status. The liberal vision of equal citizens required elimination of all such privi-

leges. Much was subsumed under the “abolition of feudalism,” the elimination of seigneurial rights and legal jurisdiction and of special legal status for designated groups, such as the nobility and the clergy. Thus Spanish liberals abolished the Inquisition, and Piedmont’s Siccardi Laws, passed in 1850, did away with church courts and legal immunities for the clergy, demanded government approval for donations of property to religious institutions, and eliminated penalties for nonobservance of religious holidays. This freedom also applied to the economy, including the destruction of the guilds. More significantly in societies that were still primarily agricultural, it removed privileged constraints on the use and sale of land, the most important of which was the expropriation of the lands of religious institutions.

The legal complexes of the *ancien régime* were replaced by rationalized legal codes that applied to all citizens. Again the model for much of the Continent was the French Napoleonic Code, established in 1804. Even before it established a constitution, Piedmont adopted a civil code (1837) and a penal code (1839) on the Napoleonic model. The 1837 code became the

basis for the Italian Civil Law Code of 1865. Piedmont’s 1859 criminal code was extended to all of Italy except Tuscany and remained in place until the approval of the Zanardelli Code in 1889. Portugal passed a penal code in 1852 and a civil code in 1867. Spain’s first penal code, passed in 1848, was revised in 1870, but Spain had no civil code until 1889. Even then it did not supersede local civil laws in several parts of the country.

This division of the national territory was a prerequisite for the creation of a centralized, hierarchical administrative structure through which the policies of the central state could be transmitted to the provinces, towns, and villages of the nation. As Javier de Burgos, the architect of Spain’s version of this structure, put it, the goal was to construct “a chain that starts at the head of the administration and ends with the last local policeman.” The inspiration for this highly centralized administrative structure came from France and the figure of the prefect, the appointed agent of the state in each of the departments. In Spain, Burgos’s creation of the provinces was accompanied by the creation of a new figure, the civil governor, who was




The Ancien Régime State. The provinces of France under the ancien régime. *Pays d'état* were provinces that had provincial estates (legislative assemblies).

the agent of the central government. These officials were invested with a wide range of responsibilities, including public order, education, welfare, statistics, and economic development. Similar developments took place in Portugal during the 1830s and in Piedmont during the 1850s as Camillo Cavour sought to build a state capable of expansion in northern Italy. He created powerful provincial officials, known as prefects, and immediately imposed them on the whole of Italy after unification in 1861.

Typically provinces were further divided into counties and municipalities, each with its own local official subordinate to the civil governor or prefect. In some cases, such as in Portugal and Spain, appointed mayors formed the lowest rung on the ladder of centralized administration. The issue of appointed versus elected mayors was often a point of division between moderate and more radical liberals.

Belgium and Britain took different paths. Belgium experienced centralized administrative systems



The Liberal State. The departments established during the French Revolution.

under Napoleon and as part of the Dutch monarchy, but when the country achieved independence in 1830 it left cities and towns a wide degree of autonomy, including the power to impose local taxes, subsidize schools and churches, and control the police and the militia. Brussels, Liège, Ghent, and Antwerp had the power to call out the militia independent of central government approval. At the provincial level the key institution was the elected council, not the provincial governor. Appointed for life, governors chaired the councils but did not act as the local agents of the state administrations, as did prefects in the French model.

As citizens made new demands on government, the Belgian government delegated tasks to local and provincial institutions or created new semipublic ones.

Britain developed a strong central state that left a number of functions to local governments or voluntary associations. As a result the direct presence of the central state in the lives of its citizens was much less apparent than elsewhere in Europe. This approach represented a continuity from the ancien régime, which relied on a range of indirect agents, such as chartered municipalities, justices of the peace, overseers of the poor, householder constables, and local associations.

The last decade of the eighteenth century and the period after 1815 saw efforts to make the central government more efficient while expanding the scope for the actions of individuals and free institutions. Included in this approach was an attack on customary rights and other long-standing constraints on economic freedom, such as the Assize of Bread, which permitted judicial control of bread and ale prices.

The 1830s and 1840s brought a significant expansion of the central state. The Anatomy Act (1832) created a central inspectorate to regulate the use of the dead for research, and the Factory Act (1833) created a specialized inspectorate staffed by professional civil servants responsible to the home office. These inspectors constituted a new species of central government agent. Over the next two decades analogous services were established to oversee poor law institutions, public health, mines, prisons, and schools. In 1836 a centralized system for registering births, deaths, and marriages was added. The government also began to regulate new areas, such as railways in 1842 and working hours in the Ten Hours Act of 1847.

Despite all these changes, local governments remained important and through most of the century affected more people directly than did the central state. A large number of new laws affecting areas such as baths, washhouses, lodging houses, public libraries, laborers' dwellings, and industrial schools left implementation to local authorities. The central government sought to achieve greater uniformity by creating the Local Government Board (1871) and by mandating local health authorities and medical officers of health (1872), but even in these functions it did not assume direct control.

POLICE

Burgos was far from unique in seeing policing as an important feature of the new state apparatus. France obtained a national police force in 1798. The Gendarmerie Nationale patrolled rural areas and highways and reported to the war minister. It was complemented by the Sûreté Nationale, an urban police force reporting to the interior minister and responsible, among other things, for political intelligence. The Sûreté gradually took over the municipal police of the major cities. By the end of the century France had more than twenty thousand gendarmes. Spain's Civil Guard was created in 1844 on the model of the Gendarmerie, and by 1880 it boasted almost two thousand posts and more than sixteen thousand men throughout the country, often in small rural towns. United Italy immediately was endowed with two highly

centralized police forces, the Carabinieri, numbering 24,626 in 1889, for the countryside and the Guardia de Sicurezza Publica for the cities. Unsurprisingly both were extensions of Piedmontese institutions.

Policing and justice was another area in which the British government extended its reach, albeit gradually at first. Municipal governments lost to the lord chancellor the power to appoint magistrates, although they gained the right to establish watch committees to oversee the police. The County and Borough Police Act (1856) made the creation of police forces mandatory and, more significantly, made them subject to central inspection. The pace picked up after around 1870. A centralized criminal records system was established in 1869, and ten years later the newly created director of public prosecutions put criminal prosecution squarely in the hands of central authority. Special Branch, with a mandate to watch political dissidents, was created in 1884. The Prison Act of 1877 gave the state increased control of the prison system. Overall, expenditures on police rose from 1.5 million pounds in 1861 to 7 million in 1914.

MILITARY SERVICE

The French Republic pioneered the mass mobilization of the citizenry as an emergency measure in 1793, but the principle of involving all the nation's young men in military service remained one of the hallmarks of liberal states, at least on the Continent. France introduced conscription in 1798 and retained it in various forms throughout the nineteenth century. The St. Cyr Law of 1818, the cornerstone, established a period of service of six years, but the term varied between five and eight years until 1889, when it was set at three years. People with enough money could purchase a substitute for their sons, but that practice was eliminated in 1873.

Spain introduced national service in 1837 but permitted the purchase of exemption with provision of a substitute until 1912. Immediately after unification Italy imposed conscription, one of the causes of widespread disturbances in the South in the early 1860s.

EDUCATION

Education proved the most contentious area for state expansion. It almost always brought the state into direct conflict with powerful religious institutions, for whom control over the minds of the young was considered essential. For many continental countries France once again provided the model. The Guizot

Law of 1833 required that every commune provide an elementary school, and two years later a corps of school inspectors was created. A child labor law in 1841 required education for all children under the age of twelve. The major expansion of the school system came with the Ferry Laws of the 1880s, which made public elementary schools totally free, instituted compulsory education, provided subsidies for school buildings and teacher salaries, and established an elaborate system of inspections. Between 1878 and 1885 the state budget for education increased by 250 percent.

Spain legislated a national school system in 1857, but the Moyano Law left municipalities holding the financial responsibility. In 1900 the central state created an Education Ministry and assumed the obligation of paying teachers. The Piedmontese school system was established by the 1859 Casati Law, and it extended to all of Italy after unification. The law created a powerful Ministry of Public Instruction that controlled public education and had oversight of private schools. The minister had direct control over all instruction and exercised it through an inspectorate. Local and provincial elective boards operated under the control of the prefects.

The British government had to tread lightly in the education field. Both the established Anglican Church and the Nonconformists opposed state intervention, and bills to create a national school system were repeatedly defeated in Parliament. The government could make only annual grants, beginning with a modest 20,000 pounds in 1833, rising to 189,000 by 1850 to 724,000 by 1860. After 1839 this grant was supervised by the Privy Council's education committee. The British experience was thus significantly different from those of many continental states, which early on created nationwide school systems, at least on paper. The British passed no equivalent of the Guizot, Moyano, or Casati Laws. Even the Education Act of 1870, which set out a commitment to a national system, did not overcome the religious issue. It created a situation in which, by the end of the century, the Education Department had to deal with over two thousand school boards and the management of more than fourteen thousand individual schools.

An integral part of education was the question of language, specifically the extension of the national language to all citizens. In 1863 about a fifth of the French population did not speak French, and under the Third Republic patois remained deeply entrenched in more than twenty departments. The pressure of an extended school system and universal military service steadily extended French. Italy faced a similar situation, but its dialects were more persistent. At the end

of the century the Poles in eastern Prussia were forcibly educated in German.

In Spain, where the existence of Catalan, Basque, and Gallego made the issue particularly complex, the state attempted to legislate the use of Spanish. Catalan was prohibited from use in notarial documents in 1862, and five years later plays written in "dialects" were censored. Catalan was banned from the Civil Register in 1870 and from the justice system in 1881. In 1896 the government forbade speaking Catalan on the telephone, and in 1902 the state tried to require that priests teach the catechism in Spanish only. Austria, a multinational and multilingual empire, faced the most difficult situation. Its 1867 constitution permitted elementary schooling in the "language of the country," but this raised the question of minorities within each "country."

CENSORSHIP

Liberal constitutions promised freedom of expression and freedom of the press, yet those freedoms were almost always immediately circumscribed by restrictive legislation. The Piedmontese *Statuto*, which became the constitution of Italy after 1860, contained a typical formula, promising a "free press subject to the constraints of the law." Liberal states exercised censorship throughout the nineteenth century, passing laws, establishing agencies, and appointing officials for the purpose. Commonalities existed throughout Europe. Theater and caricature were more rigidly controlled than printed material; printed material directed at the lower classes was more stringently censored than that aimed higher up the social scale; and the press of the organized working class was frequently a special target. Governments also regularly evaded their own laws with administrative measures. As new technologies generated new forms of communication, such as photographs and moving pictures, they, too, were subjected to state censorship.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Liberal states often actively legislated in the area of public health, although not always in the same way. Peter Baldwin has argued that two forms of state intervention controlled contagious diseases such as smallpox, cholera, and venereal disease. Germany and France responded with obviously interventionist measures, such as quarantines, compulsory vaccinations, and regulation of prostitutes. For example, Germany's Contagious Disease Law (1900) required that the sick be sequestered. In contrast, Britain and the Nordic

countries opted for an emphasis on voluntary vaccinations and on controlling the environmental conditions that caused disease. Apparently less interventionist, this was a different form of intervention. As Baldwin wrote, the voluntary and environmentalist strategy “cost more resources and administrative muscle than many [states] could muster” (Baldwin).

In Portugal, health laws in 1835 and 1844 created a national network of health authorities to issue death certificates and enforce new rules on burials, for instance, requiring location of cemeteries at a minimum distance from populated areas. These measures were not always well received, especially by peasants who saw in them a new form of taxation and an attack on long-held customs.

RESISTANCE

In many parts of Europe the construction of the liberal state provoked resistance and on occasion even full-scale counterrevolutions. Opposition came primarily from the Catholic Church, whose temporal power, material assets, and internal management were targets of the liberal state’s ambitions. But ecclesiastical opposition represented a danger to the liberal state only when it tied into significant popular discontent. Such discontent was most common in rural areas, particularly those characterized by the existence of a relatively egalitarian smallholding peasantry and numerous secular clergy who were well integrated into local life. If these peasants spoke a language other than the official one of the state, the possibilities increased further. Resistance was provoked by certain aspects of liberal state building, including the sale of local common lands, taxation, the imposition of military service, the assertion of greater control over natural resources, or the application of laws that, as with public health, threatened deeply held local customs. Local clergy frequently were influential in or even led resistance movements. The presence and extent of counterrevolution corresponded to the vigor and rapidity with which liberals built their new state. It was most significant in France, Portugal, Italy, and above all Spain.

The French Revolution was marked by numerous outbreaks of counterrevolution in a number of rural regions. There is no simple, overarching explanation for these movements, which were triggered by varying combinations of local landholding patterns and social conflicts, the effects of the intrusion of the new state apparatus into the countryside, the revolutionary abolition of feudalism, the imposition of conscription, and the attack on the church. Fourteen de-

partments revolted in western France alone in March 1793, and further upheaval occurred in the north and the south. In the Vendée, where counterrevolution was most deeply rooted, a guerrilla war continued until 1796, followed by further outbreaks in 1799–1801, 1815, and 1832.

Counterrevolution outlived the revolution in other parts of France. The Forest Code of 1827 gave unprecedented power to a new, centralized forest administration. Some saw the activities of its local agents in controlling the use of forest resources as an attack on long-established use rights, especially in royal and communal forests, provoking resistance known as the War of the Desmoiselles in the department of the Ariège.

The clergy had a prominent role in generating popular support for the absolutist side in Portugal’s War of the Brothers (1829–1834) and in the decade-long antiliberal violence that followed. New regulations requiring death certificates and the location of cemeteries at a minimum distance from villages were taken by many people, especially in the rural north, as a new tax and an attack on traditional practices regarding the dead, who, it was believed, should be kept close to the living. The 1845 Health Law was a primary cause of the Maria da Fonte revolt that spread across the north of the country in 1846 and 1847 and provoked British and Spanish intervention.

In Italy the imposition of the Piedmontese administrative system, taxes, conscription, and the sale of common lands provoked a massive wave of banditry across the south in the years immediately following unification. The imposition in 1869 of a new tax on grinding grain generated widespread peasant disturbances in the north and center of the country.

Counterrevolution was strongest and most persistent in Spain. Beginning with the “liberal triennium” of 1820 to 1823, peasants in various parts of the country, but especially in Catalonia, Valencia, the Basque Provinces, and Navarre, participated in antiliberal movements. In the 1820s they were motivated by conscription, a prohibition on burials inside churches, tax increases, and what was seen as anticlerical legislation. These issues and a defense of regional privilege (*fueros*) were the mass base for the Carlist movement, which fought a seven-year civil war against the liberal state between 1833 and 1840 and a second, shorter one from 1874 to 1876. The anti-centralist legacy of Carlism carried on into the Basque nationalist movement that emerged in the 1890s.

Belgium had a very different experience. From the country’s independence in 1830 the Catholic Church supported a liberal state that subsidized its activities and permitted religious schools and even

lived with religious toleration. When liberals attempted to secularize the schools in the 1880s, the Catholic Church and its supporters reacted but not by challenging the existence of the liberal state itself. Instead, Catholics mobilized politically and successfully fought for power through electoral means.

NEW DEPARTURES

During the last quarter of the century the liberal state responded to new circumstances by moving in new directions. On the one hand, the new intellectual trends were a reaction to the consequences of industrialization. On the other, the emergence of mass political movements, especially socialism, were encouraged by the granting of universal or near-universal male suffrage in Germany (1871), France (1875), Spain (1890), Belgium (1894), Norway (1898), Finland (1905), Sweden (1907), and Italy (1912). Liberal politicians in some countries, such as Germany, had trouble adjusting to the tumult of mass politics and were often outpaced by socialists or conservatives.

As a result new reform measures were almost as likely to be the work of conservative governments as of liberal ones. The first move came from the newly unified German Reich. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's motivation was to preempt the rapidly grow-

ing Social Democratic Party, which he banned in 1879. Through the 1880s the German government introduced a series of social insurance measures unprecedented in their nature and scope that included sickness insurance in 1883, accident insurance in 1884, and disability and old-age insurance in 1889. Within the working class at least, Bismarck's laws mandated obligatory participation and income-related contributions, provided universal coverage, did not involve means testing, and were administered centrally. By 1913, 15 million Germans had sickness insurance, 28 million had accident insurance, and 1 million received pensions. These measures were accompanied by government regulation of a range of work-related areas, such as compulsory factory regulations, the creation of labor exchanges and industrial courts, the beginnings of arbitration, and legislation limiting the number of hours women could work each day.

These German initiatives were a model that was copied or at least appealed to elsewhere. Bismarck in turn claimed to have learned valuable lessons from Napoleon III's experiments with a national pension fund and an accident insurance fund. The German model became increasingly influential in Britain after 1905. It had a major impact on David Lloyd George and was specifically referred to as an inspiration for



MAJOR SOCIAL LEGISLATION, 1883–1914

<i>Accidents</i>	<i>Sickness</i>	<i>Pensions</i>	<i>Unemployment</i>
Germany, 1884	Germany, 1883	Germany, 1889	Norway, 1906
Austria, 1887	Italy, 1886	Denmark, 1891	Belgium, 1907
Norway, 1894	Austria, 1888	Italy, 1898	Denmark, 1907
Finland, 1895	Sweden, 1891	Belgium, 1900	United Kingdom, 1911
France, 1898	Denmark, 1892	United Kingdom, 1908	France, 1914
Denmark, 1898	Belgium, 1894	France, 1910	
Italy, 1898	Norway, 1909	Netherlands, 1913	
Netherlands, 1901	United Kingdom, 1911	Sweden, 1913	
Sweden, 1901	Switzerland, 1911		
Belgium, 1903	Netherlands, 1913		
United Kingdom, 1906			
Switzerland, 1911			

the landmark 1911 National Insurance Act. In France the German model was in the forefront of parliamentary debates of welfare bills both as something to be copied and something to be avoided.

In the twenty-five years before World War I governments across Europe moved into new areas of activity. The 1890s saw the creation in Britain of the Labor Department of the Board of Trade; the Conciliation Act (1896), through which the state became the arbiter of labor disputes; and the Workman's Compensation Act (1897). The real thrust of this new, social liberalism came after 1908, with the Liberal governments of Herbert Henry Asquith and Lloyd George. Old-age pensions were available on a means-tested basis to the elderly and very poor in 1908, and three years later the National Insurance Act introduced compulsory health insurance for all wage workers and some unemployment insurance.

Between 1892 and 1910 France introduced a series of social welfare measures. Early workplace legislation was either toughened or extended. In 1892 France placed limits on working hours of children, adolescents, and adult women and in 1900 set the working day for adult males in so-called mixed workshops at a maximum of ten hours. This was extended to all adult workers two years later. Insurance for workplace accidents was introduced in 1898, but it was not compulsory and excluded all agricultural workers and some industrial ones. Old-age pensions came in 1910. These carried some state financing and

in theory participation was obligatory, although in 1912 only 7 million of 12 million eligible workers were involved.

In Italy this development began with the creation of a Labor Council composed of representatives of business, parliament, and organized labor to study labor issues and a commission to supervise emigration in 1902. The bulk of these new initiatives were associated with the governments of Giovanni Giolitti, including restrictions on the employment of children and the first protection of female labor in 1907 and the nationalization of the life insurance industry in 1912. Spain's Social Reform Institute, six of whose twelve members were Socialists, was created in 1883 to advise the government on labor issues, but the first significant legislation was slow in coming. Workers' compensation was established in 1900 and the eight-hour day in 1918.

The Scandinavian approach was the furthest removed from that of Bismarck. There political parties more associated with the right than the left promoted social welfare legislation, but the result was social programs that provided universal coverage and were financed entirely by taxes rather than by premiums. Denmark introduced such pensions in 1911 and Sweden did so in 1913.

Much of this social legislation fit within liberal conceptions of individual effort and responsibility, but that was considerably more difficult when the state began to intervene directly in family life. France was

a pioneer. In 1889 the state claimed the authority to make abused and neglected children its wards. Over the next two decades the French state also intervened between husbands and wives, passing laws that limited husbands' authority over their wives and their earnings. The state also funded mandatory maternity leave for all wage-earning women after 1913 and instituted means-tested family allowances for dependent children once a family had its fourth child. The British government curtailed parental authority with the Children's Act (1908), which required medical examinations for all children and established a system of probationary and juvenile courts. As was true with other areas of social provision, the political support for intervention in the family varied. In Britain socialists and feminists were the strongest advocates for such legislation; in France conservatives, nationalists, and Catholics were the advocates.

At the same time that intervention in the lives of citizens increased, the liberal state faced the problem of reinforcing its legitimacy and generating identity and loyalty in the face of mass political movements on both the right and the left that rejected its basic tenets. A common response was, as Eric Hobsbawm has argued, to invent new traditions. The range of such practices was great, and the actual mix varied from country to country. For example, France's Third Republic eschewed the use of the historical past, while the German Reich embraced it.

At their literal flimsiest, such traditions included issuing historical postage stamps. The first appeared in Portugal in 1894 to commemorate the five-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Prince Henry the Navigator (1394–1460). Greece (1896), Germany (1899), Spain (1905), the Netherlands (1906), Switzerland (1907), Austria-Hungary (1908), Italy (1910), and Belgium (1914) soon followed. Nations created new holidays, such as France's Bastille Day, established in 1880, and Spain's Día de la Raza, commemorating the voyage of Columbus, in 1912, and new ceremonial occasions. The first, Queen Victoria's jubilee of 1887, was copied elsewhere and repeated in Britain and its empire. The Great Exhibition of 1851, which featured the Crystal Palace, quickly evolved into frequent international expositions and world's fairs that promoted both the host and the participating nations. Liberal states also built large numbers of public buildings, statues, and other monuments.

AFTER THE LIBERAL STATE

Universal male suffrage, mass parties, and state involvement in social welfare suggest that before World

War I the liberal state was already turning into something else. The murderous effects of the war and the emergence of new forms of behavior, especially among women, exacerbated prewar concerns about the condition of the family and the level and health of national populations. Across Europe the relation between the state and the citizen changed significantly as the state became deeply involved in numerous areas that had previously been considered private life. In much of western and central Europe the liberal state was giving way to the welfare state.

The welfare state reached its full flowering in the first three decades after the end of World War II. But in contrast to the interwar years, the emphasis on collective health gave way to what Mark Mazower

(1999) described as a concern to “expand opportunities and choices for the individual citizen.” Fuelled by full employment and rapid economic growth, public spending, especially on social services, increased significantly, as did the taxation that funded it. Rather than a single model of the welfare state, considerable differences developed among nations. Probably the most famous internationally was the Swedish Social Democratic version, where the goal was to reduce inequality. The British approach used taxation to provide a basic minimum for all citizens, while Belgium, France, and Germany established voluntary insurance plans in which contributions were linked to earnings.

By the 1970s the welfare state was challenged by neoconservatives, who advocated monetarist policies, pruning the state, and a less-intrusive relationship

between the state and its citizens. This movement was strongest in Britain, embodied by Margaret Thatcher, prime minister from 1979 to 1990. But even in Britain the state’s share of economic activity, measured in public spending as a percentage of GDP, was not significantly reduced. Thatcherism weakened local government to the benefit of the central state. The ideological attack on the welfare state contributed to the changing position of some social democratic parties, which began to advocate approaches such as the “Third Way” of British prime minister Tony Blair or the “New Middle” of the German counterpart Gerhard Schroeder. In general, however, people on the Continent remained attached to the welfare state and resisted the lure of a return to something that was much closer to the liberal state of the nineteenth century.

See also other articles in this section.

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DEMOCRACY



Charles Tilly

Even today, visibly viable democracies remain a minority among European forms of rule. Like tyranny and oligarchy, democracy is a kind of regime: a set of relations between a government and persons subject to that government's jurisdiction. (A government is any organization, at least partly independent of kinship, that controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within a delimited territory or set of territories.) The relations in question consist of mutual rights and obligations, government to subject and subject to government. A regime is democratic to the extent that:

1. regular and categorical, rather than intermittent and individualized, relations exist between the government and its subjects (for example, legal residence within the government's territories in itself establishes routine connections with governmental agents, regardless of relations to particular patrons);
2. those relations include most or all subjects (for example, no substantial sovereign enclaves exist within governmental perimeters);
3. those relations are equal across subjects and categories of subjects (for example, no legal exclusions from voting or officeholding based on property ownership prevail);
4. governmental personnel, resources, and performances change in response to binding collective consultation of subjects (for example, popular referenda make law);
5. subjects, especially members of minorities, receive protection from arbitrary action by governmental agents (for example, uniformly administered due process precedes incarceration of any individual regardless of social category).

Thus democratization means formation of a regime featuring relatively broad, equal, categorical, binding consultation and protection. Summing up variation in all these regards, we can block out a range from low to high protected consultation. Any move toward protected consultation constitutes democratization;

any move away from protected consultation, de-democratization. These are obviously matters of degree: no polity anywhere has ever conformed fully to the five criteria. Hence to call any particular polity democratic means merely that it embodies more protected consultation than most other historical polities have.

PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

Why stress such abstract standards when we might simply check for familiar constitutional arrangements, such as legislative assemblies, contested elections, broad franchise, and the like? Certainly any social historian of European democracy must pay close attention to the extensive constitutional innovations that occurred in these regards after 1750. Yet three facts speak against the adoption of straightforward constitutional tests for democracy: the origins of most democratic practices in undemocratic regimes; the frequency with which ostensibly democratic constitutions remain dead letters; and the contingent, erratic emergence of democratic regimes from struggle.

First, almost all major democratic institutions initially formed in oligarchic regimes, as means by which narrow circles of power holders exercised constraint on each other and on their rulers. To take the obvious example, Britain's Parliament combined a House of Lords assembling the realm's peers with a House of Commons in which the country's small landholding class held sway. That bicameral legislature eventually became a worldwide model for representative governments. In standard adaptations of that model, an upper house speaks for territories, self-reproducing elites, and/or powerful institutions, while a lower house more nearly speaks for the population at large. In Britain itself, however, the House of Lords never became a means of democratic consultation, and the House of Commons hardly qualified before the reform bills of 1832 and 1867 expanded the national electorate to include most male working-class householders.

Second, many constitutions that look quite democratic on paper remain dead letters. Rulers cook elections, jail opponents, restrict the press, disqualify voters, bypass legislatures, suborn judges, award contracts to cronies, and terrorize popular movements despite constitutional provisions forbidding all of these activities. For instance, when Louis Napoleon Bonaparte reacted to opposition following his popular election as French president in 1848 by executing a coup d'état in 1851, he did not dare to repeal the 1848 constitution's provision for general manhood suffrage, but his henchmen immediately set to work intimidating Louis Napoleon's opposition, cutting back voters' lists, restricting the press, and weakening the national assembly. With little change in its nominal constitution, France took giant steps away from protected consultation. Not the sheer existence of standard democratic forms of organization, but their integration into effective protected consultation, signals the presence of democracy. We must trace the history of democratic processes, not merely of their simulacra.

That injunction leads to the third reason for avoiding concentration on the enactment of constitutions: the erratic, contingent emergence of democracy from struggle. As we shall see abundantly, European democratization did not result mainly from cool contemplation of political alternatives. It always involved intense political struggle. It often resulted from international war, revolution, or violent domestic conflict. Rarely, furthermore, did the struggle simply align one well-defined bloc of democrats against another well-defined bloc of antidemocrats. People changed sides, third parties intervened, and democratic institutions often formed haphazardly as compromise settlements of otherwise intractable conflicts. To explain democratization, we must examine a wide range of political struggles and detect democracy-producing processes within them—even where participants themselves did not know they were advancing democracy.

CONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRACY

In principle, we could search for democratic processes within households, associations, firms, churches, and communities, just so long as each one contained something like a government—a distinctive position or organization controlling its principal concentrated means of coercion. Some analysts of democracy argue, indeed, that democracy originates in such smaller-scale settings before spreading to a national or international scale, while still others claim that robust democracy can only operate on a small scale, among

people who know and care about each other personally. Here, however, we will concentrate on the larger scale, asking how, when, and why national regimes moved toward protected consultation in Europe since the Renaissance.

Governmental capacity. Part of the answer concerns changes in governmental capacity. Governments vary significantly in control by their agents over people, resources, information, and spaces within their jurisdiction. Capacity matters to democracy because below some threshold governmental agents lack the means of implementing protected consultation. Beneath the minimum, democracy gives way to anarchy. Anarchists and utopians, to be sure, have often taken the relative democracy of some crafts, shops, and local communities as warrants for the feasibility of stateless democracy on a large scale.

The historical record, however, suggests another conclusion: where governments collapse, other predators spring up. In the absence of effective governmental power, people who control substantial concentrations of capital, coercion, or commitment generally use them to forward their own ends, thus creating new forms of oppression and inequality. As the Soviet Union collapsed after 1989, for example, the dismantling of central authority did not release a liberating wave of democratization but gave a new set of tycoons, tyrants, and violent entrepreneurs (many of them, to be sure, former members of the Soviet state apparatus) room to ply their trades. If high governmental capacity does not define democracy, it looks like a nearly necessary condition for democracy on a large scale. In European experience on a national scale, extensive increases of governmental capacity always preceded and underlay the formation of democratic regimes.

We cannot, however, conclude that expansion of governmental capacity reliably fosters democracy. In fact, expanding governmental capacity promotes tyranny more often than it causes democracy to flower. In the abstract calculation that quantifies governmental experiences, the relationship between governmental capacity and democracy is no doubt curvilinear: more frequent democracy results from medium to medium-high governmental capacity, but beyond that threshold substantial cramping of democratic possibilities prevails as governmental agents come to control a very wide range of activities and resources.

Citizenship. Citizenship only forms on the higher slopes of protected consultation. Only where governmental capacity is relatively extensive, where established rights and obligations vis-à-vis governmental

agents involve some significant share of a government's subject population, where some equality of access to government exists among subjects, where consultation of those persons makes a difference to governmental performance, and subjects enjoy some protection from arbitrary action can we reasonably begin to speak of citizenship. Although citizenship of a sort bound elite members of Greek city-states to their governments and elite members of many medieval European cities to their municipalities, on the whole citizenship on a national scale only became a strong, continuous presence during the nineteenth century. Understanding its emergence requires attention to political changes, including revolutions, but also to the social forces unleashed by industrialization, such as the rise of working-class movements.

Democracy builds on citizenship but does not exhaust it. Indeed, most Western states created some forms of citizenship after 1800, but over most of the nineteenth century the citizenship in question was too narrow, too unequal, too nonconsultative, and/or too unprotective to qualify their regimes as democratic. The regimes we loosely call "totalitarian," for example, typically combined high governmental capacity with relatively broad and equal citizenship, but afforded neither binding consultation nor extensive protection from arbitrary action by governmental agents. Some monarchies maintained narrow, unequal citizenship while consulting the happy few who enjoyed citizenship and protecting them from arbitrary action by governmental agents; those regimes thereby qualified as oligarchies.

In searching for democratic regimes, we can take relatively high governmental capacity for granted because it is a necessary condition for strong consultation and protection. We will recognize a high-capacity regime as democratic when it installs not only citizenship in general but broad citizenship, relatively equal citizenship, strong consultation of citizens, and significant protection of citizens from arbitrary action by governmental agents. By these criteria, Europe produced no national democratic regimes before the late eighteenth century. Then, by comparison with their predecessors, the (slave-holding but at least partly democratic) United States of the 1780s, the abortive Dutch Patriot regime later in the same decade, and the French revolutionary regimes of 1789 to 1793 all added significant increments to protected consultation.

Consultation and protection. Both consultation and protection require further stipulations. Although many rulers have claimed to embody their people's will, only governments that have created concrete preference-communicating institutions have also in-

stalled binding, effective consultation. In Europe, representative assemblies, contested elections, referenda, petitions, courts, and public meetings of the empowered figure most prominently among such institutions. Whether polls, discussions in mass media, or special-interest networks qualify in fact or in principle as valid and effective preference-communicating institutions remains highly controversial.

On the side of protection, democracies typically guarantee zones of toleration for speech, belief, assembly, association, and public identity, despite generally imposing some cultural standards for participation in the polity. A regime that prescribes certain forms of speech, belief, assembly, association, and public identity while banning all other forms may maintain broad, equal citizenship and a degree of consultation, but it slides away from democracy toward populist authoritarianism as it qualifies protection. Thus the five elements of democratization—categorical relations, breadth, equality, binding consultation, and protection—form and vary in partial independence of each other.

DEMOCRATIZATION

Yet in any particular era, available precedents make a difference. Previous historical experience has laid down a set of models, understandings, and practices concerning such matters as how to conduct a contested election. During the early nineteenth century, France's revolutionary innovations offered guidelines for democratic theory and practice. After World War II, similarly, existing regimes of Western Europe and North America provided models for dozens of new regimes, including those of former European colonies. This political culture of democracy limits options for newcomers both because it offers templates for the construction of new regimes and because it affects the likelihood that existing power holders—democratic or not—will recognize a new regime as democratic.

Historical development. Over the long run of human history, the vast majority of regimes have been undemocratic. Democratic regimes are rare, contingent, recent creations. Partial democracies have, it is true, formed intermittently at a local scale, for example in villages ruled by councils incorporating most heads of household. At the scale of a city-state, a warlord's domain, or a regional federation, forms of government have usually run from dynastic hegemony to oligarchy, with narrow, unequal citizenship or none at all, little or no binding consultation, and uncertain protection from arbitrary governmental action.

Before the nineteenth century, furthermore, large states and empires generally managed by means of indirect rule: systems in which the central power received tribute, cooperation, and guarantees of compliance on the part of subject populations from regional power holders who enjoyed great autonomy within their own domains. Seen from the bottom, such systems often imposed tyranny on ordinary people. Seen from the top, however, they lacked capacity: the intermediaries supplied resources, but they also set stringent limits to rulers' ability to govern or transform the world within their presumed jurisdictions.

Only the nineteenth century brought widespread adoption of direct rule, the creation of structures extending governmental communication and control continuously from central institutions to individual localities or even to households, and back again. Even then, direct rule ranged from the unitary hierarchies of centralized monarchy to the segmentation of federalism. On a large scale, direct rule made substantial citizenship, and therefore democracy, possible. Possible, but not likely, much less inevitable: instruments of direct rule have sustained many oligarchies, some autocracies, a number of party- and army-controlled states, and a few fascist tyrannies. Even in the era of direct rule most polities have remained far from democratic.

Varieties of democratization and paths to democracy. Figure 1 schematizes variation and change in regimes. Where low governmental capacity and little protected consultation prevail, political life goes on in fragmented tyranny: multiple coercive forces, small-scale despots, and competitors for larger-scale power are possible, but no effective central government. The diagram's opposite corner contains the zone of citizenship: mutual rights and obligations binding governmental agents to whole categories of people who are subject to the government's authority, those categories being defined chiefly or exclusively by relations to the government rather than by reference to particular ties with rulers or membership in categories based on imputed durable traits such as race, ethnicity, gender, or religion.

At point A of the diagram's triangular citizenship zone, a combination of little protected consultation and extremely high governmental capacity describes a regimented state. We might call such a state totalitarian; Nazi Germany illustrates political processes at that point. At point B, protected consultation has reached its maximum, but governmental capacity is so low the regime runs the risk of internal and external attack. Nineteenth-century Belgium never reached that point, but veered repeatedly toward it. Point C—

maximum governmental capacity plus maximum protected consultation—is probably empty because of incompatibilities between extremely high capacity and consultation. This line of reasoning leads to sketching a zone of authoritarianism in the diagram's upper left, overlapping the zone of citizenship but by no means exhausting it. It also suggests an idealized path for effective democratization, giving roughly equal weight to increases in governmental capacity and protected consultation up to the point of entry into citizenship, but then turning to deceleration, and ultimately mild reduction, of capacity where protected consultation has settled in.

Figure 2 sets limits on real histories of democratization by sketching two extreme paths:

1. a strong-state path featuring early expansion of governmental capacity, entry into the zone of authoritarianism, expansion of protected consultation through a phase of authoritarian citizenship, and finally the emergence of a less authoritarian, more democratic, but still high-capacity regime. In European historical experience, Prussia from 1650 through 1925 came closer to such a trajectory than most other states
2. a weak-state path featuring early expansion of protected consultation followed only much later by increase in governmental capacity on a large scale, hence entry into the zone of effective citizenship from below. Although few European states followed this trajectory very far because most of them that started succumbed to conquest or disintegration, Switzerland—shielded from conquest by mountainous terrain, rivalries among adjacent powers, and a militarily skilled population—came closer to this extreme than most other European regimes.

All real European histories fell within the extremes. Most described much more erratic courses, with reversals and sudden shifts in both dimensions, and the vast majority entered or approached the zone of authoritarianism at one time or another. The schematic map simply makes it easier to describe the concrete paths of change we are trying to explain.

Elements of democratization. Democratization emerges from interacting changes in three analytically separable but interdependent sets of social relations: inequality, networks of trust, and public politics.

Categorical Inequality: Categorical inequality—collective differences in advantage across boundaries such as gender, race, religion, and class—declines in those areas of social life

that either constitute or immediately support participation in public politics. Buffers arise that reduce the representation and enactment of those inequalities in collective political life. For example, rich and poor alike perform military service, pay taxes, serve on juries, and gain access to courts.

Trust Networks: A significant shift occurs in the locus of interpersonal networks on which people rely when undertaking risky long-term enterprises such as marriage, long-distance trade, membership in crafts, and investment of savings: such networks move from evasion of governmental detection and control to involvement of government agents and presumption that such agents will meet their long-term commitments. Subjects do not necessarily come to trust individual leaders, but they do make commitments on the presumption that the government will meet its own commitments. For example, people increasingly invest family funds in government securities, rely on governments for pensions,

allow their children to serve in the military, and seek governmental protection for their religious organizations.

Public Politics: Partly in response to changes in categorical inequality and trust networks, and partly as a consequence of alterations within the political arena itself, the bulk of a government's subject population acquires binding, protected, relatively equal claims on a government's agents, activities, and resources. For example, governmental agents quell rebellions against wartime conscription, taxation, and expropriation not only with threats and punishments but also with displays of fairness, acts of mercy, enactments of bargains, and articulations of rules for future conscription, taxation, and expropriation.

Only where the three sets of changes intersect does effective, durable democracy emerge.

Conquest, confrontation, colonization, and revolution. Most of the time, alterations in categorical

inequality, trust networks, and public politics occur slowly and incrementally. Nevertheless, certain shocks sometimes accelerate these processes, producing surges of democratization. In European experience since 1500, the chief shocks have been conquest, confrontation, colonization, and revolution.

Conquest is the forcible reorganization of existing systems of government, inequality, and trust by an external power. In the history of European democratization, the most famous example is no doubt conquest by French revolutionary and Napoleonic armies outside of France, which left governments on a semidemocratic French model in place through much of western Europe after Napoleon's defeat. Reestablishment of France, Germany, Italy, and Japan on more or less democratic bases after World War II rivals French revolutionary exploits in this regard. Conquest sometimes promotes democratization because it destroys old trust networks, creates new ones, and provides external guarantees that the new government will meet its commitments.

Confrontation has provided the textbook cases of democratization, as existing oligarchies have responded to challenges by excluded political actors

with broadening of citizenship, equalization of citizenship, increase of binding consultation, and/or expansion of protection for citizens. Nineteenth-century British rulers' responses to large mobilizations by Protestant Dissenters, Catholics, merchants, and skilled workers fit the pattern approximately in Great Britain, but by no means always—and certainly not in Ireland. Confrontation promotes democratization, when it does, not only because it expands and equalizes access to government but also because it generates new trust-bearing coalitions and weakens coercive controls supporting current inequalities.

Colonization, with wholesale transplantation of population from mother country to colony, has often promoted democratization, although frequently at the cost of destroying, expelling, or subordinating indigenous populations within the colonial territory. Thus Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand began European settlement with coercive, oligarchic regimes, but rapidly moved some distance toward broad citizenship, equal citizenship, binding consultation, and protection. (Let us never forget how far short of theoretically possible maximum values in these four regards all existing democracies have al-

ways fallen; by these demanding criteria, no near-democracy has ever existed on a large scale.) Colonization of this sort makes a difference not merely because it exports political institutions containing some rudiments of democracy but also because it promotes relative equality of material conditions and weakens patron-client networks tied closely to the government of the colonizing power.

As England's Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689 illustrates, revolutions do not universally promote moves toward broad, equal citizenship, binding consultation, and protection. Let us take revolutions to be large splits in control over means of government followed by substantial transfers of power over government. As compared with previous regimes, the net effect of most revolutions over the last few centuries has been at least a modicum of democratization, as here defined. Why so? Because they typically activate an even wider range of democracy-promoting processes than do conquest, colonization, and confrontation. Revolutions rarely or never occur, for example, without coalition formation between segments of ruling classes and constituted political actors that are currently excluded from power. But they also commonly dissolve or incorporate nongovernmental patron-client networks, contain previously autonomous military forces, equalize assets and/or well-being across the population at large, and attack existing trust networks. Revolutions sometimes sweep away old networks that block democratization, and they promote the formation of governing coalitions far more general than those that preceded them.

DEMOCRATIZATION IN SWITZERLAND

To watch the impact of revolution, conquest, and confrontation (if not of colonization) on categorical inequality, trust networks, and public politics from closer up, consider the remarkable experience of Switzerland from the late eighteenth century to 1848. Up to the eighteenth century's end, Switzerland operated as a loose, uneven confederation of largely independent cantons and their dependent territories. Although the Confederation had a Diet of its own, it operated essentially as a meeting place for strictly instructed ambassadors from sovereign cantons. Within each canton, furthermore, sharp inequalities typically separated comfortable burghers of the principal town, workers within the same town, members of constituted hinterland communities, and inhabitants of dependent territories who lacked any political representation. In Bern, for example, 3,600 qualified citizens ruled 400,000 people who lacked rights of citi-

zenship, while in Zurich 5,700 official burghers governed 150,000 country dwellers. Within the ranks of citizens, furthermore, a small—and narrowing—number of families typically dominated public office from one generation to the next.

Both the countryside's great eighteenth-century expansion of cottage industry and the mechanized urban industrial concentration that took off after 1800 increased discrepancies among the distributions of population, wealth, and political privilege. Cantonal power holders controlled the press tightly and felt free to exile, imprison, or even execute their critics. From the outside, the confederation as a whole therefore resembled less a zone of freedom than a conglomerate of petty tyrannies. The majority of the population who lacked full citizenship, or any at all, smarted under the rule of proud oligarchs. Meanwhile, politically excluded intellectuals and bourgeois formed numerous associations—notably the Helvetic Society—to criticize existing regimes, promote Swiss national patriotism, revitalize rural economies, and prepare major reforms.

The French Revolution and democratic reforms.

The French Revolution shook Switzerland's economic and political ties to its great neighbor while exposing Swiss people to new French models and doctrines. From 1789 onward, revolutionary movements formed in several parts of Switzerland. In 1793 Geneva (not a confederation member, but closely tied to Switzerland) underwent a revolution on the French model. As the threat of French invasion mounted in early 1798, Basel, Vaud, Lucerne, Zurich, and other cantons followed the revolutionary path. Basel, for example, turned from a constitution in which only citizens of the town were represented in the Senate to another giving equal representation to urban and rural populations.

Conquered by France in collaboration with Swiss revolutionaries in 1798, then receiving a new constitution that year, the Swiss confederation as a whole adopted a much more centralized form of government with significantly expanded citizenship. The central government remained fragile, however; four coups occurred between 1800 and 1802 alone. At the withdrawal of French troops in 1802, multiple rebellions broke out. Switzerland then rushed to the brink of civil war. Only Napoleon's intervention and imposition of a new constitution in 1803 kept the country together.

The 1803 regime, known in Swiss history as the Mediation, restored considerable powers to cantons, but by no means reestablished the old regime. Switzerland's recast confederation operated with a national

assembly, official multilingualism, relative equality among cantons, and freedom for citizens to move from canton to canton. Despite some territorial adjustments, a weak central legislature, judiciary, and executive survived Napoleon's defeat after another close brush with civil war, this time averted by the intervention of the great powers in 1813–1815. In the war settlement of 1815, Austria, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and Sweden accepted a treaty among twenty-two cantons called the Federal Pact as they guaranteed Switzerland's perpetual neutrality and the inviolability of its frontiers.

Switzerland of the Federal Pact operated without a permanent bureaucracy, a standing army, common coinage, standard measures, or a national flag, but with multiple internal customs barriers, a rotating capital, and incessant bickering among cantonal representatives who had no right to deviate from their home constituents' instructions. The Swiss lived with a national system better disposed to vetoes than to concerted change.

With France's July 1830 revolution, anticlericalism became more salient in Swiss radicalism. After 1830, Switzerland became a temporary home for many exiled revolutionaries (such as Giuseppe Mazzini, Wilhelm Weitling, and, more surprisingly, Louis Napoleon), who collaborated with Swiss radicals in calling for reform. Historians of Switzerland in the 1830s speak of a Regeneration Movement pursued by means of publicity, clubs, and mass marches. A great spurt of new periodicals accompanied the political turmoil of 1830–1831. Empowered liberals began enacting standard nineteenth-century reforms such as limitation of child labor and expansion of public schools. Nevertheless, the new cantonal constitutions enacted in that mobilization stressed liberty and fraternity much more than they did equality.

Protestant-Catholic divisions and civil war.

With a Protestant majority concentrated in the richer, more industrial and urban cantons, an approximate political split between Protestant-liberal-radical and Catholic-conservative interests became salient in Swiss politics. In regions dominated by conservative cities such as Basel, the countryside (widely industrialized during the eighteenth century, but suffering a contraction in cottage industry during the early nineteenth) often supported liberal or radical programs. In centers of growing capital-intensive production such as Zurich, conflict pitted a bourgeoisie much attached to oligarchic political privilege against an expanding working class that bid increasingly for a voice in public politics and allied increasingly with dissident radicals among the bourgeoisie. In these regards, political

divisions within Switzerland resembled those prevailing elsewhere in western Europe.

The political problem became acute because national alignments of the mid-1840s pitted twelve richer and predominantly liberal-Protestant cantons against ten poorer, predominantly conservative-Catholic cantons in a Diet where each canton had a single vote. (Strictly speaking, some units on each side, products themselves of earlier splits, qualified as half-cantons casting half a vote each, but the 12/10 balance of votes held.) Thus liberals deployed the rhetoric of national patriotism and majority rule while conservatives countered with cantonal rights and defense of religious traditions. Three levels of citizenship—municipal, cantonal, and national—competed with each other.

Contention occurred incessantly, and often with vitriolic violence, from 1830 to 1848. Although reform movements were already under way in Vaud and Ticino as 1830 began—indeed, Ticino preceded France by adopting a new constitution on 4 July 1830—France's July Revolution of 1830 and its Belgian echo later in the year encouraged Swiss reformers and revolutionaries. As the French and Belgian revolutions rolled on, smaller-scale revolutions took place in the Swiss towns and cantons of Aargau, Lucerne, St. Gallen, Schaffhausen, Solothurn, Thurgau, Vaud, and Zurich. Thereafter, republicans and radicals repeatedly formed military bands (often called free corps, or *Freischärler*) and attempted to take over particular cantonal capitals by force of arms. Such bands failed in Lucerne (1841), but succeeded in bringing new administrations to power in Lausanne (1847), Geneva (1847), and Neuchâtel (1848).

The largest military engagement took place in 1847. Switzerland's federal Diet ordered dissolution of the mutual defense league (Sonderbund) formed by Catholic cantons two years earlier. When the Catholic cantons refused, the Diet sent an army to Fribourg and Zug, whose forces capitulated without serious fighting, then Lucerne, where a short battle occurred. The Sonderbund had about 79,000 men under arms, the confederation some 99,000. The war ended with thirty-three dead among Catholic forces and sixty dead among the attackers. The defeat of the Sonderbund consolidated the dominance of liberals in Switzerland as a whole and led to the adoption of a cautiously liberal constitution, on something like an American model, in 1848.

A last ricochet of the 1847–1848 military struggles occurred in 1856. Forces loyal to the king of Prussia (effectively, but not formally, displaced from shared sovereignty in Neuchâtel by the republican coup of 1848) seized military control over part of Neuchâtel's cantonal capital, only to be defeated almost immedi-

ately by the cantonal militia. Prussia's threats to invade Switzerland incited other European powers to hold Prussia in check. From that point on, the liberal constitution applied to all of the Swiss Federation. Between 1849 and 1870, furthermore, all Swiss cantons terminated their profitable, centuries-old export of mercenary units for military service outside of Switzerland. Thereafter, only papal guards and a few ceremonial military units elsewhere represented Swiss soldiery outside of Switzerland itself.

Swiss democracy. Between 1830 and 1847, Swiss democracy receded into civil war. Only military victory of one side wrenched the confederation back toward a democratic settlement. As of 1848, we might call Switzerland as a whole either a weak democracy or a democratic oligarchy. Property owners prevailed and only males could vote, but the confederation transacted its business through elections, referenda, and parliamentary deliberations, as well as making citizenship transferable among cantons. Democratic institutions comparable to those that now prevail in western Europe still took a long time to form. Women could not vote in Swiss federal elections, for example, until 1971. By the middle of the nineteenth century, nevertheless, Switzerland had formed one of Europe's more durably representative regimes.

The Swiss experience is remarkable for its transition to representative government in the presence of consistent linguistic differences. Important distinctions have long existed between Switzerland's Germanic-speaking northern and eastern cantons, its French-speaking western border cantons, its Italian-speaking southern rim, and its Romansh-speaking enclaves in the southeast. Switzerland also features sharp town-to-town differences in the Alemannic dialects known generically as *Schwyzerdütsch*, which actually serve as languages of choice for spoken communication in nominally Germanophone Switzerland. With dominant cleavages based on religion and inherited from the Reformation, the Swiss have rarely fought over linguistic distinctions.

Switzerland is even more remarkable for the vitality of representative institutions in company with fairly weak state structures. Similar regimes elsewhere in Europe generally succumbed to conquest by higher-capacity (and much less democratic) neighbors. Switzerland's topography, its ability to summon up military defense when pressed, and rivalries among its powerful neighbors gave it breathing room similar to that enjoyed by Liechtenstein and Andorra. Switzerland's tough independence likewise inspired Europe's regional politicians, so much so that Basque nationalists of the nineteenth century proposed that

their own land become the "Switzerland of the Pyrenees."

Whatever else we say about the Swiss itinerary toward democracy, it certainly passed through intense popular struggle, including extensive military action. The same process that produced a higher-capacity central government, furthermore, also created Switzerland's restricted but genuine democracy: as compared with what came before, relatively broad—if unequal—citizenship, binding consultation of citizens, and substantial protection of citizens from arbitrary action by governmental agents were established. As compared with late-nineteenth-century French or British models of democracy, however, the Swiss federal system looks extraordinarily heterogeneous: a distinctive constitution, dominant language, and citizenship for each canton; multiple authorities and compacts; and a remarkable combination of exclusiveness with the capacity to create particular niches for newly accepted political actors. Through all subsequent constitutional changes, those residues of Swiss political history have persisted. In all democratic polities, similar residues of past struggles and compromises remain.

DEMOCRATIZATION IN EUROPE

The Swiss experiences of 1798, 1830, and 1847–1848 should remind us of a very general principle. Rather than occurring randomly and separately country by country, shocks such as conquest, confrontation, colonization, and revolution bunch in time and space. They bunch partly because similar processes—for example, wars, depressions, and mass migrations—affect adjacent countries. They also bunch because a shock to one regime reverberates among its neighbors. As a consequence, democratization occurs in waves.

Europe's first important wave of democratization arrived with the French Revolution. Although the French themselves retreated rapidly from the radical democratic reforms of 1789 to 1793, French regimes from 1793 to 1815 all embodied broader and more equal citizenship (if not always binding consultation or effective protection) than their prerevolutionary predecessors. As French armies conquered other European territories, furthermore, they installed regimes on the French model, which means that in general they increased protected consultation by comparison with the regimes they displaced. Even after Napoleon's defeats between 1812 and 1815, both the French model and French-style constitutions left residues of democratic practice through much of western Europe.

Europe's next wave of democratization arose with the revolutions of 1847–1848 in Sicily, Naples, Piedmont, Lombardy, France, Austria, Hungary, Wallachia, and Prussia. By 1851, to be sure, counterrevolutionary movements and external invasions had reversed most democratic gains in all these regions. Still, from that point on at least the forms of protected consultation prevailed as benchmarks for European regimes. In different ways, furthermore, the revolutions of 1847–1848 promoted or enabled democratic reforms in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland as well. On balance, the struggles of 1847–1851 moved western and central European regimes significantly in the direction of broad, equal, categorical, binding consultation and protection—that is, toward democracy.

After 1848, revolution receded as a democratizing shock in Europe. Portugal, Spain, and the Balkan countries experienced repeated forcible seizures of power between 1848 and World War I, but protected consultation advanced little or not at all in those regions. In 1870 and 1871, France's revolutionary changes opened the path to a turbulent but broadly democratic Third Republic that survived to World War II. Precipitated by Russia's loss in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's revolution of 1905–1906 temporarily introduced a radically democratic regime, but succumbed to tsarist counterforce soon thereafter. In the aftermath, the tsar instituted a series of political and economic reforms that, compared to pre-1905 regimes, moved Russia modestly in the direction of protected consultation.

Over Europe as a whole, nevertheless, confrontation took over from revolution as the chief promoter of democratization between 1849 and World War I. In western and central Europe, mass labor movements formed, making impressive gains in representation through strikes, demonstrations, electoral campaigns, and a wide array of organizational activities. In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, for example, eligible voters reached 50 percent of adult males through hard-fought reforms at various dates from 1848 to 1912.

In those same countries, most workers acquired the right to strike—previously an illegal activity—through parallel struggles between 1848 and 1921. Legalization of labor unions, formation of labor parties, proliferation and reduced repression of popular media, regularization of nonmilitary policing, and expanded freedom to associate and assemble all constituted increases in protected consultation. They all rested, furthermore, on rising governmental capacity, the capacity both to deliver services and to enforce

popular rights over the frequent opposition of landlords and capitalists.

With World War I, the pendulum swung back to conquest and revolution. Conquest, in fact, then promoted revolution; such wartime losers as Germany and Russia experienced deep democratizing revolutions. In Germany, a social democratic regime came to power, and after extensive struggle (contained by the victorious Allies) the country emerged from its war settlement with a broadly democratic regime. In 1917, Russia's March and October Revolutions brought in first a liberal and then a radical regime. Although many analysts of 1917 claim to detect in the Bolshevik seizure of power an irresistible impulse to totalitarianism, as compared with preceding regimes, the initial transformation installed breadth, equality, consultation, and protection to an almost unimaginable degree. What remains hotly debated is how much and how soon a vast civil war, the formation of the Red Army, creation of a centralized Communist Party, and management of economic disaster reversed those early democratic gains.

That was not all. Hungary (also on the losing side as part of the Austro-Hungarian empire) passed through a brief radical revolution only to see it terminated by separate attacks of monarchist and Romanian forces. Elsewhere in Europe, struggles that had begun with strike waves during the war's later years swelled to massive postwar mobilizations in nominal winners Italy, France, and Great Britain. In Ireland, resistance to British rule greatly accelerated with the Easter Rebellion of 1916 and culminated in the formation of an Irish Free State (1922), now a British dominion similar in status to Canada and Australia, with a similarly democratic constitution. (With severe costs for democratic practice in both parts of Ireland, Ulster remained attached to the United Kingdom.)

One outcome of these diverse struggles was widespread adoption of proportional representation, an electoral system that increased the chances of small parties—hence minority interests—to place spokespersons in national legislatures. Another was considerable expansion of the suffrage, including female suffrage. As of 1910, Finland alone granted full voting rights in national elections to women. By 1925, the roster had expanded to Iceland, the Irish Free State, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Soviet Union, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. (By that time, most other regimes had made lesser concessions to female suffrage: while British men voted at twenty-one, for example, British women thirty and older had the vote.)

De-democratization occurred during the 1920s and 1930s. Fascist regimes seized power in Italy and Germany, the Salazar dictatorship displaced Portugal's weak parliamentary regime in 1932, and Spain slid from a half-dozen years of republican government (1931–1936) into civil war and an authoritarian regime that lasted until Generalissimo Francisco Franco's death in 1975. Dictatorial leaders came to power in Greece, Lithuania, and Latvia, while Stalin's rule grew increasingly despotic in the Soviet Union. Despite minor advancements of protected consultation in western Europe, by 1940 Europe as a whole had slid back considerably from the democratic heights it had reached in the aftermath of World War I. German conquests of Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Yugoslavia, the formation of a German puppet regime in Norway, and the alignment of Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria with the German-Italian-Japanese axis reduced European democracy even further.

Evaluation of the postwar settlement raises thorny issues. On NATO's side of the Cold War divide, the United States, Great Britain, and their allies used force and persuasion to establish extensively democratic regimes in most European areas outside Iberia and the Balkans. Impelled by popular mobilization and encouraged by Western Europeans and North Americans, Greece, Spain, and Portugal replaced authoritarian regimes with parliamentary democracies during the 1970s. That much looks like a great wave of deliberately promoted democratization.

On the Warsaw Pact side, however, newly installed socialist regimes of the 1940s generally promoted relatively broad, equal, and categorical citizenship while placing severe limits on both consultation and protection. Simultaneously, socialist states used their rising capacities both to equalize entitlements at the base and to increase repression of dissidents. Depending on the relative weight given to breadth, equality, consultation, and protection, then, we might rate Eastern European shifts in democracy between 1940 and 1950 as anything from minor losses to substantial gains.

In any case, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, beginning in 1989, introduced a new bifurcation into Eastern Europe. In Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine after 1989, mighty political transformations but little or no increase in protected consultation occurred despite the introduction of parties, oppositions, and contested elections. In those territories declines in state capacity undermined protection, equality, and even the breadth of political rights. In the former Yugoslavia and Albania, shattered by civil war, democracy declined from its already modest earlier levels except for the emergence of an independent and relatively democratic Slovenia. Elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc, the record varies but on balance shows increases in protected consultation. One more wave of democratization—this one just as vexed and incomplete as those of 1789–1815, 1847–1850, and 1914–1922—is rolling slowly across Europe.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE WELFARE STATE



Steven M. Beaudoin

Gone are the days when social history could be described as history with the politics left out. Social historians today are just as concerned with politics and state structures as they are with the material conditions of daily life. Indeed, those who would attempt an analysis of such pillars of social history as working-class protest or childhood would soon discover that such issues are inexorably tied to the state. This is particularly true of any study of poverty in modern society. The welfare state has thus become a central concern of social historians, who study its social, economic, and ideological roots; its role in shaping class relations and gender ideals; its economic consequences; and the strategies it fosters among the recipients of assistance. In fact, given the institutional nature of the welfare state, state, local, and private relief agency archives offer rich sources of information for social historians. In this way, the welfare state has become a staple of European social history.

If the welfare state's place in the study of history is easy to determine, the same cannot be said of its definition. For many scholars, the welfare state is the combination of government programs designed to assist the needy. By providing such services as housing, monetary assistance, and health care, these programs assure a level of subsistence below which no citizen should fall. Other scholars, however, adopt actuarial concepts and define the welfare state as the set of policies devised to redistribute risk. In a capitalist society, they argue, welfare comprises the insurance programs that protect citizens against the hardships that might result from periods of economic inactivity like those caused by illness, unemployment, and old age. Some even argue that education is part of the welfare state, for it prepares recipients for a productive work life. For all that they differ, these divergent views share at least one element: they all revolve around the issue of security. For the purposes of this essay, the welfare state includes those programs and policies forged with the goal of easing life's insecurities, from elite fears of beggars to working-class anxieties over industrial accidents. This definition underlies a history of the wel-

fare state that begins with sixteenth-century attempts to rationalize relief and prohibit begging, and ends with early-twenty-first-century programs of national health insurance and family allocations.

EARLY-MODERN ANTECEDENTS OF THE WELFARE STATE

Beginning roughly with the sixteenth century, secular authorities throughout Europe began to take a more active interest in poor relief, resulting in efforts to rationalize, professionalize, and bureaucratize systems of assistance. While historians previously argued that such concerns were the result of Protestant theology's rejection of good works as a means to salvation, current work indicates that some secularization also occurred in Catholic states, although an upsurge in piety and charitable giving following the Council of Trent (1545–1563) limited the rate of centralization and rationalization. The breakdown of older religious institutions, the decline of traditional private sources of security, such as the local community, the growth of state bureaucracies in general, and the social and economic consequences of an emerging commercial economy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries all appear now to be more likely causes of this transformation in welfare provision. Marxist historians, in particular, have seized upon the last development, linking poor relief reform to a rising mercantile economy. By allowing urban elites to regulate the supply of labor, new systems of assistance formed an important bridge in the European transition to capitalism. Another group of scholars, who base their work primarily on the rise of new institutions, such as the *hôpital-général* established in Paris in 1656, emphasize the reformers' desires to promote certain ideals and social order by enclosing social marginals.

Like the causes, the results of new concerns with poor relief varied enormously. In the Flemish city of Ypres, for example, a 1525 poor law charged a new committee of four civil supervisors with the regulation

of individual parish committees, which in turn visited recipients' homes, collected alms, and managed the poor box established in every church. In an accommodation with existing charitable institutions, the new board of supervisors also centralized the collection of gifts in a "common chest" and redistributed them to various establishments throughout the city. At the same time, legal begging was strictly curtailed. While such reforms won the praise of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (1500–1558), his support did not result in similar measures throughout his domains. In Spain, political, economic, and social structures conspired to slow the pace of, if not prohibit, centralization and rationalization. The more firmly entrenched religious institutions, which had traditionally overseen charity, and the fiscal weakness of the state throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, made the establishment of more expensive, secular charity boards almost impossible. Only a handful of cities, such as Zamora, followed the lead of Ypres and other early modern Catholic urban centers.

England lies on the other side of the spectrum as the only European state to implement successfully a national system of relief founded on a set of acts, passed in 1598 and 1601, known as the Elizabethan Poor Law. This legislation prohibited begging, made parish poor rates mandatory, and rationalized the delivery of aid by empowering overseers of the poor and justices of the peace to determine eligibility and regulate distribution. The implementation of the Speenhamland system in 1795 extended relief to those whose wages fell below a certain level, on the basis of the price of bread and family size. Commercial wealth,

historians argue, rested at the heart of such a comprehensive system of relief.

The impact of these reforms on the poor themselves seems to have been limited, except, of course, in England, where the Speenhamland system not only expanded the rolls of recipients, but also increased the number of men among those who sought assistance—a category heretofore almost completely composed of women. Throughout the rest of Europe, however, the poor were left to devise strategies that included kin networks and informal and unofficial alms, as well as new institutions created by elite reformers. In short, the new establishments and systems that emerged from efforts to centralize and rationalize poor relief did not replace older measures; they only expanded the options.

THE TRIUMPH OF LIBERALISM

In many respects, the French Revolution represents the apex of this movement to secularize and rationalize poor relief. The Revolution nearly destroyed the old system of aid by nationalizing the Church's property, by taking away the financial basis of religious poor relief, and by firmly establishing the right of all French citizens to government assistance if unable to work. Unfortunately, the various programs that revolutionaries constructed were impossible to implement in the midst of war and civil unrest. In matters of social welfare, then, the Revolution's legacy was little more than a contentious debate over the roles of the state and of private charity. From this time for-

ward, social welfare became linked to questions of state obligation and citizens' rights. State-mandated and organized assistance was equated with the radical politics that had burdened Europe with more than two decades of war.

In the Revolution's wake, laissez-faire capitalism and other tenets of classical liberalism began to hold greater sway than early modern arguments for greater state involvement. According to most classical liberals, the state had no right to violate private property in order to effect a redistribution of wealth. Individuals alone were responsible for their livelihoods and, through thrift and foresight, for preparation for the vagaries of illness and old age. A legislated system of social welfare would only serve to instill a sense of entitlement among the working class that would destroy the moral fabric of the nation. This principle did not preclude all state assistance, but rather restricted it to assistance for the truly needy, those whose plight moved the collective heart of the nation. Increasingly, however, the line drawn between the truly needy and the "undeserving" poor included fewer and fewer people as worthy of help. Poverty, many classical liberals maintained, was not the product of economic insecurity, but of moral failings. During much of the nineteenth century, then, public assistance became stingier and more punitive in nature.

The result was a retrenchment of state aid throughout much of Europe. In early-nineteenth-century Hamburg, for example, the burghers responded to economic instability, a growing population of laboring poor, and the upheavals of Napoleonic warfare by cutting back on the more generous assistance available as late as the 1790s. The 1817 regulations for the Allgemeine Armenanstalt, or General Poor Relief Agency, restricted state aid only to the registered poor, and even these services, like medical care and weekly alms, were reduced. Relief officers rephrased their mission to include the alleviation of poverty, not its prevention, as the city had once defined it. Accompanying this shift was an emphasis on volunteerism. The state pared down its responsibilities and left private charity to fill the gap. As the historian Mary Lindemann noted in *Patriots and Paupers* (1990), Hamburg's governors ceased to allow any sense of social conscience to shape state policies.

The same thing might be said of England's ruling elite. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 abolished outdoor relief for the able-bodied and their families by instituting the concepts of "less eligibility" and "the workhouse test." Those who could work were placed in workhouses and segregated from the "worthy" poor, such as orphans, the aged, and the insane. At the same time, elected guardians under the

supervision of a central Poor Law Commission replaced informal parish vestries as poor-relief administrators. With these measures, reformers hoped to bring uniformity to English public assistance while ensuring that relief did not damage the economy by artificially raising free-market wages.

Perhaps nowhere is the shift from increasing state involvement to its near absence more evident than in Russia. In 1775, Catherine the Great reformed provincial government to create provincial social welfare boards charged with establishing new institutions of public assistance, such as almshouses and orphanages. Though these boards failed to stimulate a civic spirit among her subjects, as Catherine had hoped, they did become significant contributors to the social welfare of Russian peasants before emancipation. With emancipation in 1861, however, Russian public assistance virtually disappeared, a casualty of limited powers of taxation, political fears of excessive

local autonomy, and a resurgent belief that charity must be private and morally based.

By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, most European states had retreated from the realm of social welfare, causing some scholars to argue that it is not the rise of the welfare state that demands explanation, but this more puzzling gap in the long history of state assistance. Be that as it may, the end result was the same: poverty had become the domain of local governments and private institutions like charities and mutual aid societies. While charitable activity increased, becoming a symbol of middle-class gentility, especially among women, the poor themselves suffered both from want and the moralizing control of their social superiors. Many charities, for example, restricted assistance only to mothers and couples who could prove Christian marriage. Moreover, sufficient assistance became an accident of birth, for localized relief meant a highly unequal system of aid based upon residency. Paupers who could not prove long-term residency in a given city faced deportation to their native cities. As the century drew to a close, however, calls for enhanced state services increased. By the 1870s, Europe was poised to undergo yet another shift in state support for social welfare.

THE RISE OF THE WELFARE STATE

The final decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a growing concern with social welfare and state functions. Grouped under the more general problem known to contemporaries as “the social question,” poverty seemed at the base of Europe’s many difficulties, from working-class protest to degeneration. The rise of such attention was evident not only in the reams of paper used to disseminate a wide array of opinions on the subject, but also in the public and private actions devised to address these concerns. Much of this activity sprang from bourgeois anxiety over socialist politics and working-class radicalism, which began to express itself in a growing number of strikes as well as at the polls. To many observers, municipal and private charity was no longer sufficient to deal with the vagaries of a maturing industrial economy, all too evident in the depression that began in 1873 and lasted well into the 1890s. Only the central state, many argued, could support a more comprehensive system of assistance. Moreover, in the context of social Darwinism, the state was said to have a duty to protect the nation from racial decadence and deterioration, a decline that was said to be clearly evident in a number of social studies conducted in working-class slums throughout Europe.

Although most of Europe’s elite shared this sense of fear and dread, their answers to those anxieties were far from uniform. New programs and policies were shaped as much by state structures, political considerations, and previous social welfare measures as they were by concern with riot and national decline. In the history of German social welfare, for example, historians have typically emphasized a long tradition of Prussian etatism to explain the innovative social insurance programs that the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) ushered through the new Reichstag between 1883 and 1889. These measures differed significantly from previous forms of poor relief because they were founded upon contributory systems of social insurance. The 1883 compulsory program against workers’ illness pooled workers’ and employers’ contributions to fund up to thirteen weeks of relief, which in 1903 was extended to twenty-six weeks. An 1884 law insuring workers against workplace accidents operated in a similar fashion. Finally, the pension law of 1889, financed by employers, workers, and state subsidies, provided workers a small pension if they reached seventy years of age.

While this legislation was indeed innovative, particularly in its obligatory nature, these programs did not completely eschew earlier traditions of social welfare. The bourgeois principle of self-help remained the central tenet of social welfare, and German workers contributed the lion’s share for their own insurance. Moreover, whenever possible, older institutions, such as mutual aid societies, retained a place within the newer state structure. In fact, social insurance did not supplant municipal and private charity, which remained the primary sources of assistance for the indigent, especially women and children. Finally, the laws benefited only industrial workers. By 1913, only 14.5 million workers received insurance out of a population of approximately 65 million.

These limitations, according to many historians, serve only to highlight the conservative political intent behind them. Bismarck designed these first steps toward the modern welfare state with the goal of wooing the working class away from the powerful German Social Democratic Party. His social welfare policies, according to this view, were an exercise in authoritarian state-building, nothing more. However, George Steinmetz (1993) has offered a new interpretation of German social welfare, including in his study similar reforms in poor-relief legislation that also date from the last decades of the nineteenth century. In an interpretation reminiscent of studies of early modern welfare, Steinmetz argues that the programs instituted under Bismarck promoted a bourgeois strategy of capitalist development, which included the creation and

maintenance of a free labor market. Moreover, middle-class reformers constructed this system over the objections of conservative Junkers. According to Steinmetz, the development of German social welfare owes more to bourgeois economic needs and political clout than to an authoritarian state with traditional agrarian support.

Regardless of the motives that spawned them, the three measures that formed the core of German social welfare also served as a model for reformers throughout Europe. States as diverse as Norway, Spain, and Holland all established insurance against accidents in the 1890s, while Austria and Italy reinforced similar programs with sickness insurance and old-age pensions, respectively. Frequently, however, similar programs took very different organizational forms, particularly in Scandinavia. In Denmark, for example, a set of measures created between 1891 and 1907 established the outlines of what one scholar has labeled the "solidaristic" welfare state. The 1898 Accident Insurance Act covered only wage earners, and under the Sickness Insurance Reform of 1892, sickness insurance remained voluntary and rested on a base of sickness funds and mutual aid societies, funded by participant contributions but also subsidized by the state. There was significant innovation in the realms of old-age pensions and unemployment insurance, a new type of safeguard. The Old Age Relief Act of 1891 established a right to pensions drawn from a fund financed by taxes, not worker contributions. These pensions were offered to all indigents over sixty years of age. Unemployment insurance followed the same principles as sickness insurance. It was voluntary and, although subsidized by the state, relied on participant contributions.

These innovations highlight the different sources of social welfare reform in Europe; Denmark's social insurance programs were the result of social and political compromise among the most important political parties, the Social Democrats on one side and the Agrarian Liberals and Conservatives on the other. The Radical Liberals, who represented both rural smallholders and urban intellectuals, officially organized in 1905 around a program of greater state involvement and acted as important mediators among opposing groups before and after their formation as an independent party. Danish social insurance thus rested on a foundation of peasant-liberalism and consensus, essential ingredients to later reforms.

In Britain, reforms fell somewhere between the German and Nordic models. An 1897 Workmen's Compensation Law provided employer-paid insurance for workplace accidents, while a 1908 Old Age Pension Act established pensions for the indigent over

seventy years of age. As in Denmark, old-age pensions were supported by a general tax fund, not worker contributions. The inclusion of this measure precipitated a constitutional crisis that culminated in the substantial weakening of the House of Lords. Liberal and Labour politicians followed up this new policy the following year with the establishment of Trade Boards, which were empowered to end "sweated labor" by setting minimum wages in various trades, a list that grew with time. Finally, the 1911 National Insurance Act capped this period of vigorous reform with programs for both sickness and unemployment insurance. This last bill was the product of significant compromise, however. Sickness and unemployment insurance was contributory and compulsory, but only for certain classes of workers. Health insurance affected only manual workers and those earning less than 160 pounds annually. Moreover, only the insured worker received medical assistance, not his family. Mutual aid societies and private insurers also received special attention; approved societies retained a central role in dispensing medical assistance. As for unemployment insurance (Part II of the National Insurance Act), legislators limited this experimental program to only a small group of relatively well-paid trades that suffered from periodic unemployment, such as ironfounding, shipbuilding, and construction.

As in Germany, then, new social programs added significantly to older relief institutions, but did not supersede them. Private charitable associations like the Charity Organisation Society retained a significant role in social welfare, a role they sought to enhance through cooperation with new state institutions. In fact, a growing number of historians now argue that European politicians designed their programs to complement voluntary organizations. The rise of the welfare state was not a complete break with the past, it was a gradual transformation. Nowhere was this more evident than in France.

The history of French social welfare has long suffered from the belief that little occurred to rival German and Scandinavian innovation. In the realm of maternal and pronatalist welfare, however, France took the lead among industrialized nations. By 1914 the French government had spent millions of francs establishing regional centers for prenatal care, a family allowance program awarding assistance to needy families with four or more children, and legislation granting women compensation for prenatal and postpartum leaves from employment. Yet in other forms of social welfare, French assistance remained traditional, eschewing social insurance for poor relief. Despite extremely limited programs, such as insurance for work-related accidents, legislated in 1899, and old-age pen-

sions for workers, instituted in 1910, the vast majority of French citizens continued to rely only on poor relief, which remained municipal and heavily dependent on private charity.

While the 1893 legislation granting free medical assistance to the indigent and the 1905 system of pensions for the elderly indigent decreed rights to assistance based upon citizenship, they relied almost completely on municipal and departmental funding and organization. In response, most cities increased their reliance on private charities. Between 1870 and 1914, for example, municipal subsidies to private charities in Bordeaux increased by 230 percent. In essence, then, France trod a middle path between earlier classically liberal dependence on municipal assistance and private charity on the one hand, and the social insurance schemes of its northern neighbors on the other. This curious development arose from French concepts of the state and citizenship. Against the historical backdrop of the French Revolution, politicians were reluctant to establish new rights to assistance that would entail the creation of a vast bureaucracy. They therefore, limited a citizen's right to relief and made such rights municipal obligations. However, overriding concerns over falling birth rates and degeneracy convinced these same leaders to be inventive with maternal and pronatalist welfare. Moreover, they could fit such innovations into their political ideologies by reminding themselves that women and children were not true citizens. In short, the delicate relationship between citizens and their state was not altered by assistance for women and children. Consensus on these measures was thus much easier to attain in the cantankerous arena of French politics. The end result was a system of social welfare less out of place among the other European states than previously believed.

The decades before World War I thus witnessed some startling innovations in social welfare. Having relinquished a role in such matters during the early years of the nineteenth century, most European states now played a prominent role not only in providing assistance, but also in the reconceptualization of social welfare. Few social insurance schemes relied exclusively on workers' contributions. State subsidies now supplemented traditional reliance on self-help. At the same time, proponents of social welfare spoke in terms of citizens' rights and state obligation, not voluntary relief. Even more important, programs that depended on general tax funds and not members' contributions, like the British and Danish pension plans, introduced limited measures of income redistribution, not just the redistribution of risk enforced in compulsory social insurance programs. The outlines of the modern welfare state were clearly visible in these develop-

ments. But those who benefited remained relatively few in number.

New programs affected mainly factory workers, leaving artisans, shopkeepers, and rural workers to rely on charity. Moreover, those who were not consistently part of the labor pool, particularly women, benefited little if any. In fact, women's relationship to the budding welfare state was dominated by the rhetoric of maternalism. Women deserved assistance only because their continued reproduction was central to the nation's future. As a result, women did not figure into social insurance as workers; more often than not they entered onto welfare rolls as dependents, ineligible for equal benefits. Ironically, while many welfare programs thus recognized the importance of women's reproductive labor, male politicians simultaneously refused to equate it with the productive labor of men, which received higher remunerative value both on and off the job. These shortcomings would become evident in the decades after the World War I, though real change would come only after World War II, if at all.

THE HEYDAY OF THE WELFARE STATE

The devastation of World War I demonstrated to all concerned just how inadequate welfare reform before 1914 had been. Yet few major breakthroughs were forthcoming. Instead, the reforms implemented during the interwar years merely extended insurance programs to additional categories of workers without altering basic assumptions and structures. Despite new social insurance legislation in France in 1928 and 1930, most workers remained uninsured. By the mid 1930s approximately 10 million workers—those whose wages fell below an established minimum—were eligible for a host of private and public insurance funds paid for by worker and employer contributions. In Denmark, the Great Social Reform of 1933 was more a rationalization and reorganization of earlier measures than a bold new step in a different direction. Danes could choose between active and passive membership in funds, and, despite the government's renewed commitment to universal compulsory social insurance, the latter provided very little protection. The interwar welfare state also remained a gendered entity. The new fascist states of Italy and Germany implemented maternalist welfare measures to rebuild their populations, while forcing many women to leave better-paying jobs to be replaced by unemployed men. French politicians also extended family allowances, which would later become a mainstay of the French welfare state.

There were exceptions to the general lack of innovation in social welfare policy. Sweden, for example,

began to secure a reputation for social welfare, which it would consolidate after 1945. Between 1933 and 1938, the Swedes implemented such programs as state-subsidized loans to newlyweds; maternity benefits for approximately 90 percent of all mothers, including free childbirth services; state subsidies to voluntary unemployment benefit societies; and low-interest housing loans for large families. In the new Soviet Union, too, social welfare underwent significant change. Soviet citizens were now entitled to full employment, daycare centers, and free medical care. But such new rights, and the freedoms they were meant to produce, existed more on paper than in reality. Unemployment gave way principally to small make-work programs, while free day care and communal responsibility quickly deteriorated, leaving only doubled workloads for women who entered factories while remaining responsible for the bulk of their family's daily upkeep.

When the hardships of the Great Depression struck in 1929, most European states responded by cutting back on welfare benefits. For most of Europe, it was only after World War II that the modern welfare state became reality. Although no consensus exists, many historians credit the war's varied impacts to explain this postwar expansion of social programs. Fascism's demise tarnished the traditional right and promoted the rise of new political forces, most prominently, the Christian Democrats, that did not oppose state-supported social welfare. Parties on the left also gained increased stature from their participation in resistance movements and wartime coalition governments. One argument holds that, especially in Britain, the privations of war also returned a sense of community to war-torn populations that made the redistribution of risk and income more acceptable after 1945. Perhaps most important, the postwar years witnessed the rise of a new consumer economy in which large retailers overwhelmed the small shop owners, who had long been foes of social insurance. More middle-class families, now tied to the fortunes of large corporations, acknowledged the benefits of an extended system of social welfare that would include them. Throughout Europe, then, the basic outlines of what we now call the welfare state gradually emerged from the rubble of World War II.

In Eastern Europe, Soviet domination brought social programs modeled after Russia's, including state-supported housing, health care, and education. In Western Europe, Great Britain and the Scandinavian states led the way by creating social-insurance schemes that were compulsory and universal. In addition, contributory funding was replaced with a combination of flat-rate benefits, which guaranteed basic

services to all citizens regardless of need, and supplementary programs designed to assist the needy. All of this required substantial state subsidies derived from increased tax revenues. Although many continental states like France and Germany did not immediately adopt similar measures, the basic outlines of the British and Scandinavian systems were implemented there later in the 1950s and 1960s, albeit with significant modifications rooted in earlier patterns of welfare development in each country.

Based largely on plans known as the Beveridge Report (1942), drawn up during the war by William Beveridge (1879–1963), the British welfare state made participation compulsory and benefits universal. British citizens paid flat-rate contributions and received flat-rate benefits. Since contributions had to be set low enough for the majority of British citizens, the state used tax revenue to supplement funding for such programs as National Health Insurance, implemented by 1948. The state also used tax monies to assist the needy with both housing and education costs, greatly altering the shape of British society.

It was in Sweden, however, that the true epitome of the welfare state arose after World War II. During these years a strong economy, the consolidation of the Social Democratic government, and administrative reforms dictated by wartime needs paved the way for a host of social programs. Between 1946 and 1959, Swedes created a social welfare system that combined universal flat-rate benefit programs for old-age pensions and child allowances with income-contingent programs for housing, health care, and supplementary pensions. The former guaranteed benefits to all citizens, while the latter replaced contributory schemes with means testing.

In 1963, the National Insurance Act coordinated most of these programs into three types of insurance: the health and parental insurance system, the basic pension system, and the national supplementary pension system. The first system provided benefits for medical and dental costs, as well as compensation for loss of income due to illness or childbirth and child care, including up to six months' leave to care for children under eight years of age (payable to either the father or mother since 1974). The basic pension system paid benefits to all retired or disabled Swedes, as well as family pensions for dependents that had lost a family provider. Finally, supplementary pensions were based on pensionable income earned before retirement, an income that had to be above a base amount but less than 7.5 times that same amount. In addition to this National Insurance, Sweden also maintained work injury and unemployment insurance programs. All of this was supplemented with public

assistance for those whose needs were not adequately met by insurance. This entire system rested squarely on state funding through taxation, employer contributions, and interest income from special insurance funds. Swedes reinforced this commitment to social insurance in 1981 with the Social Services Act, designed to reduce the place of individually oriented means-tested programs for a greater reliance on general, structurally oriented programs that would protect individual privacy.

In both France and Germany, on the other hand, the immediate postwar years saw mainly the extension of social welfare along lines already established before 1945, particularly through the extension of contributory social insurance funds linked to separate classes and occupations. In France, the self-employed and white-collar middle managers opposed participation in a national social security system established in 1948, prompting the maintenance of numerous private funds. Ironically, when the petty bourgeoisie sought admission to the national pension system in the 1960s, it was the unions who now opposed the expansion of social welfare to include their

poorer fellow citizens. In the end, the self-employed and white-collar middle managers won admission. A similar situation occurred in Germany, as wealthy artisans fought during the 1950s to retain a separate fund within the white-collar worker insurance system. In 1959, however, less-affluent artisans succeeded in joining their fund to the workers' pension insurance system over the objection of the Social Democrats. Soon after, various reforms in the 1960s gave France and Germany many of the trappings of the Scandinavian welfare states, including unemployment and health insurance for the entire population and a host of state agencies devoted to public health and social work. At the same time, early characteristics have not completely disappeared. Germany's welfare system remains quite corporatist in nature, while France's retains a significant role for a host of public and private insurance funds. Similarly, the system of family allowances that emerged before World War I and was later extended during the interwar years remains a central pillar of French social welfare. Payments are based on the number of children and are allotted to all French families. Such measures are designed to support population growth, not redistribute income.

The impact of the expansion of European social welfare cannot be overstated. The welfare state has fundamentally altered class relations as well as the relations between the citizenry and the state. While class distinctions clearly remain, the divisions have become less stark. Workers are now active participants in a consumer culture that they share with the middle class. Governments also claim a much greater role in what was previously defined as private life, particularly family life. Young families now raise their children with state assistance and remain free of the direct responsibility of caring for elderly relatives. Just how important the welfare state has become in the lives of most Europeans is evident in the response to growing demands from conservatives to curtail welfare spending. The welfare state entered a period of crisis in the late 1970s, as rising oil prices created stagflation. Near the turn of the century, concern over rising government debt was aggravated by an aging population and discontent with immigrant demands for the right to participate in social insurance and assistance programs. Yet the welfare state has not been abandoned. Indeed, government plans for austerity have been met with street demonstrations. While some governments, like Margaret Thatcher's (1925–) in Great Britain (1979–1990), have successfully withdrawn the state from various arenas of economic life through privatization, the basic outlines and institutions of the welfare state remain intact. Perhaps the greatest impact of the welfare state has thus been the recognition that

the state does indeed have a vital interest in actively supporting the welfare of its citizens.

THE WELFARE STATE AND SOCIAL HISTORY

Social history has played an integral role in our understanding of the welfare state, particularly of its origins. Initially, two schools of thought emerged. The first, espoused primarily by marxist historians, depicted the welfare state as a set of measures designed to dull the sharp edges of capitalism and thus lure workers away from social revolution. Other historians, however, joined social scientists in presenting the growth of state-supported social welfare as a product of modernization. As western societies developed industrial economies, insecurity among the proletariat grew. So did their political voice. The end result was a state that responded to working-class interests with social insurance. These interpretations have not fared well under increased scrutiny. Later analysts discovered that the development of the welfare state owed as much to the demands of the petty bourgeoisie as to working-class radicalism. At the same time, other scholars began to emphasize the importance of state structures and political ideologies in shaping the contours of the welfare state. The end result has been a new social interpretation that highlights the fundamental roles of middle-class voters and their political ideologies. The welfare state grew earliest and strongest not only in those nations where the middle-class became convinced that it, too, could benefit from tax-funded programs to redistribute risk and income, but also in those countries where middle-class ideology did not prohibit a strong, interventionist state. The timing of welfare reforms depended on how soon each nation's bourgeoisie could be won over to these two arguments.

The particular shape and impacts of the welfare state have also proven fertile soil for social historians.

This is especially true for those interested in gender and the family. Social insurance first grew out of contributory schemes that posited men as workers and women as dependents. And unions in many nations expressed little desire to see this pattern altered. In Britain, for example, unions linked social insurance to the concept of the family wage. Therefore, even after 1945, whether they worked or not, married women received lower benefits than men and unmarried female workers. British social welfare was thus built on a family model that envisioned married women as secondary sources of income, perpetuating a reliance on married women for part-time work. In other countries too, social welfare posited women as recipients of need-based relief and mothers' pensions, but not as full-fledged citizens. In France, on the other hand, politicians faced with depopulation recognized that married women would always remain integral members of the labor pool. The result was a social security system based on individual participation regardless of sex or marital status and a system of family allowances that rewarded all families for having children, including single mothers. This, many historians argue, played a significant role in the different paths English and French feminists chose later in the twentieth century, with British feminists taking a much more aggressive stance against the state.

Finally, social historians have begun to spend more time analyzing the transformation from reliance on private charity to the welfare state. While much work remains to be undertaken in this direction, current research already indicates that an easy distinction between public and private in the rise of the welfare state is untenable. Private charities often figured prominently in the plans of welfare reformers and remain integral parts of the welfare states that function today. In these and other ways, then, social history continues to add significantly to our understanding of the welfare state in Europe.

See also **Charity and Poor Relief: The Early Modern Period; Charity and Poor Relief: The Modern Period** (volume 3); **The Family and the State; The Elderly** (volume 4); **Standards of Living** (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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CIVIL SOCIETY



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The end of the cold war has signaled—for the time being—the end of one of the grand utopias of the nineteenth century. Although communist ideology in its many variations eroded before the end of the cold war, its demise accompanied as well as resulted from the end of utopianism. Beginning in the 1970s intellectuals from Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and other states in the former East bloc proclaimed “civil society” as a new “political program,” not as a utopia. Herein lies a cause for the post-cold-war attraction all over Europe of the “civil society” model of social organization. This social organization, rooted in European antiquity and the Catholic Middle Ages but also distinctly influenced by the Reformation, contains many local, regional, and national shadings. Variations of civil society emerged in eighteenth-century Europe and North America and spread to other communities.

THE TERM “CIVIL SOCIETY”

The various terms for civil society indicate the various traditions out of which it grew. Examples include the German *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, the French *société civile*, the Anglo-American “civil society,” the Italian *civile condizione*, and the Russian *burzhuaznoelgrazhdankoe obshchestvo*. Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth century like Denis Diderot (1713–1784), Voltaire (1694–1778), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), in France; David Hume (1711–1776) and John Locke (1632–1704) in England; and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) in Germany defined the essential attributes of civil society. Among these were the idea of contractual relationships, the reduction of religion to a private conviction, individual human rights, and political freedoms.

In the ancient tradition descending from Aristotle, the term *societas civilis*, or civil society, always designated a political society—that is, a community of citizens bound together in a governing political bond as free and equal participants. A later tradition

of the term originated in the early nineteenth century and was related to the emancipation of the newly risen middle classes from the feudal social order. The term “civil society” designated a society of private individuals distinguished by their ownership of property: in this more modern understanding of “civil society,” the term does not include the notion of political participation. As Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) declared, civil society and the state stand in opposition to each other. In the Anglo-American tradition, the ancient understanding of the term prevailed. Here civil society remained connected to political participation—ever a predominant theme—whereas the two were separate on the European continent for a long time. Use of the term since the late twentieth century calls for the ancient bond linking the self-organization of citizens for their economic benefit with political participation and seeks to overcome the separation of apolitical civil society from the politics of the state.

The various traditions of the concept share the designation of a self-organizing society; they differ in how much this community participates in the political rule of the state. The claim to a political voice did not necessarily call into question the legitimacy of traditional monarchies. Such a claim could lead to the antimonarchical, revolutionary pathos of post-1789 France, but the outcome could also be a long-lasting, highly stable monarchy—if such a monarchy accepted its transformation into a political institution that represented only the common political goals of civil society. In the German-speaking world the tradition stemming from Hegel and Karl Marx (1818–1883), which defined civil society as a philosophical and ideological category, continued to exercise significant influence; this tradition held an apolitical understanding of the concept and called for a relatively strict division of state and society. A stronger reception of Anglo-American contract theory first arrived in (West) Germany after 1945.

The cornerstone of civil society was the self-organizing individual who had the right to bond with

others in free associations. The individual citizen was defined as free from religious rule and as entitled to participate in political institutions by virtue of being an individual. In the Anglo-American states the right and natural freedom of the individual was of primary importance. This idea grew out of the Protestant tradition that made religious freedom an individual's indivisible right. This tradition interpreted religious freedom not as the result of tolerance—an instance of grace by the state—but as an inalienable human right, one that preceded the actions of any social institution. In the French tradition a concept of human rights prevailed that protected the individual from the state: freedom is understood as the restriction of potential state interference. No effective Russian tradition of individual rights ever developed. Unlike in Poland, no trace of the Renaissance, of humanism, or of the Reformation left its mark in Muscovite Russia. Only in the eighteenth century, Scottish, English, French, and—transmitted through East Prussia and the Baltic—German sources spread the European concept of freedom. However, alongside the ideas that asserted the primacy of individual rights were the equally lasting European concepts that projected individual freedoms onto the collective—the nation, state, or monarchy. These fit into a wholly different tradition.

The German Enlightenment tradition mixed different interpretations of the individual. Kant's model of civil society described the individual in various functions and social conditions. In Kant's view the legal foundation for civil society lay in the following principles: the freedom of every member of society based on his or her being "human"; the equality of members as "subjects"; and members' independence as "citizens." As a human being, anyone has the right to pursue happiness in his or her own way. As a subject everyone has to follow the law. As a citizen, anyone is a "lawmaker"; that is, he or she participates in the formation of the political will of society (or, in the parlance of American pragmatism, he or she will make the decisions that directly influence others). Freedom is conferred on all people, and at the same time every person—whether man or woman, rich or poor, aristocratic or bourgeois—is bound to obey the law. For Kant, restrictions on these universal proclamations and decrees came only with a final distinction, the "quality" of citizens. With this addendum, Kant articulated what was and is contained in all concepts of civil society, that not all people, but only those who meet certain prerequisites, gain a political say. Since Kant, the criteria for the exclusion of individual groups have fundamentally changed. Estate privileges (aristocracy), legal categories (patriciate, citizen status), economic requirements (property), and sex (the exclusion

of women) no longer set limits to participation. As before, however, there still exist restrictions based on age, capacity for rational choice, criminal record, and national citizenship.

Equality only prevails within these social restrictions; only those people selected by these filters can form through their associations the core social element of any civil society. Association is the complementary concept to civil society. Whereas Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in *Leviathan* (1651) placed the individual under the absolute sovereignty of the state in order to prevent civil war between individuals, all theorists of civil society—Locke in England, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) in France, Kant in Germany—have identified its uniqueness as the ability of persons to freely form associations among themselves in order to support one another and to regulate social life. The American pragmatism of John Dewey (1859–1952) also stands in this tradition.

Associations in civil society differ in principle from earlier forms of association in that the individual's identity is only partially defined by his or her participation in such groups. Associations and face-to-face communication exist in all societies; even totalitarianism could not do away with them. The aspect of association specific to civil society is based on functional differentiation: people participate only with a part of themselves; thus many different kinds of social circles can join together resulting in infinitely variable possibilities for interaction. The paradox is this: by limiting the common bond within associations, civil society makes an infinite variety of associations possible. Herein lies the tense relationship between particularity and universality that defines the dynamic of civil society.

Two decisive transformations have taken place in civil society since the eighteenth century: women gained the right to political participation in the twentieth century, and economic status is no longer a criterion for such participation. With these changes a central component of any conception of civil society as it had existed from the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century also changed: political decision making was no longer the exclusive domain of men with property. Every society contained different expressions of this same phenomenon. In England political exclusion based on ownership, which has been called the politics of "possessive individualism" (C. B. Macpherson), prevailed. In France the political privileges of the propertied bourgeois dominated for a long time, despite the universalist political pathos connected to the term *citoyen*. In Germany, too, and even more in eastern European societies, economic hurdles to political participation were raised.

These restrictive models of civil society defined “independence” as the decisive category for participation. They attached an economic and moral value to the term so that it signified one’s permitted conduct as well as one’s membership in society. Bourgeois optimism for progress in the nineteenth century mediated the growing tension between real social inequalities and the utopian nature of commonly held middle-class ideals. The attainment of utopia would liberate the excluded, who as individuals would one day fulfill certain criteria and enter civil society, so that they, too, could become fellow “lawmakers.” Many reached this goal, many did not. The workers’ movement and the women’s movement grew out of the attempt to change civil society’s rules of exclusion. Apart from economic barriers to political participation, in western European societies there were restrictions based on religion and national origin (if often on an informal level), while in eastern Europe—that is, the Russian Empire—there were formal restrictions against non-Christians (Jews, Muslims), which provoked protest movements.

The development toward conferring the principles of civil society on those excluded from participation seemed to signal the implementation and redemption of the civic ideal of individual self-fulfillment and civic equality. This optimism broke down, however, in many European societies at the end of the nineteenth century. Optimism for civic progress turned into *fin-de-siècle* criticism of civilized culture, and in practice optimism deteriorated into the authoritarian regimes of the interwar period. Ultimately, in Germany and the Soviet Union, it contributed to Hitlerism and Stalinism. The utopian potential first reappeared at the end of the twentieth century in the societies of Eastern Europe but was restricted to a political program for the transformation of the then socialist societies. Both the *social* utopia of civil society, based on the independence of the individual through his or her participation in ownership and education, and the *political* utopia of civil society, based on equal participation of all members, had lost little of their attraction. Nevertheless, in no way did a mere “revolution to catch up” (Jürgen Habermas) occur in Eastern Europe, as some observers in the West judged it. From its beginnings in early modern times, the concept of civil society has been flexible enough to produce very diverse forms of social organization.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

In the 1980s and 1990s the interpretations of Jürgen Habermas and Reinhart Koselleck fueled the discus-

sion of civil society. It is perhaps no accident that these two thinkers emerged in Germany in the years after 1945. Both of them attempted to explain the collapse of civil society in Germany in the years before 1945. Reflection on this failure to build a lasting civil society provoked analysis of its structure in the postwar era. Another track in historiography follows the thought of Michel Foucault on the disciplinary and regulatory character of civil society. This mode of analysis uses the opposition between the promise of a universal society and the redemption of the particular individual to formulate a rigid critique of bourgeois ideology. It sharpens critical skepticism toward the paradoxes and unfulfilled potential of civil society, but in the process often forgets that this kind of self-criticism is a founding principle of civil society.

Historical research beginning in the 1970s and 1980s concentrated on analyzing various organized associations in the eighteenth century, the media, and individual social support networks. Investigations of the social substrata of civil society, including the bourgeoisie or middle classes, led to wide sociohistorical analyses of bourgeois professional groups and numerous microhistorical studies of cities as the space of middle-class activity. The economic and social heterogeneity of these professional groups, brought to light by empirical research, led scholars since the mid-1980s to analyze more closely the cultural practices, symbols, and images that dominated this world, in order to show the homogenizing forces presumed to operate within a differentiated society. Some researchers pose the question whether one could even speak of a middle class (“bourgeoisie”) or whether the plural form, “middle classes,” (“bourgeois societies”) was more suitable. Much work concentrated on analyzing patterns of behavior and the cultural molding of individuals; an international comparative history of terminology also slowly developed.

ELEMENTS OF A BOURGEOIS SOCIETY: THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND SOCIABILITY

Four characteristics define an ideal type of civil society, and the political theorizing of the eighteenth century already described them all: criticism, functional differentiation, sociability, and the media.

Nothing is more necessary for the process of enlightenment—for the gradual formation of a bourgeois society—than the freedom to criticize. In Kant’s formulation, criticism is the potential “for reason in all matters to be put to public use.” Free criticism, the results of which are open and to which all people are entitled, is the *conditio sine qua non* for the proper dynamic of a civil society.

Criticism is free, but a restriction exists. The freedom to criticize is conferred on an individual only in a socially compartmentalized function performed by the individual: for example, on a scholar within the literary and journalistic marketplace but not within an official public office. The attribute of a critic is conferred, potentially, on any person, regardless of sex, social position, or religious worldview. Historically, this means that within the existing estate-based social system of the eighteenth century, a sphere was constituted to which all persons had access, while at the same time they remained bound by the restrictions and regulations of their social environment.

Civil society occurs within designated, bounded social spheres and provides “spaces of interaction” (Koselleck) in which sociability can take place. In these spaces of interaction a specific form of face-to-face communication arises. Here society determines—ideally for all, but in fact for the few—that the restrictive social conditions of daily life are suspended. In their absence individuals interact with no prescribed or imposed purpose. Bourgeois sociability is based on this tension between the equality gained within these spheres of interaction and the continued inequality in the outside world. This tension gives rise to the impetus and promise of bourgeois self-improvement. The arenas of sociability complement the division and regulation of individual roles required for society to function.

Civil society is based not only on the sociability within spheres of interaction. It also links these spheres and enables them to communicate. The linking of disparate spheres of interaction takes place both in direct exchanges between people and also through institutions that make interaction possible. Both aspects, sociability as face-to-face communication and as mediated forms of networking, are required for the functioning of the public sphere in civil society.

One should not underestimate the role of the media in the exercise of sociability in the eighteenth century. Letters, printed writings, newspapers were indispensable for sociability. They created an intellectual horizon that stretched far beyond the daily world and made possible the first public world of readers in which the freedom to criticize could flourish. Similarly, one should not underestimate the fundamental significance of interpersonal communication in the personal sphere within the mass-media world of the twentieth century. Both are crucial for civil society.

The public sphere thrives in social arenas that are structured to promote sociability and connected by forms of media. Within these distinct spaces, individuals conduct themselves according to a functional division of roles. In the arena of sociability, the

object criticized and the mode of rational criticism must be free of constraints. No restrictions can exist other than that the actors satisfy the requirements of their roles.

One can distinguish in this way the public sphere in civil society from similar forms of public conduct in premodern times. There were premodern forms of the “representative public sphere” where individuals decided the rules of civic conduct. There were also spheres dedicated solely to the enjoyment of public life; indeed, public life in the Middle Ages encompassed more areas of daily life than it does today. During the Middle Ages, individuals met at public gatherings and communicated as equals; for an example one need only refer to village communes. In these diverse forms of community the form of the public sphere did more than merely recreate the representational courtly model. Three elements distinguish the modern public sphere and bring it into an effective relationship with the rise of bourgeois society. First, the principle that criticism could be voiced on all issues; second, the functional division of roles; third, the growing significance of mediating institutions. (For example, the itinerant preacher no longer communicated the news; information was transmitted in writing.)

Sociability, the public sphere, and civil society do not stand one after the other in a tight causal relationship throughout European history, however. Eighteenth-century thought considered the opposite of rational conduct, “asocial sociability” (Kant), an important, complementary expression of the human craving for individualization. Forms of sociability also pervaded premodern societies, existing throughout the lower social strata to the same degree as in the middle and higher social strata. Pubs in market squares, restaurants, folk festivals, folk theaters, and religious festivals and celebrations offered a variety of options as diverse as the sociability at the courts. The spectrum of social forms has changed, but sociability as face-to-face communication has lost none of its importance. The public sphere in its more narrow sense as a political public space, however, holds a unique position in the development of modern civil society. In this sphere, the “lawmakers,” that is, people making decisions for those who cannot directly participate, can address one another (Dewey).

The outward forms of the bases of civil society have been historically variable. Crucial moments in the history of such interaction would include the spread of the movable-type printing press in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; the explosion of a reading public, the emergence of salons, academies, lodges, public gathering places, and so on in the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries; the transformation of media in the nineteenth century with the spread of daily newspapers that gradually pushed the censors aside. The rise of the commercialized press and sensational journalism hindered direct political interference in the media. In the United States and France such mass journalism spread in two waves, in the 1830s and again from the 1860s to the 1880s; in Russia and Germany it made its appearance in the final third of the nineteenth century. Print mass media focused on the novelty value of a news item rather than on an ideology. This tendency permitted the rise of an economically independent media market; at the same time, this initiated a dangerous process in which the individual reader was no longer an active, rational participant but a passive consumer of information conveyed through the marketplace. Many describe this as a decline, but civil society has always developed mechanisms to foster the independent political decision making of individual citizens, even under conditions dominated by the marketplace. In the twentieth century came the rapid spread of new media forms such as film, radio, television, and the Internet—all accompanied by intense public discussion about the dangers and consequences these would have for the political functioning of civil society.

Two examples, coffeehouses and reading societies, can be sketched briefly to illustrate how sociability and the journalistic public sphere were linked. The English coffeehouse emerged in Europe as the first institution that promoted the public exercise of reason. Late-twentieth-century research has supported and also modified Habermas's thesis on this phenomenon. From the mid-1660s coffeehouses spread not only in London (where there were already more than eighty in 1663) but also in many English, Scottish, and Irish towns; their triumphant march could barely be halted by a temporary prohibition against them in 1675. Not only men but also women, and not only members of the urban upper classes were among the rising number of visitors. Patrons discussed national and international events (what became known as coffeehouse politics) as well as local issues. Behind this phenomenon were rising beer prices, which made the coffeehouse a money-saving alternative to the pub and a popular place for the circulation of news. It competed with traditional social venues such as cockfights, lawn-bowling lanes, and "church-a les." As a drink, coffee not only was less expensive than beer but also symbolized the advance of rationality and the sober calculation of self-supporting people, where alcoholic drinks would be pushed aside.

The reading societies that arose in France and Germany in the second half of the eighteenth century

contributed to public sociability and promoted the public sphere of journalism. Here members of the middle classes met to read (newspapers, reference works, and books were too expensive for everyone to buy for themselves), and this created spaces in which people could converse about issues of general interest outside their narrow professional interests or family ties. Reading societies became classic arenas for enlightened reasoning. They also allowed the possibility for entertainment, such as smoking, billiards, and card games, which increased their attractiveness.

Other forms of association were the academies and learned societies, while Masonic lodges served as middle-class forms of association par excellence. The principle of free association quickly proved very attractive to many different social groups, greatly contributing to the success of civil society. It was even attractive and useful to those who sought to oppose it. For instance, freedom of association benefited emerging free-market societies, and opponents of the free market in a short time banded together in associations designed to curtail its effects. All modern organizations and political parties since the nineteenth century grew from these roots.

The extent to which such associations defined public life can distinguish individual societies. They dominated public life in countries where state institutions were weak, such as England, Switzerland, the United States, and also the Netherlands and Scandinavia. In countries with a strong statist tradition such as France, Prussia, and especially Russia, they competed with the hierarchical structures of state authority. In Russia up to 1917 middle-class associational life could operate only in large cities. This was also one reason why in Russia no "bourgeois" social order could succeed. For a long time in southern Europe patriarchal clientele relationships and kinship networks were more significant than anything else.

Critics of Habermas argue that a single (middle class) public sphere never existed, only various sectional public spheres that competed with one another. In a historical perspective, there is no question that numerous communications networks developed in Europe. However, these various sectional public spheres were politically successful within the evolving national civil society only if they adopted its structural organization as their model. Just as political opponents of free association quickly adopted it as their organizational principle, public associations that resisted the free market served as the political decision makers that helped integrate into society the very free-market relations they sought to oppose. This in no way excluded differentiations between competing publics, but the many communication networks were always

linked to one another. In this respect, the Internet is only the latest example of this type of interaction that provides all individuals with a potential connection as individuals to one another.

SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE BOURGEOIS MIDDLE STRATA

One cannot understand civil society without understanding the extensive social and economic transformation that seized European societies from the end of the eighteenth century. With literacy, secularization, industrialization, and urbanization, among other processes, came new professional groups and social strata based on education and property that increasingly eroded the traditional order based on birthright. Included in the new order were the entrepreneur and the salaried employee, the manager and the rentier, the lawyer and the engineer, the doctor and the teacher. This does not mean that in the European Middle Ages and in the early modern era there was no social and geographic mobility. Yet the bases for the new bourgeois social order were different: they were rooted far more firmly in individual attainment of property and educational credentials rather than in an estate-prescribed social position. It depended less on estate-based rank and lifestyle than on class condition. Place in the market economy determined social stratification in middle-class society. Late-twentieth-century studies have hotly debated the extent to which different social groups—the bourgeoisie (the economic middle class), the old urban citizenry, and the professions or the university educated (the “free professions”)—formed this class. Are government officials, pastors, and priests included as well as lower-wage employees and handworkers? It is disputable whether one can designate heterogeneous occupational groups with a collective singular noun, such as “bourgeoisie” or “middle class.” For this definition it is of central importance to establish its outer limits vis-à-vis the lower strata (peasants and manual laborers) as well as against the aristocracy, although it includes the notion of mobility for all and embraces the integration process (of becoming part of the bourgeoisie). Moreover, as a rule the demarcation from the lower classes was much stricter than from the upper classes. In Germany, though, the threshold into aristocracy was always higher than in England or France. In Russia from the early eighteenth century the Table of Ranks of Peter I (1672–1725) allowed the possibility of rising into the personal or hereditary nobility, and the non-Russian elites (the Cossacks elders of the Ukraine, the Polish aristocracy, the Baltic German barons, and so

on) were also incorporated into the imperial aristocracy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As it did in other European countries, the aristocracy in Russia up to the twentieth century shielded itself from the lower classes.

However, even when by demarcating the boundary with the aristocracy and the lower classes a distinctive social profile of a middle social stratum is produced, it still displays an important degree of inner heterogeneity. While in Germany the traditional corporate urban citizenry still had great significance in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in England, where highly skilled master craftsmen had never played a comparable role, the importance of this old urban citizenry had long vanished.

From various social subgroups a special petite bourgeoisie emerged at the end of the nineteenth century in many European societies. Out of the old middle stratum, self-employed master craftsmen, small businessmen, and shopkeepers, a quickly growing throng of salaried employees and officials completed the new middle stratum. Those with university educations (the free professions) are another subgroup that developed its own diverse traditions and social positions in all the European countries. At the end of the nineteenth century in France one segment began to establish a separate social identity as “intellectuals” critical of the existing social order. But in Germany at least to the end of the nineteenth century the majority of the educated middle class understood themselves to be members of the bourgeoisie and sought employment in civil service. In Italy the university educated, especially lawyers, referred to themselves from 1875 as *borghese* and *ceto medio* (middle class), terms which had formerly served to describe the medieval and early modern middle class. In the twentieth century the university-educated in Italy first differentiated themselves as *borghesia umanistica*, and the term *borghese* increasingly referred to an economically defined social class composed of industrialists, businessmen, and bankers. In Italy and Germany the middle class long had a strong connection to the state and only gradually emerged more self-conscious and independent. In Russia a segment of those with a higher education considered themselves the *intelligentsia* and obtained their own social identity through their criticism of the aristocracy, the merchantry, and especially the autocratic political order. But in the Russian Empire well into the nineteenth century only civil service offered a means of subsistence. The rapid growth of the free professions, the limited possibilities of making a living by offering one’s services on the free market, and the barriers to mobility in civil service led in Germany and Russia to increasing fragmentation and social iso-

lation from the end of the nineteenth century. These also encouraged the political radicalization of a segment of university-educated intellectuals who could no longer be integrated into society.

The question of the economic, social, and cultural homogeneity of the “middle classes” remains one of the more difficult subjects for historical analysis. Some scholars study the specific forms of association and community in order to discover the networking and overlapping of social milieus that were once separate. Over time it has become clear that the analysis of these middle strata has for a long time been done too much from the perspective of a marxist-influenced view of class conflict. Studies have shown the crucial importance of the merchant strata in all Western societies well into the nineteenth century. The property owners, the overwhelming numbers of economically independent actors, clearly dominated the nineteenth century and were collectively the characteristic social type for the structure of the middle classes. The fundamental social roots of all civil societies—with the exception of Russia up to the beginning of the twentieth century—go back to the traditional figure of the property owner.

The common moral and social value system of the middle strata lay in the notion of ownership. Yet this included no common *political* value system for a class that had been described as taking political action in earlier times in pursuit of “possessive individualism.” By the end of the nineteenth century the link between this social type and any distinct political value system disappeared. With this the far-reaching transformation of civil society took place. The increasing heterogeneity within the middle classes, which were the core of civil society, dissolved any close, direct link between political participation and economic status. Though many contemporaries at the time perceived this as a crisis, the societal form of civil society proved flexible enough to carry out this new social openness in a creative way.

In the twentieth century on the one hand the social-welfare state guaranteed a minimum economic status for its citizens (though there were and are huge differences between individual countries). On the other hand the spectrum of institutions and bureaucratic organizations was differentiated to such an extent that both participation and protest produced numerous possible reactions. It almost seems that the principal problem facing modern civil society after the twentieth century is no longer the social question but how to mobilize individual citizens into living politically engaged lives. Traditionally, engagement was not a problem because engagement—the role of the “lawmaker”—was for the propertied class inextricably

wedded to the pursuit of their self-interest. The survival of civil society was based on dissolving this traditional bond between economic and political interest. Yet contemporary civil societies must reclaim individual citizens, whom no direct economic interest mobilizes into political action, for involvement in the public sphere. Optimists like Albert O. Hirschman trust that this phenomenon merely reflects the inevitable swing between the pursuit of private interests and the active shaping of public life. Insofar as civil society has lost its direct link to social support groups since the end of the nineteenth century, greater room has been created to find different political answers to social problems. This is the basis for the continuing stability and attractiveness of civil society as a societal model.

CULTURAL VALUES, BOURGEOIS IDENTITY, AND CIVIC CONSCIOUSNESS

One of the founders of modern sociology, Max Weber (1864–1920), claimed that self-interest guides the actions of people, but ideas function as the switchmen that determine the rails on which the dynamic of self-interested action moves. Civil society always was and is based on a system of values, practices, and relational models. According to the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, its citizens are said to be “tangled in self-spun webs of meaning.” Civil society requires such a system of rules, or “ideal types” of values and behavior models, that cultivate a specific “quality” in the character of the citizen and shape a “civil” way of life. This “bourgeois identity” always formulated a kind of ideal or utopian design for its conduct in the world. An image of utopia determined the direction in which the individual first develops into a citizen and defined the vision according to which any society will change into a civil society.

Every civil society requires an ethic of civic consciousness, a system of ideal types, of values and practices that mediate between the various ways of living in the world. After religion had lost its comprehensive role of explaining the world and structuring life, competing spheres of values and ways of living existed side by side in a tense relation. Such cultural symbol systems served as “switchmen”; their institutionalization into actual ways of conducting one’s life (religion, relationships, economy, politics, law, art, love/sex, science, nature) has the force to structure in advance the direction in which motivations lead human conduct. Individuals carry out the “civic” direction of their lives along the idealized path of a given symbol system guided by the self-interested dynamic of their specific

way of life. Thus there is only an apparent conflict between society and the individual. The urgent struggle between liberalism and communitarianism could therefore probably be only settled violently, because it has reduced the age-old interlocking of ideas and interests into an imaginary contradiction. From the outlook of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberal theorists of civil society, this opposition still appeared as an impermissible curtailment of individual freedom.

Since its beginnings, the cultural system that regulates civil society has undergone many transformations. Following industrialization and urbanization, the web of signification, in which and with which people interpreted their experiences and directed their actions, became dysfunctional. The decades around 1800 and around 1900 can both be understood as times of such radical change. Around 1800 “bourgeois identity” emerged as a cultural system that was adequate for a specific kind of social structure and social interaction and that interpreted societal experiences in an intelligible and tension-reducing way. From the 1890s the critique of cultured civilization, articulated by citizens and often indebted to their civic ideas, gave expression to the widening gap and growing tension between the mechanisms of social interaction and the systems that endowed them with meaning. The third fundamental period of radical change within civil society began in the 1960s, with the sweeping transformation of the values of western societies. Criticized by the orthodox of the left and right as destroying values and promoting social erosion, this transformation can also be understood as a process in which civil society’s cultural system of rules provided new “switchmen” for human conduct.

This radical change caused many to diagnose a critical juncture in the history of civil society. Habermas, for example, perceived a “structural transformation of the public sphere” but later changed his diagnosis. He originally assumed a collapse of the public sphere and the disappearance of critical journalism. The more the public sphere extends outward, and with it the values of civil society, the more it loses its primary political function: to place all public events under the control of a critical public. In mass democracy and under the influence of mass media, critical public opinion turns into conformity and the cultivated, rational public turns into a cultural consumer. Habermas revised this thesis in 1990 after the transformation of values since the 1960s and the beginning of the collapse of communism in the Eastern European states. Yet others have continued with dire predictions. The idea that the independent individual—

the critical citizen—would not survive in the public sphere of the mass media, as well as the argument that the public sphere as a genuine space of civil society would succumb to a tyranny of the private sphere, has found proponents (Sennett). De Tocqueville’s insight, developed in his book on America, again proves valid: civil society delivers itself from danger with the same principles that threaten its continuation. However, the German example in the twentieth century indicates that civil society’s capacity for self-preservation is imperiled under certain conditions. The structural transformation of the public sphere has not yet proven to be such a threat.

Looking back on the twentieth century, one can understand the astonishing vitality of civil society today in the following way. Late-nineteenth-century critics perceived a crisis in the no longer reconcilable tension between the value system (with its standards of conduct always oriented to the property owner) and the prevailing logic of business. One cannot understand the political crises and the movements opposing civil society of the twentieth century without understanding these insecurities. The ongoing transformation of values at the beginning of the twenty-first century will establish a new system of values that will prescribe new “switchmen” for different forms of behavior.

OPEN QUESTIONS

Those who emphasize the multifaceted and non-utopian character of civil society recognize the variety of cultural traditions and influences that have contributed to its character. At the same time elements such as the social contract, individual human rights, and political freedoms are core concepts of the European tradition. How civil societies in the twentieth century in the middle of Europe could break apart despite participating in this tradition will be the focus of future research. These studies will also seek to determine the prerequisites for a lasting civil society. A question of particular urgency will be how societies on Europe’s periphery or outside Europe can build a civil society. These societies have already to some extent been in continuous contact with Europe. Often, however, neither the elites nor the tradition-bound majorities of these countries permit an open discussion of this question. This resistance hinders consensus building on subjects such as how to retain and change particular traditions and how to integrate “new” elements of civic, political culture so that the formation of a civil society is not perceived as a hegemonic takeover. The questions of modern nation building and middle-class society, of individuals and

associations, and of the civic public sphere and civic consciousness indicate in any case that a complex image of humanity and a system of values form the basis of civil society. It does not merely concern a liberal economic system and the making of a middle social stratum. In the end, civil society's potential rests in its ever-changing character over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially its capacity to reform itself through open discussion about its own principles and procedural techniques, including the transformation of its own mechanisms of exclusion with regard to women, the lower classes, other nationalities, religions, and races. From here there are

many possibilities for further research. In the center of it all are the elements of middle-class society and their relationships to one another throughout historical change: the public and freely accessible use of reason, spheres of direct social interaction, and mediated interaction. Prospective research will focus less on classic social history than on its connection with cultural, political, and economic history. There is less potential for research within a narrow national-historical perspective than in a comparative perspective that encompasses both European and non-European societies.

Translated from German by Mark Georgiev

See also Middle Classes; New Social Movements; Professionals and Professionalization (volume 3); Reading (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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NATIONALISM



Caroline Ford

Nationalism has been one of the most powerful forces shaping modern political life in Europe since at least the eighteenth century. It is therefore somewhat ironical that, unlike liberalism or socialism—the two other great “isms” of modern times—there has been a surprising lack of consensus regarding its definition, origins, and consequences. Insisting on nationalism’s modernity, most historians from the nineteenth century onward have argued that nationalism is an ideology consisting of a rather inchoate body of ideas and that these ideas inform nationalism as a political and social movement affirming the sovereignty and integrity of discrete nation-states. That ideology was predicated, first, on the notion that the world is divided into nations, each with its own characteristics and destiny. Second, it assumes that the nation is the source of all political and social power. With the “cultural turn” in historical studies, nationalism has also come to be defined as a form of identification, as a collective consciousness, and as a discourse drawing on complex symbolic systems. Social historians have begun to emphasize the relationship between the development of national identities and other forms of collective identification, including class and gender.

The sheer diversity and variety of nationalist movements and ideologies in Europe during the past few centuries make it extremely difficult to classify nationalism politically—as a right- or left-wing phenomenon—over time or to establish its constituent elements in religion, culture, consent, or language. Nationalism assumed a variety of different territorial, ethnic, and cultural forms, and these forms frequently overlapped. Indeed, nationalism as a form of consciousness, as a body of ideas, and as a political movement is nebulous and protean, and it is perhaps in these very qualities that its power resides. How did nationalism come into being in Europe and how has it changed as a political movement between the eighteenth century and the present? Why has it so tenaciously endured, even as the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and the promise of a new Europe without national frontiers seemed to herald its demise? An-

swers to these questions have been many and varied. How these questions have been answered (and the study of nationalism more generally) are in large part a reflection of the history of European nationalism itself.

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM: THE CONTEXT

Nationalism and the modern nation-state, as they emerged in Europe, were only thinkable and possible toward the end of the eighteenth century, as hierarchical societies predicated on vertical ties between the ruler and the ruled gave way to more egalitarian societies that were based on horizontal ties between “citizens.” Until the end of the eighteenth century, most states in Europe were dynastic and predicated on a corporate social order based on privilege. European society was divided into three orders, consisting of those who fought, those who prayed, and those who worked, and each of these orders was accorded, or not accorded, as the case may have been, elaborate privileges (as members of a corporate body, rather than as individuals) by the monarch. This was a political society of subjects rather than citizens who had common legal rights and duties.

The abolition during the French Revolution (1789) of titles of nobility and of all special privileges attached to corporate bodies laid the groundwork for a society of citizens. This society resulted in a new relationship between the constituent members of a new political order, and indeed in the creation of the modern notion of citizenship, which instantly established a political world based on horizontal rather than vertical ties. While the process by which this society came into being in the monarchical states of Europe was uneven, it was more or less complete by the end of the nineteenth century and provided the structural underpinnings for the development of nationalism in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The emergence of nationalism at the end of the eighteenth century was also a by-product of the gradual secularization of European society and political institutions. The decline of the power of universal religious institutions—most notably the Roman Catholic Church—and of the loyalties they inspired both undermined the legitimacy of rule by divine right on the part of Catholic monarchs and opened avenues for other forms of spiritual and political allegiance. From the end of the seventeenth century, new conceptions of time and space, propagated during the scientific revolution, further challenged the certainties of religion and spawned new questions regarding relationships between different geographic areas and peoples.

Finally, the emergence and development of nationalism in the eighteenth century coincided with the spread of literacy and print capitalism, which served to integrate disparate populations through the medium of a common language and culture. The rise in levels of literacy, the spread of national educational initiatives, and the growing focus, particularly among literary elites, on language as a source of national cohesion served as integrative forces.

The development of nationalism in Europe occurred in a series of stages, beginning in the decades preceding the French Revolution, the wars of “liberation,” and Napoleonic expansion, which served as a political catalyst for nationalist movements in areas of Europe that had largely been immune from nation-

alism’s appeals. This first phase of European nationalism spanned a period from the 1760s to 1848. The second stage of European nationalism, which followed the defeat of the revolutions of 1848, coincided with German and Italian unification, the advent of mass politics, and the new imperialism of the late nineteenth century. World War I inaugurated a third stage in the development of nationalism in the twentieth century, as anticolonial movements in Europe’s colonial empires increasingly began to assume a nationalist form, and as the nation-state became the dominant form of political organization in the world.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM AND ITS HISTORY: STAGE 1, 1789–1848

Although some scholars (especially Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities*) have argued that nationalism as a political phenomenon appeared first in the New World among Anglo settlers transplanted from their original homeland or among creoles, both of whom increasingly came to resent the culture of the metropole, it was firmly implanted in the Old World by the end of the eighteenth century. During its first phase, nationalism as a political and social movement was embraced by the middle classes and by literate elites and was largely an affair of the liberal left in Europe as a whole. Literate elites in western

and central Europe set out to define the nation and to promote the national cause through the celebration of language and sometimes of religion or a shared historical past. In a fragmented central Europe, writers such as Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) focused on the importance of the German language in defining nationality, and indeed, language became the key element in defining national community. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1712–1778) writings on Corsica and Poland stressed the ways in which language and culture defined a nation's individual character, suggesting that it was only through their preservation and recovery that the nation could be maintained over time.

Governments early on also recognized the importance of linguistic uniformity for the modern nation-state. For a brief time, both at the end of the eighteenth century and then again at the end of the nineteenth, the French state, for example, made war on regional languages and dialects and attempted to impose a standardized French on its citizens through varying administrative mechanisms and public education. This was part of a larger universal "civilizing mission" unleashed by the French state, but it served, above all, the national cause. Indeed, language increasingly came to occupy a place in international territorial conflicts between states. This was manifested in disputes between Danes and Germans in Schleswig-Holstein in the 1860s.

During the course of the nineteenth century, language became increasingly important to definitions of nationality and played an important role in fostering national cohesion for several reasons. First, even in territorial states possessing a multiplicity of languages and dialects, the state's official sponsorship of a national language gave it a permanence and a sense of the eternal that it would not otherwise have acquired. This official language had the advantage, moreover, of being propagated through public education initiatives undertaken by most European states toward the end of the nineteenth century.

Jules Michelet (1798–1874) and Joseph-Ernest Renan (1823–1892) argued against the notion that language, religion, race, ethnicity, or geography were essential defining features of nationality, even as they stressed the importance of the nation as a "spiritual principle." They emphasized the binding power and importance of history or historical forgetting. More than any writer in the first half of the nineteenth century, Michelet, the historian, was instrumental in emphasizing the unconscious historical processes shaping nation formation. Indeed, Michelet indicated ways in which the French, who may not have conceived of themselves as such until the French Revolution, worked

for many centuries to construct a cultural and physical fabric that came to define France in tangible terms. He suggested that the French and the French nation surely existed for centuries, even if the nation as a political unit did not come into being until the French Revolution. A shared history, however, contributed to an acceptance of a common territory or homeland by the time of the French Revolution. And that territory was comprised of citizens sharing a common historical memory. The early-nineteenth-century valorization of the *Volk* and of popular culture in western Europe was part of a larger attempt among intellectual elites to recover (or "invent") a common cultural and national past, and they sought to bring that past to a growing reading public. Some of this literary and historical work, which was pressed into the service of defining the nation, led to it being defined in terms of a kind of historical essentialism. This historicism, dedicated to uncovering a prenationalist past, allowed literary elites and political leaders to invoke an "eternal" France or Germany, whose "natural" national traits were endowed by history, language, and geography. As a certain kind of historical essentialism came to define national identities and to inform nationalist movements in the first half of the nineteenth century, the construction of ethnic identities along similar lines was not far away.

Popular protonationalism. As governments and literary elites debated the constituent elements of nationhood in the old states of Europe, including Britain and France, and in central Europe and the Italian Peninsula, where unified nation-states did not exist before the latter half of the nineteenth century, popular forms of protonationalism emerged. Much of this popular protonationalist sentiment was born, however, from armed conflict or war, rather than from a romantic attachment to language or a common historic past. Indeed war has been pivotal to the development of nationalism since the eighteenth century. The role of war in forging national sentiment became evident in the Battle of Valmy of 1792, when a poorly equipped French army faced a formidably trained Prussian force and resisted it behind the battle cry, "Vive la Nation!" This prompted Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) to proclaim that the battle marked a new epoch in human history. During the French Revolution, the *levée en masse* (mass levy of troops) of 1792, proclaimed in the name of the *patrie en danger* (the fatherland endangered), created Europe's first citizen army and justified itself in the name of a nation of citizens sharing common interests and concerns. The *levée en masse* drew on the experience of the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) and the dynastic rivalries be-

liberation across the continent and led to the transformation of the map of Europe at the Congress of Vienna (1815). Moreover, this settlement was soon followed by a war of liberation against Ottoman rule, which led to the creation of a new kingdom of Greece in 1829. Belgium became an independent nation-state after its 1830 revolt, while Poland, an unsuccessful aspirant to national sovereignty, revolted in the same year, suffering defeat in the name of national self-determination.

From the French Revolution to 1848 nationalism tended to be linked to liberal, even democratic, left-wing movements, and culminated in the “national” revolutions of 1848 in central Europe and in the Italian Peninsula. In both regions nationalism was primarily a movement of liberal and republican intellectuals, who defined themselves against and opposed political organizations predicated on dynastic ties. Those who supported national unity in the Frankfurt parliament and in the Italian Peninsula failed to press their demands because of their lack of popular support, internal divisions, and, in the case of Italy, foreign intervention. German and Italian unification had to wait more than a decade after their initial failure.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM AND ITS HISTORY: STAGE 2, 1848–1914

tween European states in the eighteenth century, particularly those between Britain and France. Thus, long before the nation-state in its modern form came into being, wars were beginning to be fought in its name, in the name of a patriotism that would soon find its expression in nationalism. Linda Colley’s important work on the impact of the French revolutionary wars on the development of British nationalism suggests as much, as she explores the decisive role played by a series of eighteenth-century wars in fostering British patriotism: the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), and the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (1792–1802 and 1803–1815). Prussia’s defeat in the Battle of Jena in 1806 was a testament to the tenacious power of the national idea in a French army of citizens, rather than subjects.

War and revolution mobilized large numbers of people at home, who rallied to a domestic cause. Even though many of those who fought in the great wars of the eighteenth century were not yet citizens, countless numbers justified their participation in patriotic terms. This popular protonationalist sentiment was soon translated into more or less successful wars of

Nationalism as a movement and as an ideology changed decisively in Europe as a result of the revolution of 1848. The debacle of the revolutions of 1848 in central Europe and the Italian Peninsula indicated that if these two areas of Europe were to be unified, that process would (and did) come about largely through “blood and iron.” The failure of that revolution and the realization among political elites, even those who supported monarchism, that nationalism could be harnessed for particular political purposes had a profound impact on its future trajectory. It was war and the stratagems of Prussia’s chief minister, Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), that led to the unification of Germany in 1871, and it was the political aspirations of Camillo Benso, conte di Cavour (1810–1861) and Piedmont’s rivalry with the Habsburgs that led to the unification of Italy by 1861. Increasingly, nationalism was linked to the designs of conservative elites during the course of the nineteenth century. Nationalism gradually became a mass phenomenon and, paradoxically, one that was linked to right-wing and sometimes antinationalist causes. The war in Schleswig-Holstein and the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, both of which laid the groundwork for German unification, have often been seen as an expression of Prussian patriotism

rather than of German nationalism, waged by Bismarck to ensure Prussian hegemony in central Europe.

Mass nationalism: “blood and soil.” By the late 1880s nationalism assumed new forms in Europe. As a movement, it increasingly became a mass phenomenon and was less grounded in the French liberal tradition of consent and contract, or even of a common culture. Race, ethnicity, and language became more important in defining nationality. Of course, this new nationalist discourse was fueled by colonialism and the new imperialism and the literature it spawned regarding the world’s races. Much of the national competition among European nation-states was played out in theaters of war on the fringes or beyond the borders of western Europe, particularly in north Africa and the Balkans.

As nationalism and its social constituency changed, so did its political associations. Having been associated with the revolutionary left wing since the French Revolution, by 1900 a new nationalism of blood and soil came to be associated with a bellicose and in some instances racist and anti-Semitic right wing all over Europe. The Dreyfus affair of 1898 in France and the formation of right-wing leagues in Germany contributed to a nationalistic rhetoric that was increasingly strident and xenophobic in nature. Changes in the character of European nationalism were both a reflection of changes in state strategies designed to mobilize their citizenries and a consequence of the democratization of the political process in many European states, with the advent of universal manhood suffrage. In short, a formerly elitist and monarchical right wing saw in nationalism a new source of cohesion and a means to attract a mass constituency.

The early historical work on European nationalism coincided with and reflected its late-nineteenth-century transformation. It resembled the racist, xenophobic, and imperialist rhetoric embodied in *fin de siècle* nationalism in evoking national traits and stereotypes. This literature was, however, counterbalanced by a serious assessment and critique of the national question by marxists of the Second International. To name a few of them, Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Otto Bauer, and V. I. Lenin devoted themselves to the problem.

World War I demonstrated the power of national identifications, as expressed, for example, in the initial massive working-class support for the war effort—in apparent contradiction with a self-proclaimed socialist ideology—in much of central and western Europe. The war revealed that the development of a national self-consciousness among different social groups did not necessarily occur at the cost of other forms of

social consciousness, even if it could supersede them at particular historical moments. Indeed, popular adhesion to causes such as those of World War I or the Boer War attests to the spread of racial ideas and a new jingoist xenophobic nationalism in a number of European nation-states.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM AND ITS HISTORY: STAGE 3, 1914–1980

It is no accident that World War I gave rise to the first serious and sustained comparative and historical inquiry into the origins and development of nationalism. This early work is primarily associated with Carlton Hayes and Hans Kohn. Hayes’s *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York, 1931) and Kohn’s *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origin and Background* (New York, 1944) were written in the aftermath of the creation of the League of Nations in 1919 and the breakup of the huge multicultural, multiethnic, and multilingual empires of central and eastern Europe—the Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman—and with the creation of wholly new nation-states in those regions. Indeed, many of the

movements dedicated to national liberation in the twenty-five years before World War I were directed against supranational and multinational empires. After World War I, nationalist movements tended to be directed against established national states in Europe. These separatist nationalist movements, which are still very much a part of the European landscape, drew on prewar definitions of nationality based on ethnicity and, in some cases, religion. The League of Nations eventually legitimized the modern nation-state as the only internationally recognized form of political organization in the world. Hayes and Kohn sought to explain how this came to be so, arguing that nationalism was indeed an eighteenth-century invention, despite the claims to a distant historical past among some nations.

Much of this critical interest in nationalism was short-lived, however, as nationalism became suspect as a result of its alliance with fascism, national socialism, and anti-Semitism in the 1930s and 1940s. Moreover, the emergence of a new cold war order following World War II, which led to the disappearance of the autonomy and independence of most of the new states created in eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War I; the rise of supranational organizations, such as the European Economic Community; and the ubiquity of international communism deflected attention away from the study of nationalism as a historical phenomenon. Indeed, it led to the conviction that nationalism represented merely a “stage” in the historical development of Europe, if not the world—a backward and uncivilized one at that—and that the nation-state would ultimately be replaced by other forms of political organization. This was a view taken by both liberals and marxists. Cosmopolitan liberals believed that nationalism was (simply) a stepping-stone to the creation of constitutional sovereign states comprised of citizens sharing common political and civil rights. Marxists regarded the phenomenon as an illusion, an atavism that was manipulated by elites for economic and political purposes. Neither could account for the persistence and pervasive power of nationalism defined in ethnic terms.

The post-World War II era also witnessed the emergence of new nationalist movements in Europe’s colonies (or former colonies). During the war itself European and non-European resistance movements emerged in response to German and Japanese attempts to create empires. Nationalism also inspired anti-colonial liberation movements in Africa and Asia in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.

Modernization theorists, writing in the 1950s in the aftermath of World War II, began to argue that nationalism and the formation of nation-states implied

ineluctable processes of assimilation. Karl Deutsch’s *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953) is a case in point. According to Deutsch, modern nation-states were built by political centers through a homogenizing process of cultural and institutional assimilation and acculturation. This process, achieved through the instruments of mass communication, railways, roads, public education, and conscription, allegedly resulted in the abandonment of traditional allegiances and identities and their replacement with those defined by the metropole. Consciously using the concept of colonization, Eugen Weber in *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, Calif., 1976) has suggested that peasants became Frenchmen as they adopted the ideas, values, and culture of the metropole—Paris—and as these values came to replace those of the region and the village. Why would the far-flung populations wish it to be otherwise, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) asked as early as the nineteenth century. He wrote that no one could imagine that it would be more beneficial to retain one’s regional identity in France, for example, when one could acquire all the benefits of French citizenship.

For much of the 1950s and 1960s, nationalism did not receive sustained or concentrated attention from social historians of Europe. They embraced the study of class formation, social mobility, and social revolution with alacrity, writing the history of peoples who formerly “had no history.” Much of this “history from the bottom up” either ignored, somewhat strangely, the development of nationalism or focused on the formation of the nation-state and its relationship to movements of social protest. Thus, the first generation of social history did not have much influence on the historical approaches to European nationalism.

Interest in European nationalisms revived slowly and then grew steadily in the late 1970s. The historical literature that emerged in this period challenged the evolutionary views of marxists and liberals, as well as the assumptions that underpinned interpretations of nationalism that were based on the concept of “modernization,” for a variety of reasons. The sudden emergence of a number of “ethnic minority nationalist” movements in the very heart of Western Europe—in Scotland, Wales, Ireland, Brittany, Catalonia, the Basque region, and Corsica—made historians question the degree to which one could count on the eventual disappearance of nationalism, and they called into question the process of national integration described by Karl Deutsch and others. How could one account for the appearance of these new nationalisms in some of Europe’s oldest nation states? Miroslav

Hroch's pathbreaking and early *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Prague, 1968; Cambridge, U.K., 1985), an analysis of the rise of nationalisms in central and Eastern Europe, suggested new ways of thinking about nationalism. He emphasized the role of regional elites and the uneven economic development "within" states, arguing that local elites whose interests were threatened by larger markets and global forces often encouraged the spread of nationalist sentiment to protect those interests. On the basis of this hypothesis, Hroch argued that nationalist movements generally developed in three separate stages. First, nationalist movements assume an apolitical, folkloric character; second, they are taken up by literate elites wishing to inculcate the "national idea" and organize the masses; and third, nationalist movements then truly gain mass-based support. This stage analysis of nationalist movements has deeply shaped the historical literature on nationalism, building on the modernization theorists' "top down" approach that has reinforced much of the historical literature on nationalism since its inception.

DEVELOPMENTS IN NATIONALISM AND ITS HISTORY SINCE 1980

In the 1980s and 1990s historians began to ask new questions about the development of European nationalism and to abandon many of the assumptions that have informed its study since the early twentieth century. As was the case with previous developments, these challenges and questions have in part been shaped by the history of nationalism in Europe. This history includes the breakup of the former Soviet Union; the emergence of nationalist xenophobia in the former Soviet Union; the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s; the rise of nationalist movements in the Balkans; and the promise of European unity and integration. These developments have refocused scholarly attention on nationalism as a central subject of historical enquiry since the early 1980s, and they have influenced the kinds of questions historians have begun to ask.

Following World War I, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States declared in his famous "Fourteen Points" that the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire should be given the the freest opportunity for autonomous development. The appearance, disappearance, and reappearance of new nations in eastern Europe have become a fulcrum for the reconsideration of nationalism as a question in Europe as a whole. "Old" nationalisms, which appeared to have withered away, have ostensibly reemerged with

a vengeance. The post-Communist organization of political space in these regions has resulted in the proliferation of new "nations" defined largely in ethnic terms. The "identity politics" rampant in the former Yugoslavia, in Kosovo, Uzbekistan, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Azerbaijan unleashed new and horrible tragedies. To what extent are these nationalisms late-twentieth-century creations or old wine in new bottles? Is this the right historical question to ask? What can the answer to these questions tell us about nation formation more generally and how can these nations be integrated into the international community of nations? Campaigns of "ethnic cleansing" have been launched in a national cause, and language tests have been established, for example, to determine who is a real Ukrainian or Slovene. Religion, ethnicity, and language continue to be divisive and defining features of group claims to sovereignty, territory, and self-determination. Such pernicious and deadly developments have forced historians to reexamine the nature of national identifications and their ultimate consequences. Rogers Brubaker has deftly explored the existence of these nationalisms in this regard, and he has suggested that one must think about nationalism in these regions not in terms of resurgence or recession, using the prevailing literature on nationalism that has focused on the state and nation building, but rather on how nationalism was "reframed" in these areas.

The Flemish, Catalans, Lombards, and Scots have continued to reaffirm their local identities and seek a greater degree of autonomy in Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Britain, respectively, as well as a role in a new Europe. Indeed, as these new "ethnic minority" nationalisms have appeared, Western European politics have also been dominated by debates concerning immigration and the permeability of national borders in a new European Union. Large immigrant populations from former European colonies have flowed into Europe since the late 1960s, and many of these immigrants share little in terms of language, culture, or religion with the dominant cultures of Europe. As a result, Europeans have been forced to ask themselves difficult questions about the relationship between nationality and citizenship. On the one hand, "ethnic minority" nationalisms call for a closer relationship between ethnicity and nation; on the other, massive immigration challenges that relationship.

Citizenship, common people, and symbols. All these developments have resulted in a gradual shift away from historical approaches to nationalism that focus primarily on state formation and social-political elites to ones that resonate more with social historians, such as the exploration of "national consciousness,"

the “culture” of nationalism, the process of identity formation (and its limits), and the role of gender in shaping nationalist movements and nationalist discourse. Historians have begun to focus on a new set of questions: Why were individuals willing to fight and die for a community and for people whom they would never meet in their lifetimes? What is nationalism’s emotional appeal? How and why are national passions aroused and in what contexts? Out of what symbolic discourses and repertoires are national identities constructed? How—through what imagery—do societies represent their nations, and what is the significance of these representations? If national identities, viewed in historical perspective, are fluid, how and why do they change through time? How and why does nationalism remain such a potent and powerful force in Europe?

In asking these questions, historians of European nationalism have explored three broad themes. First, they have investigated the nature, evolution, and

limits of citizenship and immigration policy in various national contexts. Brubaker, for example, has explored the nature and history of French and German citizenship law to highlight differing conceptions of national identity and belonging. This approach follows older “top down” models by focusing on policy making at the center.

Second, historians have begun to pay far greater attention to the formation of national identities and the creation of a national consciousness among ordinary people. This second approach has further opened the history of nationalism to social historians. Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (1991), a broad synthetic essay on the emergence and spread of nationalism, has played a pivotal role in this regard. Individual historical studies have provided nuanced historical accounts of the creation of national consciousness through time. Peter Sahlins, for example, has argued that the boundary between France and Spain was as much constructed by Catalans who live on both sides of the border in the Cerdagne between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries as it was by the French government in Paris. He therefore challenges the top-down, center-outward approach to understanding the formation of national identities and suggests ways in which local rivalries and issues inform national debates. Similarly, Celia Applegate argues that the formation of a national consciousness in certain areas of Germany was as much a product of a cherished identification with *Heimat* (one’s local homeland) as it was a product of German unification. I have argued that attempts by the French state to replace time-honored cultural practices and allegiances and to integrate Catholic Brittany into the secular republican culture of metropolitan France toward the end of the nineteenth century were incomplete at best. This did not mean that a national consciousness failed to materialize in the far reaches of the French hexagon, but rather that a national consciousness was forged through a process of negotiation and selective appropriation on the part of individuals and social groups at the periphery. All these historians have sought to understand how ordinary people, rather than elites and governments, have established a relationship with an imagined national community.

Finally, historians using techniques and insights from the “new cultural history” have focused on the importance of representation and symbolism in understanding nationalism and the propagation of national myths. Maurice Agulhon’s work on the role of Marianne as a female symbol of France since the French Revolution, and Lynn Hunt’s study of the competing symbols of Hercules and Marianne in revolutionary culture suggest that more attention should

be given to how nations and their elites define themselves and export their own images abroad.

How does one explain the survival of national antagonisms and the spread of nationalist movements in the face of transnationalism and larger processes of globalization? In many respects the world has become unified by transnational capitalist organizations. In view of its intellectual poverty as ideology, how and why does nationalism now ultimately seem to be a

more powerful mobilizing force than socialism or communism? Is the “resurgence” of nationalism an atavism, an aberration? Historians are only beginning to answer these questions. What seems clear is that nationalism as an ideology and as a political movement is and has been ubiquitous since the eighteenth century and continues to be pervasive in Europe. In the prescient words of Isaiah Berlin, written in 1991, nationalism is not “resurgent” because it never really died.

See also Emigration and Colonies; Imperialism and Domestic Society; Racism (volume 1); and other articles in this section.

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SECTION 9: STATE AND SOCIETY

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FASCISM AND NAZISM



Alexander De Grand

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Fascism and Nazism developed out of a general crisis of the European political system connected with the rise of the mass participation state from the late nineteenth century to the end of World War I. The mass participation state was marked by five features: an unprecedented expansion of the number of voters brought on by universal manhood suffrage and in some cases by the extension of the vote to women; the development of mass communications; a high degree of mass mobilization, initially by revolutionary socialist parties; new economic and social demands put forward by democratic and revolutionary organizations; and fragmented, poorly organized middle-class political party structures, largely legacies of the nineteenth-century restricted franchise. Fascism was motivated by deep-seated fears of social and political disintegration and of political revolution on the part of both ruling elites and large sectors of the middle and lower-middle classes. These classes had little to gain from a socialist revolution. Fascist and Nazi movements appeared throughout Europe during the period between World Wars I and II, but only in Italy and Germany did they come to power and develop into regimes.

By 1919 liberalism and liberal democracy, focused on individual rights, offered a pallid response to social and economic upheaval brought on by World War I. Political life had been thoroughly radicalized by war and by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Large segments of newly enfranchised masses were moving outside of established social and economic institutions and were falling under the control of revolutionary organizations. Liberal democracy, which relies on competition of individuals and groups in the political and economic marketplaces, offered little assurance of social cohesion in a time of crisis. In contrast, socialism and communism formulated powerful quasi-religious visions of human redemption and solidarity based on the triumph of the peasantry and the working class.

FASCISM AND NAZISM DEFINED

Fascism exploded on the political scene after 1919 as a countermyth, as the first mass movement of the middle class in Italy and Germany, and as a political party through which important sectors of the economic and political establishments sought to preserve the status quo in revolutionary times. Faced with a shattered political order, a highly politicized and fragmented body politic, a revolutionary threat, and a profound loss of faith in the market mechanisms, Fascism put forward a vision of social and political solidarity based on the primacy of membership in the organic nation (Fascism) or race (Nazism). It brought a new word, "totalitarian," into the political lexicon. Because social and economic disintegration after World War I seemed to threaten the very basis of Western civilization, the remedy for it had to be equally drastic or total. Using techniques of mass mobilization pioneered by the left, tactics of combat forged in the trenches of World War I, and modern means of mass communications, Fascism and Nazism promised a new and unified national or racial community.

The Fascist-Nazi political revolutions stemmed from profound anxieties about the disintegration of the social order and of the national or racial unit. Thus, not surprisingly, they shared many characteristics: the cult of the single leader who represented the essence of the nation or race; the single party through which all political life was directed; state control of mass communications and propaganda; the absorption of all independent social, leisure time, and professional activity within the state; the destruction of independent labor organizations; state direction of the economy within the context of private ownership; and the mobilization of society for war against domestic and foreign enemies.

Nonetheless, the Fascist and Nazi regimes were mired in contradictions. They were movements of the middle class, aiming at the restoration of traditional gender and social hierarchies, yet they claimed to be revolutionary regimes that would create new national

and racial communities. Both regimes at once reflected and mocked bourgeois values. They promised, especially in the case of Italian Fascism, to respect private property and ownership of the means of production. Yet they were built on a vision of mercantilist crisis that implied state direction of a shrinking world economy in which nations and races struggled continuously to survive. Mobilization for warfare undermined aspirations for political and social stabilization and the restoration of traditional values. The regimes put forward a spartan ethic of self-denial, austerity, and subordination of the individual to the group that neither was shared by most Germans or Italians nor reflected the private behavior of the leadership.

Contradictions were overcome by massive mobilization and propaganda efforts. Fascism and Nazism borrowed from their socialist and communist opponents and from traditional religion to create elaborate public rituals, vast public spaces for rallies, and an almost godlike cult of the leader. The central myth was the salvation of the nation or race through rebirth and regeneration. Rebirth could only come through struggle, new values of sacrifice, and constant vigilance against external and internal enemies. Italian Fascism consisted of constantly shifting “battles” for self-sufficiency in grain, population expansion, the value of the lire, and Italian domination of the Mediterranean Sea and against the League of Nations, France,

and England. Germany, in contrast, concentrated its full attention on the perceived Jewish biological, cultural, and economic threat and the drive for outward expansion, especially in eastern Europe.

In so far as Fascism and to a lesser extent Nazism operated according to economic theories, they opted for a corporative model of economic organization as a “third way” between capitalism and communism. Italy attempted to organize economic and social life around functional units that brought together workers and management in the various branches of the economy within a single framework. Strikes and lockouts were outlawed and replaced by mandatory arbitration. However, the destruction of independent trade unions, the close ties between industry and the Fascist and Nazi regimes, and war mobilization resulted in a state-directed autarky with major branches of the economy organized into government-sponsored cartels geared to war production and to the exploitation of conquered territories.

TYOLOGIES OF FASCISM

During the 1920s and 1930s movements modeled on Fascism or Nazism cropped up throughout Europe. Historians and political scientists have failed to find a common thread that would link the widely divergent

experiences of France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Spain, Romania, Belgium, England, and Latin American countries. Generally they have used three approaches to analyze fascism and nazism. One approach defines the two movements as modern totalitarianism and links them with the Soviet experience under Joseph Stalin. However, totalitarian theory concentrates on organization of the state and leaves out Italy, which was not truly totalitarian. A second approach finds a fascist minimum that links Italy and Germany and leaves out Soviet communism. The common core is sought in economic structures, either in the form of a crisis of capitalism or of stages of economic development, in a general European cultural crisis, in a revolt of the lower middle classes, or in the psychological trauma of a generation that experienced World War I and subsequent dislocations. Finally, a number of theories deny any connection between fascism and nazism. Fascism has its roots in the crisis of the marxist left, whereas nazism derives from ideas of racial biology common in nineteenth-century Europe.

The diversity of organizations connected with fascism poses problems for any general theory. Some movements were authoritarian-traditionalist, seeking the restoration of traditional values, often by violence, through reliance on religion and ties to conservative forces. Others were overtly fascist or nazi, seeking an autonomous base by mobilizing the lower middle class and peasantry on programs that were always antimarxist but often included anticapitalist populism, extreme nationalism, racial mysticism, and anti-Semitism.

In Austria the nationalist authoritarian paramilitary Heimwehr was allied to right-wing nationalists, its ideology was Catholic corporative, and it drew support from the small-town middle class and the peasantry. In Spain the most notable movement inspired by fascism was the Falange, founded in 1933 by José Antonio Primo de Rivera. The Falange called for an almost mystical national revival through the reassertion of traditional, Catholic values and the struggle against marxism. Eventually the Falange was subsumed into General Francisco Franco's military revolt of 1936. The oldest of the conservative, nationalist movements was the Action Française, founded in France in 1899 by Charles Maurras. The Action Française was monarchist, authoritarian, anti-Semitic, theoretically Catholic, and virulently antidemocratic. Another French movement of the authoritarian right was the Croix de Feu, founded in 1927. After 1936 the Croix de Feu transformed into the French Social Party, which drew from the middle class and peasant farmers. The Belgian Rexist movement, headed by Leon Degrelle, followed the authoritarian, Catholic

model closer to Benito Mussolini's Fascism than to Nazi paganism.

On the radical fascist right, the French ex-Communist Jacques Doriot formed the Parti Populaire Français that initially won a substantial working-class following but gradually lost it as the party was tied to conservative financial backers and gravitated toward the Nazi model during World War II. Sir Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists, formed in 1932, adopted the cult of the leader and the violent tactics that marked both fascism and nazism. Mosley's anti-Semitism drew him closer to Adolf Hitler than to Mussolini. Among the most interesting radical movements were the Hungarian Arrow Cross, led by Ferenc Szálasi, which combined extreme nationalism, radical economic and social restructuring, and violent anti-Semitism; and the Romanian Legion of the Archangel Michael, founded by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu in 1927. The Legion called for a peasant society based on extreme nationalism with a dose of Romanian Orthodox Christian mysticism. The movement was violent, confrontational, and extremely anti-Semitic with support from students and poor peasants and few ties to the economic and social establishment. The Arrow Cross and the Legion of the Archangel Michael were suppressed by the conservative Hungarian and Romanian governments in power during the 1930s.

THE ITALIAN FASCIST AND GERMAN NAZI MOVEMENTS

Origins and early development. The Fascist and Nazi movements developed in roughly three parallel stages. The first phase was the radical, quasi-revolutionary movement, which lasted in Italy only from March 1919 to mid-1920 and in Germany continued from January 1919 to the abortive Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923. The second period was marked by the transformation of both movements into broader middle-class alliances. In Italy this took place between mid-1920 and November 1921, when the Fascist movement became the landowners' primary weapon to smash the socialist peasant movement in the rich agricultural Po Valley. In Germany the transformative phase lasted from the reconstitution of the party in 1925 to the first electoral success in 1929. The final step in the party development, preparatory to the seizure of power, was when both movements became truly mass organizations, entered Parliament, and began to negotiate with the economic and social establishments. In Italy this process lasted from the end of 1921 until the March on Rome in October 1922, and in Germany it lasted from 1929 to January 1933.

The radical phase. Anton Drexler formed the German Workers' Party in Munich on 5 January 1919. A few months later, on 23 March, Mussolini launched the first *fascio di combattimento* (combat group) in Milan. The term *fascio* originally meant "group" and was used by both left and right. Members of the *fascio* were *fascisti*. Both movements combined extreme nationalism with radical economic and social programs. For instance, the first Fascist program, inspired by Mussolini's early socialism, called for the eight-hour day, worker participation in management, the vote for women, and a new republican constitution. Backing for the *fascio* came from students, veterans, and young professionals along with former socialists, syndicalists, and anarchists who had joined Mussolini in 1914 and 1915 in breaking with the official Socialist Party over Italian entry into World War I. They shared a complete rejection of the existing political system, a contempt for the Italian political class, and an intense hatred of proletarian-based socialism. The early Fascist movement was solidly northern, with particular strength in Milan, Italy's most modern urban center.

In contrast to the Fascist movement, the German Workers' Party had no ties to the left and was based in Munich, outside Germany's industrial heartland. Hitler joined the movement in late September 1919, and the next year it became the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP). The new party was extremely small, with 189 members in January 1920 and only 2,000 at the end of the year. The Nazi movement appealed to war veterans, artisans, and the disaffected lower middle class, who were hostile both to socialism and to large-scale commercial and industrial capitalism. In 1921 and 1922 it spread to the small Protestant towns of Franconia and Bavaria and to the major cities Munich and Nürnberg. Spurred by French occupation of the Ruhr Valley, inflation, and economic collapse, by November 1923 the party claimed over fifty thousand members spread throughout a large part of Germany. It had become a broad coalition of the middle class with some working-class support in the industrial Ruhr and Rhineland.

Three things characterize the social history of the early Fascist and Nazi movements. First, the leadership was young, drawn from the generation born in the 1880s and 1890s. Mussolini was born in 1883, Hitler in 1889. Second, the defining experience for both Fascists and Nazis was World War I. Coming of age as the war began, they were stamped by the conflict's violence and the solidarity of the trenches, and they re-created this cohesion in the military formations important to both parties. The Nazis created the *Sturmabteilung* (SA) in 1921; the Fascists organized *fasci*

di combattimento, or squads, modeled after wartime special combat units. These paramilitary formations made both movements something new on the political scene—parties organized not for traditional electoral politics but for violent, ongoing confrontations with political opponents. The third characteristic of both movements was an intense anger and impatience that found outlets in nationalism, hatred of democracy and socialism, and calls for the restoration of social- and gender-based hierarchies. One additional element, extreme racism and anti-Semitism, was present in the Nazi movement from the beginning. For instance, the Nazi program of February 1920 excluded Jews from membership in the future German national community.

The transformative-coalition phase. The transformative phase revealed a high degree of organizational flexibility. Powerful local leaders (*ras* in Italy, *Gauleiter* in Germany) acted with significant independence. The movements' ideological opportunism allowed them to adapt to new circumstances, and the cult of the supreme leader emerged.

The radical-populist Fascist movement reached an impasse with the Italian elections of November 1919. Mussolini's movement was solidly defeated, and the Italian Socialist Party and the Catholic Popular Party represented over half of the new parliament. By early 1920 total membership in the *fasci* dropped to nine hundred. The movement revived from this low point after November, when it spearheaded the agrarian reaction to Socialist peasant organizations and strikes. One of the best social histories of the origins of Fascism in Italy, *Fascism in Ferrara, 1915–1925* (1975) by Paul Corner, analyzes the Fascists' use of long-standing social and economic tensions to gain a popular base. By the end of 1920 the 88 *fasci* had over 20,000 members, and a year later 834 *fasci* had over 250,000 members.

The balance shifted from northern cities to the countryside and small towns of northern and central Italy. New recruits were young professionals, shopkeepers, students, and small and large landowners. They launched well-armed punitive expeditions from provincial centers against unprepared and poorly coordinated peasant unions. Beginning with the areas around Bologna and Ferrara, much of northern Italy turned into a battle zone with the passive acquiescence or active connivance of police and military authorities. This second phase ended at the Fascist congress in November 1921, when the movement officially became the National Fascist Party (PNF). The party fully accepted Mussolini's supreme position and abandoned its republican, anti-Catholic, and radical pro-

gram in favor of a monarchist and economically conservative agenda.

The Nazi movement reached a similar impasse in late 1923. The movement was outlawed, and Hitler was arrested and imprisoned after the failed attempt to overthrow the Weimar Republic (Beer Hall Putsch) of 3–9 November. The party was reorganized in 1925 on the *Führerprinzip*, or leadership principle, with Hitler as undisputed leader. The Nazi movement attracted middle- and lower-middle-class supporters, but the urban working-class strategy it pursued in 1927 and 1928 made limited gains. In the elections of May 1928 the Nazis won only 2.8 percent of the vote but made a significant breakthrough among the desperate small farmers in the northern state of Schleswig-Holstein, marking the end of the party's urban strategy. The onset of the Great Depression opened the way for major Nazi victories in 1929 and 1930.

The consolidation of the mass movement and the seizure of power. Fascists and Nazis took power in similar ways. Their paramilitary wings created a climate of violence directed at their Socialist and Communist enemies and the existing political class, which dared not crack down lest the revolutionary left revive. In both countries Parliament was paralyzed. After the 1930 elections successive German governments survived using presidential emergency decree powers. The Italian and German conservative political and economic establishments united to bring the Fascist and Nazi movements into the government, and in both countries the conservatives felt confident they could control any power-sharing arrangement. Thus Mussolini and Hitler came to power legally. The Fascist and Nazi revolutions came after the movements controlled the government.

In 1921 and 1922 the Italian Fascist squads continued their revenge against the Socialist worker and peasant unions in well-organized attacks against whole provinces. The Nazi SA, a massive organization devoted to street fighting and fund-raising, had a social base decidedly more working-class and lower-middle-class than the NSDAP. Once in Parliament both parties courted key constituencies within the established order. The Fascist Party entered the government-sponsored electoral coalition in June 1921, when it won thirty-five seats in parliament, and adopted a new conservative program in November. Weak and divided governments in 1921 and 1922 led all established political leaders to seek an alliance with Mussolini by October 1922. To precipitate events the Fascists decreed a mass mobilization of their squads and the March on Rome that began on 27 October. Faced with violence and potential civil war, King Victor Emman-

uel III first offered the post of prime minister to a conservative. When Mussolini demanded the position for himself, the monarch yielded on 29 October and appointed the Fascist leader to head the government.

During the late 1920s and early 1930s the Nazis formed organizations that incorporated students, teachers, farmers, civil servants, doctors, lawyers, and architects into the movement. Hitler ignored the party's radical economic program and reached out to industrialists. The NSDAP won 108 seats in the September 1930 national elections and controlled several state governments, sweeping aside all the other middle-class political groups. Nazi domination of the political space previously occupied by several fragmented middle-class parties was confirmed in the July 1932 elections, when the party won 230 seats and 37 percent of the votes. By January 1933 party membership had reached 1.4 million people. Social histories have revealed that, of those who voted for the Nazis, 70 percent were middle class, but roughly one-third could be described as working class or unemployed. The rank and file members were small peasant farmers, shopkeepers, artisans, civil servants, teachers, professionals, and small businesspeople. In contrast, the party leadership after 1928 increasingly was drawn from the middle and upper-middle classes. Clearly the NSDAP was a successful mass movement of the middle classes before Hitler's appointment as chancellor on 30 January 1933.

FROM MOVEMENT TO REGIME: THE FASCIST AND NAZI STATES

Until 1934 the Fascist and Nazi movements seemed to run on parallel courses. Both leaders were young when they took power. Mussolini was thirty-nine in 1922; Hitler was forty-four in 1933. Neither man offered a clear indication of his future programs, and they headed movements more suited to seizing power than to governing. The Fascist and Nazi movements proclaimed themselves revolutionary but were in coalitions with conservatives who had decidedly different aims. The two movements had changed their social bases in similar ways during the march to power. As the movements grew, more middle- and upper-middle-class people joined, but remnants of the old lower-middle-class populism remained in the Fascist squads and in the SA. Expectations that the movements would share the spoils with the bases had to be balanced against the realities of governing. The conservative industrialists and landowners' desires for merely the restoring of order had to be reconciled with the drive to total power inherent in Fascism and Nazism.

How much the Fascist and Nazi regimes were the result of choices made by Mussolini and Hitler has been the subject of much debate between intentionalists and structuralists. The intentionalists stress the role of Hitler in the Nazi regime and, in fact, both regimes must be seen, at least in part, as determined by the wills of their powerful leaders, especially in foreign and racial policies. But the structuralists are correct to see these regimes as also the products of powerful social and economic institutional forces interacting within the contexts of the new dictatorships. The organization of the regimes was largely determined by the social alliances that brought them to power. Moreover policies often were shaped by competition for power among important interest groups within the dictatorships. The implication for social historians is that a simple top-down model of power relationships is inadequate, even in highly authoritarian regimes.

The histories of the Fascist and Nazi regimes can be divided into four periods: consolidation of power and the suppression of the opposition (Italy from 1922 to 1926, Germany from 30 January to July 1933), stabilization of power (Italy from 1926 to 1935, Germany from 1933 to 1936), the drive to totalitarian control (Italy from 1935 to 1939, Germany after 1936), and war and expansion (Italy from 1935 to 1943, Germany from 1936 to 1945).

The repression of the opposition. At the top of the hierarchy was the supreme leader. After 1934 Hitler combined the offices of chancellor and chief of state, while Mussolini formally served as prime minister under the Italian monarch. Both regimes abolished the old constitutions and never replaced them. Instead, they introduced a series of ad hoc constitutional arrangements. Mussolini and Hitler immediately diminished the importance of Parliament. They quickly dissolved the old legislatures and called new elections, Mussolini in spring 1924 and Hitler in March 1933. New electoral laws gave their parties a significant advantage. Mussolini won approval of the 1923 Acerbo law, which gave two-thirds of the seats in Parliament to the party that won over 25 percent of the vote. The Nazis declared a state of emergency on 31 January 1933 and on 4 February issued an emergency decree limiting press freedom and public meetings. The Nazis used the burning of the Reichstag building by a Dutch communist in late February as an excuse to ban that party under a decree for “the Protection of the People and the State” on 28 February 1933. Mussolini ended parliamentary control over the cabinet in December 1925 with a law making the head of government responsible only to the monarch. Hitler accomplished the same end with the Enabling Act of 23 March 1933, which gave the government power to issue laws without the consent of the

Reichstag. Over time even cabinet meetings in both regimes became rarer and less important. Each constituency negotiated directly with the supreme leader or with other power centers on a bilateral basis.

The consolidation of power: economic, social, and religious policies. Upon taking power, the Fascists and Nazis faced conflicting pressures. The lower-middle-class base of the party and the paramilitary formations sought immediate rewards, such as restrictions on department stores in Germany, larger roles for the Fascist and Nazi militias, and appointment to government offices. Each of these demands conflicted with the desires of industrialists, bankers, the military, and the civil service. Both regimes coped by curbing the power of the party militias and buying off key constituencies.

In Italy this process of concessions worked only partially, and Mussolini never freed himself from the alliance with conservatives. To the landowners the Fascist government offered the suppression of the peasant unions and a substantial degree of local government control. Industrialists received the destruction of Socialist and Communist unions and reaffirmation of the supremacy of the employer within the firm. Over the long term, heavy industry was integrated into a lucrative system of state-sponsored cartels that carved up market shares to the advantage of larger competitors and guaranteed government contracts for military armaments and import substitution. The Italian Catholic Church benefited most notably from the Lateran Treaty and Concordat of 1929, which guaranteed the official status of the church and its autonomous sphere within the Fascist regime. The military won curbs on the power of the Fascist militia. The lower middle class gained increased access to party and state positions and a gradual relaxation of limits on educational opportunities. Of course, the losers in the process were industrial workers and peasants, both male and female, who faced lost political and economic rights and wage reductions with the onset of the depression.

Nazi Germany similarly bought special constituencies. Heavy industry won significant advantages. Unions of all sorts were banned, and not even the Nazi Labor Front had the right to bargain collectively. Arbitration of wages was shifted to the Ministry of Labor, and the rights of management were reaffirmed. In 1934 Hjalmar Schacht, a banker with close business ties, became economics minister, and he dominated policy until 1936. He introduced foreign currency controls, import restrictions, and cartelization in favor of large industrial corporations. Radical demands from the Nazi base, such as the anti-department store campaign, were shelved; handicrafts were

brought under the German Craft Trades organization; and small businesses were arranged under a specialized association. In September 1933 the Nazis created an agricultural marketing organization, the Reichsnährstand, which introduced price supports for basic commodities. The so-called blood purge of the SA leadership in June 1934 eliminated a rival to the military establishment, and the army was further satisfied by the decision to rearm.

On the religious front the Nazis attempted to create a party-dominated Evangelical Church but pulled back in the face of resistance from Protestant leaders in 1933 and 1934. In mid-1933 the Nazi government signed a concordat with the Catholic Church modeled on the Lateran accords of Fascist Italy. On paper the Catholic Church was assured of its own sphere of religious influence in exchange for abandoning its political activity and its youth groups. But both the Protestant and Catholic Churches in Nazi Germany were on the defensive before the power of the state.

Fascism and Nazism brought large areas of social and economic life under state control. Both regimes created youth groups (Balilla in Italy, Hitler Youth in Germany); women's organizations (*fasci femminili* and National Socialist Womanhood, and the *Deutsche Frauenwerke*); leisure-time organizations that provided both indoctrination and entertainment for workers (*Dopolavoro*, and the German Strength through Joy); myriad official professional associations for lawyers, doctors, artists, and architects; and social welfare agencies that aimed to increase the birthrate of the "racially healthy" population (the Fascist Woman and Infants Organization, and the Nazi Welfare Organization). To encourage a higher birthrate, the two dictatorships offered housing allowances and family subsidies, forced married women out of the employment market, and imposed special taxes on the unmarried. The number of women workers declined in the Fascist era due as much to the reduced importance of agriculture and textiles as to actual Fascist policy. During the early 1930s the Fascist government closed some state employment to women, and in 1938 it imposed a 10 percent quota on female employment in the state sector and in large firms. The excess of females over males, pressure from middle-class families, and mobilization for war moderated the impact of these measures, but professional advancement was closed in many areas. Politically active women were directed into party and state women's and social welfare agencies. Neither regime closed the universities to women, although the Nazis imposed a 10 percent cap on female enrollment. Nonetheless, on the eve of the war women comprised 30 percent of German university students.

Germany. To this extent the “racial community” failed to create a new German, just as Mussolini’s “revolution” failed to create the new Fascist Italian. But the two regimes did touch almost all Italians and Germans, even those who retreated into private life, by forcing them into constant daily compromises and involving them in the many official social and economic organizations. In the end the social impact of fascism and nazism cannot be separated from the effects of the war, defeat, and occupation. Certainly in the case of Italy and Germany, the “economic miracle” of the 1950s and early 1960s changed their societies more fundamentally than anything the Fascists and Nazis did.

Differences between Fascist and Nazi regimes.

If the two regimes resembled each other in important ways, they differed in equally important regards both during and after the consolidation of power. First, the Nazis made revolutionary use of the concept of race to undermine existing legal standards and bureaucratic order, to make sweeping changes in cultural life by labeling most modern art and literature Judeo-Bolshevik, and to extend state control into the sphere of private life. The Nazis used racial laws to purge the civil service in 1933; Joseph Goebbels’s new Ministry of Propaganda (1933) began to dismantle libraries and museums with a massive, symbolic book burning in the spring of 1933; and the Nürnberg Laws of 1935 took citizenship from Jews and forbade marriage between Jews and non-Jews. Applying racial theory, the Nazis sterilized those deemed physically or mentally defective or born of mixed-race marriages. They encouraged Aryans to have children; indeed divorce was granted on grounds of infertility. In Italy the opposition of the Catholic Church made sterilization or divorce practically impossible but failed to prevent the adoption of anti-Semitic legislation in 1938 that began the physical separation of Italian Jews from Christians.

The two regimes also differed in how the state bureaucracy related to the party and its paramilitary and police organizations. In Italy the Fascist Party was subordinated to the established bureaucracy that imposed the dictatorship, therefore the party never developed its own police and security apparatus. Hitler understood that the German bureaucracy was ill suited to create his racial utopia, and to a much greater extent than in Italy, the party relied on Nazi-dominated organizations to carry out its will. Most important, the SS, the party security agency, paralleled the state security police, the Gestapo. In 1936 Heinrich Himmler merged the state and party police under his control and forged a weapon of totalitarian terror

Neither Italy nor Germany encouraged significant upward social mobility. The educational system remained a middle-class bastion. Workers in Italy suffered a significant decline in wages as a result of state-enforced salary reductions during the late 1920s and early 1930s. Prices fell more slowly, resulting in an overall decline in the standard of living. Nazi Germany reached full employment by 1936, and labor shortages kept wages from falling. Both regimes provided sufficient basic foodstuffs but neglected the consumer goods sector. Nonmonetary incentives, such as housing and family benefits, replaced wage incentives.

Both Fascist rule in Italy and Nazi rule in Germany profoundly influenced their respective societies, but it is dangerous to exaggerate their impact. Certainly large areas of working class life remained on the margins of the Fascist or Nazi consensus, and the middle and upper classes could retreat into the sphere of private life. German historians of “everyday life,” such as Detlev J. K. Peukert in *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism in Everyday Life* (1987), are aware that the Nazi regime failed to resolve any of the historic social and economic cleavages in

that had no Italian counterpart. The Italian regime rested on a highly effective police apparatus (the OVRA), widespread use of informants, censorship of the media, and even concentration camps in the late 1930s, but it did not use systematic terror.

A final distinction between the two regimes is in the culture. Most of Italian culture survived under Fascism, which applied no official doctrine to purge literature, the arts, or the universities except against overt opponents. Thus Italy's greatest artists and writers remained in the country. In contrast, the Nazis forced German writers and artists into silence or exile. The Nazis gathered much of the best European painting and sculpture in 1937 for the Exhibition of Decadent Art, which subsequently was sold, was destroyed, or disappeared into Nazi private collections.

Fascism, Nazism, and war. Fascism and Nazism were geared for war and expansion. Both regimes started from a vision of a world of narrowing opportunities in which nations and races had to struggle, expand, or die. Hitler's goal of expansion of the German state was rivaled in importance only by anti-Semitic policies. In 1933 and 1934 he assured the military that he would begin rapid rearmament. In 1936, after achieving full employment and economic recovery, the Nazis rejected economic orthodoxy for continued expansion of a war economy. From the re-

militarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 to the final disaster of World War II in 1945, Nazism embarked on a series of conquests that had no limits and involved ever-widening aims.

Fascist Italy, a much weaker state, moved more slowly. Mussolini had few options during the 1920s, when Britain and France were dominant, but the revival of Germany after 1933 gave Il Duce (the leader) his opportunity. Mussolini had the more limited ambition of replacing Britain as the dominant power in the Mediterranean. By putting his country on a war footing, he might also break the conservatives' hold over his regime and resume the push for a totalitarian society. Unfortunately for Mussolini, Italy lacked the industrial and military base to compete with Germany and Britain. Mussolini embarked on wars in Ethiopia (1935–1936), Spain (1936–1938), Albania (1939), and France, Greece, and North Africa (1940–1941). Defeat in Greece and North Africa by early 1941 meant the beginning of the end of Italian Fascism, and the regime collapsed after the Allied invasion of Sicily in early 1943. On 24–25 July 1943 Mussolini was outvoted by his fellow Fascist leaders, removed by the king, and arrested. In September, Hitler's army rescued Il Duce and restored him to power as head of a puppet Italian Social Republic that lasted until April 1945. It preceded its German ally in defeat and collapse by only a matter of weeks.

See also The World Wars and the Depression; The Jews and Anti-Semitism; Racism (volume 1); War and Conquest (volume 2); Revolutions (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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COMMUNISM



Eric D. Weitz

Communism and social democracy constituted the two major branches of the socialist movement in the twentieth century. Both were direct descendants of nineteenth-century socialism; their differing political and historical relationship to the Russian Revolution marked the essential division between them. Social Democrats were committed to liberal democratic forms of government, from which they imagined a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism would occur. Universally, they supported the February Revolution of 1917 that overthrew the tsarist regime in Russia. Almost universally, they condemned the October Revolution of 1917, by which the Bolsheviks came to power.

Led by Vladimir Ilich Lenin, the Bolsheviks were initially one faction of the Russian Social Democratic and Labor Party. In the first of a number of name changes, they became the Russian Communist Party (b) in March 1918 and the All-Union Communist Party (b) in 1925, the “b” in both cases standing for “Bolshevik,” or “Majority,” the name Lenin had dubbed his faction. In reality, the Bolsheviks had only briefly counted a majority within the Russian Social Democratic and Labor Party in the years before 1917. Their opponents, the Mensheviks, or “Minority,” were, for the most part, typically social democratic in orientation. In contrast, the Bolsheviks came to believe that they could force-pace developments in Russia, bypassing the phase of liberal capitalism to institute socialism more or less immediately. Far less worried about liberal democratic norms, they were determined to maintain party control of the state as the decisive means of creating socialism. The party itself, accorded almost mystical authority by Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders, was to be a disciplined body that would guide the revolution and mobilize the entire proletarian and peasant population for the cause of building socialism. The Bolsheviks’ open advocacy of terror against perceived opponents of the revolution inspired the greatest hostility from Social Democrats, who viewed the inherently undemocratic and brutal measures of terror as a violation of the most cherished principles of socialism.

By according the state enormous power, communism created a new, twentieth-century model of state-society relations, one that would spread from Russia and the Soviet Union to other countries in Europe and beyond in the wake of World War II. To be sure, European states going back to the early modern era promoted economic development, regulated the family and gender relations, and repressed independent expression. Especially in central and eastern Europe, states had a decisive impact upon social history. But no state prior to the twentieth century had such all-encompassing determination to mold society in accord with its ideological commitments, nor did any have the technical means to regulate society on such a vast scale. In the nations under communist party rule, the “workers’ and peasants’ state” practiced a kind of internal colonialism. The communist state had a developmental and civilizing mission to fulfill, force-pacing industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture, forging nations out of disparate ethnic groups, and, not least, creating the new communist man and woman. To accomplish these dramatic tasks, the state became a gigantic apparatus, one that also violated the most basic democratic standards.

At the same time, the state, like the party, could never simply impose its programs and goals upon society. Especially in the Soviet Union, the effort to create a specifically communist modernity ran smack against the realities of an overwhelmingly peasant society marked also by enormous ethnic diversity. In the countries of central and eastern Europe, the communist states established after 1945 also faced large peasant populations and ethnic diversity, as well as more developed middle and working classes that were often quite hostile to communism. The entreaties and commands of the states were sometimes met with resistance or, more often, sullen apathy or noncompliance. In response, the state grew still larger, while all sorts of inefficiencies and compromises were carried into its institutions. Ultimately, the immobility and apathy of significant segments of their societies sapped the communist states of legitimacy, leaving them in

wreckage all over Europe. Nonetheless, the workers' and peasants' states were able also to attract a good deal of popular support, precisely because they seemed to embody development and progress.

While the history of communism focuses heavily on state-society relations in the Soviet Union and later in its satellite states, there is also a powerful social history of communism in places like Germany, France, and Italy, where the party developed as a potent protest force. Social historians have worked to determine what types of workers and peasants were most likely to become communist. In some cases, as in the area of Bologna, Italy, communist strength owed much to regional traditions of dissent and not just to class issues. Communist movements went through various phases in wooing their constituency. Thus in France in the 1930s new attempts were made to attract young people and women by combining the communist message with social programs and even cosmetic and fashion advice. While communist trade unions were typically more intransigent than their socialist counterparts, many workers sought conventional incremental goals from the unions without much reference

to revolutionary implications. Communist participation in coalition governments right after World War II was vital to the creation of welfare states in France and Italy. Communist-controlled city governments were often very effective in providing social programs. In sum, many communist voters were able to gain not only an outlet for profound social and political grievances but also a variety of practical services as well.

SOCIALIST VARIETIES

In the nineteenth century certain strands of socialism had promoted a vision of the autonomy of workers and their communities. The ideal here was of mostly small-scale communities that were self-governed and that organized production in a common, mutual fashion. This kind of socialism, sometimes called mutualism, had strong resonance in France, Italy, Spain, and Russia. This vision echoed aspects of other efforts to establish autonomous, communal societies in Europe in earlier periods, such as those of Anabaptists in the Reformation or the more radical groups active in

the English revolutions of the seventeenth century. In the age of industrialization, these ideas found practical expression in the “houses of labor” that proliferated especially in France and Italy, which served as a kind of combined working-class hiring hall, recreational center, and site of political activism. The various forms of workers’ mutual-aid societies, from burial funds to sports associations to early trade unions, were also focal points of autonomous organization, and their supporters were often opposed to any form of state intervention.

The major theorists of socialism and communism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, were notably vague in their prescriptions for the political organization of the future communist society. Yet for all their support of the large-scale features of industrialism, they too captured some of that vision of a world of self-organization in which the state, in their classic phrase, “withered away.” Many socialists seemed to agree with that formulation. But Marx and Engels also coined another phrase, the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” which would become even more renowned. Marx seems to have meant something quite democratic, almost a Rousseauian notion of the general will. Given his view that society would divide inevitably into two classes, a great majority of proletarians versus a tiny number of powerful capitalists, it is certainly fair to assume that he understood the dictatorship of the proletariat as a situation in which the vast majority of the population would deprive the tiny number of exploiters of their political rights in order to ensure the victory of the revolution. By maintaining power over and against these exploiters, a true democracy, one that ran through all the institutions of society, the economy, family, and polity, would at last emerge.

Other socialists in the nineteenth century had an even more favorable understanding of the state. In 1848 the French socialist Louis Blanc entered the revolutionary government and convinced it to establish national workshops, a kind of state-funded employment program. Some of the utopian socialists, like Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, advocated a prominent role for the state, even the capitalist state, in improving workers’ lives and charting the path from capitalism to socialism. The German socialist Ferdinand Lassalle thought similarly. Through democratic participation, the state, over time, would evolve from its capitalist to a socialist nature.

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) became the major voice of the statist tendency in the Second International, the association of socialist parties founded in 1889. As the largest socialist party before World War I, but also because it was, after all,

German, the filial descendant of Marx and Engels, the SPD wielded great authority. Alongside its explicitly Marxist orientation, the SPD in its early years was greatly influenced by Lassalle’s followers and their pro-state position. The SPD grew significantly even in the 1880s, when many party activities were legally banned. It faced its first great ideological crisis in that same decade, when it found itself confronted with a state-run social welfare program pioneered by the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Germany was the first state to adopt the key elements of modern social welfare—accident insurance, health insurance, and old-age pensions. Bismarck viewed these measures as a way to ameliorate the difficult conditions of workers in the industrial age and to undermine the appeal of socialism by binding workers to the German state. Socialists could adopt a stance of ideological purity and spurn the social-welfare measures promoted by a semiauthoritarian, capitalist state, or they could work within the state in support of the programs. However minimal the benefits in the early years, however much they expanded the realm of state intervention in workers’ lives, the social-welfare programs were immensely popular with workers. Despite their initial opposition, most socialists quickly became advocates and only fought with the state on the size and range of the programs. By the onset of World War I, many Ger-

man state. Lenin, in short, embodied the diverse strands of socialist thinking about the state.

REVOLUTION AND THE STATE

Lenin returned in April 1917 to a Russia in the midst of revolution. He immediately raised the slogan, “All Power to the Soviets,” a call that also embodied the contradictory legacies of nineteenth-century socialism. The soviets (councils) were organized more or less spontaneously in factory meetings in which workers elected their own representatives. City soviets were then formed from the representatives of the various workplaces. The movement soon spread to the countryside and the military. “All Power to the Soviets” was seen as an arch-democratic demand, a kind of mutualism writ large, since the soviets were popularly elected, democratic organs. In Lenin’s Marxian logic, soviets would necessarily adopt the “correct” position, even if it took some convincing from the Bolshevik Party. In the heady revolutionary days of 1917, Lenin saw no contradiction between democracy and revolution, a position that seemed to be confirmed when the tide of revolution brought Bolshevik majorities in key soviets in the major cities of Petrograd and Moscow and in a few key naval regiments.

When Lenin decided the time was ripe for moving the revolution beyond its initial liberal phase, he and his supporters made certain that their revolution would be seen as the work of the soviets, not the Bolshevik Party. Formally, the revolution was organized by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, both headed by Leon Trotsky, who had moved his small group of Mensheviks into the Bolshevik Party just a few months before. For all intents and appearances, the revolution carried out on 7 November 1917 was a democratic affair of urban Russia. The program proclaimed by the new revolutionary government was highly democratic. It granted land to the village soviets, self-determination to the national minorities, and workers’ control of industry. The government also called for an immediate end to World War I without any indemnities or territorial annexations and promised to convene a constitutional convention. As the new foreign minister, Trotsky opened the safe, read aloud the secret treaties the tsarist government had signed, and theatrically announced that the ministry would issue a few proclamations and then close shop. A minimalist state backed by self-organized workers’ and peasants’ communities seemed to be in place in Russia in the autumn of 1917.

But the Bolsheviks were immediately confronted with a set of intertwining dilemmas that dramatically

man socialists worked within the local administration of the social-welfare programs and had also come to demand state mediation of labor disputes. Practically, the SPD was increasingly entwined with the state, despite the ideological hostility expressed by certain wings of the party, especially its leading ideological lights, Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg. In general, an orientation in favor of the state had come to prevail in the Second International over more anarchist-leaning, small-scale, mutualist visions that rejected the state in toto.

In one of the great ironies of history, V. I. Lenin, on the eve of the Russian Revolution, returned to the antistate position in his famous tract “State and Revolution” (1917). Lenin authored a democratic, even anarchist-sounding treatise that emphasized the withering away of the state after the proletarian revolution. Lenin gave no strict time frame for this process, but it is safe to say that it would not take eons, perhaps a generation or two. Yet at about the same time, Lenin expressed great admiration for the German state in World War I, which he imagined to be a strong, stunning exemplar of rational efficiency. Lenin envisaged revolution as a combination of proletarian (or party) power and the organizational capacities of the Ger-

posed the problem of the relationship between state and society under a revolutionary regime. With all the hubris of revolutionaries, the Bolsheviks presumed that they knew the correct course (even when there were shifts in specific policies) for Russia and expected workers and peasants to follow suit. But what would happen if workers did not choose to follow the course laid out by the party? Moreover, the revolution had basically been staged in Petrograd and Moscow. The Bolsheviks had taken power through an urban revolution combined with a peasant revolt. Politically, peasants were fickle, willing to support the Bolsheviks when they promised land but by no means committed to the overall political vision of a socialist revolution. How were the Bolsheviks to engineer a revolution in such a minimally developed society? To complicate matters further, the Bolsheviks had seized power in an empire with a dizzying array of ethnic and national groups. How could support be found for a socialist revolution amid this diversity, when ethnicity was often a more critical identity marker than class? In responding to these dilemmas, the Bolsheviks would find that they could not simply impose their ideology and institutions upon society.

The first breach in the putative democratic nature of the young Bolshevik state came very quickly. In January 1918, just a few months after the Bolshevik seizure of power, a constitutional convention convened in Petrograd. The Bolsheviks had won substantial representation in the elections but were still in a minority, while the populist, peasant-based Social Revolutionary Party had garnered the largest proportion of votes. The convention was summarily dismissed by the Bolshevik-controlled Red Guards.

The key event that would define the future development of the state was the civil war that erupted in the spring of 1918. The war was fought on many fronts and included intervention by armies of other European nations and the United States, which allied with the counterrevolutionary forces. The conflict drove home to the Bolsheviks just how tenuous their position was and how much they needed an effective state to remain in power. Building on Lenin's imagination of the German state as a highly efficient, well-oiled machine (never mind the fact that Germany lost World War I), the Bolsheviks proclaimed the policy of War Communism, in which the state seized control of the whole economy and sought to mobilize the entire society to the Bolshevik cause. For some Bolsheviks, notably Nikolai Bukharin, War Communism was not just an emergency policy but the very expression of the new socialist society, which had now abolished private ownership of the means of production. Yet War Communism was a ludicrous policy that

failed miserably. The Russian state lacked the depth of its German counterpart, lacked its tradition of efficiency and competence. The Russian empire was sprawling, and it was far more difficult to direct hundreds of thousands of independent peasant landholdings than it was, in Germany, to issue orders to, say, four major firms of the steel industry or the six companies that dominated the chemical industry. Under War Communism, industrial production ground nearly to a halt, and peasants, faced with continual crop seizures, simply stopped sowing. For the first time, the Bolsheviks faced the tenacity of society, which was far greater, its malleability much less, than they had imagined.

War requires an army, and in the modern world armies are put into the field by states. The Bolsheviks had the nucleus of an army in the militias, the Red Guards, formed in the summer of 1917, who played a critical role in the execution of the revolution. But the Red Guards were somewhat unruly and hardly capable of fighting on the many fronts of the civil war. Lenin appointed Trotsky military commissar in March 1918, and it was he who displayed both organizational brilliance and ruthlessness in bringing to life the Red Army. Trotsky imposed a disciplinary regimen worthy of the Prussian kings or the Russian tsars but now combined with the ideological fervor of revolution. In creating an effective army, Trotsky contributed mightily to the emergence of a powerful state.

Still more chillingly, Trotsky created an army that practiced terror. The Bolsheviks were very open in their advocacy of terror, by which they understood the state's systematic application of extraordinary means of repression against opponents of the revolution. They published articles in newspapers extolling terror and openly debated Russian and Western socialists who were appalled at the level of violence in the Russian Revolution. Lenin issued a blistering attack on the German Social Democrat Karl Kautsky, while Trotsky displayed rhetorical brilliance and theoretical vacuity. He argued that the violence of the revolution served the higher goals of socialism and human freedom, while the violence of capitalism, no less endemic, only prolonged injustice.

The Red Army was not the only agency of terror. In December 1917 the Bolshevik state established the first of the many secret police agencies that would play such a profound role in Soviet life, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Fight Counterrevolution, known by its Russian acronym, Cheka. As the institutions of force within the state, the Red Army and the Cheka conducted arbitrary arrests and executions and seized as hostages the families of counterrevolutionaries. Perhaps most drastically, the

Bolsheviks deported entire villages in the Don and Kuban Cossack regions. The villagers were accused en masse of counterrevolutionary activities. This dramatic display of state power was sometimes accompanied by a biological rhetoric that made Cossack peasants into pariahs, incapable ever of incorporation into the new society. These people could not be “civilized” into good socialists; instead, society had to be protected from them by their utter exclusion.

The Bolsheviks ultimately triumphed in the civil war, but it was a costly victory. The cities, so central to the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, had become denuded of their populations. Many of the Bolsheviks’ most fervent supporters had been killed in the civil war. Peasants had stopped sowing; industry stopped producing. Famine was widespread. Fatefully, a strong element of militarism came to define Bolshevik culture. Many of the Bolshevik leaders adopted military dress. Iron discipline, already an ideal of Lenin, became ever more prized with the sense that the revolution was made by military might. The heroic male proletarian, who leaves the factory, rifle in hand, to defend the revolution, became an ideal that far surpassed the young woman who also fought for the revolution or labored in the factories. Revolutionary militarism meant a renewed and more fervent centering of masculine power within the institutions of party and state.

The disastrous situation at the end of the civil war forced the state to relax its grip on society. Right at the end of the civil war the Bolsheviks convened for their Tenth Congress. Surveying the devastation before him, Lenin made a strategically brilliant retreat: the state would retain control only of the “commanding heights” of the economy, banks and large-scale industry. Trade and small-scale industry would be afforded, if not exactly free rein, at least a wide range of liberties. Most importantly, the peasants would pay a fixed tax in kind and could then dispose freely of any surplus. To many Bolsheviks, this New Economic Policy (NEP) marked a restoration of capitalism and betrayal of the revolution. For others, it was a strategic retreat born of necessity. Still others, like Bukharin, who radically revised his previous support for War Communism, would come to see in NEP the possibilities for a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism.

The new policy came to pass along with one last great convulsion of the civil war, the revolt of sailors at Kronstadt in March 1921. The Kronstadt naval garrison had been a major supporter of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Now its sailors revolted against the suppression of democratic liberties and the desolate conditions in the countryside, from which many

of the sailors hailed. “Soviets without Bolsheviks,” their slogan went, invoking the democratic promise of 1917. It was an eery, sad comment on the entire course of events since October 1917. The Bolsheviks suppressed the revolt, with many of the delegates to the Tenth Congress joining the charge across the frozen Neva River, revolver in hand, to storm the garrison. The contradictions of the revolution—the state’s claim to represent the will of the people, its suppression of their will when the people found the Bolshevik state woefully wanting—were laid bare.

BUILDING THE STATE, CREATING THE NEW MAN AND WOMAN

If there was ever a golden period in the Soviet Union, it was the 1920s. The state still exercised repression, but in comparison with what came before and would come afterward, its hand was relatively light. The range of free expression was fairly broad. The economy revived and artistic experimentation flourished. Yet two fundamental structural features emerged in the 1920s. First, the Soviet Union, a federated republic of socialist states, formally came into being at the end of 1922. (From this point it is convenient to speak of Soviets and Communists rather than Russians and Bolsheviks.) Issues of ethnic, national, and religious diversity were now built into the union as a central feature of its existence. Furthermore, the institutions of party and state became formalized. Names would change, reforms would occur, but the essential features of all communist parties and states for the entire twentieth century were firmly established in the 1920s. For the party, the leading organs were the Central Committee, Central Control Commission, and Politburo. For the state, the parallel institutions were the All-Union Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive Committee of the Congress, and the Presidium. The “leading role” of the party was firmly stated in many of the constitutions of Soviet-style states and, practically, by the fact that leading personnel occupied both party and state positions. While the party and state had, technically, discrete functions, the twentieth-century neologism of “party-state” accurately captures the effective intertwining of the two.

In the relative calm of the 1920s, the communist state also articulated more clearly programs designed to forge the new Soviet man and woman. “Forge,” a term widely used at the time, conjures up the communist emphasis on the economy and state. Like the metal that emerges out of the blast furnace, the new man and woman would be “produced” through the application of human intelligence and

skill. People could not be left to develop on their own but would be crafted by labor, in this case the labor of the workers' and peasants' state.

Propaganda and mobilization, but also repression, constituted the key techniques of this labor. The ideals of socialism were propagated everywhere in the Soviet Union in the 1920s—in schools, institutes, workplaces, academies, the army. A veritable explosion of print culture emerged in the 1920s, as leaflets, pamphlets, and books espousing the ideals of socialism and the campaigns of the Soviet state were disseminated throughout society. New media also expanded dramatically in this period, as the Soviets quickly adopted radio and film for its propaganda drives. Much of the artistic expressiveness of the 1920s, the creation of a variety of modernist genres, served also to disseminate socialist ideas.

But it was also through “practical work,” through the mobilization of people in all sorts of campaigns, that the new Soviet man and woman were to be created. Mobilizing university students to teach literacy, urban workers to aid in the harvest, peasants to become involved in the organization of atheists, men to join the Red Army, women to volunteer in orphanages, committed Bolsheviks to work in the Cheka—these were all forms of activism through which men and women would learn the tenets of socialism and become solid citizens of the socialist state. They would reform themselves and those under their tutelage, a civilizing mission not totally unlike other reform efforts in the Western world in the modern period. The result would be ideologically schooled, self-disciplined people who worked selflessly for socialist development. For men, the ideal had profound militaristic connotations, conveyed by the Soviet posters of the period that invariably portrayed muscled men either producing or defending the revolution, hammer or rifle in hand. For women, the ideal was more disparate. Sometimes heroines of the revolution were depicted in fighting formation; other times they were shown as producers or as communist versions of the modern “new woman” of the 1920s—thin, athletic, active in society, and boundlessly happy. But in the 1920s, and still more in the 1930s, maternalist imagery was also prevalent, as if the socialist new woman could somehow combine all of these roles. For both men and women, socialist morality signified serious self-disciplining, a regularized, not promiscuous, sexuality, an aversion to drink and cigarettes and any other superfluous consumption beyond the strict necessities of life, and a devotion to work and politics. In 1936 the Soviet state adopted the pronatalist rhetoric and politics common to many Western countries, including a ban on abortions.

The image of the new socialist man and woman was not propagated only domestically. For all of its particularly Russian characteristics, the revolution and the Soviet Union were very much international phenomena. The Communist Party sought to influence workers and socialists all over Europe and beyond. The major agency for that task was the Communist International (or Comintern), founded in 1919 in Moscow. In the language of the day, the Comintern was to be the “general staff” of the worldwide revolution. Ultimately, the Comintern became the vehicle of Russian control over other national communist parties in Europe and beyond. But for many activists, the Comintern embodied the ideals of international proletarian solidarity against the exploitations and injustices of capitalism. Usually under the auspices of the Comintern, thousands and thousands of communists from around the world came to the Soviet Union and received political and military training in various academies and institutes.

It is impossible to gauge how successful was this vision of the socialist new man and woman that the state promoted in the Soviet Union. Certainly, repression was ever present, even in the 1920s, and ran in tandem with the more positive-sounding aspects of the socialist culture program. Only a minority of the population sought to emulate the ideal in toto. But the partisans of socialism comprised a critical minority. They were the activists in the socialist state, and without their services, the more drastic campaigns of the Stalin era could not have prevailed, nor could the Soviet Union have triumphed over the German invaders in the 1940s. After World War II, many of the foreign communists who had also been inspired by the ideals and had received training in the Soviet Union would play key roles in the communist movements in their home countries.

THE WAR AGAINST SOCIETY

On the economic terrain, grain supply remained a critical problem in the 1920s even though the peasants returned to sowing and harvesting. Moreover, the growing social differentiation in the countryside worried the communists. The real differences between a kulak, a wealthy peasant, and other agricultural toilers were usually quite minimal, but that did not stop the communists from expending great effort to classify and categorize the rural population. The kulak might have had a draft animal or two and hired labor to help out on his land. (Technically, the land was owned by the village soviet, then distributed to individual households.) While kulaks constituted perhaps 5 percent

of the rural population, they accounted for around 40 percent of the marketed grain. They held therefore a critical position in the economy. Three times the kulaks went on a grain strike—that is, they refused to bring their grain to market, counting on the government to increase the price. In the meantime, Joseph Stalin had accumulated enormous powers through his control of the party organization and its political bodies. (Formally, his powers were based on his position as general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1953, to which he added many other titles over the years, especially in World War II.) By the late 1920s, Stalin had prevailed in the intraparty factional conflicts. To Stalin and some other leading communists, peasant grain strikes threatened the authority of the state, the very existence of the revolution. He and his supporters had few scruples against deploying state power to rectify the situation.

The outcome was the massive deployment of force against the peasantry, first through grain requisitions that began at the very end of 1928, and then through the forced collectivization of peasant landholdings. These events, which extended into the mid-1930s, constituted the single greatest clash between state and society in the Soviet Union. It was a conflict between a state bent on economic development and human transformation and a vast, largely immobile rural population, wedded to private peasant landholdings and traditional ways of life, who resisted the state's drive to transform radically and unalterably conditions in agriculture. The state sent Red Army detachments into the countryside, along with elite groups of party workers, often idealistic youth. The definition of a kulak came to mean anyone who resisted the program of collectivization. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of peasants—the exact numbers remain disputed—were imprisoned or sent to labor

camps in Siberia (known by their Russian acronym, the Gulag). Many died in transit or from the extremely harsh conditions of the Gulag. In the early 1930s the ineptness of state policies led to horrendous famine in the Ukraine and northern Caucasus. As many as 6 million people may have died from the ravages of hunger. While some scholars argue that the state deliberately promoted the famine in order to break peasant resistance and to suppress Ukrainian nationalism, it seems more likely that it resulted from indifference and ineptness, though the root cause certainly was the deployment of massive force against rural society.

Concomitant with forced collectivization, Stalin initiated the rapid, state-directed industrialization drive, embodied in the series of five-year plans, the first of which was launched in 1928. Economically, the program constituted a huge superexploitation of the still largely peasant society. Whatever resources the state extracted, it channeled into the heavy industrial sector, and the Soviet Union became an industrial powerhouse. Economic development, then, went hand in hand with the massive buildup of the state. Typical of the Stalin era and its emphasis on grand scale were such massive projects as the White Sea Canal, built with convict labor in appalling conditions, and Magnitogorsk, the gigantic steel complex that arose out of almost nothing. Designed to be a model Soviet city, Magnitogorsk eventually produced great amounts of steel, but the community surrounding it endured unpaved roads, crowded apartments that rapidly deteriorated, and inadequate plumbing.

The massive, state-directed efforts of collectivization and industrialization irrevocably transformed Soviet society. The population became immensely mobile—a “quicksand society,” in the words of the historian Moshe Lewin—and more urbanized. The palpable presence of the state extended into virtually every geographic area however remote, into every family. Out of a population of around 170 million, 16 to 19 million peasants left their villages in the 1930s to enter the urban, industrial workforce. The number of cities with over 100,000 inhabitants rose in the 1930s from thirty-one to eighty-nine. The migrants were preponderantly young and male and often skilled; they left the village populations disproportionately older and female, trends that the ravages of World War II would only accentuate. Out of some 25 million individual peasant households, the state created 240,000 collective farms.

The state, then, won the battles for collectivization and industrialization, but at great cost. Despite very substantial economic growth in the 1930s and then again in the 1950s and 1960s, state-directed de-

velopment built all sorts of inefficiencies into the economy. Clearly, the absence of adequate pricing mechanisms and the inattentiveness to markets caused structural inefficiencies. But so did the laggard, slothful work discipline typical of Soviet labor. Assured of employment and at least a minimal existence by the state, presented with few material incentives for hard labor, people worked slowly and inefficiently, if perhaps more humanely, as least by Western capitalist standards. Political repression ensured that peasants could not strike or rebel, but like their counterparts in so many parts of the world, they responded to the demands placed upon them with a baleful indifference. In contrast, they lavished great attention on their private plots, when these were made available to them alongside the collective farms, notably in the 1950s under Nikita Khrushchev. The slow, lumbering character of collective-farm and industrial labor somehow became replicated in the state, which for all its powers displayed many of these same attributes. Society was not infinitely malleable, and the very processes that made the state huge also made it hugely inefficient.

Along with collectivization and industrialization, the systematic exercise of political terror in the 1930s constituted the third element in the massive buildup of the state. To the extent that the terror had any rationality, its goal seems to have been the elimination of all possible political opposition, the full consolidation of Stalin’s personal power in the party-state. If collectivization was a war against the peasantry, the Great Terror of 1936–1938 was a war against the party, but one that spilled over into the society at large. Terror, by its very nature, has an accelerating dynamic. In the infamous show trials, many of the leading figures of the revolution were deemed “enemies of the people” and subsequently executed. By 1938, only a handful of old Bolsheviks still sat in the Central Committee; fully 70 percent of the Central Committee members elected in 1934 were sent to the labor camps or executed. The officer corps of the Red Army was similarly affected, as were leading officials in the economic sector and in the Foreign Ministry. But all sorts of individuals, some with no political position whatsoever, found themselves denounced and subject to the arbitrary powers of the state. The system of labor camps expanded dramatically in this period and assumed an important role in the economy, particularly in extraction industries like mining and lumbering. More recent research in Soviet archives has shown that a significant movement in and out of the camps emerged—sentencing was not a one-way ticket. Still, thousands upon thousands of people languished in the Gulag, to be freed only in

the 1950s, while many others died from the extremely harsh conditions.

Yet another form of oppression appeared in the 1930s, that of particular ethnic groups. In the 1920s, the Soviets state had first implemented the policy of *korenizatsiia*, or indigenization. In the Soviet view, articulated by Stalin in “Marxism and the National Question” (1913), the nation represented a particular stage of historical development but also had a certain timeless quality to it based on the cultural distinctions among peoples. Progress toward socialism could only come through the national form. Hence in the 1920s, through “indigenization,” the Soviets promoted national languages and national elites. National soviets were established, and in a number of cases ethnic Russians were forcibly removed to give indigenous groups greater access to resources. Soviet scholars gave oral languages and dialects written form, and the state consolidated some tribes and ethnic groups and handed them a common language.

But a vital change came with the proclamation of the new constitution in 1936, which, in Stalinist eyes, gave legal form to the triumph of socialism. The nobility and the tsarist state, then the bourgeoisie, had been defeated. Class enemies as social groups no longer existed within the Soviet Union, just wayward individuals. And nations still existed. The very concept of essential nations that had underpinned the development of nationalities in the 1920s and early 1930s now also underpinned the attack on “suspect” nations. Over the course of the 1930s the objects of persecution shifted from class enemies to “enemies of the people,” which slid easily into “enemy nations.” As a result, beginning in the 1930s and accelerating during the war years, a variety of ethnic groups were deported in the most horrendous conditions from their historic areas of settlement, including Koreans, Chechens, Ingush, Greeks, Germans, and others. By categorizing and searching out all the members of the targeted groups, the Soviet state essentially racialized ethnicity and nationality even though the Soviets explicitly rejected the ideology of race. The state acted as if the qualities that made the members of a particular group dangerous were immutable and transgenerational, carried by every single individual necessarily and inevitably.

All told, around 3.5 million people were removed in these ethnic deportations. According to recent investigations, death rates from the exigencies of the deportations ranged from 9 percent for the Chechens to 46 percent for the Crimean Tatars. And in 1952–1953, it seems that plans were underway for the deportation of the Jewish community. Only Stalin’s death in 1953 staved off this possibility.

The vast growth in the exercise of state terror and state repression from the late 1920s into the early 1950s meant that a profound element of fear and guilt crept into social relations, a characteristic best depicted in Russian literature, such as Anna Akhmatova’s searing poem, “The Requiem,” Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s *Gulag Archipelago* (1973–1975), Varlam Shalamov’s *Kolyma Tales* (1978), or Vasily Grossman’s *Forever Flowing* (1970). The screeching sound of the “Black Marias,” the secret police autos; the knock on the door at night; the denunciation by one’s neighbors; the fearful and secretly joyous silence when a colleague suddenly disappeared, making an office or a promotion available to those who remained—these constituted part of the realities of social relations.

At the same time, the massive uprooting of society created not only a world of fear but also one of opportunities and of confidence in the developmental possibilities of the socialist future. The industrial and agrarian economies had insatiable needs for skilled workers and technicians, and those who could find themselves a spot in technical institutes or universities had unparalleled opportunities for upward mobility. The state deliberately favored children of peasant and working-class backgrounds, granting them unprecedented opportunities for education and advancement. At the same time, the downward mobility of the former privileged classes eased slightly. The 1936 constitution that proclaimed the victory of socialism formally abolished the *lishentsy* (disenfranchised) class. Now all Soviet citizens were considered equal, though social prejudices against those from formerly privileged classes remained quite strong.

The programs that began in the late 1920s, from collectivization to terror, conjured up waves of commitment, especially among youthful Soviet citizens. Stalinism represented for many of them the path out of backwardness, a mixture of nationalism and socialism that inspired pride in the country’s development and in the prospects of “building socialism.” Fear and terror there were, but they were not the only aspects of the Soviet reality of the 1930s.

WAR AND THE EXPANSION OF THE SOVIET-STYLE STATE

The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 wrought great devastation, human and material, on Soviet soil. Close to 20 million Soviet citizens died in the course of World War II. The defense and then the rollback of German forces required immense sacrifices. Through all this, the basic institutions of state and society held their ground. Indeed, the repressive,

even murderous, side of state policies in some ways accelerated—as the escalation of ethnic and national purges and the maintenance of the Gulag system indicate—even while the population rallied to the defense of the Soviet system against the foreign invaders. At the same time, building on the gender policies of the 1930s, a far more conservative tenor entered into Soviet life. A crass, essentialized Russian nationalism became more and more pronounced. The state did not even shy away from invoking its adversaries of the past, the church and the tsars, as a way of solidifying Russian nationalist sentiment in the struggle against the Germans.

At the end of the war the Red Army, having borne the brunt of the fighting for so many years, was successfully situated all across central and eastern Europe. Communist parties in France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and elsewhere had played leading roles in the resistance against Nazi occupation. As a result, they emerged in 1945 as vibrant movements with a great deal of popular support. Indeed, communism reached its high point in Europe between 1943, the beginning of full-scale resistance, and 1956, the year of Khrushchev's speech condemning the crimes of Stalin and of the deployment of Soviet troops against the Hungarian uprising.

Communist parties participated in most Western European governments in the immediate postwar years. In Yugoslavia, a unique case, the party had come to power by playing the decisive role in the resistance. It fought successful military campaigns against both the German occupiers and Yugoslav conservatives and fascists and was able to retain power despite the hostility of the Soviets, who resented the independence of the Yugoslav communists. In the West, communists were quickly driven out of governments with the onset of the Cold War in 1947 and 1948. In France and Italy communists were still able to retain enormous influence in the trade unions and other associations of the labor movement as well as in local government, all of which enabled them to pressure successfully for higher wages and improved social benefits for their working-class constituencies. By the 1980s that influence was waning. Communist voting rates in France began to decline in that decade, causing the party to resort to tactics such as hostility to immigration. The Italian party, long more flexible than the French in its willingness to collaborate with other elements, also began to fade.

In Eastern Europe, in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic, the Soviets were able, in a few short years, to bring to power communist parties loyal to the Soviet Union. Scholars argue fiercely about whether

this was the intent of the Soviets from the moment World War II began or whether they had more varied and flexible (or confused) policies that only became fixed and uniform in the context of the emergence of the Cold War between 1945 and 1949. Certainly, the great transformation of power relations within Europe, the utter devastation of Germany, and the surge between 1943 and 1948 of anti-Nazi resistance, mass worker protests, and Communist Party activism in so many countries created a fluid and unprecedented situation. The Baltic states (incorporated directly into the Soviet Union since 1939), Poland, and Bulgaria were probably slated for complete Communist Party control early on, while it is possible that more diverse political solutions would have been acceptable in some of the other countries, especially if a unified, neutral Germany had been established. "Third-way" social and political orders, somewhere between liberal capitalism and Soviet-style socialism, might have become a reality.

But the onset of the Cold War and Stalin's own deep paranoia drastically narrowed the political options by the end of the 1940s. In the Soviet bloc, a uniform pattern was created among the "people's democracies," as they came to be called. (The pattern included the GDR even though it never was called a "people's democracy." As the remains of a divided power and situated on the front lines of the Cold War, the GDR always had a peculiar status.) In all the countries, Communist Party power was secured through the usual mechanisms—an extensive security apparatus, state control over industry and agriculture, and party control over the state. This pattern persisted for the fifty years from the late 1940s onward. Moreover, the state, as in the Soviet Union, had a developmental function. It collectivized agriculture and promoted the development of industry, heavy industry in particular. Both processes occurred on a significant scale throughout the region in the late 1940s and 1950s. The social structure became transformed as people left farming and the villages for industry and the cities. Warsaw, Lodz, Bucharest, Pilsen, and many other cities grew significantly; social mobility intensified as the regimes favored the children of working-class and peasant backgrounds. The huge bureaucracies of communist states also offered avenues of mobility and a means of binding large segments of the population to the system. The state also exercised the heavy hand of repression, most drastically in the early 1950s.

The communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe were, from the outset, more developed and complex than Soviet society of the 1930s. They had more significant industrial bases and more varied social structures. Over twenty years of experience with eco-

conomic planning in the Soviet Union had laid bare many of the inefficiencies of strict central control. To varying degrees and in response to internal social pressures, the communist states experimented with slightly different models from the strict command model that persisted in the Soviet Union. The Poles gave up on collectivized agriculture; the Hungarians introduced market mechanisms in the 1960s. Only East Germany, loyal to the Soviet model to the end, carried out further nationalizations of remaining small businesses in the 1970s.

Economic development also helped create the demise of the very system that promoted it. By the late 1950s, communist states had made material improvements the mark of success of their own system. They promised their populations the consumer life on a scale comparable with the West, yet with the social protections afforded by communism. But the inefficiencies of centrally planned economies, no matter if they had some more flexibilities than the Soviets, could not compete with Western capitalist economies, especially in the more aggressive and competitive global markets in the last decades of the twentieth century. The dead weight of state repression prevented any serious reform efforts and continually antagonized substantial segments of the population. Key professional groups desired autonomy and consideration of their interests within the state. Gradually, new public spheres emerged. In the Soviet Union, the public sphere was largely composed of intellectuals who ran great risks of imprisonment in horrendous circumstances. In Poland, workers rebelled in 1956, 1968, and 1979–1980. Slowly and with difficulty, a common opposition was formed between workers and in-

tellectuals, with significant support from the Catholic Church. In Czechoslovakia a significant reform movement developed within the ranks of the party, only to be crushed by Soviet intervention in 1968. Afterward, an opposition of intellectuals created an underground community that periodically surfaced with public pronouncements in favor of democratic liberties and curbs on state power.

Ultimately, the communist states faced the tenacity of their societies, the sullen resentments against the all-encompassing claims of the party-states and their attempts to infiltrate all dimensions of social relations. Society's self-distancing from the state deprived communism of all legitimacy, even among its own leaders, who by the 1980s seemed more like ossified powerholders than champions of the socialist cause. Within a few short years, by the early 1990s, the systems would all be gone, swept away by the party's inability to manage internal reform in the Soviet Union and by waves of popular protests. Societies took their revenge upon the states that sought to mold, regulate, and repress them. At the same time, these societies were very different from those that had first spawned the socialist and communist movements in the epoch of industrialization; they were more complex, more educated, more white-collar. With the exception of Poland and Romania, the key roles in the revolutions of 1989–1991 were played not by workers, the quintessential activists and protesters of the industrial age, but by students, intellectuals, and the technical intelligentsia. The demise of communism was symptomatic of the end of the classic epoch of industrialization and of the labor movement, socialist and communist, that emerged alongside it.

See also Marxism and Radical History (volume 1); Socialism (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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BUREAUCRACY



Don K. Rowney

“Bureaucracy” is a name given to hierarchical authority structures in modern, complex organizations. Historically, the term has applied to state organizations and to the structure of the behavior of officials until well into the twentieth century. Increasingly, after World War I, bureaucracy has been a concept and term that scholars have applied to firms and large civic organizations, often with the implications of cumbersome inefficiency and impersonal insensitivity in dealings with the public or clients.

BUREAUCRACY AS A CONCEPT AND ORGANIZATIONAL TYPE

Scholars’ use of the terms “bureaucracy” and “bureaucratization” is largely owing to the influence of the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), who applied it mainly to agencies of the state. But to think of a bureaucracy merely as an office for the transaction of public business is similar to thinking of supersonic aircraft as a means of conveyance from point A to point B. Historically, the term has embodied an array of political, cultural, and philosophical viewpoints that, in turn, reflect the increasingly pervasive and intrusive presence of state and other large organizations into the modern history of European society. The continuing interest in Weber’s work on this process, and the important contributions to this body of scholarship by students and critics of Weber, oblige any extended consideration of bureaucracy to be as much a history of ideas as one of institutions.

Students of modern European history often associate the extension of state administration with the “inevitable” secularization, rationalization, and extension of royal household functions. These developments are characterized as responding to the increasing complexity of military and political functions, commercial and industrial enterprise, as well as to urbanization and the European compulsion to create impersonal legal authorities in public life. This view is especially associated with Weber’s work. Weber’s

near monopoly over thinking about bureaucracy and bureaucratization in modern Europe, however, did not take hold until the 1960s. Between the time of his death in 1920 and the mid-twentieth century—an era that witnessed an explosion in the number and scope of bureaucratic organizations—Weber’s influence in Europe generally, and in Germany specifically, was comparatively limited. With the appearance in the 1950s and 1960s of several important studies of his work and influence by scholars such as Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and the convening of the Fifteenth Congress of the German Sociological Association in 1964, commemorating the centenary of his birth, the dominance of Weberian views of bureaucracy and bureaucratic development—the process of bureaucratization—was assured.


In the English-speaking world, Talcott Parsons’s *Structure of Social Action* (1937) stimulated interest in German sociology and Weber’s ideas about the origins of capitalism and bureaucracy in modern Europe. Later in his career, Parsons would adopt a more nuanced and critical view of Weberian organizational behavior. Nevertheless, Parsons’s early understanding of Weber and bureaucratic structural development reinforced the growing importance of structural functionalism in the 1940s and 1950s and the work of the most influential American student of Weber, Reinhard Bendix.

Interpretations of Weber’s understanding of bureaucracy are, in fact, based on syntheses of a vast and diverse array of his writings, in particular *Economy and Society*, *The Religion of China*, *The Religion of India*, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, and *General Economic History*. Owing, moreover, to a proliferation of special editions and translations (especially into English) of Weber’s original works, it can be difficult to trace the provenance of Weber’s most famous and influential theories, including his views on bureaucracy and bureaucratization. This accounts, at least in part, for the continuing controversy over what Weber actually understood the phenomenon to be.

Weber thought that authority structures were the core of social organization but that such structures required validation, or legitimation, by underlying social values. Across an extraordinary range of historical and sociological studies, Weber developed a typology of authority that, depending upon historical circumstances, was reducible to one of three forms: traditional, charismatic, or legal. He thought, moreover, that legal authority was most (although not exclusively) typical of modern societies and expected this authority to broaden its scope and intensify over time. A continuing point of controversy among students of Weber is whether this view of authority and its role in society was prescriptive (or normative) or merely descriptive. In any case, the extension of written legal norms, together with an increasing dependence upon rational (as opposed, for example, to religious) standards of conduct in public life demanded the creation of the organizational structures and behavior that he called bureaucratic. While Weber recognized the importance of bureaucracies in premodern societies, he thought that the fusion of legal norms and rationality with such characteristics of modern life as complex technology, large concentrations of population, and widespread education created a circle of social, political, and economic energies that continually stimulated bureaucratic development in the contemporary world.

Although Weber's view of bureaucracy was explicitly and expertly rooted in historical research, his work, for the most part, does not seem intended to serve as detailed narrative descriptions of the emergence of modern state administrations. Thus, while histories of state and large nonstate bureaucracies written by other scholars are "Weberian" in the sense that they quite frequently draw upon Weber's ideas and use his terminology, the narratives themselves—their factual foundations and developmental sequences—often differ markedly from Weber's. Moreover, as is shown below, there are intellectual perspectives upon which one can draw for constructing and interpreting historical narratives of administrative development that are quite distinct from those that adopt the viewpoint that the history of administration is, in fact, the history of "bureaucratization."

One way of distinguishing schools of different historical narratives that use Weber's concepts and terminology is to ask how they understand the preconditions or generative circumstances for European bureaucratic development. These schools fall into two broad categories. The first is a school of political culture that lays great emphasis on a specific combination of historical circumstances—the need of central governments (usually monarchies) for the management



Max Weber was born in Germany and grew up during the Second Empire, an era of remarkable efflorescence in the arts, science, and politics. The son of a successful lawyer, he was educated in the classics and received collegiate and postgraduate training at the Universities of Heidelberg, Göttingen, and Berlin, primarily in law. Eventually he received an appointment as a professor of economics at the University of Freiburg and, later, the University of Heidelberg. Weber's analyses of social structures, religion, and social behavior pervaded North American sociological writing from the late 1930s until the 1980s. His influence in Europe was more restricted than in the United States until the post–World War II period. He continues to dominate scholarship in the field of bureaucracy, although this influence is more limited today owing to increased use by firms and governmental bodies of research from fields such as organizational psychology.

of increasingly complex organizations of growing size and an increasing reliance, over time, upon formal legislation that serves as rules of public conduct. The second is a school of explanation based in economics that owes much to the rise, in the nineteenth century, of large-scale manufacturing and commercial enterprises. Although this work is often set within a Weberian frame of terminology, it also often integrates the analytic and interpretive work of Adam Smith and Karl Marx. Literally, of course, the two schools do not form exclusive categories; in fact, Weber himself frequently combined economics and political culture as independent variables in models or typologies of bureaucratic development.

NARRATIVES OF BUREAUCRATIC DEVELOPMENT: BUREAUCRATIZATION

It is not difficult to find examples of hierarchical and functionally specialized bodies of officials in medieval Europe (for example, in both the court offices of the Holy Roman Empire and the curia of the Roman Catholic Church). Nevertheless, the transformation of secular territorial administrations into specialized administrations for war, finance, the operations of royal courts, and diplomatic and tax administration is generally a phenomenon of the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries throughout Europe, and not just in western and northern Europe, as some narratives would have it. Certain central government roles (such as taxation and warfare), however, were often coopted by regional territorial authorities or even transformed into commercial activities, with the erstwhile official—a tax farmer or a mercenary soldier, for example—assuming an entrepreneurial role between the state and the taxpayer. Thus it is difficult to find examples of the bureaucratization of state functions that develop in a linear process, moving straight from a traditional, patriarchal system rooted in the society of the royal court to a full-blown system of specializations and hierarchy legitimated by law and rationality.

Part of the reason why bureaucratization (or administrative development of any kind) was tentative and subject to reversal is owing to the limited functions of European states in society before 1800. Generally speaking, even in the eighteenth century state roles were overwhelmingly monopolized by waging war, preparing for war, and paying for recently concluded wars. Other state or court functions were comparatively modest, confined to intermittent diplomacy, the formal organization of the court itself, and, of course, the comparatively complicated functions of

administering tax collections. As Fernand Braudel notes in *The Wheels of Commerce*, these fiscal operations were more smoothly accomplished in some states than in others. But, over time, the political control of military organizations and technology and especially management of the expense of warfare, obliged states to create offices that were staffed by full-time trained officials. As Weber notes, such individuals were often drawn, early on, from the clergy. These constituted one of the few small reservoirs of men in western Europe who were both educated and independent of the landed nobility with whom the monarch often competed.

Gradually, European states began to reach into unattended spheres of social life or, at any rate, to assume responsibility for activities previously in the charge of religious organizations, local communities, and families. For example, some states began, in the eighteenth century, to take an interest in primary education, the redistribution of land, the technical education of farmers, and relief of the circumstances of the poor. The resulting modest extensions of state roles became an occasion for bureaucratization. Eighteenth-century extensions of state roles into uncharted social waters were also often the occasion of virulent political debates over the quality and substance of state administrative roles, their efficiency, honesty, and what today would be called their cost-effectiveness.

Most famously, the effect of the English cleric Thomas Malthus's *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798) was to convince some policymakers that the only effect of poor relief could be to enlarge the numbers of the poor through encouraging reproduction by a proportion similar to the degree of aid. Applied without limit, such unwise but well-intended aids would extend the problem of want indefinitely until all economic resources were exhausted. By the early nineteenth century, political confrontations over such issues introduced additional elements into what Weber would see as a self-reinforcing circle of bureaucratic enhancement. Demands for increased efficiency, reduced corruption, and the introduction of university-educated officials who, in contrast with officials of earlier generations, were not necessarily members of noble social elites or the clergy would intensify the process of bureaucratization itself.

This new era in the development of state administration often involved the expansion of bureaucracy into previously undergoverned segments of society and began the very slow inclusion of social groups—castes or classes—that previously were excluded from state roles. These developments, in turn, were accompanied by a growing need for formally

specified organizational roles, a clearly defined authority structure, and rules that protected and legally defined the authority of officials who were not necessarily born into the ruling classes. By the nineteenth century the demand for administrators who were educated in the increasingly secular settings of universities or in institutions specially designed for the training of state officials, as in France, was strong and growing.

As John Armstrong notes in *The European Administrative Elite* (1973), however, various artificial roadblocks to the inclusion of lower classes in state administration were virtually universal. As a consequence, at least up to World War I, attempts at civil service reforms (such as those proposed in Britain by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan in 1853) were very slow to take effect. Many seemingly practical structures and controls had the effect of slowing both social and operational change within services. These included the explicit division of state service into “higher” and “lower” echelons, and practical divisions into a favored and relatively influential central

service and a disfavored, relatively obscure provincial service. Such service divisions combined with examination and educational criteria such as the “classics barrier,” an educational bar that essentially excluded individuals who had not learned Greek and Latin by attending elite primary and secondary educational institutions. These constructions meant that, in civil administration and the military, “open elites” were rare until well after World War II. Indeed, a study published by the *Economist* magazine on 19 March 1994 showed that, again in Britain, the most senior positions in the civil service (the twenty offices of the permanent secretaries) were staffed exclusively by males who were overwhelmingly the products both of elite, private grammar schools and the Oxbridge universities. But the increasing pressure on both military and civil administrations to master and apply complex technologies as part of their operations often provided the wedge for lower class entrance into state service, at least at low and middle levels.

With urbanization, industrialization, and growth in population size, state roles—from mass education

to welfare and public health—had expanded by the end of the nineteenth century. State offices increased in number and authority, as did the numbers of officials and the size of agency budgets. This increased bureaucratization also broadened opportunities for social mobility via official roles, gradually exceeding the capacity of upper classes to staff even elite offices in some European states.

VARIATIONS IN THE NARRATIVES OF BUREAUCRATIZATION

As noted above, many students of the history of bureaucracy explain bureaucratization in terms of the emergence of political and cultural factors—for example, rational and legal systems of valuing public behavior and political needs of rulers. Others understand the process of European bureaucratization within a framework of economic—rather than cultural and political—stimulus. In other words, they understand the experience as a product of other factors in addition to, or besides, growing rationality and legalism, and they see it as more varied across different European states, owing to the different tempos of the state's economic development. The weight of this second view results from the fact that much of the growth of large, complex organizations has historically occurred outside the boundaries of state institutions. Manufacturing and commercial firms, even early in the nineteenth century, illustrated many of the characteristics of bureaucracy that Weber found in state organizations. Moreover, as Adam Smith showed in the eighteenth century, specialized functions and expert roles were as important in efficient manufacturing as they were in the management of state budgets or artillery brigades. Economies of scale and control of markets that made trusts and combines common in many European countries, and conditions of secure employment that were gradually forced upon employers by professional and trade associations, made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between state and industrial bureaucracies. Moreover, the densely argued view of Karl Marx that large-scale capitalism would continue to expand until it was consumed in revolution meant that, as early as the second half of the nineteenth century, Europeans started to think of themselves as living in a world comprehensively dominated by bureaucracy. This was a vision that haunted such thinkers as Friedrich Nietzsche and became a touchstone for much of leftist politics before World War I.

In fact, the relative importance of both economic and political structures and behavior in accounting for the tempo of European bureaucratiza-

tion sharply differentiates the experience of European societies in general. In eastern Europe and Russia as well as in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, different conditions applied, and narratives of bureaucratization have to be written that are different from those of the earliest industrializers. These differences are owing to significant variations both in political structures and in commercial and industrial behavior.

For example, studies of formal administrative systems in Italy have shown that the endurance of patrimonial forms of local government depended more on the survival or disappearance of forms of social organization than on the presence or absence of legal systems of a specific type. Robert Putnam, in *Making Democracy Work* (1993), in particular, sees long-enduring patterns in public and civic life as critical to differences in social adaptation to administrative systems, whatever the underlying system of law. These differences in forms of civic associations and of the public behavior of private citizens were central to Putnam's explanation of the variations in political development between northern and southern Italy in the late twentieth century.

Similarly, in his study of the history of bureaucratization in Sweden, Norway, Germany, France, and England, Rolf Torstendahl found substantial differences in the levels of both political centralization and bureaucratization over long periods of time. While they were fairly similar with respect to economic measures such as per capita income, urbanization, and levels of employment in manufacturing and commerce, these societies nevertheless demonstrated important differences in social and political traditions, "formed," as he put it, through their different histories.

Eastern Europe and especially Russia present unique problems for anyone interested in creating a narrative history of European bureaucratization. This is owing both to relatively delayed political and economic development and to the introduction of communist political systems in the twentieth century, with their highly centralized state civil administrations and centrally planned economies. Each of these historical circumstances presented special opportunities for the extension of state administrative roles. As Alexander Gerschenkron, among others, showed, the delayed introduction of industrialization and capitalism seems to have required enhanced state roles throughout eastern Europe and especially in Russia. There the need for rapid industrialization was underscored by the catastrophic failure of state foreign and military policy in both the Crimean War (1853–1856) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). In both instances the weak performance of Russian arms in the face of strategic and tactical challenges that, fifty years earlier,

Russia had successfully mastered, drove home the significance, in practice, of Russia's economic and technical backwardness. It was the state, rather than private enterprise, that took the lead in making the investment decisions essential to the development of heavy industry and the economic and social infrastructures essential to early industrialization.

Russian decisions to industrialize were thus not free of political and administrative freight. By the end of the nineteenth century, state roles in the national economy had burgeoned, with hundreds of new oversight agencies and scores of new programs designed to manage the social behavior of emerging working and middle classes and of the new civic entities—such as urban administrations, schools, and medical facilities—that accompanied industrialization. In detail, these new organizations were not equal in quality to those of France or Germany. Officials were less well trained. Corruption was more common. Bureaucratic self-interest intruded more frequently between an agency and the public it was meant to serve. Much is made in scholarly studies of these organizations of the potential arbitrary intervention of the monarchy and other members of elite society into their activities. In fact, this was a relatively rare occurrence. With advancing industrialization and the integration of the Russian state and economy into European orbits of power, the balance of authority between the monarch and the state bureaucracy was shifting in favor of the latter. In terms of their broad characteristics, the agencies of Russian state administration at the end of the nineteenth century were true bureaucracies in the Weberian sense of the word: hierarchical, legally bound, subdivided according to specialization, and defensive of officials' authority.

Following the Communist revolution of 1917, state intrusion into society became even more pervasive in Russia and, after 1945, in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe. The vehicles for fresh state intervention were increased political centralization; the rapid development of state-controlled infrastructures such as mass education, medical, electrical, and transport systems; and especially centralized economic planning, pricing, and resource allocation. It seems unlikely, however, that the state organizations which governments created to manage these activities were Weberian bureaucracies. Owing to the arbitrary roles of political police, increasing corruption, gray and black market activities, and especially to the continuing intervention of Communist parties or their surrogates, Weberian prerequisites of legal norms of operation and professional independence of officials were often absent. It may be more reasonable to think of these organizations as systems of “dual supervi-

sion,” as Reinhard Bendix would have it in *Work and Authority in Industry* (1956), since that term implies a system that cannot tolerate any degree of worker independence and attempts to avoid this by simultaneous managerial and ideological, or political, supervision. It is important to recognize, however, that arbitrary police and party roles were not universal in the Soviet and Communist bloc states and that there were administrative offices in higher education and scientific research, for example, that operated relatively independently and effectively.

The Weberian view that a circle of mutually reinforcing energies would continually expand bureaucracy in modern European society has been an important touchstone for policy debates and narratives of post-World War II bureaucratization. In the 1950s and 1960s economists such as John Kenneth Galbraith, Wassily Leontief, and Gunnar Myrdal seem confidently to have expected that state roles in planning and development were essential and certain to grow in all three major types of social system—advanced capitalist, communist, and developing. As early as the 1940s, however, proponents of “privatization,” deinstitutionalization, and devolution of state functions such as transport, power generation, criminal incarceration, education, and even of poor relief called aspects of the bureaucratization narrative into question. Economists such as Friedrich von Hayek challenged the expectation that increases in the scale of enterprises (whether state or private) would offer proportionate increases in efficiency (economies of scale), lowering the cost of output. Moreover, changes in the cost and structure of many technologies—most notably, computers beginning in the 1970s—also made the decentralized operation of social and economic infrastructures and even policymaking feasible. In *Industrial Constructions* (1996), Gary Herrigel, for example, noted a symmetry in Germany between the “centralization and integration in the economy” on the one hand and state centralization on the other in the 1960s, as contrasted with the economic decentralization in the 1980s that stimulated a “similar reversal in state structure.” It could certainly be argued, however, that the opposite has been true at the administrative level of the European Union in Brussels and Strasbourg. There, the last few decades of the twentieth century witnessed a nearly unprecedented expansion of oversight and regulatory administrations in economic, fiscal, educational, and cultural affairs, as well as in some areas of international relations.

Policy and technological change in the 1970s and 1980s also placed the bureaucracies of huge multinational and conglomerate corporations in the private sector under pressure. In the short run (during

the 1980s and early 1990s, in particular) this resulted in some corporate “downsizing” and restructuring as well as in the divestiture of enterprises from state ownership. In the longer run, however, there appears to have been a renewed emphasis on bureaucratization in the private sector, taking the form not only of expanding firm size and scope but also of internationalization (or “globalization”). This trend has also increased the importance of organizations made up of other organizations, such as trade and professional associations that engage in political lobbying and negotiate or coordinate wage bargaining nationally or across industries, leading to what Torstendahl calls “corporative capitalism.”

ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT BUREAUCRACY

While Weber tended to be preoccupied with state roles and their embeddedness into bureaucratic organizations, large nonstate organizations increasingly captured the attention of other writers. At the same time, these scholars also offered interpretations of organizational and official behavior that were at variance with Weber’s views, emphasizing, for example, the unpredictability of participants’ behavior in bureaucratic settings.

Roberto Michels, in *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (1915), studied large political associations representing lower-class interests in Germany. These organizations were created, in the teeth of much opposition, to represent the interests of laborers against large manufacturing organizations, such as the Krupp metal industries trust, and the political interest groups that supported them. Michels (with considerable critical assistance from Weber) concluded that in order to achieve their goals, these labor organizations adopted many of the bureaucratic characteristics of the huge firms with which they competed, obeying an “iron law of oligarchy.” They became, that is, bureaucracies with authoritarian leaders in their own right in spite of organized labor’s avowed antibureaucratic values. With the passage of time, internal requirements for the survival of working-class organizations conflicted with the workplace objectives of union members. This phenomenon, eventually known as goal displacement, is now recognized as common in formal organizations of all kinds.

Similarly, Frederick W. Taylor’s detailed studies of the behavior of workers in large industrial and commercial settings indicated that, whatever the content of formal bureaucratic rules of behavior, workers often



DEVOLUTION AND DECENTRALIZATION: REVERSAL OF BUREAUCRATIZATION?

In his analysis of bureaucratization in the modern world, Max Weber thought that components of bureaucratic systems would interact so as to assure the continued expansion of bureaucratic systems. Beginning in the 1970s, research in political science, economics, and history has suggested that growth in the power and scope of authority of nation-states and firms in the contemporary world may not be inevitable. For example, Charles Sable and Jonathan Zeitlin published a pathbreaking article in 1985 that called attention to “exceptions” to the rule that successful enterprises always became mass producers and thus bigger, more dominant in their industries, and more bureaucratic. In 1987 the historian Paul Kennedy published a highly successful comparative history of several major European states in which he called attention to the factors accounting not only for their historic rise to power, wealth, and global influence but to their “fall” in the later twentieth century.

Decentralization and even breakup of a firm, an industry, or a state, however, do not necessarily lead to a reduction in bureaucracy. The sources of bureaucratization, as Weber noted, arise from the need, in modern society, for managerial and service organizations that are staffed by personnel in whom the public (or the organization’s clients) have confidence or whom they regard as “legitimate.” The foundations of such legitimacy seem to rest, in most cases, on demonstrations of expertise, detachment, and, above all, professional authority on the part of the organization’s staff—the very components that Weber thought would stimulate bureaucratization.

performed below levels of job output that might easily achieve in different circumstances. Universal, formal rules governing the behavior of employees or officials, that is, could be impediments to optimum performance. Taylor set about attempting to reconstruct job site conditions in ways that would enhance worker output and summarized his findings in *The Principles of Scientific Management* (1911). He focused attention on the microstructures of workplace behavior, in contrast to the attention that Weberian analysis paid to the macrostructures. Taylor’s time-and-motion stud-

ies became famous as examples of strategies that were designed to affect performance in ways that went beyond the global rules and definitions to which Weber attached importance.

After 1910, Taylorism became one of the twentieth century's first management fads. Taylorism's influence became pervasive in some firms in North America and western Europe where management sought to improve workplace productivity without significant additional capital investment. In his attempt to reconstruct a state managerial system without all of the formalities and inefficiencies of the tsarist bureaucracy that leftist revolutionaries despised, the Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin seized upon Taylorism as an administrative and organizational strategy that promised both efficiency and humane rationality in the workplace during the early years following the Russian Revolution of 1917. The politics of Russia's revolutionary transformation of administration ultimately overwhelmed Bolshevik ideals in this context.

In both of the preceding cases one sees examples of the abstract analyses and practical workplace strategies that the combination of rapidly developing organizations and critiques of Weberian theories would produce in the mid-twentieth century. These examples could be extended by illustrations, for instance, from the "human relations" school of industrial management. Taken together, these alternative, non-Weberian views of administration may be divided into several disciplinary or educational categories, three of which are administration theory, organization theory, and institutional theory.

Administration theory. State administration, as a special career, research, and educational track, long antedates Weberianism and bureaucratic studies and may be subsumed under the field of administration theory. There is still some controversy over whether the classic, centralized state administration in France was a product of the Napoleonic era or, as Alexis de Tocqueville asserted in *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (1856), of the ancien régime. In any case, the notion that certain individuals could be prepared for a life of impartial and disinterested administration of organizations was common in many eighteenth-century European states, was central to Napoleonic reforms of state administration, and survived through the turn of the twenty-first century. For example, in France the *grandes écoles* (such as the prerevolutionary *École des Ponts et Chaussées* or the Napoleonic *École Polytechnique*) and, in Russia, the *Tsarskoe Selo Lycée* were meant to serve as training institutes for future elite state administrators. These institutions tended to focus on substantive administrative issues, as, indeed,

do their heirs—schools of business and public administration—at the end of the twentieth century.

During the years following World War II, a period of rapid growth of large-scale administrations, research in public administration increased enormously. Work by Dwight Waldo (*The Administrative State*, 1984) and others, spanning two generations, produced theories of administration that attempted to distance themselves from Weber and from the history of bureaucracy. Increasingly, at the end of the twentieth century, public and business administration programs in both the European Union and North America—such as the *École Nationale d'Administration*—relied on such disciplines as law, economics, organizational psychology, and accounting and derived much of their substantive focus not from theories of bureaucracy but from empirical case studies.

Organization theory. Organization theory and the detailed empirical study of individual and group behavior in complex organizations tend to be found within the disciplines of psychology, economics, and sociology. These offer, in many ways, a much more detailed understanding of administrative and organizational behavior than does bureaucratic research. Herbert A. Simon's *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making* (1947), for example, stimulated a broad and rich body of empirical research into specific components of organizational behavior. Within this body of work, the Weberian perspective and the idea of organization as bureaucracy play only a limited role. For example, Chester Barnard (*The Function of the Executive*, 1938) and Fritz J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson (in *Management and the Worker* [1961], a celebrated study of social organization in one of the plants of the Western Electric Company) argued in the late 1930s that informal organizations, not meaningfully accounted for by Weberian typologies, always tended to arise within formal organizations. These were unplanned and undocumented structural relations among organization participants that were, in spite of their informality, essential for the operation of the formal organization. Such informal associations not only controlled the personal relations among participants but even effectively controlled what acceptable standards for job output would be. Analysis of the equilibrium between acceptable participant effort and organizational demands was extended by Simon, whose work won the Nobel Prize in Economics, and others. Of course, manipulation of such equilibria to achieve harmonious and cost-effective output is key to contemporary management and administrative science and has become a focal subject in schools of administration.

Institutional theory. A late twentieth-century addition to the corpus of work on large organizations, institutional theory attempts to identify social structures and behavior that render economic exchange less than optimal. As developed by the economist Douglass C. North (*Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*, 1990), for example, this work is less interested in the institutions (or organizations) themselves than in their effect on economic performance. Nevertheless, institutional theory addresses the roles of both formal and informal organizations in society, comparatively and historically. Bureaucracy is of interest in institutional theoretical studies to the degree that it helps to explain institutional behavior. But an important underlying assumption seems to be that it is feasible to reconstruct social institutions—or to allow institutions to reconstruct themselves—in ways that limit, or even reverse, the organizational sclerosis that bureaucracy often implies.

SOCIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY ISSUES

The history of social mobility as it relates to bureaucracy in Europe is complex, owing not only to variations in the mobility opportunities for bureaucrats and candidates for bureaucratic appointments over time but also to important differences in the experience of individual countries. Moreover, as noted above, in the case of state bureaucracies one must keep in mind that, at certain points in time, while they may offer the means of upward mobility to individuals who gain official employment, their organizational responsibilities may well include constructing or controlling mobility opportunities for individuals throughout society. As educational administrators or fiscal agents, bureaucrats may well be responsible for shaping the career chances of virtually all future social elites, including their own future colleagues. While this may not mean that they control educational policy or even influence it consistently and significantly, there is ample evidence that bureaucratic elites act as “gatekeepers” who may control access to a vast array of career appointments in many societies. Work by authors such as John Armstrong and Ezra Suleiman, moreover, has shown that, at least until the 1950s and 1960s, this has meant that even very talented children of the lower classes in the democratic states of western Europe could be excluded systematically from elite administrative careers and even from the educational programs that might prepare them to compete for such careers.

This said, it remains a fact that large bureaucratic organizations, whether state or private, have

long served as channels for upward social mobility in Europe. Among other factors, the increasing reliance of these organizations on impersonal rules of behavior and their growing need for expertise have enhanced the opportunities of individuals, such as the clerics in early modern western Europe, who may have possessed professional qualifications for elite administrative roles without having the upper-class social credentials that were traditionally associated with administrative power. As a result, beginning as early as the Renaissance, state civil service and certain branches of military service offered opportunities to the bright and ambitious sons of literate, impecunious commoners who had access to formal education, or at least technical training, throughout Europe. These opportunities, however, almost universally excluded the daughters of all social categories (except royal families, and occasionally the children of successful members of professions and of a few industrial magnates). They also denied access to all social categories beneath the relatively privileged, educated minority who should be regarded as a sort of social subelite. The exclusions applied, for example, not only to women but usually to Jews, and often (but not always) to other ethnic and religious minorities.

In western, central and most of eastern Europe, this structure of inclusions and exclusions would not change significantly until much later. That is, career opportunities in bureaucracies broadly, and in senior political or elite administration especially, would not be democratized, reflecting somewhat the social structure of entire societies, until the late twentieth century. In Scandinavia and western Europe women made inroads into institutions of higher and, more slowly, technical education. But usually these individuals were the children of social elites or, at least, of upper-middle-class professionals and the bourgeoisie. Moreover, these educational credentials reliably translated into administrative careers in only a few, relatively undervalued, fields such as lower education and general health care.

The history of career mobility in Russia and the other republics of the Soviet Union after the Russian Revolution of 1917 was quite different from that of the rest of Europe. In Russia, to be sure, literacy, numeracy, and other results of education were so rare in the early twentieth century that even the most open bureaucratic employment policies could never have been democratic in the sense of reflecting the structure of the whole society. Nevertheless, as I note in *Transition to Technocracy* (1989), aggressive state and Communist Party programs aimed at restaffing and reconstructing the entire bureaucratic apparatus with candidates from the lower classes produced a massive

turnover and relative democratization of Soviet officialdom in a period of time so brief that its effect has probably never been matched in European history. It is important to recognize, however, that this transformation within a decade, or perhaps fifteen years, was costly in terms of squandering administrative experience and denying both to civil administration and the bureaucracy of the new planned economy educational resources that were essential to their functioning. Forced by restaffing requirements, the rapid expansion of agencies, erratic police and Communist Party oversight, and politically inspired purges to reach ever deeper into the population reservoirs of the working class and peasantry, state administration in Russia suffered a degradation in intellectual resources beginning in the 1920s from which it did not recover until at least after World War II. Indeed, one can argue that the disarray and structural weakness that one finds in the state administrations of Russia and other former

Soviet republics at the turn of the twenty-first century is partly owing to the continuing effects of this early destabilization.

Bureaucracy certainly shows no sign of significant retreat in Europe in the twenty-first century. If states are devolving and decentralizing in certain ways, they give no indication of being able to do without the rationality and structured authority that Weber found within modern bureaucracies. Moreover, as sophisticated technologies become ever more crucial to administrative operations in both the public and private spheres, the demand for independent, disinterested, legally protected experts organized into smoothly functioning career hierarchies seems certain to survive. In this critical sense, Weber's view that bureaucracy is a self-reinforcing social construct in modern society, together with his ability to identify the energies that give it life, was historically correct and analytically indispensable.

See also Secularization (volume 2); Social Mobility (volume 3).

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MILITARY SERVICE



Michael S. Neiberg

Taking their cue from the classical Greeks and Romans, some Europeans have traditionally viewed military service as the ultimate positive manifestation of the relationship between the state and the individual. To such people, the military possessed the ability to make loyal citizens out of scoundrels, educated men out of the ignorant masses, and, above all, soldiers out of peasants and workers. To others, military service instead represented the ultimate expression of the nefarious influence of the state on their lives. From this point of view the state removed men from the fields, where their labor might do some good, and placed them in the military, where their efforts were wasted in forced marches, formal parades, and martial training, all to defend an alien state that many saw as the true enemy. A peasant from provincial France, Russia, or Hungary might take orders from an officer who did not even speak his language.

Whether seen as patriotic or coercive, military service became a common feature in male lives from early modern European society forward; by the middle of the nineteenth century it was required of hundreds of thousands of young men in almost all of the states of continental Europe. This essay thematically tracks elements of military service in Europe from the sixteenth century to the present day. It begins by introducing the main types of military service, then proceeds to discuss four specifics: men's motivations for joining the military; the role of military service as an instrument of nationalization; the relationship of officers and enlisted men; and ways men have avoided military service. Finally it presents some concluding thoughts on military service in Europe since 1945.

TYPES OF MILITARY SERVICE

Since the Renaissance, four common types of military service stand out: militia, conscript, volunteer, and mercenary. Societies with few internal conflicts or external enemies have the luxury of relying on a militia: part-time soldiers who assemble only for rudimentary

training and in times of crisis. Among European states, the Swiss are the most famous for their citizen militia. Early modern German states, however, also sustained militias based on noncitizen peasants. One of the militia's greatest strengths is its cost-effectiveness. Because militiamen are civilians for most of the year, the state does not have to pay them except in times of training and war. Since they have ordinarily trained with men from their same locality, they develop important bonds and connections to their towns or counties.

The militia's greatest strengths are, however, also its most important weaknesses. Because its men are not full-time soldiers, they rarely possess up-to-date military knowledge or have much familiarity with modern military technology. These units also lack the military cohesion of regulars. Furthermore, they cannot be called to military service without risking attendant disruptions to a nation's economy. Their local attachments make them much more effective in defense of their homeland (sometimes defined as their county or town rather than the entire state) than they are on the offensive.

Conscript systems are also relatively cheap. Because the state compels military service via threats of punishment and appeals to patriotism, it does not need to compensate its soldiers generously. Conscript systems therefore can often yield large armies, as they did in the Napoleonic period and during the two world wars. The famous *levée en masse* of 1793 was not a draft per se, but it was an important antecedent as it set the precedent that all citizens of France owed military service in some fashion. Such a demand was only possible in the dramatic spirit of the French Revolution. Frenchmen responded to the *levée en masse*, producing fourteen new French armies in just a few weeks.

France's Jourdan Law of 1798 built upon the spirit of the *levée en masse* but went even further. The Jourdan Law, Europe's first large-scale systematic draft, required all young men in France to register; the government then set regional quotas to be met off of



THE *LEVÉE EN MASSE*, 1793

From this moment until that in which our enemies shall have been driven from the territory of the Republic, all Frenchmen are permanently requisitioned for service in the armies. Young men will go into battle. Married men will forge arms and transport supplies. Women will make tents and uniforms, and serve in hospitals. Children will pick up rags. Old men will have themselves carried into public squares, to inspire the courage of warriors, and to preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.

those registers. By 1815 the French system had provided two million men to the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies. Soon other states in Europe were trying to imitate both the national spirit of the *levée en masse* and the quantitative success of the Jourdan system.

Conscription, however, has important drawbacks. Men forced or coerced into military service may not necessarily feel the strong attachment to the army that militiamen feel. (Usually armies rely most heavily on conscription. Navies and air forces ordinarily depend on the threat of conscription into the army to compel men to “volunteer” for their service instead.) In effect, the army that forcibly removed a man from home sometimes became a bigger enemy than the foreign one he was ostensibly being trained to fight. When conscripts saw little connection between their goals and those of the army, friction could easily result. Friction could also result when the social and cultural backgrounds of conscripts differed from those of professionals. Along these lines, Douglas Porch in *March to the Marne* described the heavily royalist and Jesuit-educated French professional officer corps in the early Third Republic period as “an unwelcomed guest at a republican feast” (p. 1).

Conscription can also generate bitter resentment if the system provides loopholes or exemptions for certain classes while obligating others to serve disproportionately. Few military systems can afford to make 100 percent of their young men liable to conscription. They must therefore make decisions about which men they wish to conscript and which men they wish to exempt. In Imperial Germany men drew lots to determine who would serve. Other systems

provided outlets for certain people, a method that often produced intense opposition. For example, allowing the wealthy to buy a substitute commonly rankled those who could not afford such a privilege. On the other hand, becoming a professional substitute could be a promising opportunity for a young man with few attractive alternatives. Government-sanctioned mutual associations emerged in France in the 1830s to locate a substitute for a considerable fee. France finally ended substitution in 1873, but retained controversial exemptions for theology students and priests.

Some military systems rely exclusively on full-time professional volunteers. Britain, due to its traditions opposed to a standing army and the protections provided by the Royal Navy, has most often chosen this system. Even during the crises of World War I, Britain avoided introducing a draft until 1916. Volunteer systems are among the most expensive systems because men must be attracted to military service and kept there. Money is the usually preferred motivation. Ideally, a significant number of volunteers (even in militia and conscript systems) will stay on to become professionals who dedicate themselves to learning the ways of the military. Of course, not all men are true volunteers. Vagrants, orphans, local troublemakers, criminals, and debtors often found themselves “induced” to volunteer.

Finally, a state may pay mercenaries to perform its military service. Mercenaries are among the most expensive ways to man an army. Historically, they had skills that few national armies could match, but their high skill level and advanced weaponry did not come cheaply. Because mercenaries were not national troops, it mattered little if their own personal goals did not overlap with those of the society paying them. Their loyalty to anything but their next payments was almost always in doubt. If their employers failed to make timely payments, mercenaries might pillage or turn on those who defaulted on promised compensations. The rise of national armies in the seventeenth century came about largely as a response to the unreliability of mercenaries. Furthermore, as nationalism came to dominate European politics and warfare, mercenaries made increasingly less sense; an army defined by national goals could scarcely have its fighting done by foreigners. By the time of Napoleon they were already out of favor with many monarchs. By the middle of the nineteenth century they had virtually disappeared.

Many factors control the type (or types, for a state could blend two or more systems) of military service system a society employs. Economics plays a crucial role. So does the nature of a society’s civil-military relationship. States like Britain with strong

anticonscription traditions can only implement a draft with great difficulty and in times of great crisis. Similarly, mercenaries can only be effectively employed by a state with the resources to afford them. Since their loyalty is uncertain, states prefer to keep them at a distance. Sweden's use of mercenaries in Germany during the Thirty Years' War fits this model as does Britain's hiring of Hessians to fight the American rebels at the end of the eighteenth century.

Because military service systems vary, they matter for understanding the nature of military service itself. The level of voluntary recruitment, the amount of active and passive resistance to the military, and the military's ability to win battles all depend to a large extent on the type of system or blend of systems chosen. When the system and the society it serves are in harmony, the chances of wartime success are enhanced. When they are not, as in the case of Russia in 1905 (see below), the results can be disastrous.

WHY MEN SERVED

The type of military service system in existence in a given society at a given time also affected men's choices in relationship to military service. Even in a system that seeks to conscript a large majority of its young men, those men always have the choice to resist or evade military service. Other important factors in determining how men responded to military service included ideology; economic conditions; a desire for adventure; and the quality of civil-military relations.

Patriotism, or at least regionalism, might be enough to entice men to serve. The perceived immediacy of a threat could unite a nation and compel its men into martial action in the name of defense. Eugen Weber and Douglas Porch have both argued, in two very different books, that most Frenchmen after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 came (if inconsistently) to understand that their service was important for protecting *La Patrie* (the homeland) from a threatening Germany. French desires for *revanche* (revenge) and the return of Alsace-Lorraine also drew men who wanted to do their part in the great national struggle. They therefore either enlisted voluntarily or at least did not try to avoid the draft in large numbers as they had before 1870.

The enthusiastic crowds of July 1914 were another manifestation of patriotism impelling men to answer their country's call to arms. Thousands of men enthusiastically joined the army in large measure to avenge perceived slights to their nation's honor or to settle old scores with hated neighbors. Exclusively ascribing the wild enthusiasm that some men displayed for war in 1914 to patriotism is to greatly simplify a complex picture. Still, to dismiss national feeling and patriotism as a root cause is also to miss an important point. The men of 1914 were products of an era flush with national feeling. Patriotic sentiments followed them to war and, eventually, to the grave as well.

Other ideological factors could also lead men to join the military. Richard Cobb traced the creation of "Peoples' Armies" in France in 1793 to revolutionary

zeal and dedication to “internal security.” These armies were mobilized to rid France of traitors to the revolution and to remove lasting remnants of the ancien régime. They became, in Cobb’s words, instruments of terror in the *départements* of France. Most of these men were artisans and craftsmen who felt that they had a great stake in protecting the success of the revolution. The Peoples’ Armies were, in effect, local militia and shared all of the militia’s shortcomings. The regular army viewed them as amateurs and they tended to perform more poorly the further they traveled from home. The quality of their performance is less important to our present discussion than the power of ideology to motivate them to volunteer.

Ideology proved to be more important in the twentieth century than it had been earlier. International ideologies such as fascism and communism led men to fight in places quite far from home. The Spanish Civil War is a case in point. Men came from all over Europe, and as far away as North America, either to fight for or against fascism, communism, republicanism, anarchism, and a dozen more ideologies in a brutal three-year conflict.

The ideological fervor of Spain overlapped into World War II as well. Omer Bartov’s impressive studies of the Third Reich cite ideology (morally bankrupt though that ideology was) as an important element that brought men into the Wehrmacht and kept them loyal to it. Because of that ideological commitment, he argues, most members of the Wehrmacht were horrified by the bomb plot against Hitler in the summer of 1944. They saw the failure of the plotters to kill Hitler as evidence of the Führer’s divine aura. Soldiers, he notes, were more likely than civilians to support the Nazi regime. Stephen Fritz largely agrees, arguing that ideology served to sustain the German soldier throughout the low points of the war on the Russian front.

Alongside ideology, poverty stands out as the most important motivation for military service. The Thirty Years’ War produced a near-constant struggle on the part of recruiters to fill the ranks. One study of that war, Geoffrey Parker’s *Thirty Years’ War*, noted that the recruiters’ job was easiest in times of high food prices, economic recession, and budgetary surpluses that allowed them to offer high bounties. When bounties were not possible, the promise of plunder on the enemy’s land might serve as a substitute.

Geoffrey Moorhouse’s study of the town of Bury in Lancashire during World War I noted that the military served a significant role as employer of last resort. Bury, a coal and textile town, occasionally experienced extended periods of economic downturn, some of them quite severe. The army served as a way to survive

these hard times. Moorhouse notes that the success of British army recruiters in Bury, not unlike their occupational ancestors during the Thirty Years’ War, was inversely proportional to the economic health of the city and its region.

The military could serve as a kind of “bridging” institution that might, if he survived, compensate for disadvantages in a man’s civilian background. Peter Karsten notes that in contrast to Irish patriots who fought against England, Irish volunteers to the British army were almost always poorer and less literate (especially in English) than the general Irish population. Money served as a crucial incentive in attracting Irish soldiers to British service at twice their proportion in the population as a whole. Of course, ideology played a role as well. Irish troops were willing to serve England, but only as long as that army did not oppress Ireland.

For some men, the military represented a significant rise in their standard of living. Soldiers often ate better than they had as peasants, received more regular medical care, and in many cases (outside Russia at least) military life involved much less work than did full-time agriculture. Many men chose not to return to their birth villages after their term of service ended, reenlisting for as long as they could. In some cases, military service allowed a man to escape problems in his home community such as a defaulted loan, a scandalous love affair, or some other social stigma.

Military service could continue to pay dividends even after retirement. Many states introduced pensions and even rudimentary health-care systems for military veterans. The beautiful, gold-domed Parisian military hospital Les Invalides is one of the most famous and most ornate examples of post-service care for veterans, but it is far from the only one. Military service might also be the key to better jobs in civilian life or a springboard to a business or political career otherwise unattainable.

Some men actively sought to join armies, especially ones with traditions of success or special mystiques. Military systems, especially in western Europe, developed distinct military cultures to attract such men into service. In the sixteenth century Charles V’s Spain led the way in creating *tercios*, permanent regiments with their own uniforms, traditions, and patterns of group loyalty. These changes led to regimental traditions in other armies as well. Men might therefore join the military out of a desire to be a member of a particular regiment or *tercio*. Over time, these regiments produced their own uniforms to further distinguish them from other units. *Tercios* and regiments attracted men who genuinely sought the camaraderie and martial spirit that military service pro-

vided. Militaries motivated by regimental loyalty often translated that *élan* into greater spirit and efficiency on the battlefield.

Adventure motivated many young men who sought to break away from dreary peasant life or unpleasant factory work. Service overseas in a colonial army promised travel to exotic locales and participation in the “white man’s burden” or noblesse oblige. White soldiers also benefited more directly from the colonial system. Imperialism provided the means by which someone from the working classes could achieve bourgeois standards of living. Even enlisted men serving in Asia or Africa might be able to afford a servant. Just by the color of his skin, a European soldier was no longer at the bottom of society. He was instead a soldier with important responsibilities and comforts undreamed of at home.

MILITARY SERVICE AS A NATIONALIZING FORCE

The expansion and contraction of European state borders did not always conform to national or ethnic boundaries. Multireligious and multilingual empires posed challenges for conservatives and others who endeavored to create homogenous nation-states. The military, many hoped, could serve as a “school for the nation,” by teaching national customs, religion, language, and history to members of ethnic minorities. The more diverse the empire, the greater the challenge. As Karsten demonstrated, the British army took on the role of teaching English to Gaelic-speaking Irish Catholics, though it was likely much less successful in converting men to Anglicanism.

In France, the army became one institution that, in Weber’s phrase, turned peasants into Frenchmen. In the 1850s and 1860s, he contends, peasants showed a determined lack of enthusiasm toward the military and even toward the French state itself. But the Franco-Prussian War and the increased number of Frenchmen experiencing military training changed that approach by the 1890s. The basic education that French peasants learned in school was replicated in the army where literacy and understanding of French citizenship were among the criteria for promotion. Although regional differences still existed (NCOs commonly had to translate an officer’s French orders into regional dialects), Eugen Weber argues in *Peasants into Frenchmen* that by 1890 the army “was no longer ‘theirs’ but ‘ours’” (pp. 298–299).

Some states could not meet the challenge. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, linguistic, religious, and ethnic tensions prevailed over any attempt by the

army to impose uniformity. At the outbreak of World War I, Austro-Hungarian army regulations recognized nine main languages; one observer counted twenty-three languages spoken among the troops. Similarly, regional tensions persisted in Italy, where men from the north dominated the officer corps, and in Germany, where Prussians did so. “Nationalization” could thus be interpreted by many enlisted men as an attempt to persuade them to reject their own customs in favor of those fashionable in the big cities, or lose their ethnic or regional identity. In Russia, the army made a concerted effort to inculcate new attitudes, but the heavily peasant force continued to reflect traditional social and regional attachments. Thus nationalization did not always succeed, but where and when a society decided to attempt it, military service almost always played a central role.

OFFICERS AND “OTHER RANKS”

European states in the early modern and modern periods created bifurcated military systems that sharply divided officers and enlisted men. These divisions emerged from medieval distinctions between aristocrats and peasants. As late as World War II, aristocrats dominated the officer corps of many European militaries, increasingly so at their higher ends. These patterns were most pronounced in Russia (before 1917), Britain, and Germany. To be sure, many sons of the middle class moved into the officer corps over time, notably in more technologically dependent services and branches like the navy and artillery. Even in societies that destroyed or marginalized their aristocracies, social elites still came to dominate the officer corps. As a result, officer corps tended to be politically conservative and often suspicious of enlisted men.

Such divisions often created civil-military tensions. In the eighteenth century Prussia was among the states that insisted on nobles in their officer corps, even if they were non-Prussian. The Prussian state was especially suspicious of admitting too many members of the middle class into its officer corps. The attendant dislocations, many Prussians later believed, created important civil-military tensions that contributed to battlefield humiliations at the hands of Napoleon in 1806. The abolition of serfdom in Prussia the following year was partially designed to instill in the peasantry more loyalty to the state and to the army. The partial success of that reform and others improved military morale, though important tensions remained.

Similarly, as we have seen, the French military of the early Third Republic period, especially its more senior officers, were often royalists or Bonapartists.

Many of them mistrusted the Republic and had a tumultuous relationship with it. Radicals tried, with little success, to increase the number of non-nobles in the French officer corps. They even proposed that all graduates of the military academy at St. Cyr perform one year of service as a private. Propositions such as these only served to heighten the mutual suspicion between the army and the state on the one hand and between officers and enlisted men on the other. Divisions, both real and perceived, could explode in moments of crisis such as the Dreyfus affair or, to cite an earlier example, the continent-wide revolutions of 1848 (see below).

John Bushnell has argued that the Russian army before 1905 suffered from Europe's most severe divisions between officers and enlisted men. The officers were mostly nobles and products of the Europeanized Russia created under Peter the Great and Catherine the Great in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The enlisted men, however, were products of peasant Russia and not as greatly affected by the Europeanization movement. The officers, therefore, saw peasant and worker uprisings as threats to Russia, but the men were more likely to identify with such uprisings than to oppose them. To Bushnell, the large chasm between officers and enlisted men helps to explain the series of mutinies in the Russian army in

1905. One might reasonably extend his argument to 1917 as well.

In effect, before World War I three discrete groups entered military service, each in different ways. The nobility, in states where it existed, entered at the top, often through purchased commissions. To cite a famous example, Arthur Wellesley, duke of Wellington, purchased a lieutenant colonelcy at the age of twenty-four. His opponent at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, Napoleon Bonaparte, was able to use his father's minor noble status to gain admission to the French military school at Brienne-le-Château. He went on to further glory as the French Revolution opened up many new opportunities for officers of bourgeois and lower noble backgrounds.

Napoleon also went on to become a great champion of the second group, the bourgeoisie and artisan class. In opening the military "to the talents" he paved the way for many more non-nobles to enter military service. One of Napoleon's most valued subordinate commanders, Michel Ney, "the bravest of bravest," (and, some added, "the dumbest of the dumb") was the son of a master barrel cooper. He entered military service as an enlisted man in 1787, received a commission in 1792, and rose to the rank of marshal in 1804. Thus in just seventeen years he went from artisan's son to one of the most important men in France. Jean-Baptiste Jourdan, the man for whom the Jourdan conscription law of 1798 was named, was the son of a surgeon. He rose from private to marshal in twenty years.

Noble holds on the officer corps weakened as armies grew larger in the nineteenth century. In some nations, such as Germany, conservative officers argued against expanding armies too much on the grounds that doing so would require too many non-nobles to become officers. Nevertheless, aristocratic control of the military diminished significantly in the years prior to World War I, though it did not disappear entirely. Furthermore, as the military increasingly came to need skills that mirrored the skills of civilians, nobles (who ordinarily lacked such skills) became less useful. The financial, administrative, and logistical corps of armies therefore came to be dominated by the middle class.

The third group, peasants and unskilled workers, were expected to fill the ranks. Few rose to the officer corps until huge officer casualties during World War I began to leave armies few alternatives, but many did achieve high enlisted ranks. In many armies, they dominated the noncommissioned officers corps (composed of varying grades of sergeants in the army and petty officers in the navy). Because men from the peasantry and the working classes often identified with people of similar background more than they did

with their own officers, they might refuse to obey orders that they saw as unjust.

The possibility that soldiers might not obey their officers emerged repeatedly during times of civil strife. Many soldiers were uncomfortable with the role of domestic policeman, especially when they were being asked to police people of similar social backgrounds to their own. During the revolutions of 1848 the Paris National Guard did at times refuse to fire on demonstrators. In Milan, Hungarian, Croat, and Slovene soldiers belonging to the Austrian army sympathized with Italian republicans. Many deserted to the demonstrators, while others allowed themselves to be driven away by an "army" of protestors wielding medieval pikes. Prussia hired Russian soldiers to quell disturbances in the hopes that they would have fewer qualms about shooting demonstrators (they did). While most professional soldiers did obey orders to

disperse crowds, the Paris and Milan examples, on top of the general tensions of 1848, led to later reforms that increased the term of service in many nations and reduced the roles of reserves and national guards.

The mass armies required by the world wars were, out of necessity, products of conscription. The totality of twentieth century warfare encompassed every facet of belligerent societies. Most social exemptions from conscription disappeared; only men with occupations deemed critical to the war effort (these commonly included not middle-class professions, but farmers, miners, and metal workers) were exempted. But the conscriptions of the first half of the twentieth century did not produce the active opposition that earlier versions had. The only clear exceptions to this pattern were in the crumbling Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires as World War I began to turn against them. The relative acceptance of the draft dur-

ing the world wars is a product of its (perforce) more egalitarian nature and the national emergencies that the world wars represented.

Furthermore, by World War II many enlisted men and junior officers had skills of great value to the military. Operating a mid-twentieth-century army was vastly more complicated than operating one a century earlier. Armies needed large numbers of skilled men in jobs such as mechanic, radioman, and logistician. Enlisted men had ceased to be the lowest orders of society. They had become invaluable members of specialized combat teams.

AVOIDING MILITARY SERVICE

Of course, the military comes with the very important drawback of demanding potentially life-threatening service. Europe's chronic warfare and internal turmoil meant that men joined the military with the knowledge that seeing combat at some point in their careers was a distinct possibility. Contemporary military sociologists talk about military service as a trade-off of benefits and burdens. The inherent danger of military service was clearly one such burden. Furthermore, the popular association of soldiering with bad morals and habits lowered the prestige of the soldier considerably at least as late as World War I. In many sectors of European society soldiers were received with more contempt than respect.

The military also involved being subjected to harsh and sometimes arbitrary discipline. Beginning with the period just prior to the Thirty Years' War, firearms technology came to be integrated into all European armies. In order to use such weapons effectively, men had to be drilled to act in unison. The first drill manuals appeared in 1607. Discipline and drill were the means officers used in order to make lines of men act in concert. Discipline became so intense that the men often had more reason to fear their officers and NCOs than the enemy. Intense discipline became a regular feature of military life with harsh punishments (including flogging, denial of food, imprisonment, and even, in extreme cases, death) as the penalties for disobedience.

Even in times of peace, military service could be extremely unpleasant. Russian officers prior to 1905 commonly hired their men out as agriculture laborers and pocketed the profits, and Soviets soldiers did the same work in the post-World War II era. This practice existed in Germany and Austria as well. In many parts of Europe, soldiers had to spend almost all of their money on food and uniforms. Especially

in eastern Europe military service itself was seen as a form of slavery. The distinction sometimes seemed slight indeed. Until 1861 Russian peasants could be conscripted for twenty-five years or more and, in many cases, sons of soldiers were automatically conscripted as well.

Given these conditions, many men did what they could to avoid such service, often with the active support of their communities. For the community, encouraging draft evasion made good economic sense: every man lost to the army was one less man available to work at harvest time. Where substitution existed families might make considerable financial sacrifices in order to pay for someone other than an eldest son (and therefore heir to the land and guardian of the family name) to be conscripted. Eugen Weber notes that as late as 1870 some French villages simply registered all new births as girls. In others, birth certificates might not even be filed. Other men beat conscription through self-inflicting or inventing a physical disability.

CONCLUSIONS

Since 1945, military service has come to depend upon the acquisition of men (and, increasingly, women) with the necessary skills to operate highly technical weapons systems. This process, ongoing for more than a century, requires long-term professionals, who are willing to commit enough time to the military to make the investments in training pay off. Conscripts continued to fill the unskilled and semiskilled jobs, but many militaries became disenchanted with the educational backgrounds and motivations of draftees. With the end of the cold war, most European states have reduced or eliminated conscription, with Russia an important exception.

The emphasis on skill has also greatly reduced the importance of ascriptive criteria such as ethnicity and gender. Women had served in militaries in both world wars, but most commonly in traditional "women's roles." Only in the Soviet Union in World War II did significant numbers of women see combat, though as many as 25 percent of British anti-aircraft gunners were women. Soviet women served as snipers, tank drivers, and pilots. The most famous of these pilots, the "Night Witches," received the high Soviet distinction of being named a Guards Regiment.

These female services were, however, understood to be either an extreme response to exigent circumstances or a military extension of women's traditional civilian spheres. Since the 1960s, however, women have moved into military roles previously understood to be

male. Female generals, fighter and bomber pilots, and ship captains have emerged in almost all European (and, for that matter, many non-European) militaries. Similar patterns have emerged among ethnic minorities and openly homosexual soldiers, groups that in the past have at times been officially marginalized or forbidden from serving. What matters most at the dawn of the twenty-first century is skill.

The military continues to be an option for young men and women who seek a bridge to improve their lives. It is, however, becoming less and less an employer of last resort. Most militaries have minimum education requirements that eliminate the most disadvantaged members of society from serving. Although still seen by many as an alien institution, the military does not inspire the kinds of fear and hatred that it has in the past.

Military service will undoubtedly continue to evoke controversy across Europe. Recent reductions in draft calls in western and northern Europe should attenuate those controversies as men will be forced to enter the military much less often. New controversies are most likely to revolve around women's desires to move into more and more military jobs (special operations and submarines, for example) still understood by many to be the preserves of men. The role of national soldiers in international operations and transnational coalitions (such as joint European defense and the expansion of NATO) are also likely to be contentious. For historians, the most fruitful areas of future research promise to be in comparisons of European experiences of military service. Such studies can illuminate both national and continental patterns, yielding a better understanding of both.

See also **The French Revolution and Empire; The World Wars and Depression (volume 1); War and Conquest (in this volume); Social Mobility; The Aristocracy and Gentry; The Military (volume 3); and other articles in this section.**

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FROM 1350 TO 2000



VOLUME 3

Peter N. Stearns

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SOCIAL CLASS



Charles Tilly

Social class has attracted a great deal of attention, not to mention bitter dispute, from social historians. Social class refers to categorical differences among clusters of persons when material inequality constitutes (a) the categorical boundaries or (b) a likely cause of differences among bounded categories. Social class by no means exhausts human inequality. People have often organized large material inequalities around gender, age, race, ethnicity, religion, and locality, none of which qualify ipso facto as class. People also vary individually with respect to strength, size, health, volatility, and a number of other traits that affect the quality of their lives. Social class may shape or interact with these other forms of inequality, but it remains analytically distinct from them. If the idea of social class has deeply informed the study of social history, it has also generated profound disagreement among specialists in the field. As they disagree about class, analysts actually struggle over the salience, durability, impact, and categorical clustering of inequality in human life.

As they should, historians generally exclude a wide variety of human inequalities (for example, by gender, height, or religion) from social class. Beyond that minimum agreement, however, they range from considering class differences as fundamental in social life at one extreme, to denying the very existence of social classes at the other. Anyone who uses class terms to describe unequal positions or social relations makes a further theoretical commitment. Class terminology implies that the positions or relations in question cluster into categories having some degree of internal coherence and some connection with each other. Precisely the extent, nature, origins, and consequences of such coherence and connection remain controversial and the objects of extensive historical investigation.

HISTORY OF CLASS TERMINOLOGY AND CLASS ANALYSIS

Contending ideas of class circulated long before social history formed as a distinctive discipline. The Latin

word *classis* referred to a vertical division of the Roman population according to property and entered English with that meaning during the sixteenth century. Over the next century the English word “class” applied increasingly to categories of the population; but “development of class in its modern social sense, with relatively fixed names for particular classes (lower class, middle class, upper class, working class and so on) belongs essentially to the period between 1770 and 1840, which is also the period of the Industrial Revolution and its decisive reorganization of society” (Williams, 1976, p. 51). By that time writers as diverse as James Madison, Hannah More, and James Mill freely used class terms to describe the world they saw around them. In the 1840s, when Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels began treating social classes as fundamental divisions under capitalism, they incorporated common usage into their innovative theory.

So doing, however, Marx and Engels opened an enduring split between self-consciously materialist analysts of social processes and others who generally recognized differences among social classes but rejected marxist explanations of those differences. In the Marx-Engels account, material relations within every mode of production generated their own class divisions. As Marx later put the general point:

It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers—a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity—which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state. (Marx, 1972, p. 791)

Accordingly marxists have commonly analyzed history in terms of distinct modes of production: primitive communism, feudalism, capitalism, and more (Marx, 1964). Each mode, in this analysis, centers on a characteristically different opposition of classes. Marx devoted the great bulk of his attention to capi-

talism. Although capitalism harbored multiple classes, he argued, its central processes of exploitation generated increasing division between capitalists, who owned the means of industrial production, and wage workers or proletarians, whose effort fructified those means. That divided material infrastructure, furthermore, shaped the basic institutions of social life, including government, education, and kinship. So ran the strict marxist view.

COMPETING NOTIONS OF CLASS

Since Marx's day social historians have repeatedly polarized for and against this relational and production-based conception of social class. Some dispute its exact application to particular historical settings, some forward alternative conceptions of class, and some deny the very applicability of class categories to the situations they study. A characteristic (if slightly disingenuous) statement comes from the great student of France's Old Regime hierarchies, Roland Mousnier:

Despite beginning with the conviction that social classes were indeed what Marxists mean by that term, that classes had started to exist when societies emerged from so-called primitive communism, and that class struggle was if not the whole of history at least one of its most important elements, my research with my students on societies and institutions brought us to quite different conclusions. We are now persuaded the Marxist conception of social class only applies to certain kinds of societies and has been improperly extrapolated. If we want a general term for the great variety of social hierarchies, we will do better to use the expression *social stratum*, which designates a universal concept, a family. (Mousnier, 1976, p. 5)

As elements of a social stratum, Mousnier names:

- distinctive part in the social division of labor
- distinctive way of carrying out that effort
- disposition of effort by members of at least one other stratum
- mentality and style of life
- means of existence resulting from its social role

For location within a system of production, Mousnier thus substitutes function in society at large. His conception has several powerful consequences. It displaces the origins of inequality from relations of production to societal function; considers societies to consist of two or more unequal strata, differentiated vertically, in virtual isolation from each other; and excludes the lowest social level (who dispose of no one else's effort) from designation as a distinct stratum.

Mousnier goes on to argue that Old Regime France was a society of orders (honor-differentiated strata), not of classes, and that French classes formed

only with nineteenth-century industrialization. He explains that change not as a direct consequence of alterations in productive relations but as an effect of shifting values: "social classes are a type of strata existing in societies where value judgments place the production of material goods and the creation of wealth at the top of the scale of social functions, in a market economy where capitalist relations of production prevail" (Mousnier, 1976, p. 7). Mousnier distinguishes five "scales" of stratification, legal, social status, economic, power, and ideological, whose relative prominence varies from society to society and age to age (Mousnier, 1973, pp. 15–18). Thus, in the widespread view represented by Mousnier, different societies value different attributes and rank people accordingly (compare with Barber, 1957). Class therefore represents no more than a special case of a general phenomenon.

Despite its concessions to other principles of differentiation, the Mousnier-style analysis clearly presents class as a particular variety of position, individual or collective, in a hierarchy of prestige, wealth, or power. Standard marxist views just as clearly differ. They identify class as collective location within a system of production. They stress inequality but deny hierarchy in the sense of orderly (and especially consented) precedence. Over the long run these two positions have contended for dominance within social history, yet other social historians have dissented from the two majority positions. Some (e.g., Parkin, 1979) have emphasized shared relations to consumption markets, while others (e.g., Stedman Jones, 1983) have based their conceptions of class on shared consciousness or culture. Later we shall return to these alternative views, as well as to denials that class exists at all.

Before World War II, most western European social historians used class terms loosely and descriptively, attributing distinctive characteristics to upper classes, middle classes, workers, peasants, and other categories but considering problems of class formation, class consciousness, and class distinction peripheral to their enterprise. In economic and political history, however, questions of class then loomed larger. There the causes and consequences of poverty, the origins of capitalism, and the changing power of landholders, merchants, and manufacturers became sites of acute controversy. Within each controversy at least one party attributed significance to changing class relations. In Great Britain, for example, left-leaning historians, such as R. H. Tawney, Sidney Webb, and Beatrice Webb, placed class firmly on the historical agenda. Soviet historians and non-Soviet marxists also organized much of their analyses around class cate-



COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL CLASS

1. Hierarchical position. A social class is a rank or stratum defined by recognized and effective differences in prestige, wealth, or power. For example, lords, merchants, and serfs are seen as public actors rather than legal categories. This implies vertical divisions crossing large populations and resting on widespread agreement, however grudging, and promotes social history of changing rank orders, their public representations, and their implications for styles of life.
2. Market connection. A social class is a population segment defined by distinctive relation to land, labor, and commodity markets. For example, gentry, farmers, merchants, artisans, and tenants are seen as owners, producers, and especially consumers. This implies extensive but differentiated markets with significant impacts on the well-being of their participants and promotes social history of material culture, property, and consumption.
3. Consciousness and culture. A social class is a set of people who regard each other as social equals or share a distinctive body of understandings, representations, and practices. For example, the aristocracy contrasts with the bourgeoisie as a community and style of life. This implies well-defined boundaries, extensive connections, and mutual recognition within boundaries and promotes social history of changing understandings, representations, and practices.
4. Location in production. A social class designates occupants of a large but distinctive position within a system of material production. For example, capitalists versus proletarians are defined by control of capital versus dependence on the sale of labor power. This implies broad categorical divisions across whole systems of production and the significant impact of productive position on overall welfare. It promotes social history linking politics and social life to the changing organization of production and investigating shifts in forms and degrees of inequality.
5. Chimera. In a particular setting or in general, social class is an illusion or at best a mistaken description of inequalities better characterized in other ways. For example, “middle class” is viewed as a broad idea about the population majority in contemporary industrial countries. This implies fragmentation of differences in material inequality and promotes social history of ideas about identity and inequality as well as investigation of nonclass bases of inequality.

gories. But it took the populist social history of the 1950s and thereafter to make social class an inescapable preoccupation.

Marxist and materialist historians outside the Soviet Union—for instance, Jürgen Kuczynski, Eric Hobsbawm, and Georges Lefebvre—led the way. They highlighted social class from two different angles: as a general framework for historical analysis and as an object of intense empirical study. The general framework featured the rise, fall, transformation, and conflict of different classes, with marxist ideas of social development its leading impetus. Social historians, however, spent relatively little effort on general theories. They concentrated especially on the empirical study of social classes, more often working classes than any others.

A kind of populism swept over the field: enthusiasm for writing social history from the bottom up, for recovering and broadcasting the authentic vox populi. Populism became even more prevalent as it coupled with the campus mobilizations of the 1960s. Many students then moved into history with the hope of giving voice to the powerless and of identifying historical precedents for current struggles. Some took up analyses of popular political mobilization and rebellion, others reconstruction of workers’ daily lives, still others detailed investigation of social inequality and mobility. For a while it looked as though social history and sociology would form an indissoluble alliance. Sociology beckoned as the only social science discipline prepared to take class seriously.

Then E. P. Thompson almost single-handedly changed the field's direction. No doubt a number of social historians had already become uneasy about the formalism, structural reductionism, and methodological conventionality of the sociology they saw invading their enterprise. They were already ripe for a more literary, ethnographic, and interpretive account of social life, especially one that offered a larger place to consciousness than most sociologists allowed. Still, in 1963 Thompson roared onto the terrain like an invading army. Descending from the heights of literary criticism and biography, he daringly attacked on two fronts, machine-gunning mechanistic marxism even as he cannonaded conservative condescension. At least for England from the 1780s to the 1830s, he swept the field, persuading a wide range of readers that something he called the "making" of a working class occurred through a sustained series of struggles and

convincing the rest that they now had a new, seductive leftist thesis to combat.

Thompson scored his fellow marxists for structural reductionism—for assuming that one can read out people's motives and states of consciousness from their location within relations of production. The formation of class consciousness, he countered, is an arduous, contingent, struggle-ridden process whose vagaries historians must retrace in detail. Class, he objected, does not spring directly from economic position but emerges from dynamic interaction with other people. Class is a relation, not an attribute. Class consciousness, he further claimed, draws crucial parts of its content from available political understandings—in the case of eighteenth-century English plebeians, notably beliefs in the rights of freeborn Englishmen and in the priority of the moral economy over political economy. Thus he drew

marxist class analysis toward a much more phenomenological, ethnographic, cultural, and idea-oriented approach than the one previously employed by most of its practitioners.

A fierce, witty polemicist, Thompson directed equal scorn toward liberal and conservative analysts of working-class experience. He attacked two recurrent errors: (1) reduction of workers' actions to ill-considered impulses generated by sudden hardship or rapid social displacement and (2) assumption that the working classes lacked sophisticated understandings of politics and economics and therefore responded glibly to the exhortations of demagogues. To rebut these views he poured ample ingenuity and energy into uncovering popular ideas concerning rights and obligations; tracing connections among participants in such activities as machine breaking; and matching the slogans, symbols, avenging actions, testimonies, and demands of working-class activists with doctrines in the literary record.

With a literary historian's panache, Thompson mustered an extraordinary range of evidence for his thesis, drawing connections between political philosophy and popular culture, enormously broadening conceptions of relevant texts, and giving popular utterances and crowd actions a literary standing they had rarely achieved before. His victorious vision of class formation in England inspired numerous historians of other Western countries to search for parallel constructions in their own territories and periods, so much so that the phrase "making of the working class" acquired the immortality of a cliché.

Thompson never quite escaped the shadow of teleology. The idea of working class formation—of "making"—easily attaches to the teleological notion that every mode of production assigns a destiny to each of its constitutive classes (Katznelson and Zolberg, 1986). The big historical questions thus become how and to what degree each class actually fulfills its destiny. By stressing consciousness, Thompson forwarded the idea that class formation depends critically on the developing mutual awareness of people who already occupy a distinctive location within the system of production. Indeed Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963) stops in 1832, by which time, in his account, popular struggles during the 1790s had prepared working-class consciousness, post-war conflict had sharpened it, worker mobilization around reform had accelerated it, and the exclusion of most workers from benefits of the 1832 Reform Act had embittered it. But the full denouement still lay ahead, presumably in Chartism and its aftermath.

So great a challenge could not go unanswered. Sociologically inclined critics (e.g., Calhoun, 1981)

objected that Thompson misread the organizational bases of popular collective action, while critics who were speeding toward discourse and consciousness even faster than Thompson himself had (e.g., Jones, 1983) rejected Thompson's concessions to structural determinism. Still others (e.g., Anna Clark, 1995; Frader and Rose, 1996) complained that Thompson had produced an excessively masculine account of class formation, quite neglecting the crucial place of women and gender relations in the process. Since Thompson, historical studies of class have frequently formed their battle lines along epistemological and ontological divides: explanation versus interpretation, realism versus idealism, practical action versus consciousness, sociology versus anthropology.

The works of Patrick Joyce and James Vernon on nineteenth-century Britain are representative. Both sought refuge from marxist realism in linguistic analysis, Joyce fretfully and Vernon with shrill bravado. Each proposed his own interpretation of English popular culture and its creeds as an alternative to the Thompsonian history of class formation. In the baker's dozen of essays that fill his *Visions of the People* (1991), Joyce explored a wide variety of materials recording popular discourse, popular literature, slogans, demands, theater, dialect, and much more, asking to what extent their uses set workers off from other people and to what degree they conveyed direct awareness of class difference as formative experience and source of grievances. Joyce concentrated on Lancashire and the North between 1848 and 1914, eventually concluding with great unease that something like widely shared class consciousness began to emerge not in Thompson's 1790s but toward World War I.

Vernon's *Politics and the People* (1993), for its part, took on all of England from 1815 to 1867 but used as recurrent points of reference close studies of public politics in Boston, Lewes, South Devon, Tower Hamlets, and Oldham. Although his announced period overlapped the one examined by Thompson, Vernon did not aim his empirical investigation at Thompson's account of political action between 1815 and 1832. Instead he looked chiefly at post-Reform politics to document his claim that for ordinary English people the public sphere, far from opening to democratic participation, actually narrowed dramatically between 1832 and 1867.

Despite avoiding direct confrontation with Thompson's treatment of 1780 to 1832, Joyce and Vernon both sought self-consciously to displace Thompsonian analysis of class formation. They did so by means of three maneuvers: denial that economic experience shapes class consciousness; insistence on the variety of economic and social experience; and em-

bedding of all meaningful experience in language. In so doing each made two further moves he did not quite recognize and therefore did not bother to defend. The first was to adopt radical individualism, an assumption that the only significant historical events or causes consist of mental states and their alterations. The second was to doubt the intersubjective verifiability of statements about social life. Together the two moves brought them close to solipsism, the doctrine denying the possibility of any knowledge beyond that of the knower's own individual experience.

Vernon and Joyce thereby avoided questions of agency: who does what to whom and with what effects. Their occultation of agency separates them from conventional historical narrative, in which limited numbers of well-defined, motivated actors, situated in specific times and places, express their ideas and impulses in visible actions that produce discernible consequences. Those consequences typically are the objects of explanation. Conventional narrative entails not only claims to reasonably reliable knowledge of actors, motives, ideas, impulses, actions, and consequences but also (a) postulation of actors and action as more or less self-contained and (b) imputation of cause and effect within the narrative sequence. Solipsism makes most of these elements difficult, and denial of agency renders them impossible.

Vernon and Joyce also ruled out alternative modes of social-scientific analysis, which require less access to other people's consciousness as well as allowing actors, actions, and environment to interact continuously but demand strong conceptions of causal connection (Bunge, 1996; Hedström and Swedberg, 1998). Either solipsism or denial of agency suffices to command rejection of these forms of social analysis. In short the Joyce-Vernon philosophical position obliterates any possibility of historical explanation. It also undermines any grounds they might propose for accepting the validity of their interpretations in preference to Thompson's or anyone else's. At this point social history reaches an impasse (Joyce, 1995). Yet the rich, sensitive deployment of textual analysis in the Joyce and Vernon studies underlines the strong desirability of uncovering firmer philosophical ground. The challenge is to incorporate the explanation of texts, discourse, and changing consciousness into the ongoing work of social history.

SOCIAL-HISTORICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF CLASS

Despite many dud grenades hurled across the lines in both directions, fortunately debate did not much de-

ter historians' concrete investigations of social class. Hobsbawm, for example, continued to turn out major historical syntheses pivoting on broadly marxist class analyses. In collaboration with social scientists, drawn from many disciplines besides sociology, social historians have actually advanced the program of explanation (see Mohr and Franzosi, 1997; Monkkonen, 1994; Morawska and Spohn, 1994). Two developments look particularly promising: (1) systematic study of class-relevant language and texts in the context of their production, transmission, and political deployment and (2) introduction of network models and metaphors into the analysis of class relations. Both, as it happens, draw some of their inspiration from Thompson, the first from Thompson's broad treatment of texts and the second from Thompson's insistence on class as a social relation rather than an individual attribute.

An excellent example of linguistic analysis in political context comes from Marc Steinberg's treatment of dialogue among workers, employers, and public authorities in Britain's Spitalfields, Ashton-Stalybridge, and elsewhere during the early nineteenth century. Steinberg showed how available forms of discourse channeled interaction among the parties to struggle but also changed as a consequence of that interaction, indeed in the very course of struggle. Responding more or less directly to the work of Joyce, Vernon, and other linguistically sensitive historians, Steinberg concluded:

I have argued that despite recent critiques from the linguistic turn, theories of historical class formation and of political process and resource mobilization provide essential windows on fundamental processes that have been and continue to be part of great transformations in the modern world. I have also maintained, however, that the critics raise compelling issues concerning the centrality of discourse in class formation and collective action. Although rejecting the linguistic turn's alternatives, I have proposed revising Thompson's perspective on class and the political process/resource-mobilization model of contentious action with discourse as a critical intervening process. Rather than choose between material and discursive analyses, we need to conjoin the explanatory powers that each perspective offers. (Steinberg, 1999, p. 229)

Such inquiries promise to narrow the epistemological and ontological fissures that have riven studies of class.

The network approach to social relations receives prominent attention in Don Kalb's study of class transformations in North Brabant, Netherlands, between 1850 and 1950. Both the dispersed shoe-making industry and the large-scale manufacturing of the Philips Corporation attracted Kalb's relentless curiosity as he combined material from collective biography, administrative records, governmental corre-

spondence, and interviews of survivors. Kalb characterized his approach as anthropological:

My case studies of class formation in subregions of industrializing Brabant tend to illustrate that an anthropological interest in popular culture, discourse, and everyday life can, and indeed should, be wedded to social power and social process. This is so not only because power, change, and inequality are central aspects of social life that ought not be missed by any serious analyst of human affairs (that is, unless he or she accepts political irrelevance), but more importantly because class-oriented analysis can reveal crucial ambiguities, contradictions, divisions, limits, obstacles, and dynamics of culture that cannot be uncovered in other ways. In short, by consciously elaborating an approach based on a materialist idea of class with the intention to study social power and social process, I claim a more penetrating methodology for explaining and understanding culture. (Kalb, 1997, p. 2)

This historical anthropology of class rests not only on examination of utterances and representations but also on reconstruction of the dynamic social relations that constitute class. Both the linguistic and the network versions of recent class analysis retain an emphasis on relations of production but make unprecedented efforts to integrate dialogue, daily practice, and social ties as more than straightforward expressions of productive organization.

DEFINING SOCIAL CLASS

What then is social class? As the foregoing discussion suggests, social historians have generally adopted one of five answers to the question.

1. Social class consists of position, individual or collective, in a hierarchy of prestige, wealth, or power or is a special case of such hierarchical differentiation.
2. Social class describes a connection, individual or collective, to markets that produces significant differences in quality of life.
3. Social class resides in mutual consciousness or shared culture among sets of persons who collectively regard themselves, however justly or unjustly, as superior or inferior to others.
4. Social class is or depends on collective location within a system of production.
5. Social class is an illusion or at best a mistaken description of inequalities better characterized in other ways, for example, as variable individual competence, ethnic culture, or occupational specialization.

Except for the last, these competing views do not entirely exclude each other. But they imply different priorities. Marxist social historians have, for example,

sometimes combined the first four in the argument that collective location within a system of production determines both hierarchical position and relation to consumption markets while shaping mutual consciousness and culture. Thus arguing, marxists give priority to production. Other social historians assign priority to hierarchical location, consumption markets, or consciousness. In line with the first or the fifth alternative, still others deny the validity of class as description or explanation of social behavior for particular situations or even for history in general. Inequalities, even hierarchies, may exist, doubters declare, but they do not constitute social classes. When social historians do speak of social class, however, they generally stress one of the first four competing conceptions. Hierarchical and productivist ideas (alternatives one and four) have predominated in social history over the long run, but the other three positions have all competed at times.

What is at stake in this competition? Social historians who treat class as *hierarchical position* often take vertical division as part of a natural order given by custom, historical accretion, prevailing values, or social function. Relations among classes therefore play little or no part in their explanations of class differences. Changes in class structure, according to such a view, result from long-term, incremental alterations in values, mentalities, population composition, or societal type. In functional versions of the argument, agrarian societies simply require one type of hierarchy, industrial societies another.

Social historians who emphasize *connections to markets* as bases of class distinctions generally consider classes to be recent social creations. Their existence depends on the commodification of capital, land, goods, and services. This commodification can create distinct classes when two conditions converge: (1) segmented access to markets and (2) variable property rights according to the kinds of goods in question or the status of their possessors.

Emphasizing relations to labor and commodity markets, Max Weber made a famous statement of this view:

Those who have no property but who offer services are differentiated just as much according to their kinds of services as according to the way in which they make use of these services, in a continuous or discontinuous relation to a recipient. But always this is the generic connotation of the concept of class: that the kind of chance in the *market* is the decisive moment which presents a common condition for the individual's fate. Class situation is, in this sense, ultimately market situation. The effect of naked possession *per se*, which among cattle breeders gives the non-owning slave or serf into the power of the cattle owner, is only a fore-runner of real "class" formation. (Weber, 1968, vol. 2, p. 928)

SECTION 10: SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Weber explicitly distinguished class divisions from status group and party divisions, which he regarded as more crucial where labor and commodity markets were ill developed. Other historians have added markets for land to Weber's labor and commodity markets. In such a perspective class and class conflict become salient under certain special conditions, notably the predominance of land, labor, and commodity markets, but classes do not exist everywhere, need not form regular hierarchies, and often coexist with cross-cutting divisions by status and party.

To focus class analysis on *mutual consciousness and shared culture* articulates well the widespread idea that social categories matter only to the extent that people recognize and participate in them. The idea appeals to an odd assortment of social historians. They include not only methodological individualists (who regard rationally deliberated choices as prime historical motors), but also phenomenologists (who regard individual consciousness as the seat and source of human action) and theorists of mentalities (who regard society-wide shifts of shared understandings as driving forces in history). In any of these lines of thought, classes only exist if, when, and because many people come to conceive of them as existing. Consequently, for them processes of class formation and transformation operate chiefly within the cognitive sphere.

Social class as *collective location within a system of production* introduces relations among members of different categories much more explicitly into class analysis. The view has two contrasting versions, one aligned approximately with classical and neoclassical economics, the other identified broadly with marxism. The economistic version considers that markets link holders of different sorts of capital, including human capital, and apportion rewards among them according to the current value of their capital to productive processes. Although Adam Smith argued explicitly that organizational and power differentials affected what different classes (for example, merchants and landless laborers) could gain from market relations, within those limits he laid down the doctrine of returns proportionate to productive contributions. Smith's successors have portrayed production as built around freely contracted bargains among holders of different varieties and quantities of capital. Classes therefore correspond to divisions with respect to capital. Following this understanding, extensive historical research has gone into changes in living standards and in material inequality. Increasing inequality in income, wealth, and welfare becomes the evidence of increasing class differentiation (Kaelble, 1983).

Marxists counter neoclassical explanations of class differences with an interpretation of productive

relations, not as freely contracted bargains but as exercises of coercion among inherently unequal parties. The organization of production, in this view, lays the bases of class divisions; those divisions arise from unequal interaction among categories of participants in productive processes and generally involve struggle. For either the economistic or the marxist view, then, change in the organization of production generates change in class structure.

Finally, some claim that social class is a *chimera*. In fact the rejection of class analysis for particular situations or for history in general arises from several rather different groups of social historians. Antimarxists (including former marxists) sometimes take the fully revolutionary proletariat of Marx's *Communist Manifesto* (1848) as their standard for existence of a class, then set out to prove that workers' consciousness or behavior fell short of the standard. Joyce and Vernon undertook just such proofs. (This form of argument provides an ironic counterpoint to the frequent marxist practice of explaining workers' failure to act collectively against their exploiters by the absence of conditions for class-conscious action sketched in the *Manifesto*.) Market enthusiasts sometimes argue that competition among unequally competent individuals produces differential rewards but nothing like social classes. Students of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and other forms of categorical inequality often claim that what other historians see as class differences actually result from discrimination in these other arenas.

The choice among conceptions of class does not merely concern the words historians apply to the same phenomena. It involves profoundly different understandings of how history works. Competing views of fundamental social processes are at stake. Advocates of hierarchical models, for example, commit to the existence of an overarching social system or culture that generates, sustains, and transforms the relevant hierarchies. Interpreters of class as grounded in production relations, however, inevitably attribute coherence and power to material production. Such contrasting worldviews have implications far outside the workings of class.

COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF CLASS AND SOCIAL HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

To appreciate those implications, it is helpful to examine a trio of historical phenomena whose explanation depends in part on social class. In these cases the choice of one class conception or another should make a difference to the explanation itself. Beginning with obvious cases, the examination then moves to

increasingly subtle manifestations of social class: first the development of capitalism, then popular political contention, finally demographic change.

Development of capitalism. All accounts of capitalist development recognize changing configurations of work and capital. They differ greatly, however, in the significance attributed to social classes. Views of class as hierarchical position generally treat class formation as a significant by-product, but not a significant cause, of capitalist development. Causes lie elsewhere: in a society's inevitable differentiation, in alterations of collective mentalities, or perhaps in the diffusion of new technologies. Market-connection accounts of class leave somewhat more space for class formation as a cause of capitalist development, since changes in the character of merchants and of consumers both affect the organization and extent of markets. Nevertheless, market-connection models generally portray their major relations with class formation the other way around: however it occurs, expansion of labor and commodity markets differentiates participants into distinct categories—social classes—disposing of contrasting bundles of goods, services, work opportunities, and life chances.

To argue that social class resides in mutual consciousness or shared culture does not necessarily rule out origins of class consciousness or class culture in hierarchy or market position. Yet it does predispose its advocates to favor ideological and cultural explanations of capitalism as well. (In fact Weber stressed the influence of a Protestant ethic on the development of European capitalism while laying out one of the most coherent market-connection conceptions of class.) Such explanations abound; they often pivot on the assertion that western European culture predisposed its beneficiaries to competitive enterprise, an assertion that typically gives great weight to capitalist entrepreneurs in the creation of capitalism as a whole.

Analysis of class as collective location within a system of production likewise typically gives great weight to capitalist entrepreneurs but in relation, often in struggle, with other social classes. In such analyses class relations constitute major elements of any productive system, class interactions alter production, and class structure responds sensitively to shifts in the logic of production. Historians who regard class as a chimera are predisposed to explain the development of capitalism in terms of autonomous, impersonal forces, such as science, technology, the market, or changing mentalities. Thus different conceptions of social class imply distinct approaches to explanations of capitalist development.

Popular political contention. Popular political contention means ordinary people collectively making claims bearing on other people's interests when some government is either the object of those claims or a significant third party to them. Popular political contention includes collective retribution for moral offenders, intervillage fights, invasions of enclosed fields, deliberate disruptions of public ceremonies, market conflicts, strikes, and rebellions, but it also includes the demonstrations, public meetings, petition drives, and electoral campaigns that nineteenth-century Europeans eventually lumped together as social movements (Tilly and Tilly, 1981). Popular political contention does not involve social classes by definition. Indeed nonclass categories, such as religion, gender, ethnicity, and locality, have often figured in European contention. Nevertheless, differing conceptions of class have significant implications for the description and explanation of popular political contention.

Strong marxist views of class imply one of two positions. Either (1) all popular contention rests at bottom on class interests and class conflict, in which case apparent nonclass action stems from false consciousness or indirect effects of class formation; or (2) in the long run class interests and class conflict supersede other forms of division, hence other bases of contention. In the first position, excavating nationalism or religious conflict with sufficient care will eventually expose its foundation in class structure. In the second position, a variety of solidarities, interests, and conflicts arise in the short run, but, within any given mode of production, class polarization eventually prevails. Indeed that polarization eventually produces a crisis in which popular contention propels transition from one mode of production to another.

A competing version of social class as collective location within a system of production depends on non-marxist economics. If, as this second version implies, classes form around market-mediated divisions with respect to capital, popular political contention may still have a class basis. But two rather different scenarios apply. One is the case of a class having shared interests in the production of some collective good, such as protection of its kind of capital from predation or erosion, redistribution of returns from capital, or monopoly control of some market. In this case standard collective action problems arise.

A second scenario, however, involves collective reactions to consequences of occupying a common economic location, as when a labor market segment shrinks (handloom weavers are a famous European example), crucial commodities suddenly become more expensive (bread prices are a famous European example), or a productive resource disappears (enclo-

tures of common lands are a famous European example). In contrast to the first scenario, economic analysts commonly regard the contention involved in such cases as irrational, since it resists the inexorable long-run logic of the market and of returns to capital. Nevertheless, both scenarios call up economic accounts of class action that differ significantly from marxist accounts.

Obviously conceptions of social class as hierarchy, as market connection, as shared culture, or as illusion point to still other characterizations of popular political contention. Social theorists in the styles of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto have, for example, repeatedly spun out hierarchical theories of class in which political struggles emerge chiefly from efforts of subordinates to displace currently ruling classes. Shared-culture theorists of class, in contrast, typically take several steps beyond Thompson by making political tradition, altered consciousness, and response to evocative symbols central to popular action (see Herzog, 1998; Hunt, 1984; Sewell, 1980). Clearly, competing conceptions of social class lead analysts of popular political contention in significantly different directions.

Demographic change. Each approach to class has distinctive implications for the study of basic demographic processes, especially categorical differences in birth, death, marriage, sickness, mobility, and growth or decline (for a general introduction to the literature, see Willigan and Lynch, 1982). Demographers commonly think in terms of populations and imagine that categories are little more than convenient identifiers for subpopulations likely to have more homogeneous experiences than the population as a whole (Desrosières, 1998). The relevant categories then include age, sex, religion, ethnicity, and nationality, but they also include representations of class, such as income, occupation, or estimated social standing.

Social historians who study population processes more often take the categories seriously. They do so on either or both of two grounds: that the sheer existence of known unequal categories is a social fact with consequences for social behavior, including demographic behavior; and that the categories actually represent inequalities in social ties, culture, and quality of life more or less accurately.

Still, our competing answers to the question "What is social class?" lead to different expectations concerning categorical differences and their explanations. Class as hierarchical position lends itself readily to the expectation of continuous differences in behavior as a function of proximity to elite values and resources. Explanations of such differences may well in-

volve varieties of upbringing and education, but they also can emphasize social connections or access to resources and opportunities. Discontinuous distributions and well-marked boundaries—for example, in types of illness or in contraceptive behavior—then suggest discontinuous distributions of upbringing, connections, resources, and opportunities.

If social classes consist of population segments defined by distinctive relations to land, labor, and commodity markets, continuous distributions appear less likely as causes or effects of inequality. Segmented labor markets, for example, bundle interpersonal connections, identities, mobility opportunities, and a wide variety of resources (Tilly, 1998, chapter 5). Observing such effects, analysts can plausibly explain categorical differences in mortality and age at marriage by delineating clustered and market-driven differences in exposure to risks and opportunities.

Consciousness and culture? If a social class is a set of people who regard each other as social equals and share a distinctive body of understandings, representations, and practices, certainly their sharing should affect their demographic behavior and change. In fact two different kinds classes of effects should occur, the first resulting from the existence of a boundary around equals and the second resulting from shared culture. The boundary presumably limits sexual relations, marriage, kinship, mutual aid, and information flows, all of which affect birth, death, marriage, sickness, mobility, and growth or decline. The shared culture presumably includes such demographically crucial matters as contraception, abortion, child care, diet, health care, migration, and sexual practices. These are not mere speculations; many students of population change have bet heavily on class differences in consciousness and culture for their explanations (e.g., Gillis, Tilly, and Levine, 1992; Poppel, 1992).

However, about as many have adopted conceptions of class as depending chiefly on location in production. Once again a distinction arises between advocates of neoclassical and marxist approaches to the problem. For neoclassically inclined analysts, class effects on demographic change occur through the formation of similar conditions for individual decision making that affects fertility, mortality, mobility, and other demographic processes (see Goldstone, 1986; Wrigley, 1987). Although marxist reasoning sometimes overlaps with neoclassical explanation in this regard, marxists in general assign more importance to social relations at production sites. In the best social history, to be sure, those production sites include households and neighborhoods as well as shops and factories (see Hanagan, 1989; Levine, 1984, 1987).

Some students of demographic change, however, declare class a chimera. A case in point is Simon Szreter's study of fertility change in Great Britain from 1860 to 1940. Szreter organized interpretation of his voluminous data around an attack on the (common) idea of nationwide fertility differentials and declines corresponding to class differences and responding to diffusion of ideas and knowledge downward through the class hierarchy. He argued instead (a) that rising costs of raising children moved couples toward increasingly effective prevention of conception by means of sexual abstinence and coitus interruptus, (b) that this happened not class by class but according to small-scale variations among occupations and localities, and (c) that changing gender relations mattered far more than any effects one could reasonably attribute to class. Szreter summed up his findings:

The evidence presented here suggests that falling fertility among this part of the nation was far from a process graded by neat and identifiable, nationally applicable status or social class patterns. It was the relatively massive, and highly localised variations between communities, especially in the degree to which their labour markets were sexually segregated and divided, which may well largely account for occupational fertility differentials during this period of falling fertilities. This was something which was integrally linked to the

history of local industrial relations and work practices in each of these places. (Szreter, 1996, p. 364)

Szreter rejected class interpretations in the name of local and occupational particularism. In that respect he joined the sort of attack on Thompsonian class analysis mounted by Joyce and Vernon.

Examination of ideas about capitalism's development, popular collective action, and demographic change establishes that competing conceptions of class do not matter for themselves alone. They lead to different explanations of major social phenomena. The same sort of demonstration applies to historical studies of welfare, of migration, of family structure, of electoral politics, or of revolution. The conclusion would be the same: social historians contend about social class because the experiences those words point to are fundamental and because competing conceptions of social class entail conflicts about the very nature of social processes.

The debate need not remain, however, a battle of philosophical premises. Social historians are a skeptical, practical, empirical lot. The synthesis among production-based, relational, and discursive approaches to social class promises to give them superior guidance in actually explaining the processes of change and conflict they so painstakingly document.

See also Marxism and Radical History (volume 1); Capitalism and Commercialization; The Industrial Revolutions (volume 2); Collective Action (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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SOCIAL MOBILITY



Hartmut Kaelble

A standard theme of social history, social mobility was one of the topics that inspired modern social history's beginnings in the 1960s and the 1970s in Europe and the United States. Historians approached the topic for various reasons. One of their central motivations was to determine the equality of social opportunities in certain periods and contexts—that is, whether modern industrial or service societies helped or hindered chances of upward mobility for men as well as for women. In an era when the industrial and then the tertiary societies were becoming predominant in the United States and Europe, and historians turned to certain central topics, including increasing openness or reinforced exclusiveness of modern elites; the rising or declining chances of social ascent for descendants from the lower classes or from immigrants or ethnic groups; and the broadening or reduced access to channels of social ascent such as education, business enterprises, public bureaucracies, family networks, politics, sports, and entertainment. Moreover, social mobility was frequently discussed by historians in a comparative perspective. European and American historians explored both the myth of the unique chances for social ascent in America and the myth of unrestricted social mobility in communist countries. They also started to investigate societies outside the Western world.

DEFINITIONS AND METHODS

What do historians mean by social mobility? For the most part their investigations center on the social mobility of individuals rather than the grading up or down of entire social groups or classes. Thus the heading of social mobility does not cover the decline of the European aristocracy or of the urban artisanal elite; the ascent of the middle class, or of various professions, or of ethnic groups and groups of immigrants; or the decline or ascent of women. Although the study of social mobility takes these changes in social hierarchies into account, they are usually not its main theme.

Moreover, the study of social mobility does not focus on the geographical mobility of individuals, as the term might suggest, but rather on mobility within social structures and hierarchies. To be sure, a good many studies of social mobility do treat immigration and geographical mobility as a factor in social mobility; local studies especially treat the mobile as a group of historical individuals who are difficult to trace, hence creating severe methodological difficulties. The theme of transience has been particularly important in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century United States and European history. Wider studies of immigration have also tested causes (in terms of threatened downward mobility) and results (in terms of comparing mobility results for different immigrant groups) where geographic migration was involved.

Another defining feature of the study of social mobility is its concentration on occupational mobility. In investigations of intragenerational mobility, historians trace the mobility of individuals among different occupational positions or their persistence in the same occupation throughout their lives. In investigations of intergenerational mobility, historians compare the occupations of an individual with that of his or her father, mother, and ancestors at specific points in their lives. Occupation is usually seen as the crucial indicator of the situation of an individual in a historical society. To be sure, historians are fully aware of the limitations of this concept of occupational mobility. They are highly sensitive to the fact that the occupational activity of an individual in history, more often than today, might comprise a simultaneous plurality of occupations or include professions that are still in the making and thus without a clear position in the society of that time. In addition, a change in education, religious affiliation, or social networks might be as important as the change in occupation. Finally, historians are fully aware that, the farther back into history a study goes, the less reliable and distinct does occupation as an indicator of the social position of an individual become.

With occupation as the key indicator of social hierarchies, social mobility studies seek a highly dif-

ferentiated body of knowledge about societies in the past. They explore variations in income, properties, educational training, prestige, and social networks among occupations by means of linking various historical sources; individuals can be traced through marriage license files, tax files, census materials, last wills, records of churches and public administrations, and autobiographical sources. The competence of historians in linking various sources has shown a marked improvement.

The study of social mobility has been criticized for various methodological reasons. Many historians argue that the sources normally used provide only a crude idea of the historical reality; they consider data on only two or three points of time in a whole life and on only one occupation insufficient and unsatisfying. In addition, by focusing on occupations the study of social mobility excludes large parts of the population. This is especially true for women, whose historical mobility until the first half of the twentieth century mainly involved marriage rather than occupational activity. It is also true in a more fundamental way for societies in which large parts of the population did not yet have distinct and single professions. This type of mobility study therefore has less to say about peasant societies or early modern urban societies than about modern industrial societies. Moreover, critics object that the quantitative study of social mobility concentrated too heavily on quantifiable aspects of objective circumstances and neglected entirely the subjective dimension of experiences, motivations, and mentalities. Defining status is a cultural matter, and occupations change in status over time. This variability requires sensitivity in mobility assessments.

These criticisms spurred some new trends in the methods of historical research on social mobility, with the result that the study of social mobility has achieved a higher level of sophistication. Individual careers are explored in micro studies of as many details as possible, with attention to autobiographical materials that often cannot be analyzed quantitatively. Studies of a few individual cases in which source materials are rich are given priority over quantitative studies of all members of a local society. This type of micro study is rarely limited to social mobility but covers a large variety of social aspects. In addition, studies of social mobility in which occupation is not predominant are becoming more important. Thus the study of the social mobility of women has begun, though only very few studies on gender differentials exist. It has become clear that the results are highly interesting, showing that the history of the social mobility of women is clearly different from that of men. Some studies also try to include subjective matters and trace the impact

of mentalities and experiences on social mobility. Furthermore, the number of international and interregional comparative studies of the history of social mobility has increased somewhat, using the rich results of about thirty years of historical research in this field.

INTERDISCIPLINARY COOPERATION

Social mobility is one of the major fields of social history in which research comes not only from historians but also from scholars of other disciplines. This is especially true for three crucial aspects of the history of social mobility: Political scientists have sponsored important investigations using the historical perspective in exploring the recruitment of the elites, particularly the political and administrative elites. Educationists and sociologists have participated in the historical research on educational opportunities in schools and in higher education. The most important contribution comes from sociologists in the investigation of the overall trends of social mobility during the twentieth century.

In the early years of the social mobility field, historians were strongly encouraged by the work of major historical sociologists such as Pitirim Sorokin, Seymour M. Lipset, Reinhart Bendix, and D. V. Glass, who had published studies of the history of social mobility. In this interdisciplinary cooperation, quantification became an important bridge between historians and sociologists. Later, a sort of division of labor emerged between the two fields. Sociologists usually explore social mobility on the level of entire countries by means of cohort analysis, which is based on actual surveys and traces differences between older and younger age cohorts, assuming that these differences represent historical changes in social mobility. They sometimes use separate, often more detailed surveys for different age groups and compare their life stories, going on to write international comparisons of historical trends of social mobility. Sociologists also developed highly sophisticated statistical indicators for measuring trends and international differences. By contrast, historians usually explore social mobility on the local or regional level, using the variety of sources discussed above. Some historians claim to be able to study social mobility for entire regions or even countries from the early modern period onward on the basis of these sources. In selecting different types of cities and villages and in comparing local studies on a transregional and transnational level, historians also can investigate general tendencies of social mobility. Historians mostly use simpler quantitative methods of analysis that are less difficult to understand than

the indicators used by sociologists. As the links between these two disciplines are disappointingly weak, the reader is obliged to consult the sociological as well as the historical literature.

MAIN QUESTIONS

Four major questions have especially attracted the attention of historians of social mobility: Did industrialization and modernization produce an increase, decrease, or no change in social mobility? Did social mobility advance in the United States and in communist societies, especially as compared to Western European societies? How were opportunities for social mobility different for each gender? What was the discourse of contemporaries on social mobility?

Social mobility in modern society. The increase in social mobility in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries means different things to different authors in the field. Greater mobility, in the context of industrialization and modernization, can signify a more meritocratic recruitment, especially for the few most prestigious, most powerful, and best-paid positions. That mobility may occur between occupations; it may be upward as well as downward; it may apply to job mobility within the same social class. Increased social mobility may encompass the chances of both genders and of minorities. Sometimes it refers specifically to a clear increase in the opportunities of the lower classes as compared to the opportunities of the upper and middle classes, rather than greater mobility across the board.

The advocates of the view that social mobility has undergone a general increase often point specifically to the rising number of upwardly mobile persons since industrialization. They argue that various major social changes led to greater social mobility and social ascent. The general decline of the fertility rate during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made it possible for parents not only to invest more in the individual help and education of their children but also to promote their own professional careers. The rapid expansion of secondary and higher education, especially since the end of the nineteenth century, enlarged enormously the chances for better training. The rapid increase of geographic mobility since the second half of the nineteenth century led to a widening of the labor market and to a greater variety of new chances. Among the active population, the fundamental shift from the predominance of agrarian work up to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the predominance of service work, especially since the

1970s, generated substantial social mobility between occupations. The distinct increase in the sheer number of occupations in all modern societies since the industrial revolution also must have led to more social mobility. The general change in mentalities; the weakening of the emotional identification with specific professions, social milieus, and local milieus; and the rising readiness for job mobility and for lifelong training further enlarged the number of socially mobile persons. The rise of the welfare state, the mitigation of individual life crises, and the guarantee of individual social security clearly improved the chances for further training and for the purposeful use of occupational chances. Government policies aimed at enhancing educational and occupational opportunities for lower classes, for women, for ethnic and religious minorities, and for immigrants also have had an impact on social mobility. The list of factors attesting to an increase in social mobility in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is substantial.

Yet there are those who see social mobility as having remained stable or even declined. They are a heterogeneous group, with arguments stemming from very different ideas of social developments. It is sometimes argued that nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century industrialization led not only to a rising number and a fundamental change of occupations but also to a class society in which the major social classes—the middle class, the lower middle class, the working class, the peasants, and in some societies also the aristocracy—tended to reinforce the demarcation lines between classes and hence to reduce rather than enlarge the number of mobile persons. Other advocates of the skeptical view argue that the fundamental upheaval of modern societies during industrialization led to a unique volatility in social mobility, both upward and downward, and that modern societies thereafter became more closed: the generation of pioneers in business ended, most occupational careers became more formalized and more dependent on higher education, modern bureaucracies emerged, and mentalities adapted to the modern, highly regulated job markets.

Other scholars argue for the stability of social mobility rates in a different and much more narrow sense: they argue that long-term changes in social mobility from the industrial revolution until the present were mostly structural; that is, they depended almost exclusively on the redefinition of the active population rather than on the reduction of social, cultural, and political barriers. In this view social mobility remained stable if one excepts the changes simply induced by alternations in occupational structure; peasants, for example, became workers, which constituted a real

change, but not necessarily a case of upward mobility. Still other scholars posit a stable inequality of educational and occupational chances for the lower classes, women, and minorities in comparison with those for the middle and upper class, the male population, or the ethnic majority.

Out of this long debate has grown, since the beginning of quantitative studies of social mobility after World War II, a large number of historical studies of social mobility. Their wide range of results can be distilled to three main points: First, only in very rare cases was a clear decline in social mobility rates found. Most studies show either stable or increasing rates of social mobility, depending upon the type of community and country and the generation and period under investigation. However, there is no overwhelming overall evidence for either the stability or increase of social mobility rates. Second, changes of overall social mobility rates do in fact depend to a large degree on changes in occupational and educational structure. Thus one can say that modern societies became more mobile to a large degree because education expanded so much and because occupational change became so frequent and normal. Finally, much evidence indicates that the increase of educational and social mobility of the lower classes and women did not impair the educational and occupational chances of the middle and upper classes and men. Except for the eastern European countries in some specific periods, social mobility was usually not a zero-sum game.

Social mobility in the United States and the communist bloc. The question of advanced social mobility in the United States dates at least from the early nineteenth century, when the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville argued that American society offered more chances for upward social mobility than did Europe. For a long time the subject was approached from a moral perspective, concerning the advantages and disadvantages of a mobile society. After World War II some social scientists attacked the notion that American society was in fact more mobile, the American sociologist Seymour M. Lipset being the most prominent. He argued that industrialization and social modernization everywhere led to the same basic increase in social mobility; overall international figures on rates of social mobility and of social ascent after World War II did not show any American superiority in those terms. Lipset's attack on what was a myth of long standing provoked a debate among academics and intellectuals. American influence in the world had reached its peak, and the model of the American way of life in general was undergoing intense debate both

in America and in Europe. Skepticism about the American superiority in social mobility was voiced by Simone de Beauvoir, the French intellectual, who wrote in *L'Amérique au jour le jour* (1948) after travel in the United States that "there is almost no hope any more for the lower class to move up into this [upper] class." Other social scientists as well as writers defended the notion of advanced American social mobility. Ralf Dahrendorf, the German sociologist, argued in his book *Die angewandte Aufklärung: Gesellschaft und Soziologie in Amerika* that "much direct evidence exists that [the United States] offers the opportunity of social ascent also to those who would have been stopped in Europe by the rigid social hierarchies."

Evidence in three areas was put forward to prove that America was a leader in social mobility. Detailed empirical studies by sociologists demonstrated that lead in some crucial aspects, especially mobility in the professions. American higher education was more extensive and offered greater access to the professions than did the European counterpart. Hence the social ascent from the lower classes into the professions that are based on higher education was clearly more frequent than in Europe. In addition, comparative historical studies on late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century American and European cities showed that in a special sense a modest American lead existed during that period: unskilled workers in fact moved up into white-collar positions in American cities somewhat more frequently than in European cities. Finally, historians demonstrated that the important difference between American and European societies could be found in the idea of social mobility rather than in the actual rates of mobility. Americans continuously believed that their country offered more opportunities than the rigid European societies.

Studies in the late twentieth century tended to argue that American society no longer leads Europe in general social mobility. To be sure, international comparisons show that strong and persistent differences in social mobility between cities and countries existed and still exist. Hence it is difficult to accept the assertion of a worldwide convergence of social mobility through industrialization and modernization. However, probably because of the fundamental social changes in Europe since World War II, there is no clear evidence for a general American lead in social mobility against the whole of Europe.

Neither as provocative nor as persistent, nevertheless the subject of social opportunities in communist countries, especially in the USSR during the 1920s and 1930s and in the Eastern European nations in the late 1940s and 1950s, attracted its share of social mobility studies. During these periods rates of

upward social mobility into the higher ranks of the social hierarchy were substantial compared to rates in Western European societies. This was true partly because higher education expanded rapidly; partly because the communist abolition of the business and landowning elites and the seizure of power by the Communist Party opened up top positions for social ascent in industry and agriculture, politics and administrations; and partly because employment structure changed rapidly during rapid industrialization. However, the rise of social opportunities in communist countries was, if it existed at all, largely limited to the period of the initial upheaval. Most comparative studies of the 1970s and 1980s show that rates of social mobility were not distinctly higher in the eastern part of Europe compared to the western part. This change occurred for several reasons: the communist political and administrative elite became exclusive and gentrified; in several communist countries the expansion of higher education slowed down, and hence the student ratio in Eastern Europe in general fell below the ratio in Western Europe; and social change slowed down.

Gender contrasts in social mobility. Except for a few studies, the history of gender contrasts in social mobility is largely unexplored. But gender contrasts undoubtedly will add important new aspects to the general debate about long-term trends in social mobility. The existing studies point to four conclusions. First, in a more radical sense than in the study of male mobility, female mobility raises the question of whether social mobility should in fact be centered around occupational mobility or whether other factors such as marriage and unpaid or partially paid work in emerging professions are to be taken into account much more than they have been so far. In the end, marriage might turn out to be an important channel of upward or downward mobility for men as well in past societies. Second, female mobility raises the question of greater downward mobility during the transition to modern society, when female activity outside the family sphere increased. A study of female social mobility in twentieth-century Berlin demonstrates that a large number of active women became intergenerationally *déclassé* during the early parts of the century. Further studies are required to corroborate the results. Third, the study of the social mobility of women demonstrates much more clearly than the study of the social mobility of men the effects of economic crises and fundamental transitions on social mobility. Opportunities for women seem to have depended strongly on economic prosperity, on long-term social stability. In periods of economic crisis and rapid transitions

such as the upheaval of 1989–1991, women more than men belonged to the losers. Here again the study of female mobility might draw the attention of historians to a more general aspect of mobility that was not sufficiently investigated. Finally, the social mobility of women also demonstrates that definite changes in social opportunities can be achieved only in the long term. Even though important channels of upward social mobility such as education offered equal chances to women, this did not lead to a parallel improvement of occupational chances for women. It is highly doubtful that the explanation for this gap can be found simply in the study of institutions and context factors. Historical studies of the experience of social mobility and the perception of social mobility will become more important than they have been so far.

The discourse on social mobility. The historical study of social mobility has begun to be conducted in the light of another field of inquiry, the history of identities and the debate about modernity. Unlike the aspect of social opportunities, this aspect of the subject is relatively unexplored. One approach to it is by way of the history of European identity. In the decades before World War I, Europeans became aware of the rise of the superior American economy and the more liberal American society. European self-understanding was no longer based on an implicit feeling of superiority over all other societies; rather, it was tinged with a growing uneasiness about modernity. Tocqueville was a very early example of this worried European self-understanding. More advanced social opportunities in America came to symbolize modernity and, therefore, relative European backwardness. Such opportunities were welcomed by the more liberal Europeans and described as a horrifying social scenario without any fixed hierarchies by the more conservative.

This debate gradually changed when Europe entered the period of a fundamental crisis of self-understanding between World War I and roughly the 1960s. The idea of open social opportunities gradually was shared by all Europeans. However, some Europeans still saw Europe as a backward society with lower social opportunities than the United States. Other Europeans argued that one of the last aspects of European superiority was the greater room for individuality allowed by European society compared to the conformity of American society. These Europeans, among them Simone de Beauvoir, thus saw Europe as the society with more opportunities for the individual. When the historical study of social mobility began, this initial debate was still going on. After the 1970s or so European self-understanding changed again, overcoming the period of fundamental identity crisis.

Social ascent became less important as an element of European self-understanding and as a theme of the debate over modernity.

THE DECLINE OF THE TOPIC AND ITS FUTURE

During the 1980s and 1990s social mobility was much less frequently investigated by historians. The major trend of social history was directed to other themes, other fundamental questions, and other methods. A variety of factors contributed to this declining interest in social mobility.

First, the initial wave of studies of social mobility appeared to be repetitive, and the subject seemed to have lost its former innovative power. After the completion of the first twenty or thirty local studies of social mobility during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the United States and Europe, historians failed to develop a convincing strategy showing which type of community in which country and period promised to open new insights. Historians did not rush to investigate the seventh industrial or fourth port city in the sixth industrializing country. In addition, the more sophisticated the methods and the use of sources became, the more time-consuming and expensive the individual study of social mobility grew to be. This rising standard of the study of social mobility was only partially compensated by the technical progress of personal computers. One can say that the quality standard for social mobility studies by historians rose dramatically, while the chance to present additional new arguments declined. At the same time, the gap between the quantitative methods employed by historians and sociologists widened, and thus the study of social mobility by sociologists was less encouraging for historians. Moreover, some of the questions that inspired the historical study of social mobility—the more open American society, the effects of industrialization and modernization—were asked much less frequently. These questions lost their former urgency once it was widely accepted that social mobility rates were about the same in most societies and that an upward trend in social mobility in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in industrializing and modernizing countries could not be proved. Finally, the thematic trends in historical research made social mobility seem less modern a theme. The quantitative and

social scientific profile of the historical study of social mobility made it less attractive among the mainstream thematic trends of historical research, which led toward a return to political history, toward a cultural history inspired by anthropological questions unconnected with social mobility, or toward a social history dealing primarily with discourses, mentalities, and microworlds.

To be sure, it would be misleading to say that historians abandoned social mobility as a theme. Quite the opposite, the study of discourses, mentalities, values, and microworlds often treated the social mobility of individuals and rendered it a normal topic of the historian. But the label of social mobility no longer appeared on the title pages of books, chapters, or articles.

The future of the study of social mobility is that of a normal theme among many others in history rather than a top theme in an expanding branch of history, as in the 1960s and 1970s. In this more modest but realistic sense, one can expect and hope for four sorts of studies on neglected aspects of social mobility. The first is the so far neglected study of social mobility beyond Western Europe and the United States, leading to international comparisons in a geographic dimension including Eastern European, Asian, African, and Latin American cases. The questions of social opportunities in advanced and developing societies and of the particularities of Europe will then be answered in a much more comprehensive way than they have been so far. Gender contrasts is the second aspect deserving of future study. Our knowledge of the social mobility of women, in contrast to that of men, is still very limited. The subject should be pursued through case studies of contrasting countries, various activities of women, and contrasting general conditions such as prosperity and economic depression, peace and war, stability and transitions. A third future theme involves specific factors of social mobility such as religion, types of family, immigration, unemployment and poverty, background in terms of social milieu, and social upheavals and transitions. Historians will probably explore these contexts of social mobility in case studies of a certain number of individuals rather than in quantitative studies of entire communities, thus attending to the subjective experience of social mobility. Finally, the history of social mobility debates, as delineated here, is itself deserving of further study.

See also The Industrial Revolutions (volume 2); Gender and Work; History of the Family (volume 4); Schools and Schooling; Higher Education (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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THE ARISTOCRACY AND GENTRY



Jonathan Dewald

Implicitly if not always explicitly, privileged groups—aristocrats and gentry—have long been central to historians’ understanding of European social history. In part their importance reflects the extraordinary influence that these groups exercised on society as a whole through the eighteenth century and to a lesser degree thereafter. In England the high aristocracy, numbering about two hundred families, held about one-fourth of the kingdom’s land; in seventeenth-century Bohemia, an even smaller nobility held two-thirds of the land. Political and social influence matched this economic hold, so that in some regions aristocrats and gentry enjoyed a near monopoly on high positions in the church, army, and administration. To a significant extent, these intertwining forms of domination (and the ideological justifications that accompanied them) defined Europe’s social order before the French Revolution, and thus helped define the revolution itself: revolutionary leaders labeled as “aristocrats” even their non-noble enemies, because they hoped that their new society would be one without aristocrats, without even the concept of aristocracy. For similar reasons, aristocrats and gentry also have considerable importance in the history of Europe since 1815, although their social importance declined in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They pose the question of modernization, for they had to manage the transition to an increasingly democratic and industrial social order, in which claims to privilege had lost much of their ideological and practical relevance. How they accomplished this transition, and with what effects on the society around them, has important implications for understanding the larger processes of change in European society.

The present essay deals mainly with the years through 1789, when aristocrats and gentry dominated European society most completely. The final section examines how the age of revolutions affected these groups and how they coped with the new world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

IDEALS, DEFINITIONS, RANKINGS

The ancient world had bequeathed to early modern Europe (notably via Aristotle’s *Politics*) a political and personal definition of “aristocracy” as the rule of the best men. Family background and wealth were understood to contribute to fitness for this public role, but did not necessarily define it; leading families might have unworthy descendants, and social newcomers might have the abilities needed for political excellence. This understanding of social status stood in some tension with a second that had developed during the early Middle Ages and that divided society into three orders: clerics who prayed, nobles who defended and governed, and commoners who met society’s economic needs. This view presented the aristocrat as principally a warrior, and it increasingly associated social status with birth. Its fullest elaboration came in the eighteenth century, when Henri de Boulainvilliers, comte de Saint-Saire, described the French aristocracy of his day as direct descendants of fifth-century Frankish warriors and argued that they continued to display the qualities of those remote ancestors.

By Boulainvilliers’s time, though, a third vision of the aristocrat had come to dominate most people’s thoughts, that of the “gentleman,” the “honnête homme,” who had the education and self-control needed for constructive social interaction. This vision had developed first in the courts of sixteenth-century Europe and received early discussion in Baldassare Castiglione’s *The Courtier* (1528). It did not require military or governmental position, though it was compatible with their exercise, nor was it coterminous with good birth, since it rested so heavily on personal attainments. Castiglione even asked whether the ideal courtier needed noble birth at all, though he ultimately answered in the affirmative. Although theoretically undermining distinctions of birth, the ideal of the gentleman ultimately strengthened them, since

it treated ideals of aristocratic behavior as ethical universals, desirable in all men and women but best realized by those born into high society and enjoying the leisure for self-improvement.

All three traditions circulated widely in old regime Europe, their divergences producing significant instability in ideas about the social order, for each valorized different qualities and implied different standards of behavior. But most contemporaries agreed on some basic definitions and assumptions. They distinguished first between upper and lower nobilities, the former enjoying great wealth and political influence, the latter having only local authority, and in some instances not much more wealth than their peasant neighbors. In some regions political events embodied this division. In Austria and England political assemblies included special chambers for the lords, setting them apart from the mass of other nobles, as well as from the commoners. In France on the other hand such distinctions were vaguer; a peerage and other high titles existed, but received little institutional reinforcement. Monarchs tended to sharpen these status distinctions by granting more elaborate titles to leading families in their realms, often to secure political loyalty but sometimes for mere cash. In Spain, Charles V created the order of grandees in 1520, marking off the highest nobility from the rest, and its numbers increased tenfold over the next two centuries; the Austrian Order of Lords increased fivefold between 1415 and 1818; in Carinthia there was a ninefold increase between 1596 and 1726. Historians have described these creations as an “inflation of honors,” which tended to devalue respect for titles by creating so many of them; expressions of disrespect can be found in contemporary commentaries.

Definitions of these “mere gentry” varied widely from one European country to another. In France all were designated as “noble,” and they enjoyed most of the privileges of even the wealthiest lords. In the Holy Roman Empire distinctions tended to be clearer. There an intermediate level of knights stood between the mere gentry and the lords, and in many regions they were sufficiently organized to enforce for themselves some special privileges. In England only the peers (numbering about fifty in the early sixteenth century and about two hundred in the eighteenth) held formal titles of nobility, while the great majority of landowners formed a very loosely defined gentry, without any legal distinctions. In most of continental Europe, the balance between these two groups shifted decisively over the early modern period, partly because of the inflation of honors, which elaborately confirmed the loftier families’ superiority to the mere gentry, and partly because of economic changes. Mere gentry

were often unable to meet the obligations of high status, and the economically successful among them tended to be absorbed into the higher aristocracy. In fifteenth-century Austria there had been four families of knights for every family of lords; four centuries later there were twice as many lords as knights. In England, by contrast, the gentry seem to have kept pace, beneficiaries of their society’s growing wealth and widening social opportunities.

COUNTER IDEALS: THE TRADITION OF SOCIAL CRITICISM

Already in the Middle Ages aristocrats’ determination to view themselves as society’s leaders encountered ideological opposition from a variety of groups, and complaints continued throughout the early modern period. In several countries the fourteenth century witnessed outright violence against aristocrats and their properties. The leaders of the French Jacquerie (1358) explained their movement as a response to the aristocracy’s failure to fulfill its basic function, that of protecting the rest of society. In the fifteenth century a successful rebellion of Catalonian peasants was accompanied by widespread denunciations of

lords' greed and improprieties, and in the early sixteenth century a series of German peasant movements questioned the need for any form of aristocracy. Seventeenth-century Castilian nobles too complained of the enmity shown by the commoners around them. Peasants were not alone in this truculence. In the early sixteenth century, leading humanist writers like Erasmus, Thomas More, and Sebastian Brant mocked aristocrats' pretensions and questioned the value of their social contributions, especially their contributions as warriors. When Enlightenment writers took up these themes in the eighteenth century, they thus expanded on longstanding views, but they gave these old ideas new coherence and force. They systematically judged aristocratic privilege against the criterion of social utility, suggesting that traditional aristocratic behavior represented a serious drain on society's productive resources. These ideas circulated widely in the eighteenth century and affected the decisions of administrators in several countries.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF SOCIAL DISTINCTION

Important common traits marked Europe's experience of aristocratic society, partly because aristocrats themselves moved frequently across national lines. Their education often involved travel, and often so did their careers, with both soldiers and administrators moving across national boundaries, especially among the small states of central Europe and within the vast Habsburg orbit. When they moved, such men found essentially familiar social arrangements, for ideologies and customs displayed important similarities. At its upper levels, aristocratic society was European as well as national.

But there were also important differences between regions, giving the aristocracies themselves distinctive characteristics and different relations with the rest of society. A first distinction separated eastern from western Europe and centered on differences in local powers. East of the Elbe River, in central Germany, these might be very great. Aristocratic estate owners enjoyed extensive rights to demand labor from the peasants around them and to control their marriages and movements. In western Europe, estate owners had far less power, and even as a title serfdom survived in few regions, entailing only some economic disadvantages. A second division separated northern from Mediterranean Europe. Near the Mediterranean, aristocrats had lived in cities since the Middle Ages and saw little essential difference between themselves and other wealthy city dwellers. This was especially

true in Italy, but even in Spain, which took nobility very seriously, the title "honored citizen" expressed the near-noble stature enjoyed by the wealthiest city dwellers. In northern Europe, in contrast, aristocrats tended to live in the countryside and visited the cities rather reluctantly. They saw little common ground between themselves and urban merchants, and tended to resist the latter's efforts to attain higher status.

The most important difference had to do with the number of aristocrats themselves. Early modern Europe was divided between regions where even the mere gentry were rare and regions where they were much more common. The latter included Poland and Hungary, along Europe's eastern frontier, and Castile in the west, all regions that had been battlefields of European expansion. Expansionist war against ethnic enemies had been one cause of frequent ennoblement, tempting peasants and city dwellers to take up military careers. In all three countries nobles easily counted for 10 percent of the total population before the eighteenth century, and in some districts densities might be higher still: in some Castilian towns the proportion could reach one-third. In the longer-Christianized core of Europe, there were many fewer such possibilities, and nobles were much less numerous, at most 2 percent of the population of sixteenth-century France, and closer to 1 percent by 1700; around 1 percent in most regions of Germany and Bohemia; 1 percent in the Kingdom of Naples; 0.4 percent in early-sixteenth-century Holland.

Some of these differences tended to diminish over the early modern period, especially during the eighteenth century. Nobles became better educated and more familiar with other national cultures. German nobles who had the resources were expected to tour Europe as part of their education, and many British nobles did the same. Northern nobles became more urbanized, and the profusion of nobles in Spain, Poland, and Hungary diminished; in late-eighteenth-century Spain, nobles represented 4.6 percent of total population. Yet change was not all in the direction of greater homogeneity, for nobles found themselves more closely tied to their national cultures in the eighteenth century, simply because those cultures had acquired more force and coherence. Many eighteenth-century governments also controlled their leading subjects' movements and loyalties more closely than had been the case before 1700. Prussia represented the extreme case, with its nobles forbidden even to leave the kingdom without the king's approval and never allowed to seek employment in other kings' armies. The loose cosmopolitanism of earlier centuries survived best in the Habsburg lands, which continued to attract the ambitious from throughout Europe. Only sixteen of

the 157 field marshals in the eighteenth-century Habsburg army came from its own territories; thirty-nine came from outside the German-language region altogether.

PRIVILEGE

According to much early modern social theory, aristocrats and gentry enjoyed special rights because of the special functions they performed, and notably because of their military service: French nobles spoke of paying a “tax of blood” on the battlefield, which exempted them from paying the cash levies demanded of others. In fact, however, privileges tended to reflect the political bargains that governments had struck with these their most powerful subjects. In this practice France represented the extreme case. In 1439 the Crown asserted its monopoly over direct taxation but in implicit exchange exempted nobles and other privileged groups from these impositions. Thus the geography and history of privilege tended to vary with the strength of the government rather than with the extent of aristocratic services. In England, where royal government had become strong very early, all subjects paid taxes, and only the peerage enjoyed some judicial privileges. In Spain, France, most of the Holy Roman Empire and Germany, nobles enjoyed freedom from most taxes, while in Brandenburg-Prussia the nobles consented to some taxation in exchange for other kinds of advantage, such as a near monopoly on official positions, tax-free grain exports, and a monopoly on beer brewing. In most of these regions nobles also had some legal advantages in managing their properties. Feudal law in France allowed them to avoid dividing property among their heirs, thus helping preserve family fortunes over the generations. In Spain the government allowed noble families to establish entails that performed this function even more effectively, protecting property from both division by inheritance and the indebtedness of individual owners.

These circumstances meant that many forms of privilege tended to diminish over the last century of the old regime, as governments became more assertive and effective. Louis XIV set an example in 1695 when, desperate for funds to pay his armies, his government introduced the capitation, a direct tax that the nobles were to pay like everyone else. Initially assessed according to social standing, the capitation soon became simply a tax on revenue, and in the eighteenth century it was assessed with some fairness. Wealthier nobles now paid a substantial tax, though they remained exempt from many other taxes. In 1731 the duke of Savoy completely abolished nobles’ fiscal exemptions

in his realm, and the Habsburgs did the same in 1771. This scarcely meant the end of all aristocratic privileges, and some new ones emerged in these very years. In 1751 France established a military academy exclusively for nobles, and in 1781 ruled that only members of old noble families could hold military commissions. But nobles in these countries had a strong and justified sense that their special place within society was under attack.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

In principle noble families symbolized social stability, the continued dominance of old family lines. Yet the nature of aristocratic society itself created some need for social mobility because old families regularly failed to produce heirs. In fact they had a strong interest in limiting the number of their children so as to create as few inheritance divisions as possible and thus maintain familial dignity in the next generation. Family limitation became especially common in the eighteenth century as methods of birth control became more widely known and as religious inhibitions on their use diminished. In addition, by the eighteenth century large numbers of nobles remained unmarried: an astounding 50 percent of the children of the upper nobility in the Catholic Westphalia region of Germany and 25 percent of the peerage in Protestant England. This lack of reproduction, together with early modern diseases, against which nobles enjoyed no special protection, and the added danger that their sons might die in battle, meant that many noble families died out. One historian of France has estimated that in each generation about 20 percent of families disappeared, and roughly comparable rates have been established for other European countries.

If the order was to maintain its numbers, a substantial flow of new families had to replace those that disappeared, and this was everywhere the case. A variety of mechanisms governed this mobility, some of them formal, some informal and even illegal. Sovereigns could grant titles of nobility, and some official positions brought nobility to anyone who held them; the Roman legal tradition even accorded the status to anyone who had an advanced degree in the law. Until about 1600, however, most new entrants to the nobility simply assumed the status, their only justification being military service or ownership of a fief, both of which their contemporaries normally associated with high status. Control over the process was mainly local and depended on the readiness of other nobles to accept newcomers’ claims. In Germany, for instance, local colleges of knights refused to accept any new fam-

ilies whose credentials they doubted, and such families would have difficulty finding noble marriage partners for their children. Cathedral chapters had similar ideas and rejected candidates whose ancestry was uncertain.

After 1600, however, the state increasingly intervened in processes of social mobility, from motives that were both practical and ideological. Contemporaries viewed the determination of social status as an aspect of sovereignty, part of what marked a state as free from interference by higher authorities and fully in control of its own population. Thus disputes over ennoblement offered useful symbolic ground for the German principalities to demonstrate their independence from the Holy Roman Empire by raising new families to high status without the emperor's approval. Conversely, the kings of France insisted that only they, and not high nobles within the realm or battlefield commanders, could give out titles. In much the same way, the practical realities of ennoblement also produced ambiguous effects, encouraging some princes to be generous in granting titles, others to be restrictive. Already in the 1540s the French king was openly selling titles of nobility for cash; but such grants meant enlarging the numbers of the tax-exempt and (in the thinking of late-seventeenth-century administrators) of the economically unproductive. As a result, government policy might oscillate wildly during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, with rulers shifting between open and restrictive policies as their immediate financial needs dictated. Even their personal convictions might play an important role. In England, Elizabeth I was reluctant to grant high titles, whereas her successor James I enjoyed granting large numbers of them and even created a new formal category within the British gentry.

On balance, though, the state's increasing hold over the process of ennoblement restricted new entries to the nobility. Indeed, restriction became an explicit goal of seventeenth-century economic improvers, who worried that social advancement diminished the number of society's producers while increasing the number of idle consumers. Pamphleteers in Spain and royal administrators in France both expressed this concern, and in 1666 the French government took concrete steps to address it. Louis XIV's mercantilist minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert launched a series of investigations of noble titles, with fines and public embarrassment for those who had "usurped" a title. Providing documentary proof of noble status became a more common experience throughout Europe in these years. Some schools, many religious institutions, a growing number of legal positions, and most groups of military officers all asked candidates for proof of their status before admission. The era of casual usurpation

was over, and the result in most regions was a visible decline in numbers of nobles; families continued to die out, probably at greater rates than in earlier centuries, but there were fewer replacements for them. In eighteenth-century France and Spain, nobles represented about half the share of population they had represented in 1600. Only in Britain did numbers actually increase in these years, apparently a reflection of British wealth and of the loose processes of social mobility that continued to prevail there. In much of continental Europe, in contrast, the eighteenth-century nobility formed a very small group: well under 1 percent of total population in much of Germany, about 1 percent in France, a mere 0.3 percent in Bohemia. Ordinary people could spend much of their lives without encountering them.

ECONOMIC SITUATIONS

The wealth and financial prospects of nobles, though varying enormously, everywhere reflected a fundamental ideological imperative: they were to be a ruling class, devoting their energies to public matters and warfare. Their views of themselves restricted the kinds of work that they could undertake and raised ethical questions about many economic activities. Pursuing money could only interfere with that imperative, drawing their attention from public to private matters and causing disrespect among those lower in society. In France and Spain formal rules of derogation required that any nobles working with their hands or engaging in most kinds of commerce lose their status and the privileges that went with it.

Such rules were never followed absolutely, and they left large zones for calculation and innovation. Certainly there was no prohibition on the careful pursuit of economic interests. Fifteenth-century nobles had unsophisticated but reasonably effective accounting techniques, and they moved quickly when they thought they were being cheated. Nor did they confine themselves to collecting rents on landed estates. Geographic accident offered some of them commercial possibilities, and they took full advantage. In the sixteenth century, as Louis Sicking has shown, the high-born lords of Vere operated something like a merchant marine on their island estate off the Netherlands coast. Prussian nobles took advantage of their easy access to the Baltic and dominated the grain trade in their region, using their tax advantages to drive out their commoner competition. In Seville sixteenth-century nobles took a leading role in trans-Atlantic commerce; in Genoa nobles involved themselves in banking; even in France, which perhaps took derogation more seriously

than other countries, seventeenth-century nobles loaned money to the Crown, employing middle-class front men for this profitable enterprise, and a few financed overseas ventures. Above all there was England, whose aristocracy had never felt much inhibition about commercial activity and whose gentry already in the fifteenth century moved easily in and out of London commerce.

If ideology permitted the nobles a range of economic options, most nonetheless confined themselves to a limited set of these, focusing on their estates and viewing the market economy with suspicion. Hence the seriousness of governmental efforts in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to change thinking on the matter of nobility and money. Officials like Colbert, worried by the French economy's failure to match its Dutch and British competitors, sought to propagate a far wider conception of economic activity, one that celebrated commerce and encouraged even those of high status to undertake it. Eighteenth-century writers took up these themes in France, Spain, and the German states. Governments now sought to end the concept of derogation and actively encouraged the development of a "commercial nobility," the term used by one such advocate. By the end of the century, such ideas apparently had a significant impact on nobles' thinking. Many more now spoke glowingly of the importance of commerce, and more now participated in it.

Until that point, land remained by far the most important form of aristocratic wealth, the group's main source of income and the focal point for most of its economic calculations. Given the geographic variety of Europe itself, landowning might vary widely from one region to another. Already in the sixteenth century some English estates included coal mines, a natural adjunct to control of land itself. In Germany late medieval estates derived very significant income from fish-farming in ponds created for the purpose, and both German and Bohemian estates produced substantial amounts of beer. The region around Bordeaux in southwestern France included large tracts of vineyard, much of it in the control of noble estate owners. More important than this variety, however, were the basic patterns that gave estates a common look across much of Europe. In the fifteenth century most estates consisted of more than acreage; in fact the direct control of land might play a subordinate role in the estate economy. Instead, owners depended chiefly on the rents (usually fixed since the high Middle Ages) that they collected from peasants within their estates' territories and on the powers they exercised. This bundle of rights and powers defined the estate as a lordship rather than a mere property, and nobles viewed their status as closely associated with lordship itself. In feudal theory medieval warriors had been granted lordships as recompense for military service, and both theory and practice gave many lords real powers over their tenants. Most conferred on their owners the right to judge minor property disputes, and a minority had the right of high justice, which allowed them to try capital crimes.

If the structure of lordship was fundamentally similar across Europe, so also were the threats that lordship faced in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The plagues and warfare of the late Middle Ages made it difficult to find tenants and sharply reduced demand for agricultural goods; both rents and estate values declined as a result. After the damage had been made good, governmental currency manipulations and a rapidly growing money supply after 1500 sharply reduced the value of fixed rents. Governments also tended increasingly to intervene in judicial matters, making judicial rights a source of expense and harassment.

By the mid-sixteenth century, lordship was in severe difficulties in many regions, and in England it had largely disappeared. Nobles thus had to find new ways to manage their lands, and enough did so that lordship itself and the nobles who depended on it survived into the late eighteenth century. They reoriented their estates to focus on the direct control of land and other resources rather than on permanently

fixed rents. Mainly this meant acquiring land from the peasantries, who had controlled most of it in the late Middle Ages, and across Europe a vast wave of peasant expropriation, usually by outright purchase, less often through legal manipulations, marked the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Nobles had other important opportunities to acquire land during these years. As lords, they could claim exclusive control over the woodlands and pastures of their estates, and in England and Prussia they had the right to expel long-settled tenants and reorganize their farms into much larger domains. In regions that became Protestant, the mid-sixteenth century made church lands available for nobles to purchase, and even Catholic France sold off some church land between 1563 and 1586. Aristocratic and gentry acquisitions from these combined sources went farthest in England, northern Germany, and eastern Europe, somewhat less far in France and Italy. Everywhere, though, the process placed nobles in an excellent position to benefit from the economic changes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With population growing throughout Europe, farm and forest products enjoyed vigorous markets in these years, and better commercial networks improved nobles' ability to profit from these opportunities. Estate owners along the Baltic Sea thus became the principal suppliers of the fast-growing cities of the Low Countries, which needed to import most of their grain.

This economic reorientation, from the collection of feudal rents to domain management, left nobles to face the problem of labor organization. Given their reluctance to involve themselves directly in economic activity, and their absolute refusal to work with their hands, they needed to assemble the labor and managers that would make their newly constructed domains profitable. East of the Elbe River, in central and eastern Germany, Bohemia, Denmark, and Poland, nobles found an essentially political solution to this need by demanding several days' work from each farm within their lordships, a move made possible by the relative weakness of governments in the region, at least until the eighteenth century. To the west landowners had no such ability to use constrained labor, and most of them turned instead to tenant farmers, who would manage the land on short-term leases and take on the problems of organizing production and marketing produce. The rise of a new class of villagers, the tenant farmers, thus accompanied the peasantry's loss of its properties. In northern Europe these farmers tended to be wealthy and powerful figures, the principal employers within their own villages and allied to similarly powerful figures in the villages nearby. In southern France and Italy, the tenant was a less impressive figure. There sharecropping predominated,

and tenants depended on landowners to supply the capital for running their farms. In turn, the owners received a much larger share of the harvest—at least one-half, often more—than in the north.

Whatever the labor system, and no matter how much power it seemed to accord them, aristocratic landowners always had to confront villagers' resistance to their wishes. Occasionally such resistance might take the form of mass violence, as in the German Peasants' War of 1524–1526, or the Breton revolts of the Red Bonnets in 1675, both of them directed against the excesses of seigneurial power. Although these rebellions were put down savagely, they had the lasting effect of moderating landlords' demands. In the long run, however, much more significant were the smaller acts of resistance that the economic system itself accorded villagers. Even the servile labor system of eastern Europe offered such possibilities, as the most rigorous oversight could not turn serfs into enthusiastic workers; some accommodation with their interests was needed if they were to work effectively. In the west the tenant farmer held a much more powerful position against the landowner. He (and occasionally she, as many widows took over their husbands' farms) had capital and skills that could not be easily replaced, and few nobles were eager to take on the high-risk trade in agricultural commodities. Village communities also turned readily to lawsuits against lords and landowners.

Such inevitable negotiations with those who did the actual work of farming were a first limit on nobles' economic circumstances. The pressures of an increasingly consumer-oriented society were another. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a widening array of goods appeared in European markets, new architectural and artistic styles, as well as more purely material items like foods, clothing, carriages, and furniture. Even some early modern moralists stressed the propriety of nobles' spending lavishly, because expenditure demonstrated the solidity of their place atop the social order and rendered visible the differentiations on which that order rested; the less serious-minded mocked those who fell behind the fashions. Probably the seventeenth century was the most difficult period in this regard. Urbanization and the expansion of courts brought nobles into greater contact with one another and made divergences from fashion more conspicuous. It was during these years that the out-of-touch country gentleman became a stock element in French and British comedies. Another literary theme came equally to the fore, that of the nobleman who had spent his way into bankruptcy. The lure of consumption was probably the leading economic problem nobles faced.

Relations among different levels within the nobility began to change as well, for the need to keep up with the fashions raised questions about the status of poor nobles who could not afford these new levels of expenditure. Poor nobles had always been numerous, if only because inheritance patterns in many regions favored one son and left his brothers and sisters with inadequate funds. These men and women were not entirely without resources; they survived as dependents and servants of the great, and the rapidly expanding armies of the latter part of the seventeenth century offered many of them military careers. Indeed, their fate became something of a public preoccupation in the later seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, and wealthy patrons founded special schools that would prepare young noblewomen for marriage and young noblemen for military careers. But these supports could not sustain the mass of poor nobles, and the difficulties of maintaining their status in an age of conspicuous consumption forced many out of the nobility after 1650.

DEALING WITH THE STATE

Their view of themselves as governors and warriors made nobles especially sensitive to their relations with state power, and in most regions state institutions accommodated themselves to this sensitivity. Feudal traditions encouraged princes, however grandiose their ambitions, to consult with their leading subjects, assembled in formal deliberative bodies. Nobles had at least one chamber to themselves in these parliamentary bodies; and both the political chaos of the late Middle Ages and the difficult decisions required by the Reformation forced even the most autocratic princes to listen carefully to these political voices. After the sixteenth century, however, this need diminished, and with it princely concern for political consultation. The French government failed to convene its Estates General after its last session in 1614, despite frequent consultations during the previous century. In much of Germany the chronology was similar: parliamentary assemblies had met regularly over the sixteenth century and had maintained their right to approve new taxes, but after the mid-seventeenth century princes levied taxes without consent, and assemblies met much less often.

The decline of political consultation caused important political tension in the early modern period, for nobles took seriously their longstanding claim to guide their princes. Angry at their apparent exclusion from princely decisions, nobles entered readily into plotting and occasionally into outright rebellion. Most

European states had to contend with some form of aristocratic rebellion over the early modern period, culminating in the wave of rebellions of the 1640s, the years of the English Civil War, Portugal's liberation from Spain, the Fronde in France, and rebellions in Catalonia, Naples, Palermo, and elsewhere. Governments won out in most of these contests, for by this point no private army could hold out against trained royal troops. But the examples of Catalonia and England demonstrated that governments could not take victory for granted, and that aristocratic malcontents had to be closely watched.

Traditionally, historians have understood the decline of political consultation in terms of a larger triumph of absolute monarchy, the process by which princes disciplined their nobles, taught them the futility of violence, and reduced them to a more or less prosperous servitude, with few real political functions. Later interpretations, however, stressed collaboration between kings and their most powerful subjects and suggested that, over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nobles in fact exchanged one political role for another, more effective one. Parliamentary mechanisms for political consultation weakened, but nobles' share of administrative and military positions actually grew, allowing them substantial influence on the government policies they now executed. There were more military positions in these years of frequent warfare and growing armies, though nobles responded variously to these opportunities: in seventeenth-century Bavaria and the Paris basin, for instance, relatively few nobles fought, whereas in Prussia and Brittany the military was both a cultural ideal and an important economic resource.

Civil positions were also available, as governments needed many more judges, tax collectors, and local governors. In the sixteenth century these civil servants came from varied social levels, mixing some gentlemen and some men of very humble backgrounds within a middle-class majority. By the seventeenth century, however, most European civil services were becoming more exclusive and less tolerant of lowborn outsiders. Acutely aware of the powers they exercised and the wealth their positions conferred, upper-level civil servants tended to form themselves into dynasties, passing their offices on to their sons, and increasingly claiming nobility on the basis of their offices. The process went farthest in France, where a distinctive "nobility of the robe" (so named for the robes that French judges were to wear at all times) acquired official recognition in the mid-seventeenth century, but some version of this rise in social status could be seen in many countries. The results varied substantially from one region to another. In Spain and France

a fusion of official and military nobilities had taken place by this time, with frequent intermarriages and considerable readiness of old noble families to prepare their sons for official careers. In most of Germany, on the other hand, official nobles failed to obtain complete acceptance by older families, despite receiving ennoblement from the princes they served.

Finally, nobles had almost exclusive control over the courts of early modern Europe, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these institutions played a crucial role in setting public policy. Like armies and civil services, courts grew over the period, partly as a reflection of the growing power of kings themselves. Kings wanted to make their courts attractive to their leading subjects and offered a range of frivolous, increasingly elaborate pleasures. But the real business of the courts was serious, for in them both policies and careers were shaped. Kings sought advice from their courtiers, and anyone who hoped to play a leading military or political role had to make his voice heard at court. Nobles who came to court had to conform to standards of self-control and of elegance in behavior and speech, and they had to show proper respect for those more powerful than themselves who enjoyed particular closeness to the king; but these demands did not imply passivity or domestication. Nobles indeed gave up their traditions of rebellion after about 1660, but the change reflected their successful collaboration with princes rather than a loss of political vigor.

All these new forms of political engagement required new levels of education, and rising educational standards applied to even the wealthiest and the high-

est born. Those hoping for careers in administration or the judiciary needed long training in Latin literature and Roman law, certified by university degrees. At court formal education counted for less, and indeed courtiers often made fun of the judges' ponderous Latin learning. Yet educational demands applied to courtiers as well, for they needed to speak gracefully and to display a command of the culture around them; the ideal courtier of the late seventeenth century was a writer as well, whose letters and verse might circulate widely. Even military service required some education. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century armies required much more disciplined training than their medieval predecessors, and it was now expected that commanders know enough mathematics to use firearms effectively. Greek and Roman military theorists also acquired a new relevance because seventeenth-century tactics accorded such importance to infantry formations. Nobles had very practical reasons for educating themselves, and a series of new institutions met their educational needs. Some attended the universities, but in the seventeenth century Jesuit colleges (and their imitators) adapted much better to their expectations, teaching not only languages and literature but also mathematics, science, and social skills like public speaking and dancing. They intended to form young men capable of effective social leadership, exactly what nobles wanted. It was a sign of the new educational standards that in the 1630s Louis, prince of Condé—heir to a great fortune, destined for a military career, and a close relative of the French king—was sent to the Jesuits for his education.

THE AGE OF REVOLUTIONS

Nobles confronted severe and unexpected challenges in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that brought an end to many forms of social dominance they had previously enjoyed. The French Revolution in 1789 was only the most dramatic of a long series of changes, ending many formal social distinctions and some forms of aristocratic property as well. Feudal rents disappeared altogether, along with the offices whose possession had been an important item in many nobles' portfolios. New law codes required equal inheritance divisions, making it harder for dynasties to sustain their position over the generations. Perhaps most important, the Revolution ended any illusions nobles might have had as to their hold on the rest of society. They had witnessed or imagined rebellion in previous centuries, but few had envisioned an attack on their very existence as a social category; nineteenth-century nobles could never escape this consciousness, and it led them to panicky exaggerations of even small social challenges. Nor were these experiences (and the fears they stimulated) limited to France. Before 1789, indeed, the main assaults on aristocratic power and privilege had occurred in the domains of the Habsburg emperor Joseph II. He had ended nobles' tax privileges and limited landowners' powers over serfs. The French example gave much greater urgency to such reforms, for princes hoped that reform might forestall violence and allow effective competition with the French enemy. In other regions the French imposed their social models directly, ending privileges, titles, and feudal powers wherever their armies conquered.

Other challenges were less dramatic but in the long run even more threatening. The nineteenth century was a difficult time for landowners in all categories because the rules of international competition so rapidly changed. Grain from Russia and the Americas now appeared on European markets, and constantly improving modes of transportation intensified competition even within Europe. Tariff protection like the English corn laws came under pressure, and other groups in society were becoming richer and less patient with aristocratic guidance. Industrialization and banking rapidly created new fortunes, and new wealth was visible even among working farmers, who in many regions could be seen buying land and educating their children in social graces. Even if their own economic circumstances remained prosperous, aristocrats knew they were losing ground relative to others in their society.

The nineteenth century ended the aristocracies' domination of Europe's politics and their preeminence within its economy. Yet until late in the century, this

collection of changes hurt the aristocracies less than was once believed. Historians have shown that most aristocratic families survived the French Revolution with their properties intact, enabling a return to social and political prominence after 1815. Throughout Europe many actually profited from nineteenth-century industrial development, investing in enterprises and sitting on corporate boards; in any case the new industrialists were often eager to ally both politically and personally with old families. Rapid urbanization made some of their lands much more valuable, and some were also able to introduce agricultural improvements. Despite the democratic currents of the age, they also managed to hold on to political power with surprising efficacy. Through the mid-nineteenth century, electoral systems tended to favor landowners, as did supposedly meritocratic systems of recruitment to the expanding civil services, which rested partly on the social skills and classical learning that the old ruling groups had long commanded. Even courts retained some significance, giving members of old families significant

influence over policies in France, Germany, and Italy and career advantages as well. Aristocrats even benefited from the new technologies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, dominating the newly founded automobile clubs of England and France and playing a prominent role in early aviation.

Only at the very end of the nineteenth century did traditional elites lose their central place in European life, and then the sources of crisis were mainly political rather than economic or social. An anti-aristocratic government came to power in England, and its taxes on inheritance undermined what had been the aristocracies' greatest strength, their ability to accumulate wealth generation after generation. World War I destroyed the monarchies and courts of central Europe and discredited aristocratic political influence. For many families the war was an economic disaster as well, destroying savings and rendering many investments worthless. It has been plausibly argued

that 1918 rather than 1789 marked the end of aristocratic society in Europe. And there were still political maneuvers: many German aristocrats used support for conservative politicians to win favorable tariff policies for their agricultural goods in the 1920s and into the Nazi era. Even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, numerous aristocratic families survive, the 1980s and 1990s having brought them significant economic advantages. Their lands and houses, even their bric-a-brac, have increased enormously in value. Despite generations of republican criticism, they remain culturally self-confident, and the society around them has become more respectful of their values. Aristocratic society has disappeared from Europe, in the sense that aristocracies no longer place their imprint on other social groups or determine the values of society as a whole. The aristocracies themselves remain, demonstrating yet again their own capacity for survival and the tenacious power of social inequality itself.

See also Estates and Country Houses; Land Tenure; Peasant and Farming Villages; Serfdom: Eastern Europe; Serfdom: Western Europe (volume 2); Revolutions (in this volume); Gestures; Inheritance; Manners (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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THE MIDDLE CLASSES



Margaret R. Hunt

“The middle class” is a term widely applied in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to people who occupy the middle position between those who have to labor continually in order to survive, and those who hold ancestral “blood rights” to monopolize political power, economic resources, and social privilege. Historically this “middle class” has displayed great regional variability and much internal complexity and been highly sensitive to fluctuating business cycles. Impossible to pin down precisely, the status of being “middle class” is often assumed to inhere most authentically in commercial people (manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers, merchants), though it is frequently applied to more diverse groupings, which might include civil servants, “upper” white-collar salary earners, professionals, teachers and other intellectuals, *rentiers* (those who live on income from investments), and even (it has been argued) *apparatchiks* (bureaucrats). Common usage by social historians differentiates between the periods before and after industrialization—a phenomenon that occurred at different times in different European nations. For the period before industrialization there is a tendency to favor terms like “bourgeoisie,” “burgher class,” or “the middling sort.” After industrialization there seems to be a preference for “middle class” or “middle classes.”

Because of this imprecision, some historians have called for eliminating the term entirely on the grounds that it is too vague and, due to its central role in marxist polemic, too overdetermined to be really useful. Thus an influential group of historians has also argued that any and all attempts to categorize people, even very loosely, according to their economic role or market position constitutes rank reductionism.

Beyond definitional issues, few people are neutral on the subject of the middle class. And it would be difficult to find a group that has been subjected either to so much hostility or so much praise. Blamed for everything from colonialism to environmental degradation, from sexual repression to twelve-tone music, from facism to urban blight, the middle classes

are also routinely viewed as people without whom no nation can rise to distinction: the bulwark of the law, the engine of economic development, and the bedrock of morality and family values.

BEFORE INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE “RISING” AND “FALLING” MIDDLE CLASSES

The germ of the “middle class” is generally thought to be medieval town or city dwellers, often members of crafts guilds, grain or livestock merchants, notaries, moneylenders, and the like. These individuals (“bourgeois,” “burghers,” or “citizens”) could be found most often in those places blessed with a relative abundance of towns, most notably in the late medieval and early Renaissance period, the Italian peninsula, Flanders, or along the north coast of Germany. It seems likely that some of these groups’ practices and traditions derived from those of medieval traders, many of them of Middle Eastern origin. Nonetheless, the Italians, particularly, invented a number of practices and procedures, most notably bookkeeping, international banking, and moneylending, as well as a close attendance on the law courts, that were to exert a great influence on later generations. These burghers were also often deeply committed to local civic or guild prerogatives, which they sometimes had to work hard to protect from the depredations of local lords.

The fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries saw a very significant growth in some parts of Europe in the number and size of cities; an increase in the power, complexity, and military belligerence of many early modern monarchies and nation states; the breakup of the old Catholic consensus; a significant intensification of extra-European long-distance trade as a result of the “discovery” of the New World and of new trade routes to the East; and the passing of economic dominance from the Mediterranean states to northwestern Europe. None of these developments was a distinctly “bourgeois” phenomenon. Nonethe-



DID THE BOURGEOISIE RISE?

“The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part,” wrote Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in *The Communist Manifesto* of 1848. In one pugnacious phrase they set the terms of the debate for generations of social historians to come. Who was (and is) the bourgeoisie? Is it the same as the “middle class”? Has it ever been as unified a group as Marx and Engels seem to imply? What roles has it *in fact* played in revolutionary times? How much responsibility does it bear for the less dramatic, but in their way “revolutionary” transformations that have created the world we now inhabit, and were those transformations inevitable? Does bunching disparate individuals and collectivities together into so-called “classes” obscure more than it illuminates?

Not surprisingly, historians seeking answers to these questions have lavished a good deal of attention upon the great western European political revolutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Christopher Hill’s *English Revolution, 1640* (1940) argued that the parliamentary side was powerfully aided and abetted by urban merchants and bankers and capitalist estate owners, and that the revolution had the effect of making England “safe” for capitalism. Marx himself unequivocally called the French Revolution of 1789 “the French bourgeois revolution” (Marx, *Capital*, 1984, Vol. I, p. 92), and several generations of French historians, perhaps most prominently Albert Soboul, have labored to expose the lineaments of the historic defeat of feudalism that it is said to have represented. Similar claims have been made for the long, if intermittent, Dutch war of independence against Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the American Revolution of 1776, the (failed) 1848 revolutions, various nationalist revolutions against Ottoman rule, and both the abortive Russian Revolution of 1905 and the first phase of the Revolution of 1917.

Other historians (Alfred Cobban, François Furet, Colin Lucas, for France; J. H. Hexter, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Conrad Russell for England; and many others) have strenuously combatted the notion that any or all of these revolutions represent “bourgeois revolutions.” Critics of the “bourgeois revolution” thesis argue that most of these revolutions were actually initiated by members of the nobility, and that they often look more like an “aristocratic reaction” than they do a revolution against feudalism. They note that in none of these revolutions can one find

“bourgeois” groups lining up on only one side of the conflict. Moreover, the ideals of most revolutionaries seem far removed from the mundane concerns of bankers, merchants, or industrialists, and have often had the effect of retarding economic growth rather than promoting it. Sometimes it is nobles who espouse “progressive” social and economic policies. These critics have significantly undermined reductionist identifications of class status or “material conditions” more generally with the urge to revolution and indeed with “ideology” more generally.

However, a less desirable tendency of much of their work has been to detach social and economic issues entirely from the process of historical change and to imply that politics and ideology float entirely free of social and economic conditions. Their revolutions often look like chance occurrences within a bland world of consensus, or the outcome of thousands upon thousands of atomized acts of individual frustration.

Later historians undertook a variety of efforts to reinsert social and economic data into a more ideologically nuanced and causally complex picture of the great and small European revolutions. Christopher Hill’s writings from the 1980s, far more than did the *English Revolution, 1640*, acknowledge the political heterogeneity of men of trade, and emphasize the long-term results of the revolution, many of them “unintended,” rather than any unconscious, much less purposeful desire to establish a more capitalist society. Lynn Hunt’s *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (1984) replaces the narrow question of the relationship of ideology to “class” with an emphasis on region, occupation, and “insider” versus “outsider” status. She points out, contrary to Marx’s opinion, that there was nothing inexorable about the way the revolution unfolded and that it did little either for the health of commerce or to restore political stability. However, she also shows that, after a slow start, “new men,” notably professionals, and to some extent merchants and manufacturers, played a very significant role in revolutionary, as well as counterrevolutionary politics, creating, as well as seizing, the opportunities presented by the new political culture of the 1790s. She concludes that “while revolutionary politics cannot be deduced from the social identity of revolutionaries, . . . neither can it be divorced from it . . .” (Hunt, 1984, p. 13). Her account thus cautiously adopts part of the marxist schema, while rejecting historical

determinism and insisting that occupation is only one among many variables that influence political ideology and political participation.

Historians of the middle class have, in the 1980s and 1990s, been as much if not more concerned with the differences that divide this class than with the commonalities that occasionally and inconsistently unite them. Few have been able to locate a single, unified middle class. Rather this is a group or groups riven not only by differences of relative market positioning, but also by gender, religion, race, nationality, and age. As a result, some historians have sought to replace the old notion of a single middle class with two or more classes. Thus R. S. Neale argues for both a “middling class” and a “middle class.” Among social historians of Germany it is common to differentiate between the middle and upper bourgeoisie, the *Bürgertum*, and a lower-middle class, the *Kleinbürgertum* or *Mittelstand*. The *Bürgertum* is often further differentiated into the *Bildungsbürgertum* (professionals, academics, intellectuals, some salaried government officials) and the *Wirtschaftsbürgertum* (entrepreneurs, capitalists, managers, *rentiers*). To these debates may be added the large and growing literature on the lower middle class in numerous countries, which often focuses on the way its members pursue divergent political paths from other middle-class groupings.

If the bourgeois revolutionary looks less resolute, less class conscious, and indeed less like a single class than it used to, the notion of a bourgeois revolution has experienced something of a comeback, though in substantially altered form. A particularly influential position is that of David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, as articulated in a number of books and articles focusing upon German history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They argue that, while it is true that the revolutions of 1848 were, in most places, an abject failure in terms of winning the middle class any significant political power, nonetheless Wilhelmine Germany experienced what they call a “silent Bourgeois revolution.” There, in Blackbourn’s words,

an economically progressive bureaucracy served almost as a kind of surrogate bourgeoisie, leveling the ground on which the capitalist order would stand, as well as undertaking some of the preliminary construction work on its own account. Secularization removed property from the “dead hand” of the church; the peasantry was emancipated and a free market in land confirmed; guild restrictions were pruned away; and internal tariffs to freedom of trade were removed.” (Blackbourn and Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History*, 1984, pp. 176–77).

Blackbourn goes on to point out that after unification, the Wilhelmine government established technical schools and other incentives to innovation, founded a national bank, improved communication and transportation, and reformed commercial law and practice. While the state was clearly key, capitalists were hardly supine in this period. They oversaw the emergence of the public limited company and developed a variety of ways of mobilizing capital and facilitating exchange. Older industries, particularly heavy industry, recorded considerable gains, while a variety of new manufacturers came into being. At the same time modern conceptions of the rule of law gained widespread acceptance and middle-class people flocked to clubs, societies, and philanthropic associations.

If Blackbourn’s view of Germany’s development is more positive than we are accustomed to, his conception of modernity is more complex than simply “the rise of the bourgeoisie.” As he shows, enthusiasm for and commitment to the notion of progress was diffused very widely across society, involving the state, working-class groups, aristocrats, and capitalists. And those who opposed it were similarly diverse, including more traditional small-scale capitalists (small producers) and sectors of the working class, peasantry, and nobility.

If one reconfigures one’s vision to see the late nineteenth century (as Blackbourn and Eley seem to be urging us to do) in terms of an embrace of and confrontation with modernity rather than “the rise of the bourgeoisie” it becomes clear why so many middle-class people were deeply ambivalent about and alienated from both capitalism and modernity more generally. Undoubtedly one of the more interesting features of the middle class, particularly in the modern period, has been its enthusiasm for self-criticism, as well as the number of self-proclaimed “class exiles” it has managed to generate. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), the son of a lawyer and the son of a factory owner, respectively, were only two among many. While some among the alienated middle class actually came from declining groups (we need to remember that many middle-class people were downwardly mobile in the nineteenth and early twentieth century), it seems likely that many of them were simply articulating a more widespread and less class-specific anxiety about the pace and unpredictability of modernization—an anxiety to which almost anyone might be prone, but which intellectuals were far more likely to articulate.

Be that as it may, much scholarly work on the middle class(es) written since World War II has focused

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DID THE BOURGEOISIE RISE? (continued)

on their putative psychic insecurity and the way in which they were perpetually “creating” themselves as individuals, families, and classes. This problem has especially appealed to scholars on the left, who have contributed an important body of work tracing the establishment of a normatively “middle-class” culture. Thus, to mention just one among many, Eric Hobsbawm has pointed out the way that the English middle class not only favored particular types of sport (tennis, golf) over others marked as lower class (for example, football) but, in his words, “made amateurism, i.e. leisure both to pursue sports and to achieve high standards at them, the test of ‘true’ sportsmen” (Hobsbawm, “The Example of the English Middle Class,” p. 141).

The problem of how the middle class made itself has been taken up with especial enthusiasm by later scholars influenced by postmodernism, who, while they have perhaps been insufficiently critical of the term “middle class” itself (presumably because the group’s fuzzy boundaries and mutability lend themselves so well to the sorts of analysis they prefer), have nonetheless added many new nuances to our picture of the middle class(es). They have also made it harder either to make inflated claims about middle-class hegemony or to engage in what Lynn Hunt calls “a mechanistic deduction of politics from social structure” (Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*, 1984, p. 11).

Particularly important interventions have been made with respect to questions of gender. The output of books and articles on women and gender has been huge, touching on topics as diverse as mistress-servant relations, fashion, shopping and consumerism, marriage and divorce, philanthropy, and the women’s rights movements. They paint a complicated picture of a middle class riven by gender insecurity and conflict, but one in which women fulfilled a wide variety of “class” functions, from patrolling racial and other status boundaries to supplying significant amounts of capital and invisible, unpaid labor.

Race has also emerged as a key factor in the formation of a European middle class. In a book entitled *Race and the Education of Desire* (1995), Ann Stoler argues that in both Britain and the Netherlands “[the] cultivation and unique sexuality [of the bourgeois body] was nourished by a wider Colonial world of Manichaean distinctions: by Irish, ‘Mediterranean,’ Jewish, and non-European Others who provided the referential contrast for it” (Stoler, 1995, p. 136). For Stoler, too, the middle class is a nervous and unstable entity, which, far from “rising” in any definitive way, is forever trying to create itself at other groups’ expense.

In the late twentieth century, at least in western Europe, many commentators argue that the middle classes, have become so fragmented and atomized as to be largely unintelligible. The disruptions of World Wars I and II; the triumph of consumption over production; the rise of mass culture (especially radio, television, and advertising) at the expense of more localized and class-specific cultures; the centrality of forms of identity based upon race, religion, party, and affinities other than social class, and the taxonomic challenges posed by such developments as the sharp growth of a white-collar “salaried”; the expansion of the service sector; and the migration of many manufacturing jobs to underdeveloped countries, have, they argue, made the nineteenth-century language of class and class cultures obsolete. It must be said though that the end of the cold war and the apparent world wide defeat of communism has revived the claim that what we saw in the late twentieth century was the ultimate victory of the entrepreneurial middle class and the installation of a new universalism of pure individual self-interest free of traditional impediments, such as national borders. It may be that the term “middle class” is a sort of semantic fossil that no longer bears any relationship to actual social formations. However, the fact that it remains indispensable in common usage may be a signal that history and historians have not seen the last of this hard-to-define, never-quite-rising, yet strangely persistent body.

less, all had a significant impact on trade and consumption and hence the growth of an urban “middle sort.”

The new cities, with their complex provisioning needs, offered numerous opportunities for trade and commerce, while at the same time providing the locus for a wide range of civic and cultural activities.

The new states provided an unending supply of jobs suitable to lowborn but literate men, while its wars helped bring into being a whole new class of army contractors and middlemen. In these years men (and occasionally women) of commerce learned how to work closely, and generally unobtrusively, with city, provincial, and even national governments in a sym-

biotic relationship that was, more often than not, to both sides' advantage. Not surprisingly, some of the richest commercial families consolidated their wealth as well as their social position by moving up into the nobility, either by marriage alliances or by outright buying of titles, though the percentage of middling people who actually succeeded in doing this was probably small.

Few social historians any longer view the Protestant Reformation as a stealth move by capitalists—or even a development that necessarily favored them. Max Weber's famous claim in the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904–1905) that Calvinism, in particular, “taught” its adherents how to be better entrepreneurs, and hence was more positively correlated with business success than Catholicism, has fallen before copious evidence about the entrepreneurial zeal of Catholics. Historians now argue that both the Protestant and Catholic Reformations offered an expanded role in culture and politics for literate non-elites and urban people in general. There also seems to be a guarded consensus among historians that the period saw an increased valuation of work and of secular activities for their own sake, as expressed in the new attention to natural (as opposed to supernatural) explanatory frameworks characteristic of the so-called “scientific revolution,” and later the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.

At the same time, religious differences (between Catholics and Protestants, Jews and Gentiles, or even, in those parts of Europe under the domination of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims and others) cut a deep cleavage through groupings that one might, based on material considerations alone, have expected to make common cause. This was to be an enduring theme: while economic issues clearly play a role in group identity, they very seldom tell the whole story, and they are often “trumped”—or, quite simply, they disintegrate—before other allegiances.

The intensification of both long-distance and “domestic” trade ruined many bourgeois people while drawing others into the new trade nexus: many of the early shareholders in overseas adventures were members of the nobility, a high-living group that has seldom been averse to making money, particularly if it did not have to get its hands dirty. However, as with most entrepreneurial activity in the early modern period (with the partial but important exceptions of mineral extraction and, in some parts of Europe, some capitalist agriculture), the people who actually did the hands-on managerial work of banking, short- and long-distance trade, manufacturing, and getting the grain to market—those who took on the real risk—tended to be people of bourgeois stock.

Long-distance trade in particular, due both to the high profits that can come from it and its extreme volatility, came in some sense to define the upper reaches of the entrepreneurial classes, men who became veritable merchant princes (and were sometimes ennobled for their pains), but who manifested a certain lack of permanence that was characteristic of their class. These were families who could stand on the pinnacle of worldly success only to fall with a suddenness that seemed to call all human projects into question. In not a few countries these nerve-wracking roles fell disproportionately to “outsiders” of one sort or another: Huguenots or dissenters in England; Jews (particularly the Sephardim) in Holland; Armenians, Jews, and ethnic Greeks in the Ottoman Empire; ethnic Germans in Bohemia; various nonnationals in the Russian Empire. Often these groups were excluded from more traditional occupations or labored under various civil disabilities. Those who could, took advantage of far-flung kinship networks and the presumed solidarity of co-religionists to ensure accountability in a time of slow communication and few safeguards against cheating or speculation.

The prolonged depression that afflicted southern and central Europe from the 1580s on signals one of the fundamental realities of middling life, one that militates powerfully against the vision of these people as a unified whole. At the heart of entrepreneurial endeavor is, and has been, competition—between families, between nations, between regions, between old and new industries. Moreover, this competition is played out within a universe that is highly unpredictable. Economic trends then and now are far easier to discern in retrospect than they are while they are happening. Regions that, in one century or even one generation, are at the heart of a bustling trade, can go into full decline in the next as a result of war, a change of government, trade restrictions, epidemic disease, a succession of bad harvests, or simply a change of taste. A once-vibrant center of commerce that formerly supported large-scale trade in a range of commodities can turn into a depopulated backwater that supports little but barter and a few desultory livestock sales. Centers turn into peripheries, and peripheries become the centers of new economic systems. The European middle classes, like their investments, were constantly rising and falling.

Seventeenth-century Holland: a “bourgeois” society. By the mid-seventeenth century the particular alignment of center and periphery that has in some if not all respects survived in Europe to this day was already evident. Undoubtedly, the most significant marker of this was the phenomenal success of the

United Provinces of the Netherlands. Auspiciously located athwart the main land, river, and sea routes linking east and central Europe, the British Isles, France, and the Mediterranean states, with well-developed connections to the East Indies via the Dutch East India Company and the West Indies via the Dutch West India Company, the Netherlands were well situated to monopolize a gigantic proportion of seventeenth-century waterborne commerce. As a result of their successful war of independence against Spain, the United Provinces also possessed a republican polity, and a laudable, if at times somewhat fractured, patriotic spirit. In a century almost everywhere characterized by economic depression and a declining or stagnant population, the Netherlands stood out as the exception. In so doing it came to represent both for contemporaries, and for many modern-day historians, the quintessential early modern bourgeois (or, to use the Dutch term, *burgerlijk*) society.

Some of the Dutch provinces boasted local nobilities, but they played a far smaller cultural role and had less political power than in many European nations. Instead, power lay in the hands of civic elites, most of whom had risen via mercantile wealth, and who tended to have strong links to Calvinism. They oversaw a unique culture that came, in its own time, to be the talk of Europe. Contemporaries struggled to define just what made the Netherlands so unusual. By reconstructing what they saw, we can get a sense of how complex the problem of the “middle class” is. By

the seventeenth century there was already a well-developed association between middling urban dwellers (generally traders or masters) and traits like a strong belief in the power of work, compulsive thriftiness, an exaggerated attention to time, high rates of literacy and numeracy, and a certain lack of both imagination and martial virtues. Contemporary efforts to explain the “Dutch miracle” by reference to such characteristics can be seen in printed tracts, plays, and other cultural productions of the time in a number of European languages. These characterizations seem to have derived from empirical observation of at least some businesspeople (though adherence to these precepts must have been extremely variable) puzzled efforts to try to figure out why some prospered when others failed, a tendency (to which modern historians are not immune) to identify prescription too closely with actual behavior, and a desire to cut an overweening group (that is, the Dutch) down to size.

These stereotypes have a very long history in relation to “the middle classes.” And their sheer ubiquity suggests that they need to be taken seriously at the level of discourse, if less often at the level of behavior. However, as the United Provinces show, they are far too reductionist to stand on their own as a credible description of people’s behavior across the board. Thus, as Simon Schama explains in *The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (1987), the good burghers of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and like cities were hardly

exemplars of Max Weber's "worldly asceticism"; instead they boasted sumptuous houses (many of which can still be seen gracing the Keizersgracht and Herengracht Canals in Amsterdam), and cultivated a taste for serious eating, drinking, and tobacco consumption. Amsterdam shoppers could find whole streets and districts devoted to bookselling, nautical goods, spices, haberdashery, house furnishings, textiles, flowers, and even pets, those decorative little parasites that were just then becoming *de rigueur* in respectable homes. They could also tour a well-developed red-light district, roughly coterminous with its present-day location. Seventeenth-century Hollanders' commitment to work was just as likely to manifest itself in elaborate civic rituals, or, in the case of women, in the less-than-profitable activity (in monetary terms) of housecleaning as it was in the mundane activity of making money. While the Dutch certainly preferred peace to war, they could hardly be described as lacking in martial vigor, not only fighting off Spanish imperial domination in the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648), but repeatedly going to war with other European nations in defense of their trade.

And whatever else might have been imputed to the Dutch in the seventeenth century, a lack of imagination was not one of them. Visitors marveled at the way the Dutch East India Company built its own bevy of artificial islands in the midst of the harbor, Amsterdammers' ingenious methods for lifting huge ships over sandbars, the number and variety of the city's philanthropic and correctional institutions, the Dutch distaste for persecuting people on grounds of religion (though they made an exception for Catholics), their penchant for covering their walls with pictures from everyday life, and last, but by no means least, their remarkable ability to wrest huge tracts of land from the sea and turn them into lush farmland.

"Middling culture" in post-revolutionary England. In the seventeenth century Holland's main competitor (and emulator) was England. England's mid-century revolution, as well as the Glorious Revolution of 1688 were, in the first instance, conceived by political elites, not by bourgeois elements, but the period of upheaval gave rise to a number of changes that profoundly affected the climate of commerce and the lives of middling people. A series of bloody wars waged against the Dutch by both parliamentary and royalist regimes significantly reduced that nation's control over waterways and key export commodities, and by the late seventeenth century this had resulted in a significant increase in the British volume of trade. A fairly high degree of religious toleration was instituted under Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658), carried

through into the Restoration, and then enshrined permanently in the revolution settlement of 1689. England, unlike Holland, possessed a genuine aristocracy and gentry, which wielded real power in the cities and towns, in the rural areas, and in Parliament.

This fact has led historians to ask whether the middling sort in England really differed in cultural terms from their social superiors. The upper echelons of the middling sort undeniably "aped" the gentry to some degree; however, most middling people could not afford to live like the gentry, nor could they contemplate intermarrying with them. These people's lives, as is true of commercial people everywhere in the early modern period, were characterized by a great deal of insecurity and by a close engagement with trade and industry—something one seldom finds among the gentry. At the same time, one characteristic that the middling shared with their betters, but that differentiated them from many of their inferiors, was that by this time the vast majority of urban middling people, both male and female, knew how to read and write. One sign of this, a very advantageous one from the point of view of social historians, is that it became something of a fashion among middling groups beginning in the late seventeenth century to pen diaries and autobiographies. As a result we have extremely revealing diaries from a wide range of middling city dwellers.

This historical trove makes it possible to develop a few generalizations about "middling culture" (it seemed to be much concerned—at least rhetorically—with keeping good accounts; it was quite pious, though not necessarily more than other groups we know something about; it was much concerned about time-management issues), but it also shows how difficult it is to generalize about middling individuals. Thus, some middling diarists were more concerned about the state of their souls than the condition of their businesses, while others seldom went to church. Some were disgusted by aristocratic pretension, and others hobnobbed with them, and so on. Perhaps one of the few things that drew together the middling sort was an acute consciousness of risk: unlike their superiors there was no cushion between them and the vagaries of the market.

Economic differentiation and the middle classes in the eighteenth century. By the end of the seventeenth century, and still more so as the eighteenth century unfolded, a considerable amount of economic differentiation was making itself felt in Europe. It was by no means the case that all of the Northwest was prosperous. Ireland was already manifesting the results of British policies aimed at eliminating it as potential

competition in the realm of finished goods. Large parts of Scandinavia were too cold to produce much in the way of agricultural exports. On the other hand, there were zones of very considerable economic strength even in otherwise underdeveloped or stagnant economies. For example, Catalonia, in northern Spain, developed a robust, urbanized economy. Istanbul and other Ottoman port towns, despite having largely lost the spice trade to Holland, still supported a very considerable carrying trade around the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. Parts of the Balkans, notably Bulgaria, would soon develop a fairly significant textile industry, fueled both by the Ottoman army's need for uniforms, and by a growing demand from central Europe and the Middle East. Nations lucky enough to possess large mineral and ore deposits—for example, Sweden and Russia—has-tened to exploit them. But many parts of Europe remained or became economically marginal or “trapped” in underdevelopment as the North Atlantic economies' respective stars rose.

Although at the time it was standard to blame what was sometimes referred to as “the productive classes” for the state of affairs (contemporaries often bemoaned the small size of their local middle class or complained about their addiction to luxury and idleness), that is only part of the story. Commercial people did, in certain times and places, move away from trade and hole up in “safe” investments, such as country houses (this is what seems to have happened in the Venetian republic in the seventeenth century). But those traders who could afford it have always done this, particularly when market exposure was very high, the climate of trade unfavorable, or the nature of commerce undergoing alteration. The case of Venice is, in that sense, instructive, for there were many external factors influencing the health of the economy. As Jan De Vries succinctly puts it in *Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600–1750*:

Beginning in 1602 a rapid succession of new problems overwhelmed [the Venetian republic]. The spice trade was lost for good to the Dutch and English who had now begun their penetration of the Indian Ocean; the textile industry suffered from high costs and withered away in the following half-century; the city's position as an international center of book publishing became untenable because of the rejuvenated Catholic Church; the Thirty Years' War deprived Venice of her most important market while the debasement of the Turkish currency sharply increased the cost of cotton and silk up to the Venetians.

In an economy like this one it would have taken a very great innovatory capacity indeed—multiplied many times over—for the economy to sustain itself at anything like the levels of the previous century. And it is very likely that even that would not have worked. In

such an environment, commercial people make choices, and typically they choose safety rather than risk. (De Vries, 1976, p. 26)

It is also undeniably the case that some regions actively discouraged commercial endeavor, and hence the growth of a self-sufficient urban middling class, and in some cases any urban centers at all. In Spain the social hierarchy was top-heavy with nobles, who disdained commerce, and members of the clergy, whose profits, at least in theory, were measured in souls rather than in *réals*; economic policy-making through the second half of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was famously obtuse. Grazing policies led to soil deterioration. Rivers were allowed to silt up. The crown decided to expel Jews and Muslims—both relatively industrious minorities. The bloated ranks of the clergy, in particular, must have attracted many a promising youth who, in the Netherlands, would have turned to commerce; the purchase of noble status, which in Spain was particularly difficult to combine with commerce, must have claimed many more.

In the case of the Ottoman Empire, merchant and banking activity tended to be left to ethnic minorities, while Muslims monopolized official state and military positions. Different confessional groupings often lived segregated lives, under largely distinct legal systems; each *millet*, as these communities were called, was overseen by a small, self-perpetuating group generally heavily dominated by the clergy. Though some *millets* were open to outside influence (the Greek and Jewish communities in particular tended to cultivate connections to western Europe, particularly from the eighteenth century on), the system encouraged insularity, inflexibility, and a lack of integration between the imperial bureaucracy and the main economic actors, as well as between different sectors of the economy—since particular ethnic groups tended to monopolize each trade, manufacture, commercial, or financial sector. These problems were exacerbated by the devastating wars of the eighteenth century, followed in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the social upheavals and political repression that accompanied the various struggles for independence against Ottoman rule.

For its part, eastern Europe carried on a booming but lopsided trade with the northwestern European powers. By the seventeenth century a significant portion of western and southern Europe's food needs were supplied by importing—generally on Dutch ships—grain grown in the gigantic estates of eastern Europe. The turn to monoculture for export and the progressive “enservment” of much of the peasantry made for an immobile, impoverished labor force and

a small, often absentee landowner class. This caused a marked decline in consumer demand and the result was that towns in the area east of the river Elbe declined in number, population, and degree of economic diversification. Middlemen—the tiny nascent middle class—tended to be west central Europeans (especially ethnic Germans), Huguenots, or Jews, but the latter particularly were often subjected to popular and state violence, exclusion from certain trades and professions, special taxes, and confinement to ghettos or delimited territories, such as the Pale of Settlement. Eastern Europe, in economic terms, entered into a relation of economic dependency with western Europe.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND BEYOND

The role of the middle classes in industrialization. Economic historians disagree as to whether the technological and productive breakthroughs (of which factory production was only one part), which began in England in the second half of the eighteenth century, warrant the term “industrial revolution.” But even those who do accept the term agree that this was an extremely protracted revolution, whose social effects on the owners of capital, workers, and consumers came slowly and in very unpredictable and diverse ways. Most social historians date the onset of a full-

blown middle-class in England from the period approximately 1780 to 1820 and use the term “middle class” loosely for those who owned the means of production (factories), displayed patterns of consumption “typical” of middle class people, or had middle- or upper-level managerial or professional positions.

Predictably, there has been much debate about the extent to which industrialization, and indeed, the whole process of modernization of which industrialization was only one part, was “bourgeois”-driven. Certainly in the case of England, members of the nobility invested in infrastructure improvements, such as canals and later railroads, just as they had purchased shares in slave-trading voyages. In some other parts of Europe economic development had a very *dirigiste* character, planned and controlled by the state. State interventions in the economy were already habitual in Russia and the Ottoman Empire by the eighteenth century, and most European states, in both the west and east, engaged in practices designed to nurture national industries and penalize foreign competition, and indeed continue to do so into the twenty-first century. European modernization did not happen in a *laissez-faire* universe.

However, despite the involvement of political elites (whether by outright government intervention or via noble investments), it seems fair to say that the vast majority of people who oversaw the processes of

modernization and who benefited most directly from them were middle class. These men and women invested their capital in (and shouldered the risks of) the new factories, came up with the technical innovations that transformed production, managed the ever-expanding networks by which new commodities were spread across Europe, brought in raw materials from the colonies (sometimes, as in India, after taking steps to stamp out indigenous manufacturing), and learned to exploit the labor of much poorer Europeans (many of them recently arrived from the rural areas) more efficiently.

As the numbers of the middle class grew, they formed a key group of consumers. Though the middle-class people were not the only audience for the new commodities (urban working-class demand, at least in countries that supported such groups, was also significant, and so was that of older elites), they adopted lifestyles that allowed them to showcase new fashions, new styles of architecture, and new patterns of leisure behavior. At the same time, patterns of behavior and consumption associated with the more developed parts of western and central Europe began to be imitated in other parts of Europe. This process was, however, very uneven. Thus, in the less integrated areas of the Balkans, eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century mercantile elites still tended to emulate the style and tastes of Turkish elites. It was only in the early- to mid-nineteenth century that they began to imitate central European (particularly Viennese) middle-class tastes, and display in their homes such items as chairs, glassware, and candlesticks of Czech and Saxon manufacture. Similar patterns could be found throughout the more far-flung, inaccessible, economically underdeveloped regions of Europe, while the nineteenth-century discovery and valorization of regional difference also exerted a countervailing influence on the forces of cultural homogenization.

Politics and the middle classes in the nineteenth century. The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw a number of profound changes in the political and social landscape. The French Revolution was not a bourgeois revolution in the sense that Karl Marx (1818–1883) imagined, but it did clear away some of the tangled system of privilege that characterized the *ancien régime*. In England, the so-called Great Reform Bill of 1832 had more warrant to be called “middle class,” at least in terms of impact, though it is notable that it had to be voted in by an electorate of gentlemen and aristocrats. It doubled the number of men entitled to vote from perhaps one in ten to one in five, but ensured through a property qualification that men of the laboring classes and

probably large sections of the lower middle classes would continue to be excluded.

By the first half of the nineteenth century, many European nations supported growing intelligentsias. Especially in central and eastern Europe and within the Ottoman Empire, these were often partially (though never slavishly) Western oriented: many of their members had been educated abroad; they were disdainful of traditional elites (and especially of the entrenched power of the clergy and ruling dynasties) and anxious to modernize. This tendency overlapped with a series of newly militant nationalist movements, most of them organized and led by students, intellectuals, and professionals, though often in the face of widespread hostility, not least by other sectors of the middle class, (in some cases their own older relatives). These movements, often more cultural than political, displayed many common features. Thus, in a number of the Balkan lands, by the early nineteenth century movements had arisen that stressed national education, tended to adopt romantic conceptions of the national spirit, and were much given (in good bourgeois style) to gathering together in clubs, cultural organizations, and subversive societies. This movement of the young tended to be highly critical of older, traditional elites and often the clergy (thus, in Bulgaria many nationalists objected strenuously not just to the Ottoman establishment but to what they viewed as the excessive power of the Greek Orthodox Church). Similar nationalist movements made up of young, generally middle-class people, were active throughout the first half of the nineteenth century and often beyond in many of the old imperial regimes of Europe.

In the face of this sort of pressure many of the most tradition-bound governments made concessions that, in the long run, favored the growth of a middle class, such as, in the case of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, freeing the serfs and partially reforming the law courts. Some governments took steps to open their bureaucracies to new men; the Ottomans, in their dwindling empire, began permitting non-Muslims to hold government office. Governments everywhere became more efficient, and many took up issues of public health and education—long popular among middle-class people. Some (largely western) European nations had by this time extended suffrage far enough down the social scale to cover virtually all middle-class men.

However, it would be wrong to view these signs of change as a “rise of the bourgeoisie” in any simple sense; rather we should probably see them as complicated, and in some countries rather tense attempts at co-existence. Traditional elites, often aristocrats by blood, continued to wield huge amounts of political

power and cultural prestige well into the twentieth century in many European countries, and they were often quite reluctant to share either commodity. Sometimes they looked down even on the richest industrialists. And middle-class groupings were themselves highly differentiated in terms of income, rank, and prestige, though not so differentiated that they could not at times pull together with lightning speed in the face of challenges by newly militant working-class groups.

Middle classes and separate spheres. By the mid-nineteenth century, a middle-class culture with some at least partially distinctive characteristics had been established in western Europe, and there were numerous other middle-class enclaves throughout Europe, some of which emulated what they conceived to be the lifestyle of western Europeans; others of which charted their own course. But what was this lifestyle? A key criterion often used to distinguish “middle-class culture” was the existence of the privatized family, with-

drawn from the boisterous street or village culture of earlier days, and supporting women who, ideally, did not work for pay. In the case of England, an important marker of this has been said to be the tendency for manufacturing families to move their homes away from their factories or place of work. The equivalent in the case of city dwellers was to move to the suburbs then springing up around most major towns. There is no doubt that this did come to be the pattern in a number of places and among some occupations and income groups. However, even in England, professionals were much more likely to combine home and workplace, as were small retailers. And in many other parts of Europe, middle-class people, particularly the urban lower-middle class, seems to have had neither the money nor the inclination to withdraw from traditional patterns of local sociability. To this day, particularly in southern European towns, but also in the smaller urban centers of northern and central Europe one can see patterns of visiting, public ritual, charitable activity, and public sociability (for example, pub-

lic drinking) that belie the claim that the middle-class family has withdrawn from the public sphere.

Later historians, moreover, tended to reject the theory of “separate spheres,” which long held such a prominent place in women’s history. Critics argue that “separate spheres” was always more of an ideological construct than a representation of reality, and that the more injudicious uses of this theory have had the effect of diverting attention from the important ways in which the sphere of women and the family supported and intersected with the sphere of work and politics. Recent research suggests that middle-class women’s capital and their unpaid labor in and outside the home was crucial to the maintenance of their class. Women and men often pursued common class or group aims, and they shared broadly similar belief systems. While some middle-class Englishmen were seeking to apply scientific management techniques to factory work, some middle-class women were seeking to rationalize the labor of charity-school children so as to make “social welfare” turn a profit. And no sooner had some middle-class women left paid employment than others began agitating for the vote, seeking to break into male professional monopolies, such as medicine, and trying to turn women’s philanthropic activities into paid employment opportunities for themselves and other middle-class women. If there ever was a “golden age” of separate spheres, it was short-lived, at least in the English case.

Middle class associational life. The nineteenth-century middle class is often associated in people’s minds with ostentatious religious faith, and much has been made, especially in Protestant countries, of middle-class attraction to evangelical and pietistic movements. Religion, for many groups, became a vehicle to greater personal discipline; a bulwark of family patriarchy; the seedbed for other kinds of cultural, philanthropic, and reform organization; and the basis from which to criticize—as well as to convert—traditional elites and the poor. There is no doubt that the nineteenth century saw a number of movements for spiritual renewal within a variety of denominations (Catholics, Jews, and others).

However, it does also seem to be the case that, in a large number of European countries, piety came to be more and more the province of women, either because more women than men continued to see religion as a source of strength, or because secular and anticlerical (and, in the case of Jews, assimilationist) tendencies seemed less disturbing when confined to men. Whatever the reasons for it, this newly secular mood contributed to the burgeoning of more rationalist and scientific approaches to a variety of “modern”

problems, including town planning, public health, education, communications, transportation, the organization of factory work (for example, the adoption of the assembly line and of scientific management techniques), and more efficient methods of mobilizing capital.

Societies and clubs became a central feature of middle-class existence in the nineteenth century, though the roots of this went back quite a bit further in many countries, and they were never uniquely middle class. Both men and women entered into these societies, which many commentators have viewed both as a crucial stepping-stone to full participation in civil society and as an indication of the expansion of civil society as a site of independent community life. The scale and range of these groups was very wide. They included freemasonic and other semisecret fraternal associations, literary societies, chambers of commerce, societies for suppressing criminals, drama groups, prayer groups, missionary societies, and both temperance and philanthropic enterprises.

By the late nineteenth century and earlier in some places, middle-class people were also involved in a dizzying range of political clubs and societies. Some of these were broadly “liberal,” perhaps the posture we associate most readily with the middle-class; however, middle-class people also flocked to confessional parties that were often—if not always—deeply conservative and respectful of traditional elites and to nationalist parties that were frequently both nativist and racist. Moreover, a not insubstantial number of them turned to radical or even revolutionary groups endorsing positions as diverse as anarchism, communism, bohemianism, and free love. It should also be noted that the nineteenth century also saw a very significant growth in working-class clubs and political organizations, and, in not a few areas, societies that sought to appeal to both middle-class and working-class groups, either by appealing to common confessional or national loyalties, or by taking up common moral concerns, such as temperance or prostitution. A great many largely middle-class organizations also actively sought out aristocratic patronage.

As all this suggests, there no distinctively middle-class politics in the nineteenth (or for that matter the twentieth) century. Affiliations varied according to town, the sector of the middle class from which one came, religion, nationality, and individual preference, among other factors. That having been said, there probably is a case to be made that a less ideological middle-class politics were to be found at the local level. Again, it is not to be expected that middle-class people have always agreed, or ever will. However, there is a tremendous amount of evidence that middle-class

people were heavily involved, throughout Europe, in efforts to bolster local culture and commerce. This might involve gaining concessions from city governments in favor of assembly halls or other meeting places, lobbying for covered markets, better roads, new bridges, or better public health precautions, banning the running of livestock from the center of town, and attempting, with municipal assistance, to suppress popular customs that were deemed destructive of property. In eastern Europe, in particular, middle-class groups often lobbied for tax or trade concessions, or protection. This was particularly a problem for Jews who, whether rich, middle-class, or poor, were often the object of violent attacks or attempts—both legal and extra-legal—to limit their mobility, confine them to a narrow group of occupations, or extort money from them. Civic improvement with its close links to community policing and—in the case of some minority groups, community defense—was never the monopoly of middle-class people, but it was something they made peculiarly their own.

Middle-class education and its impact. Education has long been closely linked to middle-class status. Middling town dwellers were already highly literate even in the late sixteenth century in many parts of Europe. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries also saw a significant increase in middle-class women's literacy. Historically, middling or middle-class education had tended to have a more functionalist thrust than the education their betters received. There tended to be a good deal of emphasis on skills, such as bookkeeping (often for both boys and girls), and the preferred foreign languages were more likely to be commercial languages, such as French and German (or, sometimes in the Ottoman Empire, Arabic), rather than Latin and Greek. Literacy, as well as accounting skills, were routinely required of clerks and middle-class apprentices in the nineteenth century. Other skills that middle-class parents and teachers sought to inculcate into the children under their care might include better use of one's time, careful oversight of expenditures, a good writing hand, close attention to detail, and sexual restraint. None of these was unique to middle-class people, yet one does get the impression that middle-class parents and teachers went to unusual lengths to teach their children these various "prudential values." This tendency was perhaps attributable to the strains and insecurities that characterize this stratum of the population in most European countries, as well as to perceived need, in some places, to combat the continued appeal of aristocratic patterns of leisure and conspicuous consumption.

One very significant result of the high level of education accorded to women was the emergence of several middle-class women's occupations dependent either upon literacy or on a fairly high degree of education. The eighteenth century saw the establishing of purpose-built schools for girls, often, at least in western Europe, owned and directed by middle-class women entrepreneurs. In some countries such schools were run by aristocratic women and designed for aristocratic girls. In the eighteenth century, and even more in the nineteenth, significant numbers of women began penning novels and other literary productions for a living. Women journalists, newspaper impresarios, political controversialists, and feminists (such as Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin [1759–1797] in England, Olympe de Gouges [1748–1793] in France, or Eleanora de Fonseca Pimentel [1752–1799] in Naples) began to emerge, though the fact that Wollstonecraft died in childbirth, Gouges under the guillotine, and Fonseca Pimentel at the hands of a Neapolitan anti-Jacobin mob suggests something of the obstacles in the way of radical women. By the end of the nineteenth century there were women physicians in a number of European countries, virtually all of them of middle-class stock, and middle-class women also began to make inroads into government service (particularly within the emerging welfare or health sector), teaching, and even—in a few countries and in a very small way—the military officer corps. By the first decade of the twentieth century, there were small or large women's rights movements in almost all the European nations—in not a few cases several separate movements, broken down (as in the Czech lands) by ethnicity and religion, or, in Germany and some other places, by class and religion. Middle-class women's exuberant entry into the world of paid work and politics in country after country further undermines the claim that "separate spheres," if they ever existed in the full sense of the term, were as fundamental a feature of middle-class culture as has sometimes been claimed.

Middle-class morality and sexual behavior. Sexual restraint had long been a central part of middle-class people's self-definition, though up through at least the seventeenth century, it had to compete in some countries with claims about the out-of-control sexuality of citizens' wives. Typically, in the early modern period, this ideal was linked to a vision of well-ordered, pious patriarchal households, in which women, children, and servants deferred happily to the authority of the male head; both women and men respected their marriage vows; and no woman went to the altar pregnant. Even a brief perusal of contemporary court

records, middling people's own writings, or parish records confirms that middle-class people were not appreciably more likely than any other group to adhere to these admonitions in practice, and this may partially explain why they were so commonly accused of hypocrisy with respect to sexual morality.

A potentially greater problem for social historians is the great diversity across Europe in terms of the way institutions like the household, or marriage were defined. Thus, in some parts of Europe a middle-class family, particularly within what is sometimes called the rural bourgeoisie might include three or even four generations (historical demographers call this the stem family), while in other parts of Europe it might look more "nuclear," along what is sometimes thought of as the northwestern European model. Similarly, in some parts of Europe and in some classes, both men and women tended to marry in their mid- to late twenties with only a slight gap in ages, while in others they did so at younger ages; or women might marry substantially older or younger men. In some areas, and within some classes or religious groups, middling or middle-class marriage alliances came, at some point in the early modern period, to derive from the individualistic choice of the bride and groom. In other areas, classes, or religions, they continued, in some cases into the twentieth century, to be arranged by intermediaries. Because so many of the assump-

tions about what constitutes middle-class family culture have been based on the model of northwestern Europe, and specifically England, many questions remain about the ways other middle-class groups organized sexuality and family life.

One pattern that seems to have been widespread after the early twentieth century, though again this occurred at greatly varying speeds, was the early resort by middle-class families to the use of birth control. This occurred in part because of the greater likelihood of children surviving to adulthood, something that presumably was easier to achieve in the relatively clean, well-fed homes of the middle-class than in the squalid and starved habitations of the poor. Many commentators also attribute this phenomenon to a desire to invest greater educational resources in a smaller number of children, and in some countries it was bolstered by advocates of sex reform, and by feminists—as well as, in the post-World War II period, by some national governments. Again, we need to know more about how this trend spread historically, and how it conflicted and intersected with different religions, occupations, regions, and classes.

By the eighteenth or, some have argued, the nineteenth century, a well-developed discourse had arisen to the effect that middle-class people were the most moral, the most industrious, the most ingenious, and the most orderly of citizens. They were superior

both to their feckless, idle, and self-indulgent superiors, and their crime-disposed, dirty, and riot-prone social inferiors. Against this there also developed a strong strain of criticism that identified the middle classes with greed, philistinism, narrowness, and hypocrisy. Karl Marx's *Capital* probably induced relatively few people to adopt dialectical materialism *in toto* (though the notion of the rise of the middle class did become an ineradicable part of most people's conception of the West). But it did revive certain older notions of middle-class philistinism and greed and present them in a new, modernized form. This posture of self-doubt became, over the course of the nineteenth century, very common among middle-class people themselves. Dynamic groups often excel at self-criticism (a tried-and-true form of narcissism), and the middle classes have always made time for self-examination.

At the dawn of the twentieth century one of the most interesting new developments in this vein came via the theories of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939). Psychoanalysis, based largely on clinical studies of middle-class Viennese girls, promised a whole series of new insights into sexuality, gender, unconscious drives, and the process of modernization. And it turned a spotlight on the whole problem of bourgeois hypocrisy, newly universalized and partially valorized as “sexual repression.” In the 1930s members of the Frankfurt school, first in Frankfurt and then in exile in the United States, developed a series of syntheses of Freudian, Marxian, and Weberian thought that helped carry this strain of critical middle-class self-reflection into the twentieth century, emphasizing, among other things, a critique of enlightenment rationalism and technologism, and a new interest in the imprisoning (and occasionally liberating) possibilities of culture and consumerism.

The middle classes in the modern era: a balance sheet. As we have seen, though the nineteenth-century middle classes at times displayed certain common characteristics, many factors militated against their developing a common consciousness. The middle classes were constantly fragmenting. Middle-class Protestants disliked the Catholics and winked at or participated in the persecution of Jews, while middle-class Jews were often riven by disagreements over assimilation and regional identity. Groups defined as “foreign” (for instance, Sudetenland Germans in Czechoslovakia) often saw themselves having little in common with countrymen of their same class. Middle-class women and middle-class men were, in many places, divided over women's education, the entry of women into the professions, religion, and sexuality.

More than anything else it was this divided character that was bequeathed to the twentieth century.

Looking back from the vantage point of the beginning of the twenty-first century, we can see that the project of making the world safe for business has had mixed success in the twentieth century. If it ever had been a distinctively middle-class project, if there really had been a middle-class ascendancy as complete as some people assert, and if trade had been the only things on most people's minds, neither World War I nor World War II—both of which did untold damage to trade and infrastructure, as well as causing the deaths of millions of people—would have happened as they did. Clearly the turn to socialism in Russia after 1917 and of large parts of east central and Eastern Europe after 1945 did little for private enterprise. It did much, however, to build up an extensive class of *apparatchiks*, many of them thoroughly imbued with recognizably bourgeois tastes and managerial ideals, committed to ideals of universal education and better public health, and much occupied with infrastructural development.

Still, the world is undoubtedly safer for some middle-class people and their investments than it once was. In the twentieth century, and especially in the post-1945 period, generations of incremental improvements in commercial law, insurance, management efficiency, worker-management relations, education, infrastructure, communications, and medicine, largely overseen by middle-class people and offering an opportunity for many more to attain that status, have given rise to an unprecedented degree of prosperity over large parts of Europe. Even the former Soviet bloc has not been immune to these changes. There has been an unprecedented unlocking of consumer demand, unlike anything seen in previous centuries.

However, one result of this has been to render the term “middle-class” even more problematic than before. The vast majority of the population of many European countries would now be considered middle class if one went by levels of consumption alone. Universal education, democracy, welfare states, and relatively cheap goods have revolutionized the ways people live and think. Aristocracies and monarchies have largely disappeared; where they do survive they enjoy largely ritual functions. To a far greater degree than was true in previous centuries, there is now a common mass culture in which most people participate (or in which they aspire to participate).

At the same time, modernization has led to increasing inequalities in income, while the need for cheap labor during the postwar economic boom (exacerbated by the fact that rising expectations had persuaded many Europeans to refuse the dirtiest, least

prestigious, and least remunerative jobs) led to a major influx of people from the former colonies and less prosperous parts of Europe, such as Greece and Turkey, into the more dynamic economies to the north and west. Some of these immigrants have raised several generations in their adopted countries and have themselves succeeded in achieving a level of success that might be called “middle class.” Key players in the new global economy, the more prosperous parts of Europe now benefit hugely from cheap goods manufactured in less-developed regions, while an “investing class” supports global free-trade initiatives, multinational mergers, and expansive advertising campaigns that decimate local industries and already fragile middle-class groupings in formerly protectionist Third World economies. Of course, in some fundamental sense, this is not new.

Social historians often call for the abolition of the term “middle class,” but it seems to have a life of its own. The many contemporary projects intended to overcome the heritage of socialism in east central and eastern Europe routinely decry the absence of an entrepreneurial middle class. Few discussions of economic development in the Third World can do with-

out a plea for policies designed to build up or offer support to the “middle class”; with the advent of globalization these voices have grown shriller but, if anything, louder. Western European politicians routinely seek to appeal to “middle-class” groups. Social critics still blame them implicitly for much that is wrong with society, though there is a trend toward pointing the finger more precisely at “multinational corporations,” “polluters of the environment,” “the World Bank and the IMF,” “The European Union,” “NATO,” or the “energy-wasting First World” rather than the old “middle class.” Already claims are being made to the effect that Europeans (along with North Americans and a few others) now constitute a new kind of aristocracy, that, in the way of the old aristocracies, monopolizes the world’s resources, interferes disproportionately in its politics, and seeks to define its culture, all by virtue of “blood rights” based upon race, geography, and history. It remains to be seen to what extent the passing of the critical torch to developing nations and their own intelligentsias will result in entirely new conceptions of individuals and collectivities, and to what extent it will end up recapitulating the old antinomies in a new context.

See also *The Industrial Revolution (volume 2)*; *Urbanization (volume 2)*; *Suburbs and New Towns (volume 2)*; *Nationalism (volume 2)*; *Gender and Work (volume 4)*; *Gender and Education (volume 4)*; *History of the Family (volume 4)*; *Sexual Behavior and Sexual Morality (volume 4)*; *Psychiatry and Psychology (volume 4)*; *Middle-Class Work (volume 4)*; *Schools and Schooling (volume 5)*; and other articles in this section.

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PROFESSIONALS AND PROFESSIONALIZATION



James C. Albisetti

The word “profession” in English and its equivalents in the Romance languages originally had a religious connotation, as in “profession of faith.” Its second major meaning was occupation or job, what someone does to earn a living, as in the distinction between an amateur and a professional athlete. In the Germanic languages, words such as *Beruf* in German and *beroep* in Dutch had similar connotations, combining notions of a religious calling or vocation with a more mundane sense of occupation. Thus all who worked had a profession.

Yet ever since the later Middle Ages, European languages and societies have also distinguished certain professions—especially the clergy, lawyers, and physicians—as distinct from the rest. Such “liberal” professions did not involve production or trade, as manual occupations did. Most of their practitioners obtained advanced education in the liberal arts and in their specialties at universities, although in the case of the English common law, training took place at the Inns of Court, sometimes called the third university in England alongside Oxford and Cambridge.

Throughout the early modern era, from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, professionals played important but far from leading roles in societies dominated by monarchs and hereditary aristocracies. As will be shown, their authority and autonomy were circumscribed in many ways. English cartoons depicting lawyers as devils and the sharp ridicule that writers such as Molière and Voltaire directed at physicians, and in the latter’s case at clergy as well, suggest both the visibility and the limited respect that they enjoyed. From this perspective, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries emerge as the great age of professionalization, when physicians and lawyers gained significantly in prestige and power, and other groups—engineers, architects, dentists, teachers, accountants, nurses—began to fight for similar positions in society.

The main era of professionalization thus coincided with the transition from an estate-based to a class-based society, where merit and achievement displaced birth as the major pathway to status and influ-

ence. Yet the professions occupied an ambiguous place in the classic examinations of the rise of the middle classes in this era. Adam Smith considered them to do “unproductive labor,” and Karl Marx’s definition of classes according to their relationship to the means of production also left professionals in an uncertain position. Many professionals themselves, with a devotion to avowedly unpractical classical education and a frequently expressed disdain for “materialism,” did not identify themselves closely with merchants and industrialists. Such distinctions have led many German scholars to divide the middle class into two groups, the educated and the economic bourgeoisie (*Bildungs- und Wirtschaftsbürgertum*).

Modern scholarly attention to the professions as a whole began with sociologists rather than historians; the most influential work has probably been that of Magali Sarfatti Larson. Sociologists tended to build their models and theories of the professions primarily on the experience of lawyers and physicians in England and the United States. A composite picture drawn from such works would suggest that a profession is a full-time occupation that brings high status and a comfortable if not magnificent income. It is based on formal training in a field of specialized knowledge that is confirmed by some type of certification. The professional provides services to clients, not products to customers, and earns fees or even honoraria rather than wages or a salary. Members of a profession follow a code of professional ethics, policed by associations of professionals rather than the state or some other outside body. Larson herself suggested that such professional associations also try to constitute and control the market for their members’ services, especially in limiting competition from uncertified practitioners.

Occupations striving to achieve such professional status thus pursue collective rather than individual mobility in what has been called a “professionalization project.” Such projects often involve the aspiration to reach, or not to fall behind, the condition of another profession (or of the same one in an-

other country), as several examples from Germany in the late nineteenth century illustrate. In 1878 architects in the civil service opposed the admission of graduates of nonclassical secondary schools to their ranks because they would be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis classically trained civil servants with law degrees. For many years the German Physicians' Association resisted admission of young men with Latin but not Greek, and of women, to the study of medicine because such a step would lower their prestige compared to lawyers. Secondary-school teachers fought for many years, and ultimately obtained in 1909, equal pay with judges in the civil service who had university training of equivalent length. A Protestant Pastors' Association in the Prussian state church, founded in 1892, sought pay scales equal to those of secondary teachers for the same reason.

Larson's analysis contains elements of both the benevolent and the conspiratorial interpretations of professionalization that exist throughout the scholarly literature. On the one hand, the process appears as the victory of expertise, honesty, or even disinterested service over incompetence, fraud, and quackery. On the other, it involves the establishment of monopoly, exclusion of nonprofessionals, and limitation of choice for the public. Whether a regulation such as the establishment in 1858 of a Medical Register of all medical practitioners in England did more to protect the public from incompetents or to protect those on the Register from competition is an open question. Given the frequency with which professional associations tried to limit numbers through increased educational requirements, in the long run monopoly and expertise may well have worked together.

Historians and sociologists have offered various criticisms of this functionalist model of professions. One is that it treats the professional as defined by his—rarely her—work, to the exclusion of concerns of religion, ethnicity, gender, age, or region. It also views members of professions primarily as united in common aims rather than as competing with each other for clients or divided between elites and ordinary practitioners. It ignores ethnic and religious divisions within a profession, an issue of great significance in central and eastern Europe, where, for example, the creation of a Czech-language university in Prague in 1883 alongside the venerable German one reflected divisions in the professions and the population at large. In Hungary as of 1910, 49 percent of doctors, 45 percent of lawyers, and 39 percent of engineers were Jewish, a situation that tended more to divide than to unite the professions.

Another broad criticism of the functionalist model is its too narrow focus on the individual phy-

sician or lawyer in practice for himself. Not only does this focus exclude from consideration the clergy and military, which generally operate in hierarchical organizations separate from the market, but from the perspective of all of continental Europe it seriously underplays the role of the state in the certification, regulation, and even employment of professionals. Among the most striking examples are the creation of a new legal profession in Russia by decree in 1864 and the establishment of almost all the professions after 1878 in the newly independent Bulgaria, a country that had no university for the first ten years of its existence. Some German scholars have suggested the term “professionalization from above” to distinguish this process from the “projects” of existing occupational groups. Others, accepting the Anglo-American view of the free professional, have even argued that German academic *Berufen* in which large numbers of practitioners were state employees should not be considered as professions; they often speak of a process of *Berufskonstruktion* rather than professionalization. An inclusive view of learned professions needs to take into account their relations not only with clients but also with the state and with the universities, the transmitters and discoverers of the knowledge on which professional expertise relies.

THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

In this era, the Christian clergy in Europe possessed some characteristics of a modern profession, even though in many countries it remained a separate “estate.” Priests and pastors, at least in theory, possessed special knowledge and some form of certification; they performed services such as baptism, marriage, and distribution of communion that others could not. The Protestant Reformation, of course, fragmented the clergy, though many regions retained a high level of religious homogeneity. The Lutheran doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, along with translations of the Bible into vernacular languages, reduced to a degree the special expertise of pastors. The rise of dissident sects and even itinerant preachers also undermined the clergy's monopoly.

The hierarchical structure of the established churches, whether Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant, meant that the individual priest or pastor had a very different relation to colleagues than does a member of a modern professional association. The extent to which prominent positions (or sinecures), especially in the Catholic Church, remained in the hands of younger sons of royal or noble families suggests how small a role academic merit played. The dependence for appointments on patrons, or in the case of dissenting

sects on the congregations themselves, meant clergymen had little self-regulating autonomy. As late as 1835, private individuals controlled appointments to 48 percent of the livings in the Church of England, bishops 12 percent, the Crown 9 percent, and various institutions, especially the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, the remaining 31 percent.

Lawyers in early modern Europe had more characteristics of a modern profession, although they certainly did not have a monopoly of legal business or the administration of justice. The extreme case was Russia, where until 1864 there were no formal requirements for judges, court clerks, prosecutors, or attorneys, although the state did employ officials with legal training. Farther west, in many areas nobles administered justice on their own estates, royal servants without legal training controlled some courts, and churches ran others.

Most of Europe witnessed the development of a two- or three-tiered system of legal practitioners in the early modern era. Holders of law degrees, or in England those barristers admitted to the “bar” by the Inns of Court, established a monopoly over verbal pleading in court and some forms of legal advice. On the Continent these lawyers were known by such terms as *avocat*, *abogado*, *avvocato*, *Advokat*, or *Anwalt*. Below them in prestige was a second group, trained primarily through apprenticeship rather than formal schooling, men who were experts in procedure and expedited—or deliberately delayed—the progress of cases through the courts. The *procureur*, *procurador*, *procuratore*, or *Prokurator* was more often an officer of the court than the representative of a client, in contrast to the English solicitor, who also trained through apprenticeship. The *solicitador* also existed in Spain,

although with no formal requirements. By the late eighteenth century, Prussia and much of Switzerland had moved toward a single type of attorney, abandoning these distinct levels.

Lenard Berlanstein’s study of lawyers in the region of Toulouse during the eighteenth century suggests the high level of self-recruitment in the legal profession, as well as the social distinctions between its levels. Thirty-one percent of *avocats* were sons of *avocats*, and a similar percentage of *procureurs* were sons of *procureurs*. Whereas no son of an *avocat* had entered the lower branch, about 11 percent of *avocats* were upwardly mobile sons of *procureurs*.

Notaries or scriveners also performed significant amounts of legal business, especially creation and verification of documents in societies with low rates of literacy. They also trained by apprenticeship. The Company of Scriveners in London claimed a monopoly over conveyancing, or legal transfer of property, from the early 1600s until the mid-1700s, when solicitors, newly organized as the Society of Gentlemen Practisers, succeeded in breaking the guild’s monopoly, an early example of a professionalization project aimed at enlarging the market for attorneys’ services.

Physicians in early modern Europe enjoyed less of a monopoly than did lawyers, confronting as they did a wide variety of barber-surgeons, herbalists, midwives, and other purveyors of cures, at least some of whom could claim as much therapeutic success as physicians. Medicine functioned more like a trade than did law, which helps to explain why many fewer nobles undertook its study than obtained at least some legal training. For many physicians, the practice of medicine was not a full-time occupation, if only because it did not provide a comfortable income. Those fortunate enough to serve a monarch or wealthy noble ended up in a client-patron relationship far removed from the ideal of the autonomous professional.

As in the legal profession, medicine had several types of practitioners. Physicians, usually with a university degree, dealt primarily with internal diseases; they alone were supposed to prescribe medicine. Surgeons, who generally learned through apprenticeship, treated external wounds and infections and might set broken bones, thus engaging in manual work that physicians avoided. In rural areas, such surgeons were often the only medical practitioners available. Apothecaries dispensed, but were not supposed to prescribe, medicine. In England these three different groups developed as the Royal College of Physicians, the Company (later College) of Surgeons, and the Society of Apothecaries. Yet by the early nineteenth century such divisions were breaking down; what became the British Medical Association had its origins in a move-

ment of “general practitioners” who possessed multiple qualifications.

During the eighteenth century, Dutch and Scottish universities were leading centers of innovative medical education. Between 1750 and 1800 Scottish medical schools graduated about twenty-six hundred physicians, ten times the production of Oxford and Cambridge. On the Continent, advances in practical medicine also emerged from institutions established to train army surgeons, such as the Joseph Akademie founded in Vienna in the 1780s and the *Pepinière* established in Berlin a decade later.

The “profession of arms” in this era was a profession only in a loose sense. Most officer corps were dominated by, and some were restricted to, aristocrats and upper gentry. In England, officers’ commissions could be purchased as late as 1870. Although all officers underwent special training, formal educational requirements developed most consistently in the less prestigious engineering and artillery branches. When England opened an artillery school at Woolwich in 1741, it was the last major power to do so.

By the late eighteenth century, lawyers, physicians, and clergymen certainly enjoyed a reasonable amount of prestige on the basis of their specialized training and their social functions. Yet in societies that were still predominantly agricultural and where members of the nobility still dominated politics and patronage, they had neither the status nor the autonomy that many of their successors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would seek, and that some would obtain.

THE MODERN ERA

In the modern era, political upheavals often provided the opportunity or the necessity to restructure the professions. Most drastic was the dismantling of the legal and medical professions in 1791 by the revolutionary French government, hostile as it was to special social privileges and to symbols of the Old Regime. In the course of the nineteenth century, the unifications of Italy and Germany, the Compromise of 1867 that resulted in the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, the great reforms in Russia after the Crimean War, and even the new Swiss constitution of 1874 brought important changes to the professions. That so many of these changes occurred during the great age of *laissez-faire* liberalism, when guild restrictions and legal discrimination on the basis of religion disappeared from much of Europe, led to intriguing conflicts between defenders of freedom of occupation and professionals interested in control over the market for their services.

In the first decade of the nineteenth century, Napoleon recreated professions of certified lawyers and physicians in France. The reform of the legal profession established orders of *avocats* who controlled the admission of degree holders to practice through a system of apprenticeship and the swearing of an oath. They also enforced professional ethics, but the orders had no control over the number of students graduating from the legal faculties. The new system again included a second tier of attorneys, now known as *avoués*, who, though still tied to particular courts, came to represent clients more like the English solicitors. With some modifications, this system also had lasting influence in areas that had been parts of Napoleon’s French empire, including the later independent Belgium, German territory west of the Rhine River, and northern Italy.

When Russia created a legal profession separate from the state service in 1864, it adopted a mixture of Western models. It took from Prussia the single-tier or fused profession, from France and England the idea of councils of the bar to regulate the profession, especially apprenticeship after the degree. For many years, however, such councils existed in only a few major cities. Shortages of trained lawyers also led to establishment of other classes of attorneys with lesser qualifications and fewer privileges. Quotas limiting the number of Jews admitted to the bar, introduced by Alexander III, forced many Jewish attorneys to remain in the lower categories, whatever their qualifications.

The Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Dual Monarchy adopted new regulations for the legal profession in 1868 and 1874, respectively. Both lifted restrictions on the number of attorneys admitted to practice and provided for creation of lawyers’ chambers. Whereas the Hungarian regulations imitated the French system of having the chambers control admission to practice, Austria retained state examinations as the crucial determinant. In imperial Germany, new regulations introduced in 1878 brought the single-tier profession to all of the country and also established lawyers’ chambers with disciplinary powers. Yet the German lawyers’ chambers did not have control over entrance to the profession, and graduates intending to enter private practice still did the large majority of their apprenticeship in the civil service.

The Swiss constitution of 1874 allowed the individual cantons to decide whether to require a proof of competence for professionals. Shortly thereafter, several cantons abolished the “lawyers’ monopoly” over pleading in court, in the case of Zurich allowing anyone with full citizenship rights to do so. Court decisions in the case of Emilie Kempin-Spyri later

clarified that a woman, even with a law degree, did not possess such rights and could not plead. A referendum in the canton of Zurich in 1898 reversed both decisions, re-creating a closed bar and granting women access to it. In the late nineteenth century only Sweden had as open a bar as did these Swiss cantons.

When Napoleon reestablished certification for physicians in 1803, he did so without creating any corporate body like the orders of lawyers; university degrees sufficed for admission to practice. Nineteenth-century France also possessed lower-level medical practitioners known as *officiers de santé*, or officers of health, in essence replacements for the Old Regime's surgeons. Other countries also continued to have similar less thoroughly trained medical personnel. Prussia, however, eliminated its schools for such surgeons around 1850; Austria followed suit by 1871, closing even the Joseph Akademie. France eliminated the officers of health in 1892. That their Russian equivalents, known as the *feldsher*, continued to exist until after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 suggests the continuing shortage of trained physicians in rural Russia.

Perhaps the most controversial regulation of the medical profession was that enacted in 1869 by the North German Confederation and extended to the southern German states after unification in 1871. This regulation took place in the context of a new Commercial Code (*Gewerbe Ordnung*), and thus treated medicine as a trade. The new rules did establish a uniform four-year university course for prospective physicians and freed practitioners from an earlier requirement that they had to treat all patients who came to them. Yet in accord with the Commercial Code's general support for freedom of occupation, it allowed anyone to practice the "healing arts," within some limits, as long as he or she did not claim to be a certified physician. Many physicians would later consider their inclusion under the code as humiliating and its regulations an invitation to quackery.

Physicians' chambers with some disciplinary powers were established in Prussia in 1887, Austria in 1891, and Italy in 1910. These bodies did not control entry into the profession, however, as some lawyers' chambers did. Corporate groups of English physicians, even after the creation of a General Medical Council in 1858, had more control over entry than did most of their continental colleagues.

The percentage of physicians in private practice tended to decrease as one moved from west to east. Even in England, some were employed by Poor Law Unions to treat the destitute. Many Italian cities employed physicians for similar purposes; in 1876, Hun-

gary mandated that towns hire physicians for the poor. A significant number of doctors in Russia worked for the local government boards, or *zemstva*. In Bulgaria as of 1910 only 20 percent of physicians were in private practice.

The development of health and disability insurance for workers, beginning in Germany in the 1880s, had mixed consequences for the professional position of physicians. It brought them more patients as workers had to visit them for verification of claims, but it also subordinated them to insurance boards that were often dominated by workers. The issue of whether insurance boards could dictate which physicians their patients had to use even led to very "unprofessional" behavior by German physicians—a series of strikes in several cities in the 1900s.

As mentioned above, the nineteenth century witnessed drives for professional status by several new occupations. A common feature was a transition from on-the-job training or apprenticeship to formal academic culture, what in the history of engineering has been called a shift from "shop culture" to "school culture." Such academic training seldom took place in the established universities; when it did, as sometimes happened with dentistry and pharmacy, entrance requirements could be lower and the course of study shorter than for traditional fields. More typical was the experience in Sweden, which founded outside its universities new technical colleges, schools of business, an agricultural college, and institutes for forestry, veterinary science, social work, and dentistry. The establishment of a chair in engineering at Cambridge University in 1875 was an unusual step; even there, no engineering laboratory existed until 1894.

Engineering and teaching can illustrate some of the issues involved in professionalization of the less traditional occupations. In the eighteenth century some monarchs had created corps of royal servants trained in technical fields, such as the graduates of the French *École des Ponts et Chaussées* (school for bridges and roads) founded in 1747 and those of a school of mines opened in 1783. In this area the French Revolution did not break with the traditions of the Old Regime; in 1795, it added the *École Polytechnique*, which in the course of the nineteenth century became more prestigious than the medical or legal faculties in France. Yet even this elite institution provided a striking example of the sense of inferiority associated with "practical" studies when in the 1850s it began to award extra points on its notoriously competitive entrance examination to boys who had obtained the *baccalauréat*, or classical secondary diploma, that was a requirement for lawyers, physicians, and secondary teachers.

Apart from elite groups like the *Polytechniciens*, engineers often struggled to establish a clear professional identity and a controlled field of activity. An engineer could be an entrepreneur or an employee; and whatever his training, it was often difficult to say what an engineer did that an architect, builder, or skilled mechanic could not do. England saw the creation of a Society of Civil Engineers as early as 1771 and even a royal charter for an Institute of Civil Engineers in 1828; yet the first examinations to certify engineers did not take place until 1898. In Italy, only with the creation of a national register of engineers in 1922 were some official functions as inspectors reserved to those so recognized. Licensing of engineers came to Hungary in 1923.

In the field of education, teachers in boys' secondary schools gained general recognition as professionals in the nineteenth century, even though most were salaried employees, often of the state. Graduation from a university became the normal preparation, to which many countries added some form of pedagogical training and/or practice teaching. England, where secondary education enjoyed the greatest autonomy from the state, was an exception; headmasters of private schools resisted the notion that their teachers (or they themselves) needed attestation of pedagogical competence.

Elementary teachers often organized earlier and more comprehensively than did those in secondary education, yet their professionalization projects usually fell short of the desired success. Lacking university education and often from distinctly lower socioeconomic backgrounds than other nineteenth-century professionals, elementary teachers could not claim the income or prestige of the learned professions. Their work with children replicated what all parents did, thus did not appear to be based on any special skills, a perception reinforced by the high rate of turnover among them. Both a result and a cause of the continuing low status of elementary teachers was that many of them were women or even teenaged girls.

WOMEN AND THE PROFESSIONS

Throughout most of modern European history the liberal professions have been male preserves. In medicine the advance of professional monopoly in the nineteenth century involved the exclusion of women from some areas, especially assistance at childbirth. The development of obstetrics and gynecology tended to bring the physician rather than the midwife to the aid of women in labor.

Sociologists often speak of the "typing" of certain occupations as "women's work" and of the "tip-

ping" of an occupation in that direction once women reach a certain percentage of those working in a field. Among the less prestigious professions in modern European history, nursing is an example of the former phenomenon, elementary school teaching of the latter. Nursing proved particularly difficult to professionalize, for several reasons. Well into the nineteenth century most nursing was little more than custodial work performed by women of the lower classes. An alternative model developed as members of Catholic orders or Protestant deaconesses devoted themselves to care of the sick, but this made nursing appear as a charitable activity more than a skilled profession. The example of Florence Nightingale and the development of the Red Cross from the 1860s helped make nursing a more respectable occupation with formal training. A British Nurses' Association formed in 1888 to push for a professional register like that existing for physicians, an idea opposed by Nightingale. Legislation authorizing such a register did not pass until 1919, with the register itself being created in 1925.

Women had served as teachers throughout the early modern period, though most often in family settings or small, private "dame schools" that taught young children. From the late sixteenth century Catholic teaching orders such as the Ursulines ran both boarding and day schools for girls. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, formal training and certification of young women to teach in the burgeoning public elementary schools spread across Europe. The rate and degree of feminization of the teaching profession, however, were far from uniform. Around 1900, the proportion of elementary school teachers who were women varied from about 20 percent in Germany to nearly 75 percent in both England and Russia. Such women had less professional autonomy than did their male colleagues, being subjected at various times to marriage bans and often paid noticeably less for the same work. That many women teachers left after a few years to get married reinforced the idea that elementary teaching was not a professional career.

Secondary schooling in Europe remained overwhelmingly single-sex until the 1960s and 1970s, except in the Soviet Union and its satellites. Women secondary teachers long remained restricted to teaching girls. Yet even in this area, practices varied widely. Men had virtually disappeared from girls' secondary schools in England by the 1890s, and in France few men taught on a full-time basis in such schools. In Austria and Russia at that time, however, girls' schools tended to employ women only in the lower grades or in language, music, and sewing classes.

The struggles of women to gain access to the medical profession have been well documented by

Thomas Bonner. Broad interest in the admission of women to medical study and practice emerged in much of Europe during the 1860s, when the “woman question” became a hotly debated topic. The University of Zurich, founded only in 1834, gave the first modern medical degree to a woman, the Russian Nadezhda Suslova, in 1867. By the turn of the century women had gained access to practice across the continent. In England and Russia, medical training took place mostly in single-sex environments, but elsewhere women gained admission to existing universities.

Supporters of women physicians often argued that they were needed to protect the modesty of female patients, and many of the pioneers specialized in obstetrics and pediatrics. In the struggle for admission of women to the legal profession, however, arguments about a special need for female lawyers or about special female talents for the law played a much smaller role. That demands for access to the bar rested so squarely on doctrines of equal rights may well have contributed to the fact that in every European country admission of women to the legal profession trailed their admission to medicine. Success came in some areas—the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, France, and some Swiss cantons—around the turn of the century. In most of the rest of Europe, women gained access to the bar in the years after World War I. Two holdouts were Hungary and Bulgaria, which did not allow female attorneys until after World War II.

DEPROFESSIONALIZATION

Professionals can lose as well as gain status, income, control of the market, and autonomy. Over the last two centuries, the process of professionalization has undergone a variety of reversals. The decline of the clergy from its position as first estate of the realm to a profession ignored, if still granted respect, by large segments of the population is the most obvious long-term example. The abolition of the legal and medical professions during the French Revolution was a much more radical, if less enduring, eradication of professional status and privilege. The lay competition for doctors allowed under the German Commercial Code of 1869 and that for lawyers in the canton of Zurich under the Swiss constitution of 1874 serve as examples of loss of control of the market for services. Oversupplies of new entrants to the professions, whether caused by booming university enrollments or, as in Hungary after 1919, by the migration of professionals from lost territories, have devalued credentials for many. Legislation mandating the admission of women to the legal profession, which proved necessary everywhere but the Netherlands, amounted to a partial loss of control over entrance by the bar associations and lawyers’ chambers.

Authoritarian governments in the nineteenth century often made it difficult or impossible for trained professionals to form associations. In the twentieth century, dictatorships have overturned status hierarchies

and undermined or abolished professional autonomy in many ways. Perhaps the most insidious occurred in the first months of the Third Reich, when the Nazi regime issued decrees aimed at “restoration” of, and prevention of overcrowding in, the civil service. Under the guise of restoring prestige and limiting competition, the Nazi state expelled communists, socialists, Jews, and women from positions in the civil service, professions, and universities. Although such measures may have been in line with the professionalization project of German nationalist male professionals, these decrees also obliterated any notion of professional autonomy as it had been conceived in the nineteenth century.

In the late twentieth century, two less blatant processes eroded older ideas of the professions in other ways. One is the decline, especially in medicine and

law, of the individual practitioner who for many formed the model of the professional. Members of large law or engineering firms, or physicians in group practice, continue to have advanced training and certification, but they have often become employees as much as autonomous professionals. The second process has been the proliferation of academic credentials in an age of mass higher education, which has led to more and more occupations claiming professional status, not all of which can enjoy significant prestige. Important as well has been the devaluation of the concept of a professional itself. When a German hotel advertises the availability of a “state-certified masseur” and German automobile manufacturers show “professional drivers” on their test tracks, it appears that the twenty-first century may see a return to the earlier meaning of the word as any occupation.

See also Civil Society; Bureaucracy (volume 2); Medical Practitioners and Medicine; Middle-Class Work (volume 4); Higher Education; Teachers (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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STUDENTS



Keith Vernon

Students occupy a curious social position. They are in a transitory phase and do not quite make up a socio-economic, gender, or age group. They are an elite drawn predominantly from privileged sectors of society and destined for positions of authority, yet they are frequently poor, have few responsibilities, and are constantly associated with disorder. Until the late twentieth century students constituted only a tiny minority of national populations but carried enormous political, social, economic, and cultural significance. Inevitably the term has been applied variously at different times, and it has been argued that the student as an identifiable and self-conscious social role only acquired currency during the early nineteenth century. Here the term will be used to refer broadly to people attending a university or comparable institution of higher learning. Three aspects of students as a social group will be considered: First, the question of the size and composition of the student population; second, the nature of and parameters affecting student life and experience; and finally, the problem of student movements that have on occasion threatened the social and political order.

THE STUDENT POPULATION

The dimensions of the student population at any particular time are not easy to determine. Records are frequently incomplete, and definitions vary. Enrollment is one thing, attendance at classes another, and completing a degree something else altogether. Nevertheless, it is important to try to gain some idea of how large the student body has been and of its social composition. Three phases can be identified, the first two of which have received serious historical attention. Expansion, beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, faded to a stagnant period in the eighteenth century; sustained growth occurred from the early nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century; and a rapid increase followed World War II. The numbers given below, however, are approximate and indicate scale

only. Students have generally come from a limited if broadening range of social backgrounds, but student status has not been simply a function of wealth.

The view of university history as a medieval golden age succeeded by early modern decline was challenged by Lawrence Stone, who argued that England experienced an educational revolution from the mid-sixteenth century to the 1630s. A number of new colleges were established, and the student populations at Oxford, Cambridge, and the Inns of Court increased to represent some 2.5 percent of men aged sixteen to twenty, participation rates that were not equaled until the twentieth century. Studies of other European universities revealed similar patterns of institutional development and student expansion, although with different timings. Student numbers in Castile peaked in the 1590s with even higher participation rates, whereas in the Dutch Republic the rise started only in the early seventeenth century or, at the University of Coimbra, in the late seventeenth century. Some Italian universities displayed similar trends, but others did not. The revolution seems to have left Prague University untouched.

The English educational revolution derived predominantly from an influx of young gentlemen who sought places in the expanding and secularizing state bureaucracies or who wanted the educational skills to secure their positions in volatile situations. In Castile changing forms of state patronage put a premium on degrees, which fueled the growth in universities. Other investigations suggested that liberally cultivating, humanistic education did have a role, but the concentration on law degrees confirmed the importance of secular knowledge useful to the state. The participation of the aristocracy in other European universities may not have been quite as significant as in England or Castile, but the social and cultural tone of many universities undermined the medieval image of the poor scholar.

Universities and their student populations declined, however, as war and religious controversy made study more hazardous and new colleges, especially

those run by the Jesuits, cornered a large slice of the market. An oversupply of graduates made traditional forms of place seeking more attractive. Educationally, the continued scholasticism of the universities failed to accommodate the new experimental sciences. By the eighteenth century universities had become just one of several forms of aristocratic finishing, where a fairly undemanding smattering of education was added to traditional gentlemanly accomplishments. Toward the end of the century, however, resurgent nation-states once again recognized the value of a ruling cadre drawn from a wider base but undergoing uniform acculturation through a more rigorous university education.

The transformation of the university during the nineteenth century brought about fundamental changes in the size and composition of the student population. Across Europe national university systems were reformed and expanded. Existing universities grew and embraced a wider range of functions. More universities were founded, and novel institutions slowly achieved recognition at the university level. Altogether the student population grew fitfully but on a steadily upward curve, while new entrants turned the aristocratic university into a middle-class institution. Fritz Ringer, in *Education and Society in Modern Europe* (1979), led the way in analyzing these changes. Fairly detailed studies are available for several European countries. While the problems of quantification are multiplied when comparing different countries, a

consideration of Germany, France, and Russia can indicate some of the trends and complexities.

In the German states student enrollments grew from just under 12,000 in the mid-1830s to almost 16,500 in 1875, to nearly 34,000 in 1900, and to 55,500 in 1911. Technical institutes, which acquired close to university status by the end of the century, added almost 5,500 students to the totals in 1875; 10,400 in 1900; and over 11,000 in 1911. The French faculties and *grandes écoles* (institutions of specialized higher learning) saw their populations rise from just over 11,000 in 1876 to 42,000 in 1914. These numbers suggest comparable participation rates for universities, though higher for Germany if the technical institutes are added, but still tiny fractions of the population—a rise from less than 0.5 per 1,000 people aged 20 to 24 to 1 per 1,000 in the last quarter of the century. During the volatile period of university development in Russia, from the 1860s to 1900, numbers and participation rates remained much lower than in France and Germany but nevertheless showed noticeable increases. In 1836 Russian university students numbered only 2,000, which rose to 5,000 by 1859 and to about 8,000 by 1880. Some 7,000 attended specialized institutes. Rapid expansion in the early twentieth century produced enrollments totaling some 130,000 by 1914.

The development and reform of university systems was closely connected to the expansion of state

administrations and the rising demand for professionals in more prosperous industrial and commercial nations. In France the centralized Napoleonic university was geared toward providing experts for the post-revolutionary state. In the wake of Napoleonic devastation in central Europe, the Humboldtian ideal of the university as a means of national regeneration laid the foundations of the modern German university. At the same time rising prosperity brought the possibility of university education within the reach of a wider sector of the population. Concerns about overproduction of graduates, professional overcrowding, and academic proletarianization, however, were widespread. Attempts to control numbers were most overt in Russia, where the autocracy initially expanded the university system in the early nineteenth century but suppressed it in the 1860s and 1880s. In Germany state officials discouraged young men from entering a university in the stagnant mid-century. Later in the century connections to the state strengthened, which meant many civil service posts required a university degree. Student numbers rose rapidly as industrial prosperity allowed more people to consider the opportunities university educations afforded. It is perhaps surprising that French participation rates kept pace with those in Germany given that France experienced little overall population increase and its levels of industrialization were much lower. Entrance was extended to applicants from nonclassical schools, and the service sector for urban populations offered opportunities for graduates.

Being a student was the privilege of a small minority, yet the social spectrum from which students were recruited widened throughout the nineteenth century to make universities predominantly middle class. Technical institutes recruited even more from the middle classes, and where teacher training was considered a part of higher education, as it came to be in Britain, the working class began to be represented. Access, however, was not simply a function of wealth. Different countries, different institutions, and even different faculties reveal idiosyncratic patterns. Even more caveats are made when addressing questions of social background, but the available evidence is interesting.

A striking feature of German students was the prevalence of those with learned professional backgrounds. Approximately 50 percent had educated or professional but not necessarily wealthy fathers, although the proportion declined to 30 percent by the 1880s. Those coming from the commercial and industrial sectors increased their share to about 30 percent of the total. In France the expense of secondary education reserved higher education for the affluent,

but the number of students from petty bourgeois backgrounds grew. Different *grandes écoles*, however, attracted different clienteles. The *École Polytechnique* during the Second Empire drew almost 70 percent of its students from upper bourgeois families, 19 percent from the liberal professions, and only 11 percent from trades backgrounds. The *École Centrale* had higher proportions from the lower bourgeois levels, while the *École Normale* replicated the German pattern in attracting more students from the educated classes. Among the faculties law was the elite, even though medical fees were higher. It was easier to set up a medical practice, whereas law required more patronage connections. Russian universities were dominated by the nobility, which comprised over 65 percent of students in 1865 and remained a significant 35 percent as late as 1914. Middle-class elements increased their share from 3 percent to 11 percent over this period, and the petty bourgeois increased from 5 percent to 23 percent. The peasantry had a presence of between 5 percent and 10 percent, but these students were from families of some substance.

Variations around the theme were repeated across Europe during the nineteenth century. Oxford and Cambridge had aristocratic overtones until the mid-nineteenth century and remained wealthy preserves thereafter. The new civic universities, however, drew more from the local middle classes. The Scottish universities had a reputation for inclusiveness, generating a powerful mythology of the humble “lad o’ pairts” bringing his barrel of oatmeal and herrings to sustain him through a term’s study in the city. Swedish universities were familiar with students from modest and peasant farming backgrounds, although Uppsala had a more aristocratic clientele than did Lund. Universities in southern and eastern Europe remained much fewer and more like the aristocratic finishing schools of the eighteenth century. Through the late nineteenth century Germanic reforms were initiated, and some countries attempted to create a wider student cadre through scholarships, often to foreign universities. The Serbian government enabled small numbers to study at Vienna or in Germany.

Wealthy aristocrats pursued university educations primarily for cultural refinement, although younger sons still needed to find careers. Humboldtian ideals revived the faculties of philosophy. But universities were dominated by the professional faculties, and the new entrants to the universities sought secure and remunerative employment. How far, though, could becoming a student lead to social mobility? Professional self-recruitment was a significant element, and university education might be a calculated and sacrificial investment by the educated classes to main-

tain their social status. Newly rich industrialists might seek social and cultural elevation for their sons by preparing them for the professions. The principal form of social mobility, however, was probably that of marginal middle-class people striving for greater security through advancement into the professions or, more likely, civil service.

The most momentous change to the composition of the student population came with the admittance of women into the previously male preserve of the university. Education formed a central issue of the predominantly middle-class women's campaigns of the 1860s as a means both to intellectual self-realization and economic independence. In the face of considerable prejudice, women were initially permitted only as auditors on the approval of individual professors. In the 1870s women were cautiously granted entry and slowly grew to be a noticeable if minor presence. A common first step was in medical education, where traditional arguments allowed that women should be treated by other women. Even when women were admitted, however, it was rarely on the same terms as men, and areas of the curriculum, notably theology and law, remained closed for some time. Attempts to steer women into feminized courses were not successful, and women opted primarily for medicine or philosophical subjects that could lead to teaching or literary work.

Formal admission, however, was not the whole problem. No particular legal obstacles prevented women from entering a university in France, but the lack of female secondary education imposed an effective block. The universities received the first applications in the mid-1860s, but by 1882 only nineteen women had graduated. During the first decade of the twentieth century female representation grew from 3 percent to 9 percent of French university students. A royal decree in 1873 allowed women into the University of Lund, but only fifteen enrolled during the 1880s. There, too, numbers increased noticeably in the early twentieth century. Greater hostility in Germany meant women were only officially allowed into universities in Baden in 1901 and Prussia in 1908, although over 4,000 women represented 7 percent of German students by 1914. In England the civic universities quietly admitted women in the 1870s, while Cambridge and Oxford conceded women informal entry but remained vehemently opposed to women graduating until well into the twentieth century. The Russian women's movement won temporary access to university teaching in the late 1850s and the 1870s. From the late 1890s, however, higher courses for women expanded dramatically, with over 5,000 in 1905; 28,000 in 1912; and around 34,000 by 1914.

This almost equaled the 35,000 men in universities, although men dominated the special institutes. Higher courses were officially recognized as equivalent to a university education in 1911.

During the first decades of the twentieth century women helped maintain the steady expansion of student numbers. As in other areas of life, they proved more than capable of replacing the men who relinquished the university during World War I. Technological warfare also reemphasised the importance of highly trained experts in industrialized economic and military situations. In democratic countries university systems were consolidated, expanded further, or reformed. The totalitarian regimes of the 1930s, however, introduced a different kind of university planning and control. The Soviet Union pioneered serious attempts to introduce the working classes into traditionally noble universities. Initially the country established preparatory courses for workers, but more forceful proletarianization increased working-class representation from about 25 percent of students in 1928 to 58 percent in 1932. The proportion of women also increased from 28 percent in 1927 to 43 percent a decade later. Overall numbers rose spectacularly during the planning years. Total enrollment stood at

176,000 in 1928 and climbed to 508,000 at the end of five years, then slowed to reach 619,000 on the eve of World War II. By contrast, the Nazi regime brought stagnation to the universities, and women's participation particularly declined as restrictions forced them back into the home.

The most dramatic increase of the student population occurred during the second half of the twentieth century, which witnessed a transformation from a still primarily elitist conception of the university toward mass higher education. World War II further emphasized the importance of experts, especially technologists, while affluence and state subsidies brought university education within the reach of a wider range of the population. Student numbers climbed rapidly after the war, then rose exponentially during the 1960s in almost every European country. In Greece numbers rose from 28,302 in 1961 to 53,305 just four years later. In the Netherlands the total of 40,000 students in 1960 jumped to over 100,000 in 1970. Some 17,000 students participated in Swedish university-level education in 1950; 37,000 by 1960; but 125,000 in 1970. Participation rates by 1975 reached over 10 percent of those 20 to 24 years old in many countries and 15 percent to over 20 percent in some. The glaring exception was in Britain, where universities remained essentially elitist. Higher education did expand there in the postwar period, but participation rates climbed slowly to under 9 percent of the age group. Graduation rates, however, were similar to those of other European countries.

Women's representation in Western Europe increased from an average of 25 percent of the student population in the mid-1950s to 30 percent in the 1960s and some 38 percent in 1975. Rates in Eastern Europe were 5 percent to 10 percent higher for each date. Working-class participation, however, remained well below the working-class presence in the population generally. Only the imposed egalitarianism of eastern bloc countries approached representative working-class inclusion, although even there working-class students took a disproportionate number of evening, part-time, and correspondence courses. Three-fifths of Polish students in the 1960s still came from white-collar backgrounds.

In the economic uncertainty of the mid-1970s, the belief that ever-increasing student numbers were necessarily a benefit for either economy or society evaporated. The optimistic assumptions of postwar planners were undermined, and growth rates slowed appreciably. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland student numbers actually declined. Exceptions included Italy and Spain, where university reforms led to large-scale expansion. Economic and political in-

stability combined with frequent educational reform affected national patterns of student recruitment in innumerable, specific ways. Through the 1990s, however, general trends returned to noticeable expansion. European Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries registered increases in enrollment of between 25 percent and 50 percent with extremes of stasis in the Netherlands and over 150 percent increase in Portugal. Even in Britain rapid expansion during the 1990s saw participation rates approach European averages. Concerns for the importance of the knowledge economy once again put a premium on higher education. Women took most advantage of the new opportunities, almost reaching equal representation, and the need to widen participation again became an important issue. Working classes continued in marked underrepresentation among students, but for large sectors of the population higher education approached a common experience.

STUDENT LIFE

Experiences of student life are as varied as students themselves and their particular situations. A poor scholar in a small college is likely to have a different kind of experience from a wealthy young man at a large city university, which will be quite unlike that of a middle-class woman attending a provincial institution. Nevertheless, certain underlying structures shape student life in similar ways. A student's primary occupation is in principle to study. Yet academic work has never constituted the only aspect of student existence, and patterns of study and recreation organized daily life. As university courses became more organized and matriculation required a lengthy period of preparatory schooling, students became more like each other, and variations of experience were less extreme. A fundamental distinction in university structure also had important ramifications for the boundaries of student life. Collegiate-style universities regulated their students strictly. Free universities undertook tuition only, and although not without regulation, their students were at greater liberty to arrange their own affairs.

Early modern universities defined few educational requirements for entrance. Students enrolled when they were ready or were sent and embarked on a course of study with few set parameters besides periodic examinations if they wanted to graduate. The student's academic day routinely was scheduled around a series of lectures, private study sessions, and exercises. Teaching centered on the didactic professorial lecture, although the slow or ambitious might have

supplementary private lessons. Lectures commonly involved repetition from set texts, and exercises were their subsequent regurgitation. College scholars had further supervised study, while free students were left to their own devices at the end of lessons. The timetable continued until the student felt ready to perform the formal oral disputations required for a degree. These were supposed to be rigorous examinations of several hours duration, but indications are that through the period they often degenerated into sham debates. A large proportion of students, however, did not and never intended to graduate.

The increased influence of the aristocracy in universities had important implications for the character of student life. Wealthier students demanded better facilities and cultivated more genteel lifestyles, which further pushed up costs. Italian-style court dress, including, disturbingly, wearing a rapier, replaced the scholar's gown, but the more barbaric customs associated with academic and fraternal rituals also were slightly refined. University authorities feared that attempts by poor students to emulate their betters would be ruinous. In the colleges they might eke out an existence from scholarships or serving their wealthier fellows, but outside they had to negotiate what terms they could from innkeepers and landladies. The common distractions of drinking, gambling, and womanizing could lead to debt, disorder, and disci-

pline from university or town authorities. Students enjoyed various freedoms from normal civic legislation, and riotousness was a frequent problem, especially when highly strung aristocrats with swords were involved. Collegiate institutions became increasingly popular options in attempts to supervise behavior more closely.

While the mendicant scholars of medieval tradition were fast disappearing, students were also becoming more sedentary. Academic peregrination was an important feature of early universities, and a good deal of mobility survived in the sixteenth century. With universities still not numerous, students could travel long distances, often across borders. Students might study at one place but graduate at another or move to study with famous professors. Tolerant universities in northern Italy and the Netherlands attracted Protestant students from central Europe. The wars that racked Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, made travel more hazardous, and religious conflicts made authorities more suspicious of foreign students. In the seventeenth century universities increasingly divided along confessional lines and drew more from national or regional pools.

During the scholastic torpor of the eighteenth century, wealthy students acquired a smattering of education to complete their genteel training. Little serious study was undertaken, and few degrees were

completed. The nineteenth-century reforms that reemphasised learning and knowledge infused the ideal of the student with greater seriousness of purpose. Universities increasingly recruited from preparatory schools, which confirmed the age of entry at late teenage and made matriculation more of an obstacle. Exercises became more common and rigorous, with written examinations replacing oral disputations. Degree courses were shortened to three to five years, and graduation rates rose as degrees offered more secure routes into professional or administrative careers.

The German principles of *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit* (freedom to teach and freedom to learn) gave enormous scope to both professors and students. Seminars and laboratory classes were profound innovations in university teaching, although they could have contradictory implications. At best students could perambulate to different universities to study with acknowledged experts. All too often, however, such opportunities were reserved for the newly emerging postgraduate student, while the rising numbers of undergraduates were taught by overworked junior staff. Among the dominant professional faculties dictatorial lectures remained common to ensure conformity to external requirements. *Lehrfreiheit* also affirmed the right of students to be free from tutelary restrictions, and as more national university systems followed the German model, the collegiate tradition declined again. Although very different in organization, the French university, too, did not see its role as supervising students' lives. The principal exception was in England, where the collegiate system retained a powerful influence. As Oxford and Cambridge colleges were reformed academically from their former, seminary-like existences, the collegiate system was preserved vigorously as central to university education. Even the civic universities, though much closer to the German academic style, still fostered a pastoral concern for student welfare.

Despite the increasingly academic ethos that prevailed throughout the nineteenth century, life beyond the classroom remained fundamental to the student experience. Students always gathered for conviviality, more freely so in the unsupervised free university, where the inn could be literally a home away from home. Societies, clubs, and fraternities were also inevitable, combined by region, social or cultural proclivity, or elitist exclusiveness. Forms of student sociability coalesced around several stereotypes, most spectacularly the German dueling corps. These corps were bound by chivalric codes of honor exercised in ritualistic or seriously harmful sword fighting. Although often on the edge of legality, the German corps were tolerated. French student organizations were so effec-

tively proscribed that communal activity failed to develop during the nineteenth century, and sociability took on bourgeois norms, revolving around café society. By contrast, English universities actively fostered the corporate spirit, especially through team games. The cult of athleticism that swept the English universities in the late nineteenth century began to affect German universities by the end of the century and even extracted some French students from the cafés.

Unsurprisingly women's experiences at universities were somewhat different from their male counterparts'. Women frequently faced hostility, and numbers until the early twentieth century were so few that isolation could be a problem. Many female pioneers were somewhat older than the average student, and significant numbers attended foreign universities. Women students generally, however, tended to go to the nearest university and to live at home, where traditional constraints applied. Where women were in residence, behavior was closely supervised, and women were careful to avoid attracting the faintest scandal. Even so the opportunity to study was commonly a deeply significant life experience. Women formed their own social organizations, which expanded with growing numbers. As the novelty wore off, grudging acceptance among men ultimately gave way to more cordial relations. Observers noted that as the gentleman's club atmosphere was dismantled, male students' conduct improved, but women pioneers sometimes were disappointed by their successors' lack of missionary zeal.

Mass higher education in the twentieth century had profound implications for the nature of student life and the quality of the experience. Being a member of a university community of twenty thousand people presented a different prospect from being one of a few hundred. The diversification of the student population helped broaden student culture and began to break down some of the stereotypes. Many students shouldered adult responsibilities of work, marriages, and families, which could supersede identification as a student. Older students returning to education undermined the notion of a traditional university age group. Correspondance or evening classes, as in the Russian and Polish universities or the British Open University, were essentially an addition to ordinary working life. More institutions allowed students to stay at home, which affected the nature of student communities. Going away from home remained a distinctive feature of English student culture, but in other respects British exceptionalism declined as the university system moved toward mass participation. European universities in turn developed halls of residence and student organizations.

More people had the opportunity to attend a university, but the experiences of mass higher education were often unhappy. While enrollments exploded, facilities frequently did not keep pace, and extra numbers of students were squeezed into an essentially nineteenth-century pattern. Class sizes expanded beyond the capacities of both tutors and physical spaces. Adherence to misplaced ideals of academic autonomy allowed professors to retreat into private research, divorced from the everyday lives of undergraduates, while the junior lecturing staff struggled to cope with the increased numbers of students. Library resources failed to keep pace, as did work spaces and halls of residence. Dissatisfaction with university life was inevitable, leading to high dropout rates, increasingly politicized student movements, and ultimately outbreaks of frustrated violence.

STUDENT MOVEMENTS

Students and disorderliness have long been associated and within limits largely indulged. Disputes between town and gown could cause headaches for civic and university authorities, but students could also pose more serious political threats to the state. While the vast majority of students were readily acculturated to societal norms, concentrations of intelligent and enthusiastic youth free from adult responsibilities could be breeding grounds of radical ideas and movements. For the most part student organizations were founded for purely sociable purposes, but they could develop wider political directions. These were mostly syndicalist, to pursue student interests qua students. Authorities' fears, however, were also regularly vindicated when student movements participated in revolutionary activities. Interest in student movements was heightened by the demonstrations of the 1960s, attracting sociological and psychological as well as historical interpretations.

The early modern university continued the medieval tradition of students forming into nations based on their places of origin. Along with ease of language and custom or mutual support and protection in potentially hostile environments, nations offered some home comforts in a strange place. For similar reasons host states sometimes regarded university nations with equal suspicion. The early modern student, however, stood as an apprentice in the community of scholars, a lowly but integral part of the university establishment who was perhaps less likely to want to overthrow it. A self-aware student consciousness that emerged from the romantic ethos and revolutionary movements of the early nineteenth century meant students

identified more with their peer groups and formed organizations to pursue their own specific interests.

For the most part student organizations were concerned with everyday matters of student welfare. They formed credit and welfare unions to help with finances and accommodations or arranged social events. By the end of the nineteenth century corporate student unions had formed in most universities primarily to help with welfare and social issues but in some countries also to provide a means of communicating student views to the university authorities. National bodies made up of individual university unions organized in the twentieth century, but attempts to coordinate them into an international movement in the interwar period had little success. Internationalist ideals in the postwar period were similarly undermined as divisions reappeared along cold war lines. Student organizations became increasingly politicized in the postwar period. Syndicalist student trade unionism recast students as intellectual workers and demanded the rights of labor organizations, but student movements also acquired a wider political platform.

Nineteenth-century authorities tried to avoid politicization of student organizations. Political student movements arose first in France and Germany, where idealistic students regarded themselves as leaders of the revolutionary tide. In France the restoration government successfully contained them, but in Germany the nationalistic *Burschenschaften* (youth associations) garnered sympathy from others who wanted to see a united Germany. When some students resorted to assassination, the movement was pushed underground, but it reemerged in the revolutionary outbreaks of 1830 and 1848. The Russian student movement engaged in a sixty-year campaign against the autocratic state that spawned serious confrontations in the early and late 1860s and the early 1880s and a strike in 1899 involving some 13,000 students that shut the universities for over a year. In 1905 students held mass revolutionary rallies at St. Petersburg University. Nationalistic student movements operated in Poland and the Balkans by the late nineteenth century.

Interpretations of these movements has spanned the historical and sociological spectrum. Particularly interesting is the question of generational conflict. Lewis Feuer in *The Conflict of Generations* (1969) argued that student movements include a revolt against the perceived failures of their fathers' generation. The interpretation is difficult to establish historically, and student movements rarely had wider generational support, requiring the addition of more prosaic cultural and socioeconomic factors. In Germany in the 1830s

and 1840s universities experienced professional overcrowding, which eased in mid-century with the onset of industrialization, in time with the rise and fall of student disturbances. Russian students in the late 1850s reform period saw themselves as the leaders of national regeneration and opposition to state autocracy, and this ideology was reinforced in subsequent cohorts as the established student culture.

In the late 1960s universities around the world were rocked by outbursts of student protest. Virtually every Western European country was affected, most significantly France, where demonstrations in 1968 led to a general strike and an election. Violence continued in Italy into the 1970s but was much more muted in Britain and the Netherlands. Unrest in Western countries combined specific student grievances with global political concerns. Conditions for students had declined with the rapid movement to mass higher education. Classes were crowded, professors were distant, and facilities were overburdened, while the graduate job market was increasingly competitive. Students brought up in the permissive 1960s chafed against seemingly authoritarian regulations and restrictions. In a pattern that recapitulated nineteenth-century conflict, a protest about student

matters that met with overt force commonly triggered much larger and more violent demonstrations combined with wider economic, environmental, or political concerns, to which some commentators have added generational angst. Several countries responded by revising their university systems to allow greater rights and freedoms for students, including representation on governing bodies.

Eastern Europe also experienced outbreaks of unrest, noticeably Czechoslovakia. In Spain student protests carried major political implications. To many in these countries the grievances of Western students appeared trivial. For them universities and student bodies offered rare platforms for political opposition to authoritarian regimes, which could be viciously suppressed, as in Hungary. In general campuses calmed down in the late twentieth century, but at the beginning of the new millennium students around the world, including in parts of Europe such as the Balkans, continued to lead the opposition to repressive or one-party states. The combination of intelligence, energy, and idealism that is the hallmark of students provided a fundamentally important wellspring of change in the modern period. The outcomes can never be entirely controlled.

See also Student Movements (in this volume); Gender and Education (volume 4); Higher Education (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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ARTISTS



Alexander Varias

Artists have occupied a unique position in European civilizations. As conveyors of the perceived truths, ideals, and values of their societies, they stand among the elites yet rarely attain positions of political or economic power. They either hold people in awe with their skill and genius or gain contempt through eccentrically expressed visions conveyed in oral poetry, written script, stone, metal, pigments, or music.

THE RENAISSANCE

In the ancient and medieval worlds, artistic creation was attached to civic and religious architecture, whether in a temple, an assembly hall, a cathedral, or a stock exchange. Even so prominent a contributor to Italian Renaissance art as Giotto created his greatest works for churches, like the Arena Chapel in Padua or the Church of St. Francis in Assisi. During the medieval era, artists were also customarily regarded as craftspeople in terms of their social status. The situation changed during the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, especially in Florence, when artists emerged as individuals uniquely expressing visions of genius and creating works that could stand apart from architectural structures. While medieval artists' names are obscure, the names of Renaissance artists are familiar. To account for this change, Jacob Burckhardt, the prominent nineteenth-century historian who originated the concept of the Italian Renaissance, underscored the central importance of individual fame to Quattrocento and Cinquecento Italy (fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italy). Artists perceived themselves as great individuals, and they were encouraged by public adulation to do so. Giorgio Vasari, the originator of art history, went so far as to refer to Michelangelo as "divine" (Goldwater and Treves, 1945, p. 98). A survey of names associated with the Italian Renaissance seems to confirm such a shift in status: Giotto, Masaccio, Sandro Botticelli, Donatello, Leon Battista Alberti, and Leonardo da Vinci to name but a few.

At the same time the perception of aesthetic works and the nature of artistic genius, ambition, and freedom experienced transformations. Artists viewed freedom as a necessary condition for the execution of their greatest works. While Renaissance art broke from medieval traditions in emphasizing bodily bulk, three-dimensionality, and a general sense of realism, particular artists diverged in style. Masaccio emphasized massive bodies and projected shadows in a setting dominated by perspective, as seen in his great frescoes in the Brancacci Chapel of Santa Maria del Carmine in Florence. Andrea Mantegna and Domenico Ghirlandajo followed the rules of perspective while using color and composition in individual, recognizable manners. Filippo Brunelleschi formalized the preconceptions behind the new approach to painting in a scientific theory describing the visual perception of objects placed in varying degrees of distance from an imaginary observer. His theory became the strict rule for three-dimensional realism to which painters had to adhere for at least the next four centuries.

Botticelli and Fra Filippo Lippi gave their works a harder edge in the *cruda e secca* (dry) style with pronounced lines as described by Vasari. Vasari seemed fonder of Leonardo's use of subtle shadows and toning to create a smoky ambience summed up as *chiaroscuro* (light-dark).

Yet Renaissance artists participated in a common reverence for antiquity and nature. Erwin Panofsky explained the differences between the Italian Renaissance and earlier, minor "renascences" through the expanded historical consciousness of the fifteenth century, which caused contemporaries to view antiquity as a lost world whose pagan gods were no longer threatening to Christianity. Along with this came a newfound reverence for nature. Leonardo deemed painting "the sole imitator of all the visible works of nature" (Goldwater and Treves, 1945, p. 48), and Vasari, of a similar mentality, believed that "design cannot have a good origin if it has not come from continual practice in copying natural objects" (Goldwater and Treves, 1945, p. 95).



PERSPECTIVE

As artists sought to induce a picture-window effect of three-dimensionality during the Renaissance, they concentrated painterly methods on the development of perspective. The technique consisted of utilizing a series of diagonal lines, as part of the side angles of an object or scene, to draw the viewer into an imagined distance. It was as if the observer were seated before a window and looking through it.

Perspective was developed through a series of innovations. Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Italian artists like Giotto, Cimabue, and Duccio concentrated on the side angles of thrones on which the Madonna with child was seated—a scene inherited from Byzantine panels, but now imbued with more three-dimensional realism. Nevertheless, the perspective was limited and so offered a dissonant scale. During the fifteenth century, artists in Florence especially made additional strides in enhancing the sensation of “proper” perspective. Masaccio, Andrea Mantegna, and others clarified vision within the framework of one-point perspective in which people, objects, and landscapes were depicted in a visual space leading to a single vanishing point in the distance. Masaccio’s canvases also revealed an understanding that objects closer to the viewer were seen with greater clarity while those in the distance seemed vaguer in outline. Rendering atmospheric effects by means of shadows and other gimmicks thus complemented the effect.

Leon Battista Alberti, the great Renaissance architect, summarized the principles of perspective in his treatise, *Della pittura* (1436; On painting). The development of modern art during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries involved the dismantling of perspective in favor of more abstract painterly concerns.

Artists’ expanded sense of freedom collided with a counterdependence on wealthy and prestigious individuals who alone could commission their works. It was obvious, after all, that artists needed monetary and other forms of support to create their works. In the process they encountered the enhanced fame and power of great families in Florence like the Medicis, the Strozzi, and others who patronized artists. In fact artistic patronage in Florence, Siena, Rome, Venice, and other centers became a new claim to fame for

bankers, merchants, and politicians already pushing themselves onto the public stage of recognition. So much dependence upon powerful patrons could only conflict with artists’ growing sense of absolute creative freedom.

The influence and power of patrons was so pronounced that Renaissance artists often had to paint subjects dictated to them by their patrons. In one instance, in 1457 Fra Filippo Lippi painted a work according to the careful instructions of Giovanni di Cosimo de’ Medici, who wanted to give the painting to King Alfonso V of Naples (Baxandall, 1988, p. 3). One of the most famous Renaissance works, *La Primavera* (c. 1478) by Botticelli, concerned a Neoplatonic theme emphasized by the famous thinker Marsilio Ficino and was intended to instruct allegorically and pictorially Lorenzo de’ Medici’s second cousin in the philosophy and art of *humanitas* (Gombrich, 1978).

Subjects attached to Christianity, Christian saints, and biblical stories were still as dominant as they had been during the Middle Ages. Yet Renaissance art also included mythological scenes derived from ancient literature, portraits of prominent social figures, historical scenes, and still lifes.

Changes in the physical locations of works of art also underlined contemporary values revolving around artistic purpose. Previously sculpture or painting was attached directly to architectural edifices or common objects like vases. Phidias’s great sculptured frieze was part of the Parthenon of Athens. Gislebertus’s sculpture depicted Last Judgment scenes on the tympanum over the central entrance of the French Romanesque cathedral in Autun. The stained glass windows of Chartres Cathedral presented scenes from the Old and New Testaments in Gothic form. Such works, designed for public display, were civic and religious in nature and evoked town pride. How different it was for individuals to commission artistic works for display in a Renaissance villa or palazzo, where they could amuse visitors or provide educational lessons to members of the patronizing family. In addition, small objects can be moved, be sold, be purchased, be stolen, be expropriated, or disappear under historical circumstances. While sculptural friezes and remnants of temples have been moved to museums, such as the sculptures from Pergamum that were transferred to Berlin, generally the more miniature the scale of the work, the easier its displacement—a reality conducive to the later creation of museums.

Eventually other figures besides heads of powerful commercial and financial families offered patronage. Pope Julius II commissioned key works by Michelangelo in the Sistine Chapel and Raphael San-

zio in the papal rooms within the Vatican. Artists north of the Alps during the fifteenth century benefited from monarchical patronage. For instance, Jan van Eyck was supported by John of Holland, count of Holland, between 1422 and 1425 and Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy, from 1425 to 1441.

THE AGE OF THE BAROQUE

Heinrich Wölfflin, in *Principles of Art History* (1932), viewed the history of the early modern artistic period as corresponding to classical Renaissance art and Baroque art. Wölfflin distinguished the two by the closed style of the former and the open, loose form of the latter. Scholars adopted this schema, which became a traditional heritage that students scrutinized in their professional devotion. Wölfflin neglected the Mannerist movement of Italian painters, who radically rejected Renaissance stability, calm, and studied realism and developed a predilection for eccentric composition, bizarre body positions, and frenzied emotional states. Parmigianino, Bronzino, and Il Rosso were among Mannerist artists whose eccentricity defied the popular taste for standard Renaissance formulas and styles.

During the Counter-Reformation the prominent sculptor Gian Bernini produced Baroque works with dramatic swirling, twisting forms. Attracting the patronage of the papacy, Bernini and his school of sculptors were commissioned to create statues for the interior and the outside colonnade of the new St. Peter's.

The royal and aristocratic figures in France backed works by Leonardo da Vinci and others. Indeed, political leaders established a tie between state and religious power and monumental art. Marie de Médicis continued this trend when she hired Peter Paul Rubens to decorate a prominent room in the palace that eventually became the Louvre museum in Paris. At its most dramatic, art embellished the royal persona of the Sun King, Louis XIV, and his new residence at Versailles, the most famous of Baroque palaces.

The seventeenth-century Baroque Age produced the sculptural and architectural forms in Versailles, the landscape of Le Nôtre gardens at Versailles, and the immense scale of sculptural decoration in St. Peter's, the most grandiose forms of state and church patronage. In this obvious equation between art and power in European society, art was specifically intended to overwhelm observers with the majesty of the patron who made it possible.

Rubens and Bernini were conscious of their dependence upon powerful political figures and were proud of the social status they achieved through con-

nections with the world of the elite. Nevertheless, patronage and commissions did not always work out satisfactorily, as in the case of Caravaggio. The artist's unusual angles, theatrical lighting, and intense naturalism made his patrons uncomfortable, though he intended for his works like *The Supper at Emmaus* (c. 1598) and *Entombment* (1603–1604) to support the Catholic Church's positions and dogmas during the turbulent era of the Counter-Reformation. It did not help that Caravaggio also was accused of murder and led a socially scandalous life.

A number of artists of the time carried out their works in less public circumstances, forcibly or voluntarily pursuing independent artistic paths. The context of Protestant culture in Holland made such a disjuncture with the past especially stark, affecting artists' social connections. Among the artists in this situation were Frans Hals, Jan Vermeer, Judith Leyster, Rembrandt, and Jacob van Ruisdael, who continued the technique of capturing light that emanated from a single source. Following Caravaggio's lead, Hals, Vermeer, and Leyster represented the trail of an external light source illuminating an interior. While Hals and Leyster developed a more impressionistic style, Vermeer painted with a detailed, near-photographic quality. In his later works Rembrandt imbued his subjects with an aura-like light projecting outward from the body, unlike an external spotlight. Rembrandt's light envelops his subjects mysteriously and mystically. In Dutch genre painting of landscapes, still lifes, and scenes of gathered town burghers, everyday subjects became popular. Historians scrutinize works like Rembrandt's *The Nightwatch* (1642), Vermeer's *Young Woman with Water Jug* (c. 1660), and Ruisdael's landscapes with an eye to the cultural and social transformations in historical material life.

These artists' creative efforts did not reap the support and security patrons gave to other artists, but they were at more liberty to portray accurately the Dutch society in which they lived. Leyster's career as a painter reflects how rarely women were able to pursue artistic endeavors in European civilization. A student of Hals, Leyster married another contemporary artist, Jan Miense Moenaer. While she did not paint much in the last several decades of her life, her early still lifes and portraits achieved some renown, and Leyster was considered a precocious outsider to the world of art. With few exceptions, such as Hildegard von Bingen, artistic callings were restricted to men, and women who desired to paint, sculpt, design buildings, compose music, or write faced many obstacles. Leyster and the Renaissance writer Christine de Pisan paved the way for women's eventual aesthetic expression.

SECTION 10: SOCIAL STRUCTURE

ENLIGHTENMENT AND REVOLUTION

During the eighteenth century, transformations in the position and status of artists unfolded in a dual manner. In the Age of Enlightenment artists both sought support from patrons and authorities and assumed a growing role as social critics of the latter. Philosophes revealed how intellectuals could foster important relationships with monarchs and yet be outspoken socially. For example, Voltaire established a close connection with Frederick the Great of Prussia but remained an outcast in France for criticizing the Old Regime on the Continent. That course was also evi-

dent among painters, sculptors, poets, and musicians, including Mozart and Antonio Salieri, who both sought support from the Habsburgs of Vienna.

France under Louis XV was highlighted not only by the Enlightenment but by Rococo art, as in the works of Jean-Antoine Watteau, François Boucher, and Jean-Honoré Fragonard. While the Rococo style has been mocked as frivolous and overly ornamental, surpassing the Baroque in swirling designs and fleshiness by exponents of ten, its artists also conveyed many social observations. Boucher's works depict the apparently ultrasexualized atmosphere of Louis XV's inner circle, as in the scandalously erotic

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images of Mme. de Pompadour and Mlle. Murphy, and a world of hedonistic and epicurean pleasures matching the range of colors in the rainbow. Fragonard's *The Swing* (c. 1768) is a toned down but still vigorous portrayal of the aristocratic lifestyle of the era. Watteau's works express more elegiac and wistful visions of society with both critical representations of contemporary upper-class mores and reflections of popular life. Watteau's *The Embarkation for Cythera* (1717) and *Gilles, the Jester* (c. 1718) in particular provide social perspective through the decorative Rococo lens.

The eighteenth century also witnessed the dominance of Salons as the state-sponsored, official exhibition centers of paintings for the popular audience. Salons were artists' only means of reaching that audience and offered the possibility of bypassing patrons. The philosophe Denis Diderot, who wrote criticisms of works exhibited in eighteenth-century Salons, particularly praised the moralistic works of Jean-Baptiste Greuze and, seemingly sounding an alarming note, vigorously defended artistic independence.

Diderot may have been looking into the future. The last two decades of the eighteenth century were a critical point at which painting and political statement converged, in other words the period when the French Revolution was in the making. Jacques-Louis David's artistic career most reflected this convergence. His work developed from subtle, insinuating critiques of the ancien régime, as in *The Oath of the Horatii* (1784), to open statements of propaganda extolling the political events of the day. In several instances David resorted to outright heroic idolization of revolutionary figures, as in *The Death of Marat* (1793). David's works reflect the emergence of Neoclassicism as an artistic, painterly style. Architecturally Neoclassicism updated and synthesized ancient Greek and Roman forms, such as columns, pediments, entablatures, arches, and domes. Perhaps the most famous Neoclassical structures are the Panthéon in Paris and Thomas Jefferson's villa "Monticello," both of which seem to sum up the contemporary belief in reason and clarity.

In painting Neoclassicism rejected both the Baroque and the Rococo and adopted tighter brush strokes and a more formal, often austere style. Ancient life, particularly that of the Romans, was a common subject for Neoclassical artists, who selected key moments of ancient history or mythology as subjects to provide moral commentaries on contemporary mores and authority. Thus David's *The Oath of the Horatii* extolls Roman republican virtues, while his *Lictors Bringing Brutus the Bodies of His Sons* (1789) praises

the assassins of caesars. As an enthusiastic participant in the French Revolution, David viewed

the arts in the light of all those factors by which they should help to spread the progress of the human spirit, and to propagate and transmit to posterity the striking examples of the efforts of a tremendous people who, guided by reason and philosophy, are bringing back to earth the reign of liberty, equality, and law. (Goldwater and Treves, 1945, p. 205)

In the light of Robespierre's Reign of Terror, the commitment of French revolutionary leaders to the rule of law may be questioned. David's career, however, seems an artistic chronicle of the Revolution. He depicted many key events of the upheaval, such as the Tennis Court Oath of 1789, ritual death by guillotine, and the deaths of key revolutionaries like Marat. David's greatest painting presents Marat as a martyr, murdered in his bath by a political foe, Charlotte Corday, a letter from whom remains in Marat's hand. A strong line dividing light from shadow adds a theatrical effect to the scene. Surviving the dictatorships by Robespierre and Napoleon Bonaparte, David proved as adept at transforming his image as Talleyrand and adapted politically from one regime to another. Not surprisingly David depicted Napoleon as an emperor crowned in glory, which contravened his depiction of the heroic, tragic Brutus, who would have placed the achievements of Bonaparte alongside those of Julius Caesar.

ROMANTICISM

During the same era artists used their work openly to attack acts of political oppression. Francisco Goya explicitly and graphically portrayed the acts of murder and injustice committed by Napoleon's troops during the French occupation of Spain. Goya's monumental *Third of May* captures the gesture of a local villager about to be gunned down by troops. He adopted the Romantic style, rejecting the more calculated and restrained Neoclassical style he considered no longer appropriate to the age. The increased tone of passion and the strong color and brushwork accompanied a marked intensification of the artist's unique individualism. Goya's individualism was especially heightened in macabre works of his "black period," like *The Pilgrims* and *Saturn Devouring His Children* (1821–1823), depicting morbid and violent scenes caught in a ghostly atmosphere of fear, mystery, and gloom.

The work of Théodore Géricault exhibits a similar Romantic trend. His *Raft of the Medusa* (1819) represents survivors of a shipwreck stretched out or standing, desperately adrift on a fragile raft, facing a threatening sea and sky. Several among them wave to

a distant ship, the outline of which can barely be made out on the horizon. This scene, based on a historical episode, presents Romantic drama at its highest. Géricault in his short career also created paintings of the insane and in his collective work captured the general Romantic reverence of the awesome, the sublime, and the grotesque. At various levels those characteristics describe paintings of Goya, Caspar Friedrich, and Eugène Delacroix and the music of Beethoven and Hector Berlioz. In another vein J. M. W. Turner used intense color schemes and loosely applied brushstrokes to convey a Romantic reverence for the sea that influenced the Impressionists.

The career of Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres seemingly indicates a return to art blessed by the academy. In fact, Ingres's works are filled with eroticism and Romantic expressions of individuality. The tendency for artists to pursue their craft beyond the confines of the Salons and through defiance of conventional expectations was still in motion, as evidenced by Gustave Courbet, who provoked unprecedented outrage and contempt from critics. Alexandre Dumas the younger wrote a notorious diatribe:

From what fabulous crossing of a slug with a peacock, from what genital antitheses, from what sebaceous oozing can have been generated . . . this thing called M. Gustave Courbet? . . . With the help of what manure, as a result of what mixture of wine, beer, corrosive mucus and flatulent oedema can have grown this sonorous and hairy pumpkin, this aesthetic belly, this imbecilic and impotent incarnation of the Self? (Clark, 1973, p. 23)

Courbet's works departed from the subject matter and style of Romanticism. Although his individualism reflected the "Romantic rebellion," he was among the first painters to create in the Realist manner and to focus on subjects considered neither important nor attractive. This inclination had a disruptive effect on the public, and Meyer Schapiro noted (in *Modern Art*) Courbet's revolutionary role in connecting avant-garde aesthetics with political concerns.

Courbet's rustic, peasant manner was at odds with bourgeois ideas of correct behavior. Although he did not rival Gérard de Nerval's eccentric behavior traits, such as walking a pet lobster on a leash, Courbet exhibited an unpolished Rousseau-like manner that widened the divide between new artists and the bourgeois public. This divide was most emphasized by the Bohemians, who cultivated a lifestyle and a manner of expression intended to bewilder the bourgeoisie. The eventual Bohemian slogan, *épater les bourgeois* (scorn the bourgeoisie), inspired followers throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century. In Paris Bohemians congregated in select areas, at first



AVANT-GARDE

The changes from romanticism to realism to impressionism and on to other movements in modern art involved not only revolutionary styles and subject matter. Enmeshed within the entire process that originated in France was a stark confrontation between the artists and the art audience. Official exhibition galleries and salons became the center for a clash revolving around visual expectations.

By and large, the audience was made up of the bourgeoisie, which carried to the gallery demands for heroic and official subjects executed through proper finish and idealized and realistic at the same time. Rebellious artists like Gustave Courbet and Édouard Monet and those who came after them insisted on less accepted subjects and styles that did not fit the conventional formula. The response to their work from audiences and critics was often scathingly hostile. Yet they persisted. The ensuing battle of tastes and temperaments reflected their adamancy, and the term "avant-garde" denotes the near military devotion they brought both to their work and to their confrontation with hostile critics.

As painting became abstract and further removed from familiar patterns, the contrast between artistic trends satisfying to the larger public world and the ambitions of the avant-garde grew ever more pronounced until familiarity and the market transformed the situation by the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, countless instances of bafflement and anger expressed toward an unusual work or art continue to be found. Frequently, such art is assumed to be "avant-garde"—an interpretation that underlines how much of modern art has assumed the presence of an artistic elite consciously marching to the intrinsic demands of the work of art, which they feel alone in being able to formulate.

centered around the Latin Quarter and during the last two decades of the century around the newly incorporated district of Montmartre, known also as "La Butte" (the Hill). By the end of the nineteenth century the two centers of Bohemian activity were distinguished as polar opposites. Latin Quarter Bohemians were considered more intellectual, a trait perhaps derived from the presence in that district of the Sorbonne. Montmartre's Bohemians were, in contrast,

more outrageous in behavior and were associated with new sexual mores, exotic dance and music, and the supernatural. (See Varias, 1996, pp. 20–40, for further discussion of the contrasting ambience of Parisian Bohemian quarters.) At all times they invited and received contempt from the middle class and prided themselves on their great social distance from official Paris. Ironically, Bohemians tended to be from the middle class or bourgeoisie, and their individualistic revolt perhaps is explained by family conflicts.

MANET AND THE IMPRESSIONISTS

Courbet's defiance of academic, historical standards inspired upcoming artists to adopt similar individualistic stands and to paint as they wished. Patricia

Mainardi studied the decline of the Salon and in *The End of the Salon* (1993) connected that reality to other social and economic problems. During the Second Empire of Napoleon III and the first decades of the Third Republic, Édouard Manet and the Impressionists set about obviating the authoritative position of the Salons. They chose subjects from contemporary French society and used the style and colors they deemed most appropriate to that world. Causing as much outrage and offense as did Courbet's *The Burial at Ornans* (1850), Manet's *Le déjeuner sur l'herbe* (1863) and *Olympia* (1863) were considered sexually provocative, banal, and harsh all at the same time. Manet's male subjects frequently were dandies with top hats, black coats, and cravats. The center of Parisian aesthetic life immortalized in the poetry and

criticism of Charles Baudelaire, these men frolicked around the streets of Paris as *flâneurs* (drifters). The ethos of dandies included a deliberate flaunting of the self and an obliviousness to public moral standards. For Baudelaire and other dandies, the use of hashish was part and parcel of a growing rebellion among aesthetes aiming to transcend life's mundane concerns. Eventually a conservative reaction became just as commonplace after the disillusionment of the 1848 Revolution.

While Manet's use of flat forms and colors received critical, caustic rebukes, the casual attitudes toward prostitution and sexuality suggested by *Olympia* and *Le déjeuner sur l'herbe* especially conflicted with the posture of moral uprightness assumed by bourgeois men yet belied by their conduct. Manet's later works, such as *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* (1882), depict the new cafés and cabarets of the boulevards in the Paris rebuilt by Napoleon III, his planner Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann, and their architects. In the new city interaction among the various social classes increased, and moral standards relaxed, which to conservatives suggested decadence or what the sociologist Émile Durkheim later called "anomie" (social instability).

Manet's relation to the Impressionists is ambiguous. He was a fellow artistic rebel and influence but not a coexhibitor. In fact the Impressionists wished to continue and surpass Manet's stylistic revolution. For the most part the Impressionists' work was refused exhibit space at the Salons, so they formed a *Salon des Refusés* (Exhibition of the refused). Camille Pissarro, Alfred Sisley, Claude Monet, Pierre-Auguste Renoir, and Mary Cassatt captured the true character of color as affected by light at different times of the day. As they followed what they considered a scientific pursuit, the artists, scornfully called "Impressionists" by hostile critics, applied loose and broad brushstrokes, forcing audiences to decipher a scene by stepping back from the canvas. Impressionist works represent purely natural settings, as in Monet's *Impression, Sunrise* (1872), from which the artists obtained their name, and Pissarro's *View of Pontoise* (1868), and scenes of leisure and social life, as in Renoir's *Le moulin de la Galette* (1876) and Monet's *Argenteuil Basin* (1872). These canvases center on brightly illuminated scenes and show the reflection and cascade of colors caused by sunlight on fog-enveloped riverbanks or on snow-covered villages. Cassatt's domestic scenes of mothers with infants also employ the Impressionist method. Cassatt's work and that of Berthe Morisot are important examples of women's contributions to artistic movements. In addition, Camille Claudel, the unhappy mistress and student of Auguste Rodin, is

counted among the most creative and innovative nineteenth-century sculptors. As they defied the public's taste for familiar "uplifting," "idealized," and "finished" works, these artists created an artistic avant-garde that identified itself by its dedication to "higher" aesthetic standards.

Along with the striking style, the social settings and situations depicted in Impressionist works also stand out. Impressionists delighted in the gaiety and color in gatherings of people at leisure. Broad vistas of street life provided momentary glimpses of crowds. Impressionism focused on transitory views of the fragile natural world, whose never-repeating forms depend on the season, the time, the day, and the weather. Yet the concern for the momentary also centered around views of the social world. During the later part of his career, Pissarro sat behind windows in rooms several floors above street level, viewing the diverse patterns of people meandering through the streets and boulevards of Paris or the marketplace in Rouen. His excitement in painting such a scene was evident in a letter he wrote to his son Lucien from Rouen on 26 February 1896:

I have effects of fog and mist, of rain, of the setting sun and of grey weather, motifs of bridges seen from every angle, quays with boats; but what interests me especially is a motif of the iron bridge in the wet, with much traffic, carriages, pedestrians, workers on the quays, boats, smoke, mist in the distance, the whole scene fraught with animation and life. . . . Just conceive for yourself: the whole of old Rouen seen from above the roofs, with the Cathedral, St. Ouen's Church, and the fantastic roofs, really amazing turrets. . . . It is extraordinary. (Varias, 1996, p. 157)

Pissarro wrote letters to a variety of acquaintances, including his children, fellow artists, and political subversives, in which he expressed his artistic sentiments. The artist was born on St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands, descended from Jewish Portuguese parents. While at the heart of the Impressionist revolt in painting, he was also deeply involved in the French anarchist movement during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. His commitment derived from early sympathies with the grievances of the downtrodden, whose plight he had witnessed during his first stay in Paris in 1847, the year before the outbreak of a revolution. Pissarro's political and social consciousness grew during the years, especially after the cataclysmic Paris Commune of 1871.

POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Other political movements had certainly elicited artistic engagement. French revolutionary sentiments

strongly attracted David. Goya angrily gave visual expression to his sense of outrage at the injustices inflicted by Napoleon's troops on the Spanish people. Delacroix depicted events during the Greek War of Independence in his devotion to universal justice and ideals. Nationalism and socialism also attracted artists' contributions. Nevertheless, anarchism uniquely enticed artists' enthusiastic involvement in its vocal defense of complete individual freedom. When Mikhail Bakunin and other libertarians broke with Karl Marx at the meeting of the International Workingmen's As-

sociation held in London in 1864, they complained about the Marxists' exclusive concern for the industrial proletariat and their addiction to state power. In contrast, anarchists were determined to destroy the state forever. Anarchism appealed to political rebels, who distrusted the state, but it also drew many artists, who vowed to further the Romantic goal of individual creativity and to reject all attempts to confine expression within certain preordained paths.

Anarchism particularly appealed to Pissarro in that, unlike Marxism, it held a positive role for peas-

ants and artisans. Painters such as Pissarro, who depicted rural landscape scenes and admired peasants as a natural part of that charming world, found inspiration in peasants. It was, therefore, natural for Pissarro and other artists to portray scenes deemed proper to anarchist ideology, that is, social injustice, revolt, and rural settings. At times they stressed those subjects on canvas; at other times they gave their services to anarchist journals and newspapers in an attempt to reach a wider audience among the discontented masses.

An idealistic formula for freedom and justice, anarchism was also a movement driven by a variety of goals, including a vague sense of a larger communal purpose in which free individuals played key parts. Anarchist leaders envisioned artistic images as politically useful efforts to communicate the movement's ideas and aims to the people. As such messages were considered more successful when they were simple and direct, the line between free expression and propagandistic dictates grew thin. Pissarro found himself at the center of a conflict pitting politically engaged avant-garde artists dedicated to unhindered art against editors and other leaders desiring certain themes conveyed in particular styles. In the clash between political concerns and aesthetic ends, anarchist leaders viewed art as a major propaganda vehicle on the same footing with pamphlets and meetings.

This struggle was difficult for Pissarro, who seemed equally committed to both art and the anarchistic social ideal. While he wished to contribute to the spread of anarchism, he balked at calls from anarchists like Peter Kropotkin for subjects stressing work, revolt, and social justice. Anarchist leaders generally pushed artists toward a style that was accessible to the masses, generally realistic, and uncomplicated by the standards of the avant-garde. Pissarro believed that artists were in danger of losing their separate status if they were absorbed into the surrounding society and viewed simply as other workers. He wrote, "Let us be artists first" (Varias, 1996, p. 135). Lucien Pissarro wrote, "Every . . . work of art is social . . . because he who has produced it makes fellow men share the most passionate and purest emotion which he has felt before the sights of nature" (Varias, 1996, p. 136). Paul Signac, another anarchist and painter, viewed his own political activism as an expression of his individual character but not a mandate for painting in a particular manner.

By the 1880s Pissarro, Signac, and Georges Seurat created Neoimpressionist or Pointillist works, which continued experiments in color and light but reduced the size of brushstrokes to tiny points of paint. At that time Paul Gauguin and Vincent van

Gogh expressed inner states of feeling and psychic sensations using intense colors and unconventional compositions. Paul Cézanne, while maintaining the use of Impressionist color schemes, tightened his brushstrokes to create compact geometric planes. Cézanne achieved an unnatural appearance that seemed to defy the law of gravity and the truths of perspective that had stood behind Western painting since the Renaissance. These artists, although challenging the conventional perceptions of nature, believed that they expressed nature's deepest levels of reality and furthered the avant-garde's alienation from official and popular taste.

During the first years of the twentieth century, Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque, gaining impetus from Cézanne's canvases, depicted still lifes in the fragmented, multiperspective style known as Cubism. Roger Shattuck in *The Banquet Years* (1968) related Cubism to the cultural forms of the twentieth century in its emphasis on abrupt juxtaposition. In Cubist works the avant-garde artists followed their own artistic inclinations rather than the seemingly iron laws of nature. Henri Matisse's Fauvist works, which unleashed color and line in even more striking ways, followed suit. A newly invigorated interest in the primitive also was seen both in Picasso's and Matisse's works and the later sculpture of Amadeo Modigliani, who became known more for his colorful, highly stylized erotic paintings of nude women in a long Italian tradition of painterly focus.

Artists felt that their modernistic works were more in keeping with the true character of nature. Nevertheless, any suggestion that they were breaking from the conventional sense of reality and bewildering the art audience would have been met with a shrug of the shoulders. Artists had embarked on their own subjective course and were attempting to reach positions that most people could not comprehend. The public would just have to catch up to them. Other movements took shape, such as Expressionism in Germany and Austria, influenced by the pathbreaking works of van Gogh and the color of Matisse. In Austria *jugendstil* (young style) attracted the new generation of artists, including Oskar Kokoschka, and a clash of values and tastes was unleashed. By 1912 the new styles crossed the Atlantic and were displayed in the Armory Show in New York City that made Alfred Stieglitz and Georgia O'Keeffe American avant-garde personalities. In all cases the aesthetic revolution seemingly was promoted by youth, isolated individuals, an enclosed avant-garde, and Bohemians, who were to some degree or another combined in an unstable unit but who always challenged familiar notions of reality.

WORLD WAR I AND AFTER

Europeans experienced World War I between 1914 and 1918, and a series of revolutionary movements erupted in Russia and eastern and central Europe toward the war's conclusion. As Bolshevism became established in Russia and related Socialist movements nearly succeeded in Germany, the questions asked during the anarchist-artist convergence in *fin de siècle* (end of the century) France resurfaced, albeit in a different vein. These questions again revolved around the link between art and politics.

In 1917 the outbreak of the revolution in Russia brought initial euphoria, even among anarchists. During the early 1920s a number of artists converged on Russia and attempted to create avant-garde movements rooted in the novel ideals and aspirations of the revolution. While French and German influences abounded, a particularly Russian movement, Constructivism, emerged under the influence of Vladimir Tatlin, whose enormous metallic, abstract tower statue was never completed. Constructivists aspired to merge the abstract principles of the avant-garde with the technology of the machine age. Even such an apparently revolutionary movement proved too much for

the Bolshevik elite, which viewed social realist art as more readily able to communicate simple, concrete messages to the masses. By the end of the decade avant-garde artists were exiting the Soviet Union in search of aesthetic freedom in western Europe or the United States. The filmmaker Sergey Eisenstein, himself director of the pro-Bolshevik films *Potemkin* (1925) and *October* (1928), found the climate under Joseph Stalin inhospitable.

In other areas of Europe the convergence of artistic goals with political and social goals was equally evident. Before the war and the Fascist takeover of power, the Italian Futurists Umberto Boccioni, Filippo Marinetti, and Giacomo Balla created canvases that positively conveyed the dynamism of cars, airplanes, city streets, and the general excitement of the machine age. The human body itself was portrayed as a machine in motion, as in Boccioni's metallic statue *Dynamism of a Soccer Player in Motion* (1913). The Futurist style was influenced by Cubism, parallel efforts by Marcel Duchamp, and the bright, vibrant colors of Fauvism and Expressionism. Futurists heightened their revolutionary position by glorifying war, revolution, and even the destruction of museums where traditional works of art were displayed. On the

latter point they shared a position with the Dadaists. However, the Dadaists rejected traditional culture out of a hatred for a civilization that had caused such universal destruction during World War I. Duchamp's own Dadaist inclinations led him to offer a urinal as a piece of sculpture and two renderings of the *Mona Lisa*, one with a mustache called *LHOOQ* (1919) and the other without a mustache called *Rasée*. In both instances he relished the chance to mock the public's reverential view of art. While Dadaists tended to be indifferent to politics, Futurists found Benito Mussolini's Fascist regime conveniently willing to employ their aesthetic devices in reshaping Italian society.

Expressionism and other abstract currents circulated throughout Weimar Germany both before and after the war. From the war years on Käthe Kollwitz combined modernism with a needed dose of humanism and compassion in works that depicted the horrors and pathos of war. Her work emphasized a pacifistic message that she continued to convey throughout her life, even as she experienced the trauma of the Second World War.

Weimar artists, notably the painters Ernst Kirchner and Emil Nolde, also used bright colors and simplified forms to suggest emotional states of exhilaration or disturbance. Wassily Kandinsky, reaching the logical conclusion of this development, painted works of complete abstraction, sprawling fields of color entitled as such. In sculpture Ernst Barlach paralleled those simple compositions, although the Romanian sculptor Constantin Brancusi led the progress toward abstraction.

The practical arts were also affected by the desire for change. The German Bauhaus school widened the divide between the avant-garde and public expectations regarding artistic form and visual appearance. In this case, however, the conflict revolved around the question of whether the shapes and materials of the industrial world were appropriate for high artistic status. In his Bauhaus school Walter Gropius envisioned a revolution in architecture, furniture, and interior design that would utilize the lines and materials of industry. As did Futurists, Dadaists, and Surrealists, he advocated the elimination of traditional materials. Influenced by tastes in the United States, Gropius designed buildings from which all ornaments were removed and in which the exterior and interior reflected each other, promoting the birth of the glass skyscraper supported by steel girders. Mies van der Rohe later encapsulated the esteem for streamlined design in art deco, modern architecture, and other areas of design when he said, "Less is more." Functionalist aesthetics conflicted with the popular preference for traditional

design, which was considered more cozy and warm, and the Nazis sought to gain political capital by portraying the Bauhaus as "un-German."

After he seized power in Germany, Adolf Hitler, in dealing with the avant-garde, followed Stalin's precedent rather than Mussolini's. While Futurist art was acceptable to Fascist goals, Nazis regarded Expressionism and other modern art movements with suspicion and labeled them "anti-Aryan." Hitler, a frustrated artist, regarded monumental Neoclassicism as the appropriate form for Nazi architecture, sculpture, and painting and decided artists were to use a pseudo-Greek style to convey heroic masculinity. In the process Expressionism was largely suppressed. In the late 1930s Hitler and Joseph Goebbels championed an exhibition of Expressionist art, entitled "degenerate art," as a warning to Germans.

Cinema, however, was both acceptable and convenient to Nazi propaganda aims of mobilizing mass enthusiasm. Posters, radio addresses, and mass rallies using the latest available technology were all important to Nazi ends. Most notably, the films of Leni Riefenstahl successfully linked Nazism with a vision of dynamism and the promised future. In *Triumph of the Will* (1936) and *Olympia* (1938), depicting the Nürnberg rally of 1934 and the 1936 Berlin Olympics respectively, Riefenstahl promoted a Nazi modernistic vision similar to that of Italian Futurists but with the benefit of the editing and montage of film. Of course such works reinforced Nazi power and thus war, racism, and extermination. Riefenstahl later claimed that she only worked for Hitler and did not support his goals.

Avant-garde experiments in art continued through the 1930s. Surrealism, already evident in the works of Giorgio De Chirico during the 1920s, evoked paradoxical images defying ordinary explanations but hinting at the underlying symbolic, dream-like states of the subconscious described contrastingly by Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. Salvador Dalí and Joan Miró of Spain and René Magritte of Belgium were in the forefront of Surrealism. Dalí particularly lived in the eccentric way that the public had come to expect of Bohemians.

Avant-garde concepts and political concerns connected closely in Picasso's massive mural, *Guernica* (1939), which dramatically portrays the bombing of a Basque town during the Spanish Civil War. The savagery of the war and the sinister nature of the political infighting among forces resisting the invasion of Francisco Franco's troops were also described by George Orwell, among others. Picasso's painting is a graphic, close-up view of air bombardment's effects on life, yet his abstract modern art conveys the anon-

ymous horror of the twentieth century. The style in use, after all, was largely Cubist.

At the end of the Second World War the central artistic scene shifted from Europe to New York, where Arshile Gorky and Willem de Kooning participated in the movement known as Abstract Expressionism. This current was most famously epitomized by Jackson Pollock's drip paintings that originated in mythological scenes and ended in the complete immersion of the subject in abstraction. The European artistic world thereafter contended with the arrival of American art as California and other areas emerged as centers of creativity. Nevertheless, important European figures, including German artists such as Joseph Beuys and Anselm Kiefer, retained key positions. Kiefer's desolate, barren landscapes are haunting works of art.

In the midst of the war, however, Europeans took the lead in cinema and bypassed Hollywood. In France, Marcel Carné clandestinely created *Children of Paradise* (1945) during the Nazi occupation. Italian Neorealism originated in a collaboration between Roberto Rossellini and Federico Fellini. In *Open City* (1945) and *Paisan* (1946) they used a semidocumentary format to characterize the desolation and poverty of Italian life during the closing days of the war. As the term "Neorealist" implies, the filmmakers' aim was to capture the ordinary world of people by avoiding the entertainment-oriented methods of Hollywood directors and focusing on nonglamorous subjects. During the next several decades Fellini, a former comic-strip artist, widened the scope of his films by stretching the sense of realism to include psychic states and fantasy. In doing so he in-

vited the criticism of purists, who objected to his departure from strict realism. Nevertheless, he vividly portrayed Italian society as it was transformed from the poverty-laden world of *La Strada* (The Road) (1954) to the ultramaterialistic jet-set world of Rome's Via Veneto in *La Dolce Vita* (The Sweet Life) (1960), where the scavenging paparazzi reporters roamed in fierce pursuit of vapid celebrities. Neorealism also influenced French directors like Jean-Luc Godard and François Truffaut, who rendered the surrounding world in novel cinematic forms.

Western European art after the Renaissance was created out of the several impulses that shook artists. The desire to represent reality and yet transform it in the process was certainly a central motivation, albeit that the perception of reality could change relative to

the time. Both Renaissance and Cubist art were justified in such terms. Additionally, European artists pursued individualism, which encouraged them to take chances, experiment with techniques, and break with rules. Restlessness and change became a part of the development of art, and succeeding artistic movements nearly fit a pattern, although one that could have taken a different direction if circumstances had been altered. Patterns are usually imposed by outside observers. It is tempting to suggest a direct relationship between artistic culture and social change, yet that bond is questionable because many ongoing aesthetic concerns are exclusive to artists. The complexities within art history are vast because the creative personality itself is a myriad of labyrinths evading central definition.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE MILITARY



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The military has been relatively neglected by social historians. Military history, for its part, has been written from either an operational or a top-down model that leaves little room for issues of interest to social historians. But the military has played far too important a role in European social history to be so marginalized. Studying the military has value beyond a general attempt to “bring the state back in” to social history. As reflections of the societies they serve, militaries can provide great insight into larger societal patterns. This essay will outline the basic roles and social implications of military institutions in Europe from the end of feudalism to the late twentieth century in four periods: the age of monarchy; the age of nationalism; the world wars; and the postwar period.

DEFINITIONS

Military institutions, by definition, have a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence as a means for realizing the state’s political, social, and economic objectives. With that definition in mind, one must understand that no monolithic “military” exists, even within one state. Navies and armies, for example, have traditionally differed in their social composition, political outlook, and place within society. In most European states, the relationship between the two (after the creation of air forces, three) main branches of service has usually been unequal. In England, for example, the navy has always been dominant whereas in Russia and Germany the army has been dominant.

Because they are bureaucratic and hierarchical, militaries often look and act like other large public institutions. Nevertheless they differ in their relationship to the management of violence. Militaries, unlike many similar institutions, must accept the potential for high levels of fatalities as a routine part of their mission. Whereas police and fire departments, for example, experience death as an abnormality or an accident, militaries must accept it as a normal consequence of performing their primary function. They differ as well in the centrality they have to modern

European nation-states. Military institutions, charged as they are with defense and power projection, are often able to make greater demands on the state than any of their counterparts. Because they are tied to national interest, they are able to demand more from citizens than most other national institutions. This was particularly true after the state became powerful enough to compel military service from young men. After the nineteenth-century introduction of conscription, the military became a unifying institution in many European states.

In times of war, militaries often extend control into areas normally under civilian purview. In peacetime as well, the size and power of militaries can become a threat to the very societies they are designed to serve. Because they possess a monopoly on large-scale violence and have access to advanced weapons technology, they have the power to threaten other national institutions if not kept in check. As a result, European states have developed elaborate systems to maintain control of their armed forces. The patterns that emerge from these systems are generally known as “civil-military relations,” although no single “civilian” or “military” viewpoint exists within a given state.

Relationships between civilian and military spheres operate on several levels. On the highest level, civilian and military elites can differ in terms of their value systems, their social background, or their views on contemporary political issues. On a more general level a military “mentality” can emerge that separates the armed services culturally and socially from civilian society. Without controls to prevent the gap from growing too large, militaries can become disconnected from civilian society and lose the support of the people. Thus, maintaining good civil-military relations is vital to the health of a stable political system.

Samuel Huntington identified two models of civil-military relations: “subjective” control and “objective” control. Although his model has been criticized, its general outline (with a few modifications to suit our present purposes) remains a valid starting

point for discussions of civil-military relations. In the subjective model, formal constitutional and societal checks exist to limit the power and influence of military systems. These include the right of the citizenry to keep and bear arms, the creation of civilian ministries to oversee military services, and the control of military funding by parliaments or other legislative bodies. In most representative systems, the fear of one political party using the military against another is often as large or larger than fears of an outright military coup. European militaries have traditionally played a less direct role in politics than, say, their Latin American counterparts. The European fear, then, is that the creation of large armies could upset internal order by providing a political opponent with a formidable weapon. Subjective controls can also include competing and countervailing hierarchies like secret police (the Nazi Gestapo) or parallel chains of command (the Soviet commissar system). Of course, if used improperly, these controls can help a dictator stay in power by increasing his control over the military, as some historians argue Adolf Hitler did in the 1930s. They can also impair the military's performance.

The objective model of control involves imbuing a military with a professional value system that acts as its own check. Huntington argued that this model produced smoother civil-military relations than the subjective model. An objective system, he contended, builds on the military's own emphasis on ethical and behavioral codes. These codes stretch back as far as the chivalric codes that guided warrior conduct in the Middle Ages. Their ideal product is a nonpartisan and nonpolitical military that sees meddling in civilian affairs as antithetical to its own mission. Objectively controlled militaries are thus kept strong enough to serve the state's interest, but pose no threat to the state itself. By creating this kind of professional military, however, a society runs the risk of creating a military that exists as a "society apart," with values and beliefs that differ significantly from civilian counterparts. By the late twentieth century subjective and objective systems coexisted in most developed states.

States have another option for reducing the threat posed by militaries: they can keep them intentionally small and inept. In the 1930s, for example, France invested large sums of money into a chain of defenses on the German border known as the Maginot Line. The decision to build the line emanated from France's experiences in World War I, but Alistair Horne and others have argued that it also provided a way for Third Republic politicians to satisfy the voters' desires for security against Germany without creating a politically unreliable army garrisoned in the nation's interior. Third Republic politicians often saw

greater dangers from their countrymen in other parties than they did from foreigners. Creating a powerful army that could end up in the hands of political opponents after the next election was therefore politically unpalatable. With both subjective and objective controls failing, French politicians chose to keep the army on the frontiers both as a check on Germany and as a defense against its own army intervening in French internal affairs. The Soviet Union chose a similar (though much bloodier) strategy when it removed thousands of officers in the purge trials of the 1930s. Joseph Stalin preferred political reliability in his officer corps, even if it meant a decline in military capability. In both cases, a state chose to risk domination by an outside army rather than risk having its own army play too large a role in its political system.

Because variants and combinations of these three models have interacted, military coups are relatively rare in modern European history. Although the military has frequently played important roles in European political and social history, it has rarely dominated. Prussia and Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are a clear exception. In the years before World War I, German chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg took his place at the imperial table after the generals, because he had only attained the military rank of major. During that war, Europe experienced one of its few military dictatorships under Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff; notably, it failed. The German example scared most Europeans (including the Nazis) into creating even stronger checks against military influence in the interwar period.

Militaries are, if not mirror images, then certainly reflections of the societies they serve. A democratic state will necessarily produce a different military than will a totalitarian one. Similarly, a technologically and bureaucratically sophisticated state will produce a different military than a developing one. Militaries can serve as vehicles for modernization, as the Russian army did under Peter the Great, or they can act as conservative institutions that resist modernization. However constituted, militaries play critical roles in shaping a state's political, social, and cultural patterns.

FROM FEUDALISM TO ABSOLUTISM

The medieval period left three important legacies for the role of militaries in European society. First, European armies were commanded and led by aristocrats. In the face of a changing society, the military became one of the few institutions that the nobility could dominate, resulting in a conservative outlook for most European armies. Even otherwise innovative

monarchs like Russia's Peter the Great (1672–1725) and Prussia's Frederick the Great (1712–1786) were reluctant to change the social composition of their officer corps. Peter went so far as to compel noble service in his officer corps. Aristocratic control probably slowed the technological development of militaries and certainly reduced their overall level of expertise by using birth as the prerequisite for entry into the officer corps. Concentrating the officer corps in the nobility served as a subjective control by limiting senior positions in the military to the segment of society seen as being most politically reliable. Despite the limitations it brought about, monarchs saw noble participation in the armed forces as critical to the army's reliability and stability. The pattern of elite control over armies continued into the twentieth century in most European armies. Navies tended to be relatively less aristocratic and more bourgeois.

Nonnoble, "common" soldiers and sailors generally came from much lower social strata; they even included criminals. Mercenaries (defined as men who serve exclusively for money and are foreigners to the system they serve) and men paid on retainers or bounties (different from mercenaries because they are usually subjects of the state they serve) were another common solution to the problem of filling the ranks. Keeping such men motivated and reliable presented its own problems. Sixteenth-century Spain tried to solve the dilemma by creating permanent regiments called *tercios*. Each *tercio* contained about three thousand men and had distinct insignia, uniforms, colors, songs, permanent officers, and, over time, traditions. The *tercio* system created a small-unit dynamic not seen in European armies since the Roman legions. It also created loyalty to individual units and, by focusing men on the problems of their own unit, distracted military units from political participation, creating an early form of objective control. France and England soon developed a regimental system that served much the same purpose. Many contemporary European military traditions date to this period.

Second, feudalism left a legacy that militaries should have a dignity, an ethos, and a sense of duty. This code (derived in part from medieval chivalry) helped to legitimize militaries as institutions and made possible the creation of laws of warfare. The concept of a "just war" separated formal military institutions from other practitioners of violence and gave the military a political and religious basis for existence. This dignity did not, however, necessarily connect the army to any ideas of a nation-state. Noble control and the growth of royal authority meant that most subjects saw the military as an instrument of the king and the aristocracy, not the people. Put simply, when kings were

despotic, the army became an instrument of despotism (see the example of Oliver Cromwell's England).

Third, the end of the feudal period saw the rise of the state's administrative capacity, in part so that monarchs could better control their own armies. At the end of the feudal period, these capacities allowed some monarchs to broaden the recruitment base of their militaries and allowed them to rely upon their own administrations, rather than the capricious compliance of their vassals, to equip their armies. It also allowed the state to monopolize the right to declare and legitimate war. Spain and France were early pioneers in the creation of larger, less aristocratic militaries directly controlled by the monarch, though the nobility still dominated the officer corps. This trend continued throughout Europe, making the aristocracy more of a royal instrument and less the Crown's rival.

The introduction of gunpowder weapons helped to undermine the feudal order and tip the balance of power toward princes who could afford the new weapons. Gunpowder weapons were expensive and constantly became obsolete, requiring new investments. Few nobles could afford to continually update their armies. Many kings, however, could use their admin-

istrative capabilities and their wealth (itself based in part on their military success) to buy new weapons and hire more soldiers. Monarchs could now force formerly unruly dukes and barons to accept a new, far less equal, relationship. Large artillery pieces, of course, rendered tall castles, once an aristocrat's safeguard against the king's armies, much less secure. Armies thus became connected to the monarch and to his evolving state apparatus.

The state's enlarged administrative and fiscal capabilities led to increasing links with associated civilian fields of expertise. Increased sophistication in banking and other areas gave states the power to place armies in the field far from home, but most states still had financial difficulty keeping those armies in the field. Mercenaries and men paid by bounty were too expensive to keep on a permanent or semipermanent basis, and could turn on the king if he demobilized them. Much of the destruction of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) resulted from armies seeking loot or sustenance from local areas when regular payments from kings failed to materialize. War was no less expensive in the eighteenth century. French assistance to the American rebels led to a debt that required the dedication of almost half of the royal treasury to debt service.

Although most historians argue that this period did not represent one of great "skill transferability" between the military and civilian spheres, important links were created between the army and navy on the one hand and science and engineering on the other. Artillery weapons necessitated new siege techniques

and forms of fortification and defense that required skills outside the army's own ability. Engineers like France's Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707) became highly valued in an era of limited warfare and attempts to limit the impact of war on civilians by focusing military operations around forts.

Navies also built on links to civilians, especially in areas like navigation and, of course, shipbuilding. As European warships grew larger and substituted sails for rowers, they became capable of carrying more food and cannon. By the fifteenth century, European navies were becoming more powerful in African and Indian waters as well as in the Mediterranean and the North Seas. By 1518 Portuguese galleys could carry 35 guns, impressive for the time but soon dwarfed by later warships. By 1759, Great Britain had a ship that carried 104 guns capable of firing 1,100 pounds of iron every 90 seconds.

THE AGE OF NATIONALISM

Though few saw it at the time, Great Britain's unsuccessful war to subdue a rebellion in the American colonies was a watershed. Relying heavily on mercenaries, the British tried to defeat an opponent motivated more by nationalism (or at least regionalism) than by money. The French Revolution brought this same change to the European continent. Throughout the "long nineteenth century" (1789–1914) armies became less an instrument of monarchs and more an instrument (and reflection) of nations. Militaries also became larger, more sophisticated, and capable of extending European imperialism to almost any place the state wished.

France's *levée en masse*, issued in 1792, established (in theory at least) the idea that all citizens, regardless of age and gender, owed service to their nation's army because it was a representation of them and their general will. The Jourdan Law of 1798, passed to meet the demands of the War of the Second Coalition, established the principle of conscription in France and required all young men to register with the state. By 1815, more than 2 million Frenchmen had joined the army through conscription. The French Revolution changed the prevailing justification of war as an instrument of society. This connection between the military and society weakened the link between the military and the *state* and created a new link between the military and the *nation*. The difference is critical. Over the course of the nineteenth century armies became instruments of the citizenry in ways not seen in Europe since Roman times.

This connection brought fundamental changes. The logic of mercenaries as both operationally effec-

tive and cost-effective no longer made sense. The nation now had to be defended by citizens, not foreigners. Few Europeans argued that nonprofessional citizen-soldiers made better tactical soldiers. The distinction was more moral than military. The citizen, Europeans now presumed, brought *élan*, morale, and patriotism that more than compensated for any lack of military discipline or operational skills.

That logic led to another important change: the further opening of the officer corps to nonnobles. In most armies, nonnoble officers were concentrated in technical fields like artillery and engineering. Napoleon opened the officer corps much further with a famous call to his troops that all of them carried the baton of a marshal in their haversacks. While nobles still served disproportionately in the officer corps, a greatly increased number of bourgeois and former enlisted men became officers. Prussia followed suit in 1808, defining its officer corps by talent instead of birth and opening new institutions for the training and educating of officers. Two years earlier, Prussian reformers attempted to create an army on the “Jacobin” model, based on national devotion generating close links between the soldier and his society. Napoleon and his imitators radically changed the military to improve its esprit and, they hoped, its battlefield performance. In the process, they radically changed the connection that militaries had to their nations.

The connection of armies to their societies meant that they only derived legitimacy when citizens viewed them as representing the nation. Throughout the nineteenth century, various crises diminished that legitimacy by making the military again seem like an instrument of the state, sometimes against the peoples’ will. We have already seen the Prussian model and the changing balance of civil-military relations there. In Prussia, France, and elsewhere, the military’s role in breaking the revolutions of 1848 and the crushing of the Paris Commune in 1871 seemed to many to renew the links between military and monarchy as did scandals like the Dreyfus Affair, in which many republicans saw a nefarious military acting to erode the same liberties it was supposed to defend. The very term “militarism” dates to French republican opponents of Napoleon III and his use of the army as a sword of Damocles to reduce the power of the legislature, control the press, and threaten dissidents.

Fears of the military put the late-nineteenth-century expansion of continental conscription in a new light for people on both the right and the left. Marxists and other leftists saw a larger military as an instrument of capitalism and imperialism and inherently threatening to domestic liberty. Those on the right sometimes resisted conscription as well. Prussian

and German Junkers occasionally called for lower conscription levels out of fear that a larger army would mean a larger officer corps, incorporating many nonnobles. Of all the European great powers, only Great Britain, due to its geography, its residual fear of standing armies from the Cromwell era, and its unrivaled navy, avoided conscription in this period.

European militaries also created general staffs in this period to coordinate and plan military activity. Originally devised by the Prussians to manage mobilization, general staff planning and centralization seemed to show its utility to Europe in the Prussian-German victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. In the following decades, most major military systems in Europe created staffs of their own. These staffs concentrated expertise in a variety of auxiliary fields from technology to diplomacy. Although most historians argue that the period before World War I followed the pattern of relatively little direct skill transferability between the military and civilian worlds, the staff system meant that militaries now had large numbers of officers with expertise in civilian areas.

Armies and navies played central roles in expanding European imperialism. Superior technologies like steamships and machine guns made imperialism cheap. In the First Opium War (1839–1842), one British sloop sank fifty-eight Chinese junks without suffering a single hit. Most military planners and general staffs, however, were much more concerned with the immediate problems of power projection and security on the European continent itself. Militaries also had to deal with the dizzying array of new weapons systems that European industry provided in the *fin de siècle* period. By 1910, these included artillery powerful enough to reduce any existing fort, machine guns capable of firing 250 rounds per minute, all-big-gun battleships, and torpedo-carrying submarines. The inability of generals and admirals fully to comprehend these technologies partially explains the unprecedented carnage of the twentieth century.

THE WORLD WARS

The two world wars brought nightmares to Europe. From German devastation of Belgian cities in 1914 to the firestorms and Holocaust of World War II, European militaries became instruments of a level of violence that horrified the world. Each of the elements of the European military system discussed above (and for that matter the state and cultural systems as well) contributed to the carnage of World War I. The vaunted general staff system created inflexible war plans that did not permit states to respond with levels of violence proportionate to either the enemy’s per-

ceived offense or immediate threat. Germany, the birthplace of the general staff, authored the most cataclysmic of these plans, the Schlieffen Plan. The plan tried to account for Germany's unfavorable geographic position between France and Russia, which were allied through the Triple Entente. At the moment of hostilities, the plan called for German forces to move through Belgium (thereby defying Great Britain, the main guarantor of Belgium's neutrality), seize Paris in six weeks, then move east by rail to meet the Russians. Better than any other single factor, it explains how the assassination of an Austrian archduke in Bosnia set an entire continent to war for four years.

The nineteenth-century creation of mass, conscript armies meant little more than mass targets for the new weapons at the disposal of World War I armies. Despite the mass casualties, nationalism kept nationally based armies like the French, British, and German in the field. Even a French mutiny in 1917 proves the point. French soldiers refused to attack defended German positions, but they did not fraternize with the enemy (indeed, somehow the Germans never found out that a mutiny was in progress) and they did not leave their positions: they knew that they were the only force between the Germans and Paris. Armies that were not nationally cohesive broke down more fully. These included, most obviously, the Austro-Hungarian, where training was conducted in eleven languages and four different religious services were performed by army chaplains each week. They also included the multiethnic Ottoman and Russian armies as well as the Italian army, where northern-southern identities often overrode still-nascent Italian nationalism.

World War I also altered the relationship between the military and society. On the one hand, large groups of veterans, proud of their service, now claimed the right to make special demands on the state as a result of that service. On the other, the war did little to inspire popular faith or confidence in Europe's military leaders. Even among the victors, few generals emerged from the war with sparkling reputations. As a result, the public's faith in the military to resolve, or even correctly define, security problems waned. The widespread disarmament movements of the 1920s were partly rooted in a desire to keep militaries as small as possible. In effect, Europeans had come to argue that smaller, not larger, armies were the pathway to peace. That logic represented a radical change from the logic of the prewar period.

The political instability of the interwar period led to a period of relatively frequent military involvement in European politics. Most famously, army support was critical to fascist takeovers in Italy, Germany,

and Spain. In the latter case, a former army chief of staff, Francisco Franco, took power, while in the former two, Mussolini and Hitler derived much of their appeal from army support of their cause. In Greece, a military coup in 1935 restored King George II to the throne and in France major military appointments always had an overtly political dimension. Chief of the General Staff Maurice Gamelin was a political ally of the socialist Édouard Daladier. His commander-in-chief, A. J. Georges, was closely connected to Daladier's political nemesis, Paul Reynaud. The political rivalry between the generals and their political supporters impeded decision making in the French high command in the 1930s, with disastrous results. Gamelin actively opposed the return of Reynaud to power after the German occupation of Norway in April 1940. As a compromise, Daladier stayed on as defense minister. In the tense month of May, Reynaud replaced both Gamelin and Daladier with men closer to his own politics.

In both world wars, mass mobilization and mass suffering blurred the line between military and civilian. Especially in the World War II period, civilian and military skills "fused" as the formerly sharp distinction between the two spheres melted. So many people wore uniforms (including large numbers of women in Britain and the Soviet Union) that maintaining a military-civilian dichotomy proved difficult. Long-range aviation allowed militaries to take war into their enemy's heartland. The incredible sacrifices of the Soviet people underscored how warfare in the twentieth century affected civilians.

World War II also marked the decline of Western Europe as the world's main center of military power. Close links to the increasingly powerful United States military help to explain the Anglo-Soviet victory. Germany, on the other hand, was much less successful in creating synergy with its non-European ally, Japan. Throughout the war American industrial capability and manpower translated into an increasingly large voice in strategic and operational decision making. After bearing the brunt against Germany in 1940 and 1941, Great Britain had to accept second (some argue third) power status in the Grand Alliance. This diminution of European military power and prestige resulted in problems across their empires as well, including the "Quit India" movement and the growth of anti-imperial groups like the Viet Minh.

THE COLD WAR AND AFTER

The dominant theme of the post-World War II period is, of course, the cold war. No European military could escape the reality that their power in relation to

the Americans and the Soviets had diminished significantly. What, then, were militaries to do? Three possibilities soon emerged: alliance with either the USSR or the United States; neutrality (usually implying only defensive military activity); or military action largely independent from the superpowers. For some Europeans, reestablishing empires (and in some cases, the nation itself) was often a higher state priority than choosing sides in the cold war.

Most European militaries became involved in one of the two cold war alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (formed in 1949) and the Warsaw Pact (formed in 1955). NATO involved active members of the World War II coalition alongside former enemies of that coalition like Italy and, later, West Germany. The 1954 decision to rearm West Germany, under the leadership of many Nazi-era officers, stirred considerable controversy. In August of that year France rejected the proposal, but under American pressure later accepted it. The lingering problems, including NATO's 1957 naming of a German general to command forces in Central Europe, contributed to France's

alienation from NATO (see below). The militaries of Eastern Europe, of course, had little choice. Largely as a response to NATO and a rearmed West Germany, the Soviet Union codified its relationship with its satellite states' militaries in the Warsaw Pact. Austria, Yugoslavia, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland tried to remain outside the superpower alliance system, with varying degrees of success.

The existence of nuclear weapons represented a fundamental change in the logic of alliances and of military strategy itself. England's explosion of an atomic bomb in 1952 (followed by an explosion of a hydrogen bomb in 1957) and France's successful nuclear test in 1960 did not change the fundamentally unequal power relationships between the superpowers (in this case the United States) and their allies. America's role in ending the 1956 Suez War against England's and France's wishes underscored the nature of that relationship. European militaries thus faced very real credibility problems when they were seen by their citizens as mere instruments of the superpowers. This problem particularly plagued Eastern European mili-

taries as the policies they helped to enforce were so evidently contrary to the wishes of the people.

Striving to create a more independent military policy could help to solve the problem of legitimacy. Of course, this option was simply not open to the Eastern European militaries until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ironically, the end of the cold war may not have solved the problem, as many Eastern European nations soon applied for membership in NATO. France typified the model of independent military action. In 1959 France withdrew its fleet from NATO, refused to stockpile American nuclear weapons on its soil, and asked the United States to remove its warplanes. In 1966, shortly after revealing its own long-range nuclear delivery capability, France formally withdrew from the military operations of NATO. The alliance subsequently moved its headquarters from Paris to Brussels and other key facilities to Maastricht and Rome.

Allegations that national armies were primarily serving the superpowers combined with several militaries' unpopular roles in trying to reestablish empires. The French experiences in Indochina and Algeria tore the country apart, leading to the collapse of the Fourth Republic and fears of revolution or even civil war. The French war in Algeria (1954–1962) led to ten thousand French casualties, an army mutiny, and even an assassination attempt on France's greatest hero, Charles de Gaulle. Belgium's experiences in the Congo, Portuguese operations in Angola, and Dutch operations in Indonesia also met significant opposition at home. Depending on one's point of view, European militaries looked to be either ineffective in reestablishing colonialism or antediluvian in trying to restore empires that properly belonged to a bygone era. Significantly, European militaries did not support the American war in Vietnam as they had the war in Korea. To do so would have further fed charges of both neoimperialism and inappropriate action as an instrument of the United States.

The end of the cold war did not end the essential dilemma of European militaries. Although the Warsaw Pact dissolved, NATO expanded. Britain and France both joined the coalition that defeated Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, though the war was not as popular in Europe as it was in America. Europeans also

participated in military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo under the aegis of NATO. The latter operation saw the largest German military effort since 1945. British prime minister Tony Blair called the operation in Kosovo an example of a new ideology: the imperialism of morality. European military operations, he suggested, would derive legitimacy from their defense of the weak and their protection of human rights. In doing so he was both addressing the still powerful need to legitimate the actions of European militaries and recalling medieval notions of just warfare.

Exactly what role Europe should play in the military arena of the post-cold war world remains of great debate. In the absence of an immediate threat, many European nations have eliminated or greatly reduced unpopular universal (male) military training laws. Relying exclusively on volunteers, including larger numbers of women, may lead to increased legitimacy, as may European attempts to move away from American leadership. In 1999 several Western European nations took final steps toward the creation of a joint European military force designed to be able to act independently of the United States. Eastern Europe's military future appeared to be in even more doubt. Some of the former Soviet republics became important nuclear powers. Several former Warsaw Pact nations looked to NATO membership as a way to guarantee their security and gain access to advanced Western weapons technology.

CONCLUSIONS

War, according to the famous dictum by Carl von Clausewitz, is an extension of politics by other means. To paraphrase Clausewitz, militaries are an extension of their societies by other means. As such, they merit attention from social historians. Military history ought to do more than examine generalship and tactics. It ought also to explore the connections between military institutions and the social, cultural, and political patterns of European history. Here, of course, social historians have much to contribute. The result of such a contribution will be a better understanding of the ways that the military has influenced, and been influenced by, large patterns of social history.

See also Military Service; War and Conquest (volume 2); Social Control (in this volume).

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ARTISANS



Peter N. Stearns

Artisans form a key category in European social history, from before the early modern period into the early twentieth century. Many of the most perceptive studies of workers and working-class movements have been devoted implicitly or explicitly to artisans. Distinguishing between artisanal experience and that of a larger working class, but also relating the two groups, forms a vital topic in modern European history.

Artisanal history focuses primarily on western and central Europe. Even in this region, important studies show contrasting artisanal reactions, based on distinctive legal and economic contexts, despite shared components. In eastern Europe, an artisanal category began to develop in the later nineteenth century, fed by imported workers from central Europe. Until communist takeovers, this belated artisanal experience replicated some of the features seen in western Europe earlier on.

Artisans are craft workers. They share a high degree of skill, the result of substantial and usually fairly formal training. Depending on the trade, apprenticeships could last up to seven years. Acquisition of mature skill was often demonstrated by some kind of exemplary production, a “masterpiece.” After apprenticeship, most artisans went through a stage of service as journeymen, working for an artisan master and receiving wages plus, often, housing and board. In some cases, the journeyman phase proved lifelong. In principle, however, journeymen sought opportunities to become masters in their own right, by saving to buy a shop or by marrying a master’s daughter and/or acquiring through inheritance. Masters were owners, but unlike modern employers they typically continued to work with their hands, alongside their journeymen.

Artisanal work depended on rather simple, often manual technology, which brought the skill component to the foreground. Artisans participated in various stages of production, from raw material to finished product, and often had a sense of artistry and a

high degree of identification with their work. Traditionally, artisans sold their own wares.

Prominent artisanal trades included food processing (bakers, butchers), fine metal and jewelry work (smiths, goldsmiths), construction (masons, carpenters, cabinet makers), printing, and clothing (tailors, shoemakers). While the classic artisanal centers were urban, rural artisans existed as well—like village blacksmiths or millers. Rural artisans typically stood apart from peasants, often playing a key role in organizing rural protest or taking advantage of new opportunities for education and literacy. But the skill definitions for rural artisans were less clear and their

group experiences were less coherent than among the urban cohort.

EARLY MODERN PATTERNS

The European artisanal tradition formed during the Middle Ages. This is when most crafts emerged (printing was of course a later development). This is when the guild organization emerged as well. Artisanal guilds, often compulsory for major crafts in a given city, attempted to defend artisanal status and economic position on a noncapitalist basis. Guilds regulated the number of apprentices, to prevent oversupply and so a reduction of income and also to constrain the opportunity for individual masters to advance too rapidly over their colleagues by employing too many assistants. The type of training apprentices were to receive was stipulated as well, although enforcement varied. Standards of production were regulated, which inhibited rapid technological change but in principle protected the quality of goods pro-

duced. Guilds often wielded considerable urban political power. They provided a rich associational life, participating in urban festivals with distinctive costumes. Many guilds sponsored social events and also assisted members or their families in sickness or death. Guilds also facilitated travel, particularly by younger journeymen. A year or more—the *Wanderjahre* in Germany—was often spent wandering from town to town, with guilds helping the journeyman to obtain appropriate jobs. Wandering provided unusual experience for many artisans, even across loose political boundaries. It also helped prevent gluts in labor, serving as part of the security protection that artisans valued so highly. Traditionalism and group orientation, rather than change and individual maximization, characterized the artisanal tradition.

Within this context, several developments focus historical attention during the early modern centuries. Change is one. With an increasingly commercial economy and some population growth, artisanal ideals became harder to achieve. More and more journeymen found access to masterships difficult, if not impossible—particularly if there was no possibility of inheritance. Journeymen sometimes organized separately from masters in this situation. Strikes occurred, the first in European history—for example, among early printers in the sixteenth century. The artisanal economy was not yet overturned by the eighteenth century, but it was often challenged. At the same time, however, opportunities for more distant sales, even exports to such new customers as the Russian aristocracy after Peter the Great's westernization, provided growing opportunities for master craftsmen in such fields as fine furniture.

Change often had a gender component. In the Middle Ages, women as well as men participated in some crafts, even in guilds. This was most common among widows of master artisans, but there were female crafts, such as lace making, as well. In early modern Europe women tended increasingly to be excluded from the major crafts and from guilds, and a great deal of misogyny developed among some journeymen's organizations. On the other hand, the wives of master artisans often played a key commercial role, supervising the sales counter; in some cases they were more literate than their husbands.

Variety is a final early modern theme. Different parts of Europe maintained different degrees of guild cohesion. Guild traditions relaxed substantially in Britain, permitting unusual rates of technological change without obliterating the artisanal tradition. Guild traditions were far tighter in Germany, ultimately promoting a more conservative artisanal approach in economics and politics alike.

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Individual artisans contributed to the industrial revolution in various ways. Particularly in Britain and France, key industrial inventions, like the Jacquard loom in France, typically emanated from artisan-tinkerers. Some artisans masters gradually evolved their operations into more modern, capitalistic forms of employment, increasing their workforce and separating their own managerial activities from manual labor. This was particularly true in textiles. Other artisans migrated to early factories, adjusting their skills to serve as machine-installers and other skilled operatives.

On the whole, however, the industrial revolution was a shock to artisans and the artisanal tradition. The emphasis on profit, production, and often lower quality all conflicted with artisanal values. Ironically, given the gradual installation of industrialization, artisanal opportunities often continued to increase, particularly in fields like construction, where urban and overall population growth was not initially matched by technological change. But artisans knew or sensed that they were losing control of the manufacturing economy. Simultaneously, legal changes, often derived from the French Revolution, eliminated guilds or at least weakened their control over technological change and the size of the labor force. Economic and political developments in tandem led to reductions in formal apprenticeship. Many artisans encountered efforts to speed up work and reduce artistic quality, even when the factory system had not yet arrived. This was true in furniture making, for example.

Artisans reacted in various ways. Some opposed industrialization altogether. Artisans were among the leading Luddites, protesting and sometimes destroying new machinery. Many artisans formed the key au-

dience for utopian socialists who urged a return to idealized cooperative production. Artisans led in the formation of early unions, using their skilled position, their frequent literacy, and their organizational experience. Some unions were purely local, but several national efforts were ventured under artisanal leadership, from England to (later) Russia. Everywhere in Europe, artisans sponsored the first phases of what turned out to be the modern labor movement. Artisans were key participants in the great European revolutions, from 1789 through 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871. From artisanal ranks came early socialist activists, such as August Bebel in Germany.

But artisans also sought to improve themselves individually through education and by imitating some of the habits of the middle class. Many sought “respectability,” for example, by leading in temperance movements (against what was usually a heavy-drinking artisanal tradition). Many artisans picked up the new middle-class work ethic, which insisted on an unprecedented attention to clock time and maximizing productivity, in place of older artisanal traditions, such as taking off “holy Monday” to recover from weekend revels. Many tried to protect their position by marrying late and/or limiting their birthrates. Many were vociferously hostile to factory workers, whom they viewed as degraded and dangerous.

Impulses toward collective and individual improvement often combined. Artisans played a key role in the British Chartist movement, particularly in southern England, but in it they sought better educational opportunities and the vote. Artisanal unions often turned to narrow-group protection at the expense of larger working-class unity. In the 1860s, New Model unionism in Britain reacted against Chartist radicalism by stressing gains based on skill. Craft un-

ions were often quite successful, locally and even nationally, in winning higher pay and shorter hours and even pushing back efforts to speed up production through the spread of piece-rate wage systems. In all their reactions—radical, conservative, and mixed—artisans had a key impact on European society throughout most of the nineteenth century.

Artisanal history fades, however, by the later nineteenth century. The growth of the factory labor force equaled and then surpassed artisanal numbers; in England the parity point occurred as early as 1850. Labor movements continued to have identifiable artisan components, but mass unions and marxist socialism increasingly predominated by the 1890s. New technology cut into artisanal specialties. With new printing equipment, old skills were displaced and even semiskilled women workers entered the field. Sewing

machines unseated artisan tailors and shoemakers. Electric and gasoline motors, plus new materials, destroyed or at least modified artisanal work even on construction sites. By 1900, distinctions between skilled workers and other workers remained, but the skilled workers were not really artisans.

Still, echoes of artisanal separatism and tradition continued into the early decades of the twentieth century. Some artisans turned to the political right in defense of their identity. Artisanal support for Nazism in Germany was considerable, and guildlike entities were revived in response (though without significant economic powers). This was a last hurrah, however. Further industrialization, plus the advent of communism in postwar east central Europe, ended all but the memory of a distinctive artisanal identity in Europe, once and for all.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE PETTY BOURGEOISIE



Daniel T. Orlowsky

In his diaries, Victor Klemperer, a survivor and a remarkable observer of daily life under the Nazi regime, from time to time described his commonplace surroundings in a Dresden suburb. He referred to the banal decoration schemes of his neighbors and their herdlike passivity in accepting the daily outpourings and policies of the regime. When he wished to describe those people negatively, he frequently called them and their attitudes “petty bourgeois.” Herein lies a story with deep roots in European history. Klemperer was after all a university professor, a professional, a member of the intelligentsia, and a converted Jew married to a Protestant. In education and income he was several notches above the traditional artisans and white-collar workers who in the twentieth century were thought of as belonging to the lower middle class. It has been all too easy to overlook the petty bourgeoisie or to follow Klemperer and dismiss or mock them. But the historian does this at great risk.

DEFINING THE PETTY BOURGEOISIE

One of the more fascinating and hard to define topics of European social history is the role and evolution of the petty bourgeoisie. This was a social group or groups that occupied the space between the peasantry and later the factory wage laborers on the lower end of the social spectrum and the capital owning, higher status professionals of the bourgeoisie. It is a hard group to define precisely because it was composed of many groups that changed over time, from the master artisans and shopkeepers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the white-collar workers, lower- and middle-ranking civil servants, and technical personnel of the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century. The petty bourgeoisie comprised a variety of occupations and social and cultural outlooks but was generally in a precarious economic and social situation. Generally, however, too much has been made of this precariousness. The petty bourgeoisie bore the brunt of industrialization and modernization in all

their forms. Yet at the same time they furthered the process of industrialization and in the twentieth century were essential cogs in the vast projects of Soviet-style socialism, fascism, the European interventionist welfare state, and even the conservative, promarket regimes, such as that in Great Britain in the 1980s under Margaret Thatcher.

The results of the early challenges of industrialization were seen in the politics of the large numbers of people who filled lower-middle-class occupations. Most often it was a defensive politics of interest or corporation that shifted uneasily between left and right by the mid-nineteenth century. Nonetheless, to overemphasize the weaknesses of this social formation misses the important social and political power generated by the functions of the petty bourgeoisie within both socialist and capitalist societies. The occupations of the petty bourgeoisie were crucial to all the major state-building projects of the twentieth century. Through these occupations, the lower middle classes became a powerful social force despite the fact that they had to fit into the cultural and political hegemonies of classes to which they were in most respects alien, that is, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

It is hard to study the petty bourgeoisie or “lower middle classes.” Scholarship made great strides in the late twentieth century, but the groups and layers have been understudied compared to the more attractive histories of the workers, peasants, entrepreneurs, and professionals. The petty bourgeoisie were attacked vehemently by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who predicted their disappearance. Their history does not seem at first glance to shed much light on the profound historical movements and events of modern Europe. But that is the paradox, for these middling people in fact played key roles in the major revolutionary events. Petty bourgeois groups were in the forefront of the politics of “antimodernism” and hostility to liberalism. They formed part of the electoral support for fascist parties in Italy and Germany and fed various right-wing movements in France as well. In Russia, however, the lower middle strata leaned to-

ward the left, an essential social base for the Populist and Socialist Parties, and helped build the world's first socialist state, the USSR.

Thus it is no longer possible to maintain the dominant ideas associated with the petty bourgeoisie in earlier historical writings. The first idea was that the group was nonconcrete, that the petty bourgeoisie had no consistent social or cultural characteristics, lacked definition, and therefore was not a class in a marxist or any other sociological sense. The second idea was that the group emerged out of the concrete guild institutions of the Middle Ages and the early modern period and that its trajectory was inevitably toward a class within "modern" capitalism. Marx and Engels predicted that, despite its high point in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the petty bourgeoisie must inevitably lose its confrontation with capital and disappear. The last image of the petty bourgeoisie was that its discontents fueled and became a mainstay of fascism. According to this view, a straight line existed between the confrontation of artisans and shopkeepers with late nineteenth-century capitalism and twentieth-century fascism. However, the petty bourgeoisie survived and indeed reinvented itself several times during the long history of its confrontation with capitalism. Artisans could and did play an important role in electoral and corporate politics even in the twentieth century. Adding the Russian and Soviet experience to the mix, clearly the lower middle occupational groups in the right circumstances could just as well become state builders on the left as well as active elements of corporatist or fascist movements and politics on the right.

FROM CORPORATE TRADITIONS TO INDIVIDUALISM

Beleaguered shopkeepers seeking to defend older forms of commerce and turning to the right were not the whole story, however. In Britain the rise of shopkeepers was vital to the consumer revolution of the eighteenth century. There, too, shopkeepers were intermediate between middle and working classes, often supporting the latter, on whom their businesses might depend. Concern about department stores and other innovations developed. But British shopkeepers never coalesced politically, certainly not on the right. They hoped for some government protection but with fewer partisan overtones.

The German term *Mittelstand* (middle class) originated in the Middle Ages in the estate society of central Europe and the orderly world of handicrafts and artisanship. The meaning changed significantly

during the nineteenth century. The middling or mediating nature of these groups was captured in the definition, yet the *Mittelstand* increasingly represented the space between the bourgeoisie and high professionals on the one hand and the proletariat and peasantry on the other. Far from lacking a firm set of characteristics, the classical petty bourgeoisie derived their livelihoods from their own capital and labor. They earned income from small-scale property that they worked with the help of family or limited wage labor. As Geoffrey Crossick and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt put it, petty bourgeois economic activity in both form and manner of operation centered on the family. The foundations of the preindustrial petty bourgeoisie were corporations and guilds of medieval and early modern Europe. These corporations, which organized craft production and trade, were powerful everywhere in Europe except England through the mid-eighteenth century. Monopoly and order were the corporate goals, reinforced and maintained by strict entrance requirements, family origins, and conservative social norms. It was easier for the sons of master artisans, for example, to reach that status, though the typical path was through a formal apprenticeship, followed by journeyman status, and eventually independent practice in the trade as a master, having won the approval of the jury of the corporation. This approval was based on expertise in the craft. The path involved symbolic rituals buttressing the notion of the corporation as a harmonious community that protected its members and looked after its member families in time of need. These corporations in turn were part of the hierarchy of the towns, so citizenship and a place in the guild and family were part of the social identity of the master artisan.

Early challenges to this order came even before the French Revolution and the rise of liberalism and capitalism. Challenges came from the state, stratification within the guilds, and dissatisfied journeymen, who wished to strike out on their own. Corporate structures were strongest in Germany. Though weaker in France, even there small-scale enterprises and artisan life persisted into the late nineteenth century. The corporate traditions were weakest in England, where individual small-scale enterprises developed and flourished much earlier than on the Continent. The corporate traditions permitted German master artisans to organize to defend themselves and their idealized way of life against industrialization, free trade, and liberalism in politics.

In France the shopkeepers organized much later in the century and with volatile, rapid shifts from left to right in politics. The petty bourgeoisie and lower middle classes saw the power of organized labor yet

wanted to maintain their separateness from labor, and they were susceptible to the appeals of nationalism. Though French shopkeepers moved to the right, the shift was by no means simple. It involved a thorough transformation of shopkeepers' place socially and politically, their relationship to the state and its various branches of government, and their relationship to other interests, especially big business and employees. After several unsuccessful attempts to organize shopkeepers, the *Ligue pour la Défense des Intérêts du Travail, de l'Industrie, et du Commerce* was created in Paris in 1888. Quickly growing to 100,000 members, it lasted until the outbreak of World War I. At first the league's political view was radical socialist, and its main demands centered around punitive taxation of the threatening department store. Its code word was "specialization," summarized in the following 1896 appeal in the league's official newspaper, *La Revendication*:

The money you bring from all over Paris and spend in those commercial agglomerations is absolutely lost to you. . . . If on the other hand, the hatter did business with her neighbor the shoe merchant, and the shoe merchant reciprocated, then both would make money and be all the more willing to do business with the neighborhood butcher, *charcutier* [pork butcher] and wine-seller. In helping your neighbors to earn a living, you are making customers for yourself and creating an environment of mutual respect. If centralization is bad

in political matters, it is even more harmful from an economic point of view. (Nord, 1986)

The enemy was defined as all that threatened the economic independence of the local community—the department stores, financial institutions, cooperatives, and bureaucratic state. In common with representatives of the petty bourgeoisie elsewhere in Europe, the league considered itself a defender of the family, the locality, and the workplace. Foreign competition and by extension foreigners were viewed with hostility. French shopkeepers were protectionists, and as Philip Nord put it, they detested economic liberalism and were not in fact individualists. Rather they saw the family and workplace as "little communities organized hierarchically and cemented by ties of sentiment," not as institutions of free and equal individuals bound by contractual relations. The league spoke of "direct democracy" and invoked the traditions of the revolution of 1789. But the larger political context came into play as the radical right began to use rhetoric that appealed to the shopkeepers.

In addition Christian democracy after 1891 launched a defense of the small shopkeeper as a victim of the anarchy of free market individualism. According to this view, *laissez-faire* policies imposed by a cabal of Jews and Freemasons threatened the family, small shop, and other natural associations. The cure

turn inspired creation in 1904 of the Institut International pour l'Étude du Problème des Classes Moyennes, a permanent body, headquartered in Brussels, to study the problems of the petty bourgeoisie. Interest in the petty bourgeoisie on the part of large capital and conservative politicians derived from a desire for stability and a fear of socialism, similar to the motivations behind fascism later in the twentieth century. The smallholder and artisan were considered virtuous, and most important they occupied a "strategic social location, at the juncture where labor and capital met. The small shopkeeper, by virtue of his middling rank, blurred the lines of social cleavage and tempered the shock of class struggle." This rapid shift in the outlook and political alignment of the shopkeepers illustrates the unique characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie as a whole that cannot be reduced to simple political and social formulas.

was economic and political decentralization, which would reenergize local bodies as the source of Christian values. The move to the right was abetted by the need to become more effective politicians. The shopkeepers, insofar as they were small propertyholders, were caught between the socialist movement and the bourgeoisie. Shopkeepers as propertyholders and more importantly as believers in the traditional ideology described above did not necessarily support and were not necessarily supported by the emerging layers of commercial employees and white-collar workers, who saw collectivism in the form of cooperatives, for example, as salvation. The Dreyfus affair solidified the shift to the right. Nationalist electoral victories in 1900 and 1902 were in part blamed by the left on the shopkeepers, whom they now saw as enemies of the working class.

Shopkeeper engagement in nationalist politics had its downside, as the league and other bearers of traditional values lost leadership of the movement. The torch passed to syndicates, professional organizations, and new forms of corporatism that persisted after World War I. The ideology of the movement also was transformed as the syndicate took precedence over the local community in the retailer's life. State protection became less important than demands for a consultative role within the executive branch. Finally, shopkeepers identified less with the "people" and more with the *classes moyennes* (middle classes). Such notions and the idea of a full-scale mobilization of the middle classes owed much to the Belgian Catholic publicists Hector Lambrechts and Oscar Pyfferoen, who in 1899 and 1901 organized International Congresses of the Petty Bourgeoisie. These congresses in

WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS AND ARTISANS

A quiet social revolution was taking place alongside the evolution of traditional petty bourgeois social groups. A new social stratum defined as white-collar workers organized by occupation developed. The white-collar workers and the closely related technical personnel were clearly the offspring of late-nineteenth-century capitalism and technological changes. White-collar workers and technical personnel were situated just below the professions in the social hierarchy, though often they adopted and displayed educational and organizational characteristics similar to those of the higher-status professions. The prospects of social mobility for the children of the traditional petty bourgeoisie were limited. The young rarely made it into the higher world of the big bourgeoisie or high-status professions. By the end of the nineteenth century the sons and sometimes the daughters of the petty bourgeoisie, however, were drawn into the new white-collar occupations in commercial or industrial firms, the government bureaucracy, and lower-status professions such as elementary and secondary school teaching. This was one more indication of adaptability and of the new phenomenon of layering within the petty bourgeoisie itself. Henceforth occupation was a more defining characteristic, and place in the layered hierarchy within and among occupations and professions became the essence of social identity.

The rise of white-collar workers raises a host of interpretive questions. The group differed from workers, if only in being nonmanual. But they had routine jobs, often governed by new technologies, such as

typewriters and cash registers. Yet they valued their tentative links with the middle class, taking pride, for example, in wearing business outfits to work. Employers also made every effort to keep them distinct from workers, offering salaries instead of wages and often separate benefit plans. This combination helped keep white-collar workers from significant unionization, though some movements developed. The same combination explains why marxists often berated clerks for their false consciousness. The presence of many women in white-collar ranks, as salesclerks and telephone operators, was another distinctive feature of this rising segment. Eager to protect their standard of living, white-collar families were often at the forefront in limiting family size by the late nineteenth century. Finally, many white-collar workers led in developing novel leisure forms and habits, such as cigarette smoking, that might compensate for the routine nature of their work without seeming to proletarianize them.

World War I came as a watershed both for tradespeople and artisans and for the new lower middle class of white-collar workers, commercial employees, technical intelligentsia, and mid- to lower-level bureaucrats. The petty bourgeoisie in Germany and Russia exhibited the volatility and capacity for changing allegiances from right and center to left and from left to right that became the hallmark of the lower middle classes in the twentieth century. In Germany, in a major shift during the decades leading up to World War I, traditional artisans adopted a politics and culture of “antimodernism,” a term coined by Shulamit Volkov. Reacting to industrialization and the growing power of capitalism, the artisans responded negatively to liberals and socialists alike. They expressed a mood of hostility to democratic institutions and politics linked to a capitalism that was destroying their way of life. These attitudes changed to some extent during the war, as some artisans identified more with wealthier factory owners and store owners under the pressures of the mobilized state.

The ambivalence if not hostility of artisans toward what they loosely labeled “modernity” formed a ready reservoir of support for antidemocratic and fascist movements in the Weimar Republic, including the Nazis. White-collar workers, on the other hand, were more numerous and more powerful as a result of the war and the expansion of capitalist and government institutions. The lower middle classes (or *Mittelstand*) were split. A good number leaned heavily to the left and identified with the social and economic plight of factory workers and organized labor. In fact organization of white-collar workers was the order of the day, and numerous large associations were created.

The war pressured white-collar workers with inflation and stagnant or falling wages.

In France, where the structure of the economy was more conducive to the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the *artisanat* (craftsmen) virtually recreated their structure after the war in what has been termed an artisanal renaissance. In March 1922 representatives of artisanal groups met in Paris and formed the General Confederation of French Artisans (CGAF). Skilled tradespeople earlier had formed syndicates and federations that established lines of demarcation from both unskilled labor and capital, but the creation of the CGAF was a major shift from a traditional corporate trade consciousness to a class idea that posited the *artisanat* as a group with common interests based on skills and limited property. The Artisanal Charter of 1923 presented the *artisanat* as a *tampon social*, a “social buffer in a troubled tumultuous time, as a group based on the quality of work, on individualism and regional diversity” (Zdatny, 1990).

The French artisanal movement was unusually cohesive. At its core was the notion of the “profession,” or “human activity . . . productive as opposed to speculative . . . manual, full of personality, as opposed to anonymous, mechanical and schematized” (Zdatny, 1990, p. 123). This was music to the ears of corporatists who, like the more radical fascists, believed in the idea of social harmony, an anti-class war notion of society, based on occupation, “the shared skill and holistic labor experience.” The occupation or profession was the antidote to class identity and the threat of bolshevism. The occupation was, of course, closely linked to the family. The *artisanat* in the 1930s was drawn to both corporatism and syndicalism as political movements hostile to market capitalism. Al-

though a significant number of artisans opted in the late 1930s for the rightist utopias of corporatism, they never accepted the authoritarianism of fascism itself.

RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

In Russia the lower middle classes played a crucial role in the development of economic institutions, in three early-twentieth-century revolutions, and in building the world's first socialist state, the USSR. The Russian lower middle strata were truly a "hidden class" both before and after the revolutions of 1917. Their powerful social movement was instrumental in the growth of capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Russian experience combined political volatility and ambiguity with economic and institutional staying power, a relevant model for lower middle strata experiences elsewhere in Europe.

In Russia the lower middle strata leaned heavily and quickly to the left and saw factory workers and the peasantry as their natural allies. Russian commercial employees, cooperative workers, shop personnel, teachers, and medical assistants never formed a solid alliance with the liberal parties of the left center or center, such as the Kadets, Progressists, or Octobrists. The magnetism of bourgeois life remained weak, largely because the bourgeoisie was small and fragmented but also because the antibourgeois ideologies of the left, both marxism and populism, were strong. Instead, the Russian or petty bourgeoisie remained well hidden to historians and even to contemporaries because of the dominant marxist paradigm of society that emphasized workers and peasants and their struggles against capital and the nobility. The lower middle strata were full participants in the social and political movements that produced the February and October Revolutions in 1917. They organized according to occupation and profession in a prolific manner and assumed leading roles in professional organizations, congresses, political parties, and the Soviets. The Russian provisional government leaned on them heavily, especially the cooperative movement, in its half-baked attempt to transcend the market amidst the revolutionary turmoil of 1917. This mass of educated and skilled personnel was largely invisible in political discourse, a lesson in how language can obfuscate as well as shape or create social realities.

When the Soviets came to power in 1917 at the head of what was loudly proclaimed as a socialist revolution guided by a workers' and peasants' state, it was convenient to de-emphasize the powerful role of the lower middle strata in the revolution and in building the Soviet state and society. Yet in fact the entire

infrastructure of administrative and economic institutions that had grown up in the early twentieth century and had reached maturity during World War I and the revolutions of 1917 was staffed by the burgeoning masses of white-collar workers. Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks seized and maintained power and built a vast bureaucratic state quickly due to the organizational prowess of this underrecognized social group and the social revolution in which they participated as equal members with the striking factory labor, the armed forces, and the peasantry. Throughout the 1920s the Soviet lower middle class tried to fit in, to become mediators in the new socialist state and society, while avoiding the opprobrium of birth outside the proletariat. Their greatest fear was rejection as members of the socialist commonweal. They fit in and became indispensable. The social revolution continued with the addition of large numbers of women to the white-collar workforce, a feature of the new lower-middle-class life and occupations that was duplicated elsewhere in Europe. Joseph Stalin's revolution from above at the end of the 1920s and throughout the 1930s again created great instability for employees yet increased opportunities in a vastly expanding industrial economy, collectivized agriculture, and the building of new cities. All required armies of white-collar personnel.

THE SELF-IMAGE OF THE LOWER MIDDLE CLASS

Elsewhere in Europe the petty bourgeoisie were influenced by the dominant models of politics emerging from under the rubble of World War I and the Russian Revolution. In all countries some visible patterns were observable and similar questions were framed. Were the new strata of technical and protoprofessionals full members of the middle class, or were they subordinate to those higher up in the professional hierarchies and mediators between capital and labor?

With the Soviets the power of the new lower middle class in twentieth century history is clearer. For example, the self-image of the emerging technocratic lower middle classes was expressed by a twenty-four-year-old industrial chemist in June 1939:

I belong to the lower middle class. From the financial consideration, I should limit this to income ranges of about 200–300 pounds per annum. . . . In a word, the middle class man must be a black coated worker. . . . Although I belong to the blackcoated middle class, I do not think this classification is very hard and fast. For I belong to another division of the middle class, what I may call the "technologically educated" class. This division I consider very important—and interest-

ing from a historical point of view. Soon after the Industrial Revolution when Marx made his classical analysis, and it appeared as though society would divide in the main between the rich capitalist class and the poor, uneducated, unskilled machine-minding proletariat. But there has been an increasing growth of this “technological class” . . . as well as the clerical classes, accountants and the like. This technical class does show differences from the working class, and also from the purely “blackcoated” section of the middle class. Its members are highly trained specialists, with or without (generally without) wide cultural interests. It is more independent than the “blackcoated” section . . . but it has not the independence and social solidarity of the almost defunct “skilled artisan” class. And it has less power, and more opportunities for power, than any other class in the modern world. (Jeffery, p. 70)

This group’s social parameters are revealing. This lower middle class of public servants, teachers, bank and insurance officials, technicians, draftspeople, and clerical workers in the private sector earned between 250 and 500 pounds per year and received pensions, sick benefits and holidays with pay in generally secure posts. A skilled worker by contrast might earn 4 to 5 pounds per week and a university professor 1,000 pounds per year. They established a considerable social weight and political power by the end of the 1930s. During the 1920s and 1930s the lower middle class adhered to the national governments of the conservatives. The lower middle class was never proletarianized, nor did it find the fascism of Sir Oswald Mosely appealing. A generational shift in the 1930s and threats in the foreign arena radicalized some younger people.

FASCISM AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM

The social history of fascism in Italy only joined historians’ agendas in the late twentieth century. Nevertheless, the petty bourgeoisie, particularly the lower middle classes and the intelligentsia, were deeply embedded in the fascist movement. The Italian historian Luigi Salvatorelli labeled them “literate illiterates,” and Antonio Gramsci applied the term “monkey people” to this group. Salvatorelli identified a “humanistic lower middle class” found in “bureaucratic offices, scholastic halls and petty professional activities” among the supporters of fascism. According to him these people were half-educated possessors of a “smattering of formulaic and grammatical culture, the literacy of the illiterate.” They lacked the critical and synthetic abilities to use their knowledge to evaluate the contemporary political scene. Gramsci described fascism as “the urban petty bourgeoisie’s latest performance in the theater of national political life.” He warned that the monkey people “supply daily news,

they do not create history, they leave traces in the newspapers, they do not offer materials to write books.” Teachers, civil servants and white-collar employees became ardent supporters of Italian fascism, turning to the rhetorical ideals of the nation and the utopias of occupational hierarchies directly linked to the state to overcome the threat of class conflict.

In July 1929 the liberal German newspaper *Vösische Zeitung* claimed that the National Socialists represented “the petty bourgeoisie gone mad.” (Crossick and Haupt, p. 224). Similarly in 1930 the German sociologist Theodor Geiger called Nazi electoral success the result of “a panic in the *Mittelstand*” induced by economic crisis. Indeed many others linked the petty bourgeoisie, romanticism, and irrationality with fascism, defined as an “extremism of the middle.” These views repeat the antimodernism arguments of the late nineteenth century. Insofar as such arguments are teleological and monocausal, ignoring the role of other social groups in supporting the Nazis, they can be dismissed readily. As to actual lower-middle-class support of the Nazis, the picture is more ambiguous.

As demonstrated above, specific occupations and trades and their contexts are decisive in determining the actual political behavior of the lower middle class. Evidence, especially in local and regional studies, shows that owners of small retail shops and artisanal enterprises were attracted strongly to the Nazi movement and that the Nazis had entered their organizations by the end of the Weimar Republic. Although both the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the new lower middle class joined the Nazi party in numbers larger than their share of the laboring population as a whole, the majority by far remained outside the party. The German lower middle class was “preoccupied with the power and ritual of voluntary organizations” (Koshar, 1990, pp. 34–35). The party had to mobilize the lower middle class through such voluntary associations, which were often locally based. Nationalism, which in Germany also had strong local foundations, played well into the process of co-optation and mobilization. Still the new lower middle class in particular was well represented among party members. Distinctions are necessary. For example, shopkeepers voted for Nazis more often than did artisans, and Protestant areas in the north did also compared to Catholics in the south.

The Nazi Party benefited only from “shifting support among white collar and civil service groups; collectively these groups were not good predictors of the Nazi vote ‘even after the calamities of the world economic crisis descended on the Republic.’ ” (Koshar, 1990, p. 43). The Nazis had a nucleus of support among artisans and shopkeepers as noted above, but

they relied on large votes from elites outside the lower middle class as well as approximately 3.5 million workers in, for example, the Reichstag elections of July 1932.

Nazism used marketing principles to appeal to particular groups. Lower-middle-class political activity emerged out of the particular contexts set in motion by the upheavals of World War I and its aftermath. In a way the Nazis exploited a gap in language. For the more traditional members of the *Mittelstand* the Weimar experience meant neglect from the state and favors for interest groups representing large economic and social blocs. Most parties of the new democracy did not attempt to win traditional petty bourgeois support. In ideological terms, social democracy could not connect with a retrograde *Mittelstand*, the Center Party focused on the Catholic population, and the Democratic Party was too weak to effectively represent them. The Communists tried to connect with the traditional petty bourgeoisie, but the latter felt uncomfortable with them because of their nationalism and because the Communists were too closely linked to the Soviet Union. The parties and rhetoric of the right had an open field. The Nazis exploited the gap, but only through the filter of politics and only over time.

CONCLUSION

The lower middle class or petty bourgeoisie was clearly a dynamic and positive force in European history. It was capable of frequent reinventions and expansions to include new occupations and skilled, semiprofessional positions within the technology and information-driven economies of the twentieth century. Though

their appeal and self-conception often were couched in traditional language and their values looked to an idealized “pre-modern social order,” they organized for modern mass politics and affected the larger political frameworks in which they operated. Culturally they readily blended in, sometimes to imitate the prevailing cultural norms, whether bourgeois or proletarian, but also as major components of a mass consumer society. Its members were never just the passive victims of larger historical forces such as industrialization. Their attraction to retrograde movements such as fascism was never complete, uniform, or foreordained. Their collective social power in fact grew exponentially in the twentieth century, as they anchored regimes and economic and social systems across the political spectrum. They were, along with the working class, an important vehicle for labor opportunities for women, as entire sectors of the clerical workforce, shop personnel, and professions such as teaching brought in female labor and became feminized.

Members of the twentieth-century lower middle class set themselves apart from factory laborers in appearance, status, and outlook and were located astride sometimes permeable boundaries in relation to the big bourgeoisie and high-status professions. Most professions in fact had lower-ranking analogues, such as paramedical personnel in medicine; technical personnel, draftspeople, or statisticians in engineering; and elementary teachers in education, whose members fit securely into the lower middle class. Much remains undiscovered about these layers of society, their culture, the relative importance of occupational and professional associations and political parties, their relationship to matters of gender and family, and their relationship to the dynamics of post-cold war ethnicity and nationalism.

See also other articles in this section.

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WORKING CLASSES



Dick Geary

FROM WORKERS TO WORKING CLASSES, 1750–1850

The term “working classes”: a modern category.

All societies have depended on the labor of “workers” in various forms, yet the *Oxford English Dictionary* records the first use of the term “working classes” in 1789. It only entered into broader parlance after 1815. In the works of Daniel Defoe, Gregory King, and Edmund Burke, social divisions were categorized as “ranks” and “orders,” not “classes.” Eighteenth-century references to “manufacturers” included both employers and employees in a particular trade, but by the 1830s “manufacturer” and “craftsman” often meant “capitalist” and “wageworker” respectively. In Germany the term “worker” (*Arbeiter*) was used rarely before 1800. *Arbeitende Klassen* (working classes) was known but denoted artisans, including the self-employed, domestic servants, agricultural laborers, and even peasants. From the 1830s, however, the term was applied more specifically to manual wage laborers, as the self-employed were gradually excluded, though this exclusion took several decades. In Britain, France, and Germany in the 1830s and 1840s the designation “worker” became a form of self-characterization. This article is concerned with that modern category of employment.

The late appearance of class terminology reflected a social order in which wage labor for life was far from universal and in most European countries the exception rather than the rule. Much agricultural production in eastern Europe, where serfdom was prevalent, was for subsistence rather than the market as in large parts of France, Spain, and Italy and in southern Germany. Even where free workers labored for a landowner, their remuneration often was nonmonetary, that is, housing, food, and fuel. In urban Europe, especially where guild regulations remained in place, each trade retained a distinct identity, and its members fought with those of other trades. In England in 1801 many employed in manufacture had double occupations, weaving and farming, for instance, and others

returned to husbandry at harvesttime. Furthermore family economies were often mixed, with children and women tending smallholdings while men worked in manufacture. Rural trades and industries did not share a common interest with their urban counterparts, for the spread of manufacture beyond the control of urban regulation could be a major source of grievance for urban craftspeople. A complex pattern of local particularities further obviated collective identities.

Working classes and the changing shape of protest.

The shift to a language of classes corresponded to changes in the nature of labor and collective action. Until the 1820s in Britain, the 1850s in France, and the 1860s in Germany the most common form of popular protest was the riot or demonstration against high food prices, conscription, and taxation. These actions were not shaped by conflict between employers and their workers but rested on communal solidarities, which embraced women and children. They were joined after 1800, however, by a new repertoire of protest that both reflected and promoted the creation of working-class identities. The new repertoire included the destruction of industrial machinery or Luddism. In many respects Luddite actions resembled riots. They were localized, they lacked formal organization though they often required considerable planning, and they rested on the use or threat of violence. However, although Luddite crowds often included other members of the community, they were primarily made up of workers from the trades threatened by industrial machinery, and their actions were against merchants and industrialists. By promoting the notion that workers had a set of separate and definable interests, Luddism and other, similar actions helped create new identifications based on class.

The strike promoted this type of identification even more strongly. Strikes were far from unknown in eighteenth-century France and were common in preindustrial Germany. In Britain industrial action was relatively frequent before 1800. However, strikes occurred much more often after 1800. The strike dif-

ferred significantly from earlier forms of protest in its social composition and its reliance on the withdrawal of labor as its principal weapon, though violence often accompanied early strikes. It was clearly a struggle between workers and their bosses and demonstrated the increasing importance of wage-dependency in the most advanced European economies.

The first working class organizations. From the 1820s in Britain and the 1830s in France workers also developed a rich organizational life of discussion clubs, cooperatives, trade unions, and in some cases political organizations. The most common organization was the friendly society. England had over 1 million such societies by 1815, and France had some two thousand in the 1840s. Skilled workers founded friendly societies in most other European countries later in the nineteenth century, for example in Spain in the 1840s and in Russia in the 1870s. These societies provided against the misfortunes of accident, sickness, and old age in the days before the welfare state. Sometimes they expressly forbade any involvement in politics. However, they could become a focus for collective action in a single trade, serve as a cloak for radical politics in repressive regimes, and on occasion develop into trade unions.

Producer and consumer cooperatives were more clearly related to dissatisfaction with the prevailing economic order. These were created not only to provide workers with cheap and reliable goods but also to bypass the capitalist merchant in manufacture. In some cases they aimed to reestablish the craftsman's control over the product and the labor process through collectively purchasing raw materials and selling the finished goods. By 1832 Britain counted five hundred cooperative societies with over twenty thousand members. Some were only concerned with retailing, though their contribution to working-class welfare should not be ignored. Others had more sweeping aims to combat unemployment and to provide their workers with remuneration commensurate with their labor. In France the movement toward cooperative associations was the principal form of working-class activity in the 1830s and 1840s.

Simultaneously trade unions increased in significance, especially in Britain. Wool combers, shoemakers, hatters, shipwrights, and tailors had an organizational history that reached back into the eighteenth century and was by no means terminated by repressive legislation after 1800. However, the partial legalization of union activity in 1824 led to a proliferation of trade societies capable of organizing strikes. Until the 1820s the most common union was formed by a single trade in a single town. Such unions often func-

tioned additionally as friendly societies, and they usually attempted to restrict apprenticeship and entry into a trade. English cotton spinners, for example, excluded hand loom weavers from their organization. In the 1830s most British unions remained exclusive, despite some famous but abortive attempts to found general national unions. They also remained small. The masons' union, which was one of the largest, had only 5,500 members in 1851. Not until the advent of the New Model Unions, especially the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) around the middle of the century, did effective national confederations of trade unions come into existence, though these too usually restricted membership.

In France masons, carpenters, tailors, printers, and engineering workers organized under the July Monarchy (1830–1848) despite repressive legislation, and they continued more overtly in the 1848 revolution. In the Rhineland craft associations came into existence in the 1840s, while during the revolutionary upheavals of 1848, German cigar makers, printers, and engineering workers formed trade associations. Skilled workers created trade unions in the 1860s and 1870s in Russia, Italy, Spain, and most of western Europe.

Often these early unions refused to become involved in radical politics. In Britain, for example, unionized miners did not wish to be associated with Chartist political agitation, and print unions in Britain, France, and Germany turned their backs on politics. Though unions were not exclusive to workers in an economically strong position, most unskilled laborers found it almost impossible to sustain combination in periods of high unemployment or against employer offensives. Stable unions were created by those with skills, a strong bargaining position, and relative job security, whereas the journeymen of the depressed trades of weaving, tailoring, and shoemaking often provided the fuel for radical Chartism, revolutionary secret societies in Paris, and the Brotherhood of German Workers in 1848.

Yet union organization and political radicalism were not necessarily at odds. The state's frustration of attempts to form economic unions could force even moderate unionists into the ranks of political protest. To a certain extent that was the case in Britain in the early years of the nineteenth century. In France the repression of working-class industrial action in the 1830s and the 1840s led to insurrections in Lyon and Paris as well as the formation of revolutionary societies. The increase in strikes and trade unions provides evidence that growing numbers of workers identified a conflict between their interests and those of their employers, even though their solidarity usually failed to extend beyond the individual trade. In some co-

operatives and political organizations, however, a broader critique of capitalism and a language of class appeared.

Between 1815 and 1850 European workers adopted a discourse of class. Some British workers espoused the cause of radical Chartism, often because they came from depressed artisan trades and possessed little industrial muscle or because other forms of protest, such as petitions and Luddism, had failed or had been thwarted by laws of association. In the 1840s radical Chartists, such as Ernest Jones, deployed the language of class interest and a more diffuse populist and cross-class rhetoric. Advocates of cooperative socialism, including Robert Owen, George Mudie, Francis Bray, and Thomas Hodgskin, developed a critique of market economics centered on a labor theory of value and a concept of parasitical capitalism. In Paris workers read the publications of the utopian socialists, such as Étienne Cabet and Charles Fourier. Despite the fantastical nature of many of their projects, these socialists produced a trenchant critique of capitalism and recurrent economic crisis, although they did not speak to an exclusively working-class audience. They also had a profound effect on Karl Marx. In Germany the formation of the Brotherhood of German Workers in 1848 marked the point at which many journeymen broke with their masters and categorized themselves as workers. By 1850 therefore some workers in the economically advanced economies of Europe had engaged in strikes, joined unions, and embraced radical politics, though not necessarily all three.

Throughout the early industrial period the definition of the urban working class is complicated by the deep divisions between artisans and the less coherent groups of factory workers, only a few of whom had artisanal backgrounds. Most organized working-class activity, such as unions, was in fact artisanal. Only the Chartists and some of the 1848 uprisings suggested the existence of shared interests and perceptions between these segments of the working class.

A second issue that runs through working-class history is the relationship between protest history and a larger but definable working-class experience or culture. Many workers enjoyed the same leisure interests, including social drinking. Most held a highly masculine value system that relegated women to domestic functions, at least in principle. They also shared characteristics as consumers and had some sense of cooperation, bailing each other out in hard times. While a few workers strove for upward mobility, the majority were attached to a more traditional idea of work that clashed with employer attempts to increase pace and output. Some of these values were more

widely shared than the ideas promoted by specific organizational or protest efforts.

The origins of working-class identity. A classic argument about the rise of Luddism, strike action, union organization, and the language of class links these phenomena directly to the growth of an industrial economy and to the resultant material deprivation and social upheaval. This view derives some support from the fact that the nation with the largest labor movement in 1850—Britain—was also the most advanced economically. Whereas France, the German states, most of the Iberian Peninsula outside Catalonia, all but the north of Italy, and virtually the whole of eastern Europe remained predominantly agrarian at mid-century, almost 43 percent of the British labor force was employed in manufacturing in 1851. Furthermore the chronology of strikes and labor organization tended to follow that of industrialization, with its first appearance in Britain, followed by Belgium, France, and Germany with eastern Europe trailing. It also seems perfectly rational to believe that low wages, long working hours, unsanitary and dangerous working environments, and appalling and overcrowded housing conditions explain working-class protest. The personal upheaval involved in the transition to impersonal factory labor and migration to unfamiliar urban environments also has been seen as alienating workers and causing protests. However, the relationships among industrialization, living standards, social upheaval, and class identity are not simple. Examinations of these different aspects follow below.

Poverty and the formation of working-class identity. Regarding impoverishment as an explanation of labor protest and organization, what was happening to working-class living standards in the first half of the nineteenth century is far from clear or uniform. Standards varied from country to country, from region to region, and from one occupational group to another. Most calculations suggest that material conditions in Britain improved between 1790 and 1850 as average real wages probably rose by 25 percent. However, this global figure hid enormous variations. Compositors, craftspeople in the building trades, engineers, and boilermakers were especially fortunate, whereas Black Country nail makers, faced with machine competition, and Lancashire hand loom weavers, whose livelihood was threatened by Irish, female, and rural labor, experienced a dramatic decline in living standards. What made this situation worse was that earlier economic expansion had actually benefited these workers. Thus

ism were fueled as much by memories of better days and traditions of association as by poverty. The permanently poor, those who had known nothing but low living standards, were likely to be absent from protests. In any case, many strikes and virtually all stable unions were the product of the strength of skilled workers with increasing rather than declining resources. The absence of a necessary connection between poverty and industrial militancy or political radicalism will become even more apparent in the subsequent discussion of class identity after 1850.

SOCIAL UPHEAVAL AND THE FORMATION OF WORKING-CLASS IDENTITY

One argument states that social upheaval and uprooting contributed to alienation, grievance, and protest and that strikes were the result of a pathological crisis connected with the dissolution of traditional ties and with a generation of workers unaccustomed to urban and factory environments. However, strikers were rarely uprooted outsiders but tended to be well integrated into their local communities. In addition the later stages of industrial growth after 1850 exhibited higher, not lower, strike rates. Furthermore the centers of working-class protest before 1850 were usually older sites of manufacture, including Paris, Marseille, Berlin, and Leipzig, with strong craft traditions, not new industrial areas. In Halifax, England, the operatives of the new factories distanced themselves from Chartism, which had a much greater attraction among the craft trades of Huddersfield. Family units often worked together in the textile factories of Lancashire. In Germany distance migrants rarely traveled alone. In Russia factory workers in an individual plant often came from the same village.

Thus the concept of individual uprooting and anomie needs qualification. Distance migrants and new industrial workers needed time to adapt to the rhythms and disciplines of industry, which were prerequisites of union formation, and time to learn the lessons of the trade cycle as to when was the best time to strike. In many parts of eastern and southern Europe this learning process was at best just beginning on the eve of World War I.

Mechanization and the formation of working-class identity. It may seem more likely that class identity was a consequence of mechanized factory labor, which supposedly created a more homogeneous working class. However, the language of class and new forms of protest emerged in Britain, Bel-

changed circumstances rather than simple poverty generated bitter protest among hand loom weavers. Clearly factory workers were not always in the worst circumstances. Factory hours were certainly long, but they were often less so than in nonfactory and rural occupations. Moreover, for good or ill, work became more regular and less dependent on the seasons for those in manufacture in Britain between 1800 and 1850. Even for better-placed workers, however, the inflationary crisis of the 1790s and subsequent slumps in 1815, 1819, 1829 had deleterious effects on real wages or employment prospects respectively. A crisis of the scale of 1842, when a downturn in the trade cycle was accompanied by harvest failure, could not help but depress the condition of workers. In summary, British industrialization did not entail any universal fall in living standards.

In less industrial continental Europe real wages may have declined more generally. A combination of cyclical unemployment and harvest failure devastated the German textile town of Krefeld, where three out of every eight looms were idle, and Cologne, where a third of the population was dependent on public assistance in 1847. Both Luddism and political radical-

gium, France, and Germany before factory production had become widespread. Even Britain had fewer than 100,000 male factory operatives in 1830. Twenty years later domestic outworkers and artisans still outnumbered factory workers. Moreover unskilled factory labor did not form unions, rally to Chartism, or join the Parisian societies and the Brotherhood of German workers. Unions recruited from craft workers in relatively stable employment, while radical politics found strong support among the degraded artisanal trades of tailoring, furniture manufacturing, and shoe-making.

Some have argued that the centrality of the artisan experience rather than the factory experience to the growth of class awareness does not contradict the significance of industrialization in the genesis of working-class identity, for supposedly mechanized production deskilled artisans. For some workers, including nail makers and framework knitters, the problem indeed was mechanization. However, these cases were exceptional. Many artisans, wheelwrights, shipwrights, hatters, watchmakers, jewelers, barbers, and butchers, were wholly or partially insulated from new techniques. Others, such as Birmingham metalworkers and Sheffield toolmakers, adapted to factory production without a loss of skills and earnings. Even in the trades most vulnerable to expansion and degradation, such as tailoring and shoe-making, elite groups of workers continued to produce for the luxury end of the market. The trades most strongly represented among radical Chartists, French revolutionaries, and the Brotherhood of German workers—tailors, shoemakers, and furniture makers—were from trades not affected by mechanized production.

Merchant capitalism and the formation of working-class identity. If mechanization, social upheaval, and poverty did not generate working-class protest, what factors did? One of the most serious threats was not industrial capitalism but capitalism in its merchant form. In Britain, France, and Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century merchants began to relocate industries in rural areas and to deploy low-wage outworkers, a process often labeled protoindustrialization. Dispersion often brought a greater division of the labor process and the use of cheaper materials and labor. The growth of outwork led to substantial overmanning in tailoring, shoe-making, woodworking, and hand loom weaving. In textiles, craftspeople, even where they remained nominally independent and worked at home, became increasingly dependent on merchants, who purchased and supplied the raw materials and marketed the finished product.

In addition to protoindustry, work simplification extended into the urban strongholds of craftspeople. Large parts of the British woodworking and clothing trades were taken over by garret masters and sweating workshops. In Paris artisan tailors were undercut by sweatshop competition and the production of off-the-peg clothing. Shoemaking and tailoring were becoming sweated trades in Marseille in the 1840s, and German cabinetmakers became de facto employees of large furniture manufacturers. Many artisans, often with high expectations and traditions of organization, thus became increasingly dependent upon merchants, who owned the raw materials, the final product of their labor, and in certain trades like hosiery, even their tools. This dependence explains the growth of artisan socialism and cooperation and led to the denunciation of capitalists as parasites.

Political variables and the formation of working-class identity. The emergence of artisan socialism and the search for political remedies was no automatic response to changes in the labor process, however. It was driven by political variables. The European state, which previously had regulated the conditions of craft labor, increasingly encouraged the development of free market forces after 1800. In several countries between 1780 and 1850 apprenticeship, entry into a trade, and the introduction of machinery were deregulated, and wage controls were abolished. This explains why major aims of artisan agitation in Britain in the early nineteenth century were first the strict observation of the Elizabethan Statute of Artificers and Apprentices (1563) and, after its repeal in 1814, its reintroduction. The run-down condition of public relief in Britain, France, and the German states between 1800 and 1850 and an increasingly free market in grain also were perceived as infringements of the rules of a moral economy and an abandonment of the state's duty. German artisans demanded restrictions on apprenticeship and entry into the manufacturing trades, especially where guild regulations had been abolished, as in Prussia.

British political protest and awareness of workers' common interests after 1800 was also a consequence of increasing repression. The Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800, the use of the military against Luddite actions, and the use of yeomanry volunteers against demonstrators, most infamously in the Peterloo Massacre in Manchester in 1819, gave rise to an acute sense of discrimination and politicized grievances. A French law, the *loi le Chapelier*, which took effect in 1791, proscribed combinations and contributed to the growth of revolutionary societies in Paris

and to insurrections there and in Lyon. Strikes and combinations were also illegal in most of the German states until the 1860s except for the brief revolutionary interlude of 1848.

WORKING-CLASS IDENTITY IN 1850

The emergence of a sense of class arose from the interaction of worker expectations, merchant domination in the workplace, the state's retreat from paternalism, and repressive legislation. That identity, however, remained fragile and extremely limited in 1850. Many workers were unaffected by merchant capitalism, and factory labor was mostly quiescent. Moreover most of the skilled workers who formed unions were as anxious to protect their own interests against other workers as against their employers. Industrial militancy and trade union organization did entail conflict between the employer and worker and required some degree of solidarity. In this sense they indicated a degree of class awareness.

This solidarity was usually restricted to an individual craft and did not necessarily imply any shared identity with workers as a whole. What is more, those who became radical Chartists, joined Parisian clubs, and went to the barricades in parts of Europe in 1848 were not only journeymen craftspeople but also small masters. Consequently some historians have preferred to see radical Chartism in Britain and republicanism in France as forms of popular rather than class protest. For Gareth Stedman Jones, for example, Chartism arose from a populist political discourse rather than from a new class structure.

As a counterweight to the skeptical position, John Breuilly has shown that artisan socialism had an international structure in the 1840s. Workers in different cultures responded in similar ways to increasing dependence on merchant capitalism, suggesting that ideas of class arose from the conflict between traditional artisan expectations and merchant capitalism. The discourse of class made sense to certain workers in different countries and cultures precisely because of the economic reality of dependence and because restrictive practices were no longer feasible.

Within this economic framework, the presence of small masters in radical artisan movements is explained by the fact that they, like their journeymen, were losing their independence. Master tailors in Cologne and cabinetmakers in Paris were increasingly tied to a single merchant in the 1840s. The Birmingham metal trades carried out their activities in small workshops, but in the 1830s and 1840s these became dependent on larger firms. Masters divided into two

groups. Those with capital resources became merchants, but others became increasingly proletarianized. Channels of mobility for journeymen were blocked by overmanning, and more capital was required to set up as a master. Consequently the interests of masters and journeymen splintered.

As it became increasingly difficult for journeymen to become masters, issues of journeymen's rights, wages, and working conditions set masters and journeymen in conflict. German masters and journeymen together desired restrictions on the import of foreign manufactures, entry into a trade, and the introduction of machinery, but only masters demanded the reintroduction or enforcement of guild regulations, which gave them power over journeymen. This conflict of interests became apparent in the 1848 revolution, when Berlin journeymen formed the Brotherhood of Workers. Similar conflicts had become increasingly bitter in the London tailoring trades in the 1820s and 1830s. In the 1850s and 1860s a growing separation of shopkeepers and masters from workers was evidenced by increasingly endogamous marriage patterns and a separate associational life in Britain and France. By the 1890s in Germany *Handwerker* (artisan) had come to mean a self-employed craftsman, who organized separately from and often against the burgeoning labor movement.

The solidarity between petty bourgeois and working-class communities took much longer to fracture in some places and in some trades than in others. In Saint-Étienne, for example, the fracture had to wait until the last two decades of the century. Small shopkeepers, master craftsmen, and journeymen often inhabited a popular rather than a proletarian social milieu. This common milieu was reinforced by intermarriage between working-class and petty bourgeois groups. Thus the consolidation of separate worker-employer identities was far from complete in 1848 and remained far from universal in 1914, but it constituted the dominant trend.

THE GROWTH OF WORKING-CLASS IDENTITY, 1850–1914

Signs of identity. Between 1850 and 1914 ever more European workers went on strike, joined trade unions, and supported political parties that claimed to speak for the working class. France experienced over five hundred industrial disputes between 1900 and 1914. In Germany 1 million workers downed tools in 1912. Between 1911 and 1914 a strike wave of unprecedented proportions hit the United Kingdom. The increase in strike action involved the greater

mobilization both of more members of the same trade and of more trades. It was also far from unilinear, depending partly on the trade cycle and partly on the learning process of new and less-skilled workers. But strikes did come to incorporate these groups, including match girls and dockers in Britain in 1888 and 1889 and female textile workers in Saxony in 1903. This extension of strike action to new categories of employees was especially noticeable in strike waves, such as those of 1869 to 1871 and 1889 to 1891 in Germany and Britain, 1910 to 1912 in Germany, and 1911 to 1913 in the United Kingdom. The growth of strike participation encouraged a massive increase in the number of trade union members between 1850 and 1914. Britain had over 4 million trade unionists, Germany had over 3 million, and France had roughly 1 million on the eve of World War I. German Austria also possessed a high trade union density, but growth on a mass scale was yet to come in Italy and Spain and was effectively proscribed in tsarist Russia.

Above all the working classes announced their presence in political parties that expressly claimed to articulate the interests of labor. By the end of 1910 the British Labour Party held forty-two seats in the House of Commons. The French Socialist Party (SFIO) could count on the support of 1.5 million voters, and its Italian counterpart (PSI) was making considerable headway in local elections in the north of the peninsula. Most successful of all was the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) with over 1 million members, 4 million voters, and a massive empire of ancillary leisure and cultural organizations by 1914. The SPD became a model for social democratic parties in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Finland, and Russia. Workers also made their presence felt in more dramatic and violent ways in the Russian Revolution of 1905–1906; in the “tragic week” in Barcelona in 1909, when anarchosyndicalists fought with the authorities; and in armed clashes in Italy in the “red fortnight” of June 1914.

Explanations of the rise of labor. That more workers went on strike, joined unions, and voted for labor or socialist parties between 1850 and 1914 is indisputable. Why they did so and how typical these workers were of European labor as a whole, however, is less clear. It is certain that industrial conflict and unionization cannot be explained by working-class impoverishment. Britain continued to witness the most strikes and to have the largest trade union membership, yet British real wages were between one-third and one-half greater than those in France and Germany in the 1860s. A Board of Trade investigation in 1905 concluded that money wages in France were

only two-thirds and in Germany no more than three-quarters of their British counterparts at a time when the price of rent, food, and fuel was actually higher on the Continent, by some 20 percent in Germany. Moreover the standard of living of British workers increased substantially between 1850 and the outbreak of World War I. The average length of the working week declined substantially between the 1860s and 1914 from over sixty hours to approximately forty-eight hours. In 1850 workers on average spent 75 percent of their wages on food. By 1914 the figure had dropped to 50 percent. Their diet became more varied and included corned beef, cakes, eggs, cocoa, and even fruit purchased from cooperative and chain stores. Housing conditions remained deplorable by later standards but certainly improved after 1850. By 1914, 80 percent of British families with three or more members occupied at least three rooms, and many enjoyed the benefits of piped water and gas lighting. The single-family terraced house enabled a better-off worker's family to enjoy a “modest domesticity” (McKibbin, 1990, p. 307), for which virtually no equivalent existed in the densely occupied industrial cities of continental Europe. Rates of child mortality fell and life expectancy rose, reflecting the general improvements in living standards. Most notably, real wages rose, according to one index from 100 in 1850 to 190 in 1913–1914. This enabled British workers to travel to the seaside, go to the races and the music hall, and watch football matches in huge numbers.

Of course such working-class prosperity was not universal. Regional variations in wages were vast. Carpenters earned ten and a half pence an hour in London but only four and seven-eighths pence an hour in Falmouth in 1908. Between 1840 and 1880 the differential between skilled and unskilled wages probably increased. Subsequently it declined in some trades but still remained substantial. Unskilled building workers received 64 percent of the wages of their skilled colleagues in 1885. The differential between male and female wages was even greater. According to Charles Booth 30 percent of the London population lived below the poverty line in 1886. Irish immigrants tended to live in the worst housing conditions, where typhus, called “Irish fever,” was common. Accidents, illness, periodic unemployment, and old age remained sources of insecurity.

The economies of continental Europe exhibited similarities. The living standards of French and German workers rose steadily between 1850 and 1900, precisely when industrial and political labor movements began to recruit in large numbers. Again the benefits were spread unevenly. In the fourteen years

before the outbreak of World War I, however, some of the gains were eroded in France, and real wages stagnated in Germany as a result of price inflation.

In addition to uneven prosperity, a set of new developments created problems for even skilled workers. The emergence of an increasingly numerous class of white-collar workers standing between management and the shop floor produced both more impersonal labor relations and an obstacle to the mobility prospects of the skilled manual worker. A range of technological innovations eroded the status and security of some groups of skilled laborers by facilitating the employment of semiskilled workers. Mechanical saws, prefabricated wooden units, and iron and concrete building materials revolutionized the construction industry. Milling machines, specialized lathes, and mechanical drills and borers intensified the labor process in engineering. By the 1890s the hand manufacture of shoes was displaced by a new technology. In general, however, the problem confronted by skilled workers had less to do with technological innovation, which lagged behind that in the United States, than with an intensification of work stemming from greater supervision, the premium bonus system of remuneration, and "scientific management." Growing numbers of workers demanded a shorter workweek, and workers in France, workers at Bosch in Stuttgart, and print and engineering workers in the United Kingdom went on strike against the reorganization of production. Some German engineering workers even complained of nervous exhaustion. The emergence of engineering workers in the forefront of industrial protest between 1910 and 1920 may well have reflected these developments. That emergence reinforces the position that factors other than poverty drove working-class mobilization.

Skilled workers: the backbone of labor mobilization. Many workers remained poor, and even skilled workers were not affluent or completely secure before 1914. Again, however, increasing resources facilitated widespread strike action, a growth in trade union membership, and to some extent membership of labor and socialist parties. This becomes clear when the timing of strikes at upturns in the economic cycle and the membership of trade unions is examined. Trade unions were strongest throughout Europe among workers who had served apprenticeships and who, through their skills, had considerable bargaining power, such as printers, skilled woodworkers and metal workers, masons, plumbers, and bricklayers. Unions were weakest among the unskilled and poorly paid, such as agricultural laborers, domestic servants, unskilled textile workers, and women. This was not true just of

Britain. Most French unionists in the 1870s were skilled, while printers, engineers, bricklayers, and carpenters formed unions in Germany in the 1860s. In Austria typesetters and watchmakers established successful craft associations by 1867, while artisans provided the backbone of labor organization in Milan and Turin in the 1870s.

In contrast, unskilled factory workers in France and Germany did not usually join unions or go on strike. Semiskilled laborers were increasingly involved in strikes after 1889. General unions formed in the United Kingdom, and industrial unions formed in Germany. However, the great majority of members were still skilled and male in 1914. The membership of the unskilled was more fragile and often declined at times of economic recession. The strike waves of 1889 to 1891 and especially 1910 to 1912 attracted greater numbers of the semiskilled and unskilled workers to industrial action. Nevertheless, the unskilled in general and women in particular, though capable of strike action, faced much more difficulty in sustaining organization.

Patterns of political mobilization were slightly different. Impoverished outworkers often played a role in the early history of socialist parties. Depressed textile workers in Roubaix, Reims, Roanne, and Lyon supported French anarcho-syndicalism. In Germany, August Bebel, the leader of the SPD, was first elected to a Reichstag seat not by the factory workers of Chemnitz, the German equivalent of Manchester, but by the depressed domestic weavers in Glauchau-Meerane. By 1913 the scale of social-democratic electoral support was so great in Germany's large Protestant cities, over 70 percent in Berlin and over 60 percent in Leipzig, that some unskilled and semiskilled workers must have voted for the party.

However, from the beginning skilled workers also took charge, and by 1914 the British Labour Party, the French and Italian Socialist Parties, and the German and Austrian Social Democratic Parties were organizations of skilled men in the building, metal, and woodworking trades. Parisian artisans formed the backbone of French anarcho-syndicalism, and skilled workers in printing, metalwork, and clothing manufacture took the lead in the creation of the Italian Workers' Party in the 1870s. The Spanish Socialist Party drew its first support from printers in Madrid. These skilled workers experienced rising living standards in the main. They enjoyed a strong bargaining position against their employers and had the resources, time, and energy to invest in union and party activities. Their ability to assert their identity thus stemmed from strength, not weakness. They also possessed a culture that, through apprenticeships, incul-

cated the worth and dignity of labor. They had expectations and aspirations that the unskilled and impoverished either did not share or could not realize. They also possessed long traditions of craft association that sustained industrial militancy and organization. In many cases, however, these skilled men remained concerned solely with their own sectional interests and failed to identify with the working class as a whole. This was especially so in Britain, where most enfranchised working-class voters stayed away from the Labour Party before 1914. The politics of class thus depended on factors outside the labor market.

Industrialization and identity. Rising living standards, the spread of strike action, and the growth of trade union membership related manifestly to changes in the occupational and residential structure of European society. The more rural the society, the less pronounced these developments were. In general few rural workers went on strike, joined unions, or voted socialist between 1850 and 1914. Sometimes prevented from organizing by repressive legislation, as in parts of Germany and in tsarist Russia; tied to landlords by law or by nonmonetary types of payment, like tied housing, food, and fuel; with very low wages, few expectations, and little bargaining power, rural labor did not possess the resources to mobilize in any sustainable way.

Significant exceptions existed, however. The French and Italian Socialist Parties and the Spanish anarchists had some success at recruiting support from rural areas. In Emilia and the Po Valley landless la-

borers and some sharecroppers protested against agrarian capitalism and benefited from labor exchanges, through which the Italian Socialist Party exerted influence on the hiring and firing of rural labor. In France agrarian socialism recruited not only from the landless woodcutters of Cher and Nièvre but also from landowning peasants in parts of the Midi. These peasants had access to urban ideas and enjoyed a collective social life around the local bar and café. Most important, they engaged in market agriculture, in particular viticulture; often experienced conflict with commercial intermediaries; and were subject to the fluctuations of the market, as in the agricultural depression of the 1870s and 1880s. In rural southern Spain anarchists recruited landless laborers who lived together in large agrotowns. In general, however, the industrial and political mobilization of European workers was a product of industry and the town.

The growth of wage labor and urbanization. In 1811, 30.2 percent of the British workforce was employed in manufacture, mining, and industry. A century later the figure had risen to 46.4 percent. At the same time employment in trade and transport increased from 11.6 percent to over 21 percent. In Germany approximately 35 percent of the labor force was still employed in agriculture in 1907 but by then 40 percent worked in crafts and industry and 25 percent in the tertiary sector. Dependent wage labor became the norm, especially in factory employment, though this development was more extensive in Britain and Germany than in the rest of Europe. In Germany the

percentage of wage earners, as distinct from the self-employed, in industry grew from 57 percent in 1875 to over 76 percent in 1907. Russian industrial labor also expanded rapidly between 1875 and 1914, although it constituted a small minority within the population as a whole. In Spain 11 percent of the labor force worked in industry, rising to almost 16 percent in 1910.

At the same time an ever greater percentage of the European population moved into towns. In 1800 only 23 European towns housed over 300,000 people. By 1900 135 such towns existed. In the same period London grew from a city of 1 million to one of 4.5 million. In Britain urban dwellings outstripped rural dwellings in 1851, in Germany in 1891, but not until 1931 in France. In Germany, where a strong correlation existed between size of town, trade union density, and support for the SPD, a large migration of population from the rural east in to Berlin, Saxony, and the Ruhr took place. The percentage of the Reich's population living in towns of over 100,000 inhabitants grew from 4.8 percent in 1871 to 21.3 percent in 1910. Even in countries with lower overall levels of urbanization, individual cities experienced dramatic growth. Thus between 1897 and 1914 the population of Saint Petersburg rose from 1.26 million to 2.11 million, though Russia as a whole remained overwhelmingly rural. In France 16 cities had over 100,000 inhabitants by 1911, and Paris increased its population by 345 percent between 1800 and 1900, from 547,000 to 2.8 million.

That some correlation existed between industrialization-urbanization and strikes—trade union membership seems indisputable. However, industrial workers from rural backgrounds, distance migrants, and workers new to factory conditions took longer to organize than longer-term factory workers. Where employers were strong, as in heavy industry in the Ruhr Valley, or where the labor force was largely unskilled, industrial organization and strike action were difficult to sustain. They were also difficult where the state intervened to repress industrial conflict, obviously in Russia, to a significant extent in Germany, and much less in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, unions were strong where labor was skilled and organized, where employers were relatively small and disorganized, and where the state or employers promoted collective bargaining, as in Britain in the decade before 1914. Notwithstanding these caveats, the correlation between the chronology of industrial union and trade union growth seems clearly positive. It is often overlooked, however, that the uneven development of the industrial economy fragmented rather than united labor in a single class.

UNEVEN INDUSTRIALIZATION AND WORKING-CLASS FRAGMENTATION

Obviously industrial growth and technological modernization took place at different times in different countries. Agricultural labor as a percentage of the total workforce dropped to 8 percent in Britain but still stood at 31 percent in Germany, 42 percent in France, and 57 percent in Spain in 1920. It still constituted 46 percent of Russian and 53 percent of Polish labour in 1950. The early but relatively gradual industrialization of Britain, where craft associations already existed, facilitated the development of powerful sectional unions and gave rise to a system of collective bargaining. In contrast, later but more rapid and more capital-intensive industrial change in Germany after 1850 spawned powerful but intransigent employers and a labor force that was far less likely to be successful in the arena of industrial conflict. Consequently labor turned to the politics of social democracy.

Equally significant was the uneven development within national boundaries. In France most of the Midi was free of modern industry before 1914, and Languedoc actually deindustrialized. In northern Italy industry expanded, while the south remained overwhelmingly agrarian and impoverished. The spectacular economic growth of Saxony, the Ruhr Valley, and Berlin was not vouchsafed to Germany's eastern provinces or most of the Reich south of the Main River. Catalonia and the northern Basque provinces were much more economically developed than the rest of Spain, while Austria-Hungary boasted of both dynamic industrial cities, such as Prague, Vienna, and Budapest, and the most primitive rural economies in the Balkans. In consequence the structure of the labor force was regionally variable, which may in turn explain the persistence of regional traditions in working-class behavior and identity.

Unevenness was also sectoral. In France a large artisanal sector survived beyond 1914 but coexisted with the modern exploitation of hydroelectric power, technologically advanced artificial fiber (rayon) production, a modernized automobile industry, and the most innovative retail sector in Europe. Germany's Second Reich housed giant firms in electrotechnology and chemicals yet still possessed a domestic textile and shoemaking industry. Even within a single industry technological modernization did not breed a homogeneous workforce. Different sectors of the same industry, for example, engineering, modernized at different rates.

Such modernization did far less to "deskill" European workers than is often imagined. The huge expansion of engineering actually created more, not

fewer, jobs for skilled engineers, as in Bielefeld, which became a center of German bicycle manufacture. Even where modern machines facilitated the deployment of semiskilled labor, that labor was rarely recruited from the ranks of the formerly skilled. Instead, as in the case of the French textile industry, labor came from those new to industry, often from rural backgrounds. Skilled men still set up and tended the new machines, but the invention of gas and electric motors together with the need for bicycle and motorcar maintenance afforded mechanics new opportunities for self-employment. On the shop floor labor was divided further by differential payment systems. As a result a common identity remained the exception rather than the rule. In fact factors exogenous to the labor process created cross-occupational solidarity, among them the rise of exclusively working-class residential communities, increasingly endogamous marriage patterns, and the emergence of a hereditary proletariat, that is, a generation of workers not new to the factory and the urban environment. The autocratic behavior of employers, the relative weakness of middle-class liberalism, and political repression and discrimination forged a class identity among some European workers.

The fragmentation of working-class politics. As demonstrated, economic development did as much to divide as to unite workers. In creating solidarity, the state's role was crucial in the generation of a radical politics of class. When the state relied on indirect taxes

or agricultural tariffs, it demonstrated its hostility to urban consumers. When it interfered violently in industrial conflict, deprived workers of full citizenship rights, and rested on nonparliamentary foundations, working-class grievances were often politicized and marxist parties were likely to be strong, as in Russia, Austria, and Germany. That liberal and parliamentary regimes were best able to create legitimacy among workers was demonstrated at the end of World War I, when labor overthrew the old autocracies in Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany but not the democratic polities in Britain and France.

Workers in similar occupations often displayed similar forms of behavior and identity across national boundaries, but this correlation did not include politics. Miners possessed a strong sense of occupational identity almost everywhere, but printers were almost always the first to form stable unions and to engage in collective bargaining. Dockers in Hamburg, Livorno, and Liverpool had difficulty organizing and often leaned toward direct action. Males dominated the industrial organizations of labor well into the twentieth century in virtually all European countries. In Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary engineering workers rose to prominence in various forms of protest, often involving tensions between cautious trade union leaders and a restive rank and file.

As noted, however, these international similarities usually were restricted to the sphere of industrial behavior and did not extend to politics. This is clear

even in the postulate that “labor aristocrats,” skilled workers with high earnings and job security, such as printers and skilled engineering workers, provide a key to the reformism of the British labor movement. In England the labor aristocrats dominated the unions and voted Liberal, but in Germany they joined the SPD, and in Russia they appeared at the barricades in 1917 and 1918. Thus their politics cannot be explained by their place in the labor market.

Even the role of the state is not enough to explain working-class politics. Within the boundaries of a single state, workers in the same occupation often displayed marked differences in political outlook and identity. Miners in Pas-de-Calais, for example, gave their support to reformist socialism, whereas their counterparts in the southern Massif tended toward syndicalism. Syndicalism in Spain was supported by the workers in small-scale textile production in Barcelona but not in Guipúzcoa. Moreover the political identity of the same group of workers in the same place could change over time. For example, in Spain Asturian miners supported primarily reformist labor organizations until the 1920s then engaged in insurrectionary violence. The change was clearly dictated by shifts in the political conjuncture, perhaps at the local level, and not at the workplace.

Support for political parties, which spoke the language of class, was stronger in some states than in others; but even in imperial Germany, which had the largest socialist party in the world with a marxist program, the SPD could never claim to speak for the German working class in its entirety. Even among dependent wage laborers, other identities cut across and fragmented that of class. Women and the unskilled were largely absent from the membership, as were Catholics, Poles, and those who belonged to company unions and voted National Liberal, such as senior workers at the Krupp steelworks in Essen. In Britain and France significant numbers of workers preferred the collaborationist politics of liberalism to class confrontation and voted for the Liberal Party or the Radical Party respectively.

It was also not unusual for workers to give their support to nationalist or conservative political parties. That happened in the “working-class Tory” districts of industrial Lancashire, where hostility to Irish immigration and to Liberal mill owners played a role. This last instance also suggests that class identity and political conservatism were not invariably incompatible. Indeed the French wool shearers of Mazamet sustained lengthy strikes against their employers but gave their votes to conservative parliamentary candidates. At Krupp in Essen workers who belonged to the company union, sang in the company choir, and lived in

company housing voted National Liberal before 1914, Nationalist in the 1920s, and Nazi in the depression of 1929–1933.

A sense of class could also be fractured by religious and denominational variables. Socialism in France, Spain, and Italy went hand in hand with anticlericalism, and the parties of the left were weak in areas of high religious observance. In Germany, Holland, and Flemish Belgium, Catholic workers formed their own Christian Unions and voted for Catholic parties. Ethnic differences were as divisive and potentially more explosive than those of religion. In Austria-Hungary, Czech and German workers split into separate organizations. Poles in imperial Germany stayed away from both the Catholic Center Party and the SPD, formed their own unions, and voted for the cause of Polish nationalism. No love was lost between English and Irish laborers. Workers in the north of France resented the employment of Belgians, and Marseille dockers displayed even greater hostility toward North African workers.

Gender and working-class fragmentation. The European working classes were further fragmented along the lines of gender. Women were grossly underrepresented in the membership of trade unions and labor and socialist parties. Even in the SPD, which had a women’s organization with 170,000 members in 1914, females only constituted 16 percent of the total party membership. Significantly these women were usually not employed outside the home but were the housewives of Social Democrats. Part of the reason for female absence from the ranks of organized labor lay in the distribution of female employment. In Germany in 1907, 4.5 million women worked in agriculture, and 3.75 million worked in domestic service. Only 1 million found jobs in trade and commerce and 2 million in manufacturing. In Britain in 1911 almost 40 percent of the females in paid employment worked in personal and domestic services, 16 percent in textiles, 15 percent in clothing manufacturing, 3 percent in metals manufacturing, and 2.1 percent in agriculture. Of those employed in manufacturing, many worked in poorly paid domestic production. Female factory occupations were usually unskilled and badly rewarded. Thus women were the archetype of unskilled labor, and unskilled, poorly paid men did not form unions or join political parties either.

The difficulties of mobilizing women were compounded by other, more gender-specific factors. A woman’s time was taken up by labor in and outside the home, the so-called “double burden.” Furthermore the great majority of women in factory employment were unlikely to keep their positions for life. In

Germany in 1895 over 52 percent of employed females were single, 40.2 percent were divorced, and only 9.1 percent were married. In the United Kingdom sixteen years later the figures were respectively 69.3 percent, 29.4 percent, and 9.6 percent. Most women working outside the home would not do so for the rest of their lives. They were usually young and single, and at around age twenty-four they left for marriage or childbirth. Since the home and not the workplace was the locus of their activities for much of their lives, investment in factory-based organizations made little sense.

Religious observance was much higher among European females than males by 1900. Continued religious commitment may have kept women away from “godless” socialist organizations. Women also faced gender-specific discrimination. They suffered verbal and physical abuse, low wages, and proletarian antifeminism, which could become quite vicious in times of recession. Trade unions often were not interested in the problems of female workers, who were considered wage-cutting competitors rather than comrades. Also, as women did not yet possess the vote, many labor politicians in Britain and France showed little interest in their mobilization.

Of course working-class wives and daughters indispensably supported striking brothers, fathers, and husbands by caring for their offspring and providing sustenance on picket lines. The work of women in the home that created the space and time for the union and party activities of males. Though relatively few female workers joined unions, many women went on strike.

White-collar workers were generally absent from the unions, and their numbers in the total workforce increased rapidly by 1910. They constituted 36 percent of all wage earners in France in 1906, though under 40 percent of the French workforce were wage-workers at that time, and they were 18 percent of the total German labor force. In Germany, where the “collar line,” the division between white-collar and blue-collar workers was especially great, the former displayed considerable hostility toward socialist organizations. Most did not organize, but those who did usually joined the German National Union of Commercial Employees, which was antisocialist, nationalist, imperialist, and anti-Semitic. The political identity of white-collar workers, however, was less clear in many other European societies and underwent significant changes during World War I.

Working-class identity in 1914. On the eve of World War I more workers went on strike, belonged to trade unions, and voted for labor or socialist parties

than ever before, in part an indication of class identity. However, that identity was fragile and was not shared by all. In fact the great majority of European workers, even in Britain, never went on strike, formed a union, or voted socialist. Uneven economic development and religious, ethnic, and gender differences complicated, obscured, and sometimes undermined the class solidarity the socialist parties hoped to create. However, those who considered their skill, gender, religion or ethnicity important might still have some perception of themselves as workers. The Christian (Catholic) Unions in Germany, for example, were increasingly involved in industrial action. Polish workers were proud to be Polish, but they joined the Free (socialist) Unions in the strikes of 1905 and 1912 in the Ruhr Valley. In fact to be a Pole in the Ruhr was to be a worker. National and class perspectives in this case reinforced one another.

The possibility of the coexistence of different identities raises another important point. Support for the national cause in 1914 did not necessarily imply the demise or absence of class consciousness. Not only was proletarian patriotism different from the jingoism of the nationalist right, but the same Welsh miners who volunteered to fight for king and country in August 1914 were back on strike the following year. Studies of various European cities, including Brunswick, Hamburg, and Vienna, have suggested that workers did not demonstrate the same nationalist fervor as their middle-class compatriots in the first days of the war. Patriotism and a sense of class could go hand in hand. German workers marching off to the front sang patriotic and socialist anthems. That working-class men and women were divided in various ways in 1914 is not surprising, but remarkably many of them had overcome such divisions by 1914. The story of the European working classes after that date is also a story of solidarities and divisions.

EUROPEAN LABOR FROM 1914 TO 1950

World War I. World War I is best remembered for its human sacrifice and its material deprivation that formed the background to revolutions in central and eastern Europe at its end. Yet the experience of European labor during the war was in some ways ambiguous. In the belligerent nations civilian politicians and army generals realized they could not sustain the war effort without the support of organized labor, a clear statement of how far the working classes had come since 1800. In the democratic states, France and Britain, members of the Labour Party and the SFIO were taken into the war cabinets. Although the semi-

autocratic German state went nowhere near as far, it granted some degree of recognition to trade union leaders and their wishes. Union officials were exempted from conscription and were given a role in the organization of food supplies and welfare. The unions were for the first time allowed to recruit rural laborers and state employees, and a law in 1916 established workers' councils with elected labor representatives in all large firms. This effectively obliged previously authoritarian employers to deal with the unions and gave a massive spur to the growth of union membership from 1917.

State recognition of and consultation with trade union leaders gave the unions greater legitimacy in other countries too, and national systems of pay bargaining began to erode local particularities. It now made sense to be in the union because the union might be able to achieve something. At the same time shortages of labor in the dominant munitions industries placed workers in a strong bargaining position. Government intervention to control prices and rents and the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials together with an acceptance of new welfare obligations brought to the public's attention the possibility of controlling private capital and the advantages of planning. It was no accident that the British Labour Party first adopted clause IV, nationalization of industry, in 1918.

The consequences of these developments were paradoxical. Unions benefited from recognition, yet the collusion of trade union leaders and labor politicians with systems of national wage bargaining gave rise to shop floor discontent. Radical shop stewards who were often hostile to the official union leadership emerged in Clydeside, Berlin, and Turin. The divide that separated restless workers from trade union bureaucracies was widened by massive food shortages and high levels of inflation in central and eastern Europe, above all in Russia. In Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Russia food riots involving women and children became common. So did strikes throughout Europe caused by food shortages and inflation but facilitated by severe labor shortages in the munitions industries. On top of all this, the war forced longer working hours and an intensification of labor with the suspension of protective labor legislation and a marked increase in industrial accidents.

The war years also witnessed a restructuring of the workforce. Increasing numbers of women and youths were recruited to fill the shortage of labor in the arms industry. They came to work in the large engineering and electrical concerns in Berlin, and the foundries of Krupp and Thyssen in the Ruhr, in large factories on the outskirts of Paris, in the giant engi-

neering concerns of Turin and Milan, and in the Putilov munitions factory in Saint Petersburg. The newer factories, manned by semiskilled workers, employed serial techniques in production. Trained on the shop floor to perform a specialized task, the workers had not experienced apprenticeships but were far less quiescent than unskilled workers. They played a major role in the revolutionary upheavals at the end of the war in Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Vienna, Berlin, Budapest, Turin, and Milan, where the focus of industrial militancy shifted to the large factories.

At the same time more workers became involved in industrial protest and union organizations. Women, rural laborers, and the unskilled in chemical and steelwork appeared on the historical stage between 1917 and 1924 but were largely quiescent again after 1924, by which time political and employer controls had been reestablished. The deteriorating situation of white-collar employees in Germany encouraged some of them to join socialist unions and to vote for the SPD at the end of the war.

Material deprivation and a restructuring of the labor force generalized economic discontent. The war transformed that discontent into a political issue, for material deprivation was manifestly caused by war waged and ended by governments. Thus strikers in central Europe demanded peace and democratic reform. They failed to see why they should make sacrifices for states that treated them as second-class citizens. The inability of the old regimes to guarantee peace was the immediate cause of revolutions in February and October 1917 in Russia and in Austria and Germany a year later. The war thus had a massive impact on labor and actually prepared the ground for the exercise of power by workers' parties in some states after 1918 by temporarily demobilizing or destroying their enemies, especially where the old regimes were held responsible for defeat.

However, many of the upheavals were not unmediated consequences of the war alone. Revolutions took place where radical working-class cultures had developed before World War I and were absent in democratic Scandinavia, Britain, and France. The years immediately before 1914 had seen waves of labor militancy in Germany, Italy, and Russia, often associated with conflicts between trade union leaders and a radical rank and file of engineering workers. Most of the socialist parties in continental Europe, such as the SPD, the SFIO, and the PSI, had revolutionary and reformist elements before 1914. In the course of the war and in the wake of the Russian Revolution and the foundation of the Third International, these split into social-democratic and communist wings. This split therefore had a prewar his-

tory and was not simply a consequence of war and inflation between 1914 and 1923. The absence of a revolutionary movement in Britain before 1914 partly explains communism's failure to take hold there after 1918.

Postwar revolutions. The overthrow of autocratic regimes in 1917–1918, the sacrifices workers made during the war, the increasing legitimacy of labor politicians, and the continued shortage of labor at the end of World War I led to the greatest upsurge in international working-class industrial militancy and political radicalism that Europe had seen. The October Revolution brought the Bolsheviks to power in 1917 and saw the first attempts to create a socialist society. Admired by many workers at the time as a model of workers' government, it inspired the creation of significant communist parties in France, Germany, and Italy. Yet revolutionary socialists did not successfully seize power anywhere outside of Russia. Social structure in western Europe lacked a revolutionary peasantry but produced a large and powerful bourgeoisie, which was effectively absent in Russia owing to the dependence of its industry on foreign capital or tsarist initiatives. This Western bourgeoisie was temporarily weakened in the revolutionary upheavals at the end of the war but rapidly reconstituted its control over labor during the economic downturn in 1921 in the United Kingdom, France, and Italy and in 1923 in Germany. Particularly in Germany and Italy the defeat of the revolutionary left was the work of armed counterrevolutions by right wing paramilitary groups, the *Freikorps* and the fascist *squadristi*, respectively. From 1922 in Italy and from 1933 in Germany fascist regimes destroyed the industrial and political labor organizations.

The failure of the revolutionary left to deliver liberation to the European working classes, compounded by the split between democratic socialists and communists, most obviously in Germany, should not obscure the fact that social-democratic welfarism did much to improve the workers' lot in several European states. In the Weimar Republic, national governments with SPD participation extended welfare benefits massively, built public housing, and initiated a sea change in industrial relations by enforcing trade union recognition and collective bargaining. In Britain the fact that the Labour Party was in office only briefly did not prevent measures to subsidize council housing and improve unemployment benefits. Social-democratic participation in the governments of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden impressively extended social welfare. In Sweden the all-socialist government of Per Albin Hansson established a public works pro-

gram of jobs, created a system of pensions and unemployment relief, reduced working hours, set up maternity benefits, and developed a national medical service. The Popular Front government, a communist-socialist-liberal alliance, in France in 1936 increased wage rates, introduced paid holidays, and obliged employers to recognize trade unions.

The absence of a successful socialist revolution outside Russia therefore did not mean the abandonment of working-class interests. However, social-democratic reformism was only possible where it found allies among democratic liberals and where the middle class was prepared to tolerate it. It made no headway against authoritarian regimes in eastern Europe or against fascist dictatorships. Furthermore the great upsurge of labor militancy between 1917 and 1920 rested on conditions of economic expansion and job security. High levels of unemployment after 1921 (1923 in Germany) demobilized and fragmented the labor movement. The search for jobs or the desire to keep them set the employed against the unemployed, factory against factory, men against women, and the young against the old in disputes regarding who should keep the jobs. The 1930s were a period of authoritarian government in eastern Europe, fascist rule in Italy, and Francisco Franco's triumph in Spain but also of Conservative Party domination in Britain. Left-wing governments in France were shortlived in this decade.

The European working classes, 1924–1950.

The general models used above to account for variations in working-class politics continued to hold true in this period. They varied enormously from country to country, often depending on earlier traditions, as in the case of communist party support. It is true that socioeconomic factors go some way toward explaining the split between democratic socialists and communists. Germany exhibited a strong correlation between unemployment and the size of communist party support, for example. In Germany, France, and Italy political radicalism was particularly marked among young and semiskilled workers in large factories. Yet the British and the Swedish unemployed and semiskilled did not turn to communism. Again political traditions and the preexistence of revolutionary labor were crucial. No simple correlation emerged between economic position and electoral behavior.

The number of wagedworkers increased generally between 1914 and 1950, from 4.7 million to 6.5 million in France, from 17.1 million to 21.4 million in the United Kingdom, and from 9.3 million to 9.7 million in Italy. Between 1913 and 1950 the average rate of growth of nonagricultural employment was 1

percent per annum in Western Europe and 1.5 percent in Eastern Europe, reaching as much as 2.6 percent in Russia, though Eastern Europe was still overwhelmingly rural. In Britain 70 percent of the active population were workers in the 1950s. Furthermore national systems of wage bargaining and decreasing differentials between skilled and unskilled workers helped create a working class that was economically more united than previously. Though union density increased from 23 percent in 1914 to 44.1 percent in 1950 in Britain, from 17 percent to 39 percent in the Netherlands, and from 15 percent to 76 percent in Sweden, the combined vote for the parties of labor rarely rose above 35 percent in most European countries. Only infrequently did socialists form majority governments before 1944, and Sweden was the most obvious exception to this rule. This may have been partly because of the enfranchisement of women in several states between the wars, though Italy and France did not enact woman suffrage until the end of World War II and it produced Catholic mass politics. Women remained less likely to vote for the left in this period, not least because the division between work and home remained as complete for married working-class couples as it was before. In 1931 only 16 percent of married British women were employed outside the home, and the evidence is overwhelming that women placed a positive value on housework and child rearing at this time. They also voted for parties that proclaimed the sanctity of traditional family values.

The increase in waged labor also should not obscure the fact that much of that labor was nonmanual. By 1933 white-collar workers made up approximately 25 percent of the active population in Germany. In Britain the proportion of nonmanual workers in the labor force rose from 18.7 percent in 1911 to 30.9 percent in 1951. Paid by seniority and thus guaranteed rising incomes where they remained loyal to the firm, they often acted as intermediaries between management and the shop floor, and they were conscious of their status. Not until the 1960s and 1970s did the rates of unionization of female and white-collar staff began to catch up with those of males in manual employment. Furthermore the unemployment of the interwar years often decimated precisely those sectors of the economy where working-class militancy had been strong, such as coal mining.

Again support for the labor parties and trade union membership were not consequences of impoverishment, except possibly the unemployed, many of whom fell into apathy and resignation rather than militancy. For those employed, real wages continued to rise, and levels of poverty were reduced according to all the British surveys. The life expectancy of workers continued

to improve, but it still did not reach that of the middle class. Working-class consumption, typified by visits to the cinema, the dance hall, and sports events, increased significantly. This was especially true in Britain, but France and Germany experienced similar developments between the wars. Extensions of welfare and especially public housing made a huge contribution to working-class living standards. However, homogenous working-class residential areas became more common than before, while the mobility prospects of even skilled manual workers remained extremely limited into the 1960s. Hence significant numbers of European workers, increasingly self-confident in the democratic states, held collective values. The extent of embourgeoisement before the 1960s was truly limited.

EPILOGUE: EUROPEAN LABOR AFTER 1950

As early as the 1950s some commentators feared the demise of traditional working-class culture at the hands of mass entertainment in Britain. Those fears heightened in the recession of the 1970s and the political triumph of Thatcherism. The postwar welfare state and massive rises in real wages in the 1950s and the 1960s, the time of economic miracles, stimulated huge increases in working-class consumerism. From the 1960s working-class ownership of houses and cars expanded dramatically. Radio, already popular before 1950, and television enhanced the possibilities of private, home-based leisure. Slum clearances sometimes disrupted working-class residential communities. The recession of the 1970s and 1980s laid waste to many of the traditional heartlands of labor and deindustrialised large parts of Europe.

Simultaneously white-collar employment outstripped that of manual labor. By 1981, 52.3 percent of the active British population was employed in non-manual jobs. In Holland 1,042,000 worked in manufacturing but 2,943,000 worked in trades and services at the same date. Simultaneously a feminization of the labor force occurred. Whereas the number of women workers in 1950 was 7.1 million in the United Kingdom, the figure rose to 22.9 million by 1990. In 1951, 32.7 percent of women and 87.6 percent men of working age were gainfully employed, but by 1980 51.6 percent of women and 77.9 percent of men were working. Working-class support for labor politics eroded in Western Europe, and socialist parties survived only where they appealed to the middle ground and to voters outside the traditional working class.

Historians and sociologists have debated the extent of embourgeoisement of the working class amid undeniable affluence in the postwar decades. The

growth of an immigrant lower working class in most Western European countries also created internal tensions and disparities within the working class. Many workers no longer displayed distinctive culture or behavior, even aside from the dilution of working-class politics and the decline in unionization. But the working class was still less likely than the middle class to strive for upward mobility or to send children to universities, reflecting social barriers and distinctive expectations. Most people of the working class view their labor in fiercely instrumental terms, judging it on the basis of earnings, in contrast to those of the middle class, who usually seek some meaning in the work. The boundaries of the working class have definitely become less defined, but the concept continues to have some real utility in European social history.

The lot of workers in Soviet-controlled Europe was, of course, very different. Workers played a role in the collapse of Communist regimes, most obviously in the Solidarity organization in Poland. This was far from a universal phenomenon, however. Until the 1970s many workers in Eastern Europe enjoyed rising living standards, though not on a Western scale. Some,

miners in particular, enjoyed special privileges, so it is not surprising that they supported the old regime in Romania and did not initially participate in Solidarity in Poland. The collapse of the old system and the triumph of market forces created massive inequalities and a decline in living standards for the great majority. In western Europe the old working class became only a shadow of its former self, and in eastern Europe it seemed powerless.

CONCLUSION

For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the working classes possessed a distinct identity, but that identity was never uniform. In some cases workers did show allegiance to a broad concept of class, though this was more often the case in autocratic than in liberal states and was rarely a consequence of economic variables alone. Class identity was always fragile and contested by other loyalties of nation, race, gender, and occupation. Since 1960 it has arguably been in a state of dissolution. However, the struggles of working men and women have done much to change

European society, especially in the form of the welfare state, though some would see even this achievement as threatened in the early twenty-first century. Furthermore, cross-national comparisons of working-

class behavior and identity do suggest that much can still be explained in terms of structures—be they economic, social, or political, whatever the postmodernists may tell us.

See also **Technology; Capitalism and Commercialization; The Industrial Revolutions; Communism (volume 2); Collective Action; Moral Economy and Luddism; Labor History: Strikes and Unions; Socialism (in this volume); Gender and Work; Factory Work (volume 4); and other articles in this section.**

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SERVANTS



Bridget Hill

For a large part of the period from the sixteenth to the early twentieth century, servants were ubiquitous throughout Europe. The largest concentrations were in the cities and towns, but servants were also found in rural villages and on farms. In rural France, for example, between 2 and 12 percent of the population was in service (Hufton, 1993). It constituted the biggest employment after agriculture. Indeed the smaller proportion of servants in France and Germany as compared with Britain was the result of a larger number of women still working in agriculture. Thus, servants formed a significant occupational group in Europe. Numbers probably peaked in the late nineteenth century, declined steadily in the following years when in both France and Britain new job opportunities opened up for women, and slumped in the period following World War I. Yet until World War I, domestic service remained throughout Europe the largest category of female employment (Hufton, 1997). As late as 1911 in Britain, 35 percent of working women were employed as domestic servants.

In part it is the large number of servants in the population, especially in urban areas, that makes them an important subject of research for social historians. In the eighteenth century they constituted something like 12 percent of the population of any European city or town (Hufton, 1993). In Paris at the end of the eighteenth century there were one hundred thousand servants—that is, 15 percent of the population (Fairchilds, 1984). In France as a whole there were two million servants, which meant that 8 percent of the population earned their living in service (Fairchilds, 1984). According to Patrick Colquhoun, London in 1806 had two hundred thousand servants of both sexes, with twice as many women servants as men (Hufton, 1993). Given that such a sizable proportion of the population of European countries was in service, one must ask why. Where did the demand for servants originate? Where did servants come from and why did they choose (if “choose” is the appropriate word) service as an occupation?

Servants were unique among the lower classes in their contact with their employers. This was the nearest most masters and mistresses came to the laboring class. Indeed, one function servants performed was to shield their employers from contact with the working class. The diaries and journals of employers tell us a great deal about master-servant relations, the work servants were expected to do, the conditions under which they carried it out, and the conditions of hiring and firing. Accounts written by servants themselves are rare, but some do exist. Other members of the working class were suspicious of and even hostile to the close, even intimate, relations between many servants and their employers. An analysis of these relations provides a fascinating insight into the complexities of class. Because most domestic servants were not natives of the town or city in which they worked, the history of service is also intimately linked to the history of rural-urban migration and, on a wider scale, to international migration.

With the exception of France and England, comprehensive studies of domestic servants are lacking. One reason this subject of research has been ignored is that, as part of the lower orders, servants and their work were regarded as unimportant. Only in the late twentieth century did historians see them as a fit subject for study. Another reason is that from the end of the seventeenth century servants were increasingly women, and, some historians would say, therefore of little significance. That the vast majority never wrote about their experiences also presents real difficulties in learning about servants. They constitute an elusive and nearly silent group of the population. Some were visible, but most were not. If historians were to rely only on the many accounts written by employers they would rapidly conclude that servants constituted a necessary evil, as they were generally the subject of criticism and abuse from employers.

Information about servants is also available in the many courtesy books telling servants how to behave toward their mistresses and masters and how best to perform their tasks, but these tell us little of how

in fact they did behave or exactly what work was demanded of them. Many of these books were written by men and emphasize the dependent role of servants and their duty of unquestioned obedience, loyalty, and absolute discretion. One of the worst sins a servant could commit was to discuss the lives and behavior of his master and mistress outside his household.

DEFINITION OF SERVANTS

“Servant” is a term that has been used very loosely. In England in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the term covered all servants in husbandry—that is, both farm servants and domestic servants. Although now the distinction between live-in servants and day laborers who lived in their own homes and worked only part-time for an employer is clear, in earlier periods people did not distinguish between the two (Hill). Apprentices were frequently referred to as “servants,” as were undertenants in the seventeenth century.

In France the term *domestique* or *serviteur* could cover a great range of occupations and people from very different social backgrounds. *Domestique* was used not to describe the work done as much as the conditions of employment: a *domestique* lived in an employer’s household in a state of dependency. Those considered *domestiques* might include gardeners, musicians, teamsters, shop clerks, silk weavers, and lawyers (Fairchild, 1984).

WHO BECAME A SERVANT

During the eighteenth century the demand for domestic servants increased as urban development cre-

ated a growing affluence among the middle classes. Who were the servants who responded to this demand and from where were they recruited? Most women entering domestic service came from the countryside. It has been estimated on the basis of urban censuses that in the preindustrial period 13 percent of the total population in any city north of the Loire were country girls in service (Hufton, 1997). Only a minority of those employed in cities and towns were natives of the towns in which they worked.

The link between domestic service, rural poverty, and unemployment for women was a close one. In southeast England, where agricultural changes had limited the nature of employment available to women, the sheer inability of single women to earn sufficient funds for economic independence made migration an important option. In France girls living in the poor and backward agricultural regions of the Massif Central regularly made the journey to Montpellier and Béziers. In Toulouse in the eighteenth century girls were recruited from the poor agricultural land of the surrounding hill areas.

In general, women entered service when young. The censuses of Würzburg and Amsterdam show a steady influx of female adolescents. Domestic servants in Amsterdam came from the northern provinces, where family poverty forced many girls into service at a very young age (Hufton, 1993). After 1820 in the area of the Netherlands, where there was a heavy concentration of textile work but where the industry was in decline, parents decided between factory work or domestic service for their daughters. Eighteen percent of domestic weavers’ and 28 percent of factory workers’ daughters decided to enter domestic service and left home at a very early age (Janssens). In England it was normal for girls aged thirteen to fourteen to enter service, and many started much earlier. In nineteenth-century Italy children as young as ten or twelve were brought into a family as maids. They grew up with the family and lived in intimacy with their mistresses. Often they were expected to serve all their lives in the one family (Robertson).

According to Danish landowners the very low level of wages on farms persuaded maidservants to migrate to the nearest provincial town or to Copenhagen in the hope of finding better conditions of employment (Dahlsgård). During the first half of the nineteenth century, unmarried girls aged twelve to thirteen flocked to Antwerp and the other chief towns of Antwerp province. Most of them came to be housemaids of Antwerp families. As the city’s director of poor relief wrote in 1843, these migrants did not come to Antwerp “in order to set up in business or to carry on their former trade but quite simply to find in another

community one way or another the means of existence denied them in their birthplace” (quoted in Lis, p. 45).

The middle classes in towns usually preferred to recruit their servants from the countryside. They were regarded as better and more virtuous workers. It is interesting to note that nearly one in two of female immigrants to Antwerp left the city in the period between 1817 and 1830. At least one-third returned to their places of birth, hoping no doubt that the meager savings they had made in service would enable them to marry. Similarly, seasonal migration from Massat, a village in the Pyrenees, was essential to the survival of the inmates. Most young girls migrated to Spanish cities, but however long they were away, ultimately they tended to return home with the little capital they had accumulated (Hufton, 1997).

CHANGES IN DOMESTIC SERVICE

During the eighteenth century domestic service was changing. In the first place it was fast becoming feminized. Increasingly, only wealthy masters could afford to employ men at twice the wages of women servants. They did this to display their wealth; also, as the streets were unsafe for women, men served in public as pages, coachmen, and porters. This process first affected urban servants in Britain, Holland, Germany, and France, and later in Spain and Italy. In addition, and perhaps most notably in postrevolutionary France, there was a marked decline in the number of servants employed by the nobility and an increase in the number employed by the middle classes. Another change was the increasing mobility of servants. In response to the chance of a wider experience, better wages or conditions, or the hope of more sympathetic employers, domestic servants constantly changed places.

With the expansion of the middle class in the eighteenth century many more households than formerly were able to employ servants. Given the differential between the wages of male and female domestics most of these households—some quite humble—employed a woman. There was a marked increase in the number of single-servant households. Male servants tended to opt out of service, resenting the close personal supervision. There were far more employment opportunities available to them that allowed them to live in their own homes. In the massive migratory flow from country into towns women were predominant. Many of them ended up in domestic service, so that cheaper female servants became readily available.

Thus, noble households became smaller and more feminine not only because female domestics

were cheaper but because male domestics were increasingly attracted out of service by alternative occupations. Apparently the proportion of male servants in noble households peaked around 1750 and then declined. In England in the mid-eighteenth century, the duke of Bedford’s household numbered forty servants of both sexes (Hill). While earlier in the seventeenth century households of over fifty had been common, by the late eighteenth century they frequently numbered twenty or less.

Even so the hierarchical structure of servant households often remained. In servant-households in nineteenth-century Germany, for example, individual workloads were carefully defined according to gender, and a rigid hierarchy was maintained between upper and lower servants both in their work, at mealtimes, and in periods of rest. A lady’s maid, for instance, was carefully defined in a German dictionary compiled by the Brothers Grimm as “a maiden in the service of a princess or a noblewoman . . . distinct from the chambermaid, often also from the maids-in-waiting who are below her in rank, and distinct also from the housekeeper who runs the household” (quoted in Jores and Maynes, p. 65). On the whole the bottom of the hierarchy was occupied by women, the top by men (Fairchilds, 1984).

By the end of the eighteenth century, most middle-class households employed one servant, usually a woman. Increasingly, lowly families could afford to employ servants. Maids-of-all-work were cheap enough to attract new employers who wanted help with the burden of the family wash or someone to serve in a shop when the mistress was occupied. Servants had moved into the category of wage earners and were no longer regarded as part of the families who employed them. They were contracted to work and no longer used to denote status or for show. In consequence service was seen by some as increasingly menial and the condition of service considered degrading.

SERVANTS' WORK

Beginning in the nineteenth century in larger households, the labels attached to individual domestics described the work they did and distinguished them from other domestics. Thus terms like “butler,” “coachman,” and “postilion” bore a close relationship to the work performed by the servants in these positions. In the eighteenth century such labels were more arbitrary. Servants, however they were labeled, moved between roles in response to their employer’s current needs. This is reflected in advertisements for servants that appeared in mid century. In 1755 the *Ipswich Journal*, for example, carried an advertisement for “a Livery Servant who has been used to wait at Table, and knows something of Horses, and if he has any Knowledge of Gardening it will be the more agreeable.” It was the same when it came to employing a woman servant. One advertisement for a female servant in the same journal ran “Wanted immediately. A Cook Maid in a large Family, who must look after two Cows” (Hill, pp. 23–24). For the majority of single-servant-employing households the label attached to them was of little consequence. Most were females, maids-of-all-work, whose range of duties might have little or nothing to do with housework.

SERVANT HIRING

Normally it was women who both hired servants and supervised their day-to-day tasks. In Germany, however, husbands not only did the hiring but sometimes also the supervising. Similarly, in middle-class households in nineteenth-century Rome it was common for the husbands to deal with the servants and even arrange for the delivery of supplies (Robertson). In England hiring fairs were held at the Whitsuntide and Martinmas fairs when all kinds of servants paraded

before their future employers prepared to hire themselves out for six months’ service or a year.

Around the middle of the eighteenth century in England registry offices were established to provide exemplary servants with places. Almost immediately they were accused of fraud and deceit. There were servants prepared to pay for good references, and the registry offices responded willingly. In Scotland John Lawson set up a registry office, calling it Lawson’s Intelligence Office as early as 1701. He offered to provide households all over the country with reliable servants. But employers found that servants recruited through registry offices did not stay any longer than those recruited by other means (Plant).

Servants were more commonly recruited through friends, relations, or tradesmen. Although servants in search of a position were expected to offer good references, it soon became clear that employers could not trust their authenticity. Employers were urged to seek out former mistresses in order to inquire about their past servants. Some mistresses resorted to advertising for servants, although that method presented difficulties when it came to checking up on applicants. In Spain it was often the village priest who established a line of contact with a particular city and would act as a reference for a girl taken on by a family. Therefore Galician girls migrating as servants tended to predominate in Madrid (Hufton, 1997).

WORKING CONDITIONS

The conditions of employment varied according to the size of the household and the individual employers. Hours were always long—frequently twelve to eighteen a day. Servants rose early to light fires and start the drudgery of cleaning the house. While employers might define their servant’s duties carefully, there was no set time schedule. Free time was minimal—perhaps one day off a month. Often there was no clear agreement about off-duty time, so that servants could be on call every hour of the day and night. A German essayist, Fanny Lewald, wrote in the mid-nineteenth century of how the German domestic servant was “‘in service’ day and night. On workdays and holidays, at any hour, the master and mistress have a right to her services” (quoted in Joeres and Maynes, p. 68). This was typical. Samuel Pepys’s female servants were frequently expected to stay up until he returned home drunk, and then to undress him and put him to bed.

Accommodation varied greatly. It could consist of a space on the kitchen floor, the area under the stairs, a cupboard, cellar, or by Victorian times, an

unheated and unlit attic equipped with a trundle bed and little else. It could consist only of a space in a bed. In seventeenth-century France, masters and mistresses thought nothing of having servants of the same sex sleep two or three to a bed. Often all that was provided was a space on a landing. Danish servants often occupied minute rooms adjacent to the kitchen and without windows. A Neapolitan servant maid in the twentieth century still slept in a dark cupboard under the stairs. In the larger noble households of prerevolutionary France, male servants at the top of the hierarchy might have rooms of their own, but most servants lived in houses with two dormitories—one for men and the other for women. Lack of privacy was guaranteed by the failure to provide any keys to servants' rooms. This was just one factor that made female servants vulnerable to the attention of the male members of the household. Pepys regularly watched his female servants undressing. Victorian houses were often designed with separate staircases to separate servants from their master and mistress and to prevent those unfortunate confrontations, but they still occurred.

The standard of food given to servants also varied. Some servants ate the same food as their employers, although not necessarily of the same quality;

others did not. The British feminist author Mary Wollstonecraft, visiting Scandinavia in 1795, was horrified to find that employers gave their servants food different from what they ate themselves. This was, however, the usual practice in Scotland in large households. In 1829 Lady Breadalbane ordered that no butter was to be served in the servants' hall but that all their pies and puddings must be made with dripping (Plant, p. 171). On the whole servants' food in Scotland was dull but not unwholesome. In smaller households the servants ate the same food as their employers. As there was little meat, most of the week they lived on porridge, broth, and bannocks.

WAGES

Throughout Europe, the wages paid to servants varied enormously—both among different areas of each country, and between towns or cities and the rural countryside. For example, while in general female servants' wages were half those of men in Denmark, there were wide variations between one manor and another (Dahlsgård, p. 63). There was also a striking contrast between wages in Scotland and England in the early

eighteenth century. Maximum wages were fixed by the Lanarkshire justices in 1708 at £24 Scots a year or £2 sterling for any male servant able to perform “all manner of work relating to husbandry” (Plant, p. 165). In England, the equivalent wage could be at least five times greater.

What has not always been fully appreciated are the large number of servants who were paid no wages at all but were taken on to work in exchange for board and lodging. In Denmark until the late twentieth century it was customary for daughters who became maidservants on farms to receive practically no cash wages at all (Dahlsgård). In England many pauper servants were placed by the parish authorities with employers. Foundlings who survived tended to go into service. Unemployed daughters of those claiming parish relief were liable to be forced into service on the same terms. Not only were no wages paid to them, but the parish authorities usually gave their employers an allowance toward the maintenance of the servant. Young boy-servants, or “livery boys” as they were called, might be given a suit of clothes, but rarely, if they were paid at all, were they paid more than a pittance—more pocket-money than a wage (Hill).

From the sixteenth to the early eighteenth century the wages of French domestic servants are accurately described as “in general so low as to be almost nonexistent” (Fairchilds, 1984, p. 54). Most servants were paid *à récompense*—that is, they received board, lodging, and some sort of present at the end of their service. Such a system was widespread among both farm and house servants. The alternative was hiring *à gages*, when servants were in theory paid a yearly wage, although very often it was paid at least partly in kind. In 1705 François Louradour was hired by the Chevalier de la Renaudie at a yearly wage of “eighteen livres, two shirts, and one of my old hats” (quoted in Fairchilds, 1984, p. 55). But wages often went unpaid—sometimes for as long as six years. In eighteenth-century Madrid, many servants in times of hardship were prepared to work for their keep alone—at least until times improved. Most expected to be able to profit a little from the sale of food, and even in modest households servants expected to be able to sell “dripping from meat . . . to street vendors for candles” (Hufton, 1997, p. 86).

In general women servants earned less than men, often no more than a half, even for the same kind of work. Wages varied not only according to gender but also by skill and by geographical location. In France, Paris was by far the highest-paying city for servants. But all servants, except the most highly skilled upper servants, earned wages that were uni-

formly extremely low, even taking into consideration the value of their board and lodging. Things changed when servants’ wages began to rise gradually in the period 1730–1750 and then sharply in the 1770s and 1780s. All wages were rising in France in this period, but servants’ wages rose more than those for other occupations. The wages of an unskilled female servant rose 40 percent between the periods 1726–1741 and 1771–1789. For male servants the rise was even greater. In these circumstances hiring *à récompense* died out (Fairchilds, 1984).

If wages of domestic servants were universally low there were perks from which servants could benefit. We do not know the exact origin of these perks, but by the beginning of the seventeenth century they were a firmly established practice to which servants attached great importance. As the relationship between employers and servants became less paternalistic and more contractual, such practices came under increasing criticism, but attempts to abolish them were met with frenzied opposition. As Samuel Richardson’s heroine learned in *Pamela*, it was usual for employers to pass on clothes to their servants. In England there were often tea allowances made to female domestics and beer to males. Some employers gave special washing allowances to their servants. Cooks and housekeepers were in a position to benefit from tradesman’s perks given to confirm their employers’ continued use of their services. But by far the most valuable of perks were vails or tips. This custom survived from a time when guests of a household were expected to tip the servants. Vails amounted to a generous supplement to wages for those servants who benefited from them—that is, mainly male servants who were on public view, such as footmen, postilions, and butlers.

SERVANTS AND SEX

One thing common to all female domestic servants was their vulnerability to advances made by their employers, their employers’ sons, or fellow servants. Away from their families and friends, in strange households, these young girls lacked all protection from sexual exploitation. Absence of privacy in households (as has been noted, if a servant was lucky enough to have a room of her own she would not possess a key) meant frequent cases of pregnant servant girls. In France ecclesiastical court records reveal masters who impregnated three maids in succession but managed to negotiate marriages for each (Hufton, 1997). We know most about the situation in France, where the *déclarations de grossesse* (statements required

by law of unwed mothers detailing the circumstances surrounding their pregnancies) provide an invaluable source of evidence. Even so, the threat to servant maids was almost certainly much greater than the evidence suggests. To many it seemed perfectly natural that masters should have sexual access to their servants. It is clear that in France affairs between servants and masters were commonplace. It seems probable that most female servants experienced some form of sexual harassment from their masters at one point or another (Fairchilds, 1984).

For the majority of the servant girls who became pregnant, employers had made promises of money or gifts, or threatened dismissal or the use of force. Often male servants promised marriage and abandoned the women when they became pregnant. In eighteenth-century Nantes, for instance, 40 percent of women reporting illegitimate pregnancies were domestic servants. In Marseilles it was as high as 90 percent (Maza). There is no reason to think the situation in England was all that different. In France it appears to have been easy for a well-to-do master to unload the maid he had made pregnant on some single male in need of money. Often this was done with the full connivance of the wife-to-be. Such a marriage cost one French seducer one hundred florins and a new set of clothes (Hufton, 1997).

Such marriages notwithstanding, the fate of the pregnant servant maid was dire. As soon as her condition was known, instant dismissal followed. The opportunities for her reemployment were few, particularly if she had the child. Shame and fear of returning to their families caused many to take to the road. A town provided more anonymity than a rural village. But they had to be very careful, for anyone harboring a traveling pregnant woman in England could find himself in court and fined (Hufton, 1997). Wherever they were discovered, they were harassed and moved on. Occasionally evidence of some humanity toward such traveling women appears. Anne Frie of Broad Hinton told the magistrates in 1610 that when she found “ ‘a walking woman . . . in travail of child in the open street’ she took her in ‘for womanhood’s sake’ ” (Hufton, 1997, p. 269).

While there is some disagreement about the scale of recruitment of domestic servants into prostitution, two groups constituted regular sources. One was unemployed domestic servants (Fairchilds, 1984). As Daniel Defoe’s *Moll Flanders* suggests, in such cases the choices were simple—either prostitution or starvation. Often such prostitution was short-term and the women returned to regular employment as servants at a later stage. In France that was the recurring experience of women employed in the silk manufac-

ture in Lyon. Whenever trade was bad the *servantes* would be dismissed. Their only recourse would be a period in prostitution. The same thing happened in the lace industry in Belgium when bad trade left women workers unemployed. They made their way to Dutch ports and for a spell became prostitutes (Hufton, 1997). The second source for the recruitment of prostitutes was inn servants, who received no regular wages but were expected to survive on the basis of tips. It is not surprising that they attempted to supplement their earnings by prostitution (Fairchilds, 1984, p. 75). In Amsterdam, where prostitution was particularly common, most prostitutes were migrants from the north Netherlands and Germany, and 15 percent of the total number of prostitutes had been servants (Hufton, 1997, p. 326).

SOCIAL MOBILITY

What chances existed for upward social mobility among domestic servants? For the minority in larger households it was possible to ascend the servant hierarchy by learning new skills and accumulating experience. As Olwen Hufton writes, “a kitchen skivvy after a few years might even advance to parlourmaid.” She might achieve the status of chambermaid or, more exceptionally, lady’s maid, but this was far from usual, and required a large dose of good luck (Hufton, 1993, p. 21). So for a minority of servants of status there was some career structure to their lives in service. In the large houses of the rich, where a strict hierarchy of servants existed, an experienced servant could enjoy a measure of autonomy, a comfortable standard of living, and some authority over others. This was especially true of male servants. Given the decline in the number of male servants there was a decreasing opportunity to marry men in service. Many female servants married tradesmen or craftsmen. Others were lucky if they won the affections of the lowest paid laborer. Much depended on what dowry a female servant had managed to accumulate from her earnings. Real social advancement from marriage, however, was rare. If the estimate of John Rickman, the chief statistician employed on the early nineteenth-century British census, was right—that is, that one-third of servants were upwardly mobile, one-third remained static, and one-third were downwardly mobile—then two-thirds of servants experienced no social betterment (Hill). For the majority of servants there was no such career structure. This in part explains the great mobility of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century domestic servants who were constantly changing places, to learn new skills, to increase their wages or improve

their working conditions, and often just to get away from an unpleasant master or mistress.

Most young girls entering into service had little or no education. There is evidence that by the eighteenth century in Britain and the Netherlands better-off employers were demanding a degree of literacy from servants above the level of kitchen maid. It has been argued that servants were more literate than the rest of the working population and that a high proportion married above their social origins (Smith). Of course literacy varied; in France and the Mediterranean countries, literacy rates were much lower. In the departments of Provence and Normandy, for example, the literacy rate in the eighteenth century was barely 30 percent. Employers of servants in Spain did not expect them to be literate. In northwest Europe in the eighteenth century, employers demanded some sophistication and education in their servants (Hufton, 1997).

What was the attitude of servants to service? Of eighteenth-century London female servants, D. A. Kent wrote, "domestic service was an occupation which allowed women a measure of choice and relative economic independence" (quoted in Hill, p. 107). In sharp contrast is the comment from a German novel of the brother of a German woman entering service. "You have no idea of the dependent status that awaits you, or of the moods to which you will be exposed" (quoted in Joeres and Mayne, p. 66). One historian confidently states that most French women employed as domestics would have been anxious to get out of service as soon as they possibly could. For thousands of French women service was an unpleasant but necessary experience that lasted ten years before a dowry was earned to make marriage a possibility (Maza). In fact many servants married and left their employment. At least in theory the head of the household would expect to be consulted, if not about the groom, then about when the marriage was taking place. If the girl hoped to stay on in service the approval of the head of household was essential. There is evidence that, by the end of the eighteenth century, French domestic servants found service more and more intolerable as it involved loss of independence. Service at its best was regarded as a temporary bridge to better things (Fairchilds, 1979).

In their anomalous position between masters and mistresses and the rest of the laboring class, servants belonged nowhere. They were an isolated group.

Female domestic servants in particular were consistently objects of hostility, as indeed were unmarried women generally. Their unmarried status was seen as threatening by a society that saw marriage as the foundation of social stability. They were assumed to be promiscuous, debauched, and wanton, and were often accused on the barest of evidence of being prostitutes. Their ambiguous position was seen as menacing and a threat to social order (Maza).

In the twentieth century, as employment opportunities for women increased, the number of women choosing to enter service declined. Women wanted better wages than was possible in service, and more independence and freedom to live in their own homes and to spend their spare time as they chose without the close supervision of their employers.

In 1849 the *Westminster Review* published an article looking forward to a time when women would refuse to enter domestic service. The growth of more attractive alternative occupations for women in the late twentieth century made domestic service a rarity except among the very wealthy. But in a subtly different form domestic service thrived in the shape of home-helps, baby-sitters, and *au pairs*. These occupations appealed mostly to women, often single parents with young children, who needed part-time employment. The great difference from domestic service of the past is that they lived in their own homes and led lives independent of their employers.

See also Estates and Country Houses (volume 2); Prostitution (in this volume); Illegitimacy and Concubinage (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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PEASANTS AND RURAL LABORERS



Cathy A. Frierson

From the North Atlantic to the Urals in the 1500s, peasants and rural laborers made up 80 to 90 percent of the population. Peasant men and women were part of a population expansion that began with the ebb of the Black Death in the late fifteenth century and extended into the second half of the seventeenth century. Geographic location set the first boundaries. Peasants who lived west of the river Elbe in the German northeast were among the more fortunate of Europe's rural laborers; those born to the east of the river Elbe faced limits more restrictive and more persistent.

In western Europe, most peasants lived on small farms, for which they paid the lord of the manor rents in money or in kind. Although they were not free of obligations, they did have some autonomy in developing strategies for meeting them. They decided how best to cultivate the land and tend their animals to produce goods they either paid to the master or sold at a local market for the cash they then paid as rent.

In France in the 1500s, most peasants were legally tenants of lords, or seigneurs, to whom they owed monetary payments. There were some peasants who owned their land outright, but their numbers diminished in the 1500s and continued to decline thereafter, especially near urban areas, where population increased and wealthier members of society bought land as an investment. By the middle of the seventeenth century, only a very small number of French peasants owned enough to feed their families, much less prosper. This made the French peasantry a population of renters, who paid rents, taxes, and tithes to landowners, the state, and the church.

The lord was closest at hand and figured most prominently in the local imagination, as he exacted rent on the land and fees for fishing in his streams, hunting in his forests, or milling grain in his mills. The lord also controlled the local markets and could charge fees on peasant trade there. Finally, the lord controlled the local courts and political system, setting the parameters for justice and governance in the local communities that constituted the peasants' world. Some French peasants were able to go beyond meeting

the lord's demands to expand the lands they rented and become minor employers themselves, hiring less prosperous neighbors to work in their fields. This practice increased during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, creating a majority population of agricultural laborers who might dig a fellow villager's soil as a hired worker or sharecropper. By the end of the seventeenth century, agricultural laborers might make up as much as 90 percent of a village's population. Relative opportunity and social differentiation thus went hand in hand in the early modern French village.

Rural agriculturalists in England in the 1500s enjoyed a degree of autonomy on the land they worked and security in their tenancy that would have been the envy of peasants east of the Elbe. With the population recovery from the Black Death, lords needed peasants as much as peasants needed access to the lords' land. Lords were constrained not only by demographic trends and their labor needs, but also by an emerging royal judicial system that entered into their relationships with the peasants on their manors. While lords were certainly the masters of their land and retained considerable powers to exact fines, fees, and rents, they found themselves granting forms of tenancy that enabled a peasant to contemplate long-term farming on a particular plot of land and not only the prospect of paying the lord his due, but also opportunities for going beyond subsistence and obligation through successful farming.

Short of outright ownership of the land in perpetuity, English peasants sought a form of tenancy termed copyhold in inheritance. A peasant who secured a copyhold in inheritance for the land he tilled paid an annual rent, but could pass the land to another peasant (not only a family member) who in turn had to pay an entry fine to the master in order to receive the copyhold. Both rents and entry fines varied according to the landlords' whims, injecting some insecurity in the relationship for the peasant and opportunities for revenue and exploitation for the lord. Manorial court records reveal both that lords' courts were mimicking new royal court procedures and that



The Landed Estate. Adapted from Werner Rösener, *The Peasantry of Europe*, translated by Thomas M. Barker (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994), p. 104.

peasants were successfully disposing of their land to individuals of their choice, who received the preferred tenancy through copyhold in inheritance. Less preferable forms of tenancy were prevalent in the Midlands and the south of England, including copyhold for lives (not heritable) and beneficial leases, which gave lords considerably more power over the peasants and subjected the peasants to more insecurity in their relationship to the land and the master. All three forms of tenancy (copyhold in inheritance, copyhold for lives, and beneficial leases) determined what the peasants owed to the masters, but the peasants determined how they met the terms of tenancy.

Even in Spain, where poverty was the primary experience of the 80 percent of the population who were peasants, those working on the land were legally free. The economic condition of the Spanish peasantry in the sixteenth century and beyond closely resembles that of agriculturalists east of the Elbe, but the Spanish retained legal freedom of movement. As in France, town dwellers bought up land, forcing farmers who had held their land in tenancies for life to enter short-term tenancies, with all the insecurities and periodic reminders of their economic dependency that entailed. Everywhere, peasants paid taxes, rents, and dues to noble, church, and royal lords. In the northern mountains, peasants lived on small plots of land in miniature villages, paying their dues largely in kind, but increasingly in cash from the sixteenth cen-

tury forward. In Catalonia, situated on France's southern border and along the Mediterranean coast, peasants were able to secure long-term tenancies starting in the sixteenth century; some used these opportunities to expand their holdings until they themselves rented their land to other peasants. Further south, peasants were more likely to be day laborers on large manors, or *latifundia*, which dated to the reconquest of Spanish land from the Moors in the thirteenth century. There, fewer peasants could be called proprietors and most were either renters or hired hands. Over all of Spain, half of the peasants had to hire themselves out to their wealthier neighbors for at least part of the year, either because they had no land at all or too little to enable them to feed their families from one harvest to the next. Across Western Europe, as in Europe east of the Elbe river, those who tilled the soil did so not only for individual lords, but also for institutional lords such as religious institutions, the state as a major landowner, universities, and foundations. Further, peasants dependent on individual lords might find themselves transferred from labor on the land to labor in the lord's other enterprises, such as mining or agricultural processing.

Peasants born on the west bank of the river Elbe in the sixteenth century entered a trajectory leading some to individual proprietorship, freedom of movement, and expanding expectations for personal prosperity beyond subsistence. In the west, peasants had secured heritable land tenures and fixed rents by the sixteenth century. While they still had to pay the lords of the land their due, peasants could plan for a future because they knew they had the land they cultivated for as long as they wished, and they knew what their financial obligations would be. These certainties enabled a class of middle peasants to emerge and expand as they moved onto lands that had been abandoned during the Black Death. The family farm situated in a compact village became the peasants' foundation for moving beyond subsistence. They were fortunate in the fertile soil they farmed and the dynamism of towns and cities, which created both markets for any surplus they might want to sell and a class of burghers who kept the aspirations of the landed nobility in check.

These advantages enabled the agriculturalists in German states west of the Elbe to enjoy a steady recovery through the sixteenth century up to the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). A generation of warfare depleted both population and resources, threatening the gains the west German peasants had made in the previous century, yet the foundation of those gains seems to have carried them through to both financial recovery and confirmation of the personal freedom and secure land tenures their forebears had acquired. With

an eye to tax revenues, rulers in the west German states intervened on behalf of the middle and more prosperous peasants, protecting them from noble lords' efforts to render them more dependent and less mobile. As the eighteenth century approached, peasants along the Rhine, Weser, Main, and western reaches of the Danube owed regular taxes to their political rulers, but farmed and lived as community members relatively free of the heavy hand of their noble neighbors and landlords. The most prevalent forms of tenancy were ownership, for which the peasant still paid rent to a lord; and hereditary leasehold, so-called "steward tenancy" or *Meierhof* in the northwest. Much less prevalent were lifetime leasehold and tenancy at the will of the lord, who could recall it without warning. The latter faded from the German landscape as tenancy became hereditary in practice, even if not legally recorded as such. This is not to say that the peasants of west German principalities and duchies were free of domination. They were still captives in a web of obligations and hierarchies (*Herrschaft*) that provided channels for the intrusion of church, state, and nobles into the life of the village. But in the larger European framework, peasants in the west had a wider range of possibilities and actions than their fellows to the east.

Peasants born east of the Elbe in the sixteenth century entered a downward spiral toward the loss of mobility, increasing dependence, economic stagnation, and vulnerability to natural and man-made calamities. From Brandenburg to Moscow, through Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, and Romania, noble lords and ruling princes responded to the demographic crises of the fourteenth century and the political and military crises of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by joining forces to bind peasants to land and master, locking them into a series of dependencies and insecurities. Throughout these regions, noble lords were able to secure the legal restriction of the mobility of peasants living on their lands, which they had often acquired through the beneficence of the ruling prince or king. The result was large landed estates, populated and cultivated by plowmen and their families, whose former freedom to move from one estate and master to another was criminalized and subject to punishment.

The obligations of peasants in eastern Europe and Muscovy also became more restrictive, shifting from payments in money and kind to labor services. When east European peasants greeted the day, it was as likely that their activities were already defined and assigned to the lord's land and barns as it was likely that they could work for themselves according to their own priorities. Lords were not only taskmasters; they also acquired the roles of local judges, juries, tax col-

lectors, and often human barriers that peasants were forbidden to pass in order to appeal directly to the prince or king. Furthermore, as peasants were bound to lord and land, the lord viewed them as part of an estate's inventory, to be bought, sold, or traded as he saw fit. The estate was the lord's patrimony; peasants were patrimonial possessions; patrimonial lords became local petty autocrats over the people who labored beneath them. The reach of the laws that enforced these regimes was, of course, limited, and peasants continued to flee whenever they could in search of better conditions of life and labor. But the fact was that fleeing within the eastern half of Europe usually only led to another master with similar expectations and prerogatives.

COMMUNITY AND MENTALITIES, 1500–1750

Through the early modern period, all peasants and rural laborers in Europe, from Moscow to Glasgow, answered to another master or mistress beyond their earthly superiors in the shape of landlord, cleric, or state official: nature. Peasants cultivated the land in the traditions of their ancestors, using implements little changed over the previous centuries. The energy available to them came from the sun, the wind, food, water, and animals. Their ability to forecast the weather, to anticipate frost, flood, or drought, rested on folk wisdom and memory. Their understanding of diseases that struck human, plant, and animal populations offered little or nothing that would help them

prevent or treat them. This subordination to weather, soil, water, and microorganisms joined their subordination to secular and religious masters to inform the bonds they created with each other and the belief systems they embraced and defended in the communities they inhabited and imagined.

Before the technological age, nature set the parameters of cultivation and production, determining which crops to grow, animals to raise, foods to eat, clothes to wear, housing to construct, and fuel to provide heat and light. Soils, temperatures, and precipitation created a different set of boundaries in Europe, cutting across the tenancy line at the river Elbe. Peasants in central Norway and northern Russia were equally likely to be planting barley; peasants in northern Germany, Poland, Lithuania, and Muscovy shared in the experience of cultivating rye and oats; while those around Dijon, Munich, Budapest, and Kiev were growing wheat. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, peasants largely ate what they grew, without imported tastes or ingredients from other regions. Before the advent of railroads, steamships, and an extensive network of weatherproof roads (still lacking in late-twentieth-century rural Russia), the costs of transporting foodstuffs and the risks of spoilage over long journeys inhibited an interregional market in grains or meat and dairy products, and the differentiation of diets, urban or rural.

Peasants in early modern Europe devised social and agricultural strategies to meet environmental demands, while their belief systems and identities reflected their interpretation and attempts to accommodate those demands without yielding to them completely. Scattered plots in open field farming provided a form of insurance for peasants who recognized that diversifying their crops and distributing their fields over relatively broad areas meant that total crop failure was unlikely in the event of some natural misfortune. From insect infestations and blight to local flooding, drought, or hailstorm, natural assaults on cultivated fields were less likely to wipe out one peasant's or even an entire community's subsistence when numerous plots were spread out, usually with strips of uncultivated land ("balks" in England) to act as the equivalent of a firebreak, protecting each field from the misfortunes of a neighbor's. Scattered plots also enabled peasants to plant multiple crops, as for example winter and spring wheat, sequentially, moving from one to the next while avoiding simultaneous tasks on all of them.

Family life reflected economic considerations. In the north and west of Europe, families were nuclear by the mid-sixteenth century, comprising husband, wife, children, and hired hands who worked together

as a labor unit on the land they cultivated. On the southern periphery along the Mediterranean, through the Balkans and into Russia, the household comprised extended, multigenerational and multibranching families who likewise constituted a labor unit. In the west small farms and the relative autonomy peasants enjoyed in organizing their labor encouraged independent households of nuclear families, which took shape when young people had worked long enough to set up a separate home. Kin networks continued to be of primary importance in establishing personal identity, but the larger social and economic structure of western Europe made it possible for a nuclear family to farm on its own and hire hands if its labor needs exceeded familial capacity. In the east, where peasants had to render significant labor to their lords, nuclear families might often be short of the working hands they needed to meet external obligations and feed their families. In areas where poor soils joined significant labor obligations and premodern technologies, extensive farming encouraged extended families or the addition of hired hands to ensure household survival. The trend toward larger households quickened in the late seventeenth century as the grip of lords on bound peasants tightened.

Families were everywhere the primary community and source of identity. Through membership in a family or a household, the individual peasant had access to the land and its products and to shelter, and held a position in the next larger community—the village. Gender, age, marital status, blood ties, and relationship to the household head established a peasant's place in the world. In this framework the distinction between peasants and rural laborers emerged across Europe. Almost everywhere, peasants within families whose household head had established tenancy or serf's terms with the external lords were both more secure in fact and in status within village communities. Those whose families did not have an adequate combination of land, equipment, and labor to support themselves through farming had to hire themselves out to subsist. In Spain and Portugal, such rural laborers lost not only autonomy in their farming lives, but also access to common village pastures and other lands, which was reserved for peasants who could support themselves and their families on the land they cultivated. In southern Iberia, these laborers had reached 75 percent of the rural population by the eighteenth century, and for the entire region, 50 percent of the total.

In Germany west of the Elbe, the ranks of the village poor grew in the sixteenth century, prompting the development of local systems of poor relief and charity. So-called "cottagers" had only their houses

and a small plot of land for a cottage garden. While not landless, they had to seek subsistence beyond their land, either through hiring themselves out as workers for other, more prosperous peasants, or through practicing some supplemental trade, such as pottery, smithing, carpentry, or cobbling. In the German states east of the Elbe, the numbers of the rural poor expanded after the Thirty Years War, with more and more villagers falling into the category of landless labourers or householders with inadequate land, who had to work for their fellow peasants as well as the lord to feed self and family. Everywhere in the German states and elsewhere in Europe, this was disproportionately women's fate when they were widowed with children. At this largely pre-industrial era, stratification in rural communities defined layers of prosperity by access to the land and the capacity for household subsistence. Within peasant society, prosperous peasants were thus in a position to assume the status of local "betters" vis à vis their more dependent peasant neighbors.

Stratification within village communities bred resentment and visions of a social reckoning among the poorer peasants and rural laborers, as well as fear and a consequent effort to impose social discipline among the more prosperous and powerful peasants. Historians have detected the tensions within village communities in "epidemics" of witchcraft, court re-

ords of local conflicts, and testimonies before officials of Christian churches from those accused of heresy. Accusations of witchcraft fell most frequently on women, and sometimes men, who lived on the margins in rural communities. Women living outside the disciplined order of the patriarchal household fell under suspicion when disorder came to local communities in the form of human or animal epidemics, family disputes, or excessive sexual activity outside the bonds of marriage. Sometimes church officials joined with village leaders in the campaign to restrict the power of women, whose traditional practices in healing threatened both the monopoly of church doctrine and local social hierarchies. Similarly, church and local peasants could join together to bring a maverick in the community to heel if he or she failed to attend church services regularly or to take communion while there.

Rural laborers who challenged the local hierarchy or the larger social and political order sometimes offered tales of personal encounters with angels or supernatural beings who, they said, articulated alternative visions of a more just and equitable society. Within these oral traditions, captured for historians in the testimonies of those accused by their neighbors or local priests, marginal members of Europe's early modern villages left their record of disabilities and discomforts on the edge of their communities.

**EMANCIPATION: FROM BONDSMEN
AND BONDSWOMEN TO FREE CITIZENS:
1770–1861**

In the late eighteenth century, princes, kings, emperors, and revolutionary leaders began to set the peasants of land free from obligations to their lords and bonds to their land. Emancipation came through a combination of influences, ranging from the ideals of individual liberty and property to revolutionary upheaval and warfare, which illuminated the hazards of maintaining an order perceived to be unjust, unproductive, and a brake on economic development. The decisions by the prince of Savoy in 1771 and Austria's Emperor Joseph II in the 1780s to abolish serfdom anticipated the watershed resolutions in revolutionary France between 1789 and 1793. When France's National Assembly and National Convention eliminated all noble prerogatives and peasant duties to their lords, then granted peasants the right to divide up the land they cultivated without any compensation to their former lords, they set in motion a total program of emancipation without compensation that was not matched or fully achieved elsewhere in Europe for more than a century. Individual liberty and rights in property became the hallmark of the French Revolution's gains for those peasants who held land; landless laborers and tenant farmers gained individual liberty in principle, but continued economic dependency on their wealthier neighbors. Even so, France set the standard for emancipation and exported it either on the bayonets of Napoleon's soldiers or by example to the rest of Europe.

Across the German states and into the Russian Empire, reforming bureaucrats placed peasant emancipation above noble prerogatives in the name of economic and military progress. For the Prussians, defeat at the hands of Napoleon's army led the Hohenzollern rulers to launch an incremental process of granting peasants personal liberty and freedom of movement in 1809, which expanded two years later to the granting of rights in land to peasants, who had to compensate their former masters and the land's former owners with a third or a half of the land they were cultivating. By 1838, the process of turning peasant renters into property owners and full citizens was largely complete in Prussia.

In Russia, military defeat in the Crimean War enabled reform-minded bureaucrats to implement Alexander II's decision to emancipate the Russian serfs who dominated the rural landscape in the empire's European provinces west of the Ural mountains. Through the Emancipation legislation of 1861 for proprietary serfs and subsequent decrees for state and

crowns peasants, tens of millions of Russian peasants gained their personal liberty from their masters and property in land, for which they were to pay compensation over the next four decades. They did not gain full liberty of movement, however, as legislation bound them to their communities absolutely for the next decade, and made departure from their communities thereafter contingent upon the granting of permission by the communal assembly of household heads. In principle, they gained equality before the law with other Russian subjects; in fact, the vast majority of their legal concerns remained within the jurisdiction of the caste-specific cantonal court, over which peasant judges presided and ruled according to customary law. The compromises evident in Russia's emancipation process illustrated on the largest scale in Europe the challenges emancipation had posed to rulers everywhere: how to grant individual liberty and property to the majority population of peasants while maintaining economic stability and social order.

Behind emancipation lay the rulers' and bureaucrats' goal of economic progress, now understood to be a prerequisite for membership in the European community of modern states and for military power to defend the interests of those states. The very concept of modern economic and military power was itself in transition during these years, shaped by the process of industrial revolution in Great Britain, which coincided with the political and social revolution in France, and vied with it for influencing both agrarian policies and the experience of Europe's peasants and rural laborers.

**PEASANTS UNBOUND: ENCLOSURE,
PROFIT, AND THE LOOSENING OF THE
BOND TO THE LAND**

Between 1800 and 1850, Europe shifted from a world in which roughly 80 percent of the population continued to live and labor in the countryside to one in which the push of agricultural reform and the pull of industrial development and urbanization was displacing, rearranging, and in some cases, destroying the parts making up the preindustrial village. Great Britain set the standard for the emergence of the modern European countryside. Social and economic processes played out there were repeated across the continent.

The push of agriculture. The new element was the prospect of steady agricultural surplus, which could bring both profit to landowners and a ready food supply to towns and cities. The consolidation and enclosure of scattered plots from open fields into

hedged spaces has long been the hallmark of Great Britain's shift from early modern to modern agriculture and the rural social relations it engendered. Hailed initially by agricultural reformers of the Scottish enlightenment, including Adam Smith, "rationalizing" the open fields by gathering scattered plots together, fencing them in, then subjecting them to profit-oriented farming was understood to be the absolute prerequisite for economic progress. This agricultural transformation was mirrored by a social transformation in which peasants trapped in the narrow expectations of subsistence were replaced by farmers who managed their consolidated holdings with an eye to profit on the commercial market, incorporating profit-maximizing developments in crops, animal husbandry, fertilizers, and technologies.

In this mix of technological, economic, agricultural, and social transformation, the social group denoted by the label "peasants" was a *de facto* endangered species en route to extinction in Europe's development into a modern, industrial, market, consumer society revolving around cities and their activities. As early as 1896, the French observer Jean-Gabriel de Tarde referred to the peasant as a "fossilized creature." Rural laborers were those countrymen and women who provided the hired labor to the entrepreneurial agriculturalists termed farmers. Thus, the

peasantry ceased to be a social group or class bound by the traditional concepts, practices, and horizons of the early modern period. While the term and the phenomenon persisted into the second half of the twentieth century from France through Eastern Europe, both "vanished," to use Henri Mendras's expression, much earlier in Scotland and England. One may still visit the village of Laxton, a functioning open field village in Nottingham, to observe peasant practices in England, but one does so as a tourist or a historian peering into an archaic social and economic form.

The features of the transformation of subsistence farmers/peasants into farmers, rural laborers, or urban workers included dispossession, dislocation, and disintegration both social and moral for the peasants and rural laborers who were its victims, and conversely expansion of property, prosperity, and opportunity for those who became farmers and major landowners. As land was consolidated and fenced in, rents increased, labor decreased, agriculture became more intensively commercial, and animal husbandry grew. Enclosures were both voluntary and state enforced through acts of Parliament. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries village communities voted through unanimous decisions required under common law thus, voluntary enclosure could be frustrated by as few as one peasant unwilling to relinquish land in his use. In the eigh-

teenth century acts of Parliament, which required only majority consent, dominated the process. Enclosure by Parliamentary decree, therefore, is the more notorious in the literature for compelling unwilling smallholders to give up their land to the process, and for granting formal property rights to those who received consolidated plots.

Enclosure produced one of the great human dramas of social history. Marxist historians, interested in distributive justice, have focused on the inequities in property distribution enclosure produced. Furthermore, because enclosure commissions in individual communities were typically dominated by large local landowners, the process itself earned E. P. Thompson's sobriquet, "a plain enough case of class robbery." Among the most damaging aspects of enclosure was the loss of free access to common lands in pasture and woods, which deprived the rural poor of traditionally free fodder for their horse or cow and fuel for their fireplace or stove. Fences, hedgerows, and ditches constructed to demarcate consolidated fields kept out not only wandering animals, but also the women and children of the poor who had previously gleaned the harvested fields for whatever leavings they could find to add to their meager larders.

When smallholders received lands through the enclosure process, they also received the obligation to

fence them in at their own expense, primarily to keep their animals contained, thus to prevent their trespass and damage on their neighbors' crops. This cash expense was disproportionately high by comparison with fencing expenses for the larger holdings; sometimes it alone was adequate to convince a smallholder to leave the land altogether. Rural laborers who had earlier been able to supplement their wages with access to common lands and perhaps to garden on a small strip of land assigned to their cottage now found themselves genuinely landless and reliant solely on the labor of their hands and backs. Enclosure, meant to consolidate land and increase production, thus had a broad effect of alienation for the rural poor in England, who were separated first from common lands, then, through the combination of high rents and fencing prices, from the land itself and the subsistence farming they had practiced.

This experience was especially bitter when they observed the benefits larger farmers gained, as enclosure did indeed increase profits for those with land sufficient to compensate for the costs of enclosures. There can be no doubt that this social and economic transformation subjected large numbers of the English population to harsh psychological, physical, and social trauma, which surfaced in such rural crimes as arson, maiming of farmers' animals, and theft of harvested

crops. Beyond individual acts of protest and desperation, full-scale rural revolts broke out as the most striking demonstrations of the human costs of enclosure and the agricultural revolution it represented. The preponderance of rural laborers among those accused and convicted of crimes against the property of the beneficiaries of the agricultural revolution pointed to their frequent inability to maintain subsistence for themselves and their families in the new order, as well as to their profound sense of alienation from the communities that developed around profit-oriented, prosperous farms.

Like the witchcraft epidemics of the early modern era, the epidemiology of rural crimes in the nineteenth century pointed to stratification in rural communities. As the village population segregated into farmers, rural laborers, and those who departed to become urban workers, the farmers and rural laborers remained on their former lands on transformed terms. Land and labor were now commodities. Farmers possessed the land and commanded labor on terms designed to generate profit in the larger market, while rural laborers became atomized individual labor units, alienated from both the land and the products of their labor. Laborers protested their reduced status and means by seizing goods they needed for subsistence, or by destroying those same goods through maiming livestock and torching hayricks when farmers denied them access to these sources of their income in commercial farming.

And yet, England did not suffer in macroeconomic terms from this process. On the contrary, enclosure coincided largely with the great leap forward in England's economic history, when the industrial revolution created opportunities for employment and mobility to compensate for the lost insurance of open field, community-based farming. When they found themselves outside the figurative and literal fences of England's agricultural revolution, the displaced agriculturalists had new occupations to explore, new residential centers to inhabit, and new forms of transportation to use to get there. Whereas the undeniably traumatic character of enclosure in those areas where it was imposed from above constituted the "push" of this great transformation, external markets, urban employment, and accelerated economic processes constituted the "pull."

The pull of industry. The bond to the land was broken not only by forced enclosure and state decrees, as in England, but also by the attractions and opportunities offered by Europe's shift from the rural and agricultural to the urban and industrial. Peasants not only "lost" the rural way of life they had known for

centuries because their way of life was undermined by state decrees and commercial farming; they also discarded it in search of opportunities beyond the constraints of climate, land, family, and local community.

From Laxton in England to Erdobeny in Hungary to Soligalich in European Russia, this push and pull generated greater mobility for peasants and rural laborers. Social structures, work routines, and geographic boundaries gave way, yielding hybrid labor experiences and social identities throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Those who continued to farm incorporated new crops, production and processing techniques, and fertilizers, and often combined their agricultural labor with seasonal work for emerging markets and the industrial sector. Those who shifted to commercial farming in England and elsewhere also invested in new technologies to speed up agricultural labor, simultaneously threatening the manual skills of the rural laborers and setting new time standards for the performance of daily tasks. Timepieces, such as clocks and pocket watches, became markers of the farmers' higher status and new expectations, as intensely resented by their laborers as the farm equipment in their more prosperous neighbors' barns. Enterprising farmers turned to cash crops for the market, abandoning traditional crops and crop rotation, disrupting seasonal cycles and altering familiar landscapes. The technologies of western Europe made their way through eastern Europe all the way to Russia, where British steel plows competed on the local market with Swedish steel plows for the purchasing power of Russia's most innovative farmers.

Eighteenth-century Flanders provides a particularly vivid example of the combination of agricultural and nonagricultural pursuits by peasants and rural laborers, as well as of the social stratification that accompanied that combination. Flemish peasants planted flax, then transformed it into cloth over the winter months. Flax farming and linen production through home-based spinning and weaving enabled peasants to supplement their agricultural income when population increase and the fragmentation of landholdings threatened subsistence. Family-based linen production for town merchants fed an international textile market, primarily in the American colonies, where Flemish cloth held coffee beans, covered the backs of slaves, and decorated windows in colonial homes. Labor came from every able family member, but rural laborers also hired themselves out to families who had the looms they could not afford on their own. For both the hired hands and the family weavers, the income their participation in the international linen market brought was quite low. For many it staved off indigence, however, while providing a safety valve of

sorts in the period between the shift to commercial farming and the full-blown development of industry.

Once industry entered the equation in full force, such tenuous adaptations to demographic and macroeconomic developments faded before the more stunning prospects and pressures of industrialization and urbanization. Before the industrial revolution, peasants combined farming and nonagricultural home-based occupations, such as weaving, smithing, lace making, pottery, or tanning, producing goods to trade in their local or neighboring communities largely as a seasonal supplement to subsistence farming. Once steamboats and trains opened up broader transportation opportunities, towns became centers of industry and commerce, and markets expanded in town for labor and in the countryside for urban products. Non-rural locations and occupations exerted a magnetic pull so forceful that it dislodged many elements in the rural structure, breaking up old patterns and drawing people away from the land. The emigrants included gentry landowners, who sold their land to garner capital to invest in the commercial, industrial economy. Peasants thus gained opportunities to become smallholders themselves. People, products, and information began to move back and forth between town and country.

This process displayed great regional variation, of course, in its tempo, with England and the Low Countries moving most rapidly away from agricultural dominance toward industrial, capital economies. In France in the nineteenth century, tenant farmers leased their lands from wealthy urbanites who invested the capital they had gained in banking and industry in land in the countryside. These former peasants were able to accumulate extensive landholdings of their own and become powerful local employers who hired neighboring peasants. In some regions, peasants rose above their neighbors not through tenant farming, but through their own labor, prudent saving and control over expenses, and family planning. The French village also included peasants who were able to support themselves and their families on their own lands, neither expanding their lands with an eye to profits nor falling behind or risking the loss of any of their holdings. Still other peasants held onto their family land only by supplementing their income with periodic labor through jobs in town or local factories. Sharecroppers and migrant rural laborers in France constituted the lower elements in village stratification. They typically had no land of their own and lived lives of forced subservience as long as they remained in the countryside. In 1892, there were 2.5 million rural laborers in France, who were the group most likely to contribute to the 650,000 rural inhab-

itants who left for the cities and towns between 1896 and 1901. France and Germany were slower to embrace technological changes (from the use of mineral fertilizers to the purchase of farming equipment), and Russia lay at the geographic and chronological extreme of the spectrum. But even in imperial Russia, so late to embrace industrial development and so constrained by officials fearful of a landless rural proletariat whom they associated with Europe's revolutions, the emergence of industrial centers and a consumer economy by the 1890s wrought upon the countryside the same changes experienced as much as a century earlier on the other end of the European continent.

Four "types" among the peasantry in European Russia in the late nineteenth century illustrate the experience, however belated, of the European peasantry and rural laborers in the transition from agricultural to industrial societies: the peasant proprietor, the migrant agricultural laborer, the peasant-worker male, and the peasant woman who departed for the city or factory town. Peasant proprietors were those who bought land from the departing gentry, who had given up farming when they no longer had access to free labor as they had before the emancipation of their serfs. Peasant proprietors' numbers expanded after 1883, when the state established the Peasant Land Bank, with loans available at affordable rates to the enterprising agriculturalist. These peasants invested not only in land, but also in recently introduced mineral fertilizers and steel plows imported from Sweden and England. They hired their less fortunate or less enterprising fellow peasants, purchased cloth and factory-made clothes in town or from itinerant traders, replaced their thatched roofs with tile or tin, drank tea from samovars, and illuminated their homes with kerosene lamps. They might well be literate, and thus able to read both popular chapbooks and the state's newspaper targeting the aspiring peasant farmer with news of agrarian methods and reforms. They might also join a peasant cooperative, thus entering an institutional arrangement signifying their larger involvement with the market and state beyond their village's boundaries. In sum, their economic and social existence reflected a series of choices and decisions about how to shape their agricultural existence, which was no longer the product of their involuntary bondage to the land, but of their preferences and dreams.

Migrant peasant laborers might well be property owners, too, who farmed the land they had received as part of the emancipation settlement, but who needed to seek income elsewhere to supplement subsistence farming, in order to pay off their various tax obligations or to purchase items for their households. Some traveled far to the south of the empire to large

labor markets where wealthy landowners sent their stewards to hire enough hands to bring in their commercial crops. They traveled by train and by riverboat, as well as by cart or wagon, often covering remarkable distances in their search for cash income. The existence of an export market in grain was critical to their employment, however, so they too were involved in the larger market economy, despite the fact that they continued to labor on the land. Once in the hiring markets, they met their counterparts from all over the European provinces of the Russian Empire, whom they recognized as fellow laborers, but not as members of one community.

Peasant-workers were those who left their villages seasonally to work in cities and towns. Often they traveled in village groups as a labor cooperative, hiring themselves out annually to the same employer, living together in factory barracks or city apartments in social groupings that resembled village structures. Like the migrant laborers, they sought cash income, some of which they sent home to family members still in the village and some of which they used to purchase city clothes and goods, which would make them desirable in the eyes of peasant girls when they returned to the village. They, too, traveled by riverboat, railroad, or wagon, part of the Europe-wide movement of peasants into cities, human agents of the transition from the agricultural to the industrial society. The railroads they traveled were themselves funded in no small part through loans from major French banks, who had invested the savings of French peasants in the great Russian construction projects.

The magnet of the city also attracted peasant women, many of whom followed the men of their village and assumed traditional roles as housekeepers and cooks for their transposed community. Others entered domestic service for urban families or became factory workers, usually in the textile industry, moving into factory housing or communal apartments. Like their male covillagers and relatives, many of these peasant women followed a circular pattern of migration, moving back and forth between village and town. Along the way, they gained not only cash, but also new tastes in clothing and entertainment, a sense of mobility as they rode the imperial rails, and a sure knowledge of alternatives to the traditional tasks of the peasant woman. By 1900 in the central industrial region of Russia, which comprised seven provinces, roughly one-fifth of the peasant population requested and received the internal passports they needed to migrate for labor. Somewhat more than half the peasants who immigrated to Moscow and St. Petersburg for labor were women. Thus, at the far eastern reaches of Europe, the processes of transition away from the in-

voluntary bondage to the land that had marked the peasant experience 150 years earlier across the continent had accelerated even in Russia, and had come to include women as well as men. By the end of the nineteenth century, former peasants in some countries were beginning to depart from their insular worldview by participating in collective organizations, movements, and, to a smaller extent, political parties. Collective organizations included cooperatives for the purchase and use of farming equipment, mutual insurance programs, volunteer firefighting brigades, and some farmers' trade unions. There were also parties founded by members of the intelligentsia who became advocates for the peasants and encouraged their political engagement. In Russia, peasant-focused politics had already gone through several party formations by 1900, from the Populists of the 1870s through the People's Will and Black Repartition of the 1880s to the Socialist Revolutionaries of the turn of the century. In Bulgaria the Agrarian Union, formed in late 1899, was on the verge of being the dominant political force in the country. These embryonic forms of economic and political organization would expand in the twentieth century. Full-blown, they would signify both the end of the autarkic peasant mentality and the need for agriculturalists to fight for the preservation and subsidization of their way of life in an industrial age.

PEASANTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Most peasants in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century had a dim concept of the state or of their identity as citizens of a national political culture. The expansion of their mental horizons had occurred largely in the last decades of the nineteenth century through instruction in churches and schools, military training, and the reading of newspapers and the popular press. The very creation of the nation state was recent for citizens of Italy, Germany, and Serbia, and peasants in central and eastern Europe had every reason to be skeptical about any lasting territorial polity. Even in France, with its long tradition of consciously constructed nationalism, peasants often entered the army uncertain about the identity of their enemies or the political order they were to defend. Yet the state has been the critical player in determining the fate of the European peasantry in the twentieth century. The state most brutally invaded the lives of rural people through the failed politics embodied in two world wars fought across the farmlands of France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the

Soviet Union. The Russian and Spanish civil wars brought similar visitations of destruction upon the Russian and Spanish peasants. The trench warfare of World War I left mines and shells deep in the fields, still to be located and defused a hundred years later by state-employed *demineurs*, or worse, to detonate under the tractors of French farmers who unwittingly come upon them during spring planting. Invading German troops and tanks in World War II laid waste to the farmlands of Belorussia and Ukraine, when soldiers paused long enough to burn hundreds of villages to the ground. These wars also forced peasant men into the service of the state through conscription. From a vague notion associated with a distant capital city or a local tax collector at the beginning of the twentieth century, the state became an unavoidable entity and element in the rural consciousness.

The state became alternately the agent of forced transformation or the object of political activism. Most dramatically in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and 1930s and in the states the Soviet Union dominated after World War II, the state determined the nature of agriculture and the socioeconomic position of the people who practiced it on consolidated collective farms, forcing a twentieth-century version of enclosure and binding the peasants to the land again through a system of internal passports, and eliciting popular resistance that repeated the traumas of a century earlier in England. Collectivization in the east also reproduced the divisions between the tightly

bound and the relatively free along a line running through Germany that followed the boundaries of the early modern era. To the west of that line, states have stepped in to protect those who farm through state subsidies, tariff systems, and social welfare programs, which make it possible for the individual farmer to prosper in an industrial age. On the eve of World War II, a distinct minority of the population was engaged in agriculture in western Europe, as the percentages for the following countries indicate: France, 32.5 percent; Germany, 29 percent; Belgium, 17 percent; Britain, 5.7 percent. The pull of industry and the power of market economies ensured that peasants would indeed “vanish” in the twentieth century. Everywhere in the West, those who worked the land did so as part of national and international economies, with their work experiences and financial lives as likely to be shaped by regional associations, the International Labor Organization, national ministries and departments of agriculture, import and export regulations, international trade treaties, and state subsidized grain and dairy prices as by their individual or family ties to the land. From the crops they plant to the goods they buy and sell in the marketplace, contemporary agriculturalists must reckon with national and international policies and economic trends far beyond the reach of household, village, or region.

Enclosure on a massive scale, dubbed agrobusiness, made even those independent small farmers attuned to the market seem irrational vestiges of an

earlier age. To defend the farming way of life, agriculturalists of the twentieth century formed numerous associations, such as those in France: the Cooperative for the Collective Ownership of Farm Equipment, Societies for Land Management, Associated Farm Interests, Movement for the Organization and Protection of Family Farms, Farmers' Organization for Communal Land Use, and others. French farmers were the most notorious for taking collective action to defend their way of life against international competition and policymaking, with their tractors processing through Paris and their assaults on trucks importing cheap produce from Spain being emblematic of their effort to command the attention of the state to protect their interests. In Hungary, independent farmers participated in post-communist politics with the goal of prohibiting the sale of Hungarian farmland to international interests. From tractors to the ballot box, farming people seized modern technologies and systems to keep rural interests in play, to maintain some power in a world defined by cities and industries.

Farming people of the second half of the twentieth century thus abandoned by necessity or choice much of what sociologists, anthropologists, and historians have described as the "peasant way of life": insularity; dependency on or forced subservience to powerful lords; distance from the dominant systems and values of the larger society beyond the village; primary bond to the land and localities; a cyclical view of time; an aversion to innovation and profit; and profound conservatism in economic, social, and po-

litical decisions. And, yet, the word "peasant" has not disappeared from the vocabulary of European cultures or from the mental landscapes of their citizens. Peasants continue to be viewed as the somehow still essential figures in national distinction. *Paysans* still sell their grapes, garlic, cheese, and lavender sachets in the market at Ferney Voltaire, where the city folk from Geneva crowd on Saturday mornings to touch base with the fundament of old French culture. In Budapest, a few genuine people of the countryside sell their honey and flowers at the Vasarcsarnok, the central market otherwise dominated by traders. In Moscow, *muzhiki* still pass through the major train stations, with heavy packs on their backs filled with farm produce in the morning when they arrive and city goods in the evening when they head home.

While cityfolk may disdain such "peasants" for their rough ways, urbanites still fill the trains and highways as they make their own pilgrimages back to the countryside, where many of them till small garden plots, gather mushrooms and berries, and thereby connect with the land of their ancestors' primary experiences. When asked in the year 2000 if Russian people would still rush to their summer cottages at the first moment spring planting becomes possible, even after a fully modernized system of agricultural production and distribution is in place in all cities and towns, two young law professors in their twenties laughed and said, "Of course, we will! We go to plant not just to produce food for our pantry. We go because of our connection with the soil. It restores us

and makes us whole after a winter in apartments, buses, subways, and cars in the city.” At the opposite end of Europe, in England, urban people display the same impulses and attachment to the earth in their gardening and lobbying for continued free access to walking paths across farming properties in the countryside. Everywhere in Europe, “peasants” are entrepreneurial farmers or hired laborers whose insular world

has given way to the industrialized market. But the peasant past continues to hold emotional meaning and definition for an urbanized society which maintains its tenuous bond with the land. States have also everywhere provided the infrastructures of communication and rapid transportation that make the rapid movement of agricultural goods to market and of industrial goods to the countryside possible.

See also Land Tenure; Peasant and Farming Villages; Serfdom: Eastern Europe; Serfdom: Western Europe (volume 2); and other articles in this section.

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SLAVES



Richard Hellie

The slave is typically, with some exceptions, at the bottom of society. This was true in Renaissance and later Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic as well as in nearly all other times and places. Other constants also apply to nearly all slaves throughout history. For one, the slave is nearly always an outsider, someone whose race, religion, or nationality is different from that of the slaveowner. The slave typically is socially dead, excluded from participating in society, whether through voting, office holding, access to the slave-owning society's burial rituals, or simply joining in festive activities. All slaves are legally owned by someone or a corporate organization, and the powers of the state are available to slaveowners to enforce their claims to their chattel. These state powers range from registration of chattel to providing court services for the resolution of disputes over whether a person really is a slave or over which owner has the right to possess the chattel. In the eyes of the law, the slave is universally an object, never a subject.

World history knows basically two types of slaves: household (domestic) slaves and slaves owned because they produce value in agriculture, mining, industrial, or other production for their owners. Production slaves are relatively rare in world history, confined to classical Greece and Rome and in the New World after 1500. Europe after 1250 knew almost nothing but household slavery until the Nazis enslaved "subhumans" to man their factories and the Soviets enslaved "political undesirables" as well as common criminals in the Gulag, the vast penal system of labor camps. Probably even including these two episodes, slavery was never central for European economic development.

Because slavery in Europe is partly a political phenomenon defined by states in their laws as well as a nationality phenomenon in deciding who is an "insider" and who an "outsider," slavery can be discussed in terms of the major political entity in which the slaves lived, the country or nation in which they were enslaved, and under whose laws they were held in bondage. The discussion is best conducted from east

to west, from Russia to England and Ireland—that is, from countries with more extensive and enduring slavery practices to places with less extensive slavery that was abolished much earlier. Thus this essay begins with Russia, then moves to the Slavic countries and the Ottoman Empire; Italy, Iberia, and France; and northern Europe; and ends with England, Scotland, and Ireland. It does not deal with Europe's role in the slave trade of non-Europeans or in the abolition movement involving non-Europeans.

RUSSIA

From earliest known times in the areas that are now Russia and Ukraine, slaves were relatively common. Russia and Ukraine had the most developed system of slavery in all of Europe; its impact there was the most prolonged in all of Europe, with the twentieth-century Soviet system of slavery lasting longer than any other country's. After 1132, whatever political unity in Rus' had existed in the previous quarter millennium evaporated as smaller and smaller principalities were created that warred with one another. Slave raiding became one of the major objects of warfare, and some of those war slaves were housed in barracks and forced to farm in an attempt to give value to land that otherwise had none for the social elite, other than as a source of taxes on the agricultural population. This situation was only made worse by the Mongol conquest of 1237–1240, for the Mongols enslaved at least 10 percent of the East Slavic population. This initiated the process of making Slavdom into one of the world's two great slave reservoirs, the other being Africa. Indeed, in many European languages the word "slave" comes from the word "Slav." The Mongols and their heirs the Crimean Tatars "harvested" Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles) and sold them throughout Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa, where buyers inspected them along with black Africans.

After Moscow put an end to the anarchy on the East European Plain by creating Muscovy, a unified

Great Russian State, in the late thirteenth century, slavery, perhaps unexpectedly, continued to play a major role. A perceived labor shortage was a major feature of most of Russian history, with the years 1870–1917 being perhaps the sole exception. In such an environment the demand for slaves and slavelike chattel was intense. In the mid-sixteenth century a central bureau, the Slavery Chancellery, was created to record slaves, slave transactions, and disputes over slaves. Muscovy was the sole country in the world ever to have a single, centralized office for the recording of slaves. At least eight kinds of slavery existed there: for debt (which was worked off by females at the rate of 2.5 rubles and by males at the rate of 5.0 rubles per year); for indenture (a young person, typically male, agreed to work for an owner for a number of years in exchange for training and some cash upon manumission, or release); pawnship (a special category of urban slaves); special military captives (who had been seized as military booty by Muscovite soldiers but might have to be released upon the signing of a peace treaty); hereditary slaves (the offspring of slaves, who could never look forward to manumission regardless of how many generations they had been enthralled); reported slaves (elite slaves who managed estates); military slaves (men who sold themselves to cavalrymen to accompany and to assist their owners in warfare—their price was considerably higher than that of other slaves); and limited service contract slaves.

About half the slaves in Muscovy were limited service contract slaves, who violated the social scientific norm that slaves were supposed to be outsiders. Prior to the 1590s, in a limited contract, slaves signed a contract to work for someone for a year in lieu of paying interest on a loan (a form of antichresis); upon default, they became full slaves whose offspring would become hereditary slaves. After the 1590s they could not repay the loans—which they almost never did—and were freed upon the death of their owners. For the slaves, this was a form of welfare in which the slaveowners agreed to feed and clothe their chattel. All of these types of slaves were registered in the books of the Slavery Chancellery, and they were all treated alike, for example, in case of flight or ownership disputes. Except for limited service contract slaves after the 1590s, manumission was rare for Russian slaves. The numbers of slaves cannot be calculated with any precision, but they may have composed 10 percent of the population, certainly a much higher percentage than anywhere else in Europe after 1300.

In Europe after 1300 slave rebellions occurred solely in Russia. Khlopko was a slave who led others on the southern frontier in an uprising against the government in 1603. Bolotnikov, the leader of the

vast uprising of 1606 under his banner, was a runaway military slave (many of the rebels were not slaves). After these experiences the government diminished the role of elite slaves in the army, thus depriving them of combat training. After Bolotnikov no slave led a rebellion in Russia, although fugitive slaves are known to have participated in the Us and Razin uprisings of 1667–1671. They also participated in the 1682 uprising in Moscow led by musketeers against Sophia, Ivan, and Peter, the sibling trio of rulers, during which they made sure to burn the records of the Slavery Chancellery. There were probably no such episodes elsewhere in Europe because of the low concentrations of slaves in Christian Modern Europe.

Slavery served as the model for serfdom in Muscovy, even more so than was the case in the territories of the decaying Roman Empire. The major difference was that the serf was still the subject of the law and owned things that his owner legally could not claim. He also had to pay taxes, whereas the slave, as chattel, generally did not. Serfdom was consolidated by the Law Code (*Ulozhenie*) of 1649, after which peasants began to sell themselves as slaves with increasing frequency so as to avoid paying taxes. After a census was taken in which the government discovered what was happening, all farming slaves in 1679 were converted back into serfs. Being a household slave offered one other tax dodge. Serfs, peasants, and others began to convert themselves into household slaves, whereupon the government in the early 1720s converted all household slaves into household serfs and, with the new soul tax (a head tax on every male), put them all on the tax rolls. This essentially abolished slavery in Russia, although its impact lived on in the institution of serfdom, which after the middle of the eighteenth century was increasingly slavelike in that the serf owners could dispose of serfs as though they were slaves: move them around, sell them without land, force them to work demesne lands, and control them as though they were their personal chattel. The Nazimov Rescript of 1857 proclaimed the intention to free the serfs from their owners' control, but they were to remain bound to the land until they had paid for it (over a period of forty-nine years). The slavlike element of serfdom—personal dependency on a serf owner—was abolished in 1861, but the serfs were not fully freed until 1906, when, with the cancellation of the redemption payments, they were allowed to move wherever they wanted and became almost full citizens.

By many definitions the extensive Russian use of penal servitude was another form of slavery. Exile for criminals was introduced in the seventeenth century with the twin purposes of “cleaning up” the central areas and populating the frontiers, especially

the southern frontier south of the Oka and the Siberian frontier east of the Urals. Classic exile demanded that a felon, who was either a common criminal or, increasingly, a political dissident resettle involuntarily from a desired locale to an undesirable locale. After 1700 this typically meant sending someone out of Europe into Asia. Over a million were so relocated between 1649 and 1917. A slavery element entered into the equation when the felon was forced to work. Gold mining was a frequent occupation chosen for the forced-laborer exiles in Siberia and the Russian far east.

The Russian heritage of slavery was revitalized in an example of path dependency in the Soviet period. The peasants were again bound to the land in 1930 as part of the collectivization of agriculture (sometimes called “the second enslavement,” in which they were not issued passports, with the result that they could not move from their collective farms) and in the Gulag system of forced labor. The NKVD (secret police) got into the business of operating huge slave labor camps as part of the intensified industrialization drive of the Five Year Plans. Soviet central planners in Moscow relied on the slave miners in Vorkuta, for example, for 40 percent of Leningrad’s coal. Again, this system was unusual from a world perspective, for most of these “slaves” were not outsiders but native Soviet citizens who were made artificially into “outsiders” by the heaping on of derogatory apposi-

tions: enemy of the people, exploiter, wrecker, traitor, scum, insect. (They were supplemented by genuine “outsiders,” Poles and people from the Baltic states, as the Soviet Union expanded in 1940 and the NKVD arrested and sent to the Soviet forced labor camps anyone who was considered capable of opposition. They were followed by Germans POWs during World War II.) The Gulag slaves were freed only upon closure of the concentration camps after the death of Stalin in 1953. Most were freed by 1957, and allegedly there were few slave laborers in the Gulag when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The exact total number of Gulag slaves is unknown, but numbers up to twenty million are mentioned in the literature. The Gulag was known for high death rates until Stalin’s death, which made the Soviet institution look much like the Nazi dual-purpose camps—extraction of labor until the victim was exterminated.

SLAVIC COUNTRIES AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Other Slavic countries in Central Europe also had slaves. Poland had privately owned slaves in the Middle Ages, peaking in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but they blended into serfs as the “second serfdom” expanded in the late Middle Ages. Slaves originated primarily from capture in war but also from

punishment for criminal activity, indebtedness, and self-sale. Polish slaves were freed by owner manumission, by the slave's working his way to freedom, or as a punishment of the master (who was deprived of his property). A slave turned out by his owner during a famine automatically gained his freedom. Slavery was abolished in Lithuania by the Lithuanian Statute of 1588.

The Balkans (Byzantium, which fell to the Ottoman Empire in 1453, Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia) present insuperable problems for a short essay. About 40 percent of Byzantium, the Eastern Roman Empire, lay in Europe; it was Orthodox Christian and used Roman law. Slavery in Byzantium yielded to serfdom and essentially died out in the Middle Ages, after 1100. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire's faith was Islam, and slavery was revived there by the Turks. The Ottoman Turks by 1500 conquered most of the rest of the Balkans and imposed the slave norms of the Qur'an and the Shari'a (the fundamental code of Islamic law) where they could. The result was a revitalized system of household slavery as well as military slavery in the form of the infantry janissaries and galley slavery in the Mediterranean. In addition to the janissaries, there were elite slaves—as many as 100,000 in 1609—who belonged to the sultan and worked in the palace. State slaves were also used in large construction projects such as marketplaces, schools and mosques, and hospitals. Household slaves fulfilled their traditional roles—domestic service, cleaning, cooking, running errands, standing guard, tending children, and so forth. Islam permitted slave women to be concubines, which was the assured destination of almost every young female slave. Slaves were also used in the silk and textile industries and other small businesses.

Ottoman slaves were outsiders. Taken by the Crimean Tatars from the neighboring Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, and some Hungarians, they were almost always Christians, sometimes animists, and typically Slavs. Up to 2.5 million slaves are calculated to have passed through the Crimean market in Kaffa (Kefe) alone in the years 1500–1700, most of them destined for the Ottoman Empire. The Muscovites set up a special tax to ransom their nationals taken by the Crimeans into slavery, and individuals paid such monies as well. Muscovite attempts to keep out the Crimeans were the major factor motivating the first Russian service-class revolution and the creation of a garrison state—in which the autocrat ruled supreme—that had serfdom as one of its major constituents. The Polish government did not engage in the ransom of its subjects, although occasionally individuals did. In

1607 a Polish-Ottoman treaty required that Polish slaves be returned without the payment of ransom, but that had little impact on the Crimeans. In spite of the treaty, Poles continued to be taken into captivity, especially after the Russians completed in the years 1636–1653 the construction of the Belgorod fortified line, which kept the Crimean predators out of Muscovy and deflected them into the Rzeczpospolita (the commonwealth). Catherine the Great liquidated the Crimean Khanate in 1783, which put an end to Crimean slave raiding. After that slaves in the European parts of the Ottoman Empire were so-called “white slaves” kidnapped from the Caucasus (Circassians and Georgians) or black slaves imported through Egypt from Africa. Turkey increased its number of galley slaves in the seventeenth century, most being from Muscovy and some from Italy. Galley slaves had one advantage over others: while in port, when not chained to their oars or benches, they could jump ship and make their way to freedom; but the number who did was very small. The Crimean War brought the trade in Christian Georgians to the attention of the British, who in the 1850s convinced the Ottomans and Russians to suppress it. The trade in Islamic Circassians was suppressed four decades later. The Ottoman slave trade was abolished officially only in 1909. As always, the abolition of the trade did not signify the abolition of slavery itself. Slavery in the Ottoman Balkans was extinguished only by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after 1878 and World War I. The modernizing reforms of Kemal Atatürk, who proclaimed the state of Turkey with himself as president in the early 1920s, fully brought slavery to an end.

Census records indicate that, in spite of the huge numbers of slaves known to have been imported, slaves never exceeded 5 percent of the total population of the Ottoman Empire because Islamic practice encouraged frequent manumission by slaveowners. In other words, the “outsiders” were considered to be “insiders” after a very brief period of time. On the other hand, the Islamic world was addicted to slaves. Social relations were established so that the society could not function without slaves. Frequent manumission meant that it was necessary to replace those manumitted either by frequent slave raids or frequent trips to the slave market. Slavery became a form of involuntary migration marked by the high death rates of those who resisted capture into slavery or died en route to their final destination of enslavement. These high death rates (often only one in ten reached a slave destination) prefigured the high death rates in Soviet and Nazi slave systems.

Roma (Gypsies) comprised an interesting subset of the slaves in the Balkans, primarily in Romania,

Wallachia, and Moldova. Many of them were brought there from India by the Ottomans and remained into the twenty-first century. As a visible minority, a number of them were converted into slaves, and their enslavement was recognized by law. They were probably first enslaved by the Ottomans, who viewed them as outsiders. This view was adopted by the indigenous peoples as the Turks allowed them significant local control. As usual, the slaves can be divided into field and household slaves. Among the latter the Roma were valued as slaves in the sixteenth century as artisans and laborers. A Moldovan law code of 1654 referred to the Roma as slaves. The monarch, private individuals, and the church all could own slaves. An Ottoman Wallachian penal code included all the Roma among the slaves. When the Russians moved in (1826–1834), they tried to limit Romanian slavery. In 1837 and 1845 some slaves were freed in Moldova, and in 1847 the church in Wallachia freed its chattel. In 1855 the Moldovan parliament and in 1856 the Wallachian parliament voted to free the slaves, and in 1864 the ruler declared all Roma to be free people.

After the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans, the northern part of what was to become Yugoslavia (especially Croatia) remained Catholic and fell under the domination of the Habsburgs in Vienna. While slavery was being revitalized south of the Sava River under the Muslim Ottomans, in Croatia it yielded to serfdom and did not reappear again until the Nazi conquest. Here Austria set the tone. In Austria slavery was largely irrelevant in the modern era.

ITALY, IBERIA, AND FRANCE

In Italy the slavery of the Roman Empire merged into serfdom, but nevertheless Renaissance Italy was well acquainted with slavery, which persisted at least until the seventeenth century. In the period 1300–1700 slaves probably composed 5 percent of the population at any given time. Until the merchants of the Italian city states were driven out of the Black Sea by the Ottomans in 1475, a number of them engaged in the slave trade. Particularly noteworthy were the Genoese, who dispatched any number of Slavs to Italy. Italian merchants of the late Middle Ages were the most active in the slave trade. Florence in 1363 permitted unrestrained import of non-Roman Catholic slaves. Besides Genoa and Florence, slavery flourished in Venice, where thousands of Slavic slaves were sold in the first quarter of the fifteenth century alone. In Italy Slavic slaves were joined by Africans, and both were employed in domestic slavery, where females were typ-

ically preferred and sometimes used as concubines. A small minority of slaves were used as artisans in hand-craft production, both on estates and in the thriving towns. Male slaves occasionally were used as business agents to extend the family firm, and they also traded on their own account.

Although wars were frequent on the Italian peninsula, the losers were rarely enslaved by the victors. Other factors had a greater impact on slavery practices. In areas close to Islamic lands of the Ottoman Empire and North Africa slavery was reinforced by virulent Muslim slavery, especially in Italy and Spain, where Islamic merchants with their slave merchandise and morality had a definite impact. Also important in the maintenance of slavery in Italy was the heritage of Roman law, in which slavery was one of the most evident social institutions. The Black Death of 1347–1348, following famine in the earlier 1340s, killed up to a third of the population in much of Europe, creating a labor shortage and therefore increased demand for slave labor in Italy. (Elsewhere in Europe the labor shortage led to the freeing of serfs and other servile workers as rising wages created an intense demand for free, mobile labor.) The cultivation of sugarcane in the Canary Islands prompted transference of slavery there from the eastern Mediterranean islands. Italian states with navies employed slaves, primarily purchased in North Africa, in their Mediterranean galleys into the eighteenth century. Other galley slaves came from Russia, the Rzeczpospolita, Greece, and from captured enemy ships.

Spain and Portugal both experienced slavery during the Renaissance and beyond. Spain was in regular combat with the Moors, who were subject to enslavement upon capture. Both countries also imported Africans for household employment. During the Renaissance and into the modern era, household slavery continued, as did the use of slavery to retain valued artisans. Córdoba, the leading city in Spain and one of the major cities in Europe, had a flourishing slave trade and slave community. Seville later became Spain's leading slave city in terms of slaves' percentage of the city's population. The king of Castile before 1265 ordered the law compiled in the *Las Siete Partidas*, which was based on Roman law and was confirmed by the *Leyes de Toro* in 1505. Thus Roman law entered Spain and subsequently much of the New World, including Louisiana. Spain owned the Canary Islands and transferred slave sugar cultivation from there to the New World. Given these factors, it was easy for Spain to develop slavery in its New World possessions. Up to half of the crews of Spanish galleys in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were slaves. Slaves were also employed in agriculture as shepherds, and household

slavery persisted into the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Portuguese slavery became significant in the second half of the fifteenth century and peaked in the sixteenth century, when slaves constituted a significant portion of the population. Subsequently it declined and by the eighteenth century was reduced to occasional household slavery. Slaves in Portugal originated in the late Middle Ages from conflicts with Muslims, but became significant only when the Portuguese began to play a significant role in Africa after 1450. The economic pull, as elsewhere, was a perceived labor shortage resulting from wars and epidemics. Most Africans were reexported to northern Italy and Spain, but sufficient numbers remained to compose 2.5 percent of the total population. Besides Africans, slaves were imported from China, Japan, Brazil, and elsewhere. Slaves were primarily an urban phenomenon, where they were valued for their household service and their income-generating activities as employees in the iron and prepared-food industries, as artisans, clerks, and merchants. As was true in Russia, owners legally did not enjoy automatic sexual access to their female slaves, and the church regarded slave marriage as a sacrament. Slavery was abolished in Portugal in 1869.

France was the European country seemingly least affected by slavery in this period. It epitomized the processes at work after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Slavery survived into the twelfth century in the Loire Valley on a few monastery estates and elsewhere.

The absence of state power had made the enforcement of slave laws nearly impossible, with the result that magnates preferred to retreat to their manors and rely on more tractable sources of labor that needed less compulsion and were probably cheaper besides. The demand for slave labor was also reduced by technological improvements including improved heavy plows, the horse collar and harnesses that permitted draft animals to pull heavier loads, and horseshoes, which gave horses (which were improved by selective breeding) more traction. Water mills replaced slave labor in such activities as grinding grain. More effective crop rotation improved yields. These factors combined to make slaves an inefficient form of rural labor. As was true in much of western Europe, by the eleventh century most slaves were assimilated into the class of serfs. On the other hand, in Marseille both slavery and the slave trade flourished in the Middle Ages but declined in the city as they had declined in the countryside. France had galley fleets in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but no more than 20 percent of the oarsmen were slaves. When the French jurist Jean Domat compiled the law in the years 1689–1697, slavery was not mentioned because it did not exist in France. In the early modern period in France, “slave” was primarily a derogatory epithet rather than a reality.

NORTHERN EUROPE

In Norway, Iceland, and Denmark, slavery was extinct by the thirteenth century, in Sweden by the four-

teenth. During the Viking era, circa 750–1050, the Norwegians, the Danes, and Swedes went “a-viking” (became pirates) throughout Atlantic Europe in search of loot and human booty. After that era household slavery existed in Scandinavia on a very small scale, with Celts (Irish) being the most common slaves in Norway and Iceland. The word “thrall” was the Old Norse word for slave. It is assumed that increasing population density and church pressure combined to terminate Scandinavian slavery.

The modern Dutch Republic had no slaves. In 1648 it was explicitly illegal, and attempts to establish slave markets in the major seaports were vetoed by local officials. Dutch merchants, however, were prominent in the international slave trade in both Asia and the New World, and overseas Dutch were prominent slaveowners wherever Holland had colonies. Intellectually, the Synod of Dort in 1618–1619, a gathering of Calvinist theologians from northwestern Europe, was noteworthy for its statement that baptized slaves were entitled to the same liberties as other Christians and should not be sold to non-Christians. The dogma did not require Calvinists to convert their chattel and thus effectively did not compel the manumission of slaves. The Synod’s dictum was important in northwestern Europe in holding that anyone was capable of conversion to Christianity and thus capable of freedom. This ran counter to the belief that certain persons, for example because of their race, were suited for slavery and thus unsuited for freedom.

The Germanies had thriving slave systems in the High Middle Ages. German eastward expansion, the *Drang nach Osten* (press to the east), turned many Slavs in the conquered lands into slaves. Around the year 1000 there was a full range of slaves in Germany, with the majority of course on the bottom as household dependents. Some slaves, however, were even “slave ministers,” figures who had positions of responsibility in the government, just as they did in the Byzantine Empire and in late medieval Muscovy. In the Germanies slavery where it existed and while it lasted tended to be a rural phenomenon, for the famous doctrine *Stadluft macht frei* (town air makes one free) put a damper on urban slavery, something that was not true throughout most of the rest of Europe. Anyone who was not a native was subject to enslavement in the Germanies. A kinless, “outsider” slave at emancipation was subject to various forms of clientage and a transitional status to freedom that might last as long for his heirs as three or five generations. As elsewhere in Central Europe, so in the Germanies slavery in the productive sphere tended to be pushed aside by serfdom, especially east of the Elbe. The reason for this phenomenon was clearly economic: the owner

was responsible for his slave, whereas the serf was typically expected to fend for himself. In the household, of course, the situation was different. While the household slave worked, his or her output was not monetizable.

Germany shares with Soviet Russia the dubious distinction of being one of the nation states of the twentieth century that revitalized slavery in a major way between 1938 and 1945. Unlike the Soviets, who preferred to enslave their own, the Nazis had a marked preference for “outsiders”—Jews, Slavs, communists, Roma, all of whom were called *Untermenschen*, sub-humans who were suited for slave labor. French and other POWs were also added to the millions in the slave labor force. Over 7.5 million non-German civilians were transported to the Third Reich to work as slave laborers. Fritz Sauckel, Hitler’s Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization of Labor, was the major organizer of this importation of millions of slave laborers. The Nazi choice of occupation for their slaves was somewhat different from the Soviet choice. Rather than logging and mining, canal and railroad building, the Nazis employed their slaves in manufacturing and

agriculture, wherever there were labor shortages to meet World War II military needs caused by the drafting of 13 million men into the Wehrmacht. The Hitlerite labor shortage was aggravated by the Nazi mystique that women should stay at home and not replace in field and factory their men who had been inducted into the Wehrmacht. By 1945 nearly a quarter of Germany's labor force was non-German, and in agriculture it was close to half. A number of the biggest, most famous German companies, including I. G. Farben, Volkswagen, Mercedes, Friedrich Flick, BMW, Bayer, Hoechst, Siemens, Thyssen, and Krupp, used slave labor they leased at the bargain rate of four Reichsmarks per day per slave from Heinrich Himmler's SS; survivors in 1999–2000 were still suing those companies in an attempt to gain recompense for their labor. The Nazis in numerous cases followed the same noneconomic, extermination-through-labor policy that was employed in the Soviet Gulag. The Nazis also placed extraordinary priority on making their female chattel into sex slaves of the Wehrmacht.

ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND IRELAND

In both England and Ireland after the year 500, Celtic and Germanic (Anglo-Saxon) peoples considered each other fair game for enslavement. Just before 1000 slavery was revitalized, and it endured throughout the

eleventh century. In 1102 a church council at Westminster forbade the sale of slaves, a sign that slavery was on the wane. By 1500 it is probably accurate to say that slavery had died out in England, although not in Scotland. In 1569 (the eleventh year of Elizabeth's reign) occurred one of the most famous legal decisions of all time. In a suit brought by Cartwright, who was going to flog a slave he had imported from Russia (the slave might have been a Russian, Tatar, Pole, or Finn), it was held that "England was too pure an air for slaves to breathe in." After that time, the issue of white slaves (other than indentured laborers) did not arise in England. A possible major source of slaves was ruled out when in 1601 Elizabeth ordered the expulsion of blacks from England. Early in the eighteenth century Lord Chief Justice Holt opined that "as soon as a negro comes into England, he becomes free." Nevertheless, a few black slaves were brought into England by their owners.

Throughout most of the eighteenth century English newspapers contained advertisements to sell slaves and to recover runaways. Then in 1772 the Lord Chief Justice Baron Mansfield ruled in the famous *James Somerset v. Charles Stewart* case that a slave essentially gained his freedom by landing in Britain. The plaintiff, a former Virginia slave, could not be shipped against his will back into slavery in Jamaica. Mansfield wrote that "a notion had prevailed, if a negro came

over, or became a christian, he was emancipated.” Henceforth slavery in England was unsupportable by English law. Although Englishmen subsequently were the major players in the international slave trade out

of Africa and were the major slaveowners of the sugar islands of the Caribbean and the tobacco plantations of the South, slaves themselves had little or no physical contact with England.

See also The Balkans; Russia and the Eastern Slavs; Roma: The Gypsies (volume 1); Serfdom: Western Europe; Serfdom: Eastern Europe; Military Service (volume 2); and other articles in this section.

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MARGINAL PEOPLE



Timothy B. Smith

During the first three quarters of the twentieth century, as Europe overcame subsistence problems and constructed massive welfare states, the problem of poverty and social marginality seemed to have receded into the background. Unemployment was down to 1 percent in Germany by 1960, and it remained below 2.5 percent in most of western Europe until 1973. But during the last twenty years of the century, the marginal people of Europe once again became visible: the homeless (an estimated 500,000 in France and 930,000 in Germany alone in 1996), illegal immigrants (up to 1 million in France); the unemployed (20 million unemployed in Europe in the mid-1990s), and the estimated 6 to 8 million Sinti and Roma (commonly known as Gypsies) who for so long have been living on the margins of society. Except for a brief respite between about 1960 and 1975, during Europe's golden age of full employment, vagrants, beggars, and economic marginals of all sorts have always been a visible and significant feature of western European society.

Until the twentieth century, the economies of Europe were not strong enough to support the vast majority of the population at a level of comfort on a regular basis. Plague and famine periodically paralyzed the economy, pushing people to the margins of society. Until the eighteenth century, when Europe escaped from the Malthusian trap, population ebbed and flowed according to the rhythms of the harvest and pestilence cycles. Although England had escaped from the specter of famine by the early nineteenth century, France had its last nationwide subsistence crisis in the 1850s, and in eastern Europe the threat of crop failure persisted decades longer. Starvation was still a real threat to the peasants of eastern Europe and Russia through World War I and, in some cases, after.

The harvest was the lifeblood of the early modern economy; when it failed, as it did so frequently (one in six harvests in England failed during the seventeenth century), a large part of the population would

be forced to scramble to make ends meet. Only when European populations became more urban and more commercial and less peasant based and agricultural—would prosperity increase. Those nations which underwent an agricultural revolution first (Britain) would be the first to enjoy widespread material prosperity. But the processes associated with modernization—agricultural improvements, rural exodus, urbanization, mechanization of artisanal industry, and so on—would, in the short (or intermediate) term, push millions of people to the margins of society. East of the Elbe River, millions of peasants remained mired in serfdom until the mid-nineteenth century.

The typical western European peasant family lived in poverty right into the early nineteenth century, but with one unsettling event—a crop failure, an injury or illness, a rise in bread prices, the death of a spouse or a child, a foreclosed debt—they could be pushed from poverty into destitution and would have to seek charity or public assistance or else take to the road to beg or steal. For example, during the period 1840–1842, some 84 percent of those entering three major *dépôts de mendicité* (beggars' prisons) in Belgium were first-time offenders, members of the casual labor force who were ineligible for public assistance.

Women would sometimes resort to prostitution in a last-ditch effort to spare the family from the shame of seeking assistance, or simply to make ends meet: “morals fluctuate[d] with trade” (Leeuwen, 1994 p. 601). Minor forms of illegality such as smuggling, poaching, and petty theft were common. Banditry persisted in parts of Europe (Italy) well into the nineteenth century. Everywhere, the distinction between poverty and indigence was blurred, and until some point in the eighteenth or nineteenth century (depending on the nation) perhaps half of the continental European population risked falling into indigence or destitution at any given time. Within this wider context of general poverty, however, it is possible to identify certain particularly vulnerable and/or marginal groups.

SOURCES

For the most part, our knowledge of marginal people stems from three sources: court and police records, where the otherwise elusive marginal people left their scarce and faint traces in the historical record; the archives of hospitals, poor relief agencies, and charities; and from the observations of elite contemporaries. Scholars have been interested in the study of poverty and marginality not only because of its intrinsic importance, but also because it provides a good window into many other issues: class relations, trends in religious observance and practice, political and social ideologies, the growth of state penal powers and social spending, and so on.

Thanks to several detailed studies of the clientele of hospitals, prisons, and workhouses, we know that some social groups were more at risk of falling into indigence than others: casual farm laborers (*journaliers*, as they were known in France), the elderly, widows with children, workers with large families, and casual urban laborers. Child beggars could be seen everywhere in London. In 1816, Lionel Rose reminds us, 50 percent of the three thousand inmates in London's twenty jails were under seventeen years of age. In 1848 Henry Mayhew estimated there were thirty thousand to forty thousand young "street Arabs" wandering in London.

RURAL MARGINALS

Many rural marginals were attracted to the large capital cities, as were youth, who were drawn to places like London and Paris by the thousands. Few young provincials, Arthur Young noted in 1771, could resist the allure of London. But the medium-sized regional centers—Lyon, Grenoble, Turin, Toulouse—were usually closer to home. Seasonal migration within a region was also common, especially in Alpine areas. For example, every year during the period 1780–1820 roughly twenty thousand peasants would leave their spartan mountain villages in Piedmont (today part of Italy) to eke out an existence in nearby cities or in France for six or even nine months.

These people, like their elders, lived in what Owen Hufton has termed an "economy of makeshifts." Agricultural laborers, those who lived on the margins of rural society, with no firm roots or legal claims to the land, accounted for roughly 40 percent of those who entered the Charit  hospital in Aix-en-Provence, France, during the eighteenth century; up to one-half of those assisted by some charities in the 1890s; and 20 percent of patients in the hospitals of Mantes-la-Jolie, outside Paris, around 1900. Typically, landless

rural laborers were the largest single component of any given nation's floating, vagabond population, but textile workers, artisans, soliders and sailors, servants and apprentices were also commonly found among the wayfaring poor.

Most villages also contained a marginal population, as opposed to older images of village solidarity and rough equality. Many villagers lived hand to mouth, easily victimized by disease, periodic bad harvests, or simply overlarge families. As European agriculture became more commercialized, with inroads on community resources such as common lands, the marginal village population increased.

The debate over the social consequences of enclosure (the process whereby the English—and, later, other Europeans—cleared and enclosed common lands and forests and set about using the land more productively, with fewer laborers) has divided historians for generations. Undoubtedly, enclosure was good for the economy in the long term, leading to more productive use of land, but it hurt several social categories, in particular small owners and casual farm hands, who drifted to the margins of rural (and urban) society. The historian Deborah Valenze has argued that in England women were hurt more than men. The modernization of agriculture during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries eliminated women's traditional role in growing and gathering food as well as other customary activities such as tending livestock. Women were forced into domestic service, factory work, marriage, and quite often into begging and prostitution. Some enterprising people, like the English landowner John Warren of Stockport, were not unaware of the consequences of their actions: having enclosed a commons in 1716, he set up a prison and a workhouse in one corner of his lot. As Roy Porter concludes in his acclaimed survey, *English Society in the Eighteenth Century*, the eighteenth-century agricultural revolution created a landless proletariat, many of whom remained on the margins of society for decades before being integrated (if they ever were) into new positions in society.

THE MARGINS OF URBAN SOCIETY

Many cities engaged in significant efforts to help both the working and the unemployed poor. Between 1829 and 1854 in Amsterdam, for example, a quarter of the population received assistance on a regular basis. But as Marco van Leeuwen shows, the elderly and workers with large families were favored. In an age of limited resources, a sharp line between different categories of poor served to ration relief. Poorly paid artisans and textile workers were among the luckiest of the poor,

in the sense that their somewhat respectable occupations gave them a chance of receiving public assistance from urban authorities. Lyon geared its relief system to unemployed silk workers; Florence geared its poor relief system to unemployed shoemakers, textile workers, woodworkers, and the like; and Antwerp favored unemployed textile workers (27 percent of those assisted in 1855 were in the textile trade).

A wide stratum of urban society was never fully integrated into the civic fabric or the regular economy and would have had a harder time getting relief: young journeymen, apprentices, casual day laborers, hawkers, porters, ragpickers, haulers, dustmen, charwomen, and domestic servants. These last were particularly vulnerable. Most were unmarried, and many lived in damp basements or cramped attic apartments. Many slipped into prostitution, begging, or vagrancy at some point in time.

This state of affairs had not changed much by the late nineteenth century. The lack of full-time, reliable, adequate wages was the root of the problem. When the city of Hamburg was engaged in a public-health crusade against cholera in the 1890s, it did background checks on the laborers employed in “disinfection columns.” Of some 671 men who had their backgrounds checked, 82 had criminal convictions, often several. But most of these convictions were for minor contraventions, indicating, as Richard Evans concludes in *Death in Hamburg*, “the extent to which the poor of Wilhelmine Germany habitually broke the law in order to survive” (Evans, 1987 p. 322). These

were working men, not professional vagabonds or beggars. Catharina Lis observes that the vast majority of those interned for petty crimes in early-nineteenth-century Antwerp were of the poorest stratum of the lower classes.

Surveying a wealth of literature on European urban and social history since 1750, Peter Stearns and Herrick Chapman estimate that the typical large European city in the nineteenth century had a floating, marginal, casually employed labor force which might amount to 20 percent of the population. These unskilled transient laborers searched for new work every day or every week—dock work, ditch digging, hauling, carting, construction work. Paid low wages, they were often hired by the day by a hiring boss in a city square. Many drifted from city to city in search of work, and along the way they might be forced into begging or petty crime. Deprived of the strong neighborhood support networks enjoyed by permanent residents of the city, they lived on the margins in every sense. And yet their very numbers suggest that they were indispensable to the running of the cities—they performed work which no one else would. In a world without the eight-hour day, with little or no labor protection, no welfare state, and low expectations, “marginals” could pick up society’s crumbs by taking on a handful of odd jobs at any given time.

Indeed, Barrie Ratcliffe has argued that to be marginalized from mainstream society during the nineteenth century did not necessarily mean that one was also alienated and more prone to criminality. Indeed,

as he suggests, when one adds up the various categories of “marginal” people even in early-nineteenth-century Paris, one approaches such a large number that one may be able to speak of the mainstream. Certainly these “marginals” were more integrated into the casual economy than today’s unemployed marginals. Still, workers in the early stages of industrialization were often lumped together in the minds of elites with vagrants and other unsavory characters. As the French *Journal des débats* put it in 1832, “workers are outside political life, outside the city. They are the barbarians of modern society.” The same was true, John Merriman argues, for workers in the new faubourgs. Suburban workers were relegated, in Merriman’s term, to “the margins of city life.”

HONOR, BLOOD, AND RELIGION

In the Germanic areas of central Europe, the loss or lack of honor, a value enforced by the urban guilds, was a barrier to entry into society. It could even be a permanent condition, passed on to one’s unlucky offspring. This sort of inherited dishonor was less common in western Europe. Honor could be lost in the first instance through illegitimate birth, a criminal record, or racial “impurity,” such as having Slavic blood. Lack of honor might mean permanent marginalization, which would force people into a lifetime of begging, theft, smuggling, and/or vagrancy.

The religious divide was often impenetrable. Numerous large European cities had important religious minority communities: Muslims in Venice, Moors in Spanish cities (until they were expelled), Protestants in predominantly Catholic cities, and so on. Of course Jews were marginalized throughout European history in every nation. Indeed, as Christopher Friedrichs notes, “perpetual marginalization was the norm for non-Christians” in Europe in the period 1450–1750—and beyond (Friedrichs, 1995, p. 239).

The Jews were first granted full civil rights in France during the Revolution, but social and economic discrimination continued in the early nineteenth century and then increased later in the century, as the traditional religious recipe for anti-Semitism was made more virulent with the addition of racial, biological anti-Semitism. Jews were dispersed throughout Europe, but everywhere they lived they were conspicuously marginalized, often as a matter of local or central government policy. Jews were often forced to wear markers on their clothing so that they would not be mistaken for Christians. The concept of the Jewish ghetto was first introduced in Venice, but it reached its zenith in Frankfurt, where Jews were confined to a single street, walled and gated off from

the rest of the city, and restricted in their movement. If there was one caste-like division in European society in the early modern period, this was it: the towering wall between Jews and Christians.

Walled free cities in central Europe usually denied full citizenship rights to foreigners of all sorts. But money could serve as a passport to social acceptance, if not full citizenship. Some foreigners were prized for their skills or assets (Italian bankers and silk weavers in Lyon, foreign merchants in Polish cities, Italian master craftsmen in France); others were feared as dangerous marginals (Italian peasant migrants in nineteenth-century Marseille). Impoverished foreigners who arrived in distant cities seeking casual labor or charity might be lucky enough to be tolerated, but often they were sent packing with the crack of a whip. A steady flow of Irish beggars was redirected from London back to Ireland in the eighteenth century, but most managed to elude authorities long before their ship set sail, returning to London to start all over again. In addition to the usual social and economic obstacles thrown in the way of immigrants, non-Christians and foreigners had to cope with hostility toward their different religion, language, and customs. They accounted for a large proportion of any given city’s beggars.

BEGGARS

The problem of begging and vagrancy decreased significantly between the two world wars (there were, for example, only 4,760 prosecutions in Britain in 1934, as compared with up to 25,000 per year in the period 1900–1914). Still, beggars could be seen in European cities until the 1950s or 1960s, and in the 1980s they reemerged in a dramatic fashion. The question, as always, is one of magnitude. In the early modern era (1450 to 1750), and in many places right into the late nineteenth century, beggars could often swamp cities.

German court records from the early modern period provide a glimpse into this complex and colorful underworld: there were *Stabülers* (professional beggars with several children); *Klenckner* (beggars who positioned themselves near churches and marketplaces with broken limbs and other deformities, whether real or feigned); and *Grantner* (beggars who feigned illness, often using soap to induce foaming at the mouth). The fifteenth-century Italian writer Teseo Pini listed forty different “occupational groups” within the world of begging in his book *Speculum cerretanorum* (1484). The Englishman John Awdeley listed nineteen in his 1561 study of the issue, *Fraternity of Vagabonds*. Marginals inspired fear in the minds of many people, and many imaginary traits were ascribed to them. As Keith

Thomas has shown, in early modern England vagabonds were often seen as filthy, scavenging dogs, beasts who lived from one scrap to another, slaves to their empty stomachs. Often portrayed as subhuman, marginals were sometimes treated as such.

Despite the misconceptions and fears that surrounded marginals, the image of the “professional beggar” was in fact grounded in reality: one could cite the unofficial beggars’ guild in fifteenth-century Cologne; the thousands of beggars who paid taxes in German cities in the early modern period; or, more recently and specifically, a certain Hubert Nicolourdat, a sixty-eight-year-old Parisian arrested for begging at least fifty-six times by 1899, or Louis-René Pasquer, a sixty-year-old with fifty-four arrests to his credit. Every European town had its share of occasional and professional beggars. As is the case today, some had their fixed spot—on a certain street corner or opposite the church—which they “owned.” In eighteenth-century Marseille, beggars bequeathed their spots to their impoverished relatives, who would come in from the countryside to claim their deceased relative’s corner. In some smaller cities, like those of Brittany as late as 1900 or like Aix-en-Provence, in southern France, the streets were overrun by beggars:

They squatted on street corners, swarmed near the city gates, and crowded the churches, disrupting services with their piteous pleas for alms. Once in the troubled days of the 1620s, more than 2,000 beggars crowded the courtyard of the Hôtel-de-Ville [city hall]; when they tried to climb a staircase to beg outside the chamber of the municipal council, it collapsed under their weight. (Fairchilds, 1976, p. 100)

This type of scenario was still being played out in the nineteenth century, for instance in Florence, where begging and poverty were widespread. A census of 1810 recorded 36,637 poor persons, of whom 22,838

were deemed to be indigent, out of a population of only 69,000. Vagabonds who hailed from outside the city were threatened with a prison term of up to ten years if they were caught by officials. A new workhouse-prison, the Pia Casa di Lavoro, awaited them.

WANDERERS

Socially marginal groups in the early modern period were often made up of itinerants who practiced a number of precarious occupations. Some even peddled quack medicine. When this precarious “economy of the makeshift” failed—as it did so often—they might resort to other forms of legal activity; failing that, they would turn to begging, swindling, and theft. It was in all rural marginals’ best interests to keep their options open. A typical landless wanderer was Edward Yovell, a vagrant whose story has been told by the historian Paul Slack. Yovell was born in London in the sixteenth century. After an apprenticeship in Worcester ended, he began wandering. Twice in a two-year period he took up casual work in London. He helped out at harvest time at his uncle’s farm in Surrey, worked at various inns in Chichester, and followed a circuit leading back to Worcester via Salisbury, Bristol, and Gloucester, where he begged and took casual work when he could find it. Like most vagrants, he often took on work—when it was available.

Many wanderers tended to try to make it on their own in the summer by foraging, hunting, and mushroom picking in forests, and by traveling. The forests were their safety valves. In winter, however, demands for charity and public assistance would increase significantly, especially in northern Europe. The roads would become more dangerous at this time of year. In some countries, such as France, marginals

would head south for the winter. The city of Nice was overwhelmed with this type of seasonal migrant in the late nineteenth century. Hospital admissions would double in some towns during the winter months and at the low points of the harvest cycle, when marginal people would suffer more than others.

Peddlers—a more enterprising lot than simple vagabonds—roamed the rural roads selling their wares: repair services, odds and ends, almanacs, chapbooks, and medical potions. They were at once marginal and indispensable, in that they helped to spread news and knowledge.

ILLNESS AND DISABILITY

Edme Gardy, a twenty-seven-year-old from Auxerre, France, was condemned in 1775 in Paris to stand in the pillory for two hours, to pay a small fine, and to be banished from Paris for three years. His crime? He had been arrested for begging. His road to the pillory had begun shortly before his arrest, when he had sustained an injury while doing some casual farm work in the Brie region. He had been forced to beg, he pleaded to the magistrate, while he nursed his injury. At a time when Paris was overrun by several thousand beggars (there were up to eight thousand detained beggars alone in prisons in the region in 1784), there was little sympathy to be found. Gardy's story, recounted by Jeffrey Kaplow, speaks volumes about life at a time when the slightest injury (for a manual laborer especially) could spell a trip to the poorhouse or to prison.

In the absence of effective and widely available medical treatment, illness, disability, and serious injury were three sure tickets to a life on the margins of society. Disease and deformity meant shame—and shame meant marginalization. Lepers are the most obvious example of such a marginalized group. Similarly, victims of venereal disease were often treated by special hospitals, cut off from the mainstream, or even relegated to the margins of city boundaries. But there were many others. In Toledo in 1598, for example, 15 percent of arrested beggars and poor-relief recipients were lame, 12 percent had broken or missing limbs, 7.5 percent were blind, and most others had some other form of illness or disability (5 percent were without a tongue). In Lower Saxony in the period 1659–1799, 24 percent were lame; in Aix-en-Provence in 1724, the figure was 25 percent. The elderly infirm without familial support or social patrons often ended up being dumped into beggars' prisons in nineteenth-century France, or else they ended up in the hospital or hospice. Until the second half of the twentieth century, when European governments finally began to

provide meaningful assistance to the physically handicapped as a sort of social right, physical disability almost certainly led to a life on the margins of society. In the French city of Saint-Étienne 83 percent of beggars arrested in 1858 had some form of physical disability. Epileptics and persons with severe skin diseases formed a disproportionate number of French beggars and vagabonds into the early 1900s.

STIGMATIZATION

Many marginals were forced to wander because they had been branded (sometimes literally) as outcasts. Stigmatization is a product of scarcity and low expectations: stigmata mark off the unworthy from the worthy and ease the claims on public resources. The branding of vagrants with hot irons is perhaps the utmost form of stigmatization. It was indeed practiced, but it was certainly not a routine affair in most areas of Europe. David Underdown uncovered only one branding of a “rogue” in an eight-year period in seventeenth-century Dorchester, England. The practice appears to have been more common in central Europe. Nonetheless, the practice of branding—from England to France to the German lands—suggests that European elites generally shared the idea that poor marginals were some sort of subhuman species, to be treated like livestock. Indeed, in his study *Man and the Natural World*, Keith Thomas unearthed much evidence to suggest that marginal people were often deemed worthy of the same (harsh) treatment as animals.

WOMEN, INFANTS, AND THE ELDERLY

Olwen Hufton estimated that among the wandering poor in eighteenth-century France, men outnumbered women by six to one. This figure, as she notes, is skewed in that men were more threatening and therefore more likely to be reported to police. Still, there were fewer opportunities for women to take to the road. Their safety would be at risk, and the need to care for children often anchored them to a particular city, where they might beg or receive charity. Men forced to live on the margins of society were arrested at ten times the rate of women in late-nineteenth-century France.

Despite men's higher rate of conviction for begging and vagrancy, few social groups were as vulnerable as young single pregnant women or elderly widows. A pregnant village girl might escape to the city to bear her child far from the watchful eyes of her fellow villagers, or she might become pregnant by

some young man (or her employer, if she were a domestic servant) in the city and be left to fend for herself. As Rachel Fuchs has shown in her book on child abandonment in urban France, illegitimate birth and child abandonment were perhaps the most pressing social problems of the early nineteenth century in several major French cities. In the 1830s over thirty-two thousand infants were officially abandoned each year, and the actual figure was much higher. At times up to one-third of all live births were abandoned. As recently as the 1890s, over thirty-three thousand Italian newborns were abandoned by their mothers each year. Similar patterns of child abandonment have been found in Russia and Spain. By the late nineteenth century one-third of newborns in Milan and Florence were left at foundling homes. In Italy and in other Catholic countries, the Catholic Church deprived illegitimate children of a social identity and branded their unwed mothers as sinners, relegating both to the margins. Until the advent of child and maternal welfare benefits in the twentieth century, pregnancy for young, poor, or single women almost certainly spelled poverty and often social marginalization.

Elderly men and women, especially those who had toiled away at physical labor throughout their rough lives, were particularly prone to begging and vagrancy. The old and retired vineyard workers of the Gironde, near Bordeaux, are a case in point. As an inquiry during the French Revolution revealed, when these men could no longer work, they became prisoners of their worn-out bodies, often totally dependent on public charity or begging (or both) to survive. Elderly, impoverished widows were a common sight at street corners, as well as in hospitals and hospices (where they often constituted a majority of residents) and at charities, many of which devoted as much as half of their resources to the elderly. A wide but insufficient array of charitable institutions was set up to assist these people. Elderly *journaliers* (casual farm hands) in France and English farm hands dispossessed by enclosure were overrepresented on the relief rolls and in the begging and vagrancy statistics.

ATTITUDES TOWARD MARGINALS AND REPRESSIVE MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THEM

Europeans have usually held conflicting views of the poor and have accordingly prescribed contradictory measures to deal with poverty. This is as true for the sixteenth century as it is for the nineteenth. If, on the one hand, marginals were to be chased out of town after having their ears bored, their noses cropped, their backs lashed, or the letter V (for vagabond) or R

(rogue) inscribed on their arms with a branding iron, the worthy poor served, on the other hand, as what Hufton called “the linchpin in the salvation of the rich” (Hufton, 1974, p. 132). They were to be assisted, and those who administered the institutions which assisted them would gain social, political, and spiritual capital.

Early responses to begging and vagrancy. A wave of reform swept across Europe starting in the 1520s, prohibiting indiscriminate public begging. The concept of the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor gained ground at this time and was officially incorporated into many municipal poor-relief systems. Badges were introduced to distinguish the worthy poor from all others. This had the effect of further marginalizing those who were not recognized as the local worthy poor. Vagrancy and begging were on the rise at this time, and reform was designed to cope with these problems, which seemed to be getting out of hand. Banditry, for example, had become so severe on the Italian peninsula that in 1572 Milan and Venice concluded a treaty regarding punishment of bandits: They were not to live within fifteen miles of the places from which they had been banished. If found within these limits, they could be attacked and killed without penalty. Bandits were preferred dead to alive; there were no extradition provisions in the treaty. Authorities took remarkably repressive measures to combat the problem of banditry, but bandits and vagabonds also inspired sympathy among the common people. Some marginals, such as Cartouche, the legendary French criminal, or Geronimo Tadino in sixteenth-century Veneto, became folk heroes, to be revered as well as feared.

The creation of a rural proletariat in Europe, beginning (slowly) in England in the seventeenth century, in France and elsewhere in the eighteenth century or later, exacerbated the problem of vagrancy. Already in 1688 Gregory King’s crude demographic study of England (only a rough sketch of reality) estimated a population of 400,000 cottagers and paupers as well as 849,000 vagrants. Historians are generally in agreement that vagrancy and begging became more acute problems over the course of the eighteenth century. All statistics point in this direction—arrests, admissions to hospitals and charities, and so on. London and Paris were never more overrun by beggars than in the period from 1770 to 1820, but the problem persisted into the twentieth century. Kathryn Norberg provides ample evidence of the increasing geographic mobility of the population, coupled with the rise in vagrancy in and around eighteenth-century Grenoble. Bands of thieves and vagrants terrorized the

French countryside in the eighteenth century and well into the late nineteenth. In 1820 thirty-nine thieves led by a certain “Bruno” wreaked havoc in the Auvergne. The notorious vagabond-murderer Vacher terrorized France in the 1890s, killing up to two dozen people. Bands of so-called *apaches* terrorized Parisians at about the same time. These seemingly rootless marginals from the suburbs, living on the margins of the city and the world of work, struck fear in the hearts of polite society. Stern repression was seen as the only solution.

But official proscriptions against begging were not always received sympathetically by the general population. In many parts of Europe, a certain “moral economy of begging” persisted, whereby people, particularly the common people who must have realized that they might one day be forced to beg, recognized that beggars were not necessarily lazy, immoral shirkers. In her study of Aix-en-Provence, Cissie Fairchild found numerous occasions in which the common people prevented city officials from enforcing the laws against beggary. In July 1749, for example, an angry crowd forced the officials of the Charité hospital to set free a group of beggars they had arrested. The poor in eighteenth- and even nineteenth-century England and France embraced the “moral economy” which defended their customary rights, including a notion of the right to subsistence. Food riots in defense of a “just price” were common.

With the advent of liberal political economy in the period from 1780 to 1850 (depending on the nation), this old “moral economy,” which provided certain benefits to the respectable poor, was attacked by economists and politicians alike. As the market eroded the old paternalistic society, the tendency to marginalize the poor and blame them for their poverty increased. Those who failed to live up to the notion of self-help espoused by Samuel Smiles (in *Self-Help*, 1859) were deemed doubly responsible for their lot in life. Vagrancy laws and urban police forces were introduced in Britain between 1815 and 1830, which turned the screws of the law tighter on the nation’s marginal population. A more concerted approach to “eradicating” mendicity was (once again) introduced in France in the 1830s. Belgium followed the same path once it won its independence. In an age which celebrated individual self-improvement, marginals became less tolerable: they stood as a threat to the ethos of the age. The penitentiary was born, and beggars’ prisons got a second life in the period from 1820 to 1850.

Attitudes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Late in the nineteenth century, at-

titudes toward marginals hardened in several countries, as the issue became entangled in the growing concern over national depopulation and the “degeneration” of racial stock. In light of the heightened military competition that preoccupied politicians and elite opinion, marginals were seen as a sort of cancer on the body politic, a threat to the military, economic, and demographic virility of the nation. This was particularly the case in France, Germany, and Italy—three countries whose cities were being overwhelmed by rural migrants, vagabonds, and beggars at this time.

In the countryside, vagabonds and migrant workers were a regular sight into the early twentieth century. There were still an estimated 200,000 to 500,000 vagabonds (up to 1 percent of the population) roaming the roads of France in the two decades before World War I. Guy Haudebourg estimates that 9 percent of Bretons were beggars in the eighteenth century, and 6 percent of the population still begged in parts of Brittany in the nineteenth century. The problem was also acute in Germany, which was in the grips of a process of rapid and massive internal migration, with only half of Germans living in the place of their birth in 1907; in Italy, where the southern population was being “pulled” up toward the northern cities out of hope for a better future; and in Belgium. Over fifty thousand people were arrested for vagrancy and begging each year in France during the 1890s.

In the thirty years before World War I, France took remarkably repressive measures against marginals. In 1885 the “relegation” law was passed, empowering judges to deport certain categories of recidivist and violent vagabonds. France deported over five thousand vagabonds to its colonial prisons in the tropics each year in the 1890s, and in 1902 alone the figure topped 9,900. Prussia had an agreement with Russia to send vagrants and criminals to Siberian prisons. Hamburg sent criminals to Brazil. The Belgians constructed what was arguably western Europe’s most draconian beggars’ prison at Merxplas.

Repression toward the Sinti and Roma (or Gypsy) populations in central and eastern Europe was stepped up shortly before and during World War I. Europe’s largest marginal group, at the end of the twentieth century with a population of up to 8 million scattered across the continent, the Sinti and Roma were repressed as a matter of state policy in several countries. Attempts were made to stamp out their itinerant culture, to force them to settle down. By 1906 Germany had bilateral agreements to “combat the Gypsy nuisance” with Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Italy, Russia, and several other nations. The Danes began to expel them beginning in the 1870s.

In an age of nationalism, an age which emphasized the need for a single unifying national culture within state boundaries, those who did not belong to the dominant ethnic group might be further marginalized. This was particularly the case in the Austro-Hungarian empire (with the Romanian minority population in Hungary, for instance) and above all in Russia, where a wave of brutal pogroms (public anti-Jewish campaigns of harassment and often extreme violence, including murder) was encouraged by authorities in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Russia's 5 million Jews were compelled to live in a region of western Russia and eastern Poland known as the Pale of Settlement. As repression increased beginning in the 1880s half a million Jews migrated to western Europe and North America. By 1900 foreign populations were being harassed out of or even expelled from several nations: the German government, for example, forced thousands of ethnic Poles across the German border into Russia in the 1880s and 1890s. In Russia, a state program of "Russification" attempted to wipe out the Ukrainian language. Poles in Russia were targeted for discrimination. Russification was paralleled by Magyarization, as Hungarians attempted to spread their language and root out minority languages in the portions of the Austro-Hungarian empire under their control.

Since World War I. In many ways World War I marks the beginning of a new era. It disrupted traditional seasonal migration patterns, as many marginals were drafted into the war effort. After the war, in France (and possibly elsewhere in the West) the population settled down and became more urban. During the 1920s and 1930s, workers in many countries made important gains—higher wages, better working conditions, paid vacations, more bargaining power, more stable work conditions, and so on. But the Depression turned the clock back again (especially in Germany and Britain), and marginal people suffered immensely. Post-World War II prosperity did not really materialize in western Europe until the mid-1950s, and cities like Paris and Turin were still encircled by squalid shanty towns into the 1950s, the result of the rural exodus, the influx of immigrants, and the deplorable and insufficient housing stocks of France and Italy. Here as elsewhere the urban poor lived, literally, on the margins of urban society, banished to the *banlieu* (suburb).

After the bloodshed and Holocaust of the 1940s, the golden age of prosperity which fell upon Europe during the 1950s and 1960s helped most people finally to join the economic mainstream—but not permanently. The bubble of prosperity burst in the mid-

1970s. Unemployment inched up to as much as 13 percent in the European Community by the mid-1990s. Hard times affected all, but the marginals of the 1980s and 1990s were most likely to be young people: one-third of Italians under the age of thirty were unemployed, as were one-fourth of French youth, and almost one-half in Spain. Non-European immigrants—North Africans and French citizens of North African descent who live in the suburban ghettos of Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and other large French cities; Turkish "guest workers" in Germany; Africans in Italy; immigrants from the Caribbean in the United Kingdom; and so on—were also particularly vulnerable. They accounted for a disproportionate number of the long-term unemployed and were often the victims of racial violence and discrimination.

There were over one hundred suburban housing ghettos in France, containing hundreds of thousands of immigrants and their children. Complexes like Sarcelles and Les Tartarets were plagued by unemployment rates of over 30 or even 50 percent. In several European countries, including France, Italy, and Spain, the long-term unemployed (those without work for over one year) accounted for up to 40 percent of the unemployed at times in the 1990s. In Spain and Italy, the rate of female unemployment was markedly higher than the average. In the mid-1990s, the unemployment rate of Italian women under the age of thirty was over 43 percent. One-half of Arab youth in France (under age twenty-five) were unemployed.

The existence of marginal populations is of course nothing new. But there was a new dimension the situation of the late twentieth century. Before the twentieth century, most major western European cities would also have contained a marginalized immigrant community or communities, whether it was the Irish in Liverpool or London or, later, Jews and other migrants from eastern Europe. But the situation in the last decades of the twentieth century was in many ways different. Although historians once argued that migrants were, by definition, "uprooted" and alienated, research in the 1980s and 1990s showed that migrants to nineteenth-century cities were often welcomed into supportive networks by members of their community who had already put down roots in their new homes. Provincials and foreigners alike created "urban villages," crude mini-welfare states, providing the charity of the poor toward the poor, with a strong self-policing element as well.

This world was dying by the end of the twentieth century, especially in suburban ghetto housing complexes. The separation of home and work, the uprooting of younger generations from their parents and grandparents in vibrant, densely populated slums,

and the advent of high-rise public housing units eroded sociability and support networks among the poor. Over the course of the twentieth century, as work became more structured, routine, and full-time, falling out of the job market acquired graver, more long-lasting consequences. The fine gradations of rank and status and the numerous types of footholds on the occupational treadmill that accompanied a more casual labor market disappeared. As Roy Porter stresses throughout *London: A Social History*, the widespread availability of casual work until the 1960s and 1970s facilitated the social and economic integration of most newcomers to the city. This process stopped,

and in the 1990s the city was embarrassed by the sight of a shanty town erected by the homeless on Lincoln's Inn Fields.

Europe's marginals were, by the end of the twentieth century, a distinct minority, denied the fruits of consumerism and leisure which most people were able to enjoy, cut off geographically from the economic and social mainstream, often denied full citizenship rights, and shut out of a more stable and formalized labor market. The integration of economically marginal peoples into the mainstream of European society was surely one of the greatest challenges facing Europe at the century's end.

See also Roma: The Gypsies; Immigrants (volume 1); Migration (volume 2); Social Control (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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COLLECTIVE ACTION



Charles Tilly

Collective action applies pooled resources to shared interests. In European social history, collective action has ranged from communal bread baking to electoral campaigns, from idol-smashing to revolution. Much collective action actually consists of conflict or cooperation, which imply two or more interacting parties. To treat an episode as “collective action” is therefore an analytic simplification; it singles out the perspective and behavior of just one participant in complex interactions. Collective actors sometimes include corporate bodies such as craft guilds and religious confraternities, but on occasion they also include friendship networks, neighbors, and participants in local markets. Collective action rarely involves all members of such ongoing social structures at the same time, but often draws currently active participants disproportionately from one or more existing structures.

Participants in collective action, furthermore, regularly claim to speak in the name of such structures—our guild, our confraternity, our lineage, our neighborhood, and so on—or in the name of more abstract collectivities such as workers, women, Huguenots, pacifists, or environmentalists. Some of European social history’s most vivid moments centered on this sort of claim making: Florentine workers rising against the oligarchy in the name of crafts excluded from municipal power; newly converted mountaineers resisting demands of their Catholic lords in the name of Protestant sects; Parisian residents attacking the Bastille in the name of the whole citizenry. Over that same history, nevertheless, the great bulk of collective action took less spectacular forms such as local celebrations, jury deliberations, or the everyday production of goods or services by households and workshops.

NARROW VERSUS BROAD DEFINITIONS

Social historians and social scientists often reserve the term “collective action” for episodes engaging participants who do not routinely act together or who employ means of action other than those they adopt

for day-to-day interaction. Collective action in this narrow sense resembles what other analysts call protest, rebellion, or disturbance. It differs from other collective action in being discontinuous and contentious: not built into daily routines, and having implications for interests of people outside the acting group as well as for the actors’ own shared interests. When those implications are negative we can speak of conflict, whereas when they are positive we can speak of cooperation. The narrower definition of collective action refers to discontinuous but collective contention, whether conflict-bearing or cooperative.

No one should adopt the narrower definition without recognizing four important qualifications. First, no sharp dividing line exists between “routine” and “extraordinary”; demonstrating and attacking ethnic rivals, for example, sometimes become everyday activities. Second, exceptional bodies of participants and unusual modes of action always depend in part on previously existing social relations and known models of making claims. In old-regime Europe, for instance, the unauthorized popular courts that repeatedly formed to judge violators of the public interest always drew their members from previously established political networks and regularly mimicked routines of royal courts. Third, even in apparently repetitive, everyday forms of collective action such as tending a village’s common lands or establishing defenses against infectious diseases, participants were incessantly negotiating, improvising, and applying group pressure to reluctant contributors. Fourth, both exceptional and everyday episodes of collective action therefore pose essentially the same problems of explanation.

Nevertheless, social historians who have adopted the narrower definition of collective action have rightly sensed that something sets off discontinuous, contentious collective action from its continuous and non-contentious forms. Discontinuous, contentious collective action always involves third parties, often poses threats to existing distributions of power, and usually incites surveillance, intervention, and/or repression by political authorities. As a consequence, it also gener-

ates more historical evidence in the form of chronicles, memoirs, administrative correspondence, judicial proceedings, military reports, and police records than do continuous and noncontentious varieties of collective action. Accordingly, social historians who seek to reconstruct collective action can generally do so much more easily for its discontinuous, contentious forms. The following discussion therefore draws disproportionately on studies of discontinuous collective contention. It also deals primarily with popular collective action rather than collaboration among the rich and powerful. Finally, because historians of northern, central, and western Europe have so far done the bulk of European research on popular collective action, the arguments and conclusions that follow qualify as no more than working hypotheses for southern and eastern Europe.

CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION

From the perspective of individual self-interest, collective action (especially its narrower form) presents a logical puzzle. Much collective action produces goods from which all members of a group benefit whether or not they participate in the action. Cleaning up a local water supply, building a new market, and raising the minimum wage for a whole category of workers provide obvious examples. Since participation takes effort and often exposes participants to risks, any particular member of the beneficiary category therefore has an interest in standing by while others do the essential work and take the crucial risks. To the extent that collective action is discontinuous and contentious, furthermore, costs and risks generally increase. In such circumstances, individual costs loom large compared with likely individual benefits. If everyone stands by, however, nothing gets done. This collective-action problem helps explain why many populations that would have been collectively better off if they had coordinated their action to produce shared benefits—for example, most women in cottage textile production—rarely acted together on a large scale. One of the most important findings of social history, early on, was the necessity of existing community structures and goals for protests, which means also that the poorest sectors of the population can rarely mount collective action.

Yet Europeans frequently did manage collective action. Some special circumstances reduced collective-action problems. If the number of potential participants and beneficiaries in a collective action was quite small, for example, each member would gain a sub-

stantial share of the benefits, could easily gauge whether others would contribute their shares of the effort, and could readily put pressure on would-be slackers. In the presence of shared interests, small numbers thus promoted collective action. At times one of the potential beneficiaries (for example, a merchant household contemplating construction of a bridge across a forbidding river) had so much to gain from collective action that it invested a large share of the resources to produce the collective good and to reward other people's participation in production of the good. Other favorable circumstances for collective action included serious, simultaneous threats to group survival, extensive communication among parties to a shared interest, and opportunities to make substantial individual gains (for example, through looting or acquisition of inside information) while serving collective ends.

Europeans still repeatedly acted collectively in the absence of such favorable circumstances. Why? Like other peoples, Europeans accomplished most of their collective action through institutions and practices they invented, borrowed, or adapted in the course of historical experience. Some of those institutions and practices emerged from more or less deliberate attempts to coordinate collective action; labor unions and revolutionary associations qualify in this regard. But many came into being as by-products of local, routine social interaction, as when unmarried village males who drank, fought, and played sports together formed organized bands that also collected wood for holiday bonfires, conducted shaming ceremonies outside the houses of cuckolds, and ritually barred the way to wedding processions for local brides who were marrying men from other parishes.

Institutions and practices promoting collective action varied significantly in their mixes of coercive, material, and solidary incentives. States, for example, generally employed significant coercion to produce collective action; they conscripted soldiers, forced reluctant taxpayers to contribute their shares to collective endeavors, and seized privately held land for public purposes. In contrast, although workshops and factories used plenty of coercion, they generally organized much more directly around quid pro quo material rewards than states did. Meanwhile, kin groups, religious congregations, sewing circles, and similar institutions offered substantial solidary incentives to their participants in addition to whatever coercion and material reward they dispensed. They provided opportunities for intimacy, affirmation of identity, mutual aid, social insurance, information, and participation itself—backed by the threat of shaming, shunning, or utter exclusion for those who violated their fellows' expectations.

For most of European history, most Europeans carried on risky, emotionally engaging, and delayed-payoff activities such as procreation, cohabitation, long-distance trade, and pursuit of the afterlife by means of institutions and practices centering on solidary incentives, with coercion and material reward playing a lesser part. Kinship groups, neighborhood networks, and religious congregations figured importantly in these institutions and practices, but so did more specialized organizations such as devotional and penitential confraternities, lodges, and mutual-aid societies. On the whole, Europeans insulated such structures from interference by outsiders and public authorities; they did so either by keeping the structures inconspicuous or by relying on protection from powerful members of the same structures.

SHIFTING REPERTOIRES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

One of European history's greatest changes was a massive shift from such solidarity-bound structures toward governments, firms, unions, specialized associations, and other organizations emphasizing coercion and material rewards as sites of high-risk, emotionally engaging, long-term activities. The shift occurred in most of Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To be sure, it did not obliterate institutions and practices centering on solidary incentives. Europeans still find their sexual and marriage partners, for example, chiefly through networks of friendship, kinship, and neighborhood that are typically homogeneous with respect to class, religion, and/or ethnicity. Some groups, like poor housewives and working women, continued to find it easier to mobilize through these kinds of daily networks. Still, as compared to the fifteenth or sixteenth century, the average twentieth-century European conducted a much wider range of risky, important business through institutions and practices centered on coercive and material incentives.

That large transformation of institutions and practices interacted with substantial shifts in collective action. To understand these shifts, we must recognize four profound features of collective action, wherever it occurs. First, it always takes place as part of interaction among persons and groups rather than as solitary performance. Second, it operates within limits set by existing institutions, practices, and shared understandings. Third, participants learn, innovate, and construct stories in the very course of collective action. Fourth, precisely because historically situated interaction creates agreements, memories, stories, precedents, practices, and social relations, each form of

collective action has a history that channels and transforms subsequent uses of that form. The form of collective action we call a strike has a distinctive history, as do the forms we call coup d'état, feud, and sacred procession. For these reasons, collective action falls into limited and well-defined repertoires that are particular to different actors, objects of action, times, places, and strategic circumstances.

Any collective actor employs a far smaller range of collective performances than it could in principle manage, and than all actors of its kind have sometimes managed somewhere. Yet the performances that make up a given repertoire remain flexible, subject to bargaining and innovation. Indeed, precisely repetitive performances tend to lose effectiveness because they make action predictable and thereby reduce its strategic impact. The theatrical term "repertoire" captures the combination of historical scripting and improvisation that generally characterizes collective action.

Europe's collective-action performances changed incrementally as a result of three classes of influences: shifts produced by learning, innovation, and negotiation in the course of collective action itself; alterations of the institutional environment; and interactions between the first two. In the first category, eighteenth-century Britain's petition march mutated from the humble presentation of a signed request borne by a few dignified representatives of the petition's many signers to the clamorous march of thousands through streets to confront authorities with their demands. The campaigns of John Wilkes on behalf of rights to public dissent during the 1760s figured centrally in that change.

Alterations of the institutional environment—notably suppression of civic militias as national armies formed—lay behind the widespread disappearance in western Europe during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries of collective action by means of armed local bands marching under elected captains marching in military order. (The century beginning in 1789, however, saw widespread revival of similar performances by centrally authorized but sometimes independent militias such as the French National Guard.)

Examples of interaction are more common. An instructive case is the legalization of strikes in most western European countries during the nineteenth century. That legalization typically protected rights of workers to assemble, deliberate, and withdraw from work collectively, but simultaneously declared a wide range of previously common worker actions (such as coercion of nonstrikers and attacks on employers' houses) illegal. It also subjected strikers to scrutiny of governmental specialists in industrial relations. Similarly, governmental interventions in public health,

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education, water control, and other local production of collective goods generally standardized organization from place to place, reduced the autonomy of local institutions, and subordinated local efforts to top-down control.

The shift from eighteenth- to nineteenth-century repertoires. Although incremental change in repertoires never ceased, in some periods interaction between internal alterations of performances and transformations of their institutional environments accelerated. In those periods, massive transformations of repertoires occurred. The best-documented transformation of this sort affected much of western Europe during the century or so after 1780. At least in Great Britain, the Low Countries, France, Germany, and Italy, a large net shift in popular collective action occurred. At the shift's beginning, we might characterize prevailing repertoires as parochial, particular, and bifurcated: parochial in orienting chiefly to local targets and issues rather than national concerns; particular in varying significantly with respect to format from setting to setting, group to group, and issue to issue; and bifurcated in dividing sharply between direct action in regard to local targets and requests for intervention by established authorities (chiefly priests, landlords, and officeholders) when it came to national questions. In contrast, we might call the repertoire that came to

prevail during the nineteenth century cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous: cosmopolitan because it covered a wide range of targets and issues, emphatically including national ones; modular because people used essentially the same forms of action (such the public meeting) over a broad range of issues; and autonomous because participants addressed objects of their claims in their own names via interlocutors from their own ranks.

The last observation requires qualification. The very changes that produced the new nineteenth-century repertoire also opened unprecedented opportunities for a variety of brokers who spoke, or claimed to speak, for popular constituencies. Those brokers included labor leaders, organizers of popular societies, and substantial peasants, but they also sometimes included alliance-making priests, officeholders, and bourgeois. Such brokers often played significant parts in popular collective action, especially in connecting interactions of disparate groups. They also frequently competed with each other for recognition as valid representatives of their claimed constituencies.

Table 1 summarizes contrasting principles in the earlier and later western European repertoires. We may call them "eighteenth-century" and "nineteenth-century" with the warnings that transitions from one to the other took decades everywhere and occurred at different times in different regions, that each collective-

action performance had a somewhat different history and timing from the others, and that various segments of the population moved from “eighteenth-century” to “nineteenth-century” repertoires at their own paces. Powerful people and local authorities, for example, typically assembled at their own initiative long before the nineteenth century. Some of the repertoire change, indeed, consisted of generalizing just such elite privileges to ordinary people. Gender also shaped available repertoires of protest, since rights available to women expanded on different timetables than those of men, and expectations of female and male behavior differed as well.

With these provisos, note how closely western Europe’s eighteenth-century collective-action repertoires adapted to local conditions. They depended heavily on prior daily connections among participants in collective claim making. They also drew heavily on local knowledge of personalities, symbols, and sites. Well-documented examples include shaming ceremonies (such as “rough music”), popular interventions in public executions (to attack a maladroit hangman, to jeer at the victim, or sometimes to rescue him),

sacking of houses occupied by persons accused of wrongdoing, and invasions of enclosed common fields. In less overtly conflict-filled domains, local celebrations, water control systems, and use of communal ovens likewise depended heavily on dense personal connections and local knowledge. The exact forms, personnel, and circumstances of these performances varied greatly from place to place. Later repertoires sacrificed some of that local knowledge and connection but offered the possibility of coordination among multiple sites and ready transfer of learning from one site to another. The public meeting, the demonstration, the voluntary special-purpose association, and the electoral campaign all generalized easily from one place or occasion to another.

As they created the new repertoire, Europeans were inventing what later generations called social movements. Although historians sometimes apply the term indiscriminately to all sorts of popular collective action regardless of time and place, it refers especially to sustained challenges of constituted authorities in the name of wronged populations, challenges backed by public displays of activists’ worthiness, unity, numbers,



TABLE 1
 CONTRASTING PRINCIPLES OF EIGHTEENTH- AND
 NINETEENTH-CENTURY REPERTOIRES IN WESTERN EUROPE

Eighteenth Century

Frequent employment of authorities' normal means of action, either as caricature or as a deliberate, if temporary, assumption of authorities' prerogatives in the name of a local community

Convergence on residences of wrongdoers and sites of wrongdoing, as opposed to seats and symbols of public power

Extensive use of authorized public celebrations and assemblies for presentation of grievances and demands

Common appearance of participants as members or representatives of constituted corporate groups and communities rather than of special interests

Tendency to act directly against local enemies but to appeal to powerful patrons for redress of wrongs beyond the reach of the local community and, especially, for representation vis-à-vis outside authorities

Repeated adoption of rich, irreverent symbolism in the form of effigies, dumb show, and ritual objects to state grievances and demands

Shaping of action to particular circumstances and localities

Summary: *parochial, particular, and bifurcated*

Nineteenth Century

Use of relatively autonomous means of action, of kinds rarely or never employed by authorities

Preference for previously planned action in visible public places

Deliberate organization of assemblies for the articulation of claims

Participation as members or representatives of special interests, constituted public bodies, and named associations

Direct challenges to rivals or authorities, especially national authorities and their representatives

Display of programs, slogans, and symbols of common membership such as flags, colors, and lettered banners

Preference for forms of action easily transferred from one circumstance or locality to another

Summary: *cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous*

and commitment. The social movement's preferred performances were (and still are) demonstrations, processions, public meetings, petition drives, print pronouncements, and interventions in electoral campaigns. Social-movement activists commonly formed special-purpose associations devoted to promotion of their causes. They also typically created identifying names, banners, badges, and slogans.

Little of the social movement repertoire would have been possible without extensive interaction between internal changes in collective action performances and transformations of their institutional contexts. Social-movement activists pushed accepted

boundaries of association and assembly but also took advantage of changes in legal controls brought about by others. Thus popular associations proliferated in French cities after the Prussian victory, and the very bourgeois revolution of 1870 brought down Louis Napoleon's empire. Those popular associations then coupled with National Guard units as frames for activism in the 1871 insurrectionary Communes of Paris, Lyon, and other cities.

Regimes and regime changes exerted significant influence over collective-action repertoires. At any given moment each regime made rough, implicit, but often effective distinctions among performances that

performances and all others, with the paradoxical effect that collective action frequently consisted either of subverting promoted performances (for example, shouting antiregime slogans during official ceremonies) or adopting clearly forbidden means (for example, assassinating public officials or collaborators). Undemocratic regimes narrowed the tolerated middle.

While the transition from eighteenth- to nineteenth-century protest forms is most studied, other points of change in the history of European collective action deserve attention. These include the decline of the great rural revolt against landlord and manorial controls, which began in the late Middle Ages and tapered off after the great risings of 1648. The decline of strikes and unions in the later twentieth century raises questions about changes in protest goals and participants.

METHODS OF STUDYING COLLECTIVE ACTION

Social historians know much more about the detail of popular collective action in western Europe because students of that region have more often studied popular collective action systematically. Elsewhere, most published information on the subject comes either as illustrative material in general political histories or as documentation of major conflicts. Whatever their region and period of specialization, however, serious students of European collective action generally adopt a combination of three rather different procedures: collection and analysis of relatively homogeneous catalogs of events; reconstruction of one or a few crucial or characteristic episodes; and recasting of previous political narratives by inclusion of popular collective action, often as seen through experiences of one or a few localities or groups.

Systematic catalogs of collective action episodes require extensive effort but offer significant rewards for social history. Because many European governments started collecting comprehensive reports of strikes during the nineteenth century, students of industrial conflict have often concentrated on systematic catalogs of strikes and lockouts. Other historians, however, have used administrative correspondence, periodicals, and other sources to construct catalogs of events they have called riots, protests, or contentious gatherings. Catalogs of this kind have the advantage of facilitating comparison and detecting change, but they remain vulnerable to reporting biases.

Closely studied episodes offer the possibility of attaching participants and actions more firmly to their social settings than most catalogs do. They have there-

it promoted (such as participation in public ceremonies), tolerated (petitioning), or forbade (sacking of toll gates). Regimes backed these distinctions by means of rewards and punishments for potential and actual collective actors: honors, entertainment, food, and drink for promoted performances; imprisonment, execution, shaming routines, or military attack for forbidden performances. Generally speaking, democratic regimes tolerated a wider range of collective-action performances. That toleration actually sharpened the distinction between tolerated and forbidden performances, made forbidden performances the province of political outcasts, and encouraged a wide range of actors to make their claims by means of tolerated or promoted performances. Undemocratic regimes, on the average, drew sharper lines between promoted per-

fore attracted many students of crises, revolutions, and rebellions. Pursued alone, they have the drawbacks of extracting the event from its broader historical context (including its relation to previous, subsequent, and even simultaneous collective action) and of making comparison more difficult.

The augmented narrative has two signal advantages. First, it makes clear what bearing the study of collective action has on conventional interpretations of the political history in question. Second, it provides direct answers to the question: why should historians care about these sorts of events? All too easily, however, it lends itself to the supposition that the questions built into previous narratives were valid. Since the questions addressed by existing narratives (for example, did people support the regime or not?) often actually mislead investigators (for example, where participants in collective action are strongly attached to local leaders who maintain only contingent commitment to the regime), it is always prudent to undertake close examination of collective action for its own sake.

**CASE STUDY: THE LOW COUNTRIES,
1650–1900**

We can see the advantages of synthesizing catalogs, specific episodes, and augmented narratives by looking at popular collective action in the Low Countries from about 1650 to 1900. During those two and a half centuries, the regions now known as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg underwent major changes of regime and of popular politics. Seen from the top, the Low Countries moved from dynastic struggles to intermittently revolutionary politics mobilizing substantial blocs of the general population in bids for control over central governments.

Suppose we recognize as revolutionary situations those instances when for a month or more at least two blocs of people backed by armed force and receiving support from a substantial part of the general population exercised control over important segments of state organization. By that rough test, likely candidates for revolutionary situations in the Low Countries between 1650 and 1900 include the following events:

1650	Failed coup of William II
1672	Orangist seizures of power in many towns
1702	Displacement of Orangist clients in Gelderland and Overijssel
1747–1750	Orange revolt in United Provinces, after French invasion precipitates naming of William IV of Orange as Stadhouder
1785–1787	Dutch Patriot Revolution, terminated by Prussian invasion

1789–1790	Brabant Revolution in south
1790–1791	Revolution in principality of Liège, terminated by Austrian troops
1792–1795	French-Austrian wars, culminating in French conquest of Low Countries, installation of variants of French and French-style rule
1795–1798	Batavian Revolution in north
1830–1833	Belgian Revolution against Holland, with French and British intervention

In detail, to be sure, these clustered events consisted of much meeting, marching, petitioning, confronting, fighting, sacking, arguing, and organizing. The largest changes in texture consisted of shifts from the mobilization of aristocratic military clienteles and burgher militias to the sustained integration of ordinary householders into national struggles for power. In conformity with our general argument, increases in state capacity promoted shifts toward mobilization on the basis of detached identities and by means of nationally standardized repertoires.

Cataloging “eighteenth-century” repertoires in Holland.

Seen from a local perspective, collective contention occurred far more frequently, and changed character even more dramatically. Rudolf Dekker has cataloged dozens of “revolts”—events during which at least twenty people gathered publicly, voiced complaints against others, and harmed persons or property—in the province of Holland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By comparison with all of Europe’s contentious repertoires from 1650 to the present, the events in question generally qualify as small, local, variable in form from one place or group to another, and bifurcated between (many) direct attacks on local targets and (few) mediated appeals to higher authorities. Concretely, Dekker’s catalog emphasizes four sorts of events: forcible seizures of marketed food or attacks on its sellers; resistance to newly imposed taxes; attacks by members of one religious category on persons, property, or symbols of another; and attempts to displace political authorities.

By and large, qualifying events falling outside those four categories involved a fifth category: collective vengeance—for example, sacking of houses—on figures who had outraged public morality. Sacking of houses also often accompanied protests against tax farmers and other public figures targeted in the first four categories of violent events. In that regard, Dutch eighteenth-century popular actions greatly resembled their French, British, and North American counterparts. Like students of old-regime contention in these other areas, Dekker calls attention to the festival atmosphere of many such rituals: “A participant in an Orangist disturbance of 1787 declared,” he reports,

“I’ve never had so much fun at a fair as in tearing down that sacked house” (Dekker, 1982, p. 92). More generally, Dekker’s events conformed recognizably to prevailing old-regime repertoires of popular contention in western Europe as a whole. Along the standard range from petitions and parodies through local vengeance, feuds, and resistance to mass rebellion, they clustered at the edges of prescribed and tolerated forms of public politics. Nevertheless, in such times of general political struggle as the Orange revolt of 1747–1750, they merged into open rebellion.

So far as Dekker’s catalog indicates, Holland’s struggles over food concentrated from 1693 to 1768 in market towns and in periods of rising prices when local authorities failed to guarantee affordable supplies to the local poor. His catalog’s tax rebellions (which Dekker worries may only have been “the tip of the iceberg”) focused on farmed-out excise taxes rather than direct taxation, and clustered in times of general struggle over political authority such as 1747–1750. In a Holland where about half the population belonged to the established Dutch Reformed Church, perhaps 10 percent to other Protestant denominations, 40 percent to the Roman Catholic church, and a small number to Jewish congregations, ostensibly religious conflicts often included struggles for voice in local affairs as well as responses to religiously identified external events—for example, the duke of Savoy’s persecution of Protestants in 1655. Like tax rebellion, however, religious contention appears to have surged in times of general political struggle such as 1747–1750. At such times, every political actor’s stake in the polity faces risk. As a result, a wide range of place-holding and place-taking action occurs, regardless of how the cycle of contention began.

Events that Dekker classifies as openly political pivoted on the house of Orange. Under Habsburg rule, the absent king had typically delegated power within each province of the Netherlands to a Stadhouder (state-holder = lieu-tenant = lieutenant or deputy). From their sixteenth-century revolt against Habsburg Spain onward, Dutch provinces had commonly (although by no means always or automatically) named the current prince of the Orange line their Stadhouder, their provisional holder of state power; that happened especially in time of war. Whether or not a prince of Orange was currently Stadhouder, his clientele always constituted a major faction in regional politics, and opposition to it often formed around an alliance of people outside the Reformed church, organized artisans, and exploited rural people. During the struggles of 1747–1750, contention over the Stadhouder’s claims to rule merged with opposition to tax farmers and demands for popular

representation in provincial politics. Such events underwent greater transformation between 1650 and 1800 than did food-, tax-, and religion-centered events.

Defining the emergence of “nineteenth-century” repertoires in Holland.

During the later eighteenth century, we see emerging concerted demands for broad participation in local and provincial government, so much so that R.R. Palmer’s *Age of the Democratic Revolution* (1959–1964) bracketed the Dutch Patriot Revolt of the 1780s with the American Revolution (1775–1783) as significant representatives of the revolutionary current. Wayne te Brake’s systematic analysis of the Dutch revolution in the province of Overijssel identifies the 1780s as a historical pivot in popular claim making. Public meetings, petitioning, and militia marches did much of the day-to-day political work, but in company with older forms of vengeance and intimidation. In the small city of Zwolle, te Brake reports, for example, that in November 1786,

A gathering of more than 1,000 persons in the Grote Kerk produced a declaration that a scheduled election to fill a vacancy on the Sworn Council by the old method of co-optation would not be recognized as legitimate. When the government nevertheless proceeded with the election in mid-December, the chosen candidate was intimidated by Patriot crowds and forced to resign immediately. (te Brake, 1989, p. 108)

When Prussian troops ended the revolution with an invasion in September 1787, however, the Patriots’ Orangist opponents took their own vengeance by sacking the houses of Patriot activists. Speaking of nearby Deventer, te Brake concludes that

the “People” of Deventer had entered politics to stay. Not simply the rhetorical invention of self-serving Patriot pamphleteers or constitution-writers, “*het Volk*” had in the course of the 1780s become an armed and organized reality which proved to be easily capable, when united, of breaking into the urban political space. As unity gave way to division and conflict at all levels of society, however, the force and significance of the new popular politics was by no means extinguished. Thus, as we have seen, the counter-revolution in Deventer represented the victory of one segment of a newly politicized and activated “People” over another—not simply a restoration of aristocratic politics as usual. Indeed, the Orangist counter-revolution in Deventer unwittingly consolidated two momentous changes in the politics of this provincial city, the combination of which suggests that the character of urban politics was forever transformed: the private, aristocratic politics of the past had been shattered and the foundation had been laid for the public, participatory politics of the future. (te Brake, 1989, p. 168)

In public politics at a regional and national scale, both repertoire and participation in contention were changing noticeably.

During the later eighteenth century, organized workers and their strikes also became more prominent in Dutch political struggles. A significant transformation of contentious repertoires was under way even before French conquest so profoundly altered the Low Countries' contentious politics. On balance, newer performances in the Low Countries' repertoires mobilized more people from more different settings, built on detached rather than embedded identities, targeted more regional and national figures and issues, adopted forms that were more standardized across the whole region, and involved direct rather than mediated presentation of claims. Specialized political entrepreneurs (as opposed to established local and regional authorities) were emerging as critical actors in popular contention.

Cataloging collective action in early Belgium.

In a parallel study to Dekker's, Karin van Honacker has cataloged about 115 "collective actions" directed against central authorities farther south, in Brabant—more precisely, in Brussels, Antwerp, and Louvain—from 1601 to 1784. Some actions took place in a single outing, but many consisted of clusters spread over several days or weeks. Honacker classifies her events under four headings: resistance to violation of local political rights, fiscal conflicts, civil-military struggles, and fights over food supply. The first two categories overlap considerably, since in Brussels the dominant guilds (the Nine Nations) frequently resisted taxes on the basis of what they claimed to be their chartered rights. Religious struggles of the sort that figured prominently in Holland escape Honacker's net because they did not typically set members of the urban population against authorities. With Brabant under Spanish, then Austrian, control, struggles of civilians with royal soldiers, disputes over their quartering or payment, freeing of captured military deserters, and competition of urban militias with royal troops for jurisdiction all loomed much larger than in Holland. Fights over food supply, however, greatly resembled each other in north and south; repeatedly city dwellers attacked merchants who raised their prices and outsiders who sought to buy in local markets.

On the whole, Honacker's catalog of events from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Brabant reveals less change in the character of popular demands than Dekker's findings from Holland. In the three southern cities we see repeated resistance to royal centralization in the name of established privilege, but no obvious swelling of demands for popular sovereignty. Claim making followed western Europe's characteristic old-regime repertoire; in Honacker's account it featured frequent employment or parody of authorities' own

political means and symbols; participation of people as members of established communities and corporate groups; concentration of claim making in holidays and authorized gatherings; rich symbolism, often including shaming ceremonies; and orientation of avenging actions to dwellings of perpetrators and to places where alleged offenses occurred.

Defining the emergence of the new repertoire in nineteenth-century Belgium.

The eighteenth-century repertoire did not last much longer. Gita Deneckere has assembled a catalog of "collective actions" in Belgium as a whole from 1831 through 1918 from a wide range of archives, official publications, periodicals, and historical works. Her catalog includes about 440 occasions on which people gathered and made collective demands "in the socio-economic field of conflict," which means largely workers' actions and actions concerning work. Within that field, her evidence demonstrates a significant alteration in Belgian repertoires of contention.

Or, rather, two alterations. Up to the revolution of 1848, Deneckere's contentious events feature workers' assemblies and marches to present petitions, attacks on the goods or persons of high-priced food merchants, and work stoppages by people in multiple shops of the same craft. Workers' actions frequently took the form of turnouts: occasions on which a small number of initiators from a local craft went from shop to shop demanding that fellow craft workers leave their employment to join the swelling crowd. The round completed, turnout participants assembled in some safe place (often a field at the edge of town), aired their grievances, formulated demands, and presented those demands to masters in the trade (often through a meeting of delegations from both sides), staying away from work until the masters had replied satisfactorily or forced them to return.

Between the revolution of 1848 and the 1890s, turnouts practically disappeared as demonstrations and large-firm strikes became much more frequent and prominent. Although strikes and demonstrations continued apace into the twentieth century, from the 1890s onward regionally and nationally coordinated general strikes emerged as major forms of contentious action. As Deneckere says, workers and socialist leaders designed general strikes to be large, standard in form, coordinated across multiple localities, and oriented toward national holders of power. These new actions built on public identities as socialists or as workers at large. They represented a significant shift of repertoire.

Of course these changes reflected major nineteenth-century social changes such as rapid ur-

banization and expansion of capital-intensive industry. But the changing repertoire of contention also had a political history. Deneckere sees increasingly tight interdependence between popular contention and national politics. In the 1890s,

The correspondence between successive socialist mass actions and the parliamentary breakthrough to universal suffrage is too striking for anyone to miss the causal connection. On the basis of published and unpublished correspondence from ruling circles one can conclude that the general strike had a genuine impact, in fact more significant than contemporary socialists themselves realized. Time after time socialist workers' protests confronted power-holders with a revolutionary threat that lay the foundation for abrupt expansion of democracy. (Deneckere, 1997, p. 384)

Thus, in Belgium, street politics and parliamentary politics came to depend on each other. Deneckere's analysis indicates that both before and during democratization, major alterations of repertoires interact with deep transformations of political power. It identifies confrontation as a spur to democratization.

However, this interaction between protest repertoires and political transformation was also powerfully gendered, since both sides of the equation affected largely male citizens. That is, the breakthrough to universal suffrage in the 1890s in fact applied only to men, just as the majority of socialist workers in the

streets were also men. Thus a masculine-dominated form of collective action spurred gendered forms of political transformation.

Evaluating the catalogs. Methodologically, the analyses of Dekker, Honacker, and Deneckere offer us both hope and caution. All three use catalogs of contentious events to gauge political trends and variations in the character of conflict. Clearly, such catalogs discipline the search for variation and change in contentious politics. But comparison of the three catalogs also establishes how sensitive such enumerations are to the definitions and sources adopted. Dekker's search of Dutch archives for events involving at least twenty people in violent encounters, regardless of issues, brings him a wide range of actions and some evidence of change, but it excludes smaller-scale and nonviolent making of claims. Honacker's combing of similar Belgian archives for collective challenges to public authorities nets her plenty of smaller-scale and nonviolent episodes but omits industrial and intergroup conflicts. Deneckere's sources and methods, in contrast, concentrate her catalog on industrial events.

None of the three choices is intrinsically superior to the others, but each makes a difference to the evidence at hand. When trying to make comparisons over time, space, and type of setting, we must make

allowance for the selectivity of all such catalogs. We are, nevertheless, far better off with the catalogs than without them. The Low Countries are among the few regions where scholars have inventoried contentious events on a substantial scale before the twentieth century. France and Great Britain are two of the others. For most of the rest of Europe we must settle for pickings from general histories and for occasional specialized studies of particular localities, issues, and populations.

THEORIES OF CAUSALITY

Significant historical questions are at issue in such investigations. As figure 1 indicates, historians' descriptions and explanations of popular collective action vary significantly along two dimensions: intentionality and precipitating social processes. With respect to intentions, some authors emphasize impulse: hunger, rage, or fear. In such a view, ordinary people burst into public politics only when driven by irrepressible emotions. Other authors argue that various available agencies and programs impose consciousness on ordinary people, as when churches, political parties, or local power holders dominate popular views. More populist or radical historians commonly counter impulse and imposition accounts with the assertion that popular collective action arises from shared understandings of social situations—whether those shared understandings develop from daily experience or result in part from exposure to new ideas.

Along the dimension of precipitating social processes, historians sometimes emphasize social stress (for example, famine, epidemic, war, or geographic mobility) as the chief precipitant of popular collective action. Their investigations typically explain collective action as response to crisis. Others single out political mobilization by organizations committed to change or by local consultation within dissenting segments of the population. Their investigations center more directly on organization and consultation among aggrieved people. A third group of historians treat popular collective action chiefly as an expression of group conflict. Such conflict may align class against class, but it also forms along religious, ethnic, linguistic, kinship, gender, or local cleavages. Although the third group of historians resembles the second in examining organization and consultation, they also study intergroup relations in daily contacts.

The two dimensions correlate. Where direct impulse and social stress coincide, we have historians' analyses of collective action as disorder—as temporary disruption of the political order maintained by

established authorities. Imposed consciousness and political mobilization likewise pair with each other in analyses of social change, where competing movements and leaders articulate changing popular interests more or less effectively. Finally, historians who see struggle as history's motor characteristically attribute shared understandings to ordinary actors and portray group conflict as the motive force. Rarely, in contrast, do historians who consider social stress to be the chief precipitant of popular collective action also impute shared understandings—except perhaps in the form of wild beliefs—to its participants. Similarly rare are historians who explain collective action as a consequence of group conflict, yet read the consciousness of participants as unmediated impulse; the largest exception to this rule is the explanation (almost always wrong) of intergroup struggle as direct venting of age-old hatreds.

More is at stake in disputes over the description and explanation of collective action than mere differences in opinion among historians. On the whole, analyses in the disorder zone deny historical effectiveness to ordinary people; instead, they treat history as the product of great individuals, slowly changing mentalities, or impersonal forces. They also treat at-

tributes of individuals (rather than, say, their social locations or their relations to other individuals) as the fundamental causes of their behavior, including their participation in collective action. Within the zone of social change, historians typically consider large-scale social processes such as secularization, urbanization, or the development of capitalism to cause a wide range of effects, including transformation of incentives and opportunities for collective action. Here reorganization of everyday social life and of politics plays a significant part in explanations of collective action. Historians who emphasize struggle commit themselves to views of individual social life as inextricably embedded in relations among individuals and groups. In classic marxist analyses the crucial relations form within the organization of production, but nonmarxist social historians have also studied relations of conflict and co-

operation based on gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, and locality.

A dwindling number of social historians treat Europe's popular collective action as the expression of direct impulses incited by social stress. Social historians have contributed significantly to moving prevailing historical explanations of popular collective action toward social change and struggle. As they have done so, they have uncovered increasing evidence of the influence of existing institutions on the form, frequency, and outcome of collective action. One significant contribution of European social historians, indeed, has been to show how extensively local institutions mediate between people's individual impulses, on one side, and collective action, on the other. Here the histories of conflict, of cooperation, and of social institutions converge.

See also other articles in this section.

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MORAL ECONOMY AND LUDDISM



John G. Rule

Although the concept of a moral economy has older uses, in the twentieth century historians' use of the term "moral economy" largely followed an influential article written in 1971 by the English historian Edward Thompson. In "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," reprinted in *Customs in Common* (1991), Thompson sought to explain the actions of the English who rioted against high food prices. Focusing on the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a time of rapid change, he presented food rioters as resisting the cold logic of the "market economy" by asserting an alternative "moral economy" based on a sense of justice and entitlement to procure food at affordable prices. The rioters appealed to a disappearing tradition of paternalist regulation of the food market by the state.

MANIFESTATIONS OF MORAL ECONOMY

Backed by a powerful sense of legitimacy, the typical food-rioting crowd indulged in premeditated, controlled behavior against what it saw as unjust, self-interested attempts to profit from food scarcities. The protesters especially targeted middlemen, who were seen as enhancing food prices by imposing themselves between the food producers and the consumers. Crowds, which often included women, took direct action in marketplaces, at fairs, or at bakers' shops by seizing food from sellers, publicly selling it themselves at a "just" price, and returning money and sacks to the sellers. They usually took wheat or barley in the form of grain, flour, or bread but sometimes took meat and cheese. Merchants who transported grain from areas where it was in short supply, in order to sell it in markets offering higher profits, especially London, were also likely to have it seized in this way. Crowds visited farmers suspected of hoarding grain while prices climbed even higher and ordered them to bring their grain to the nearest local market.

Food riots occurred in more than a dozen years between 1714 and 1815, and they continued sporad-

ically later in the nineteenth century. They were widespread in the so-called wartime famine years of 1795–1796 and 1800–1801 (see Wells, 1988). With more than four hundred outbreaks between 1790 and 1801 alone, examples are plentiful with which to illustrate the patterns Thompson included in the moral economy. Although some changes emerged, such as the north was affected later than the south, for the most part the main characteristics of these protests endured, and the compact contemporary account of more than fifty riots in the *Annual Register* of 1766 provides models. Not many of these took place in the north, which that year had a better harvest than the south.

In Gloucestershire and Wiltshire cloth workers destroyed flour mills, taking grain and distributing it among themselves. In Exeter, another center of woolen manufacture, protesters seized cheese and sold it at a reduced price. Cornish miners forced butchers to lower meat prices, as did metalworkers at Wolverhampton. In Derby a crowd took cheese off a riverboat before it could be shipped from the town. Similarly cheese intended for transport to London was seized from a wagon. In Devon protesters seized corn from the barns of farmers, sold it openly at a market for a fair price, and returned the money and sacks to the farmers. In Malmesbury, "They seized all the corn, sold it at 5s a bushel and gave the money to the right owners." In Nottingham a crowd seized all the cheese being sold by the factors (middlemen) but, significantly, left untouched that being sold directly by the farmers.

Such rioting recurred from one place to another over wide lapses of time, a response from the popular memory when pressure situations arose. In some places the proclivity for riot was stronger than in others. For example, riots intended to stop the outward movement of corn happened at transport networks, such as seaports and inland waterways. Manufacturing and mining communities exhibited an especially robust tradition of food rioting because crowds formed easily in their dense populations and because, unlike the farming population, miners bought most of their food


in markets. Inhabitants of market towns felt invaded when, for instance, Cornish tin miners entered Penzance, Redruth, or Truro or when colliers from neighboring villages entered Bristol, Coventry, or Newcastle. Often anonymous letters served notice of the intention to lower food prices, like this one received by a magistrate at Norwich in 1766, “This is to latt you to know and the rest of you Justes of the Pace that if Bakers and Butchers and market peoppel if thay do not fall the Commorits at a reasnabel rate as thay do at other Markets there will be such Raysen as never was known.”

The letter’s eccentric spelling hardly lessens its impact, and serious rioting did indeed follow. However, actual violence was rare, whatever threats were issued. Food rioters deliberately killed no one over the whole period, although a small number of rioters was shot by those defending their premises. John Bohstedt, in *Riots and Community Politics in England and Wales, 1790–1810* (1983) argued that food riots worked best in smaller communities, where the magistrates had authority to offer negotiation and even reciprocation rather than outright suppression. In general harsh retributory sentences were not imposed, and once order was restored magistrates often went some way toward meeting the wishes of the crowd by encouraging lower prices and initiating or participating in relief measures. Eighteenth-century crowds rioted

over food prices in part because they could expect some short-term remedy.

Thompson’s article attracted significant critical response, to which he replied at length in “The Moral Economy Reviewed” (*Customs in Common*, 1991). Some objected that Thompson’s moral economy implied that the defenders of the corn market, especially Adam Smith and his major discussion in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), were immoral or at least had no moral vision about access to food. Thompson’s critics pointed out that Smith in fact believed that the free operation of the market was the best defense against food shortages because it evened supply and, through the rationing effect of high prices, restrained consumption until the next harvest.

Thompson welcomed the examination by John Walter and Keith Wrightson, in their 1976 article “Dearth and the Social Order in Early Modern England,” of the implementation of regulation of prices and marketing activities. The government achieved this regulation through such means as the issuing, at times of dearth, of the *Book of Orders*, first done in 1597. The book reminded justices of the peace of their powers to take action over price and supply (such actions became the objectives of the eighteenth-century crowds). The government also resorted to the prosecution of offending traders, a course of action




Food Protests in Britain, 1794–1796. Adapted from Andrew Charlesworth, ed., *An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain* (Croom Helm, U.K., and Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pages 98–99.

that had been part of the response of the authorities in the seventeenth century. This reinforced the authority of justices in times of dearth. Years of high prices were more frequent in the eighteenth century, but rioters drew a sense of a moral economy from a longer expectation of regulation, much of which was still part of the common law and statute law, although it was increasingly disregarded by government. In the popular memory a belief in regulation remained strong, and as Douglas Hay demonstrated in “The

State and the Market in 1800: Lord Kenyon and Mr. Waddington” (1999), it persisted among some of the more traditional justices.

Thompson cautiously did not extend his concept of a moral economy beyond the English experience, but to a marked extent the same essential features appeared in food protests across Europe. Indeed the British historians Richard Rose and George Rudé, who pioneered the study of food rioting in England ahead of Thompson, both first studied riots in revo-



Food Protests in Britain, 1766. Adapted from Andrew Charlesworth, ed., *An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain* (Croom Helm, U.K., and Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pages 90–91.

lutionary France. In that country, too, the government abdicated from paternalist control of the food market and came to believe in *laissez-faire*. This switch was especially marked under the finance minister Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot in 1775, when disturbances around Paris were the largest of the pre-1789 period. But in 1768, an earlier dearth year, France experienced a full medley of food-rioting actions, including people seizing grain to sell at just prices, known in France as *taxation populaire*, or popular price control.

The riots of March and April 1775 were widespread and serious enough to earn the title *la guerre des farines* or the “flour war.” The change of regime brought about by the Revolution did not end food riots, which continued on a considerable scale in 1789, 1792–1793, and 1795. During these years the riots were widely scattered. In the provinces, the riots for the most part targeted grain or flour, as in 1775. In Paris the main targets were meat, butter, and eggs, but even sugar, coffee, and soap became the objects

of riots. The crowds were as insistent on the tradition of *taxation populaire* as they had been under the ancien régime, but now protest over food prices also involved political slogans. These protests were at least partly successful in securing a short-term (fifteen months) return to the days of regulation as the Convention imposed price controls under the law of the General Maximum of 1793. After the 1790s food rioting was never again so widespread or so insistent, but the moral economy of *taxation populaire* persisted to some extent into the disturbances of 1848. Protests in the depression year of 1817 called for *taxation populaire*, as did the disturbances of 1845 through 1847, when the traditional bogeymen of corn hoarders, grain exporters, and bakers were again targeted and women led demonstrations to force sales in the markets at just prices.

In Spain the riots of 1766 followed the removal of controls over the grain trade in the previous year. Those protests expressed a sense of a just price with expectations that authorities would lower prices. But unlike in England and France, the Spanish riots were an unusual occurrence in a country where food riots remained rare. In Germany food riots against the resented commercial operations of grain dealers remained a feature of the widespread disturbances of the 1840s, when food riots in Berlin and elsewhere produced government intervention and the sale of bread and grain at reduced prices. Prussian Germany experienced two hundred food riots in 1847.

More than twenty years after his original article, Thompson remarked that, even if he did father the term “moral economy,” it had come of age in historical discourse and he was no longer responsible for its actions. He had misgivings about its application away from the special moral and entitlement context of the food supply. He was uneasy, for example, about extending it generally to expectations from traditional systems of poor relief, such as the pre-1834 Old Poor Law in England. He conceded that in carefully considered contexts some actions of industrial protest could have a moral economy dimension.


In this regard Thompson approved the work of Adrian Randall, who analyzed both the food riots of 1766 and the industrial dispute of 1756 within the same woolen-working communities of Gloucestershire in “The Industrial Moral Economy of the Gloucestershire Weavers in the Eighteenth Century” (1988). Both protests were informed by the same values and displayed the same community solidarities and sanctions. Industrial protestors, like food rioters, appealed both to custom and to the regulative legislation of the labor market in Tudor and Stuart statute law. They appealed also to the authority of magistrates, seeking

their intervention as conciliators and arbitrators. No firmly bedded reactionary opposition to the market economy as a whole, these disturbances reflected resistance at points where the market operations broke down or threatened to break down customary standards and expectations.

Other historians, equally influenced by Thompson’s insight, have presented eighteenth-century industrial disputes as legitimized within assumptions of rights and entitlements. William Reddy in *The Rise of Market Culture* (1984), his important study of French textile workers in dispute, even suggested that “something like a moral economy is bound to surface anywhere that industrial capitalism spreads” (Reddy, p. 334), developing as much from lived experience as from traditional culture. Yet viewing any version of the moral economy as capable of generally embracing early forms of industrial protest presents problems. It implies resistance to a particular set of capitalist market operations affecting wages or employment, but not all and possibly not even most industrial disputes in eighteenth-century and early-nineteenth-century Europe were defensive. Smith, discussing English workers’ strikes in 1776, recognized the existence of “offensive” strikes intended to take advantage of favorable situations in the labor market to increase wages or otherwise improve workers’ conditions. In such actions allied artisans frequently employed strategies more explicable in the modern language of industrial relations than in that of an industrial moral economy. However, that not all disputes can be explained by moral economy does not mean that the concept does not apply in some measure to a significant population of conflicts at points where innovating capitalist employers were breaking down the ingrained traditions and expectations of occupational communities and trades. No more than in the food market was customary culture in the labor market the simple antithesis of market culture. The culture of the wage-dependent artisan, cloth worker, or miner presumed that the labor market was not fully free but operated under the restraints of custom and claimed rights. In short, the workers understood as “fair” a market that recruited only from those with an entitlement to a particular trade and that employed neither unskilled labor, especially female, nor machinery simply to enhance the profits of capital.

LUDDISM

In England. The best-known example of such community-based resistance is the Luddite disturbances of 1811–1813. The machine-breaking activi-



The Luddite Riots. Adapted from George Rudé, *The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730–1848* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), page 82.

ties of workers across much of England's industrial north and Midlands seriously alarmed the government and gave a new word, "Luddism," to the language. Luddism can be linked to the moral economy in at least two ways. First, it was based on the resistance of occupational communities, where networks of kin and neighborhood interlocked with those of employment to provide a rich texture of customary expectations about ways of working and living. Second, it came at what Thompson, in *The Making of the English Working Class*, called the "crisis point in

the abrogation of paternalist legislation and in the imposition of the political economy of laissez-faire upon and against the will and conscience of the working people" (1968, p. 851).

Machine-breaking and other attacks on employers' property had a long history in the repertoire of workers' actions against employers in times of dispute. Eric Hobsbawm called this "collective bargaining by violence" (1964, p. 7) in his article "The Machine Breakers." At times the attacked machinery was seen as a grievance for bringing unemployment to

skilled workers and hunger to their families. At other times machines were broken as a means of putting pressure on employers or as acts of revenge.

The English disturbances of 1811–1812, however, were without precedent in their extent and seriousness. They seemed to pose a threat not just to capitalist employers but to government itself. A prelude had succeeded in the woolen industry of the west country, the same area of manufacturing where Randall claimed to identify an industrial moral economy behind the strike of 1756. The shearmen, who cut the nap from a woven piece of cloth with heavy hand shears, a vital role in finishing cloth, had attacked the newly introduced shearing frames that threatened to displace their skill. Their action effectively deterred clothiers in that region from persisting with their innovations.

The name “Ludd” first appeared in the stocking manufactures of the East Midlands, where framework knitters produced hosiery on stocking frames. In 1811, a time of market contraction due to the war with Napoleonic France, the capitalist hosiers, who employed the framework knitters by putting-out the yarn to their homes, began a series of measures to reduce labor costs. Essentially they resorted to “colting,” that is, to the employment of young unskilled labor to make stockings by the cheaper method of “squaring.” Squaring is knitting on wide frames a square of cloth from which stockings were subsequently cut and sewn instead of knitted in the traditional fully fashioned way. Work was the issue, not new machinery as such. A Nottinghamshire folk song of the time, “General Ludd’s Triumph,” expresses the grievances of the trade and of the community in which it was enmeshed along with the determination to continue the struggle:

Till full-fashioned work at the old fashioned price
Is established by Custom and Law.
Then the Trade when this arduous contest is o’er
Shall raise in full splendour its head.
And colting and cutting and squaring no more
Shall deprive honest workmen of bread.
(Hammond and Hammond, 1979, p. 212)

At first the knitters concentrated on traditional action within the context of a paternalist state. They petitioned Parliament for an act of regulation to preserve just wages and fair employment. This produced nothing, and local magistrates refused to intervene when hosiers continued to cut wages. Attacks on knitting frames began. The framework knitters were no more indiscriminate in their targets than were the food rioters. Their attacks by night were said to be led by a mythical “Captain” or “General Ludd,” whose name appeared at the bottom of a host of threatening letters. But as another verse of the ballad points out,

“His wrath is entirely confined to wide frames/and to those that old prices abate” (Hammond and Hammond, 1979, p. 212). At its most active phase in Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire, from March 1811 to February 1812, the movement destroyed one thousand wide frames in one hundred separate attacks. A worried government reacted, making machine breaking a capital offense and dispatching six thousand troops to Nottingham.

The name “Ludd” appeared elsewhere. It spread to woolen manufactures of the West Riding of Yorkshire, where shearmen, or “croppers” as they were known locally, began a series of attacks on newly introduced shearing frames. As conflict intensified, an organization formed that was capable of attacking larger mills, and lives were lost. The fears of the skilled croppers were not unfounded. By 1817 only 860 out of 3,625 croppers had full employment. Ludd also appeared in Lancashire and adjacent parts of Cheshire, where the development of cotton weaving by power looms created a machinery issue. But few manufacturers were at that time attempting power cotton weaving, and the disturbances were part of a medley of protests that included the food riots of 1812.

Luddism is not an easy phenomenon for historians to accommodate within traditional labor history. Its early historians, especially J. L. Hammond and Barbara Hammond in *The Skilled Labourer* (1927), called it a regrettable but understandably desperate response by workers who, in the face of the growing influence of the economic ideology of *laissez-faire*, had failed to persuade government to redress their grievances by invoking paternalist regulation. Machine breaking was the final act in the traditional craftworkers’ struggle to maintain or revive customs and laws that the new breed of capitalist employers was eager to evade. Increasingly the state seemed on the side of capital rather than labor. For the Hammonds and some others the true line of descent for the labor movement in Britain was through the “constitutionalists,” who had organized the petitioning of Parliament. Without any strong evidence, they insisted that the constitutionalist movement developed parallel to but entirely separate from the direct actions of the machine breakers.

Such compartmentalization of protests works even less well for Yorkshire and Lancashire than for Nottingham. Government spies reported that the Luddites in the northern counties were moving beyond industrial protest into political action and were even linking to an underground Jacobin revolutionary movement. The Hammonds dismissed these reports as the fabrication of self-interested professional spies. In 1964 Thompson, in *The Making of the English*

Working Class, was the first modern historian to argue that the government was right to take the threat of revolution in the Luddite districts seriously.

Some historians agree that Luddism or its failure convinced at least some of the artisan population that the old regime was no longer willing to play a paternalist role and intervene to redress the balance of power between employer and worker. This view was reinforced by actions outside the Luddite areas. Calico printers, cotton workers, and others petitioned fruitlessly over working and hiring conditions. Possibly the Luddism of 1811–1813 was the last major episode of industrial protest that can be accommodated within the idea of an industrial moral economy and hold parallels to actions in the food market. Indeed in *The Question of Class Struggle* (1982) Craig Calhoun suggested that the events of 1811–1813 were in essence a “populist reaction” legitimated by the senses and beliefs of community rather than a revolutionary movement based on the concept of class conflict. The innovating capitalist was viewed less as a person exploiting labor than as a person breaching the norms of the occupational community. In fact the protest had elements of both.

The community basis of resistance to machinery was evident in earlier periods. The introduction of spinning jennies into the cotton districts, threatening the traditional cottage-based wheel spinning, led to attacks on the machinery of the inventor James Hargreaves at Blackburn as early as 1768. Much more widespread and serious were the disturbances that erupted across Lancashire in 1779, when not only the jenny but carding and roving machinery were coming into use. The most notable attack was on the factory at Chorley of the inventor and industrialist Richard Arkwright. An idea of the social justice expectations of the moral economy clearly emerges in this episode in the protesters’ distinction between large jennies of twenty spindles or more, which were taking the site of yarn production from the cottage to the workshop or factory, and the smaller, hand-operated jennies, which were considered fair. Although smaller jennies displaced the wheel, they had been accommodated within the cottage economy and had offered enhanced earnings. What was fundamentally at issue was the viability of the family economy, which was the economic and moral building block of the community.

Women carried out domestic spinning, and as the ratio of spinners to weavers was 6 to 1, more women than just the wives of hand-loom weavers were employed. In addition to male and female cloth workers, colliers, nail makers, joiners, and general laborers were among the eight thousand or more who participated in the disturbances of 1779.

In France. Moral economy protests and equivalents of Luddism characterized many early industrial settings. In 1788, when the spinning jenny was introduced into the Rouen district of France, the resulting disturbances suggested the existence of an industrial moral economy. The reduction of the rates paid for hand spinning had severely lowered family earnings when food prices were beginning a rapid rise. Protestors claimed that “machines had stolen the bread.” Industrial protests merged with food riots by the summer of 1789. In July a mob composed mainly of women attacked a grain store at Rouen, then attacked the workshop of an English artisan where jennies and carding machines were manufactured. After it was fired on, the angry crowd scattered the broken parts of the machinery in the same manner that food rioters sometimes scattered seized grain. In the following weeks protesters frequently attacked workshops where new jennies were in operation in Rouen, Paris, Lille, Troyes, and Roanne. Attacks continued sporadically until 1791. Another round of protests against machinery occurred after 1815, when French industrialization was gaining speed.

The machine breakers of the English north and Midlands gave a generic word to the language with revealing speed. “I have not been able to discover any symptom of ‘Luddism,’” the mayor of Preston advised the government in 1816. The following year the cutlery workers from Sheffield were reported to have a “complete system of Luddism.” By then the meanings had been conveyed to France, where the prefect of a woolen-manufacturing district urged that manufacturers should consult with him before introducing shearing frames, saying, “It is prudent to spare ourselves the disorders which the Luddites have committed in England.” To some extent the events of 1811 and 1812 in the West Riding were repeated in the older woolen districts of France, including Sedan, Reims, Carcassonne, Lodève, and Clermont, in 1816 and 1817. A few manufacturers were introducing shearing frames and gig mills, and they expected the support of the authorities. Earlier the threat of violent protest had been a deterrent, as it had been in the west of England. In 1803 a Sedan merchant explained that the authorities would undoubtedly punish workers who resisted machinery, but “who will return to us our murdered families and burned workshops?”

The more determined introduction of shearing frames in 1816 and 1817 brought resistance from shearmen and from the woolen-working community as a whole. Women again were prominent, reportedly urging the men to be even more vigorous. According to a Vienne police report the crowd shouted “down with the shearing machine” as they removed one from

its crates and threw it into the river. Ballads expressed the same moral outrage that had legitimized English Luddism. A petition to the government accused the machinery of offering the “pernicious means of shearing, glossing and brushing 1000 ells of cloth, while being directed by only four men.” It was an “evil” that would destroy and divide the community because it would be “beneficial only to the owners.” The prefect of Hérault, while recognizing his duty to suppress riots and protect manufacturers’ property, called the machines “an inevitable and almost irreparable evil.” Whether as part of a strategy or as a persistence of belief in the old moral, regulated economy of the ancien régime, the protestors appealed to the recently restored king, hoping, “If he knew this machine would reduce many of us to begging he would not let it be introduced.”

The episodes of 1816–1817 involving shear-men and established woolen centers are the closest parallels in French labor history to English Luddism. However, attacks on machinery remained endemic if sporadic in France for another three decades, whereas in Britain, with the noted but idiosyncratic exception of the attacks on threshing machines in the name of “Captain Swing” by the agricultural laborers throughout southern England in 1830–1831, machine breaking did not pose a significant threat in the years after 1820. The slower pace and different character of in-

dustrial change in France allowed both artisan attitudes and domestic manufacturing to persist longer, underpinning notions of traditional entitlements to work and to bread.

From the episodes of 1816–1817 to the Revolution of 1848, more than one hundred major incidents of Luddism were recorded, with distinct peaks at times of high food prices and political upheaval, such as 1828–1833 and 1846–1848. Both urban and rural workers were involved. As well as serious food rioting, for example, Paris in 1830 and 1831 experienced Luddite-type actions among female shawl workers and tobacco workers as well as an attack on printing machines at the government’s Royal Print workshops. In 1830 around two thousand cutlers were involved in destructive disturbances in Saint-Étienne, as were other workers in Toulouse and Bordeaux. In the period of the political and hunger crises of 1848 silkworkers and tobacco makers attacked machinery in Lyons. River boatmen attacked steamships in Lyons, while at Rouen they damaged railway lines.

In Germany. Such early forms of industrial protest persisted at least as long in Germany, although frequency there was affected by the fact that German states were policed more effectively and determinedly. Traditions went back to the early modern period with attacks on ribbon mills by embittered laceworkers.

Other Luddite outbreaks included those of the metalworkers of Solingen in 1826, the silk weavers of Krefeld in 1827, Saxon weavers and Leipzig printers in the 1830s, and most serious and best-known, the linen weavers of Silesia in 1844. During 1848, the “year of revolutions,” Germany had episodes with textile workers, as did Italy, especially in Campania.

In *The Rebellious Century* (1975), Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly argued that food rioting, machine breaking, and the protection of rights over woodlands or commons belong to a “reactive” era of European popular protest due—after the mid-nineteenth century, or two decades earlier in Britain—to give way to a “proactive” modern era of organized trade unions and political movements ready

to negotiate in different ways with the power of the state. How far notions of moral economy assist in understanding a transitional stage associated with resisting the increasing encroachments of capitalism is debatable. What is clear is that, wherever groups feel traditional entitlements, whether to food or to the right to work as a resource controlled by the members of a particular trade or community, they inevitably legitimized their protests in moral terms. Usually those terms pose at least some measure of opposition to the workings and rhetoric of the “market.” It is far too easy to offer the moral economy as a simple antithesis of the market economy, but to a significant extent the former only has meaning when considered against the growth of the latter.

See also Modernization; Technology; The Industrial Revolutions (volume 2); and other articles in this section.

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URBAN CROWDS



Michael P. Hanagan

Urban crowds comprise a large number and great variety of human social interactions. A broad survey of European history reveals that crowd behavior has been shaped by transformations of the state system, the character of urbanization, and the composition of urban populations. Urban crowds have been one of the oldest objects of social analysis. Generally theorists have condemned the crowd as prone to irrationality and violence, although this view has never gone unchallenged.

THEORIES OF CROWD BEHAVIOR

The dominant classical view, based on philosophers such as Plato and the historical accounts of Tacitus and Procopius, portrayed the crowd as an unthinking mob. Almost all the conceptions of crowd behavior articulated by nineteenth-century crowd theorists can be found in Tacitus's analysis of the Roman mob. In the late 1880s the conservative historian Hippolyte Taine's monumental history of contemporary France (*Origines de la France contemporaine*; Origins of contemporary France) drew the attention of the developing social sciences to crowd phenomena. Appalled by the Paris Commune of 1871, Taine delighted in presenting the gruesome details of crowd atrocities during the French Revolution and argued that such behavior was endemic in democracies. Within a decade, the French sociologist Gustave Le Bon had ransacked the writings of a host of innovative predecessors to create the field of "crowd psychology." Le Bon listed three characteristics of crowd behavior: a psychic unity giving the crowd a sense of almost unlimited power, a collective mentality yielding suddenly to powerful emotional appeals, and a very low level of intelligence sinking to the level of the lowest common denominator of its participants. While urban crowds were Le Bon's prime example of crowd behavior, he believed his principles applied to all human assemblies from juries to legislatures. In 1960 Elias Canetti attempted a reconstruction of this intellectual tradition

by emphasizing the crowd's transcendence of individualism, but Canetti's ignorance of historical context and penchant for facile generalization limited his influence in the contemporary reshaping of theories of crowd behavior.

A more favorable view of crowd activity originated in the Renaissance in Niccolò Machiavelli's *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy*. Machiavelli portrayed the uncorrupted Roman crowd as the last repository of civic virtue and the only recourse against tyrants and a degraded aristocracy. His views influenced Montesquieu, who celebrated the English crowd's role in maintaining that country's mixed constitution. In the nineteenth century, the great French historian Jules Michelet was a foremost exponent of the Machiavellian view. Posing the rhetorical question of who participated in the siege of the Bastille, Michelet responded, "The people, the whole people."

Only in the twentieth century did historians and sociologists such as George Rudé and E. P. Thompson introduce a new perspective on crowd behavior based on the actual study of crowds, primarily in turn-of-the-eighteenth-century England and France. The result was a striking early achievement of the "new" social history. Uncovering a variety of records about the individual identity of crowd participants, Rudé examined the composition of protesting crowds, while Thompson concentrated on crowd demands and their social context. Their investigations challenged images of the crowd as primal and irrational and also the view of the crowd as the collective conscience of an entire society; instead they portrayed protesting crowds as composed of relatively better-off members of popular communities responding to specific threats to their communities and acting according to widely shared popular cultural assumptions. Sociologists studying contemporary crowds have also challenged some of the basic postulates of earlier crowd theorists. Questioning images of the "lonely crowd," Clark McPhail has shown that crowds are not generally composed of isolated, atomistic individuals subject to the manipulation of talented orators; rather,

small groups of friends generally join together in the formation of crowds. Small group ties persist within crowds and condition an individual's response to speakers and the actions of other crowd components.

THE CROWD IN HISTORY

Begun by Rudé and Thompson, the study of historical crowds became an important theme of historical analysis, and works at the end of the twentieth century have enabled historians to discover secular patterns in crowd behavior. For a survey of some of the findings of crowd historians, a few definitions are helpful. An "urban crowd" refers to a number of people, say ten or more, who are not part of government, assembled for some common purpose in a publicly accessible place within a densely settled site of three thousand or more inhabitants. The three chief types of crowds are extrinsic, claim-making, and commemorative. "Extrinsic crowds" are the unintended but inevitable consequence of time- and space-restricted services, usually connected with commerce, entertainment, or routine religious observance. Crowds thronging to markets, fairs, or balloon ascensions are examples, as are concert audiences and attendees at Sunday religious services. With an extrinsic crowd the services in question could be provided privately without serious decline in the value of the services. Thus, in the nineteenth century the replacement of open stalls by private shops lessened the crowd character of many grow-

ing market towns without affecting the fundamental purpose of commercial exchange. A Catholic mass retains its full meaning with only the celebrant present.

In contrast, numbers are necessary to claim-making and commemorative crowds, and poor attendance amounts to failure of the claim. "Claim-making crowds" make claims on at least one person outside their own number, claims that if realized would affect the interests of their object. Claim-making crowds have taken many different forms. At one time or another, the seizure of grain, cessation of work, pulling down of houses, mass demonstrations, invasions of common land, rough music, and naval mutinies were all recognized forms of claim making. Recognizing a claim-making process required familiarity with the social and cultural context on the part of both claim makers and the objects of their claims. When employers first saw most of their workers withdraw in concert from work, often leaving unfinished material to ruin in stilled machines and, subsequently, marching around factory gates with signs, shouting insulting names at loyal workmen, these actions struck many of them as personal betrayal, criminal disruption, or attempted extortion. Only in time did the "strike" become a recognized form of claim making, with laws distinguishing legal from illegal actions and with both employers and workers carefully scrutinizing each other's behavior to distinguish routine from nonroutine behavior in order to gauge relative strength or weakness.

“Commemorative crowds” pay tribute, witness events, or assert an identity openly. Examples are sports rallies, religious revival meetings, and coronation processions. Because the political purposes of commemorative crowds are not always explicitly stated and the intentions of their organizers may differ considerably from the mass of participants, they deserve special attention. Commemorative crowds often demonstrate the extent of support for a particular identity and may implicitly support political claims; insofar as it discusses commemorative crowds, this essay deals with implicitly claim-making commemorative crowds.

The ritual actions of commemorative crowds and authorities’ attitudes toward them may implicitly express claims more effectively than explicit claim making. In Northern Ireland in the 1990s, sectarian Protestant determination to preserve a “Protestant state for a Protestant people” was asserted publicly through parades commemorating battles such as those of the Boyne (1690) and the Somme (1916) and Protestant holidays such as Reformation Day. To demonstrate their predominance, hard-core Protestants insisted on their right to march through both Protestant and Catholic communities, and Northern Irish authorities generally supported their claims. Meanwhile Catholics, who emulated the Protestants in the use of parading, were allowed to celebrate such holidays as St. Patrick’s Day and the anniversary of the Easter Rebellion (1916) by marching only through Catholic areas. In an effort to resolve the conflict resulting from Catholic resistance to Protestant parades through their neighborhoods, British politicians attempted to work out impartial procedures for granting parade permits. In turn, this led to confrontations between political authorities and sectarian Protestants who opposed both the limitations on their parading and, much more important, the concept of a nonsectarian political administration in Northern Ireland.

As in the case of Northern Irish parades, a clear line cannot always be drawn between various categories of crowds. Until the nineteenth century, almost all claim-making crowds emerged from extrinsic and commemorative crowds. Market days, fairs, Sunday church, processions, and carnivals were the only legitimate public assemblies and offered the best opportunities for the development of claim-making crowds. In early modern European marketplaces, Monday was often a favorite day for bread or grain riots. Grievances were discussed and participation pledged after Sunday church services that brought together community members; the actions were carried out the next day, which many urban workers took off or on which they worked irregularly.

From 1500 on, population growth combined with urbanization increased both the average size and frequency of extrinsic urban crowds. Nineteenth-century social theorists proclaimed their own time as preeminently the “age of the crowd” and insisted that the crowd was becoming the dominant force in modern society. Yet such claims cannot be sustained, for in fact crowds played an important political role at almost all stages of European history after 1500.

Perhaps the single most important factor affecting the character of claim-making crowds was the nature of the political regime. Since commemorative and claim-making crowds are significantly shaped by state transformation, this essay examines their characteristic features in the era of composite monarchies, sovereign states, and consolidated states. It also looks at how changes in urban population and its distribution caused by commercialization and industrialization affected the character of crowds.

COMPOSITE MONARCHIES AND CROWDS

In 1500 composite monarchies dominated Europe. These were cobbled-together unions of previously separate political units that retained the important political institutions of preceding regimes and were typically territorially dispersed. Fragmented sovereignty and overlapping jurisdictions were characteristic features of composite monarchies. The claims to legitimacy on the part of the central authority were frequently weighed against the competing claims of regional or local authorities, and small territorial units often strengthened their positions by playing off the rival claims of king and emperor.

Already by 1500 the European state system was characterized by permanent military competition, and military success was strongly affected by economic development; money fueled western European war machines, and the search for money inevitably brought tax collectors and royal financial agents to town. In the sixteenth century, towns in western Germany, northern Italy, the Netherlands, and the Baltic used their financial power to mobilize troops and maintain a large degree of independence from the territorially large but capital-poor states surrounding them. The autonomous power of many cities combined with conflicts among rival polities about their respective rights led to the emergence of political spaces for direct negotiations between authorities and crowds. These spaces tended to disappear with the rise of the sovereign state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but were revived and expanded with the growth

of consolidated states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In the era of composite monarchies, the distinctive features of claim-making crowds, both commemorative crowds with implicit claims and explicitly claim-making crowds, were their origin in non-claim-making crowds combined with their ability to negotiate directly with rulers or to take independent authoritative action.

For a look at a commemorative crowd, Mardi Gras 1580 in the Dauphiné region of southeastern France, as described by Le Roy Ladurie in *Carnival in Romans* (1979), offers a representative case. At the

time France was in the midst of its seventh religious war since the accession in 1560 of ten-year-old Charles IX under the regency of his grasping mother, Catherine de Médicis. In the chaos produced by the confrontation between Catholics and Protestants, normally quiescent popular forces organized to influence power. In the Dauphiné peasant leagues mobilized to protest unjust taxation, and in the city of Romans, urban artisans challenged the oligarchical elites' monopoly of urban political power and also protested the incidence of urban taxation. The monarchy's preoccupation with the religious wars forced local elites to act directly on their own behalf; to reassure the king

about the propriety of their own actions, they exaggerated the Protestant ties of their artisanal enemies. Elites used the Mardi Gras crowd to articulate a response to popular demands. Mardi Gras provided a public forum for assembling their party, expressing their concerns, and declaring their intentions. Antoine Guérin, royal judge and political boss, organized the celebrations; by means of parade floats and dramatic performances, he expressed the elite's hostility to rebellious artisans, their fear of artisan cooperation with rebellious peasants and local Protestants, and their determination to use violence against the insubordinate artisans. Toward the end of Mardi Gras, the elites called on their henchmen to put into practice the murderous intentions expressed initially in carnival.

Turning from western Europe in the midst of religious wars, one finds a good example of a claim-making crowd in eastern Europe and the Baltic region in the period immediately after the Thirty Years' War. Although the situation of divided allegiances that marked Mardi Gras in Romans represented a thirty-five-year break in the continuity of the French monarchies' drive toward centralized power, dual allegiance was a permanent condition in the independent city-state of Reval (modern Tallinn) in the second half of the seventeenth century. In terms of everyday politics, a mercantile oligarchy ruled the city but recognized the Swedish king's overlordship. Oligarchical rule was far from absolute. Public petitions presented to the city council were the normal method for presenting artisanal demands, and artisans had real bargaining power. City rulers generally depended on the urban population to enforce the law, and adult males often possessed arms as members of the city militia. Artisanal petitions were seriously considered and rejected only when they conflicted with the interests of the merchant oligarchs, which they often did. Merchants were willing to loosen or remove restrictions on the entry of nonguild, migrant workers to the urban market, a move that would make the goods that merchants sold cheaper by reducing the cost of labor. Serious divisions arose due to the merchants' stance, and artisans rioted. In 1662 a group of artisans attacked twenty soldiers that the city council had brought in to repress such riots. Artisans also appealed to the Swedish king, who, in response, made concessions to them as a way of retaining popular support in the distant city.

Together, the commemorative Mardi Gras crowd in Romans and the claim-making artisans in Reval capture essential features of crowd action in the composite monarchies of early modern Europe. Claim-making crowds generally emerged only from extrinsic or commemorative crowds, and the conditions of

their emergence powerfully shaped the character of their claims. Claim-making crowds frequently employed violence. Mardi Gras parodies hardly encouraged compromise, and petitioning often assumed the character of an ultimatum because it was unconnected with the give and take of daily political interaction.

The dual sovereignty of Reval, with an urban oligarchy close at hand and a distant but powerful Swedish king, represented a very common feature of European urban life; in such situations, crowds were able to manipulate competing sovereignties. The diversity of structures and the fragmentation of sovereignty within composite monarchies allowed for the creation of "political spaces" in which popular crowds could actually negotiate with authorities and extract political concessions; but the possibility of popular political power contained a threat that might move elites to respond with terrible violence, as evidenced by the incidents in Romans. Even in France, local elites' control of the most powerful administrative positions allowed them a great deal of room for independent maneuver, especially when the monarch was occupied elsewhere. While the conditions for the emergence of claim making did not promote compromise or conciliation, the political context for claim-making crowds provided favorable opportunities for concessions; these contradictory situations often resulted in violence and, in the long term, created pressures for the limitation of popular claim making.

SOVEREIGN STATES AND CROWDS

Under the pressure of war, conflicting claims to sovereignty were resolved by the emergence of sovereign states, mainly constitutional or autocratic monarchies but also confederations and independent city-states. In these states, sovereignty tended to be concentrated in a single geographic and institutional location, although the central power continued to operate through a variety of intermediary institutions, autonomous municipal councils, freewheeling legal institutions, and quasi-independent clerical establishments that all acknowledged the central power's ultimate dominance but still possessed a great deal of decision-making leeway. Major political thinkers of the period such as Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes championed the view that sovereignty should be located unambiguously in a single institution, preferably a monarchy. Their insistence that sovereignty could not be divided, however, was easily refuted by a simple survey of the contemporary European state system. Thus their views were not so much assessments of what existed

as the founding propositions of the ascendant sovereign state.

As composite monarchies collapsed, the formation of the Dutch republic and the Swiss confederation represented the triumph of confederations of independent cities and small autonomous regions. But if cities dominated the Dutch and Swiss territory, territorial states dominated cities in England and France. Ultimately, territorial states proved more successful in mobilizing troops than were city-states or confederations. Although they succeeded in dominating cities, however, English and French monarchs also had to come to terms with urban financial elites. The power of these elites grew as an expanded international trade linked urban consumers to colonial markets and encouraged the growth of urban networks linking cities throughout states.

The development of networks of cities in western Europe provided a dramatic contrast with eastern Europe, where cities were few and urban elites weak both politically and financially. The weak commercialization of the eastern European countryside and the orientation of eastern European landlords toward selling their grain directly on international markets gave eastern European urban elites much less of a commercial role and consequently much less bargaining power than their western European counterparts. The military monarchies that emerged in the area depended on the forced recruitment of serf labor, not on paid mercenaries or conscripts; lacking wealthy urban bankers, these monarchs depended on coercion. The annexation of Reval in 1710 by Peter the Great ended that city's dual sovereignty and lessened the opportunities for independent crowds. In England and France commercial ties and financial concerns tightly connected cities, and channels of communication that served commerce could also effectively transmit political information throughout the nation and indeed throughout all western Europe.

In the era of sovereign states, commemorative and claim-making crowds changed in important ways. Claim-making crowds were less likely to negotiate directly with rulers; instead they allied with or sought to enlist powerful intermediaries who might intervene on their behalf. Crowd action typically focused on remedying immediate grievances and often employed violence, but having carried out their actions, crowds typically appealed humbly to powerful local figures to confirm their actions.

Harris's study, *London Crowds* (1987), presents a splendid example of a commemorative crowd used in implicitly claim-making ways. He studies attempts to rally support for and against the Exclusion Bill, a proposal to deny the royal succession to the Catholic

duke of York, later James II. In November 1680, on a day celebrating the accession of Elizabeth I, a London crowd, supported by a Whig club, carried an effigy of the pope seated in his chair of state through the City. At Temple Bar the effigy was burned on a giant bonfire. Urban crowds were able to carry out such symbolic actions because urban policing largely rested with part-time, unpaid local officers, constables, beadles, and watchmen, who served in rotation. In theory these officers were property holders, but some hired replacements. As a result many local officers represented the poorer rather than the richer urban population. In an emergency these officers were entitled to call on any passerby for support. If worse come to worst, six regiments of trained men could be called on; in practice, however, it was impossible to coopt passersby to repress a procession with which they sympathized, and even the regiments' loyalty was far from totally reliable. In the weavers' riot of 1675, some regiments even seem to have gone over to the weavers.

Although urban crowds acknowledged the monarch's sovereignty, they still reserved the right to express their opinion. But the issues at stake were no longer demands that could be settled directly by negotiations between crowds and rulers; the fate of the Exclusion Bill proposed in Parliament depended on divisions within the English elite. While crowds could not exert their influence directly, crowd opinion still represented a legitimate expression of opinion as acknowledged even by its opponents. The Tory response to Whig efforts to mobilize crowds against the duke of York was to mobilize crowds in his favor. A variety of crowds and popular political perspectives existed in the City of London. While many in London were disappointed by the restored Stuart monarchy's failure to reduce taxes, the London population was not notably sympathetic to religious sectarians. As the government tightened its grip on the government of the City of London, Tory crowds mobilized. In 1681 at Westminster, a crowd organized by the scholars at St. Peter College dressed up and burned "Jack Presbyter" in effigy.

In 1795 in Exeter, Devonshire, an English claim-making crowd can be seen in action as described in Bohstedt's *Riots and Community Politics* (1983). On market day forty or fifty people assembled and forced a farmer to sell wheat and potatoes considerably below market price. Two days later, at the next market day, the crowd reappeared to seize wheat and potatoes; but this time the mayor intervened, and under his auspices the commodities were sold at compromise prices somewhere between their market price and that set by the previous crowd. In the same region, other crowds

mobilized during this period and events like those in Exeter were repeated.

Bohstedt's study locates the Devonshire crowd in the larger framework of English popular protest and reminds us that crowd action depended on far more than a shared sense of popular grievances—it hinged as well upon the existence of social and political structures that facilitated popular mobilization. Bohstedt shows that southwest England was the favored location for such food riots. The area was heavily commercialized and was the major supplier for the English fleet. Thus, at a time when food prices were rising, the inhabitants of the area's small towns, who purchased their food in the markets, witnessed large food convoys supplying the fleet. More important, the prosperity of the small-town economy of the area was a product of a population of prosperous farmers who served as an intermediate social layer between day laborers and artisans and the great landlords who leased land to the farmers and controlled the local administration. Food riots presented an opportunity for landlord officials, the mayor, or the justice of the peace to intervene and secure local popularity by championing the people against gouging farmers and urban traders. Such tactics depended crucially on the presence of an urban economy and of middle-class buffers between great landlord and landless laborer. In the

Yorkshire countryside dominated by villages and lacking strong intermediary classes, landlord justices of the peace could not condone food riots because such actions would directly challenge their rule. Accordingly, repression of riots was fierce, and agrarian discontent was liable to manifest itself in anonymous letters rather than food riots.

While rulers increased their control over territorial states, crowds were confined to the margins of state politics. In the era of composite monarchies crowds could find political space to bargain directly with authorities; in the era of the sovereign state such possibilities dwindled. As in London, the closest a crowd could come to challenging politically the central authorities was in the great capital cities, the seats of centralized sovereign power, but even here the challenge was indirect, confined to demonstrations of implied approval or disapproval, and strongly influenced by powerful elites.

Although the relationship between crowds and central authorities had become attenuated, crowds still played an important role in local politics where political authorities yet possessed considerable leeway to respond independently to crowd demands. In Europe and the Americas, much protest involved attempts to take on-the-spot action to put right a perceived violation of popular morality; violence was

often an implicit or explicit element in such actions. Hungry urban crowds invaded bakeries to sell bread at a just price. Crowds protesting tolls destroyed toll-gates. Unpopular administrative actions resulted in attacks on administrators. Protest was typically bifurcated, with vigorous popular action at the local level combined with humble appeals to higher authorities to support crowd actions. At the local level crowds acted militantly, but the crowd's political role was usually restricted to local struggles for traditional rights; crowds were seldom in a position to raise completely new demands or to seek the incorporation of their demands into the law.

CONSOLIDATED STATES AND CROWDS

Finally, after 1700 consolidated states developed that were territorially continuous, centralized, and differentiated and that monopolized coercion within their borders. These enjoyed a new and more direct relationship with their populations. The consolidated state abolished intermediary institutions and governed directly through its own officials. Initially, the consolidated state came into the daily life of ordinary Europeans in the form of the tax collector and the recruiting officer, but it slowly established itself as educator, health officer, and caretaker. In return for the increasingly heavy burden of taxation and conscription, the state conferred citizenship on its population and bestowed a whole series of new rights as well as a new sense of national identity. As states expanded their fiscal demands and widened conscription, citizens in turn demanded expansion of their rights. Among the most important rights that citizens demanded was the expansion of suffrage.

Meanwhile the character of cities was changing; industrialization created new cities and transformed the artisanal and commercial core of many old ones. A casual proletarian labor force emerged, permanently settled in the city. This growing proletarian labor force lacked both the personal and collective resources of the artisan; they often did not even own their tools and lacked guild organizations. While artisanal protest dominated most of the period under consideration, the problems of urban proletarians came to the fore in the twentieth century.

Consolidated states affected profoundly the character of commemorative and claim-making crowds. Unlike the crowds previously discussed, crowds within consolidated states were able to constitute themselves and to take action on their own initiative. They had considerable freedom to select the conditions under which they would mobilize and an increased ability

to select their tactics. They also were able to make demands directly on those in power. At the same time, crowds were less likely to be able to act autonomously, and their actions were limited by the political parties and formal organizations that were often instrumental in organizing them.

May Day represents an important example of the commemorative crowd in the era of the consolidated state. In 1889 the founding meeting of the International Socialist Congress in Paris set the date as an international labor day. Like so many of the affairs of the "International," May Day celebrations were organized at the national level by national political organizations. The earliest May Day celebrations also involved claim-making crowds, as formal demands for the eight-hour day and other socialist reforms figured heavily in the celebration. Strikes for an eight-hour day often were launched on 1 May and settled in the days and weeks following. Legal enactments in the wake of World War I made the eight-hour day a reality in many countries. Long after their original demands had been won, however, labor organizations and socialist parties continued to organize massive demonstrations on 1 May to demonstrate working-class strength. So powerful had May Day become in popular consciousness that rivals of the socialist movement sought to coopt it. The Catholic Church proclaimed 1 May the Feast of St. Joseph the Worker, and in Germany the Nazi regime proclaimed it National Labor Day to encourage the incorporation of workers into their own ranks.

Strikes and demonstrations are the best examples of claim-making crowds in the era of the consolidated state. In August 1969 Italy was on the eve of its "hot autumn" of massive working-class upheavals. As analyzed in Tarrow's study, *Democracy and Disorder* (1989), production workers in the industrial zone of Mestre, Venice's link to the mainland, went on strike against the petrochemical giant Montedison. They demanded reorganization of the company's incentive plan and an equal pay increase for all grades of workers. Students joined workers on the picket line to demonstrate their support. New tactics were introduced: workers struck every second day, thus avoiding a loss of pay, but at the same time totally disrupting the plant's integrated functioning. When the company finally resorted to a lockout, a huge column of workers and students occupied the train tracks and the station, proclaimed a general strike, and announced their intention of closing off railway access to Venice. Within a day the company settled the strike with a generous across-the-board pay increase.

May Day crowds in France and the petrochemical strikes in Venice illustrate the new features of

crowd activity in the era of the consolidated state. Tilly has labeled the characteristic features of modern protest as autonomous, cosmopolitan, and modular. Neither May Day parades nor strikes typically originated in extrinsic crowd celebrations or in commemorative crowds formed for other purposes, but rather were autonomous protests in that the protesters took the initiative in setting the time and place of their action. The form of the protest was also different from that of earlier crowds. Both May Day and the strike were cosmopolitan forms of claim making in that their participants regularly exceeded a single locality. In the form of general strikes, the protest form could extend through an entire nation, and the range of the May Day parades was international. Both strikes and May Day parades were also “modular” forms of protest in that they could represent a variety of kinds of claims. Where grain riots were almost inevitably associated with a rise in bread prices, the new forms of protest could be used to demand extensions of the suffrage or an end to imperial rule in European colonies, as well as to demand higher wages and the eight-hour day. Indeed, one of the first challenges faced by authorities and trade union leaders confronted with the French general strike of May–June

1968 was to find out exactly what it was the workers wanted.

A key element of both May Day parades and strikes that distinguishes them from previous manifestations of crowds was the presence of an organized police force. No longer relying on unpaid watchmen recruited from the population to enforce the law, states instead hired professionals who began to develop tactics of crowd control. Police having become the urban authorities charged with handling crowds, policing profoundly affected the character of crowd activity. The difference can be seen partly in the official responses to the revolutions of 1848 and to the mass protests of 1919–1921. In 1848 most European cities lacked a large professional police force. When large crowds gathered demanding reform, the only force large enough to respond was the army. Unfortunately, armies were not trained in crowd control. Shoot or do nothing were pretty much the options available to them. Almost always, the soldiers shot, and the resulting deaths produced the revolution’s first martyrs as well as the proximate cause for building barricades. Police handling of general strikes and mass demonstrations in 1919–1921 was often brutal, but in western Europe it lacked the murderous violence

of 1848 and helped to prevent revolutionary situations from becoming actual revolutions.

If claim-making crowds gained enormous freedoms within consolidated states, they were also constrained in entirely new ways. Increasingly, formal organizations served to coordinate crowd protests and to formulate collective demands. Legally recognized trade unions, social movements, and socialist parties often possessed independent connections to power that helped to protect crowds from threats of police brutality; yet crowds also lost a great deal of freedom to articulate their own demands. More and more, crowds served as the mute witness for the popularity of claims formulated by others. The negotiations between the political leaders standing on the balconies of city halls and the crowds assembled below—either

roaring their approval or bellowing dismissal, as was characteristic of 1848—was replaced by disciplined demonstrations, previously coordinated between formal organizations and police authorities and limited in their political expression to slogans and posters preapproved by sponsoring formal organizations. Insofar as claim-making crowds continue to play an important role in modern politics, they are relatively domesticated crowds, quite different from those of Reval in 1662 or Paris in 1848. Having acquired new rights vis-à-vis the state, crowds have increasingly been subordinated to the purposes of formal organizations.

Every European age has been the age of the crowd. Over five centuries, crowds have played an important role in European history; it is only their structure and orientation that have changed.

See also **Absolutism** (volume 2); **Festivals** (volume 5); **Police** (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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REVOLUTIONS



Michael D. Richards

Revolutions form one of the principle elements of European history after 1500. If they generally begin with issues of political power, they nearly always quickly come to include social, economic, and cultural issues, and have contributed in fundamental ways to the transformation of European politics and society.

Under the influence of Karl Marx, many social historians approached revolutions as examples of class struggle. Social classes were the major actors and the outcome of a revolution affected the composition of society, as well as distribution of economic and political power within it. In the 1960s historians challenged the use of class. Did all bourgeois, for example, see life the same way? What led some factory workers to join unions and support political parties and others to concentrate on personal interests? Also, social historians sometimes neglected the political entirely in their concern with describing and analyzing the way people lived.

Later scholarship emphasized an analysis of political culture, ideology, representation, symbols, and images. It often presented ideas about the origins and results of revolution in terms of social class, but in ways different from the Marxist analysis. Some of the revisionists stressed the futility of revolution and the danger that its attempts at reform would lead to a powerful and oppressive state. By the turn of the century, the state of the historiography of revolution was quite fluid. The Marxist position had been undermined but not eliminated. The revisionists, not a particularly united group to begin with, faced numerous different approaches, which had in common an interest in reconnecting the political and the social.

The impact of revolution on society, of course, varied from revolution to revolution. Challenges to the existing social order appear in each of the revolutions under consideration. As a generalization, it might be asserted that these challenges were unsuccessful in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and only partially successful in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. One result is that after the Revolutions of 1848, most members of the middle classes

believed revolution was no longer a useful tool for reform or change. In the twentieth century, revolutionary challenges to the social status quo, beginning with the Russian Revolution of 1917, frequently resulted in a fundamental reordering of society. These massive attempts at social engineering, associated in nearly every case with Communism, without exception resulted in appalling social disasters.

Three European revolutions in particular stand out: the English in the seventeenth, the French in the eighteenth, and the Russian in the twentieth century. Each created a revolutionary tradition that heavily influenced revolutions that followed. The English Revolution furnished an example of the ways in which religious issues and political questions came together in explosive ways in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The French Revolution brought to the fore not only questions of political arrangements but also issues concerned with social structure. However, the ways in which people lived did not change much, although for women the Revolution was undoubtedly a step back. Perhaps the most important result of the Revolution was to unleash the force of nationalism, a force that did more to change how people lived over the following two centuries than any other. Finally, the Russian Revolution, as already noted, produced an expanded idea of revolution, which called for re-making every aspect of life. It is perhaps not accidental that the utopian tradition began at the same time as the revolutionary tradition. At the heart of revolution is an aspiration toward utopia.

There is no agreement on what a revolution is, but a minimal definition includes calls for substantive change in the political system. A change in personnel is not sufficient. A revolution can also entail changes in economic arrangements, social structures, or cultural assumptions. The use of force or at least the potential for the use of force is necessary but, again, not sufficient. Finally, a revolution need not involve innovation. Attempts to preserve what is in existence or what people believe once existed can have revolutionary repercussions. There are also failed revolutions



EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS, 1500–2000: A SHORT LIST

Italian City-State Revolutions (1494–1534)	Polish Revolt (1863–1864)
Spanish <i>Comuneros</i> Revolt (1520–1521)	Paris Commune (1871)
German Peasant War (1524–1526)	Revolution of 1905 (Russia)
Netherlands Revolt (1568–1609)	Irish Revolution (1916–1923)
The Bohemian Revolt (1618–1648)	Russian Revolution of 1917
British Revolution (1638–1660)	German Revolution (1918–1919)
The Catalan Revolt (Spain) (1640–1659)	Hungarian Revolutions (1918–1919)
The Fronde (France) (1648–1653)	Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)
Revolution of 1688 (Britain)	Yugoslavian Communist Revolution (1941–1945)
Dutch Patriot Revolution (1785–1787)	Hungarian Revolution (1956)
Brabant Revolution (Belgium) (1789–1790)	“Prague Spring” (Czechoslovakia) (1968)
French Revolution (1789–1799)	“Events of May” (France) (1968)
Italian Risorgimento (1789–1870)	Irish Revolt (Northern Ireland) (1969–1998)
Polish Revolt (1794–1795)	Portuguese Revolution (1974)
Batavian Revolution (Netherlands) (1795–1798)	“Solidarity” (Poland) (1980–1989)
Revolutions of 1820	Bulgarian Revolution (1989)
Revolutions of 1830	“Velvet Revolution” (Czechoslovakia) (1989)
Revolutions of 1848	German Revolution of 1989 (German Democratic Republic)
Greek War of Liberation (1821–1832)	Romanian Revolution (1989)
Decembrist Revolt (Russia) (1825)	Albanian Anticommunist Revolution (1990–1992)
Belgian Revolution (1830–1833)	Implosion of the Soviet Union (1991)

The list does not include the extensive involvement of European countries in colonial liberation movements and revolutions outside Europe. Based on tables in Goldstone, ed., 1998, pp. xxxix and xl; and in Tilly, 1993, pp. 74, 82–83, 94–95, 114, 151, and 203.

or revolutionary situations that never develop further. And, finally, the line is often quite thin between revolution and many other phenomena that have characteristics in common with it.

REVOLUTIONARIES BEFORE THE CONCEPT OF REVOLUTION

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, even though the concept of revolution as a radical way of doing politics did not exist, there were events that should be seen as revolutions. A combination of religious and political issues drove most of the revolutionary events of the sixteenth century. Religion and politics continued to be major factors in the seventeenth century. In addition, economic, social, and demographic issues added fuel to the revolutionary fires. While most of the events had limited results, the Netherlands Revolt

and the British Revolution had important consequences for those two nations.

The Netherlands Revolt (1568–1609). Participants in the Netherlands Revolt against the Spanish crown did not begin with the intention of gaining independence. Like many other revolutionary movements in this period, the Netherlands Revolt developed mainly out of religious conflict and political disagreement. It resulted in the establishment of the Dutch Republic, which enjoyed world-power status in the seventeenth century.

Important Dutch leaders were appointed to the Council of State under the regent, Margaret of Parma, but they had little influence on the formation of policy. Instead Philip II of Spain reorganized the church to increase royal control and to continue attempts to stop the growth of Calvinism. The form of opposition

varied according to the group involved. The Confederation of Nobles in 1565 was a protest against royal policies, while the sacking of Catholic churches by lower-class crowds the following year was directed against religious policies.

The duke of Alva, sent to repress the rebellion, was successful militarily, but he was not able to convince the States-General to grant new taxes. Attempts in 1571 to collect taxes by force led to revolt in 1572. By July 1572, the rebels had conquered many of the towns in Zeeland and Holland and others had joined the revolt voluntarily. The States of Holland offered William, prince of Orange, military command. William, the mainstay of the revolt, emphasized the rights of the provinces and the wrongs committed by the Spanish authorities. Where revolt in the south had largely ended, revolt in the north took positions on political and religious matters that made compromise difficult. Also, by this time the Netherlands Revolt had become part of international conflicts involving France, England, and Spain.

The Pacification of Ghent, approved by the States-General on 8 November 1576, attempted to assert the leading role of the States-General in the affairs of the Seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands and religious freedom for Protestantism. It was not possible, however, to hold all the provinces together. In the Union of Utrecht, January 1579, the Dutch-speaking areas of the north separated from the southern provinces. The latter reconciled with Philip II. In part this was in reaction to radical Calvinism among the lower classes. The northern provinces formed the United Provinces of the Netherlands.

William the Silent worked to keep the Netherlands together in the early 1580s. On 10 July 1584, however, he was assassinated. English intervention the following year proved crucial in preserving the United Provinces. Additionally, Spanish preoccupation with England and France helped the Dutch survive. In 1609 Spain agreed to the Twelve Years' Truce. Formal recognition of Dutch independence came only in 1648.



Areas of the Netherlands in Revolt, December 1572. Adapted from Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, p. 143.

The Netherlands Revolt led to a society tolerant of religion and favorably disposed to commerce and manufacture. The large number of refugees from the south added greatly to the success of the Dutch Republic. Although urban elites continued to dominate politics, the bourgeoisie found ample scope for business. The lower classes also enjoyed some of the fruits of the seventeenth-century golden age.

The British Revolution (1638–1660). The British Revolution, as it is now called in recognition of the importance of the overall British context, also involved a mixture of political and religious issues. Unlike the continental revolutions it was not affected by external problems or by widespread peasant revolts.

By the twenty-first century, historians no longer saw the British Revolution as a long defense of English

political rights against royal tyranny. Some profess to see little political conflict before 1638 and the emergency situation created by the Scottish uprising. Others see political opposition forming in the 1620s and coming to a head in the Petition of Right in 1628 and in the dissolution of Parliament by Charles I in 1629. Although no revolutionary group formed after these events, the policies of the crown were unpopular and widened the gap between the court and the country. The ship money tax (a special tax that had previously been levied only on coastal areas to help pay

for defense) in 1638 was especially unpopular. Complicating the matter was the Scottish Revolution, which forced Charles I to call in 1640 first the “Short Parliament,” which, however, refused to vote funds for war with Scotland, and then the “Long Parliament.”

The immediate goal of the parliamentarians was the end of measures associated with the Crown’s eleven years of rule without the help of parliament. The parliamentarians benefited from the support of both merchants and the poor. By 1642 opposing sides had formed, each claiming to defend the true English



DRIE OKTOBER

Drie Oktober (3 October), a municipal holiday in the university town of Leiden, celebrates the relief of the siege of the town in 1574. The relief of Leiden not only had considerable military significance but probably even more psychological impact in the struggle of the Dutch to regain political and religious freedoms.

The Spanish forces took up positions during the night of 25–26 May and sealed off the city from outside aid. They planned to starve Leiden out as they had done earlier with Haarlem. If successful, they would drive a wedge between supporters of the Dutch Revolt in the northern part of Holland and the main concentration of strength in Zeeland.

Most in Leiden were loyal to William the Silent and the Dutch cause, but the town had failed to reprovision after an earlier siege. Compounding this, town officials did little to ration provisions the first two months.

On 30 July, the States of Holland, meeting in Rotterdam, decided to flood two water control areas to the south of Leiden in the hope of eventually flooding the area around Leiden itself and drowning “*la vermine Espagnole*.” There were many reasons why the plan would not work. Nevertheless, the slogan advanced was “*Liever bedorven dan verloren land*” (better a drowned than a lost land).

As preparations began for the fleet that was supposed to rescue Leiden, the town questioned its ability to hold out. It even sent messengers to William toward the end of August to ask him to release its citizens from their oath to him if he could not come to their aid. The mes-

sengers returned on 30 August with news that help was being readied and the town celebrated by parading musicians through the streets.

Reduced in September to a ration of 1,000 grams of meat (bones included) every four days, the citizens of Leiden seriously considered accepting Spanish offers of mercy and amnesty. The fleet was on its way, however, as people in Leiden learned on the 15th. Two weeks later, however, although the fleet was close, the water had not risen sufficiently for it to relieve Leiden.

The night of 29 September, a gale drove the North Sea into the mouth of the Maas River, sending it back in floods through the cuts in the dikes. By 1 October the water had risen high enough for the fleet to move toward Leiden. On the 2d there was only one more strong point to be taken. Early on the 3d a party of men left Leiden, determined to attack the strong point from their side. The story goes that an orphan went ahead to see what he could see and found the Spanish had abandoned the fort and even left behind a pot of *Hutspot*, an unbelievable feast for anyone who had not eaten well in weeks.

The fleet moved into Leiden and distributed food to the starving inhabitants. Afterwards all went to the Pieterskerk for prayers and hymns. The town had suffered greatly, with the death of some 6,000 of the 15,000 inhabitants, but it had endured. Observing the way in which nature itself seemed to have intervened, the God-fearing Dutch could hardly help but interpret it as a sign of favor for their cause.

political system and the Protestant religion. Both factions were similar in social composition: support from the gentry with leadership furnished by aristocrats. In the civil war between 1642 and 1647, the parliamentarians (or Roundheads) defeated the royalists (or Cavaliers) at Marston Moor and at Naseby.

The parliamentarians favored disbanding the army as soon as possible. Soldiers worried not only about pay but also about the religious and political settlement proposed by Parliament. The Putney debates in 1647 showed the influence of the Levellers, a middle-class group interested in popular sovereignty and social equality. This group, moving away from doctrines that looked to the past, looked toward universal ideals and revolutionary change.

Civil war broke out again in 1648, but this time the royalist cause was quickly crushed and a republic established. Charles was tried, sentenced, and then beheaded on 30 January 1649. In December of the previous year, the military command had carried out a purge of the House of Commons, leaving "The Rump" to carry on.

The new Commonwealth survived the popular unrest of the early 1650s and Oliver Cromwell reestablished control over Ireland and Scotland. In 1653 Cromwell forcibly removed "The Rump" from office. After the failure of the "Barebones" Parliament, he became lord protector. In effect a personal dictatorship, it collapsed soon after Cromwell's death in 1658. Following an interval of confusion and crisis, Charles II was invited to return.

The British Revolution was not a bourgeois revolution in the Marxist sense of a revolution produced by the growth of a capitalist economy. Nor can it be said it was caused by a "crisis of the aristocracy" or by rising or declining gentry. Cultural changes associated with Puritanism played a prominent role, but these cut across the lines of social division. Social discontent helped generate radical democratic movements during the Revolution, but these did not triumph. Late twentieth-century historians emphasized continuity and also argued against any decisive victory for constitutional monarchy. It is true, of course, that it took the Revolution of 1688 to make Parliament supreme. One can even argue that a process of political evolution continued into the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the British Revolution of the mid-seventeenth century was an important step in the creation of a durable political system, a constitutional monarchy based on widespread participation and recognition of political and civil rights. It played an important role in establishing a political culture that many British took for granted by the beginning of the twentieth century.

The Revolution of 1688. Was the Revolution of 1688 actually a revolution? It may have been little more than a coup against the government of James II, but it did what the earlier British Revolution had been unable to do: establish the supremacy of Parliament and put Britain on the road to constitutional monarchy.

Although much of the political nation stood ready to support James II when he came to the throne in 1685, he squandered that support by engaging in what was perceived as a weak foreign policy, that is, a foreign policy that favored Louis XIV. He was also seen as conducting a domestic policy that did not appear to respect the law. Many distrusted his attempt to promote religious toleration, which was seen as threatening the Church of England. By 1688 many Whig and Tory politicians, ordinarily opponents, united behind the idea of inviting William, prince of Orange, *stadhouder* (chief executive) of the United Provinces of the Netherlands and also the son-in-law of James II, to invade England. According to some historians, this plan had widespread support among merchants, gentry, and aristocracy.

After James II and his family fled to France, a Convention was elected, and in February 1689 debated what should be done. It was agreed that James II had abdicated and that Mary and William had inherited the throne. The Convention further issued the "Declaration of Rights," essentially a restatement of English law. This document underlined a position that had not been fully accepted before, the concept that the nation, not the monarch, was sovereign. These were, as one historian has it, "reluctant revolutionaries." In fact, John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* (1690) was largely ignored at the time as too radical.

The Fronde (1648–1653). Under the heading of "The Fronde" (from *fronde*, French for slingshot), historians have grouped protests by royal officials, aristocratic revolt, urban disorders, and rebellion in the countryside. Contemporaneous with the British Revolution, the Fronde lacked an institution such as Parliament to serve as a focus for opposition to the crown. Also, no leader of the same caliber as Cromwell or William the Silent emerged. The situation of the monarchy was precarious, with a regent, Anne of Austria, ruling for the boy king Louis XIV with the help of an unpopular first minister, Cardinal Mazarin. Nevertheless, the Fronde failed because of a lack of unity, purpose, and leadership.

The Fronde began in the summer of 1648, but it was the product of years of high taxes and attempts to establish an absolutist form of monarchy. Almost all groups in France, from the great nobles to peasants

in the countryside had grievances. The breakthrough came when the regent and Mazarin attempted to end the ability of the Parlement of Paris (a judicial body, not to be confused with the English Parliament) to obstruct royal business by arresting two of its judges. This led to the “days of the barricades,” 26–28 August, when officials, merchants, artisans, and other urban dwellers took to the streets.

The Treaty of Reuil in the spring of 1649 settled many of the issues with the Parlement of Paris and other bodies of officials, but not with the nobility, who wanted Mazarin dismissed and their right to participate in governmental affairs recognized. In the first part of the Fronde, the commander of the royal army had been Louis, prince of Condé, a royal cousin. In the civil war beginning in 1649 Condé switched to the side of the Frondeurs and became their main leader. Although a talented military leader, he lacked political skills. The Fronde became increasingly fragmented.

When Louis XIV declared his majority in 1651, this created a dilemma. Most of the protest had been

directed against Mazarin, and not the king. Now that he was ruling directly, it was no longer possible to claim to be rebelling against the regent and Mazarin.

In fact, much of France did not rebel. Of ten parlements, only four rebelled. Many cities remained quiet. Nonetheless, the concessions the Parlement of Paris gained initially from the crown might easily have led to a very different style of monarchy in France. France after the Fronde took a path quite different from that of Britain or the Netherlands.

THE ERA OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The French Revolution dwarfed the other events associated with it. It also inspired or made possible some of those events. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider the period from roughly 1770 to 1850 as an era of rebellion and revolution, a time of rapid change and dislocation. Whether one looks at demographic trends, price series, intellectual currents, political develop-

ments, or diplomatic events, change rather than continuity is the prevailing theme. The French Revolution introduced the main elements of modern politics, including the idea of constructing the political system from the ground up. It also raised many social issues. For some the revolution became an instrument for refashioning men and women into citizens.

In the decades after the Napoleonic Empire there were three successive waves of revolution. The first, in 1820, was relatively minor. The second, in 1830, had significant repercussions. The last, in 1848, involved most European nations and initially appeared to introduce fundamental changes to European politics. In the end, however, it led only to compromise and reaction.

In addition to the waves of revolution, there were individual revolutions of some note. These included, among others, the Decembrist Revolt of 1825 in Russia, the Greek liberation movement (1821–1832), an ensemble of events in Britain in the early 1830s, and the Risorgimento in Italy. Theorists as well as activists abounded. The most important theorists of the period were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The anarchists were also prominent in this period. By the end of the century, hundreds of thousands of Europeans were organized in revolutionary parties or groups, but, paradoxically, only a relatively small number actually looked forward to revolution.

The French Revolution. The beginnings of the French Revolution lie in the fiscal problems of the monarchy. Where the nation as a whole was prosperous, the government was deeply in debt because of its involvement in past wars. A reform of the tax system seemed the obvious solution.

The ministers of Louis XVI hoped an Assembly of Notables would agree to the new taxes, but this group deferred to the Estates General, an institution that had not met since 1614. As soon as it was decided the Estates General would meet, a controversy broke out that split those planning to use tax reform to widen the governing process. The group identified with the aristocracy appeared to want to monopolize political influence. The other, identified with a national or patriotic position, seemed to want broader participation in the political process. Voting in the Estates General had been by estate, the first being the clergy, the second the nobility, and the third everyone else. The “patriots,” drawn from the liberal aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, wanted to double the third and vote by head. This opened the possibility of obtaining a majority. In the pamphlet war before the elections, Abbé Sieyès argued forcefully in “What Is the Third Estate?” that the third estate, as the backbone of the

nation, deserved to be an important part of the political process.

During the elections, voters composed *cabiers*, lists of grievances. The *cabiers*, while noting many particular complaints, also expressed loyalty to the monarchy and satisfaction with the established church and hierarchical society. Delegates expected change, but within the confines of the established system.

A series of events in the summer of 1789 plunged France into revolution. When the crown failed to lead, the third estate declared itself on 17 June the National Assembly and invited members of the other estates to join it. It planned to write a constitution, which implied sovereign political power vested in the people. This was the first move toward revolution.

The next was mostly symbolic. On 14 July, a crowd composed mostly of the lower-middle class and lower classes, stormed the Bastille, long a symbol of royal tyranny. This action was part of a municipal revolt that overturned governing bodies in many cities around France. It may also have forestalled plans by the monarchy to disperse the National Assembly.

In response to peasant disorders in the countryside, the National Assembly abolished nearly all privileges on the night of 4–5 August, providing a new meaning for the word “Liberty” (which, not capitalized, had been a synonym for privilege) and also creating a situation of equality before the law. Finally, on 26 August, the National Assembly enshrined “Liberty” and “Equality” in the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,” a statement of principles meant to be attached to a constitution.

When a mob composed mostly of women forced the king and his family to move to Paris in October, the first part of the revolution was complete. The National or Constituent Assembly followed the monarchy to Paris and worked there on defining a constitutional monarchical system.

Attempts to construct a constitutional monarchy floundered because of two major problems. One was the place of the church in the new revolutionary system. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790), which established a state church, divided the clergy into those who refused to take an oath of loyalty (“Refractors”) and those who took the oath (“Constitutionals”). This created a dilemma for many French. How could they support the Revolution and remain Catholics?

The other major problem concerned the monarchy. Louis XVI, uncomfortable with the arrangement for constitutional monarchy, was under pressure from his wife, Marie Antoinette, and many nobles to bargain for more power. The attempt by the royal family to

flee the country in June 1791 effectively ended the possibility of constructing a workable system.

By 1792 the major groups opposing the Revolution were the aristocracy, large numbers of clergy, and many peasants. The latter often took their cue from the local notables and the clergy and were naturally suspicious of anything originating in the towns. The main support for the Revolution came from the urban middle and lower-middle classes. Many belonged to revolutionary societies of which the Jacobin club was the best known and most powerful. The Jacobin club in Paris, which met in a former monastery, was connected to Jacobin clubs throughout France. The urban lower classes also supported the Revolution and intervened sporadically.

France went to war in April 1792 as both opponents and supporters of the Revolution maneuvered to gain advantage. On 10 August, the war going badly and the king's loyalty uncertain, a crowd stormed the royal residence in Paris and overthrew the monarchy. With the election of a new representative body, the Convention, the Revolution moved into a more radical phase. Initially, the main question was what to do about the king. Eventually he was placed on trial and by the narrowest of margins—one vote—sentenced, and later executed. The execution took place on 21 January 1793.

Although there were no political parties, factions developed in the Convention. The execution of the king eliminated any reason for monarchists to remain in the Convention. Among the supporters of the republic and democracy, almost all middle class, two groups stood out. The group associated with Jacques-Pierre Brissot, the Girondins (several came from the department of Gironde), had been reluctant to vote to execute the king. It also had difficulty meeting the demands of the lower-middle and lower class Parisians, the so-called *sans-culottes* (those who wore trousers and not the knee breeches favored by the aristocracy). The Mountain, which sat up high on the left in the Convention, favored property and order just as the Girondins, but found they could make those decisions the Revolution seemed to require. Most deputies were part of an unorganized mass known as the "Plain" or the "Belly." Even those identified as part of the Mountain or the Girondins by their opponents did not always see themselves as members of one or the other group.

By the middle of 1793, France was fighting a coalition of European powers and a civil war. Furthermore, the lower and lower-middle classes in Paris, now the driving force of the revolution, demanded a maximum on prices and a minimum on wages. In a tense atmosphere such as this, some saw the reluctance

of the Girondins to take radical measures as traitorous. At the beginning of June, Girondins were driven from the Convention and arrested.

Over the next few months, the Committee of Public Safety, formed that April, became the main locus of power in France. Maximilien de Robespierre, who became a member of the committee in July, quickly became the leading figure, and was responsible for much of the Reign of Terror (1793). But a number of others, including Georges Danton, Lazare Carnot, and Louis-Antoine Saint-Just, also played important roles.

In the late summer and the fall, several extraordinary measures were passed. First, the nation was called to arms in August with the *levée-en-masse*. In September a *maximum* on prices was enacted. More draconian measures followed. Still, some historians argue that the Terror was mostly an effort to preserve France and the revolution. Much of the horror associated with the revolution actually took place in the civil war. Also, some of the representatives-on-mission went far beyond their orders, as was the case, for example, in the mass drownings at Nantes.

Robespierre and other revolutionaries wanted to use revolution to transform humanity and spent time discussing various architectural and educational



SANS-CULOTTES

The *sans-culottes* saw themselves as simple and hard-working, loyal to the revolution and ready to defend it with their last drops of blood. In political terms they might be considered the victors of the great revolutionary *journalées*, the storming of the Bastille on 14 July 1789, the overthrow of the monarchy on 10 August 1792, and the removal of the Girondins from the Convention on 31 May 1793. For historians influenced by Marx, they were the forerunner of the working class, who were playing their role in the classic bourgeois revolution.

In social terms, the *sans-culottes* were broadly representative of the Parisian lower-middle and lower classes. They were likely to be shopkeepers or artisans, less likely to be wage-earners or domestics. They were certainly not marginal figures, although often portrayed as such in nineteenth-century accounts of the revolution, not people without sources of income or fixed residences.

The *sans-culottes* were, above all, social animals. Fraternity was the watchword and they customarily presented themselves as part of a group or committee or as speaking for their section. They despised those who wanted to set themselves apart, whether through manner of speaking, dressing, or behaving. One dressed as everyone dressed, in pantaloons, sabots (wooden shoes), a red cap, and a tricolor cockade. The opposite of the *sans-culottes* were the aristocrats, by definition proud and selfish and not fully human.

In economic terms, the *sans-culottes* did not believe in absolute equality but rather in social justice. Everyone should have enough on which to live. Prices of the most necessary items as well as wages and profits should be fixed.

The *sans-culottes* were most prominent in the Year II (1793). In part, this was due to the radicalization of the revolution. But it must also reflect the increasing political involvement of some of the *sans-culottes*. The overthrow of the monarchy in August 1792 and the new circumstances this created resulted in more continuity in political involvement than before. The execution of the king in January 1793, an economic crisis that spring, and the division between the Girondins and the Mountain increased the significance of popular militancy. By the fall of 1793, the *sans-culottes* had gained two important goals: the *maximum*, or price controls; and the revolutionary armies, a people's militia. Many *sans-culottes* could read and write or were in any case influenced by revolutionary publicists and even by some of the *philosophes*, especially Jean-Jacques Rousseau. They saw themselves more and more as playing a historical role.

It has been estimated that only five to ten percent of those eligible to participate in the political life of the forty-eight sections of Paris actually did so. A small minority of this group, perhaps 3,000 to 4,000, made up the functionaries of the sections. It was this small group that worked with the Mountain to channel the political energy of the *sans-culottes*, to make that energy more regular, formal, and predictable. By the time Robespierre was executed on the 10th of Thermidor (July 1794), the *sans-culottes* had lost much of their revolutionary power. Or perhaps they were only exhausted from their revolutionary labors. In any case, they had lost the power to push the revolution forward. For the time being, they stepped back out of politics.

schemes. Little came of this, however. The *sans-culottes*, long in the habit of sending delegations and petitions to the Convention, were gradually cut out of political life. They still exerted considerable influence, however, on dress, behavior, language, and forms of entertainment, emphasizing the plain, the simple, the sentimental, and the moralistic.

Robespierre and his fellow revolutionaries were constantly on the alert politically in the first part of 1794. Robespierre turned first on Jacques-René Hé-

bert and the Enragés, once hugely popular with the *sans-culottes*. He then ordered Danton put on trial. By the early summer everyone in the Convention worried about Robespierre's next move. Several representatives-on-mission, fearing prosecution for their crimes, helped organize an opposition. Robespierre, taken into custody on the 9th of Thermidor (27 July 1794), was guillotined the next day.

The Revolution ended with the death of Robespierre. No one had the energy after years of intense

political activity to restart the machinery of the Terror. The Thermidorian Reaction, a gaudy reaction to the puritanism of the Revolution, replaced the Terror. The Convention gave way to the Directory, a complicated system that, over the next four years, worked mostly through occasional coups. Finally, Napoleon carried out one last coup on the eighteenth Brumaire (November 1799). The Directory began the work of consolidating the revolution; Napoleon finished it in brilliant style in the first years of his rule. While there

is dispute over how much social tensions, as opposed to political and ideological issues, generated the French Revolution, there is little doubt about some key social results. While revolutionary chaos disrupted economic development, revolutionary legislation—for example the abolition of the guilds—favored a more capitalist economy in the long run. The end to manorialism and the establishment of equality under the law undermined the position of the aristocracy. The legal context of peasant life also changed sub-



INTERPRETING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

For much of the twentieth century, historians viewed the French Revolution from a marxist perspective. They saw it as the classic example of a bourgeois revolution clearing the way for the development of capitalism. The high-water mark of the marxist approach came with Georges Lefebvre's study of 1789, published in 1939, the sesquicentennial of the French Revolution.

The first important challenges to the marxist view came in the 1960s. Historians focused on the early leaders of the revolution, the definition of the word bourgeois, and the extent to which the revolution cleared the way for the development of capitalism. Alfred Cobban was one of the most prominent revisionists. He and other historians showed that many of the early leaders were aristocrats, that many bourgeois identified with and aspired to become aristocrats, and that the revolution actually retarded the growth of capitalism.

Although no longer a marxist interpretation, the revisionist position remained a social interpretation. It now featured a crisis of social mobility. More people within the ranks of an elite of aristocrats and bourgeois sought to improve their social positions. The elite split, creating the opportunity for revolution, but later reappeared as notables after having learned the high price of revolution.

Revisionists concentrated on learning more about political culture. This ranged from festivals and images to the use of language. The new concentration on the political recognized that political activities shaped social relations and identified the development of a new political culture as the most important result of the revolution. Even if society seemed much the same after the revolu-

tion, the new political culture was not forgotten and continued to influence social development.

The person most prominently associated with the revisionist interpretation in the latter part of the twentieth century, François Furet, believed the French Revolution led unavoidably to the Terror. Politics in the revolution was, according to him, simply a means for reshaping society. Many revisionists, however, do not take that view.

The bicentennial marked the peak of the revisionist interpretation. Observers in the 1990s saw a fluid situation in which neither the revisionist position nor the marxist position was dominant. By 2000, much of the work being done focused on connections between the political and the social. For example, one approach emphasized the idea of apprenticeship or political acculturation. What kinds of networks, previous associations, and local circumstances helped to draw one into revolutionary politics? What is involved in the actual practice of politics? The result is a political interpretation informed by an extensive knowledge of social history.

It may be that these approaches seek to extend the work on ideology, representation, imagery, and symbolism of the revisionists. Or it is possibly a more pragmatic, local approach to politics that makes reference to social history. It is no longer possible to interpret the revolution in terms of large social categories. By the same token, the revolution cannot be understood in political terms alone. Social conditions place certain parameters on political action. In turn, political action and the development of a political culture change social conditions. How these interactions work will likely be the focus of much historical scholarship in the near future.

stantially. Attacks on the church created new social and cultural divisions. The revolution's impact on family life was less dramatic, though divorce was briefly tolerated. Disparities between revolutionary ideas and a rather conservative approach to gender had important consequences in the nineteenth century.

Revolution had spread to other parts of Europe even before Napoleon began his string of conquests. In some instances revolution took place either before or at the same time as the French Revolution. Even countries such as Prussia, opposed to Napoleon and the tenets of the Revolution, changed considerably in order to preserve its independence. Modifications of guild and manorial systems spread throughout Europe.

Dutch Revolutions (1780–1800). The Dutch Revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century provide a good example of the other revolutionary events occurring around the time of the French Revolution. The initial Dutch Revolution, the Patriot Revolution from 1786 to 1787, grew out of involvement in the American Revolution. This led to war with England and criticism of the government for its handling of the war. A Patriot group formed in opposition to Prince William V, the *stadhouder* of the Netherlands. The Orangists organized to defend the prince. In 1781, J. D. van der Capellen, one of the Patriot leaders, called on the Dutch to imitate the Americans in seizing control of their affairs. In 1783 the Patriots organized citizens' committees and militias. Even the regents, powerful figures on the municipal level, joined the anti-Orangist popular movement.

By 1787 the Patriots had succeeded in gaining power on the municipal level in Utrecht. Then the movement, radically democratic and revolutionary, took control of the provinces of Overijssel and Holland. Just at the point of success, however, artisans and shopkeepers, worried about new regulations passed by municipal councils dominated by the Patriots, switched allegiance to the Orangists. The Orangists also imitated the Patriot organizational efforts. Prussian intervention in 1787 sealed the fate of the revolution and restored William V to power.

If the first Dutch Revolution anticipated the French Revolution, the second came largely as a direct result of the French Revolution. Popular forces had remained concentrated in the voluntary associations and militias. With the help of French forces, the Patriots came to power again in the mid-1790s. The Batavian Republic, however, experienced increasing problems with the French, especially after Napoleon came to power. Finally, in 1813 the Patriots were driven from power and William I, son of the last *stadhouder*, became king.

The Revolutions of 1830. Of the several revolutions in 1830, by far the most important took place in France. The origins of the revolution owe something to the effects of the economic crisis of 1826–1827, but it was largely a product of the provocative policies of Charles X and his reactionary aristocratic allies, the “Ultras.” The liberal opposition disliked what it viewed as an alliance between “throne and altar.” It also believed the electoral franchise was too narrow. The July Ordinances of 1830, which dissolved the newly elected and liberal Chamber of Deputies, disenfranchised three-quarters of the electorate and provided for new elections, was meant to produce a pliable Chamber. It also called for a harsh policy of press censorship. This brought apprentices and journeymen from the print shops out into the streets of Paris. The demonstrations on 26 July 1830 escalated the following day to barricades and battles with troops. Charles abdicated 2 August and Louis-Philippe, duc d'Orléans, became “king of the French.” The tricolor again became the national flag and in April 1831 the franchise was doubled. A variety of groups, peasants, artisans, workers, and socialists, viewed the revolution as permission to voice grievances. The first few years after the revolution were marked by disorder and repression and in the 1830s and 1840s republicanism and socialism developed rapidly.

The July monarchy was considered liberal and more favorably disposed to business than Charles X's government had been. Land, however, was still the main basis for wealth and the bourgeoisie, if more prominent than before, were divided into groups with differing interests.

Elsewhere, the Belgian revolution was successful in defeating the Dutch and creating an independent state. Great power interest in the strategic importance of Belgium played an important role. The reverse was true in Poland. An uprising in November in Warsaw created popular support among artisans at first. The Polish nobility, however, hesitated to ally with the peasantry, the only real chance for the revolution to succeed, and it collapsed in August. In this case, some great powers, namely France and Great Britain, had no particular reason to intervene, while others, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, had every reason to suppress the revolution. There was also some activity in Italy, which the Austrians dealt with easily, and in Germany.

The Revolutions of 1848. The Revolutions of 1848 formed the major instance of revolution in Europe between the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution. They began in France, where for several reasons they took on a character different from revo-

lutions elsewhere. Eventually, most of the continent was involved in revolution.

Three factors helped create the possibility of revolution in 1848. First, economic crises in 1846–1847, stemming from bad harvests and leading to high prices and unemployment, produced tensions in much of Europe. Next, the transition to an industrial economy brought problems for many, particularly among artisans, priming a large number of people for protest. Finally, the legacy of the French Revolution and unfinished business from the Revolution of 1830 created a particular situation. Political banquets meant to press for the expansion of the franchise easily spilled over into violent confrontation.

In Paris the government decided in February 1848 to ban a demonstration supporting electoral reform but could not control the protest that followed. Louis-Philippe and his prime minister quickly lost support. A provisional government formed after the collapse of the government and established a democratic republic. Almost immediately a gulf appeared between the moderate republicans making up the government, mostly drawn from middle-class professional men, and those who had supported it on the street, drawn largely from the artisans and skilled workers and from the lower-middle class. The latter groups often wanted simply to return to the old ways of living and working, ways that economic change was destroying.

The Second Republic's major response to the needs of the lower classes was the National Workshops, basically relief measures for the unemployed. This was not what Louis Blanc, an important French socialist and member of the government, wanted. He favored something closer to producers' cooperatives.

Since France was already an independent nation, the social question appeared almost immediately. For their part, the moderate republicans feared the electoral power of urban artisans and workers under the new arrangements for universal manhood suffrage. The situation finally came to a head in June when the government ruthlessly used the army, the National Guard, and the Mobile Guard to suppress protests against the dismantling of the National Workshops.

The social question existed in Germany as well, but the more pressing question was national unity. When Frederick William IV refused the Frankfurt Parliament's offer to head a new German Empire, this ended the major thrust of revolution in Germany. Frederick William, having recovered his confidence and reestablished support in Prussia, easily defeated the revolution in Prussia and in several other German states as well. By 1849, the Austrians, too, had regained the initiative in Vienna and had crushed Czech revolutionaries in Prague and Hungarian revolutionaries in Budapest, the latter with the aid of the Russian Empire. They had also prevailed in the Italian

peninsula, where Italian revolutionaries had been temporarily successful.

The most important results from the Revolutions of 1848 were negative. France failed once again to find a workable political system, either in the Second Republic or in the Second Empire of Napoleon III that followed. The direction that Italian unification took over the next two decades, however, owed much to experiences in 1848–1849. Finally, while the movement toward German unification owed little to 1848, it may be argued that many German liberals responded to unification as they did because of their perceived failure in 1848.

After 1848 the middle classes ended their interest in revolution, even in a moderate political revolution for a constitution and representative government. Already fearful of the urban lower classes, the lesson they learned from 1848 was that revolution was too unpredictable a phenomenon to be safely used. The urban lower classes, especially the emerging proletariat, were now wary of allying with the middle classes in a revolutionary movement. Some were attracted to the idea of proletarian revolution that Marx and Engels put forward after 1848 or the ideas of the anarchists, but many others preferred reform and trade-union work. As for the countryside, in Germany, Austria, and Italy, the end of manorialism tended to reduce peasant discontent.

The Paris Commune (1871). The Paris Commune was the last major revolutionary event of the century and an isolated one at that. It ended the tradition of the French Revolution. It was mainly a product of municipal pride, the bitter experience of the siege of Paris by the Prussians between September 1870 and January 1871, and the possibility that the royalist National Assembly elected in February 1871 would attempt to restore the French monarchy. The catalyst was the attempt by the French government to disarm the Parisian National Guard on 18 March 1871.

The Paris Commune was meant to recall directly the revolutionary Paris Commune of 1792. It even adopted the revolutionary calendar, which meant it was now Year LXXIX. Those who made up the Commune were largely socialists and neo-Jacobin radicals drawn from the middle classes and white-collar and skilled workers. The main ideas were to defend the republic against the return of the monarchy and to protect the autonomy of Paris. The Commune was also against the church, the army, police, and bureaucracy. Relatively few social changes were made, however, since the overwhelming reality was the civil war.

On 21 May, French troops broke through the defenses and began a week of street fighting. Many

prisoners were slaughtered or executed after a perfunctory court-martial. Estimates are that 20,000 Communards died. Marx and Engels hailed it as the dawn of an age of proletarian revolution. Late twentieth-century historians saw it more as the end of an era of revolution and the product of a particular location and circumstances.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Once the French Revolution established the idea of revolution as another way of doing politics, many sought to develop theories of revolution. The two most prominent nineteenth-century theorists were Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895). They developed a theory of scientific socialism to distinguish their ideas from those of the Utopian Socialists. History, they stated in the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), consisted of class struggles. At mid-century, they saw economic life dominated by the bourgeoisie. As the bourgeoisie changed all aspects of European life, it created the class—the proletariat—destined to destroy it, according to Marx and Engels.

Underlying the class struggle was economic life itself, which involved the means for carrying on economic life, that is, the forces of production, and the ways in which economic life was organized, that is, the relations of production. All else was superstructure, a reflection of economic life. Invariably, the forces of production developed to the point where the relations of production constricted them. Marx and Engels thought this would soon result in conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Eventually, the proletarian revolution would usher in a new historical situation, a classless society in which there was no longer a conflict between the means of production and the relations of production.

Marx and Engels played a role both in the founding of the First International, a grouping of socialist parties and trade unions, and in its destruction, rather than see it controlled by the anarchists. They also oversaw the founding of the German Social Democratic Party (the SPD). After Marx's death in 1883, Engels played a prominent role in SPD politics for more than a decade.

Although Marx and Engels believed in the historical inevitability of their ideas, they continued to emphasize organization of the working class. Historical conditions had to be ripe for a revolution to take place, but, in the meantime, workers achieved class-consciousness through activism and prepared for the new era after the revolution. They speculated that revolutionary change might come through peaceful means. Engels, in his introduction to *Class Struggles in France*, wrote about the possibility of achieving

power through the ballot box and the difficulties of mounting the barricades. Even so, he was unsure the bourgeoisie would surrender power peacefully and warned social democrats to be prepared if necessary to defend the revolution.

Marx and Engels strongly influenced revolutionaries in Europe and beyond in the last part of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century. Their understanding of revolution had a powerful, even fateful, impact.

Anarchism. Anarchism, a major rival to Marxism in the second half of the nineteenth century, advocated abolition of the state and formation of cooperative institutions. Anarchists, however, differed over means. The major current thought in terms of peaceful change through the power of the example of cooperatives. The person most closely associated with this tendency was the Russian, Pyotr Kropotkin (1842–1921). Another important current stressed the need to use violence to destroy the state and found its most important advocate in another Russian, Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876). A wave of terrorist violence at the end of the nineteenth century led to the stereotype of the anarchist as a bomb-throwing, heavily bearded madman.

Anarchism found a good reception in France, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain, particularly among peasants in large-estate regimes, as in Andalusia, and among artisans. In the twentieth century it was briefly prominent in the Russian Revolution and Civil War. It also had many supporters in the Spanish Civil War. Finally, it enjoyed something of a revival in the 1960s among student radicals.

THE ERA OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

There is no comparison between the Russian Revolution and similar events in twentieth-century Europe. The German Revolution of 1918 and other revolutionary events in central Europe after World War I were minor events. Italian Fascism and German National Socialism proved to be major factors in twentieth-century history, but it is difficult to consider either a genuine revolution. Each contained revolutionary elements, but it would be more accurate to see the two phenomena as parasitical. German National Socialism challenged the established order in Europe because it controlled the resources of the German nation.

The Russian Revolution, although measuring itself against the French Revolution, set the new standard for revolution in the twentieth century. Espe-

cially in the form of the Stalinist Revolution of the 1930s it appeared to offer a blueprint for independence, freedom, urbanization, and industrialization. Its influence continued nearly to the end of the century and declined only with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Russian Revolutions of 1917. The February Revolution ended the Romanov dynasty. Over the next few months, the Provisional Government struggled to solve Russian problems. Its failure led to the October or Bolshevik Revolution that brought V. I. Lenin and his party to power.

The February Revolution was more a collapse of the Russian Empire than an organized effort to seize power. Russia, battered by defeats in World War I, was close to economic disintegration early in 1917. For a variety of reasons, large numbers of people thronged the streets of Petrograd (St. Petersburg) on 23 February o.s. (8 March). Over the next few days, the crowds grew larger. Eventually the soldiers, sent to control the crowds, made common cause with them.

A Provisional Government was organized at the end of February to deal with the political vacuum caused by the government's disintegration. Its most influential members were Alexander Guchkov, an Octobrist and minister of war, and Paul Miliukov, a Constitutional Democrat (Kadet) and foreign minister. At the same time, the Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers and Workers appeared. People spoke of "dual power," the idea that the Soviet represented public opinion and therefore had considerable leverage on the Provisional Government.

The Provisional Government overestimated the patience of average Russians and insisted on continuing the war effort. To do this, it was necessary to postpone decisions on the form of government and land reform. Eventually, the government's failure to end Russia's participation in the war and to take action on major questions doomed it.

For several months, however, the Provisional Government maintained power in Russia. Alexander Kerensky, a moderate socialist, quickly became the most powerful figure in the government, becoming prime minister in the summer of 1917. Kerensky seemingly had no rivals by the summer of 1917.

Lenin returned to Russia in April and set out in the April Theses a position that distinguished his party, the Bolsheviks, from all others in Russia. He called boldly for a peace without annexations or indemnities, land to the peasants, and all power to the Soviets. The Bolsheviks at this point were a very small party.

By the fall of 1917 Lenin believed Russia was ripe for revolution. The Central Committee (CC) of

the Bolsheviks was reluctant to take action, but Lenin persuaded them to put the idea of revolution on the agenda. Leon Trotsky, a major figure in the Bolshevik Party and also an influential figure in the Petrograd Soviet, made preparations to protect the revolution. Red Guard units, workers' militias, and soldiers and sailors in the area overthrew the Provisional Government in October when it appeared it was beginning a counter-revolution. The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, meeting then in Petrograd, approved a Bolshevik government. The seizure of power was accomplished with relatively little bloodshed, but the civil war that followed was bloody and cruel. For

many historians, the civil war period shaped the party and its leaders in important ways. Institutions such as the Cheka (the secret police), state control of the economy, and political dictatorship were products of the civil war. Communist leaders also dealt with intervention by several great powers.

Socially, the Russian revolution depended heavily on discontent among factory workers and urban artisans, heightened by the pressures of early industrialization and rapid urbanization, and among peasants angered by the existence of large estates. Marxist leaders meshed readily with worker groups, but ultimately bypassed some of the main peasant demands. With

regard to social structure, however, the revolution affected countryside and city alike, with the expropriation of foreign owners, the abolition of the aristocracy, and a host of new educational and political opportunities for members of the former lower classes.

The Stalinist Revolution (1928–1938). A little more than ten years after the October Revolution, Stalin took the Soviet Union through what was, in effect, a revolutionary experience. The first two Five-Year Plans (the third was interrupted by war) were heroic efforts to industrialize the Soviet Union. The plans, which emphasized heavy industry and centralized economic planning, were intended to create the economic basis for socialism. Stalin also wanted to prepare the Soviet Union for the possibility of war.

The First Five-Year Plan, officially dated from the latter part of 1928, called originally for difficult but not impossible goals. Stalin insisted on raising the already high targets. He emphasized large-scale projects and speed. Magnitogorsk, a new metallurgical complex near the southern end of the Ural Mountains, is a good example of the Stalinist approach to industrialization in that its goals were raised repeatedly.

The Soviet Union became a major industrial power in the 1930s. The labor force more than doubled, from about eleven and a half million to nearly twenty-three million. A large number of peasants left the new collective farms to work in factories in the cities. One of the main features of the Stalinist Revolution was rapid social mobility. Consumer goods were scarce and housing crowded, but many Soviet citizens took great pride in the new Soviet Union.

Collectivization, which began in 1928, resulted in approximately fifty percent of peasant families joining collective farms by early 1930. Many had been forced to join. The level of resistance was so high Stalin was forced to retreat. His article in March 1930, “Dizzy with Success,” blamed problems on overzealous subordinates and reassured peasants they would not be forced to join. Many left at that point, but continuous pressure meant that by 1933 over ninety percent of peasant families had joined collective farms or state farms. One feature of collectivization was the hunt for kulaks, so-called rich peasants. Often these were simply the most independent peasants in a village. They were sometimes summarily shot, or they might be shipped to some desolate spot.

Collectivization was a failure as an economic policy. In 1932 there was a massive famine in the Ukraine and the northern Caucasus region. About seven million peasants died. Intended to mechanize agriculture and to increase productivity, collectivization became the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy.

The Stalinist Revolution also included the great purges, a series of show trials and purges of various institutions. It is conventionally dated from the assassination of Sergei Kirov in December 1934. The purges are the most controversial part of the Stalinist Revolution. The heart of the purges, the *Yezhovshchina* (after Nikolai Yezhov, the head of the NKVD, the secret police) was in 1937 and 1938 when the army was purged and two of the three main show trials took place. The issues in dispute concern, first, who was responsible and what were their motives, and, second, how many died in the process. Stalin and some of his associates clearly played major roles, but there is also evidence that many subordinates went beyond orders either because they were zealous, fearful, or simply opportunistic. The numbers are difficult to sort out, but it appears the NKVD executed less than a million prisoners during the purges. Labor camps in the Gulag (the acronym for the NKVD prison system), while harsh, were not comparable to the Nazi death camps during World War II.

Finally, the Stalinist Revolution has also been seen as a “Soviet Thermidor” (Leon Trotsky). The Stalinist Revolution industrialized the Soviet Union, but it also created a group of privileged bureaucrats who adopted many aspects of life from the tsarist period. This may be seen most strikingly in the educational system, where experimentation was dropped in favor of rote learning, school uniforms, and other trappings of the tsarist educational system. Workers, while far less privileged, did have access to free education and health care and low-cost housing and food. Those who remained in the countryside were the major losers.

The postwar fear of the Soviet Union and the development of the cold war encouraged the acceptance among social scientists of the concept of totalitarianism. Supposedly, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy were comparable in the desire of each to control all aspects of life. The Soviet Union had done far more than Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy to change the way its citizens lived, but even it did not succeed in creating a totalitarian society. Although there was some political value in emphasizing the similarities of the three regimes, comparison invariably broke down on close examination of actual conditions and practices. Totalitarianism eventually came to be seen as a social science construct of limited explanatory value.

Post-war Revolutions. The German Revolution was the most important of the postwar revolutions. It began in November 1918 with the refusal of sailors at the naval base in Kiel to take part in a last engagement against the British navy. In Kiel and several other cities in northwestern Germany, sailors, soldiers, and



ROSA LUXEMBURG, MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY

In 1898, Rosa Luxemburg moved to Berlin to seek her fortune in the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). New to the SPD, she was, however, no novice. The year before she had earned a doctor of law degree from the University of Zurich with a thesis on the development of capitalism in Poland. She was also one of the founders and leaders of the Polish Social Democratic Party (SDKPiL).

The SPD wanted Luxemburg to work in the Polish areas controlled by the German Empire, but she almost immediately began playing a prominent role in the Revisionist controversy. Revisionists, particularly Eduard Bernstein, stressed the importance of bringing Marx up to date. Luxemburg defended marxist orthodoxy, particularly in her pamphlet *Social Reform or Revolution?* A brief quotation may sum up her argument:

The legislative process and revolution are . . . various methods of historical progress that one can choose at the buffet of history like hot or cold sausages according to inclination, but various *factors* in the development of class society that qualify and complement one another.

Virtually an overnight success in the SPD, Luxemburg spent the next several years writing articles and giving speeches on the necessity of working toward the eventual outbreak of revolution. At the same time, she worked to create a personal life, with a comfortable apartment, a few close friends, and, most important, the companionship of her lover and coleader of the SDKPiL, Leo Jogiches.

The Russian Revolution of 1905 seemed to offer a new political direction. She succeeded in traveling to Warsaw, in the Russian part of Poland, only in December 1905, when the main part of the revolution was over.

Nevertheless, for a few months, she lived the life of a full-time revolutionary. In March 1906, she and Jogiches were arrested. Her health deteriorated alarmingly in prison and friends and family worked to secure her release on bail. In August she was allowed to leave the country.

She wrote a pamphlet, *The Mass Strike*, setting out her ideas on revolution, but by the time it appeared the SPD and most other European social democratic parties had lost interest in the possibilities for revolution. The SPD showed little interest in Luxemburg's idea that the working class would gain class consciousness through historical experience in mass strikes. Luxemburg found the period between the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the outbreak of World War I very difficult in personal terms as well. She broke with Jogiches after hearing he had had an affair with another woman.

Rosa Luxemburg spent most of the war in prison. From there she hailed the Russian Revolution as "the mightiest event of the World War," but she believed its fate depended on what the countries of the West did.

Luxemburg was released from prison on 9 November 1918, the day the German Revolution began. She and her friends had little influence on German politics over the next two months. She participated in the formation of the German Communist Party (KPD), but this changed little more than the name. In January 1919 she became involved in the so-called Spartacist Rebellion. Arrested on 15 January, Rosa Luxemburg was beaten, shot to death, and tossed in the Landwehr Canal in Berlin. Her body was recovered in the spring. And so ended the life of a brilliant, orthodox marxist revolutionary, someone who likely would have made an important difference in the interwar period had she lived.

workers formed the equivalent of the Russian soviets in 1917, Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. A second center of revolution appeared in Munich when social democrats formed the Bavarian Republic on 8 November. The following day the Kaiser left Berlin for exile in the Netherlands and social democrats formed a coalition government.

When the Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils met in mid-December, it supported govern-

ment efforts to provide food and oversee the demobilization of the army. Radical elements formed the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) late in December of 1918. Early in January 1919 some members of the KPD tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the government. The main result was the arrest and murder of two prominent leaders of the KPD, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Sporadic attempts from the left and the right to overthrow the government

characterized the period from 1919 to 1923, but the Weimar Republic survived and seemed to take on new life by the mid-1920s.

Elsewhere, a radical center of revolution emerged in Hungary, now an independent state. In March 1919 a coalition of left socialists and communists proclaimed a Soviet Republic. The most prominent figure in the regime, Béla Kun, immediately began establishing socialism in Hungary. The regime lasted only until 1 August 1919, however. Beyond Germany and Hungary, there were few echoes of 1917 in Europe.

The Hungarian Revolution (1956). Most of the revolutionary activity after World War II took place in the Soviet bloc. As was the case with the Hungarian Revolution, it provided clear indications of how deeply unpopular the Soviet-style regimes were. In 1956 Hungary, like Poland, questioned the failure to address consumer needs, the practice of police terror, and the reasons for the show trials of the early 1950s. Unlike Poland, however, Hungary could not find a path that would provide it autonomy without provoking the Soviet Union.

On 23 October 1956, Imre Nagy, a popular, reform-minded communist leader, was again appointed prime minister. His appointment led to a surge of popular enthusiasm. In the next several days, Hungary moved toward a more democratic political system, a mixed economy, and neutrality. The Soviet Union, particularly once the Suez Canal crisis began to preoccupy the United States and its allies, decided to send in troops. Despite weeks of resistance, it crushed the Hungarian Revolution. Some 2,700 died fighting or were executed. More than 200,000 fled the country. The Soviet Union demonstrated the narrow limits of experimentation it would accept. The United States and NATO showed their unwillingness to risk nuclear war in order to help the Hungarians.

Student Revolts in Europe (1965–1968). In the last half of the 1960s, students and intellectuals questioned every aspect of the established system in what appeared to be a new wave of revolutions. They accused governments of ruling in an authoritarian style at home and aiding counterrevolution abroad. Some saw themselves as part of a worldwide revolutionary movement. Others had more limited aims, the reform of elitist educational systems. The impact varied. Britain and the Netherlands had important movements, but limited results. Germany and Italy contended with larger movements, but escaped major crises. Only in France did student radicalism lead to the possibility of revolution.

May 1968 in France occurred because of dissatisfaction with the authoritarian style of government and uneasiness with rapid and uneven change, but mostly because of complaints about conditions at the new University of Nanterre. It began almost accidentally. On 22 March a meeting to protest the arrests of students for protesting the involvement of the United States in Vietnam produced the 22 March movement. On 2 May, members of the movement, locked out of Nanterre, went to the Sorbonne, part of the University of Paris. The next day, police broke tradition by coming into the Sorbonne and arresting hundreds of students. This began a series of demonstrations between students and police in the Latin Quarter. By the 13th, in support of the students, hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in Paris against the government. The next day workers seized the Sud-Aviation plant. Eventually ten million workers all over France went on strike. The French government seemed in serious trouble.

Toward the end of May, the French government finally took hold, dissolving the National Assembly and setting a date for new elections. Charles de Gaulle, president of France, appealed for “civic action” against a “totalitarian plot.” The possibility of a communist takeover frightened many. Parisians, initially sympathetic to the students, had tired of disruptions. Workers generally only wanted modest changes. Student radicals themselves were divided as to goals. Faced with a choice between stability and revolution, most voters opted for the former.

The “events of May” were never close to succeeding. The “system” was the enemy, but no one could agree on what to put in its place. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a German studying in Paris, caught the imagination of many, but most radicals distrusted leaders. Operating mostly on the level of tactics, the students

were lost once the government seized the initiative. In addition, labor organizations impeded potential links between students and factory workers.

Radicalism continued in the 1970s and led to the formation of terrorist organizations in Germany and in Italy. These groups were the source of much drama in the 1970s, but the fulcrum of politics moved back toward the right-center in the 1980s.

The Prague Spring (1968). The Prague Spring encompassed efforts to create a “socialism with a human face” in Czechoslovakia. Although crushed by the August invasion of troops from the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), it left a legacy that was revived in the revolutions of 1989.

By the mid-1960s, Czechoslovakia was ripe for change. Reformers in the Czechoslovak Communist Party called for reform in the neo-Stalinist party and for new economic policies. Writers, filmmakers, and people working in theater had already begun daring artistic experiments.

In January 1968, Alexander Dubček replaced Antonín Novotný as first secretary of the party. Dubček represented the moderate reform element in the party and also spoke for Slovak interests. Reforms began cautiously. An “Action Program,” announced in April, called for concentration on consumer-goods production and the expansion of political freedom.

The pace of events was too rapid for many in the party. Quasi-political clubs appeared and the Social Democratic Party was revived. A radical declaration, “2,000 words,” signed by many intellectuals and cultural figures, appeared in June. By then, not only students and intellectuals but also the working class supported the reforms. Conservative elements in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, however, began to wonder if the party could maintain its political monopoly.

The WTO also grew nervous. Czech leaders met with their counterparts from the WTO in July and again in August. Dubček believed he had successfully convinced the WTO the Czechoslovak Communist Party had the situation under control. On the night of 20–21 August, WTO troops and tanks crossed into Czechoslovakia. The Czechs followed a policy of nonviolent protest, but this did not stop the invasion. Over the next few years the “normalization” of Czechoslovakia took place. Some half million members of the Czech Communist Party were thrown out of the party. People who had been officials or doctors now worked as janitors, construction workers, or window washers.

In the west the invasion was seen by many as one more example of counterrevolution destroying

the hopes of reformers and revolutionaries in a year filled with disappointments. The Prague Spring was also presented as a lost opportunity for Communism to show what it could do. Leonid Brezhnev, head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, asserted in the “Brezhnev Doctrine” that the USSR had an obligation to intervene in Czechoslovakia to preserve the continued existence of socialism.

The East European Revolutions of 1989. By 1989 the “Brezhnev Doctrine” was a dead letter and the Soviet bloc faced a period of change and reform. Mikhail Gorbachev, secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was largely responsible for the new situation. Gorbachev had begun a process of reform in the Soviet Union that, while unsuccessful, influenced reformers and dissidents throughout the Soviet bloc. He had stated pointedly that the Soviet Union would no longer intervene in domestic affairs of other Soviet bloc nations. Finally, Gorbachev opened a new era in the cold war, resulting in much better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The reemergence of Solidarity, the trade union movement begun in 1980, as a major factor in Polish politics in 1989 added to the new situation. In the elections in the summer of that year, Solidarity won a stunning victory. The first non-Communist premier in more than forty years headed the new coalition government. In Hungary, too, there were important changes in 1989. That summer Hungarians candidly discussed the Revolution of 1956, and in a moving ceremony they reburied martyrs from that event.

In each of the countries that experienced revolution in 1989, domestic factors played important roles. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) began to collapse first simply from a hemorrhage of people. Thousands of East Germans crossed the border between Hungary and Austria, which Hungary opened in mid-summer. East Germans also crowded into the West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw and eventually traveled to West Germany on special trains. Finally, the uncontested march on the ring road around Leipzig on 9 October began a process in which the government responded to events rather than initiated them. Each week demonstrations in Leipzig, Berlin, Dresden, and other cities grew larger and bolder. The attempt by the government to regain its footing by dumping party leader Erich Honecker was insufficient. The more-or-less accidental opening of the Berlin Wall, long the symbol of the standoff between communism and democracy, doomed the government. By this time, thousands of ordinary East Germans had decided they no longer were interested



LEIPZIG AND THE BEGINNING OF THE GERMAN REVOLUTION OF 1989

On Monday, 9 October 1989, rumors abounded in Leipzig, the “Second City” of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The authorities were stockpiling medical supplies. Police and militia groups were taking up positions near the Nikolaikirche in the city center. All signs pointed to a showdown between the government and the demonstrators, who planned to march around the city after the weekly peace prayer services that evening. Now that the official ceremonies marking the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR had taken place, the government had no reason to avoid a confrontation.

For many years, there had been a weekly prayer service at the Nikolaikirche. In the fall of 1989, when the services started up again after a summer recess, a new element appeared. After the service, people met outside the church to talk about current events, including the large number of East Germans who had crossed the Hungarian border to Austria and, subsequently, to West Germany. Many people talking outside the church after the service had not attended it, but knew they could find people to talk with after the service. In September and the first Monday in October there had been demonstrations. The weekend before the 9th, during the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR, people had been arrested. Everyone expected that this Monday there would be some kind of confrontation between demonstrators and the authorities.

On Monday, 9 October, in addition to the usual peace prayer service at the Nikolaikirche, several other services were scheduled to accommodate the expected crowds. At each service someone read an appeal from six

prominent citizens of Leipzig. The appeal noted the need for discussion of the serious questions now facing the nation and called for all in attendance to refrain from provocative behavior.

After the services, the demonstrators began walking the ring road that encloses the center of the city. Unlike the week before, the police, the militia, and the *Stasi* (the political police) merely watched. The crowd chanted *Wir sind das Volk* (we are the people, that is, the people for whose benefit the government was supposed to be ruling) as it walked around the city center. And also, very important for that particular moment, it chanted *Keine Gewalt!* (no violence).

It is still not clear why the government chose not to confront the demonstrators that evening. Probably the decision was made on the local level to avoid violence. On whatever level the decision was made, it was of tremendous importance. The peaceful demonstration by thousands of ordinary people that Monday evening marked the beginning of the German Revolution of 1989. From then on, no matter how quickly and radically the government responded to a particular initiative of the crowds of demonstrators in Leipzig, Berlin, Dresden, and other cities of the GDR, it always found itself one step behind. Exactly one month after the successful demonstration in Leipzig, the Berlin Wall opened on November 9th. Over the next few months, the revolutionaries moved from a desire to reform the GDR to the idea of merging the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Negotiations for unification moved rapidly and in 1990 the GDR and the FRG came together as a united Germany.

in reforming the socialist system. To the dismay of the activists in the civic movements, they embraced the appealing idea of entering the social market economy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The elections of 18 March 1990 made it clear that most East Germans wanted unification with West Germany.

In Czechoslovakia, demonstrators in Prague filled Wenceslaus Square in November. At first, police tried to break up the demonstrations, but over the next few days the crowds swelled to overwhelming numbers. The Czech government remained always a

step behind. The center of political gravity shifted to the Magic Lantern Theater, where Václav Havel and others worked to direct the revolution. In December, the old government resigned and a new government headed by Havel formed. Alexander Dubček, hero of the “Prague Spring,” returned from years of obscurity to take part in the “Velvet Revolution.”

The revolutionary wave swept away the Communist government in Bulgaria without violence. In Romania, however, Nicolae Ceaușescu, who had ruled in an increasingly arbitrary way since the 1960s, tried

to stay in power. Captured by revolutionary forces, he and his wife were tried, declared guilty, and shot. Television pictures of the dead couple flashed around the world.

In a few short months, the unthinkable had happened. The “Iron Curtain” was no more. New governments began experiments with market economies and democratic political systems.

CONCLUSIONS

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the long Russian Revolution. Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the system had inadvertently caused its demise. It was not likely it would have survived much longer in any case. It was ironic that Gorbachev, a true believer in the communist system, was the prime mover in its dissolution. It was also fortunate in that he ended the system in a way that caused little damage.

Five hundred years of revolutions did much to shape European political, economic, and social systems. Paradoxically, one major conclusion may be that failure leads to success. Those revolutions that eventually resulted in enduring systems—for example, the Dutch, the British, and the French—each involved a series of revolutionary efforts to achieve a consensus durable and flexible enough to sustain itself into the future. The Russian Revolution of 1917, however, turned into a system that, while hardly ideal, worked well enough for a time, but lacked any capacity for dealing with new circumstances.

In politics, systems capable of responding to changing circumstances have the best chance to endure. Revolutions seem prone to create systems that resist moderation and compromise. Nonetheless, in the future change may still come through revolution. Almost no one foresaw the Revolutions of 1989. That series of events also calls into question any easy connection between revolution and the desire for utopia. The temptation in revolutionary situations has been to want to change human nature dramatically, but there are examples of revolutions where the moderates have not moved in the direction of large-scale social engineering. So much depends on circumstances and the weight of the past. In the end there are no iron laws of revolution.

See also other articles in this section.

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LABOR HISTORY: STRIKES AND UNIONS



Michael P. Hanagan

Labor history studies the history of class relationships in societies where wage labor predominates. It is inevitably bound up with strikes, the major forms of wage-labor protest, and trade unions, the major organizations for mobilizing wage laborers. One scholar noted, "Strikes and unions appear to be the only universal characteristics of industrial societies" (Roberto Franzosi, unpublished paper, 1992).

EUROPEAN LABOR HISTORY BEFORE THE 1960s

Labor history has flourished in countries with some perceived anomaly in labor movement development requiring explanation. For a long time most scholars viewed labor movement growth as following a necessary path of development from the foundation of the first local trade unions to the organization of national unions, culminating in socialist parties composed of class-conscious workers. Expectations about the "necessary path" of labor development were powerfully shaped by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's *Communist Manifesto*. Marx and Engels portrayed economic concentration and mechanization as promoting a movement from dissatisfaction with local conditions on the part of workers within specific trades, to a generalized class consciousness. For early generations of labor historians a glance around the Continent seemed to warrant such a generalization. By 1914 national trade unions and socialist parties had formed in almost every continental European state and were making rapid electoral progress wherever workers possessed the suffrage. France and Germany, where class-conscious labor movements began to emerge in the late nineteenth century, did not see the first growth of serious labor history. Instead, labor history developed in England, where the moderate Trades Union Congress gradually rallied to a Labour Party that adhered, very tentatively, to socialism in 1918. For some time the most important questions in labor history were implicitly comparative. Why did

the labor movement in an individual country not follow a path pursued by labor in other countries?

British labor history. Among the first classics of labor history were the study of British trade unions by Sidney and Beatrice Webb published in 1894 and the series of studies of laborers and skilled workers between 1780 and 1840 by John and Barbara Hammond, the first of which appeared in 1911. The Webbs' trade union history emphasizes the democratic character of trade unionism and its commitment to bargaining at a time when the enfranchisement of a substantial section of the male working class worried many middle-class Britons. In Russia the newlywed Vladimir Ilich Lenin and his young wife, Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, celebrated their honeymoon by translating the Webbs' history. The Hammonds' much-reprinted portraits of the industrial revolution as a catastrophic visitation on the proletarianized laborers shocked many Britons, who gloried in their pioneering industrial role. The Hammonds portrayed Chartism as a native English variety of radicalism. They set off a controversy about the standard of living in the industrial revolution that endured into the twenty-first century and lastingly concentrated the attention of British labor historians on this period of the nation's history.

The Hammonds and the Webbs produced an analytical labor history based on archival research that dealt with broad social conditions of the population and the effects of industrial change on their daily lives as well as with trade unions as institutions possessing unique organizational characteristics and capacities. They brought social history concerns into labor history from the outset. Although neither the Hammonds nor the Webbs were traditional academics, their arguments developed according to academic standards and almost immediately stimulated academic debate. They were extremely fortunate that their successors in the interwar years included historians as remarkable as G. D. H. Cole and R. H. Tawney.

In the 1950s and 1960s British scholarship in labor history was brilliantly advanced by historians of the caliber of Eric Hobsbawm, George Rudé, and E. P. Thompson. Like their predecessors these historians did not occupy prestigious academic positions but still exerted major influence within academia. Surely the Hammonds and the Webbs would have been surprised to discover that their successors apprenticed in the Communist Party Historians Group between 1946 and 1956. They would also have been surprised by the transformations in labor history these scholars wrought. Hobsbawm and Thompson particularly expanded the Hammonds' focus on the changes in the daily life of workers caused by the industrial revolution and stressed the influence of violent protests against capitalism in the formation of broader reform movements instead of democratic integrationism. Hobsbawm advanced some basic ideas that labor historians debated in the 1960s and 1970s. His elaboration of the role of the "labor aristocracy" in labor movements, debated by Lenin and other socialists at the turn of the century, and his conception of the "rules of the game" as a set of standards, mutually understood by workers and employers and subject to change over time, were widely influential.

Still more important was Thompson's emphasis on the role of popular culture and political conflict in the development of a worker identity. In his classic account *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963), Thompson acknowledged the marxist argument that economic forces created a new industrial proletariat but insisted on the importance of popular culture and social conflict in the development of class consciousness. Unlike earlier labor historians, Thompson portrayed class consciousness and class conflict as more than reflections cast by economic structures. He insisted on their independent roles in class formation. In particular Thompson challenged the view that British class formation in the early nineteenth century was incomplete because it did not achieve the kind of socialist consciousness found in France. Thompson denied that consciousness could be ranked and insisted on its variety and complexity.

Thompson's work provoked a great deal of controversy among British labor historians, but even those who challenged him betrayed his influence. Scholars such as Gareth Stedman Jones increasingly focused on the role of cultural and ideological factors in the molding of popular identity, stressing that class was only one possible construction of popular experience and arguing for the independent role of ideology and culture in identity formation. Only a minority of historians pursued Thompson's emphasis on the role of conflict in shaping identity formation.

French labor history. The contrast between the timing of the evolution of labor history in Britain and in France is remarkable. In 1913 the scholar Maxime Leroy published a pioneering work, *La coutume ouvrière*, dealing with labor's influence in the regulation of nineteenth-century French industry. It found no echo in academia or in the labor movement. Never reprinted, Leroy's book survives in only a handful of libraries around the world. Pre-1914 France produced popular narratives recounting the history of the labor movement from the point of view of particular socialist factions or by concerned middle-class outsiders. These histories were seldom based on extensive research, simply reinterpreted familiar events, and never paid attention to the condition of the great mass of French workers or the transformations in the labor force under way as the country industrialized in the late nineteenth century.

As a field of academic study, French labor history began at least a generation later than English labor history. Founding figures like Maurice Dommanget, Georges Duveau, and Jean Maitron moved easily between socialist movements and historical research projects. Dommanget possessed a prodigious knowledge of the history of the French Socialist movement, Duveau's studies of working-class life and educational theories under the Second Empire prefigured the later turn toward social history, and

Maitron was personally familiar with many labor activists. French labor history tended less toward comparison, either explicit or implicit, than did English or German labor history. France's revolutionary heritage and early embrace of socialism often was taken for granted, as if that country followed a predestined path of development. French historians perhaps remained unaware of the unique features of their country's evolution.

As in England the growth of labor history in the French academy resulted from a need to explain unexpected developments within the labor movement during World War I. Despite the denunciation of war by the Socialist Party and the revolutionary pretensions of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (General Confederation of Labor), the main French trade union, both party and union entered into the war effort with hardly a demurrer. Why did French leftists follow one course of action and Russian leftists another course? After World War I the movement split into communist and socialist factions, and as the split hardened historians sought to understand the basis of this profound division within the working classes. Why did French intraclass political divisions prove so irreconcilable? Responding to these questions was an important problem facing French labor history. To understand why revolutionary political rhetoric had concealed nationalist sentiments, French labor historians examined the social conditions of trade unions and political parties. In the 1960s and 1970s France produced a brilliant constellation of academically trained labor historians to address these questions, including Claude Willard, Annie Kriegel, Michelle Perrot, Rolande Treppe, and Yves Lequin.

German labor history. In Germany the advent of dictatorships delayed or interrupted the growth of labor history scholarship until the post-World War II period. In the 1950s and 1960s German historians, preoccupied with the rise of fascism, explored Germany's "special path," the particular mixture of traditional institutions and rapid industrialization that produced both mass socialism and fascism. German historians were particularly interested in comparative history, focusing in particular on comparing German development with that of England. Like French historians German historians were interested in why self-proclaimed revolutionary socialists had embraced the war so eagerly. Of course, marxist East Germany was especially concerned with labor history. East German labor historians typically concentrated on the history of socialism and trade union organization, but innovative historians drew on Western labor history, which was interested in broader social and cultural aspects

of workers' experiences. Perhaps the best-known labor historian of the immediate post-World War II period was Gerhard Ritter, who produced an important study of the labor movement in Wilhelmine Germany. In the 1960s and 1970s a large number of talented German historians emerged, including Werner Berg, Dieter Groh, Jürgen Kocka, Klaus Tenfelde, and Hartmut Zwahr.

EUROPEAN LABOR HISTORY AFTER THE 1960s

The 1960s and 1970s were a period of rapid growth in labor history throughout Europe. In these years, the growth of politically independent radical youth movements and spontaneous explosions of worker protest led to a reappraisal of labor movement history by many militant young historians. In general these young historians sought new approaches to answer old questions. Addressing the classic question of why the London working classes became quiescent in the late nineteenth century, historians abandoned their focus on the character of marxist leaders and studied the deindustrialization of the London urban economy in the second half of the nineteenth century. To answer why French trade unionists supported the war effort in World War I, historians rejected the old emphasis on traitorous leaders and looked at the undermining of artisanal militancy by waves of industrialization. To explain the German socialists' participation in the war, historians explored the cultural isolation of socialist workers and the wholesale acceptance of mainstream cultural assumptions by German socialist organizations. Young scholars began to label themselves "labor historians" and, though established historians remained doubtful, to explore the social and political bases of class formation. Almost every European country produced serious works of labor history, and some academic traditions, such as those of the Netherlands and Sweden, yielded their own distinctive historical approaches to the field. Americans, too, contributed significantly to European labor history, but they often were as much influenced by American labor historiography, an interesting subject in its own right. They are not discussed in this essay.

Increasingly, current events mocked attempts to claim "exceptional" status for a national labor movement or to argue that any nation had followed a "special path." The dominant questions in labor history lost their significance as the sense of labor as an international movement declined. Everywhere in Europe labor movements adapted to the national political environment. Although this accommodation began

during the interwar and war years, its reality became clear after World War II, as European labor movements developed different patterns of strike militancy and varied relationships with states. Strikes diminished in some countries, while worker militancy continued in others. Some trade unions participated in industrial planning alongside employers, while other national unions balked. Some trade unions gave socialist parties considerable leeway to negotiate labor demands, while others refused or kept party leaders on a tight leash. In the 1970s labor union membership declined in many European countries, and the bargaining positions of trade unions almost everywhere deteriorated. Many labor historians shared Hobsbawm's sense of *The Forward March of Labour Halted?* (1979). Few any longer saw labor as an international movement with a common strategy and an incontestable claim on the future. The marxist paradigm that privileged workers as the "world-historical" class seemed less convincing.

Faced with the dissolution of old assumptions, the decline of labor movements, and labor's varied efforts to adapt to national politics, labor history reconfigured itself. Some historians argued for a more institutional labor history that would place labor organizations more precisely within national political structures. Most labor historians chose to cast their nets more broadly, looking at class and the ways in which class interacted with culture, gender, and race—a vital contact with social history generally. No longer preoccupied with manifestations of class consciousness, historians stressed how class interpenetrated, shaped, and was shaped by other social and cultural contexts. Other labor historians, focusing on discourse and the ways language constructs meaning, sought to look at how class was discursively constructed and deconstructed. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed an explosion of exciting labor history and a dramatic expansion of research agendas. Scholars such as Anna Clark, Patrick Joyce, Alf Lüdtke, Hans Medick, Gérard Noiriel, and Pascal Ory indicated the continuing richness of this research tradition. However, it became increasingly difficult to locate them within a unified field of study because labor history entered a postparadigm fluidity.

As labor history gave up its concern with "exceptionalism" or "special paths," it also abandoned its concern with internationalism. But in an age when trade unions confront globalization and states come under pressure from both the European Union and international organizations, it may be necessary to consider international issues again without the teleological blinkers of common paths and shared strategies.

STRIKES

One of the oldest concerns of labor history has been the study of strikes. More than any other, this area has produced interdisciplinary exchanges between historians and social scientists, but these exchanges have not been as complete as they might. A look at studies of strike propensity by sociologists and economists may bear more on debates among historians than is generally realized.

While the origins of the strike can be traced to far antiquity, strikes did not become a routine form of protest until the nineteenth century. The rise of the strike form of protest is roughly correlated with the growth of the wage labor force that became the focus of labor historians. In all European countries the collective cessation of work became the universal weapon of labor protest. Whether demanding higher wages, the eight-hour day, the suffrage, or the end of colonialism, workers struck.

While labor historians have studied strikes extensively, most research on the rhythms of strike activity is by sociologists or economists. Unlike many other aspects of labor history, strikes are susceptible to precise measurement in terms of participation, duration, and length, and many scholars have detected a tendency for strikes to occur in waves. Systematic records of strikes maintained by national governments or culled from other sources have been subjected to quantitative analysis. While willing to consider the findings of social scientists, labor historians have, with only a few exceptions, generally proven reluctant to undertake anything but the most elementary quantitative analyses.

Theories of strike causation abound. Some scholars stress the role of supply and demand for labor, others see strikes as dependent on the interactions of workers and employers, and still others emphasize the need to place strikes within a political context. Early social scientific explanations of strike activity sought a single universal cause, either searching for a single general principle that explained all strike activity or positioning labor movements within a comprehensive stage theory of development. While some once-prominent theories of strike causation have been seriously challenged, a sophisticated theory of strikes probably depends less on accepting or rejecting competing theories than on combining various theories and specifying the circumstances in which different explanations apply or refining them to take into account additional factors.

Strikes and business cycles. One of the most commonly employed explanations of strike activity is an

economic model that links strikes to business cycles. In good times, when labor markets are tight, workers are likely to strike for higher wages, while in bad times, when unemployment makes it easy to replace workers, they are less likely to strike. Such explanations depend on a highly instrumental interpretation of labor relations, but strike waves are loosely correlated with economic cycles. More intriguing is the relationship of strikes to longer Kondratieff waves, cycles of approximately fifty years' duration. James Cronin has argued their importance in understanding large-scale changes in the structure of the British labor movement.

While most scholars agree that business cycles play a role in strike activity, much remains that economic conditions cannot explain. Most notably they cannot explain international variations in strike propensity, and these differentials have become more important with time. The variations in strike propensities among leading European countries increased significantly during the twentieth century. Because strikes vary along national lines, the development of different regimes of industrial relations or political factors are liable to be of more importance.

Strikes and unions. The presence of trade unions is another factor associated with strike activity. By pro-

viding workers with collective resources and experienced organizers, trade unions increase the likelihood of strikes. Undoubtedly trade unions contribute to strike propensity, but on some occasions unionization increases after strike activity rather than before it as trade union theories of strikes would suggest. Trade unions are sometimes the products of strikes rather than their causes.

While unions may facilitate strikes, they also play an important role in shaping them. Michelle Perrot's study of strike activity in France explores the era of spontaneous strikes. Between 1870 and 1890 most strikes occurred without prior notice. Frequently the notification of a paycut resulted in an unannounced strike. Upon reading the posted notifications, a band of workers might roam the shop floor, singing revolutionary songs and calling their fellows out on strike. Next a committee of workers would be elected to represent workers' grievances to their employers and to report their employers' responses to general assemblies of workers. These workers' assemblies made all the basic decisions, often unanimously. Gradually, Perrot argued, trade unions took over the strike, requiring workers to propose concrete demands and organizing them in disciplined demonstrations. In the process, Perrot suggested, strikes often lost touch with the sentiments of the rank and file.

While most students of strike activity agree that business cycles and trade unions encourage strike activity, stage theories of trade union development that once enjoyed considerable support generally have been abandoned. In the 1950s and 1960s a well-known American study by Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, and Charles A. Myers emphasized the existence of a variety of forms of evolution beginning with societies controlled by dynastic elites. They contended that under special circumstances revolutionary intellectual elites used worker militancy to take power. But revolutionary elites were only temporary custodians of power. In the long run only middle-class elite regimes proved really stable and compatible with the requirements of modern industrialization. Middle-class elites were willing to bargain collectively with workers if necessary to accomplish their economic goals. For Kerr and his collaborators, 1960s America was a model of advanced industrial relations, while European unions with their communist and socialist affiliations were only hindrances to the development of genuine industrial relations. Supporters of this view may take comfort from the collapse of the USSR but only cold comfort, since American collective bargaining collapsed almost as completely. Most European trade union movements remained more vital than those in the United States at the end of the twentieth century.

Strikes and industrial relations. Other interpretations relying on industrial relations stress international variations in factors such as employer organization, repression, or the organization of labor. The component factors of industrial relations may differ in degree across Europe and are better candidates for explaining the manifest variations in the character of strikes. Although labor history is based on the study of class relationships, workers have been studied far better than employers. Only in the late twentieth century did historians begin to analyze employers' roles in labor conflicts. Much can be learned. For example, the mysterious short-term cycle of Italian strike activity that had puzzled some scholars is explained by the three-year contracts that prevailed in large-scale Italian industries. Over time the ability of employers to organize and collectively oppose strikes has varied greatly. Peter Stearns demonstrated that French strike activity declined in the years before World War I, as employers successfully organized to resist militant unionists. Roberto Franzosi showed that the anticommunism of immediate post-World War II Italy allowed the state and employers to carry out repressive actions against communist activists.

Franzosi offered the most daring argument of all and presented well-documented evidence about the

ways class conflict influences the formation of the working class and industrial organization. He posited that labor militancy in large factories resulted in the transformation in the character of Italian heavy industry. Responding to the waves of strikes that swept Italian industry in 1969, industrialists reconfigured their industrial sites, abandoning the strike-prone, large, continuous-process plants operating under intense time discipline. They trimmed the workforces at large factories and subcontracted to more flexible, smaller plants that were also less likely to unionize. Franzosi argued strongly that labor militancy influenced the choice of technology and plant selection at the highest level.

Strikes and the political context. Another series of powerful arguments contributing to the understanding of strikes and strike waves stresses the political context of labor relations. In this literature political parties are seen as shaping strike militancy and thus as influencing the character of class conflict. Among the best-known arguments in this vein are those that contrast countries like Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, where strikes have been infrequent, with countries like Belgium, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, where strikes have been common. According to this interpretation, countries with large Social Democratic Parties that have close relations with trade unions incorporate trade unions' demands into political bargaining and, by exerting pressure at the national political level, avoid strikes. In contrast, countries such as the United Kingdom, where trade unions and the Labour Party are not intimate, or France, with multiple trade unions and politically marginal left-wing parties, have been unable or unwilling to diminish strikes.

A more sophisticated political interpretation of the origin of strikes is that of Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly. Like Franzosi they maintain that industrial conflict produces unique repertoires of protest and that such repertoires can have enduring influence on class antagonisms and their expression. A "repertoire" of protest is a cultural creation that describes how people act together in pursuit of shared goals. Shorter and Tilly described how a particular type of political strike became a part of French workers' repertoire. They suggested that the precarious political position of the Third Republic led republicans to intervene to protect workers, who were generally republicans, from large employers, who were often antirepublican. Eventually republican intervention shaped French industrial relations. Instead of gathering resources for long strike struggles, French workers engaged in temporary but massive strikes to win the at-

tention of politicians. They were most likely to strike when prolabor administrations took power. The massive strikes of June 1936 that followed the election of the Popular Front can be seen as the climax of this tendency.

Strike outcomes. While theories about the causes of strikes proliferate, much less work has evaluated the primary concern of strikers and employers, that is, the outcomes of strikes. The most important work in this area is that of Samuel Cohn. Looking at French strikes between 1890 and 1935, Cohn found that unions engaged in frequent strikes produced higher wages, even when strikes failed. In addition strikes over working conditions and political issues won more in the long run than strikes over wages. Short strikes yielded greater gains than long strikes, and bureaucratized, centralized unions produced smaller gains than decentralized unions. But strikes only yielded these results when unions competed against one another, as they frequently did in pre-1914 France, to establish their militancy. Once a trade union established its identity as reformist and decidedly moderate, trade union competition discouraged militancy. Employers channeled benefits to the moderate trade unions to reward them and to punish radicals. In such circum-

stances radicals could be made scapegoats and punished when strikes occurred.

The analysis of strike conflicts has produced a rich and diverse literature concerned primarily with the causes of strikes. Much of this debate was conducted by social scientists using quantitative methods to analyze strike behavior. The full weight of their findings has not yet been integrated into mainstream labor history. Certainly, social scientists have been more willing than labor historians to suggest that labor conflict plays an important role in shaping industrial organization and protest repertoires. More fully than many labor historians realize, the work of social scientists suggests that industrial conflict is an important determinant of class formation and identity.

TRADE UNIONS

In every European industrial country workers organized into trade unions, which played an important role in generating strikes. Trade unions are legal institutions regulated by governments, economic institutions that claim jurisdiction to represent different sections of the labor force, and political organizations that often have formalized relations with national po-

litical parties and sometimes with organized industrialists. Trade unions are one of the characteristics that distinguish labor movements from other social movements seeking to influence government for social reforms. They have a base in ongoing organizations that represent workers in their everyday work life. Because they usually have a professional staff, organize at the national level, and control substantial resources, trade unions provide the sustained support to working-class social movements that enables them to endure the inevitable ebb and flow of popular support characteristic of many social movements.

Trade unions vary considerably according to

- 1 the type of workers they seek to organize,
- 2 their power to establish an organizational monopoly in an occupation or an industry,
- 3 state regulation, and
- 4 their ability to develop a centralized national structure.

Although students of industrial relations recognize the importance of different forms of labor organization in collective bargaining, the full range of causes of international differences in the structures of trade union organizations has been studied little.

Origins of trade unions. The earliest trade unions organized highly skilled workers, and some historians have argued that early trade unions were shaped by the ideological perspectives of the failing guilds or corporations. Both organizations sought to regulate trade, and early trade unions often provided death benefits and sometimes pension plans reminiscent of the services that guilds provided for their members. William Sewell Jr. suggested that in France early mutual aid societies inherited guild traditions and transmitted them to the nascent trade union movement. Sewell's view has been challenged by French historians who found little relationship between the first mutual aid societies and collapsing guilds, and not much evidence indicates that elsewhere in Europe mutual aid societies perpetuated guild outlooks. In any case the democratic character of western European mutual aid societies in contrast with typical guild practices should raise doubts about the continuity of their views. In Germany, where guilds retained a legal or semilegal basis into the mid-nineteenth century, the influence of guild spirit may have shaped attitudes. Scholars have suggested that the provision for elected workers' representatives to supervise the insurance funds that Otto von Bismarck incorporated into his insurance laws was a response to the older practice of guilds controlling and supervising their members' funds.

While they may not have inherited the practice from guilds, highly skilled urban artisanal trades, invariably the earliest centers of craft trade unionism, were everywhere dominated by males. The strength of trade unionism has always depended on informal solidarity among workers created and maintained in the social world outside the workplace. The first unions were invariably unions of highly skilled workers based on male recreational networks formed in cafés, bars, and taverns and shared residence in working-class neighborhoods. Mary Anne Clawson described these informal male ties as constituting a "fraternalism" that, while underwriting worker solidarity, also preserved gender discrimination within the working class. Gender discrimination in early craft trade unions also reflected a desire to preserve skilled craft jobs, especially in the textile industry, from "deskilling," a frequent synonym for feminization.

Industrial unions. Although the industrial revolution threatened the positions of many craft unions, the sense of shared interests that produced industrial unionism took much longer to develop, in contrast to Marx's original expectations. The industrial revolution influenced artisans by bringing many of them into large factories, but even behind factory walls these workers maintained their characteristic independence. In many instances they remained a self-conscious elite, separate and independent from the majority of factory workers. The industrial revolution also increased the numbers of coal miners, who represented a new group of workers, the semiskilled workers. Unlike artisans, most miners acquired their skills by assisting or working alongside older, more experienced workers. But like artisanal labor, underground coal mining depended on the spirit of teamwork and off-the-job recreation. Such images of camaraderie aboveground and belowground could only be accepted in a gendered form, usually as masculine characteristics.

Eventually the second industrial revolution, with its large-scale capital accumulation and new disciplinary techniques, brought new opportunities for women. But progress was hardly immediate. At first the great power accumulating in the hands of employers enabled them to remake the labor force, and by and large they made it in their own image, masculine. A new family economy arose around the fledgling industries of the second industrial revolution. This family economy was based on increased earnings of male workers in heavy industry and decreased opportunities for female employment, as homework declined and unskilled factory work grew more slowly than semiskilled. Working-class males increasingly found stable, long-term employment, while their

wives performed domestic labor at home but not commodity production.

As the militancy of workers crested during the 1920s, a result of the vast expansion in metalworking during World War I, trade unionists attempted to embed the assumptions of this new family economy within the bargaining process by demanding a “family wage” sufficient for adult males to adequately support a family. The significance of the demand for a family wage differed from nation to nation and from occupational group to occupational group. In some nations, such as Great Britain, many male skilled workers actually attempted to maintain nonworking wives even though budgetary constraints often foredoomed their goals. In France male coal miners demanded a family wage on the assumptions that women’s work was unsteady and subject to more fluctuations than men’s work and that family maintenance depended on the preservation of a stable, high male wage. In both cases male workers based wage demands on assumptions about males’ predominant responsibility for wage earning, but such assumptions did not always require married women’s absence from the workforce, even as an ideal. The family wage model justified a dual wage structure for men and women whether or not women were in fact supplemental earners.

The vision of the male proletarian breadwinner did not prove prophetic. Partly as a result of war work during both world wars but also because of recurrent labor shortages, employers were forced to accept a growing number of female workers in heavy industry. Many of these organized women rejected the assumptions behind the family wage and its implications for trade union action. As the twentieth century wore on the division of labor once more changed. By the late nineteenth century white-collar unions formed in some European countries, and their expansion was general in the post–World War II period. White-collar work always had a larger proportion of women than artisanal or semiskilled labor. At first a rough equality prevailed among male and female clericals. As the number of clerical workers grew, most women were tracked into gender specific pools of female secretaries, while male workers occupied better-paid positions with chances for promotion. In the twentieth century the gendered division of labor within many areas of white-collar work and the associated unions began to break down. When schoolteachers, engineers, designers, or bank clerks organized, women were as likely to organize as men. Fraternalism was least likely to dominate in the expanding white-collar unions, although a gendered division of labor remained characteristic of many trade unions in most industrial countries.

Competing union movements. The preceding discussion of unions as bargaining agents presumes that unions successfully established their claims to represent workers. In many European nations rival unions competed for workers’ allegiances. In some cases employers or repressive states tacitly supported the creation of company unions to prevent the growth of independent trade unions or as vehicles to enhance surveillance of workers. Paternalistic unions sometimes offered financial inducements for membership. After the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891), Catholics organized their own trade unions, and in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy these unions became minorities to reckon with. Originally many of these religious unions adopted paternalistic principles and sought to conciliate employers, but over the long haul they became more militant and independent of employers. As they did so Catholic units also tended to become more secular and sometimes provided militant competition for established socialist or communist trade unions. In addition Catholic unions often successfully organized women workers. The church’s original insistence that men and women workers meet separately sometimes fostered the growth of Catholic female trade union activists more successfully than did secular socialist unions, with a few exceptions, like those associated with the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party) when socialist women also organized separately. In France in the 1960s and 1970s the formerly Catholic Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (French Democratic Confederation of Labor) often criticized the communist CGT from the left.

While leftists denounced the division of the trade union movement between religious and secular unions, in the end the most serious divisions in the European labor movement were produced by leftist factions. Before 1919 socialist unions were the majority unions in almost all European countries. Exceptions included France and Spain, where revolutionary syndicalists or anarchists were dominant, and England, where after 1906 the Labour Party, not at that time socialist, was the official party of most trade unions. Although trade unionists publicly expressed opposition to war, the enthusiastic participation of the majority of trade union organizations in the World War I war effort and divergent responses to the Russian Revolution of 1917 split the trade union movement in many countries right down the middle. Communists won the majority of the trade union movement, at least temporarily, in France and Italy and possessed a substantial minority in German and Austrian trade unionism. Until 1989 communists re-

tained a powerful hold over the major unions in France and Italy, and opposition between socialist and communist trade unionists proved divisive in national trade union movements. In one of the most dramatic examples, the socialist-communist divisions in Germany in the 1930s contributed to the Nazi Party's rise to power.

Unions, parties, and the state. The spread of radical ideas into the trade union movement or in some cases the ideological resistance to radicalism has attracted much attention. Trade unions as institutions regulated by the state have received less attention. Strikes in Europe became legal but also subject to greater regulation. The same laws that recognize some strikes prohibit unauthorized, sit-down, and wildcat strikes. The modern strike is powerfully influenced by legal regulations. Long after trade unions were recognized legally in Great Britain, judges found it difficult to distinguish between unions and criminal conspiracies and awarded civil damages to employers that would have resulted in a prohibition on strikes. Laws passed in 1859, 1871, and 1875 to legalize peaceful strikes were invalidated by court decisions declaring strikes breaches of contract and, as such, conspiracies against employers. These decisions forced trade unionists to intervene politically to protect their organizations. The Taff-Vale decision of 1901, which held that trade unions were conspiracies of civil law, was the

breaking point that stimulated British trade unionists to form the Labour Party to obtain relief. The French law of 1884 that seriously restricted the right of unions to own property and forbade unions to have relations with political parties encouraged the growth of a revolutionary syndicalist movement stressing militancy rather than building strike funds or performing social insurance functions.

The relationship between trade unions and socialist parties also powerfully influenced the bargaining strategies pursued by trade unions. Countries where trade unions developed early, in advance of or separate from socialist parties, often found it difficult to construct industrial unions. The United Kingdom and Denmark had early trade union movements, and craft unionism retained significant strength. When socialist parties played an important role in the construction of trade unions, they almost always built industrial unions and favored centralized trade union organizations. Socialists preferred centralized industrial unions because they facilitated relationships with national socialist political parties.

In the 1960s and 1970s the presence of such organizations was practically a precondition for labor's participation in "neocorporatism." "Neocorporatism" refers to the extraparliamentary cooperation between the state and private interests by which the state confers legal authority to private groups in return for their self-regulation. According to Colin Crouch, Austria,

the Netherlands, Sweden, and West Germany were among the leading neocorporatist states. While the study of the neocorporatist phenomenon was a favorite research topic of the 1970s, interest subsequently slackened because of the phenomenon's decline in the face of global competition.

Just as important for the evolution of industrial relations was the trade unions' formal relationships with socialist parties. Perhaps the most striking position on their relationship is that first taken by Seymour Martin Lipset. He argued that in countries like Great Britain and the United States, where suffrage expanded before the growth of socialist parties, craft unions developed ties to liberal parties, inhibiting the growth of socialist parties and ties between trade unions and socialist parties. In contrast, in countries like Germany and Scandinavia, where mass socialist parties developed in advance of national trade unions, socialist parties dominated the trade union movement, encouraged industrial unionism, and coordinated economic policies with trade unions.

In a work comparing Britain and Sweden, James Fulcher stressed the importance of the relationship between trade unions and socialist parties. Fulcher argued that in countries like Sweden, where socialist parties dominate trade unions, it is much easier to develop an active labor market policy. In countries like Britain, where relations between trade unions and socialist parties require negotiation and bargaining, it is

politically difficult to impose an active labor market policy and possible only to secure pledges of support for wage-price guidelines. Because active labor market policy is a flexible and efficient economic tool, it tends to win public support and to sustain cooperation between party and union. In contrast, because wage-price guidelines tend to incite union hostility, these policies maintain the tense relationship between party and union characteristic of Britain. Thus the party-union relationship in both countries has a self-sustaining character, but the equilibrium status is more favorable to workers in Sweden than in Britain.

Unions in national and international perspective. In the late twentieth century the focus among students of labor history shifted from a preoccupation with explaining national peculiarities or "exceptional" behavior to a concentration on the adaptation of labor movements to national environments. Scholars began to recognize that differences in political contexts and the relationships between industrialization and democratization exerted long-standing influences on trade unions and class formation. Much work has stressed the open-ended character of the interaction between politics, industrialization, and trade union organization. At any given point in time militant workers must chart their course within a context of labor movement structures, party and labor relations, and political alignments inherited from the past and

not easily changed. To understand this interaction, it is necessary to examine historical processes.

Considerable evidence points toward another shift within labor movements that poses important questions for labor history. The collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 revealed that the Eastern European working class had abandoned its long-standing socialist commitments. That tradition produced revolution in Russia and greatly facilitated the Soviet takeover of Eastern European governments in the post–World War II period. Although the USSR is gone, socialists and communists have remained split, and relatively little has been done to overcome the internal division of the international labor movement.

The persistence of this division when it seems to lack all justification has been particularly puzzling given the widespread recognition of the new importance of an international organization. Increasingly labor movements are concerned about global economic trends and the effects of European Union policies on their members. Such concerns are ironic. In the nineteenth century the labor movement was the most international of movements. Labor leaders were among the first concerned with establishing international ties to prevent the importation of strikebreakers and to discourage cheap foreign labor by helping laborers organize. In the nineteenth century business leaders questioned the loyalty of socialist leaders because of

the socialist connection to international organizations. In late-twentieth-century Europe matters were almost reversed. Capital took the initiative in forming the European Union and in enrolling European states in international organizations from the World Trade Organization to the International Monetary Fund. In contrast, European labor leaders were notably slow to organize internationally. Increasingly students of labor movements have sought to understand how the most international of social movements has become so nationally oriented.

Labor history has revealed the multiple ways labor movements have interacted with national governments and national employers' organizations. A pressing issue is the extent to which adaptation to national environments has incapacitated labor for international organization. The varying structures of trade union organizations, the array of national strike repertoires and strike frequency, and the different cultural practices of national trade union movements pose serious problems for effective international coordination and collective action. In the past class conflict served as a potent force for mobilizing workers to recognize new circumstances and to adapt to new organizational forms. Will the advent of globalization and the greater transnational organization of capital produce a new sense of transnational class identity? Addressing this question may well become the next major item on the agenda of labor history.

See also Marxism and Radical History (volume 1); The Industrial Revolutions; Communism (volume 2); Social Class; Working Classes (in this volume); Gender and Work; Factory Work (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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SOCIALISM



Eric D. Weitz

Socialism is a word that has inspired great hopes and dread fears. It became the preeminent ideology of the labor movement in the industrial age, even if it never won the majority support of workers, let alone the rest of the population. Amid the harsh realities of industrial society, when poverty and insecurity were often the fate of workers, when society seemed riven by intense class conflict and an obsession with productivity and material success, socialism's promise of a world infused with liberty, equality, and prosperity proved immensely appealing. Socialism gave to its largely working-class advocates an enhanced sense of identity as workers, the opportunity to improve themselves through education and political activity, organizations through which they could fight for their ideals, and associations in which they and their families could enjoy their leisure. In many countries in Europe, the socialist movement played the key role in establishing or widening the democratic system and contributed greatly to the expansion of the social welfare state. It promoted women's participation in politics and the economy and gave a more open and liberal tenor to society.

At the same time, socialists fostered the enhanced discipline and regulation of modern society, both through the expanded role of the state that most socialists demanded and through the ideal of the self-disciplined, dedicated, male socialist militant. Socialists were often blind to forms of oppression that were only partly rooted in the class character of industrial society. In the heyday of the socialist movement, roughly from 1880 to 1960, women were accorded secondary status and socialist parties rarely challenged the gender division of labor or even the overt discrimination against women in the labor market and in wage scales. Too often, the socialist movement degenerated into sterile controversies over what precisely constituted "true" socialism. Factionalism—one group leaving to form a new party, another group expelled by party leaders—became a fixed feature of modern socialism. In its worst forms, the belief that the future society would come about through armed revolution

and a vigilant state resulted in authoritarian systems in central and eastern Europe that systematically violated democratic liberties and, at times in the Soviet Union, engaged in mass killings of defined population groups, all in the name of socialism.

Socialism has been most commonly studied from the standpoint of intellectual or political history. Social history has also made important contributions, by turning its attention to the movement's social composition and its significance for working-class life and culture. In their studies, social historians have examined the variety of social groups that were drawn into the movement—artisans in the utopian socialist phase, students, discontented professionals, and, certainly in some cases, peasants. The social history perspective has illuminated the fact that socialism has never been a purely working-class phenomenon, and it has helped to explain why the movement failed to attract some workers, such as British textile workers, long drawn to the Conservative Party. Social history has also sought to assess what socialism meant for the workers involved, both in terms of practical politics and individual and group identities. For many workers, socialism was a means of reinforcing their efforts to improve wages and working conditions—a view of the movement which tended to promote a revisionist, rather than a revolutionary, ideology. Others, however, found real meaning in socialist revolutionary ideology, which sustained them in agonizing work situations and motivated them for political action when they could find no other place within the existing political system.

ORIGINS AND IDEOLOGIES OF SOCIALISM

The words "socialist" and "socialism" appeared first in German in the eighteenth century and have Latin roots. The immediate derivation of the words lay with the natural-rights philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, notably Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Thomas Hobbes, and Christian Wolff, who

made “society” or the “social” an object of rational investigation and a source of sovereignty. The term “socialist” was first used as a pejorative, especially by Catholic philosophers who attacked natural-rights theorists as heretics. By the 1790s, “socialist” had become a more neutral term of description for them, chiefly for Pufendorf and his intellectual descendants. Often, they were called interchangeably “naturalists” or “socialists.” In 1802 came the first recorded instance of the word “socialism,” again in reference to Pufendorf and his teachings. Around the same time, the philosopher G. W. F. Hegel used the term “antisocialist,” by which he meant, oddly enough, the same group of thinkers whom others had labeled socialist. For Hegel, natural-rights theory, especially in its French variants, was individualistic, hence antisocialist.

Into the 1830s, the terms were only common in the intellectual discourse of the very few members of the educated elite, especially in Germany and Italy. Conservative philosophers and theologians would continue to see a direct line of descent from Grotius, Pufendorf, and Hobbes and their concern with the social to the socialist thinkers and organizers of the modern period. But around the 1820s and 1830s, the meaning of the words became transfigured, and their usage became vastly broadened. The sources for the change were the French and industrial revolutions of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the great transformations that ushered in the modern era. Both revolutions gave an entirely new meaning to the social. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the word “social” conjured up images of masses in motion, the popular classes going to the barricades in Paris and Lyon or joining the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies as they crossed the Continent, spreading the ideas of liberty and fraternity. “Social” also signified the new factory system, with scores and hundreds of workers toiling away behind the gates in a factory and giving a new density to urban life. The “social question” emerged, signifying a new realization of the poverty and the dangers to the social order that industrialization brought in its wake.

“Utopian” socialists. For the first time in the 1820s, “socialist” was used self-consciously and in a positive sense by a political group, namely, the followers of Robert Owen in England. They seemed to have no knowledge of the word’s usage in German, but obviously adopted it from the term “social,” now widely current to designate both English versions of natural-rights theory and the entire complex of transformations associated with the French and industrial revolutions. In the 1840s Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels would pin the term “utopian socialists” on the

Owenists and their French and (a few) German counterparts, notably the writers, ideologues, and organizers Charles Fourier, Étienne Cabet, Flora Tristan, and Claude Henri de Saint-Simon and their followers. The term has stuck ever since, though not always with the disparaging sense used by Marx and Engels. These first socialists were by no means all alike; a number of them postulated ideas that definitely ran toward the wild (and sometimes endearing) end of the political spectrum. Fourier’s belief that men and women in the future socialist society would live among oceans of lemonade is only one of the more bizarre examples.

Still, it is possible to identify certain common elements among the utopian socialists. All of them believed that industrialization had created a crisis in human existence that required radical solutions. As heirs of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, they believed that the new society could be created by self-conscious acts of will, by human beings, rational in nature, dissecting the problems around them and conceiving the correct course of action. In opposition to the conflict and anonymity of the new industrial society, people would live in small-scale, face-to-face, self-governed communities. Production would still be largely artisanal in nature (though Owen’s communities were based on factories). The early socialists did, indeed, imagine their solutions to be utopian in the sense that they would solve for all eternity the problems of human existence. The mutual ownership of wealth would unleash great prosperity, precisely because wealth would not be squandered by the excesses of the few who could afford to indulge their whims and desires. Common ownership would also abolish the jealousies that arose from social inequalities, which had caused so much conflict and so many wars in all of past time. But the utopian socialists firmly believed that their promised society was not only about economics. It would also be about liberty and the creation of a true fraternity (and, in the minds of a few, like Tristan, a new sorority as well) that had been promised by the French Revolution but that had gone unfulfilled. Socialism would be the stage of the “loving and productive society,” in the words of the Saint-Simonians. Warm and affectionate relations would emerge among people, perhaps underpinned by the recognition that their interests lay in harmony with one another. Artistry and innovation would flourish, and true liberty—self-government and individuality—would at last prevail.

A number of the utopian socialists also engaged in a radical critique of the patriarchal family and were among the first to articulate a call for the equality of women and men. A few of them, like Fourier, also envisaged more open and experimental sexual lives in

their communities. Particularly in the sphere of family and gender relations, the utopian socialists promoted more diverse and radical ideas than the marxist parties and trade unions that came to dominate the socialist movement later in the century. In this sense, marxism, while playing a key role in the explosive growth of the movement, also represented a narrowing of the social critique and of the political possibilities represented by socialism.

Alongside the emancipatory strains, there was, no doubt, also a strong tenor of control and regulation in utopian socialism. The Owenite communities in Scotland and the United States, notably New Lanark and New Harmony, were carefully supervised by Owen, who was, after all, an industrialist, albeit an atypical one. The Icarian communities, founded by Cabet and his followers in France and the United States, were more completely collectivist than the Owenite ones, but by their very nature they too were not exactly amenable to expressions of individuality. Fourier thought each socialist community should house precisely 1,620 members.

But even organization and control could prove appealing to people whose lives were being battered by the advance of the market system and the factories. Both the timing and the message of the utopians held particular appeal for anxious urban craft workers. The utopian socialists began to attract popular support in Britain and France between the 1820s and 1840s, and somewhat less so, but also significantly, in Germany.

They were tireless organizers and thereby helped create the pattern of ceaseless political activism that would be a major characteristic, for good and bad, of the socialist movement well into the twentieth century. Much of their energies (and resources) went into the establishment of model autonomous communities, which they believed would become replicated throughout society. Utopian socialists also engaged in political activism in the existing systems. Owen, Cabet, Tristan, Fourier, and others lectured, wrote pamphlets and books, and published newspapers. Their followers agitated around the country, distributing the printed word and learning to speak whenever an audience could be found. They formed the first trade unions and producer and consumer cooperatives in working-class communities. They helped generate the climate of opposition to the prevailing order that fed into the revolutions of 1848. The cause in 1848 was not theirs alone, by any means, but the early activists inserted a minority, socialist strain into the agitation surrounding the revolts that spread all over Europe.

These engagements generated intense hostility from the forces of order, governments, industrialists, and the churches. The dreary run of arrests, prison sentences, exile, and, sometimes, execution became a feature of the activist life. For the representatives of order, the utopian socialists represented dangerous, even perverse, ideas, and they went to great lengths to paint the socialists as destroyers not just of the politi-

cal and social order but of the family and morality as well.

The marxian impulse. The utopian socialists suffered in the widespread repressions that followed the revolutions of 1848. But there were inherent weaknesses in their ideas that also contributed to their decline (though not disappearance) in the second half of the nineteenth century. The biggest problem was the small-scale orientation of utopian socialism at a time when industrial units were becoming ever larger and the wave of nationalism was superimposing national upon local and regional identities. By 1880 or so, utopian socialism seemed somewhat quaint, the product of an earlier, now largely surmounted, era. Marxian socialism could meld far more easily with nationalism than could utopian socialism. Moreover, the Owenite and Icarian communities suffered the fate of so many communal organizations that set themselves apart from society. A kind of sterile infighting set in, along with severe economic difficulties. A few of the communities would survive into the twentieth century, carrying along traces of their original egalitarian ideas. But almost no one could imagine them to be the pioneers of new forms of social and political organization.

Instead, over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, the ideological direction shifted to marxism. One should not imagine that marxism became easily and completely the single or even dominant expression of socialism. Various strands of anarchism had strong followings, especially in the Mediterranean regions of Europe and in Russia. Moderate socialists, especially in Great Britain, explicitly rejected marxism. Even in Germany, syndicalist-type socialism, rooted in the trade unions and contemptuous of politics and the state, had significant support in particular regions and trades, notably in the Berlin construction trades, among others. The supporters of Marx and Engels fought long and hard in France and Russia to establish their own parties and their domination over other groups, and they were never completely successful. The majority of workers all across the Continent remained outside the socialist camp and affiliated with Catholic, conservative, or liberal parties.

Nonetheless, it was marxism that became the dominant ideology of the socialist labor movement. Marxism offered militants and workers a clear perspective on contemporary society and a sense of history. For those who engaged the ideas, even on a cursory level—and Engels’s “Socialism, Utopian and Scientific,” was probably the most accessible and widely read summation—marxism gave people an understanding of how capitalism had emerged and how it

would be, inevitably, superseded. By accepting and even promoting industrialism and the nation-state and, at the same time, ruthlessly critiquing them, marxism accorded with the lived realities of many workers, who lived within these structures yet chafed at their oppressions. Marxism also promised, in essence, a developmental dictatorship to the more backward parts of Europe—that is, a system that would bring more underdeveloped areas into the era of the factory and the nation-state, and then would go beyond them.

Still, marxism retained many of the impulses of the utopian socialists who both preceded and were contemporaries of Marx and Engels. Like the utopians, marxism promised an end to history, a point at which all the bloody, ceaseless conflicts that had defined history would truly be surmounted. Society would be harmonious, egalitarian, and democratic. Self-government in a world of equality would create the substratum that would allow individuals to develop freely their own talents and interests. The clash between individual and society would be forever erased. And that essential contradiction of capitalism—social production coupled with private ownership of the means of production—would also be surmounted, leading to unparalleled riches for all.

Marxist arguments continued to appeal to many artisans, who, along with intellectuals, often provided the leadership for the political movements that resulted. (The German socialist leader August Bebel, for example, was from an artisanal background.) But the ideology and above all the strong emphasis on solid political organization also attracted factory workers and miners, many of whom, by the last third of the nineteenth century, became durable supporters. Finally, it was at this point that peasants in certain regions, because of tensions over landownership or traditions of regional dissent, moved toward socialist commitment. This was the case in the countryside around Bologna, Italy, for example, and also in southeastern France.

THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF SOCIALISM

Marxism provided a heady vision, and it helps explain why a new surge of the socialist movement began in the 1860s and then took off, especially from the 1880s, and continued well into the twentieth century.

Organization and the movement before World War I. The socialist upsurge began more or less concomitantly in all the countries of central and western Europe and then spread more slowly into eastern

Europe, where the economies were less developed and the political systems more repressive. The socialist upsurge did not occur easily, and it was not a simple creation of political ideologues. Socialism as a movement was shaped not just by the ideology of marxism but also and very profoundly by the proletarian milieu in which it was anchored.

Around the 1860s in central and western Europe, that milieu was still largely artisanal in nature despite the tremendous growth of factories. The first socialists tended not to be factory proletarians, those idealized by Marx, but skilled, male craft workers who labored in small shops, some of which they owned. They had not been subject to the difficulties of factory labor, but had very definitely felt their livelihoods and ways of life threatened by the advance of factory production and the capitalist market. Some of these people became the key rank-and-file militants of the socialist movement, those who spread the word, organized cooperatives and trade unions, and helped found, in the 1870s, the first marxian socialist parties that would last long into the twentieth century. Increasingly, they began to attract factory workers to their side as well, though many of those workers first entered the trade unions, especially when the so-called “new unionism” of the 1890s emerged, with mass unions in large-scale enterprises like the docks, coal mines, and steel factories. New unionism was clearly tied to the contemporaneous “second industrial revolution” based on very large-scale production and on the high technology of the day and typified by chemicals production, electric-power generation, steel manufacturing, and deep-shaft mining.

Germans succeeded in creating the largest socialist party in this era, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). This feat alone would warrant attention to the SPD. In addition, the SPD became the model party of the Second International, the association of socialist parties formed in 1889. Because of its size and ideological sophistication, and because, after all, Marx and Engels were German, the SPD was seen as their filial descendant.

Around 1900, the model socialist in Germany, as well as in Britain and soon also in Russia, was a male skilled worker, self-disciplined at work and at home and dedicated to the cause. In this period the “cradle-to-grave” concept—the notion that one would be involved in the party through the entire life course, and that the party would also take care of its members—became firmly ensconced. Children and youth would spend their free time in the libraries and clubs accommodated in union or party halls. They would distribute party leaflets and sell its newspapers on street corners. As apprentices, they would be prepared

to enter the union along with learning a trade. As adults, they would distribute party writings; demonstrate in support of free suffrage, higher wages, and peace; wander to different localities and workplaces as agitators for the party; stand for election as union delegates; and, if they lived in a country where democratic norms prevailed, run for the local city council. They might also learn to administer the arcane rules of state-supervised health plans, or learn how to counsel workers to obtain their accident insurance or old-age pensions. Their free time might be spent in the socialist choir or bicycle club. After a Sunday outing with the family, they might retire to the party hall for beer and a hot meal.

The situation for women was more complex, and everywhere women were a distinct, and sometimes minute, proportion of the organized socialist movement. Despite the socialist call for equality between men and women, the male “family wage” had become a fairly common ideal in the socialist movement. By demanding that working-class families be able to live on male wage earning, the socialist parties absorbed the common dual-spheres rhetoric of the age, which charged women with maintaining and developing the domestic sphere. In this manner, socialism supported patriarchal power. Moreover, socialists were enamored with heavy metal, the coal and steel industries that were the very epitome of industrialism and that employed few female workers. Socialists could not imagine a movement that organized only textile and commercial food workers, sectors in which women were much more prevalent, let alone those in domestic service. Yet at the same time, socialists sought to organize women into the movement, most successfully when women were allowed to join separate female groups. Some women, like Clara Zetkin and Adelheid Popp, countered the intense male prejudice of the movement. Like male militants, they found in socialism a setting where they could develop their talents and interests and give meaning to their lives.

Socialism was never, then, simply a political movement. It became inscribed in the social and cultural life of workers and militants, male and female, in very profound ways. There were towns and neighborhoods in Germany, France, Britain, and Scandinavia that acquired a pronounced socialist tone by the time of World War I. Clearly, the movement itself depended upon the tight intertwining of workplace and community that marked the age of high industrialization. There were always competing and overlapping identities—of religion, region, gender, and nationality. But an identification with class was probably strongest in Europe between 1880 and 1960, when workers encountered one another in the factory,

on the streetcar or train commuting to work, and on the sidewalks and in the courtyards and pubs of the neighborhood. Upon that social reality, socialism provided an added layer of identity, one that gave ideological meaning to the status of worker.

Farther east on the Continent, socialism was far less rooted in society, if for no other reason than that industry was much less developed. Still, significant socialist parties had emerged in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Poland, and Russia, and they too won at least a few pockets of support. The harshly repressive political conditions, especially in Russia, resulted in a more militant, still angrier tone to the socialist parties. Almost every leading socialist in the Russian Empire endured the horrendous conditions of tsarist prisons and Siberian exile. They had little opportunity and fewer resources to provide the recreational programs and representation that socialists gave to workers in the western countries. They also competed with more peasant-based parties that represented a nonmarxian, populist form of socialism. A more typical form of contact between socialist militants and regular workers in these areas was literacy groups, in which socialist militants, often intellectuals, strove to teach workers, many of them only weeks removed from the villages, to read, and thereby introduce them to socialist teachings. Surreptitious trade unions were another form of organization, as was the establishment of underground couriers, who would distribute pamphlets and other literature.

Sometimes the rigors of underground life brought out the worst aspects of conspiratorial mentalities—sterile ideological conflicts, authoritarian dealings with others, arrogant confidence in the righteousness of one's own cause, and acts of terror against opponents. Indeed, in his famous tract *What Is to Be Done?* (1902) Vladimir Ilich Lenin turned many of the aspects of party life specific to the authoritarian conditions of Russia into the model organizational form for all socialist parties. Lenin wrote rhapsodically about the most severe discipline and most complete devotion required of party members, who were to be professional revolutionaries. Going further than most contemporary socialists and sharply modifying standard marxism, Lenin also argued that workers would not automatically develop revolutionary class consciousness. Instead, the revolutionary socialist party had to bring class consciousness to the proletariat.

Lenin's views were by no means universally accepted even within the marxian wing of the Russian socialist movement. Nor were the conflicts restricted to the east. The socialist movement, always diverse, faced severe internal dissension in the two decades before World War I. The "revisionist controversy," be-

gun in the 1890s, can be seen as the precursor to the great divide that would open up between socialists and communists in the wake of World War I. Initially fought out within the SPD, the conflict soon spilled over to the other member parties of the Second International. Eduard Bernstein, a leading figure in the SPD, argued that capitalism was not dividing into two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, as Marx had predicted. Instead, the middle class was expanding. Socialist parties had to win the backing of the members of the middle class as well as proletarians if they were ever to come to power with majority support. Socialism would then be implemented gradually and democratically. An accumulation of reforms, not armed revolution, would create the socialist future. Bernstein was opposed by Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg, who would later have their own differences, but for a time at least were united in upholding the marxian orthodoxy of revolution against Bernstein's more accurate sociological analysis of capitalism.

Most socialist workers, it can safely be estimated, were closer to the revisionist than the revolutionary position. Despite all the fire and brimstone of marxian rhetoric, which the socialist parties happily reproduced, in Germany, France, Britain, and Scandinavia socialists were increasingly drawn into the administration of the state. If not at the very top levels, at least in the municipalities, welfare agencies, and state-supervised labor markets, socialists worked ardently to improve the daily existence of the working class. They had successes, and the revolutionary impulse waned, at least in central and western Europe. At the same time, in the years just before World War I, class conflict grew exceedingly intense. Strikes and demonstrations became ever more prevalent, inspiring great unease among the upper classes, great hopes among workers and socialist militants. Luxemburg gave voice to this view with her idealization of mass spontaneous strikes, which was based on her observations of the 1905 Revolution in the Russian Empire.

World War I and socialist movements. On the eve of World War I, socialism had become a powerful movement in many countries. As political and diplomatic tensions accelerated in Europe in the summer of 1914, socialists made concerted efforts to prevent the advent of war. In every country they held great rallies in favor of peace, and the national leaderships convened for deliberations under the rubric of the Second International. But the SPD, attracted by the force of nationalism, fearful of government repression and a Russian invasion, voted in support of war credits in the German parliament—in contradiction to the antiwar position that both the German party and the

International had expressed for years. With very few exceptions, the other socialist parties followed suit. Contrary to long-held opinions, however, the most recent research has shown that workers did not all march enthusiastically off to war. The vote for war remained controversial among the rank and file, and many went off to war bitter at their own leaders and fearful of the realities of warfare.

World War I, the first total war in history, had unprecedented consequences for the working class and the socialist movement. As states directed resources, human and material, into the war-related industries, the working class became more concentrated in heavy industry and the more urbanized industrial areas. By and large, this was not the first time that women were drawn into the industrial labor force, as the most recent research has shown, revising another long-standing myth from the war era. But there were important sectoral shifts in women's labor, out of textiles, commercial food processing, and small-scale production generally and into the metalworking and munitions factories. Female workers were also becoming more highly skilled. The working class became more concentrated, accentuating those links between community and workplace, the sense of a common destiny, that underpinned the rise of the socialist movement.

This restructuring occurred in the midst of the enormously high death rate suffered by soldiers at the front and the intense losses and hardships endured by the population at home. Moreover, the state, since it had assumed such enormous powers during the war, became the object of hatred and the target of protests.

With increasing breadth moving west to east across Europe, a chasm opened up between populations and governments and between workers and their socialist representatives who supported the war effort. In many places, notably the metalworking and munitions factories of Düsseldorf, Berlin, Turin, Petrograd, and elsewhere, incremental change seemed a rather unsatisfying program as food supplies and official rations plummeted, the number of working hours grew incessantly, and increasing numbers of soldiers never returned or came back physically and psychologically wounded.

The result of popular discontent was a wave of strikes and revolutions on a scale not seen since 1848. Typically, strikes broke out first over wages and food rations. Workers were often able to extract concessions from employers and the state. Quickly, though, strikes became more overtly politicized as workers raised demands for an end to the war and for democratization. In Russia, the strikes in February 1917 led almost seamlessly to revolution when the troops began to follow the sentiments of workers, many of them female, and Tsar Nicholas II realized that he had virtually no support. Elsewhere, in Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, revolution would erupt more or less concurrently with the end of the war.

Two critical factors emerged out of this vast wave of popular protest. In the course of strikes and revolutions, workers invented the "council" ("soviet" in Russian), a democratic form of representation initiated in the workplace during mass demonstrations. Typically, at the end of a great rally workers would

elect delegates to represent their interests to employers and the state. The councils from different factories in a city would convene and constitute the city council. Usually workers elected well-respected local leaders, shop stewards or other union representatives, to the councils, and most of those elected were members of one or another socialist party. The councils presented an often chaotic and confused form of governance and could not easily be assimilated into the existing state structure. Leon Trotsky famously labeled the situation in Russia between the February Revolution and the October Bolshevik Revolution as the period of dual power, when the executive of the councils and a more regular state ministry existed side by side. At first, the councils were rather submissive to the government, but in the course of the year they became far more assertive, and each body began jockeying for power.

However chaotic the situation, however unfulfilled the leaders' promises went, the councils represented the potential for a more democratic form of governance than that which prevailed both in the Soviet Union and in the West. The councils represented a distinctively twentieth-century model that emerged out of the disastrous conditions of war, out of the long-term process of capitalist development that concentrated a good segment of the working class in the heavy industries, and out of the decades of socialist organization that had intensified the sense of class identity and promoted the ideas of democracy and

socialism as the solution to the travails of life under capitalism.

But the struggle over the councils, which lasted in many countries until 1921, also revealed the limits of socialism's democratic promise. Men were not the only workers who went out on strike, nor were strikes the only manifestation of workers' protests in the World War I era. Women initiated strikes in many factories, and they launched demonstrations and riots designed to force merchants and government officials to lower food prices. Yet all across Europe, women were forced out of the factories at war's end as the men returned from the front. Socialists, trade unionists, employers, government officials—all were united in the belief that men deserved priority in the job market. The vain, desperate search for a return to "normalcy" meant that women were to return to home and hearth and men were to regain their supposedly rightful place at the workbench. All of the politically active groups could envisage, with hopes or fears, depending on the perspective, a new order arising out of the workplace and the councils. None of them could imagine the contours of a future society based on female drill press operators or demonstrations and riots in the marketplace.

The Bolshevik Revolution. The second enormous consequence of World War I was the fatal, irreparable division of the labor movement into communist and

socialist wings. The February Revolution that had toppled the tsarist system had inspired nearly universal support among socialists and great hopes for a future democratic Europe. The Bolshevik Revolution aroused almost immediate criticism, which became ever more fervent as the Bolsheviks undertook antidemocratic measures, such as dispersing the Constitutional Convention because Bolsheviks were in the minority of those elected to the body. When counterrevolutionaries launched a civil war that lasted from 1918 to 1920, the Bolsheviks responded with the organization of the Red Army and the open advocacy of terror against political opponents. To many Western socialists, the Bolsheviks merely mirrored the traditional authoritarianism and violence of tsarist Russia. “Russian conditions” became a watchword for avoiding experiments like the council system and a term that conjured up images of chaos, violence, and backwardness. A good deal of prejudice against Slavs, so deep that it approached a racialized hostility, was bound up with these views. To many well-schooled marxists, the Bolsheviks had violated the laws of history by trying to push Russia from its peasant-based underdevelopment to the socialist future without bothering to linger in the intermediary stage of bourgeois capitalism.

Yet to many workers and socialists, the Bolshevik Revolution became a great rallying point. After the long, dreary, miserable years of war, a war that so many socialist leaders had supported, the audacity of the Bolsheviks, their willingness to seize and defend power in the name of socialism and their unbridled opposition to the war, proved inspiring. The Bolsheviks promised the socialist future in the here and now, and that was enough for many people. Many of these hopes would be dashed over the course of time—the disillusionment with communism is a pronounced literary genre of the twentieth century, resulting in shelf loads of epochal novels and memoirs. Arthur Koestler’s *Darkness at Noon* (1940) is simply one of the most famous, but it was hardly the first of its kind.

Nonetheless, communism would continue to draw powerful support, even in its most undemocratic, murderous periods under Joseph Stalin. Like the socialists before them, communists proved dedicated and tireless organizers. In particular neighborhoods and towns all over Europe—in Wales and Scotland, in Berlin, in the Paris suburbs, in Turin—communism became a part of everyday culture, structuring and giving meaning to the lives of its supporters. Despite a few lapses, notably the period of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact from 1939 to 1941, in the 1930s and 1940s communists proved the most consistent opponents of Nazism and fascism. Their prominent and effective roles in the resistance against

German occupation led to the high tide of communism from around 1943 to 1956, when the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, revealed publicly the immense crimes of Stalin. In that same year, the televised images of Soviet tanks crushing the Hungarian revolt, combined with the impact of Khrushchev’s revelations, destroyed for many people the allure of communism, although communist power remained in place for another thirty-five years.

Despite the virulence of the communist-socialist split and the growing competition from mass consumer culture, the 1920s were the high point of a specifically socialist culture in Great Britain and the German-speaking countries. “Red Vienna” became a model socialist municipality. Socialists implemented extensive social-welfare and cultural programs, organized giant festivities, and built well-run city housing for workers. On a smaller scale, similar programs were initiated in a number of German cities that had significant socialist representation in the municipal governments. Socialist ideals were woven through daily life, which also now became the object of discipline and reform by socialist leaders who found the unruly aspects of working-class life distasteful and an expression of the moral degeneration of life under capitalism.

The social democratic model. Socialist culture in central Europe was effectively quashed by the rise of Nazism. But in Sweden socialists came to power in the 1930s in alliance with the rural population and established a successful system that combined an extensive social welfare program with democratic participation. This was the archetypal social democratic model that, in one fashion or another, was followed by other socialist parties that came to power after World War II. Its attraction was so great that even conservative parties modeled some of their programs along similar lines, if only to outcompete their socialist rivals.

The success of the social democratic system went hand in hand with the decline of socialism and the working-class subculture that had sustained it. Socialists in central and western Europe were now deeply entwined with liberal capitalism. By the 1960s, the utopian impulse of socialism had all but disappeared. Socialism now meant trade union officials who negotiated wage increases and improved benefits and government leaders who raised old-age pensions. The progress here should not be underestimated. After the upheavals of two world wars, worldwide depression, and fascist violence, the postwar decades offered workers, for the first time, a measure of economic security and material improvement. Without the force of socialism, these improvements would never have occurred, certainly not on the scale that enabled work-

ers, by the 1960s, to enjoy four-week vacations and the pleasures of the automobile.

Yet the mobility offered by the automobile symbolized the breakup of working-class communities. Since World War II capitalist expansion has displaced the once-tight linkages between residency and workplace. Highways, automobiles, and urban renewal dispersed working-class populations. Most recently, work itself has sometimes been dispersed into cyberspace by computers and all over the globe by the hyperactive mobility of capital. The influx into Europe from the late 1950s onward of large numbers of immigrants from Africa and Asia has sometimes made ethnic and national identities seem far more salient than class identities. Consumerism and mass, popular culture have provided alternative sites of leisure and entertainment and, most definitely, values different from those invoked by the socialist and communist parties.

Historians and sociologists continue to debate what socialism or communism meant to workers in affluent European consumer societies. Proclamations about the “end of ideology” in postwar Europe seemed premature. But it is true that the lives of workers moved beyond the confines of socialist organizations and that attention to consumer goals diluted political activism. These pressures pushed for greater pragmatism in socialist and communist parties alike.

Socialism, then, grew in tandem with industrialization and nation-building, two central features of Europe’s modern epoch. Socialism’s tide ran high in the period from roughly 1840 to 1960; its decline is symptomatic of Europe’s move into a postmodern age. Work and workers remain, but a specifically socialist class consciousness is ever harder to find. Yet socialism’s past provides a storehouse of democratic ideas and promises that may still find its advocates.

See also Marxism and Radical History (volume 1); The Welfare State; Communism (volume 2); Social Class; Artisans; Working Classes (in this volume); Gender and Work; Factory Work (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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GENDER AND POPULAR PROTEST



Anna Clark

Eighteenth-century observers of popular protests often characterized food riots as female. As popular protest evolved into more organized forms, such as strikes and political demonstrations, did the female presence fade? Indeed, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century crowds were depicted as a masculine sea of sober dark suits and hats. But a closer look reveals women's persistent presence. Food riots reerupted in the years around World War I, a time of crisis. As historian Temma Kaplan argues, women expressed "female consciousness," drawing on neighborhood bonds to defend their families and communities. Does this mean that personal, local, and familial ties motivated women, rather than the impersonal, formal, organizational bonds that attracted men? The historical record shows that domestic obligations kept many women from joining trade unions or other political organizations, but male hostility also deterred women. Even without formal organizations, however, women did not riot only as mothers of families; they went on strike as workers, joined radical processions, and even triggered revolutions.

THE SYMBOLISM OF GENDER

Eighteenth-century observers often dismissed riots as the work of disorderly "women and boys." It is important therefore, when analyzing popular protest, to consider masculinity as well as femininity in a gender analysis. The association of women and boys with disorderliness derived, in part, from the fact that both groups were excluded from the formal power structures of towns and villages. Indeed, young men could threaten a community's order by rioting and carousing simply for entertainment. But young men also played an important role in the informal means by which small communities regulated themselves, such as "rough music" and other moral rituals. In "rough music," villagers would rebuke those who violated community norms—for instance, by inflicting domestic violence—through congregating at their house at

night, banging pots and pans. Popular protests often adopted rough music's repertoire.

Women also played an important symbolic role in popular protests when they drew upon the carnivalesque tradition. In carnival, the world could be turned upside down for a day: women could rule men, the young the old, and servants the master. Protests also borrowed the ritual and display of carnivals, such as processions bearing effigies of hated authorities or celebrated heroes. In more organized community protests, such as mass processions, young girls dressed in white and carrying flowers often served as symbols of family, purity, and unity. But women were also emblematic of defiance, female nature being seen as more disorderly and irrational than the male: sometimes men who rioted or engaged in nocturnal terrorism would take on a female persona, such as "Queen Sive," the mythical queen of the fairies in eighteenth-century Ireland, or "Lady Lud" in the Luddite riots against machinery in Nottingham in 1811–1813.

Popular protests were not, of course, simply irrational, carnivalesque outbursts of disorder. Rather, popular protests occurred when authority failed to live up to its obligations, or even disintegrated. Women defended their communities alongside men when outside forces threatened them. For instance, during the sixteenth-century Peasant Wars, women went on mass deputations to plead for the freedom of husbands who had been conscripted or captured; in 1522, fifty women invaded Basel's city hall demanding recognition for a Lutheran preacher. During wartime, villages might send out women to confront soldiers, hoping that the military men would hesitate at shooting females.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, contemporaries often identified food riots with women. In food riots, inhabitants of a community would protest the high prices or scarcity of food. Rather than just rampaging and seizing food, however, they often appealed to authorities to enforce old laws against hoarding or profiteering. If such protests went unheeded, crowds would appropriate grain or bread;

the ringleaders would then sell the food at what they considered to be a “just price.” E. P. Thompson identified this practice as the defense of a “moral economy,” in which prices were based on need, against an encroaching market economy. Women played an essential role in the moral economy because they were chiefly responsible for feeding their families, and because they daily went to market to purchase provisions, thus easily assembling for protests. But as the historian John Bohstedt has pointed out, most food rioters were not women; in eighteenth-century England, for instance, it is estimated that they composed between 14 and 33 percent of food rioters. And women did not only participate in riots as consumers but also as workers and as members of communities, alongside men. For instance, women were more likely to participate in food riots in industrial towns, where they were often employed in new industries.

FOOD RIOTS AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Food riots could also have a wider impact when they occurred in the context of a breakdown in state authority, as in the French Revolution. Food riots were endemic during subsistence crises in eighteenth-century France; in fact, women’s right to protest food shortages and high prices was implicitly recognized, although authorities would arrest women who attacked persons or destroyed property, as in the Flour War in Paris of 1775. Such riots acquired a political dimension in 1789. Women were excluded from the Estates General, the formal assemblage of representatives of the clergy, the nobility, and the people, which was called in 1789, but as the third estate (the people) transformed itself into the National Assembly, the common people of Paris became more and more interested in political affairs. Orators denounced the king in Paris streets and cafés, and blamed his foreign mercenaries and aristocratic hoarders for the food crisis that plagued the city. While women played only a minor role in the fall of the Bastille prison on 14 July 1789, they helped to transform the position of the monarchy in October. On 5 October, the fishwives, market women, and female consumers of Paris, accustomed to spreading the news of the day as they bought and sold provisions, decided they needed to take action to ensure that the people of Paris were fed. A huge crowd of five to six thousand women marched from Paris to Versailles, sweeping up passersby in their wake. Once the weary and footsore women arrived in Versailles, they crowded into the palace and sent a delegation to the king. Fearing for their lives, the next

day the king and queen and their children returned to Paris, their coach led by a crowd of women who chanted that they were bringing back the baker, the baker’s wife, and the baker’s children.

The women of the *sansculottes* played a pivotal role when crowds erupted and changed the direction of the Revolution. They spread rumors, incited hostility to aristocrats, and attended not only club meetings but executions with enthusiasm. In 1793 women of the popular classes joined male *sansculottes* in calling for an insurrection against the moderate Girondins. They also protested and even rioted to enforce a maximum on the price of bread, sugar, soap, and candles; by conceding to their demands, the Jacobins gained *sansculotte* support in their struggle to attain power. Female revolutionaries organized women’s groups in thirty cities around the country, most notably the first feminist organization: the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women, founded by Pauline Léon and Claire Lacombe, a chocolate maker and actress respectively, in 1793. This society discussed women’s rights, but their public political protests mainly stemmed from their militant Jacobinism. They vehemently supported the war effort, and even patrolled the streets of Paris, allegedly in trousers, urging women to sacrifice for the war, forcing passersby to don the tricolor, denouncing aristocrats, and demanding a maximum on prices. However, the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women clashed with other, less militant women, especially the market women, who did not support the price maximum. And their fierce feminism clashed with the Jacobins’ domestic ideology, derived from Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Jacobins denounced the revolutionary women as *harridans* who had no place in politics; women, they proclaimed, should remain in the home and raise good republican citizens. Some prominent feminists, such as Olympe de Gouges, were executed in the Terror, and Léon and Lacombe were imprisoned. After the Terror, poor women increasingly turned against the Revolution, instead rioting in support of the Catholic Church, which they saw as consoling them for the hardships that the Revolution had failed to ameliorate.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY LABOR ISSUES

By the early nineteenth century, popular protest focused on labor issues. Women sometimes participated in labor protests as workers and as members of working-class communities, but trade unionism tended to be dominated by a tradition of male bonding and a concomitant hostility to female workers. Trade un-

ions descended originally from the artisanal associations of the early modern period. As guilds disintegrated and the interests of masters, apprentices, and journeymen diverged, male workers formed their own associations. Journeymen, especially, formed groups known in France as *compagnonnage* and in Germany as *Wandervogels*; in Britain they were often called friendly societies. As members of such groups, men could find work in any city. As they traveled, they also transmitted a heritage of song, legend, and resistance to masters' work discipline through drinking customs and labor organization. They based their identity as workers on fraternal bonding and often on a hostility to women, which had roots in both personal and labor relations. Journeymen could no longer expect to attain the status of mastership in their late twenties, acquiring a wife and a workshop at once; instead, they were condemned to a perpetual adolescence, marrying or cohabiting without earning enough to support a wife. Their ties to their fellow workmen competed with the claims of home. In addition, journeymen traditionally kept up their wages by insisting that all craftsmen go through a strict apprenticeship, but they faced increasing competition from unapprenticed labor, especially from women. During the late eighteenth century, journeymen often struck against the competition of female labor, especially when women ran machines, which undercut male skill.

Textile workers, however, followed a different pattern of popular protest, since their labor process was based on the family rather than the masculine workshop. The father might weave and the wife and children card and spin. As the handloom weaving industry expanded once mechanization increased the supply of yarn, women increasingly wove as well. Textile workers, such as weavers, sometimes attempted to follow artisan traditions in keeping out unapprenticed workers, such as women, but the artisan tradition was not particularly suited to an industry in which over half the workers were women and children. Weavers therefore had to organize on the basis of community as well as workplace bonds.

As textile processes became mechanized, first in spinning, then weaving, this gender division of labor translated into factories. Skilled men, such as cotton spinners or power loom mechanics, would oversee the work of women and children, who usually composed over half of the workforce. To strike effectively, therefore, male workers also had to draw upon kinship and neighborhood ties, and gain the support of female and child piecers and power loom weavers. When they did so, their strikes could be quite formidable. For instance, in 1818 a strike wave broke out in Lancashire, England, as male and female factory workers violently

protested against the introduction of lower-paid female workers who were used to undercut the wages of skilled men. Male and female workers viciously attacked the rival female workers, threatened to burn down factories, and also rioted against high food prices.

In areas where women worked as wage earners, they were also much more likely to participate in collective political action. To be sure, radical republican ideology regarded men as more rational, disciplined, and suited to public life, while women, it was thought, should look after home and family. However, radical women could turn these notions to their own ends, claiming that as wives and mothers they had a right to protest, to strike, to appear on platforms, to speak in radical causes, in order to defend their families. While the middle-class notion of domesticity restricted women to their homes, working-class women could combine a domestic identity with participation in popular protest. Their bold actions belied their modest words. For instance, in 1819 in northern England, women formed Female Reform Societies to support the cause of male suffrage and radical reform. They embroidered banners and carried them in the great reform procession to Manchester on 16 August 1819. When the yeomen cavalry charged the crowd, women fell alongside men in the massacre known as Peterloo.

REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGIES AND INSURRECTIONS

In general, radical organizations defined republican ideologies and worker consciousness in masculine terms. However, radicals espoused varied visions of masculinity. For instance, the British Chartist movement for the vote split into "moral force" and "physical force" wings in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Those who advocated "moral force" believed that radicals must denounce violence and organize in a peaceful, disciplined manner to prove their respectable manhood. Although the "moral force" wing also usually denounced women's wage earning as destructive to the working-class family, their moral reform efforts also opened up some space within the movement for women. Chartists often tried to create alternatives to the pub, sponsoring Chartist churches, temperance societies, and soirees that could appeal to women as well as men.

Yet frustrated by peaceful efforts for reform, radicals sometimes turned to a more insurrectionary tradition in which physical, military prowess took precedence and excluded women. Men could imagine

themselves as conspiratorial heroes fomenting revolution. In the Chartist movement for the vote of the 1830s and 1840s, for instance, the “physical force” wing often marched and drilled, and mounted a few abortive insurrections. They justified their activities as defending their wives and families, proclaiming, “For child and wife, we will fight to the knife!”

The early nineteenth-century French republican tradition also celebrated revolutionary violence, seen in masculine terms as the brave citizen able to fight on the barricades. Often driven underground by monarchical repression, republicans covertly congregated in cafés, largely frequented by men. So even when repression forced radical organizations to base themselves on informal community networks rather than legal organization, this informality did not incorporate women. Instead, republican ideology celebrated fraternal bonding and ignored women.

When open insurrections broke out, however, as in 1848, a few women fought on the barricades, and more incited men to action or planted flags on cobblestones, especially in areas where women were very active in industry, such as Rouen’s textile mills. And 1848 stimulated the formation of women’s political clubs such as the Société de la Voix des Femmes. The 1848 revolution in France, of course, triggered radical and nationalist uprisings in Germany and elsewhere. In Germany, the insurrection had been preceded by the potato riots of 1847, in which women took a significant part. In October 1848, democratic women presented a petition demanding women’s right to vote. Wearing revolutionary colors, women fought on the barricades in Dresden. The year 1848 also witnessed the formation of many women’s political and charitable associations, including newspapers and schools, but the repression of the 1840s crushed the women’s movement in the German states until the 1860s.

Women also played a highly visible role in the Paris Commune of 1870–1871. The Prussian army came to the brink of invading Paris in 1870; Napoleon III had capitulated to the invaders, quickly offering peace terms. But the working people of Paris, organized along anarchist and socialist lines, refused to surrender to the Prussians. Instead, they seized the cannons of the national army and took over the government of Paris themselves. The working-class women of Paris either fraternized with government soldiers to distract them or threw rocks at troops and cut the traces of horses’ harnesses. Rumors spread that prostitutes urged a mob to lynch two French generals at the inception of the Commune. During the Commune’s regime, hundreds of women evoked the heroic role played by women in the October Days of 1789

by marching to aid the Commune and the National Guard. As in the earlier revolution, they also assembled in a few debating societies, discussing issues such as divorce, women’s rights, and peace. However, the national army attacked and overcame the Commune in May 1871. Many women perished as thousands of Communards died defending the city, or were executed as they were captured. The press denounced the women of the Commune as bloodthirsty, anarchistic harridans, depicting them as *pétroleuses* who set Paris alight as the Commune collapsed. Women thus symbolized the threat the Commune posed to bourgeois France.

In Britain during the same era, workingmen’s protests became much more disciplined and controlled, as skilled men organized themselves into legal associations and trade unions. They would assemble in large, peaceful demonstrations with elaborate trade union banners, demanding their political rights as manly workers. However, when moderate action failed, occasionally the hint of disorder could impel the government to act. In 1867, when Parliament delayed passing the Second Reform Bill, enfranchising urban working men, working men illegally assembled in Hyde Park, breaking down iron railings and trampling on flower beds. Parliament quickly passed the bill.

WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE

Women agitating for female suffrage in Britain emulated the workingmen’s campaign for the vote. After decades of lobbying, pamphleteering, and organizing, to no avail, feminists were told by politicians that they must prove that large numbers of women wished for the vote. To do so, by 1905 the suffragettes (militant advocates for the vote) began more public, mass demonstrations of women and their supporters. As had male trade unionists, they marched with banners and adopted their own iconography of colors (purple, green, and white), as emblematic of the purity and righteousness of their cause. Workingwomen, especially in Lancashire, also began organizing for suffrage. But when peaceful protest failed by 1912, suffragettes turned to more violent means of popular protest, blowing up postboxes, smashing windows, hectoring politicians, and chaining themselves to railings. They intended to gain attention for their cause, to force politicians to act, and to court martyrdom. In prison they went on hunger strikes to demand the status of political prisoners, only to be force-fed. Released when dreadfully ill, their gaunt faces declared their determination to gain the vote.

On the Continent, the women's movement for the vote faced much more formidable obstacles. In France, the Radical Party believed female suffrage would lead to clerical dominance, but a few feminists nonetheless engaged in spectacular activities, such as burning the discriminatory Civil Code in public, overturning ballot boxes, and breaking the windows of polling booths, although the feminist movement never engaged in widespread property destruction as in England. In Belgium, sections of the socialist movement had supported women's rights, but when socialists abandoned protest politics and entered the government with the Liberals in 1902, they gave up their support for women's suffrage. In Germany, women were prohibited from joining political parties or indeed from attending political meetings altogether until 1908 under the Prussian Law of Association.

WOMEN AND TRADE UNIONS

During the late nineteenth century, socialist and trade union movements were quite hostile to middle-class feminism. Although some socialists wished to organize and support women as workers or mothers, labor movements generally refused to acknowledge women as workers. Male trade unionists often assumed that women were unorganizable as workers because work did not provide the center of their identities, being only an interval before marriage and child rearing.

Especially in areas such as Russia, they often depicted women as ignorant, illiterate, and in thrall to priests.

In the mid to late nineteenth century, trade unionists all over Europe increasingly adopted the ideal of the breadwinner wage, the notion that a man should be able to feed his family; concomitantly, they often demanded that girls and women be excluded from the workforce, or at least from factories and mines, to preserve the working-class family and keep up male wages. Did this notion of the breadwinner wage lead to women's exclusion from popular protest? Male workers feared that employers would use cheap female labor to undercut their wages. For instance, after Milanese ribbon weavers successfully struck against wage cuts in the 1860s and 1870s, employers substituted female for male ribbon weavers. But the male ribbon weavers did not try to incorporate the women into their trade union organization or to impel them to go on strike. As a result, the trade became low-waged and feminized.

Some historians, however, have argued that working-class women went along with demands for the exclusion of women workers and for the breadwinner wage for men because they wanted their husbands to earn enough so that they could stay at home instead of working long days in a noisy factory. Even if wives and mothers did not work for wages, they joined in protests for their husbands, brothers, and fathers because their family survival depended on it. For instance, in 1869, the women of La Ricamarie, France, rallied around their husbands, brothers, and sons, who were coal miners striking against wage cuts. Crowds of frenzied women insulted and even threw rocks at the soldiers who defended the mines, stirring the men to further militance. As they shared in the community mobilization, the women also shared in its vulnerability, as soldiers shot two women and a baby as well as ten men.

Women workers in late nineteenth-century industry, furthermore, were not necessarily passive and quiescent. Although women tended to compose a very low percentage of unions and socialist organizations, they often struck spontaneously not only over wage grievances but against sexual harassment and other issues. For instance, Dundee jute workers occasionally engaged in wildcat strikes against unfair labor practices, but male trade unionists never supported their actions. In trades where married women continued to work, such as tobacco in Spain, Russia, and France, and textiles in Germany and France, they were more likely to engage in strikes or even to join unions, since they had longtime ties to their workplaces and communities and a sense of pride in their skill. Tobacco workers were especially known for their militance. In

1895, when thirteen hundred “cigarette girls” struck the Laferme factory in St. Petersburg against new machines that took away women’s jobs, the women broke windows and threw the tobacco and even furniture out of the building. But female tobacco workers’ militance differed from their male counterparts. While willing to strike, they hesitated to join unions, in part because their identities were bound up in their neighborhoods and communities, not just in their work; they were just as likely to act as consumers in the marketplace, defending their families, as they were to act as workers in the factory and union. German women textile workers also built upon their identities as both women and workers to engage in collective action. They sometimes rioted against sexual harassment or engaged in wildcat strikes in solidarity when a sick woman was fired.

By the 1890s, however, some trade unions and socialist organizations did attempt to harness women’s willingness to engage in collective action. Many women joined trade unions in Germany after the Prussian Law of Association was repealed in 1908. The Social Democratic Party supported women workers in 1903, when they struck at Crimmitschau demanding ten-hour days on the basis that they needed an extra hour for home life. In the 1890s Milan tailors, realizing they could not restrict access to skill in their trade, admitted women to their union, and both men and women struck in 1892. A union also organized women in a Pirelli rubber plant in 1898, a year when Italy was wracked by strikes, demonstrations, and food riots.

Male trade unionists sometimes tried to take advantage of women’s energies for their strikes, but they often found them difficult to control. For instance, in 1913 men and women joined together in the Constancy textile strike in Barcelona, protesting low pay for women both in factory and sweated labor. For the first time, a leftist trade union group, the National Confederation of Labor (CNT), demanded higher wages for women, not just the breadwinner wage for men. But unlike male workers, women organized themselves by neighborhood, not by trade, and defined their demands to include cheaper food prices as well as higher wages. They battled authorities at the workplace and in the streets. Appalled, the men of the CNT asked them to stop, but the women kept on confronting the authorities.

WORLD WAR I

The era of World War I witnessed an upsurge of women’s strikes and food riots. During World War I,

women entered the workforce, especially in munitions, to substitute for the men at the front. During the first years of the war, most trade union, socialist, and suffrage organizations, with some significant exceptions, supported the war effort, exhorting all to sacrifice. But by 1916–1917, long hours, food shortages, and the endless slaughter of their men at the front increased discontent among women workers. In 1916 women in the war industries often engaged in spontaneous strikes. They would first meet outside the factory, in halls, even movie houses, to organize themselves into committees, to write their grievances, and to raise strike funds, and only then would they contact syndicalist trade union leaders. (Syndicalists believed that a general strike would enable labor unions to take over government and society.) Once they struck, their actions would often take on a festive, carnivalesque atmosphere as they marched around cities turning out women in other factories. As Laura Lee Downs points out, these were not just parochial strikes over local concerns, but soon linked up to wider issues as the general crisis spread. Food riots broke out, and vast crowds demonstrated against the war. Similarly, in Milan in 1917, women workers in textile factories first struck over sexual harassment and piecework, but soon broadened their concerns as they rioted for food and closed down munitions factories to protest the war.

The persistence of food riots in a time of crisis belies the conventional chronology that food riots disappeared with modernization. Rather, their reappearance signified the fragility of the modern state. When Germany faced food shortages in 1915, housewives mounted peaceful demonstrations simply requesting that the government intervene to lower prices and ensure supplies, but when local governments failed to respond, housewives began to articulate more explicitly socialist goals, demanding that the state take over all food and clothing supplies and distribute them equally to all, especially the poor. Governmental responses to these demands, while inadequate, staved off revolution. In France, just after the war, women’s agitation over food combined traditional and modern elements: they drew upon their traditional neighborhood networks, but they also cooperated with syndicalists and socialist organizations and set up their own committees.

In Russia, however, women’s strikes and food riots became symptomatic of a general crisis that resulted in the Bolshevik takeover of 1917. As early as 1905, women participated in the huge strike wave that swept through both peasants and workers in the context of political agitation and war. Along with their men, women workers and housewives demonstrated

before the Winter Palace to petition the tsar on Bloody Sunday. As the Russian polity broke down under pressure of war, women and men began dozens of protests all over Russia against shortages of bread, soap, and other essentials. Peasant women also used their status as mothers to defend their communities, using their children as shields in demonstrations so that soldiers would not shoot. But by 1913–1915, women became more confident and assertive as workers as well; textile workers, predominantly female, actually became somewhat more apt to strike than workers in male-dominated industries such as metalworking. Women's actions on International Women's Day, 23 February 1917 (Russian calendar), are widely seen as triggering the February revolution. Defying instructions by labor unions and social democrats to remain calm, both housewives and women workers demonstrated against high prices and shortages of food, pouring into the streets to urge workers to strike. This strike wave soon erupted into a massive protest against the war, which soldiers refused to suppress.

Immediately after the Bolshevik revolution, however, the Communists remained ambivalent about the place of women. They gave women legal equality and promised to collectivize childcare and housework. But some male Communists depicted strikes and demonstrations by discontented women workers and soldiers's wives as counterrevolutionary, regarding them as *babas*, ignorant and conservative peasant women who hindered the revolution. But women themselves

could exploit this stereotype, drawing upon the tradition of the *bab'i bunty*, or peasant women's riots. These were outbreaks of violent peasant opposition, which authorities viewed as irrational and hysterical. When the Communist Party introduced collective farms in the late 1920s and early 1930s, women were especially opposed to collectivization of livestock because women raised cows and hens to provide eggs and milk for their children, and to sell. Peasant communities often thrust women to the forefront of their protests against collectivization, knowing that women enjoyed a certain, if limited, immunity from punishment.

THE INTERWAR PERIOD

In some ways, gender tensions increased in the interwar years. Hardened by their service at the front, frustrated by the failure of abortive socialist insurrections, and embittered by wage cuts, inflation, and unemployment, German men, especially communists, tended to organize in a militaristic, confrontational style, marching in formation in uniforms through the streets and engaging in street battles with fascists. Women had misgivings about this increasingly violent form of politics, writes Karen Hagemann, and preferred organized cultural activities such as parades, festivals, International Women's Day, and agitation around reproductive rights.

In postwar France, conventional politics still marginalized voteless women. To make the French suffrage campaign even more difficult, all street demonstrations were banned in Paris in the early 1930s, a time of great political instability. So feminists carried out spectacular, symbolic actions, such as secretly entering the Senate public gallery and tossing pamphlets onto the politicians, hoisting banners on buses and taxis, silently demonstrating, and postering Paris. Although few women joined trade unions and the Socialist and Communist Parties (they were not even allowed to join the Radical Party until 1924), many women workers, such as factory workers and even clerks in department stores, participated in the strike wave following the election of the Popular Front in 1936. Contemporary pictures showed women workers knitting as they occupied factories, while men smoked and played cards. Even as women workers struck, however, Popular Front parties focused on a maternal, pronatal feminine image.

The Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1939 provoked an unusual efflorescence of women's political activities. Enfranchised by the republic in 1931, anarchist, socialist, communist, and republican women leapt to its defense when the civil war began. The anarchist group *Mujeres Libres* (free women) combined militant support for the republic with a demand

for female emancipation. In the first months of the civil war, the armed militia woman even became a potent symbol of republican resistance, even though she was more important as a symbol than as a representation of the number of women fighting at the front. In fact, after the initial outburst, those women who were fighting at the front were sent back to support the men through working in munitions, nursing, and propaganda. However, in 1937, when the National Confederation of Labor took over Barcelona factories in the name of the workers, female workers resisted labor discipline and protested food shortages. The fascist triumph pushed women back into the home, as in Germany and Italy.

WORLD WAR II AND AFTER

Fascist regimes and occupying forces banned trade unions and socialist organizations, of course, but the abolition of formal politics made space for women's participation in the resistance in Italy and France. Women could smuggle and spy for partisan groups, but they also overtly demonstrated against food shortages and protested against the deportation of their husbands, brothers, sons, and neighbors to labor camps in Germany. During the 1950s, however, both

left and right parties espoused a domestic role for women, once again marginalizing them in politics.

During the 1960s the New Left criticized traditional social movements for their emphasis on the workplace as the only locus of struggle; instead, the New Left engaged in spontaneous, theatrical, nonviolent protest suited for a media age. While the New Left appealed to women, it also romanticized the masculine rebel's defiance of authority. In response, the women's liberation movement invented its own form of spectacular protest, such as disrupting the Miss World contest. One wing of the women's movement also declared that women were more nurturing than men, and should therefore engage in their own autonomous protests against war. Most notably, between 1981 and 1991 women encamped around Greenham

Common, a cruise missile base in England, surrounding the base with thousands of women linking hands and blowing whistles in a form of "rough music" against nuclear missiles.

From the sixteenth century to the twentieth century, as popular protests became more organized into formal associations such as trade unions or political parties, women faded from view. But the persistence of women's strikes, food riots, and feminist actions in the twentieth century undercuts the notion that women were reluctant to engage in public political protest because of an essential feminine nature, a preference for fluid, spontaneous, personal actions. Instead, when popular protests became formalized, political actors were defined in masculine terms, which marginalized women.

See also other articles in this section.

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NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS



Gisela Kaplan

Social movements in Europe are a phenomenon of the modern era. Indeed, although there were many movements before the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were not called movements or analyzed as such because they generally failed to be based on important seminal ideas or ideologies. Instead, they tended to focus on specific grievances or specific goals. Such actions lacked any conscious intention of overturning the status quo. It is worth remembering that the Latin word *revolutio* signified the *restoration* of order, not its overthrow (as turning about, a return of the same). The term gained its new meaning only after the French Revolution. Nevertheless, in social history it can be very important to ascertain when and how a new idea started and so be able to answer the question why it became relevant and significant at a certain time in history.

The French Revolution (1789–1791) created an important baseline for modern social movements because of two very important ideas. One revolutionary idea argued that vested interests were not in the interest of the people and therefore should not be the foundation of the state. While the French Revolution did not succeed in overturning class divisions it succeeded in challenging the interests of the aristocracy and, in particular, their political power. It also challenged the church, which provided the other most powerful representatives of parliament. The “third estate,” the people, were hence to be considered as gaining new status in the politics of their nation. The second important idea, originating in seventeenth-century England, discredited, then to be later supported by the French Revolution, was to issue a Declaration of Human Rights. The important element of this declaration was the assumption that people had rights rather than just duties and that they had equal rights, no matter what their status might have been at birth. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s point well before the Revolution that “man is born free but everywhere he is in chains” referred to the social and political ills of his time, as he perceived them. However, to “unshackle” each individual, as revolutionary idealism de-

sired, proved to be difficult in practice. This was so partly because vested interests are not given up without a fight and partly because the broad restructuring of Europe in the nineteenth century favored a politics of oppression, domination, and imperialism, fought out also in two world wars and driven by fascism. It took well into the second half of the twentieth century before democracies in western Europe were on a firm footing and the ideals proposed before and during the French Revolution could be raised again.

THE ROOTS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY REVOLTS

The first events that we may see as precursors of social movements occurred in the seventeenth century, a century of great instability and of a particularly long-drawn-out war (the Thirty Years’ War, 1618–1648). These first movements of the 1640s and 1650s questioned the authority of the aristocracy and the kings. Sometimes more generally referred to as the “seventeenth-century crisis,” they affected England, France, the Spanish Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Poland. They had in common that, for fleeting and yet impressive moments, the world turned upside down and traditionally accepted social orders were suddenly overturned. When, in Catalonia and Naples, the populace took to the streets to fight against the aristocracy, led in Naples by a mere fisherman (Masaniello), contemporaries felt that these disturbances were qualitatively different from the riots of years earlier.

More ominous to the aristocracy (and even the common people) of Europe than this were the events simultaneously taking shape in England. Here it was not just a revolt but a battle cry by radical clergy and learned burghers, who claimed that great changes were required in England, not just in politics but across the entire spectrum of society. The rebellion succeeded insofar as it led a king to the executioner’s block. The beheading of Charles I of England in 1649 stirred an

immediate controversy, in which completely new concepts were debated by a small but powerful minority. Groups like the Diggers and the Levelers advocated something akin to a public health insurance system, maintenance of common land, communal life as opposed to individual ownership, and a participatory democracy based on the idea of equality. Between 1647 and 1649 the Levelers drafted an *Agreement of the People*, a type of constitution that was to form the basis for the American *Declaration of Independence* (1776)—perhaps the best index of the “modernity” of their ideas. By 1660 the Levelers and their ideas had been driven underground, but they would find an echo in the ideals of the French Revolution, which would change social and political thinking in Europe forever.

THE AGE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: 1789–1945

Large-scale unrest arose again with the Enlightenment period and the French Revolution. In the eighteenth century the French philosophes as well as English and Scottish thinkers developed the confidence to think that everything could be ascertained and explained by reason. The belief that human institutions and systems of government could be rationally analyzed, assessed, and reformed gave new justification for overturning the status quo. One group receptive to these ideas was the bourgeoisie, which emerged along with a new economic system and thinking: capitalism. In England and France, in particular, economic developments had led to the strengthening of a group of people who did not fit well the traditional three-tiered society composed of the king, the church, and the people. The “third estate” had consisted of powerless peasants, but the growth of cities and of trade in western Europe saw the rise of a class who were city dwellers, businessmen, merchants, traders, professionals (particularly lawyers). Increasingly they felt ignored by a political system entirely run by church and aristocracy. The bourgeoisie demanded more space, more freedom, and greater participation.

While some scholars no longer view the French Revolution as primarily class-based, in the classic interpretation it was led and motivated by the bourgeoisie while the common people of Paris and rural France were coopted to secure the numbers. A charter of human rights was declared, embodying the principles of the *Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité* that were the catchwords of the Revolution. Maximilien de Robespierre, later executed, pronounced the right to work, and the first feminists argued for equal rights for women. Despite countless backlashes after the

Revolution, the brief revolutionary Reign of Terror, and Napoleon’s dictatorship, the idea and expression of individual rights were to become the ethical benchmark for Europe and later for the industrialized world in general. Moreover, the forms that political action took during the Revolution defined the shape of social movements for the next century and more.

Several European uprisings and revolutions took place after the French Revolution—one set between 1830 and 1831 and another, involving large numbers of people across all of Europe, in 1848, fought over the principles of individual and national rights. These revolutions were crushed, but the social movements associated with them began to address new issues, no longer just those of a politically frustrated bourgeoisie. By the mid-nineteenth century the industrial revolution had taken off in many western European countries and, in the advanced case of England, had shown its first stark fatalities. A new social group made its entry into the history books: the factory workers. Their often appalling living and working conditions were described by Karl Marx’s collaborator, Friedrich Engels, in *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*. The labor movement coalesced around the struggle to improve these conditions and establish basic rights for workers. This movement, influenced by the writings of Marx and Engels and fanned by the socialist parties of western Europe and then Russia, put forward the most popular and powerful program for political and social change between 1870 and World War I. Its influential powers as a liberatory force for the working classes and as an advocate for an experimental egalitarianism in Europe began to decline in the 1920s, due to rising fascism and, in the East, to Stalin’s totalitarianism.

One other major movement developed in the nineteenth century—the women’s movement. Women’s movements emerged at various times and in various places throughout Europe, culminating in most western European countries (led by England) in the suffragette movement toward the end of the nineteenth century. Suffragettes demanded the vote, as Olympe de Gouge had during the French Revolution, changes in property laws and marriage laws, and a right to work.

For most Scandinavian countries, the cause of women’s rights was associated with an almost continuous agenda of social change throughout the nineteenth century. In Sweden in 1810, well before anywhere else, women gained permission to enter trade and sales occupations. In 1845 they obtained the right to inherit property. Other milestones followed, including the right to attend universities as fully enrolled students in 1873. Although many of these

rights were implemented before the rise of a significant social movement, its emergence in the late nineteenth century spurred even more change. Before it died down in the 1920s, divorce by mutual consent was made possible (1915), women gained the vote (1919), and a new family law of 1920 abolished the husband's guardianship of wife and children. Norway was the first sovereign state in Europe to give full citizenship rights to women, a process that began in 1901 and ended with full suffrage for all women in 1913. As early as 1908 the country passed a law granting women equal pay for equal work. Many of these improvements, including amendments to family law that granted women rights to control and inherit property, were the result of a widespread suffrage movement which had been active since the mid-1880s.

Another noteworthy case of very early consideration of women's rights and issues was Italy, despite its strict Catholicism. Italy had developed a strong bourgeois city culture during the Renaissance, when women filled with distinction several of the most important chairs in the universities of Italy. This past became a model for Italian women much later. After the unification of Italy in 1870, women played an active role in politics, whether in grassroots workers' movements or (usually) on the political left, even before the existence of an organized women's movement.

Before the elections of 1897, the socialist Anna Kuliscioff gained fame by calling for an end to the dehumanizing working conditions of 1.5 million Italian women. Anna Maria Mozzoni, by contrast, stressed the need for the liberation of women. As early as 1864 she advocated the right to divorce, and in 1881 she founded a league for the promotion of women's interests. In 1897 the first National Women's Union was formed in Rome, followed by other local and national organizations. One organization, *Unione Donne Italiane*, founded in 1944, existed throughout the post-World War II years and retained an important voice even at the time of the "new" women's movement of the 1970s.

Since universal suffrage was eventually achieved in all European countries, the issue of citizenship receded into the background, even though its importance was not entirely lost. Almost naturally, because of the idea of women's moral superiority that was common among the movements, many of the national women's movements joined together prior to World War I and became internationally associated in peace movements. Renewed feminist and libertarian ideas were proposed between the world wars, but they were largely confined to the brief period between the end of World War I and the rise of fascism. Renewed feminist and liberationist ideas were proposed long before the two world wars. Although their expression

was driven underground by fascism, ideas of earlier generations never died and resurfaced in the second-part of the twentieth century. Historically, then, with a couple of exceptions, it is rather incorrect to conceive of the women's movements of the late 1960s to 1980s in Europe as "second" or "new" women's movements. It is possible to trace back feminist ideas to the nineteenth century or even earlier.

Europe has had a dual legacy of revolutions and authoritarian traditions, and throughout the modern era these forces have been played out against each other. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries tradition prevailed more often than radicalism, but progressive ideas and the social movements associated with them flourished in particular periods. It is impossible to understand how the "new" social movements after World War II would have taken place without the humanism of the Renaissance and the revolutions attempting to unshackle the chains that traditions, vested interests, and even the church had foisted upon the individual. It is especially difficult to think of the new social movements without the Enlightenment and the rise of the ideological left, with its dreams of equality, liberty, and a social contract to gain and maintain personal freedom. In a sense, the new social movements are the logical extension of the long-drawn-out Enlightenment projects. The Enlightenment and the French Revolution made slavery and serfdom unsavory, inequality problematic, and a self-sustaining wage a basic right.

POST-WORLD WAR II LIBERATORY MOVEMENTS AND IDENTITY POLITICS

The "newness" of the social movements after World War II has to do with the focus of their grievances. There had always been uprisings by poor farmers and poor urban dwellers in times of famine but their revolt was usually not aimed at the political and social fabric. By the early twentieth century, Europe had also become familiar with protests by workers against bosses and by the working class against the ruling classes. However, it was entirely new to see protests for specific issues forging alliances across class and even political parties. The old revolutionary dictum of justice, equality, and liberty for all was supplemented by a new awareness of one's neighbor, community, and world. Indeed, the new movements forged, temporarily at least, a new sense of community and new identities. The threat of nuclear armament, the many problems of the environment, and, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the perceived threats of globalization, repeatedly gave rise to strong protests and to

protest movements. Other new concerns of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries were movements concerned with celebrating and wishing to protect individuals and individual differences. Laws were challenged as unjust if they were found to discriminate against individuals on the grounds of sex, age, ability, sexual orientation, ethnic background, religion, or any other social markers. In other words, from the 1960s to the 1980s, in particular, but also thereafter, the new movements were concerned with turning the table on society and its norms and values.

After World War II, a number of movements arose that some thought were qualitatively different, to be discussed in their own right, and thus should be labeled "new." Others have claimed that these new movements were really continuing and concluding unfinished business of the nineteenth century. The emphasis on historical processes characteristic of social history would support the latter view, at least to some extent. The French Revolution and the European working-class movements were certainly precursors of the various women's movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Most autonomous women's movements of the postwar era were associated with the left. Some called themselves marxist and others socialist. The Korean War and the Vietnam War also brought into sharp relief the role Western societies played in the affairs of people far from their own legitimate bases of power. Through their activities, the new movements addressed questions of citizenship, the possible trajectory of personal freedom, and the nature of the communal good to which they hoped to contribute.

The first set of these movements of the 1950s and 1960s involved the labor movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, nuclear disarmament, and the student movements. These movements were characterized by claims concerning class, race, anti-imperialism, and the power of the state. Later they were to be called the "classical" movements, while the movements of the 1970s and 1980s are generally referred to as the "new" social movements. The new social movements included the peace movement, the environmental movement, the women's movements, and the disability movement. While these two sets of movements have been distinguished by different names, certain continuities in social criticism, driven by a desire for a new orientation of society at large, can be observed. All "new" movements went through several phases, from a preparatory incubatory stage (usually in the mid-1960s) to a revolutionary phase (from the end of the 1960s to the mid-1970s), ebbing to reformist phases thereafter and to a diffuse phase of pragmatic politics from the mid-1980s to the present.

The features specific to the new movements included, first, a new identity politics that was defined not by class but by the self-identification of the movements' members as women, as gay, as disabled, and so on. Second, such identity politics made it possible to combine forces with groups whose individuals were formerly separated across class lines and at times also across political affiliations.

The economic and welfare context was also important. Notably, the new movements occurred within a context of full employment. For the fifteen years between 1948 and 1963 unemployment in most European countries averaged around 1.9 percent or rose, at the most, to about 5 percent. In short, this period was one of "entrepreneurial euphoria," uninterrupted by crises. The postwar years also saw an expansion of the welfare state. Service industries underwent a boom period and heralded the growth of the service sector throughout the remaining decades of the twentieth century. Sweden was hailed as the model welfare state, and most European countries had some policies in place to protect the individual from personal hardship and to offer support services of some kind for specific life situations. There were two additional factors, at least for the onset of the postwar women's movements. One had to do with the fact that during World War II women were asked to fill men's places in manufacture and most other civilian positions once thought to be the prerogative of men. The same women were not always entirely satisfied with returning to home duties. Their daughters were well aware of the tensions and conflicts and took up the fight that their mothers could not or would not fight. A second decisive factor was provided by an unlikely source: the pharmaceutical industry. The invention and sale of birth-control pills in the early 1960s delivered into women's hands freedom from worry about unwanted pregnancies. A side effect of the pill was a promise for women of greater social freedom, even the option of having careers without premature pregnancies. Family planning became a new field of service support for women and young couples.

The impetus for the movements hence did not arise from hunger and want. Germany experienced an economic "miracle" and was for many years in a state of boom. Even economically troubled Spain experienced its own "Spanish miracle" in industry. Between 1950 and 1956 its industrial production tripled, and in the 1960s Spain's industrial growth rate was exceeded only by that of Japan. Not all European countries were in quite such a privileged position. Portugal was still poor. Greece was also predominantly an agrarian society, with more than 50 percent of the labor force still employed in agriculture in 1960. But

here and in Portugal the new movements were considerably weaker. In that sense, the movements were the last vestiges of an unusually long and comforting economic summer. The quest for careers, independence, and fulfillment of one's abilities fell on fertile ground. Shortages of labor, expressed in guest-worker conscription and a rising demand for female labor, created favorable circumstances for discussions of women's equality with men in the workforce.

However, crises fell upon the movements in almost all countries with a change of economic fortunes. By the early 1970s inflation was the chief concern, having jumped from 2 or 3 percent in the immediate postwar decades to over 10 percent in most and over 20 percent in some European countries. These increasing signs of an imminent crisis were coupled with fiscal disasters in 1973 and 1974, caused by the oil embargo. Stock-market declines greater than those in the Wall Street crash of 1929–1932 were recorded. From 1976 to 1983 unemployment for women in member states of the European Economic Community rose by 15 percent, as compared to a rise in unemployment for men of only 0.6 percent. In all, a total of 7 million women in eighteen western European countries lost their jobs in less than a decade.

Student movements. The influential American civil-rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s had substantial repercussions throughout Europe. Then, in the 1960s, student movements and hippies created an atmosphere of general upheaval against the state. The entire basis of western European life came under review. Student demonstrations took place in Madrid and Barcelona as early as 1965. Like other countries, Spain had massively enlarged its educational institutions, opening eleven new universities since the 1950s. Britain had opened a total of twenty-eight, and throughout Europe the number of student enrollments had risen astronomically, growing by more than sevenfold in some countries in the span of less than fifteen years. The student movement, particularly in France, was strongly associated with the union movement and to some extent (as in Italy) with political parties of the left. Ironically, the German student uprising of 1968 originated from the Free University of Berlin, the one West German university which had been founded after the war as an explicitly democratic institution. The students understood that the ideals were not translated into practice.

The student uprisings in France, Italy, and West Germany were not just campus revolts but uprisings against the establishment and the state generally. Ultimately, they were not just "student" uprisings but represented the discontent of an entire generation, the

generation mostly born after World War II and the Holocaust. They were not going to take the lead from their parents and grandparents, who, they felt, had given them no reason for pride. They wanted to see substantial changes, not just at the level of university administration, but in society at large so that they would see democracy in practice, transparent politics, and a complete abolition of traditional social hierarchies. Their influence on other movements was significant, partly because some of the same people who had been active in the student movement would later emerge in one of the other movements.

The “new” women’s movements. The new wave of women’s movements arose simultaneously in European countries, as in the United States, Australia, and Canada, often within just a few years of each other and, at times, without knowledge of the others. In national analyses, one finds quite often that specific triggers for the mass-scale movements were unique to one country. For instance, Norway had the resistance movement of the Lapps, who were fighting for self-determination (as they were also in Finland and Sweden). Denmark had a movement against joining the European Community that led to the so-called people’s movement against the EEC in 1972. Finland’s first movement for women’s liberation occurred in the context of Finnish nationalism and calls for secession from Russia. In Berlin, it was the visit of the shah of Iran, general imperialism, and the fight against outmoded institutions that gave rise to the student movement there, and this merged almost seamlessly into the autonomous German women’s liberation movement. In all the above-named cases women actively participated in these movements and hence learned to organize politically. It was easier to shift people from one cause to another than to mobilize politically inactive or inexperienced groups. But such a national analysis cannot account for the enormous similarity and the timing of movements across national and continental boundaries.

It is generally agreed that the so-called new women’s movements in western Europe began in France and West Germany around 1968. By the end of the international Decade of Women (1985), every western European country had had some exposure to women’s protests and demands, sometimes leading to a drastic revision of thinking on individual liberty and political participation. In 1988 leading women declared that the European Community was, legislatively, the most progressive political community for women in the world. Credit for these advances was primarily due to the tens of thousands of women who developed a keen eye for strategy, for the impact of

protest, and for political organization. They mobilized in sometimes spectacular protest events (Reclaim the Night, smile strikes, or the dramatic strike actions by 90 percent of Icelandic women, refusing to do their chores). However, the European political powers were also keen to take some credit for this apparent achievement. They argued that the foundations for gender-fair legislation were laid in 1957 in the Treaty of Rome, which sealed the formation of the EEC. The Treaty of Rome espoused the principle of economic parity and fair competition, and this included the rights and costs of female employment. Equalization was to avoid any distortion of competition stemming from a lower-paid female workforce. The second wave of the movement happened well after these politico-economic European networks were in place. Although grassroots movements did not at first take much notice of this European framework, nor did officialdom take note of grassroots movements, both levels of activity moved in the same direction of change.

All women in western Europe are now formally equal before the law, a right that in most countries existed before the second-wave movements started. They all have a right to equal opportunity in education and to careers once thought to be the sole domain of men. The problem was, and partly still is, that the gap between formal legal and political equality and daily practice has not been entirely bridged. Thus a culture of dissent and protest spread throughout western Europe and, to a point, became respectable. Such a culture of dissent was stronger in central Europe than in the Scandinavian countries, where much had been achieved in a quiet step-by-step program of reform over most of the twentieth century. The protests were nearly absent in countries behind the Iron Curtain because women’s demands so much fought for in the West had already been fulfilled, in a fashion.

Abortion and the women’s movement. Abortion was clearly the issue around which the greatest support in the women’s movement was collected in the 1970s. Women marched in their tens of thousands, including many women who otherwise took no active part in the women’s-movement activities. Abortion and reproductive technologies have been themes since the nineteenth century. New antiabortion and anticontraception regulations, perceived as necessary to boost populations, were enforced either toward the end of the nineteenth century, or at the beginning of the twentieth. Most western European countries introduced antiabortion laws for the first time in the twentieth century. Antiabortion laws occurred at a time of nationalism and racism, fascism, and preparation for war. Many countries had criminalized abortion by the

time World War I broke out in 1914, and several others, such as Germany and Italy, had tightened the laws by the 1920s or 1930s, introducing strict penalties and long prison sentences for offenders and for those who volunteered to become accessories.

In such areas as sexuality, contraceptives, and family counselling, the Scandinavian countries, except for Norway, were in general far ahead of other Western nations, both in legislation and in policy initiatives. The issue of abortion was also decided earlier there and usually with far less public uproar than in other countries. Thus, in Scandinavia, abortion never became the catalyst for women's movements that it did in other western European nations. Iceland, Sweden, and Denmark liberalized their abortion laws in the interwar period (1918–1939), Finland in 1951, and Norway in 1965. Abortion on demand was introduced in Denmark in 1973 and in Sweden in 1975. One of the main reasons, one suspects, why Sweden never developed a strong new feminist movement is that most demands that brought women together in other countries had actually been met in Sweden.

Elsewhere in Europe, the case was different. Although the abortion issue was hardly new in Europe, it was “novel” again in the 1960s and 1970s because the issue began to acquire new meaning through the rise of the women's movement, which viewed the right to abortion as a necessary condition for the liberation of women. Eastern European countries provide a useful contrast. Abortion was freely available and encouraged, but in the absence of methods to prevent conception.

Gay liberation. The new gay liberation movement started some years after the women's movements in Europe, but it, too, had a long history of struggle. Broadly, in western Europe the existence of libertinism among the European aristocracy had traditionally enabled the maintenance of a permissive subculture. In this sphere secret expressions of a sexual diversity were possible and not uncommon, especially in a bawdy and celebratory court culture of the seventeenth century and thereafter. There were rituals and occasions both for women and men to seek and maintain same-sex lovers. The aristocracy generally deemed itself to live above the strict moral laws of its age. Such practices and favors were occasionally extended to members of the bourgeoisie, usually when these were either wealthy or beautiful. The most famous of these affairs became scandals not because they existed but because they had been flaunted in public, as in the case of George Sand (1804–1876), especially in her affair with Marie Dorval, which Sand conducted

while dressed in male attire. Then the full force of nineteenth-century French laws, written largely by the aristocracy for the “lower classes” (including the bourgeoisie), had to descend on her. In another famous case, which led to the conviction of Oscar Wilde for homosexual offenses in 1895, Wilde's unforgivable error had been to have stepped outside his class. But these scandals aside, a gay subculture never stopped flourishing. An openly gay woman like Rosa Bonheur (1822–1899) or Collette (1873–1954) would have been unthinkable in Australia or the United States. Women such as Sylvia Beach (1887–1962), Gertrude Stein (1874–1946), and her lifelong companion Alice B. Toklas (1877–1967) moved from the United States to Paris in order to live a life that was possible in Paris but still rather unlikely or impossible in New World countries.

Legally, homosexuality was not always forbidden. The situation was extremely uneven between countries, and policies changed within countries from one regime to the next. For instance, the French crim-

inal code of the Napoleonic era permitted any sexual activities between any consenting adults. Repression occurred only with the Vichy government during World War II, when the age of consent was raised to twenty-one. Prosecutions for anyone below that age were then conducted on the basis of pedophilia, and women were usually not prosecuted. In the Soviet Union of the 1920s homosexuality was considered normal, and Soviet legislation stated so explicitly. However, with the Stalinist reaction also came severe repression. Likewise, the Netherlands had persecuted and executed hundreds of homosexuals in the early part of the eighteenth century. But following the French Revolution, the law penalizing sodomy (under which any male homosexuality fell) was abolished in 1811, removing all restrictions on consenting adults. German occupation of the Netherlands under the Nazis imposed a brief reign of terror, but immediately after the war (1946) there was a Dutch campaign to liberate gay people from the oppression. As early as 1944 homosexuality was decriminalized in Sweden, and about ten years later the High Court ruled that sexual preference was an irrelevant criterion for parental fitness. Unparalleled anywhere else in the world, the Swedish Riksdag actually decreed in 1977 that two people of the same sex living together “shall be fully accepted by Swedish society.” Between 1951 and 1960 there existed an International Committee for Sexual Equality, which many western European countries joined.

Explicit mention of lesbians occurred much later, largely because it was believed that homosexual relationships between women either did not exist or were not possible. Lesbians suffered from the veil of invisibility so completely that they often did not come to the attention of the public and very little was known about them. Radclyffe Hall’s novel *The Well of Loneliness* (1928), which dealt openly with lesbianism, was widely translated into European languages in the late 1920s, and it had a major impact on local subcultures by testifying to their existence.

Despite the ongoing existence of a gay subculture in the large cities of Europe, the degree of oppression against homosexuality should not be downplayed. In the 1950s and 1960s homosexuality was considered a perversion within internationally defined disease models. When offenders were not sent to prison, they came to the attention of the medical profession for treatment, which usually entailed an attempt to “cure” them. Aversion therapy was practiced in most Western countries from the 1950s to the 1970s, using electric shock or administering emetic agents that caused prolonged bouts of vomiting.

Surprisingly, despite the long French tradition against criminalizing homosexuality, France did not

lead the way to gay liberation. The Stonewall riots of gays against police in New York in 1969 gave the impetus for change throughout the entire Western world. In France, the beginning of the gay liberation movement is commonly identified as the protest on 1 May 1971 that interrupted the May Day celebrations. A small group of people participated in that protest, but a decade later, in 1981, there were mass demonstrations (over 10,000) against legal discrimination. A gay liberation movement began in Spain in 1977. In Italy the most successful gay and lesbian organization was ARCI-Gay, a wing of ARCI (Associazione Ricreativa Culturale Italiana), a cultural association affiliated with the Communist Party. By 1989 they had a national office in Rome.

However, the fight for rights of gays and lesbians was not without severe problems and violent reprisals. The first (post-Stalinist) underground gay organization in Leningrad lasted for just two years (1984–1986) before the KGB disbanded it, exiling, firing, or imprisoning its members. But Stalinist draconian laws were dropped between 1991 and 1993 in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Uzbekistan. In 1993, under Boris Yeltsin, the criminal penalties against homosexuals in Russia were dropped, freeing over a thousand prisoners convicted on homosexual charges. In Greece, it was found that the Greek gay organization AKOE and its journal “offended public morality,” and in 1991 the editor was sentenced to imprisonment. In Cyprus and Turkey the laws on sodomy were declared invalid in 1992, but gay organizations had suffered police attacks, bashings, systematic beatings, and prosecution (1987–1992), and not only there. Gay bashings were on the increase through the early 1990s in other countries that had decriminalized homosexuality.

The HIV and AIDS crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s gave new impetus to the movement, which was becoming increasingly international. The gay liberation movement was never a uniform or politically clearly demarcated group. It was diverse in social composition and consisted of competing schools of thought, nationally and internationally. Since 1995 gays and lesbians have obtained full legal rights throughout Europe, although social rights have not been achieved everywhere, let alone with the same breadth as in Sweden or Denmark.

Environmentalism. Environmentalism encompasses not just conservation but also broad issues of lifestyle. From the mid-1990s onward, for instance, urban activism sought to reclaim cities from the car. It is generally agreed that the oil crisis of 1973 sparked the European environmental movement, although

other events were important. In 1972 the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess began the “deep ecology” movement, and Greenpeace staged its first major action against whaling. Rachel Carson’s book *Silent Spring* (1962) alerted the public to the dangers of DDT and the rampant use of pesticides. The rise of the environmental movement is reflected in the substantial shift from traditional to nontraditional associations that occurred in the period from 1980 to 1994. Membership in unions and in established political parties declined, while organizations working for third-world countries, refugees, and human rights increased their membership twofold in this period. Organizations dealing with nature and the environment experienced a fourfold increase. In 1994 Greenpeace had 600,000 members, Amnesty International 164,000, Medecins sans Frontier 500,000, and World Wildlife Fund 600,000 members.

Like the women’s movements, the green movement consisted of many different groups and political persuasions. It is difficult to speak of “left” or “right” political positions or to assign a specific class profile. Under the single heading of environmentalism we may find strains as diverse as pop ecology, mysticism, and economic rationalist approaches to “resource management.” There were deep ecologists, supporters of Earth First!, spiritual Greens, bioregionalists, spiritual ecofeminists. And like the women’s and gay movements, they too resorted to unconventional, extraparliamentary forms of mobilization.

In most countries “green” ideas were readily translated into political parties. The Greens, founded as a party in Germany at the beginning of 1980 and in Austria and Switzerland in 1986, quickly gained a respectable number of seats in Parliament. The Greens argued for an entire renewal and revision of society, economy, and politics. They argued that the ideology of profit and the economic principles of growth had inbuilt the seeds of its own destruction because, if proceeding unchecked, this thinking was destroying the physical basis on which economic success was built. With hindsight, the Greens have been extremely successful insofar as modern economies have at least introduced the concept of sustainable development and have begun to seriously deal with a series of environmental problems. Their founders were former leaders of the student movement and thus represented an ambivalent mix of a traditional leftist revolutionary orientation and a new “catastrophism.” The new catastrophism was fanned by people who believed that the planet was doomed unless something was changed very quickly. They argued that human societies came perilously close to destroying their own world by orchestrating the largest wave of extinctions since the

age of the dinosaurs and the wholesale destruction of forests, particularly rain forests. They were usually regarded as doomsday prophets and dismissed as too radical although, today, we know their predictions were largely correct. They revealed the potentially disastrous consequences of a bigger-is-better philosophy and urged societies to revise their destructive practices. Increasingly, however, the Greens acquired a mandate from the population to deal with environmental issues. By the late 1990s they were no longer regarded as alternative lifestyle and marginal. The Green Party of the United Kingdom made the sudden “greenness” of European politics visible when, in 1989, it won over 14.5 percent of votes in the elections for the European Parliament.

While in Britain the movement was aided specifically by people with a concern for the remaining wildlife, in Eastern European countries it contributed to a sense of liberation from overbearing state power. In Eastern European countries the environmental movement started to become a cause célèbre, largely because environmental protest could be closely identified as a protest against the power of the state. A Bulgarian environmental group called itself Ecoglasnost. Charter 77 in Prague, a human-rights dissident organization, turned green. The Polish Ecological Club became active in 1980, and demonstrations were held in Hungary in 1988. Mikhail Gorbachev’s repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine led to a rapid liberalization throughout the countries of the communist bloc. With the disintegration of communist regimes in 1989, nongovernment organizations rose to new prominence in the East. In short, by the late 1980s the environmental movement had spread throughout all of Europe. Moreover, it had become a recognized international concern. In 1987 the Brundtland Report, called *Our Common Future*, was published by the World Commission on Environment and Development. In 1992 Rio de Janeiro hosted the world’s first global environmental summit.

The peace movement. If the environmental movement makes it difficult to tease out the political and class affiliations of its members, the peace movement adds a problem of categorization as “new” or “classic” movement. The modern post–World War II peace and antiwar movements began their mobilization in Europe in the 1950s and were generally very active throughout the 1950s and early 1960s but then died down, to reemerge as a strong “new” movement in the 1980s. Antiwar sentiments were directed against actual military interventions (Korea, later Vietnam) and oppression (the 1956 uprising in Hungary), while peace movements tended to look closely at security

policies and the nature and purposes of armament. There were also marked differences between East and West. In Eastern Europe, peace movements were at first undifferentiated and broadly anti-imperialist, directed against those outside the Soviet bloc. Western movements, by contrast, put their own governments and policies under scrutiny.

In the late 1950s Britain was one of only three nuclear powers in the world. By 1957 there was noticeable opposition to the path that Britain had chosen, evident in the formation of a National Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT) and a British Peace Committee, which presented a case against any use of nuclear weapons at the Stockholm Peace Appeal. The important Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed in 1958, with the philosopher Bertrand Russell as its first president. In 1972 the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1) between the United States and the Soviet Union was signed. Although it was

considered a flawed agreement by many, it drained the peace movement and the CND of some of their urgency and momentum.

The rekindling of the peace movement's concerns in the early 1980s followed two very different routes and was sparked by different events. One was the 1979 election of Margaret Thatcher, who, in concert with President Ronald Reagan, publicly expressed her belief in increased arms spending. Then there was the war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1982, with its inevitable military rhetoric. Another source of revitalization came from the women's movements, particularly from Germany, where the government proposed in 1978 that women should be conscripted into the army in the same way as men, for a compulsory military service of eighteen months. In May 1979 this resulted in a series of demonstrations. In Germany it signaled, in fact, the beginning of a new peace movement. By 1980 the West German contribution to the international women's peace movement was substantial.

During the United Nations world women's conference in 1980, "Women for Peace" organizations presented General Secretary Waldheim with 500,000 signatures of European women against nuclear weapons and militarism. This opposition, particularly to nuclear power stations and nuclear weaponry, steadily drew wider support and began to spread across Western Europe, involving men and women alike. The largest mass demonstrations against nuclear weapons and the arms race were held in October 1981 and again in October 1983. From Helsinki to Brussels, from London to Rome, and from The Hague to Madrid, vast numbers of people took to the streets at the same time. Over 3 million participants were estimated to have taken part, clearly suggesting that the environmental and peace movements had become truly European rather than just national events. It is important to add that the end of the cold war ushered in a period in which the tense "stand-off" tactics between East and West diminished. The processes that led from the Stockholm Peace Appeal to the 1992 environmental summit in Rio de Janeiro indicate the long road that had to be traveled from local and national protest to mainstream international summit meetings.

The twentieth century saw humanity degenerating into practices of large-scale planned elimination of human life and into the most destructive warfare in human history. Yet in response there emerged strong liberatory movements that remembered the Renaissance, humanitarianism, the individual conscience, and the French Revolution. At no time, as at the beginning of the twenty-first century, have the peoples of Europe enjoyed so much personal freedom.

See also other articles in this section.

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STUDENT MOVEMENTS



Brendan Dooley

When French students took to the streets once again in October 1998, they brought to a close a thirty-year period of academic unrest that has left an indelible mark on modern culture. To the extent that students as a group and student movements as a category of social action can be identified throughout European culture from the Renaissance to the present, this most recent period in the history of student movements has been unique. Nonetheless, coordinated behavior on the part of those enrolled in educational institutions has always played an important role in larger processes in society. Students alone, as a social elite with specific requirements and specific connections to the institutions of power, have created episodes of protest with a lasting impact on the lives of subsequent generations of students as well as on their societies at large. And students as intellectuals have contributed a crucial ideological element to larger movements for social change.

To be sure, the demands of the students in 1998, mainly of high-school age, were far more modest than those of the student protestors in both Spain and France in 1986. All they wanted were more teachers and better school facilities; whereas their predecessors demanded modifications in university entry requirements and other reforms aimed at leading their societies ever farther along the path to democracy. Similar to the latter were the protests of Italian university students in 1977–1978, sparked by grievances concerning plans for changes in university curriculum that were then before the government.

All these student protest movements in western Europe paled by comparison with the movements in Eastern Europe in 1988–1989, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Yugoslavia, which helped bring about the collapse of their Soviet-backed regimes. Closer in kind to the movements in Eastern Europe, at least from the standpoint of the link between academic grievances and more or less profound social and political ones, as well as from the standpoint of the depth of the impact on contemporary culture, were the student movements of 1968.

These were briefly brought to mind in the waves of antinuclear protest that hit Western Europe in 1980 and 1983.

Social scientists have offered several explanatory models for the recurrence of student protest throughout European history. Some have given a prominent role to generational conflict. For instance, Lewis Feuer states that members of a rising generation imbued with notions of modernity and change may wish to vent on the one preceding it all the frustrations accumulated during their young lifetimes. Some observers have pointed to identity and personality crises due to problems of socialization affecting large groups of individuals. According to Erik Erikson, especially in periods of social upheaval, many young people may refuse to enter adult roles on the terms set for them by adult society. Others such as Kenneth Keniston have seen the presence of alienated and at the same time talented leadership types as a major factor determining whether a student population will be given to revolt. Still others such as Gianni Statera have turned attention to class conflict, pointing out that even students from privileged backgrounds may for a time share a status of dependency with, for example, factory workers.

As elements in a larger society, some theorists have pointed out, students may share in generalized social pathologies like the anomie described by Émile Durkheim or the various new threats to individual autonomy that go under the names of “iron cage” (Max Weber) or “the colonization of the Lifeworld by system imperatives” (Jürgen Habermas). Work on political opportunity structures has tried to show how the political and social consistency of a whole society may lend itself more at some times than at others to the expression of widespread discontent, taking into account variables such as social cleavages, institutional stability, and strategies within the movement and the regime.

For the more remote history of student movements, however, it should be kept in mind that almost all explanatory models have been elaborated on the

basis of events in the last several decades for which accurate survey data has been available. Moreover, there are some problems with pinning down the specific historical characteristics of students as a group. They share their status for a far shorter period of time than categories like laborers or mothers. Only in the beginning of the nineteenth century did they begin to develop a self-conscious identity. In every case and in every period, the vastly different circumstances make long-term generalizations an imperfect way of analyzing the phenomenon.

THE EARLY MODERN UNIVERSITY

Social historians have shown how universities evolved in the Renaissance into mainly elite degree-producing institutions for entrance into the professions of medicine, law, and the church. It is important to remember that students before the mid-twentieth-century were for the most part not only a social but a gender (male) elite. Typical student organizations at this time included brotherhoods, drinking clubs, and dueling fraternities, intended mainly to extend to students the same corporate protections guaranteed to other groups. These organizations have so far received no more scholarly attention than have the sporadic eruptions of “town versus gown” violence. Disputes with a town were caused as often by ordinary bread riots as by perceived acts of disrespect for the honor of the citizen or noble families to which the students belonged. Occasionally a *translatio studi* resulted, that is, the movement of an entire student body away from a town, the last of which was from Göttingen to a nearby woods in 1790. Especially at Padua, the contested election of a rector could bring about rioting between student factions. As universities came under the control of political officials in the various states, the imposition of discipline was accepted in return for guarantees protecting the universities’ privileges and immunities.

By the sixteenth century, governments began to regulate what had been the most common “student movement” of the time, namely, the so-called *peregrinatio academica*, or academic peregrination, whereby students in France, for instance, tested the waters in no less than three universities, on the average, before getting their degrees. Due to religious disputes and, especially in the less-popular places, fears of a decline in the numbers of students, governments began to insist on restricting the exercise of the professions in their states to those who had received their degrees locally. Unwittingly, they set the stage for local organizational activity in the centuries to come.

More incisive student actions affecting religious, intellectual, and political life in the period usually be-

gan outside the university and found echoes within, so they cannot be analyzed as products of a particular student culture or ideology. In the religious category may be mentioned the Little Germany organization in early sixteenth-century Cambridge, in support of the Lutheran Reformation. Intellectual movements included the formation of academies, a typical expression of the Renaissance ideals of polite conversation, usefulness, and pleasure, to which university students in Italy made significant contributions. Most likely in order to increase patronage opportunities, law students at the University of Rome founded debating clubs where they gave harangues and disputations in preparation for their exams, inviting prominent local personages to listen in or take part. Political movements were exemplified by the factions at Oxford in the support of the dynasties of Lancaster and York before Edward IV’s decisive victory in the Wars of the Roses. Two centuries later, political sympathies at Oxford remained largely with the king even while civil war was going on and Puritan religious ideas had made serious headway among students.

STUDENTS AND REVOLUTION

During the French Revolution, students imbued with late Enlightenment ideas and perhaps less reconciled than their elders to the ancien régime began playing a more radical role in pushing events in new directions. An organization called the Society of Law Students at Rennes devoted itself to studying the deteriorating political situation of the country and engaged in violent protests against the local nobility, side by side with the unemployed laborers in the Young Citizens’ society. And after the University of Paris was drastically reduced by the legislation of February 1792, a considerable number of students enrolled en masse as volunteers in the People’s Army, proclaiming their adherence to the ideals of equality and freedom. The French Revolution attack on ancien régime corporatism raised serious questions about future university organization even in areas where guilds and corporations were not abolished. Without immediately doing away with the brotherhoods, drinking clubs, and dueling fraternities of old, students began casting about for new forms of organization.

Modern student organization began in Germany with the so-called Burschenschaften, founded in Jena in 1815 but rapidly diffused throughout the country. In this case, for the first time, social historians have identified a real youth crisis, as students began defining a specific public sphere for themselves, distinct from the political establishment of Restoration

Europe. Students often shared a radical nationalism drawn from writers such as Johann Fichte, as well as an anti-régime fervor galvanized by disappointment in the Napoleonic wars. And although they often agreed with Wilhelm von Humboldt's new concept of university education as forming civilization rather than imparting mere encyclopedic knowledge, they did not find this ideal embodied in any existing institutions. The Burschenschaften offered an opportunity for self-reform. Against what was viewed as the political and intellectual establishment's effete Francophilia, they set the new image of the physically fit, self-disciplined, and Teutonic youth.

An expression of the new movement was the first student festival at Wartburg in October 1817, where some fifteen hundred students gathered to express their ideas about freedom and fatherland. At Giessen, a radical right-wing version of the movement, called the Giessener Schwarzen (Giessen Blacks), was formed by Karl Follen, whose program supported an interpretation of German nationalism that excluded French, Slavic, or Jewish elements in the country. When certain acts of violence attributed to members of the student organizations brought about their suppression under the Carlsbad Decrees in 1819, they began a more radical and subversive career underground. In Poland, where libertarian and patriotic ideals inspired by the Burschenschaften combined with opposition to the Russian regime, official decrees banned all secret student societies in 1821. To drive home the point, students were arrested and some exe-

cuted in Wilno in 1823 in connection with anti-Russian statements.

All over Europe, students contributed significantly to the unrest that built up in the 1830s and 1840s, and social historians so far have not distinguished student motivations from the motivations of other elements of the populations involved. Students were as deeply affected as anyone else by the heady mixture of socialist ideas and romantic patriotism that had no room for expression under the prevailing sociopolitical system. In France they took part in the agitation that led to the fall of the Restoration monarchy and the establishment of the July monarchy in 1830. In Göttingen the following year, they were largely responsible for the creation of a communal council that briefly stood ground against the Hanover government of William II in Münster. In 1832 over thirty thousand students and other participants celebrated patriotism and future German unification at the Hambach festival. In 1833, prefiguring the revolutions of 1848, students at Frankfurt belonging to a group called the Vaterlandsverein unsuccessfully sought worker and peasant support in a failed attempt to seize the federal treasury and bring about a universal uprising. Even in Switzerland, a student group known as the Radicals formed in 1839 to advocate a closer union of the cantons and democratic political reforms.

In Paris one of the triggers of the 1848 revolution was the suppression by Louis-Philippe's government of a politically motivated course by Jules Michelet at the Collège de France, which brought the

students out in force one month before actual fighting began. Here as elsewhere, what encouraged student participation in the events that were to follow, besides constitutional ideals, was the specter of intellectual unemployment raised by rapidly increasing enrollments in a time of economic stagnation. In Germany the Eisenach Festival was intended to provide a forum to discuss democratically these as well as more specifically German issues. Some twelve hundred delegates from all over Germany presented their resolutions to the National Assembly then meeting in Frankfurt to draw up a constitution for a new German empire. Although no answer was given, the students were somewhat mollified by the establishment of democratic bodies like the Prussian Landtag and by the suppression of the Carlsbad Decrees.

RUSSIAN POPULISM

The failure of the 1848 revolutions in Europe and the defeat of Russian militarism in the Crimean War combined to set the stage in Russia for some of the farthest-reaching student movements of the age. Often from provincial backgrounds, students were quickly acculturated to the latest trends on their arrival at the universities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Imbued with the ideas of Marx, the French socialists, and Alexander Herzen, they rebelled against what they perceived as the failed modernism of their elders. Rather than capitalism and state authoritarianism, they turned to agrarian socialism as the solution to society's ills, seeing in the countryside, where many of them originated, the seeds of a more complete rebirth than any possible in the rest of Europe. This populist philosophy seemed all the more utopian considering the dismal conditions most peasants in Russia continued to endure, but its promise grew increasingly attractive as students from poor backgrounds poured into the universities under Nicholas I's new enrollment policies. For thirty years it formed a powerful undercurrent in student life, surfacing from time to time in more or less violent conflicts with the imperial authorities, and included many brilliant theorists and activists, from Mikhail Bakunin to Pyotr Kropotkin.

Organizational activity reached fever pitch with Alexander II's liberation of the serfs, but expectations were soon disappointed. The banning of student organizational activity in 1861, together with a reduction in the number of government scholarships, occasioned a major strike at the University of St. Petersburg. As strikes spread to Moscow and elsewhere, many students were jailed and the university was closed for two years. The government's apparent

lapse into political intransigence drove the movement toward more desperate measures. Pyotr Zaichensky at the University of Moscow published the secret paper, *Young Russia*, calling for violent revolution as the only way to bring about constitutional reform, land reform, emancipation of women, nationalization of factories, and the abolition of inheritances. Other students there and elsewhere set up "Sunday schools" to disseminate such ideas among workers and peasants. Dmitri Karakozov, a member of a terrorist faction at the University of Moscow called Hell, advocated and eventually attempted the assassination of the tsar in 1866. The government reaction, known as the White Terror, led to the arrest of the ringleaders and staved off further terrorist action for a time. Soon, frustrated by peasant indifference and plagued by government repression, some participants turned again to terrorist tactics, attempting and actually carrying out assassinations of several public figures. Disagreement about these tactics created a rift within the movement that led to the formation of the People's Will, the group responsible for the assassination of Alexander II in 1881.

The years before the 1905 revolution may be taken to exemplify the way responses to student de-

mands can turn isolated incidents into a rationale for more incisive organizational activity. The disastrous Russo-Japanese war had hardened the students' resolve, although they were not chiefly involved in the 1905 Bloody Sunday event, where soldiers fired on a crowd of about three thousand demonstrators gathered at Moscow University to begin a strike that was to last nine months. In a huge meeting, they drafted the Second Moscow Resolution committing the student movement to "revolutionary" politics. They organized public propaganda programs and encouraged fellow students to do the same at the universities of Odessa and Kiev. When railway and other workers joined the students in a general strike, Nicholas II finally issued the October Manifesto granting freedom of conscience, speech, and assembly and promising franchise and more powers to the Duma. His subsequent reassertion of autocracy set the stage for the Bolshevik Revolution.

WORLD WAR

In Bosnia and Herzegovina too, but slightly later than in Russia, a new intelligentsia began to emerge, and the Russian revolution of 1905 inspired hopes for change. As students, they were exposed to ideas in sharp contrast with the realities of peasant life. Social historians have identified two distinct groups. A few went to university in Vienna or Paris, where they imbibed advanced ideas about universal brotherhood and the socialist future. Typically, though, they stayed at home and never got beyond local high schools, where intellectual prospects were dominated by less sophisticated notions of heroism against the tyrannical oppressor. To the latter group belonged Gavrilo Princip, a student member of the Black Hand movement, who assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand on the eve of World War I.

In western Europe, student movements were also changing by the late nineteenth century, particularly with the rise of student support for right-wing, anti-Semitic movements. Concerns about job prospects and a sense of competition from Jewish students help explain the new divisions in student politics, particularly in some professional schools in countries such as France. Other students retained more traditional leftist attachments.

After the war, the most active student organizations were in Germany. The most effective leaders were as much repelled by the chaotic world of communist revolution immediately to the east as they were by the indecisive Weimar government in their midst. When Weimar called for international cooperation to

resolve the issue of war reparations imposed by the Versailles Treaty, they called for a stronger Germany in opposition to the rest of Europe. Their sentiments were confirmed as Germany slid deeper and deeper into economic chaos and the communist revolution began threatening from within. In 1919 the Deutsche Studentenschaft (DS) began to provide a system of representation for students and, through a program called Studentenhilfe, to finance poorer members. Its ideology of pan-Germanism and anti-Semitism, however, came in conflict with the liberal programs of the Weimar government. The anti-Semitic sections, especially those based in Austria, were eventually forced out, but not before the whole organization began to take on a radical nationalistic character.

In analyzing the German movement at this time, social historians have focused on explaining the climate in which Nazism eventually flourished. Even more radically nationalistic than the DS was the Fichte Hochschulgemeinde, formed in 1919 to celebrate the ideas of Johann Fichte. Along with other groups, it went on to form a part of the Hochschulring Deutscher Art (HSR) aimed at promoting the ethnic community. As the leading voice in student politics throughout the 1920s, it represented anti-parliamentarianism, anti-marxism, and authoritarianism. A major influence within the HSR came from the so-called Young Conservatives, especially strong in Berlin, who added the elements of irrationalism, anti-intellectualism, assertiveness in foreign relations, and nationalistic revolution to this heady mix. Some of the more radical members of the HSR were involved in the failed Nazi beer hall putsch of 8 November 1923. In 1924 a militant fragment broke off to form the Deutschvolkische Studentenbewegung, which, allied with an Austrian sister organization, spoke through a newspaper called *Der Student*. In 1926 a Catholic group seceded from the increasingly radical and militaristic HSR, calling itself the Gorres Ring. However, it too swerved increasingly to the right in the 1930s, advocating the Mussolini government as an acceptable alternative to Weimar, and proclaiming ethnic nationalist concepts.

The first Nazi student groups emerged in Munich in 1922 and in Weimar in 1925, but a veritable national movement began only in 1926. Originally founded by the students themselves, they soon came under Nazi party leadership. By 1928 party leaders appointed Baldur von Schirach to lead them and opened recruitment to all elements of the university populations, from disenchanted proletarians to the members of the older dueling fraternities who had already been espousing right-wing political ideals. Soon the Nazi student network began organizing violent

demonstrations against the left. Older groups like the HSR began to lose ground, and soon the Nazis took control over leadership of the DS as well. On 12 April 1933 the DS issued twelve theses “against the un-German spirit,” denouncing Jewish and liberal literary works, and it organized the book burnings that took place at German universities between April 26 and May 10. Eventually the DS was placed under the direct authority of a Reichsstudentenführung headed by Gustav Adolf Scheel, who coordinated it with the Nazi German Student Union.

To be sure, the German movement was not entirely Nazi at this time. In the midst of the war effort, students at the University of Munich staged the only public protest against the party since its rise to power in 1933. Led by Hans Scholl and his sister Sophie, they maintained contact with anti-Nazi sympathizers throughout Germany by way of a correspondence network later dubbed the “White Rose Letters.” To engage support for a wider uprising they printed and distributed pamphlets. When the pamphlets were discovered by the authorities, the Scholls were arrested, beaten, and hanged, as were many of their correspondents.

In occupied France, social historians have shown, anti-Nazism could become a student ideology. Students staged the Arc de Triomphe demonstration on 11 November 1940, celebrating the World War I armistice and protesting German occupation of Paris.

Demonstrators were either killed or deported to Germany. Later, in 1943, students played an important part in the Forces Unies de Jeunesse Patriotique organized to protest the occupation and to call for egalitarianism and democracy in the universities.

TOWARD 1968

The first postwar movements were provoked by Soviet-backed repression in Eastern Europe, and at first they were isolated reactions to specific circumstances rather than generalized protests. Supported by the Allied occupation forces, students objecting to manipulation and isolation within the Friedrich-Wilhelm University, located in Soviet-occupied Berlin, in 1948 formed the Free University in the Allied zone, with a radical new program and a new anti-hierarchical structure.

As students became more aware of the gap between political rhetoric and reality in their countries, they contributed to the workers’ uprisings in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1953, which occasioned the first armed Russian intervention in the satellite states. Fearing a workers’ uprising in Hungary that year, the Soviets replaced the repressive Mátyás Rákosi with the more moderate Imre Nagy. What followed has presented social historians with a typical case in which bungled policies provoked a wider move-

ment. When Nagy immediately freed eighty thousand political prisoners and revealed the terror tactics utilized by the previous regime, the Soviets restored Rákosi to power in 1955. As opposition to Rákosi grew, members of the Petöfi club, the university wing of the Communist Youth League, were among the most vociferous. By July the Russians moved in, replacing Rákosi with the even harsher Ernö Gero. Nonetheless, inspired by the October 1956 revolution in Poland, students began organizing for an independent, democratic, socialist Hungary. About five thousand met on October 22 to adopt the Budapest Technical University Resolution, spelling out demands for peaceful change and demanding reinstatement of Nagy and the withdrawal of Russian forces. Some 300,000 demonstrators, led by students, assembled on October 23. But when security forces fired on the students, Hungarian soldiers called in as reinforcements joined the demonstrators, and the Soviet-backed government took flight. Nagy thereupon took over and formed a cabinet, promising freedom and independence from the Warsaw Pact. Soviet control was reestablished only after a full-scale attack on Budapest and severe retaliation, in which some 20,000 rebels were arrested, 50,000 died, Nagy and 2,000 others were executed, and more than 80,000 were wounded. Nearly 230,000 Hungarians escaped to the West, and 10,000 students were deported to Russia.

The last episode of 1950s student activism in the Eastern bloc was the protest at the University of Warsaw occasioned by the closing of the student paper *Po Prostu*, which had taken a liberal line since the October Revolution of 1956, advocating political liberalization. Protesters who called for reinstating the paper were ambushed and beaten by police after a grant of safe conduct. Those who presented the petition to the government of Prime Minister Wladyslaw Gomulka were arrested.

Several episodes, isolated at first, led to the massive student unrest unleashed in both east and west in 1968. All involved leadership structures were perceived to be more interested in global security issues than in promoting democratization at home. At times the protest was mainly confined to university-related issues. For instance, during the Week of Action in November 1963, French students belonging to the Union Nationale des Étudiants de France (UNEF) and several teachers' unions struck to demand better facilities, more scholarships, and larger research accounts. There was also concern about placement prospects in disciplines like sociology, and these could fuel attacks on the social order. At times university issues combined with wider ones connected with differences in worldview between governments and students.

In this period, for the first time, echoes from the United States had an important effect on student action in Europe. Student involvement in the Freedom Summer in Alabama in 1964 and in the Berkeley student revolt that followed, showed the potential of mass action. The Vietnam War, hotly contested in the United States from 1965, seemed to symbolize for many Europeans the worst effects of Western militarization and colonialism. At the same time, young people of both genders were affected by social and cultural trends that had been transforming modern life on both sides of the Atlantic. In spite of increasing affluence, democratic ideas tended to advance beyond the democratizing potential of even the most open societies. Movements that once concerned a tiny vanguard now became part of mass youth culture, not only in politics, but also in other areas of life. Intellectual liberation was inspired by the Situationists, the neoexistentialists, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Artistic liberation was inspired by the Beat poets and by abstract expressionism. Sexual liberation, meanwhile, introduced behavioral patterns that conflicted with the traditional structure of the family. Attacks on modern consumer society highlighted the lifestyle components of the student movement.

A pattern of confrontation emerged and spread rapidly from place to place. In 1964 students at the Free University in Berlin protested the arrival of the Congolese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe, thought to be a pawn of Belgian mining interests. When the administration refused student requests to invite Erich Kuby, a noted left-leaning critic of West German politics in general and of the university in particular, students staged a protest focused on issues ranging from the tenure case of an activist instructor to the Vietnam War.

In France the rift between the government of Charles de Gaulle and student politics had begun to grow from 1960, when the UNEF declared its support for Algerian independence and officially requested that the government begin negotiations with the rebels. After two years of confrontations on this issue, the government banned student public protests. Finally in 1963 rumblings of discontent culminated in the Sorbonne explosion, ostensibly sparked by the breakdown of university structures in the face of growing enrollments. After a day of struggle between 10,000 Sorbonne students and 4,500 police, some 300,000 students in the nation's twenty-three universities went on strike, along with half the professors. The following year, on the occasion of a university tour by the Italian president, accompanied by the intransigent French education minister Christian Fouchet, University of Paris students and the UNEF organized

protests calling for democratic reforms within the universities.

In Britain protests in 1965 at the London School of Economics were concentrated against the white community in Rhodesia, which had declared independence from the black nationalist federation. In Italy the first protests, centered at the University of Turin in 1965, began with the question of official recognition for a degree in sociology, and spread out to include student governance, curricular reform, and the relevance of instructional programs to contemporary affairs. Likewise at Turin, a seven-month occupation of the university buildings in 1967 began by focusing on university issues and broadened out to include social issues of national concern.

Student activism in German universities began to reach critical mass in June 1967, when students protesting a state visit by the shah of Iran were subjected to a previously planned police attack involving brutal beatings and the execution of a bystander. About twenty thousand students from throughout West Germany attended the funeral in Hanover on 9 July. The Hanover meeting produced a manifesto connecting police brutality to the authoritarian and exclusionary structure of German government as well as to the general crisis of the university. The meeting and its outcome propelled the student leader Rudi Dutschke and the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS) into prominence. The same year, students formed the Kritische Universität in West Berlin as an alternative to the increasingly bureaucratized Free University by offering student-taught courses.

1968 AND BEYOND

The 1968 season of student unrest opened in Czechoslovakia. In January an unpopular neo-Stalinist secretary of the Czech Communist Party was replaced by Alexander Dubček, who introduced far-reaching reforms including democratization within the party, freedom of movement, and freedom of expression. Students played an important role in the Prague Spring of discussion and protest that followed, with calls for a continuation of the reforming line and the dissolution of Communist Party rule. Encouraged by the Prague movement, students in Warsaw took the occasion of the banning of a nationalist drama to demonstrate for more freedoms and democratization in Poland. The brutal repression of both movements would be a point of reference for student leaders in 1989 during the Velvet Revolution.

In the West the power of the student movement in Prague inspired actions chiefly motivated by such issues as NATO demands on Europe, the Vietnam

War, and the effects of U.S. policies in the Middle East. In Rome the via Giulia protest led to 250 student arrests. Next came Germany, where Rudi Dutschke was shot and severely wounded during the suppression of the Easter riots, crippling the movement.

In France the expulsion of the student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit from the University of Nanterre for his organizational activities moved the center of protest once more to the Sorbonne. On May 3 the rector called in police to remove the demonstrators, who responded by erecting barricades and flinging cobblestones. A week-long battle ensued, in which hundreds of students and police were injured and six hundred students were arrested. Police brutality and government intransigence brought the workers over to the side of the demonstrators, though direct contacts were limited in part by union leaders' uneasiness about bourgeois students, and a season of strikes ensued. By late May some ten million workers were on strike, joining labor issues to the political ones, and the De Gaulle government seemed on the verge of collapse. Only quick concessions by De Gaulle on labor issues, weakening the workers' support for the student movement, avoided political disaster; and a successful appeal brought conservative elements in the country to the government's side in new elections. Inspired by the May events in Paris, outbreaks occurred on June 3–10 in Zagreb and Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in Zurich later that month, in London, and still later in Warwick, where students discovered documents showing university administrators' investigations into student political activity.

The significance of the two-year period of protest is still a matter of debate among social historians. Most have agreed that the immediate results were less important than the long-term consequences. At least in the West, the movements produced few concrete gains besides more open enrollments and fewer entrance requirements. Over the long term, some studies have blamed the movement for driving the radical leftist fringe toward a drastic change in tactics. Disappointed by the failure of the movement to bring about a general revolution, these studies say, some organizers resorted to forming a tiny vanguard of violent operatives dedicated to subverting the system—the Red Army Faction in Germany, Direct Action in France. In Italy the rise of the Red Brigades made the student movement of 1977–1978 all the more radical and violent. On the positive side, studies have suggested that the movement drew attention to the persistent class divisions that seemed to prevent realization of the democratic dream, as well as gender divisions that helped create the women's movement, while the postwar political parties began to abandon

ideology in the general enthusiasm that accompanied the economic boom. It drew attention to the negative side of capitalist development and modern technology, emphasizing the limits to economic growth and bringing environmental concerns to international attention, culminating in the Greens movement (begun by students in late-1970s Germany). Intellectuals, many of whom had been students or professors in the

1960s, including Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, in questioning the very concept of modernity, looked to the emergence of a new intellectual movement that was eventually dubbed postmodern.

From this standpoint, social historians were less stunned than political scientists when workers who had lived through the 1970s in Eastern Europe as well as students who were just coming of age in the 1980s

began questioning the technological and economic utopia of socialism, first in Poland and then elsewhere. For two decades, the movements for reform, democracy, and pluralism had run up against increasingly intransigent and entrenched administrations in these countries. Even convinced socialists saw that something had to change.

The Solidarity movement in Poland from 1981 showed that the regimes were not entirely invulnerable; and Gorbachev's reforms sent shock waves throughout the Eastern bloc. Inevitably, students became involved in what followed. They were on hand when the Honecker government crumbled and the Berlin Wall came down. They were in the vanguard of the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. Prague Spring veterans who had organized themselves in early 1989 spearheaded a large commemorative demonstration that August. Government repression of a large student demonstration the following November

pushed the protest over into revolt. The unofficial opposition party thereupon threatened a general strike. When the government realized Russian aid would not be forthcoming, it resigned. Here as elsewhere, the Soviet era was over.

Although the 1989 movements signaled the decisive end of an epoch in European history, they did not signal the end of student protest movements. The long view of university history suggests that the most recent flare-ups are merely foretastes of what may happen when genuine issues join the interests and the passions of the mass of students, sending them into the streets once more, proclaiming the power of youth, the oppression of the generations and of parents, and the desire for change. The long view also suggests that there is no guarantee that the future envisioned by student movements will always necessarily correspond to the liberal ideals of equal opportunity, multiculturalism, and freedom for all.

See also Students (in this volume); Higher Education (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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MODERN PROTEST POLITICS



Marco Giugni

Social protest is a permanent, though discontinuous, feature of European society since the dawn of history. It occurs when ordinary people act together to defend threatened collective interests and/or identities or to promote new ones. Historically it has taken various forms: antitax revolts, struggles against conscription, food riots, land occupations, seizures of grain, insurrections, strikes, barricades, public meetings, and many others. At times social protest cascaded into larger cycles of contention involving dense interactions among various groups using different forms of action (Tarrow, 1998). These phases of generalized contentious activity gave rise to revolutions when multiple centers of sovereignty were created, which turned the conflict into a struggle ending in a forcible transfer of power (Tilly, 1993). Most often, however, social protest occurs at a lower scale, involving a limited number of actors who lack regular access to institutions and engage in confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents. When these actors engage in sustained challenges to power holders based on common purposes and social solidarities, we have a social movement.

European social movements emerged as two large-scale social processes—the emergence of an urban-industrial economy and the consolidation of the national state (Tilly et al., 1975)—interacted to produce fundamental structural changes in history. On the one hand, capitalism—the concentration of the means of production and the separation between those who control these means and those who provide labor—produced new conflicts and oppositions, most notably between capital and labor. On the other hand, state formation—the creation of autonomous, differentiated, and centralized governmental organizations that are territorially bounded and have the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence over that territory—created a concentration of power and of coercive means in the hands of state authorities. Such infrastructure was needed, among other things, to collect taxes and to engage in wars. In due time, the state and its representative institutions such as the parliament became the main target of social protest as national

politics and local contention intertwined to an increasingly larger extent (Tilly, 1995).

The concentration of capital and coercive means that marks the expansion and consolidation of the European national state implied a transformation of the structures of power in society. New collective interests and identities emerged, new opportunities arose, and new forms of group organization (such as the class) appeared. This, in turn, contributed to the birth of modern social movements by remodeling the forms of collective action (see Figure 1). Charles Tilly (1986, 1995) has shown in his masterly accounts of popular contention in France and Britain how the repertoires of contention changed under the influence of these two large-scale processes via the restructuring of interests (and identities), opportunities, and organization.

Social movements are a special form of social protest and contentious collective action, one that emerged out of the shift from the old to the new repertoire of contention as the concentration of capital and coercion transformed its modalities. Sidney Tarrow (1998, p. 30) has described this shift as follows:

In the 1780s, people knew how to seize shipments of grain, attack tax gatherers, burn tax registers, and take revenge on wrongdoers and people who had violated community norms. But they were not yet familiar with acts like the mass demonstration, the strike, or urban insurrection on behalf of common goals. By the end of the 1848 revolution, the petition, the public meeting, the demonstration, and the barricade were well-known routines, employed for a variety of purposes and by different combinations of social actors.

The national social movement of the late twentieth century was born, indeed invented by Europeans as they created the new collective-action repertoire, as Tilly puts it (see his article on collective action in this volume), and can be defined as:

a sustained challenge to powerholders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those powerholders by means of repeated public displays of that population's numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness. (Tilly, 1994, p. 7)

SOCIETAL CLEAVAGES AND EUROPEAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The nineteenth century: Traditional lines of conflict. Social movements are the overt expression of latent social conflicts. Their mobilization rests upon societal cleavages, that is, social and cultural dividing lines that oppose the interests and identities of different groups in society. Capitalism and state formation did not only produce a reorientation of the repertoires of collective action. They also modified the structure of dominant conflicts in society and hence the social-structural foundations of social movements. Traditional cleavages constitute the condition for the mobilization of many contemporary movements. In his fundamental geopolitical mapping of Europe, Stein Rokkan (1970) stressed four traditional cleavages, which are particularly important in this respect: the center-periphery, religious, urban-rural, and class cleavages (see Kriesi et al., 1995, ch. 2, for a discussion in relation to social movements).

Social movements are organized efforts, based on a shared identity, to reach a common goal mainly, though not exclusively, through noninstitutional means. This clearly distinguishes them both from political parties (which engage in elections) and interest groups (which act mainly within the existing institutional channels by way of lobbying and negotiations with the power holders), although at times they make use of forms of action usually adopted by the latter. This definition also emphasizes the action side of movements rather than their organizational basis or their ideology, although the latter two aspects allow us to distinguish between movements and enter the explanation of their mobilization. It therefore excludes purely cultural-ideological movements such as the *Nouvelle Droite* (New Right) in France or cultural-spiritual experiences such as the New Age, as well as religious movements insofar as they do not express themselves through political challenges.

This article deals with social movements as a particular form of the broader category of contentious politics, which includes related phenomena such as riots, rebellions, terrorism, civil wars, and revolutions, and which can be defined as collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects involving government as mediator, target, or claimant and bearing on the interests of claimants (McAdam et al., 1996; forthcoming). Given their origin in the formation of the modern national state, this article focuses on the emergence and mobilization of in western Europe from the mid-nineteenth through the twentieth century, drawing from the work of social historians, sociologists, and political scientists.

The center-periphery cleavage forms the basis for the mobilization of regionalist and nationalist movements. Examples are countless: Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales in Britain; Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque country in Spain; Alsace, Brittany, Corsica, Occitania, and again the Basque country in France; Friuli, Sardinia, Southern Tyrol, and the Val d'Aosta in Italy; Flanders and Wallony in Belgium; Jura in Switzerland; and many others. Most of these movements claim have as their final objective the political control over a given territory and are coupled with an ethnically based identity. As such they are ethnic-national movements. The example of the Italian Northern League, however, indicates that this is not always the case. Its claim for an independent or autonomous Padania (the final goal varied over time, shifting back and forth from the quest for more autonomy to full independence) did not rest upon an ethnic identity. It is sometimes framed as such, but there is no basis for a collective identity of the people of Padania in ethnocultural terms. However, regionalist or nationalist claims are typically related to a specific territorial identity and are facilitated by two kinds of cultural resources: religion and especially language. In addition, the strength of this cleavage depends very much on the structure of the state, specifically on its degree of centralization. Regionalist and nationalist claims historically were more frequent in centralized states like France and Spain than in federalist ones like Germany and Switzerland, where the devolution of power to the peripheral minorities tends to institutionalize the conflict between the center and the periphery. They occurred especially

when the minority in question has been or felt discriminated against.

The religious cleavage in Europe refers to the opposition between Catholics and Protestants that emerged out of the sixteenth century Reformation. It took different forms in countries where one of the two religions predominates, like France, Italy, and Spain, and in countries that were religiously mixed, like Germany and Switzerland. In predominantly Catholic nations, this cleavage refers to the conflict between the church and the state. In religiously mixed nations it historically opposed Catholics and Protestants. By the late twentieth century the religious cleavage had lost much of its strength and did not often give rise to contentious collective action, although from time to time in predominantly Catholic countries, popular upsurges of protest occurred, typically with regard to education issues. France is a well-documented case in point. Elsewhere, the religious conflict was largely institutionalized into the party system. To be sure, on the world scale the main opposition of the late twentieth century was that between Judaism and Christianity (especially Catholicism) and Islam. Thus, the religious cleavage may be seen as returning in certain western European countries, such as France and Britain, that hosted high numbers of immigrants from the Muslim world. This displacement of the traditional religious cleavage may have facilitated the mobilization of Muslim immigrants in those countries, and indirectly provoked the reaction of racist and extreme right groups.

The urban-rural cleavage opposes Europe's urban and industrial regions to the rural areas where agriculture and the peasant economy prevailed. This line of conflict was dominant during the nineteenth century, forming the basis for the social protest carried on by farmers. In the course of the twentieth century it weakened considerably as the number of farmers shrunk everywhere in Europe and as they became increasingly integrated into national politics. However, in many countries they maintained a strong organization and collective identity, and were able to mobilize in important ways—as they often did in France—often in reaction to the threats posed on them by the process of European economic integration.

The fourth and last of the traditional cleavages is certainly the most important. The class cleavage refers basically to the opposition between the working class and the bourgeoisie. Thus, it obviously underpins the mobilization of the labor movement. The transformation of the class structure that took place with the industrial revolution made this cleavage central from the mid-1800s to at least World War II. The growing role of the service sector in West European

countries, however, eroded a large part of the social basis of the labor movement. Furthermore, increased living standards and the expansion of the welfare state weakened the culture and collective identity of the working class. On both these counts (the structural and the cultural underpinnings of labor movements), the strength of the class cleavage diminished in the course of the twentieth century, but kept nevertheless an important mobilization capacity. This holds true especially in countries like France and Italy, in which the industrial conflict between labor and capital was not pacified and therefore remains politically salient.

Twentieth century: New lines of conflict. If the rise of labor and other European social movements stems largely from the profound transformations of the societal conflict structure inscribed in the process of modernization, the same can be said of movements of the second half of the twentieth century. At least in western Europe, the four traditional cleavages highlighted by Rokkan weakened during the twentieth century. At the same time, the weakening of traditional structures and the centrality of the class conflict brought to the fore a new cultural and social cleavage that opposed different sectors within the new middle class (Kriesi 1989): those with a “postmaterialist” value system, stressing individual participation, emancipation, and self-fulfillment; and those with a “materialist” value system, emphasizing socioeconomic needs as well as social order and security. Increased social mobility, the development of a mass education system, and above all the post-World War II economic growth with the related expansion of the welfare state resulted in economic well-being, and may have provoked what Ronald Inglehart (1977) called the “silent revolution,” that is, a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values in western societies, leading to the emergence of what came to be known as the new social movements.

New social movements, mobilized around demands for cultural rights and a better quality of life, had three main thematic foci: (1) the criticism addressed to the new risks and threats engendered by economic growth and technological progress; (2) the rejection of all sorts of bureaucratic control over the individual; and (3) the assertion of the right to one's own lifestyle and the right to cultural difference. Thus, the new social movements were situated at the crossroads of the criticism of modern civilization and the search for the cultural emancipation of marginalized minorities. Some prefer to call them left-libertarian movements (della Porta 1995). They are “left” because they mistrust the marketplace, private investment, and the ethic of achievement, and they

are committed to egalitarian distribution; they are “libertarian” insofar as they reject the regulation of individual and collective conduct by both private and public bureaucracies in favor of participatory democracy and the autonomy from market and from bureaucratic dictates. This label refers to a social movement family that includes the New Left, which prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s; the new social movements, which took the upper hand in the 1980s and 1990s; as well as student movements.

Although there is no clear-cut demarcation between “old” and “new,” most observers would call “new” the following movements: peace, ecology, antinuclear, women’s, solidarity (humanitarian, antiracist), squatters’, and other counter-cultural movements, as well as movements mobilizing for the rights of often-discriminated minorities such as gays and lesbians. Some would add student movements to this list. Others, however, consider them a precursor of the new social movements, which are seen as more pragmatic and less tied to the ideology and organizations of the New Left.

Labor movements (and their ramifications within institutional arenas, most notably social-democratic parties and labor unions) and the new social movements are two dominant areas of social protest—better yet, two political families—of twentieth-century Europe. Both can be classified as leftist forms of social

protest. A third area, located at the opposite end of the political spectrum, comprises conservative and extreme right movements. But, is this a real political family? Can we find a common denominator that allows us to place them in one and the same category? Piero Ignazi (1994) finds at least three different streams within the ideology of the Right: (1) a conservative stream that stresses order and tradition but accepts modernity; (2) a “counterrevolutionary” stream, basically antimodernist and nostalgic for the *ancien régime*; and (3) a fascist stream, profoundly anticommunist but in its own way revolutionary. (This distinction is only in part drawn from the classical division proposed by René Rémond, which posits a legitimist and traditionalist right, an Orleanist and liberal right, and a Bonapartist and authoritarian right, which is the precursor of fascism.) However, while we may identify certain traits that unite rightist groups and clearly distinguish them from the Left, in particular with respect to the notions of social justice and equality, it is very difficult to put in the same field liberal, conservative, and authoritarian currents. On the one hand, fascism is clearly opposed to liberalism as it emphasizes the superiority of the state over the individual and poses limitations to individual freedoms. On the other hand, with its stress on the creation of a new order and its nationalistic populism, the fascist tradition is also profoundly anticonservative

and revolutionary, and hence clearly distinct from the moderate (conservative) right. Furthermore, the fascist ideology is antisystemic, for it displays a fundamental opposition that undermines the legitimacy of representative democracy.

The legitimist (monarchist) and Bonapartist traditions singled out by Rémond form the initial, nineteenth-century ideological underpinnings of the extreme right in the European context (Ignazi, 1994). While the former only rarely gave rise to forms of social protest and was for the most part confined to a marginal space, the latter has been sadly important as it was at the heart of the rise of various fascist movements and regimes in several European countries, most notably Germany, Italy, and Spain, between the two world wars. In addition, various neofascist and neonazi groups, have, explicitly or implicitly, referred back to this ideological tradition. (Whether we can speak of social movements in these cases is doubtful, at least following the definition used here.)

The “traditional extreme right” stems from the conflicts underlying the development of the industrial society and is therefore, in a way, the other side of the coin represented by the class cleavage. Another type of right surfaced in the 1980s and 1990s, which some have called the “postindustrial extreme right” (Ignazi, 1994) and others the “new radical right” (Kitschelt, 1995). Like the traditional extreme right, the new radical right is basically antisystemic. Yet it does not stem from the fascist tradition, and sometimes is even opposed to it ideologically. It is better seen as a response to the transformations that characterized Western Europe after World War II. The weakening of traditional bonds and the emphasis on self-determination and individual freedom are among the outcomes of these transformations. In a way, the structural transformations that have characterized western society during the twentieth century gave rise to new social and cultural cleavages which came to underpin both the new social movements and the new radical right. The movements of the extreme right, in this view, express a deepening conflict between the “winners” and the “losers” of the modernization process (Kriesi, 1999). People adhering to the extreme right would be the “losers,” as they would have poor social and cultural resources to cope with rapid social change (accelerated by globalization processes).

While the value system carried by the new social movements was basically social-democratic, libertarian, and emancipatory, that of the extreme right was antisystemic, authoritarian, and antiegalitarian. The discontinuity of the new radical right with the traditional extreme right is seen in the fact that it often has a neoliberal view with regard to economic issues.

According to Kitschelt (1995), the new radical right combines an authoritarian ideology, a market/liberal position toward the allocation of resources, and a particularistic conception of citizenship and membership in the national community. It is therefore not surprising that it has found in immigration and the multicultural society, which it resists on the basis of an ethnocultural conception of the national identity, one of its main grounds for mobilization. Indeed, one of the main characteristics of the new radical right in western Europe, together with its populist appeal, is its xenophobia, which often leads to overtly racist attitudes and behaviors.

The European extreme right, both in its traditional and new radical variants, has usually been channeled into parliamentary politics, taking the form of a party. At the same time, however, these parties have often behaved as social movements, mobilizing people in the streets and challenging the established authorities by means of unconventional protest actions. In addition, especially in the last part of the twentieth century, violence by small extreme right groups surfaced in various countries. Such violence basically took three forms: (1) planned and organized terrorist acts (especially during the 1960s and 1970s, for example by rightist anarchists); (2) more spontaneous activities by various groups of skinheads and naziskins (often addressed against immigrants and asylum seekers, especially during the 1980s and 1990s); and (3), less often, attacks by radical right religious fundamentalists (such as antiabortion activists).

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Those who do not fear simplification may think of different historical periods as being characterized by a dominant social conflict that gives rise to a specific type of social protest. According to Alain Touraine (1984), for example, if the labor movement is the central movement of industrial society, the new social movements express the new conflicts inherent in industrial society, whereby symbolic rather than material goods are the crucial stake. In a more systematic fashion, the German sociologist Joachim Raschke (1985) has described as a succession of three political paradigms the shift in the focus of conflict that has taken place since the second half of the nineteenth century. The forms of resistance that characterized Europe in the *ancien régime*, such food riots and tax revolts, are centered around the “authority paradigm” and reflect the struggle against an unequal distribution of power. The closer we get to the French Revolution, the more

this kind of protest concerns the fundamental rights of people and—if these rights are met—citizens: freedom of speech and assembly, voting rights, and so on. In the course of the nineteenth century, and especially after 1848, the crucial conflict shifted toward class conflict, centered around the “distribution paradigm” opposing the owners of the means of production against the labor force. Social rights became the crucial stake, and the main issues had to do with the distribution of wealth in society. More or less since the 1960s, finally, the dominant conflict has come to reflect the “lifestyle paradigm.” The centrality of class conflict is undermined, as the defense of interests and identities linked to traditional cleavages, typical of the old politics, has lost significance in favor of nonmaterial issues addressed by the new politics, such as the quality of life, minority rights, unconventional lifestyles, environmental protection, and so forth. Cultural rights and individual autonomy have become the crucial objects of contention.

To be sure, some of the themes raised by the new social movements were already present in the nineteenth century. This holds especially for the women’s, ecology, and peace movements, which are among the most important, both quantitatively in terms of political mobilization and qualitatively with regard to the relevance of their claims for twentieth-century. Not incidentally, these precursors of the contemporary new social movements emerged at a time when the national social movement was slowly forming as a major collective actor. Thus, the roots of the women’s movement can be found in the *cabiers des doléances* of women during the French Revolution, in which they complained that the only choice left them was between misery and gallantry. The first organizations to defend the interests of women began their activity in Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century. Curiously, French feminists remained quite marginal for a long time. Contemporary environmentalism was pioneered by German romanticism, and the first environmental organizations in Europe were established in the late nineteenth century. These small circles of ecologists *ante litteram* were mainly concerned about the need to protect and conserve certain natural spaces.

The most persistent precursor to the new social movements formed around the issues of peace and war. The origins of modern pacifism can be found in the Enlightenment, or, from an organizational point of view, at the time of the Napoleonic Wars; perhaps the first peace association in Europe, the London Peace Society, was formed in 1816. Similar organizations were created across Europe in the following decades. Their efforts to prevent war, which often contained a

strong internationalist dimension, became stronger concomitantly with the intensification of international conflicts, most notably at the end of the nineteenth century and during the two world wars. After the Russian Revolution, the pacifist movement inevitably suffered a split between a radical, communist-oriented wing and a moderate, most often religiously-based wing. This split became most visible during the years of the cold war, when the issue of nuclear arms took center stage.

Just as the repertoires of contention had changed in the shift from the *ancien régime* to modernity, women’s, ecology, and peace issues were transformed in the twentieth century as a result of the “silent revolution” described by Inglehart. Initially, in their archaic forms, the new social movements were generally restricted to small circles of scientific, social, and intellectual elites. Furthermore, issues they were concerned with were not yet anchored in a larger, structural social conflict. The 1960s and 1970s both radicalized and popularized those issues, leading to mass mobilizations on behalf of women’s rights, the environment, the maintenance of peace, and other themes related to new societal risks and cultural lifestyles. This shift revived the movement for women’s liberation and gender equality, political ecology and opposition to the use of nuclear energy, as well as antimilitarism and the fight against the arms race. They did not, however, fully re-

place traditional feminism, nature protection and conservation, and peace reformism.

If taken in a synchronic rather than diachronic perspective, Raschke's distinction of three political paradigms lends itself nicely to a simple classification of European social movements according to the claims they articulated. To do so, however, we must add a further distinction, namely that between movements challenging the established authorities and counter-movements, which defend established rights and privileges against those challenges (Kriesi, 1988). This yields six distinct categories of movements (see table 1). Movements asking for more regional autonomy or for the right to a separate state are the most typical expression of the authority paradigm in Western Europe. Racist movements and various forms of resistance to political autonomy can be seen as their corresponding counter-movements, as they defend traditional privileges by denying fundamental political rights to others. Labor movements are at the core of

the distribution paradigm. Indeed, the greatest impact of the transformation from the old to the new repertoire of contention described by Tilly lies in the creation of the conditions for the political mobilization of workers. Antitax and farmers' movements that defend traditional material privileges are examples of counter-movements acting within this paradigm. Finally, the claims articulated by the new social movements concern the lifestyle paradigm. Within this paradigm, they are distinguished, for example, from antiabortion movements, insofar as the latter defend traditional lifestyles.

CYCLES OF CONTENTION

Political conflicts are ultimately rooted in structural and cultural cleavages. These dividing lines, however, create only the potential for social protest and contentious collective action. They remain latent as long



1848: THE FIRST MODERN CYCLE OF CONTENTION

The first modern cycle of contention peaked in 1848, as insurrections spread across Europe in the spring, facilitated by crop failures of 1846–1847, widespread political repression, and the emergence of nationalism. These insurrections combined a variety of claims and aspirations: from the civil war between Catholic and Protestant cantons in Switzerland to the renewed fight against monarchy and for liberal rights in France; from demands for constitutional reforms in Vienna to Sicily's quest for independence from Naples; from the political and social claims of an emerging working class in Britain to the struggle to end Austrian rule in Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, and northern Italy. By the middle of 1848, all major European regimes were threatened or had been overturned under the push of crowds organizing, marching, and erecting barricades in the streets.

The seeds of this phase of generalized social unrest lie in the French Revolution of 1789 and the July revolution of 1830. Strictly speaking, however, this cycle of contention covers the period from March 1847, when the first open conflicts occurred, to August 1848. The peak was reached in February to April 1848 (see Godechot, 1971).

The 1848 revolutionary upsurges represent the crossroads of the two driving forces of the nineteenth century and of modern European history: liberalism and socialism. It was above all a liberal and bourgeois revolution, focusing on political rights, but in which an emerging and increasingly self-conscious working class was

gaining its place in history and addressing social issues. These two fronts were fighting to defend different interests and against different enemies, but their destinies were intimately interrelated within the logic of industrial and capitalist society. In addition, nationalistic aims and aspirations, embodied by demands for autonomy, independence, and adhesion to other states, intersected with the class struggle.

The cycle had its highest point in France with the February revolution, but it started at Europe's periphery, most notably in the Swiss civil war (Tarrow, 1998). Echoes from the Parisian July Revolution of 1830 gave rise to a struggle for power in Switzerland, which resulted in a series of political and military conflicts in the cantons. The liberal Protestant cantons wanted to strengthen the central power and impose their will on the mainly Catholic rural cantons, which in response formed the *Sonderbund* (separate alliance), a mutual defense league, in 1845. Civil war was declared in August 1847, after the federal Diet had ordered the dissolution of the Catholic-conservative alliance in July of the same year, which refused to comply and was defeated by before the end of the year. In 1848 the now strengthened Swiss Confederation adopted a new federal constitution, which included the democratic principles declared by French revolutionaries some fifty years earlier.

There had been various revolutionary attempts in the Italian states during the 1830s and 1840s, most of

as they are not politicized—that is, until people develop a collective identity, a sense of solidarity, and a political consciousness, all aspects constitutive of a social movement. When and where these processes have occurred, Europeans engaged in challenges to the constituted authorities in the name of their collective interests or identities. While these challenges often emerged and evolved on their own, sometimes they clustered in broader waves of generalized social unrest which we may call cycles of contention. A cycle of contention is

a phase of heightened conflict across the social system: with rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a rapid pace of inno-

vation in the forms of contention; the creation of new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities. (Tarrow, 1998, p. 142)

Social movements form broader cycles of contention as changes in their external political environment present themselves, affecting the mobilization of several challenging groups, and as different movements influence each other, some providing incentives and opening the way to others.

George Katsiaficas (1987) has identified four periods of crisis and turmoil on a global scale—what



them led by secret societies such as the *Carbonari*, the *Filadelfi*, or Giuseppe Mazzini's Young Italy (see Tilly et al. 1975). Revolts broke out across Italy in 1848 and included attempts by peasants and workers to make their claims heard (especially in the south and in Sicily), as well as temporarily successful bourgeois revolutions in Sicily, Naples, Lombardy, Venice, Tuscany, and the Papal States. In the north, just as in the rest of the Habsburg empire, people fought the Austrians, helped there by King Charles Albert of Piedmont-Sardinia. Although the constitutional and republican experiments were cut short after 1848, this period of unrest paved the way for the Italian Risorgimento, which eventually led to the unification of Italy in 1861, after the previous year's spectacular conquest of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies by Giuseppe Garibaldi.

In Germany, liberal revolutions led to the convening of the Frankfurt Parliament (1848–1849), a national assembly whose members were popularly elected and whose aim was the unification of Germany. In the short term, however, the most straightforward effects of the 1848 unrest occurred in France, most notably in Paris, where the “February revolution” of 1848 led to the abdication of Louis Philippe, the overthrow of the monarchy, and the establishment of the Second Republic. General dissatisfaction with the reactionary policies of the king and his minister François Guizot had been growing in the pre-

ceding years. Furthermore, the poor conditions of workers worsened in the crisis of 1846–1847, which induced socialist Louis Blanc to propose the *ateliers nationaux* (national workshops), factories managed by the state to provide the unemployed with jobs, to counteract these worsening conditions.

The conflict began within institutional circles and then spread outward (Tarrow, 1998). When the regime rejected the parliamentary opposition's demand for suffrage reform, moderates and republicans allied to launch the campaign of “banquets” to promote reform, and took the issue to the streets, not only in Paris but also in the province. The protest turned to overt rebellion as the initiative passed into the hands of the National Guard and the urban poor, and repression provoked an escalation of violence, especially when protests by workers and radical socialists, known as the June Days, were crushed by the government. The new republic inaugurated in February 1848 lasted for less than five years, as conflicting class interests facilitated the coup d'état by Louis-Napoléon in December 1852 and the establishment of the Second Empire under his lead one year later. In France as elsewhere in Europe, moderates pulled back, eventually allowing military force and conservative reaction to gain the upper hand over popular contention, putting an end to the first major European cycle of contention.

he calls “world-historical social movements”—that have occurred since the historical phase that embraced the American and French revolutions: 1848–1849, 1905–1907, 1917–1919, and 1967–1970. Each had its ascending social class, emergent organizations, dominant social vision, and privileged tactics (see table 2 on page 317). At least two of them qualify as major European cycles of contention. The uprisings that broke out all over Europe in the winter and spring of 1848 represent the first modern cycle of protest. This revolutionary period combined issues pertaining to political rights and claims about social rights with large doses of nationalism. In a way, 1848 was at the same time a bourgeois liberal revolution against the

last gasps of an abdicating monarchy and a proletarian revolution of a nascent labor movement struggling for a place on the stage of history. By the time of the Paris Commune in 1871, the latter had fully gained that place. Another major cycle of contention, with fewer consequences, had its peak in 1968. Student and labor movements were at the core of this phase of unrest. Yet, if traditional cleavages and claims typically underpinned the 1848 cycle, the events of 1967–1970 represent the rise of the New Left and of movements based on new—“postmaterialist”—cleavages; in brief, the shift from old to new politics.

Of course, other moments of generalized social unrest have occurred in Europe, like the post-World



1968: STUDENT PROTEST AND THE NEW LEFT

France in May 1968 symbolizes and represents the peak of a cycle of contention that saw students and workers at center stage, but involved other social groups, issues, and claims as well, such as peace, nuclear arms, women's liberation, and other calls for social and cultural emancipation. In brief, a whole political sector known as the New Left contributed to produce a major phase of turmoil. Students across Europe organized assemblies, held sit-ins, and went into the streets to show their dissatisfaction with the higher education system as well as with political institutions and the functioning of society at large. The mobilization of the student movement was particularly significant in Germany, Italy, and France.

Although the most dramatic memories of 1968 come from Paris, the European wave of student unrest began in Germany. In the early 1960s, the German student movement paved the way to the outbreak of protest by providing their counterparts in other countries with ideological tools and a model for a new type of action based on the separation from institutionalized politics and greater autonomy. West Berlin can be considered the birthplace of European student protest, both chronologically and ideologically (Statera, 1975). There, the protest transcended issues pertaining to the university system, first denouncing the Vietnam War and then imperialism, the repressive nature of capitalism, the authoritarian character of society, the lack of real democracy, and so

forth. Students were massively repressed by the German authorities after December 1966, thus facilitating the rise of a strong extraparliamentary opposition starting from mid 1967. The New Left staged a variety of activities during 1967 and 1968, including a series of attacks against a hostile national newspaper monopoly (Katsiaficas, 1987). The unrest became particularly strong when the parliament passed emergency laws aimed at social control on 20 May 1968. A series of actions, blockades, and mass demonstrations were held that month throughout the country, and included a call for a general strike that was endorsed in several cities.

While the major mobilizations in Germany occurred in 1967, in Italy student masses actively participated only in 1968. Yet in both countries the protest radicalized and spread across the nation during 1967 to peak in spring 1968. The Italian student movement began above all at the Universities of Trent and Turin, where in November 1967 students occupied the headquarters of the arts faculties nearly uninterruptedly for about seven months. The unrest took a broader dimension in spring 1968, involving thousands of people all over the country and leading in March to serious clashes with the police at Valle Giulia in Rome. By the end of the year, the student movement had developed ties with workers, who joined the protest with their own grievances and claims. The mobilization of the labor movement peaked in the so-called "Hot Au-

War I period, with the strike wave and the Popular Front in France, the rise of nazism in Germany, and that of fascism above all in Italy and Spain. Another cycle of contention, this time with tremendous social and political impact, occurred at the end of the 1980s in eastern and central Europe. Spurred by the move toward liberalization made by the Soviet party secretary Mikhail Gorbachev through *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring), the powerful mix of claims for civil rights and democracy and together with nationalistic aspirations produced one of the more dramatic geopolitical changes of the twentieth century. The democratic "revolutions" that in 1989–1991 led to the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and eventually to the birth of a

number of new states also show how processes of diffusion may help social protest spread from one place to another, from one country to another. This, together with diffusion from one sector of society to other sectors, contributes to the creation of a cycle of contention.

Cycles of contention have various outcomes. The radicalization of social protest, which can lead to the overt use of violence, is one; its institutionalization is another. Often radicalization and institutionalization both occur at the same time at the end of a cycle of contention as a result of the selective repression exerted by the political authorities, which exploit and exacerbate the split between radicals and moderates within the movements, and of the dynamics of com-



tumn” of 1969 as major strikes threatened to block the Italian economy and as contention was transforming into class struggle. Students, the New Left, and organized workers all contributed to a major cycle of contention, which declined as various groups of the New Left became increasingly active outside the factories, some turning to terrorist activities.

Student unrest in France was the most intense but at the same time the most short-lived within this cycle of contention. The protest both started and ended more abruptly than in Germany and Italy. Although signs of agitation and dissatisfaction with the educational system had already been present before, the effective rise of collective action began in the fall of 1967 and continued sporadically through the winter and early spring of the following year. It then took an upward turn in March and April 1968, not only in France but in various European countries. In France, the turning point occurred on 22 March, following the occupation of the administration building of the University of Nanterre, which became the center of the protest under the leadership of student activist Daniel Cohn-Bendit. The protest turned into revolt and a near insurrection starting from the night between 10 and 11 May 1968, when barricades and clashes with the police in Paris as well as in other cities nearly led to the collapse of the French government, as President Charles de Gaulle, rumored to be considering

resignation dissolved the parliament. As in Italy, the labor movement joined the protest and engaged in a series of large-scale strikes. The cycle was turning into a near revolution, but de Gaulle’s party won the elections in June. After its abrupt rise in May and June 1968, the student movement rapidly demobilized and the working class returned to work with the signature of the Grenelle agreements on 27 May 1968, which closed the crisis as far as industrial relations were concerned. Factory militancy continued, but the May events largely exhausted the mobilization capacity of the other major sectors of the French society.

The student and New Left cycle of contention of 1968 also touched Eastern Europe. The student movement was particularly active in Poland, where it showed characteristics similar to those of its West European counterparts, although its mobilization there did not deal with issues pertaining to the academic structure (Statera, 1975). Protests rapidly spread from Warsaw to the rest of the country in March 1968. The most dramatic images in that part of the Continent, however, come from Czechoslovakia, where the most important popular movement for reform in the East since the one that occurred in Hungary in 1956 was brutally repressed by Soviet arm in August 1968. The Prague Spring thus finished before it could keep its promises, and it was twenty years before revolutionary change came to Eastern Europe.

petition among the groups involved in the protest (della Porta 1995; Tarrow 1989). Yet collective violence is also an outcome of collective action in general, which usually comes in periods of national struggles of power (Tilly et al., 1975).

Terrorism, a special case of violence used for political purposes, is carried out by small, organized, underground organizations. It is not a social movement, but often arises as a result of cycles of contention that involve social movements. In twentieth-century Europe there were three main sources of this highly delegitimized type of political violence: left-wing organizations, right-wing or extreme right organizations, and ethnic-nationalist organizations. Germany and Italy witnessed impressive levels of political

violence in the wake of student and labor unrest that occurred across Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s (della Porta, 1995). Clandestine armed organizations such as the Red Army Fraction in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy—to mention only the most famous left-wing terrorist groups—made themselves known during the 1970s. Italy, in particular, suffered from the actions of both left- and right-wing underground organizations. There, the escalation of left-wing violence seems indeed to have been a product of the 1968 cycle of contention. However, this effect is likely to have been exacerbated by a strong left-right polarization and the reminiscences of the harsh confrontations between these two political fronts under the fascist regime in the 1920s and 1930s.



1989: THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, no one could imagine that a few years later the Berlin wall and “real socialism” would be only history. Gorbachev’s *glasnost* and *perestroika* were a series of reforms and a policy of liberalization that provided new opportunities for people to organize and mobilize. These policies triggered a wave of democratization movements that formed a major cycle of contention, with truly revolutionary outcomes, in east and central Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The symbolic peak of the cycle occurred on 9 November 1989, when East Germany’s government announced the opening of the Berlin wall. Although at times and in some places, as for example in Romania, the protest took violent forms, most of this cycle of contention involved peaceful demonstrations, strikes, and protest marches, which has led some to speak of a “soft revolution” or, specifically referring to the case of Czechoslovakia, of the Velvet Revolution.

This cycle of contention was carried in the first place by claims for civil rights and democracy from below. In addition, as in 1848, liberal revolutions intersected with nationalist strife, and the weakening of the Soviet control stimulated nationalist feelings and aspirations that led to civil war, first in parts of the Soviet Union and later in the Balkans. Gorbachev’s cycle of reform, especially the proposal to introduce real elections and the removal of the threat of Red Army intervention, spurred protests for more autonomy in several republics of the Soviet Union. The first open signs of revolt appeared in Estonia and Armenia in February 1988 and proliferated in the course

of 1989, when in the three Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) people went to the streets to call for independence from Moscow. Social protest remained sustained in the former Soviet Union through 1990 and 1991, and continued even into 1992 (Beissinger, 1998). Indeed, although at the same time, participation diminished, violence increased dramatically in 1992, also as a result of the military intervention of the government in Moscow. The three Baltic republics proclaimed their independence in 1990. Georgia followed in 1991. The Soviet Union collapsed in the wake of the attempted coup d’état by party hardliners in August of that year.

Also in the spring of 1989, conflict emerged in Yugoslavia between the ruling Serbs and the country’s other ethnic groups, who demanded more autonomy from Belgrade. This conflict led to the civil wars that shook the Balkan area in the 1990s. First Slovenia, then Croatia and Bosnia fought for and eventually obtained their independence.

Social protest played an especially significant role in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Concerning the former country, the decision by the Hungarian authorities to open the east-west border and hence to create a breach in the Iron Curtain in the summer of 1989, with the resulting exodus of people from East Germany, precipitated the crisis and further encouraged people to demonstrate first for political reform and then for German reunification (see Oberschall, 1996). The key events occurred in Leipzig, the second-largest city, in fall 1989. In spite of initial repression, increasingly larger crowds staged a series of demonstrations and marches, sometimes with many thousands of people, which peaked in

Other countries were touched less by left- and right-wing terrorism but dealt with violent actions taken by the armed branches of nationalist movements. Britain, France, and Spain certainly suffered from this type of political violence. Terrorist acts respectively by the Irish Republican Army, the ETA Basque organization, and Corsican nationalist groups filled the pages of newspapers for many years. In these cases, terrorism appears less as an outcome of a given

cycle of contention than as an endemic feature of those societies, although the pace and intensity of terrorist acts may vary according to the ebb and flow of nationalist protest more generally.

Cycles of contention sometimes evolved into full-fledged revolutions, as in 1789 France, 1917 Russia, or in 1989–1991 Eastern Europe. Historians have identified the major factors that may produce a revolution: the weakness of the state (due to either in-



October of that year. Shortly, thereafter, a weakened government was forced to announce the opening of the Berlin Wall.

The protest spread rapidly from East Germany to Czechoslovakia and the Balkans. The Velvet Revolution that eventually led to the division of Czechoslovakia into two separate countries (the Czech Republic and Slovakia) was successful in short order. Although a peak in mobilization and clashes with the police occurred in January 1989, the democratic movement took a real popular dimension only in the fall of 1989. The strongest mobilization had its center in Prague and lasted only six weeks, including a general strike on 17 November, which proved

to be a crucial event in the challenge to the Communist regime (see Oberschall, 1996). The dissident alliance Civil Forum was founded in Prague on 20 November. By the end of 1989, Václav Havel, the leader of the democratic opposition to the regime, was the new president of Czechoslovakia.

At more or less the same time, in Romania the Communist regime shot at people demonstrating in Timișoara. Previously this would probably have meant the retreat of demonstrators and the “reestablishment of order,” but in the changed international context of the late 1980s the inevitable result of this harsh repression was an escalation of violence that led to the arrest and the execution, in December 1989, of president Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife. These events strongly contrast with the changes that occurred in Hungary and in Poland. In Hungary, social protest in 1988 and 1989 found a divided Communist party, and opposition was facilitated by the erosion of its authority from within. In Poland, negotiations between the government and the free union *Solidarność* (Solidarity) began at the end of 1988, eight years after the latter was outlawed in 1981. The first noncommunist government was freely elected in a Communist country on the following year.

The democratic movements of the late 1990s produced profound changes in Europe’s social and political landscape: more than seventy years of applied communism came to an abrupt end as the Soviet Union collapsed and the Warsaw Pact broke up; new states were created, in some cases after bloody civil wars, and Europe’s geopolitical configuration was revolutionized with the end of the bipolar system.

ternal or external pressures, or both), the creation of a situation of multiple sovereignty, and the responses by the state to the claims for the control of power made by an increasingly strong and radical collaborative effort to overthrow the state (Tilly, 1993). In brief, revolutionary situations (i.e., open divisions of sovereignty) occurred when a deeply fragmented state was unable to fulfill its basic functions and when there were at least two contenders struggling for power.

These situations produced revolutionary outcomes (i.e. a forcible transfer of power from one contending party to the other) when a weakened state responded to challengers with inconsistent repression. Furthermore, state repression was all the more likely to lead to a revolutionary outcome to the extent that it—and those who perpetrated it—was perceived and evaluated as illegitimate by a large number of people in society.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATIONS

State fragmentation and repression thus appear as major determinants of the shift from social movements to cycles of contention and revolutions. This suggests that contentious collective action is not simply the product of grievances or perceived threats. Indeed, among the major contributions of research since 1970 is the idea that, contrary to what breakdown and collective behavior theories postulated, social change impinges only indirectly upon social protest through a restructuring of existing power relations, not directly by creating social stress and deprivation to which protest would be a collective response. Students of social movements have elaborated the concept of political opportunity structures to account for the emergence of contentious collective action and to explain its ebbs and flows. Political opportunity structures capture those aspects of the political context of movements that mediate the impact of large-scale social changes on social protest and either encourage or discourage mobilization.

Doug McAdam (1996) has made an attempt to summarize the numerous dimensions of political opportunity structures found in the extant literature. He came up with the following four kinds of “signals to social or political actors:” (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. Some of these aspects of the external environment of social movements are rather stable (e.g. the institutional structure of the state); others are more volatile and subject to shifts over time (e.g., political alignments). All of them affect people’s expectations for success or failure of collective action and either increase or decrease the social and political costs of mobilization.

Political opportunities, however, do not single-handedly produce social movements. Other factors concur to give rise to this form of contentious collective action once processes of large-scale social change have created the structural and cultural cleavages that provide the conditions for their political mobilization. European social movements have emerged due to the interplay of the mobilizing structures by which groups seek to organize, the cultural framing processes by which people define and interpret situations and events, and the political opportunities that provide them with the incentives to act collectively. Tarrow (1998) has aptly summarized the process of movement emergence as follows:

contentious politics is produced when political opportunities broaden, when they demonstrate the potential for alliances, and when they reveal the opponents’ vulnerability. Contention crystallizes into a social movement when it taps embedded social networks and connective structures and produces collective action frames and supportive identities able to sustain contention with powerful opponents. By mounting familiar forms of contention, movements become the focal points that transform external opportunities into resources. Repertoires of contention, social networks, and cultural frames lower the costs of bringing people into collective action, induce confidence that they are not alone, and give broader meaning to their claims. Together, these factors trigger the dynamic processes that have made social movements historically central to political and social change (p. 23).

There are few studies that compare the mobilization of European social movements across countries by means of systematic empirical evidence. One of the reasons is that this is a costly and time-consuming endeavor. This state of affairs, however, is changing. Hanspeter Kriesi and his collaborators (1995), for example, have provided a comparative analysis of social movements for a short but significant historical phase. We can use their work to show the extent to which the mobilization of contemporary social movements resembles or varies across nations as a function of different sets of political opportunities. Table 3 shows the distribution of protest actions in four European countries from 1975 to 1989. Even without going into too much detail, we can stress a certain number of interesting patterns. First of all, movements that rest upon traditional cleavages are much stronger in France than in Germany, Switzerland, or the Netherlands, both in percentages and in the numbers of people mobilized. In the latter three countries, traditional cleavages had to a large extent been pacified, whereas in France they kept much of their political salience. As a result, the types of movements and issues based on the four cleavages stressed by Rokkan (regionalist movements, education, peasants’, and labor movements) play a greater role in the French context. This, according to the authors, leaves less space for the mobilization of the new social movements; their findings largely confirm this hypothesis. Furthermore, if we look at the number of participants involved in strike activity—the typical means of action used by the labor movement—we realize how strong the class cleavage in France was, compared to the other three countries. In general, a cross-national comparison of both the relative and absolute strength of European social movements shows that, at least for the four countries included in the study by Kriesi et al., their mobilization varies strongly across nations as well as across movements. Such variations depend



TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF PROTEST ACTIONS IN FOUR COUNTRIES, 1975–1989

	<i>Percentage of actions^a</i>				<i>Number of participants^b</i>			
	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Neth.</i>	<i>Switz.</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Neth.</i>	<i>Switz.</i>
<i>New social movements</i>								
Peace movement	4.4	18.7	16.9	6.0	14	111	92	25
Antinuclear energy movement	12.8	12.8	5.1	7.2	9	26	15	24
Ecology movement	4.4	11.3	8.0	10.6	2	11	5	16
Solidarity movement	9.2	15.0	17.7	16.0	15	13	19	19
Squatters' movement	3.0	13.4	14.1	18.4	0	6	5	14
Gay movement	0.8	0.3	2.0	0.7	1	0	4	0
Women's movement	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.1	2	1	3	3
Total new social movements	36.1	73.2	65.4	61.0	43	168	143	101
<i>Traditional movements</i>								
Student movement	4.8	1.5	2.2	0.2	23	4	7	0
Civil rights movement	1.5	1.3	0.6	2.7	0	2	0	3
Foreigners	2.5	4.2	7.1	8.5	1	2	3	8
Regionalist movements	16.6	0.1	0.0	10.6	4	0	0	11
Education	4.0	1.5	1.0	0.2	62	2	2	0
Peasants	6.6	0.3	1.3	0.8	3	2	1	1
Labor movement	10.1	4.3	9.2	3.7	33	19	19	15
Other left-wing mobilizations	2.0	3.9	2.4	2.4	1	3	14	4
Right extremism	3.3	3.8	0.7	0.6	1	0	0	0
Other right-wing mobilizations	2.6	1.9	1.0	2.0	1	7	2	4
Other mobilizations ^c	9.7	4.0	9.2	7.5	9	2	6	9
Total traditional movements	63.9	26.8	34.6	39.0	135	43	55	55
Grand total	100%	100%	100%	100%	178	211	198	156
(n)	(2132)	(2343)	(1319)	(1215)	(2076)	(2229)	(1264)	(1027)
Strikes	—	—	—	—	225	37	23	2
Grand total including strikes	—	—	—	—	403	248	221	158

Source: Adapted from Kriesi et al. (1995), pp. 20, 22.

^a Figures for the labor movement do not include strikes.

^b Sum of the number of participants in all unconventional actions per million inhabitants. Missing values have been replaced by the national median of the number of participants for a given type of event. Petitions and politically motivated festivals are excluded. Figures on strikes are based on statistics by the International Labor Organization (ILO).

^c Also includes countermobilization to new social movements (e.g. all actions directed against them).

very much on the specific political opportunity structures available at a given historical moment, but also on the organizational strength of movements (mobilizing structures), and on the resonance of their claims in the society at large (framing processes). In addition, the level of mobilization of single movements also depends on their relationship with political institutions over time. Certain contemporary movements, such as women's movements, have followed a pattern of institutionalization that has robbed them of much of their mobilization capacity and they therefore either become latent or tend to act through more conventional means, which are not captured by the kind of data gathered by Kriesi and his collaborators.

The prevailing structure of political opportunities in a given nation does not only affect the amount of collective action and the levels of mobilization of social movements; it also encourages the use of certain forms of action while discouraging others. We have an illustration of that by looking again at the data provided by Kriesi et al. (1995). Table 4 shows the distribution of protest in the same four countries broken down by form of action, ranging from the more moderate and conventional actions (the use of direct democratic instruments, petitions, and politically motivated festivals) to demonstrative actions (street demonstrations, rallies, public meetings, etc.), confrontational actions (boycotts, occupations, blockades, etc.), and violent actions (violent demonstrations, destruction of objects, bombing, etc.). The action repertoire of social movements is decidedly more radical in France and, conversely, more moderate in Switzerland. This difference, according to the authors, is largely explained by the different opportunity structures in the two countries as yielded by the combination of two of four dimensions highlighted by McAdam (1996): the degree of openness of the institutionalized political system and the state's capacity and propensity for repression. The closed and rather repressive (exclusive) French state has led social movements to make more frequent use of radical and often violent forms of action, while the open and facilitative (inclusive) Swiss state has channeled the protest into more moderate and conventional actions. In this picture, Germany and the Netherlands provide two intermediate cases, as they combine institutional openness and a propensity for repression. The action repertoire of social movements in these two countries, therefore, is more radical than in Switzerland but more moderate than in France.

Although limited to four European countries, this example shows that social movements and the power structures of the national state, which grew together in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, re-

main intimately linked. After World War II, as the world became increasingly interconnected and processes of economic globalization and cultural homogenization accelerated, several international and supranational institutions emerged. Like national ones, these institutions provide opportunities and incentives for contentious politics, and scholars have begun to document forms of transnational collective action and transnational social movements (see among others della Porta et al. 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith et al. 1997). At least a part of this collective action transcends national boundaries to become transnational social movements, which have recurrently formed in Europe. The creation first of a European Economic Community, then of the European Union undoubtedly opened new opportunities for the mobilization of transnational actors and organizations. Yet, by the late twentieth century, such opportunities remained rather limited and did not stimulate the kind of popular contention that characterized the activity of earlier social movements. National states remained strong in most policy areas and still controlled their borders and exercised legal dominion within them; most mobilizing structures, collective action frames, political opportunities, and repertoires of contention were therefore available at that level. These are resources that even the controversial process of globalization was hardly able to counteract.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

European social movements must be studied as part of a broader spectrum of contentious political actions which includes other forms such as cycles of contention and revolutions. These are related phenomena that originate in similar circumstances but evolve in different patterns as a result of the interaction between social protest, state response, and the larger social and political environment. Jack Goldstone (1998) has elegantly formulated this idea as follows:

Contentious collective action emerges through the mobilization of individuals and groups to pursue certain goals, the framing of purposes and tactics, and taking advantages of opportunities for protest arising from shifts in the grievances, power, and vulnerability of various social actors. But the *form* and *outcome* of that action is not determined by the conditions of movement emergence. These characteristics are themselves emergent, and contingent on the responses of various social actors to the initial protest actions. (p. 143; emphasis in original)

As Charles Tilly has shown in his many publications on the subject, during the past few centuries Europe has witnessed a long-term structural transfor-



TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF PROTEST ACTIONS BY FORM OF ACTION IN FOUR COUNTRIES,
1975–1989

	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>
Conventional ^a	2.6	4.9	4.2	21.7
Demonstrative	41.7	60.6	49.7	52.5
Confrontational	24.5	19.3	35.0	13.4
Violent	31.2	15.2	11.1	12.4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
(n)	(2132)	(2343)	(1319)	(1322)

Source: Adapted from Kriesi et al. (1995), p. 50.

^a Direct democracy, petitions, and politically motivated festivals.

mation that involved at least two interrelated processes: the rise of capitalism and the success of the national state over other forms of government and social organization. This transformation fundamentally affected the interests, identities, opportunities, and organizations of Europeans, with two major consequences. On the one hand, the ways Europeans have engaged in contentious collective action, as well as its very targets, have been modified, leading, at some point during the nineteenth century, to the emergence of modern social movements. This change took place in close conjunction with the rise of electoral campaigns and interest-group politics at the national level (Tilly, 1995). On the other hand, the large-scale transformation of European society created a number of structural and cultural cleavages, which underpinned the mobilization of these movements and affected that of later movements.

We may identify four main movement families typical of twentieth-century Europe, most prominent in western Europe, but in part also in evidence in eastern Europe: (1) labor movements, (2) left-libertarian and new social movements, (3) movements of the extreme right, and (4) regionalist and

nationalist movements. The lines of conflict underpinning these areas of contention translated into actual social protest when political opportunities gave Europeans the incentives to mobilize and encouraged them to use their internal resources to form social movements. Sometimes the emerging challenges to the constituted authorities clustered into broad and widespread cycles of contention, as in 1848, 1968, or 1989. Sometimes such waves of generalized social unrest produced revolutionary outcomes. Most often, however, people's engagement to defend or promote their interests and identities remained within the boundaries set by the existing cultural and institutional parameters, the very same parameters that account for the similarities and variations in the mobilization of social movements across countries. In either case, by their actions Europeans have shown—and continue to show—that social protest is not an irrational response to situations of strain and deprivation, but is just one of the ways people have to defend or promote their interests and identities, sometimes the only way available. Indeed, as Karl Marx has forcefully shown, conflict is inscribed in the very structure of society.

See also other articles in this section.

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Section 12



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CRIME



Pieter Spierenburg

In the past, no less than today, crime has been seen as a problem and contemporaries have expressed concern about it. Notions of what is criminal and what is not, however, vary over time. These variations are related to changes in both social structure and the material environment. Obviously, an offense like reckless driving can only exist in a world with cars. Similarly, sorcery can only be a crime in a society in which belief in magic is widespread. And the variability of the content of crime extends further. The definition of moral offenses changed as ideas about sexuality and gender and notions of privacy changed. Homosexual activities involving adult men, for example, ceased to be illegal in most European countries since the nineteenth century. Although stealing another's property and assaulting a person are unlawful in almost any society, the meaning and context of these actions greatly differ with time and place. In less developed, feudal regions, for example, cattle rustling was not primarily a means to enrich oneself but a challenge to the power of a rural patron and a test of his capacity for protecting his people and goods. Crime, then, is not a single, straightforward social category but rather a multifaceted phenomenon. Consequently, the historical study of criminality is not just about what some people actually do but also about perceptions, attitudes, and cultural stereotypes.

DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

Most historians adopt a practical definition of crime, which reflects its diversity. With minor variations in terminology, they define crime as illegal behavior which, if detected and prosecuted, can be punished in a court of law or by some other official agency of law enforcement. Thus crime is simply anything forbidden by the secular authorities. When they determine that blasphemy can be prosecuted and punished in court, it is a crime; should they decide that burglary is no longer punishable, it would not be a crime. Any other definition would be based on the investigator's

own sense of right and wrong, bringing the danger of anachronism. Of course, contemporaries never unequivocally agreed with the authorities' demarcation of the range of punishable offenses. Investigating the extent to which various social groups had different views of what is wrong and what is not is an important subject within the historiography of crime. Finally, our definition is not restricted to behavior actually prosecuted: it includes those acts which remain undetected, the so-called dark number.

This practical or institutional definition means that illegality is the sole characteristic all crimes have in common. Criminality is a "container concept." Hence few studies deal with total crime, and if they do, they break it down into categories again. This applies to qualitative as well as quantitative studies. It is not very meaningful to add up figures for theft, fornication, and insulting policemen and present them as a total crime rate. This would be like adding, without specification, corn prices and tax returns and calling them an "economic figure." The diversity of criminal activities also has a distinct advantage: there is a very broad range of historical studies which all, in one way or another, belong to the historiography of crime. Because of the broad range of criminal activities, it is impossible to present a neat chronological account, with crime being like this in the sixteenth century in Scandinavia, Germany, or England, like that in the seventeenth, and so on to the twentieth. The treatment must necessarily be thematic, pointing at change along the way.

By definition, crime is intimately related to the state. Through criminal legislation and court action, the state demarcates the borders of lawful and unlawful behavior. Historically, this implies a parallel relationship between processes of state formation and criminalization. It is only when stronger states emerged that the perception of wrongful acts changed. A number of harmful activities were gradually redefined as being not merely conflicts between private individuals but directed against the state as well. Henceforth they were a breach of the peace, offending the sovereign.

While “classical offenses” like theft and assault were thus redefined, a number of newly created offenses—smuggling, begging, prostitution—were included in this category. Consequently, the activities in question came to be listed under the same heading as crimes. This process extended over a long period, but for most of Europe the sixteenth century was the crucial period of transition. We can term this the beginning of criminalization: the creation of the category of crime itself. From the beginning of the period with which this encyclopedia deals, then, crime was a reality, albeit a reality defined from above.

Crime is what you find when you study court records. In the tradition of legal history, criminal records are studied, if at all, as a supplement to legislative sources. To the legal historian, laws and statutes are of primary interest, and the courts’ activities are merely the application of the rules. Social historians, by contrast, are interested in court records because crime is a mirror of society. It reflects, among other things, relations between social classes, submerged tensions, the position of immigrants versus natives, gender relations, and structural change over the long term. More particularly, court records are one of the few sources dealing almost exclusively with common people. They reveal things about the way of life of ordinary men and women, not just of the lawbreakers among them but also their families and neighbors. From the beginning, therefore, the study of historical crime received an impetus from the fashion of writing “history from below.” Whereas the first generation of crime historians (from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s) was especially concerned with either the quantitative analysis of property crime or particular offenses which revealed social tensions, the second generation (from the late 1980s) preferred violence over property crime, focusing on issues of ritual, honor and shame, and gender.

The extent to which such issues can be studied in depth depends on the quality of the sources. Much of the earlier work on England, for example, has been done with so-called indictments: brief statements in which the defendant’s offense is defined in legal terms and not much more. The prevalence of these documents follows from a peculiarity of the English criminal trial, which remained largely accusatory (allowing only private prosecution by a wronged party) until the early nineteenth century and was based on a jury system. Whereas continental procedure was largely based on written records, the oral element remained more important in England. The main part of the English trial was public and oral before the jury. Examination documents merely served to bolster the prosecution’s case at this oral trial and were considered of little

worth afterward. Few of these documents have survived. However, later British historians discovered that extensive trial papers have been preserved of some of the lower courts, dealing with neighborly conflicts in urban neighborhoods and rural communities. On the Continent, interrogation protocols have been preserved for many of the higher courts as well, due to the greater importance attached to the written dossier in countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Incidentally, a Dutch sentence of the early modern period is the opposite of an English indictment: it says what the defendant actually did, often without legally defining the offense.

The records of criminal trials are not the only sources for the historical study of crime. Prison records exist in several countries from the seventeenth century onward, but these are primarily valuable for the history of punishment. When we deal with perceptions of criminality, the contemporary crime literature is an important source, available from the late seventeenth century. From the nineteenth century onward, newspaper accounts inform us about individual cases, but they can also be used to provide supplementary data for quantitative studies. In the twentieth century, finally, police records constitute a source of major importance.

Although no standard categorization of crimes, approved by all scholars, exists, it is common to distinguish four general categories: (1) violence, or crimes against the person; (2) crimes against property, from theft and fraud to robbery; (3) morals offenses, punished either by secular or church courts; and (4) a residual category of offenses against authority, the state, or public order. Historians whose research goes back further in time often add a separate class of religious offenses, such as heresy and blasphemy. With the exception of the third category, especially when prosecution for prostitution was intense, men constituted the majority of offenders. It should be stressed, however, that male preponderance in criminality is much greater in the twentieth century than it was before. In early modern Europe, women often made up 30 to 40 percent of offenders; their share in theft could be considerable. From the late seventeenth century onward, the proportion of women tried in court gradually declined.

PROPERTY CRIME AND THE PROBLEM OF QUANTIFICATION

Quantitative studies of crime mainly deal with violence, in particular homicide, and various types of property offenses. Major issues include the propor-

tional share of categories of offenses, temporary peaks and lows in criminality, trends in property and violent crime, and urbanization and crime. The first of these issues led to the oldest thesis in the historiography of crime. It was developed in the 1960s and early 1970s by French historians, who spoke of a shift *de la violence au vol*, from violence to theft. They argued that the feudal code of honor led to a preponderance of violent offenses, while the central place of the market in bourgeois society produced a larger share of property offenses. Society still was rough and rife with emotions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but in the eighteenth a more pacified and commercialized society emerged. In this view, the modernization of crime took place during the eighteenth century, as a concomitant of the transition from a feudal to a bourgeois society.

Since the late 1970s, the thesis of a shift from violent to property offenses has been under attack. Although the data from France appear to be congruous with it, a later generation of French historians doubted whether these data reflected a shift in real crime. For one thing, the violence-to-theft thesis refers to the ratios of criminal categories rather than the absolute rates; it is about the share of the two categories of offenses in the total criminal caseload of particular courts. This share is mainly the outcome of decisions at the judicial level; it has to do with the priorities of courts. The courts of prerevolutionary Paris, for example, eagerly prosecuted theft of even the smallest item of food, while they cared less for fights among men and women of the lower classes. It is more likely, therefore, that late-eighteenth-century France witnessed an increase in concern for the protection of property than a peak in real property crime.

Finally, the violence-to-theft pattern has not been found in other countries of early modern Europe. In England property offenses accounted for a large share of the courts' business already in the 1590s, in some cases amounting to three-quarters of all indictments. The proportion of property offenses declined as the seventeenth century progressed, and it remained low during most of the eighteenth. Only in the last decades of the eighteenth century did the prosecution of property offenses again reach the level of the late sixteenth. In Amsterdam the proportion of property offenses rose steadily from about 30 percent in 1650 to about 45 percent in 1750. However, since total prosecuted criminality dropped sharply in this period, the rate of property offenses actually declined. It rose again, also elsewhere in the Netherlands, at the very end of the eighteenth century. With converging data from France, England, and the Netherlands, this last trend appears international: ratios and rates of prop-

erty offenses peaked toward the end of the early modern period.

Determining crime rates. The French studies upon which the violence-to-theft thesis was based remained confined to the the ancien régime. However, for the quantitative study of crime in Europe, the main historical dividing line is between the prestatistical and the statistical periods. During the first half of the nineteenth century, most European countries began to compile criminal statistics. Only from then on is it possible to investigate crime rates on a national scale. Before that period, research is largely restricted to individual courts. The geographic scale constitutes the main difference, rather than the origin of the figures. Well into the twentieth century, national statistics were generally based on figures for prosecuted crimes. This was the case, for example, with the Prussian criminal statistics from 1836 to 1850. From 1857 English criminal statistics included information on main indictable offenses and figures for summary trials before a magistrate; the larger category of crimes known to the police was not reported nationally. The Swedish police did not keep statistics until 1949. Yet most historians accept the opinion of criminologists that every stage of the criminal justice process represents a distortion of the figures and that hence the figures at the first stage, crimes known to the police, are best.

With regard to the quantitative study of crime in both the early modern period and the nineteenth century, then, one methodological problem looms large. How do we know if the level of prosecuted crime reflects the level of real crime? Apart from having police reports available, modern criminologists supplement their statistics with data from victims' surveys. Historians, on the other hand, only have figures based on prosecuted cases. The problem is not the existence of a dark number as such, but the question of whether it remains constant. If the ratio of prosecuted to undetected thefts is always 4 to 2, for example, any increase or decrease in prosecuted theft represents a proportionate increase or decrease in real theft. However, such a situation is unlikely to prevail. If the number of prosecuted thefts rose in a year of hardship, for example, was this because people stole more often or because police and courts were particularly attentive in that year?

One of the earliest answers to that question was based on a negative argument: short-term fluctuations, if not too insignificant, may be taken as meaningful reflections of actual criminal activity, provided that they cannot be due to any legal, administrative, or other change taking immediate effect. This only

applies to major fluctuations in crime and in years when the cited counterforces are absent. For the rest, there are two main tools for tackling the problem presented by the dark number. The first is a careful assessment of the influences upon the level of prosecution. For example, English historians emphasize that, in the course of the eighteenth century, concern among the public about the appropriateness of the death penalty for minor crimes against property increased, with a growing reluctance to report and prosecute these offenses as a consequence. This made the rate of indicted property crimes a poorer sample of actual property crime as the century wore on. The second tool is the attempt to look for other indicators to make one's assumptions about the incidence of real crime more plausible. During the crisis years 1771–1772 in Amsterdam, for example, the number of property offenses peaked. Simultaneously, the total amount spent by the various churches on poor relief and the total value of goods brought to the municipal pawn shop were considerably higher than in the years immediately preceding and following.

The two most systematic attempts by historians so far at counting real crime each elaborate one of the tools just mentioned. They refer to the prestatistical and the statistical period, respectively. In his 1982 article "War, Dearth, and Theft in the Eighteenth Century," Douglas Hay examined the impact of war and dearth upon the level of property crime, based on an analysis of Staffordshire cases in the eighteenth century. To distinguish the level of prosecuted from that of real property crime, he referred to the latter as "appropriation." The analysis focused on the influence of two factors, fluctuations in food prices and the alternation of periods of war and peace, upon the level of indictments for larcenies. The data clearly showed peaks in the level of indicted larcenies during the aftermath of war and in years of excessively high food prices.

To show that these peaks reflected increases in the amount of appropriation, Hay argued by way of deduction. In hard years, he noted, poverty was an acute affliction rather than a routine experience for a greater number of people. Consequently, he expected not simply more appropriation in those years but also a change in the nature of the offenses and the offenders. These expectations proved true. Among the offenders, for example, the proportion of women increased in years of high prices, suggesting that more people who did not otherwise run the risk of appearing before the courts stole in those years. The offenses included a disproportionate amount of lesser charges, rather than capital crimes, and the sort of appropriation committed without much planning increased in

frequency. A parallel argument pertained to the alternation between war and peace. Demobilization increased the number of men who were likely to resort to appropriation. In the aftermath of war, then, one would expect the proportion of serious property crime to rise, and indeed professionally committed thefts predominated and the number of women decreased. The traditional factors influencing the level of indicted offenses, such as the formation of associations for the prosecution of felons, were unlikely to have operated to any special extent in years of dearth or following wars.

This analysis has a wider relevance. Studies done in other European countries have revealed similar patterns with respect to peaks and lows in property crime. Even though the data precluded a refined methodological analysis along the lines just described, we may assume that, parallel to the English case, peaks in prosecuted property offenses reflected peaks in appropriation. Generally, years of dearth were years of increased property crime throughout Europe, well into the nineteenth century. Regarding the aftermath of war, matters were a little more complicated. Unlike England, continental countries did not simply send away soldiers and navy men and take them back again. Notably in regions where military operations were held, war itself could equally lead to increases in vagabondage and appropriation, in particular by deserters. For the local population, to be sure, it may have made little difference whether they suffered from robbery by deserters or pillage by regular soldiers.

For the statistical period, V. A. C. Gatrell (1980) assessed the influences upon the level of prosecution over a longer term rather than in peak years. He dealt with property crime and serious violence, two types of offenses about whose heinous character and the desirability of a reaction there was widespread consensus during the period he investigated. In England and Wales, prosecutions for these crimes peaked in the 1840s, but from about 1850 until 1914 the rates, relative to the population, steadily declined. The national scale and longer term of this decline ruled out any influence of incidental or local circumstances. Only two important factors remained: the efficiency and determination of police and courts on the one hand and citizens' cooperation with the law on the other. Both factors had a steadily increasing impact throughout the nineteenth century. As a consequence, the dark number must have steadily decreased, or, as Gatrell put it, recorded and real crime converged. For the period from 1800 to 1850, when recorded crime rose sharply, this convergence can be consistent with either an increase or a decrease in real crime. For the period from 1850 to 1914, however, it necessarily im-

crime, holds for Europe generally, but he admitted that more research, in various countries, is needed.

Informal handling of crime. This debate about “modernization” and crime refers to an early phase of urbanization and industrialization, roughly from the 1840s until the 1920s. In the course of the twentieth century, levels of crime, in particular property crime, increased again, especially since the 1960s. Throughout Europe, the level of prosecuted property crime in the second half of the twentieth century was much higher than in the early modern period, in absolute numbers of course but also relative to the total population. Part of the difference probably is real, as the opportunities for theft and fraud are so much greater in the modern world. Another part of the difference, however, is due to a combination of two factors characteristic of the early modern period: the lesser grip of police and courts on illegal behavior and the tendency of private individuals to solve their own problems. The result was that a lot of illegal behavior was dealt with informally at the community level. Historians commonly refer to this world of partly hidden crime and the reactions to it as the *infrajudiciary*.

Researchers discovered the world of the *infrajudiciary* because it occasionally surfaces in the judicial records themselves. Some defendants were charged by their neighbors with a long series of offenses, most of which dated back years. The last theft had finally prompted the victim to take legal action. Alternatively, it was simply mentioned that the defendant had a longer history of wrongdoing, which up to then the community had dealt with informally. A particularly illustrative example comes from a nonlegal source, the chronicle which the seventeenth-century yeoman Richard Gough wrote of his parish, Myddle:

But I must not forgett John Aston, because many in the Parish have reason to remember him. Hee was a sort of silly fellow, very idle and much given to stealing of poultry and small things. Hee was many times caught in the fact, and sometimes well cajoled by those that would trouble themselves noe further with him. Butt at last hee grew unsufferable, and made it his common practice to steal henns in the night and bring them to Shrewsbury, where hee had confederates to receive them att any time of night. Hee was att last imprisoned and indicted for stealing twenty-four cocks and henns. (Gough, 1981, p. 145)

John Aston’s neighbors finally took him to court because he had become “unsufferable,” but they did not want him to run the risk of hanging, so they fixed the worth of the stolen poultry at eleven pence.

The example from this chronicle highlights a common practice: a complaint to the court often was

plied that actual crime rates declined even more rapidly than the statistical record indicated. Although the method is adequate, Gattrell’s “convergence principle” has a limited applicability. It only works when the efficiency and determination of police and courts and citizens’ cooperation with the law are increasing, and it only leads to a meaningful conclusion when recorded crime rates decline or at least stay constant.

Again, these British findings have a clear relevance for other European countries, several of which appear to have partaken of the decrease in prosecutions for property crime since the middle of the nineteenth century. In Prussia, for example, prosecutions for theft started to decline in the 1850s. The rates for simple theft declined further in the statistics of imperial Germany from 1882 until 1914, although this trend was offset somewhat by a rise in other property offenses like embezzlement and fraud. In most of Europe, the second half of the nineteenth century was a period of expanding industry and rapid urbanization. Hence the data about criminality in this period are relevant for a debate about the “modernization” of crime, in which historians have engaged for long. The English and German figures contradict earlier notions that urbanization and industrialization brought about a greater preponderance and rising rates of property crime. Hence Eric Johnson (1995) argued against the thesis of Howard Zehr (1976), who stated that modernization led to an increasing preponderance of property crime, not only in Germany but also in France. Johnson believed that his own thesis, that modernization did not necessarily bring an increase in property

a last resort. Before it came that far, the neighbors dealt with the offender in an informal manner, as they also did with occasional thieves. Sometimes victims were able to recover their stolen property. Or they acquiesced when, for example, a poor neighbor had stolen their chicken and eaten it. In such cases they might give the thief a beating, as happened to John Aston. These types of informal reaction to crime were typical of an agrarian world in which villagers knew each other well. Well into the nineteenth century, the majority of Europe's population lived in such villages, which means that the informal system was a very common one. Moreover, even in a metropolis like Amsterdam it happened occasionally that victims came to the house of a thief to demand back their stolen goods. The pattern by which charges against fellow villagers often were the culmination of a series of complaints has been found in France, England, the Netherlands, Germany, and Scandinavia, from the beginning of the seventeenth century until the early nineteenth. Although the list of prior complaints can be included in crime figures, these cases are only the tip of an iceberg. For one thing, they only involve habitual malefactors, tolerated for some time but finally prosecuted.

Informal handling explains part of the difference in levels of prosecuted property crime between the early modern and the modern age. Although individual victims of crime were capable of acting on their own, historians assumed, upon discovering the *infrajudiciary*, that specific persons or institutions were involved in out-of-court settlements. French historians, for example, found that socially recognized arbiters such as the seigneur of a village or the parish priest sometimes acted as mediators. Notaries could be involved, too. In a sample of Parisian notarial acts from the first half of the seventeenth century, 153 acts concerned *infrajudicial* settlements. However, the overwhelming majority of cases concerned assault or verbal attack, not theft. Similarly, in Dutch notarial archives of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries one finds depositions about conflicts among neighbors and marital quarrels but hardly anything about stolen property. In three-quarters of the Parisian cases, moreover, the wronged party had started judicial proceedings. Withdrawal of the complaint usually was one of the provisions of the settlement. These cases were not purely *infrajudicial*; rather, one of the parties had used a judicial complaint as a means of forcing the other to agree to an *extrajudicial* settlement. Thus, as far as mediation is concerned, we are left with the verbal intervention of local notables and clergymen, which left no trace in written records.

One type of ecclesiastical institution remained where historians hoped to find informal handling of

illegal behavior: Protestant associations exercising discipline over church members. In particular, Calvinist consistories were active to promote harmony within the religious community. These institutions dealt with a broad range of activities deemed undesirable, including matters of doctrine, church attendance, morals, sexuality, marital harmony, and the maintenance of friendly relations between neighbors. Sometimes they dealt with violent conflicts among church members, especially in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. However, studies done so far on Protestant discipline in several countries have hardly disclosed any cases of conflicts arising from theft. In the case of Lutheran Sweden we know that the agencies involved in parish justice were interested in property crime, but the parishioners refused to cooperate. When the ecclesiastical committee visiting the village of Rikleå in 1752 inquired about it, the villagers responded that a number of thefts had been committed during the previous year and that they had some idea who were guilty, but they refused to mention names. To conclude, the bodies exercising church discipline in the early modern period were important agencies of social control, but they hardly dealt with crimes, certainly not with property crimes. We know that the subterranean stream of property crime existed, but it is almost impossible to quantify.

VIOLENT CRIME

Whereas most of the important work on property crime was done in the 1970s and 1980s, violence, in particular homicide, is a central concern of today's crime historians. They consider homicide rates as an indication of the level of serious violence generally. Homicide is an attractive subject because the problems of method are less serious than in the case of property crime: it is difficult to hide a dead body, and records exist of bodies found (called coroner's reports in England). Hence in this case it is feasible to count real crime, with only an insignificant dark number. As with property crime, the count is always relative to the population, the homicide rate being defined as the annual average, over a specified period, per 100,000 inhabitants in a specified area.

Yet there is no universal agreement about how to count killings. For one thing, some historians still accept rates of prosecuted homicide instead of only taking figures based on body inspections into consideration. This can make a difference. In early modern Amsterdam, for example, the ratio of detected to prosecuted homicide varied from 9:1 to 3:1. Therefore the homicide rate should always be calculated from re-

ports about bodies found. For scholars investigating recent periods, this is the standard procedure. In most European countries, medical statistics about the causes of death are available from the end of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth. A second disagreement concerns the figures for infanticide, commonly defined as the killing of a baby at birth or shortly after. Some historians insist that infanticides should be included in the homicide rate, whereas others reserve the latter concept for the killing of adults and adolescents. This, too, can make a difference, notably for the sex ratio among the killers. The solution adopted by most historians is to present both homicide and infanticide rates. Third, there is the problem of counting homicide in small towns and regions, especially acute for the period before 1500. Because of low population figures, the homicide rate depends too much on chance. For example, if a town has four thousand inhabitants, six killings per decade already make a homicide rate of 15. Because of this, and the great variation in the English medieval rates, J. S. Cockburn (1991) advocated discarding all figures prior to 1500. Twentieth-century rates, on the other hand,

are somewhat less comparable to earlier ones, due to the influence of increased medical expertise and medical infrastructure such as fast ambulances. As a consequence, more people survive an attack, who, in an earlier period, would have died from their wounds.

Trends in homicide rates. The method adopted influences one's conclusions on the long-term trend of homicide, although, in all cases, this trend turns out to be one of decline. England was the first country for which a graph down the centuries could be constructed. The homicide rate in England declined from about 20 per 100,000 in 1200 to about 15 in the later Middle Ages, between 6 and 7 in the Elizabethan period, and then further down (with the most dramatic fall from the late seventeenth to the late eighteenth century), until the figure stood at 1 around 1900. These figures are averages in a double sense, representing the combined rates of several towns and regions, and, moreover, they are partly based on studies which counted prosecuted cases only. If these studies were discarded, the pre-1500 figures, in particular, would end up higher. The available data for the Con-

tinents in this period are suggestive. Towns in Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden had homicide rates of 50 or more in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In Amsterdam, the rate still approached 30 in the sixteenth century. Thereafter, both the Dutch and Swedish trends resemble the English one. In Dutch cause of death statistics, kept since 1911, the homicide rate was under 0.5 until 1970, except in the 1940s.

For the statistical period, figures are available for all European countries. By the late nineteenth century the long-term decline in homicide had affected the whole of western, northern, and central Europe. The Prussian rates, for example, fluctuated between 1 and 2, and the French rate was under 2 as well. The decline set in later in southern and eastern Europe. The Italian homicide rate still stood at 9 around 1880. In Rome alone, the figure was 12.3 in the years 1872–1879, but then it declined to 4.8 in the years 1910–1914. Throughout southern and eastern Europe, homicide rates declined until they were mostly under 5 in the 1930s. After World War II the rates in most European countries tended to converge, which implied a slight rise for some. Since about 1970, however, homicide has been on the rise throughout Europe (and in the United States), reversing an age-long trend. This rise affects the big cities in particular. In Amsterdam, for example, the figure was 6 in the late 1980s and 1990s, and if correction is made for greater medical expertise it increases to 8. This nearly approaches the figure for the early eighteenth century. It is unclear yet whether the contemporary European-wide rise in homicide is temporary.

Most historians explain the downward trend in homicide from the thirteenth century to 1970 with reference to Norbert Elias's theory of civilization. According to this theory, the increasing differentiation and complexity of society forced people increasingly to control their impulses, violent and otherwise. Several historians paid attention to the social context in which homicide took place in different periods. In every period, this context includes gender. Homicide, and serious violence generally, took place in a male world. In periods of high rates, such habits as knife fighting among men accounted for the majority of cases. Killers as well as their victims were overwhelmingly male. In periods of low rates, on the other hand, while the great majority of killers still were men, women got greater prominence among the victims. The few existing studies counting killer-victim relationships over a longer term confirm this pattern. In Amsterdam a shift occurred by the middle of the eighteenth century, when homicide rates were dropping rapidly: the share of female victims rose, as well as the

proportion of victims involved in an intimate relationship with the killer. In England, the long-term decline in homicide was accompanied by a parallel increase in the proportion of cases taking place within the biological family: from 8 percent in the fourteenth century to 45 percent in the second half of the twentieth. As still another way of placing homicidal violence in context, one can distinguish two axes, one with the opposite poles of impulsive versus planned violence, the other with poles of ritual versus instrumental violence. These axes show that the long-term decline in homicide was accompanied by an increasing prominence of instrumentality and planning in violence.

Violence and gender are linked in another way in infanticide. Rather than reflecting aggressive impulses or revengeful desires, this crime tells the story of shame and desperation. The criminal records from England, France, the Netherlands, and Germany confirm that infanticide was committed almost exclusively by unmarried mothers, often servant girls. The interrogation protocols reveal that most of the women involved saw no way out, because of shame but also because of the material consequences. A servant girl who bore a child was dismissed right away, left without a legal income for herself and her baby. The courts considered infanticide a serious offense against Christian morality in a double sense: illicit sexuality and the taking of human life. They were especially severe from the middle of the sixteenth until the middle of the eighteenth century. Then it was even a punishable offense, capital in France and England, for a woman to give birth to a dead baby if she had concealed her pregnancy and refrained from calling upon a midwife. There was no need to prove actual killing. Later, the male judges gradually became more merciful, often paternalistically seeing the accused as poor misled women. In the course of the twentieth century, as the social acceptance and material possibilities of raising children outside marriage increased and, finally, with increased availability of contraceptives, infanticide became a marginal crime.

Arson and minor violence. The attack on and destruction of a person's property is usually classified as a violent offense. Arson occupied a prominent place in the criminality of preindustrial Europe. It was a typically rural crime, facilitated by the material environment. A farmer's house, his barns and haystack, highly flammable, were easy targets for local people who knew their way. No nightwatchmen patrolled in villages, which also lacked public illumination. Arson has been investigated in Germany, France, and England. It was either a form of extortion by wandering

groups or, more often, a product of conflicts within rural communities. The motive was to hurt or take revenge on the other party, for which the maiming of cattle sometimes served as an alternative. In the mountainous districts of Bavaria, arson was still a common means of taking revenge in the second half of the nineteenth century. Villagers resorted to it in order to maintain their honor when no other way of redress seemed possible. The perpetrators waited until the wind blew in the right direction, so that only the target farm would burn down. With less flammable material used for the construction of farms and the spread of insurance, arson is less of a threat in the modern world. Today criminal arson is rather the work of the proprietors themselves, wishing to cheat on the insurance company.

Minor violence and conflict in urban and rural communities have received ample attention from crime historians since the 1990s. In this case, the focus is less on quantification than on the character of communal relations. The lower courts in rural areas during the *ancien régime* dealt largely with petty conflicts among neighbors. Accusations of slander, for example, mostly brought forward by women, were often numerous. Rural lower courts, then, were involved in questions of gender, honor, and neighborliness. An example is the village of Heiden in the German county of Lippe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The villagers and the local authorities shared a common outlook as far as the sanctity of property and the code of honor were concerned, but their opinions diverged about violence as a means of solving conflicts and such public-order measures as the regulation of alcohol consumption.

POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME

For many people in Europe's past, crime was essentially something "the others" did. Contemporaries handled their fears of crime and made sense of it by locating it in specific social groups. Thus the supposed existence of a "criminal class," ready to infect the whole of the working class, haunted the bourgeoisie of Victorian England. At the same time, the French spoke of "the dangerous classes." Older studies saw these French and English fears as largely realistic. They viewed criminality in terms of a professional underworld: a criminal class existing in symbiosis with the working class as a whole and therefore posing a major threat to social order. They saw the urban proletariat as a permanent reservoir of criminality and revolutionary ferment, chaotic and irrational. This view, however, since the 1970s has been criticized by his-

torians of popular protest as well as by crime historians. The former emphasized the rational character of collective action by the lower classes, while the latter showed that nineteenth-century lawbreakers did not form a group acting in conjunction with the working class as a whole. Workers who considered themselves respectable and abided by contemporary standards of morality distanced themselves from the "roughs." There was a widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of the rule of law. In the English Black Country, for example, workers themselves often acted as prosecutors in cases of theft. The public-order panics which occasionally broke out were staged by the media to promote the introduction or expansion of the police.

In the early modern period, vagrants were the group held accountable for a large part of criminality. Early modern Europe indeed knew a marginal population, recruited from the semiemployed and unemployed in towns and the landless proletariat in the countryside. Fears for the criminal potential of vagrants date back to the sixteenth century. Historians who studied the way of life of these marginal groups in France, England, and Germany came up with a nuanced picture. Certainly, vagrants were obliged to

steal at times, but they were even more adroit in devising techniques for raising pity when begging. Sometimes this entailed purposely mutilating a child. Marginal people did not live according to the ethics of comfortable society, but they were masters in the art of survival. Although individuals gave alms at times, the majority of the settled population of early modern Europe expressed a hostile attitude to vagrants as a group. France introduced special courts in the eighteenth century to deal with vagrants. If any group in history approached the image of a “criminal class,” they did. However, they did so not because all marginal people had the habit of stealing but because begging, vagabondage, and the mere fact of being born as a gypsy were offenses in themselves. Hence it is better to speak of a criminalized class.

The crime literature of the past offers another possibility to study popular perceptions, but in Europe this is still an underresearched subject. Rather than expressing collective fears of crime, we find it mostly concerned with notorious individual cases. In the early modern period, a large part was also punishment literature, since the pamphlets and small booklets of which it mostly consisted were usually published on the occasion of the offender’s execution. Examples are the life accounts by the ordinary, or chaplain, of Newgate prison of the criminals hanged in London. This type of literature was highly moralistic in tone, explaining how the offender’s ungodly life necessarily led to robbery or murder. Another type of crime literature was primarily sensational. One study (Wiltenburg, 1992) compared broadsides dealing with family violence in early modern England and Germany. While the majority of English ones were about husband murderers, the authors of German pamphlets focused on women and men who slaughtered their entire families in a moment of madness. Newspaper accounts and novels about crime after 1800 have hardly been studied yet by European historians.

CRIME AND SOCIAL PROTEST

Whereas in popular perceptions and literature crime was often portrayed as more fearful and atrocious than in actual reality, some actual criminal activities were not seen as crimes by a large part of the population. Sometimes offenders even enjoyed support. British historians in particular have argued that the offenses in question formed a category in itself, which they called “social crime.” Others, while agreeing that popular support for offenders is an important subject, have objected to that term. It implies an antiquated

understanding of the word “social,” meaning “for the benefit of the poor or the lower classes” or “in the service of class struggle.” In a modern, neutral definition “social” refers to the interaction of people; hence every crime is a social activity. Nevertheless, the question of whether certain crimes were an expression of popular protest is a valid one.

Eric Hobsbawm was the first to posit a link between crime and protest. His *Bandits* (first published 1969) dealt with bandits within a geographically wide range of peasant societies, including preindustrial Europe, and in particular with bands enjoying a measure of support. These bandits, he argued, were peasant outlaws, whom the state or feudal lords regarded as criminals but who actually remained part of the peasant world. The people regarded them as heroes, avengers, fighters for justice, or even leaders of liberation. The relatively long life of many of these bands could only be explained by the active or passive support they enjoyed from the peasant population. Hence their actions constituted an “archaic” form of protest against the prevailing order of society. Hobsbawm’s thesis drew an obvious parallel between the bandit and the guerrilla soldier, who, in Mao Tse-tung’s famous phrase, found a haven in the peasant population like a fish in the water. Simultaneously, the thesis was inspired by the image of Robin Hood, stealing from the rich and distributing the proceeds to the poor.

We know for sure that the Robin Hood myth played an important role in the popular culture of preindustrial Europe. Noble robbers abound in chapbooks, for example, but most historians doubt whether this type existed in reality. Significantly, Hobsbawm’s European data were mostly from eastern or Mediterranean Europe. In ancien régime France, for example, although some rural bands could count on a degree of popular support, this remained largely confined to accomplices. After 1789 it was the counterrevolutionary forces in particular who recruited former criminals and bandits. Neither do the data for eighteenth-century Germany provide much support for Hobsbawm’s thesis. Although Carsten Küther (1976) accepted this thesis, distinguishing the peasant bandit, who enjoyed popular support, from the common outlaw, recruited from the marginal population or a minority group, the latter type appeared at least as numerous as the former. Uwe Danker (1988) criticized Küther, pointing out that most bandits were either Jews or people with “infamous” occupations, two groups despised by the peasants. Moreover, the peasants themselves often were victims of the operations of bandits. Danker explained the successes of robber bands primarily by the relative weakness of the German states.

Anton Blok provided the most explicit critique of Hobsbawm's thesis. He emphasized the weakness of the peasants in this context. Preindustrial peasants were so powerless that they hardly would have been able to support bands over a longer period. Thus he formulated a counterhypothesis: the more successful a person is as a bandit, the more extensive the protection granted him. This protection primarily came from powerful persons or groups, in the form of acquiescence or tacit support from landlords or regional elites. Bandits' activities often ran counter to peasant interests. Moreover, most members of successful bands were relative outsiders in the peasant world. They had been or were peddlers, skimmers, or innkeepers, working in occupations involving a high degree of geographical mobility or offering special opportunities to cover illegal activities. Finally, most bands operated especially in areas where state authority was weak. In the Netherlands, for example, they enjoyed a longer life in border areas than in the urbanized western part. Throughout Europe, the chronology and geography of banditry confirmed its inverse relationship with the growth of state power. After the revolutionary period large bands disappeared from the scene in France, the Netherlands, and Germany, whereas Mediterranean areas remained infested with banditry until the early twentieth century.

Although the homeland of the Robin Hood story, England has been relatively free from banditry since the beginning of the early modern period. Yet the country had its own peculiar offenders who enjoyed local support, in particular in the eighteenth and

first half of the nineteenth centuries. As rule, they were involved in collective activities not viewed as crimes by most of their neighbors. Rather than robbery, the offenses were poaching, smuggling, wrecking, and, in one case, coining. Local people considered these activities as lawful, often as ancient rights. They felt entitled to shoot deer in the nearby forest, for example, but the forest now belonged to the king, and his officials considered the poachers thieves of the king's property. Likewise, the law denied the inhabitants of coastal villages any entitlement to the goods in stranded ships. As in the case of banditry, the research into these crimes was motivated by a desire to find archaic forms of social protest. And again, the results were ambiguous.

For one thing, the protagonists' methods were ruthless at times. The wreckers in Cornish villages, for example, rather than waiting for a ship to run ashore, lured it to the rocks with false lights. This hardly qualifies as protest against social injustice. Generally, wrecking was not so much an activity of the poor as the favorite pursuit of an entire community. When news that a ship had stranded reached the inhabitants of one seaboard village during religious service, they all ran out of church, with the parson yelling after them, "Wait for me." In such cases, support for offenders simply meant local defense of the community's collective complicity against outside agents of law enforcement.

In a similar vein, poachers thought of themselves as defenders of local custom. The Blacks of Windsor Forest, a more or less organized group of

deer poachers in the 1720s and 1730s, were experts in age-old privileges. The majority belonged to ancient local families, wealthy and respectable but not of the highest rank. Their opponents were agents of the bureaucracy administering the royal forests. Coining, on the other hand, never was viewed as an ancient right. Yet the so-called Yorkshire Mint, an organized group of counterfeiters and dealers in false gold coins in the 1760s, also enjoyed widespread protection in the county. The coins of this mint were widely accepted, to the advantage of local businessmen operating in a regional market. They were the counterfeiters' staunchest supporters. Other inhabitants of Yorkshire, businessmen and gentry with a concern for their long-term economic interest viewed in a national perspective, cooperated with the law to suppress the illegal mint. Thus the confrontation was between two groups with antagonistic interests, located within a regional and national context, respectively. In a similar vein, poachers, smugglers, and wreckers were locally or regionally bound. The poor never played a leading role in any of these groups of offenders. The laws they impinged upon mainly upheld the fiscal and economic interests of the national state.

A similar clash of interests was visible in other countries, in particular with smuggling. In Dutch cities in the eighteenth century it was a collective enterprise to sneak boats loaded with untaxed grain into town. The smugglers could count on the sympathy of a large part of the urban population. In Prussia's western provinces the smuggling of salt, tobacco, or coffee was a thriving business in the first half of the nineteenth century. Although increasing in intensity during manufacturing slumps, it was no poor man's game. Local merchants were involved, and the Prussian administration tried to counter the practice by setting up antismuggling cartels. The authorities were only partially successful.

The conclusion on smugglers, poachers, and their kind parallels that on bandits. The fact that the people refused to see some offenses as crimes cannot be explained by a simple model of class struggle such as that posited by Hobsbawm. Rather than archaic protest by the poor against the social order, these crimes represented local and regional resistance to the intrusion of the modern state.

CONCLUSION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIME

Several major trends formed the changing face of crime from the sixteenth century to the twentieth. Foremost among them was the inclusion of certain

forms of behavior into the category of crime and the exclusion of others from it. There was a steady increase in criminalization from the sixteenth century until the first half of the nineteenth. At the same time, however, decriminalization took place in certain fields.

The early modern process of criminalization first hit the marginal population of vagrants and beggars. Before the sixteenth century, these groups had been largely tolerated. Both begging and giving alms were viewed in religious terms, the wandering beggar following the footsteps of Jesus and his apostles. From the sixteenth century onward, beggars and vagrants increasingly came to be considered a nuisance or even a threat to public order. Increasingly, they were hunted and often committed to prison workhouses. By the early seventeenth century, vagrancy and unlicensed begging were defined as offenses throughout Europe, and licensed begging was severely restricted. The prosecution of these offenses was largely a matter of summary justice, leaving behind few quantifiable records.

Another wave of criminalization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had to do with the expanding power of the state. As governments increasingly taxed the population and set up tariff barriers, the law defined evasion of the tax as another crime. Smuggling was the result, with smugglers often enjoying support from local communities. Internal tariff barriers largely disappeared after the *ancien régime*, but in the border areas between European states, smuggling remained a lucrative business until the middle of the twentieth century.

An extension of the range of property crime represented the third wave of criminalization, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Taking away small "perks" from the workplace, for example, came to be treated as a criminal activity. Workers themselves thought they were entitled to perks, provided the commodities taken had a low value and it concerned small quantities. The prosecution of workplace offenses was mainly an urban affair, but around 1800 this wave of criminalization hit the rural population in particular. The forces of ongoing commercialization and an expanding state bureaucracy resulted in an intensified prosecution of various activities hitherto considered as the exercise of traditional rights by inhabitants of rural communities.

Poaching, redefined as stealing the game belonging to the owner of the land, has been mentioned already. In the Bavarian mountains, despite vigorous prosecution, poaching remained a favorite pastime of rural youths until the early twentieth century. With increasing urbanization and a dwindling number of wild animals, this crime became relatively marginal. Likewise, gleaning, the collection of leftovers from a

harvested field, is no longer a frequent practice. It was a customary practice, usually performed by women and children, well into the nineteenth century. The English Court of Common Pleas declared in 1788 that no one had a right to glean without the permission of the owner of the land. Still, prosecutions for this offense remained infrequent in England. Unauthorized gathering of firewood, on the other hand, was frequently prosecuted in several European countries. A Prussian law of 1821 made the traditional gathering of wood punishable, going into the detail of specifying three types of the offense. The majority of the rural population continued to consider the use of the old common woods and meadows as their traditional right. The level of prosecutions for theft of wood remained high in all Prussian provinces between 1815 and 1848. Nowadays, mainly the rich have fireplaces in their homes, and they buy their firewood at gas stations. Thus this wave of criminalization has rolled back again because most of the activities involved have become obsolete.

Processes of decriminalization date back to the late seventeenth century. In many cases, decriminalization was directly or indirectly related to secularization. Secular courts stopped prosecuting people for blasphemy, for example. With the separation of church and state, most religious offenses disappeared from the books. We can add witchcraft and sorcery here, which the courts in most European countries no longer considered a crime by 1700. Suicide, for a long time punishable by exposing or piercing the dead body, was decriminalized in the eighteenth century. Other sins stopped being crimes, too, with the advent of the liberal state. Offenses such as simple fornication, bestiality, and, in most countries, sodomy have not been prosecuted since the nineteenth century. England and the Netherlands, however, witnessed a revival of criminalization for certain morals offenses around 1900. In the late twentieth century, sexual activities involving children increasingly became a target for prosecution. In 1998 a Swedish law made soliciting a prostitute a punishable offense for men. Criminalization has also extended to a violent offense with sexual overtones, rape. In the seventeenth-century Netherlands, judges made it clear that only forced sex with a respectable woman could attract their attention. Well into the twentieth century, rape victims had a hard time proving they had not provoked the act, but under the influence of the feminist movement since the 1970s this situation has changed.

Apart from social views about which activities are criminal, there were broad changes in the character of crime from preindustrial to modern society. Property offenses became more dominant among total

criminality, a development which initially reflected an increasing concern of the courts for the protection of property. In modern society the preponderance of property offenses among total criminality is even more marked. For example, in the Netherlands in the 1980s, the ratio of violent to property crime was 1 to 32. This figure can hardly be the result of prosecution policies alone. The high crime rates of modern society are largely due to higher levels of theft and burglary. In their turn, those levels are related to the greater opportunities for appropriation compared to preindustrial Europe.

In connection with this, the traditional pattern whereby property offenses peaked in years of demobilization and especially economic crisis has disappeared. In England economic depressions still caused peaks in property crime in the nineteenth century, but after 1880 this correlation gradually weakened. French criminal statistics reveal a quite similar pattern: food prices explain most of the variance in theft rates until the 1870s and then no longer. Prior to German unification, Prussian and Bavarian statistics reveal a correlation between grain prices and thefts. This correlation significantly weakened in the statistics of the German Reich, available from 1882 onward. Factors such as ethnic discrimination became more important in explaining concentrations of property crime. In Sweden, finally, the correlation between economic hardship and property offenses decreased from the 1870s onward. Since industrialization came to Sweden much later than to England, factors such as the growth of a social welfare system partly explain the shift. Historians refer to this sea change as the shift from poverty-related to prosperity-related property crime. For ages people had stolen out of sheer necessity, but in twentieth-century Europe this was no longer the case.

The long-term trend in violent crime was unequivocal: homicide rates declined from the thirteenth century to about 1970; among the violence which remained, encounters of an instrumental type and conflicts among intimates occupied a greater share. Even though total prosecuted criminality now consists overwhelmingly of offenses against property, and today's homicide levels are far below those of the sixteenth century, the recent upsurge in homicide constitutes a puzzling countertrend, not yet satisfactorily explained by historians or criminologists. In eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union obviously plays a part. Homicide rates in Estonia, for example, moved up from about 7 in 1989 to over 25 in 1994. It is more difficult to explain the rise in homicide in western and central Europe. Some of it is due to the increased availability of firearms, although these are

much less common than in the United States. Other possible factors include the immigration of men from societies more accustomed to violence and the spread of organized crime with its violent elimination of competitors.

Finally, modern petty crime differs from its pre-industrial counterpart. Minor conflicts in villages and

neighborhoods no longer constitute a concern even for the lower courts. Sensitivity to personal honor has decreased. When neighbors are in conflict, it is largely subject to mediation by the police. Today's petty cases are traffic violations, breaches of administrative rules. The result is an intensification of the link between illegal behavior and state control.

See also **Roma: The Gypsies** (*volume 1*); **Modernization; The Industrial Revolutions; War and Conquest; Urbanization** (*volume 2*); **The Military; Marginal People** (*in this volume*); **Honor and Shame** (*volume 5*); and other articles in this section.

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SECTION 12: DEVIANCE, CRIME, AND SOCIAL CONTROL

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PROSTITUTION



Kathryn Norberg

The history of “the oldest profession” falls into four broad periods characterized by changes in the policing and organization of the sex trade: municipal regulation between 1300 and 1500, criminalization between 1500 and 1800, medical regulation between 1800 and 1890, and recriminalization from 1890 to 1975.

1300–1500: MUNICIPAL REGULATION

In the late Middle Ages, prostitution was tolerated, indeed encouraged by municipal elites throughout Europe. Prostitutes did not inhabit the margins of late medieval society; they were accepted members of the community with a special place in ritual life. In Germany, prostitutes were honored guests at weddings, and in Lyon they participated in municipal processions and festivals that defined civic space. Prostitutes were full members of medieval society because the city fathers considered them guarantors of domestic order. Like Saint Augustine (354–430), the fifteenth-century city fathers believed that prostitution was a lesser evil, an acceptable alternative to adultery or the rape of virgins. The brothel for these good Catholics provided an outlet for male sexual energy that might otherwise be directed at honest women. That most of the official prostitutes had compromised their virtue—or been raped by bands of young men—also soothed the burghers’ conscience.

During the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance, officially sanctioned and regulated red light districts existed in most large European cities. In Florence, respectable citizens like the Medici owned the city’s bordellos, and a special court known as the *onesta* moderated disputes between prostitutes and bordello owners. The situation in England was roughly similar. By the early fifteenth century port cities like Southampton and Sandwich had red light districts where prostitution flourished. In London prostitution was illegal save in the Bankside or Southwark neighborhood, where bordellos or “stewes” could be found as early as the thirteenth century. By 1500 the sex

trade was the principal economic activity of this area, tolerated and regulated by the local authorities.

On the Continent, town governments actually owned and administered bordellos. Always pressed for ready cash, city governments usually auctioned off the right to run the bordello to an individual known variously as *Frauernwirt*, bordello padre, or abbes. Contracts between brothel managers and city governments can be found in the records of Strasbourg (1469), Munich (1433), Seville (1469), and Toulouse (1296). In return for a certain sum of money, the brothel manager had the right to charge the prostitutes for room and board and take as much of their earnings as he could. The city did oblige the brothel manager to observe certain regulations governing the hours and the clientele of the brothel. Most cities insisted that the municipal bordello be closed on religious feast days and that priests, Jews, and married men be banned at all times. The municipalities also fined prostitutes who lingered too long with a particular man so that clients did not become too attached to any woman.

In the streets next to the city brothel, a host of unofficial whores solicited in unlicensed drinking establishments. These unlicensed prostitutes tended to be younger, less experienced, and more expensive than the inmates of the official brothel. They were also a source of distress to the city fathers, who considered them illegal and uncontrollable. City governments in southern France, Seville, London, and Augsburg levied heavy fines on these women, whose numbers tended to proliferate as the sixteenth century approached.

1500–1829: CRIMINALIZATION

In the mid-sixteenth century, the medieval world of tolerated, municipally regulated prostitution came to an abrupt end. Criminalization replaced tolerance and city fathers closed the municipal brothels in Augsburg (1532), Basel (1534), and Frankfurt (1560). Spain followed suit somewhat later; Seville closed its bordello in 1621. Events were not so dramatic in Italy.

Though they never officially closed the red light districts, authorities in Florence and Venice adopted a more stringent attitude toward prostitutes after 1511 and tried to suppress all manifestations of venal sex. Throughout Europe, authorities tried to eliminate clandestine prostitutes or at least limit where they could solicit. In France the 1560 ordinance of Orléans made owning and operating a bordello illegal. In Spain Philip IV officially banned brothels throughout his kingdom in 1623. By 1650 the municipal bordello, whether in France, Italy, or Germany, was a thing of the past.

Historians have been at pains to explain this change in attitude. Syphilis, which appeared in Europe in the spring of 1495, at first seemed to provide an answer. Europeans certainly understood how the disease was contracted and knew that prostitutes spread it. But most of the bordello closings occurred some thirty years after the worst syphilis epidemics, which occurred between 1495 and 1510. And in one case, Seville, a serious bout of venereal disease in 1568 led the city authorities to reopen, not abolish, the municipal bordello and its regulations.

What caused the closing of the official brothels? Religious change (not disease) appears to have been the single most important factor in changing attitudes toward prostitution. In Germany, Martin Luther

(1483–1546) condemned prostitution and criticized Saint Augustine's rationalization of mercenary sex. Luther and the other Protestant reformers believed that men were to be held to the same standard—chastity—as women and that the bordello, far from discouraging fornication, promoted the ruin of the young. Devout Catholics also railed against whores: in 1566 Pope Pius V threw all the courtesans out of Rome, and in 1556 the Venetian Republic made prostitution a crime. Moralists began to see in the whores a threat to honest women and the matrimonial order. In the Rhone valley, preachers in the 1480s condemned prostitution and with it the municipal bordello, which they regarded as a source of temptation and sin. Though it occurred later than elsewhere, a similar new morality led to the end of toleration in Spain. In Seville, Catholic reformers launched a campaign to reform prostitutes which led in 1620 to the closing of the municipal brothel.

Religious revival, whether in the form of the Protestant or Catholic Reformations, contributed to the criminalization of prostitution, but it did not cause it. Official bordellos were in trouble long before Martin Luther. In 1501 the city fathers of Frankfurt tried to auction off the management of the local brothel but they found no takers: the municipal house was no longer profitable. Too much competition had

driven it out of business. The multiplication of clandestine prostitutes appears to have been the problem. In Spain, Italy, France, and Germany a rash of decrees banning clandestine prostitutes preceded the official brothel closings, indicating that new sexual attitudes and practices had made the public brothel obsolete even before religious reformers attacked it.

The proliferation of independent prostitutes indicates an important change in clients' taste: men no longer wanted to go to the public house and rub shoulders with a mixed, even dangerous crowd which was now made up of armed men—that is, soldiers. The large armies called into existence by the early modern state revolutionized prostitution and made it almost a branch of the military. Now hordes of prostitutes followed the armies that traversed Europe. No municipal regulation, not even military discipline, could control these women, who spread disease to the most powerful armies. In Strasbourg, Frankfurt, and Nürnberg, local authorities tried to disband the prostitutes who camped outside the city walls and prostituted themselves to soldiers in nearby forests. But they were powerless to rid the town of these unwanted visitors.

These women and their unruly clients made a mockery of Augustine's lesser evil: they did not guarantee the domestic order, they disrupted it. So too did another new kind of prostitute who posed an even more serious threat—the courtesan. In the late 1400s, preachers in Dijon, Venice, and Florence railed against a better sort of harlot, one who wore fine clothes and plied her trade secretly, a prostitute who seduced respectable men and distracted them from their domestic duties. This woman was called a courtesan, after the genteel women who accompanied the celibate clerics of Rome's papal court on their social rounds. A few of the Italian courtesans were women of letters, like the Venetian poetess Veronica Franco (1546–1591) or the Roman writer Tullia d'Aragona (1510–1556). These women offered more than sex, they offered eroticism—sex with an elegant and accomplished expert.

The courtesan, be she a Venetian poetess or a Parisian actress, enjoyed more independence and certainly more money than her camp follower or bordello sister. These privileged women probably benefited from the criminalization of prostitution, for they were independent entrepreneurs who escaped the brothel and its regulations. But not all early modern prostitutes were so lucky. The disadvantages produced by criminalization probably outweighed the advantages enjoyed by a minority. Criminalization made the prostitute vulnerable to third parties who profited from the prostitutes' need for secrecy and her fear of the

police. Pimps, procuresses, touts, landlords, and blackmailers skimmed money off the prostitutes' earnings and diminished their autonomy.

Worse still were the police and other judicial authorities. By 1720 virtually all cities in Europe had adopted ordinances condemning prostitutes and subjecting them to harsh prison terms. In Paris the edict of 20 April 1684 was followed by a series of laws (1713, 1724, 1734, 1776, and 1778) that made prostitution punishable by incarceration in a syphilis hospital or prison for between three months and three years. To the east, Vienna and Prussia had stiffer penalties. In 1690 Frederick I of Prussia ordered all the bordellos closed and their inmates publicly flogged. Somewhat later, in 1750, Empress Maria Teresa established a Chastity Commission which also closed bordellos, arrested prostitutes, and sentenced them to labor as street sweepers.

Unlike its absolutist neighbors, the English Crown did not seek to repress prostitution. No English statutes made prostitution itself criminal. London constables could arrest streetwalkers on lesser charges like vagrancy or loitering, but most were disinclined to do so. In the first third of the eighteenth century, a series of private groups appeared to supplement police repression. Known collectively as the Societies for the Reform of Manners, these moral vigilantes waged open war against prostitution, homosexuality, and other forms of "riot" from 1690 to 1730. Though utterly without authority, members detained women and had them thrown in the Bridewell or a special prison for prostitutes where hard work was prescribed as an antidote to sin.

By 1730 the moral vigilantes had disappeared. Everywhere in Europe, police enforcement of anti-prostitute statutes became lax and episodic. In major cities, certain districts—Covent Garden in London and the Palais-Royal in Paris—were set aside for prostitution, and whores congregated around public promenades, pleasure gardens, and theaters. The large numbers of streetwalkers and prostitutes testified to the lack of police enforcement. Nicolas Edme Restif de la Bretonne (1734–1806), a French writer, estimated that 20,000 women prostituted themselves in Paris, a city of some 600,000 souls. Restif's figures are almost certainly exaggerated, but it is clear that prostitutes were numerous because preindustrial women's work was particularly conducive to prostitution. Women who washed, mended linen, or sold food or second-hand clothes walked the streets, soliciting clients whether for honest or dishonest work. Once the woman had found a client, she was generally expected to bring the cleaned linen or food to his room, thereby facilitating sexual contact. A woman could prostitute

herself without anybody, especially nosy neighbors, being the wiser. Full-time bordello inmates had a more difficult time hiding their occupation, but they could reenter the world of honest work with little or no trouble. Single women's work was casual and episodic, so it easily accommodated venal sex.

Only arrest labeled a woman as a prostitute, and arrest was becoming less and less common as a more tolerant attitude toward prostitution emerged. A decline in religiosity as well as a growing concern over venereal disease prompted this change. As early as 1724, Bernard de Mandeville (1670–1733) argued in *A Modest Defense of Public Stews* that prostitution was not criminal in and of itself. It was only dangerous when uncontrolled. Other, less well known authors called for the end to arbitrary penalties and the institution of regulation as a means of protecting families and promoting public order. Particularly prominent among these regulationists were physicians who regarded venereal disease as the greatest hazard of prostitution and proposed that some system of health checks be instituted.

Such publications proved prophetic. In 1792 Berlin instituted a system for regulating prostitutes which required police approval before a brothel could

be opened and compelled prostitutes to live in certain streets. Somewhat later, in 1796, the Paris Commune instructed its police officials to search out and register prostitutes. Registered prostitutes received a card, and in 1798 two physicians were given the task of examining Parisian whores. In 1802 a physician established a dispensary where prostitutes underwent compulsory examinations. Napoleon's prefects continued the struggle to contain and control prostitution. In Lyon, Nantes, Marseille, and other French cities, local officials undertook a census of prostitutes and bordellos. They also limited prostitution to a few preselected streets and required that all bordellos be registered—in other words, approved. At the fall of Napoleon, the foundations of a complete regulatory system existed.

1800–1890: MEDICAL REGULATION

In the nineteenth century, many European cities instituted an elaborate system of ordinances which permitted prostitution but limited and monitored it. These ordinances resembled Napoleon's measures: while there were variations, medical regulation was often referred to as "the French system." And as in

France, authorities claimed to be controlling syphilis. But the measures enacted also greatly increased the ability of the police to monitor working-class activity, sexual or political. The father and principal apologist of the regulatory system was the French social hygienist Alexandre Jean Baptiste Parent-Duchâtelet (1790–1836). In 1836 Parent-Duchâtelet published *Prostitution in Paris*, a two-volume study rife with statistics, tables, maps, and charts. *Prostitution in Paris* was the first “scientific” study of mercenary sex, for it used empirical evidence—principally Parent-Duchâtelet’s own observations at the Parisian dispensary—to describe prostitution. Parent-Duchâtelet estimated that there were twelve thousand prostitutes in Paris, and he collected detailed data (including hair and eye color) on about one thousand.

For the first time we have a relatively accurate portrait of the prostitute. Parent-Duchâtelet found her to be between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four and a working woman engaged in traditional, as opposed to industrial, occupations (i.e., a seamstress or domestic). To his contemporaries’ astonishment, she was usually a native Parisian (as opposed to a migrant) and almost never the fruit of an illegitimate union. Nor was she herself pregnant at the time she became a prostitute. The cherished scenario of the country girl seduced and abandoned in the city did not hold up to Parent-Duchâtelet’s scrutiny; neither did the myths that prostitutes were infertile or possessed of biological abnormalities. Later in the nineteenth century, physicians would attribute prostitution to genetic deformities, but Parent-Duchâtelet gave social reasons for a woman’s fall. “Lack of work and poverty,” he wrote, “which is the inevitable consequence of low wages, are the unhappy source of prostitution.”

Despite his scientific pretensions, Parent-Duchâtelet was no impartial observer. On the contrary, he was an ardent supporter of regulation, and his study argued for the imposition of mandatory health checks and an increase in police supervision. Like all regulationists, Parent-Duchâtelet believed that prostitutes had to be closely monitored and controlled, ostensibly in the interest of containing venereal disease.

The mandatory health check or pelvic examination was the linchpin of the regulationist system. When a prostitute went to the dispensary her name was inscribed upon a register and she was issued a card on which each subsequent visit was marked. This card constituted a license, which allowed her to prostitute herself. Failure to display the card when questioned by the police would lead to immediate imprisonment without trial or judicial recourse. Obviously,

regulation greatly increased the powers of the Parisian police. It is certainly not coincidental that nineteenth- and early twentieth-century French legislatures declined to approve—or even debate—regulation. For its entire existence, regulation was at best only semi-legal; it was based on administrative decree alone, on the decision of the highest police officer, the prefect.

If the health check was the linchpin of regulation, then the brothel was its center. Proregulation physicians and policemen encouraged brothels because they facilitated police control. Madames enforced discipline and health checks, and the brothel walls assured that no prostitute escaped the all-seeing eye of the morals squad. If the brothel was transparent to the police, it was all but invisible to honest women and children. Municipal ordinance prescribed closed shutters and windows and permitted no distinct signs save the lone discreet red light. To ensure that these regulations were observed, the police both in Paris and the provinces bestowed licenses to run brothels only on certain individuals. Only women over twenty-five years of age could apply for a license, and they had to give proof that the owner of the building in question knew of its proposed use. Brothels could be located only in certain neighborhoods, had to be at least one hundred meters from public buildings, schools, and churches, and could be open only at certain times.

The bordello was the centerpiece of regulation, and it flourished in the home of regulation—France. In 1840 Paris had at least 230 licensed brothels. Provincial France too had “houses of tolerance,” as official brothels were known. Montpellier, with a population of approximately 460,000, had twenty-four houses of tolerance, while Angers and Mans had fifteen and twenty-five, respectively. Usually these were small establishments with no more than seven prostitutes, excluding the auxiliary female personnel (maids and cooks), who also satisfied clients at times of high traffic, like market days or when new recruits were called up by the army. Outside France, the bordello was less popular. In 1881 there were only 1,119 brothels in the whole of Italy.

In the course of the nineteenth century, some kind of regulation was adopted by Italy (1860), Russia (1843), Prussia (1839), and Vienna. Officially, England did not follow suit. But between 1864 and 1886 the British War Office and Admiralty administered a series of ordinances that came very close to continental regulation. The Contagious Diseases Acts, as these ordinances became known, were meant to eliminate venereal disease by compulsory registration and medical exams, and the laws were enacted only in garrison towns and ports like Southampton and

Plymouth. In these towns, a special police unit called the “water police” tracked down prostitutes and confined them in venereal disease prisons, known as lock hospitals.

The effects of regulation, whether in England or on the Continent, were highly detrimental to prostitutes, perhaps more detrimental than seventeenth- and eighteenth-century criminalization. To be sure, prostitutes could solicit if they had registered with the police and undergone the required health checks. But even registered, they also had to obey an array of ordinances which made it all but impossible for a woman to support herself through prostitution. In France and England prostitutes could not solicit in drinking establishments or near barracks. In Paris they could not occupy sidewalks or major thoroughfares

except between seven and eleven o’clock in the evening. They could not stand near churches, schools, public buildings, or in public gardens. Prostitutes could not congregate in groups, speak in loud voices, or provide food or drink in their homes. In short, women could not solicit clients, which is tantamount to banning prostitution.

Far from removing the legal constraints on prostitutes, regulation only increased them. It subjected the prostitute to a more powerful, more invasive police force, thereby throwing her into the arms of pimps and other third parties. It also fixed her identity as a fallen woman by inscribing her name on a register. Regulation subjected prostitutes to consistent police harassment, to social stigma, and to economic hardship.

RECRIMINALIZATION: 1890 TO THE PRESENT

By 1880 the weaknesses of regulation caused many Europeans to turn against the system. Sometimes this movement—or rather movements, for there were many diverse opinions and groups—is called abolitionist because it opposed the existing prostitute statutes. However, it is more accurate to call its proponents antiregulationists, for they sought to reform, not abolish, laws against prostitution. None wanted to legalize or decriminalize prostitution. Most antiregulationists regarded prostitution as a terrible moral scourge and dire biological threat.

Of all the antiregulationists, the British militant Josephine Butler (1828–1906) was alone in manifesting real concern for individual prostitutes. Butler was a middle-class widow of deep religious sensibilities who considered the compulsory pelvic examinations imposed by the Contagious Diseases Acts (CDA) an affront to womanhood. In numerous public speeches, Butler pointed out that soldiers and sailors were not subject to the same invasive procedures, and she called for an end to the exams which she considered “instrumental rape.” Through the Ladies’ National Association, she mobilized middle-class women to fight against the CDA and aid prostitutes. This unprecedented alliance between middle-class and working-class women staged theatrical “rescues” of prostitutes and succeeded in galvanizing public opinion. In 1886 the CDA were rescinded, and many of Butler’s crusaders turned their attention to women’s suffrage.

Opposition to regulation did not end, Butler’s success encouraged continental opponents of regulation. French abolitionists like Yves Guyot and Senator René Bérenger criticized not the excesses of the system but its inefficiencies. Of particular concern were the clandestine prostitutes, the large number of women who were never inscribed, never examined, and never monitored by the police. By 1890 they had come to represent more than half of the prostitutes in Paris, and they were thought to constitute a threat to the health and moral welfare of society.

The white slavery panic struck in the midst of this debate. In 1885 London journalist W. T. Stead (1849–1912) published an inflammatory account of child prostitution entitled “The Maiden Tribute to Modern Babylon” in the *Pall Mall Gazette*. Stead reported that lecherous old men regularly purchased children for five pounds on the streets of London. Stead’s lurid accounts started the white slavery panic, which eventually spread from England to the Continent. In 1899 the first international conference on white slavery was convened in London and attended

by the representatives of eleven European nations. Three years later sixteen countries sent envoys to the second international conference.

Historians once dismissed the white slavery panic as nothing but hysteria. The antitraffickers’ rhetoric was extravagant—one French newspaper claimed that more girls had been killed by white slavers than by tuberculosis—but these zealots were reacting to real changes in the demand for and organization of prostitution. The great migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from Europe to the Americas created both a high demand for prostitutes and the networks to transport them from Europe to the New World. In Poland, for instance, Jewish vice networks grew as Jewish emigration increased. Once limited to Warsaw, Jewish pimps expanded their operations to embrace North and especially South America. In the 1910s many prostitutes in Buenos Aires were Jewish girls transported there by Jewish mafias operating in Poland and the Americas.

The great migrations also fed racism and with it biological explanations for prostitution. Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) did argue that prostitution was a product of private property, along with illegitimacy and other moral scourges. But socialists aside, most Europeans preferred the physiological fantasies of Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909) to the economic explanations of Engels or Parent-Duchâtelet. According to Lombroso and his followers, prostitutes were born, not made, and they possessed atavistic qualities like small heads, husky voices, or tattoos. To Lombroso, prostitutes were degenerates who threatened the biological integrity of the race by injecting hereditary syphilis into the population.

The early years of the twentieth century saw important advances in the diagnosis and treatment of venereal disease. But the Wasserman test and the arsenic-based “606” potion did not allay the fear of syphilis. Quite the contrary: anxiety over venereal disease became more widespread and intense during the interwar period. In France hereditary syphilis was blamed for (among other things) chronic French depopulation. Whether in France, Germany, or Britain, “degeneracy” was associated with syphilis, and prostitutes were subject to stricter measures of medical surveillance than ever before. In France the number of dispensaries where prostitutes were registered and examined multiplied: by 1940 there were over 2,000.

Other purely punitive measures joined these medical statutes. In 1885 the British Parliament passed the deceptively named Criminal Amendments Acts, which raised the age of consent and authorized the police to enter bordellos and arrest “seducers” (and prostitutes) at will. In France the law of 3 April 1903

made traffic in women punishable by three years of prison.

In many instances, special laws were enacted to “protect” minors. In England the Industrial Schools Amendment Act of 1880 authorized police search and seizure of underage prostitutes. In France the law of 11 April 1908 licensed similar police sweeps and provided special reformatories for the underage prostitutes. These statutes, like many others, targeted youth and probably reflected anxiety over the new freedom that life in the cities and the rise of service industries accorded young women.

Not just the young were experiencing a sexual revolution. During the 1890s, a new taste for seduction and eroticism manifested itself in the population at large and had a profound impact on prostitution. The demand for prostitutes changed: sexual need no longer brought the client to the prostitute. In most cities, workingmen had established their own homes and embraced a middle-class conjugal lifestyle. Henceforth, desire rather than need motivated the client, and he demanded more personal, more seductive forms of venal sex. The regulated house of tolerance, for example, tended to disappear. Beginning in the 1880s in Paris and 1900 in the provinces, official bordellos closed; by 1935 there were only twenty-seven official houses in Paris. Clients preferred the illusion of seduction to the regimentation of the bordello and the independent prostitute to the brothel inmate. Now men encountered prostitutes in new places, like the dance hall or the beer garden. Once contact was made, the client accompanied her to a new institution, the *maison de rendez-vous* or hotel that rented rooms by the hour. Gradually, the *maison de rendez-vous* completely eclipsed the bordello: in 1935 there were sixty-five recognized hotels in Paris and many more that had escaped police notice.

With the demise of the house of tolerance, prostitutes gained a measure of autonomy. Unlike brothel inmates, the independent prostitute was not enslaved by debt or forced to work long hours. But new forms of domination arose to replace the old. Stricter criminal statutes and police surveillance increased the need for secrecy and opened the door to parasitical third parties. In London, pimps first appeared in large numbers in the 1900s in the wake of anti-white slavery legislation. Isolated from the working class and marked as a “professional,” the prostitute found herself at the mercy of criminal elements. In France and Italy hotel owners replaced bordello madames as the managers of prostitution and used their power to extract more work and longer hours from the prostitute. In some cities mafias and crime syndicates took control of

prostitution and subjected prostitutes to a new, harsh work discipline.

Life was no better for the prostitute in the Soviet Union or the totalitarian states of Italy and Germany. In 1918 the Russian revolutionaries abolished the regulatory system which had prevailed in tsarist Russia and proclaimed that prostitution, an outgrowth of capitalism, no longer existed. Of course, women continued to sell sex, and they were subject to arrest under a series of ordinances prosecuting vagrants and anti-socials. In the late 1920s, special workhouses or *propholactoria* were established where prostitutes were reeducated through forced labor.

In the fascist states, the approach was different in form if not in spirit. Mussolini reconfirmed Italy’s tolerated brothels in 1923, 1931, and 1940. In Germany, the Nazis reinstated regulated brothels and made sure that strict racial and biological hygiene was observed within them. Throughout Europe, the militarization of society during World War II encouraged a brief, episodic return to regulation.

The years between 1945 and 1972 saw a recriminalization of prostitution that was both profound and paradoxical. In 1951 the United Nations adopted a resolution condemning the traffic in women and calling for an end to state regulation and criminalization of prostitution. Only five nations signed the resolution and most ignored it. In France, while one aspect of the old regulationist regime—the brothel—was abolished in 1945 by the so-called Marthe Richard law, another—compulsory registration—survived. A national health file was established, and any prostitute who failed to register was subject to arrest and imprisonment. Further, the law of 23 December 1958 recognized “passive solicitation” and made it a misdemeanor punishable by a steep fine. As in the past, French prostitutes were subject to police harassment and unpredictable official persecution.

In Italy the Merlin Law of 1956 abolished all forms of regulation, including registration, but prescribed jail terms for individuals convicted of “favoring” prostitution. While ostensibly directed against pimps, the law was used to harass prostitutes, who saw their husbands, boyfriends, and fellow prostitutes prosecuted under it.

In England the situation was no better. Unlike continental Europe, the United Kingdom had known neither true regulation nor even real criminalization: prostitution was not—and had never been—a criminal offense. This situation changed in the 1950s when the Wolfenden Committee recommended a set of new anti-sex trade laws. In 1956 the Sexual Offense Act prohibited brothel keeping and prescribed stiff penalties for those living off immoral earnings.

As in Italy, the antipimping law was turned against prostitutes themselves, and the notorious Street Offences Act of 1959 made the situation worse. According to this act, a woman could be convicted of soliciting on the word of a policeman alone and forced to pay a stiff fine. After two fines a woman was labeled a "prostitute" in all judicial documents for life, whether or not she continued to engage in sex work.

While prostitution was being recriminalized in France and England, a new approach was adopted in northern Europe, specifically in Holland and Germany. In Germany officially tolerated and regulated brothels called Eros Centers were established in Hamburg (1967) and subsequently in Bonn, Cologne, Stuttgart, and Munich. While these centers were supposed to eliminate third parties and curb violence, prostitutes declined to work in them because of the extreme regimentation and high room rental fees. In Holland a different, more laissez-faire approach emerged, with brothels and massage parlors being unofficially tolerated, at least in Amsterdam.

Amsterdam aside, the recriminalization of prostitution had a predictable consequence: prostitution went underground and became less visible. The telephone greatly facilitated this process, and today prostitution is all but invisible in most western European cities. Police surveillance and occasional harassment

continues and is particularly harsh for those prostitutes left on the streets. These women constitute only 20 percent of the sex workers in most European cities, and yet they account for over 90 percent of the arrests. Even in the most lenient countries, fines and legal fees keep most prostitutes in debt and on the street. To protest these conditions, fifty prostitutes occupied the Saint-Nizier church in Lyon, France, in 1975. Soon prostitutes' groups arose in Grenoble, Montpellier, Toulouse, and finally Paris, leading to the creation of a national organization, the French Collective of Prostitutes. Not long thereafter, other prostitutes' rights groups emerged: in the United Kingdom, the English Collective of Prostitutes (1975); in Amsterdam, the Red Thread (1984); and in Berlin, HYDRA (1980), to name but a few. All of these groups are active today and campaign for the decriminalization of sex work in both national and international law. In 1985 the first International Congress of Whores convened in Amsterdam and addressed a range of issues—AIDS, police harassment, international traffic in women—concerning sex workers. Subsequent congresses have been held, signaling the advent of a new era in the history of prostitution: henceforth, prostitutes themselves will have a say in the organization and policing of the "oldest profession."

See also Sexual Behavior and Sexual Morality; Illegitimacy and Concubinage; Sex, Law, and the State (volume 4).

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WITCHCRAFT



J. A. Sharpe

Witchcraft is a subject that has attracted considerable scholarly attention as well as a lively popular interest, and around which a number of historical myths have gathered. Most of the scholarly work on this phenomenon has, understandably, centered on the era of mass persecutions, the so-called European witch craze, between about 1450 and 1750. Work on this period has produced an extensive and ever-expanding body of publications rich in varied, imaginative, and exciting interpretations. Yet beliefs in witchcraft, themselves part of a wider intellectual framework incorporating popular magic and what the modern observer would categorize as folklore, have been present in Europe throughout recorded history.

The terms “witchcraft” and “magic” have, of course, been used broadly and present considerable definitional problems. In 1937 the anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard proposed a widely accepted set of definitions that attempts to distinguish clearly between witchcraft and magic. He argued, in effect, that witchcraft is normally thought of as an innate quality, probably inherited by the supposed witch, and is used primarily to inflict harm through the occult power of the witch’s ill will. Magic, conversely, involves a number of techniques, and the ability to carry out these techniques is not inherited but rather acquired through learning.

It might be possible to sustain something like this distinction when dealing with witchcraft as a phenomenon in European history. Observers in 1600, for example, generally accepted a difference between the witch, normally female, illiterate, and lower class, and the magician, often learned, sometimes a member of the social elite, and nearly always male. Yet the village witch always existed in the intellectual context of a culture that enjoyed much wider beliefs in the magical, the occult, and the supernatural, and throughout the medieval and early modern periods terms that translate as witchcraft, sorcery, or magic tended to be used interchangeably. Witchcraft is, therefore, best understood as a broad range of beliefs and practices that flourished within a wider belief system that accepted the supernatural.

As noted, witchcraft attracts popular interest and has been surrounded by more than its fair share of historical myths. The problems resulting from this became increasingly marked in the twentieth century by the emergence of Wiccan and Pagan groups that adhered to witchcraft as an ancient, pre-Christian religion. While having no wish to offend people’s religious sensibilities, one should point out that there is little evidence that what was described or persecuted as witchcraft in the medieval or early modern periods was an organized religion—though admittedly a number of contemporary theorists thought it was—and that the practices of Pagans and Wiccans have only tenuous connections with peasant beliefs of the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries. Modern witchcraft, despite its claims, seems to have little historical foundation.

The subject of witchcraft was also firmly lodged in the mentalities of learned writers in late medieval and early modern Europe, when it was referred to frequently in theological, medical, and scientific writing. Along with the peasant belief in witchcraft, demonological writers from the fifteenth century onward created a view of the subject that stressed the importance of the demonic pact, the witches’ sabbat, and the notion that the witch was a member of an organized, heretical, satanic sect. Peasants had witchcraft, and members of the elite had natural magic, a set of occult ideas and practices that often attracted men of considerable intelligence and learning. The latter was closely connected to pursuits such as astrology and alchemy as well as to mathematics, astronomy, and science. Witchcraft existed in relation to a broad, rich, intellectual context.

FROM THE DARK AGES TO THE *MALLEUS MALEFICARUM*

Anthropologists have demonstrated that belief in witchcraft and associated phenomena was present in a wide range of societies and likely has been a part of the mental world of Europeans from the earliest times. As

might be expected, however, evidence for early witchcraft beliefs and practices has to be drawn mainly from the works of Greek and, more important, Roman writers. The concept of *magia*, which seems to have corresponded roughly to medieval and early modern magic, was familiar in ancient Rome and comprehended sorcery and witchcraft. Certainly by the end of the Roman period something like the witch image, so common in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, already existed. Consider the following description given by the poet Lucan (A.D. 39–65) in his *Pharsalia* (book 6, lines 511–523):

The gods of heaven, and the fact that she was still living, did not prevent her from hearing the silent converse of the dead, or from knowing the dwelling places of hell and the mysteries of subterranean Pluto. The witch's face is haggard and loathsome with age; her dreadful countenance, overlaid with a hellish pallor and weighed down by uncombed locks, is never seen in the clear sky; but if storms and black clouds take away the stars, she then comes forth from robbed tombs and tries to catch the night-time lightnings. Her tread blights the seeds of the fertile cornfield, and her breath poisons air that was previously innocuous.

The stereotype of the witch as the hag, the elderly, worn, and probably lower-class woman, clearly dates back to classical culture.

The problem of magic, witchcraft, sorcery, and the occult became somewhat more complex with the beginning of the era of the Christian conversions in about the fourth century. The realities of the situation meant that, despite the reservations of some Christian thinkers, the early church had to make a number of accommodations with the pagan religions it sought to supplant. Thus churches were built on or near the sites of pagan worship, saints' shrines were located in pagan holy places, and Christianity incorporated many aspects of the preexisting practices surrounding divination, prophecy, and folk healing. The "magic of the medieval church" obviously helped make Christianity accessible and acceptable to the bulk of the population, although it never quite escaped the censure of religious purists. The learned held some practices unwarrantable despite an inherently ill-defined line between the sacred and the profane. Partly as a result of this lack of definition, occasional charges of sorcery arose, and certain people, because of their actions or public opinion, were considered appropriate targets for accusations of witchcraft. Conversely, early law codes suggest that at least some rulers regarded accusations of witchcraft as ungodly and disruptive and consequently attempted to discourage them among their populations.

Certainly the religious observers upon whose writings much of our knowledge of early medieval Europe is founded were convinced that their world was full of magical practitioners, denounced variously as *praecantatores*, *sortilegos*, *karagios*, *aruspices*, *divinos*, *ariolos*, *magos*, *maleficos*, *inantatores*, *phitonocos*, or *veneficos*. (The terms defy precise or consistent translation.) For these writers, however, the problem was still that occult practitioners offered a type of magic that competed with that of the church. They were diviners, fortune tellers, lot casters, and faith healers rather than malefic witches. The malefic existed, of course, but the tendency was to regard witchcraft and associated popular magical beliefs as a sign of ignorance and superstition rather than the presence of demonic influences. Occasionally writings refer to witches being punished, like the tenth-century note of a woman proved guilty of witchcraft who was drowned "as is the custom with witches." But most stories about witchcraft end with a description of the clergy deploying saints' relics or other holy items to defeat the witch's magic rather than with a description of execution.

This situation was to change during the fifteenth century. The exact processes involved remain perhaps a little unclear, but three main factors seem to have been at work. First, there was a general theological shift, perhaps as a by-product of the psychological impact of the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century, which emphasized the uncertainty of human life, the pervasiveness of sin, and the power and influence of the Devil. Second, in a series of treason-cum-sorcery cases among Europe's political elite, highly placed persons were found guilty of using sorcery and magic to harm monarchs and popes. Last, the persecution of heretics, which had flourished over the High Middle Ages, shifted its focus to include witches, now defined as a satanic sect. The witch was no longer the individual with occult powers that might occasionally be used to do harm but rather one of Satan's agents in the cosmic struggle between Good and Evil. The religious insisted on the importance of the pact between the witch and the Devil, and the development of ideas regarding the sabbat provided a collective image of witchcraft. The witch now flew to nocturnal meetings, where she met scores, hundreds, or even thousands of other witches, feasted on the flesh of newborn children, danced, drank, and engaged in orgiastic sexual intercourse, the whole proceedings being presided over by the Devil.

By the late fifteenth century the witch myth was firmly established, and the witch, for the educated at least, was a willing tool of the Antichrist. Two changes had taken place. The developed witch stereotype was now generally that of a lower-class person, more than

likely a female. In theory anybody could be a witch, but in practice it was peasant women who were most often accused. But contemporaries were aware that educated, relatively wellborn men also practiced magic. One of the contextual elements that allowed belief in witchcraft to flourish among Europe's elites was the involvement of some of their members and associates in magic, in attempts to contact the spirit world, in alchemy, in astrology, and in that broad neo-Platonic mode of thought that left ample room for the occult. The educated and the wellborn, of course, rarely incurred the wrath of officialdom for their magical or occult interests; peasant women were burned as witches by the thousands.

THE GREAT WITCH-HUNTS

Belief in witchcraft was firmly entrenched in late medieval Europe and was part of a wider system of

thought that accepted the occult and magic as everyday realities. However, during the period following the Middle Ages, from about 1450 to about 1750, witchcraft enjoyed its highest profile as a historical phenomenon. That was the timespan of the persecution of witches, described by some historians as "the European witch craze" (Trevor-Roper, 1969). Because of deficiencies in the survival of records, it is impossible to determine how many people suffered legal prosecution as witches over those three hundred years. Certainly the figure of 9 million executed witches, once accepted in feminist and Wiccan circles, has been exploded. Scholarship of the 1980s and 1990s has suggested much lower figures, with perhaps 100,000 accused and 40,000 executed (Levack, 1995). What is also certain is that the period of the witch persecutions was the tragic outcome of a confluence of elite and popular concerns. This general conclusion is borne out by that handful of detailed scholarly local studies of the rise and fall of witchcraft persecution which

have demonstrated what a complex and multifaceted phenomenon the craze was.

The crucial issue was the desire for a purer, more defined, and more rigorous Christianity, which lay at the root of the Reformation of the sixteenth century. In the two centuries preceding the Reformation, the struggle of the Catholic Church against heresy had continued, and during the fifteenth century the traditional village witch came to be identified as a member of a new, diabolical, heretical sect. At the same time that the inquisitors were beginning to try people for witchcraft, learned theologians in their libraries and studies were developing a new and more frightening image of the Devil. This formative phase of demonological theorizing was summed up in 1487 with the publication of the *Malleus maleficarum* (witches' hammer), written by two Dominicans, Johann Sprenger and Heinrich Kraemer. The importance of the *Malleus* has been overstated: it did not represent the ascendancy of a triumphant, hegemonic view of witchcraft but was rather a propaganda piece written to justify the actions of its authors in a set of controversial trials. One of its major objectives, in fact, was to convince sometimes reluctant secular authorities that they had a part to play in witch-hunting.

This last issue became less contentious as the sixteenth century progressed. The Reformation and the subsequent Catholic Counter-Reformation helped define Christian and hence anti-Christian beliefs and behavior more clearly. But these religious movements also had a political dimension: the secular concept of the good citizen was now inextricably enmeshed with the church's concept of the good Christian. At a crucial stage of state formation, many people in positions of influence thought they were attempting not only to bolster secular government but also to produce a "godly commonwealth." The witch became the enemy of the king and the magistrate as well as of the clergyman and the true Christian.

These long-familiar developments led to the once standard interpretation of the witch craze as concocted by bigoted, ignorant, power-crazed judges and clerics and foisted on the population to destroy pre-Christian beliefs. The subject was treated as an issue of intellectual rather than social history—until the early 1970s, when two British historians, Alan Macfarlane and Keith Thomas, developed a paradigm that put witchcraft accusations firmly in their social context. They shifted their focus of attention away from legal treatises and demonological tracts to court records and trial pamphlets on English witchcraft cases. Arguing that it was possible to write a history of witch-hunting "from below," they stressed that the phenomenon is explicable not just through the

thoughts, policies, and actions of the powerful but also through the fears, strategies, and cultural horizons of the ordinary villager.

In particular Macfarlane's work, founded on a close examination of the unusually rich documentation for the English county of Essex, convincingly rooted witchcraft accusations in both village life and the broader socioeconomic changes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He noted that witchcraft accusations were normally brought by richer villagers against poorer ones. Probing more deeply, he discovered that a witchcraft accusation commonly was brought after a dispute between the accuser or members of his or her household and the accused over the denial of charity. The alleged witch, characteristically a poor and elderly woman, would come to the accuser's house and ask for money, food, drink, or perhaps the chance to work. Her request denied, the old woman would make off in an angry mood, possibly muttering threats. A little later an inexplicable illness or some other disaster would befall the refuser of charity, his family, or his farm animals. The earlier altercation, threats, or ambivalent phrases uttered by the supposed witch would be connected to the misfortune, especially if the woman requesting charity had already been suspected of witchcraft.

Macfarlane linked this model of witchcraft accusations after the refusal of charity to broader changes in the region during the period of accusations. In England, as in most of Europe, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were marked by steady population increase. This increase created tremendous pressure at the bottom of society, especially in that it created a large body of poor. Traditional forms of poor relief, in Macfarlane's model, were unable to cope with the extent of poverty, and it took time to put an effective poor law into operation. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries many substantial villagers were uncertain about how to deal with the poor, both in practical and in psychological terms. In harsh times the neighbor begging at the door was refused, but a lingering communal ethic made the refuser feel guilty. Under these circumstances, a witchcraft accusation was a method of transferring guilt: it was not the refuser of charity who was challenging community values but rather the perpetrator of malefic witchcraft. Macfarlane had learned from anthropology that witchcraft accusations ran along the fault lines in society, symbolizing redefinitions of community and the severing of social relationships. He connected the Essex cases to broad and familiar themes, such as the development of capitalist agriculture, the breakup of the traditional village community, and the rise of individualism.

Macfarlane's charity-refused model, although a consistent theme in accusations, has not proved universally applicable to early modern Europe. He and Thomas, however, did demonstrate convincingly that witchcraft can be studied in the context of peasant beliefs, which can no longer simply be dismissed as ignorant superstitions or ideas foisted on the peasantry by the elite. Rather, witchcraft on this level, however distant and alien to the modern observer, made sense and had a function for those involved in the phenomenon. In the 1970s historians' ideas about witchcraft trials were dominated by knowledge of the big crazes, which, for example, led to hundreds of burnings dur-

ing the early seventeenth century in the German territories of Ellwangen, Trier, Würzburg, and Bamberg. Further research demonstrated that the pattern Macfarlane established was far more common, and accusations were launched sporadically, normally against individuals or two or three supposed witches. Robin Briggs's work reveals that witchcraft accusations were an established feature of early modern Lorraine, for example, but they were located in the world of the peasant and in the petty disputes endemic to village life. Moreover, it became clear that over the whole of Europe the major peasant concern was with *maleficium*, the concrete harm supposedly perpe-

trated by witches, rather than the demonic pact or the witch's candidacy for membership in a diabolic heretical sect.

Another striking feature of accusations of witchcraft during the witch craze was that they were most frequently directed against women. A few regional case histories to the contrary, most court records containing witchcraft accusations demonstrate that the malefic witch was thought of as female. In Macfarlane's Essex sample, over 90 percent of the accused were women, and perhaps 80 percent of the accused in Europe as a whole were women. A number of differing interpretations attempt to explain the connection between women and witchcraft.

In the 1970s writers, most of them not academic historians, within the women's movement interpreted the gender imbalance in witchcraft accusations as one of the most overt and horrific outcomes of the male oppression of women. The acceptance of the estimate of 9 million executions made this manifestation of men's unpleasantness toward women seem all the more terrible. These writers did well to focus attention on and demonstrate the importance of an issue on which male historians had rarely commented, but few scholars of witchcraft history have regarded the inordinate accusations against women simply in terms of male oppression. Early modern Europe was a male-dominated society in which medical theory, science, and theology all agreed on the moral, intellectual, and physical inferiority of women, but it has proved difficult to establish exactly how this generalized intellectual context translated into individual witchcraft accusations.

Research has suggested a deeper set of issues. Pertinent questions are how frequently witchcraft accusations were launched between women, how often women acted as witnesses against women, and how often women participated in semiofficial actions against female witches, such as searching for the witch's mark. No political system, not even early modern patriarchy, works unless the majority of those it seeks to rule accept or at least acquiesce to it. Thus the involvement of women as accusers and prosecution witnesses in witchcraft cases might be further evidence of the dominance of male values. It seems more fruitful, however, to regard witchcraft as a phenomenon that operated to a large extent within the female sphere, in that world of female concerns over child rearing, the protection of domestic space, and the politics of reputations and local gossip that social and cultural historians of early modern Europe have been slowly reconstructing. A number of studies assert that accusations often revolved around the bewitchment, frequently to death, of children. Their mothers were

the accusers, and postmenopausal women were the accused. Psychohistorians have begun to explore this theme within the paradigm, familiar in psychoanalysis, of the malevolent mother. At the very least, examinations of popular attitudes toward menopause, rather than a consideration of generalized misogyny, are needed.

From court records and the published works of contemporary demonologists, moralists, and skeptics emerges a folklore of counter-magic providing strategies for those who thought themselves bewitched to use against their alleged tormentors. On a village level witchcraft was about power. The accused witch was often an old woman who was unlikely to seek revenge through violence or litigation against those who had offended her, but she supposedly wreaked havoc on her adversaries through the deployment of occult forces. Her power could be counteracted by rival magic. Religious reformers argued that these counter-measures were without scriptural basis and hence were as ungodly as *maleficium*, but they had little impact on a population that desired more immediate and overt relief from witchcraft than the church's remedy, prayer. In hopes of alleviating the sufferings caused by witchcraft or transferring them to the witch, people scratched witches to draw blood from their faces, burned hair from their heads or thatch from their roofs, or made witch cakes from grain and the urine of the bewitched and burned them.

"Good witches" were crucial to this counter-magic and an essential element in the broader culture of popular magic. The practitioners of popular magic, folk medicine, and divination, good witches were probably as common a feature of the period's witch beliefs as were the malefic witches who loom so much larger in the historical consciousness. Macfarlane and Thomas, in their studies of English witchcraft beliefs, gave due importance to those the English commonly called "cunning folk." Many contemporary writers observed that these folk were widespread and their services eagerly sought by the population at large. Cunning men and women offered medical services that were cheaper, probably less unpleasant, and possibly as effective as those available from the officially qualified physicians of the period. They could find stolen goods or identify the thieves who had taken them. They could tell fortunes and were consulted by young girls on the identities of their future husbands and by pregnant women regarding the sex of their unborn babies. They were the obvious counselors for victims of witchcraft, for they confirmed suspicions about who was behind the bewitching and recommended methods of combating the malefic witch and averting her witchcraft.

As might be expected, the equivalents of the English cunning men and women were to be found all over Europe. Research on Lorraine, for example, has demonstrated the importance of what were, literally, “witch doctors,” specialists in treating witchcraft and identifying witches, who frequently played a key role in focusing and developing accusations. Some were itinerants, and even those who were not sometimes acquired reputations that spread over a radius of twenty miles. These *devins* or *devineresses* (soothsayers) did little more than confirm existing fears that an illness was supernatural and existing suspicions as to who was responsible for its occurrence. Much of the knowledge about them surfaces through records of formal prosecutions of witches, but their main objective was to keep their patients away from court action, which would undermine the good witches’ position as the major source of relief and possibly attract the unwanted attention of officialdom. The activities of these Lorraine practitioners, like good witches everywhere in Europe, were illegal and reprehensible in the eyes of the church. The evidence in the Lorraine archives and elsewhere of the activities of *devins* and cunning folk constructs, in effect, a magical underworld.

The techniques used by the cunning folk and other practitioners varied widely. Mostly unlettered, they used charms and bastardized versions of Christian prayers. In England following the Reformation, for example, cunning folk apparently were fond of using doggerel fragments of the Latin prayers and creed of the old church, much to the distaste of the Protestant authorities. In Catholic areas like Lorraine, cunning folk often used prayer and holy water in their deliberations. All over Europe cunning folk used the sieve and shears, a practice in which the sieve, balanced on the points of a pair of shears, would move when questions were put to it. Another common technique involved primitive versions of the crystal balls popularly associated with fortune tellers. Other practitioners of folk magic employed more elaborate techniques, some of which point toward connections with the learned magic of the elite. By the mid-seventeenth century a reasonable proportion of cunning folk, in some regions at least, was literate, possibly signifying access to unusual and powerful knowledge in a period when illiteracy was the norm. Some had books, particularly of astrology, and used them when aiding their clients. No doubt the literate cunning man or woman had access to the almanacs and popular medical treatises of the period. As the frequent references to both cunning men and cunning women and *devins* and *devineresses* make clear, if malefic witches tended overwhelmingly to be female, good

witches were of either sex, the implications of which deserve full exploration.

The cunning folk attracted particular odium from Protestant writers, locked as they were in the battle to inculcate right religion in the face of entrenched ignorance and superstition. The English Protestant theologian William Perkins (1558–1602) argued that, since good witches got their powers from the Devil as clearly as did the bad ones, they were equally deserving of death and were doubly reprehensible because they used devilish practices to convince the population that they were doing good. Nevertheless, good witches rarely received severe punishment. The secular authorities treated them lightly or subjected them to the generally weak penalties of the ecclesiastical courts. Yet the theologians’ attitude brings into question officialdom’s perception of witchcraft and why the witch-hunts declined.

The established tradition, in many ways correct, is that the Christian church, both before and after the Reformation, played a key role in creating the witch persecutions of early modern Europe. The church’s revised view of the importance of the Devil, the perceived need for a more sharply defined Christianity, and the “acculturation” of the population at large, or at least some sections of it, to accept this official, more stringent Christianity were all of essential importance. Many societies have accepted that witches exist and that they are evil, but the European witch craze was a unique event that owed much to changes in official Christianity from about 1450 onward. Yet the church’s role was not one of simple and unthinking repression. Some convinced and theologically orthodox Christians allotted witchcraft only a marginal importance. The key theological issue was the significance awarded to Divine Providence. Skeptical writers argued that many of the afflictions popularly attributed to witchcraft were, in fact, the product of the will of God, designed as a test for the faithful. This position was a little austere for the bulk of the population. People could take a witch to court or consult cunning folk about how best to deal with witchcraft, but such remedies were not available against the Almighty. A related position regarded the whole slate of witchcraft beliefs as the product of popular superstitions rather than of the influence of the Devil. Thus a conundrum arises. In some areas the processes of Christianization unleashed by the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation resulted in witch persecution, but in others they led to the attitude that witchcraft beliefs were a sign of popular ignorance, demanding the mild sanctions of the church courts and the education of the population rather than witch burnings.

While theologians and senior clerics developed a number of theoretical positions on witchcraft, judges and legal writers also demonstrated ambivalent attitudes toward the phenomenon. The legal codes of most if not all European states of the period included laws against witches, but witchcraft in many respects enjoyed a peculiar status as a criminal offense and was difficult to prove. To solve the problem some judges simply dropped the normal rules relating to evidence, especially to evidence and confessions elicited by torture, which frequently fueled the large witch-hunts. Other judges were more cautious. In England the high acquittal rate in witchcraft cases, the comparative lack of large-scale hunts, and the rarity of convictions after the 1650s owed much to the fact that assize courts, where most English witch cases were tried, were presided over by highly qualified and experienced judges appointed by the central government. In France, where those convicted of capital crimes had a right to appeal to the judges of the Parlement of Paris, most local convictions for witchcraft were quashed by the 1630s. In Scotland, Sir George Mackenzie, the lord advocate during much of the late seventeenth century, was extremely skeptical about witchcraft accusations and helped reduce the number of trials and convictions.

These signs of elite skepticism about witchcraft lead to that most complex of problems, the decline of the belief in witches and witchcraft. Some discussions of this development have centered around the marginalization of witchcraft beliefs by the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. A new religious style stressing rational belief rather than extreme sensitivity to daily manifestations of Divine Providence was also of considerable significance. The importance of these factors is undeniable, yet seemingly the skepticism among the elite was caused as much by a cleavage between elite and popular culture as anything else. By about 1700 senior judges, senior ecclesiastics, senior bureaucrats, and learned and polite society in general were likely to deride witchcraft beliefs and witchcraft accusations as evidence of peasant ignorance and popular superstition, just as they might dismiss some manifestations of popular religion. To understand the end of the European witch craze requires an awareness of the social history of snobbery.

By 1750, except for a few isolated burnings, the persecutions had ended. In France, England, and much of Germany the executions had been reduced to a trickle by 1650. In the Dutch Republic, Spain, and Italy malefic witchcraft had never been a matter of much concern to the authorities. In some places, like Poland and Hungary, witch persecution came late, but even in these territories it had more or less collapsed by the mid-eighteenth century. The provin-

cial elites, local clergy, petty noblemen, and urban patricians joined their social superiors in rejecting witchcraft beliefs, although this process was slower and less complete than might be imagined. Belief in witchcraft and magic had become the prerogative of the common people. Although such matters were rarely recorded in the late eighteenth century, the few extant reports of a good witch's activities, the occasional record of supposed malefic witches being assaulted or killed, the odd paper charm that survived, all suggest the resilience of what were by then subterranean supernatural beliefs.

THE SURVIVAL OF WITCH BELIEFS

For the elite the early eighteenth century marked the point at which, whatever their subsequent ideas about the occult, credence in the old style of witchcraft had waned dramatically. Among the lower orders, above all Europe's peasantry, the established beliefs in witchcraft, sorcery, and magic lived on, waiting to be rediscovered by nineteenth-century folklorists and country clergymen.

One of those clergymen, the Reverend J. C. Atkinson, recorded the existence of witchcraft beliefs and the pervasiveness of popular magic among nineteenth-century country dwellers. In 1841 Atkinson became vicar of Danby in North Yorkshire, a remote parish on the edge of the North York moors near the North Sea coast. England by that time regarded itself as a progressive, advanced society marked by science and industrialization. Atkinson, a southerner, was amazed to discover how widespread beliefs in witchcraft were. He wrote in 1891:

I have no doubt at all of the very real and deep-seated existence of a belief in the actuality and the power of the witch. Nay, I make no doubts whatever that the witch herself, in multitudes of instances, believed in her own power quite as firmly as any of those who had learned to look upon her with a dread almost reminding one of the African dread of fetish. Fifty years ago the whole atmosphere of the folklore firmament in this district was so surcharged with the being and the works of the witch, that one seemed able to trace her presence and her activity in almost every nook and corner of the neighbourhood. (Atkinson, 1891, pp. 72–73)

Atkinson described beliefs in shape changing, concerns about *maleficium*, the widespread use of charms and amulets, and a general willingness to consult cunning folk.

Indications are strong that the situation Atkinson described probably prevailed in other rural areas of nineteenth-century England. Specific research demonstrates the persistence of witchcraft beliefs even in

the urban lower classes, in London, for example, up to the mid-nineteenth century. Judith Devlin constructed an overview of France in the century and a quarter after the Revolution. Popular magic, quasi-magical manifestations of popular Christianity, and belief in the occult were still firmly entrenched. Christianity was still distorted by popular misconceptions, by a lively folklore surrounding saints and shrines, and by a refashioning of the fundamentals of the faith to meet the pragmatic devotional needs of the peasantry. Folk medicine, which depended on pagan rites, traditional techniques, miracles, and faith healing, still offered a viable alternative to "official" medicine. The popular mind, especially in rural areas, still accepted apparitions and prodigies and a world suffused with werewolves, monsters, fairies, elves, ghosts, and omens, and belief in demonic possession, astrology, and prophecy continued.

In this mental world, Atkinson's "folklore firmament," witchcraft enjoyed a central position. Devlin argued that witchcraft by this time was not a matter of explanatory and practical functions so much as an adaptable social vocabulary that allowed individuals to bring retrospective charges against those who they thought inflicted excessive or unnatural misfortunes on them. Countermagic, spells, charms, and good witches still helped against bad witches. But the basic functions of witchcraft in nineteenth-century France were, as had probably always been the case in peasant Europe, to reflect strained relationships in a backward, traditional society and to relieve and justify anxiety and anger. For people worried that they had fallen short of the ideals of their society, witchcraft transferred feelings of guilt or uncertainty onto others, who were accused as witches.

It might seem that developments in the early twentieth century finally rendered witchcraft beliefs redundant. How could such beliefs survive in a world marked by universal education, the triumph of science and technology, secularization, mass culture, and rapid communications? Over much of Europe witchcraft disappeared as a genuine traditional element in popular belief. Yet in the 1960s the French anthropologist Jeanne Favret-Saada, working in the Bocage region in western France, discovered persistent beliefs in malefic witches. Those who thought themselves bewitched sought help from “unwitchers,” the equivalents of sixteenth-century cunning folk. Obviously witchcraft in the Bocage in the 1960s was not exactly the same as the witchcraft of the early modern period, but striking parallels appear, including concern about occult power and occult fields of force, apprehension over series of inexplicable misfortunes, feelings of helplessness in the face of bewitchment, and nervous confrontations and negotiations between witches and victims. Although most educated moderns would assume that the history of witchcraft ended three centuries

ago, Favret-Saada’s work leaves room for speculation as to what beliefs and practices have persisted in isolated parts of rural Europe.

Witchcraft has been the focus of considerable attention from specialist scholars, nonspecialist thinkers, and the general public. This attention has created a lively historiography that has postulated a variety of interpretations of the phenomenon, especially regarding the “burning times” in early modern Europe. Among these interpretations, social history methodologies have attempted to reconstruct what witchcraft and witchcraft accusations meant in the context of the village communities of late medieval and early modern Europe. Research in these periods, and that dealing with witchcraft in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has produced an unexpected possible conclusion. Often dismissed by historians as a marginal or even bizarre topic, witchcraft, defined as a set of beliefs that help people make sense of many aspects of their world, has been one of the most enduring components of popular mentality in European history.

See also other articles in this section.

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BANDITRY



Paul Sant Cassia

As a type of predatory, acquisitive, and violent action by groups of men (sometimes including women), banditry has a long history dating from ancient Greece, Rome, and China. In central and eastern Europe and in the Balkans, it was found in the countryside, in specific conditions (such as following wars and massive dislocations) and in specific periods, especially in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the modern nation-state was emerging. In Latin America it was part and parcel of an expanding frontier economy. Banditry tended to emerge in remote, difficult-to-control mountainous areas containing large numbers of semimobile and state-resistant pastoralists. Although there are examples of lone bandits, bandits tended to form into fluid bands, sometimes of up to twenty persons. Kinship, real or fictive, was an important component of their organization, and solidarity was reinforced through the institutions of blood brotherhood and adoption, as well as through feasting and other rituals. Banditry can be seen as a continuum from the camel raiding Bedouin, through the “noble bandits” of the nineteenth-century Greek Klephts, to contemporary armed autonomist groups (such as Chiapas in Mexico or Kurds in Turkey or Chechen fighters against Russian intervention in Chechnya) labeled as “bandits” by the state.

In Europe banditry assumed its most important forms in rural societies, particularly in Mediterranean regions and particularly as property relations changed in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. The following analysis focuses on this important category, where among other things causation has been carefully studied. But more informal kinds of banditry occurred in other settings. After wars, for example in the eighteenth century, veterans often roamed the country in predatory groups that some peasants regarded as bandits or brigands. Fears of banditry of this sort surfaced in 1789, during the French Revolution, and helped trigger rural risings. While banditry as an outcome of social instability has declined in most of Europe, thanks to firmer policing and changes in military recruitment and policies toward

veterans, echoes persist, for example in the formation of criminal groups in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.

SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS

More than most other social phenomena, the characterization of banditry depends upon how it is approached. Banditry can be seen as a legal category, a social category, and as a series of powerful stories and myths. Its meaning has changed across time and across disciplines. As a legal category, banditry is a pernicious form of crime that subverts the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence. From the perspective of the modern nation-state, bandits (or brigands, a term more popular in the nineteenth century) are criminals who resist the civilizing power of the state through violence, brutality, extortion, theft, and protection rackets. Bandits are seen as beyond the pale of “civilized society,” a symptom of the low level of development of the countryside, a problem impeding progress and thus meriting swift, equally brutal, suppression by the army or police, without much regard to the constitutional human rights the modern state claims to protect. Most of the historical sources on bandits are the words of army or police officers charged with ridding the countryside of such “sores” or “plagues” and are thus highly partial. From the perspective of the “bandit” himself, the situation may look different. To him, an escape to the mountains may be the only way of avoiding an unjust state summons or pursuing a private revenge. Other sources, such as ballads, popular accounts, and oral history—often bypassed by traditional historians engaged in depicting the history of the nation-state as the progress of civilization over barbarism—concentrated on bandits’ roles as popular heroes.

Two pioneer historians who emphasized the social aspects of banditry were Franco Molfeese and Eric Hobsbawm. In his celebrated book, *Bandits* (1969), Hobsbawm interpreted them as prepolitical rebels.

Social bandits were considered by their people as heroes, champions, and fighters for justice in a world that often denied them justice. Hobsbawm distinguished bandits from gangs drawn from the professional underworld and from communities for whom raiding was a normal way of life (such as the Bedouins). According to Hobsbawm, bandits were symptoms of major transformations in society, but they did not themselves transform it; they were activists, not ideologues, and after World War II they disappeared. Bandits were recruited from the most mobile segments of peasant society: young unmarried men, landless laborers, migrants, shepherds, ex-soldiers, and deserters. They took to the hills to right some personal wrong, becoming the noble robber. Although they were supported by the local community whose yearnings for a prepolitical just world they embodied, they were usually betrayed.

Hobsbawm's thesis has been criticized by Anton Blok and other anthropologists. Blok argued that there is more to brigandage than voicing popular unrest. By applying Norbert Elias's notion of power configurations to his historical anthropological research on Sicily, he suggested that Hobsbawm overemphasized class conflict and romanticized bandits. Rather than being champions of the poor, bandits often terrorized and oppressed them. Bandits prevented and suppressed peasant mobility by putting down collective peasant action through terror and by carving out avenues of individual social mobility that weakened collective action. Blok asserted that analysis must encompass the wider society within which bandits operated. Bandits required protection in order to survive; otherwise they were quickly killed by the landlords' retainers, the police, or the peasants. In Sicily, such support was forthcoming from mafiosi (local men of authority who often engaged in illegal activities and protection rackets) or local politicians. Blok formulated the "principle" that the more successful a bandit, the greater the protection he enjoyed.

BANDITRY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Where banditry has persisted, it can clearly be linked to the inability of the state to control the countryside. Although it would be simplistic to attribute the decline of banditry in the modern world to the state's increasing monopoly of violence, this is certainly important. Indeed, when used by state authorities, the pejorative "bandits" labels forms of violent resistance they cannot control except by equally brutal repression. The persistence or decline of banditry depends

upon a complex interplay of variables, including the social structure and political ecology of a particular region; the nature and distribution of property and capital accumulation (whether landed or movable and precarious, such as livestock) and the means available to legitimate it; the presence or absence of trust and its relationship to the development of civil society; underdeveloped electoral processes, which may encourage strong-arm tactics; and the predominance of permanent insecurity rather than permanent misery at the grass roots, the former being more conducive to banditry. The political ideology of local elites and their relationship to the state is also important because bandits may either be co-opted by local elites as a means to resist the state (as occurred in Sicily in the immediate post-World War II period) or, reluctantly, by the state, as in nineteenth-century Greece, where they were used for irredentist adventures and to threaten the supporters of rival politicians. The state's policies toward landlordism, peasant cultivators, and pastoralists may also be a significant variable because they may favor one over the other, with radical implications for illegal practices. In certain situations peasants may have preferred the traditional depredations of pastoral bandits to the more extensive, sustained ones of the state, such as taxes, and in other situations the depredations of the potentates' henchmen may have been protected by powerful national interests.

In many societies, such as in southern Spain, Sicily, Greece, and the Balkans, banditry had a predominantly agro-pastoral base. In Sicily and Greece violent entrepreneurs from pastoral backgrounds managed to create new niches for themselves in the nation-state, especially when the new regime attempted to penetrate the countryside. In Sicily mafiosi were actively involved in the *risorgimento* (the nineteenth-century movement for Italian unification), backing the adherents of Giuseppe Garibaldi and managing to wrest effective control of landed estates from the absentee Sicilian aristocracy. They thus shifted their wealth into land, their pastoral backgrounds proving particularly useful both in co-opting bandits and in suppressing peasant unrest. In Greece banditry was intimately grounded in pastoralism and even had a seasonal cycle based on movements from the plains to the mountains. The age-old conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists obliged the former to intimidate peasants, especially in the new Greek state, which radically reduced the amount of land available for pasturage and tried to encourage the expansion of the small peasant cultivator class. War increased dislocation and unrest in the countryside, further encouraging banditry.

For an analysis of banditry, it may be useful to steer a middle course, borrowing from the various perspectives that treat bandits as primitive social rebels (as Hobsbawm does), as individual opportunists, or as the co-opted henchmen of rural potentates (as Blok does). Often all these features coexist in particular examples of banditry, although one may be more dominant than the others.

Banditry in Europe traditionally appeared in areas where large-scale landholding coexisted with a relatively permanent intermediate strata of leaseholders or freeholders based upon family-sized plots, such as in Sicily, parts of Greece, and Cyprus. Sustained banditry required concealable, transportable wealth (cash, cash crops, animals, alcohol, narcotics) that left few traces. In the nineteenth-century Mediterranean, banditry was particularly strong where pastoralists occupied an intermediate position between small-scale cultivators and large-scale proprietors, as in northern Greece, or where overseers and sharecroppers occupied that position, as in rural Sicily, but also where pastoralism was prominent in its own right, as in Sardinia and Corsica.

There were basic differences between banditry in predominantly agricultural areas and in mountainous pastoral areas. In the latter, banditry appears to have been more resilient, especially where a combination of external factors militated against turning pastoralists into peasants. Banditry in agricultural contexts was usually more controllable and could be tamed more easily, especially when violent men from humble origins acquired secure property rights (usually through co-option or protection by elites) and thereby achieved legitimacy.

Banditry tended to appear less frequently in areas with large masses of rural proletarians, such as Puglia in southern Italy. In Puglia few legal or illegal opportunities were available for social mobility, and the social relations of production encouraged the emergence of collective solidarity and of anarcho-syndicalism (a doctrine advocating that workers seize control of the economy and government). Much the same appears to have happened in Andalusia, where absentee landlords were separated from a mass of largely landless laborers and where rural discontent increasingly took class forms.

A final important variable is the process of mythicizing at the local and national levels. In the Mediterranean and elsewhere the circulation of popular accounts of bandits was particularly significant, sometimes interacting in complex ways with the creation of the nation-state's history. Bandits were portrayed in texts as outsiders and hence dangerous, as residues from the past and hence ambiguous, or as

insiders and hence admirable. They might move from the outside to the inside or vice versa. These portrayals affected how bandits were perceived and legitimated, even allowing them to legitimate themselves. In nineteenth-century Greece, ex-Klephts such as Theodoros Kolokotronis used their memoirs to glorify themselves. Many bandit chiefs published pamphlets in their own defense claiming that, like all good Greeks, they were fighting the Turks, the Muslim outsiders who were the true brigands attempting to discredit the country. In the late nineteenth century Corsican bandits liked to present themselves as "Robin Hood" figures.

In reality bandits changed sides according to self-interest. Such definitions and redefinitions have created a vocabulary of justification, traces of which remained even at the end of the twentieth century. In Crete, for example, extensive livestock theft was legitimated orally by reference to highly selective, nationalist accounts of the "freedom-loving" Klephts of old mentioned in schoolbooks. In Andalusia local communists turned nineteenth-century bandits into protorebels in the regional cause, symbols in their devolutionist struggles with Madrid. Stories about bandits are therefore an intrinsic part of the phenomenon.

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF BANDITRY

Throughout the Mediterranean, at least as far back as the eighteenth century, banditry has often been incorporated in nationalist and regional rhetoric. *Bri-gantaggio politico* had already emerged as a central feature of Corsican independence strategies against Genoa under Giacinto Paoli and Gian-Pietro Gaffori in the mid-eighteenth century. Political banditry often required outside support to be successful. This was the case in Corsica, southern Italy (Calabria), and Sicily in the early nineteenth century, when the British supported their "chivalrous brigand-allies" against the French. In postindependence Greece Klephtic heroes figured prominently in nationalist rhetoric. In Sicily the bandit Salvatore Giuliano's ambiguous notoriety in the post-1945 period, created partly through extensive press coverage, derived from his expression of regional Sicilian aspirations, despite the fact that he also massacred peasants. Like the contemporary "Bandit Queen" in India, Giuliano became the subject of novels and films.

The packaging of the myth of banditry in nationalist political rhetoric cannot be disregarded as unrelated to historical and anthropological analysis. Bandits were often romanticized after the fact by way of rhetoric and texts that circulated with a life of their

own, giving the bandits a permanence and potency that transcended their localized domain and transitory nature. The ways in which bandits were portrayed in the modern nation-state and the ways such symbols were used to legitimate contemporary struggles are as significant as what the bandits actually did and represented. That is, it is an incontrovertible fact that bandits often terrorized peasants who appear to have voluntarily supported them; yet this fact does not exhaust or even address the issue of why and how banditry emerged, how it was sustained, or how bandit myths achieved such potency at both the local and national levels.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VIOLENCE

Traditional banditry has often been accompanied by extreme violence in both its expression and its repression. In banditry, as in feuding, from which it in part derives, personalized violence is crucial and finely graded; the intensity of violence, however distasteful to a modern sensibility, suggests a form of control. Violence is targeted specifically against persons and properties (usually animals) of persons, and displayed through stories. It functions as a warning and a deterrence against further acts of violence.

Terror and violence often had a personal element. Many bandits in Corsica, Sicily, Cypress, and elsewhere embarked on their careers through personal vendettas. A nineteenth-century observer noted that for the Corsicans the vendetta was a kind of religion. But betrayal to agents of the state was always a grave danger, unless the individual was protected by powerful interests. In Corsica, for example, many bandits were obliged to rely on the support of family and kin and thus soon found themselves further enmeshed in family feuds. They used their prepotency and violence to protect their kins' interests and thus ensure the support of family against betrayal to the state. The more protected an individual was, especially by powerful patrons, as in Sicily, the less he needed to use violence for the meanings it could convey and the more opportunities he had to employ ambiguity and courtesy—a point noted by many outside observers, although such courtesy must surely have been ironic. The more marginalized a bandit was, the more dependent he was on protection, the greater the risk of betrayal, and thus the greater the tendency for violence to appear “gratuitous”—that is, to signify itself.

As the genesis of banditry was personal, so too was its prosecution. In their typical form, most stories about bandits can be reduced to the following pattern: The triggering incident is a slight to personal or family

honor by another family or individual of equal or superior status. A member of the slighted family, usually a young man, responds with violence, thereby breaking state law, and flees. Revenge in kind is threatened by the family who made the initial slight. The slighted family causes the death of the original offender. As both families resort to banditry, deeming their acts of illegal violence morally just, they become marginalized. The state attempts to capture the offenders and, if it is successful, executes them. Alternatively, the offenders are betrayed by other families, also resulting in their deaths.

A central way to express violence and damage one's opponent's interests was through the mutilation of both individuals and animals. As an exchange between individuals, banditry thus employed a specific set of finely graded messages involving violence to the body and property of the victim. Property, as a stand-in for its owner, was subjected to an excess of violence, such as the disembowelment of livestock, but not killed. The owner would thus be forced to complete the bitter destruction of his own herd. In other cases, such as in Corsica, mules' ears were cut off as a ritual death threat. Such actions served as a warning or an unambiguous omen of further action. Whereas smaller animals such as dogs were destroyed, larger ones such as sheep were grievously wounded, and the largest animals (bulls, mules, etc.) had marks left on them. The victim was therefore defined taxonomically.

Through the destruction of animals or other property of the offender, or even the killing of some other person, a surrogate victim is created. As René Girard noted in *Violence and the Sacred* (1988), by killing not the murderer himself but someone close to him, an act of perfect reciprocity is avoided and the necessity for further revenge is bypassed. The act resembles both a sacrifice—in that the victim of the second murder is not responsible for the first—and a legal punishment—in that the violent retribution can be seen as imposing an act of reparation on the offender.

After the selection and killing of the victim, whether the original offender or a surrogate, the body was often mutilated to underscore the significance of the act of revenge. The body had to be “prepared” retroactively—disassembled and then reassembled in a grotesque parody of the original body—to be offered back to the group who “made” it. This desecration of the body also defiled the bandit or perpetrator. Yet through that act the bandit embarked on his final transformation. He set himself up outside the community and thus as the ultimate sacrificial victim. The songs about the hardships of bandit life in Corsica, Greece, and elsewhere lament that becoming a bandit

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was far from glorious. Most bandits in Corsica saw themselves as victims; they spoke about their “disgrace,” “destiny,” and “fate” (*poveru disgraziatu*). In Greece the notions of *atichos* (luckless) and *moira* (fate) were equally prevalent.

Thus it was not so much through their lives that bandits generated the sometimes powerful myth of nobility as through their deaths. Nor was it because they lived or died “nobly.” It was rather that, by being betrayed and killed or publicly executed, they achieved sacrificial status. Either they became symbols of betrayal by more powerful vested interests, or the violence of their executions, and the disassembly of their bodies as public spectacle, demonstrated the irrepressible power of the state over the individual. When caught and juridically processed, their bodies became the subject of a publicly demonstrated spectacle of state power.

The bandit is thus not so much an expression of peasant reaction to oppression or a form of wish fulfillment as a transfiguration of peasant suffering, transformed from individual execution to the collective personification of sacrifice. The parallels between bandits and saints, and the linkage in the literature between bandits and monks, are not fortuitous, either in terms of the social conditions that gave rise to banditry or in terms of the iconography and models of suffering. Popular models of suffering were available in the lives and tortures of saints, and imprisoned bandits could become like saints, especially when they repented. Michel Foucault noted that the greater the spectacle of state punishment (and most glorifications of banditry by the peasantry date from the period immediately after the establishment of nation-states), the greater the risk that it would be rejected by the very people to whom such spectacles were addressed.

THE PROBLEM OF COMPLICITY

The extreme violence practiced by bandits against peasants in many contemporary accounts has been interpreted in two ways: as expressive or as instrumental. Hobsbawm tended to an expressive interpretation. He spoke of “pathological aberrations” and “ultra violence” as a manifestation of the “primitive” nature of bandits’ rebellion, but he could not explain it adequately. Blok and others interpreted it in instrumental terms: violence ensures peasant submission. This interpretation is also problematic since violence reinforces the fragmentation of peasant collective consciousness but is not its direct cause.

It may be useful to distinguish between violence, as a performative act and a system of signs, and

terror, as the effect of such actions on the wider social field within which bandits operate. Two famous Italian politicians, Luigi Franchetti and Sidney Sonnino, who conducted a wide-ranging investigation in Sicily in the late nineteenth century, noted that, unless one introduced the notion of complicity, it was difficult to understand why there was such widespread peasant submission to the activities of bandits. Peasant complicity was not always imposed through terror but could also be spontaneous and lucrative. Franchetti and Sonnino also noted a widespread admiration for bandits among the literati, who romanticized them, and paradoxically among landowners, the most likely to suffer from bandit depredations. Although fear and protection are critical components of bandit power, they are not a sufficient cause for bandits’ sustained prepotency. A widespread and effective climate of fear would in any case be difficult to maintain if it were to be reduced to the potential violent actions of a few individuals, unless it were supported by a consent bandits received at the local level. Because they were embedded in local communities, bandits benefited from a grassroots solidarity against outsiders and state authority. Local codes of behavior such as *omertà* (Sicilian for “silence”) obliged individuals to maintain a solidarity of silence and noncooperation with the authorities or risk extreme ostracism and revenge.

Consequently, it is difficult at the local level to distinguish those acts that can be called personal (such as a vendetta over a matter of honor) from those that can be labeled political (such as protecting the political interests of the elite). Clearly, bandits had an interest in encouraging the interpretation of their actions as personal and personalizing rather than political. Violence worked to encourage individuals to “mind their own business.” Violent retribution was “justice,” a private affair not to be reported to the state. Inevitably, state authorities viewed such violence as a sign of “barbarism” to be mercilessly extirpated, and as a moral weakness in the peasants who were duped by the bandits. Thus activities by bandits that had political implications (such as violence that kept the peasants cowed and docile) were often perceived as personal at the grass roots and hence of only limited concern, except to the participants.

Banditry employed a set of moral codes drawn and indistinguishable from kinship-based ideas of justice and retribution; hence a reaction against banditry was often impossible because it conflicted with the moral codes that regulated traditional society. As in many stateless societies, the distinction between the private and the public (that is, civil society) had limited significance. Banditry certainly possessed a cumulative political significance in suppressing peasant

unrest, but the actions it employed were embedded in peasant morality. Thus peasant complicity might be either active or passive but equally significant in both cases. Passive complicity consisted of a series of unconnected individual acceptances of the status quo and served to conceal illegal violent acts.

Banditry employs a distinctive and extreme form of personal power and prepotency that requires constant reinforcement by means of a series of actions, such as selective generosity and magnanimity, as well as calculated arbitrariness. These practices contribute to the mythic value of the bandit or mafioso, which Diego Gambetta suggests is an essential precondition for the trust that mafiosi and others require to operate. Calculated arbitrariness in imposing one's will and extravagant generosity are two aspects of the same phenomenon. They personalize the mafioso's or bandit's power and prepotency, generate respect, and emphasize his inalienable symbolic capital. Stories that circulate about the bandit or mafioso often constitute an essential part of his power. That power can also be manifested in the paradoxical expressiveness of silence—the unspoken stories that say it all.

Banditry is therefore a phenomenon that is not only often refractory to the investigations of the outside observer but also concealed from the participants themselves. Stories about bandits should be treated as texts to be deconstructed. Caution must be exercised in reducing discernible sociological facts, such as the observation that a bandit successfully managed to evade capture for a long period, to single empiricist causes, such as powerful protection. Likewise, stories about bandits should not be treated as primary raw data on the bandits themselves or as simple expressions of hidden peasant aspirations, but rather as the result of a process of elaborated discourse (including textual discourse and reinterpretation) about power relations within society. These discourses are often metaphorically constructed, interpreted, and reinterpreted in various ways. Discourse on and about bandits in society indicates a great deal about that society and its power relations.

BANDITRY AND LITERATURE

Literary romanticization of bandits was pronounced during the formation of nation-states and was often coupled with the desire of the urban literati to discover sources of opposition (often to foreign rule) in the countryside. Guerrilla popular uprisings (casting "banditry" as an expression of the struggle for freedom) against outside despotism in Corsica in the mid-eighteenth century, and Greece in the early nine-

teenth, caught public imagination. In his *Contrat social* (social contract; 1762) the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau singled out the Corsicans in Europe as the one people fit to produce just laws. Rousseau's imagining of the Corsican way of life contains many of the germinal contradictory notions about bandits that developed in romanticism and have retained popular currency. He claimed that, whereas all Europe saw the Corsicans as a horde of bandits, he saw them as a free people capable of discipline. Similar views were initially entertained by Byron about the Greek Klephts.

The Rousseauesque utopia inverted traditional wisdoms and manufactured the bandit as the first modern primitive within the borders of Europe. Where there was no (state) law, Rousseau discerned justice; where the people were oppressed, Rousseau anticipated freedom; where the ancien régime recognized anarchic, bloodthirsty bandits, he discerned exemplary citizens capable of discipline. Bandits were natural men, outside time, but nevertheless potential lawmakers. Fully to realize themselves and the future, they had further to recover their bucolic pleasures and the simplicity and equality of the rustic life. Previously bandits were seen as "barbarians" with whom one could coexist, inhabiting the same time, and whose criminality was predictable but religiously condemnable. Now they were seen as living ancestors who inhabited a different time and who had to be tamed in the modern republic. Likewise, in the mid- to late nineteenth century, Klephts also figured prominently in Greek historiography, representing an often entirely fictional traditional opposition to Ottoman rule.

The myth of banditry may well, therefore, have a double function. In the hands of urban intellectuals it points to the bad old days before the establishment of the nation-state, when life and property were not secure. On the other hand it suggests that ordinary peasants or pastoralists, the source of national folklore and the social stratum from whom bandits were traditionally recruited, possessed the right ethnic sentiments in rejecting foreign authority, exploitation, and other abuses. That peasants were often misguided and ultimately shifted their loyalties only serves to demonstrate that they are incapable by nature of taking legitimate mass political action—unless, as Rousseau intimated, they are under the leadership of the more enlightened urban elites.

By the mid-nineteenth century the countryside of Europe's periphery became a theatrical topos where the vicarious fantasies and terrors of an emergent national literate bourgeoisie could be collectivized and enacted in literature. In Spain, Sicily, Greece, and Corsica (and, on the other side of the Atlantic, in

Latin America), bandits became important literary, as well as operatic and iconic, subjects. Novelists (such as Edmond About and Prosper Mérimée) traveled to remote places in Greece and Corsica, for example, to ground their texts in direct experience and observation. Local responses were mixed but increasingly hostile to such collective negative stereotypes.

Banditry in places like southern Italy and Sicily became the subject of numerous inquiries as well as massive army intervention. Between 1860 and 1870 more lives were lost during the Italian army's campaign in southern Italy against peasant brigandage than in the war of unification. From the perspective of the state, the Mafia and *brigantaggio* became part of the wider *questione meridionale* (the southern question): Why is the South backward, crime ridden, and state resistant? Brigandage moved from being a question of individual barbarism that the state had to extirpate by aggressive actions such as massive repression to one of collective measurement, documentation, education, and economic development.

Unsurprisingly, this view of the South aroused the ire of local intellectuals and politicians. As the Sicilian novelist Leonardo Sciascia (1921–1989) noted, an element of latent racism entered into the northern view of the South, and as soon as banditry and organized crime were posed as typically “Sicilian” phenomena emerging from its psychology and history, the Sicilian educated classes reacted by minimizing the

criminality. An earlier Sicilian novelist, Luigi Capuana (1839–1915), denied the Sicilianness of the Mafia and brigandage, claiming that, though the Mafia existed in Sicily, it was no different from criminality found elsewhere.

The mythology and rhetoric that surround banditry must be interpreted carefully. Following Hobsbawm, bandit myths are generic expressions of hidden grassroots aspirations; following Blok, these myths are largely irrelevant to banditry's political functions in the class war. The two interpretations are not necessarily opposed and indeed may coexist at different levels of analysis. Essentialist definitions are not helpful to understanding; yet because what passes as banditry cannot be analytically separated from wide areas of social life, its presentation in discourse is particularly significant. A full understanding takes into account not just the various ways in which strongmen were co-opted by the powerful but also how such men were portrayed by various strata of society.

Peasant idealization of bandits was also variable and a function of their subsequent political evolution. Bandits did not necessarily belong to the peasantry; they often belonged to those groups who sponsored or controlled the production of (often) literary symbols. In a number of places, however, bandits belonged to the peasantry through their presence in widely circulated chapbooks, which popularized and contemporized bandits.

CONCLUSION

Banditry is an aggressive form of illegality and of adventurist capital accumulation found in certain social contexts, especially those marked by insecurity and violence; in this sense it is a product of political economy. Neither solely a prepolitical form of protest nor a means of suppressing peasant unrest, it may have performed these functions among others. As a category of social behavior, banditry employs specific displays of violence to generate terror for personal ends. As a legalistic and political-social category, banditry is formed by the impact of the state on local communities, and its meanings have changed across time to reflect these changing relationships. From a statist perspective “banditry” can be labeled as a certain type of violent behavior, but it may not be viewed this way at the grass roots. It operates between the state-imposed system of law and social order on one hand and the local system of vengeance and grassroots conceptions of justice on the other. It is a specific form of arbitrary personal prepotency and agency with its own “aesthetic” and accompanying discourses, thriving on, and constituting itself through, a complex array of symbols. How authorities have responded to this form of prepotency (either through savage repression or co-optation of strongmen) has itself influ-

enced responses to banditry at the local level. The state is therefore complicit in the construction and interpretation of banditry.

Since the nineteenth century there have been two discourses on banditry, intimately tied with the nation-state and its imaginative geography. First, *bandites d'honneur*, heroes of the vendetta, exponents of personal honor on the periphery of society, are always presented on the horizon of the past, as traces of a nostalgic world that has been lost forever. The closer one gets to it, the more such positive features appear to recede. Conversely, there are “contemporary bandits” involved in protection rackets, common robberies, murder, and other crimes. An extreme form is contemporary political brigandage, which merges with political terrorism, blending political programs, covert violence, and protection rackets. “Genuine” banditry always seems to have existed in the past, never in the present. The modern state stereotypes regions within it as inhabiting a bygone era, thus rationalizing repression of legitimate regionalist, autonomist, and cultural aspirations by labeling them as banditry. If bandits are the backward, bloodthirsty, unthinking, “barbarians” the state (and army) portray them as, then it is the state’s duty to suppress them in order to protect “civilized” values. So does banditry become a historiographical discourse about order, justice, and freedom.

See also the section Rural Life (volume 2); Peasants and Rural Laborers and the section Social Protest (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND HOOLIGANISM



Kathleen Alaimo

Explicit in the term “juvenile delinquency” and implicit in the word “hooliganism” is a youthful connotation. Thus, their history is linked to the histories of children, childhood, youth, and adolescence. Historians have found that juvenile misbehavior and adult concerns about such misbehavior are recurrent themes in most sources about children and youth throughout history. Many investigations of juvenile delinquency highlight the significant dissonance associated with life-cycle transitions. This approach stresses the importance of examining juvenile delinquency in terms of the generalized norms established for youth in particular times and places.

In the overall project of socializing children, which was historically undertaken by family, church, employers, and schools, juvenile delinquency often appears as a direct challenge. However, it may represent both historically evolving adult expectations and the efforts of young people to find expression within variably constrained environments. In other words, juvenile misbehavior not only has a history marked by changes and continuities but also one linked to larger social, economic, political, and intellectual forces. Whether juvenile misbehavior is viewed as troublesome but tolerable, or acute and worthy of societal anxiety or attention, depends largely on historical context.

Social historians have focused on the changing constellation of youthful activities and behaviors identified as “delinquent” by different societies at various points in their history. Social history explores the processes by which definitions of juvenile delinquency have emerged and changed over time. In addition, social history has illuminated meaningful patterns of juvenile delinquency, tied to social, cultural, economic, and even political conditions of long historical moments. Social historians’ interest in the everyday, lived experience and the lives of the seemingly voiceless has brought the study of juvenile delinquency and hooliganism into the arena of historical inquiry concerned with such matters as deviance, social control, classification, authority, resistance, life-stage transi-

tion, as well as socioeconomic dislocations and popular politics. This approach enriches the body of work that addresses the legal, reform, and policy aspects of juvenile delinquency. Of particular importance to social history is the nature of the link between juvenile delinquency (as a cluster of behaviors as well as an ever-changing concept) and processes of social and political change such as those associated with industrialization, urbanization, compulsory schooling, mass political mobilization, and the bureaucratization of the helping professions.

Several debates mark the current state of scholarship on juvenile delinquency and hooliganism in European social history. One that should be laid to rest is the vexing question, parallel to that asked about childhood and adolescence, of whether juvenile delinquency is a modern invention. Though the term itself may be of relatively recent origin, the reality behind the concept has long been present in European society. While some of the field’s pioneers (mostly modern historians) variously declared the invention of juvenile delinquency in the early nineteenth, the mid-nineteenth, the late nineteenth, and the early twentieth century, the later work of medievalists and early modern historians argues for significant continuity in this area. Medieval Christian moralists, Renaissance city fathers, and Reformation theologians all spoke with a combination of trepidation and indignation about wild, disrespectful, disruptive youth. Still the approaches to juvenile delinquency and the institutional mechanisms used to respond to juvenile misbehavior differed in important ways between the early modern and modern periods. The debate about whether juvenile delinquency is a modern invention is best transformed into a series of investigations that seek to highlight the different manifestations and causes of juvenile misbehavior and the different meanings of and responses to those behaviors at various moments and places in history. Indeed, rather than debate whether juvenile delinquency is a modern invention, social historians should pursue lines of inquiry that illu-

minate the variable role of ruralism and urbanism in shaping conceptions of juvenile delinquency.

A second compelling issue in the social history of juvenile delinquency and hooliganism is the role of class. The overwhelming body of literature concerning juvenile delinquency and hooliganism targets children of the poor and working classes. This visibility is the result of two distinct but related approaches. One approach views the concept of juvenile delinquency as an expression of class conflict, both cultural and economic. Seeking stability, productivity, and order, the elites (comprising lawmakers, property owners, moralists, and social reformers) judge as deviant behaviors seen as commonplace or expedient in working-class cultures. Of particular significance here is the tendency of working-class youth, whether apprentices or street traders or unskilled laborers, to acquire some measure of independence through work and as a result to create peer group leisure activities that violate the norms of youthful dependency. Also important is the pressure on poor children to beg, pick pockets, or sleep on the streets when family support fails, especially in times of economic instability. In the industrial age the high incidence of property crimes committed by working-class youths may confirm the class character of juvenile crime, whether due to the experience of deprivation or the failure to internalize the values of private property. Another approach draws on the theoretical contributions of Michel Foucault, treating the construction of juvenile delinquency as an exercise of power through the use of classifications and models not only by the state (that is, public authority) but also by elite social groups. Foucault's insistence that power is fundamentally about access to knowledge and control of language has been particularly influential. The ability to classify certain behaviors and experiences, impose those classifications on others, and mete out discipline on the basis on those classifications is clearly an exercise in power relations. To some extent, then, the very coining of the term juvenile delinquency, apparently in the nineteenth century, emerges as part of a broad codification, surveillance, and control function.

Reflecting the emphasis of the primary sources, social historians have explored juvenile delinquency as a pattern of behavior among poor and working-class youth, albeit a pattern identified by the middling and upper classes of modern European society. A refreshing alternative is provided by historians of late medieval and early modern European youth who have found elite youth of Italian cities and French youth of the craft classes behaving in riotous and violent ways, creating fear among authorities. Contemporaries sought explanations in cultural traditions, espe-

cially in the role of the peer youth group, the fabric of the local community, expectations about the transition to adulthood, and the masculine ideals of the age.

Gender is a third issue confronting historians of juvenile delinquency and hooliganism. Until recently most work on juvenile delinquency focused on boys and young men. Public records reveal that male offenders were largely responsible for juvenile thefts, assaults, public disturbances, and vagrancy. Not surprisingly, female offenders appear primarily in the context of charges of prostitution (both forced and "voluntary") though occasionally they were linked to begging and petty theft. The historical tendency to see the girl problem as one of (im)morality and sexuality had a direct impact on the methods of correction and treatment proposed for wayward girls. Given the overwhelming domination of the juvenile delinquency landscape by boys, one is tempted to wonder if delinquency should be analyzed as a male problem. Pamela Cox has broadened the picture by examining the policing of girls in twentieth-century Britain that took place not at the center of the newly created juvenile justice system but rather in peripheral institutions such as rescue homes and venereal disease hospitals. Girls have also emerged from the shadows of crime and misdemeanors in recent studies focusing on nineteenth-century girl gangs in England.

The role of "age" as a category of analysis is an especially significant issue. Juvenile delinquency is a "status" phenomenon where behaviors sanctioned as juvenile delinquency result from the age of the offender; curfew violation and school truancy are two examples of status offenses. Moreover, many acts considered delinquent in young people, such as smoking or alcohol consumption, are acceptable adult behaviors. Juvenile delinquency and hooliganism are specifically associated with adolescence and youth, and thus shed light on the tension inherent in the shift from child to adult. The very idea of juvenile delinquency draws attention to the conflicts over authority between adults and those who are no longer children but not yet fully independent adults. The concept of juvenile delinquency implies a distinctive type of social deviance, and is linked to notions about the equally distinctive role and character of youth in society. In the nineteenth century sharpened concern over juvenile delinquency prompted a wide variety of intrusive efforts to deal with what contemporaries regarded as a problem of epidemic proportions. Juvenile delinquents found themselves subjected to intensive control and "protection" well into their teen years. This extended subordination of youth did not go unchallenged as young inmates in juvenile prisons and

reform schools articulated their resistance to punishment and rehabilitation. By tapping the disciplinary files of such institutions as well as the reports of twentieth-century probation officers, social historians may give voice to the delinquents themselves.

THE PREMODERN AGE

During Europe's Middle Ages, though criminal responsibility was generally set at age fourteen, responses to youthful deviance appear flexible. An extended period of youth contributed to an adult willingness to tolerate, within certain parameters, youthful delinquency. Thus, first offenders and local youth received some consideration, and those who participated in communal demonstrations of moral judgment, the *charivari*, also could expect societal tolerance and even approval. Evidence of medieval penal practices that took account of the youthfulness of offenders exists, such as reduced sentences and even separate prisons (as in fourteenth-century Nürnberg), though the latter was not common. Swedish provincial laws suggested those who had attained the age of fifteen, the age of civil and therefore criminal responsibility, could not be held fully responsible for their

actions if they still lived under the supervision of a household guardian, whether parent or master.

Youthful male sexual violence pervaded medieval urban communities. Cities in late medieval France and Italy tolerated rape, including gang rape. The aggressive sexual behavior of youths was driven by the desire to become "men" and resentment against a tightly regulated sexual economy. Municipal brothels, whose clients consisted largely of unmarried young men, channeled the otherwise aggressive and rowdy behavior of young males. Also, groups of armed youths posed as brigands in many medieval settings, and the participation of elite young men suggests links between aristocratic culture, war-play, chivalry, and youth violence. Street gangs engaged in turf wars disrupted medieval cities, as in the late fourteenth century when Florence witnessed a clash between rival gangs named Berta and Magroni that lasted nearly two months.

THE EARLY MODERN AGE

"Reasons of misrule," "guardians of disorder"—such expressions capture the spirit of juvenile misbehavior and convey the ritualized nature of youth culture in early modern Europe. The misrule of youth had its

rationality and young people, particularly males, carefully guarded the disorder. The mischief of nocturnal outings, the challenge of youthful insult and assault, and the irreligious pranks of the young constituted habitual behaviors not unexpected by adults, which were often winked at, but sometimes taken seriously enough to be punished through the formal mechanisms of court.

Two particularly relevant circumstances of the age shaped youthful behaviors and adult responses. First, the overwhelming majority of young people lived within the parameters of household-based service. The adolescent years were spent away from the parental home; young people learned skills under the watchful eye of a master or mistress, integrated to some degree into their service family, and enjoyed the company of peers at community social gatherings and during free time. Second, the impact of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations reshaped attitudes toward and responses to youthful misbehavior as concerns about righteous living and social stability intensified.

Appreciating the challenges posed by an extended period of youth, situated between childhood and full adulthood, early modern European society accommodated youths' need to experiment with authority arrangements. The long passage to adulthood offered opportunities for tolerable disorder, such as carnival and other festivals, the charivari, and celebrations connected to familial and community events such as weddings. These occasions gave young people, especially boys, roles to play in coordinating and carrying out collective gaiety, playful folly, or community judgment. Songs, parades, floats, costumes, and the all-important mask became part of the ritual tumult that accompanied Mardi Gras or a demonstration against an unacceptable marriage. These events offered opportunities for disorder within a controlled setting, allowing young people to role-play the adult practices of making judgments and policing the community.

Though early modern European society created room for young people to run riot, express insult, and topple the traditional order within the parameters of rural and urban community life, it would be misleading to suggest that young people rarely crossed the line into disruptive and destructive behavior spurned by the community. Smashed lanterns, thefts from orchards, attacks on animals (the "great cat massacre" by Paris print-shop apprentices re-created by Robert Darnton is perhaps best known), fruits and vegetables flung at passersby, and street fights such as the "boys' wars" reported in Aachen in 1757 are part of a rich picture of rough, wild, disruptive behavior carried out on the streets of towns and villages in daylight and at night. German, French, and English sources reveal

wicked youth, drunk and cavorting amid bonfires and music, determined to commit some mischief before night's end. Though municipal edicts against nocturnal disorder existed, some cast with tones of intense emotion, the practice of municipal authorities was in fact relatively indulgent.

Judging such activities as youthful pranks that would come to an end with the arrival at adulthood, rather than criminal acts leading to a foreboding future, municipal authorities attended to such delinquency with certain, but not excessive, effort. In sixteenth-century German towns, little prisons or "cages" were built to provide short-term punishment for young people who had disturbed the peace or insulted the honor of a townsman but who had not committed a serious crime. Apprentices in Rheinfelden swore an oath that they would not be noisy after the night bell rang. Even the ritual cherry wars, a distinctive type of fruit theft, provoked adult anger but not much in the form of repression. In London, despite an accumulated body of legal precedent that gave municipal authorities jurisdiction over apprentices, punishment was mild. Most problems with insubordination by apprentices were handled not in the Mayor's Court but at the level below in the Chamberlain's Court. The emphasis was on arbitration and the chamberlain acted less as judge and more as mediator. Rather than punish, which was within his authority, the chamberlain was more likely to reprimand and compel the disputants to reach a compromise outside of court. Many cases never made it beyond the chamberlain's clerk who also worked to mediate disputes between masters and apprentices. Still London did have two prisons, known as "Little-Ease" due to their low ceilings, for apprentices who had been referred by the chamberlain for stubborn indiscipline.

The Protestant and Catholic Reformation affected adult responses to juvenile delinquency. As children belonged to both God and society, the wicked and disobedient would be punished by both, that is in the afterlife and during the earthly life. Calvinist catechism was most explicit on this point, threatening everlasting pain as well as a miserable life. In seeking to close down a brothel, late-sixteenth-century church leaders in Basel expressed a zero-tolerance view: youth should never be forgiven, especially for sins of pleasure, but should be controlled through punishment. Municipal concern over disturbance of the nighttime peace intensified during the Reformation period, as did edicts seeking to control disruptive noises during religious services. Particular concern focused on alleged sexuality immorality. Preachers targeted such traditional courtship practices as dancing and playing

pranks on girls to secure their attention, as well as popular nuptial rituals whereby young bachelors publicly taunted the newly married couple with a disruptive yodeling. As zealous ecclesiastics targeted youthful immorality, the young responded with hooliganish behavior, disrupting the services of preachers and staging nocturnal attacks on priests. Municipal authorities responded to pressure from churchmen with laws such as those in Württemberg that threatened escalating punishments for those caught repeatedly disturbing the peace.

In early modern Europe, disorderly youthful behaviors were generally either part of a repertoire of

pranks intended to notify the adult world that play had rough edges or part of ritualized popular culture such as carnival and charivari that provided opportunities for controlled disorder by those who could still legitimately get away with such collective madness. In addition, male youth violence was expressed around issues of territoriality and sexual control of the local female population. Rural youth fraternities regularly engaged in brawls with outsiders who sought to court “their girls” and did not hesitate to turn the knife from a traditional tool into a weapon.

Paul Griffiths has persuasively argued that in early modern England youth constituted a “threat-

ening subgroup” when their behavior challenged adult authority, particularly in the context of service. Citing numerous seventeenth-century sources, Griffiths finds English moralists fraught with anxiety about the dangers, mischief, and deviance of youth but at the same time hopeful that youth could be directed to make the right choices for the future. Griffiths questions the widely held view that youthful rituals of misrule were approved or at least tolerated by adult society, citing increasing complaints by residents and increasing arrests of young people engaged in festive rioting on May Day or Shrove Tuesday. At the center of his analysis is a more nuanced and textured reading of early modern youth culture, a reading that rejects the image of young people as strictly enclosed in the household and integrated into a mixed age social world through the practice of apprenticeship. Though most young people lived in service they were not completely shackled by this situation, but rather had some opportunities for autonomy within and outside the household. Rather than pranks or community-tolerated misrule, youthful disorder emerges as serious deviance intended to challenge adult authority. The insubordination of youth, especially in the context of service, appears then as a problem of socialization in the transition from childhood to adulthood, a problem rooted in the difficulty of reorganizing the balance between work and play and redefining the meaning of time. The seriousness of this problem is illustrated in the response of authorities, especially those of the urban areas where relatively large populations of young people existed. Though not literally labeled “juvenile delinquency,” Griffiths identifies a “youth problem” in the discourse and practices of early modern English authorities.

Interpreted through a “politics of age” framework, the generally public punishments meted out to disobedient apprentices emerge as carefully planned efforts to visibly demonstrate the authority of the household, the master, and the community. When an early-seventeenth-century London fishmonger’s apprentices wreaked havoc in the marketplace by throwing fish, swearing, attacking customers, and disrupting business, the fishmonger’s court took action, arranging an “open” punishment for the apprentices. An audience of apprentices was gathered to witness the lecture and whipping administered to the wild boys. Griffiths also argues that anxiety about “masterless” young people resulted in the criminalization of independent youth who resisted service. Between 1623 and 1631, a young Jane Sellars was repeatedly detained, charged with vagrancy, whipped, and banished for failing to remain in service. From charges of idleness and vagrancy to charges of petty theft and ille-

gitimacy, Sellars was eventually designated a felon. The last mention of Jane Sellars is an order for execution recorded in December 1631. Griffiths argues that young people who were “at their own hand” or “out of service” constituted a threat to order and stability in early modern England because they placed themselves outside the institutions of socialization and control.

While early modern European society seems to have been comparatively tolerant of youthful mischief, evidence of severe punishment can be found. In Zurich, between 1500 and 1750, more than one hundred young people were executed for offenses including bestiality, sodomy, theft, arson and homicide. In an age when burning at the stake, being buried alive, and drowning were still common forms of execution for notably heinous crimes, young people were generally beheaded, a form of punishment considered more humane. Still the execution of a Hamburg boy, age eleven, for throwing a stone through the window of a Hansa official’s house seems extreme. Moreover, the use of charitable institutions, such as orphanages, as settings for correctional measures suggests the need to look carefully at the ways in which early modern societies may have masked their treatment of juveniles whose behavior seemed to require punishment or reform. For example, Seville’s eighteenth-century asylum for street waifs also served as a depot for delinquent children committed by family members or public authorities.

In general, however, early modern Europeans appear more willing than their descendants to accept youth as an age when natural and social inclinations required outlets for the expression of disorder. This tolerance extended primarily to boys, as girls were both formally and informally constrained from moving about freely outside the household, particularly at night. Indeed, the concerns of Protestant Reformers exacerbated the social restrictions on girls. Nonetheless, youthful deviance was not generally considered criminal and punishments, even those meted out by judicial or other supervising bodies, were moderate and generally symbolic. The most important concern seems to have been maintenance of order within the household world of service. Additionally, it should be noted that the greater mixing of younger and older youths not only meant broader alliances for mischief, such as the youth abbeys of early modern France, but also reduced the age-specific character of such mischief. Youth culture encompassed the teens and twenties and any associated deviance clearly had a broad age base. Thus the early-eighteenth-century Paris print-shop cat massacre comes down to us as the work of apprentices and journeymen, albeit led by the apprentices.

By the eighteenth century, nocturnal disturbances, especially in the cities, stood less chance of being overlooked. Concern with street safety resulted in the installation of lanterns and the deployment of police patrols. The goal of municipal order clashed with disruptive youth behaviors. Gangs of well-to-do young men, such as the Mohocks of London, troubled adult society with their random, belligerent, rakish behavior. Nor were rural environs immune to these concerns, as evidenced by the presence of eighteenth-century Irish “peasant societies” made up of young men who attacked enclosures. That these groups took names (Whiteboys, Oakboys) implies a degree of collective identity.

Shaped by local social and economic networks, generally more flexible and tolerant, certainly less bureaucratic and pessimistic, early modern European attitudes toward the varied expressions of youthful mischief and hooliganism began to change during the eighteenth century. The slide toward labeling such behaviors as “juvenile delinquency” and seeing in them signs of serious social danger, reflections of deep economic dislocation, and hints of a lifetime of criminality shaped much of the next century.

THE MODERN AGE

By the nineteenth century, an increasingly worried public viewed youthful misbehavior as deviant and even “criminal.” Early modern reactions of toleration, mild rebuke, and moral exhortation had been rooted in the conviction that youthful disorder would be outgrown. In contrast, the nineteenth century witnessed the growth of differentiated, age-specific institutions intended to correct, punish, and reform delinquents over increasingly long periods of incarceration or surveillance. The conceptualization, codification, and bureaucratization of the “problem” of juvenile delinquency mark the modern experience of youthful hooliganism.

Social historians and others have mined the nineteenth century searching for patterns of delinquent behaviors, profiles of delinquent youths, sources of adult anxieties, and trends in approaches to juvenile corrections. Efforts to identify “turning points” in the evolution of a new, more anxious view of juvenile delinquency and attempts to assess the dual impact of urbanization and industrialization have figured prominently in many studies. Social historians have considered the role of the state, especially the judicial, police, and welfare functions. Legal thinking influenced by the ideology of childhood, the creation of professional municipal policing, and the expansion of publicly

funded institutions designed to envelop the juvenile delinquent all abetted the social construction of juvenile delinquency. Social historians have not only scrutinized the cycles of cultural anxiety that contributed to revised definitions of juvenile delinquency but also examined the unfolding of the ideologies of childhood and adolescence during the nineteenth century.

Nineteenth-century crime statistics are difficult to use for arriving at solid conclusions regarding the incidence of youth crime, rates of change in youth crime, or the proportion of youth to adult crime. The science of statistics and the development of a state statistical bureaucracy varied across Europe. More importantly, as definitions of “juvenile” and “crime” changed over time, the statistics measured different phenomena. During the nineteenth century, new categories of offenses emerged especially in the area of juvenile behavior. In addition, the age-specificity of the statistics varies over time and from place to place. If various quantitative measures indicate an apparent increase in what nineteenth-century Europeans considered the “problem” of juvenile delinquency, then what does this reveal about the activities of youth, the anxieties of adults, the norms of society and the role of the state (including police, courts, prisons, and welfare institutions)?

The French political cartoonist, artist, and social critic Honoré Daumier captured adult anxieties about precocious urban childhood in an 1848 drawing for the newspaper *Le Charivari*. Amid the revolutionary atmosphere of Paris, Daumier’s *Paris Street Urchins in the Tuileries* portrayed street children as participants in the overthrow of the monarchy. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Europe’s middle classes appeared bewildered, unable to distinguish between deprived and depraved children. Urchins, street arabs, pickpockets, gamins, vagrants, orphans all seemed dangerous and endangered. Newspaper reports of accused children brought before Parisian courts during the July Monarchy juxtaposed natural innocence and unnatural precocity in an effort to navigate the murky terrain created by an evolving ideology of childhood and an increasing anxiety about the rising incidence of juvenile crime. By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, a “juvenile delinquent” may well have violated the criminal code but more likely violated a bourgeois standard of appropriate behavior, thereby committing an “offense” rather than a crime. As such offenses became increasingly codified and linked to penal corrections, the incidence of juvenile delinquency increased.

Industrial urbanization, the wage economy, migration, and increased illegitimacy contributed to making juvenile delinquency a social problem of

growing dimensions in the nineteenth century. As the percentage of young people in the European population rose, fears of precocious children and delinquent youth abounded. Moreover, as cities and towns attracted ever-larger populations of young workers and would-be workers, concerns about the decline of apprenticeships and the crafts and the concomitant rise of unskilled labor fueled fears of idle, and therefore unruly, youth. Wage-earning youth struck an independent and threatening image as potential gamblers and consumers of alcohol and tobacco. Industrial child labor exacerbated worries of stolen childhoods and rising immorality among children trapped in the vicious world of early factories. Not surprisingly, runaways and orphans constituted a large portion of those identified by authorities as “delinquents.” In mid-nineteenth-century France, vagrancy and begging constituted over 50 percent of juvenile crime committed by boys. Girls were most often charged with prostitution and begging, the former being equivalent to a vagrancy charge for boys. In this context, homelessness and unemployment became “crimes” and the basis for commitment to a house of correction.

The bourgeois ideology of childhood shaped the nineteenth-century history of juvenile delinquency. It compelled a rethinking of the relationship between

children and crime, raising questions about responsibility and discernment, punishment and rehabilitation. The notion spread that while children might not be fully responsible for their crimes, whether heinous or simply mischievous, they were surely a distinct population of offenders who required age-specific punishment and correction. Though children might be considered innocent of evil intent due to their age, adult observers could not help but conclude that children were more than capable of committing crimes and disturbances. The ideal of innocence clashed with the reality of vice; adults found the solution to this contradiction by creating distinct judicial and correctional methods tied to the youthfulness of offenders.

There is an important irony here. Innocence and inexperience emerged as the hallmarks of true childhood, and the delinquent child stood as either an unnatural aberration or a sympathetic victim of poverty or neglect or abuse in need of rescue. Relieving children of criminal responsibility for their mischief, adult authorities compromised the autonomy of young people. Removed from the adult criminal justice system, including its prisons, juvenile delinquents became a class apart, garnering so much special attention it could be smothering. Nineteenth-century contemporaries constructed the problem of juvenile delinquency, then proposed to reform, rescue, and protect “at-risk” children. The very uniqueness of children brought greater scrutiny, restriction, and confinement to those young people who seemed to confound the idealized image of the innocent and dependent child.

As early as the first two decades of the nineteenth century, English judges demonstrated a certain sympathy for child criminals. Between 1801 and 1836, 104 children received death sentences at the Old Bailey court though in fact none of these children was executed. An 1828 inquiry found that many judges were reluctant to bring children to trial because many crimes carried capital punishment sentences. The reform movement against capital punishment drew a good deal of its power from cases involving juveniles, no doubt influenced by the newly emerging ideology of childhood. The 1828 report also called for the development of a separate prison system for children. Three further developments occurred in England during the first half of the nineteenth century. First, many previously indictable crimes (that is, those tried by a jury) became subject to summary jurisdiction (that is, sentencing by a judge). Second, punishments meted out to child offenders became relatively less severe. Third, new types of crimes emerged as previously tolerated behaviors became defined as offenses. The interaction of these developments contributed to the

“problem” of juvenile delinquency. In essence, more juveniles were punished more often, and for a wider range of mischief, but punishments were less severe. Still debated is the precise timing of this shift, with various historians pointing to the periods of 1790–1830, 1830s–1840s, or the 1850s. Peter King’s analysis of English county court records demonstrates that in the early nineteenth century summary jurisdiction sharply increased the number of juveniles processed by the judicial system and sent into the correctional system. The relative absence of juveniles from the lists of indicted criminals, noticeable by the mid-1820s, is thus misleading when trying to identify the origins of the “problem” juvenile delinquency. By midcentury, in England, as elsewhere in western Europe, new institutions reserved exclusively for juvenile offenders dotted the landscape: Parkhurst Prison for boys in England, La Petite Roquette and Les Madelonnettes in France.

Court records, police reports, and newspapers reveal the kinds of offences nineteenth-century juveniles committed. Crimes against property constitute a significant area of youthful mischief, especially in the case of boys. This includes pickpocketing, pilfering, vandalism, simple theft, and larceny. In Sweden in 1841, 93 percent of offenders under age fifteen had committed property offenses involving pickpocketing, theft, and burglary. Even for girls, theft accounted for all but one offense in this age group. By the latter decades of the nineteenth century, theft became the most common crime among boys, replacing vagrancy. In France, 4,718 of 5,800 youth cases judged in 1864 concerned simple thefts. Often these thefts involved goods of little value, reflecting perhaps the growth of consumer goods in European society. References to stealing handkerchiefs abound in the court testimony of young thieves in 1830s’ London. Vagrancy, assault, premarital sex, and public disorder were other common juvenile crimes. In Sweden, the majority (fifty-one of seventy-five) of those charged with premarital sex in 1841 were female. As concern for public order intensified, bringing with it a great interest in cleaning up the urban environment, numerous public disturbance and curfew violations surfaced. Use of fireworks, “dangerous play,” swearing in public, and loitering in groups (gangs) could all lead to detention of juveniles in the later decades of the nineteenth century.

Child thieves who worked the streets and alleys of major cities participated in an adult network of criminality that included those who fenced stolen goods and corrupt police who closed their eyes to the dishonesty of certain pawnbrokers and publicans in exchange for a part of the take. Such child offenders frequently emerge as victims of adult manipulation,

including their neglectful or absent parents. As urban reform took hold, including the razing of congested alleys and winding streets in both London and Paris, the physical environment that had shielded young pickpockets gradually faded. The introduction of a more professional police presence in the second half of the nineteenth century also altered the environment in some municipalities. The creation of institutions designed to “protect” delinquent or at-risk juveniles added further to the changing world of juvenile criminality.

During the nineteenth century, the age for being conditionally responsible for criminal actions gradually increased, from fourteen to sixteen to eighteen years of age. Correctional methods evolved from imprisonment with adults and transportation to separate children’s prisons, agricultural colonies, and houses of correction to schoollike reformatories and probationary surveillance by state guardians. Some of the earliest reform schools designed for juvenile delinquents were established in Belgium beginning in 1848, such as those at Ruysselede and Beernem. In general, punishment moved in the direction of distinguishing young offenders on the basis of age and developing methods considered age sensitive.

The nineteenth-century construction of juvenile delinquency harbored several contradictions, including the conflicting image of juvenile delinquents as threats to society and as victims of socioeconomic dislocations and/or family dysfunction. Though the two images coexisted through much of the nineteenth century, some historians have suggested that the delinquent-as-victim image came to predominate by the 1870s to 1880s. This shift coincided with major efforts on the part of states to implement programs designed to materially improve the lives of young people. Across Europe, though the timing varies from place to place, child labor laws and compulsory schooling laws converged toward the end of the century to produce a new lifestyle for children of the working classes. Concerns about child endangerment, both physical and moral, inspired laws regarding child protection. Many such laws targeted poor parents, not society, as the locus of neglect, cruelty, abandonment, and abuse. With this development, delinquent children were seen as victims of parental neglect or abuse, and therefore in need of being saved from such deplorable conditions. In many European countries, the fairly new prisons for children were replaced by youth reformation institutions, intended to be more like schools and less like prisons.

Nineteenth-century juvenile delinquency discourse and practice reveals the larger cultural trend toward discipline of juvenile nonconformity and independence. The growth of private and public agen-

cies to carry out plans for punishment, correction, and reformation confirms this. Moreover, the quantitative evidence is unequivocal in demonstrating a pattern of increase in the number and percentage of young people caught in the web of institutions created to control, reprimand, and rehabilitate them. In the late 1820s, fewer than one hundred youths per year were sent to houses of correction in France, while that number jumped to close to three thousand per year in the early 1870s. In England, reformatory schools and industrial schools were created in 1854 and 1857 to handle convicted young offenders as well as those deemed in need of protection. Similar institutions appeared in Scotland and Ireland. In the decades after 1870 Prussia experienced a severe shortage of reformatory space as the number committed to such institutions skyrocketed. A fivefold increase in Prussian commitments to correctional education occurred between 1900 and 1914.

Had hooliganism spread so widely among European youth that it warranted these institutional responses? Had adult society become obsessed with the urge to “discipline and punish” the young? In the early modern period, most juvenile offenders were handled through the institutions of household and community; serious offenders were treated within the parameters of the adult system of criminal justice. And while adult complaints about youthful mischief abounded, there is little evidence of a profound sense of panic or crisis associated with juvenile behavior in the early modern period. By the nineteenth century, the elaborate efforts made to provide separate treatment for a seemingly vast and growing population of juvenile delinquents strongly suggests the emergence of a crisis surrounding the issue of youth behavior. Though the generous presumption of childhood innocence (at least as an ideal) lay at the heart of the formal provision of a separate system for juveniles, the result was to create a publicly recognized social problem of compelling intensity. This panic brought more and more juveniles under the vigilant eye of adult society. As European society developed age-sensitive institutions to treat the juvenile delinquent, reluctance to bring large numbers of young people before the civil authorities waned. This line of development culminated with legislation such as the Children’s Act of 1908 in England and 1912 laws in France and Belgium creating special juvenile courts and auxiliary support institutions and personnel to aid in the prevention of juvenile delinquency.

Around 1900 heated cries about the crisis of juvenile delinquency rose again, perhaps reflecting the new standards of youth behavior associated with the evolving notion of adolescence and the emergence of

a youth-oriented culture of leisure. Ironically, this new wave of anxiety coincided with a trend toward conformity in youth behavior as measured by the greater involvement of young people in structured, adult-run activities (for example, extended schooling and youth groups). One explanation for this wave of anxiety was the popularization of the psychology of adolescence which suggested that all young people were potentially troubled and troublesome. Though a class bias still placed poor and working-class youth at a disadvantage, the psychology of adolescence implied that the experience of puberty itself contained the seeds for rebellion, conflict, and misbehavior. Every adolescent was a potential delinquent in need of supervision and guidance. At the turn of the century, a pervasive wave of anxiety about the behavior of youth spread across Europe. Demographic and political developments heightened awareness of the quality and quantity of Europe’s youth. In addition, the commercialization of leisure with the possibilities it offered young workers to define themselves through clothing, smoking, and dancing further contributed to that anxiety.

The model of adolescence popularized by social science experts, reformers, and bureaucrats promoted adult vigilance and youthful dependency. This model clashed with working-class experience and as a result these youths offered a point of resistance to the imposition of conformity. As the school-leaving age increased, the truancy of juveniles was often an assertion of independence and of a preference for work over school. Working-class memoirs and oral histories confirm that activities regarded as criminal and delinquent by police authorities appeared to working-class youths as so many examples of “larking about.”

The street stood at the center of much young working-class social life where street-corner gambling, scuffles between neighboring gangs defending their territory, and girls, football, and petty theft all coexisted. In Vienna middle-class teachers and scout leaders claimed bands of wild working class youth (*Platten*) filled the streets. In Manchester working-class girls formed part of the scuttlers’ world of “disorderly” conduct as weekend promenading transformed the streets into youth-dominated spaces. In Paris newspapers reported the rise of the apache, a sort of working-class version of a rake. In Russia juvenile crime (*bezprizorniki*) inspired fear in law-abiding residents of St. Petersburg who sensed that every juvenile delinquent was a potential hooligan bent on defying not only adults but also civilization itself. As hooligans, older male teens roamed St. Petersburg’s streets, harassed pedestrians, shouted obscenities, carried brass knuckles, engaged in public drunkenness, threw rocks,

invaded respectable neighborhoods, and projected a threatening image.

The years of World War I witnessed a sharp increase in the incidence of juvenile delinquency as European society experienced disruption in all facets of life. Soldiering fathers, working mothers, food shortages, and early release from school contributed to youth disorderliness. In Germany fears about unsupervised youths with money led military authorities to impose a savings program to limit their spending. In Hamburg officials even tried to regulate attendance at shows and smoking in public. In England juveniles under age sixteen charged with crimes increased during the war years from 37,500 to 51,000 per year.

The postwar period introduced some new direction in adult responses to juvenile delinquency. Although theories of adolescent development and the corollary of adult guidance were considered universal in application, working-class youths did not consistently attain the satisfactory outcomes signaled by conformity and dependence. Working-class girls seemed to defy "respectable" norms of behavior when it came to appearance and sexual habits. Confronting a decline in skilled jobs, resistant to continued schooling, trapped in "dead-end" jobs, sensitive to the pull of extreme political groups, and attracted by the freedom of the streets and its night life, working-class youths in the 1920s and 1930s posed a formidable challenge to those who sought a well-regulated, orderly youth experience. An army of professional youth workers, including mental health experts, developed strategies to identify and treat children and young people who challenged the model. By 1920 conventional explanations of juvenile delinquency focusing on deprivation and environment competed with the growing belief that delinquency had its roots in individual psychological dysfunction. By the mid-1920s Britain had borrowed the child guidance clinic innovation from the United States, as the therapeutic approach to juvenile delinquency spread throughout Europe. Weimar Germany adopted new legislation, including the National Juvenile Justice Act (1923) and the National Youth Welfare Act (1924), based on acceptance of a medicalized model of juvenile delinquency. Increasingly, heredity, environment, and personality were seen as interacting forces that could lead to mental and behavioral problems under certain circumstances of social instability. In England the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 expressed the new effort by replacing discipline and punishment with discipline, welfare, and treatment. The old distinction between reform schools and industrial schools disappeared under a new rubric, "approved schools," intended to house delinquent, neglected, and at-risk

youths. In Fascist Italy observation centers maintained a close surveillance of the youth population in an effort at delinquency prevention.

Juvenile delinquency statistics for the 1920s and 1930s confirm the continued centrality of property crime, especially petty theft. In 1928 Hamburg, fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds convicted of crimes were overwhelmingly convicted for property offenses: 77 percent of boys convicted and 83 percent of girls convicted. Bicycle thefts were widespread while girls most often shoplifted from department stores or stole from their domestic employers. As the Depression set in, juvenile theft increased in many places. However, crimes against the state and public disorder committed by juveniles, usually males, increased too, especially in states where political tensions ran high. Thus in Hamburg juveniles accused of trespass, obstruction, and disturbance of the peace increased. Fears of cliques, wild hiking clubs of working-class adolescents, permeated Germany in the late 1920s. At the same time, panic over European cultural changes involving the popularity of dance, jazz ("Negro music"), cinema, and pulp fiction contributed to a perception of youthful immorality and led to legislation such as the 1926 German Law for the Protection of Minors against Smutty and Trashy Literature.

Trends set earlier in the century continued in the 1940s and 1950s. World War II ushered in an era of increased juvenile crime; explanations centered on the "broken homes" that resulted from the disruptions of war. Though most juvenile crime in the immediate postwar period seemed to be related to poverty and dislocation, some observers worried about the long-term moral impact of such "waywardness." In the later 1940s and 1950s, incidences of recorded juvenile delinquency were fueled by factors as diverse as youths' economic situation, over-surveillance of youth behavior, a widening psychological definition of delinquency, a treatment-oriented juvenile justice system, and the temptations of popular culture.

The optimism of the postwar period supported approaches to juvenile delinquency, real and imaged, that focused on social reconstruction. In Great Britain the Criminal Justice Act of 1948 proposed better ways to treat youth offenders, most notably by placing severe restrictions of the use of imprisonment, abolishing corporal punishment, and emphasizing the use of probation and residential training. The Federal Republic of Germany developed annual Youth Plans beginning in 1950 and attempted a thorough reform of its correctional practices, with an emphasis on voluntary commitments, family placements, protective supervision, and especially prevention of juvenile delinquency through youth activities and psychotherapy.

By the 1960s the emergence of an outspoken youth culture, defiant of adult authority and flaunting conventions of sexual morality, challenged the twentieth-century ideal of a conformist, regulated youth. This mostly bourgeois youth rebellion affirmed traditional working-class youth resistance to adult controls on autonomy. Music and fashion tended to bridge the chasm of class that had typically divided European youth. French working-class youth in the post-1960s tended to define themselves more in terms of their youthfulness and less in terms of class differentiation that had characterized pre-1960s gangs, promoting a vision of universal, natural youth. A wave of hooliganism (*teppismo*) swept Italy in the early 1960s involving vandalism of streetlights, “exhibitionist” fashion, street rowdiness, and car thefts. The work of teenage boys, these incidences of delinquency coincided with economic prosperity and point to the growing generation gap.

Ironically, 1960s youth turbulence seemed to confirm the idea of the fundamentally wild nature of adolescent development, especially in the area of sexuality. And in an environment of widespread material well-being and social services, factors such as poverty and family breakdown could no longer be held accountable for juvenile delinquency. With the therapeutic model in crisis, some advocated a return to a more tolerant approach to youthful misbehavior, reminiscent of the early modern world. Scandinavian studies found that to some extent juvenile crime as a stage of life phenomenon was “statistically normal.” Social scientists advocated young people’s right to self-identification. A nascent child’s rights movement developed in Europe too. Applied to the issue of juvenile

corrections, the idea that young people have rights has led to a reconsideration of all the measures associated with treating juvenile offenders as though the right to care and protection obviated the right to due process.

Modern European society has seemingly created a more rigid world for its youth, despite the disappearance of arranged marriages and the development of an independent youth culture. Formal schooling and organized leisure have increasingly come to shape young people’s lives. At the same time, young Europeans have more pocket money than ever before and are more free to spend it as they wish. The paradoxes are relevant for understanding the evolution of juvenile delinquency and adult responses to it. Despite highly publicized but nonetheless rare instances of violent juvenile crime (child murderers also existed in previous centuries), hooliganism and juvenile delinquency remain very much tied to definitions orchestrated by adults. Laws imposing helmets on teenage Italian motorcyclists have been flouted by youths who say the helmets ruin their hairstyles and who resent adults making ageist laws. What counts as offense very much depends on demographics, cultural norms, institutional developments, political and economic environments, as well as the constantly tested hierarchy regulating adult-child relations. In contemporary Europe, discussions of hooliganism and juvenile delinquency often center on immigrant and minority youth on the one hand and right-wing youth on the other. Waywardness, disorderliness, and mischief appear as threads of continuity in the lives of European youth, while the social meaning of these behaviors reflect adult anxieties about the stability of family, community, and state.

See also The European Marriage Pattern (volume 2); Street Life and City Space (volume 2); The Welfare State (volume 2); Youth and Adolescence (volume 4); Festivals (volume 5); and Policing Leisure (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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POLICE



Haia Shpayer-Makov

Policing has taken many forms historically and has gone through radical transformations, making it difficult to offer a precise and universal definition of the term “police.” This essay employs the term broadly to mean official organs entrusted with the enforcement of law and order and endowed with the right to use force for public ends.

Throughout most of history the police were only one, and not necessarily the prevalent, instrument of law enforcement. In the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance (1300–1600) a variety of institutions and individuals performed the functions of law and order maintenance that we now associate with the institutions called “police.” Moreover, the authority to sanction violence in the name of law enforcement was not the monopoly of the rulers. Life in medieval Europe was highly localized, and this was reflected in the application of power and the control of crime as well. Political sovereignty was fragmented and local authority was largely independent of royal direction. Many cities authorized special patrols and watches to protect life and property and to bar strangers from entry, particularly at night. Manorial lords often imposed their will and/or defended their rights with their own private means of coercion. Some religious institutions, such as the Inquisition, deployed their own law enforcers to attain their sectional goals. The church, universities, guilds, and corporations had their own means of implementing administrative rulings. In the relatively unified kingdom of England, a more systematic policing structure emerged, based on local lords who were appointed by the Crown as justices of the peace, and on their subordinates, the constables, who helped them keep the peace and bring malefactors to justice. Service as a constable, though unpaid, was obligatory for adult men in the parish for one year by rotation or appointment.

In most places in Europe, however, a permanent coercive force was nonexistent, and the enforcement of laws, rules, and norms depended on the acceptance of their legitimacy by the local population. In general, sanctions and social pressure were sufficient to regu-

late internal affairs, and if not, the community often administered its own justice. Warnings, reprimands, and ostracism could compel conformity to rules. The local worthies (for example, the parish priest or the lord’s agent) often acted as go-betweens to settle an injury, by agreement of both parties involved.

It is during the seventeenth century that the expansion and growing importance of the police in European society are first observable. This change did not signify any sort of break with the past. The emerging policing structure was rudimentary, and it functioned side by side with traditional patterns of law enforcement well into the modern period. The more intensive adoption of police organs, though, marked the beginning of a general trend, which in retrospect constituted one of the major societal developments of the modern era.

To be sure, no one system of policing was common throughout Europe at any one time, nor was this area unified by a similar chronology. The presence, character, functions, purposes, and authority of law enforcement agencies varied greatly not only between states but also from one region to the other and over time. Furthermore, the development of national policing systems proceeded at different speeds. Nonetheless, many parts of Europe experienced parallel developments with regard to their civil and criminal justice systems, and political bodies, whether local or central, private or public, took similar steps to enforce them.

European societies often looked to each other for models of policing, both positive and negative, to emulate or to discard. Whereas Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Italy were deeply influenced by the French mode of policing, in England opposition to police reform during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the implementation of reform thereafter, were both guided by rejection of the French system, which was perceived as too authoritarian and intrusive for the British tradition of government. Later on in the nineteenth century police reformers on both sides of the Channel felt they had a lot to learn from

each other's systems. Once reorganized early in the nineteenth century, the English constabulary became a frame of reference for police forces all over the world. Conquest was also a factor in the import and transfer of ideas and practices from one part of Europe to another. French expansion under Napoleon resulted in the implementation of a centralized police system in some areas under subjugation. And policing arrangements in the European colonies were molded under the impact of European rule.

Thus, despite wide diversity, a pattern of policing evolved in Europe made up of different combinations of law-enforcing traditions and methods in each nation, but having a measure of uniformity. Processes of consolidation and convergence accelerated in the nineteenth century and by the early twentieth century were well established, resulting in a policing structure generally resembling that of today. Broadly similar in the various European states, the police became a fundamental component of the criminal justice system and a mainstay of all governments in Europe and, in light of the European influence, throughout the world.

EARLY MODELS OF POLICING

Clearly, the expansion of formal police forces at the dawn of the modern era was connected to broader social phenomena. Economic, social, cultural, and political forces, which comprised what we call the processes of modernization, made an indelible mark on police development. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted today that the expansion of the police in Europe cannot be explained apart from state formation during the late Middle Ages and early modern period,

although theorists interpret this relationship in varied ways. For example, marxist historians, while concurring that specialized police agencies developed in the context of the state, link the rise of police power more closely to the transition from a kin-based to a class-dominated society. Viewing class conflict as the driving force behind social change, and the emergence of private property at the end of the Middle Ages as the basis of class formation, marxists maintain that the need of the rising capitalist class to control the means of production accounted for the growth of police institutions. According to this interpretation, the state used its growing monopoly over violence and surveillance to support capital in its struggle to achieve and maintain a privileged position vis-à-vis labor. Indeed, both business and the state were concerned with preserving the socioeconomic order and thus often shared compatible and even overlapping objectives. Indubitably, the state commonly represented class interests, although it also had other goals that it strove to achieve and therefore cannot be seen solely as the servant of the capitalist class.

Viewed from the broader perspective of state building, the ability of emerging states to consolidate their power within clearly demarcated boundaries depended on their ability to impose uniform rule, coordinate internal control, and monopolize the use of force. Eroding or coopting the power of feudal lords and other independent political agents was thus essential for state builders. To attain these goals, sovereign states had to develop both their own sources of income and instruments of coercion. Invariably, the creation of standing armies accompanied the centralization of power. Aside from fighting wars to maintain the independence of the state, the army became the

principal means of internal pacification in the early modern period (c. 1500–1800). Gradually sovereigns came to accept that they could not routinely achieve control and carry out law-enforcing functions without civil organs invested with punitive powers and loyal to the regime. The steadily growing role of the ruler as a legislator and source of ordinances made this requirement even more compelling.

In contrast to the army, a grid of police forces was not immediately established to meet the demands of consolidation. Initially, the state relied mainly on the army, judiciary, bureaucracy, and private entrepreneurs to collect taxes and gain control over its territories. Permanent, centrally directed police organs appeared only very slowly across the European landscape despite the absolutist character of most continental regimes in the early modern period. Not until the middle of the seventeenth century, with the accelerated growth of state bureaucracies, can we see the beginnings of a more resolute and methodical policy for the establishment of formal police institutions. The political scientist and police historian David Bayley has suggested that the centralization of law enforcement was likely to occur where attempts to consolidate state control were met by prolonged violent resistance. Three major European powers illustrate his point.

France, facing incessant attempts to stem the tide of state encroachment into local power bases, pioneered the notion of a centralized police structure which, though modified greatly over time, has persisted to the present. During the first half of the seventeenth century, royal officials were made responsible for administering justice, finances, and public order in provincial centers. However, a highly rebellious aristocracy and various instances of domestic disorder prompted Louis XIV (ruled 1643–1715) to reinforce royal power in 1667 by creating the specialized post of lieutenant of police for Paris under his direct control. This official and the policemen at his disposal were entrusted with a wide range of tasks. The considerable powers invested in the post, and close proximity to the king, made the head of police one of the most important officeholders in France. Additionally, as was customary in early modern Europe in the case of high offices, the upper echelons of the new Paris police held venal posts designed to meet the perpetual need of the monarch for revenues to finance his wars. Ever more intent on furthering central administrative control over the periphery at the expense of privileged individuals and bodies as well as on gaining revenue, Louis eventually nominated lieutenants of police and police commissioners in the principal cities and towns of France in 1699. A network of urban police admin-

istrations was thus created directly under the supervision of the police lieutenant in Paris, aimed at allowing the ruler closer surveillance over his kingdom. However, these venal posts were often purchased by a local count or bishop who took little notice of orders issued by the lieutenant in Paris, though he might have corresponded with the lieutenant and sent him information—if it suited the local official's interests. For all the efforts made by the French monarchs, policing in the provinces remained largely local.

Two other European powers, Prussia and England, support Bayley's argument from a negative perspective. Though no less absolutist, Prussian rulers allowed the Junkers (landed aristocrats) to exercise police functions in their own territories. The Junkers, having largely accepted the monarch's dominance and their own obligation to serve in his army and administration from the seventeenth century on, posed no threat to the growing concentration of power in the hands of the royal sovereign. Similarly, sporadic popular resistance to state activity was not perceived by the Prussian monarchs as threatening. With the unification of Germany in the early 1870s, each constituent state largely took charge of its own police matters, a situation that resumed in the post-World War II era in West Germany after the interlude of the Nazi period, when Adolf Hitler had established the Gestapo as a centralized police force. The relatively decentralized police structure in Prussia and later in Germany, however, did not prevent the rulers from using the police as a powerful political weapon or from maintaining strong control over policing in cities, towns, and counties. In England, where royalty had asserted control over its territories in the Middle Ages, considerably predating the consolidation of the modern continental state, the aristocracy was allowed to wield power locally as it presented no serious challenge to the unity of England. No centralized police system was created. English law enforcement continued to be based mainly on local justices of the peace and constables.

It is important to emphasize that even where the state took no systematic steps to set up centralized law enforcement, it nonetheless benefited from the spread of police control locally in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However unprofessional, unimpressive, and mostly socially inferior, local policemen exerted power through surveillance and represented legitimate authority. The element of sovereignty was implicit in the nature of their task and in their powers of prohibition and coercion. Moreover, certain locally controlled police, such as the constables in England, actually acted in the name of the monarch even if they were not under royal control. Thus, in an

indirect way, wherever policing existed, it contributed to the general functioning of state institutions and the centralization of state power.

DUTIES OF THE POLICE IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

Between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries the term “police” was understood altogether differently from today. It did not refer to personnel or to an institution but to the application of laws and ordinances. Coming into use during the fifteenth century in the German territories (in its German form *polizey*), the word police (which derived from the Greek *polis*, meaning city-state) denoted the administration of domestic affairs generally. The tasks undertaken by organs associated with policing were thus far more extensive than in the twentieth century.

State security. An analysis of police activity in the early modern period reveals that only a small fraction of it concentrated on the detection or prevention of crime. As power in a given country became increasingly centered on the sovereign, and as the sovereign invested greater energy in securing the state against internal opposition, the relevance of the police as a political instrument grew steadily. As early as 1554, the Russian tsar Ivan the Terrible (ruled 1533–1584) set up the infamous *oprichniki*, a police force of six thousand uniformed men who, in addition to serving as his bodyguards, also supervised public places. Unbridled by any legal restrictions, this force used mass terror and torture to guard the sovereign and his regime against perceived threats from the aristocracy, the church, and the peasants. Members of the force were rewarded for their efforts by grants of land confiscated from their original owners. The *oprichniki* survived for only seven or eight years, though it set a pattern for successive Russian regimes for over four centuries. While the sixteenth century was not yet ripe for a permanent body of political policemen in Russia, various tsarist officials filled the task of forestalling subversion until, in 1697, as part of a broad centralization effort, tsar Peter the Great (ruled 1682–1725) established the Preobrazhensky Office to tighten his hold on the population. From then on, under different names and authorities, an almost uninterrupted chain of secret police organizations in Russia responded with varying degrees of repression to the slightest indication of discontent in the country, thereby undermining the development of a civil society distinct from the state.

Besides disrupting or suppressing the activities of groups and individuals suspected of disloyalty, the organs charged with political policing engaged in amassing information on a multitude of subjects, a reflection of the broader strategy adopted by state makers of obtaining systematic knowledge as a way of enhancing state power and increasing revenue. Not satisfied with the employment of visible police forces, Louis XIV also resorted to extensive undercover police operations. This use of spies and informers was not unprecedented. Regimes everywhere had relied on such methods to protect themselves against real and imagined plots and conspiracies as well as any other opposition. Louis, however, was to excel in this respect. With the help of the lieutenants of the Paris police, he entrenched a nationwide system of surveillance while also utilizing the provincial police to maintain close control over dissidence. A century later, at the start of the French Revolution, this royal police force disintegrated, and attempts were made to establish locally elected forces in French cities. These efforts were short-lived, and successive regimes, whether headed by the Bourbons, revolutionary governments, the Directory, or the Bonapartes, continued (and under Napoleon even markedly extended) the tradition of utilizing both open and secret policing to strengthen central power. As with other aspects of French culture, this system was studied and in some cases adopted by rulers across the Continent.

The Habsburg monarchy was equally notorious in employing police officials to observe anyone who might be a potential enemy and to act vigorously upon this information. Having gained supreme royal power over the periphery somewhat later than France (in the mid-eighteenth century), Austria lagged behind in forming a systematic network of spies and informers. Still, Austrian monarchs, perceiving them-

selves as highly vulnerable, managed to outdo the French in the use they made of this potent tool. Greatly improving upon the existing mechanisms of social control, Emperor Joseph II (ruled 1765–1790) entrusted his agents with reporting on the activities and opinions of ordinary people as well as of the aristocracy, clergy, and such other institutions as charities and schools. In building this apparatus of surveillance, he was guided by Count Pergen, an innovator in police administration who, like General Aleksandr Benckendorff in early-nineteenth-century Russia and Joseph Fouché under the Directory, Napoleon I, and the restored Bourbon monarchy, was instrumental in helping monarchs organize and operate an extensive political-cum-police network. The French Revolution and its aftermath led to a tightening up of police operations almost everywhere in Europe. Haunted by fears of revolutionary ideas and French agents, Austria was galvanized into an incessant vigil over organizations and individuals who might fall prey to such ideas, over state officials to ensure their loyalty to the regime, and over possible spies.

Although governments also used various public servants of the Crown to look out for possible sources of sedition, it was the secret police who were most intensively involved. Generally better remunerated than ordinary policemen (when these were paid), secret agents were specially recompensed for their zeal in rounding up suspects or submitting incriminating reports. Countless innocent victims paid dearly for these efforts. The agents' intelligence gathering did not aim solely at overt activities but included reporting on opinions. Moreover, they also punished suspects. Their task was internal security, but these agents extended their operations abroad to keep track of travelers and to intimidate political refugees who flocked to other European cities as a result of repression at home, particularly during the nineteenth century. While the effectiveness of these operations is impossible to measure, clearly they did not manage to stop the spread of dissent and stem the tides of revolution in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, especially in those countries in which the police were all-powerful. They may, however, have prevented specific challenges to regimes, such as cases of potential assassinations.

Public order. Beyond the need to curb oppositional elements, routine order was also considered essential for social stability and state control. The notion that the sheer presence of police forces could deter lawbreaking and prevent acts of defiance was increasingly accepted in the eighteenth century by both national and local governments. European cities had long maintained official bodies acting in a police ca-

capacity, in addition to military garrisons, patrols, and watchmen, and now they were determined to expand policing arrangements in the locality. Reform of the administrative organs of state during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries facilitated the evolution of more specialized and centralized systems of policing. The growing importance of cities as centers of both power and civil unrest impelled central authorities to concentrate on securing order and effective law enforcement in urban areas. As a result of both state and municipal efforts, cities had better-organized institutions of policing, while policing in the countryside was largely contingent upon local initiatives. Police administrators were nominated in some capitals. Paris led the way in 1667. St. Petersburg followed suit in 1718, Berlin in 1742, and Vienna in 1751. Directors of police were appointed in many other cities all over Europe during the course of the eighteenth century. London was the most prominent exception to this trend, although policing arrangements there underwent certain reforms in the eighteenth century. Significantly, the city teemed with petty crime and unruliness.

State security and public order were obviously interrelated, and therefore keeping the peace became an important factor in the widespread trend during the eighteenth century to restructure policing arrangements. Additionally, central and local rulers were impelled by the need to modernize their societies and provide solutions to mounting urban problems. A more prosperous and healthier population could also augment the resources of the state and its military capability. Local elites were also prompted by civic pride. While in Russia police regulations focused on the repressive and negative aspects of law enforcement, in French, German, Dutch, and Scandinavian towns police ordinances incorporated a plethora of constructive tasks, including essential municipal services such as street lighting, street cleaning, garbage collection, supervision of public hygiene, and monitoring the quality of the water supply. Depending on the institutional power structure in each locality, and in the absence of other officials to perform such jobs, police agents often became responsible for fire prevention, first aid, finding shelter for abandoned children, the provision of welfare and food supply, and the control of traffic. Sometimes policemen were assigned the task of reminding inhabitants to lock their doors. Whether in the interest of the state, the local authorities, or the common good, the police performed essentially noncoercive duties, which improved the quality of life in cities and towns. Eighteenth-century observers consistently commented on how safe, orderly, and hygienic Paris had become, certainly in comparison to London.

The maintenance of order in the countryside was also basic to state security. Particularly important was public safety on the roads and highways. Here, too, France proved prescient in organizing a patrol system responsible to the central authorities. The origins of the *maréchaussée*, a paramilitary body of mounted and foot constabulary tasked to look out for deserters and protect rural inhabitants from violence by soldiers, can be traced to the medieval period. In the sixteenth century the role of this body was expanded to include maintaining order, repressing highway robbery and smuggling, gathering information, and monitoring vagabonds and civil crime in the countryside, while at the same time its military character became more distinct. Performing both military and police duties, these ex-soldiers were fully armed and uniformed, lived in barracks, and operated in military conditions mostly under military authority. In the eighteenth century the *maréchaussée* was reorganized into a nationwide force with clearly defined tasks and a coordinated presence throughout the country. In 1791, at the height of police experimentation by the revolutionaries, it was restructured again, as the Gendarmerie Nationale, serving as a model for most European countries during the next few decades.

Policing economic activities and public morality.

State interests in early modern Europe went beyond the security of the regime and the preservation of order. No less important was the regulation of industry and commerce. Most European states pursued mercantilist policies aimed at augmenting national wealth and military power. In implementing such policies, national and local police officers in countries such as France, Prussia, and Austria intervened in various stages of the processes of production and trade by, for example, inspecting markets and fairs, supervising food prices, and checking the accuracy of weights and measures. In so doing, these officers penalized instances of usury and embezzlement and prevented monopolies and profiteering.

A key element in mercantilist strategies was to ensure the industriousness of the population. With demographic growth forcing surplus populations off the land, and the growing mobility of labor, governments and local authorities adopted policies of either criminalizing or domesticating transient labor and of setting paupers to work. The police played an active role in regulating the labor supply and inculcating the ethos of paternalism and hard work among the lower orders. Particularly targeted for police attention were masterless men and laborers who refused to work for low wages. The able-bodied unemployed were forced to work, runaway servants were apprehended, and in-

subordinate workers were punished. The aim was to reduce the number of indigents who became a burden on the community and to augment the supply of cheap labor. Even if these policies were implemented only sporadically and inconsistently, the police benefited both the state economy and the nascent capitalist class. Furthermore, acculturation of the surplus and marginal population was undertaken because this population was seen as a source of social instability. Subsequently, ordinances were issued and measures were taken all over Europe against beggars, vagrants, peddlers, gypsies, Jews, and/or casual workers.

The policing of economic activities was not carried out for material reasons alone. The police were also an important tool for regulating conduct and fostering conformity to accepted social norms. Fear of godlessness sometimes led to the enforcement of religious observance in Catholic and Protestant countries alike, with infractions of Sunday and holiday observance treated with particular harshness. This impulse to standardize moral behavior resulted in police attacks on various forms of popular culture and amusements throughout Europe. Feasts and festivals were often rigidly supervised, certain games prohibited, and theatrical performances censored. In some areas, dress was inspected and ostentation banned. Sexual misbehavior was also occasionally treated heavy-handedly by the police. In some places, mothers were punished for bearing children out of wedlock. It was also common for police to inspect lodging houses and regulate street prostitution. Police registration of local inhabitants and visiting foreigners enabled local and national authorities to gain information and monitor their movements.

LIMITATIONS OF EARLY POLICING SYSTEMS

Clearly, policing in continental Europe in the early modern period implied growing penetration into the private lives of ordinary people. In comparison with today, however, such intervention was only intermittent and only partly the product of state regulation. The attempts to create strong states and achieve territorial consolidation by forming or expanding instruments of rule succeeded only partially. An array of bodies and offices fulfilling various, often overlapping, police and nonpolice functions continued to coexist in the different territorial entities, with little or no collaboration between them. Only some were part of the state bureaucracy, while others were controlled by local power holders or were privately employed. In fact, until the nineteenth century, no state had developed a full-scale nationwide police network. Small

communities throughout Europe continued to rely on informal arrangements, and local lords still exercised both police and judicial powers. In eastern Europe, policemen were often the protégés of local dignitaries, who used them principally to execute their own private orders. All of this meant that large areas of Europe remained free of the presence of permanent forces of law and order, and the existing ones were unevenly distributed. Even as rulers enacted a growing number of laws and ordinances, they neither possessed adequate manpower nor allocated sufficient finances to implement them throughout entire territories. In times of disturbances they preferred to employ the military. This partial condition of law enforcement reflected the limited power of the absolute state. Paradoxically, in England, where constables were less intrusive and had a more limited range of duties, the policing system was relatively widespread and entrenched, though there, too, enforcement was patchy.

The sparse distribution of police agencies often impelled the community to rely on its own resources to pursue offenders. Local inhabitants in England were supposed to raise the hue and cry if they detected lawbreakers. The novelist Henry Fielding, who was a London magistrate in the mid-eighteenth century, along with his brother John, also a London magistrate, appealed to the general public and to pawnbrokers in particular to disclose any information they might have about stolen property, thieves, and their methods. In England and in many continental communities, redress for crime fell almost entirely on the victims. It was they who brought the crime to the attention of the authorities and they themselves were often responsible for capturing the offender, collecting evidence, finding witnesses, and bearing the costs of prosecution. The propertyless clearly had less access to the legal system, allowing a substantial number of culprits to be spared. The haphazard nature of law enforcement also gave rise to commercial enterprise. For example, the Thames Police of London (established in 1798) was initially funded by private insurance companies with a view to reducing theft from the London port and retrieving stolen property. The infliction of harsh punishments throughout Europe on selected offenders, often for the slightest deviation from the norms, was partly meant to serve as a deterrent to crime in the absence of systematic law enforcement.

THE EMERGENCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE MODERN POLICE

The modern police configuration took shape only gradually. During the course of the nineteenth cen-

tury, governments everywhere took steps to make policing routinized, pervasive, and constant, even though much of law enforcement was still locally controlled. Despite budgetary constraints, police forces were increasingly publicly funded and, initially in cities, uniformed foot patrols became the principal and largest component of the national policing structure. In 1829 two major cities in Europe—Paris and London—were provided with a system of uniformed police, followed in 1848 by Berlin, the first city in Germany to have a municipal police force. Provincial cities, towns, and villages soon acquired their own police as well. State-controlled gendarmeries appeared across almost the entire Continent, filling the vacuum in much of rural Europe where the law had been only sporadically enforced by official police forces. The authority of the gendarmeries sometimes extended to cities, as was the case in France and Prussia. The fact that most countries opted for a military style of force to police the countryside demonstrated the widespread impact of military models and culture on police development.

As a result of such initiatives, police forces grew in size and complexity, and the policeman became a familiar figure in almost every neighborhood. His uniformed presence was expected to be sufficiently threatening to deter would-be lawbreakers. Moreover, the policeman gradually became both a key agent for integrating people and territory and a visible symbol of the state's jurisdiction.

Evolving duties. The police labor force that emerged in the course of the nineteenth century was typically full-time, regularly paid, and subject to bureaucratic control. Work for the large proportion of policemen who composed the lower levels of the hierarchy was harsh, wearisome, and meagerly remunerated. However, the regularity of income and the various welfare benefits extended to policemen in many countries made the job attractive, especially for the unskilled and for displaced rural workers. For their part, decision makers in countries such as Britain generally preferred rural to industrial workers, since the latter were seen as less compliant and loyal. Police relationships with social groups from which they emanated form an important part of modern social history. Generally, police have reliably disciplined popular unrest when called upon to do so.

Police officers throughout Europe continued to discharge a mosaic of functions, retaining many of their old tasks. In addition to preventing and discovering unlawful activities and maintaining order and stability, the police still were expected to strengthen industrial discipline, control the indigent, and carry out various duties in the areas of public health and

welfare. Supporting bourgeois standards, they policed deviations from moral norms and restrained popular pastimes. Some estimates suggest that a full half of police time in urban areas aimed at controlling popular leisure. In the same vein, police cleared public spaces of petty merchants, gamblers, and the drunk and disorderly even more vigorously than before. Traffic control and the prevention of juvenile delinquency became important police assignments toward the end of the nineteenth century. However, with the exception of the British force, the range of police tasks actually narrowed substantially during the course of the century. By the beginning of the twentieth century, for example, the police had largely abandoned the policing of the poor and the provision of a number of municipal services as other state administrators and agencies emerged to handle these functions. In contrast, while governments continued to employ armies throughout the nineteenth century to keep order in times of emergency, particularly during riots, civil disorder, and strikes, police reorganization allowed the gradual replacement of the army by the police, which during the twentieth century took predominant charge of maintaining internal public order, leaving the army as the principal guardian of external security.

Indeed, the general trend in the occupational world toward specialization and differentiation of tasks was reflected in efforts by police administrators throughout Europe to demarcate responsibilities more clearly and provide more specialized services. Separate departments were created for uniformed policing, detective work, political surveillance, and specialized tasks. These developments pointed to the growing professionalization of policing in Europe. A reflection of this trend was increasing attention to technical expertise. Toward the end of the nineteenth century police forces in Europe adopted the telegraph, telephone, fingerprinting, forensic science, photography, and other new technologies as indispensable tools for their work. Another modern notion was the application of uniform rules for the administration of the force. Entrants had to comply with a set of established selection criteria demanding not only physical stamina but also literacy skills, and the period of training that recruits underwent was progressively expanded. Whether as part of state or local government, the police were relatively ahead of private institutions in establishing standardized procedures, amassing systematic information, and compiling statistical records relating to various aspects of their work.

What also distinguished the new police was a growing tendency to follow due legal process or at least present a semblance of adherence to the rule of law. The spread of constitutional structures during the

nineteenth century meant that government in general was held more accountable, and heads of state were obliged to operate within the confines of the law. Among the most visible representatives of the state, the police, too, had to demonstrate that they were subordinate to the law. Although secret police departments often disregarded legal procedures, official rhetoric increasingly adopted the vocabulary of the Enlightenment. Sensitivity to public opinion became more evident during the latter part of the nineteenth century in such liberal societies as England, although even states which retained absolutist notions of gov-

ernment, like Germany, were forced to justify police activities.

Police and the public. In effect, state expansion only augmented the state's dependency on the cooperation of its citizens, whose loyalty now had to be won. Although the working classes were everywhere the primary target of both secret and open policing, their demands were also considered, especially after the revolutions of 1848. The more liberal the government, the more it stressed that the main objective of the police was not to serve the interests of the state or the privileged classes but to defend the individual and the community against unlawful intervention. Instructions to be cordial to the public pervaded the training of police constables in England. Clearly, surveillance and control needed to be less visible or explicit and more subtle, a tendency that coincided with the growing reluctance to use the might of the army to curb protest.

The policed population was never passive regarding police power. Hostility to police activity by the governed continued throughout the nineteenth century and beyond. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the presence of the police and their purposes had been accepted, if sometimes grudgingly, as a necessity. The appearance of police officers as major figures in European novels of the nineteenth century and the emergence of detective fiction at the end of the century illustrate the growing legitimacy and importance of police officials in modern society. As more people appealed to police for assistance even in private matters, the police in turn extended services relating to individual safety and everyday needs.

Historical accounts of the shift to full-time and systematic policing adduce a variety of factors. The weakening of the paternalistic face-to-face forms of control in rural areas, the rapid expansion of cities, and the growth of industrial capitalism, which required a disciplined labor force, created an underlying feeling that contemporary police arrangements were inadequate and inefficient. Incidents of collective violence and civil strife were commonly interpreted by the new bourgeoisie as symptoms of a social breakdown. Now in a better position than ever to influence state policies, this sector opposed any restraint on the expansion of the capitalist economy and any challenge to private property. Reports about rising crime rates and fears of the growing power of the industrial masses, the more organized nature of political protest, and the spread of socialist doctrines calling for the overthrow of the social order strengthened pressure to alter traditional policing arrangements. An organized and permanent police force was recommended as a

means of ensuring punishment. Democratization, the decline of overt public punishment, and the humanization of personal relations were also important in laying the groundwork for police reform. The restructuring of police forces was designed to improve control over cities, suppress new forms of crime, and supervise the lower social orders. The rise of new concepts of state management that stressed administrative efficiency and rationalization also shaped the new police.

English and continental police. Despite the convergence of varied national models into a generally discernible pattern of law enforcement during the nineteenth century, a broad dividing line was observable between the police in England and the police in the major continental powers such as France, Germany, and Italy. Early uncritical accounts of police development in England emphasized such a distinction by portraying the origins, aims, and practices of the English police as radically different from police histories elsewhere. Such observations mirrored the arguments of police reformers in nineteenth-century England who maintained that, unlike its continental counterparts, the constabulary system had arisen from the community and was therefore the custodian of traditional liberties and a servant of the people. Implicit in these arguments was the conviction that the mission of the English police was simply to protect the majority against a handful of violators of the law. Since the 1970s, police historians writing from the perspective of social history have challenged such interpretations and have shown that the difference between the police on the Continent and in England was more apparent than real. They have pointed to the fierce resistance that the new police encountered in all working-class areas and to their societal partiality. Various studies have focused on the role that the police played in suppressing demonstrations and popular forms of entertainment and in their biased and brutal interventions in industrial disputes. In these studies the new English police appear as an instrument of bourgeois reforms and interests. Research has also revealed that the English police were no less corrupt or corruptible than police forces across the Channel and that English policemen did not always adhere to the letter of the law.

Nonetheless, in some respects the English police may be contrasted with the majority of the continental powers. In much of mainland Europe the modern police emerged out of the politics of absolutism and matured against a background of uprisings and revolutions. The absence of such experiences informed the evolution of policing in England. The result was that

while continental police forces tended to pay greater attention to keeping rulers in power and less to the prevention of crime and protection of property, the emphasis in England was substantially different. Although British governments had used spies and informers to keep a sharp eye on agitators and assure internal peace, until the quite late establishment of the Special Branch (in 1884) to combat Irish and anarchist terrorism these agents had never been part of a permanent system, as was often the case on the other side of the Channel, and they had never been used as extensively. In fact, less occupied with state security, Britain was almost the only European power to extend asylum and shelter to the many political refugees fleeing persecution in Europe. Moreover, whereas a number of continental forces were responsible to central government, the English police continued to rely on a local system of policing, albeit against growing state intervention in police affairs as in other aspects of life. Of all the professional forces formed throughout England during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, only the Metropolitan Police of London were organized as a central body accountable to the Home Office. All other police, whether borough or county, were locally controlled.

In another context, all police forces in Europe bore some resemblance to military institutions, whether in the use of uniforms, rigid discipline, hierarchical

structure, ritual, or violence. Yet countries with a strong military tradition, such as Germany, tended to follow military models more closely, while in England a widespread fear of military influence reduced the tendency to adopt military precepts in all parts of the British Isles, apart from Ireland. In German, French, and many other continental forces a military background was either a prerequisite or a preference for enrollment, and military weapons were commonly used, whereas many police administrators in England were reluctant to recruit ex-soldiers, firearms were deployed only under special circumstances, and a *gendarmerie* type of police was never created.

POLICING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Significantly, despite the reduction in police functions on the Continent and the legal constraints within which they increasingly operated, the police continued to grow and considerably strengthen their position and status during the twentieth century. They attained ultimate power after World War I in one-party states, whether fascist or communist, where they were unrestricted by law or tenets of public accountability. Totalitarian regimes, in particular, showed an obsessive reliance on both the secret and uniformed

police to monitor the life of the people, ruthlessly suppress dissidence, and detain anyone considered an enemy of the regime. Some historians now claim that the numerical strength and intrusiveness of the police were greater in communist countries than in Nazi Germany and that state security institutions under the tsars were less coercive than under the Soviet regime. Studies have also shown that for all the terrorism perpetrated by the Gestapo and Soviet security forces, their efficiency depended to no small degree on collaboration and denunciations from the citizenry. Apparently, not only in nontotalitarian societies do the police need public cooperation.

By virtue of their wide dispersion, size, activities, and formal organization, the police everywhere served as vehicles of state expansion. Yet developments in Europe in the twentieth century highlight the complex relationship between the state and its law enforcement apparatus. While instances of police resistance to the rise of nondemocratic regimes have been recorded, police complicity was more prevalent. The same was true in areas under foreign occupation. Such responses indicate that the forces of law and order were not monolithic and not necessarily persistently loyal to the state they served, but followed their own inclinations. The tenuous support that the Weimar police (and army) extended to democratic Germany provides further proof of the ambiguous political role and attitude of some police forces.

Despite the cold war after World War II, the inhabitants of Western Europe on the whole enjoyed a growing liberalization of police practices. One manifestation of this was the gradual coopting of women to this male-dominated occupation. At the same time, police forces became more technically complex organizations. Cars and electronic equipment made it possible to offer quicker service, be more accessible to the public, and perfect the means of social control without seeming coercive. Communication devices also facilitated better supervision of subordinates by their officers. Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century the workings of the police had become much more controlled and subject to bureaucratic intervention. There was also a shift toward proactive techniques of law enforcement involving greater emphasis on surveillance by means of acquiring detailed knowledge of the population. Crime investigation has always taken up only a small proportion of the policeman's time

(apart from detectives, of course). Now more than ever law enforcers—even patrol officers—engage in the processing of knowledge by writing reports, undertaking administrative duties, and collecting and sorting information. The use of computer technology for data storage, retrieval, and analysis has further enhanced the surveillance capacities of the police.

These intangible interventionist measures are currently causing grave concern in the liberal democracies of Europe. However, this is but one topic in the broader debate over the role of police in society, which includes such contentious issues as police accountability, selective enforcement, discriminatory policing of minority groups, and the question of officers' discretion. Beyond these concerns, the police figure prominently in public discourse, as reflected in the preoccupation of the mass media with the agencies of law enforcement. The interest in police and policing is no less extensive among academics of diverse disciplines. As part of the growing attention to crime and the criminal justice system among social historians during the 1970s, the police became a major field of scholarship. Since then, these historians have offered varied perspectives on how patterns of law enforcement were shaped by changing historical processes. Placing the police within a broad socioeconomic context, they emphasize the role the police play in mediating between centers of power and all areas of life. The police are seen as a social control mechanism, and their development is analyzed against wider strategies of power in society. The social history of the police thus affords insight into the machinery of government at various levels and its impact on ordinary people. A significant contribution relates to the ways that police have historically interacted with and reinforced social and cultural norms. Since the police have dealings not only with offenders but with the population at large, studies of the police facilitate a deeper understanding of collective mentalities and of the life of the nonprivileged sectors of society. Also instructive is the focus on the police as an independent agency with its own motivations and interests. During the 1990s scholarship shed light on the policeman as a worker and the ruling police elite as an employer. By combining high politics with history from below, social historians of the police have succeeded in broadening our horizons on the social dimensions of the past while at the same time enriching our appreciation of domestic politics.

See also Street Life and City Space (volume 2); Absolutism (volume 2); The Ref-ormation of Popular Culture (volume 5); Festivals (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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PUNISHMENT



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Penal practices as well as the theories behind them have varied considerably by region, the natures of the authorities involved in sentencing criminals, and the sociocultural contexts of their deployment. Moreover the practice of punishment has not always corresponded to the laws and philosophies that purportedly guided it. To further complicate matters, penalties have differed with regard to the social status, gender, and age of the convicted. Bearing in mind these distinctions, it is still possible to draw salient generalizations about punishment in Europe from the Renaissance through the twentieth century. This essay opens with a discussion of the general trajectories that characterized the evolution of European penal practices and proceeds to an analysis of how scholars have evaluated the political, social, and cultural significance of the practice and reform of legal punishment.

PENAL PRACTICES IN EARLY MODERN AND MODERN EUROPE

Generally early modern penalties targeted the criminal's body, whereas modern forms focused on the convict's soul. Both attempted to deter subjects or citizens from transgressing social and legal norms but in rather different manners. Early modern punishment strove to inculcate fear and set examples through public, corporal, and often cruel practices while simultaneously excluding criminals from society. In contrast, more modern penal systems tended to privatize punishment and confine criminals yet generalize disciplinary systems throughout society. Even as this pattern predominantly holds true, it is nonetheless necessary to note that penal practices overlapped and were used in combination with one another in both early modern and modern Europe. Moreover the transition from one form to another was neither simple nor without contradictions. Instead it was gradual, incomplete, and frequently contested. Corporal and capital punishments continued to exist alongside penal bondage and confinement, and penal innovations were subject

to challenges arising at the same time that authorities instituted the innovations.

To simplify this picture, this essay first discusses the various penalties meted out by judicial authorities, beginning with physical, public, and shaming forms of punishment. It then moves on to different types of penal bondage and institutions of confinement and an examination of extrainstitutional penal practices that developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Where appropriate, this essay notes how penal forms operated in combination with one another; how secular authorities drew on other idioms, such as ecclesiastical and military ones; and how certain penal forms came to displace other practices.

CORPORAL AND PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS

Early modern European courts meted out various corporal punishments. Flogging was the most prevalent form practiced. Whips or lashes consisting of leather thongs fastened to handles were common all across Europe, but some countries also developed specific devices. The metal-barbed knout constituted the harshest Russian penal instrument before 1845, and the English had the fearsome cat-o'-nine-tails, nine leather tails thirty-three inches long that were spiked with metal balls. The gauntlet, rows of soldiers armed with crops, was generally reserved for military offenders or those inhabiting militarized zones. Lighter corporal punishments, like the birch or rod, were used against less serious offenders or to "domestically" punish wives and children.

Like other forms of corporal and capital punishment, floggings were often public during the early modern era. However, once criticism of public punishment sharpened in the mid-eighteenth century, floggings increasingly transpired behind prison walls. For example, subsequent to 1820 floggings were privatized for male convicts in England. Nonetheless, floggings remained part of the penal language even

once the prison gained hegemony in modern Europe. Flogging was used to punish convicts transported to French penal colonies through 1880, corporal punishment remained prevalent in German prisons through the late nineteenth century, and England finally abandoned the whip in 1967. The significance of flogging's publicity and its abolition is explored below.

In addition to floggings, early modern courts prescribed various forms of bodily mutilation. Putting out eyes, slitting nostrils, slicing cheeks, and amputating arms, ears, and tongues frequently accompanied whippings, the death sentence, transportation, or penal bondage. Courts generally sentenced criminals to the mutilation of body parts that symbolized the nature of the offense committed. In Germany executioners amputated a thief's hand and publicly displayed it to spectators to convey the message that the ruler would not tolerate theft. Similarly tongues were clipped in cases where criminals committed perjury, blasphemy, or other offenses involving speech. Often the ceremonies associated with mutilation emulated rituals of personal retaliation, which roughly followed the precept of "an eye for an eye" articulated by Judeo-Christian law. By appropriating these forms, early modern penal regimes suggested that public justice was supplanting private. These practices also dem-

onstrate that early modern penal forms frequently retributed the transgression committed and were not tailored to individual criminals.

The most severe mutilation practices were in decline by the sixteenth century, yet bodily mutilation did not disappear from the lexicon of physical penalties in many places until the nineteenth century. The Dutch cut off some felons' thumbs until the early eighteenth century, Napoleon reinstated the amputation of parricides' right hands in his 1810 penal code, and Russians continued to rend the nostrils of serious criminals until 1845.

Mutilation served other functions beyond the symbolic and retaliatory. Disfigurement also made it easier for authorities to identify recidivists and escaped convicts in an era when states lacked sufficient policing, and it served as a visual marker enabling honest societies to exclude offenders. Branding, another form of bodily marking, was similarly motivated. European states devised branding practices that at once underscored the ruler's sovereignty, denoted the nature of the crime, facilitated the identification of the criminals, and distinguished convicts from the rest of society.

During the early modern period, when state sovereignty was still questionable, brands identified offenders as subject to the monarch's will. Russian convicts bore the brand of the eagle associated with Peter the Great, and Netherlandish criminals were marked with the elector's coat of arms. A brand also identified the nature of the crime. French and Russian thieves were marked with a "V" for *voleur* (thief) and "VOR" for *vorovstvo* (theft), respectively. After 1650 the English burned the letters "AB" onto the foreheads of English adulterers and fornicators. Vagrants were a frequent target of authorities who, in the process of centralization, sought to clamp down on wanderers. The 1532 *Carolina*, the criminal code of the German emperor Charles V, authorized branding vagrants throughout the German states, while Russian ones were branded until 1863. Furthermore brands denoted the type of punishment to which the convict was sentenced. Criminals condemned to French galleys were branded with "GAL" (*galère*), and Russian hard laborers bore the scar "KAT" (*katorga*, exile at hard labor). Branding persisted well into the era of penal reform. In France considerable continuity existed between Old Regime branding rituals and those used after the French Revolution. Likewise the number and range of English offenses that compelled branding, first instituted by the Tudors, multiplied from the sixteenth century through the eighteenth century. Not until 1779 did England abandon branding. Branding as a form of punishment was abolished

in Russia in 1845 but continued to be used as a police measure against vagrants and fugitive convicts for nearly another twenty years.

The third form of physical chastisement widely practiced in Europe from the fifteenth century through the nineteenth century was capital punishment. In the early modern era executions, like other penal forms targeting the body, symbolized royal power and were intended to safeguard society by prompting subjects to submit to the ruler's will. Early modern executions which took manifold forms, can be divided into those deemed honorable and relatively less painful, generally limited to beheading or death by sword, and those considered dishonorable, which involved painful, attenuated deaths. The latter included drowning, boiling in oil, burial alive, burning at the stake, breaking at the wheel, drawing and quartering, and hanging—the most enduring and prevalent form of dishonorable execution.

The most macabre forms of capital punishment annihilated every trace of the condemned. Until the late sixteenth century drowning and burial alive were frequently deployed against women who violated sexual or moral norms, and witches were burned at the stake during crazes that peaked in the era of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Drawing and quartering and breaking at the wheel were primarily used against men. The former was often reserved for regicides and traitors and was hardly ever employed after the sixteenth century, though the executions of Robert-François Damiens in 1757 and Yemelyan Ivanovich Pugachov in 1775 defy this rule. (Admittedly Pugachov was strangled before he was quartered.) In contrast, breaking at the wheel persisted into the nineteenth century as a penalty for robbery or wife murder because officials believed that its utterly terrifying nature was particularly deterrent. In spite of the endurance of these horrific penalties, the most gruesome forms of capital punishment were in decline by the late sixteenth century. This was largely due to the increased control that European authorities exerted over penal practices as well as the authorities' desire to ritualize punishment as a clear means of morally edifying witnesses.

A natural segue leads to the related concepts of dishonor and publicity. Across Europe scaffold ceremonies and stagings of punishment spectacles were as important as the contents of sentences. These rituals stigmatized the criminal and the society to which he or she belonged. Stripping and exposing the body, even when the criminal was subjected to less painful penalties such as the ducking stool, subjected the offender to disgrace and shame in the presence of witnesses and, in early modern Europe's corporatist so-

cieties, destroyed the perpetrator's civic identity, marking him or her as outcast.

The shame associated with flogging or execution was intensified by the executioner's touch. In the Germanies this contamination was so polluting that, if suspects survived torture and were acquitted, they were nonetheless exiled from their communities. Although executioners were central to the penal ritual, they were marginal figures who lived outside respectable communities and wore special clothes. In France and Germany executioners' children were excluded from honorable crafts and could marry only the children of other executioners. In the Baltics executioners also performed other disreputable jobs, like collecting night refuse and removing the dead. In Russia executioners were generally chosen from the ranks of convicts, and by the mid-nineteenth century executioners were so ignominious that criminals refused to volunteer for this role even though it would spare them the lash.

Because the executioner was considered a source of pollution by elites and popular society alike, members of those corporations bearing the greatest social status gradually were exempted from punishment involving the executioner's touch. Death by sword was reserved for nobles and "respected citizens" in France and Germany, and military courts in Germany and Russia replaced lashings with the gauntlet to preserve the dignity of officers and soldiers. By the nineteenth century even the gauntlet became incompatible with soldierly honor. Prussia and Russia abolished it in 1808 and 1863, respectively.

Thus the lower classes and outsiders, such as vagrants and Jews, felt the full force of the executioner's whip or the hangman's noose and were consequently subjected to the most defaming penalties. Even once the era of penal reform got underway in the late eighteenth century, the lower classes continued to be subject to corporal punishment. While Russian nobles were spared the lash and the knout beginning in 1785, peasants were flogged until 1904. Similarly the 1794 Prussian General Law Code began to replace lashings with imprisonment for elites but not for lower classes, and corporal punishment was not eliminated for most Germans until 1871. By the turn of the nineteenth century rulers differentiated between privileged and unprivileged members of their societies through, among other means, subjection to or exemption from floggings.

Like class, gender was a factor that mitigated the dishonor of public punishment. In France women were buried alive rather than hung prior to 1449 out of concern for modesty. This practice, which harkened back to ancient Rome, was also used in the Germanies

and Russia in the early modern era. In England women were burned at the stake out of the same concern. Only female witches were drawn and quartered because they purportedly lacked feminine shame. When women were hung or lashed in France or Germany, their necks and faces were masked to protect their identities. Growing concern about baring the female torso contributed to the exemption of women from public whipping in England in 1817 and in Russia in 1863. While female exiles continued to be beaten in Russia for another thirty years, these floggings transpired privately after 1863. Across Europe crowds expressed especial affront at the sight of women's stripped, lashed, and hung bodies, and executioners were reluctant to administer beatings to female criminals. Thus while shame and dishonor were integral to the spectacle of public punishment, infamy had its limits, particularly when it threatened sexual mores and provoked erotic disorder.

Inculcating shame was only one object of scaffold rituals. They also conveyed sovereignty and allowed centralizing European states to symbolically monopolize control over violence. The ceremonies of public punishment frequently integrated ecclesiastical

forms that implied the divine nature of secular justice. After the fifteenth century the Spanish monarchy employed the practices of the Inquisition, particularly the *auto da fé* (act of faith), to identify and prosecute deviance. Likewise seventeenth- and eighteenth-century German and Swiss rulers assimilated into the secular penal system religiously edifying forms of public punishment originally used by ecclesiastical courts. Public punishment often incorporated liturgical chants and funeral rites, and priests presided at the scaffold from England to Russia.

Authorities designed scaffold rituals to legitimate the capacity of the state to retribute crime. The appropriation of ecclesiastical practices constituted only one element of this enterprise. Rulers also encouraged popular participation in punishment because they required public validation of their supremacy. The presence of magistrates and soldiers with drawn swords, fearsome processions to the scaffold along the most populous routes, the enactment of punishment on the busiest squares on market days, and the ringing of bells and beating of drums were features common to penal rituals across early modern Europe. In many places authorities garbed convicts

awaiting sentencing specially or mandated that they wear placards announcing their crimes. Formal clothes were also specified for the executioner and the officials presiding at the sentencing. These rituals underscored the majesty of the ruler and the consent of the gathered public to his or her sovereignty.

Yet public punishment's efficacy in expressing the ruler's legitimacy was dependent upon the correspondence between authorities' intentions and audiences' interpretations. Crowds were active agents in constructing the meaning of penal forms and as such were a necessary but potentially subversive component of the penal ceremony. Rulers were aware of this predicament. As they centralized their power, they began to regulate the scaffold more strictly to preclude the audience from interpreting these rites in ways that might sabotage their sovereignty.

While corporal and capital punishment originally transpired at the crime scene, from the seventeenth century through the nineteenth century, scaffolds occupied permanent locations. European officials also began to curtail the customary freedoms of the condemned. Seventeenth-century German rulers fearing it would provoke riots, repealed the Carolina's provision permitting criminals to curse their judges during the three-day interval between the proclamation of a death sentence and its execution. French authorities clamped down on the indulgences traditionally granted the condemned during the *nuit blanche* (last night) rituals. In a further effort to manage the penal spectacle, officials sought to repress the practice popular in France, Italy, Russia, the Germanies, and England wherein a man or woman condemned to public punishment would be pardoned if a virgin female or unmarried male, respectively, offered to marry the convict. Yet authorities were unable to prevent crowds from appealing for clemency on these grounds, even after they made it illegal in the eighteenth century.

Even earlier, in the mid-sixteenth century, Venetian officials attempted to abolish the centerpiece of the carnival festival because it challenged secular monopolization of penal rites. During the festival twelve pigs and a bull were chased ritually through the streets and penned up at the execution site in the square before the Palace of Doges. There blacksmiths garbed as executioners beheaded the animals in a parody of official justice. Although this ceremony transpired during a period of symbolic inversion—the days preceding lent—officials felt that it threatened their sovereignty, and their lack of success in repressing the practice clearly demonstrates the accuracy of their assessment. The parody pointed out the dangerous multivalent effects of the spectacle of punishment.

During the eighteenth century authorities became increasingly troubled by popular propensities to treat scaffold rituals as carnivalesque occasions. In England and on the Continent critics lamented that witnesses to floggings and executions behaved as if they were at a street theater. They took this as a sign of the masses' lack of civilization and tendency to trivialize death and bodily pain.

The same critics, however, simultaneously evinced a very different sort of anxiety. They feared that crowds might sabotage the scaffold by rioting. In England surgeons who removed the corpses of the executed for use in anatomy lessons were frequent targets of the crowd's ire. English authorities shifted their policies in 1749 and 1750, reserving bodies for friends and family, but this did little to quell popular discontent. The continued rioting that transpired along the Tyburn procession, the traditional route through London to the gallows, convinced officials to abolish the procession in 1783. Yet the removal of the scaffold to outside Newgate Prison failed to achieve the desired effect. Even once executions became rarer, crowds refused to grant uncomplicated consent to scaffold rituals, particularly when they perceived that the condemned was an ordinary member of their own society. Their celebration of convicts' heroism or martyrdom in broadsheets, ballads, and engravings continued to unsettle authorities, who eventually responded by abolishing public executions in England in 1868.

Similar riots transpired during the eighteenth century at scaffolds across Europe, taking place more regularly in France after the 1760s. In Germany crowds revolted at the sight of botched executions, a frequent occurrence. Although full-fledged execution riots were rare in the German states, scaffold punishments failed to convey the intended deterrent message, prompting Prussian officials to reform the laws governing public executions in 1805. As in England, they abolished scaffold processions and instead transported the condemned in closed carts. They also held back the crowd, encircling the punishment site with cavalry. Most importantly they authorized that executions be carried out only at dawn. Officials' fears about popular disturbances at the scaffold in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions prompted all of the German states to move executions inside prison walls. Authorities further east noted that the Russian masses also absorbed mixed messages at the scaffold and attempted to contain the spectacle of punishment by eliminating the knout in 1845. When this failed to dissolve the specter of popular disturbance, Russian officials abolished public flogging altogether in 1863.

Social anxieties were not the only reasons that authorities restricted or abolished scaffold rituals. En-

lightenment thought, the softening of morals associated with the civilizing process, and the rise of reformist evangelical movements combined to inculcate in elites a disdain for public and painful punishment. Nonetheless capital and corporal punishments were meted out against offenders, particularly those of the lower classes, into the twentieth century. While such penalties clearly were less acceptable and less prevalent throughout Europe by the mid-nineteenth century, the movement from physical punishments to confinement followed a complicated trajectory.

Many European countries repealed capital punishment in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Finland (1826), the Netherlands (1850), Belgium (1863), Norway (1875), Denmark (1892), and Sweden (1910) exemplify this trend. Yet abolition often proved impermanent. While Russia abolished the death penalty for all but political crimes in 1754, the autocracy sentenced thousands to summary executions after the 1905 Russian Revolution. Austria temporarily abolished capital punishment in 1786 but reinstated it after the French Revolution. Frequent reversals in policies regarding the death penalty characterized the situation in Germany well into the twentieth century. Although Maximilien de Robespierre vehemently decried executions, the French democratized and mechanized death in 1792 by introducing the guillotine, whose blade publicly lopped off offenders' heads until 1939. The English Parliament refused to revise the "Bloody Code" and between 1688 and 1820 increased four fold the number of offenses subject to capital statutes. While the monarch fre-

quently exercised his merciful prerogative throughout that period, executions persisted in private through 1950. Thus, Britain practiced physical chastisements alongside penal forms.

BANISHMENT, PENAL BONDAGE, CONFINEMENT, AND DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES

In early modern Europe corporal punishment often was used in combination with fines and banishment. Generally monetary damages were imposed on elites, who were the only ones who could afford them. Until the eighteenth century primarily political dissidents of the upper class were subject to banishment, and rarely was an individual exiled from an entire country during this era. Prior to the rise of centralized states, troublemakers more often than not were barred from living in particular cities or small communities. Officials simply lacked the means of policing wider regions. As rulers consolidated their realms in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the situation began to change, those who transgressed public order were banished from entire countries.

Penal bondage entailed several overlapping practices, such as galley and hulk labor, transportation, and imprisonment, and was more widely employed than banishment in early modern Europe. This punishment, which gradually developed from the sixteenth century through the nineteenth century, reflected the new values associated with the Reforma-

tion and the Counter-Reformation, including changing views of idleness and the desire to impose morality on wider social strata. It was additionally motivated by the new economic realities that expanding nation-states faced, particularly the need for regular militaries and the desire for colonies.

France, Spain, and Italy pioneered sentencing convicts to galleys. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries vagrants and beggars were consigned to this punishment alongside slaves. In 1530 the practice was extended to a wider range of minor and major offenders in Spain, and the trend persisted through the late sixteenth century, when galleys increased in both number and size. In seventeenth-century France galley labor became the primary penalty to which male convicts were sentenced.

The proliferation of galley sentences was largely attributable to naval expansion, and the abolition of the practice in Spain and France in 1748 resulted not from a change in penological methods or philosophies but from improved naval technologies. Galley sentences set the tone for hard labor patterns that emerged across Europe later in the early modern era. As Spanish colonialism advanced, more convicts were sentenced to work in mines and presidios. During the eighteenth century these work camps became full-fledged penal institutions that facilitated Bourbon economic development by mobilizing large workforces at relatively minimal costs. The French galley system underwent a similar transformation. Once ships no longer required oarsmen, convicts were used on shore as hulk laborers.

Utilitarianism motivated transportation. England innovated this system, using it to colonize its possessions in North America and later in Australasia, endeavors that were fiscally beneficial but hotly challenged from penological and sociological standpoints. From 1718 to 1776 England transported 50,000 convicts to its New World possessions and sold many of them to private planters. The American War of Independence temporarily disrupted transportation, which resumed in 1780. At that time Australasia became the repository for over 180,000 English convicts, mostly property offenders and petty criminals. New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania), and Western Australia were all built on convict labor. While this system effectively expelled criminals from Britain, critics denounced it on contradictory grounds. Supervision was lax, the homesteads and profitable work in private enterprises available to convicts undermined penal objectives, and difficulties in transporting women prevented family economies from taking root in Australasia, contributing to the impression that Australia lacked civilization. Critics condemned

transportation as insufficiently dreadful yet simultaneously held that it sabotaged British efforts to attract voluntary settlers to the region. Whether in spite of or because of its profitability, British transportation was scaled back in 1838 and wholly dismantled in 1867.

Other European attempts to use transportation for state advantage were less successful than Britain's. From the seventeenth century through the nineteenth century Russia's efforts to settle Siberia produced dubious economic benefits and aggravated the marginal status of the borderland. Widespread criticism began in the mid-1840s, yet fiscal concerns, a lack of prisons, persistent desires to exploit Siberia, and the belief that some convicts could not be reintegrated into society impeded the substantive alteration of exile until the 1870s. Russians continued to banish large numbers of people to Siberia until the early twentieth century.

France also experimented with transportation, establishing a system just as Britain dismantled its own. A need for cheap colonial labor was one factor that led the French to begin transporting criminals to Guiana in 1852 and New Caledonia 1864, respectively. The French also sought to exclude "dangerous classes" from society in the aftermath of the 1848 revolution. Yet harsh conditions, morbidity rates that earned the colonies the epithet "bloodless guillotine," and inadequate discipline led the French to question the efficacy of transportation by the late nineteenth century. The system was curtailed in 1894 and abolished in 1947.

Operating under the same preconceptions the English held about women's capacity to civilize convicts, Russian and French authorities unsuccessfully attempted to import women to their penal colonies. The endeavors of all three countries failed dismally owing to a larger underlying tension. On the one hand authorities sought to exclude convicts from society and strip them of their civic identities, yet they simultaneously sent exiles a different message. By promoting marriages and homesteading exiles, they encouraged convicts to resume their normal lives in the colonies. On a material level this simply failed to achieve the desired effect. More fundamentally the paradox bankrupted transportation of its penological premise. The 1880 International Penal Congress questioned transportation's legitimacy and set the tone for its abandonment across Europe in subsequent decades.

Like banishment, confinement was motivated by the desire to exclude convicts from European society. Confinement began in Europe around 1600, when prisons gradually became institutions of forced labor. Early modern jails were places of detention for

convicts awaiting sentencing and for debtors. The first workhouses confined the poor, elderly, and sick—not criminals. Whereas initially jail occupants remained idle, by the early sixteenth century workhouse inmates were submitted to labor regimens. By incarcerating vagrants in workhouses, Britons, Spaniards, Netherlanders, and French sought to crack down on idlers during the sixteenth-century economic crisis that swept across Europe. Labor appeared to have a redemptive quality, and the assumption was that work would turn beggars and the unemployed into productive subjects.

Beginning in 1596 the Dutch considered confinement in the Amsterdam *tuchthuis* (rasp-house or prison) a viable alternative to flogging and asserted that labor could correct criminality. Similar institutions were established across the Netherlands, and noncriminals were soon removed from the rasp-houses to other specialized facilities. Although other countries emulated the Amsterdam *tuchthuis*, confinement for penal purposes remained rare outside of Holland. London's Bridewell (1555) was reserved for poor relief, and only in the late seventeenth century did English prisons become associated with the judicial system. Charity and the confinement of noncriminals predominated in German and Baltic prisons through the mid-eighteenth century. Families refused to deliver undesirable members to institutions associated with criminality. Only after 1650, when specialized workhouses were erected for offenders, did authorities in the Germanic regions begin to incarcerate criminals.

Early modern workhouses served multiple purposes and were with few exceptions marked by confused boundaries and an undisciplined disposition. They were less segregated from the outside world than their modern counterparts. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Royal Prison of Seville was a meeting ground where the underworld maintained strong ties with other city groups. Prison doors often remained unlocked, prostitutes came and went, and wardens and inmates intermingled. The eighteenth-century Newgate Prison operated similarly. Confinement also affected different social strata in distinct ways. Because inmates had to pay room and board, their access to financial resources determined whether they starved or lived lavishly. Newgate's guards rented out well-appointed apartments to the wealthy, while debtors shared squalid common rooms. The Dutch elite were generally exempted from labor and were confined separately from the poor.

Significantly the prison developed alongside other penal practices, and its ascendancy over these other forms was neither predetermined nor complete.

Corporal punishment continued to play an important role in disciplining offenders. Moreover imprisonment was often interchangeable with galley labor and transportation. If anything, the development of long-term incarceration, regimented labor practices, and increased tendency to close the prison to the public that became hallmarks of the penitentiary system lent the modern prison some of the mystique of other forms of penal bondage.

According to some historians, the contrasts between the early modern and the modern prison have been overdrawn. They suggest that the chaos of the eighteenth-century prison has been exaggerated and that the nineteenth-century prison was far from a "total institution." Nonetheless the penitentiary model that quickly influenced European developments did mark a transitional moment in penal history. While the early modern prison was not designed for long-term incarceration or rehabilitation of the convict, who generally lingered in it pending "real" punishment, by the early nineteenth century convicts were sentenced to lengthy confinement and subjected to routines aimed at encouraging their transformations. In addition, a movement developed to classify convicts according to crime, age, and sex. In stark contrast to early modern punishment, which focused on the offense, the nineteenth-century form penalized the offender by designing correctional tactics that accounted for his or her individual characteristics. Though this shift was marked by tensions, inconsistencies, and practical impediments, the alteration was momentous.

The new functions that specialists ascribed to punishment were both reflected in and fostered by the spatial organization of the penitentiaries founded across Europe during the nineteenth century. Early nineteenth-century reformers were enthralled with the architecture of North American prisons, particularly Philadelphia's. Like the blueprint of the panopticon produced by the English utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, radial prisons ensured constant supervision of inmates, whose cells were located along corridors branching off of a central inspection point. Advocates of this system asserted that spatial arrangements would allow them to reshape human nature. Confinement in austere, undecorated, and windowless cells seemingly compelled prisoners to contemplate their guilt and prevented them from consorting with one another in ways that might spread criminality. Inspired by such ideas, the British opened their first national prison at Millbank in 1816. While this prison was a costly failure, it set the tone for the much more successful Pentonville prison, founded in 1842. The Pennsylvania (or Philadelphia) system served as a model for Anglo-

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American developments and was influential elsewhere in Europe. For example, the Prussian penal code, promulgated the same year that Pentonville opened its doors, advocated solitary confinement and led to a spate of penitentiary construction beginning in 1844.

Although many European penal specialists invested faith in the power of separate confinement to discipline and reform inmates, this system posed great fiscal and architectural demands. Thus complete solitary confinement of prisoners remained rare, even in the heyday of the Pentonville model. Much more common was the Auburn System, whose more cost-conscious penitentiaries submitted inmates to silent communal work by day and solitary cellular confinement by night. Whereas the Philadelphia model required authorities to build new structures, the Auburn System permitted them to convert existing buildings into prisons. Embracing the Irish practice of gradual treatment, penal specialists in England, Prussia, France, Russia, and other countries instituted a system whereby convicts spent their first months in solitary confinement followed by communal living that was gradually increased for good behavior. While theoretically regenerating criminals and preparing them for eventual release, this approach also seemed more humane than complete solitary confinement. From the very start British, Prussian, and Russian penal reformers raised concerns that the total seclusion of inmates was excessively cruel and promoted insanity. Communal work and the stage system mitigated these problems.

Yet prison administrators faced difficulties in effecting even this modified system. Inadequate facilities and fiscal realities fostered overcrowding and impeded the categorization of offenders. Even in places like England and France, where the state devoted considerable resources to prison construction, convicts found numerous ways of evading separation, devising elaborate argots and other modes of communication, and homosexual subcultures flourished despite injunctions. Guard deficiencies compounded disciplinary problems.

The rehabilitative objectives of the penitentiary, however, mandated more than concern about proper confinement. Specialists also predicated the system's success upon the elaboration of labor regimens, moral and educative practices, and inspection. Work was the central organizing principle of life in the nineteenth-century carceral (prison). While this was nothing new, after all, prisoners had labored in the Amsterdam *tucht-huis* since the sixteenth century, work was more organized in the new penitentiaries, lending them at least theoretical similarity to the factories contemporaneously developing in Europe. Yet labor practices

varied across Europe. Private entrepreneurs played a large role in the French penal system, which increased prisoners' productivity but detracted from the disciplinary philosophy of the prison. French entrepreneurs were more interested in maximizing profit and thus were unconcerned with teaching convicts skills that might have transformed them into useful citizens. In contrast, British penitentiaries often employed inmates at the treadmill ostensibly grinding corn but more frequently engaging in the unproductive task of grinding air. Although Russian reformers sought to introduce compulsory labor in the 1870s and 1880s, facilities were so overcrowded that it was impossible to allot adequate workshop space to implement their plans. Moreover penal administrators across Europe found it difficult to locate appropriate labor for convicts.

The paradoxes of the penitentiary system were also evident in moral regimes. Though prisons supposedly functioned as sites of educational and religious instruction, reformers failed to devise strategies for accomplishing these goals, and any developments in these directions remained uneven. Even where education existed, reformers found that this hardly impeded recidivism and ultimately perceived that literacy produced superior criminals.

That not all prisoners were men further complicated matters. It was difficult to fit women into a male-oriented disciplinary system. Reformers like the British nonconformist Elizabeth Fry, who spearheaded the foundation of women's prison associations in the 1810s, and penal specialists argued that women required special moral regimens that emphasized religion, the fostering of personal bonds between inmates and warders, and labor forms designed to inculcate domesticity. Gender-based modifications, which were embraced in many European countries after the second quarter of the nineteenth century, undermined much of the masculine penal complex. Even these changes were difficult to implement because pragmatic concerns impeded construction of gender-specific prisons, hiring of properly trained female guards, and location of suitably feminine labor. Even when authorities attempted to tailor the prison experience to women, punishment still failed to rehabilitate them. Authorities across Europe complained that female inmates posed greater disciplinary problems than male inmates and that incarceration seemingly bred deviance among women to an even greater extent than among men.

Penal reformers hoped that the inspection and nationalization of prisons would alleviate such problems. Britain established a national inspectorate in 1832, which resulted in the closure of many local pris-

ons over subsequent decades and culminated in the nationalization of British prisons in 1876. Other European countries, such as Russia and Prussia, followed suit. While attempts to impose uniform disciplinary practices made prison regimes harsher, they nonetheless failed to enhance the rehabilitative potential of the penitentiary.

More than practical shortcomings frustrated the penitentiary's capacity to reform inmates. Rather, from its inception this system was undermined by a theoretical paradox. The twin goals of the nineteenth-century prison—rehabilitation and deterrence—worked at cross-purposes. By mid-century critics began to resolve this dilemma by separating criminals whom they sought to reform from hardened recidivists. The increased involvement of a whole range of specialists in penal reform; new scientific theories of criminality, including Cesare Lombroso's criminal anthropology and Social Darwinism; and greater public awareness of and fears about crime supported this medicalization of deviance. Experts argued that the prison failed to rehabilitate criminals because at least some offenders were incorrigible. Revising their penal philosophies, they used scientific practices to diagnose incurable criminals. Labeling this group degenerate, they advocated its incarceration in long-term facilities and applied to its members psychiatric treatment and eugenics principles then in vogue in Europe. They thus aimed to preclude members of this group from contaminating less serious criminals and reproducing deviance.

Taking cues from the principles that juvenile justice systems elaborated in the first half of the nineteenth century in Britain, France, and Germany, numerous countries established reformatories for corrigible convicts. These institutions, like the French agricultural colonies for youth, removed offenders from polluting urban environments into familial ones that inculcated domesticity, good health, and skills. Like their juvenile counterparts, these adult facilities came under considerable criticism in the years after World War I. Reformatories opened for inebriate women in Britain were judged excessively lenient, insufficiently rehabilitative, and exceedingly costly. The failure rate of such reformatories combined with the economizing demanded by the Great Depression led to their closure and replacement with more traditional penal confinement in some instances and cheaper, noncustodial arrangements in others.

Belgium first introduced the suspended sentence and probation in 1888. France (1891), Luxembourg (1892), Portugal (1893), Norway (1894), Italy (1904), Hungary (1908), Greece (1911), the Netherlands (1915), and Finland (1918) quickly fol-

lowed suit, and much of eastern Europe emulated this model after World War I. Supervised parole, which remanded convicts into the custody of private patronage networks or police, developed simultaneously. First used experimentally on juveniles in the 1830s, parole was applied to adults in Portugal (1861), Saxony (1862), Germany (1871), and France (1885) and gained the approval of the 1910 International Prison Congress.

These noncustodial arrangements facilitated individualized sentencing and mainstreaming of former convicts, yet it is incorrect to equate them with deinstitutionalization. Rather, they amounted to the extension of the prison's disciplinary practices into society. By the turn of the twentieth century many states possessed the capacity to effectively regulate and supervise their populations and to inaugurate surveillance techniques, such as the French and Russian passports that clearly marked an individual's status as a criminal. In 1999, Britain introduced an electronic tagging system to monitor criminals granted early release from prisons.

The extension of disciplinary regimes into the community at large did not signify that prisons everywhere were dismantled or that convictions ceased to mount, even in countries committed to noncustodial penalties. As prison committals declined in countries like France, where the prison population halved between 1887 and 1956, they proliferated elsewhere. Even before the Nazis rose to power, the prison network in Germany expanded massively. Many socialist countries witnessed similar increases in convictions. After the 1950s western European prison populations swelled, and penal forms continued to coexist. Just as it is impossible to posit a unidirectional trajectory of development from corporal punishment to confinement, so is it problematic to suggest that the prison was replaced by noncustodial penal forms.

In summary, two distinct trends characterize the penal systems articulated in twentieth-century Europe. On the one hand, some countries sought to rehabilitate criminals and mainstream them into society. To these ends, diverse states such as those of Scandinavia, the Netherlands, France, and Italy introduced and refined non-institutional punishments such as furloughs, fines, community-based correctional systems, conditional release, and supervised parole. On the other hand, penal institutions simultaneously proliferated throughout Europe and prisons remained the preeminent form of punishment for criminals, and particularly for a more concentrated recidivist population. Even as public awareness of the brutality of Germany's and the Soviet Union's extermination and labor camps fueled a mounting social outcry against

inhumane and cruel incarceration and led critics and statesmen to emphasize the importance of prisoners' rights and fair treatment within carceral facilities, the number of prisons and inmates increased markedly in Western and Eastern bloc countries alike. Moreover, in the late twentieth century authorities largely have rejected the notion that the prison might rehabilitate the convict, instead suggesting that the carceral constitutes an institution in which criminals are to be managed, identified, and set off from upstanding citizens.

EVALUATING PUNISHMENT: THEORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

Scholars have evaluated European penal practices and developments in varying ways. Some historians have perceived these changes through the rubric of humanitarianism and progress. Accepting as valid the arguments of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century penal reformers, historians such as Leon Radzinowicz (1948), J. R. S. Whiting (1975), and David D. Cooper (1974) asserted that the rise of the penitentiary was enlightened in its intentions and results because it supplanted barbaric corporal and capital punishments, others, like Bruce F. Adams (1996), who studied nineteenth-century Russian prison reform, modified this picture somewhat, suggesting that shortcomings in practice resulted from the problems of interpreting advanced Western theories in backward autocratic contexts. These positions mistake rhetoric for reality, overlook the continued use of corporal punishment after the rise of the penitentiary, assume that the regimens established in the prisons were humane, and generally fail to examine the larger power relations and authority structures in which the new prisons took shape.

The narrative has been substantially revised by other analysts. Revisionists, who fall into several camps, have asserted that it is essential to examine the wider context in which punishment was deployed. By and large they have privileged the social control aspects of penal change, arguing that reformers' enlightened rhetoric obscured more nefarious tendencies.

One group, which concentrated on punishment's economic effects, asserted that utilitarian aims impelled the replacement of executions and floggings with penal bondage and prisons. According to Marxists like Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer (1939) and Dario Melossi and Massimo Pavarini (1981), the labor demands of nascent commercial capitalism led states to develop prisons that resembled factories. Empiricists demonstrated that penal labor bore little resemblance to factory work and instead was frequently

far from productive, was traditionally organized, and existed in countries that evinced little capitalist development, rendering the Marxist argument suspect.

Other Marxists, such as Douglas Hay and Peter Linebaugh (1975), took a different approach. They contended that the sharpening class conflict constituted the ideological basis of criminal law and explains the continued commitment of the English Parliament to capital punishment even in the face of reformers' attacks on and popular riots against executions. Yet by belying that the lower classes benefited from and often championed the "Bloody Code," this position strips them of agency.

Still others of an orientation not necessarily Marxist insisted that, while the penitentiary's economic benefits were dubious, the context of capitalism's rise and state consolidation engendered and was facilitated by new penal modes that asserted greater discipline over criminals and noncriminals alike. Examining the power relations inherent in capitalism, Michael Ignatieff (1978) considered that the birth of the penitentiary constituted part of the process whereby government reformers, social critics, employers, and nonconformist evangelicals sought to locate new forms of social order that could manage the poor, given increased urbanization and the breakdown of traditional relations. In contrast to Ignatieff, Michel Foucault expressed no interest in the multiple discourses that informed penal transformations. Although ostensibly focused on penal practices, his influential *Discipline and Punish* (1979) is more concerned with the rise of modern disciplinary society. Tracing the late-eighteenth century movement away from executions that marked sovereign power in increasingly ambivalent spectacles of punishment, Foucault suggested that the nineteenth-century penitentiary was the site at which various discourses—penal, medical, and psychiatric—converged to form a carceral continuum. Operating in a manner similar to Bentham's panopticon, this institution at once imposed total supervision, individualized convicts by classifying them, and ensured the construction of permanent deviance that facilitated the reproduction of disciplinary practices and their eventual generalization throughout society, even as the process of punishment itself was increasingly privatized.

Both Ignatieff and Foucault take their arguments concerning social control too far. As Ignatieff (1981) noted, revisionists have predicated their positions on the misconceptions that the state monopolized penal regimes and was solely responsible for enforcing social order and that domination is the essence of all social relations. Foucault's portrayal of the carceral continuum is also marred by his attribution of

agency to power, which in his account is totalizing. For Foucault disciplinary regimes are everywhere and unstoppable; any resistance ultimately reinforces and can never subvert discourses of domination.

Others have offered correctives to all these models. Some, like Pieter Spierenburg (1984; 1991), emphasized the gradual and overlapping nature of transformations from the scaffold to the prison. Extending Norbert Elias's argument concerning the civilizing process (1939), Spierenburg suggested that the amelioration of elite and popular morals, the increased visibility of and potential for managing marginal populations, and social pacification facilitated by urbanization and state building explain the demise of harsh bodily punishment and the rise of confinement.

According to Spierenburg's theory, during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, feudal codes still held sway and, in the absence of well-developed and centralized state power and policing, individuals often took to arms and unquestionably accepted the violence that pervaded their societies. In contrast, from the late seventeenth century, as absolutist authorities began to monopolize the technologies of physical violence and began to pacify the societies that they governed, attitudes toward physical chastisements changed markedly. These sensibilities, which first developed among elites and only slowly spread to the masses, led to the privatization of corporal and capital punishment and helped fuel an ever widening critique of violent penal regimes.

Others emphasized that, more than humanitarianism or the civilizing process, social fears engendered penal change. Thomas Laqueur (1989), Arlette Farge (1993), and Abby M. Schrader (1997) modified Hay and Foucault's depictions of the scaffold spectacle, asserting that the crowd constituted the central actor and interpreter of executions. Authorities curtailed them because the effects of public executions became increasingly ambiguous and threatened state power. While V. A. C. Gatrell (1994) contended that the eighteenth-century crowd more frequently affirmed executions than negated them, he maintained that politicized spectators in the Victorian era forced

the British government to abolish public hangings. That humanitarianism was never central to these abolition processes may explain the continued existence of corporal and capital punishment.

Historians like Patricia O'Brien (1982) suggested that social fears also motivated authorities to establish prisons. Concern about the political unrest of the dangerous classes led elites to replace executions with more generalized disciplinary practices, first articulated within prison walls and then generalized throughout society once states developed sufficient policing. Modifying Foucault's argument in important ways, O'Brien maintained that this process failed to strip convicts of agency. Inmates developed their own subcultures in dialogue with and resistance to penal discipline. Finally, disciplinary practices were never totalizing. Rather, disorder was as important as order in the penitentiary. Penal forms were continually combined, and at the same time that penal specialists articulated new disciplinary regimes, challenges arose to them. Likewise, Michelle Perrot (1980) and Lucia Zedner (1991) contended that modern "total institutions" were exceptional and can hardly be deemed successful.

Ultimately, as David Garland (1990) suggested, no single cause explains the development, reform, and abandonment of penal practices. All of these theorists articulated elements of truth. Humanitarian arguments were not merely empty rhetoric. Economic concerns certainly explain why particular labor regimes seemed attractive in certain contexts, and class conflict always pervaded but never predetermined social relationships. Likewise authorities were motivated to undertake reforms because of social fears but not exclusively for this reason. Resistance from below was neither wholly impotent nor completely powerful. Finally, disciplinary practices predominated but never completely controlled either the inmates' lives inside the prison or those of the free individuals outside it. As Foucault contended, punishment fulfilled a "complex social function" (*Discipline and Punish*, p. 23) in both early modern and modern Europe. History and historiography certainly confirm this impression.

See also other articles in this section.

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MADNESS AND ASYLUMS



Peter Bartlett

INTRODUCTION

It may be best at the outset to tame some demons which haunt the popular understanding of madness and asylums of the past. This popular view is of a history infused with horrors. The eighteenth century was a period where the insane were chained in cellars, left in the dark to rot. The nineteenth century moved the insane into stone fortresses, institutions growing over the course of the century to contain upward of a thousand lost souls, concealed for life behind gothic walls, out of sight and out of mind. These nineteenth-century lunatics, hollering in their isolated cells, were tamed and drugged into submission in the first half of the twentieth century. In this semi-conscious and dazed state they were left to rock back and forth, tied to their chairs for their own protection, until released at the end of the twentieth century to wander aimlessly in the public streets when the combined miserliness of governments and naïve optimism of civil-rights extremists resulted in the closure of medical facilities without development of adequate community alternatives. Over this tale lies the specter of the medical man: the quack in the eighteenth century; the distant, callous, and ineffectual administrator of the nineteenth; the chemical controller of the early twentieth, invested with unchecked legal powers; and later the wronged hero, able to provide solutions if only given the legal authority and financial resources to do so. And throughout lies the question of the condition of the patients themselves: were they really mad, or merely difficult; is mental illness really about medicine, or about social control?

Like many popular myths, this one is not without its bases in fact, but it by no means tells the whole story. Certainly, the close and damp quarters in which eighteenth-century lunatics were chained did exist, but as Roy Porter has shown, the eighteenth century could also be characterized by new and optimistic medical treatment. The nineteenth century certainly saw the exponential growth of institutional care of the insane, but it was not usually confinement for life:

roughly two-thirds of those admitted to English county asylums, for example, were released within two years. While contained in the asylum, the life of the patient might be regulated by a tight schedule, but relatively few patients were actually physically restrained for extended periods in padded cells or restrictive clothing. Nor was the schedule punitive. It might, for example, allow for a game of bowls on the lawn in the evening—quite a different image from the oppressive one offered in the popular myth. Certainly, the early twentieth century contained its share of drug treatments, but it also saw the rise of psychology and talking cures. And throughout the last four hundred years, institutional care has never replaced care by families and in the community more broadly. The perceived problems consequent on the release of persons with psychiatric difficulties at the end of the twentieth century are simply not new. Nor is the removal of people from psychiatric facilities into the community necessarily to be understood as a failure: while the perceived failures are visible, successes—and they are many—do not attract notice.

The perception at the end of the twentieth century is that the definition, care, and treatment of mental illness and those it affects are within the province of medicine. That is very much a late modern perspective. The colonization of madness by medicine has been a process spanning much of the last four hundred years, involving boundary disputes with law, politics, religion, and popular understanding. Even now, there are areas where the rout is not complete. In law, medical testimony will be relevant in determining insanity, but it is not necessarily conclusive; and among the public, studies continue to show that when confronted with a troubled person, the care of a friend or minister may be advised as often as a visit to a psychiatrist. The history of madness and the care of the insane is thus not necessarily simply a branch of the history of medicine.

The social and political influences on the development of understanding and care of the insane are complex. Psychiatry has been used for overtly po-

litical purposes, as in the confinement of dissidents in pre-revolutionary France and the twentieth-century Soviet Union, but such overtly political cases have never formed a statistically large portion of psychiatric patients. Persons with psychiatric or developmental disabilities have been subject to extremist political programs, as for example in the policies of eugenics most extremely articulated in the practices of Nazi Germany. The temptation is to marginalize these policies as a function of the specific German régime, but the prevalence of eugenic thought in much of Europe and North America for much of the first half of the twentieth century suggests that a much more nuanced approach to the relations between medical science, political thought, and social history is necessary.

Certainly, there can be little doubt that psychiatry has been used as a method of social control. One social response to deviant behavior has often been to understand the individual as mad; but to label this “social control” places a particular critical edge to the analysis. Frequently, the people concerned posed real social problems. It is all very well to refer to the confinement of a violent and delusional person, for example, as social control; that does not mean it is necessarily a bad thing. At the same time, the articulation of madness itself can be understood as influenced by social, political, and philosophical factors. The doctors who developed diagnostic criteria lived in specific cultural climates, and were influenced by contemporary events and theories. Thus when we read in the

first part of the twentieth century of women’s insanity being caused by “overambition,” it seems difficult to divorce this from cultural attitudes toward women in the period.

There is of course a scientific story to be told, but other approaches are also important in the social history of madness and the care of the insane. Homosexuality provides a useful illustration here. Its history can be written from the perspective of the history of scientific medicine: there have been genetic, biochemical and psychological theories about its causes and incidence. That does not entirely explain the rise and fall of homosexuality as a mental disorder, however. Scientific inquiry into homosexuality did not cease when it ceased to be classified as a mental disorder, in the late twentieth century. The scientific investigation of homosexuality continues, suggesting the history of those inquiries has a life separate from the classification of diseases. It further seems that the science does not explain the chronology of medicalization as effectively as external factors. The placement of homosexuality in the medical model occurred in the late nineteenth century, when moral values of sexuality were being re-enforced. It is therefore not surprising that homosexual behavior was articulated in a framework of deviance. Similarly, its removal from medical taxonomy occurred during and after the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.

In the history of madness and the care of the insane, as in so much of social history, the history of



MOMENTS IN MADNESS: ASYLUMS IN TIME

- 1377: Prior of the Order of St. Mary of Bethlehem (later called “Bethlem”) caring for insane.
- 1409: Valencia (Spain): Father Jofré opens an institution for the insane. By tradition, this is the first institution specifically designed for lunatics in continental Europe.
- 1656: Foundation of hôpital-général of Paris. French provincial counterparts follow in 1676. Not curative facilities, but place of early institutional care of the insane among others.
- 1690: John Locke publishes *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*. Places the ancient distinction between idiocy and lunacy on a philosophical ground. Idiocy is stated to be the inability to reason, and lunacy correct reasoning based on incorrect and deluded sensation.
- 1723: Tsar Peter the Great decrees that institutions for lunatics should be built. Decree not acted upon, apart from one 25-bed unit founded in 1776.
- 1751: Opening of St. Luke’s Hospital (London), a charitable hospital for the care of the insane.
- 1764: Foundation of French dépôts de mendicité (workhouses). Another place of institutional care for the insane among others.
- 1796: Founding of the York Retreat, and the beginning of moral treatment in England.
- 1798: Establishment of the psychiatric service at Charité Hospital, Berlin, when the penitentiary where the insane had previously been held burned down.
- 1801: Publication of Philippe Pinel’s *Traité médico-philosophique sur l’aliénation mentale, ou la manie*, where moral treatment first discussed.
- 1805: Opening of the renovated asylum at Beyreuth, the first modern German institution for the insane.
- 1808: First English/Welsh County Asylums Act passed. Allows construction of asylums at public expense, for the accommodation of the insane poor.
- 1809: First major Russian mental hospital founded. Development of asylums in Russia slow. By 1910, only 438 psychiatrists in all tsarist domains.
- 1810 (approx): Monomania first identified by Esquirol.
- 1820s (early): General paralysis of the insane, a manifestation of neurosyphilis, identified by Antoine-Laurent Bayle
- 1828: English/Welsh Madhouses Act requires private madhouses to be licensed by justices of the peace. Creates inspectorate for London madhouses.
- 1834: English/Welsh Poor Law Amendment Act passed. Creates professional bureaucracy that allows for efficient development of county asylum system.
- 1838: Law of 30 June 1838 establishes national system of asylums in France.
- 1839: John Conolly becomes medical superintendent of the Hanwell Asylum (London). Beginning of the nonrestraint movement.
- 1844: Commencement of publication of the first German psychiatric journal, *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie*
- 1845: New English/Welsh County Asylums Act makes the provision of county asylums mandatory, creating the legal structure of a national framework. Inspectorate, the Lunacy Commission, given a national mandate.
- 1850s: Identification of “circular insanity” (mania and depression) by Jean-Pierre Falret and Jules Bailarger. Renamed “manic depressive illness” by Emil Kraepelin in 1899.
- 1852: Foundation of the Société Médico-Psychologique, the association of French doctors specializing in mental medicine
- 1857: Rise of use of bromides as sedatives.
- 1877: Beginning of statutory scheme of boarding out, an early form of community care, in Scotland.
- 1860: Benedict-Augustin Morel publishes his taxonomy of mental disorders in *Traité des maladies mentales*. Insanity had long been thought to have hereditary characteristics, but Morel adds the theory of degeneration, that insanity gets worse in subsequent generations. In the twentieth century, when this argument intersects with genetic thought, the insane are perceived as a new sort of social danger.
- 1870s: Jean-Martin Charcot redefines and rejuvenates concept of hysteria

(continued on next page)



MOMENTS IN MADNESS: ASYLUMS IN TIME (continued)

- 1875: Robert Lawson of the West Riding Asylum (Yorkshire, England) begins using morphine as sedative and hypnotic for psychiatric patients.
- 1878: Benjamin Ball hired as first professor of mental medicine in France, at the University of Paris.
- 1885: General Medical Council (United Kingdom) introduces specialist course in psychological medicine. No one takes the examination in the first year.
- 1886: Viennese psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing publishes *Psychopathia Sexualis*. A variety of sexual behaviors enter the realm of psychiatric pathology.
- 1887: Establishment of the Dromokaition on Corfu, by private subscription, to replace the 1838 facility inherited from British occupation of the island. This is the only specialized Greek psychiatric facility until the foundation of a clinic at the University of Athens in 1904.
- 1889: Rimsky-Korsakov Institute founded; 1894, Kashenka completed, following public funding appeal. These are the first two significant psychiatric institutions in Moscow. The Bechtereve, the prime psychiatric hospital in St. Petersburg, was not completed until 1908.
- 1893: Emil Kraepelin publishes taxonomy of mental disorders. To the traditional categories, he adds dementia praecox, later renamed schizophrenia, a category further developed in the eighth (1907) edition of his textbook.
- 1913: English/Welsh Mental Deficiency Act 1913 provides a framework for the institutionalization and community supervision of people considered "mental defectives." Parallel legislation introduced in Scotland the same year.
- 1920: Rise of prolonged sleep therapy, popularized by Jakob Klaesi (Zurich).
- 1921: Dispensaire system established in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Serves as administrative basis for the provision of good community care through the 1980s. By 1950s, handling only psychiatric cases. By 1957, 2,300 dispensaires contained in general health centers, and an additional 119 in free-standing centers.
- 1930: English/Welsh Mental Treatment Act 1930 allows voluntary admission to madhouses and asylums. Previously, all persons had been legally detained. Parallel legislation introduced in Scotland.
- 1933: First use of insulin coma therapy, Vienna.
- 1933: Rise of Nazis in Germany. During the Nazi regime, more than 100,000 persons with mental health difficulties or developmental disabilities were killed in an organized program of "euthanasia," in gas chambers located in psychiatric facilities.
- 1934: Ladislav von Meduna first induces convulsive shocks for treatment of psychiatric patients (Budapest).
- 1935: First lobotomy performed at the Santa Marta Hospital, Lisbon, by neurologist Egas Moniz.
- 1938: Ugo Cerletti (Rome) first uses electricity to induce convulsive shocks.
- 1943: Penicillin used in the treatment of neurosyphilis. General paralysis of the insane disappears quickly from asylums.
- 1949: Australian John Cade uses lithium on psychiatric patients. Introduced into Europe by Morgens Schou, a Danish psychiatrist, in 1952. Becomes treatment for mania.
- 1952: Chlorpromazine in use on psychiatric patients as treatment for schizophrenia.
- 1954: Inpatient psychiatric population peaks in England, at 148,000 (33.45 per 10,000 population). By 1981, inpatient rate drops to 15.5 per 10,000 population. By 1997–1998, inpatient beds total less than 46,000.
- 1955: Tricyclics used on psychiatric patients by Roland Kuhn (Switzerland). Becomes treatment for depression.
- 1959: English/Welsh Mental Health Act 1959. Major rewriting of legislation. Voluntary admissions become preferred, with confinement only to be a last resort.
- 1993: Homosexuality removed from International Classification of Disorders, the international standard of mental disorders coordinated by the World Health Organisation. It had been removed in the American DSM classification almost twenty years earlier.

the ideas cannot be conflated with the history of their application. Stated objectives and descriptions may well be open to challenge by modern empirical research. This has been most controversial when unfortunate and often unforeseen consequences are perceived to challenge the benevolent intentions of historical figures, but the past can equally be seen in a more sympathetic light than perceived by its contemporary commentators. Thus cure for nineteenth-century medical men was something near at hand, but still in the future. The perception that their asylums were full of chronic and incurable cases was their perception, not a twentieth-century gloss. As noted above, late-twentieth-century scholarship instead shows modest success at cure, if that is understood as release from the asylum and return to the community. Twentieth-century scholarship thus shows the nineteenth-century asylum to be more successful than it took itself to be.

The difficulty in confusing the history of ideas with the history of their application is illustrated by the confinement of women. The received history portrays the asylum as a place where women were subject to particular control at the hands of patriarchal ideology. Certainly, the history of psychiatry reflects broader social notions of women and their sexuality, which was portrayed as unbridled passion requiring restraint. Thus the French hydrotherapist Alfred Béné-Barde at the turn of the twentieth century claimed that “the hybrid neuropathy that has seized [hysterics] does not require calming. These female patients must be tamed. That is why cold water succeeds” (quoted in Shorter, p. 125). The social control implications are obvious, but such statements nonetheless do not translate simply into psychiatric practice. Thus for much of the nineteenth century, the large English county asylums admitted women only marginally out of their proportion to the population as a whole. The significant imbalance in an English context arises only in the twentieth century, when at least in theory the ideological marginalization of women was past its peak. This does not of course mean that the ideological history is irrelevant. It does mean that it reflects only one part of the puzzle of how the care of the insane actually worked in practice.

Several points may be drawn from this. First, it is simplistic to portray the history of madness, psychiatry, and the care of the insane as “good ideas gone wrong,” and it is misleading to perceive the cast of characters in those histories as composed of heroes and villains. Such an approach diverts attention from the more interesting and detailed analysis of how that history developed. Second, while some scholars have approached the histories with particular emphases (on

social control, or on the history of medical science, for example), and while such specific foci may enlighten some points, the histories of madness, psychiatry, and care are multifaceted. A unitary focus risks missing the richness of the tapestry. Third, as political and social factors influenced the development of the histories, they are to be understood not merely according to factors which span international boundaries, but also as a result of their local circumstances. It would be uncontroversial to suggest that the histories developed differently in the twentieth-century Soviet Union than in western Europe, but this can be understood as an extreme example of a general point: Europe is not one culture, and one must therefore think of European histories of madness.

All of this raises its share of difficulties. The history of madness and the care of the insane is not one history: it is a profusion of histories. Since the 1980s there has been an explosion in the academic study of these histories, but the scope for research is yet more vast. In many of the specific histories, research has only just started, and much remains to be done. Here, even more than in other fields, social history is a work in progress.

CARING FOR THE MENTALLY ILL

Until the creation of universal state-funded health services after World War II, and to a considerable degree beyond, care received by the mentally ill has been a function of the individual's financial means. In general up to the early nineteenth century, and often beyond, specialized care of the insane, whether provided by doctor, cleric, or lay person, would be provided only if the patient or his or her family could afford to pay, and the standard of care would depend on what the payer could afford. For the truly well off, such care might involve the complete avoidance of formal institutionalization and the provision instead of one or more paid carers. As insanity and developmental disabilities have long been viewed as a matter of shame, such carers might be formally appointed to other positions in the household, or presented as companion of the individual. In families with leisure, the care might further be left in the hands of relations, sometimes brought in for the purpose. While a doctor's services might form a part of the overall package, day-to-day carers would not be likely to be particularly medically trained.

Alternatively, the well-off might remove the insane person to a private establishment. Such private madhouses have a long history, but became considerably more common through the eighteenth century. They remained a chosen place of care for those with money throughout the nineteenth century, and can be seen to survive in private mental hospitals catering to an exclusive clientele. The private madhouse sector catered to all classes who could afford to pay for care. At the high end of the scale, such as the Ticehurst Asylum in England, patrons might be admitted with their personal servants, and the day was filled with recreation befitting the social standing of the inhabitants. These institutions would not necessarily be controlled by doctors. Instead, particularly prior to the mid-nineteenth century, they might be run by either clerics or laity. From the eighteenth century until roughly World War I, spas provided a variation on such private care, particularly for nervous disorders. While it is difficult to see that care for mental disorder has ever been fashionable, it is certainly true that care in an eighteenth- or nineteenth-century spa imported an air of exclusivity and privilege.

For those without such means, care was not nearly so plush. For families with some means, less expensive private madhouses might be an option for at least the short term. These were not the elegant establishments of the upper class. Sometimes, they might involve simply a family prepared to care for a small number of individuals to boost their own in-

come, but increasingly, these madhouses became businesses in their own right. While not deliberately punitive, the economics of business made them much more Spartan than the establishments of the rich, with fewer attendants and more patients per room. By the mid-nineteenth century, these institutions sometimes contained hundreds of inmates and charged competitive rates, in an institutional environment usually overseen by a doctor.

Nonetheless, the realities in a world before disability insurance was that for the bulk of working people, the requirement to pay for care in such a madhouse might tax the family resources to the breaking point, particularly when the insane individual was the primary breadwinner. Such families frequently found themselves, like the respectable poor, trying to care for them at home. As long as the insane person was sufficiently placid and at least one responsible person was able to remain in the home to supervise, this might be an option. When this was not the case, poor relief, the old social safety net, might intervene to provide a small supplement to the family income, or to fund a carer for the individual in the home if possible. Particularly if the individual were violent the poor relief authorities might be prepared to pay for some form of incarceration. In the nineteenth century, this might be in any of a variety of places: a private madhouse, a jail or similar institution, a poorhouse or workhouse in countries where those existed, or in one of a small number of specialized places for the care of lunatics, generally run by religious establishments.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the institutional ground shifted, and in much of Europe, specialized asylum care became available for the poor. These new institutions developed in parallel to existing private madhouse provision, although their scale eventually dwarfed such private provision. In England at the beginning of the nineteenth century, for example, only a few thousand insane poor were confined. By the end of the century, numbers had grown to close to 100,000. In German-speaking Europe there were 202 public asylums by 1891, and in France 108. In Germany itself, the number of insane persons confined rocketed from one in 5,300 in 1852 to one in 500 in 1911.

It is this explosion of care that has consumed much of the social historians' interests. It did occur in much of Europe, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France, Italy, Sweden, and parts of Germany. It was by no means universal, however. Moscow did not acquire a significant lunatic asylum until the last decade of the nineteenth century, for example, and as late as 1900, two asylums sufficed for all of Portugal. While one of the first specialized

facilities for the insane had opened in Spain in the fifteenth century, large-scale asylum-building did not occur there until the twentieth, and in Greece, the first three state-owned institutions were not founded until between 1912 and 1916.

For those nations where the move to institutional solutions did occur, the reasons for this explosion of care are a matter of hot scholarly debate. Andrew Scull places the rise of the asylum in the context of changing economic circumstances in the move toward capitalism. The move from cottage industries to factory work meant that fewer family members worked at home, and fewer could therefore combine work with the care of an insane family member. Further, the downward pressure on wages in the industrial economy made it more difficult to feed an unproductive member of the family. This argument has much to recommend it. Certainly, the case studies of patient records in nineteenth-century asylums would suggest that admissions occurred when a family could no longer cope with the insane person at home, or if the insane person had first been moved to a poor-law facility, when he or she became too unruly or violent to remain in that environment. The bulk of those admitted were either violent or suicidal. Individual admissions were the result of practical problems.

As Scull also points out, the period was one where institutional solutions were in fashion more broadly. Specific eighteenth-century progenitors of the asylum can be identified. In England, charitable medical institutions for the insane underwent a modest spurt of growth from 1751, when St. Luke's Hospital was founded. Eighteenth-century facilities are however notable for their diversity. France certainly had medical establishments for lunatics, the Salpêtrière and the Bicêtre in Paris being the most famous, and these like the eighteenth-century English charitable facilities can be seen as ancestors of the high Victorian asylum: institutions created on a hospital model, with a doctor in charge. At the same time, French eighteenth-century institutional care of lunatics also occurred outside medical settings, in *hospitaux-général*, *dépôts de mendicité*, and religious institutions. Notwithstanding the name, the *hospitaux-général* were not curative institutions, and not under medical control. They were instead institutions founded in the third quarter of the seventeenth century for the confinement and control of French riffraff generally, but including the disorderly insane. In 1764, the *dépôts* were created as workhouses for the poor, but they, too, quickly expanded to include the care of the insane poor. As in much of Roman Catholic Europe, the church also provided care. By 1789, the Chaitains, the Brothers of Saint-Jean-de-Dieu, were operating

seven institutions for the insane in France, and other religious orders also offered institutional care. These mixed models of care are reflected elsewhere in Europe. In Berlin, the insane were only moved to a hospital when their previous accommodation, the local penitentiary, burned down in 1798, and in Greece, the bulk of the insane seem to have been lodged in nonspecialized facilities for the poor well into the twentieth century. Even in England, where the asylum movement was strong, a quarter of the poor insane were lodged in poor-law workhouses throughout the nineteenth century.

The move to institutional solutions for social problems also occurs outside the realm of insanity. The growth of the asylum corresponds to the growth of the prison and the workhouse. The asylum may therefore be understood as reflecting a more general trend in the minds of policymakers. This is in turn consistent with the economic analysis. With the wealth flowing from industrialization, expensive institutions became an option in a way that was not previously possible in most of Europe. The broad policy move to institutional solutions may have affected the minds of the families involved as well. It may possibly have become more acceptable to send a family member to an institution as the period progressed.

The changing role of medical professionals also undoubtedly had its effect in the development of the asylum. The eighteenth century rejuvenated medical thinking, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century, doctors and others were, with a new enthusiasm, claiming that insanity could be cured. The new specialist band of alienists, as doctors specializing in mental disorders were then called, argued that the removal of the patient from family surroundings was essential for cure, and indeed that the asylum itself, as a place of order that would reorient the mad person back to their right self, had a curative effect. While such an approach was not the exclusive preserve of medical professionals, the image of the curative asylum enjoyed the support of the benevolent, but also the parsimonious, for while the asylum might be expensive in the short term, it promised the longer term removal of insane persons from poor rolls and their return to productive labour.

The movement toward institutional solutions must also be understood in the context of specific national histories: the rise of the asylum becomes possible when local infrastructures are sufficiently developed to make it a real possibility. Indeed, the administrative context of the asylum takes quite different forms depending on the nation involved. In the German states, for example, institutional provision appears to have been linked to universities. With roughly

twenty universities, each vying for academic kudos, this was a viable possibility. In England, with Oxford and Cambridge the only universities prior to the opening of University College London in 1828, the university system would have been unable to support a network of asylums. Instead, the English poor law was reorganized in 1834 to include a professional cadre of administrators. While the foundation of the English county asylum system predates the so-called New Poor Law, it is only after 1834 that the asylum system, where admissions were administered by the poor-law authorities, begins to take hold and grow. In France, after a brief hiatus during the upheavals following the Revolution, the involvement of the church returned, and remained for much of the nineteenth century. Not merely did the Catholic Church own and operate its own asylums, it also provided the nursing staff for many of the state-owned facilities throughout the nineteenth century, marking the institutions with some degree of religious flavor and occasionally in ideological conflict with the medical officers. In Belgium, this system continued to the end of the twentieth century, with more than 80 percent of psychiatric institutions still administered by religious bodies.

The asylum regime. For much of the nineteenth century, the routine of daily life in the asylum was one of the prime curative features. Employment would be provided, appropriate to the social class and abilities of the individual. For the poor, this would usually involve needlework or laundry work for women and groundskeeping or farm work for men. Libraries were provided, stocked with morally uplifting literature. The food was not excessive, but a good diet was provided as essential to recovery. Asylums were built to ensure a healthy atmosphere for those confined in them, including proper ventilation for the summer and central heating for the winter. On many of these practical and measurable matters, the asylum offered a standard of living well superior to that of the poor insane person in the community. Unsurprisingly, at least some of those confined wanted to be there. At the same time, it was institutional living, controlled by staff and removed from the individual's family and community. Equally unsurprisingly, some inmates clearly did not wish to return to the asylum on their departure.

For much of the nineteenth century, the asylum's chief claim to cure rested in its regime. The bleedings, cuppings, and blisterings of the eighteenth century, treatments designed to restore to balance the bodily humors upon which early modern medicine was based, fell from fashion, although cold baths, emetics, diar-

rhetics, wine, and porter were slower to disappear from the landscape of treatment for mental disorder.

It was not until the last quarter of the century that new chemical treatments began to be used in asylums. The first set of these were sedatives: morphine, chloral hydrate, and bromides. Paris asylums alone were using over a thousand kilograms of potassium bromide per year by 1891 (Shorter, p. 200). For general paralysis of the insane (GPI), a psychiatric manifestation of neurosyphilis, fever treatments began around 1890, but were eventually superseded by treatments involving malarial injection about the end of World War I. These methods remained until the discovery of penicillin in 1943. The first half of the twentieth century saw its own additions to medical treatments in the form of coma therapy and shock therapies. As the name suggests, the object of coma therapy was artificially to place the patient in a coma, for periods occasionally up to two hours. Insulin was used to induce the coma, first in Austria by Manfred Sakel in 1933, who argued that coma therapy was a cure for schizophrenia. The procedure became particularly popular in Switzerland and the United Kingdom, although its efficacy was doubtful and its mortality rate significant. The object of shock therapies was to induce a convulsive seizure, which, largely by trial and error, was discovered to have therapeutic effects. The seizures were originally drug-induced, first in 1934 by the Budapest psychiatrist Ladislav von Meduna. In 1938, however, the Italian psychiatrist Ugo Cerletti discovered that the application of electricity to the brain produced a similar effect. Electroconvulsive therapy, or electroshock therapy was born, and within a few years became a very common treatment, particularly for depression. As with coma therapy, repeated treatments might be necessary to produce the desired effect.

The end of World War II marked a return to drug therapies. Chlorpromazine was first used as a treatment for schizophrenia in Val-de-Grâce military hospital in Paris in 1952, and within a year, it was in use throughout the French psychiatric system. Lithium was discovered as a treatment for mania by John Cade in Australia in 1949, and was first introduced into Europe three years later by Morgens Schou, a Danish psychiatrist. Tricyclic medications, so called because of their chemical structure, were first used on depressed patients by Roland Kuhn in Switzerland from 1955. All of these drugs became psychiatric staples, and for the first time, psychiatric drugs became big business. In 2000, psychiatric medications accounted for roughly one-quarter of the prescriptions in the United Kingdom National Health Service.

From asylums to community care. The postwar period saw a move from asylum-based care to community-based alternatives. English asylum accommodation peaked in 1954, with 148,000 beds. By 1997, there was less than one-third this number. The scholarly debate regarding this movement is as fractious as the debate regarding the growth of the asylum movement. Scull argues for an analysis based on economics and the sociology of the medical profession: after the war, money had become tighter and governments no longer wished to provide expensive institutional care; the psychiatric profession, its place of authority now secured, did not require the asylum as a visible symbol of its importance. Certainly, in the final decades of the twentieth century, when government policy throughout Europe tended to move to the right, the continuing trend to reduce the scale of inpatient psychiatric care can be seen as part of a larger political agenda, but that is more difficult to apply to the period after World War II, when governments

seemed more willing than ever to become involved in national systems of socialized medicine.

In part, the move can no doubt be understood as a result of new practicalities. While the nineteenth-century moral treatment required the curative regime of the asylum, and coma and shock therapies could be administered only in the closely supervised medical environment available in a psychiatric facility, the new drug therapies could be administered in outpatient clinics. Nonetheless, outpatient clinics did not begin with the introduction of these drugs. Jean-Martin Charcot had such a clinic in Paris as early as 1879, and they were common in German asylums by 1920. Care with families in the Belgian town of Gheel had originated in the eighteenth century, and continued through the nineteenth. From 1857, the Scots boarded out up to a quarter of their poor insane through a scheme given a formal legislative basis, and in 1860, more than half the Welsh poor insane were cared for outside institutions. These initiatives did not neces-

sarily diminish in the twentieth century. The English Mental Deficiency Acts were providing statutory community supervision for 43,850 people by 1939.

The new initiatives toward community alternatives can be seen as growing from older models. While care within the family is still often a very important element of these community alternatives, it is no longer a necessary component. Developing both from models of boarding out and from more sensitive social services and social housing policies responding to people who would never have been institutionalized in asylums in the past, governments now sponsor disability pensions for those who can live on their own or with their families, group homes for those who cannot, and day-care centers for both these groups. There are, of course, ironies to these “new” policies. The disability pensions have much in common with the older poor law relief provided under eighteenth- and nineteenth-century schemes. The group homes are frequently owned in the private sector, with care purchased from them by governments much as care might be purchased from private madhouses in the nineteenth century.

While modern drugs have created new possibilities for community care, the development of these programs from models predating the advent of the drugs suggest that the doctors as well as governments

were in favor of blurring the lines between inpatient care and the community. Legal changes in English law are consistent with this view. Up until 1930, all persons admitted to county asylums and private madhouses were legally detained. The Mental Treatment Act 1930 introduced informal admission for the first time. In the Mental Health Act 1959, a preference toward such admissions became formal government policy. Moves were further made to integrate psychiatric populations with general hospital patients. By 1977, one-third of English psychiatric admissions were to psychiatric wards in these general hospitals, rather than to asylums for the insane alone. Italy went one step further, abolishing specialized psychiatric facilities in 1978 and treating all psychiatric patients either in the community or in general hospitals. Such moves can be seen as removing the high legal walls that, as much as their physical counterparts, had separated the psychiatric facility from the community.

In this context, the move to community care can be seen as a piece of a larger policy agenda. The complexity of these movements leads to conflicting results. Certainly, since the 1960s there has been a movement toward greater patient rights. Psychiatric patients sometimes enjoy much greater control over their treatments than before, although these rights often lag considerably behind North American systems.

There is also new regulation of clinical trials. The development of the drugs identified above occurred without approval of ethical committees, with remarkably little prior knowledge as to whether the treatment to be given was safe, and with no attention paid to the views of the patients who served as guinea pigs. In psychiatry as in the rest of medicine, considerable movement has occurred toward ensuring that experiments are safe and ethical. At the same time, the movement toward community care has brought with it calls for increased surveillance of people with mental health problems outside hospital, buttressed with enforced treatment regimes. If the values of the broader community have begun to enter the asylum, so controlling values of the asylum have also begun to enter the broader community.

MADNESS, CONTROL, AND MEDICINE

From the above history of the care of the insane, it will be clear that the medical colonization of madness cannot be seen as a foregone conclusion. Even today, the care of the insane can be seen as flowing from an uneasy tension involving doctors, the government, and the public, in which the insane themselves risk being lost in the shuffle: it is simplistic to say that medicine has somehow "triumphed." The history of those administering madness must, like the history of the care of the insane, be understood as infused with a variety of themes.

From politics to medicine. By the early nineteenth century, medical involvement was generally necessary prior to the admission of an individual to a lunatic asylum. This does not necessarily imply an acknowledged expertise in matters of insanity, however. France provides an example of how this involvement might be almost accidental. Prior to the Revolution of 1789, the insane had been confined under *lettres de cachet*, the Royal Prerogative of confinement without hearing or appeal, that had attained symbolic importance to the revolutionaries as an abuse of royal power. In one such abuse, some political dissidents, whose confinement would be particularly sensitive, were classified by the monarchy as insane, not merely criminal. The *lettres de cachet* could not be continued by the revolutionary government in their previous form, yet lunatics posed considerable practical problems if left without control. The solution was to take the confinement of lunatics out of the overtly political realm: doctors would decide whether a person was actually insane and requiring confinement. Thus this authority of doctors over confinement does not necessarily originate in an overwhelming case for expertise or

ability to cure, but rather in a matter of political expediency.

The movement of the medical profession to create a specialization in mental medicine was a somewhat haphazard affair, marked by contingency. Specialized training was usually limited. In France, courses in mental medicine were occasionally run as adjuncts to the main medical program, but it was not until 1878 that a professor of mental medicine was first hired at the University of Paris. Formal training was similarly sparse in the British Isles. Alexander Morison had instituted a course of lectures in 1823, John Conolly in 1842, and Thomas Laycock in the 1860s, but these courses were badly subscribed. Morison estimated that his course, over twenty years, attracted a total of little more than a hundred students. It was not until 1885 that a certificate course in psychological medicine was introduced by the General Medical Council, and no one applied for the first examination. Professional apprenticeship training did exist formally in the main psychiatric hospitals in France and informally as assistant medical superintendent positions began to appear in England in the second half of the century, but these produced relatively few experts to staff the growing number of facilities. While Jean-Étienne Esquirol by 1820 claimed the care of the insane to be a speciality within medicine, it was a speciality practiced by those trained as generalists.

And what of the disorders which were the subject of this apparent specialization? Here again, one can see a variety of themes in operation. Certainly, there are issues of control and professional interest. The doctors lived in their specific societies, however, and therefore the history of the disorders involves the history of philosophy and political contingency. There are also issues of the history of medical science, but here too the dividing line between science and philosophy and society is fluid.

The project of organizing insanity into categorical structures, and of identifying new forms of madness can be seen as an example of these intermingling themes. From antiquity, mental illness was understood as of two main sorts, melancholia and mania. The eighteenth century saw a revived interest in theorizing insanity, and, gradually, new categories of insanity were introduced and new theories of causation were articulated. The reasons are manifold. Certainly, there has throughout the period been an advantage to an individual's career in publishing texts detailing the nature and indications of insanity. Publication has always been a way to individual fame for the author. The publication of texts and taxonomies was also an exercise in professional development, however, for the placement of madness into an overtly medical frame

emphasizes that it is the province of medicine. In this, the development of uniform systems of classification has a particular importance. Professionalism implies both expertise and objectivity. The development of a common language, uniformly applied by experts guided by ethical and professional principles, is an important part of this process. Disagreements between alienists were actively discouraged by the nascent nineteenth-century professional organizations, and remain controversial to this day.

Indeed, the history of classification in the late twentieth century reflects some of these concerns. Since 1949, International Classification of Diseases has included a section on mental disorders. The classificatory system contained therein and developed in ten-year amendments since that time can be seen as an attempt to introduce order and uniformity into diagnoses and categorization among psychiatrists internationally. The inclusion of mental disorders for the first time in 1949 in part reflects the foundation of the World Health Organization, which coordinates the compilation of the work. While the 1949 edition was considerably expanded overall, the inclusion of mental disorders can be seen as indicative of the increasing acceptance of psychiatric practice by general medicine—a process that had been a project of the alienists for a hundred years. This was arguably particularly important at this time. The abuses of psychiatry under the Nazi regime in Germany had come to light, and a reassertion of the professional nature of psychiatry can be understood as important in this period. Throughout the ongoing development of the ICD, consistency in application has been of particular importance. In the 1993 revision, consistency has been particularly important not merely among those using the ICD system, but also with those primarily in the United States and Canada, where the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual system is used instead of ICD. Prior to that time, there were marked divergences in diagnosis based on similar facts, with North Americans far more likely to diagnose schizophrenia than their European counterparts. Certainly, the desire for consistent categorizations and applications can be seen as scientifically important, but it is also difficult to deny that the prior divergences in practice caused considerable embarrassment to the medical professions concerned. The amendments are also thus in the professions' interests.

The creation of new categories of disorder can be seen as flowing in part from developments in medical science, and in part from social and professional interests. Some important disorders have existed in medical understanding and been developed for hundreds of years. Depression developed from melanco-

lia, a category that has existed since antiquity. The origins of psychotic disorders can be seen in the manias of history. Other disorders have come and gone, however. Monomania was identified by Esquirol in about 1810. It was understood as a single pathological obsession in an otherwise sane mind. By the late 1820s, it was a common disorder. Jan Goldstein notes that it accounted for 45 percent of admissions to the Charenton asylum in Paris between 1826 and 1833, and 23 percent of admissions to Montpellier asylum from 1826 to 1829. By 1870, it had all but vanished. Certainly, a scientific basis was articulated for the disorder, but Goldstein argues that it was also important in the turf war between doctors and lawyers as expertise in criminal insanity matters. Monomania allowed doctors to portray themselves as experts in court, by diagnosing a disorder not readily identifiable to laity. The political purpose was not restricted to self-interested professionalism. A finding of monomania allowed markedly increased flexibility in sentencing, in the context of an otherwise very strict Napoleonic Code. Monomania can thus be seen as lying at the intersection of doctors' political reformist views and professional advantage. When these background factors changed, the diagnosis became much less important, whatever its medico-scientific merits.

Other new diagnoses can be understood as broadening the market for psychiatric services. For much of the nineteenth century in France there was a glut of doctors. Goldstein argues that the rise in hysteria in the second half of the nineteenth century was in part the result of a need for mental specialists to find new markets for their services. Shorter makes a similar claim about the increasing number of neurotic disorders in the second half of the twentieth century. There are social control implications to these developments, as ever more people become involved in the psychiatric universe. At the same time the history of psychiatric administration over the twentieth century has increasingly focused on non-enforced treatment. If we see a rise in social control, it is increasingly social self-control.

The nineteenth century saw insanity as flowing from some combination of physical, moral, and environmental causes. A physical predisposition in the form of weak nerves, heredity, epilepsy, or a brain lesion, for example, was thought usual if not necessary for the onset of mental illness, but that would not usually suffice. While this might be the "predisposing" cause, an "exciting" cause was also necessary. The possibilities here were legion, including overindulgence in alcohol, an excess of religious devotion, bereavement, childbirth, use of drugs, ill-treatment by a spouse, the fear of poverty or unemployment, and

overwork. Certainly, there are social control implications to these categories, and the insane might be perceived in heavily moralistic terms. John Hadley, admitted to the Leicestershire and Rutland County Asylum in 1852, was said to possess “a large amount of animal cunning, low trickery, and all the paltry and petty devices of an abandoned character.” Not all insanity was due to such moral failing, however. John Kettle, admitted to the same asylum three years earlier had been “remarkable for his steady, industrious and sober habits.” His insanity was instead caused by the demise of his business. The doctors might even place the blame on broader social and environmental causes. Thus Elizabeth Spawton’s insanity in 1851 was attributed to the “crowded and vitiated atmosphere” to which she was subjected in her many years employment as a factory hand. Economic factors such as those to which John Kettle was subjected and public health in factories were as much issues of social concern as the dissoluteness of the poor that formed the basis of John Hadley’s characterization. In each case, the description of the inmate cannot be separated from broader social themes. The latter two cases do emphasize that while nineteenth-century alienism was about social control, it was also about creating broader understandings of how it was that social control became necessary.

Moral treatment. The ambiguities surrounding social control, and the mixture of themes in the de-

velopment of insanity, can also be seen in the creation and development of moral treatment. It was a philosophical advance that reconceptualized insanity to create the intellectual space for the development of this approach. In 1690, John Locke, himself a physician, recast the ancient distinction between idiocy and lunacy in a philosophic framework. While idiocy involved the inability to reason, lunatics could reason, but did so from incorrect and deluded sensations. The placement of insanity in the realm of sensation and unbridled passions was continued by Étienne Bonnet Condillac. The new emphasis on the ability of the insane person to reason provided the intellectual background for moral treatment at the beginning of the nineteenth century, treatment that was based on the patient’s ability to correct his or her ways.

The foundation of moral treatment in France was based on political contingency. Philippe Pinel was a provincial doctor from Montpellier, who went to seek his fortune in Paris in 1778. There he was effectively shut out of the medical establishment until the revolution. The system of medical accreditation then in effect meant that his Montpellier qualification had no validity in Paris, and it was only with the revolution that Pinel was able to come to prominence. At that time, he was politically well placed to do so: he had become a partisan of the revolution and in 1790 obtained municipal office in Paris, where several of his friends were in positions of considerable influence. In 1793 he was appointed to the medical directorship of

the Bicêtre, and two years later he was transferred to the Salpêtrière. While there, he developed his system of moral treatment, which he published first in 1801. This system marked a move from the physical treatments of the eighteenth century to a system where the alienist interacted instead with the personality of the patient. Hope and encouragement were offered, and deluded ideas directly challenged, by an alienist whose authority was re-enforced through physical and moral means of control. These were not techniques derived from medical theory, but instead from Pinel's observation of his own lay orderlies at the Bicêtre, although Pinel did place the techniques in a scientific context.

Independently but contemporaneously, a similar approach was being taken by William Tuke at the York Retreat, founded in 1796. The Retreat, however, was founded in direct reaction to medical control and its abuses at the charitable York Asylum. Based on a Quaker ethos of dignity, piety, and charity, the Retreat treated its patients as members of a family under the guidance of the superintendent. As with Pinel's version, an attempt was made to connect with the patient at his or her level of understanding, and to build on that. Suitable employment was provided, both to occupy the insane in a reasonably pleasant way, and to prepare them for a return to the community.

Moral treatment was influential across Europe, but particularly in England, where coopted and somewhat modified to emphasize the absence of physical restraints and pervasive surveillance by asylum personnel, it became the basis of the curative asylum of the mid-nineteenth century. Again, there is an issue as to how much this is to be understood as a

medical development. The traditional version of history is that the nonrestraint system in England was popularized by John Conolly, the medical superintendent at the Hanwell Asylum from 1839. While certainly the medical specialists adopted it as their own in the middle years of the nineteenth century, Akihito Suzuki has suggested that Conolly himself was not instrumental in the introduction of the approach, which was instead developed by the justices of the peace who formed the administrative board of the asylum.

Much has been made of the shift in emphasis implied by this approach, from control of the body to control of the mind, of the self. Michel Foucault characterizes this as a new technology of power, that where the old treatments had controlled the body of the insane person, the new treatments were a battle to control the individual's mind or self. There is a strong case to be made for this view, in that the object of moral therapy was self-control, in the hope that the individual might reintegrate as a productive member of society. In the twenty-first century, this remains the object of mental health policy. Those who choose not to take their medication, those who choose madness, and as a result who choose not to fit in are characterized as immoral. Certainly, there is a significant social control element, but the ethics of this element is difficult to gauge. Integration is, after all, the object of many of those who have been involved in the psychiatric system. Does this mean that social control is the mutual aim of the carers and the insane person, in which case is it control at all? Or does it instead mean that the social control has worked, and that the controlling view has been truly internalized?

See also Health and Disease (volume 2); and other articles in this section.

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Section 13



SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL REFORM

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CHARITY AND POOR RELIEF: THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD



Brian Pullan

In the teachings of the Christian churches, charity was a religious emotion, a divine fire that destroyed the love of self to make room for the love of God and neighbors. Closely related to charity or *caritas* was mercy or *misericordia*. According to the vision of the Last Judgment in chapter 25 of the Gospel of St. Matthew, salvation depended absolutely on willingness to be merciful to the poor, as if each one were Christ himself. A good Christian would strive at once to imitate Christ and to find him in deprived and afflicted people and in wanderers, pilgrims, galley slaves, and the inmates of jails.

“I must be a suitor unto you in our good Master Christ’s cause,” wrote the bishop of London to the king’s secretary in 1552. “I beseech you be good to him. The matter is, Sir, alas, he hath lain too long abroad (as you do know) without lodging, in the streets of London, both hungry, naked, and cold. Now, thanks be to Almighty God, the citizens are willing to refresh him, and to give him both meat, drink, clothing and firing.”

Whereas charity could flourish between equals, mercy denoted transactions between the strong and the weak, the rich and the poor, even the living and the dead. “Charity and mercy are distinct virtues,” pronounced the Jesuit Jerome Drexel (1581–1638), for many years a preacher at the court of the elector of Bavaria. “Friendship and charity are given or received by equals, but mercy excels in that it looks to and supports a lesser person. Charity embraces human beings for their goodness, mercy for their wretchedness, for merciful people are like God to those whom they assist.”

In practice mercy and charity were seldom so clearly distinguished from each other, and associations devoted to mercy and to charity were equally concerned with the relief of the poor. Six works of mercy were commended in the Gospel, but the tradition of the Catholic Church had added a seventh, the burial of the dead. To balance those works of “corporal” mercy, which were performed toward the body, Catholic catechisms listed an equal number of others done

for the benefit of the soul. The seven works of “spiritual” mercy included offering prayers and masses for souls suffering in purgatory; teaching Christian doctrine to children and ignorant adults; rescuing public sinners, including common prostitutes, whose way of life exposed them to damnation; and converting unbelievers, among them Jews and Muslims.

Through its links with corporal and spiritual mercy, charity became associated with poor relief, education, and campaigns for moral improvement. But legal definitions of charity, as in Tudor England, also included public-spirited attempts to better the lives of communities by providing or maintaining amenities. Indeed the preamble to an English statute of 1597, which remained in force until 1888 and established an official list of proper charitable uses, referred not only to various forms of poor relief but also to “repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea banks and highways.”

Poor relief, however, was not inspired solely by the religious motives of charity and mercy, and some relief was financed by rates and taxes rather than by voluntary contributions. Worldly, practical, and humane reasons lay behind attempts to relieve poverty. Conspicuous among them was the fear of public disorder. Riots erupted if the poor were made desperate by shortages of bread or if the government of a state or city failed in its fundamental duty of guaranteeing supplies of food and frustrating the maneuvers of speculators who attempted to amass quantities of grain and profit from soaring prices. Another prominent reason was the fear of disease, especially the notorious plague that might invade a community if vagrants were allowed to wander freely from infected to healthy areas. Third was the desire to protect the economy against heavy losses of population through epidemic or famine, since few governments doubted that a large population containing a high proportion of skilled workers made for a strong and prosperous state. Last was the need to tide the labor force over spells of slack trade or seasonal unemployment. Most of the poor laws passed from the sixteenth century onward contained provisions for set-

ting the able-bodied poor to work. These measures were influenced by religious disapproval of idleness (which was regarded as sinful as well as antisocial), and perhaps even more by the desire of merchant capitalists to secure cheap, disciplined labor to perform simple tasks, such as spinning wool, winding silk, beating hemp, or rasping dyewood, as in the London Bridewell established in the 1550s or the Amsterdam workhouse opened in the 1590s.

Some people devoted their leisure to charitable activities not, perhaps, from purely religious motives but because they saw them as a path to prestige and the control of patronage. Since acts of charity were highly esteemed, positions on the boards of management of hospitals or other concerns conferred status and bore witness to a person's probity. Sometimes, as in early modern Venice and eighteenth-century Turin, these positions compensated certain social groups (in Venice the citizens, in Turin the court aristocracy and the merchants) for their exclusion from power in the state. Other times, as in sixteenth-century Bologna, control over charities consolidated the power and authority of the senatorial families who dominated the city.

In other instances, as in Amsterdam, the task of running an orphanage, hospital, or house of correction served as an apprenticeship for members of the political elite before they entered the senate. A statue or bust in the hall of a hospital or a commemorative tablet in a church reciting a benefactor's good deeds conferred a kind of immortality in almost any country. The practice of benevolence was described in the English *Gentleman's Magazine* in August 1732 as "the most lasting, valuable and exquisite Pleasure."

METHODS OF POOR RELIEF

Poor relief schemes generally included harsh measures intended to correct the rebellious poor who refused

to work, seemingly in contradiction to conventional notions of Christian charity, though they could be represented as a form of tough love. In the early eighteenth century Lodovico Antonio Muratori (1672–1750), a scholar, parish priest, and archivist to the duke of Modena, argued in a controversial treatise that punitive measures should be regarded as acts of charity toward the body politic if not toward the individual. "If we show little indulgence towards defective members," he wrote, "this becomes charity towards the whole body." To deny alms to a wastrel could be an act of charity, since such a refusal might spur him or her into leading a better life.

Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries societies waged a war on begging and vagrancy rather than a war on poverty. In its broadest sense poverty was the condition of being compelled to labor in order to live and having no savings or independent income in reserve if prevented from working. It was accepted as part of the natural or providential order, in which the rich and the poor were complementary, each supporting the other. The benevolent almsgiver needed the prayers of the poor in return for his or her acts of charity. Sometimes poverty was seen as a vital spur to industry on the assumption that, unless driven by the fear of starvation, most people would not choose to work. Charity was a conservative force designed to palliate poverty but not to uproot it by a radical redistribution of wealth. It was intended to preserve the existing social order, and people often showed a special tenderness to distressed gentleness and respectable people who had fallen on hard times and were ashamed to beg.

Most early modern societies, however, tried to promote one kind of change by transforming the idle poor into the industrious poor and by equipping solitary and unprotected young people to take their proper places in society and the family. This involved apprenticing orphaned boys and abandoned children

to useful trades and placing girls in domestic service and eventually providing them with dowries that would enable them to marry respectable husbands.

At least from the twelfth century ecclesiastical lawyers authorized almsgivers to discriminate between the worthy and the undeserving poor both on economic and on moral grounds and to favor those who were in greater need and those who were better behaved. By the sixteenth century organized private charities and public relief schemes were clearly endeavoring to concentrate their resources on the genuinely needy. This group included not only the widows and orphans whom every ruler traditionally vowed to protect, not only the aged and feeble-minded, but also working families burdened with large numbers of dependent children or plunged into destitution by the prolonged sickness or disablement of the principal wage earner. Instead of waiting for the poor to present themselves at the charity's headquarters, officers visited homes and systematically compiled censuses. About 1603 the officers of San Girolamo della Carità, a religious society devoted to poor relief that expected to cover one-third of the districts in Rome, were instructed by their society to take account of "female children of any age and males up to the twelfth year" and to exclude from relief all families with fewer than three children and parents in good health.

Concern for the respectable, hardworking poor, for victims of circumstance who patiently accepted their misfortunes, and for the young and the aged was balanced by harshness toward drunkards, gamblers, idlers, and the tricksters who bulked large in the literature of almost every European country. By the late seventeenth century parts of France and Italy exhibited an ambition to carry out what Michel Foucault has called a "great internment" of beggars, lunatics, and social undesirables in general hospitals. Here they would be separated from the public and subjected to a quasi-monastic regime based on regular work, sexual abstinence, and compulsory piety. But few if any societies actually possessed the resources to carry out such a far-reaching measure, and beggars' hospitals were often restricted to women, children, and invalids.

ADMINISTRATION OF POOR RELIEF

Charity and poor relief were administered partly by the Christian churches, partly by voluntary organizations, partly by the foundations of individual philanthropists, partly by the town, village, or parish, and partly by the state. Public authorities tended to intervene drastically only in emergencies, but many cities

in continental Europe established public health offices and food commissions charged with taking preventive measures against plague and famine. Both church and state claimed the right to supervise charities and inspect their accounts. The Catholic bishops insisted on performing this task after the Council of Trent empowered them to do so in the 1560s. Calvinist churches appointed deacons with a special responsibility for collecting and dispensing alms to the poor. In Catholic societies much of the work was in the hands of the lay officers of religious fraternities, hospitals, or other foundations who were subject to clerical advice and surveillance but enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy.

It is arguable whether or not the theological differences of Catholics and Protestants gave rise to distinctive approaches to the problem of poverty. Catholics insisted on the crucial role of good works, which included acts of mercy and a great many other pious deeds, in accumulating the religious merit vital to salvation. They often contended that the highest aim of all acts of mercy and charity ought to be the salvation of souls, those of the receivers as well as the givers of charity. Protestants held that good works were but the fruits and signs of salvation through the merits of Christ alone and through belief in his sacrificial death. They saw poor relief as a means to creating an orderly and God-fearing society, a truly Christian commonwealth.

Catholics and Protestants also defined the objects of charity rather differently. Catholics gave to members of religious communities who had renounced all worldly goods and made themselves poor, to pilgrims traveling to sacred places, and to souls suffering in purgatory, on whose behalf they celebrated masses. Sometimes several hundred masses were offered for the sake of a single soul, and special funds were set up to finance them. For Protestants only the involuntary living poor, who had neither chosen poverty nor descended into poverty out of dissolute behavior, could be proper objects of charity. Apparently Protestants were better able to concentrate on the needs of society rather than the needs of souls insofar as the two could be separated, for sins such as fornication and incest could be countered by improving degrading social conditions.

However, it seems certain that from the 1520s onward both Catholic and Protestant cities in western Europe attempted to adopt poor relief schemes on broadly similar lines, seeking to centralize or coordinate the dispensation of charity, to suppress or control begging, and to provide work for everyone capable of doing it. Such schemes may have originated in Lutheran Saxony, but they proved broadly acceptable to

many Catholic communities in Flanders, France, Italy, and Spain. In Flanders and Spain representatives of the begging friars, the traditional champions of the poor who saw their own interests threatened by the bans on begging, vigorously opposed the poor laws, arguing that they would deprive the poor of a fundamental human right to ask for alms as they chose and to travel freely from the more barren to the more prosperous parts of a country. But the University of Paris approved the principles behind the poor law scheme of Catholic Ypres in 1531, and the misgivings of the mendicant orders were not shared by all the Catholic clergy or by Catholic magistrates.

Similarities should not be exaggerated, for Catholics continued to favor organizations of which reformed communities disapproved. To take an obvious example, brotherhoods and sisterhoods devoted to pursuing their own salvation by good works continued to flourish and multiply in Catholic societies until the mid-eighteenth century. Elsewhere they were swiftly abolished at the Reformation, and their absence cleared the way for the parishes, their traditional though not invariable rivals.

In 1523 an ordinance written by the reformer Martin Luther for the small town of Leisnig in Saxony conceded that, if voluntary charity and endowments proved unequal to the task of sustaining the local poor, the authorities would be entitled to levy a compulsory contribution from the more prosperous mem-

bers of the community. However, most communities in continental Europe clung to the belief that giving to the poor ought to follow from personal choice rather than legal coercion. Only in England did the parish authorities regularly levy poor rates, which parliamentary statutes had empowered them to impose since 1572. Although only about one-third of English parishes were accustomed to using their statutory powers in 1660, the practice had by 1700 become almost universal. On the other hand, in many communities outside England the moral pressures to give were intense enough to constitute a “charitable imperative,” with only slight differences between a voluntary subscription and an obligatory payment or between a religious undertaking and a civic duty.

By virtue of parliamentary legislation and its local enforcement, England developed something close to a national system of poor relief, although the practice of levying rates did not eliminate the need for private action. In continental Europe most towns and cities made their own arrangements, which depended on large institutions located in cities that often served the surrounding districts as well. Such foundations were supported by bequests, gifts, and the proceeds of collections taken on the streets or through poor boxes in churches. Occasionally the state or town government or a benevolent ruler supported a particular charity by allocating to it the proceeds of certain indirect taxes or judicial fines.

To generalize is difficult, but it is reasonable to suggest that in any particular city the institutional arrangements consisted of a combination of some though not necessarily all of the following elements: religious brotherhoods and sisterhoods or voluntary societies whose concerns included poor relief, visiting and nursing the sick, or moral improvement, or all of these things; hospitals or hospices, which could be both poorhouses and places for medical care; workhouses and houses of correction; institutions for the care of orphans, lost or abandoned children, and girls thought to be in moral danger; houses for reformed prostitutes or otherwise dishonored women; public pawn banks designed to lend money freely or at nominal rates of interest against pledges to customers who could prove need; free schools intended chiefly to teach the elements of Christian doctrine; medical care provided by publicly salaried physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries and by nurses, who were often themselves poor people; and public granaries and food stores.

Some attempts were made to simplify these complicated structures. In many cities of northern Italy, France, and Spain magistrates and ecclesiastical authorities endeavored, from the mid-fifteenth century onward, to consolidate small hospitals into larger and better-supervised organizations. In the 1520s the newly Protestant towns of Germany led the way by a few years in establishing "common chests" or central

almonries to control all relief paid to people who remained in their homes. Similar institutions soon followed in the Low Countries and in France.

Not all forms of organized charity were directed primarily toward city dwellers. For instance, the *Monti Frumentari* or grain banks of Italy lent seed corn or food for consumption to farmers and hoped to recover their loans at harvesttime. The charity workshops of eighteenth-century France benefited smallholders and agricultural laborers during the months when seasonal unemployment was most severe. Despite their name, they were to pay wages rather than dispense alms, chiefly for road building and textile work. Rural Finland, perhaps in response to the famines of the 1690s, developed a system whereby peasant households were divided into groups known as *rote*. Each group was charged with looking after one of the parish poor, who might either lodge with one particular household or move at intervals between one household and another in the group.

Beyond all institutional charity lay innumerable personal transactions and informal neighborly acts. They have left no documentary traces but must have been crucial to the subsistence of the poor. Survival may have depended as much on the neighborly charity of the poor toward each other as on the merciful condescension of the rich and the sometimes grudging agreement of prosperous folks to pay the poor rate levied on social superiors.

See also other articles in this section.

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CHARITY AND POOR RELIEF: THE MODERN PERIOD



Timothy B. Smith

In the late twentieth century, massive national welfare states consumed up to 40 percent of the gross national product (GNP) in several western European nations. Charities performed vital services, but they were shadows of their former selves. Their total spending paled in comparison to state social welfare spending. The accident of charity has been replaced by the guarantee of social insurance. Cradle-to-grave welfare states, providing insurance against illness, disability, unemployment, and above all old age poverty, shelter Europeans from life's major risks.

The welfare state is young. In Europe prior to the 1920s charity and poor relief predominated over social insurance. These were by definition concerned with providing the minimum necessary for survival. Charities often were as concerned with providing moral and religious guidance as they were with providing financial assistance. The welfare state is concerned with ensuring a basic level of material comfort and in Europe generally does not mix morals with money.

State-provided social welfare matched private charity in strength in the 1920s in France and Britain. In Germany this occurred a little earlier, and in other European nations, such as Italy, it was a little later. But everywhere charity was the bedrock of poor relief throughout the nineteenth century. London had over seven hundred charities in the 1880s, and Paris had several hundred. Spending by charities overshadowed spending by public authorities. In Lyon, France, private charities spent over 18 million francs in 1906, whereas public social welfare cost only 1.34 million francs. Giving and receiving private charity was a crucial part of the urban experience in nineteenth-century Europe, figuring at the center of civic life, where the state did not. In Russia the almost complete absence of public assistance in the early nineteenth century meant that mutual aid within estates and private charity were indispensable. Charity flourished even in places notorious for their poorly developed civil society and their tiny middle class, such as Russia.

As late as 1900 most European states extracted only 3 percent of the GNP through taxes. By the end

of the twentieth century that figure averaged 45 to 50 percent. The states did not have enough public money to redistribute before the 1930s to 1950s. Private charity and local poor relief helped keep the European social order intact but little else. It set its sights low and promised even less. Ultimately, as Western Europe moved toward an open, prosperous, and egalitarian society in the 1950s, private charity diminished. Although it still flourished in Britain and to a lesser extent in some continental countries, charity was displaced entirely by the welfare state in many nations. In Germany and Scandinavia the state so dominated the social service scene that it squeezed charity to the margins of civil society.

Until the 1960s charity was by definition an asymmetrical exchange between unequal partners. Presuming that social inequality, while possibly regrettable, was nevertheless inevitable, it has dealt with the symptoms rather than the roots of poverty. Throughout history charity has been what Enlightenment critics like Paul-Henri-Dietrich d'Holbach called an "accidental virtue." Charity might be well established in one city but weak or nonexistent in another. Critics on the left, especially in France and Germany, charged that charity was necessarily antidemocratic. Charity and the poor law tended to stigmatize recipients, so many British politicians, among them Aneurin Bevan, worked to create the universal welfare programs of the 1940s. Considerations of dignity thus combined with the inadequacy of private charity to spur the establishment of state-sponsored welfare.

THE PREDOMINANCE OF PRIVATE CHARITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE

Although they date from much earlier in European history, charity and poor relief in the nineteenth century exhibited some special features. First, churches, the traditional providers of charity, came under recurrent attack by secular reformers. Where the churches

weakened, as in France, serious questions arose regarding the institutional base of charity. Even there, however, churches remained fundamental to the charitable effort. Second, industrialization and urbanization made poverty more visible. Population increases also had an effect, for example, enlarging the number of abandoned children. Third, middle-class beliefs challenged the validity of charity. Strict economic liberals urged that charity harmed the recipient, making him or her dependent rather than self-sufficient. Many cities tried to ban begging because it contradicted a proper work ethic. Similar beliefs lay behind efforts in England to tighten poor law provisions and to force recipients into unpleasant workhouses. Benevolent institutions attempted to distinguish the worthy poor, who simply could not work because of illness or old age, from the lazy, who should be prodded into the active labor force. Charity continued nevertheless, but on less secure cultural foundations.

Regional differences were important. Orthodox Christianity had always heavily emphasized charity, and in countries like Russia that emphasis continued unchanged. Some have argued that the emphasis on charity there delayed political measures to aid the poor. The debate over religion as the basis for charity in France was not replicated in England, where concerns about charity's demoralizing effects were more prominent.

Outside of England and parts of Germany, where the poor law was tax-financed and a major annual

expense, publicly funded social assistance, even at the local level, was relatively undeveloped. In the vast majority of French, Spanish, and Italian towns and villages, private charities and the church provided the lion's share of poor relief throughout the nineteenth century. In many towns publicly funded assistance simply was not available. In many French departments, the ninety county-sized administrative units that make up the country, lay charities did not exist in 1900. But charity was heavily concentrated in the wealthier regions of France and Europe, and was almost nonexistent in some of the poor, remote areas. Between 1800 and 1845, six of ninety French departments, Seine, Rhône, Nord, Seine-et-Oise, Haute-Garonne, and Bouches-du-Rhône, received one-quarter of all charitable bequests. In western and central France the church was still heavily involved in charitable activity, to the point of monopolizing it. Typical was the city of Angers, which in 1890 had sixty charities, all private and Catholic. The Seine department was home to no less than 3,227 charitable institutions in 1897. At the end of the century Lyon had at least 245 private charities, and when multiple branches are included the figure is over 1,000.

In France and other parts of Europe the Catholic Church expanded its charitable activities in the nineteenth century. From the 1830s, for example, the Société de St.-Vincent-de-Paul (Society of Saint Vincent de Paul) spread its roots across Europe and North America. By 1860 it had over 1,500 chapters and

100,000 members in France alone. Religious orders, particularly the female ones, multiplied at an incredible rate in the 1820s and 1830s. In Lyon, the first to be officially reconstituted in 1825 were the Ursulines, the Carmelites, and the Soeurs de Saint-Joseph et Saint-Charles (Sisters of St. Joseph and St. Charles). The Jesuit Congrégation des Messieurs (Brotherhood of Gentlemen) was one of the most active male orders on the charitable scene. With the support of the church, these orders devoted their energies to teaching the catechism to the working classes and to charitable works. Dozens of providences for orphans and young children, such as the Providence de Saint-Bruno and the Providence de Saint-Pierre, were established between 1815 and 1825. In the early stages of industrialization, the church's charities were crucial to coping with social problems.

Until the 1890s the church generally took a fatalistic view toward poverty, reminding workers that the poor would always be here. Church and bourgeois politicians alike viewed religion as the last rampart between civilization and proletarian barbarians, yet the church was generally opposed to official state social reform. It devoted its energies to supporting voluntary charity, whether directly, through the parish system, or indirectly, through lay but religiously inspired institutions, such as the *Association catholique de la jeunesse française*, (Catholic association of French youths) which had sixty thousand members by 1905.

Despite its shortcomings, private charity kept the social world from falling apart, especially in France, Italy, and Spain, which had no poor law. Even in areas where public assistance was unusually well developed, such as the Pas-de-Calais department in northern France, 73 percent of the families of agricultural laborers in 1913 received some form of charity. In Saint-Chamond, France, 60 percent of the population of one parish, 2,200 of 3,600 inhabitants, received assistance in 1844. In times of trouble private citizens organized ad hoc charities.

THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF WORK AND CHARITY

The predominance of private charity in nineteenth-century Europe shaped relations between employers and workers. Employers wrote letters recommending admission of their laid-off workers to charity, poor relief, or the local hospice. Local elites pulled strings for "their" protected poor, usually the poor of their *quartier* or neighborhood. Those who donated to hospitals and charities had a say in who received assistance. Political clout helped too. One family might

control all the major relief institutions in a small town of France. In some small villages, like Sommieres in Gard southern France, one person ran both the hospital and the welfare bureau for twenty years. Clearly in such a setting a bad reputation would immediately disqualify a person from relief. In many small, remote towns during the first half of the nineteenth century, the *bureau de bienfaisance* (poor relief bureau) was merely a revived *maison de charité* (house of charity) of the Ancien Régime, run by the same people, usually the Sisters of Charity. Many were in fact located next to convents, such as in Châtillon-sur-Seine.

Charities determined the so-called "poverty line" on a daily and individual basis. A reputation for unusual generosity earned Charles Neyrand, a nineteenth-century French industrialist, the nickname of "father of the poor." Charity and work could become inseparable in small cities, where the same people provided or denied both. "The provision of aid by local notables and wealthy bourgeois defined the nature of their relations with workers almost as much as wages did" (Accampo, 1989, p. 147). The leaders in smaller cities and towns "alternate[d] roles of benefactor and [boss]" and assured that charity was a face-to-face affair. The degree of power a person gained over another through the provision of charity was viewed in the twentieth century as antidemocratic and a violation of citizenship rights.

The downside to this state of affairs was an erosion of families' self-sufficiency. Charity, after all, was needed due to insufficient wages and unstable jobs. For every *centime* (cent) gained, some small degree of self-sufficiency and self-respect was lost. Many workers could live with this bargain, but others found it a bitter pill to swallow. England's great tradition of workers' self-help or mutualism, as revealed in the proliferation of its tens of thousands of friendly societies, was also based to a certain extent on fierce pride of independence from charity. Seeking charity admitted a lack of self-sufficiency. The hallmark of respectability was independence.

CHARITABLE GIVING AND IDENTITY: CLASS, GENDER, COMMUNITY

Charity formed a significant component of local elites' self-conception. The religious view of charity was by definition a localized, parish-based one. Charity solidified the loyalty of the populace and often tolerated no outside state interference, that is, no outside authority that might compete with local elites for the sympathies of the poor. The hand that gave liked to remind recipients of just who had given. "Charity,"

wrote the philosopher Victor Cousin during the debates on the right to assistance in 1848, “knows no rule, no limit; it surpasses all obligations. Its beauty is precisely in its liberty” (Smith, 1997). The existence of charity justified a certain degree of inequality.

In poor regions, such as the hinterland of Toulouse, France, southern Italy, southern Spain, and much of the Massif Central, that relied on sharecropping and were largely unaffected by economic change, poverty was pervasive. Rural notables capitalized on this poverty by distributing charity to cement the loyalty of the peasants. In much of western France traditional noble-peasant patronage relationships survived until the mid-nineteenth century. In some parts of western France, châteaux were still the principal source of poor relief as late as the 1880s. At that time the key source of relief in small rural communes in Aube, Doubs, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Corsica, Savoie, Ardèche, Hautes-Alpes, and several other departments was private alms. Seasonal migration and door-to-door soliciting of alms was a way of life for many French in 1900. In some areas, like Brittany and Aveyron, hospitality for vagrants was still a widespread custom, provided for the most part out of fear, as late as 1900. This type of charitable activity was not unique to France. In parts of southern Italy and Spain, traditional patron-client relations, in the context of highly inegalitarian and agriculturally backward societies, were fixed with the seal of charity. It was a small price to pay for the elites, who owned up to 95 percent of the wealth and almost all the land in these regions.

Charity in nineteenth-century Europe was practiced out of civic pride. It brought prestige to the city, as in eighteenth-century Hamburg, and those who administered it acquired considerable social and political capital. The same was true if not more true in smaller cities and in medium-sized towns, where the hospital might be the largest and most imposing building other than the church or the city hall. Baron de Verna, president of the Lyon hospital board, noted in 1828 that for some families serving the poor was their *raison d'être*. “As in the time of our fathers,” de Verna said, “municipal honors [and offices] almost always become the recompense for he who has devoted himself *au service des pauvres*” (to the service of the poor).

Local charities and hospitals were powerful sources of elite identity. A seat on the board at the famous hospitals in Berlin or Vienna was a plum position. London’s high society ran the city’s voluntary hospitals. In France hospitals from Aix-en-Provence to Montpellier to Lyon to Beaune figured at the core of provincial identities. The burghers of Amsterdam, immortalized by artists for centuries, commonly struck

poses as civic leaders and as philanthropists. In English cities like Manchester, elite men built substantial public reputations by serving on charity boards. The rich and the respectable vied with each other in good works, and no noblewoman was without “her” poor. Indeed the wives of nobles and the bourgeois often framed their entire social lives around the practice of charity.

Membership on hospital boards or on the administrative boards of longstanding charities came with privileges. Early in the nineteenth century, in Lyon for example, it was a badge of social preeminence and also “the required passage to arrive at the high magistrature.” Those who accepted the call to service had come, to use their words, to “ennoble themselves” through administering “the sublime work of charity, the most noble of virtues.” In 1900 the Abbé Vachet observed that the call to office retained the same prestige: “The title of hospital administrator is, in Lyon, a veritable title of nobility, it is the highest rank a man can strive for.” Henri Boissieu sounded the same note in 1902: “The hospital administrators are today what they were in 1600: notables. The title ‘hospital administrator’ remains a consecration of notability.”

Charity grew in tandem with the rise of the middle class. In Lyon, France, for example, the wealth of the middle class increased over fourfold between the 1840s and the 1860s. The number of charities doubled during this period, the fastest rate of growth in the city’s history to that date. At best this was a sign that the middling ranks were more compassionate towards the poor. At worst, it was a sign that they were laundering their new riches and cleansing their consciences through charitable works. Charities across Europe relied on the largely unpaid charitable forces in most large cities: including bourgeois women who served as administrators and visited the poor, Sisters of Charity who staffed hospitals and refuges for the elderly, middle-class men of the merchant class who organized charity concerts to support the workforce of their troubled industry.

In their function as *dames de charité* (ladies of charity), middle-class French women maintained important links to the public sphere, and they played no small role in upholding it. Women, usually married, middle-aged women and especially *dames religieuses* (nuns) were indispensable in running the system. In 1841 and 1874 the directors of Lyon’s welfare bureau admitted that it was powerless without women: “To each his mission: the members of the *bureau de bienfaisance* [relief committee] can administer and supervise very well; but absorbed with their family duties and business affairs, they cannot visit and assist the

needy as well as the sisters, who have devoted their entire lives to this saintly task.” Indeed in 1893, twenty thousand women worked on a full-time, paid basis in philanthropic institutions in Britain. In addition 500,000 women worked full-time without pay in charities. After domestic service, philanthropy was the primary occupier of women’s time. Perhaps 1 million women and children attended mothers’ meetings each week. By the late nineteenth century several of Britain’s most important philanthropists and social reformers were women such as Octavia Hill, Beatrice Webb, Helen Bosanquet, Josephine Butler, and Clara Collet.

Bonnie Smith wrote of the women of the Nord department, near the French border with Belgium who visited neighbors in distress and held monthly “days” (*journées*) on which the poor could come knocking to receive money, clothing, or food. As Smith showed, female charity was geared toward needy mothers and their children, providing day care centers, crèches, and maternal aid societies. Male charity favored unemployed male workers, housing cooperative societies, and retirement or accident insurance through mutual aid societies.

When national social welfare legislation was in the works, some elites were reminded what they might lose. Throughout the century opponents of public assistance argued that legal charity or publicly financed social assistance would deprive the philanthropist of this opportunity. F. M. L. Naville warned in his influential treatise, *De la charité légale*:

in making this duty [private charity] a legal obligation . . . [a national poor tax] imposes upon the individual, by force, sacrifices which, when they are made voluntarily, are a source of the most sweet and noble pleasures. [The tax] threatens his wish that he may have a happy future beyond the grave. Whereas he hopes to acquire the approval of God and forgiveness for his faults by practising charity, it [legal charity] interposes itself between him and the supreme judge, and deprives him of this source of hope and consolation.

Many French and other Europeans believed that the charitable impulse must remain just that, an impulse, and not a legally mandated responsibility. As the guidebook used by relief administrators and volunteers in Paris, *Manuel des Commissaires et dames de charité de Paris* (1830) reveals: “charity . . . is the calling of the well-to-do. Charity is tender and affectionate; [but] it examines before its acts; it surveilles . . . it attaches to its relief consolations, advice and even paternal reprimands. . . . It allows [the giver] to become rich in good works.”

One of the century’s most influential works on the social question, the Baron de Gérando’s *Le visiteur*

du pauvre (1832), went through several editions during the 1830s and found a space in the libraries of most of France’s charities. A veritable bible for philanthropists and welfare bureau administrators, this pocket-size, 480-page book speaks to the European elite’s desire to be actively involved in the lives of the poor. Gérando toed a familiar line on the sublime virtues of personal charity, its healing effects on class relations, and its ability to rejuvenate society. The key to understanding the social question, he argued, was to picture society as a family that includes those who owe care and protection, as a father owes his children, and those who owe others their obedience and gratitude, as children owe their parents.

The Hospitaliers-Veilleurs of Lyon, like countless other Catholic charities in nineteenth-century Europe, were quite frank about their intentions. The charity’s director instructed the volunteers in 1897: “As well as tending to your patients’ corporal needs, you will seek to save their souls, to develop within them religious sentiments and practice, to prepare them for a saintly death, and, in that, to work for your own sanctification.” The secretary of the Société de Patronage des Jeunes Filles (Society of Protection of Girls) reminded her colleagues, “Your reward is the sweet certainty of knowing that you are working for your own eternal happiness.” As with so many others who engaged in the charitable exchange, these administrators were as concerned about their own futures as those of their charges.

LOCALISM AND VOLUNTARISM: THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHARITABLE ACTIVITY

The essentially local and voluntary nature of most poor relief and charitable activity distinguish it from modern welfare states. In most Western countries in the twentieth century, social solidarity was a national sentiment. The well-off of Paris or Berlin generally accept the idea that the poor of Provence or Bavaria are just as worthy of government assistance as the poor of their own cities. But prior to the twentieth century many elites’ sense of social solidarity stopped at the parish or city boundary, and outside of Germany no welfare state to speak of existed. Prior to the 1880s, when Germany pioneered the welfare state, private charity and local poor relief systems were the norm across Europe. In addition outside of England, where the poor law provided in theory a legal right to assistance, few Europeans had a right to assistance before the twentieth century.

When notables died, their wills often included bequests to the poor of their particular parish or street.

Well into the nineteenth century it was common for notables to have permanent patron-client relations with the local poor. The parish remained the moral anchor of the notables, and only the parish poor were owed charity.

The *pauvres honteux*, or shame-faced, locally known poor, were assisted. In several French and German towns, the locally known “humble” poor were even granted a regular spot in annual processions. Thus marginals were often fully integrated, symbolically as well as materially, into society. Charity was a civic event, a unifying force, a way to bring the local community together to affirm reciprocal bonds. In processions, parades, and even in the annual Lord Mayor’s Day parade in London in the 1880s, the common people were reminded of the beneficence of the rich.

But, in the end, the poor generally had no right to make a claim. In an age of limited resources, elites drew the line to ward off excessive claims with moral and religious litmus tests and residency requirements. One of the primary functions of the Lyon hospital administrative board, which met every week, was to determine which of the *vieillard* (elderly indigent) applications to accept. It helped to have friends in high places or at least to live near a rich or influential member of the community. In 1840, to pick a random year, three of the first four names on the *vieillard* admission list had social connections. Marguerite Plailly had been sponsored by the widow of a former accountant at the Hôpital de la Charité (Charity Hospital); Jeanne Binet was recommended by the family of Marguerite Berthon-Fromental, who had bequeathed over 200,000 francs to the Hospices Civils a few years earlier; and Jean-François Gautier was sponsored by the Comte de Bussy.

Traditional charity involved an entirely different set of authority relations from those of the 1920s or later. No universally valid, impartial criteria determined who would or would not receive aid. Charity, assistance, medical care—all forms of philanthropic activity—were grounded in inegalitarian social relations between the donor and the recipient. Gaining admission to the hospitals for the local poor was a sign of the persistence of local notables’ social power, which they frequently exercised in both life and death. Bequests often contained clauses spelling out what type of person would be eligible for assistance.

Significantly, the men and women who administered and dispensed public assistance went to great lengths to determine the merit of each individual case. To understand why this was so requires a conscious leap in the historical imagination to a time when the indigent had no legal claim to relief, when the needy

had to prove their moral and religious worthiness, when no clear idea of what constituted “poverty” or “need” existed, and when no rigid conception of a “poverty line” had developed. Since no clear criteria for establishing need existed, many needy were refused assistance for no good reason or for political or religious reasons. As a result poor relief systems in the nineteenth century were often quite arbitrary.

However, some guidebooks were published. In his influential 1847 pamphlet *Du paupérisme en France*, François Marbeau defined the worthy poor: “The good indigent is honest, respectful, appreciative, and resigned. . . . [He] is grateful for the services we provide to him, and he is always ready to devote himself to his benefactors. . . . He is humble: he suffers with patience the ills he cannot avoid. Resignation [is] the virtue of the poor” (*Marbeau, 1847, pp. 25–26*). This pocket-size guide to public policy, like the Baron de Gérando’s *Le visiteur du pauvre*, served as a sort of policy bible.

The French, of course, had no monopoly on this sort of face-to-face approach to the charitable vocation. The famous German “Elberfeld system,” named for the town, became a model for Europe late in the century. It was ostensibly a rigorous, “scientific” approach to charity with thorough screening processes. It relied on the existence of a vibrant voluntary sector and required elites with time on their hands. By the late twentieth century the upper middle class generally worked and had little time for charity.

The Elberfeld system suggests that Europe’s elite was still confident in its ability to cope with the social question with rudimentary local poor relief systems and purely private, personalized, and local charities. At least this was their wish. Significantly, many European charities emphasized the re-creation of the family in their works. This is important because the family was the dominant paradigm of the age. It was only natural that the civic elite should turn to its most familiar and trusted institutions, family and church, to help keep the social fabric intact. The state was not trusted by most people. It was distant yet intrusive, a threat to local liberties and pretensions. A sense that private and local interests were powerless to solve the social question had not yet emerged, and most Europeans were not yet ready to jettison the two sturdy pillars of society, family and church, and turn to the state to solve the social question. This would require an intellectual breakthrough, the likes of which do not occur overnight. It happened only in the 1880s to the 1920s, depending on the nation. Private charity was given six or seven decades to prove its capacities to cope with the urban social question that emerged, in the eyes of elites, in the 1830s.

CHARITY, MORALITY, AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Debates over the poor law provided part of the context for English charity. Originally established in 1601 to deal with growing poverty associated with a more commercial economy, the poor laws provided meager aid, mostly in kind, to the poor and unemployed. Poor law reform in 1834 instituted more middle-class or liberal principles—greater encouragement to work, less local variance, and lower taxes. Greater centralization was combined with lower funding and more rigorous tests for applicants. Able-bodied people were supposed to be forced to work, and unpleasant workhouses sheltered those who received aid. Workers attacked the system—in fact, a critique of the poor law was one component of the Chartist movement—but it survived until the twentieth century.

At the same time Great Britain was home to the world's most developed charitable sector in the nineteenth century. Religious pluralism begat philanthropic and educational pluralism. The annual revenues of the more than seven hundred charities in London were greater than the entire budgets of several small European states in the 1890s. Charitable giving was an ingrained part of British middle-class households. One study in the 1890s calculated that on average middle-class households spent a larger share of their income on charity than on any other item in their budget except food. A survey of artisans and working-class families in the same decade revealed similar results. Half of them made weekly donations to charity, and a quarter also gave to a church. This invisible welfare state, the charity of the poor toward the poor, was crucial to the survival of working-class families. As Ellen Ross demonstrated, in late nineteenth century working-class London, women's informal support networks kept people going when the going got tough. This of intra-class charity was ubiquitous but left fewer traces in the historical record than official, elite-sponsored charity.

It is common to portray charitable activity as a means of social control. The middle class used charity as an entry point into the lives of the poor. Ladies visited working-class mothers and peddled their “domestic imperialism” with one hand while giving with the other. Historians such as Gareth Stedman Jones have portrayed charity as a bourgeois ploy to placate the poor. Others, such as Jane Lewis and Ross have emphasized the moral gaze of middle-class female visitors and school attendance officers.

It is too easy to dismiss this historical school as overly hostile toward the middle class. Much commends this school of thought, and it of course applies

to the rest of Europe. Philanthropic societies, usually with some sort of religious inspiration, bombarded the poor with advice. They lectured the poor, demanded to see proof of good morals, and asked intrusive questions. This was done at British Sunday schools, charity schools across Europe, day care centers (*salles d'asile* in France), apprentice schools affiliated with the poor law in Britain, hospitals, mutual aid societies, reading societies, and *cercles* (clubs) in France.

The multitude of charitable organizations operating in the nineteenth century boggles the mind. In addition to those just listed orphanages; old age refuges; agricultural colonies for young wayward youth; Magdalen asylums for prostitutes; and charities for the deaf, the blind, the deaf-mute, to teach marriage, and to construct working-class homes functioned. Religious minorities, such as Jews and Protestants in France, and foreigners, such as the Swiss in Lyon, ran reading societies, workers' garden societies, and charities.

The wealth of charitable institutions, many of which peddled morality, attests to charity's central role in society. But charity was intrusive. The conservative historian Gertrude Himmelfarb wrote, “The Victorians, taking values seriously, also took seriously the need for social sanctions that would stigmatize and censure violations of those values” (Himmelfarb, 1994, p. 142). It was only natural that they would demand adherence to some sort of moral code while they dispensed their charity.

Every cause had its champion, and every denomination had its cause. Evangelicalism was a call to action on almost every conceivable public issue, including the abolition of slavery, child labor, child prostitution, child poverty, the prevention of cruelty to animals and children, and of course the suppression of vice. For the British, humanitarianism became a sort of surrogate religion during the nineteenth century. As Webb noted in 1884, “social questions are the vital questions of today: they take the place of religion”. Most nineteenth-century charities, whether British, French, German, lay, church, or officially secular, aimed at the moral improvement of the poor. As Himmelfarb argued, the late-twentieth-century language of morality, when applied to social issues, is usually assumed to be the language of conservatives. The nineteenth century was obsessed with the issue of “character” and “respectability.” Charity shared the obsessions of responsibility, restraint, decency, decorum, industriousness, foresight, religiosity, and temperance. In the nineteenth century charity asked questions and preached solutions before it dispensed relief.

Despite what many people would regard as an outdated concern with mixing morals and money, by

1900 European philanthropy was in fact moving with the times. Charities and social policy organizations, such as the Charity Organisation Society and the Office Central des Oeuvres de Bienfaisance (Central Office of Institutions of Charity), were becoming national in scope, bureaucratic, and professionalized, although both attempted to rationalize and limit charity. In Britain the Salvation Army had 100,000 mem-

bers in 1906. In addition the Church Army, Dr. Barnardo's, the Jewish Board of Guardians, the Catholic Federation, and the Society of St. Vincent de Paul were formidable actors on the national political scene, advocating causes as well as dispensing relief. Some leaders of charities tried to defend their turf against the growing powers of the national state. Others, especially those run by female advocates of maternal and

child welfare, used their charitable mission as a vehicle to advance the national welfare state.

THE WITHERING OF CHARITY, THE GROWTH OF THE STATE

By the late nineteenth century in many countries the veneer of self-help and laissez-faire was wearing thin. Charities abounded, but poverty persisted. In 1899 in London, for instance, charities spent over 6 million pounds, more than the budgets of some small European countries and more than the French national public assistance budget. Despite this, as Charles Booth's social survey *Life and Labour of the People of London* (1885–1905) demonstrated, some 30 percent of Londoners were, by his widely accepted calculations, poor.

State assistance expanded because it had to. The second industrial revolution, associated with heavy industry, steel, shipbuilding, and metalworks, began in the 1870s. The insufficient capacity of the older collective forces, such as localized charity and the church, to bear the consequences of these new economic forces and to cope with urban ghettos and cyclical, industrywide depressions required greater state intervention. New industrial suburbs sprouted in England, France, and Germany, and the church could not keep up. The old parish system of charity began to break down. Germany began the process of building a welfare state in the 1880s, and France, Britain, and Scandinavia followed in the 1890s and 1900s.

Between the two world wars cities across Europe, from London to Paris to Vienna, constructed miniwelfare states. Private charity was finally eclipsed, at least in a few large cities. Cities across Europe raised their taxes but also delivered more goods to their residents between the wars. The most famous example of this is Vienna, where a socialist municipal council created the world's most advanced miniwelfare state during the 1920s. As municipal social services expanded, charity was displaced, but not erased, from the civic landscape.

England experienced a fivefold increase in central state expenditures on social welfare services between 1918 and 1938. In 1918, 2.4 percent of the GNP was spent on the social services, and by 1938, 11.3 percent of the GNP was devoted to them. By the 1930s between 40 and 50 percent of British working-class families received some form of government contribution to their income. By the mid-1930s public welfare spending amounted to at least ten times the sum spent by private charity in Great Britain. In Germany the state provided more social services. Social welfare was now conceived as a sort of civic right and the antithesis of private charity dispensed by the bourgeoisie on their terms.

Everywhere in Europe the old spirit of noblesse oblige and the institutions that grew out of it were ill equipped to deal with the social problems born of total war. By the end of World War I inflation had taken its toll on charity and hospital endowments, and

in the 1920s the balance finally tipped toward public funding. As new medical technologies sent expenses on an upward spiral, small charitable hospitals, largely funded by small private bequests, could not keep up. The state had to step in. Traditional charity simply could not cope with higher medical costs or the generally higher public expectations after the war.

Between 1920 and 1940, as the state grew in strength, wealth, and influence, the financial backbone of private, local charity withered away. In France by 1944 hospitals' endowments provided only 7 percent of their revenues, down from 12 percent in 1932. Annual donations distinct from a long-term endowment, accounted for between 1.2 and 2.4 percent of revenues in the 1930s, but they were down to 0.8 percent in the 1940s.

After World War II the shift from traditional charitable medicine to state-sponsored or provided medicine was dramatic. In France, for example, by the 1950s most hospitals received over 90 percent and in some cases 98 percent of their revenues from *frais de séjour* (patient-day expenses), which were reimbursed by public authorities and by the social security system. In Britain the process was even more direct. Voluntary, that is, private or charitable, hospitals simply

were taken over by the new National Health Service funded by general taxation.

As Europe became prosperous and as expectations of the state increased, the accident of charity was replaced or, as historians such as Lewis would argue, complemented by the guarantee of social security. As Europeans reformulated the idea of citizenship to include all men, regardless of birth or property, and as of 1918 all women, they moved away from the old moral strictures that guided charitable efforts in the past. As of 1918 receipt of poor law assistance in Britain no longer disqualified a person from voting rights and full citizenship rights. The right to social welfare was enshrined in the new German constitution of 1919. Privately operated charity seemed at odds with an expanding notion of citizenship rights. Private charity was crushed under the Bolsheviks, who argued that the socialist state had no need of bourgeois charity.

In Western Europe charity was quietly surpassed by state insurance. Citizenship rights came to mean a constant set of rights available to all on equal terms in all parts of any given country. Charity guaranteed none of this. Above all charity was tainted by its association with inegalitarian values. Charity discriminated and implied inequality among the classes. Charity did not disappear overnight, certainly not in Britain, where at least 110,000 charitable trusts existed in 1950. But it was overshadowed by the state's expanding services. Charity survived and in some nations, Britain in particular, retained its long-standing, quasi-public status, helping to pick up the slack when state resources were squeezed. Nevertheless, the old spirit of voluntary charity, of noblesse oblige or of moralizing toward the poor, is in most places extinct.

"I do not like mixing up moralities and mathematics," claimed a young Winston Churchill in 1909. As Europe moved away from charity and toward social insurance, it effected a divorce between morality and social policy that came to define the essence of the European welfare state. In many ways modern European welfare states became the very negation of nineteenth-century charity. Perhaps this is charity's greatest legacy.

See also The Welfare State (volume 2); and other articles in this section.

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SOCIAL WELFARE AND INSURANCE



Young-sun Hong

The welfare state is one of those essentially contested concepts that haunt all narratives of modern society, and, as a result, even the most basic account assumes a prior interpretation of its origin, nature, and significance. Its genealogy has often been traced to the first organized measures, both public and private, to deal with the masterless, migrant poor who emerged as a distinct social group at the end of the Middle Ages as a result of the breakdown of manorial community, parish, and extended household. However, the use of the term “welfare” to describe all such efforts to meet the needs of society’s weakest members over the past six hundred years inflates the concept beyond all usefulness and obscures the novelty of modern welfare systems which have developed since the 1880s and the important changes they brought about in the relationships between state, market, individual, and the family.

THE CONCEPT OF WELFARE

The origin of both the “social question” and the modern systems of poor relief, welfare, social insurance, and social security which have developed in response to it can be traced to the rise of the market society, the commodification of labor, and the increasing dependence of individual well-being on the ability to secure the necessities of life through the labor market alone. The social question has been defined, on the one hand, by the complex relationship between work and character (for example, individual responsibility, industry, and foresight) and, on the other, by concerns about the corrosive impact on family, community, and national solidarity of the growing economic insecurity of wage labor, an experience which was itself the obverse of the expansion in the economic freedom of the individual associated with the coming of the market. Welfare may be understood as an attempt (by either the state or voluntary associations) to alter the distribution of wealth and opportunity that would result from the unrestricted play of market forces in order

to achieve a greater degree of equality (of outcome or opportunity); strengthen the solidarity of the community (which can be seen either as intrinsically valuable in itself or as a political necessity in an age of intensified national competition); discharge a moral obligation to protect children, the family, the sick, the elderly, and the unemployed; increase the economic and/or demographic strength of the nation by insuring the fullest development of its human capital; or any number of other goals.

The development of the welfare state and its systems of social welfare, social insurance, and social security is significant for the social history of the modern West in a number of ways. These programs affect the standard of living and quality of life of a large section of the population both directly through the monetary assistance and services they provide and indirectly through their impact on the dynamics of the labor market. They redistribute both income and opportunity, and they strengthen the bonds of social solidarity upon which the legitimacy of the nation-state ultimately depends. However, this Whiggish perspective must be counterbalanced by an awareness that the provision of welfare benefits and services is never a socially neutral act. For example, there are many different ways of providing benefits to the unemployed, the sick, the elderly, or single mothers, and the specific strategies adopted to meet the perceived needs of these groups are often of greater significance than the level of benefits itself. Consequently, the various regimes of social service provision define the concrete meaning of the rights of the individual and, through this, the meaning of citizenship, the nature of the state, and the structure of individual subjectivity and experience. The most important and creative studies of welfare and the welfare state in recent years have been comparative studies of the differences between welfare systems, the heretofore hidden ways in which these systems have created and reproduced social inequalities and gender roles, the cultural assumptions underlying these systems, and the political processes that have determined their contours.

FROM POOR RELIEF TO WELFARE

The emergence of welfare can only be understood against the horizon of—and as a reaction to—the specific forms of assistance for the poor and the laboring classes established in the nineteenth century. Up to the late nineteenth century, many members of both Christian and secular social reform circles, especially in western Europe, regarded indigence as *prima facie* evidence of individual moral failing, which manifested itself in sloth, improvidence, various forms of vice and deviance, and ultimately in the material and moral distress of the needy. On the basis of this individualist, voluntarist conception of poverty, two antithetical yet complementary systems for providing for the needs of the poor were established across the middle decades of the nineteenth century in Europe and the United States. While the deterrent, disciplinary public poor relief system provided the most minimal assistance under harsh and socially stigmatizing conditions in order to insure that assistance in no way undermined individual responsibility, industry, and foresight, an extensive network of voluntary charity

provided supplementary aid to the deserving poor whose need was not considered to be the result of individual moral failings. In England, these policies were institutionalized by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 and the formation in 1869 of the Charity Organisation Society. In Germany the model was established in 1853 by the reform of municipal poor relief in the town of Elberfeld. In France, by contrast, the Catholic Church and its associated voluntary organizations continued to be the primary provider of assistance to the needy, and France was the only west-European country without a statutory municipal assistance program until the 1890s. These programs were designed to satisfy the universally recognized moral obligation to aid the needy, but to do so in a way that would not further demoralize those persons whose indigence was already regarded as a sign of their weakness of character or impair the efficient functioning of the labor market.

Beginning in the 1880s and 1890s, this individualist conception of indigence was gradually displaced by a new social perspective on poverty, which regarded poverty less as the result of individual moral

failing than as the result of social factors that lay outside the control of the individual: the unequal distribution of income; the impact of business cycles on employment levels; dangerous working conditions; unsanitary living conditions; the susceptibility of the laboring classes to the existential uncertainties of accident, old age, and illness; the financial burdens of large families (especially when coupled with the death or disability of the family breadwinner); and the inability of working-class women to shoulder the multiple burdens of work and family. This social perspective on poverty reflected the changing living and working conditions created by continued urbanization, massive migration, and the second industrial revolution. However, the resulting social dislocation acquired its immediate political resonance due to the rise of socialism among the skilled, organized factory working classes, the concern among the propertied classes that the working-class milieu were breeding moral disorder and weakening the health and physical constitution of the nation and race, and the sense that these developments were negatively impacting the unity of the nation at the very moment when economic, political, and military competition between the industrial nations of Europe and the world was reaching an unprecedented intensity.

On both sides of the Atlantic, the rise of Progressivism—with its logic of social solidarity and its concern for national efficiency—reflected the fact that industrialization and urbanization had fundamentally altered the social foundations of the prevailing individualist understanding of poverty and the minimalist, deterrent approach to charity and poor relief to which this conception had given rise. Public poor relief and voluntary charity had operated on the assumption that the public provision of services and monetary assistance—before the individual had exhausted all available resources and was faced with imminent indigence—would place a premium on sloth and improvidence and thereby fatally demoralize the working classes. The Progressives insisted that benefits to both the nation and the individual of positive public measures to prevent these new kinds of systemic poverty far outweighed the potential dangers to individual morality. Similarly, the Progressive willingness to use public power to intervene directly in social and economic relations in order to compensate for the deleterious social consequences of impersonal social forces went beyond the limits on state intervention imposed by nineteenth-century legal and social thought. A new conception (based on Progressive commitment to social solidarity and national efficiency) of social citizenship and the development of new strategies for dealing with the social question

marked the birth of the modern notion of welfare and the new form of political organization that came to be known as the interventionist, social, or welfare state.

For social reformers, the many dimensions of the social problem condensed around two distinct complexes: the working-class family and the question of social reproduction on the one hand, and, on the other, the worker question and the need to combat the socialist temptation among the predominantly male, organized working classes. The development of separate social programs designed to meet the needs of each of these groups led to the crystallization of the classic two-track structure of the twentieth-century welfare state: preventive, therapeutic social welfare programs to address the perceived crisis of social reproduction and social insurance to reduce the economic and social insecurity of workers who formed the backbone of the socialist movement.

PREVENTIVE SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS

Beginning in the 1880s, voluntary organizations and municipal governments across Europe began to create an increasingly dense network of social assistance programs that were designed to extend the social rights of the urban poor by compensating for the impersonal, structural risks of working-class life. The most serious source of existential insecurity for the working classes was the lack of work. Initially, social reformers advocated rural labor colonies to discipline casual laborers, habitual malingerers, and vagrants, who were particularly prone to drink, panhandling, and petty criminality. However, the impact of projects for disciplinary social engineering for these marginal groups was limited, and in the 1880s and 1890s the “discovery” of unemployment as a systemic social problem for the solid members of the working classes pointed to the need for new departures. Labor exchanges represented an important attempt to reduce un(der)employment and the indigence of casual labor by rendering the national labor market more transparent and efficient. Also, beginning in the mid-1880s, many cities began to rely on public works projects to relieve the need of the working classes during economic downturns. Though these efforts to relieve the poor through labor exchanges and public works programs did reflect a change in spirit, their potential was limited to managing need rather than preventing it.

The first unemployment benefits were those provided on a voluntary basis by workers’ friendly societies (often with subsidies provided by middle-class reformers) and by unions. The first attempt to move

from such voluntary assistance to genuine insurance was taken in 1894 when the Swiss canton of Saint Gall instituted a compulsory insurance scheme, which soon faltered due to inadequate financing. The decision by the Belgian city of Ghent in 1901 to provide municipal subsidies to existing union unemployment insurance plans was more successful due to its sounder actuarial foundation. The Ghent system was emulated across much of Europe over the following decade, and the better understanding of the possibilities and the limits of such schemes powered the learning process that ultimately made possible the establishment of national unemployment insurance programs. However, the political sensitivity of support for the unemployed insured that progress in this field would be laborious and ultimately quite limited, and most countries did not take the decisive step toward unemployment insurance until after World War I.

This same period saw the proliferation of preventive, social hygiene programs to combat chronic, contagious diseases, such as tuberculosis, social problems that stemmed from poor living and working conditions, and infant mortality and related maternal health problems. The cornerstone of these programs were the maternal and infant welfare centers, which were established in many cities to couple the medical observation of newborns with the dissemination of hygienic advice to mothers. Because bottle-feeding and related digestive tract infections were the leading cause of infant mortality, these centers generally maintained close relations with municipal and/or voluntary programs that offered premiums—paid upon visits to these centers—to encourage needy mothers to nurse their children or that made sterilized milk available either free or at reduced prices to those women who could not or would not nurse their children. By 1914, many European countries had passed labor laws requiring that pregnant women not work during the weeks immediately preceding their expected due date or for a specified period after the birth of their child. However, because this legislation did not provide adequate replacement for the wages lost during this period of enforced abstention from work, expectant and nursing mothers often had no choice but to turn to municipal public assistance. This intrinsic limitation of maternal welfare programs gave rise to a broad movement on both sides of the Atlantic for the creation of mothers' pension and child benefit programs. However, these efforts generally did not bear fruit until the late 1930s and later.

Around the beginning of the twentieth century, social reformers in many European countries began to call for the establishment of school lunch and health inspection programs, which they argued were neces-

sary for the realization of the goals of public schooling. The provision of both school lunches and school medical inspections proved to be surprisingly controversial precisely because it represented an especially clear example of the state taking over the direct provision of services that had previously been the responsibility of the family alone.

The conflict between the principles of deterrence and prevention was one of the major fault lines in the politics of welfare reform. The debate over public guardianship for children, reform schooling, juvenile justice reforms, and the entire panoply of programs aimed at abandoned, endangered, and delinquent youth raised with particular sharpness the question of the implications of preventive, therapeutic social programs for the rights of their ostensible beneficiaries. Although these measures were justified in the name of the national interest in preventing criminality and insuring the proper education of future citizens and workers, they were so controversial because they entailed the extension of state power into the sphere of family and parental authority. The necessity of intervening in the lives of endangered children *before* they had committed a punishable offense clearly contradicted the principles of liberal jurisprudence. The ensuing debate over the logic of prevention gave birth to a new social conception of law and to a new notion of social citizenship, in which the rights to work, health, and education were extended to the individual but coupled in an uneasy manner with positive obligation of the recipients to engage in socially useful work, actively maintain their health, insure the adequate socialization of their children, and, more generally, discharge those social obligations whose fulfillment was the primary purpose for extending these rights in the first place. However, Jacques Donzelot and Detlev Peukert have argued that, far from bringing about a real extension in the social rights of the individual, the efforts of these programs—and by extension, all preventive, therapeutic social programs—to rationalize juvenile behavior in accordance with the norms of middle-class society actually entangled the individual in a close-meshed network of surveillance and tutelage, which ultimately absorbed and negated, rather than extended, the sphere of individual freedoms.

Reformers also searched for ways to provide for specific groups of the worthy poor that would be more adequate to their real needs and entail none of the social stigma or political disabilities associated with poor relief and charity. One example is the movement for public pensions for the elderly and also for working-class mothers. A first step toward the development of pensions for the elderly was taken in 1891, when

Denmark approved a plan to provide nondisqualifying monetary aid to those worthy, elderly poor who had previously led upright lives (those who had not depended on poor relief). This movement was given additional momentum by the establishment of a non-contributory old-age pension plan in New Zealand—a member of the British Commonwealth—in 1898. France (1905) and Britain (1908) both adopted non-contributory, but means-tested old-age pensions (though in 1925 the British program was reformed in the direction of a contributory system). Sweden went even further, establishing the world's first universal, non-contributory old-age pension program in 1913. The Germans, on the other hand, were reluctant to follow this trend and instead opted to meet the needs of the elderly through an old-age and invalidity insurance program. However, due to the low level of benefits and limited coverage, the Germans still had to rely on poor relief and covert subsidies from other social insurance programs to support the worthy elderly.

The emergence of welfare measures in the late nineteenth century has generated a considerable comparative historiography dealing with such issues as the greater commitment to voluntary insurance schemes on the part of the French, versus the more systematic German approach. At the beginning of the twenty-first century this debate also focused on the differing degrees to which various welfare programs emphasized women as welfare recipients and on the emergence of aid to families as an area of particular concern. Finally, social historians continue to grapple with the issue of the impact of welfare measures in welfare's early period: What kinds of welfare measures had an effect, given the limitations in coverage—the focus on urban workers, for instance—and the range of benefits offered? Certainly, early welfare initiatives did not stem the growth of socialism and trade unions, though they did sway many socialists toward a reformist rather than a revolutionary approach.

SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS IN INTERWAR EUROPE

World War I led to the exponential growth of welfare programs that, until the war, had still faced stiff opposition from the proponents of deterrence. Social programs played a vital role in solidifying the home front by counteracting the disruptive social consequences of total war and promising a greater degree of social citizenship to the working classes. After 1918 the growth of welfare programs continued to accelerate in response to the expanded public commitment of many states—often inscribed in their new consti-

tutions—to the social welfare of their citizens, and the 1920s was a period of unprecedented intensity for major social legislation in both western and eastern Europe. However, the expansion of state social intervention was not an unmixed blessing, for the very act of identifying one social group as deserving of special public solicitude invariably created a sense of discrimination by those groups who were not included. As a result, expanded state social intervention in the interwar years tended to divide the polity as much as unify it, especially when this intervention was accompanied by the struggle for scarce resources and competition between social service providers to shape the norms informing such activity. The later 1920s witnessed a retreat from the optimism that had characterized welfare reforms over the previous decades, and this trend was reinforced by the severe financial retrenchment in the welfare sector during the Great Depression.

One of the more interesting issues in the history of social welfare in the interwar years is the role of welfare in Nazi Germany. Toward the end of the twentieth century, social welfare in Nazi Germany received intense scholarly scrutiny because it has become increasingly clear that social and welfare policies to benefit productive and racially valuable members of the national community cannot be separated from policies designed to segregate and ultimately annihilate those persons whose poverty and social deviance were regarded as evidence of their racial inferiority. Despite the undeniable continuities in welfare theory and practice across the 1933 divide, scholars continue to debate the modernity of Nazi racial policies and the legitimacy of regarding them as a variant of the modern “welfare” state.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL INSURANCE

In contrast to welfare programs for those who stood outside the labor process or were only partially integrated into it, social insurance was designed primarily to protect the organized, largely male working classes and through them also protect their families against the threat of destitution due to the risks of accident, old age, sickness, and unemployment. The predication of benefits on prior contributions limited the applicability of this strategy of social security to better-paid and regularly employed workers, primarily men employed in the skilled trades. The willingness of the propertied classes to accept the idea of a legal right to benefits depended above all on the adoption of the principle that such a right would strengthen, rather than diminish, the incentive to individual thrift and

foresight, as Winston Churchill (1874–1965) insisted with regard to the British unemployment insurance system. As François Ewald has argued, it was the adoption of the technology of insurance that made it possible to transcend the rigid individualism that had dominated nineteenth-century thought in the name of a more social, solidarist worldview.

Under the chancellorship of Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), Germany took the lead in establishing workers' insurance programs against sickness (1883), work accidents (1884), and old age and invalidity (1889). The introduction of this legislation represented a two-pronged attempt to forestall the further radicalization of the working classes. Bismarck hoped that state subsidies to the insurance funds would gain the allegiance of the workers by demonstrating the paternalistic concern of the state for their well-being and that the very existence of such insurance programs would reduce the number of instances in which these workers would be forced to turn to deterrent, discriminatory municipal poor relief. These insurance programs, and those established in other states over the following decades, were constructed on the foundation laid earlier by friendly societies, unions, and other, often semipublic insurance funds. The novelty

of German social insurance legislation lay in the combination of compulsory membership and the decision to insure the actuarial soundness of the programs by initially restricting them to those skilled trades that were politically most sensitive but economically most insurable because of their relatively high wages and steady employment patterns. Although employers were required to contribute to sickness and disability insurance (and bear the entire cost of accident insurance), the redistributive impact of these programs was limited. Workers paid for their benefits in the form of contributions, and the propertied classes benefited from tax reductions loosely tied to anticipated reductions in poor relief costs. The funds were administered by workers and employers (the “social partners”) on a parity basis. However, Bismarck's policies failed to stem the rise of Social Democracy in Germany, and in fact, the social insurance funds quickly became administrative strongholds of German Social Democracy.

Informed by the German experience but inspired by the transatlantic Progressive spirit that Daniel Rodgers describes in *Atlantic Crossings*, national insurance programs against accident, sickness and disability, and old age were established (either on a compulsory basis or through state subsidies to voluntary

programs) in almost every European country by the 1930s, with most of the remaining gaps being closed immediately after World War II. (See table 1.) During these years, the existing social insurance systems were expanded to cover additional risks and include new social groups—white collar workers, self-employed and farmers, dependent family members (in health insurance, for example), and survivors (in pension insurance). By 1939, almost every west European state had introduced insurance programs that were designed to provide minimal income as security against the major causes of economic insecurity.

Unemployment insurance was usually the most controversial because it entailed the most radical break with liberal political economy. In contrast to the actuarial predictability of accident, sickness, and old age, business cycles—and therefore employment levels—were far more volatile. Moreover, insurance against unemployment was a classic example of moral hazard. And lastly, no system capable of insuring against the high levels of structural unemployment and the extraordinary economic problems of the Great Depression would have been financially feasible in any case. In 1911, Britain established the first compulsory nationwide unemployment insurance program. Although contributions by workers and employers provided the lion's share of the financial means, the state agreed to subsidize the program (though these subsidies were justified less in terms of their redistributive impact than as compensation for anticipated reduction in poor relief costs). The system was linked in an integral manner to the labor exchanges to reduce frictional unemployment and test willingness to work. The incentive to work was to be maintained by waiting periods and limits on the duration of benefits. The British example was followed by a number of other countries after World War I. However, the Great Depression forced all of these countries to retreat from a rigorously constructed system of insurance to various mixtures of unemployment insurance, assistance provided without means testing, and means-tested outdoor relief—the notorious “dole.”

FROM SOCIAL INSURANCE TO SOCIAL SECURITY

The immediate postwar period brought a new wave of social legislation in many European countries. The most influential document of this period was the report prepared for the British government by the economist William Beveridge (1879–1963) in 1942. The Beveridge Report proposed the creation of a national minimum benefit to guarantee freedom from want for

all citizens. It also laid out the rationale for legislation on family allowance, old-age pensions, and a national health service, and it was conceptually linked to the postwar commitment by Britain and other states to full employment and Keynesian economic policies (counter-cyclical deficit spending intended to maintain a high level of aggregate demand, in contrast to older economic orthodoxies which espoused the importance of balanced budgets). The Beveridge plan had such an extraordinary resonance across the Western world because its underlying commitment to social justice appeared to hold the key to rejuvenating democratic political systems that had failed in so many respects during the 1930s. Historians have disagreed over whether this postwar wave of social reform was made possible by the expanded influence of the working classes or by Conservative acquiescence to the social programs they had fought tooth and claw before the war. In fact, Social Democratic support for social insurance marked a sharp departure from their previous insistence that such insurance was intrinsically reactionary because it failed to correct the fundamental problem of working-class distress: exploitation that deprived the worker of the full fruits of his or her labor. There was also a similar political moderation on the right, and after 1945 Tory paternalism and the Christian Democratic idea of a social market economy came together with an increasingly deradicalized socialist movement on the common ground of the welfare state. Peter Baldwin has convincingly argued that the universalist, egalitarian social insurance schemes developed in the Scandinavian states and, in part, in the Beveridge system were based not on the weakening of prewar class antagonisms and the acceptance of redistributive social insurance programs, but rather on the incorporation of the middle classes into the welfare system in ways that allowed them to benefit from the socialization of risk while limiting the redistributive burden imposed upon them.

As with every other major welfare program, the movement for family and child allowances had developed in an ad hoc, experimental manner before World War I, but the idea achieved widespread acceptance only from the 1930s. France (1913) was the first country to establish a nationwide system of family allowances, though most U.S. states established similar programs between 1911 and 1919. During the 1930s, Sweden established child allowance and maternity benefit programs, financed through general revenues. Family allowances were regularized as part of the broad expansion of social services in every country after 1945.

By the postwar period at the very latest, most of the states of Western Europe had developed a fairly

similar network of social insurance programs. Together, social services and social insurance provided a minimal degree of economic security and insured the needy at a minimal level necessary for them to be considered full-fledged members of the national community. A shift in the development of the welfare state came between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s. During this period, social insurance was extended from workers to the middle classes and the goal of these programs shifted from minimalist income replacement and the equalization of the most egregious class differences of industrial society to the active promotion of the highest quality of life for all citizens in order to give more substance to the idea of social citizenship. To achieve this goal, income maintenance programs became nearly universal, and their benefit levels were constantly improved. Pensions were reformed (Germany, 1957) so that benefits for present retirees reflected real increases in productivity and income, rather than past contributions; this permitted retirees to participate in the postwar economic boom and maintain their relative standard of living, rather than simply satisfy their basic needs. Unemployment benefit systems became less restrictive, and benefits became more generous. Child allowances became increasingly universalistic and were gradually uncoupled from need. The compensation for actual loss of income was increasingly supplanted by preventive measures to forestall the risk through health services, occupational training and rehabilitation, and education, while the scope and quality of all of these services—especially medical care and education—expanded steadily. In England, the victory of prevention over compensation was symbolized by the replacement of contributory national health *insurance* with a universal, tax-based national health *service* in 1948. All of these factors contributed to the constantly increasing rate of growth

in social spending from the late 1950s through the 1970s. During the postwar decades, the creation of a more comprehensive, more universalist, more solidarist system of social services devoted to the prevention of need and the active promotion of higher standards of living and quality of life all came together to form that new system of welfare known as social security.

WELFARE STATE REGIMES IN POSTWAR EUROPE

To affirm the existence of broad trends is not to say that all welfare states and systems are the same. The act of choosing between the various means available for meeting a perceived need always reflects an understanding of the nature of the problem as determined by previous policy precedents, political and cultural traditions, economic and social trends, prevailing perceptions of gender roles, state administrative capacities, and the prevailing balance of political forces. These differences were largely ignored in the first generation of comparative research on the welfare state, which regarded aggregate public social spending as the key to understanding the development of the welfare state.

The most influential comparative analysis of the different forms of the postwar welfare state is the typology of welfare state regimes developed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen in *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990). This ideal typology is based on the manner and extent to which welfare systems emancipate the individual by de-commodifying labor, the patterns of income redistribution and social stratification created by these programs, and the relationship between the state, the market, and the family implied by these programs.

The liberal or residual welfare state is based on a dual system. For the majority, individual welfare is to a large degree determined by the play of market forces. For those persons who cannot satisfy their basic needs through the labor market, minimal transfer payments (such as the American Social Security system) and limited entitlements and means-tested public assistance are provided. Such programs do little to reduce social inequalities. The United States, Canada, and Australia are the archetypical examples of this type of welfare regime.

In contrast, in conservative, corporatist welfare states the state plays a much larger role in promoting social security. However, the purpose of this state intervention is not to promote equality, but rather to insure social security in a way which will preserve existing status and income differentials between occupational groups. This type of welfare regime is often described as a “pillared” system because separate health care, retirement, and so on exist for each major occupational group. Benefits are of necessity related most directly to earnings and contributions (rather than citizenship or need), and they are usually determined as a percentage of earnings. Premiums are paid by both employers and employees, and the management of such programs is generally devolved onto the social partners on a parity basis. Occupational benefits are

supplemented by means-tested public assistance for those outside the labor force. Family members are generally covered through the breadwinner, rather than each individual member being eligible for benefits in his or her own right by virtue of his or her status as a citizen. The religious, socially conservative nature of this regime type is reflected first in its commitment to the preservation of traditional family structures and discouragement of female labor-force participation, and second in its insistence that public social service providers intervene in a subsidiary manner only if voluntary or confessional agencies are unable or unwilling to provide necessary services to the family or individual. This corporate regime has developed most fully in Germany, which has a strong statist tradition, and in Austria, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries, whose welfare systems have been deeply influenced by social Catholicism.

The third welfare state regime, which is identified most closely with Scandinavian—especially Swedish—Social Democracy, is characterized by the fusion of a high degree of universalism and an equally high degree of de-commodification. Its primary policy goal is less to compensate for the loss of income than to promote a higher standard of living and a more fulfilling way of life for all citizens. This was necessary in order to give substance to the idea of social citizen-

ship and meet the political challenge of capturing the support of the new middle classes for such a solidaristic system. In this Scandinavian system, all occupational and social groups enjoy identical rights and participate in a single universal system, though benefits are graduated according to actual earnings. This system was built on the foundation of the proto-Keynesian ideas developed by Swedish Social Democracy in the 1930s. In addition, by providing grants directly to children and assuming direct responsibility for caring for children, the elderly, and the disabled, the Scandinavian welfare system diverges from the male breadwinner model to a greater extent than in most other states by meeting the needs of these persons in a way that makes it possible for women to choose between work and household.

Not all countries fit neatly into this classificatory schema. From the end of World War II until 1979, Britain was a hybrid mixture of the universalism most closely identified with the Social Democratic model and the low level of benefits (which is the correlate of financing through general tax revenues) characteristic of the liberal, residual model. However, the precise balance of this mixture shifted in the liberal direction under the prime ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major. Also, some people have suggested that the states of southern Europe, including Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy, constitute a fourth regime. In these states, welfare services are provided primarily by church, family, and voluntary organizations, rather than the state, and the systems are marked by fragmented coverage and uneven distribution among occupational groups.

SOCIAL WELFARE IN COMMUNIST EUROPE

The mirror image of the dynamic Swedish model was to be found in the Soviet Union and other communist states of postwar Eastern Europe. Under communist rule the right to work was constitutionally guaranteed, and the integral connection between economic and social policy that was forged in postwar Western Europe by Keynesian fiscal policy was made in communist systems by centralized state planning for industrial production and full employment. The model of forced industrialization and agricultural collectivization that was implemented in the Soviet Union by Stalin and, later, the communist parties of Central and Eastern Europe, did bring about a rapid increase in productivity and income in these relatively backward regions during the first decades of communist rule. This spurt in economic development made possible

real improvements in virtually every area of social security in comparison to the precommunist era.

From the 1930s, social services in the Soviet Union were linked to the performance of that productive labor which was deemed essential to the construction of socialism, and a substantial proportion of social services in the Soviet Union and its East European empire were provided through the workplace, including housing, health care, child care, leisure and cultural activities, and vacation facilities. These services were not fringe benefits, but a necessary complement to wages that were set at an artificially low level in accordance with the dictates of central economic planning. In theory at least they obviated the need for any separate welfare programs except for those persons who were never fully integrated into the labor process. In addition, these communist states also promoted public welfare through substantial state subsidies of basic consumer goods and services, such as food, housing, transportation, energy, and health care.

However, these initial developments were impressive only in relation to the low level of previous social programs in these regions. The institutionalization in the 1950s and 1960s of an industrial model based on abundant unskilled labor, outdated technology, and productivity that stagnated at a low level could not sustain the long-term improvements in social security beyond the level reached during the initial spurt. The welfare systems of communist Europe also suffered from a number of structural problems. The ambitious commitment of these states to the welfare of their citizens led in practice to the extensive growth of a social service system that was so inefficient and so systematically starved of resources that it was often incapable of providing an even minimal level of basic services to all. Housing shortages, the frequent absence of basic medical equipment in polyclinics, and low pension rates were the most egregious examples of this dysfunctionality. The ensuing shortages created the opportunity for corruption and the temptation to allocate scarce social services on the basis of bribery, nepotism, and/or patronage. In the paternalistic "welfare dictatorships" of communist Europe, everything was done by the party state for the people, who were systematically excluded from the formulation of welfare policies and who had no legally enforceable right to challenge the decisions of the state. The right to social services was limited to individual conformity to the system, creating a vast potential to instrumentalize control over scarce social services for political ends—to reward those groups loyal to the regime and to punish opponents. Despite the state's commitment to the prevention of need, the development of the welfare system was subordinated to the imperatives of

production. This, together with the limited scope for public opposition, led the governments of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe systematically to injure the health of their populations “by requiring work in health-damaging environments, by polluting the earth and atmosphere, and by presiding over a social system that indirectly encouraged alcoholism, unhealthy diet and suicide” (Deacon, p. 3). The negative impact of these trends was even more severe because of the ideological insistence that these societies had already attained a level of development at which the class tensions and contradictions of bourgeois society had been overcome. This view prevented communist policy makers from recognizing the new social, economic, and cultural problems created by the postwar transformation of these societies and developing social policies to meet the challenges posed by these developments.

The combination of political alienation and the inability to redeem those social promises on which communist regimes based their claim to the superiority of their system were major factors in the eventual collapse of communism. In the late-twentieth-century period of transition toward parliamentary democracy and capitalism (at least in most former communist countries), state policy makers faced a sharp dilemma. The legitimacy of these new states rests to no small degree on their promise that capitalism will finally make good on those welfarist promises made by the communists. Yet it is difficult to resolve the contradiction between the fiscal constraints imposed by market-oriented reforms and the pressing need for social services to buffer the consequences of inflation and unemployment. Postcommunist governments have begun to turn their attention to social policy, and the politics of social policy in these states will be shaped by a variety of factors: macroeconomic conditions, institutional legacies from the communist period, pre-communist social policy traditions, the ideological orientation of the governing parties, and the structure of the political system within which they operate. However, it is still too early to predict with any accuracy how the welfare systems in these states will evolve in the twenty-first century.

WOMEN, GENDER, AND THE WELFARE STATE

Family policies have been explicitly based on assumptions concerning gender roles. The specific social rights established by welfare programs depend upon whether the beneficiary is regarded primarily as a worker or a citizen, a man or a woman, a father or a mother, the family breadwinner, the family caregiver, the guardian of domesticity, or as the mother of a new generation.

European feminists initially advocated mothers' pensions and family allowances because they hoped that such programs would expand the rights and choices available to women as citizens, regardless of their marital status, and enhance their independence either by recognizing the social value of unremunerated domestic labor and compensating them for it or by freeing them to pursue work outside the household. However, the family policies of most European welfare states have been based fairly explicitly on the ideal of the male breadwinner and stay-at-home housewife. The primary aims of family allowances have been the elimination of children's poverty and/or the promotion of state population policy, not the provision of an alternative to the male breadwinner model. In contrast, the maternity and family policies of the Scandinavian countries have gone the furthest toward extending the rights of women as citizens, rather than in their capacity as mothers.

Esping-Andersen has been criticized by feminist historians, who argue that essential aspects of women's experience within the welfare state are systematically obscured by his gender-blind analysis of work and welfare. More specifically, they point out that, given prevailing patterns in the sexual division of labor, the de-commodification of women's labor has generally led to the restriction of women to the domestic sphere where, secondly, they become primary yet unremunerated providers of welfare services to others. This reflects the fact that most welfare programs were originally designed to reinforce the family wage system and, therefore, had a distinctly paternalist character. Consequently, while de-commodification of labor has been regarded as an important indicator of emancipation for men, these critics argue that for women de-commodification has not led to greater economic independence or enhanced the social citizenship rights available to them outside of marriage.

In the 1990s, feminist historians made important steps toward a fuller incorporation of gender as an independent analytic dimension in accounts of the welfare state. Ann Orloff has, for example, suggested that any adequate description of welfare systems must take into account the extent to which they promote women's access to paid labor and establish those rights necessary for them to maintain an autonomous household independent of their roles as wives and mothers. Other writers have argued that the analysis of gender and the welfare state must focus on “caring regimes,” which determine the ways in which the family influences the structure of the labor market by means of the unpaid provision of welfare by women rather than analyzing the relationship between paid and unpaid labor.

CRISIS, RETRENCHMENT, AND NEW DEPARTURES SINCE THE 1970s

The post-1945 consolidation of the welfare state in Western Europe led to steadily accelerating growth in social spending. By the mid-1970s total social spending amounted to between one-fourth and one-third of the gross national product in most western welfare states, and it substantially exceeded this latter proportion in some countries. In the 1970s, this accelerating growth came to an abrupt halt. It appeared that the growth of the welfare state had reached its limits though it was not clear whether this was due to external fiscal constraints or whether the internal forces which had propelled this growth had been exhausted. Conservatives argued that the welfare state had become “ungovernable” because the responsiveness of democratic government to popular political pressures was leading to unsustainable levels of public social spending. Neo-marxists, on the other hand, attributed the looming crisis to the heightening contradiction between the need for ever-greater social spending (to reconcile the laboring classes to the continued existence of capitalism and/or socialize the costs of the reproduction of labor which would otherwise have to be borne by capital alone) and the requirements of the accumulation of capital.

The economic crisis of the 1970s led to substantial cuts in social spending in almost every country. These retrenchment measures did not lead to the abandonment of the basic features of the existing welfare regime in any country. Retrenchment strategies included such measures as increasing contributions and tightening the connection between benefits and contributions in Bismarckian-type welfare systems; restricting eligibility through greater use of income- and means-testing in flat-rate, Beveridgean systems; increasing co-payments; combining reductions in basic benefits with greater use of means-tested supplements to target expenditure on those who need it most; and changing complex formulas in order to alter conditions and costs of retirement programs.

In Britain and the United States, the Thatcher and Reagan administrations used the economic crisis as a springboard for a broad ideological attack on the welfare state consensus that had prevailed in both countries since the 1940s. However, despite their initial hopes, the Thatcher administration was able to make only incremental changes rather than effect a root-and-branch reform of social service provision. For example, the 1986 Social Security Act in Britain did not bring about the wholesale transfer of pension provision from the state to the private sector, but rather implemented several measures designed to make pri-

vate pensions more appealing while at the same time making it easier to opt out of the public pension system. The effect of this legislation was to shift the British welfare system toward the liberal, residual model. The plan put forth by the French prime minister Alain Juppé in 1995 was based on an eclectic mixture of policy principles. On the one hand, he proposed transforming the corporatist organization of the national health insurance system into a universalist public health system along the lines of the British model. On the other hand, the increased reliance on means-testing to target family allowances moved in the opposite direction from that universalism which he was trying to establish in the health care system.

Three important socioeconomic forces have been driving European welfare reform since the 1980s. First, the aging of the population and the emergence of new family structures and patterns of labor market participation are creating new needs and altering the patterns of work, family, and gender upon which Western welfare states have rested. In addition, the aging of the population is leading to higher expenditures for pensions and health care, and these fiscal pressures are further intensified by the corresponding reduction in the ratio of active workers to the retired population.

Second, the political economy of the postwar welfare state in Western Europe was altered by the emergence of a new industrial regime, which was based on a more flexible organization of production through electronically controlled machines operated by increasingly highly skilled and highly paid workers, dependence on continuously accelerating technological innovation, and new forms of corporate structure to manage these processes. From 1945 through the 1980s, the state linked the interests of organized capital and

labor in a program of full employment and social welfare. Changes in the organization of production have distinct implications for the Keynesian welfare system.

This reorganization of production cannot be separated from a third major force: economic globalization and the increasing integration of the European nation-states into the European Union. The enforced harmonization of social policies is an essential element of the logic of European integration, and the necessary changes put pressure on those national compromises concerning wages and social spending which had been the foundation of the Keynesian welfare

state. By making the boundaries of the national economic and social space more porous and subject to the disruptive effects of international economic competition, globalization increases the demand for social programs to cushion the population against these disruptions at the same time that the pressures of international competition are diminishing the capacity of the state and industry to pay for these programs. The disjunction between the global scale of production and the national provision of welfare has even been pulling at the solidarist glue that has held the European welfare systems together for the past half-century.

See also **The World Wars and the Depression; Since World War II (volume 1); The Life Cycle; The Welfare State; Communism (volume 2); The Family and the State; Motherhood; Widows and Widowers; The Elderly (volume 4); Working Classes; Labor History: Strikes and Unions; Socialism (in this volume); and other articles in this section.**

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ALCOHOL AND TEMPERANCE



George Snow

Alcohol has played an important role in human society since the accidental discovery of the effects of ethyl alcohol—the product of the natural fermentation of honey or fruit. The agricultural development and domestication of grape stock—viticulture—resulted in wines that were considered to have, in addition to other qualities, salutary medicinal benefits. The agricultural revolution that led to the production of wines also led to the manufacture and consumption of beer—a beverage relying on the fermentation of large amounts of starchy grain.

ALCOHOL IN EARLY SOCIETY

Wines and beers of varying strengths and description became the primary beverages among European populations confronted with unpotable drinking water, since the antiseptic power of alcohol, along with the natural acidity of wine and beer, killed many pathogens in the questionable water. In addition to these salutary properties, wine especially acquired a reputation as a means of settling the stomach, as a prophylactic in the prevention of colds, and as an antiseptic in the cleansing of wounds. Consumption of alcoholic beverages also temporarily altered behavior—elating and gladdening some, enhancing the feeling of physical strength of others, promoting camaraderie and fellowship for many more, and lowering personal and social inhibitions for all. These attributes of alcohol led churches throughout Europe to inveigh against its excessive consumption—that is, drunkenness (*ivrognerie*, *Trunksucht*, *p'ianstvo*, and *borrachera* in French, German, Russian, and Spanish, respectively)—from the Middle Ages on. All of this was in spite of the fact that wine was central in the celebration of the Eucharist and that in European climates conducive to viticulture, the church frequently operated the biggest and best vineyards at a considerable profit.

By the Renaissance the process of distillation to produce spirits—a process invented earlier by the Arabs—had gradually spread first to Italy and then to

northern Europe, reaching the extreme north and northeast—Scandinavia and Muscovy—by the mid-fifteenth century. The powerful spirituous beverages aquavit and vodka—names that derive from the word “water” in Scandinavian languages and Russian, respectively—resulted from a process that used a boiling water–alcohol mixture to derive a condensation with a higher alcohol content than that of the starting liquid. Distilled alcoholic beverages could pretend neither to nourishment nor to low alcohol content—but they became widely popular in some areas of Europe (for example, Russia), where they replaced wine and beer as the preferred beverages in daily life and in the celebration of church holidays and ceremonial occasions, such as births, christenings and baptisms, marriages, deaths, and wakes. Distilled beverages did not carry the sacral associations of wine, which remained the chief potable of Catholic countries, such as France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. But the increasing availability and strength of distilled alcoholic beverages in the post-Reformation period produced seemingly higher levels of drunkenness and the accompanying official concerns.

The predominantly rural and agrarian nature of most early modern European societies did not make a social problem of alcohol consumption—whether in the form of beer, wine, or distilled spirits. In the agricultural way of life the sense of time, the ebb and flow of seasonal activity, the compulsion to work, and the consumption of intoxicants were all of a kind of “natural” process. That is, the line between work and life was blurred, permitting a greater intermingling of labor and social intercourse in which drinking played an important role and did not seriously inhibit the performance of tasks central to agricultural production. Then, too, in eastern Europe, and particularly in Russia, a drink of vodka was both a ceremonial and an official confirmation of an agreement or a bargain in rural villages, and village work parties were frequently paid on this basis, a natural consequence of undermonetized economies. Consequently, criticism of alcohol consumption remained muted and was only

expressed when consumption reached excessive levels. Many homilies were, therefore, directed against the practice of drinking to get drunk.

Other subterranean rumblings against excessive alcohol consumption during this period came from moralists disturbed by the spread of distilled spirits—with the matter betraying national animosities: the French accused the Italians of introducing distilling techniques learned from the Arabs, the Germans accused the French of the same thing, and the English claimed that their soldiers had been introduced to gin drinking in Holland during the wars of the sixteenth century. Behind all of these concerns was the fact that strong liquor was being drunk everywhere in Europe by the eve of the Enlightenment, and virtually every country, using the same basic techniques and custom-built still, had begun to fashion its own indigenous beverage: Scotch among the Scots, *Branntwein* and schnapps among the Germans; and arrack and raki, made with rice from the Far East, in the western Mediterranean.

Economics of alcohol. As consumption of alcohol in its various forms became more widespread and popular in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European governments saw its manufacture, distribution, and sale as potential sources of revenue—both direct and indirect. Consequently, the English Parliament required licenses of alehouses (1552), Boris Godunov's Muscovite government (1598–1605) taxed the sale of vodka by the *kabaki* (taverns), and the French King Louis XIV (1638–1715) taxed the sale of eaux-de-vie sold by cabarets at the same level as wine. An inestimably valuable source of indirect taxation that served a redistributive function, the direct or indirect sale of alcoholic beverages by the state legitimated their consumption in some quarters. In many cases, this association made bars and taverns a focus of attention for both tax inspectors and, later, temperance reformers. In some other cases, for example in Russia, it made the government itself the target of temperance critics.

Alcohol consumption as a moral issue. Although it was recognized that alcoholic beverages differed in strength, there was little widespread perception of their heavy consumption as either a medical or a social problem. Indeed, alcohol consumption was for a long while seen as a moral problem. In England the respectability of places for the retail sale of some alcoholic beverages increased during the Restoration. A similar lack of concern existed in France during this period, while in Russia the redistributive nature of alcohol sales was institutionalized: the *kabaki* became a state monopoly, a status recognized by the *Ulozhenie* (legal code) of 1649.

By the eighteenth century, however, leading elements in England, the Germanies, and France had begun to express concern about alcohol abuse—although for different reasons and on different bases. The concern reflected in William Hogarth's engravings and in Wesleyan religious sensibilities in England and the growing medical awareness of alcohol's debilitating effects in the Germanies were directed against distilled alcoholic beverages. Beer and wine continued to be viewed as "natural" and therefore less harmful than the products of distillation. This distinction remained a basic feature of much temperance thought to the beginning of the twentieth century. Because

wine was for a long time the main alcoholic beverage consumed by Frenchmen, concern with alcohol abuse was slow to develop in France. But by the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century and with the increased appearance of distilled alcoholic beverages, French and German physicians were coming to see the excessive consumption of alcohol as a public-health problem.

Alcohol consumption as a health issue. The concern about alcohol consumption as a public-health problem was first expressed in early-nineteenth-century England when the term “delirium tremens” was used by the physician Thomas Sutton to describe the violent restlessness, hallucinations, and other phenomena associated with prolonged alcohol abuse. During this same period physicians of diverse nationality published studies of the effects of alcohol abuse on the liver. Not a few of them posited that such abuse was a form of disease, a contention that led to the emergence of the disease model that later played so important a role in European temperance movements and eventually replaced the moral paradigm. Associated with this model was the assumption that it was a degenerative disease not only for the drinker but for his or her progeny as well—an assumption that played a significant role in late-nineteenth-century racial degeneration theories and in some temperance literature. Knowledge about the effects of alcohol on the human body was, in any event, scattered and fragmentary, varying from country to country.

This situation was remedied by the synthesizing work of the great Swedish physiologist and researcher Magnus Huss (1807–1890). Huss’s contribution to the emerging concern about alcohol abuse and the myriad physical problems associated with it was the product of his extensive familiarity with international literature on the subject plus his own wide travels and personal observations, as a physician in Swedish hospitals, of the ravages of drink among the poor. All of these elements came together in his great work *Alcoholismus chronicus* (1849), originally written in his native Swedish and translated three years later into German. Huss’s neologism “alcoholism” not only was succinct but followed common scientific usage in applying the suffix “-ism” when describing a disease. He systematically classified the physiological and psychological changes attributable to excessive, long-term alcohol consumption, as described by the English physician Wilfred Batten Lewis Trotter and clinicians like the German Fuchs and the American Benjamin Rush. Rush had been among the first to describe chronic drunkenness as a disease, and one that was implicated in other diseases—including epilepsy.

Huss’s work provided an international framework for analysis and diagnosis: the enemy now had a name and a symptomatology—tools that were invaluable to temperance proponents throughout Europe, despite Huss’s own focus on the harmfulness of distilled alcoholic beverages and his acceptance of the naturalness of fermented ones. Huss’s work also supported the general apprehension that the consequences of alcohol abuse led ineluctably to race degeneration. Such theories of alcohol-created degeneration later found their fullest expression in the mid-century clinical works of the Frenchmen Bénédict Morel and Valentin Magnan—theories that influenced Émile Zola’s widely read Rougon-Macquart novels and later influenced middle-class intellectuals and reformers devoted to the temperance cause.

THE SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR CONCERNS ABOUT ALCOHOL ABUSE

The rise of medical concern about alcohol abuse was contemporaneous, or nearly so, with two major social phenomena. One was the great industrial upsurge during this period, which drew a large labor force to rapidly developing towns and cities to work in mills, foundries, and factories. Attendant on the growth of this urban labor force was a middle- and upper-class apprehension about these laborers’ proclivity for strong drink. This proclivity and the working classes’ relative poverty, substandard living conditions, and high levels of violence and crime constituted a witches’ brew that alternately frightened and appalled polite, middle-class society from England to Russia. Although the members of society reacting to excessive alcohol consumption among the working classes were largely merchants; professionals, such as physicians, lawyers, teachers; and clergy—what has been described as civil society—and people from the privileged classes, small artisans and even industrial workers themselves also reacted to alcoholism, often associating abstinence from strong drink with self-improvement. Factory, mill, and foundry owners were also concerned about workers’ proclivity to abuse alcohol, especially because agrarian patterns of alcohol use imported into the more rigid time and production constraints of industrial capitalism resulted in damaged machinery, delayed production, and general financial loss.

European intellectuals and political leaders viewed the alcohol issue in a broader social and political context. Friedrich Engels posited a direct relationship between industrial capitalism and alcoholism, attributing workers’ drinking problems to the physical demands of their working conditions and the

pollution of their environment by industry—in short, he argued that alcoholism was merely an epiphenomenon and that capitalism was the real culprit. Karl Marx was more than a little hostile to temperance both as a concept and as a movement. For him places such as English gin shops epitomized the essence of capitalist economic relations and were rightly the only Sunday pleasures of the people. Hence, he dismissed “economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the condition of the working class, organizers of charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, *temperance fanatics*, and hole-and-corner reformers of every kind” as coteries of the bourgeoisie. Similarly, the German Social Democratic leader Karl Kautsky emphasized the importance of the tavern as a gathering place for workers to discuss politics and as a center for German workers’ social network, while the Russian I. G. Pryzhov in *Istoriia kabakov v Rossii* (A history of taverns in Russia) claimed the same function for his country’s drinking places. Yet Marx also decried drunkenness, along with prostitution and usury, as “the interest charged by the bourgeois against the vices of ruined capitalism.” Little wonder, then, that European socialists were split into two camps over the issue: those who agreed with Kautsky, and those who followed the Belgian socialist Émile Vandervelde, who preached total abstinence as a means by which the worker could escape an unjust and exploitative system. Militant Social Democrats during Russia’s prewar revolutionary period continued this latter tradition, viewing total abstinence from the coils of “the green serpent” of alcohol abuse as a form of the spartan self-denial and discipline demanded of the revolutionary vanguard.

The second social phenomenon contemporaneous with and, to some extent, intimately connected with increased medical concern was the emergence of a civil society in various European states. Developing models of the formation of middle-class attitudes, sensibilities, and awareness, modern social historians see the activity of this civil society as extending along a continuum from promotion of private-property rights and the rule of law, to movements for professionalization, to the development of a public sphere independent of the state. In short, this society constituted a network of voluntary associations that served as a major means by which the bourgeoisie attempted not only to set the tone in the material and cultural spheres but increasingly to influence public policy on a host of issues. These issues included public health, education, and penology. A civil society further implies a critical mass of educated individuals, professional societies, and cultural organizations, all of which established intermediate identities between the family

and the state. This was, then, the promotion of activity for the public good rather than for private gain, the practical and purposive activity of citizens rather than subjects.

EARLY TEMPERANCE EFFORTS

The earliest recorded temperance group in Europe was established in Sweden in 1818 as a result of the efforts of the Lutheran clergy. This temperance effort was directed against the consumption of schnapps and continued to condone the moderate consumption of wine and beer. Only later in the century did the concept of temperance divide along lines advocating moderate consumption or total abstinence, or teetotalism. This division came to characterize virtually every European temperance movement save one—the German—before World War I. The Lutheran clergy was also responsible for the earliest temperance efforts in the Russian Empire—in the Baltic provinces in the 1830s.

In England and Russia organizations less formal than the government took the lead in fostering temperance. In England parliamentary legislation attempted to combat alcohol abuse by introducing laws that would permit the freer licensing of drink shops (which, proponents believed, would end the monopolistic practices that promoted excessive alcohol consumption). Such legislative efforts were grounded in the belief that government regulation of drinking places fostered adulteration, high prices, smuggling, and drunkenness. Ending monopolies and introducing free licensing would, advocates believed, end these evils as well as eliminate the artificial attractions of drink that stemmed from government favor. The Beer Act, which capped a decade devoted to this kind of approach, thus extended the free-market principle to the sale of drink, with the anticipation that the lower price of beer under this new system would encourage Englishmen to drink it instead of gin. It was thus yet another variation of the “pure” alcoholic beverage versus distilled alcoholic beverage debate.

In Russia the same reasoning lay behind the growing criticism of the government’s exploitation of the vodka tax farm (*otkup*). However, the Russian government was caught in a dilemma: it opposed efforts by the Lutheran clergy in the Baltic provinces, but at the same time its officials were concerned about increased levels of alcohol consumption—especially of the non-taxed homemade vodka (*samogon*) sold in unlicensed speakeasies (*korchmy*). The government addressed the issue not only of abuse but of the illicit sale and consequent adulteration of vodka by studying

the related issues in a series of commissions. Unlike the English, however, these bodies suggested greater official regulation of the drink trade by controlling, among other things, its location near schools and public buildings, restricting the size of licensed *kabaki*, and increasing the price of vodka to make it less affordable to the masses. France, in contradistinction to England and Russia, increased the number of officials overseeing the cafés.

MORE FORMALIZED TEMPERANCE EFFORTS

True temperance movements—that is, voluntary organizations formed by essentially private members of society—began in England and Germany only in the 1830s and 1840s, in France in the 1870s, and in Russia in the late 1880s and 1890s.

While not the first to organize temperance groups, England witnessed the most rapid development of quite diverse organizations—many of which inspired efforts in other countries. Independent societies were among the first of these groups, followed by national organizations—the National Temperance Society in 1842 (later the National Temperance League) and the British Association for the Promotion of Temperance in 1835 (later the British Temperance League). In England these organizations advocated teetotalism—a position not popular in other European states. Over the decades other groups were formed: workers' associations, fraternal temperance orders—including the Order of Good Templars (an import from the United States)—denominational temperance societies, and women's temperance associations. England also had specialized societies for, among others, soldiers and sailors—two groups that had historically been given alcoholic beverages to reward them for performance in the field or to warm and fortify them, out of a belief in alcohol's restorative and reinvigorating properties.

The English temperance model greatly influenced the development of temperance groups in Russia in the 1890s. Norman Kerr's *Inebriety: Its Etiology, Pathology, Treatment, and Jurisprudence* (1888) was one of the earliest treatises on the subject of temperance to be translated into Russian, although the works of German and French scientists and clinicians were ultimately the most widely circulated. There were significant differences of course. While there had been antialcohol protests in rural Russia in the period 1859–1861, they were directed less toward moderation or total abstinence than toward the high cost and low quality of vodka sold by tavern keepers under the *otkup*. Some of this protest was clearly anti-Semitic—

directed against Jewish tavern keepers and illicit drink sellers more often than against gentile ones.

The transition from the tax farm to an excise system in the 1880s helped stimulate a true temperance consciousness among Russian public-health physicians, lawyers, and other professionals. While on the surface directed against the new system for increasing drinking and alcohol abuse among the urban working class, much of the sentiment against the excise originated with officials and intellectuals who found introducing entrepreneurship into the drink trade an unwanted form of competition. Clerical involvement was restricted until the late 1880s due to Orthodox Church officials' disapproval of temperance efforts. With the introduction of the state vodka monopoly in 1894, however, temperance in Russia was officially recognized and significantly boosted, and the number of groups championing the cause grew exponentially. This included state-sponsored organizations—the Guardianships of Popular Sobriety.

The efforts of all these groups in Russia were similar in tone and form to those in England: basic literacy, education, skill training, entertainment, libraries, reading rooms, encouragement of tea consumption as an alternative to alcohol, and, above all, propaganda on the debilitating economic, physical, and mental consequences of alcohol consumption. The Russian movement also became fully committed to the disease model of alcoholism and advocated creating specialized institutions for the treatment instead of punishment of alcoholics. Like English and French groups, Russian temperance organizations published journals, newspapers, and pamphlets devoted to educating people on the harm of alcohol consumption. Unlike in England, church temperance organizations were held at arm's length by others in the movement, and legislative support for temperance became possible only with the third state Duma after 1907.

Germany experienced many of the same tensions as England and Russia. The early German temperance movement (1830s and 1840s) insisted on the moderate consumption of beer and wine and the avoidance of distilled liquors. But teetotalism made little headway. The German movement was characterized by the same religious and moralistic features as denominational temperance activity in England and as some local parish activity in Russia. As in England and Russia, these early groups required adherents to take a vow renouncing spirits. However, German temperance underwent a sea change after mid-century and by the mid-1880s had come, in the form of the German Association for the Prevention of Alcohol Abuse (DMVG), to emphasize a more scientific approach. This included devoting attention to the medi-

cal and treatment aspects of alcoholism and lobbying the state for changes in German licensing laws as well as for laws that would permit the legal, institutional treatment of alcohol abusers. Because of the central importance that German socialists gave to beer halls as social and political gathering places for workers, the DMVG stressed moderation only. The Good Templars did not, therefore, enjoy a warm response among German socialists.

France represents the final example of temperance in a major European state. As with most European societies, drinking in general—and the consumption of wine in particular—had traditionally been seen as a source of refreshment as well as a symbol of a bond. Hence a drink was often a means of sealing a business agreement. However, as early as the eighteenth century, the cabarets were seen as contributing to heightened levels of drunkenness and as places for idlers. As in Germany, distinctions were made between more “natural” alcoholic beverages and the stronger, physically more harmful *eaux-de-vie*. Added to this mix was the perception, so ably expressed by Honoré de Balzac, that the *cafés* selling alcoholic beverages were, in and of themselves, “parliaments of the people.” Thus, following the revolutionary era, both republican and imperial French governments so feared this aspect of drinking places that they established special arms of the law to watch over them in the countryside, villages, and small towns.

As in other European countries, the increasing concern of the bourgeoisie, public-health officials, and the medical profession with alcoholism among urban workers was notable in France. Moreover, in France as elsewhere in Europe, industrialized distillation made for a deadly combination of large quantities and low prices. Thus in France, too, consumption levels increased markedly in the course of the nineteenth century. Wine was increasingly replaced by beer and cognac and, in the final quarter of the century, by the deadly absinthe. Yet for all this, not until 1872 was the first voluntary temperance organization—the Association contre l’Abus des Boissons Alcooliques—formed in France.

In the last decades of the nineteenth century French temperance groups—although few in number and small in membership compared with England—sponsored legislative efforts to control alcohol production and decrease alcoholism. The French groups, while consciously avoiding a teetotal position, sponsored the same family-oriented activities and entertainments as the British and, similar to the Russian movement, were anxious about worker housing as a causal nexus for alcohol abuse. Worker temperance organizations also enjoyed some popularity in France, indeed to a much greater extent than in Russia because in France a nationwide worker organization—the Federation of Anti-Alcohol Workers (FOA)—was formed in 1911, whereas in Russia the tsarist govern-

ment's restrictive policies in the years before World War I precluded formation of such a group.

Aside from the major nations of Europe, only Sweden attempted and, to some extent, succeeded in combating both the liquor traffic in general and the rising levels of alcohol abuse in particular through the Gothenburg System of 1865. This system involved creating limited-dividend corporations for the manufacture and sale of drink and local monopolies for the retail sale of brandies; in addition, there was a rationing of the population, and on-premise consumption of alcoholic beverages was prohibited except in eating places. Only Russia's vodka monopoly attempted to achieve some of these effects—for example, by attempting to make the state vodka shops monopolies for the sale of drink by the bottle for off-

premises consumption but allowing its consumption by the glass in first-class restaurants, some taverns, and the dining rooms of railway stations. Sweden's far-reaching efforts were not replicated in most European states, however. The Gothenburg System's major shortcoming was its inability to control the importation of spirits and the sale of beer and wine. Not until 1919 did Sweden reform the system further by attempting to eliminate private profit from every branch of the manufacture and sale of alcohol.

INTERNATIONAL TEMPERANCE EFFORTS

What pulled all of these disparate national temperance efforts together was the International Congress against

Alcoholism held in various European capitals from the 1880s up to the eve of World War I. These gatherings—increasingly teetotal in spirit and content—addressed the burning issues of the movement: alcoholism as disease; the nature, scope, and desirability of institutional centers exclusively for the treatment of alcoholism; and the regimens to be followed in such centers, including the increasingly popular use of hypnotism as a therapeutic measure. These assemblies also addressed issues such as the relation between alcohol abuse and public-health problems and social issues. Tuberculosis and epilepsy were among the myriad ailments associated directly or indirectly with alcohol abuse. Moreover, social issues such as wage levels, housing conditions, crime, and the workplace environment—including conditions in factories—also preoccupied the delegates to these gatherings.

Still, by the eve of World War I, for all these efforts, anomalies persisted. In France, for example, the continued popularity and productivity of homemade alcoholic beverages—the *bouilleurs de cru*—and in Russia the troublesome problems of home manufacture and illicit sale of home-manufactured alcoholic beverages—particularly vodka—remained unsolved. Both countries also failed to rally women to their temperance causes. In other European countries and in the United States, women were seen as the natural allies of temperance—because they had not yet acquired the bad habit of drinking and because patriarchal views held that they were either made of nobler stuff than men or less influenced by alcohol due to physical or mental inferiority. Despite the evidence from the United States and England, temperance groups in France and Russia failed to attract large numbers of women and had only a handful of women temperance leaders.

The outbreak of World War I was seen as an occasion to make a new, alcohol-free beginning. But very little action was taken to restrict access to alcoholic beverages. Except, that is, in Russia, where the tsarist government temporarily prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages during mobilization (to avoid the drunken excesses witnessed during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, when alcohol was readily available to newly mobilized troops) and then totally prohibited the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages for the duration of the war. There were even intimations that this policy would be made “perpetual.”

TEMPERANCE AFTER WORLD WAR I

The Russian experiment was not successful, and home brewing, cases of alcohol poisoning, and liquor riots

soon appeared. Antialcohol and temperance propaganda was largely ignored and, hence, unsuccessful in both France and England as well. With the war's end, in the 1920s the state became increasingly involved in the matter of alcoholism and temperance, an approach that prevailed for the remainder of the century.

In Russia the October Revolution initially carried a promise of reform in the alcohol problems of the previous centuries by a group philosophically opposed to alcoholism on the basis of marxist theory. Not only was abstention viewed as “heroic” by many worker-Bolsheviks, but the Communist Party took the position that alcohol abuse had been an epiphenomenon of the deep-seated contradictions of capitalism. Declaring war on alcoholism as a social disease, with V. I. Lenin labeling it a plague of the petite bourgeoisie, the new Communist state announced that the proletariat would root it out through the propagation of the “Communist ideal.” Thus, sweeping measures were enacted to combat and eliminate drinking: distillers were shut down; inebriates were declared subject to arrest and prosecution; the death penalty was prescribed for members of the Red Army who abused alcohol; “narcological dispensaries” were organized to treat alcoholics; and prison terms of at least ten years were mandated for the illegal manufacture of alcoholic beverages—especially *samogon*. The new government also began publishing a monthly temperance journal, *Trezvost' i kul'tura* (Sobriety and culture), to spearhead the drive for sobriety and to promote demonstrations in favor of it and the formation of temperance societies. Yet these efforts were more Potemkin villages, and the societies were never independent or effective. The narcological dispensaries in Moscow reported an increasing annual turnover of patients, leading one early Soviet alcohol researcher to calculate an alcoholism rate of thirty per one thousand population for the city and more than one million chronic alcoholics in the nation.

In the 1930s fiscal imperatives led Joseph Stalin to increase production of alcohol and to control its sale—a classic redistributive method of the tsarist period. Yet the ranks of heavy drinkers did not increase during this decade despite the stresses of urbanization, industrialization, repression, and fear. Rather, alcohol consumption—and, one must assume, alcoholism—slowed both because the standard of living could not accommodate the regular purchase of alcoholic beverages and because the loss of their agricultural products slowed the peasants' production of *samogon*. There was, too, the additional fear that “decadent behavior” such as heavy drinking could lead to incarceration or worse. The other side of the coin, however, was Stalin's wartime return to the practice of issuing a daily

ration of vodka to soldiers. But with war's end, alcohol consumption and attendant alcoholism rose in Soviet society in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. One scholar of the phenomenon calculated that in the Russian Federation alone, 11.3 percent of the population aged fifteen and older were alcoholics. The data for this period produced by Western scholars were largely inferential, however, since the Soviet Union continued to regard such figures as tantamount to state secrets.

With the antialcohol campaign launched initially by Yuri Andropov and continued by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s, Western scholars saw the first real public discussion of alcoholism and temperance in the Soviet Union since the 1920s. Multifaceted in its conception and calling for the creation of a state temperance society, the campaign claimed by late in the decade significant decreases in alcoholism and its associated problems. Beneath the surface, however, the manufacture of *samogon* had soared, and to avoid the state's strictures on hours of sale and quantity of bottles allowed for per capita purchase, the public had turned to strong, often poisonous substitutes, such as antifreeze and shoe polish. Consequently, this great state temperance campaign died with a whimper not too long before the collapse of the state that sponsored it.

France experienced many of the same problems as the other European nations after World War I. During the war alcohol consumption declined, but fol-

lowing the restoration of peace, production and consumption rose markedly, as did alcoholism. Indeed, the few antialcohol barriers raised during the war were removed, government intervention was discouraged, and rates of consumption and alcoholism rose steadily into the late 1930s. Temperance simply was neither popular nor economically desirable. Then, too, American Prohibition smacked too much of puritanical moralism to many Frenchmen. Only the Family Code of 1939 and its creation of the Haute Comité sur la Population represented any effort to restrict alcohol consumption.

Real declines in alcoholism in France were made possible only by World War II, which, with defeat and occupation by the Germans, ended the *laissez-faire* policies with respect to alcohol production and consumption. What the Vichy government started was continued in the post-World War II period by the Fourth and Fifth Republics—that is, extensive state involvement in antialcoholism and temperance. In this, it is much like—albeit more effective than—the Soviet example. Unlike the Soviet Union, however, there was a revival and extension of legitimate private antialcohol groups. The state also became convinced, through the research of Sully Ledermann, that the greater the level of alcohol consumption in a society, the greater the amount of alcohol-related harm. With the Fourth and Fifth Republics' assumption of responsibility for medical care and rational economic



TABLE 2
PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL OF ALL VARIETIES
(IN LITERS PER CAPITA OF 100 PERCENT ALCOHOL)
FOR SELECT EUROPEAN STATES, 1990–1996

	1990	1993	1994	1995	1996
Denmark	9.8	9.9	10.0	10.1	10.3
Finland	7.8	6.8	6.6	6.4	6.3
France	12.6	12.3	11.8	11.9	12.1
Germany	11.7*	11.8	11.5	11.2	10.8
Sweden	5.8	6.0	6.1	5.7	5.2
United Kingdom	7.6	7.1	7.3	7.0	7.2
Norway	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.0
Russia	—	5.5	5.3	5.2	5.2

* Figures for the Federal Republic only
The International Order of Good Templars

planning, then, the state increasingly viewed alcoholism as a disease with both societal and economic consequences for which the state had responsibility. This approach was perfectly consonant with the social philosophy of the so-called welfare state of other European countries after 1945. Consequently, a series of enactments provided impetus for a state antialcohol campaign mandating treatment, compulsory blood tests for criminals to measure blood alcohol levels, and measures against drunk driving—many of which remained in effect in the 1990s.

Like the Soviet Union and France, Scandinavian countries involved the state in antialcohol efforts. Finland, for example, repealed prohibition in the early 1930s but established ALKO to control the production of and trade in alcoholic beverages. ALKO was also charged with operating retail stores for spirits, wine, long drinks (spirits mixed with soft drinks), and strong beer. Unlike the unrealistic U.S. goal of total prohibition, Finland, like Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, strove from 1918 to the 1990s to reduce the detrimental effects of alcohol use by steering consumption and habits in a “healthy” direction—a goal reminiscent of both the prerevolutionary tsarist alcohol policy and the Gothenburg System. Finnish municipalities, like those in Sweden, are obliged to provide services for people with substance-abuse and related problems. Moreover, many hospitals in Fin-

land have detoxification units operating as part of the national health-care system. Sweden began dealing with detoxification in the late 1940s by creating outpatient clinics for alcoholics. Both states legislated close interaction between nongovernmental organizations, municipal governments, and essentially private treatment centers in the struggle with alcoholism, with Sweden providing such services under the auspices of its Social Services Act of 1982. Sweden and Finland, like Denmark and Norway, have introduced strict limitations on alcohol advertising as part of an ongoing preventive approach.

The German flirtation with antialcoholism and temperance in the years after World War I displayed the same ambivalence as in the period before 1914. High levels of consumption and abuse characterized the Weimar years. The Great Depression had the same flattening effect on alcohol consumption and alcoholism in Germany as it did elsewhere in Europe. Further, there was no “official” antialcohol posture adopted in the period 1933–1945, despite Hitler’s well-known abstemiousness—that is, with the exception of those German physicians who, mirroring the early racial degeneration temperance approaches of the nineteenth century, saw alcohol abuse as a factor undermining Aryan racial purity. The division of Germany into the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany from 1945 to 1990 makes gen-

eralization difficult, but alcohol consumption was the most widespread chronic disorder even after reunification. Nonetheless, several provinces set up mass-media campaigns focusing on sobriety in specific situations. But of all the European nations, Germany remained behind in both governmental and private temperance efforts at the end of the twentieth century.

Britain experimented with prohibition early in World War I, when David Lloyd George was chancellor of the exchequer, but ultimately settled for the creation of the Liquor Control Board—which closed pubs in the mornings, afternoons, and early at night, a practice that survived in attenuated form until the 1990s. Scotland, however, did introduce local option even before the outbreak of war in 1914. Despite this, a broad array of church-based and secular temperance organizations remained active into the 1920s, their efforts aided by the inevitable drop in consumption during the Great Depression. Only after 1945 and the achievement of a parliamentary majority by the Labor Party, with its wide-ranging program of welfare and public-health services, did alcoholism and measures for its treatment or eradication become concerns of the state—again, an approach perfectly consonant with other European states of the time.

Recovery from the devastation of World War II and growing prosperity in Britain produced increased levels of alcohol consumption—which approximately doubled between 1950 and 1980. This troubling phenomenon and its attendant problems sparked the creation or reorganization of government departments charged with administering health issues as well as the creation of a new organization called Alcohol Concern. Alcohol education issues were mandated to be handled through an independent body (Action on Alcohol Abuse, or AAA) under the aegis of the Royal Colleges of Medicine. (The AAA was discontinued after 1989 due to insufficient funding.) A series of acts in the 1970s and 1980s required, among other things,

mandatory licenses for shops and beverage distributors; established legal age limits for consumption; and restricted the hours for sale of alcoholic beverages. In 1990 the Portman Group, an association of alcohol manufacturers, established a “Proof of Age” card to encourage compliance with the legal age limits for the purchase of alcoholic beverages. As with other countries in the European Union, severe penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol were introduced in 1967 and 1981 (the Road Safety Act and the Transport Act, respectively). And finally, as with other European states, under the rubric of prevention a detailed set of guidelines regulated the advertising of alcoholic beverages on radio, television, and in various print and advertising media.

Although international temperance and anti-alcohol conventions were held after 1945, they had far less importance than before 1914. Uniformity of action by the European states on this issue came only in 1990 with the formation of EURO CARE—Advocacy for the Prevention of Alcohol Related Harm in Europe, an alliance of voluntary and nongovernmental organizations concerned about the impact of the European Union on alcohol policy in member states. EURO CARE maintains a Web site detailing alcohol statistics for nations in the European Union. [For statistics of alcohol consumption, see tables 1 and 2.]

With the World Health Organization’s recommendations for reduction of alcohol production in various states and the European Union’s insistence that potential members adopt equitable alcohol taxation policies, many of the aspects of alcohol consumption, abuse, and temperance that had been the concern of European civil society from the eighteenth through the early twentieth century appeared well on the way to standardization through state or national and even supranational efforts at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

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ORPHANS AND FOUNDLINGS



David L. Ransel

Historical research on orphans and foundlings dates to the mid-nineteenth century when large studies of municipal and regional institutions to care for them appeared. Prominent examples include Andrea Bufini's study of the Milan foundling hospital (1844) and Franz Hügel's wide-ranging report on the Austrian empire and many other parts of Europe (1863). Impressive works on national care programs for unwanted children followed in subsequent decades. Léon Lallemand surveyed the history of abandoned children in France in 1885. M. D. van Puteren did the same for Russia and also drew instructive comparisons with other parts of Europe in 1908. The authors of these and similar studies on other municipalities, regions, and countries were not professional historians, and their purpose was not so much to write history as to influence contemporary debates about the moral and practical consequences of government-assisted care of illegitimate or unwanted children. They did nevertheless compile a wealth of historical material that late-twentieth-century social historians used as a point of departure for their studies.

This new historiography of child welfare began in the 1970s with works by Olwen Hufton and Natalie Zemon Davis on the development of public services in early modern times and has continued in a series of studies on social and institutional responses to child abandonment, including the works of John Boswell on antiquity and the Middle Ages; Claude Delasselle, Rachel Fuchs, and Janet Potash on France; Richard Trexler, Philip Gavitt, David Kertzer, Volker Hunecke, and many others on Italy; Joan Sherwood on Spain; and David Ransel on Russia. Interest in this topic was stimulated initially by the French "Annales school" and its attention to demography and the processes of everyday living. The political protests of the 1960s in the United States and France intensified historians' interest in the lives of the common people and the poor. The rise of movements for women's rights and an unprecedented entry of women into the historical profession in the 1970s fueled research into the primary spheres of female activity: family, work,

childbearing, and child rearing. The study of abandoned and orphaned children offered a good vantage point from which to examine issues related to women and the family, such as survival strategies of the poor, the productive and reproductive roles of women, the value of children, the growth of municipal and state institutions for assisting women and families, administrative and policing strategies, the classification and ordering of modern urban life, and industrial production.

John Boswell's study of child abandonment from late antiquity to the Renaissance introduced the novel idea that the disposal of unwanted children in city squares, garbage dumps, and dung heaps was a mechanism for redistributing human resources and balancing out a disorderly reproductive process. Some families produced more children than they needed and by abandoning them either contributed children to others who had too few or delivered them into the hands of slavers and jobbers who could recoup the cost of rearing the children in their later use or sale. Despite Boswell's impressive command of sources, his work received criticism for its transparent moral and political aims and his failure to consider conflicting evidence. One of Boswell's aims was to convince readers that the conventional family models based upon blood or marital relations were recent impositions and not the typical family arrangement known to Western history. Another was to argue that before governments and private charities stepped in with modern technologies of categorization and exclusion such as foundling homes and orphanages, people quite naturally and logically redistributed children among themselves and that they did so with virtually no damage to the children. This libertarian notion, that in the absence of intervention by government and welfare institutions social problems are worked out to the advantage of all concerned, failed to take into account the very high toll in infant life that such an informal mechanism inevitably entailed. Indeed, Boswell contended that most of the abandoned children of antiquity survived, a conclusion that flies in the face of all

that has been learned since about infant survival under such conditions. It is difficult, however, to deny Boswell's point that the institutional care of modern times, especially the foundling care programs of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were likewise accompanied by an excessive infant and childhood mortality.

ABANDONMENT AND INFANTICIDE

In antiquity the decision about whether to spare the lives of children was left to the family or, more accurately, to the father. At first this power was absolute and enduring, but gradually legal restrictions narrowed its scope until a decision to dispose of a child was permitted only in the case of newborns. Not until the end of the fourth century was infanticide outlawed by the Christian church, but the practice scarcely came to end just because a law was passed. Although the church brought about this protection for children, it may initially have shown some tolerance for abandonment and infanticide so long as these acts were not an excuse for unlicensed sexual pleasure. The early church fathers distinguished between infanticide as a way of avoiding the consequences of one's lust, and infanticide for economic reasons. Penitentials proposed much lighter penalties for infanticide committed by a poor woman than for the same act committed by a wealthy woman. This stance was common in the West until at least the eleventh century.

Along with some tolerance of infanticide to keep population in line with economic resources, there may also have been some acceptance of non-marital sexual activity in the early centuries of Christianity. But this changed in the eleventh century after the Council of Rome in 1074. The church began to stress the importance of confining sexual indulgence to marriage, an emphasis that was strengthened toward the end of the Middle Ages and carried forward even more vigorously by the Reformation. While bastards and the women who bore them were widely tolerated in the Middle Ages, after the Reformation the position of the unwed mother became increasingly isolated and precarious. She faced social ostracism and the prospect of having to turn to prostitution or other unsavory means of staying alive if she did not rid herself of her baby before its existence became known. It is impossible to say if abandonment and infanticide increased, but they became different. If they had earlier occurred with some degree of understanding from the community, they now became a desperate means of escaping communal censure. These acts became personal rather than social, and they arose from and

contributed to the mounting misogyny of Christian Europe as the Roman and Protestant churches campaigned ever more vigorously against social deviance, especially as personified in the most exposed and vulnerable women.

By the sixteenth century, states joined the churches in the crusade against extramarital intercourse and its products, the illegitimate child and infanticide. In several countries, unmarried servant women were regularly inspected to see if they had breast milk. The presence of milk in the breasts justified, according to article 36 of the *Constitutio Criminalis Carolina*, introduced in the Holy Roman Empire under Charles V in 1532, the application of torture to discover the cause. The even more draconian article 131 introduced a presumption of guilt for murder in cases in which an unmarried woman was alone at the time of birth, hid the baby, and the child was later found dead. This rule was subsequently written into French law in 1556 and confirmed as late as 1708. Presumption of guilt based on similar or slightly modified conditions, usually involving failure to register an extramarital pregnancy, subsequently found its way into the codes and practices of many other countries, including England in 1624, Sweden in 1627, Württemberg in 1658, Denmark in 1683, Scotland in 1690, and Bavaria as late as 1751. Punishment was harsh and usually included painful or prolonged death (being cast upon a fire or buried alive). A misogynous regime in Russia brought equally ferocious punishment, even if there matters never went so far as to fix in law a presumption of guilt for an unwed mother whose child had died.

THE FIRST FOUNDLING HOMES

While the church had led the way in campaigning against illegitimacy and infanticide, it was also the first institution to come to the aid of unmarried women and innocents. The religious orders of the Italian cities began establishing foundling homes as early as the thirteenth century, with the opening in Rome of the San Spirito hospital in 1212. (Some sources date the first such home to 787 in Milan, but little is known about this effort.) The stimulus for creating the San Spirito refuge was said to be the scandal of women throwing babies into the Tiber River. Similar hospitals soon appeared in other Italian cities. In Florence during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries two hospitals, the Santa Maria da San Gallo and the Santa Maria della Scala, took in unwanted children. These multipurpose institutions also accepted poor people needing medical assistance. In time, strain on

the limited resources of the hospitals led to differentiation and specialization. In the mid-fifteenth century, the city fathers collaborated with the silk guild to establish an institution dedicated to the care of foundlings, the great Ospedale degli Innocenti.

By this time, Florentines considered the work of these hospitals essential to the character and stability of their community. Failure to aid exposed and abandoned children would not only undermine their society by reducing its population, but would also erode the myths of solidarity that bound the community together in its earthly life and linked it to the heavenly city. Thus, children left to die were not considered only as a sanitation problem but as amputated limbs of the communal body and unbaptized souls lost to God. Efforts to save the children were valued as a means of drawing the community together, and the rescued children played an important role in the salvation of the community because of the blessings that their prayers were thought to bring to the city.

During the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance the Italians worked out an approach to foundling care that relied on large institutions supported by a combination of religious, corporate, and municipal resources. Usually the infants brought to the institution were screened and sent out to wet nurses in the town or more often the surrounding countryside. Eventually the survivors returned for education at the institution, and finally were assigned to apprenticeship, military service, menial labor, or marriage. This approach, known as the Latin or Catholic system, moved across the Alps into France and Austria, where in the sixteenth century humanist writers stressed the need for organized relief and other public welfare measures to curb increasing problems of urban disorder. Begging and vagrancy were their major concerns, but humanist values also promoted a new solicitude for poor children. For the smallest and most helpless, the abandoned and exposed babies, many towns provided foundling homes on the Italian model. For poor or unsupervised children who had survived early childhood, towns established institutions for their care and training in line with the humanist belief in education as an instrument for making good citizens.

France offers the best example of the development of the Latin system north of the Alps. A multipurpose hospital, the Grand Hôtel-Dieu de Notre-Dame-de-Pitié in Lyon was taking in children as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century. Marseille and Paris may have provided such assistance earlier still. By 1536 the state began to play a role. Francis I opened a hospital in Paris designed exclusively for the care of foundlings and named it the Hospice des

Enfants-Dieu. An important contributor to this work in the next century was the clergyman Vincent, later St. Vincent de Paul, who devoted much of his life to caring for abandoned children. With the help of the Dames de la Charité (Ladies of Charity), he opened the Hôpital des Enfants Trouvés in Paris in the 1630s. Within a few decades this institution was having difficulty managing its growing population of foundlings, difficulties that arose even before the great explosion of illegitimacy and child abandonment in the eighteenth century.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

By early in the eighteenth century, the sight of infant corpses lying in ditches, on garbage heaps, and in sewer drains was familiar throughout Europe. Sewers, being less visible, were evidently the most frequent points of deposit. After a fire that devastated Rennes, France, in 1721, workers rebuilding the city opened the sewers and found the skeletons of over eighty babies. Even in the 1690s the slaughter had been disturbing enough that the crown ordered municipalities to use their local Hôtel-Dieu as a receiving point for abandoned children. But many localities were not able to shoulder the cost of caring for foundlings, and when the burden on local institutions became too

heavy, they discouraged admissions. People responded by bringing their unwanted children to the Paris hospital, often over long distances, because the Paris home had support from the crown and accepted nearly everyone. By the mid-eighteenth century, a brisk trade had sprung up between the provinces and the capital, as people paid carters to convey babies to the Paris foundling home. Some local welfare facilities even organized their own expeditions to deliver abandoned children to the Paris institution.

During the eighteenth century, public opinion was swinging away from the punitive approach to the unwed mother. Concerned with population growth, enlightenment writers fostered a new understanding of her plight and encouraged a revolt against the ferocious penalties that had been visited upon her. In the sentimental literature of the age, unwed mothers were portrayed as victims as often as were their children. The public was persuaded that both the children and the mothers had a better chance of surviving if the mothers could anonymously dispose of their babies, and a consensus formed in favor of an open admissions policy like that of the central Paris foundling home. This policy was usually symbolized by the turning cradle, a device that allowed a woman to deposit her baby unseen at the door of the home by rotating a cradle that pivoted between the outside and the inside of the building. First used in Italian foundling homes, the device spread to other Roman Catholic and even some eastern Orthodox lands by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

For much of Europe the use of the turning cradle was limited to the time of the Enlightenment revolt against persecution of unwed mothers. It was most often found and remained longest in strongly Catholic lands, with their strict norms against premarital sex and opposition to paternity searches in cases of illegitimacy. Conservative Catholic authorities defended the turning cradle as much for its role in protecting the honor and sanctity of the family as for preventing desperate women from killing their infants. By concealing the identity of unwed mothers, the device shielded families from scandal and from the property claims of illegitimate offspring. Communal solidarity required protection of family interests in places where the family formed the essential building block of society. The country in which families most effectively dominated social and political life, the kingdom of Sicily, was also the quintessential home of the turning cradle. By law, every town in the kingdom had to erect a foundling home with this device and keep it open day and night. The turning cradle was common in other Mediterranean lands and their dependencies. Spain and Portugal supported homes

with the devices throughout their metropolitan provinces and also exported them to their American colonies. To the east, the turning cradle appeared in Orthodox lands of the Balkans and was instituted in Russia by Catherine the Great as early as 1764 and maintained right into the 1890s, later than in any other country.

Something different happened in the north and northwestern parts of Europe. During the Renaissance, foundling homes on the Italian model had reached as far north as many of the German cities, but they did not endure there. The retreat of the sponsoring Roman Catholic institutions after the Reformation partly explains this. Although some writers believe that the Protestant emphasis on personal rather than communal responsibility was also a major factor, this emphasis may only have reinforced a preexisting family system and moral climate. Even in Catholic principalities of Germany, cities soon turned away from large central foundling hospitals and sought to lay the cost of support for illegitimate children on the parents. In contrast to Latin Europe, paternity searches were legal in the north, and families were expected to maintain control over their members and not look to the community to care for the products of misbehavior.

Later, responding to the humanitarian revolt of the eighteenth century and the new sympathy for unwed mothers, some northern cities erected large foundling hospitals and allowed anonymous admission. In Denmark, for example, such an institution was established in the middle of the eighteenth century when a turning cradle was attached to the Copenhagen workhouse. Institutions in London and Stockholm provided the same opportunity. But, as had happened farther south, this open admissions policy soon generated a deluge of children, including the importation of unwanted infants from outlying areas, and in the case of Denmark, even from a foreign country, Sweden, across the sound. In 1774 the Danes replaced the turning cradle with a system requiring unwed mothers to rear their own children, if necessary with financial assistance from the community. England and Sweden soon turned away from large centralized foundling operations for the same reasons. So, once again, as in the Renaissance, this type of institution proved short-lived in the north. England, the Nordic countries, and much of Germany henceforth provided homes and training only for true orphans or other children for whom no one could be found to take responsibility. Homes of this type were supported either by municipal governments or civic and religious organizations such as the Free Masons and Pietists. Orphans were usually brought up to about age eight

and then turned over to masters as apprentices or servants.

In the north, the structure of financing the care of unwanted children and the values that underlay this structure differed from those in the Catholic Mediterranean lands and in Russia. In England and the continental Protestant countries, the cost of foundling care was borne directly by the community or its immediate representatives and was not cushioned by large private endowments, self-generated revenues from associated enterprises, or church and central government subsidies. Accordingly, in Protestant lands, ratepayers or their representatives imposed limits on the amount of money available for this service and forced tighter admissions policies. Underlying this approach to public welfare were the strength in Protestant countries of corporate bodies other than the family and no doubt, too, the emphasis on personal rather than community responsibility. The disclosure of illegitimacy and the assignment of responsibility for it were lesser threats to community solidarity in these lands than were its concealment and the laying of its cost upon the public. Since the Reformation, the temporal powers had taken a greater role in enforcing social norms, and the family, which was less crucial to maintaining social discipline than was the case in the south, required less protection from the disorderly behavior of its members.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Between the wholly Catholic lands to the south and the Protestant-dominated polities to the north stood France and Belgium, whose experience revealed an ambivalence about the application of the two prevailing systems of foundling care. The turning cradle came late to these lands and then briefly swept all other systems aside. Before the nineteenth century, foundling care was a local matter, and the large area encompassed by Belgium and France subsumed a variety of value systems and corresponding diversity of responses to child abandonment. Methods in Flanders and Brittany resembled those in Protestant lands. In Flanders, the parish alone bore responsibility for abandoned infants or illegitimate children whom parents could not support; in Brittany, a subdivision similar to the parish, *the générale des habitants*, played the same role. Unlike other jurisdictions in France and Belgium, these two permitted, even demanded, paternity suits so that the father could be made to support his illegitimate child and relieve the parish of the burden.

Morals in Brittany were severe and illegitimacy low. But, by the same token, nearly all unwed mothers sought to escape shame by abandoning their infants. In the factory areas of northeastern France, illegitimacy was judged less harshly, its incidence was higher

than in Brittany, and a smaller proportion of women abandoned their children. There people were more likely to condemn an unwed mother for abandoning her child than for keeping it, especially after the initiation of aid for unwed mothers in the middle of the nineteenth century. This attitude contrasted sharply with the moral climate of southern France, which in its concern for family honor and solidarity was more like that in the neighboring Mediterranean lands. Despite these varied value systems, both the adoption of the turning cradle early in the nineteenth century and its removal after 1840 occurred as a single process throughout France and Belgium, an example of the universalizing effects of the French Revolution. In 1811, in order to fulfill the promise of the Revolution to care for all illegitimate children, the national government ordered foundling shelters everywhere to use the turning cradle. But it soon became clear that this decision complicated rather than facilitated the goal of caring for illegitimate children, since the system of anonymous admissions led to the deposit not just of illegitimate children but also a burgeoning number of legitimate children and soon exhausted the resources intended for the care of the illegitimate. Moreover, many abuses were discovered. Married women would contrive to abandon their babies to the foundling hospital and then receive back their own children as nurslings. For this wet nursing and fosterage of their own children they obtained a regular subsidy and eventually a pension. Although the authorities tried to counter this fraud by transporting children deposited in one province to another for nursing and fosterage, this solution simply led to a skyrocketing death rate among the children. The French soon declared the system of blind admissions a failure, and by midcentury the turning cradle was rapidly being phased out and replaced by a system that identified and excluded legitimate children and provided financial assistance to needy unwed mothers to rear their own children.

Although Catholic conservative opinion continued to argue for the turning cradle on the grounds that its abolition would increase infanticide, cause scandal in the family and community, and entrust the rearing of children to women of demonstrated immorality, the move away from institutional care and toward a modern welfare system of individual subsidies proceeded apace. The Belgians adopted the French reform within a few years and returned to the methods in use earlier in Flanders. Others soon followed. Spain began to phase out anonymous admissions in the 1850s, and Portugal did so between 1867 and 1871. In Italy, the birthplace of the turning cradle, the process began about the same time, and by 1878 only

one-third of the Italian homes continued to operate with the devices.

In Russia the change did not come until the 1890s, a tardiness associated with the peculiar history of the Russian imperial foundling homes. Catherine the Great, a German princess by birth, and her education adviser, Ivan Betskoi, a man who had spent many years in western Europe, established these institutions, which in time became the largest in all of Europe. The Russian foundling homes were consciously designed on the most progressive Western models and constituted another aspect of the country's rapid, self-conscious westernization in the eighteenth century. Founded at the height of the humanitarian revolt against the persecution of unwed mothers, they enjoyed the most liberal admissions policy on the continent. Children were accepted at all hours with no questions asked. At first, admissions were even artificially stimulated by advertisement of the homes. The reasons for this liberality were two. First, Catherine and Betskoi hoped not merely to save illegitimate children but also to build from them an educated urban artisan and service class, "a third rank of people," as they said, a social estate that Russia then lacked. Second, the homes, constructed on a lavish scale in the heart of the Moscow and St. Petersburg, were intended to serve as symbols of tsarist solicitude for the common people.

Not surprisingly, the homes were soon swamped with unwanted infants. At their peak in the mid-nineteenth century, admissions at the Moscow home alone surpassed seventeen thousand children a year. The hope of building an urban estate from these children quickly faded, because even the much smaller numbers entering the facility in the late eighteenth century could not be kept alive in urban institutions and had to be turned over to wet nurses in the countryside for care and feeding. Local fosterage saved some children, but even so mortality rates ran as high as 85 percent. When the English reformer Thomas Malthus visited Russia in 1789 in connection with a survey of foundling hospitals throughout Europe, he assessed the mortality at the Russian homes and quickly punctured the rosy public image of this tsarist philanthropy. He remarked dryly that "if a person wished to check population, and were not solicitous about the means, he could not propose a more effectual measure, than the establishment of a sufficient number of foundling hospitals [like these], unlimited in their reception of children" (quoted in Ransel, p. 58). The symbolic importance of the Russian homes as the most visible and well-financed tsarist charity nevertheless remained and caused difficulties for reform. Modifications in the admissions policy were in-

troduced now and again, in particular at the time of the great reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, but fundamental reform did not take place until 1892, and the homes continued to operate right up to the Bolshevik revolution.

PUBLIC STANDARDS FOR PERSONAL DECISIONS

The arguments for reform of the open admissions policies in southern Europe, France, and Russia were based on an understanding of the rapidly changing social terrain of the countries in which the turning cradle was used. Critics acknowledged that in the past the family had been the key to social discipline and needed protection from property claims and from the implied loss of control that illegitimacy signaled. The turning cradle had afforded the required secrecy. But, the critics continued, the family had changed, individuals had become less dependent on the family and less loyal to it. In these circumstances, the turning cradle acted more as an assault on the family than a protection, since it permitted married couples to turn their children into wards of the state. As for unwed mothers, it was far better, contended opponents of the turning cradle, to oblige them to declare themselves so that they could benefit from the financial assistance, professional guidance, and encouragement that would persuade them to keep their children. In these arguments one sees the emergence of a central idea of modern social-work intervention: the imposition of public standards on personal decisions about the size and character of families. It led directly to what Jacques Donzelot called the "policing of families," for if subsidies were to be furnished to women who were not only poor but also regarded as immoral, then the same program would have to be extended to other more deserving women such as widows with children, mothers of large families, and working mothers. In short, according to Donzelot, the reform of foundling policy planted the seed of the modern family allowance and the state surveillance that accompanied it.

The advent of the welfare state, government subsidies, and fosterage of unwanted children ended the era of the large-scale institutionalization of unwanted children in western and central Europe. In the twentieth century, children's homes continued to operate in most large cities, providing care for children who could not be placed with families and helping to manage periodic surges in the orphan population that resulted from war and other calamities. The Armenian massacres of 1915 spawned tens of thousands of orphans, who were placed in homes in Russian Armenia

and Greece. The number of children orphaned and abandoned during the Spanish civil war reportedly ran to ninety thousand. World War II is thought to have produced a staggering thirteen million abandoned and orphaned children. As many as a half million were artificially manufactured by a Nazi policy of kidnapping children from occupied countries and Germanizing them so that they could be turned into loyal instruments of state policy (the *Lebensborn* program).

In Eastern Europe the socialist regimes established in Russia in 1917 and elsewhere after World War II introduced welfare measures to protect mothers and children. Even so, on occasion, the number of abandoned and runaway children reached catastrophic proportions, as in Soviet Russia following the civil war and famine of the early 1920s. Estimates of the number of "unsupervised children" in Russia in those days range between four and seven million. This crisis was scarcely brought under control when a new wave of orphans appeared in the wake of the brutal campaign to collectivize agriculture and the devastating famine that followed in the early 1930s. World War II produced another generation of orphaned children in Russia, and in the late twentieth century, as a result of the political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union, the numbers again mounted into the

hundreds of thousands. Romania, where abortion and contraception were banned under the dictatorship of Nicolae Ceaușescu (ruled 1974–1989), maintained a large and miserably cared for orphan population that became an unfortunate legacy for the regimes that followed. The Balkan wars of the 1990s produced a new stream of East European refugees, including a substantial new orphan population.

In sum, the very different approaches to child abandonment that characterized the southern and northern regions of Europe from the Reformation to the end of the nineteenth century ultimately resolved

themselves in a welfare system that provided subsidies to mothers to care for their own children or, in the case of true orphans, opportunities for fosterage, adoption, and, in infrequent cases, institutional care. Russia and some other countries of eastern Europe, despite public commitments to provide full welfare services and protection for mothers and children, failed to deliver on these promises for a number of reasons: lack of sufficient prosperity to support such services, choices to invest in heavy industry and military goods rather than social services, and periodic political and economic crises.

See also **Childrearing and Childhood; Concubinage and Illegitimacy** (*in this volume*); and other articles in this section.

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DEVELOPMENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITIES: THE “BLIND,” “DEAF AND DUMB,” AND “IDIOT”



David Wright

Physically and developmentally disabled individuals occupied the fringe of modern social history. They represented to contemporaries the margins of society, and have been treated by historians accordingly. Individuals with disabilities come into view only to illuminate the pious endeavors of clerics, the revolutionary experiments of medical men, the unselfish generosity of philanthropists, or the pioneering work of educational theorists. Too often, individuals with disabilities are cast as grateful recipients of alms or helpless victims of the historical drama of industrialization—important not for the social reality that they experienced but rather for the advances that “civilized” society has achieved.

PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY

The recent emergence of disability studies in academic circles has helped to promote a gradual, if slow, appreciation of disability as a legitimate area of inquiry. Yet despite recent interest, huge gaps in our knowledge remain. Historians are too often faced with the stock character of the medieval “blind beggar,” the ubiquitous “village idiot,” or the lamentable “deaf and dumb” child. To compensate, some disability researchers overemphasize the great “self-emancipators” who achieved success “despite their disability” or, like John Milton, *during* their disablement. Little is known of the great mass of individuals who did not conform to these unrepresentative portraits, individuals who carried out quotidian lives in their local communities.

We also know relatively little about the demography of disability in past time. On the one hand, some researchers suggest that, lacking the intervention of modern medical techniques, disability in the early modern period would have been more common than it is today. Developmental disability (through neonatal complications or lead poisoning) and physical disability (such as smallpox-induced blindness) could have contributed to an overabundance of disability in previous centuries. On the other hand, the bare sub-

sistence level at which most people existed might have meant that the life expectancy of those with disabilities was significantly lower than that of the general population. Child abandonment, or even infanticide, of disabled offspring should not be discounted. This may have depressed the numbers of disabled people in past time. Lastly, there may well have been epochs in which certain types of physical disability would have been particularly relevant, such as during and immediately after the great European wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The importance disability gained in popular and elite cultures has also ebbed and flowed over the last four centuries. The ideas of the Enlightenment—with its emphasis on the improvability of humankind—directed sustained attention on the moral and ontological status of disabilities. Disabled children in particular became the subject of novel experiments in education, as new medical and philosophical belief systems interacted and informed each other. The disabled became the objects of experimentation and segregation, important as the antithesis of the self-sufficient, educated, physically perfect modern citizen. Disabilities therefore should not be seen as a constant in either an epidemiological or conceptual sense, but as heavily dependent during certain epochs on transformations in society, culture, the economy, and medical science.

Histories of disability place great emphasis on the “backwardness” of premodern attitudes to the “blind,” the “deaf and dumb,” and the “idiot.” However, it is not clear the degree to which poor agricultural communities would have considered, say, deafness as something that, by its very nature, isolated afflicted individuals from their social surroundings. By contrast, the dramatic transformation of European society during the modern era—from local economies dependent primarily upon small-scale agricultural production and local kinship ties to a more impersonal wage-driven industrial society of factories and urbanization—must have boded ill for those who, by the new definition of efficiency, could not compete as ef-

fectively as the newly defined “able-bodied.” Certain social and economic changes may thus have made certain conditions more “disabling” than they had previously been. Thus, portraying the history of disability as a great upward march from ignorant superstition and social isolation to enlightened scientific medicine and integration is wholly inadequate. The history of disability must be approached with a consideration of the ambiguities of human actions and social change.

This article will summarize the social history of disability in modern Europe. It will draw upon recent historiography to explore the transformation of social welfare, the educational revolution regarding children with disabilities, the medicalization of disability, and the emergence of disability rights. It will look in particular at three disabilities as defined by contemporary society, namely the “blind,” the “deaf and dumb,” and the “idiot.” Contemporary terminology will be used in order to bear witness to popular methods of describing disability in past time. Language tells us a great deal about the understanding of disability. Rather than trying to erase these terms from collective historical memory, we should address the issues they raise and seek to understand why we no longer consider them acceptable in a current context.

DISABILITY AND THE EARLY MODERN STATE

States in early modern Europe have a long history of regulating the property of, and providing relief to, individuals who were incapable of governing their own affairs due to a permanent disability of mind or body. European statutes regarding “idiots”—those defined as having permanent mental infirmity to the extent that they could not govern their own affairs—date back to the thirteenth century, providing ward status for such individuals and setting out the means by which their property would be managed. “Idiots” were recognized as separate and distinct from “lunatics,” individuals who had temporarily lost their reason but could still have lucid intervals. This simple distinction between idiots and lunatics reappears repeatedly in legislation governing mental disorder throughout the early modern period and continues in current usage in the differentiation between the developmentally disabled and the mentally ill.

As European states began to organize social relief during the early modern period, other categories of disability and dependency began to appear on the registers of churches, parishes, and towns. Under the Elizabethan Poor Laws, for instance, parishes in England and Wales were responsible for providing relief

to their destitute poor, regardless of the cause. The terms “blind” and “deaf and dumb” were widely used by magistrates and overseers of the poor adjudicating on cases of families petitioning for relief in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Overseers of the poor and local magistrates in the England were experienced, if not enthusiastic, in dealing with cases of disability and adopted local solutions to resolve situations in which family and kin care had broken down. In such situations of household crisis, some parishes paid allowances to families to continue caring for dependent relatives within the home; others hired non-related individuals to care for disabled individuals in other households, a system known as “boarding-out.” In countries across Europe, Catholic orders took on many of the responsibilities that had been subsumed by civil parishes in Protestant regions. Clergy considered ministering to the disabled as a sign of Christian piety; parables from the Bible describing Jesus tending to the “lame,” the “blind,” and the “deaf and dumb” provided moral guidance to those who dedicated themselves to the church. Indeed, many churches ran “hospitals” with a changing, and poorly defined, clientele of the sick, the aged, and the disabled.

Religious denominations in Spain experimented with the first organized system of teaching the “deaf and dumb” to communicate. A sixteenth-century Benedictine monk named Pedro Ponce de León adapted for use with the deaf his monastery’s system of communicating by signs and gestures. He did this because the deaf were being prevented from joining the priesthood because of an inability to speak. Such restrictions of religious and civil rights of those with disabilities were widespread within Europe at this time. Thus the new techniques championed by Ponce de León and others became important to the propertied and clerical classes. It is probably accurate to say, however, that apart from the aristocracy, local informal traditions of nonverbal communication persisted alongside new techniques formalized by individuals such as Ponce de León. Fragmentary evidence of travel diaries in early modern Europe, for example, describe encounters with “deaf-mutes” who functioned perfectly well within their communities.

Over the course of the eighteenth century, more secularized institutions were increasingly complementing religious provision. In France, the power and wealth of the monarchy enabled successive sovereigns to establish large medical institutions for their disabled and sick poor, such as the Salpêtrière and Bicêtre hospitals in Paris. Creating hospitals for the sick poor was both a means of signifying the wealth of nation-states and a vehicle for engendering popular sympathy for the benevolent dictatorship of autocrats. In re-

sponse to the growing commercialization of society, there was also an emerging for-profit sector in the eighteenth century, where lay and medical proprietors operated small homes for disabled members of the prospering middle classes, although the extent of the private sector caring seems to have differed dramatically between regions. The impact of the Enlightenment, however, and the growing wealth of most western European countries provided the basis for emerging charities and educational institutions dedicated to teaching and training the disabled.

EDUCATION AND SPECIAL INSTITUTIONS

The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed an explosion of interest in the teaching of disabled children. Jacob Rodriquez Pereire, a Portuguese teacher who emigrated to France, refined techniques for teaching “deaf-mutes” to speak. He gained notoriety teaching children of the French nobility, launching the audist tradition of instruction (placing emphasis on lipreading and the spoken word). In 1760 Louis XV subsidized the establishment of a school for “deaf-mutes,” the Institution Nationale des Sourds-Muets (National Institution for Deaf-Mutes) in Paris. In 1776 the French Abbé de L’Épée published a book on the instruction of “deaf-mutes” by “methodological signs,” the other dominant tradition of communication now known as signing, or sign language, which he had used at another famous Parisian school, the Institut National de Jeunes Sourds (National Institution for Deaf Youth). Schools for “deaf-mutes” were also opened in Germany and Scotland in the 1760s and the 1770s as the ideas of the Enlightenment spread throughout the educated elite of Europe. Much competition subsequently arose over the presumed advantages and disadvantages of the two competing systems of deaf communication.

Experimentation was also taking place in the education of the “blind.” Valentin Haüy opened the Institution Nationale des Jeunes Aveugles (National Institution for Blind Youth) in Paris in 1784. He pioneered the use of embossed print and promoted the education of blind children, as outlined in his *Essai sur l’éducation des aveugles*. Encouraged by Diderot’s famous *Lettres sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient* (Letter on the blind for the use of those who see; 1749), Haüy refined the practice of reading embossed characters, each representing individual letters. After the Revolution, Haüy migrated eastward, establishing a school in Berlin before settling in Russia. Simultaneously, similarly minded groups, some in-

spired by the French example, others emerging independently, established schools for the blind, in Liverpool (1791), Vienna (1804), Berlin (1806), Milan (1807), Holland (1808), Prague (1808), Stockholm (1808), St. Petersburg (1809), and Zurich (1809), Copenhagen (1811), Denmark (1811), Aberdeen (1812), Dublin (1816), and Barcelona (1820).

At approximately the same time, Francesco Lana-Terzi’s *Prodromo*, an Italian treatise delineating symbols of lines and dots representing letters of the alphabet, was published in French. Lana’s treatise suggested that the characters could be embossed for blind students, a system that was eventually adopted and refined by the French army as a means of reading coded messages in the dark. An officer, Charles Barbier, sent his system to the French National Institution for Deaf-Mutes for use in teaching. One young adult student, Louis Braille, refined the system of embossed dots into simple two-by-three matrices. It was only one of many different systems in use, but its flexibility and simplicity quickly ensured that the Braille method would succeed as the most important system of reading, being endorsed as the approved European method by the end of the nineteenth century.

The establishment of state or philanthropic institutions for the “blind” and the “deaf and dumb” provided an impetus for the creation of a professional medical discourse on the treatment and training of the developmentally disabled. Shortly before Haüy escaped revolutionary France, Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard, a physician at the Institution Nationale des Sourds-Muets, commenced educational experiments on hearing acquisition and speech formation. As a young physician, he had been brought a mute boy, captured running wild in the woods. Philippe Pinel, the famous psychiatrist who had “un-chained” the lunatics at the Salpêtrière Hospital, declared the boy an “incurable idiot.” Itard, we are informed, rejected the pessimism of Pinel and sought to “elevate the boy from savagery to civilization.” Although Itard largely failed in his endeavor to render Victor (as the boy was sometimes called) “civilized,” he did manage to teach him to identify letters and interpret simple words.

The philosophical and social implications of Itard’s experiment, published in *De l’éducation d’un homme sauvage* (Paris, 1801), were widely circulated by the French Academy of Science and influenced similar experimentation in the large French hospitals, particularly by a handful of French physicians associated with the Salpêtrière and Bicêtre hospitals. In 1837 Edouard Séguin, a student of Itard, experimented with the training of idiot children using “physiological” and “psychological” methods. At the Hospice des Incurables and at the Bicêtre he claimed

that he achieved success in training “idiot children” to speak, write, and count. In 1841 he published the first of several treatises on the treatment and education of “idiots,” most of which were eventually translated into English and German. The mantra that the “idiot could be educated” reverberated across the European medical and philosophical communities.

The apparent success of Itard and Séguin influenced a young Swiss medical student, Jacob Guggenbühl, who had become interested in “cretins.” Frustrated by the lack of educational initiatives for their education and treatment, Guggenbühl persuaded the Swiss Association for the Advancement of Science to fund a demographic study of the prevalence of cretinism in his own country. His numerical findings, combined with his enthusiasm for the French school of training and education, sufficiently impressed the Swiss Association that they agreed to subsidize the construction of a small retreat. Guggenbühl built this institution on the side of Abendberg Mountain, in the miasmatic belief that the “odors” and bad air of the Swiss swamps were part of the reason for the high rate of Swiss cretinism. Thus by the 1830s French and Swiss physicians challenged the “irreversibility” and “ineducability” of idiocy and associated forms of developmental disability.

Despite the attention being paid to the training of “idiots,” “deaf-mutes,” and the “blind” at national institutions, local authorities across Europe were not rushing to establish residential schools at taxpayers’ expense. Rather, the concern for public order which had been heightened by urbanization and migration prompted the construction of local institutions for “lunatics” throughout the nineteenth century. Medical superintendents of public asylums were overwhelmed by admissions of individuals with a wide range of physical and mental disabilities. A significant minority of admissions to these new mental hospitals were “idiots” and the “deaf and dumb.” The pressure of numbers in state asylums, combined with the growing awareness of educational efforts with the disabled, gradually persuaded charitable organizations and civic institutions to establish specialist hospitals for the “blind” and “deaf and dumb,” and asylums for idiots across Europe throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century. Institutionalization, however, was not a foregone conclusion, as class, gender, household structure, occupational background, and geographical location dictated the type of accommodation and support those with disability might receive outside the home.

The construction of teaching and residential institutions for disabled individuals provided subjects

for the generation of new medical discourses on the etiology and pathophysiology of developmental and physical disability and led to the advent of new inventions for better diagnosis. Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von Helmholtz invented the ophthalmoscope in 1850, providing more accurate means of observing and measuring pathological processes of the eye. Thereafter followed the invention of the retinoscope, the slit lamp, and other diagnostic tools for eye examination. The utilization of anesthesia and antiseptics in the mid-Victorian period paved the way for later corrective ear and eye operations, such as cataract surgery. Specialist “eye” and “ear, nose, and throat” hospitals were created in the latter half of the nineteenth century as physicians and scientists incorporated rapidly advancing knowledge in cell biology, physiology, anatomy, and bacteriology. Medical specialization also occurred in the area of psychological medicine, as asylum superintendents proposed increasingly detailed lists of mental ages and psychiatric classifications. As medical ideas gained prominence in most western European societies, a new biologically based discourse of disability crept into popular discussion and social policy in the last decades of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth centuries; this would pro-

foundly change attitudes to, and the conditions and treatment of, those with disabilities.

RACIAL HYGIENE

Although the establishment of institutions for the disabled was precipitated and encouraged by great intellectual optimism, this sanguine outlook had changed by the end of the nineteenth century. Several factors account for a new popular and professional belief in the relationship between disability and what was then known as “degenerationism.” First, urban middle classes in many European countries were beginning to fear an allegedly uncontrollable and physically stunted lumpen proletariat. Second, there was a growing awareness of hereditary influence in the pathogenesis of diseases, and many commentators felt that mental backwardness and physical disability resulted from a degenerative “taint” passed down through families. With the proliferation of Darwin’s views on natural selection, medical treatises and social commentaries increasingly incorporated hereditarianism into their medical explanations of disease etiologies. Societies were conceptualized as competing with each other for survival, what is now known as “social darwinism.” Third, national government statistics seemed to suggest a dramatic increase in the numbers of disabled individuals, those deemed the least “fit” of society, while alerting the public to the decline in fertility of the “successful” members of the new middle class. Alarmist commentators suggested that such a differential fertility rate between the “worst” and the “fittest” of society would inevitably lead to social or “race” degeneration. The ideology that formed the basis for the national eugenics movements of the early twentieth century was thus based upon a revolution in intellectual thought, a transformation in the medical understanding of disease, the growing confidence of doctors to become involved in public policy, and the heightened tensions of arms races between industrialized countries.

The advent of national elementary education in Western countries in the last three decades of the nineteenth century also contributed to the heightened fear of the multiplication of individuals with physical and developmental disabilities. Children who had previously been outside the public view were brought into state classrooms and soon caused problems for school officials. Although the Scottish Education Act of 1872 made provision for the education of blind along with seeing children in public schools, teachers in most other European countries complained that children with disabilities disrupted the proper envi-

ronment for teaching, and education authorities soon agreed to erect separate day or residential schools for the training of children whose disabilities were considered incompatible with regular teaching. Hence local elementary state schools for the “blind,” “deaf,” and developmentally disabled arose at the turn of the twentieth century and dominated education provision for “handicapped” children for the next eighty years.

Decisions over who were “mentally deficient” and who were not, prompted educators to debate the boundaries between the mentally “normal” and the mentally “subnormal.” Charged with a desire for more “accurate” and quantitative measurement of social phenomena, medical practitioners sought measures to quantify “mental subnormality.” The most famous of these were devised by the French lawyer Theodore Simon and his psychiatrist student Alfred Binet, whose names were given to the first standardized mental test developed at the Sorbonne between 1900 and 1905. The Simon-Binet test was supplanted in 1915 by the intelligence quotient (IQ), a mathematical score ranked on a normal distribution curve. The IQ test purported to give medical doctors and educationalists a finer instrument for discriminating between and among populations of children. From then onward, vague social categories, such as “idiot,”

“imbecile,” “moron,” “feeble-minded,” and “backward” were associated with numerical equivalents and increased scientific legitimacy.

Armed with new and apparently more accurate measurements of intelligence, with social surveys purporting to show the link between hereditary mental disability and crime, and with the fear over the differential fertility rate, eugenics movements emerged within intellectual circles in most European countries during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Borrowing their name from Francis Galton’s term for “well-born,” eugenicists actively encouraged the state to promote what they termed “racial hygiene” through selective breeding. Although national movements took on different characteristics, the common elements were a belief in the hereditarian nature of disability, the close association of mental disability with other social evils, and the belief that the disabled were “breeding” at a rate outstripping more “fit” elements of society. Public policy became centered on the needs of society to segregate and control the “feeble-minded” and other disabled individuals. Moreover, campaigns began in many countries to forcibly sterilize disabled women who were thought to be “at risk” of breeding further “degenerates” and to restrict the fertility of disabled individuals who were thought to be likely to pass on their disability to future generations.

In Nazi Germany, the confluence of eugenics, a highly racialized polity, and the heightened extremism of war-torn Europe led first to segregation and later to the sterilization and, ultimately, the murder of thousands of disabled individuals. The 1933 Sterilization Act attempted to advance the cause of racial hygiene by instituting the mandatory sterilization of all people with disabilities linked to heredity, including deafness, “mental deficiency,” and blindness. The execution of “mentally deficient,” physically disabled, and elderly individuals in hospitals constituted the first, and sometimes forgotten, wave in the Nazi “Final Solution.” Although precise figures are difficult to determine, well over a hundred thousand developmentally and physically disabled children and adults were executed by firing squad or gassed in the concentration camps in Germany and Poland between 1940 and 1945. Rather than seeing the extermination of the disabled as a horrific but unique act, it is more sensible to see it as the most extreme consequence of a new professional and popular collectivist discourse on disability that was shared across Western society.

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

Despite the experience of the Holocaust, many of the interwar policies of segregation and sterilization con-

tinued in European countries for decades after the end of the war. Institutions for the “mentally deficient” grew to enormous proportions in the 1950s and 1960s, housing many patients from early childhood until death. Many European countries, particularly the Scandinavian nations, continued to have policies of “voluntary” sterilization and “euthanasia,” whereby parents could take their handicapped children to undergo surgery, or where disabled children were not giving life-sustaining treatment due to their disability. The emergence of prenatal screening techniques, such as amniocentesis, permitted family practitioners and obstetricians to counsel parents to terminate pregnancies in the cases of fetuses with genetic abnormalities, such as Down’s syndrome. These decisions made about selective procreation, which might have decreased the overall number of those children born with severe disabilities, were counterbalanced by medical and public-health changes that led to increasing life expectancy of those born with disabilities and, by the 1980s, to the survival of significantly premature babies who have developed severe mental and physical disabilities later in life.

Meanwhile residential schools continued to evolve throughout the period 1945 to 1970 into separate communities distinct from and independent of society. Starting from the very beginning of the twentieth

century, schools for the “blind” and schools for the “deaf” built additional “sheltered workshops” where the pupils (many of them adults) could work at trades and offset the costs to their families and to the state. A widely accepted public discourse prevailed whereby separate institutions, most often residential, were considered better for the disabled individual and better for the family. Disability became a condition requiring removal from general society into specialized institutions.

This dominant attitude was challenged during the 1960s, when civil-rights movements in North America and Europe addressed the status of social groups marginalized by gender, race, language, or disability. Wolf Wolfensberger, among others, articulated a set of policies, broadly known as the ideology of “normalization,” which sought to place the disabled in a “culturally normative” set of social roles and experiences. The focus of his critique was a set of residential facilities and educational policies that sought to segregate the disabled from society, ostensibly for their own benefit. Normalization, by contrast, sought to eliminate special schools and residential facilities and reintegrate the disabled into society. The last three decades of the twentieth century were dominated by the debate over “streaming” versus “destreaming.” Gradually many large, long-stay institutions for the

“mentally retarded,” for the “blind,” and for the “deaf” have been closed, or dramatically reduced in size, and replaced by integration in “normal” schools and by accommodation in smaller group homes.

The language used to describe certain types of disability has also changed dramatically. Advocacy groups have argued that older terms such as “the mentally deficient,” “the blind,” and “deaf and dumb” (and their continental linguistic equivalents) stigmatize the individual concerned and influence negatively the social options open to them. Many groups advocate placing people first, hence *people* with disabilities, *people* with developmental handicaps. Others have gone further by arguing for the absence of any disability descriptor and for emphasizing the plurality of abilities which all individuals share. This view has been particularly pronounced in the field of hearing impairment, where some researchers challenge the conceptual framework of deafness as a disability, preferring to see people with hearing and speech impairment as communicating in a visual rather than auditory world. The debate over the role of language in the labeling of individuals and in their possible stigmatization continues to rage throughout society and government.

Just as the language describing disability has changed, so too has the composition of that group of individuals seen or labeled as disabled. The demographic revolution in European countries over the last two centuries, from young societies under siege from infectious diseases to older societies suffering from chronic ailments, has altered the stereotypes of disability. Impairments of hearing, sight, and cognitive functioning are becoming more and more common among an increasingly numerous population of the elderly. In the public mind, a disabled person is more and more likely to be old, rather than the disabled child typical of Enlightenment discourse. Moreover, disability is no longer viewed as an either/or proposition (someone is either blind or not). Advocacy

groups emphasize that disability constitutes a spectrum of impairment.

Most recently, disability rights groups have called for access (on all levels) to social programs and activities, with some success. The physical infrastructure of society has been gradually transformed by wheelchair ramps, braille lettering on elevators, and a thousand other minor but important alterations making government and leisure services accessible to those who previously could not use them. Such changes have been hard-won. Advocacy groups have taken their campaign for disability rights to legal as well as political remedies. The European Court, with its own declaration of rights to which all European Union nations are bound, has acted as a vehicle against overt and subtle discrimination against people with disabilities.

CONCLUSIONS

The social history of people with disabilities has thus been one of profound ambiguities and contradictions, of real and Pyrrhic victories. Nor has the experience been uniform across different types of disability. Economic changes in European countries toward an “information-based society” pose fewest problems for the hearing impaired and more for the visually impaired. Recent closures of long-stay residential institutions for individuals with hearing or visual impairment have proved successful—less so for the severely developmentally disabled. The emergence in the last two decades of the twentieth century of a culture of extended work hours, a renewed emphasis on individual responsibility and self-sufficiency, and the fragmentation of the nuclear household has left many developmentally disabled individuals alone in the community and as devalued by society as ever. Accommodating the needs and aspirations of people with disabilities in the postinstitutional era remains one of the most demanding challenges facing modern European societies.

See also Section 17, Body and Mind (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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PUBLIC HEALTH



Dorothy Porter

The health of populations helps to reveal transformations in social and economic conditions and highlights the changing relationships between the state and civil society. At one time the history of public health was written by public health professionals who wrote administrative histories of preventive health services and of the control of epidemic diseases. This historiographical tradition often traced a chronology of events from ancient to contemporary times, identifying the development of public health as a progressive achievement representing a triumph of rational knowledge over superstitious ignorance. In the late twentieth century, however, the history of public health was investigated by social historians, who explored the cultural significance of epidemics, the impact of disease upon demographic structure and economic change, and the role that protecting population health has played in state formation. Social histories of public health have also revealed the political and ideological conflicts created by collective actions aimed at improving the health of populations. This essay will examine the impact of such actions upon the changing social, political, and cultural relations of European societies from late medieval times, when Europe experienced one of its most devastating pandemics, the Black Death.

THE PLAGUE AND EPIDEMIC CONTROL

As the historian Paul Slack has pointed out, epidemics share many characteristics with other natural catastrophes like earthquakes and tidal waves. But the responses provoked by each vary widely. While all natural catastrophes disrupt social order, they attack the basis of social cohesion in different ways. Epidemic diseases not only cause widespread mortality that affects economic production and the defense capacities of societies, they also impose social stigma and alienation upon individual victims. The enduring metaphor of the social death of medieval leprosy sufferers, who were ordered to be segregated from the rest of

society by the Third Lateran Council in 1179, continued to haunt the world of the infectious and chronically sick. Collective actions taken to limit the impact of epidemics therefore risk heightening social tension as much as they manage it.

The disease that eliminated up to a third of Europe's population in the fourteenth century, commonly referred to as the Black Death, is much disputed by contemporary historians. The traditional view that the Black Death was an epidemic of bubonic plague does not fit easily with the pattern and rapidity of the spread of the disease between 1348 and 1353 or some of the contemporary accounts of victims' symptoms. Some historians have therefore attributed the epidemic to other rapid killers such as anthrax. Whatever the organic origin of the disease, the Black Death affected European societies dramatically. Not only did it thin out social and political elites, it also devastated the agricultural laboring population, creating opportunities for social and economic mobility that severely weakened an already fracturing feudal system based upon rigid hierarchies and tied labor. Epidemic visitations of plague continued over the next three hundred years. New civil administrative structures to deal with plague were created in Renaissance and early modern Italian city-states that became models for public health administration throughout Europe.

The Black Death stimulated the first application of what became the favored method of epidemic control by early modern states, quarantine. Venice first closed its port to all suspected vessels for thirty days in March 1348. The period was extended to forty days, and quarantine was eventually adopted by all European port authorities to prevent the importation of numerous infectious diseases. Political authorities also adapted the system to isolate inland communities by enforcing military cordon sanitaires to prevent diseased travelers and goods from entering cities or fleeing from them. In premodern times, the most rational response to an infectious disease like plague was to flee an infected location, and this was resorted to by

many who had the resources to do so. Political authorities anxious to maintain existing ruling structures tried to limit the hemorrhage of both the powerful and the productive classes. Reduction of ruling elites could create opportunities for social rebellion, especially as epidemics stimulated panic. Thus, from the time of the Black Death, Italian city-states set up special health boards to institute measures to control the spread of the disease by controlling the movements of both sick and healthy populations.

As outbreaks of plague continued after 1348, civil policing to suppress panic and disquiet grew incrementally throughout Europe during the Renaissance and the early modern period. Local civil authorities sometimes taxed those wishing to flee and posted guards to protect the property of the absent. Elaborate regulations were developed in order to control the behavior of the urban poor, whose swelling numbers were viewed as an increasing risk to social stability. The poor and the socially deviant were perceived as the prime victims and bearers of plague. Political authorities in Italian city-states recognized that economic deprivation, social deviance, and plague were a potentially volatile cocktail. Health regulations targeted the movements of the morally outcast, such as prostitutes, “ruffians,” and beggars, as well as the plague-sick poor. Measures were also taken to separate the sick from the healthy through the establishment of isolation hospitals, often outside city walls. While health authorities justified their actions as necessary steps to prevent the spread of plague, their primary goal was maintaining social stability by controlling the mobility of the anarchic, unpredictable underclass. For similar reasons, the English central state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reproduced many Italian plague controls. Here house arrest and isolation of victims’ families were adopted in order to keep people in their place at moments of crisis in the same way as the Elizabethan Poor Law enforced local settlement when communities faced periods of economic failure and shortage. The English plague regulations, however, stimulated violent opposition and thereby contributed to increasing disorder.

Plague controls brought civil authorities into conflict with the interests of other ruling elites. Quarantine greatly interfered with trade and was vigorously resisted by merchants and their laborers, who were both adversely affected. Such tensions increased throughout the early modern period. By the seventeenth century the power and prestige of many Italian city health boards grew to the point where they were able to challenge the authority of the church. Festivals, religious assemblies, processions, and other public gatherings were often banned in epidemic times despite the

strong opposition of the clergy. Health authorities justified their actions on the basis of experience. For the church, plague was the result of divine wrath that could be assuaged only by penance and observance. For health officials the divine origin was less significant than the miasmas that spread the disease along with the anarchy that it threatened to provoke.

SYPHILIS AND STIGMATIZATION

If plague prevention instituted new levels of political intervention into civil life, epidemic syphilis in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries highlighted the consequences of stigmatization for disease sufferers. In the Renaissance and early modern world fears of social disorder were matched by the dread of the moral corruption that could result from disease. In the late fifteenth century the disease that came to be identified as *morbus gallicus* (French disease) was believed to be a new contagion. Numerous contemporary observers wrote accounts of a new epidemic pox appearing in Italy in 1495 following Charles VIII’s campaign against the Spaniards for control of Naples. His army, which consisted largely of mercenaries from Belgium, Germany, southern France, Italy, and Spain, was believed to have spread the disease as it disbanded and soldiers returned to their homelands. Within a decade of the first outbreak noted at Fornovo, epidemic syphilis had spread throughout Europe. The stigma of syphilis is reflected in the way that national cultures frequently identified it as the disease of their enemy, but it was most commonly referred to as *morbus gallicus*.

The *morbus gallicus* was recognized to be spread venereally. Christian ideology accounted for it as divine retribution for licentiousness, but contemporaries such as Joseph Grunpeck also attributed it to astrological sources. From the sixteenth century the American origin of the disease was the source of much controversy and remains so even today. Isolation of sufferers was attempted by some authorities, the syphilitic being subjected to stigmatization similar to lepers in medieval times. Stricter controls were instituted against beggars and vagrants in France, where old leper houses were converted into accommodations for “incorrigible paupers.” The *hôtel-Dieu* (city hospital) overflowed with émigré pox victims in the 1520s, who were provided with money to return home. In France inspection and stricter regulation of prostitutes was established from 1500. In Edinburgh in 1497 the city council required patients sick of the “gradgor” to be removed to the island of Inch until they were completely cured. Anyone resisting the

regulations faced the penalty of complete exile and the branding iron.

Changing attitudes toward sexual practices were already evident in Renaissance societies. The late medieval tradition of the steam bath, which had been part of a cult of pleasure rather than an instrument of cleanliness or hygiene, began to decline in the sixteenth century. Many famous hotels offering the steam bath as a main attraction disappeared throughout Europe. The custom of visiting the steam bath to conduct a discrete liaison or simply to enjoy free and easy frolicking among naked men and women also began to decline. The pleasure dome of the steam bath became a target of the guardians of public morals, but their decline coincided with the rise of epidemic syphilis. The epidemic significantly affected changing attitudes toward libertine pleasure, adding caution to the justification for new codes of moral discipline. The aims of public authorities to control syphilitic contagion were assisted by broader changes in cultural beliefs and social behavior regarding the pursuit of pleasure. What may not have been successfully achieved through coercive public policy was perhaps accomplished through new moral ideologies.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF HEALTH IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

As plague retreated from Europe from the late seventeenth century, geographical exploration, urban development, and imperial expansion created new dis-

ease patterns in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Epidemic diseases of isolated communities became endemic in urban environments. By the eighteenth century shock invasions were replaced by rising levels of endemic infections and chronic sickness that occasionally became epidemic, such as malaria, smallpox, and gout. The absence of catastrophic disasters meant that emergency disease control was no longer a priority. Instead, the age of the Enlightenment became a period in which a new interest in the social scientific analysis of the health of populations developed. The eighteenth century also witnessed innovations in sanitation and immunization, and late Enlightenment thought made new connections between social improvement and environmental reform. By the nineteenth century the Enlightenment study of political arithmetic and human longevity evolved into the statistical enumeration of human misery and the social physics of human improvement. The Enlightenment pursuit of happiness through a felicific calculus translated into a social science of amelioration (investigations undertaken by voluntary researchers and social reformers into the social conditions of economic deprivation and destitution that were aimed at informing social policies of improvement) in the nineteenth century that was inherently bound to the improvement of population health. ("Political arithmetic" is the term used by the seventeenth-century English man of letters William Petty to describe his quantitative analysis of what he called the political anatomy of Ireland; Petty believed that the quantita-

tive analysis of the strength of the state—including the analysis of the health of the population, levels of production and “market research” into the sale of individual commodities—should become a general form of enquiry called political arithmetic. “Social physics” is the term given by the early nineteenth-century Belgian astronomer Lambert Adolphe Jacques Quételet to the quantitative analysis of social conditions, including the health of the population, using the statistical concept of the normal frequency distribution. “Felicific calculus” is the term given by the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century English political philosopher Jeremy Bentham to the analysis of the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the founding principle on which to base utilitarian philosophy of government.)

The relationship between the health and wealth of nations was extensively explored in political, economic, and social theory in the eighteenth century. The development of what the French ideologue Condorcet called “social mathematics” was highly significant in the development of the relationship between the emergent modern state and the health of its subjects. Various methods of counting the subjects of the state and measuring its size and strength in terms of their number and their health were introduced in the

early modern period. These practices were supported by the political philosophy of mercantilism, which viewed the monarch’s subjects as his paternalistic property and equated the entire well-being of society as coterminous with the well-being of the state as embodied by the sovereign. The political bookkeeping that enabled the state to measure its strength in terms of the size of its healthy population guided its administrative goals and objectives.

These were the early foundations of “vital statistics” and epidemiology that, by the nineteenth century, became a prerequisite for systematic disease prevention. Lambert Adolphe Jacques Quételet (1796–1874), a Belgian astronomer who devised the theory of the normal frequency distribution curve, took up the quantitative analysis of social physics in the early nineteenth century. A generation younger than Condorcet, Quételet believed that social physics could provide the basis of the scientific management of society.

In France in the early nineteenth century, the application of social physics did not lead to social reform. Instead, it created a new academic inquiry into the conditions that determine health and disease, an inquiry that founded the nineteenth-century European science of hygiene. An ex-army surgeon, Louis René Villermé, who was a friend of Quételet, trans-

lated social physics into elaborate studies of the differential mortality of the rich and poor and the health conditions of the proletariat and their average expectation of life. However, these studies did not stimulate political action. Villermé warned against the involvement of the state in health reform and suggested instead that the remoralization of the poor would eliminate epidemic disease and premature mortality.

In Britain the “geography of health” was examined as part of the discovery of the social conditions of the poor. Statistics was embraced as a tool for measuring social inequality by early Victorian reform movements. Statistical studies of health and the social determinants of disease were set up in response to the shocking effects of the cholera epidemics of the 1830s and 1840s, and subsequently Victorian epidemiology sought to eliminate the spread of disease by destroying the environment that bred it.

HEALTH AND THE MODERN STATE

The early modern state linked the investigation of population health to political strength through a mercantilist philosophy. This philosophy also inspired Enlightenment public health promotion through methods of “medical police” developed in Prussia and Sweden and explored theoretically, above all, by the Austrian court physician Johan Peter Frank. Public health featured prominently in the rhetoric of revolutionary democracy at the end of the eighteenth century, both in the newly established American republic and in the declarations of the revolutionary governments in France. The French revolutionaries declared health, like work, to be a right of man, making it an obligation of the social contract between the modern democratic state and its citizens. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the British state had translated this principle into a civil right, in which all possessed equal rights under the law to protection from epidemic disease. In 1848 French and German revolutionaries identified the key to improved population health to be the establishment of “state medicine.” In France Jules Guérin, in the *Gazette médicale de Paris*, and in Prussia Rudolf Virchow, in his reports on typhus in Upper Silesia, both suggested that democratic freedom, universal education, and social amelioration would prevent epidemic diseases. In France and Prussia supporters of social medicine urged the medical profession to take on a political role and become attorneys to the poor and statesmen in disguise.

The political role of preventive medicine within the modern state became an urgent material as well as an ideological issue as exponential rises in epidemic

and endemic infections among urbanized populations accompanied the process of industrialization in European societies. The diseases of industrial, urbanized civilization were those transmitted relentlessly among overcrowded populations living in appalling insanitary slums with totally inadequate refuse and sewage removal, drainage, and little or no access to uncontaminated water. Typhus, typhoid, amoebic diarrhea, tuberculosis, diphtheria, and, despite the introduction of smallpox vaccination throughout Europe, smallpox continued to haunt industrialized as well as agricultural populations. But perhaps the disease that conjures up the classic image of industrial society under siege from contagion is cholera. Asiatic cholera followed troop movements out of India through eastern, central, and western Europe between 1830 and 1832 and became the first of several pandemic invasions. Overall, cholera killed far fewer than endemic fevers, but the social psychological effect of the suddenness of its invasion and the speed and manner in which it killed was dramatic. Cholera highlighted the tenuous social stability of the class structures of European societies. Conspiracy theories were rife among the European proletariat and peasantry. Rioters in Russia attacked nobles and officials because they believed that the water was being poisoned as part of a Malthusian effort to reduce surplus population. The homes of noblemen and the offices of health authorities were ransacked throughout Prussia, and officials were murdered in Paris. In Britain Bristol’s poor rioted in protest against the removal of the sick to isolation wards, believing that this was a means of providing the medical profession with bodies to anatomize.

Cholera coincided with crisis in nineteenth-century Europe, but often conditions were made ripe for its spread by social upheaval. Cholera was spread by social dislocation—the mobility of population created by the expansion of trade in the nineteenth century, which brought rural populations into the cities—and subsequently exacerbated it. This pattern of social dislocation and epidemic spread is equally demonstrated for another acute infection characteristic of the times, typhus. Typhus has a long history of being associated with war and famine, frequently flourishing in military encampments and jails, but it became almost endemic among some urban populations during the nineteenth century.

Sanitary reform developed at different rates in European states throughout the nineteenth century. By the end of the century most major European cities had sewage and drainage infrastructures and improved water supplies. Most northern European states established various types of local and, in some cases, central government health authorities who monitored health

conditions and administered a wide range of public health regulations. Some city administrations, such as the Paris Health Council, became models for national governments. Other cities avoided the costs of public health imperatives as long as possible. When cholera attacked Hamburg in 1892, long after it had retreated elsewhere in Europe, the city-state paid a political price for neglecting to filter its water systems by being taken over by Prussian administration. Incremental environmental sanitary reform throughout Europe in the nineteenth century slowly reduced the effects of lethal infections. While historians and historical demographers continue to dispute the determinants of population growth, increased protection from the environmental hazards of industrial urbanization continue to figure prominently in assessments of mortality decline by the turn of the twentieth century. Historical epidemiologists still consider the reduction of infant amoebic diarrhea through cleaner, filtered water supplies to have played a significant role in that decline.

Providing for the health of communities, however, could lead the modern state to sacrifice the civil liberties of individuals. Movements developed in mid-nineteenth century Britain, France, and Germany opposing compulsory smallpox vaccination as tyranny rather than salvation. Acts passed by the British state establishing the compulsory inspection of prostitutes in garrison towns in the 1860s were opposed on similar political grounds. In the 1870s and 1880s the campaign to repeal the Contagious Diseases Acts in Brit-

ain interpreted the enforcement of health as a gross violation of civil liberties by a centralized power exercising a form of medical despotism and a double moral standard. By the end of the century, however, the Notification of Infectious Disease Acts in Britain interned those sick of a listed infection in an isolation hospital until they either recovered or not, but they provoked no libertarian opposition or alarm.

The civil disorder stimulated by state action during the cholera epidemics throughout Europe in the early nineteenth century was not repeated at the end of the century as modern democratic states made more and more interventions into the socioeconomic and biological lives of citizens. In industrialized and modernizing European states, a new political ethos of collectivism encouraged the development of compulsory social insurance schemes to protect workers from injury, sickness, unemployment, and old age. Population health policies began to incorporate medical services to vulnerable groups, including mothers, infants, school children, and the mentally retarded. In the twentieth century, obtaining population health was no longer limited to the prevention of disease but began to include public provision to cover the costs of medical services along with new strategies for encouraging individuals to adopt healthy lifestyles.

HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The twentieth century witnessed the incremental growth of comprehensive, state-funded public health and medical services throughout Europe. In the interwar years a preliminary model welfare state with integrated health and medical services developed in Weimar Germany. Between 1919 and 1933 the Weimar Republic viewed the economy as an organism that could be managed by the state, which would redistribute wealth through welfare benefits. Weimar welfare facilitated the socialization of health and prioritized the goals of the social hygiene movement, focusing on the prevention of chronic disease, the health of mothers and children, and the treatment of psychiatric disorders.

The development of health services under Weimar was motivated by organismist, collectivist social ideology that included beliefs in regenerationist biology. Eugenic ideals about the need to plan population development were compatible with ideals of collective responsibility for welfare in numerous other European contexts during the same period. Demographic and eugenic concerns led to new directions in health and social policy in Scandinavia, Britain, and France. On

the one hand, prioritizing the health of mothers, infants, and children and encouraging large families was legitimated as protecting the health of future generations and ensuring demographic balance. Pronatalism was promoted in Sweden and France following World War I. In Scandinavia, Belgium, France, and Germany various forms of family allowance were developed to ease the economic burdens of parenthood. On the other hand, preventing the reproduction of the eugenically “unfit” through restrictive marriage laws, the segregation of the mentally retarded and mentally ill, and the voluntary or compulsory sterilization of various social groups was aimed at reducing the potential for biological and racial decline.

Positive and negative eugenics in Europe before World War II was one expression of the increasingly influential ideology of social planning. The corporate management of capitalist economies based upon the ideas of John Maynard Keynes gained legitimacy in European states as the failures of unregulated markets threatened the survival of industrial capitalism. A comprehensive, integrated system of health and medical services for workers and their dependents was one of the linchpins of the vision of the welfare state outlined by the British liberal intellectual William Beveridge, whose 1942 report influenced the development of health and social security policies throughout Europe following the war.

According to the social policy theorist Gosta Esping-Andersen, three “worlds” of welfare emerged after World War II that relied on more or less bureaucratically administered state funding, voluntary and compulsory insurance, and market mechanisms. A significant division developed between the generous insurance-based social security systems that operated in parts of continental Europe and the lower level of insurance plus tax-funded, means-tested state benefits that operated in Britain. Further divisions occurred between universal statutory insurance-based systems constructed in Europe and the private insurance plus means-tested welfare provision that operated in the United States.

Within these broad frameworks different rates of welfare expansion continued for the first three decades following 1945, until international economic crises in the 1970s ended what has been eulogized as a “golden era” of political consensus, economic growth, rising living standards, and social justice. While the viability of the welfare state was increasingly challenged in the 1980s, comprehensive health coverage has been the most politically resilient of its features. In the 1980s New Right assaults on what it viewed as the culture of dependency produced by “nanny states” sought only to reform rather than remove state-funded health care systems. The continued popularity of state-funded health care perhaps ema-

nated from the fact that, as the left wing British economist Julian Le Grand pointed out in 1982, the middle classes benefited from them most.

HEALTH CARE AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

While the public provision of health care continued to be politically popular in the 1990s, fears concerning the demographic structures of twenty-first-century postindustrial societies support a culture of personal health responsibility that had been promoted by the state and commercialized by the marketplace throughout the twentieth century. As state medicine throughout Europe became involved in the provision of personal services, new emphasis was placed upon individual prevention through the development of healthy lifestyles. In the interwar years new perspectives on preventive medicine were developed in the Soviet Union, Germany, Belgium, and Britain that attempted to make clinical medicine a social practice through the interdisciplinary amalgamation of medi-

cine and social science. Following World War II social medicine focused upon prevention through public education about health hazards to the individual. A precedent was set in the health education campaign aimed at reducing lung cancer through the prevention of cigarette smoking.

The antismoking campaign in Europe exemplified the new message of the clinical model of social medicine: the key to the social management of chronic illnesses—such as lung cancer—was individual prevention, fostered by raising health consciousness and promoting self-health care. While antismoking has achieved a degree of success in Europe, it has had much greater influence in North American societies. However, the model of prevention through individual education gathered momentum in the wake of the antismoking campaign. Subsequent postwar campaigns offered lifestyle methods for preventing heart disease, various forms of cancer, liver disease, digestive disorders, venereal disease, and obesity.

In 1981 T. Hirayama published the results of a study that demonstrated that nonsmoking wives of heavy smokers had a higher risk of contracting lung cancer than did the wives of nonsmokers. The campaign to prevent “passive smoking” subsequently took on the character of a nineteenth-century campaign to prevent infectious disease. Like all such public health campaigns, the collective benefit of state action penalized and stigmatized a specific social group, whose members were represented as social pariahs and failures and moral inferiors.

The mixed messages involved in the prevention of tobacco consumption have been fully represented in the campaigns against a new lethal infectious virus appearing in the early 1980s, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which leads to a fatal syndrome commonly referred to as AIDS. The emergence of a new killer infection in the early 1980s reawakened all the public health concerns associated with an earlier era. AIDS was initially compared to dramatic historical invasions of the past such as plague and cholera. The initial impact of AIDS upon popular, political, and expert perceptions raised familiar issues regarding the right of the state to police and regulate the spread of infection through surveillance, notification, screening, and quarantine. Those who favored authoritarian intervention called for the institution of compulsory testing, identity cards for people who were HIV-positive, and their isolation. Most of these goals were not taken up by national policymakers, but the question of identity cards came close to realization in some local contexts, such as Bavaria.

By the late 1980s its transmission through needle-sharing among impoverished intravenous drug

users meant that AIDS was spread more and more by poverty and social despair rather than unprotected sexual intercourse. The length of time between contracting the HIV virus, the onset of the AIDS syndrome, and the death of the sufferer lengthened as more effective therapeutic treatment slowed the physiological progress of the disease. Thus by the 1990s AIDS began to be perceived as a chronic disease among minority high-risk groups rather than an epidemic infection. AIDS victims have suffered legal and social discrimination in the popular mind and by official agencies. The implication of bodily and spiritual corruption has persisted as a powerful contemporary trope.

A new social contract of health has been promoted in public health campaigns from antismoking to AIDS prevention. It is a contract based upon a model of prevention that utilized medical and social scientific analysis to maximize health chances by encouraging individuals to change their lifestyles. However, the state and its public health agencies have not had a monopoly on the promotion of health through lifestyle management. Health promotion through lifestyle education has also been successfully commercialized.

Since the eighteenth century “self-health” has been successfully commercialized through the publication of advice manuals and the promotion of dietary aids and exercise regimens by various entrepreneurs. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries health reformers promoted physical culture cults such as calisthenics, eurythmics, vegetarianism, and mastication techniques. Such traditions continued in the advertising campaigns for mass-produced foods such as cereals as health aids and in a commercialized exercise culture. In the early twentieth century the value of exercise for healthy living was commercialized by American entrepreneurs such as Eugene Sandow, Bernarr Macfadden, and Charles Atlas, who established their own brands of competitive bodybuilding and physical culture systems. In the United States and in Europe, the interwar years witnessed the symbolic association of the healthy body with racial health and national supremacy.

Following World War II bodybuilding expanded as a commercialized competitive sport and, along with the increased popularity of spectator sports as a leisure pastime, spawned a new fitness industry. The fitness and beauty industries in the late twentieth century became hugely successful international markets involving the sale of sportswear, health foods and dietary aids, commercial health and gymnasium clubs, health and beauty holiday resorts, fitness training, and plastic surgery. Slimming alone has become a large market

industry. The message of the commercialized health industry mirrors that promoted by the state: health is an individual responsibility that has to be worked for through individual effort and paid for from individual pockets. By the early 1990s the healthy body became a symbol of social and economic success and the diseased became associated with social failure and dysfunction. As liberal democratic societies within and beyond Europe retreated from the public funding of health and social welfare, both the state and the marketplace sought to blame ill health on individual irresponsibility and ignorance.

Although the contract of health between the social democratic state and its citizens is thus being reconfigured, at the beginning of the twenty-first century there are, nevertheless, signs that the structural causes of ill health are not being entirely overlooked. As the gap between the affluent and the impoverished widens in postindustrial societies throughout Europe, the relationship between poverty and ill health has again become a focus of state concern. Mortality differentials and rising levels of the traditional diseases of poverty, such as tuberculosis, have re-created an awareness of the impact of inequality on levels of health. Poor people die earlier because their health is compromised by low incomes, unemployment, poor housing, and social exclusion. Population health is compromised in areas with poor social facilities and where people are intimidated by high levels of crime and disorder. The poor and industrial workers are also often exposed to greater risks from environmental pollution and occupational hazards.

The impact of inequality upon health is beginning to be taken into account by social democratic policymakers in Europe. In Britain, for example, New Labour health ministers acknowledge that in tackling the root causes of avoidable illness, “in recent times the emphasis has been on trying to get people to live healthy lives” (Dobson and Jowell, *Our Healthier Nation*, p. 2). The New Labour government suggests, however, that they want to try an approach with “far more attention and Government action concentrated on the things which damage people’s health which are beyond the control of the individual” (*Our Healthier Nation*, p. 2). The consequences of the absence or shrinkage of welfare states in industrial societies throughout the world also impacts upon European thought regarding the restructuring of networks of social security that help to ensure population health. Population health within and beyond Europe, however, continues to be an ongoing negotiation between civil society and the state. The outcome of that negotiation depends, as it has always done, upon the political will of both.

See also **Health and Disease** (volume 2); **Urbanization** (volume 2); **The Welfare State** (volume 2); **Doctors and Medicine** (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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FROM 1350 TO 2000



VOLUME 4

Peter N. Stearns

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER HISTORY



Bonnie G. Smith

The presentation of women and femininity in history began centuries ago, most influentially with *The Book of the City of Ladies* (1405) by the French writer Christine de Pisan. Right through the early twentieth century amateur authors writing to support themselves created a rich social history of women and femininity. At that point academic scholars joined in this endeavor, producing thousands of scholarly histories. Simultaneously this branch of social history—like most other history—has been buffeted by the winds of political and cultural change, and this has resulted in an evolving set of interests, theories, and debates. Early on these debates revolved around the moral value of women and thus femininity; by the nineteenth century the rationale for writing about women often involved asserting their secular, heroic stature based on feminine contributions to the public sphere. The revitalization of social history in the academy late in the twentieth century depended on these nineteenth-century themes, especially asserting the historical value of women's active presence. Somewhat later, however, gender theory questioned whether there could legitimately be a history of women—social or otherwise.

The earliest histories of women following Pisan's work focused on women exercising moral and intellectual gifts. Women of learning, queens, and moral leaders such as Joan of Arc all served as important topics, composing a social history of the topmost layers of society. With the collapse of the Old Regime in the French Revolution, writers like Stéphanie de Genlis set about chronicling the old court ways, but in a more systematic fashion than the memoir form of the works of the comte de Saint-Simon a century earlier. Laure d'Abrantes produced much-appreciated and multivolumed histories of the salons of Paris. Women's histories of the Vendée also presented the social life of women and their families under siege, with women playing the heroic role of provisioning and maintaining the social fabric during war and genocide. The focus on moral leadership of women ultimately eventuated in the towering work of the Strickland sisters, Elizabeth and Agnes, whose mammoth histories of the

queens, princesses, and other royal women of England and Scotland focused on social habits, customs, rituals, marriages, and family life.

NINETEENTH- AND EARLY-TWENTIETH-CENTURY HISTORIES OF WOMEN

Enlightenment curiosity provoked intense travel and investigative writing that portrayed the social life of peoples past and present; the Dutch travelers Betje Wolff and Aagje Deken as well as Joanna Schopenhauer, Albertine Clément-Hémery, Ida Hahn-Hahn, and Lady Morgan were some of the most important contributors from the 1780s to 1850. These eventuated in comparative social and cultural histories such as Lydia Maria Child's *The History and Condition of Women* (1835). Social rituals such as those of guilds, festivals, religious observances and monuments, institutions for the poor and orphaned, hospitals, and charitable societies in which women played an important role filled in the picture drawn in these works. Part of the impulse to portray social life fused with concern for what was early in the nineteenth century called "the social question"—the question of the poor and their possible uprising, on which thinkers of different political views expressed opinions. Various European thinkers described the condition of the poor, and notably the condition of poor women such as seamstresses, as well as the state of the working-class home. In the 1830s, Alexandre Parent-Duchâtelet simultaneously explored the history and condition of prostitution in Paris, while early in the 1840s Bettina von Arnim produced her history and analysis of the condition of the poor in Berlin. Most of these books provided numerically informed accounts of the poor, especially poor women, and their past.

Many of these historians believed that only by studying women's activities could one achieve a clear understanding of the social fabric—an understanding that was valued very much by amateurs and their appreciative readers but very little by the newly profes-

sionalizing historians of the academy from the middle of the nineteenth century on. The latter, taking their cue from Hegel, avoided private life, genealogy, and other aspects of the familial as a low kind of “memorializing” that compared ill with the high endeavor of political history. Sarah Taylor Austin, translator of Ranke, Cousin, and other historians, nonetheless maintained in her history of German social life in the eighteenth century that only by understanding the history of women could one understand the important social underpinnings of political rule. This marked an important shift in women’s history, from asserting women’s moral worth as an antidote to charges of innate sinfulness to affirming a secular and social contribution that women had made. Several influences fed this historiography, including burgeoning feminist and reform activism, utopian social thought, and separate-spheres ideology.

Other trends in nineteenth-century thought deepened some of these themes in the social history of women. The development of the nation-state rested in part on the provisioning of new services such as sanitation, the elimination of disease, and the prevention of epidemics. Associated with the foul and disease-bearing, prostitution became a major topic of amateur history written by such eminent doctors as Abraham Flexner. As science tried to demoralize sex, doctors and amateurs produced studies of sexual customs, most notably their evolution over time. Once it was shown that sexual customs were constantly changing, it was easier to place them under the sign of history

and science rather than religion and morality. Although a growing interest in ethnology and anthropology also fed this impulse, historians of women were among the first to write the history of the “masses” who made up the democratizing nation-state. Working with her husband, J. R. Green, Alice Stopford Green wrote history as a nationalistic study of society—a tendency in historical study which was an important component of the discovery of women by professional history later. A strong champion of women’s rights, Stopford Green also wrote histories of the Irish people and their struggles for social and economic justice under English rule.

The first wave of feminism and the attendant movement of women into universities, especially in the United States and Great Britain, also kept the social history of women alive, all the while transforming it. Inspired by feminism, groups such as the Men’s and Women’s Club in London produced studies of prostitution, women’s work, and family customs for their meetings. Lina Eckenstein, a member of that club and amateur scholar, published *Women under Monasticism*, (1896), a pioneering social history. Amateurs like Julia Cartwright and Margaret Oliphant studied women’s patronage of the arts; their works also depicted a complicated social and cultural life among the upper classes, in which women’s social privilege allowed them real influence in the arts. The Cambridge historian Mary Bateson studied the double monastery with similar result: within monastic society women could exert power equal to that of men despite religious denigration of women’s moral capacity. The culmination of this line of argument and this tradition appeared in Eileen Power’s *Medieval Nunneries* (1922), in which the social and economic organization of monastic women was vividly depicted.

Although the coeducation for which feminists fought had many inequities, those women educated by the system, like Bateson and Power, were skilled in archival and other kinds of professional research. Archives directed them not only to material for political history, but also to evidence allowing for a new social history of the lower classes and domestic life. Trained by Lilian Knowles, the pioneering economic historian at the University of London, Alice Clark in her *Working Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century* (1919) established a line of argument in the social history of European women that, like many other nineteenth-century explanatory models, remains influential to this day. For Clark, the appearance of manufacturing and protoindustry made it more and more difficult for women to earn their livelihood. Ivy Pinchbeck’s *Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution* (1930) also established working women as broadly covering

the field of labor, while a variety of historical and statistical studies by social scientists provided a data base for similar studies of women in almost every European country. Simultaneously women workers were writing their own social histories in such works as *Mein Arbeitstag*, *Mein Wochenende* (1930) and *Maternity: Letters from Working Women* (1915). Women in white-collar jobs received important treatment in Wanda Neff's *Victorian Working Women* (1929)—a study that showed the deterioration of jobs such as bank clerks, secretaries, and teachers, once women entered the profession. Like the studies of Clark and Pinchbeck, Neff's has set some of the terms for studying women in white-collar jobs and the professions.

WOMEN'S HISTORIES AFTER 1960

Even before World War II a rich social history of women in almost every class had emerged. But it was after 1960 that the field exploded with the rise of family history, quantitative demographic history, and a new history of the working class. Historians in these fields applied a somewhat different professional methodology to social history than that which had developed over the previous century. As these areas of social history emerged, they almost all took men as their important historical group and generally overlooked the possibilities for thinking of women as historical subjects. Pioneering works like E. P. Thompson's *Making of the English Working Class* (1963) described laborers who were taken as universal, though implicitly male. Even family reconstitution and population studies failed to see the gendered implications of their many and useful findings. However, that quickly changed with the new round of feminist activism that arose at almost the same time.

By the 1970s, activists were targeting the absence of women from the curriculum and research agenda of universities and schools. In part their inspiration came from major feminist writings like those of Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan, whose arguments on behalf of women were grounded in detailed examination of various social categories used to group women: married women, lesbians, housewives, old women, and so on. Late in the 1960s Natalie Zemon Davis and Jill Conway, teaching a course in women's history at the University of Toronto, produced a lengthy bibliography of women's history—much of it social—that circulated in mimeographed form. Conway and Davis drew precisely on the social history—of women in the Renaissance, women in monasteries, notable women, working women, and others—that had been written during the previous

century and a half. After that, women's history and women's studies courses arose, many of them rich with the beginnings of a professionalized research agenda in the social history of European women.

Innovation was rife, with many historians expressing the belief that women's history could not be like men's history, which was mostly about high politics. Rather, as had been maintained in the mid-nineteenth century, it would take a social form. Contesting the emphasis on men in the new labor history, women's historians in the 1970s investigated the conditions under which women worked. They recognized, however, that one did not necessarily look for women workers in the same locations as male workers. For one thing, in western Europe until the end of the nineteenth century the largest category of women workers found employment as domestic helpers of various kinds. Emphasizing the experience of class, historians Cissie Fairchilds and Theresa McBride described the interactions of women servants and middle-class women in England and France and found the conditions of work in the household far more onerous than those in the factory. Isolation, scrutiny by employers, and round-the-clock responsibility prevented the development of women's labor activism. Nonetheless, both of these works pointed out, social advancement was possible in domestic labor.

Studies of factory women and artisanal women mushroomed too, though the reliance on Pinchbeck was strong because of the richness of her narrative. English historians Jill Liddington and Jill Norris explored women textile workers of the north, finding them politically astute and active. Using some autobiographies and first-person narratives as sources, Rose Glickman's *Russian Factory Women* (1984) described the divergent work experience of Russian women within the mixed agricultural and manufacturing economy of the late nineteenth century, in which women moved from one sector to the other. Many of these and similar studies were attuned to the need for working women to combine household duties with paid employment of some kind.

Women as historical agents. Already, interest in combining the social history of work with the life cycle of women had produced a different kind of history, most notably in Joan Scott and Louise Tilly's *Women, Work, and Family* (1978). Using quantitative and demographic methods, this pioneering book plotted work for pay against women's age and their fertility. It also compared the employment histories of women in different types of manufacturing towns, resulting in the idea that women were historical agents, and that they developed their family and personal "strategies" around

a more varied set of factors than did men. This combination of evidence for women's agency in developing family strategies, along with a mapping of their biological life course, became influential. For example, Erna Olafson Hellerstein's early anthology of documents for the history of European women, *Victorian Women* (Stanford, Calif., 1981), used the life course rather than political events as its organizing principle.

Prostitution also came under the rubric of a life strategy. Understanding sex work as a strategy rather than a moral failing followed the line of argument explored by many nineteenth-century writers. Judith Walkowitz's depiction of the blurred boundary between working-class women and prostitution showed that casually employed women whose work had off-seasons turned to prostitution during these periods. Members of the working class saw these women as members of their own group, not as outcasts. Rather, it was the state policy of regulation that turned them into marked, disreputable members of society. Jill Harsin, in her study of the French regulatory system, found it to consist not of legislation but of police decrees from the Napoleonic period mandating regular inspections of prostitutes and their incarceration, should there be any sign of infection. Harsin's work

complemented that of Alain Corbin, whose *Filles de noce* (1978) showed the regulatory system as part of the disciplining of bodily functions in the modern period. A student of Michel Foucault, Corbin described the brothel as rationally conceived, located, designed, and managed from the nineteenth century on.

HISTORIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NORMS, AND RESISTANCE

A history of social movements eventuated from the attention to agency and strategizing within the life course. Analyses of women as actors in the English, French, and Russian revolutions emphasized their interest in subsistence and family issues as well as their involvement for reasons that were feminist or proto-feminist. Barbara Taylor, Joan Moon, and Claire Moses explored women's activism in chartist and utopian socialist associations, while Temma Kaplan and Louise Tilly looked at housewives' and working women's involvement in protest over issues of working conditions and subsistence. Natalie Zemon Davis's work on *charivari* chronicled yet another kind of social activism connected to the maintenance of social norms in mar-

riage, sexuality, and household life in the early modern period. Davis's study directed scholars' attention early on to the cultural shape and ritualistic patterns of social movements, as well as historians' focus on what seemed to be private life.

With the emphasis on rationality and agency, historians turned to the development of social norms and the inculcation of standards of femininity. Carol Dyhouse, Deborah Gorham, and Joan Burstyn studied the education of women and found that from the beginning of a young girl's life femininity was inculcated as the opposite of male privilege. Mothers, for example, forced their little girls to stay in and work while their brothers played outside. Doctors were also seen as inculcating feminine norms in their treatment of older women as unable to care for their families, themselves, or their mental health. Not only did doctors wrench health care from women, but they subjected middle-class women to all sorts of regimens to bring them into line.

Formal schooling consisted of different subject matter for girls and boys, with girls receiving a heavy dose of household arts and religion instead of the increasingly secular and liberal-arts curriculum for boys. When universities opened their doors to women, however, the innovation was often used as the occasion for curricular modernization, especially, in the case of England, the addition of modern languages, math, his-

tory, and science alongside the study of classical languages and literatures. At first social historians relied on the autobiographies of those, like Vera Brittain, who had been among the early generations of scholars. Eventually, Martha Vicinus included these women in her study of the various kinds of single women's experiences at the turn of the century, and thus helped construct the portrait of the "modern" woman. Jo Burr Margadant explored the sex-segregated postsecondary schooling of young women during the French Third Republic, and Dyhouse expanded her purview to publish *No Distinction of Sex?: Women in British Universities 1870–1939* (1995).

Studies of the development of accomplished or activist girls appeared in such works as Barbara Engel's *Mothers and Daughters: Women of the Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-Century Russia*, which discussed the inculcation both of feminine norms and adult ambition or rebellion as part of a historically-specific family process. The extraordinary array of intellectual and nihilist women emerged from a mixture of familial, emotional, and cognitive experiences that were particular to their times. Simultaneously, studies of inculcation of norms among peasant women appeared in studies of female relationships in the extended Russian and eastern European family.

The early years of second-wave feminist social history also looked at those women who did not im-

bibe, or who resisted, feminine norms. Mary Hartman's *Victorian Murderesses* (1977) looked at the crimes, testimonies, and judicial trials of British and French women in the nineteenth century. Other works studied thievery, luddism, and rioting, often as an extension of the new social history that saw this kind of behavior as "primitive," as in the banditry and Swing rioters described by Eric Hobsbawm. This was not the conclusion of scholars like Hartman, however. Somewhat later, the violence done to women—the extreme expression of their social subordination—was described in Anna Clark's *Women's Silence, Men's Violence: Sexual Assault in England 1770–1845* (1987). Klaus Theweleit's *Male Fantasies* (1987) and Maria Tatar's *Lustmord* (1995), chronicling depictions of German men's desires to slaughter and victimize women in the most grossly violent ways, provided further context to the grimmer aspects of the social history of women in the post–World War I period.

Religion provided an intermediate place—one in which women were perhaps socialized to sex roles, but which also became a space for resistance and self-transformation. Myriad studies addressed the religious terrain, making for a rich social history both of spiritual belief and its social functioning. From the Renaissance on, much debate ensued about the social outcomes of religious fervor among nuns and intensely devout laywomen. Brenda Meehan charted the life of women religious in Russia, illuminating the social practice of widowed, married, and single women. Gillian Ahlgren demonstrated that Teresa of Avila's particular devotional writings gave women the means to bypass the worse consequences of Tridentine Catholicism and left a legacy of empowerment. Phyllis Mack's *Visionary Women* (1994), while it richly captured the specific language of women's preachings in

the seventeenth century, also showed the ways in which they moved through society. Taking up the thread from E. P. Thompson's focus on working-class men's alternative Methodism, Deborah Valenze traced the networks and the social force women developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries through their ministries. The impact of Protestantism on women's education—particularly their instruction in reading—also engaged many social historians.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER HISTORY

By the early 1990s calls for an end to women's history and a turn to gender history caused anxiety among some practitioners. Joan Scott's "Gender: A Useful Category of Analysis" summarized the theory of gender as it had been developed by anthropologists and literary theorists. Adapting these theories for historical use, she suggested that one could not examine women's past alone, for women existed only in relationship to men. That relationship was implicated in the play of systems of power, with gender being a primary expression of power. Not everyone joined in the rush to gender history; some practitioners saw gender as yet another way of appealing to men in the profession by saying that women could not be discussed historically without them. Judith Bennett in "Feminism and History" maintained that the way to understanding power was less through analysis of gender than by dealing historically with the manifestations of patriarchy. Gisela Bock, however, argued that women's and gender history needed one another and were in fact complementary.

As it turned out, the development of gender history enhanced women's social history and shed new

light on femininity. For the early modern period the histories of sexuality, women's criminality, and prostitution were all restudied. Among the prominent topics in which interpretations changed was the study of witchcraft, which also benefited from scrupulous microstudies. Although there was little debate that the majority of witches were women, the localized studies—for instance those of Wolfgang Behringer and Alison Rowland—found witches to be distributed along marital and age statuses in many cases. These works also showed that witches could be integrated into the community for long periods of time. However, the “gendered” subjectivity and narratives of witches, as explored by historians like Lyndal Roper and Dianne Purkiss, found in accuser's testimonies evidence of particularly “feminine” concerns such as those of motherhood, the body, and female duty. Women with such anxieties might project their sense of guilt onto others, who in some cases became the accused. In the case of witchcraft, oddly enough, gender turned historical analysis away from misogyny toward the conditions of femininity.

The term “femininity” gained new resonance and legitimacy as the proposal that femininity and masculinity were related added a new historical dimension to the understanding of femininity and class. For instance, *Family Fortunes* (1987) by Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall explored the social history of the British middle classes by looking at the mutually constructed roles of men and women in the early nineteenth century. Using this gendered perspective, Davidoff and Hall found less disparity between femininity and masculinity than earlier authors had. On working women, gender history provided insights as well. Tessie Liu's *Weaver's Knot* (1994) looked at the hero of many a labor historian—the solitary artisan of the nineteenth century—to find that his image could only be maintained if the women of artisanal families were dispatched to nearby factories to bring in additional money. Thus the image of the courageous artisan resisting proletarianization for himself depended on the proletarianization of his wives and daughters. Laura Lee Downs looked at women metallurgy workers during World War I through the prism of gender, finding that although factory owners often employed the available gender stereotypes in assigning women tasks and wages, they simultaneously noted what women could actually do. Women's work in metallurgy became a permanent feature of the industrial landscape—Downs adduced numbers—because of both factory owners' and women's experience of war.

At the close of the twentieth century historians continued their dissection of working women's experience

despite the attacks on social history investigations from this perspective. For the early modern period, Heide Wunder and Christina Vanja's *Weiber, Menscher, Frauenzimmer: Frauen in der ländlichen Gesellschaft 1500–1800* (1996) explored women's work not only in vineyards and protoindustry but also in their various other occupations. Earlier conclusions about the pervasiveness of women's work in the early modern period held, but scholars gave more detailed accounts, showing, for example, that women, though often driven from certain sectors like the woolen guilds in the Netherlands, remained active as fishwives, spinners, seamstresses, and workers in the health care trades. Amy Louise Erickson, in *Women and Property in Early Modern England* (1993), showed additionally that women controlled property more extensively than hitherto thought. Finally, Natalie Zemon Davis's wide-ranging *Women on the Margins* (1995) gave a rich portrait of the work life of three very different seventeenth-century women whose labors initially complemented those of their spouses and who subsequently went off to construct a complex and intense life course combining craft with religious fervor, migration, and mental self-exploration. The life-course model for women in early modern Europe had evolved not only because of the study of gender but because of advances in the history of work and sexuality: the anthology by Judith M. Bennett and Amy M. Froide, *Singlewomen in European History 1250–1800* (1999), covered a wide variety of these new and old perspectives in social history, including demography, sexuality, and citizenship.

Cultural contextualization. Beatrice Farnsworth and Lynne Viola's 1992 anthology *Russian Peasant Women* outlined a rich history of everyday life including work, sexuality, and reproduction and set it in the context of peasant culture. This cultural contextualization of the social history of women and femininity marked a major change in the field. Similarly, Anne-Marie Sohn's massive thesis on the everyday life of French women of the lower classes analyzed their educational, social, and cultural milieu. Departing from the theories of the 1970s and 1990s that women in food movements and neighborhood activism were “prepolitical,” the work of Ellen Ross showed that the neighborhood solidarity of working-class mothers laid the groundwork for shop-floor protest, an insight explored further in Anna Davin's *Growing Up Poor: Home, School, and Street in London 1870–1914* (1996). Belinda Davis's study of women food protesters in Berlin during World War I found that, far from having no political agenda or impact, these protesters challenged the government to respond to

ordinary people's needs. Thus women's wartime responsibilities for food changed the nature of public discourse and, eventually, the nature of government. The 1998 anthology *Women and Socialism, Socialism and Women* (Helmut Gruber and Pamela Graves, eds.) provided a comparative look at women's connections with unions and socialist activism in the interwar years. Finally the range of women's work in the post-World War II period received comparative treatment in *Frauen arbeiten: Weibliche Erwerbstätigkeit in Ost- und Westdeutschland nach 1945* (Gunilla-Friederike Budde, ed.). One study found, in the case of West Germany, strikingly different behavior on the part of working-class women who entered the work force because of the "pull" of jobs rather than the "push" of their husband's wages. The anthology additionally concluded that the largest discrepancies in worklife between East and West Germany were in the agricultural sector.

Historians also looked at the rise of service-oriented job opportunities in new ways. The connection between women's philanthropy of the nineteenth century and their work for the welfare state has long been made, but in *The Rise of Caring Power* (1999), studying philanthropy in the Netherlands, Annemieke van Drenth and Francisca de Haan concluded that women developed a system different though related to the "pastoral power" as articulated by Michel Foucault. Women's dominance of the caring professions arose from their desire to make subjects of other, poorer women and in so doing to exercise their own power. De Haan has also studied women office workers in the Netherlands, examining the battle for survival that existed in white-collar work. In studies of postindustrial work since 1945, in which women play an enormous role, Cas Wouters has described the psychological work of women flight attendants, while others have focused on the connections between service women and technology and knowledge.

Another theme of late-twentieth-century scholarship involved women's experience of consumer society. Anthologies like Victoria De Grazia's anthology *The Sex of Things* (1996) and Katherina von Ankum's *Women in the Metropolis* (1997) abandoned much of the disapproval that had earlier characterized accounts of women's consumerism. Instead, studies illustrated how consumer activity modified women's relationship to urban space, whatever the class. Arlette Farge's work on the eighteenth century showed women occupying the streets with gusto and claiming neighborhoods, doorsteps, and markets. Erika Rappaport's *Shopping for Pleasure: Women in the Making of London's West End* (2000) connected women's consumerism late in the nineteenth century with a range of social positions

they assumed—as members of an imperial power, as provisioners, and as citizens fully entitled to enter public space. Studies of women as consumers of films, as participants in beauty pageants, and in their relationship to cosmetics, clothing, household design, and architecture have all enriched historical depictions of everyday life.

Political regimes. The study of Nazism and fascism—as well as a new social understanding of various political regimes—benefited from the turn to gender. This construct encouraged a rethinking of the ways in which politics took the formation of masculinity and femininity as a national goal. This political mission yielded societal results under various political regimes, but they were particularly visible under Nazism and fascism. The privileging and construction of a soldierly masculinity led fascists to build a complementary, coercive femininity among Aryan women that demanded a commitment to reproduction. Building a numerous Aryan population became the mission of Aryan women, while the curtailment of reproduction was the lot of non-Aryans. These insights have led to new interpretations of the social history of the Holocaust. Aware of the gendered cast to that catastrophe, Marion Kaplan (*Between Dignity and Despair*, 1999) has been among those uncovering the conditions that made women more often its victims than men. Other studies have explored sexual relationships and judicial trials of "racial" sex offenders under Nazism.

Seeing gender and population control as major aspects of political regimes—be they international, national, regional, or local—has led scholars to compare democracies with totalitarian governments in their impact on the social lives of women and the construction of femininity. Maria Sophia Quine's *Population Politics in Twentieth-Century Europe: Fascist Dictatorships and Liberal Democracies* (1996) sees that the two types of state differed little in their desire to control domestic life, sexuality, and the relationship between generations. Studies of the policies of the Soviet state and those of Eastern Europe, from the 1920s down to the reforms of the post-Soviet nations, have uncovered a pattern of interventionist regulation of reproduction—whether allowing abortion or not, or allowing birth control or not—determining the life course of women to a far greater degree than that of men. The policies of the British welfare state, post-World-War-II France, and the new West Germany all shaped the reproductive, work, and domestic lives of women by mandating population enhancement.

As perspectives shifted to view it as not only a matter of high politics, but a more wide-ranging

movement with important social components, imperialism became a full-fledged site for the study of women's social agency. European women travelers were newly evaluated as important members of imperial society and bearers of its culture as their memoirs and travel reports were republished in the 1980s and 1990s. Other studies began the process of looking at the social aspects of European imperialism in the colonies as more complex than imagined; a picture emerged in which women settlers, missionaries, and colonized peoples played major roles in shaping social and political relationships. The argument developed that women were more racist than men because, disliking the concubinage of colonized women, they ended the closeness of white men and local women that imperialism entailed. Margaret Strobel's *European Women and the Second British Empire* (1991) questioned this argument, while Helen Callaway's work on settlers in colonial Nigeria argued that women had reshaped many of the social aspects of imperialism. Sexuality as a major component of men's gendered relationship to colonized women through science, concubinage, prostitution, and rape, was investigated in a variety of works including those of Londa Schiebinger, Pamela Scully, and Luise White. Frances Gouda's *Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies 1900–1942* (1995), her edited volume with Julia Clancy-Smith, *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism* (1998), and Kumari Jayawardena's *The White Woman's Other Burden: Western Women and South Asia during British Rule* (1995) enriched the portrait of the social functioning of women and femininity in overseas empires, while other works began showing women's use of colonial goods and their role in developing a culture of global consumerism.

Another important line of scholarship in the social history of women and femininity developed around global migration to Europe in the post–World War II period. As many women from the decolonizing world entered Europe in the 1950s and thereafter, their place in metropolitan society was shaped by the lingering values of imperialism and neocolonialism. *The Heart of the Race: Black Women's Lives in Britain* (Beverly Bryan et al., 1985) used oral testimony to compile the

experiences of moving to the metropole and working in the welfare state. The social history of women immigrants to Europe also appeared in a variety of testimonials and first-person accounts, while their central role in the post-Fordist workplace was also investigated. R. Amy Elman, ed., *Sexual Politics and the European Union* (1996) explored the social policies that affected these women's lives.

Social history of post-Soviet women also opened up in the 1990s. In the official histories of the collapse of the socialist regime, women disappeared as leaders of the social movements that had brought about Communism's collapse. Moreover, post-Soviet governments, eager to escape the appearance of hewing to socialist values, reinvigorated the ideology of separate spheres. In the midst of massive restructuring of the economy, this ideal entailed the firing of millions of women. From 70 to 80 percent of the unemployed in any job category in the 1990s and early twenty-first century were women. Some of these changes were charted in such works as Barbara Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender, and Women's Movements in East Central Europe* (1993), Ellen E. Berry, ed. *Postcommunism and the Body Politic* (1995), and Mary Buckley, ed. *Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia* (1997). Simultaneously another interesting facet of social history of women—a more complex picture of the social and cultural lives of women under Stalinism—was advanced in such works as Helena Goscilo and Beth Homgren, eds. *Russia-Women-Culture* (1996) and Rosalind Marsh, ed., *Women in Russia and Ukraine* (1996).

The social history of European women and femininity has been a fertile field of study for two centuries, with many more studies and breakthroughs still to come. More innovations should be in the offing as the historiography of gender unfolds; technology's impact on women's social history is gaining new attention; and the social history of European women since 1945 should find many new investigators. As post-colonial studies increase in importance, they, too, have been advancing social history, and they have meshed nicely with gender history to open still other paths in European history. The development of world history also holds real promise for social history's advance.

See also other articles in this section.

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PATRIARCHY



Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks

Social historians and other scholars frequently disagree about the meaning and usefulness of the word “patriarchy.” Some use it very broadly, to mean social systems in which men have more power and access to resources than women. By this definition, every culture that has left written records has been patriarchal. Others use it more narrowly, to mean social systems in which older men, particularly those who are fathers and heads of households, have authority over women, children, and men in dependent positions, such as servants, serfs, and slaves. By this definition, most Western cultures were patriarchal until the eighteenth or nineteenth century and retain vestiges of patriarchy today, such as the continued power of fathers over their children. (This narrower definition of patriarchy is sometimes termed “patriarchalism” or “paternalism.”) Still others avoid using the term completely, arguing that it is too politicized and associated with feminism; they prefer terms that they see as more neutral, such as “male dominance” or “paternal power” or “inequities based on gender.” Others avoid it because they feel it lacks much explanatory value; at least until the twentieth century, patriarchy was simply an aspect of human life, like breathing, and so in their opinion merits little scholarly attention.

Most historians who choose to use the word “patriarchy” emphasize that despite their ubiquity, patriarchal systems have taken widely varied forms. Male assertions of power over women, children, and dependent men have involved physical force, legal sanctions, intellectual structures, religious systems, economic privileges, social institutions, and cultural norms. Thus patriarchy does have a history, and social historians have been particularly active in investigating the changing construction of patriarchy and the responses of women and men to it. Most investigations of that history in Western cultures concentrate on three periods, which will thus be the primary topics of this article: the origins of patriarchy in antiquity, the explicit institutionalization of a father-centered patriarchy in western Europe during the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, and the challenges

to that patriarchy by the liberal revolutions of the late eighteenth century and radical social movements of the nineteenth century. Because patriarchal configurations of power were less explicitly a matter of concern in the Middle Ages than they were in the early modern period, most medieval historians have not felt compelled to make them a specific focus of investigation. Historians of the twentieth century tend either to use the term without explicating or defining it, or to avoid it altogether, although some investigations of authoritarian regimes that made extensive use of father imagery—such as Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy, and Stalin’s Soviet Union—do label these as patriarchal and explore the consequences of this ideology. Whatever century they lived in, all later supporters (and most opponents) of patriarchy hearkened back to ancient models and made references to patriarchy’s origins, so it is important to understand the scholarly debate about this before looking at more recent developments.

THE ORIGINS OF PATRIARCHY

Explanations of the origins of patriarchy were first advanced in the nineteenth century, particularly by German social theorists. The scholar J. J. Bachofen asserted that human society had originally been a matriarchy in which mothers were all-powerful. The mother-child bond was the original source of culture, religion, and community, but gradually father-child links came to be regarded as more important, and superior (to Bachofen’s eyes) patriarchal structures developed. Bachofen’s ideas about primitive matriarchy were accepted by the socialist Friedrich Engels, who postulated a two-stage evolution from matriarchy to patriarchy. In matriarchal cultures, goods were owned in common, but with the expansion of agriculture and animal husbandry men began to claim ownership of crops, animals, and land, thus developing the notion of private property. Once men had private property, they became very concerned about passing it on to

their own heirs, and attempted to control women's sexual lives to assure that offspring were legitimate. This led to the development of the nuclear family, which was followed by the development of the state, in which men's rights over women were legitimized through a variety of means, a process Engels describes as the "world historical defeat of the female sex."

The idea that human society was originally a matriarchy with female deities and female leaders continues to be accepted by some scholars and a number of popular writers, but it has been largely discredited among anthropologists and historians for lack of evidence. What has not been discredited is the notion that both property ownership and political structures were intimately related to patriarchy. The historian Gerda Lerner has tipped Engels's line of causation on its head: women, she argues, *were* the first property, exchanged for their procreative power by men with other men through marriage, prostitution, and slavery. Thus patriarchy preceded other forms of hierarchy and domination such as kin networks and social classes, and women became primarily defined by their relation to men. Like Engels, Lerner links patriarchy with economic and political change, but she also stresses the importance of nonmaterial issues such as the creation of symbols and meaning through religion and philosophy. Women were excluded from direct links to the divine in Mesopotamian religion and Judaism, and defined as categorically inferior to men in Greek philosophy. Thus both of the traditions generally regarded as the sources of Western culture—the Bible and Greek (particularly Aristotelian) thought—affirmed women's secondary position. Because other hierarchies such as those of hereditary aristocracy, class, or race privileged the women connected to powerful or wealthy men, women did not see themselves as part of a coherent group and often supported the institutions and intellectual structures that subordinated them.

Lerner's ideas have been challenged from a number of perspectives. Materialist historians have objected to her emphasis on ideas and symbols, and to the notion that gender hierarchies preceded those based on property ownership, while some classicists have argued that she misread ancient prostitution and other aspects of early cultures. Despite these objections, however, some of her—and Engels's—points are now widely accepted. Though it is unclear which came first, women's subordination emerged in the ancient Middle East at the same time as private ownership of property and plow agriculture, which significantly increased the food supply but also significantly increased the resources needed to produce that food. Men generally carried out the plowing and care for animals,

which led to boys being favored over girls for the work they could do for their parents while young and the support they could provide in parents' old age. Boys became the normal inheritors of family land and of the rights to work communally held land.

The states that developed in the ancient Middle East further heightened gender distinctions. They depended on taxes and tribute as well as slave labor for their support, and so their rulers were very interested in maintaining population levels. As hereditary aristocracies developed, they became concerned with maintaining the distinction between themselves and the majority of the population, and male property owners wanted to be sure the children their wives bore were theirs. All of these concerns led to attempts to control women's reproduction through laws governing sexual relations and, more importantly, through marriage norms and practices that set up a very unequal relationship between spouses. Laws were passed mandating that women be virgins on marriage and imposing strict punishment for a married woman's adultery; sexual relations outside of marriage on the part of husbands were not considered adultery. Concern with family honor thus became linked to women's sexuality in a way that it was not for men. Men's honor revolved around their work activities and, for more prominent families, around their performance of public duties in the expanding government bureaucracies.

The states of the ancient Mediterranean built on these precedents, with the Roman Republic developing the most comprehensive notion of patriarchy in the ancient world. Roman fathers in theory held life and death power over their children, including married daughters. Such power, termed the *patria potestas*, appears to have been very rarely exercised and may actually have served to protect women from abusive husbands.

These economic and political developments were accompanied and supported by cultural norms and religious concepts that heightened gender distinctions. As agricultural communities changed the landscape through irrigation and building, they increasingly saw themselves as separate from and superior to the natural world and developed a nature-culture dichotomy. Because women were the bearers of children and because they did not own the irrigated, culturally adapted fields, they were regarded as closer to nature and therefore inferior. As more of women's labor began to take place inside the house or household complex, and as houses were increasingly regarded as owned by an individual or family, women were increasingly associated with the domestic or private realm. Men, whose work was done outside in conjunction with other men, were

increasingly associated with the public realm, a realm that grew in complexity and importance as communities and then states expanded. Heavenly hierarchies came to reflect those on earth, with the gods arranged in a hierarchy dominated by a single male god, who was viewed as the primary creator of life. Both monotheistic religions that developed in the ancient world, first Judaism and then Christianity, regarded their single god as male and excluded women from official positions of authority. Christianity also adopted and adapted Roman notions of paternal power, with bishops and priests taking the title “father” and, in western Europe, ultimate authority coming to reside in a single father, the pope, whose title derived from a Latin word for father.

The development of patriarchy in the ancient world is thus a complex process, with no single cause: property ownership, the division of labor, the requirements of marriage, the growth of the bureaucratic state, cultural values, and religious ideas were all involved. Patriarchal hierarchies shaped all of these in turn, and continued to do so throughout Western history. Later Europeans referred back to the patriarchal values and institutions of the ancient world constantly, and took longer to question and challenge patriarchy than almost any other aspect of ancient culture. Indeed, the very individuals who challenged other inherited institutions and hierarchies were often the strongest supporters of patriarchy, seeing no contradiction in their refutation of traditional authorities in other aspects of life and their acceptance of those same authorities when it came to notions of gender.

Patriarchal Structures in Early Modern Europe

Just as it had in the ancient world, the elaboration of patriarchy in early modern Europe involved economic, political, cultural, and religious issues. Economic institutions that developed in the Middle Ages, such as craft guilds, were patriarchal in both the broad and narrow sense. Women were generally excluded from formal programs of apprenticeship that led to independent mastership in a guild, although as the wife or daughter of a master a woman might work in a shop and as a master’s widow might run one. Women’s ability to work was thus dependent on their relationship with a man, not their own skills and training. The men involved in guilds were also arranged in a patriarchal power structure, however, with the master having authority over his apprentices and journeymen, who might be grown men. In some places journeymen objected to this situation and formed their own guilds,

but these were often prohibited by state authorities, who saw them as dangerous and antithetical to the properly hierarchical arrangement of society.

Economic development in the later Middle Ages and early modern period is generally described as the rise of capitalism, which has long been recognized as offering more opportunities for men than it did for women. Because sons inherited more than daughters—a pattern established in the ancient world—women rarely controlled enough financial resources to enter occupations that required large initial capital outlay. In some areas capitalism created opportunities for wage labor, but women were regularly paid far less than men, or their pay went directly to their husbands or fathers when families rather than individuals were hired. Occupations that required advanced training were closed to women, as they could not attend universities or academies. Their domestic and family responsibilities prevented them from entering occupations that required extensive traveling, and their productive tasks within the household, even if these were for pay, such as laundering or sewing, were increasingly defined as reproductive—as housekeeping. Thus in many instances capitalism and patriarchy worked together to heighten existing gender distinctions, a process that has been analyzed in what is usually termed a “dual-systems approach.”

The intertwining of capitalism and patriarchy did not have the same effects in all of Europe, however, or the same effects on all social groups. The expansion of wage labor, despite its low pay and low status, may actually have benefited some women, as it allowed them to leave the parental household and perhaps even support themselves without marrying. This possibility of greater independence was unacceptable in the minds of political authorities, who began to pass laws that attempted to force women into male-headed households. Such laws had not been necessary earlier because the opportunities for women to live alone and support themselves by their labor were much fewer. In southern Germany, unmarried women were forbidden to move into cities unless they went into domestic service in a male-headed household, and a special pejorative term, *Eigenbrötlerinnen* (women who earn their own bread), was used for women who lived on their own. These laws were often justified with explicit defenses of patriarchy, noting that if women did not live in male-headed households they would be “masterless” and “indulge in slovenly and immoral debaucheries.” Such laws were largely ineffective, however, if the demand for women’s wage labor was great enough, a situation that occurred especially in cloth-producing areas. In sixteenth-century Augsburg, for example, city authorities tried to force

women who spun thread to live in the households of male weavers, but they refused, saying openly they were not so dumb as to work as spin-maids for the weavers when they could earn three times as much spinning on their own. Such comments incensed both the authorities and the weavers, but the demand for thread was so great that there was little they could do. Thus in this instance, the demands of patriarchy and those of capitalist development were at odds with one another, a situation that was rare, but possible.

The attempt by city governments in Germany to force everyone to live in male-headed households was only one of the many ways in which political institutions and patriarchy were linked in early modern Europe. In cities and villages, political rights—to make decisions about common concerns, to choose and hold office as a public official—were limited to men, and in some cities, such as Venice, to men who were married heads of household. Women were often considered citizens—which gave them legal advantages over noncitizens and the obligations to pay taxes—but this did not bring the rights that it did to male citizens. Though they often took oaths of allegiance on first becoming citizens, they did not participate in the annual oath swearing held in many cities and villages, in which adult male citizens swore to defend their town and support it economically. (Parts of Europe where this oath swearing was maintained and prized into the modern period were often those where patriarchy was the strongest. Switzerland, whose national mythology revolves around stories of William Tell and village democracy, was the last country to Europe to grant women the vote; they received it only in 1971, after eighty-two referenda.)

The connection between masculinity (or fatherhood) and political power was strong in early modern nation-states as well as cities and villages. The lack of male heirs in many of Europe's ruling houses led to an unusual number of female monarchs in the sixteenth century, an apparent contradiction with patriarchal ideals. This situation sparked a vigorous public debate about women's rule, with many writers arguing that women's rule was unnatural, unlawful, and contrary to Christian scriptures. The Scottish religious reformer John Knox termed rule by a woman "monstrous" and "repugnant." Defenders of female rule, who often hoped to gain favor with female monarchs through their writings, attempted to separate the private and public persons of a queen, arguing that she could be feminine in her private life—and thus subject to her husband if she was married—but still exhibit the masculine qualities regarded as necessary to a ruler in her public life.

Jean Bodin, the French jurist and political theorist, used the narrower definition of patriarchy—rule by fathers—as another reason to object to women's rule. He argued that the state was like a household, and just as in a household the husband/father has authority and power over all others, so in the state a male monarch should always rule. The English political writer Robert Filmer carried this even further in *Patriarcha*, asserting that rulers derived all legal authority from the divinely sanctioned fatherly power of Adam, just as did all fathers. Male monarchs picked up on Filmer's ideas, and used paternal imagery to justify their assertion of power over their subjects. James I of England commented in speeches to Parliament, "I am the Husband, and the whole Isle is my lawful Wife. . . . By the law of nature the king becomes a natural father to all his lieges at his coronation. . . . A King is trewly *Parens patriae*, the politique father of his people." Though such language was usually used to justify royal absolutism, it was also used by those who opposed certain royal actions; they stressed, in these cases, that the king was *not* acting as a beneficent and loving father would and thus merited criticism.

This link between royal and paternal authority could also work in the opposite direction to enhance the power of male heads of household. Just as subjects were deemed to have no or only a very limited right of rebellion against their ruler (James asserted that it was "monstrous and unnatural for sons to rise up"), so women and children were not to dispute the authority of the husband/father because both kings and fathers were held to have received their authority from God. The household was not viewed as private but as the smallest political unit and so as part of the public realm. Jean Bodin put it succinctly: "So we will leave moral discourse to the philosophers and theologians, and we will take up what is relative to political life, and speak of the husband's power over the wife, which is the source and origin of every human society."

Concerns about the patriarchal state and household led not only to theoretical treatises and royal speeches but also to new laws. Rulers intent on increasing and centralizing their own authority supported legal and institutional changes that enhanced the power of men over the women and children in their own families, in what the historian Sarah Hanley has termed the "family/state compact." In France, for example, a series of laws were enacted between 1556 and 1789 that increased both male and state control of marriage. These were proposed and supported by state officials because they increased their personal authority within their own families and simultaneously increased the authority of the state vis-à-vis the Cath-

olic Church, which had required at least the nominal consent of both parties for a valid marriage. Children who disagreed with their father's decisions on marriage or other matters could be imprisoned by a *lettre de cachet*, a warrant of arrest signed by the king of France and closed with a seal (*cachet*), ordering their imprisonment without trial until further notice. *Lettres de cachet* were also used occasionally by husbands seeking to control wives who were disobedient or whom they regarded as harming family reputation and honor.

Religious institutions occasionally worked against patriarchy, as in the requirement of spousal consent in marriage, but more often worked to reinforce it. During the fifteenth century, humanists and religious reformers increasingly emphasized that God had set up marriage and families as the best way to provide spiritual and moral discipline. In sermons, homilies, and catechisms, they stressed the role that godly men were to play in leading these families and the corresponding duties of pious and obedient women and

children. Such paternalistic households fit well with those envisioned as ideal by the craft guilds and became an essential part of Protestant moral ideology after the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. Because Protestants—beginning with Martin Luther—put such an emphasis on marriage as the proper life for all people and patriarchal households as the cornerstone of society, the Protestant Reformation used to be viewed as the originator of these ideas. It is now recognized that such ideas were quite common already in the fifteenth century and that they were based on still earlier social and economic changes that had made the marital pair the basic production and consumption unit in Europe. Thus Protestant ideas about the family did not create the patriarchal bourgeois family but resulted from it, a causal line that can help explain why the ideal family in Catholic writings was exactly the same as that in Protestant: a pious, responsible, forceful husband and father, who lovingly but firmly governed his pious, deferential, and obedient wife and children.

Though the patriarchal family did not originate with the Reformation, certain aspects of Protestantism worked to strengthen patriarchy at both the household and state level. Protestantism, and in England, Puritanism, granted male heads of household a larger religious and supervisory role than they had under Catholicism, in which the priest could serve as an alternate source of authority for a wife or child, who could thus use one patriarchal structure to limit the power of another. (Wives in Protestant areas could turn to their pastor or city authorities if their husband was abusing his authority or acting irresponsibly, but authorities usually intervened only if the husband's actions were causing financial ruin for the family.) The fact that Protestant clergy were themselves generally married heads of household also meant that ideas about clerical authority reinforced notions of paternal and husbandly authority; priests were now husbands, and husbands priests. Most Protestant writers also gave mothers a role in the religious and moral life of the household, but this was always secondary to that of fathers and derivative from paternal authority. At the state level, the ruler was now in charge of the church, thus not only—as patriarchal theory had it—deriving his power from God but having direct power over God's deputies on earth. This situation made opponents of female rule in Protestant areas even more adamant in their opposition, although astute female rulers were careful not to highlight the issue. Elizabeth I, for example, commented that she had the “heart and stomach of a king,” but chose the rather neutral title “governor” rather than the more clearly dominant “head” to describe her position vis-à-vis the Church of England.

This brief sketch of various issues has indicated that a range of relationships of governance in Europe from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries were clearly patriarchal: husbands and wives, fathers and children, masters and servants, pastors and parishioners, rulers and subjects, and (in some instances) employers and workers. The multifaceted nature of early modern patriarchy served to make it appear an inevitable part of life, as both God-given and natural. Thus those who were regarded as opposing or subverting patriarchy were described and sometimes treated very harshly. Female rulers were largely protected from the effects of such attitudes by their position, but women accused of witchcraft, scolding, or infanticide were not. The very ubiquitousness of patriarchy could also create conflicts, however, as cities and pastors defended wives against their husbands, or states ordered fathers to send their children to school, or guild masters “adopted” young women as their “daughters” to gain more workers and contravene laws

that forbade female labor. Patriarchal systems could thus work at cross-purposes to one another and be manipulated in ways that served individual and group interests.

CHALLENGES TO PATRIARCHY

The contradictions within and conflicts between patriarchal structures were joined in the early modern period—or even earlier—by intentional challenges to patriarchy. Very soon after craft guilds were formed, for example, journeymen in many parts of Europe formed their own guilds and objected to the power of masters (and masters' wives, who usually decided what they would be fed) over them. These journeymen's guilds were often banned by city and state governments, but they continued as clandestine or quasi-clandestine groups and maintained their power by refusing to work in shops that did not follow their rules. Such guilds—termed *compagnonnages* in France—were egalitarian in their relationships within the group, with members calling each other “brother” and electing their leaders, but they were also hostile to women's labor and often to women in general. Thus they opposed patriarchy among men but supported it in relation to women.

This same pattern can be found among English men who overthrew the monarchy and supported a parliamentary form of government in the seventeenth-century Civil War. Even the most radical groups in the Civil War never suggested that ending the power of the monarch over his subjects should be matched by ending the power of husbands over their wives. The former was unjust and against God's will, while the latter was “natural,” as the words of the radical Parliamentarian Henry Parker make clear: “The wife is inferior in nature, and was created for the assistance of man, and servants are hired for their Lord's mere attendance; but it is otherwise in the State between man and man, for that civil difference . . . is for . . . the good of all, not that servility and drudgery may be imposed upon all for the pompe of one.” Despite Parker's sentiments (which were shared by most of his colleagues), groups of women did petition Parliament several times. A few of these petitions were received respectfully, but most were not, and the women were called “bawds and whores” whose husbands should give them more to do at home. Such treatment led many women who reflected on women's condition to remain loyal to the monarchy and occasionally to point out the irony of Parliament's position. The writer Mary Astell, for example, commented: “If all men are born free, how is it that all women are born

slaves? . . .” Why does Parliament “not cry up Liberty to poor female slaves?”

By extending political power to a somewhat larger group of men, parliamentary governments in the early modern period in fact heightened the gendered nature of patriarchy and the importance of sex as a determinant of political power and rights. Once the decision of an all-male representative body became the most important factor in determining who would rule, women even lost the uncontrollable power over political succession they had through bearing the next monarch. (The fact that parliamentary power over the choice of a monarch freed men from being dependent on women’s biology was not lost on early modern advocates of republican governments or limited monarchy.)

During the seventeenth century, some thinkers began to question the basis of patriarchy in the same way they questioned other traditional institutions. In his *On the Equality of the Two Sexes* (1673), François Poulain de la Barre argued that men and women have equal capacity for reason and that differences between the two are a matter of inherited prejudices. His ideas were adopted by several of the leading figures in the Enlightenment, who argued that gender hierarchies were no more rational or tolerable than aristocratic hierarchies. The marquis de Condorcet, for example, commented, “Why should individuals subject to pregnancies and to brief periods of indisposition not be able to exercise rights that no one ever thought of denying to people who suffer from gout every winter or who easily catch cold?” For a brief period during the early years of the French Revolution, *lettres de cachet* were abolished, the property rights of women and children were improved, and women were granted the right of divorce; these measures gave women more civil rights in economic and marital concerns than anywhere else in Europe.

For most of the revolutionaries, however, the possibility of getting pregnant created a type of distinction unlike any other when it came to civic political rights. Whereas wealth, family background, social class, and status of birth were distinctions they increasingly took to be meaningless in terms of the limits of citizenship—the 1791 Constitution limited voting rights to those men who had some property, but by 1793 all men over twenty-one could vote—sex remained, in their eyes, an unbridgable chasm. Pierre-Gaspard Chaumette, a Parisian official, commented in 1793, “Since when is it permitted to give up one’s sex? Since when is it decent to see women abandoning the pious cares of their households, the cribs of their children, to come to public places, to harangues in the galleries, at the bar of the Senate? Is

it to men that nature has confided domestic cares? Has she given us breasts to feed our children?” In the eyes of most revolutionaries, patriarchal relationships of authority and governance among men were socially constructed and thus alterable, but those involving men and women were established by nature and were thus unchangeable.

Many women in Paris and other cities in France paid no attention to such ideas and actively opposed all forms of patriarchy. Poor women marched from Paris to the king’s palace at Versailles demanding that the king sign a new constitution; they signed petitions and formed clubs calling for further political changes and, along with men, carried weapons in armed protest marches through the streets of Paris. Throughout all of these activities, they identified themselves as citizens—*citoyennes* in the feminine in French—and as patriots. The writer Olympe de Gouges drafted a *Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Citizen* as a counterpart to the earlier *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*, proclaiming “Woman, awake! The tocsin of reason is making itself heard the world over. Assert your rights. . . . This sex, too weak and too long oppressed, is ready to throw off the yoke of a shameful slavery.”

Such actions and words did not lead to greater gender egalitarianism. Six months after they formed, women’s political clubs were banned as threats to “public order,” and none of the various constitutions drafted during the Revolution allowed women to vote. The conservative backlash after the Revolution led to greater restrictions on women’s civil rights regarding economic and family issues as well as their civic po-

litical rights. In Napoleon's Civil Code of 1804—which became the basis of many law codes in Europe with the Napoleonic conquests—adult unmarried women were relatively free to engage in business and legal affairs, but married women were to be totally subservient to their husbands. As Article 213 of the Code puts it, “A husband owes protection to his wife, a wife obedience to her husband.” Napoleon himself suggested that this article ought to be read aloud at weddings, for in a century when women “forgot the sense of their inferiority it was important to remind them frankly of the submission they owe to the man who is to become the arbiter of their fate.”

Napoleon's opinion on other matters was firmly rejected throughout Europe in the nineteenth century, but his opinions about the centrality of patriarchy were accepted by men of widely varying political persuasions. The word “male” was included in laws regarding political rights, thus barring women at the same time that such laws removed property requirements for male voters. Though some socialist thinkers took Engels's attacks on patriarchy seriously, others did not. The socialist leader Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, angered in 1848 that socialist women were endorsing political candidates, wrote

The role of women is not the exterior life, the life of activity and agitation, but the intimate life, that of sentiment and of the tranquility of the domestic hearth. Socialism did not come only to restore work, but also to rehabilitate the household, sanctuary of the family,

symbol of matrimonial union. . . . We invite our sisters to think about what we have said and to penetrate to this truth, that purity and morality gain more in the patriarchal celebrations of the family than in the noisy manifestation of politics.

The labor organizations that developed in the nineteenth century often used similar language, arguing not for women's right to work but in favor of a “family wage” high enough to allow married male workers to support their families so that their wives could concentrate on domestic tasks. Such wages were only an ideal, and industrial workplaces often replicated the patriarchy of the household in their organization. Male overseers replaced parents as supervisors of production and often claimed the right to control the activities of workers while off the job, ostensibly to guard their morals and honor. In many industries, young unmarried women and children predominated among the workers, with hierarchies based on age reinforcing those based on gender.

Along with the affirmation, reinvigoration, and creation of patriarchal structures based on gender, the nineteenth century also saw the beginning of social movements to overthrow these structures. Women's exclusion from formal political rights sparked an international movement for women's rights, which gradually succeeded in lessening husbands' controls over their wives' property and persons and, in the twentieth century, obtained voting rights for women in Europe. Social reformers increasingly called on the state

to intervene or at least get out of the way when fathers or husbands were abusive or unsupportive; divorce laws were slowly liberalized and programs of foster care for children established. Women workers sometimes organized their own unions or otherwise pressured the labor and socialist movements to address their concerns, recognizing that higher wages for women were a more secure avenue to economic independence than was a family wage for men. Governments eventually yielded to pressure by reformers and banned child labor in factories and mines; they were less willing or able to prohibit children working directly for their parents on farms and in the household, though mandatory public schooling acted to lessen this.

This slow dismantling of patriarchal structures was too fast for many people in Europe, and twentieth-century authoritarian regimes in Europe played on people's fears about social change to gain support for their own dictatorial powers. Using explicitly patriarchal imagery, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and Franco portrayed themselves as loving fathers to their countries, who would reward their good children and discipline those who disobeyed. They praised women for their roles as wives and mothers—particularly as mothers, for they were extremely concerned with maintaining or increasing population—and promised a return to the traditional values of the past. Such rhetoric was successful in gaining them mass support and allowing the construction of states dependent on the will of one man to a level unimaginable to early modern patriarchs such as James I. This very concentration of patriarchy was a force for its continued erosion, however, for the totalitarian regimes continued to limit the power of fathers, employers, religious leaders, and other lesser patriarchs, just as the

social reformers whose policies they attacked had recommended. Thus all patriarchal structures other than the state continued to lose authority, a pattern that persisted after the totalitarian leaders died.

Some social historians have seen this pattern persisting in Europe at least until the 1980s, for they view the state welfare programs which developed in most countries of Europe after World War II as state paternalism or patriarchy. Immediately after the war, such programs also promoted patriarchal relations within the family because they were geared toward a male breadwinner–female homemaker model. These programs became more egalitarian in the 1970s under pressure from feminist groups and some political parties, however, and their curtailment because of political changes and economic dislocations in the 1980s has, in fact, increased gender disparities as women decrease their hours of paid work and time for activities beyond the household in order to care for family members. The fact that women remain responsible for a disproportionate share of all domestic tasks provides evidence for analysts who point to the continued power of patriarchy to structure people's lives. They point out, as well, that nationalistic and ethnic-separatist leaders often promote a patriarchal family ideal no different from that advocated by Robert Filmer over three centuries ago. Thus, though the official legal and political privileging of certain types of men over women and other types of men has largely ended in Europe, patriarchy continues to shape relationships, cultural values, and institutions in significant ways. These differ in different parts of Europe, however, and it is difficult to say whether increasing contacts among people within Europe and beyond its borders will serve to shorten or lengthen patriarchy's endurance.

See also Capitalism and Commercialization (volume 2); Gender and Popular Protest (volume 3); The Household; Inheritance; Courtship, Marriage, and Divorce; The Family and the State (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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WOMEN AND FEMININITY



Bonnie Smith

The social experience of European women over the past five hundred years has consisted of productive activity in agriculture, manufacturing and industry, and domestic work. Simultaneously, reproduction and sexuality have also shaped women's lives, complicating their work as producers. Although conditions increasingly differed from eastern to western Europe, growing most divergent in the nineteenth century as industrialization and urbanization accelerated to the west, the intersection of reproduction and production remained a constant determinant of social experience. Cultural values and political systems as expressed in legal codes and religious belief constructed community practices that also influenced social experience. Finally, the march of history included the development of colonization and imperialism, the quickening pace of globalization, and the rise of consumer culture—all affecting the lives of ordinary women in Europe. These developments often helped produce social differences of ethnicity, race, and class, which also served as determinants of women's lives and of their social practices of solidarity and institution-building.

THE RELIGIOUS AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

Western religious belief and legal systems spelled out many of the social and cultural practices that communities and individuals followed. Although elements of Judeo-Christian doctrine proclaimed the dignity of women and femininity, religious leaders generally emphasized male superiority. As inheritors of Eve's sinfulness, women were pronounced disobedient, lustful, and physically foul. Institutionally they had no right to preach or to hold priestly or rabbinical office. The coming of Protestantism in the sixteenth century, while stressing the direct accessibility of God to all souls, nonetheless underscored women's wifely and maternal roles and simultaneously closed down religious orders that had heretofore offered women a realm for their exercise of spiritual and social power.

Religious institutions deemed that women's bodily functions needed special purification and monitoring. Thus, both Christians and Jews set rules for sexual relations, menstruation, childbirth and post-parturition, most of them based on ideas of women's unique filthiness. From these ideas developed the social practices of femininity, many of which remained in effect through the twentieth century.

From 1500 on law codes increasingly privileged men by giving them the bulk of inheritance (especially in land) and by stripping women of all possessions and property upon marriage, transferring ownership (though sometimes just the administration of property) to the husband. Although in some regions married businesswomen had the right to conduct business as if unmarried, in most places there was a law of coverture that merged a wife's interests and property in her husband's. This was part of a general Western trend that systematically impoverished women from young adulthood through old age by transferring wealth to men. By the onset of industrialization early in the nineteenth century modern legal codes were mandating the confiscation of married women's property and extending it to include all wages and other earnings of women. The system was reinforced by laws forbidding women to bring lawsuits, to serve as witnesses in law courts, to exercise full guardianship of their children, or to hold business licenses in their own name. Late in the century reformers, mostly in western Europe, tried to alleviate some of the worst abuses of this legal reallocation of women's wealth in a series of married women's property acts that allowed women ownership of their wages and personal property.

PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Over the past five hundred years women's economic activity has changed dramatically, from a situation in which approximately 90 percent of women were peasants in a predominantly agrarian economy to the beginning of the twenty-first century when the majority

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held service-sector jobs in an advanced industrial and information society. Several factors remained relatively constant, however: Women received lower remuneration whether in food or wages, while their entry into virtually any job category lowered the status and pay for that work; they often had the greatest responsibility for household work and childcare while working for pay; their economic activity generally took place in the context of a gendered division of tasks, although the assignment of any particular job to one sex or the other might vary from country to country or region to region; and finally, many experienced sexual harassment on the job.

In the relatively self-sufficient peasant societies of early modern Europe women tended to household chores like cooking and cared for vegetable gardens, barnyard animals, and dairying. Around towns they sold eggs, cheese, and other produce. Women who were serfs (unfree laborers) owed household and field work to the aristocracy of their locale. At harvest women joined men in cutting, bundling, and gleaning grain. In winter spinning, weaving, and sewing garments replaced outdoor activity.

Townswomen in the early modern period grew more numerous as commercialization, urbanization, and state-formation progressed. Within towns their work included selling in markets (in some cities three-quarters of all market people were women), domestic service, and artisanal activity of many kinds. For the most part guilds banned women from becoming master artisans, but in some crafts such as printing and carpentry, they could take over their husband's business when widowed. Because household and artisanal work was little mechanized, urban homes demanded much arduous labor such as gathering water and fuel. Thus, in early modern France one urban person in twelve was a servant and two-thirds of them were women, as was also the case in early modern Florence. Service likewise provided important employment for young rural women, who constituted two-thirds of farm servants assisting hard-pressed farm families. There was movement back and forth between urban and rural work well into the twentieth century as factory workers returned to their families for the all-important harvest or as underemployed craft workers headed to the countryside in the summer to work in the fields. At the bottom of urban society were slave women, brought by traders to the ports of Spain and other countries where they served as domestics, spinners, and prostitutes. Rural families as well might sell young daughters into prostitution in the early modern period.

Improvements in agriculture, the rise of landlessness (for example with the enclosure system instituted

in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England), urbanization, and the development of widespread trade in goods and agricultural products gradually increased demand for many items, notably textiles. Merchants in towns distributed raw materials for spinning to underemployed women in the countryside. From that time on productive work for pay at home accompanied the rise of manufacturing in a system called protoindustrialization. As domestic industry or outwork became a staple of advanced economies, women at home did an array of tasks from knitting stockings, making straw hats, and polishing buttons to late-twentieth-century outwork involving the production of leather goods and computer data entry. The most emblematic out- or pieceworker was the seamstress, especially prominent from the early nineteenth century on when the need for military uniforms in the Napoleonic wars led to the breakdown of clothing production into its component parts—collars, sleeves, buttonholes, etc.—which were then apportioned to individual outworkers. Because these workers were isolated at home, they were often exploited, with low rates per piece, long working hours in the event of high demand, and seasonal unemployment of up to six months per year. Outwork nonetheless allowed women to coordinate work for pay with childcare and permitted employers to profit from an elastic workforce while minimizing their investment in buildings and equipment.

From the mid-eighteenth century on the new factory system employed women workers. The mule jenny and water frame made practical the mechanization of spinning powered by a central source of energy—a cluster of innovations that brought entire families as well as individuals into the industrial workforce. Where industry hired families, a sexual division of labor held, in which women carded fiber and sometimes tended machines, while men repaired and also ran machines. Young single women worked in factories, their lower wages making them an attractive labor pool for what in its early days was an experimental and risky form of production. Sometimes these workers were housed and boarded (as in the traditional system of domestic service) and factory work could be seasonal, allowing women to return to rural areas for harvests. This was usual in pre-World War I Russia, for example. Unlike piecework, domestic service, or agricultural employment, factory work ran by the clock, paid regular wages, and followed a discipline partly shaped by the needs of the machine. Nonetheless, several traditional conditions remained: a sexual division of labor, lower wages for whatever work women did, and on-the-job sexual harassment. Paying higher wages than domes-

tic service or the nascent service sector, factory work appealed to many women.

Overall, however, industrialization tended to reduce women's opportunities for formal work; this was the case for over a century. The displacement of rural production hit women harder than men. Even in the cities, domestic service outpaced factory work as a source of jobs for women. Developments like laws restricting women's (but not men's) hours of work further reduced demand for women. Most middle-class women did not work formally at all, while many working-class women labored only until marriage. There was some variation—larger numbers of women retained formal employment in France, for example, than in Britain—but the overall pattern was clear. Only in Russia did industrialization coexist with high levels of employment for women, both before and after the Revolution of 1917.

The service sector started to grow in the mid-nineteenth century, becoming the largest employer of women in the last third of the twentieth century. Consisting of retailing, office work, healthcare, librarianship, and other non-blue-collar work, the new sector reflected the growing complexities of management, the rising knowledge-based component of the industrial order, and the need to realize the economy's potential for consumerism. These jobs were said to appeal to women's desire for clean work, and many (such as secretary, bank clerk, and librarian) had been formerly held by men. As women took the rapidly expanding jobs, the positions lost status, pay declined, and the various categories of service work became female ghettos lacking any opportunity for advancement. Simultaneously, professionalization occurred in medicine, university teaching, and the law, and this entailed rigorous training from which women were generally excluded, and licensing, which also tended to disfavor women. These high-paying male service jobs or professions had their low-paying female counterparts—for example, male university professor and female primary school teacher or male physician and female nurse. Service jobs tended to go to young attractive women who lost their posts as they aged or married. Most service positions demanded literacy and numeracy, more accessible with the spread of secondary and university education late in the nineteenth century. The growth of the service sector was accompanied by the elimination of women from the top levels of business management. If some women had run extensive mercantile and industrial firms before the middle of the nineteenth century, thereafter men generally were able to keep women out of executive positions (and in secretarial or clerical ones) even until the early twenty-first century. Nonetheless, a few

women gained wealth or distinction as writers, artists, musicians, poets, editors, and performers. Travel to the colonies and other distant places also brought renown, as athletic feats, wartime heroism, or flights into space did later.

During World Wars I and II some posts opened in the higher paying manufacturing jobs (notably munitions) and in government bureaucracies, expanded at the time to militarize economies. The socialist revolution in Russia in 1917 and eventually the Soviet Union announced an expanded work role for women, especially in the drive to industrialize the USSR after 1928. Although much was made of Soviet women as tractor drivers and factory workers, the same segmentation of the workforce existed as in the rest of Europe. Only the jobs assigned women differed: they served as doctors and sanitation workers, for example, both of these low status, badly paid, and onerous work. After 1945 the Soviet bloc had approximately 90 percent female employment, and the percentage of women in the paid workforce generally expanded across Europe in the twentieth century. There were notable exceptions: Hitler and Mussolini professed to want women out of the workforce, but their policies actually resulted in driving them from good jobs in the professions and civil service to menial and low-paid work such as domestic service. After World War II West Germany prided itself that its women still not hold important jobs in industry and commerce. Mediterranean countries such as Spain also had a lower percentage of employed women, as did the Netherlands, which noticeably kept women from prestigious work like university professorships. By the late twentieth century part-time work was 80 to 90 percent female. As the welfare state contracted to reduce benefits from the 1980s on and as the lower echelons of the entire workforce faced competition because of globalization, more of the European workforce was said to be feminized—that is characterized by lower benefits and pay and a lack of security. Outwork in the growing information technology sector, also lacking benefits, employed an increasing number of women at home.

After the mid-twentieth century the arrival of large numbers of people from the former colonies changed the composition and nature of the female workforce. Since the sixteenth century women had served colonizing societies as slave and forced laborers who performed domestic, agricultural, and sex work for their imperial rulers. Some had come to Europe long before the late twentieth century as servants, free artisans, performers, military aides, students, and travelers. With post-World War II decolonization, immigration swelled, and while not all immigrant women

worked, many did. Most found that however skilled and well-educated they were, they could obtain only menial jobs, among them domestic service or low-level jobs such as janitors, nurses' aides, and sweatshop workers. Second- and third-generation women migrants were often similarly thwarted in finding decent employment, but many worked to ensure that anti-discriminatory legislation (some of it in the form of European Union regulations) helped to provide some kind of employment assistance, especially in reaching higher level service-sector jobs. Nonetheless cultural discrimination and the growing success of racist political leaders beginning in the 1980s often meant harassment at work.

SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTION

The coordination of productive work with the reproductive, domestic, and sexual conduct of society shaped women's lives. Because of the pronounced, though varying, sexual division of labor in the context of a subsistence economy in the early modern period, the majority of the population lived in families and mar-

ried, with marriage and reproduction coordinated to family and societal needs. Arranged marriages occurred as late as the early twentieth century made by parents determined to create agricultural, commercial, or political alliances, usually with economic and lineage interests foremost. In England and northwest and central Europe, women married relatively later than elsewhere with their age at marriage somewhere in their mid-twenties in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In these areas married couples generally lived by themselves or in a household with parents, while in eastern and southeastern Europe family members congregated in large multigenerational families. Women in these households lived in a hierarchical organization of female kin, dominated by the senior woman, although ultimate power lay in the hands of the patriarch. By contrast, married women and their daughters in northwestern Europe enjoyed greater autonomy and opportunity to be enterprising. By the late nineteenth century, urbanization, changes in agriculture, and the development of consumer society allowed more people to live outside marital and extended family relations. These conditions also loos-

ened the grip of the family on marital, sexual, and reproductive behavior. By the late twentieth century even a family of two parents and their children was no longer the norm, as there were more single-parent families, the vast majority headed by women.

From the sixteenth to the twenty-first century several distinct reproductive trends were evident. The span of fertile years increased dramatically because of two phenomena: the falling age of menarche (the onset of menstruation) from fifteen to eighteen years of age in the sixteenth century to thirteen or younger in the twenty-first century and the delay in menopause from around forty to fifty or a bit later. The biological expansion of fertility resulted from improved diet and health. To limit fertility in the early modern period in order to coordinate family size with available resources, late marriage was a common practice. In addition women used a variety of potions and cervical blocks to prevent conception; they also practiced abortion and infanticide when unwanted conception did occur. Nursing children also inhibited conception, as did the social custom of sexual abstinence after childbirth and during nursing. Coitus interruptus was also known. After the mid-nineteenth century condoms (made more practical by the vulcanization of rubber in the 1840s) and the diaphragm (invented and perfected in the second half of the century) contributed to the decline in fertility. The spread of literacy expanded knowledge of other birth control practices, notably the withdrawal method, while scientific understanding of the ovulatory cycle in women allowed for more effective practice of the rhythm method. Abortion nonetheless remained common. In the twentieth century surgical sterilization, the birth control pill, IUD, and morning-after pill became available to European women. In the Soviet bloc, where especially from 1945 to 1989 other forms of birth control were less available than in western Europe, abortion was a major form of birth control. The average woman in the sixteenth century might have raised only two or three children to adulthood because of late age at marriage, a limited number of fertile years, higher infant and child mortality rates, and certain birth control customs. In the twenty-first century women raised even fewer children almost exclusively because of mechanical and chemical forms of family limitation.

In the early modern period reproduction constituted an essential component of femininity, defining what it was to be a woman and encouraging women to try to adopt the social roles of such cultural icons as Mary and Old Testament heroines. Reproduction was also a major anchor of female solidarity, bringing women together around childbirth. Child-

birth was attended by a midwife and occurred in the individual's living quarters with the women of the family or neighborhood playing a major role in the delivery. The midwife and other women were the main repositories of reproductive knowledge. Over the centuries the decline in fertility attenuated the equation of femininity with reproduction not only in the case of individual women but in terms of social knowledge, as professional medicine gradually brought pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare within its social orbit. Late in the nineteenth century 90 percent of births occurred at home; by the twenty-first century more than 90 percent occurred in hospitals and were attended by doctors. Knowledge and practices of childbirth were not necessarily better when controlled by women: midwives could deform or even kill infants in the birthing process, while they also were known to leave mothers permanently injured. Mothers themselves had many practices, such as a fear of cleanliness, considered wholly unwise today. These aspects of femininity and ties of group solidarity around reproduction deteriorated with urbanization, the rise of literacy and spread of public education, and the triumph of birth control. Childcare centers complemented public schools in diminishing the childrearing component of

women's lives, while modern medicine and birth control lessened the bodily damage and pain associated with reproduction and femininity. One ingredient of reproductive femininity—breast-feeding—ran a more erratic course as it went in and out of fashion over the entire five-hundred-year period, with aristocratic and urban working women often putting their children out to wet nurses until the late nineteenth century. An ideological push for breast-feeding in the eighteenth century and scientific understandings of breast-feeding's health benefits in the second half of the twentieth were two elements that brought new, if not enduring, appeal to the practice.

Sexuality first shaped femininity in the religious production of feminine typologies—as either the sinful, voracious, or seductive biblical antiheroines or the biblical models of chaste virgins or reproductive exemplars. Because a subsistence economy demanded reproduction to be well coordinated with productivity, sexuality was sufficiently constrained to ensure replacement of the population within a well-regulated marital system. The legal translation of this exigency was to make women's sexual fidelity an important social norm with deviation punishable by death or imprisonment to the late nineteenth century. Sexual excess was a prerogative only of the nobility in this subsistence society, and noblewomen as well as men could exercise this prerogative. Sexual behaviors and norms were monitored by various community groups to deter premarital sex, sodomy, bestiality, old coupling with the young, and other practices that upset the reproductive system. Often non-heterosexual behavior was ignored so long as the individual functioned within the reproductive, heterosexual system—that is, so long as she married and had children.

With urbanization and the development of an economic surplus, illegitimacy became more common, constituting more than half of all births in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century in many European cities and becoming a widely accepted social practice by the twenty-first century. The breakdown of the heterosexuality-reproduction-marriage triad within the context of urbanization allowed for the public emergence of homosexual couples—for example, Lady Eleanor Butler and Sarah Ponsonby, known as the ladies of Llangollen, in the late eighteenth century. There are many indications of a variety of sexual practices and behaviors for the early modern period, and great discussion over whether those engaged in non-heterosexual behavior had a homosexual or lesbian identity. With the birth control revolution of the late nineteenth century, and the drop in European fertility by half, a group of “new women” emerged who often worked in the service sector, re-

mained single, and set up domestic partnerships with other women. Sexual boundaries were permeable at this time, allowing movement between all-female and heterosexual relationships—the English writers Radclyffe Hall and Mary Renault described this fluidity along with its attendant heartbreak in their novels. Lesbians who lived their sexual identity shaped urban neighborhoods, organizing networks of sociability from at least the mid-nineteenth century. In addition, transvestism has long been an important sociosexual practice, sometimes providing access to male privilege and to partnerships outside social norms (though some maintained that these partnerships with their stereotypically heterosexual appearances were very much within those norms). Some observers believe that despite a greater variety of sexual identification, by the twentieth century there was actually less fluidity. Others disagree, citing the substantial majority of the population living in heterosexual marriages in the early modern period.

WOMEN'S SOCIABILITY AND SOLIDARITY

Patterns of sociability operated within a matrix of economic/class and reproductive/sexual concerns. Agricultural women in the early modern period came together around childbirth and childcare but simultaneously worked together in such activities as quilting or nightly spinning sessions during which social information was transmitted in the form of gossip, news, or storytelling. Marriages were also arranged, courtships begun, and transactions negotiated, as men and boys sometimes stood on the fringes of the nightly session. These also allowed sharing and thus saving light and heat. Because private interior space was limited and possessed few utilities, in villages and cities early modern sociability took place in the streets. Women gathered at water fountains, markets, and laundering spots such as riverbanks. By the beginning of the twentieth century solidarity continued to germinate in urban neighborhoods where women shared information on school policies, welfare programs, markets, and local affairs. Working women's solidarity matured in guilds, church organizations, mutual welfare clubs, and by the late nineteenth century in unions. A variety of unions existed including church-sponsored organizations and those attached to political organizations such as the Social Democratic and Labor parties. Mutual welfare groups and the earlier guilds had often tended to workers in sickness or provided death benefits. Unions sometimes played this role, but they also helped women organize around issues of pay and

working conditions. The period before World War I saw strike activity, some organized by unions, among women workers: the work stoppages by London match-girls in the 1880s, or the Italian agricultural workers in the 1890s, or the protests by anarchist women in Barcelona early in the twentieth century. As the service sector grew, women telegraph operators and teachers also unionized, gaining some gender equity in pay after World War II.

Working women could not always afford the dues for union membership because their wages were lower than men's; nor could they take time from the double burden of home and factory work to attend union functions. So neighborhood bounds often brought activism in times of economic crisis, with working women joining women at home (whether working for pay in the outwork sector or not) in protest. In the eighteenth-century periods of scarcity working-class women launched food riots; market women marched on Versailles during the early months of the French Revolution and captured the royal family; in German cities in 1847 townswomen stormed bakeries and markets to protest the high cost of food; the protests of women everywhere during World War I kept the home front periodically in turmoil, ultimately playing a role in the Russian Revolution of 1917; under the Nazis women staged protests against scarcities, connecting one another through handwritten bulletins full of survival tips. On the whole, however, women's roles in the leading forms of protest declined in the nineteenth century. Men substantially dominated unions and strikes and led in protest voting. The rise of feminism in the late nineteenth century, though more vigorous in places like Britain and Scandinavia than elsewhere in Europe, responded to this context.

Aristocratic and upper-class women's solidarity revolved around different forms of social life. A small group of women participated in the social transformation of early modern European court life during which the certain refinements and rituals of etiquette replaced the crude and violent military style of royalty and the aristocracy. Early modern courts set patterns for behavior, including the establishment of rank and hierarchy, arrangement of marriages, maintenance of kin alliances, and institution of codes for dress and etiquette. As courts came to concentrate on state-building through political and economic mechanisms instead of through military control, women advanced cultural unification with their patronage of the arts and humanistic learning and participated in some of the religious struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in which the social power of the state had a large stake. Using kin connections, notable aristo-

cratic women like the Guise in France advanced the careers of chosen men in their families. Noblewomen outside the courts often lived on isolated estates in early modern Europe, sometimes taking responsibility for the well-being of their families through farm management while their husbands attended to their military, court, and other political activities. They would often have responsibility for the village dwellers' health, for supporting religious institutions, and for educating children. Unlike court women their opportunities for intraclass solidarity would be few. As urbanization and state-building occurred, the nobility came to inhabit towns and cities, though not necessarily central courts, participating more actively in intellectual and social life. Holding entertainments and intellectual discussions in their homes, wealthy women (both aristocratic and upper-class) shifted social and cultural power away from the court center when they ran their salons. Such salons continued to have social, cultural, and political force until World War I, but never so much as during the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment.

In the next centuries, middle- and upper-class women performed works of philanthropy, easing some of the real suffering caused by agricultural change, industrialization, and urbanization. They directed their work toward poor families, particularly in commercial and industrial centers, and made charitable work part of a feminine identity. Based on a new ideology of separate spheres, middle- and upper-class women spent most of their time in the home nurturing and providing a comforting atmosphere, while men forged the new capitalist order or engaged in politics and professional life outside the home. Some critics see the middle-class woman as primarily engaged in fostering adherence to new social rules for cleanliness, propriety, and consumption. The "angel in the house," however, quickly took her nurturing mission to the outside world as a distributor of charitable relief, womanly wisdom, or religious salvation. Although Judeo-Christianity had long mandated concern for the poor, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed the development of male and female benevolent organizations, sometimes tied to religion but also increasingly secular in focus. Women's organizations set up daycare centers and schools for poor children, distributed aid to poor mothers, helped wayward girls and orphans, and helped prostitutes, women inmates, and released female criminals.

These philanthropic organizations often had moral and religious foundations, but by the middle of the nineteenth century women reformers imbibed the secular message of the burgeoning social sciences. The sociological formulations of Auguste Comte, notably

expressed in his ideas about “positivism,” maintained that one could determine the laws by which society functions and then set policy to ameliorate social conditions. Positivism and other social science teachings led women to found schools of domestic science to teach poor women the “laws” of housekeeping, to do statistical surveys of various kinds of women’s work, and to study the working-class household and at the same time try to make it better regulated and more cost-efficient. As factory legislation came to determine the conditions under which women worked, some women reformers started working for the government as inspectors of conditions in the workplace. And, as governments late in the century started national programs to improve the health of the working class, women reformers also moved from private philanthropy to government jobs. Increasingly women’s role in this developing “welfare state” replaced their involvement in personal charity, although never entirely.

Education for these social roles occurred in a variety of places, in the early modern period especially in churches, in the public observance of rituals, and in the everyday productive and familial life of the household. Women taught their daughters the practical skills of a subsistence, agrarian society, while boys usually worked with their fathers. Both sexes learned family norms through observation coupled with additional religious lessons. With the growing importance of scientific, humanistic, social scientific, and technical knowledge, children came to learn not only these topics but sex and civic roles in school. Girls’ education often lagged behind boys’, but in many European countries, governments eager to inculcate civic and scientific values sponsored mandatory public education—often secular. The gap in home education and literacy closed in the nineteenth century, though school curricula did urge domestic duties and loyalties on women. Although wealthy women tutored at home could be intellectually accomplished, it was not until women were admitted to universities in the second half of the nineteenth century that higher education became readily available. By the late twentieth century the single-sex institutions of secondary and higher education had given way to predominantly coeducational high schools and universities. This expansion of education lay behind the emergence of the New Women who entered the service economy and eventually the professions. However, the media, including print media, radio, film, and television, also produced models of normative feminine roles that women could absorb or resist. By the late twentieth century both the media and the pervasive educational system were as influential as the family in the inculcation of feminine norms. Under fascism, Nazism, and commu-

nism an array of social clubs for children and youth also inculcated correct gender norms as part of political education.

Despite this array of institutions for instilling the rules of femininity, women’s behaviors were often deviant or seen as such by communities, churches, and governments. In the early modern period some of the primary deviants were those practicing or said to practice witchcraft. Witches were those who by virtue of a sinful agreement with the Devil committed personal and social harm. Amid periodic outbursts of witchcraft hysteria, women were executed as witches out of proportion to their numbers, although some historians studying local outbreaks of witchcraft hysteria maintain that men and women were accused equally. Urbanization brought more secular crimes such as theft to the fore, much of it committed by poor women stealing anything from firewood to small items from the families for whom they worked. With the rise of department stores, kleptomania was a form of deviance attributed to women. Also in the nineteenth century some of the most spectacular crimes were those of women murderesses, whose acts were interpreted as stemming from a special female pathology originating in the reproductive organs. However, because the crimes of many murderesses involved close relatives, some historians interpret them as rooted in libidinal states—partly love stories—and in gender roles.

At the opposite extreme of femininity and women’s sociability were those women who formed religious communities, whether conventual or informal, under Orthodox or Roman Catholic supervision. Many of these women come from wealthy or noble families. In the late medieval period, as abbesses or leaders of religious communities women held social and even political power. Women religious served social functions by engaging in health care, educational, or economic activities, or by providing spiritual services such as prayer. Some especially talented women religious, Teresa of Ávila for example, wrote meditations on spiritual life and on the social roles of women, often questioning the denigration of their sex. Protestantism saw women’s social role to be within the nuclear family rather than in all-female congregations. Socializing children, including teaching reading and religion, became a fundamental part of these women’s identity. Almost from the beginning, however, Protestantism’s emphasis on the direct relationship of the individual soul with God inspired many women to preach and prophesy even to the point of social and political persecution. Although Jewish women did not undertake this kind of preaching, they were responsible for much of the sociability and ritual in their religion. From this

time to the twenty-first century, however, they experienced incredible persecution at the hands of Christians, peaking with the Nazi genocide but not ending even with the collapse of the Soviet Union, whose anti-Semitic policies continued in the successor and former client states. Historians judge that especially in the Holocaust more women than men experienced what has been called the “social death” inflicted on Jews under Hitler because they did not migrate, staying to care for aged parents, for example. And they were sent in larger numbers than men to the death camps and died there in larger numbers.

From the eighteenth century European society underwent secularization, during which a noticeable dimorphism occurred in religious practice. Women’s participation in religion dramatically outstripped that of men, which is not to say that men stopped being religious. Whether in Protestant or Catholic countries men’s social participation in religion diminished while that of women became strong. As examples the number of women in religious orders far surpassed the

number of men, and spontaneous religious observances, such as pilgrimages and special devotions to new holy women, increased. Although this has led historians to judge that a “feminization of religion” occurred in the modern period, others note that religion remained a prime example of the gender hierarchy at work in social institutions; church hierarchies remained totally male until the late-twentieth century. Nonetheless, religious organizations provided a forum in which women could resist such norms, and in the twentieth century religion became a rallying point for resistance to Soviet rule, in the 1980s and 1990s drawing crowds of hundreds of thousands testifying to religious belief; many of these were women. Finally with the migration of women from foreign colonies, the social practice of religion such as wearing special clothing became a particular bone of contention. For secular leaders, headscarves and other apparel breached the secular social solidarity on which national unity depended.

The social experience of women in Europe over the past five centuries has revolved around certain constants: a gender division of labor; a primacy accorded women’s reproductive activities; the development of social activism and solidarity; a constant practice of varying forms of resistance to norms, whether criminality or innovative styles of living or heterodox sexualities. Simultaneously individual aspects of these social practices have been immensely varied, often differing not only from country to country but from locality to locality. Changes occurred frequently, but the nineteenth century stands out as a period of particular change and tension. Restrictions on political rights tightened and work roles become increasingly circumscribed for women; at the same time more women had access to education, and birthrates declined. An ideology stressing women’s domestic virtue served as an attempt to bring coherence to these contradictory elements. The expansion of political and legal rights and the opening-up of new work roles in the twentieth century relieved some of the tensions. A certain homogenization between men and women has occurred with the development of effective media for the transmission of social norms. Despite the rise of media and mandatory education, there has been a seemingly more rapid change in norms of femininity over the past century and even, some imagine, the development of a genderless society in the Western world and a turn to the disembodied sociability of the Internet in the communications revolution.

See also The Population of Europe: Early Modern Demographic Patterns (volume 2); New Social Movements (volume 3); History of the Family (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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MEN AND MASCULINITY



Peter N. Stearns

The rise of women's history was predicated in part on the claim that most prior history, including social history, had focused on the doings of men. This was of course true. But the success of women's history and the insights it produced have increasingly made it clear that historical attention to men as a gender can be rewarding as well. Indeed, some probing of the nature of masculine standards and behaviors is essential for women's history, lest men become mere stock figures in a story of oppression or glorious liberation.

Men's history has not, to be sure, generated a vast literature as yet, and work on developments in the United States exceeds that devoted to European history. The subject of boyhood, for example, a crucial component of men's history, has yet to find elaborate European treatment. Fatherhood also needs more explicit treatment. Some findings are available, however. In certain cases they derive from more familiar segments of social history. Thus working-class behavior has been partially reinterpreted in light of gender issues, and what by contemporary standards is the highly sexist orientation of many workers has gained attention. Divisions among peasants have gender implications. The split among eighteenth-century Danish peasants, between land-buying peasants and those content to work less hard and drink more involves predominantly male behavior. Histories of crime, punishment, and disease cast light on male behavior and expectations applied to men over the course of recent centuries. The list of connections here is long, and it gains further detail from the discoveries of women's history. Studies of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century witchcraft craze bear on masculinity, for instance. The disproportionate attacks on women as witches, usually (in Europe, as contrasted with New England) by predominantly male accusers, raise obvious questions about the relationship between this phenomenon and larger confusions in male perceptions of women.

Particular focus, in this still-young field, goes to the issues generated for masculinity by the industrial revolution. While "crisis of masculinity," as a concept,

risks being overused (there are two candidate periods in the nineteenth century itself), male standards were called into serious question by industrialization, and a host of compensatory behaviors and rhetoric resulted.

PATTERNS IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE

Early modern Europe was clearly a male-dominated society—what some historians call patriarchal. Most men had clear and fairly traditional ways to find and demonstrate identity. Peasants became fully men when they acquired land of their own and were able to marry, artisans when they had mastered a craft and could set up shop (and, again, marry and sire children). Attitudes toward women could be correspondingly dismissive. A substantial division of labor was assumed. A French peasant proverb argued, "It is the husband who carries the stones, but the wife who makes the house." But lest this seem too benign, another proverb held that "It is easier to replace a wife than a cow." On the death of a spouse, as in most patriarchal societies, widows were hedged with restrictions, lest the property generated by their late husbands be jeopardized, while widowers often remarried quickly. Male superiority extended to emotions. Men could try to argue away bad behavior on grounds of anger, which was too powerful an emotion for women to claim; jealousy, an emotion stemming from a weaker bargaining position, was their best bet.

For the early modern centuries, beyond highlighting dominant patriarchy, three historical issues surface. First is the question of variety. Not all men were the same. In Catholic countries, a few men singled themselves out by holy celibacy, an interesting complication of standard male demonstrations. Homosexuals were officially reproved—Christian culture had become unusually vigorously opposed to homosexuality since the Middle Ages. But some homosexual communities existed in the larger cities like London and Paris. Policing of their activities existed, for example in eighteenth-century Paris, but was not con-

sistently harsh or effective. The extent to which homosexual options or fears figured into the lives of most men is simply not clear.

Variations in social class are more obvious. Aristocrats could indulge a code of male-based honor that was not available for most other men. Maneuvering to protect one's honor, and to extend honor-based controls over wives and daughters, was a vital part of aristocratic masculinity, showing up for example in duels and vendettas. In the Mediterranean, these standards of combative honor extended more widely, affecting even the peasantry and leading among other things to high rates of murder based on revenge. But in other parts of Europe, the distinctions ran strong. Differences between property-owning men and the growing number of landless formed another important distinction. If establishing oneself as peasant owner or artisan master was masculinity's badge, what about the rural laborers and permanent journeymen—many of whom could never marry and, judging by characteristic illegitimacy rates, did not usually sire children?

The second issue bears some relation to the first, and it involves the question of change. For example, the rise of wage laborers, without access to property, from the seventeenth century onward seems to have altered male (and female) sexual and marriage patterns. While a large percentage of men still never married, new marriage forms did allow some family formation and sexual expression for some members of this growing class. Another sign of change resulting from economic shifts involves the clear effort by male journeymen to exclude and vilify women as economic competitors in the crafts. Not only were guilds increasingly closed to women, but journeymen's rituals often gained a distinctly misogynist cast. Men were

reacting to economic threats to established masculine status.

Other kinds of change loom large. The Protestant Reformation, initially itself reflective in part of Martin Luther's relations with his own father, increased the importance both of the family (since celibacy was no longer a special virtue) and of the father within the family. Protestant men often claimed special responsibility for the moral upbringing of children, taking the lead for example in family Bible reading. Stricter paternal discipline may have been part of this picture, particularly between fathers and sons. In terms of images, Protestantism reduced Catholic emphasis on a suffering Christ and on Mary as intermediator, heightening the focus on a stern, paternal God. At the same time, Protestant writings by the seventeenth century urged affection between husband and wife, which may have softened this domestic aspect of patriarchalism in some cases.

A few historians have speculated about another, possibly related, kind of change in male behavior by the seventeenth century. The intensity of male friendships may have declined. As in other societies, traditional European society often featured dramatic instances of tight emotional bonds between two men, as comrades in arms or even fellow workers. Stories about this bond, which was often stronger than that between men and women, and the devotion and sacrifice it could inspire, were readily available. As the European economy became more commercial, however, men increasingly saw themselves as competitors, which limited this kind of boundless affection. The result was a pronounced shift in male relationships, which among other things helped turn men toward the family as their primary source of emotional fulfillment.

The third aspect of early modern history that wins attention involves comparative issues. Was the European version of patriarchal status for men at all distinctive, compared to other patriarchal societies? Christianity imposed some complexities, compared say to Hindu or Confucian (but not Buddhist or Islamic) traditions. Christian theology emphasized women as a prime source of evil, but also insisted that women, like men, had souls and could be saved. The distinctive European-style family that emerged by the early modern centuries has implications as well. Characteristically late marriage tended to emphasize the nuclear family unit. In this situation, husbands and wives may have had to cooperate in work more fully than was true in societies where larger extended families held sway. Despite all the talk of division of labor and female inferiority, then, in practice men and women may have interacted with greater equality and informality (beneath the aristocratic class) than was normally the case. At the same time, the late marriage age gave fathers greater power over sons, who could not normally assume full manhood, demonstrated by marriage, without winning property from their fathers through gift or inheritance. Tensions between adult sons and fathers ran high as a result, at an extreme leading to violence, more normally generating elaborate legal arrangements that would protect aging fathers against economic retaliation by their more vigorous sons once the older men lost the ability to administer their property outright. Exploration of Eu-

ropean masculinity in comparative context is at its infancy, but some possibilities are intriguing.

THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

A number of changes came together for men, particularly in western Europe, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They had diverse implications, some pointing to new opportunities, others dramatically challenging established status. The net result was a significant shift in male self-definitions as well as new relationships between men and women.

Dramatic population growth drove increasing numbers of men from any prospect of property ownership. The growth of landless laborers and the flocking of men to cities, looking for wage work, were the manifest signs of this new pressure. Even when men successfully won a livelihood, the impact on their self-esteem could be considerable. During this period, to put the point simply, many men could not replicate their fathers' version of masculine success, either as peasants or as artisans. One interesting result was an increasing "masculinization" of popular protest. Riots over food shortages, which once linked women and men in joint action, saw men taking increasing roles. This presaged nineteenth-century protest patterns, in which male predominance (as political rioters, union members, and strikers) was increasingly assumed. Another result was a reduction in the authority fathers

had over sons. When there was not enough property to offer as inheritance, sons found the need to listen to their fathers' instructions dramatically reduced—antagonizing the old man made little difference to one's economic prospects.

Enlightenment ideas, pushing toward new kinds of political participation, offered new opportunities for some men. Except for the pioneer feminist writers like Mary Wollstonecraft, when Enlightenment writers spoke of the need to defend freedoms or gain political voice, they assumed they were talking about men. From the French revolution onward to 1900, new political rights and experiences were almost exclusively male.

Then came industrialization. Gradually, urban men were pushed into new roles as factory owners or as businessmen or professionals in an industrial context. The most striking general result, bearing on a variety of social groups, was a reduction of the opportunities men had to interact with children. Work was now located outside the household. Men might compensate to a degree by bringing their sons or nephews into their office or factory, but this did nothing to remedy the lack of time available to spend with infants. Furthermore, the burdens of factory work for young children, or the needs of education for middle-class children, quickly reduced the opportunities for fathers and sons to work together. Some historians have argued that, as a result, father-child relationships dramatically deteriorated. At the very least, they changed.

Women came to be seen as the primary caretakers for children. European culture began an apotheosis of motherhood, to some extent from necessity. Fatherhood was redefined, reducing its qualities of moral mentorship and increasingly emphasizing bread-winning. The good working-class father was the one who consistently supported his wife and children. Whether he spent much time with them or how he related to them emotionally faded in significance. For their part, many men abandoned claims of particular competence, at least with young children. By the end of the nineteenth century many French men claimed to find it perfectly natural that most primary school teachers were now women, for they had qualities that men lacked.

Working-class masculinity was shaped by the nature of work, even apart from the shifts in family life. Many aspects of factory labor were degrading by the customary standards of masculinity. There was no chance, for most, to rise to ownership. Workers would spend their lives not just working for others, but taking detailed instructions from supervisors. Deskilling was another important feature of factory life for many. While some workers could take pride in their ability

to direct machines, most found the loss of personally identifiable skills disconcerting—particularly if they came from an artisanal background. In some industries, like textiles, the lack of clear differentiation between skills for male and for female workers drove home the point that manhood was under attack.

In this context, working-class men developed a partially new and highly gendered culture that provided compensatory identity and pride. Considerable leisure focused on the tavern, where men could join with other men—women were often excluded outright. Tavern culture encouraged demonstrations of male prowess in drinking and, often relatedly, in fighting. This was a tough culture. As Clancy Segal, a British miner, put it in a 1960 autobiography: “The collier regards himself as A Man, in every department of his life. The slightest traces of femininity, of softness . . . of sexual ambiguity, are ruthlessly rooted out, or suppressed.” Learning to be this kind of man was a vital part of growing up male, a target heightened in fact by the absence of fathers from their sons' daily lives.

Part of working-class male culture spilled over into relationships with women. Marriage became more important than ever, if only because the family made new sense in terms of division of labor, with men working, and women providing supplemental income but also taking care of consumer and household chores. But many working-class men (though surely not all) were abusive of women. Violence within the family may have increased as men came home exhausted, sometimes drunk. While rates of beatings may have declined by the later nineteenth century, perhaps because women were forced into greater docility, occasional wife murders remained a problem. In 1850, the typical working-class murder resulted from a barroom brawl, but by 1900, with men spending more time at home, the victim was most often a wife.

Demonstrations of sexual prowess could be part of this new culture. Women who worked in factories, often in partial undress, were often sexual targets. Sexual taunting was part of the factory scene, and though impossible to prove precisely, rape probably increased as well, if only because more young men and women were operating without close parental or community supervision. The vaunted sexual revolution of the late eighteenth century, among working people of both countryside and city, showed particularly in the increased rate of illegitimate births. Historians have debated the gender context for this development. Without question, some individual women found the new freedom to engage in premarital intercourse exhilarating. But it is likely that more of them found it something of a necessity, as a means of trying to win a man, while men found the opportunity to dally with

possibly several women an exciting opportunity to demonstrate masculine prowess—as one German worker, Moritz Bromme, put it, “to become a Don Juan.” Many men waited until a girlfriend became pregnant before committing further, and some never committed at all.

Male workers also strove to limit economic competition from women, a counterpart to their new economic vulnerability and their desire to prove themselves as distinctive breadwinners. Efforts to limit women’s hours of work flowed from a sincere desire to make sure the home could be cared for, but also from a hope that, with limited hours, women would become less desirable as employment targets. Long union struggles over wages frequently invoked the concept of a “family wage,” itself based on the assumption that men should be paid enough to care for the whole family, while the levels of women’s wages mattered little if at all. This was the context in which most early unions and many strikes became exclusively masculine affairs, with women urged to cheer on their husbands and sons. Correspondingly, working-class protest often indulged in the language of masculinity, with strikers insisting to employers that they were acting against conditions “contrary to our manhood.”

Masculinity in the growing middle classes had its own challenges. Here there was property ownership or possession of professional skill, so the problems of demonstrating masculinity were less severe. But successful middle-class masculinity did depend on considerable periods of schooling, which was not clearly a masculine pastime, and then on often-sedentary work that did not automatically reinforce one’s sense of being a man. One reaction was rhetorical: discussions of business life often evoked images of hunting or war. Men were engaged in a survival of the fittest, in which every masculine strength must be mobilized against the possibility of weakness or failure. Another reaction was exclusionary. Women were removed from most business offices. Industrialists themselves noted that, early in the nineteenth century, their wives often did their accounts and helped supervised sales, as had been traditional in business life. But with success this pattern abruptly ended, save in the small shops. Respectable women were pulled out of work, increasingly confined to domestic duties. The masculinity of office work itself was suitably reinforced.

Here too there could be sexual expression. Middle-class men married late, so that they could establish the economic base for the family. Once married, they increasingly faced the need to limit the number of children born and this often had to be accomplished through sexual restraint. Middle-class culture urged men to exercise self-control. Growing concern

about masturbation enforced a discipline on boys. But sexual interests emerged nonetheless. Young men often patronized the growing number of urban prostitutes, and later in the century formed an audience for pornography as well. Sexual coercion of female servants or factory employees was not uncommon. While not applicable to all middle-class men, a sexual double standard undoubtedly developed, with women held to much stricter norms of respectability than were men.

Middle-class men also sought recreational outlets that could demonstrate masculinity. Some adopted aristocratic codes of honor. It was noteworthy that in several European countries, rates of dueling exploded in the later nineteenth century among student populations, which were becoming increasingly middle-class.

Growing interest in sports formed another key middle-class outlet, quickly shared by working-class men. Sports provided an ideal way to train boys to be men in a setting in which actual educational and work skills were not highly gendered. Sports also formed another way to link middle-class attainments with interests of the aristocracy, in contexts such as the great British public schools. The growth of soccer (football) and other sports, initially as opportunities for participation but soon as occasions for vicarious indulgence as spectators, owed much to the needs of middle-class masculinity.

Attitudes toward women reflected gender needs. Middle-class men might concede women’s greater morality (though this was truer in Protestant than in Catholic cultures) as a recognition of some of the ambiguities of their own public lives, but they often also stressed women’s frailty. The Hamburg businessman whose wife frequently fainted in public was not entirely displeased, for it confirmed his superior strength and authority. Arguments about women’s irrationality went far back in western history, but they were trotted out more vigorously in a period in which dependence on education for economic success was growing.

NEW CRISES

Basic patterns of industrial masculinity were clearly established in western Europe by the later nineteenth century. Some have persisted into our own time. Some additional perturbations affected the turn of the century period, introducing a few new factors, while relaxing some earlier pressures. The results point in several directions and invite further analysis.

The rise of feminism reflected some of the earlier constraints on gender relationships, but they provoked additional change. Some men supported feminism, but others found it a new source of threat.

Feminism combined with women's advances in education—which had occurred despite male asides about emotionalism and irrationality—and their halting entry into the professions. For the working class, technological advances allowed women new opportunities in fields such as machine building and printing. In offices, white-blouse workers made interaction with women on the job, if mainly with women as inferiors, a standard part of middle-class work life. For some men, all this added up to an undesirable challenge, which must be bitterly opposed.

All social classes were now involved in new levels of birth control. Some men doubtless welcomed this as a relief to their obligations as breadwinners. Others, however, were frustrated by the new limitation on their ability to demonstrate procreative prowess. Groups of workers particularly associated with masculine imagery, like coal miners, were as a result slower to cut birth rates than the class average. Individual middle-class men were also disoriented by the new limitations of paternity.

Within the middle class, the rise of management employment and the decline of individual entrepreneurship could pose a new challenge to male identity. More middle-class people now worked for others, life-long, than ever before.

Signs of stress surfaced in several areas. Growing male (including boy) interest in military toys and activities may have reflected new needs for male self-expression. Movements like scouting surged as a means to give boys a chance to develop masculine achievement in a world increasingly described by school and female schoolteachers. Slightly later, fascist organizations expressed masculine aggressiveness quite explicitly. Nazi arguments about restoring women to traditional roles and costumes were matched by the jackbooted masculinity of the Party faithful.

New concerns about homosexuality surfaced (and were also mirrored in the Nazi movement). Homosexuality was now scientifically labeled and regarded as a disorder. European and American psychologists highlighted homosexuality as a serious issue, and it became a growing concern for parents and boys alike. To be sure, opportunities for heterosexual expression gradually increased, among other things with the growing availability of birth control devices, but the new anxiety about homosexuality maintained some sense of constraint in this aspect of male life.

In the United States, the turn of the century decades also featured a growing, if halting, interest in new family roles. Time spent at work was declining. While male leisure life remained active, and partly separate from family concerns, many men were spending more time around the home. A downside to this was the increase in certain forms of domestic violence, both in Europe and the United States. But new attention to fathering possibilities was possible as well. In the United States, fathers began to grope for new roles, ultimately emerging with a strong emphasis on being pals with children. This seems not to have been the case in Europe, where the paternal disciplinary role remained stronger, and the friendly sharing of leisure pastimes did not so quickly develop. But how fathers defined their time with children remains unclear in the European case. One interesting straw in the wind: men began to report greater pleasure in daughters than in sons, possibly because girls seemed more emotionally rewarding.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS

The focus on the fundamental reshufflings of nineteenth-century masculinity has overshadowed his-

torically informed evaluations of change and continuity in the twentieth century. Obviously, one key development has involved modification, if not elimination, of some characteristic industrial reactions. Masculinity no longer depends on keeping wives in the home, away from significant work opportunities. Male differentiation and superiority at work and in work rewards remain, but with much narrower margins. Correspondingly, the breadwinner justification for masculinity has been modified, which may mean that men need to seek other family roles. Within the home, also, gender differentiations have become less sharp. Many couples share consumer interests, home repair projects, and family vacations. Low birth rates and widespread use of artificial birth control devices condition male-female sexual relations, more in Europe than in the United States.

Several studies—dealing for example with Germany and with Holland—suggest a shift in men's parental style, dating from the late 1950s, toward a modification of traditional disciplinary authority and a more emotionally relaxed approach to children. This corresponds to the chronology of women's reentry into the labor force. It may correspond also with new concerns about men's health, associating with growing realization of the disproportionate male liability to coronary disease and stroke (this is a connection that has been suggested for the United States).

The rise of white-collar work and the growing public interactions between men and women, from

school to office to leisure site, have produced complex codes of behavior for many men. Manners became more informal, for example in male-female interactions, but this was not the same as complete permissiveness. Men now had to learn more subtle forms of self-control, appropriate to particular situations. A Dutch sociologist studied the rise and nuance of social kissing as one instance of this new pattern. It became appropriate for middle-class men to greet certain women with a kiss, in contrast to the greater restraint and formality of nineteenth-century patterns. But the kiss should also be carefully asexual, demonstrating clear self-control. Knowing the right rules, now that they are less codified, becomes an important part of growing up male from the mid-twentieth century onward.

At the same time, important continuities persisted. They included a tremendous identification with sports and significant divisions in the identity and leisure cultures of middle- and working-class males. Emphasis on women as responsible for beauty continued an older theme as well, though with new particulars as a result of changes in costume and desired body shape. Even amid freer sexual behaviors, men were only half as likely as women, in countries like France, to seek emotional commitment as part of sexual contact; remnants of a double standard reaction thus persist as well. Contemporary masculinity is composed of this complex interplay between recent change and patterns inherited from past adjustments.

See also other articles in this section.

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FEMINISMS



Laura E. Nym Mayhall

Feminism is frequently defined as the collective organization of women on behalf of women. In this respect, feminism serves as a subject of social history. But European feminism, properly understood, engages with intellectual, political, and cultural history as well, for feminism historically has been both political ideology and social movement. The development of feminism coincided with and was part of the global expansion of Europe, the emergence of political liberalism, and the growth of capitalism from the fifteenth century. Feminism, like other systematic critiques and ideologies such as liberalism, has become part of the common discourse of many cultures in the West, but its legacy and inheritance are often confused with contemporary meanings.

While the term “feminism” did not enter usage in Europe until the 1880s, the concept remains useful as a way of thinking about women’s power and political authority since the Renaissance. The historians Tjitske Akkerman and Siep Stuurman have identified three criteria for feminist activity: a critique of misogyny and male superiority, a challenge to the putative naturalness of women’s oppression, and an awareness of gender solidarity and the desire to speak on behalf of women. Drawing upon these guidelines, we can speak of feminist traditions, or feminisms, but must be careful to define those traditions historically, within the context of their time and with reference to other contemporary ideologies and developments.

We have only to look to the ancient Greeks for evidence of a long history of skirmishing between the sexes. Aristophanes’s *Lysistrata*, after all, makes high comedy of this antagonism, positing a scenario where women uphold their respect for life by withholding sex from their men at war. Yet we would be mistaken to see in such gender solidarity the seeds of a feminist consciousness. The texts of the ancients are useful, however, for establishing the extents and limits of the feminist impulse as forged within the European tradition. Through the adoption by early Christians of selected elements of Greek and Roman culture, and the rediscovery of ancient texts by humanists in the

Renaissance, Europeans inherited certain ways of thinking about relations between the sexes, which rooted male superiority in mythology, science, and the law. Only after women had attained levels of education sufficient to leave traces upon the historical record, however, did they register objections to this sexual hierarchy and their subordinate status within it. Modern feminism, therefore, can be traced to the Renaissance, when a few highly educated women protested the deprecation of their sex.

RENAISSANCE FEMINISM, 1400–1688

Renaissance feminism produced a set of cultural discourses, participated in by men and women, about women’s power and authority. A long tradition of discussion of women’s inferiority existed within classical and Christian texts. The Greek philosopher Aristotle argued for a duality of human nature, positing the intrinsic superiority of the active masculine principle over the passive feminine. The inferiority of women relative to men underlay medieval theology, philosophy, and medicine. Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, however, developments in Europe created conditions within which a number of increasingly educated and articulate women would challenge these cultural assertions of women’s inferiority. The Renaissance’s celebration of human potential, and the Protestant Reformation’s elevation of individual spirituality, gave rise to a feminist consciousness. The development of an urban, educated elite created a constituency for the dissemination of these new ideas.

From the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, in what became known as the *querelles des femmes* (disputes about women), the educated daughters of humanists, businessmen, and clergy wrote to counter arguments for female inferiority and subordination to men. Christine de Pisan’s *Livre de la cité des dames* (Book of the city of ladies; 1405) marks the first significant contribution of a woman to this debate. While historians disagree about the precise ori-

osophical and did not involve ordinary women in large numbers. However, as historians have shown, an impressive number of feminist texts were produced between 1400 and 1688, with a predominance of texts by Italian authors in the fifteenth century, and from Britain, France, and the German-speaking lands in the sixteenth century. Thus, for over two hundred years, Renaissance feminism generated vibrant debate about the status of women relative to men.

ENLIGHTENMENT FEMINISM, 1689–1789

New ways of discussing the power and authority of women emerged during the Enlightenment movement that swept all of Europe in the late seventeenth century. Discussion of “women’s nature” took place within the context of a rationalist, scientific discourse; changing conceptions of political obligation; and the worldwide imperial expansion of Europe. Enlightenment feminism represented a veritable explosion of feminist discourse and a shift in argumentation from early critiques of misogyny to specific proposals for freeing women from men’s control. Women participated in Enlightenment feminist discourse in greater numbers as well, as hostesses for intellectual exchange in salons and as authors and readers. The period witnessed dramatic increases in literacy among European women (from 14 to 27 percent in some regions), in the publication of books, periodicals, and tracts by women authors, and in private book ownership.

Revolutions in science and politics and the global expansion of Europe challenged hierarchical assumptions about women’s natural inferiority. Applying the French philosopher René Descartes’s critique of ordinary experience to social life, the Frenchman François Poulain de la Barre argued in the 1670s for a distinction between the sexed body and the unsexed mind. John Locke’s contract theory, which replaced divine authority with that of natural rights, not only limited the power of monarchs, it also established the marital relationship as a voluntary agreement entered into by consenting partners. The expansion of Europe into Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and the New World led to comparative analyses of women across cultures and set enlightened Europe on a mission to civilize the rest of the world. An emerging feminism was part of the gospel.

Enlightenment feminists critiqued three aspects of women’s subordination, proposing alternatives to existing structures. All three expanded the scope of the Enlightenment’s challenge to tradition and to institutions of church and state. First, men and women examined the idea that husbands possessed natural au-

gins of feminism in the early modern period, the aesthetic beauty and analytic rigor of Pizan’s text make it an important point of departure for discussions of European feminism. Pizan (c. 1364–1430) argued that the education and training of women, not their natures, made them inferior to men. She argued for women’s inborn equality with men, based on women’s virtue, a point she illustrated with reference to prominent women from the Bible, fables, and history. Women’s subordination, she asserted, resulted not from women’s natural inferiority but from men’s envy of women’s virtue. Only cultural customs and practices perpetuated women’s position relative to men’s.

A number of European women elaborated upon these arguments, including the French writer Marie de Gournay (1566–1645), the Venetian poet Lucrezia Marinella (1571–1653), and the British playwright Aphra Behn (1640–1689). These early feminists wrote in a variety of genres, each contradicting notions of women’s inferiority inherited from classical authors and Christian texts and arguing that women were fully human, not restricted by their natures or biology. This early feminist movement was largely literary and phil-

thority over their wives. The English writer Mary Astell, the French jurist Montesquieu, and the French novelists Marie-Jeanne Riccoboni and Jeanne-Marie le Prince de Beaumont argued that male dominion in marriage violated natural law and human equality. Second, debate about women's education emerged in response to the French philosophe Jean-Jacques Rousseau's didactic novels of the 1760s, *Émile* and *Julie*, in which Rousseau proposed that the ideal education for women prepared them to serve men. Feminist writers such as Charlotte Nordenflycht in Sweden, Mary Astell in England, and Josefa Amar y Borbón in Spain asserted women's intellectual capacity and their unique moral and maternal qualifications for educating citizens. Third, the controversy over women's political authority gave rise to a quantity of prescriptive literature, in every European context, advising women to be virtuous and obedient, and a less prolific but influential set of texts asserting women's capacity for public office, military service, and voting.

Enlightenment feminism bequeathed a complex legacy to subsequent generations. Largely a cultural and political discourse engaging elite women, it nevertheless gave women access to universal notions of justice, equality, and freedom, while simultaneously emphasizing women's difference from men. Never a large-scale social movement, Enlightenment feminism created a discourse among educated men and women that celebrated women's sexual difference while rejecting traditional notions of sexual hierarchy.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1789–1815

The French Revolution marks a turning point in the modern history of European feminism. The Revolution's political theory engaged directly with the power and authority of women, and for the first time, a wide cultural discourse about women's citizenship emerged in France in which women played a large role. The French Revolution was only part of a wave of democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth century, in the Americas and Europe, in which bourgeois men articulated political grievances that were then extended by some women and men on behalf of women. Nevertheless, the French Revolution left an ambiguous legacy for feminism. The Revolution never fulfilled its promise, for women or men, but women's experience of participation in politics, and the set of rich and controversial texts inherited by the next century, circulated feminist ideas across Europe and indeed around the world.

Between 1789 and 1792 in France, changes in the legal status of women and their practice of active citizenship opened new possibilities for women in po-

litical life. The Revolution introduced legislation endowing women with legal rights unprecedented in Europe, including the right to own property and sign contracts in their own names. Divorce was also legalized for the first time. The expansion of women's civil identities granted them the standing, in name if not in fact, of citizenship. Women then claimed the rights of citizenship through membership in women's revolutionary clubs, formed in Paris as part of the wider club movement of the Revolution, but which eventually emphasized women's emancipation more specifically. In 1791 women addressed the National Assembly on behalf of women's rights as citizens, and in 1792 some women went so far as to claim the natural right of organizing themselves within armed units of the National Guard. On the streets, before the legislature, and in their own organizations, women challenged the Revolution's designation of women as passive—i.e., nonvoting—citizens and claimed for themselves the perquisites of active citizenship. Encouraged by revolutionary leaders in Paris, for a time women's participation in the momentous events of the Revolution promised them a new status as social and political actors.

The French Revolution was not only a social movement, however; it was also a literary and cultural movement. The Revolution inspired a flood of writing across Europe, in every genre, much of which addressed the relationship of women to civil society. Three texts in particular defined the juridical, political, and social aspects of women's condition into the next century. The marquis de Condorcet argued on strictly legal grounds for the inclusion of women in the political process in *On the Admission of Women to the Rights of the City* (1790). In *The Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen* (1791), the French playwright and monarchist Olympe de Gouges revised the revolutionary manifesto of September 1791 to include women, thereby revealing the implicit exclusion of women from the ostensibly universal language of the early Revolution. The English author Mary Wollstonecraft argued, in her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), for the inclusion of women's virtues into social life. All of these texts exemplify the complex legacy of the French Revolution for feminism as women sought to force ostensibly universal definitions of citizenship to include the particularity of women's sexual difference. These texts and others also made analogies between sex and other forms of difference, including race, to demonstrate the reality of the embodiment of rights rather than their purely abstract expression.

Feminist success during the Revolution in appropriating masculine standards and active citizenship

was short-lived, however. The fall of the monarchy in August 1792 and the triumph of the radical Jacobins in May 1793 led to the suppression of women's political clubs and social organizations later that year. By 1804, consolidation of French law under the Napoleonic Code legislated women's subordination, revoking civil rights gained earlier. Nonetheless, the French Revolution, by making the status of women a central component of democratic revolutions, by briefly changing women's status before the law, and by allowing women to act as citizens, left a record against which feminist activity would be measured into the next century.

UTOPIAN FEMINISM, 1815–1850

Utopian feminism developed from within three different social movements of early-nineteenth-century Europe: socialism, evangelical revivals, and democratic and nationalist movements. These strands of utopian feminism grew out of male radical movements, and all appropriated language and imagery from these movements on behalf of women's emancipation. The term "utopian" was one used by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) to contrast their own scientific, materialist understanding of socialism with earlier European movements for social justice. "Utopian" in this context thus refers to a range of early-nineteenth-century movements working toward the radical transformation of society. Utopian feminism marked a movement away from the French Revolution's emphasis upon individual and civil rights, to imagining new forms of social organization, of work and family life, of production and reproduction.

Utopian socialist movements in England and France connected women's oppression to economic and political concerns. Groups of men and women following charismatic leaders devoted themselves to the creation of new social orders based on cooperation, love, and peace. In the 1820s and 1830s, groups of Saint-Simonians, Fourierists, and Owenites grew and thrived in England, France, Egypt, and the Americas, with flowerings in Spain and Italy in the 1840s. Women working within these movements theorized connections between women's sexual subordination and the social and economic oppression of class. They drew analogies between bourgeois marriage, prostitution, and slavery, and they implemented innovative cooperative measures for child care and domestic labor.

Utopian socialist feminists focused upon women's difference from men and upon the social and economic consequences of women's sexual subordi-

nation. Irish Owenists William Thompson and Anna Doyle Wheeler addressed women's sexual repression in relationship to their lack of political representation. In an 1825 manifesto entitled *Appeal of One Half the Human Race, Women, against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to Retain Them in Political and Thence in Civil and Domestic Slavery*, they argued against the notion that women's interests were subsumed under their husbands', countering that women should have equality of political representation. Thompson and Wheeler argued as well for the collectivization and mechanization of labor to aid women in child care and, ultimately, for the abolition of the wage relation through the eradication of private capital.

Evangelical revivals in Europe, both Protestant and Catholic, produced other groupings of utopian feminists. Religious dissenters formed breakaway groups in which men and women developed social and political critiques of women's roles in modern society. These included the Radical Utilitarians in London, Quaker prayer meetings in the United States and Britain, charity organizations in Holland and Switzerland, and Free Protestants and German Catholics in the German-speaking lands. Members of these groups considered new modes of social organization, giving women leadership roles in their communities. Women sat on councils, edited journals, circulated petitions, and worked for adult education. Radical Utilitarians in Britain went so far as to argue for the inclusion of female suffrage on the Chartist platform of demands in the 1840s. Involvement of these evangelical organizations in the international antislavery movement imbued their rhetoric with a vocabulary with which they could discuss domestic relationships; analogies between women's condition and that of chattel slaves frequently characterized their critique of women's position in society. Feminists in subsequent organizations would claim the movement of women on behalf of the abolition of slavery as an important precursor to later feminist activity.

A final grouping of utopian feminists grew out of the democratic and nationalist movements flourishing during the 1848 revolutions in Europe. Working- and middle-class women in the German-speaking lands, in Poland, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, formed political clubs and mobilized around a variety of issues, including the abolition of serfdom and the future emancipation of their nation-states. Women also played a central role in the radical democratic Chartist movement in England. While much of this feminist activity was stimulated by concern for the deplorable social conditions arising out of early industrialization, its focus was upon democratic issues and bridging social distance between women of the middle and

working classes. The failure of the 1848 revolutions to effect real, democratic change signaled the collapse of these feminists' attempts at social and political transformation.

LIBERAL FEMINISM, 1850–1890

By 1850, what contemporaries called “the woman question” had entered mainstream political debate and shaped a range of social and political questions. From the growing political assertiveness of the middle class and the end of cross-class political coalitions after the revolutions of 1848 emerged a feminist movement at midcentury with largely liberal, evangelical Protestant, middle-class proponents and goals. The mid-nineteenth-century movement was the first mass organization of feminism as a social movement, mobilizing thousands of women across Europe in a number of different causes. These middle-class women organized on behalf of women's rights, attacked the subordinate legal status of women, and challenged women's exclusion from higher education and professional employment. They mounted moral reform campaigns against prostitution and felt empowered to speak for other women, exploiting growing European empires abroad for professional development in fields like teaching and medicine.

Liberal feminists across Europe engaged in a variety of efforts at expanding the civil status of women. Reform of the divorce laws and of laws regarding married women's property and custody of children figured prominently in the midcentury movement. Feminists viewed education as a central component of elevating women's status and made the secondary education of girls, and then the university education of young women, a priority of their activism. Educational reform and a demographic situation of “surplus” women at midcentury led to widening expectations of and demands for women's professional opportunities. The period between 1850 and 1920 witnessed a flowering of suffrage campaigns, beginning in Norway in the 1830s, France in the 1840s, and Britain and Sweden in the 1850s. By the turn of the century, European women participated actively in political life at the local level and pressed for inclusion at the national level.

Feminists mobilized also in the realm of social reform, with women's philanthropic work bridging the gap between feminism and bourgeois society. The diagnosis of prostitution as a social problem in the 1860s and 1870s prompted liberal evangelical Protestants in England and Switzerland, and Catholics and freethinkers in Paris, to form the International Abolitionist Federation in Geneva in 1877 for the

eradication of prostitution. Feminists mounted numerous social purity campaigns across Europe, urging an end to the sexual victimization of women and the adoption of a universal and strict moral code among men and women.

Feminists combined these political and moral imperatives in campaigns that simultaneously expanded the roles of middle-class European women in colonial contexts and engaged them as imperial actors. Arguing for the right and obligation of women's participation in the imperial nation, feminists in Germany, Britain, and France sought positions as doctors and teachers in Europe's Asian and African colonies. British feminists based arguments for women's suffrage on the assertion of white women's responsibilities to their less advantaged sisters and brothers of color.

The textual production of liberal feminism exceeded the output of earlier periods. The feminist press, important throughout the nineteenth century for circulating ideas and creating community, flourished in Switzerland, Italy, France, and Britain from the 1860s. Important feminist theorists of this period included the English philosopher John Stuart Mill, whose *Subjection of Women* (1869) analyzed the marital relationship as potentially analogous to both slavery and tyranny and urged the enfranchisement of women as remedy. The French dramatist Ernest Legouvé argued in *Histoire morale des femmes* (The moral history of women; 1849) for the protection of separate but equal spheres in family and social life and for reforms in education and the law on the grounds of women's maternal function.

“NEW WOMEN,” 1890–1918

By the late nineteenth century, the expanding political activism of working- and middle-class women, an increase in the number of women who never married, and a marked decline in the European birthrate fostered cultural anxiety about women's changing roles. New conceptions of women emerged, along with bolder feminist critiques of marriage and women's role within the family. Feminists organized nationally and internationally on behalf of women's political rights in suffrage movements across Europe and the white settler colonies, in defense of women's economic opportunities in socialist organizations, and in support of their sisters at home and abroad. Some national variations continued in the strengths and arguments of feminist movements, for example between countries of Protestant and those of Catholic traditions.

The “New Woman” figured largely as a literary type in the fiction of the 1890s and served as a vehicle

for discussing changing expectations about women. At the heart of the “New Woman” controversy raged a debate about marriage, begun in 1879 with *A Doll’s House*, the Swedish playwright Henrik Ibsen’s shocking portrayal of the spiritual and moral vacuum at the heart of bourgeois marriage. Ibsen’s critique was reiterated by the English suffragist Cicely Hamilton, whose 1909 *Marriage as a Trade* argued that marriage differed from prostitution only in the social approval attached to its status. Concern about the fate of bourgeois marriage was linked to anxieties about the falling birthrate. Since the Franco-Prussian conflict of 1871, European nations had understood military preparedness as a function of the available conscripts. Contemporaries pointed to declining birthrates among bourgeois families, falling most precipitously in France, from twenty-six per thousand in 1870 to twelve per thousand in 1918. Feminists joined the state in proposing maternal endowment as a way to solve the population problem. Feminists in Britain, France, and Italy walked a difficult line as they sought to improve conditions for mothers, protect children, attain state recognition for female work and values, and challenge the exclusive power of fathers over women and children.

While discussion of issues like sexuality and reproduction became more pointed in the feminist and mainstream press, women’s political activism itself

took more extreme forms. Suffrage militancy, most pronounced in Great Britain but emulated around the world, included violence against property and various forms of passive resistance, such as resistance to registration by the census and to payment of taxes. Inspired by August Bebel’s best-selling text, *Die Frau und der Sozialismus* (Woman and socialism; 1879), which argued that women’s oppression, like class oppression, was rooted in historical circumstance and hence could be overcome, working- and lower-middle-class feminists in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia mobilized in ever larger numbers in socialist organizations. And middle-class women throughout Europe discovered new opportunities to act on behalf of the public good through the philanthropic work they pursued in secular and religious organizations. Women’s work on behalf of other women and children gave them valuable managerial experience and created ambiguous zones between home and public life, zones later filled by the activities of welfare states.

The late nineteenth century produced unprecedented international feminist cooperation. The formation of transnational feminist organizations was spurred by the continuing expansion of Europe into Africa and the Indian subcontinent and by the desire of European women to speak for women of color. European feminists, however, cast their efforts in universalist language as the creation of a global sisterhood.

To name but the largest of these organizations, feminists organized to gain women's rights around the world in the International Council of Women (1888) and the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (1904), and in opposition to war in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (1915). Many of these organizations expanded beyond their original mandates in the years following World War I, gradually becoming more inclusive and less hierarchical.

FEMINISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 1918–1968

In the years following World Wars I and II, feminism in Europe was framed within the context of maternity as women struggled to reconcile their roles as wives and mothers with a desire for political and economic independence. Women negotiated the meanings of motherhood against a backdrop of tremendous loss and anxiety—about the continuation of democracy after World War I, and the future of Europe after World War II. The loss of life experienced by European nations during the World War I gave impetus to postwar concern about the birthrate, while the emerging disciplines of psychology and sexology encouraged the development of heterosexual companionate marriage. Feminists continued their campaigns to expand the democratic franchise to include women. Historians have seen this period as one of relative decline for feminist activity, but the quantity of research demonstrates the extent to which feminist organizations and institutions were maintained and developed.

In the period between the wars, feminists across Europe argued that women's economic dependence upon men contributed to women's lack of employment opportunities and the devaluation in status of women's unwaged labor in the home. Campaigns for both equal employment opportunities and family endowment benefits for mothers and children emerged from this analysis. Much feminist activity of the interwar years was devoted to fighting new restrictions on married women's work and to expanding the range of possibilities for women's professional development. A major shift in marital relations became apparent with the success of Marie Stopes's 1918 best-seller, *Married Love: A New Contribution to the Solution of Sex Difficulties*, which sold 200,000 copies in its first two weeks, and a million by 1939. Stopes set as a goal the births of only happy, healthy, and desired children. She viewed birth control as a means to improve maternal health and advocated contraceptive use only for married women. Stopes opened numerous birth control clinics in Britain. Similar work was done in France

after World War II by the Association Maternité Heureuse (Happy motherhood association), which led the fight to reform a 1920 law banning contraception. Feminists in these years approached the question of contraception as a women's health issue rather than a question of rights. Companionate marriage, mutually pleasurable sexual relations, and controlled fertility, while becoming part of feminist thinking for the first time, were not beliefs widely held by feminists, and would not become so until the years following World War II.

The most influential feminist text published during these years was Simone de Beauvoir's *Le deuxième sexe* (*The Second Sex*; 1949). Beauvoir took on women's oppression within the private sphere, critiquing the limitations of marriage, the family, and housework in women's lives. The influence of *The Second Sex*, however, was felt only in the generation of women coming of age during the next phase of feminism, the women's liberation movement. Far more characteristic of the period was *Women's Two Roles*

(1956), an attempt by Alva Myrdal and Viola Klein to reconcile women's waged work and familial responsibilities.

THE WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND AFTER, 1968–1980

The resurgence of feminist activity around the world in the late 1960s is frequently referred to as “second wave feminism,” implicitly connecting late-twentieth-century feminism with earlier campaigns for women's political rights, most notably for the suffrage. The women's liberation movement, however, grew from the specific historical circumstances of Europe after World War II. Stagnation of male wages and European commitment to fair competition for men and women in the workforce made waged labor for women increasingly desirable and, indeed, in many cases imperative. The development of a contraceptive pill gave women control over their fertility and meant that for the first time in human history, women could decide to have sexual relations without unwanted pregnancies. The women's liberation movement was part of a number of protest movements known as the “New Left,” which emerged in the period of affluence characteristic of European nations after 1960. Women active in organizations of students, trade unionists, and antiwar activists experienced great frustration with men's inability to recognize women's sexual oppression as an issue.

The women's liberation movement utilized consciousness-raising as a means of educating women about the political dimensions of their own experiences. “The personal is political,” the movement's slogan, exemplified feminists' attempt to raise awareness of the political significance of issues traditionally deemed outside of politics, such as sexuality and reproduction. Feminists fought for access to contraception and abortion, against the sexual victimization of women, and for an end to discrimination against lesbians in the arenas of employment, health care, and child custody. Ecofeminism explicitly linked women's condition to that of the earth, with large numbers of women belonging to and supporting the Green Party in Germany and protesting the United States' cruise missile installation at Greenham Common in England.

By 1980, feminism had entered mainstream European culture and had become a familiar concept in most countries. In the 1980s more than half a million women in West Germany, France, and Italy marched in favor of abortion rights. The United Nations declared the years from 1975 to 1985 the decade of women, sponsoring conferences in Mexico City, Co-

penhagen, and Nairobi, where the public visibility of women's issues and networks of activists brought women's condition before the world. And in Germany by the end of the decade, abortion rights became a significant issue in negotiations over national unification.

This phase of feminist activity implemented forms of protest used by other New Left movements, including spontaneous demonstrations. More organized campaigns, such as the “Reclaim the Night” marches in England and West Germany in 1977 and Italy in 1978, drew attention to the effect of violence against women upon their personal freedom. Feminists also engaged in acts of civil disobedience, as in the 1972 open letter to the French press signed by three hundred women, attesting to their procurement of illegal abortions. The women's liberation movement largely sought change peacefully, with notable exceptions like the Italian group *Rivolta Femminile*, which argued that feminism and pacifism were not synonymous. Like other feminist movements before it, the women's liberation movement produced its own journals, magazines, books, and celebrities. And like earlier movements, this phase of feminism generated not only critiques of women's oppression but also alternative ways of analyzing the world. The creation of entirely new fields of inquiry, like women's studies in the university curriculum, is perhaps its most lasting legacy.

The women's liberation movement generated a number of texts analyzing the sexual and psychological dimensions of women's oppression and emancipation. Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* (1970) explored male supremacy in European and American literature. In *Woman's Estate* (1971), Juliet Mitchell continued the tradition of linking women's subordination to other forms of oppression, such as class. Feminists also grappled with the oppression of race, particularly within feminism itself. The 1981 essay by the black British feminist Hazel Carby, “White Woman Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood,” challenged the implicit whiteness of feminist theory. French and Italian feminists, in particular, celebrated women's sexual difference in texts such as *Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un* (This sex which is not one; 1977), by the French philosopher and linguist Luce Irigaray.

POSTFEMINISM?

Opponents and proponents of contemporary feminism alike frequently characterize the 1980s and 1990s as postfeminist. With the institutionalization of women's studies in universities, attainment of voting rights for European women, reform of divorce

and marriage laws, and the integration of feminist activists into mainstream politics, many people believe that feminism has reached the end of its trajectory as a protest movement. Yet many men and women claiming to be feminists would see in the term “post-feminism” a less sanguine assessment of feminism’s accomplishments. Many feminists profess disillusionment with the gains women have made, pointing to the double burden of waged and household labor borne by most women of the working and middle classes. Women’s roles in families, they argue, remain largely unchanged, with few men willingly accepting equal domestic responsibilities. Feminists also claim dissatisfaction with women’s gains in the political sphere, pointing to the relatively small number of female representatives in the political process at both local and national levels in every European country. Finally, tensions exist between feminists in first- and

third-world countries over cultural practices such as clitoridectomy and veiling, leading to a disavowal by many of the notion of a global sisterhood, for European feminists a unifying conceit since the mid-nineteenth century.

Yet perhaps the measure of feminism’s accomplishments should be the extent to which it has become part of common public discourse. While many women claim not to be feminists, they simultaneously assert their right to the independence, equal rights, and sexual pleasure feminists have claimed for themselves over preceding generations. If the history of feminism can instruct us as to its future, then we can predict that a tension will remain always within feminism between women’s sexual difference and their desire for equality, and feminism will reinvent itself continually in relationship to contemporary ideologies, current issues, and national concerns.

See also The Family and the State; Sexual “Revolutions” (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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GENDER AND WORK



Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks

All cultures from prehistoric times to the present have drawn distinctions between men's work and women's work. In some societies these distinctions are so strong that individuals who are morphologically male but who do tasks normally assigned to females are regarded as members of a third gender. The link between gender and work has not been this strong in European culture, but economic institutions, technological developments, cultural norms, religious and intellectual currents, and popular beliefs have all played a part in shaping clear distinctions between men's and women's work. These distinctions have, in turn, determined how tasks would be valued, with tasks normally done by men valued more highly than those done by women, even if they took the same amount of time, skill, and effort. In fact, the very definition of "work" has often been gender-biased, with men's tasks defined as "work" while women's have been defined as "assisting," "helping out," or "housework." Some tasks done by women, such as the care and nurturing of family members, have generally not been regarded as "work" at all.

In the same way that gender history in general grew out of women's history, the study of gender and work developed primarily out of studies on women's work. Economic and labor historians whose primary focus was work were often more attentive to class differences than to those of gender; their focus was the male work experience, but its gendered nature was not analyzed or explored. This is beginning to change, but there are still many more studies that focus explicitly on women's work than on men's work defined as such. Historians themselves have thus contributed to the notion that men's work is simply "work," whereas women's is "women's work," but this is slowly changing as more scholars recognize and highlight the gendered nature of their subjects.

Gender hierarchies in the division of labor have survived massive economic changes in Europe over the last five hundred years, with new occupations valued—and paid—according to whether they were done primarily by men or women. This resiliency has

led social historians into several different lines of investigation. One of these has been to search for the reasons why women's labor has been undervalued, a question historians began investigating as early as the 1920s. A second line of inquiry, which began in the 1970s, explores how economic changes, such as the development of commercial capitalism, industrial production, or the global labor market, were experienced differently by men and women. A third and more recent line of inquiry reverses the second, and investigates how gender hierarchies (or sometimes more pointedly stated, how patriarchy) shaped economic developments. In all of these areas, historians are increasingly cognizant not only of work itself but also of the meaning of work for individuals and for society at large. Thus they use as their sources economic data such as employment statistics, census records, business reports, union records, and account books, and also more subjective records such as letters, diaries, newspaper editorials, advertisements, and personal memoirs.

Of these three lines of inquiry, the second has received the most attention, with many studies tracing how men's and women's work changed as the result of new production methods, labor structures, kinds of technology, or market organization. Many of these studies focus on a single village, city, or region, and it is clear that any generalizations across all of Europe must be made very carefully. Innovations were often made in one area decades or even centuries after they were made in another, during which time other things that shaped gender structures, such as religious ideas, public schooling, political structures, or the availability of contraceptives, had also changed. The impact of a similar change in work patterns might therefore be very different in one region from another, depending on when it was introduced. Local studies have made clear that along with this chronological difference, other axes of difference such as social class, race, marital status, and age must be taken into account when exploring changes and continuities in the gender division of labor or the meaning of work.

EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1450–1750)

The period from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century in Europe is often described economically as “the rise of capitalism,” during which larger and more complex forms of economic organization developed in some parts of Europe, leading them to become economically dominant. These new forms changed the relationship between gender and work somewhat, but capitalism did not generally alter the existing form of economic organization, which was based on the household.

The household economy and wage labor in rural areas. During the Middle Ages, the household became the basic unit of production in most parts of Europe, a process some social historians label the “familialization of labor.” The central work unit was the marital couple, joined by their children when they became old enough to work. Though in some parts of southern and eastern Europe extended families lived together, in central and northern Europe couples generally set up independent households upon marrying, making the production unit also a residential unit.

Until at least the eighteenth century, and even later in many parts of Europe, the vast majority of people lived in the countryside, producing agricultural products for their own use or that of their landlords, or for local and international markets. Serf households on the vast estates of eastern Europe produced almost completely for an export market. Agricultural tasks were highly, but not completely, gender specific, though exactly which tasks were regarded as female and which as male varied widely throughout Europe. These gender divisions were partly the result of physical differences, with men generally doing tasks that required a great deal of upper-body strength, such as cutting grain with a scythe; they were partly the result of women’s greater responsibility for child care, so that women stayed closer to the house and carried out tasks that could be more easily interrupted for nursing or tending children; and they were partly the result of cultural beliefs, so that women in parts of Norway, for example, sowed all grain because people felt this would ensure a bigger harvest. Whatever their source, gender divisions meant that the proper functioning of a rural household required at least one adult male and one adult female. Remarriage after the death of a spouse was very fast, and few people remained permanently unmarried, although widows faced far more barriers than widowers. These households sometimes hired young people as live-in servants or occasional laborers during harvest, and by the early seventeenth century some rural households lived by their labor alone.

Technological changes and new types of crops introduced during the early modern period altered the tasks that people did, but did not end the gender division of labor or the basic household unit of production. During the seventeenth century, for example, turnips and other root crops were increasingly grown in many parts of Europe and then fed to animals in stalls. Both tasks were very labor-intensive and generally done by women, who had traditionally taken care of the animals housed with the family. Women also tended and harvested crops that provided raw materials for manufactured products, such as flax, hemp, silk, and plants for dye. As animal products and these more specialized crops became more significant parts of the rural economy in some areas of Europe, agricultural labor became feminized. This increased the demand for female wage laborers in the countryside, although most women (and men) continued to work as part of a household economy and did not receive separate wages for their work.

In some rural areas, commodities other than agricultural ones were a significant part of the economy, and their extraction or production shaped the gender division of labor. In Portugal, Norway, and Galicia (the northwest part of Spain), adult men were away fishing during the summer months, leaving women and children responsible for all crop and stock raising. Visitors from other parts of Europe often commented that women in these areas were more independent and forceful than was appropriate, that they boasted how little they needed men to survive. Men from these areas sometimes agreed with their critical visitors, but sometimes praised the strength and self-reliance of their women. Strength was also an important quality for women who lived in mining areas, where they carried ore, wood, and salt; sorted and washed ore; and prepared charcoal briquets for use in smelting. Most of the work underground was carried out by adult men in the preindustrial period, though the mining companies that hired them assumed they would be assisted by their families. Men were paid per basket for ore, but it was expected that this ore would be broken apart and washed, jobs that their wives, sisters, and children did, though they did not receive separate wages for their work.

Mining provides one example of how the familial organization of production carried over into the world of wage labor in rural areas, and in some parts of Europe cloth production followed a similar path. Beginning in the fifteenth century, urban investors hired rural households or individuals to produce wool, linen, and later cotton thread or cloth (or cloth that was a mixture of these), paying the household or individual only for the labor and retaining

ownership of the raw materials and in some cases the tools and machinery used. Historians use several different terms to describe this development—domestic or cottage industry, the “putting-out” system, or protoindustrialization—and stress that it continued as a significant form of economic organization in more isolated rural areas such as Switzerland or Slovakia well into the nineteenth century or even the twentieth. In parts of Europe where whole households were hired, protoindustrialization strengthened the familial organization of production but broke down gender divisions, as men, women, and children who were old enough all worked at the same tasks. In other parts of Europe, individuals were hired separately during slack times in the agricultural cycle; because such periods often differed for men and women, this hiring was gender specific, and wages were paid directly to the individual rather than to the family as a whole. Thus in these areas the familial organization of production was disrupted, but gender divisions were maintained.

Individual wages did not mean equal wages; women’s wages for agricultural or manufacturing tasks were generally about one-half to two-thirds those of men for the same or similar tasks. Women’s wages appear to have been determined more by custom than the market, for they fluctuated much less than men’s both over the life cycle and with shifts in the economy. Even during periods of rising wages, women’s wages rose more slowly. Married women’s wages were also

less than those of widows for the same task, a wage structure based on the idea that married women needed less because they had a husband to support them, not on an evaluation of the quality of their work. The difference between male and female wages meant that in areas where wage labor was available for both sexes, men generally worked for wages while women concentrated on subsistence farming and maintaining the household.

Historians disagree about the effects of wage labor and protoindustrialization on gender structures. Some analysts find that as more young people, especially women, received wages, they gained power within the family and were more able to make independent decisions about such issues as their marital partner or place of residence. A few even see wage labor as the reason European illegitimacy rates rose in the eighteenth century as young women felt more free to search for sexual satisfaction and love. Others note that women often turned over their wages to male family members, or had no right to them at all, as was the case for married women in some parts of Europe, whose wages legally belonged to their husbands; thus a woman’s income was rarely her own to spend as she pleased. There has been much less discussion of the effects of gender structures on protoindustrialization, but some studies are emerging which suggest that investors often chose areas in which there was significant female seasonal unemployment when they were developing cotton or linen production.

Households, guilds, and capitalism in urban areas. The familialization of labor was not simply a rural phenomenon in medieval Europe, but also occurred in urban areas. Most goods were produced in household workshops, with all stages of production, from the purchase of raw materials and tools to selling the finished product, carried out by members of the household, and the goods produced traded either within that particular city or regionally. Urban households often included individuals who were not family members—servants, apprentices, journeymen—but at their core in most parts of Europe was a single marital couple and its children.

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, urban producers of certain products began to form craft guilds in many cities to organize and regulate production. There were a few all-female guilds in cities such as Cologne, Paris, and Rouen, with highly specialized economies, but in general the guilds were male organizations and followed the male life cycle. One became an apprentice at puberty, became a journeyman four to ten years later, traveled around learning from a number of masters, then settled down, married, opened one's own shop, and worked at the same craft full-time until one died or got too old to work any longer. This process presupposed that one would be free to travel (something that was more difficult for women than men), that on marriage one would acquire a wife as an assistant, and that pregnancy, childbirth, or child rearing would never interfere with one's labor. Transitions between these stages were marked by ceremonies, and master craftsmen were formally inscribed in guild registers and took part in governing the guild. By the late fifteenth century, journeymen in some parts of Europe began to define their interests as distinct from and often antithetical to those of the masters, and to form their own guilds; these, too, had elaborate rituals reinforcing group identity and loyalty.

Women fit into guilds much more informally. Masters' wives, daughters, and domestic servants worked in guild shops or sold the goods produced in them, and masters' widows ran them briefly after their husbands' deaths, but women's ability to work was never officially recognized and usually depended not on their own training but on their relationship with a guild master. Even this informal participation was challenged in the early modern period, and the only women allowed to continue working were those who could convince political authorities that they would otherwise need public welfare. Both craft and journeymen's guilds supported prohibitions on female labor, as maintaining an all-male shop became a matter of honor and status as well as a way to limit com-

petition for jobs. Women were also excluded from certain occupations because they were barred from attending universities or professional academies. Occupations seeking to improve their status regularly banned women as a mark of growing professionalism. The decline of women in the crafts was a major development on the eve of industrialization.

The masculine nature of high-status work played an important role in determining class distinctions. Whereas in the Middle Ages middle-class women worked alongside their husbands, by the seventeenth century changing notions of bourgeois respectability meant that such women concentrated on domestic tasks, on purchasing and caring for the increased number of consumer goods that were a mark of class status. Shopping and housework could be very labor-intensive and physically demanding, but they were not defined as "work." Increasingly anything a woman did within her home, including work for which she was paid or which supported the family, such as taking in boarders or doing laundry, was regarded as reproductive rather than productive, as housekeeping or helping out rather than work. No matter how much of her day she spent on tasks to support the household, a bourgeois woman did not "work."

The gendered meaning of work affected not only middle-class urban residents but lower-class ones as well. Domestic industry—particularly in cloth production—expanded in many cities as well as the countryside in the early modern period, with households and individuals hired to do one specific stage of production. Those stages regarded as "women's work," such as spinning and carding, were paid less than those regarded as "men's work," such as weaving. Spinners' wages were kept low by employers seeking to reduce the costs of their products and by the number of women seeking employment in spinning as other occupations were closed to them. Employers and government officials seeking to increase production and exports also justified low wages by asserting that spinning was simply a substitute for poor relief or a stopgap employment until women found a man to support them. They also argued that keeping wages low would prevent unmarried spinners from being able to live on their own, and would force them to live in proper, male-headed households where their activities could be more easily controlled.

As the growth of domestic industry created more opportunities for wage labor, and economic changes such as enclosure (the fencing of land previously available for common use) drove more people to migrate in search of work, political authorities became increasingly concerned with what they termed "masterless persons," those without a fixed place of

residence and under no one's control. They regarded the household as the smallest unit of social control, and aimed to have everyone under the authority of a responsible household head, preferably male. These efforts were sometimes directed specifically against women, for whom wandering was a mark of sexual looseness rather than an occupational stage as it was for journeymen. In Germany and France, laws were passed that forbade unmarried women to move into cities, required widows to move in with one of their male children, and obliged unmarried women to move in with a male relative or employer; in England city officials could force any unmarried woman between the ages of twelve and forty to become a servant. Such laws, combined with the fact that men had a broader range of occupations open to them, led to a gradual feminization of domestic service. In the seventeenth century, about 60 percent of the servants identified in some urban censuses were female; by the nineteenth century, 90 percent of the domestic servants in England were female.

Along with production and domestic service, early modern cities offered a range of other occupations for men and women, most of which had their own gender hierarchies. Health care was undertaken by male physicians, barber-surgeons, and apothecaries, along with female midwives, hospital workers, and informally trained medical practitioners. Urban commercial life comprised long-distance merchants who brought in luxuries such as spices and precious metals or necessities such as grain from far away; regional merchants who handled commodities such as wool and cloth; local wholesale traders; and market vendors who sold food, alcoholic beverages, clothing, and household items. The top of this range was almost all male, for women controlled less wealth and were barred by social constraints or law from traveling or conducting business independently. Women did invest in commercial ventures and later in joint-stock companies, however, and they predominated at the bottom of the range as local retail vendors. Although economic historians discussing the rise of capitalism and the market economy in this period have primarily focused on male capitalist investors, bankers, and wholesale merchants, female retail traders, pawnbrokers, and moneylenders shared their capitalist values. Such women developed a strong work identity, and often played a significant role in urban disturbances, from bread riots to the French Revolution.

For the very poorest city dwellers, gender was a less significant shaper of occupational life than was poverty. Some historians ruefully term this an "equality of misery," and note that it was true for very poor rural residents as well. People with no property, skills,



WOMEN AND SPINNING

No occupation has been gendered female in Europe as clearly as spinning. When English peasants in the fourteenth century wished to describe the lack of social classes at the beginning of human history, they sang: "When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?" Women of all social classes were expected to spin, from those in city jails or municipal brothels (between customers) to the highly educated elite. King James I of England's reaction to a young woman presented at court who could speak and write Greek, Hebrew, and Latin was "But can she spin?" The female branch of a family was often termed the "distaff" side, after the staff used to hold flax or wool in spinning before the invention of the spinning wheel, and commentators wishing to describe the ultimate breakdown in the expected gender division of labor in areas of protoindustrialization noted that men were spinning.

Spinning was the bottleneck in cloth production, for preindustrial techniques of production necessitated at least twenty carders and spinners per weaver, so authorities developed a number of schemes to encourage more spinning. They attached spinning rooms to orphanages, awarded prizes to women who spun the most, made loans easier for those who agreed to spin, set up spinning schools for poor children. They did not use what would probably have been the most effective method—paying higher wages—as they worried this would promote greater independence in young women and allow them to live on their own rather than in a male-headed household. Declining opportunities for women in other occupations did lead more of them into spinning, however, and by the seventeenth century unmarried women in England all came to be called "spinsters." The equivalent male term, "bachelor," did not come from the world of work, but from feudalism: a "knight bachelor" was a member of the lowest order of knights, who served a higher noble.

or family connections did any type of small job they could; hired by the day or the job, they put together an "economy of makeshifts," in which survival was very dependent on the price of bread. They traveled to rural areas during harvest time, repaired city walls and fortifications, and carried messages and packages

from place to place. Women (and in some cities, men) might combine such work with occasional prostitution, and a few of these made selling sex a full-time occupation. Until the sixteenth century, most cities had an official municipal brothel in which prostitution was fully legitimate; these were closed in some cities of Europe with the moral fervor of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations, though in others prostitution was simply regulated rather than criminalized.

MODERN EUROPE (1750–2000)

Historians have traditionally regarded the development of industrial capitalism in Europe as one of the world's most significant events, one of the very few economic developments to warrant the term "revolution." The impact of industrialism on men and women was not uniform, however, but varied, particularly for women, according to such factors as age and marital status. Developments of the twentieth century, such as the growth of information technology and policies of state welfare, were similarly complex in their effects.

Change and continuity in the industrial economy. The earliest studies of women's work saw the growth of industrial capitalism as a dramatic break, transforming the household organization of production, in which the home and workplace were united, into a factory organization, in which they were separate. This narrative was modified somewhat during the 1990s, as historians paid more attention both to earlier changes, such as agricultural wage labor and domestic production, and to continuities in industrial economies, such as women's continued responsibility for housework, which has given them a "second shift" of work until today in most of Europe.

Some of the gendered processes first identified by historians of industrialism are now recognized as having occurred earlier as well. Historians of the industrial period have pointed to the de-skilling of certain occupations, in which jobs that had traditionally been done by men were made more monotonous with the addition of machinery and so were redefined and given to women, with a dramatic drop in status and pay; secretarial work, weaving, and shoemaking are prominent examples of this. They have noted that notions of "skilled" and "unskilled" work are often, in fact, gender divisions, with women excluded from certain jobs, such as glass cutting, because they were judged clumsy or "unskilled," yet those same women made lace, a job that required an even higher level of dexterity and con-

centration than glass cutting. This link between gender and "skill" had actually begun in the preindustrial period, though in these cases the addition of machinery often made jobs "male" instead of "female." Both brewing and stocking knitting, for example, were transformed into male-dominated occupations in some parts of Europe. When knitting frames and new brewing methods were introduced, men began to argue that they were so complicated women could never use them; in reality they made brewing and knitting faster and increased the opportunities for profit. Women were limited to small-scale brewing and knitting primarily for their own family's use.

Links between gender and "skill" have continued in the postindustrial economy. Using a typewriter was gendered female in the early twentieth century, but working with computers has been gendered male and accompanied by an increase in pay and status. This regendering of work on a keyboard has been accomplished by associating computers with mathematics and machinery, fields viewed as masculine, which girls have been discouraged from studying. Advertisements in computer magazines often portray women at the keyboard only if they are emphasizing how easy a computer system is to use.

There are thus significant continuities from the preindustrial to the industrial (and postindustrial) period in the links between gender and work, but industrialism also brought change. Factories brought new forms of work discipline in which overseers replaced parents as supervisors of production, machines concentrated in large numbers determined the pace of work, production was split into many small stages, and work was not easily combined with domestic or agricultural tasks. All of these changes made it difficult for adult women to combine factory work with their family responsibilities, so that factory work was the province of men, younger unmarried women, and children. Existing wage scales and notions of the value of women's work as compared to men's meant that young women were often the first to be hired as factories opened, particularly in cloth production, because they could be hired more cheaply. Tasks that were regarded as more highly skilled or supervisory were reserved for men. Certain industries that developed slightly later, such as steel, also came to be regarded as "men's work," so that the industrial labor market was segmented by gender both within factories and across industries.

Though the work women did in factories was often very similar to that done in household workshops, it was also more visible, and became a topic of public discussion in the nineteenth century. Politicians and social commentators debated the propriety

of young women working alongside or being supervised by men who were not their relatives, a debate fueled by instances of rape and sexual exploitation in the factories. Intermixing of the sexes at the workplace was described as leading to “immorality,” hasty marriages, and increased illegitimacy, and female factory workers were often charged with having dubious sexual morals. Such fears led to further segmentation of the labor market by gender, as women—or their families—chose sex-segregated workplaces, which were viewed as more “respectable.” Concerns about morality shaped the work opportunities even for those needing public support. City and parish authorities often set up small endowments for poor children to learn a trade; while boys were apprenticed widely, girls were increasingly limited to such things as the making of hats or mantuas (ladies’ loose robes, usually worn over other clothing), trades generally regarded as “genteel.”

Sex-segregated workplaces could only go so far in controlling morality, however, and an even better solution, in the minds of many commentators, was for women to avoid paid employment entirely. Middle-class authors, male and female, extolled the virtues of women remaining home to care for their husbands and children, arguing that motherhood and not wage labor was women’s “natural” calling and a full-time occupation. Economic as well as moral concerns played a role in these debates, for male workers also opposed women in the factories because their lower wages drove all wages down. The labor organizations that developed in the nineteenth century often argued in favor of a “family wage,” that is, wages high enough to allow married male workers to support their families so that their wives could concentrate on domestic tasks and not work outside the home. Laws

were passed, as in England in 1847, limiting the hours of work for women in the factories, but not those of men, a differentiation that would limit women’s desirability as workers.

Both full-time motherhood and a “family wage” were only an ideal, of course, because in actuality most working-class families survived only by the labor of both spouses and the older children. Older daughters—and less often, sons—often gave part of their wages to their parents even when they lived apart from them, and married women took in boarders or did laundry and piecework at home in order to make ends meet. However, these domestic activities rarely showed up in the new statistical measures such as gross national product, which governments devised in the nineteenth century, because they were defined as “housekeeping” and thus not really work. According to the German industrial code of 1869, women who spun, washed, ironed, or knitted in their own homes were not considered workers (and thus not eligible for pensions), even though they worked for wages, while male shoemakers and tailors who worked in their own homes were. The invention of the sewing machine in the late nineteenth century probably increased the number of women and children who supported their families with such home work, though statistics are hard to obtain, as such work was not counted as a full-time occupation even if it was undertaken ten hours a day, as it often was.

The labor organizations that developed in Europe during the nineteenth century varied in their gender politics. In Great Britain, labor unions organized primarily along craft lines and, like the earlier craft guilds, often opposed women’s labor as dishonoring or cheapening their craft. Many British unions specifically limited membership to men, which led to the formation of a few all-women’s unions. On the Continent, labor unions generally organized along industrial lines and had closer connections with socialist and other left-wing political parties. This made them slightly more open to including women members, particularly as some socialist parties, such as those in Germany, began to advocate greater political and legal rights for women. Still, socialist party policies were often ambivalent, supporting women’s right to work while recruiting women as wives and mothers, not workers, into the parties. In general, however, women made up a much smaller share of union membership than they did of the work force, though they often participated with men in strikes, demonstrations, and protests for better conditions, even if they were not members.

Industrialization was an uneven process; many areas remained primarily agricultural until well into the twentieth century, with mechanized farming

methods adopted only slowly. Particularly after the advent of large-scale steel production, the opportunities for men in industry pulled male workers out of agriculture. Women made up a larger percentage of the agricultural work force of both France and Germany in 1910 than they had fifty years earlier. As they had in the preindustrial period, both men and women in rural areas often engaged in domestic production alongside farming, processing raw materials such as flax for linen or finishing goods such as cloth, which had been made in a factory.

Notions of propriety and appropriate gender roles shaped the work lives of middle-class Europeans perhaps even more than working-class ones. Universities were open only to male students until the last half of the nineteenth century (or later in some countries), when pressure from social reformers led to the slow admission of a few female students; thus women could not enter occupations that required university training, including medicine and law. Positions within growing government bureaucracies were similarly limited to men, though middle-class women did involve themselves on a volunteer basis with causes of social reform such as child labor laws or the improvement of conditions in hospitals. Such activities were acceptable because they were seen as an extension of women's caring activities in the home, though they also led women to call for better access to professional training and ultimately led to paid labor in occupations such as social work and teaching. The expansion of primary and secondary schools in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created new jobs for women; judgments about the relative value of female and male labor shaped wages in teaching, making young women the cheapest option. In teaching as well as factory work, supervisory positions were reserved for men, a situation that continues in many parts of Europe today.

At the same time that teaching expanded, changes in communications technology and the distribution of goods also created new types of jobs for women as secretaries, postal clerks, telegraph and telephone operators, and department store clerks. Because such occupations required serving customers or assisting supervisors, they came to be viewed as especially appropriate for young women, who were hired for their appearance and pleasing demeanor as well as their abilities. In some areas women who held these positions were fired if they married or planned to marry—men in similar positions were not—or if they became too old. Open discrimination by age or marital status continued in some “female” service occupations until the 1970s, with flight attendants being the best-known example.

War and state welfare in the twentieth century.

The links between gender and work in the twentieth century were shaped to a greater extent than earlier by military developments and state policies. The advent of “total war” introduced the phenomenon of full economic mobilization in the two world wars. The state's role in economic organization grew dramatically in the twentieth century, partly as a result of total warfare and partly in response to economic crises like the Great Depression. During World War I, government propaganda campaigns combined with improved wages encouraged women to enter the paid labor force to replace men who were fighting. The granting of female suffrage in many countries right after the war was in part thanks for women's work as nurses and munitions workers. Though the demobilization of men once the war was over led to women being fired or encouraged to quit, the enormous losses among soldiers in the war also made it impossible to return completely to prewar patterns. The lack of men in some countries, especially Germany, meant that more women would remain single and thus in the labor force their whole lives. Throughout Europe, between one-fourth and one-third of the total paid labor force was female after the war.

Trends in work patterns during the 1920s and 1930s continued those that had begun in the nineteenth century, with a few new twists. Both men and women left agriculture for industry, though women fled farms faster than men, as they could earn relatively more in the city. (Female agricultural laborers earned about 50 percent of the male wage in the interwar period, while female industrial workers earned 60 to 70 percent of the male wage; rural workers were rarely covered by policies such as maternity leave, which were guaranteed to women in industry in many European countries by the 1920s.) As industries changed, the gender segmentation within them did as well. Growing chemical and electrical industries often produced standardized parts on assembly lines, with female workers supervised by male foremen. Many of the women in these industries came from declining textile and clothing factories, but there was often a perception that women were “taking men's jobs.” This sentiment was heightened during the Great Depression of the late 1920s and 1930s, and women who married routinely lost their jobs. Vast numbers of men also became unemployed during the period, of course, though it is difficult to make comparisons based on gender because women's work had often not been measured in the first place, and married women were excluded from unemployment benefits in many countries, so they never applied and thus were not counted among the unemployed. Labor organizations contin-

ued to be ambivalent toward women, at times encouraging their inclusion or separate women's unions, but more often opposing women's work and trivializing women's issues. Women were harder to organize than men, as their wages were often too low to pay union dues, their family responsibilities prevented their attending union meetings, and they had been socialized to view their work as temporary and not to challenge male authorities.

In many countries of Europe, the 1920s and 1930s saw the development of authoritarian dictatorships, which transformed ideas about women's "natural" role as wives and mothers into government policies promoting maternity and reproduction. In the Soviet Union, this exaltation of motherhood was accompanied by measures that encouraged women's labor, as married women—except for the wives of high-level Communist Party and business leaders—were also expected to engage in productive work outside the home. Women's literacy rose from 43 to 82 percent between 1926 and 1939, and women formed a significant share of the technical, scientific, and industrial labor force. In Fascist Italy, working women were denounced as taking jobs away from men, and work was celebrated in vigorous propaganda campaigns as inherently masculine. Despite this rhetoric, women continued to make up an increasing part of the paid labor force in industry and government bureaucracy. Only in Nazi Germany was mobilization for war accomplished without increasing women's participa-

tion in the labor force, a situation made possible only by the Nazi regime's drafting of nearly 8 million forced and slave laborers—most of them male—from occupied countries.

World War II brought a feminization of the industrial and agricultural labor force in England and France similar to that of World War I, and in all of Europe there were attempts after the war to return to what was perceived as "normalcy," with male breadwinners responsible for supporting women and children. These attempts no longer included outright bans on women's work, however, and they were less successful in Europe than in the United States. Women's labor force participation rose during the 1950s and 1960s, though educational and training programs leading to higher-paying jobs were often still limited to men. Gradually during the 1970s through the 1990s access to education and jobs previously limited to men was opened to women, though most employed women continued to be concentrated in lower-paying service jobs such as office work, child care, hairdressing, and cleaning (dubbed the "pink collar ghetto"), so that women's average full-time earnings remained about two-thirds those of men. (Sweden was the most egalitarian country in Europe, with female wages about 90 percent of male in 1985.)

Relying on statistics about the paid labor force for understanding gender divisions of labor in the twentieth century is misleading for a number of reasons, however. Women often predominated in the

“underground” or “gray market” economy in many areas, selling commodities and services—including prostitution—on a small scale as they had for centuries. Most of these transactions were intentionally unrecorded to avoid taxes and do not form part of official statistical measures, but are the only way people survived. Such work “off the books” was an important part of many European economies; estimates from Italy judge that the unrecorded exchange of goods and services probably equaled that of the official economy after World War II.

Evaluating the gender division of labor must also take unpaid work within the household into account. Even in areas in which women made up more than half of the full-time labor force outside the household, such as the Soviet Union, women continued to do almost all of the household tasks. In the Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe, shortages in foodstuffs and household goods such as soap meant that women had to spend hours each day (after their paid workday was done) standing in lines; because of this “second shift,” women were not free to attend Communist Party meetings or do extra work on the job in order to be promoted. This situation did not change when communism ended in Eastern Europe in 1989, though more women had time to spend in lines because they were more likely than men to be unemployed, a result of economic restructuring and of the resurgence of a domestic ideology encouraging women to leave the workforce. The time needed to obtain basic consumer goods was much shorter in

Western Europe so that the second shift was less onerous, but it was no less gender specific; even in relatively egalitarian Sweden, women who worked full-time spent at least twice as long on household tasks as men, and even longer if there were children in the house. (See figure 1.) This situation led some feminists in the 1970s to advocate “wages for housework,” while others opposed this idea as reinforcing an unfair gender division of labor.

During the 1950s through the 1980s, most of the countries of Europe promoted social programs in which the burdens of poverty, unemployment, sickness, old age, and child rearing would be shared by the state. Such state welfare programs were initially geared toward a male breadwinner and female homemaker model, with women in some countries receiving family allowances if they had children and unemployment compensation and other benefits limited to full-time (and thus more likely male) workers. Under pressure from feminist groups and some political parties, these policies became more egalitarian in the 1970s, with benefits extended to part-time workers and paid parental leave or shortened hours available for both fathers and mothers. Such policies have not changed the actual work situation in most parts of Europe, however; men in the 1990s continued to be much less likely to take parental leave or a shortened workweek than women, and women far less likely than men to be found among labor or business leaders.

Economic dislocations and the rise of neoconservative political leadership in the 1980s led to cut-

backs in social provisions and healthcare in many countries, in what has been described as an “assault on the welfare state.” This trend has pushed much responsibility for care back onto the family, or, more accurately, onto the women in families, which further increases the likelihood that women work part- rather than full-time. Statistics bear this out: according to a study by Eurostat, women made up 41.4 percent of the paid labor force in the twelve countries of the European Union in 1995, but they made up 80 percent of the part-time labor force. Employers often favor part-time or temporary workers, as it allows them to be more flexible and pay little or no health insurance or other benefits. Many of these employees work from their own homes rather than in factories, as computer and communications technology allows a very decentralized workforce. Like the domestic production of much earlier centuries, such work is often paid by the piece rather than the hour, which allows for greater flexibility but also greater exploitation, as there is no limitation of the workday. Because it can be combined with minding children and cooking, home production is often favored by women; such work includes data processing and other forms of computerized office work, but also more traditional jobs such as making gloves or shoes, for the sewing machine continues to be an effective tool of decentralization.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the relationship between gender and work in Europe is far more affected by developments and events outside of Europe than ever before, as Europe becomes simply one player in a global economy. Workers from outside Europe, particularly from former colonial possessions, bring their own cultural values about proper gender relations with them when they migrate in, altering what is viewed as appropriate work for men or women. Companies from outside Europe, especially from Japan, structure the workforces in their Euro-

pean factories along gender and ethnic lines, with European women clustered at the lowest levels, European men in the middle, and Japanese men at the top. European companies choose to build factories and invest outside of Europe, where labor costs are much less, supporting what are often extremely exploitative situations involving the work of women and children. It is difficult to predict where these trends will lead, and also too early to discern what the effects of the movement within Europe toward economic and political unity will be. It is clear, however, that gender will continue to structure work in Europe, and that changing work patterns will also alter gender roles.

See also Gender Theory (volume 1); Capitalism and Commercialization; Proto-industrialization; The Industrial Revolutions; The Welfare State (volume 2); Servants; Prostitution (volume 3); Preindustrial Manufacturing; Factory Work; Middle-Class Work (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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GENDER AND EDUCATION



Linda L. Clark

Gender, like social class, economic realities, religious background, and national origins, long affected Europeans' access to education and the content of instruction, formal and informal. Indeed, widely accepted notions about differences between men's and women's psychological and physical characteristics and about the relationship of gender differences to appropriate social roles, for which education prepared the young, predated the Renaissance and Reformation. As one English author observed in 1913, "our educational institutions and practices descend from Greece." Aristotle, like many later theorists, defined the family as the basic unit of society and assigned leadership of the family and civic society to men, grounding the separation of gender roles and women's formal exclusion from public life in notions about men's intellectual, moral, and physical superiority. Xenophon's pronouncements on women's household roles were also still disseminated by some late nineteenth-century educators. Judeo-Christian biblical texts likewise provided rationales for female subordination to men, dating from Eve's punishment for leading Adam to sin. Although Christianity offered messages about the spiritual equality of the sexes, as well as of the rich and poor, the apostle Paul enjoined women to remain silent in the public space of the church. Biblical and Aristotelian gender polarities, combined in Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologia* (1266), continued to figure in the pedagogical recommendations of Renaissance humanists in Italy and northern Europe.

EDUCATION, GENDER, AND SOCIAL STATUS IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE

The best-known Renaissance writings on the value of a classical education addressed male social and political elites, and typically treated female education as a secondary concern. Nonetheless, Plato's call for educating both men and women of the elite "guardian" class, the imagined leaders of his ideal Republic, sup-

plied one precedent for advice dispensed by Baldassare Castiglione and Thomas More, among others. Already in 1405 Christine de Pisan, daughter of an Italian doctor employed by the French court, had regretted women's inferior education in her *Book of the City of Ladies*. Perhaps the first woman in European history to earn a living solely from her pen, she turned to writing once widowed with three children, and she recognized literacy's potential value for women in similar financial straits. Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier* (1528), a widely translated guide to comportment in a court, recommended that women receive much of the same instruction in letters and arts as men but also assumed different uses for this learning, men's knowledge serving to impress princely employers while women's learning enhanced the ability to orchestrate social gatherings. A badge of social distinction, instruction in Latin and Greek long remained central to the education of upper-class European men and, eventually, of the middle classes, who aspired to emulate aristocrats' tastes and later to supplant their political dominance. Long before nineteenth- and twentieth-century debates about whether a classical education was suitable preparation for men's careers in commerce and industry, secular and religious spokesmen questioned whether such learning was necessary or even morally appropriate for women.

Furthermore, well into the twentieth century many Europeans assumed that a rigorous academic education did not suit children of the lower or popular classes, either because it lacked practical value for their work lives (which often began as early as age seven or eight) or because it could expose them to ideas possibly threatening to the established social order. The intertwined variables of class and gender, as well as political, religious, economic, and demographic realities, thus influenced both elite and popular education from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. For both sexes, access to education was determined by the goals of religious institutions and governments, as well as by the growth of commercial and industrial economies wherein literacy in the vernacular proved more

useful than it was in traditional agrarian societies. Not surprisingly, both men and women in urban areas often attained much higher literacy rates than their rural counterparts, long before most European states made primary education compulsory during the later nine-

teenth century, Prussia having led the way a century earlier.

Although families' demand for schooling often preceded laws mandating it, some states approached mass or universal literacy sooner than others. Protes-

tant emphasis on Bible reading to deepen piety also furthered literacy for both sexes, and Counter-Reformation competition between Catholics and Protestants spurred popular literacy in some French regions. The Catholic schools of Christian doctrine in sixteenth-century Italian cities likewise taught reading and writing as an aid to learning the fundamentals of faith: boys and girls were instructed in separate churches on Sundays by lay and religious men and women. However, in other areas where religious rivalry was lacking, as in Spain, Counter-Reformation bans of the 1550s on printing, selling, or owning vernacular editions of the Bible reinforced negative attitudes toward reading printed matter, and religious culture remained oral, visual, and social. Moralists long worried that literacy would expose the “weaker sex” to ideas encouraging immoral acts, such as writing love letters.

The dovetailing of political and religious goals could produce the most dramatic literacy statistics for both women and men. Against a backdrop of Protestant Pietism, the Prussian king Frederick William I made primary education compulsory in 1717, as did Frederick the Great, whose 1763 decree envisioned eliminating school fees for the poor. Despite uneven compliance, especially in rural areas, by 1800 perhaps three-fourths of Prussian men and half the women were literate, as compared to 68 percent of men and 43 percent of women in Protestant England. In France on the eve of the Revolution of 1789, women were also noticeably less literate than men (27 percent, as compared to 47 percent), and revolutionary leaders soon announced the goal of universal primary education for both sexes, considering that it would prepare men to exercise their new rights as citizens and enable women to transmit the values of the new political culture to their children. During the Revolution, however, other concerns took priority, and the educational goal was not attained.

Before the nineteenth-century expansion of public primary schooling, privileged girls and young women often received instruction from private tutors and governesses, while boys and young men of comparable background increasingly progressed from private lessons to schools. On the Continent, Jesuit schools for boys were the most numerous category of advanced primary and secondary schools in many Catholic countries, and they specialized in training future social and political elites. Less privileged girls learned much of a practical nature from their mothers or other female relatives, and some briefly attended day schools. Parisian records for elementary schools (*petites écoles*) in the 1620s indicate the existence of at least 42 teachers, 20 of them priests and 20 women

(5 of them married). In Catholic lands, nuns from orders like the Ursulines and Sisters of Charity also ran boarding or day schools for girls. Although these schools served a range of social groups, individual institutions often appealed to a particular class or segregated pupils according to social origins. Separation of the sexes was the norm in elite education and in many larger or city schools for the humbler classes, but by 1632 the Czech exile Jan Amos Comenius had provided a rationale for coeducation.

Apart from national and regional studies, historians have examined particular schools, such as Saint-Cyr, opened in 1686 and inspired by François de Fénelon’s and Mme de Maintenon’s interest in not only preparing French upper-class girls to manage complex households but also diverting them from the worldly salon society of Louis XIV’s reign. Maintenon thus wanted to exclude history and geography from the Saint-Cyr curriculum, which became the model for Russia’s Smolny Institute for Noble Girls, founded in St. Petersburg in 1764, three decades after the launching of a school to prepare young noblemen to become army officers. Instruction in religion, good manners and morals, foreign languages, music, and dancing marked the Smolny curriculum, which was soon copied in a parallel school for nonnoble girls, who would not, however, study architecture and genealogy. After an inspection in 1783 reported that most Smolny teaching was in French, Russian received greater emphasis, and lessons on child rearing were prescribed. Austria created a school for army officers’ daughters in 1775 and another for civil servants’ daughters in 1786, both institutions preparing their charges to become governesses if they should need to work.

A more varied clientele benefited from girls’ schooling in late eighteenth-century Paris. There were places for about one out of every five Parisian girls in schools mostly subsidized by the Catholic Church, and nearly 90 percent of seats in day schools were occupied by daughters of artisans and merchants, noble girls being somewhat more likely to attend boarding schools. Empress Catherine the Great’s 1786 education statute furthered her emphasis on westernization of Russia’s elites, envisioning an urban network of secondary and coeducational primary schools that would be free and open to all the nonserf classes but not addressing rural education. In 1800 Russian boys in school outnumbered girls by a ratio of ten to one, and, as in other countries where public schooling was free before it was compulsory, aristocratic and middle-class youngsters often benefited more than poorer groups. At the same time, nobles reluctant to have their children mix with other social classes in

public schools also resorted to private boarding schools.

The first French public postprimary schools for girls were the Legion of Honor institutions founded in 1807 by Napoleon and intended largely for the daughters of army officers. Initially headed by Mme Jeanne Campan (formerly in the employ of the deposed Bourbon dynasty), Legion of Honor schooling was the task of three institutions, stratified along lines of social class. The curriculum did not match the academic rigor of the *lycées*, the elite public secondary schools for males also created by Napoleon, and so it did not prepare girls for study in universities or the newer *grandes écoles* for training engineers and scholars. Nonetheless, many Legion of Honor girls needed to work and often became teachers, thus countering Napoleon's much quoted assumptions about women's domestic destiny and intellectual inferiority.

Such assumptions had also been central to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's famed pedagogical treatise *Emile* (1762), which enjoined mothers to provide children with emotional nurturing and to breast-feed infants instead of hiring wet nurses. Interpreted today as indicating the development during the Enlightenment of a new and more positive phase in the history of childhood, *Emile* was also a critique of aristocratic and bourgeois women's participation in eighteenth-century salons. Many women readers thought that Rousseau's emphasis on the contribution of mothering to children's development enhanced appreciation of feminine roles, but Catherine the Great preferred

Fénelon's educational treatise. Certainly Catherine's public role was not one that most French revolutionary leaders found suitable for women, for they denounced the meddling in Old Regime affairs by Queen Marie-Antoinette and aristocratic women and in 1793 formally closed women revolutionaries' political clubs.

PRIMARY SCHOOLING IN THE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

During the nineteenth century primary schooling expanded considerably. There was demand from families alert to its possible economic value for both girls and boys, and governments wanted a training ground for an informed and law-abiding citizenry. At the same time, the Catholic Church, alarmed that anticlerical men increasingly avoided churchgoing in such countries as France and Italy, advocated religious schooling and the presence of religious orders in public as well as private school classrooms, hoping that nuns' education of girls would maintain the church's influence in family life. Jewish communities had traditionally attached more importance to men's than to women's education, but as legal restrictions on Jewish minorities were removed, rabbis worried about Judaism's survival in societies where assimilation was possible and so also emphasized women's role in preserving Jewish identity. Where political and religious considerations

had limited impact on educational policy or parental choices and where economic development was slow, as in Spain, the push for primary education lagged behind other parts of Europe and was tied particularly to demand in growing urban areas. In 1860, 65 percent of Spanish men and 86 percent of women were illiterate, and in 1900 that was still true for 56 percent of men and nearly 72 percent of women.

England allowed local school districts to make primary education compulsory in 1870 but did not guarantee free schooling until 1891, whereas both free and compulsory schooling figured in the French primary education laws of 1881–1882, sponsored by the new, democratic Third Republic (1870–1940) and education minister Jules Ferry. By the time of the Ferry Laws, the great majority of French school-age children of both sexes already received some primary schooling, but the improved training of teachers and curricular reform enhanced the quality of much instruction. Before the political drive for universal education, 30 percent of English bridegrooms and 45 percent of brides in 1850 could not sign the marriage register, as was also true in 1854 for 31 percent of French grooms and 46 percent of brides. By 1900 only 5 to 6 percent of French spouses could not sign, and in England in 1913, that was true for only 1 percent of either sex. When German unification was completed in 1871, the kingdom of Prussia was close to achieving universal literacy (90 percent of men, 85 percent of women), although Catholics' illiteracy rates were twice as high as Protestants' rates. Italy lagged in comparison. Piedmont's Casati Law of 1859, extended to the rest of the newly unified Italy in 1861, formally organized public education and created normal schools for women, and the 1877 Coppino Law made three years of schooling compulsory for both sexes. Yet many communities did not adequately fund free schooling, and some families were resistant. In 1861, 78 percent of Italians were illiterate, and nearly half remained so in 1901, when regional rates varied from a low in Piedmont in the industrializing north—14 percent of males, 21 percent of females—to a high in remote Sicily, with 65 percent of males and 77 percent of females.

French and Italian educational reform also had a pronounced anticlerical dimension, partly linked to the governments' concern about the influence of Catholic education on women's beliefs and political leanings. In France anticlericalism reflected the continuing combat between republicans and Catholic monarchists. Accordingly, republicans secularized the public school curriculum and replaced religious teachers with lay men and women. The latter change had greater impact on girls' schools because lay male

teachers had long been more numerous in boys' schools than teaching brothers, whereas the number of nuns teaching in public schools had risen under the terms of the Falloux Law of 1850. In the new Italian state, unified between 1860 and 1870, anticlerical education policies were a response to the antagonism of Pope Pius IX and his successors, who opposed the demise of the independent Papal States. Count Camillo di Cavour, prime minister of Piedmont and architect of Italian unification, had ended religious orders' role in public schools, and 1877 legislation removed religion lessons, not returned to the state curriculum until the Fascist era. In Spain, however, the brief moment of liberal distancing from the church, due to the Carlist rebellion against Queen Isabella II, was soon replaced by an accommodation epitomized by the 1857 Moyano Law, which mandated religious lessons in public schools, allowed clerical inspection, and was not altered until the Second Republic (1931–1939) imposed the secularizing policies that the Franco dictatorship subsequently discarded.

In imperial Russia, gender differences in schooling and literacy also long complemented rural/urban differences and were influenced by the Orthodox Church as well. In 1897, 64 percent of urban males and 70 percent of females aged nine and older were literate, as compared to 35 percent of males and only 13 percent of females in rural areas. Peasants themselves evidently initiated the first major push for expanding rural primary education, immediately after the 1861 emancipation of serfs. During the 1890s, when social turmoil accompanied protracted famine, local government councils and the Orthodox Church assumed more control over schools, as did the central government after the 1905 revolution. Although perhaps half of all school-age children received some education by 1914, gender and geographical differences persisted: 75 percent of urban boys and 59 percent of girls attended school, but the respective rural figures were 58 percent and 24 percent. These lags have been attributed not only to a large rural population's failure to see economic value in literacy, especially for girls, but also to Russian Orthodoxy's fear that knowledge of Western science and languages would divert people from religion.

The expansion of schooling, public and private, enlarged the market for textbooks and other curricular materials, and much school literature contained messages that reinforced both social class distinctions and gender norms. In the wake of the French Revolution, anxious European elites had expressed new interest in the need to educate mothers, the first educators of young children and thus the first purveyors of social values. Like conservative elites, liberals and progres-

sives endorsed tailoring educational content to gender, for women were formally excluded from the political rights for male citizens introduced by the Revolution of 1789 and later nineteenth-century European revolutions or voting reforms.

French primary school textbooks for both sexes emphasized the virtues of hard work and respect for authority and also discouraged expectations of upward social mobility. Third Republic textbooks for girls' schools maintained the emphasis on women's domestic and maternal roles familiar in the texts of the July Monarchy (1830–1848) and Second Empire (1852–1870). Typical female role models were nurturing and gentle but also watchful of the behavior of their children and husbands. Good housekeeping was presented as a way to divert men from cafés and cabarets, and some textbooks presumed that a loving and dutiful wife could dissuade a working-class husband from participating in disruptive strikes. One 1892 textbook was relatively unusual because its central woman character not only survived but also prospered in the world of work, rising from humble seamstress to successful proprietor of a Paris dressmaking establishment. Lest that example inspire unrealistic ambitions, a preface by a former education minister cautioned readers that the odds were a hundred to one that they would remain workers.

An 1878 Spanish textbook authored by an archbishop's sister depicted Queen Isabella I as not only pious and intelligent but also dedicated to sewing shirts for her husband, King Ferdinand. Comparable differences in gender attributes and roles appeared in pedagogical materials used by the states in imperial Germany, although there the greater prevalence of coeducation also minimized the insertion of specifically feminine images. Nonetheless, the curriculum in the last two grades of Berlin's elementary schools for girls devoted four hours less per week to math and science than did the boys' curriculum, so that girls could devote four hours to sewing and needlework.

Unlike the United States, where coeducation in schools largely taught by women was the prevailing model by the mid-nineteenth century, many European countries still favored separate boys' and girls' schools, provided that economic resources were available. If public finances were limited, as in many rural areas, the maintenance of boys' schools or small one-room coeducational schools took priority. The anticlerical Third Republic followed Catholic tradition by mandating separate primary schools for boys and girls in communes with a population of at least five hundred, but in Protestant Prussia, imperial Germany's largest state, two-thirds of all elementary school classes—particularly in rural areas—were mixed in

1906. Coeducation was also typical in another schooling option that emerged during the first half of the century: the infant or nursery school, first created in cities and towns where many mothers worked outside the home. While boys' schools had male teachers, women teachers were usually, but not necessarily, preferred for girls' schools and nursery schools, and their growing numbers reflected expanded opportunities for attending secondary schools or normal schools.

In contrast to the United States, in many European countries young men's and women's path to the normal schools that trained primary teachers took them first from a primary school to a higher primary school, rather than to an academic secondary school, which catered to a more socially elite clientele and was, in many instances, long a masculine preserve. Indeed, well into the twentieth century, the divide between primary and secondary schooling in Europe was often not only one of age brackets but also of social class, and the attachment of fee-paying elementary classes to some public secondary schools enabled pupils to avoid mingling with children of the popular classes.

SECONDARY SCHOOLING AND ISSUES OF ACCESS AND GENDER

Secondary schools were not only more elite but also more often single-sex than were primary schools, in both Catholic and Protestant countries, and girls' access to secondary schooling lagged because of belief that their domestic destiny did not require extensive academic training. What the English termed an “accomplishments” curriculum (literature, foreign languages, the arts, and needlework) prevailed in many countries' private and boarding schools for teenage girls until parental demand and public policy effected a change. Indeed, the English government's delayed response to such demand, orchestrated by the National Union for Improving the Education of Women, prompted the foundation in 1872 of the Girls' Public Day School Company, whose shareholders supported the mission of forming “character by moral and religious training” and “fitting girls for the practical business and duties of life.” Even after England's Education Act of 1902 promoted publicly funded secondary schools, girls' schools could, for pupils over fifteen years of age, substitute a combination of domestic subjects for part or all of the curriculum in science and mathematics. For boys, secondary schooling, particularly in England's elite private “public” schools like Eton and Harrow, remained a mark of social distinction even when they did not continue studies at

a university. In 1891, only 2.7 percent of German boys aged ten to fourteen were enrolled in secondary schools, and the comparable figures for France, Spain, and Italy were, respectively, 2.56 percent, 2 percent, and 1 percent.

France launched public secondary schools for girls in 1880, anticlerical republicans presenting their purpose not as professional preparation but rather as additional education for middle-class daughters, who would become republican wives and mothers. Accordingly, the curriculum of the new girls' *lycées* and *collèges* was two years shorter than that for boys' schools, and until the 1920s it did not include Latin and Greek or advanced courses in mathematics, sciences, and philosophy, all necessary to pass the examination for the secondary degree (*baccalauréat*) required for formal admission to universities. Young women thus needed private tutoring to prepare for that degree hurdle, first negotiated by a woman in 1861, and eventually some Catholic girls' schools tried to compete with public schools by offering baccalaureate subjects. The Italian government, however, began allowing girls to attend boys' secondary schools during the 1870s, for the priority in public funding was remedying deficiencies in primary education. Nonetheless, Italian upper-class families continued to send daughters to Catholic boarding schools or convent-like secular boarding schools, which were typically finishing schools not emphasizing preparation for work. Spain's official enrollment of female secondary school students occurred after 1900, and in 1923 they were still only 12 percent of secondary students.

In the Austrian half of Austria-Hungary, the first school preparing young women for university admission was one opened in Prague for Czech speakers by a women's organization. Like France, Austria did not have girls' public secondary schools with a classical curriculum leading to the diploma (*Matura*) required for university entry, but after Prussia introduced official regulations for higher girls' schools in 1894, Austria followed in 1900 with a six-year program, two years shorter than that for males. Prussia's important curricular revisions of 1908 still differentiated between girls' and boys' secondary schooling but also enabled some girls' public schools to prepare pupils for the degree (*Abitur*) needed for university admission. No state-run school in pre-1914 Austria did the same, and in 1910 the government actually halted some provincial towns' practice of admitting girls to boys' secondary schools for such preparation. Belgium similarly excluded ambitious young women from male secondary schools until the 1920s and had only one publicly funded course (created in 1907) to pre-

pare them for universities. Most Russian girls' secondary schools also lacked a curriculum equivalent to that for boys until one was mandated in 1916.

Coeducation in secondary schools was most common in Scandinavian countries but did not affect the Swedish state grammar schools. It also became somewhat more prevalent in England after the 1902 Education Act enabled local education authorities to open a number of new secondary schools and upgrade others, some becoming coeducational in the process. The English Headmistresses' Association was not enthusiastic about coeducation, however, and neither were German women teachers, who had a vested professional interest in opposing it because teaching jobs for women were not plentiful in Germany.

TEACHERS

National variations in women's place in teaching corps during the later nineteenth century were noteworthy. Under the French Second Empire, nuns outnumbered lay women as teachers in girls' schools and nursery schools, and the anticlerical Third Republic retained the Catholic penchant for sex-segregated schools. Lay women, however, became the favored teachers for the Republic's girls' schools, and for the first time the national government and departmental administrations provided adequate funding to open new normal schools to train lay women teachers; the state also assumed responsibility for paying teachers' base salary in 1889. Against the backdrop of extended conflict between state and church, the Republic emphasized the maternal nature of lay women teachers, as compared to nuns, and unlike most other nations, did not expect women to leave teaching if they married or became mothers. Although French women teachers, like most of their counterparts elsewhere, received less pay than men at some levels of the official scale before World War I, the number of women applicants exceeded the availability of posts in most locales by 1900, and many women secondary school graduates also obtained primary teaching credentials to secure employment.

Whereas women were half of France's lay primary teachers by 1906 and more than 60 percent of Italian primary teachers, the same was not the case in imperial Germany (1871–1918), where educational policy remained the preserve of its individual states, independent before national unification. Women were still only 18 percent of German elementary teachers in 1906 because opportunities for women were retarded by older educational traditions, notably Protestant pastors' role and state bureaucracies' long ex-

perience with certifying male teachers and school inspectors. Authorities thus preferred hiring men, particularly for the many rural coeducational primary schools, and women more typically taught in sex-segregated schools in cities. In Russia, Orthodox priests and seminarians had long dominated primary teaching, but in 1871 a shortage of male applicants for teacher-training institutes led the government to admit women. By 1911 most primary teachers in Russian cities were women and, despite prolonged rural resistance, they were also a majority in the countryside. Both Germany and Austria lagged in training and allowing women to teach math, sciences, and classical languages at the secondary level. Austrian women could not teach academic subjects in middle and upper grades of girls' secondary schools until after 1900, a possibility acquired by Russian women in 1903.

In England, as in the United States, the teaching force was overwhelmingly feminized by 1900, for reasons more economic and cultural than political or religious. Women teachers would accept lower pay than men, for whom better-paid employment was more plentiful, and teaching, particularly in primary schools, had become stereotyped as a "woman's profession." In 1900, nearly 75 percent of American, 73 percent of British, 66 percent of Swedish, and 68 percent of Italian teachers were women, many of them single.

UNIVERSITIES AND ACCESS TO PROFESSIONS

Academic secondary schools gave access to European universities, the training ground since the Middle Ages for prestigious professions and long closed to women. The history of women's presence in universities often displays a lag between their informal and formal admission and also between their formal enrollment and the possibility of utilizing a degree to enter a profession. Whereas special colleges for women were attached to some English universities, continental countries—with the exception of Russia—typically rejected separate women's institutions at this level and did not open existing universities to women until dates much later than the founding of the first English and American women's colleges. At first, some of the latter were, in fact, more like high schools than real universities. Queen's College and Bedford College in London, established in 1848 and 1849, admitted younger teenagers, and only in 1878 did the University of London open its degrees to women. A half century elapsed between the founding of Girton College for women in 1869 and Cambridge's awarding of degrees to women, although in the interim women were admitted to the examinations of both Oxford and Cambridge Universities.

Swiss universities were in the vanguard of continental institutions offering admission and degrees to foreign women from countries where universities excluded them, such as Russia, Austria, and Germany. The University of Zurich admitted women as degree candidates in 1867, and a Russian woman was the first degree recipient. Subsequently the tsarist regime concluded that political radicalism was fueled by exposure to freer circulation of ideas in other countries and in 1873 ordered Russian women studying in Switzerland to return home. At the same time, however, Russia opened special higher courses and advanced medical training for women. Thereby Russian women had more access to advanced education than other European counterparts of the 1870s, but a backlash occurred during the reign of Tsar Alexander III, who attributed his father's assassination in 1881 to liberal policies. By 1886 all women's higher courses except those in St. Petersburg were closed, not to be reopened or newly launched until the reign of Nicholas II (1894–1917), who endorsed the St. Petersburg Medical Institute for Women in 1895 and allowed new courses in the capital and Moscow in 1900 and in nine other towns after the 1905 revolution. Although Russian women were allowed to audit courses at the regular universities for several years after the

1905 revolution (until 1908), they could not matriculate at these before 1914.

Social custom and administrative rulings delayed the enrollment of women students in France and Italy. The first French university degree awarded to a woman was conferred in 1868, but until 1913 more foreign than French women were enrolled in France's universities. Italian women began to receive advanced degrees after universities were opened to them in 1876, and in Denmark the first women obtained degrees during the 1880s. After a woman received a medical degree from a Spanish university in 1881, an 1882 decree barred women's access, and subsequent decrees limited their status to auditors until full official access was granted in 1910. In England, Scotland, and Wales the timetable for awarding degrees to women varied by university, with the newer public or "red brick" universities acting well before Oxford and Cambridge, which did not grant women degrees until 1920 and 1921. Indeed, Cambridge delayed women's voting membership in the university until 1948.

The first Austrian women university graduates were also schooled in Switzerland, and, as in Russia, the desire of some women to utilize Swiss diplomas in their native country created pressure for opening universities to women. In 1890 Emperor Francis Jo-

seph allowed a Swiss-educated ophthalmologist to open a clinic with her husband, and in 1896 Austrian-born women with foreign medical degrees were allowed to practice in the empire if they first passed the requisite Austrian university examinations. By 1897 a campaign launched by Czech feminists to open Austrian universities to women had resulted in access to faculties of philosophy, and although medicine also opened in 1900, law faculties remained inaccessible until 1918. Germany lagged behind Austria in letting women matriculate in universities, but in 1900 Baden became the first German state to admit women, and in 1908 the doors of the University of Berlin fully opened, with all German universities accessible by 1909. In sum, on the eve of World War I, women were 6 percent of university students in Germany and Italy, 3 percent in Belgium, 10 percent in France, and over 16 percent in England. The comparable Russian figure is 27 percent, but women were restricted to special higher courses.

Once graduated from universities, women faced both formal and attitudinal obstacles to entering the more prestigious professions. Access to medical practice preceded access to legal practice, partly because of some countries' receptivity to the argument that women were the appropriate doctors for women patients and infants. Nonetheless, women medical school graduates often encountered problems with securing hospital internships, and many accepted posts on state payrolls because establishing successful private practices was difficult. Russia's special medical training for women resulted in more registered women doctors than in more politically and socially progressive countries: 698 in Russia by 1888, as compared to 258 in England by 1900, 107 in Germany by 1907, and 95 in France by 1913. A 1900 law made France the first major European country to admit women with law degrees to the bar, a right already accorded in Sweden in 1897 and approved in Norway and Geneva, Switzerland, in 1904 but not provided in Germany, England, Austria, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, and Romania until after World War I. Yet as of 1914, only eleven French women had been admitted to the bar, and another nineteen held probationary status. Russia's first women law graduates could not practice until after the 1917 revolution. There would be similar lags in women's admission to the most prestigious civil service ranks or university professoriates. Russian-born Sofia Kovalevskaia obtained a chair in mathematics in Stockholm in 1883, and Polish-born Marie Curie was the first woman to do so in France (largely because of prior collaboration with her husband Pierre, with whom she won the Nobel Prize for physics in 1903).

FROM WORLD WAR I TO WORLD WAR II

World War I proved to be a watershed in women's rights and education in more than one respect. Women's new professional opportunities in law and the civil service paralleled the postwar granting of suffrage in England, Germany's Weimar Republic (1919–1933), and Czechoslovakia, among other countries, but a gap remained between educational opportunity and political rights for French and Italian women, not enfranchised until after World War II.

The Bolshevik (Communist) takeover of the 1917 Russian Revolution ushered in new promises of both class and gender equality, as the prewar socialist Second International had demanded. The first Soviet census in 1920 rated 44 percent of the population as literate (58 percent of men, 32 percent of women), and twenty years later Stalin's regime could boast of an 87 percent rate (94 percent of men, 82 percent of women). Communists ordered the merger of women's higher courses with local universities in 1919, but politicization for a time reduced women's representation among students. Women were 38 percent of university students in 1923–1924 but 28 percent by 1928, for many students of bourgeois origins were removed and only 15 percent of students enrolled in Communist groups were women.

After World War I, other more economically backward areas of eastern and southern Europe also began filling gaps in primary education. Poland, independent for the first time since 1795, made schooling compulsory in 1919, but nearly a quarter of the population remained illiterate in 1931. Whereas the more industrialized Czech state already boasted of nearly universal literacy in 1921, Hungary lagged behind western Europe until the 1930s, and more than half of all girls and women were illiterate in Romania and Yugoslavia in 1931 and 43 percent in Bulgaria in 1934. Thus much of eastern Europe did not achieve either universal literacy or the closing of the gender gap in literacy until after World War II, under newly implanted Communist regimes. Spain also lagged, even though increased public funding, coupled with greater demand for schooling, reduced illiteracy between 1920 and 1940 from 35 to 17 percent for men and from 50 to 28 percent for women. The attempt to secularize Spanish public schools by the ill-fated Second Republic incurred the wrath of traditionalists, who launched the protracted Civil War (1936–1939) that toppled the Republic. Francisco Franco's authoritarian regime, in keeping with the 1929 papal condemnation of coeducation as harmful to Christian learning, then abolished coeducation, which had been favored by the Republic.

Access to secondary schooling that was the equivalent of the best schooling for young men of the middle and upper classes also remained an issue for advocates of equal opportunities for women and poorer children of both sexes. Czechoslovakia in 1922 promised young women equal access to secondary schools, and France in 1924 finally responded to long-standing demands by feminists and middle-class parents and allowed girls' secondary schools to offer the option of an academic curriculum matching that for boys. Subsequently, French public secondary schooling became free. Throughout the interwar period, French advocates of a single schooling system (*école unique*) for all children also tried, but with minimal success, to break down the structural obstacles facing bright children who wanted to advance from the primary to the secondary school system. Achievement of that goal would not occur until after World War II and, for most schoolchildren, not until the Fifth Republic (1958–).

The woman university student also became a more frequent sight after World War I than before, although professional advances remained limited. Women were a quarter of all university students in France, England, and Czechoslovakia by 1928, but only 5 percent in Spain. In medicine there were, by 1929, at least 2,231 women doctors in Germany, 860 in Poland, 519 in France, 450 in Yugoslavia, 411 in Austria, about 350 in Italy and the Netherlands, 256 in Latvia, 198 in Bulgaria, 109 in Norway, about 100 in Sweden, and 85 in Lithuania. France, which had pioneered in admitting women to legal practice, then had only 96 women lawyers, as compared to 15 practicing in Fascist Italy, 65 in the Netherlands, 180 in England, and 251 in late Weimar Germany. Many other women recipients of law degrees had opted for newly opened professional posts in the civil and social services. Farther east, Hungary and Bulgaria still denied women the right to practice law in 1930.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s the woman professional often encountered antagonism in more than one setting. Blamed in some democracies for taking jobs away from men, she also faced the hostile propaganda of Fascist regimes, which accused her of not fulfilling her maternal obligation to produce children who could serve their nation at home or at war. In 1928 Mussolini's Fascist state banned the future appointment of women as directors of middle schools, having already excluded them from new appointments to prestigious university and secondary posts. Nonetheless, women remained about 70 percent of all Italian teachers, and their place among secondary school students actually increased from 19 to 26 percent between 1927 and 1938 and among uni-

versity students from 13 to 15 percent. Hitler's regime imposed a 10 percent quota on German women university students in 1933 and, in 1934, also required six months of obligatory labor service before university entrance. Although that quota was not always rigorously enforced, and numbers of male university students also dropped sharply because of new employment possibilities or other Nazi service obligations, women's place among students declined from 18.5 percent in 1932 to 14.2 in early 1939, their number falling from 18,813 to 6,342.

SINCE 1945

After World War II, the gender gap in literacy in the more economically backward parts of Europe was largely closed, and, as before the war, women in western and central Europe increasingly moved from the classroom to jobs in offices and services in the tertiary sector of the economy rather than the industrial sector. Under Franco's dictatorship (1939–1975), Spanish illiteracy rates fell from 17 percent for males in 1940 to 5 percent in 1970, and for females, from 28 percent to 12.5 percent, although the 9 percent female illiteracy recorded in the 1981 post-Franco census was still more than double that for men. In the Soviet Union, by comparison, the 23 percent rural female illiteracy rate of 1939 had been virtually eliminated by 1959, even though the dismantling of coeducation in favor of single-sex schools during World War II had delayed educational advances for some young women.

Another educational reform affecting boys and girls in many countries was the new emphasis on a common middle school experience, promoted by the French Fifth Republic during the 1960s and provided

for in Italy by a 1962 measure. From middle schools larger numbers of young women and men advanced to secondary schools and universities. In Italy in 1961, 19 percent of all adolescents attended secondary schools, and by 1974, 35 percent. Young French women received half of all academic high school diplomas by the 1960s, and increasingly they attended coeducational rather than single-sex schools, which ceased to be the norm by the 1970s. In Spain, however, the secondary diploma (*bachillerato*) remained an elite, male degree until after 1960, for the Franco regime's new secondary schools for girls only partially met needs and required pupils to take courses in domestic arts. Spanish university regulations in effect until 1970 also continued gender distinctions: male students did mandatory military service, and women did a six-month social service program, consisting of lessons on political values and home economics and then work in an office, nursery, or shelter.

During the later 1960s women university students in France, Italy, and West Germany joined male students in various protests directed not only against inadequate educational facilities but also toward larger social issues, and, as in the United States, displays of male chauvinism by radical spokesmen helped spur a revival of feminism. New attention to the gender bias in educational institutions and curricular materials was prompted by the renewed feminist awareness of how assumptions about gender traits and roles limited opportunities for women in the workplace and other aspects of public life.

By the mid-1980s women were more than half of the students in Polish, Hungarian, Norwegian, Portuguese, and French universities, and more than 40 percent in most other countries. At both the secondary school and university levels, the latest gender gap was less often a matter of smaller enrollments and more often one measured by the differences between women's and men's choices for academic and professional specialization. In France and elsewhere, choices made at the secondary school level typically limited options for higher education. Thus in 1983 French women obtained four-fifths of all secondary school baccalaureates in the humanities but only one-third

of those in the natural sciences and mathematics; in turn, women comprised only 10 percent of students at France's elite engineering school, the *École Polytechnique* (finally opened to women in 1972), and only 15 percent at the prestigious National School of Administration. Similarly, at universities in Great Britain in 1988 women were 77 percent of education students and 71 percent of language and literature students but only 11 percent in engineering and 26 percent in the physical sciences. Women's underrepresentation in engineering and the sciences limited their access to many of the higher-paying jobs offered by those specializations.

Farther down the educational ladder, gender differences in options selected in technical high schools left many young women vulnerable to unemployment or underemployment. At the end of the 1980s many European professional women continued to work in education, where they numbered about two-thirds of those so employed, even as more opportunities gradually opened to them in other fields. Women were more likely to work and to have fewer children during the 1980s than during the 1950s but, as in the United States, they often earned less than men and were less likely to attain the highest posts.

Despite the dropping of most formal barriers to gender equality in the laws, education, and workplaces of the fifteen states of the European Union of the 1990s, there was thus still concern about cultural and societal factors retarding women's educational achievement in certain fields, just as attention was also focused on factors retarding educational progress by working-class children, more likely to be made to repeat grades than middle-class offspring. The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and his disciples made trenchant critiques of the role played by elite institutions in perpetuating male social and economic elites and their "cultural capital." Other commentators, however, doubt that schools in democratic capitalist societies function merely to perpetuate elites, suggesting that for girls and women, as for the sons of workers, education also remains a key to achieving both intellectual growth and the possibility of professional and social advancement.

See also Gender Theory (volume 1); Students (volume 3); Child Rearing and Childhood; Youth and Adolescence (volume 4); Schools and Schooling; Higher Education (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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Section 15



THE FAMILY AND AGE GROUPS

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HISTORY OF THE FAMILY



David Levine

In the world we have lost, the prevailing model of family relations was derived from the Fourth Commandment injunction to honor fathers and mothers. Premodern families were supposed to be organized hierarchically along the age axis and organized patriarchally along the gender axis. This discursive conceit was deeply embedded in everyday life; alternatives to patriarchy were dishonorable because they were essentially unthinkable. Familial pluralism could only be the product of uncontrollable demography abetted by the rigidity of social hierarchies. By way of contrast, in the world we are making, familial pluralism would appear to be the product of centrifugal forces of individualism. In the age of late modernity, the family is castigated as being both repressive and antisocial. The disintegration of a uniform model of family relations is not just the result of novel discursive strategies; indeed, one analyst has estimated that there are as many as two hundred different “family” arrangements recognized by contemporary Americans and Europeans. Within these fields of forces, social experience is now widely variable. It was not always so.

Family history is complicated not only by changes over time, which have been a primary focus of research, but also by class and regional variations. This essay deals extensively with social class, including characteristic divisions between upper-class and mass patterns. Regional factors must also be kept in mind. The bulk of the work on family history concentrates on western and central Europe; southern and particularly eastern Europe have been less well served. In eastern Europe there has been more emphasis, historically, on extended family relationships as opposed to the nuclear links emphasized in the “European-style family” that emerged in the early modern period. By the late nineteenth century, however, industrialization brought eastern European, and even Russian, patterns closer to those of western and central Europe.

THE EMERGENCE OF FAMILY HISTORY

Historians have studied the family as both structure and process. Its patterns have been analyzed in terms of demographic characteristics of both individuals and the married couple, residential arrangements in the household, and kinship relations reaching beyond the walls of the primary residence. The family’s changing configuration over time—its process—has been examined in relation to both the centripetal pull of collective strategies and the centrifugal force exerted by individual interests, principally those of gender and age. In addition, the family has been studied as a prescriptive image which was regulated by the exercise of power that was generated for sustaining religious and political order. Finally, it has been recognized that for most of the past millennium individual identities were created within the orbit of family life.

The explosion of social-historical writing that has occurred in the last four decades of the twentieth century has been keyed by the desire to rescue the common people of the past from the massive condescension of posterity. In urging historians to adopt this stance, E. P. Thompson was surfing the crest of a long wave. Thompson was not alone; indeed, he was part of an insurgent movement that had the common intention of writing history from the bottom up as opposed to the traditional, top-down practice of focusing on elites, governments, diplomacy, and wars as if that were all that mattered in history. The historical project was refocused and its main concern was the mundane *vie quotidienne*. The everyday life of anonymous people in the past became a significant concern of scholarly study.

Two key texts highlighted this first phase of family history: Philippe Ariès’s *Centuries of Childhood* and Peter Laslett’s *The World We Have Lost*. These two pioneers had, to quote Marc Bloch, followed “the smell of burning flesh” into the archives. Their path, however, was hardly direct—Ariès was a director of

the Institute of Tropical Plants while Laslett was a political scientist who had published the definitive edition of John Locke's *Two Treatises on Government*. Ironically, it was in doing this editorial work that Laslett was made familiar with Locke's opponent, Robert Filmer, who was a hard-line defender of the Stuart monarchy. Filmer's arguments in favor of the divine right of Stuart kings was based on his explication of the Fourth Commandment injunction to honor fathers (and kings, too). Wanting to know more about Filmer's ideas and their relationship to the social milieu of seventeenth-century England led Laslett to do his initial research on household structure.

If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then Ariès and Laslett are to be lionized. Their books were, at one and the same time, a demonstration of what was possible and an invitation to learn more. Laslett, in particular, devoted himself to spreading the gospel of family history by inaugurating the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, by organizing international conferences, and by continuing to publish extremely influential journal articles as well as several collections of scholarly essays. Laslett's contribution was enormous although his primary concerns with residential organization—Did people in the past live in nuclear or complex households? What was the incidence of coresidence and kinship ties? What was the relationship between illegitimacy and marriage?—hardly kept pace with the expanding frontiers of this new universe of studies which he had helped to reveal.

If Ariès and Laslett were the originators of the new field of family history, they were prolific progenitors. The most significant monograph on the subject published in the 1970s was Edward Shorter's *The Making of the Modern Family*. This book was not without its critics but *The Making of the Modern Family* was successful because Shorter had not only provided a coherent overview of the subject but had also done so by connecting the material and emotional aspects of the subject. Shorter's claims were overblown—it is not a simple matter, as he asserts, to move from high infant mortality rates to maternal indifference and neglect—but he pinpointed key connections. If later analysts would dispute his claims of maternal neglect and challenge his anachronistic quest for romantic love, he forced them to counter his claims. The subject was enlivened by Shorter's incursion even though the framework he set forth was never a dominant paradigm.

Shorter's writing on the organization of family life was written in the grammar of the borrowed language of the sentimental family which reached its apotheosis in the immediate postwar world. His historical

vision reflected that time-honored disguise, bereft of a foundation in the exigencies of daily life. It is not too much to say that if this image of the sentimental family was first repeated tragically in the 1950s, then Shorter repeated it farcically. In particular, Shorter politicized the subject because he enraged feminist historians, provoking them to reply with analyses of their own. After the publication of *The Making of the Modern Family*, the easy verities of patriarchalism would never again be acceptable.

In response to the groundbreaking impact of Ariès's, Laslett's, and Shorter's monographs, a number of scholars began to do primary research that scholarly journals were eager to publish. These studies illuminated new and unexpected aspects of the history of the family. Many of these articles occupied a kind of scholarly no-man's-land between the recognized, disciplinary frontiers of the academy. If journals devoted to demographic studies and economic history were the most welcoming, the older mainstream publications were decidedly uninterested in this new venture. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, supply met demand in a virtuous circle of growth and expansion as new journals appeared that positively welcomed material on the history of the family.

In North America, the *Journal of Social History* and *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* both began their lives in the wake of—and in response to—Thompson's injunction to rescue the common people from "the massive condescension of posterity." Studying history from the bottom up meant that questions of social reproduction had become problematic, which, in turn, meant that issues of biological reproduction followed suit. The turn to social history was thus complemented by a rising interest in population, demography, residential arrangements, and kinship organization. In France, the journal *Annales de démographie historique* began publication and although its primary concern was with historical demography, articles appeared there which were tangentially concerned with the history of the family.

Family history was on the academic map. During the 1970s, the field became closely studied and universities began to advertise for—and appoint—"historians of the family"; the Newberry Library in Chicago began its summer seminars on new research methods that enabled traditionally trained historians to borrow social scientific methods to analyze routinely generated data banks in their quest to study family history. In mid-decade, the Social Science History Association was launched; one of its primary aims was to draw together scholars from diverse academic pigeonholes who shared an interest in the history of the family.

A landmark was reached in 1976 when the *Journal of Family History* first appeared. However, that event did not significantly alter the characteristic borderline status of historical family studies despite the unflagging energy and boosterism of Tamara Hareven, the *Journal's* first editor. In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, another crop of new journals began publication that were also well disposed to printing articles on the history of the family: *Social History*, *Histoire Sociale/Social History*, *Social Science History*, *Continuity and Change*. In addition, articles on the history of the family also appeared in journals primarily devoted to agricultural history, educational history, feminist history and gender studies, labor history, modern history, and medical history. Furthermore, a complete bibliography would be studded with references to works published in journals concerned with demography and population studies, economic history, geography, marriage and the family, medieval and renaissance studies, peasant studies, and urban studies. And academic journals tied to national constituencies (*American Historical Review*, *Canadian Historical Review*, *English Historical Review*, and so on), devoted to particular national histories (such as *Archive for Reformation History*, *French Historical Studies*, *Journal of Central European History*, *William and Mary Quarterly*), or devoted to particular time periods (such as *The Sixteenth Century Journal* or *Victorian Studies*), all welcomed contributions that were concerned with the family's history insofar as it could be connected with their primary area of interest. True to its frontier position between established academic disciplines, the history of the family would continue to be a house of many mansions. It is quite simply impossible to do justice to the extraordinary variety of topics that assembled under the roof of family history.

Interest in the field mushroomed in these decades and monographic studies exploded. A tiny proportion—like Shorter—were devoted to providing an updated overview of the subject, but far and away the majority were concerned with a particular take on the larger image. Like a CAT scan, whose imaging system recursively slices through a body to analyze its inner structures, this spate of studies gave shape to the historical subject of the family once they were viewed together. Furthermore, it became quite common for historians studying local social systems to devote a chapter or two to issues that are relevant to the study of family history. Similarly, biographers' concerns with prominent individuals now had a new relevance as these studies provided further insight into the family dynamics of famous people's lives. Historians of widely different interests contributed to the subject's growth by showing how it bordered on aspects of bio-

logical, cultural, material, political, psychological, and social experience.

By 1980 a plethora of articles and monographs that touched on the history of the family had been published. The first generation had not only discovered a field of study but had also created paradigms that have been essential to its definition. Several aspects of this pioneering effort are worthy of comment:

1. The history of the family was a recentered field of study that shifted emphasis from large-scale events and processes to the reproduction of primary social units.
2. The issue of reproduction had become problematic in its own right as demographic studies made it evident that the modernization boilerplate associated with the Princeton Fertility Project did not do justice to the intricacies of pre-modern family systems.
3. Alongside this demographic complexity, historians uncovered an assortment of residential arrangements.
4. Within the household, family systems seemed to be connected to wealth-holding in the sense that the families of the propertiless were less coherent because the younger generation was freed from its constraints—but at the cost of having to find a haven in a heartless world.
5. The Old Testament ideology of patriarchy sounded like a backbeat driver to the rhythms of family life but its orchestration was attuned to a combination of factors—age, sex, wealth, residence, and occupation were recombined to create a medley of family systems.
6. New ideologies of sexuality led to novel forms of gendering in the Victorian age which Lawrence Stone, in *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England* had suggested was a cyclical reassertion of early modern patriarchy but which other analysts, following Thomas Laqueur's argument in *Making Sex* and Michel Foucault's claims in *The History of Sexuality*, located in the power-knowledge techniques of medicalization and state-formation initiatives.

After two decades of exciting study, the family now had its history (Hareven, 1991; Herlihy, 1983; Lynch, 1994; Stone, 1981; and Tilly, 1987). Yet if the overall shape of this field was decidedly different from the "before/after" models first suggested by theories of modernization, and if the beauty of science lies in the details, then the historical contours of the family's history remain to be discussed. So, in the remaining sections of this essay, the history of the family will be

reanalyzed in very broad chronological terms; first, the ancient and medieval period with special attention being paid to the impact of Christianity and the shift from slavery to serfdom; second, the early modern period with regard to residential organization, the biological aspects of reproduction, and the issue of family strategies; and, third, the modern period with particular heed being paid to the interventionist role of state-formation initiatives.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE EUROPEAN FAMILY

Starting with a contrast between the ways that the ancients defined individuals, David Herlihy draws our attention to the enormous implications of the transition away from antiquity. Herlihy's reorientation makes it evident that the modernization of the family was not only the product of a long evolution but also built upon very deep foundations. This meant that much of what the modernizers took for granted was problematic in the sense that it, too, needed to be explained. Christianity had made the correspondence between social harmony and sexual order problematic by radically restructuring the meaning of sexual heat; in its campaigns against infanticide, it diminished the powers of fathers; in its reorganization of religious life, it altered dramatically what it was to be male and female; in its advocacy of virginity, it proclaimed the possibility of a relationship to society and the body that most ancient doctors would have found injurious to the health. Nonetheless, in contrast to the ancient models of self-representation, Christians believed in the equality of all sinners and the necessity of conjugality for those who could not devote themselves to a monastic existence. The emergence of the family as a moral unit was linked to the Christian concern with *ordo caritatis* (ordered love). The love of God and salvation of one's soul outstripped all other forms of love; it was followed by the elevation of conjugal relationships.

In combination with the demise of slavery, this Christian model of marriage created a social mutation of the most profound importance. It was an explosive mixture that radically transformed the way in which the educated classes represented social reality. Herlihy's writings alert us to the fact that medieval surveyors made the humble peasant hearth and farm the standard units by which the entire community was measured. Ancient censuses had not used the household in counting subjects or in assessing their wealth but by the eighth and ninth centuries the family farm, called variously *mansus*, *focus*, *familia*, *casata*, *casa mas-*

saricia (in Italy), *hufe* (in Germany), *hide* (in England), had become the basic component of manorial and fiscal assessment. Vast differences in wealth and power did not break the bonds of comparability. This uniformity indicated the emergence of a single ethic of marriage from which there could be no variant standards of behavior—or morality—within the Christian community.

Christianity proved to be a particularly felicitous partner in legitimating this state of affairs. Jack Goody argued that the fourth-century emergence of new family forms was the direct result of the transition from sect to church that was paralleled by the enactment of ecclesiastical bans on incest. In so doing the church reconfigured "strategies of heirship," and in particular the control over close marriages, those between consanguineous, affinal, and spiritual kin. These novel restrictions on the ancient practices of endogamy, adoption, and concubinage made it more difficult for the propertied classes in the Roman Empire to transfer property within the family over generations because it closed the option of creating tight, endogamous knots of restricted elementary families within which wealth could be secured in the face of demographic uncertainties.

In effect, the new institutional church thrust itself into the process of inheritance by making it both possible and attractive for the dying to divert wealth from family and kin to its coffers. Not surprisingly this created tensions between the interests of the senior generation using its earthly possessions to secure heavenly benefits and those of the junior generation more concerned with the production of material goods. Goody suggested that it was not accidental that the church appears to have condemned the very practices that would have deprived it of property. A great buildup in church wealth rapidly ensued so that by the seventh century about one-third of the productive land in France, for example, was in ecclesiastical hands. Thus it had become possible for the church to accumulate wealth—to create an endowment of property for itself—and to establish places of worship as well as fund its charitable, ecclesiastical, and residential activities.

Given the importance of Goody's controversial argument it is hardly surprising that much debate followed its publication. In essence, there have been three thrusts to this criticism: the first point has been that Goody has oversimplified the organization of family life in the pre-Christian Mediterranean by overemphasizing the importance of endogamy and paternal power; the second criticism has been that he has confused motivation for creating new rules regarding both spirituality and sexuality with the im-

plementation of these rules that were created for their own reasons; and the third line of dissent has suggested that Goody's argument makes the mistake of fusing the church's ability to legislate in matters of family formation with its ability to enforce these laws.

Quite obviously, Goody has drawn our attention to an extremely complex historical development, although for our present purposes it is probably worthwhile to worry less about the veracity of Goody's account than to agree with his emphasis on the end product's distinctive character. Indeed, for Goody—as for others who have been interested in the history of the family—the subject has encouraged a form of regressive history in which the familiar, known systems of human reproduction are set in contrast with the unknown and unfamiliar family formations of earlier ages.

In addition to the maintenance of a stable domestic government among his dependent population, “the lord's interest in the supply of demesne labour induced him to interfere in the personal affairs of his servile dependents, extending regulation beyond the immediate tenant to include the peasant family as well.” (Middleton, p. 110). It is not clear, however, to what extent this “interference” was conducted on a daily basis as opposed to the more generalized maintenance of frontiers and boundaries within the social formation. There is, for instance, no evidence that lords played an active role in pairing up peasants and acting as marriage brokers. In considering this question it is perhaps useful to remember that while the slave had been treated like an ox in the stable, who was always under his master's orders, the villein, even if he was a serf, was a worker who came on certain days and who left as soon as the job was finished.

Even before the Carolingians reorganized the governance of western society, other forces were changing its basic productive relations. The creation of peasant tenements was the result of a far-reaching innovation, a new method of utilizing dependent labor. From the end of the sixth century, great landowners married off some of their slaves, settling them on a manse. In the Carolingian period the peasant tenement (*manse*) seems to have had three different meanings: often, it was an enclosure on which the house was built; sometimes, it was the whole farmstead including its landed properties; and, it was also used in a generic form to denote a measurement of land. But this physical connotation was only one side of the coin; the other side was the fact that the manse was a kind of tenure, heritable in the family of the man who had cleared and worked that property. When the word first appeared around 650 it already had a strong seigneurial stamp as we learn about manses from the ac-

counts of lords and kings who have adopted the single-family farm as the basic unit on which rents and dues were imposed. Peasant families cultivated the manse's appurtenant lands in order to feed their own families. This devolution of responsibility reduced the master's staff-maintenance costs while generating enthusiasm for work on the part of the servile task force. Slave couples were now entrusted with seeing to their childrens' upbringing themselves until they became of working age. This transformation of slaves and free-men into serfs and villeins forms the baseline from which subsequent developments materialized.

This process of settlement was not a complete novelty however; rather, Herlihy connects the manse with the ancient squatters' sovereignty and argues that there was an element of continuity in the customs governing colonization in western Europe. The work of settlement, it would seem, had to be organized in relation to the supply of willing workers at a time when capital, markets, and transport were defective. Peasant pioneers survived largely by foraging in the wilderness over those critical years until the land should fructify; willing, not driven like the slave to the sloppy performance of his *sordidum servitium*, and able through spontaneous effort to sustain the hard labors that colonization required.

The manse thus arose out of settlement, it was permanently in the possession of the man who worked it, it was heritable in his family although burdened with service to the owner of the land, and it was roughly equal in size. It meant a heritable tenement that was the colonizers' analogue to the landowners' property rights. The seventh-century peasantry were not taxed on their land per se, but rather they continued to fulfill personal tax obligations by cultivating the soil. The peasants' *retrait lignager*—the right to inheritance of villein holdings for customary tenants' families—was a crucial counterweight to the arbitrary power of seigneurs. In a sense this was a quid pro quo—it gave the lord a solid core of reliable tenants who had some interest in the vitality of the manor while it gave the peasant patriarchs the semblance of control over their property thereby entrenching their power within the manse. And, of course, the peasant patriarch was given control over the women and children under his cottage's roof.

If the peasantry—90 percent of the population—were defined by their relationship to the primary means of production (the soil), the thin upper crust was defined by its relationship to power. And the primary indicator of a family's power was its hold over land. In making this argument, Herlihy draws our attention to Georges Duby's landmark studies of family formation in France around the year 1000. By

then Christianity had radically broken away from its Judaic and pagan inheritance in separating descent from reproduction. Christianity was from its beginnings a religion of revelation which believers joined by being reborn in Christ's grace. For Christians, therefore, expectations of salvation were not linked with lineage nor were the achievements of ancestors passed on to descendants. For this reason—because charisma was not transmitted through priestly dynasties—Christians were not enjoined to maintain the patriline as a religious task nor were they expected to continue the cult of the dead through physical or fictitious descendants. Formal marriage rules were an indicator of deeper, more important changes in the way in which the world was understood. This changed around the year 1000.

The key aspect of knightly survival was a new form of inheritance which limited descent to the eldest male heir. Patrimonies were thereby maintained intact rather than being divided and subdivided as had been the case before the year 1000. The conjugal family was only a single cell of a larger organism, the lineage. The shift from clan to lineage—from extended to dynastic family—was a relatively gradual process. The Norman Conquest of England in 1066 captures this transition in a snapshot. It must be seen as involving not simply the replacement of one aristocracy by another but also the replacement of one set of family relationships by another, a change not merely in personnel, not merely in all those external relations of the aristocracy, but a change in internal organization, in familial structure, in assumptions about property. Before the Normans, English surnames were neither hereditary nor toponymic; after the Battle of Hastings it became possible to identify individual families—their history and their fortunes—by their property.

The whirlwind of military energy that flung the Normans across the length and breadth of Europe in a few generations satisfied the ambitions of brothers and younger sons through the establishment of colonial lineages in their vanquished territories. Behind the fictions of lineal descent, most members of this new upper strata were “men raised from the dust” whose primary characteristics had been their loyalty to the Crown and their luck in staying onside through all the twists and turns of civil war, attempted parricide, and fratricide. Those who were disobedient lost everything—at the time of Magna Carta, only four of the twenty-one family heads among the Twenty-Five Barons could trace their lineage back to the Conquest, 150 years earlier. And, of course, many lines simply did not reproduce themselves in the male line. Indeed, only one family lineage that was prominent

in pre-Conquest Normandy was still influential in early thirteenth-century England.

Clerical intervention followed a few decades after the secular ruling class had radically shifted its marriage strategies through the exercise of strict control of the lineal patriarch over his sons and daughters. Their new system of primogeniture effectively reduced the possibility of dividing the patrimony and thereby played a crucial role in the invention of family traditions. At the same time, however, the Gregorian church's fear of incest was based on the view that consanguineous marriages occurred among kin related to the seventh degree. This was an awkward and essentially unenforceable rule: who was not someone else's sixth cousin among the aristocracy? Jean-Louis Flandrin has computed that someone who followed these rules would have had at least 2,731 cousins of his/her own generation with whom marriage would have been forbidden. It was therefore expedient for noble husbands to discover they were living in sin and to demand a divorce or annulment; the historical record is full of such discoveries which usually occurred—fortuitously, no doubt—when the marriage was without children or when political realities swiftly changed in an unexpected fashion. In 1215, at the Fourth Lateran Council, the ruling on incest was amended so that marriages outside the fourth degree of kin were ruled nonconsanguineous. By bringing canon law into line with social reality there was a much greater chance that marriage could be made indissoluble; at the very least, a spurious divorce would be more difficult to obtain for the rich and powerful.

The insistence on clerical celibacy prevented the creation of a hereditary caste of priestly scholars. In each generation, the clergy was sustained by the donation of oblates to holy orders. This had two very significant implications: first, literacy was not confined to a self-perpetuating caste but was widely dispersed among the children of the whole population from whom the clergy was recruited; and, second, it brought the clerical aristocracy and the secular aristocracy to a common ground. Great lords frequently donated one of their sons to the church; such endowments were inspired partly by piety and partly as form of familial insurance. By the end of the twelfth century there was a shared bond of common interest between landlords, who sought an orderly system of inheritance, and the clerics who were trying to enforce Christian monogamy. Aristocrats were prepared for most purposes to be subject to clerical control—“not only in fits of penitence, but actually when making marriage treaties affecting their inheritances and standing in the world. This was largely because legitimate monogamy had come to be the heart of the system of

inheritance, as it was to be the heart of the Church's idea of marriage as an institution." (Brooke, p. 154)

While much attention inevitably devolves upon the marital alliances and strategies of the upper class, it would seem that the post-Gregorian church's new marriage policies had a significant resonance for the lower orders. In establishing the centrality of consent in the making of a Christian marriage, the canon law of marriage made the marital union easy to create, endowed it with serious consequences, and made divorce difficult. This was exactly the opposite of the situation prevailing in both Roman and barbarian law. The Christian desire to evangelize the servile population and draw it into the cultural domain of the church was founded on a remarkably democratic principle: all men and women—no matter whether free or servile—were considered to be morally responsible agents whose sins were an abomination in the sight of God. Is it merely coincidental that the creation of a radically new system of marriage was installed at exactly the same time that the last vestiges of slavery were disappearing from northern Europe? The post-Gregorian church's marriage policies were deliberately fashioned to help the lower orders avoid the sins of concupiscence and adultery, at the cost of abridging the rights of feudal lords to control the intimate lives of their dependent, servile population.

NEW TRENDS IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

The advent of the printing press is indirectly responsible for shifting our frame of reference in studying the early modern history of the family. Moveable-type presses made it possible to create printed records that, when production was routinized, provided new sources for studying the subject. Ironically, this impact was indirect as most of the parish registers and census-type enumerations were handwritten, but these were produced in response to a massive ratcheting up of the administrative technologies of early modern state-formation.

Renaissance states began to make it a requirement that the state's church record all baptisms (births), burials (deaths), and marriages that were celebrated in each parish. The primary reason for doing this was that it was in keeping with the Renaissance state's novel desire to intensify its surveillance over the subject population. These parish registers supplied the raw material that enabled the study of historical demography to enjoy enormous growth in the 1970s and early 1980s. The two most crucial questions that the demographers addressed related to age at first mar-

riage for women and levels of mortality. In the nature of things, family reconstitution studies also provided information about fertility rates—both illegitimate and marital—and birth control.

The most significant finding to emerge from the first generation of primary research into parish registers was that early modern women married about a decade after puberty, in their mid-twenties. Wealth played a small role in marital strategies—it was usual for propertied young women to be married at an early age, whereas if they had no property they were more likely to be on their own and marry at a later age—but both rich and poor belonged to a common culture of family values. To marry, a couple need some level of capital and this meant that a period of enforced saving usually acted to extend the courtship as money had to be set aside to outfit a home, albeit in a minimal fashion. Propertyless women, therefore, usually married at a later age, which often meant that they were also marrying away from the close scrutiny of their natal families. For them, the peer group played a crucial role in courtship rituals, the marriage ceremony, and the wedding celebrations. The emergence of a distinctive "European-style family" sums up some of the special features of marriage ages and rates in the majority of the population.

Arranged marriages were hardly unknown but they were much more likely to occur when significant dynastic or property considerations gave the older generation reasons to intervene in the decision-making process. In fact, for those youths who were wealthy enough to attract this kind of close concern from their elders it was often the case that the Christian right to marital choice was narrowed to a kind of veto power over the alternatives offered to them by concerned parents and/or guardians. The key point is that very few marriages took place between partners who had not met before they knelt together in front of the altar.

For many, this late age at first marriage meant that a significant amount of time was spent outside the parents' residence; service was a common experience among the lower classes as children and their labor were shifted upward from the propertyless to the propertied. An ancillary implication of this demographic system was that it gave enormous rationale in support of the patriarchal homilies drawn from the Fourth Commandment to honor fathers and mothers by extending its meaning to fictive parents. In early modern England, France, and, especially, Germany, there was an extensive literature that commented upon patriarchalism and the housefather's relationship to state-formation: as Filmer knew in his bones, the king was the father of his people in the same way that the head of the household was the father-figure of both

the natural and fictive children who lived in his cottage. This patriarchal definition of identities was one of the primary reasons why the man who assumed the identity of Martin Guerre was executed as a traitor—Arnaud de Tilh had called into question the God-given order of society. Therefore, a traitor's death was not only logical but also just in the legal mind-set of the sixteenth century.

Mortality was high in the parish register populations but it has been found to be the product of three factors: epidemic disease, which was a constant threat; residential location—cities and even densely packed villages were hospitable environments for microorganisms that attacked defenseless babies without mercy; and maternal nursing practices. Women who breast-fed their children had much, much lower levels of infant mortality than those who began feeding them on solids almost immediately after birth. Child-birth and childrearing were the primary experiences of most adult women for most of their adult lives. Nursing had a significant bearing on family life not only because it kept children alive longer but also because it was correlated with longer birth intervals. Families in which the mother nursed for as long as thirty months usually had fewer births and more survivors.

In contrast to the silent treatment given to nursing practices, illegitimacy, which was most decidedly a minority experience, has been the subject of a large number of articles. In part, this is a reflection of the impact of Shorter's arguments—and the desire to re-

fute them. In addition, the subject has been easier to study as there were discrete legal prohibitions and sanctions levied against single mothers. To be sure, toward the end of the early modern age—after 1750—rates of illegitimacy skyrocketed, but it is important to keep in mind that during the 1500 to 1750 period the ratio of illegitimate to legitimate births hovered around 1 percent.

Fertility statistics have also been gleaned from family reconstitution studies. The most significant finding has been a negative one—with a few exceptions, most couples practiced unregulated intercourse. For demographers, this state of affairs suggested that their fertility was “natural” but, of course, matters are not as simple as that. Indeed, there was nothing natural about “natural fertility” since optimal levels were only about one-third the level that could be achieved by fertility maximizers. Rather, natural fertility was the product of a variety of cultural and biological adjustments as couples sought to optimize their family size—not maximize it.

Unfortunately, however, we know almost nothing about sexual habits or the intimacies of married life. Lawrence Stone tried to get at these secrets but he was stymied by the fact that all but a few upper-class, diary-keeping males say anything about their conquests. Few commented on their day-to-day activity in the marital bed. No women spoke of these matters, even to their own locked diaries. What went on in the peasants' cottages—or in the fields surrounding them, for that matter—is a matter of surmise; guess-

work, really. Shorter, for example, postulated that plebeian sexuality was Hobbesian—nasty, brutish, and short—rather than playful, but his examples are drawn from middle-class, urban missionaries who saw only darkness and ignorance among the peasantry. By and large, therefore, the early modern marital bed is a terra incognita of historical analysis.

After Thomas Robert Malthus had published his *Essay on the Principle of Population* in 1798 it became something of a bourgeois parlor game to suggest that the lower orders were oversexed and underresponsible but, in point of fact, not much is to be learned about plebeian sexuality from this nineteenth-century, blame-the-victim discourse. The new rhetoric of sexuality that emerged with the medicalization of social relations suggested that respectable women were passionless but that lower-class women tended to be more “masculine” and, therefore, more at the mercy of their passions. In the 1867 *Report on the Employment of Children, Young Persons and Women in Agriculture*, for example, it was claimed that “Not only does it [i.e., agricultural labor] almost unsex a woman in dress, gait, manners, character, making her rough coarse, clumsy and masculine; but it generates a further very pregnant mischief by infitting or indisposing her for a woman’s proper duties at home.” At the heart

of the writers’ concerns is a worry that the supposed “natural” character of rural, proletarian women was threatened by “masculine” work. Such women would not only be “unsexed” but also socially deranged since they would be indisposed to “a woman’s proper duties at home.”

This notion of “a woman’s proper duties at home” had a different meaning from what earlier generations understood to be the proper ordering of a family and household. By the high Victorian period, the privatized family had been by and large divorced from production, becoming instead the matrix for biological and social reproduction, consumption, and sentimentality. In order to understand what earlier generations had experienced as family life it is necessary to look at the literature concerning “family strategies” that enjoyed a substantial vogue from the early 1970s through the late 1980s. The concept’s popularity really took off in response to Shorter’s many articles that preceded the appearance of *The Making of the Modern Family* in 1975. Louise Tilly and Joan Scott wrote two articles (one of which was coauthored with Miriam Cohen) and a book (*Women, Work, and Family*) that were directly aimed at countering Shorter’s assertions of female passivity and economic marginality. Their work enjoyed enormous celebrity because

it not only provided a credible reply to Shorter but also showed a way forward to women's historians (and I use the term "women's historians" advisedly because in the 1970s the concepts of "feminist history" and/or "gender history" were not yet widely current).

The Tilly-Scott argument began with the proposition that Shorter's vision of the pre- and early industrial family was anachronistic because he neglected the ways that subsistence imperatives overlapped into the private sphere. Beginning from the basic fact that more than half the European population was either completely landless or else living on a marginal piece of property, Tilly and Scott were able to show that much of Shorter's discussion of courtship strategies was beside the point as more than half the population did not engage in marital alliances. Next, by looking into the basic ways the majority's catch-as-catch-can family economy functioned to piece together a subsistence income—Olwen Hufton had called this "an economy of makeshifts"—Tilly and Scott demonstrated that plebeian women held up more than half their family's economy through their involvement in marketing, gardening, petty farming, fowl-keeping, looking after the family pig, and various forms of protoindustrial production. By looking at what plebeian women did—as opposed to what middle-class, urban, male social commentators said about them—Tilly and Scott presented a vastly different reconstruction of the historical experience of plebeian family life.

The Tilly-Scott emphasis on protoindustrialization neatly dovetailed with one of the other preeminent concerns of family historians of the late 1970s and 1980s. Beginning with Franklin Mendels's 1972 article, the study of industrialization before the classic industrial revolution became a hot topic. In part, this newfound interest could be linked with a pervasive unease at the earlier explanations of "the take-off into self-sustained growth" that had been popularized by cold warriors like W. W. Rostow and, in part, comparative studies among the English, continental European, and Third World experiences of industrialization were making it evident that the prehistory of the classic industrial revolution was a subject of extraordinary importance. Industrialization did not just happen in the weeks after Richard Arkwright set up the first spinning mills, based on ideas purloined from the rural spinners who had sat in his barber's chair in Lancashire in the 1760s.

To rephrase Rostow's image: reaching a threshold of economic preparation along the runway now seemed to be more significant than the actual takeoff. This lead-up took on even more significance as Raphael Samuel made it clear that during the classic industrial revolution much of the actual production was

still based on subdivided handicrafts; for almost two generations, steam power had been limited in its application to production routines in machine spinning. Outside the textile industry, steam power was even less significant for even longer. Curiously, however, while the subdivision of labor was fully appreciated there has been little study of the ways in which skill was transmitted; labor historians prize skill (as did the laborers they study) yet they have been reluctant to explore how it was reproduced. Educational historians, who should be concerned with skills-learning, are abysmally silent about it.

The protoindustrial family economy captured social historians' imaginations for a variety of reasons: first, it conferred agency on the lower classes in keeping with the Thompsonian injunction to rescue them from the massive condescension of posterity; second, it recentered the practice of social history away from great men and great events and toward the strategies of reproduction which the popular classes employed in their everyday life; third, it gave a logic to the study of demographic trends and family formation systems as well as connecting the study of domestic organization to a narrative structure; fourth, it made sense in terms of the reevaluation of industrialization that was current among economic historians; and, fifth, it provided historians with a way of demonstrating that family history could not simply be read off a sociological template, such as that provided by modernization theories. The past needed to be studied on its own terms.

Beginning with the point that proletarianization was the dominant process in the majority of plebeian families well before the industrial revolution, social historians of the family discovered a new kind of past. The exigencies of work and material life assumed a primordial importance. Instead of the well-housed, well-fed patriarchal family of the peasantry—the English yeomen, the German *bauern*, or the French *laboureurs*—social historians introduced us to masterless men, independent women, and cultures of misrule in which youths of both sexes (though predominantly males) turned the social world upside down, mocking their elders and their elders' conventions. In particular, charivaris were occasions for mocking "inappropriate" marriages and publicly shaming those housefathers who were less than masterful. In place of residential stability, social historians discovered a lost world of footlooseness, wandering, and mobility. Oddly, however, studies of marital breakdown and desertion have never been pursued in a systematic manner.

For most members of the lower classes, the long years of service between puberty and marriage was a

life-cycle phase when fathers and mothers were fictive, not genuine parents. Rather than a Bible-reading patriarch sternly disciplining his household, the plebeian family seemed to be a more contingent arrangement. Kinship, too, seems to have been looser among the propertyless than among their betters, whether in the middling sort or the upper classes. Furthermore, it seemed that the protoindustrial family had its own peculiar demographic dynamic: freed from the constraints of property transmission, men and women were able to contract marriage at an earlier age. The first family reconstitution studies of Belgium and the English Midlands pointed toward a protoindustrial family that was reproducing itself vigorously while streams of migrants from rural regions supplemented their rising numbers. In rural industrial regions, the countryside thickened as workers' cottages were built, quite literally overnight.

The key to protoindustrial demography was thought to have been a falling age at first marriage for women, which meant that generations followed one

another more closely while families were reproducing for a longer period of time. In addition, there are hints in the data that illegitimacy rates were higher, more protoindustrial brides were pregnant at marriage, and levels of marital fertility stayed up rather than slumping as women got older. What seemed strikingly evident from simulation exercises was that massive shifts in annual rates of growth would have resulted from relatively small declines in the age at first marriage for women. David Levine's original study of Shepshed was designed to capture one such community. While it would be a mistake to generalize as if all Europe was Shepshed, it is a far graver mistake to miss the point that even if only a fraction of the original proletarians living in Europe in 1750 fully and completely took on these new characteristics—or if all took on some of these behavioral changes to only some degree—then we can explain the observed growth within the parameters of the model propounded by Hans Medick, Jürgen Schlumbohm, and Peter Kriedte's "theory of protoindustrialization."

Changes in the early modern period, particularly by the eighteenth century, also involved shifts in emotional definitions. Without arguing that premodern families were devoid of emotion, it does seem that emotional expectations for parent-child as well as spousal relationships began to increase by the seventeenth century. Protestantism played a role, as did the commercialization of the economy, which prompted more attention to emotional support within the family. Love was redefined and gained a greater role, for example in choices of marriage partners, while anger within the household was newly criticized. How much these changes entered daily relationships, and what the pattern was among various social classes, continue to be debated. But the emotional emphasis would continue into the modern period, particularly as some of the economic and production functions of the family declined when work moved outside the home.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

When the debates surrounding the prolific power of protoindustrialists peaked in the early-middle 1980s, they were superseded by new concerns about the ways in which gender was organized. In part, this new concern derived from the increasing pressure of feminist historians to distance themselves from the now-older issues of women's history; and, in part, it gained inspiration from the writings of Michel Foucault whose influence was at its height at this time. Foucault's writings provided a fertile ground for exploring issues of identity formation, which began to take the place of materialist concerns with family strategies and socio-economic change as the driving force of historical analysis. The key text in this historiographical shift, *Family Fortunes*, was written by Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, who set out to explore how two sets of English middle-class women's lives were organized by changing images of gender. While they paid close attention to the material forces that influenced the lives of the female Cadburys of Birmingham and the Taylors of Essex, the most exciting parts of their argument derived from Davidoff and Hall's close attention to the ways these women fashioned and represented themselves in accommodating the exigencies of social change. As they write,

The concept of purity had taken on a special resonance for women partly because of fears associated with the polluting powers of sexuality. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the middle class was their concern with decorum in bodily functions and cleanliness of

person. Thus, maintaining purity and cleanliness was both a religious goal and a practical task for women. (Davidoff and Hall, p. 90)

This point is tremendously important in the Victorian emphasis on women's roles as mothers—as opposed to the early modern concern with women as wives. Such women were enjoined to make their homes a safe haven in a heartless world. And, as Davidoff and Hall write, it was a task that was taken on with a religious fervor. It should be added that emphasis on this new orientation in middle-class women's self-definition was accompanied by a missionary desire to implant these behaviors on those below them in the social structure whose family lives were thought to be backward, crude, and primitive.

This argument is superbly demonstrated by the historical anthropologists Orvar Löfgren and Jonas Frykman, whose work compares and contrasts family life among the peasantry, the proletariat, and the middle classes in Oscanian Sweden. The confidence of the bourgeoisie in labeling other behaviors as backward, crude, and primitive provided an enormous impetus to social reform. Lower-class families were to be the object of surveillance and those whose behavior was not in conformity with the new standards were to be the object of state-sanctioned policing. At the heart of this vision, then, is the arrogation of truth by the instrumentality of social reason which takes place alongside the marginalization of those who do not—or will not—conform. Exercising control through the discipline of the body, the mind, and the soul is one of the key themes in modern history. The internalization of discipline was part of a long and arduous process of education which was an extremely protracted issue in the making of modern societies.

In the course of the early modern period, this technology of the self was severed from both religion and its patrician class origins; self-examination became popularized as the real way of life, not just a formalized set of ritual observances in the charge of specialists. The modern state has bureaucratized self-policing by incorporating it into the daily life of its citizens—from cradle to grave—and by cloaking it in the positivistic mantle of medical science. The regulatory thrust of this command structure was built upon deep foundations; in this regard, nineteenth-century state-formation was modern in that it was able to avail itself of new institutions, new techniques, and new technologies while deploying these strategies against a fundamentally new class.

The family axis in this way became both more narrowly construed and more attentively policed. It became the site for sentiment-building in some of the trends at the end of the early modern period. In it,

the most rigorous techniques of repressive discipline, as Michel Foucault writes, “were formed, and, more particularly, applied first, with the greatest intensity, in the economically privileged and politically dominant classes.” He further states that “what was formed was a political ordering of life, not through an enslavement of others, but through an affirmation of self” so that “it has to be seen as the self-affirmation of one class rather than the enslavement of another: a defense, a protection, a strengthening, and an exaltation that were eventually extended to others—at the cost of different transformations—as a means of social control and political subjugation.” (Foucault, p. 120)

Resistance to this disciplinary project was based on something more than an irrational adherence to tradition. Family formation strategies were not reflex actions; they represented something deeper that adapted to changing pressures by assimilating what was needed and rejecting the rest. In an age of revolution, the pressures to adapt became more intense and the resistance to change more complex. In the course of adapting themselves to change, both discursive and behavioral practices were being beaten on the anvil of plebeian resistance with the hammer of bourgeois prescription and so came to develop a shape of their own.

In place of the independent paternal authority that characterized the early modern family—and provided the organizing metaphor for its political theory—the modern state apparatus permeated domestic space. Coincident with the fertility decline, a new disciplinary complex congealed; orchestrated by the state, the helping professions coordinated the application of power and knowledge in the daily lives of the citizenry. Teachers, social workers, psychologists, and the whole battery of social welfare agencies were created from a patchwork of voluntary institutions that had previously been called upon to aid the sick and infirm.

Under the mantle of professionalization, the job of interpretation devolved into the province of a new technology of the self staffed by “the directors of conscience, moralists and pedagogues.” Foucault writes, “the discovery of the Oedipus complex was contemporaneous with the juridical organization of loss of parental authority.” (Foucault, pp. 128, 130). This reconstituted family became not just the locus of what Foucault calls “bio-power” (and which might be termed “human capital formation” to conform to Anglo-American understanding) but also, and inevitably, the apparatus through which the practical regimen of reproduction was carried out. The reproduction of “bio-power” was thus both the means and the end of the revolution in the family. Foucault’s insistence on the nature of power relations in the politics

of family formation provides an important dimension to the processes of social change within which the decline of fertility, class formation, compulsory schooling, social welfare, and democratization occurred. The hallmark of this new knowledge-politics was the state’s enhanced powers of surveillance—to police, supervise, discipline, punish, and reward. The growth of a state apparatus concerned with human capital speaks very much to this point. Indeed, it provides the glue that joins together the public and the private, the social and the individual.

The fundamental sites of this new disciplinary program were the public school and the private family. The proletarian family was revolutionized in the course of the transition from early modern to modern times, when the proletariat became the overwhelming majority in the European population. The working-class household became the site of social and biological reproduction, not production, and in the process it came to be judged by the quantity and the quality of its product—human capital. We can see the prehistory of this transformation in the debates on police and charity initiated by the early modern political arithmeticians and political economists, but it was not until two centuries later that the institutional instruments were put in place to realize this Malthusian positivity, the modern family.

Faced with recalcitrance and outright resistance from plebeians, social disciplinarians sought recourse to the courts and argued that it was both a social and an individual good to break up immoral family units. When a child’s “home environment” is deemed “unsatisfactory” a huge caseload of bureaucratic paper is developed by a team of “experts” (in the helping professions) while the threat of constant intrusion into a “problem family” remains as long as their file is “active.” This was the field of moral force within which the massive expansion of compulsory schooling orbited.

Many of the social functions of the working-class family—education, health, and welfare—were superseded by the aggressively intrusive actions of the modern state while its productive functions were redefined by industrial capitalism. The restructuring of the social relations of production—as a result of the exclusionary tactics of trade unionization and a renewed patriarchy which privileged adult males—was intimately connected with the implosion of the working-class family as women and children were removed from the world of work. The restriction of working-class fertility was another tactic by which the labor supply was controlled when the cost of its reproduction began to soar and even teenaged children were removed from productive, waged-work and kept in school by the rules and regulations of the state. It was

only in these radically transformed circumstances—not just in response to the prescriptions urged upon them by respectable moralizers—that the working-class family reorganized itself. But it would be misleading to suggest that it was able either to resist or to ignore the prescriptive demands of the moralizing modernizers. We can see the impact of this intrusion most clearly in the changing life cycles and gender roles of its members.

In contrast to the corporate life cycle of its predecessors, the urban proletariat was decidedly modern in that its children stayed at home until marriage. Marriage was itself predicated on the ideal of the male breadwinner and the domestication of the wife/mother. The commodification of labor-power, and the concomitant devaluation of skill, compressed the life cycle of the proletariat. Instead of a two-phase transition from childhood to youth and then from youth to adulthood—the first marked by leaving home and the second by marriage—which characterized the corporate life cycle (as well as its rural equivalent of service), the proletarian life cycle was marked by a single transition in which leaving home and marriage were squeezed together.

The huddling of working-class families was necessitated by the disintegration of older modes of production and compounded by the massive increase in the supply of labor as a result of the demographic revolution. On one hand, adult male workers lost control of the labor process while on the other they lost control over their patriarchal family capital. In these circumstances, by the end of the nineteenth century, it was possible for only a tiny minority of labor aristocrats to approximate the male breadwinner ideal urged upon them by the dictates of proletarian claims of respectability in concert with the bourgeois chorus of Malthusian moralizing.

The transformation of demographic behavior was strongly influenced by the way in which those who had been marginalized made their own history. It was their proactivity—expressed in demographic terms by their recourse to fertility control (for their own reasons it must be added) and expressed in social terms by their rising expectations for inclusion in both civil and consumer society—that acted as the sorcerer's apprentice, transforming the task facing our historical Sisyphus. This task was further complicated because the relative openness of the marketplace was challenged by a mean-spirited class-consciousness sparked by the Malthusian project of blaming the poor for their poverty. Yet the openness of the marketplace survived; so, too, did the responsiveness of the political system. Marginalization intensified the contradictions which could promise inclusion but was

predicated on the exploitation of one half of society for the liberation of the other half. Consumer culture is now within the reach of everyone and in the grasp of most. The remarkable modernization of the working-class family was not a matter of bourgeoisification so much as a convergence around a certain normative standard that was acknowledged by all even though it was interpreted in quite distinctive ways according to one's class, ethnicity, gender, and age.

The power of disciplinarians was neither absolute nor uncontested; rather, their aims (discursive and practical) were hammered out against the anvil of working-class resistance. The blows that the working class absorbed were directed in an attempt to refashion its identity. To a large extent, this refashioning has occurred; but, equally, this new identity is not exactly what those who wielded the hammer of social change had in mind. But, then, they didn't have computerized, automated production routines in mind either; nor did they envisage the insistent demand for equality—social and political, personal and private—which has distinguished twentieth-century social politics.

This brings me to conclude with a question: Is the “modern age” over? If so, then, when did it end and what is replacing it? If we connect the modern age with a prescriptive vision of family discipline, then we are now living in an age of “late modernity.” The prescriptive center no longer holds. The loss of that prescriptive unanimity is a matter of fact. Those who mourn that loss cannot forget the sentimental family; they seem to believe that it was a natural form of social organization and not one constructed in the transition from early modern to modern times. The cost exacted by modern memory is that those who cannot forget the family often mistake its appearance and in so doing betray a fundamental misunderstanding of the contingency of the world we have made. The splintering of prescriptive unanimity has led to the emergence of familial pluralism. More particularly, I would suggest that if the early modern world was characterized by “government of families,” the modern world by “government through the family,” then the world of late modernity will be characterized by “government without the family.”

Along with increasing diversity of family types in the twentieth century has come a redefinition of many family functions. Except for a brief post-World War II baby boom, numbers of children per family continued to decline, and in general childrearing declined as a family function. The entry of married women into the labor force from the 1950s onward changed their bargaining power within marriage. Many families increasingly served as rec-

reational and consumer units, and many people found they could do without the family altogether for these purposes. Rising divorce rates and, particu-

larly in areas such as Scandinavia, increasing numbers of unions without marriage, signaled this redefinition of functions.

See also other articles in this section.

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KINSHIP



Andrejs Plakans

When used by historians, the term “kinship” and its variants (“kinship ties,” “kin networks”) commonly point to a domain of social connections individuals had by virtue of birth and marriage. In everyday life these ties generated kinship roles (father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, uncle, cousin, etc.) which, if and when enacted, entailed certain rights, responsibilities, and behaviors. The enactment of these roles left various kinds of evidence in the historical record. In earlier research, scholars often drew a line between “family” (parents and children) and “kin” (other relatives), but because of the influence of anthropology on social history, this practice has now faded. Historical researchers usually include within kinship investigations not only family but also types of “fictive” kinship, such as godparenthood. In the study of historical kinship in Europe, most of the questions raised initially about the continent are still very much open: Which persons in a pool of potential kin were socially recognized as such, and how did these practices differ among traditional European societies? What rights and obligations did various kinship statuses entail? Were there “systems” of kinship, and how binding were the “rules” of such systems? Did enactment of kinship roles over time produce a collective “tilt,” so that a past society can be characterized as, for example, “patrilineal” or “bilateral”? And how did the kinship domain interact with other social domains such as marital practices, property relationships, friendship circles, and the legal order?

The expectation among historians of Europe that kin ties had significance in historical explanation of both individual and collective behavior is of long standing. With some exceptions, however, prior to the 1960s and 1970s research tended to follow a biographical model, focusing on concrete historical individuals and their kin involvements when the narrative required. Sometimes this thrust was enlarged, as when in prosopographical research (collective biography) a collection of individuals of the same kind were investigated. But in the 1960s the confluence of new research directions changed this approach and

produced, within the context of a “new social history,” what might be called a new kinship history as well. The research mode identified with the French journal *Annales* called for an exploration of social (and other) “structures of long duration” (*la longue durée*); and in England the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure initiated major quantitative projects in what were termed historical sociology and historical demography. A greater openness among historians toward the methods and subject matter of such social sciences as sociology and anthropology (particularly the latter, as far as kinship was concerned) complemented these philosophical and methodological changes. As a result, among historians studying Europe both European and non-European, much more attention than ever before came to be paid to the social relationships that connected people by birth and marriage.

This new “agenda” remained highly decentralized, of course, with some researchers seeking to identify kinship structures that persisted over long periods of time, others investigating the “kinship content” of such microstructures as the household, and still others exploring how long-term changes in fertility, mortality, and migration affected the number and types of kin available in particular historical situations. Much of this work was conducted within other specialties of the new social history, such as family history, the history of women, and the history of children. The new kinship history shared the new social history’s interest in nonelites (“history from the bottom up”), though a number of prominent researchers continued their work on nobilities. Historians who did not find these new directions compelling continued to work in the older but still very vibrant biographical mode. One might also observe that these new directions were as fruitful to the study of kinship patterns in the medieval period of European history as in the period after the Renaissance.

In the post-1970s decades, researchers of historical kinship have continued to work largely along the lines established in the founding period, while ab-

sorbing yet newer emphases. Among the latter have been the stress on such variables as class, ethnicity, and sex—since kin ties may have been understood and experienced differently by the rich and the poor, men and women, German and Swede—and the injunctions stemming from postmodernism, which underline that all social relationships and accompanying vocabularies must be examined within the context of the deployment of power. There has also been a general deemphasis on the search for “kinship rules” and a new stress on the instrumental nature of kinship ties—on the notion, in other words, that such ties can be bent or ignored or treated playfully when situations warrant. With respect to research tools, historical kinship study has benefited from computers, which are of immense assistance not only in compiling and managing databases but also in producing data configurations with lightning speed. Because historical kinship research normally begins with the scrutiny of complex networks of linked individuals, rapid mechanical reconstruction of such configurations has saved countless research hours.

Though four decades of development seem a long time, the operations of kinship in most of the societies of historic Europe still have not received systematic description. Most of the newer research has been conducted in the history of western and northern Europe (England, France, the Scandinavian countries), with central Europe (the German lands, the Habsburg monarchy) next in line. The Balkan Peninsula has long held a special place in European kinship research because of the work of anthropologists on its complex patrilineal household formations (the *zadruga*); similar work in other areas of eastern Europe did not begin until the 1990s. (Here, the Marxist-Leninist paradigm that controlled historical research for many decades pictured kinship largely as a feudal matter, that was being left behind by a society evolving toward socialist modernity.) Nonetheless, in spite of the unevenness of research, the study of kinship has become an inextricable part of European social history.

THE QUESTION OF EVIDENCE

In moving from the study of concrete historical personages and their kin to an examination of kinship as a structuring principle of communities and entire societies, historians turned their attention to new ways of merging primary sources. Those that had been used earlier—such documents as wills and testaments, autobiographical accounts, marriage contracts, retirement contracts, letters, and land and court records—

had to be supplemented in order for coverage to include not only the classes of people who used such instruments but the common people as well. The new sources included household lists and registers of birth, death, and marriage. Listings frequently contained a profusion of kin terms, while vital registers, if integrated through nominal linkage, by definition could yield examinable networks of related people.

In the analysis of these newer sources, historians were at a disadvantage when compared to anthropologists, who had studied kinship in living communities for about a century. First, anthropologists could question the people whose relations they studied and obtain from them the meaning of kin terms and information about rights and obligations kin statuses entailed. Also, true to the imperatives of their discipline, anthropologists had elaborated a vast body of theory about kinship phenomena, so that results of fresh studies could be, in a sense, fitted into and made sense of by reference to an existing corpus of propositions about how kinship worked. Historians, by contrast, had no such theories about the past, though they were aware of the quasi-historical theories put forth by nineteenth-century sociologists about long-term changes in kinship relations on the European continent—that with increased migration kin networks had become diluted, that kinship had become a spent force with the onset of modernity, that the typical kin cluster of the modern world had become the two-generational nuclear family. These ideas, as it turned out, were, at best, hypotheses to be tested continually; certainly, given their generality they could not help in organizing the close-to-the-ground information to which historians now turned their attention.

The problems of dealing with the new evidence were numerous. To begin with, the most useful sources for kinship research about common people—household listings that used relational terminology, vital registers that listed kin-connected persons over time and in separate volumes—not only did not state the names of all possible kin roles a given configuration could yield, but they also rarely supplied evidence about how kin behaved toward each other. For example, a configuration of terms such as “husband, wife, son, daughter”—all that was usually needed for an enumerator to produce a household list—stated only four role labels but implied at least as many others—father, mother, brother, sister. In evidence culled from vital registration lists, the problem of implicit roles became even more serious because careful linkage of, for example, a series of father-son dyads could implicitly yield such role labels as grandfather, grandson, uncle, nephew, and so on, even though the terms for these roles would not actually appear in the source

itself. Moreover, these sources yielded static relationships rather than direct evidence about behavior, leaving it to the historian to impute social significance to an uncovered relationship. In other words, when it came to kinship, even the smallest data set required much inferential thinking, as well as necessitating the linking of these genealogical constructs to sources that would yield evidence about transactions among the named persons.

Continued research at the level of individual persons also raised the question of the representativeness of the communities being researched, in two senses. First, there was the question of how many examples of an enacted kin relationship were needed before the relationship could be judged to be a significant one for the community in question. Second, the question arose of what kind of hierarchies of kin relationships existed, so that certain of them could be judged to be more important than others. Clues to the questions that needed asking could be obtained from anthropological research on kinship, but historians could not—as anthropologists could—ask the people being studied for their views on the matter. Beyond that, it was not at all clear what kinds of kin relations had to be identified as socially significant before an entire community could be described as having an operative kinship rule, or how much variation could be permitted without losing the ability to characterize a region as one that had, say, patrilocal post-marital residence (i.e., newly married couples coming to live in the husband's father's household).

To avoid the problems of imperfect historical sources, some researchers, aided by the computer, made use of the technique of microsimulation. In this the starting point was either a real or an imagined population, the development of which over time was simulated rather than followed in the historical record. The technique required the stipulation of rates of birth, death, marriage, and migration, as well as the stipulation of the mean ages at which these events were likely to have taken place. The exercise was useful for answering such questions as, for example, how many different kin of certain types could a person have in a given demographic regime. Moreover, by comparing real-world findings with simulated results, it was possible to gauge whether a particular community was “normal” or somehow extraordinary. The technique did not call for the substitution of simulated populations for real ones, but it did improve the chances of evaluating the findings about real populations.

A final problem pertained to the evidence that presumably was needed for documenting kinship change over long periods of time—a goal of prime

importance to historians. Several choices presented themselves. One could study kinship cross-sectionally at several points in time in many communities and infer long-term change from the nature of the structures present at these points. One could also follow the kinship domain in a single community for as long as the sources permitted, thus obtaining a more reliable record of changes but sacrificing geographical coverage. Beyond that, one also had to choose among the configurations that best manifested long-term kinship change—the lineage, the coresident kin group, the shifting meaning of a particular dyadic relationship—and make the case that these and not others were the best indicators of kinship change in the long term. Alternately, one could invest all research effort in analyzing a community at a single point in the past, in the hope that others would complement the effort by studying similar communities in later and earlier time periods. None of these alternatives has shown itself as being easy, nor as the clear path to unchallengeable characterizations of long-term kinship change.

KIN TIES WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE HOUSEHOLD

The origins of the new direction in kinship research during the 1960s and 1970s are to be found in the work of, and the research engendered by, the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure. In some respects, its innovations were inadvertent, because the group's concerns were focused not on kinship per se but on the comparative long-term history of the domestic group (or family household). In the course of laying out an agenda, researchers found the need to create a system of classification that counted, among other things, the kin of the household head—relatives who were not the spouse and offspring of the head (coresident kin). Though in household listings from northeastern Europe (including Great Britain) the proportion of coresident kin turned out to be comparatively low, in listings from other European sites (particularly eastern Europe), the proportion was much higher. This information provided an important clue to how domestic groups differed across the European continent. In some places, kin-linked groups dispersed, while in others there was a pronounced tendency for kin groups to stay close together—even coreside—as long as the resources of the holding supported them. These differing characteristics were judged to be important because they provided a clue to how groups perpetuated their structures over generations. It was hypothesized that children growing up in groups of certain structures—rank-

ing from simple to complex—were likely to internalize the values of such groups and to recreate the same structures over the course of many generations.

Moreover, anthropological theory suggested that the “coresident kin” were an important clue to general kinship principles active in the community under study. Where no coresident kin were present in the household, the practices of the community endorsed “neolocal postmarital residence” (i.e., newly married couples set up households separate from their parents). By contrast, the presence in the household of married sons and married brothers of the household head suggested patrilocal postmarital residence principles at work. In the developmental cycle of the household, sons upon marriage remained living with the parental couple, but married daughters went to live with the parents of their husbands. Somewhat later in the cycle, after the parental couple had died, a listing of the group would show a structure consisting of married brothers. Moreover, the types of kin who coresided indicated other kin preferences in the community. Coresiding married sons and married brothers (as contrasted with coresiding married daughters and married sisters) suggested that the community, and perhaps the region, valued patrilineality (i.e., males in the father’s line staying together as long as possible). The presence of only one married son could be considered a clue to the active use of the stem-family principle, which means that a designated male heir stays with the parents while others disperse. The presence of sons-in-law suggested that in times of crises (no sons, death of designated heir, underage sons), the family could violate postmarital patrilocality and allow a married daughter and her husband to coreside with the current head. In areas where there were no coresident kin or the proportions were very low, the question of how domestic groups worked to perpetuate themselves would have to be sought in other evidence, but where coresident kin did exist, they were an important interpretative resource. In their work anthropologists readily moved from findings about the characteristics of domestic groups to statements about general kinship principles underlying group structures, and researchers following the Cambridge Group’s approach tended to adopt this strategy as well.

In order to provide a framework for ongoing research, in 1983 Peter Laslett proposed a four-part regionalization of the European continent in light of the evidence that had been uncovered to date about historical domestic group structures. This scheme, consisting of thirty-three criteria, suggested that “tendencies in domestic group organization” in Europe demonstrated the existence of four broad zones—

west, west-central, Mediterranean, and east. With respect to kinship within the household, the proposal suggested that the proportion of coresident kin in the domestic groups of the western zone had tended to be very low, in the west-central zone low as well, and in the Mediterranean and eastern zones high. Married brothers in the western zone had been virtually absent from the historical record of households, while in the west-central zone their proportions had been low, and in the Mediterranean and the eastern very high. Subsequent research on household kinship has not overturned this schema, even while scholars dealing with particular communities have found the formulation problematic, especially as far as the eastern and Mediterranean zones are concerned.

Prolonged comparative research on kin within the household necessarily led to questions about kin who were not in coresidence with each other—a line of inquiry that has yet to run its full course. The main questions were whether dispersed kin maintain relations with each other so that they could be conceptualized as a corporate group; if so, what structures these groups had; and what difference the existence of such groups made for the individuals and families composing the group. The main obstacle to systematic research about non-coresident kin was always the nature of the primary sources, all of which—especially household lists and vital registers—required time-consuming and expensive linkage projects before such broader questions could be addressed. The yield of positive links from such linking projects tended to be socially skewed (the propertied and titled classes having much better documentation than the common people) and problematic (names did not match, and in many parts of Europe population turnover was much more rapid than had been believed). Turnover led to the dispersion of sibling groups, sometimes far beyond the borders of the community and thus beyond the reach of reconstruction. There was no warrant for believing that such far-flung ties were always and everywhere broken permanently, because they could always be reactivated. But it did mean that whereas kin configurations within the domestic group could be described comparatively precisely, those that involved different residences and different communities continued to lead a shadowy existence as far as empirical research was concerned. In principle, through the adept use of precise genealogical information it was possible to reconstruct—at least for the higher social orders—all manner of wide-reaching kin networks, but the act of reconstruction was not in and of itself evidence that the network members used their ties or even recognized them. It remains to be seen what use, if any, was made of such ties, whether some

were activated more than others, and whether distance tended to equalize all such kin relationships.

Work on these and related questions produced research strategies to overcome the obvious difficulties. One such strategy has been to choose a defining framework and to define kin ties outside the frame as irrelevant. This strategy is an expanded variant of the study of household kinship, where the household boundary provides the frame. A larger frame can be provided by the community—village, serf estate, neighborhood of a city—and the kin ties deemed important are those which play out within the history of the unit. This choice is analogous to traditional anthropological field research, in which the small community was the focus. Another strategy focuses on a particular time-based kinship formation—a lineage, for example, and most commonly a patrilineage—and uses only its members (individual and families) as objects of study. This strategy can produce results at a point in past time when the relationships of all living lineage members are scrutinized, as well as over time, if the lineage is successful in persisting and has an existence over many generations. If a particular community's past is well documented, it is of course possible to study lineage formation and lineage extinction within a community over a long period of time. A third strategy has been to explicate the kinship ties of a single historical person within and outside that person's place of residence, starting with the information in an exceptionally informative historical document such as a diary. Identifying the composition of personal kin networks has been a normal part of the anthropologists' arsenal of weapons in kinship study, but, in the historical context, this strategy leaves unanswered the question of the representativeness of the individual and the community in which the individual resides.

A fourth strategy for examining kin activity outside the household is to focus on social processes that are not by definition a result of kinship activity but do involve kin. Thus, for example, studies of migration have revealed that kin of migrants could be helpful in the move by providing temporary homes at the point of arrival or a set of temporary residences during the move itself. In such studies, it is not kinship itself that is of interest but the uses to which kin ties can be put. Similarly, the workings of inheritance systems have yielded valuable information about kinship ties. Another example is recruitment to political office in premodern governments, since in these nepotism played a substantial role. In these studies, of course, there is no need to identify all existing kin ties, since the only directly relevant ones are those which the evidence marks as having been used. Yet without in-

formation on the ties not used, the researcher remains in the dark about why these ties and not others were activated, since the "population at risk" from which the used ties were drawn remains unknown.

During the last three decades of the twentieth century, investigations of kinship outside the household moved forward at a slower pace than studies of household kinship. Moreover, the same geographical skewing exists in both subfields, with one notable exception. Generally, we know far more about kinship outside the household in western Europe than in central or eastern Europe. The exception is, again, the Balkan Peninsula, which has fascinated anthropologists for several generations. The kin-focused studies of the English nobility have few parallels—in studies of, for instance, the Russian nobility—and, at a different end of the social spectrum, studies of kinship in the villages of eastern Europe remain sparse in comparison with the numerous village studies in France. In the 1980s, German and Italian scholarship began to turn to questions about social microstructures and kinship as well, but in all cases many of the questions this research direction raised at the outset remain only partially answered.

KINSHIP STRUCTURES, KINSHIP RULES, AND HISTORICAL SHIFTS

Implicit in kinship research efforts has been the assumption that kin ties bind persons to certain behaviors. If generalized throughout a community, region, and society, and if demonstrated to be operative over long periods of time, such constraints could then be thought of as examples of "structures of long duration," predisposing (or binding) people to act in certain ways, even if only half-consciously. Dedicated empiricists among kinship researchers would have liked to wait for sufficient micro-level research before drawing such macro-level conclusions, but, generally speaking, work has proceeded in a somewhat less ordered fashion. Findings about the operation of kinship in everyday life have confirmed, rather than uncovered, the long-held view that traditional European society placed greater emphasis on relatives on the father's than on the mother's side (patrifocal rather than matrifocal), that Europeans who found lineage reckoning of use tended to favor patrilineal rather than matrilineal, that in postmarital residence decisions it was the groom's father's household that was favored, and that in many inheritance settlements it was sons rather than daughters who benefited the most. In such matters, kinship research about Europe has brought no surprises. To the extent that kinship ties manifested

themselves as long-term practices or structures, these favored males while not always totally disadvantaging females. What kinship research has accomplished, however, is to demonstrate how everyday life, when it involved kinship ties, did not necessarily treat structures as sacrosanct, as a set of hard and fast rules. Thus Laslett's concept of "tendencies" in domestic group characteristics is useful in an even larger sense. Even though research on kinship has repeatedly demonstrated that custom and tradition favored males, it has also demonstrated just as convincingly Europeans' readiness not to disfavor females. This emerges when the starting point of research is shifted from "structures" and "rules" to individual-centered networks and to events in the individual life course.

Existing research has shown that such a shift is not simply a matter of changing research strategies but the logical next step in how historical kinship needs to be studied. It is entirely possible to view a "kinship system" from different positions, with structural features being one position and individual kinship another. The principles demonstrably operating in these different realms may seem to be incongruous, but that is evidence that a kinship system may itself contain seemingly incongruous elements. Empirical research on kinship in the European past has demonstrated quite convincingly that great care must be exercised before assuming that there was one European system or that, within it, we can easily delineate cultural areas in which determinative subsystems with certain characteristics operated over time.

Within the general context of male-favoring kinship structures, it has become obvious that when necessary individuals used kin connections on both the father's and mother's side: ego-based kinship, to use the anthropological term, was bilateral. Assistance, favors, support, and other help of various kinds for a person in trouble could just as easily flow from one's matrilineal as patrilineal relatives. At times, this was dictated by necessity, when demographic cataclysms had reduced the number of patrilineal kin; but even when both sides were thriving numerically, Europeans could count on help on both sides when they needed it.

Certain practices that seemed to favor females over males were profoundly disturbing when brought into play. An example is the in-marriage son-in-law, a kin type that appears in those traditional societies where coresidence of married couples was common. Ordinarily, household succession concerned sons, but when a couple had had only daughters or when sons had died, there was little hesitancy to incorporate into the domestic group a son-in-law as a potential heir. In communities where this was common, the practice

was frequently surrounded by loss of face for the parental couple and the son-in-law. In these situations, however, it is clear that it was the survival of the family's base—the farm or holding—that was of principal importance, even though survival was accomplished through a break in the patriline.

A much more direct threat to the perpetuation of kinship structures and rules was the growing significance of the nuclear family unit, a slow process starting perhaps in the seventeenth but definitely present by the eighteenth century. In this shift, wider kin ties were not necessarily severed but were deemphasized. Thus the husband-wife and parent-child ties became more important than the ties between the same husband and his father and other patrilineal relatives. Emphasis shifted from a kind of equality among one's own children and the children of one's siblings and became focused on one's own children. In this situation the wife ceased to think of herself as still attached, even after marriage, to her father's line, and increasingly began to think of herself as the spouse of her husband, irrevocably removed from the father's kin network.

It is very probable that this shift, operating from the eighteenth century onward, gradually equalized kin ties to persons outside the conjugal family unit. Specific kin ties to particular individuals lost whatever force they had had before, and all kin beyond the conjugal family became more or less interchangeable. Such a shift did not invent a new feature of European kinship but simply enhanced the importance of existing bilaterality. In some societies, especially in western and northern Europe, where domestic groups were always small and did not often include coresident married relatives, this shift—judging by the fuzziness of kinship terminology—was already under way before the eighteenth century. Elsewhere, where coresidential kinship was more complex, the specificities of individual links were maintained for a longer time. Demographic trends clearly accentuated the equalization of kin relationships. In the nineteenth century, as levels of intracontinental migration increased dramatically, and as out-migration to North American and other continents increased as well, kin ties were severed and the specificities of relationships lost. Reforms in the law came increasingly to enshrine equal inheritance among offspring, so that it became increasingly difficult to favor sons over daughters.

Several features of these long-term shifts appear to stand out. First, it has not been demonstrated unequivocally that, with the so-called "triumph" of the modern nuclear family, kin ties beyond the family have been permanently abrogated. Repeatedly, research has shown that kin remained an important point of

reference, and kin networks could be mobilized to fulfill various kinds of support functions. Kinship obligations to specific persons might no longer be felt as mandatory, but kin continue to be recognized as a group distinct from friends and strangers. This has been particularly evident in European societies in which the twentieth century has brought long periods of social stress. Documentation of familial behavior during the two world wars, for example, shows repeated instances of the use of kin networks for survival, and the collapse of communist regimes and the transformation of state systems in Eastern Europe in the 1989–1991 period has demonstrated again the importance of kin networks for all manner of assistance. Stories associated with continuing insurgencies in the post-1991 Balkan area (e.g., Kosovo) document Kosovo Albanians mobilizing transcontinental networks of relatives to assist in the battle for “national independence.” Though there is considerable evidence about the equalization and democratization of kin connections, there is little that suggests that kin have been made equal to friends.

Second, kinship theorists have at times made reference to “modern” European kinship, which car-

ried the implications that “modernity” was a permanently achieved state and that the interchangeability of kin ties had permanently superseded all other kin characteristics. With increasing doubts about the permanence of the “modern,” however, it is fair to say that there is no historical warrant for assuming that the present state will last forever. The appropriate assessment would be that the present is a phase—neither higher nor lower—of the continually unfolding social history of the European continent, and that the current configurations do not provide any usable clues to what the characteristics of future phases will be.

Third, some features of “modern” European family life may make kin reckoning more difficult and dethrone lineage reckoning entirely. The high proportion of marriages that end in divorce, the equalization of state benefits to married and unmarried cohabiting couples, the diminishing fertility rate, and the growing popularity of no-child or single-child families all disrupt lineage formation and lineage calculation. The proportion of Europeans involved in such phenomena appears to be growing. If such trends continue, the identification of lineages will clearly become virtually impossible, and perhaps irrelevant.

See also The European Marriage Pattern (volume 2) and other articles in this section.

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THE HOUSEHOLD



Richard Wall

This essay assesses the multifaceted character of the household as a residential and social unit. Later sections of the essay consider the role of economic, demographic, and social factors in shaping household forms, and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the various attempts that have been made to map the variation in household patterns across Europe.

The household is usually defined as a residence unit. The members of a household include all persons, whether or not they are related to each other, who share a clearly defined living space or dwelling. The household is in this way clearly distinguished from the family, whose members are related to each other, however distantly, but do not necessarily co-reside. Households can also have other attributes. Members of the household (or some of them) may pool their incomes, eat communally at least once a day, and earn their livelihood from working together to exploit assets rented, leased, or owned by the household, such as a farm or workshop. Other ties may develop from this level of cooperation: a sense of mutual dependence among the members of the household, respect for the authority of the household head, and a desire to preserve the privacy of the physical space occupied by the household. The household may also undertake the socialization of the young and afford shelter to members of the local community (primarily relatives but in some cases also nonrelatives such as foster children and the childless elderly) unable to provide for themselves from their own resources. Vestiges of the religious and judicial functions of the household lingered from medieval times.

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF THE HOUSEHOLD

The multifaceted character of the household has been a major source of its appeal to economists, sociologists, and social geographers as well as historians. The household has attracted attention both as the unit which ensures the reproduction of the labor force and

the unit through which capitalist economies pressurize individuals as workers. The household has also been viewed as the locus of many of the relationships between men and women, where much work, domestic labor, and child care is undertaken. Different theorists have stressed some functions of the household at the expense of others. For Michel Verdon it is the criteria of residence; for Kathie Friedman it is its role as an income-pooling unit. This leads the latter to redefine the household to include persons who live elsewhere who contribute to its economic well-being, thereby identifying as the significant unit in societies not those persons who live together but the wider group of persons who share (some) of their income. As Diana Wong has pointed out, such an approach assumes that this support network provided generalized support according to need rather than, as was usually the case, limited assistance in exceptional circumstances. Inequalities in access to the resources of the household on the part of husband and wife, parents and children, master and servant, are also ignored.

Nevertheless, many households are not autonomous economic and social units. For example, Martine Segalen has documented for the west of Brittany in the nineteenth century the extent to which networks of neighbors as well as kin, smallholders as well as farmers, cooperated in a range of labor-intensive tasks such as ploughing, harvesting, and threshing. Such networks also channeled information, offering the individual material, social, cultural, and political privileges and introductions to a potential spouse. Euthymios Papataxiarchis has argued that on the Greek island of Lesbos in the nineteenth century, mutual aid, care of children, and even significant interpersonal relationships extended beyond the household. Women's ties were with their families of origin, while the men had their (exclusively male) social groups. Variation can be expected in the strength of the social ties which united members of different households according to area of residence, time, the nature of the particular household economy, and the social standing of the

household, but too little research has been completed to provide a wide-ranging comparative perspective.

The situation is considerably better as regards the economic ties between households. Analysis of the time budgets collected by Frédéric Le Play and his followers indicate that in Europe in the middle and later nineteenth century more than half of young couples working as peasants, artisans, tenant farmers, and laborers had received substantial financial support from their parents or parents-in-law either at the time of their marriage or later. In most cases, and in particular in western and northern Europe, this support was received without the necessity to coreside. Parental support was forthcoming less frequently in England, the Low Countries, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, and Paris than in other parts of Europe. Underlying these variations were differences in the nature of the household economy. Couples who were peasants or smallholders were much more likely to receive financial support from their parents than were couples who were factory workers or laborers. Other than parents, more distant relatives, employers and landlords, and other nonrelatives also made significant contributions to the standard of living of persons resident in other households.

In practice it is no easy matter when working with historical documents to identify an unambiguous, let alone a consistent, definition of the household. The lists of inhabitants which furnish the information on family and household patterns in England prior to the official censuses of the nineteenth century almost without exception fail to provide any definition of how individuals were set out in groups, whether separated by lines, spaces, or numbered consecutively. The most detailed of these lists have been identified as listing households on the basis of the information provided on the members of these groups: spouse, sons and daughters, other relatives, and servants were all described in relation to the person listed first in the group. This also has the advantage of providing a measure of consistency with the definition proposed in the British Census of 1851, where the household (referred to as the family) was defined as follows: "The first, most intimate, and perhaps most important community, is the family, not considered as the children of one parent, but as persons under one head; who is the occupier of the house, the householder, master, husband or father; while the other members of the family are, the wife, children, servants, relatives, visitors, and persons constantly or accidentally in the house" (quoted in Wall, 1972, p. 160). Even so, total consistency is not assured, as the British censuses of the nineteenth century were conducted on a *de jure* basis, recording all persons resident in a household on

a given night, whereas the precensus lists of inhabitants registered only the *de facto* population, the habitual residents of the household.

One of the severest problems encountered by historians seeking a coherent definition of the household is occasioned by the presence of lodgers and other nonrelatives who rented their accommodation from the principal household but budgeted separately. Some relatives and even adult children may occasionally have been in the same situation. On a definition of the household which focuses on income pooling, they should logically be considered as constituting separate households. Conversely, on a definition of the household based on common residence they should be counted as members of the same household unless known to be occupying separate living space. Most nationwide surveys of living arrangements in present-day Europe attempt to give equal weight to the common dwelling and common housekeeping in their definitions of the household, as recommended by the United Nations.

EUROPEAN FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD SYSTEMS

If the way households function and even the way a household is defined are embedded in a particular culture as well as in a particular economic system, considerable care is required in comparing the structure of households across both time and space. Some scholars have argued that all comparative work is flawed, as it simplifies and distorts social realities by using the criteria of areal coverage and prevalence in conjunction with the selection of supposedly objective standards or norms to determine the significance of a social structure. Classifications of household types, David Sabean has declared, are useless unless they take into account power relationships within and beyond the household and the networks which linked household with household, family with family, and individual with individual—an approach that can only be achieved through the study of a particular locality. The contrary view is that each local or regional study needs a wider comparative survey to place it in context. This is the approach adopted here. The loss of precision and context that this entails is admitted, as is the fact that similarity in household structure of populations from different time periods or regions is not to be taken as evidence that social relations invested in that structure were necessarily identical.

There have been a number of attempts to map the variation in household forms across Europe. In a two-stage process, first the distinguishing features of the household system are arbitrarily determined and

then, second, the regional prevalence is measured. For John Hajnal, building on his earlier work on European marriage patterns, the key aspects of the household system of northwest Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a late age at first marriage by men and women (over twenty-six for men and over twenty-three for women), the immediate assumption by the newly married couple of the headship of a household, whether newly formed or a continuation of the parental household (in which case the parents would retire), and the circulation of young people between households as life-cycle servants prior to marriage. Northwest Europe as defined by Hajnal encompassed Scandinavia (including Iceland but excluding Finland), the British Isles, the Low Countries, the German-speaking area, and northern France.

Hajnal's rule about headship runs counter to Peter Laslett's earlier (and later) conceptualizations of the west European family system, which envisaged the formation of an independent household on marriage as one of its key characteristics. In his 1983 paper "Family and Household as Work Group and Kin Group: Areas of Traditional Europe Compared," Laslett also argued that it was possible, using a broader set of criteria as the defining characteristics of each family and household system, to identify four, rather than two, distinct family and household systems that were dominant in, if not entirely exclusive to, particular areas of Europe: northwest, west and central, Mediterranean, and east. These criteria included, in addition to household formation rules, procreational and demographic characteristics and the types of kin present in the household, as well as aspects of the role of the household in the area of work and welfare. The effect, possibly unintentional, was to anchor each household system more firmly within a particular economy and broader social structure, the latter reflecting in particular the extent and nature of community and state support for disadvantaged groups within the population.

According to Laslett, the family and household system of northwest Europe was distinguished not only by the formation of new households at the time of marriage, a late age at first marriage, and the predominance of simple-family households (households consisting of couples with or without unmarried offspring or lone parents and unmarried offspring) but by the rarity with which households functioned as work groups and the presence of households which received a large part of their income in the form of transfer payments from the community. By contrast, the family and household system of central Europe contained a large proportion of stem-family households (where a married son, on his marriage or later,

continued the parental household by succeeding his father as the household head), and many households were work groups. In other respects, Laslett argued that the household systems of central and western Europe were similar. The household systems of Mediterranean and eastern Europe shared with central Europe the association between the household and the work group but departed from its other features through higher proportions of complex households (particularly in eastern Europe), early ages at first marriage (for both sexes in eastern Europe; for men only in Mediterranean Europe), and absence of the link between marriage and the formation of a new household.

Hajnal's and Laslett's delineations of European family and household systems have now been challenged from a number of quarters. One concern has been the fluidity of the boundaries between the various regions. Boundaries between "systems" might also shift over time. During the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the household system of Hungary evolved from the simple-family household system as in northwest Europe toward more complex structures in the face of land scarcity in one part of the country and labor scarcity in another. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, as the economy of Corsica deteriorated, extended- and multiple-family households came to predominate in place of less complex households. Other societies moved in the reverse direction. For example, in the southwest of Finland simple-family households increased at the expense of complex households during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in response to legal reforms which permitted the division of farms and the formation of households by the landless. After 1850 the trend toward more simple household forms was reinforced by innovations in methods of fishing which reduced the amount of capital and labor required. Simple-family households also replaced complex-family households for reasons still uncertain in some parts of Sweden during the eighteenth century. Instances in which, in different parts of Europe between 1750 and 1950, there were fewer complex households than fifty years earlier were almost matched by instances when there were more complex households later on. In some populations (Hruni, Iceland, and Cuenca, Spain) a trend toward more complex households is even evident after 1900, although increasing complexity of household structures was most in evidence in the nineteenth century.

A second challenge to both Hajnal's and Laslett's conceptualization of marriage and family patterns has involved a search for inconsistencies within the defining characteristics of a particular family system: for example, signs of the presence of a late age

at first marriage in conjunction with low proportions remaining unmarried and a high proportion of complex households, or, alternatively, of an early age at first marriage coexisting with a preponderance of simple-family households. Such evidence has been duly produced, particularly from Italy, making it difficult to maintain that there was just one Mediterranean family pattern. It is clear that the variability is too great to be accommodated within one household system, even with a generous allowance for the fluidity of boundaries between systems and the presence of marriage and household patterns incompatible with the characteristics of the household system of which they were supposedly part, as argued by Laslett.

An even more fundamental attack on the premises of the conceptualization of the northwest European household system has been mounted by Daniel Scott Smith. According to Smith, two of its key characteristics, a late age at first marriage and a high rate of permanent celibacy, were not intrinsic elements of the family system but the product of external constraints. Whenever there was an open frontier, as in North America, age at marriage and the proportions of never married fell below the levels associated with a northwest European household pattern, leaving only the establishment of a new household on marriage as the defining characteristic of the system. Yet it is possible to show that even this principle might be violated at times, such as when economic circumstances, in

the form of a shortage of housing at a suitable price or the need for young married women to seek employment outside the home, enforced the coresidence of relatives outside the immediate nuclear family of parents and unmarried children. Smith also envisages, as does Michel Verdon, a universal preference for small and simple households. Households, they argue, would always adopt this form but for the existence of a variety of constraints which prevent such preferences being implemented.

Demographic, economic and social change, particularly in the twentieth century, has had a profound effect on household forms. One such change was the fall in fertility which substantially reduced the size of the average household during the first half of the twentieth century. Rising living standards, in conjunction with an increased preference for residential independence on the part of both the elderly and their adult children, has also reduced the frequency of multigenerational households since the end of World War II. For the same reason, boarders and lodgers, so common in households in western Europe in the nineteenth century, all but disappeared during the twentieth century. Instead of living with relatives or non-relatives, many more persons at the beginning of the twenty-first century lived on their own, in a one-person household. Some changes, of course, occurred earlier, such as the decline in demand for male farm servants throughout much of England in the late eigh-

teenth century. However, the reduction in demand for female domestic servants, and the willingness of young women to undertake such work, can be dated, at least for England, to the first half of the twentieth century.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPEAN HOUSEHOLD FORMS

Tables 1 through 3 provide a more detailed perspective on family and household patterns in the European past by setting out the variation in the proportions of extended- and multiple-family households and in membership of the household defined by relationship to the household head. Table 1 measures the variation in the proportions of extended and multiple households in the middle of the nineteenth century, when data are most plentiful. Extended-family households include both a family group (couple with or without unmarried offspring or lone parent with unmarried offspring) and other relatives such as a parent, sibling, or grandchild. If these relatives themselves constitute a family group (couple or parent and child), then the household is classified as multiple. In mid-nineteenth-century England, as table 1 indicates, there were almost five times as many extended-family households as multiple ones (the average frequency [median] for the eleven populations is 14 percent against 3 percent). Just under one in six households were complex: i.e., either extended or multiple. The range in values was also considerable: 1 to 7 percent for multiple family households, 11 to 16 percent for extended households, and 12 to 21 percent for complex households. This, then, is the English experience behind Laslett's suggestion that northwestern Europe in the past had very low proportions of multiple-family households. There is, therefore, some justification for the claim of "very low" proportions of multiple-family households, given a maximum 7 percent of households of the multiple type in mid-nineteenth-century England. However, the fact that up to a fifth of households in some English populations in the middle of the nineteenth century were complex must raise doubts about the claim that the proportions of complex households were "very low."

Nor are these patterns particularly distinctive. Multiple-family households were equally rare in some French populations: as, for example, in Montplaisant, although located in the south of the country, as well as in a number of populations in northern France. There were also Spanish, Italian, Swedish, and Icelandic populations with as few multiple-family households, and even some populations from southwest Finland with no more multiple-family households than in the English populations with the highest frequency

of multiple-family households of the eleven English populations. On the other hand, there were other French, Spanish, Italian, Icelandic, Swedish, and Finnish populations with proportions of multiple-family households far in excess of the experience of any of the English populations. What is therefore most distinctive about the English experience is its uniformity, relative to the variation in household forms occurring in other parts of Europe.

The division of Europe into distinct familial regions as proposed by Laslett—northwest, central and middle, Mediterranean, and east—also looks problematic. Most distinctive, and with very high proportions of multiple and complex households, are the populations of eastern Europe. Yet even in this instance, multiple-family households occur almost as frequently in some of the northern Italian populations (and in higher proportions than on the Linden Estate in Kurland, Lithuania), and proportions of complex households present were as frequent in western districts of Finland. Mediterranean populations look particularly diverse, as others have noted. In the middle of the nineteenth century, there were fewer extended-family households in southern Italian populations than in England (although probably more multiple-family households), whereas in northern Italy the proportions of multiple-family households were close to those of eastern Europe. Household patterns in the Nordic countries were also extremely variable, with several populations from Iceland and Sweden not conforming to the tenets of the northwest European household system, although placed by Hajnal within the ambit of this system for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Unfortunately, we cannot proceed further with delineation of the sphere of influence of west (or northwest) European family patterns, as the selection criteria used to produce table 1 resulted in the inclusion of only one population from Germany and one from Switzerland, and none at all from Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark. Other studies indicate, however, that rural households in England contained as many relatives as did households in Denmark and Flanders and more relatives than households in the Netherlands. We may reasonably infer, therefore, similar proportions of complex households in Denmark, Flanders, and England (lower in the case of the Netherlands). By the same token, households in nineteenth-century Ireland were considerably more complex.

Rural households. Table 2 sets out the membership of the household in a number of rural populations enumerated at a variety of dates between the late sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries, with mem-

bership of the household expressed in terms of the number of persons present of each type: heads of household (married and nonmarried), offspring, relatives, servants, and, finally, any other persons not known to be related to the head of the household. The number of persons of all types found within the household varies considerably, and the variation would no doubt be greater if it had been possible to include more populations from southern and central, let alone from eastern, Europe. In the case of servants, for example, in the selected rural populations the range is from 118 per hundred households in Iceland in 1703 to fewer than 20 per hundred households in the

countryside around Gouda in the Netherlands in 1622, in certain Swiss communities between the mid-seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and in the Spanish province of Cuenca in the eighteenth century. For offspring, the range is from 279 per hundred households in Egislaus in Switzerland, in the area around Gouda, and in West Flanders in 1814, to 157 per hundred households in Cuenca in 1724.

Gauging the significance of the variation is more difficult but can be considered from the following points of view. In the first place there is the question of the smoothness of the distributions when the populations are placed in rank order from those with most

offspring, kin, or servants to those with least. Three populations, for instance, stand out as having an above average number of servants (Iceland, Denmark, and West Flanders). Then follow a number of populations with more moderate numbers of servants (Norway, west Nord Brabant, and England) and finally three populations with very few servants (the Swiss com-

munities, Cuenca, and three of the rural areas in the Netherlands). In a similar vein, populations can be identified where very few households were headed by nonmarried persons (Denmark, West Flanders, and the Swiss communities) or contained a large number of unrelated persons (Iceland and to a lesser extent Norway). On the other hand, there are very few occasions

when any one population is sufficiently distinctive as regards a particular component of the household—for example, the number of its offspring, relatives, or servants—to stand apart from all other populations. Of the various populations examined so far, the most distinctive in view of the large number of servants and other unrelated persons is Iceland, but even Iceland may come to look less distinctive as investigations of other European populations are completed.

Indeed, already the differences between Iceland and the rest of Europe look quite modest when set alongside the structure of the household in some non-European populations—that of India, for example, where there were 122 relatives per hundred households in 1951, and the Russian serfs of the nineteenth century, with their 520 relatives per hundred households. Nevertheless, it is obvious that there has been considerable variation in household structure even within the confines of northern and central Europe. For example, the Danish, Norwegian, and West Flemish populations had many married household heads and many offspring and servants, the number of off-

spring being boosted in West Flanders by the frequency with which both widowers and widows remarried. The populations of rural Holland stand out on account of the relative rarity of kin and servants in the household. The distinctiveness of Iceland, on the other hand, as has already been mentioned, was due to the large number of servants and other unrelated persons attached to its households. Finally, a fourth household pattern may exist, exemplified by the relative frequency with which nonmarried persons headed households. This pattern is found in England, west Nord Brabant, and Cuenca. Iceland, it will be noticed, also had many nonmarried heads of household.

Urban households. A place may also have to be reserved for a European urban household. Table 3, using the same classification scheme as table 2, shows that, in general, urban households were less likely than rural households to be headed by a married couple and that they contained fewer offspring but more relatives and many more unrelated persons, many of whom

of course would be the lodgers and boarders traditionally associated with town life. Overall, urban households, even including lodgers, were generally smaller than rural households. As with the rural households, however, there is also evidence of considerable variation from place to place. The households of the inhabitants of Norwegian towns, for example, were most likely to have married couples as heads. Households in Bruges, Gouda, and Zurich were more likely than those of other towns to contain offspring. Relatives, other than members of the head's own nuclear family, were most often to be found in the households of the inhabitants of Bruges and Fribourg. Servants turn up most frequently in Norwegian and Swiss towns and in Konstanz, and unrelated persons in Rome, Bruges, and Fribourg. Yet despite this variation in the composition of the urban household, the association of specific types of households with particular towns is not an easy task. In part this reflects the very fragmentary nature of the evidence currently available. London, for example, is represented only by one of its central and wealthier parishes, Rome by a handful

and variable number of parishes at different points in time, and even Southampton by only half of its parishes. This should increase the measured degree of variation from area to area, yet the reality is that households from different urban populations seem to differ somewhat less in certain key respects (in numbers of households with married and nonmarried heads and in the number of offspring they contain) than do households from different rural populations. Of the towns and sections of towns covered in table 3, only those in Holland really stand out on account of their low numbers of relatives, servants, and other unrelated persons in their exceptionally small households.

Sex ratios. The emphasis on variability is reinforced if we consider the sex ratio of particular categories of people within the household, nonmarried heads, offspring, relatives, servants, and other unrelated persons in the rural populations of Europe. As might be expected, through women generally being younger than spouses on marriage and generally outliving them, most of the nonmarried persons heading households were women. Even here, however, Iceland provides an exception, while two of the three Swiss communities lie at the other end of the distribution, with more than three times as many nonmarried women as nonmarried men heading households.

Sons and daughters who resided with their parents were usually present in almost equal numbers (a sex ratio of around one hundred). Any marked departure from a sex ratio close to a hundred in a population of any size would indicate either a mortality differential by sex or, most probably in these populations, an earlier exit from the parental home either by sons or by daughters. In rural populations, other factors being equal, any desire to retain male family labor in farming and keep the heir in residence, assuming the heir was, by preference a son, would tend to raise the sex ratio. However, the effect on the sex ratio of the entire offspring group (as opposed to offspring over the age of ten) is likely to be muted since the vast majority of offspring would be of an age when both sons and daughters would normally still be in the parental home. Nevertheless, in the case of England, where local censuses giving ages have been analyzed, it emerges that prior to the late eighteenth century it was sons and not daughters who were first to leave the parental home.

Whether this is the same elsewhere would merit investigation. What is already evident is that the majority of the young rural labor force recruited in the form of servants was male. Many of these servants, of course, were the offspring who were "missing" from the homes of their parents. The surplus of male ser-

vants shows up strongly in West Flanders in 1814 and in England before 1750. However, the surplus is less marked in Denmark at the end of the eighteenth century and is reversed in two of the Swiss communities and in Iceland, indicating considerable differences in the way in which these societies used service as a source of labor. Comparable differences occurred in the sex ratio of the groups of related and unrelated persons in the household. In a number of the populations, for example, such as rural Denmark in 1787, female relatives outnumbered male relatives by more than two to one, whereas in West Flanders there were considerably more male relatives than female.

A glance at the sex ratio of the urban populations suffices to show that females predominated in the majority of towns that it was possible to examine (few data sets, unfortunately, were available). Females were generally in the majority among the nonmarried

heads of households and among relatives, servants, and other unrelated persons to a much greater extent than was the case with the rural populations. The effect of this excess of females (in Bruges, for example, there were only six males over fifteen to every ten females) on the economic and social life of certain towns was considerable. Through their preponderance in the population these women made a major contribution to the economic vitality of these towns, and their networks of contacts with other women, both relatives and nonrelatives, were an important feature within the social structure.

Not all city populations, of course, were like this. The City of London parish of St. Mary Woolchurch, for example, had a marked surplus of men among the nonmarried household heads. However, of all the urban populations examined, it is those from Rome which are most distinctive on account of the

temporary household structures, particularly supposedly new forms such as nonmarital cohabitation and “living apart together,” as well as the increased numbers of lone parents and persons living alone, are seen as the result of the exercise of personal choices on the part of those concerned—in other words, as cultural preferences, although with the economic wherewithal to live in the desired way taken as a prerequisite.

The capacity of economic forces to shape family and household patterns is self-evident and can take a multitude of forms. For Pier Paolo Viazzo and Dionigi Albera, environmental factors, particularly the varying labor requirements of different mountain communities of northern Italy, explained the variations in their demographic and family patterns. The significance of the local labor market is also stressed by Michael Mitterauer for Austria, by John Rogers and Lars-Göran Tedebrand for Sweden, and by James Lehning for the Loire region of France, among many others. More generally, economic factors appear to underpin the marriage and household patterns of northwest Europe. According to this scenario, the timing of marriage and the formation of a new household were postponed until a suitable farm became available, sufficient savings had been accumulated, or an appropriate skill gained on the labor market. In eastern Europe, on the other hand, the serf owner, together with the village community, occasioned the formation of complex households.

In societies where land was a key resource, a shortage of land, whether as a result of population growth or landlord restrictions on land use, could occasion the formation of more complex households. However, greater security of tenure could also encourage the formation of more complex households, even when the economic situation of the farming population was, relative to other sections of the economy, in decline, as in Hrúni, Iceland, between 1880 and 1930. Hrúni provides a particularly interesting example, as early in the nineteenth century the structure of households in Hrúni had become less complex during a period of severe economic hardship resulting from disruption to trade and depleted catches of fish, even though the crisis was less severe in its impact in Hrúni, an agricultural parish, than in parishes whose inhabitants depended on fishing.

The role of demographic factors as determinants of family patterns is also very evident. High mortality limits the opportunities for parents to coreside with their adult children. A rise in life expectancy at older ages, a rise greater for women than for men, as in the twentieth century, increases the numbers of persons at risk of living on their own. The growth of population may also strain the existing family system, directly or indirectly: directly by forcing parents to ex-

relative preponderance of males in all constituent parts of the household, at least in the first two of the periods studied (1650s and 1700s). In the case of Rome, there is no reason to doubt the representative nature of these results since year by year through the course of the seventeenth century a marked surplus of males was recorded in the total population of the city.

THE FORCES SHAPING EUROPEAN FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD SYSTEMS

To explain the essential elements of the family system at the earliest point at which its workings can be observed, different scholars have pointed to the significance of a broad range of economic, cultural, and demographic factors. Economic forces have probably commanded the greatest attention in the attempts to explain historical family structures. In contrast, con-

port children to the grandparental home, indirectly by promoting the subdivision of landholdings, thereby making complex households less viable. The demographic impact of male migration, rather than a set of inheritance rules, is cited as the factor occasioning the presence of extended households in Lanheses, Portugal.

Much more difficult to identify with any degree of precision are the norms and expectations influencing residential choices. However, most interpretations of historical household structures, even while according preeminence to economic factors, have awarded at least a minor role to cultural forces. For Mitterauer, for example, cultural forces limited the explanatory power of eco-types (local economies that suited the topography) as determinants of household patterns in the extreme east and west of Austria. According to Inez Egerbladh's account of the family patterns of landed peasants in coastal areas of northern Sweden, cultural influences such as a strong regional church helped to shape family patterns within the context established by demographic and economic factors. Cultural influences lie embedded in the ways in which property is transferred between generations and in whether the care of the elderly is assumed almost entirely by the family or is shared with the community.

Admittedly, there have been some dissenting voices. Smith and Verdon have separately argued that

there was a natural preference in historical populations for the formation of simple, noncomplex households. Smith saw it as natural because of the resemblance between the simple family and the basic biological unit, and Verdon because of the "natural" preference for every adult not part of a couple to maximize their individual autonomy. These accounts at first sight leave no room for the forces of cultural change, although it would seem that both Smith and Verdon see culture as the prime determinant of a presumably universal family system. Other factors, primarily economic but also including, at least for Smith, well-established behavioral patterns, feature only in the role of constraints which prevent individuals from following what would otherwise be their natural inclinations to live separately from other adults.

Smith and Verdon assume a major disjuncture between the real (but largely unexpressed) preferences for particular types of living arrangements and the households that are actually formed. In this respect they are in agreement with Laslett, but with the important difference that Laslett saw the familial normative structure as enabling individuals to survive demographic and economic crises and ideological transformations. Verdon and Smith, by contrast, see the natural preferences of populations as completely subverted by economic and other constraints. Others

have predicated a more harmonious relationship between economic and demographic realities and the familial system, in which choices are framed taking account of the options available. Such arguments have been advanced to explain the evolution of family patterns in a specific microregion in Croatia after the defeat of the Ottomans, the long-term persistence of simple-family households in the Spanish province of Cuenca, and the continued dominance of the northwest European household system. The significant factors shaping family patterns in northeast Croatia were, according to Jasna Capo Zmegac, the timing of resettlement, the amount of land available, and the family patterns of the first settlers. These factors acted in combination to establish preferences for particular types of household. In a similar vein, David Reher has

argued that in Cuenca relatively early and universal marriage, neolocal household formation, and property transfers through inheritance ceased to be demographic, social, and legal acts and became normative cultural behavior. Finally, Mitterauer traces the origins of the northwest European household system back to the early Middle Ages and the combined influences of the Catholic Church and a tighter control over access to land consequent on a deterioration in the land-labor ratio. According to Mitterauer, therefore, the northwest European household system was the joint creation of economic circumstances and a specific institutional structure (which was itself embedded in a number of cultural values). These forces then shaped the cultural preferences of various European populations which kept the system in place thereafter.

See also **The Population of Europe: Early Modern Demographic Patterns** (volume 2); **The Population of Europe: The Demographic Transition and After** (volume 2); **Preindustrial Manufacturing** (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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INHERITANCE



Julie Hardwick

In the narrowest sense, inheritance concerns the transmission of property from one person to another, whether that property is money, real estate, personal possessions, titles, or kingdoms. This very specific process has, however, the broadest of implications. Every person in European society—men and women, rich and poor, young and old, urban and rural, Catholic and Protestant—was affected by the transmission of property through inheritance. Relations between people, whether parents and children, siblings, or men and women, have influenced and been profoundly influenced by the way inheritance worked. The giving of property provided a symbolic as well as material means for family members to express their affection for each other or to designate their preferences for some family members over others. Moreover, patterns of inheritance were determined by many factors, such as laws, economic practices, social customs, and demographic patterns, as well as personal preferences. Because exploring the way inheritance worked in a particular historical community reveals many different aspects of that community, European social historians have found inheritance to be an invaluable topic.

The approaches of historians to the study of inheritance have changed focus in significant ways since the 1970s. They have moved from examining what might be called the mechanics of inheritance, looking at issues like what the pertinent laws were and what wills of individual testators suggest about how those laws were observed (or not) in practice, to trying to place inheritance more broadly in the context of social relations. In this more recent phase, social historians have looked at inheritance as a key strategy that family members used to deal with the various challenges they faced—to ensure they had support in old age, to provide for all their children, or to guarantee that social status was maintained. This conceptual approach encourages historians to examine the many ramifications of inheritance. As David Warren Sabean has observed, “The way that property is held gives shape to feelings between family members, territorializes emotion, establishes goals and ambitions, and gives to each a sense

of dependence and independence” (Medick and Sabean, 1984, p. 171).

Key variables in inheritance practices include laws, timing, the nature of the property, and the status of men and women. The legal regimes governing inheritance varied enormously from country to country or even region to region within countries. Yet as social historians have shown in many studies, families did not always seem to follow the dictates of laws when it came to transmitting their property. They pursued a variety of strategies that tried to ensure that their own goals were met even while legal requirements were being observed or circumvented.

The timing of the transmission of property was enormously influential, shaping individual fortunes and family relationships. Parents might transfer property, in the form of dowries, gifts, or postmortem bequests, to one or more of their children at almost any time between the children’s marriages and the parents’ deaths. The consequences of these decisions over timing were enormous. A son who had to wait until his parents died to receive his inheritance might, for example, continue living with them and delay marriage. In turn, that pattern of delayed marriage for men was often accompanied by high rates of illegitimacy or prostitution.

When laws required that all children inherit equally or constrained parental testamentary discretion in other ways (as in England, where in many cases the law of thirds prevailed, whereby a widow would get a third, the children would get a third, and the father could dispose of the other third as he chose), parents could still privilege one child over another either by differential timing or by the kinds of property assigned to each child. One child might, for example, receive a substantial portion of their inheritance years earlier than a sibling.

The character of the property that was transmitted—that is, whether it took the form of movables (cash, tools, linen and other household goods, or personal items) or immovables (usually land or houses)—was also a key element in inheritance. When property

was transferred on the marriage of a child, it was more likely to be in movables than in real estate.

Gender was another critical element in inheritance: men's and women's right to property often differed, whether as widows and widowers or as sons and daughters. It was possible, for instance, that in a family where the parents' property appeared to be divided equally among all children, sons might receive a preponderance of the land and daughters a preponderance of the movables. In some early modern communities, daughters who received dowries at the time of their marriages were subsequently excluded from any further claim on their parents' estate. Early modern women who were widowed often found them-

selves in very precarious financial situations because they had to divide their household property with the other heirs.

EARLY MODERN EUROPE

Inheritance shaped the prospects of most early modern Europeans in very profound ways. Although laws about the transmission of property varied enormously, in early modern society a person's life was profoundly shaped by what property he or she might receive through inheritance. The impact was not only economic but also social, framing household structures and kinship relations.

Renaissance Italy. Renaissance Italy provided one of the earliest and most fertile grounds for historians' studies of inheritance. Although the territory of Italy was divided into myriad self-governing republics, Venice and Florence have dominated scholarly attention. In Venice, patrilineal ties (where kinship was figured through the male line) were especially strong. The most striking institutionalization of this dynamic came in the form of the *fraterna*, a legal device that gave sons equal and joint shares of their fathers' estates while excluding daughters, who had rights only to dowries. Traditionally, this inheritance system was viewed as the key to the persistent close ties between male kin, especially in the Venetian elite, and to the marginalization of women.

Yet as historians have studied inheritance in practice as well as law, a more complex view has appeared because Venetian women's dowry rights were strongly protected, and elite women were key links in the kinship networks that underlay political and economic success. Persistent dowry inflation through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries made daughters ever more expensive. While some families responded by coercing their girls to pursue the cheaper course of becoming nuns, other families met the clear obligation to dower daughters at whatever cost by drawing on an ever wider group of kin to raise the money.

In Florence, broadly similar inheritance practices prevailed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Patrilineal tendencies were reinforced as new elite

families of merchants and bankers emulated traditional aristocratic practices by giving themselves a family name that was transmitted by male heirs. The marginalization of women was given more material form when families used dowries to fulfill their obligation to daughters while sons were given equal shares of all remaining property. The close ties between brothers that resulted were evident, for example, in the establishment of fraternal communities where all brothers and their families lived together in the same large household, even after the father had died. Even when these groups broke up and siblings established their own households, they often lived in very close proximity, building complex webs of kinship ties that underpinned much economic and political activity. Sisters meanwhile found themselves in limbo, regarded as only temporary members of either their birth families or the families of their husbands.

Partial inheritance. Just as inheritance contributed to the distinctive characteristics of Renaissance Italian city-states, different inheritance laws and practices were similarly pillars that profoundly shaped daily life in the rest of Europe from the late fifteenth to the late eighteenth century. In many parts of Europe, rural and urban, partible inheritance prevailed as a matter of both law and practice. In these kinds of inheritance systems, the property was divided up more or less equally among all heirs. Families observed versions of partible inheritance in much of England, in slightly

different forms in western and northern France, and in much of Germany.

In some partible inheritance regions, the commitment to absolute equality was extraordinary. In western France, for example, customary law set very egalitarian standards for inheritance. Daughters as well as sons had equal claims on non-noble estates, and the principle of forced return to the succession required that all property received previously be declared so that the final portion each claimant received would reflect long-term equality. Heirs met to report what each had already received (whether as dowries, loans, or gifts of other kinds), and then the lots were made. Again elaborate safeguards ensured that equality among heirs was preserved. Heirs selected lots according to their sex, with all sons choosing first, and their age, with the oldest having the first pick. This pattern might seem to give the oldest son considerable advantage over the youngest daughter. Yet the person who would choose last was charged with making up the lots from which the heirs would choose, an ingenious device that gave him or her clear incentive to make the lots as fair as possible.

In other partible inheritance regions, the division of property followed what might be termed a different-but-equal pattern. In England, for instance, where many peasant families practiced partible inheritance, an alternative strategy was usually pursued. One heir alone would receive the land, while the others received movable wealth of various kinds.

The consequences of partible inheritance were complex. While it ensured equality among heirs, the constant fragmentation of property endangered the financial viability of family members. Social historians studying some areas, such as rural societies in early modern Germany, have argued that partible inheritance caused intense competitiveness and tension between siblings, whereas elsewhere, as in early modern French towns, it seems to have fostered cooperation. In England, partible inheritance that limited land transfers to one child left the other heirs detached and free to pursue their lives elsewhere, in towns, cities, or even the emerging colonies. In many parts of France, where land was assigned to all children, peasant ties to the countryside remained strong, contributing to greater reluctance to emigrate. Many commentators and historians have linked these differences to subsequent differences in national histories, such as rates of economic development or successes with colonization.

Primogeniture. In other regions, families followed versions of inheritance systems based on the principle of primogeniture, in which one child (usually the eldest son) inherited the bulk of the landed property.

Primogeniture was especially widespread among elites throughout European society and in areas where Roman law prevailed, such as southern France and Spain. In Roman law regions, testators had broad discretion to distribute property as they saw fit, which allowed them to concentrate their estate in the hands of a single heir.

Yet even in areas where a basic commitment to primogeniture prevailed, in practice most families showed a clear desire to provide for all of their children. Daughters received dowries and younger sons were helped with education or apprenticeships to provide them with means to make a living otherwise than off the family land. In such areas, families may not have been committed to equality, but they seemed to have pursued equity in their efforts to ensure to the best of their abilities that each child received help. Thus for most nonelite families the legal differences between partible inheritance and primogeniture were not as important in practice as they might seem. Families used inheritance along with many other aspects of their lives to weave strategies that met the varying needs of parents, children, and siblings.

In the late nineteenth century, a French sociologist, Frédéric Le Play, hypothesized that the practice of primogeniture led to the formation of a particular kind of household structure that he called “the stem family.” Le Play suggested that in families where only one son would inherit the land, the heir’s marriage usually coincided with the retirement of his parents. Subsequently, the two married couples shared a multigenerational household while other noninheriting siblings either went off to establish their own households or remained unmarried in the household of their brother and parents. Since the 1960s, social historians have endeavored to investigate the validity of this thesis, and many doubts have been raised. Historians now think household structures were less stable than this model suggests. Multigenerational households were common experiences at some point for many people, but their formation represented particular moments in the life courses of families. Moreover, families adopted multigenerational households for many reasons besides inheritance systems, including caring for the elderly, redistributing labor needs, and providing child care.

Dowries and inheritance. Marriages were also important moments of property transmission, primarily through families’ provision of dowries to their daughters as they married. Realistically, a girl could not marry without a dowry in this period. If a young woman’s parents could not afford to provide her with one, she needed to work to save her own dowry. Many

female servants, for example, used the payment they received at the end of their term of employment to fund dowries for themselves. (Early modern servants were usually paid only when they left their employers' households, not on a regular weekly or monthly basis.) Most nonelite families seem to have taken their dotal obligations to their daughters very seriously, however, and provided contributions to dowries if they could.

For newly wed couples, dowries were critical elements in establishing the long-term prospects for married life. Young men could use the cash injection dowries represented as an important means of promoting their careers, allowing them to fund their occupations by buying tools or positions. Even the poorest women's dowries also usually included the essential goods to set up a new household—items like a bed, some pots and pans, a stack of linens, and some clothes.

The effect of giving dowries on women's right to inherit varied considerably. In some areas, families considered that their obligations to their daughters had been met by the provision of dowries, and such "dowered off" daughters gave up any further claim on family property. In these cases, dowries were probably a means by which daughters' claims on family property were limited, and consequently girls received smaller shares than their brothers. Elsewhere, though, daughters who had been dowered were still entitled to participate in the division of property after their parents' deaths.

Legally, in most countries, husbands became the managers, if not the outright owners, of their new wives' dowries (and of any other property their wives subsequently inherited). Nevertheless, women's ability to have access to their own property varied from place to place. In England, a married woman's legal identity was consumed by her husband's as she became a *feme covert*. In the countries of continental Europe, women's dowries were often divided into lineage property and community property, even in nonelite families. Husbands managed both, but could only inherit community property: women's children became the heirs to lineage property, and if wives died childless, husbands had to return lineage property to their in-laws. Everywhere courts were careful to protect women's dowries from the threats posed by husbands who might squander the money.

Noble inheritance patterns. For elite families across Europe, the situation was different. Even in regions where partible inheritance prevailed for commoners, laws permitted noble families to practice primogeniture in some form. Such families often pursued versions of primogeniture most ruthlessly because they felt that their status, with all the privileges

it carried, would be jeopardized by dividing their patrimony—their family property in all its forms—among many heirs. The most striking practitioners of primogeniture were of course the European monarchical dynasties, who bequeathed not only personal property but kingdoms, and the contrast between the fortunes of the child who would inherit and other siblings was very dramatic in terms of political power as well as material comfort. The eldest son was the preferred heir in all royal families, and all sons were preferred to all daughters. In France, the early modern observation of Salic law meant in fact that women could not inherit the throne.

Other aristocratic families adopted a number of strategies to circumvent the perils of multiple heirs. The proportion of never married sons and daughters in elite families was high, a tactic that reduced the number of heirs and limited the financial burdens that dowries presented. In many Catholic countries one or more children were encouraged to take religious orders, a step that invalidated their right to inherit. As a result of choices like these, in eighteenth-century Venice, for example, 64 percent of the sons of elite families never married, while in France at the same time 42 percent of the sisters of dukes and peers likewise remained single. The numbers were similarly high throughout European aristocracies.

From the sixteenth century onward elite families also increasingly developed new legal means to avoid the division of their estates. These practices (known as *mayorazgos* in Spain, *fideicommissa* in Italy, *substitutions* in France, and strict settlements or entails in Britain) all sought to preserve intact the landed estate that usually provided the core of both the wealth and the status of great families by forbidding the division of land and putting it beyond the claims of creditors.

All such efforts to preserve the wealth of aristocratic families intact privileged the status of the family as a lineage or dynasty over the interests of individual heirs. Even the son who inherited such an estate was effectively a tenant for life rather than an owner, as his ability to manage the property was severely restricted. He could not, for example, sell the estate, and his ability to mortgage it to raise money was also strictly limited. Younger sons often found themselves with few prospects and needed to seek their fortunes in the army or church. Some historians argue that daughters may have fared better, at least if they were permitted to marry. Although dowry inflation was rampant across Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the result that the high costs of dowries threatened to ruin many families, the alliances daughters made were essential for the building of kinship and political networks. A daughter who

SECTION 15: THE FAMILY AND AGE GROUPS

was married with a dowry sufficient to attract a suitor of appropriate status could expect to live a life that was more on a par in material terms, at least, with that of her inheriting oldest brother than her younger brothers could.

Widows. Women who were widowed were also a distinctive group in terms of inheritance. In most countries, widows were entitled to a specific share of the property they and their husbands had accumulated. That share was determined either by law or by specific arrangement at the time of the couple's marriage. It was often around a third, although it could be much less. Although this provision was meant to give widows financial means to support themselves, the splitting of household property between widows and all other heirs left many widows in dire financial straits, as tax rolls from communities across Europe show.

Wills offered one last means for testators to shape the disposal of their property. Historians have shown that besides the practices already described that took care of the majority of property, men and women also used small gifts of personal property, like jewelry, clothes, linen, or books, as a way of expressing particular ties. Women especially seem to have been likely to remember their sisters or nieces, emphasizing a continued sense of the importance of extended kinship beyond the conjugal families they had established with their husbands.

MODERN EUROPE SINCE 1789

The two hundred years or so since the late eighteenth century have seen many dramatic shifts in European society that have had enormous impacts, both directly and indirectly, on the practice and significance of inheritance. These changes have included not only obvious developments like the passage of new laws that explicitly impacted how inheritance worked but also the emergence of new economic and political patterns that have transformed the role of inheritance in most communities.

The era of the French Revolution marked a watershed in many ways, as political changes in many countries were accompanied by shifts toward industrialization, albeit at different rates and by different means in different countries. In France itself, many revolutionary leaders were quick to insist that all children should have equal inheritance rights. The commitment to equal shares for all heirs became a cornerstone of revolutionary legislation, and was enshrined with little alteration in the Napoleonic Civil Code of

1804. For those seeking to reform France, equality of inheritance had political as well as familial goals because they foresaw newly egalitarian families as the building blocks of a democratic nation. This Civil Code, with its emphasis on equal shares for all heirs, became enormously influential in other continental countries in the nineteenth century, providing a model for legal reform. Even regions where its introduction was not the result of Napoleon's conquests chose to adopt the Code, as in the case of the Netherlands, where it became law in 1838.

As Western industrial societies evolved, four key developments dramatically reduced the traditional importance of inheritance in determining individual wealth and life course for all but the richest of families. For most young people, education rather than inheritance became the key to their life fortunes. With the rise of wage earning, children became more independent of their parents. The emergence of a variety of

social security systems as elements of welfare state programs also reduced individual dependency on inheritance. The most important of these perhaps has been the establishment of national pension schemes that provide income during old age. Finally, many governments introduced new fiscal regimes, of which estate taxes were the most significant for the role of inheritance.

Nevertheless, the property families transmit from generation to generation still has important material and symbolic roles. Although laws about inheritance still vary from country to country, with France, for example, insisting that all children inherit equally and Britain giving parents the right to divide their property as they wish, in practice equity among all inheriting children, both sons and daughters, has become the rule in all but the most elite families.

Since World War II, as life expectancy has increased, parents have increasingly chosen to pass property to their children at many different stages rather than at the traditional pivotal moments of marriage and death. Parents have underwritten the costs of education as that has become an increasingly important determinant of success for large parts of populations, and offered financial help at many other moments, such as the purchase of houses or the birth of children.

The situation of widows in particular has changed dramatically in many regions since World War II. Increasingly, in countries like England that give wide latitude over the disposal of property, when one spouse dies, the surviving partner, man or woman, inherits the entire estate, leaving the next generation to receive their ultimate share only after the death of both parents. Even in areas like the Netherlands, where inheritance laws are still heavily influenced by the provisions of the Napoleonic Code that were introduced in the nineteenth century, husbands have moved toward choosing to protect the rights of their

surviving wives to have at least use of all the property. This pattern, which privileges the interests and competence of both spouses, marks a dramatic change from earlier practices, when widows' portions were assigned along with those of other heirs on the death of the father.

In the countries of Eastern Europe, meanwhile, the post-World War II transition to socialism revolutionized inheritance along with many other aspects of family life. The abolition of private ownership of the means of production ended the role of inheritance as a means by which wealth was transmitted from one generation to the next.

In sharp contrast, elite families have continued to incline toward preserving their estates intact. The legal strategy of entail survived most powerfully in England, where the nobility, like other testators, enjoyed few restrictions on the transmission of their property. For continental nobilities, however, the egalitarian intentions of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Code produced powerful impetuses toward division. Since the early nineteenth century, elites in France and Spain have had only very limited abilities to keep their estates intact. Even in countries like Prussia that at first shared with Britain the survival of the right to entail, noble estates were being divided by the later nineteenth century.

Even in the most aristocratic circles, where primogeniture seems to prevail most stoutly in the transmission of titles and estates, changes in progress suggest that the dramatic transformation of inheritance practices of the last two centuries are reaching the highest levels. In 1999, the British government was preparing a constitutional revolution that designated birth order alone, regardless of sex, as the key to inheritance of the British monarchy. Should a future monarch see a daughter as the firstborn, she will become queen ahead of any subsequently born brothers.

See also Gender History; Patriarchy (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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THE FAMILY AND THE STATE



Roderick Phillips

The family has historically been central to European social systems. In the early modern period and during much of the modern age it was the main institution for reproduction and the raising of children, the principal means by which property was transferred (by inheritance) from one owner to another over time, and it frequently provided services, such as the care of the sick and old, that in modern times are more commonly associated with other social institutions. The family economy, to which all members of the family contributed labor and resources, was the main unit of production in the preindustrial European economy and it remained important well into the industrial era.

The family was also perceived as critical to the maintenance of social stability and the moral order. Sexual activity was generally defined as permissible or illicit by its relationship to family relations: sex within marriage was permitted while sex before or outside marriage was frowned upon. Children were socialized into gender and other roles within the family; and in many respects authority within the family was portrayed as mirroring the exercise of power in society at large. Marriage breakdown, disobeying parental authority, the reversal of gender roles, dishonoring the family, and other disruptions of patterns of normative family relationships were often perceived as real threats to social stability.

Given the importance of the family to so many dimensions of society, the economy, and the polity, it is not surprising that any institutions that wanted to control the social order, either by changing it or maintaining the status quo, had a particular interest in all aspects of the family.

During the Middle Ages the church progressively appropriated control of the family, sexuality, and morality from secular authorities that had regulated family relationships and behavior through customary legal codes or legislation based on Roman Law. For example, laws and customs that permitted divorce were steadily replaced by church decrees and council decisions against divorce until finally, by the thirteenth century, the canon law of marriage was tri-

umphant throughout most of Europe (although it was weak at the peripheries). Divorce was effectively denied to European populations until the Reformation.

By the end of the Middle Ages the church regulated the formation and dissolution of marriage and a broad range of behavior within the family, particularly as they related to sexuality. Some spheres of family life evaded church regulation more than others, however, and in general the church had less success in gaining jurisdiction over property matters than over individual behavior and family relationships. There were also class differences in that the church made exceptions for the wealthy and powerful. For example, the church often waived prohibitions based on consanguinity and affinity, which ruled out marriage between a man and a woman who were too closely related, to enable royal or aristocratic families to arrange marriages that served political or dynastic ends.

The emergence of the nation-state in the early modern period challenged the dominance of the church over many areas of law, including the family, and the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries can be seen as a period in which the state progressively undermined the authority of churches to regulate the family. Although it was by no means a steady, linear trend, the general trajectory of change is clear throughout much of Europe, and by the second half of the nineteenth century the primacy of the state in regulating the family in Europe was established. Even though much of the substance of family law and policy continued to express principles that drew on Jewish and Christian teaching on the family—biblical texts frequently remained points of reference for legislation related to marriage, divorce, and sexuality until the late twentieth century—the power to legislate and competence to judge family matters were progressively transferred from church to state.

The distinction between church and state should not always be drawn too starkly, however, because as much as there was conflict between these two institutions for power to regulate the family, there was often cooperation. In England, where the church re-

tained much authority over the family until well into the nineteenth century, it did so at the behest of the state. When a commission was set up to revise the canon laws of the Church of England after the Reformation, it was appointed by the king, who was head of the church. Similarly, in eighteenth-century France the royal government set down the rules by which the church kept records of baptisms, marriages, and burials. The process by which the state assumed legislative power over the family from the religious authorities was sometimes sudden and dramatic, as during the French Revolution. But for the most part it was a slow evolution that combined both cooperation and tension between the two bodies.

There are three broad areas in which the state related to the European family in the early modern and modern periods (1500 to the present). First, the state attempted to regulate the family by means of laws, especially those dealing with marriage formation, stability and dissolution, sexuality, parental authority, inheritance, and adoption. Second, the state developed policies in other social spheres that affected the family directly. For instance, states frequently sponsored measures to increase population size by encouraging (and sometimes even coercing) procreation using fiscal and other means. Third, models of state power sometimes drew directly on images of family authority. The clearest example is patriarchy, where the monarch's relationship to his subjects is likened to that of a father's to his children, a relationship that was considered natural (even when it was created by adoption) and was therefore deemed to be beyond challenge.

The social history of the family has related unevenly to the evolution of the state's attempts to regulate family relationships. Although the state, like the church before it, prescribed rules and norms of behavior, many were widely disregarded by populations in their everyday lives. Court records dealing with family issues—such as litigation concerning inheritance, suits by one engaged person to force the other to fulfill a promise of marriage, or prosecutions for domestic violence—reveal challenges to legal prescriptions.

For all that the state had an interest in regulating the forms of the family—who could marry whom, what circumstances might justify a divorce, how property ought to be divided—and for all that it gradually accumulated authority over them, it has historically been reluctant to legislate or intervene judicially in some areas. A prime example is domestic violence. According to the doctrine of “moderate correction” that was enshrined in many European codes of law, a husband was permitted to “correct” (punish) his wife physically when he had good reason and when the

violence he used was “moderate”—that is, when it did not draw blood or threaten the wife's life. Because much domestic violence was thus legally permissible, court records do not reflect its incidence and there is no way to ascertain how common violence was. It is quite possible that the principle of “moderate correction” expressed a position broadly accepted by men as a means of maintaining authority within the family.

The law established the boundaries of many areas of family life and at times compelled individuals to observe the outward forms of acceptable behavior. Inheritance laws established the identity of heirs and their rights, and these rules appear to have been observed; they were enforceable by law. On the other hand, rules of partible inheritance, which mandated the division of property among more than one heir, could be circumvented if some heirs wished to sell their share (or exchange it for goods or services) so as to allow one person to consolidate ownership of all or most of the property.

In some respects the social history of the family is the story of the struggle of social groups or individuals to maintain their autonomy to observe cultural or individual forms of behavior despite the demands of the state. It is important to bear class distinctions clearly in mind here. State-sponsored regulations often expressed the values of one particular class, such as the bourgeoisie. Workers or peasants might well ignore attempts to interfere with patterns of behavior to which they were accustomed. For example the high rate of premarital pregnancy in some parts of Europe in the early modern period (about a fifth of English brides were pregnant when they married in the seventeenth century) might well have reflected a continuing pattern where couples began to have a sexual relationship as soon as they were engaged and married when the woman became pregnant. Such an attitude to the relationship of marriage and sexual activity would give a premarital pregnancy a completely different (and acceptable) meaning than in a culture or class where a sexual relationship was expected to begin only after marriage and where premarital pregnancy was evidence that the principle of premarital chastity had been breached.

THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

The intrusion of the state into family affairs began in earnest with the development of the nation-state at the beginning of the early modern period, and a number of centralizing monarchies, such as those in France and England, began to legislate on family issues. Paradoxically, state regulation was boosted by the Protes-

tant Reformation, which shattered the unity of the medieval church and led to the creation of state-sponsored churches in northern Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Scotland, the Netherlands, and England. In Protestant states the church continued to play an important role in some aspects of the family, but Protestants generally accepted that the secular authorities, increasingly the nation-state, had authority and jurisdiction over many family matters. They rejected the Catholic doctrine that marriage was a sacrament, and believed that even though marriage was ordained by God, it should fall within the jurisdiction of the state.

John Calvin, for example, argued that marriage was a civil contract under the jurisdiction of the secular authorities, and Martin Luther likewise insisted that it was a “worldly thing” and that the state should regulate marriage and divorce. In Sweden, the basic reforming law of the Lutheran Church in 1572 specified that marriage was an issue for the civil law.

Even so, Protestant states were generally slow to assume the power to regulate the family, and in most countries churches continued to play important legislative and judicial roles in family issues. The canon law adopted by each church continued to be important and the church courts continued to adjudicate in many matrimonial issues in England until the mid-nineteenth century. In parts of Protestant Switzerland, marriage courts were mixed tribunals of clerical and lay judges from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. In Scandinavia, church courts handled marriage cases but turned them over to secular courts if they were unable to reconcile the parties.

Although the Reformation opened the way for the state rapidly to increase its regulatory activities over the family, there were fewer differences between Catholic and Protestant states than might be expected. Throughout Europe, regardless of the dominant confession, states progressively gathered legislative power into their own hands at the expense of the religious authorities. This was the case in Catholic France, where the royal government steadily eroded the legislative and judicial powers of the Church. The indissolubility of marriage was affirmed by the Catholic Church in one of the decrees of the Council of Trent in the 1560s, but because the French monarchy claimed primacy over the church in France, it issued its own declaration to the same effect, the 1580 Edict of Blois.

French royal judges also began to use a legal instrument known as *appel comme d'abus*, which was a declaration that a church court hearing a case was acting beyond its authority. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries the royal courts used this action

to gain jurisdiction over a wide range of family issues: the marriage of minor children, bigamy, impediments to marriage, and broken engagements, as well as all property questions that affected spouses, parents, and children.

The state also gained legal and judicial authority over the family from the Catholic Church in the Habsburg empire. In 1784 Emperor Joseph II forbade the church courts to exercise any jurisdiction over the validity of marriages, legitimacy of children, promises of marriage, engagements, or any other matrimonial matter. The 1784 law declared that marriage was a civil contract and that power over it lay solely with the civil power (the state) and the civil courts.

The same process was evident in Protestant states. In Sweden the state (through the monarch) began to override the Lutheran Church's marriage laws almost as soon as they were issued in the late 1500s. By the 1630s the practice had developed whereby the Swedish king could grant divorces by dispensation in circumstances other than desertion and adultery, the only grounds recognized by the church. Grounds for divorces by royal decree included ill-treatment, frequent drunkenness, and the presence of “hatred and bitterness between the spouses.”

Faced with the Church of England's refusal to allow divorce (it was unique among Protestant denominations in this), the English state began to grant them instead. From 1670 until 1857 (when a divorce law was passed), English men who could prove their wives were guilty of adultery (and English women whose husbands were guilty of aggravated adultery) could have their marriages dissolved by private Act of Parliament. The church was not excluded entirely from such cases, however, because it was necessary for a petitioner to obtain a separation from an ecclesiastical court before obtaining the parliamentary divorce.

Within this broad trend of growing state intervention, it is possible to detect a number of recurring patterns. One was the tendency of the state to intervene in the family in order to achieve certain broader social and political goals. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was widespread concern in governments about what was thought to be sluggish or nonexistent demographic growth. This was an important matter in a period when economic and military power were more directly related to population size than they are today. In late-seventeenth-century France the government of Louis XIV tried to stimulate the birthrate by providing tax concessions to large families. This was the beginning of persistent attempts on the part of the French state to employ fiscal and other inducements to encourage procreation. In the eighteenth century the French monarchy tried to re-

duce infant mortality by such means as sponsoring courses in midwifery, requiring unmarried pregnant women to register their pregnancies with the authorities, and reforming the laws related to the treatment of abandoned children.

Divorce was sometimes used for the same demographic purpose. In Prussia, Emperor Frederick William II designed a divorce policy in part with demographic purposes in mind. In 1783 he issued instructions to judges stating that “in matters of divorce one ought not to be so easy going as to further abase [marriage]; but one should not be too difficult either, because that would impede population.” When divorce was legalized in France in 1792, one argument was that it would allow unhappily married (and presumably nonprocreative) couples to remarry and have children with their new partners.

The progressive secularization of family law and policies from the seventeenth century onward typically shifted the balance of regulation from churches to the state. Many Enlightenment writers were critical of the continuing influence of religion over law and society, and because they had no wish to see these issues unregulated, they urged their respective states to take over jurisdiction from the church. Faced with

specific problems, governments enacted legislation and adopted policies that extended their power. In England, where the Anglican Church controlled marriages, a Marriage Act was passed by parliament in 1753 in order to combat the increasing incidence of clandestine marriage. In France, where in the eighteenth century only marriages performed by a Catholic priest were recognized in law, the state unilaterally improved the position of Protestants with respect to the legitimacy of their families. From mid-century royal judges tended to consider Protestant marriages valid for the purpose of inheritance, and in 1787 King Louis XVI issued an Edict of Toleration that extended legality to marriages by Protestants.

Within the evolution of state power over the family in Europe, there were periods of acceleration, generally associated with revolution or political upheaval. During the English Revolution the republican government of Oliver Cromwell passed laws dealing with a variety of marriage issues. Civil marriage was legalized in 1653 and in 1650 an Adultery Act provided for capital punishment in certain cases. A married woman who committed adultery could be hanged along with her accomplice, but a married man who committed adultery with an unmarried woman was liable only to imprisonment for three months. In this case the limits of state law were determined by juries which, clearly thinking that the penalty was far too severe for the crime, refused to convict married women of adultery in all but a handful of cases during the ten years the Adultery Act was in force.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The French Revolution (1789–1799) provided a particularly striking example of the emerging role of the state in attempting to regulate the family and establishing family policy as part of a broader agenda for social transformation. Revolutionary legislators accelerated the process of secularization that had been evident under the Old Regime and deprived the church of any legal authority over the family. As for the substance of Revolutionary law, two aims appear to have been uppermost. The first was to make family relationships more consensual and equal than they had been under the Old Regime and the other was to use the family for broader demographic, social, and political purposes.

Greater legal equality within the French family was achieved by a series of legal reforms. The authority of fathers and husbands to control their children and wives was steadily reduced, beginning with the abolition in 1789 of *lettres de cachet*, arrest warrants that

could be obtained from the royal bureaucracy in order to imprison any family member whose behavior threatened the honor or financial security of the family. The following year, a new family court was established to deal with litigation or other issues involving family members. In the constitution of 1791, marriage was declared to be a civil contract, and in September 1792 a wide-ranging law made marriage easier (the range of impediments was reduced and the age of majority was lowered to twenty-one years from the twenty-five or thirty years then current in various regions of France) and divorce legal for the first time in France. Women and men were given equal access to divorce either by mutual consent, for reason of incompatibility, or for a number of specific grounds that included violence, insanity, immorality, and desertion.

The reform of family law under the French Revolution also transformed property relationships. In 1792 married women were granted property rights and in 1793 a new inheritance law mandated equality of inheritance among all children to replace the unequal distribution that had been the case in much of France before 1789. Earlier in the Revolution, the rule of primogeniture (inheritance by the firstborn) that had applied to noble estates was replaced by equality of inheritance in order to break up the financial power of the aristocracy.

The effects of these legal reforms on behavior varied. The marriage rate increased in many places, although it rose most dramatically in 1793 when the government introduced conscription and drafted bachelors before married men. Under the divorce law, which remained in force until 1803, there were perhaps as many as twenty thousand divorces, two-thirds of them in Paris alone. Given that France had a population of 28 million at the end of the eighteenth century, the number of divorces was low by modern European terms, but it was astonishingly high for the time. Outside Revolutionary France, divorce was either not available or, when it was permitted (in Protestant states), it was difficult to obtain and correspondingly rare. In England there were only 325 parliamentary divorces (including four by women) in the whole period from 1670 to 1857.

In France there was a surge of divorces in the first years the Revolutionary divorce law came into effect, as thousands of couples who had separated informally when divorce was not available took advantage of the new law to put their status on a legal footing. In the Norman city of Rouen, divorces averaged 161 a year during the first three years of the 1792 law, but the annual average fell to 67 in the following years. Some of the early divorces regularized separations that dated back decades. In Rouen one of the

first divorces, in December 1792, dissolved the marriage of a woman whose husband had been missing more than thirty years: he had not returned from service in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763).

French Revolutionary law reforms generally improved the legal status of women within the family, a stark contrast to their continued exclusion from many other citizenship rights (such as the right to vote). Within the family, women gained equality of inheritance, and married women could own property in their own right and sue for divorce. Still, material circumstances often inhibited many women from using their new rights. Most divorces were sought by urban wives, who had the possibility of finding accommodation and work when they left their husbands. In contrast, divorces in rural areas were not only less common, but they were more likely to be sought by husbands.

French Revolutionary legislators not only reformed the law to reduce what they considered the tyrannical authority the Old Regime had given husbands and fathers but they aimed to foster harmony within the family. Divorce itself was viewed as a last resort, and it was hoped that its simple availability would lead husbands and wives to settle their differences amicably rather than persist in domestic conflict. Similarly, one of the purposes of giving all children an equal share of their parents' inheritance was to eliminate the jealousy and hatred that inequality of inheritance was believed to have fostered among siblings.

By these reforms of family law in the 1790s, and by other measures that included national festivals in honor of family values (such as fidelity within marriage and respect and obedience toward parents) the Revolutionary legislators intended to create the legal framework for a new family. In it the parents would remain married because they wanted to, not because they had no alternative; spouses and children would be treated as equals; and harmony, not conflict, would reign supreme. The Revolutionary family would thus embody the virtues of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity that underlay the Revolution more generally. As a microcosm of the new state and society, the family would socialize and prepare men and women for their roles in the regenerated nation.

It was expected that a morally regenerated family would also lead to a higher marriage and birth rate and would thereby serve the demographic policies of the period. Improvements in family life would make marriage more attractive but, in case things did not work out, divorce provided a means of escape. Partly in order to boost the marriage rate, bachelors were subjected to policies that would induce them to marry. They were taxed more heavily than married men, lev-

ied at higher rates when forced loans were imposed to pay for the costs of war, and were conscripted before their married peers. The sentiment was often expressed that men who did not marry were asocial at best and antisocial at worst because they lived solitary, selfish lives and did not contribute fully to society or to population growth. Revolutionary legislators rejected proposals that bachelors be humiliated into marriage by being forced to wear ridiculous headgear or that any man not married by the age of thirty should be executed.

There is little evidence of much success in the goals that French Revolutionary family law set out to achieve. The marriage rate did rise in some years, but there is no reason to think that the character of relationships within the family was affected by the new policies. Even so, the French Revolution was an early and striking example of a state attempting to remodel the family and to align it with broader social and political agendas. Napoleon revised family law in a different direction to foster broader social and political agendas. The Code Napoléon (1804) made divorce more difficult to obtain, especially for women, and generally strengthened the authority of the father over his children and the power of a husband over his wife, reforms that reflected the authoritarian Napoleonic regime.

NINETEENTH CENTURY

Elsewhere in Europe state intervention in the family increased at a more sedate pace. The nineteenth century was a particularly important period, for it saw a virtual revolution in statistics and measurement that enabled states to produce national censuses with greater precision and to collect social statistics of all kinds. As state bureaucracies expanded steadily and there was a dramatic extension of state activity in all areas of economic, social, and cultural life, the state regulation of the family intensified in many European countries. In England the first comprehensive marriage legislation was enacted in 1837, and twenty years later divorce was made available from the civil courts for the first time. A wave of secularizing and liberalizing legislation on marriage, separation, and divorce swept through Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. Included were laws granting married women varying degrees of property rights.

The creation of new unified states in the nineteenth century intensified the role of the state. The unification of the German states under Prussian leadership led to the extension of secular law and, by the turn of the century, the promulgation of a uniform

code of laws—including family law—for the German empire. For the most part the new imperial law was based on existing Prussian code, which tended to be more liberal than laws that had been in force in many other states that became part of the empire. In Italy, too, unification led to the passage of standardized state laws related to the family, a major source of conflict between the nation-state and the papacy.

State-sponsored education could also affect family relationships, particularly by the end of the nineteenth century. Governments used education to encourage women to be good wives and mothers, for example, reinforcing this emphasis in family ideology. Regulations in hygiene, infant feeding, and other matters, pushed through schools and some welfare agencies, could also constrain family behavior.

TWENTIETH CENTURY

It was in the twentieth century, however, that the most serious attempts to regulate the family in the interests of the state were undertaken. Paradoxically, some of these attempts often involved weakening the family in order to reduce its effectiveness as a rival to the state in claiming the loyalty of individual citizens. There were hints of this tendency during the French Revolution, for during the Terror (1793–1794) the Jacobin regime introduced policies that were at odds with the more general tendency of Revolutionary policy of strengthening family relationships and the family as an institution. Jacobin legal innovations included making divorce much easier and removing procedures of the 1792 law that were designed to prevent the abuse of divorce; giving inheritance rights to illegitimate children; encouraging loyalty to the nation at the expense of family relationships if necessary; and framing educational reforms that would have children live in state boarding schools rather than with their parents. In the first half of 1794, during the radical phase of the Terror, thousands of children were given names (such as *Liberté*, *Égalité*, and even *Guillotine*) that linked them to the state rather than their families.

Underlying these policies (which were repudiated and repealed when the Jacobins were overthrown) was the belief that family sentiments inhibited the development of concern for society more generally. This belief was expressed early in the nineteenth century by a number of utopian socialists, including Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, who fostered alternative family systems in the model communities they devised.

A more sophisticated analysis of this sort was developed by Frederick Engels and Karl Marx, who argued that both the state and the family system at

any given historical period reflected existing economic relationships. The nineteenth-century family reflected the values of the dominant bourgeoisie, and state and family would be transformed when the working class seized political power. Early in the 1917 Russian Revolution the Bolshevik government implemented family laws that reflected the Marxist view that the bourgeois family would disappear. Divorce was made available at the request of either or both spouses and contraception and abortion made freely accessible. The result was a high rate of divorce and a decline in the birthrate during the 1920s that so concerned the regime of Joseph Stalin that in the mid-1930s family policy was reversed: divorce was made much more difficult to obtain and contraception and abortion were officially regarded as antisocial because they ran counter to the state's need for a growing workforce.

Other authoritarian regimes of the interwar period also paid attention to the family. In Germany the Nazis manipulated family law for a variety of state purposes following Hitler's declaration in *Mein Kampf* that marriage "must serve the greater end, which is that of increasing and maintaining the human species and race. This is its only meaning and purpose." The 1935 Nuremberg Laws forbade marriage and sexual intercourse between a Jew and an "Aryan," while other laws prohibited the physically or mentally "unfit" from marrying. While groups classed as undesirable were thus excluded from the state-recognized family system, "Aryans" were encouraged to marry and procreate. A system of marriage loans was established, with a quarter of each loan being canceled with the birth of each child. Nazi divorce law also reflected the regime's demographic agenda. Grounds for divorce included not only disparaging Hitler, but also premature infertility and using illegal means (abortion had been banned for "Aryans") to terminate a pregnancy.

Extreme family policies and rigorous family laws were imposed by a number of authoritarian states in the first half of the twentieth century in order to achieve racial or demographic goals. Most governments opted for more moderate policies, even if their goals were often similar. Many states introduced laws based on eugenics principles that were designed to improve the physical and mental health of the population. In France, anyone intending to marry had to obtain a certificate that showed their health and family history of physical and mental disease so that the prospective spouse would be fully informed about potential risks to any children they might have.

Most governments attempted to encourage a higher birthrate, by some combination of family aid and regulation of certain types of birth control such

as abortion. Fascist states went farthest in this direction, along with the Soviet Union after the more experimental 1920s, but France and other democracies joined in. Rarely, however, did these interventions affect family behavior, as birth rates continued to drop.

From the late 1960s, which ushered in a period of liberalization in social policies of all kinds, European states began to reduce the level of family regulation. A notable example was the introduction of no-fault divorce laws, under which divorce was available not on grounds (or faults) set out in law but after the couple had lived apart for a certain length of time. The effect of this legal reform was to allow spouses themselves to decide what grounds justified separating and, in the course of time, divorcing. Rather than be required to prove violence, drunkenness, cruelty, persistent drunkenness or some other state-designated ground, spouses could decide what circumstances or behavior were so intolerable as to make living together impossible.

States also accorded children greater rights with respect to their parents. Some, such as Sweden, went so far as to allow children to "divorce" their parents, but even where this was not possible, state agencies became far more willing to intervene to protect children when they appeared to be at physical or emotional risk if left in their families.

States also began to adopt more tolerance toward diversity in family forms. In the late twentieth century governments throughout Europe considered the issue of same-sex marriage. By the end of the twentieth century no state had given same-sex partners the right to marriage in exactly the same form as different-sex couples, although some (including the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden) permitted same-sex couples the same pension and fiscal rights. Among others, France had created state-registered unions or partnerships that had many of the financial and fiscal effects of marriage.

Trends in family policy in the late twentieth century have run in several directions simultaneously. On the one hand there has been a tendency not to interfere in aspects of family and marriage such as sexual behavior and to allow married couples to make their own decisions about divorce based upon their individual expectations and experiences. Similarly there has been a tendency for the state to blur the distinction between marriage, a state-sanctioned institution, and cohabitation, which historically has existed in tandem with but apart from the official family system.

While the state may be seen to be deregulating the family in these respects, it became more intrusive in others. Intervening to assure the rights and well-being of children is one example, as is the greater will-

ingness of the state to have its police and courts intervene in domestic violence, an issue in which the state has historically been reluctant to intervene.

CONCLUSION

Since 1500 there have been many points of contact between the social history of the family and the history of the state's relationship to the family. The persistent aim of the state to regulate marriage, filiation, and family relationships has provided historians with vital documentation on the family, but it is necessarily biased in favor of the state's perception of the institution. Marriages are documented, but rarely are cohabiting couples. Divorces are recorded, but not couples who separated informally unless they came to the attention of a state agency.

Records of courts and other state agencies offer privileged insights into many aspects of the family, and they are the core of historical studies of themes such as divorce, domestic violence, and inheritance. Censuses and records of vital events (births, marriages, deaths, and divorces) provide the basic source material for the study of family demography and enable historians to determine such important information as marriage and birth rates, family size, age at marriage, the duration of marriages before divorce or death, and rates of remarriage.

This is not to discount the important records maintained by churches, nor the myriad other sources that are often useful to historians of the family: personal papers, family archives, and the records kept by institutions such as guilds. But state records, like the church records that preceded or ran parallel to them, have certain advantages. They tend to be maintained relatively intact and concentrated in accessible locations in state or regional archives. They also often offer series of documents (like court records that extend over centuries) that enable historians to track changes over the long, medium, and short term and to identify historical trends.

At the same time, it is important to recognize the limitations of any sources. Court records of family behavior highlight breaches of the law or challenges to legal prescriptions, but we cannot say with any certainty how representative they were of more general social behavior. Very few cases of domestic violence reached the courts because a degree of violence was permitted under the rubric of "moderate correction" and because women, who were most often the victims, were seldom in a social or economic situation to prosecute their husbands even if they wanted to. A woman whose family depended upon her husband's work and income for its survival had little interest in seeing him imprisoned or fined, for either penalty deprived the family of vital resources. In this respect, as in many others, the material and cultural circumstances of family law tended to neutralize many attempts the state might have made to change family relationships. They also mean that historians must always be very cautious about interpreting and generalizing from records of such cases.

Nonetheless, the relationship between state and family is an important one for social historians, not least in that it can provide historical indicators of the extent to which family-specific behavior can be influenced by state policy. Overall the conclusion must be that states have experienced little success in encouraging rates of marriage formation or fertility. Legal restrictions on divorce in the past might well have kept the number of divorces low, but they did not necessarily have much impact on informal separation.

Research on the history of the state, the law, and the family is more than an integral part of the history of the family because so many historians rely on state-generated documentation as their primary sources of evidence. In order to read them effectively they must understand the legal, judicial, and political contexts that produced the documentation. Although the state may have become so intrinsic to family systems as to be an invisible partner to those involved in historical families, it is an institution that historians of the family must confront explicitly in their research.

See also The Welfare State (volume 2); Patriarchy; Sex, Law, and the State; Sexual Behavior (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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COURTSHIP, MARRIAGE, AND DIVORCE



Joanne M. Ferraro

Marriage in European society was the basic unit of social organization and was believed to form the fabric of society, giving it cohesion and stability as well as a legal structure to govern inheritance and reproduction. In some European towns and villages marriage also conferred political rights on men. For both women and men it was a rite of passage to social adulthood. First and foremost, marriage forged the alliances, inheritance practices, and patronage systems that permitted generations of family lineages to endure over time. Nonetheless, prior to the nineteenth century many people either chose not to marry or more commonly could not afford to marry. About 10 to 15 percent of the overall population in northwestern Europe during the early modern period did not marry at all. The percentage was higher for southern Europe. Thus marriage was a privileged status often made possible by inheritance. Those who had nothing to inherit did not necessarily feel compelled to establish a legal, conjugal bond and so experimented with other forms of family life based on informal arrangements. The proportion of people who married in western Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries increased significantly from that of the early modern period. The change was linked in part to the transformation of the family from an economic unit into an affective household.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MARRIAGE

Any discussion of European marriage must take into account its demographic and economic context, social and cultural attitudes about age and sex, and the constructed norms of masculinity and femininity that affected the marriage process. John Gillis's findings for early modern England may be extended to the Continent as a whole. The conjugal ideal best served people of economic substance. Moreover it reflected a gender-bound view of relationships between women

and men. Finally, the values and patterns of behavior attached to marriage differed according to social and economic standings.

Marriage in the cities, towns, and villages of early modern Europe was a recognized community affair rather than the more private agreement between individuals that developed in modern times. Rites and festivities evidenced its public nature. Betrothals, marriage contracts, and weddings involved complex relationships with kin, friends, and community that in turn helped sustain the conjugal bond over time. Courtships, betrothals, and weddings were occasions of social drama in which family patriarchs forged new social and political ties with compatible families. Both the social activity leading up to the wedding and the actual ceremony furnished occasions to publicize these new relationships of solidarity. The public announcement of the bride and groom's consent, the exchange of rings and gifts as symbols of the new union, and the public affirmation of the marriage by family and community were as important as the actual legal procedures that established the bond. Thus church, state, family, peers, and community participated in this collective process that ultimately validated a new economic, social, and legal unit.

The breakup of rural communities during the modern era, in contrast, profoundly changed the relationship between a marrying couple and local society. A more commercial economy reduced traditional ties and constraints. One result was an increase in the number of illegitimate children from 1750 onward. Urban growth later furthered the increase. In Britain by 1830 rural areas witnessed marked depopulation as more people moved into manufacturing towns. They left their community ties behind for a more impersonal urban environment. At the same time the enclosure movement in the countryside furthered the breakdown of the rural household and, in turn, the cohesion of the rural community. Late nineteenth-

century industrialization solidified this overall trend, bringing strangers together in marriage or common law relationships without the participation of the wider community. Far from family, community, and religious counsel, couples might also form relationships that left unmarried women abandoned with child.

Marriage in European society held profound religious significance. It was one of the seven sacraments of the Catholic Church, and its essential function, according to Catholic dogma, was reproduction. Sex for pleasure alone was a sin; the couple's purpose was to procreate and suitably educate children. Protestants took this argument in another direction by actually devaluing celibacy and asserting that marriage was the spiritually preferable state. They praised the patriarchal nuclear family as a liberation from the celibacy idealized by Catholic thinkers. Husbands and wives were more highly regarded in principle than monks and nuns. Protestants such as Martin Luther claimed to have released Catholic clerics from the regulated life of a cloister or monastery and sexual repression and to have freed children from the involuntary celibacy that accompanied family practices of restricting marriage. Luther and later other Protestants maintained that marriage stabilized both partners sexually and, by extension, society as a whole, creating households, communities, property, and honor. Maintaining principles of good household government would in turn impart good government on society at large. The home thus founded good citizenship, good habits, and virtue.

Both Protestant and Catholic courts regarded mutual consent as the essential requirement for a valid marriage. Church services celebrated the union, making it public and secure under law, but it was the couple's mutual agreement that made it binding in the eyes of God. Strasbourg law explicitly stated in 1534 that a church ceremony was not obligatory to make a marriage valid or legal. Despite this stance, it was recognized that church ceremonies performed the important function of putting marriage on public record. Registering nuptial vows systematically could help prevent the breach of promise cases women more often than men brought to the courts.

While marriage was a sacrament in Catholic theology, for Protestants it was not. However, some still regarded it as a spiritual bond, and for Luther it was a divine ordinance. Martin Bucer took a different view, regarding marriage as a civil matter devoid of spiritual content save for the church's blessing. He maintained that marriage was a secular bond legitimized under secular authority. It was the church's duty, however, to set up and uphold the moral standards associated with marriage, just as secular authorities enforced them.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN MARRIAGE: VARIATIONS IN PLACE AND TIME

Regional, demographic, and economic factors affected marriage patterns in Europe. Historians have identified a European marriage pattern in northwestern Europe, which included England, Scandinavia, France, and Germany. Age at marriage in these areas was linked to the idea that couples should be economically independent before setting up their own households. Thus couples married in their mid- to late twenties and immediately established independent, nuclear households. It was preferable that husband and wife be close in age, with perhaps a two- to three-year difference between them. Women in their twenties were regarded as better suited for marriage because they brought both maturity and experience to it. Some women at the lower levels of society worked as domestic servants prior to marriage. Women who married in their twenties were less dependent on their husbands than women who were significantly younger than their spouses. In a nuclear household older brides were also freer from the authority of mothers-in-law.

The northwestern pattern differed from practices in southern and eastern Europe, where some couples married in their teens and lived under the authority of one set of parents well into adulthood or, typically, a teen bride wed a man in his late twenties or even thirties. Young Jewish women in Italy were engaged at puberty and usually married between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, while their grooms were between twenty-four and twenty-eight. Christian girls in Florence, according to the tax survey of 1427, married young, between thirteen and sixteen, while their husbands were from eight to twenty-five years older. Urban areas witnessed wider gaps in age between couples than rural ones. The delayed age at marriage of urban males helps explain the presence of prostitutes as well as concubinage and secret marriages. Younger wives were frequently at a disadvantage in their relationships with their spouses. However, if they outlived their husbands, inherited wealth, and did not remarry, they achieved financial independence relatively early in their life cycles.

Household structure in southern and eastern Europe also varied from the northwestern model. Depending on demographic trends and economic means, a household could be multigenerational rather than nuclear. Extended families with grandparents, multiple siblings, uncles, and aunts were common in rural areas, where successful farming depended in part on a steady supply of labor. Wealthy families as well had the capacity to house several generations in one house-

hold in both the city and the countryside. Children married early, seventeen for grooms, fifteen for brides. Age at marriage rose slightly after 1860. In extended families the practice of married children living under the authority of a father until his death emancipated them delayed social adulthood and often created tensions within the household. In contrast, the urban worker or shopkeeper could not afford to maintain an extended family nor supply employment to all offspring. Thus his or her household did not extend beyond its nuclear origin. Sons and daughters married if they could establish separate households, the groom with secured work, the bride with a dowry. If not, they remained unmarried.

Besides regional variations, demographic and economic trends also affected marriage patterns. Marriage rates usually rose following the catastrophic mortality resulting from famines and epidemics. The reduced population made the resources needed to set up new households, including land, employment, and possibilities for profit, more readily available. The average age at marriage plunged during these cycles, a reflection of the urgency of replenishing numbers. The earlier age at marriage increased the number of childbearing years. In contrast, in periods when the population was swollen and landed resources did not match demand, the marriage rate dropped and age at marriage rose. More people remained unmarried during these demographic cycles. This was generally the case during the sixteenth century, a period of dramatic demographic growth accompanied by inflation. The period witnessed a decline in the number of extended family households. The last three decades of the century, however, brought religious war, plague, and famine, relieving population pressure and encouraging earlier marriages. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries also experienced cycles of economic hardship that impinged on marriage rates.

In contrast, from about 1750 to 1914 the European population grew dramatically, from 140 million in 1750 to 266 million a century later and 468 million on the eve of World War I (1914–1918). While early modern societies had suffered high natality and mortality rates, societies of the modern era experienced an overall reduction in the incidence of mortality. Once again living standards declined in rapidly growing towns and cities, limiting marriage rates. Although poverty constrained marriage, many couples established common law unions. France was an exception to the growth trend, as were areas where landowning peasants practicing partible inheritance attempted to limit births. In these cases couples still took into account economic considerations when deciding whether or not to marry. Dowries and marriage

contracts remained important. Men married later than women, upon establishing financial independence, and the age gap among couples was sizable.

In the early modern period many women and men who did not marry spent their lives in convents or monasteries in the Catholic areas of southern and eastern Europe. This was often not out of choice but out of necessity. Sometimes parents could not provide a daughter with a dowry commensurate with their social class, or parents restricted the number of sons who could marry for financial reasons to preserve the wealth of the lineage over time.

In Catholic Italy the growing number of women who could neither afford to marry nor enter a convent prompted the city-states to found special asylums for women. These institutions provided food and shelter, while residents earned their keep through spinning or sewing. This was a way, according to the views of both secular and ecclesiastical authorities, to protect a woman's virtue and the honor of her family. In many instances lay donors provided small dowries for these women so that eventually they could leave the asylum for marriage. Poor unmarried women who did not enter asylums or convents generally ended up working as domestic servants if they were fortunate or as prostitutes if they were not.

COURTSHIP

Dating did not exist in early modern European society. Forms of courtship were determined in part by social standing. At the upper levels of society marriage was primarily a business arrangement. Parents, not spouses, made the match, generally employing such criteria as status, wealth, family reputation, and religion. Family patriarchs, taking into account the standing of the family in political and social life as well as the preservation and expansion of its wealth, arranged betrothals with the help of friends, kin, and marriage brokers. Children had at best minimum input in these negotiations. Sometimes the betrothed did not meet until formal contract negotiations were finalized. At that point the prospective groom was permitted to visit the bride during the period leading up to the wedding. At other times the couple did not meet until the actual wedding day.

Lawrence Stone hypothesized that betrothal practices for upper-class English families evolved between the sixteenth century and the eighteenth century from the "restricted, patriarchal, nuclear" family to the "closed, domesticated, nuclear" one. By the late seventeenth century and the eighteenth century children chose their partners but asked for parental con-

sent. Marriages determined by economic and social interests waned. By the end of the eighteenth century affection and companionship became decisive criteria in making the match, and husbands and wives manifested strong affective bonds. This process, Stone maintained, advanced by the upper and middling strata of English society, trickled down to the lower classes.

Stone's hypotheses have not remained unchallenged. Perhaps the greatest adjustments have come from new research on the values and behavior of the mass of the English population. Historians have argued that popular experience in England differed from that of the aristocracy, upper gentry, and urban plutocracy and that popular experience did not necessarily derive from upper-class models of behavior. Moreover even within the upper levels of society, some evidence points to courtship or input from children, modifying the argument of strict parental absolutism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Young people's initiation of marital agreements, however, apparently had more success farther down the social ladder, where wealth and standing were lesser concerns. Still parental consent was desirable, and property was an important consideration. Parity in the match remained the most common criterion for suitability. In early modern France dowries and marriage contracts governed the joining of families through wedlock. Financial concerns led men to marry late, after reaching a state of economic security. Women married considerably earlier, joining with husbands in the service of lineage and family estate management.

The less-formal arrangements of meeting at social occasions and forming attractions was more prevalent or at least socially acceptable among the peasant and working classes. Young people met at dances and celebrations. It was acceptable for them to pair up in a large group at festive occasions but not to pair off. One reason for this was to protect the young woman's honor; unaccompanied dating was unacceptable. Another reason was that, until couples were ready to make a serious commitment, they preferred to keep their courting relationship private. Thus most serious courtship went on at night, out of sight of others. The suitor brought the woman gifts. Among the English lower classes these included stay busts (corset stays) and love spoons. Gifts had significant symbolic value. They could signify whether the pair were friends or lovers, whether the relationship was honorable or licentious, or whether the relationship was getting serious or not. Friends and servants sometimes acted as go-betweens during the courting process.

When couples expressed mutual consent to marry, their casual courtship was transformed into a serious relationship that now involved a wider circle of family and friends in the alliance. Consent had to be expressed in front of public witnesses before it was taken seriously and considered a binding promise. Various rituals allowed the community to recognize publicly the new commitment. One was hazing, which, Gillis has argued, expressed the intense feelings of jealousy and loss aroused any time a friend became engaged. It meant these single people were about to withdraw from their unmarried friends and join the circle of married couples. Charivari was another rite that neighbors engaged in to express disapproval of unusual betrothals.

Protestant theologians and jurists held that secret marriages were valid if not licit and urged parental acceptance since these unions had already been consummated. Conversely, parents also were urged not to coerce children into arranged marriages. Luther denounced excessively authoritarian parents in this regard and urged civil authorities to punish them. In Catholic territories boys and girls of canonical age, fourteen and twelve, respectively, had the right to refuse arranged marriages.

Clandestine marriage in France presented a highly different case. Sarah Hanley's research has demonstrated that marriage was regulated in lockstep with the growth of political absolutism and specifically served the secular interests of the French *noblesse de robe* (judicial nobility). At the Council of Trent, French delegates differed from their Italian and Spanish counterparts by insisting that the church sanction parental control of marriage. But the opposition, rather than

capitulate, countered that parental consent was not required for a valid marriage to take place. French lawmakers continued to institute legislative changes that secured parental authority, arguing that it was critical to safeguarding natural and legal propriety. The Parlement of Paris thus implemented legal reforms. In 1556 it overturned canon law with a royal edict decreeing that parents could disinherit children who married without their permission. It also established the legal age for marriage without parental consent as thirty for men and twenty-five for women. The edict was an effort to exercise social and political control and to protect property. The Ordinance of Blois followed in 1578, requiring the officiating priest to have proof of the ages of the couple and the consent of their parents. Violators of the ordinance were charged with forced abduction or willing elopement, crimes punishable by death.

Legalists continued throughout the seventeenth century to tighten patriarchy, strengthening the power of husbands over wives. In 1629 and 1639 the requirement of parental consent was reiterated with further restrictions. Thus the French absolutist state created its own civil laws on marriage, curtailing ecclesiastical jurisdiction and claiming that marriage was a civil contract, not a religious one. Violators of the rules on parental consent would be tried in the secular courts. Determined couples in both Protestant and Catholic areas, however, managed to defy parental wishes despite efforts to restrict them. Romantic love may not have been practical in early modern Europe, but it was a powerful force that sometimes overrode the principles of property and standing that propelled arranged marriages. Both marriage and divorce in early modern Europe were more the concern of the propertied than of the humbler folk, whose values and behavior were guided by other, less-restricting principles.

Courtship and engagement in Jewish families shared some of the characteristics of Christian practices, but Jewish women might play a greater role in the matchmaking procedures. While it was traditional for fathers to arrange marriages, at times mothers, theoretically in the presence of witnesses, made the matches and concluded the symbolic exchange of property. The marriage contract provided for the costs of banquets, lodging, transportation, and clothing. The betrothed exchanged gifts and sometimes love notes. They, too, played some role in choosing whether to marry or not. Jewish women came to marriage with dowries, but so did grooms. The *ketubah* was the debt a man owed his wife in the event of divorce, imprisonment, or death.

Courtship obviously changed as a result of industrialization and urbanization. Parental controls less-

ened. Among the working classes and some peasants it was increasingly common to engage in sexual intercourse before marriage, and marriage might occur only if a woman became pregnant, with pressure from her family to match. Middle-class arrangements remained more formal with strong economic overtones as families sought to assure the financial viability of a new family through a proper blending of resources by the bride and groom. But a culture of love, which could complicate expectations in courtship, also gained ground, widely touted in novels and popular reading.

MARRIAGE RITES

Throughout the Middle Ages and into the early modern period practices varied according to region, social class, and religious affiliation. In 1562–1563 the Catholic Church, through the Council of Trent, attempted to regularize and unify rites of marriage in Catholic areas of Europe. The council mandated that couples announce their banns in advance, publicizing them at least three times in their community; that they marry before their parish priest and at least two witnesses; that they affirm and publicize their mutual consent; and that they register the marriage. These requirements were formulated in response to the widespread confusion over what constituted marriage, for a wide variety of customs had prevailed in western Europe, developing over time in an autonomous and haphazard manner. Although by the fourth century A.D. the church had proclaimed that consent was the basis of Christian marriage, requiring that rites demonstrate the wish to join together, consent had not been attached to any specific protocol. French authorities, unlike their neighbors in England and on the Italian Peninsula, aimed to standardize marriage rites early on, from the eleventh century. They emphasized the sacramental nature of the bond and monitored the requirement of mutual consent attentively. Elsewhere, however, a freedom of form prevailed until the last decades of the sixteenth century.

Form was determined by socioeconomic level as well as by regional custom because marriage was a primary instrument of property relations. Marriage among humbler folk may not have entailed formal negotiations, and some couples may simply have started living together with or without a church ceremony. The man publicly kissed the woman and presented her with a gold ring or some other gift, whereupon they proceeded to have a sexual relationship. Some evidence suggests that communities recognized these unions and did not stigmatize their offspring. Brides may have gone to their weddings in the early

stages of pregnancy. Marriage arrangements of this nature, however, were forbidden at the Council of Trent and were condemned as sinful. The council mandated that all marriages must be performed by a priest in a church. The Anglican Church was more lenient in these matters, while the Puritans concurred with the Catholic stance that marriage be formally blessed by the church.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the English upper and middle classes, in contrast with the lower strata of society, followed some protocol of arranged marriage. The groom's father wrote to the bride's father asking permission for the son to court the lady. After several visits, if the potential groom found the woman appealing, he gave her gifts of gold, a ring, or a pair of gloves over a period of about six months. Once the fathers agreed to the betrothal, the bride's father visited the groom's father, and the fathers agreed to a dowry. A ceremony and celebration followed, yet the bride did not leave her natal family for several weeks. The groom fetched her in the presence of family and friends, and the couple began their life together. Of course, these are just a few examples among many variations.

In the Italian regional states marriage contracts often preceded any clerical benediction of the match and were of utmost priority. Even artisans, workers, and peasant farmers went to notaries to record dowries, the exchange of consent, and the gifts of wedding rings. But the social orders with political weight and financial substance paid the closest attention to the contractual nature of marriage and to the financial terms of the union, for marriage was of deep importance to the socioeconomic structure of society. In many Italian cities, such as Florence, Venice, and Brescia, oligarchs constituted a hereditary elite, and endogamy was essential to the lineages' preservation and expansion of power over time. The secular dimension of marriage rites reflects the importance of patrilineal descent and of the disposition of dotal property within urban lineages. Marriage created a new economic unit linked to a network of other units that affected the cohesion of society. Negotiations between the allying families, who were normally entering into a political as well as a social consortium, were mediated by common friends. The fathers, or alternatively the male kin of the future spouses, met accompanied by close family and friends. At this meeting the terms of the marriage were set down in writing, and they were formally finalized at a later date in a notarial document. This betrothal ritual was as binding as the wedding ceremony. The size of the dowry, the terms of dowry payment, the living facilities and clothes the husband promised to provide, and an itemized account of what

the bride would bring to the marriage were all stipulated in the contract. Marriage was indeed an economic arrangement.

Until at least the early twentieth century women of all classes, Jewish or Christian, were expected to provide dowries that might consist of some clothing and household items, usually including the marriage bed and bedding, for poor women, or vast amounts of cash, goods, or property for wealthy ones. The dowry was a statement of the bride's social status, publicizing her place in society as a whole. The dowry often substituted for a daughter's share of the family inheritance and increasingly did not include the land earmarked for the patrilineal lineage. Often that land was entailed, a legal restriction that made its recipient, through primogeniture, its custodian over his lifetime with the obligation to pass it on to the first male in the line.

The dowry was the central concern of contract negotiations. While in Roman times its purpose was to aid the groom with the expense of matrimony, in medieval and early modern times it was the bride's right to a share of her natal family's patrimony. Her husband could not alienate or consume it, and his own property was in jeopardy if he transgressed these rules. Legal restrictions over the governance of dotal resources varied from region to region. The dotal share might be equal to that of male siblings' inheritances, or it might amount to more or less. Fathers, brothers, mothers, aunts, and other kin contributed to dowry resources, for a well-dowered bride became a family's social asset with which to make a beneficial matrimonial alliance. If an unmarried and undowered woman lacked parents or paternal ascendants, responsibility might pass to her maternal ascendants, for jurists, clerics, and secular authorities considered dowry provision fundamental to the welfare of women. Laws regarding a woman's control of her dowry varied from region to region. In general a husband had use of it but not ownership during his wife's lifetime. In some areas a widower was entitled to one-third of the dowry, and the rest went to surviving children. Women who thought their husbands were wasting their dowries could sue them. Courts in many areas protected women, taking control of the dowry out of the husbands' hands. The Republic of Venice established a special tribunal for this in 1553. Women might bequeath their dowries, and in some areas they were obliged to leave them to their children. The dowry's importance was so fundamental to both the married woman and her wider kinship network that in Florence a public Dowry Fund was established at the birth of a daughter so deposits could accumulate over time and secure for her a place in the marriage market.

Moreover many cities established charities to help with the dowries of the indigent.

In the Italian states the sixteenth century was characterized by dowry inflation, making women and women's property increasingly important to marriage negotiations. Only after the details over the dowry were ironed out could the future groom visit his intended, bring her gifts, and dine with her family. At times the wider kinship group and their friends gathered publicly to celebrate the betrothal and to voice doubts or objections before the final arrangements were made. The marriage contract was a binding document, and guarantors and arbiters were appointed to implement its terms and to supervise its proper execution.

Following the establishment of a marriage contract, the rites of engagement unfolded at the bride's house, where friends gathered and gifts were delivered. The future husband visited, bringing friends and family. A notary asked the couple the questions relating to mutual consent prescribed by the church to con-

firm their agreement to an alliance formed by the families. The husband gave his new wife a wedding ring and gifts, and a wedding banquet followed. Wedding banquets could be quite lavish and last for days, with large feasts, dancing, games, and other festivities. By the end of the day of the verbal promise and exchange of rings, the union had to be consummated to be valid. The consummation could also be accompanied by festivity, called *charivari*. Typically the couple was serenaded but also inundated with noise made with drums, bells, and horns. Widows who remarried were also subject to this social ridicule and festivity. In Florence this was called *mattinate*.

The newlyweds might reside with the bride's family during the initial stages of the relationship. When the new bride left her natal home for that of her husband, further ceremonies might follow, such as riding through the town by torchlight escorted by friends and family. This was a way to notify the entire community of the couple's consent.

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES

Early modern Catholic marriages have largely been characterized as patriarchal arrangements in which husbands exerted paternalistic authority over wives. These models come largely from moral treatises and other prescriptive writings that in fact may not reflect social reality or the variety of experiences of the historical past. Protestant writers took a slightly different stance from their Catholic counterparts, emphasizing companionship, but in principle both denominations advanced the same patriarchal model of marriage. Protestants, Catholics, and Jews stressed shared responsibility between husbands and wives. A husband was required to sustain the upkeep of his wife and children, to protect them from harm, and to guide them. The husband was expected to be a role model for his family and servants, exercising self-control and good wisdom. He was to be God-fearing and disciplined so he might rule firmly but gently over his family. Excessive eating or drinking was frowned upon; abusive authority, violence, and infidelity were condemned. A husband was to exercise goodwill and concern for the welfare of his wife and family. The marital bond was to be based on mutual respect and love,

though wives were asked to defer to the authority of their husbands.

A wife was responsible for governing her household and servants and for feeding and disciplining her children. She was her husband's co-worker and companion but was required to respect his authority. In Protestant areas women were usually in their twenties when they married so they would be mature enough to take over the responsibilities of running a household. A wife was expected to perform the conjugal duty of having sex and procreating, though her refusal was not grounds for divorce. Infidelity was condemned, and a woman was obliged to carefully guard her honor and reputation by behaving in a modest and civil manner and not indulging in excess.

The marriages considered to work best, according to prescriptive writings, were those in which husband and wife were close in age, both shared the same religion, both had similar economic means and social status, and the union enjoyed the approval of parents and friends. It has been argued that a wide age gap between spouses brought less parity to the marriage and at times less compatibility.

Ideas of greater parity in marriage found their way even into Russia's highly patriarchal pattern around 1700, with the partially westernizing reforms

of Peter the Great. In a traditional custom the bride's father passed a whip to the groom as a symbol of the transition of male disciplinary authority. Peter outlawed this custom and in general promoted greater independence of wives among the upper classes.

The age of industrialization in the nineteenth century brought marked changes to the division of labor between husbands and wives. Husbands worked farther away from the home, becoming wage earners in factories and offices. Wives remained at home to supervise households and children. Only married women from poor families worked outside the household. Legal changes in the status of husbands and wives subordinated married women to their husbands. Wives did not enjoy the same legal rights as their spouses. For example, in England they did not have the right to hold property in their own names. In France the Napoleonic Code gave married men the preponderance of the rights to property, divorce, and custody of children. Most everywhere middle-class women lacked basic legal rights, whether under English common law, the Frederician (Prussian) Code, the Napoleonic Code, or Roman law. Husbands had the legal right to control wives' property, to determine their standard of living, and to make all decisions regarding estate management and the upbringing of children. In eastern Europe paternal authority was even more absolute.

Feminists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries fought to redress the legal subordination of wives to husbands. Some political activists, liberal politicians, and demographic specialists, preoccupied with declining birthrates, joined them. Together these groups argued for the basic rights of married women, such as the right to their wages, to own property, and to share the governance of children with their husbands.

In western Europe the role and status of wives during the early twentieth century began to slowly change. As they became better educated, women acquired more control over their homes and their children. Some managed the family budget, the children's schooling, and religious instruction. Married couples developed stronger affective ties to each other as the home increased in emotional importance. More marriages were based on affection and sexual attraction than the formal arrangements of previous centuries.

The world wars of the twentieth century further advanced the rights and opportunities of women both at home and in the labor market, although in interwar periods married women were encouraged to leave the workforce to men. As the century progressed growing numbers of women acquired white-collar jobs, giving them independence and the possibility of dramatic

change in lifestyles. More married as well as unmarried women worked and supported themselves, family size became smaller, and husbands increasingly shared family and household responsibilities.

REMARRIAGE

The likelihood was greater that widowers would remarry than would widows, especially if widowers were left with children who needed maternal care. Conversely, widows with children were more unlikely to remarry. Older women were at a greater disadvantage than younger ones, whereas age did not appear to make as much difference among widowers. For example, in seventeenth-century France only 20 percent of widows remarried, while half the widower population took new spouses. For women economic status played a role both in their desirability and their own wishes to remarry. A rich widow had a better chance of finding a new husband but might resist the pressure of remarriage in favor of enjoying her newly gained economic freedom. Her in-laws also might discourage remarriage lest the property be dispersed. Pressure for young widows of economic substance to remarry was high, both for the wealth they had to offer and because their independence and sexual experience were disturbing to a predominantly patriarchal society. The same did not apply to widowers, who were socially desirable but free to do as they chose.

THE QUALITY OF MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS

Historians have explored both the ties of affection that bound married couples and the tensions that divided them but have come to no consensus over the quality of early modern marital relationships, most of which were arranged. One part of the debate has hinged on property arrangements and inheritance patterns that restricted marriage. Some historians have stressed that parental authority over marriage delayed social adulthood and prevented ties of affection between parents and children. Moreover Philippe Ariès, Jean-Louis Flandrin, David Hunt, and Stone found affection absent in early modern couples. They characterized relations between spouses and between parents and children as distant and cold, for arranged marriage was a product of relationships based on property and not on love. The findings of other historians challenged this thesis, primarily by making it class specific. Steven Ozment's research on burgher society in Reformation Europe reveals intense emotional relationships be-

tween husbands and wives as well as between parents and children. Michael MacDonald's study of depression in early modern England finds spousal loss a common cause. He argued that affection was important and expected in marriage. Moreover several historians pointed to the writings of Lutherans, Puritans, and other Protestants during the Reformation that stress the importance of companionate marriage and mutual affection between spouses while still sustaining patriarchal principles.

Physical attraction and emotional love were not prerequisites for arranged unions. However, the potential development of love and affection played a critical part in keeping a marriage together. Sentiments are not always easy to document. Whether love developed in marriage or not, a successful union was one that developed respect and trust and in which spouses shared responsibility and were willing to work and sacrifice for the good of the household.

Another part of the debate over the quality of marital relationships revolves around the contention that dramatic changes in the history of sentiment took place from the eighteenth century onward. Flandrin and others argued that the family took on greater emotional importance for its members as early industrialization created a less emotional or psychologically satisfying environment. The growth of domestic manufacturing and the expansion of market relationships created sterile, competitive relationships among individuals and social classes, and the family became the center of emotional life. The relationship between husband and wife became less authoritarian and more affectionate. Evidence for this position is in family advice literature published during the Enlightenment. Writers urged the expression of greater affection and love in place of anger. This has been interpreted as the first steps toward the modern, middle-class ideal of the loving home. It seems, however, that this thesis is based primarily on prescriptive literature and applies best to the aristocracy and the middle class. In contrast, critics of this view, who have studied social experiences at other levels of society and through other sources, have argued that love may have thrived beneath the principally economic relationships produced by arranged marriage. Some sixteenth-century studies have concluded that the nuclear family increasingly became a focus of loyalty and was upheld in the Protestant ideal of the companionate marriage. During the Reformation the home displaced the church for some religious activities, such as reading the scriptures and prayer. Whether or not major changes in the emotional lives of husbands and wives, parents and children, took place during the eighteenth century is still debated.

Yet another historical controversy revolves around whether a married woman maintained close ties with her natal family or simply came under the custodianship of her husband's family. The answer may be linked to customary practices. Christiane Klapish-Zuber found that fifteenth-century Florentine families detached themselves from married daughters, while Joanne Ferraro's evidence for sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Venice indicates parents continued to be actively involved in their married daughters' lives, especially if their sons-in-law were failing in their duties as husbands. Moreover both Stanley Chojnacki and Ferraro have found that in Venice and Brescia, respectively, women made bequests to members of their natal families and provided female kin with dowries, signs that they continued to maintain close kinship ties throughout their lives. In early modern Jewish families, however, women were expected to leave their natal families behind both emotionally and physically so husbands rather than fathers would have the final say over their married lives.

Again industrialization and urbanization would change family dynamics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many urban working-class men spent much of their time outside the home at work and in male comradeship. Wives often preserved intense contacts with their mothers, sharing a variety of activities and household chores even when living in separate residences.

ANNULMENT, SEPARATION, AND DIVORCE

Because divorce was not permitted and separation was discouraged, the Catholic Church devoted a great deal of attention to regulating marriage at its inception to prevent the conflicts that ultimately might lead to petitions for annulment. The church meticulously defined the impediments to marriage that invalidated any claims to a legitimate union. An invalid marriage was grounds for annulment, in canon law signifying the marriage never took place and the parties involved were still free to wed. Couples obtained annulments in cases of forced unions, incapability of consummating the marriage (premarital impotence), and consanguinity and affinity in relationships of third cousins or closer. The Catholic Church also found marriages between people of different religions inappropriate unless the non-Christian converted. Taking vows of chastity or holy orders impeded marriage, as did secret vows to wed someone else or sexual relations with another person after one was engaged. Godparents and godchildren were forbidden to marry because they shared a spiritual affinity, and a godchild could

not marry the child or sibling of a godparent. Legal guardianship created the same impediments. It was, moreover, inappropriate to marry someone convicted of fornication, adultery, or planning to murder a married lover's spouse. Life-threatening coercion also invalidated the consent to marry. In a number of cases that came before the courts of early modern Venice adult children lamented that they were forced into the arrangements of their parents with threats of violence. The Catholic Church maintained that parental consent was not a prerequisite for valid marriage and that these unions had been forced against the will of one or both of the spouses.

The discussion of divorce in Catholic circles was far less detailed than the subject of impediments. While Eastern Orthodox courts allowed divorce for adultery or taking religious vows, the Roman Catholic Church did not permit this solution for failing marriages. Canon law defined marriage as a permanent union before God and the church, based on Matthew 19:6, "What God has joined together, no man may put asunder." However, under specially defined circumstances couples in failing marriages were allowed separations of bed and board. This signified they would not cohabit, but they could not remarry. The circumstances under which the Roman church allowed separation included life-threatening abuse, leprosy, and adultery. Battered wives in early modern Venice found the Patriarchal Court sympathetic to their grave circumstances. The court acted as a place where women could seek redress and hope to dissolve a failing union. Often women in bad marriages in early modern Venice and elsewhere in the Italian regional states retreated to one of the many asylums established through law and ecclesiastical charities. In this way the *malmaritate* (badly married) safeguarded their honor and reputations before their communities. Husbands were ordered by secular tribunals to sustain the cost of living of separated wives and to be responsible for the care of the children. Adultery was also just cause for separation in Catholic courts. A guilty husband was responsible for the support of an injured wife. In the reverse case, however, a wife might be obligated to forfeit her dowry as punishment for this serious moral offense.

In early modern France the Roman Catholic doctrine of marital indissolubility was staunchly defended by the Gallican church and the monarchy. As in Italy, separations were permitted. However, the control over this process came increasingly under the civil courts because of property considerations. Separations had far-reaching effects, unraveling ties between kin groups and political oligarchies, rearranging or canceling property transfers, forcing friends and

relatives to adjust to a new social situation, and generally upsetting the life of the community. Consequently this solution to failing marriage was highly discouraged and rarely occurred before the eighteenth century. More women than men sought separations in the French ecclesiastical courts because they needed the assistance of the law against tyrannical husbands. Separations in France were granted when the wife was in physical or moral danger, if she was falsely accused by her husband of adultery, or if her husband was insane, attempting to murder her, or expressing deadly hatred of her. On the other hand, wives with adulterous husbands were generally expected to endure poor marital relations.

Ecclesiastical authorities in France increasingly lost jurisdiction over the regulation of marriage and separation to secular authorities. Ultimately a partnership developed between the Gallican church and the absolutist state that marked the beginning of secularization and the laicization of family law. The trend spread throughout many parts of western Europe. Gradually, from the eighteenth-century onward, French monarchs and their counterparts in Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, and Catholic Austria, had a hand in dissolving marriages, as did republican Venice's Council of Ten, the oligarchy's supreme judicial organ.

In eighteenth-century France the grounds for marital dissolution expanded from adultery and desertion to emotional incompatibility. Most thinkers during the *ancien régime* opposed divorce until the Enlightenment, when philosophers rejected the theological assumptions of the Middle Ages in favor of natural law and secular ideas receptive to divorce doctrines. Some argued that divorce would promote population growth, regenerate morality, and increase happiness and harmony within families. The subject of divorce was prominent in the depopulationist literature emphasizing both reproduction and regeneration. Its prohibition reputedly caused adultery and illegitimacy as well as child and spousal abandonment and poverty. Divorce and remarriage would make families happier. Moreover, writers such as Montesquieu and Paul-Henri-Dietrich d'Holbach argued that it would be beneficial for women, who could use it as a counterweight to the authority that their husbands wielded within marriage.

Not just in France but throughout the Catholic regions of Europe separation was generally discouraged by the church courts, and couples were urged to work out their differences. This was true in Anglican England, where marriage differences came under the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts that continued to administer medieval canon law. The Reformation had

not revised canon law in England save for reducing the number of proscribed degrees of incest. The Anglican Church, unlike other Protestant denominations, did not permit divorce with permission to remarry but, as in Catholic areas of Europe, granted separations of bed and board in cases of adultery and life-threatening danger as a result of physical abuse. As the idea of companionate marriage diffused throughout Reformation England, wives requesting separations as a result of cruelty received more sympathy.

Before 1657 the ecclesiastical courts in England had sole jurisdiction over marital break up. The church courts were administered by men trained in the civil law over property matters who in marriage cases applied canon law as well. By the late seventeenth century English common law courts became increasingly involved in breach of promise suits, and these slowly

replaced marriage contract suits before the ecclesiastical courts. English criminal courts also became involved if either of the parties chose to sue the other for bigamy or sodomy. Finally, Parliament had a hand in marriage disputes in the late seventeenth century. It passed private bills of full divorce with permission to remarry for wealthy husbands.

England instituted many deterrents to suing for separation, particularly if the wife was initiating the dissolution. Stone wrote that significant numbers contrived to escape their marital bonds without going to court. Only 10 percent of the cases involving legal proceedings came to trial and sentence. Stone contended that wives, made docile by the ideology of female subordination and inferiority, were reluctant to sue for separation. Moreover for them separation meant near certain financial hardship or destitution.

When the husband was found guilty, the alimony was generous, amounting to a third of his declared net income. However, it was hard to enforce payment. Another serious deterrent was that wives could also lose contact with their children. Fear of publicity also discouraged petitions to separate. The situation of English women, as presented by Stone, is in stark contrast to the sympathy for abused wives expressed by the ecclesiastical court in early modern Venice.

Nonetheless, reasons to separate in England did arise, among them the physical separations and outright desertions caused by war, infidelity, financial quarrels, ruptures between the husband's kin and the wife's kin, physical cruelty by the husband, and adultery by the wife or husband, although generally the double standard made only adultery by the wife legitimate grounds for separation. Marriage ties in early modern England could be broken in a variety of ways, such as through desertion, wife sale among the lower classes, and separation by private deed. In the last instance the husband and wife made a private agreement in which the husband assured his wife alimony. The wife was subsequently financially free to act. Divorce as a legitimate remedy for failed marriage only came to England after 1660, and until 1820 it was class specific. Only the rich, landed elite and merchants could afford to pay the personnel involved in formal litigation.

In other Protestant areas of Europe marriage regulations differed from both Catholic and Anglican ones on several points. First, they stressed the importance of parental consent more than Catholic regulations did and allowed for the possibility of divorce with remarriage for adultery, impotence, refusal to have sex, abuse, abandonment, and incurable diseases. Second, Luther reduced the large number of legitimate impediments to Catholic marriage to two or three, including impotence, marriages made in error, and the twelve kinship barriers stated in Leviticus 18.

Protestant reformers, however, were not in consensus over what constituted a legitimate impediment to marriage. In Strasbourg and Constance the tenets of canon law still essentially informed rules about marital impediment. In conservative Nürnberg, however, reformers not only sustained the kinship barriers that had been outlined by the Catholic Church but further multiplied them. The theologian Andreas Osiander established nineteen kinship barriers from Leviticus 18 and 20, fifteen from the laws of Moses, and sixteen from the kinship ties traced from grandparents.

In principle Protestants made divorce and remarriage possible for those with legitimate cause. Reformers, such as Luther and Bucer, and theologians, such as Johannes Brenz in 1531 and Johannes Bu-

genhagen in 1540, rejected the Catholic solution of separation of bed and board for failing marriages. Without cohabitation, they maintained, no marriage existed. Moreover they rejected the Catholic notion of marriage as a sacrament, viewing it instead as a secular commitment. Its purpose extended beyond procreation to that of creating a harmonious hearth and home through mutual commitment. French Reformed Protestants and English Puritans took a similar stance.

Perhaps the most compelling cause for divorce in Protestant areas was adultery, which liberated the innocent spouse from the union. Lutheran theologians also recognized emotional incompatibility and hatred as causes for marital dissolution but not religious differences. In extreme cases couples could be granted a separation, but the husband retained the right to summon the wife back into his house if he could not manage it by himself. A grant of separation, however, did not sanction dating or remarriage. Brenz cited other unusual circumstances that might lead to divorce, including threats of murdering a spouse or of practicing dangerous magic, but none was as powerful as adultery in arguing for divorce. A marriage that was not consummated after three years could also be dissolved, but not if the marriage had been consummated and then serious illness impeded sexual relations. Desertion was also legitimate reason to divorce, as it certainly did not live up to the ideal of companionship in marriage. The abandoned spouse was allowed to remarry a year after his or her partner's disappearance.

Divorce in Protestant areas of Europe came under the jurisdiction of secular tribunals rather than the clergy. Lutheran clergy could advise the court, but they neither made marriage laws nor judged marital litigation. Luther called on civil magistrates to establish divorce courts that would use both scripture and secular law as their legal and moral guidelines. Protestant courts tended to be cautious in granting divorces. Nürnberg judges in particular resisted divorce and remarriage, fearing it would encourage adultery and abandonment. Conservative reformers voiced these concerns in Basel as well. John Oecolampadius advocated that only adultery should be valid cause for divorce. But these conservative views were balanced with more liberal ones, such as those of Bucer, who recognized leprosy, madness, impotence, and abandonment as just causes for the dissolution of marriage. Thus in Basel both men and women sought divorce on these grounds. Refusal of the conjugal duty, however, was not just cause for marital dissolution.

Ozment collected important information on the activities of the Protestant courts. A Zwinglian church

court was established in Zurich in 1525, replacing the bishop's court in Constance. Two clerics and four lay authorities sat on the six-member team that dealt with contested marriages and requests for divorce. While this court could make judgements, their enforcement was exclusively in the hands of the city councils, which also served as appellate courts. The Zurich court heard petitions mostly from women, who were sometimes represented by lawyers, and supporting testimony from parents, guardians, and other witnesses. The court recognized six grounds for divorce, specifically adultery, impotence, willful desertion, serious incompatibility, a sexually incapacitating illness, and deception. The court also attempted to end lay concubinage, prostitution, and breach of promise to marry and to regularize secret marriages, perhaps to protect the reputation of pregnant women by obtaining a firm marriage commitment for them. It denied private unions and required credible witnesses at the marriage ceremony as well as public declarations of mutual consent. Betrothed couples were urged to postpone cohabitation until after public vows and a church-recorded marriage ceremony.

In Basel five laymen and two clergymen heard divorce cases. The court recognized adultery, impotence, willful desertion, capital crimes, leprosy, and deadly abuse as grounds for divorce. Convicted adulterers were fined five pounds. The fine was doubled for a second offense, and the offender was given a six-day jail sentence. Repeated offenses increased the punishment. Zurich had similar punishments. An offender could be banished from the church, his or her right to hold public office withdrawn, and his or her eligibility to join guilds and societies removed. Remarriage was not permitted until one to five years after the divorce. Basel was more severe, forbidding remarriage. The injured spouse in adultery cases received a cash settlement as well as property.

Divorced people were expected to wait at least one year before remarrying. The ceremony for a second marriage for Lutherans had to be a private affair before civil authorities rather than a public church occasion. The couple made their commitment before civil magistrates and then perhaps spent an evening with family and friends and a pastor who concluded the new union. The remarriage of a widow or a widower was also a private occasion.

Besides petitions for separation or divorce, church courts heard cases that challenged arranged marriages. In Venice these petitions were often brought by women in defiance of parental authority. Life-threatening coercion or disinheritance, if convincingly demonstrated, gave cause for invalidating an unwanted marriage. In Zurich parental challenges to secret mar-

riages of children under nineteen came to the court's attention, but these marriages were not automatically annulled.

Under certain circumstances, such as infidelity or violent abuse, divorce was permitted in Jewish law, though wives did not have the right to initiate the petitions. Still, cases were brought before rabbinic courts by women accusing men of various deficiencies that were acceptable grounds for divorce according to rabbinic law.

DIVORCE IN THE MODERN ERA

In terms of the law, the modern history of divorce began with the French Revolution. Enlightenment ideas about the family gained prominence, and for several years divorce was legalized, open to action by wives as well as husbands. Although the rate was not massive, a number of divorces ensued, often initiated by women. Napoleonic legislation then closed off many opportunities. During most of the nineteenth century divorce remained highly circumscribed throughout Europe, particularly for women. But changes in laws, usually associated with the discussion of new rights for women, altered the situation late in the century.

By 1900 divorce had spread dramatically throughout Europe. Only a few Catholic states (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland) made no legal provisions for divorce. Elsewhere civil courts made it readily available, and the laws governing marital dissolution were generally liberalized. England founded a Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in 1857. France, having suspended divorce laws in the second decade of the nineteenth century, reintroduced them in 1884. Meanwhile nineteenth-century ideologies of domesticity and femininity urging equal access to divorce courts for women made a notable impact, so much so that divorce became a subject of debate in the years leading up to World War I. Framed as "the marriage question," the broad and lively discussion encompassed such issues as free love, polygamy, fertility, contraception, the liberties of women, and the social and moral issues of divorce. Conservative efforts to restrict divorce faltered as many countries either legalized or liberalized it. Divorce increased in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, when experiments in family law were widespread. Nevertheless, great efforts to maintain family stability characterized the Stalinist era.

In the second half of the twentieth century divorce was accessible to all social groups. As the century progressed divorce rates soared. It is difficult to attribute this dramatic rise to any one cause. Explanations have linked a number of important transformations in twentieth-century life, including attitudes toward

sexuality, morality, and religion; the relations of men and women; and social, economic, and demographic conditions. The late twentieth century brought change both in the expectations of marriage and in the attitudes toward divorce. Premarital pregnancy, which previously had propelled couples into marriage, lost its social stigma, and single parenthood gained recognition. In Scandinavia a growing number of people, including parents, did not bother with marriage at all. Further, increasing numbers of women entered the

labor market, achieving the financial independence that gave them choices about whether or not to marry and whether or not to remain married. Legal changes also facilitated divorce for women, giving them property rights and the possibility of alimony and child support. The late twentieth century was thus a vital transition period that broadened the opportunities to marry and at the same time made divorce more commonplace. Divorce rates varied by region, however, and the United States outnumbered all others.

See also other articles in this section.

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MOTHERHOOD



Ellen Ross

Motherhood, as defined here, is the cultural process of locating women's identities in their capacity to nurture infants and children. As a set of concepts it dates only from the late eighteenth century or the early nineteenth century in Europe. English dictionaries do not make these distinctions, yet "motherhood" can be differentiated from mothering, actually caring for children, and also from the biological events, pregnancy, birth, and lactation, associated with maternity. The panorama of changing discourses and practices offered by social history vividly demonstrates the error of conflating motherhood, mothering, and maternity.

Four main eras are identifiable in the history of mothers' child rearing practices and in dominant ideas about women and their mothering capacities:

- (1) the early modern period, with its shifting and contradictory narratives and images of mothers and communal child care patterns;
- (2) the late eighteenth century and the nineteenth century with their elaboration of motherhood as a sacred female calling;
- (3) the twentieth century from 1918 to about 1970, when birthrates plummeted, psychological constructions of motherhood dominated the helping professions and the mass media, and motherhood as a symbol was central in the formation and reconfiguration of war-torn nations; and
- (4) the late twentieth century, characterized by a dramatic reconfiguration of the material experience of motherhood.

This entry covers both the discursive aspects of motherhood as eventually constructed by the literate elites as well as the phenomenology of mothering among the peoples of Europe—strands that are deeply intertwined. Meanings of motherhood and motherly roles have been communicated to the inhabitants of Europe in a variety of ways. Communities have informally enforced their own norms through gossip, shaming rituals, or exhortation. Voluntary associations accepting foundlings or offering aid to mothers have

played major roles in communicating principles of motherhood. As Jean-Louis Flandrin and Michel Foucault have pointed out, clergymen, especially in the early centuries, have been central in establishing the discussive outlines of motherhood and fatherhood. State legislation on such issues as compulsory education, child custody, child labor, and workplace protection are also powerful statements about parental duties. The mass media, of course, have also played an incalculable role in propagating models of motherhood.

WIFE, MOTHER, WITCH: THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY THROUGH THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Europe's Catholic heritage offered an ambivalent view of mothers. Celibates were the holy ones, and not until the late Middle Ages were married people considered for sainthood. Christ's mother Mary, whose cult was promoted by the twelfth-century church as a way of stimulating lay piety, was different from all other mothers—not only because of her lifelong virginity but because of the enraptured devotion to a single child with which she was often depicted. Late medieval and humanist writers often preferred Anne, the mother of Mary and the matriarch of a large extended family, as a more familiar model of maternity.

With the Reformation, the saints lost both their shrines and their vivid personal presence. The new moral center of the Christian universe was the family. Though Martin Luther revered maternity and women's nurturing of children, in Protestant countries marriage rather than motherhood dominated female identities. In the public rhetoric of Reformation-era Augsburg, for example, a woman was almost always referred to as a Frau or *Weib*, almost never as *Mutter*, which referred to the uterus.

In both Catholic and Protestant countries, families were patriarchal. In law and to a great extent in custom too, children belonged to their fathers, whose

duty it was to raise them to be decent, God-fearing, and self-supporting. The Renaissance Florentine system of placing infants with wet nurses was organized through fathers, who often negotiated with the *balia* or her husband and who decided when the child should be weaned or transferred. In Samuel Richardson's *Pamela*, Part 2 (1741), Pamela's husband and former master autocratically insists on a wet nurse for their new baby despite Pamela's strong desire to breast-feed, another indication that wetnursing signified paternal power more than maternal indifference. Patriarchy did not always mean a stern and remote father, of course. Dutch fathers were depicted in seventeenth-century paintings playing with or teaching children, even infants.

Being a mother—giving birth or caring for children—was the destiny of European women in the early modern era and fully occupied the adult lives of most of the female population. In early eighteenth-century France approximately five children per family survived, and about two more did not live beyond childhood. For the average European in 1700, life expectancy was only about twenty-five years, and few lived past age forty. A woman marrying in her mid-twenties or a little later would most likely die with young children still in the home.

Not all children's births have been welcomed. Women have always tried to limit births that would cause hardships, and recipes for abortifacients were

part of folk knowledge and the more specialized knowledge of healers. In some of the poorest regions of the world even in the twentieth century, to be a mother could involve a form of triage, the selection of some children for neglect or abandonment and nearly certain death. Very poor or unmarried women were more likely to abandon their newborns. This practice had become so common by the Middle Ages that special homes for foundlings, whose death rates were extraordinarily high, proliferated in major European towns. The number of foundlings increased whenever economic conditions deteriorated.

Wife, housekeeper, and breadwinner were identities that competed with and often overshadowed that of mother. For the poorest women, the preoccupations of income earning and the price of the grains that made up family diets were far more central than the development of each child. Household survival was based on "an economy of makeshifts" (Huf-ton, 1974, pp. 69–127), such as begging, thieving, charity, or street selling. The collective desperation of poor mothers entered the historical record through the bread riots of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including the October Days in 1789, which constituted a crucial stage in the French Revolution. Mothers' sense of "food entitlement," to use the term of the economist Amartya Sen, brought women into the streets well into the twentieth century, most famously in Saint Petersburg in March 1917 but also in early twentieth-century Italy and in Germany during World War I.

Mothers were extremely important as educators of the children in their care, especially girls. Literate mothers produced literate children. Mothers also taught daughters household skills, such as growing vegetables, keeping hens, feeding pigs, making cheeses, or simply preparing meals. Sewing—fancy or plain depending on the status of the household—constituted another important set of skills mothers imparted to their daughters. The poorest mothers often made their daughters partners in subsistence activities, such as selling milk or vegetables at market or even begging. Mothers sometimes managed to save enough money from their own by-employments of fattening chickens or rabbits or selling honey to help daughters accumulate dowries that would dramatically improve their marriage prospects.

The biological mother and child pair that seems so natural today received relatively little cultural emphasis. Both urban and rural women in the early modern period supervised and befriended many who were not their biological children. Households exchanged children, especially teens, as apprentices and servants. In eighteenth-century Paris, for example, domestic

servants, workshop apprentices, and local neighborhood children and young people circulated constantly through both domestic and work spaces. Servants sometimes inherited from their masters as if they were kin. The formal adoption of children, while difficult in this period when blood lineages were essential to definitions of family, did take place, at least in France, under a variety of legal fictions.

For aristocratic and bourgeois women of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in many parts of Europe, breast-feeding by the biological mother of an infant was not considered essential. Wetnursing, especially common in France among the well-off and those of moderate means, meant that a woman might spend little time with her biological children during the first few years of their lives. Wetnursing apparently was the norm in eighteenth-century Hamburg, where a surprising five thousand of its ninety thousand inhabitants were wet nurses by profession.

To say that the construction of motherhood is a twentieth-century phenomenon is not to claim that fertility, birth, or children received no cultural emphasis in the early modern period. They were in fact at the center of elaborate systems of folk magic and storytelling. Themes related to motherhood are also prominent in definitions of witchcraft, in many regions a capital crime, for which at least 200,000 were executed between about 1450 and 1725. Men constituted under 20 percent of that number. The witch, as the definition was formulated over many generations in clerical treatises and court transcripts, was a distorted mother. She was betrayed by her "witch's teat," any extra fold of skin upon which the devil could suck. The ingredients of the brew served at witches' weekly sabbats included dead babies, and witches killed or caused to sicken animals and children, especially babies. A witch's daughter or granddaughter might well become a witch. Court records and trial transcripts reveal the jealousies, grudges, and fears generated by issues of fertility and child-bearing that often were the motives for denunciations and may have given the crime of witchcraft its vivid inverse relation to motherhood. The accused included a disproportionate number of midwives and lying-in assistants.

Perhaps the inchoate mother of this era is most easily seen in folktales, which portray a wide range of mothers and stepmothers, loving, cruel, witchlike, strong, clever, and stupid. Tellingly, in the nineteenth-century Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, whose versions of these tales became widely read, turned the jealous and vicious biological mother of Snow White into a stepmother. By this time cruelty and envy did not square with notions of selfless motherhood.

THE CULT OF MOTHERHOOD: 1760–1918

The cult of motherhood developed in the context of a new anatomy and physiology. Late eighteenth-century anatomists broke with the "one-sex" view that had dominated the study of anatomy since the Renaissance, in which the female was simply an imperfect or perhaps inverted version of the male. Medical writers began to stress the anatomical differences between women and men and to detail female reproductive anatomy and menstruation, a trend that was accentuated with the early twentieth-century discovery of the endocrine system and hormonal differences between women and men. Physicians and other Enlightenment authors, most famously Jean-Jacques Rousseau in *Émile* (1762), claimed breast-feeding and a mother's full-time care of her infants and children was "nature's will," using as models both animal mothers and aboriginal peoples in Africa and South America. Though some of the new arguments outlined the health advantages of mothers' milk and maternal care, the feeding method represented a new, idealized mission for leisured woman free of other

demands. Their pleasure and fulfillment was to come through motherhood.

Indeed motherhood became, in advice books for women, the central female identity. The touch of the child was supposed to bring out the latent, intensely tender feelings in women. As the nineteenth-century British physician P. H. Chevasse put it: "The love of offspring is one of the strongest instincts implanted in women; there is nothing that will compensate for the want of children. A wife yearns for them; they are as necessary to her happiness as the food she eats and the air she breathes" (Oakley, 1980, p. 9).

In Victorian ideology motherhood was associated with the home, which was distinguished from the public world of politics and industry. The private realm was the special arena of mothers, who presided there as "the bright spirit of the home" or as "our warming sunshine," as middle-class Swedes stated (Frykman, 1987, p. 121). Family events, such as dinners and holiday celebrations, revolved around the presence of the mother, then seen as the only such figure in a child's life. Conceptions of the central place of female nurture in children's spiritual

development circulated in thousands of middle-class advice books. Many well-off mothers closely charted their children's motor skills, language, and social development and were deeply involved in their achievements.

In France the cult of motherhood was heavily accented with populationism and, given France's low birthrates, had official government support. The long-lived Bordeaux Society for Maternal Charity offered material aid and close surveillance and was typical of nineteenth-century French voluntary and government organizations formed to promote the new motherhood and to encourage procreation. The upper-class volunteers of the society accepted only women of demonstrated respectability, cleanliness, and thrift but supported them with generous cash payments. Meanwhile French statisticians adopted new ways of charting population size that focused on classifying women in terms of their childbearing potential and counting the babies born to women in their "fertile" years. Although government and private agencies in France offered a number of services to pregnant women and new mothers, they also treated women with small families almost as traitors undermining the nation's vitality.

The new motherhood doctrines were by no means fully instituted in wealthy women's daily lives, though there they had the greatest chance of acceptance. To be sure the practice among the comfortable classes of hiring wet nurses gradually died out everywhere in the nineteenth century, as much the result of the feasibility of bottle-feeding because of antiseptics as of new desires for intimacy with infants. In Paris by the nineteenth century the majority of wet nurse patrons were poor working women. Wealthy women continued as wives and socialites first, mothers second. In the early nineteenth century many mothers in the Nord province in France continued to run family textile businesses and visited their infants and children on Sundays at their wet nurses or boarding schools. Many dissenting voices throughout the nineteenth century challenged the new motherhood paradigm. Feminists harshly criticized their own mothers' lives and motherhood as an institution more generally. To take just one example, Florence Nightingale loathed domestic life and suggested that there should be "crèches for the rich as well as the poor."

For the bulk of the population, the experience of mothering was little changed by the new doctrines. Being a mother meant, as it had in the past, the struggle to feed and dress a large family on an economy of makeshifts. Fatalism about frequent pregnancies predominated, and families were especially large through most of the nineteenth century. Even the best-

educated women in most of Europe did not limit their births significantly in the first half of the nineteenth century. Britain between 1800 and 1850 and Russia between 1850 and 1900 averaged completed family sizes of over six children plus stillbirths and child deaths. Maternity constituted a physical feat, as it had in earlier times. Even though life expectancy increased substantially in the richest European countries by the nineteenth century, only a few mothers lived long enough to see all of their children grow up and leave home.

If domesticity and motherhood were the only appropriate callings for women, the vast majority of the female population was stigmatized as unwomanly. As industrial capitalism developed in the early nineteenth century, more mothers and nonmothers became waged workers, though at about only half of men's rate of pay, rather than creating subsistence goods for their own families. In rural Hungary and England women plaited straw in their homes for national markets. In Danish villages women shaped and fired clay pots. Throughout Europe women were farm laborers. They were forced to work for landlords in eastern Europe, where serfdom existed until the middle of the nineteenth century in the Hapsburg lands and until 1861 in Russia. Urban mothers toiled in factories and workshops, worked at home on piece

rates, took in lodgers, sweated in industrial-sized laundries, or took in washing at home.

In much of rural Europe women were still agricultural workers under the discipline of a father, a husband, a father-in-law, or in feudal regions a landlord. Under these conditions women's maternal functions were considered secondary. In late nineteenth-century Russia, for example, breast-feeding was the rule, but as new mothers quickly returned to the fields, babies were fed several solid meals each day. Often pacifiers of cloth filled with grain and bacon rind, often prechewed by an adult and obviously quite deadly, were given to babies. Folk sayings such as "It's better to lose an egg than a chicken" minimized the loss that an infant death represented and also stressed the importance of the mother as a worker.

In urban working-class households, motherhood, whether accompanied by waged work or not, involved hard physical work and careful budgeting rather than finely tuned child nurture. What would have been called "mother love" by Victorian middle-class observers was, as understood by poor mothers and children, embodied in the mother's physical exertions, such as frantic bargaining for discount food, after-hours factory piecework done at home, late-night hours spent sewing or ironing children's clothing, and bedside vigils with sick babies. Indeed moth-

ers' incessant work is central in French and German nineteenth-century working-class autobiographies. The daughter of a Paris lace maker wrote that it was her mother "who with her needle and agile fingers built a wall against misery" (Maynes, 1995, p. 79).

Children in these urban settings were expected to repay their mothers' efforts back in cash or in kind. They minded younger siblings, did household chores, helped with mothers' home manufacturing, or freed their mothers from the costs of their keep by taking jobs as servants or factory hands. In late nineteenth-century London they ran household errands and often were sent to fetch things that required a long wait in line, such as the penny-a-quart soup served by a local mission, where one autobiographer often waited in the 1890s with his empty jug. As their children grew though their teens and earned higher wages, mothers claimed a diminishing share of this cash, though sons kept more pocket money than did daughters.

These patterns of mother-child reciprocity became strained, especially in the early twentieth century. Compulsory education, introduced in some of the German states as early as the eighteenth century, represents one of the tensions. In northern and western European countries the years of required schooling expanded in the late nineteenth century or the early twentieth century. The French system, which from 1833 had educated only boys, included girls after 1881. In Britain after 1881 all children between five and ten were expected at school, and the years of compulsory schooling gradually increased thereafter. Mothers' rights to children's services were thus defied by national education systems. Educators, for their part, sometimes attacked maternal claims on the time and loyalty of their children.

The new classification of women as mothers is evident in a variety of nineteenth-century institutions and was sometimes beneficial to women, sometimes not. Unions fought to keep women workers out of their shops in the name of their motherhood capacity, legislators enacted special conditions for hiring women workers, and pregnant or lactating women had claims on particular state or municipal services in many countries. A German law of 1878, for example, mandated unpaid maternity leave for factory workers for three weeks after a birth. Otto von Bismarck's health insurance scheme of 1883 included short-term maternity benefits, though the payment was at the discretion of the funding agency.

For many suffragists and feminists, motherhood provided the basis for claims to citizenship and voting rights. The former seamstress Jeanne Deroin, a utopian socialist and feminist inspired by Olympe de Gouges, argued in 1848 for women's right to work

and for full political participation by stressing their importance to fulfilling a mother's "duty." Deroin said, "It is especially the holy function of motherhood, said to be incompatible with the exercise of the rights of the citizen, that imposes on the woman the duty to watch over the future of her children and gives her the right to intervene, not only in all acts of civil life, but also in all acts of political life" (Scott, 1996, p. 70). Deroin was imprisoned in 1850 for her political activism.

The infant welfare movement of the early twentieth century, an international campaign for infant and child health led by medical and social work professionals, added new meanings to motherhood. For the first time it was not only a special kind of female nurture but a highly complex and technical calling. The campaign introduced new knowledge about nutrition, vitamins, for example, and the measure of food energy in calories; bacteriology; statistics on infant death rates; and new data on child development. Professional journals and popularly written pamphlets offered mothers practices, such as antiseptics in the home, that could improve the health and survival of their children. Anna Fischer-Dueckelmann's *The Housewife as Doctor*, first published in German in 1910, included detailed information on the home, health, pregnancy, and birth. Eight full pages were devoted to the chemical composition of dust. Infant welfare activists were successful in getting European legislators of this era to pass such measures as licensing childbirth personnel, tighter supervision of foster parents, and free or subsidized medical care for working-class mothers and infants.

The turn of the century's increased public attention to motherhood and infant care heartened those feminists who had long been concerned with the needs of working mothers but with little legislative success. French feminists openly played on population fears to improve the situations of mothers and of women in general. Maria Martin said in 1896, "If you want children, learn to honour the mothers" (Cova, 1991, p. 120). Feminists of varying positions combined suffrage agitation with proposals for government support for working mothers, mothers' child custody rights, and support from fathers of illegitimate children. Others developed this preoccupation with mothers' importance in a more radical direction. For instance, the Norwegian feminist Katti Anker Moeller argued in the first decades of the twentieth century that mothers should not be dependent on husbands but, single or married, should be paid by governments to raise their children independently. Furthermore, she thought without reproductive choice for women, motherhood would simply be "slavery."

Women should be able to choose or reject childbearing with available contraception and abortion. Moeller's international contacts with feminists of similar views, Helene Stoecker, head of the German *Mutter-schutz* movement in particular, suggest the vitality of "maternalist" feminism in this important era in the social history of motherhood.

MID-TWENTIETH-CENTURY MOTHERHOOD: FROM RECIPROCITY TO MATERNAL LIABILITY

For the majority in western Europe, the sheer physical work of mothers—childbearing, child care, and probably also housework—began to decrease in the interwar period. Most obviously, child care declined along with birthrates in most of Europe, including Poland, Yugoslavia, Norway, Britain, France, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. Only Ireland maintained its prewar birthrates through the 1920s. In the interwar years workers' birthrates began to approximate those of artisans and the professional and middle classes, which had begun, in general, to decline in the second half of the nineteenth century. Caring for two or three children was surely less taxing than caring for five or six. The expansion of social infrastructures also helped to ease the mother's burden, especially with municipally supplied clean and plentiful water, indoor plumbing, electric lighting, gas stoves, and in the 1930s antibiotics to treat children's illnesses, such as pneumonia, rheumatic fever, and bacterial infections.

The expansion of a mass consumer culture in the 1920s brought new kinds of proscriptions for mothers, however. New behaviorist ideas about the importance of "training" children, transmitted through advice literature and medical personnel, paralleled the movement to rationalize industrial production. The experts of the interwar period, including the Australian doctor Truby King and Americans L. Emmett Holt and John Watson, advocated efficient child rearing methods, such as rigid "habit training" and avoiding germ transmitters like kissing and cuddling. The U.S. home economics movement positioned mothers mainly as efficient homemakers and consumers of household cleaning supplies, packaged foods, and small appliances like toasters, radios, and irons. Scholars have explored some of the paradoxes of an American-born trend when electrification and income levels in Europe were considerably lower than those in most of the United States. Even in Berlin fewer than half of the homes had electricity in 1928. The campaign to modernize the home in Weimar Germany did little more than accentuate the domestic

sexual division of labor, conflating motherhood and housekeeping.

Developments in psychology were crucial to twentieth-century motherhood. Particularly after World War II, psychoanalytic thought was popularized through many service professions, including social work, psychology, and psychiatry. In mid-twentieth-century Britain, as Denise Riley noted, psychology was a major "historical actor" in the postwar re-creation of gender and motherhood. Initially Sigmund Freud had remarkably little to say about mothers and certainly did not blame them for the problems of his analysands. However, in his writings of the 1930s, the decade of his death, Freud reassessed his thinking on gender. The girl's discovery of her "castration," her readiness to blame this on her mother, her wish for a baby as a substitute for the "lost" penis were the ingredients of a psychoanalytic position that postulated motherhood as a basic need of all women. D. W. Winnicott, on the other hand, put mothers and their mothering at the center of his writings beginning in the 1930s. He viewed infant development as a social as opposed to an instinctual process, but this "society" included only the mother and child. The emphasis, in all the schools derived from Freud, on invisible and unconscious forces irrevocably shaping children's personalities together with the Winnicott-inspired concentration on mother-infant interactions made a close social scrutiny of women's child care inevitable. Motherhood had become associated with continuous contact between mother and child, and other potential caretakers, such as fathers, siblings, grandparents, or neighbors, were viewed as secondary figures in a child's emotional world. Mothers' obligations to their children were expanding markedly, while those of the child were dropping away.

The twentieth century's many episodes of deadly violence on European soil, two world wars, at least three episodes of genocide, and many fascist or totalitarian regimes with their huge casualties, brought a distinct kind of suffering to mothers perhaps unprecedented in its severity. The Turks' forced marches of Armenians in 1915 killed hundreds of thousands of women and children. Famines generated by World War I and its aftermath killed many more among the Central Powers and in the Soviet Union. The World War II bombings of civilians and the Nazi genocide did not guarantee respect or protection to mothers. Indeed mothers with infants and small children were usually executed first in concentration camps. In the Bosnian Civil War of the early 1990s, Serbian soldiers systematically raped Muslim female civilians, intending to force them to bear their captors' offspring.

Being a woman at home in wartime meant both material hardships and perpetual fears for the safety of husband or son. The soldiers' death tolls of the two world wars, between 9 and 10 million in World War I and about 22 million in World War II, left millions of widows with young children and populations with long-lasting sex-ratio imbalances. World War I killed nearly a quarter of the Serbian male population aged fifteen to forty-nine. In 1950 women headed a third of German families, and the Soviet Union in 1959 had seven women to every four men in the age group thirty-five to fifty. In the two decades after World War II the revival of early marriage, high birthrates, and intense female domesticity constituted in part an effort to reestablish some form of normality.

Twentieth-century states sometimes enforced "normal" motherhood with a vengeance. Benito Mussolini, ruling over an overpopulated country whose emigration route to the United States had just been cut off, nonetheless promoted "births, many births" (De Grazia, 1992, p. 41) as a way to restore the con-

ventional gender relations that had been shattered in the aftermath of World War I. Mussolini defined all women in terms of motherhood, implementing new penalties for abortion, the repression of birth control, the exclusion of women from many professions, and discrimination against girls in secondary and higher education.

Similarly motherhood figured prominently in the reconstitution of West Germany after 1945. With so many soldiers dead or still prisoners of war, the new state was a "country of women." High proportions of women lived alone or with their children, and the illegitimacy rate was over 16 percent in 1946. Even in 1950 the country counted 130 women to every 100 men aged 25 to 40. The few women who were feminists before 1933 and survived the Nazi years hoped that Germany's new constitutional order would include more egalitarian family law and welfare measures to benefit married and single mothers. But West Germany was constructed as a patriarchal state, a link in cold war Europe's anticommunist chain. The conventional two-parent family with a Hausfrau mother became the symbol of the "free" Germany.

Post World War II state welfare programs expanded in much of Europe. Though based on a variety of views of women's capacities, these programs included family allowances, maternity leaves, medical care, and in some countries state-run child care and after-school centers for all children of working or non-working mothers. Sweden provided a salary and housing allowance to women whose partners did not offer child support. Although postwar government policy in France continued to be based on efforts to encourage population, the socialists and communists who helped formulate the French policies in 1945 also strongly supported women's and mothers' rights to work and to equality in the workplace.

THE RECONFIGURATION OF MOTHERHOOD: THE 1970s, 1980s, AND 1990s

By the last decades of the twentieth century, motherhood had been transformed yet again. A majority of mothers, even those with young children, had broken with Winnicott's dicta and were now in the labor force. Taboos on births outside of marriage had waned, and with highly reliable birth control methods and legal abortion in the great majority of European countries, the one-child family became the new norm in many regions.

One departure from the European past was the proportion of mothers not married to their children's

fathers, though in many cases the parents were cohabiting. In western Europe as a whole and worldwide, about a third of households were headed by women. The proportion of births to single women in Britain, for example, shot up dramatically in the 1980s, reaching about one-third of all births in the early 1990s, the highest in its history to that date. In Denmark and Norway the proportions approached 50 percent in the mid 1990s.

The completed fertility rates of European women in the late twentieth century were at a historical low. In the late 1990s the Italian rate was under 1.2 children per woman. An Italian sociologist commented, "The ethic of sacrifice for a family" has dissipated (Spector, 1998, p. 6). The highest European Union rates were those of Ireland and Norway at slightly under two children. Spain and Italy had the lowest. European Muslim countries had higher fertility rates, 2.5 in Albania and 2.7 in Azerbaijan, than their Christian neighbors, but these were considerably lower than in the Muslim parts of Africa. European conditions, attitudes, freedoms, and services quickly transformed the birthrates of North African immigrants to France, which declined steeply during the 1980s, and of West Indian, Indian, and Chinese immigrants to Britain.

Mothers' work outside the home lost much of its stigma in the late twentieth century. Indeed among the best-educated mothers, over 90 percent of those with postgraduate degrees had jobs in virtually every country in the European Union according to 1995 figures. Although mothers' job holding varied from country to country, rates were high, partly reflecting the fact that most of the jobs generated in late twentieth-century decades were "female" ones. Among the women between twenty and fifty-nine years old with at least one child under the age of eleven, proportions in the labor force ranged from a high of 89 percent in Denmark to a low of 67 percent in the western states of Germany in 1992. Labor force rates were about as high among mothers of children under seven years of age.

Not surprisingly, motherhood as a doctrine faced lively challenges in this period, beginning in the 1970s with the objections of Ann Oakley, Adrienne Rich, Jessie Bernard, and Christine Delphy. Motherhood's overwhelming demands were among the elements critiqued. As Rich wrote in *Of Woman Born* (1976), "The institution of motherhood finds all mothers more or less guilty of having failed their children." At about the same time the wages for housework movement, with Italian roots, attacked the association of mother with socially dependent homemaker. Activists argued that housework and

child care, productive activities beneficial to society as a whole, ought to be waged by governments or husbands, a position that had not been enunciated since the 1900s. In her 1947 *Housewife*, a sociological study of mothers' attitudes, Oakley continued this line of argument: that love of children was by no means equivalent to enjoying housework. The two needed to be separated. In the 1970s and 1980s, the growing acceptance of fathers as capable of child care, supported by parental leave in several states, further shifted what it meant to be a mother. In the 1990s the acceleration of genetic research also challenged the older concept of motherhood. Researchers in many scientific disciplines found that personality traits of all kinds have genetic bases and may have little to do with the quality of a person's mothering. Finally, the reproductive technologies available to at least some European women, separating conception, pregnancy, and birth, shook the biological foundations of motherhood.

Twentieth-century feminists attempted to move motherhood from the realm of the private and culturally invisible into the center of culture and politics. Feminist environmentalists defined the Earth as a mother and viewed women as more respectful of nature because of their experiences of pregnancy and childbirth. Other feminist activists, with a revived sense of mothers' social importance, attacked welfare-state bureaucracies for failing to provide housing and quality medical services for mothers and children. They demanded public support for those, mainly women, caring for dependents of all needs.

It would be wrong, of course, to see the patterns of the late twentieth century as the end of motherhood discourses or of female mothering. In general child care continued to be socially coded as female. In two-parent, two-earner families, including those in Denmark and Sweden, where fathers were most involved with their families, the preponderance of both child care and housework is done by women. Single parents are overwhelmingly women. Raising children alone, while relatively free of the disgrace of "bastardy," often means poverty. Welfare benefits declined in the European Union during the 1980s and had never, in most countries, offered parity for those not fully in the workforce. As a result, from about a fifth to a quarter of female-headed households in Europe were poor. Proportions were higher in Ireland and lower in Sweden. Poverty rates for such households appeared somewhat larger for some groups of immigrants and ethnic minorities.

Elisabeth Badinter, in her social history of motherhood, *Mother Love: Myth and Reality* (1981), implied that the regime most "natural" to women was the era of casual care and benign neglect destroyed by

Rousseau's writings on motherhood and childhood in the 1760s. It is tempting to suggest that the contemporary European regime comes closer to meeting women's fundamental needs as mothers. After all, it includes the ability to limit conceptions, end pregnancies, and maintain small families and offers op-

portunities for economic independence and job holding while raising children. History, however, is not the place to look for hypothesized natural human tendencies. Instead history offers a range of material possibilities that enables us to interpret our own lives with clarity and wisdom.

See also **The Population of Europe: Early Modern Demographic Patterns; The Population of Europe: The Demographic Transition and After** (*volume 2*); **Women and Femininity; Gender and Education; Childbirth, Midwives, Wetnursing** (*in this volume*); and *other articles in this section.*

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CHILD REARING AND CHILDHOOD



Colin Heywood

Can there be a history of childhood? Until the late twentieth century most people apparently thought not. The temptation was always to think of childhood as a natural and universal phenomenon. The members of any society tend to consider their own particular arrangements for childhood as rooted in nature, having been steeped in them all their lives. At the same time it is easy to assume that the overriding influence on childhood will always be the biological immaturity of children. It will therefore be broadly similar in all societies and of limited interest to scholars. Some have even suggested that a male-dominated academic profession for decades contemptuously dismissed child rearing as beneath its dignity, a humdrum matter left to wives and mothers. Historians face the additional problem of assembling evidence on a section of society little seen and almost never heard in the surviving documentation. Not surprisingly, as late as the 1950s the history of childhood could be described as almost virgin territory. An extensive literature addresses child welfare, outlining the efforts of philanthropists, charities, and above all the state in this sphere. Such an approach, however, has done little to show how people conceptualized childhood as a distinct stage of life and even less to illuminate the experiences of children themselves.

Two developments in historiography have brought the subjects of childhood and children more firmly into focus. First, historians and social scientists in general grasped the important cultural dimensions of childhood. Far from a natural and universal model of childhood, each society, each class, perhaps even each family constructs its own image of the child. Some, for example, consider children naturally deprived from birth, and others see them as naturally innocent. The physical immaturity of children is undeniable, of course, but it is no longer considered a determining influence. As the sociologists Allison James and Alan Prout wrote, "The immaturity of children is a biological fact of life but the ways in which this immaturity is understood and made meaningful is a fact of culture" (James and Prout, 1990, p. 7).

Second, a number of researchers set out to recover the experience of growing up in various social and geographical settings in the past. In so doing they reacted against the older habit of depicting young people as putty in the hands of adults, with all the emphasis on development and socialization. Instead they looked for the ways in which children have been active in carving out their own place in the world, noting their interactions with parents and other forms of authority. Locating and interpreting sources in this area poses problems. It is not hard to find examples of manuals giving advice to parents on how to raise their offspring, but whether anyone took any notice of them is another matter. Members of the educated elite may have left traces of their feelings for their children in diaries and autobiographies, but how the mass of peasants and laborers felt must remain largely a matter of conjecture. Nonetheless, the basis exists for understanding social constructions of childhood in the past and for what might be called a social history of children.

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CHILDHOOD

Philippe Ariès and the "discovery" of childhood.

In 1960, with his *Centuries of Childhood*, Philippe Ariès launched the history of childhood with a bang. Ariès made the striking assertion that "in medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist." By this he did not mean that people had no affection for children, but rather that they lacked "an awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular nature which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young adult" (Ariès, 1996, p. 125). The result was that medieval civilization failed to perceive a transitional period between infancy and adulthood. Around the age of five or seven, as soon as they could survive without the constant attention of their mothers, the young were launched into the world of adults. They joined in the games and pastimes going on around them and learned their trades working beside

fully trained practitioners. Children were simply thought of as miniature adults.

The “discovery” of childhood had to await the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. Ariès discerned two phases in this process. To begin with, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries women looking after children took the initiative by treating them as a source of amusement and relaxation, delighting in their “sweetness, simplicity and drollery” (Ariès, 1996, p. 126). Ariès conceded that “mothers, nannies and cradle-rockers” (p. 125) must have always found the little antics of children touching, but he suggested that they had hesitated to express their feelings. The second, and for Ariès more significant stage, began in the seventeenth century. At this point reformers replaced the “coddling” of children with “psychological interest and moral solicitude” (p. 128). A small group of lawyers, priests, and moralists came to recognize the innocence and weakness of childhood. Gradually, starting with the middle classes, these reformers imposed the notion that children needed special treatment, “a sort of quarantine” (p. 396) before they were ready to join the world of adults. What Ariès envisaged, therefore, was a huge shift in the cultural sphere, attributable to the growing influence of Christianity and a new respect for education.

Moving on from Ariès. Like many other pioneers, Ariès found his work at once praised for its originality and sniped at on all sides by the next generation of researchers. Few historians after Ariès accepted that there was a complete absence of any consciousness of childhood in medieval civilization. Certainly medieval authors did have a tendency to gloss over childhood and adolescence. Even in the early modern period, children were still largely absent from literary works, as both the French and the English cases attest. Insofar as authors did focus on the young, it was often the child prodigy, the *puer senex*, a child who already thought like an old man, who interested them. For example, Thomas Williams Malkin, born in 1795, started his career at age three, became an expert linguist at four, was a profound philosopher at five, read the fathers of the church at six, and died of old age at seven. Nonetheless, medievalists were quick to demonstrate at least some recognition of the “particular nature” of childhood during their period by examining law codes, for example, or medical treatises. They also drew attention to the extensive treatment of the notion of the ages of man inherited from classical antiquity. During the late medieval and early modern periods, such ideas and the images associated with them, including the swaddled baby or the frolicsome child, were widely disseminated in the vernacular.

However, these schemes were largely academic exercises that owed more to the ingenuity of philosophers in relating the human life cycle to the natural world than to any direct observations of children and others. Besides the seven ages familiar from Jaques’s speech in Shakespeare’s *As You Like It*, popular interpretations embraced three, four, and six ages. It all depended on the author’s intention to draw parallels between the stages of life and, for example, the four humors or the seven planets.

The sweeping changes during the early modern period proposed, but not very convincingly documented, by Ariès also made the majority of historians uncomfortable. For a while some accepted the notion of a discovery of the particular nature of childhood but claimed to locate it in another period or a more specific one. Pierre Riché, for example, went back to the sixth century among teachers of the young oblates in the monasteries. John Sommerville contended that “sustained interest in children in England began with the Puritans” of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for they were “the first to puzzle over their nature and their place in society” (Sommerville, 1992, p. 3). According to many historians, in the eighteenth century the French philosophe Jean-Jacques Rousseau was perhaps the first thinker to consider childhood worth studying in its own right.

Scholars began to diverge even further from the Ariès approach by doubting the appropriateness of thinking in terms of a definitive discovery of childhood at some point in the past. Critics of Ariès, notably Adrian Wilson, accused him of extreme “present centeredness” (Wilson, 1980, p. 147). That is to say, Ariès looked for evidence of twentieth-century French ideas of childhood in medieval Europe, failed to find it, and then leaped to the conclusion that the period had no awareness of this stage of life at all. It is conceivable that the Middle Ages had a consciousness of childhood so different from the familiar modern one that it is unrecognizable. The suggestion of some fixed and stable notion of childhood “waiting in the wings of history for just recognition” (Jordanova, 1989, p. 10) then becomes difficult to sustain. Instead it may be more illuminating to seek various cultural constructions of childhood in the past. These invariably competed with each other at any particular period and did not necessarily evolve in one direction. Indeed many historians have noted the ambivalence of adult attitudes to childhood. There is in fact a whole repertoire of themes in the construction of childhood worthy of exploration.

Nature versus nurture. One reason why medieval writers paid scant attention to children was that they

did not share the modern view of the early years of life as critical for character formation. They considered the nature a child is born with the most important influence, the raw material without which the finest nurturing would be wasted. Hence Middle High German texts assume that a base character like Judas, brought up to be a noble, was bound to turn out badly. Conversely, a young man responds almost instantly to instruction in his true calling, as Parzival became an accomplished knight relatively late in life after a few words of instruction from the hermit Gurnemanz.

This particular balance in favor of nature over nurture gradually shifted in the opposite direction from the Renaissance onward. The Dutch humanist Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536) hinted at the common notion that a child's mind was a blank sheet on which teachers could write whatever they considered suitable. He noted the "quality of rawness and freshness" in a child's mind, which had to be molded to produce a fully human soul rather than a "monstrous bestiality." The English philosopher John Locke gave

the image of the child as a *tabula rasa* a further boost when he published *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693). In the final paragraph he admitted that he had considered the gentleman's son for whom it had been written "only as white Paper, or Wax, to be molded and fashioned as one pleases" (Locke, 1989, p. 265). The middle and upper classes in particular began to pay more attention to this "molding" of the young and to the detailed advice on child rearing and education provided by moralists. The idea that "the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world" became received wisdom. Locke summed up the increasingly environmentalist perspective by asserting, "Of all the Men we meet with, Nine Parts of Ten are what they are, Good or Evil, useful or not, by their Education" (p. 83). At the same time he noted that tutors needed to pay close attention to the "various Tempers, different Inclinations and particular Defaults" found in children (p. 265).

Hereditary influences made something of a comeback in certain scientific circles during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Italian

Cesare Lombroso claimed that some people were born criminals. Fortunately, an “anthropological examination” would expose these criminal types, explaining their “scholastic and disciplinary shortcomings” so they could be segregated from their better-endowed companions. Meanwhile a number of educational psychologists in England and Germany asserted the hereditary nature of intelligence. In 1906 Karl Pearson stood Locke on his head by writing, “the influence of environment is nowhere more than one-fifth of heredity, and quite possibly not one-tenth of it.” Three years later his colleague Cyril Burt concluded that intelligence is innate after finding that boys from a small sample of upper-class families in Oxford performed better at his tests than those with a lower-middle-class background. He spent the rest of his career campaigning for selectivity in education on the grounds that most of the population could never develop much in the way of intelligence. What mattered, in his view, was to identify and nurture that small elite “endowed by nature with outstanding gifts of ability and character.”

Depravity versus innocence. The origin of the view that children are naturally depraved goes back to St. Augustine, who asserted in the fourth century that the taint of sin was passed down from generation to generation by the act of creation. His firm line that infants are born in sin generally prevailed over the opposing one of infant innocence until the twelfth century. It was also taken up again with a vengeance from the sixteenth century onward by Protestant reformers and their Catholic counterparts, both heavily influenced by Augustinian theology. A German sermon dating from the 1520s contended that infant hearts craved after “adultery, fornication, impure desires, lewdness, idol worship, belief in magic, hostility, quarrelling, passion, anger, strife, dissension, factiousness, hatred, murder, drunkenness, gluttony” and more. The English Presbyterian Daniel Williams was equally forthright in the eighteenth century, telling his juvenile readers, “Thou by nature art brutish and devilish.” Yet for all their insistence that children were born with evil in their hearts, Puritans were at least willing to envisage them as vessels “ready to receive good or evil drop by drop,” or as young twigs ready to be bent the right or the wrong way. Catholics of this same era continued the Augustinian tradition with no less vehemence. As Pierre de Bérulle, leader of the Oratorians in France, magnificently put it during the 1620s, “Childhood is the vilest and most abject condition of human nature, after that of death.” At the same time they were prepared to argue that the very weakness of children made them model Christians insofar as they were in no position to resist the Divine Will.

Catholic and Protestant writers also liked to compare children to wild, undomesticated animals. Both Erasmus and Martin Luther, for example, characterized bad behavior as animal-like. Small children, according to the historian David Hunt, were seen as intermediate beings, not really animals but not really humans either. This tradition died hard. The English Evangelical movement of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was perhaps most explicit in reasserting the idea that children are by nature evil. Its last gasp around 1900 took the form of recapitulation theory, whereby each child growing up follows the stages of civilization experienced by human beings. Childhood was of course akin to savagery.

The contrasting belief in the original innocence of children was also deeply rooted in the Christian tradition. As early as the fifth century Pope Leo the Great preached, “Christ loved childhood, mistress of humility, rule of innocence, model of sweetness.” During the early modern era notions of infant depravity continued to hold sway, though most authors softened the original Augustinian position. A full blast against it came with the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and the most forceful opponent was Rousseau. He made his position perfectly clear in *Emile* (1762), which begins with the famous line, “Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things, everything degenerates in the hands of man” (Rousseau, 1979, p. 37). As innocents, children could be left to respond to nature, then they would do nothing but good. “Respect childhood,” he counseled, and “leave nature to act for a long time before you get involved with acting in its place” (p. 107). The romantic conception of childhood, which first appeared during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, continued in this vein. It depicted children as “creatures of deeper wisdom, finer aesthetic sensitivity, and a more profound awareness of enduring moral truths” (Grylls, 1978, p. 35). Childhood had become a lost realm that was nonetheless fundamental to the creation of the adult self. For the poet William Wordsworth, in his “Ode: Intimations of Immortality” (1807), “Heaven lies about us in our infancy!” For the German romantic Jean Paul Richter, in *Levana* (1807), children were “pure beings” sent to earth from the unknown world above.

It was one thing to proclaim the angelic nature of childhood in a poem but quite another to create plausible characters in a novel or to deal with hardened street urchins. Charles Dickens (1812–1870) may occasionally have lapsed into sentimentality when describing children, such as Little Nell (from *The Old Curiosity Shop*) or David Copperfield. More characteristically, as Peter Coveney observed, in his

strongest depictions of childhood Dickens achieved a powerful mingling of pathos and idealization with the squalid (Coveney, 1967, p. 159). By the twentieth century the association of childhood with innocence was firmly embedded in Western culture, though the excesses of Victorian sentimentalization of childhood did not survive the appearance of Freud's theories on the human personality.

Helplessness versus dependence. All infants are born helpless, but when they should start becoming independent is an open question. As late as the nineteenth century the majority of children in Europe were encouraged to begin supporting themselves at an early stage. The age of seven was an informal turning point when the offspring of peasants and craftspeople were generally expected to start helping their parents with little tasks around the home, the farm, or the workshop. By their early teens they were likely to be working beside adults or were established in apprenticeships. They might have left home by then to become servants or apprentices. This is not to say that they were treated as miniature adults—they certainly were not required to do the same work as older people—but they were expected to grow up fast. The young may also have discussed sexuality quite openly with adults during the medieval and early modern periods. The sociologist Norbert Elias argued that boys lived from an early age in the same social sphere as adults, and the latter did not feel it necessary to restrain themselves “in action or in words” as in modern times. He cited *Colloquies*, a schoolbook written by Erasmus in 1519, which includes sections on a young man wooing a girl, a woman complaining about the bad behavior of her husband, and a conversation between a young man and a prostitute. (Elias neglected to mention that the book was condemned by the theologians of the Sorbonne and eventually put on the Catholic Church's Index of Forbidden Books.) How much of a sex life young people had in the past is a matter of controversy among historians. Low rates of illegitimacy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may provide evidence of sexual austerity outside marriage. Alternatively, Jean-Louis Flandrin argued from French evidence that youthful libido found various outlets short of full intercourse, especially through homosexuality, masturbation, and intimate courting customs.

Since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the middle-class desire has been to isolate children and, later, adolescents from the world of adults. Young people have been increasingly infantilized by efforts to keep them out of the workplace, to repress their sexuality, and to prolong their formal education in schools and colleges. Ideally such feeble creatures

would be removed from all temptation, constantly supervised, and subjected to an endless round of rigorous rules and exercises. Hence learning languages would feature prominently. To put it another way, the child would be kept apart and preserved by living in Latin among the idealized figures of antiquity. Yet it was one thing for Rousseau to recommend that the young remain continent until their twenties and quite another to prevent them from masturbating or experimenting with the opposite sex. Efforts to prevent children from earning a wage also clashed with peasant and working-class notions of early independence. These tensions came to a head in many countries during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as governments attempted to impose the new model through factory legislation and compulsory schooling. The notion of a long childhood finally prevailed, perhaps at the cost of underestimating the capacities of children.

Age versus sex. How did people in the past combine their perception of age, a child as opposed to an adult, with that of sex, a male as opposed to a female? During the Middle Ages, when they used the word “child” in written sources, they usually appeared to have a boy in mind. In the Occitan literature of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, for example, girls were virtually invisible. For centuries the prevailing mode in literary sources provided advice on the rearing of young males from the elite. Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* was a particularly illustrious example. Rousseau's *Emile* reflected something of a turning point in the eighteenth century by introducing Sophie beside Emile, though the subordinate role envisaged for her hardly endeared Rousseau to feminists or to modern sensibilities. The romantic movement brought the child rather than the boy to the forefront. Indeed the tendency was for that stock character in Victorian fiction, the child redeemer who reconciles estranged members of families or helps adults see the error of their ways, to be a girl. One thinks of Sissy Jupe, Little Nell, or Florence Dombey in the work of Dickens. Advice on the dress, diet, and exercise appropriate for children and infants in Victorian England minimized sex differences. Parents were probably relaxed about this, according to Deborah Gorham, because they were certain about innate differences between males and females. Nonetheless, they hoped that, as the two sexes played together, the supposed weakness of the girl would be strengthened and the roughness of the boy softened.

Conclusion. It appears from the available sources that a generalized interest in childhood was slow to

emerge in Europe. This might be linked to underlying socioeconomic conditions. In an agrarian economy, predominant in much of Europe until the nineteenth century, children were inserted gradually into the world of adults from an early age. Childhood and adolescence meshed progressively and almost imperceptibly into adulthood. This does not necessarily mean swallowing the Ariès thesis whole and asserting that people in early modern Europe were unaware of different stages of development among the young. For example, the responsibilities with which young people were entrusted at the workplace were graded until the youngsters reached full maturity as workers in their late teens. They played their own games, apart from those of adults, and legal codes recognized their need for protection under certain circumstances.

Nonetheless, under these conditions childhood and adolescence did appear less structured and special. Most young people followed in the footsteps of their parents, so one generation shaded unobtrusively into the next. The strict age grading introduced by the modern school system was a late-nineteenth-century development. Also a raft of cultural influences from antiquity and Christianity lent themselves to a negative view of childhood. These were challenged under the humanist banner during the Renaissance, allowing the more sympathetic perspective on childhood, which was also part of the Christian tradition, to come to the fore. Changing material conditions also fostered an interest in childhood, notably with the rise of capitalism between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. Various historians have noted how an increasingly commercialized and urbanized society required more investment in the young. The urban labor market was more diverse than that of the villages, the element of choice and experimentation became more critical during the early years, and education was established as a channel to success in business and above all the professions. The welfare of children became a matter of intense interest, which immensely complicated the whole business of child rearing.

CHILD REARING PRACTICES

Bad parents, good parents. Parents have received a bad press in much of the historical literature on child rearing. In *The History of Childhood*, Lloyd deMause went further than most in a ringing denunciation: “The history of childhood is a nightmare from which we have only recently begun to awaken. The further back in history one goes, the lower the level of child care, and the more likely children are to be killed, abandoned, beaten, terrorized and sexually abused” (DeMause, 1974, p. 1). To his critics, deMause had

in effect written little more than a history of child abuse. He was, however, in good company during the 1970s. Lawrence Stone asserted that, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, children in England were “neglected, brutally treated, and even killed” (Stone, 1977, p. 99). Edward Shorter contrasted the indifference of mothers to the development and happiness of infants in traditional society with the “good mothering” of the modern period. Later studies of parent-child relationships generally took a more tolerant line on past practices. Steven Ozment deflated earlier claims, observing, “surely the hubris of an age reaches a certain peak when it accuses another age of being incapable of loving its children properly” (Ozment, 1983, p. 162).

Historians have attempted to distinguish more carefully between practices considered in the best interests of the children at the time, even though they might appear wrongheaded in hindsight, such as swaddling, and others, such as infanticide, condemned outright in the past as in the present. The general drift of the revisionist argument has been that continuities in parenting are more in evidence than any dramatic turning points. Examples of cruel and abusive parents can be found in any age, they have suggested, but the vast majority probably felt affection for their offspring and did the best they could for them. Linda Pollock, for instance, denied that the young were neglected or systematically ill treated in the past because of an alleged inability to appreciate the needs of the young. Her bold counterassertion, based on British and American material, was that there were “very few changes in parental care and child life from the 16th to the 19th century in the home” (Pollock, 1983, p. 268). The problem of finding evidence to settle what appears to be two plausible but contradictory cases has presented an interesting agenda for debate.

Caring for infants: food, clothing, and hygiene.

A compelling case can be made to show that the alleged indifference to childhood in the medieval and early modern periods resulted in a callous approach to child rearing. Infants under two years of age in particular were thought to suffer appalling neglect because parents considered it unwise to invest emotional or material resources in “poor sighing animals” who were all too likely to die young. Hence they often were denied their mother’s milk and instead were sent to mercenary wetnurses. Imprisoned for hours in their swaddling bands and tight little cribs, they were left to stew in their own excrement and other filth. At the very worst, they were killed or abandoned to a charitable institution. Only with the more enlightened views on childhood of the eighteenth century did par-

ents begin to adopt more “modern” approaches to child care. Certainly moralists and physicians gave ample testimony on parents’ lack of interest in their youngest children. Yet some historians possibly have sided a little too hastily with Enlightenment reformers in denigrating parents influenced by the traditional popular culture.

On the matter of feeding infants, at first sight nothing would appear more heartless than to snatch a newborn babe from his or her mother. Indeed a tradition among physicians and theologians favoring maternal breastfeeding was established well before the famous interventions of Rousseau and his contemporaries during the eighteenth century. The seventeenth-century Dutch writer Jacob Cats, for example, entreated young mothers to “give the noble suck to refresh your little fruit.” Yet in much of Europe, notably in France and Italy, wealthy families turned to wet nurses, women paid to suckle someone else’s child. Wetnursing took on a whole new scale in many cities during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1780 the lieutenant general of police estimated that only 1 in 30 of the 21,000 babies born each year in Paris was nursed by its mother. The rest went to wet nurses in the suburbs or the surrounding countryside. By this period in France the very wealthy had been joined on the market by large contingents of artisans, shopkeepers, and even servants. Contemporaries accused mothers of refusing to breastfeed because they

were more concerned about their figures and the social round than the welfare of their children. Fathers were considered no less selfish, circumventing the recommended abstinence from sexual intercourse during breastfeeding (it was thought to spoil the milk).

As for the nurses, they supposedly acted as true mercenaries, treating their tiny charges as a commodity like any other. According to their critics, they deceived parents in their letters on the condition of their charges, offered milk to their own children before the little intruders, and supplemented their overstretched milk supplies with pap made from flour or bread-crumbs and water. Above all they allegedly deprived infants of the care and attention they needed. In eighteenth-century England, John Stedman complained bitterly of his four wetnurses:

The first of these bitches was turn’d off for having nearly suffocated me in bed. . . . The second had let me fall from her arms on the stones till my head was almost fractured, & I lay several hours in convulsions. The third carried me under a moulder’d old brick wall, which fell in a heap of rubbish just the moment we had passed by it, while the fourth proved to be a thief, and deprived me even of my very baby clothes.

To clinch the case, an appalling “massacre of the innocents” occurred in the villages. George Sussman suggested three levels of infant mortality among those born in French cities during the eighteenth century. The lowest and rarest rate, 180 to 200 per 1,000 live

births, was registered among those breast-fed at home by their mothers. A medium range of 250 to 400 per 1,000 occurred among those put out to nurse in the countryside. Finally, a catastrophic rate of 650 to 900 per 1,000 struck foundlings who also were placed, several to each nurse, in rural areas.

This grim version of events, however, risks distorting the overall perspective on infant feeding. To begin with, the consensus among historians is that most mothers in the European past breast-fed their own offspring at home. Wetnursing, generally confined to the larger, older cities of Europe, was rare in villages, small towns, and the new industrial centers of the nineteenth century. It was also quite rare in Germany and Holland and perhaps in England. Evidence from Germany supports marked regional variations in feeding practices. A 1905 survey shows that infants in the northern and western sections of Bavaria and Baden and in Hessen usually were breast-fed, while the majority in southern and eastern Bavaria were fed artificially. But data for such maps of breast-feeding practice are rare.

The traditional custom was to wait a few days before putting babies to the breast because mothers thought the first milk was a bad substance. Newborn infants were given a range of substitutes, such as milk from another woman or a purge. (The benefits of colostrum were not recognized generally until the French surgeon François Mauriceau turned the tide in the late seventeenth century.) Nurslings were generally fed on demand at all levels of society. The German physician Friedrich Hoffmann reported in the 1740s that “for the most part the breast is given in the first months every two hours; after three or four months, six or seven times a day; and at length only twice or thrice a day.” Even wetnurses apparently suckled their own children for nine or ten months before taking on another for money. Weaning was an important rite of passage that varied considerably according to such considerations as the wealth of the parents, the health of the mother, the sex and size of the infant, and local customs. It generally occurred somewhere between six months and two years.

A further point to bear in mind is that, until the “Pasteurian revolution” of the late nineteenth century, wetnursing was the safest alternative to maternal breastfeeding. Some wealthy mothers may have believed that peasant women were healthier than they were and that the country was a more suitable place for children than the city. What counted therefore was finding and maintaining a good nurse. Many in the middling ranks of society had little choice in the matter. Wives were essential in running a small workshop or business, as among the silk weavers of

eighteenth-century Lyon and Milan, and the families could not afford to spend much on a nurse. The wealthy, who could choose from the best wetnurses, were in an entirely different position. Most of them probably took for granted the privilege of handing over child-care responsibilities to someone else, whatever the dangers. Above all the urban elites could secure nurses who lived in or near their homes and who therefore could be supervised easily. Memoirs written by children from noble families in imperial Russia describe the serfs who nursed them as loving and attentive; the poor women were in no position to be anything else.

Providing children with enough food was the overriding problem facing poor families well into the nineteenth century. Pierre-Jakez Hélias remembered that large families in the Pays Bigouden area of Brittany during the first decade of the 1900s still measured food sparingly and that children squabbled over crusts of bread. Keeping children warm was a further challenge. For the first month or so of their lives children were tightly bound with strips of cloth; after that their arms and heads were left free until they were ready for the little robes that both boys and girls wore. Medical opinion became hostile to swaddling during the eighteenth century. Critics argued that it restricted the freedom of young limbs, risked constricting the breathing of the child, and left it wrapped up with its own urine and feces for long periods. They also felt that hanging a swaddled child from a nail for hours was negligence. Yet they were bound to recognize that, besides keeping infants warm, these practices helped protect the young from being bitten by domestic animals, pigs especially. The popular belief was that the bands and tightly fitting cribs helped the child develop strong bones and an upright posture. The lower orders also diverged from educated opinion on matters of hygiene. Many mothers believed that a layer of dirt on the head protected the fontanel and that it was better to dry diapers than to wash them because of the healing powers of urine. Such practices gradually died out during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the medical influence on childhood became more prominent. The resultant changes, in terms of child development and adult attention, were considerable.

Infanticide and abandonment. The parent-child relationship sometimes broke down completely, most dramatically when infants were killed or abandoned by their parents. Charges of infanticide were rare in the law courts, but occasionally evidence surfaces hinting that newborn infants were quietly disposed of in some numbers by mothers and their accomplices.

During the 1720s, for example, when a drain was opened in the Breton town of Rennes as part of a construction program, the tiny skeletons of over eighty babies came to light. Judicial records reveal that those caught by the authorities were almost invariably unmarried women, mothers who had killed their illegitimate offspring shortly after birth. It may be that married couples managed to rid themselves of unwanted infants by surreptitiously starving or suffocating them. Because infant mortality remained high until the late nineteenth century, such criminal acts were difficult to detect. Servant girls, the occupational group most often prosecuted for infanticide, were more vulnerable, because they were constantly supervised by their employers and associated with this type of crime in the common mind. Since good character was all-important for a servant, the pressures on these young mothers were enormous. If discovered as the mother of an illegitimate child, a servant faced instant dismissal from her job, poor chances of future employment, and reduced prospects for a respectable marriage partner. The risk of shame and impoverishment was therefore particularly acute for a servant with a solid reputation; a more dissolute woman had less to lose.

Infanticide would probably have been more common in the European past had it not been relatively easy during many periods to abandon a child. The scale of abandonment in certain towns was simply staggering, particularly after the middle of the eighteenth century. In Paris during the early nineteenth century, approximately one-fifth of all babies born in the city were abandoned. In St. Petersburg during the 1830s and 1840s, the figure was between a third and a half, and in Milan up until the 1860s it was between 30 and 40 percent. Few of the foundlings were in fact discovered on the streets in this late period. Most were deposited with foundling hospitals and other charitable institutions. By the nineteenth century boys were as likely to be abandoned as girls, and legitimate as well as illegitimate children were included in considerable numbers.

Initially these decisions by parents appear cruel, especially given that mortality rates for foundlings reached 80 or 90 percent during the first year of life. Doubtless some unscrupulous parents took the opportunity to off-load unwanted children onto a charitable or state-run institution. The occasional doctor, lawyer, artist, military officer, or noble who turned up as a father—perhaps rejecting the outcome of an illicit liaison—in the records of the Hôpital des Enfants-Trouvés (Foundling Hospital) in eighteenth-century Paris surely was open to the common accusation of debauchery.

A closer look at the evidence on abandonment suggests two further considerations, however. First, the familiar combination of shame and poverty bore down upon young, single women from the working classes who were contemplating parenthood. A number of studies have revealed close links between surges in the abandonment of children and periods of economic crisis. In the Norman town of Caen a rise in the price of wheat was soon followed by an increase in abandonments during the eighteenth century. In Russia the *soldatki*, the wives and daughters of men drafted into lifetime military service, were prominent as abandoning mothers during the early nineteenth century. Second, parents often made it clear that they hoped to reclaim their children at a later date, when their circumstances improved. They frequently slipped little forms of identification into the babies' clothing, such as ribbons, medals, playing cards, or plaintive notes explaining their predicaments. They may have believed that their babies would have a better chance of survival in the foundling hospital than at home, apparently unaware of the lethal conditions in the hospitals and among the hard-pressed wet nurses. Volker Hunecke showed that in nineteenth-century Milan large numbers of poor families treated the local foundling hospital as a source of free nursing for their legitimate children. He cited, admittedly as an extreme case, the handloom weaver Maria G., who in twenty-eight years produced twenty-two children, all but the last nursed by the hospital.

The second phase of childhood: age two to seven years. After weaning, children moved into the second phase of childhood, commonly perceived to last until around the age of seven, the age of reason. The specter haunting the young during this stage of life was the intrusive rather than the indifferent parent. According to the historian Bogna W. Lorence, many parents in the eighteenth century insisted on complete control of their children in a bid to subdue their spirits and harden their bodies. Indeed, throughout the early modern period, parents often set out deliberately to break the will of their offspring. The more fervent Protestants usually emerge as the villains. In 1732 Susanna Wesley wrote in a letter to her son John Wesley, the future founder of Methodism: "In order to form the minds of children, the first thing to be done is to conquer their will and bring them to an obedient temper." Evidence from continental Europe, however, suggests that Catholics as well as Protestants thought in terms of breaking in the young. Child rearing then became a grim story of cold and formal relationships between parents and children, rigid rules, harsh punishments, and heavy-handed moralizing. It is tempt-

ing to contrast this type of regime with the gentler one, based on mutual affection between parent and child, documented in a minority of upper-class households from the late seventeenth century onward. Twentieth-century historians attempted to present a more sympathetic view of puritan parents and to locate them more precisely in particular social milieus. They noted that even the most austere evangelicals were moved by the desire to save the souls of their children and that rigorous theory was usually softened by more flexible practice.

During early childhood children were mainly in the hands of women—mothers, aunts, grandmothers, nurses, governesses, and older sisters. Some mothers, particularly those in aristocratic circles, doubtless remained indifferent to the fate of their offspring at this stage. The French statesman Charles-Maurice Talleyrand claimed never to have slept under the same roof as his mother and father. Children in this milieu were routinely handed over to a governess, often remembered by Russian nobles as an arbitrary and punitive character. At the other end of the social scale, mothers from the laboring classes struggled with difficult material circumstances, which may have strained relationships with their sons and daughters. Children were a potential nuisance for women who had a heavy routine of work on a farm or in a workshop and the tightest of budgets to manage. Many working-class autobiographies from the nineteenth century recall with some resentment the lack of physical warmth in relationships with mothers. At the same time the writers generally recognized that their mothers were trying to look after their interests as best they could. Adelheid Popp, born near Vienna in 1869, claimed that she had been deprived of a childhood guided by motherly love. “In spite of this, I had a good, self-sacrificing mother, who allowed herself no time for rest and quiet, always driven by necessity and her own desire to bring up her children honestly and to guard them from hunger.”

Similarly, pious mothers who believed in innate depravity, typically women from lower-middle-class backgrounds, were not necessarily unsympathetic to young people. A woman like Susanna Wesley might display a steely determination to break the wills of her progeny, but she also provided a caring and supportive environment. Stone argued that mothers and fathers who attempted a more affectionate, child-oriented approach first appeared among the English landed and professional classes during the late seventeenth century; the approach then spread to the Continent and to other classes. This may underestimate parental interest lower down the social scale, but certainly it helped to have material security and support from servants.

One of the earliest tasks of child rearing was toilet training. Modern authors have often expressed surprise at the relaxed attitudes that prevailed in this area until the late nineteenth century. For the mass of the population living in the countryside, a mess on a beaten earth floor was easily cleared up with the help of some ashes. Even in more bourgeois circles, judging from diaries, it often passed without comment or was treated lightly. During the 1680s a Dutch authority counseled parents to avoid frightening infants during the process and to treat bed-wetting merely as a passing phase. Parents might prove more anxious when teaching their children to walk, since tradition associated crawling with animals rather than humans. They resorted to leading strings attached to clothes and little frames to encourage children to remain upright as early as possible. Sometimes those in middle- and upper-class circles inflicted various iron collars and backboards on girls as a follow-up to swaddling.

To help teach children to talk and to count, mothers relied on a repertoire of lullabies, nursery rhymes, riddles, and counting games. Lullabies, curiously enough, often dwelled on the harsh realities of life. A German one, presumably from the time of the Thirty Years’ War in the seventeenth century, urged the child to go to bed because Count Oxenstierna and his Swedish army would be coming in the morning:

Ber’ Kinder, bet’,
Morge kommt der Schwed’.
Morge kommt der Oxestern,
Der wird die Kinder bete lern.

Pray children, pray,
The Swede will be here in the morning,
Oxenstierna will be here in the morning,
And he’ll teach the children to pray.

Counting and word games usually were playful, as in the French counting game that played on the pronunciation of “assassin,” “*assa un, assa deux, assa trois, assa quatre, assa cinq.*” Others were parodies, such as “*Dominus vobiscum, mangez les poires, laissez les pommes*” (the Lord be with you, eat the pears, leave the apples).

Peasant families in addition had to think about keeping youngsters out of danger while adults were busy. They generally relied on fear, threatening their charges with an assortment of bogeymen, trolls, fairies, werewolves, and the like lurking around water and forests. In Brittany, for example, Hélias remembered warnings of the man with carrot fingers, a tall figure in a cloak who liked to play tricks on travelers. The vibrancy of this culture is difficult to determine. Folklore collections give the impression that many regions had a rich heritage, while studies of modern industrial towns sometimes leave a bleaker impression. A selec-

model soldiers. The earliest board games certainly trumpeted their educational content. Titles of early English games included *A Journey through Europe* (1759), *Royal Geographical Amusement* (1774), and *Arithmetical Pastime* (1798). By the middle of the nineteenth century manufacturing centers such as Nürnberg in Germany and the Black Country in England turned out huge quantities of cheap wooden and metal toys, and evidence suggests that even some working-class households could afford to buy them.

The production of books for children also took off in the eighteenth century. For a long time the heavy-handed moralizing of an earlier tradition loomed large. The most infamous example is the passage in Mary Martha Sherwood's *The History of the Fairchild Family* (1818), in which the parents react to a squabble between siblings by imposing an evening walk to see the rotting corpse of a man hanged for murdering his brother. More appetizing fare for children soon appeared, however. German authors, like the brothers Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, mined a rich vein of fairy tales and folk poetry, while American and English authors, including James Fenimore Cooper and Frederick Marryat, became renowned throughout Europe for their adventure stories.

The most challenging role for "intrusive" mothers was passing on moral and religious values. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when most people still believed in the innate depravity of children, the only way they saw to break in such creatures was to draw up a tight set of rules and strictly enforce them. A German discipline manual dating from 1519 barked out its orders to children: "Sleep neither too little nor too much. Begin each day by blessing it in God's name and saying the Lord's Prayer. Thank God for keeping you through the night and ask his help for the new day. Greet your parents. Comb your hair and wash your face and hands." Even babies and toddlers who broke the rules risked fierce retribution. During the 1600s the future king Louis XIII of France was first whipped by his nurse when he was only two years of age. Susanna Wesley noted in a sinister passage concerning her offspring, "When turned a year old (and some before) they were taught to fear the rod and to cry softly."

Whether many parents stayed the course in crushing the will of their children is a matter of speculation. The constant complaint from moralists that mothers loved to spoil their children may hint that they avoided the extremes. Doubtless the widespread custom was "beating, whipping, abusing and scolding children and holding them in great fear and subjection," as Pierre Charron observed in 1601. Yet advice manuals advised using corporal punishment as a last

tion of autobiographies of working-class childhoods in Vienna around 1900 indicate that the use of language was reduced to the bare essentials.

Parents also turned to a range of toys and books for children to help with their intellectual and physical development. However, the main developments here did not occur until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In all periods children improvised toys from everyday materials and created their own fantasy worlds. In the seventeenth century, for example, John Dee mentioned in his diary, "Arthur Dee and Mary Herbert, they being but 3 yere old the eldest, did make as it wer a shew of childish marriage, of calling ech other husband and wife." Besides traditional playthings, such as tops, marbles, and dolls, the toy industry supplied young people with innovations that included board games, jigsaw puzzles, automata, and

resort and disapproved of immediate, ill-tempered responses to childish faults. What mattered was that the child develop a conscience and internalize the prevailing norms. English Puritan testimony suggests that this group may not deserve its fearsome reputation in child rearing. Ralph Josselin's diary, written between 1641 and 1683, gives no hint of harsh and authoritarian attitudes toward his sons nor of physical punishments. The historian Simon Schama noted that Dutch Protestants in the seventeenth century followed the alternative humanist tradition of cajoling children into learning. Moreover adults always faced the likelihood that excessive discipline would provoke resistance. In her memoirs, Madame Roland, famed for her association with the French Revolution, con-

trasted her "sagacious and discrete" mother with her "despot-like" father. Her mother realized that the young Jeanne-Marie needed to be governed by reason and affection. Her father failed miserably, and his recourse to the rod converted his gentle daughter into "a lion."

The third phase of childhood: age seven to twelve or fourteen. The age of seven, as noted above, marked a significant turning point in the life of a child in early modern Europe. The future Louis XIII discarded his robe for a doublet and breeches, and the sons of Russian nobles moved from the female to the male quarters in the home. Children faced new responsibilities as they became involved in formal edu-

cation and the world of work. Gender differences, never far below the surface in infancy, became more pronounced. Fathers took over prime responsibility for sons, while mothers continued their instruction of daughters. Agricol Perdiguier, brought up on a small farm near Avignon early in the nineteenth century, remembered that his father considered reading and writing a waste of time for girls (though he was scarcely more ambitious for boys) and that the two youngest daughters at least were spared from work in the fields. Children might be educated at home, by a tutor in elite families, or by parents, but the latter sometimes found this a daunting task. There were books to help them, such as *The Rules of Christian Propriety and Civility, Very Useful for the Education of Children and for People Who Lack Both the Good Manners of Society and the French Language*, published in 1560 in France, but parents with rudimentary educations must have struggled to achieve much.

Growing maturity did not necessarily mean that children were freed from demands for unquestioning obedience. Highborn families might insist on elaborate signs of deference. For instance, the daughter of a Russian noble family recalled that “children kissed their parents’ hands in the morning, thanked them for dinner and supper, and took leave of them before going to bed.” Working-class families, faced with overcrowded lodgings, bore down on the young in their own way to ensure that fathers were not disturbed when they returned from work. In Vienna parents often imposed silence at mealtimes and punished children by making them kneel quietly. Some children had to leave home at this stage, but this was the exception rather than the rule. In preindustrial times most waited until their teens, when they went to a boarding school, for example, started an apprenticeship, or entered domestic service. Children of a poor family might have to depart at a more tender age, possibly temporarily, usually to work as a servant of some kind.

Older children usually escaped from the clutches of the family to spend much of the day in the company of their peers. Boys and girls played together in the fields or on the streets of a town, but mostly they went their separate ways. Young males tended to form gangs, profiting from their greater freedom to roam away from the house. It seems that young lads drifted into these gangs at around the age of ten and gave them up when courtship took over during their late teens. The gangs had their own codes of conduct. Members solemnly supported their oaths with a “cross my heart” or, in the French version, “Boule de feu, boule de fer / Si je mens, j’irai en enfer” (Ball of fire, ball of iron / If I lie, I go to hell). Gangs demanded

absolute loyalty and punished sneaks and traitors mercilessly, as demonstrated by the fate of Bacaille in Louis Pergaud’s novel *La guerre des boutons*. For betraying his comrades’ camp to a rival gang, Bacaille was stripped, beaten, and spat upon, and his clothes were returned heavily soiled, with all the buttons missing.

The climate of the urban street gangs, as Michael Mitterauer noted, was dominated by a strong sense of machismo. The gangs carved out their identity by defending their “patch” against incursions from rivals in neighboring parishes or sections of town. According to a report from Cologne in 1810, repeated brawls during the summer months prevented young lads from venturing unaccompanied into another district. In Lancashire this custom of “scuttling” involved much ritualized abuse and brandishing of weapons, though in the end the lads preferred to rely on fists and boots in a fight. A gang member from Manchester insisted that, from his experiences in the early twentieth century, “It wasn’t too serious; every party was more or less satisfied with a black eye or a nose bleed.” Public authorities regarded male juveniles with a jaundiced eye because of their rowdy street games, their petty thefts, and their pranks to annoy adults. Such antics have a long pedigree. In the 1590s complaints were recorded of boys breaking windows and disturbing services at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London.

Girls were more inclined to group together in twos and threes, defiantly observing and mocking the males. Parents tied them more closely to the home, especially in Mediterranean cultures. Even farther north, custom demanded that they behave modestly and make themselves useful. A study of the village of Minot in Burgundy revealed that, among the young shepherds in the fields, boys played around while girls knitted, made lace, or mended clothes.

Last but not least, young people spent as much time as they could playing games among themselves. These activities display a remarkable continuity. Iona Opie and Peter Opie remarked in *Children’s Games in Street and Playground* (1969) that “if a present-day schoolchild was wafted back to any previous century he would probably find himself more at home with the games being played than with any other social custom” (Opie and Opie, 1969, p. 7). They noted that the Elizabethans played bowls, “king by your leaue” (a version of hide-and-seek), and “sunne and moone” (tug-of-war). Other familiar games can be traced back to the Middle Ages and even into antiquity, encouraging the pleasing notion of a particular culture of childhood. Thomas Jordan talked in terms of a lost tribe of children, which the historian must

investigate like an anthropologist to understand how it transfers the lore of the group to its newest and youngest members; for it is children, not adults, who teach the rules. The danger is sidelining the young into a ghetto, ignoring the fact that from the beginning they acquire their language and patterns of thought from adults. Nonetheless, children undoubtedly liked nothing better than to roam unsupervised in the fields, in vacant lots, or around the streets of a town. Georges Dumoulin remembered marauding the gardens of his village in the Pas-de-Calais with friends during the 1880s. Their favorite occupation was killing the cats of wealthy old women and turning them into a stew. The young also played games with scrupulous attention to tradition. Karl Friedrich Klöden recalled from his childhood in late-eighteenth-century Germany, "One knew that 'Kühler' [marbles] was played only in early spring, ball only at Easter time, kite-flying in the autumn." The Opies classified the games under various headings, including chasing, hunting, racing, daring, guessing, and pretending. Sporting activities, which were not universally codi-

fied until the nineteenth century, included football (soccer), hurling, hockey, and tennis.

Child rearing is a matter of interaction between adults and children. Parents invariably start out with ideas about how they want to bring up their children, influenced by religious beliefs, standard of living and occupation, region, and family traditions. Yet they quickly confront manipulation or even outright resistance from their progeny. As indicated, nurslings had some control over their mothers when they were fed on demand, young children might provoke rivalry for their affections between their mothers and their wet nurses, and older children rebelled against overly intrusive parents. The question is whether historians should look for continuities or discontinuities in the history of parent-child relations. Clearly children had some capacity to shape their own lives.

CONCLUSION

The quality of life for children has in many respects improved almost beyond recognition since the Middle

Ages, at least in western Europe. The crippling death rates, when a quarter or more of all babies were dead within a year and another quarter failed to reach adulthood, have ended. The painful and disfiguring diseases, such as rickets and tuberculosis, have receded, and although glaring disparities in income and wealth have persisted, most children are probably better fed, clothed, and housed (not to mention entertained) than in the past. The period of quarantine from adult life, so precious for Ariès, has become well entrenched, notably with the triumph of free, compulsory education. Perhaps a long line of humanists from the time of Erasmus onward encouraged a more sensitive handling of young people. It is uncertain how children reacted to separation from parents,

whippings, cold baths, threats of bogeymen, and meditations on death, but perhaps a measure of resignation was the best that could be expected.

Yet progress has its costs. Child rearing became a more daunting experience for parents in the late nineteenth century, as experts from the medical profession and others turned it into a science. Young people have been deprived of many of the responsibilities they took on in earlier centuries. In 1979 Martin Hoyles wrote indignantly, "Our present myth of childhood portrays children as apolitical, asexual, wholly dependent on adults, never engaged in serious activities such as work or culture" (Hoyles, 1979, p. 1). It is perhaps fortunate that children have an impressive record of subverting adult intentions.

See also Birth, Contraception, and Abortion; Farm Families and Labor Systems (volume 2); Patriarchy; Motherhood; Youth and Adolescence; Generations and Generational Conflict; Puberty; Childbirth, Midwives, Wetnursing; Child Labor (in this volume); Schools and Schooling (volume 5).

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YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE



Andrew Donson

Social historians have taken an interest in youth in part because of their numbers: Those age fifteen to twenty-nine comprised 26 percent of the population both in France in 1776 and in England in 1840. While the decline of fertility in the nineteenth century limited this preponderance, modern states recognized that they needed youth to establish their legitimacy. Governments, aware that they did not lack competition for the allegiance of this crucial group, engaged in massive projects to make young people reliable citizens. For revolutionaries, the rough and energetic behaviors of male youth—their predilection to engage in violence and radicalism—proved instrumental. Social history has established that youth played a pivotal role in the development of European polities.

Because modern states and reformers left voluminous source material in their drive to reinforce citizenship and morality, we know far more about the modern than the premodern period. But social historians have been successful in applying their main approach—identifying the norms, behaviors, and institutions that correspond to the stage of the life course marked by growing independence from the family—to all periods. In Europe before the modern era, the stage of youth distinguished itself by its rites and rituals. By contrast, youth in the modern era was far more defined by leisure, secondary schooling, and the norms and behaviors that social scientists called “adolescence.”

THE CONTINENT IN THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION

The most celebrated argument in the social history of youth was Philippe Ariès’s thesis in *Centuries of Childhood* that French society in the fifteenth century made no distinction between adults and young people. Ariès contended that youth—as a concept and a stage in the life course—emerged out of developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when parents began to express affective bonds to their children and a

growing literature presented youths as imperfect, weak, and in need of education. His narrative explored the pedagogical implications of socializing youth in such works as Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1712–1778) *Emile* (1762). Much research in social history confirmed that German Protestantism in the Age of Reason demanded diligent raising of children. The debate against Ariès hinged on whether youth as a stage in the life cycle existed in traditional rural Europe.

Against Ariès, the scholarship of Natalie Zemon Davis and Andreas Gestrich borrowed methods from anthropology and made clear that European villages had rituals where single young men regulated the pools of marriageable young women. In France, the young men in these charivaris, the carnivalesque hordes, donned masks and publicly humiliated those perceived to be disrupting the marriage market. In Germany the *Katzenmusik* (cat howls) of male youth humiliated adulterers, as well as men in second marriages and women who failed to become pregnant. Humiliation was administered with loud shouting or singing to debase the putative miscreants.

Most importantly, this rough courtship ritual was often organized in formal youth societies, like religious orders and trade associations. Upon church confirmation at fourteen years of age, members entered the organized male youth abbeys in parts of France and the brotherhoods and boys’ clubs in Germany. From this age until twenty-five to twenty-nine, the age of marriage, young men in these groups issued statutes, held meetings, marched in parades, and upheld financial regulations. On the Continent more generally, fraternal and journeymen’s associations segregated young people by age, developed elaborate initiation rituals, and enforced rules of celibacy. Their members fostered strong corporate identities linked to age during their itinerant period, their *tours-de-France* or *Wanderjahre*. Of course, age segregation in these rites and organizations was far from strict. Examples abound of adults who engaged in the rough and carnivalesque behavior alongside male youths. “Youth” was a flexible category in the early modern period,

and the age at which it began varied with locale and time.

The rough practices of youth had a long tradition of tacit support in European villages, but with the growth of cities in Renaissance Italy, charivaris became more mixed-age or disappeared altogether. Because governments wanted to solidify their rule, they could not condone the arbitrary justice meted out by the rough behaviors of male youth. In addition, demographic and financial changes in Florence made fathers absent in the raising of children. As Richard Trexler argued in *Dependence in Context in Renaissance Florence*, for these reasons many grew anxious about masculinity and the leanings toward debauchery among male youth. In 1396, these conditions induced petitioners to found a confraternity, the first formal institution outside the nobility aimed at socializing youth in restraint and dutifulness (Renaissance schools never undertook such moral aspirations). By the mid-fifteenth century, numerous such groups for boys age thirteen to twenty-four staged political and religious dramas. These youth groups also provided supervised leisure activities, competed for positions in public processions, and held elections for officers. In their probity they cast themselves as the pious saviors of society. As such, these organizations influenced local politics in fifteenth-century Italy, and the charivaris disappeared.

Still, the rougher traditions of male youth were integrated into the new youth groups. Italian tyrants

organized boys into brigades during festivities, having them light bonfires and fight on the street as a way to reinforce authority. Likewise, between 1497 and 1502 the confraternities under the preacher and reformer Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498) appointed themselves the roles of moral guardians, burned books and paintings, emitted sulphur and manure during sermons, and attacked girls whom they perceived as shameless. In Europe after the Reformation, religious holidays and other festivities were opportunities for male youth to wrestle married men, set fires in fertility rituals, and on Mardi Gras play *soules*, a violent form of football. It was expected that during weddings youths would fire salvos, extort drink money, obstruct processions for ransom, and ferret out the couple in their conjugal bed. Youths also made themselves conspicuous outside festivals by playing pranks. They scared people, jumped off bridges, threw benches in churches, and rolled large stones down hills.

Gender, the relations of power among the sexes, strongly informed the stage of youth. Courtship and sexuality needed to be regulated for at least a decade: Europeans had exceptionally late marriages—the average age of marriage was much higher than most other cultures in the world. Youth, the stage between leaving home and marriage, was therefore particularly long. Though young women certainly participated in the charivaris, research shows that rough behaviors were practiced primarily by young men who asserted

their authority over the pools of marriagable young women. Female youths found more equanimity in the rituals regulating courtship in the village spinning or light rooms (*Spinnstuben* in Germany, *veilles* in France, *posidelki* in Russia). The practical use of these rooms was to conserve light and warmth while sewing and doing handicraft in winter, but the rooms also developed into spaces attended exclusively by young people where they could drink heavily, discuss villager misconduct, organize mixed-sex charivaris, and engage in physical and erotic contact.

The modern age ultimately brought the decline of charivaris, spinning rooms, and other rural traditional practices. Furthermore, the category “youth” became more distinct. States and voluntary associations began to organize their activities according to age, determined by state-issued birth certificates. More rigorous segregation by age was also a consequence of urbanization, public schooling, voluntary societies, military conscription in nationally led armies, and the consequent politics of nations. As the categorization of youth developed, more stringent regulations and hierarchies of age followed. In Germany in the eighteenth century, enlightened state and ecclesiastic officials strove to end the free sexuality in the spinning rooms and replace the arbitrariness of the *Katzenmusik* with a rational form of adult justice. Of course, state and civil society arrived late in rural Europe: We still find the traditional rough practices in the German countryside in the period before World War I and in France after World War II. But though the date of the arrival of modern youth culture differed in countries, regions, and times, scholars agree that across Europe youth became a more regulated stage in the life course, and traditional rural practices faded.

EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

England is a well-studied case in the early modern social history of youth. England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries lacked the age-segregated charivaris and organized youth groups common on the Continent. But apprenticeships segregated female youths age fifteen to twenty-five and male youths age fifteen to twenty-nine. These youths were single, in dependent relationships, and performed service as domestics, apprentices, or farm laborers. Though Ariès contended that an extended adolescence was a privilege only for the upper class, almost all subsequent scholarship has established that most youth in early modern England had a particularly long period of dependence—as long or longer than in the modern period. Though the time spent under the care of biological parents was short, masters acted in *loco parentis*.

In general these relationships of dependency were short-term with any individual master, however. Because labor was in high demand, rural youths in early modern England had considerably high mobility, working in one apprenticeship for only a period of months or weeks before moving on to benefit from skills in a different one. In this regard, youths enjoyed a fairly large degree of independence in making decisions about where to work. The two features of high mobility and short-term dependence on masters marked youth as a particular stage in the life course.

Although Lawrence Stone argued in *The Family, Sex, and Marriage* that the removal of children from their biological parents demonstrated the lack of affective ties in the early modern period, few scholars now agree with this thesis. Masters were far less sadistic than historians initially assessed them to be. Low rates of illegitimacy tend to indicate that communal supervision limited the abuse of female apprenticeships by male masters. Furthermore, parents and kinship networks continued to provide financial and logistical support for apprentices after leaving home. Of course, public bureaus to support youths—clubs, voluntary associations, parish-relief systems, and philanthropic societies—expanded in the late seventeenth century. Furthermore, provincial attorneys, registry offices, newspaper advertisements, and hiring fairs in the countryside provided new institutionalized support to apprenticed youths. But ultimately biological parents and kin remained the single most important source of aid.

While England lacked the formal youth groups of the Continent, certain rites were similar to those in the rest of Europe: Youths had particular roles in such holidays as Shrovetide and May Day. They engaged in contests, cockfights, revels, and games such as football, skittles, archery, cudgel, and sword play. The ale house served as the place where youths developed an informal associational life and discussed their own ideas about recreation, literature, sexuality, and riotous behavior.

As with the charivaris on the Continent, these activities often involved adults, as the distinctions in age created by the state did not yet have their import. Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos pointed out in *Youth and Adolescence in Early Modern England* that variations in levels of literacy and in regional practices tended to splinter youth cultures. In general, the value systems of youths and adults converged, and youths lacked social institutions and spaces separate from adults. The hallmark of the early modern period, Michael Mitterauer claimed in *A History of Youth*, was the relative absence of competition between the family and the peer group.

This condition was nevertheless coterminous with the high mobility that demarcated youth from the adult world. Arguing against the view that early modern England lacked a cohesive youth culture, Paul Griffiths emphasized in *Youth and Authority* the informal rituals of age, such as the pranks, licentiousness, and fighting condemned in a large body of pamphlet and advice literature. The needs of high mobility—the life on the road—brought a separate set of interests for youth, which then shaped their recreation, support, and companionship.

THE REVOLUTIONS AND MODERN YOUTH

What distinguished youth in the modern from the early modern period were the national and social revolutions that brought military conscription, voluntary societies, and public schooling. While our understanding of youth more broadly in the French Revolution (1789) is still limited, the violence of male youth clearly proved instrumental to tyrants, reactionaries, revolutionaries, and other radicals. After the fall of Robespierre (1758–1794) in July 1794, for example, gangs of young men calling themselves the Gilded Youth attacked members of the radical Jacobins and forced actors to sing counterrevolutionary tunes in Parisian theaters. On the left, the need to have youth participate in the violence—in the wars and the intimidation—boded well with the political demand for reform, that is, for rejuvenation and renewal. Article 28 of the Constitution of 1793 guaranteed “one generation cannot subject a future to its laws.” The concept of youth was grounded firmly into the French Republic.

The most important legacy of the French Revolution for the social history of youth was not its violence but its introduction of age regulation by the state. The need for conscripted soldiers to fight the Republic’s wars complemented the codification of age in state citizenship and eligibility to hold office. Furthermore, the new Republic set up a pedagogical policy that emphasized the collective over the individual—citizen-soldiers needed to be loyal. As early as the Reign of Terror (1793–1794), there were demands that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds be trained in patriotism, martial arts, and hatred of tyranny. The Republic also introduced a host of civil ceremonies, the *fêtes de jeunesse*, which celebrated the ages of citizenship (twenty-one) and bearing arms (sixteen).

The pedagogical goal of creating loyal citizens in turn ceded to the right to receive an education. Consequently, new distinctions of age were produced

in the *lycées*, faculties, and *grande écoles* of the national university system after Napoleon. These schools, whose first graduates Alan Spitzer called the *French Generation of 1820*, concentrated boys of the same age in youth barracks, thereby increasing the importance of the peer group. They produced a cohort of young men who expressed their awareness of their youthful identity on the editorial boards of journals and in discussion circles, Masonic lodges, and political groups. They turned in the 1830s to the “Young France” movement, established ties to Saint-Simon (1760–1825) and other Utopian Socialists, and reproduced the theme of revolution, rejuvenation, and renewal. But France in 1806, a country of 25 million, had only 50,000 pupils receiving secondary education. Much about the ancien régime persisted: The *Wanderjahre* and *tours-de-France* of apprentices flourished on the Continent after Napoleon.

During the industrial revolution Britain saw a slow decline in apprenticeships and the youth culture they had produced: The new jobs in factories did not demand that youths be itinerant and gain skills in short-term, dependent relationships at work. Furthermore, factory labor offered youths independence and so gradually ended the early separation from the family that so strongly characterized the early modern period. Consequently, youths working in factories now lived at home until they married; patriarchal migrant apprenticeship in Britain declined. Though wages offered a modicum of independence to youths, volatile industries like weaving brought instability, misery, and discontent—in short conditions that abetted rough behaviors of youth in gangs and popular movements like Captain Swing (1830). The radicalism of youths of the lower social classes in Britain in turn frightened an increasingly influential middle class, which held a more restricted view of youth independence, education, respectability, and other distinctions. While the rough traditions of youth proved useful in political revolutions, liberal politicians shunned youths’ violence.

THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE BIRTH OF ADOLESCENCE

John Gillis argued in *Youth and History* that adolescence denoted a particular stage in the life cycle of middle-class families in England after 1870 and in Europe more generally. Adolescence was characterized by the pressure of being middle class—of securing professions, trades, secondary schooling, or perhaps admission to university. At the same time, it was a stage in the life course with increasing leisure time, as middle-class youths had the privilege to learn and

play, in contrast to adults and working youths. Because increased leisure time led to independence, the discourse on adolescence in Europe after 1870 expressed concern of this stage in the life cycle and called for more controls (Gillis, 1974, pp. 95–183).

Thus despite the privilege of an adolescence of learning and leisure, middle-class youths faced controls, such as the time discipline enforced in the secondary school regimes of the new European middle classes (see sidebar). Secondary schoolboys in both England and Germany faced a particularly brutal world, with the liberal use of corporal punishment. Suicide notes of middle-class teenagers in Germany identified their despair with the strict and demanding conditions in school. As John Neubauer has made clear in *The Fin-De-Siècle Culture of Adolescence* (1992), the woes of the privileged secondary-school boy and his contrast to the working class usually orphaned boy became a familiar theme in literature. Youth as a particularly trying time in the life cycle was depicted in novels by Charles Dickens (1812–1870), Honoré de Balzac (1799–1850), and Gustave Flaubert (1821–1880), and in the poetry of Arthur Rimbaud (1854–1891), Paul Valéry (1871–1945) and Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1874–1929). In the visual arts, the gaze turned toward youth most introspectively in Edvard Munch's (1863–1944) painting *Puberty* (1895), a subject that medical science had openly discussed for the first time in the 1870s.

Some historians have disagreed with Gillis that a concept of adolescence had developed before the turn of the century. As Harry Hendrick pointed out in *The Male Youth Problem*, the term “adolescence” did not come into wide usage among social workers in England until after the publication in 1904 of G. Stanley Hall's (1844–1924) *Adolescence*. Adolescence was largely a concept of Hall's influential work, which had borrowed heavily from Freud and the discussions of the celebrated case of Dora in 1901. As Mitterauer has argued in *A History of Youth*, the grounding of the term “adolescence” in psychology related to the new social scientific discourse of youth that emerged at the turn of the century. Though German social scientists never widely adopted the French and English term *Adoleszenz*, they produced a large body of studies on youth and developed powerful pedagogical models that predicted the speed of learning and acquisition of practical skills. Influenced by the progressivism of Ellen Key (1849–1926) in *Century of the Child* (1893, Swedish; 1902, German), German pedagogues addressed issues of motivation and self-determinism. And as in Britain, social scientists in all European countries turned to a concept of adolescence as a vulnerable period to create categories of youth deviance.

Gillis pointed out that because application of these categories of youth deviance enforced greater conformity in comportment and appearance, adolescence became universalized for all social classes, even though its model was clearly a middle-class youth.

The concept of adolescence reproduced femininity for middle-class youth and made categories of gender more rigid. As Carol Dyhouse made clear in *Girls Growing Up in Late Victorian and Edwardian England*, the British middle-class families disapproved of women who worked outside the home; a sexual division of labor asserted middle-class respectability. Consequently, when secondary schooling did become acceptable, it aimed to prepare girls for matrimony. The separate sphere of domesticity was also institutionalized in public elementary schools that expected schoolgirls to become mothers or domestics.

THE YOUTH MOVEMENTS

The sine qua non of adolescence was leisure, but the leisure of working adolescents, with its rough practices of marking territory and participating in courtship parades, distressed the middle class. Consequently, a vigorous reform movement developed after the 1870s in Europe to educate, train, and above all enforce morality. Reformers set up clubs, youth centers, apprentice homes, and sports associations. Uniformed youth movements, such as the Boys Brigade (founded in 1883), evolved into organizations with the goal of furthering the empire, Christian manliness, and youths' efficiency and reliability.

The influence of uniformed youth movements was limited, however. As Michael Childs pointed out in *Working-Class Lads in Late Victorian and Edwardian England*, these organizations failed to attract the vast majority of working-class male youths whom the movement was supposed to reform. But the British youth movements presented a model of social control highly attractive to states and reformers: The more time a youth spent in supervised activities, the less likely he or she was involved in activities deemed delinquent. As John Springhall has argued in *Youth, Empire, and Society*, the combating of deviance also pleased a state that saw the advantages of nationalism, militarism, and imperialism—ideologies central in the founding of the Boy Scouts in 1908. The goal of the Scouts, like the ambition of the pedagogues in the French Revolution, was to create the citizen-soldier.

Youth organizations in Germany at the turn of the century were particularly well developed. Secular clubs for youths—crafts, gymnastics, and other sports—flourished. The availability of rail transportation to rural areas led to the growth of hiking organizations for urban middle-class youth. In addition, Germany by 1918 had 350,000 members in Catholic youth groups and boasted an even larger network of Protestant organizations. Further making Germany unique were the growth of large socialist and patriotic organizations: The Socialist Youth Movement, with an estimated 250,000 members in 1914, and the Young German League, a patriotic umbrella organization with 750,000 members. In contrast to Britain, these last youth movements followed a politics opposed to the social order. The right followed the left's lead in viewing youth as a regenerative social and political force.

The most celebrated of the German youth movements at the turn of the century were the *Wandervögel* (wandering birds), the hiking organization. Though it had fewer than 50,000 members, the *Wandervögel* were important in asserting the demand for youths'

self-expression and self-realization, a demand that then influenced a wide range of youth organizations, from socialist to conservative ones. Furthermore, they presented a challenge to the strict and drab academic system: They set up youth hostels, held "nest" meetings, and performed folk music on the lute and the guitar.

France too had an expanding youth movement at the turn of the century. The French Catholic Youth Association, founded in 1886, had 140,000 members by 1914. In addition, French youth groups supported hosteling, football, bicycling, and socialist and communist politics. When Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde published the survey *Les jeunes gens d'aujourd'hui* (Young People Today) under the pseudonym of Agathon in 1913, they made France aware that youths wanted their own organizations. Furthermore, Catholic youth rejected pacifism and showed a disdain for intellectual introspection. They wanted national renewal, even if that meant a war to win back Alsace and Lorraine. Above all, the associations that grew out of this youth movement, Maurice Crubellier has argued in *L'Enfance et la jeunesse*, constituted peer groups and made age more salient.

Segregation by age, peer groups, and leisure offered the opportunities to cultivate youthful identities that were then addressed by a popular commercial press. In Britain as early as the 1830s, cheap domestic romances and sensational stories—the "penny bloods"—flooded the bookstores for youth. Youths wanted fantasies, and the religious monthly's appeal was simply no match for the penny hero Sweeney Todd, the demon barber of Fleet Street. As the Danish anthropologist Kristin Drotner showed in *English Children and Their Magazines*, Britain in the 1880s in particular saw a more expansive and open youth reading culture with the publication of the durable youth magazines, *Boys Own Magazine* (1879–1967) and *Girls Own Paper* (1880–1908). These magazines were the first popular literature to address a variety of leisure and work activities: skating, angling, photography, hygiene, body building, career advice, and rabbit feeding. Advanced literacy and a commercial mass book market had addressed the adolescent.

In addition to age, this popular reading culture was clearly distinguished by gender. As Sally Mitchell demonstrated in *Girl's Culture in England, 1880–1915*, male youths were cast as active movers and shakers and had a masculinity where emotions were absent or minimal. Female youths by contrast had intellects appropriate not for creating but for ordering and making decisions, for purity, service, sacrifice, and domesticity. But girls' magazines in Britain also addressed the promising female professions and oc-

cupations, such as nursing, teaching, and clerical work. The first generation of women with secondary schooling produced a pool of writers who filled voluminous pages of school stories, holiday adventures, advice on careers, and tales of heroism and misfortune. Together these produced a modern girl caught between the expectations of domesticity and the fantasies of independence.

WORKING-CLASS YOUTH

The nineteenth century saw a long and gradual decline in apprenticeships for working youths. Apprenticeships brought more security for youths in the long term but made them more dependent on their families in the short term. Wage labor, on the other hand, offered immediate independence and financial relief for poor families. Furthermore, with the successive child-labor laws, the pool of cheap labor shrank, and the demand for the labor of male youth swelled. A buoyant labor market for youth—a condition that characterized Britain from the 1890s to the Great Depression and Germany from the 1890s to the end of World War I—in turn raised the status of the young workers in the family, as they had more money to control and spend.

The youth movement was stimulated in part by the middle class's desire to reform the consumer habits of working-class youths. Although most youths in industrial Europe still worked more than forty hours per week, the growing number of high-wage jobs increased the leisure time and pocket money available

to spend on consumer pleasures, such as alcohol, tobacco, football, cinemas, cafés, billiards, penny bloods, amusement fairs, and dance and music halls. With money for clothing, social types with distinctive dress styles emerged. In German cities, there was the *Halbs-tarke* (ruffian), with his weapons, sported insignias, bright colors, fantastic hats with feathers, and other distinctive raiment. In Paris, there was the *apache* (savage), who rejected work, stood in conflict with his family, scribbled graffiti, dressed well in a silk scarf and a cap, and spent his days wandering coolly through the streets. Formal working-class youth organizations, though growing rapidly, were still incipient in comparison to the middle-class youth movements. Much of working-class culture thus continued to reproduce the rough traditions of youth: Youths in working-class neighborhoods formed gangs and fought on the street. Courtship came to be regulated by youths in the Monkey Parade, the trains of male and female youths who dressed in their weekend best and picked each other up. These behaviors alarmed a set of middle-class reformers, who sought to impose respectability on working-class youth.

As vigorous as the youth movements in trying to impose this respectability were the organizations that addressed the so-called “boy labor” problem, the masses of male youths who became porters, messengers, newsboys, vanguards, and errand boys. These “blind alley” jobs, as they were called in Britain, were chosen because they offered wages that in the short term were far higher than traditional apprenticeships. They also had better working conditions, with more

independence and less monotony. Concerned about the reliability of these male working-class youths “between school and the barracks,” between the ages of fourteen to eighteen, Germany became the first country to found obligatory vocational schools aimed at both the practical and moral welfare of youth in these jobs. It also set up advice and job exchange centers.

In all European countries, discipline in school was the response of the middle class to the growing independence of working-class youth. The oral interviews collected by Stephen Humphries in *Working Class Childhood and Youth* showed that though school offered the possibility to achieve literacy, the classroom demanded strict obedience and gave little room for creative self-expression. As in the rest of Europe, teachers in Britain meted out brutal punishment against violation of regulations or resistance to authority. All European countries founded juvenile detention centers, which kept boys deemed deviant in isolation in order to develop their piety, moral integrity, and self-control. British working-class schoolboys harbored deep resentment against the educational regime and the class inequalities it produced. Poor families looked upon obligatory grammar schools as an imposition because they limited the wage-earning potential of sons and daughters.

Working-class youths gained leisure as industrialization progressed, but they still spent a significant amount of time at work, in addition to commuting and doing household chores. Work also started early: A 1908 survey in Vienna revealed that over 40 percent of eleven- and twelve-year-olds had jobs, and this figure did not include informal modes of work. Furthermore, all but the very poorest working-class families encouraged their daughters to stay at home to shop, care for siblings, and do housework. A survey in Vienna as late as 1931 discovered, for example, that 45 percent of all girls were kept home from school regularly. The case was similar in England. Nevertheless, as Robert Wegs has argued in *Continuity and Change among Viennese Youth*, the general trend after 1870 was for working-class youths to spend less time with families and more time with one’s peer group in school, youth organizations, and public sites. Without a doubt, working-class youth after 1900 in Paris had a repertoire of associations and leisure activities to shape a youth identity.

Despite many attempts to limit the independence of youth in England, France, and Germany, spaces for youth separate from adults widened in the 1920s. Public consumer venues—theaters, cinemas, automats, jazz clubs, sport clubs, hiking and hosteling organizations, and dance halls especially—offered opportunities wherein the absence of adults established

norms and hierarchies. The demise of the calling system, where parents had regulated courtship, and the broad adoption of the dating system, where youths themselves determined the rules of wooing, is perhaps the most lucid example of how this new recreational world gave youths greater opportunity to shape their social world. As David Fowler established in *Young Wage-Earners in Interwar Britain*, working youths showed a defiance of their parent’s call for respectability. They fashioned their own teenage culture in leisure activities and the new objects of consumption. Cinemas, spaces that youths visited on average three times per week, became the venues where rival gangs toughed out hierarchies of status and established the turf of youth. In France too, consumer items like the “show me bracelet” offered possibilities to create youth identities.

SOVIET YOUTH

It was a hallmark of totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century that they introduced national youth organizations with the goal of socializing youth in political loyalty. Just as the requirements of conscription induced new pedagogical goals after the French Revolution, these national youth organizations proved essential in producing ideologically reliable soldiers on a massive scale. For example, the 400,000 members in the Soviet Komsomol (Young Communist League) filled the ranks of the Red Army in the civil wars after 1917, and at least 10 million of its members fought in World War II. In Germany, the Hitler Youth served as a conduit for the elite Nazi groups, just as the Free German Youth in East Germany cultivated future Communist Party members. While the success of the Italian Fascist organization is doubted, historians agree that the Hitler Youth, the Komsomol, and the Free German Youth were essential in establishing the legitimacy of European totalitarian states.

On the eve of the Revolution, Russian youths were still largely integrated into the world of adults. Like their counterparts in rural western Europe, they participated in the rough music rituals of villages and regulated courtship in the light and spinning rooms. In the cities, however, industrialization clearly placed new interests on the labor of youth. The liberalization following the February Revolution in Russia in 1917 led to a blossoming of autonomous youth groups, including the Socialist ones that pioneered the strategy of using youth cells in factories to protest those in the worker’s movement who ignored them. The programs of the Communist Party in June 1917 included concrete demands for improving youths’ social and economic standing.

The Komsomol, Ralph Fisher argued in *Congresses of the Komsomol*, demonstrated that a successfully run state youth organization in totalitarian regimes secured the loyalty of future soldier-citizens. The first national youth institution of its size and complexity in the history of the world, the *Komsomol* was imagined to be the vanguard of the social revolution. After the civil war, it cast itself as a bulwark against the decadence of the West, expelling its members for bourgeois attitudes and demanding a plain style of dress. It grew rapidly, incorporating previously independent youth organizations, which had flourished after the Revolution, into a vast network of recreational and political clubs. Youth organizations that resisted its march were banned, and great efforts were made to organize rural youth, despite the protest of village leaders. Memoirs attest that the mission of the *Komsomol* was greeted enthusiastically by its members, who felt hopeful it would bring social justice and better education and employment. Membership rose to 2 million at the announcement of the first Five Year Plan in 1928. But the Komsomol's commitment to improving youths' social and economic standing was weak. Its higher priority was to secure ideologically reliable members for the Communist Party.

A singular phenomenon in the European experience of youth was the displacement in the Soviet Union of 9 million youths, a consequence of World War I, the civil war, and the subsequent famine and orphans they produced. Like western European cities, Soviet cities had a vibrant subculture of youth gangs that engaged in brawls, public courtship displays, and promenades around streets, gardens, taverns, and dance halls. But this subculture of displaced youth also differed markedly from European youth by its independence and its identity with wandering: Initiation rites into gangs included clinging to the underside of trains. A strong counterpoint to the organized youth in the Komsomol, these youths were viewed in theory by the Party as victims of capitalist oppression. In practice, it dealt with them as hooligans, forcing them into working and attending vocational schools. By 1938, two-thirds of those arrested were sent to work camps. The same draconian treatment applied to dissident members of the Komsomol, which purged its ranks.

YOUTH UNDER FASCISM

Like the Communists in the Soviet Union, the Fascists in Italy presented themselves as a continuing revolution whose dynamism stemmed from its youth. Indeed, fascist martyrology in 1925 claimed one-half of its saints were under twenty years old. Youth were

by all measures disproportionately represented in the party. In the early 1920s the average *squardrista*, the fascist fighter, was scarcely over twenty years old. In 1922, when the Fascists became a mass party, the average age of its members was just twenty-five.

The goal of creating the citizen-soldier led the Italian Fascist Party to use schools as an agency of indoctrination. Benito Mussolini's (1883–1945) education ministers introduced state textbooks in the fascist spirit and eliminated academic freedom for teachers. Emphasis was on blind obedience to the Leader. The Italian Fascist state-run youth organization, Opera Nazionale Balilla (National Youth Works), functioned much like the Komsomol. It organized schoolboys under eighteen years of age into leisure activities like sports and paramilitary training and countered refusal to join with demands for a written explanation. As in the Komsomol, membership was also a prerequisite for advancement in careers. The Italians also pioneered a political aesthetic for their youth: Sleek uniforms, athleticism, singing, glorification of war, and rites of the Party. By 1930, premilitary training for boys was obligatory. In certain respects, the Opera

Nazionale Balilla expanded opportunities to working-class Italians: At least 4 million youths participated in the fascist culture courses, most in rural areas, in 1939. But the socialization project, Tracy Koon has argued in *Youth in Fascist Italy*, ultimately failed to provide Italy in World War II with a mass of loyal soldiers, as the 1930s saw a growing dissidence among youth against Mussolini and his project.

In contrast to Britain, which had little youth protest and generational conflict after World War I, Germany had political and independent associations for youths that practiced violence and radicalism. Of course, most youths preferred the state-supported sport and recreation associations, as the welfare of youth was guaranteed by the Weimar Constitution (Articles 119–122). But Germany was the country in Europe with the most splintered and politically charged youth organizations: paramilitary Protestant groups; Nazi, Socialist, and Communist Party associations; and the peculiarly German autonomous male youth groups, the Bünde, who aspired to an idealistic atavism of mythic knights and masculinity. Suffering tremendously under the inflation and the unemployment, youths turned to violence and radicalism and played a significant role in the downfall of the Weimar Republic.

Before 1933, the Hitler Youth was a relatively small organization not rigidly controlled by the Nazi Party. But like the Komsomol in the Soviet Union, the Hitler Youth owed its success to intimidation and violence: Its members swallowed older youth organizations and beat up those who resisted. In addition to its predatory tactics, the Hitler Youth's growth also stemmed from its popularity, especially among right-wing groups in rural Protestant organizations and also among the working-class youth. Its maxim, "youth must be lead by youth," had much affinity to the early youth movements. It also attacked hierarchies within the educational system, as its leaders goaded members to challenge the authority of teachers and the traditional curricula. The organization promoted camping, hiking, and physical fitness and gave recognition to the efforts of working-class youth, developing the immensely popular competitions in craftsmanship and technical skills in which 3.5 million participated. Membership grew to 7.7 million members in 1939, making it a rival to the Komsomol. Like the Komsomol, the Hitler Youth provided the state with an ideologically reliable cohort: The broad reach of the Hitler Youth made it one of the central institutions that popularized racism, anti-Semitism, violent nationalism, and the Hitler myth. As a general trend, the fascist and communist models of national youth organizations lessened the significance of school and family in the socialization of youth. Both placed

youths under the guidance of state-sponsored, ideologically driven youth groups.

YOUTH IN THE COLD WAR

The history of totalitarian regimes is also about the resistance from urban youth subcultures: In Germany, youth gangs with names like Edelweiss Pirates and a Swing scene of high school jazz parties together formed an underground, illegal protest of the morality and politics of the Nazis. Subcultures flourished in the Soviet Union after World War II as well. The era of Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) was marked by a new youth counterculture distinct from the Komsomol. Calling themselves the *stiliagi* (the "stylish"), they were the sons and daughters of the elite urban class who cast their identity in their dress and preference for jazz. Subsequent to the *stiliagi* were other subcultures: the *bitniki* (beatniks) and the rock, punk, and heavy metal aficionados. Nevertheless, youth culture remained dominated by the Komsomol, whose membership grew to 19 million by 1962. The Komsomol continued to block avenues of dissent against the Communist system and its Marxist-Leninist ideology. It persecuted the *stiliagi* and threatened to send them to work camps. In contrast to the West, youth in the East were neither subject to a secondary labor market nor influenced by a consumer-oriented culture. Furthermore, the Komsomol provided a single and ideologically unified organ of social control. Even the discourse of youth, including its sociological study, were coordinated by the policies of the Komsomol.

In East Germany, the state-sponsored Free German Youth was a central institution that solidified communist rule as well. It had quickly gained 1 million members by 1949, filling the void vacated by the Hitler Youth. Its popularity stemmed in part from its promotion of games, dances, and sports and its project of building a socialist consciousness in volunteer work projects on dams, buildings, and farms. As important, however, was that membership in the Free German Youth improved chances in receiving advanced education and choice apprenticeships. By 1977 more than 50 percent of all eligible youths age fourteen to twenty-five were participating. Even if informal youth organizations flourished despite the Free German Youth, it remained a durable institution of the Eastern system. It also complemented schools, which had their pupils take oaths against fascism, sanctify socialist heroes, and condemn capitalism under the maxims of Marxism-Leninism.

In many ways, Western Europe after 1945 saw trends similar to the interwar period: The traditional

practices of rural youth disappeared; secondary schools absorbed greater numbers of youth; affluence made working unnecessary for the growing middle class; sport and confessional youth associations thrived; youths visited cinemas, cafés, and dance halls. But in other ways, ties of Western Europe with the United States introduced the American culture of consumer goods, such as radios, motorcycles, automobiles, cameras, jazz, rock and roll music, and record players—status symbols that defined youthful identities. Still, youths in Central Europe in the 1950s were remarkable for their conservative apoliticism. Surveys showed that their primary concerns were employment, inflation, and other economic matters. This stance stood in contrast to the highly politicized and confident youth culture of the 1920s and 1930s.

In all European countries in the 1960s, however, a generation of youths who had not experienced the war became active politically, particularly against the spread of nuclear weapons, relationships with the East, the Vietnam War, and the conservative academic and educational establishment. These more liberal views also altered sexuality, impelling the vast majority to support premarital sex. In Britain, peer groups that stood in opposition to state institutions

and formal youth associations proliferated. Stuart Hall and his colleagues have argued in *Youth Subcultures in Postwar Britain* that these groups—the Mods and the Rockers, the Teddy Boys, the Skinheads, and the Rastas—were an effect of the growth of leisure in Britain after World War II and the ascendancy of universal secondary schooling. Furthermore, mass culture (entertainment, art, communication) produced styles of dress (shaved heads and black suits) and expressions of musical taste (jazz or rock) that asserted an identity separate from the adult value system.

Youth has existed as a stage in the life course throughout European history, but a youth subculture based on style and dress had its origins in the modern transformation that introduced consumer goods and commercial locales. Modernity also made the boundaries between youth and adulthood more distinct. Furthermore, it made peer groups more influential insofar as the stage of youth shifted away from work and toward leisure and age-structured institutions like school. At the same time, states and politicians recognized the importance of winning youth to establish their legitimacy and created highly influential institutions of socialization.

See also *The Life Cycle (volume 1)*; *Students*; *Juvenile Delinquency and Hooliganism (volume 3)*; *Puberty*; *Child Labor (in this volume)*; *Schools and Schooling (volume 5)*; and other articles in this section.

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WIDOWS AND WIDOWERS



Sherri Klassen

Through most of European history, the death of a spouse created a crisis in social identity. Widowhood for both sexes called into question alliances between families that were forged in marriage, threatened the continuity of patrilineal wealth, and reduced the emotional and economic support for the surviving partner. Widowers could emerge with a relatively unscathed identity, their wealth and family intact. Widows, however, embodied many of the contradictions in European attitudes toward women and marriage. Widows were both the weakest and the most powerful women in their society, both dependent and independent, the least respectable of women and the most.

DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE MEANING OF WIDOWHOOD

Widowhood refers to the state of being unmarried due to the loss of a spouse through death. In most legal and cultural definitions, remarriage terminates widowhood. The size of the population of widows and widowers, therefore, depends both on the frequency of deaths of spouses and on the frequency of remarriage. Before the twentieth century, marriages rarely lasted longer than thirty years and were almost as likely to be dissolved by the death of a wife as of a husband. The European population, however, contained more widows than widowers because the latter were likelier to remarry.

Estimates place the percentage of widows in Europe between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries close to 11 to 14 percent of the female population. The visibility of widowers was much smaller; rarely would more than 5 percent of the male population be widowed at any given time. Fifteenth-century Florence provides an informative exception. Recording almost as much information as a census, the tax records there show that 25.1 percent of the female population over the age of twelve in 1427 was widowed. The large number of widows reflects a pattern in which women married very young to much older men, a pattern

common to much of Renaissance Italy and perhaps more prevalent than once assumed.

Increasing female longevity combined with decreasing remarriage rates kept between 10 and 17 percent of the population of European women widowed through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The two world wars of the twentieth century produced an increase of 5 to 7 percent in the number of widows. The proportion of widowers also dropped as women increasingly outlived their partners in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

As life expectancy increased in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the age of widows also soared. The proportion of widows and widowers always increased with age because young men and women whose spouses died were more likely to remarry than were their elders. A sharp decrease in mortality in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries meant that the death of a spouse became a much rarer experience for men and women under the age of sixty. On the eve of the French Revolution, 42 percent of the women in France who died between the ages of twenty and sixty were widowed at the time of their death; in the most recent census of France, only 1.9 percent of the women under the age of sixty were widows. This meant a reduction in the number of widows and widowers left supporting young children and an increased cultural equation of old age with widowhood. The diversity of widowhood decreased as a result. Previously, age and marital status had interacted in the social definition of womanhood; the experiences of widowhood depended on the age of the widow as well as on her class or social standing. By the late twentieth century, widowhood disappeared as a social and cultural category, though it remains a demographic one.

Widowers and relatively young widows frequently ended their widowhood with remarriage. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, approximately 30 percent of all marriages in France involved a widow or a widower. Fourteenth-century Tuscany shows the tendency for remarriages to be greater in the countryside than in urban centers, but this does

Demographics formed one of many factors determining the likelihood of widows and widowers to remarry. In European history since the Renaissance, the population's sex ratio was rarely imbalanced enough to alter marriage patterns considerably. Such an influence was evident in periods of high migration. Since men tended to emigrate in greater numbers than women, these periods showed unusually low rates of remarriage for widows. Apart from such aberrations, economics, legal systems, and family structures played a more powerful role in deciding whether widows would live independently, with family, or remarry.

ECONOMICS, INHERITANCE LAW, AND THE HOUSEHOLD

In premodern Europe the loss of either spouse brought economic as well as personal suffering. The household, existing as an economic unit, relied on the contributions of at least two adult members. This was true for members of all levels of society. Though the wealthy were rarely threatened with starvation at the loss of a spouse, widows and a certain number of widowers in these classes felt their resources diminish. Peasant households and city dwellers alike could face severe economic dislocation when death deprived the household unit of one of its breadwinners. Widowers were most likely to overcome this economic dislocation by marrying again; widowers with young children often married within months of the death of their spouse. Widows might remarry, but they more often found other recourses in response to the economic strains of widowhood.

Widowers benefited economically as well as personally from remarriage. A new wife brought with her a new dowry or marriage portion—wealth that the widower could use for as long as they were married. Among the elites the portion a wife contributed to the marriage could be considerable, and family businesses often relied on the dowry as capital. A widower without children was usually required by law to return his wife's marriage portion to her family. Those who fulfilled this obligation saw their capital dissipate at the moment of widowerhood. A widower with children would not normally lose control over his first wife's dowry—this would remain in his trust until his children would inherit—but he gained a second dowry and a valuable assistant with a subsequent marriage. Though the marriage portion could significantly affect the household economy of artisans, the urban poor, and the peasantry as well as the wealthy, widowers from these classes also sought to replace the lost income provided from the deceased wife's labor.

not appear to have been the case in other regions of Europe. Eighteenth-century data confirm that widows were likely to relocate upon the death of a husband, but these moves were not always from the country to a town or city. In this period, one-half of all widowers and one-third of all widows remarried after the death of a spouse. The percentage to remarry dropped in the nineteenth century when increased life expectancy diminished the number of younger widows and widowers. Not only age but also the number of dependent children appears to have affected the widow or widower's decision to remarry. The vast majority of remarriages studied in sixteenth- to nineteenth-century France involved the marriage of one party with children to a spouse who had no children. Marriages were frequently made between partners of disparate ages throughout the period; instances where both partners were over the age of fifty became less rare in the early nineteenth century.

A widow suffered greater economic loss with the death of her spouse than a widower of the same social standing. Though the legal regimes varied, widows were often excluded from any inheritance from their husbands' estates. Both Roman law and common law, the two systems that predominated in European legal practice, dictated that a certain amount of the estate must be assigned to the widow. Under Roman law widows were entitled to the dowry that they brought with them into the marriage. The heirs were obligated to liquidate enough of the estate in order to return the portion to her. Under common law the heirs needed to provide the widow with one-third of the couple's common goods.

Occasionally, the wealth that the widow could claim through her marriage portion was considerable. In Renaissance Italy merchants married young women with exorbitant dowries and used this wealth to establish their businesses. In the highly volatile family clan system operating in the Renaissance Italian city-states, large amounts of wealth transferred at marriage served to bond families together. When a woman was widowed young, her family saw an opportunity to create new, advantageous matrimonial ties. Far from being empowered by the wealth they controlled, these widows had few choices but to follow the dictates of their families since their wealth had made them vital to the family status. The men who relied so heavily on their wives' income feared this outcome. A widow's remarriage deprived her children by the first marriage of the use of her wealth. Disputes broke out when the husband's family refused to pay the widow the amount

she had brought into the marriage for fear she would leave the children of this marriage destitute.

The property that widows controlled bolstered their authority in the family and helped them economically maintain the family unit. In addition to the portion due back to widows in their marriage contracts, some women gained property or assets of their own through inheritance. Though some of the legal regimes excluded women from their husband's estates, other relations and friends frequently bequeathed items or money to women. These amounts remained theirs alone when the women were widowed. Where the law did not forbid it, husbands sometimes bequeathed the bulk of the estate to their wives. When this was the case, and the widow controlled considerable wealth, her children relied on her for their economic future since she controlled the inheritance that would allow them to establish themselves in a trade or take over the family plot of land.

When not awarded a full estate, widows were frequently awarded the rights of usufruct during their widowhood. Under Roman law, when the heir was a minor, the testator could name a guardian in his will who would manage both the finances of the estate and make decisions regarding the child's education and upbringing. In most cases the heir would be the couple's eldest son and the widow would be named guardian. This allowed her control of her late husband's wealth for as long as her son was a minor and guaranteed her custody over her son. If she chose to remarry, however, the guardianship would pass to one of the child's paternal relatives. This restriction on



WIDOWS AND CHILD CUSTODY UNDER THE NAPOLEONIC CODE

When Napoleon conquered new lands, he imposed the French Civil Code, or Napoleonic Code, on much of continental Europe. Most of these countries maintained remnants of this civil law well into the twentieth century. The following passage outlines the restrictions placed on widows with regard to their children. Although this law broke with the Roman law tradition allowing fathers to name a guardian other than the children's mother, it still allowed the fathers to name an assistant, and it required a family council meeting before widows could remarry and maintain custody. The passage is from chapter 2, section 1 of the 1930 version of the Civil Code.

Article 389. The father is during the lifetime of the husband and wife the legal administrator of the property of their children who are under age, and are not emancipated. . . . When the father is deprived of the administration, the mother becomes the administratrix in his place and stead. . . .

Article 390. After the dissolution of the marriage by the natural or civil death of the husband or wife, the guardianship of the children who are under age and not emancipated belongs as a matter of right to the survivor of the father or mother.

Article 391. The father nevertheless may appoint a special adviser to the surviving mother as guardian, without whose advice she cannot take any steps in connection with the guardianship. If the father specifies the purposes for which the adviser is appointed, the guardian shall be able to act without his assistance in all other matters.

Article 395. If the mother who is guardian wishes to remarry, she must call together the family council before the celebration of the marriage, and such council shall decide whether she may retain the guardianship. . . .

Article 407. A family council shall be composed, in addition to the Justice of the Peace, of six blood relatives . . . of whom half shall belong to the paternal side and half to the maternal side, following the proximity in each line. . . .

Source: The French Civil Code, 1930

the widow's custody of her children remained in effect in many parts of Europe until legal reforms in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Occasionally, nineteenth-century women petitioned to be allowed to remain the guardians of their children even after they had remarried, arguing that they had needed

to remarry in order to support the children who were now being denied them. These women were caught in a bind—while the legal system pressured them against remarriage, economic survival pressured them toward it.

The rights of usufruct afforded the widow less power over her children than outright ownership, but even in these cases widows controlled the purse strings of the family. The practice of widows claiming the usufruct of the estate sometimes exceeded the boundaries of the law. This is particularly true of France, where adult children tried in vain to gain access to their paternal inheritance while their mothers were still alive and living on the wealth of the estate. In addition to providing the widow with a home and economic well-being, the use of the estate gave her the power, by passing on (or withholding) necessary amounts of capital at opportune moments, to determine the education and training of her children, set the amount of her daughters' dowries, and influence the timing of their marriages and professional decisions.

Napoleon's legal reforms brought legal consistency to the inheritance and custody rights of widows across most of Europe, and the resulting legal system remained in effect until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Napoleonic Code ensured widows a portion of the joint estate but gave fathers control of the custody of their children and allowed the patriarch the power to dictate educational and other life choices of his heirs in his testament. Widows also needed to obtain permission from a family council before they were permitted to remarry while maintaining custody of their children. Property disputes between widows and their children continued throughout the nineteenth century, dying down as a result of demographic shifts rather than legal adjustment.

THE PRIVILEGES OF WIDOWHOOD

Efforts to strengthen the position of the household patriarch in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century legal reforms bolstered the widow's legal position. Over the course of these centuries, the household acquired a more significant legal role, with the head of the household wielding power as the monarch ruling over his or her subordinates. A widow with dependent children ruled her household with most of the same rights and authority that her late husband had exercised. Unlike a married woman, a widow could engage in business in her own name, form contracts, speak in court, and make decisions with regard to the other members of her household. Economic power bolstered the widow's moral authority over her children

and generally provided her with a level of respect from her children that rivaled the respect given to her late husband.

Before the emergence of the modern state, citizenship was often defined by household status. Such a definition allowed the women who headed their households to enjoy the same privileges and partake in the same responsibilities as the men who headed households. In some towns and corporate bodies, this included voting privileges and eligibility to hold minor offices. As the heads of their households, widows also paid taxes and contributed to the funds for maintaining a military force.

As head of the household, a widow with the usufruct of her husband's estate governed the estate in his absence. Noble widows governed the people on their lands in addition to administering the lands. Under feudal systems, a widow could administer justice and resolve disputes, control the various monopolies, arrange for relief in times of famine, and raise her own army. As feudal systems gradually disintegrated over the early modern period, noble widows lost their position as rulers. The centralized monarchies that emerged offered no equivalent position for noble or royal widows. With the exception of Catherine II (the Great) of Russia, sovereign power was never passed to a king's widow in the early modern period. When a royal widow ruled, she did so as a regent for an un-

derage son. Though royal governments spawned bureaucracies with officials whose offices were passed from one generation to the next, widows played no role in this transmission and were excluded from offices and bureaucratic work.

Though barred from the government, widows did have special privileges allowing them to operate their deceased husbands' businesses and trades. Widows were particularly active in moneylending and banking, dominating these fields especially if they had no adult sons to usurp their roles. Artisan women had the right to take over the family business and participate in the guilds or trade associations as full members. Some of their rights were gradually reduced between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, but for as long as an artisan economy remained, widows operated workshops on much the same footing as masters. These women became masters in the trade through their connection to their deceased husbands. In regions where a married woman could not engage in financial transactions or conduct business in her own name, widowhood provided her with commercial independence. Artisan businesses could, however, be difficult for a widow to operate alone. Since artisans generally established their businesses and married at approximately the same time, their businesses relied on the work of both partners. While a widower might remarry to replace the labor of his wife, a widow re-



CHOOSING TO REMAIN A WIDOW IN FIFTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE

In 1405 Christine de Pisan, herself a widow, wrote a book of advice to Frenchwomen of various social standings. The following passage complements the statistical information that suggests that widows who could manage financially frequently preferred to avoid a second or subsequent marriage.

Of Widows Young and Old

Because widowhood truly provides so many hardships for women, some people might think it best for all widows to remarry. This argument can be answered by saying that if it were true that the married state consisted entirely of peace and repose, this indeed would be so. That one almost always sees the contrary in marriages should be a warning to all widows. However, it might be necessary or desirable for the young ones to remarry. But for all those who have passed their youth and are sufficiently comfortable financially so that poverty does not oblige them, remarriage is complete folly.

Source: Christine de Pisan, *A Medieval Woman's Mirror of Honor: The Treasury of the City of Ladies*, trans. Charity Cannon Willard (New York, 1989), 200–201.

tained her business only so long as she remained a widow. Widows, then, relied heavily on assistance from their children and from paid laborers or journeymen, who replaced some of the labor lost by the husband's death. In some of the legal regimes, a widow could pass her business to a new husband if this husband was a journeyman in the same trade. Many widows, however, chose not to remarry and preferred to continue their family trade as the head of both the household and the family workshop.

The growing cult of domesticity and a shift toward industrial work patterns in the early nineteenth century combined to eliminate privileges afforded to widows in business and the trades. When the guild system dissolved, the opportunities for widows to operate small businesses faded. The industrial employer preferred unmarried women whose place in industry was short-term. Widows were likelier to find employment in domestic service or retail trades. The middle classes and the nobility had, by the nineteenth century, embraced an ideal of female domesticity. Though middle-class families built businesses upon marriage

alliances, these alliances provided widows with no place in the family firm. In the nineteenth century widows, as much as married women, resided within the domestic sphere.

THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET

While the privileges afforded widows allowed some to succeed, others lived on the brink of destitution. Both artisan widows and widows of the laboring classes keenly felt the economic dislocation that accompanied widowhood. Widows with small children and elderly widows without children were particularly vulnerable to poverty—the first because they needed to support dependents and the second because they needed to support themselves. Widows fought poverty with the labor of their own hands. Research for seventeenth-century London shows that only 15 percent of all widows were unemployed. Widows became destitute when work was insufficient for economic survival.

If a widow's income was insufficient, she first turned to family members for assistance. Those who had only young children or none sought aid from their siblings and cousins, occasionally gaining help from the families of their husbands. Older widows relied on their own children for assistance; far more elderly women than men could be found living as dependents in one of their children's homes. Widows with land or businesses relinquished control of this wealth by signing it over to one of their offspring in return for a promise of care in old age. A successful widowhood depended upon a strong relationship between the widow and her adult children.

When family support was lacking, widows, who had long been recognized as members of the “deserving poor,” turned to charity for assistance. Biblical exhortations urged Christians to give alms to assist poor widows and orphans; widows appeared in disproportionately large numbers on the English Poor Law lists and in Catholic countries received parish charity. Widows could depend on assistance from their local churches, the sympathy of their neighbors, and private charities. Guilds and mutual aid societies maintained funds to assist the widows and orphans of their members, though these funds rarely provided more than funeral expenses. In Victorian England, when etiquette even for the poor demanded funerary pomp, mutual aid burial societies grew into organizations of mammoth proportions.

In exceptional cases, pensions and insurance schemes assisted some widows as early as the eighteenth century. The Netherlands and Prussia were pi-

oneers in this area, but other countries followed over the course of the nineteenth century. The early schemes usually provided pensions for the widows of civil servants and soldiers. The size of the pension was based on the husband's rank and the value of his service to the state. French Revolutionary widows petitioned the government for pensions by citing both their own poverty and the exemplary service performed by their late husbands. The practice continued into the twentieth century. The widows of veterans received pensions after each of the two world wars—an expense that asked the states to dig deep into their national pockets.

Despite a continued recognition of the needs of the widow and the growth in their numbers, social welfare reforms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not address widows as a unique category of women. Reforms aimed at increasing the birthrate provided benefits to young mothers. Though the reforms were geared toward married women, since they were enacted in the interwar years, many of the young war widows with children would have benefited as well. Older widows benefited from old age pensions but, unless they had contributed with their own wages to the insurance schemes, they received a much smaller allowance than their husbands received in their own old age. In Britain after World War II, William Beveridge's social insurance plan provided need-based relief for widows with children who were seeking training or employment. The plan included both a cash payment and child-care subsidies.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, husbands also began to plan more diligently for the support of their widows. Life insurance offered planning and security to working- and middle-class couples. Moreover, inheritance practices no longer excluded widows from their husbands' estates. Husbands felt a keen sense of responsibility; providing for a secure widowhood had become a matter of masculine pride. Private responsibility continued to supersede state responsibility in the case of impoverished widowhood. When the state did provide assistance, this was offered for the travails of old age or maternity and was not tied specifically to widows.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

The widow's social and cultural identity was shaped by her relationship to her deceased spouse. Trappings of widowhood reminded society that the widow was not truly independent, that her apparent independence derived from her unrelenting bond with the husband beyond the grave. Widows defined their so-

cial and cultural identities in a terrain dominated by two opposing stereotypes—that of the virtuous and dependent widow and that of the powerful, independent, and licentious widow. The widower occupied a very different land. While a woman's identity has, to varying degrees throughout European history, been tied to her relationship with a man, the reverse was not true for male identity. Thus the loss of a wife impinged on a man's identity to a much smaller degree than the loss of a husband impinged on a woman's.

In having been joined and subordinated to her husband through marriage, a widow became a liminal character upon her husband's death, existing between death and life. Even the name by which the widow was known reasserted this liminality. Although naming patterns varied, widows normally continued to use their dead husband's name as their own and were identified as "the widow Brown," either as their whole name or as an appendage to their birth name, as in the French pattern: "Marie Petit, veuve [widow of] Bonhomme." Research on seventeenth-century England has shown that women who were widowed twice chose to identify with their more prestigious dead husband, whether or not this was their more recent marriage. This practice demonstrates that widows consciously exploited their relationship with deceased husbands to build up their own prestige and status.

MOURNING

Widowhood began with a period of mourning replete with the symbolic liminality of widows, who withdrew from the world of the living, rejecting social life, sexuality, and sumptuous goods. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, aristocratic widows underwent a period of isolation in their houses or bedchambers upon the death of their husbands, often resting on particular beds and chairs taken out of storage only in times of mourning. Pious widows in mourning rejected any hints of sexuality, and custom forbade remarriage and flirtation during that period.

Better than any of the other mourning customs, widow's weeds demonstrated the widow's position between life and death. Mourning dress, common in European history from at least as early as the fourteenth century, imitated the garb of the monastic communities and originally placed equal demands on male and female mourners. Black was adopted as a color for mourning by the sixteenth century as an imitation of the religious habit first worn by the Benedictine monks. Just as monks and nuns ritualistically

enacted a death to the world, so too did mourners ritualistically reject the world of the living for their period of mourning. Both men and women in mourning wore long robes with hoods, usually in black, through most of the early modern period.

While mourning was ungendered in the sixteenth century, three centuries later mourning etiquette had become distinctly feminine. As regular fashions diverged, mourning clothes became less imitations of the monastics and instead somber reflections of everyday clothing. By the nineteenth century men wore black suits and women dressed in silk or wool black dresses suitable only for mourning. Women withdrew from social life for several months, whereas men simply attached a black armband to their sleeves and carried on their business. The greatest difference between male and female mourning was the length of time each was to dedicate to grief. Eighteenth-century French court etiquette dictated that widows mourn their husbands for a year and six weeks; widowers wore mourning for six months after the death of their wives. Mourning for women reached its grandest scale in the mid-nineteenth century, when widows were expected to be in various stages of mourning for two and a half years and widowers for only three months. Many older women continued to wear mourning beyond the prescribed period. In so doing these widows

continued to express their marital status in their personal appearance, representing themselves as defined through their spouse and his death.

For royal and aristocratic widows, representations of their marital identity could help confirm their status and establish their authority. Queen regents in particular wore opulent mourning clothes that explicitly reminded their subjects that their authority was derived from their connection to the deceased king. Obedience to the mourning queen depended on her connection to this past as much as on her role as mother of the next king. Mary, queen of Scots, arrived in Scotland as a widow and drew the entire Scottish court into mourning with her—a fine emblem of the unity of the court behind her. By the nineteenth century, however, mourning no longer evoked authority. When Queen Victoria went into mourning, politicians feared that she would destroy the position of the English monarchy by withdrawing so completely from politics and world affairs.

PIETY AND VIRTUE

In addition to asserting a connection to a deceased spouse, mourning clothes indicated virtue, and many wealthy widows chose to emphasize this aspect of their

widowed identity. Retirement had been a common preference for aristocratic women from the early Middle Ages. Church fathers admonished widows not to remarry, and widows who remained faithful to their dead husbands enjoyed a certain prestige throughout the history of Christian Europe. Many of the first women's convents were founded by widows and indeed housed more widows than never-married women. By the sixteenth century, convents frequently took in wealthy widows as lodgers; they followed a less rigorous rule than the nuns but lived within the walls of the convent and participated in parts of the liturgy.

While some widows were drawn to the radical movements of the Protestant Reformation, the Catholic Reformation of the seventeenth century saw much wider-scale involvement of widowed women. The Catholic Reformation movements seemed to allow widows to work in the world without divorcing themselves from their families and community. Such women had found retirement to a convent impossible because of their duties to their children and obligations to manage estates. Groups of pious, wealthy widows banded together in seventeenth-century Italy, Spain, and France to do good works and minister to the urban poor in the growing cities of the early modern period. Such pious women had found marriage restricting their devotional lives and welcomed the freedom that widowhood offered. Together with St. Vincent de Paul, the widow St. Louise de Marillac established a group of laywomen, both widows and unmarried women, who visited the poor and tended the sick. These "daughters of charity" administered a good deal of the local parish charities from the seventeenth into the twentieth century. Likewise a group of widows gathered in Paris with the assistance of St. François de Sales to form a moderate religious community known as the Sisters of the Visitation. The order was designed with the particular needs of widows in mind—the members were permitted to leave the community periodically in order to deal with their family obligations. Through these activities, religious widows formed a niche for themselves that relied on their independence, control of wealth, and moral status as widows.

The independence even of virtuous women in widowhood was, however, frequently a contentious issue. Most of the religious movements that involved widows in active work in the early seventeenth century were within decades converted into contemplative orders—convents in which nuns engaged in very limited work and restricted themselves to life within the confines of convent walls. These nuns might teach or nurse the sick within a hospital, but they lost the flexibility that had made the orders particularly attractive

to the independent widow. When widows began to participate in ministering to the poor in the late nineteenth century, they did so alongside married women and under the leadership of younger, unmarried women. Though many widows still devoted themselves to their faith, they found no institutional expressions for it and no active ministry.

DANGEROUS WIDOWS

Independent and solitary widows posed threats to the male social order. While some social structures sought to confine widows in remarriages or within the families of their birth, for most of the European past widows headed their own households and acted as free agents. Though many of these widows won sympathy and respect, others garnered suspicion and censure.

Though widows were not to be found in large numbers in the criminal elements of society, numerous widows in premodern Europe developed a reputation for dabbling in the occult and wielding power

through witchcraft. Even before the rage of witchcraft trials in the seventeenth century, various widows were credited with manufacturing and selling charms or divining the future. Approximately half of the individuals prosecuted in the early modern offensive against witchcraft were widows, most of them childless and between the ages of forty and sixty. Many of these widows had built up reputations as witches over the course of a decade or longer. Neighbors, long wary of these solitary figures with their sharp tongues and vague threats, eventually denounced the women when the legal system turned its attention to witchcraft as a crime.

Though the denouncing neighbors feared the widow's muttered curses, the judicial witch-hunters suspected her unbridled sexuality. The most pernicious stereotype of widowhood was that of the independent and sexually licentious widow. According to the witch-hunter's manual *Malleus maleficarum* (The hammer of witches; 1486), older women without legitimate sexual outlets engaged in intercourse with the Devil so as to satisfy their insatiable sexual desires. Medical theory supported the belief that the female sexual appetite grew with age and that widows, having tasted the pleasures of sexuality, became voracious in their desires after being denied them by the death of their spouse. In addition to erudite theory, popular fears and fantasies created images of wanton widows. The widow's uncontrolled sexuality remained a topic of humor and anxiety throughout most of European history, appearing as a trope in the theater of the seventeenth century, the libertine novels of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and cartoons and pornography in the nineteenth. The libertine widow was seen as controlling her own sexuality, disregarding her connection to her late husband and manipulating the minds and bodies of the men around her.

A widow's sexuality called into question her fidelity to her late husband. Because widows acted as liminal beings—their identity depending on the bonds that transcended death—their sexuality was still liminally owned by their husbands. The power of this bond was reflected in remarriage taboos that existed in various degrees of strength in most places and periods of the European past. In Renaissance Italy both widows and widowers broke taboos when they remarried. Custom dictated that widowers pay a sum of money to their neighbors when remarrying to compensate for disrupting the social order through their act of pseudobigamy. Remarriage to a widow required a larger payment. Refusal to pay resulted in rough music and vandalism. On the other hand, observers of nineteenth-century French peasantry were astonished to see widows and widowers arrange new mar-



THE LIBERTINE WIDOW

One of the most famous literary widows is the marquise de Merteuil of Choderlos de Laclos's epistolary novel *Les liaisons dangereuses* (1782). The widow here is in complete control of her sexuality and manipulates the people around her through deception and sexual power play. By the late eighteenth century, libertinism portrayed a widow's sexuality as dangerous not because of her unbridled and voracious appetite but because of the control it could hold over men and the havoc created by a widow whose sexuality was not channeled through male ownership. The following passage is a letter from the marquise de Merteuil describing her early life as a widow.

Monsieur de Merteuil's illness interrupted these soft occupations; I had to follow him to town whither he went for medical aid. He died, as you know, shortly afterwards; and although, taking it all round, I had no reason to complain of him, I felt nonetheless keenly the value of the liberty my widowhood would give me and I promised myself to make good use of it.

My mother expected I should go into a convent or return to live with her. I refused both courses; all I granted to decency was to return to the country again. . . .

I began to grow weary of my rustic pleasures, which were too monotonous for my active head; I felt a need for coquetry to reconcile me with love, not to feel it veritably but to inspire and to feign it. In vain I had been told and had read that this sentiment could not be feigned; I saw that to do so successfully one had only to join the talent of the comedian to the mind of an author. I practiced myself in both arts and perhaps with some success; but instead of seeking the vain applause of the theatre, I resolved to employ for my happiness what others sacrifice to vanity.

Source: Choderlos de Laclos, *Les liaisons dangereuses*, trans. Richard Aldington (New York, 1962), 180–181.

riages on the occasion of the deceased spouse's funeral feast. Elsewhere, remarriage taboos were expressed in the amount of time a widow or widower was required to remain unwed. The period was generally longer for women than men. In late seventeenth-century England, remarriage within ten months of the death of a husband could bring charges of petty treason against the widow-bride. By the late nineteenth century, widows who remarried within the prescribed two and a half years brought scandal upon themselves. Only through the ritualized transitions within the mourn-

ing period was the widow's sexuality freed from the grasping hand of her buried spouse.

THE DECLINE OF THE WIDOW

Although the number of widows increased, widowhood lost much of its cultural meaning in the twentieth century. Demographically, even with the surge of young widows produced by the two world wars, widowhood continued to be increasingly confined to the latter two or three decades of life. Widows, then, became part of an already marginalized population in European society, and age became the more significant category defining them both legally and culturally. In combination with altered definitions of marriage and womanhood, the aging of the widowed population deprived widowhood of much of its earlier cultural meaning.

A watershed in the decline of the significance of widowhood occurred with the two world wars of the

twentieth century. Already before the outbreak of war, women had begun to construct their identities with less attachment to their matrimonial ties. The war accelerated this process by producing a great number of widows at the same time that it demanded women perform war service and recognized women's actions quite independently from their positions as wives and widows. In responding to the demands of total warfare, women dropped their mourning rituals and costumes. Women in World War II were warned that to wear mourning clothes displayed a lack of patriotism; each fallen husband was to be applauded as a hero rather than mourned as a personal loss. When war widows did band together to seek pensions or attend memorials, they were invariably conservative women, holding onto a cultural identity marker that was quickly growing irrelevant. For the majority of widows, although they continued to mourn privately, their authority and independence no longer bore any connection to their special bonds to men who rested on the other side of death.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE ELDERLY



David G. Troyansky

At the turn of the twenty-first century, as European states tinker with the social security systems their populations have come to treasure, “the elderly” present a variety of faces. Naming them poses a problem. The word “elderly,” like “the aged,” carries with it an odor of condescension, fragility, and passivity. “Elders” implies wisdom, “seniors” a certain activity and privilege in the marketplace, “older people” a category that avoids categories. Distinctions between the “young old” and “old old,” or “third age” and “fourth age,” register the impact of demographic, medical, socio-economic, political, and cultural changes as well as the separation of retirement from old age. Such diversity of names and categories, which exists in other European languages as well as English, reflects cultural choices but also social historical changes. People live longer in our present “age-transformed” populations (Peter Laslett’s phrase), claiming entitlements, consuming medicines, and forming new social, cultural, and political groups.

Social historians have sought to understand these transformations and have shared their labors with historical demographers, cultural historians, and political economists. Their concerns have included demographic aging, family and household structures, work and retirement experiences, state support systems, medicalization and institutionalization, cultural representations, and popular attitudes. Those concerns are best addressed through their own chronologies, approaches, and examples. At the most general level, however, the literature on old age and the elderly can be divided between social and cultural history.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL APPROACHES

The general tensions between social and cultural history are visible in the literature on the history of old age and the aged. As Paul Johnson has explained, social historians who made the elderly a subject of historical interest favored such themes as participation,

well-being, and status, and addressed them in studies of employment, political activity, property ownership, health, and the transmission of household authority. The earliest efforts tended to follow an already creaky “modernization” scheme. For some, the modern world rendered the elderly marginal. For others, it was pre-modern society that had no use for them and modernity that invented them as a group.

Such simple choices proved unsatisfactory. The history of old age would not be contained in a one-directional master narrative of either progress or decline. Social historians have examined the age structure of limited populations, the shape of peasant households, entries to and exits from hospitals, age consciousness in official records, and the development of social policies concerning old age and retirement. But no overarching model has emerged.

Cultural history provided a possible solution. European culture has long examined the ages of life. Religious, philosophical, and scientific texts provided prescriptions for aging well, often connected with related themes of vanity, honor, and preparation for death. Religious retreat and humanist retirement to the study were among the recommended options for the fortunate minority, but there was no formal marker of entry into a new lifestage. Literary and artistic materials offered descriptions of experience but tended to repeat traditional tropes and images among representations of the elderly. Cultural historians recognized the predominance of certain images, from the ridiculous, lascivious graybeard or crone to the dignified wise man or woman.

These images have changed with successive periods of cultural history. The Protestant Reformation and the growth of the early modern state have been associated with the rise of patriarchy. The Enlightenment has been associated with a softening of the image of the patriarch and a process of de-Christianization that focused new attention on the last years of earthly existence and harmony between old and young. Nineteenth-century middle-class culture further developed eighteenth-century sentimentality, announc-

more in terms of physical and mental condition, household authority, and cultural status than numerical age. Awareness of chronological age mattered little to most premodern Europeans.

The greatest contribution of cultural history was to make clear that old age has meant many different things in different historical settings. It might have to do with authority and its loss. It might come with the marriage of children. It might bring honor or ridicule. It was already an object of study. More people in the contemporary world can experience it, and although cultural historians found much to examine in the early modern period, some social historians and historical demographers insist on the unprecedented nature of modern demographic aging.

DEMOGRAPHIC AGING AND INCREASING LIFE EXPECTANCY: TWO PROCESSES

Recognition of demographic aging lay behind some of the growth in historical literature on aging and the aged. Some historians have considered the aging of populations on a par with the demographic transition that has traditionally been described simply as a decline in mortality and fertility. It was the fertility decline, principally in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that resulted in demographic aging: an increased percentage of people over the age of, say, sixty or sixty-five within a population. Thus the age pyramid was broadened at the top, the eventual result of narrowing at the bottom. Even the post-World War II baby boom failed to reverse a process that has had a lasting impact on Europe and much of the world. Peter Laslett has demonstrated that there is no going back. The “fresh map of life” for the majority of Europeans includes a long period (the “third age,” as the French named it) from retirement to the time of sickness, decline, and death.

In early modern European countries, between 7 and 10 percent of the population was over the age of sixty. France reached 12 percent by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Sweden reached that level in 1910, when England and Germany still had just under 8 percent. England attained 12 percent in 1931, Germany in 1937. Experiencing the demographic aging that transformed Europe in the second half of the twentieth century, England had 16 percent over the age of sixty in the 1950s and 17 percent by the 1980s. These figures were significantly higher for women, lower for men (table 1). Socioeconomic differences were apparent, as they had been in the early modern period as well.

ing the great era of grandparenthood, and also produced a powerful image of the indigent elderly. In all those periods, one found nostalgic evocation of a time in the past when elders were respected.

Cultural historians paid attention to representations of the ages of life, often in the form of a ladder or series of steps ascending by decade to fifty and descending to one hundred. Such images hardly conformed to typical human experience; they are best read as allegorical renderings of the life course that urged adherence to prescribed roles and attention to the omnipresence of death. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, flames of hell beneath the steps warned of the punishment for straying. In the eighteenth, the images turned secular. Other sources suggest a very old tradition of seeing sixty, sixty-five, or seventy as the threshold of old age. Some historians have asked when people began to see each other as old, placing the emphasis on physical appearance, and some suggest menopause as a female threshold. Institutions such as hospitals and hospices often settled on sixty or seventy, but labor and environmental conditions more commonly placed the beginning of old age closer to fifty. Still, the elderly have been identified

Local economic differences render “national” figures in the earlier period misleading. Thus eighteenth- and nineteenth-century cities receiving large numbers of young immigrants had relatively few elderly (sometimes under 4 percent), while depressed rural areas experiencing out-migration might for a time reach as high as 20 percent. The early modern elderly often had a small female majority, but that gender gap grew to be very significant in the modern and contemporary periods.

The female role in demographic aging (a merely perceived role if fertility decline is not only women’s responsibility) and the fact that female life expectancy has exceeded male life expectancy led some early demographers to blame women for what they saw as a symptom of national weakness. In this way, demographic aging has been given political and cultural meaning, symbolizing national decline. Beginning in the 1920s, the work of French demographer Alfred Sauvy expressed that common conservative fear and

provided a very influential model for social scientific thinking about aging. It need not have been that way. Aging could have been seen as a sign of progress in the battle against disease and premature death. Whether survivors of disease constitute a healthy population is another matter that has been debated. James Riley’s discussion of “insult accumulation” dares to make projections about unhealthy survivors among elders in the future, but most historians of aging have avoided the alarmist language of Sauvy.

Declining mortality had some impact on the aging of populations, particularly in the more contemporary period, but its more important result was increasing average life expectancy. In general that meant more children reached adulthood. Only in the most recent period has mortality among older people fallen significantly. But even in the early modern era, some periods were clearly healthier than others, and socioeconomic standing almost always had an impact on survival into old age. The wealthy and

adulthood, thus eliminating infant and child mortality. It is clear that once they survived childhood, reaching middle age was common for early modern young people. In France from the 1740s to the 1820s, the probability of a twenty-year-old's reaching age 60 went from 41.9 percent for men and 43 percent for women to 59 percent and 58.1 percent. But socioeconomic differences were crucial. In seventeenth-century Geneva, those probabilities for men and women can be divided into three classes. At the highest social class, the probability was 51.7 percent for men and 52.1 percent for women; in the middling classes, 38.8 percent and 40.5 percent; in the lower classes, 31.9 percent and 33.9 percent. Thus European elites had an experience of what their cultures considered old age long before the transformation of entire populations and the generalization of retirement.

Placing the emphasis on the contemporary period, Peter Laslett has created a "third age indicator," a measure of the moment when at least half of a country's male population can expect to survive from twenty-five to seventy. Patrice Bourdelais, criticizing demographers' arbitrary choice of a threshold of old age, opted for a moving threshold based upon probabilities of living five years between the ages of sixty and seventy-five and upon the chances of living another ten years. He recognized that chronological age does not correspond simply to "biological age," that a sixty-year-old person in the twentieth-century was not the equivalent of a sixty-year-old person two centuries earlier. His approach, lowering the age of entry into old age while moving back in time, resulted in the claim that old age was almost as common in the early nineteenth century as in the twentieth. In effect, he was telling demographers to tone down their alarm.

Even before the big transitions, within the context of the old demographic regime, situations have varied. Relatively small demographic alterations and migration resulting from regional economic developments may have contributed to social stresses. And we find life expectancy after childhood that is surprisingly long. Old people, in short, were visible in all historical times. They are mentioned in high cultural sources referring to continued political and administrative activity or the awarding of honorary posts, legal sources regarding exemption from military or state service, and notarial archives for premortem transmission of property. In some historical settings before the great transitions, peculiar household structures influenced the nature of the aging process. In Renaissance Florence, for example, husbands were on average thirteen years older than their wives. But even elsewhere, old men might have

privileged were therefore overrepresented in the elderly population.

Historical studies of life expectancy have mostly provided figures for life expectancy at birth. In England, whose population history has been most thoroughly studied, life expectancy at birth was around thirty-five from the sixteenth through the mid-nineteenth century. Progress was apparent in the late nineteenth century and dramatic in the twentieth. European women reached a life expectancy of 50 in the 1910s, 57 in 1930, 71.5 in 1960, 74.1 in 1970, and 77.5 in 1985, when men lagged farther behind at 70.6 (table 2).

Historians of the elderly have discovered the advantage of studying life expectancy in youth and

the oldest child, regardless of sex, was the heir, and patterns varied dramatically from one microregion of Europe to another. Rudolf Andorka found great “generational depth” in the household system of four Hungarian villages in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Households there went through stages and changed shape, as children matured, left, and sometimes returned, but three generations coresided in the vast majority of households containing aged individuals. This may have been a cultural choice, but it may also have been the result of land shortage or the lack of charitable institutions.

By contrast, independent households remained the norm for the elderly in much of western Europe. In some cases, that may have meant abandonment and neglect, but most scholars have assumed that elders living on their own, then as now, did so by choice. And independent households did not preclude assistance from relatives, particularly at moments of emergency. Such assistance, moreover, may have continued to flow from elders to their children and other kin. We should not assume that the elders were necessarily poorer than their adult children. But widows and infirm widowers who did not manage to remarry might be in a difficult position. Even in England, in situations of need or where property was involved, the elderly might join or be joined by adult offspring in a stage of what David Kertzer calls a nuclear reincorporation model.

For knowledge about the elderly without property and without children, the best historical sources concern charitable institutions. In England the des-

young children, especially as widowers remarried much more frequently than widows.

FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURES

The elderly were not the primary concern of the early family historians, who tended to emphasize childhood and marriage. But eventually it became apparent that family history was a possible approach to the elderly. Just as historians found a predominantly nuclear family model in northwestern Europe and a variety of extended forms to the east and south, so they have described a range from independent elders to older persons living within more complex households. As they turned from static descriptions of households at particular moments to more developmental life course approaches, they found more complicated and gradual transitions from one generation to another.

Some parts of Europe were characterized by coresidence between adult generations, and local custom indicated whether the younger resident was an older or younger child, a boy or girl. Inheritance customs and laws, whether demanding division of property or permitting a favored heir to hold the patrimony together, played a major role in determining the residence pattern. In southwestern France, for example,

titute elderly were supported partly by the poor-law system and partly by relatives. One kind of support might complement the other. Lynn Botelho has found a significant percentage of seventeenth-century elderly receiving assistance in two small villages of Suffolk, but discovered that the amounts provided were considerably less than for the younger poor. She also found that one community was more generous than the other, probably because it was wealthier, but possibly because of greater religious motivation. Continental Europeans dealt with the poverty of the elderly in a variety of ways. Catholic charity was often based upon the activities of confraternities. German assistance to the aged tended to be local, while some French institutions were supported by the monarchy. Sherri Klassen has looked at urban elderly women in eighteenth-century France and found a variety of ways in which neighbors and coworkers met the impoverished elderly's minimal needs.

Culture undoubtedly played some role in determining patterns of residence, but structures varied according to the local economy. Thus, separating family from work history is artificial. Families were work-units, and the modern tendency to separate interest and sentiment is an obstacle to understanding the past. Within generally prescribed patterns of residence and inheritance, families worked out labor responsibilities and expectations for succession. Sharecropping

households in southern Europe often joined together generations and kin. Feudal landlords sometimes forced transmission of limited authority from a less productive older generation to the next. In a very different spirit, some northern European elders chose retirement at their children's expense.

WORK AND RETIREMENT EXPERIENCES

Preindustrial populations were overwhelmingly rural, and transmission of property usually took place gradually. But there were exceptions. Thus it is possible to speak of peasant "retirement." At a time when the "empty nest" was not yet a common experience—in recent times property tends to flow from the very old to the fairly old or to skip a generation—transmission of authority and individual retirement primarily involved aged parents and young adults. In many parts of Europe, the "old person's portion," room, field, or bench, was commonplace. Notarized maintenance provisions have led historians to speculate about the need for such assurances. Did the stipulation that adult children owed so much firewood or food indicate the absolute need for such provisions? Would children have neglected the elderly if not legally bound to care for them? Or did it simply set forth sensible guidelines? Whether they were effective or

even needed, such legal agreements continued to be drawn up in rural areas into the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Eventually, rural exodus and changes in occupation rendered them less important. So did the rise of private and public pensions. Over the long term, individual arrangements were replaced or accompanied by transfer payments involving large bureaucracies that may well have shifted the locus of intergenerational tension from individual families to entire societies. One consequence may have been greater intergenerational solidarity within families, but that is hard to know.

Artisanal experience was occasionally comparable to peasant experience in terms of transmission of the patrimony. Tools and shops replaced tools and fields in notarized settlements. Workers' own organizations sometimes addressed issues of dependency. Provident funds, mutual aid or friendly societies, and savings banks had early origins, but they were more concerned with meeting short-term emergencies such as temporary disabilities and burial costs than with a long-lasting old age, which became more important in the nineteenth century. Such organizations always favored men over women.

With demographic aging, workers often tried to hold onto their jobs or shift to less burdensome tasks. Adaptation to new tasks indicates a traditional approach that continued even into the era of industrialization. It has been suggested that elderly industrial workers were not a problem because aging workers tended to move into other occupations. The notion of career was not yet fully formed, especially among proletarians. Thus old age pensions for industrial workers often struck those workers as deferred payments they would never see.

Workforce participation was high for the elderly in the nineteenth century, higher perhaps than in pre-industrial Europe. In such circumstances, retirement came only with disability or a downturn in the economy. It was not a condition to be sought. Participation of the elderly in the workforce fell dramatically in the twentieth century. In England, for example, 73.6 percent of males aged 65 and older were defined as "economically active" in 1881; that figure fell to 56.9 percent in 1911, 31.1 percent in 1951, and 8.7 percent in 1991. It was not a consistent decline, as wartime demand temporarily reversed the trend, and interwar rates of labor force participation remained exceptionally high in France, but in general (and especially in the second half of the century) healthier elderly, physically capable of working longer, retired. Historians have debated the degree to which this was a matter of choice. They have also debated the role of business and of the state in the spread of retirement. Were

systems of social security largely responses to national emergencies, or did the creation of social security systems encourage retirement? Both situations can be found, and particular political parties, unions, and interest groups pushed differently for state pensions.

The Bismarck pensions in Germany are often described as the policy of a conservative politician seeking to steal an issue from the socialists. It was not an issue that was high on the socialist agenda before the late nineteenth century, but it had appeared from time to time on the European left since the French Revolution. Nineteenth-century political thinkers spoke about a social debt to the aged, but little was actually done for elderly other than soldiers or civil servants. By the late nineteenth century, a right to retirement was proclaimed from many quarters. Bismarck's state socialism developed out of an awareness of how private pensions served to discipline workers. Social welfare systems financed by general revenues are commonly assumed to be most highly developed in Scandinavian countries as a result of social democratic activism in the 1930s; however, Peter Baldwin has argued that in the late nineteenth century Danish and Swedish agrarian middle classes demanded universalist and solidaristic social legislation so as not to be denied benefits socialists were demanding for urban working classes.

STATE INTERVENTION

Before the spread of social security, European states addressed issues of aging and retirement at two levels: rewards to civil servants in the form of pensions and assistance to the poor. The structure of pension systems was elaborated in the world of the relatively privileged public servants. Formulas for arriving at payment schedules were worked out long before the social security era. Early modern pensions had usually been paid at a wide range of ages for services rendered, not as a reward at the end of a career. Dock workers in the English customs service (1684–1712) and tax farmers in France (1768) were early beneficiaries of retirement systems, but military pensions in the eighteenth century provided the most influential models for civil service pensions in the nineteenth. Different government ministries often set up their own systems, which were eventually standardized and centralized in France in 1853, Great Britain in 1859, and the German Empire incrementally in the 1870s and 1880s.

Salaried industrial workers were next to receive pensions, and miners tended to be first in that group: 1854 in Prussia, 1894 in France. Railroad workers followed. Meanwhile, private pensions continued to

play a role, paternalistically aiding and disciplining a minority of workers. In Britain friendly societies were more common, thus maintaining the middle-class ideal of the provident worker. But that image changed as social investigations, similar to those conducted on the continent, revealed a significant population of aged poor. Social insurance was passed in Germany under Bismarck in 1889, in Britain in 1908, and in France in 1910, but coverage varied: the Germans covered white-collar workers, the British focused on the poor, and the French included farmers. Coverage of the self-employed and professionals generally awaited the welfare state legislation following World War II. Private pension schemes, far from being replaced, continued to grow in the welfare state era. Income packaging was more common than dependence upon a single source of support.

The image of the retired worker included the Bismarck pensioner who was really a victim of disability rather than age and the French pensioner who had a “right” to leisure at a particular age, but the image was always male, and all across Europe state pensions were designed for older men. Women were offered widows’ pensions or their own, usually at

lower rates. Age at retirement varied as well, but national systems tended to imitate each other. The Bismarck pensions had an impact throughout Europe, and the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France after World War I resulted in the continuation of German rules in French territory.

Studies of state pension systems indicate the eventual emergence of retirement as a way of managing old age, but that stage was reached incrementally. Often parties of the Left avoided the issue, seeing forced retirement as a trap and old age pensions as devices for cutting wages. They were particularly hostile to contributory pensions, demanding instead non-contributory pensions paid out of general revenues. Businessmen and civil servants saw contributory pensions as fiscally responsible and providing a clearer individual right; they saw noncontributory ones as open-ended, too expensive, and overly redistributive. Members of friendly societies feared losing control of pension funds. But they eventually compromised, and the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the development of social welfare policies that dealt with old age, retirement, widowhood, and medical care.

Over the long run, social security systems contributed to the development of a three-stage life course: training, work, and retirement. Particular debates about retirement pensions revealed serious disagreements over issues of equity and purpose. Pensions based upon male breadwinner assumptions marginalized women, who were consistently the majority of the elderly. Age of eligibility and requirements to leave the workforce were hotly contested. Did pensions exist as insurance for the aged poor or as a right for all elderly?

MEDICALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION

As European welfare states created greater coherence out of individual institutions dealing with income, housing, and health, attention focused on the medicalization of old age. The process was not completely new. A medical literature on preventing aging and works addressing the diseases of the aged go back to the ancients; like other wisdom from the classical past, these ideas were revived in the Renaissance. The eighteenth century saw a western European campaign for public health, the beginnings of a long-term professionalization of health practitioners, a greater differentiation between age groups in medical publications, and the proliferation of projects for hospitals and hospices.

Institutions changed slowly, but hospitals and workhouses assigned different roles to people of different ages. Nineteenth-century poorhouses were transformed into old age homes. Nursing homes and other facilities emerged in the twentieth century, and hospitals themselves, overcoming popular fears that they were essentially places to die, witnessed a dramatic aging of their populations. Young men were more likely to be found in French and German urban hospitals than old men or women at the beginning of the twentieth century. All that would change. In a sense, the popular turn to medicine still preceded the medical profession's discovery of its new clientele. Consuming medicines, paid for by the state, became the norm for the European elderly in the second half of the twentieth century. An unmedicalized old age became virtually unthinkable.

Geriatrics has proved successful, but it has hardly shared the heroic image of other specializations. A medical practice that emphasizes treating chronic illness, easing pain, improving quality of life, and observing the process of dying was often less attractive than one that cured acute illness and restored patients to youthful vigor. Gerontology, resulting from

the fusion of different strands of the social and health sciences, has perhaps been more successful than geriatrics, which developed as a branching off from mainstream medicine. We are back in the realm of culture.

CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND POPULAR ATTITUDES

Some historians have moved relatively easily between cultural representations of old age and popular attitudes about it. *King Lear* provides a lesson about the risks of premortem transmission both for kings and farmers. It has spoken to rather diverse audiences ever since Shakespeare wrote it, and it derived from earlier tales. But as paths of inheritance in the twentieth century have tended to skip generations, and as aging Europeans depend more upon state-administered transfer payments and less upon private patrimony, that great tragic expression has probably come to be more about intergenerational sentiment than property, which long remained a subject for peasant proverbs. Throughout Europe one might have heard that a father can raise one hundred children, but not one of a hundred children can support an aged father. Such folklore survived into the twentieth century.

Stereotypes of the elderly still abound. Modern Europeans have an entire menu of possibilities. Attitudes toward the elderly are multiple, but emphases have been different at different times. In the early modern period, witchcraft became associated with elderly women. Even when witch-hunting came to an end, the image survived. The respected elder emerged as a common figure in eighteenth-century culture, which frowned upon traditional ridicule. It is possible to recognize an emphasis on both the decrepit aged in certain discussions of the welfare state and the young old in appreciations of the positive features of age-transformed populations.

A significant change occurred in the last quarter of the twentieth century, when retirees could look back on an earlier generation that had pioneered retirement. Expectations changed accordingly. Retirees not only traveled and became active consumers, but increasingly changed residence after retiring from the workforce. But knowledge of what previous generations have achieved is tempered by the various ways in which aging people move from the "active" life to the third age. Some still experience retirement as disability. Others experience it as a choice and a cultural opportunity. They take up serious projects and participate in "universities of the third age." Still others approach it through premature unemployment, which

is a challenge for individuals and for social security systems. The unemployed may become the retired long before becoming elderly.

The third age is the happy side of contemporary European aging. It combines health, wealth, and possibilities for cultural enrichment. The fourth age, looking much like indigent old age of a century ago, but lasting longer, poses challenges of a philosophical as well as economic and political nature. Social history suggests that neither broad demographic changes nor individual predicaments can be understood in isolation. It is hard to imagine a reversal of demographic aging, and demand for labor in countries with large numbers of elderly will result in population movements. The twentieth century has seen immigration to Europe from the former colonial world—that was

the specter for some of the conservative demographers who first noticed the phenomenon of demographic aging. The formation of the European Union is accelerating another historical trend, the migration of Europeans from countries of relatively high fertility and unemployment to other parts of Europe. And yet fertility declines in Italy, formerly sluggish economies develop, and European governments, recognizing the historic trend of increasing productivity, are experimenting with cuts in working hours. Leisure becomes as much of a problem as work. Questions of intergenerational equity, not as yet so explicitly posed as in the United States, force their way onto political and social agendas. And the institutional challenges of the very old may test European ideals of intergenerational solidarity.

See also **The Population of Europe: Early Modern Demographic Patterns; The Population of Europe: The Demographic Transition and After; The Life Cycle** (volume 2); and other articles in this section.

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GENERATIONS AND GENERATIONAL CONFLICT



Elizabeth Townsend

“Generation” is a term that indicates identity with a particular age group. Although it may refer to any age, this term has most often been associated with youth. Generation X, the Lost Generation, the Beat Generation, the “1989” generation, the Pepsi generation, the Baby Boomers, the Sixty-Eighters, the German Youth Movement, the Hitler Youth Movement, and the French bohemians are all examples of youth generations. As a term, “generation” seems familiar, easy to comprehend, self-evident. Yet “generation” can stand for a theoretical concept, a thirty-year age group in society, a student movement, a literary group of friends, a grandchild, youth at war, youth making war. This essay will explore the historical uses of the term “generation,” both in social history and in related disciplines.

Generational history has been explored by social historians from several vantage points. It is not, however, an analytical staple, and may well deserve more attention than it has received. The factors that shape a generation vary with time, and generational identity is not a constant. This has been true even in the past two centuries of European history, when the generational concept has been particularly deployed.

DEFINITIONS OF GENERATIONS: BIOLOGY AND HISTORY

The study of generations can be seen as many-layered, but its basic components are the biology and history of individuals within groups. Biology refers to an individual’s particular life cycle—birth, growing up, aging, and dying. History refers to the historical placement of the life lived. Historical generations are formed by combining the two. To better see how the term “generation” is used in different contexts, it might be helpful to recognize the mixture of history and biology within each type of use.

First, biological family-based generations can be seen as relationships between father, son, and grandson. Second, genealogical generations can be seen as biological generations used as markers of his-

torical time. In the most famous example, the Old Testament, one biological generation begets another to show how much time passes. Third, a generation can be seen as a group of people born around the same time (a number of painters born during the 1950s, for instance). Often these groups of people know each other (friends, schoolmates) and it is that relationship that is the focus of the study (and how that relationship affects what they do and how they view the world around them). Fourth, “generation” can be used in a broader context to understand larger societal groups. These groups are made up of individuals who do not know each other but nevertheless feel a particular bond because of the time in history that they were born and the events they have lived through.

In some instances, a person could belong to all four types of generation simultaneously. For instance, British writer Robert Graves, born in 1895, lived in a family made up of his parents, his siblings, and grandparents, an example of a biological family-based generation. One could confine a study of Graves to understanding the relationships between the generations of his family. Second, his birth could be used as a marker of the next generation of Graveses or of British upper-class society. This is what a demographer who studies populations, or a genealogist, would do. Third, historians could look at his school friends and see how they viewed the world. This study would be broader than the Graves family study, but would be confined to the relationships of the group he spent his life with. Art historians and literary historians often use the term “generation” in this way, to describe a group of artists working in the same circles, influenced by the same movements, and developing new works within the context of a group consciousness. Fourth, Robert Graves could be seen in the larger context of people born in the 1890s who served in World War I. The members of this larger generation type do not know each other, but they have common ties nevertheless. Born around the same time, they usually experienced the same kinds of events and cultural

experiences growing up. Because of this, their reactions to large, often catastrophic events tend to fall within a particular range that makes them identifiable as a group. Graves identified himself as part of the World War I generation.

The concept of generation has been used as far back as the Old Testament, Homer, Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle. Even this early, “generation” was used in a variety of ways. For instance, Genesis describes biological generations—relationships between parents and children (Adam and Eve with Cain and Abel)—and uses genealogical generations to mark time, as described above. Also, the book of Job contains elements of generational conflict, where one generation does not agree with the next. The Middle Ages with their feudal primogeniture laws of inheritance could also be seen as promoting generational study. But it was not until the nineteenth century that modern theories and examples of generations began to emerge.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Before the industrial revolution, social and technological change moved slowly, with few upheavals that drastically altered circumstances from father to son to grandson. As feudal systems were replaced by capitalist and industrial societies, scientific, industrial, and democratic revolutions changed the structure of society and of historical time, including interaction within the family. Sons and daughters no longer necessarily followed the same life path as their parents and often moved away to industrial jobs or educational opportunities. Thus, the growth of generational consciousness can be seen as a by-product of the growth of industrialization, modernization, urbanization, democratization, and nationalism. Generational identity was a product of a quickly changing society, and came to be seen as synonymous with youth confronting and/or hastening that change.

By the nineteenth century, notions of progress and change had enveloped society. At this time new emphasis was placed on childbearing and childhood, and the idea emerged of “youth” as a distinct time between childhood and adulthood. This time, often spent in new cities or at universities, far from parents, gave youth a time to gather together in coffeehouses and bars, to discuss the new ideas they were being exposed to. They began forming bonds of a generational sort.

Nineteenth-century generations in this context became narrowly defined as conflictual youth movements of the male, educated elite at universities. Some of these students were political, even violent activists.

Others withdrew from society, creating their own alternative bohemian ways of life. This elite expanded during the nineteenth century to include more middle-class men, and many of the student movements rallied for greater access to education for women and for the rights of other groups in society, including peasants. The university became a site of agitation for increased democracy, and the students saw themselves as the generation to bring about that change. They longed to modernize, liberalize, democratize, and radicalize. The German student movements of 1815 and the Russian student movements of the mid-1800s exemplified this desire to change existing institutions and prevailing attitudes. What is interesting about generations is that often the “new” generation builds on the frustrations and dissatisfactions of the old “new” generation. Each successive generation builds on the success or failure of the previous generation, trying to be more modern, more industrialized, and more successful.

Post-Napoleonic student movements. In many ways, generational identity began with the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. As examples, student generations of Germany and France are polar opposites, as one responded to victory over Napoleon and the other to his defeat.

The German student movement, centered in the *Burschenschaften* (youth associations), is considered the first student revolt in western history. Anthony Esler’s *Bombs, Beards, and Barricades* describes the movement, one centered on the idea of nationalism and a “united Germany.” The movement involved university students, many of whom had just returned from having volunteered in the German Wars of Liberation against Napoleon (1813–1815). These young men typically came from middle-class Protestant families from northern Germany. Their anger was directed at Metternich and other politicians, for their lack of commitment to nationalist aims once the war had ended. The sense of a generation emerged as interested students formed reading groups at the universities. This segued into public demonstrations, which culminated in mass public events like the Wartburg Festival. While this generation of students did not find immediate success, their actions spurred other student movements in Germany throughout the nineteenth century, and their dreams were realized when Germany became unified in 1871.

In contrast to the post-Napoleon generation in Germany, with its activism, public protest, and dynamic leaders, the post-Napoleon generations in France took a different path. Alan Spitzer’s *The French Generation of 1820* explores the incongruencies this

generation felt, as they found themselves faced with a far different world than they had been prepared for. As nineteenth-century Europe faced repeated challenges of revolution and revolt, successive generations of youth came to identify with the particular cause at hand.

Anthony Elser also explores the post-Napoleon generations in France, calling them the romantic generations. The first romantic generation, of 1820, set the stage with new ways to think about and view the world, and included writers, painters, and composers like Alexandre Dumas, Honoré de Balzac, Hector Berlioz, Eugène Delacroix, Victor Hugo, and George Sand. The second romantic generation, of 1830, adopted these views and embodied the romantic way of life in dress, style, and attitude. Born around 1810, this was the first bohemian generation. Far from being militant rebels, these youth withdrew from society and created a subculture of their own. Elser describes them as the first modern counterculture.

France and Germany were not the only countries to experience the rise of generational consciousness. In Austria, a generation of 1848 made its presence known, and in Italy the youth played an important part in all steps of unification. Russia also experienced significant generational movements, as the youth sought to move the country into a more democratic era. As populist university students tried unsuccessfully to include peasants in their movement, disillusionment set in, leading to more radical actions.

Interestingly, the German Student Movement, the French bohemians, and the Russian populists were all inspired to action in part by literature. The eighteenth-century poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's novel *Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774) articulated the frustrations, feelings, and desires of the German students. The work has been identified by scholars as one of the first to inspire a modern generational consciousness. Joachin Whaley's "The Ideal of Youth in Late-Eighteenth-Century Germany" (Roseman, 1995), looks at the works of Goethe, J. C. F. Schiller, and Friedrich Hölderlin in generational context, noting that they reflected a Sturm und Drang generational consciousness that was adopted by subsequent generations as part of their own identity.

Like Goethe, Victor Hugo inspired a generation. His novel *Les Misérables* is supposed to have presented the first portrait of student revolutionary leaders, which became a universal type taken by subsequent student movements as models for action and style of dress. Elser describes scenes of the 1830 French bohemian generation waiting for hours to see a new play by Hugo, and emphasizes the importance of Hugo's fiction in the development of this generation's conception of itself.

In contrast to Goethe and Hugo's novels, Ivan Sergeyevich Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons* (1862) both embodied the complaints of the Russian nihilist generation and inspired individuals to act like the characters. The relationship of literature and generations continued to be important, but it changed with time. This first set of modern generations in the nineteenth century used literature as a model for their action, thoughts, and behavior.

Generational theories. As generations became identified with revolution and change, in a separate arena theories developed to explain the movement of history by identifying generations. During the nineteenth century, demographers, philosophers, and French historians took up the idea of the generation to categorize humanity, to explain larger questions of society, and to understand the impact of political changes. Auguste Comte used generations to study the "velocity" of human evolution. John Stuart Mill built on Comte's work, and also devoted a few pages to understanding the empirical laws by which society changes with each age. Émile Durkheim examined the influence of generations in times of accelerated change, particularly as men moved to urban areas, where they were less bound by traditions. Justin Dromel sought to organize French history in generational groupings, although he later abandoned the genealogical approach to the idea of collective identity. Other nineteenth-century generationists include Antoine Cournot, Leopold von Ranke, Giuseppe Ferrari, Gustav Rümelin, Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Pinder, and Julius Peterson. But it was not until the early twentieth century that modern generational theories were developed. The two major twentieth-century theorists, who sought to understand the nature of the historical or social generation, were the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and the Austrian-born German sociologist Karl Mannheim. They developed notions of generation that are still used by scholars today.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The twentieth century also saw a change in emphasis within generations themselves. Where in the nineteenth century generations had comprised university students and young bohemian intellectuals struggling to change the culture and institutions of their society, the twentieth century saw generational identity developing around the events of war itself. For many twentieth-century generations, their identity would be forever linked with blood, death, and destruction. The World War I generation, in many ways, became the

model for the characteristics and qualities of a war generation.

World War I. Erich Maria Remarque is the most widely read World War I generationalist. His novel *All Quiet on the Western Front* describes the war and how deeply it affected his generation. Unlike the older generations at the front, with careers and lives to return to after the war, his generation had just graduated from high school, had not begun careers, and had not married or started families. Just when his generation entered the world of adults, they marched off to fight the war. They knew nothing but war. In his novel, Remarque wonders how they will ever fit back into society. He contrasts his generation with the schoolteachers who preached to them of the honor and glory of war—Remarque’s generation had believed their teachers and felt betrayed. His parents and grandparents’ generations were no better than the schoolteachers; they sat at home gossiping about the war, seeing it more as a chess game than as the reality Remarque’s generation experienced. Finally, Remarque describes the generation too young to fight as strong and confident, unblemished by war, which has crippled and worn out his own generation.

A number of scholars, including Robert Wohl, Paul Fussell, Samuel Hynes, and Eric Leeds, have looked at this World War I generation. The genera-

tion itself produced many novels and memoirs, including Robert Graves’s *Goodbye to All That*, Vera Brittain’s *Testament of Youth*, Edmund Blunden’s *Undertones of War*, Irene Rathbone’s *We That Were Young*, and R. C. Sherriff’s *Journey’s End*. Compared to the nineteenth-century generations, which used literature as a battle cry, the war generation used literature as a healing process for their wounds. Instead of looking to others for models, they wrote stories of their own war experiences. Their literature solidified their identity as a generation.

Out of the aftermath of World War I, Hitler and Mussolini, who both identified themselves as part of the war generation, used the fuel of their broken generation to embark upon their rise to power. The Hitler Youth Movement in Nazi Germany created an institutional identity for a new generation of youth. In this way, generational identity became a tool for military might. One could say that the British had tried this earlier in the century, after they realized they had been unprepared for the Boer War. They started the Boy Scouts to produce men who were fit and healthy for military service in the future. By the 1930s, generational identity was being used as an institutional tool of political control in both Germany and Italy. Literature also played a role in the formation of generations in fascist Europe, in the form of propaganda promoting appropriate behavior and views.

This institutional generation faced reconstruction of generational identity upon Germany's defeat in World War II. Alexander von Plato, Dagmar Reese, and Michael Buddrus have written about the difficulty of this transition in a collection of essays edited by Mark Roseman entitled *Generations in Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770–1968*.

World War II. World War II produced identifiable generations associated with resistance, occupation, allies, and Holocaust survivors. In identifying one's own generation age was less important than the activities one was involved in, and the generational aspect played less of a role than in previous instances. And yet, views on politics and visions of what the postwar world should look like were deeply colored by one's generational perspective. Henry Rousso describes this phenomenon in *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*. Angela Dalle Vacche also describes a generational progression of visions of Italy's past in *The Body in the Mirror: Shapes of History in Italian Cinema*. Neither book foregrounds generations as the motivation behind changes in history, but both recognize that with each generation new influences arise and a rewriting of history takes place. In some way, these books mimic the place generation holds in the post–World War II era. No longer the

individuals central focus, as in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the concept of generation is nevertheless still present.

The 1960s marked a resurgence of generational identity and conflict in Europe and America. The 1970s found scholars once again interested in writing about generations, both describing current events as well as investigating past generations. Like the nineteenth-century student movements, the May 1968 student rebellion in Paris and the other student movements throughout Europe and the United States signaled a return to the activist university population, out to change the institutions and culture of society. A great deal has been written on the subject. Ronald Fraser's *1968: A Student Generation in Revolt*, using interviews with participants in the 1968 revolts as a basis, compares the rebellion in six countries: the United States, West Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and Northern Ireland. Esler and Lewis Feuer also devote chapters to the 1968 student uprisings in their studies of student movements. In relationship to literature, scholar John Hazlett sees the generation as writing their autobiographies and forming their generational identity in the midst of the events themselves, a process he traces in *My Generation: Collective Autobiography and Identity Politics*.

In the late twentieth century the notion of generational identity was embraced by American adver-

tisers, who targeted baby boomers and generation X, for example, in their ad campaigns. But unlike earlier generations, centered around activist activities or around war and other types of catastrophic events, these generations were centered around consumerism and economics. In “The ‘Generation of 1989’: A New Political Generation?” Claus Leggewie demonstrates the difficulties of discussing these generations in the terms used to describe earlier generations.

Leggewie discusses the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which should have been a marker of identity for a new generation of youth. The participants, however, were well established, middle-aged professionals who, instead of coming from a common socioeconomic background, represented all kinds of social movements, the church, the governing classes, and artistic and intellectual groups. If they were a generation in the previously accepted sense, this group might be called the “eighty-niners,” but they do not fit the traditional profile of youth in conflict and revolution. So, instead of looking at the cohort that toppled the wall, Leggewie turns his attention to the youth in 1989, to see if he can fit them into the category of generation. Leggewie’s concentration on youth points to the self-inflicted inflexibility felt by those using generation as a category. The youth of 1989 were not active participants, but instead experienced the events as a “community of TV consumers.” No longer conflict or war generations, the new generations are defined by their consumerism. This change in orientation in how generations are defined can be seen particularly in studies of the baby boomers and generation X.

APPLICABILITY BY SOCIAL CLASS AND GENDER

Robert Wohl, in *The Generation of 1914*, sets out the three elements necessary for a historical generation: age, common experiences, and self-conscious identity as part of a generation. Neither social class nor gender is included in this or any other of the standard definitions of generation. Yet the well-known generational studies have concentrated on upper-middle-class, educated male youth during particular times of cultural and political societal change. Charles Rosen’s *The Romantic Generation* provides an example. In his preface, Rosen explains that he excludes women composers from his study because their work and their notoriety are not sufficiently up to the standards of the more well known men composers of the 1820s and 1830s.

Generational histories of war have also focused primarily on men. War brings specific generational identity not merely to those who fight in the battles, but to those who are children during the war, those who care for the combatants, and those who wait, worry, and pray for the safe return of loved ones. Lynne Hanley’s *Writing War: Fiction, Gender, and Memory* explores this theme. Parents, grandparents, and children too young to participate all have experiences, specific to the historical period, that could be categorized from a generational perspective. Too often, though, only the soldiers have been studied.

Feminist scholars have not readily used the generational structure either. Jennifer E. Milligan’s *The Forgotten Generation: French Women Writers of the Interwar Period* presents one example. Her study looks at women writing during the interwar period, regardless of age, to reinscribe them into history. One of her goals is to provide the missing links of collective identity and continuity in women’s writings. But her work does not look at a group of women of a particular age, experience, or self-consciousness. Rather she focuses on the writings of women during a period of time, without regard to their historical generational identity. Mark Roseman’s 1995 collection *Generations in Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770–1968*, includes two essays specifically on women and generation, as well as essays on Jewish political generational identity, and working-class generational identity. While these essays constitute a good beginning, more studies of generational identity in a myriad of groups are needed to understand better the relationship between class, gender, and generational group formation.

FAMILY-BASED BIOLOGICAL GENERATIONS AS HISTORICAL

For a long time, historians felt that the biological categories of parent, child, and grandchild were ahistorical. Generational histories could not be based on these categories, because no definitive dates existed for clumping people together. Every day a new child is born, making it impossible to distinguish between one historical generation and the next.

And yet, the story of the family within a historical framework has provided a great deal of interest, especially in the form of memoirs and novels. These stories take intergenerational experiences as their focus, shedding light onto larger, historical generations. These types of works provide the opportunity to view generations without focusing on the

male elite of society. In fact, many of the most prominent works of this kind have focused on the relationships between mother, daughter, and granddaughter. The most famous of these is American novelist Amy Tan's *The Joy Luck Club* (1989). European examples also exist. British writer Vera Brittain's *Honourable Estate* (1936) documented in fictional form three generations of her family and the place of women in society—in the suffrage movement, in marriage, in politics, and in war. Her novel *Born 1925: A Novel of Youth* (1948) explores the relationship between a World War I veteran who began as a pacifist with the next generation's desire to participate in World War II. Marianne Fredriksson's

novel *Hanna's Daughters: A Novel of Three Generations* (1998) spans one hundred years of Scandinavian history and looks at the relationship of mother, daughter, and granddaughter in terms of the interrelationship of choices and opportunities for each.

Another interesting development in generational studies comes from Holocaust scholars, who use the family-based biological category of generation to understand the impact of the Holocaust survivors' experiences on their children and grandchildren. In this way, generational studies look beyond the generation that experienced events firsthand to see what impact their memoirs and experiences have on the next generations.

SOCIAL HISTORY: APPROACHES TO GENERATION

Social historians tend to rely on Karl Mannheim and José Ortega's concepts of generation as the basis for their work. These early-twentieth-century theorists tried to determine the parameters of what makes up a generation. Building on their work, Alan Spitzer, Robert Wohl, Anthony Esler, Lewis Feuer, and Hans Jaeger are among scholars who have investigated the concept of generation. Anthony Esler has quantitatively done the most work on generation, covering a wide variety of subjects, including an introductory history to the concept. Spitzer's "The Historical Problem of Generations," and Jaeger's "Generations in History: Reflections on a Controversial Concept" survey the work on historical generations, and are critical to understanding generation scholarship. Both pieces look at Mannheim and Ortega's theories in the context of other studies on generations.

Robert Wohl and Alan Spitzer both conducted studies on specific generations that led to a deeper exploration into the meaning and theory of generation. In particular, Robert Wohl's work looks at the development of the concept of generation in theoretical terms, and includes detailed chapters on Ortega and Mannheim. Anthony Esler and Lewis Feuer have each written substantial survey works on student and youth generations over the last two hundred years.

OTHER DISCIPLINES AND APPROACHES TO GENERATIONS

Generational historians look at groups of people born around the same time who experienced similar events and circumstances that informed a generational consciousness. But, as this essay points out, the notion of generation has been used in other ways as well, both by historians and in other disciplines.

Artistic and literary scholars have often used the term "generation" when describing a particular art or literary movement—usually referring to a group of friends or people that knew each other. Their point is to confine their study to those who created a particular genre of art. Generation is a structure that helps them define the parameters of their project. Although literary and artistic groups are found throughout both the modern and pre-modern periods, these twentieth-century scholars have conceived of such groups within a generational context.

Samuel Hynes's *The Auden Generation* depicts a group of friends that developed a prominent British literary movement during the 1930s. Hynes is not

concerned with depicting a larger historical generation (such as the war generation) nor is he concerned with intergenerational relationships within the individuals' families. Yet for Hynes the concept of generation is important in defining his project. He begins by defining a literary generation born within a particular range of years (between 1900–1914), who developed with a particular consciousness and in particular circumstances. Although his project aims to better understand English culture during the 1930s, he confines his study to this small group.

Charles Rosen's *The Romantic Generation* presents examples in the field of music. He studies the music of composers whose style was defined in the 1820s and 1830s, including Frédéric Chopin, Franz Liszt, Hector Berlioz, Felix Mendelssohn, and Robert Schumann. He suggests that after Beethoven's death in 1827, this new generation gained a sense of freedom from his shadow. Rosen deliberately excludes

Giuseppe Verdi and Richard Wagner, because their musical style became fully developed in the 1840s, rather than in the 1820s and 1830s. He seeks to understand how these composers' music is bound to the literature and science of their time.

Leon Edel's *Bloomsbury: A House of Lions* is a biography of the Bloomsbury group, which included Virginia Woolf, Leonard Woolf, Clive Bell, Virginia's sister Vanessa Bell, Lytton Strachey, John Maynard Keynes, Duncan Grant, and Roger Fry. Although Edel never identifies this group as a generation, his work parallels the generational studies of Rosen and Hynes. He presents a group of artists (some family-related) who worked within the same cultural context, were born around the same period, and grew up under the same circumstances. Thus, Edel looks at the Bloomsbury group in what might be called a generational perspective.

Finally, Gertrude Stein's "Lost Generation" in 1920s Paris is an interesting case. The famous label is supposed to identify a generation lost because of their experiences in World War I. However, a number of the most prominent members of this Lost Generation never actually fought in the war. They might more appropriately be called the "expatriate generation." *Sylvia Beach and the Lost Generation: A History of Literary Paris in the Twenties and Thirties* by Noel Riley Fitch chronicles the world surrounding Shakespeare and Company, Beach's English bookstore and lending library located in Paris. Like Edel, Hynes, and Rosen, Fitch sets out to paint a portrait of a group of artists, including Ernest Hemingway, William Carlos Williams, James Joyce, and Ezra Pound.

Sociologists and other social scientists study generations as well. In both his 1951 dissertation, *The Cohort Approach*, and his 1965 essay, *The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change*, Norman Ryder was the first to substitute the word "cohort" for generations. Usually using birth-years as a marker, Ryder pointed out in his essay that a cohort can be defined by an infinite number of markers, such as marriage

year, graduation year, or even all those who published a novel in a particular year or set of years. He discarded the notion of a collective generational self-consciousness, pointing to the homogeneity within a cohort group. Yet he believed that cohorts powered social change. Cohorts are determined by temporal, rather than qualitative, subjective data. In 1997 Melissa A. Hardy compiled a series of sociological essays, *Studying Aging and Social Change*, beginning with classic essays by Mannheim and Ryder, and including later developments in specific sociological areas of cohort analysis, aging, and social change.

Other disciplines that use the concept of generations are anthropology and gerontology. The life-course approach focuses on shared experiences at particular stages in life. Life-course scholars focus on all stages of life, rather than the narrow focus on youth often taken by generation scholars. Life-course scholars often, but not exclusively, use a biographical approach to their subjects. Age-groups and age-systems are a related area of study used by sociologists, anthropologists, gerontologists, and other scholars. An example of such studies is *The Changing Contract across Generations* (1993), edited by V. L. Bengtson and W. A. Achenbaum.

CONCLUSION

Generational studies tend to track change—whether within families, over long historical periods in the form of statistics, in small intimate groups, or in large social groups. Change is often created by the generation's reaction to larger events that have changed their circumstances within society. Generations can be active artistic and political movements, or they can be passive or consumer groups. What they have in common is that they alert us to some kind of change. They are like barometers measuring the pressure of change on society, yet they also exert pressure, influencing the particular changes a society makes in its institutions and culture.

See also other articles in this section.

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Section 16



SEXUALITY

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SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND SEXUAL MORALITY



Lisa Z. Sigel

Two conflicting beliefs dominate discussions about sexuality. On the one hand, people think sexuality is innate and unchanging. On the other hand, many believe that Freud's era brought sexual diversity. Neither is in fact true. Although sexuality might appear inherent, historians have shown that it, like most aspects of human life, has developed over time. Sexual behaviors, orientations, and identities and even the understanding of the fundamentals of physiology have been shaped and molded by historical factors. Rather than being intrinsic to the individual, sexuality is affected by everything from food production and family systems to social class and psychological theories. In turn, rather than being segregated into a small and private area of people's lives, sexuality has shaped historical processes from systems of governance to styles of worship.

In excavating these patterns, historians have confronted the second misconception that dominates popular perceptions about sexuality. Many people believe that men worked, women stayed home, and a combination of "nature" and the church constrained sexual behaviors until the 1960s. Sexual diversity, including single motherhood, sexual experimentation, and homosexuality, supposedly began in the twentieth century. This cluster of beliefs formed a progressing narrative from repression to liberation that Michel Foucault decisively undermined in his series on sexuality. To help understand the past on its own terms, historians demonstrated that sexuality is neither static nor easily influenced. The reciprocal process between large social forces and the formation of the individual at his or her most basic level makes the history of sexuality particularly important to social historians who try to understand the relationship between individual choice and broad social change.

To document sexuality in the past, historians have grappled with gaps in the sources and learned to use sources in new ways. Traditional sources, like government documents, newspapers, and memoirs, tend to say little about sexual practices. In spite of the centrality of sexuality to people's lives, few individuals

wrote about their sexual desires or sexual activities, and those who did often fit their experiences into pre-existing narratives about temptation, love, or adventure. In addition the proportionally small category of literate people who left accounts of their lives, sexual or otherwise, were overwhelmingly from the aristocracy or bourgeoisie, which makes their documents exceptional rather than representative. The literacy campaigns of the nineteenth century did not focus on individual self-expression. When working-class people began to write their own stories, few wrote their sexual stories in any detail, and even fewer disregarded the morality campaigns that made sexual acts something to regret. Thus memoirs and autobiographies reveal little about sexuality for the majority of the population. Historians have had to resourcefully overcome these gaps in the sources.

Historians have augmented firsthand accounts with legal codes, criminal records, literature, art, medical tracts, and psychiatric testimonies. When using such sources, historians learned to read them as carefully constructed narratives that reveal as much about social expectations and prejudice as actual behaviors. Thus women who abandoned their children at foundling homes told careful stories of their own sexual experiences to fit with the demands of charity. Few bragged about their sexual exploits, instead relying on stories of seduction and abandonment. Decoding such information offers hints rather than certainties about people's lives. While social historians have learned a great deal about how Europeans saw themselves, their bodies, and their sexual partners, correlating thought with deed and belief with practice has proven difficult. Charting the history of sexuality is no easy task, and despite the proliferation of fascinating accounts, much work remains.

THE RENAISSANCE

One of the first findings people need to confront about the history of sexuality is the frequently over-

looked tie between sexuality and reproduction. Because sexual reproduction in the twentieth century was a choice and generally a positive choice at that, the lack of choice makes sexuality in the premodern world look a bit dismal. The limits on birth control and abortion made sexual intercourse fraught with economic and social consequences. The differences among European societies are the second issue that deserves consideration. Region, religion, social class, and urban or rural settings all effect patterns of sexual morality and behaviors and make universal generalizations impossible. Nonetheless, some broad patterns are discernable, and after the shock of sexual limitations, the ways that sexuality worked in European society before the twentieth century seem flexible, even though the constraints that influenced individuals and society were different than those operating in the twentieth century.

The church, the family, and the community were the three main regulators of sexual morality in the premodern world. The Catholic Church before the Reformation provided a theological basis for sexual standards across western Europe, even if the interpretation and implementation of theology varied from region to region. The standards set by the church included celibacy and sex within marriage. St. Paul, in his famous injunction that “it is better to marry than to burn,” provided an illustration of the Catholic model of sexuality. Christian society saw sexuality as a powerful force that needed to be eliminated or, if that was unfeasible, channeled into marital procreation. Although priests continued to marry and have concubines until the eleventh century, by the Renaissance the church had developed a more uniform standard of sexual restriction.

In practice the family and the community saw to much of the informal and daily policing of sexual behaviors, working to maintain economic and social stability. The community regulated premarital and extramarital intercourse as well as nonprocreative intercourse, like bestiality and homosexuality. Because most Europeans lived in agricultural communities and depended for their livelihoods on the land—a limited and often unpredictable resource—they tended to delay marriage, a pattern which encouraged the curtailment of sexual activity generally. Women experienced menarche or onset of menses in their late teens, and the community further shortened their procreative years by not marrying them off until their mid-twenties. Most women went through menopause in their early forties, creating a window of roughly a decade and a half of fertility. Women spaced their reproduction through prolonged lactation after childbirth, herbal remedies, and mechanical devices.

By limiting reproduction, families sought to conserve their resources and thus to guarantee generational stability. But reproduction remained critical to the agricultural community. Thus premarital sexuality was tolerated in many areas when it was clearly “premarital.” Often the community allowed couples some sexual interactions once a marital contract or promise was established. In some regions in Germany and the Low Countries, a couple married only when the woman proved her fertility by becoming pregnant. The lack of other economic options guaranteed that the suitor would fulfill his promise and honor his implicit contract.

The demands of survival in closely knit agricultural communities encouraged careful regulation of other sexual practices as well. The charivari, for example, disciplined extramarital affairs. Bands of young men paraded through the streets, stopped at the houses of cuckolds or May-December marriages, and demanded payment in coin. The community called attention to sexual deviance and insisted on sexual standards and sexual reform. The charivari also provided young men yet unable to marry with an outlet for their resentments against those who already enjoyed sexual relations.

Often the church and community worked together to police sexual morality. Although medieval legends attributed the origins of the Danish royal family to the sexual congress of a farm girl and a wild bear, by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries such legends of human-animal copulation, no longer suggestive of strength and virility, rapidly went out of favor. The church proclaimed bestiality a sin against nature, and the community responded with surveillance and turned perpetrators over to religious and state authorities. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Sweden cases of bestiality accounted for 25 to 35 percent of capital punishments, and even more men were sentenced to flogging, hard labor, and church penalties. Because herding was a young boy’s occupation and milking was the labor of women, the Swedish community grew wary of interactions between adult men and animals, often watching at chinks in the barn and examining men’s clothes for evidence of inappropriate animal matter. Families, servants, and friends were so horrified at finding perpetrators that they experienced fits and seizures and felt polluted. Wives of bestial men worried that they would give birth to monsters, and even the perpetrators believed they needed to practice coitus interruptus lest their sperm impregnate animals. Although the church set the doctrine, the community and the family regulated the individual.

In eastern Europe a similar cooperation between the church, the state, and the community controlled

sexuality. Slavs did not become Christian until much later than western Europeans, but by the Renaissance paganism had been curtailed, at least on the surface, in eastern Europe. The Orthodox Church, which dominated a large part of eastern Europe, concurred with the Catholic Church in a number of important aspects of its conception of sexuality. Virginity and abstinence were favored in both variants of Christianity, though Orthodox religion stressed abstinence even within marriage. While Slavs recognized the relationship between intercourse and conception, they separated sexual desire, which came from the devil, from procreation, which was a blessing from God. Sexual impulses came from outside humanity and only brought evil to the individual and the community. In contrast, western Europe saw a rise of romantic and courtly love from the twelfth century onward that legitimated sexual impulses. Slavs tended not to connect love with sexual desire. Instead love remained tied to generosity rather than physicality, at least until the importation of Western culture by Peter the Great. However, the apparent harshness of these beliefs was tempered by a greater pragmatism than in the West. Orthodox theology judged on the basis of actions rather than thoughts, allowing individuals a less stringent standard of observance. Furthermore, while ideals for behavior remained high, expectations of observance re-

mained low. Orthodox priests could marry even though celibacy remained the ideal.

In Mediterranean cities the traditional protectors of sexual morality, most notably the family, the community, and the peer group, were weakened by urban anonymity, economic opportunities, and population change. City life offered more room for sexual variation than did life in the village. Population losses from the plague encouraged the migration of the young with their unruly desires to urban areas, where they encountered a proliferation of prostitutes, courtesans, slaves, and servants and opportunities for seduction, fornication, and gratification of homosexual desire. These sexual options particularly benefited young noblemen, who could gratify their sexual desires down the social hierarchy with little interference. Although a woman could use sexuality as a way to influence her life course by copulating with a man on the understanding that it would cement their future marriage, the repercussions of the loss of virginity if such a method failed made the strategy quite dangerous.

Women were often victims of circumstances and status. Postpubescent women had far fewer opportunities than their male coevals, because society believed they should be daughters, wives, or widows, though even the last carried a certain instability. The

other option for those whose families could afford it was joining a nunnery. That route did not always guarantee an end to sexual intercourse, as cases of nuns bearing children demonstrate. But even without actual intercourse the rhetoric of the church made nuns brides of Christ and infused spiritual life with sexual meanings. Life in the nunnery thus mirrored life outside the nunnery in its understanding of women as sexual creatures, even though it granted them a greater opportunity for autonomy. In the secular world marriage and the family continued as the

central institutions upholding social stability, and city governments stepped in to guarantee the smooth functioning of those institutions. In cases of rape, seduction, and fornication, for example, the Venetian government often demanded that the perpetrator supply the woman's dowry and marry her or serve time in jail. The government assured that sexually active women did not become a burden on society by guaranteeing them a place within the institution of marriage. While urbanization and trade offered more opportunities for sexual congress, the ideals of marriage

and family as the central organizing principles that guaranteed stability remained intact.

Paradoxically, the Protestant Reformation ended the sacrament of marriage but elevated the importance of marriage within society. Protestant theologians argued that celibacy brought hypocrisy rather than spiritual enlightenment and that all should marry, including clerics. Conflicts over sexuality and gender formed an important component of Protestant criticism of the Catholic Church. Their attacks on Catholicism emphasized the irregularities of contemporary moral life and encouraged the purification of society. Clerics railed against prostitution and in many places expelled prostitutes for the frequency of their sinning, while they generally only fined their clients. The metaphor of the whore as a symbol of evil spread beyond women, and the pope became known as the arch-whore in antipapal polemics. In these polemics sexual irregularities and sexual chaos caused by the inappropriate insistence on celibacy in the Catholic Church were contrasted with proper Protestant sexuality regulated by the family. In regions that became Protestant, the end of the monastery, priesthood, and nunnery brought the reintegration of the spiritual into the familial world.

The opportunities for female autonomy and asexuality guaranteed by the nunnery ceased in the Protestant world and diminished even in the Catholic world, which tightened the constraints around nuns in reaction to the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation insisted that all women existed within a sexual domain and that all should be placed under the hierarchy of the family. In the realm of symbols, the Protestants deemphasized the Virgin Mary, who had allowed a place for the mysteries of sexuality to receive a measure of contemplation, and, their suppression of the cults of both male and female saints—whose sexual renunciation, even if fictive, had often been a facet of their spiritual ascension—diminished the variety of available religious symbols. By minimizing Mary's place in theological discussions, removing the saints from contemplation, and eliminating the option of separate, celibate life as a spiritual path, Protestant theologians left procreative, marital sexuality as the most viable model for synthesizing spirituality with sexuality.

While mainstream Protestant thought used rhetoric about sexuality to distinguish itself from Catholicism, it maintained a sexual morality linked to the family and community. Familial control of sexuality characterized premodern social regulation across the Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant worlds. Even in rapidly changing urban environments, the family and community were the central institutions impos-

ing sexual morality. The church and government reinforced the family and community in the maintenance of sexual stability even though religion and systems of governance varied from region to region. The insistence on stability implies a recognition that sexuality could bring economic, cultural, and social chaos. The sheer force and power attributed to sexuality as a disruptive agent demonstrates its centrality to the Renaissance world.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Although the Enlightenment questioned established belief in the area of sexuality, the period experienced a tightening of legislation and a criminal crackdown on perceived deviance in sexual and gender roles. For example, the eighteenth century saw a reaction against

sodomite practices. In the Dutch Republic a total of forty-four executions took place between 1233 and 1729, but roughly two hundred executions were carried out between 1729 and 1803. The most enlightened areas, including France, Britain, and the Netherlands, experienced the harshest administration of such laws.

Historians have debated the causes of the criminalization of sexual deviants and the relationship between sexual conservatism and Enlightenment thought. In general they tie changes in enforcement of sexual norms to the increased reliance on biology and science, on the ways that sexuality stood in for discussions of traditional authority (such as in the attribution of sexual immoralities to authorities of the *ancien régime*), and on new forms of gender differentiation. The application of reason to human behavior was supposed to clarify and expose where human nature ended and cultural forms began, allowing society to strip away those perversions that impeded its progress. Instead of presenting firm conclusions, the Enlightenment encouraged European society to question. The church's relationship to sexuality, the sanctity of marriage, and the relationship between the sexes could no longer be accepted as given, but all became subject to critical inquiry. As the Enlightenment stripped away the legitimacy of old authorities, it enthroned new ones, such as reason, nature, freedom, and the individual, that shaped in both constructive and destructive ways people's sexual options.

Most historians see the Enlightenment as a time when gender and sexual norms underwent radical revisions. Thomas Laqueur has shown that before the eighteenth century biological sexuality was conceptualized as a matter of degree. During the Enlightenment the sexes became antithetical, and gender became wedded to biological sex. In medical texts and anatomical drawings female genitalia began to look distinct from male genitals rather than as internal versions of male organs. Along with their new look, female genitals gained their own nomenclature, like ovary and vagina, rather than derivatives from male organs, like stones and shafts. The egg became a miniature version of the female, passive, waiting, and monogamous, while sperm became the active agent of reproduction. Science ceased to see maleness and femaleness as related in a hierarchy of perfectability and instead began to examine them as wedded to an incontrovertible biology. Women could not become men through the sudden descent of a penis because women and men were constitutionally different from the ovaries outward.

As science differentiated male from female on the basis of biology, social philosophers like Jean-

Jacques Rousseau and Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin emphasized the innate differences between the sexes. These authors overturned the traditional ideas that women were the more lusty partners and instead emphasized their maternal urges. Both writers argued that social fripperies and sexual intrigues led women astray, although their conclusions about how to provide women with a meaningful role in society differed. Wollstonecraft put forth a program of education for women that would allow women to develop their potential outside of sexuality. If given the chance, women could put aside coquetry and vanity and contribute to a sound home and a sounder society. Rousseau, on the other hand, believed that women should stay in the home and follow their maternal impulses. Education would harm women and lead society astray. As this example demonstrates, Enlightenment thought did not provide a single, clear line on sexuality or procreation but provided an impetus for debate and argument.

These debates, which took place in reading groups or clubs and through essay prizes (a common Enlightenment convention), centered on ways to differentiate the natural sexual drive from sensuality. Essay prizes encouraged extended discussions on topics like masturbation (1785), sexual control (1788), the ruination of servants (1790), and celibacy (1791), the last apparently funded by the king of England. And as Isabel V. Hull pointed out, the reading groups, clubs, and lodges that formed the foundation of a German civil society during the Enlightenment took sexuality seriously as an avenue for thought. Extended explorations of the "normal" preoccupied these groups, and the main concerns of citizenship, adulthood, character, and marriage overlapped with the issue of sexual maturity, potency, and restraint. Even the issues of abnormality, in particular masturbation and infanticide, became grounds by which to differentiate the positive effects of marital procreation from the sexual degeneracy associated with absolutist and aristocratic ruin. The discussion and elaboration of sexual standards thus played a pivotal role in the formation of a German civil society.

In France the relationship between sexuality and politics received even greater scrutiny. The Enlightenment's questioning of tradition opened clerical, aristocratic, and absolutist norms to debate. European aristocratic society was more sexually permissive than other classes. Extramarital affairs, concubinage, sexual clubs, intellectual salons, early marriage, and early widowhood allowed both male and female aristocrats a great deal of leeway for sexual dalliances. Enlightenment thinkers used those pleasures as a way to delegitimize traditional authority by focusing on the

themes of corruption, profligacy, and the pitfalls of the social hierarchy. The disavowal of tradition, however, did not function just as a thinly veiled class-based attack on aristocratic behavior and privilege. In fact, the aristocracy who benefited sexually from their social privileges were often at the forefront of Enlightenment intellectual life, and thus party to the process of defining new forms of liberty. Aristocratic women provided the philosophes with financial, political, and social support and used their salons to popularize radical ideas and to encourage intellectual life. The philosophes' writings on sexuality took multiple forms, including attacks on religion and the sexual profligacy of clerics, mockery of the monarch's sexual peccadilloes, philosophic inquiries into the nature of sexuality, and anticlerical and antimonarchal pornography, which encouraged rethinking traditional sources of authority over sexuality. The French government saw the implicit threat in these philosophic and sexual writings and responded by outlawing them. Philosophes and pornographers were drawn closer together as they sought to escape prosecution and to earn profits from their writings. The combination of high political philosophy and low pornographic innuendo became a powerful way of stirring public opinion and fomenting change.

The changes inspired by such works took numerous directions. The Enlightenment encouraged freethinking, as the example of the English radical Richard Carlile demonstrates. Carlile advocated birth control so both men and women could engage in sexual intercourse and pleasure without fear. On the other hand, the marquis de Sade took liberty and freethinking to its most radical conclusions. His version of untrammelled liberty in sexuality meant that the pursuit of pleasures and liberties should allow no barriers, including the recognition of the personhood of others. The emphasis on reason and freethinking allowed people to reconsider the impact of sexuality on the individual outside of the traditional restraints of family, the church, and the community; from this starting-point, individuals arrived at radically different conclusions.

Freethinking in matters of sexuality and politics overlapped in low circles as well as in the salon. John Gillis has demonstrated that plebeians followed a pattern of informal marriage that received legitimacy from Enlightenment debates. Elites institutionalized marriage in the eighteenth century and attempted to impose new standards of betrothal, ceremonies, and bastardy on English society. However, plebeians resisted this imposition, and between the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century informal marriages reached new heights. In resisting marriage

fees and clerical control over marriage, individuals avoided religious and political control over sexuality. They wedded and bedded according to their own dictates. Informal marriage and equally informal divorce were popular practices that Enlightenment thinkers followed rather than initiated. In advocating individual freedom to marry and divorce based solely on affection, Enlightenment and revolutionary thinkers like Thomas Paine articulated patterns of sexual freethinking already in place.

Paine justified his marital freethinking and his own de facto divorce with the model of Native American practices. The establishment of empires after the Age of Discovery allowed the European world much greater contact, however unequal, with regions throughout the Atlantic world and across the globe. The vast cultural differences between Europe and other regions gave rise to speculation on the state of nature, and many Europeans contrasted their own decadent society with the supposedly more primitive and natural societies abroad. European philosophes used travel narratives, like Denis Diderot's *Supplément au voyage de Bougainville* (written 1772, published 1796), and their own fantastical portrayals to discuss sexuality in nature as a way to undercut cultural corruption in Europe. European projections about Polynesian, Amerindian, and Turkish sexuality offered utopian models of sexuality without corruption. However, it is important to recognize that "utopia" means no where, and these ideas spoke more to a rejection of European norms than to any recording of sexual practices elsewhere. Europe's fixation on Turkish sexuality and the pleasures of the harem, for example, did little to elucidate day-to-day life within the harem. Instead, such accounts provided ways to think about the pleasures and dangers of sexual variation, like anal sexuality, within an absolutist society, where men ruled and women submitted. The range of places explored in such narratives speaks to the wide-ranging interactions that Europe had with the rest of the world in the eighteenth century. While in many cases Europeans argued for toleration and admiration for the "noble savage," they also exported their beliefs about the sodomite, the tribade, polygamy, and polyandry to the areas they explored and colonized. In North American areas where Europeans gained dominance, practices such as polygamy were outlawed, and the berdache was persecuted.

The Enlightenment left numerous contradictions in European society around the issue of sexuality. While it secularized issues of gender and sexuality, in essence delegitimizing religious authority over them, it also laid the groundwork for state control of such matters. It shifted rather than eliminated social con-

trol over sexuality. Many of the progressive impulses of the Enlightenment, like pleas for tolerance, helped root out older patterns of prejudice, like the illegality of sexual relations between Jews and Christians. But Enlightenment thinkers also contributed to new stereotypes, like the “noble savage” and the amorous Turk. Such stereotypes carried great weight and influenced social and political relationships between Europeans and other peoples. The triumph of science and the scientific method associated with both the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment offered new ways to envision sexuality and sexual biology and in the long term contributed to improved sexual health. However, the rise of science also endowed biology with a new importance that made male and female inextricably different. This turn to biology to explain the world allowed continuing inequalities on the basis of sex. These enduring contradictions set the stage for future conflicts between sexual morality, sexual deviance, and sexual behaviors.

THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY

As a result of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Code, which affected much of the Continent, replaced laws on sodomy with laws on public indecency and the corruption of minors. These laws institutionalized the distinction between private home, ruled by the father, and the public spaces, ruled by the state. While previous legislation made little distinction between public and private spaces, the new laws focused on the state’s role in encouraging marriage and propagation. The more liberal-sounding laws did not decriminalize sodomy or other acts of sexual deviance. Instead, they shifted the rhetoric of prosecution from sin to antisocial behavior. Because much homosexual activity took place in parks, bathrooms, and other public places, the new laws about public indecency, exhibitionism, and corruption of minors became a way to control and penalize homosexual acts and practices. Although most European states ceased to execute individuals for acts of sodomy, the nineteenth century remained a period of repression for same-sex desires.

After the French Revolution legislation regarding adultery tightened. After the initial liberalization of laws between 1789 and 1795 allowed the redefinition of marriage as a civil contract, the Napoleonic Code of 1804 reintroduced a sexual double standard. Divorce legislation instituted during the high point of the French Revolution insisted on equality and freedom and allowed both men and women to sue for divorce on the basis of incompatibility or moral of-

fenses. However, the Napoleonic Code, while maintaining the secular state of marriage, allowed a man to sue on the basis of adultery but a woman to sue only if her husband committed adultery in the marital household. A man’s sexual irregularities occurred because of his perpetual quest for freedom according to the new formulation, but a woman’s adultery negated her essential maternal qualities as constituted by Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau.

A similar double standard prevailed across Germany with regard to female sexuality. A Prussian decree of 1854 insisted that any woman who had sexual relations with a married man forfeited claims to paternity and support. Both Prussian and French legislators, justifying changes in laws surrounding divorce and adultery, argued that women’s sexual infidelity disrupted the public realm. Demands for order in the public realm reinforced the sexual subservience of women in the private realm. For both sodomy and adultery, the period of questioning and liberalization during the Enlightenment that culminated in the French Revolution gave way to a later reactionary regime that intended to suppress these supposed disorders of sexuality and gender. As part of this reaction, nineteenth-century society invented a tradition of continuity even though patterns of regulation, beliefs about sexuality, and sexual behaviors had changed. By linking sexuality to fictive traditions, nineteenth-century society developed a way of thinking about sexuality that seemed universal, intrinsic, and natural.

As part of the new natural order, new marital ideals developed. In the new model man ruled the household as the representative of reason, and woman submitted as appropriate for emotion. The two spheres joined through affection, compassion, and mutuality. The rise of the compassionate marriage among the middle classes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought new expectations to marital intercourse. No longer was intercourse supposedly based on physical hungers that made it necessary for good health. Instead, a new model of sexuality emerged in which intercourse became an expression of love akin to spiritual communication. The model of affectionate marriage brought new power dynamics to sexuality. If marriage was based on mutuality and love rather than patrimony, then forced sex within marriage broke the fundamental emotional exchange of affection and respect. Women’s reform efforts stressed “voluntary motherhood,” meaning that a husband should control his passions rather than expect sexual congress as a right of marriage. The model of affectionate marriage combined with the expense of raising children among the bourgeoisie, who clothed, fed, and educated their children until their twenties rather

than sending them out to work, made birth control an economically prudent action. The falling birthrates in western Europe, particularly among the middle class, testify to the effectiveness of these economic and ideological changes, even though different societies used different means to achieve the decrease. By the mid-nineteenth century France achieved low marital fertility through prostitution, coitus interruptus, and nonprocreative sexual practices. In England delayed marriage continued to be the norm.

Regardless of the effectiveness of the informal and formal control over marriage, conflicts between compassionate marriage as a model and the desires for sexual pleasure as practice created tensions in the nineteenth century and helped contribute to an increased focus on sexual deviance. Medicine, social scientific theory, legislation, moralism, and popular accounts all contrasted the purified home as the emotional center of the family with the polluted world of public life, where sexual deviancy took place. Although sexual deviance in these formulations began to look like the opposite of sexual morality, the two reinforced each other at a number of fundamental levels. Sexual murder provides a clear example of this process. Although serial killers murdered before the nineteenth century, sexualized serial murder seems to be a particularly modern phenomenon related to new gender roles and the development of sexual and social autonomy for women. As the historians Judith Walkowitz and Angus McLaren have shown, sexual violence intensified existing gender and sexual relationships. The famous case of Jack the Ripper, in which an unidentified person murdered and eviscerated five London prostitutes in 1888, encouraged the policing of streetwalkers and raised tensions and concerns about single and independent women. Rather than working to make the streets safer for women, urban reformers worked to clear out the transients in the Whitechapel area in response to the murders, which dispersed support networks for women. The media and the police told women to remain at home, where the levels of sexual and other violence remained high throughout the century. In Victorian England, sexualized murder reinforced gender control and state surveillance of sexual deviants like prostitutes. Victorian society's use of a violent rhetoric against prostitutes and other independent women at some level contributed to actual violence against such women.

More routine examples also illustrate the relationship between sexual morality and deviance. According to medical authorities, the prostitute functioned as the main vector of sexual disease. Across Europe the state tried to stamp out syphilis and gonorrhea, even though the two were not yet fully differ-

entiated, by controlling prostitutes, regulating the sex trades, and introducing coercive measures against "loose" women identified as carrying the diseases. Doctors and moralists contrasted the long-suffering wife with the degraded prostitute to justify these coercive measures but generally ignored the role of men in spreading the disease. Many doctors kept the information about a husband's infection from his wife even though that meant that she would receive little or no medical help or attention. The issue of public health elevated the home even while sexual deviance infected it with disease. The contradiction was noted by feminists and socialists, who focused on the husband's sexual philandering.

Feminists attempted to reroute the conversation about sexuality toward discussions of the implicit flaws in the marital contract, while socialists emphasized the economics of poor women prostituting themselves for rich men. The rhetoric about prostitution and syphilis from each side, whether conservative, liberal, or revolutionary, pitted ideals about sexual morality against problems of deviance. In each model, sexual morality needed to be reformed to combat greater problems in society. Ridding society of social problems like loose women, gender inequalities, or economic inequalities was supposed to make the problems of sexual deviance wither away. The Victorian world, which became in the modern formulations synonymous with repression, spent a great deal of time and energy focusing on sexuality. If sexuality was a secret, then it was a secret invested with enormous powers.

The home and family as the center of procreative sexuality received additional relevance with the development of eugenics. Eugenicists, building on Charles Darwin's theories about the evolution of species, developed a science of race. They believed that populations and races competed against each other in a struggle for survival. This struggle took place between nations and races through battles over fecundity. According to eugenicists, falling birthrates among the middle class and the proliferation of the unfit boded ill for the continued progress of society. Eugenicists attempted to counter the problem by encouraging births among the fit, a program called positive eugenics, and discouraging births among the unfit, or negative eugenics. Fitness in both the positive and negative eugenics programs remained a nebulous quality that often stood in for race and class and ignored environmental causes of ill health and debility, like malnutrition, work conditions, and impure food.

The eugenics program also overlooked the real reasons that people had for limiting their fertility, like limited economic resources. The fears about decadence and the decline of the white race across Europe

encouraged greater control of sexuality in the public realm. Both national and international campaigns against abortion and birth control, both of which were said to contribute to race suicide; pornography; the white-slave trade; and homosexuality and other forms of so-called perversions were part of the eugenics program. In addition to discouraging practices that curtailed fertility, eugenicists tried to encourage procreation by linking it to patriotism and national duty, by providing tax incentives and social programs to help the fit raise children, and by providing scientific knowledge about ways to increase marital pleasure. The science of sexuality thus received legitimacy because of its links to nationalist and imperialist concerns. Eugenics demonstrates that issues of sexuality defy traditional political categories. Although in the twentieth century eugenics was most often associated with the far right of the political spectrum, most notably fascism, in the nineteenth century it was associated with the political left.

Nationalist concerns about fitness also contributed to new models of sexual deviance. Although the Enlightenment advocated sexual tolerance, nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century medical science more effectively promoted reforms if not tolerance by stressing the physiological character of homosexuality. According to these early sexologists, sexual perversion had two causes, environmental, which included habitual masturbation, and hereditary. Just as evolution caused heterosexual desire, so devolution caused homosexual desire. The stresses and strains of modern life and the availability of physical stimuli weakened individuals, making them susceptible to sexual diseases. Once introduced as pathologies into families, they caused devolution. The early focus of medicine and psychiatry on homosexuality, alternately called sexual inversion or uranism, had progressive motivations that nonetheless produced a number of negative consequences for homosexuals. Sexologists, including K. H. Ulrichs, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Magnus Hirschfeld, and Havelock Ellis, tended to see sexual deviance as a medical problem that could be cured rather than as a legal problem that deserved punishment. In shifting the focus of homosexuality from the law court to the doctor's office, these reformers stigmatized the homosexual, however, creating a model predicated on mental illness that lasted well until the late twentieth century.

The increased focus on the origins of sexual inversion in the medical community was matched by a series of court cases that raised the issue of homosexuality in the law, the press, and the popular imagination. The cases of Oscar Wilde in England, Baron Jacques d'Adelswärd-Fersen in France, and Philipp

Eulenberg in Germany publicized homosexuality in each of those countries and contributed to the notoriety of the developing gay subculture. A gay culture flourished in homosexual balls, bars, and brothels in Europe's large cities. The negative outcome of these cases combined with the increased visibility of homosexuality made homosexuals increasingly vulnerable. Nonetheless, the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw an outpouring of literature for and about homosexuals. Memoirs and novels raised the issues of same-sex desires and allowed homosexuality to become more central to the cultural life of Europe. Lesbians also developed their own cultural life. While the notoriety of male homosexual subcultures and literature has frequently overshadowed the development of a lesbian culture and literature, with the possible exception of Radclyffe Hall's *The Well of Loneliness* (1928), the increased opportunities for independence, education, and professional development allowed middle-class women to escape the familial home and live in same-sex relationships. The continued belief that women were less beset by sexual desires than men masked much of lesbian life under the rubric of spinsterhood.

In spite of the period's reputation for stifling sexuality, Europe between the French Revolution and World War I experienced major transformations of sexual ideals, legislation, and behaviors. Enlightenment ideals, like the freedom of the individual, a naturalistic interpretation of sexuality, and the turn away from tradition, continued to affect much of society. Governments across Europe attempted to stabilize society after the outbreak of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, but despite new legislation and policies, ideologies like nationalism, socialism, and feminism swept across western Europe and further reworked sexual behaviors and models. Women and workers began to fight for a greater role in society, and they saw sexuality as an emblem of the need for social, economic, and political reform. The rise of nationalism contributed to a race for procreation. Large urban centers that allowed extensive sexual variation in turn encouraged reformers to develop new models for dealing with sexual deviance. The extensive and often acrimonious discussions about sexuality demonstrate not only the central place that sexuality had in the Victorian world but also how political and social changes played out along a sexualized fault line.

EUROPE IN THE AGE OF THE WORLD WARS

In post-World War I Europe, sexuality remained a central metaphor for discussing changes in society.

The extreme conditions during the war years allowed women to develop new roles and to take advantage of new economic opportunities. As young women from all classes stepped out of the paternal home, they developed their own sexual standards rather than inheriting them from their parents' generation. Dating, premarital sex, and a rise in illegitimacy became a facet of youth culture. In many ways the development of a mass society during the war gave rise to a liberalization of sexual culture after the war. The deepening of democracy as a result of the war made the state more accountable to the political and social desires of a broad section of European society, and as a result shifts in sexual morality occurred fairly rapidly.

The flourishing of film, jazz, flappers, modern art, and modern dance testified to the daring sexual culture of the age. Josephine Baker appeared semi-nude in cabaret shows across Europe. Marlene Dietrich, the German film star, dressed in a man's topcoat and tails and publicly inverted male dress patterns, hinting at the emerging butch-femme cultural formations in the lesbian community. Film, public dances, and seaside bathing resorts exposed even the poor to the emerging pleasure culture that flirted with sexual titillation.

Modernism, as both an artistic and an intellectual movement, began to confront sexuality head-on. The surrealists took up themes of unconscious sexuality and confronted the nonprocreative and nonmarital aspects of sexuality. Salvador Dalí's *Lugubrious Game* (1929) used the themes of coprophilia and masturbation to provoke viewers. Although they based their art on Freudian psychology, surrealists' interpretations of the relationship of sexuality to the unconscious bore only a surface resemblance to that of Freud's. In the world of the surrealist little made sense, and certainly sexuality was not an orderly phenomenon. In contrast, Freud saw sexuality as integral to human development and believed that perversion only resulted when the orderly processes from oral, anal, to genital development went awry. His theories and the advocacy of the "talking cure" demonstrate the new place sexuality held in the culture of the interwar period. Although earlier sexologists like Krafft-Ebing had discussed sexuality and perversion, their work mattered to a fairly small section of interested scholars, doctors, and writers. During the interwar years, in contrast, the overt discussion of sexual themes became more central to conversations across European society in a wide variety of contexts, from the death impulse to the meaning of civilization. Freud's popularity as a theorist owes something to his emergence during this particular period. His theories of the Oedipus and Electra complexes, his beliefs that babies had sexual

urges, even his advocacy of the vaginal orgasm legitimated sexuality as a central part of the human experience and moved ideas aboveboard that appeared perverse just a generation before.

Despite the rhetoric of conservatives who were affronted by these changes, the 1920s did not just advocate hedonism. Instead, sexuality took an integral part in the many struggles over the direction of society. Sexual themes in modern art criticized the hypocrisy of the prewar world and the atrocities of the war. Sexual autonomy became linked to the increased rights of the individual. Sex reform and access to birth control information became part of a cross-European effort to enact progressive social reforms. In contrast, sex education, stressing premarital abstinence, morality, and the basics of reproduction, using plants and lower animals as examples, was occasionally incorporated into schools, generally in classes on ethics and biology. The church continued to argue that sexuality was a product of lust and thus to be fought against. In 1929 and 1931 Pope Pius XI warned against sex education, while the left successfully lobbied for greater access to information about sex. In the Soviet Union the revolution gave rise to increased access to birth control, divorce, and abortion, which allowed women to define their own sexual destinies. Early Soviet policy allowed women to take control of their own fertility as part of a broader policy of social reform. However, prostitution and homosexuality were repressed, and little was done to insure the sexual safety of women in prison and work camps. The steps toward greater flexibility in promoting women's independence were curtailed by the 1930s, when Joseph Stalin stressed the need for raised birthrates to advance the state. Other sexual matters received even harsher treatment. In 1933 homosexuality was recriminalized, in 1935 pornography was banned, and in 1936 abortion was outlawed.

The importance of the state over the individual became symptomatic of the political shifts of the 1930s. Many of the programs and beliefs about sexuality that gained momentum during the 1920s came under attack during the 1930s. The rise of fascist regimes in Italy, Germany, Spain, and Portugal and conservative regimes across much of eastern Europe were in part predicated on the supposed social disorders of the preceding generation. In attacking these disorders, fascist ideology singled out sexuality and gender as key elements. Fascist regimes across Europe reacted to changes in society by targeting the supposedly decadent and degenerate sexual culture of the 1920s. In practice this meant outlawing birth control in Spain, insisting on the procreative role of women in Italy, and attacking homosexuals in Germany. Roughly ten

thousand gay men went to concentration camps in Germany, where 60 percent of them died. Spain and Italy sought to eliminate the modernization of sexuality and return to a family-oriented state. In contrast, Germany developed a new ideology that stressed the state over the family. The Nazi Party incorporated eugenics into its political platform and sterilized roughly 400,000 people on the basis of the Law for Prevention of Offspring with Hereditary Diseases (1933). The Nazis also removed the stigma in laws regarding illegitimacy in 1940 to promote the birth of racially pure offspring within or outside of marriage. The Nazi agenda was by far the most radical and far-reaching in its attempts purify Aryan race lines and to eliminate the bloodlines of those who supposedly tried to pollute the Aryan body, in particular Jews who, according to Nazi propaganda, lusted after Aryan women. In conceptualizing sexuality as a race for reproduction, Nazi theorists took eugenics to its extreme conclusions and on that basis justified the murder of millions of people.

As conservative governments aggressively pursued population programs, democratic governments scrambled to find consensus to counter the threat of the right's military strength. For the most part, the search for consensus meant moderation or silence in the area of sexuality. Legislation and social programs took a backseat to the recovery from the Great Depression then preparation for war.

THE POSTWAR WORLD

In issues of sexuality, World War II did not end in 1945, according to a Dutch saying. In the Netherlands 250 homosexual men were castrated to avoid prison sentences between 1937 and 1967. While political conservatism was largely discredited at the war's end, sexual conservatism stayed intact until the 1960s. The sexual conservatism had real implications for people's lives that should not be overlooked. At the same time, though, this conservatism masked larger changes that allowed the transformation of sexual behaviors and morality in the next generation.

Individual states returned to prewar policies on sexuality. Germany returned to stressing sex within marriage and retreated from the intrusive stance toward the family it developed under the Nazis. Other European states emphasized family, population, procreation, and heterosexuality. The French focus on population and procreative sexuality continued unabated as it had since the nineteenth century. In England sexual conservatism existed side-by-side with rising illegitimacy and women's continued participa-

tion in the workforce. In Italy prewar conservative tendencies prevailed. However, the world after the war was not the same as the one before. Prostitution became a problem as a result of the war and occupation. The church reacted by reemphasizing the family, but the position of the church shifted slightly when it advocated sexual harmony within marriage as a way to maintain marital resilience. In 1948 the church opened a Catholic marriage counseling facility to combat the growing secularization of society. The church's new stance revealed a larger accommodation to secularization of sexuality.

Although the secularization of sexuality varied from region to region and from religion to religion, European states largely separated church and state and individuals increasingly tended to see spirituality and sexuality as separate realms. In part this shift had been building since the Enlightenment, which delegitimized the church's traditional authority over sexuality. With secularization and the rise of the state as a secular authority also came the growing distinction between public and private. This division contributed to the waning influence of the church over public behavior and public morality, as people believed that church teaching no longer necessarily applied to the public sphere. If the dictates of one church or another concerning sexual morality held any validity, they generally did so within the realm of the individual conscience, the family, or the religious community, no longer coterminous with the state or any other public authority. Regulation of sexual behavior continued, but it was now for the state to decide—its reasoning stripped of explicitly religious content—what types of behavior constituted a threat to society and how they should be dealt with.

These long-term trends toward secularization were augmented by a number of fairly rapid changes that occurred as a result of World War I and World War II. The impact of communism in Eastern Europe and a large socialist presence in Western Europe delegitimized religion and religious control of sexuality in much of Europe. Additionally women's continued participation in the workforce across Europe and the resulting female independence laid the groundwork for shifting sexual mores across Europe. As women became more economically independent, they could decide their own sexual destinies. The dominance of the mass media and American culture and the postwar economic recovery also made many changes possible. Because of the American servicemen and service-women stationed in Europe, American youth culture, including rock and roll, films, and dating, began to influence European society in the 1950s. This transatlantic pattern of cultural interaction intensified dur-

policies. Sexual intercourse ceased to be predicated on an implicit premarital contract. Men and women began to have intercourse at younger ages as part of dating and early adulthood. The stigma against women's unmarried sexual activity lessened, so young women as well as young men envisioned sexual intercourse as an individual right and pleasure that did not involve marital intentions.

Across Europe marriage as an institution became less important. However, unmarried couples behaved in very similar ways to married couples, exhibiting patterns of monogamy, procreation, and mutual economic support. It appears as if the informal aspects of marriage mattered more than the formal institution of marriage, particularly since the economic, social, and legal stigmas against bastards were lifted. In many ways this model continued the longer trend of informal marriage among the working classes before the twentieth century. Formal marriage from the Renaissance forward was often a luxury that workers could not afford. The falling marriage rates in Europe did not signal the end of the heterosexual couple. Instead, an additional stage of life, in which young people lived together rather than married, became more standard.

In Western Europe states liberalized laws on sexuality and lifted restrictions on birth control, abortion, homosexuality, and pornography. During the 1960s the Labour government in Britain decriminalized homosexuality between consenting adults in private, began subsidizing birth control under the National Health Service (NHS), and allowed the NHS to cover abortions. Contraception, which was severely curtailed in France until 1967, became legal, and limited abortion rights were passed in 1975. In Germany the reassessment of the past encouraged a rejection of the earlier generation's sexual behaviors and morality as the two "dirty secrets" combined into one. German students rejected the double standard, premarital purity, and the linking of promiscuity and sin. West Germany legalized the birth control pill, abortion, and pornography. East Germany connected sexual liberalization with capitalism and American culture and did not respond as favorably to changes in youth culture. Nonetheless, East German young people pushed for similar adaptations, and across Germany beliefs and behaviors changed rapidly.

Along with new behaviors and regulations, new theories of sexuality took hold during this period. Theology began to emphasize the dignity and well-being of parishioners' lives as essential to Christian teachings. Partly in response to internal changes in the church and partly in response to the broader secularization of society, the Catholic Church and many Protestant denominations reexamined their own tra-

ing the 1960s and continued into the twenty-first century. Medical advances separated sexual intercourse from the physical repercussions that society had used to tie sexual actions to sin and deviance. Syphilis and gonorrhea, the scourges of sexuality in the past, became curable with penicillin in 1943, leaving a window, before the onset of AIDs in the 1980s, in which sexual intercourse seemed disease-free. The apparent end of sexual diseases followed by the widespread availability of the birth control pill in the 1960s promised to liberate sexuality from its previous constraints.

During the 1960s the feminist movement, the gay liberation movement, and the youth movement rapidly transformed sexual morality and sexual behaviors in Europe. In many ways the 1960s signaled a return to the issues of the 1920s, which had been discarded amid the extremes of World War II. These movements were self-conscious attempts to transform society and also the culmination of slower changes in European society. The 1960s had far-reaching consequences in terms of individual behaviors and state

ditional stances towards sexuality. Because of the liberalization of abortion laws in many countries, the Catholic Church muted its message of the sinfulness of unmarried mothers. In contrast to abortion, bearing an illegitimate child seemed like the lesser sin. In turn this position promoted a more relaxed stance on premarital sex. Sexual purity no longer carried the force it once did. Even in Ireland, where Catholicism was the semiofficial religion, churchgoers relaxed attitudes on sexuality after the 1970s. In a poll taken in 1973 and 1974, 87 percent of those over fifty-one years of age thought premarital sex was “always wrong,” whereas only 44 percent of those aged eighteen to thirty agreed. Moreover theology considered fair negotiation and trust in sexuality equally important as procreation. Abuses of power like rape and molestation violated these principles and seemed more compelling problems to individual priests, ministers, and members of the laity than sexual purity. The long-term impact of this focus created conflicts over abortion, sexual abstinence of clerics, and homosexuality within Catholic and Protestant Churches and divided Christian communities across Europe.

Other controversies, apparent at the origins of these rapid changes, became embedded in sexuality and continued to affect it. Most notably the relationship between the nature of biology and the social restrictions around sexuality called for new theories and

new legislation. An identity politics that emerged from the Western European focus on individual rights legitimated alternative sexual desires. The contradictions between commercialization and sexual liberation raised important questions about what purpose sexuality should have in society.

Feminist scholars examined the relationship between sexuality and women’s second-class status, which did not guarantee them the same rights, responsibilities, and freedoms as men. They noted that much of the theory about the biological origins of sexual impulses and behaviors guaranteed men’s freedom at women’s expense. The theory that women’s sexuality was organized around maternity rather than orgasmic pleasure received particular opprobrium because it overlooked women’s physical desires, justified the division of women into whore-madonna dualities, and legitimated legislation promoting maternity rather than protection of women as equal citizens. Feminists affirmed women’s sexual desires as legitimate in and of themselves and lobbied for access to birth control and abortion to free those pleasures from reproduction. Reassessing the Freudian theory that posited the vaginal orgasm as the mature orgasm and the clitoral orgasm as immature, they argued that the theory promoted male pleasure through heterosexual coitus rather than female pleasure through manual stimulation. The continuing controversies around these theories

pointed toward the gaps in understanding female and male sexuality. If biologists, psychologists, and doctors cannot agree on the physiology of sexual pleasure, then separating biology from culture remains impossible.

The gay liberation movement also attacked the theoretical underpinnings of sexuality. The disease model of homosexuality did not allow individuals to build an identity that incorporated their sexual preferences. Instead, it argued that same-sex desire was a pathology, even though no adequate treatment existed. Citing the work of Alfred Kinsey, whose book on American men, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (1948), demonstrated that a significant proportion of the male population had same-sex desires and experiences, gay activists argued that homosexuality was not pathological but normal and as a normal desire deserved recognition rather than imprisonment, electric shock therapy, and other dubious treatments. If homosexuality is intrinsic and natural, then social restrictions against it are unnatural according to the new model. Feminist and queer theories redrew the boundaries of nature and culture and, in the process, threw into doubt the basis of previous legislation.

A third area of reconsideration developed around the issues of capitalism and sexuality. The commercialization of sexuality became an important issue to progressives and conservatives alike. Political differences over what to do about the issue persist, and many see problems in the economics of sexuality. For example, the use of women in sexually suggestive advertisements raises the question of whether women have been liberated sexually or made into another commodity. Similarly, the decriminalization of pornography, initially touted as a step away from state censorship, promised to liberate sexuality, political opinions, and artistic sensibilities. In 1960, for example, Penguin Books won a censorship case against the British government concerning D. H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover* (1928). The relaxation of old standards seemed to liberate art from the vise of Victorian morality. However, the distinction between art and pornography remained shaky, and standards based on the idea of socially redeeming value permitted states to err on the side of free speech rather than censorship. First soft-core then hard-core pornography gained legal status across Europe over the objections of feminists and traditional conservatives alike. Especially in Britain and the United States, feminist work in the area of pornography has raised the ques-

tion of whether legalization liberates both men and women or it only provides a way for men to conceptualize women's subjugation. Conservatives argue that pornography inspires perversions and desecralizes what should remain sacrosanct. In spite of these concerns, pornography has become an international phenomenon through the rise of film, television, and video. The breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe and the economic instability it engendered encouraged a rise in the sex trades across national borders, including the manufacture of pornography. Pornographic production companies use actors from across Europe and sell the products to an increasingly international audience. The poverty in eastern Europe encouraged many women to sell their only asset, themselves, in spite of the equally international spread of diseases like AIDS. The transition to capitalism in eastern Europe demonstrates the problems of commercialization at its most profound levels.

As these issues demonstrate, sexual morality has slowly emerged from the province of the church, the family, and community, and the regulation of morality and behaviors has shifted to the state and the individual. This shift, though promising in its inception during the Enlightenment to free individuals from the chains of tradition and allow them to find more reasonable accommodations for their passions, created as many confusions and controversies as previous systems. Sexual behaviors transformed along with systems of regulation. The two seem mutually dependent, though their relationship is not as straightforward as many might believe. For example, in spite of the enormous pressures toward marital procreation in the nineteenth century, individuals practiced family planning and curtailed the number of their offspring. Regulation attempted to control behaviors but to little avail. Religion and family did not successfully control sexuality before the Enlightenment, but the state and secular authorities also failed after the Enlightenment. Instead, systems of regulation seem to provide individuals with models that they build upon, reject, and accommodate. People's diverse reactions to changes in sexual regulation demonstrates the complexity of sexuality. As an identity, a practice, and a biological phenomenon, sexuality contravenes legislation and easy answers. Nonetheless, as the history of sexuality demonstrates, large changes reverberate through the individual, making it unclear where an individual's sexuality ends and social forces begin.

See also other articles in this section.

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ILLEGITIMACY AND CONCUBINAGE



Anne-Marie Sohn

From the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the public view of illegitimacy and concubinage (or cohabitation) changed radically. Once marginalized and ostracized, these behaviors became common and tolerated. Thus abstinence gave way to the right to sexual fulfillment for all, and the bastard, once despised and condemned to an almost certain death among the poorest, became the illegitimate child who is both desired and cherished, as the boundaries between concubinage and married life disappeared.

FROM ABSTINENCE TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS

If this long-term change is unquestionable, numerous national and regional exceptions reveal the complexity of factors that influenced sexual freedom.

Chastity established as an expected virtue. It is incontestable that the Reformation and especially the Counter-Reformation introduced a rupture in social perceptions and controls. Certainly, Christianity had always upheld the family as the sole venue for reproduction and fought unceasingly against extramarital sexuality, although it never succeeded in eradicating it.

In Catholic countries, the post-Tridentine reaction hardened the marriage doctrine of the church, devalued love except in marriage, and reinforced the repression of extramarital sexuality because the new solemnity of the sacrament of matrimony rendered transgressions more difficult. The effects were immediate. Around 1560 the rate of illegitimacy fell dramatically. In France it was on average 1 percent, and even less for the rural parishes; but it was higher in the cities, to which young peasant women, anxious to hide their “mistake,” flocked in order to give birth. Prenuptial conception fluctuated between 3 and 4 percent in the countryside. In England, on the other hand, the decline came later, contemporary with Oliver Cromwell’s Commonwealth; the rates of illegitimacy in rural areas actually grew from 1560 to 1620,

reaching between 2.3 and 3.5 percent. Beginning in the 1660s, the English and French situations were comparable, with illegitimate births not exceeding 1 percent. On the other hand, England distinguished itself by its frequency of prenuptial conceptions, which occurred in 10 to 40 percent of marriages, depending on the region.

Loosening constraints (1750–1850). Beginning in 1750 most European countries saw illegitimate births rise dramatically. In England the rate of illegitimacy reached 3.3 percent in 1741–1760 and 4 percent in 1761–1780; it exceeded 5 percent by 1781–1787. In France the rate increased fivefold in one century, and the rise, though coming later, was just as regular, reaching 1.8 percent in 1760–1769, 2.6 percent at the eve of the Revolution, 4.4 percent in 1810, 6.6 percent in the 1820s, and stabilizing at over 7 percent in 1860. The upsurge was even greater in the cities, where on the eve of the Revolution illegitimate births stood at between 8 and 12 percent, and at 30 percent in Paris. From 1790 to 1830, the average reached 16.2 percent for small cities, 20 percent for medium-sized cities, and 22.5 percent for large cities.

The phenomenon also reached Scandinavia and exploded in Germanic countries in the first half of the nineteenth century. In Austria the rate of illegitimacy wavered between 10 and 30 percent in 1870. It reached 40 to 50 percent in Styria and 68 percent in Carinthia; hence the expression “Carinthian marriage.” In some districts it reached 60 percent. In short, Austria surpassed all European and urban records, with illegitimate births reaching 50 percent in Vienna and 69 percent in Klagenfurt. This peak was followed by a decline in the twentieth century.

Illegitimate birth in the twentieth century. The increase in illegitimate births in the twentieth century was real, although it occurred more or less early in the century. However, the statistics do not represent the phenomenon with complete accuracy because of con-

trapection. Thus in France, for example, the recorded rate of illegitimacy does not reflect a sexual freedom that was increasing but was masked by the association, common since the Belle Époque, between coitus interruptus and, when that failed, abortion. Thus only 8.7 percent of children were illegitimate in 1900–1914, increasing to only 11 percent in 1978. But more revealing is the fact that between the two world wars 20 percent of newlywed women were pregnant and 12 percent were already mothers. In England from the 1840s to the 1960s the rate of illegitimacy, except for the periods just after the world wars, remained stable around 3.4 to 5.4 percent. Prenuptial conceptions never dropped below 16 percent, and prenuptial relationships increased rapidly: 16 percent of women born in 1904 had experimented with such relations, compared with 36 percent of the generation born between 1904 and 1914. On the other hand, in the Netherlands, where the power of religious parties was great and their influence reinforced by the practices of the coalition government, the prudish atmosphere restrained the liberalization of morals so well that in 1955 the rate of illegitimacy reached its lowest level. Likewise, in Ireland, where Catholicism shaped the national identity, the rate of illegitimacy stagnated at around 2 percent and in 1961 fell to its lowest level, 1.6 percent, even though contraception remained taboo.

During the 1960s, however, all European countries experienced a “sexual revolution,” accompanied by the massive diffusion of contraception, which permitted the avoidance of unwanted pregnancy. Nonetheless, beginning in 1970 Europe saw a new explosion in illegitimacy. Denmark and Sweden were at the peak of this development, followed by Great Britain and also by France, where the change accelerated: in 1991 one-quarter of births occurred outside marriage, 37.6 percent in 1997, and 40 percent in 1998, with a rate of over 50 percent for firstborn children. Illegitimate births thus became a major component of demography, attesting to the overturning of traditional standards of behavior.

ILLEGITIMACY AND PREMARITAL SEX

The rate of illegitimacy reveals the degree of tolerance for nonmarital relationships, but it still needs interpretation. Edward Shorter imputes the “first sexual revolution” of 1750 to 1850 to industrialization. Capitalism overturned attitudes by valuing profit and by creating the autonomous worker whose choices were no longer subordinated to traditional rules and authorities. If the economy played a role, however, its role was much more complex than Shorter claims, and

in any case the economy was not the only cause of change. The erosion of religion and the transformation of the family were also significant. The legal system also directly and indirectly influenced individual choices.

Historians have debated the various causes of the rise in illegitimacy, as they combined to produce some striking changes but also great regional and class variations from the late eighteenth century onward. A key issue involves gender: obviously, both men and women participated in premarital sex, but quite possibly for different reasons and from very different positions of power. Weaker job opportunities for women may have increased a woman’s felt need to use sex to try to cement a link with a man, while men’s concerns about eroding status may have made sexual conquest a more desirable expression of masculine prowess.

Illegitimacy and the law. In the early modern era laws prohibited extramarital sex. In Germanic countries the Reformation codified sexual norms through ordinances of morality (*Sittlichkeitsordnungen*). Catholic states, in the wake of the Council of Trent, criminalized concubinage and sexual relations between fiancés. In France the declaration of pregnancy, instituted in the edict of 1556 by Henry II, was intended to prevent infanticide but also sought to restrain passions by rendering the father responsible for his child and its upkeep. Similarly in England in 1733 women were given the right to bring suit against the father of their children, to secure marriage or the confiscation of his goods if he refused to pay alimony, and even to send him to prison if he was penniless. In the Germanic countries the legal framework of marriage hardened toward the end of the seventeenth century. Severe limits were imposed on the marriage of house servants.

Legislative restraints endured, and indeed grew, into the nineteenth century. In France the Civil Code (1804), in defining the legal obstacles to marriage, placed certain couples in inextricable situations. Dispensations accorded for marriage between an aunt and a nephew related by marriage, or between a stepfather and stepdaughter, were extremely rare and were the product of prolonged negotiations. Furthermore, until the Lemire law of 1898, the acquisition of the administrative documents necessary for marriage was difficult for peasants who moved to the city and who were often illiterate, and the cost was frequently prohibitive for the poorest of them. The society of Saint-François Régis was founded in Paris in 1826 in order to facilitate these procedures and to permit the legalization of stable concubinages. In Germany and Austria the legal restrictions inherited from the seven-

teenth century were reinforced into the 1820s and 1830s. Thus developed the policy called “consent to marry,” which aimed at preventing concubinage and illegitimate birth but had the paradoxical effect of making them more widespread. Workers who were not landowners were required, in effect, to have a stable income, irreproachable conduct, and to possess some goods to be able to marry. These restrictive laws survived until the creation of the German Empire in 1870 and until 1868 in Austria, with the exception of the Tirol, which did not repeal them until 1921.

Socioeconomic structures and illegitimacy.

While cities differed from the countryside in socioeconomic conditions, rural areas themselves were often quite distinct in their attitudes to illegitimacy. In France and Germany, for example, there were both permissive and restrictive regions. In France rural illegitimacy was particularly strong in the northeast half of the country, where it reached 5 percent by 1820–1829. In 1914 one-quarter of Alsatian marriages were celebrated after the conception of a child. The Hautes-Pyrénées and Basses-Pyrénées were second, always

staying two percentage points above the national average. In the valley of Campan (Hautes-Pyrénées) the proportion of illegitimate births even reached 18.3 percent. Added to this is the fact that prenuptial conceptions were rarely lower than 5 percent. This phenomenon was even more accentuated in the German Alps.

Thus geographical contrasts often arose from different social structures. In regions like the Pyrenees, where the eldest son traditionally inherited the bulk of a family's wealth, the younger sons often remained bachelors in order to keep the family property intact, and the poorest younger daughters could not find a husband for lack of a dowry. The exclusion from inheritance explains the extramarital outlet before the rural exodus reduced the demographic pressure that reached its peak in 1848. But the ostracism that weighed on young single mothers persisted to the point that within three generations distinct lineages were established of single mothers, who were relegated to the bottom of the social ladder. The right of the eldest (*Anerbenrecht*) also existed in Germany and led to similar situations. Furthermore, in areas of large-scale farming, which in Germany and Austria beginning in the eighteenth century employed a large working class, servants and dispossessed youngest sons were too poor to marry. As they were also very mobile, they escaped the scrutiny of the neighbors and had elevated rates of illegitimacy.

On the other hand, in "democratic" societies such as Savoy, and even in regions like the Parisian basin, where the peasants were leaseholders and not landowners, the decision to marry rested on personal qualities. Consequently, all suitors were considered equal, familial pressure was weak, and the freedom accorded to the young was great. In 1910 Arnold van Gennep concluded that, at the most, 10 percent of young women of Savoy entered marriage as virgins. *Kiltgang*, the generic name given to the practices of youth in the French, Swiss, and Germanic Alps, as well as in Scandinavia and England, reveals the correlation between economic equality and premarital sex. In these regions, young men would prolong the evening by visiting young women in their homes. They could demand shelter and in that case would sleep next to the young women, fully dressed and generally on top of the covers. They could even go to a woman's room in a group and stay there alone or in turns without compromising her reputation. It goes without saying that when these young people got engaged, the *Kiltgang* gave way to proper and decorous courtships. This rite codified the freedom of youths, but under the double control of their peers and of adults, who remained vigilant though in the back-

ground. In effect, a young woman who mixed court- ing with debauchery lost her chance at matrimony.

In cities and villages dedicated to protoindustry, a similar situation produced the "immorality" of the working woman, denounced vehemently by both the French and the English bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century. Laborers, who were deprived of any inheritance and indifferent to the strategies of social status, became involved very early with their chosen loves, since at the age of eighteen a young man earned as much as an adult. Pairing off was thus a natural occurrence. In the principality of Neuchâtel in Switzerland, the increase in illegitimacy—31 percent of births after 1760—was a result of the flood of cotton textile manufacturing into the villages. The introduction of cotton manufacturing, which recruited its labor force from among poor peasants and proletarianized farmers, brought increased sexual freedom as cohabitation was based on salaries and hard work. Thus, the bonds that tied marriage to the inheritance of land were loosened.

Generally, illegitimate births were limited to the working classes until the twentieth century. A census of France during the Third Republic (1870–1940) confirmed that nearly 87 percent of young women who had had nonmarital relationships were wage earners: 35 percent were laborers, 29 percent were house servants, and 22.7 percent were agricultural day workers or farm servants. As under the ancien régime, servants, frequently uprooted to an unknown city, appear to be the primary victims of this system: they were 3 times less likely to marry and 2.5 times more likely to commit infanticide than workers. As for female agricultural workers, if they managed to obtain a shotgun marriage as often as factory workers, they were nonetheless twice as likely to commit infanticide. But economic constraints are only part of the story, and the comparative ease of city-dwelling women was due more to the attitudes that prevailed in the city than to their financial independence.

Attitudes toward illegitimacy. Wherever the teaching of the churches was respected, chastity was established as an absolute. Take for example the courtship practices of the early modern era. An engagement, also called *don de foi* (gift of faith) or *promesse à main* (promise of the hand), was common in England. It rested on a public agreement between families with witnesses and symbolic gestures such as the kiss and an exchange of gifts, most often a gold ring. Still, this agreement did not take effect until after sexual relations. The banns (official public announcement) of marriage therefore served only to confirm the engagement of the spouses and their parents.

These engagement practices were not abolished until 1753 with the Hardwick Marriage Act, which had little effect on them. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, prohibited them as early as 1564. This explains the lower number of prenuptial conceptions on the Continent than in England.

Dechristianization also eroded moral prohibitions. Evidence shows that the development of concubinage and illegitimate births in Germanic countries beginning in the eighteenth century coincides with an erosion of the influence of churches. In France, where Jansenism and above all the Revolution were accompanied by a decline in religious practice, the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century no longer had the means to make its sexual standard respected. Priests were denounced for their rigidity and for the hidden influence they exercised in their confessionals over the lives of couples. Men turned away first from the confessional, then from the altar. The French who remained practicing Catholics freed themselves rapidly from sexual prohibitions, to the point that confessors opted for caution through the 1930s. Despite the development of the cult of the Virgin Mary and the exaltation of feminine virginity through sodalities such as the Enfants de Marie, the secularization of society permitted the emancipation of single men and women.

The value accorded to virginity, however, could be independent of religious precepts. To take the French example, in Flanders, Artois, and Picardy virginity was not valued in the least. In Gravelines a virgin could even be referred to as "rien qu'une merde sur une pelle" (nothing but shit on a shovel). In Burgundy the subject was never even taken up. As for the Normans, they did not criticize the unmarried mother, as they were happy to verify her ability to bear children. Peasants were always torn between a respect for chastity and a rejection of barrenness. There were, by contrast, until the period between the two world wars, areas that were hard on young women who had "erred." In these places even prenuptial conception was criticized, and weighed as an indelible stain on the wife. Furthermore, in certain southern rural regions masculine honor and feminine virginity were conflated. There, a prenuptial relationship was experienced as a dishonor that began with the first suspicion of immorality, and the punishment was public. The charivaris (noisy rituals that expressed communal disapproval of perceived violators of social norms) that targeted "loose women" were common in Charente and in Limousin until 1914, in Brittany during the period between the wars, and in Languedoc into the 1950s. The rejection of illegitimacy thus led either to rapid marriage or to infanticide, which is reflected in

the statistics, although in the north both shotgun marriages and infanticide were rarer.

The geography of intransigence takes on the appearance of a mosaic. The laxity of the Basques, for example, contrasts with the rigidity of the Ossau valley and of the eastern Pyrenees. In Mâconnais girls were rarely scrutinized, while the reverse was true in neighboring Bresse. In Alsace, where, in the case of birth before marriage, they said "the papers were late," there were communes that conserved the *Krönel-Hoschzit* (virgin marriage crown) that was passed on with pride from mother to daughter. And in the Bas-Rhin, Catholic parishes, isolated in Protestant lands, were particularly cruel to "dishonored girls," who were relegated to a pew of infamy at the back of the church. The weight of regional attitudes could prevail over national trends, sometimes with unexpected reversals. Savoy, long indifferent to feminine virtue, aligned itself with the bourgeois model after World War I and required virgin marriage from then on.

In the cities, tolerance prevailed among the populace, which joked that one must lose one's virginity as quickly as possible to avoid being taken for a half-wit. Far from wanting to marry a virgin, many men preferred experienced women. An illegitimate child was better received and a single mother, if she was not promiscuous, could be wed. Shotgun marriages were common. But there were also workers and artisans, often from the south, who retained the ideology of honor from their village life, and who believed the virtue of the fiancée guaranteed the future wisdom of the spouse. And the middle-class cult of virginity remained unshakable at least until the 1920s among the lower middle class. Nevertheless, the transformations of the couple and the family prevailed over this resistance in the twentieth century.

From illegitimacy endured to illegitimacy proclaimed. In France patriarchy eroded in the nineteenth century. Maternal and paternal love bloomed, and a wave of tenderness washed over familial relationships. Unquestioned obedience to the father's command gave way to persuasion, and children gained more freedom. The reduction in parental authority went hand in hand with the rapid decline of arranged marriages. After World War I marriages of love triumphed even in the most resistant regions, if only because heavy demographic losses prohibited excessive restrictions. These marriages rested on the union of two individuals who took a chance at happiness with a freely chosen partner. In this framework, happiness depended on love. One had to seduce one's future spouse, and the progression from tender words to sexual relations became inescapable.

Certainly, young girls could say no, but refusal passed more and more often for frigidity. Between the two world wars 30 percent of couples consummated their union before their wedding night. Although it was still possible before World War II, refusal became archaic in the 1950s and 1960s, when the one-night stand became an obligatory rite of initiation. In 1959, 30 percent of women admitted to prenuptial relations, and 12 percent refused to respond to a question about them. Things then accelerated: from 1968 to 1989, the age at which a young person first had intercourse dropped five years for women and six years for men. By 1989, 90 percent of young women were no longer virgins by the age of eighteen. In Denmark, while 40 percent of female students were still virgins in 1958, only 3 percent were in 1968. In Sweden 68 percent of women born between 1905 and 1935 and 86 percent of those born between 1935 and 1950 were no longer virgins at the time of their marriage. Thus sexual relations became the norm for single young people between 1920 and 1968, but they resulted less frequently in unwanted pregnancy because of progress in contraception.

Beginning in the 1970s, the new phenomenon of the planned illegitimate child emerged, attesting to the dissociation of reproduction from marriage and contributing to a decline in marriage. The changes in concubinage were the ultimate proof of this.

CONCUBINAGE BY DEFAULT AND BY CHOICE

Concubinage (also called cohabitation) is not well understood because it is difficult to pinpoint. Its history is therefore a developing one. The French example,

however, reveals that in the recent past concubinage changed from a marginal practice to an official way of life.

The social milieus of concubinage. During the Restoration in France (1815–1830), one out of five households in Paris lived outside the bonds of marriage. This was far less than alarmist contemporary witnesses claimed. Furthermore, Parisian cohabitants were not as overwhelmingly working-class as has been thought. Nonlaborers made up, depending on the quarter of the city, 33 to 40 percent of cohabitants. If concubinage was indeed one of the “forms of working-class civilization,” it thrived equally on the anonymity and freedom that the capital offered.

The study of concubinage under the Third Republic confirms the change. Of recorded cohabitants, 80 percent lived in cities, with half in large cities, and 15 percent in Paris. A comparison of the maps of concubinage and industrialization is equally striking. Concubinage thrived in modern France along the Paris-Lyon-Marseille axis extended to the Belgian border. Conversely the west, the Alps, the Massif Central, and Languedoc had little cohabitation. Also, in villages cohabitants were less numerous—9 percent—and were generally day laborers. Rural France tolerated social mistakes, preferring prenuptial pregnancy to a barren woman, but unanimously rejected a public attack on the norm. Thus concubinage remained overwhelmingly a characteristic of the working class into the period between the two world wars: 60 percent of men were artisans or laborers, and 48 percent of women were laborers, 28 percent working in textiles. Generally, cohabitants also came from the urban lower classes, which mixed laborers and the lesser trades, from bread sellers to upholsterers and ragmen. Privileged circles represented at best 10 percent of male cohabitants, for while concubinage was unthinkable for a middle-class woman, it seduced certain middle-class men. One-quarter of the cohabitants of single young women came from well-to-do circles. That said, the working-class character of concubinage increased from 1840 to 1940.

A multifaceted concubinage. In the Third Republic concubinage involved partners with varied levels of sexual experience. Among women, 56 percent had been or were still married and only 44 percent were unmarried. Cohabitants who had been married were older, since 64 percent moved in with their partner after thirty years of age. They also controlled their fertility well: one-third had no children, 43 percent had one or two children, and 67 percent—72 percent

among widows—had no illegitimate children. Unmarried cohabitants, on the other hand, were younger: 82 percent were younger than thirty-five, and 20 percent were minors. They were also less experienced: 54 percent failed to avoid pregnancy. The concubinage of unmarried women was thus similar to prenuptial relationships, although 30 percent of them lived with men at least ten years older than they and of a different social class.

When the motives that prompted couples to live together outside of marriage are taken into account, the situation becomes even more complicated. For 10 to 25 percent of couples, concubinage was lived as though it was a preface to marriage. This phenomenon concerned only marriageable couples, half at best of those living in concubinage. It was most often young single people who found themselves in this situation, sometimes because their parents disapproved of the union, sometimes because the promise of marriage, or engagement, was enough of a union, sometimes because the women involved secretly hoped to legalize their union. Without the pressures of society and especially the family, this situation could drag on for long periods of time. Young couples whose four parents were still alive were rare in the nineteenth century, at most one-quarter in Beauce near Orléans. Further, the parents of young cohabitants seemed particularly patient and tolerant, even agreeing to house the young couples. On the other hand, cohabitants who had previously been married, primarily women who were separated, divorced, or abandoned, were not always in a hurry to enter into a binding relationship, and remained satisfied with a situation that preserved their freedom. They did not discard the possibility of legalizing their union, however, primarily for reasons of inheritance; thus toward the end of their lives, older couples would often marry in order to settle legal questions of inheritance. On the other hand, after 1918 war widows remained inflexible for fear of losing their pension.

In one out of four cases, however, cohabitation resulted less from choice than from necessity or instability; 12 percent of cohabitations reveal marginality and poverty. Abandoned women with children agreed to concubinage because of a lack of resources. This was also true of unemployed women. Victims of their sex in the workplace, young underpaid women would live with a man just to survive, and would leave him when they found work. Concubinage between a servant and her master, in the city or in the country, was not always forced on the woman, and there were servant-mistresses who commanded respect, but that situation more often arose from the economic subordination of women; a servant who refused the sexual overtures of her master would be fired. Certain un-

derprivileged and scorned professions existing on the margins of society, such as ragmen or fairground entertainers, made concubinage a way of life. Some cynical men preyed upon mildly disabled women, imposing themselves and taking advantage of these women who could not protest. Four percent of cohabitants came from the circle of ex-convicts, prostitutes, and pimps. Marginal society was frequently indifferent to moral norms.

But most cohabitants, at least half, moved in together as good spouses. The most common face of concubinage was that of cohabitants regarded as married couples. A shifting vocabulary was daily proof of this, particularly with the change from *concubine* and *concubin* to “wife” and “husband” and, for the woman, the use of “Madame” followed by the man’s name. It was also common for neighbors to be ignorant of the legal status of cohabitants whom they believed to be married. Confusion was particularly strong in the case of young couples, couples who had been together five years or less, and women who had been married and retained their married name and behavior. In order for this assimilation to be possible the couple had to live quietly and project honorable conduct, without scandal. Contemporaries praised supposedly married couples for their good rapport, hard work, and the love they had for each other. Cohabitants were esteemed because they were respectable. They gauged their own conduct against that of married couples and concluded that their irregular situation with regard to legal status could in no way dishonor them. Since they conducted themselves as responsible and moral citizens, and were supported by the praise of their contemporaries, they had little reason to go before the mayor to be married. On the other hand, those who refused on principle to marry were rare. Until World War II concubinage was not the free union advocated by anarchists; it appeared more often as a substitute for married life.

Therefore it is not surprising that the behavior of cohabiting couples was similar in all points to that of legitimate couples of the same working-class circles. There were no more bad male cohabitants—violent, alcoholic, “bad providers”—than there were bad husbands. The tacit contract that made up concubinage seems even to have protected women from abuse because a husband could use his status as head of the family to exercise unchallenged tyranny. In particular, concubinage took women away from the domination of a jealous man or “master.” It did not prevent love from blossoming, sometimes in forms more exalted than in the framework of marriage, nor did it prevent adultery from occurring with the same reactions as in married couples. Cohabiting women were judged like wives, according to their domestic and professional

talents. They were not worse housekeepers than married women and did not complain more about serving their partners. They were not worse mothers. For example, they rarely abused their children. Their role was even more important than that of a mother in a legitimate family, in which attachments could be lukewarm compared to the love an unmarried woman had for her children. The only difference between legitimate and illegitimate couples was that cohabitants suffered, beginning in the interwar period, under the increasing spread of “social hygiene,” a more particular scrutiny. Suspected a priori of immorality, and put at a disadvantage by their low income and poor living conditions, they were judged incapable of educating their children. Thus 47 percent of unmarried parents were deprived of their parental rights and authority on grounds of immorality, compared to 25 percent of married parents.

Although three-quarters of cohabitants lived peaceful daily lives, concubinage was not generally accepted, a fact to which public reprobation bears witness. Primarily verbal, this criticism denounced the “false household” and even became xenophobic when the cohabitants were ostracized foreigners, as were the Yugoslavs, Portuguese, and Algerians in the interwar period. It could even compel certain couples to hide their legal status. But in the twentieth century no one dared vilify the bastard child, whose interests had been protected by the authorities since the 1870s because of the collapse of the birth rate.

From prenuptial relationships to accepted concubinage. In the late twentieth century, as soon as

a couple began an extramarital relationship, the question of living together arose.

In France, 12 percent of future spouses already lived together at the time of their marriage in 1965, 17 percent in 1968, 43 percent in 1977, and 87 percent in 1997. Living together served as the framework for prenuptial relationships, and marriage, which was no longer obligatory, often intervened only after the first birth. The rate of illegitimacy coincided thenceforth with the rate of concubinage. Further, the law confirmed these evolutions by giving any natural child, whether of a married couple or of a single person, the legal right to social services. More than two million couples, one out of ten, thus lived without legal ties. From 1985 to 1999 nearly all couples lived this way, at least at some point in their relationship. Also, public disapproval was no longer an issue. That said, the acceptance of concubinage undermined the institution of marriage. Couples thereafter had many options in choosing their social status: free union, marriage, PACS (*pacte civil de solidarité*). PACS, debated in Parliament in the late 1990s, created a contract, primarily aimed at establishing inheritance, between cohabitants, whether heterosexual or homosexual. On the eve of the year 2000, recognition of homosexual concubinage was the order of the day.

Thus the circle of a long history, beginning in 1750, is completed that allowed public opinion to tolerate and then to accept as normal both sexual relations outside of marriage and concubinage.

Translated from French by Sylvia J. Cannizzaro

See also Orphans and Foundlings (volume 3); Courtship, Marriage, and Divorce (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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PUBERTY



Alexandra M. Lord

Europeans have traditionally regarded puberty as a dangerous demarcation point between adulthood and childhood. Much of this anxiety has stemmed from the fact that puberty signals the emergence of adult sexuality. But concerns about puberty have also been linked to medical and lay perceptions of the mature and immature body. As a transition point between adulthood and childhood, puberty has often been characterized as a period of “great weakness.” In becoming an adult, the adolescent was believed to experience a radical physiological transformation. For boys, this transformation was defined in terms of the emergence of sexual desire, the appearance of body and facial hair, a deepening of the voice and a growth in height. For girls, puberty has been defined first and foremost in terms of menarche. This emphasis on menarche has been widespread despite the fact that Europeans from the ancients onwards have recognized that other factors—the appearance of body hair, the emergence of breasts and the development of sexual desire—are also linked with female puberty.

A PERIOD OF DIFFERENTIATION AND DANGER

Because physical maturity is linked to socioeconomic factors, ages at puberty have fluctuated from region to region and from period to period. In general, European women appear to have experienced menarche relatively late, at anywhere between fourteen and sixteen. Instances of women experiencing puberty at the age of twelve and thirteen can, of course, be found, but these cases are relatively uncommon and appear to have been regarded as highly unusual by contemporaries. Ages at menarche appear to have remained fairly constant before the nineteenth century; beginning in the late nineteenth century, improved nutrition, especially in Western Europe, began to have an impact upon the emergence of maturity. Ages at menarche then began to drop, with women experiencing

their first menstrual cycle at anywhere between twelve and fourteen.

In the absence of such a clear marker as menarche, calculating men’s ages at puberty is difficult. However, the link between sexuality and puberty may provide some insights into this subject. Medical texts, contemporary literature, journals, inquisition records, and a variety of other sources indicate that many boys began experimenting sexually around the age of twelve or thirteen. Religious rituals marking the emergence of adulthood, such as the Christian practice of confirmation and the Jewish bar mitzvah, would also seem to indicate that most Europeans viewed the emergence of adulthood as occurring between twelve and fourteen. This age appears to have been fairly constant. But in view of the role nutrition plays in the development of puberty, it is possible that physical maturity occurred later in preindustrial than in industrial Europe.

Occurring as they did at similar ages, male and female puberty were often seen in complementary terms. Thus the ability to produce semen was often viewed as a parallel process to the ability to produce menstrual fluid. Discussions of the changes in a women’s breasts and nipples were often paralleled by discussions of the changes which occurred in a young man’s nipples. And just as a young man’s voice became deeper with the emergence of puberty so too did a young woman’s voice become higher. These similarities did not, however, mean that female and male puberty were seen as being analogous. According to both lay and medical writings, female puberty resulted in an overall weakening of the body, with the end result being that women became both physically and mentally weaker than their male counterparts. Conversely, male puberty led to an increase in both physical and mental strength. In other words, rather than illustrating the similarities between the sexes, puberty underscored the differences between them.

Even in medical models that elided the differences between the sexes, such as Aristotle’s one-sex

model, puberty was seen as a pivotal point in differentiating between male and female traits. According to the Aristotelian schema, the primary difference between men and women was one of heat. Women, being colder, lacked the external genitals that characterized the male body. But puberty—among a range of other activities such as jumping or active sex—could transform the female body by causing an increase in heat, resulting in the emergence of male genitalia. Women could thus become men. Men could not become women as all creatures strove toward perfection. Being already perfect, the male body remained static, even during puberty. In medical texts and lay literature, this point was best illustrated by the story of Marie-Germain Garnier. Garnier had lived as a girl until, at the age of fifteen, she experienced puberty. This, combined with the violent and highly physical act of jumping across a ditch, caused a rupturing of Garnier's internal ligaments and, ultimately, the emergence of a penis. Garnier was now publicly acknowledged to be a man and his/her story was widely circulated. The famous sixteenth-century surgeon Ambroise Paré (1510–1590) claimed to have met Garnier, and he used the story to demonstrate the fungible nature of sexual difference in his medical text, *On Monsters and Marvels* (1573). Garnier's story also appeared in Michel de Montaigne's *Travel Journal* and *Essays* (1580), while a folk song insured that the story remained well known among both the literate and illiterate. Other less well known but equally graphic examples of women becoming men during puberty can be found in medical literature dating back to the ancients.

While this transformation from female to male was the most dramatic evidence of the body's instability during puberty, it was not the only sign of the body's precarious state during this period. Beginning with the ancient Greeks, medical practitioners routinely emphasized the role puberty played in initiating diseases. According to Hippocrates, adolescents experiencing puberty could expect to suffer from not only the diseases associated with childhood but from a range of other diseases as well, most dramatically prolonged fevers and epistaxis (bleeding from the nose). Later practitioners echoed this sentiment, arguing that puberty was often characterized by the onset of consumption (tuberculosis), convulsions, or epilepsy. On the positive side, puberty could also signal the termination of childhood diseases—in particular, the termination of epilepsy and the disappearance of testicular dropsy (an enlargement of the testicles). However, practitioners were more inclined to emphasize the relationship between puberty and the onset of new diseases; the termination of childhood diseases, while a characteristic of puberty, was often downplayed or even ignored. Puberty thus came

to be more commonly viewed in negative rather than positive terms.

FEMALE PUBERTY

While both male and female puberty were characterized as periods of dangerous instability, female puberty was widely regarded as the more dangerous of the two. The reasons for this belief stemmed, in large part, from the emphasis which Europeans placed on the appearance of a young girl's first menses. Because the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions all saw menstruation as a fundamentally unclean process, a young girl's first menstrual cycle marked a negative transition point in her life. Leviticus detailed the restrictions to be placed on a woman once she had experienced puberty; menstruating women were prohibited from engaging in any type of intercourse with men and from participating in various religious rituals. Nowhere was the stigma associated with menarche more evident than in the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition; before experiencing puberty, young girls were allowed to participate in a range of religious rituals as well as allowed freedom of movement within the church. The emergence of menarche, however, put an end to this freedom. While the Western church was not as consistent in forbidding menstruating women from full participation in various rituals, western theologians routinely portrayed menstruating women as unclean. Outside of the Christian tradition, adherence to Leviticus was even stricter. For Jewish women, puberty meant that a woman was now required to attend the *mikvah*, the ritual bath which cleansed a woman after her menses. And among Islamic gypsies, menstruation was also seen as a form of pollution—a clear indication that, while puberty might bestow adult status on a young girl, it also carried negative overtones.

This negative view of puberty was not limited to the realm of theology; it was endorsed by medical theory as well as folk beliefs. For pre-nineteenth-century medical practitioners, menstruation and its causes were regarded as inexplicable. While the theories explaining the reasons behind this process were myriad, the menses was almost always defined in terms of the weaknesses of the female body. Thus, in experiencing menarche, a young woman's body presented evidence of not only her unclean and therefore sinful state, but also of her physical inferiority.

Although menstruation was typically regarded within the context of physical inferiority and/or of a woman's sinful nature, folk practices that stressed the supernatural aspect of menarche were only slightly less disparaging. In preindustrial Europe, menstrual

blood was traditionally viewed as having magical properties such as the ability to tarnish mirrors or to cause flowers to wilt. While these attributes did not necessarily have positive connotations, they did accord the female body some measure of power. This emphasis on the supernatural powers of menstrual blood was reflected in attitudes toward menarche. Not surprisingly, a woman's first menstrual blood was believed to be especially potent; it was often collected and used in the concoction of various potions. Because menstrual blood was often viewed in conjunction with a woman's power over a man, this fluid was believed to be especially effective when used in love philtres. Mothers in medieval France, for example, collected their daughter's first menses to create a charm which would ensure that the girl's future husband would remain faithful to her.

Variations and abnormalities in menarche. Despite its unique and magical properties, medical theorists and folk healers maintained that menstrual blood was prey to a variety of external influences. Paramount among these was climate. Women living in southern and tropical climates were believed to experience an earlier puberty than their counterparts in northern and colder regions. According to this schema, southern women—women living in Italy and Spain—experienced puberty at the age of twelve or thirteen. In tropical regions, the age of puberty was believed to drop even lower; women in Africa were widely held to experience menarche at eight or nine. Northern women—women living in Britain or the Netherlands—experienced puberty at the age of fifteen or sixteen. In arctic regions, there was even some debate as to whether women *ever* experienced menarche. Women in Lapland, for example, were sometimes characterized as suffering from a permanent form of amenorrhea (an absent menses). Although there was no evidence to support this view of climatic influences and although medical practitioners began to dismiss this theory in the nineteenth century, this belief lingered among lay people. As a result, there is and always has been a tendency to regard women from southern regions as experiencing sexual maturity at an earlier age than their counterparts from northern regions. As an early puberty has often been linked to a greater sexual awareness and sexual promiscuity, this belief has led many Europeans to argue that women from southern or tropical regions are more inclined to sexual passion and sexual activity than their “colder” counterparts from northern Europe.

This link has also led many practitioners to argue that sexual maturity and morality are strongly connected. During the eighteenth century, the noted

French physician Jean Astruc (1684–1766) echoed the concerns of many of his contemporaries when he argued that an early menarche could be precipitated simply by the reading of obscene books or by unchaste touching. Astruc's theory was endorsed by a variety of physicians and found additional support among clergymen and moralists. This view continued to hold sway among lay people throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, in European culture, a late puberty has typically been regarded as preferable to an early one, since a late menarche is often viewed as evidence of a young girl's greater sense of delicacy and modesty.

While an early puberty was not desirable, most medical practitioners and lay people agreed that an excessive retardation in puberty was also best avoided. Young girls who reached the age of seventeen or eighteen without a menses were characterized as suffering from primary amenorrhea or chlorosis, a term which referred to the greenish cast the skin assumed. This greenish coloring was, in fact, believed to be so pronounced that lay practitioners often called the disease “the green sickness.” Throughout the Middle Ages and early modern period, chlorosis was believed to stem from one of two causes. In the first case, the body produced menstrual fluid, but because there was no egress for this fluid, blood accumulated within the body. This form of the disease was regarded as dangerous; although menstrual fluid was not believed to be toxic, its retention within the body could cause it to *become* toxic. In the second case, chlorosis was the direct result of a malformation within the hypersensitive uterus. This form of chlorosis was believed to be even more dangerous than the first. Practitioners and even lay people commonly maintained that this disease resulted in death if not properly treated. Possible causes for either form of primary amenorrhea were numerous, but beginning in the eighteenth century, medical practitioners began to argue that affluent and urban lifestyles were among the primary causes of this disorder. Although widely accepted, this theory was contradicted by the evidence, as most women who suffered from primary amenorrhea were drawn from the working classes.

To cure this disorder, practitioners advocated several different remedies. In cases where the fusion of the hymen prevented menarche, practitioners were told to pierce the hymen to allow the blood to escape. But while this treatment was frequently recommended, this procedure was rarely performed, undoubtedly because of concerns regarding a young girl's chastity. Although Europeans were aware that a torn hymen did not always indicate that a girl was not a virgin, most parents were reluctant to allow their daughters to un-

dergo this procedure. Actual treatments for amenorrhea were, as a result, often less dramatic. Emmenagogues—medications which were believed to provoke the menses—were commonly used, and adolescents' diets were closely monitored under the belief that a proper diet would foster the growth of the womb. Young girls were also warned of the dangers associated with indolent and excessively affluent lifestyles. Some historians have argued that this attack on affluent lifestyles is evidence of a class hostility on the part of medical practitioners, who were often from the lower middle class.

The medicalization of “normal menarche.” Hostility and criticism of their patients' lifestyles may also have reflected practitioners' uneasiness in discussing menarche with female patients. While historians have argued that there was no real taboo on discussions of menstruation in preindustrial Europe, the care and treatment of women experiencing menarche had traditionally been confined to the female-dominated practice of midwifery. Beginning in the seventeenth century, however, male medical practitioners began to argue that the dangers presented by menarche were such that medical assistance was necessary. Male practitioners now began to inquire about their patients' menstrual cycles, often noting the patient's age at menarche and using this age to predict and assess the patient's health. While some doctors argued that a woman who never experienced menarche was still a woman, the growing consensus held that a “normal menarche” was the primary hallmark of good health.

But even a “normal menarche” entailed the belief that women were more fragile and less stable than men. William Osborn, an eighteenth-century British medical practitioner, argued that a young girl's first menses was lightly colored. Her second and later menses assumed darker colors as a result of the fear that she experienced upon receiving her first menses and noting the external changes that puberty had wrought upon her body. Descriptions of puberty echoed such sentiments by describing it as a “crisis” and defining it as the result of vessels being “forced open” by an excess of blood. The emphasis on the violent nature of puberty may explain why so many girls were unprepared for menarche. Fear, combined with a growing prudery—especially during the nineteenth century—fed a vicious cycle: Many mothers were reluctant to discuss menarche with their daughters, and as a result some girls seem to have been caught unaware by their first menses. Their reactions of fear and distaste confirmed many practitioners' belief that menarche was an especially traumatic and turbulent period for a young girl.

In the nineteenth century, the British psychiatrist Henry Maudsley took this argument a step further, arguing that the onset of menstruation was so draining that girls needed to be cautioned against the overexpenditure of energy during this crucial period. According to Maudsley, the physical drains on the body during puberty were so great as to preclude any type of intellectual activity. Competition was to be avoided, as it could damage a young girl's nerves, pushing her over the edge into insanity. Overall, any overexpenditure of energy during puberty could, Maudsley insisted, result not only in amenorrhea and sterility but even the atrophy of the breasts. Thus, young girls who were careless of their health during this period would never become women; instead they would become “sexless beings” whose monstrous nature and inability to reproduce would result in race suicide. Although vigorously refuted by many of his contemporaries, Maudsley's argument was used throughout the late nineteenth century to justify the exclusion of women from higher education.

Hysteria and other disorders of female puberty.

Concerns regarding puberty were not limited to discussions about menarche. From the classical period into the twentieth century, female puberty was associated with a range of disorders. Among the best known of these were hysteria, insanity, and anorexia nervosa. The profound psychological and physiological changes which occurred at puberty were also believed to accentuate a tendency toward epilepsy, consumption, and convulsions. Experiences at puberty also shaped a woman's interaction with the supernatural: throughout the Middle Ages and most of the early modern period, young girls who were between twelve and sixteen were believed to be especially vulnerable to possession by demonic spirits. And in the nineteenth century, most famous female mediums claimed to have experienced an especially traumatic puberty.

Of all the diseases associated with puberty, hysteria has had the strongest and longest connection. This strong connection stems in large part from the fact that hysteria has traditionally been viewed as a disease of the womb. While the causes assigned to this disease have not always remained constant from period to period, most medical practitioners have associated the disease primarily with women. When practitioners have sought to disassociate this disorder from the womb, the implication has always been that hysteria was a gynecological problem—a disease rooted in uniquely female organs. Thus, puberty, the period when the womb underwent the most dramatic change, was traditionally linked with hysteria. Even doctors

who claimed that hysteria stemmed from neurological causes were inclined to see a connection between puberty and hysteria. Typically, Robert Whytt, an eighteenth-century professor of medicine at the University of Edinburgh, argued that hysteria was a nervous disorder but then went on to link the disease with adolescents and menstrual disorders. According to Whytt and many of his contemporaries, primary amenorrhea could and often did initiate an attack of hysteria. Even the fright which a young girl experienced upon her first menses could trigger a hysterical episode. Later medical practitioners took a more sophisticated approach, linking hysteria and puberty with a growing sense of sexual awareness. Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), for example, claimed that girls who expressed boyish attributes as children were most likely to experience hysteria at puberty. This hysteria was directly caused by the repression of a young girl's masculine desires; this repression, while presenting dangers to a young girl's health, was necessary if feminine desire was to emerge.

While alarming, hysteria was not the most significant threat which faced a young girl at puberty. According to many Victorian doctors, insanity posited one of the greatest dangers of adolescence. Mental breakdowns during puberty were always explained in biological terms—they were, in other words, a result of the physical changes associated with puberty. Yet evidence suggests that the insanity exhibited by many pubescent girls stemmed from the restrictions placed on them during this period. Certainly, the onset of menstruation and the corresponding development of breasts and body hair sharply limited the activities which a young girl could pursue; travel, exercise, and physical activities were often prohibited. Given the intense scrutiny which young girls underwent at this point in their lives, it is not surprising that many of them rebelled and that their rebellions were often couched in terms of mental instability.

Like insanity, anorexia nervosa has often been characterized as one of the most serious illnesses associated with adolescence and puberty. Varying forms of this disorder can be found throughout European history; however, it was not until the nineteenth century that Europeans began to make a strong connection between puberty and anorexia nervosa. Several instances of “fasting girls” received widespread press attention in the early part of this century, but it was only in 1868 that the British practitioner William Gull isolated and named the disease. While Gull did not make a direct equation between anorexia nervosa and puberty, he argued that the disease was common in young girls between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three, ages commonly associated with sexual matu-

ration. In 1873, the French physician Charles Lesègue termed the disease hysterical anorexia and claimed that food refusal stemmed from a conflicted relationship between a maturing girl and her parents. According to Gull, Lesègue, and their contemporaries, puberty was characterized by peculiar cravings and irregular eating patterns. In both medical and lay literature, these bizarre eating patterns were often taken as evidence of unnatural sexual appetites. Masturbation was not uncommon among these girls. To prevent this type of behavior, parents were told to monitor their daughter's health before it deteriorated. Again, the implication was clear; without proper care, a young girl's experience of puberty would be a negative one. This trend and view continued into the twentieth century. Although perceptions of anorexia nervosa shifted during this century, the disease continued to be associated with girls experiencing and/or completing puberty. In fact, some theorists began to argue that girls experiencing anorexia nervosa were attempting to retard or reverse their sexual maturation.

A host of other disorders—epilepsy, consumption, “long-continued fevers,” and convulsions—were also linked to puberty. The causes of these diseases were believed to be myriad. But most medical theorists linked these disorders with menarche. In those cases where the menses was absent or retarded, practitioners argued that any one of a range of illnesses could be expected. Consumption, for example, might occur because, lacking a natural egress, menstrual fluid would accumulate and collect in the weak and maturing lungs of adolescents. Consumption was also linked to the vanity which most young girls began to experience at puberty; according to some practitioners, the pre- and postpubescent girl's desire for a slim figure led to irregular eating which led, in turn, to consumption. Epilepsy and convulsions, both of which were seen as separate and distinct disorders, were often linked to the instability caused either by puberty itself or by the onset of new passions during this period.

While medical discussions such as these always cast puberty in dire terms, religious and lay perceptions of female puberty did little to contradict this view. It might be argued, in fact, that medical practitioners took their cue from Judeo-Christian doctrine; as evidence of a woman's sinful nature and impurity, the menses and its onset could never be regarded with equanimity. But even in lay terms, the onset of menarche would always be a troubling issue. While puberty signaled the emergence of womanhood, it also signaled the advent of a restricted life. Before the development of the tampon and effective

birth control in the twentieth century, menarche and menstruation would always circumscribe a woman's activities.

MALE PUBERTY

Male puberty has traditionally received less attention from medical, lay, and religious writers than its female counterpart. To some degree, this more limited emphasis may have been the result of the more diffuse nature of sexual maturation in men. Although many ancient and medieval writers argued that male puberty began at a specific moment (most typically at the age of fourteen), and that the production of semen paralleled the onset of the menses, the process of maturation is not as clearly delineated in men as it is in women. This lack of a clear demarcation point for male puberty was not, however, the only reason for limited discussions of this topic in religious, lay, and medical literature. A young boy's sexual maturation, while not without dangers, carried less negative overtones than that experienced by his sister. For theologians, a young boy's maturation might incline him toward masturbation and other forms of illicit sexual activity, but it did not automatically render him impure. In fact, religious rituals commemorating a young boy's coming of age were often couched in highly positive terms. For lay writers, male puberty entailed the emergence of adulthood—and as male adulthood brought freedom, not restrictions, male puberty was often depicted in relatively positive terms. Medical writers agreed, presenting puberty as a period when a young boy came into his full strength. Viewed from this perspective, it is not surprising that most Europeans regarded male puberty with less concern than they did its female counterpart.

This did not mean that Europeans completely ignored male puberty. From the ancients onwards, the subject was discussed in both medical and lay texts—although always as a subsidiary to female puberty. The relative absence of medical literature on male puberty stems from the fact that the male body was never medicalized to the extent that its female counterpart was. While the female body was the focus of midwifery and gynecological texts, the male body was usually discussed within the context of general medicine. As a result, the unique nature of male biology was often ignored.

Concern over male sexuality. According to many ancient and medieval medical practitioners, the key difference between the sexes lay in one of heat. Men were hotter than women, a characteristic which en-

abled them to grow facial hair and extensive body hair. Although some practitioners speculated that men matured at a slower rate than women, this type of speculation often took a back seat to more general discussions of sexual maturation. For early medical writers, as for their later counterparts, male puberty was often directly linked to a young boy's emerging sexuality.

During the Middle Ages, writers as varied as Hildegard of Bingen and Albertus Magnus agreed that the production of semen was not necessary for a boy to experience sexual pleasure. Puberty did not, in other words, result in the emergence of sexual desire. However, puberty did mark an increase in this desire. The release of this passion—through masturbation and even intercourse—was regarded with some ambivalence. Albertus Magnus argued that moderate sexual activity during this period would enable the body to grow faster. Sexual intercourse could also contribute to the greater nourishment of the body as the ejaculation of semen entailed the expulsion of “humidities” which impeded the body's heat. But while Albertus Magnus and other writers might argue that sexual activity was natural and to be encouraged during this period, this did not mean that medieval writers called for unlimited sexual activity. Most lay and medical writers agreed that excessive intercourse during this period could harm a young boy. But if excessive sexual activity could damage a young man's health, so too could sexual inactivity. Medieval writers warned their readers that an inability to produce semen at this period denoted a lifetime of impotence.

The dangers of masturbation. Beginning in the eighteenth century and stretching into the Victorian era, practitioners began to be more condemning of the dangers associated with sexual activity during puberty. As numerous historians have pointed out, the Enlightenment signaled a shift in thinking about masturbation, illicit sexuality, and, therefore, puberty. Beginning with the publication of the anonymous *Onania* (c. 1710) and S. A. Tissot's *Onanism or a Treatise upon the Disorders Produced by Masturbation* in 1760, masturbation by young boys came under increasing attack. By the nineteenth century, it was commonly accepted that the temptation to masturbate was especially prevalent in young boys experiencing puberty; according to most medical literature, this activity could and did permanently damage a young boy's health. Even writers such as the Victorian physician George Drysdale, who maintained that the generative organs required “due exercise” from puberty onwards, spoke of the dangers associated with “self-pollution.”

Resulting as it did in the wasting of semen, this practice was commonly believed to cause incurable nervous and hypochondriac complaints as well as an overall “constitutional weakness.” These fears regarding adolescent masturbation stemmed from a variety of factors. Beginning in the eighteenth century, a growing number of medical and lay texts began to explore the moral welfare of children and adolescents. Texts condemning adolescent masturbation were, then, a part of a wider publishing trend in which the experiences of childhood and adolescence were being prioritized.

Although sexual maturation could, at least in biological terms, enable young men to marry and produce children, Europeans did not encourage young men to marry immediately after puberty. The reasons for delayed marriage were, of course, economic, but medical writers provided a justification for later marriages by viewing sexual activity during and immediately after puberty in nonreproductive terms. Condemnations of masturbation may have been linked to fears that young men were marrying later; without the natural outlet of marriage, young men were believed to turn to masturbation for relief. It was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with the publication and acceptance of works by writers such as Havelock Ellis (1859–1939) and Sigmund Freud, that masturbation during puberty came to be viewed in less negative terms.

Puberty and the attributes of masculinity. The external changes wrought by puberty also reflected a young man’s sexuality. Typically, the appearance of facial and body hair was seen as a mark of virility. Both medical and lay literature claimed that the hairier the man, the more powerful was his libido. Thus, both the quantity and location of the hair which appeared on a young man during puberty were viewed as evidence of his sexual temperament. As men from southern Europe were often believed to be more hirsute than their counterparts from northern Europe, this connection between hair and sexuality was undoubtedly behind the belief that southern men were more sexually active than their northern counterparts. While the sexuality of southern women was depicted in negative terms, the virility of southern and hirsute man was widely admired.

Concerns regarding puberty and the physical changes which occurred during this period were not linked solely to sexuality. Before puberty, young men were believed to possess a feminine appearance; in lay literature, prepubescent boys, with their smooth skin and high voices, often played upon their sexual ambiguity by assuming feminine personas. This type of

gender distortion was frowned upon in postpubescent boys, and concerns regarding sexual ambiguity can be found in the writings of moralists and medical practitioners. Of particular concern to these writers was the descent of the testicles, as the failure of these organs to descend at puberty would result in sterility. But while this aspect of puberty was frequently discussed, treatments for this disorder remained rudimentary and ineffective throughout most of European history. Along with the natural descent of the testicles, practitioners also discussed the external changes which occurred at puberty and the ways in which these changes should be regarded. Medical texts informed readers that, although alarming, the changes wrought by puberty were not to be feared. Thus the appearance of a milky serum in a young boy’s breasts during puberty was, medical texts insisted, as natural as the appearance of facial hair. Neither should be regarded as evidence of an abnormality.

In fact, in discussions of male puberty, the emphasis was almost always positive, stressing the naturalness of a boy’s physical development. This view reflected the widely held belief that puberty resulted in a surge of strength for young boys. In becoming men, boys left the protected world of childhood to enter into a world of wider opportunities and, on occasion, greater physical activity. Typically, the eighteenth-century French writer M. Brouzet argued that boys experiencing puberty were naturally attracted by activities such as hunting and militaristic games. This attraction was not surprising, as puberty entailed not only a surge of physical strength but also the emergence of greater confidence. While natural and to be expected, this vitality could be sapped if proper care was not taken. Education was especially crucial at this period, as it helped a young boy to become aware of his new masculine role. For many moralists and medical writers, this meant that separation of the sexes was to be encouraged during this pivotal period in a young man’s life.

The fear that a young man would fail to assume masculine characteristics even after puberty was, of course, a very real one. The rigid gender divisions of European society required the creation of a clear demarcation point, which differentiated between the masculine and feminine spheres. Young boys who failed to become masculine as teenagers distorted gender roles and were thus feared by their contemporaries. Concerns regarding male puberty were, as a result, most significant at periods when masculinity was in doubt or under attack. Under normal circumstances, however, a young man’s puberty was depicted in positive terms, for it opened up for him a world of wider opportunities.

CONCLUSION

Throughout European history, lay, medical, and religious writers have viewed puberty as a period of great instability. These views stemmed in part from the fact that this period was characterized by the creation of a sharp demarcation point between masculine and feminine. Before puberty, gender roles, while distinct, were not always defined in absolute terms. The physical changes wrought by puberty, however, served to accentuate and justify the social divisions of gender within this society. When looked at through the lens of gender, puberty took on

sharply different meanings. For women, puberty was often viewed in negative terms, as it marked the end of a young girl's freedom. For men, of course, the converse was true; puberty marked the emergence of freedom. Despite shifts in medical perceptions of the body and despite the changes in religious views which have occurred over the last five hundred years, these views of puberty have remained fairly consistent over time. Only in the twentieth century—and then only gradually and incompletely—did new views of sexuality and the development of new methods of artificial birth control modify traditional concerns to some degree.

See also other articles in this section.

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MASTURBATION



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Masturbation is usually regarded as an asocial, even antisocial act, normally conducted in private (or at least under conditions of some furtiveness) by an individual, without engaging with another person as sexual partner—except perhaps as the object of voyeurism or fantasy. However, because of the social loading with which all sexual acts are freighted, and thus the social implications of even the most solipsistic act of sexual gratification, masturbation (self-abuse, onanism, the solitary pleasure, defilement with the hand, the secret vice, bashing the bishop, squeezing the lizard, spanking the monkey, jerking off, wanking, etc.) has significant claims to be discussed among other manifestations of the sexual urge.

It is probably the most universal of all sexual practices, at least among men. Surveys on the subject since the nineteenth century suggest that well over 90 percent of men masturbate at some time during their lives. However, the figures for women are significantly lower, though different surveys give a much wider range of variation. Women tend to start at a later age than men, and their frequency of masturbation is around half that of men. The practice has not been the subject of legal regulation, though an 1896 British case of a man arrested for “procuring an indecent act with himself” (presumably in public) is on record (*R. v. Jones and Bowerbank*).

Masturbation is of particular interest to the historian since it quite suddenly became the subject of a medico-moral panic early in the eighteenth century. Although this panic underwent mutations over the course of time, it did not disperse until well into the twentieth century. Its repercussions are still making themselves felt.

Allusions to masturbatory activity can be traced back into antiquity, although the most famous ancient example, the crime for which Onan was struck dead (Genesis 38:9), was not masturbation at all but coitus interruptus, when Onan refused to impregnate the widow of his deceased brother according to the levirate requirement. A rather more positive vision was perhaps conveyed by Egyptian myths of origin cred-

iting the creation of the universe to masturbatory acts by divine beings: Ra of Heliopolis, for example, emerged from the primeval swamp, masturbated, swallowed his semen, and impregnated himself with the god Shu and the goddess Tefnut. However, it would appear that in the case of humans, for whom the act was not procreative as it was for deities but rather the inverse, masturbation was, if not completely stigmatized, not approved or recommended. The Greek Cynic philosopher Diogenes is purported to have masturbated publicly, remarking that it was a pity that the pangs of hunger could not be assuaged as easily as the pangs of lust, simply by rubbing the affected part. In classical antiquity masturbation was largely framed within wider discourses of decorum, propriety, and avoidance of excess that were generally applicable to manifestations of sexual desire.

Within Christianity masturbation, which was largely believed to be particularly the vice of the celibate and the young, was included under the heading of sins of the flesh and considered to contravene natural law. However, it was not the subject of particular scrutiny in the confessional, and unlike other sins of the flesh (such as sodomy), it was not penalized under secular law within Christendom.

For many centuries the Western medical tradition considered it to be no more deleterious than any other manifestation of lust—that is, if not indulged to excess. Indeed, within the Galenic humoral system of medicine, excessive continence causing retention of semen was regarded as almost equally damaging.

THE INVENTION OF A MENACE

These attitudes changed some time around the first decade of the eighteenth century, for reasons that are still the subject of considerable historiographical debate. The immediate cause is well known. Sometime during the first two decades of the century an anonymous volume entitled *Onania: or, The Heinous Sin of Self-Pollution, and All its Frightful Consequences, in*

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Both Sexes, Consider'd, with Spiritual and Physical Advice to those, Who Have Already Injur'd Themselves by This Abominable Practice. And Seasonable Admonition to the Youth of the Nation, (of both Sexes) and Those Whose Tuition They Are Under, Whether Parents, Guardians, Masters, or Mistresses was published in London. Its pathbreaking message about the uniquely disastrous consequences of the solitary vice was disseminated throughout Europe. Its claims for the physical deleteriousness of masturbation seem the stranger, given that the anonymous author—possibly a Dr. Bekkers, an obscure figure—appears in fact not to have been a doctor but a clergyman, or at least at one time in orders. Certainly he gave more attention to the sinfulness of the practice than its harmfulness, even while proffering a patent quack remedy. The work probably deserves a place in the history of advertising as an early example of creating anxiety about an alleged affliction while holding out a remedy for it. At this stage, masturbation, besides having terrible spiritual consequences, was presented as the cause of a plethora of physical (rather than mental) ailments, affecting not only the genitals themselves (with stranguries, or the slow and painful emission of urine; priapism, a painful persistent state of erection; impotence; and discharges) but the entire bodily system (with epilepsy, consumption, fainting fits), and causing infertility in both sexes.

The book went into many editions. Letters purportedly from grateful readers (and replies) were published in the later editions. Its actual impact is hard to gauge, but at the very least it was presumably profitable enough to be kept in print promoting the advertised medicines. It was very much part of a subculture of quackery and did not figure in serious medical discourse, although there were a number of imitations as well as counterattacks. In 1724, Bernard de Mandeville, in *A Modest Defence of Publick Stews* (i.e., public brothels), perhaps a satire on the onanism panic, argued that fornication with prostitutes was preferable to masturbation.

Critics argued that naming and describing the loathsome practice was itself a vicious action likely to deprave and debauch. Earlier silence on the subject may have been due to the feeling that it was not for public discussion. The author of *Onania* and his successors, however, claimed that the habit was so widespread, and so deleterious, that outspokenness was the only remedy. Innocence was not its own best preservation; it was better by far to warn the young against this pervasive danger. They advanced the “public interest” argument for speaking about forbidden practices: this was an educational enterprise warning against vicious habits and offering remedies for their

consequences. Some historians have argued that, under the guise of an apparently high-minded agenda of social responsibility, tracts on onanism were in fact a new kind of pornography, inciting the sins they claimed to deplore. While it is hard to imagine luridly gothic accounts of the evils of self-abuse as a turn-on, the existence of the literature may have brought the possibility of the practice to the attention of some who had never previously considered it.

The permeability of the boundaries between commercial quackery, orthodox medicine, and popular anxieties, which is a noticeable theme in the history of this “great fear,” as Jean Stengers and Anne Van Neck have called it, is demonstrated by the appearance of a work on the subject by the respectable and reputable Swiss physician Samuel Tissot. Initially published as *Tentamen de morbis ex manustupratione* in 1758, it was reissued in French two years later in 1760 as *L'Onanisme, ou Dissertation physique sur les maladies produites par la masturbation* (Onanism, or a treatise upon the disorders produced by masturbation). It was rapidly translated into English, German, Dutch, and Italian and remained current for nearly a century. It was heavily indebted to *Onania*, in particular relying on a detailed if critical analysis of the letters from supposed sufferers published in successive editions of the latter.

Tissot constructed a respectable theory on the cause of the disease of masturbation by careful and selective citation from texts of the ancients and Renaissance physicians about the evils of excessive lust in general. The effects he described were pervasive, afflicting the digestive, respiratory, and nervous systems, creating debility and pallor, and affecting the faculties and memory. In women it caused hysteria and a plethora of uterine problems. Unlike the anonymous author of *Onania*, Tissot produced physiologically based arguments consonant with current medical theories for the reasons why masturbation had such evil consequences. On the one hand he drew on humoral theory for an explanatory model, making the suggestion (which became an enduring tradition) that the loss of one ounce of seminal fluid was equivalent to losing forty ounces of blood. On the other he proposed that the activity was a damaging expenditure of nervous energy in an artificially caused convulsive spasm, upsetting the natural balance of the bodily mechanism. He did not propose any patent remedy for the affliction, preferring to make recommendations for a regimen, such as cold baths, a healthy lifestyle, exercise, regularity of the bowels, moderate amounts of sleep, and an endeavor to keep one's thoughts pure. However, quinine, iron water, and other strengthening medicines were also mentioned.

Masturbation became universally reprobated in Europe. There seems to have been little difference in response between Catholic and Protestant cultures, although there were local variations. The question that fascinates the historian is why, at this particular juncture, a previously largely ignored sexual practice came to be seen as the root of a massive amount of physical harm. It has been argued that the new view of masturbation provided an explanation for a variety of bodily ills that existing medical science was ill equipped to account for, at a time when an increasingly rationalist climate of thought was rejecting supernatural causality. But this argument does not account for the staying power of the belief in masturbation's ill effects; that belief persisted well beyond the rise of alternative explanations for many of the diseases attributed to the practice, although the catalog of its alleged consequences often altered.

With the development of urbanization, a growing emphasis on privacy, and changing social patterns (for example, increasing differentiation and stratification between family members and servants), old community forms and mechanisms of control were breaking down. Thus self-abuse, it may be argued, threatened social and community ties already seen as precarious. Masturbation may have actually increased during the mid-eighteenth century as a result of the rise of a bourgeoisie promoting repressive sexual morality and foreclosing traditional options for sexual gratification among the unmarried. A rise in the age of marriage also may have contributed. Contemporaries occasionally attributed it—or its increasing prevalence and malignance—to the luxurious habits of new urban affluence, novel reading, tea drinking, and other pernicious manifestations of modern life. It is a curious fact, and possibly not coincidental, that the eighteenth century saw a massive production of erotica, in particular printed pornographic texts, very different from productions of earlier folk traditions of carnivalesque bawdiness.

A psychoanalytically influenced perspective argues that, as the idea of hierarchical authority was subjected to serious erosion in the period between the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution, individuals were faced with greater responsibility for themselves and their families. The anxieties thus generated fostered the development of phobic and compulsive processes—for example, the panic over this “least controllable, least harmful” manifestation of the sexual impulse—as a psychic barrier against pervasive sexual guilt and anxiety. The shift from a culture of externally imposed “shame mechanisms” of social control to one of internally generated “guilt” during this period might also be invoked. However, the panic

was not coterminous with the most obviously Protestant and modernizing cultures of northwestern Europe but was far more wide-ranging.

The relationship between masturbation and what might seem a far more pressing cause of concern regarding sexual conduct, venereal diseases of epidemic prevalence, is convoluted. Many of the symptoms attributed to masturbation—genital discharges, lassitude and debility, sores, rashes and spots, uterine disorders—could well have been those of syphilis, gonorrhea, or a range of other unidentified venereal afflictions. Alternatively, perhaps the prevalence of venereal diseases led some individuals to take the logical step of resorting to masturbation as a substitute for potentially dangerous copulation for the relief of sexual desire. Yet for well over a century promiscuous intercourse (at least for men) was seen as a lesser danger than masturbation, and resort to prostitutes was sometimes recommended as a “cure.”

It has also been suggested that fears about masturbation in children in particular were generated by the greater value being attached to children and childhood and increasing anxiety over their moral and physical welfare. A concern for the problem figures in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's programmatic text on progressive child rearing, *Émile* (1762). Yet the cause and effect of this argument could almost be inverted: that is, it could be said that much of the attentive surveillance of the young by parents or within the pedagogic context was being advocated precisely on the grounds that without stringent attention children might fall into “secret habits” of self-abuse.

The changing status of servants within the household fostered growing concern about entrusting them with the care and upbringing of the children of their social superiors. Anxieties about the possible “corruption” of children by social inferiors who might teach them habits of masturbation were pervasive. The extent of the horror around the issue of children not merely falling through ignorance into a deplorable habit but being inducted into it by adults entrusted with their care was demonstrated (but with a very different social and class slant) in the accusation against Marie-Antoinette in the Revolutionary Tribunal that she had taught and encouraged the dauphin (Louis XVII) to masturbate. Thus, the practice could also be subsumed under a rhetoric of “aristocratic debauchery.”

FROM DEBILITY TO INSANITY?

Tissot remained the leading medical authority on masturbation well into the nineteenth century. There

was no advance in medical thinking on the subject, although it continued to be a topic of medical concern and pedagogic intervention and the basis of a flourishing industry in quack remedies. The next major shift took place around 1840, as various evolving specialties within medicine took an interest.

Several authorities had already expressed the opinion that masturbation played a significant role in the etiology of insanity. As early as 1816 the French physician Jean-Étienne Esquirol wrote that “masturbation is recognized in all countries as a common cause of insanity.” In 1839 Sir William Ellis, in his *Treatise on Insanity*, asserted that “by far the most frequent cause of fatuity is debility of the brain and nervous system . . . in consequence of the pernicious habit of masturbation.” However, views among physicians were not monolithic, and a number of German authorities in particular expressed some caution about the actual causal relationship of masturbation to insanity, suggesting that the habit might follow upon the onset of the latter rather than lead to it.

While the above writers assumed that masturbation might provoke various kinds of mental disorder, by the 1870s, predominantly in Britain, the category of actual “masturbatory insanity” was defined. Authorities such as David Skae, T. S. Clouston, and Henry Maudsley argued for a particular form of mental disturbance brought on by self-abuse. While some association between masturbation and insanity, especially in adolescents, was believed to exist, there was a relatively rapid retreat from this extreme position: both Clouston and Maudsley conceded a few years later that the connection was far from clear. But masturbation was still not regarded as innocuous. If not the cause of actual insanity, it was indicted for generating “neurasthenia” and nervous disorders.

No simple shift occurred from the idea that masturbation produced physical symptoms to the notion that it caused insanity. Effects on the brain and nerves were mentioned in the eighteenth century, while the physical debilitation threatening the masturbator remained prominent during the nineteenth century. There were shifts of emphasis rather than radical changes.

One of the works most influential on the perception of masturbation throughout Europe in the nineteenth century was Claude-François Lallemand's three-volume *Des pertes seminales involontaires* (On involuntary seminal discharges; 1842). He was more concerned with the pathological loss of semen—“spermatorrhoea”—through involuntary causes, which could be brought about through the irritation of the genital organs set up by habitual masturbation. “Spermatorrhoea” was seen as being at least as deleterious as

masturbation, with the additional horror that it could not be terminated by exercising willpower and self-discipline. It was a godsend to quacks. The imprimatur of Lallemand's name gave it credence within the medical profession, but doctors were careful to differentiate themselves from “advertising quacks” and their often spurious diagnoses of this complaint.

By the last quarter or so of the nineteenth century a few physicians in several European countries were beginning to question the role ascribed to masturbation in the etiology of so many disorders, and some even pronounced it harmless. Sir James Paget, in Britain, suggested during the 1870s that, although a filthy and unmanly habit, it was no more deleterious than sexual intercourse. Like intercourse, it could be debilitating in excess, and because no partner was needed, it was easier to pursue it recklessly.

THERAPEUTICS AND GENDER ATTITUDES

History has paid a good deal of attention to the brutal prescriptions advocated by the medical profession for the eradication of masturbation (not always adequately differentiated from treatments for spermatorrhoea); around the middle of the nineteenth century, these replaced previous recommendations of lifestyle and dietetic changes. For two or three decades—roughly speaking from the 1850s to 1870s—surgical solutions were proposed to eradicate the peril.

This ruthless agenda may have been the result of the rising belief in the relationship between masturbation and insanity. It may also have been influenced by the advent of the concept of public health and the desirability to the state of a healthy populace. A number of epidemic diseases had been, if not totally eradicated, at least severely curtailed in their effects by programs of sanitary engineering and the enforced quarantine of infectious individuals, while compulsory vaccination schemes seemed to offer the end of the dangerous and disfiguring disease of smallpox. It was also an age of heroic surgery as antisepsis and anesthesia enabled surgeons to go boldly where no scalpel had gone before, a development that may have encouraged belief in surgical cures for previously incurable and intractable conditions.

Most interest has been shown in the relatively rare and unusual operations inflicted on women and girls. The clitoridectomies performed by the British surgeon Isaac Baker Brown during the 1860s in an attempt to alleviate the various disorders in women that he attributed to self-abuse are often cited. Baker Brown's procedures, both operative and in the promotion of his theories, raised an enormous furor within the medical profession, and he was expelled from the London Obstetrical Society after an acrimonious meeting. He subsequently went mad and died shortly afterward. The operation seems to have fallen into more or less total disrepute in Britain. Contemporaneously in France, the eminent French medical scientist Paul Broca argued in a debate at the Société de Chirurgie de Paris in 1864 that infibulating a girl of five (fastening the sexual organs with a clasp), while a drastic solution to onanism, was preferable to the last resort of clitoridectomy, which nevertheless featured in discussion as a possible expedient.

What gives such cases a possibly undue prominence is their relative infrequency. Masturbation in the male was the object of far greater social anxiety and medico-moral and pedagogic policing throughout the nineteenth century, but it was a constant factor rather than the begetter of scandalous causes célèbres.

Such cases as did arise largely affected quacks rather than legitimate doctors: in Britain following the Medical Act of 1858, some members of the medical profession and moral reform organizations made a concerted effort to prosecute profiteering quacks who drummed up fears of the consequences of masturbation and the dangers of spermatorrhoea and then offered expensive "remedies" (sometimes conjoined with blackmail).

Contemporary accounts suggest that it was very hard for men to avoid the vast amount of propaganda put out by the industry in spurious remedies—posters, handbills distributed in the streets, advertisements in newspapers—even if they managed to spurn the allurements of "anatomical museums," which, with their luridly realistic waxwork representations of the horrific consequences of self-abuse, offered a mix of enlightenment and titillation as a come-on for the sale of patent remedies. In the upper and middle classes public schools provided both a hotbed for the dissemination of masturbatory and homoerotic practices and a source, via schoolmasters' sermons, of more or less explicit horror-mongering about these practices.

There was thus a widespread climate of fear among men about masturbation. This fear-mongering did not just apply to children or young boys but was also aimed at young men, as the increasingly late age of marriage in the middle and upper classes led to concerns about how they managed their sexuality before it achieved a legitimate outlet. Many men were reluctant to take their anxieties to their medical practitioners, fearful of moral condemnation and, perhaps, of the remedies that might be applied. The leading British medical journal *The Lancet* in 1870 mentioned the deployment of caustic preparations and cauterization to render erection painful and guard against improper manipulation, as well as correcting any oversensitivity of the organ in question. Blistering and penile infibulation were also recommended and applied. John Laws Milton's much republished medical tract *On Spermatorrhoea* (1875) included illustrations of toothed and spiked penis rings and electrical alarm systems intended to prevent erection, and thus nocturnal emissions, in sufferers from this dread disease. While similar devices were sold by quacks, they usually purveyed less painful and drastic treatments, such as herbal compounds and "galvanic belts" (which seem to have deployed electricity as a magic revitalizing power, rather than giving electric shocks to the wearer). The topic was also addressed by the proponents of alternative health systems such as phrenology (which held that mental faculties were indicated by the shape of the skull), herbalism, naturopathy (a system of treatment that eschewed drugs and surgery in

favor of natural remedies and a healthy regimen), and hydrotherapy.

Parents and teachers were exhorted to employ rigorous surveillance of children (the constant repetition of such exhortations may suggest that this was less practiced than promoted). Corporal punishment and threats of “cutting it off,” as well as emphasizing the potential long-term damage to health of playing with the genitals, were recommended. Restraints might also be imposed in cases where the undesirable habit was already established.

MASTURBATION AND NATIONAL DEGENERACY

During the later decades of the nineteenth century a new campaign against the dangers of self-abuse was mounted. Largely directed against the adolescent boy, and initially focusing on the upper and middle classes, it was fed by anxieties about national fitness and the capacity of the existing elite to continue to rule in the face of challenges from rival nations and rising social groups within the nation. The constant subtext of venereal disease, in a period during which clinical observation and investigation were increasingly revealing

the long-term and congenital effects of syphilis, was also a factor.

While similar manifestations occurred in other European countries, possibly the most coherent form of this new mutation of masturbation panic can be seen in the “social purity” movement that arose in Great Britain. This movement represented an alliance between feminists who had fought against the regulation of prostitution under the Contagious Diseases Acts of the 1860s, religious interests (provincial non-conformists in particular), public health advocates (medical and nonmedical), and educators.

While “social purity” cannot be reduced to its campaign to purify the nation through the eradication of masturbation, this was a significant element of its strategy. For the feminists within the movement, male lust and its concomitant, the double moral standard (sexual laxity in the male was a peccadillo, in women grounds for social excommunication), was at the root of much that was wrong with society, both on the moral level and in the propagation of disease. It was therefore argued that, since lust was already ineradicably ingrained in the majority of adult males, the target should be youth. Social purity campaigners believed that children should be provided with the clean, pure, true facts about sex and reproduction at an early age, preferably by their mothers, as a counterweight to any misinformation they might acquire from servants or “corrupt companions.”

For adolescent boys, however, it was recognized that further warnings were necessary, in particular in the social class in which boys were traditionally sent away to school. This view fit in with the agenda of educators who saw themselves as preparing a new generation of the ruling class of an imperial nation, who needed to be inculcated with the values of self-discipline, self-control, and mastery over the instincts.

Exactly how masturbation endangered the future leaders of the country was not clear-cut. On the one hand, indulgence in self-abuse was seen as fatally eroding habits of self-discipline and resistance to carnal temptation: ultimately the sufferer would be unable to resist the temptations of later life, such as solicitations to fornication and the associated risk of contracting venereal disease. On the other, the traditional discourse of the debilitating effect of masturbation itself was still present, and its ghastly effects on health, sanity, future sexual functioning, and the capacity to father healthy children featured prominently in the growing genre of advice literature.

The awful warnings of social-purity sex educators differed, however, from those of the commercial quacks, who continued to flourish. The social purity

campaigners offered the possibility of redemption, condemning the despair created by quack literature so that profit could be made from spurious “cures.” The problem was to some extent remoralized, with religion being advocated as a fortifying resource against the habit and prayer commended as a weapon against temptation. The traditional lifestyle prescriptions were made: cold baths, hard beds, early rising, physical exercise, the avoidance of rich and highly seasoned foods as well as alcohol, the distraction of the mind from impure thoughts. In particularly difficult cases, consulting a genuine doctor was recommended.

A vast amount of literature was produced by the social purity movement. In addition to books such as the age-graded works of the American clergyman Sylvanus Stall in his “Self and Sex” series, *What a Young Boy [or Young Man, Young Husband, Man of Forty-Five] Ought to Know* (1897–1907), widely disseminated in Europe, a plethora of pamphlets was produced both by individuals and a range of organizations, distributed free or at a cost of a few pence. These pamphlets found probably their largest outlet in the various youth organizations being established to cope with the newly defined problem of adolescence.

SEXOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new science of sexology endeavored to investigate sexual behavior, initially in its more anomalous manifestations. Richard von Krafft-Ebing, the Austrian psychiatrist and forensic medicine expert, noted “onanism” as well as degenerate heredity in many cases in his encyclopedic compilation of sexual deviations, *Psychopathia sexualis*, first published in 1886 and subsequently in much expanded editions. However, other writers, notably the British doctor and man of letters Havelock Ellis, drew on anthropological and animal studies to suggest that “auto-erotism” was an almost universal practice. Far from being a uniquely human vice, many animals resorted to analogous behavior, and it was found even among the “primitive” races, contradicting the notion that it was a malign by-product of civilization.

Gradually a somewhat more humane attitude to masturbation emerged. If it was still regarded as reprehensible and not to be encouraged, the horror-mongering of earlier epochs, it was argued, had done much to cause the neurotic sufferings attributed to the practice itself. This new view, however, took quite

some time to influence general opinions on the matter. Sir Robert Baden-Powell's *Scouting for Boys* (1908) and *Rovering to Success* (1922) threatened dire outcomes if "beastliness" was practiced, and these texts were published with relevant passages unchanged until well after the Second World War. Leading child-care manuals of the interwar period advised tying children's hands at bedtime to prevent them from masturbating, even as the idea of gently distracting the child's attention, as opposed to threats and punishment, was creeping in as the best mode of handling the "problem." The most progressive works even came to define it as a natural stage in childhood and adolescent development (though "neurotic" in adults).

Marie Stopes, the British birth control advocate and author of the best-selling, widely translated marriage manual, *Married Love: A New Contribution to the Solution of Sex Difficulties* (1918), became a prototypical agony aunt (or advice columnist) for her sexually troubled contemporaries; letters from her male readers suggest that anxieties about the possible damage done by masturbation remained exceedingly prevalent throughout the interwar period. Men of all ages and social classes feared they had affected their health, their ability to father children, and their capacity to function sexually by sometimes very fleeting episodes of adolescent self-abuse. Some of the letter writers specifically cited works such as Stall's and similar social purity literature, but most seem to have picked up their fears as part of the general atmosphere of the time. Occasionally there are faint hints of counterdiscourses—that it was part of the passage to manhood (the social purity literature sometimes suggested that wicked older men might impart this view to boys), that it was preferable to going with prostitutes or ruining good girls. However, in general masturbation for men seems to have become the focus for a range of inchoate anxieties about their own sexuality and sexual functioning, about male desire and "manliness."

What is striking is the lack of any similar anxiety expressed by Stopes's numerous female correspondents. Very few indeed expressed the kind of hysterical fear of ruin characteristic of so many male correspondents. This suggests that whereas male contact with the idea of masturbation was assumed to be almost inevitable, thus requiring the torrent of warning, girls were deemed much less imperiled, and therefore warning them about a vice they had never thought of and were unlikely to come across would be counterproductive. Stopes herself, though reassuring to male fears about lasting damage, was not entirely positive about male masturbation; however, she conceded in correspondence, if not in published works, that masturbation was a possibly permissible expedient for the

resolution of sexual tension in the unmarried mature female.

Like a number of her contemporaries, Stopes suggested that masturbation unfitted a person for marriage by accustoming its practitioner to forms of sensation and stimulus unlike those of conjugal sexual intercourse, for the man as well as the woman. Those who were influenced by and sympathetic to psychoanalytic thinking also suggested that the role of fantasy in masturbatory acts might be psychologically deleterious to sexual adjustment. Others suggested that the practice, if overindulged, led to antisocial solipsism. The view, based on a somewhat bastardized popular Freudianism that became prevalent in the 1950s, that clitoral excitation in the woman prevented the transition to the "mature" vaginal orgasm does not seem to have enjoyed much currency outside actual psychoanalytic circles in the interwar period.

THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

One might imagine that with the increasing spread, via medical, pedagogic, and child-rearing literature, of the notion that masturbation did no harm, the gruesome history of the "great fear" must have ended about 1950. This was far from the case. While "old-fashioned" fears were scorned, well into the 1970s works of sex education stated that it was much better to try not to masturbate. Older texts with their much less benign messages continued to circulate. The masturbator might not be seen as headed for an early grave or the lunatic asylum, but the British pejorative "wanker" still suggests, at best, a sad loser unable to find a suitable partner. Fears about masturbation long ago took on a life of their own as part of popular culture and urban folklore.

In 1961 Belgian students were questioned about the effects of masturbation. They believed that it retarded growth, weakened the will, and caused blindness, baldness, impotence, sterility, and the procreation of abnormal children. In the early 1990s a group of health-care professionals and educators in Hungary gave "masturbation" as the cause of *tabes dorsalis* (a spinal disorder caused by tertiary syphilis). No questions on it were included in the British survey *Sexual Behaviour in Britain: The National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles* (1994) because of the distaste and embarrassment the subject caused in respondents. In 1994 the United States surgeon general, Joycelyn Elders, was dismissed for advocating the teaching of masturbation in the context of AIDS prevention. While this concession by President Bill Clinton to the

“moral majority” was condemned in European journals, such as *The Lancet*, most European countries were not exactly promoting the practice.

Within the specialty of sex therapy, masturbation has found a medically licit niche. However, while “self-pleasuring” may be recommended to develop responsiveness and familiarize the individual with his or her genitals, in most sex therapy this practice is implicitly a prelude to taking the knowledge and skills thus learned into partnered sex. In the European context, there is no real equivalent to the American Betty Dodson. In 1974, influenced by the sexual revolution and

the second wave of feminism, Dodson wrote *Liberating Masturbation: Celebrating Self-Love*. Over twenty years later, her Web site celebrated masturbation’s potential for engendering an “erotic renaissance.”

The vast proliferation of pornographic Web sites, phone sex lines, and other erotic media suggests masturbation is widely practiced in Europe, but that it is still a “secret vice” exploited for commercial gain—though in rather different ways from those of the advertising quacks of the nineteenth century. After nearly three centuries, *Onania* continues to cast a long shadow.

See also other articles in this section.

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PORNOGRAPHY



Lisa Z. Sigel

Pornography functions as an umbrella term to cover a wide variety of representations concerned with sexuality, including literature, photographs, illustrations, statuary, and films. An interest in sexuality ties these diverse media together, but in spite of the single predominant theme, pornography has a wide variety of foci and uses—personal spite, political attack, mockery, titillation, and amusement. The realm of sexuality provides fertile ground for depiction, and different ages made use of the raw matter of sexuality within the context of contemporary concerns.

Social historians have begun to chart out how pornography works and what it means within a historical context. Social historians of the 1960s and 1970s began to look at pornography to understand the sexual meanings, acts, and behaviors of the past. While they found these patterns in pornographic texts and images, they also found more than they initially expected. Pornography from the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Age of Revolution, the Victorian Era, and the modern world speaks to more than just sexuality. Religion, politics, family, state formation, and gender all figure in and through pornography. In the late twentieth century scholars explored how pornography and sexuality fit into the broader processes that concern the social historian. Neglecting pornography leaves a partial understanding of the past in which culture, politics, and social interactions are curiously fragmented and the understanding of social change is markedly incomplete.

Exploring the history of pornography, scholars have disproved two contradictory popular beliefs. The first belief, that pornography does not change, has been disproved through close explorations of specific periods, through examinations of media, and through deliberations on content. Historians have shown that pornography changes in form, content, and audience. The second popular belief, that pornography is getting worse, either in volume or in content, presents a more complex problem for the historian because of the inability to use quantitative methods on produc-

tion or distribution. While more pornography exists than did a century ago, the sources are not available that would allow a reliable statistical analysis of the ratio of artifacts to individuals. The second aspect of the formulation that pornography is somehow qualitatively worse has been thrown into doubt by historians. Close qualitative analysis has shown that earlier pornography was also a social and cultural problem. Thus social historians have demonstrated that pornography as a phenomenon is rather more nuanced than popular beliefs tend to insist.

THE RENAISSANCE

While pornography in the modern world has connotations of popular rather than learned or “high” culture, during the Italian Renaissance pornography developed within the scholarly world. The renewed interest in classical learning that characterized the Italian Renaissance brought with it writings explicitly focused on sexual themes. The ancient world had an ethos of sexuality different from that of Christian Europe, and the writings of the ancient world reflected this. Homosexuality, a focus on the priapus, and prostitution were integral to the rituals and religions of public life, and the writings, objects, and images of ancient Greece and Rome incorporated these themes. Ancient texts and ancient images had a pagan orientation at odds with the Christian culture of reproductive sexuality expounded by the Catholic Church. These conflicting meanings of sexuality merged to create a dynamic adjustment of ideas through pornography during the Renaissance.

The pornography of the Renaissance took both visual and literary forms. Visual images include paintings, engravings, and woodcuts of the female nude and the act of intercourse. The works emphasize the beauty and perfection of the human form. While these works frequently have allegorical themes, the depiction of coitus places the gods and the heavens within the realm of physical pleasures, and the gods

have decidedly fleshy tones. The works of Agostino Carracci, Titian, and Perino del Vaga, for example, overturn the medieval tradition of vilifying the flesh. By giving earthy themes and earthy pleasures places within ancient allegories, Renaissance art argued for a corporeality within spirituality and learning.

At the same time the development of the printing press in the mid-fifteenth century allowed a wider dispersal of literary pornography. Italian writers created a pornography built from the ancient texts and contributed to a vernacular and bawdy tradition. Pornography was a form of self-amusement and a political commentary for the most educated in society. Antonio Vignali's *La cazzaria* (1525–1526) and Ferrante Pallavicino's *La rettorica della puttana* (The whore's rhetoric, 1642) were based on ancient styles and were produced in the literary clubs that formed around pa-

trons and styles of learning. However, pornography also functioned as a commercial endeavor, a growth industry perfectly suited to those with skills in wit, satire, and rhetoric, such as Pietro Aretino. Aretino demonstrated his literary skills in *Ragionamento della Nanna e Antonia* (1534) and *Dialogo quale la Nanna insegne* (1536), often jointly published under the title *Ragionamenti*, called *Aretino's Dialogues*. His more well-known work, the *Posizioni* (c. 1527), called *Aretino's Postures*, was inspired by the illustrations of Giulio Romano. Aretino's works have a strong anticlerical focus, in particular satirizing the sexual urges and conduct of priests and nuns. They also stress the voraciousness of women, the sexual incompetence of husbands (perhaps a literary variant of the popular tradition of charivari, the noisy serenade to newlyweds), sexual positions, and details of various ways to

please. His dialogues include discussions of intercourse, heterosexual penile-vaginal as well as anal sex, and innuendos about boys. Aretino deliberately violated social taboos and used whores to speak about the delights and malice of sex.

Pornography became so widespread that the Council of Trent (1545–1563) differentiated between ancient texts and more recent writings, like *Aretino's Postures*. The church, functioning as a social regulator, differentiated between licit and illicit writings and enforced sexual norms. The ancient writings could be read because of their eloquence and propriety, but new writings were banned by the papacy for salaciousness. The audience for pornography for the most part remained the learned, while the majority of people in Europe relied on an oral, local tradition for information and amusement about sexuality.

The works of the Italian Renaissance, particularly the literature of Aretino and his imitators, traveled across Europe and became part of a canon of obscenity. Italy was known for its popular pornography, and writers from France and England paid Italy a dubious compliment by setting their fictional erotica in Italy. Authors of other countries also explicitly built on works from Italy. Thomas Nash, the English author of *The Choise of Valentines; or, the Merry Ballad of Nashe His Dildo* (c. 1593), stated that he sought to imitate the style of the Aretines. In his poem, which was circulated in the 1590s, Nash recounted a trip to the brothel to visit a lady's shrine "to see if she would be my valentine." This work builds on Aretino's themes of brothel tours, impotence, and women's insatiability. Nash's use of the style and themes of Aretino demonstrates the circulation of learning during the Renaissance and pornography's integration into that circulation.

This international exchange of sexual ideas linked the major centers of developing European economy and culture. Although publications frequently gave false publication information (a practice that bedevils the historian and the bibliographer), the false information marks the rise of particular European centers. For example, *Aloisiae Sigae Satyra Sotadica de Arcanis Amoris et Veneris* (The dialogues of Luisa Sigea) was written by Nicolas Chorier of Vienna, published in Latin in either Grenoble or Lyon in 1659 or 1660. However, Chorier falsely attributed the work to a Spanish woman and the translation to Joannes Neursius, a Dutchman. The text appeared in England and was translated into English and French by the 1680s. The confusing trail of fake names and incomplete publication information should not obscure the links among centers of education, literacy, publishing, and wealth. Spain, Holland, England, and France had

reached prominence as centers of the Atlantic world. This world worked not only as an economy but also as a place of thinking. The diffusion of knowledge, including the basest sexual knowledge, built on the Renaissance tradition and circulated through the Atlantic world.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE AGE OF REVOLUTION

The exploration of pleasures of the flesh took on an additional resonance during the Enlightenment's attempt to separate reason from tradition. The pornography of the Enlightenment has been characterized as libertine. The word "libertine" originally meant free-thinker but eventually came to connote sexual excess. Libertinism began as an upper-class movement against religious and social customs and gradually spread in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Libertinism applied Enlightenment ideals to sexuality. Belief in rationality and the natural rights of people and skepticism regarding social customs and church mandates made sexual freedom a component of personal freedom, and pornography addressed these issues.

Two prominent social historians, Lynn Hunt and Robert Darnton, demonstrated that the critiques implicit in pornography occurred as part of the broad philosophical discussion. Pornography as a literary phenomenon was tied to the philosophes through critiques of governance in prerevolutionary France. By combining social critiques with sexual allegations, pornography undercut the legitimacy of the French monarchy, the Catholic Church, and the institutions of privilege. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the ecclesiastical systems of social regulation seen in the Renaissance gave way across Europe to state regulation of morality as societies became more secular and were organized around the nation-state. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century revolutionary sentiment expressed in pornography gave the state good reason to outlaw pornography's dispersal. Pornography not only spoke to sexuality but also to social customs, social regulations, and social relations. The disruptive nature of pornography made the boundaries between "obscene libel" and "treason" nebulous and therefore dangerous. The French monarchy outlawed both pornography and philosophy, cementing the ties between the two as the philosophes had little to lose from the most scurrilous allegations. By the mid-eighteenth century the underground publications of pornography and other bawdy tracts went hand in hand with revolutionary sentiment, and discussions of politics were saturated with discussions of sexuality. Contrib-

SECTION 16: SEXUALITY

uting to the French Revolution of 1789, pornography critiqued the Old Regime's sexual practices and explored new meanings for sexuality.

Some of the great freethinkers of the Enlightenment wrote pornography. Honoré-Gabriel de Riquetti, comte de Mirabeau wrote *Erotika biblion* (1782), and Denis Diderot wrote *Les bijoux indiscrets* (1748). Freethinking culminated in the works of the Marquis de Sade, who wrote the novel *Justine, ou les malheurs de la vertu* three times. He completed the first manuscript while a prisoner in the Bastille two years before the outbreak of the French Revolution. He published the second version in 1791, then he reworked it to include *Histoire de Juliette* (Story of Juliette) in 1798. The novel of the two sisters "disproves" piety and God's workings on Earth through the reward of vice and the punishment of virtue. Sade takes the pursuit of freedom and gratification to a logical conclusion through rape, child molestation, mutilation, and even necrophilia. His works explore the limits of individual desire in a world unplanned by God and full of maleficence. Philosophers and feminists have used Sade's work to expose the contradictions in the ideals of liberty. Written about women rather than by them, Sade's work employs women's bodies to form philosophies of self and society, limitation and liberty, intrinsic value versus use of the body. Sade bankrupted his estate with his excesses and then demanded that his wife fill his jail cell with expensive delicacies. In his life and in his work, feminists have found important relationships between Enlightenment ideals and female subjugation.

Across the English Channel, England developed its own libertine tradition. Although less philosophic and less violent than Sade, John Cleland produced an equally important text, *Fanny Hill; or, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure* (1748 or 1749). This novel features a prostitute, a tour of the brothel, and a series of intertwining stories as each character tells her sexual history. The main story of Fanny Hill, the protagonist of the work, implicitly criticizes the aristocracy as decayed and debauched members of society who prey on the poor. In addition the work criticizes traditional social relations and argues for relationships based on sexual freedom and personal inclination. These elements place the work in the freethinking movement, and as a novel, the work fits into the broader genre formation in England. The model of interlocking letters and dialogues is superseded in *Fanny Hill* by plot, character development, and description. The discussion of pornography as literature is an important counterweight to the idea that a firm line separates popular culture and high culture. Pornography, as an artifact of popular culture, was not an isolated form

of writing, and the pornographic novel rose alongside the more "canonical" novel.

English pornography became more overtly politicized with the outbreak of the French Revolution, as the wave of revolutionary sentiment that crossed Europe influenced texts, writers, and ideas. Iain McCalman, in his study of the English revolutionary world, tied republican agitators to the publication of pornography. The itinerant publishers of revolutionary tracts wrote pornography when the English government cracked down on seditious literature during the French Revolution, and this tradition of revolutionary pornography continued well into the nineteenth century. Radical pornographer-pamphleteers, like William Dugdale and George Cannon, churned out salacious, antigovernment texts during the Queen Caroline affair (1818–1820), when George IV tried to divorce Caroline on the grounds of adultery. These revolutionary pornographers continued to publish a wide variety of pornographic works that destabilized the legitimacy of the British monarchy even though their efforts did not culminate in a radical break with the past like that in France.

THE VICTORIAN WORLD

By the 1840s in England and earlier on the Continent, writers ceased the production of libertine pornography. Pornographers continuously republished the old "classics" in most European languages, but new works excised revolution, philosophy, or critique to refocus in two directions. One applied a greater scientific approach to sexuality, and the other explored titillation and, increasingly, specific sexual fetishes. The process of photography, patented in 1839, contributed to both scientific pornography and fetishistic pornography.

Scientific pornography authors wrote about sexual matters, such as aphrodisiacs, hermaphrodites, sexual techniques like flagellation, biting, intercourse, and sexual practices in distant lands. The scientific aspects did not preclude these works from functioning as pornography, however. They were written, printed, and published by the same people and sold to the same audiences. The development of the social sciences into distinct scholarly disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, and sexology, from the 1880s through the 1920s separated works about sexuality from works designed to arouse. This division redefined pornography as based on arousal. Thus Richard Burton and Forster Fitzgerald Arbuthnot's printing of the first English translation of Mallanaga Vatsyayana's *Kama sutra* in 1873 was halted on the

grounds of obscenity, but later Burton's translation of *The Arabian Nights* (1885–1888) suffered no such disruption even though the work had equally obscene themes. The growth of the social sciences differentiated works that might have been considered pornographic, like those of Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Havelock Ellis, and Sigmund Freud, from pornographic works.

As the study of sex gained legitimacy, the study of pornography did also. The great bibliographies, central to any historical study of pornography, were written during this birth of sexology. Henry Spencer Ashbee published a three-volume bibliography of pornography in England, *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* (1877), *Centuria Librorum Absconditorum* (1879), and *Catena Librorum Tacendorum* (1885). In 1875 Hugo Hayn published *Bibliotheca Germanorum Erotica*, which he expanded and supplemented between 1912 and 1929. Jules Gay's six-volume work, *Bibliographie des ouvrages relatifs à l'amour*, was published between 1871 and 1873, then supplemented by J. Lemonnier between 1894 and 1900. These works on English, German, and French pornography, respectively, have formed the backbone for historical examinations.

As the social sciences legitimated the scientific study of sexuality, pornography became a catchall term for items meant to arouse. While the texts produced during the late nineteenth century display a wide variety of interests, individual works are oriented toward a specific sexual activity, such as dominance, submission, children, or flagellation. Each work has its own fetish, and advertisements played up the fetish by de-emphasizing authorship and artistry in favor of fixation. In works like the anonymous *With Rod and Bum* (1898) and *Stays and Gloves* (1919), the narrative is a process of description and culmination, and in each case the process repeats itself. The most well-known work of the period, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch's *Venus im Pelz* (1870), explores male masochism. The main character, Severin, enslaves himself to his mistress Wanda for sexual and psychological gratification. Masoch, a historian, wrote about the problems of liberalism in eastern Europe, and his extended metaphor of dominance and submission integrates the problems of sexuality and gender within contemporary civilization. Only when Severin overcomes the debilitating tendencies of modern society can he assume the male role of dominance. This work became the preeminent source for formulating the psychological motivations of masochism. Sexologists named sadomasochism after Masoch and Sade.

Sexual fetishism in pornography developed against the backdrop of the emerging consumer economy. Consumerism offered new opportunities for sexual ex-

ploration divorced from social accountability. For instance, *My Secret Life* (1885–1890), an anonymous pornographic memoir, obsessively documents the male narrator's sexual experiences. The narrator's "real life" of family, community, and work are lost to the "secret life" of brothels, prostitutes, and voyeurism. The author translates the anonymous transactions of a consumer society into impersonal sexual exchanges. The narrator transforms his world into a "pornatopia," a word coined by the historian Steven Marcus to describe the narrator's ability to perceive his world as a utopia of sexuality.

Advancements in photography contributed to the development of pornographic fetishism. Pornographic daguerreotypes appeared by the 1840s, but the daguerreotype allowed only one image per exposure. Later forms of photography allowed more prolific reproductions. The visual pornographic tradition gained a new momentum with photography. Many photographs featured women and intercourse, however, new orientations emerged in the 1880s that played up specific foci, like children, miscegenation, breast size, and underwear. The new orientations were matched by new visuals, including the close-up, the ejaculation or "money shot," and the keyhole, in which the image is bracketed by the shape of a skeleton keyhole, making the viewer a voyeur.

By World War I pornography was traded at a "mass" level as well as a "class" level. These "mass" pornographers took advantage of the mails, and captions for photographs appeared in as many as four languages, usually English, French, German, and Italian. Beginning in the 1890s and culminating after World War I, the rise of a mass consumer culture opened new access to pornography. While previously pornography had broad and diffuse social impacts, the majority of the population, whether peasants in Renaissance Italy, artisans in Enlightenment England, or workers in the French Empire, did not have widespread access to these ideas. But a number of factors, including increased wages, shifting social norms, ever-expanding city life and its subsequent anonymity, and leisure time, fed the rise of mass pornography. The growing number of literates could obtain inexpensive pornography through paperbacks, pamphlets, and cheap magazines, while everyone, regardless of literacy, could find postcards, penny-in-the-slot machines, inexpensive photographs, and films.

Mass pornography built upon older erotic traditions. Photographs, particularly the continental ones in the 1880s and 1890s, had a substantial anticlerical theme, showing the continued relevance of the church even in a more secular society. Postcards used older scatological themes, and penny-in-the-slot machines

and democratic governments insisted on a disciplined populace, and the state began to ferret out sexual and social deviance, including pornography. Boosted by ideas of “respectability” and new interventions in social regulation by the middle class, the state became more concerned with the degeneration, both sexual and social, of the populace. While pornography remained illegal, scientific studies of sexuality were more accepted at the end of the nineteenth century. However, birth control information, abortion advertisements, instruction manuals, and explicit literary discussions of sexuality still came under obscenity legislation. The demarcation of pornography from sexual information and artistry continued as the state, artists, intellectuals, and the marketplace negotiated with each other.

In spite of state control, pornography flourished in many of the major cities of western Europe, including Paris, London, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Budapest, Lyon, Barcelona, and Zürich. Pornographers produced works for international as well as national audiences and no longer waited for their products to diffuse slowly throughout Europe and America. Instead, they were petty entrepreneurs, using a mail-order system. The international traffic in pornography at both a class and a mass level surpassed the boundaries of state control and state jurisdiction. Voluntary organizations and state agencies across Europe initiated international conferences regarding obscene publications by the 1910s.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

sexualized the sentimental narrative of marriage. The recycling of older themes into a visual format brought to the masses the elite ideas of sexuality. The rapidly expanding empires of the 1870s through the 1890s provided new opportunities for a popular, symbolic imperialism. Photographs and illustrations from Asia, Central America, the Caribbean, and Africa flooded back to Europe, exhibiting to all levels of European society concrete images of the benefits of imperialism and European dominion. For example, images of Algerian harem women became common across Europe, making French colonial control more enticing.

The retreat from libertine pornography and the growth of a more popular and less revolutionary version in the nineteenth century did not signal a decline in state legislation against it. The state reconceptualized its concern about matters of morals and increasingly passed laws against the “social evil” of pornography, considered the causal force behind sexual and social deviance. Moreover the growth of nationalism

World War I increased the audience for pornography as the mass migrations of people, the physical and social mobility of men and women, and the disruption of daily life opened new opportunities for exploring sexual material culture. With the end of the war popular and cheap pornography flourished, particularly “girly” photos and motion pictures.

Motion pictures developed in the 1890s, and some early films included female nudity. However, the origins of motion picture pornography generally date to *Le voyeur* in 1907 or to *A l'ecu d'or ou la bonne auberge* in 1908. French filmmakers pioneered the erotic motion picture, but Germans and Italians soon produced their own films. During the 1920s and 1930s France produced a large number of “blue” movies, largely by Bernard Nathan and the anonymous “Dominique.” The movies used indoor and outdoor photography and featured heterosexual, group sex, and lesbian scenes. An international trade also developed, and some historians argue that Buenos Aires became a production center for films shown across

Europe. Pornographic films developed well before sound, but the captions for silent films presented few barriers to an international market. Films became a staple fare at brothels, encouraging an overlap between one type of sexual exchange and another. Films also traveled between towns and were semipublicly aired, and were sold to private collectors.

The alternate tradition of more expensive literary texts also flourished, as the works of Pierre Louÿs demonstrate. Louÿs wrote poetry, prose, and novels and took hundreds of photographs of young girls. After his death in 1925, his wife sold his papers, which publishers used to produce *Manuel de civilité pour les petites filles* (1926), a sexual etiquette book for young girls, and *Trois filles de leur mère* (1926), a student's experiences with a family of prostitutes. These works built on the themes of older literary pornography, in particular the interest in prostitutes that dates back to the Renaissance and the nineteenth-century fixation on young girls. In comparison, Georges Bataille, a philosopher, used surrealist techniques in *Histoire de l'oeil* (1928), which explores subconscious terrors through the sexual lives of a boy and two girls. The application of modernist techniques in this work demonstrates the continuing ties between "high" literature and pornography.

Because of the complexity of pornography, multiple discussions about it occurred simultaneously within European countries and across Europe. On one hand, lawmakers during the 1920s tried to differentiate between artistic representations of sexuality and pornography, allowing the publication of works like James Joyce's *Ulysses* (1922) as artistry. On the other hand, pornographic production continued to develop its own trajectory in literature, photographs, and films. Lawmakers struggled for a definition of pornography that would allow artists to explore sexuality, while pornographers attempted to widen the definitions of art or circumnavigate them entirely. Finally, a greater acceptance of sexuality in public encouraged a proliferation of semipornographic displays.

Ambiguous definitions of pornography increasingly presented problems as the psychological and cultural dislocations of World War I encouraged the acceptance of Freudianism and modernism. These intellectual attitudes argued that sexuality was central to the human condition, and they inspired new literary and visual movements that stood somewhere between pornography and "the cult of the body." This "cult of the body" withstood the political divisions of the times. Artists, intellectuals, and ideologues viewed the body as a central icon of communication and used the naked body as a symbol of social decay or cultural superiority. Photographic images emphasized hard-

ness, leanness, and youth as symbols of personal and social vitality. The symbol of the body was strengthened by the rise of nudism, the back to nature movement, and the increase in youth groups, all of which legitimized the prevalence of sexuality and the nude in public. Photos, statues, and films featuring nude men and women became more commonplace.

The political right, Nazis in particular, saw Freudian and modernist images as pornographic and symbolic of social decay but developed their own "cult of the body" during the interwar years. The Nazis took power in Germany in 1933, and in one of their first acts to rid society of degenerate sexuality, they burned the Institute of Sexual Science's books and papers. Nonetheless, the male nudity in the public art of the Nazis had strong homoerotic overtones, newly characterized as nonpornographic and wholesome. The Nazis denounced modern art as pornographic, but Nazi representations of bodies remained fluid and incorporated elements of pornography into public art.

The debates over pornography that began during the 1920s and the 1930s persisted into the post-World War II world, but the catastrophic impact of fascism in Europe legitimated political liberalism, including greater freedom of the press. The attitudes of the 1950s encouraged the continuation of older illegal and semilegal forms of pornography in film, photography, and literature, but European governments reversed social policies during the 1960s and 1970s by legalizing pornography. Libertarians argued that free speech worked as a defense against fascism, but in many ways the politics of sexual liberation during this period were far removed from the Enlightenment. While earlier pornography used sexuality to critique old social forms and posit greater possibilities for society, later pornography emphasized sexual pleasures as intrinsically valuable and worthwhile. Pornographic works did not need to speak to politics or redeem society. States defined pornography so that a work with any element of artistic, historical, literary, or social value could not be censored. With the new formulas, a flood of publications, films, and images emerged across Europe, notably in England, France, Germany, and Scandinavia. The policies of legalization moved pornographic films, literature, and photographs from brothels and back rooms to theaters and bookstores, where they were available to respectable society, including women. The legalization of pornography also permitted more aboveboard film production and reduced cottage industry pornographic photography and literature. Certain types of representations, especially glossy magazines and films, predominated, making pornography palatable to a broader consumer culture.

Legalization during the 1960s and 1970s was matched by a growing international feminist movement with increasing concerns about pornography. While pornography has been consumed primarily by men, the dominant images and foci in pornography have been of women. The feminist movement discussed the meanings of these representations of sexuality, particularly the sexuality of women. The American position that pornography degrades and objectifies women, most clearly articulated by Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon, was imported into Europe and made notable headway in England. This position received less attention in France, where the works of Anaïs Nin and Pauline Réage resist this feminist analysis of pornography. In Réage's *The Story of O* (1954) the heroine "O" allows herself to be stripped of sexual freedom, personal autonomy, and control over her own sensibilities and pleasures. The story embraces personal renunciation and male dominance. The pseudonymous but apparently female author complicates a feminist analysis of pornography with the complexities of women's desires as Sacher-Masoch did with men. However, as feminists have pointed out, masochism and renunciation for men have been defined as deviant or perverse, while masochism for women has been culturally inculcated. The feminist debates over pornography have suggested possibilities for legislation that uses the standard of oppression rather than explicitness. Although new standards developed in England, most countries after the 1960s opted for increasingly liberalized censorship standards.

With legalization pornography emerged as a viable source of national revenue, and the economics of pornography became a national consideration. World War II encouraged American dominance in Western Europe, and the realm of pornography proved no exception. The pinup girls that American GI's carried with them became models of public representations of sexuality. American "porno" films and magazines followed shortly. The American culture industry dominated during the postwar years, and Americans influenced European pornography as magazines such as *Playboy* reached European markets. When the Scandinavian countries legalized pornography in the late 1960s, American producers heavily entered the market, driving out many local productions. In contrast, France in the 1970s sought to develop its own industry by taxing imports, encouraging a resurgence of the French pornographic film. Hungary entered the international market as a location for film production to stimulate the post-Communist economy. The up-

heavals caused by the breakup of the Communist bloc encouraged an influx of actors into western European films. The days of national control of pornography, as tenuous as it had been, seemed over, particularly because technological innovations like videos and the Internet distribute pornography rapidly across national barriers. While historians assess the social implications of these developments, pornography has become an international product that reaches an international audience.

Areas for further research on pornography abound, from assessing the meaning of pornography in eastern European countries to documenting the lives of models and actors who took part in production, finding reliable statistics on users, and examining the impact of pornography on people's concepts of sexuality. While social historians since the 1960s have uncovered important relationships between pornography and politics, religion, family, and gender relations, they also have found a dense source that deserves continuing attention and that raises many questions.

See also other articles in this section.

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SEX, LAW, AND THE STATE



Roderick G. Phillips

Sexual attitudes, behavior, and relationships have historically been among the most regulated areas of human activity in Europe. Some sexual relationships, such as those between persons of the same sex (homosexual) or between persons within specified close relationships (incest), have been deemed “unnatural” and socially disruptive insofar as they represented deviations from what is defined as the “natural” order of things. Other sexual relationships, such as those involving unmarried individuals or couples (often called fornication) and sex outside marriage (adultery) have been defined as illicit because they represented deviations from the principle that sex was permitted only between husband and wife. Historically they have been the object of legislation when they were considered threats to the stability of marriage, which was seen as a guarantor of social stability.

Beyond specific kinds of sexual activity and the reasons they have been ruled illicit or illegal by the state and religious authorities, sexual behavior has historically been difficult to regulate. Human sexuality has borne an immense burden of political and cultural significance. Sexual behavior and reputation have defined honor in a way that other human activities have not. More shame has been attached to transgressions of sexual mores than to almost any other social or legal rule of behavior. One result is that sexual slander has been the most effective means of undermining the reputation of a group or individual. Thus many of the marginal religious sects that sprang up during the English Revolution of the mid-seventeenth century were alleged to practice free love.

Certain representations of sexuality also have been subject to regulation in various ways. The explicit depiction of sexual acts in literature, the visual arts, or music may be variously defined as erotic or pornographic. The historical record shows that much of what might be considered pornography in modern society was in earlier centuries intended less to arouse a reader or viewer sexually than to be a means of social comment or political criticism.

REGULATION BY THE CHURCH

Before the rise of the nation-state in the early modern period and the extension of state regulation, most of the oversight of sexual behavior fell within the jurisdiction of the church. While the state progressively extended its secular jurisdiction over a wide range of social behavior and over key institutions such as the family, it was relatively slow and hesitant to legislate on sexuality. Certain forms of behavior that were offenses in church law, such as fornication and adultery, have only rarely been the subject of state legislation. In general the state has preferred to use civil remedies rather than criminal law against sexual activities that legislators considered improper. For example, where church courts often fined, excommunicated, or sometimes imprisoned adulterers, adultery has rarely been punishable under secular law. Instead the aggrieved spouse sought other remedies, such as separation or divorce, and sometimes obtained financial compensation from the adulterous spouse’s accomplice in the adultery.

Because church law was the background to state laws and policies regarding sexuality, it is useful to sketch the outlines of sexual attitudes and behavior in ecclesiastical law. The broad rules for sexual behavior embodied in church law were drawn from the Bible, which deals, in several instances ambiguously, with many aspects of human sexuality. Church doctrines were debated and refined by theologians, councils, and popes for centuries, and by the late Middle Ages they reached a broad consensus. Even so various church councils and papal decrees and the many theologians who wrote on sexual issues adopted variations, some minor but some significant, among the policies. One of the challenges facing historians is to define the broadly accepted doctrine on human sexuality without losing sight of the variations. This doctrine was the basis of the secular policies later adopted and adapted by secular legislators who framed state law.

The doctrines of the medieval church on sexuality have been described broadly as negative. Sexuality was considered a gift bestowed by God, but the church preferred the faithful to suppress it if they could. The church valued a life of chastity more highly than one of sexual activity and, following St. Paul, held that Christians ought to remain virgins if they could but that they should marry if they could not. Marriage was deemed an institution ordained by God so men and women could be sexually active in a way that was not sinful. One of the explicit purposes of marriage in church doctrine was to “prevent fornication.” In this sense marriage was tainted by its sexual purpose.

On the more positive side church doctrine endowed marriage with the role of procreation because the church insisted on the necessary link between sex and conception. This meant that only procreative sexual activity was permitted in church law, a doctrine that ruled out same-sex sexual relationships and any heterosexual sexual activities, such as oral or anal sex, that could not lead to conception. For the same reason it also excluded techniques such as coitus interruptus (withdrawal by the male before ejaculation), the use of contraceptives in the form of suppositories and condoms, and abortion.

The church placed extensive limitations on procreative sexual activity by a married couple. The church forbade sexual activity at times of penance, such as Advent and Lent, and on certain days that had particular religious significance. Certain coital positions were forbidden. Intercourse with the woman on top was not permitted because it reversed the proper order of society in which men were dominant, and the retro position was condemned because it was too reminiscent of the way animals have intercourse. Sex while standing was discouraged as less likely to result in conception because the semen would flow out of the vagina. What is commonly known as the missionary position was the sole favored position for intercourse.

Although many church writers agreed that sexual relationships might give pleasure, they were generally opposed to having intercourse solely for recreational reasons. The possibility of conception should always be present, which raised the question whether intercourse with a pregnant woman or a woman past the age of conception was permitted. This reinforced the opposition to the use of any contraceptive technique or device, which made intercourse solely recreational by depriving it of any procreative potential. While too-frequent sex was deplored, intercourse was nonetheless considered an obligation within marriage if only to deter either partner from looking for sexual gratification outside marriage. Sex was widely referred

to in church literature as “the conjugal [or marital] debt.”

The enforcement of these laws by the church courts in the medieval period and beyond varied widely, a pattern that continued when state legislation came into play. In addition to the expected variations according to time and place, the courts tended to treat offenders of various social classes differently and men differently from women. In some instances laws explicitly specified distinctions in penalty between women and men. For example, it was common for laws of adultery to provide more severe penalties for adultery by women, arguing that an adulterous woman risked becoming pregnant and creating the possibility that another man’s child would inherit her husband’s property. A double standard of sexual morality, which held women to higher standards of sexual behavior, is a persistent theme in the history of sexuality and sexual attitudes, and it was often expressed in laws and their enforcement.

Throughout the Middle Ages the church was the dominant force in the regulation of morality, including sexual morality. It claimed a special role in the surveillance of behavior that threatened the salvation of individuals, and it argued that general disobedience of God’s laws as understood by the church would bring God’s wrath upon society more generally. In addition sexual offenses were intimately linked to doctrinal nonconformity, and heretics often were alleged to be sexual deviants.

LEGISLATION AGAINST ADULTERY

The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century broke the unity of the medieval church and led to the creation of a number of discrete confessions under the protection of secular political authorities. It was accompanied by a shift in attitudes toward sexuality as Martin Luther, John Calvin, and other leading Reformers decried the church’s preference for chastity and argued for recognition of sexuality as one of God’s gifts to humans. Although Luther’s writings at least contained some residual admiration for those who could remain virgins throughout their lives, the Protestants generally argued for the holiness of marriage and for husband and wife to enjoy their sexual activity without sinning as long as they behaved with modesty and the propriety appropriate for using a God-given gift. Protestant theologians were somewhat uneasy about the pleasure that could be derived from sex, but they generally decided that a moderate degree of pleasure was not sinful as long as it accompanied an activity that could lead to procreation and the building of a Christian society.

At the same time that they raised the value of sexuality and marriage, which were intimately linked, the Protestants were trenchant critics of the laxity with which the church, which became known as the Catholic Church to distinguish it from the Protestant confessions, had enforced sexual morality. Reformers such as Luther and Calvin declared that first the church had set impossibly high standards by insisting on the primacy of chastity and celibacy and by making marriage difficult through a range of impediments, and second it had failed to enforce them. The result, they argued, was that sexual immorality was widespread throughout Christian Europe, especially among the clergy, whether they were priests, monks, or nuns. In contrast to the celibate clergy of the Catholic Church, Protestant clergy were permitted to marry.

At the time that state authorities were sponsoring the founding of Protestant churches, this criticism provided an opportunity for the state to begin legislating in matters of sexual morality. But secular legislators, whether monarchs or parliaments, were reluctant to regulate sexuality with the same rigor and enthusiasm that the churches showed. Although a great deal of state legislation on sexuality was enacted between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries, it was rarely as comprehensive as the purview of the churches. For example, few secular laws paralleled the medieval church's interest in attempting to restrict coital positions.

Because of the relatively restricted scope of state regulation of sexual behavior, churches continued to play an important role through the nineteenth century, just as they did in many aspects of the family. In part this was because the churches could stake a claim to a particular authority over morals, a claim that was not generally challenged by the state because it did not interfere with state policies and even tended to reinforce a particular vision of social relationships and order. Exceptions existed, notably secular laws that aimed to repress homosexuality, but on the whole behaviors such as fornication and adultery have rarely been criminalized. When they have been included in civil law, as grounds for divorce, for example, their application has depended not on state initiative but on the initiative of an injured party.

The history of adultery in England provides an example of the range of legislative options applied to sexual issues over several centuries. Jurisdiction over adultery fell to the courts of the Church of England following the Reformation in the 1530s. It was generally punished by fines, penances, and excommunication in varying combinations and often involved public shame. The guilty parties were compelled to stand in white sheets in the marketplace or in church

for two or three consecutive Sundays. Penalties were more severe if adultery resulted in pregnancy. The woman involved was often whipped, half-naked, through the streets of the community and could be imprisoned for up to a year.

On the whole, however, the attitudes of the English church toward common adultery were relatively lenient compared with Calvinist areas like Geneva and Scotland, where in the sixteenth century adultery was made a capital offense. During the English Revolution, when state policy was influenced by Calvinist principles, a more rigorous policy was introduced on the grounds that adultery, incest, and fornication had become widespread and that it was necessary to enforce the biblical rule of death for an adulterous woman. A 1650 law provided the death penalty for a married woman who committed adultery and for her accomplice. On the other hand, a married man who committed adultery would be executed only if he had intercourse with a married woman. If he committed adultery with an unmarried woman or a woman he believed was unmarried, he was liable to a comparatively lenient punishment of three months in jail and a bond of good behavior for the following year. Notably this rigorous law found little support among the men who sat on juries during the 1650s, and not many were willing to convict a woman and send her to her death for committing adultery. Records indicate only a few executions, all of women, under the adultery legislation between 1650 and 1660, when it lapsed. This pattern of convictions reinforces the findings of several historians that adultery generally was not considered a serious offense until it became scandalous or resulted in pregnancy.

When the 1650 Adultery Act lapsed, adultery again fell to the jurisdiction of the church courts, and attempts to recriminalize adultery or to provide other penalties against adulterous couples failed in England. From the 1770s to the early 1800s several "adultery prevention bills" were passed by the House of Lords but were defeated in the House of Commons. Some tried to prevent the marriage of an adulterous couple on the grounds that such marriages effectively rewarded the immoral behavior of the parties concerned. But at least one bill, introduced in 1800, aimed to make adultery a crime punishable by a fine and imprisonment.

Never criminalized in England after 1660, adultery remained a justification for separation in the ecclesiastical courts, and it became grounds for a divorce when Parliament began to grant individual divorces by private acts of Parliament in 1670. Even then the church had a role to play in that a man seeking a parliamentary divorce had first to obtain a separation

from an ecclesiastical court. Following that, he was required to sue his wife's accomplice in civil court for damages, a suit known as "criminal conversation," meaning "illegal intercourse." The judges awarded damages that were sometimes considerable, in the thousands of pounds, and sometimes a symbolic few pennies. Suits for damages for criminal conversation treated sexual access to his wife as a husband's property and her lover as a trespasser whose action had to be compensated in monetary terms. Often the amount was fixed according to the amount of honor at stake. The higher the social rank of the husband, the greater his loss and the more compensation was appropriate.

Some 325 parliamentary divorces based on adultery were granted from 1670 to 1857. Almost all were obtained by men, but in the nineteenth century three women successfully divorced their husbands. They, however, had to prove not simply adultery but aggravated adultery, that is adultery compounded by another offense such as incest, bigamy, or desertion. This is a clear example of the double standard that held women accountable to higher measures of behavior than men.

This double standard was embodied in the first English divorce law (1857), which allowed men to divorce their wives for simple adultery but required a woman wanting a divorce to prove aggravated adultery. Men and women in England were not put on

the same legal footing with respect to adultery until a new divorce law was passed in 1923.

Other states had different legal trajectories with respect to adultery. In France various secular codes dealt with the issue before the French Revolution. The Catholic Church retained some jurisdiction, and under its law an adulterous woman could be confined to a convent for two years. But secular legal codes also dealt with adultery. Among others, the customary law of Normandy allowed a man to separate from his wife for reason of adultery but provided a woman with the same remedy only when she could prove that her husband had committed adultery in their dwelling. If he was unfaithful elsewhere, she had no legal recourse. During the French Revolution men and women had equal access to divorce when it was legalized in 1792, but the double standard did not disappear entirely. A woman divorced for adultery was penalized in the division of property following divorce, but this was not so for an adulterous man who was divorced by his wife.

In general the legislators of the French Revolution, who paid a great deal of attention to the family and social relationships, passed few laws dealing with sexuality, and the regulation of sexuality declined markedly in comparison with the Old Regime. Despite their concern for promoting population growth and thus ensuring that infanticide was limited, the revolutionary legislators suppressed the requirement for pregnant, unmarried women to make declarations of pregnancy to the authorities. Prostitution was criminalized, but mainly because of concerns about the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, especially in garrison towns. Prostitutes were confined, treated for their illnesses, and instructed in the skills that would make them good republican wives and mothers. Sodomy, which had been a capital offense under the Old Regime, did not appear in the criminal or civil codes of the revolutionary period. The Napoleonic period following the Revolution restored the double standard more rigorously. A woman divorced for adultery was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of three months to two years.

Although adultery was thus a matter of concern to the state, which provided either punishment or remedies in civil law, premarital sex was generally deplored but not criminalized. At various times, however, states have developed policies involving unmarried women who became pregnant. In eighteenth-century France, for example, any unmarried woman who was pregnant had to make a declaration of pregnancy (*déclaration de grossesse*) to the police, in which she identified the man responsible and set out the circumstances of the pregnancy, that is, whether she

was forced, coerced, persuaded, or willingly agreed to have sexual intercourse. The purposes were not specifically to repress premarital sexual activity or to punish sexually active unmarried women but rather to help the authorities ensure that the father of the child rather than the community paid for the child's birth and upkeep and also to minimize the chances that the woman would try to abort her child or kill it once it was born.

In this case one of the main underlying rationales for the apparent regulation of sexual activity was in fact the state's desire to increase the size of the nation's population. The authorities thought that many women practiced abortion or infanticide to the detriment of the state's demographic interest. They believed one way to reduce the incidences of both was to compel pregnant women to acknowledge their pregnancies and be held accountable if they could not produce a child when the authorities inquired.

A similar concern about burdening communities with illegitimate children was reflected in English legislation of 1576 and 1610. The first law gave justices of the peace the powers to investigate when a child was left in the charge of the parish, to order the parents to support the child, and to punish the parents. The 1610 law allowed justices to sentence mothers of illegitimate children in these cases to imprisonment in a house of detention for a year. Forty years later the law that provided the death penalty for incest and some cases of adultery also allowed imprisonment for three months of couples guilty of fornication.

Clearly it is not possible to generalize about the role of European states in regulating sexuality. In the early modern period immense variations existed among individual states. The rigor of legislation varied from one issue to another, as did enforcement. It can be argued, too, that it is important to consider not only regulations expressed in state law but also those that emanated from the church when the state effectively delegated legislative and judicial powers to it. In other words, state laws were only part of a broader apparatus that defined permissible sexual activities and sought to ensure conformity.

LEGISLATION AGAINST HOMOSEXUALITY

The full force of the state has been felt more frequently in the area of sexual activity between people of the same sex. The word "homosexuality" first appears in the nineteenth century, and until then and even afterward the law focused not on sexual orientation but on specific forms of behavior, generally sod-

omy or buggery. That is, individuals were defined, for the purposes of the law, not by orientation but by actions.

Secular laws against sodomy date from the Middle Ages. Although the statutes of late thirteenth-century Florence are incomplete and the specific penalties for sodomy are not clear, they did include exile from the city-state. Most secular legislation dated from the sixteenth century, and the first English example was a 1534 law of Henry VIII. Passed on the grounds that existing penalties were too lenient, this act made "buggery committed with mankind or beast" a felony that could be tried only in the secular courts. Conflating buggery and bestiality only highlighted the sense that homosexual activity was deemed an offense against nature.

In one of the most famous cases in early modern England, the earl of Castlehaven was prosecuted in 1631 for, among other offenses, raping his wife and sodomizing two of his male servants. Even then, however, circumstances that were not specifically sexual came into play. Castlehaven had encouraged his male servants, while he watched, to rape his wife and her daughter by a previous marriage, and this breach of the rule of social distance seriously aggravated the charge. Castlehaven and two of his servants were executed. Similar concern for the respective social classes of men involved in homosexual relationships was evident in prosecutions for sodomy in the Royal Navy in the seventeenth century. Sodomy was punishable in its own right but was considered more serious when it involved an officer and an ordinary seaman.

On the European continent other states also legislated against homosexuals in the wake of the Reformation. The 1532 penal code issued by the emperor Charles V included sexual intercourse between men, between women, and between humans and animals in the category of crimes against nature, and it provided the model for later Prussian legislation. Dutch military regulations and secular laws from the same period specified the death penalty for "unnatural misuses," with burning the usual prescribed form of execution. In practice penalties varied. In the eighteenth century only about 10 percent of convictions in the Netherlands resulted in execution. The rest were sentenced to corporal punishment, long periods of imprisonment (up to fifty years), and banishment. The last known execution of a man convicted of sodomy under Dutch law occurred in 1803.

Much legislation was directed at sodomy, and many cases focused on an age or class disparity between the parties involved. Legislation enacted in Florence in 1325 prescribed castration for a man convicted of sodomizing a boy, a fine of 100 *lire* for boys

aged fourteen to eighteen who allowed themselves to be sodomized, and a fine of 50 *lire* or being flogged naked through the city for a boy under the age of fourteen who did likewise. The penalties applied to boys younger than fourteen were also applied to women involved in acts of anal intercourse. In the fifteenth century the Republic of Venice issued regulations to try to limit the “abominable vice” of sodomy in schools of music, gymnastics, fencing, and mathematics that brought men, especially older men and young boys, together in close quarters.

Lesbianism has been historically of less interest to legislators than male homosexual activity. It is arguable that lesbian sex was frequently viewed not so much repugnant as symptomatic of more fundamental offenses such as heresy. For this reason it might have been less important to secular legislators than religious legislators. But the use of an instrument that simulated heterosexual sex aggravated the offense of lesbian sex. Spanish law in the fifteenth century varied in its treatment of sexual activity between women depending on whether or not they used a dildo. Two women convicted of having a sexual relationship “without an instrument” were whipped and sent to the galleys, but two nuns who employed a dildo were executed by burning. Generally, however, known prosecutions of women for lesbian sex are few and far between in the early modern period: four in sixteenth-century France, two in Germany, and one each in Italy, Spain, Geneva, and the Netherlands. This is not to say that more did not occur, but the incidence was clearly low. It is notable that women charged as witches or heretics also were charged with related sexual offenses, but they usually were accused of engaging in heterosexual activities, including having sex with the devil.

In some European countries laws against sodomy stayed on the books for centuries with variations over time in terms of their enforcement. The English law of 1534 was reenacted several times, revoked twice, and soon reinstated—all before 1600. But after 1600 it remained essentially unchanged for two and a half centuries, until the late nineteenth century. Even though the death penalty was abolished in the 1820s for more than a hundred crimes, it was retained for buggery, rape, and sex with a girl under the age of consent, then thirteen years. Finally in 1861 legislation abolished the death penalty for sexual crimes, including rape. In 1885 the criminal law was amended to make “acts of gross indecency,” which included all sexual acts between males, whether in public or private, and “procuring” males for such acts, punishable by imprisonment for up to two years with hard labor.

Other European states reformed their laws on homosexuality. Prussia abolished the death penalty for sodomy in 1851, and Scotland did so in 1889. But this did not imply toleration of homosexual relationships. The German Penal Code of 1875 punished “criminally indecent activity” with imprisonment for up to five years.

THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

During the nineteenth century the extension of activity by the state, in the context of growing concern about social stability, led to renewed interest in sexual morals. The broad-based “moral purity movement” focused on issues such as prostitution; white slavery, the insistence that large numbers of young European women were abducted and sold into sexual slavery in the Middle East and elsewhere; and the spread of venereal (sexually transmitted) diseases. Despite strong pressure from this movement, which also pressed for controls on alcohol and gambling, legislators were generally unwilling to attempt to regulate sexuality as broadly as some organizations wanted.

Nonetheless, states enacted legislation on some social issues whose associations were explicitly sexual. Concern about the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, particularly about their effects on military personnel, led the British Parliament to pass the Contagious Diseases Acts beginning in the 1860s. These laws gave the authorities powers to detain women suspected of being prostitutes and to have them examined for symptoms of sexually transmitted disease. The laws were applied with particular intensity in naval towns like Portsmouth, but after an outcry at the discriminatory character of these measures, which ignored the men who were also infected with diseases, the acts were eventually repealed.

In the late nineteenth century, too, eugenics influenced the policies of a number of states with respect to sexuality. Reflecting a widespread sense of a tendency toward physical, intellectual, and moral degeneration because unregulated procreation passed on undesirable traits from generation to generation, many eugenicists argued for education and voluntary restrictions on marriage and fertility. Others, however, urged governments to step in to stop what they called “the breeding of the unfit” that they believed was leading to “race suicide.” In the late nineteenth century a number of states, including Sweden, began programs of sterilization to limit the fertility of men and women diagnosed as insane.

Again, however, homosexuality was the main form of sexual activity pursued by the state with much

enthusiasm in the late 1800s. At the turn of the century several states were rocked by sensational trials under these laws, including those of Oscar Wilde in England in 1895 and a number of senior military personnel in Germany in the decades before World War I.

Throughout most of the twentieth century European states pursued a variety of policies toward sexuality. The general tendency was toward less intrusive and more liberal policies, in which the state did not try to regulate the parties to sexual activities or the nature of their sexual activities. These trends were by no means linear, nor did they occur at the same rate throughout Europe. Notable exceptions existed. In Nazi Germany laws forbade sexual relationships between “Aryans” and Jews. Although apparently conventional in many respects, Nazi policies on sex and the family were underpinned by racial and demographic agendas. Homosexuality, condemned as degenerate and useless for demographic purposes, was criminalized, and the number of prosecutions rose steadily, reaching eight thousand in 1938. After serving prison terms, thousands of homosexuals were sent to concentration camps. Adultery was retained in Nazi divorce law, primarily because adulterers ran the risk of having sex with unapproved partners. The regime set up a program called *Lebensborn*, under which racially approved women were impregnated by racially approved men to foster the development of a population the Nazis considered racially superior.

Such draconian policies toward sexuality as the Nazis’ have been rare in European history. They were echoed in Romania in the 1980s, however, under the regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu. To promote population growth, Ceaușescu forbade the use of contraception and abortion and required women to undergo regular medical examinations to ensure that they were observing the law.

The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed a general decline in state legislation concerning sexuality. Laws against fornication and adultery had long disappeared. From the 1960s onward states liberalized laws concerning abortion and contraception and progressively decriminalized prostitution and homosexuality. Sexual relationships between homosexuals were decriminalized in England in 1967, and by the end of the 1970s they had ceased to be a crime in most West European states. Within another two decades policy shifted toward granting homosexuals positive legal rights, and in the 1990s several states, including Belgium, Denmark, and France, established registered partnerships that gave same-sex couples many of the legal rights and fiscal benefits that different-sex couples derived from marriage.

At the same time specific forms of sexual activity, notably those involving children and young people under the age of sexual consent, child pornography, and pedophilia, gained a higher profile. They evoked legislative responses in a number of European countries where there were well-publicized cases.

Research on the history of sexuality, including its regulation by state law, frequently reflects issues debated in contemporary society. A great deal of research by historians of sexuality in the 1970s and 1980s focused on women and gender. In the 1980s and 1990s more attention was devoted to homosexuality. The work of historians has contributed not only to knowledge of the historical experiences of men and women of all sexual orientations but also to the evolution of social attitudes toward sexuality and their expression in policy and legislation.

Whatever the specific theme they research, historians seek to historicize sexuality and to show that behavior, attitudes, and policies are best understood contextually. One result has been to deny that certain forms of sexuality and some sexual orientations, even if they are by far the most common, are “natural” or “normal.” To this extent the historical work has helped inform debates on sexual issues.

As for sources, historians of sexuality are both rewarded and penalized by the place of sexuality in Western culture. On one hand, few dimensions of human behavior have been historically as widely debated as sexuality. Sexual attitudes and behaviors often have been used as surrogate measures for other events and conditions, such as the general level of social order and the state of morality in younger generations, and official documentation and public sources of all kinds provide a wealth of material. Moreover sex has long been a prominent theme in literature and art. All these sources pose problems of interpretation, but they represent a massive database in the search for elusive “social attitudes” toward specific forms of sexuality.

Yet, on the other hand, this mass of documentation deals with one of the most intimate and private dimensions of human activity. Few records of individual sexual lives exist, and few diarists recorded their sexual experiences and thoughts. The single source most commonly used by historians probing the sexual experiences of individuals, specific groups, or whole societies in the past is judicial records. Needless to say, these give invaluable insights into the regulation of sexuality and the ways in which certain offenses were disposed of by the courts. But they seldom reveal how cases were filtered through the policing and judicial processes. That is, no clear sense emerges of the extent to which the extant court cases were representative of more general behavior.

A number of historians have attempted to define certain periods as more permissive and others as more repressive in terms of both social attitudes and the regulation of sexuality. Some have argued that the late seventeenth-century Restoration was a hotbed of sexual activity and that the nineteenth-century Victorian era was one of intense sexual repression on both the individual and the social levels. Neither generalization seems convincing. While some evidence supports broad swings in several countries, the complexity of the issues involved makes generalizations difficult and hazardous. It is arguable that some examples of the regulation of sexuality were actually attempts to regulate the behavior of women. In other instances

the rationale behind sexual control was a desire to increase population size or to limit the social implications of increasing numbers of illegitimate children. It is also important to look beyond the terms of legislation to understand the way laws were applied.

The relationship of the state, law, and sexuality is an important historical question, but it is necessary to recognize that sexuality is frequently and intimately associated with other major issues, such as class, gender, and authority. This is not to diminish the importance of the regulation of sexuality as a subject of historical investigation but to recognize its central importance in understanding the links between the private and the public dimensions of European history.

See also other articles in this section.

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HOMOSEXUALITY AND LESBIANISM



Randolph Trumbach

Throughout the centuries since 1300 sexual relations between males have been defined by the official cultures of the church and the state as immoral and illegal. From the arrests, trials, and punishment of men who engaged in this behavior it is possible to sketch a history of male homosexual relations. More trials were held in southern than in northern Europe before 1700, and more trials were held in the north than in the south thereafter. Consequently more is known about Italy in the later Middle Ages than about England, France, or the Netherlands, and more is known about these three northern countries than about southern Europe in the subsequent centuries. Nonetheless, some signposts are visible. The nature of sexual relations between males changed profoundly around 1700 as the result of a major shift in all sexual relations, whether heterosexual or homosexual, and significant but lesser changes occurred after 1850 and 1950.

The history of sexual relations between women, by contrast, is much harder to reconstruct. In some places the behavior was illegal, and in others it was not. But the archives have yielded only about a dozen cases before 1500. By the eighteenth century a short history is possible, written from the literary representations of desire between women. But not until the nineteenth century did the diaries and letters of leisured women extensively document actual relationships. After World War II oral histories reconstruct a public sexual culture for women. It is of course likely that significant differences existed throughout these centuries between the sexual behavior of women and men if for no other reason than the domination that men exercised over all of women's activities. But evidence suggests that the significant changes in sexual behavior between men after 1700, 1850, and 1950 had parallels in the behavior between women, since at these points in time the entire Western sexual system, heterosexual and homosexual, changed.

AN AGE-STRUCTURED SYSTEM, 1300–1700

In the years from 1300 to 1700 sexual relations between European males were structured by differences in age. This meant that men past the age of puberty who could grow full beards took sexually active roles with adolescent boys who had entered puberty. Since for reasons of diet and physiology puberty then began later than it did in the twentieth century, boys between the ages of fifteen and twenty-two were anally penetrated by men who were in their mid- to late twenties and sometimes older. This was not, however, the behavior of a minority of 4 or 5 percent of all males, as homosexual behavior was in Western countries in 2000. Instead it is likely that all males experienced conscious desire for other males and that most of them acted on this desire. But these males also desired women. Some of them went to prostitutes, and most of them eventually married women and had children. Among the minority who never married, some were primarily interested in boys, but most were probably restrained from marrying by economic factors that were part of a distinctive western European demographic regime. That demographic regime disappeared over the course of the eighteenth century as marriage became universal except among the small minority of exclusively homosexual men.

More importantly sexual desire in men after 1700 was divided between an overwhelming majority who were exclusively heterosexual and a homosexual minority of less than 5 percent. This can be difficult for Westerners to understand, because in the late nineteenth century a supposedly scientific psychology analyzed the sexual divisions observed in Western societies as moral or biological constants that must exist in all human societies. This psychology invented the terms "homosexual" and "heterosexual" to describe

these divisions, unaware that they had only arisen in the first generation after 1700.

Westerners after 1700 had difficulty understanding any sexual system other than their own. This was true even when they read the evidence for earlier Western societies. Despite the great prestige of the classical civilizations of Greece and Rome in Western culture, the literary evidence for their sexual systems, in which men desired both boys and women, was ignored, denounced, or misinterpreted by educated men, who read it as a standard part of their educations. The literary evidence of the Renaissance, whether from Italy or England, was similarly misread in the mistaken belief that Christianity, because it denounced and punished sodomy, had profoundly changed the behavior of European men from what it had been in the ancient pagan Mediterranean. Observing cultures other than their own, in many of which men desired both boys and women, Europeans similarly either ignored the evidence of their own eyes or denounced it as the peculiar degeneracy of inferior races. They understood only Western behavior because that was presumed to be the biological and moral norm. The homosexual minorities of their own societies were categorized as biological and moral deviants, and all homosexual behavior from any time or place was similarly classified.

A comparative perspective. The age-structured system of sexual relations between European males that prevailed between 1300 and 1700 is better understood when compared with similar systems from other cultures and contrasted with gender-structured systems of homosexual behavior. In the Mediterranean world the prevailing systems for sexual relations between males were structured by differences in age. Among the ancient Greeks adult male citizens who had grown their beards courted beardless adolescent boys who were their social equals. It brought great prestige to a beautiful boy like Alcibiades to be desired by many men. But ideally a boy was faithful to one lover, who became his guide. The sexual component of the relationship ended when the boy grew his beard, and his lover married a woman. Boys had to be careful that they were not publicly stigmatized as either passive or mercenary. A free boy who allowed his favors to be bought lost his rights of citizenship, but foreign boys who were slaves or prostitutes were legally bought by their owners or patrons. The transition from passive boy to active man was crucial, and the minority of adult men who continued to be passive were held in contempt even if they married women.

The Roman system was similar yet profoundly different in that relations with free boys were forbidden. Only foreign adolescent slaves or prostitutes were

legal companions for men. The Roman material also documents more fully two different kinds of adult passive men. The *cinaedi* married women and remained part of ordinary social life but were held in contempt. The *galli*, by contrast, were given a grudging respect. They left their families and became members of itinerant bands who served a goddess. They danced, begged, sometimes castrated themselves, and were often prostitutes. Consequently men had four different sexual roles in their relations with each other: active man, passive boy, *cinaedus*, and *gallus*. The *cinaedus* and the *gallus* came into existence when a passive boy failed to make the transition to the active role. Passive men from the lower social strata became *galli*. Those who were not prepared to abandon their families and rank became *cinaedi*, the most difficult role of all. But all four roles were parts of a single system in which differences in age ordinarily justified and even gave prestige to some kinds of sexual relations between males. In both Greece and Rome the law and religion therefore took for granted that all men would desire sexual relations with both women and boys.

This age-structured system of four roles (one active, three passive) survived into the world of the Islamic Mediterranean. In the twentieth century in Turkey, for instance, were active men, passive boys, *ibne*, and *köçek*. The *ibne* was the passive man who stayed in society and even married. The *köçek* joined a transvestite band of entertainers and often castrated himself. The *köçek* was admired, and the *ibne* was held in contempt. Similar systems of four roles with different terms for each role existed in Morocco, Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and northern India. One *hijra*, the northern Indian equivalent of the Turkish *köçek* and the ancient *gallus*, explained that when men could not easily find a woman or a boy, they went to a *hijra*. It is important to notice that, though Islamic religion and law condemn relations between males, adult men are held in honor by their peers when they penetrate a boy, an *ibne*, or a *köçek*. Two systems of sexual morality, the official and the unofficial, therefore coexisted, but the unofficial actually described what men did. As late as 1963, 44 percent of Arab men in advanced psychology classes at the American University in Beirut admitted to having sexual relations with males. The similarity between these Islamic systems and those of ancient Greece and Rome is striking. It raises the question of whether or not the Christian societies that existed between the Roman and the Islamic worlds were any different in this regard, and it outlines the patterns of sexual relations between males that are documented in southern Europe or the northern Christian Mediterranean from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries.

Sexual relations between males structured by differences in age is one of two predominant world-wide systems. In the other system relations between males are structured by the presence of a minority third gender role of biological males who have been socialized to combine aspects of the behavior of the two dominant male and female roles of the majority in their societies. This system appeared less frequently than the other, but it has been observed among most of the native peoples of North America, the islands of the Pacific, and sub-Saharan Africa. In age-structured systems all males as adolescents passed through a period of passivity, but most became active once they grew beards. Only two decided minorities remained passive as men. In gender-structured systems most men never experienced sexual passivity. Both as adolescents and as adults they penetrated a small passive minority. This minority from childhood had been socialized into a role somewhere between those of most men and women. Their bodies were strong like men, so they were notable workers, but they did not fight as warriors. Instead they dressed, spoke, and moved as women. In their passive sexual roles with the male majority, they might play the role of prostitute, lover, or wife. They can seem to have a superficial similarity to the two kinds of passive males found in age-structured systems. But unlike the *cinaedus* or the *ibne*, they did not marry women, and unlike the *gallus* or the *köçek*, they did not join liminal groups that served as alternative families. No one expected that they would grow up to be active men, and their sexual partners did not pass through a period of sexual passivity. It is important to understand the differences between these two systems because the major transition in sexual relations between Western males that began around 1700 can be usefully conceptualized as a transformation from a system structured by age to one structured by gender.

These two systems have so far been described only in terms of relations between males because it is primarily those that are described in the historical and anthropological sources. But the two systems also existed among women. Some Native American women became warriors and took wives. The women of Sparta and Lesbos probably took girls as their lovers, and the women of modern Mombasa certainly did. But the age-structured systems of the Islamic world also produced the sworn virgins of Iraq or the Balkans who became men and probably gave up all sexual relations. They neatly parallel the men who became *ibne* or *köçek*. But the women who became masculine were given high status. This was true whether they were the women warriors produced by a gender-structured system or the sworn virgins of a society structured by

differences in age. It will therefore be appropriate to see whether these distinctions can be used to understand the history of sexual relations between Western women.

Renaissance Florence. Florence in the fifteenth century provides the most detailed picture of sexual desire between males in the Europe of the late Middle Ages. In the second and third generations of that century at least 15,000 Florentine males were accused of sodomy, and over 2,400 were convicted by the principal magistracy charged with overseeing sodomy. From this Michael Rocke estimated that at least two-thirds of all Florentine males were implicated by the time they reached the age of forty, and these figures do not cover all the magistracies. This strongly suggests that almost all males had sexual relations with other males at some point in their lives and did so repeatedly. The importance of this finding cannot be stressed too much. The most perspicacious readings of the ancient Greek and Roman sources have demonstrated a similar world, and a number of anthropologists who studied societies outside of the West in the twentieth century found the same. But these readings and observations have been challenged or ignored by those convinced that homosexual behavior was limited to a small deviant minority.

Sodomy was nonetheless illegal in Florence. Preachers like Bernardino of Siena regularly denounced it, but Bernardino also accepted that it was widespread. He even said that mothers were proud that their attractive adolescent sons caught men's eyes and deliberately sent them into the streets dressed in the most alluring clothes. The Florentines apparently lived out their sexual lives under two different moralities, a Christian one that disapproved of sodomy and a masculinist and patriarchal one that promoted it. Other facets of the sexual life of Christian Europe exhibited such a contradiction. Christians brought before the Inquisition believed that simple fornication between unmarried men and women was no sin, and married couples divorced each other even though the church held that marriage was indissoluble. Christians also resorted to magic instead of using the channels of grace provided by the Church. These contradictory moralities existed together in the minds of individuals, and at some moments and in some roles one morality prevailed over another in the life of an individual. The presence in all males of sexual desire for other males have to be teased from literary sources. It can be demonstrated statistically.

This must mean that the distinction between a homosexual minority and a heterosexual majority cannot have existed in Florence. If this distinction did

not exist in a single European society, it is extremely unlikely to have existed in any of them. Certainly all modern Western societies are organized sexually by the same distinction between homosexuals and heterosexuals. It is true that this distinction became dominant in different Western societies at different moments after 1700, but it is apparent, when Florence is compared with either the ancient pagan or the later Islamic Mediterranean, that the sodomy of Florence was nothing new. It was simply more open and therefore better documented.

The question arises whether or not sodomy became more open in the course of the fifteenth century. There had certainly been relatively few cases in the fourteenth century when the penalties had been far more severe. As the penalties were moderated into a series of graduated fines, which were often not paid, the number of denunciations increased. Many Florentines therefore thought that sodomy was wrong, but they did not think it was so wrong as to merit severe punishment. This was the compromise between the two moralities by which many Florentines lived. But in their adolescence and young manhood, most Florentine males lived entirely according to the masculinist morality and not the Christian one. When Niccolò Machiavelli worried about his son's intimacy with a boy, Francesco Vittori told him: "Since we are verging on old age, we might be severe and overly scrupulous, and we do not remember what we do as adolescents. So Lodovico has a boy with him, with whom he amuses himself, jests, takes walks, growls in his ear, goes to bed together. What then? Even in these things perhaps there is nothing bad."

The sodomy most Florentine males practiced was strictly organized by differences in age. From the time boys entered puberty at fifteen, delayed for physiological reasons, until their beards began to grow at nineteen or twenty, they were anally penetrated by older men. These men were usually unmarried and in their late twenties. Between nineteen and twenty-three came a transitional phase, when a young man could be both active and passive. He was always active with someone younger and passive with someone older. Adolescent boys occasionally took turns being active and passive with each other, but young adult men never allowed themselves to be passive with their adolescents. Older men sometimes fellated their adolescent partners instead of penetrating them. Most men stopped pursuing boys once they married, in their thirties. A few adult men (12 percent) never married, and some had boys throughout their lives. Some men in their twenties had sex both with female prostitutes and with boys. A very few adult men allowed themselves to be penetrated. They presumably failed to

make the transition from passive boy to active man. No adult transvestite men appear in the fifteenth-century records, but the evidence shows such men in the sixteenth century. They certainly appear in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century records for Spain and Portugal. All of the four positions typical of age-structured systems in the Mediterranean world therefore existed in Renaissance Florence: the active man, the passive boy, the passive man who tries otherwise to live a conventional life, and the transvestite passive man. But as in all such systems, most activity was between men and adolescents. This was not simply a preference for younger partners of the kind found among the homosexual minority of men after 1700. It was instead a desire for the smooth, small, lightly muscled bodies of boys, and it was a desire that was always destroyed, whether in Greece, Rome, Islam, or Christian Europe, by the growth of hair on the thighs and the face.

This world of men and boys could be both highly promiscuous and lovingly faithful. In 1480 sixteen-year-old Andrea was sodomized by forty-two different men in the course of a year, and on average boys, when they were interrogated, confessed to eleven partners. Adult men were as active. A baker admitted having twenty-four boys over seven years, and a butcher admitted having thirty-four boys over twelve years. Sometimes, about one in ten, a boy was voluntarily sodomized by as many as eight men in turn at a time, which occasionally degenerated into gang rape. Some boys were prostitutes. A network of prominent citizens in 1467 sponsored a brothel of boys that a blacksmith ran. Some boys worked for a procurer, or a ring of four boys together worked the taverns, gambling tables, and the houses of female prostitutes, picking up 120 men between them. Boys who were not prostitutes were often given gifts of money at each sexual encounter, which no doubt helped to maintain their honor. Men were often contemptuous of the boys they sodomized, describing them as women, prostitutes, or wives, and this no doubt was part of the source of their sexual excitement. It also explains why some fathers were not anxious that their sons be known as passive. It was acceptable to fathers for their sons to sodomize other men's sons, however. These ambiguities persistently appear in age-structured systems, whether in ancient Greece or the modern Islamic world. Nonetheless, at least a sixth of the men and boys interrogated formed a loving sexual bond that lasted from one to six years. A weaver who worked with his boy and nightly slept with him was said to see "no other god but him." A dyer and an apothecary swore on the gospel book as it lay on the altar that they would be faithful to each other, which would

have made a legally binding marriage between a man and a woman.

The rest of Europe. Patterns similar to Florence's turn up throughout southern Europe. Other parts of Italy prosecuted fewer than Florence since the penalties were usually more severe. Venice had known places where men picked up boys. Group sex and gang rape occurred as well as long-lasting love affairs. Occasionally an adult man was sexually passive, and a few men were transvestites. The entire age-structured Mediterranean system was present. The same was probably true of Rome, or so the evidence from Michelangelo Caravaggio's life suggests. But it is instructive to consider the disagreements among his biographers. Some see only the female prostitutes with whom he associated and whom he used as models in his paintings. Others see only the apprentices and adolescent servants with whom he lived and slept and whom he depicted clothed or nude in his paintings. It is clearly difficult to see the women and the boys as inhabitants of a single sexual milieu.

In Spain and Portugal the Inquisition records document similar patterns. In most cases sodomy occurred between men in their twenties and boys between fifteen and nineteen with the men active and the boys passive. These boys were often dressed and

painted like women. Florentine boys do not seem to have done this, though at least one of the Roman boys in a painting by Caravaggio was mistaken for a woman. The Iberian material also presents more clearly cases of adult transvestite men, who constantly dressed as women, used women's names, and in some cases even constructed artificial vaginas to conceal their penes. But typically in the Mediterranean pederastical system such men were a decided minority.

Information about northern Europe is much sparser because that area had fewer trials. Basel, for instance, had only eight trials in the first fifty years of the fifteenth century. The penalties were severe. Four were exiled, and three were burned at the stake. In 1475 a chaplain at the cathedral confessed to having sodomized several times a choirboy who lived in his house. The boy claimed that the priest had persuaded him by saying, "If everybody who committed this act was burnt at the stake, not even fifty men would survive in Basel." When read in the light of the southern European materials, these fragments reveal a world of widespread sexual acts between men and adolescents with a great deal of implicit tolerance and few cases brought to trial because the penalties were too severe.

The Reformation in northern Europe apparently made no difference. In Geneva in 1610 a man under torture for high treason and murder confessed

to having sexual relations with twenty other males and thereby revealed the existence of a world that usually went undisturbed. England has been studied most extensively. The fragmentary evidence comes in three kinds, including a few trials for sodomy, biographical anecdotes about gentlemen and kings, and plays and poems. Literary scholars who study the third category sometimes claim to find evidence for egalitarian sexual relations between two adult men in some plays from early in the century, but these are certainly misreadings. Those who study the Restoration plays agree that the sodomy in them is structured by differences in age. Every case of sodomy brought to court concerned relations between men and adolescents. Even the most hostile anecdotes about King James I and his lovers took for granted that the king was dominant with younger men. Robert Carr became the king's favorite when he was twenty and "smooth-faced" and fell from favor when he grew his beard, lost his looks, and then married. In England, possibly because of a physiological regime different from that in the south, a young man's passivity could last till the age of twenty-five.

Court factions regularly vied with each other to present the king with a favorite of their choosing. They apparently took for granted that it lay within the power of any handsome young man to satisfy the king's desire, presuming evidently a universal capacity in this regard. The comments on James's behavior could be either condemnatory or noncommittal, establishing in Protestant England the continued presence of two opposing moralities of sodomy. During the years of his marriage, when James evidently slept with his wife because of the cycle of her pregnancies, no evidence indicates that he had male favorites. The favorites came only after he ended sexual relations with his wife. No one thought the king was an effeminate, passive sodomite interested only in men or boys, because such mollies did not appear in England until a hundred years later. The real difficulty with the English material is that the two kinds of passive adult men found in the Mediterranean evidence have not shown up except for the case of John Rykener. He called himself "Eleanor" and was found in women's clothes having sex with another man in a London street on a night in 1394. He worked regularly as a prostitute but also had sex with women. The seventeenth-century populace could conceive of men who were both active and passive and labeled them hermaphrodites, but no actual example has come into view.

Sexual behavior between women. The pattern of sexual behavior between women before 1700 is harder to establish than that of men. If they were structured by differences in age, primarily the small number of

adult, masculine transvestite women who penetrated other women with an artificial phallus made it into the legal sources, not the majority of older women who had sex with younger ones. It is as though the sources for men described only the exceptional cases of the two kinds of adult passive men and ignored most of the acts between adolescents and men. Similarly in the twentieth century anthropologists mentioned in passing that many adult women in the villages of Iraq had sex with younger women but then devoted their detailed studies to the exceptional transvestite virgin. In 1560 the Aragonese Inquisition received denunciations of several women for sexual relations with each other enacted "without any instrument." The courts were told not to prosecute because lascivious behavior among women who had not used an artificial phallus was not sodomy. But two Spanish nuns who had used dildos were burned in the sixteenth century. From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries in Italy, Spain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and England women dressed as men, married women, and used artificial penes. Sometimes their wives seem to have been unaware that their husbands were not biological men. In some places these female husbands were punished once they were discovered. Their wives sometimes left them but occasionally stayed in the marriages. Female husbands were part of a larger group of women who for varying lengths of time dressed and lived as men. Some of these women became transvestites as a means of getting better work or while searching for an absent male lover or husband. It is not clear whether those who married women and used a phallus began to dress as men primarily for sexual reasons.

Differences in age seemingly were not an important part of these marriages between women. The literary sources that represent affairs between women indicate that older women took younger ones as lovers without dressing as men or using an artificial penis. Eighteenth-century English erotic novels by Delarivier Manley and John Cleland present such age-structured relations, as does the Italian libertine literature of the previous two centuries. From the arrests of a dozen women in Amsterdam for having relations with each other, it is apparent that as late as the 1790s many of these relationships were partly structured by differences in age. Bartha Schurman, who was thirty-one, murdered Catharina de Haan because she was jealous of her involvement with twenty-three-year-old Bets Wiebes. Maria Smit (forty-six) was observed by neighbors as she made love to Anna Schreuder (seventeen). Gresia Debber, who was twenty-four, was involved with three others, one twenty-seven, close to her own age, but two much older, thirty-seven and

forty-six. Two mistresses seduced their maids, who were probably younger women. Christina Knip, forty-two years old, raped a fourteen-year-old girl. Knip used a dildo, but none of the other women did. Some of these women were married, some widows, some single; none was a transvestite. Except for a case in 1750 involving two women (fifty and sixty years old), these prosecutions are the only ones for sexual relations between women during two centuries in Amsterdam. It is not clear why they were prosecuted, but it is likely that they represent the nature of most relations between women in traditional Europe more closely than do the 119 cases of women who lived as men and sometimes married women in the Netherlands in the same period.

A GENDER-STRUCTURED SYSTEM, AFTER 1700

This age-structured system in Europe began to disappear over the course of the eighteenth century, first for men and then for women. It was replaced by a system that structured same-sex relations by gender differences and divided the world into a homosexual minority and a heterosexual majority. In the eighteenth century the change seems limited to northwestern Europe (England, France, and the Netherlands). It reached central Europe by the middle of the nineteenth century, but it did not appear in southern and eastern Europe until the early twentieth century. When it first appeared around 1700, it was probably part of the major societal shift that produced the dominant modern culture of the next three centuries. This likelihood is confirmed by the experience of Japanese society, which between 1910 and 1950 moved similarly from an age-structured to a gendered system that divided the world into a homosexual minority and a heterosexual majority. The beginning of and slow growth of equality between men and women probably account for the change. Certainly in traditional societies, like those of North America, in which same-sex relations were structured by the presence of a third-gender minority, women had relatively higher standing than they did in the age-structured societies of the Mediterranean or East Asia. In neither kind of traditional society was the sexual world divided into a homosexual minority and a heterosexual majority. The modern sexual system was therefore in some respects radically different from all preceding systems.

Mollies. In the thirty years after 1700 it is possible to identify in English society a new kind of sodomite called, in the slang of the streets, a “molly.” A molly

was an effeminate adult man who desired to have sex only with men or boys. His speech and gait were similar to a woman’s, his clothes tended to be elegant, and he occasionally dressed as a woman for a ball. Among his fellow mollies he was often known by a woman’s name. Some men, like the Princess Seraphina, always dressed as women, people referred to them using female pronouns, and they lived by prostitution. All mollies differed from the effeminate men of both traditional systems. Their role was closest to the North American berdaches. But whereas it was legitimate for the berdache to be penetrated by the men and boys from the majority, in the modern system the molly was supposed to be strictly avoided by the men and boys from the majority. The molly did desire such men, sometimes as their only objects, but the men who yielded were concerned to hide this carefully since any contact with a molly could be used to put them into that despised category. Mollies also and perhaps mainly had sex with each other, whereas the berdaches strictly avoided each other.

Mollies also differed from the two types of passive men in age-structured systems because in their cases sexual acts between males no longer centered upon men with boys. It is true that adult mollies sometimes pursued boys and that for a while in the early eighteenth century some men continued to desire both women and boys. It was also the case that throughout the next three centuries some men in total institutions like prisons or ships at sea satisfied themselves with the boys who were present. But it was no longer acceptable for a boy to be passive. Boys talked among themselves about mollies with constant horrified fascination, but a boy approached by such a man tended to panic. Masturbation was severely discouraged with threats of mental and physical debility because it led males to a fascination with their penes instead of with women’s bodies.

The appearance of the molly was accompanied by the development in the majority of men of a new sexual role that allowed them to desire only women. Men’s desire for adolescent males, which had existed as far back as one can go in the history of the Mediterranean, were now taboo. Instead men determinedly pursued the populations of streetwalking female prostitutes, who filled the principal thoroughfares of most Western cities for the next 250 years. They seduced unmarried women with such callous vigor that within a hundred years illegitimacy climbed to unprecedented levels. In the end every sexual act was threatened by the venereal diseases men contracted from prostitutes and passed on to their wives and children. Whoremongering no longer injured a man’s reputation. Instead it was crucial not to be known as a molly. Black-

mailers could terrify a timid man by swearing to charge him with sodomy, since the charge once made was difficult to disprove. But no term distinguished this male majority. They were simply men and not mollies.

Mollies met each other walking in the streets or strolling in the shopping arcades, where it was possible to linger unobtrusively. They met as they turned against a wall to make water, and they met strolling in the parks. In these places they mingled with female prostitutes and with the men who were the prostitutes' customers, and they picked up some of those men. The intermingling of the worlds of prostitution and sodomy lasted for 250 years, until prostitutes more or less disappeared from the streets in the late twentieth century, when premarital sex became common among young respectable women. The molly like the prostitute was promiscuous, and mollies copied the manners of prostitutes. The term "molly," like other subsequent terms, including queer, punk, gay, faggot, fairy, and fruit, was first used for female prostitutes.

The molly and the prostitute in the course of the eighteenth century were the deviant minorities who defined the roles of the respectable majority of men and women. But sentiment and domesticity made women into mothers and destroyed the old presumption that, in Alexander Pope's phrase, every woman was at heart a rake. The male majority's loyalty was contested between the prostitute, with whom they could demonstrate their exclusive interest in women, and the wives, who were the mothers of their children

and the source of domestic comfort. Mollies as men experienced a similar tension between libertinism and domesticity. For the next 250 years they could not legally marry each other or have children, though some mollies married women and had children. In the relative privacy of their molly houses, to which only they had access unless a traitorous molly admitted the legal authorities, they invented rituals that longingly mocked the rituals of marriage and domesticity. Sometimes they conducted marriages with one partner dressed as a bride and with bridesmen and women in attendance. The room in which they engaged in group sex might be called the chapel, the sex called marrying, and a sexual partner called a husband. A man might go into labor and be delivered by a midwife of a wooden doll, his child might be baptized, and his male gossips might visit to drink caudle as a woman's friends waited on her in the real world.

In that real world a molly's life was happiest if he could hide his effeminacy, putting it on and off as he entered and left the molly house. It was sometimes claimed that mollies worked in the trades that dressed women and cared for their hair, but these were simply the men who could not easily hide their effeminacy. Mollies worked in the full range of occupations, and they lived everywhere in town. Men from the middle and upper classes had the most to lose if they were identified as mollies and sometimes tried to hide their effeminacy in an elegant estheticism. But women gossiped about them and their effeminate gestures behind their backs, and men excluded them from political

office. If they misjudged and made a pass at the wrong man and were arrested, their families were likely to disown them, and their only option was to flee into exile abroad.

The molly was an English phenomenon, but the life of the new effeminate sodomite remained something like this through the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries in England, France, and the Netherlands. In eighteenth-century Paris the displacement of the traditional libertine who pursued boys by the new effeminate sodomite can be traced in the police records, with the first predominating early in the century and only the latter present by the 1780s. The legal reforms that came in France with the Revolution did not criminalize sodomy. This sometimes has been mistaken for a new regime of toleration, but the police in both France and the Netherlands simply arrested men for public indecency in the nineteenth century and probably in greater numbers than they had in the previous century. In the 1870s the Parisian police kept a register of sodomites from which a social world rather like that of the eighteenth century can be reconstructed. Of course some changes occurred. Bourgeois propriety no longer allowed men to urinate

openly in the street, so the public urinal became one of the main venues for finding a sexual partner and remained so throughout Europe until the 1950s. The young policemen and the telegraph boys in their uniforms joined the soldiers in the streets as objects of men's desire. In the Dutch material from the middle of the eighteenth century men said they were born with their desires and knew they were different from most men. Both the Dutch and the French sources document more readily than the English the male lovers who lived together as couples with varying degrees of fidelity.

Sapphists. Women, on the other hand, were more likely to live as a couple and not move in a public world of meeting places once a new masculinized "sapphist" or "tommy" who was exclusively interested in women appeared in the later eighteenth century. In this respect sapphists had more in common with the majority of women than they did with sodomites, who like other men were likely to pursue sex in public places. The lives of sapphists also differed because the female prostitute, not the sapphist, delimited the respectability of the majority of women, whereas most

men measured themselves against the sodomite. Nonetheless, the gender identities of the sapphist and the sodomite were similarly constructed in that they both combined selected aspects of the gendered behavior of the women and men of the majority. The masculinized sapphist emerged one or two generations after the appearance around 1700 of the effeminate sodomite. She initially appeared among gentlewomen, whereas the poor produced their sodomites from the very first. Why these differences existed is unclear.

To understand the novelty of the sapphist it is necessary to distinguish her from the woman who dressed as a man, married women, and used an artificial penis. These passing women had been the deviants in a system in which most acts between women were structured by differences in age. In that respect they had been similar to the two deviant kinds of adult passive men when most acts between males had occurred between men and adolescents. The sapphist did not wish to pass as a man. She wished to be openly ambiguous, but she hoped that her ambiguity would be stimulating to women's eyes and not to men's. She wore a woman's dress but walked with a man's gait. Seeing Anne Lister in the street, two female prostitutes in the early nineteenth century approached her and touched her breasts to reassure themselves that she was not a transvestite man. Transvestite men in the street were likely to be sodomites engaged in prostitution. In her diary Lister unambiguously established the sexual practices of sapphist women in the way that sodomy trials do for those of men. Her similarities with late-eighteenth-century women like Mrs. Damer, about whom contemporaries gossiped because she wore a dress but with men's boots, help explain the transformation in sexual identity that these women represented. Lister demonstrated that relations between women in the early nineteenth century were sometimes genital. These relations were not all romantic and platonic. The late-nineteenth-century discussion about such women did not create them. It merely described them no doubt with the intention of morbidifying them.

Lister was a landed gentlewoman who eventually suffered some degree of ostracism because of her perceived tastes, even if the hostility was nothing like the internal exile that the rich young man William Beckford endured because of a scandal over a boy who grew into an effeminate sodomite. Those parts of Lister's diary that detail her sexual feelings and relations with women were written in a secret code. She eventually dressed in black to avoid criticism that she was not fashionably feminine, and she adopted inconspicuous elements of men's clothes, like braces to hold up her drawers. She disliked masculine manners in

women, but her own deep-toned voice frightened other women. She spoke flirtatiously with women the way a man would. Her lover called her "Fred" and "husband." She fantasized that she took a young woman into a shed on a moor and had sex with her using a penis. At thirty she stopped menstruating, and she grew mustaches. Her contemporaries began to ostracize her, and her lover, who liked what happened in bed between them, became embarrassed to be seen with her. But Lister told her friend that she considered her feelings "natural to me inasmuch as they were not taught, not fictitious, but instinctive." She read the ancient Romans to understand her own relations, but she found the women in Juvenal artificial because they did not form marriages with other women as did the English sapphists, whom she began to recognize and meet in her thirties.

Lister flirted with many feminine women and had sexual relations with most of the sisters in one family. The most important was Marianne Lawton, who had married a man. This marriage Lister dismissed as mere "legal prostitution." The two women, vowing marriage to each other in bed after a night of lovemaking, agreed to take the sacrament together as a pledge (an old way of making a clandestine marriage between a man and a woman) but to avoid any other ceremony as long as Lawton's husband was alive. When this relationship broke up, Lister went to Paris to recover. She described the sex with women there more explicitly than the "kisses" she wrote about with Lawton. Some people supposed that women who had sex with women had enlarged clitorides for penetration, but Lister explained to one woman that her body was not hermaphroditic, that no one had corrupted her, and that her feelings were "the effect of the mind." Lister would not allow this woman to reciprocally touch her clitoris or put her finger into her vagina, though she had done this to the woman. That, she said, would be "womanizing me too much." Her male identity allowed her to give pleasure but not to receive it directly. Eventually Lister, when she was forty-one, began a romance with an Englishwoman ten years younger than she, and they lived in a marriage until Lister's death.

It is not clear that Lister's feminine partners had the same kind of sapphist identity that she did. Such women may have moved easily in and out of the world of conventional sex with men. It has been suggested that these feminine women did not have a lesbian identity until after the 1950s, when the majority of women took on a heterosexual identity by masturbating in increasing numbers and having sex with men they did not mean to marry, behaving as the majority of men had since 1700. Lister's peers turn up else-

where in Europe in the nineteenth century. The French painter Rosa Bonheur dressed in trousers or the riding habit, a masculine jacket and a feminine skirt, that sapphists often used and lived in marriage with two women in succession. These gentlewomen moved in private networks, however. At the end of the nineteenth century a public sapphist world first appeared in bohemian Montmartre. In literary discussions these women were often portrayed as prostitutes, and some prostitutes, like Thérèse V. in the 1890s, did prefer women. But the working-class sapphist remains hard to find.

Discussions of homosexuality. In the second half of the nineteenth century the lives of homosexual men and women became the focus of an increasingly intense public discussion. Michel Foucault and his followers have claimed that this discussion produced the modern homosexual identity. It is certainly true that the terms “homosexual” and “heterosexual” were coined in the late nineteenth century. As J. A. Symonds put it in *A Problem in Modern Ethics* (1891), “the accomplished languages of Europe in the nineteenth century supply no terms for this persistent feature of human psychology, without importing some implication of disgust, disgrace, vituperation.” The words “sodomite” and “sapphist,” “molly” and “tommy,” could not be used in respectable conversation. These roles, contrary to Symonds, had not always existed, but by the late nineteenth century they were two hundred years old. What therefore needs explanation is why in the 1850s doctors, like Claude François Michéa and Johann Ludwig Casper, who had observed effeminate sodomites from the subcultures of their day, and in the 1860s homosexual jurists and literary men, like Karl Heinrich Ulrichs and Károly Mária Kertbeny, who invented the term “homosexual,” drawing on the widespread conviction of sodomites and sapphists that their feelings were inborn, offered a biological origin for the existence of the homosexual minority that came into existence in the generation after 1700.

From the middle of the eighteenth century educated Europeans like Thomas Canon tried to justify modern sodomy by comparing it with ancient pederasty, and they continued to do so into the twentieth century. But a perspicacious reader like Lister could see the difference between herself and the Roman women. Biology may have offered a more modern and convincing basis for Ulrichs and Kertbeny to argue that the state should not punish innate behavior. This was certainly the basis of the first homosexual rights movement that Magnus Hirschfeld launched in 1897, the Scientific Humanitarian Committee. For Ulrichs and Hirschfeld the homosexual was an effeminate

man, a third biological sex, an individual with a woman’s soul in a man’s body. The association of effeminacy seemed to some men deeply discreditable. Consequently in Germany, France, and England groups like the *Gemeinschaft der Eigenen* and (community of self-owners) and individuals like André Gide promoted an alternative vision of a masculine homosexuality between men and adolescents. By the 1920s Germany had a homosexual rights movement with thousands of members. The dominant role of German thinkers and activists in all these developments remains unexplained, and when in the early nineteenth century the modern homosexual role and an accompanying subculture became identifiable in German society has not been established. It is also not apparent why after 1850 bourgeois homosexual men throughout Europe were moved to publicly justify their behavior in this way. It is certain, however, that the discussion was used against them once the idea of a third sex was presented as a perversion by Richard von Krafft-Ebing (in 1886) and other psychiatrists.

The patterns of homosexuality in the twentieth century and their relationships to the lives of the heterosexual majority are unclear. It is not apparent, for instance, when the modern pattern of gendered behavior, with its division of a homosexual minority and a heterosexual majority, displaced traditional age-structured systems in eastern or southern Europe or in North and South America. In Russia as late as 1860, when the modern system had been fully established for some time in western and central Europe, men were still attracted to both boys and women. But by 1900 something like a homosexual subculture accompanied presumably by a heterosexual majority existed in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Modern homosexual life was established in North American cities by the 1820s. The difficulty is in understanding the lack of evidence for it in the eighteenth century when the patterns of heterosexuality that accompanied it in England were clearly present in colonial society. The history of Italy, which provides the best evidence for the traditional system, has not been studied since eighteenth century. The legal discussions in Spain between the 1930s and the 1950s make it likely that those were the years of transition for Hispanic societies. Jurists and psychologists in Argentina, Mexico, or Cuba in the early twentieth century used the categories produced in the European discussions at the end of the nineteenth century to describe the sexual encounters between males in the culture of their streets and prisons, unaware that their system of adult men who penetrated boys and passive transvestite men differed profoundly from the homosexuals of their European sources.

In Western and Central Europe from the 1930s to the 1950s homosexuals became a focus of the disputes between fascists, socialists, and communists, each group blaming the others for sexual perversion. The German homosexual emancipation movement was smashed by the Nazis, and thousands of homosexual men were sent to concentration camps. Joseph Stalin conducted his own purges. In Western Europe and the United States homosexuals were labeled security risks during the cold war. But the gains of the earlier German movement were not entirely lost. Danish psychiatrists, one of whom had even joined Hirschfeld's committee, employed the German argument that homosexuality was congenital to justify the decriminalization of homosexual relations between consenting adults as early as 1930. On the other hand, France, which for two centuries had no penal legislation, passed laws in 1942 and 1960 that established a higher legal age for homosexual than for heterosexual acts and stiffer penalties for public indecency when it was homosexual. But by the 1960s most of Europe had decriminalized acts between consenting adults. This granting of respectability to the adult homosexual was often accompanied by two related strategies. Transvestite homosexuals were recategorized as transsexuals and encouraged to undergo surgical transformations of their genitals, and relations between adult homosexuals and adolescent youths or young men in the armed forces were severely policed. In England, for instance, 10 percent of the prosecutions in 1900 were for relations with boys under sixteen, but by the

1950s those were 75 percent of all cases. Having shed its pederasts and transsexuals, a more homogeneous homosexual minority stood poised to enter the brave new world ushered in by the next wave of the homosexual rights movement that arrived from the United States after the Stonewall riot of 1969.

After 1969 homosexual men and lesbian women throughout Europe advocated a move from the private legalization of their consenting relations to a more public acceptance of their right to form legal unions and raise families. From Scandinavia to France and even Spain this was accomplished in an amazingly short period of thirty years. So vast a transformation needs a correspondingly large cause, and changes in the heterosexual identities of the majority of women and men are the likeliest explanation. Most women after 1950 acquired heterosexual identities. Their rates of masturbation nearly matched those of men, and with widely available birth control, they engaged in ever-increasing numbers in intercourse without marriage. These new heterosexual women were firmly demarcated from the feminine partners of lesbian women. At the same moment the sexuality of heterosexual men became domesticated. They ceased to go to prostitutes in any significant numbers, and their sexual contacts with homosexual men also declined. These men and women did not necessarily marry each other. Births outside of marriage and the number of couples living without marriage increased. As a result toleration grew for a homosexual minority that was firmly separated from the heterosexual majority.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE BODY AND ITS REPRESENTATIONS



Lisa Z. Sigel

Although the body functions as both a material and a symbolic artifact, it received very little attention by historians until the late twentieth century. The intellectual tradition inherited from Plato, arguing that the physical is just a shadow of the real, as well as the biblical verse “in the beginning was the word” have created a legacy making physicality a mere precondition for the more important matters of mind and soul. Nonetheless, bodies have long dominated European history. Preindustrial bodies remained poised precariously between reproduction and starvation. The rapid changes in agricultural production, hygiene, medicine, and labor since the Renaissance have transformed the body and its impact on society. Bigger, healthier bodies and more of them have remade modern Europe into a mass society with changing aesthetic, medical, and psychological norms that balance population concerns with an increased focus on individualism and new demands of privacy. At the same time that history plays out on and through the body, individuals use their bodies to create their own identities: fashion, clothes, cosmetics, and surgery allow people to create, express, and perform their roles in society.

While bodies have always been available for study, historians have only begun to examine them as separate and equal to the minds that dominated previous discussions. This interest in the body by social historians converged from a variety of directions, many of which have attempted to undermine the mind-body dualism inherited from the Enlightenment. As history has become a more inclusive discipline since the 1960s, historians have tried to historicize their own experiences as embodied beings and have attempted to formulate ways that society has used criteria based on physicality to sort and discipline human beings.

At the most concrete and materialist level, social historians have combined techniques from sociology and physical anthropology to document the body as an artifact. To assess the impact of the industrial revolution, for example, social historians have looked to

quantifiable data on the body as a source that would speak beyond the positions laid out by more literate sources. Although those who amassed data on bodies from previous generations rarely did so from an unbiased position, the data itself can be retooled to speak to issues of mortality, illness, and health. The body as material can function as a basic economic indicator that registers wealth and well-being of populations.

Approaching the materiality of the body in a much more confrontational way, women’s historians have demonstrated a lack of fixity in the relationship between biological sex and gender, even though women have been conceptualized as limited by their own biological nature in much of Western history. To explore how “biology became destiny,” to paraphrase Sigmund Freud, women’s historians began to theorize how gender or constructions of femaleness and maleness have been wedded to biology. As part of this project, they examine the ways that societies theorize gender and biology, teach beliefs and practices, and represent them historically.

Scholars of sexuality, in many cases building upon the work of women’s historians, have examined the ways that sexual roles and meanings become constituted. Scholars of homosexuality first rediscovered a hidden past, then examined the factors that impeded sexual choice, and finally looked toward processes that allow for sexual and social accommodation. Both women’s historians and historians of sexuality have radically reexamined what had been considered unchanging by questioning experiences such as family formation, pain and pleasure, and the biological “urges” of the body.

Cultural historians have built on the methods of literary critics, anthropologists, and art historians to read the body as a sign of society. The debates over language that developed in other disciplines encouraged historians to examine discourse of the body. Rather than seeing knowledge as a form of universal, ahistorical truth, social historians, diverging from the practices of intellectual historians of previous generations, have examined the context of that language to

see the emergence of the mind-body split. Thus, they have tried to reinscribe the mind in the context of the world rather than accepting the legacy of René Descartes in the form of the disembodied thinker as absolute. By exploring the development of discourse, cultural historians have demonstrated that the province of “nature” has been largely culturally constructed and thus has changed over time.

These multiple and overlapping directions of scholarship have converged upon the body because it is a central symbol in issues of gender and sexuality, aesthetics and representation, politics and ideas. As society has developed since the Renaissance, the understanding, uses, and meanings of the body have been central to the process of change. As the skeletons of our former selves demonstrate, bodies physically document the effect of big structural changes on the inhabitants of Europe; at the same time, the representations of the body whether naked, clothed, or even unencumbered by flesh show the variety of ways that the body can be conceptualized, perceived, and utilized.

THE RENAISSANCE AND EARLY MODERN PERIOD

At a basic level, most bodies during the Renaissance were still caught within the demands of subsistence living. On average, the crops failed every sixth year, leaving most people, and particularly the young, a legacy of malnutrition, ill health, and early death. Epidemic and endemic disease, from the periodic episodes of plague that lasted well into the eighteenth century to the continual scourge of smallpox that caused 10 to 15 percent of all deaths in early modern Europe, made attention to the body and its signs of health and illness a central part of everyday life rather than merely the province of doctors, surgeons, and healers. The body as a medical issue mattered across all levels of society. Beyond medical matters, beliefs about other aspects of physicality mattered as well. The study of the body, the schooling of the body, and the relationship between body, mind, and soul all went through incremental changes that heightened the importance of corporeality during the period. While spirit still mattered and older popular beliefs still flourished, new beliefs about physicality emerged between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries that made the issue of representation as important as the body itself.

Renewed interest in corporeality. During the Renaissance, scholars reexplored beliefs about the body inherited from the ancient world. Some of these be-

liefs, like the medical beliefs of Aristotle and Galen, had influenced European thought throughout the Middle Ages. Others, like the emphasis on personal experience as a method of learning, gained a new respectability. While religion and religious beliefs still governed the conduct of the individual and served as a foundation of education, art, medicine, and philosophy, Renaissance society gave the corporal a new weight in relation to the spiritual. The Church itself rejected the renunciation of the flesh seen in medieval penitents and flagellants who sought to mortify the flesh and renounce its desires. Furthermore, the renewed interest in ancient learning emphasized that the exterior reflected the interior self; thus the physical being of a person spoke directly to their spiritual states. Aristotelian belief emphasized that one’s ethics, character, and morality could be read from the physical state because these states were formed by controlling one’s passions.

The way anatomists understood the organs and the material matter of the body was based upon a different schema than our current beliefs. The medical understanding of the body was based upon the Hippocratic and Galenic traditions. In these traditions, both the environment and the imbalances in the substances that made up the body caused illness. Health was a matter of maintaining equilibrium. The basic substances of blood, phlegm, black bile, and yellow bile made up the physical matter of bodies and each substance had its own quality that could be read from the countenance of the individual. The preponderance of a substance affected the individual’s temperament and health. Sanguineous people had a preponderance of blood—which was hot and dry—and thus they were faster moving and more animated than the phlegmatic. While people’s constitutions helped form their temperaments, the environment played a part as well. Heat and cold, moisture, drafts, exercise, shocks, and accidents affected the balance of the humors and caused illness.

Humors, their properties, and their relationships to the environment created the constitution of the body as a sexed organism but, even in the case of sex, biology was a matter of degree and balance rather than a matter of opposition. Women were understood as essentially similar to men though with different predominating humors and internal rather than external genitals. Anatomists saw the vaginal canal as an internal shaft that corresponded to the penis and the ovaries as internal testes. Both sexes produced semen. Without orgasm from both parties, no conception could occur. Similarity in biology, rather than difference, encouraged both learned and popular belief that women needed to orgasm and ejaculate during inter-

course to conceive. Coldness and dampness on the part of women and dry heat on the part of men functioned as some of the main markers of biological difference. Thus, women could theoretically become men if heat or shock drove their internal organs outward. Historians have shown by exhuming anatomical drawings and medical beliefs that the simple platform of biology, even in the supposedly clear example of biological sex, remains subject to projection and representation.

At the same time that medicine and natural philosophy formulated these approaches to the body, magic and religion played a role in catastrophe, illness, and the constitution. Though the body's outward appearance spoke to the balance of fluids and organs, it also spoke to the internal state of the soul. Divine intervention could alleviate illness and divine displeasure could cause it. Not only did people believe that the direct will of the Christian creator could affect the functioning of the individual, more accidental influences played a part on the constitution. For example, the experiences of the mother were transferred to the baby because the spiritual was directly tied to the body. Thus, according to popular belief, seeing a deformity while pregnant could give rise to a likewise deformed child. The combination of formal learning and magical belief constructed the body's relationship to the world. As well, the stars played their part in the constitution of the body. The neo-Platonic tradition emphasized that all nature was alive and animate. The placement of the stars affected the physical relationship of the body because macrocosm and microcosm were innately tied, and the most learned in society used astronomy as a way to predict and encourage good health. The conception of the body as a physical being was thus based on many, highly individualized factors, and medicine had the job of peering beneath the opacity of the skin to discover the right balance toward physical health for each person.

The interest in the physical encouraged a new form of exploration into the body based upon observation and personal experience. Renewed interest in corporeality during the Renaissance and the increased interest in philosophical and medical knowledge encouraged the practice of dissection and anatomy, which flourished in Renaissance learning as a way to understand and experience the body firsthand. Artists and naturalists overlapped in their search to see the relationship between the body's interior and its exterior. Both Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) and Michelangelo (1475–1564) based their artistic representations of bodies upon detailed anatomical drawings. The bodies they drew were not necessarily the exact bodies they saw but images heightened by beliefs

about notions of beauty in the physical form: central to conceptions of beauty were ideas of symmetry, strength, vigor, and grace. Nonetheless, unlike medieval artists, their firsthand knowledge of anatomy gave their works, even those with an allegorical or religious focus, a representational facility that made their conception of the human form more rooted in worldliness and less in the spiritual realm.

Presenting and representing the body. Books on courtesy and manners dictated new ways of schooling the body and its appearance for aristocrats, courtiers, and the bourgeoisie. These books stressed that deportment could be learned, rather than only scrutinized, and the presentation of self could be cultivated as an art. Physical acts of eating, drinking, dressing, speaking, and moving, all of which bespoke character and social status, could be acquired. These accomplishments governed overt physical acts like the use of table implements and the handkerchief and also less tangible ways of controlling the body and wielding it as a predicator of sophistication. For example, movement and dance meant not only steps and timing, but also grace, energy, physicality, control, composure, and expression. One had to know the steps to dances and also know how to deport oneself through the steps. As formal dancing became a social accomplishment and dances began to emphasize the couple instead of groups of three to four, as they had in the Middle Ages, gender behavior and demeanor became a more formal part of dancing as a learned activity. Women needed to learn to demonstrate sweetness, charm, and restraint as qualities in movement; men had to show steadiness, virility, and control.

The schooling of the body as an art thus crossed over between performance and representation. Acts like dancing allowed individuals to perform gender roles and represent themselves as accomplished individuals. Other arts from the Renaissance, like painting and sculpture, incorporated similar ideals of the body as representing the inner workings of character and morality. Artists stylized the human form to create complex aesthetic and moral representations of body that spoke to the internal and external character. Titian's Adonis in *Venus and Adonis* (1551–1554), for example, combined delicacy and vigorous movement. His upright form strides away from the more languorous Venus in movement reminiscent of the male Renaissance dancer.

Older beliefs in the body continued to flourish. The body still had magical properties that gave it curative powers. The live bodies of kings, the dead bodies of convicts, and the body pieces of saints transcended the limitations of physicality and provided a

reservoir of material for spiritual interaction. The touch of the king as well as that of the corpse could cure skin diseases. The transformative powers of bodies as sacred material made the burial sites and the traffic in saints' pieces part of an early tourist trade. The body politic had both material and symbolic power; the term referred to the physical being of the monarch who reflected the domain of the state.

Just as the king's body had divine powers that performed a social role in providing cohesiveness, the

convict's body performed justice, retribution, and divine mercy for the benefit of society. Through public torture and ritualized hangings, society could read the effects of crime and immorality upon the countenances of the criminal. The body formed a conduit to the soul. The criminal was made to perform a walk of penitence often carrying the props of his crime. At crossroads, he called out his crimes and sentence, and when arriving at the scaffold, often erected at the site of the crime, he confessed and was executed. The

body or its pieces were sometimes left to mark the site of wrongdoing as a rotting marker of justice. If not executed, the marks of criminality were permanently displayed upon the figure of the criminal. Pierced tongues for blasphemers, amputated hands for thieves, and lopped ears for beggars made the stigma of criminality permanently visible as signs of the social order.

The presence of death in everyday life made the corpse a much more significant part of society in the Renaissance and early modern world than in the twenty-first century. Not only did markers of death like the hanging corpse and the weeping, long-dead saint act as conduits to physical and spiritual rejuvenation,

the idea of the corpse hovered behind the daily acts of life, spurred, no doubt, by the precariousness of existence. The dance of death and the stages of life, two traditional motifs in prints, make it clear that death lurked behind every scene. No matter what station one achieved, death—represented in the grinning skeleton and the waiting coffin—would offer the final embrace. The juxtaposition of life and death, beauty and the grotesque worked as experiential as well as representational motifs. For example, St. Bartholomew's Fair featured an open market, a field for jousting, a hospital, and a gallows. Knights and ladies, cripples and saints mingled with entertainers like fire-

eaters, puppeteers, animal trainers, dwarfs, half men/half beasts, and other curiosities. The heterogeneity of St. Bartholomew's made it a rich location for the interweaving of commerce and entertainment, physical punishment and physical prowess upon which one could read morality tales in motion.

The protean and ribald body appeared in Renaissance pornography (although the term "pornography" did not itself appear until the nineteenth century). In these representations, the body became a seething mass of profane and spiritual desires that nurtured each other. Through the themes of coitus, bodily evacuation, and the intermingling of orifices, the sexualized body enhanced sexual tensions in society, including the problems of celibacy, the unfaithful wife, the crossed lovers. Through pornography and other representations in the visual and literary arts, men argued about the place and meaning of women and women's bodies in the Renaissance world. Theological understandings of sexuality as well as pornography argued for women's highly sexual nature. Women had the stigma of Eve and were thus biologically insatiable. They needed to be curbed sexually rather than aroused. However, the highly sexed nature of women's bodies offered opportunities as well as problems, and the roles of the courtesan, whore, wife, and mother allowed women to use the social stigmas to their own advantage. Prostitutes in Venice used the rage for small, conical, and firm breasts to advertise their trade by uncovering their breasts in the streets.

The introduction of syphilis to Europe at the end of the fifteenth century (often attributed to Columbus's sailors, as well as foreign troops, Italians, French, or Jews) and its rapid spread brought a physical manifestation of immorality that influenced generations of artists. The rotting nose, open sores, and twisted limbs of the syphilitic and the excessive salivation brought by the treatment of mercury became emblematic of a guilty life and worse death. The importance of physical beauty as indicative of inner purity made the outward manifestations of syphilis markers of sexual immorality. Just as witch's tits spoke of congress with the devil and lopped ears indicated criminality, so the lost nose of the syphilitic announced sexual and moral transgressions. Early attempts to reform and remake the body through surgery began with the reconstruction of the nose to erase the stigma of syphilis. Techniques of skin grafting first developed during the Renaissance, even though they appear largely forgotten until the nineteenth century, when doctors rediscovered techniques of beauty surgery. The mark of the syphilitic continued to counter claims about the progress of humanity even after Enlightenment notions about progress prevailed.

THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AND ENLIGHTENMENT

While previous generations of scholars saw the scientific revolution as a decisive break marked by scientific advances and a new rationalist approach to the world, social historians who look at actual practice in addition to intellectual changes have some doubts about the clarity of that break. Instead, they tend to see continuity in practice and beliefs. While some large changes in the conception of the body emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these shifts in fact built upon ideas from the Renaissance and were similarly tempered by continuities and contradictions.

At a material level, the world of the body remained limited by a precarious existence. The "little ice age" of the seventeenth century produced famine and starvation. The recovery during the eighteenth century, while allowing for greater agricultural production and a higher population, did not relieve physical misery. In fact, people suffered from the dynamic changes produced by economic development. Growth in the population in the eighteenth century outstripped growth in food production, creating a relative decrease in the standard of living. This resulted in short, sickly bodies suffering from epidemic and endemic disease. The early phases of the industrial revolution and urbanization moved people away from the countryside and its food sources, while higher fertility rates and stagnant mortality rates meant that the population, overall, continued to grow. In late-eighteenth-century England, for example, the rise in population was not offset by an equal rise in food supply, resulting in high food prices, periodic shortages, and frequent riots. Huddled in cities, living in substandard housing, and eating a poor diet overwhelmingly composed of carbohydrates, early industrial workers suffered physically. Up to three-quarters of a worker's income was spent on food in early industrial society, and even with that commitment there was malnutrition and short and sickly bodies. Social class played out in body size and types of diseases. Gout, from rich foods and a heavy diet, affected the wealthy, while scurvy, from too few fresh vegetables and fruits, affected the poor. Thus, notions about progress—a central doctrine of the Enlightenment—need to be weighed against continued physical misery.

While people continued to suffer long-term debility, the elites produced new ideas about the body as a physical organism. William Harvey (1578–1657), in one of the best examples of the revolutionary nature of science, discovered that the heart functions as a pump that moves the blood through the

body in a great circle. Harvey, educated in Padua in anatomy and medicine like many Renaissance natural philosophers, saw the soul as a primary force in the body in accordance with Galenic tradition and believed that the blood moved purposefully, rather than mechanically. Thus his ideas seem firmly situated in the Renaissance notions of the body. At the same time, his discoveries, based upon the emerging scientific method of experimentation and observation, contributed to new mechanistic notions of the body.

Even after the idea of the body as a machine emerged, humors and the environment continued to play a large part in ideas of health and sickness. Older conceptions of health augmented the new materialist approach to the body. Theories of miasma and contagion, respectively bad air and the passage of disease between individuals, allowed people to respond to disease by charting weather and draining the swamps. Scientific discoveries based on observation and experimentation yielded results like the discovery of the central nervous system, which contributed to new formulations of ill health. No longer did the spleen predominate in matters of illness, now the nervous system, and particularly the refined nervous system of the upper classes, made certain illnesses more likely.

The scientific revolution and Enlightenment emphasized the process of questioning established belief. The multiple directions of those questions began to pull apart orthodoxies and opened the way for new formulations of the nature of humankind. For example, theories on race, which had emphasized notions of blood, began to examine environmental factors and physiological causes. Competing theories—that all babies are born white but become black within eight days or that the acquirement of dark skin from

the African sun was passed from parent to child—implied ways to achieve progress, however dubious and misinformed. Other theories, like that suggesting physiology caused racial degradation, left little room for such improvements. Thus, while attempting to get to root causes of problems, natural philosophers continuously stumbled over the issue of free will versus biology.

As part of the program of mapping the body as discrete and the mind as governed by free will, Enlightenment thinkers tried to do away with superstition, irrationality, spells, faith healing, and magic. In attacking these irrational beliefs and practices, however, Enlightenment thinkers deemphasized the body and its importance in favor of a rational world controlled by the mind. By the eighteenth century the use of religion, astrology, and magic waned in medicine as the body became a more discrete entity that functioned in isolation according to its own laws, rather than one governed by the laws of the cosmos.

The privileging of mind over body, of free will over the symbolics of blood and flesh, however, allowed for a new reliance on the physical and mechanical causes of physical malfunctions. Thus, the body as a mechanical entity came to be seen as causal in “mental” illness. Treatments, from attempts to balance the humors in the seventeenth century to control of the physical and moral environment in the nineteenth century, saw the physical as a conduit to the interior or mental world of the body.

Nonetheless, a new emphasis on biology emerged during the period, influenced in particular by René Descartes (1596–1650), a central figure in the Enlightenment. Descartes’s ideas about the body encouraged a new emphasis on the mind as separate from the body. He posited that deceptiveness of sensory data discredited it as a way of knowing one’s existence. Instead of believing in the close correlation between soul and body, or even between seeing and knowing that characterized the formulations of many Renaissance scholars and lay people, Descartes saw the mind as paramount and the body, ruled by the mind, as merely responsible for carrying out the animal functions. Because of this formulation, Descartes has been held responsible for the development of the mind-body split characterized as Cartesian dualism and for the ensuing oppositions that have held sway in Europe. As man became characterized by mind and intellect, woman increasingly became seen as antithetical to man, thus more closely aligned to body. Likewise, culture, or the province of the mind, became positioned against nature, the province of the body. These gross divisions were only partially explicated; nonetheless, they affected formulations of the

body as a site of meaning and as a physical entity. Later philosophies looked to gender as intrinsic, and natural philosophers developed a standard of biological difference that added to these oppositions.

Anatomists began to draw male and female reproductive organs as incommensurate, and the language for the female organs, terms such as “ovary” and “vagina,” entered the European vocabulary. Sex became intrinsic and incontrovertible—heat could not make a woman into a man. As woman became conceptualized as unlike man rather than essentially similar, the role of passion changed as well. Women no longer needed orgasm to conceive, laying the groundwork for later theories that pregnancy could occur through rape and that women’s passions were essentially maternal rather than genital. As man and woman became anatomically antithetical, the functions of sex organs became central to an understanding of the natural world. Carolus Linnaeus (1707–1778), a naturalist, developed the classification of mammalia—of the breast—to characterize the animals that suckled their young. Contemporaries pointed out that male mammals did not suckle, but the biological difference between male and female stuck as a central part of biological classification.

The new meanings assigned to men, women, and the body politic reconceptualized maternity. The battle of the breast formed one strand of the decisive differences that emerged during the Enlightenment. While the rich had favored wet nurses in previous centuries to maintain the small, firm breast of the woman, social philosophers argued that maternal nursing was a natural act that cemented the roles of family members. The act of wet nursing, in which the poor suckled the rich, became a metaphor for the larger perversions of the political state. In 1780 only 10 percent of Parisian babies were suckled in their own homes, but within twenty years, roughly half of Parisian babies suckled at the maternal breast. The republican model of nurturing mother, suckling child, and approving father promised a new natural political state of equality for man and domesticity for woman.

THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY

The long nineteenth century (1789–1914), marked at the beginning by the French Revolution and the end by the outbreak of World War I, saw a tremendous transformation in bodies and their meanings. New ideas about the equality of “man” gave rise to a variety of revolutionary movements in 1789, the 1830s, and 1848 that demanded greater self-determination but often resulted in greater bureaucratic control of the

poor. During this period, the formation of modern nations, scientific racism, the rise of an industrial and consumer culture, and antithetical gender roles all were closely interrelated with the body and the way it was understood.

The French Revolution of 1789 began a reorientation in European politics toward democracy and a mass society. As part of this movement, a shift away from the king as a representation of the body politic and toward the uniformed body of the soldier-citizen worked as a metaphor to reconceptualize the nation. The bodily corruption of the monarchy and the aristocracy served as central themes in satire and caricature to undercut the legitimacy of the ancient regime. For example, the supposed sexual profligacy of Marie Antoinette, the queen of France, became a popular theme in pornographic propaganda. As well as delegitimizing older symbols, the formation of new ideals about the body played out in myriad directions. The guillotine began as a way to minimize the pain of execution and create a uniform system of justice. The kiss of Madame Guillotine, as it became known, supplanted previous crime- and class-specific methods of torture and execution. Men’s fashions downplayed the sumptuousness of aristocratic fabrics and offered a new simplicity in the outfitting of men’s figures. In spite of the supposed domesticity of women, the female form still had revolutionary potential. The most famous example of this appears in Eugène Delacroix’s *Liberty Guiding the People*, also known as *Liberty on the Barricades*. *Liberty* memorialized the uprising of the July revolution of 1830 in which Parisian workers, soldiers, and students overthrew Charles X’s monarchy. In the painting, the bare-breasted and barefoot figure of “Liberty” leads the charge through the dead bodies that lay strewn at her feet. She stands a full head taller than her comrades, waving the flag in one hand and holding a rifle in the other. The painting, withdrawn by the French government from public view because of its subversive potential, reemerged during the revolution of 1848. The female form here combined neoclassical elements with a romantic sensibility to express the political demands for a new society. The male and female body thus served as symbolic repositories for thinking through what equality meant to civil society.

Against this backdrop of new ideals of equality, economics still affected the physical form. During the first half of the century, people continued to go hungry as industrialization spread from England to the Continent. The rich continued to be taller, healthier, and less stricken by disease than the poor. Although conditions were alleviated during the second half of the century through improved agricultural techniques,

a leveling off of the birthrate, and improved public hygiene, the changes were incremental and the poor still suffered hunger and debility. Widespread industrialization caused its own infirmities, like scalpings when girls' long hair was caught in machines, dismemberment from industrial accidents, and new forms of industry-related disease like black lung and brown lung. Although sanitary measures became a public health concern, crowding, adulterated food, and dirt and disease made the poor seem like a race apart.

Questions of race. The issues of race were exacerbated by new scientific theories and the renewal of European imperialism. Racialism gained new ground with the development of theories of evolution. Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1859) examined the way that animal species developed over time. However, his theories were rapidly applied to people. The

problems emerged in deciding who constituted the species of mankind and in what direction that species was heading, as Darwin's *Descent of Man* (1871) made explicit. Concerns with race contributed to two competing theories on the origins of mankind; the first, called monogenesis, posited a single line of descent; the second, called polygenesis, insisted that the races had multiple lines of descent and that each race constituted a different species. Accordingly, each race had different distinguishing marks and scientists developed schemas of body types to classify the races. The Jewish or hook nose, the jug ears of the Irish, the kinky hair of Africans became supposedly scientific facts, rather than mere stereotypes. The science of race tried to document body type and correlate social, emotional, and intellectual factors with the physical form. Eugenicians attempted to sort out the races using basic tools for measurement like calipers, scales, and

measuring tapes and tried to assign the races distinct social strengths and pathologies.

The clear diversity of physical forms even amongst whites and fears about what diversity meant for society fostered attempts to fix social ills through breeding. (For example, English aristocrats were almost eight inches taller than working-class men, as recruiters found when trying to enlist soldiers for the Boer War between 1899 and 1902. Out of twenty thousand volunteers, fourteen thousand were rejected on the basis of being unfit.) To combat “race suicide,” eugenicists developed two programs. In the negative eugenics program, they believed that if what they considered to be degenerate types could be separated from the rest of society, they would no longer interbreed with the fit and pollute the body politic. They attempted to limit the reproduction of those they identified as social inferiors like criminals, alcoholics, and the insane through voluntary and involuntary birth control. The more positive eugenics program encouraged the proliferation of the fit by promoting reproduction, limiting birth control for the healthy, and providing social insurance programs for children. These positive campaigns became more vehement after World War I, particularly in France and England, because of the enormous death rates both societies suffered and the plummeting birthrates. The search for racial types reached its most radical conclusions under Adolf Hitler, but only after attaining a respectable place in sociology and medicine for almost fifty years from the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century.

As racial types became scientifically defined through body parts, fitness and the development of modern medicine allowed individuals to transform their bodies to fit the new standards. Greater attention to the individual body produced remarkable results in the discovery of antiseptics and anesthetics. These discoveries allowed surgeons to venture beneath the skin to repair and remake the body without killing the patient. The idea that beauty equals health and happiness became paramount. Surgeons could beautify individuals according to the new “scientific” ideals of body standards circumventing the biological standards of race.

Schooling the body. The nineteenth century also saw the rise of physical education, athleticism, sport, and the schooling of the body as an organized educational activity. Although people played physical games and engaged in sport (like boxing and hunting) before the nineteenth century, the nineteenth century characterized these earlier pleasures as barbaric blood-sport and systematized physicality so that control rather than excess became the watchword of exercise. The back-to-nature movement in Scandinavia and Ger-

many promoted healthy exercise for the individual and social renewal for the group. Bathing, in nature and in swimming pools, promoted fitness, vigor, and mental health. Organized hiking allowed people to slough off the pollution and degradation of industrial and urban life and renew their primitive sides. Physical education drew upon military drilling and rhythmic exercises to make children into compliant and productive citizens and workers. The assembly, for example, schooled the body in a posture of discipline, carefully segregated individuals into a uniform mass, and controlled the unregulated habits of children, guaranteeing no kicking, punching, tickling, or other displays of childlike physical pleasures. The careful positioning of bodies made them easy to watch, control, and discipline. The same techniques that applied to children prevailed wherever masses of uniform bodies were needed by the state, such as in prisons, the army, and other institutions.

The overt discipline of the bodies of the poor was matched by more covert ways to discipline according to social class and gender. Changes in fashion begun during the French Revolution continued to heighten the physical differences between men and women throughout the nineteenth century. As men’s clothes became plainer with the rise of the ubiquitous black suit that cut across class lines, social class played out on and through the female form. Working-class women’s clothes, featuring petticoats, shirts, skirts, shawls, and wooden shoes, marked them as utilitarian working beings. Rich women’s clothing guaranteed good posture and a body well-formed for sexual pleasure by straightening the spine, pushing up the breasts, narrowing the waist, and accentuating the buttocks. Corsets and bustles, layers of undergarments, and heavy and expensive cloth marked a rich woman as incapable of work and barely capable of walking. As part of this demarcation, rich women’s bodies were transformed by the trappings of their class. They experienced spinal curvatures, displaced internal organs, and a limited physical capacity that hindered their ability to sit, walk, and dance. Fashion magazines and etiquette books offered programs and advice to the parvenue on ways to act, dress, and appear appropriately. Their stylized figures and the mannerisms that emerged to match the clothes demanded the utmost attention and care.

The display of the body. At the same time, however, few people had the opportunity to gaze upon their figures in full. Most peasant villages had only one mirror located at the barbershop, and the urban poor had as little opportunity to see themselves as physical beings. With the rise of a widespread com-

modity culture in the late nineteenth century, mirrors became more popular even though the tinge of erotic appeal continued to stigmatize them. Gazing at oneself implied a lewdness associated with prostitution and drunkenness because barrooms and brothels featured large mirrors for voyeurism and self-inspection. Parents of respectable girls kept them from viewing themselves as a way to preserve their psychological and physical chastity. Girls washed in light shifts rather than naked and wore costumes for sea bathing that covered their torsos and extremities. The physical form was an object for outward display, rather than close self-inspection.

Against the backdrop of this circumspection, the display of monstrous bodies took on additional potency in the Victorian world. Touring companies and permanent installations of biological curiosities allowed the public to see the supposed wonders from distant (and mostly fictionalized) lands. The “Hottentot Venus” and the “Elephant Man” in England, the “Aztec Twins” and the “Fuegians” in Germany, and the pan-European tours of “Jo-Jo the Dog-Faced Boy” and “Lionel the Lion Man” all brought throngs of spectators to consider the strangeness of biology and the oddity of the physical form. The narratives of the sideshow posited the possibility that these people served as the evolutionary “missing link” between man and animals. These narratives set the people’s origins in the remote “jungles” of distant lands where they lived outside modern society surrounded by like individuals. People thronged to such spectacles—a crowd of fifty thousand descended to watch the Fuegians go about their daily lives. They also bought photographs, postcards, and other mementos to remind them of such sights. The fixation on oddities did not stop at casual entertainment; anthropologists debated the origins of such anomalies. Visitors could touch the Hottentot Venus to prove that her rump was unpadded, and scientists wrote papers on the meaning of her genitals. Especially given the close attention to sexual propriety for “normal” female bodies (whose rumps, though padded, were not prodded), the focus on monstrous bodies as entertainment and education in the Victorian world underlined the centrality of the physical form as a basis of meaning. Undergirding the fascination with oddities were questions about the origins of humankind and the meaning of physical diversity.

The eroticism of the naked form and close restrictions on sexuality heightened taboos around sexuality. New injunctions against homosexuality, prostitution, masturbation, and pornography arose during the nineteenth century as a way to channel the energies of sexuality. Behind these conflicts lay a concept

of the body as a limited energy system. Masturbation wasted energy and directed sexuality away from marital, procreative sexuality. Furthermore, continued masturbation left the body and mind sapped and impotent resulting in mental and physical illness. Doctors and parents used a variety of methods to discourage the practice. At the simplest level, innuendos and lack of privacy for adolescents discouraged masturbation or at least encouraged the concealment of it. When adolescents continued to masturbate, parents, physicians, and moralists turned to more complicated techniques including sermons and lectures, restraining devices, and physical mutilation to stop the chronic masturbator.

The emphasis on procreative sexuality within marriage should have discouraged prostitution. However, the belief that men needed a sexual outlet meant that men sought prostitutes and that the number of prostitutes continued to rise. European states reacted to the rise in prostitution by alternately outlawing it, regulating it, and ignoring it. The problem of venereal disease kept these problems of prostitution in front of the state. Doctors considered prostitutes one of the main vectors of venereal disease and recommended they be placed in prison or venereal hospitals subject to dubious medical treatment like the ingestion of arsenic and mercury. Feminist campaigns for social purity that emerged across Europe from Britain to Russia built upon the image of the prostitute as the victim of men’s promiscuity and the state’s unfeeling treatment of women. The prostitute became a powerful icon for addressing male sexual privilege at the expense of women’s purity because contemporary theory argued that women had few sexual or economic desires of their own. Often the injunctions against such sexual practices held their own erotic appeal, as can be seen in the white slave trade scandals at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. The popular press reported on the supposed abduction and sexual slavery of young girls. These sensationalist reports heightened concerns about girls’ safety and raised the specter of a dark menace that preyed upon the innocence of Western women. Though few cases of sexual slavery were found, and those women who were spirited abroad were generally seasoned prostitutes who went to work in continental brothels, the frisson of fear that accompanied such reports added to the sexual thrills of Victorian and Edwardian society’s ideas of race.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The factors that limited bodies in the premodern world, such as inadequate food sources and unhy-

gienic cities, had been curtailed by the beginning of the twentieth century. Bodies grew bigger and people had a greater likelihood of surviving to adulthood. The development of antibiotics during World War II, combined with the nineteenth-century medical advances of antiseptics and anesthetics, promised to wipe out disease and ill health. The great scourges of the past, from smallpox to polio, declined and in some cases were eradicated making it seem as if the precariousness of life and the fragility of the body would end. However, the massive mortality of the two world wars combined with the cataclysm of the Holocaust undermined this vision of progress. Instead, the tension between two opposing ideals of bodies that were established during the nineteenth century deepened during the twentieth. On the one hand, bodies became building blocks of a mass society; on the other hand, the rise of individualism played out in the greater attention to the individual body. The world wars and the rise of mass politics during the twentieth century insisted that bodies mattered mostly in quantity. The numbers game of trench warfare, in which each side attempted to throw the most soldiers “over the top” into no-man’s-land, set a standard for mass death and dismemberment that has since characterized the twentieth century. At the same time, the development of commercialization and identity politics insisted the individual is distinct and noteworthy. This contradiction still dominated the politics of bodies at the close of the twentieth century.

World War I brought home the necessity of health and fitness in a mass society. At the same time, it also insisted on a fragility of bodies and established a new relationship between mind and body. The sheer numbers of people needed for mass war in World War I encouraged a new rationalization of resources and manpower. The health of the individual and the meaning of bodily fitness became an essential function of the state. In the front lines this meant a greater uniformity of the individual for the formation of a mass army. As the war devoured men on the front lines, they became interchangeable parts in favor of larger objectives of the war. In a grand irony, this commitment to the masses meant greater caloric intake and better health for working-class soldiers even given the appalling casualty rates. Behind the front lines, the rationing of calories, particularly in Germany, weighed the needs of the individual with the needs of the nation’s war machine and left a generation of children with the physical consequences of malnourishment. As the state expanded to meet the needs of “total war,” it took greater control of the individual’s body, molding, using, and ultimately discarding it in accordance with the demands of the greater society.

As the fighting and horrendous conditions affected men’s minds, European society needed to confront the mind-body split in new ways. No longer could insanity and the refusal of the mind to function be blamed solely upon a weak feminized biology that allowed for an easily disrupted body. At the outset of the war, doctors first believed that soldiers were faking their conditions. As more seasoned and decorated soldiers experienced neurasthenia and hysteria, doctors and military officials turned to a biological explanation—a blast from high velocity shells disrupted the nervous system causing “shell shock.” However, by the end of the war, psychological explanations gained ground—no longer a conscious or a physical act, the unconscious mind of the soldier took over the body, rendering it incapable of action. Although psychologists and doctors attempted to use moral suasion, firmness, and a controlled environment to convince men’s minds that fighting constituted progress, the long-term relationship between mind and body continued to be called into question, raising room for a later acceptance of Freudian analysis.

The massive number of mutilated men returning from the front as amputees, invalids, and victims of shell shock encouraged the development of reconstructive surgery to assist in their return to society. Physical reconstruction, though limited in its ability to restore faces and bodies, attempted to provide the patient some semblance of normality and happiness. The reconstructed face could not “pass” as normal; instead, surgeons tried to create a visage closer to humanity. (A French gibe stated that before the patient was horrible and afterward ridiculous.) The limited efficacy of such procedures encouraged a new modernist sensibility that rejected positivist notions about progress, at least in the artistic community. Representations of the wounded hero and particularly the image of veterans mutilated by face wounds became an important visual and literary element in the promotion of interwar pacifism. Exhibitions of facial casts from military hospitals in Paris, Berlin, and London allowed visitors to experience the horrors of war and scrutinize surgical reconstructions of the wounded. Expressionism in particular grappled with the disfigurement of veterans as a metaphor for the ugliness of society. Surrealists incorporated the rawness of bodily effluvia and perceived bodily urges—blood and excrement, sex and death—into their paintings. The veterans themselves fought to get basic benefits like artificial limbs and pensions and worried less about the symbolic uses of their disfigurement. The schism between high and low meanings of disfigurement in the early 1920s quickly disappeared as life as normal returned and the politics of disfigurement retreated to

the background of European society. The disfigured continued to be a large part of the European landscape, however, and as late as 1938, 222 thousand officers and 419 thousand enlisted men received disability pensions in Britain alone because of World War I.

The interwar years. The interwar years continued to transform the roles of women, the meaning of sexuality, and the state's responsibility for health and fitness. The exigencies of war had allowed more female autonomy, in part because the needs for women's productive labor superceded demands for reproduction. While women's roles as wife, mother, and daughter remained important for propaganda purposes, the necessities of war afforded women new opportunities to define themselves. For the most part, this meant taking jobs long denied them, having sex outside of marriage, marrying earlier, or striking out on their own. Across Europe, women's freedom during the war contributed to the subsequent contest over sexuality in the 1920s and 1930s. In a striking example, the need for soldiers during the civil war in Russia allowed women to form an independent unit called the Women's Battalion of Death. The women in the battalion shaved their heads, wore regular army gear, and trained to fight. However, the Red Army used them for propaganda purposes—as a way to raise troops—rather than allowing them to contribute on the front lines. Outside of Russia, caricatures of the battalion insisted on seeing them as sexual creatures rather than as equal citizens and soldiers.

The place of women and the meanings of female sexuality and the female body were much debated on all sides. The falling birthrates, the belief in an abortion epidemic, and rising rates of women's paid labor pitted the new woman, with bobbed hair, shaved legs, and a job, against the idea of the traditional wife and mother. Progressives tended to see women's roles as workers and citizens as important as their roles as mothers and made birth control and abortion more available so that women could control their own fertility. Even with their attempts to alleviate sexual misery from unplanned and unwanted pregnancies, though, sex reformers made sexual health, including the female orgasm, part of a program that would serve the state. They recommended that sex education including technical information would restore marriage and stabilize society. Conservatives and fascists tended to see sex education and birth control in a more negative light and stressed women's social and biological roles within the family as primary. (Mussolini gave medals to mothers with large families who provided many sons for the state.) The female

orgasm, no longer necessary to conception according to the more recent understandings of sexual reproduction, mattered less than the social imperative of populations and the state.

Discussions of sexuality included a reconceptualization of homosexuality. Sexologists in the nineteenth century, like Richard Krafft-Ebing (1840–1902) and Havelock Ellis (1859–1939), began to reexamine sexuality through the lens of science. They believed that homosexuality and other so-called sexual aberrancies were medical rather than criminal. Building upon the work of these early sexologists, scientists like Magnus Hirschfield argued that homosexuals were “sick people” with a specific etiology rather than individuals who willfully disregarded morality, theology, and the law. As a “sick” person the homosexual should not be prosecuted, but treated and cured. Hirschfield's Institute of Sexual Science in Berlin bore the slogan “per scientiam ad justitiam” (to justice through science). The medical model of homosexuality began to affect legislation during the early 1930s, but the fascist backlash circumvented its acceptance. Hirschfield's institute was one of the first sites of Nazi book burnings in the 1930s as the Nazis sought to make an example of the institute's liberalism and supposed disregard of the family.

Society's concern with health, fitness, and the body gained momentum during the interwar period. The rise of modern dance, nudism, and dieting were all predicated upon new ideals of discipline and display rather than concealment. In France, for example, the new culture of dieting emerged in urban areas, particularly for the middle-class woman. The voluptuousness of the corseted female figure from the nineteenth century gave way to a new angularity of women clothed in outfits more attuned to movement, exercise, and athleticism during the twentieth. Doctors began to prescribe regimes of exercise and restraint, overturning traditional ideas of gluttony and plumpness as indicators of good health. While in rural areas food and fatness continued to signal good fortune, the urban ideal of bodies became one of control and moderation. Even Communist Party newspapers during the interwar years embraced fashion and fitness as legitimate concerns indicating a top-down movement of body image. The shift in ideas about weight demonstrates the centrality of control and discipline to the twentieth-century world.

While immediately after the war a focus on the body included a greater sympathy for the heroically wounded and disabled, the shift toward health and vigor as measures of political strength quickly returned. In Germany, the hard, male body became central to ideals of the fascist state. Leni Riefenstahl's

Olympiad (1938) served as a preeminent attempt to apply modernist techniques of representation to the physical form. Her filming techniques, including a nontraditional narrative, close editing, and the use of multiple camera angles, seem divergent from more traditional aesthetic standards set by Hitler's government, which rejected most forms of modernist representation as degenerate. However, the film's emphasis on beauty, fitness, competition, and the interchangeability of perfect bodies seems emblematic of the Nazi cult of the body. The glorification of raw, male power in her film corresponded with the larger objectives of the Nazi government. As political parties made their bids for control of the vastly expanded state, the issue of body politics made its way to the center of political ideologies.

The continued interest in eugenics during the interwar years made the physicality of the body key to the strength of the state. In the most extreme example under the Nazi government, the characteristics of the body correlated to the individual's political and social place in society. According to this formulation, Jewishness no longer meant a religion or cultural identity, but a series of physical characteristics (skin color, nose shape, ear proportions) that indicated what the Nazis saw as the deeper Jewish goals of promoting communism or capitalism. Thus, while individuals

might lie about their purpose, the body could not. The Nazis took the idea of bodies laboring for the state and expanded it so that not only the product of bodies but the bodies themselves belonged to the state. These ideas clearly related to earlier ideas about physical fitness and health, in which the state derived its vigor from that of its citizens. For German citizens, this program meant that their primary allegiance belonged to the state, and they owed it to the state to maintain good health and strong offspring. In a great irony, the Nazi regime began an antismoking campaign as a way to maintain good health. What made the Nazi regime's treatment of physicality particularly disturbing was that they extrapolated these ideas so that the body no longer maintained its integrity, particularly for its subjects rather than its citizens. Hair, fillings, physical functions all served the state as raw material. The body became a resource for experimentation and recycling, as the treatment of Jews and other subjects made clear. Until the 1980s, skeletons and preserved tissue samples from the Holocaust victims of the Nazi era circulated in West German universities and laboratories. The impact of earlier policies lingered in the German reluctance to donate organs, as compared with other European countries where harvesting and donation became more routine. The physical integrity of the body has become para-

mount as a way to reject Nazism. (In contrast, East German society under communism, which saw organ donation as serving the community and state, had much higher rates of donation and transplant. The overtones of Nazi policies in eastern Germany were superseded by the communist ideal that the individual should serve the state before and after death.)

After World War II. In the postwar world, a number of often contradictory impulses toward the body and its meanings predominated in Europe. In Western Europe, the body entered the provinces of commercialization and identity politics even though the two were often at odds. In Eastern Europe, the body remained subordinated to the needs of the state, but the utilitarian nature of communist regimes sometimes afforded more leeway for individuals in terms of choices for the body than liberal regimes in Western Europe; the availability of abortion is one example. The ideas of health and fitness that dominated the interwar years returned after the end of World War II. Rather than being mediated by the economics of a boom economy in the twenties and the bust economy of the 1930s, the economic growth allowed for a more fully commercialized society in Western Europe.

Commercialization encouraged a deepening concern with beauty, as the continued rise of plastic surgery, creams, fads, and potions show. The body continued to be groomed as a sign of health and happiness, and increasingly this sign became available to all classes. State-sponsored social welfare programs that offered adequate nutrition and medical care allowed the physical differences of class—like height and health—to diminish. In turn, this physical equality combined with a greater availability of consumer goods allowed identity to be at once less permanent and more prominently displayed. Not only did clothes become cheaper, allowing people to put on and take off their allegiance to brands and fashions, but the supposedly innate biological markers like lip shape, biological sex, or nose size could be changed.

Sexual health and a focus on the body beautiful made erotic display and erotic pleasure central to new conceptions of identity. The sexual body joined the realm of commercialization as products to enhance erotic appeal were joined by advertising that used sexuality to sell products of all types. A number of factors including greater access to birth control, a loosening of restrictions around pornography, and new conceptions of marriage predicated upon intimacy, partnership, and love, rather than economics or progeny, allowed the erotic body to be separated from the reproductive body. Sexual pleasure became a worthy goal in and of itself. Sexual education, begun in the

interwar years to combat sexual misery, was superseded in the 1960s and 1970s by sexual liberation and the right to sexual pleasure. This conception of sexual pleasures as innately worthy allowed for a further liberalization of laws against homosexuality. Gay activists began to argue that homosexuality was not an aberrancy or pathology but a normal state upon which one's identity rested.

New patterns of formulating life and death, the outermost markers of bodily integrity—demonstrate the continued problems of embodiment and its representations in Europe. Greater control of the body by the medical profession has raised new questions and options toward the body. In vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, and surrogate motherhood further removed boundaries around reproduction. Pregnancy has become a choice, but a choice increasingly made in tandem with doctors and technology. Even death seems fully medicalized. The vast majority of Europeans die in hospitals attached to machines under the watching eyes of the medical community. Medical technology keeps the body alive after severe accidents and organ failure, raising the issue of where the self resides. The older pattern of death as part of life seems to have disappeared. Whether souls reside in the brain, the whole body, or in the beating heart, whether life starts at conception, quickening, or birth, whether cloning replicates the soul as well as the body have become important questions because of developments of technological progress. Whereas philosophers raised such questions during the Enlightenment and saw science as providing new answers, science raises these issues and leaves society struggling to catch up.

On the other hand, older beliefs about death and the body continue to haunt European society. With the breakdown of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the body has again been reformulated as a symbol of massive political change. In one of the more interesting (and gruesome) examples the political implications of change have played out in corpses and dead bodies through the exhumation and reburial of political figures. The rise in ethnic nationalism in the Balkan region encouraged a grand tour of the bones of Prince Lazar to commemorate the battle of Kosovo in 1389. In 1987, his bones began a two-year tour of Serbian monasteries from Belgrade through Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo in an illustration of the belief that Serbia is wherever Serbs are buried. The display of his bones outlined the political geography of greater Serbia. The “politics of dead bodies,” to use a phrase by Katherine Verdery, consolidated claims by ethnic national groups in the former Yugoslavia. Mass graves, which had been ignored as part of the for-

mation of the multinational state after World War II, added to the rhetoric of nationalism as each group began to exhume the bodies of their dead. Older beliefs about the body can thus suddenly revive as symbols of massive political change.

The contradiction in the history of the body, as old ideas suddenly reemerge alongside new meanings, demonstrates that conceptions of embodiment are neither integrated nor progressive. Instead, the patch-

work of often conflicting beliefs affect bodies and their representations at all levels. The sexual body, the gendered body, the political body, and the commercialized body have all had their own histories that warrant close attention. Historians have only begun to excavate and make sense of the meanings of bodies. Because these beliefs refuse to remain static or stable, work on the topic should continue to preoccupy historians for any number of years.

See also other articles in this section.

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CLEANLINESS



Virginia Smith

In the mid-twentieth century, the subject of “cleanliness” was a footnote to the triumphant history of the British, European, and American public health movements, wherein progress in cleanliness was accepted as a foundation of modern life. Despite the devastation of two world wars and other, more local conflicts, Europe as a whole during the twentieth century was probably a cleaner, better housed, better groomed, less verminous place than in earlier centuries. This situation was largely due to unremitting public policies, high public expenditures on infrastructure and research, and ever-increasing consumer demands for luxury goods. Rats, lice, and fleas were subdued, children were shod and clothed, urban slums were demolished, open sewage was encased, pipes supplied water, skin diseases were treated effectively, vaccinations forestalled pandemic diseases, and general life expectancy increased. In addition during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Europe and then the United States became pre-eminent in net world exports and technical developments in hygienic artifacts such as pipes, ventilation systems, sanitary ware, medicines, perfumes, toiletries, clothing, and even architecture. Europe exported the Western hygienic lifestyle worldwide through its self-appointed “civilizing mission” in its colonies. After the missionaries and governors left, the architects and engineers remained.

As a twist in the history of European hygiene, the mid-twentieth century hubris about Western achievements in cleanliness began to fade. Oil spills; atmospheric pollution; food contamination through mass farming and marketing, notably the beef market; and macroenvironmental pollution of seas, rivers, lakes, and forests politicized a new generation of green activists. Many activists were products of postwar universities, but they were joined by church members, farmers, rural workers, and a substantial portion of the general public.

METHODOLOGY

The academic debate on the history of hygiene in Europe has undergone various vicissitudes. For many

years it was generally accepted that due to the Fall of Rome, the class to which hygiene had been addressed no longer existed, leaving hygiene in a dark age that lasted until the Enlightenment, leaving the main historical interest centered on the modern revival of hygiene, which began in the mid-eighteenth century. By the 1960s the topic had become loosely attached to what was then called “the standard of living” debate concerning the effects of the industrial revolution. In the 1970s the subject was wiped off the historical map by the new sciences of historical epidemiology and demography. According to those studies, the population rise was not determined by catastrophic filth-and-death rates but by proactive birth-and-marriage rates. While the impact of personal hygiene was assumed to be negligible, public hygiene only became effective in the late nineteenth century, following national sanitary reconstruction by the various European states. Mere personal cleanliness was relegated to the notoriously unscientific behavioralism as one of many secondary factors. It was a low point for cleanliness on the scholarly Richter scale.

In the late 1990s many historical certainties were challenged, notably by the French *Annales* historians, opening up new questions and sources in the history of cleanliness and hygiene. The pioneer German sociological historian Norbert Elias started in the 1930s to trace the development of the psychology of habits of “refinement” from the early Middle Ages through several hundred years of what he called the civilizing process. He ended his career with the study of the formal rituals of the royal bedchamber in the reign of Louis XIV. His work began to bear fruit in the 1960s with a new generation of French scholars (including Alain Corbin on the history of odors and the senses, André Guillerme and Jean-Pierre Goubert on the history of water, Guy Thuilliers and Françoise Loux on rural customs) and English social historians (such as Lawrence Stone on marriage and sexuality). Georges Vigarello, in *Concepts of Cleanliness* (1988), took up the history of cleanliness where Elias had left it (in a long footnote) and studied the change in groom-

ing habits from 1400 to 1700. It is now generally accepted that there was a redrawing of social boundaries during this period toward intimacy and privacy.

There are two ways in which the *Annales* methodology can help fill in what are still the many gaps left in the long history of cleanliness. Firstly, a theory of multiple speeds, or levels of time, is helpful in accounting for the consistently recurring evidence of long-term temporal anomalies—the fact that ancient hygienic customs and technology coexist with modern hygienic customs and technology. Elias gave a good *Annales* description of levels of time existing simultaneously, like “a river with three currents running at different speeds. Seen in isolation the phenomena in each of these streams are unique, and unrepeatable. But in the context of differing rates of change, phenomena in a slower current are apt, from the position of a faster current, to seem immutable, eternally recurrent” (*The Court Society*, p. 14). The slowest current of all is the biogenetic timeframe, which helps harness the physical structure of the contemporary human body to those of its animal ancestors. The next slightly faster current is long-term human social development, which confirms the body-anthropologist’s view that layers of social customs and training have polished or finished the original primate body. The fastest current is history as we generally record it, occurring over a few hundred years at most. Increasing historical interest in very early hominid societies and in long periods that left few or no written records (such as the Dark Ages) has tended to make Elias’s original *longue durée* seem rather short, and will continue to question conventional assumptions about linear development and linear time.

The second major methodological change produced by *Annales* is that the subject of hygiene is clearly not confined to a single continent, as Fernand Braudel points out in *The Structures of Everyday Life* (1967). The chronology of the conventional texts on European hygiene is altered dramatically if world history is taken into account, particularly early world history. The worldview enables us to appreciate the effects of global climate and topography on hygiene, particularly the significance of the civilization-laden subtropical zones. In light of all this the start date of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century European Renaissance is late and only relates to one end of the Asian landmass. Prehistory and ancient world history are the foundations on which all later European habits were built. Those foundations operated subliminally throughout this essay’s three culturally distinct periods, the Middle Ages–Renaissance, the Reformation–Enlightenment, and the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This essay highlights four major themes,

grooming, washing and bathing, house cleaning, and popular science. The bibliography of this article recommends sources that discuss precise details concerning this large subject.

PREHISTORY

The basic mammalian needs of the body have remained roughly the same since the Renaissance. People eat, defecate, sleep, work, and play according to the diurnal and seasonal phases of the sun and the moon. Human habits as nesting animals also have changed only slightly. People can still “nest” quite happily in a single room and, like animals, divide the nest into living quarters, or separate areas. The human sense of space is acute. Spatial ability is shown in the animal response of automatic recoil (disgust or loathing) from dangerous dirt and poison and in the danger zones and social exclusion zones practiced within and between species. Like other animals, humans constantly groom themselves. Mammalian grooming is triggered by chemical hormones and endorphins, which ease the body from its alert state into a necessary state of calm relaxation that has been called an opiate rush.

Thus biophysical human cleanliness is an initial judgment via the senses and a subsequent removal of any unwanted matter that is out of place. The anthropologist Mary Douglas drew attention to the psychology of defilement in *Purity and Danger* (1966) and showed how the physical separation from any designated form of dirt acts as a form of social control. Ancient purity rules drew certain social and physical boundaries in and around the body and were part of the classification (ordering divisions) of the cosmos and the social world. Language is a form of classification, and the Anglo-Saxon words “clean” and “dirty” are what linguists call basic level categorizations. The most elaborate and ritualized clean-dirty boundaries or social exclusion zones were devised within the world’s ancient religions. Pollution theory and divisions of graded holiness featured more or less strongly in Buddhist, Hindu, Egyptian, Zoroastrian, Greek, Roman, Islamic, and Judeo-Christian religious rituals. Religious psychology appeared as a new rationale for hominid cleansing processes well before 5000 B.C. Subsequently, ideas of pollution were written down and thus entered theology.

Zoological evidence suggests, however, that the hierarchical social model predates the hominid experience. Zoologists have seen exactly how social allogrooming (grooming by others) becomes an exercise in social organization and control. Primates order a

grooming hierarchy according to kinship, gender, and rank, and within this order they exchange services and social favors. For instance, the alpha male and alpha female receive the most grooming attention. In a challenging argument, the primate ethologist Robin Dunbar suggested that the social requirements of communal grooming may well have led to early forms of language—vocal grooming or gossip—as larger hominid groups literally struggled to stay in touch. Much of this zoological evidence fits well with the archaeological evidence suggesting that grooming was also a major preoccupation of early Neanderthal groups.

The history of bathing, the wet toilette beloved by humans and other bare-skinned animals, reveals a further interrelationship between biological continuity and social change. Public bathing has a long history in Europe and formed, in Britain at least, a springboard for sanitary reforms in the nineteenth century. River worship, lustral baths, and holy wells have an ancient pedigree, and they also were connected with healing. On all the continents communal bathing in the world's natural hot springs and hot mud wallows was one of the earliest pleasures of hominids and other species. In Europe as elsewhere tribal festivities often lasted for days. The *thermae* (hot springs) of the southern Mediterranean (Italy and Turkey) and the hot volcanic springs of northern Europe (especially Germany, Hungary, and Russia) were in use in the Roman period and later became spas.

Where no hot springs existed, tribes on all continents, including the Irish and the Finns in Europe, improvised man-made sweat huts of wood, stone, mud bricks, or thick vegetation, heated inside by small fires or hot stones. Participants followed the sweat with a cold dip in a river, a lake, or a snowdrift. This technique was fully refined in the Roman baths' technology of fierce heat and plunge pools.

MIDDLE AGES TO THE RENAISSANCE

After the Pax Romana ended, civic life disintegrated in the western parts of the Roman Empire. According to Inge Nielsen, a historian of Roman baths, one of the first economic indicators of decline in imperial towns was the failure to maintain the costly public baths. The northern European tribal farmers were not by custom town dwellers. Instead, Europeans built ancient hydraulic devices, such as lavers (washhouses); latrines; conduits; black, white, and gray water drainage; tanks; sumps; and cesspits, into monasteries, castles, palaces, and the small urban areas of medieval and Renaissance Europe. Domestic refuse systems (inflow and outflow) had been developed during the prehistoric millennia, and the dry sewage system, recycling or scavenging collected waste into fuel, fodder, and fertilizer, was used consistently in all rural and semirural areas. Well into the nineteenth and twen-

tieth centuries the majority of rural or semirural peoples, resembling their nomadic ancestors, lived in a single room with an annex, in which nothing was wasted, all was recycled, and objects were few but essential. During the previous two millennia domestic storage systems and artifacts, such as chests, bags, boxes, barrels, urns, and bottles, and simple cleaning materials, such as sand, salt, soda, and soap, had come into use. In product terms, cleanliness was always a technical necessity, enabling possessions to work bet-

ter, last longer, and look attractive. Though not luxurious, this life was not necessarily unclean. Good or adequate hygiene at all dates depended on the efficiency and good order of the individual household.

Body grooming is not usually featured in histories of human hygiene. In fact, the Greeks regarded it as merely cosmetic or superficial and did not consider it a science. Nevertheless, it was probably the occasion when most prehistoric and early modern bodies were thoroughly inspected and deeply cleaned.

Primate ranking patterns connected with grooming were certainly transferred to hominid tribal units. The alpha male and alpha female primates correspond to tribal chieftains, kings, queens, and emperors. Almost all the basic European tools, skills, and cosmetic ingredients of grooming developed in the palaces of the subtropical Eurasian civilizations that existed from 5000 to 500 B.C. China, India, Mesopotamia, and Egypt initiated body-painting, scarification, tattooing, ornamentation of body parts, and oiling, bathing, powdering, painting, perfuming, robing, and floral decoration reached new heights in the courts of Nebuchadnezzar, Nefertiti, and Cleopatra, and at dinner parties in democratic Greece and republican Rome. The first Eurasian civilization on the European mainland was Minoan Crete (about 2000 B.C.).

The Mediterranean area had long abundantly imported and exported luxury products. Though commerce was reduced in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire, which had produced safe trade routes and large markets, the east-west trade in rare oils, perfumes, paints, powders, and silks was protected by the Mongolian Empire and was sustained via Byzantium and the Silk Route up to the mid-fourteenth century. After that, European merchant venturers entered shipping. The ancient Asiatic toilette provides the background for later European cosmetics and beauty care, especially the courtly toilette. The towering wigs and headdresses of eighteenth-century aristocratic Europe echo those of aristocratic Middle Kingdom Egypt in 1500 B.C. The most famous recorded toilette of modern European history is that of the French King Louis XIV, who established the etiquette for his *levée* (arising) and *couchée* (bedding) in precise gradations of intimacy and patronage. Like his magnificent predecessors, he wore complete works of body art. The Sun King liked to dress in white satin, glitteringly ornamented, with his great fur-trimmed chieftain's cloak trailing on the floor. He was groomed by his retinue and controlled by his doctors, who always made a grand medical fuss about his bathing regimen.

Far from being careless and filthy, the majority of medieval and early modern populations were equally concerned with their health, beauty, and well-being. They practiced methods of dry primate grooming, keeping their skin clean and healthy by rubbing, combing, and anointing it with unguents. Numerous small physical actions and reactions, such as scratching, stretching, picking teeth, combing hair, rubbing eyes or skin, and inspecting feet, provided essential maintenance and care of the unusually bare hominid skin.

In colder regions much of the skin was protected with clothing. As French historians discovered,

people talked quite a lot about clothing, especially during the white linen and undergarment explosion of the seventeenth century that Vigarello vividly portrayed. Clothing was considered a part of dry cleaning and part of the evacuatory system, as it absorbed perspiration and other bodily juices. "I pray you keep your husband in clean linen, for that is your business," ran the advice to a fourteenth-century goodwife. In addition she should provide baths for the feet, cut hair and nails, heal sores, feed, medicate, and generally offer a "remedy for every ill" (quotations from *The Goodman of Paris*, translated by Eileen Power, 1928). By the nineteenth century the immaculate, white linen marriage trousseau that French peasant girls kept could contain hundreds of items.

Daily primate grooming was enshrined in the first and most famous health poem, *Regimen sanitatis salernitanum*. An early medieval digest of six Greco-Roman nonnaturals of hygiene, air, exercise, evacuations, diet, sleep, and passions of the mind, the poem was widely copied in many vernacular European languages and circulated in both manuscript and printed forms. Under the heading of "Sleep," a late-medieval Scottish manuscript regimen suggests:

When a person rises in the morning, let him stretch first his arms and his chest and let him put clean clothes on and let him expel the superfluities of the first digestion . . . then let him rub his body if he has time . . . then let him comb his head and wash his hands out of cold water if it is summer and out of hot water if it is winter . . . and let him wash his eyes . . . then let him rub his teeth. (*Regimen sanitatis*, translated by H. Cameron Gillies, 1912)

Longer grooming sessions on the parts, hair dressing, nail cutting, body bathing, dentistry, and paintwork, were performed at different times of the day, or on certain days of the week, usually Fridays, Saturdays, or Mondays, before or after the days of religious observances. The male and female heads of households received most of the grooming attention, with or without domestic body servants. All members of the household took time out for festive grooming sessions before important personal rites, such as birthdays or marriages, and probably before the public holidays on the religious calendar.

Special grooming attention was paid to the old, to the young, and to adolescents during their rites of sexual display and courtship, when the body had to appear especially healthy and beautiful. As in antiquity, males could purchase body services, specifically the daily shave, from visiting barber-surgeons, in barbershops, or in bathhouses. The professional reign of barbers lasted from the eleventh to the fifteenth century. Thereafter barber-surgeons became medical sur-

geons and hid their old cosmetic skills. Delousing was a constant problem. Even with relatively sparse hair, humans offer plenty of opportunities for vermin or parasites, and the most obvious apelike traits humans exhibit are elaborate nit-picking or delousing grooming sessions. Intimate delousing was still common in the twentieth century. Communal delousing occasionally appears in European drawings and paintings from the medieval period onward and in rare literary reference. Similar practices certainly continued in remote rural areas in Russia during the nineteenth century.

Everyone aspiring to respectability in early European society regularly washed “the parts,” especially the face and hands. From the earliest times European peoples washed and strip washed in basins or dipped in round tubs, inside or outside the house, depending on climate and custom. Domestic washing was quite distinct from domestic bathing or full immersion. Significantly bathing apparently was not on a daily or weekly rota but was on a calendar month or seasonal rota. Elizabeth I of England, like her bishops, had a monthly bath “whether she needed it or no.” As Vigarello emphatically reported from French texts, Europeans widely believed that exposing the naked skin to air and water carried grave dangers, like catching cold, and the colder, temperate areas of Europe did not favor casual exposure of the body. Climate, topography, wealth, knowledge, personal preference, and bodily strength or habit determined bathing practices. On the whole, for most of this period bathing was regarded as an optional extra or a luxury, much valued when available. It was considered especially necessary for filthy and muscle-weary travelers, laborers, and people with certain medical conditions.

New domestic bathing arrangements began to appear between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. For example, in Italy, France, and England the aristocracy engineered multiple water conduits and drainage systems and installed fixed stone baths and washbasins in their houses. They manufactured porcelain handbasins and, in France, bidets. In smaller town houses elongated portable tin baths gradually supplanted round wooden tubs. The first domestic, portable showers gained popularity during the nineteenth century.

The old traditions of public bathing for pleasure thrived in the Middle Ages. In the eastern Roman Empire, centered at Constantinople in Asia Minor (now Turkey), public baths were incorporated into Muslim culture when the rising Islamic empire took over those Roman colonies. Through contacts with Arabic baths and Arabic translations of classic texts on balneology, technical knowledge spread to medieval

western Europe. Presented as an exotic luxury, bathing remained a part of medieval European court culture, as in the Islamic-style court of the Kingdom of Sicily, which was ruled by a Viking-Norman family during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The wife of the English king Henry II, Eleanor, originally from French Aquitaine, an old Mediterranean Roman province, made sure she had bathing facilities wherever she held court. Extant pictures depict medieval courtly bath feasts held as receptions for honored guests, with tanks set out in the open air. Similarly embroideries show court ladies bathing in tanks *en pleine air* (in the open air), guarded by female attendants.

The theme of recreational bathing carried into the many medieval town stews, barbers’ hot baths, and the custom of “going to the stoves” (or “hot house”) with groups of friends who brought in wine and food. In particular, recreational bathing often featured in marriage rites, and was strongly associated with love and courtship. Communal “stoving” remained popular in northern and eastern Europe during the twentieth century.

As to the vexed question of licentiousness, most ancient European public baths were closely controlled by Roman edicts, followed in the early medieval period by locally enforced laws. The early Christian church only condemned public baths that allowed the tribal habit of mixed bathing. Complaints about bawdiness and disorder increased during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Even those houses that practiced single-sex bathing were affected by plague epidemics of increasing severity and by sexually contracted syphilis, which appeared in the 1480s. By the end of the fifteenth century, when fear of contamination drove many customers away, most local public baths closed. Hothouse bathing returned to London in the mid-seventeenth century under a new name, the bagnio.

The larger thermae and cold-water medicinal baths survived, particularly in Italy and Germany, and their healing powers attracted increasing medicoscientific

observation. After 1553 multiple transcriptions of the Venetian Thomas Junta's authoritative work *De balneis* (1553), appeared in Latin, French, German, and English. *De balneis* comprises a directory of Italian and German mineral baths and a summary of classical and medieval scholarship on bathing. Balneology became a science and outdoor spa bathing an increasingly fashionable pastime for men and women.

THE REFORMATION AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT

During the millennium after the Fall of Rome, tribal populations in Europe slowly multiplied under the ancien régime and in other parts of the world. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the European population grew in a steep upward curve and this growth did not stop. Was the phenomenon attribut-

able to additional food supplies, adaptation to microorganisms, vaccination, the growth of relatively stable political and economic systems; or public paving, drainage, pest control, and private baths? Microdemographic studies indicate that life expectancy was affected by innumerable factors, and improved personal and domestic hygiene were undoubtedly among them. The European hygienic mentalité developed more quickly between the seventeenth century and the twentieth century than it had in the previous eight hundred years. In some ways nothing changed, but in other ways everything changed, through simple accumulation: more people, more material goods, more words, and more ideas. The Renaissance supplied the words; the Reformation supplied new ideas; and new ideas extended consumer demand and fueled further expansion.

“Rational” hygienic science seems a product of the science of the Protestant North, ambivalently relating to and questioning the old southern masters for their own ends. The printing press was the key technological advance in the development. By the 1480s, during the Renaissance, a complex and coherent ancient scientific cosmology had existed in written form for approximately eighteen hundred years, and the early printers exposed as much as possible to public view and to the public purse. Alongside lucrative work for churches, literature and popular science were their mainstay. Throughout Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, the Greek hygienic doctrines of temperate regimen were translated from Latin into the vernacular, commented on, and above all experimented with. Seventeenth-century science focused the medical gaze on the body; in the eighteenth century, bodies were counted, measured, weighed, dissected, examined, and analyzed on an unprecedented scale as the scientific Enlightenment spread rapidly throughout Europe.

Many self-employed and semi-employed observers and experimenters in the seventeenth century found in the new “mechanical” or “chymical” physiology simply a new professional opportunity to extend their skills. But for others, especially in Protestant England, Holland, and Germany, the Reformation had touched everything and given natural philosophy a new moral stance. To be a “puritan” meant to take an ascetic view of life. The new science of hygienic physiology was interpreted as a resounding confirmation of God’s work and natural proof of the Old Testament hatred of uncleanness and abominations. Like the practices of the Jewish and Christian sects of the late Roman period, with whom the puritans strongly identified, the observance of ascetic purity rules meant a great deal in the daily lives of many

seventeenth-century sectarians. To take one example, the English Anabaptist Thomas Tryon (1634–1703) was a proponent of an ascetic cold regimen, advocating cleanly and godly vegetarianism, fasting, herbal remedies, bathing in cold water and air, and cool beds. He wrote seventeen books on godly hygiene for a new sectarian audience of middle- and lower-class tradesmen, artisans, and housewives. Tryon was just one among many medical Dissenters and visionaries of the period, a hotbed of Protestant ideas described by Charles Webster in *The Great Instauration* (1975). Many of these beliefs and publications crossed the Atlantic with people who settled in America. In Europe they worked their way quietly through eighteenth-century society in the form of a new moral earnestness and reemerged in the grass-roots religious revivals of the nineteenth century.

During the eighteenth century, hygienic ideas advanced on all fronts. By the late eighteenth century, British, French, and German physicians found a ready market for the new cool sanitary regimen, popularized at both ends of the century first by John Locke and then by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In Protestant Britain it was well bedded in. Cool air found its way into the bedroom in the treatment of smallpox; swaddling bands were discarded, heating drugs were reduced, and cool vegetables found their way onto the table. Domestic cold-water bathing was widespread; it was later modified to more temperate warmth.

The regimen was completed by open-air sports. The Renaissance and Reformation gentry had already promoted sporting exercises such as tennis, golf, and bowls. The eighteenth-century hygienic renaissance added swimming, cricket, archery, wrestling, boxing, and horse-racing. Jogging and gymnastics came in at the end of the century; rugby and football arrived in the mid-nineteenth century. There was also open-air bathing. Cold river bathing became fashionable in Europe during the Renaissance, at a time when the old hot-water public bath system had broken down. Beginning in the late seventeenth century the British began dipping, like the Romans, in the sea. The bracing habit of cool-bathing in spas and coastal resorts spread gradually throughout northern France and Germany in the late eighteenth century, reaching the Mediterranean in the late nineteenth century, and linking up with the old spa bath trade, which was also booming in Germany, Italy, and France. In the mid-nineteenth century mountaintop hydros, or hydrophatic treatment centers, were established across Europe following the cold-water-cure craze initiated by German balneologist Vincenz Priessnitz. Eighteenth-century cities like Bath, Brighton, and Budapest developed the mass leisure industries of the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries. All these towns and cities were notorious centers of conspicuous consumption and sexual display for the wealthy. Eighteenth-century Europe, following the French lead, developed the new hygienic fashion for clothes and lifestyle *au naturel*, throwing away their corsets, wearing white, and worshipping the ancient Greek purity of line that in architecture was called classicism. In late eighteenth-century Europe much of the increasingly massive gains of the various empires was being poured into housing. The rebuilding of European housing, replacing perishable materials, such as mud or wattle and daub, wood, and thatch with stone, brick, and slates, had begun in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and was well under way by the eighteenth century. European architecture lavishly embraced newly designed hygienic conveniences in urban terraces and squares and in suburban villas, mansions, and palaces that slowly covered the countryside. Designs addressed ventilation, heating, cooking systems, larger windows, drainage, plumbing, indoor latrines and bathrooms, and new parks and gardens. The old seasonal and diurnal patterns of house cleaning were codified for the new gentry employers and employees in household manuals published in the mid-eighteenth century. Many new luxuries and new surfaces, carpets, wallpaper, silver plate, ormolu, and veneer, required care. In 1774 a London magazine, the *Annual Register*, complained of “Saturday and absurd cleanliness. . . . Each day we scrub and scour house, yard, and limb, and on SATURDAY, ye Gods, we swim!” (quotation from *The Spectator*, 1711–1714, edited by H. Morley, 1887, p. 192).

At the other end of the social scale, to have wooden boards or flag floors to scrub at all was, for many in the British Isles and elsewhere in rural Europe, still an unaffordable luxury. The metropolitan rage for cleanliness barely affected rural Scotland in the eighteenth century. Samuel Johnson found the ancient Scottish hut life fully or partially preserved, a precarious survival depending on scant resources. Highland huts, Johnson observed in his *Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland* (1775), “are of many gradations; from murky dens, to commodious dwellings.” “Gentlemen’s huts” had plastered walls, glass windows, and wooden floors. The clash of cultures is vividly evoked in a wry observation:

Often . . . the house and the furniture are not always nicely suited. We were driven once, by missing a passage, to the hut of a gentleman. . . . When I was conducted to my chamber, I found an elegant bed of Indian cotton, spread with fine sheets. The accommodation was flattering; I undressed myself, and felt my feet in the mire. The bed stood upon the bare earth,

which a long course of rain had softened into a puddle. (p. 91)

These older ways of life long remained in rural areas of Europe barely touched by the cash economy. Partisans found the same situations in the Italian mountains in the 1940s. Earth floors were common in England and in many other European countries at the end of the eighteenth century. They were less common at the end of the nineteenth century and almost nonexistent in Europe at the end of the twentieth century, even at camping sites.

THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Utmost cleanliness, sensibility, and refinement had ruled the drawing rooms of the wealthy in the late eighteenth century, and the old smells and stench of humanity had begun to be noticed. Greater personal hygiene, and an understanding of its natural causes, led inevitably to steps being taken in greater public hygiene, particularly where bodies were congregated together—notably in the prisons, the army, the navy, and in towns. A new theory of public hygiene at the turn of the century called it “medical police”: the quality of public air (in France) and public water (in England) was increasingly discussed and scientifically analyzed. Cholera sharpened health issues in the mid-century. The first civic act was usually to provide paving for the streets; the problem of drainage was addressed next, and then housing. The management of the ever-growing suburban settlements and the removal of the unhygienic urban poor became one of the great political issues of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. Many of the oldest slums and rookeries were not dismantled until after World War II. The renaissance of public hygiene in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was complex: the period of elaborate sanitary legislation in Britain, on the Continent, and elsewhere; breaking the codes of the microbiological system and conducting warfare on germs; national insurance schemes and the creation of the welfare state; and Darwinism, Spencerian eugenics, and social hygiene.

Added to this brew of politicians, scientists, and philanthropists was the new breed of religious sectarians that had returned to the old seventeenth-century ascetic beliefs and given them a new twist. From the late eighteenth century onward in Britain and Europe, radical therapies included homeopathy, mesmerism and phrenology, and a new raft of beliefs in “physical puritanism,” which included macrobiotic vegetarianism, herbalism, cold-water bathing, air-bathing (i.e.,

nudism), antivivisectionism, cold-water drinking and teetotalism, and the temperance movement. Dissenters were also prominent in the working-class educational movements, initiating many books and lectures on popular science and popular physiology. The nineteenth century working-class utopia was certainly a hygienic one. In Britain, Quaker and Unitarian philanthropists, communitarian Owenites and early Socialists, and the muscular Christianity school of Anglican clergy promoted the sanitary ideal. The Garden City movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century espoused a similar hygienic utopianism.

The many naturist health sects and vegetarian societies of the 1850s, 1880s, 1900s, 1920s, 1930s, and 1950s sought the perfect body through healthy diet and exercise. In fact 1880–1950 was the great era of sports, not only mass, working-class sports but also sports for girls and women. Party-political sports flourished as well. The British Socialists were inveterate bicyclists and walkers, most progressive leagues had a naturist wing, but only the German Nazi Party had that particular blend of tribal body cult and Goethean vitalism.

Extermination of one's neighbors was no novelty in Europe, but the appeal to hygiene was. Blood-tie tribalism, complete with purificatory rites and boundaries, was rechristened racial purity by the Nazis and later was called ethnic cleansing by the Serbs. However, studies have shown that immigrant communities often suffer the same treatment from their host communities, which separate immigrants as "dirty foreigners." In all European colonies, the European immigrants turned host communities into an underclass on grounds of racial superiority. Most immigrants did not go so far as the puritanical Dutch apartheid system in South Africa, which was finally outlawed by world opinion and United Nations sanctions near the end of the twentieth century.

The cult of the perfect body became in the second half of the twentieth century, perfectly commercial, and resoundingly secular, and unpolitical except for sexual politics. Dirt and torn clothes, punk, and grunge, became a sign of youthful rebellion. Bodies rarely stank as they had earlier, and the consumption of soaps and cosmetic products per head rose steadily after the 1870s. From the 1920s, first gas and then electricity revolutionized domestic appliances and domestic cleaning. Kitchens had been modernized once in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and then again in the twentieth. The modern bathroom arrived with the piped domestic water supplies; at the end of the twentieth century the bathroom was even more well-equipped, but still filled with the same ancient luxury goods. From the 1950s a growing array of cleaning products appeared, mostly derived from the old pharmacopoeia, but less harsh, more perfumed, and increasingly repackaged in a new material, plastic, for consumer convenience: plastic tubing, pots, bottles, sprays, pumps, and so on.

The word "cleanliness" is rarely used in its moral sense and is usually applied to domestic and institutional hygiene. It certainly does not grip the poetic imagination as it did in the twelfth century Anglo-Saxon poem "Cleanness," in which beauty, purity, and cleanliness suggest a glittering, shining, wholesome, and radiant aesthetic with godlike attributes. Television broadcasts instead the daily soap operas, in which no dirt, dust, or facial blemishes are allowed on the screen.

The history of cleanliness is like an iceberg—much of it is submerged below the waterline. The *Annales* methodology has reconstructed what was previously invisible and has greatly extended the historical range. Many gaps in the evidence remain, among them the virtually untapped *longue-durée* history of bathing and cosmetic grooming; Greek, Roman, and medieval hygiene; and Protestant and Catholic hy-

giene and their local variants. Further research on the main contours of cleanliness will probably confirm much of what has already been written on the subject

but in greater detail. Most likely, the economic history of cleanliness and hygiene will prove to be the real eye-opener.

See also *The Annales Paradigm (volume 1)*; *The Population of Europe (volume 2)*; *Public Health (volume 3)*.

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THE SENSES



Constance Classen

HISTORICIZING THE SENSES

The senses are not simply biological in nature, they are also shaped by culture. Perception is, in fact, profoundly affected by cultural practices and ideologies. Just as social norms influence how people dress and what they eat, social norms influence how and what people see, touch, or smell. This social dimension of perception makes the senses subject to historical change and thus to historical study.

Culture shapes senses in many ways. The very number of the senses is dictated to some extent by custom. While the senses are generally counted as five—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch—their number has risen or fallen at different times according to the interests of the day. For example, in premodern Europe, speech as a supposedly natural faculty was sometimes counted as a sixth sense.

Along with being enumerated, the senses are also ranked according to cultural traditions and values. Such ranking plays a basic role in determining which sensory impressions will be deemed most important by a society and which will be filtered out or ignored. In the West sight customarily has been deemed the highest or most important of the senses, followed by hearing, smell, taste, and touch. This has meant that visual and auditory practices and information usually have been considered of much greater value than those derived from the so-called lower senses of smell, taste, and touch.

The ranking of the senses is congruent with a hierarchy of social values. According to this hierarchy, the higher senses are associated with values highly regarded by society and the lower senses with lower or even negative values. For example, the top-ranked sense of sight has traditionally been linked with the highly valued faculty of reason—intellectual vision. The lowly sense of touch, on the other hand, has been associated with mere physical sensation—the “mindless” pleasures and pains of the body.

The hierarchy of the senses has been subject to some variation in Western history. Within a religious

context, hearing, as the sense through which people perceive and obey the word of God, has often been considered the highest sense. For example, in a medieval allegorical epic by Alain de Lille, the senses are depicted as five horses pulling a coach carrying Prudence to Heaven. As the swiftest horse, Sight leads the others, followed by Hearing, Smell, Taste, and Touch. When the coach proves unable to reach Heaven, however, Prudence is persuaded by Theology to unharness Hearing and ride to Heaven on him alone. Here faith—hearing—ascends to spheres where reason—sight—cannot go. Likewise, in certain contexts touch has been called the most fundamental of the senses, while even smell and taste might be given a certain priority as the senses that can most readily access the essence of a thing and thus are least easily deceived. Despite such variations, however, sight and hearing have generally been accepted as “higher” senses and smell, taste, and touch as “lower” senses.

The social values assigned to the different senses are expressed in a variety of ways. The contrast between sight as a supposedly rational sense and smell as an “intuitive” sense is evident in idioms such as “I see what you mean” and “I smell a rat.” These different sensory values are also conveyed by associating visual signs (that is, writing, diagrams) with the exercise of reason and olfactory signs (that is, perfumes) with the use of intuition and emotion. The sensory values of a period are further conveyed through such means as stories, myths and religious practices, social customs, and techniques of child rearing and education, in which adults may put much effort into teaching children to understand visual signs but little effort into teaching them to find meaning in odors.

While some senses are ranked higher than others, each sensory field contains both positive and negative sensory values. For instance, although sight has a high social status, certain sights, such as dark colors, or certain uses of sight, such as for personal adornment, may have negative associations. Sensory values, furthermore, must always be understood in context, for what may be a foul sight or smell in one context

may be construed as pleasant in another. The smell of urine has generally been associated with negative values. However, within the context of the royal palace of Versailles in the eighteenth century, the strong urinous odor of the grounds owing to a lack of sanitary facilities acquired some of the social prestige of the court itself. This is a good example of how sensory perception is not purely physiological in nature but is informed by cultural values.

The cultural construction of the senses affects not only how people perceive the physical world but also how they relate to each other. While on a practical level of everyday activities it is understood that all people use all of their senses, on a more symbolic plane high-status social groups are associated with the higher senses and low-status social groups with the lower senses. An instance of this comes from the work of the nineteenth-century natural historian Lorenz Oken, who postulated a sensory hierarchy of human races with the European “eye-man” at the top, followed by the Asian “ear-man,” the Native American “nose-man,” the Australian “tongue-man,” and the African “skin-man.” Oken’s hierarchy of races and senses is based not on any intrinsic characteristics of the races but on their social rankings within the Western imagination.

Aside from its links with particular sensory faculties, each social group is invested with a range of sensory values. Again the more positive sensory values are associated with higher social groups and the more negative ones with groups deemed by the elite as lower on the social scale. Within the domain of smell, for example, high-status groups are customarily typed as fragrant or inodorate, while low-status groups are described as foul-smelling. These associations may be based in part on actual traits of these groups. Persons of wealth have more access to spacious, well-aired homes and costly perfumes, while poor people living in crowded, unsanitary dwellings often have to put up with foul odors. Nonetheless, such sensory social divisions are fundamentally symbolic in nature, depending not on any actual traits of the group in question (that is, unpleasant odor) for their cultural force but on social perceptions that are translated into sensory values. The English author George Orwell wrote in the 1930s, for example, that even those servants whom members of the middle and upper classes knew were quite clean seemed marked by an unappetizing odor (Orwell, 1937, p. 160).

In such cases a general feeling of repulsion based on the low social status of workers is transformed into a bad smell. Under these circumstances even the cleanest, most fragrant member of the working classes may be symbolically typed as malodorous. Conversely,

malodor in members of the upper classes does not necessarily detract from their symbolic fragrance.

This sensory categorization of different groups of people enforces social boundaries and hierarchies and rules of social interaction. It signals which groups are thought to uphold the integrity of the social body and which are thought to have an injurious, corrupting effect on the social body. The scheme works well because people often have strong reactions to sensory impressions, such as fragrant or foul odors. When a group has a strong association with positive or negative sensory qualities, positive or negative social and physical reactions follow. Thus Orwell wrote that, even though the stench of the working-class body might be imaginary, it nonetheless induces a physical feeling of repulsion in members of the middle and upper classes that is scarcely possible to overcome (Orwell, 1937, p. 160).

The sensory values propagated by the dominant social group are often internalized to a greater or lesser extent by all groups within society. For example, members of the working classes will come to believe that, no matter how much they wash or what perfumes they use, they are somehow not as clean or as fragrant as members of the upper classes. Members of marginalized groups may also challenge such sensory values, however, and propose alternative schemes whereby “clean-living” workers are contrasted with the “filthy” rich.

The social history of the senses uncovers the different ways in which sensory values have worked to uphold or challenge the social order, shaping the fortunes of groups and individuals. Senses are the means by which people perceive each other and the world. By exploring the ways in which sensory perception has historically been invested with cultural values, scholars can better understand the worldviews of peoples of other eras and at the same time appreciate the social underpinnings of the contemporary sensory universe.

WORK IN THE FIELD

The history of the senses is a broad field with a great range of possible topics for investigation. A work in this field may trace the shifts in sensory values within a society over time, or it may concentrate on an in-depth study of specific subjects, such as the role of hearing in sixteenth-century Anabaptism or the “language of flowers” in Victorian England. Whatever the scope of the subject matter, a sociocultural dimension is essential in a sensory history. A history of perfume, for example, does not constitute a history of the senses

unless it relates perfume practices to social trends and ideologies. Similarly the investigation of the sensory worlds of past eras should not merely describe the range of sounds and smells that existed at a particular time, as evocative as that might be, but should uncover the meanings those sounds and smells had for people.

The primary difficulty for the historian of the senses is that sensory environments and the meanings with which they are invested are ephemeral. The changes may be subtle or dramatic, but the world of sensory values is one of constant flux. It is hard to know what or how people of other periods perceived and what these sensations meant to them. Ironically, the most important source for the sensory historian is the seemingly desensitized written text. Learned treatises elaborate philosophies of the senses, letters and diaries describe the sensibilities of everyday life, medical studies praise the healing powers of scents and savors, court records tell of witches condemned for casting an "evil eye," and literary works reveal the sensory priorities of their authors' classes and times. Such written sources may be supplemented by information gleaned from works of art and from items of material culture, such as clothes, furniture, and houses. Where the sources are silent or unclear, a certain amount of conjecture is necessary.

While a broad field in its possibilities for study, the history of the senses has been largely unexplored. Nonetheless, a number of seminal works have contributed to the history of the senses as a vital area of investigation. In the 1940s the cultural historian Lucien Febvre argued that sixteenth-century Europe placed less emphasis on sight and more emphasis on the other senses than did modern Europe. He wrote in *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century* (1942), "A series of fascinating studies could be done on the sensory underpinnings of thought in different periods" (Febvre, 1982, p. 436).

The work of Norbert Elias, the historian of manners, similarly if less explicitly suggests the importance of historicizing sensibilities. Stimulated by Febvre, Elias, and others, cultural historians began to tentatively explore the sensory values of different periods in their writings. Robert Mandrou wrote in 1961 that the senses of hearing, smell, taste, and touch nourished the mental world of sixteenth-century Europeans in ways alien to moderns. Also in the 1960s Michel Foucault aroused interest with his analysis of how sight has served as a medium of social control in institutions like hospitals and prisons.

Influenced by the writings of French cultural historians and by the work of the Russian literary scholar Mikhail Bakhtin, Piero Camporesi in the 1970s

produced a remarkable series of books on the role of the sensuous in the popular culture of premodernity. Camporesi's work focuses on such aspects of material culture as food and the body, with all its fluids and airs, situating each within an intricate web of folk beliefs and practices. However, as Camporesi does not usually look at sensory values separately from particular material objects, such as food or the body, or try to locate his rich source material within a broader scheme of contemporary social values, it could be said that his works offer a sensuous reading of history rather than a historical reading of the senses according to the definition presented here.

The first major exploration within the history of the senses came in 1982 with the publication of Alain Corbin's book *Le miasme et la jonquille* (The foul and the fragrant). In this book Corbin aimed to bring smell out of the historical closet and to demonstrate the importance of odors in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French culture. Corbin argued that this period saw an intensification of scientific and public concern over the relationship between stench and disease transmission. Strong body odors and perfumes became associated with the working classes, while the elite endeavored to rid themselves of personal odors through increased practices of cleanliness. Smell as a sense declined in utility, save to report disgust. The novelty and wealth of the subject matter together with Corbin's intriguing analysis of the role of smell in contemporary social discourses made *Le miasme et la jonquille* a popular and influential work and helped legitimize future investigations into the history of the senses.

A number of books by Constance Classen explore the cultural construction of the senses in Western and non-Western history. *Worlds of Sense* (1993) investigates such topics as the decline of smell and the rise of vision in modernity and the variation in sensory values across cultures. *The Color of Angels* (1998) delves into the sensuous symbolism of premodern cosmologies, the association of sensory values with traditional gender roles, and the expression and redefinition of sensory norms in modern art. These studies bring out the extent to which sensory perception has been impregnated with social values in different domains of life in different periods and places. Other notable histories of the senses are *Medicine and the Five Senses* (1993) edited by W. F. Bynum and Roy Porter and the literary-historical study *The Smell of Books* (1992) by Hans J. Rindisbacher.

A number of related fields, such as psychology, sociology and literary studies, have contributed to the development of the history of the senses. Anthropology has had the greatest influence on the history of

the senses, in fact so much so that, as Corbin has suggested, the social history of the senses might otherwise be called the “historical anthropology of the senses” (Corbin, 1995, p. 181). The anthropology of the senses heightens awareness of the cultural relativity of sensory perception by bringing out the different sensory priorities of different societies. The odors denigrated in one society may be esteemed as sources and symbols of knowledge in another.

Among those who influenced the development of the anthropology of the senses are Claude Lévi-Strauss, who analysed the sensory codes of myths, and Mary Douglas, who explored how “natural symbols,” such as the body, can encode a range of social norms. Another influential line of thought comes from the work of the communications theorists Marshall McLuhan and Walter Ong on the relationship between a society’s dominant mode of communication (for example, speech or writing) and its sensory model. The foremost exponent of the anthropology of the senses is the Canadian anthropologist David Howes, editor of *The Varieties of Sensory Experience* (1991) and co-author of *Aroma: The Cultural History of Smell* (1994).

As in other fields of social investigation, historians have employed a variety of theoretical approaches to the history of the senses. Among them are a marxist perspective and a feminist perspective. A marxist approach might consider how sensory hierarchies have supported social hierarchies and how class conflicts might be expressed in differing sensory norms. A feminist approach might explore the historical interrelationship of sensory values and gender values and how these affected the lives of women and men.

Twentieth-century feminist theory, as expounded by Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, certainly professed that the senses are strongly imbued with gender values. This notion has been explored within a historical context in *Sexual Visions* (1989) by Ludmilla Jordanova, *Vision and Difference* (1988) by Griselda Pollock, and *The Color of Angels*.

As regards marxism, Karl Marx made the intriguing statement, “The forming of the five senses is a labor of the entire history of the world down to the present” (Marx, 1972, p. 141). Marx’s evident interest in sensory perception was taken up by a number of twentieth-century marxist theorists. Walter Benjamin explored how modern capitalist culture was creating a new aesthetic of perception. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno suggested that vision is associated with the upper classes due to its inherent detachment, while the mingling nature of smell makes it a sign for the “promiscuous” lower classes. Even without a marxist history of the senses, marxist theory has certainly influenced sensory historians and cultural historians

in general to undertake a history “from below,” from the perspectives of workers and peasants as well as the ruling classes, and to take account of the role of class interests in promulgating social and sensory ideologies.

In a way, looking at the lives of workers and peasants invites an exploration into the culture of the senses because of the traditional association in the West of the “lower” classes with the body and sensuality—the riot of the carnival, the squalor of the hovel, and the earthy rites of hearth and harvest. Similarly the move away from the study of economies, institutions, and public events to study private, everyday life, also found in cultural history, suggests a “descent” from a world of order and reason to the disorderly “underworld” of the senses. Scholars must carefully avoid giving the impression that only the world of the poor is truly sensuous or that sensory symbolism is confined to private life—the kitchen and the bedroom. Sensory values, in fact, shape the worlds of both princes and peasants and permeate the public sphere as much as the private sphere.

Historians of the senses also are cautioned not to impose a personal perceptual model on the sensory experiences of earlier societies. Twentieth-century preoccupations emphasized the importance of both visual culture and sexual culture, and historical studies of sensory life often have been limited to one or the other. An example is Peter Gay’s study of Victorian life, *Education of the Senses* (1984), which deals with sexual behavior and attitudes rather than with the senses as such. The social history of the senses, however, should be open to the full range of sensory experiences as well as to the social relations among the various senses. Indeed it should be particularly attentive to those past expressions of sensory life—the odor of sanctity, the king’s healing touch, the mythical basilisk’s deadly gaze—that, while vital to the popular consciousness of their time, seem most irrelevant to the twenty-first century.

THE SENSORY WORLD OF THE RENAISSANCE

The sensory world of Renaissance Europe, while affected by the shifting sensory values of the modern age, was grounded in traditional practices and beliefs retained from the ancient and medieval periods. Sensory phenomena—colors, odors, sounds—were regarded as potent forces, agents of health or illness, bearers of planetary energy, and symbols of sacred and social order. As in the ancient and medieval periods, during the Renaissance all of the senses were accorded essential cosmological and cultural roles. Thus while

sight was customarily considered the highest of the senses, it was still insufficient to convey a complete “picture” of the world. The five senses formed a set, like the four seasons or the seven deadly sins. Just as summer or summer and autumn could not by themselves signify a whole year, so sight or sight and hearing could not by themselves accurately convey the nature of the universe.

The “five senses” was, indeed, a popular literary and artistic trope during the Renaissance. A number of plays and stories depicted the senses as each perceiving the world differently and inadequately on its own. Furthermore the medieval and Renaissance predilection for allegory meant that each sensory quality of an object was examined for its symbolic import. The rose was considered an apt symbol of love not only or even primarily because of its beautiful appearance but because of its sweet odor and taste and the poignant contrast between the softness of its petals and the sharpness of its thorns.

Meaning came through all the senses during the Renaissance, and so did pleasure. The Renaissance banquet at its most sumptuous was intended to stimulate all of the senses. Dishes were designed to delight the eye as well as the palate, such as elaborately sculpted confectionaries and peacocks stuffed with spices and adorned with their own feathers. Between

and sometimes during courses musicians and actors provided entertainment. The banquet hall was perfumed with rich incense, and at the end of the meal refreshing bouquets of flowers might be distributed. The peasant equivalent to this banquet of the senses was the popular feast, which similarly combined delights for all the senses, from the mouthwatering flavors of ales and pies to the toe-tapping tunes of the fiddler.

In the sacred sphere, both God and the devil were believed to order or disorder the world through a variety of sensory channels. People imagined, based on the ancient notion of the music of the spheres, that a celestial concert of angelic choirs, interrupted now and then by the devil’s discordant braying, kept the planets moving along their tracks. Within the realm of smell, people thought trails of odor traveled between heaven and Earth and between Earth and hell, integrating the cosmos in a sacred interplay of scent. Sanctity manifested itself through fragrance and sin through stench. The nose-wise saint could sniff out one or the other, detecting, for example, the pristine scent of virginity or the corrupt stink of carnality.

Accounts of the odor of sanctity were abundant during the Renaissance. The Spanish nun Teresa of Ávila died in 1582, and her corpse became renowned for the fragrance it exhaled, a fragrance that lasted

through several inhumations and exhumations. This fragrance was credited with various miracles of healing and added greatly to St. Teresa's reputation for exceptional holiness. A century later in France, Benoîte of Notre-Dame de Laus experienced the olfactory tug-of-war between heaven and hell in her own person. The long-suffering Benoîte reportedly was assaulted with demonic stinks and alternately was rescued by angelic perfumes until she lay in an exhausted stupor. In her most renowned act, she followed a trail of scent left by the Virgin Mary to the divinely chosen site of the future church of Notre-Dame de Laus.

Like the cosmos, the human body, a microcosmos, was ordered or disordered through a multiplicity of sensory channels. As "gateways" to the body, the senses seemed eminently suited to receive influences that could either benefit or injure the body. If poisonous foods could be taken in by the mouth, why not "poisonous" sights by the eye or "poisonous" scents by the nose? Sensory qualities were considered independent forces that served as media of health or illness.

The attribution of agency to sensory qualities made it essential to take such qualities into account when diagnosing disease. A putrid smell emanating from a patient might not simply be a symptom of a particular illness but a primary cause of the illness as well as a vehicle of infection. Likewise treatments might be directed through a variety of sensory avenues. A complaint was often classified and treated in accordance with the hot or cold, wet or dry categories of humoral theory. Thus someone deemed suffering from an excess of "cold" and "wetness" might be treated with herbs considered "hot" and "dry." Music had a range of medical uses, most importantly in treatment for mental disorders. As "air" working on "air," it realigned the disturbed spirit of the patient with the harmonious music of the spheres.

It was believed that fragrant and pungent odors both warded off the contagious odors of disease and alleviated a variety of ailments. The scent of the mandrake cured headaches and insomnia, while rose perfume cooled overheated brains. Violet scent reportedly calmed fits. The alchemical theories of the Renaissance in turn emphasized flavors as basic agents of health and illness. Paracelsus held that the four flavors in the body, sourness, sweetness, bitterness, and saltiness, produced different sorts of physical ills. These "savory" pains, however, could be treated with flavorful remedies, such as salty or sweet elixirs.

The sensory models of the body and the cosmos that underlay much of premodern thought were imbued with ideologies of gender and class. According to humoral medicine, men were positively valued as

hot and dry in nature, while women were negatively valued as cold and moist. Indeed the female sex was held to have its origin in insufficiently heated or "undercooked" semen. The most perfectly heated semen always produced males. Heat was held to endow men with courage, strength, and honesty, while coldness made women timid, weak, and deceitful.

Apart from the attribution of different sensory qualities such as temperature to men and women, the senses themselves were coded by gender. Men were associated with the "higher," "spiritual" senses of hearing and especially sight, but women were connected with the "lower," "animal" senses of smell, taste, and touch. This gender division of the senses was linked to a gender division of social spheres. The supposed masculine mastery of sight and hearing was deemed to fit men for such activities as traveling, studying, and ruling (overseeing), while the female association with the proximity senses made women the guardians of the home and mistresses of the kitchen, the bedroom, and the nursery. Such gendered divisions of sensory life were invested with enormous social force and could only be transgressed with considerable difficulty. For example, female writers of the Renaissance period and after, such as Catherine des Roches in France and Margaret Cavendish in England, continually had to justify why they practiced the visual, masculine activity of writing instead of engaging in more feminine sensory pursuits, such as cooking and sewing.

Sensory ideologies of class often paralleled those of gender. Peasants and workers, like women, were allied with the body and the senses, while upper-class men were associated with the mind and reason. The "lower" classes were also customarily associated with the domains of touch, taste, and smell. They were manual laborers preoccupied with the animal necessities of life, that is, food and a warm place to sleep. Increasing contact with the inhabitants of Africa and the Americas led to the symbolic incorporation of these peoples into the European sensory and social order as well. Like the "lower" classes and the "lower" sex, the "lower" races were customarily associated with sensuality rather than reason and in particular with the "lower," "animal" senses.

While much of the sensory symbolism described above prevailed into the nineteenth century, a number of developments during the Renaissance produced significant changes in the Western sensory order. The Renaissance was an exciting period of sensory discovery, with new sights, sounds, and savors entering Europe from the New World. Strange vegetables such as tomatoes and corn appeared on Old World tables. "Native" weavings, carvings, and musical instruments and even natives themselves were displayed for the

admiration of Europeans. Enthralling accounts circulated of the curious customs practiced in the newly discovered lands. This cornucopia of exotic stimuli encouraged a fascination with other possible sensory worlds that continued for several centuries. In the sixteenth century Thomas More, inspired by accounts of the Inca Empire, imagined a fragrant commonwealth in which cities were free from stench, meals were perfumed, and neighbors competed in gardening. Intrigued by the Peruvian quipu, a mnemonic device employing knotted strings of different colors, the eighteenth-century English author Horace Walpole saw possibilities for new sensory idioms, such as a language of colors in which puns were made of overlapping hues or a tactile language that could weave poems and knot rhymes.

As the entry of new goods and ideas from the New World increased the possibilities for sensory creativity and enjoyment, the Protestant Reformation, with its backlash against “heathenish” sensualism, had the contrasting effect of sobering European sensory life, particularly in northern Europe. Gaudy clothes, rich foods, and perfumes seemed to the more austere reformers to direct Christians’ attention to things of the world rather than the spirit. The church, according to the Reformation ideal, was a place of sensory simplicity, purified of incense and visual displays.

The invention of printing with movable type in the fifteenth century had a profound effect on Western sensory life. The consequent mass production of books made vision an even more important sensory avenue for acquiring knowledge about the world. In religion, for example, literate Europeans relied less on such nonvisual means of accessing the divine as smelling odors of sanctity and tasting the body and blood of Christ and relied more on reading the Word of God.

The Renaissance also saw the beginnings of the desensitized mechanical model of the universe that eventually dominated Western culture. Developing a “scientific” understanding of perception that persisted through the twentieth century, René Descartes reasoned that the senses were purely physical mechanisms designed to convey information about the physical world to the mind. The growing field of quantitative analysis in turn stressed the importance of measure, number, and weight for comprehending and conveying information about the world over such nonquantifiable sensory qualities as odors and music.

Seemingly void of sensuous “coloring,” the scientific paradigm of the universe in fact became permeated with visual values. This development was influenced by various factors. Sight had long been associated with the faculty of reason, and as the field of

science was based on the exercise of reason, it seemed appropriate for sight to be the sense of science. The scientist did not wish to “smell out” (that is, intuit) the workings of nature or to “taste of” (that is, experience) them but to expose them to the light and see them, to understand them. The invention of “optick glasses,” such as the microscope and the telescope, extended the power of sight over the other senses and emphasized the role of vision in investigating the nature of the universe. Furthermore prevalent visual models, such as maps and charts, seemed to adequately represent the world through only one sensory medium, sight. Even mathematics, the most apparently abstract of scientific endeavors, relied on visual signs.

THE SENSES IN MODERNITY

While the old, organic, and multisensory concept of the cosmos lingered in the recesses of the Western imagination, the visualization of the world became pronounced during the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. As the word “Enlightenment” suggests, this period stressed the value of light and sight. This emphasis was manifested by sight’s dominant role in contemporary philosophy and by the widespread attention to scientific advances in the field of optics. In keeping with the male associations of sight and reason, the rise of science was heralded as a triumph of clear-sighted masculine vision over the murky “feminine brew” of superstitions and myths that had previously dominated Western thought.

The ocular obsession of the Enlightenment influenced the domain of aesthetics as well as science and philosophy. During the Renaissance the artistic interest in naturalism and linear perspective emphasized the “realism” of visual images and turned canvases into seeming windows on the world. During the Enlightenment aesthetic attention focused on the organization of space. The eighteenth century disdained the crowded, dark, winding streets of the medieval city and dreamed of wide, bright thoroughfares with open vistas. To give an example of this changing aesthetic, in the Middle Ages the ideal garden was a walled enclosure redolent with the scents of flowers and resonant with singing birds and splashing water. In the eighteenth century the ideal garden became a park, a seemingly infinite expanse of space bounded by no walls or fences, in which odors and sounds were dispersed and the eye was free to roam, seeking the distant horizon. This shift in spatial aesthetics paralleled the changing understanding of the nature of the universe. The Middle Ages and the Renaissance imagined

the universe as concentric, an enclosed space of enclosed spaces animated and ordered by a network of multisensory energies. The Enlightenment swept away those old sensory “cobwebs” and opened up the universe to infinite space, a vast visual realm of whirling planets and darting beams of light.

The nineteenth century saw a continuation and extension of most of the visualist trends of the Enlightenment. This century, for example, maintained public order through visual surveillance. These surveillance practices included increased supervision of the population through modern institutions, such as public schools and prisons, and increased monitoring of nocturnal activities made possible by improved street lighting.

Concern for public health in turn led to sanitary reform movements aimed at bringing light and fresh air into the smelly, dark homes and streets of the poor. On the economic front, the intensification of capitalist production and values begun with the industrial revolution emphasized the visual display of goods both to promote sales and as a conspicuous sign of plenty. In the nineteenth century the invention of photography established sight as the sensory repository of the past and the preeminent mediator of reality, while the arrival of electric light extended the domain of sight into the furthest corners of darkness.

One prominent social development of modernity was the rise in importance of the individual as a discrete entity with personal rights and boundaries. In terms of the social history of the senses, this meant that people had to take greater care not to transgress the sensory space of others with untoward odors, noises, or touches. As the most apparently detached of the senses, sight was often the most socially acceptable sense. This was particularly true in the context of urban centers, in which people daily came across strangers whom they could not touch or smell, to whom they could not even speak with propriety, but at whom they could look. In fact the saying “look but don’t touch” became a sensory motto of the modern age.

The elevation of sight in modernity was often presented in evolutionary terms as the final stage in a sensory and social development from barbarism to civilization. Civilized people, it was held, perceived and appreciated the world primarily through their eyes. Primitive people, by contrast, were imagined to rely just as much on their noses and fingers for knowledge of the world. Charles Darwin gave this notion of a social progress from the “lower” senses to the “higher” a biological basis by suggesting in his theory of evolution that sight became evermore important to humans as they evolved from animals and learned to

walk upright and take their noses off the ground. Sigmund Freud later psychologized this theory and claimed that individuals went through similar sensory stages in the transition from infancy to adulthood.

As the above indicates, in many cases the elevation of sight was accompanied by a diminution in the importance of the other senses, particularly the proximity senses. Smell, taste, and touch were divested of much of their former cosmological and physical powers and were relegated to the cultural realm of personal pleasure or displeasure. For example, instances of the odor of sanctity were characterized by prominent scientists as hallucinatory episodes or else as ill odors arising from the ravaged body of the saint. Similarly by the end of the nineteenth century the medical profession established that odors could neither cause nor cure disease, thus allotting smell virtually no role in modern medicine.

These shifts in the Western sensory order did not go uncontested. Indeed throughout Western history persons and groups challenged the dominant sensory model with alternative ways of making sense. In the later half of the nineteenth century a significant counterreaction developed to the visualist tendencies of modernity, tendencies associated with scientific materialism and industrialization. This counterreaction was centered in the artistic community, whose members sought to recreate the ideal of a multisensory cosmos through art. The French poet Charles Baudelaire, often considered the forefather of this movement, wrote forcefully that the need to understand sensory phenomena is linked in chains of correspondences due to the essential sensory unity of the cosmos. The correspondence of the senses meant that any sensory impression could and should call up corresponding sensations in other sensory modalities. A color might remind a person of a sound, or a sound might be described in terms of a fragrance.

Inspired by this multisensory aesthetic, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century artists experimented with creating concerts of perfumes or serving color-coded dinners. The multisensory nature and the popularity of this aesthetic movement meant that it cut across artistic fields. In his influential book *A rebours* (Against nature, 1884), the French novelist J. K. Huysmans described playing “internal symphonies” by drinking a succession of liqueurs corresponding to different musical sounds and creating the impression of a flowering meadow by spraying a room with floral perfumes. The Dutch artist Jan Toorop attempted to portray the auditory and olfactory realms in his paintings by depicting sound swirling out of bells and scent rising up from flowers. The Russian composer Aleksandr Scriabin aspired to en-

gage all the senses in his compositions by including odors, tastes, touches, and colors as part of the performance.

In the twentieth century, however, the notion of a multisensory aesthetic was increasingly dismissed as a quaint, sentimental holdover from *la belle époque* (the beautiful age), unsuited to the brisk nature of modern life. Bold visual lines and colors seemed more in keeping with the characteristics of modernity than clinging fragrances or nostalgic harmonies. With the spread of motion pictures, sight became even more established as the sense of modernity, capable of capturing and acclaiming the rapid pace of modern life. The proliferation of enticing advertising imagery that accompanied the growth of the consumer society indicated that sight was not only the objective sense of science but also the subjective sense of desire.

While the twentieth century saw the virtual end of many earlier ideas about the senses, one sensory ideology persisted—the Western association of women, workers, and non-Europeans with the devalued lower senses. People still deemed men the masters of sight and women the guardians of taste and tact. Workers and “primitive peoples” were still imagined as inhabitants of a dark, odorous underworld of brute sensations. Hence Orwell stated in *The Road to Wigan Pier*, “The real secret of class distinctions in the West” can

be “summed up in four frightful words . . . : *The lower classes smell*” (Orwell, 1937, p. 159).

As the century progressed these sensory ideologies of “otherness” came under greater attack, primarily by members of the groups negatively stereotyped. The attack proceeded along several, at times opposing, fronts. One approach resisted any apparent form of sensory ghettoization and asserted the right to equal participation in the “higher” sensory and social spheres of the dominant group. Another positively revalued some of the “lower” sensations and sensory pursuits traditionally associated with a group. Among women, for example, a number of writers and artists chose to explore and celebrate traditional feminine associations with touch, taste, and smell.

At the end of the twentieth century a range of sensory trends existed. The prevalence of visual imagery and of the visual medium of the computer suggests that sight will rule the popular Western imagination for some time to come. However, the spread of alternative medical treatments, such as aromatherapy and acupuncture, signals interests in other avenues of sensory experience. The writings of Oliver Sacks and others have attracted attention to the alternative perceptual worlds of persons with such sensory disabilities as deafness. Regardless of its direction or directions, the Western sensory model provides a rich terrain for cultural investigation.

See also other articles in this section.

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GESTURES



Herman Roodenburg

Gestures are perhaps the most ephemeral subject ever studied by social historians. Scholars studying gestures in present-day societies can always photograph and film their subject; historians have to do without such devices. They have to work with texts, not the most convenient medium to capture any gesture, or with such visual media as prints, paintings, sculpture, or, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, photographs and films made by other parties. Studying gestures in the past is a complicated but also a very rewarding task. Gestures are not only ephemeral; most of them are also, to the men and women employing them, self-evident and taken for granted. It is the naturalness and unreflectedness of gestures that may offer important and quite unexpected insights in the culture under study. So far most studies have focused on the early modern period. The sources on Antiquity and the Middle Ages are scarce. The relative paucity of studies on gestures in the nineteenth and the twentieth century may be explained by a lesser interest among the historians of these periods in the history of the body and the new cultural history in general.

THE STUDY OF GESTURE

According to the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, “gesture” refers to “a significant movement of limb or body” or the “use of such movements as expression of feeling or rhetorical device.” This is a broad definition, encompassing essentially the whole carriage and deportment of the body. Though this was the original meaning of the term, it generally has been limited to indicating a movement of the head (including facial expression) or of the arms and hands. A gesture may be inadvertent (blushing, fumbling with one’s clothes) or deliberate (nodding, making the V-sign). Most scholars agree that a degree of voluntarism should be implied. They also acknowledge that no watertight divisions exist between posture and gesture or between voluntary (or conventional) and involuntary (or nat-

ural) gestures. Indeed these divisions have a history of their own.

Many gestures function independently of the spoken word. A lucid survey of such “autonomous” gestures is in *Gestures: Their Origins and Distribution* (1979) by the ethologist Desmond Morris. The revised edition is *Bodytalk: A World Guide to Gestures* (1994). Particular types of autonomous gestures are the sign languages of the deaf and various tribal and monastic communities.

After the 1970s most studies undertaken by anthropologists, sociolinguists, and social psychologists focused on gestures that accompany speech, or gesticulation. Video and other audiovisual techniques have shown that speech and gesticulation are produced together, as though they are two aspects of a single underlying process. Many studies have been devoted to the nature of this matching, that is, to the question of how phrases of speech production are related to phrases of gesticulation. In addition older classifications of speech-related gestures were qualified and new ones introduced. A well-known classification includes beats, pointers, ideographs, and pictorial gestures. Beats or batons beat time to the rhythm of the words. Pointers or indexical gestures point to the object of the words, either a concrete referent in the immediate environment or an abstract referent, such as a point of view brought forward by the speaker. Ideographs only refer to abstract referents, and they diagram the logical structure of what is said. In contrast, pictorial gestures, essentially the gestures of mime artists, refer to concrete objects and activities.

Gesture has been studied and practiced from many perspectives. Since antiquity speech-related gesture has been a part of rhetoric. For example, both Cicero (106–43 B.C.) and Quintilian (c. A.D. 35–c. A.D. 100) wrote extensively on delivery, in Greek *hupokrisis* and in Latin *actio* or *pronuntiatio*. They deemed it no less important than the other four departments of oratory: *inventio* (invention), *dispositio* (disposition), *elocutio* (elocution), and *memoria* (memory). Quintilian was the first to explicitly distin-

referred to the *Discobolos* (c. 450 B.C.) of Myron (fl. c. 480–440 B.C.), one of the finest examples of classical contrapposto, as an illustration to *elocutio*. Just as this statue, in abandoning the straight line, suggests movement and grace, the speaker, too, should favor an ornate style and introduce grace and variety. Even at the beginning of the fifteenth century, when the complete text of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* and Cicero's rhetorical works became available, scholars complained about the impracticability of classical delivery. They found it hardly conducive to contemporary oratory, and some, including the German rhetorician Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560), disposed of classical *pronuntiatio* altogether.

The tradition of the civilization of manners is another perspective in which the study and practice of gestures has been prominent. In his ground-breaking study on the development of manners, the German sociologist Norbert Elias (1897–1990) strongly emphasized the rules governing the essential activities of life. He discussed the more psychoanalytically significant prescriptions concerning urinating, defecating, and hiding one's nudity and also the lesser ones concerning blowing the nose, sneezing, coughing, and spitting—in short, all those activities that “we share with the animals,” as the author of one of the most important manners books, the Frenchman Antoine de Courtin (1622–1685), explained. But the manuals are far richer than Elias, with his strongly Freudian point of view, suggested. They also deal at length with phenomena such as postures, gestures, facial expression, and even paralingual phenomena (the pitch or intensity of the voice). The sixteenth century experienced an explosion of such texts, though many display a disinterest in classical *actio* or *pronuntiatio* similar to that in sixteenth-century texts on rhetoric. Jakob Burckhardt (1818–1897) and several later historians, including Elias, inaccurately said the rules propounded in these manuals originated in the classical or courtly tradition. As the English historian Dilwyn Knox argued, many of these texts derive from the *disciplina corporis* (body discipline), the monastic and clerical precepts of comportment that from the thirteenth century on were communicated to the laity. For example, reaching back to *De institutione novitiorum* (on the instruction of novices) possibly composed by the canon regular Hugh of St. Victor (1096–1142), this tradition provided the framework for Desiderius Erasmus's idea of *civilitas* (civility) set forth in *De civilitate morum puerilium* (On the Civility of Children's Manners) (1530) and the texts based on it, including other manuals on proper comportment, the numerous Latin school curricula, and the regulations of the new Catholic orders, such as the Jesuits.

guish delivery into *vox* (voice) and *gestus* (general carriage of the body). Interestingly Cicero was already using notions such as body language (*sermo corporis*) or the eloquence of the body (*eloquentia corporis*).

FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Both Cicero and Quintilian's writings were crucial to the flowering of rhetoric in the Renaissance. Delivery, however, had a modest impact. It is true that classical contrapposto was more or less reconquered by Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472) and later authors, such as Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), Michelangelo (1475–1564), Giorgio Vasari (1511–1574), and Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo (1538–1600), on the basis of a passage from Quintilian. However, it is significant that the text in question was not on delivery. It merely

The second half of the sixteenth century witnessed a new interest in gestures. At this time both the courts and the urban elites in most European countries adopted notions of civility. Generally this development followed a course of restraint compared to the excess of gestures attributed to the peasant population; the inhabitants of southern Europe, particularly the Italians from the seventeenth century onward; and the newly discovered peoples in the East and West. Many of the new codes were adopted in the arts of dancing, acting, painting, and sculpturing. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the concept was increasingly set off against the mere appearance of manners and all exaggerated civility. The background to this was the late medieval aesthetic-cum-moral conviction, already implied in the monastic and clerical codes of comportment, of a close correspondence between physical expression and inner disposition.

The emphasis on the moral or universal rather than the conventional nature of gestures brought civility and the study of physiognomy together. An informative example is *De humana physiognomoniam* (On human physiognomy), published in 1586 by the Neapolitan dramatist Giambattista della Porta (1535?–1615). Later studies related physiognomy to the passions, as in the *Conférence de M. Le Brun sur l'expression générale et particulière* (1698) by the French court painter Charles Le Brun (1619–1690), or from a new psychological perspective, related to the so-called moral sentiments, as in the *Ideen zu einer Mimik* (1785–1786) by the German scholar Johann Jakob Engel (1742–1802). These works reveal that gestures were now also studied and practiced from the perspective of contemporary painting and stagecraft.

The late sixteenth century and the seventeenth century also witnessed a philosophical interest in gestures. In 1572, for example, the Spanish scholar Arias Montanus (1527–1598) published *Liber Ieremiae, sive de actione*, (The book of Jeremiah, or on delivery), in which he argued for the universality of gesture. Similarly Giovanni Bonifacio's *L'arte de' cenni* (1616) and John Bulwer's *Chirologia; or, the Naturall Language of the Hand* (1644) were conceived as manuals of rhetorical delivery. However, both authors professed a belief in a natural, universal language of gesture, opining that its often-noted diversity could be reduced to a few general principles and thus facilitate the conduct of trade in Europe, the New World, and the Far East. In the process classical delivery was revalued as natural gesture in contrast to merely conventional gesture and was increasingly identified with the Greco-Roman tradition. Eventually this philosophical interest inspired discussions

on universal language schemes in the late seventeenth century and the eighteenth century.

The Neapolitan scholar Andrea de Jorio (1769–1851) offered a quite different, strongly antiquarian approach to classical gestures in *La mimica degli antichi investigata nel gestire Napoletano* (1832). Based on the idea that the lively gestures of his poorer townspeople, the *volgo*, were a direct legacy of the Romans, he interpreted gestures as a key to understanding the mimic codes on antique vases, murals, and reliefs. Offering an extensive survey of all the gestures he witnessed in the streets of Naples, De Jorio's study was highly original. At the same time he was very much a nineteenth-century scholar in his selection of a contemporary phenomenon among the lower classes not for its concrete significance to these individuals but as a relic or survival from the past. In the same decades the romantic folklorists, in particular Jacob Grimm (1785–1863), professed a similar approach aimed at the Germanic past. Later in the century well-known evolutionists, including E. B. Tylor (1832–1917) and Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), took an interest in gestures not for their roles in the contemporary culture but for the entry they supposedly afforded into the origins of language. Remarkably both evolutionists were careful not to associate the more lively gesticulation of Italians and southern Frenchmen with a lack of civilization or primitivism.

TECHNIQUES OF GESTURE

In his famous essay "Les techniques du corps" (1935) the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1872–

1950) discussed gesture independently of any evolutionary schemes. Defined as “the ways in which from society to society men know how to use their bodies” his “techniques” included a wide range of phenomena, from sitting, standing, walking, dancing, swimming, and sleeping to table manners and matters of hygiene. At the same time his comparative approach ranged from the gait of American nurses, whom he observed in a New York hospital, to the delicate balancing of the hips displayed by Maori women in New Zealand. Anticipating the writings of American anthropologists, in particular those of Ruth Benedict (1887–1948), and of Mary Douglas, Mauss was greatly interested in the ways physiology, psychology, and sociology converged in his techniques. He emphasized the role of education, adopting the notion of *habitus* in its Aristotelian and Thomist sense of *hexis* or acquired ability well before Pierre Bourdieu.

Mauss’s essay research along with David Efron’s *Gesture and Environment* (1941) inspired later research. Reissued as *Gesture, Race, and Culture* in 1972, Efron’s work was the first systematic study of cultural differences in gestures. Encouraged by the anthropologist Franz Boas (1858–1942), Efron studied the use of gestures in two ethnic groups, Jewish Yiddish-speaking immigrants and immigrants from southern Italy, in New York City for two years. Using drawings, photography, and film, Efron and his colleagues found some significant differences. The Italians, for example, used both arms, generally needed more space for their

gesticulations, and mostly stood apart from one another. In contrast, the Jewish immigrants gestured in front of their faces or chests, stood together in small groups, and touched one another frequently. The Italian immigrants displayed a range of symbolic gestures, many corresponding to De Jorio’s inventory, while the Jews displayed a preference for beats and ideographs. Arguing against theories that regarded gesture as racially determined, Efron also showed that the various differences were less conspicuous in the second generation of the two groups, who absorbed much of the American mimic code. Efron’s study was also one of the first to focus on speech-related gestures.

In the 1950s a group of anthropologists, sociolinguists, and social psychologists turned to the study of nonverbal communication. The anthropologist Ray Birdwhistell coined the notion of kinesics, the study of communicative body movements. His colleague Edward T. Hall and others introduced proxemics, the study of the distance people keep from each other when talking, and haptics, the study of the way people touch each other during conversations, or social space. In the following decades the fast-growing studies of face-to-face interactions and semiotics gained many insights. In the 1970s art historians, such as Michael Baxandall and Moshe Barasch, studied gestures in Italian paintings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In the 1980s intellectual historians; literary historians; historians of rhetoric, the stage, and dance; and a wide range of historians of everyday life, in-

cluding Jean-Claude Schmitt and Peter Burke, developed a much broader interest in gestures, posture, and comportment. Keith Thomas said, "The human body

is as much a historical document as a charter or a diary or a parish register . . . and it deserves to be studied accordingly."

See also other articles in this section.

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MANNERS



Cas Wouters

Erasmus, the Dutch humanist, advised his readers in the sixteenth century not to spit on or over the table but underneath it. After that spitting became ever more restricted, until it was banned altogether. In the 1960s most British buses still had “No Spitting” signs. In the West even the very urge to spit has generally disappeared.

Medieval people blew their noses with their fingers. In 1885 Christoph Höflinger, the author of a German manners book, warned his readers not to clean their nose with anything but a handkerchief. Evidently this had not yet become a general habit, for he acknowledges the “courage and mastery over oneself” required to maintain a “decent demeanor.”

These examples show some of the changes that have come about in Western manners—changes in behavior as well as in the sensibilities and norms regulating what range of behavior is allowed, what is prescribed, and what is forbidden. Some changes in this range have become formalized as good manners, others as laws. The code of manners and the judicial code supplement and reinforce each other; both provide motives and criteria for punishment and reward. Transgressions against the code of manners are punished in a variety of ways, ranging from assigning blame by means of gossip to excommunication, all involving a loss of face, respect, or status. Manners provide important criteria for social ranking.

THE FUNCTIONS OF MANNERS

Any code of manners functions as a regime, that is, as a form of social control demanding the exercise of self-control. A regime of manners corresponds to a particular network of interdependencies, to a certain range of socially accepted behavioral and emotional alternatives as well as to a particular level of mutually expected self-controls. All individuals are confronted with demands on self-regulation according to the code of manners prevalent in their particular group and society. Thus the history of manners offers empirical evidence for social and psychic processes; that is, for

developments in relationships between individuals and groups (social classes, sexes, and generations) as well as developments in individuals’ patterns of self-regulation and personality structure.

As a rule, manners among the upper classes serve to maintain a social distance between those classes and those trying to enter their circles. Manners are instruments of exclusion or rejection and of inclusion and group charisma: individuals and groups with the necessary qualifications are let in while the “rude”—that is, all others lower down the social ladder—are kept out. The dual function of manners is evident in a comment such as “They are not nice people”: manners are a weapon of attack as well as a weapon of defense. Any code of manners contains standards of sensitivity and composure, functioning to preserve the sense of purity, integrity, and identity of the group. Incentives to develop “good taste” and polished social conduct further arise from the pressures of competition for status. In this competition manners and sensibilities function as power resources, deployed by the upper classes to outplay and dominate lower classes.

From the Renaissance onward European societies tended to become somewhat more open and socially more competitive. As a result the sensibilities and manners cherished by the established functioned as a model for people from other social groups aspiring to respectability and social ascent. Good manners usually trickled down the social ladder. Only at times of large-scale social mobility, when whole groups gained access to the centers of established power, did their manners to some extent trickle up with them. In contrast to individual social ascent, the ascent of an entire social group involves some mixing of the codes and ideals of the ascendant group with those of the previously superior groups. The history of manners thus reflects the social ascent of increasingly wider social groups in European societies since the Renaissance.

Some changes in manners are symptomatic of changing power balances between states. As France became the most dominant power in Europe, French

court manners increasingly took over the model function previously fulfilled by Italian court manners. In the nineteenth century, with the rising power of England, the manners of English “good society” came to serve as a major example in many other countries. After World War II, when the United States became a dominant superpower, American manners served more easily as a model.

THE STUDY OF MANNERS

Interest in the history of manners, a fairly young and as yet understudied discipline, has grown together with interest in the history of emotions, mentalities, and everyday life, all of which became more serious topics of research after the 1960s. Among the studies that prepared the way was the work of the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, particularly his *The Autumn of the Middle Ages*, originally published in 1919. This book had an unusual focus on manners, emotions, mentalities, and everyday life in the fifteenth century; it presented a lively sketch of the wide range of behaviors, the intensities of joy and sorrow, the public nature of life. Throughout the 1920s this work remained exceptional. In the 1930s the historians Lucien Febvre, Marc Bloch, and others associated with the French *Annales* school again took up an interest in mentalities, lifestyles, and daily life.

The first systematic study of the history of manners, *The Civilizing Process* by Norbert Elias, appeared in German in 1939. This book provided a broad perspective on changes in European societies; pivotal to

Elias’s work was an analysis of the extensive European literature on manners from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The book thus enlarged the empirical basis of cultural history as it had been written thus far. Elias focused particularly on manners regarding the most basic human functions such as eating, drinking, sleeping, defecating, and blowing one’s nose. Because these manners are universal in the sense that humans cannot biologically avoid these activities, no matter what society or age they live in, they are highly suitable for historical and international comparison. Elias presented a large number of excerpts from manners books in chronological order, thus revealing an overall directional trend in codes of behavior and feeling. By studying these sources, Elias uncovered evidence of long-term changes in these codes as well as in people’s psychic makeup. Elias made connections between the changes in personality structure and changes in the social structure of France and other European societies and offered explanations for why this happened. According to his theory the main motor of the directional process is the dynamic of social relations—that is, in changes in the ways in which people are bonded to each other. Changes in these networks of interdependency are also changes in status competition; they are changes in sources of power and identity, in the ways people demand and show respect as well as in their fears of losing the respect of others and their own self-respect.

On the European map the study of the history of manners has many blank spots. Manners as a serious object of study has faced a major obstacle in the

strong social pressures of status competition. No matter what definition of “good manners” may prevail, if these do not come “naturally,” that is, more or less automatically, the effect is ruined. Only manners springing from the inner sensitivity of “second nature” may impress as “natural.” Otherwise, the taint of longings for status and the fear of losing status attach to an individual, provoking embarrassment and repulsion. Thus, status competition and inherent status fears have exerted pressure to associate the entire topic of manners with lower classes and lower instincts. That is, as good manners themselves were taken for granted, the subject of manners was limited to spheres in which good ones were taken to be absent. Throughout the period from the 1920s to the 1960s, manners were discussed mainly in the context of the behavioral “problems” of lower classes, of children having to learn such things as table manners, as well as of social climbers and *nouveaux riches* who were usually seen as being too loud and too conspicuous. Status fears have thus functioned as a barrier to developing the level of reflexivity needed for serious interest in the history of manners. These fears have impeded the development of a historical perspective by making people less inclined to perceive of their own manners and those of their social group as the outcomes of social and psychic processes.

The social ascent of certain groups—the working classes, women, youth, homosexuals, and blacks—spurred the development of the level of detachment and reflection needed for studies in the social history of manners and mentalities. In the 1960s and 1970s these groups were emancipated and further integrated within nation-states. They succeeded in being treated with more respect. An avalanche of protest against all relationships and manners perceived as authoritarian coincided with the widening of circles of identification. As processes of decolonization took hold, whole populations were emancipated and integrated, however poorly, within a global network of states. Greater interest in the daily lives of “ordinary” people ensued. With increased mobility and more frequent contact between different kinds of people came the pressure to look at oneself and others with greater detachment, to ask questions about manners that previous generations took for granted: why is this forbidden and that permitted? These processes have been the driving forces behind the rising popularity of the study of manners and mentalities.

Existing studies of manners concentrate on changes in upper-class manners. They highlight the ways manners were used to differentiate groups by class, but they do not deal directly with lower-class manners. In particular, the code of manners prevalent

in lower classes before they experienced a certain degree of integration into their societies is left unstudied. It is the task of social history to examine how long these distinct lower-class codes of conduct persisted; to what extent they were integrated into the dominant code; to what extent people from lower classes did imitate their “betters”; and when and how these mixing processes occurred to form uniform national codes of manners. The following sketch of changes in European regimes of manners owes a debt to Norbert Elias’s *The Civilizing Process* in two ways. First, it uses his theoretical perspective on manners as a model; second, to illustrate changes up to the nineteenth century, it relies on empirical data extracted from his research and presented by Stephen Mennell (1989). For the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this article draws on studies by Michael Curtin (1987), Leonore Davidoff (1973), Horst-Volker Krumrey (1984), and several by Cas Wouters. The following discussion is a general one; only few remarks indicate variations in the development of manners within western Europe, and differences between western and eastern Europe are neglected altogether. In general, specific national regimes of manners have developed from different national class structures. In each country a national regime of manners emerged out of changes in the relative power of the rising and falling strata, out of their specific forms and levels of competition and cooperation. The ways in which the ranks of falling strata were opened up by and to rising strata appear to have been decisive in the development of distinctive re-

gimes of manners and to have determined variations in the general pattern set out here.

THE PERIOD OF COURTS AND COURTESY

The manners books studied by Elias included prominent ones that were translated, imitated, and reprinted again and again. These books were directed primarily at the secular upper classes, particularly people living in courtly circles around great lords. Early modern terms for good manners such as “courtesy” derive from the word “courts.” With few exceptions, these books address adults and present adult standards. They deal openly with many questions that later became embarrassing and even repugnant, such as when and how to fart, burp, or spit. In the sequence of excerpts Elias presents, changes in feelings of shame and delicacy become vividly apparent. The series on table manners, for example, shows that people at feudal courts ate with their fingers, using only their own general-purpose knife or dagger. The main restriction on using the knife was not to clean one’s teeth with it. Everyone ate from a common dish, using a common spoon to put some of the food on a slice of bread. One was advised to refrain from falling on the dish like a pig, from dipping food one has already taken bites from into the communal sauce, and from presenting a tasty bit from one’s mouth to a companion’s. People were not to snort while eating nor blow their noses on the tablecloth (for this was used for wiping greasy fingers) or into their fingers.

Throughout the Middle Ages this kind of advice was repeated. Then, from at least the sixteenth century onward, manners were in continuous flux. The codes became more differentiated and more demanding. In the sixteenth century the fork is mentioned, although only for lifting food from the common dish, and handkerchiefs and napkins appear, both still optional rather than necessary: if you had one, you were to use it rather than your fingers. Only by the mid-eighteenth century did plates, knives, forks, spoons, and napkins for each guest, and also handkerchiefs, become more or less indispensable utensils in the courtly class. In this and other aspects, the code of these upper classes was then beginning to resemble the general usage of later centuries.

Erasmus wrote that it was impolite to speak to someone who was urinating or defecating; he discussed these acts quite openly. In his conduct manual, *Il Galateo ovvero De’ Costumi* (1558), Giovanni della Casa wrote that “it is not a refined habit, when coming across something disgusting in the sheet, as sometimes happens, to turn at once to one’s companion

and point it out to him” (Elias, 2000, p. 111). This warning is in line with other evidence from early manners books, which indicate that urinating and defecating were not yet punctiliously restricted to their socially designated proper places. Often enough, needs were satisfied when and where they happened to be felt. These bodily functions increasingly came to be invested with feelings of shame and repugnance, until eventually they were performed only in strict privacy and not spoken of without embarrassment. Certain parts of the body increasingly became “private parts” or, as most European languages phrase it, “shame parts” (“pudenda,” deriving from the Latin word meaning to be ashamed).

The same trend is apparent in behavior in the bedroom. As the advice cited above indicates, it was quite normal to receive visitors in rooms with beds, as it was very common to spend the night with many in one room. Sleeping was not yet set apart from the rest of social life. Usually people slept naked. Special nightclothes slowly came into use at about the same time as the fork and the handkerchief. Manners books specified how to behave when sharing a bed with a person of the same sex. For instance, a manners book of 1729, as quoted by Elias, warned that “it is not proper to lie so near him that you disturb or even touch him; and it is still less decent to put your legs between those of the other.” From the 1774 edition of the same book, an advance in the thresholds of shame and repugnance can be deduced, for this pointed instruction was removed and the tone of advice became more indirect and more moral: “you should maintain a strict and vigilant modesty.” The new edition also noted that to be forced to share a bed “seldom happens” (Elias, 2000, p. 137). Gradually, to share a bed with strangers, with people outside the family, became embarrassing. As with other bodily functions, sleeping slowly became more intimate and private, until it was performed only behind the scenes of social life.

In directing these changes in manners, considerations of health and hygiene were not important. They were used mainly to back up—sometimes also to cover up—motivations of status and respect. In all cases restraints on manners appeared first, and only later were reasons of health given as justifications. Nor did changes in poverty or wealth influence the development of manners prior to the mid-nineteenth century, after which their importance did increase.

In general, as Elias’s examples showed, what was first allowed later became restricted or forbidden. Heightened sensitivity with regard to several activities, especially those related to the “animalic” or “first nature” of human beings, coincided with increasing segregation of these activities from the rest of social life:

they became private. Again and again, what was once seen as good manners later became rude or, at the other extreme, so ingrained in behavior as to be completely taken for granted. Social superiors made subordinates feel inferior if they did not meet their standard of manners. Increasingly, fear of social superiors and, more generally, the fear of transgression of social prohibitions took on the character of an inner fear, shame.

All new prescriptions and prohibitions were used as a means of social distinction until they lost their distinctive potential. Gradually, ever-broader strata were willing and anxious to adopt the models developed above them, compelling those above to develop other means of distinction. For instance, it became a breach of good manners to appear naked or incompletely dressed or to perform natural functions before those of higher or equal rank; doing so before inferiors could be taken as a sign of benevolence. Later, nakedness and excretion not conducted in private became general offenses invested with shame and embarrassment. Gradually, the social commands controlling these actions came to operate with regard to everyone and were imprinted as such on children. Thus all references to social control, including shame, became embedded as assumptions and as such receded from consciousness. Adults came to experience social prohibitions as "natural," coming from their own inner selves rather than from the outer realm of "good manners." As these social constraints took on the form of more or less total and automatically functioning self-restraints, this standard behavior had become "second nature." Accordingly, manners books no longer dealt with these matters or did so far less extensively. Social constraints pressed toward stronger and more automatic self-supervision, the subordination of short-term impulses to the commandment of a habitual longer-term perspective, and the cultivation of a more stable, constant, and differentiated self-regulation. This is, as Elias called it, a civilizing process.

In his explanation, Elias emphasized the importance of processes of state formation, in which taxation and the use of physical violence and its instruments came into fewer and fewer hands until they were centralized and monopolized. Medieval societies lacked any central power strong enough to compel people to restrain their impulses to use violence. In the course of the sixteenth century, families of the old warrior nobility and some families of bourgeois origin were transformed into a new upper class of courtiers, a tamed nobility with more muted affects. Thus the territories of great lords were increasingly pacified, and at their courts, encouraged especially by the presence of a lady, more peaceful forms of conduct became obligatory. Such conduct was a basic part of the re-

gime of courtly manners, and its development, including ways of speaking, dressing, and holding and moving the body, went hand in hand with the rise of courtly regimes.

Within the pacified territories of strong lords, the permanent danger and fear of violent attack diminished. This relative physical safety facilitated the growth of towns, burgher groups, commerce, wealth, and, as a result, taxation. Taxes financed larger armies and administrative bodies, thus helping the central rulers of the court societies to expand their power and their territory at the expense of others. The dynamic of the competition for land and money went in the direction of expanding the webs of interdependence, bonding together the people of different territories. Political integration and economic integration intertwined and reinforced each other, culminating in the absolute monarchies of the later seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.

The inhabitants of these states were increasingly constrained to settle conflicts in nonviolent ways, thus pressuring each other to tame their impulses toward aggressiveness and cruelty. Moreover, families of bourgeois origin had risen in power, enough to compete with the nobility and forcefully to demand more respect. Their former social superiors were obliged to develop the habit of permanently restraining their more extreme expressions of superiority, particularly violent ones. Such displays were successfully branded as degrading. As they came to provoke shame and repulsion, impulses in that direction and the corresponding feelings of superiority (and inferiority) came to be more or less automatically repressed and rejected. Thus, in a widening circle of mutual respect and identification, the more extreme displays of superiority and inferiority were excluded from the prevailing regime of manners.

In the early modern period, the general level of mutual identification was such that, for example, displays of physical punishment and executions were common public spectacles. Moreover, these were still considered necessary to bolster central authority and to seal the transfer of vengeance from private persons to the central ruler. From the early seventeenth century onward, the more extreme, mutilating punishments were mitigated or abolished. During the nineteenth century most corporal punishments were abandoned or, like executions, removed to within prison walls. And in the twentieth century, in most western European countries executions were abolished altogether. The taming of aggressiveness coincided with an increase in sensibility toward suffering, that is, in the scope of mutual identification. Growing sensitivity to violence, suffering, and blood can be deduced also from changes

in manners such as increasing restrictions on the use of the knife as an instrument and symbol of danger. For instance, it was frowned upon to eat fish or cut potatoes with a knife or to bring the knife to one's mouth. In a related trend, the slaughtering of animals and carving of their meat were removed from the public scene into slaughterhouses. The carving of large cuts of meat was also increasingly removed from the dinner table to the kitchen.

FROM COURTESY TO ETIQUETTE

In absolute monarchies all groups, estates, or classes, despite their differences, became dependent on each other, thus increasing the dependence of each of the major interests on the central coordinating monopoly power. Administration and control over the state, its centralized and monopolized resources, first expanded and spread into the hands of growing numbers of individuals. Then, with the rise of bourgeois groups no longer dependent on privileges derived from the Crown, in an increasingly complex process royal or "private" state monopolies turned into societal or "public" ones. With the exception of the Netherlands, where monopoly administration had already in 1581 been taken over by merchant patricians, this shift from private to public occurred in the late eighteenth century, first in France and later in many other European countries. This process accelerated in the nineteenth century, with the rising power and status of wealthy middle classes and the declining importance of courts, formerly the aristocratic centers of power.

The transition from the eighteenth-century courtesy genre of manners books to the nineteenth-century etiquette genre expresses this change. The etiquette genre presented a blend of aristocratic and bourgeois manners. The aristocratic tradition continued, for example, in the importance of being self-confident and at ease. Even the slightest suggestion of effort or forethought was itself bad manners. Whereas courtesy books typically advocated ideals of character, temperament, accomplishments, habits, morals, and manners for aristocratic life, etiquette books focused more narrowly on the sociability of particular social situations—dinners, balls, receptions, presentations at court, calls, introductions, salutations. Etiquette books were directed at sociability in "society" or "good society," terms referring to the wider social groups, segments of the middle and upper classes, that possessed the strength of a social establishment. Especially in "society," manners were decisive in making acquaintances and friends, and through manners one could gain influence and recognition. Manners also functioned as a means of winning a desirable spouse. In comparison

to court circles, the circles of "good society" were larger, and sociability in them was more "private." In many of those circles the private sphere was more sharply distinguished from the public and occupational sphere.

The life and career of the bourgeois classes both in business and the professions depended heavily on the rather punctual and minute regulation of social traffic and behavior. Accordingly, nineteenth-century manners books placed great emphasis on acquiring the self-discipline necessary for living a "rational life"; they emphasized time-keeping and ordering activities routinely in a fixed sequence and at a set pace. The entrepreneurial bourgeoisie needed to arrange contracts, for which a reputation of being financially solvent and morally solid was crucial. To a large extent this reputation was formed in the gossip channels of "good society" (or its functional equivalent among other social strata).

The reputation of moral solidity referred to the self-discipline of orderliness, thrift, and responsibility, qualities needed for a firm grip on the proceedings of business transactions. Moral solidity also included the sexual sphere. It was inconceivable that any working bourgeois man could create the solid impression of living up to the terms of his contracts if he could not even control his wife or keep his family in order. Therefore, bourgeois means of controlling potentially dangerous social and sexual competition to a substantial degree depended on the support of wives for their husbands. At the same time, these pressures offered specific opportunities to women. Whereas men dominated the courtesy genre of manners books, in the etiquette genre women gained a prominent position, both as authors and as readers. As the social weight of the bourgeoisie increased, middle-class women enjoyed a widening sphere of opportunities. Although confined to the domain of their home and "good society," in the nineteenth century upper- and middle-class women more or less came to run and organize the social sphere. The workings of society in large part took place in women's private drawing rooms. To some extent, women came to function as the gatekeepers of this social formation, as arbiters of social acceptance or rejection.

THE EXPANSION OF "GOOD SOCIETY"

As circles of good society were larger, more open, and more competitive than court circles, the people in them developed increasingly detailed and formal manners for social circulation. Particularly in Britain but also in other countries, a highly elaborate and increasingly formalized regime of manners developed. It con-

sisted of a complicated system of introductions, invitations, leaving cards, calls, "at homes" (specified times when guests were received), receptions, dinners, and so on. The regime regulated sociability and functioned as a relatively refined system of inclusion and exclusion, as an instrument to screen newcomers into social circles, to ensure that the newly introduced would assimilate to the prevailing regime of manners, and to identify and exclude undesirables. A basic rule of manners among those acknowledged as belonging to the circle was to treat each other on the basis of equality. Quite often this was expressed in what became known as the Golden Rule of manners: do to others as you would have them do to you. Others were treated with reserve and thus kept at a social distance. In short, members treated everyone either as an equal or as a stranger; in this way more extreme displays of superiority and inferiority were avoided.

Entrance into "society" was impossible without an introduction, and any introduction required the previous permission of both parties. After an introduction, a variety of relationships could develop, from merely a "bowing acquaintanceship" to one with the "right of recognition," as the English called it. As a rule these differentiations in social distance among those included in "society" ran parallel with differentiations in social status. Thus, even within the ranks of "good society" the practice of reserve functioned to keep people considered not equal enough at a social distance and thus to prevent (other) displays of superiority and inferiority. Procedures of precedence, salutation, body carriage, facial expression, and so on, all according to rank, age, and gender, functioned to regulate and cover status competition within the ranks of "good society."

As large middle-class groups became socially strong enough to compete in the struggle for power and status, they also demanded to be treated according to the Golden Rule. As "good society" expanded in the nineteenth century, circles of identification widened and spread, becoming increasingly multilayered. As ever larger groups ascended into these ranks, status competition intensified, pressuring all toward greater awareness and sharper observation of each other and of themselves. Sensitivities were heightened, particularly to expressions of status difference. As standards of sensibility and delicacy were rising, the manners of getting acquainted and keeping a distance became more important as well as more detailed.

To keep a distance from strangers was of great concern. Especially in cities, the prototypical stranger was someone who might have the manners of the respectable but not the morals. Strangers personified bad company. Their immoral motives and behavior

would put the respectable in situations that endangered their self-control, prompting loss of composure in response to repulsive behavior or, worse, the succumbing to temptation. The repeated warnings against strangers expressed a strong moral appeal, revealing a fear of the slippery slope toward giving in to immoral pleasures.

These warnings were directed at young men in particular. Playing a single game of cards with strangers, for example, would "always end in trouble, often in despair, and sometimes in suicide," an early-nineteenth-century advice book warned. By its nature, any careless indulgence in pleasure would lead to "a lethal fall" (Tilburg, 1998, pp. 66, 67). This strong moral advice was intended to teach young men the responsibilities needed not only for a successful career but also, as marriages were no longer arranged by parents, for choosing a marriage partner. Advice betrayed the fear that such choices would be determined mainly by sexual attraction. Social censorship verged on psychic censorship: warnings expanded to the "treacherous effects" of fantasy. This kind of high-pitched moral pressure stimulated the development of rather rigid ways of avoiding anything defined as dangerous or unacceptable via the formation of a rigorous conscience. Thus the successive ascent of large middle-class groups and their increasing status and power relative to other groups were reflected in the regimes of manners and of self-regulation.

THE FORMALIZING PROCESS

Developments from the Renaissance to the end of the nineteenth century can be described as a long-term process of formalizing and disciplining: more and more aspects of behavior were subjected to increasingly strict and detailed regulations that were partly formalized as laws and partly as manners. The regime of manners expanded to include restrictions on behavior defined as arrogant and humiliating, as wild, violent, dirty, indecent, or lecherous. As this kind of unacceptable behavior was sanctioned by increasingly vigorous practices of social shaming, emotions or impulses leading to that behavior came to be avoided and repressed via the counterimpulses of individual shame. Thus, via an expanding regime of manners, a widening range of behavior and feelings disappeared from the social scene and the minds of individuals. In the nineteenth century, among upper and middle-class people this resulted in the formation of a type of personality characterized by an "inner compass" of reflexes and rather fixed habits, increasingly compelling regimes of manners and self-regulation. Impulses and emotions increasingly came to be controlled via

the more or less automatically functioning counter-impulses of an authoritative conscience, with a strong penchant for order and regularity, cleanliness and neatness. Negligence in these matters indicated an inclination toward dissoluteness. Such inclinations were to be nipped in the bud, particularly in children. Without rigorous control, “first nature” might run wild. This old conviction expresses a fear that is typical of rather authoritarian relationships and social controls as well as a relatively authoritative conscience. The long-term trend of formalization reached its peak in the Victorian era, from the mid-nineteenth century to its last decade; the metaphor of the stiff upper lip indicated ritualistic manners and a kind of ritualistic self-control, heavily based on an authoritative conscience and functioning more or less automatically as a “second nature.”

**THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
A LONG-TERM PROCESS
OF INFORMALIZATION**

Around 1900 large groups with “new money” were expanding and rising, creating strong pressures on “old money” establishments to open up. Whole groups and classes still were outspokenly deemed unacceptable as people to associate with, but as emancipation processes accelerated, the old avoidance behavior of keeping a distance became more difficult. People from different social classes had become interdependent to the point where they could no longer avoid immediate contact with each other. Especially in expanding cities,

at work and on the streets, in public conveyances and entertainment facilities, people who once used to avoid each other were now forced either to try to maintain or recover social distance under conditions of rising proximity, or to accommodate and become accustomed to more social mixing. At the same time people were warned against the dangers of familiarity, of being too open and becoming too close. From another direction came attacks on traditional ways of keeping a distance as an expression of superiority. As some social mixing became less avoidable, more extreme ways of keeping a distance and showing superiority were banned. Manners became less hierarchical and less formal and rigid.

The same trend is apparent in manners regulating the relationship between the sexes. From the end of the nineteenth century onward, women gradually escaped from the confines of the home and “good society” (or its functional equivalent among other social strata). Chaperonage declined, and upper- and middle-class women expanded their sources of power and identity by joining the suffragette movement, attending university, engaging in social work, or playing sports. Women, especially young women, wanted to go out, raising the question of whether they were allowed to pay for themselves. The respectability of meeting places and conditions of meeting became more flexible, as young people began to exert control over the dynamics of their own relationships, whether romantic or not.

In the 1920s many newly wealthy families were jostling for a place within the ranks of “good society.”

The rise of whole social groups triggered a formidable push toward informalization, and rules for getting acquainted and keeping a distance declined. The expansion of business and industry, together with an expansion of means of transportation and communication, gave rise to a multitude of new types of relationships for which the old formality was too troublesome. New meeting places for the sexes such as dance halls, cinemas, and ice-skating rinks were debated for the freedom they offered. As women entered the wider society by going to work in offices, libraries, and other places, office manners became a topic. The whole trend implied rising demands on the social navigational abilities of the individual, a greater capacity to negotiate the possibilities and limitations of relationships easily without tension.

Until the 1960s some manners books still contained separate sections on behavior toward social superiors and inferiors. Later these sections disappeared. Ideals for good manners became dissociated from superior and inferior social position or rank. The trend was to draw social dividing lines less on the basis of people's belonging to certain groups—by class, race, age, sex, or ethnicity—and more on the basis of individual behavior. The avoidance behavior once prescribed toward people not deemed socially acceptable was increasingly discouraged. No longer could certain groups be legitimately targeted; rather, certain behaviors and feelings—including humiliating displays of superiority or inferiority—were considered inappropriate and could be shunned as such. Avoidance behavior, no longer explicitly set out as rules, thus tended to become internalized; tensions between people became tensions within them. Accordingly, traditional ways of keeping a distance and being reserved when confronted with those outside one's social circles were transformed into the "right of privacy," a concept which lacked a specified class component. The perception was that each individual should have the right to be left alone, to maintain a personal or social space undisturbed by unwanted intrusions.

Restrictions on ways and places of meeting sharply diminished from the 1960s onward. Early in that decade Mary Bolton, in *The New Etiquette Book*, observed (as though with a sigh): "Boy meets girl and girl meets boy in so many different ways that it would be quite impossible to enumerate them." This change in the conditions of "respectable" meeting is in keeping with a general shift in the balance between external and internal social controls. Respect and respectable behavior became more dependent on self-regulation, and self-controls increasingly became both the focus and the locus of external social controls.

In the 1960s and 1970s, with entire groups rising socially, practically all relationships became less hierarchical and formal. The emancipation and integration of large social groups within welfare states coincided with informalization: the regime of manners rapidly lost rigidity and hierarchical aloofness. Many modes of conduct that formerly had been forbidden came to be allowed. Sexuality, the written and spoken language, clothing, music, dancing, and hairstyles—all expressions exhibited the trend toward informality. On the one hand, the spectrum of accepted behavioral and emotional alternatives expanded (with the important exception of displays and feelings of superiority and inferiority). On the other hand, an acceptable and respectable usage of these alternatives implied a continued increase of the demands made on self-regulation.

In increasingly dense networks of interdependency, more subtle, informal ways of obliging and being obliged demanded greater flexibility and sensitivity to shades and nuances in manners of dealing with others and oneself. The rise of mutually expected self-restraints allowed for what might be called a controlled decontrolling. Emotions that previously had been repressed and denied, especially those concerning sex and violence, were again "discovered" as part of a collective emotional makeup: in the emancipation of emotions many emotions reentered both consciousness and public discussion. From a set of rules manners turned into guidelines, differentiated according to the demands of the situation and relationship. This was accompanied by a strong decline in social as well as psychic censorship. Both the fear and awe of fantasy or dissident imagination diminished together with the fear and awe of the authorities of state and conscience. On the level of the personality, an authoritarian conscience made way for a conscience attuned to more equal and flexible relationships. As a psychic authority, conscience lost much of its more or less automatic ascendancy, a change that can be described in shorthand as a transition from conscience to consciousness.

Within families, commanding children and presenting them with established decisions came to be seen as dangerous. Acceptance of preemptory authority—do it because I said so—was seen as a symptom of blind submissiveness, estranging children from their own feelings. Parents more intensely invested in their children's affective lives, and family ties gained in confidentiality and intimacy. Pedagogical regimes stressed mutual respect and affection, and parents and teachers sought to direct children to obey their own conscience and reflections rather than simply obey the external constraints of adults.

In the 1980s the collective emancipation that had flourished in the 1960s and 1970s disappeared and a market ideology spread. This reflected a change in Western European power structures: politicians and governments came to side less with unions and social movements, and more with commercial and managerial establishments. From the 1980s onward the prevailing power structures allowed only for individual emancipation. Individuals aspiring to respectability and social ascent came to feel strongly dependent again on the established elites and they adjusted their manners accordingly. Thus the sensibilities and manners of the elites again functioned more unequivocally as a model. This shift was reinforced in the 1990s. The events that followed the collapse of the Iron Curtain—breaking out into violence in some cases, such as in the former Yugoslavia—intensified feelings of fear, insecurity, and powerlessness. Increased awareness of European nation-states' lack of control over global processes stimulated a tendency to identify with the established order and to focus with great concern on anything perceived as a threat to it—criminality and bad manners in particular. Accordingly, the whole regime of manners became somewhat more compelling. To a large extent, informal behaviors that had become socially acceptable in the 1960s and 1970s remained so, through their endorsement by and integration into the standard, dominant code of manners.

CONCLUSION

In the twentieth century a dominant process of informalization followed the long-term trend of formalization: manners became increasingly relaxed, subtle, and varied. As more and more groups of people came to be represented in the various centers of power

that functioned as models for manners, the more did extreme differences between all social groups in terms of power, ranking, behavior, and management of emotion diminish. More and more social groups directed themselves to uniform national codes of behavior and feeling. Thus, as power inequalities lessened, the Golden Rule and the principle of mutual consent became expected standards of conduct among individual, and groups.

The turn of the twentieth century, the Roaring Twenties, and the permissive decades of the 1960s and 1970s were periods in which power differences sharply decreased. They were also periods with particularly strong spurts of informalization. As power and status competition intensified, and sensitivities over social inequality increased, demonstrations of an individual's distinctiveness became more indirect, subtle, and hidden. References to hierarchical group differences, particularly to "better" and "inferior" kinds of people, were increasingly taboo: social superiors were less automatically taken to be better people. Yet it was not until the 1960s that the once automatic equation of superior in power and superior as a human being declined to the point of embarrassment.

As bonds of cooperation and competition blended, the people involved came to experience more ambivalence in their relationships. At the same time, many people increasingly felt compelled to identify with other people, as was expressed and reinforced by welfare state institutions. Widening circles of identification implied less rigid boundaries of nation, class, age, gender, religion, and ethnicity and provided a basis for a rising societal level of mutual trust. Expanding and intensified cooperation and competition prompted people to observe and take the measure of themselves and of each other more carefully, and to show flexibility and a greater willingness to compromise. Social success came to depend more strongly on a reflexive and flexible self-regulation, the ability to combine firmness and flexibility, directness and tactfulness. As manners and relationships between social groups became less rigid and hierarchical, so too did the relationships between psychic functions such as impulses, conscience, and consciousness. A larger and more differentiated spectrum of alternatives opened up, with more flowing and flexible connections between social groups and psychic functions.

Introducing the term "third nature" as a sensitizing concept can illuminate these changes. The term "second nature" refers to a self-regulating conscience that to a great extent functions automatically. The term "third nature" refers to the development of a more reflexive and flexible self-regulation. Ideally, for someone operating on the basis of third nature it be-

comes “natural” to attune oneself to the pulls and pushes of both first and second nature as well as the dangers and chances, short-term and long-term, of any particular situation or relationship. As national,

continental, and global integration processes exert pressure toward increasingly differentiated regimes of manners, they also exert pressure toward increasingly reflexive and flexible regimes of self-regulation.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE EMOTIONS



Rineke van Daalen

Pioneering work in the historical nature of the emotions began in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time interest in aspects of history that previously had been largely unexplored increased, and historians initiated studies of the lives of ordinary men and women, their habits and beliefs, and their attitudes toward birth, marriage, death, and disease. These new topics, especially the study of family life, put researchers on the track of different kinds of emotions. Indeed the sociologist Michael Anderson considered “the sentimental approach” one of the three most important theoretical streams in the history of family life.

The examination of changes in familial emotional standards and experience and in their interactions, has encompassed a broad range, including feelings of honor and gender, honor in relation to parents or to the family, shame and sexuality, and shame in relation to illness. Scholars considered feelings like love and empathy or their absence thoroughly and systematically as topics in their own right, and they have given particular attention to the feelings of affection between men and women and between parents and children. They paid less attention to intersibling dynamics and such feelings as anger, hate, jealousy, grief, shame, and embarrassment, which they studied more obliquely. For the rest, emotion research casts its net to include far more than family life. For example, it may take in attitudes toward political events, the conditions under which anger appeared among the working classes, or the social specificity of fear and phobias.

For obvious reasons, historians are best informed about the feelings of those who are articulate. Adults, members of the elite, and those who were literate clearly generate more sources than do children, peasants, or workers. Personal documents, such as autobiographies, letters, and diaries, provide a many-faceted image of emotional cultures in the past. Parents reflected on the educations of their children and recorded their surprise, pride, or disappointment as they watched their offspring grow up. Adults looked back to their early years and wrote about their emo-

tional lives as children, and in a few instances children wrote diaries.

The interest in emotions went hand in hand with a growth in interdisciplinary methods. Historical approaches combined with sociological, anthropological, and psychoanalytic theories. These disciplines all had characteristic theoretical and methodological traditions, making it difficult to integrate them and take advantage of their individual strengths. During the twentieth century historical research into intimate relations raised theoretical and methodological issues. Aside from the lack of historical sources for the study of emotions, interpreting these sources can be complex. A tension exists between deeply held emotional standards, emotionology, and emotional experience, that is, between the ideals and fantasies of people on the one hand and reality on the other hand (Stearns and Stearns, 1985). That makes it difficult to understand exactly what moral and medical tracts, manner books, religious sermons, legislation, pictures and paintings, biographies, and letters reveal about emotional lives and psychic structures. To what extent do these sources recount reality, or do changes in this material correspond with actual transformations in emotions and in behavior?

Because of the historically and locally bound nature of emotional standards and emotion management, such questions cannot be answered in general terms. Methodological directives and methodological problems are dependent on time and place. Before the late seventeenth century many aspects of social life were public. In interactions between men, women, and children, the role of the community was important in defining and enforcing standards of conduct and emotions. Privacy was a more diffuse concept and did not exist in the modern sense. Thus social historians studying love in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have not become much wiser from analyzing diaries or love poetry. Considering the traces of love, which were specific for the early modern period, is more productive. People tended to associate love with the body and with visible and tangible behavior, and

public in mind. Parental diaries recording children's educations do not elaborate on severe methods of behavior regulation. But retrospective writing on childhood and youth may reveal a different perspective, recalling harsh treatment and physical punishment (Pollock, 1983). By combining a broad variety of material and the perspectives of different groups, researchers can expand and better substantiate their hypotheses.

Methodological, conceptual, and theoretical problems have induced a great many controversies and disputes and in some cases have resulted in diametrically opposed views on the history of emotions. This tendency has been reinforced by the fragmented nature of emotion research, which is scattered over demarcated studies of intimate relations in different places and among different groups in western Europe. These studies demonstrate the relevance of understanding emotional standards and experiences within the context of broader social, economic, and political relations. They uncover where the first signs of romantic love or modern maternal feelings appeared, in which countries or regions, in rural or urban communities, or among peasants, artisans, the bourgeoisie, or the working classes. But few studies look at the direction, chronology, and origins of change. *A History of the Family* (1986), a systematically comparative family study edited by André Burguière, Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Martine Segalen, and François Zonabend, elaborates on differences in family life between northern and southern Europe and between eastern and western Europe but without focusing on emotions.

A pioneer work in this area is Norbert Elias's study *The Civilizing Process* (originally published in German in 1939). Examining the relationship between social and psychic processes in western Europe from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century, Elias developed an inclusive theoretical framework. He demonstrated that changes in personality structure relate to changes in social structure and that changes in emotion management are a function of social interdependencies. This treatment of emotion management contributed a historical and sociological perspective to human psychology and gave the nature of the modern habitus a central place in the history of European societies. It is an example of the interdisciplinary approach required in analyses of changes in emotional behavior and emotional experience.

Studying a variety of European etiquette manuals, Elias identified gradual changes in emotional standards. During the Middle Ages emotions were expressed more violently and directly with fewer psychological nuances and complexities than in subsequent centuries. Manners were less formalized, and

they thought it could be controlled in the same way as other physical functions. They assumed that magic, potions, charms, and rituals could ensure the desired outcome to an amorous encounter. Lore concerning significant objects and customs provides greater insight into such a culture of the emotions than do diaries or autobiographies (Gillis, 1988).

A Dutch study of personal documents demonstrates in another way that each source has its own outlook and limitations. Historians looking for expressions of grief at the death of a child in pre-nineteenth century diaries have found only dryly formulated short notes. But to base observations merely on those brief remarks and to infer that parents were not deeply moved by the death of a child would be inaccurate. Diaries were not where people expressed their mourning. Family happenings and familial emotions were commonly described in topical poems and songs. Indeed epitaphs and printed poetry disclose passionate specimens of grief (Dekker, 1995).

Texts and representations were constructed for different reasons and with a certain intention and

fewer aspects of behavior and feeling were subjected to strict regulation. Attitudes toward violence, sexuality, bodily functions, and emotions gradually changed. In the centuries that followed the Middle Ages people exerted stronger pressures on each other, implying self-restraint and a more stable, balanced, and differentiated self-regulation. Aspects of human behavior, especially those associated with bodily functions, such as sleeping or eating, became strictly regulated and were regarded as distasteful. Consequently they were removed to the back stage of social life. Confrontations with people whose manners were less formal produced feelings of embarrassment and discomfort.

Elias related the changes in people's behavioral and emotional standards to expanding social constraints and to the processes of state formation and growing interdependency. He perceived a connection between the level of control of natural and social phenomena at a given moment and the amount of affect and fantasy in a society's thinking. The greater the affective involvement of people, the less their ability to understand and control their world. In his comprehensive study *La peur en occident* (1978) Jean Delumeau also dealt with changes in the relationships among living conditions, the need for security, and sentiments of fear in the "Christianized" Western world between the fourteenth century and the eighteenth century. Elias drew important connections between social and psychological processes. Subsequently developments in different kinds of emotion management have become a major topic of study. Although family life may be seen as the main site for the transmission of the habitus that characterizes a society, feelings between people who are intimate are only one of the many research subjects in this tradition. A variety of other emotions, ranging from changing feelings of solidarity with and compassion for the poor and sick to changing feelings of discomfort with outsiders, also have received attention.

The following paragraphs picture changes in emotion management and deal with various theoretical approaches and controversies. The focus lies on the emotionalizing of family relations, emphasizing love relations and maternal or parental feelings. The central, recurrent theme refers to the most important phenomena in the history of emotions in western Europe, the gradual separation of nuclear families from the wider community and from extended kinship ties; the withdrawal of families from the outside world, including servants; and the individuation of persons with respect to the nuclear family. This extension and differentiation of social networks is related to changes manifested in emotional attitudes toward events, such as birth, death, and marriage, and to shifts in emo-

tional involvement and in feelings of identification and loyalty to the family, the community, and the nation.

This article examines the distribution of emotions and emotional standards and their spread among sexes, social strata, religions, cities, and the countryside by imitation and through disciplining and regulating measures. It also sheds some light on differences in emotion regimes in various regions of Europe.

THE EMOTIONALIZING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN

The view that romantic love and maternal sentiment are part of modernity is strongly contested by some social historians. They do not observe the emergence of a new emotional style and relativize differences from the past, arguing that relationships between betrothed couples and spouses and between parents and children have always possessed an affectionate character.

As to feelings between men and women, it is difficult to maintain that passionate love is a recent phenomenon found exclusively in the modern period. Sentiments of love have a differentiated and versatile history. Raging love and lovesickness, erotomania, have a long tradition that go back to antiquity (Lepenies, 1969; Wack, 1990). People suffering from these passions were obsessed with the loved object, and in that respect their feelings relate to more modern notions of courtly love and romantic love, which initially were the prerogative of a small, elite circle. In *The Court Society* (1969) Elias considered the development of romantic love relations in France, both reality and ideal, characteristic of the Renaissance. During this period behavior came to be governed less by spontaneous, immediate impulses and more by deliberation and contemplation. Accepted manners became stricter and behavioral codes more regulated. Distance increased between feelings and reason, while at the same time a space arose in which personal and intimate passions could flourish.

Elias observed, first among the courtly elite, a transition from relatively simple and undifferentiated sentiments toward complicated, subtle feelings between men and women. New demands on emotion management for women and even for physically strong men first were formalized into codes of manners and later became unwritten laws requiring self-control. Men and women became more reserved toward each other in matters of sexuality, while their thresholds of shame and embarrassment increased. The growing distance between the sexes manifested itself in the concealment of sexual activity, both in social interac-

tions and in consciousness. Idealizing and refraining from the loved object and seeking satisfaction in personal melancholy were ingredients of the sentimental complex of romantic love. Elias considered these alterations in emotion regimes as the symbolic expression of changes in the distribution of power, status, and respect in the seventeenth-century French court. The aristocratic circles were especially affected by the restraints that accompanied centralization of power in seventeenth-century France.

In a certain sense Mary Wack's observations concur with Elias's views. She demonstrated in *Lovesickness in the Middle Ages* (1990) that the person suffering from erotic preoccupation was typically a man of noble birth. His lovesickness resolved the psychological and social tensions facing aristocratic males. Lovesickness enabled aristocrats to control their own erotic vulnerability, regarded as feminine, in a rational, masculine way.

Women in love relations were initially restricted to the role of the object of desire, but their positions changed during the Renaissance, when medical writers depicted them as victims of love. Lovesickness, associated with "female disorders," such as chlorosis, hysteria, and nymphomania, became connected to pathology of the sexual organs. The doctor's visit to the languishing young woman was a frequent theme in

seventeenth-century Dutch genre painting. Wack attributed this shift in the position of women during the early modern period to the surplus of young, marriageable women, who confronted a shortage of eligible men. For these women lovesickness was a strategy for finding sexual and romantic fulfillment. Once the doctor had diagnosed unsatisfied love and discovered the object of this love, the girl's parents could arrange a marriage and a happy ending.

These studies by Elias and Wack use both a cultural anthropological and a sociological approach to earlier societies. They try to understand and to reconstruct feelings of love and lovesickness by accounting for how people perceived the phenomenon of love in the past and by interpreting it in a historical social context. They clarify that affective relations between men and women are part of broader social constellations and that later concepts of romantic love, despite some similarities, must be separated from courtly passions, which had nothing to do with marriage.

The classic studies of the rise of familial feelings, including Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (1975), Jean-Louis Flandrin, *Familles: Parenté, maison, sexualité dans l'ancienne société* (1976), and Lawrence Stone, *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500–1800* (1977), regard romantic love as an important aspect of the modernization of the familial emotional culture. They observe during the eighteenth century the replacement of familial and community considerations by romantic sentiments and a striving for personal happiness. Courtship became a private affair, in which people did not wish to be restrained by communities, parents, peers, or neighbors. This privatization reordered priorities in partner selection, which became more personal. People followed their own inclinations, often at some geographical distance from their home communities. Spontaneity and empathy rose in importance, and customs and tradition fell to secondary positions. Endogamy declined along village lines, occupational lines, and class and status lines, while the ages of partners increasingly approached equality.

Shorter, Stone, and Flandrin located the beginnings of the romantic revolution with different social strata and interpreted its origin in different ways. Shorter situated its birth at the same time that affective sexuality was linked to romance, and he saw the lower classes, who were in the eighteenth century the first to be caught up in the market economy, as the vanguard of the sexual revolution. For these new proletarians, capitalist work generated an escape from traditional controls and a wish to be free. Stone located the rise of "affective individualism" with the key middle and upper sectors of English society and sit-

uated its establishment half-way through the eighteenth century. The emerging, wealthy entrepreneurial bourgeoisie was especially receptive to the values of personal affections because their way of life was oriented to personal achievement, thrift, and hard work. From the late seventeenth century on their ideas about domesticity, marital affection, and the education of their children spread to other segments of the English elite.

Personal autonomy and romantic love interwove first for young lovers. But love was difficult to reconcile with the social obligations of establishing a household. Feelings of love during courtship were considered a prelude to marriage but a danger during marriage. Thus the transformation of courtship preceded a larger transformation of married life. Men and women defined their marriage relationships not so much in terms of intimacy as in terms of cooperation and mutual sharing (Gillis, 1985). Marrying was a good strategy to guarantee a certain level of prosperity or, for the rich, to preserve the family capital.

Feelings between husbands and wives became less dependent on economic considerations earlier for the higher social classes, while the lower social classes had to wait until the rise of the welfare state. As that happened romantic sentiments more easily spilled over into marriage. It is characteristic for this type of conjugal ideal that love, marriage, and sex are strongly interwoven. The self-evidence of this tripartite unity came to be challenged during the sexual revolution of the 1960s. With the possibility of sex for the sake of sex, men and women who were infatuated slept together, even without considering marriage. By the end of the twentieth century couples chose to live apart, to live together, or to marry. A tension arose between sexual desire and the longing for enduring intimacy (Wouters, 1998).

For couples rich, poor, urban, and rural, in all their variety, ideals of intimacy and love took on importance at every stage of their relationships. Though love was judged a necessary foundation for lasting relations between men and women, the tension between feelings of love during courtship and the reality of running a home and living together did not vanish completely. Consequently Gillis termed the romantic marriage "ideal," often unable to live up to everyday reality and the myth of conjugal love. The myth persists and although most people are aware of its idealized nature, they still behave as if it were viable. The imbalance between feelings of romantic love and worries about everyday life has had a somewhat gendered nature. Although decreasingly in the twenty-first century, young girls remain preoccupied with love. They idealize men, they fall in love more often than boys,

and they have fantasies about dream lovers. These fantasies of heterosexual intimacy have rarely come true (Gillis, 1985), but girls and women expect more empathy and understanding from their lovers and spouses than do men. Women value emotional marriage ideals more than men and show a greater need, willingness, and ability to talk with their partners and to discuss their emotions and relationships. Also they are sooner disappointed and dissatisfied, although men and women both strive for affectionate companionship and shared lifestyles and both have high expectations of each other. People widely hold that once love and infatuation dwindle, the only legitimate reason for staying together has disappeared.

As the supervision of community and family diminished and men and women increasingly regulated their own relationships, their behavior and feelings were subjected to codes and formal emotional standards. But during the twentieth century these standards steadily relaxed, becoming varied and subtle. This trend toward informality may be explained by greater equality in the balance of power between the sexes and by the emancipation of women. For men this process implied increased self-discipline and em-

pathy, while women gained more latitude and greater opportunities. In that sense the distance between women and men decreased. The demands of lovers and partners, male and female, with respect to intimate and sexual relations were heightened. Sincere emotions and authenticity gained importance, while formal manners lost their absolute and discriminatory character. Emotional management came to depend on the situation, and people were expected to assess and understand empathetically which emotional standards were appropriate (Wouters, 1995).

THE EMOTIONALIZING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN PARENTS AND CHILDREN

The historiography of parental attitudes and emotions has been strongly influenced by the work of the French demographic historian Philippe Ariès. *Centuries of Childhood* (1960), a study of changes in manners and feelings of parents and children, reviews the long period of the ancien régime and is based on pictorial representations of family life and a diversity of texts.

Among Ariès's important observations is that the position of infants and small children and the attitude of adults toward children in medieval society were profoundly different from those of twentieth-century society. The idea of childhood as a life stage and the awareness of the particular nature of children did not exist. During the twelfth century children were depicted as adults reduced to a smaller scale with adult expressions and features. As soon as children could walk, talk, and do without constant supervision, they became part of the adult world and participated in adult activities. They did not wear special clothes and did not possess games or toys. At about the age of ten poor children were expected to leave home to work as servants in other households. For them quitting the state of dependence on their parents also meant leaving childhood. The French language made no distinction between children and adolescents. The word *enfant* (child) referred to both categories.

Ariès observed that the pictorial representations of children indicate a gradual transformation in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. The affectionate and naive aspects of the appearance and behavior of children, their special charms, were brought to the fore, first in the religious iconography of childhood and later, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in the lay iconography as well. The first representations of dead children in the sixteenth century were made on their parents' tombs beside their mothers, but in the seventeenth century the children were

represented by and for themselves. These later portraits indicate that children were increasingly seen as beings with souls of their own.

A growing sensibility appeared among parents, evidenced by their pleasure with the amusing charm and frolicsome behavior of their small children. They expressed their new emotional appreciation of childhood by coddling and playing, yet at the same time they were afraid that too much tenderness could spoil children. Instead of being entranced by the winsomeness of their children, parents should act like educators. For children to mix with adults too much could be harmful to their fragile natures, while too much coddling, though much enjoyed by the parents, was also a risk. Taking the specific nature of each child as the starting point, parents should correct the conduct of their offspring. Accompanying these new ideas, the process of growing from childhood to adulthood became a lengthier one.

Seen from the theoretical framework of Elias, changes in the emotion management of adults are linked with those of children. The differentiation of childhood and changes in the relationship between children and adults suggest a growing distance between adulthood and childhood in their patterns of emotion regulation. Growing up took a longer time because children had to learn more before they could behave as adults. The emotional involvement on the part of parents expanded, while the emotional distance from their children decreased. Both parents and children had to acquire greater self-control and emotion management.

Comparing the medieval ideas and feelings of parents about their offspring with this new parental sensitivity, Ariès observed that the former adult attitude may be considered insensitive or indifferent. But he warned explicitly against confusing this restraint with a lack of affection. Infant mortality was high, and a certain reserve provided a *modus vivendi* for overcoming grief at the death of a child. Their vulnerability and low chance of survival converted children into anonymous beings waiting for adulthood.

Ariès's work was continued by various social historians and sociologists who emphasized the transformation of parental feelings. While Ariès described the discovery of childhood and its consequences for feelings and manners in a reserved and cautious way, his followers made more radical statements. The classic example is Shorter's *The Making of the Modern Family*. In dealing with the upsurge of parental sentiments, Shorter primarily was concerned with the relation between mothers and infants. Seeing indifference as the traditional attitude of mothers toward their babies and small children, he elaborated this thesis by analyzing

eighteenth-century practices like abandoning illegitimate infants, swaddling babies, and sending babies to paid wet nurses, an old custom among the aristocracy that during the seventeenth century trickled down to lower social strata. He considered these practices deliberate, cruel actions in all social classes and an indication of the absence of maternal feelings. He did not observe any signs of mothers coddling and playing with their babies and suggested that mothers accepted even the death of a baby with placid equanimity. Women whose earnings could cover the wet nurse's wages or whose husbands could afford the costs boarded out their children in large numbers; poor women took in nurslings.

Factory workers were the only group that never boarded out their infants or took in nurslings. Shorter saw them as "the spearhead of modernization" in the development of romantic feelings also. He demonstrated that it is impossible to generalize for the whole of France let alone Europe because of vast differences in scale and the pace of change in maternal feelings among social classes, regions, country folk, and urbanites. In general the persistence of traditional in-

difference lasted longer in the heart of the countryside and among the lower classes. Within Europe, France was an anomaly in the number of children sent away from home to live with a wet nurse. In England the custom of swaddling was abolished before the start of the nineteenth century, while the modernization of maternal feelings developed slowly in central Europe (admittedly a broad category). In the Netherlands swaddling never was common, and even wet nurses who came to feed a baby at his or her home were rare (Shorter, 1975; Clerkx, 1985).

For Shorter, Elisabeth Badinter, Stone, and Lloyd deMause this absence of maternal affection caused maternal uninvolvedness and poor child care. They regarded maternal feelings as an independent variable. Maternal indifference, common in France and England before the eighteenth century, continued in some circles and in isolated regions well into the nineteenth century, and these scholars held that indifference responsible for the high infant mortality. It seems possible that the rise in maternal emotional involvement and the concomitant increased attention to their offspring may result in a decrease of the rate of infant

mortality. This stretches Ariès's argument that parents could not permit themselves to become attached to a child whose risk of dying was so high (Ariès, 1960).

These interpretations of apparently affectionless familial attitudes, particularly the more radical versions, have evoked violent discussion. Historians such as Alan Macfarlane and Linda Pollock have argued the opposite view, claiming that emotional relations have changed little over the centuries and playing down generalizations about dramatic transformations. Macfarlane elaborated this thesis with respect to relations between men and women, while Pollock did the same for parental care and child life from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century.

The lack of consensus about long-term changes in familial emotions reflects the personal and emotional involvement of the researchers. Scholars accused each other of sloppiness, for example, in selectively reading and quoting their sources without an eye for inconsistencies or for data that did not fit their interpretations. They even claimed willful misinterpretation in "the other camp." Both perspectives have been strongly influenced by the family standards common in twentieth-century Western societies. The emotional involvement of scholars has prevented them from doing justice to the perspectives and perceptions of mothers and from making interpretations in the social context of the times.

Ariès's work was innovative in more than one respect. He wrote his book in a period when the nuclear family was blossoming and booming in the West, when family life centered around children, and when many people considered that living together in strictly private nuclear families was the normal and established way. Ariès, however, demonstrated that attitudes toward childhood are specific to societies at certain moments in time. Age differentiation and the lengthening of the phase called "childhood and youth" should be seen as modern phenomena. Child care and parental feelings also have their own histories. In the 1960s and 1970s Ariès's ideas and even more so the work of the historians who followed him did not, in a sense, fit the current, emotional family ideal. As material security increased, sociologists pointed to the decline of the economic and material functions of the family and situated its major importance in its affectionate functions. Family historians focused on the affective and to a lesser extent on the cognitive aspects of human dependencies and on the relativation of the importance of economic and political aspects of social life. In this respect their perspective has been similar to that of family sociologists. The observation that familial emotions in the past were less affectionate

than in the twentieth century was all the more disturbing and surprising.

NETWORKS EXPAND, FEELINGS OF LOYALTY BROADEN, AND REGULATION OF THE EMOTIONS ALTERS

The increasing importance of the conjugal family as a social group has produced important changes in emotional involvement. In the sixteenth century feelings of loyalty were directed to family members, to neighbors in the local community, to mostly homo-social peer groups, and to people of the same religion. Scarcely any sections of the population entertained the notion of an independent nuclear family. The family life of the merchant and ruling classes was embedded in extended families and that of peasants and artisans in the small communities. In the modern period the networks in which people lived gradually expanded, while the family relations of both the rich and the poor moved in the direction of differentiation of the conjugal family as a discrete, private, and revered social unit. Domesticity became an ideal and gradually separated from the interference and concern of family and community. Identifications and feelings of loyalty broadened, while at the same time the emotional attachments between members of the nuclear family became stronger (Ariès and Duby, 1985–1987; De Swaan, 1995).

These processes of inclusion and exclusion embraced a more general process of change within a broad range of intimate and physical human behaviors and mentalities. Family members lived more on their own, and their emotional attachments became strengthened. The consolidation of affectionate bonds between mothers and infants in Shorter's view has crystallized this process of privatization and seclusion of the nuclear family. He drew a correlation between changes in the emotional attitude toward birth and changes in the significance of the community at this event.

Dutch seventeenth- and eighteenth-century genre pictures of *kraamkamers*, rooms specially furnished and decorated for the lying-in period, may be relatively early expressions of this connection. Events in the *kraamkamer* just after birth were a popular theme of Dutch genre artists, some of whom, such as Cornelis Troost, painted a series on this subject. The large number of paintings makes possible a comparison of fifty *kraamkamers* from the beginning of the seventeenth century through the eighteenth century. The most important change in these pictures is increased intimacy and privacy indicated by, among other things,

the number of people present. The older illustrations depict crowds of visitors eating, drinking, and making merry. The spaces are relatively open, and windows and doors provide views of the world outside the room or even outside the house. The later pictures, including Troost's, show an intimate circle around mother and infant of at the most five people with no view of the world outside.

The small family scenes and the way they are represented reveal the relatively early private and emotional relations of nuclear families among certain elite circles in the Dutch Republic. Foreign visitors reported that Dutch family life was characterized by a strong attachment to hearth and home and by a close family orientation, especially among burghers, well-to-do citizens such as merchants or patricians (Van Daalen, 1993).

An upsurge of romantic love during courtship and new definitions of love accompanied the nuclear, domesticated family life. The changes in marriage patterns were similar to the privatization of the *kraamkamers*. In the seventeenth century a new couple had to submit to public rites of passage, while betrothal in later times licensed withdrawal from the peer group, which guaranteed some privacy. Traditional marriages were public happenings, creating a new social order where roles were well defined, rituals were firmly established, and feelings were kept well under control. In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries love became associated with intimacy and was defined as an inner feeling. The new notions of love required new expressions. Verbal utterances replaced traditional customs and ritual practices, and the public rites of betrothal were replaced by the private engagement, witnessed only by the immediate family. These transformations occurred first among the educated elites from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. Smallholders and artisans continued the traditional practices and the old definitions of love well into the nineteenth century. Indeed elements of this constellation still existed in the working-class cultures of industrialized Western countries in the twentieth century (Gillis, 1985).

Such changes in dependency relations and in emotion management may be seen as aspects of the disintegration of preindustrial, small-scale community life and as part of the expanding networks in which people participated and in which their identities were molded. Among these aspects was a growing gap between elite groups and the common people or between a "high" culture and a "low" culture. Pagan feasts and charivaris were condemned along with frightening phenomena like witchcraft and all kinds of blasphemy. The mad and the poor were seen as a

public danger and were labeled sluggards, heretics, and disease carriers who should be confined to workhouses. From the sixteenth century on, during the religious reformations, Protestant, Catholic, and civil authorities together increased their efforts to acculturate and normalize deviant people within a Christian moral order. This moral order had a reassuring effect and diminished feelings of fear (Delumeau, 1978).

During nineteenth century state expansion, nation building, and industrialization people became integrated within the framework of the nation-state. The relevance of this frame of reference for intimate relations and emotion management increased with the expansion of collective welfare arrangements, beginning in the swiftly growing cities of the nineteenth century. Large numbers of newcomers seized the new opportunities of the industrializing cities. Local facilities were no longer fit to deal with the urban situations, and municipal institutions tried hard to adapt. People manifested an increasing sensitivity to one another and connected the inconvenience of stench and dirt with fears about infectious diseases and anxieties about "social contamination." Feelings of disgust mingled with concerns about the domestication of bodily functions, public hygiene, and morality. Citizens and municipal institutions demarcated rooms for different functions, separated and cloaked houses from the outside world, and ascribed specific functions to different urban areas. These actions protected domesticity and family life while spatially segregating different classes (Corbin, 1982; Gleichmann, 1977; Van Daalen, 1988). The annoyance and offense of crowds of people intertwined with changes in patterns of stratification. In those nineteenth-century cities physical and social mysophobia should be seen as signs of social and status insecurities.

In the twentieth century the development of the welfare state made poverty less threatening with improved material conditions and institutionalized social security. Thus the vagaries of fate were tempered, which implies a change for the better, especially for the lower social strata. The lower classes gained the possibilities of emancipation and changes in affect control and behavioral codes, which in previous periods had been the standard among the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. Increased social security in this respect may be considered as a condition of change in emotion management throughout society. But in other respects new forms of emotion management, such as the willingness among people from all social classes to save money, were necessary conditions for the collectivization of social security.

Processes of collectivization also have intentionally promoted affect control, especially among the

lower classes. A broad range of professional groups emerged, each with its own discourse and its own emotional and behavioral codes. Their specialized knowledge and their accompanying professional attitudes were more and more taken over by laypeople. Individuals acquired a more deliberate, more calculating, and more detached attitude and approach to

their bodies and emotions. Instead of following tradition, intuition, and first impulses, they tried to reflect on their conduct and emotions by looking for orientation among relevant professionals (Donzelot, 1979; De Swaan, 1988).

With regard to the education of their children, parents paid heed to advice from medical doctors, psy-

THE EMOTIONS

chologists, and professional educators. They sought information about the different emotional stages of growing up and considered this insight necessary for a good, equality loving education. To a lesser extent a comparable process of professionalization accompanied the emotionalization of the relations between men and women. A broad range of experts offered advice and consultation.

Thus the control of emotions and the concealment of reactions are induced on the one hand by more security and on the other hand by professional, formal knowledge and insights. The transformation in emotional culture has occurred along with emotional restraint and a growing reluctance to display emotional intensity (Stearns, 1994). But at the same time it could be said that the growth of arrangements promoting material security established

conditions for the increased importance of emotions in social relations. Styles of emotion management became more relevant as a criterion in the process of ranking and in the struggle for status and power (Wouters, 1992).

A comparable link may be seen between the degree of physical safety and material security in societies and the blossoming of sociological and historical interest in emotions and emotion management (Wouters, 1992). In Western societies a relatively high level of safety and security has promoted the study of emotions, especially in the 1970s and the 1980s. After that period the passionate wrangles waned somewhat, and the topic of emotions became a study in its own right. It is a field of research with evident blind spots, such as hate and other emotions that induce aggression and violence in a modern world.

See also other articles in this section.

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ANTHROPOMETRY



John Komlos and Robert Whaples

Anthropometric history is based on the analysis of the physical characteristics of human beings, especially height, weight, and the body mass index. Beginning in the late 1970s, researchers analyzed such data from historical populations, and their findings have reshaped our understanding of social and economic history in fundamental ways.

The systematic study of the physical characteristics of human beings reaches back well into the eighteenth century. By the 1830s both Adolphe Quételet and L. R. Villermé recognized that biological outcomes were influenced by both the natural and the socioeconomic environment—that innate differences in potential height did not account by themselves for the geographic, social, and temporal differences in physical stature. However, until French historians of the *Annales* tradition began to explore the socioeconomic correlates of human height in the 1960s, the topic interested primarily scholars of nonhistorical disciplines. The explosion of research in the field of anthropometric history has been sparked by cliometricians—economic historians who explicitly link economic models with measurement and statistical techniques. This new field of “anthropometric history” has primarily used human biological measures as complements to (and sometimes substitutes for) conventional indicators of well-being and has also begun to investigate their social consequences.

SOCIOECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON HEIGHT

The relationship between the height of a population and its social and economic structure is based on the biological principle that human growth is related to nutritional status—nutrition intake minus such claims on nutrition as body maintenance, work, and disease encounters. Calories and protein consumption not used for these other purposes during childhood and adolescence are available to enable the human organism to grow. These proximate determinants of stature

are themselves determined by socioeconomic factors (figure 1). Since the body’s ability to process nutrients is influenced by its disease encounters, the epidemiological environment, hygiene practices, population density, and government policy all have played an important role in determining anthropometric outcomes. The work environment and effort expended prior to reaching adulthood also matter. We now know with certainty that historically the physical stature of a population or subpopulation depended generally on such socioeconomic factors as the level, variability, and distribution of real income, as well as on the relative price and availability of nutrients, particularly of dairy products and other animal proteins. Urbanization and the degree of commercialization of the economy also had an impact on the human growth process, as have, beginning in the late 1800s, such factors as government expenditures on public health and sanitation and the level of educational attainment. In sum, because humans cease to grow after a certain age, the height of a population cohort is a historical record of the nutritional intake in conjunction with environmental factors during the cohort’s childhood and youth.

The relationship between nutritional intake and physical growth has been established beyond doubt by medical and biological experimental research, with maternal nutrition also playing a significant role. Genes are important determinants of individuals’ heights, but genetic differences approximately cancel in comparisons of averages across most large groups and nations; so in these situations average heights accurately reflect net nutrition.

MEASURES OF WELL-BEING

There are many reasons for integrating human biology into mainstream social and economic history. These include the limitations of using a single measure, such as gross domestic product (GDP) or income per capita, as a proxy for overall welfare, as well as the diffi-

culties associated with deriving income data in historical populations. Human well-being involves such a complicated set of issues that a wide array of concepts and measures is needed to understand it adequately. The best measures of human well-being should meet several criteria: they should have a sound theoretical basis linking them to well-being, they should be concise and easy to understand, and they should be so widely used that new measurements can be easily compared with well-known benchmarks.

Real GDP per capita has been the most widely used measure of the standard of living because it fulfills these criteria: GDP provides a way to aggregate diverse goods produced by the economy using prices (which reflect marginal benefits) as weights; most economic models show that well-being should increase with rising income per capita; and GDP per capita is immediately understood and widely used. However, GDP per capita has many well-known shortcomings as a proxy for welfare. It does not include the value of leisure and other nonmarket activities, does not consider the impact of pollution and other environmental externalities, makes no attempt to encompass distributional concerns, and is plagued by problems of correctly adjusting for inflation and spatial price differences. In addition, income measures are not available for subpopulations in a historical context, including women, children, aristocrats, and slaves, and its distribution within the household is by no means clear.

Biological measures have emerged as an additional tool that meets the above-mentioned criteria. Sometimes called the biological standard of living (as opposed to GDP per capita's material standard of liv-

ing), height indexes measure how well the human organism itself thrives in its socioeconomic and epidemiological environment and capture the biologically relevant component of welfare. In distinction to other, more direct measures of health, such as longevity and morbidity, average physical stature is relatively easy to compute for many historical populations, and it can be quickly compared to modern distributions. Health measures emphasize that the human experience ought not to be thought of in one dimension: well-being encompasses more than the command over goods and services. Health in general contributes to welfare, independent of income. Stature picks up some of the factors left out by simple income measures, such as work intensity and opportunities to rest, environmental concerns, and even the distribution of resources. Height is also an important determinant of life expectancy.

To be sure, height indexes have their own set of limitations, including the facts that their relevance is confined to the first two decades of life, they cannot easily measure improvements in well-being beyond a certain threshold, and they abstract from the consumption of a wide range of goods and services that people value enough to trade against nutritional status. Both income and stature are correlated with, but distinct from, two of the measures of well-being that are incorporated into the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI)—education and longevity—as well as such intangibles as freedom, empowerment, capabilities, and spiritual well-being. Hence, neither height nor income is a perfect measure of welfare. Such a measure does not exist. Instead, historians have used these measures in tandem with one another so

as better to understand the past. While the two measures are often closely correlated with each other, the exceptions to the rule provide rare insights for our understanding of historical processes.

APPLICATIONS OF ANTHROPOMETRY

Anthropometric measures emerged in the late 1970s, when the primary concerns of economic historians were to extend the existing indexes of living standards backward in time, to illuminate the famous debate about the living conditions of workers during the industrial revolution, and to provide indexes where none existed before. For instance, conventional measures of money income obviously did not exist for American slaves, whose well-being was at the center of a major historical controversy surrounding the publication of Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman's *Time on the Cross* in 1974. Richard Steckel, a student of Fogel, subsequently explored slaves' physical stature records obtained from slave shipping documents (manifests). His findings turned out to be quite astounding—adult slaves were relatively tall by contemporary standards. In fact, they were taller than most Europeans, and about as tall as American urban workers. Perhaps even more surprising was the finding that despite their heavy work regimen, on American soil slaves actually grew to be taller than the African populations from whence they originated. To be sure, the latter comparison reflects not only the food allotments they received but also the propitious disease environment and resource endowment of the American South.

This was a major finding, and even though subsequent research revealed that slave children were grossly (and perhaps systematically) undernourished, it unleashed a veritable avalanche of research on anthropometric history. Soon thereafter, a large number of new archival sources were explored, including military, criminal, insurance, hospital, and school records, voter registration cards, servant contracts, newspaper advertisements, certificates of freedom, anthropologists' field observations, and even skeletal remains. Anthropometricians have also examined data on birth weight, the body mass index (BMI)—which measures weight divided by height squared (kg/m^2)—and various body dimensions such as percent body fat and waist-to-hip ratio. With some half a million observations studied so far, anthropometricians have merely scraped the tip of an iceberg. An impressive array of statistical techniques have been developed to deal with the biases of particular data sets—such as military minimum height requirements—to calculate group

means and distributions. Fortunately, the normality of height distributions facilitates this task.

In addition to slaves, there were a number of other subpopulations, such as subsistence peasants, aristocrats, children, and housewives, who were not integrated into the labor market and for whom, therefore, conventional indexes of living standards, such as daily wages, did not exist. The problem of data scarcity also applies to societies in which statistics are inaccurate. This pertains to some degree to most economies prior to the mid-nineteenth century but also to such twentieth-century dictatorial regimes as the Soviet Union or Maoist China. For instance, during Stalin's reign, in spite of the extensive propaganda announcing economic progress, the average height of military recruits increased by only 1.1 centimeters, whereas in the United States the advance was fully twice as large and was even greater in Western Europe. The problem of data representativeness applies also to societies in which the informal sector is a substantial share of the economy but is not part of the official records. In Soweto, for example, anthropometric measures have provided the only reliable information on the well-being of children.

Another important line of research recognizes the significance of physiological development on the course of economic development itself. Drawing on the modern positive relationship between body mass index and mortality, Fogel argues that over half the decline in European mortality that has occurred during the last three centuries was the result of economic and nutritional factors that were associated with increases in body size. John Murray's research shows that the modern relationship between BMI and mortality risk is very similar to that which prevailed in the 1800s, thus supporting Fogel's argument. This implies a positive feedback mechanism: better economic conditions cause greater stature, which makes people healthier and more productive, which in turn strengthens economic growth. The twentieth-century trend in body size also has important implications for future mortality trends and policies regarding aging.

The insights gained thus far from the anthropometric research program have been substantial, and the methodology is widely regarded as one of the most important recent developments in the field of economic history.

LEVELS AND TRENDS IN AVERAGE HEIGHT

Heights have increased steadily in the developed and much of the developing world during the twentieth



TABLE 1
LONG-TERM TRENDS IN THE STATURE OF ADULT MEN (IN CENTIMETERS)

<i>Birth-Decade</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>
1750	172	167	167	165	n.a.		165	
1800	173	166	167	166	166	164	163	
1850	170	165	168	169	165	165		163
1900	171	169	173	171	170	167		169
1950	177	174	178	178	178	172	171	176
1970	178		184		185			183

Sources: Nicholas and Steckel (1991); Sandberg and Steckel (1987); Steckel and Floud (1997); Steckel (1995); Komlos (1999); Komlos (1989); Baten (1999).

century. However, this trend ought not be projected backward in time. Prior epochs were characterized by long country-specific fluctuations in physical stature. In western Europe before the twentieth century, adult male heights generally varied between 165 and 170 centimeters, and decadal movements often corresponded well with business cycles. As table 1 shows, Europeans were considerably shorter than their American cousins during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, by the late twentieth century, the Dutch and Scandinavians were the tallest peoples in the world—between five and seven centimeters taller than Americans.

A significant episode of declining heights occurred in Europe during the late eighteenth century at the beginning of the industrial revolution. Average heights fell in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria, Hungary, and Bavaria beginning around the 1760s. Insofar as real wages fell consistently throughout much of that period, the decline in physical stature in the second half of the eighteenth century is not paradoxical (figure 2). The rapid demographic expansion in Europe, coupled with such exogenous factors as the deterioration in weather conditions, brought about diminishing returns to labor in agriculture, making it more difficult to maintain the nutritional status of the population. As long as the agricultural sector was dominant and trading opportunities limited, weather conditions had an obvious impact on nutritional status. Climate affected the length of the growing season and thereby the extent of the harvest. Jörg Baten has shown that physical stature in Bavaria correlated pos-

itively with tithes collected by landlords, and both were affected by mean temperatures. The output of pasture was also influenced by environmental conditions, in turn affecting milk production. Thus the increase in Bavarian heights of the 1730s was accompanied by an improvement in weather conditions, and both downturns in physical stature—in the late eighteenth century and in the 1830s and 1840s—were accompanied by adverse climatic conditions.

Several European countries, as well as the United States, experienced marked downturns in height during the 1830s and 1840s (figures 3 and 4). This pattern is more of an enigma because real wages were generally increasing as average heights fell during the period. These episodes of declining heights were often associated with the beginning of industrialization. Heights fell during the early industrial periods in Austria, Germany, Holland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Later on in the century, similar downturns were experienced by the populations in Australia and Spain but, notably, not in Japan after the Meiji Restoration and the beginning of industrialization. The diminution in the biological standard of living in the United States was particularly surprising, since per capita output was increasing by some 40 percent per generation. Most spectacularly, average heights of males born in Britain around 1850 were about 2 to 3 centimeters shorter than the average for those born around 1820. Although Britain's industrialization had begun long before, this was the country's most rapid period of urbanization. On the other hand, the evidence on France is as yet inconclusive.

While the height of military recruits increased slightly (by one centimeter) during the course of the first half of the nineteenth century, that of the students enrolled in the *École Polytechnique* seems to have diminished.

Richard Steckel and Roderick Floud argue that the timing of industrialization relative to the rise of the germ theory of disease along with public health measures, the extent of urbanization, and diets are the keys to understanding the relationship between stature and industrialization. The germ theory of disease, which became widely accepted by the medical profession by the 1880s, and the subsequent diffusion of public health measures were effective in preventing infection. Exposure to pathogens worsened with industrialization by crowding people together both inside and outside the workplace. Arduous factory work may have been a drain on health. Migration, emigration, and interregional trade brought about by industrialization also increased the exposure of the population to pathogens—as evidenced by the diffusion of epidemics along trade routes. Thus industrialization and urbanization before the development of the germ theory and measures to combat the spread of disease often caused the population to pay a biological penalty, which could not be overcome by rising incomes. After the development of the germ theory, negative health consequences among later industrializers could be largely eliminated, allowing increasing heights. In addition, some early industrializers, such as France, might have been able to avert the urban penalty.

French military heights rose slightly during industrialization prior to germ theory. One reason may be that France's transition was eased by its declining fertility and slower urbanization.

Other explanations for falling heights stress additional economic forces unleashed by the onset of modern economic growth. Much evidence suggests that environmental factors, although their impact varied over time and across localities and they acted in combination with changes in the epidemiological environment, cannot completely explain the decline in health (and the biological standard of living)—that is, the trend in height remains negative even after accounting for changes in the disease environment. Critics of disease-based theories argue that if declines in heights during the 1800s were caused primarily by a deterioration in the disease environment, then one would expect that all segments of society would have been affected; diseases would not have discriminated by gender or by social status to such an extent. Hence, the fact that the physical stature of several groups, including German high-status students, American middle-class cadets, Harvard and Sandhurst students, and male slaves did not decrease at the outset of modern economic growth implies that an increased incidence of disease does not, by itself, explain the diminution in average height. After all, many of the upper- and middle-class youths were of urban origin and were surrounded by the same epidemiological environment as the common man. Moreover, heights increased in some places even as population density,

urbanization, and commercialization—three important correlates of the ease with which diseases spread—also increased. This line of reasoning implies, therefore, that the decline in heights was caused primarily by a decrease in nutrient consumption and other forces spurred on by economic changes.

One such force unleashed by the onset of industrialization was the skewing of the income distribution in many places in favor of the upper-income groups. This had an adverse effect on average physical stature, inasmuch as the proportion of income spent on food declined as income rose, and the marginal contribution of nutrients to human growth diminished with increasing food intake. A shift in the distribution of income from the lower- to the upper-income stratum caused a decrease in the height of the offspring of the former group, while the height of the children of the upper classes improved by a smaller amount, thus pulling the overall average down.

Moreover, the relative price of nutrients increased considerably with industrialization, partly because technological change and capital accumulation in agriculture were slower than in industry, but also because of rapidly diminishing returns to labor in food production, particularly in Europe, in spite of the spread of the potato. In Britain, for instance, the price of food relative to textiles rose by 66 percent between 1770 and 1795. This induced a replacement of expensive calories and protein with cheaper carbohydrates, even among social groups whose income was increasing moderately. This shift happened partly be-

cause the transportation revolution was still in its infancy and methods of food preservation were primitive. Thus less milk, meat, fruits, and vegetables were available for the children and youth of the increasingly urbanized working-class households, despite the considerable advances that were being made in the industrial sector. Consequently, the composition of food intake shifted toward less protein-rich diets. Because the health implications of many consumption decisions were still unknown, some shifts in tastes, such as the increased popularity of white bread, also meant that diets were becoming less wholesome.

With the onset of industrialization, income probably became more variable for a substantial segment of society that had severed its ties to the land. Even if the reduction in food consumption brought about by such adverse developments was temporary, its stunting effect on children could be permanent.

Population growth contributed to the deterioration in nutritional status because of diminishing returns to labor in the agricultural sector in many parts of Europe, where the opportunities for expansion of arable land were quite limited. The increase in both relative and absolute bread prices throughout Europe at the end of the eighteenth century was a direct outgrowth of population expansion. Real wages declined, even in Britain, where agricultural improvements were more advanced than on the Continent.

Furthermore, industrialization and the increased division of labor in turn unleashed other processes, such as the integration of hitherto isolated regions

into a larger world market, which magnified their impact on nutritional status. In the preindustrial world, remoteness from markets had a propitious impact on nutritional status—probably because almost all the output of the family plot or farm was consumed within the household or perhaps because isolation from the market also meant physical isolation and the more benign disease environment brought about by low population density. No exceptions have been found to the generalization that isolated regions had taller populations: it holds true throughout Europe, North America, and Japan. Yet, once integrated into a larger market, self-sufficient peasants with incomplete knowledge of the fundamentals of health production may have willingly or out of ignorance traded away nutrients essential to the health of their children, who became stunted (and less healthy) as a consequence. In sum, declines in physical stature were associated with economic and epidemiological processes and structural changes that often, but not always, accompanied the onset of modern economic growth.

Heights in the twentieth century were much less susceptible to cyclical fluctuations than in prior epochs, except during the world wars. Markets in food products became better integrated, so that local shortages were alleviated quickly. Child labor declined or was entirely eliminated, freeing up calories for the biological growth process. Because food consumption became a much smaller fraction of family income, it was possible to protect one's nutritional intake from the effects of short-term income fluctuations. The stock of savings increased, so that the reliance on current income was less absolute than before. As a conse-

quence, the impact on heights of even such a major downswing in economic activity as the Great Depression of the 1930s was hardly evident. In contrast, the downturn of the 1890s still had a noticeable impact on physical stature. In addition, government expenditures on welfare programs such as unemployment insurance increased, so that business cycles had a negligible impact on children's heights. For western Europeans the more equal distribution of income, and a social safety net that protects the lower classes from the adverse biological effects of poverty, may have tipped the biological standard of living in their favor relative to the United States. Hence political processes, too, had an effect on human biology through public expenditures on health, unemployment insurance, and welfare.

URBAN-RURAL AND REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

Town dwellers were invariably at a nutritional disadvantage in the preindustrial and early industrial world because they were farther from the source of food supply and, unlike the rural population, were not paying farm-gate prices for agricultural products. Instead, they paid for the costs of transporting food and for the services of the middlemen. Until the invention of refrigerated railroad cars and ships, transportation technology was not advanced enough to ship dairy products and fresh meat over long distances in sufficient quantities, and at low enough prices, to accommodate the biological needs of urban workers. A sub-

stantial urban health penalty has been found in widely separated early industrial cities studied such as London, Glasgow, Vienna, Charleston, Philadelphia, and Tokyo. For example, men born in Baltimore in the pre-Civil War era were 3.3 centimeters shorter, and women 1.5 centimeters shorter, than those born elsewhere in the state of Maryland.

The only exception to this generalization found so far is the case of Munich, whose inhabitants were not shorter than those living in the Bavarian countryside in the early nineteenth century. Munich was close enough to the Alps to be supplied with sufficient dairy products on a regular basis. Moreover, the presence of the king's court meant that a large segment of its population was composed of government employees whose income was exempt from cyclical variation. Most urban dwellers were not so lucky.

The above pattern also holds at the regional level: the populations of urbanized or industrialized regions such as New England, East Anglia, or Bohemia were shorter than those of agricultural regions. The accessibility to markets meant that farmers traded away nutrients, and therefore had shorter children, than those agricultural producers who were farther from markets. Prior to the transportation revolution, the availability of milk and meat at the local level had a positive independent effect on nutritional status. The higher income earned in early industrial regions generally did not suffice to offset the longer distances that these perishable products had to travel to reach the consumers.

The relationship between remoteness from markets and urbanization, on the one hand, and physical stature, on the other, changed completely with several social, political, and economic developments that began in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The beginning of massive public investments into social overhead capital, such as sewer systems and waterworks, meant that a higher degree of cleanliness could develop. Due to these improvements in public health and sanitation, the human organism was less exposed to endemic and epidemic infections. The decline in the cost of long-distance ocean shipping brought the productivity of the American prairies within the reach of Europeans. The invention of refrigerated ships and railroad cars enabled perishable agricultural products and fresh meat to be shipped over longer distances. Then, in the twentieth century, an increase in the number of doctors and a revolution in medical technology made possible by the unprecedented affluence of the West had a major impact on health and biological well-being in the developed world. For all these reasons, by the turn of the twentieth century, urbanites tended to be taller than their

rural counterparts, in vivid contrast to the preindustrial and early industrial periods. This is the case in contemporary China as well.

Finally, regional variation in the epidemiological environment had a major impact on height before the twentieth century. Several studies have found a negative correlation between regions' crude death rates, or the infant mortality rates, and adult stature. For instance, men were particularly short in the malaria-infested parts of Murcia (a province of Spain), as were slaves in the disease-ridden rice-producing areas of South Carolina. Hence, prior to the twentieth century, when malaria was brought under control, irrigated agriculture had a negative impact on physical stature. High levels of population density also fostered the transmission of diseases. As noted above, there is some evidence that the increased trade and mobility associated with improved transportation, market integration, urbanization, and industrialization did so as well.

INCOME AND SOCIAL STATUS

In the preindustrial and early industrial periods there was an almost perfect positive correlation between physical stature and income or social status in cross-sectional analysis (figure 5). In the 1840s literate French soldiers were 1.4 centimeters taller than illiterate ones, for example. Aristocrats were taller than the middle class, who in turn were taller than the offspring of the lower classes. In fact, teenage gentry boys around 1800 were taller than the *Oliver Twists* of London by as much as 15 centimeters, probably the largest such social difference ever recorded. Orphans were also shorter than average: for a typical Slovak male, having his father die before he reached age thirty cost him almost 2 centimeters. However, losing one's mother did not have a significant influence on adult heights. Students were invariably taller than average because, until World War II, education tended to be a privilege rather than a political right. In the United States differences tended to be small by occupation, but slaves were shorter than their owners. No exception has been found to the generalization that in a given time period physical stature rose with income, as long as the groups compared grew up in the same region, faced with the same relative price of nutrients and exposed to the same disease environment.

Across geographic units, however, income did not always correlate positively with physical stature in the early industrial world. Higher income did not always compensate for the higher price of nutrients or

higher population density that went hand in hand with economic development. Thus the Irish and Scottish tended to be taller than the English, even though they were poorer on average, and, similarly, Poles were taller than Austrians in the Habsburg monarchy. Bosnians and Serbs were more than 7 centimeters taller than Hungarians, and southerners in the United States were slightly taller than northerners. The tallest white males in the United States in the antebellum period were born in the most isolated states, such as Kentucky and Tennessee, and the shortest in the most advanced region, New England. The Indians of the American prairie were the tallest population on record in the middle of the nineteenth century. However, in the twentieth century the effect of income became more positive at the regional level as well, probably because regional price differences diminished, and the delivery of public health services also correlated positively with per capita income. In the developed world at the turn of the twenty-first century, only very slight differences in physical stature remain by social class, while in the Scandinavian and Dutch welfare states they have disappeared entirely.

GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES

Before the twentieth century, evidence on the height of females is quite scarce because they were obviously less likely than males to be part of institutions that kept records on physical stature. However, two major

sources of female heights of the early nineteenth century do exist—slave and criminal records. These provide conflicting pictures. Sometimes female heights exhibit different trends than male heights. In a couple of cases, females experienced a decline in their physical stature prior to that of males. This was true among the free blacks of Maryland and among Scottish convicts. On the other hand, female heights fell after male heights in early-nineteenth-century England. Some have argued that in times of economic stress boys would have received privileged treatment within the household economy at the expense of girls. However, an examination of the issue for the United Kingdom led Bernard Harris to conclude that it is not possible to infer any significant difference in the treatment of boys and girls from early-twentieth-century height data and that it is impossible to generalize about earlier periods as well. In general, female stature seems to react less dramatically than male stature to disease and nutritional deprivation; thus it is hard to make comparisons across gender.

Research has also examined the impact of adult height on social outcomes in a historical context. Robert Whaples's 1995 study of Slovak immigrants to the United States found that greater height was associated with earlier marriage. Probably because taller men were generally more economically productive and generally earned more, they were more attractive in the marriage market. For example, at age twenty-two, a 149-centimeter-tall Slovak immigrant had a 37 per-

cent chance of being married, while one who was 188 centimeters tall had a 66 percent chance of being married. Likewise, Bavarian women below 150 centimeters were significantly less likely to be married.

CONCLUSION

The nature of human welfare, its components, and its measurement is a philosophical question as old as recorded history. A definitive answer will surely remain elusive. Efforts to supplement conventional economic indicators with biological ones go as far back as the mercantilist thinkers of the seventeenth century who used biological indicators such as population size and life expectancy to gauge the well-being of populations.

Research on the biological standard of living assumes that there is no single measure of well-being. To equate GDP per capita with the standard of living entails a large number of simplifications. Broader measures of well-being, including the Human Development Index, add considerable information to conventional income measures of human welfare—they can unveil the hidden costs as well as the neglected benefits of modernization. In the early phases of modern economic growth, income indexes generally overestimate growth in relation to broader measures of well-being—in the United States by as much as a factor of four. In the twentieth century, however, the reverse is the case. During the decade of the Great Depression, for instance, a Human Development Index for the United States grew twice as rapidly as per capita income. Thus, incorporating such indicators into indexes of well-being can change in fundamental ways our assessment of economic performance.

Because progress is never uniform in all dimensions of human existence, it is useful to supplement

conventional indicators of well-being with other measures, including biological indicators. The anthropometric history written at the end of the twentieth century has led to an expanded knowledge of welfare since the eighteenth century. It is now known that the common men and women in many regions of early industrial Europe and North America were, in some ways, worse off than their parents. There was some divergence between their living standard, as conventionally defined, and their biological well-being. The human organism did not always thrive as well in its newly created socioeconomic environment as one might be led to believe on the basis of purchasing power at the aggregate level. According to Steckel and Floud, countries that industrialized and urbanized before the development of the germ theory and public health measures paid a biological penalty.

More careful research is needed to supplement traditional income measures with new indexes, as well as additional investigation of the Human Development Index and its components, particularly on the “noneconomic” aspects of life, both at the theoretical and empirical levels. Though there will be no easy answers, documenting the biological attributes of human beings seems to be a promising way to proceed. As Stanley Engerman suggests, “Given the difficulties in finding an answer to any basic question of differential welfare, perhaps our best strategy is to accept the specific value of particular indicators for answering particular questions but also remain aware of the complexity of the multitude of factors that makes these examinations so difficult and generalization so uncertain” (1997, p. 39). Thus far, anthropometric history affords a much more nuanced view of the welfare of the populations living through the rapid structural changes accompanying two and a half centuries of industrialization.

See also Racism (volume 1); Standards of Living (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS AND MEDICINE



Matthew Ramsey

Medicine is connected to so many aspects of human experience that we cannot easily isolate it from other areas of social history. Certain key topics are addressed separately in the entries cross-listed below. This article deals primarily with medical practice and secondarily with ideas about health, illness, and the treatment of disease in their social context.

VARIETIES OF EUROPEAN MEDICINE

The first part of this article surveys the kinds of medical practitioners, practices, and beliefs and situates them in the diverse societies and cultures of Europe. It provides a framework for the second part of the article, which describes the evolution of the organized medical occupations, from their appearance in the late Middle Ages through the twentieth century. The emphasis throughout is on medical pluralism: elucidating the many forms that medicine and medical practice have taken has been one of the major contributions that social history has made to the history of medicine.

A diversity of practitioners. Throughout history, family, friends, and neighbors have ministered to the sick, and patients have treated themselves with domestic remedies. In addition, a very heterogeneous group of men and women have offered medical services based on their reputed special knowledge and skills. In Europe some have had formal training and credentials, but many have not. For some, medical practice has been a full-time occupation. For others it has been a sideline or an occasional activity.

The very vocabulary used to refer to medical practitioners reflects this complex social reality. The title “doctor,” which derives from a Latin word for teacher, was conferred on holders of the highest university degree. Over time it came to mean, very broadly, a medical practitioner. In this article, it will refer to M.D.s, to distinguish them from other kinds of authorized practitioners. A memory of this tradi-

tional convention has survived in the British custom of addressing surgeons as “mister.”

Numerous other terms designated a medical practitioner, who might or might not possess a university degree. In medieval Europe, the Latin term *medicus* (*medica* in the feminine) simply meant someone devoted to the healing arts, as it had in ancient Rome, which lacked a formal system of training and licensure. In the Romance languages, it gave us *médecin* in French, *medico* in Italian, and *médico* in Spanish—the common word for “physician.” That English word (and the old verb “to physic”) come from a Latin word for natural science and ultimately from the Greek word for natural, recalling the long association between medicine and specialized learning. In medieval texts, *medicus physicus* referred to a well-educated practitioner. The common German term for physician, *Arzt*, also once had lofty connotations; it ultimately derives from a Greek word that designated the chief court physician during the period of the Roman Empire (“archiater” in English).

In contrast, “surgery” and its cognates derive from the Latin *chirurgia*, which in turn comes from a Greek term meaning “working with the hand”; the medieval *medicus chirurgicus* dealt with wounds (an old German word for a simple surgeon was *Wundarzt*), performed rudimentary operations that did not invade the body cavity, and treated “external” disorders, including skin conditions. With some exceptions, surgeons through the early modern period were members of a separate occupation. Some practitioners dealt with a particular condition or part of the body—bonesetters, tooth pullers, lithotomists who cut for bladder stone, oculists who operated on cataracts; midwives are a special case of the same phenomenon. In France before the Revolution, practitioners who concentrated on a particular surgical condition were collectively known as *experts*, from the Latin word for experience, since their competence derived mainly from practical experience of a particular kind.

In the vernacular, there were also a series of terms meaning one who heals: “healer” in English,

guérisseur in French, *Heiler* or *Heilpraktiker* in German, *curandero* in Spanish, *quaritore* in Italian, and *lekar'* in Russian. Over time these terms came to refer to a practitioner without formal training, though in nineteenth-century Russia the title of *lekar'* was given to a qualified practitioner below the level of the more highly trained *doktor meditsiny*, and Germany has had a system of certification for *Heilpraktiker* since the 1930s.

We now commonly refer to formally trained and certified practitioners as the medical “profession.” For the sake of convenience the same term can be applied to practitioners in earlier periods who shared these basic characteristics. It is important to bear in mind, however, that until the nineteenth century the boundaries between “professionals” and other practitioners were poorly defined. The network of approved practitioners encompassed a wide range of occupations and of individuals with uneven training and different types of authorization. The right to practice might be based on anything from a university degree to a privilege accorded by the Crown or by town officials. Itinerant drug peddlers might be authorized to sell and even administer a few particular remedies. Members of the clergy who cared for parishioners and property owners who gave medical assistance to their servants and tenants or to the poor were also an accepted part of the medical scene.

A great variety of other practitioners also sold remedies and offered medical advice. The most colorful were the traveling “charlatans,” often accompanied by a troupe of clowns and other entertainers, who set up medicine shows in marketplaces and town squares, where they hawked panaceas and “secrets” for particular diseases. (A less pejorative term for untrained practitioners was “empiric,” which suggested that they owed their knowledge and skills to experience—*empeiria* in Greek—rather than formal study.) They flourished in the early modern period, bringing their specialized products and services to out-of-the-way places. In addition, local residents of all descriptions sold a few remedies or were thought to enjoy a special skill to heal particular diseases. Cunning-folk were believed to possess special knowledge or powers, often including an indwelling gift to heal, or to identify and counteract witches whose spells had caused disease and other misfortunes; other magical services might include predicting the future or finding lost objects. In European languages and dialects, these various healers (the preceding is a composite portrait) had a multitude of names, which often suggested esoteric knowledge; the Russian word *znakhar'* (*znakharka*, fem.), like the English word “cunning,” comes from a root meaning “to know.”

Traditional empirics and healers persisted in rural areas into the twentieth century, though they were to a large extent displaced by mass-marketed proprietary remedies and by practitioners of newer forms of what we now call alternative medicine—magnetizers, for example, the progeny of the Mesmerist movement of the late eighteenth century, who claimed to diagnose and cure disease through a form of animal magnetism. At no point has the profession enjoyed a de facto monopoly of medical practice.

Multiple beliefs and practices. Medical beliefs and practices were similarly characterized by pluralism. A common intellectual thread, however, has run through Western learned medicine since classical antiquity. From the late Middle Ages through the early nineteenth century, the dominant tradition drew on Greek sources mediated first through Arabic translations and then passed on through Latin retranslation to the centers of learning in western Europe. The core of the Greek tradition derived from the body of writings traditionally attributed to Hippocrates, which provided a naturalistic explanation of health and disease without reference to a supernatural realm. The key principle was equilibrium. Four critical humors—blood, phlegm, and black and yellow bile—affected the functioning of mind and body, and an imbalance of these humors produced disease. Therapy, such as bloodletting and drugs that purged, induced vomiting, or otherwise acted on the humors, was intended to restore the equilibrium. Greek learned medicine was codified by Galen (c. 129–199 C.E.) in the second century C.E. in a set of treatises whose extraordinary authority endured for centuries. Although his physiology and therapeutics did not go unchallenged in the early modern period, Galenic principles continued to dominate the university curriculum into the early nineteenth century.

In addition to Galenism, Europe also inherited from classical antiquity an immense body of empirical medical lore concerning the healing properties of natural substances. Some found its way into texts that were integral parts of the Greek medical canon. A different perspective appears in the *Natural History* of Pliny the Elder (23–79 C.E.), a vast and uncritical compendium of miscellaneous information on the properties of animals, plants, and minerals. Pliny shared with some of his Roman compatriots a hostility to the theoretical pretensions of Greek physicians.

Drawing on this tradition, early modern pharmacy incorporated a multitude of plants, as well as animal parts and excreta (the *Dreckapotheke* or filth pharmacy, as the latter sorts of remedies came to be called in German). Even human secretions had a place

in the pharmacopoeia, as did human fat and preserved tissue, discreetly known as “mummy,” which was typically prepared from the cadavers of executed criminals. The animal products began to disappear from the codices, or official lists of medications, over the course of the eighteenth century. By the early nineteenth century, nearly all were gone and a small number of active ingredients, such as quinine from cinchona bark, had been isolated from a few of the many remaining plant remedies. Although the initial results were modest, pharmacology increasingly relied on chemistry to produce pure drug substances.

Throughout European history, we also find therapeutic practices that we would characterize as magical or religious, though there were no clear dividing lines. These categories would not always have made sense to participants; the potency of a particular herb, for example, might depend on performing a certain ritual or saying a prayer while gathering it. One of the most common magical procedures sought to transfer a disease from the patient to an animal or plant. Religious healing has been even more widely practiced. Greek and Roman patients appealed for divine intervention to cure disease and travelled to shrines seeking cures. Christians did the same, sometimes adapting pagan shrines to their purposes. Many healers, for their part, saw themselves as imitating the

example of Jesus caring for the sick. The cultic veneration of the saints and the concept of patron saints as they developed in western Christianity also became closely identified with healing. The brothers Cosmas and Damian, physicians and Christian martyrs in the third century, became the patron saints of medicine; but many others were invoked for particular diseases, typically associated with an aspect of the saint’s life or death. The martyred Saint Apollonia, whose teeth were broken, was invoked for toothache and became the patron saint of dentists.

In the modern period, new types of unconventional medicine emerged, sometimes linked to a form of spiritualism. Their adepts were often well organized, particularly in Germany, Britain, and the United States (which exported its medical movements to Europe), and they explicitly rejected official medicine and its central tenets. Homeopathy, for example, founded at the beginning of the nineteenth century by the German physician Samuel Hahnemann (1755–1843), treated disease with substances that caused similar symptoms, on the principle that like cures like, but in minute doses at very high levels of dilution. Homeopaths contrasted their gentler and (in their view) more efficacious therapeutics with the drastic remedies of the “allopaths”—bleeding, purging, and toxic drugs, such as mercury, the standby against syph-

ilis since the sixteenth century. Rather than disappearing with the rise of modern biomedicine, alternative medicine grew along with it.

Many Europes. The two previous sections have discussed aspects of medicine and medical practice common to many parts of Europe. Both were shaped to a significant degree, however, by particular cultural, social, and political environments.

We tend now to think mainly in terms of modern national cultures. Well into the nineteenth century, however, many Europeans thought of a province or some smaller region as their “country,” and might not have recognized themselves as belonging to a nation-state, such as France or Spain. At the same time, many people thought in terms of larger affiliations. For centuries, educated Europeans recognized two great but ill-defined civilizational divides, between north and south, east and west, with implications for medicine and medical practice. The north-south divide was in part the product of climate, geography, and the relationship with the land, reflected in some of the ingredients frequently used in remedies—olive oil for ointments and wine for cleansing wounds and macerating herbs in the south, for example. This division was also cultural and historical, as could be seen, for example, in the prevalence of Roman law codes in the south and customary law in

the north. The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century originated and took hold in the north, where it produced distinctive religio-medical practices and sectlike alternative medical movements. In part for this reason, the north has been more tolerant of medical pluralism than the south.

The east-west divide had deep roots as well. The Roman Empire permanently split in two in the fourth century C.E. The Greek eastern half, with its capital at Constantinople, outlasted the Latin empire in the west by a millennium, falling at last to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Christianity divided along similar lines, with reciprocal excommunications marking the Great Schism of 1054. Eastern Orthodox rites, together with the associated popular religio-medical practices, diffused throughout the Balkans and eastern Europe to Poland and Russia.

A third division followed the emergence of Islam in the seventh century. It spread rapidly outward from Arabia, reaching the Iberian peninsula in the early eighth century. The Christian reconquest of Spain was not completed until the end of the fifteenth century, by which time Constantinople had fallen and the Ottoman Turks had begun to expand into southeastern Europe. Although Ottoman power subsequently declined, the Balkans stayed in Turkish hands. Islam remained a powerful force in this land marked by ethnic and religious pluralism and helped shape

the medical cultures of the region. Although the Qur'an has little to say about medicine, subsequent commentators developed a medicine of the Prophet. Something of Arabic popular medicine, with its emphasis on jinns (spirits below the rank of angels) passed into southeastern Europe as well.

As we move forward in time, a fourth distinction between East and West becomes increasingly important. In the Ottoman and Russian empires and many other parts of eastern Europe, limited resources and an undeveloped market economy meant that full-time medical practitioners were thinner on the ground than in the West. The small number of doctors—most of them foreign or foreign-trained—were concentrated in the capital and a few other urban centers.

Finally, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe for nearly half a century after World War II established a fifth east-west divide with important implications for medical practice. Institutions with very different traditions were incorporated into a system of state medicine that greatly diminished professional autonomy.

The rise of the nation-state led to a new set of medical traditions; they most clearly left their mark on institutions and the organized medical profession, which will be discussed in subsequent sections of this article. But it is important to remember that ethnic and cultural divisions often did not coincide with political boundaries, particularly in the east. European Russia, for example, was at one end of a vast region stretching out through Siberia in which the Ural-Altaic peoples practiced shamanism. The shaman owes his healing powers to his ability to commune with the spirit world. Although he undergoes a kind of apprenticeship, his function depends less on acquired learning than on a calling thrust on him at birth. In the West, too, large pockets of cultural difference survived within or astride national frontiers, each with certain distinctive features in its medical culture. Brittany, for example, apart from a Celtic language completely unrelated to French, had an unusually high concentration of prehistoric megaliths (giant stones) known as *menhirs* in Breton. A patient might rub against a menhir or scrape it to obtain a powder for use in preparing medications.

Two widely dispersed groups constituted minorities within every European society. The Jews and the Roma ("Gypsies") shared a long history of diaspora and persecution culminating in genocide at the hands of the Nazis; each also had a distinctive place in the social history of European medicine, though of very different kinds. Jews played a disproportionate role as learned physicians in both Christian and Islamic lands, serving all communities, despite a series of restrictions and prohibitions in the former. Judaism

also powerfully affected views on health and healing within the Jewish community. Although in the Torah only Yahweh appears as a healer, a long tradition supported both learned medicine and popular practices. On the one hand, the revered status of the man of learning demanded respect for the physician (*rofe*) and contempt for quacks. Although the sick and suffering might avail themselves of prayer, they were to rely first of all on natural means. On the other hand, the laws and customs governing hygiene and diet were inextricably linked to religious obligations. Popular medical traditions included magical elements, such as charms. The medieval mystical system called the Kabbalah, which greatly influenced modern Hasidism, was equally non-naturalistic. Hasidism developed in the eighteenth century from a widespread popular revival movement in the Poland-Ukraine region, led by charismatic *tsaddikim*, or holy men. The most celebrated, Israel ben Eliezer (c. 1700–1760), was



ROMANI ("GYPSY") MEDICINE

In the Romani cosmos, the *marime* (morally or physically unclean) is a source of disease; the same term applies to exclusion from the community for violation of purity rules and other norms. Many key practices serve to keep the unclean lower half of the body and its products separate from the *wuzho* (pure) upper half; this distinction applies particularly to women, who are considered potential sources of pollution. Outsiders (*gadje*) who do not observe these precepts are unclean and a source of disease. Such diseases can be successfully treated by outsider physicians, but only *drabarni*, the Roma's female healers, can treat illness originating within the community. The worst of the latter are attributed to the Devil or to Mamioro, a spirit attracted to unclean houses, though they are also the source of powerful remedies. Mamioro's *johai* (ghost vomit), most often found in garbage dumps, is the most potent available remedy. More routine maladies can be treated with herbal preparations. The Roma tend to use the *gadje* health care system only when their own medicine has failed, except for childbirth, which is unclean and would make the home *marime* if the mother delivered there.

called Ba'al Shem Tov (Master of the Good Name) because of his reputation as a miracle healer. The term was also applied more generally to Jewish itinerant healer-magicians, whose gifts were attributed to their mystical knowledge of the secret and unspeakable names of God.

The Roma reached southeastern Europe from the Indian subcontinent by the fourteenth century. Their powerful concepts of purity and impurity and of insider-outsider status, together with the itinerant life some of them led, set them apart from the surrounding society and medical cultures. Because of their distinctive and uncompromising views on health and healing, encounters with physicians often produced a reciprocal sense of dislocation. A similar experience recurred with increasing frequency in the late twentieth century with the arrival of large numbers of immigrants from former colonies and elsewhere overseas—immigrants whose customs contributed to a growing medical multiculturalism.

THE ORGANIZED MEDICAL OCCUPATIONS

The first section of the second part describes the occupational structures that emerged in the late Middle Ages and lasted, with some changes, through the eighteenth century. They were primarily corporatist in organization, with guildlike bodies supervising medical practice. The second section concerns the development in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of many of the features we associate with the modern medical profession, including new forms of organization and licensure. The dominant model in western Europe was liberal in the sense that medical professionals, once certified, were free to practice as they wished. It was also bureaucratic or statist in that government increasingly controlled the process of licensure. The third section focuses on the development in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries of national health insurance, social security, and other forms of third-party payments, which transformed not just the economics of health care but also its place in the larger society.

The medieval and early modern medical field. Through most of the Middle Ages, an aspiring physician would have learned medicine at a cathedral school or monastery or through apprenticeship. The first universities appeared in England, France, Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and then in the German lands and central Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-

turies. The doctorate was the highest degree, normally following the baccalaureate and licentiate, and in some cases came in higher and lower versions; it was not necessarily required for medical practice.

The first medical graduates, many of them members of the clergy, coexisted with the highly diverse network of practitioners described in the first part of this article. Priests and monks made up a sizable percentage of the total number of active practitioners. Their role declined after about 1500, though religious houses continued to maintain dispensaries and care for the poor. Women, though a minority of active practitioners, won public recognition as physicians. They were excluded from the new universities, however, and gradually from the organized medical occupations other than midwifery.

Physicians also shared the medical arena with authorized surgeons and apothecaries, plus the various trades, such as herbalists, spice dealers, and grocers, that sold medicinal plants or other ingredients for making remedies. In principle, the physician, the man of learning, supervised both surgeon and apothecary. The surgeon might bleed a patient at his direction; the apothecary would provide the medication he prescribed, if necessary compounding it according to his directions. This triad was at best an approximation of the social reality; as long as it existed, practitioners regularly complained about boundary violations.

Except in parts of southern Europe, physicians were a distinct minority even of authorized practitioners. In most of eastern Europe they remained scarce; it has been estimated that at the beginning of the seventeenth century, there were perhaps twenty western-trained physicians in all of Russia. Thanks to charity work, sliding fee scales, and public appointments, physicians might treat the indigent and patients of modest means, but the mass of the population did not make regular use of their services.

Physicians did not on the whole enjoy the status or income that we associate with the medical profession today, though it was possible to rise through court appointments and other forms of patronage. In a society of legally defined orders, they usually ranked among the respectable bourgeoisie; the most successful sometimes purchased a patent of nobility where that was possible. In Russia, the Table of Ranks established by Peter the Great (1672–1725) in 1722 placed a university-trained medical doctor at Rank IX, which conferred personal but not hereditary nobility.

The case of surgery is more complex. A tradition of academic surgery existed, mainly in France and southern Europe; in Italy, especially, it gained a place in the university curriculum. “Surgeons of the long robe” as they were sometimes called, in reference to

their academic gowns, shared the physicians' acquaintance with the Latin corpus of medical texts and a commitment to practice guided by theory. Most surgeons, however, trained exclusively through an apprenticeship system comparable to that of other manual crafts, and many may have been illiterate. At the lower end, surgery was linked to barbering; barbers commonly performed minor operations, pulled teeth, and used their razor for bloodletting.

In most places, lower-level surgeons were the most numerous and widespread of practitioners, serving all the basic medical needs of the population. In central and eastern Europe, one finds special categories, including "practical surgeons" who lacked the full education of master surgeons but could serve the rural population. In the eighteenth century, German states established *collegia medico-chirurgica* to train *Wundärzte* and *Feldscherer* (feldshers). The latter term, which dates from at least the sixteenth century, derives from a German word whose literal meaning is "a mili-

tary man working with shears"—a clear reference to the old association between barbering and surgery. From their origins as surgeons in German and Swiss military companies, the feldshers spread through central, eastern, and parts of southern Europe; they treated increasing numbers of civilians and became the principal providers of medical care to the rural populations.

The more ambitious surgeons aspired to separation from the barbers and autonomy from the physicians. In eighteenth-century France they succeeded spectacularly. The Paris surgeons definitively severed the link with barbering in 1743 and in 1748 won formal recognition of a Royal Academy of Surgery. (Their London counterparts achieved separation from the barbers in 1745.) A decree of 1750 recognized a Paris College of Surgery independent of the University of Paris.

Over the course of the eighteenth century, several other intersecting trends transformed the world

of surgery. A growing number of practitioners trained in both medicine and surgery. When the French revolutionaries unified medical and surgical education in 1794, some surgeons regretted the loss of their distinct identity, but the decision simply reinforced and formalized an already well-established trend. Moreover, surgeons increasingly delivered babies, treated teeth, and began to perform and improve operations once generally left to the *experts*. The term “dentist” first came into common use in this period, starting in France. A new conception of specialization was beginning to emerge, in which the specialist would first acquire a general medical education.

Although more clearly tradesmen than surgeons, apothecaries underwent a similar apprenticeship. Most practiced at least a little medicine and surgery, in addition to selling drugs. In England, where apothecary-medical practitioners were particularly numerous, one of them won a notable legal case in 1704, which affirmed their right to treat patients, though they could still charge only for the medicines they sold. A growing number of practitioners qualified as both surgeons and apothecaries, and the “general practitioner” emerged from this dual occupation in the nineteenth century.

In keeping with the legal and social order of the Old Regime, physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries formed corporations—guilds and guildlike organizations—in cities and major towns. The first major urban craft guilds appeared in Italy in the thirteenth century, and the institution subsequently spread throughout southern, western, and northern Europe. The arrangements in the medical field were complex, sometimes bringing together physicians and surgeons, but more often not. Just as surgeons were frequently linked with barbers, apothecaries were often joined with spice dealers. It should be added that universities and faculties were themselves corporations of masters and students, chartered by emperors, kings, popes, and other rulers.

The corporations were probably strongest in France. In England *laissez-faire* increasingly prevailed, and on the rest of the Continent state and municipal institutions played a larger role in regulating the medical field. The corporations admitted candidates to practice, typically requiring special examinations and fees, and prosecuted unauthorized practitioners, who might include members of another corporation who had crossed the boundary between the two fields. In France, some medical faculties offered little instruction and had become more regulatory than educational institutions. In London, the Royal College of Physicians, established in 1518, theoretically enjoyed a monopoly of medical practice in the capital and its

outskirts, though this did not keep many others from working there.

In most of the rest of Europe, a more bureaucratic regulatory system emerged, though outside the east it often coexisted with fairly robust corporations. In Spain, the Royal Protomedicato, or medical board, conferred licenses and prosecuted those who violated the medical regulations; in many areas practitioners also had to belong to local corporations, but they functioned as mutual-aid societies, religious confraternities, and the like. In Italy, the kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia adopted *protomedicati* on the Spanish model. In the northern and central states of the peninsula, guildlike colleges enjoyed the power to license practitioners since the late Middle Ages. By the sixteenth century, though, some of the colleges had become virtual state agencies; Florence established a state board with licensing powers in 1560. In northern and central Europe, state medical boards (*collegia medica*) emerged in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In France, although the corporations retained control over practice, the Société Royale de Médecine, chartered in 1778, was empowered to regulate mineral waters and the remedy trade.

Licensure was not the only way in which government impinged on medical practice and practitioners. Physicians found employment with the public health boards pioneered by the city-states of the Italian Renaissance. The northern Italian cities also hired public physicians and surgeons, starting in the early thirteenth century. The institution of the municipal and district physician, who typically treated the poor and discharged certain public health functions, spread widely, especially in the German lands, where he was given the title of *Physikus*. Apart from these official functions, in much of central and eastern Europe the government closely supervised the activities of practitioners after they had been licensed, telling them how and where they could practice and even, in some cases, whether they could marry. In Russia, medical practitioners were formally members of the civil service; very few could have sustained a private practice on the open market. In most German states they were recognized as public health officials. Finally, the military, with its great need for surgeons, played an important role in providing not just employment but also instruction. In the eighteenth century, the Berlin Collegium Medico-Chirurgicum (1724) and the Josephinum Academy in Vienna (1785), both devoted to training future military surgeons, were among the most distinguished surgical schools in Europe.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the corporations were on the defensive, challenged not only by new institutions, but also, in the west, by the

burgeoning medical marketplace. Commercialized brand-name remedies, heavily advertised in the new periodical press, sometimes reached an international clientele. The wide dissemination of medical literature at all levels also encouraged new kinds of self-help; in the view of some practitioners, it undermined the physicians' authority over the medical field.

The nineteenth century. The Revolution (1789) had destroyed the old corporate order in France, including the faculties and guilds. After a period of laissez-faire, which its critics characterized as "medical anarchy," France in 1803 adopted a new medical regime, a cross between a bureaucratic and a liberal model. The state alone would certify new practitioners, but from that point on they were essentially free from government oversight. French military victories during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars brought analogous reforms to neighboring countries. Some of these changes were reversed after the fall of Napoleon, and in places outside the French sphere of influence many older institutions remained intact. But the deeper transformations reflected in the legislation of 1803 were not unique to France.

In the new model, credentials were standardized and based on uniform examinations. The French not only educated future surgeons and physicians together (a doctorate of surgery was available but required the same basic preparation); they also eliminated the variations in the requirements of the faculties, which had been only partly coordinated by a royal edict of 1707. Doctors could work anywhere in France; under the Old Regime the right to practice in a city required affiliation with a local corporation as well as a medical degree. After some debate, the legislators decided to retain a second tier of practitioners; the *officiers de santé* (health officers) were in theory to meet the needs of rural populations, like the old country surgeons. Although they received a simpler, shorter, and more practical training, they were members of the same occupation as the doctors and were entitled to call themselves physicians.

Henceforth there would be no more special privileges or royal dispensations. There would be no authorizations to practice some part of the medical arts. France led the way in the development of new specialties, including orthopedics and psychiatry, but the M.D. degree was a sine qua non. (The exceptions were midwifery, which had its own diplomas, and dentistry, which remained unregulated until 1892.) Anyone who practiced without an official credential was ipso facto guilty of illegal medical practice. Authorized practitioners now, more clearly than before, embodied what by the mid-nineteenth century had

come to be called "official medicine." By the same token, it became easier to identify alternative medicine, especially as unlicensed practitioners and proponents of unconventional medical systems formed their own organizations and even schools.

The new French medical regime became the model for strict regulation of the medical field throughout the Western world, though it was not universally emulated. To some it smacked of Napoleonic authoritarianism. England never imposed a national professional monopoly; indeed, the Medical Act of 1858 rescinded the local monopolies of the old corporations. In Germany, the trades ordinance of the North German Confederation introduced *Kurierfreiheit*, or freedom of healing, in 1869, while lifting the old regulations governing the activities of physicians; it was extended to the unified German Empire in 1871.

France continued to license health officers until 1892. It was the German states that led the way in eliminating the two-tiered system in the 1840s and early 1850s, closing practical schools and making the university essentially the single point of access to the profession. Russia, at the other extreme, retained an elaborate multitiered system. A law of 1838 provided for seven medical degrees (*lekar'* was the lowest). These nice distinctions mattered less among lay people; after around mid-century they generally applied the term *vrač'* (physician) to all medical practitioners, as they still do. The feldshers, however, remained a distinct category; they dominated medical practice in many rural areas, resisting efforts by physicians to impose their authority.

In England, the general practitioners trained in hospitals or by apprenticeship formed a broad lower tier compared with the university-educated physicians, especially the elite of the Royal College of Physicians in London. The Medical Act of 1858 created a single register of qualified practitioners without either standardizing education or replacing the old certifying bodies. A conjoint Board of Examinations was created in 1884, and two years later a Medical Amendment Act imposed a general requirement for qualification in medicine, surgery, and obstetrics. The medical field thus had a basic credential, though practitioners remained stratified into general practitioners and hospital consultants. This distinction had parallels elsewhere. Though the degree might be the same, the elite was set apart by hospital and faculty appointments, high government positions, and membership in academies. In France the *internat*, a form of postgraduate hospital training available only to a small cadre chosen by competitive examination, sorted practitioners at a very early stage in their career.



THE FRENCH MEDICAL PRACTICE LAW OF 19 VENTÔSE YEAR XI/10 MARCH 1803

TITLE 1. General Provisions

ARTICLE 1. Starting on 1 Vendémiaire Year XII [24 September 1812], no one may pursue the occupation of physician, surgeon, or health officer, unless he has been examined and licensed as set forth in this law.

ARTICLE 2. Those who are authorized to practice medicine after the beginning of the Year XII will be called *doctors* of medicine or surgery, if they have been examined and licensed at one of the six special medical schools, or *health officers* if they have been licensed by the boards described in the following articles.

...

TITLE TWO: Examinations and Licensure of Doctors of Medicine or Surgery

ARTICLE 5. Examinations for doctors of medicine or surgery will be given in each of the six special medical schools.

ARTICLE 6. There will be five examinations: the first on anatomy and physiology; the second on pathology and nosology; the third on *materia medica*, chemistry, and pharmacy; the fourth on hygiene and legal medicine; the fifth on internal or external clinical medicine, depending on whether the candidate is seeking the title of doctor of medicine or surgery. The examinations will be public; two of them must be in Latin.

ARTICLE 7. After the five examinations, the candidate must defend a thesis written in Latin or French.

ARTICLE 8. Students cannot take the examinations until after they have studied at one of the special schools for four years and paid the appropriate charges.

...

TITLE 3. Training and Licensing of Health Officers

ARTICLE 15. Young men who plan to become health officers are not obliged to study at the medical schools; they can be licensed as health officers after having been a private student with doctors for six years, or having worked at a civilian or military hospital for five years. Three consecutive years of study in medical school can substitute for the six years with the doctors or the five years in the hospices.

ARTICLE 16. In order to license health officers, a medical board (*jury*) will be established in the capital of each *département* [administrative district] composed of

two doctors residing in the *département* appointed by the First Consul [Napoleon Bonaparte], and by a commissioner selected from among the professors of the six medical schools, and appointed by the First Consul.

...

ARTICLE 17. The departmental boards will conduct the examinations for licensing health officers once a year. There will be three examinations: one on anatomy; the next on the rudiments of medicine; the third on surgery and basic pharmacy. They will be given in French, in a room open to the public.

...

TITLE 4. Registration and Lists of Doctors and Health Officers

[All authorized practitioners must register with the local authorities, who will draw up a list for their district.]

ARTICLE 28. Doctors licensed by the medical schools may practice their profession in every locality in the Republic.

...

ARTICLE 29. The health officers can set up a practice only in the *département* in which the board examined them, after registering as has just been indicated. They cannot perform major surgical operations except under the direction of a doctor, where one is available.

...

TITLE 5. Training and Licensing of Midwives

ARTICLE 30. In addition to the training conducted in the medical schools, the most frequently used hospice in each *département* will establish a free annual course on the theory and practice of delivering babies, especially intended for the training of midwives.

...

TITLE 6. Penal Provisions

ARTICLE 35. Starting six months after publication of this law, any individual who continues to practice medicine or surgery, or to deliver babies, without being on the lists [described in the preceding articles], and without having a diploma, certificate, or letter of licensure, will be prosecuted and sentenced to pay a fine to the hospices. . . . The fine will be doubled for repeat offenders, who in addition may be sentenced to prison for no more than six months.

In many places, recruitment became less socially exclusive over the course of the century. In Russia, medical education was reorganized in 1856, part of the larger program of modernization and social reform, (including emancipation of the serfs) following defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856). The changes gave access to many who had previously been ineligible. (See Table 1.) An even more striking development in the last decades of the century was the admission of women to medical training, starting in Switzerland and France. Russian women showed a strong early interest and figured disproportionately among the first female candidates for degrees at Zurich and Paris. Many others qualified as *feldshers*, a title for which graduates of midwifery schools were eligible. By 1913, 10 percent of Russian medical practitioners were women.

In addition to educational reform, medical practitioners felt a need for new organizations to fill the void left by the passing of many of the old corporations, and by the restricted membership and diminished influence of those that remained. In France, where revolutionary legislation prohibited occupational organizations to defend common economic interests, physicians formed mutual aid societies, which federated in 1858 as the General Association of French Physicians. The whole was greater than the sum of its parts and functioned in many ways as a national profes-

sional association. A generation later, physicians began to form more militant unions—*syndicats*, the same word used for labor unions—though they remained technically illegal until 1892. In that year, the *syndicats* received not only legal recognition but also the right to initiate prosecutions for illegal practice. Germany also had a wide range of voluntary professional organizations, many of which came together in 1873 to form the Federation of Medical Associations. In Britain, the old corporations survived but provided no representation for the rank and file. The British Medical Association (1855) grew out of a Provincial Medical and Surgical Association (1832), an organization primarily for general practitioners hostile to the privileges of the medical elite, on the one hand, and competition from unqualified practitioners on the other. In Russia, the progressive Pirogov Society, named for the celebrated surgeon and scientist Nicholas I. Pirogov (1810–1881), held a series of national congresses starting in 1885 and used a network of local branches to promote medical reform throughout the empire.

In societies where the liberal model of medical practice prevailed, professional misconduct by licensed practitioners posed one of the most troublesome challenges to the new order. In France some physicians called for “disciplinary councils” and other neocorporatist solutions. Later the *syndicats* tried to disci-

pline their membership, but the only sanction they could enforce was expulsion. In Britain, the General Medical Council established by the 1858 act could strike errant practitioners off the Register, though they could still practice so long as they did not claim registration. In the German Empire, elected but official chambers of physicians were empowered to police the conduct of licensed physicians; those accused of professional misconduct could be sent before “courts of honor” (*Ehrenräte*). Professional ethics, which became a prominent topic of public discourse at the beginning of the nineteenth century, met a similar need in a less formal way: published codes could take the place of the old corporate statutes in guiding the conduct of practitioners. “Medical deontology,” as it was sometimes called, primarily concerned relations with other practitioners; a physician should not lure away a colleague’s patients, for example. Increasingly, though, it also emphasized patient rights, such as confidentiality.

Another challenge to the liberal model was the expanding role of government, even outside the coun-

tries where the physician was a kind of public servant. Medical practitioners found a growing number of appointments in schools, prisons and other institutions, in public health services, and as physicians to the poor. In Russia, as part of the program of reform that followed the Crimean War, Alexander II (1818–1881) established elective district and provincial councils known as *zemstvos*. Public health was among their top priorities, and they hired practitioners to provide medical services in the countryside. By the early 1890s *zemstvo* physicians made up 10 percent of the profession in Russia—a minority, to be sure, but a vocal one, committed to political populism.

Although the principle of government health care programs received wide support from those looking for a middle way between outright socialism and *laissez-faire* liberalism, the form it should take became a subject of intense debate. The *zemstvo* physicians, whose position recalled the town and district physicians of the Old Regime, represented only one possible approach. The pioneering system of social in-

insurance established in the German Empire by the Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) in 1883 was another, very influential model. Introduced as part of a campaign of reforms designed to steal the thunder of the left, Bismarck's plan amalgamated a great number of existing local sick funds for workers into a program that employers and employees would jointly administer; workers at the lower end of the pay scale were required to join. The funds signed contracts with individual physicians, who normally received either a fixed salary or an annual payment for each patient covered (capitation). Eventually the system was opened up to all licensed physicians, who would be paid on a fee-for-service basis. In France, a law of 1893 on rural medical assistance left the decision on the form of payment to the districts (*départments*); the great majority chose fee-for-service.

In addition to government programs, a growing number of physicians signed contracts with traditional mutual-aid societies, large employers, and insurance companies, which could use competitive bidding to force costs down. Beyond the economic threat, contracts with third parties, private or public, aroused concerns in western Europe about the future of the liberal physician-patient relationship, in which the two were supposed to agree freely on a service for which the patient would pay directly. More and more often, the purchaser was no longer the consumer. Even though third-party payments benefitted the profession by greatly expanding the market for its services, many physicians resisted such proposals, wary of becoming subordinated to lay managers. These fears were a powerful motive behind the drive at the end of the century to develop more effective medical organizations, whether modeled on the old corporations or on the newer trade unions.

The twentieth century. The continued development of ambitious national health care plans was one of the hallmarks of twentieth-century medicine in Europe. Britain established National Health Insurance (NHI) on Bismarckian lines in 1911; compulsory for low-wage workers, and financed by joint worker and employer contributions, it provided sickness benefits and paid for treatment by a general practitioner chosen by the patient from the NHI list—a “panel doctor.” Physicians received a capitation for each name on their list. After World War II, the new National Health Service (authorized in 1946, fully implemented in 1948) extended this system to the population at large, funding it mainly with general tax revenues. With the hospital system fully incorporated into the plan, medical care now became famously “free.” France followed a somewhat similar path, im-

plementing a social insurance plan in 1930 that included medical coverage; it was compulsory for low-wage industrial and commercial employees. The major difference between this plan and the British model was that patients would pay the physician of their choice and then be reimbursed 80 percent of a standard fee by their chosen insurer; several insurance options were available, including mutual-aid societies, which also offered supplementary policies to reimburse the 20 percent copayment. The Social Security system adopted in 1945 eventually extended coverage to virtually the entire population; it retained the expensive fee-for-service system, but with provisions in-



TRAINING PHYSICIANS IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE: A MODEL OF SCIENCE-BASED MEDICAL EDUCATION

The unification of Germany in 1871 resulted in uniform criteria for medical education and licensure throughout the new Empire, drawn essentially from the Prussian model. Training emphasized both laboratory science and practical clinical experience. Candidates had to possess a diploma from a classical secondary school (*Gymnasium*), study medicine for four years at a university (including two semesters spent in medical and surgical clinics), and deliver four babies. One part of the licensure examination covered the basic medical sciences; it included a demonstration of practical skills in histology, physiology, the preparation of pathological specimens, and the use of the microscope. The remainder of the examination comprised written, oral, and clinical tests on general medicine and surgery, together with ophthalmology, obstetrics, and gynecology. Each candidate had to perform at least one dissection. The clinical work entailed examining and caring for six patients over an eight-day period. The candidate also had to deliver a baby and show on an anatomical model how to deal with different presentations of the fetus. The German standards were generally recognized as the most rigorous anywhere in the nineteenth century.

Bonner, p. 254, citing *Reglemente für die Prüfung der Ärzte und Zahnärzte vom 25. September 1869*. Berlin, 1869.



TABLE 2
SOVIET INTERMEDIATE MEDICAL PERSONNEL BY SPECIALTY IN 1950 AND 1974

<i>Specialty</i>	<i>End of 1950</i>		<i>End of 1974</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>
Feldshers	160,000	22.2	525,100	21.7
Feldsher-midwives	42,000	5.8	78,500	3.2
Midwives	66,500	9.2	244,100	10.1
Assistants to environmental health doctors and assistants to epidemiologists	18,500	2.6	45,500	1.9
Nurses	325,000	45.2	1,185,500	48.9
Medical laboratory assistants	25,300	3.5	105,300	4.3
X-ray technicians and x-ray laboratory assistants	7,500	1.0	29,800	1.2
Dental technicians	6,700	0.9	30,000	1.2
Disinfectors* and disinfectionists	27,000	3.8	87,000	3.6
Residual group†	40,900	5.7	92,300	3.8
Totals	719,400	100	2,423,100	100

* This is a conjectural translation of *dezinstruktori*.

† Not given in source; obtained by subtracting numbers listed under each specialty from the grand total.

Sources: *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR* for 1970, p. 692; and for 1974, p. 730. Michael Ryan. *The Organization of Soviet Medical Care*. Oxford, 1978, p. 71.

tended to limit physicians' actual charges in most cases to the maximum set in an approved fee schedule. These mechanisms were of some help in protecting patients, but the system as a whole had no budgetary cap. The escalating costs led to further restrictions but not to a capitation system; France clung to its version of socialized medicine with a liberal face.

In Russia, the social insurance law adopted in 1912 was in many ways comparable to the Bismarckian system, but the October Revolution (1917) brought far more radical changes. After initially coopting the insurance system, the Bolsheviks found themselves embroiled in a protracted conflict between proponents of workers' insurance and of a rival vision of universal, state-controlled Soviet medicine. The 1920s were a period of flux, in which Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) made room for a significant private medical sector. With the end of the NEP in 1928 came a campaign against private medical practice (though it was not outlawed) and much tighter controls over the work of physicians. The government set up numerous medical centers, dispensaries, and health

stations in factories and on the new collective farms, elements in a comprehensive national health care system. The return to an insurance model started only in 1991, just before the Soviet Union collapsed, part of the broader move away from the planned economy. The basic system introduced in the Russian Federation consisted of national and regional compulsory insurance plans, with the possibility of private insurance as a mostly symbolic affirmation of free-market values.

The October Revolution transformed not just health care coverage but also the entire medical field, particularly after the demise of the New Economic Policy. The Pirogov Society was abolished in 1922; medical personnel in the Soviet Union became "health workers," most of them state employees; a central Health Commissariat was established to oversee public health and medical care; the medical faculties, detached from the universities, became training institutes under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat. Although populist pressures for physician care for the entire population led to a move away from lower-

level practitioners in the 1920s, the feldshers became a central part of the new Soviet health program in the 1930s, promoted by the Communist Party as more genuinely proletarian than physicians. (See Table 2).

Under the Soviet system, the medical profession declined to a level of pay and status below that of technical workers. Its position deteriorated further in the unstable economy that followed the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. Soviet medicine also became increasingly feminized, reinforcing the pattern established in Russia before 1917. Generous policies on maternity leave, child care, equal educational opportunities, equal pay, and the theoretical right to hold any job or political office contributed to the trend. But the percentages also reflected a tendency for men to seek more attractive opportunities elsewhere.

The structure of the medical occupations changed in western Europe as well. The number of specialists, on the one hand, and of paramedical personnel, on the other, increased substantially, though not to the same degree as in the United States. Graduates of new nursing schools increasingly replaced the old nursing orders; other auxiliaries provided special services, such as rehabilitative therapy, under a physician's supervision. What the Russians called "intermediate-level practitioners" suffered varying fates but generally declined, apart from midwives, who remained much more strongly implanted in Europe than in the United States.

CONCLUSION: ENTERING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

At the end of the twentieth century, the European medical scene was not what many would have predicted at its beginning. In 1900, recent advances in the medical sciences, especially microbiology, seemed to promise a new science-based medicine that would dramatically improve the health of the population,

raise the status of the medical profession, and discredit alternative medical systems. These expectations were fulfilled in part. Yet the last years of the century also saw the rise of antibiotic-resistant microorganisms, particularly tuberculosis, and the emergence of frightening new diseases, one of which, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), established a significant presence in Europe. Many other diseases and disorders remained beyond the power of medicine to cure or even to explain, and although life expectancy reached new heights (except in some of the former Soviet republics, where it declined), this was not necessarily true of the quality of life. Moreover, despite the triumphs of biomedicine, alternative medicine flourished as never before, borrowing freely from Chinese, Indian, and other non-Western philosophies and medical systems, as well as from indigenous healing traditions. Medical consumers had a wider choice of therapies for self-treatment than ever before, many of them available on the Internet, or at least the prosperous ones did. Europe still suffered from social inequities in medical care, though they were far less pronounced than in the United States.

Except for a relatively small number of highly paid specialists, most practitioners in the late twentieth century saw their incomes stagnate and their autonomy decline, as the cost restrictions imposed by the various forms of public health care plans began to bite more deeply. In the 1970s, a common radical critique had denounced the excesses of professional and medical power; by 2000 it seemed clear that much of the real power lay elsewhere.

The situation at the beginning of the new millennium confirmed the basic theme of this article. Although the development of modern biomedicine has been a powerful force, medicine is also shaped by larger social, cultural, political, and economic factors. New forms of medical pluralism replaced older ones. The social history of medicine cannot be written simply as a linear story of the rise of medical science and the medical profession.

See also Professionals and Professionalization (volume 3) and other articles in this section.

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CHILDBIRTH, MIDWIVES, WETNURSING



Amanda Carson Banks

For the majority of western European history, childbirth was viewed as a normal process, and the community was content to allow nature to follow its course. The predominant practices and associated material items and indeed the very language were predicated on this understanding and approach to birth. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1771) reflected such a philosophy by defining midwifery as “. . . the art of assisting nature in bringing forth a perfect foetus, or child from the womb of the mother.” Intervention was rare; doctors were called only in the case of an impossible delivery, the death of the mother, or the death of the child *in utero*, and the beliefs and traditions of society governed this process.

Since the Renaissance, childbirth, midwifery, and early infant care in Europe have been influenced and shaped by societal issues, resulting in great changes, new understandings, and different practices. The history of this cycle provides an exciting opportunity to observe how broad changes in a society interact with each other to impact and influence a smaller, specific area. Specifically, these changes include the waning authority of the Catholic Church, the Enlightenment and its emphasis on reason, advances in technology and medical knowledge, industrialization and the move of large portions of the population to urban centers, changes in economic structures and the rise of the middle class, changes in belief patterns and structures in both organized religion and “household” or folk religions, and changing definitions and “new” understandings about women’s bodies and health.

This history has been approached in a number of different ways and from a variety of perspectives. Until the mid-twentieth century, the history of birth was presented as a continuum of medical advances, charting the role not of the community but of technological developments in the birth process. Works like Albert Buck’s *The Dawn of Modern Medicine* (1920), George Engleman’s *Labor Among Primitive*

Peoples (1882), and Herbert Spencer’s *The History of British Midwifery from 1650–1800* (1927) are examples and were based on a cultural evolutionary understanding of western medicine. Describing practices undertaken and advocated by medical professionals, they did not capture or discuss the experiences of the vast majority of women giving birth, nor did they address the issues of the surrounding society and how these intersected with the process.

In the nineteenth century, early folklorists and antiquarians began to collect what they regarded as “relics of the past,” particularly the traditions and beliefs of the more rural areas. Examples associated with pregnancy, childbirth, and infancy were also gathered in this process and included items such as notions about dietary intake and prenatal marking, the divination of the sex of the child, practices and styles of delivery, methods of pain relief, postures for delivery, and the customs and rituals of birth-chamber attendants. These were recorded in large collections of folkways and rural practices and are great resources for historical information.

Later efforts to create a history of birth from a social or cultural perspective placed such traditions and practices in Europe within chronological periods that were seen as having similar or consistent trends and practices. A typical first period begins in the depths of the past with social birth, where women were highly involved in delivery as midwives, mothers, and assistants, practicing a noninterventionist approach that centered around serving the mothers. A second period begins in the mid-1700s with the growing importance of the profession of medicine and the increase in the study and practice of midwifery by male physicians. A third period, from the mid-nineteenth century until the early twenty-first century, is portrayed as a period of consolidation of medical control over birth, with an increasing definition of birth as a pathological, disease state that requires medical control and management.

SOCIAL BIRTH— THE RENAISSANCE TO 1700

In the time of “social birth,” the process of labor and delivery was a community event. Near the time of delivery the neighborhood midwife was alerted that her services would be required in the days to come. When the moment arrived, the father, another child, or a neighbor was sent to bring her to the home to assist in the delivery. The midwife would bring along the tools of her trade—twine, scissors, cloth, and perhaps a portable birth stool or chair. The birth stool or chair would be assembled and the mother would spend her labor talking with the friends and neighbors who had gathered. When she reached the point of delivery, she would sit upon the birth stool and deliver her child. The birth stool or chair was an important artifact of birth in Europe well into the nineteenth century. It was the implement of choice for midwives, early man-midwives or accoucheurs, and even found popularity among early obstetricians. Birth chairs were used across national boundaries, by rural and urban women, and by both upper and lower classes for delivery. While exhibiting certain common characteristics throughout the continent, such as the semi-

circular opening in the low seat, an open and supportive back, and hand-holds for bracing during contractions, these items of traditional birth bore the distinctive qualities of various areas, including regionally unique ornamentation and construction. In fact, the birth chair was so intimately associated with birth and midwives until the mid-nineteenth century that it was used in both textual references and in art to symbolize the birth act. In some instances, the midwife of a region was recognized for her services to the community and provided with a chair or a stool. For example, an account from the records of Stadt Baden in Switzerland in 1427 records that a midwife was hired to serve the town, and in 1429 a *kindbetterstul*, a birth stool, was purchased for her use.

Midwives and early midwifery texts. Midwives have a long history. They were long considered high-ranking members of their communities and were sources of advice in birth control, pregnancy, child rearing, and conception, as well as all elements of community health care. Midwives had an expansive knowledge of herbal treatments ranging from the early use of ergot, a wheat fungus that stimulates labor (later used and marketed as a medical drug), to anesthetics, aids for relaxation, and herbs to cause the contraction of the uterus. Midwives passed the bulk of their knowledge from one to another through oral communication and informal apprenticeship. Little written material was available regarding midwifery, and the available texts were in Latin (like the works of Hippocrates, Magnus, and Savonarola).

One of the first European books on midwifery written in the vernacular was Ortloff von Bayerland's *Das Frauenbüchlein* (Little book for women; 1500). Eucharius Rösslin, the city physician of Frankfurt-am-Main, soon followed with a similar book, *Der Swangeren Frauen und Hebammen Rosengarten* (A garden of roses for pregnant women and midwives; 1513). Like Ortloff and others to follow, Rösslin directed his text to practicing and knowledgeable midwives, offering few suggestions as to actual delivery but rather advising that they follow nature and do what seemed best. The text of Jakob Rueff (1500–1558), director of midwives in Zurich, *Ein schön lustig Trostbüchle in von den Empfängnissen und Geburten der Menschen* (Cheerful, gay, and comforting little book about the conception and birth of people; 1544) is equally revealing of the general practice of delivery in its descriptions and detail about the practice and artifacts of birth, and of the basic tenor of societal attitudes toward the process. He briefly describes the process of birth, suggests some tools, primarily crochets for dissecting a blocked or dead infant *in utero*, and describes the attributes of a

model midwife. Louise Bourgeois followed with a casebook of sorts, detailing her experiences as a midwife in *Observations diverses de Loyse Bourgeois ditte Boursier, Sage-femme de la Roynne* (1617).

Of course, just because midwifery writers from various points of the continent were writing similar accounts does not prove that the general practices of birth were universal throughout England and Europe. The proof is in the fact that these were not the only works. Many texts were written throughout Europe that offered the same advice and understanding about birth, and these texts portrayed midwives as serving their community, government, and church and occupying a revered position in society.

Midwives and witchcraft. Despite the high status midwives held within the community, they also bore the burden of suspicion. Beginning in the Middle Ages, midwives in most European countries were required to be certified by parish priests, or in larger cities such as Paris, London, Frankfurt, and Cracow, by the bishop, as to their upstanding virtue and honesty and their lack of association with witchcraft in order to practice legally. Without this church approval and early licensing, a woman who acted as a midwife or healer was open to charges of witchcraft. The church became involved because midwives were required by law to baptize children, often *in utero*, in the event of a difficult or fatal delivery so the infant could be absolved of original sin prior to death. In addition, part of a midwife's duties, as dictated by church authorities, was to determine the identity of an illegitimate child's father. The Catholic Church was more interested, therefore, in the role of midwives as Christians than in their skills in delivery.

Suspicion related to witchcraft had dogged the reputation and careers of midwives since at least the time of the Dominicans Heinrich Kramer and Jakob Sprenger who wrote in their 1484 *Malleus Maleficarum* (Hammer of witches), "No one does more harm to the Catholic Church than midwives." This suspicion of witchcraft stemmed from various Christian doctrines that loosely supported the interpretation of illness or death as the will of God or the result of sin and association with the devil. In fact, Jacob Rueff believed that "monsters," children with deformities, were begotten by devils. By association, midwives were vulnerable to charges of witchcraft in case of failure to deliver a perfect child. Suspicion was also attached to their free access to objects long considered magical: the placenta, the umbilical cord, and the caul of an infant. In 1555 Würzburg, in Bavaria, instituted regulations that forbade midwives to take the placenta away from a birth and required that they throw it in

running water (for purification) for disposal. As late as 1711 Brandenburg regulations forbade midwives to give away or sell any remains of birth like the membranes, caul, or umbilical cord.

Wet nursing. While critical to the birthing process, a midwife could do little in the area of feeding or nurturing an infant unless she was also a wetnurse. Typically, a mother would feed her own child. In situations where a mother was unable to nurse, either because of sickness, inability to produce milk, or death, a wetnurse was employed to feed the child until weaning. Broadly conceived, wetnursing—the practice of a woman suckling another's woman's child for pay—stretched well beyond simply feeding the infant. It included all areas of childcare and early infant nurture. The majority of wetnurses in Europe were initially employed by foundling hospitals for the care and feeding of children who had been abandoned or handed over after the death of the mother.



FORCEPS

Obstetric forceps were invented in France in 1588 by Peter Chamberlain (1560–1631). The forceps were shaped like two large spoons and were inserted into the birth canal one at a time around the infant's head and then screwed together. The infant was then pulled out. Use of forceps increased the possibility that the infant might survive a difficult or otherwise impossible delivery, and was a significant improvement over past practices where the child had to be dissected in cases of impaction or impossible delivery. As Hugh Chamberlain, Peter's grandnephew, wrote, use of the forceps dispelled the notion "... that when a man comes, one or both must necessarily die." The forceps brought much honor and business to the Chamberlain family and they were jealously guarded, carried from one job to another in a large, locked, and highly ornate wooden box. When the Chamberlains arrived the mother was blindfolded, all birth attendants sent from the chamber, the room darkened, and bells and noises used to muffle the noise of the forceps. Due to this secrecy, forceps were almost unknown until 1699, when the design was sold to a Dutch college.

However, the popularity of wetnursing among women who could feed their own infants but for a number of reasons chose not to grew more widespread among royalty and upper classes of Europe between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. For these classes, one of the primary reasons for choosing to send a child out to nurse was the need to keep the cycle of ovulation continuing, so that a mother could give birth and quickly conceive again. Often, a wetnurse kept the child in her care long after the actual act of wetnursing ceased, which typically occurred after 24 months. The age that the child was weaned was determined not by a paid wetnurse but rather by the father, and varied according to the sex and birth order of the child. Eldest sons received nursing care the longest and youngest daughters received it for the shortest time. The wetnursing system was well organized early on. Networks of fathers and the husbands of wetnurses almost exclusively negotiated the contracts, and in many cases of extant documentation, theirs are the only names listed on contracts. There were also organized caravans for wetnurses returning from cities with their new charges, and government-managed bureaus. In many cases, at town or village celebrations, holidays, markets, and fairs wetnurses would gather to announce their availability. In Spain,

Portugal, and Germany wetnurses wore special costumes or clothing that indicated their business.

A woman who had recently lost her own child was regarded as the ideal nurse. Second best was a woman who had recently weaned her child, but this was always regarded as a little questionable if the child remained in the home, due to concern that she would continue to nurse both children, thereby affecting the quality and quantity of the milk going to the paying child. Wetnurses were expected to be married women or very recently widowed. Traditional laws, rules, and expectations of behavior were both understood and often captured in the wording of written contracts. For example, nurses were not to associate with their husbands during their tenure as wetnurses. In fact, one of the nurses of the future Louis XIV was dismissed because she was overheard talking with her husband in a garden. This rule was in place because it was believed that the milk of women who engaged in sexual relations was less palatable for infants. Further, the milk of pregnant women was considered of substandard quality, since it was believed that the fetus would draw all the nutrients away from the milk, making it weak and useless to the nursing child. Parents were also upset if their wetnurse turned out to be menstruating while nursing, as this milk was also con-

sidered unhealthy and polluted and possibly dangerous for the child. They would often terminate the contract or, if they could not find a replacement nurse, reduce her wages to reflect their opinion about the quality of her milk. While early wetnurses were all married women who either lost a child or had weaned one early, gradually more and more women placed their own children out to poorer, rural wetnurses so that they in turn could take on higher-paying customers for their milk.

Until the mid-eighteenth century medical writers and some midwifery manuals gave advice about the qualities and characteristics to look for during the selection of a wetnurse. It was believed that not only would a child pick up habits from the nurse, such as “coarse behavior,” but also that the demeanor, style, manner, and appearance of the nurse could be transmitted through her milk to her nursling. There was also the belief in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the sex of the child the wetnurse had recently given birth to would have an effect on the child she would nurse, in that the milk was designed for a child of a particular sex and could be damaging, or perhaps even deadly, when given to a child of the opposite sex. The belief that children took on the mental and physical qualities of the one providing the milk remained strong well into the eighteenth century. This belief not only influenced the choice of a wetnurse, but also raised some questions and some hesitation about artificial feeding using animal’s milk. Stories were told about children becoming goatlike or stupid like sheep for being fed the milk of these animals, and the later midwifery texts advised against anything but mother’s milk unless as a last resort. In foundling homes where a shortage of available parish funds for paying wetnurses, or a general shortage of nurses made this necessary, goats, asses, and sheep were kept on the grounds so children could either be fed the milk via carved-out animal horns, or, most frequently, they were held straight to the animal’s teat for feeding.

While maltreatment of the infant was rare, since it was a source of income and any damage or death would result in loss of pay, abuse did happen on occasion. The primary danger to nurslings, however, was the threat of being “over-laid,” that is, the nurse rolling over onto them and smothering them while asleep and nursing in bed. Devices were designed to prevent this, and parents would often supply the nurse with such protection, along with swaddling clothes and infant wear. Infants also died of the many ailments and diseases that commonly affect children, and the graveyards of rural parishes throughout Europe have a disproportionate number of infant graves given the gen-

eral population, for if a child died, the nurse would have it buried locally and then would notify its parents.

THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT— 1700–1850

With the Enlightenment, the authority of the Catholic Church waned and the pursuit of scientific study and reason increased. Medicine was freed from the outdated notions of Galen and other ancient writers and from the confines of religious orthodoxy concerning illness and health. In midwifery programs, male physicians were at last allowed access to the study of the human body, post-mortem dissections, and attendance and observation of pregnant and delivering women. While initially these physicians had access primarily to the difficult or deadly cases of birth, by the early eighteenth century physicians were attending difficult cases even outside the charity centers of the university, writing midwifery texts, and even founding lying-in hospitals exclusively for the delivery of indigent women.

The practices of birth changed as a result. Most evident are the change in posture for delivery from upright in a birth chair to recumbent in a bed, and the shift toward the male birth attendant. Changes were also apparent in attitudes toward women and in



THE FIRST USE OF A RECUMBENT POSTURE FOR DELIVERY

According to tradition, the first use of a recumbent posture for a normal delivery (and in some versions, the historic first use of a man-midwife by choice for a normal delivery) was by Louis XIV’s mistress, Louise de la Valliere, in the late seventeenth century. It is said that Louis insisted that she lie down upon a bed so that he could observe the birth (a socially inappropriate activity of the time) from a hiding place behind the curtains. The legend follows that influential members of the French court then followed King Louis’s lead and took to employing man-midwives when they wished to keep their illicit affairs a secret since a midwife’s duties, as dictated by the authorities, included determining the identity of an illegitimate child’s father.

the language regarding pregnancy and birth. Such terms as “teeming” and “breeding” to describe pregnancy were replaced in contemporary diaries, literature, and other texts with terms such as “sick,” “confined,” and, tellingly, “ill.” A writer in the London *Gentleman’s Magazine* in 1791 commented on this.

All our mothers and grandmothers, used in due course of time to become with child or as Shakespeare has it, *roundwomb’d* . . . but it is very well known that no female, above the degree of chambermaid or laundress, has been with child these ten years past . . . nor is she ever *brought to bed*, or *delivered*, but merely at the end of nine months, has an accouchement antecedent to which she informs her friends that at a certain time she will be confined.

Midwifery and the rise of obstetrics. The declining influence of the church had made charges of witchcraft less frequent, and midwives continued to practice their art on a large scale throughout Europe. However, doctors began to question the role and ability of midwives. Midwifery manuals soon gave way to obstetrical texts that were less directed toward practicing midwives and more toward physicians. They covered the more fascinating aspects of labor and delivery, and in the titles of these works, pregnancy and birth were increasingly referred to as the diseases of women. The limited exposure of doctors to normal labor, and the popularity of texts that dealt almost exclusively with abnormalities such as poor presentation, impacting, narrow pelvises, and the birth of “monsters” (infants with acute deformities), cultivated an increasingly threatening picture of birth that quickly led to a perception among doctors, and eventually among the population they tended, that pregnancy was anything but normal. The texts that were designed for midwives became more directional and instructive, eventually becoming little more than advice booklets for matrons, not midwives. These books instructed women as to proper behavior during pregnancy examinations and birth, and provided general guidance for the selection and use of doctors. The gradually changing tone of these texts cultivated a changing attitude and approach to midwives and, by association, women. The discovery of the lucrative field of man-midwifery, as well as the growing influence of physicians’ guilds and colleges proved to be real threats to the practice of traditional midwifery and to the livelihood of female midwives.

According to William Smellie (1697–1763), a British physician, when the British army and navy surgeons were put on half pay in 1748, many of them attended his lectures on midwifery in order to increase their incomes by practicing as “man-midwives,” the



THE ACCOUCHEUR

The term *accoucheur* was used in reference to man-midwives and appeared in the titles and texts of obstetrical works beginning in the late eighteenth century. The *Oxford English Dictionary* cites the first literary use of *accoucheur*, the French, and hence polite, term for obstetrician, as Laurence Sterne’s 1760 novel, *Tristram Shandy*. “—yet nothing will serve you but to carry off the man-midwife.—*Accoucheur*,—if you please, quoth Dr. Slop.—With all my heart, replied my father, I don’t care what they call you,—but wish the whole science of fortification, with all its inventors, at the devil;—it has been the death of thousands,—.” Literary tradition credits Dr. John Burton of York (1710–1771) as the victim of Sterne’s satire.

common term of the day. Simply taking the training and advertising their skill was not sufficient for doctors to change the way birth had been practiced for hundreds of years. They accomplished this by increasingly defining birth as a dangerous, pathological crisis that warranted, in fact demanded, their professional services. This undermined the credibility of midwives, compromised society’s belief in their skill, and fed the growing conception within society of the fragility of women. Society, led by the tone and tenor of these obstetrical authorities, began to suspect midwives of incompetence, evil, and squalor. Charles Dickens’s description of a midwife in *Martin Chuzzlewit* (1843) was typical and reflected his cultural milieu.

The face of Mrs. Gamp—the nose in particular—was somewhat red and swollen, and it was difficult to enjoy her society without becoming conscious of a smell of spirits. Like most persons who have attained to great eminence in their profession, she took to hers very kindly’ insomuch, that setting aside her natural predilections as a woman, she went to a lying-in or a laying-out with equal zest and relish.

By the late eighteenth century, through guild membership and the concomitant persecution of nonmembers who attempted to practice medicine, physicians and surgeons controlled and regulated the medical profession as they saw fit.

Ill health and birth as a pathology. The practice of birth was also affected by shifts in the general attitude of the populace about femininity and womanhood and their role in the birth process. Other important factors included the industrialization of Europe, changing economic structures, and the emergence of the middle class. Each played a significant role in shaping the new beliefs about the process in general. For doctors and scientists in the nineteenth century, birth had come to be viewed as dangerous because women were at last understood to be as weak and fragile as they truly were. Exertion and activity were regarded as dangerous to their health and general well-being. If a woman did not experience illness as a result of such activities, she must not be truly female. Thus, fragility and ill health became acceptable and indicative of refined sensibility and social status. Members of the growing middle class sought to emulate the wealthy classes in all ways, and showing that active economic participation of their wives and daughters was not necessary was critical. Idleness, once considered sinful, was now a status symbol.

The cultivation of upper-class women's ill health as a sign of status and civilized behavior further contributed to the growing conception that the whole process of childbearing was well beyond a refined woman's capability. The social corollary to such thinking was that if a woman did not appear to suffer a difficult, possibly dangerous, labor and delivery, she was in action and demeanor like a "savage." "In proportion as we remove women from a state of simplicity to luxury and refinement, we find that the powers of the system become impaired, and the process of parturition is rendered more painful. In a state of natural simplicity, women in all climates bear children easily, and recover speedily" (Edward Murphy, 1862). If a woman was civilized, it was believed, she needed medical help in delivery.

In the nineteenth century birth did in some ways become more difficult. The idealization of women as fragile created an image of women as inherently unhealthy. Meanwhile, life in the industrialized city and the standards of fashionable dress in many ways made image reality. Years of use of women's undergarments and supports, such as corsets and straitlacing, seriously altered a woman's anatomy, and made delivery difficult or impossible due to a malformed torso and pelvic area, not to mention the damage done to the fetus by their continuous use throughout a pregnancy.

The history of birth has also been shaped by changes in the structure of communities due to industrialization and urbanization. The strong bonds of female community, particularly noticeable through

their earlier participation in the delivery of a community member, were weakened by the movement of large segments of the population to cities, where friends, family members, and neighbors were unavailable. Socially, pregnancy became an increasingly unacceptable topic of polite conversation. People rarely spoke about pregnancy and childbirth and when they did, they used euphemisms and told "where babies come from" stories (e.g., the stork and cabbage patches). Even practitioners used such euphemisms when advertising their services. For example, midwives in France had signboards depicting women in cabbage patches with smiling infant faces.

By the middle years of the nineteenth century the general practice of delivery was strikingly different from what it had been a hundred years earlier. Increasingly, birth was seen as a medical specialty that was practiced rather than a natural event that occurred. Birth chairs increasingly became more and more elaborate in order to compensate for the perceived inability of women to labor and deliver effectively alone. New postures for delivery were favored, from horizontal postures in special-made birth chairs to the fully recumbent postures in bed. Drugs were used to hasten delivery, bloodletting was practiced, and the extensive use of obstetrical tools was employed to remove the infant. Such changes made the doctor physically more comfortable and enhanced his feeling and appearance of control, but simultaneously increased the actual burden on the mother and removed control of the event from her. The elements and practices associated with the earlier, more natural, approach came to be regarded with apprehension and dread, representing a period before treatment was available: the dark ages of medicine and a time of "meddlesome midwifery."

Wetnursing in the eighteenth century. While midwifery experienced a great decline in appeal, the popularity of wetnursing reached its peak in the late eighteenth century. The economic and social conditions of the period played a large part in this. Early in the industrialization period, the increase of artisans, shopkeepers, and factory workers in the city expanded the market for the services of wetnurses. Such city workers found the cost of wetnursing was more affordable than the loss of their wives' salaries or labors. Doctors believed a nursing child could drain all the strength and health from a mother, and therefore encouraged women to find wetnurses (this follows the folk tradition that a woman loses a tooth per child nursed). The upper and middle classes, influenced by this thinking and the greater social freedom it permitted, continued to utilize wetnurses. It is notable

that Catholic countries (France, Spain, and Italy) had stronger traditions of wetnursing, bureaus to manage the process, and governmental laws and regulations to control it. This wider use of wetnurses was in part due to the larger number of foundling hospitals and the higher number of abandoned infants. In Protestant countries fewer infants were put out to wetnurse; also, fewer children were abandoned. In fact, in countries such as Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, children were not typically sent out to nurse at all. Rather, the nurse was frequently required to be resident in the family home while employed. In some cases, a wetnurse was employed to visit the baby's home once or twice a day to feed the child.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF MEDICAL AUTHORITY—1850–2000

By the mid-nineteenth century, obstetrics had arrived as a legitimate branch of medicine almost entirely male dominated. Maternity hospitals or lying-in centers were first used only by poor women who were delivered for free in exchange for their use as test cases for medical students. However, in the early twentieth century upper-class women and paying customers increasingly gave birth in hospitals following the introduction of obstetrical anesthesia, most particularly, the Twilight Sleep. This method, introduced by Bernhard Krönig in Germany in 1899, used a combination of morphine and scopolamine and caused an amnesiac and unconscious state. It was regarded as a blessing to women since it removed all pain and erased most memory of the process. Like the changes brought about by other medical implements, such as forceps, the use of anesthesia affected the process and practice of birth significantly. It increased the number of medical personnel required for an effective birth; it limited the posture for delivery to a recumbent, often restrained, position; and it strengthened the portrayal of women as too ineffective to manage the process alone. Delivery in hospitals took place in operating rooms or theaters, with the women highly anesthetized on flat tables or hospital gurneys that included arm straps, shoulder straps, and stirrups with leg restraints, attended by licensed medical personnel. Midwives and mothers were literally and symbolically absent. The texts concerning birth were medical ones detailing procedures. The history of birth was written as an example of glorious advances of western civilization. The texts available and intended for women were treatises on home economics, advice for mothering, scientific housekeeping, diapering, and tips for care and nurture.

Renewed communication and alternative birth.

Coupled with the growing trend toward forms of socialized or nationalized medicine in European countries, in the mid-twentieth century, women began once again to communicate with one another on the topic of birth. Bolstered by dialogue, women sought out information and brought about the growing popularity in Europe of natural methods of birth like *Accouchement Sans Douleur* (the Lamaze Method) and the methods of Grantly Dick-Read and Frederick Leboyer, who sought not only to reduce unnecessary intervention in their deliveries, but also to defeat patronizing attitudes of professional medicine toward women. The movement toward more natural birth was popular among both childbearing women and the medical profession as a way to better and more economically care for women in childbirth. Medicalized birth was lessened, and more natural and healthier approaches to childbirth reappeared. In addition, the last three decades of the twentieth century also saw the rise of a small movement for alternative birth. En-

compassing a wide variety of natural, alternative, and noninterventionist practices, the movement for alternative birth placed value on the mother's role and strove for practices that worked in concert with birth, rather than attempting to dictate and manipulate it. This movement looked to traditional practices and the growing trend toward self-care for models of practice. Newer approaches were introduced, such as underwater birth, and older practices were revived, like birth as a community-attended event.

Midwives in the twentieth century. In the early years of the twentieth century, midwives in much of Europe, already professionally compromised, increasingly lost access even to indigent women as clients. Hired by governments and municipalities, midwives performed home visits following delivery to check on the mother and to monitor the infant's progress, and were infrequently, if ever, participants in the birth process. Only in very rural areas were midwives still the primary birth practitioners, as need dictated their participation.

With the growth of nationalized medicine, midwives made a return to delivery, caring for the majority of births, those without likelihood of complications requiring significant intervention. As an increase in births crowded available space and resources at hospitals, a trend emerged toward shorter stays, fewer "procedures," and the less expensive attendance of midwives at birth. Midwives practiced in hospitals as certified nurse-midwives, legally licensed and recognized. A large number of lay midwives (unlicensed) attended home births and other alternative forms of delivery. In England and on the continent, midwives delivered a large portion of infants with a physician merely attending, although the control and management of what is considered a normal birth, and what is deemed appropriate care, was still governed by professional medicine.

Wetnursing in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As more and more women delivered in hospitals and stayed for extended periods, they began the process of nursing as advocated by the newer gen-

eration of obstetricians, and wetnursing experienced a demise. With the influence of reformers who campaigned throughout the nineteenth century for a closer mother-child relationship, and the development of adequate forms of artificial feeding, including bottles, infant cups, nipples, and spoons, and sanitary cow's milk, wetnursing was no longer useful, fiscally sound, or any more beneficial than any other means of feeding. While technological advances in artificial feeding did not immediately affect the rate at which children were given over to nurses, they did change the work of the nurse from wetnursing to dry nursing (hand feeding with bottles).

World War I, falling on the heels of decades of campaigning by social authorities about the benefits of mothers nursing their own children, was a primary cause of the demise of wetnursing. During the war, women found that, indeed, wetnursing was far more expensive than the new, alternative forms of infant feeding. After the war, fewer women worked outside the home, making wetnursing unnecessary. It was all but nonexistent in European countries in 2000. Friends and relatives might nurse a child while the mother was away, but there is almost no evidence of a paid market for wetnurses, and the trend toward bottle feeding remained fixed. The advent of effective breast pumps made even bottle feeding with cow's milk unnecessary.

CONCLUSION

While the history of childbirth, midwifery, and early infant-care has changed significantly since 1500, the forces that shaped this history have been consistent. Changes in knowledge and advances in medical science have made a great impact. The economics of the community, societal customs, attitudes about women's roles, changing social classes, and industrialization have also played a significant role in the history of birth. For this reason, the history of childbirth, midwives, and wetnursing provides a vibrant and tangible means of studying the power of cultural and societal norms and attitudes, and the changing face and values of society throughout European history. Likewise, this cycle will continue to reflect the ever-present changes in society.

See also Birth, Contraception, and Abortion; The Life Cycle (volume 2); Motherhood; Women and Femininity (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY



Roger Smith

“Psychology” denotes simultaneously an expert occupation and the character, mind, feelings, and behavior of individuals. “Psychiatry” denotes the medical specialty concerned with mental illness. The words themselves and the aspects of life they refer to, considered as distinct domains and classes of activity, are modern. The history of psychology and psychiatry encompasses a huge diversity of views about human nature and social relations, and that diversity was present even after psychology and psychiatry became professional occupations in the twentieth century.

Psychology as an occupation is an academic discipline, usually but not always understood to be a natural science, and a cluster of applied specialties. Described this way, psychology is overwhelmingly a twentieth-century phenomenon, a characteristic feature of Western modernity. In the sense of an individual’s mental life, however, everyone has a psychology, and it is possible to talk about the psychology of people anywhere and in any period of history. All the same, an intense focus on people’s psychology, rather than on other dimensions of the human world, is in fact distinctive of the twentieth-century West.

Psychology and psychiatry are distinct occupations, to the extent that the latter requires a medical qualification and is part of the medical profession. Nevertheless, there is considerable overlap of interest. Clinical psychology has been the largest area of employment for psychologists since about 1950; psychiatry has made significant contributions to psychological ideas, for example, of the emotions. In between psychology and psychiatry lies the history of psychoanalysis, the history of the considerable but controversial impact of the Viennese physician Sigmund Freud on European self-consciousness in the twentieth century.

PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERNITY

The modern history of psychology and psychiatry is bound up with the rise, beginning about 1880, of the

professions in the human sciences, the creation of service occupations offering expertise in human affairs—economics, political science, the management sciences, planning, and so on. These professions, and the social, legal, and governmental arrangements that support them, function to offer rational guidance or control in all aspects of human affairs. This contrasts with earlier ages in which it was thought right for order to stem from the interests of rulers, tradition, fate, or God. Psychology and psychiatry are therefore part of what the German sociologist Max Weber analyzed as the rationalization of the modern world.

Like so much European social history, the history of psychology and psychiatry varies considerably with local circumstance. As occupations participating in modernization, psychology and psychiatry fit the pattern in which modern social systems spread outward from Western Europe, in interaction with North America, to southern and eastern Europe. Nowhere in Europe, however, was the scale of development and size of the growing human science professions on a par with the United States. Although many European ideas had earlier crossed the Atlantic and informed American developments, after 1945 Western European psychologists often looked to American leadership in the development of the field as a natural science. Russia shared in Western developments in both psychology and psychiatry in the three decades before the 1917 revolution. Thereafter the Soviet system made any activity concerned with individual consciousness, capacities, and conduct a politically sensitive matter. Whatever the historical diversity, at the end of the twentieth century, psychology and psychiatry were deeply embedded in the experience and expectations of people and in the institutional arrangements of all European countries. Marriage guidance, counseling, market research, child care, education, self-development and self-identity, anxiety, mental breakdown, criminality, aging: every aspect of individual experience and relations between people had its socially embedded psychological or psychiatric reality.

The history of psychology is at one and the same time about what people are thought to share by virtue of a common nature, and how they are thought to differ by virtue of group or individual characteristics. Psychology has never been neutral, because classifying people by difference is the way social values are embedded in policy and action. European countries sought world empires, struggled for national or ethnic dominance, and ordered society by class and gender, and this involved drawing on as well as reinforcing psychology. Psychology provided the language with which to debate similarity and difference. Arguments about what people owe to an original nature as opposed to civilization, or to nature as opposed to nurture, have been a recurrent part of European as well as North American political discourse.

Much of what we associate with psychology is new. In the twentieth-century West there was a marked emphasis on individual qualities and individual subjective experience as the basic fabric on which society is built and in relation to which values must be judged. This stress on the value of individual people and their psychological world correlates with the spread of democracy in politics and competitive individualism in economic life. For example, voting in democratic societies is designed to decide issues according to the sum of individual preferences. Critics therefore draw on descriptions of earlier ways of life in which what was of value in a person was not individual feelings or preferences but rather her or his place in civic society, in God's plan, or in the progress of humanity.

In this regard the Renaissance appears to mark a decisive shift. Early Christians stressed the life and salvation of the individual soul, and Roman law recognized the dignity and responsibility of the individual person. In Europe between 1450 and 1650, however, there is evidence for a new self-consciousness about how subjective life distinguishes people as individuals. The portrait and the self-portrait became genres of painting; autobiography, letters, diaries, and religious interrogation of the soul spread as forms of communication with other people and—more distinctively—with one's self; and essays and philosophy emphasized individual experience as authority for knowledge. In the eighteenth century, the novel began to provide people with a way to fashion their own lives and sensibility. This culminated in romanticism, the Europe-wide culture that established a lasting commitment to individual feeling and creativity and set up the image of artistic genius as a model. If early-nineteenth-century language stressed the richness of the human soul in Christian terms, it

also valued the emotional and sensuous experience of embodied individuals.

Romantic ideals shaped human beings as psychological subjects during a century in which the industrial revolution and rapid urban growth gave rise to mass society in cities from Glasgow to Petersburg. When the individual acquired unprecedented freedom and lost identity through city life, psychology came into its own. Italian and French psychologists of the crowd, most popularly Gustave Le Bon, described how in the mass individuals lose autonomy and act by imitation. Social psychology began around 1900 to study the determinants of human relationships. The spread—however uneven—of economically liberal, democratic, and urban society in Europe was accompanied by forms of knowledge and power expressed through the psychology of the individual. When men and women collapsed or degenerated under the strain of the new conditions, or were perhaps ill-equipped at birth to cope, psychiatry provided a social response.

The crystallization of psychology and psychiatry as areas of activity at the end of the nineteenth century also depended on the increasing social authority of the natural sciences. The natural sciences, especially physiology, became the basis for what was claimed as expert knowledge about normal and abnormal individual capacities. Liberal and radical social thinkers turned to psychology and psychiatry in order to replace faith about the soul and God's will with facts about the mind and behavior. Conservative observers feared that the new sciences encouraged materialism, religious unbelief, and social upheaval if not revolution. The acceptance of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution in the second half of the century set such hopes and fears within a framework of belief about natural progress and the place of humanity in the universe. When the communist Soviet state was established in 1917, for a few years some intellectuals thought that the time had arrived when all prejudice about human nature inherited from the past could be thrown away. It was possible, they dreamed, "to engineer the human soul" (in words used at a writers' congress in 1934) and use psychology as the technology to create a new, free man. But for every believer in the inevitable march of scientific progress there was a pessimist who feared the cost. The reported figures for degeneracy, the evidence of alcohol and drug abuse, prostitution, venereal disease, mental deficiency, crime, and class and racial backwardness at the end of the nineteenth century gave substance to these fears and much of the content to modern psychology and psychiatry.

EARLY VIEWS OF HUMAN NATURE

There was no area of learning and no occupation called psychology (or psychiatry) in the Renaissance and early modern periods. There was, however, a rich language for individual character, the language of the humors, temperaments, spirits, and passions, which had originated with the ancient Greeks and been modified by Christian values. This was the language about people used by Shakespeare and Rabelais. It was used both by educated people, including physicians, and by the common people, and it provided a way to describe both human nature in general and individual differences. The language expressed a belief that treated disorders—body and soul were closely linked—as an imbalance in the humors and spirits. Description was as concerned with the moral and religious dimensions of human existence as with physical well-being, since all dimensions were equally real in a world ordained by God. Writers thought it natural to correlate order and disorder in the world and in the individual, to compare the macrocosm and the microcosm, and the body politic (the state) and the body physical. Astrology and magic appeared as reasonable ways of forecasting and intervening in human affairs.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, educated elites began to be skeptical about substantial parts of this belief system, though it retained a large popular following through to the twentieth century. New ideas favored a nonmagical, mechanical ordering of nature and the separation of the soul and the body as different entities (though practical knowledge, not least of madness and passion, held them together). The French philosopher René Descartes championed the idea that the body is fully a machine, and the Englishman John Locke wrote that individual knowledge and character is constructed piecemeal from experienced sensations. These steps seemed to render the study of human nature as much of concern to teachers and natural philosophers (the word “scientist” was not yet invented) as to theologians. Most provocatively, Locke introduced the argument that it is consciousness and memory, the product of experience, rather than a soul, which gives a person his or her identity.

Belief spread that the universe is ordered according to the laws revealed by Isaac Newton at the end of the seventeenth century, and known through experience in the manner analyzed by Locke. This gave intellectual content to the European culture present in the period between Louis XIV and the French Revolution and known to historians as the Enlightenment. Many observers then and later thought of this period as the beginning of the modern secular age, the age in which Europeans sought and made

progress on the basis of knowledge about nature and human nature alike. The “Enlightenment project,” as twentieth-century social critics called it, culminated later in great social movements, both in the marxist form claimed as authority for communism and in the liberal form developed under capitalism, to advance scientific knowledge of human beings and human affairs. In the eighteenth century, meanwhile, the argument that human nature becomes what it is through experience, and through the pleasures and pains of experience leading to one action rather than another, encouraged belief that education and social reform would lead people out of superstition, barbarism, and tyranny. But there remained a vast gap between the aspirations of the educated theorists of progress and the predominantly rural population of Europe. Yet, while Enlightenment ideas were restricted to small aristocratic circles in central and eastern Europe, there were settings where what the eighteenth-century Scotsman Adam Smith identified as commercial society flourished and supported “the science of Man” (to use

the contemporary expression). In cities like Edinburgh, London, Amsterdam, Bordeaux, Paris, and Geneva, and later in emerging provincial industrial cities like Birmingham and Lyon, social mobility, new wealth, and literacy opened up society to new and sometimes radical ideas.

In this intellectual and social context, a few writers, like the academic at the Prussian university of Halle, Christian Wolff, and the French-Swiss *philosophe*, Charles Bonnet, began to differentiate psychology as a branch of knowledge. Their interests were philosophical, religious, and moral rather than scientific in the later restricted sense of the term. The Scottish universities taught about the human mind and the formation of character under the rubric of moral philosophy, and they increasingly did so in a manner that separated the subject from theology and hence created more secular ways of thinking about human nature. David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*, published in 1739–1740, was a work in this vein, though it was too skeptical and un-Christian to attract an audience when published. In London and in pre-revolutionary Paris, the reformist Jeremy Bentham developed systematically the opinion that all individual action pursues pleasure or avoids pain, and hence that a calculus of pleasures and pains will make possible a new social order. In the East Prussian center of Königsberg, J. F. Herbart propagated a science of psychology in the service of government in the early nineteenth century. Psychology became differentiated as a branch of knowledge.

Responses to madness and abnormal behavior in the eighteenth century also became less focused on the soul or nonmaterial events and more on the disordered mind. Although it remained common to refer to disordered spirits, Locke's work suggested a view of madness as the wrong working of reflection on experience, a jumbling in the mind of the right order of sensations. Humoral theory continued in practice to underlie much ordinary care, and this was still the case when special homes and asylums for those with mental disorder began to be common in the late eighteenth century. Experience with what, from an educated European perspective, appeared to be abnormal people, gained through travel and encountering different customs, or simply through interacting with children and peasants, sharpened questions about what makes people the way they are. Debates about the origin of language, the state of mankind before civilization, and the effects of education were lively and open-ended, treating psychological ideas as part of discourse about social progress. All this helped shape a modern psychological language; for example, reference to the emotions rather than the passions be-

came common in English in the second half of the eighteenth century.

Contemporary observers of polite society were struck by a new delicacy, reflected in the new fiction, about individual feelings. An interest in sensibility, or claims about the faculty of perceiving beauty, attracted essayists, moralists, and physicians to psychological expression. There was renewed enthusiasm for the ancient and Renaissance art of physiognomy, the art of reading the soul's character from the face. The work of the Swiss pastor Johann Kaspar Lavater was celebrated, and the fashion for the cut-out profile of a person's head, the silhouette, spread through all homes with cultural aspirations. In Paris around 1800, the Austrian physician Franz Joseph Gall elaborated phrenology, the study of individual character by correlating the shape of the head with the underlying brain and mental faculties (like philoprogenitiveness, a polite term for the reproductive instinct). Many people in western Europe and North America learned to anticipate the creation of a science of human nature, accessibly focused on individual differences, by examining the embodiment of mind in the brain. Slightly before Gall, another Austrian physician, Anton Mesmer, introduced in Paris the trance phenomenon that bears his name, mesmerism, which also had a large public audience. When rethought (and called hypnotism), mesmerism suggested that there are hidden or unconscious powers in the human mind. In the late nineteenth century, hypnotism was the direct antecedent of the new science of the unconscious introduced by Freud and the French physician Pierre Janet, among others.

One of the most dramatic of all experiences in human differences, which captured everyone's imagination, was of so-called wild children, children apparently living alone like animals in the countryside. These children posed in concrete form the great political question of the Enlightenment: By what means has man achieved a state of civilization, and is this state natural? Stories of wild children recurred in Europe, even into the twentieth century. Captured in 1724, Peter the wild boy of Hanover was made to tour polite society and even to visit the court of George I of England. In 1801, in what remains the most famous of all experiments on psychological development, Jean Itard, the innovative head of the institute for deaf-mutes in Paris, began the task of bringing civility to the wild boy, Victor, who had lived alone in the woods of the Aveyron region and lacked language, cleanliness, and ordinary sensibilities. It was in these terms, rather than in the twentieth-century language of nature versus nurture, that people faced the challenge of understanding human nature.

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY

Psychology and psychiatry thus have very complex roots in many walks of life and not only in academic, philosophical, or medical circles. Two institutional changes in the first half of the nineteenth century had great importance for the consolidation of the fields as distinct social entities. First, the reform of German universities, stimulated by a cultural resurgence under the Napoleonic occupation, created circumstances in which areas of knowledge expanded and flourished as academic disciplines. Other countries imitated the German model or adapted it to local circumstances in the second half of the century. The changes put in place the basis for academic careers, for universities to be accepted as arbiters of knowledge, and for the rapid growth of natural science subjects. The discipline of experimental physiology developed, and it included research on the nervous system and on the senses, systematically studying mind and action in its physical setting. Then, beginning in the 1870s, especially around Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig and Georg E. Muller in Göttingen, there were new and successful

initiatives to make psychology a subject using natural science methods. When taken up elsewhere, especially in the United States, the philosophical dimension was reduced, and the outcome was the modern academic discipline of psychology. German psychological research focused on the composition of consciousness and the rational adult mind. But also in Germany, as elsewhere, research was guided by practical interests in education, commerce, social problems, or the law.

At the same time, especially following the efforts of the physician Wilhelm Griesinger in Berlin, the study of mental disorders entered the university and sought a place as part of scientific medicine rather than as part of asylum management. In gradual ways, varying with local administrative arrangements, this established the academic medical specialty called psychiatry. This step also depended on the second of the institutional changes to be mentioned, the asylum movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Across Europe, the asylum became the answer to what was newly perceived as a major social problem and challenge to humanitarianism, the plight of the insane. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the asylums were firmly in the medical orbit and associated with medical organizations that often turned their attention to social problems like alcoholism. The description of mental disorders, the clinical activity that preoccupied late-nineteenth-century psychiatry, was closely tied to moral judgment about the needs of social order. In the decades before World War I, the German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin, followed by the head of the Zurich institution, Eugen Bleuler, established the basic modern categories of mental illness, the manic-depressive and schizophrenic psychoses.

If institutional changes made possible new academic disciplines of psychology and psychiatry, a widely diffused social and political culture brought attention to the different capacities of individual minds and social groups, like social classes, men, women, nations, and races. Indeed, by the early twentieth century, psychology was well on its way to becoming the lingua franca, the shared language, of human difference. Phrenology had set an early example, but it was largely rejected by scientists by 1850. In the early twentieth century, psychologists began to classify people, and especially children in the classroom, by intelligence, by aptitude, and then, from the 1930s, by personality. The common usage of words like “intelligence” and “personality” is modern: “intelligence” replaced “reason” as it refers to a natural capacity shared in part with animals rather than an abstract phenomenon; and “personality” seemed to be a way to refer to the collective attributes of a person with-

out the old-fashioned moral judgments often implied in a reference to “character.”

New work on individual capacities depended on the development and standardization of tests, and the creation of statistics as the means to analyze test results and to relate results to supposed underlying causes of human differences. By this route in particular, psychologists developed an expertise that distinguished psychology as a separate occupation. Statistical analysis was an important British contribution, and in Britain the single most important influence on the academic subject of psychology was Francis Galton, a Victorian obsessed by finding ways to measure human variation. As an academic discipline, however, British psychology developed slowly in the twentieth century, in the interwar years in association with industrial and educational applications; it was only after 1945 that it grew rapidly in size.

In France, Victor Cousin dominated academic philosophy and teacher training for a considerable part of the nineteenth century, and his influence sustained an official view that psychology is the training of the soul in pursuit of the good, the true, and the beautiful. Then, in the 1870s, the concerted efforts of secular and Republican writers like Hippolyte Taine and Théodule Ribot created opportunities for what was called “new psychology,” a psychology built on experimental and clinical observation of people. The use of clinical methods, the intensive examination of single, exceptional individuals, gave a special character to French work. Alfred Binet studied hypnotized subjects, his own daughters, and great calculators before undertaking the work on individual children in the classroom that led him to devise the first intelligence tests, published in 1905. The Catholic Church responded to the new psychology, creating an institute that included the field in the University of Louvain or Leuven in Belgium in 1889. Pastors both Catholic and Protestant, as in the Netherlands in the 1920s, turned to psychology in the hope of overcoming the perceived distance of the churches from people’s experience of modern life.

Scientific ideas in general, and enthusiasm for psychology in particular, were unevenly spread in Europe. For those committed to modernization, the distribution of psychology mapped the unequal progress made by different countries. Reformers believed that ignorance and resistance to psychology and psychiatry indicated backwardness caused by dogmatic religion, economic and social underdevelopment, and oppressive rule. Progressive intellectuals in Catholic countries like Italy and Spain, or in an autocracy like Russia, therefore often looked to Britain, France, and Germany for advanced ideas and the authority for a

rational and humanitarian order. The evolutionary thought of Darwin and the contemporary social thinker, Herbert Spencer, was an important medium of cultural transfer, and both writers clearly supported a psychology that treated human beings as a part of nature. Students from countries on the margins of Europe studied abroad, brought home scientific thought and radical ideas, and—frequently associated with nationalist movements—sought the means to bring their peoples into the modern age. Much of the idealism went in fact into practical tasks in education or in medicine, as in the careers of the people who introduced modern psychology into Romania, Hungary, and elsewhere. Interest in psychology was part of liberal and radical hopes for change in Russia from the late 1850s. By the end of the century, the early efforts of Ivan M. Sechenov to link psychology and the brain were replaced by more recent French and German psychology and psychiatry. The Russian practitioners, however, faced by the unbending reactionary politics of the tsars, nearly all linked the future of their science to the modernization of the country. By the outbreak of World War I, then, Western secular ideas about human nature were widely diffused across Europe, if in some settings restricted to a small professional class.

Psychology and psychiatry took for granted certain norms of mental life and conduct. It was thought that divergences from the norms, implicitly understood to be male, Western, adult, and middle or upper class, constituted natural experiments, and hence great value was placed on studying children in contrast to adults, women in contrast to men, Anglo-Saxon in contrast to Italian, and so on. One such so-called natural experiment, multiple personality, intensively studied in France, appeared dramatically to question belief that human identity is given by a unitary soul. Then, in the years around 1900, Freud developed what he called psychoanalysis, working with the natural experiments provided by neurotic cases. He generalized from these cases, in the light of his own self-analysis, to construct a psychology of the unconscious, which argued that irrational feelings and motivation are normal, not abnormal. Immediately before World War I and in the interwar decades, he gained a large public audience for his views, not least because he provided a framework for thinking about sexuality, then becoming a publicly discussable topic. Further, as he pointed to the power of irrational forces in human life, his outlook matched Europe’s experience of war and the rise of Nazism and fascism. But even as Freud gained an audience, psychoanalysis split into factions, and his most influential earlier supporter, the Swiss psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung, left in 1913 to

construct his own analytical psychology, which emphasized the reality of a collective unconscious.

All the combatants in World War I centrally organized production and social life in the interest of national efficiency. Opinion was favorable to those who claimed scientific expertise in human affairs, psychologists among them. Psychologists contributed, for example, to studies of industrial fatigue, of great importance to the manufacture of munitions. In the 1920s psychotechnics, the use of psychological tests and experiments to assess personnel and work situations, was widely taken up. The Austrian railways, for example, employed a special train to test its staff. Research on the psychology of children, to create a basis for welfare and education, rapidly expanded. This research involved many women, and in this way as well as through popular texts and advice manuals, motherhood and psychological expertise became closely linked. Child care brought together psychology, psychoanalysis, and psychiatry, as at the Tavistock Institute in London, which became a major center for training people in psychotherapeutic approaches to social questions like marriage, doctor-patient rela-

tions, and delinquency. In the Netherlands and German-speaking countries, psychologists favored character analysis, using handwriting for example, a form of qualitative psychology that was thought to express the unique dignity of each person, in contrast to the quantitative techniques of assessment becoming widespread in the Anglo-American world. In the Soviet Union, by the end of the 1920s the Communist Party was asserting full authority over all areas of intellectual and social life, including the sciences and the professions. During the Stalin years there was suspicion of any practical activity or science not directly serving the communist interest as currently presented by the party. Psychology as a discipline came under suspicion, and in the early 1950s there was a concerted but never fully successful attempt to replace psychology by physiology. In Nazi Germany many psychologists found occupation in personnel testing, and some propagated a form of character analysis sympathetic to racist ends; yet others, many Jewish but also the influential group of Gestalt psychologists, were forced out of work and into emigration.

In the interwar years, psychology became increasingly divided between academic experimental research and the activity (including psychoanalysis) that flourished in practical settings. Many academic psychologists were interested in physiological psychology, the relation of mental events to brain functions, and their research was inaccessible to those not trained in the field. Interest in the brain did link psychology and medicine, especially via the clinical specialty of neurology, the field of brain disorders. Most psychiatrists hoped one day to be able to correlate mental illness and brain disorder, but the early years of the century were filled with pessimism. In the 1930s psychiatrists, almost desperate to make an impact on the seemingly intractable cases in asylums, turned to physical therapies that forcibly intervened in the brain. The effort was international: Manfred Sakel introduced insulin coma in Hungary, Ugo Cerletti used massive electric shock in Italy, followers of Ivan P. Pavlov in the Soviet Union induced deep sleep lasting days, and Egaz Moniz organized the first frontal lobotomy surgery in Portugal. All this was taken up in English-speaking countries before it was substantially displaced in the 1950s by new drug therapies that, for the first time, helped reverse the ever rising number of asylum patients.

Starting in the 1940s, brain research, led by the United States, became a heavily committed and fast-growing area of science, and some scientists claimed it would finally unravel the secrets of the human mind. Skeptics doubted that knowledge would be gained quickly, even when new computing technology suggested powerful models for psychological events

and encouraged what is known as cognitive psychology. Some critics were also opposed on religious or ethical grounds to viewing human beings as material machines. Nevertheless, there was a Europe-wide public following for new ideas about the brain and human identity, an interest taken up in science fiction and films.

While psychology developed very unevenly as an academic discipline and as an occupation in Europe, a large profession became established in the United States. Especially after 1945, United States psychology, which claimed to have established objective methods making psychology a rigorous science, was followed by many European countries, especially West Germany, the Netherlands, and those in Scandinavia. At this time the politics of social democracy and the welfare state supported the provision of psychological expertise and intervention in many areas of life and across the population. Whereas early psychoanalysis was available to a small number of fee-paying individuals, post-1945 psychotherapy became part of the life of ordinary people. Psychologically trained personnel worked on a substantial scale in education, personnel management, counseling, and with difficulties in living of all kinds. It seemed possible to represent the goals of life in psychological terms, and the literature of self-development and personal growth became big business, while many churches rethought pastoral care in a psychological idiom.

In Eastern Europe, following the liberation and then occupation of countries by the Red Army, psychology, like every other area of activity, was forced

into conformity with the current policies at the center in Moscow. This imposed an approach given legitimacy by reference to Pavlov's name in the 1950s, the evidence of which was still evident much later, though many intellectuals learned to live with a split between overt conformity and covert independence. Nevertheless, in the 1970s Soviet psychology itself began to diversify and expand, often drawing strength from marginalized earlier work, notably by the Marxist psychologist, Lev Vygotsky, who had died in 1934. With the breakdown of the Soviet empire in 1989 and the virtual ending of funding for science in Russia itself, Eastern European psychologists looked to the West for professional standards or for employment, or responded to a new private clientele.

In summary, the conspicuous twentieth-century growth of psychology in North America as well as in Europe means two things: It means, first, the establishment of a service occupation, which is itself divided between academic psychologists, who view psychology as a scientific discipline, and applied psychologists who view psychology as an expertise in the care and management of individual and interpersonal problems. Second, this development means a shift in beliefs and values, so that it is now widely and unthinkingly held that an expressive life in terms of individual psychology is what accords dignity to existence. A European culture, and more generally a Western culture, has emerged in which psychological knowledge is thought to give access to the good life, and critics have variously judged that this conviction is at the expense of political engagement, spiritual

concern, civic consciousness, and nonpersonal values generally. More positive observers note the humane values that appear to tie together democracy, systems

of social welfare and individual support, and psychological activity, giving people knowledge and power to govern their own lives.

See also other articles in this section.

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Section 18



WORK

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WORK AND THE WORK ETHIC



Peter Shapely

The subject of work and the work ethic in Europe covers an extremely varied number of issues, making generalizations difficult. The term “work” applies to a wide range of human activities. It can describe unpaid activity in the home and with the family or, more readily, a range of paid employment in, for example, manufacturing industries, agricultural work, crafts, or a profession. Each group has numerous subdivisions, such as unskilled, semiskilled, skilled, clerical, management, and entrepreneur. Other divisions are drawn along gender and age lines.

Work is not simply an economic activity. To fully appreciate its significance, work has to be examined and understood as a cultural activity and as a construct of society. Work ethics are a reflection of these social and cultural constructs rather than the economic process. Because it is not simply a physical activity designed to secure material benefits, work and especially ideologies of work have to be seen in the political and social contexts as well as the economic context to be properly understood. This article considers work and work ethics in these contexts and briefly looks at a number of areas. In the preindustrial period the focus was on work in agriculture and, to a lesser extent, the craft industries. The nature of the work performed by men and women was different, though only in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was the economy of work in Europe perceived as a separate sphere of action for men and women. An inseparable correlation existed between family, home, and work. Industrialization gradually brought a number of changes across Europe. Work slowly moved from the home into factories, and practices and hours of work became more regulated. Industrialization had a significant impact on women and children. Subsequently the state became more involved in providing a regulatory framework that guaranteed hours, pay, and conditions.

Although the European Union brought an increasing sense of homogeneity to work practices through standardizing legislation in western Europe, a singular work experience or set of practices previ-

ously did not exist across the Continent. Work was never seen as a sole experience or activity, and work patterns always developed unevenly. This is true of the whole period from the early sixteenth century through the twentieth century. No single model explains the pattern of work in Europe. Even labels, such as the “industrial revolution”, are misleading because they suggest that a clear and singular process occurred simultaneously throughout the area and eventually led to the dominance of mechanization and the factory. The process of change was uneven not just between different areas of Europe but also within any particular region. This variety also characterizes attempts to define the work ethic. It is impossible to think about a single monolithic work ethic. During the period a number of ideologies of work were expressed that had existed in Europe since ancient Greece. Central to the work ethic was social status. Society was graded according to each individual’s work status. Slaves and poor laborers were at the bottom of the social hierarchy and were employed in low-skilled and hard labor that was generally considered degrading. Above them were the skilled crafts, followed by the arts, including architecture, which all had varying degrees of social value. The large and successful commercial employers achieved greater distinction, but at the top of the social hierarchy in ancient Greece and Rome stood the nobility, whose role was simply that of the warrior.

PREMODERN PATTERNS: THE PEASANTRY

The work ethic evolved as Christianity gradually spread across Europe. The Christian religion had a significant impact in redefining work ideology. However, Christianity did not simply replace the philosophy of ancient Greece. The disciplinarian approach of Aristotle was integrated into the teachings of the Catholic Church. Yet the status given to certain occupations did begin to change. Influenced by Christian philosophers, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, a new hierarchy of occupations developed. Work as a cleric

or in other religious careers had the greatest value. Below them were the merchants, shopkeepers, and farmers, followed by artisans and peasants. The church frowned upon those involved in finance, such as money lenders, and in general the populace was suspicious of the profit motive. Work was part of the natural order, and people were born into their positions. All occupations reflected God's will. The medieval work ethic discouraged workers from maximizing their potential income by working longer and harder than necessary. Workers in the medieval period and much of the early modern period had a single notion of what they needed to survive and were not usually encouraged to go any further. Profit and social emulation had limited impact. In the sixteenth century both the Catholic Church and the state promoted meekness, dutifulness, and submissiveness to social superiors. People were taught the virtues of hard work and obedience.

This sense of duty and obedience was reinforced through the structure of early modern rural Europe. Around 90 percent of European workers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were employed in agriculture, and the majority of these belonged to one of the many peasant classes. Peasant workers of Europe had varied experiences and fortunes. In England the yeoman class generally thrived in contrast with the lot of peasants in southern Europe. In parts of Spain and Italy, such as Castile and Naples, the peasant workers struggled under harsh conditions. Landowners and the church kept peasants in their place. The land was poor, and the tax burdens were oppressive. Wide variations existed even among peasant workers in the same country. Of French peasants, the laborers, who were mostly plowmen, had a higher social status than other peasants, though even this narrowly defined class experienced diverse work burdens and levels of prosperity within the country. Their numbers declined throughout the seventeenth century. Some rose into the ranks of the *fermiers*, the small landowners. Others sank to the level of the *manoeuvres*, the unskilled workmen, who used the stock, seed, and land of the local landowner in return for half of the produce. Below them were the *journaliers*, or wage laborers. Many of the French peasants of all ranks were effectively tied to the authority of the seigneurs, the powerful landowners. Some exercised manorial rights, including unpaid labor for a few days each year.

Central Europe exhibited a similar multiformity. In Germany the *Meier*, or free peasants, enjoyed reasonable levels of prosperity in the north, but conditions in the south led to a decline in peasant success during the seventeenth century. In Prussia the free peasant, or *Colmer*, often became a large farmer. Yet

even within the German states clear differences developed. In East Elbia in the late eighteenth century serfs could be reduced to a state of virtual slavery, whereas in nearby Westphalia dues were much lighter, movement was far less restricted, and serfs could even inherit their land. In some areas the serfs were simply expected to give up a set number of hours every year to work on the landowner's estate or to pay other dues, including matrimonial taxes and death duties. In England the yeomen were viewed as virtuous freeborn laborers who worked their way up the social ladder.

Most of Europe was dominated by serfdom, which continued in Russia and large parts of eastern and central Europe into the nineteenth century. Serfs worked under poor conditions and severe controls on individual freedom. In Russia, tied to the landowner's territory, serfs were subjected to a number of burdens, including oppressive labor dues. Free peasants lived in Russia also, but even they were usually bound to the landlord by heavy debts. Many sank to the level of the *bobyli*, the landless laborer, or the *kabala*, who had become so bound to the landowners by debts that they were little more than slaves. The ideology of serf work was associated with oppression, servitude, and duty. Peasants could virtually sell themselves into this state of servitude, which freed them from taxation and army service. In the mid-seventeenth century serfs comprised nine-tenths of the working population in Russia. The powers of the landlord increased, and serfs became a status symbol for the landowners, who often held onto their power over serfs not for profit but because of the prestige attached. The precise working conditions were determined by the contract between the serf or the serf's forebears and the landowner. They worked on the land, often barely at a subsistence level. Large areas of eastern Europe, including Poland and parts of the Habsburg Empire, had a similar form of serfdom. In other areas the restrictions on freedom were far greater. Czech peasants, for example, worked in terrible conditions. Serfs in eastern Europe tended to be worse off than those in the west. Serfs could not emigrate without the lord's consent, and they were often allowed to marry only serfs from the same estate. Inheritance taxes were some of the heaviest burdens. In parts of west Germany the relatives of deceased female serfs were expected to give up her best clothes, and the male heir often had to give his largest head of livestock.

The work ethic in rural early modern Europe maintained an essentially reactionary outlook. Many of the European peasants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were conservative in nature. In their "fixed life world," attitudes toward work were based on customs passed on by each generation. Peasants

worked for the basic necessities of life, at self-sufficiency rather than for profit and economic expansion. They did not compete with fellow peasants, and opportunities for social mobility through work achievements were limited. The Catholic Church did not encourage a different view. Peasants feared that, if they became more competitive and profit-oriented, they would attract the avarice of other peasants, tax collectors, and

landlords. With few incentives, they were slow to adopt new work techniques. Poor laborers regarded themselves as part of a divine order that positioned the landowners at the top.

Even for those who were not serfs, manual labor in the preindustrial period was often physically demanding. The notion of a golden age of satisfying work existing before industrialization is a myth. In the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries work was simply toil, whether the task was paid or unpaid. Work ethics for the laborer or skilled worker did not glorify the virtue of such toil. It was simply a means of survival. The agricultural worker plowed the land as part of the household duties in securing a livelihood, or he or she performed the same task as paid labor. In either case the toil was hard and the conditions poor. Many peasants in the seventeenth century enjoyed only a basic subsistence standard of living. Because their holdings were small, they supplemented their incomes by working as wage labor on big farms or by taking up side occupations, such as weaving. Large Dutch farms employed young servants who worked for board and lodging and who became a part of the family, as many as three generations working and living on the same farm. When sons married, they remained on the family farm.

Not all rural areas were dominated by serfdom. By the early sixteenth century parts of Europe were moving away from traditional feudal structures toward commercialization of agriculture. The status of agricultural workers became more fragmented. In England the traditional yeoman class divided into capitalist farmers on the one hand and wage-earning laborers on the other hand. Agrarian capitalism led to the growth of wage labor, and bonded labor slowly disappeared. The process was quicker in some areas, such as England, where like in the Netherlands, a large section of the working population was employed as farm servants, living and working on big estates. In England they were usually young men and women employed for one-year contracts who became a part of the working family. As such they were expected to perform any of the tasks on the estate, whether in the field or in the house. Day laborers were different. Often married, they were usually older than farm servants. They lived independently of the employer and were employed only when work was available. Theirs was an uncertain position, dependent on the seasons, the weather, and their own health.

While agriculture dominated employment in preindustrial Europe, skilled crafts provided the major source of employment in the towns and cities. From the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century skilled craft workers across much of Europe organized into guilds, which had governed some trades since the Middle Ages. Ethically the guilds stressed quality of workmanship, which they guaranteed by controlling entry into the guild and terms of apprentice training. Moreover they protected workers' rights and offered their members and the towns in which they operated a high status. Independent handicraft production was regulated. In many European countries statutes rein-

forced the rights of artisans to establish wages, rates, and the terms of apprenticeships. Giving artisans an organizational structure, guilds allowed them to wield collective power. Many new guilds originated from older medieval craft associations. They had strict rules and regulations and were highly ritualistic. The size and nature of their memberships differed enormously. Some were wealthy merchants, others were humble craftspeople. Modest tailors, for example, often delivered goods to order, rarely had stock on hand, and usually relied on the client to supply the cloth. Brewers, on the other hand, were often wealthier, owning larger properties and employing workers.

The artisan usually was an independent crafts-person who made and sold a particular product themselves. Some artisans employed one or two journeymen. The term also had wider applications, referring to those who served a lengthy apprenticeship to become skilled in a particular craft. Their apprenticeship and skill gave them the right to exercise work in that particular trade. Most artisans were in reality employed journeymen. They were also socially mobile, and many improved their ranks over a period of time. Some had lower status and wages than others. Indeed, some employed journeymen earned more than independent artisans such as garret masters. Even most skilled artisans were in reality wage earners. In Britain the artisans' skills were seen as male property, a central feature of their ethics that gave them a sense of dignity, status, and respect. They demanded respect from employers and exercised superiority over unskilled laborers. Employers did not interfere with artisans at the workplace and did not expect them to keep fixed hours. Tradespeople controlled knowledge, skills, and practices, restricting entry to their trades. Their status depended upon the possession of proper equipment, tools of the trade, and clothing traditionally associated with their trade. Myths were central to guild ceremonies.

Myths and rituals became more pronounced in the eighteenth century in reaction to increased pressures. Guilds often defended the interests of their members. The Dutch weavers of the late seventeenth century organized in opposition to attempts by local merchants to reduce pay by hiring local and German peasants as cheap labor. The skilled craft workers, artisans, and journeymen attempted to safeguard their positions, but during the eighteenth century the regulations and powers of the guilds diminished. From the mid-sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century French artisans, such as tailors, hatters, and cutlers, organized groups known as the *compagnonnages*, or guilds. The French *compagnonnages* were informal groups shrouded in ritual and mystery whose practices varied according to trade and area. The aura of mys-

tery and myth was important. Some claimed that their rituals actually dated back to the building of Solomon's Temple. Creating a complex system of distinctions, the rituals underpinned hierarchies and the status of graded workers. The *compagnonnages* flourished in the late eighteenth century, due partly to the growth of urban areas and partly to the erosion of the legal rights enjoyed by some journeymen. Those legal provisions had distinguished them from other journeymen, and rituals replaced the legal protection. German workers organized, the *Bruderschaften* with their own ceremonies.

Artisans found their positions increasingly under threat of depreciating in the nineteenth century. In England artisans defended their trade skills, considered their property, against increased mechanization, cheap labor, the repeal of supportive legislation, and the Combination Laws, which were acts passed by Parliament in 1799 and 1800, to prevent formation of trade unions. Their work ethic conflicted with the emerging classic liberal philosophy. Exponents of political economy, including Adam Smith, condemned practices such as apprenticeships, claiming they were too restrictive and a barrier to economic freedom. Artisans, regarding those criticisms as attacks on their legal property established in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were forced to defend themselves against capitalists and the unskilled labor used to produce cheap goods. The eighteenth century through the early nineteenth century was a period of flux for skilled workers with increasing division of labor and differentiation of skills. On one hand skilled artisans were still needed by capitalists, so the workers retained considerable power. Facing frequent strike activity, insubordination, and resistance, capitalists found it difficult to impose regular working habits. On the other hand skilled workers were increasingly separated from ownership of the materials with which they worked and sale of the finished products. New machinery increased productivity, and some machines, such as knitting frames, required less skill. Capitalists produced inexpensive though inferior goods by employing cheap labor.

Artisans attempted to stem the tide of industrialization in different ways. In the late eighteenth century they became increasingly exclusive, prohibiting girls from apprenticeships. The ideology of the skilled artisan maintained a predominantly male hierarchy. Women were barred from many trades in an attempt to protect those trades from cheap labor. Women were even excluded from trade organizations, such as that of hatmaking, in which they were members during the early eighteenth century. Strikes by hatmakers and tailors in the early nineteenth century were aimed at

keeping women out of the occupation. While undermining the position of women in the labor market, exclusion ironically led to their becoming a larger body of unskilled labor and further increased the threat to artisans.

WOMEN

Working women experienced lower status during the early modern period, though the clear demarcations that evolved in the nineteenth century did not exist. Women married to independent laborers found it difficult to secure regular employment outside the household, and those who did usually combined agricultural work with washing and cooking for field laborers. Work, paid and unpaid, in much of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe was organized around the household as the central unit rather than around individuals. For peasants the idea of separate work and domestic spheres lacked any real meaning. Working in the field or working in the kitchen were complementary parts of the same strategy. Marriage was an economic partnership, and women worked alongside their husbands on farms and in workshops. Among the poor, wives usually worked as spinners for the same people who employed their husbands as weavers.

Nevertheless, jobs were divided between men and women. Work ethics connected tasks concerned with the home and garden with the female domain. However, the edges were blurred. In seventeenth-century France, for example, women made the dough, but men kneaded it and heated the oven. Men tended sheep, but either women or men tended cows. The division of work in peasant households varied enormously across Europe. Employment for women varied according to the industry and the area. Women were employed in relatively high-status occupations in the medieval period, but this was not always the case in Britain during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In addition, although they worked in a range of trades, their actual roles were usually restricted. Work ethics subordinated their roles to men. Women dominated certain trades, such as silk, but their guilds lacked the formal status and power of men's guilds in Europe. Apprenticeships were not the same for men and women, involving lower skills and less training for women.

RELIGION, WORK ETHICS, AND THE MIDDLE CLASS

The teachings of the church and the patriarchal structure of society reinforced perceptions of women and

work. The role of the church was important in legitimizing the premodern work ethic; however, it never established across Europe a universal value system based on its ideology. The growth of commercial activity in northern Europe from the early sixteenth century conflicted with the Catholic ideal. Max Weber expounded the notion of the Protestant work ethic in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. While Weber's theory has been criticized as overgeneralized and inconclusive, it does highlight important developments in perceptions of work and the work ethic. Weber focused on the fact that the Reformation coincided with economic growth in northern Europe. Loosening the bonds of the Catholic Church allowed greater individual freedom, which was expressed in work. Profit became increasingly acceptable. Commercial growth was characterized by a reinvestment of profits into new business ventures rather than simply achievement of prestige or security. Entrepreneurial activity, the willingness to take risks in business deals, increased markedly, and a new approach to work and the acquisition of wealth evolved. Prudence, sobriety, maximum use of time, and the desire to achieve through individual merit, moral values closely associated with Calvinism, distinguished the emerging entrepreneurial class. Yet this development was not just about the wealthy; it was associated with work at all levels of the social spectrum. The key

was that workers performed to the very best of their abilities, irrespective of the nature of the job.

Weber did not claim that the Protestant work ethic actually caused capitalist growth, but he demonstrated that the values derived from Protestantism clearly favored the establishment and expansion of a capitalist economy. A different cultural approach to work emerged in which the entrepreneur was increasingly successful. Work ethics now stressed the role of the individual working for deferred gratification or concentrating on accumulating virtue and money instead of immediate pleasures. The workers' moral obligations were to perform all tasks to the best of their abilities no matter how small or menial the work, to take orders from an employer willingly, and to value work as a source of meaning and worth for each individual. These values, an oversimplification of the evolving work ethic, did not come entirely from the growth of Protestantism. The transition from the old and largely feudal order to a capitalist system cannot be pinpointed to any particular period. It is impossible to say exactly when one set of relations took over from the other.

However, these values did permeate parts of European culture, beginning in the sixteenth century. The Reformation ultimately if unintentionally encouraged a more secular mentality, which encouraged greater acceptance of the entrepreneur and work dis-

cipline. The new work ethic was especially successful in northern Europe, where the Reformation was most influential. In western Europe the Protestant work ethic became manifested in a number of ways, including the nineteenth century “gospel of work” and the notions expressed by Samuel Smiles’s best-seller *Self-Help* (1859). Smiles’s ideas were not original. His book reiterated the values of hard work, diligence, thrift, sobriety, and deferred gratification in terms of individual moral worth, though with greater emphasis on social mobility as a result. The Protestant work ethic facilitated industrialization, though it was not a major factor in its development. Similar thoughts about work emerged in traditionally Catholic regions, such as France, as the work ethic became middle class more than Protestant. The middle classes used work beliefs to criticize aristocrats, whom they considered idle and unproductive. Deep class identity was involved, as many middle-class people did indeed work very hard.

Industrialization itself had a marked impact on the work ethic, which was affected by the growth of capitalist and market values. Beginning in the late eighteenth century classic liberal economists and philosophers, such as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, stressed the value of limited government interference, especially in economic affairs. They emphasized the role of the individual and self-interest. If individuals were prepared to work hard, they should reap the benefits of their energy and commitment. Those who did not choose to work hard should be left to struggle. Workers should be free to move between jobs according to their own interests and no longer be tied to the land like serfs and many peasant groups. Wages should be set according to the market. Old seigniorial rights were an unjust barrier to natural rights and freedom. Entrepreneurs should be able to operate largely unfettered. Merchants became the eighteenth-century risk takers, forming the driving force behind economic growth and British industrialization. Individuals like Richard Arkwright gradually moved production from the home to the factory.

While many capitalists embraced the classic liberal ideology, it was not universally accepted. The utilitarian view was criticized throughout the nineteenth century both by conservatives, such as Thomas Carlyle, and by the emerging socialists, such as Karl Marx. Marx believed that waged work was essentially a form of capitalist oppression. For him the work ethic was not about profit for the individual but social justice and equality for all workers. Factory owners had widely varied attitudes toward work and their employees. German employers were authoritarian, while the British were paternalistic. The German work ethic viewed la-

bor in terms of time, the British in terms of products. German workers in the woolen industry were paid according to the number of shuttle movements completed in a given time period. British weavers were paid according to the number of threads actually woven. These methods of payment reflected the different cultural assumptions about work resulting from the different conceptions of work. Some nineteenth-century large employers, like Hugh Mason, Titus Salt, and the Cadbury family, built large settlements for their workers to provide homes, libraries, schools, and churches and to promote their own value systems. Still, this group of factory owners formed a minority in Britain. Many employers simply did not have the resources to build such facilities, and others did not share the philosophy. Nevertheless, it was a means of exerting authority outside the factory and was a result of their perception of work as a commodity. German employers in general had a more tyrannical reputation inside the factory. Partly in response to similar employer attitudes across Europe, the working classes formed labor organizations to protect their interests in the face of the capitalist market. In the industrial society workers were defined increasingly along class lines. As the factory became the principal mode of production, modern ideas about class emerged. In Marx’s notion of class, workers shared a sense of consciousness based on their relationship to the means of production.

In nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany the work ethic was also rooted in a sense of dignity and purpose in daily work. Germans, for many of whom work was a serious vocation for life, believed they possessed an attitude toward work that was superior to that of workers in southern Europe. Some nineteenth-century observers, such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Marx, worried about the decline of traditional skills that resulted from industrialization and the rise of mundane jobs. A movement grew to develop a greater sense of “joy in work.” By the end of the nineteenth century some felt that work should be an enriching experience. Wilhelm von Riehl conducted one of the most comprehensive studies into what he believed was the German work ethic. His theory, based on observations of the Protestant urban middle classes, describes an intrinsic value attached to the very experience of working. Work was exalted for its benefits to the community, no matter how mundane, rather than for materialistic reasons. All work serviced the needs of the people. To give workers a stake in the system, capitalists tried to promote a positive attitude and reduce any sense of alienation by offering training for a trade. Industrialists established technical training schools to promote industrial education. However, others saw work as a duty and a

burden that should be eased by better pay and conditions. Their ideal was not joy in work but joy after work, and they longed for liberation from work rather than through it.

WORKING-CLASS WORK AND BELIEFS

Social historians have tried to determine what work ethic common laborers maintained in the face of industrialization and the middle-class praise for hard work. Some clearly bought into the idea of work as dignity and even tried to increase their efforts to please employers or to maximize personal gain and advancement. But more workers probably maintained what British laborers called a “lump o’ labor” concept. Work was fine, but it should not be frenzied or intensified. A given amount of pay merited a set amount of work. Obviously, given mechanization, this idea was not easily defended, but it entered into considerable labor protest and described some aspects of work in the less-technical sectors, like construction work. When customary work ideas could not be defended, new concepts replaced them, most notably the notion of instrumentalism. In instrumentalism workers admitted they could not defend traditional practices, but they insisted on higher pay in return for concessions so work would be an “instrument” for a better life off the job.

Industrialization in the nineteenth century brought significant changes to work practices, but it was not a universal process. In England the course of industrialization focused on parts of the northwest, West Yorkshire, and small areas of the Midlands and northeast. In Russia serfdom was not abolished until 1861, and even then peasants remained tied to the land through oppressive dues. Large areas of southern and eastern Europe remained untouched into the twentieth century. Those areas affected by industrialization experienced gradual changes in work patterns. Work inside the factory demanded greater discipline, which had a marked impact on the ideology of work. Work habits were restructured so that production was determined by mechanized production rather than by nature. Industrial society demanded the maximum use of time, characterized by systems of bells, timekeepers, time sheets, and clocking in. Work time was distinguished from home time. The emerging emphasis on time discipline was underlined by the decline of St. Monday. Rural workers often avoided work on Monday, called “holy Monday” in France, especially if they had spent the previous day in the local inn. However, industrialization demanded more commitment, and industrialists suppressed St. Monday after the late eighteenth century.

The shift from task-based to product-based notions of time discipline happened by degrees. Traditional practices continued in mining and handicraft work into the nineteenth century. In spite of capitalists’ efforts to control time, British workers were renowned for their irregular work habits. Their work ethic was product-based. Many worked for short bursts followed by periods of inactivity. Work experiences also crossed a wide range. Domestic work was not regulated by the clock, and unpaid voluntary work was similarly unconstrained by notions of time. Because industrialization was not uniform in either time or place, craft techniques prospered across Europe alongside factories that employed technology. Cyclical unemployment brought uncertain time disciplines into occupations such as dock work, and periods of high demand had an impact on the time and structure of work in some industries. The seasons continued to dominate work and time practices in agriculture. Capitalists and managers did not always follow a clock-based work structure, even in manufacturing industries. Single industries, such as ceramics in Staffordshire, England, had a variety of work-time practices in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to different company sizes, different techniques, and different demands.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS

Despite the variety in work practices, strict regulation of the workplace increasingly became a marked feature of manufacturing during the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century work dominated people’s lives, and most workers had little leisure time. As this started to change in western Europe, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed a mixture of approaches. The expansion of communism challenged capitalist systems. Work in the Soviet Union was transformed under Joseph Stalin’s Five-Year Plans and the development of a controlled economy. The industrial workforce doubled to 6 million people by the end of 1932. Peasants moved in large numbers into coal, iron, and steel production in areas like the Ukraine. Work ethics were based on service to the state. The government handed down planned targets, putting enormous pressure on managers to reach hard goals. Collectivization forced many out of the rural areas into the emerging industrial regions, and “shock work” (intensive additional work) was introduced to improve productivity. Younger workers encouraged shock work, but older skilled workers, who had been in industry prior to the Five-Year Plans, often resisted it. The skilled workers even abused the shock workers, including beatings and murders. Older workers also

resisted new practices and attempts to cut rates of pay. The government introduced the continuous working week in 1932, and workers faced penalties if they left their jobs without permission. Managerial authority was asserted with great vigor. These measures were intended to improve productivity as demanded by the state. Beginning in the mid-1930s the state gave increasing publicity and heroic status to dedicated workers, such as the coal miner Aleksey Grigoriyevich Stakhanov, who broke productivity records. In Germany the Nazi government also promoted the virtues of work, and German work ethics centered on the idea of service to the race through the state. Building on the joy through work ideal of the late nineteenth century, the Nazis embarked on a number of propaganda crusades, such as their “beauty of labor” campaign. Joy would be the reward of serving the state.

In the second half of the twentieth century work practices and the hours of work gradually improved across most of Europe, especially in the west. Regulation of time became an asset of the labor movement. Vacation time increased, and a leisure ethic joined the beliefs about work. Overtime was a feature of the

time-disciplined work environment, and in postwar Europe full employment and the growth of trade union power led to greater regulation of overtime. Workers demanded rates increase by 50 percent or even 100 percent for working outside the agreed hours. Unions negotiated a series of other strict conditions, including demarcation lines. However, with the decline in manufacturing and union power in the early 1980s, such regulations and agreements faced increasing pressures.

Along with the changes in work structures and practices, the numbers employed in certain sectors shifted significantly. Several classifications gradually replaced the artisan. At the bottom were unskilled laborers, many employed in casual or seasonal work, such as dock workers. For most of the nineteenth century they were the poorest workers, and they were the least organized. In contrast, skilled workers in manufacturing tended to be organized in trade unions. Some historians believe that skilled workers formed an aristocracy of labor. They kept themselves aloof from unskilled workers, and like artisans before them, they jealously guarded their position in the workplace.

Above them stood a wide range of middle-class occupations. Besides the increase in those employed in business and manufacturing, the number of people employed as clerks and in other professions grew notably. The older professional groups, such as lawyers and doctors, multiplied, as did private sector professionals, such as managers and accountants. Throughout the twentieth century the trend toward professions continued across western Europe. Indeed the number employed in manufacturing declined in much of Europe, especially in the late twentieth century. At the same time more workers joined service industries, such as tourism.

LARGER PATTERNS: WORK AND FAMILY

Despite the shifting pattern of employment, work ethics and the underlying changes in work practices and structures from the preindustrial period remained. One of the most fundamental changes was the demise of the family unit as the central work unit. From the mid-eighteenth century the relocation of the workplace away from the family home and into workshops and factories meant a gradual separation of spheres between the economic and the social and between the private and the public. As tasks slowly became divided, women were increasingly associated with the domestic sphere, while men were identified with labor in the workplace. These divisions became a central feature in the ideology of work. The concept of gaining all of the means to live through paid labor emerged in the nineteenth century. Most European households did not rely on income through paid labor in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in the late eigh-

teenth century most households depended on a variety of work strategies to secure their livelihoods. A single, full-time regular job providing the sole source of income was the exception rather than the norm.

Until the nineteenth century women were likely to be the main money earners because they sold produce at markets or produced textile goods in the home. In the nineteenth century this changed with the emergence of the family wage. Male workers received substantially higher wages than women. Work ethics placed the male worker as the chief earner, the family breadwinner, and his wage was supposed to support all members of the family. Trade unions tried to keep women out of skilled work to keep wages higher. Middle-class morality also decided that the new, heavy machinery was unsuitable for women. Work ethics stressed that physically demanding labor belonged exclusively to men. Traditionally coal miners worked in family units, including wives and children, but this practice ended in England with the 1842 Mines Regulation Act. Until the eighteenth century women were apprenticed in some trades and were employed in heavy labor, but this changed in the late eighteenth century. Women married to upwardly mobile men entered the middle classes and became more idle, while the wives of skilled journeymen lost much of their independence and often entered domestic service.

Much historiographical debate has concerned the impact of industrialization on work opportunities for women. Certainly women remained vital in the workplace. Women and children accounted for substantial numbers of employees in textiles in the late eighteenth century. Lace making was almost exclusively female, and cotton industries employed more women than men. These textile industries were central to the economic explosion in Britain. Women were also significantly involved in the metal industries, such as nail making and hardware manufacturing. In the mid-eighteenth century merchants relied on the cheap and unregulated labor of women. The number of women employed by merchants grew, but it remained low-status work. With mechanization women moved into new industries, but those positions, too, were low-skill, low-wage work. The first developments in new technology were designed for home situations. The spinning jenny, for example, was introduced into domestic production in the late eighteenth century, and the move into factories run by merchant manufacturers followed. That relocation meant that women lost control over their own labor.

However, increased mechanization did not cause a dramatic transition in women's working lives, though it is impossible to make generalizations. On one level

it restricted opportunities for women. Certainly as industrialization developed in the nineteenth century opportunities for women in industry declined. The range of available apprenticeships decreased, and less than half of the apprenticeships available to men in nineteenth-century Britain were also available to women. Opportunities for women concentrated in domestic service and textiles, and the status attached to "women's work" was lower than that of "men's work." On another level, industrialization took women out of the home, providing them with a form of liberation from the home. Yet this was not necessarily a positive development. In many ways this transition from the home to the factory led to more rigid subordination of women in the male-governed industrial system.

Women were subservient even in occupations numerically dominated by women. As mechanization

in the British cotton industry grew, women accepted a variety of occupations in the mills. Initially in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries they occupied auxiliary positions, including often the most insecure positions. They were paid poor wages, often only half those of men. With the development of the power loom women came to occupy the main positions, such as spinning. Women's wages increased in the mid-Victorian period, in some instances equaling the rates enjoyed by men. However, men held most supervisory and management positions. The majority of women did not enjoy wage equality with men. This was underlined in the sweated labor workshops, where many women were employed. Work there was characterized by low wages, long hours, and poor working conditions. In the late nineteenth century sweatshops attracted attention in Britain, where Parliament conducted investigations between 1888 and 1890. Sweat-

shops were concentrated in the poorest urban districts, such as the East End of London, and they often employed women, children, paupers, and immigrants. Employers often issued outwork, which made it virtually impossible for workers to organize unions or for factory inspectors to investigate their practices. This work was also characterized by subdivision of labor and deskilling, which assured low wages and poor conditions.

Children worked in miserable conditions across much of nineteenth-century Europe. Their smaller physical frames suited them for various jobs in which poor health, mutilation, and deaths were not uncommon. Partly in response to increasing concerns about children's positions, many European nations introduced work legislation. Work ethics eventually viewed children as unsuitable for employment. In the nineteenth century Britain passed numerous acts to provide an extensive protective framework for children. Factory acts in the early Victorian period established hours and conditions of work in textiles and mines. Anthony Ashley Cooper, earl of Shaftesbury, and other leading reformers continued the campaign into the mid-nineteenth century, when legislation addressed a number of other industries. Significantly the 1870 Education Act demanded that all children under ten years of age should attend school full-time. Most legislation was permissive or at least difficult to enforce, but it established important precedents that were improved during the twentieth century. Separating children from work complicated judgments about the nature and utility of childhood.

New work systems also brought attention to older workers, who increasingly were considered less competent to deal with the stresses and learning components of modern labor. Many older workers were demoted or laid off. Pension movements emerged to offer some protection for them, and formal retirement systems took effect during and after the Great Depression. Ability to work and removal from work complicated appraisals of old age by the elderly and by society at large.

Throughout the twentieth century European governments continued to pass laws to protect workers. Women gained rights in the workplace in the second half of the twentieth century. The communist states provided greater equality for women at work than did most other European nations, but beginning in the 1960s the western European democracies passed legislation promoting and supporting women's rights. Most European countries recognized the need to provide maternity leave, preschool child care, and anti-discriminatory legislation. Women entered most traditionally male-dominated work spheres, though in

smaller numbers and with lower pay than their male coworkers.

CONCLUSION

Certainly generalizations about the impact of any single work ethic in terms of time or place would be naive. Diverse ethics permeated societies across Europe at different periods and among different classes, and no single ethic dominated. Ethics, ideologies, or meanings developed from social and ideological forces, and precise conditions varied across Europe. Some areas remained untouched after the medieval period, while others, such as Britain, underwent huge changes. Geographical differences and cultural diversity created multiple peasant experiences. No single, all-embracing time-work discipline existed. Ethics centered on freedom or on oppression. They were determined by Catholic and Protestant philosophies, by social structures and cultural traditions, by political and economic ideologies, and by shifting technology. Even in the nineteenth century traditional work values did not disappear. The clock, seasons, life courses, family demands, and mechanization impacted different areas in different periods, underlining the assortment of European work ethics and experiences. Agricultural workers in the early modern period included the oppressed serfs of eastern Europe, the more liberated peasants of Germany, and the free yeoman of Britain. Farm workers in northern and western Europe were not tied by seigneurial dues, but they were subjected to technological changes at a much earlier date than the serfs of Russia, who effectively worked under the same conditions from the medieval period into the twentieth century.

Artisans also had dissimilar experiences and practices. Many were employed as journeymen; some were self-employed and worked from their homes; and a few enjoyed wealth and status, owning large properties and employing other skilled and unskilled workers. Industrialization threatened many groups of artisans; however, its impact on work depended upon the time and place. Workers who moved into the factories felt its effect on work ethics and practices, including stricter discipline and regulations that affected hours, pay, and conditions. The capitalists moved from their merchant houses, where they organized the home-based workers, into the rigid factory system, where they directly employed workers. Yet the factory did not invade all forms of work. Many areas of Europe remained predominantly agricultural. Stalin's Five-Year Plans initiated the shift of Russian workers from rural areas into towns and factories in the twentieth

century. Large areas of southern Italy and Castile in Spain remained untouched by modernization.

Industrialization stimulated mixed fortunes for women. Some were liberated from their homes but were still employed and supervised by men. Others, such as middle-class women, had reduced work opportunities. Work ethics subordinated women for most of the period from the Renaissance to the late twentieth

century. Industrialization's impact on women continued to attract debate among historians and attention as a subject of studies of work in Europe. Research has continued regarding technological change, the decline of traditional manufacturing industries, and the growth of the service sector. Those challenges have endured with the growing impact of the European Union and globalization of work.

See also Serfdom: Western Europe; Serfdom: Eastern Europe; Farm Families and Labor Systems (volume 2); Social Class (volume 3); Patriarchy; Gender and Work (in this volume); Protestantism (volume 5).

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PREINDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING



Steven A. Epstein

The industrial revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries applied new technologies and sources of power to the traditional handicraft production of earlier centuries. In the period preceding this revolution, from the bubonic plague of 1348 to the 1770s, a sophisticated system of manufacturing had emerged in early modern Europe. This system, called preindustrial for the sake of simplicity, produced products of amazing complexity, from delicate watches and porcelain ware to printed books, pistols, telescopes, silk tapestries, and the great Spanish galleons, Portuguese carracks, and English East Indiamen that sailed across the globe. The quality and diversity of these products are a tribute to the skilled labor force that created them. Whether by 1770 this labor force constituted a true working class anywhere in Europe is one of the most important questions to answer about this phase of labor history. These centuries also witnessed the rise of the first industrial entrepreneurs and inventors who revolutionized manufacturing. How was work organized, what were the social and economic relations between employer and employee, how were specific trades conducted, and why were some parts of Europe more precocious in manufacturing than others? These are other important questions.

Social historians are primarily interested in this phase of labor history because it serves as a bridge between the agrarian and artisanal societies of the Middle Ages and the rise of modern manufacturing in the industrial revolution. These centuries merit attention in their own right because they witnessed a profound transformation in the world of work. The social relations surrounding manufacturing paved the way for rapid technological progress and the acquisition of skills fundamental to subsequent advances. The gulf between the payers and takers of wages widened and hardened long before an industrial proletariat emerged in the nineteenth century. Preindustrial manufacturing transformed European society and introduced many millions of women, men, and children to the discipline of the workplace.

The state of knowledge of this period of labor history remains behind the study of medieval agriculture and modern industry. Research on the social relations deriving from work has yielded a wealth of local studies, primarily on western European cities or specific trades. Broader syntheses of national or regional styles of organizing work remain rare. Given these limitations, this summary of preindustrial manufacturing will begin with a look at the general circumstances of manufacturing at the beginning of the early modern period. Next, a series of case studies on specific trades and issues will illuminate important features of the social history of work and enterprise. Finally, an overview of manufacturing on the eve of the industrial revolution will reveal the major trends of the period.

MANUFACTURING AROUND 1500

The periodization of labor's history remains a vexed issue, and whatever value the term "Renaissance" has in other fields, it does not apply to this subject. Early modern social history, stretching from the calamities of the plague years of the later fourteenth century to the age of revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century, makes a better frame for this field.

Guilds. The most important social institution defining the circumstances of most manufacturing in this period was the guild, or *métier*, *Zunft*, *gremio*, *arte*, or the many other terms by which the institution was known. The guild, a legacy of the Middle Ages, was an organization of employers who banded together to foster the interests of their trade or profession. Guild regulations determined who could work at a trade and often prescribed standards of production that imposed measures of quality and uniformity on objects as diverse as a loaf of bread or a clock. Guilds, primarily urban institutions, controlled large

areas of manufacturing, especially in staples like cloth or ironworking.

Guilds existed in nearly every city in Europe, and few trades escaped the principle that employers, and not their workers, determined the customs of the trade. Two important trends were working against the hegemony of guild-based production in the early modern period. First, guild restrictions always prompted some entrepreneurs to find ways to evade the guilds. The best-known instance of this evasion was the putting-out system of wool cloth production refined in early modern England and Germany. Instead of employing weavers in the old-fashioned, intensely regulated atmosphere of urban household production, the organizers of the putting-out system took wool or thread to rural workers who labored outside the reach of the guild system and produced thread or cloth of lesser quality but at a cheaper price. The putting-out system transformed rural society as it brought cash, new skills, and the employer/employee relationship to traditional agrarian society. This system also competed with urban weavers and spinners. Second, by the eighteenth century social and economic theorists, most notably Adam Smith, condemned guilds as medieval relics, conspiracies against the public good, monopolies that benefited only the masters and not the consumers or workers. Guilds were under sustained attack by the late eighteenth century.

The corporations (*métiers*) were abolished during the French Revolution as a symbol of the corrupt Old Regime, and enlightened absolutists like Leopold of Austria abolished their guilds. Hence the early modern period witnessed the last phase of guild-based manufacturing and began the legend that guilds were a kind of feudal relic—hostile to change and working people. And yet, as the naked exploitation of industrial Europe became more apparent, a certain nostalgia for guilds arose in the nineteenth century, and some of the earliest working-class organizations were proud to call themselves guilds. Hence guilds were viewed in terms of contrary stereotypes: as a grim hierarchy of masters exploiting their apprentices and journeymen and women, or as symbols of a golden age of labor before the horrors of the factory. Like all stereotypes, both of these contain measures of truth and falsehood.

Masters and workers. The masters, the men and occasionally women who were the owners of shops and the full members of the guilds, provided employment and training to the workers who did much or in some cases nearly all the labor. Being a guild master in the early modern period increasingly meant that one had inherited, purchased, or married into the position. Guilds everywhere were increasingly becoming

closed cartels hostile to new members. Every city with guilds had a hierarchy of trades, with wealthy masters and merchants lording over the more humble master butchers and candlemakers. The defining principle remained that the master worked for his or her customers, and not for wages. An exception to this rule was the building trades, where master carpenters, masons, and bricklayers often worked for big contractors for wages. In practice, taking wages reduced the status of the trade, for a sharp line separated those who provided employment and paid wages from those who took jobs and wages. In many cities this line also determined who enjoyed full citizenship, with the benefits as expected going to the masters.

The social relationship between master and his or her employees was more complex than simple status might suggest. Even in this relationship among unequals, workers had some rights to bargain over pay and working conditions, and masters were expected to care for their employees, sometimes even in sickness and in health, as the work contracts stipulated. In the skilled trades like weaving, cabinetmaking, printing, and the like, journeymen and women performed most of the basic work. These laborers, having completed terms of apprenticeship, were certified as possessing sufficient skills to practice the craft. They worked for wages, often at rates customary to a particular trade, especially in the years of stable prices in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Even customary wages allowed some room for bargaining, and while some trades had agreed-upon pay schedules set by the guilds, most allowed masters some flexibility to take into account age and skill.

Wages depended on two basic systems—a fixed rate of pay, usually set by the day or for longer terms of up to several years, or piece rate pay that yielded so many pennies per length of cloth or yards of yarn spun. Workers avoided wherever possible being paid in kind because such payments imposed additional costs on them and really only benefited the employers. Piece rate wages allowed the workers some control over how long and hard they worked, but contemporary observers like Adam Smith knew that they encouraged overwork and exhausted people trying to feed their families. A set daily wage, with time allowed for meals, required employers to keep a closer eye on slackers. The young men and women who worked by contract for a fixed wage had some security of employment because employers were obligated to keep them on, even on slow days when casual laborers found no daily work.

Working conditions, especially the most important one, the length of the working day, were determined by the customs of the trade. (Hourly pay scales

awaited the industrial revolution, so the real issue was the length of the day.) Since working by candlelight or oil lamp was expensive and in some trades undesirable because of the possibility of errors, the amount of sunlight generally determined the length of the working day, making it longer in summers. The journeymen and women often worked in shops attached to the master's house, and in such cases meals were usually provided. Craft traditions dictated a large number of holidays in both Protestant and Catholic parts of Europe; everywhere churches frowned on Sunday work, and Saturday was usually a half holiday. Saints' days remained a feature of the work calendar in Catholic countries, where up to eighty days a year, including Sundays, were not workdays and hence not paid working days either. A worker with a weekly or annual salary usually worked in a more prestigious trade than the worker on a daily wage and hence was not so dependent, as casual laborers always were, on a day's pay for a day's work. Saturday, the traditional payday for most artisans, often witnessed bouts of relaxation that carried on into Saint Monday, the customary slack day of the workweek. Clauses in work contracts often required journeymen and women to work in good faith and without fraud, and also usually compelled workers to avoid gambling and other vices, especially under the master's roof.

Regulations hemmed in the market for labor in the early modern system of manufacturing, and traditions dictated that masters did not attempt to steal

away another's workers by offering higher wages, though of course some did. Journeymen and women had pride in their skills and sometimes completed a masterpiece or objectively fine product in order to demonstrate their command of their craft, even if they would never themselves become masters. They also had strong opinions about what the just level of wages was in their particular trade. These workers, denied lawful organizations of their own, nevertheless had a strong sense of solidarity that revealed itself in informal associations discussed below. Long before the industrial revolution, a hierarchy of labor existed in which the journeymen and women in the most prestigious and highly paid trades—clockmaking, jewelry, cabinetmaking—ranked higher than their peers in the more common trades. In general workers' status derived from whether or not their trade catered to wealthy customers who purchased carriages or paintings. High-priced raw materials did not necessarily confer high status. Women, active in aspects of the silk trade and in making gold thread, did not enjoy high status or wages because they worked on expensive raw materials. The gender division of labor is a complicated subject best considered in the context of specific trades, but, generally, trades in which women predominated became lower status and poorly paid, and women earned less than men even when they did the same work. The idea of a labor aristocracy—highly paid artisans and mechanics turning out objects requiring great skills to produce—had deep roots in the

early modern period. The industrial revolution did not invent a labor aristocracy; it simply upset the older order.

Social and religious aspects of guilds. The guilds in all parts of Europe retained, as part of the medieval legacy, a strong measure of spiritual and paternalistic features. The guild was usually a religious confraternity with a chapel and common ritual observances. The masters attended one another's funerals and looked out for distressed members. Their employees were often expected to attend an annual service and contribute to the guild's charitable activities. The degree of common spirituality attached to work meant in practice that the workplace, like the wider world, practiced one religion. The goldsmiths of London and Paris had similar institutions, but in the former all the members were Anglicans and in the latter all Catholics. The reliance on oaths and ritual practices generated religious conformity and as a result denied all Jews and various dissenters access to the guild, journeyman status, and often even employment.

These charitable and spiritual aspects of the trade helped to define a specific attitude toward the structure of society as a whole and to the organization

of manufacturing—corporatism. According to this social theory of labor, corporatism defines the world of work not in terms of a sharp divide between employer and employee but in terms of divisions along craft or professional lines. Thus a corporatist approach to society views the right groupings as the butchers, the bakers, and the candlestick makers. This emphasis on solidarity according to the type of work—from the richest goldsmith to his or her most humble worker—of course benefited the masters, since it encouraged their workers to identify with the interests of the trade, as defined by the employers. A corporatist vision of social organization imposed on the masters certain obligations defined now as paternalism in its most positive sense—the fatherly duty of superiors toward subordinates—as part of a reciprocal set of obligations that went beyond the simple cash nexus of employment. The preindustrial manufacturing workplace was supposed to be corporatist and paternalistic. In reality it was also intensely patriarchal, as few women ever enjoyed the full powers of a master in their trades. But a sense of reciprocal duties blunted the sharp edges of exploitation, and in some cases the workers in the new factories of the industrial age looked back with justifiable nostalgia on the working conditions of earlier centuries.

Apprenticeship. The last general aspect of manufacturing across Europe was the near universality of apprenticeship. Again, circumstances varied widely by trade, but a broad picture emerges about the experience of being an apprentice in the early modern period. Apprenticeship was vocational education, and it was by far the most widespread system of teaching and learning in Europe. Boys and girls, typically in their early teens but sometimes younger, were committed by their parents or guardians to long terms of service to a master by contract in exchange for training in a craft or trade. In order to be a full-fledged journeyman or woman, it was required to serve a term of apprenticeship, a length of time usually determined by guild statutes. Masters did not routinely employ anyone who had not been an apprentice for years, learning a craft at a master's side and often living in his or her house. Depending on the trade and city, apprentices sometimes received a small stipend like a training wage. Often in luxury trades the parents had to offer a payment to the master to take on their son or daughter as an apprentice. In these trades the term of service was typically longer, reflecting the value of the training in the years of cheap labor the master received from the apprentice.

Even when parents wanted their children to follow in the family trade, they often thought it better

to have another master train the apprentice in a fostering relationship. Training assumed the right of correction, and it was perhaps easier for parents to allow another person to beat one's children into learning a craft. The main obligation of apprenticeship was for the master to teach and the apprentice to learn. By these means technological skills were passed from one generation to the next, and improvements in techniques were not lost because successful masters had pupils. This educational system also encouraged paternalism in the workplace because it was not unusual for a young person to progress from apprentice to journeyman or woman in the same shop. Only for a very few did the story end in the idyllic marriage of the apprentice to the master's daughter. But some workers retained filial attitudes toward their employers because they had been literally raised by them.

Many trades prohibited training women as apprentices, and so they were denied the technical skills necessary to succeed in some trades. Where women were allowed to work at a craft, they too took on apprentices, boys as well as girls. But the patriarchal features of the system denied technical training to women in so much skilled manufacturing like jewelry, almost all aspects of the metal crafts, printing, ship construction—the list goes on and on—that working women found themselves often confined to laborious, repetitive tasks. Of course some women escaped these male-imposed strictures and ran some businesses, but these were exceptions and a tribute to the persistence of strong individuals. These women were not yet perceived as a threat to the mainly paternalistic and patriarchal system of manufacturing.

Household production. Since, with few exceptions, most manufacturing remained small-scale, where the employer closely supervised his or her workers, preindustrial, prefactory manufacturing can be called household production. Yet few family-based operations supplied enough labor from the pool of close relatives, so successful masters were always dipping into the labor market to augment their supply of hands. Hence household production was not static or exclusively family-centered, and it often depended on people who came and went, or childless masters who passed a business on to someone else. Even this labor mobility, which included a fair measure of changing trades altogether as smiths became clockmakers and carpenters became cabinetmakers, fostered the dissemination of new techniques as new ideas from one trade found applications in another.

The guild system of masters, journeymen and women, and apprentices, surrounded by large numbers of casual laborers and those too weak or down-

trodden to work, constituted the main features of preindustrial manufacturing. A labor market with an evolving system of wage labor existed. Improving technologies brought forth new trades as the clockmakers and gunsmiths formed new guilds. This system of manufacturing was producing fine silk cloth, ships, muskets, books, watches, and other items that were the most advanced in the world, granting Europeans an advantage over other cultures without steel and guns. Better technologies developed both in the guilds and in the large sector of manufacturing that remained outside their jurisdiction. An ostensibly paternalistic system of labor imposed obligations on both parties to a work contract. A fairly rigid gender division of labor denied women access to many lucrative trades, even when they comprised a substantial percentage of the workforce. These broad social realities varied by time and place, and were changing at different rates in the centuries leading up to the industrial revolution. The best way to understand the variety in the social history of manufacturing in Europe is to examine some specific issues in context.

WORKHOUSES

The attractions of being an apprentice or working as a laborer would not appeal to everyone, and there were always people by temperament not suited to the discipline of the workplace. Cities in particular needed a means to keep a supply of new workers coming to town, for early modern cities were notoriously unhealthy places with low birthrates and high death rates, thus they depended on immigrants from the countryside to maintain their numbers. So the system required a fair degree of socializing new people to the routines of work. The pull of the labor markets benefited from some push to compel people to work, because idleness set a bad example and masters needed hands.

What occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries across Europe was a number of experiments in forcing the able-bodied to work and not to beg or turn to charity or poor relief. Simon Schama (1987) has noted an example of how compulsion worked in practice, in the case of the Amsterdam Tughuis, a combination of prison and workhouse, which opened in 1595. Eventually, in 1614, when begging by the able-bodied became illegal in Amsterdam, violators were sentenced to the house—for a term of six months for a second offense. The overseers of the Tughuis thought it necessary to discipline and reform the sturdy vagrants and beggars by setting them to work. At first the idle were taught skills like weaving, but in

1599 the house got the monopoly for producing powdered brazilwood. This wood, the fruit of the Dutch colonial trade, yielded a dye essential to the city's cloth industry. Producing the dye required laborers to saw the wood, and the workhouse inmates seemed an ideal labor force. Sawing for fourteen-hour days to make the required number of pounds of dust gained the poor workers a meager wage that no one in a free market would accept for this kind of work. The women inmates were put to work in a similarly grueling system of compulsory spinning.

People refusing to work were put in the water house, where they were given the choice of manning the pumps or drowning in the water they refused to move. The water house of Amsterdam became a tourist attraction as people from across Europe came to witness this stark method of teaching people the value of work. The message to the workers was clear—avoid sloth, beggary, and crime, and work for the wages the market offered, or risk correction. Behind all the wonderful accomplishments of the Dutch economy in its golden age, it must be noted that there was a push as well as a pull into the labor markets. The state was training people in some rudimentary skills that would be useful to them as laborers in the cloth and ship construction trades.

The planners of these workhouses saw themselves as enlightened humanists and reformers combating sloth, a deadly sin. In 1656 the Genoese nobleman Emanuele Brignole proposed the creation of a central institution that would concentrate all the enemies of public order—the syphilitics, the insane, and especially the incorrigible beggars, orphans, criminals, and vagabonds who would not work. The city government agreed, and by 1664 over one thousand people, segregated by sex, age, disease, and crime, were inmates in the *Albergo dei Poveri*, where the able-bodied passed their time making useful canvas, cheap cloth, and clothing from cotton. The city purchased some slaves who had useful skills to use as instructors for teaching trades to the idle poor. This prison labor competed with some aspects of free-market production of cotton cloth in Genoa (the city whose French word for it—*Gênes*—became to English speakers “jeans”). The government kept the competition with free workers to the bottom of the trade, where it would serve as a check on wages, and the *albergo* took up work supplying menial labor and rough products for the private sector.

Some of the best-known experiments in using poor relief to discipline a workforce occurred in England. Elizabethan legislation of 1597 established overseers of the poor, unemployed, and unemployable in every parish. The overseers had the power to raise

taxes, the poor rates, in part to purchase raw materials so that children not being maintained by their parents could be set to work. The idle also faced the obligation to work; it became illegal to be unemployed. The overseers also had the authority to put boys and girls into apprenticeships so that they might learn useful trades and become self-supporting. These provisions remained in effect until the late eighteenth century, when even harsher measures were taken against those who would not work. These examples from across western Europe demonstrate that behind the considerable advances in manufacturing and productivity, as well as increases in the general standard of living, lay the threat of compulsion to keep people at work.

SHIPS AND CLOCKS

Preindustrial manufacturing produced many outstanding items that were the marvels of the world—great sailing ships, fine watches, firearms of all types. Individual artisans invented the piano and turned out violins that still are played today. Entrepreneurs like Josiah Wedgwood in England developed pottery works that would soon rival the porcelains of Asia. The surviving examples of this and other crafts demonstrate the high standards and accomplishments. Two distinctive industries, the giant ocean-sailing ships and Mediterranean galleys produced in this period and the much smaller clocks and watches, are useful examples of how manufacturing evolved in the early modern period.

The Venetian Arsenal, with roots deep in the Middle Ages, became in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the biggest shipyard in the world (Lane, 1973). By the 1560s the Arsenal employed between two to three thousand men in a variety of trades and was capable of constructing and maintaining a fleet of more than one hundred galleys. These fighting ships, turned out in an assembly-line fashion, were remarkable because they were constructed not as unique vessels but from interchangeable parts. This style of manufacture made it much easier to build and repair galleys. Various guilds of laborers worked on all phases of shipbuilding, but the Arsenal also anticipated modern systems of management because this large work site required vigilant and capable administrators. The Arsenal also became a rare example of a vertically integrated organization. Venice established state forests to secure regular supplies of timber. The need for sails, pulleys, cannon, and other key items involved the Arsenal with a host of suppliers. The success of the Arsenal allowed Venice to remain an international power and stave off the advances of the

Ottoman Turks in the eastern Mediterranean, who had large shipyards of their own. But the Arsenal was a unique institution, and its size and fame demonstrated that early modern manufacturing was capable of recruiting a large, skilled workforce, managing large-scale production, and creating a class of artisans with a strong sense of work identity and a willingness to march against the Doge's palace in pay disputes.

Shipyards were plentiful along the Atlantic coasts, and while no maritime power had a centralized yard to rival the Arsenal, the great sailing vessels like the Portuguese carracks, capable of making the long sea voyage to India and carrying large cargoes, were a new style of ship requiring skills from carpenters and caulkers, among many other trades. Peter Linebaugh (1992) has studied the workers in the naval dockyards of England in the eighteenth century. These yards, some of which employed a thousand men, were the largest industrial establishments in the country. A very sophisticated scale of daily wages and overtime regulated the work in the yards. The master craftsmen were in charge of the apprenticeship system and ran it to their benefit. Wages were often in arrears, and the workers were responsible for paying for medical services and the chaplain out of their own pockets. Being in management or a supplier of raw materials to the docks was often the path to riches because of pervasive public corruption.

The yards were certainly no workers' paradise. The dockyard workers struck in 1739 partly because they were paid only twice a year, when they were paid

at all, and they objected to this and the general atmosphere of corruption surrounding public contracting. Worker traditions and management clashed most forcefully on the issue of "chips." By long tradition in the woodworking trades, scrap timber and wood chips belonged to the workers. Their families, especially their wives, had by custom participated in this benefit, which was an important supplement to the stagnant and infrequently paid wages. Over the course of the eighteenth century the government continuously tried to limit the amount of wood the men could carry out of the yards and to exclude altogether the women from scavenging. The workers heated and built their houses with this wood, so they were zealous defenders of their rights. The clash between modern (if corrupt) management and the traditions of the trade shows how a workforce with a strong sense of solidarity was still capable of resisting attempts by employers to control their workplace. In this case the workers were producing warships in a century punctuated by major wars, so the threat of work stoppages was serious, and the workers were even prepared on occasion to fight the Royal Marines to defend their prerogatives. Not all workers enjoyed this self-confidence and leverage over their masters.

Social historians have been interested in the development of mechanical timepieces because these instruments changed the ways people thought about time and the working day. Great tower clocks began to appear on churches and city halls across Europe in the early fourteenth century. These earliest clocks

helped to keep a standard time necessary for the cycles of monastic prayer, and their bells fixed the boundaries of the local working day. The story of manufacturing timepieces is the history of miniaturization and increased skill in assembling complicated parts that made up the most intricate machines produced by preindustrial crafts. As David Landes (1983) has described the evolution of the trade, smaller portable clocks first appeared as luxury items in the later 1300s, and jewelers and goldsmiths were active in this trade. Spring-driven clocks first appeared in the early fifteenth century, probably in Italy, and from there it was a small step to making personal watches. Shortly after 1500 very small timepieces appeared, sign of the rapid technological advances in a trade barely two centuries old.

Early modern centers of clock- and watchmaking, northern Italy and southern Germany, soon lost supremacy to English watchmakers, who by the eighteenth century dominated the international trade. By the middle of the century Swiss workers were beginning to turn out high quality timepieces that could compete with English ones. Why the most advanced sector of an industry moves from one place to another remains an important question about manufacturing in any era. The social organization of work usually provides the answer. From one point of view, guilds of clockmakers, which became common only in the sixteenth century, impeded personal ambitions and the development of labor-saving techniques that would allow watches and clocks to be produced more cheaply. The credit guilds receive for educating the next generation in technological skills in this view needs to be balanced against the technological conservatism of guild masters and their desire to divide markets rather than compete over them. Hence in places like England and Holland, where guild rules did not reach beyond the major cities, advances in manufacturing techniques were more rapid than in older centers like Augsburg and Nürnberg. In England, out-work in the unregulated Midlands produced the parts masters assembled and finished in London. Masters benefited from purchasing the cheapest possible parts manufactured by relatively unskilled labor. Soon the entrepreneurs of the Swiss valleys would challenge the English, and in the cantons the trade was completely unregulated.

The rapid advances in this trade, as opposed to preindustrial weaving, may result from the weaker role guilds played in it. This pattern of manufacturing also meant, however, that a larger gulf separated the masters and shop owners from their workers, and gradually fewer people had the chance to rise through the ranks and become self-employed watchmakers. This

trade comes the closest to anticipating the effects of the factory system on other areas of manufacturing.

COMPAGNONNAGE

One of the most distinctive and revealing institutions shaping preindustrial manufacturing was the French *compagnonnage*. This association, explored by Cynthia Truant (1994), was a semisecret, illegal group of unmarried journeymen originating in early modern France. More than one *compagnonnage* existed, and it is better to think of them as social brotherhoods. The earliest signs of the *compagnonnage* appeared around Dijon in the fifteenth century, and as Natalie Zemon Davis (1975) has shown for Lyon, journeymen printers there in the sixteenth century were organized enough to strike. By the mid-seventeenth century these associations were common throughout France, strongest in the provinces, less so in Paris, where the powers of the *métiers* remained strong.

From the point of view of social history, the *compagnonnages* represent a movement of worker solidarity born in a corporate world of work dominated by the employers. The journeymen, though they worked alongside women in many trades, did not allow them to join the *compagnonnages*. Hence these movements against paternalism in work were gendered from the beginning. These journeymen were not primitive rebels or precocious trade unionists, nor were they simply emulating the medieval guild. The *compagnonnages* supported migrant journeymen in searching for jobs and places to stay in new cities. Journeymen took a hand in regulating the circumstances of work against the entrenched but decaying power of the masters.

The members of the *compagnonnages* were bound together by an oath that fostered solidarity. Initiation into the societies involved elaborate rituals, as revealed around 1645 in the customs of the journeymen shoemakers of Toulouse. Denied access to guildhalls and chapels, the journeymen usually met in taverns, so there was always a strong social and convivial component to their associations. A new member swore to obey the rules, and he received a kind of baptism with salt and water that incorporated him into the society. A sponsor, called a godfather, stood at his side as he joined. The use of religious symbols shows how *compagnonnages* grew out of corporate society and drew on the customs of religious confraternities. The most important feature of these rituals was that they attached the loyalty of the ex-apprentice not to his employer but to his fellow journeymen. To the extent that these workers increasingly controlled access to

work in the eighteenth century by refusing to work for masters who did not honor their rules, they set the stage for legal associations of workers that developed during the industrial revolution. The secret aspects of the *compagnonnages* made government and guilds suspicious of them. Since the alternative might have been a more direct revolt against the status quo, the *compagnonnages* were usually tolerated. A closer search for these shadowy groups in other European countries may reveal how skilled workers opposed the power of their employers.

NEW TRADES—GUNS AND BOOKS

The increasing use of handheld weapons, muskets and pistols, in early modern warfare—itsself a growth business—created oscillating demands for these products. Manufacturing guns was a new trade in this period, and the stages of work represent one of the most sophisticated divisions of labor in preindustrial manufacturing. Carlo M. Belfant (1998) has investigated this trade in the northern Italian city of Brescia, a renowned center of gun manufacture. Brescia had some natural advantages for this trade: iron ore was nearby, as were forests to supply fuel and streams for water power. Why the area should have so many highly skilled gunsmiths as opposed to other types of metalworkers is unclear, but early innovations in techniques probably explain this local specialization.

The stages of production were complex and reveal an advanced division of labor. First, miners had to extract iron ore and turn it over to forgers who produced the first, rough cast iron. Cast iron contains many impurities that weaken the metal, so sophisticated forges heated the cast iron, with mills providing the water power necessary to drive the hammers that literally beat the impurities from the metal. This early use of water power for forging enabled local smiths to turn out high quality sheets of forged iron. Next, the most skilled phase occurred as master gunsmiths produced gun barrels from the sheets. The barrel was the most critical part of the weapon because cheap ones exploded or quickly split, rendering the gun useless. Brescia's weapons enjoyed a high reputation because of the barrels, and the masters who made them presided over the craft. Various other specialized artisans, like borers, finished the basic barrel. The final step was burnishing, a craft dominated by women masters and apprentices.

An allied trade of skilled craftsmen produced the flint gunlocks, the firing mechanism. Other teams of artisans assembled the barrel and gunlock into a musket or pistol. This trade required skill in wood-

working as well as metalworking. The early stages of production were out in the countryside, near the forges, while much of the finishing work took place in Brescia. Many allied trades, like the makers of bayonets, powder horns, and bullets, were also located in the region. This complex industrial zone was capable as early as 1562 of turning out 25,000 muskets a year. There was a continuously high level of activity till the end of the eighteenth century, when the industry was still able to make for Spain 150,000 rifles from 1794 to 1797. The market for Brescia's weapons was international and driven largely by the pace of warfare. This unpredictability of demand caused problems for the masters, who along with their workers preferred regular production and profits to bouts of overwork or unemployment.

The Venetian state governing Brescia tried and failed to introduce some regularity into the market for weapons. Hence tensions developed between the masters and artisans making the guns and the merchants who sold them in large lots to customers across Europe. The producers were frequently in debt and turned to new guilds to defend their interests against the merchants. A guild of gunsmiths, run by the barrel makers and including the borers, gunlock makers, and other crafts, emerged in the early seventeenth century, a sign that a guild still struck masters as their most sensible means of mutual assistance. Since the masters had little choice but to sell to middlemen, the social relations of markets and work were changing in ways the guilds found difficult to master. Forge owners were also important to the trade and were not in the guild. The guild masters wanted to force merchants to share big orders among the members, another typical indication that the masters were more interested in surviving in the trade than driving out their competitors. This instinct to form a cartel failed to serve the interests of all the workers and masters in the craft, so the trade in 1717 opted for one central guild including all phases of manufacturing, on a more equal footing, to confront the merchants. By the middle of the century, the masters of the lesser trades, thinking their interests neglected by the barrel makers, asked for and received their own guilds.

All these problems inside the trade led to a decline in quality. The merchants sought to evade the guild rules by engaging in out-work, but cheaper barrels from deep in the countryside hurt the reputation of guns from Brescia. Whether the gradual decline of the industry resulted from anticompetitive guild rules, an inability of the trade to deal with irregular demand, or frustrated desires of workers to rise in the craft remains unclear. Also, international competition had become stiffer as each nation thought it necessary to

have a domestic, reliable supply of weaponry and people skilled at the trade. This case study of the trade around Brescia reveals that the advantages of a first mover in this craft did not guarantee a permanent, prominent position in the business of guns. The problem was that the social relations surrounding work could not keep up with the increasingly international economy of Europe.

Ever since Johann Gutenberg of Mainz used movable type around 1450 to print the first books in Europe, the printing trades had evolved and produced millions of books, pamphlets, and prints. As a new trade at the cutting edge of early modern technology, printing still adopted the guild system typical of older industries. Early printed books described new technologies, the diversity of trades, and even occupational illnesses. Printing was an unusual trade because much of its work required literate artisans in societies where overall literacy rates remained low. Also, the printing trade was exceptionally mobile, and skilled masters and workers moved across Europe looking for markets and work. Literate workers and companies left behind records that Robert Darnton (1985) has used to illuminate the craft in Paris and Neuchâtel in Switzerland. In Paris the Crown fixed the number of master printers at thirty-six in 1686, making it difficult for journeymen to rise in the craft. The most skilled workers were threatened by the cheaper work by apprentices and laborers not in the *compagnonnages*. Journeymen in these circumstances often moved quickly from job to job, and a fair amount of violence, drunkenness, and absenteeism characterized the workplace. The journeymen retained some solidarity in the face of all these problems. Printing too suggests that preindustrial manufacturing was no golden age for workers trapped in a rigid guild hierarchy with few prospects for social mobility.

CONDITIONS AT THE END OF THE PERIOD

Printing, a modern trade, experienced some of the first genuine industrial strikes. General strikes among the cloth workers in Leiden in 1644 and 1701 revealed that it was hard to organize against the masters

and merchants who dominated the increasingly international scope of work. When the cloth workers of Salisbury revolted in 1738, the government executed the ringleaders, another sign that state authority in this period firmly sided with the employers. As the great European social historian Fernand Braudel (1982) observed about these and other revolts, the putting-out system and the guilds remained the entrenched powers in manufacturing. Where these institutions were weakest, the industrial revolution would first appear. The modern, capitalist employers originated, however, in the social relations surrounding work in the early modern period. So too did a gender division of labor that excluded women from many trades and usually paid them lower wages for the same work. This system put boys and girls to work learning a trade at young ages and forced the able-bodied idle to work. The workers, especially the journeymen and women, faced the start of the factory era in the late eighteenth century with some worker solidarity. But they were in an increasingly weak position as the reciprocity of the older system of paternalistic wage labor gave way to harsher working conditions. A working class was in the making.

CONCLUSION

It is important to remember that the dominant features of preindustrial manufacturing were changing in advance of industrialization. Guilds were under attack, though many survived in strength. Manufacturing in rural areas was gaining ground. In this system, merchants from the cities distributed raw materials and orders to workers who labored in their homes, usually with primitive manual equipment, and then manufacturer representatives picked up the finished products and paid the workers by the piece. An alternative system had workers coming into town to get materials and then later to sell products. Hundreds of thousands of rural (domestic or putting-out-system) workers were involved in textiles, shoes, and metal goods by the eighteenth century, either full-time or part-time. Finally, technological change, though uneven, also affected many branches of preindustrial manufacturing.

See also Protoindustrialization; The Industrial Revolutions (volume 2); Artisans (volume 3); and other articles in this section.

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FACTORY WORK



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Factory work is at the core of industrialization, a process that defined economic change in Europe for more than a century. The factory system was a way to organize work and produce goods that differed from small-scale personal manufacture in homes and workshops. Beginning in Britain around 1750, industrial production eventually became the dominant form of manufacture, though not the dominant sector of the economy, in most European countries by 1914. Whether termed “industrialization” or “industrial revolution,” the transformations were neither linear nor uniform. National, regional, industrial, and gender variations existed in the rate and extent of change. While factories gathered more of the manufacturing population, technology, power-driven machines, and large-scale production were a part of the broader process of industrial development. That process experienced variety, unevenness, progress, and regress because many production processes involved a combination of factory work, machines, handicraft workers, and domestic industry. Countless women worked in factories, especially in textiles, yet domestic manufacturing persisted as a critical way for thousands of women to contribute to the family economy. In many areas, especially on the Continent, a symbiotic relationship persisted between old and new techniques, mediating against the notion that industrialization was a startling event. The transformations that altered the economic and social characteristics of Europe were slow, particularistic, and complex. This essay offers insight into the multiple changes and continuities that form the social context for a broader understanding of factory work. It focuses on the major industrial nations of Britain, France, and Germany from the eighteenth century to the twentieth century. For western and central European workers, the role of factories in shaping work experience was especially critical in the nineteenth century. The twentieth-century brought the factory into eastern Europe, and especially after World War II it brought immigrants into the factories of the west. In eastern Europe—however differently communist ideology envisioned industrialization—the So-

viet economic system produced many patterns similar to those observable in earlier industrial revolutions. Factory work has not been a constant, even in countries like Britain that industrialized early. Expansion of factory size and the growth of technical automation conditioned the work experience.

Despite variations with time and place, a number of patterns warrant particular attention. Factories changed the work experience in several important respects. They increased the pace of work, as machines tended to dictate speed. They encouraged work specialization, so ultimately the semiskilled worker, adept at a fairly narrow job, became the classic factory operative. Few workers participated in more than a small stage of the production process, and the separation of work from a clear sense of the end product contributed to what some observers have termed the alienation of factory labor. Factories created new problems with accidents and noise. They also subjected workers to detailed supervision either by other workers or, as time went on and organization became more formal, foremen or efficiency engineers. Finally, factories definitively separated work from home, forcing workers to deal with many strangers as colleagues. For many workers, both in the early days of factories and later amid more complex organization and technology, the quality of the work experience deteriorated. Various protests attempted to address this situation but with little hard-won success. Strikes and unionization often focused more on compensation for work—in the form of pay and benefits—than on the work itself.

BRITAIN, 1750–1914

Mechanization and factories. The strength of Britain’s commercial and manufacturing success in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries formed the base for the first industrial revolution. Important factors facilitated Britain’s industrialization. Innovations in agriculture and restrictions on land ownership made farming less viable as a full-time occupation. Domes-

tic manufacturing, usually with whole families working together, established a large protoindustrial base. A considerable rise in population put pressure on existing resources. Large workshops, resembling factories but without mechanization, undergirded the imperial economy, functioning in printmaking, linen and woolen manufacturing, lace and stocking making, ironware production, and the other metal trades. Maxine Berg indicated that the large-scale woolen workshops of West Yorkshire moved into a factory system, incorporating division of labor, standardization, concentration of labor, and the use of unskilled workers, prior to mechanization. Thus factories predated the industrial revolution.

However, technology opened a new path. In 1765 James Watt modified a crude steam engine to make it more versatile, and steam power became available to run a variety of machines that changed the production process in essential ways. Inventions in spinning pushed textiles to the forefront of industrial production. The advent of the spinning mule in 1779 made England “the workshop of the world.” Mechanized spinning was identified as the first significant

change in the mode of production in Europe. It is symbolic of the factory system in Britain but also in other societies undergoing industrialization. By the 1790s almost all cotton spinning for market was located in factories. Weaving was technically more difficult to mechanize, and increased demand for cotton cloth initially resulted in expansion of hand weaving and home production. Domestic weavers were mostly men, whereas hand spinning was done by women. When power was introduced to weaving in the first years of the nineteenth century, thousands of handloom weavers who lived in the countryside were displaced. This disturbance was one of the most visible negative effects of industrialization, and its long-lived lament was expressed by artisans, who were confused and angry, and by labor historians like E. P. Thompson, who wrote *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963), one of the first great social histories of this group.

Among other textiles, industrial development varied according to the types of fiber and the work processes involved. Mechanization of woolens was slower than cottons because spinning and weaving wool fibers was more difficult and more expensive to do by machine. Machines could be used in only certain parts of the production process, such as preparing the raw wool for spinning and finishing the surface. West Riding in Yorkshire became the center of England’s wool industry when steam engines were incorporated into various stages of production. The general trend in textiles was mechanization, but factories did not eliminate domestic industry and handwork because some operations resisted a technical solution.

It took most of the nineteenth century for the conversion to factory work to saturate industrial production. The early stages of industrialization were marked by the erosion of old crafts through division of labor and by the development of new skills suitable to mechanized production. New technologies changed the scale of production. Advances in metallurgy were as impressive as those in textiles and perhaps more influential to the expansion of mechanization because machines made from iron could sustain the heavy, repetitive demands of the factory system. Coke was used instead of charcoal for smelting, steam-powered engines increased production, and machines became the platforms for creating other machines. Most of the new equipment required large plants. Iron puddling furnaces, steam and water engines, silk-throwing mills, spinning factories, and weaving machines all needed space.

The goal was to rationally organize production by restructuring the work process and by increasing the productivity of workers. When machinery was ap-

plied to jobs in which skilled labor performed most operations, a revolutionary change occurred. Standardization and uniformity were achieved by dividing the whole work process into individual tasks that could be mechanized. Adam Smith believed that the division of labor enhanced productivity. With training and experience, worker efficiency increased, and simplified, repetitive work reduced the need for skilled labor, lowering costs. Smith argued,

The great increase in the quantity of work, which, in consequence of the division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different circumstances: first, to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of time, which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and, lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many. (Berg, 1979, p. 48)

Mass production in factories meant cheaper production. Although numerous studies on specialization were conducted at the turn of the century, the Charles Babbage report entitled “On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures” was significant in establishing the principles of factory organization. The report sold three thousand copies shortly after its publication in 1833. Babbage concluded that production costs could be substantially reduced by dividing a craft into its constituent parts. He also composed a list of questions for workers. The inquiry form was available to industrialists who wanted a clearer picture of their workforces and work processes. Questions for both employers and workers included: Were various parts of the same article made in one factory or elsewhere? If elsewhere, did the work processes differ? Did the “master” or men provide and repair the tools? What level of waste was tolerated by the “master”? What was the cost of the machinery, and was it made and repaired at the factory? How many persons were necessary to attend each machine? What was the composition of labor—men, women, children? Did age and gender affect job assignments? What wages were earned by each category of workers, and were earnings determined by time or piecework? What was the average daily work time, and did workers have to perform night or shift work? What degree of skill was required, and how were workers trained? Answers to these questions have also assisted social historians in reconstructing the social history of labor.

Structuring factory work: management and regulation. Large, mechanized establishments created new issues of labor management. Early factories depended on skilled, mature male workers, who made

up the “labor aristocracy.” In the manner of craft trades, these workers had considerable control over their work and the machines they operated. Robert Owen sought to implement his ideas of work civility in his New Lanark mill in Manchester, which he ran between 1800 and 1829. He advocated organizing his workers into a kind of family, in which community and factory were linked together and the humane treatment of labor would result in “pecuniary profit.” Owen’s style of paternalism was directed at problems of labor discipline and at transforming persons new to industrial work into a reliable and efficient labor force. Factory discipline was essential to the production process in all mechanized industries. Workers paid substantial economic and psychological costs in regions where machines displaced home industry and separated work from the household. In the early stages of industrialization, these violations caused overt resistance to machines and the mills. One of the most famous episodes of worker violence occurred in the woolen industry in the Midlands and West Riding. In the Luddite “outrages” of 1811 and 1812, workers broke into factories and destroyed the machines, which they identified as the major threat to their economic safety and way of life. Thompson wrote:

The main disturbances commenced in Nottingham, in March 1811. A large demonstration of stockingers, “clamouring for work and a more liberal price” was dispersed by the military. That night sixty stocking-frames were broken at the large village of Arnold by rioters who took no precautions to disguise themselves and who were cheered on by the crowd. For several weeks disturbances continued, mainly at night, throughout the hosiery villages of north-west Nottinghamshire. Although special constables and troops patrolled the villages, no arrests could be made. (Thompson, 1963, p. 553)

Factory workers left scant records, but inquiries and parliamentary debates over industrialization provide information about conditions on the job and about how workers lived. Housing, food and drink, clothing, and health were all subjects of investigation and evaluation. On the job concerns of factory workers focused on hours and wages. The hours issue was the subject of some of the first attempts to regulate factory work, particularly the use of child labor. Factory work required set hours, punctuality, and productivity rates governed by the machines. In areas of continuous around-the-clock activity, such as the iron and glass industries, laborers usually worked shifts of twelve hours. The glass industry had alternate six-hour shifts. The generally accepted workday for most industries was from 6:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. The twelve-hour day was normal in textiles, although with increased mechanization hours were extended, sometimes

to 8:00 P.M. Owen addressed the issue in 1815. Consequently the select committee of 1816 formed, and in 1819 legislation restricted child labor to twelve hours daily. The act, however, had little effect. Employers ignored it, and enforcement was difficult. The six-day work week was the norm, with work lasting until 6:00 P.M. on Saturdays. Legislation in 1825 confirmed the twelve-hour day in the cotton industry and limited Saturday work to nine hours, but as with previous legislation, enforcement was practically nonexistent.

By the 1830s regulation of factory work was clearly part of the broader reformist climate in Britain. The parliamentary Sadler commission of 1832 intended to expose the conditions of children in factories, and testimony before the commission came from workers themselves. A twenty-eight-year-old cloth dresser reported that he had started in the flax mills at age ten. Work commenced at 5:00 A.M. and ended at 9:00 P.M. with a dinner break at noon. Boys and girls began working in the woolen mills as young as five or six. As adults they remembered working until 9:00 or 10:00 P.M. in the summer while sufficient light lasted. As youngsters both boys and girls were “strapped” to keep them awake and working. One of the ugliest practices was employing orphans from asylums in cities. The children were shipped to the factories, where they were compelled to work in exchange for food and shelter.

The Sadler hearings and debates led to the Factory Act of 1833. Robert Gray, in *The Factory Question and Industrial England* (1996), explained that provisions stipulated a maximum of eight hours and compulsory schooling for children between nine and twelve years old. For youngsters between thirteen and seventeen, the twelve-hour day was the limit. The act also established a factory inspectorate. With some exceptions, the provisions extended beyond the cotton industry to include all textile production that used power machines.

Once factory work was identified as the cause of debility, disease, and moral danger, the government intervened. This act established the model and structure for subsequent legislation. The Factory Commission’s factory inspections legitimated further investigations. Medical opinion was instrumental in forming concern for factory labor and setting the rationale for regulation. Lung diseases, stomach and bowel disorders, varicose veins, leg ulcers, pelvic deformities, and childbirth problems were linked to factory work. In the 1840s, against the background of public and political pressure, the Chartist movement, and worker violence, legislation was expanded. In 1847 the Act to Limit the Hours of Labour of Young Persons and

Females in Factories confirmed the ten-hour day in textiles. The precedent for government intervention and regulation of factory work, particularly in textile mills, where large numbers of women and children were employed, was generally accepted by the mid-nineteenth century.

The living standards of workers also came under scrutiny. Thompson described the average worker as living close to the subsistence level, but variations including industry, place of employment, skill level, and gender made the “average worker” somewhat elusive. The standard of living issue integrated questions about family, women’s work, child labor, national health, and morality. Inquiries into diet, housing, and sanitation provided information on the living conditions of factory labor, which spurred later debates among social historians about the impact of industrialization on workers’ standard of living. Most workers subsisted on a diet of cereal and potatoes. Meat was scarce, available only when someone earned extra money for a proper Sunday meal. Workers’ wives bought inferior parts of animals, such as a cow’s heel, a sheep’s trotters, a pig’s ear, and tripe. Beer was considered a necessity by many factory workers. It eased frustrations and encouraged camaraderie in the countless pubs that grew up in factory districts. Despite shop rules, workers liked to drink on the job, explaining that it gave them strength and quenched their thirst.

Change and continuity: 1875–1914. Many of the themes and problems of Britain’s early industrialization persisted in the years before World War I, although working and living conditions improved somewhat. Regional industries were still a part of the economic landscape before 1914, with wide variations in the scale and concentration of production, levels of mechanization, wage systems, and workers’ earnings. Factory work was almost complete in textiles, engineering, and metal work, but subcontracting had not been eliminated. Expanded and more sophisticated technology was troubling to workers, whose pride was bound up with the job. Although formal apprenticeships declined, skilled labor was required for many operations in the factory, where most workers were trained on the job. Evidence points to generational tension. Older skilled workers were reluctant to accept younger, less-skilled workers as equals. Some skilled workers went to extremes to protect their craft and independence. John Benson reported:

There used to be a craftsman in this shop who always came to work with a piece of chalk in his pocket. When he arrived each morning he would at once draw a chalk

circle on the floor around his machine. If the foreman wanted to speak to him he could do so . . . as long as he stayed outside the circle. But if he put one foot across that line, he was a dead man. (Hinson, 1973, pp. 58–59)

A London engineer said that in 1897 he and his fellow workers used passive resistance and sabotage against new machinery and time monitoring. They deliberately slowed down the pace of work and complained to the “rate-fixer” that the production charts were wrong. The stopwatch was not welcome on the factory floor.

In the 1890s increased supervision became prevalent in most modern industries. New technology flattened the gap between the skilled and the unskilled. A factory inspector reported a policy used in some textile mills to guarantee production and enforce labor discipline requiring that female workers give the foreman a tally when they went to the toilet. The information was collected, and a woman was fined at the end of the month if the reckoning showed she spent more than four minutes for each visit to the facilities. Despite protective legislation, child labor was widespread before World War I. Working-class poverty was a recurrent theme, and children in textile families were expected to earn. Compulsory public education was introduced in 1876, but children continued to work part-time. In the textile mills in Lancashire and Yorkshire, children left school at age twelve to work half-time in the factory and full-time when they reached

thirteen. This practice persisted until 1918, when it was legally abolished.

The British economy underwent structural changes between 1875 to 1914. However, it would be incorrect to assume that all traditional modes of production disappeared. The period of mature industrialization witnessed increased mechanization, wage systems based on speed of productivity, expanded use of piecework, and closer supervision of workers as many firms instituted systematic and “scientific” management. Child and female labor decreased. Trade union membership grew, and associations included more semiskilled and unskilled workers in their ranks. Although aggregate data on worker protests are incomplete, indications are that workers learned to use strikes as effective disruptions to force managements to meet at least some of their demands. Strike activity increased between 1908 and 1910, but in 1911 the number of strikes and the number of workers who struck rose dramatically. They stayed high until the outbreak of war.

THE CONTINENT

Industrialization began on the Continent considerably later than in Britain. Wars, civil disturbances, and political particularism delayed innovation; guild restrictions were tenacious; the agrarian economy remained stable; domestic industry prevailed; and a

shortage of raw materials retarded conversion to factory production. Also, deep social attitudes preserved traditional ways of work. By 1830 the only continental country that had introduced mechanization was Belgium, which converted various branches of the textile industry into factory work. France and several of the German states followed, along with southern European states like Italy and Spain, which progressed more slowly and with greater regional variations. For those entrepreneurs who realized the connection between wealth and mechanization, Britain was the source of technology, machines, and skilled labor. British workers installed machinery and trained others to use it efficiently; businesspeople developed factories in Belgium, France, and Germany; and British capital supported many industrial endeavors. W. O. Henderson stated in *Britain and Industrial Europe* (1965) that knowledge, inventions, machines, and personnel were transferred from Britain to the Continent, but conversion to factories also depended on national and regional economic, social, and political considerations.

FRANCE, 1850–1914

The factory worker was not characteristic of French labor in the mid-nineteenth century. Only about 20 percent of workers were employed in factories and mines in 1850. The pattern of development was regional with significant variations. Domestic industry and agriculture engaged most of the population in the first half of the nineteenth century, even while machines and mechanization were adopted in selected industries, such as textiles and metallurgy. However, tradition and relatively good earnings in the countryside made it difficult to entice labor into factories. Robert Magraw offered the following profile in *A History of the French Working Class* (1992). Textiles and clothing were the two largest branches of industrial production, employing about 58 percent of the nonagrarian population in the 1840s. About 10 percent of industrial labor was in metallurgy. Women and children were used extensively in factory work because they worked for lower wages and compensated for reluctant male labor. In 1866 about 30 percent of industrial labor was female. This figure rose to 40 percent by the outbreak of the war in 1914. Children comprised about 12 percent of factory workers in the 1840s, but that number declined gradually as a result of social concerns and the Labor Law of 1841.

Structuring factory work: management, resistance, and regulation. Generally the French were more traditional and less willing to submit to fac-

tory organization than the British. The French held strong ties to the land and to handwork. Industrialists had problems drawing workers, and the resulting labor shortage affected the composition of the workforce, wages, and the way employers treated their workers, especially those whose skills were essential to production. Employers found it easier and cheaper to use domestic industry instead of investing large sums in machines and factory buildings. Employers also faced seasonal interruptions. Factory workers who maintained connections with family and village usually went home for the harvest. In such an industrial environment, skilled workers could command high wages, and many employers offered further inducements to secure a stable core of workers.

It took several years of training and experience for textile workers to reach quality performance, but skill was not the only constraint. French factory workers tended to treat requirements for punctuality and discipline with distaste. They took unauthorized breaks, stole materials, showed up for work drunk, and insisted on observing Holy Monday as a day off to recover from Sunday. If none of these maneuvers relieved the pressure, French male workers often changed jobs and locations, a practice that disturbed production because new people had to be trained and integrated into the factory system. In metallurgy and other kinds of heavy industry, a skilled male labor force was essential. Because of the nature of the work, women and children were not appropriate substitutes. Metal firms paid high wages and raided other plants to keep a full complement on the job. Skilled English workers were used initially to train men in metals, and fifteen years was not an unusual length of time to reach full proficiency.

In textiles women made up half of the factory labor force. More women worked in spinning than in weaving, and more women worked in cotton production than in woolens production. But the composition of the labor force varied from region to region. Several factors mitigated against increasing the use of child labor. Male wages were high enough to limit the need for youngsters to enter the factories. New technology and larger machines eliminated tasks usually performed by children, especially the very young. Indications suggest that employers were aware of the effects of factory work on children's health and morality. Concerns culminated in the Child Labor Law of 1841. The law stipulated that children under eight years of age were prohibited from factory work, it banned night work for children under thirteen, and it required that children receive at least some elementary education. As in Britain, the law was evaded by

both employers and families, who needed the meager earnings to get by. Factory inspection was unreliable, and the law applied only to firms with more than twenty workers. At least the issue of child labor was in the public domain, but humanitarian concerns did not override the cost benefits of child labor until the 1870s.

Wages in factory work were higher than in domestic industry, and they rose in the nineteenth century. The level of mechanization affected wage rates in various industries and regions. Notions of a “just wage” were included in pay considerations. What was deemed fair was supposed to be a notch above subsistence and reflective of the worker’s skill, strength, and experience. To maximize return on the investment of machines and to keep costs low, manufacturers tried to insure that workers produced to capacity. High wages were one incentive, but piecework contributed to increased production and also to regulation of the work process. Laborers were commonly paid by the day, but skilled workers earned price per piece. Some evidence, however, shows that workers deliberately adjusted their productivity to prevent employers from setting standards of output at higher levels. Fines were imposed for disciplinary violations. It was expected that workers would clean and repair their own machines. To counter absenteeism and job changing, some of the larger manufacturers required that workers sign a contract. Employers often withheld a small part of a worker’s pay, which was returned only if the reason for leaving was acceptable. Factory rules also promoted standardization, regularity, and quality work. Too much independence was not tolerated. Peter Stearns wrote in *Paths to Authority* (1978) that workers were prevented from “wandering” about the factory floor, carousing, drinking and smoking around the machines, and even singing. Fines were imposed for such behaviors.

Paternalism was a distinctive feature of large firms. Benefits were seen as a way to insure a disciplined, stable complement of workers, especially skilled adult men. While the approach was more prevalent in heavy industry, large textile plants eventually offered similar benefits. Benevolent policies did more to steady the work force than high wages. Among the benefits were company housing, pension plans, medical care, and on-site company schools, all of which bound workers more closely to their employment. Paternalism was clearly a strategy to promote manufacturers’ self-interests and also to transmit middle-class values of family, order, cleanliness, and sobriety. Large textile firms in Nord and Alsace established mutual aid groups that provided a small amount to workers who were out because of illness or accident, and burial

funds were popular. Voluntary or compulsory savings banks were also a part of company packages. Firms that established schools not only improved the quality of families and future workers but also complied with the 1841 Child Labor Law. Commonly children went to school for a few hours to learn the basics of reading and writing, then went to the factory. While paternalism provided mutual benefits for industrialists and factory workers, only a minority of France’s labor force was eligible. Most workers, especially women, were employed by companies whose approach to labor was cost-effective and exploitative.

Change and continuity, 1870–1914. Between 1871 and 1914 French industrial structure continued to exhibit the characteristics of uneven development. Compared with Britain, small-scale, workshop production persisted in many sectors. The crisis of military defeat in 1870 and a depression that lasted almost until the end of the century slowed industrial advancement.

However, by the turn of the century a “second industrial revolution” was underway. The pressure of foreign competition expanded mechanization and stimulated new industries. Peugeot in eastern France changed from making metal hoops for corsets to producing automobiles. By 1914 France was home to the second largest car industry in the world. Lorraine became one of Europe’s major steel areas. Technical knowledge enhanced chemicals, electricals, rubber, and aluminum. In Lyon the number of mechanized looms for silk production rose from five thousand to forty thousand by 1914, and industry diversified to include chemicals, metals, pharmaceuticals, glass, locomotives plants, factory-made clothes, and shoes in 1914.

As with early industrialization, France faced labor shortages prompted by rapid technological change and industrial diversification. The composition of the labor force was marked by certain particulars that were not seen in Britain. The number of women rose due to aggressive recruitment by employers. Women made up 31 percent of the labor force in 1866 and 37 percent in 1906. In Lyonnais half of the chemical workers, two-thirds of the clothing workers, and one-fifth of the metal workers were women. Interestingly, in contrast to England and Germany, married women tended to return to the factory after they had children. Migrant labor also figured largely in French industry. Belgians and Germans were supplemented by thousands of Italian workers brought in for the iron and steel industries. By 1914 about 1 million foreigners worked in France.

The standard of living improved at the turn of the century. Even with variations among industries

and economic fluctuations, job security was less uncertain. The severe survival crises of the past subsided, and workers came to think of former extras as necessities. Workers' diets were more varied, often including fruits, butter, and condiments. By the 1900s workers allotted about 30 percent to 40 percent of their budgets to food, whereas at mid-century it hovered around 70 percent. Health and hygiene improved. Clinics for working-class mothers in major industrial areas affected prenatal and maternity care, and child morbidity fell considerably. Contemporaries measured worker health, at least in males, by the increased number of conscripts who qualified for military service. Reducing child factory work ameliorated health generally. Protective legislation of 1874 and 1892 set age restrictions, banned child labor in certain industries, and increased the number of factory inspectors. Parents often subverted the provisions by asking inspectors to ignore the illegal jobs of their children.

As wages improved and work time lessened, more workers had time and energy for leisure. The so-called "English week" of five and a half days allowed workers to think in terms of the weekend. Drinking, of course, was always important, but younger workers also looked to sports for excitement and relaxation. Some factories encouraged workers to organize soccer teams not only for healthy exercise but also to build company loyalty.

GERMANY: RAPID MECHANIZATION, 1870–1914

When Britain's industrialization was described as mature, the German states were just starting to adopt mechanization. Before the mid-nineteenth century mechanized factories were uncommon. Around 1840 German manufacturing was infused with technology from Britain. It is generally accepted that Germany's industrialization took place comparatively quickly and that changes occurred even more rapidly after unification in 1871. Regionalism was a noticeable feature of German industrial development. The centers for textiles were in Silesia and Saxony in the east and the Rhineland and Westphalia in the west. Heavy industry, iron, and metallurgy were located in the Ruhr Valley and Saar. Other areas maintained relatively traditional conditions to the beginning of the twentieth century. The large coal reserves in the western provinces of Prussia were not yet fully exploited. Metalworking establishments were small, scattered, and powered by water. Iron making was usually a supplement to peasant farming. The Solingen metal works

employed large numbers of skilled men who worked in the traditional handicraft mode. Following unification, many of the hindrances to industrialization were eased and replaced by government support for economic advancement. The most aggressive period of industrial development was between 1895 and 1914. Huge firms organized in factory production accounted for the greatest increase in labor.

Germany experienced variations in the growth of specific industries and time differences in the process of mechanization and factory concentration. Most obvious were discontinuities between the capital goods and consumer goods industries. Because of the nature of production, an expanding market, and an available supply of skilled and semiskilled male labor, heavy industry could profitably introduce machinery and mechanization. In textiles, clothing, and tobacco a fluctuating market, foreign competition, and a ready pool of unskilled and semiskilled labor, almost 50 percent of which was female, made nonfactory work more flexible and more profitable. In the period of Germany's rapid industrialization, approximately 50 percent of industrial female labor was employed in the clothing industry, which further expanded into domestic industry and the putting-out system with the introduction of the foot-operated sewing machine.

The structure of factory work. Sexual division of labor was a statement about social and economic issues related to factory work. Earning a living was integrated into definitions of masculinity and femininity. When women worked in factories, their employment was often seasonal and intermittent, as industrial demand and personal and family needs guided their work outside the home. Over the course of their work lives, women changed jobs. They combined various kinds of work in factories, domestic industry, and agriculture and stayed at home if male earnings were sufficient for family viability. In the factory gender segregation was integral to questions of wages, skills, turnover, and legal protection. Controlled work assignments segmented industries and operations, as employers, government, religion, and society at large separated men's work and women's work into categories of labor. Sexual division preserved the contours of traditional gender roles by removing women as far as possible from direct competition with men. Protective legislation divided men and women workers by gender and regulated women's participation in the labor force. The same theme was adopted by male-dominated labor unions in an effort to control and even eliminate women from factory work, but that proved impossible.

During Germany's rapid industrial expansion in the 1880s and 1890s, a persistent labor shortage made women the appropriate choice for factory work. Women's factory work is best captured by examining the textile industry, where, as in France and Britain, women made up the core workforce before 1914. Kathleen Canning noted in *Languages of Labor and Gender* (1996) that, in the textile regions of the Rhineland and Westphalia, the lives of both single and married women included work in the factory. Censuses report that the number of women employed in the mills in all of Germany rose by 63 percent between 1882 and 1907, while male employment barely changed. The western provinces were also areas of heavy industry, which drew male workers away from the textile factories. Many factory women came from domestic industry, but the influx of hundreds of young women from the countryside aroused the most attention and worry. The single mill girls symbolized the worst effects of industrialization and factory work. However, employers were concerned not only with filling the line but also with developing a mature, reliable, and productive group of women, many of them married, to "regulate" the younger workers. Most entrants could learn enough in several weeks to do passable work and were considered fully productive within a year. Despite feminization, men continued to earn higher wages in textiles because they had the formal training to execute jobs that required skill, strength, and the know-how to handle the machines. Gender division of work processes and supervision made it difficult for women to improve wages or conditions on the job.

Industrialization brought an entirely new perception of time management and an opportunity to use time to regulate and discipline factory workers. Michael Schneider pointed out in *Streit um Arbeitszeit* (1984) that mechanization increased weekly work hours in textiles from seventy-five in 1825 to ninety in 1850. In the decade from 1860 to 1870 the work week was eighty-one hours. Worker protest was evident by mid-century. In Wuppertal two thousand factory workers went on strike to demand a twelve-hour day with extra pay for overtime. In the metal industries skilled male labor in the huge Krupp and Borsig factories worked a sixty-six-hour week, while male workers in printing and woodworking were in the factory from sixty to seventy hours a week.

Wage structures varied by industry and skill level. Systematic data on wages are not available for Germany for 1871 to 1914, but the existing material is sufficient to convey a sense of earnings by industry and operation. Total wages and wage rates varied according to employers' assessments of the work and the



WAGES IN GERMANY 1871–1914

A survey conducted by the Union of Factory Workers gathered the following information.

<i>Men Workers</i>		<i>Women Workers</i>	
<i>Weekly Wages (in marks)</i>	<i>Percentage of Workers Earning the Wage</i>	<i>Weekly Wages (in marks)</i>	<i>Percentage of Workers Earning the Wage</i>
less than 12	1.12%	less than 8	8.92%
12–15	4.71%	8–10	29.50%
15–18	17.49%	10–12	33.80%
18–21	25.49%	12–15	20.17%
21–25	31.12%	15–	7.61%
25–30	16.40%		
30–35	2.95%		
35–	.72%		

Franzoi, 1985, p. 43



WAGES IN STUTTGART IN 1900

This information was collected by industry.

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Men's Wages (in marks)</i>	<i>Women's Wages (in marks)</i>	<i>Women's Wages in Percentage of Men's Wages</i>
Painting and Varnishing	20.53	11.28	55%
Shoemaking	18.27	10.89	59%
Upholstering	20.75	10.80	52%
Day Work	16.72	10.59	63%
Printing	27.64	9.82	35.5%
Bookbinding	21.83	9.67	44%
Textiles	20.10	9.13	45%
Tobacco	14.21	8.02	56%

Franzoi, 1985, p. 44

worker, a hierarchical system influenced by custom and social status. Generally workers were considered skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled depending on their training and experience. Many skilled workers in heavy industry had family members in the same trade, and some had apprenticed. But as industrialization progressed, training under the supervision of a skilled worker was carried out in the factory. Skilled workers preferred piecework because it suggested a measure of control over production and gave them the opportunity to increase earnings. Piecework usually sped up production and put extra demands on labor. Many of the workers in the Daimler car factory complained of exhaustion, and textile workers spoke about chronic fatigue from the pace of the machines. Although most indices show that skilled male workers in heavy industry earned good wages, cycles of prosperity, recession, and depression caused underlying insecurity and unpredictability. Employers also used wages as disciplinary tools. Base wages could be reduced if workers defied regulations. A textile company in Gera docked its workers 25 *pfennigs* if they arrived late or left work five or ten minutes early. The same fine was imposed on any worker caught dirtying the factory or smoking. Disturbing other workers, mutilating cloth, or tampering with machines could cost a worker half a day's pay.

Children were used heavily in the early factories, especially textiles, because they were a source of cheap labor and often were part of a family unit. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century children worked almost as many hours as adults. For example, in Dortmund in Westphalia children were in the factory for ten to fifteen hours daily. In Cologne in the Rhineland work time was eleven to fourteen hours, and in Breslau (present-day Wrocław), an eastern textile center, the workday lasted for ten to fourteen hours. The work was dirty, dangerous, and exhausting. In 1839 a petition from the provincial assembly in the Rhineland to the king of Prussia requested that children under nine be forbidden from working in factories, that daily work time for children nine to sixteen years old not exceed ten hours, and that children not be in the factories on Sundays and holidays. These provisions were adopted by the North German Confederation when it was formed in 1867.

Regulation of factory work. As in France and Britain, child labor in Germany was one of the first concerns categorized within the social question (*soziale Frage*), followed quickly by women in factories. The work-time issue was a central theme of the organized labor movement. The socialist trade unions took up the campaign, demanding adoption of the

ten-hour day as the normal workday, and that became both the goal and the slogan for improving conditions of the working class. The Hirsch-Duncker Unions called for the protection of child labor and for the ten-hour day. Bishop Wilhelm von Ketteler and other prominent Catholic spokespeople argued for industrial reforms to protect the family and to preserve morality. Owners and industrialists, of course, resisted reforms because to them productivity was directly connected to hours at work. For those who were willing to consider reducing hours, the only trade-off was intensification of the work process by speeding up the machines.

Desires to alleviate workers' suffering and at the same time to curtail their efforts to gain political power led conservatives to support social reform. Otto von Bismarck, who saw the Social Democratic Party and its related trade unions as a threat to the Reich (empire), devised social welfare programs to prevent workers from participating in marxist-based labor organizations. Although only about twenty-five thousand industrial workers out of approximately 5 million were involved with these unions in 1875, the number was growing and labor agitation, including an increased frequency of strikes, was becoming disruptive. In 1878 the Reichstag (parliament) passed antisocialist legislation that dissolved the Socialist Party and its affiliated labor unions. Government anxiety and pleas for social activism by both the Protestant and the Catholic Churches coalesced in the social reform legislation of the 1880s. A national health insurance program formulated in 1883 mandated contributions from both employers and workers. In 1884 national accident insurance became available for workers injured on the job. Lastly, a kind of social security system was introduced that provided workers with a small pension at age sixty-five, but only a minority of workers qualified for the program.

The culmination of the public outcry, agitation by the trade unions, Reichstag debates, and Catholic social reform work was the Labor Law of 1891, the most comprehensive employment law in Germany in the prewar period. The new regulations stipulated general conditions for all workers and mandated specific provisions for children and women. The following conditions pertained to all workers regardless of age or gender. Protections for life and health included prescriptions for workrooms, machinery, light, air space, and ventilation. Preservation of morality and decency required separating the sexes where work processes permitted and providing separate facilities for toilets, washing, and changing. All Sunday and holiday work was prohibited. Children under fourteen years old were forbidden employment, and children

had to attend school until age fourteen. Work time for boys and girls between fourteen and sixteen could not exceed ten hours. Daily work time for all women could not go over eleven hours and ten hours on Saturday. Employment in industries with special problems of health, safety, or morality was subject to restrictions. The time-work issue of the 1890s was the struggle for the ten-hour day for all workers, but employers increased machine speeds and used rationalization to prevent any loss in productivity. Between 1890 and 1914 the continued pressure on manufacturers brought down work time, but it was accomplished industry by industry and factory by factory.

WAR WORK

At the beginning of World War I older men in Germany substituted in factories for those called to military service. Quickly, however, women, many of whom had been strangers to factory work, were recruited for industrial jobs. In armaments factories and metallurgical plants the composition of the workforce changed dramatically. Women were actively sought as workers after 1916, when management recognized that the war would be one of attrition. In critical industries the proportion of women rose from 22 percent to 33 percent. The number of women in textiles declined as women sought better-paying work in armaments industries. Sexual division of labor and job segregation diminished in textiles, and women moved into operations that were previously reserved for men. However, men who were essential to the war effort resented the huge infusion of women and fought to preserve occupational exclusivity. The climate was often tense on the factory floor, as men engaged in criticism and ridicule and only reluctantly helped women learn the job. Employers paid lower wages to women, and the male-dominated trade unions were less than supportive of the notion that fair treatment for all should include women. Men interpreted the presence of women in traditional male jobs as future male unemployment and lower male wages. Employers used the labor crisis to further dilute jobs and rationalize the work process. Many tasks were segmented, so operations that formerly required skilled and semiskilled men could be performed by unskilled women.

Reform movements were suspended during the war, but workers responded to increased pressure with sporadic strikes. To maintain the civil truce and to assure a steady supply of labor in armaments industries, the government and employers understood the importance of organized labor in the management of the workforce. Trade unions were recognized, and

worker councils and arbitration boards were established. Shop stewards gained tremendous power on the factory floor. Organized protests gradually increased during the war, reaching its highest level in 1917 and 1918. After the 1918 revolution initiated the German Republic and brought the Social Democratic Party into prominence, the eight-hour day was established in all industry branches with the understanding that no reduction in pay would result.

The labor shortage problem that nagged French industry reached crisis proportions during the war, as massive mobilization drained the factories of adult men. Of chemical workers, 58 percent were drafted. The leading engineering and armaments plant, Le Creusot, lost 5,500 workers in the first year of the war, and only around 25 percent of Renault's workforce remained after call-up. The labor deficit was filled by recruiting women, rural migrants, and immigrants and by returning thousands of skilled men from the front to the factories. Women in factories were hardly novel in France, but the war economy deepened existing trends. From 30 percent of the industrial labor force in 1914, women's participation grew to about 40 percent in 1918. Most obvious, however, was the presence of women in previously male industries and jobs. Women were employed extensively in munitions, chemicals, and metals. Women's work in the war sector was usually classified as semiskilled or unskilled, and they were normally under male supervision. They were told that their steadiness and dexterity made them particularly suited to dangerous jobs in munitions factories. Male-female pay differentials narrowed somewhat, but female wages did not reach equality with male wages. As women left the traditional consumer goods industries, wages there increased, too. To retain their female employees, some large companies provided nurseries and infant-feeding rooms. The pressure to produce caused exhaustion and accidents. Reform legislation restricting hours and night work were cast aside, and safety regulations were ignored. Dust, toxic fumes, and dangerous metals caused respiratory ailments, skin diseases, miscarriages, and stillbirths.

Mobilized workers (*mobilisés*) were those called back from the front to take charge of operations that required skilled labor in the war factories. They were still formally in the military and were subject to military discipline. These "soldiers in the factory" rejected army pay and demanded war wages appropriate to skill level. Their presence in factories and factory towns caused tension and criticism. Many of these workers in heavy industry had been involved in labor protest movements before the war, and their skills gave them privileged status. They were most likely to ex-

press hostility to speedups, dilution of work, and company paternalism. However, considerable resentment against them existed. They were accused of shirking and of causing the massive slaughter of men below their station. In the context of the devastating war, all worker complaints appeared trivial and unpatriotic, but a great deal of labor unrest and labor militancy broke out, especially in the spring of 1917. Workers went out on strike to protest falling wages, speedups, long hours, and high accident rates.

In Britain enthusiasm for the war against Germany brought in enough volunteers to deplete the industrial labor force. Thousands of skilled workers enlisted, amounting to a fifth of male engineers and a quarter of the skilled workforce in munitions and explosives. The government recognized the need for formal controls. Cooperation between industry and labor was considered necessary to sustain the increased pressures of the war economy, and British trade unions were encouraged to participate in decisions regarding war production. The government compromised its *laissez-faire* policies to intervene in areas most troublesome to workers. Food prices doubled, and rents jumped enormously where war industries were located. Industrialists sought justification for demoting skilled jobs to unskilled categories, but certain skilled workers were exempted from military service. To prevent disturbances in production, some employers told male workers that rationalization and technology would be reduced or eliminated after the war to permit the return of “normal” production and work relations. British union workers negotiated written promises that rationalization and women would disappear from the factories when peace returned. The Munitions of War Act of 1915 made strikes illegal, criminalized worker interference with productivity, and suspended safety regulations.

In 1916 six thousand women went on strike at the munitions factory in Newcastle against low wages. To integrate women into the factories, to lessen worker discontent and protest, and to promote productivity, Britain devised the idea of a factory-based welfare system with female supervisors. The welfare principle that women and children needed special treatment was only one part of the objective. As an adjunct to management, the policy seemed a more humane and efficient approach to insuring steady and energetic production. It was argued that the notion of family on the factory floor was more comfortable to women workers and more conducive to worker well-being. Supervisors were not only responsible for canteens, infirmaries, soap, toilet paper, and sanitary napkins, they had control over work, discipline, and interaction with foremen. Their function as supervi-

sors in many ways paralleled that of management, but only regarding women. They were supposed to identify troublemakers, but more importantly, in the spirit of harmony and sometimes of maternalism, they tried to redress grievances over conditions and wages while at the same time minimizing absenteeism and production interruptions. Middle-class values were a part of their mission. Rough women, irregular relations with men, and inappropriate dress all came under the scrutiny of the “welfare lady.” Not surprisingly, skilled male workers resented their presence, and foremen viewed them as a silly intrusion.

FACTORY WORK AFTER 1918

The massive dislocations and hardships of Europe’s postwar years involved demobilization and reconstruction of the economy. Efforts to handle unemployment and inflation were directed toward rationalization and reclassification of the labor force. Many components of rationalization were intensifications of wartime production methods. Companies increased mechanization by introducing labor-saving machines and standardization of parts. Simple, tiny, and repetitive tasks vastly improved the flow of production with its automated and impersonal assembly-line precision. New forms of work direction, often called Taylorization after the engineer Frederick Taylor, were imported from the United States. New Soviet factories introduced these patterns as well. Dilution of work processes meant the substitution of semiskilled and unskilled labor for skilled workers. Sexual division permitted reclassification of women into a differentiated category of labor that was low skilled and cheap. While this allowed new levels of women’s work in industries like chemicals and electrical appliances, it also created a framework in which many women could be structured out of the labor force and reassigned to the housewife role. Indeed, analyses of women in postwar economies have confirmed material and social impulses for restoring gender roles. This approach certainly went a long way to eliminate redundant labor. Old industrial branches were generally slow to recover or actually went into decline. New industries, such as chemicals and electricals, promised recovery and innovation for the future. Automobiles and radios were growing, vibrant, and representative of the new consumer culture, at least for those who could afford them.

CONCLUSION

Historically factory work is not an isolated phenomenon. It is best examined within economic and social contexts related to time and place. Yet recurrent

themes persist over three centuries. Workers' relationships to machines and the work process influence the sense of self. Factory production evokes images of urgency and depersonalization. Gender and sexual differentiation of labor, with the corollary of anxiety about women's proper role, are evident in the early stages of industrialization and are apparent in schemes to reclassify women in postwar economies. Child labor, the central focus of reformers and protective leg-

islation throughout the nineteenth century, was eliminated from modern societies but continued as an ingredient in developing countries, ironically in those sectors of the economy influenced by globalization. National, regional, and gender factors influence manufacturing in the world economy, while changes in factory production are at the center of labor-management relations. Technology, dilution, and the search for cheap labor are concerns of the modern market.

See also Technology; Protoindustrialization; The Industrial Revolutions (*volume 2*); Working Classes; Labor History: Strikes and Unions; Social Welfare and Insurance (*volume 3*); Gender and Work (*in this volume*); and other articles in this section.

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MIDDLE-CLASS WORK



Peter N. Stearns

Middle-class work is largely a modern topic, and indeed the class itself, as a self-conscious entity, dates back only to the eighteenth century in Europe. The middle class did begin to develop distinctive ideas about work at that point, and in some cases began to follow a distinctive work regimen as well. Gaps between assertion and reality, nevertheless, are an important aspect of the topic. Between the late eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries, the middle-class work ethic had palpable historical impact, not only on the class itself, including its children and the training they received, but also on judgments of other groups viewed as deficient in the work category. By the late nineteenth century, the topic became more diffuse because of growing leisure interests and the development of a lower middle class linked to middle-class standards but not defined by them. Historical analysis of middle-class work in the twentieth century is less well developed.

Regional factors play a role in the timing of more modern commercial and economic structures. A distinctive middle class did not emerge as fully in eastern Europe as in the western areas, and so its work definitions were both less clear and less significant. However, under communism, an implicit middle class linked with the upper echelons of the Communist Party developed some distinctive work and training habits.

Several historical debates are linked to the subject of middle-class work. The German sociologist Max Weber's (1864–1920) ideas about a Protestant ethic related directly to work; his argument has been disputed but remains an important focus for the early modern period. For the nineteenth century, there is inevitable debate about how fully the middle class lived up to its own beliefs, and evidence (and probably reality as well) is varied. Though it is not as clearly addressed, there is a gender issue. Most images associated with middle-class work are male, and mirror images of middle-class women as idly decorative (if repressed) used to be commonplace. This view has shifted, but exactly how women related to class ideas

about work remains somewhat unclear. Finally, the complex issue of the lower middle class, which expanded in the later nineteenth century, significantly involves judgments about its work styles and goals.

THE EARLY MODERN BACKGROUND

As the number of merchants and professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, grew during the Middle Ages, at least two work characteristics distinguished them from the more familiar social groups around them. In contrast to the aristocracy, this new, largely urban bourgeoisie depended on work not only for support but also for identity. It did not carve out a distinctive leisure style, though individuals, once attaining great wealth, might imitate aristocratic opulence. More important was the fact that, in contrast to the masses of urban workers and peasants, this group did not work with its hands. Nonmanual labor could provide real status, and in some corners of Europe, such as the Balkans, clerks even grew their fingernails long to demonstrate their position. More commonly, special clothing, however sober, made distinctions clear. The prestige attached to nonmanual work would linger into contemporary society.

This said, it is not clear that this group shared any particular consciousness about the role of work or that it worked particularly hard. Individuals, eager to amass more wealth, put in long hours with great intensity. But no vividly defined ethic emerged at this point. The bourgeoisie was defined by legal status as well as occupation in many cities, but its self-perception did not necessarily involve work.

Then came the Protestant Reformation. Because Protestant leaders argued that salvation was predestined rather than acquired by holy efforts, they may have encouraged a new sense of the validity and importance of merchant endeavor. In the first place, the old Catholic suspicion of profit-seeking activities, which was declining as western Europe became more commercial, faded in light of the fact that, at least in

principle, one's worldly pursuits did not have direct impact on salvation. In the eyes of the Protestant God, it was no better to be celibate than married, or to be poor than rich. Second—in that contradiction so often noted with Protestantism—the very fact that good works did not cause or predict salvation led some Protestants to seek other measures of God's will, prior to death and judgment. So an argument developed that hard work leading to economic success showed God's favor. In sober Protestant communities, leadership was provided by men of means who were assumed, by their worldly attainments, also to reflect God's grace. It was worth working hard to gain the rewards that would show God's favor, even though, technically, there was nothing one could do about salvation itself.

In his work on the Protestant ethic, Weber highlighted these conundrums in Protestantism. He added that the package precluded frivolous spending of the wealth acquired, for that would detract from work and success as demonstrations of holiness. So hardworking merchants piled up profits that they did not fritter away in leisure pursuits or excessive luxury, thus accumulating capital that could be used for further expansion—and Europe's capitalist class was born. Distinctive work devotion is not the only component of this well-known Weber thesis, but it plays a considerable role.

The Weber thesis has, over time, faded noticeably, as it was found to have several flaws. First, European capitalist behavior predated Protestantism. Not only in Renaissance Italy, but in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France, Catholic merchants could display a work and accumulation devotion not measurably different from their Protestant counterparts. Second, Protestant merchants were not always particularly zealous. A Protestant enclave in southern France, in the Cévennes area, saw a number of businessmen develop small textile firms, but there was no sign that they worked their operations with any noticeable vigor or zeal. Few studies now follow up on Weber directly. It is true, however, that the expansion of commerce and manufacturing in early modern Europe undoubtedly encouraged many businesspeople to step up their efforts. Protestantism for some may have furthered this general movement. No full-blown middle-class work ethic had emerged as yet. Many businessmen, once successful, hoped to emulate an aristocratic lifestyle, complete with buying a landed estate, rather than continue to keep nose to grindstone. But there were signs of change.

It is also important to note that, from the sixteenth century on, judgments of poverty increasingly included concerns that many poor people were to

blame for their lot because of inadequate attention to work. A growing distinction between worthy poor—people who because of infirmity or family status literally could not maintain themselves—and the unworthy—defined in terms of failure to work properly—began to enter into poor-law policy and into growing concerns about begging and other manifestations of idleness. Here was another seedbed for middle-class values.

Finally, while the Weber thesis no longer seems to explain either the timing or the reasons for a definitive middle-class work ethic, the Reformation had one further impact that began to affect work values by the late seventeenth century. A host of religious minorities were created. While these may have been influenced by the larger implications of Protestantism, they seem to have been still more affected by minority status. This status left groups like Quakers in England barred from political office, though tolerated sufficiently to operate in the business world. Minority conditions also limited contacts children had with other groups, tightening their relationships with adults in ways that could produce a distinctive work zeal. Whatever the precise mix, it was becoming clear by the eighteenth century that a disproportionate number of some of the most hardworking and successful business families (though by no means the whole set) were emanating from minority segments. Quakers and Nonconformists in England and Protestants in eastern France formed two classic cases. Jews, once legally emancipated, formed a similar component in the business and professional spheres where they concentrated. Later in the nineteenth century, Old Believers played a comparable role among early Russian industrialists. Hard work could be a ticket to success amid discrimination, as well as a personal badge of identity.

A CLEARER TRANSITION: THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Several factors associated with the emergence of the class in other respects combined to produce a more definitive middle-class work ethic during the eighteenth century. Commercial growth continued in western Europe, augmenting business ranks and their self-confidence alike. An increasing number of manufacturing operations began to separate management from the producing labor force. Woollen production in Yorkshire, England, for example, had seen artisan masters working alongside their journeymen in 1700. With expanded market opportunities, by 1730 a clearer division occurred, which meant that the erstwhile masters moved away from manual labor while also differ-

entiating themselves in other respects from their labor force. Population growth was a factor. Many businessmen were faced with growing numbers of children, mainly because more began surviving than had traditionally been the case. Camille Schlumberger, a manufacturer in Alsace, began to work harder than his own father had, converting his artisanal operation into a full-blown manufacturing enterprise, essentially because he had twelve children to support. If he were to do the right thing by each, in terms of dowries for daughters, schooling and jobs for sons, he needed to expand, and that meant work. (His own sons would then, in the first half of the nineteenth century, move into the ranks of early industrialists, not only in textiles but also in railroads and other areas.) Several developments, in sum, produced situations in which businesspeople probably did begin working harder than had been the case before, to take advantage of new commercial opportunities and to deal with family demands.

The Enlightenment also played a role. Enlightenment theorists praised the value of work, legitimating the pursuit of earthly rewards. They also used work as the basis for virtue and productive citizenship, contrasting it to the idleness of the aristocracy. This line of argument showed up in the early phases of the French Revolution, when classic definitions of the Third Estate insisted that working people (if they were also property owners) manifested the essence of citizenship, and should not be outvoted by parasitic aristocrats.

Then came the industrial revolution, the final factor in creating an articulated middle-class work ethic that became a badge of honor for the class. Industrialization quite simply provided many middle-class people with a growing array of tasks. Early factory owners had to organize appropriate technology, supervise a labor force, and arrange for marketing. Ultimately, of course, bureaucracies would be organized to take care of some of these specialized functions, but in many early factories the practical burdens on individual proprietors could be considerable. Similar pressures could affect people responsible for expanding commercial outlets. Shopkeepers became increasingly adept at a variety of marketing techniques, beyond traditional displays of wares; but these took time and effort. New work demands spilled into the professions a bit more diffusely. But claims of extensive work could be part of professional self-justification in an age in which, increasingly, work was king.

Industrialization also put middle-class people in intimate contact with other groups whose work habits seemed demonstrably unsatisfactory. Many factory owners contended with former peasants or artisans

who did not voluntarily adapt themselves to the more intense speed and coordination demands of the new machines. These workers had an ethic of their own, but it did not fully conform to the demands of modern industry, or to the expectations of the managers themselves. A common belief held that workers labored only about 60 percent as hard as they could. And many workers lacked a keen sense of the connection between work and time, which was becoming a vital link in the middle-class view. Bending work to the demands of the clock was not automatic, and this perceived failure or reluctance too could increase a middle-class sense that the lower classes were deficient in work drive. The middle-class home provided another class confrontation—between husbands and wives with strong work expectations and lower-class servants who lacked the motivation to measure up. Industrialization, in other words, created a growing array of situations in which middle-class people could take pride in their distinctive work habits and judge other groups disparagingly on the strength of seemingly different performances.

THE WORK ETHIC

Industrialization thus provided the context in which the full-blown middle-class work ethic was articulated, building on Enlightenment precedent. By the 1820s and 1830s publicists in most Western countries trumpeted the common message. Samuel Smiles (1812–1904) was the most famous spokesperson in England, but he had counterparts in France and elsewhere. Lessons about the value of hard work crept into schoolbooks, for example, in Prussia from about 1780 on.

Hard work was the chief good in life, according to this argument. With work, people were protected from damaging frivolities, from excesses that jeopardized health or morality or both. Work would also allow people to better their station in life: the relationship between work and mobility, and the positive desirability of advancement, were crucial components in the work ethic. Samuel Smiles's stories were filled with the virtuous lives of hardworking ordinary men, but also with stories of people who, through hard work alone, managed to move from humble to exalted station. The rags-to-riches story was a middle-class work-ethic classic.

The praise for work had a harsher flip side, already prepared in some of the earlier attacks both on the aristocracy and on the poor. Commentary on the idleness of the aristocracy diminished in the nineteenth century, as the middle class gained greater power and even, in its upper reaches, merged with the aris-

tocratic group. But novels continued to berate idle aristocrats. Another group was singled out for unjustified idleness and dissolute work habits: the bohemians, taken to represent many artists and intellectuals, some of whom had abandoned respectable middle-class origins. But the clearest brunt of work-ethic judgments fell on the poor. Many cities, under middle-class administrations from the 1820s or 1830s on, attempted to ban begging on the grounds that people who did not work did not merit support. Revisions of the English poor laws (in 1834) also attempted to distinguish between poor people capable of working and thus undeserving of help, and those unable to work and thus deserving, hoping to discipline and reform the former group. Habits like drinking were blasted for their erosion of the capacity to work. Clearly, the new work ethic had some of its greatest impact by undergirding evaluations of and policies toward others, including, in Europe's colonies, "native" peoples viewed as insufficiently industrious. In Europe itself, the nineteenth century witnessed a persistent, if implicit, debate between middle-class and working-class individuals about what work was supposed to be like, and while neither group fully persuaded the other, the middle class disproportionately framed the debate. Factory owners who argued that their workers put forth only two-thirds the effort of which they were capable felt comfortable in limiting wages and conditions accordingly.

As an ideal, the valuation of work served to unify diverse segments of the middle class, who could at least agree on the standard and its applicability in judging social worth. While hard work was pushed particularly by some of the newer, upwardly mobile segments of the middle class, professionals and more traditional commercial sectors could agree at least in principle. Shopkeepers, though usually far less affluent than merchants and many professionals, also subscribed to the ethic, providing among other things an extensive readership for the manuals that praised hard work.

MYTHS AND REALITIES

How much did the middle class itself live up to its own cherished self-image where work was concerned? Inevitably, there was variety, and inevitably there has been some historical debate. During the early decades of industrialization, some factory owners really did seem to live to work. Sixteen-hour days were common—indeed, one of the reasons some factory owners failed to realize the impact of the hours they imposed on their workers was that their own work time matched or exceeded them. They suffered pangs of

conscience when they were too ill to work; they shunned vacations and were clearly uncomfortable off the job. Not only work itself, but also the intensity devoted to the process, marked this pattern of behavior.

Still later, in the final decades of the nineteenth century, significant middle-class groups lived lives filled with work intensity. The training process began early. Leading technical schools in France featured heavy demands on time and attention, and diligence counted at least as much as brains. From school, engineers moved into positions where long days with few if any vacations continued to be expected. Many came to work even on Sundays, to keep up the pace. So the work ethic could be very real. Some of the diversions that were most popular in the middle class, such as sports, thrived because they seemed to drive home work habits, not because they diverted from them.

Professional groups often turned to greater work zeal as part of their redefinition in an industrial society. With stricter licensing standards and examinations, preparation in law and medicine required new levels of discipline. But other groups in the middle class, without officially renouncing the new work values, treasured a more balanced life. Some engaged not only in extensive leisure, but also in some of the less respectable forms of leisure, such as drinking, womanizing, and gambling, some of which clearly detracted from the work process. Historians are just uncovering those areas where behavior did not measure up to work-based codes of respectability. For many, students' days, work-related travel, and, even later, age provided periods and occasions when zeal might particularly slacken, even in the mid-nineteenth-century heyday of the proclaimed commitment to work.

Almost certainly as well, work commitments diminished somewhat over time. Once the hardest tasks of establishing an industrial economy and a solid family position were completed, by the later nineteenth century, leisure activities became more openly acknowledged. Work was not rejected, but the single-minded devotion decreased. Revealingly, after about 1870 the sales of works by the most blatant work advocates, like Samuel Smiles, declined precipitously. In later age, increasing numbers of middle-class people also began to seek retirement, which spread first in these ranks. Intense work could be capped by a formal period of non-work, again a modification of the original vision.

Women's relationship to the work ethic was not always clear. Middle-class standards increasingly urged removal of respectable women from the labor force. Factory owners who began with their wives keeping accounts, in the early nineteenth century, soon pulled back when they won greater success. The growing

confinement of women to domestic duties diluted formal commentary about applying the work ethic to women. Expectations that women would be decorative and also accomplished in certain family leisure skills, such as piano playing, also diverted attention from work. In comments on the poor, it was men, not women, who were criticized for unjustified idleness. In practice, however, the demands of the middle-class home might prompt an increase of work pace not totally unlike that experienced by many men. Living up to new standards of health, cleanliness, and child care, assisted on average by a single servant, had its own work requirements. The full intensity of the male pattern might still be missing—among other things, women's work was less constrained or limited by clock time—but women's lives and outlook might shift in similar directions.

THE LOWER MIDDLE CLASS

The rise of the white-collar segment, from the 1870s on, raised additional questions about work. Many clerks, and their employers, were at pains to establish links with middle-class work values. Their occupations were nonmanual; they depended to some degree on education, at least on literacy, they required middle-class attire on the job. And many clerks undoubtedly aspired to upward mobility, based on hard work, for themselves or their children. It was a sense of commitment to work that helped keep most white-collar employees from joining unions, which constituted an admission that work might be sacrificed in favor of protest.

Yet white-collar work was not standard middle-class fare. It was often repetitious. It involved taking directions from others. It did not necessarily generate upward mobility. Employers might talk of middle-class values and assume enough discipline to warrant salaries rather than working-class wages; they were eager to separate white-collar from blue-collar to limit protest, but in fact they regulated and monitored clerical work closely. One German employer in the 1920s even installed steam jets in clerks' toilets, timed to go off after two minutes, to prevent lingering. For female clerks, work was often a temporary status prior to marriage, which further diluted a work-based identity. Many white-collar workers gravitated toward new leisure interests, as a relief from the limitations of their jobs. Here, as in other respects, the relationship of the rising lower middle classes to larger middle-class standards was ambivalent at best. Correspondingly, the growth of the lower middle classes contributed to the implicit loosening of the work ethic around 1900.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Middle-class work in the twentieth century has been less extensively studied than the patterns in evidence during the heyday of industrialization. Several trends deserve note nevertheless. A basic commitment to work as part of self-definition and self-worth remained. Middle-class people were much more likely to profess satisfaction with their jobs than their lower-class counterparts. Pressure on children to perform well in schools maintained socialization toward the work process within the middle class. Condemnations of other groups for inadequate work zeal abated somewhat, but persisted to a degree.

There were signs of increased work interest in some sectors of the middle class. The rise of a managerial middle class, often within the Communist Party, during an active industrialization process in Eastern Europe, involved some echoes of the kind of work devotion that had flourished in Western Europe earlier on. In Mediterranean Europe, including France, from the 1950s on devotion to clock-based work began to cut into traditional long lunches. The movement of married women into the labor force (though hardly confined to the middle class) reduced some of the appearances of gender difference in work values.

But limitations on excessive work zeal gained ground as well, differentiating the European middle classes from their American counterparts in some key respects. Formal retirement spread more widely. While some European countries, as in Scandinavia, delayed retirement until age seventy, others pushed it earlier. The middle classes were characteristically less eager to retire than blue-collar workers, but the sense that a final stage of active life should be free from formal work was widespread.

The most striking change involved the growing commitment to extensive vacations. Again, various social groups participated in the expansion of vacations, which began in part as a response to unemployment but spread much more widely after World War II. The middle classes, however, led the way during the Great Depression, if only because they could afford to make more active use of free time. Vacations of four to six weeks became common in countries like France and Germany, in marked contrast to the United States and Japan in the same decades. This development was not a surrender of the devotion to hard work. Indeed, the alternation of time off with employment was thought to facilitate work intensity. But it did indicate considerable distance from the values and behaviors characteristic of the nineteenth-century middle class.

See also The Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Reformation; The Enlightenment (*volume 1*); Capitalism and Commercialization; The Industrial Revolutions; The Population of Europe: The Demographic Transition and After; Shops and Stores (*volume 2*); The Middle Classes; Professionals and Professionalization (*volume 3*); Gender and Work (*in this volume*); Protestantism (*volume 5*); and other articles in this section.

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WORK TIME



Gary S. Cross

Time at labor has depended on technological and economic realities but also on political power and cultural values. Work time has decreased with modern industrialization, but that decline did not simply correspond with increased productivity nor has it decreased at the same rate that consumption has risen. Moreover, especially since industrialization, patterns of male work time have diverged from female hours of labor.

PREINDUSTRIAL WORK TIME

The cadence of preindustrial agricultural work was often set by the season and weather. While labor from sunup to sundown was common, the workday varied by the task to be done. It was interrupted by feasts and festivals that mostly coincided with slack periods between fall harvest and spring planting or waiting times within the growing cycle itself. Harvest holidays, followed by a series of festivals between Christmas and Mardi Gras, and then by a festival season from Easter to Pentecost, filled the low point in the activity of rural Europeans. Midseason holidays like Midsummer or, in England, wakes week in August, corresponded to lulls in farm work or to annual fairs during which farm laborers found employment. Lack of reliable timepieces allowed for irregular work habits, and labor was frequently interrupted by play and rest breaks. Long days, often beginning before eating, required three or more meal and drink respites.

In craft occupations, the lack of laborsaving devices meant twelve or more hours of work per day. But long workdays were interrupted by seasonal slowdowns in demand for goods or supplies of raw materials. Capital could not be tied up in inventory, especially when slow transportation already greatly retarded the cycle of production and sale. And the workweek was often characterized by short Mondays because workers had to wait for slow moving supplies or for orders to arrive at the work site. The speed of the oxcart or sailing ship controlled the pace of busi-

ness for the merchant and producer. Moreover, hours and days of labor varied greatly among crafts: workers in luxury trades, where journeymen were often organized and skills in short supply, were able to restrict work time, especially with traditions of holiday taking. In seventeenth-century Paris, craftspeople enjoyed up to 103 holidays, and in parts of northern Italy in the sixteenth century the figure was about 95 (including Sundays). Many skilled trades celebrated an informal “holiday” at the beginning of the week in what, somewhat mockingly, was called St. Monday. This custom epitomized an often-noted characteristic of preindustrial labor: its preference for leisure over increased income. When prices for their products rose or when costs of living decreased, craft workers sometimes responded with working less and playing more rather than attempting to accumulate wealth.

Still, workers in low-skilled trades or jobs requiring daily effort (like candle making or baking) worked far more hours. Moreover, work time stretched along almost all the course of a life. There was little chance of saving for retirement or allowing the young the luxury of a work-free childhood. In the sixteenth century over 40 percent of the population of Italian towns was under sixteen years old, and as late as 1820 in Britain some 48 percent of the population was under the age of twenty. Small wonder that child’s play was sacrificed to work. Even the enlightened John Locke supported “training” children in poor families with work from the age of four, and apprenticeships regularly started at ten. Equally, retirement was only for the rich; with age, workers withdrew from labor gradually or when incapacitated.

In periods of relative prosperity (like the sixteenth or eighteenth centuries), crafts workers reduced the hours of labor sometimes by two hours per day. This was possible because “employers”—often little more than suppliers of raw materials and marketers of finished products—had little direct control over the pace or methods of work. The actual production process was usually controlled by a father in a household of workers, and these laborers were also often mem-

bers of his family. This probably reduced work discipline that might have been imposed if labor and management had been separate. The employer seldom entered this cottage and certainly had no direct means of forcing weavers or spinners to work rapidly or regularly.

Perhaps the greatest influence over preindustrial work time was its common setting—within or near the household dwelling. The so-called domestic economy allowed men to mix wage or piece work time with numerous other forms of employment and tasks that helped to provision and maintain the household (cutting firewood, etc). Of greater significance was the close integration of productive and family-caring work time that fell to women. In the domestic setting they were able to shift quickly from household and child care work to agricultural or craft production according to the needs of the family. The complex

blending of work roles was an economic and biological necessity that often meant a female workday that “never ended.”

Attempts to increase output by increasing labor time devoted to the market was a key element in the development of modern capitalism. Repeatedly, governments tried to restrict holidays (for example, to twenty-seven per year in England in 1552) or even to impose a minimum workday (to twelve hours per day in England in 1495). During the Puritan revolution in England authorities attempted to eliminate traditional religious festivals and to impose instead a strict observance of a Sabbath rest. This was supposed not only to increase annual workdays but to create a regular pattern of work and recuperation appropriate for industrial and commercial work. Similarly, during the French Revolution employers were given authority to set work time, and the experiment with the ten-day

week was to make a more productive workforce than the traditional Christian week. These efforts had mixed results.

From the sixteenth century, English merchants tried to tap “underutilized” rural labor by putting farmers to work in the winter at spinning yarn or weaving cloth. This so-called putting-out system, however, frequently frustrated merchants because the episodic and slow pace of agricultural work made these part-time peasant artisans undisciplined and unreliable producers. One solution, advocated by early eighteenth-century economists, was to lower pay to cottage workers to force them to extend their weekly working hours (devoted to market tasks). The common view was that domestic workers had a fixed notion of an appropriate standard of living. If pay rates rose above that standard of subsistence, they would work fewer hours. Only the whip of low rates would induce them to lengthen and intensify their work time. A seemingly more effective means of quickening the pace and length of the workday was the mechanization and central management that came with industrialization.

WORK TIME AND EARLY INDUSTRIALIZATION

The centralized workplace is often viewed as the most important development of early industrialization, insofar as it made possible the imposition of work discipline and the lengthening of the working day. Not only did the factory make regular working hours a condition for employment, but new managerial and mechanized techniques enhanced the ability of the employer to intensify work time. Mechanization, especially in steam-driven textile mills, provided employers with incentives to raise working hours to twelve or even fourteen hours by the 1820s (the latter especially in France and Belgium). Efforts to amortize costly equipment over a shorter period, attempts to reduce costs as competition increased and prices dropped, and hopes of taking advantage of new gas lighting all encouraged the lengthening of working hours.

Historians, however, have increasingly questioned the impact of the factory on enforcing time discipline. The sweating system, which imposed on piece-rate workers in the garment and other trades such low prices that they were forced to “voluntarily” extend their working hours to survive, played a major role in the intensification of work. Moreover, many skilled trades outside the factory system (even those with central workplaces) were able to avoid exten-

sion of the workday. In the mid-nineteenth century, male Birmingham metalworkers preserved a three-day workweek. Similarly, skilled workers on the Continent maintained St. Monday traditions deep into the century. The real lengthening of the workday took place mostly among workers in mechanized textile mills and other trades competing against machines and overcrowding. In any case, early industrialization did not mean a reduction of work time, but rather economic growth.

Another impact of the centralized workplace was the gradual removal of wage work from the home. This eventually led to the withdrawal of men from domestic chores and forced women into making difficult compromises between wage and family obligations. Ultimately, the separation of work and domestic life resulting from the removal of materials and machines from the home obliged female workers to embrace a clear separation of wage from family care work. Often this meant that working-class women experienced a new and distinct work life cycle—wage work when young and single followed by home-bound family and household work when married with children—should the husband’s income be sufficient to support the family.

Market work time decreased faster than that of home-based work. This was partly a function of different rates of technological change and partly due to the intractable, time-consuming character of domestic work. This put family work on a very different plane than wage work. The “housewife’s” work did not disappear, of course, but neither did its value enter the calculus of the money economy. Family work was hidden in the clouds of the private. As a result, work time became sharply gendered. For men, time liberated from wage work became “free” from work obligations in private leisure; for women, family-related chores remained in a privatized realm of work with no segmentation of time into “free” and “obligated” periods.

REDUCING WORK TIME IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

While rising productivity made possible the diminution of work time, the timing and extent of the reduction depended upon international labor and political movements that fought with management over control of the labor market and workplace. This struggle was shaped by the language of industrial efficiency and mass consumption but also by a gender order that rigidly divided wage labor from family work. The reduction of public working hours has been episodic,

usually bitterly resisted by employers and governments, certainly far more so than the other contested fruit of industrial productivity—the increased power to consume.

Efforts to reduce the workday to ten hours spanned the years from the 1840s until about 1900. A generation of agitation for a ten-hour day in the textile mills of Britain resulted in an 1847 law restricting that work time standard to women and children (although men won it also in bargaining and where their work depended upon the protected groups). In France the political upheaval of the midcentury produced a maximum-hour law in 1848, but it was restricted to workers in mechanized factories. Gradually the ten-hour provision was extended in Britain to many trades. Only in 1904, after twenty-three years of legislative struggle, was a ten-hour law passed in France for women.

Movements for an eight-hour day broadly stretched from the mid-1880s until 1919. The “three-eights,” the equal distribution of the day between work, rest, and leisure, was a slogan for a generation of May Day labor and socialist parades from 1890. International groups from the socialist Second International to the reformist liberal International Labor Office advocated simultaneous transnational improve-

ments in the labor standard (including a reduction of work time). Despite active movements for a universal eight-hour day in England from 1888 until 1892 and repeated strikes in many European countries in which the eight-hour day was a major issue (for example, the May 1906 general strike in France), employers and legislators stood firm against it. A principle impediment was fear that an hour’s reduction in any one company or country would put that entity at a competitive disadvantage with less generous employers or nations.

The eight-hour day became a nearly universal concession only during the labor upsurge that accompanied the closing years of World War I (1917–1919). Eight-hour proclamations, beginning in the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, spread in 1918 to Finland, Norway, and then to Germany in the wake of collapse and revolution in November. By mid-December the movement passed to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. From the revolutionary regimes of eastern and central Europe, it spread to Switzerland. In Britain, from December 1918 to March 1919, major industries rapidly conceded reductions in work time. In February the movement reached Italy in a wave of shutdowns that affected, in turn, metals, textiles, chemicals, and even agriculture. And in

France in April 1919, a new parliament approved of an enabling act for an eight-hour/six-day workweek. This insurgency also produced eight-hour laws in Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland by June and in the Netherlands and Sweden by November 1919. Nearly everywhere, workers used this unique opportunity for reform to increase leisure time. International pressure from below was paralleled by hopes that the eight-hour day would become international law, removing the traditional fear that a raised labor standard would put an industry or country at a competitive disadvantage on the international market. Committed to this goal was a transnational network of reformers often rather erroneously labeled “Wilsonians.” In 1920 the eight-hour day became a transnational labor standard, protected by an international convention sponsored by the International Labor Organization.

The concept of the forty-hour week with a two-day weekend had its roots in the nineteenth century with the Saturday half-holiday. As a means of granting women workers Saturday afternoon to shop and prepare for Sunday, it was embraced by English textile mills in hopes of improving and stabilizing working-class family life. Skilled male workers also demanded and often won the half-holiday from the 1850s. Only from 1889 did French reformers call for the Saturday half-holiday. The *semaine anglaise* (English week, named after its English origins) alone was a guarantor of the “sanctity” of Sunday rest and family togetherness, they argued. Especially where women worked and where men were well organized, the Saturday half-holiday was won after 1917.

The more radical two-day weekend became a goal of labor movements in France and Britain in the 1930s (in the form of a forty-hour week). This standard became law in France in June 1936 during the strikes that accompanied the beginning of the leftist Popular Front government. However, business bitterly opposed this unilateral disarmament of the French economy, and the work time standard was eliminated in late 1938 as an impediment to preparation for war. Many wage earners in Europe won the weekend/forty-hour week only in the 1960s.

Until World War I a paid annual holiday was rare, except in some white collar and government occupations where paperwork was made up after a break or where a seasonal slowdown in business made a vacation feasible. The movement for the paid annual holiday intensified in the interwar period. Between 1919 and 1925 legislation provided paid vacations in six eastern and central European countries. The movement peaked in the mid-1930s with the widespread support for the two-week paid vacation in France in 1936 and a week’s holiday in many British industries

in 1938. Ironically, in spite of massive unemployment and deep ideological fissures within Europe, the vacation became a near universal ideal. It responded to deep needs that transcended ideology and economic system. In the generation after World War II, the vacation became the leisure concept of choice for most Europeans: the one- or two-week holiday expanded to three or more weeks in the prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s and commonly was from four to eight weeks by the end of the century. As a result of these changes, average hours worked in France and West Germany dropped from 38 and 44 hours respectively in 1950 to 31 hours by 1989.

IDEOLOGIES AND DILEMMAS OF REDUCING WORK TIME

Popular pressure for reduced work began in reaction to efforts of nineteenth-century employers to impose regular and increased intensity of output on labor. These movements were inspired by a variety of work-

based and essentially defensive motivations: to decrease machine use and thus output and layoffs due to “overproduction”; to win a larger share of income from increased productivity by raising wages through greater overtime and making labor more scarce; and to reduce seasonal unemployment by extending batches of work over a longer period.

Arguments for reform. Most historians have seen these short-hour movements as essentially wage driven. A minority, like William Reddy and Neil Smelser, argue that these demands were instead intended indirectly to perpetuate the domestic work unit and patriarchy. Both views, however, underestimate changing attitudes about work and the origins of the demand for blocks of time free from employment. Industrialization not only increased productivity, making a reduction of labor time feasible, but physically separated productive from “reproductive” or family activities. The expulsion of leisure from the workplace and the spatial division of home and work required an equally sharp time demarcation. Thus, interest in regular blocks of daily, weekly, and eventually yearly time free from wage labor increased as the only way for men especially to recover family and leisure time lost to disciplined work. Moreover, many nineteenth-century laborers saw the traditional custom of working at a series of seasonal jobs and tramping from job to job replaced by stationary and regular employment. Wage-earners greeted the passing of the old “porous” workday, idealized by E. P. Thompson and other historians, with ambivalence. Despite the loss of a sociable work culture, in the long run workers demanded a reduction of work time to enhance the opportunity of social relationships off rather than on the job. Working-class men abandoned the pub of their workmates for the neighborhood bar, which they increasingly visited with their wives. Long evenings began to count more than long work breaks. The movement for the Saturday half-holiday and full weekend reflected a similar interest in uninterrupted periods of family and leisure time. For these workers, leisure was to be realized in a new distribution of time—a uniform and compressed workday with longer, more predictable and more continuous periods of personal time.

Reduction of work time was more than an adaptation to industrialization. It was also a practical expression of the demand of wage earners for freedom from the authoritarian relationships of work. For example, shop or office workers sought to limit the employers’ access to their time. In seeking to end the “living-in” system that required wage earners to reside at their workplace, these workers attempted to create

a clear separation between the masters’ time and their own. The intermingling of work and life for many dependent workers—in shops, farms, or domestic service—was not an ideal to be defended but a curse to be overcome.

The eight-hour movement of the early 1890s cut across the trades in England, France, and Germany. It was not confined to long-hour occupations or even to laborers with special workplace rights to defend. Mechanization, reformers argued, should not only provide increased material goods but free workers from “slavery” and introduce them to the “duty” to enjoy life. When the eight-hour day was won for most in 1919, trade unionists argued that a longer day was “unnatural.” British trade unionists insisted that differences in intensity, productivity, skill, and danger of work should be reflected in wages, not hours. To deny the eight-hour day was to deprive workers of citizenship and even “manhood.”

These arguments clearly challenged laissez-faire orthodoxy by claiming that the workplace and labor contract were subject to public protection and citizenship rights. As important, reduced work time threatened the employers’ power in ways that wage increases did not. It could raise wage costs (either in overtime rates or simply because the employer had to hire more labor, which reduced the labor pool and thus raised wages), and it could force employers to buy expensive machinery, accumulate inventories (in anticipation of later sales), and thus tie up capital. By contrast, an unrestricted workday adjusted at will allowed the employer to avoid these costs during expansions. Finally, whereas wage increases could be easily reversed in response to prices (at least in the nineteenth century), employers feared that this would not be possible with hours. A shorter workday, then, threatened to slow the turnover of capital and to choke off profits. At the same time, workers were seldom able to reduce hours through negotiation. During economic downturns—when they had an incentive to share jobs through shorter regular hours—they lacked bargaining power. During economic booms, when they had the advantage of a tight labor market, many individual workers had to replenish income lost during the last recession by working overtime.

Most important, competition, especially as the market extended internationally, dissuaded employers from reducing hours. In the 1830s and 40s competition between English and continental textile mills justified British resistance to the ten-hour day. The same fear blocked the eight-hour day in the 1890s, and economic nationalism in the 1920s similarly threatened the newly won eight-hour day. There were also social and cultural impediments to reduced work

time. The idea of the right to free time raised concerns about the use of leisure by the male working class. Elites associated this leisure with disorder, imprudent consumption, and radical politics. This was one rationale for the refusal of the British Parliament to grant the ten-hour day to men in 1847.

Thus major hours reductions were intermittent and very difficult to win. They coincided with the social and political upheavals of 1847/1848, 1919, and 1936–1938, often requiring simultaneous international and cross-class movements, and they often followed long intellectual debate and political struggle. Rarely can they be correlated with economic trends.

This lack of correlation is ironic because the most successful arguments to reduce wage work time were economic rather than political. Repeatedly, reformers argued that shorter hours optimized output and human capital and increased mass consumer spending. Nineteenth-century political elites were relatively open to arguments that linked reduced work time to bodily safety. For example, in France the twelve-hour law of 1848 applied to men working in factories because these workplaces were deemed “dangerous” (as opposed to domestic or open air work sites). Work time agitators were almost obliged to overstress the harmful and involuntary character of mechanized work. This emphasis removed factory workers from the ranks of “free adults” and made them subject to the kind of protection given to minors. Yet the framing of the debate in these terms deflected the argument away from the citizen’s right to a shorter workday.

Frustrated hour reformers also embraced industrial efficiency and mechanization as a means of reducing the costs of reduced work time. From the 1890s on the European Left found in the United States “proof” that industrial efficiency made for both less work time and more output. Labor groups found allies among efficiency scientists who sought optimal output over relatively long work periods rather than short-term maximum production at the price of long-term labor fatigue and deterioration. From about 1900 to 1920, various studies found an overly long work period was self-defeating, for it led to absenteeism and reduced efficiency and often was no more productive than shorter work spans. Investigators discovered that early morning work (before the traditional 8:00 A.M. breakfast break) and work on Saturday afternoon hardly justified fixed capital expenditures. This research provided a powerful support for the reduction of work time after World War I.

Wage earners were often slow to embrace the trade-off of increased productivity for shorter hours,

fearful that increased efficiency would result in layoffs. By the mid-1920s, however, European unions were beginning to reject the linkage between increased productivity and joblessness. Instead, they embraced mechanization and even the scientific management advocated by Frederick Taylor, as a way to preserve the normal workday of eight hours and to win the forty-hour week.

Work time diminutions were also supposed to stimulate mass consumption. An early form of this argument (from the 1830s) claimed that shorter hours would shift wealth from capital to labor by making labor scarce and thus more costly, and thereby encouraging popular spending. Shorter hours would shift investment away from luxury goods to more profitable mass markets. A different, and in the long run more politically acceptable, argument emerging in the 1880s claimed that shorter hours meant leisure time sufficient to create desire for new consumer goods (without necessarily increasing labor costs).

Work time, family, and gender roles. Finally, given an inhospitable political culture, short-hour advocates did not argue for free time for men (still deemed subversive), but adopted a familial rhetoric in the defense of personal life. In the nineteenth century legal reductions of working hours could be justified only if shorter work time facilitated the fulfillment of family duties. It justified liberation from wage work if it was deemed socially necessary, as was women’s “free time.” Female time liberated from wage work was not a threat, for it was not “free” but rather necessary family and housework time. Thus legislators were won far earlier to the principle of reduced wage time for women. Nineteenth-century employers attacked St. Monday, the custom of taking part or all of the day following the Sabbath as a holiday, as a threat to work discipline. But gradually they accepted the idea of the Saturday half-holiday (for women especially) because it was necessary to prepare for family life on Sunday. This idea of a protected time for female domesticity had an appeal that crossed the gap between workers and middle-class reformers. Inevitably workers and their allies embraced an ideology of rescuing motherhood, creating at least a “part-time” housewife in the wage-earning married woman. Male-dominated workers’ movements thoroughly embraced the ideal of the women’s domestic sphere. Even though men often used laws that granted only women shorter hours to gain free time for themselves (because factories often could not function without female labor), this hiding behind women’s petticoats fully embraced the primacy of domestic work for women. Indeed, hour reductions for women were conveniently

used to drive women out of some jobs. Opposition of women's groups to shift work (especially in the 1920s) shared a similar assumption: factory labor should not be tolerated at "unnatural" hours when women had obligations of child and home care (coordinated with the working hours of men and children). Women's participation in the short hours movement reinforced the expectation that their time was to be organized around "family" needs that stretched across the divide between the private and public. The quest for the "normal workday" of ten and then eight hours was an integral part of an ideology of separate sex spheres.

Familial rhetoric did not exclude the "duties" of men entirely. The short-hours movement embraced the ideology of the "respectable working-class father." Less work time meant more gardening and other quasi-farming rituals for men. By the 1850s in Britain, the Saturday half-holiday had become an important symbol of family life and even of a more "democratic" fatherhood. Reformers argued that Saturday afternoons free from wage work provided fathers with the opportunity to spend time with their children. Early twentieth-century French trade union propaganda painted a picture of the eight-hour father with sufficient job security and time to provide for his family and to "guide" his children. These references to free time for fatherhood, however, were vague and rare. From the 1920s reformers argued that the annual paid vacations would restore the spiritual unity of the family undermined by the modern functional division of family members. Both the Left and Right embraced the extended holiday, for it fitted a common gender and family ideology: vacations would provide family time away from domestic routines. It would enable the father to learn paternal roles while at play with his children.

The family ideology of short-hours movements was not mere opportunism. It was more an appeal to bourgeois obsessions with domestic standards and guilt over denying working-class men housewives. In the details of negotiations over work time in the five years after 1919, family issues were central. Especially important to unions were the elimination of before-breakfast work and an eight-hour day that was stretched out in split shifts. Organized workers resisted two- or three-shift systems, especially in textiles, where women predominated. The ideal was not merely a short but also a compressed workday to free longer blocks of time for private life, especially for meeting the needs of coordinating family schedules.

Still a conflict remained: on one side stood the mostly male model of public obligation and private freedom; on the other, the married female experience of obliged time that made obtaining wage work dif-

ficult. For some it meant accommodating a work schedule stretched between wage work, commuting, and private household and family care work. As long as the necessary work of family remained a female responsibility, equity in that work was impossible. And the shorter hours movement systematically avoided this issue, despite talk of improved fatherhood. The predominance of men in the public labor market guaranteed that the ideology of the male provider dominated movements for shorter hours. The language of "free" time implied that men's family work obligations were fulfilled by their wages. The demand for reduced work time reinforced the perception of public time (contested for control, valued as "money" and "productive") as radically split from private time (deemed to be unconstrained and without economic value).

LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE WORK TIME

This perception of the scheduling of work time has predominated until the late twentieth century. Since the 1980s there have been a number of challenges to this scheduling of work time. Rising unemployment led West German metalworkers to push for a thirty-five-hour workweek, and the French Left, returning to power in the 1980s, favored weekly hour reductions as a work-sharing program.

As important, dramatic increases in married women's employment, especially after 1960, have undermined the prevailing gender division of work time. Implicit in the concept of the eight-hour day/forty-hour week was the assumption that it was worked by men outside the home while family and household care work was done by a wife. The introduction of massive numbers of married women into the workforce (reaching 60 percent or more in most European countries) hardly produced a "symmetrical family" of gender equity in the sharing of wage and domestic work time. In this context feminists, union leaders, and others began to advocate more flexible work schedules. Such adaptability could reduce rigidity in production schedules and staffing services (favored by businesses) but flexible working hours could also facilitate the complex needs of families and individuals. Of special concern were the needs of young families to balance child care and employment time.

As in the past, these efforts have met with strong resistance. The French effort to reduce work to thirty-five hours in the 1980s was frustrated by the anti-regulatory politics of conservative governments in Britain and Germany, which impeded any coordi-

nated hour reduction. Later reformers have been unable to re-create the international coalition that supported the eight-hour day in 1919. In some ways the generation of World War I was a golden age of labor internationalism—when a rough economic equality between industrial states existed. Since the 1920s the opportunities to free time from work on an international basis have been much more difficult to win. Economic nationalism in the 1930s and especially fascism in Germany and Italy frustrated French efforts to institutionalize a forty-hour work week. More recently, the advent of authoritarian third world industrial powers and increased competition between oppressed third world and Western labor has frustrated even those workers who have unions or a foothold in the state, limiting their ability to break with the discipline of the international market and to free time from work.

As important, the goal of reducing the working day may have lost the appeal that attracted so many earlier to the eight-hour day. Time lost in commuting and the marginal usefulness of, for example, an additional half-hour per day may make other allocations of free time much more attractive. Individualized packages of time such as additional vacation, child care leave, earlier retirement, and flextime have replaced the social ideal of a uniform reduced work-week. Yet such personalized schedules have been hard

to win through collective bargaining or law, which generally presume uniform standards and seem to threaten the return of a divisive individual labor contract. Moreover, the older ideal of “family time” has been frustrated by the spread of shift work (first during World War II and then as contract concessions). The efforts of unions and women’s groups early in the century to preserve family time by opposing “unnatural” hours has succumbed to the logic of international markets and the drive after 1945 to increase production. Attempts of chain stores to extend hours to Sunday or nights in the 1980s and 1990s generally have failed. Still, the value of family time is increasingly attacked as contrary to American-style consumer convenience.

Underlying these difficulties is the legacy of the short-hours movement itself. On the one hand, that movement addressed the “public” issues of regular employment, work intensity, and job control; on the other, it treated “freedom” as disengagement from public obligation in favor of private time. This dichotomy obscured the sexual dynamics of domestic work time and the fact that “after hours” means very different things for women and men. It also has ostensibly privileged the private life while giving family time no value comparable to waged time and placed its greatest burden on wives and mothers. Meanwhile men (and increasingly women) remain obligated to

driven work and segmented lives built around “providing” and the frustrated dreams of private fulfillment. Ironically, the short-hours movement that gloried the private life has contributed to its being undervalued.

The long-term trend of industrial economies toward growth without new jobs may increase pressures for the reduction of work time. And the tendency of economies across the globe to converge to-

ward a similar labor standard may help revive an international desire for short-hours, as in 1919 (at least within the European Community). Moreover, the two-income family with its burden of wage hours is also a likely site for the building of a new quest for time. Inevitably, it will be expressed in terms radically different from the earlier eight-hour struggles because it would not be based on the same gender assumptions.

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CHILD LABOR



Colin Heywood

Child labor is a subject that stirs the passions. People in present-day Europe react with indignation to reports of those few children still working in “sweatshops” in their own societies, not to mention the millions employed in the poorer countries of the world. They have come to regard the widespread employment of children in the past as shameful. The climbing boy suffocating up a chimney, or the little mill hand working to the relentless pace of a machine, have become stock images of the industrial revolution. Yet such hostility to child labor is a comparatively recent phenomenon. During the early modern period, the majority of families sought work for their children as a matter of routine. Indeed, the authorities worried more about “the sins of sloth and idleness” among the young than about excessive work. It was the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that brought profound changes to the role of children in modern society. In Europe, as in America, child labor legislation and compulsory education ensured that children would be dependent on their parents and to some extent sheltered from the world of adults. In the much-quoted words of Viviana A. Zelizer, children became economically “worthless” but emotionally “priceless.”

The first historians to investigate child labor generally focused on the passing of the Factory Acts in England. They adopted a simple challenge and response model, in which the unprecedented “exploitation” of child labor in the factories and workshops provoked the state to intervene. As Hugh Cunningham has pointed out, their story could be dressed up in the form of a romance, with gallant figures such as Lord Shaftesbury rescuing poor factory children from the clutches of cruel employers. Such a heavy focus on the benevolent influence of the state on child labor was not to everyone’s taste, however. There was always a critique from the political right, which emphasized the material and moral progress brought by the factory system and the disadvantages of state intervention for child workers, notably a loss of training and skill. Various historians since the 1960s have argued that rising real wages rather than Factory Acts were

the main influence on the long-term decline of child labor. Others have noted that certain groups of employers and workers were more receptive to curbs on child labor than others, thus reinforcing considerable regional disparities in the age structure of the labor force. Others again have charted the changing cultural context in which ideals of childhood were defined and redefined. Finally, Myron Weiner has asserted that it was compulsory school attendance rather than factory legislation that finally eliminated children from the workshops, the former being more readily enforced than the latter. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the historical literature remains skewed toward industrial and urban child labor, and toward Britain and other nations that industrialized early.

When discussing the history of child labor, it is difficult to avoid the influence of contemporary experiences in a modern, bureaucratized society. The temptation is to ask at what age children started work, as if starting work were the same as starting school in the modern era, and whether they were employed or unemployed, categories most adults would apply to themselves. The answers are likely to be misleading, unless one makes considerable allowance for the peculiar nature of children’s work in the past. Children’s entry into the labor force was staggered over several years, according to personal circumstances and the availability of work in each locality. Some had full-time employment outside the home, but the majority probably worked without wages in a family unit or took on little tasks, such as caring for siblings, that released adults for productive labor. The shift from childhood into youth also proceeded imperceptibly. Definitions of “children” in the labor force varied considerably in different national contexts: most historians have taken fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen to be the upper age limit.

CHILDREN AND FAMILY WORK ROUTINES

Despite the grisly images that loom large in textbooks, much of the work done by children in the past was

casual and undemanding. Children gradually drifted into the labor force, mopping up a host of little tasks that were appropriate to their size and experience. They might make themselves useful around the age of six or seven, but were unlikely to train in the more skilled and exacting tasks until around the age of ten, at the very earliest. Censuses of population do not lend themselves particularly well to recording this type of routine working and helping. For what it is worth, the British census of 1851 found that only 3.5 percent of children aged five to nine were occupied. P. E. H. Hair concludes that, even allowing for a high margin of error, “the vast majority of children under ten did not undertake any regular gainful employment.” In the next age group, ten to fourteen, the census found no more than 30 percent occupied: 37 percent of boys and 22 percent of girls. Not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is there evidence of a crisp transition from childhood into the adult world of work, marked by the ritual of leaving school at the minimum age required by the state.

In Europe the majority of children lived in the countryside—at least until urbanization steadily impinged from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Employment in agriculture generally required strength and stamina that were beyond the capacity of children. On the small family farms that were characteristic of many parts of Europe, children of both sexes were confined to such jobs as looking after younger brothers and sisters, fetching water and firewood, picking stones, scaring birds, spreading manure, and “minding” pigs and sheep. Their contribution was also partly seasonal, reaching a peak with the intensive work routines of the harvest period. Younger juveniles took food out to the laborers in the fields, while the older ones bound corn into sheaves behind the harvesters. Some of this work required long, lonely hours out in the fields, but it also left plenty of time for leisure pursuits. Early in the sixteenth century, a native of Segovia described mingling his sheep with other flocks so that he and his fellow shepherds could play games along the lines of hockey and racing.

During their early teens, as they moved from childhood to youth, gender differences among young farm workers became more pronounced. Daughters continued to help their mothers around the house, the garden, and the dairy, while sons began to work more intensively beside their fathers in the fields and stables. At this age, many young people left home for employment in other households. The proportion of the youthful population involved in farm service varied considerably between regions. In Austria, for example, between the seventeenth and early twentieth centuries, a sample of census material from various

rural communities reveals that somewhere between a fifth and a half of those in the age-group fifteen to nineteen were servants. An unfortunate minority, drawn largely from the ranks of small peasants and agricultural laborers, had to take this path at an earlier age, perhaps when as young as seven or eight. In general, though, service with another family was associated more with youth than with childhood. Ann Kussmaul calculated from evidence concerning early modern England that thirteen to fourteen was the most common age for moving into service in husbandry. A female farm servant might begin her career helping the farmer’s wife with household chores and looking after the children. A female farm servant in Bavaria at the end of the nineteenth century started at the age of thirteen or fourteen, helping the peasant’s wife with household chores and looking after the children. She would hope to move up the hierarchy of servants as she grew older. The ultimate aim of such girls was to accumulate enough skills and money for a dowry to secure a husband. In Tuscany during the late eighteenth century, girls preferred to work on larger farms, where they could learn a broader range of skills, and so enhance their marriage prospects. The typical male experience was slightly different. The young Robert Savage started in the kitchen of a big farm in Suffolk as a “back’us boy” (back house boy) at the age of twelve. By his mid teens he had moved on to the more obviously “masculine” work of helping with the horses and assisting a shepherd at lambing season. In isolated cases during the nineteenth century, and indeed creating considerable scandal, children of both sexes joined agricultural gangs, working the arable land of East Anglia and Belgium or the rice fields of Piedmont and Lombardy.

In the towns, particularly the major commercial and administrative centers, paid work for children was not always easy to come by. The traditional apprenticeship system continued to flourish during the early modern period in Europe under the supervision of the guilds. The master undertook to teach all the “rudiments and secrets” of a trade to a boy or a girl. He would feed and lodge them within his own family, so that they could learn all the values and customs associated with their calling. The apprentices for their part agreed to obey the master, in an agreement that might last for up to seven or even ten years. However, apprenticeships did not usually start until young people had reached their early or mid teens, an age when they were considered sufficiently strong or mature to be able to cope with the requirements of the craft. In a few trades that did not need much in the way of strength or skill, such as nail making and ribbon weaving, they might start earlier. In England there were

also the pauper apprentices, who were usually placed with a farmer or a craftsman by the Poor Law authorities around the age of seven or eight. Otherwise apprentices, like servants, were more often youths than children.

Apprenticeships did not usually start until boys, or in some cases girls, had reached their early or mid teens. Again, children lacked the physical strength necessary for many trades, notably those in the construction industry. Where children did go into full-time work, the example of nineteenth-century Lon-

don reveals a minority starting around the age of six or seven, but most delaying until they were closer to twelve. They began with light work such as making clothes or “trimmings” for furniture, street selling, or making deliveries. Even without a full-time job they could help with household chores and perhaps also a domestic trade. Girls in particular looked after younger children for their mothers or, in the words of the social investigator Henry Mayhew (1812–1887), were “lent out to carry about a baby to add to the family income by gaining her sixpence weekly.” Their

next step, at twelve or thirteen, was often to become a “slavey”: a telling indicator of the fate that awaited child servants everywhere in Europe. Domestic service was by far the largest employer of female labor in Europe before World War I. As in the villages, the young girl started at the bottom, as maid of all work in a modest household, or as scullery maid in a large one. At this stage her life became one of constant drudgery: cooking, cleaning, running errands, and lugging the laundry to and from the wash place.

In sum, children were perhaps the most flexible workers within the family economy, ranging from full-time employment outside the home to helping their parents with a wide range of light jobs. As such, although it is difficult to measure their precise contribution, they were valued members of a team. Young people were also likely to accumulate a varied experience of work by their late teens. Edward Barlow, to take an example from mid-seventeenth-century England, began his working life in Lancashire as a casual laborer at harvest time and in a colliery. He went on to apprentice in the Manchester textile trade, and then tried his hand in London as successively an errand boy, a post boy, and a vintner’s apprentice. He finally settled on a seven-year apprenticeship as a seaman. In late-nineteenth-century Germany, the anonymous female author of *Im Kampf ums Dasein!* moved from gluing bags at home to domestic service, later found jobs in a series of factories, and ended up as a waitress. For the most part, the work performed by children in agriculture, the handicraft trades, and the service sector remained uncontroversial. However, indignation aroused in the late eighteenth century by the fate of the climbing boys employed by chimney sweeps, or *petits savoyards* as they were known in France, gave a hint of battles to come.

CHILD LABOR AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the authorities in many regions were keen to promote industry precisely because they hoped it would provide a reliable source of employment for women and children living in poverty. Whether industrialization did in the end bring an increase in the proportion of young people who were gainfully occupied is a matter of dispute, particularly among British historians. Some of them assert that since most children in the preindustrial era had been expected to make a contribution to the family economy, there was little scope for a general increase in child labor during the industrial revolution. A more common assumption would

be that industrialization did draw in more young children to the labor force—although it is not clear whether the peak was during the “protoindustrial” phase of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, or the later factory-based phase of the 1830s and 1840s. Most historians would also accept that industrialization brought a more intensive use of child labor in certain occupations. Children working in, say, cotton mills and urban “sweatshops” were everywhere a minority, but they faced more regular employment through the year, longer hours, and a more sustained level of effort than their peers.

The first signs of change appeared in the countryside during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when merchants decided to profit from the supply of relatively cheap and docile labor for their manufacturing operations. Families in these “protoindustrial” workshops were goaded by the pressures of poverty and the seemingly endless round of agricultural and industrial work into erasing the customary division of labor by age and gender. The historian Hans Medick has drawn attention to child labor among rural weavers, spinners, and knitters, “which both in its intensity and duration went far beyond that of the corresponding labor of farm peasant householders.” During the early nineteenth century, among the handloom weaving families of the Saxon Oberlausitz, young children wound bobbins and prepared spools, while both adolescent boys and girls learned to weave. Similarly in England a royal commission on the employment of children in 1843 reported that the children of knitters in the Leicestershire hosiery industry began work around the age of six, seven, or eight. The boys worked up to twelve hours a day as winders, the girls as seamers. Boys as young as ten years of age worked on the stocking frames, and allegedly were soon able to earn nearly as much as their fathers. Other trades that employed countless numbers of children in the countryside included lace making and embroidery, straw plaiting, nail making, and other forms of metal working.

Pressure on child workers in the smaller workshops also increased in the towns during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as guilds and apprenticeship regulations crumbled in the face of free markets. Take the example of children employed in the silk industry of Lyon. The development of *grande tire* looms for the production of fancy brocades involved numerous *tireuses* (drawgirls) pulling their heavy cords for up to fourteen hours a day—until the invention of the Jacquard loom in 1807 eventually made them redundant. Silk reelers fared little better. In 1866 the legal authorities of the city investigated the case of ten-year-old Marie Péchard, a so-called ap-

prentice reeler, after she ended up in the hospital with a serious eye disease. They found that a certain Dame Bernard was employing Marie and two other girls in their early teens for sixteen hours a day, from five or six in the morning until ten or eleven o'clock at night.

The climax to the story came, of course, with the massive "exploitation" of child labor in the cotton mills, coal mines, and factories of the industrial revolution. Steam power and machinery, it is commonly assumed, allowed women and children to take over work that had previously required the strength and skill of an adult male. Certainly the earliest spinning machinery of the late eighteenth century was designed to be operated by children (strictly, in this case, ousting adult females), in a bid to reduce labor costs. By a fortunate coincidence, from the point of view of employers, large numbers of pauper children were available for industrial work on long-term contracts. Robert Owen (1771–1858) estimated that he employed five hundred parish apprentices in his cotton mill at New Lanark, in Scotland, in 1799. Overall, children under thirteen accounted for 40 percent of the workforce in this mill. As a rule, though, children continued their customary role of acting as assistants to adults, taking on ancillary tasks and at the same time learning the skills and general culture of their trade. Examples are legion: the little piecer who tied broken threads for a mule spinner; the winder who prepared bobbins for a weaver; the trapper who op-

erated ventilation doors for miners at the coal face; and the carriers of bottles for glassblowers.

Children of both sexes often did the same work, though there were variations between trades and regions. Young girls sometimes worked underground in the coal mines, as the 1842 children's employment commission found in Yorkshire, Lancashire, South Wales, and East Scotland, but the pits increasingly became male territory in most parts of Europe. The temptation is always to emphasize that children might start work in the mills "as young as seven or eight." Most, however, probably waited until they were ten or twelve in the textile trades and into their teens in a heavy industry such as iron and steel making. At the Heilmann spinning mill, for example, in the Alsatian town of Ribeauvillé, an industrial census of 1822–1823 listed twenty-seven children aged eight to eleven but eighty-one aged twelve to fifteen. Employers liked to argue that the new machinery had taken over the physical effort of work, so that children only had to bestir themselves intermittently. A less partial view would surely stress the long hours and sustained concentration required in the early mills. A piecer in a cotton mill during the 1830s was likely to have to work for thirteen and a half hours a day, and be prepared to rush forward and mend any of up to five hundred threads.

There is evidence, then, that the early *industrialisation sauvage* of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-

turies brought an increased reliance on child labor. How far this varied between the countries of Europe is difficult to estimate, given the lack of reliable statistics. The safest conclusion must be that child labor in the manufacturing sector was particularly important for the early starters on the path to industrialization, notably Britain, Belgium, France and the western parts of Prussia. An industrial enquiry of 1839 to 1843 in France found 143,665 child workers under the age of sixteen, equivalent to 12.1 percent of the labor force. Another, but not necessarily comparable one, for Belgium in 1843, counted 10,514 child workers, or 19.5 percent of the total. Much of this was concentrated in a small number of industries, particularly textiles, as can be seen in table 1. The often distressing experiences of factory children were therefore far from typical, yet it was their plight that loomed large in the debates over child labor launched by social reformers.

CHILD LABOR AND CHILD WELFARE

Lurid accounts of harsh working conditions for children in the factories and workshops were grist for the mill for all those who feared that industrialization and urbanization would cause massive social dislocation. The public health movement that emerged in France during the 1820s and 1830s reflected such concerns, notably with the investigations by Dr. Louis Villermé into the “physical and moral condition” of textile workers. There was talk of a “bastardization of the

race” in the wake of industrial expansion. The new manufacturing centers were allegedly producing children described by Villermé as “pale, enervated, slow in their movements, tranquil in their games” who would later be incapable of defending their country. The heightened economic and imperial rivalry between nations of the late nineteenth century, combined with threats to the established order from the labor movement, only served to reinforce the obsession with “degeneration” in certain circles throughout Europe. A British doctor, Margaret Alden, warned in 1908 that “the nation that first recognizes the importance of scientifically rearing and training the children of the commonwealth will be the nation that will survive.”

The first observers to ring the alarm bells were doctors in the industrial towns of Britain who were disturbed by the physical condition of child workers. As early as 1784 a report on conditions in the Lancashire cotton mills by one Dr. Percival, following an outbreak of typhus, noted “the injury done to young persons through confinement and too long-continued labor.” The case against child labor on health grounds was not as straightforward as might be thought. In the first place, the costs of working at a tender age had to be set against the benefits of earning a wage and contributing to a higher standard of living. Employers even liked to emphasize the cleanliness of their factories in comparison to the slums, and the “moderate degree of healthy exercise” that work involved. Hence reformers generally argued against the dangers of ex-

cessive work for children rather than against work per se. In the second place, providing statistical proof that child labor in industry undermined health was not always easy. Apologists for the factory system asserted that the health of children was undermined more by the poverty of their families than by their working conditions. Villermé was surely right to note the cluster of influences that lay behind the poor physical condition of so many workers in the towns:

I do not seek to establish whether the poor succumb most readily to their lack of nourishment; to the poor quality of their food; to their excessive work; to the bad air; to illness brought on by their trades, humidity, unhealthy lodgings, squalor or overcrowding; to the anxiety of being unable to raise a family; or even to the intemperate habits common amongst them.

As for the specific influences of child labor on health, reformers first highlighted the strain of a long working day on a small and partially formed body. During the 1840s, for example, children in the cotton mills of Ghent worked from dawn till 10 P.M. in winter, and from 5 or 5:30 A.M. till 8 P.M. in summer. Such long hours produced twisted limbs and curved spines among the poor “factory cripples,” as they were known in Lancashire, and weakened the eyes of thousands of girls engaged in close work such as lace making and embroidery. A second set of problems noted by doctors and other observers was the unhealthy environment created in the workshops by dust, noxious fumes, humidity, and high temperatures. Adelheid Popp recalled being poisoned by her job with a bronze manufacturer in Vienna during the 1880s; Alice Foley in her turn described a spell working in the basement of a Bolton weaving shed where “the frames stood on damp, cracked floors and I recall that the captive clouds of dust and lint could never escape.” The young operatives were vulnerable to a sad catalog of afflictions such as typhus epidemics, “spinners’ phthisis” and other forms of tuberculosis, anemia, eye infections, and white phosphorous poisoning (in the matchstick factories).

Industrial accidents were another hazard for child workers. These were a particularly unwelcome feature of the industrial age. Before the nineteenth century a child might suffer a mishap such as being run over by a cart, but this paled into insignificance before the dangers associated with power-driven machinery. The early factories were a menacing concentration of fast-moving shafts, drive belts, flywheels, and gearings that could seize the hair or loose clothing of a passing operative. Piecers were all too often crushed by self-acting mules; “tenters” on the power looms might be hit in the eye by their shuttles; drawers in the mines fell under their wagons; and children

cleaning machinery had fingers and hands mutilated by the moving parts.

Contemporaries were probably even more perturbed by the threats to the moral and educational development of child workers. They disliked the idea of the young being snatched from the bosom of their families and launched into the rough-and-tumble of life on the shop floor with its coarse language, licentious horseplay, and sometimes outright brutality. Of course, employers' representatives countered that the tight discipline of a well-run factory ruled out such pernicious influences, and some of the larger factories arranged separate workshops for males and females. At the extreme, silk mill owners in southern France brought in nuns to supervise the girls and young women they employed. All the same, many children must have found entry into the world of work a trying experience. The pauper apprentices of the early industrial revolution were doubtless more vulnerable than most to abuse. How representative the experiences of Robert Blincoe were is open to question, but his alleged sufferings at Litton Mill in Derbyshire certainly make grim reading. Older "stretchers" in the mill regularly kicked and beat him, threw rollers at his head, and played sadistic games such as tying him by the wrists to a cross beam so that he had to draw up his legs every time the machinery moved under him. Other children suffered at the hands of adults impatient with their pace of work. Lea Baravalle, who worked as a *sbattitrice* in an Italian silk mill immediately after World War I, recorded how the throwsters hit her and splashed boiling water in her face if she was slow in supplying them with thread.

Finally, the tension between work and school aroused a series of impassioned debates throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the medieval period, according to Philippe Ariès, "all education was carried out by means of apprenticeship," meaning that boys learned their trade and their "human worth" living and working with adults. This type of apprenticeship was gradually replaced by an academic training, but this was a slow process, particularly in the "mechanical arts." Young people, particularly the males, continued to follow apprenticeships during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, yet it was generally agreed that the whole institution had become seriously debased. An extensive division of labor in the "sweated" trades and the mechanization of production in the factories permitted so-called "apprentices" to be exploited as a cheap source of labor. There remained a residual feeling that starting work as early as possible had its benefits, notably acquiring arcane skills and learning the disciplines of the workshop. It was also plausible for employers to assert

during the early nineteenth century that children excluded from the workshops would merely idle away their time on the streets, given the absence of school places for them. Certainly, peasant and working-class families had to weigh the costs and benefits of investing in the schooling of their offspring. The novelist Jules Rebour highlighted their dilemma by staging an argument during the 1870s, in the Vivarais province, between father and mother over the future of their son, Jacques Baudet. The father was willing to make sacrifices for him to continue to attend school, even after he had acquired a basic literacy, in the hope that he might secure a better job. The mother would have none of it, asserting that a school certificate would never be enough to land someone from their background a white-collar occupation: better by far for him to start earning in the hope of building up a landholding. The young Jacques duly started work as a shepherd.

If the need to earn a living sometimes ruled out any schooling at all, in other cases it confined time in class to the winter months, allowing children to work on the land during the harvest season, or undermined schooling's effectiveness by requiring them to work before and after class. Heinrich Holeck, born in Bohemia in 1885, had to help his stepmother with her brick-making job by getting up at four in the morning to prepare the clay and resuming work after school making bricks. As a broad generalization, the schooling of girls was sacrificed to work more readily than that of boys, and country children attended class less regularly than those in the towns. By the late nineteenth century, however, such disparities were fast disappearing as school triumphed over work.

CHILD LABOR IN DECLINE

The obvious starting point for analyzing the causes of the withdrawal of children from the labor force would be to pinpoint when the process started. If, as Clark Nardinelli claims for the British case, the long-term decline set in before the passing of effective Factory Acts, then one would have to look farther afield than state intervention for explanations. Unfortunately, such evidence is hard to come by, not least since many of the statistics on child labor first appeared when states attempted to justify and implement factory legislation. Nardinelli uses data from the textile industry to show that child labor was decreasing relative to adult labor before inspectors began to enforce the 1833 Factory Act, the first such act to have any teeth. In 1816, he estimates, children under thirteen accounted for 20 percent of the labor force in the cotton

industry, but by 1835 the proportion had fallen to 13.1 percent. He also notes the relative decline of child labor in the silk industry during the 1840s and 1850s, even though its mills were not covered by factory legislation in this period.

The broader picture of a gradual elimination of children from the economically active population cannot be documented before 1851, when the British census began to record the occupations of young people. At that point, as noted above, 96.5 percent of children aged five to nine were without a "specified occupation," and from 1881 the census no longer considered it worthwhile counting them. The next

group, aged ten to fourteen, experienced an uneven decline in the proportion occupied from decade to decade, but the long-term trend was clear: if 30 percent were occupied in 1851, only 17 percent were in 1901. Other countries in Europe were less preoccupied with this issue. The French census, for example, did not publish information on the active population by age group until 1896. In that year only one-fifth of those aged ten to fourteen were occupied, and as in Britain, most of these would have been aged thirteen or fourteen.

Social reformers in all countries certainly attempted to use state intervention to curb the abuse of

child labor. Their motives were largely humanitarian, though other parties might support them for more mercenary reasons. Howard Marvel argued that the 1833 Factory Act in Britain was designed to favor the interests of the large urban manufacturers in the textile industry. He reasoned that they employed relatively fewer young children than their rural counterparts, and that with steam rather than water power they rarely needed exceptionally long working hours to compensate for interruptions to production. British factory operatives and weavers in the Ten Hours Movement also agitated during the 1830s and 1840s for shorter working hours for children, making it clear that this was part of a wider campaign to lighten the burden of labor on all workers. Everywhere the state proceeded by a process of trial and error, gradually extending the scope of factory legislation and tightening the systems of inspection. The British paved the way in 1802 with an act that limited itself to protecting apprentices in the cotton mills, moved on to a broader but still ineffective one in 1819, and had to await Althorp's Act of 1833 for the first workable system of inspection. Among later landmarks, the 1842 Mines Act attempted to ban all females and boys under the age of ten from underground work; the 1844 Factory Act pioneered the half-time system, permitting children to divide their time between work and school; and the 1867 Factories Extension Act finally branched out beyond the textile industries. Prussia and France in their turn began tentatively around 1840 with child labor laws that were hamstrung by feeble means of enforcement, and went no further until 1853 in the former case, 1874 in the latter.

All such legislation aimed to regulate rather than abolish child labor. To begin with, it tended to set minimum ages, such as eight or nine, which made little difference to employers, and concentrated on grading hours according to age, banning night work, insisting on sanitary measures in the workshops, and enforcing a limited amount of schooling. The impact of these laws on child welfare is open to question. On the one hand, they undoubtedly drove some child labor "underground," into the small workshops that were either exempt from legislation or difficult to inspect. They may even have deprived some needy families of income. On the other hand, they curbed some of the worst abuses of children in the workshops and encouraged the shift from the workshops to the school benches. Even Nardinelli concedes that the 1833 Act in Britain caused what he sees as a short-term boost to the secular decline in child labor by placing a "tax" on it, in the form of the costs incurred by employers in taking responsibility for the education of the children. The fact remains that the clear-cut demands of

compulsory schooling until the age of thirteen or so did more to keep young children out of the workshops than child labor legislation.

Before concluding that state intervention provides the key to removing children from the workplace, however, one should ask why the climate became favorable to legislation during the early nineteenth century, and also why the initial opposition to it from many quarters eventually weakened. Historians have sought answers in both the cultural and the socioeconomic spheres.

In the first place, eighteenth-century thinkers began to formulate new ideals for childhood, which ultimately made it unthinkable for young people to work. Out went the existing orthodoxy that children were essentially idle creatures who needed to be put to work as soon as possible. In its place, Jean-Jacques Rousseau proposed that people "love childhood, indulge its sports, its pleasures, its delightful instincts." Doubtless the sentimental approach to childhood championed by Rousseau and by the romantic poets initially reached only a narrow, middle-class audience, and their ideas were always contested by those espousing less sentimental viewpoints. Nonetheless, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, something of a consensus emerged portraying children, in the words of the historian Harry Hendrick, as "innocent, ignorant, dependent, vulnerable, generally incompetent and in need of protection and discipline." Such a construction of childhood went against the grain of earlier peasant and working-class experience, though it did complement demands for a "family wage": a wage high enough to allow a male breadwinner to support his wife and children without their having to work. It also meshed neatly with the growing interest in formal education among the "popular" classes. By this period opposition to shorter working hours and at least part-time schooling was often associated with "rougher" elements among the laboring population. Glassworkers provided an egregious example: in 1875 a French divisional inspector described them as "the most appalling collection of undisciplined good-for-nothings, drunks and idlers that it is possible to imagine." The upshot was an increasing acceptance at all levels of society that children should spend an extended period in school.

In the second place, changes in the labor market arguably tended to push children away from the world of work. On the one hand, the rising real wages, which sooner or later trickled down to workers during the course of economic development, made families increasingly reluctant to supply their children to employers. Sections of the working-classes remained anx-

ious over the loss of earnings from their children implied by child labor legislation, but they did gradually shift the balance from work to school. On the other, technical progress in industry reduced the demand for juvenile workers. Cotton spinners, for example, allegedly found that they needed to employ fewer piecers once the self-actor had replaced the hand mule. Let it be added that there was nothing inevitable about these forms of change on the shop floor. Per Bolin-Hort highlighted the stubborn persistence of operatives in the Lancashire cotton industry continuing to put their own children in the mills as “half-timers,” even though they were a relatively affluent group of workers. He also documented the diversity of strategies open to employers in deploying different types of labor on the same technology.

Finally, it should be noted in passing, historians of education have revealed the growing demand for education among the “popular classes” well before it was made compulsory. The French scholar Roger Thabault showed how in his village of Mazières-en-

Gatine the peasants were won over to primary schooling from the middle of the nineteenth century onward when improved transport, commercialized agriculture, and elections ended their isolation from the rest of the nation.

In sum, the virtual extinction of child labor in the developed economies of Europe was a protracted process, linked to a broad range of changes in society. The implication for “third world” countries today is that campaigns to improve conditions for child workers will face a long haul, in the context of tight family budgets, labor-intensive methods of production, poor communications, and established conceptions of childhood. At the same time, there is no denying that from an early stage of industrialization efforts at reform made a difference to the welfare of the young. A very mixed bunch of philanthropists, politicians, working-class radicals, journalists, civil servants, industrialists, factory inspectors, and schoolteachers contributed in their various ways to imposing a “modern” conception of childhood.

See also Youth and Adolescence (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL HISTORY

FROM 1350 TO 2000



VOLUME 5

Peter N. Stearns

Editor in Chief

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POPULAR CULTURE



Peter Burke

Definitions of popular culture abound, whether it is viewed primarily as peasant culture, oral culture, unofficial culture, the culture of custom, the community, culture created by the people or for the people. Despite or sometimes because of this abundance, some historians have questioned whether popular culture is a useful category of analysis at all. To discuss this question is the fundamental aim of this article. After a short discussion of the historiography of the subject, the remaining pages will be devoted to problems, notably the problem of the sources; the problem of defining the key terms “popular” and “culture”; the twin problems of hegemony and resistance; and the problem of mass culture.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Popular culture was long neglected by historians because ordinary people were considered beneath the “dignity of history.” Although earlier European antiquaries had sometimes written with more or less condescension about popular customs, a serious interest in the culture of ordinary people on the part of the learned began not among historians but among men of letters, such as Sir Walter Scott and Johann Gottfried Herder. A movement developed, from the late eighteenth century onward, to collect traditional popular poetry before the new urban and commercial society destroyed it. This interest in the “folk” spread from poetry to music, painting, and building and to the beliefs and customs described from the middle of the nineteenth century onward as folklore (*Volkskunde*, *folcllore*, and so on). Open-air museums of peasant housing and material culture were founded in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and elsewhere in the later nineteenth century.

One of the main reasons for this new interest was that the people, especially the peasantry, were believed to have preserved the cultural heritage better than other social groups had done. Around 1800 in many parts of Europe, a return to this heritage was

regarded as an antidote to the corruption of different national cultures by the imitation of foreign models on the part of the upper and middle classes, especially in the cities. It was no accident that this “discovery of the people” took place in the age of nationalism or that more interest was shown in popular culture in central and eastern Europe and in Scandinavia than in western Europe, more in Scotland than in England, and more in Brittany or Languedoc than in the Île-de-France.

Until the 1960s most historians were content to leave the study of popular culture to the folklorists. However, two shifts of interest combined to place the study of popular culture on the agenda of historians at this time. First was the rise of history from below. Following the example of E. P. Thompson in Britain and like-minded scholars in other countries, historians of culture and society increasingly found a place for ordinary people in their narratives. Second, the turn toward the new cultural (or sociocultural) history meant that historians of the “popular classes” found a place for culture alongside their discussions of the standard of living or political action.

However, to give culture a greater importance than before was to do more than simply widen the historian’s agenda, as the debate over Thompson’s *Making of the English Working Class* (1963) shows clearly enough. Thompson’s book was criticized by his fellow Marxists for what they called its “culturalism,” a deviation from the economic interpretation of history. They had not expected to hear so much about broadside ballads or to learn about the symbolism of food and initiation ceremonies and the iconography of riots or to be told that John Bunyan’s *Pilgrim’s Progress* was a foundation text of the working-class movement or to read about the culture of the English radicals or that of the weaving communities of Yorkshire and Lancashire.

As this example suggests, although new approaches to history are normally designed to solve problems, they often raise problems of their own. In the field of popular culture, the two most fundamen-

tal problems revolve around, although they cannot be reduced to, the difficulty of defining the two key terms, “popular” and “culture.”

THE PROBLEM OF THE SOURCES

All historians have to grapple with the problem that their access to the past is indirect, but historians of popular culture face the problem of mediation in an unusually acute form, as the following observations may suggest.

1. Historians of the culture of ordinary people are often condemned to see it through the eyes of elites, including the antiquarians and folklorists who collected much evidence that would otherwise have been lost but also added their own interpretations of it. We know a good deal about elite views of popular culture and all too little about the reverse.
2. The alien eyes through which we see so much of popular culture are sometimes literally foreign, the eyes of travelers, because in early modern Europe in particular, festival culture and everyday culture alike were taken for granted in the region itself, so that only outsiders found it sufficiently surprising to bother to record it. It would be difficult indeed to write the history of the Carnival of Venice without the testimony of a succession of foreign visitors who described what they saw or asked the locals what it meant, visitors such as the fifteenth-century German nobleman Arnold von Harff or the seventeenth-century English gentleman John Evelyn. However, foreign visitors notoriously misunderstand what they see and even what they hear in a strange environment.
3. The eyes through which a historian observes popular culture may also be hostile eyes, for example, the eyes of reformers, whether clerical or lay, intent on purifying the culture from paganism, superstition, immorality, or disorder.
4. Much of popular culture is oral; some would define it as essentially oral. Yet in the age before the use of the tape recorder, the oral survives only through written evidence, which necessarily distorts it. The performative element in popular culture is even more elusive, the verbal descriptions and occasional images providing no more than an approximation to the lost reality.
5. Historians of culture, like historians of society, want to discover what the norms were in particular places and times. Since these norms were

taken for granted at the time, historians are condemned to discovering them from the breaches, reconstructing what should have happened from stories about what went wrong—from a tavern brawl that led to manslaughter to Carnival in the city of Romans in Dauphine in 1580—analyzed by the French historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, in which local social and religious conflicts, exacerbated rather than appeased by the festivities, led to a massacre.

6. When, in the most favorable conditions, the sources allow the historian to view popular culture from inside, the participants who have left first-hand accounts do not form a random sample of the whole but are the more self-conscious individuals, generally the more prosperous, literate, and urban.
7. In any case, different kinds of ordinary people participated to different degrees. The visibility and audibility of young adult males in festivals from carnival to charivari will be obvious enough. The majority of the community, including women, remained relatively invisible and inaudible. Following the sources closely, historians run the risk of assuming the consensus of the community and overlooking possible differences, distinctions, and conflicts.
8. Surviving sources privilege major celebrations in major cities at the expense of the more common rural festivities, which were smaller in scale and often escaped the notice of visitors and reformers alike.

All these problems are serious, but none of them rules out the possibility of writing history at all. Better-documented examples illuminate others for which the evidence is more fragmentary, while different sources for the same event or activity may confirm or supplement one another.

THE PROBLEM OF THE POPULAR

For some nineteenth-century scholars, “the people” included everyone. It was synonymous with the nation, and in some European languages the same word (*narod* in Russian, for example) is used in both contexts. For others, the term rightly referred only to the peasantry, thus excluding the urban working classes, who were thought to have no traditions of their own. Today, historians still have problems with the concept of the popular. From an economic point of view, the people might be described as the relatively poor. In political terms, they are what the Italian social theorist Antonio Gramsci called the “dominated classes” (*classi*

subalterni), in other words, the powerless. A strictly cultural definition is more difficult. The people might be described as the formally uneducated, more exactly, as those who have not had access to higher education and may not even have attended school. It will be noted that these three definitions are essentially negative, describing the people as those who lack what other groups possess. In similar fashion, popular culture has often been described if not defined in terms of residues, what is left over after “high” culture (Michelangelo, Shakespeare, Descartes, Beethoven, and so on) has been subtracted—leaving us with folk songs, folktales, and folklore. The disadvantages of defining any object of historical study in terms of what it lacks rather than what it possesses should be obvious enough.

The binary model. Another general problem is that of the cultural distance between the elites and the people in a given place and time. Where earlier historians either argued or, more frequently, assumed that the upper classes lived in a different cultural world from ordinary people, much work in cultural history has dealt, following the Russian cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin, with interactions, exchanges, or negotiations between the two. For Bakhtin, the cultural distinction between high and low was not a distinction between social groups but rather one between the official and the unofficial. He emphasized the importance of unofficial occasions, such as Carnival, and unofficial locales, such as the marketplace.

Late-twentieth-century studies confirmed Bakhtin’s suggestion by showing that sixteenth-century Eu-

European nobles, for example, participated in what we call “popular culture” at least on some occasions in the year, such as Christmas and Carnival—the rituals associated with the annual cycle of the seasons offer the clearest example of common participation by different social groups. The wives and daughters of the nobility participated still more fully in everyday popular culture at this time partly because their level of literacy was generally lower. The elites were bicultural just as they were bilingual in the sense of being able to speak a standard or literary form of the vernacular as well as to communicate with ordinary people in the local dialect.

This biculturalism of individuals and groups facilitated exchanges between cultures or subcultures. It has long been known that certain cultural items, romances of chivalry, for example, have descended in the social hierarchy over the centuries, forming part of what the German folklorists called “sunken cultural property” (*gesunkenes Kulturgut*). Movement also took place in the opposite direction, as in the case of dance. The European upper classes regularly appropriated styles of dancing from the peasants, attracted by the vigor and spontaneity of these dances but gradually refining them until the need to borrow reasserted itself. In some cases it is possible to trace a complete circle of appropriation and adaptation between the culture of shepherds, let us say, and aristocratic pastoral.

It is virtually impossible to discuss interactions of this kind without using terms such as “learned” and “popular,” or “high” and “low.” In other words, we need the dichotomy in theory even when we are engaged in undermining it in practice. At the very least it provides historians with a useful kind of shorthand or a model in the sense of a deliberate simplification that enables the user to understand a more complex reality somewhat better. Some scholars, particularly those interested in cities, have advocated a three-tier rather than a two-tier model, finding a place for an apparently distinctive third or middle-class culture. One example is found in the American historian Louis Wright’s *Middle-Class Culture in Elizabethan England* (1935) with its descriptions of printed books or booklets that encourage self-improvement, give instructions in domestic relations or guidance to godliness, or offer accounts of the wonders of nature and of travel. Another comes from a perceptive study of nineteenth-century Sweden, by Jonas Frykman and Orvar Löfgren, in which the bourgeoisie are presented as defining themselves first against the culture of the aristocracy and then against the culture of the working class.

The problem is that on close inspection, this middle-class culture often turns out to have many elements in common with the other two. In those cases it therefore seems preferable, on the grounds of intel-

lectual parsimony, to work with a binary model on one condition: that the frontier between the two cultures is not regarded as too sharp or too stable. Historians need a model that enables them to discuss not only degrees of cultural distance but also change over time. The binary model allows them to do this and also to distinguish the directions of cultural movement, upward or downward.

The logic of appropriation. Unfortunately, the conceptual problems of historians of the popular do not end at this point. As the French scholar Roger Chartier has argued, it is extremely unwise to try to define the popular in terms of particular texts, images, festivals, or other items given the different uses and meanings of the same artifact or practice when it is appropriated by different individuals or groups. In France at the end of the seventeenth century, for example, certain folktales (fairy tales, as we sometimes call them) that had long circulated among the peasantry were appropriated by the lords and ladies who surrounded Louis XIV. However, the stories changed their meaning when they were transported from the cottage to the court, just as Marie Antoinette in pastoral garb was no ordinary shepherdess. In his own work on French chapbooks, the so-called *Bibliothèque Bleue* (so called because the booklets were bound in cheap blue paper), Chartier has tended to focus on the texts, studying their careers or trajectories as they were adapted to the needs of different communities of readers and listeners.

This approach is both valid and valuable. However, it surely needs to be complemented by another approach, which might be described as a “social history of culture.” The traditional, more or less Marxist sociology or social history of culture, which aligned ideas, artifacts, and performances with different social groups (usually social classes) has often been criticized as too simple and reductionist. For instance, according to the French theorist Michel de Certeau (a major influence on Chartier), the old sociology of culture failed to take account of the phenomenon of appropriation, of what he called the creative or productive aspect of consumption, the different uses and meanings of the same item in different settings. Certeau viewed culture as a kind of bricolage in which the users were continually producing something new out of old materials.

However, the social history of culture is capable of being revised to take account of these suggestions. A new social history of culture might usefully center on what might be called the logic of appropriation, in other words, the principles underlying the selection and combination of texts, images, and so on by a par-

ticular social group in a particular setting at a particular time. The British sociologist Dick Hebdige's well-known study of some British popular subcultures of the 1960s and 1970s, notably the Rastas, mods, and punks, argued that it was precisely by bricolage that these groups created their own styles, but that each style also had a social meaning. How can we discover this logic of appropriation? Such an investigation might well start from a social rather than a cultural definition of the popular, such as the attitudes and values of ordinary people as they are expressed or embodied in practices and in artifacts. Of course social groups are to some extent culturally constructed—defined by their style of life—but only to some extent, since there are real and sometimes extreme contrasts in wealth and power underlying the lifestyles of different classes or “estates.”

The advantage of this social definition is that it leaves open for empirical investigation two fundamental problems. The first is whether or not there are cultural divisions within the subordinate groups taking the form either of cultural stratification (the richer and the poorer peasantry, for example) or of what has been called segmentation into subcultures—male and female, old and young, urban and rural, not to mention occupational subcultures such as soldiers, sailors, beggars, thieves, shepherds, cobblers, and so on. In order not to forget this variety, it might be advisable to employ the term “culture” in the plural and speak of learned cultures, popular cultures, religious cultures, and so on.

The second problem is whether or not particular cultural items are shared (in a given place at a given time) between ordinary people and elites, either ruling classes or specialists in what is variously called “high” or “learned” culture (priests, intellectuals, and so on). What is often called popular religion, for instance, might be better described as the religion of the laity or as unofficial religion—although we should not forget that ordinary people sometimes developed their own forms of religious organization, such as Catholic confraternities and Protestant lay preaching.

An alternative description might be “local religion,” a point made by the American anthropologist William Christian in a study of religion in the region around Toledo in Spain in the later sixteenth century. Focusing on chapels, shrines, relics, indulgences, and the collective vows that villages made to saints to invoke their aid against natural disasters, Christian argues that “the vast majority of sacred places and moments held meaning only for local citizens,” including in this group the local elites as well as ordinary people.

How much or how little different social groups have in common culturally has varied a great deal in

the last five hundred years of European history. From the sixteenth century onward starting in Italy, historians have discerned a movement of withdrawal from popular culture on the part of the nobles, the clergy, and finally the middle classes, male and (somewhat later) female, beginning in Italy and spreading to France, England, the Netherlands, Spain, central Europe, and finally, Scandinavia and Russia. A vivid example comes from a 1986 study of early modern Barcelona. The author, James Amelang, speaks of a “retreat to the balcony” by urban elites; “direct participation in communal ceremonies gave way to observation, as the ruling class abandoned the street in favor of the balconies and inner salons of its mansions” (p. 196). The speed of this process of withdrawal must not be exaggerated. It was perhaps never complete, and in the twentieth century, if not before, the movement went into reverse. All the same, the concept of withdrawal has the advantage of suggesting links between a number of more specific changes, from the rise of private Carnival parties among elites to the abandonment of dances and taverns by the Catholic clergy after the reforms enacted at the Council of Trent.

THE PROBLEM OF CULTURE

“Culture” is if anything an even more difficult concept than “popular,” and students of this topic have experimented with different definitions and research strategies. The first solution to the problem, adopted by the folklorists of the nineteenth century (if indeed it was a conscious solution and not an unconscious assumption), was to treat popular culture as a set of popular equivalents of the main forms and genres of high culture, in other words folk music, folktales, folk art, folk drama, and so on. This was for the most part what they chose to collect. A second solution, more open ended, was to focus on performances and especially on festivals, above all on Carnival—not only the central rituals (processions, dances, mock trials, and executions) but also the informal practices that surrounded them, the songs, the masks, the violence, and so on. Carnival has been studied with most care in the major cities along the urban spine of Europe—Naples, Rome, Florence, Venice, Basel, Nürnberg, and Cologne. These were the locales in which the most spectacular performances took place from the later Middle Ages onward for the sake not only of the citizens but of villagers from the surrounding countryside, not to mention the foreign visitors who arrived in increasing numbers from the late seventeenth century onward. From the nineteenth century onward, however, there is also increasing evidence of Carnival at the village level in Italy, France, Germany, and elsewhere.

Whether or not ordinary people used to spend most of their year looking forward to Carnival and other festivals or remembering past ones, it is clear that their culture cannot be reduced to such events. The late-twentieth-century solution to the problem, “What is popular culture?” was to approach it through the study of everyday life. Following the lead of anthropologists and the philosophy of the “cultural construction of reality,” historians used the term “culture” more and more widely to speak of “political culture,” “print culture,” “culinary culture,” “housing culture,” the “culture of poverty,” “the culture of the factory,” the “culture of consumption,” and so on. Among the advantages of this approach is the fact that the gendering of popular culture appears more clearly in the study of the everyday than in that of festivals, whether one thinks of distinctive female attitudes to sexuality or violence, or of women’s access to certain cultural spaces, from the public square to the tavern.

However, if all human activities are to be described as culture, there seems no point in using the term at all. Cultural historians have stuffed so many different items into their sack that it is on the verge

of bursting. A possible solution to this problem might be to define cultural history, like cultural studies, in terms of an approach (or a discourse) rather than a field in the conventional sense. The approach might be described as one emphasizing values, attitudes (including what the British critic Raymond Williams called “structures of feeling”), and symbols, wherever they are to be found, as they are expressed or embodied in artifacts (images, tools, buildings) and in actions, whether everyday practices or special performances. It is also concerned with what the Russian semiotician Juri Lotman called the poetics of culture, the unwritten rules and unspoken assumptions underlying everyday life.

Unfortunately, these concepts too present obstacles. The notion of a cultural rule has been criticized by the French social theorist Pierre Bourdieu as too rigid. On the other hand, his alternative to it, “habitus,” might be said to have the opposite disadvantage—it is too flexible and elusive. The idea of the “everyday” is also more ambiguous than it may look, since in different contexts it has different meanings—private as opposed to public, popular as opposed to elite, routine as opposed to creative, and normal life as opposed to special occasions.

Perhaps the safest way to operate with the concept of culture is to treat it as historians have learned to treat the popular. In other words, not to focus on the everyday in itself but rather on the relation between the everyday and its opposite, the extraordinary, including in this category major events like the Renaissance, the Reformation and the French Revolution. The German sociologist Max Weber had a word for this process of interaction. One of the recurrent themes in his work was what Weber called *Veralltäglichung*. Usually but not quite accurately translated as “routinization,” the term refers to the incorporation of novelties into everyday practices. It might be rendered as “quotidianization,” “domestication,” or even “familiarization”—a choice that has the advantage of reminding us that the “defamiliarization” advocated by some European writers early in the twentieth century was precisely an attempt to combat this process and to force people to look at their everyday reality with fresh eyes.

THE PROBLEMS OF HEGEMONY AND RESISTANCE

The study of popular culture, like the study of the everyday, has sometimes been criticized by politically committed historians as a kind of escapism, a retreat from the political. In the case of some scholars, this

criticism may have been on target, but the links between politics, the everyday, and popular culture have been pointed out by a number of scholars.

Some of these scholars view popular culture as a means of political control or of “social” control as sociologists used to say. This theory goes back a long way. Roman elites thought that the people could be controlled by “bread and circuses.” In the late Middle Ages, Carnival was already viewed as a period of license that would enable society to function normally the rest of the time. Marx called religion the opium of the people, and this idea has been extended to include elements of secular culture such as escapist literature.

A more subtle explanation of the fact that governments and ruling classes have often more or less had their way, taken over from Antonio Gramsci by some historians of popular culture, is the idea of “cultural hegemony.” The essential idea is that the ruling class rules not, or not only, by naked force but rather by infecting other social groups with its values or worldview, so much so that ordinary people may come to accept the dominance of the church, the monarch, the aristocracy, and so on as unquestionable, as natural, as no more than common sense. Thus the popular image of the “three estates,” which circulated in Europe in the form of cheap woodcuts as well as in literary texts, portrayed society as a division of labor blessed by God between those who pray, those who fight, and those who work in the strict sense of the term. Subaltern or dominated groups often structure their world through models provided by the dominant group. In that sense the dominated groups may be described as “muted,” the term coined by the British anthropologist Shirley Ardener to describe the culture of one of the most important of these groups—women.

The principal alternative to the opium theory, however, is its exact opposite, the idea of popular culture as encouraging or underpinning resistance to changes initiated by governments or ruling classes. Open resistance sometimes took the form of rebellion, its forms or language colored by the local culture as many historians have argued with reference to the Peasants’ War in Germany; the “barefoot” rebellion of Normandy in 1639 (*Va-nu-pieds*); the revolt of the serfs, led by Pugachov, in eighteenth-century Russia; or the Luddite riots in early-nineteenth-century England.

Another form of resistance is more subtle. Muted groups often have a way of subtly changing the interpretation of the ideas or symbols handed down to them by the ruling classes. The creative appropriation discussed earlier, in the section on the idea of the pop-

ular, may be linked to what are sometimes described as “counterhegemonic strategies,” a phrase that may exaggerate the degree of self-consciousness and planning involved. Popular revolt, for instance, has not infrequently been justified in terms of official religious values. One famous example is that of the German peasants who rose against their masters in 1525 claiming that serfdom was unjust because Christ died for all men. Another is that of the Neapolitans who claimed that the Blessed Virgin (more exactly, a particular manifestation, the Virgin of the Carmine) was on their side in their revolt against Spanish rule in 1647. Alternatively, appeal may be made to a dead ruler for support against a living one, as the Norman rebels in 1639 appealed to Louis XII, who was said to have wept whenever he asked his people for money, against his successor Louis XIII, who had recently increased the burden of taxation. The songs, stories, and plays that treat outlaws or bandits as heroes, from Robin Hood to the mid-twentieth-century Sicilian Salvatore Giuliano, should not be forgotten because they justify resistance. No wonder then that Henry VIII was advised to forbid plays about Robin Hood on the grounds that they encouraged disobedience to royal officials.

To study popular resistance through rebellion alone, however, is like studying popular culture through its festivals, forgetting everyday life. Open revolt, however spectacular, was relatively rare. As the American political scientist James Scott was one of the first to emphasize, resistance to officials, landlords, or factory owners has often taken more everyday forms such as going slow, poaching, or sabotage, and the repertoire of these forms is part of popular culture—it is, after all, a form of knowledge and it may also have a symbolic meaning.

In any case, popular political culture was not just a matter of resistance. There were traditions of self-government at the village level in many parts of Europe, the German *Gemeinde* being a particularly well-known example. In Sweden the peasantry were represented in the Diet (*Riksdag*) as a separate estate of the realm. In many early modern cities, the craft guilds played a significant part in municipal politics. From the sixteenth century on, the role of ordinary people, especially urban males, in politics gradually became more important at the level of the state as well as the locality. The impetus to this increased political participation and political consciousness was one of the consequences of the Reformation. The religious wars in France, for example, and the revolt of the Netherlands against Philip II were civil wars in which local elites divided by religion appealed to the people for support, forming unstable coalitions with them.

Something similar happened in the course of the so-called revolutions of the 1640s, notably, the English Civil War. In all these cases, a crucial element in the mixture was print. Printed pamphlets produced by both sides to justify their cause had the long-term effect of involving ordinary people in supralocal (if not national) issues more deeply than before.

The French Revolution both fitted the pattern of the earlier revolts and went beyond it. Once again, divided elites appealed to the people, and once again, print played an important part in the movement. However, there was a larger role for ordinary people on this occasion. The new political culture was more egalitarian than its predecessors, witness the attempt at the elimination of distinctions of dress, for example. Festivals were organized on a grander scale than before, allowing more people to participate.

Retrospectively at least, 1789 appears as a watershed in the history of popular culture, especially since it more or less coincided with the first stages of the longer industrial revolution. Traditional revolts continued in rural areas, such as the Rebecca Riots in Wales or the War of the Demoiselles in the Ariege in 1829, in both of which cases male rebels dressed as women. In cities, on the other hand, we see increasing participation by ordinary people in large-scale political movements such as the revolutions of 1848 and 1917. There was also more popular participation in everyday politics, thanks to the gradual extension of the vote.

The extension of the vote was linked to the spread of schools, the spread of schools to the rise of newspaper reading, and this in turn to increased political awareness. In England universal education was made compulsory after the extension of the vote to artisans in 1867. As a Victorian cabinet minister joked, "We must educate our masters." Universal primary education was also necessary to inculcate loyalty to the nation-state, to turn "peasants into Frenchmen" as the American historian Eugen Weber put it. In Russia a literacy campaign followed the revolution, while posters and films also promoted "mass mobilization." We have reached the problem of "mass culture."

THE PROBLEM OF MASS CULTURE

It has often been argued or at least asserted that a major change in European culture took place around 1800. It was about that time that traditional popular culture was replaced or, more exactly, began to be replaced by mass culture. The culture that the folklorists were collecting and recording was in terminal decline.

Where popular culture "grew from below," to employ the incisive formulation of Dwight Macdonald, "Mass Culture is imposed from above."

Discussions of "mass culture," at their height between the 1930s and the 1960s, present two problems in particular. In the first place, description, narrative, and analysis were closely linked to critique, to rejection. The critique was often formulated in terms of inauthenticity or spuriousness. Mass culture was viewed not as a culture but as an absence of culture or an anticulture. The intellectuals who criticized mass culture viewed the masses as the "other," in a way not so very different from earlier condemnations of "superstition," "license" or disorder.

In the second place, there was the problem of nostalgia, of idealizing or romanticizing earlier forms of popular culture from different periods. For example in *The Uses of Literacy*, a study of publications and entertainments such as magazines, popular music, and television, the English critic Richard Hoggart contrasted the "candy-floss world" of the 1950s, with its "sex in shiny packets," with what he described as an "older order," the more authentic working-class culture of his youth in Leeds in the 1930s. Needless to say, other critics located the golden age of popular culture considerably earlier than Hoggart, in 1900, for example, or in 1800. Take the music hall or its French or German equivalents at the end of the nineteenth century. Does this new institution exemplify the creativity of popular culture or, on the contrary, the rise of a mass culture turning ordinary people into passive spectators (as television would later be said to do)? The history of spectator sports such as boxing (institutionalized in England by the eighteenth century) and horse racing (institutionalized by the seventeenth century) leads to similar conclusions.

If only homemade culture qualifies as "popular," while commercialized culture is mass culture, then the latter has a much longer history than is usually admitted. In England, France, and elsewhere, the eighteenth century has been described as the age of the first "consumer society" in the sense that certain manufactured goods, such as clothes and furniture, were now cheap enough for ordinary people to buy. As for commercialized entertainment, one need look no farther for it than the theater of the fairground in Paris and elsewhere or the races at Newmarket. But why stop in the eighteenth century? The rise of the permanent theater in the late sixteenth century in London and Madrid gave opportunities to Shakespeare and Lope de Vega, but all the same it was commercialized and passive entertainment for a broad section of the urban population. The prevalence of print was already allowing "stars" of the entertainment

world to emerge, among them the Londoners Richard Tarlton, the clown, and John Taylor, the waterman-poet. Both men knew how to add to their reputation with publicity stunts, such as dancing all the way from London to Norwich or sailing from London to York. Does this mean that mass culture had already arrived by 1600?

A more precise and so a more useful concept than mass culture is that of a “culture industry,” central to the Frankfurt school of critical sociology. The industrial revolution, so it is argued, led to the mass production of culture. To be more precise, it led to a proliferation of standardized objects such as cheap prints, still cheaper in the age of the steam press than they had been in the early modern period. According to Marx, mass production led to the transformation of the people into the masses.

In contrast to Marx and the Marxists of the Frankfurt school, some late-twentieth-century analysts of popular culture, notably Michel de Certeau, emphasized the freedom of individual consumers to resist mass culture, for example, by making their own selection from the mass-produced objects available to them and by endowing these objects with personal meanings. Some of the British youth cultures or subcultures of the 1970s, such as the Rastas, mods, and punks mentioned in an earlier section, exemplify this process with particular clarity. However, the style of

these rebellious subcultures has in turn been incorporated by the producers of mass culture, notably in the garment industry.

In any case the training of children was also standardized in the, nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the rise of compulsory school attendance in one European country after another, replacing informal methods of instruction in the family, the field, or the workshop by a more official, formal, or institutional culture. The British anthropologist Ernest Gellner described this process as the rise of “universal high culture.” It might be more exact to speak of an attempt to introduce pupils to a high culture that was national or Western rather than local. The standardizing or leveling tendencies of the schools were reinforced by those of youth organizations such as the Hitler-Jugend and the Russian Komsomol, founded in a fascist and a communist country, respectively, in the twentieth century and an integral part of what has been called the “propaganda state.” In the USSR in the 1920s, for example, the regime favored revolutionary songs and the patriotic music of Glinka and Tchaikovsky over traditional folk music.

All the same, in practice culture was also shaped by class. E. P. Thompson was a sharp critic of the traditional view of culture as the expression of communal values, thus privileging shared meanings over

conflicts of meaning. Ironically, he has himself been criticized for the communitarian model of worker's culture that underlies his famous *Making of the English Working Class*. To go beyond this communitarian model, it may be useful to turn to Pierre Bourdieu, whose ethnography of contemporary France stressed the extent to which the bourgeoisie and the working classes have each defined themselves in contrast to the other. Was this also the case in nineteenth-century England? To the argument that schools introduce high culture to everyone, Bourdieu replies by stressing the hierarchy of schools and other institutions of higher education and the inequality of access to institutions at the top of the ladder. In other words, universal education did no more than replace one form of cultural stratification with another, while the cultural hegemony of the elite persists.

The culture of the school can also be resisted, a process described by Paul Willis in a study of working-class male adolescents in Birmingham in the 1970s. However, resistance had its price. The rebels who did not take school seriously ended up in unskilled working-class jobs.

POSTINDUSTRIAL OR POSTMODERN CULTURE

Studies of the postindustrial or postmodern age have important implications for historians of contemporary popular culture. The increase in leisure, whether voluntary (owing to a reduction of working hours) or enforced (owing to unemployment) obviously has

important cultural consequences. So does the late-twentieth-century globalization of culture. It undermines the nineteenth-century nationalization of cultures, reducing cultural variety in the world as a whole while at the same time increasing choices at the level of the individual and leading to cultural hybridization on a scale and at a speed previously unknown. The decline in the importance of literacy in an age of television and home computers is also of great significance for the future history of popular culture. Of the changes in progress in the 1990s, however, the one most central to the theme of this essay is the breakdown of the old barriers between elite and popular cultures. It is the inverse of the movement of withdrawal in the early modern period, discussed above. Almost everyone watched the same television programs, for instance, and thus participated in a common culture, even if many minorities—not only elites—had a second culture of their own.

In the last few years of the twentieth century, a certain reaction among historians against the idea of popular culture arose. To some extent this reaction was justified by the crude dichotomies sometimes employed in the past. However, this response may also be a projection onto the past of the situation in which, to quote Susan Sontag, "the distinction between 'high' and 'low' culture seems less and less meaningful." Late-twentieth-century analysts perceived a danger that historians of the early twenty-first century would forget the existence of the barriers of birth, wealth, and education that were so important in the cultural history of Europe in the previous five centuries or more.

See also other articles in this section.

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HIGH CULTURE



Arthur Mitzman

Although there is no consensus among historians as to the definition of high culture, for many the term evokes the ivory tower of art for art's sake, mandarin aversion to raucous public entertainments, and high-brow disdain for politics. Because of this assumption of a willed distance from mundane, everyday life, elective affinities between high culture and the normal concerns of social history seem lacking. Where social historians have dealt with it, they have been more preoccupied with its relevance to the broader agendas of social history—that is, popular culture, demographic trends, or institutional intermediaries for cultural formation like schools and publishing houses—than with its contents, which they have left to specialists in literary and intellectual history. Under the influence of postmodern theory, in the late 1980s and 1990s social historians turned away from questions of social stratification and power toward broadly cultural matters of gender, textuality, print culture, and identity. This shift, however, has not increased their professional interest in the conventional terrain of high culture.

Nonetheless, the standard references to “culture” in modern European history link it to high rather than popular culture and consistently show high culture besmirched with political and social involvement. In general many of the turning points in the evolution from ancien régime to modern society have been associated, rightly or wrongly, with high culture. In Germany the term is used in the romantic nationalist defense of German *Kultur*—whether against Latin civilization, as in Jakob Burckhardt's title *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (1860; *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*), or, after 1872, against Rome-centered Catholicism in Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* (cultural war). In Belgium the revolutionary birth of the nation in 1830 was triggered by an opera performance, a high culture ritual. In France conservative enemies of the French Revolution attributed that upheaval to the anti-Christian rationalism of the High Enlightenment. A century later the concept of the “intellectuals” was inseparable from the intervention

of creators of high culture, like Anatole France, Marcel Proust, and Émile Zola, who defended Alfred Dreyfus in the “affair” that led to the definitive separation of church and state in the Third Republic. To the extent that most of these political events involved social conflict and that the various movements of high culture implicated in those events were shaped by the rapidly changing social institutions, ideologies, and mentalities of the modern era, “high” culture merits scrutiny by social historians.

The significance of high culture for historians is here limited to its meaning in modern Europe from the Renaissance to the twenty-first century. Assuming the relevance of certain literary, anthropological, sociological, and depth-psychological perspectives, this discussion proceeds from four theoretical points of departure: Friedrich Nietzsche's distinction in *The Use and Abuse of History* between celebratory, “monumental” high culture and negative, satiric, parodistic, deprecatory, “critical” high culture; the Weberian concept of an ongoing rationalization and centralization of all aspects of society; the Freudian concept—not altogether unrelated to the Weberian one—of culture as sublimation of instinctual impulse; and Pierre Bourdieu's notion of “cultural capital.” Frameworks for the discussion are the dialectical relation between “high” and “low” in Western culture, as discussed in anthropologically informed literary theory; Robert Muchembled's notion of a *mission civilisatrice* (civilizing mission) directed at the lower orders of society by the social strata embodying the high culture; and the complex question, provocative to intellectual historians, sociologists, and social historians alike, of the relation between high culture, cultural capital, educational institutions, ideologies, and intellectual paradigms, which might be called the question of the sociology of knowledge.

The first section of this article distinguishes the anthropological notion of culture from high culture. It differentiates between high culture's monumental and critical sides and between modern secular and premodern religious high cultures, tracing the histori-

cally shifting boundaries between “high” and “low.” The second section discusses the various underpinnings of modern secular high culture. On the one hand are the religious and psychological bases for the evolving opposition of high and low; on the other are the institutional and ideological bases of that distinction in the culture of the modern world. This section also posits the paradoxical blurring of high and low in art, literature, and music. The third section presents the increasing predominance of critical elements in the secular high culture of the modern era in terms of the emergence of formal criteria—the autonomization of thought and aesthetics, bohemia, and abstraction—and concludes with a summary of the critical theory of the Frankfurt school. The final section focuses on the paradoxical relationships between autonomization and universities as cultural monuments, between postmodernism and political economy, and between high culture and cultural capital.

SOME DISTINCTIONS

Anthropologists view culture as the totality of that part of the human environment that has been more or less consciously created by humankind. Since 1970 this notion of culture largely has been taken over by both cultural and social historians. Agricultural systems and implements, ideologies, cities, architectural styles, automobiles, information technology, poems, weapons of mass destruction are all, as conscious creations, expressions of human culture.

A narrower meaning of culture excludes from such creations those that are indispensable, or at least materially useful, for human survival and focuses on those that are viewed by the society that produced or inherited them as agreeable. Such creations are useful in the nonmaterial sense of being edifying or pleasing to eye, ear, or mind. On what basis within this latter category is the historian to distinguish between high and low? On the one hand, any distinction between high and low culture remains an artificial construction based on the values of those who make the distinction rather than on an evidential reality. On the other hand, historical analysis of the contents of such constructions in particular societies has yielded many answers to the question of the sociology of knowledge.

With this paradox in mind, a workable definition of high culture is that which signifies the spiritual, intellectual, and aesthetic achievements viewed by the hegemonic strata of a particular society as worthy of emulation and continuance. This definition appears to stress the monumental, self-celebratory side of culture; but to understand the concept it is crucial

to realize that a critical, satiric aspect has frequently accompanied it, even been integrated into it.

Although high cultures are normal in the history of civilization, arguably Western society since the Renaissance is a unique case. In most of the world’s major civilizations, the monumental aspects have predominated and have been inseparable from religious traditions, rituals, and beliefs cultivated by either a priestly caste or a religiously colored, bureaucratic mandarin. Such civilizations, including ancient Egypt, Confucian China, and the Christian Middle Ages, were stratified so sharply by sacralized social privilege and distinction, frequently taking the form of caste systems, that specifically cultural differences between high and low were usually less important than the social ones embedded in sacred hierarchies of power and privilege. For example, medieval Europe had two parallel high cultures, that of the feudal aristocracy, based on a religiously sanctioned code of chivalry, and that of the church, which monopolized literacy and intellectual debate. Nonetheless, even in the Christian Middle Ages parodies and inversions of both the clerical and the aristocratic cultures originated in and supplemented the high cultural heritage. The musical play-inversion of rites and hierarchies, *la fête de l’âne* (the feast of the ass), which introduced an ass into the church as bishop, was performed by apprentice clergy in cathedrals during the ten-day holiday after Christmas. The vernacular masterpieces of Boccaccio, Chaucer, and Dante ridiculed the vice and folly of the powerful as well as of the common people of the medieval world.

In the Western version of high culture that developed between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries, the hegemonic strata came to distinguish themselves by their identification with and support for literary, artistic, musical, and intellectual achievements of an increasingly nonreligious character. The gradual disappearance of a religiously sanctioned hierarchical social order, together with the accelerating degree of social mobility, blurred social contrasts that formerly were taken for granted. A shopkeeper who became a wealthy banker was avid for the insignia of distinction, and an aristocrat who fell on bad times no longer was guaranteed privileged status by birth and title alone. In this context the contrast between those associated with the achievements of the secular high culture and those associated by idiom, taste, and mentality with the culture of the common people became more important. The common people were assumed to have a merely customary, contingent, or mercenary character, viewed as base or barbaric, expressive of a low popular or mass culture. But the high culture that was the fruit of family values and education and that per-

mitted identification with the hegemonic strata—Bourdieu’s “cultural capital”—became an important supplement to economic capital.

Paradoxically, however, in the contemporary world the concepts of high and low culture appear more and more difficult to distinguish, particularly since the development of modern media. A clear-cut distinction between the elite and the popular in cinema and television is hard to find, and the impact on culture of the diffusion of texts and images through the Internet has further complicated matters. The inexpensive reproduction of art and music has led some critics to repudiate the mass diffusion of such works as inauthentic, reserving the notion of high culture for works and performances that are created and appreciated directly, without electronic or other means of reproduction or amplification. Walter Benjamin, for example, distinguished original works of art from their reproductions by the “aura” attached to the original.

This problem of shifting boundaries between high and low is, of course, anything but new. There are many historical examples of cultural artifacts, once considered “elite,” that became “popular” and vice versa. “Classics” easily have become popularized under certain circumstances, for example, through the films or musicals that have brought works of Victor Hugo, George Bernard Shaw, or William Shakespeare to the masses. Paradoxically, many of the plays and novels that have become part of the “high” culture heritage, including those of the three men just mentioned, were originally presented to the public in theaters and imprints intended for a popular audience. Indeed the source of modern dramaturgy lies in the vernacular mystery plays of the Middle Ages that, though originating in the clergy, became a phenomenon of the urban lay culture by the early fourteenth century. Most of the survivals from past cultures, such as Gothic cathedrals, the works of the Greek philosophers, the writings of Dante, Boccaccio, and Chaucer, revered since the eighteenth century by those who viewed them as testimonies to the sublimity of the human spirit, blurred the distinction between elite and popular.

As the automatic sacralization of power and privilege that characterized the Middle Ages was called into question, it became desirable and necessary for the ruling strata to add cultural distinction to the other attributes of power. The bases of such questioning multiplied in the modern era. The Reformation, which at least at a spiritual level denied hierarchy; the mercantile individualism of the urban cultures; the rationalism spurred by feudal absolutism; and after the French Revolution, the democratic ideologies of na-

tionalism and socialism—all undermined the religiously endorsed hierarchies that shaped most of Western culture.

Thus the modern concept of a high culture, which links the cultivation of aesthetic, intellectual, and ethical sensibilities to a secular worldview, has been coterminous with the postmedieval evolution of literate elites, whose social hegemony depended, in their eyes, on their capacity to distinguish themselves culturally from inferiors. Cultural (as distinct from social) contempt for what was “low” or popular became increasingly evident in Renaissance and baroque Europe among an increasingly literate and luxury-loving aristocracy, who disdained the rituals, beliefs, and idioms of common people, physical labor, and apart from the city-states of northern Italy and Flanders, commercial activity. Cultural contempt also appeared in the value the subsequent bourgeois society placed on brainpower and the refinement of feeling as opposed to muscle power and violent emotion.

THE EVOLUTION OF SECULAR HIGH CULTURE

Religion and psyche. Although the concept of a secular high culture became common coin only in the modern world, its origins are implicit in the historical development of morality and religious ideas. To the extent that religions evolved from local beliefs (shamanism, totemism, animism) linking the supernatural to natural phenomena into a belief in some kind of transcendent, rationally comprehensible, omniscient, and omnipotent being, the newer faith viewed the older one as of a lower order. Where distinctions were made between heavenly (divine or moral) and earthbound (diabolic or immoral) supernatural forces, the earlier religions were associated with the earthbound. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error* (1979) demonstrates this association in the operations of the fourteenth-century inquisition in a southern French town.

This high-low opposition, the basis of subsequent distinctions between high and low culture, occurs frequently in cultural history. The ancient Greek contrast between the gods of Olympus and their chthonic predecessors is one example, as are the various myths and legends of the classical and Christian traditions depicting a winged hero (Perseus, Saint George, or Saint Michael) rescuing a maiden from the clutches of a multiheaded hydra or dragon associated with the underworld. Shakespeare’s opposition (in *The Tempest*) of Prospero and Caliban is a secularized variant on this: the cultivated seer versus the barbarian

“wild man.” Christianity’s denigration and suppression of medieval nature religions, whose traces in the countryside persisted well into the nineteenth century, is an example. Another instance is the scorn among austere and “elevated” Christian reformers for clerical corruption and for the compromises, such as cults of the saints and carnival festivals, the Catholic Church made with the older religious beliefs. Tied up with religious notions of a higher culture was a slow transformation of morality and notions about human sexuality. The development of conscience (the evolution from “shame” to “guilt” cultures) accompanied both the change in the psychological locus of religious conviction from matriarchal (natural) to patriarchal (heavenly) belief systems and, independent of the matriarchy-patriarchy split, the change in social ethic from aristocratic honor to bourgeois virtue. As Norbert Elias, following Freud, showed, this latter evolution also involved mounting repression of affects that might lead to gross behavior, violence, or uncontrolled sexuality (associated with the lower body) and an increased emphasis on civility, tolerance, and ratiocination (associated with the head).

This valorization of intellectual capacities in the medieval and early modern world was long associated with the concept of a “higher” Christian sublimity, both religious and aesthetic; but for the French mon-

archs of the seventeenth century, that valorization was a means to curb the grossness and impulsive violence of the court aristocracy. Later, it was a means for Deist bourgeois successors to the Christian-feudal tradition to establish their own cultural identity against that imposed by the old regime. One of the icons of European high culture, Mozart’s *The Magic Flute* (1791), provides an outstanding example of such a post-Christian religious identity. This opera reveals an artful integration of many of the themes of high versus low. It also shows the ambivalent relationship between the monumental and the critical sides of high culture characteristic of the era of the French Revolution and the dependence of the critical aspect on elements of the popular culture.

The Magic Flute demonstrates that the “superior” morality of high-culture Freemasonry was not simply directed against the “low” culture of the populace. To the contrary, the bird catcher Papageno, although given to buffoonery, is an emblem of virtue. Indeed the opera’s initial performance in 1791 took place in a popular theater, evidence that the enlightened bourgeois and the popular were not sharply separated at that time. Like Mozart’s other major operas, *The Marriage of Figaro* (1786) and *Don Giovanni* (1787), *The Magic Flute* sets the ethical standards of the enlightened bourgeois against the waning feudal-

clerical social order of the old regime as high versus low. In *The Marriage of Figaro*, Count Almaviva is trapped by his petit bourgeois majordomo and his long-suffering wife into giving up his licentious ways. In *Don Giovanni* the libidinous aristocrat is literally swallowed up by the underworld for his conscienceless sexual violence. *The Magic Flute* represents an early version of the moral consciousness of Europe's new middle-class culture, which in its Masonic form was more inclined to seek models in the religious rituals and consciousness of ancient Egypt than in those of classical antiquity.

Institutional and ideological bases of the evolution to a secular high culture. In general the notion of high culture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries prioritized a classical literature that began in Greek and Roman antiquity. This development was largely dependent on two interrelated cultural phenomena that some observers consider the basis of both nationalism and modern society as a whole: mass literacy and printing. For these achievements to become

widespread—ultimately catalyzing the modern distinction between high and low culture—four changes were necessary: the triumph of political centralization over feudal anarchy, the imposition of uniform vernacular languages on the innumerable patois of Europe's regions, the valuing of literature written in a uniform language, and an organized educational system accompanied by some kind of merchant capitalism. Culturally speaking, these various aspects of the ongoing rationalization and centralization of social power constitute the unity of the era of European history from the Renaissance to the twenty-first century.

During this period the consciousness of a distinction between high and low culture flourished, but its origins can be traced back to the various vertical culture clashes of the late medieval period. Elias, in his theory of the “civilizing process,” focused on the efforts of French royal courts to curtail the violence and incivility of aristocratic vassals by importing standards and “manner books” from the more advanced courts of Renaissance Italy. But Robert Muchembled and others applied Elias's idea more broadly to the



THE MAGIC FLUTE

As *The Magic Flute* begins, the hero, Tamino, who will subsequently be initiated into an Egyptianate religion of sun-worshipping Deists, is chased by a huge serpent, a monster of the underworld. Tamino is rescued by three female servants of the Queen of the Night, who gives him the task of rescuing her daughter from the clutches of Sarastro, a villainous usurper and successor to her husband as high priest of the solar circle. The opera makes clear that the Queen of the Night, not Sarastro, is the true villain. Analysis of the text and music of the opera and the backgrounds of its collaborators—particularly Mozart and Emanuel Schikaneder, who commissioned the opera, signed his name to the libretto, and played the role of Papageno in the initial production—suggests that the solar cult is a thinly disguised version of Masonic beliefs and rituals. Late-eighteenth-century Austrian Freemasonry, to which all the important collaborators belonged, embraced High Enlightenment Deist ideas of a supererethical monotheism deemed compatible with the moral teachings of most major world religions.

The conflict between Sarastro and the Queen of the Night is thus a conflict between high and low, that is, between heavenly and terrestrial, light and dark, sun and moon, true religion (Deism or Freemasonry) and false (by implication Catholicism). Overlapping these is the symbolic opposition between male (patriarchal) and female (matriarchal) principles. Women are not condemned altogether as evil and irrational—the daughter of the Queen of the Night is initiated into the mysteries of the cult alongside the hero—but the opera follows Enlightenment stereotypes in viewing them as intellectually dependent on men and given to evil passions when outside the male controlling influence. When, after the evil female does everything in her power to murder Sarastro, saying, “My heart is seething with hellish vengeance,” Sarastro, foils all plots against him, revealing the generous wisdom of a philosopher-king in dealing with her: “Within these sacred portals, revenge is unknown . . . enemies are forgiven.” Thus does the opera show the superiority of reason over violent emotion.

history of the early modern epoch. Muchembled, in *Popular Culture and Elite Culture in France, 1400–1750* (1985), demonstrated that similar attitudes characterized the efforts of the church to Christianize the common people in the late medieval and early modern periods. In this case, however, the repression of the pre-Christian belief system on the grounds of superstition, immorality, and ungodly violence actually involved a diffusely conceived and executed “civilizing offensive” of a Christian culture, which saw itself as higher, against a partly pagan popular culture, which Christians viewed as lower. This offensive mission was part and parcel of the valorization of intellectual and ethical capacities and of a higher Christian sublimity, both religious and aesthetic, visible in the philosophy of Nicolas de Malebranche and François de Fénelon and in the music of Johann Sebastian Bach and Marc-Antoine Charpentier. In baroque art, for example, in the work of Nicolas Poussin, huge canvases commissioned by the church expressed Christian sublimity through biblical subjects. Other paintings evoked for royal and feudal patrons heroic themes from classical antiquity, themes with which the aristocratic elites of the period identified.

As in Mozart’s operas, comparable religious values with non-Christian or post-Christian presuppositions permeated the new bourgeois culture. Nonetheless, a certain ambiguity, also evident in *The Magic Flute*, characterized the relation of high to low in the modern era both before and after the French revolutionary watershed.

FROM THE “MONUMENTAL” PREMODERN TO THE “CRITICAL” MODERN

Even under the Old Regime, a number of important writers later associated with high culture, such as François Rabelais, the poet François Villon, and the playwrights Shakespeare and Molière, produced a major part of their oeuvre with little regard for the monumentalist norms that guided the work of most of their fellow creators. Genial creators made as much use of popular language and legend as of high-culture form. This tendency continued in the romantic era, for example, in the “grotesque,” carnivalesque aspects of Hugo’s oeuvre, and in the twentieth century, in works by James Joyce. In the work of the seventeenth-century English poet John Donne, religious sublimity coexists with an erotic passion that certainly escapes the confines of Christian sublimity. Donne’s poems suggest the complexity of the high culture of the time and anticipate the coexistence of the sacred and the

erotic in the work of the nineteenth-century French poet Charles Baudelaire. Other examples include the complex relationship between the sixteenth-century love stories and religious poetry of Marguerite de Navarre and the mingling of the sacred and the erotic in the poetry of Elizabeth Barrett Browning.

During and after the demise of the Old Regime, this complex relation of the producers of high culture to the values and dogmas of the social elites that supported them intensified. Coinciding with the political and economic modernization of Europe, the aesthetic triumphs of high culture in the two centuries after the French Revolution reveal that the creative figures of modernism were elaborately connected both to the official morality of the bourgeois society that was their frequent social origin and source of support and to the “underworld” morality and perspectives of the popular culture normally denigrated by the dominant bourgeoisie. On the one hand, the developing high culture of Western art, literature, music, and social and philosophical speculation has been caught up in an ongoing professionalization and autonomization such that artists, thinkers, and musicians have created increasingly for their peers rather than for the economically and politically powerful. On the other hand, their social ties to the powerful have been frequently attenuated by a profound criticism of official morality and by a felt need, both ideological and creative, to infuse the common people with culture. This latter impulse was shaped by two mass ideologies, sometimes compatible and sometimes at loggerheads, that accompanied the processes of modernization: nationalism and socialism.

Following the French Revolution, a new social framework allowed an uneasy cohabitation of the trend toward professionalization with the impulse toward cultural populism. Via the impersonal marketplace and the individualization of social relations, the cultural creators gained increasing independence from the hegemonic classes. The patronage of wealthy nobles, royal courts, and high churchmen had been embedded in the hierarchical society of the old regime along with the aristocratic salons in which writers, artists, and musicians often found their wealthy patrons. The telltale sign of a sea change in the relation of the artists and intellectuals to society, and thereby in the significance of high culture, was the replacement, during the period of postrevolutionary romanticism, of the salon with the coterie of independent, like-minded artists and writers. Various circles of romantic novelists, poets, artists, and critics collected around the Schlegels in Germany, around William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge and later around Lord Byron and Percy Bysshe Shelley in En-

gland, and around Hugo and his friends in France. These circles were all premised on the material possibility of earning a living as a writer or artist directly through the marketplace. In *Illusions perdues* (1837–1843), Honoré de Balzac portrayed brilliantly the functioning of coteries and salons in the era of the French Restoration (1815–1830). Salons and elite patronage never completely lost their influence over the production of high culture, and aristocratic libertinism and love of luxury were important elements in the aesthetic critique of bourgeois society by high culture poets and intellectuals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly in the art for art's sake movement. But after romanticism the institutional frameworks inherited from the Old Regime waned steadily in influence; the popular press, cost reductions in print technology, and university positions enabled artists and writers to determine the form and content of their creativity. Although social paradigms continued to be important in shaping individual creativity, they were attenuated when transmitted through the marketplace.

An important side effect of this relative independence from the taste and desires of elite patrons was the creation of bohemian subcultures, as in Schwabing, Montmartre and the Latin Quarter in Paris, and Greenwich Village and SoHo in New York, that nurtured communities of relatively free artists, writers, and composers. It is to a considerable degree within such subcultures that the two principal and often contradictory tendencies of modern thought and aesthetics—professionalization and autonomization, and cultural populism, making art and ideas the advocate of the suffering masses—have manifested themselves.

Historically, painters and sculptors frequently were of humble origins. In the Middle Ages, because of a tight association between traditional artisan crafts and the paintings and sculptures, largely of wood, later revered as high art in museums, the creators almost never signed their names to their work. This changed only in the Renaissance culture of the northern Italian cities, such as early thirteenth-century Siena, where individual painters were becoming recognized. More than two centuries later the transformation of anonymous artisan into artist was repeated in the metamorphosis of the goldsmith Benvenuto Cellini into a renowned sculptor.

Despite their individuality, Renaissance artists had little room to determine their own subjects, and the content of post-Renaissance visual art continued to reflect the monumentalist, self-celebratory tastes of the ruling elites. The baroque and classical painters of the ancien régime, uniformly subsidized by elite patrons, portrayed scenes from antiquity and religious

history intended to augment the grandeur of church, state, and feudality. In the Netherlands, where a burgher elite ruled over the newly liberated eleven provinces, artists portrayed bourgeois interiors, the peasantry, and everyday life but in conformity with a new paradigm. The important exception in the history of French painting is the seventeenth-century work of the brothers Antoine, Louis, and Mathieu Le Nain, who also painted the peasantry. This aspect of their work was long forgotten and was finally brought to public attention in the 1850s by the writer Champfleury, a friend of the realist painter Gustave Courbet. In general artists remained dependent on elite patronage. Even in the French revolutionary epoch, older painters such as Jacques-Louis David continued the classical style and its antique subject matter, merely bending its significance toward the celebration of the new value of civic liberty. Younger artists like Antoine-Jean Gros and Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres adapted the existing style to the contemporary situation, particularly in the celebration of Napoleonic military valor.

With the exceptions of the preimpressionist experiments with light and color by the romantic landscape artist J. M. W. Turner and the Pre-Raphaelite circle in England, the important nineteenth-century movements and innovations in the plastic arts were French. After Waterloo, French romantic artists, such as Eugène Delacroix and Théodore Géricault, began to emphasize their own styles and tastes. But apart from his well-known allegorical painting *Liberty Leading the People* (1831), the closest Delacroix came to depicting ordinary people was his romanticized gypsies and his colorful scenes of North African life. Although the new bourgeois elites paid considerable sums for portraits of themselves and their families, paintings of ordinary Europeans, most of whom were peasants in the nineteenth century, were rare before 1848. Only artists with an engraving background, like Honoré Daumier, Grandville, and Charles Johannot, regularly expressed cultural populism through lithographs in popular reviews and books, thus reflecting the social and political radicalism of artisan revolutionaries and democratic revolutions.

Modern art began around 1848 in the new school of realism represented by Courbet and Jean-François Millet. For the first time in France ordinary peasants became a common subject of paintings, as did circles of artists and writers, a clear sign of the developing autonomy and self-awareness of groups of creative figures. The cultural populism implicit in Courbet's work was representative of the brief revolutionary period in which it first appeared, but interestingly the genre of peasant paintings long outlived

the radicalism of the French Second Republic. The Bonapartist empire that followed derived its legitimacy from popular referenda, in which the support of the peasantry was crucial. As long as the peasants were depicted as long-suffering but not revolutionary, Courbet and his friends could continue to paint them. In other words, the shift from a radical to a conservative cultural populism, matching the transition from the Second Republic to the Second Empire, occurred largely unnoticed in the visual arts. A friend of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Baudelaire, Courbet made public his feelings about the Second Empire in 1871, when, as president of the Paris Commune's fine arts committee, he ordered the destruction of a major Bonapartist symbol, the Vendôme column, a gesture for which he was punished after the commune was crushed.

The public greeted realism in painting with the same kind of incomprehension that has greeted most artistic innovations since the French Revolution. Courbet was dubbed the "leader of the school of ugliness," partly because of the somber tints of his palette and partly because of the unlovely character of the rural

population he so "realistically" presented. Although impressionism, the artistic movement that followed realism, had a brighter palette, it was not given a better reception. Although the countryside depicted by impressionists was frequently the lush, summery landscape of southern France, and the women represented usually bourgeois beauties on holiday, the painters' brush strokes and other techniques made a picture coherent at a certain distance but incomprehensible when looked at up close. Impressionism took the first steps toward abstraction of color and form, and this emphasis on the formal aspects of art pleased philistine tastes no more than had realism.

Impressionism's new formal concerns had double origins, one social, the other technical. Socially, with the increasing autonomization of art, artists produced for one another, which, as with classical music throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, made contemporary art increasingly inaccessible to the contemporary lay public. Technically, the artists in the last third of the nineteenth century, the era of impressionism, confronted the fact that, for the first time in history, a machine—the camera—could more

accurately reproduce visual reality than the most talented painter. This mimetic aspect of the new technology encouraged artists to focus on what the camera could not do, organize color and form not imitatively but imaginatively. Moreover at the end of the nineteenth century the emphasis on time as a constituent element of reality, for example, by Henri-Louis Bergson and subsequently by Proust, was picked up by impressionist artists in a way that prefigured cubism and futurism's efforts to represent change and motion in two-dimensional canvases. During roughly the same time span (1880–1930), symbolist, surrealist, and expressionist art attempted to depict emotional states that were only loosely related to visual reality. The terminus of this increasing distance from traditional representation was abstract expressionism. All these movements were partly the result of the autonomization of the plastic arts, partly the creative artist's

response to the camera, and partly reactions to the accelerating pace and complexity of social existence and the theories that reflected it.

Despite their trend to abstraction, many modern artists have been vitally concerned with the "social question." Vincent van Gogh and Camille Pissarro, both related to impressionism, showed such engagement in the nineteenth century, as did Pablo Picasso, one of the first cubists, and many French artists in the twentieth century. Other artists, particularly those associated with the *fin de siècle* symbolist movement, like Gustave Moreau and Puvis de Chavannes, continued to treat the classic themes of antique myths dear to the high culture notions of the bourgeoisie but with an effort to penetrate the myths' emotional significance. European surrealism would later make similar efforts. The admiration expressed by André Breton, a leading surrealist, a communist, and a Trots-

kyist, for Moreau's symbolist painting warns against any facile association of the more traditional high culture of the symbolist movement with bourgeois conservatism.

The social history of modern literature is in many ways similar to that of modern art. Literature experienced an increasing sense of independence from the dominant class whose values it was expected to represent. It too went through phases of romanticism, realism, and simultaneously with impressionism, naturalism. The tight connection between impressionism and naturalism is illustrated by the friendship between the founder of the naturalist school, Zola, and one of the principal impressionists, Paul Cézanne. Zola crafted one of his major novels, *L'oeuvre* (1886), around this relationship. With the exceptions of cubism and abstract expressionism, the other artistic movements mentioned—symbolism, futurism, surrealism, and expressionism—all had literary equivalents.

Literary romanticism was initially more important in Germany and England than in France; only in France did it parallel the development of romanticism in the visual arts. The common denominator of all romanticisms was their correspondence to the principal social and political trends between the French Revolution and the revolution of 1848. The literary high culture of the postrevolutionary epoch revealed the increasing weight of the critical as opposed to the monumental side of high culture. On the one hand, writers expressed the individualism of the liberal era both in their appreciation and emulation of individual genius, military or literary, and in their striving to earn their bread independent of official patronage. On the other hand, they also voiced the new sense of collectivism that emerged in that era. The circles of poets, critics, playwrights, and novelists, even when their social origins were aristocratic or upper bourgeois, echoed the revolutionary consciousness of the masses. They often cast this consciousness in the mold of nationalist sentiment, which was more common in Germany, or of the utopian strivings of artisan socialists, as in the social romanticism of some French writers, such as Eugène Sue, George Sand, Jules Michelet, and Pierre Leroux, in the 1840s. Both the individualist and collectivist values of the romantics fed their criticism of bourgeois conformity.

Technology and education helped popularize literature and reinforced authors' leanings toward cultural populism. Improvements in printing techniques made books and newspapers cheaper throughout the century. Economically, from the 1830s on writers like Balzac, Sand, Sue, Zola, and Charles Dickens published their novels in *feuilleton* installments, which provided a regular source of income. Ideologically, the

reactions of a more literate popular public sometimes had a radicalizing effect on authors.

Subsequent literary movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—realism and naturalism in particular—shed much of the diffuse social idealism and stylistic excesses of romanticism but retained and accentuated the romantic devotion to the craft of the artist, an aspect of the developing professionalization of cultural creation. They also accentuated the critical, parodistic, even subversive element in literature. Examples include the mid-century French novelist Gustave Flaubert, the poet Arthur Rimbaud, the playwright Alfred Jarry, and the French and German circles of expressionism, dadaism, and surrealism.

This critical element went deeper than merely siding with the popular victims of the new liberal order. Entangled within all of these movements from romanticism to naturalism and symbolism, writers liberated from upper-class patronage set themselves critically against the dominant liberal values of the nineteenth century. For some this meant a recourse to the remnants of Old Regime aristocratic values that were libertine and luxury-loving but also distinctly anti-utilitarian. Among those were the French school of *l'art pour l'art* (art for art's sake) as represented by Théophile Gautier and Baudelaire and in Germany the poetic circle of Stefan George. Writers such as Wordsworth and some of the German romantics immersed themselves in alternative religious conceptions that emphasized the "eternal recurrence" of the world of nature. In the juxtaposition of "natural harmony" to the jarring and depressing world of commerce and industry, a number of romantics, such as the historian Michelet, came close to expressing later ecological concerns.

Many creative figures of nineteenth- and twentieth-century high culture emerged from circles of rebellious bourgeois youth. Such circles peppered the social landscape from roughly the end of the eighteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century and fed the ongoing critique of the dominant values of the elites. The adolescent groups of friends, beginning with German, English, and French romanticism, imprinted oppositional values on a wide variety of important creative figures, from Wordsworth and Coleridge to the German expressionists and French surrealists. Flaubert was powerfully influenced by a group of adolescent intimates, which is reflected in his *L'éducation sentimentale* (1869). Oppositional values were at the heart of the German youth movement, which started in an elite Gymnasium in Berlin, and the student-based youth rebellion of the period 1965 to 1975.

A number of these themes—nature as an alternative to industrial society, the distance from liberal

utilitarian values, and an increasing appreciation of the sexual passions and an opposition to their repression in high Victorian culture—appear in the work of two Austrian writers of the late nineteenth century, Arthur Schnitzler and Hugo von Hofmannsthal, and in the work of two English novelists of the early twentieth century, E. M. Forster and D. H. Lawrence. In general the critical element in modern high culture wavered between this more profound, often philosophical dissent from its monumental, self-celebratory aspect and the cultural populist denunciation of social injustice.

This wavering shows up in the evolution, between 1930 and 1970, of the Frankfurt school, the group of German philosophers, sociologists, and psychoanalysts specifically associated with critical theory. Continuing the Hegelian-marxist tradition in German thought, most of the principal figures in this group focused, until the middle of World War II, on the critique of fascism as a fusion of traditional authoritarianism and monopoly capitalism in its anticommunist phase. During this period critical theory represented a sophisticated marxism that was nonetheless a version of cultural populism. The course of the war seems to have convinced many of them that the responsibility for modern barbarism lay deeper than any traditional leftist interpretation could account for. Indeed it was inherent in the Western notion of rationality, particularly in its empiricist, liberal, instrumental, and nondialectical forms. That rationality posited the domination of reason over nature and emotion and impeded empathy with human suffering. This turn took shape in a series of books and articles that began with Max Horkheimer's wartime *Eclipse of Reason* (1947) and a book he coauthored with Theodor Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (1947), which posed fundamental questions about the character of the rationalism propagated by the High Enlightenment. It continued to Herbert Marcuse's seminal works *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (1955) and *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). Following its transformation during World War II, the Frankfurt school provided an essential commentary on modern high culture, analyzing critically its philosophical presuppositions, condemning its ties to inhuman systems of exploitation and mass destruction, and defending and resuscitating its aesthetic protagonists who resisted its norms. It particularly defended poets and artists who refused the limitation on feeling and imagination mandated by the monumental, self-celebratory side of the "official" culture's instrumental rationalism.

The work of Jürgen Habermas carried the critical theory begun by Horkheimer and Adorno into the

late twentieth century. Habermas's work exhibits little of the specifically Hegelian, marxist, and Freudian presuppositions of his predecessors. Poststructuralist and postmodern theorists attacked those assumptions as "essentialist," that is, as presupposing—by positing the reality of abstract ideas like the dialectic, capitalism, and the id—some kind of real essence, a subject capable of historical action. Habermas attempted to recast critical theory on bases less susceptible to such attacks. He replaced the Frankfurt school's opposition between instrumental and dialectical reason with a differentiation between official and private discourse. This differentiation parallels the distinction, posed by the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, between the psychological analogues of society and community, *Kürwille* and *Wesenwille*. In the face of postmodern critiques of "essentialism," Habermas thus retained the utopian element in critical theory. In his view the expansion of those private spheres of discourse and their social underpinnings create a new normative basis for philosophy and "a community of needs and solidarity" as well as "a community of rights and entitlements" (Benhabib, 1986, pp. 339).

CONCLUDING PARADOXES

The extensive discussion of the historical interaction between the monumental-celebratory and the critical aspects of modern high culture leads to a related problem: the extremely complex tension between

- (1) processes of autonomization in the arts and the intellectual disciplines,
- (2) the institutionalizing of intellectual and cultural production in universities,
- (3) changing paradigms or discourses about literature, art, science, and society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
- (4) changes in modes of production and in the norms of political economy, and
- (5) high culture as the "legitimate culture" or the "cultural capital" (in Bourdieu's terms) of hegemonic elites.

Bourdieu attempted to order the paradoxical connection between the autonomization of the aesthetic sphere—the emphasis by the creators and appreciators of visual art, literature, and music on purely formal questions divorced from narrative, social, or ethical content—and the elites' use of the new formal criteria as a badge of their distinctive cultural prowess. The paradox is that this autonomization—initially in the social and economic frameworks of coteries, bohemian communities, and literary reviews—devel-

oped after the disintegration of the *ancien régime* as a symbol of the emancipation of writers and artists from aristocratic patronage. The emergence of autonomization coincided with a historically unprecedented outburst of criticism, by poets and other writers, of the new society that had afforded them this freedom. Among the devotees of art for art's sake were, in France, Gautier, Flaubert, Baudelaire, and Stéphane Mallarmé; in Germany, the George Kreis and Thomas Mann; and in England, Oscar Wilde. These artists frequently had only contempt for the high bourgeoisie, who a generation or two later embraced as sublime their separation of aesthetics from ethics and transmitted their works to posterity in deluxe bindings.

The institutional independence of poets, artists, and intellectuals was, however, historically circumscribed. It continued to exist for poets like Ezra Pound, William Butler Yeats, and T. S. Eliot and for novelists like Proust, Joyce, and Joseph Conrad until well after World War II. The social space of intellectual and artistic freedom remained open for philosophers and critics like Jean-Paul Sartre and Edmund Wilson until the mid-twentieth century. It is undeniable that most aesthetic production and virtually all critical work in philosophy and social thought in the late twentieth century was written, painted, sculpted, or composed by members of university or college faculties. A fundamental path for social historians of culture, then, is to trace and comprehend the development of new ties and new dependencies between, on the one hand, the intellectual and poet and, on the other, the economic and social power elites that control universities.

Flowing out of this dependency is a further question concerning the relationship, within the academic dispensation, between the autonomization of high culture production, the paradigms and ideological parameters that shape it from within, and the changes in the dominant mode of production that mold the perspectives of the powerful entrepreneurs and other public figures who govern the universities. For example, does a certain correspondence exist between the deconstructionist side of postmodern thought and the decentralizing production methods that since Henry Ford have swept global industrial centers? Do both reflect the triumph of a liberal or neoliberal worldview that emphasizes the individual and denies the collective? That worldview posits the need for "flexibility" of labor, condemns public spending, especially on the poor, and denies the "social question" even as it rejects structural thinking, "essences" and fixed "subjects," and demands the universal acceptance of "risk" and "chaos." This linking of postmodern and neoliberal perspectives has been resisted by

academic radicals, who argue that postmodernist aesthetics imply the transgression of conventional discourse. Moreover such radicals have purported to defy the individualism of neoliberal thought by pointing to the support of postmodernism for "identity studies," a field that deals with the values and interests of collectivities, particularly of ethnic and gender groups. Those hostile to the postmodernist position, however, have argued that this radical postmodernism touches on collectivities only as individual entities without intrinsic connection to humankind as a whole or to collective notions like class or nation that used to be considered an integral part of it. Thus they undermine any concept of a social justice applicable to all people and make it impossible to theorize a "just society." In the 1950s and 1960s American cold war propaganda agencies easily exploited and manipulated avant-garde aesthetic creations by covertly subsidizing individuals and organizations, anticipating the rupture between aesthetics and ethics in postmodernism. Thus the "transgression" of conventional ethics by the late-modernist autonomization of aesthetics may be quite compatible with the dominant liberal ideologies of the second half of the twentieth century.

An additional link between contemporary ideologies and postmodern high culture surfaces in information technology, which has inspired industrial and financial practices since Ford and has shaped the postmodern view of the world. Instantly downloading information onto the computer screen has conditioned automated production methods and the international financial market, and it also has encouraged the ahistorical and "playful" way of thinking of postmodern philosophers and literary critics. Technology has had another parallel impact on economy and high culture, the elimination of as many costly "permanent" positions as possible in factories and offices. The ease of subcontracting in computerized production has been mirrored in universities in a proliferation of poorly paid, nontenured positions and in the shifting of much professional production to underfunded and academically substandard junior colleges or branches of state universities. Finally, the postmodern dismissal (as "essentialist") of notions like "the nation" and "the working class" has coincided with the factual undermining of both phenomena by neoliberal globalization and computerization.

Merely granting the possibility of correspondences between the preconditions and precepts of postmodernism and those of neoliberal ideology raises two final questions for the social historian confronting contemporary high culture. What does the autonomization of aesthetics and intellectual disciplines, so bravely launched in the nineteenth century, signify in

an epoch in which the producers of art and thought may reflect, both in their organizational dependence and in their intellectual and aesthetic paradigms, the worldview underlying the current mode of industrial production and exchange? The second question flows from the observation that both the monumental and the critical aspects of high culture have always been

dependent on a notion of the present as imbedded in a continuum that moves between past and future. Given the symbiosis between the neoliberal celebration of the end of history and the virtual denial of history mandated by postmodern criticism and philosophy, are either of these aspects, particularly the critical, valid?

See also **The Medieval Heritage** (volume 1); **Secularization; Communications, the Media, and Propaganda** (volume 2); **Artists** (volume 3); **Belief and Popular Religion** (volume 5); and other articles in this section.

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MAGIC



Stuart Clark

The word “magic” has been in widespread use throughout modern European history as a label to designate social phenomena. Precisely what it designates, however, remains elusive, for neither social scientists nor social historians have succeeded in defining it. This is partly because what magic has signified has varied from age to age and context to context; it is a classic example of a concept whose meaning and application are always a function of local circumstances. For late-twentieth-century historians, though not for many in the past, this makes any attempt to define it in a transhistorical manner not merely difficult but undesirable. Partly, too, magic has most often been something disapproved of, and “magical” a term of refusal. This is especially true in the sphere of religion, where magic has invariably been a concept employed either to stigmatize competitor faiths or to proscribe beliefs or behavior deemed to be irreligious. It is in this sense that magic has been the “other” of Judeo-Christian religious tradition from biblical times through to the present day. Western science has also had a major part in investing magic with oppositional meanings, in this case between the cogency and rationality of orthodox scientific or medical practice on the one hand and the error and irrationality of the magician on the other. Here magic has mostly been bad or pseudo science, as defined by the scientific establishment of the day.

One striking consequence of this for the social historian is that it can be difficult to find anyone in the past who accepted “magic” as a correct description of what they thought or did, let alone any who called themselves “magicians.” A glaring example comes from the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. The two major leaders of Protestantism, Martin Luther and John Calvin, along with all their colleagues and successors, argued that Catholicism itself was merely a form of magic, with its many miracles, its exorcisms and votive prayers for the dead, and the transubstantiations of the Mass as the most prominent examples. One could hardly expect their Catholic contemporaries—or, indeed, Catholic historians of

the Reformation since—to agree with this. But such has been the power behind this particular piece of labeling that only in the late twentieth century do we realize that to talk about pre-Reformation religion as “magical” is to use an essentially Protestant vocabulary.

There are some important exceptions to this principle, as we shall see; the Renaissance magus, the ceremonial magicians of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, and even the magical healers and diviners of the European countryside have not lacked self-recognition or been solely defined by those hostile to them. Nevertheless, magic has mostly been a term of attribution and its social history must, in consequence, be a history of how that attribution came to be made and how it has been contested. Some people have indeed been magicians and have practiced a magic they themselves have defined and developed. Usually, however, it is a question of which individuals or groups have used the concept of magic to label other individuals or groups and for what reasons.

Naturally, scholars too have indulged in the same labeling. The early academic history of anthropology in Europe, for example, was marked by the adoption, under the influence of the two traditions already mentioned, of distinctions between magic and religion and between magic and science that were almost entirely stipulative and dismissive of the magical practices of other cultures. Pioneer anthropologists like James Frazer and Edward Tylor tended to conceive of magic in terms of ignorance of natural causes and fear of inexplicable phenomena and to call any practice “magical” if it appeared, in their eyes, to control by supernatural means what could not be controlled by technological ones. Some historians of pre-industrial European society and its culture have taken the same view, interpreting popular festivals, for instance, as attempts to cope magically with technological inadequacy and its consequent emotional tensions. Historians of science, too, have not always been careful to avoid the Whiggish sentiment that many aspects of medieval and early modern science were

magical in nature. By the 1990s, however, to describe an aspect of any culture, past or present, as magical was thought to beg serious questions. Indeed, magic has come to be seen as a cultural construction, there being nothing in our attitudes to ourselves or to the world that is inherently magical. Once again, then, the task of social history becomes that of understanding how this construction came about and how it has been utilized and discussed in various sociocultural settings.

THE RENAISSANCE MAGUS

The intellectuals of the Renaissance are the most significant of those who very definitely enunciated their own theory of magic. Indeed, they had a very highly developed notion of the seriousness and importance of magic, which they called *magia*. With an illustrious pedigree stretching back to ancient Persia and to the mythical Egyptian philosopher Hermes Trismegistus, it signified the pursuit by adepts of a highly elevated and esoteric form of wisdom based on the perceived presence in the world of mystical patterns and intelligences possessing real efficacy in nature and in human affairs. In the cases of the Italian Neoplatonist Marsilio Ficino and the German occultist Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, causation was seen in terms of an organically related hierarchy of powers. Influences descended from the angelic or intellectual world of spirits to the stellar and planetary world of the heavens, which in turn governed the behavior of earthly things and their physical changes. The magician was, in consequence, someone who sought to ascend to a knowledge of these superior powers and then accentuate their normal workings by drawing them down artificially to produce wonderful effects. This conception of magic was reinforced by the further idea that man was a microcosm and that the proportions and harmony of his body therefore resembled those of the universe. Hence the well-known depictions of the human frame with the arms and legs outstretched to meet the circumference of a perfect circle.

There is no doubt that men like Ficino and Agrippa, and other magicians of this kind, like the Italian Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and the Welshman John Dee, thought of their studies as the highest form of natural philosophy. For them magic had only positive connotations. But it is also easy to see why they aroused the hostility of churchmen, who often saw their work as demonic. *Magia* was as much an act of mystical illumination as a piece of science; here the magician aimed at a priestlike role and his wonders competed with the miracles of religion. In the early



AGRIPPA ON MAGIC

Magick is a faculty of wonderfull vertue, full of most high mysteries, containing the most profound contemplation of most secret things, together with the nature, power, quality, substance, and vertues thereof, as also the knowledge of whole nature, and it doth instruct us concerning the differing, and agreement of things amongst themselves, whence it produceth its wonderfull effects, by uniting the vertues of things through the application of them one to the other, and to their inferior sutable subjects, joyning and knitting them together thoroughly by the powers, and vertues of the superior Bodies. This is the most perfect, and chief science, that sacred and sublimer kind of philosophy, and lastly the most absolute perfection of all most excellent philosophy.

— *From Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa, Three Books of Occult Philosophy, first published in 1533.* —

sixteenth century the Paduan philosopher Pietro Pomponazzi even argued that the secret forces studied by the magicians could explain away such miracles in naturalistic terms. Theologians and clergymen suspected that magical wonders were beyond nature altogether and, knowing that they could not be God's work, attributed them to the collaborative power of demons. Here is a good example, therefore, of the turning of a word with positive associations into a pejorative; *magia* became mere magic. Nevertheless, the three occult sciences that made up the practical applications of *magia*—astrology, alchemy, and natural magic, together with their derivatives in the field of medicine—enjoyed a great vogue in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed, these were often considered the most demanding, most innovative, and most rewarding kinds of science to practice. Their concentration on hidden causes made them intellectually challenging, and their promise of marvelous effects made them exciting as observational and empirical practice and offered material and political rewards, as well as renown.

It was once normal to assume that Renaissance *magia* was inimical to proper science and that astrology, alchemy, and the like were pseudosciences that had to be swept away before modern science could

develop. But this was to accept at face value the retrospective judgments made by modern scientists themselves, once *magia* had become outmoded and depreciated. Late-twentieth-century historians were much more likely to avoid this anachronism by recognizing the vital contribution the occult sciences made to natural philosophy throughout the early modern period and even to the kind that developed in later-seventeenth-century Europe. John Dee was the first major English exponent of Euclidean mathematics; Francis Bacon, the great propagandist for scientific reform on empirical lines, wished to make *magia* a central part of his program, once he had purged it of what he regarded as its more fanciful and esoteric practices; and Isaac Newton, it is now well known, pursued alchemy no less fervently than physics or optics. More fundamentally, historians are also far more aware of the difficulty in making any conceptual distinction between science and magic in this context. Throughout the early modern period, the concept of magic encouraged researchers in many disciplines to see their activity in the empirical and interventionist terms that defined science from the eighteenth century onward.

A good individual example of how *magia* had a crucial role in what we now think of as a classic scientific “revolution” comes from the field of astronomy. The heliocentricism of Copernicus, announced in his *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* of 1543, was heavily influenced by a traditional magical reverence for the sun as a symbol of the divinity and of knowledge. During the Renaissance, this tradition found expression, above all, in the writings of Ficino, whose enthusiastic follower Domenico Maria da Novara was professor of astronomy at Bologna and an associate of Copernicus. Copernicus himself described the sun as “enthroned” in the heavens and as “the lamp, the mind, the ruler of the universe,” citing Hermes Trismegistus on the same theme, and Neoplatonists like Giordano Bruno were among the keenest early supporters of the Copernican system.

Of particular significance for social history, historians in the late twentieth century were also becoming increasingly aware of the great significance of the occult sciences in the political circles in which many magicians then moved and received patronage, notably those of monarchical courts and aristocratic households. Magic offered a vocabulary for rulership and the exercise of authority, just as it provided a pattern for science. The powers of rulers were often seen in divine and mystical terms in Renaissance Europe and their ability to provide solutions to political problems was regarded as thaumaturgical and charismatic. Magic provided a way of conceptualizing these ideals.

It also worked in secret ways, as did princes in the realm of *arcana imperii* (secrets of state). The processes of alchemy, in particular, were often applied allegorically to the problems of maintaining order and harmony in societies divided by religious and other conflicts. Natural magic likewise helped to promote the keen interest in marvels and the setting up of *Wunderkammern* (cabinets of curiosities) that typified courtly and aristocratic notions of power and knowledge in this period. An example of the application of magic to government can be seen in Bacon’s utopian work *New Atlantis*, which appeared in eight editions between 1626 and 1658. It contains the vision of a society ruled by men who combine the functions of politicians, priests, and natural philosophers. Another illustration is the sustained interest shown in the magical or “occult” sciences at the court of the emperor Rudolf II in Prague between 1583 and 1612. Above all, perhaps, it is the figure of Prospero in Shakespeare’s last play, *The Tempest*, that best captures the relationship, ambivalent at times, between the art of ruling and the practice of magic. In some respects, Prospero is a Baconian figure, a natural magician seeking knowledge and control of nature’s secret powers;

he nevertheless renounces magic before returning to power as the duke of Milan.

THE REFORMATIONS AND POPULAR MAGIC

Whatever their differences, the religious Reformations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—Protestant and Catholic alike—were fundamentally concerned to improve lay piety and morality. What historians now see as the social impact of religious change in this period consisted chiefly in this—getting ordinary men and women to take religious values and solutions more seriously in every aspect of their individual and communal lives. This applied in particular to the trials and tribulations of everyday life in the preindustrial countryside and to the more concrete steps often taken to prevent misfortune and alleviate distress. Study after study has shown how, all over Europe, ordinary people regularly appealed not to their own consciences or to the collective conscience of the church, as their priests urged them to do. Instead they turned to local practitioners skilled in healing, divination, exorcism, and astrology to help solve their everyday problems. They did this frequently in cases of suspected witchcraft but any kind of misfortune, anticipated or experienced, could justify a visit to the “cunning” man or woman. Alternatively, they might use their own traditional folk remedies, since the techniques employed by the specialists were, in principle, accessible to all.

Those who practiced these techniques presumably thought that they worked in a straightforward causal way; they were simply techniques for dealing with an illness, a bad crop, a theft, or an unrequited love. Although they themselves sometimes called them “magic”—and, indeed, “good” or “white” magic—they did so without any implication of inefficacy. Churchmen, by contrast, were convinced not only that they diverted attention from concepts like providence, sin, and repentance, but that they were also empty of all effect, appearing to work only because the devil intervened to make them do so. They were suspicious, too, of the scraps of real religion often mixed up in these folk techniques, especially religious objects and words (like holy water or candle wax, saints’ names, and prayerlike incantations). Universally, they were known as “superstitions” by the orthodox, but “magic”—now “evil” or “black” magic—was also the label used to denounce them. By the end of the sixteenth century, vast areas of lay culture were, in principle, susceptible to the charge. It was made in countless sermons, catechisms, confes-



A LUTHERAN PREACHER’S DEFINITION OF MAGIC

This definition of magic was offered by the Lutheran preacher and writer Bernhard Albrecht in a book denouncing popular magic, published in 1628: Magic occurs “when anyone uses something in God’s creation, such as herbs, wood, stones, words, times, hours, gestures and the like, or seeks to bring about some effect, other than God has decreed, with the assistance and support of devils, either to reveal hidden or future things, or to obtain unnatural things, supposedly to help a neighbor.”

sors’ manuals, works of casuistry, and specialist books about witchcraft and demonism, and it could be applied to many popular forms of agriculture and domestic production; behavior to do with marriages and parenting; attempts to find lost goods or hidden treasure, or to be lucky in gambling; the widespread belief in omens and propitiousness; foretelling the future; the interpretation of dreams; and the casting of lots. Particularly prominent was the accusation that popular medicine was full of magic. For two centuries and more, disapproving clerics, and other intellectuals and professionals, condemned a vast array of traditional folk practices to do with protecting and preserving the body because they were irreligious and deemed not to work.

Intellectually, then, the two Reformations were an attempt to reinforce the boundary between what was deemed to be religion and what was deemed to be magic (although as we saw earlier, religious enemies accused each other of performing magic, too). The social consequences associated with this campaign have been the subject of many studies of early modern communities going through what can only be described as a process of acculturation. Some experts, like the French historian Robert Muchembled, have attributed the upsurge in witchcraft trials to the social strains that resulted. The European countryside became divided by commitment to the new religious ideals, projecting onto witches the fears, anxieties, and guilty feelings aroused by the cultural revolution being imposed from above; thus, witches were creations of the attack on magic. Other historians have concen-

trated on the issue of whether this revolution actually succeeded in changing lay behavior and eradicating magic from people's lives. The most pessimistic verdict in this debate was that of Jean Delumeau, who argued controversially that even in France the population had not become fully Christianized on the eve of the Revolution in 1789. Whatever its successes or

failures, however, the attack on popular magic between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries was a crucial part of probably the most sustained attempt ever made in European history to change fundamentally the beliefs and behavior of the general population.

Easily the most authoritative and influential attempt to absorb the whole subject of magic into the mainstream social history of early modern England was Keith Thomas's *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (1971). By borrowing the method of thick ethnographical description from social anthropology Thomas was able to show the embeddedness of magical practices, especially those to do with personal fortune and misfortune, in the daily lives of ordinary men and women in the period. The book provided an immensely rich panorama on the subjects of magical healing, the work of the "cunning men" and other magic professionals, the popularity of astrology, and the fears about witchcraft. More than this, Thomas juxtaposed the history of popular culture in these areas with the Protestant Reformation in England, showing how deeply interrelated the two were and how concerned the religious reformers were to take every suggestion of magic out of religious belief and practice. Most controversially Thomas offered an account of the decline of magic not solely in terms of intellectual criticism, or in relation to technological improvements that made contemporaries gradually less vulnerable to an environment they had hitherto had difficulty in managing, but as an aspect of the development of the notion of self-reliance and of faith in unaided human capacities.



TRADITIONAL FOLK PRACTICES

Typical instances of traditional folk practices are diagnosis by measuring a person's belt or girdle; healing by charms or other forms of words or by symbols (especially the misuse of religious words or symbols); healing by wearing amulets; the belief in the evil eye and in illness by bewitchment or by being touched; the attribution of various powers to body parts or substances (notably blood and semen); many practices to do with determining the sex of a child during gestation; the opening of chests or doors to relieve labor pains; and the curing of a wound by treating the weapon that inflicted it.

MAGIC AND MISFORTUNE IN MODERN EUROPE

Partly as a result of Keith Thomas's thesis, evidence that popular faith in magic has continued down to the present is often presented as a case of the "survival" of superstition after it was supposed to have disappeared under the influence of better religion, better education, and better insurance policies. This is a further instance of the labeling that invariably accompanies the concept of magic. Even in Judith Devlin's pioneering study, *The Superstitious Mind*, where the peasants of nineteenth-century rural France were reported to have beliefs in magical healing, apparitions, witchcraft, possession, and prophecy that were scarcely different from those of their medieval predecessors, magic was still associated with intellectual irrationality and confusion and with emotional trauma. During the twentieth century it was sensa-

tionalized and exoticized in newspaper reports, collected and treated as an archaeological relic by folklorists, and explained away by rationalist and functionalist anthropologists. Once again, however, what the social historian has to recognize is that magic has gone on being appealing not as an archaism or a substitute for better solutions but as applicable to specific situations deemed to be directly relevant to it. This is especially true of the misfortunes associated with witchcraft and of the management of health, love, and money.

Witchcraft has been a continuous presence in modern European societies even though the last legally sanctioned executions of witches took place in the eighteenth century. Communities have gone on fearing the witch's malice, have gone on identifying witches in their midst, and, in consequence, have gone on resorting to counterwitchcraft. Magic, always a powerful apotropaic in this area, has thus retained its relevance, and "unwitchers," cunning men and women, "witch doctors," and other magical specialists have kept their clients. In the Netherlands, in the province of Drenthe, both the church and civil authorities took action against magicians of this sort long after they had ceased to punish witches. In France, the studies of historians like Matthew Ramsey and Bernard Traimond have shown how crucial to the moral and social economy of rural communities were the *devins* and other healers who diagnosed illness by witchcraft and treated its symptoms. Traimond looks, in particular, at the stories of a Basque barber-surgeon in Bayonne around 1750 and of three unwitching specialists, two of whom were unfrocked priests, in Bordeaux in the 1800s. The folk magic and rural superstitions of Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have likewise been the subject of the studies of the social historian Eva Labouvie.

Counterwitchcraft by no means exhausted the repertoire of magic in these and other countries. Treasure seeking (a male preserve), divination, and techniques for enhancing love also figured prominently. But a diminution in the role and scope of witchcraft cases and their narrowing social complexion—they became restricted to the countryside, to the lower socioeconomic classes, to nonprofessionals, and to women—did mean a corresponding reduction in the importance of magical remedies. Even so, and whatever its precise form, or the sex or social position of those involved, popular magic has proved to be a rich resource for the historian interested in the social and cultural dynamics of modern communities.

Twentieth-century versions of magic of this sort were certainly not lacking. Unwitchers were still practicing their skills virtually everywhere in Europe, well-



A DANISH WITCH DOCTOR

In Drenthe in 1862 newspaper accounts of a witch doctor named Sjoerd Brouwers reported that he recommended that an eighteen-year-old girl suffering from nausea, headaches, backache, and stomachache should rub her toes between twelve and one o'clock at night with pig's blood in which a cock's head had been boiled. After this her father had to ride her around the house three times in a wheelbarrow. The medicines were to be buried and every other day before sunrise they were to be smelled. Two weeks after this report, the newspaper announced that the girl had been delivered of a chubby boy. (Gijswijt-Hofstra, 1999, p. 111)

integrated in witchcraft "systems" and, indeed, occupying a key position in them. This was nowhere more dramatically shown than in the Bocage in the 1970s, when the French anthropologist Jeanne Favret-Saada found herself "caught" so personally in the witchcraft episodes she was studying that she came herself to be seen as both bewitched and an unwitcher. A witchcraft case in the Dutch town of Sliedrecht in 1926 involved a prominent and widely consulted witch doctor, Lambertus Lelie, and in 1954 in Sarzbüttel, northwest of Hamburg, a witch doctor named Waldemar Eberling who had been seeing clients for decades was put on trial accused of illegal medical practice.

LEARNED AND CEREMONIAL MAGIC FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Eventually the occult sciences of the Renaissance were overtaken in the scientific mainstream by different assumptions about nature and different styles of natural inquiry. Astrology, alchemy, and natural magic decisively lost ground, the first not least through its seventeenth-century links with radicalism. Most of the natural effects previously ascribed to magical or occult causation were explained away by eighteenth-century physics and chemistry. It became customary in "enlightened" circles to ridicule the magic of previous eras as the product of superstition, irrationality,

and ignorance. The French philosopher and historian Voltaire declared magic to be “an impossible thing” and thought that magicians were mostly imposters. It is important to see this disparagement as a social and ideological phenomenon, as well as an intellectual one, with magic becoming a point of reference for a whole set of assumptions about modernity and progress. It was said to be the product of “enthusiasm” and deception—precisely the sorts of things most troublesome to increasingly commercialized societies. Denouncing magic was a way of establishing the values of order and politeness and other cultural boundaries appropriate to such societies. In effect, it was an aspect of ideological changes driven by conflict. Above all, it was a way of making a social distinction between the classes thought to be most and least committed to the new enlightened values.

On the other hand, we should not be misled by the language used by the “enlightened” crusaders against magic into thinking that the European elites could not continue to mix what were proclaimed to be incompatible beliefs. The occult and the supernatural had a posthumous life in the art and literature of this period. Suppressed, they returned, migrating into the world of the Gothic and into romanticism, where the supernatural could be made sublime and its terrors enjoyed without risk. The “decline of magic” is also seriously compromised by the presence in European high culture of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of new forms of occult science—labeled “pseudo” sciences by the dominant Newtonianism. Alchemy and astrology survived enough to continue to appeal, alongside new studies like animal magnetism, physiognomy, and phrenology. Franz Anton Mesmer, whose “mesmerism” resembled the magnetic theories of the Renaissance natural magicians, for whom magnetism was always the classic occult quality, behaved like a magus and even a shaman, though always protesting scientific respectability. The physiognomical teachings of the Swiss pastor Johann Kaspar Lavater were likewise reminiscent of the magical traditions of the past.

At the same time, ceremonial or ritual magic, another former ingredient of Renaissance neo-Platonism, enjoyed a fresh popularity, especially among the members of the secret societies and benefit clubs that flourished to an extraordinary extent from the eighteenth century onward. Freemasonry, in particular, was committed to magical rites derived from the wisdom of ancient civilizations and the transmission of secret skills and crafts down the ages, and designed to initiate members. Its key symbols included the pentagram, the five-pointed star central to magical tradition. Ronald Hutton writes that “it is difficult

to overvalue the importance of Freemasonry in nineteenth-century British culture. It was patronized by royalty, existed in every part of the nation and in town and countryside alike, and was an accepted part of local life” (p. 5). Magic also appealed strongly to the antirationalist trends in nineteenth-century society, and a revival of learned interest in it occurred in the final decades, notably around the French enthusiast Alphonse Constant (“Eliphas Levi”), the Societas Rosicruciana in Anglia (founded in 1866), and, from 1888 until about 1900, the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, which actually practiced a ritual magic based on Greek, Hebrew (cabalistic), and Christian traditions. Among the best known members of this last order was the Irish poet W. B. Yeats.

One other aspect of the nineteenth century’s interest in magic should be noted, though it has nothing to do with the *practice* of magic. This is the emergence of many attempts to explain the place of magic in human thought and society, and not simply to condemn it as wrongheaded as the eighteenth-century thinkers had done. Magic became more and more the subject of academic investigation—by theorists of cultural change and secularization, by folklorists, antiquarians, and anthropologists, even by psychopathologists. Chief among the sociological theories that emerged was that of the “positivists” Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, both of whom argued that human consciousness had progressed through successive stages in which first theology, then metaphysics, and finally science had a dominating influence. This kind of metanarrative historicized magic by giving it a historical role at an appropriate moment of human development, much as Émile Durkheim later suggested a social-functional role for it. Such scholarly explanations have in fact had a profound effect on the historiography of magic ever since; they testify to magic’s power to resonate in the minds of Europeans even when they neither believe in it nor seek to perform it.

MAGIC AND PAGAN WITCHCRAFT

Twentieth-century Britain saw a remarkable development of pagan witchcraft, known as Wicca, in which magical elements are prominent. As Ronald Hutton has shown, these elements stem partly from the traditions of ceremonial magic already discussed and partly from the continued practice of magic into the modern age in its popular form by cunning folk, conjurers, charmers, and users of “natural medicine.” This last tradition bequeathed to modern pagan religion not only a store of operative magical techniques but a number of those who practiced them as well.

From the first, Wicca was portrayed by its followers as a vehicle for magical powers and with rituals designed to release and manipulate them. It was inspired in part by Aleister Crowley's *Magick in Theory and Practice* (1929), the most important exposition of the techniques of ritual magic from the early part of the century, but it also included elements from traditional *grimoires*, descriptions of witchcraft practices by the anthropologist Margaret Murray, and initiation ceremonies borrowed from Freemasonry and from the Golden Dawn. During the 1950s the leading Wiccan, Gerald Gardner, was continuously revising its rituals by drawing on these and other sources. The second main branch of the movement, the Alexandrian, after Alex Sanders, was likewise based on cabalistic and other forms of ritual magical working. More recently still, pagans have looked more critically at the sense in which Wicca continues the practices of an "Old Religion," but still its magical core remains. As Hutton has said, "at the heart of its mysteries lies a particular notion, and experience, of the transformative power of something which is called magic" (p. 71).

The central aim of this magic is not just personal development and self-knowledge but concrete powers—powers to see and know, to create and move, and to heal. These are acquired both by releasing and expanding abilities thought to lie hidden in each individual and by tapping into the workings of the cosmos, much as magic has always been conceived to operate by synchronisms between the microcosmic and macrocosmic levels of things. In Hutton's view,

Wicca is thus a religion that negotiates with supernatural beings in a way normally reserved for magicians; that is, by seeking to direct forces that would in conventional religious contexts be seen as beyond human control. For this purpose deities are drawn by ritual means to join with the individual, who is seen both as a priestess or priest, passively serving and praising the divine, *and* as a witch, constraining the divine to cooperate. In social terms the practice of magic by modern Wiccans reveals the capacity for independence and organization characteristic of the small group of religious enthusiasts, while also exemplifying what Hutton calls the "privatization" of religion in the mid- to late twentieth century. However, unlike other manifestations of the phenomenon known to sociologists of religion as New Religious Movements, pagan witchcraft does not, according to Hutton, "depend heavily upon one or a few charismatic leaders. It does not appeal overwhelmingly to a particular age group or cultural group. It does not offer a radical break with existing family and social relationships; and it does not challenge the wider culture as a whole" (pp. 77–78).

MAGIC AND SATANISM

The second part of the twentieth century also saw the creation of groups who call themselves "satanists." A huge mythology concerning their supposed devil worship also arose, but it bore no resemblance to the actual beliefs and behavior of satanists. Among these

groups magic has had a role as both practice and ideology, though the numbers involved make this a marginal social phenomenon. Ironically, it is the mythology that has been of greater interest and significance to social historians and anthropologists of religion. A leading analyst of both the American and British manifestations of satanism is Jean La Fontaine, who said that modern satanists are yet further practitioners—

if self-taught—of the learned and ceremonial (or ritual) magic that we have seen to be so crucial to the European Renaissance, the development of Freemasonry, the nineteenth-century occult revival, and twentieth-century enthusiasts like Aleister Crowley (for whom magic was “magick” and a way of rescuing the self, in both its spiritual and bodily manifestations, from the burdens of social convention). The Church of Satan founded in California in 1966 by Anton Szandor LaVey, for instance, proclaimed a threefold magical power in its rituals—the power to attract love and desire, the power to give help, and the power to destroy—while the rituals themselves depended heavily on the magical symbol of the pentagram and the magical god Baphomet. Its offshoot, the Temple of Set, as its name makes clear, has proclaimed strong links with ancient Egyptian magic and its beliefs include the magical idea of the transformative power of the subjective will aided by rituals.

The mythology surrounding satanism crystallized in the modern world in accusations of devil worship accompanied by child abuse and led to well-publicized cases of intervention by social work professionals and would-be prosecutors. What is of interest to social historians here, once again, cannot be an actual magical practice since no independent evidence to corroborate the accusations has been found. Instead, it is the social phenomenon of such accusations that is itself under scrutiny, preeminently so in La Fontaine’s authoritative study of the subject, *Speak of the Devil* (1998). Mainly, the analysis has fallen on the emergence in recent decades of revivalist and fun-



THEOSOPHY

Theosophy, a movement founded in 1875 and inspired by the Russian noblewoman Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, was popular in North America, Europe, and India. Its main belief, like that of the pansophical claims of the Renaissance magi, was that a single wisdom lay behind the differences in world religions and philosophies. Blavatsky herself also practiced magic, in the sense of attempting to make voices and objects appear from nothing (psychokinesis), and also popularized the notion of reincarnation in the West. (Hutton, 1999, p. 10)

damentalist “New Christian” movements, anxious, like their Reformation predecessors, to brand all other religions as unbiblical and satanic. For these movements devil worship has always been a historical reality rather than what it is for historians—a social and cultural construction extending back through the ages to embrace medieval heresy, early modern witchcraft, and modern Freemasonry, and now active again in the form of all sorts of supposed modern depravities. First in the United States and then in Europe, these have come to include the ritual sexual abuse of children,

accusations being fueled by the testimony of new converts remembering their own satanic pasts, by other adults “satanically” abused in childhood, and by children suggestively interviewed by “experts.” The uncanny resemblance between these sources of “evidence” and those that led to the witch-hunts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has now become apparent. We return, then, to the distinction that has been constitutive of the social history of magic in the modern world, the distinction we started with—between actual practice and the allegation of practice.

See also **The Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Reformation** (volume 1); and other articles in this section.

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FESTIVALS



Mack P. Holt

Festival, feast, fête—these are all words that derive from the Latin *festum*, meaning a celebration or an occasion for celebration, such as a holiday (or holy day). Thus, the history of festivals in the modern West is necessarily linked to eating and drinking, Christianity, work and leisure, and the history of rituals generally. Moreover, the history of festivals in the West from the Renaissance to the present is distinctly diverse. A cornucopia of local, regional, national, and some nearly universal festivals have existed all over Europe since the high Middle Ages. They range in scope from festivals marking rites of passage—births and marriages, for example—to feasts denoting a specific time of the calendar year—the harvest in early autumn and new millennium celebrations being obvious examples—to religious feasts such as Carnival and Easter (with Lent in between), to nationalist festivals—Bastille Day in France being the best known. The experience of European festivals is so diverse that no short summary can possibly be complete. What follows is less a comprehensive survey of European festivals from the Renaissance to the present than an essay that attempts to sketch out some of the major types of festivals and assess how they have changed over time. The principal claim made is that the functions of these festivals evolved and changed between 1500 and 2000. In the late Middle Ages most festivals served many purposes, but one thing they all shared was the ability to build and cement an idea of community. Many, in fact, delineated the boundaries of the community itself: between the sacred and the profane, between insider and outsider, or just between the orthodox and the unorthodox. Even though definitions of community, the sacred, insiderness, and orthodoxy have changed over the centuries, some of these functions have remained. What changed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, was that participation in these festivals evolved from a largely collective and social experience to one much more individual and commercial. That is not to argue that a utopian “world we have lost” has been replaced by less satisfying modern commercialism. Nor is it sug-

gested that community and capitalism are mutually exclusive. Changes over time do help us better understand ourselves, however, as a closer look at several specific examples of these changes will make clear.

CARNIVAL

The word carnival comes from *carne*, meaning flesh. And as the etymology of this word in most Latin-based languages indicates, this means animal flesh, or meat, as well as human flesh. Thus Carnival has always been associated with the consumption of flesh as well as the carnal sins of the flesh—gluttony and lechery—two of the seven deadly sins for Christians in the late Middle Ages. It may seem a genuine irony, then, that Carnival’s entire *raison d’être* was its link to Lent and the feast day of Easter itself, that link being the purification and satisfaction of sin through the sacrament of penance. Usually in the form of a three- to six-day period of feasting culminating in Shrove Tuesday (Mardi Gras, Fastnacht, and so on), Carnival preceded the beginning of Lent in the liturgical calendar, which always falls on Ash Wednesday. Thus Carnival was a festival of the flesh that marked the transition from a carnal period of behavior to a penitential regime of abstinence from flesh altogether during Lent—both from meat and from sex, even between husbands and wives. The Lenten season lasted from Ash Wednesday until Easter Sunday, the single most important feast day on the liturgical calendar, where the consumption of flesh was resumed once again, traditionally in the form of the paschal lamb. Carnival was the first half of an inseparable duality, of which the other half was Lent. Carnival was a period of feasting, meaning shops were supposed to be closed, with leisure replacing work, while Lent was a period of fasting and purification. The whole was designed as a means of preparing the sinner, via confession and penance on the one hand and abstinence of flesh on the other, for the holiest feast of all, the consumption of Christ’s own flesh in the sacrament of the Eucharist on Easter Sunday.

But why did clerical and political authorities condone such explicit gluttony and lechery during Carnival? How could such deadly sins be a precursor to, much less a vital part of, preparation for the sacred experience of the mass? The answer does not lie in the “safety-valve theory” proposed by some social anthropologists, whereby ecclesiastical and secular authorities allowed the masses to let off a little steam for a few days once a year to keep the lid on the boiling cauldron of social tensions that were inevitable in a hierarchical society. By letting the laity turn their world upside down during Carnival, so the theory goes—allowing gender roles, social roles, and even political roles to be reversed, with men dressing as women and peasants dressing as kings—the world would remain more or less right side up the rest of the liturgical year. While this argument may doubtless contain an element of truth, it does not explain why premodern authorities seemed to condone, or at least turn a blind eye to, behavior and comportment that would have profaned the sacred any other time of the year. A much better explanation is depicted in Pieter Brueghel’s painting *The Fight between Carnival and Lent*. On the left side a fat and corpulent peasant is mounted astride a beer barrel, with a roasting spit for a lance on which a pig’s head is skewered. On the ground beside him are playing cards, dice, and other things associated with gambling, while his assistants offer him jugs of wine, beer steins, and a grill for roasting meat. This “carnal knight” is engaged in battle with his opposite, an emaciated cleric sitting in a chair pulled by two women. His lance is a long oven paddle on which are two fish, the only allowable flesh during Lent. Beside him are the loaves, pancakes, and pretzels that made up the rest of the Lenten diet. The point of this image is not just that Carnival and Lent were polar opposites and in competition with each other, but that they were engaged in as part of a common process of penitential satisfaction of sin. The object of the feasting of Carnival was to emphasize and bring to light the entire corpus of sin from the previous year, so that it could then be eviscerated and ultimately confessed and satisfied during Lent itself. This dialectical relationship between carnival and Lent was perhaps best depicted in Rabelais’s fictitious king of the Carnival, Quaresmeprenant, whose very name indicates the symbiotic relationship between the two (*carême-prenant* is the French name for this pre-Lenten period). Rabelais’s writings are full of references to Carnival, and many writers, above all Mikhail Bakhtin, have been misled into believing that Carnival’s origins lay rooted in folklore and popular culture instead of in the penitential season of Lent.

This was a festival of carnality. It was usually symbolized by some kind of stock carnival figure or effigy, traditionally the figure of a fat man, which was paraded around during a feast and ceremoniously burned at the end of it. Gluttony was the order of the day, and lots of meat, especially from fat animals such as pigs or boars, was consumed with relish, washed down by large quantities of beer in northern Europe and wine in the south. There was also a considerable amount of sexual display and insult involved. Brothels, protected and even run by local officials in many municipalities throughout Europe before the Reformation, were obviously in much demand during Carnival. And overtly sexual symbols and metaphors were explicitly displayed in many of the festivities, from the huge, fat sausage that was carried through the streets in Königsberg and the even more graphic phallus that was paraded through the streets of Naples, to the more common sexual icons of cocks and bears. For this short period sexual propriety seemed to be suspended, as passions that were supposed to be tightly reined during the rest of the year became unbridled.

Carnival was also a period when other passions were unleashed: insult, envy, and anger among them. Fistfights were common everywhere and even ritualized in some places, such as Venice, where young men carried out their territorial and familial struggles under the guise of ritual. That violence might be the natural by-product of a world turned upside down should not be too surprising, and its ubiquity is yet another strike against the safety-valve theory. If women were temporarily allowed to fulfill the roles of men—to be “on top,” to use Natalie Davis’s wonderful phrase—or if peasants were allowed to play the role of kings, this might help eliminate enough steam in the social boiler to keep the entire structure from exploding. On the other hand, turning the world upside down might, by allowing violence and displaying alternatives, threaten the very social order the process was supposed to protect. The riot and massacre that broke out in the French town of Romans in Dauphiné during Carnival in 1580 may be the best known, thanks to Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, but there were plenty of other such violent incidents that grew out of Carnival in Naples, Switzerland, Corsica, and elsewhere to suggest that this was far from an isolated episode. It is thus largely irrelevant to argue whether the function of Carnival was to reinforce the social order (the safety-valve theory) or to undermine it: it could do both.

The chronology and geography of Carnival are also instructive. Despite the claims of many scholars, Carnival does not appear to be an ancient pagan rite that was appropriated by Christianity for its own pur-

poses (as was the case with so many Christian rituals). In fact, there is little evidence of Carnival anywhere in Europe before the twelfth century. So it appears to be entirely a medieval and Christian phenomenon. Nor was Carnival practiced uniformly throughout Europe. Most of the features described above were largely restricted to southern Europe: almost the entire Mediterranean region including Spain, Italy, and the islands, as well as most of France, Austria, Switzerland, and much of Germany. In northwestern Europe—Brittany and other parts of northern France, the British Isles, most of the Low Countries, parts of northern Germany, and all of Scandinavia—the festivities of Carnival were limited to little more than the ritual eating of pancakes on Shrove Tuesday. There might have been regular Shrove Tuesday football match accompanied by some Morris dancers and other festivities here and there, but in essence, the carnality was largely missing. So how is the geography of Carnival to be explained?

John Bossy is surely right to stress that the answer lies in Carnival's foundation in and links to the sacrament of penance. The Roman liturgy of the sacrament was a largely collective and entirely public affair. Christians were required to confess their sins, as well as satisfy them before God through an act of penance, before they could participate in the Eucharist on Easter Sunday. The confession was a public one, as the sinner openly confessed his sins to the priest and to God; although he or she was not specifically addressing the other parishioners present, they obviously were able to hear what was going on. Then the priest would place his hands on the head of the penitent as a public sign of reconciliation to God and his neighbor. The act of penance to be performed afterward varied widely, but it was also intended as a public sign of contrition and reconciliation. This often took the form of public penitential processions, as large numbers of penitents collectively sought to expiate their sins through the ritual of parading through the streets of their town or village. In short, in the Roman liturgy penance was a social sacrament whose function was not only preparation for the Eucharist, but also the reconciliation of everyone in the community to each other as well as to God. It is evident, however, that the Roman liturgy's hold on the laity was not so secure the farther one ventured from Rome. Indeed, by the high Middle Ages it had already disappeared in many parts of northern Europe, and in others it had never been established at all, as local liturgies were introduced from the beginning. In most of northern Europe confession and penance had never been so public and collective as in the south. Given the communal and collective nature of Carnival itself,

it is not a surprise that it tended not to catch on in most of northern Europe. Carnival was hardly resistant to exportation to foreign cultures, however, as its adoption by many Jews and Orthodox Christians makes clear. Nevertheless, it does appear that the geography of Carnival is tied to the history of penance.

Reform attacks on Carnival. That geography was seriously threatened, however, by the reformations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Protestant as well as Catholic. Luther, Calvin, and most other Protestant reformers, by accepting Erasmus's revised translation of Matthew 4:17, rejected penance as a sacrament altogether, and it is thus no surprise that the carnality of Carnival became a prime target of their anti-Catholic attacks. Perhaps more surprising is how quickly many Catholic reformers also came to attack Carnival. Again, the link with the sacrament of penance is instructive, as both Protestant and Catholic reformers alike sought to transform a collective and social ritual into an individual and private practice. The innovator on the Catholic side was Carlo Borromeo, archbishop of Milan. Borromeo's bright idea was the invention of the confessional box in 1565, which quickly put to rest the social aspects of the sacrament. With confessions no longer made in public, and with a barrier between priest and penitent to prevent the laying on of hands, the function of reconciliation to the community soon took a backseat to reconciliation with God. And with the sacrament of penance shorn of its communal and public face, there was not much point left in celebrating Carnival, especially as it invoked so many sins of the flesh.

The Catholic Church's rejection of Carnival was just one thread in a much broader tapestry of social

and moral reform that arose out of the Catholic Reformation in general and the Council of Trent in particular. Like the much vaunted “reformation of manners” so associated with the Puritans and other Protestants, Catholic post-Tridentine piety had as its ultimate goal the reestablishment of the kingdom of Christ on earth through a stricter policing of moral discipline. Although Calvin’s Geneva may be more closely associated with moral discipline in the public eye than Counter-Reformation Catholicism, it is nevertheless true that Borromeo’s program in Milan was just as great a source of Reformation discipline as anything conjured up by the Protestants. Indeed, this was one of the principal goals shared by all reformers, Protestants and Catholics alike, which, despite their theological differences, made them allies in a war against the common enemy of carnality. And when both churches as well as the state nearly everywhere in Europe began to mount serious anti-Carnival campaigns, it is no surprise that in the long run they were successful. By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, in fact, Carnival was just a shadow of its former medieval self in the cities and urban areas, even in southern Europe. Although resistance was far stronger in the rural countryside, where the reach of church and state was less secure, it is nevertheless clear that the Protestant and Catholic Reformations had a significant impact on the practice of Carnival by 1700. Although the festival continued to exist, it was largely shorn of much of its carnal and virtually all its penitential functions.

By the late eighteenth century in Paris, for example, the rituals were already becoming more commercialized. For the elite, more conscious than ever of distinguishing themselves from the masses, there were a number of privately organized masked balls and banquets, above all the famous ball held every year at the Paris Opera. For the popular classes, there were also more restrained public masked balls, and food and drink tended to be available in great quantities outside the city walls, where taxes were lower. There were also processions of artisans’ guilds, the most prominent of which was that of the butchers, who paraded a fat ox—*le boeuf gras*—through the streets of Paris nearly every year until 1870, the only interruption being the years of the Revolution (1790–1800). Although this is clearly evidence that flesh had not disappeared entirely from Carnival, brothels and other overt signs of sexuality were largely absent. Moreover, during the years of the Second Empire (1851–1869) Napoleon III clamped down on the celebrations even further by attempting to curtail street masking. The masked balls declined as a result, including the Opera ball, and as the suburbs were

brought into the city limits, even the excesses of food and drink were no longer available. In the years after 1870 Carnival became less a social and even more a commercial enterprise. In Paris, as in many other European cities, large department stores and other commercial institutions tried to revive the festival. About all that they could sustain, however, were a few parades, as popular participation declined precipitously. By 1900 little remained of Mardi Gras in Paris except for a parade and a few neighborhood balls. The day of Mardi Gras itself was no longer either a feast day recognized by the church or a holiday recognized by the state. What had once been perhaps the single most anticipated festival in the entire calendar, with members of all social classes looking forward to its excesses, had become by the twentieth century just another workday.

To suggest that Carnival had disappeared from Europe completely is not entirely true, however, as it was revived in the New World in the late nineteenth century at the very moment it was waning in the Old. This epilogue demonstrates that Carnival could survive in the twentieth century only as a commercial venture. Both the American and Brazilian incarnations of the festival—in New Orleans and Rio de Janeiro respectively—depend on tourism to survive, and both show how far individualism and commercialism have replaced community as the focus. In New Orleans it was local social clubs, known as *krewe*s, that in the 1870s created Mardi Gras by holding their own balls and parading through the French Quarter on Shrove Tuesday. While many of these clubs remain exclusive and parochial even at the beginning of the twenty-first century (the anti-Black and anti-Semitic elements of some of these clubs is well known), some such as the Rex *krewe* started selling tickets to tourists and other outsiders as early as 1872. Already by 1900 more than 100,000 tourists were flocking to New Orleans every February. The Hermes and Bacchus *krewe*s, founded in 1937 and 1969 respectively, were devoted to tourism from the beginning and now work with the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, bringing in nearly half a million visitors at Carnival time. The city’s own tourist bureau estimates that by the 1970s the two weeks leading up to Mardi Gras generated more than fifty million dollars annually in tourist revenues, roughly 10 percent of all revenues brought into the city by visitors each year. And if added to that are another twenty-five million dollars each year in locally generated revenue in preparation for the event, it is clear that the city of New Orleans, as well as the state of Louisiana, has come to rely on the celebration of Carnival in its own form of Mardi Gras as a major source of revenue. To be sure, this

modern form of American Carnival may contain many more carnal elements—prostitutes and *le boeuf gras* are still very visible in New Orleans—and rites of inversion than its European counterparts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but it is now entirely a commercial spectacle. And the carnality is for sale year-round in New Orleans, not just during Mardi Gras.

The Brazilian Carnival in Rio de Janeiro has its own narrative, but one that moves in a similar direction. It too was transformed into a commercial enterprise via tourism, and as with Mardi Gras in New Orleans, Carnival in Rio began and is still structured around social clubs that hold balls and parades. Unlike the krewes in New Orleans, however, the samba schools in Brazil are less exclusive and less exclusively upper and middle class. Whereas in New Orleans the black population was traditionally excluded from Mardi Gras and forced to hold its own parades in the black quarters of the city, in Rio there has always been a more inclusive and communal atmosphere at Carnival. Nevertheless, the parades of the samba schools, like the parades of the krewes in New Orleans, have now become dominated by commercialism, each vying to outspend and outdo the others. As in New Orleans, the tourist industry is what drives as well as funds most of this activity in Rio. The major difference in Rio is its geography. Being in the southern hemisphere means that Carnival in Rio contains none of the elements associated with the end of winter and beginning of spring as in Europe; it is the end of the summer in Brazil, and the beach in Rio has proven to be just as commercially viable a site for Carnival as Bourbon Street in New Orleans. And for its participants in both hemispheres today, any association with penitence and preparation for Lent has long since disappeared; Carnival is now in the business of entertainment.

NEW YEAR

Celebrating the end of one year and the beginning of another, unlike Carnival, goes back to the pre-Christian era of the earliest societies. What constituted a year, however, varied widely from one society to the next, though most did eventually coalesce around a model that fit into the changing seasons of the harvest year. It was the Romans who first moved the West onto an exclusively solar calendar. The early Roman calendars were lunar calendars, basing the length of the year (354 days) on the cycles of the moon. In 46 B.C.E. Julius Caesar mandated that the Romans switch to a solar calendar of 365¼ days, with

an extra day added every fourth year. The Romans marked the end of one year at the end of December and the beginning of another starting in January with a special festival and celebration.

When Christianity finally became the official Roman religion after the conversion of Constantine in the early fourth century, the Church did not entirely replace the Julian calendar with a new one of its own. Instead, it appropriated the old calendar and many of its festivals, replacing Roman festivals with Christian festivals. The Church did alter the numbering of the years—making the year one that of the year of the birth of Christ, as opposed to the year of the founding of the Roman Republic—and also altered the beginning of the year, changing it from January 1 to Easter Sunday. The celebration of the new year was transformed in the early fourth century at the Council of Nicaea in 325, when Easter itself was fixed to the cycle of the moon: the first Sunday after the first full moon after the spring equinox (that is, no earlier than March 22 and no later than April 25). Thus, from 325 the festival celebrating the New Year was the same day as the festival celebrating the birth of Christ. And because the preceding evening was still during Lent—a fast day instead of a feast day—New Year's Eve clearly did not mean much to premodern sensibilities.

The impetus for a more secular celebration of the New Year came in the sixteenth century, and as with Carnival, the Protestant and Catholic Reformations played a role. First, several states—France, for example, in 1564—decided unilaterally to switch the beginning of the year back to the Roman date of January 1. This had less to do with any desire to secularize New Year celebrations than the fact that with New Year's Day not being fixed, virtually every year had a different number of days, which was already causing problems in contracts, leases, and rents that normally lasted for the duration of a calendar year. It was the shift away from the Lenten season that ultimately provided New Year celebrations with a more secular focus. Although the modern idea of champagne and New Year's Eve parties is a much more recent invention—champagne did not even exist until the late seventeenth century, when it was allegedly invented accidentally by a French monk, Dom Pérignon—it was not too much of a leap for Europeans in the eighteenth century to revive the older Roman pagan rituals of feasting to celebrate the New Year, usually on New Year's Day itself. There were few public rituals or celebrations of note until much later, but Europeans everywhere generally celebrated the New Year with family and friends, exchanging greetings and wishes of good fortune and prosperity for the coming

year. Good luck rituals varied from one part of Europe to the next. In Austria and Hungary, for example, pigs were believed to bring good fortune and live pigs were often let loose in the streets of Vienna and Budapest. In other places the eating of certain foods at the New Year was believed to bring good luck throughout the rest of the year—from special New Year's cakes, ales, or other delicacies, to more traditional meats, fish, and vegetables. The emphasis everywhere was on sharing food, drink, and greetings and good wishes with family and friends.

The New Year's Eve gatherings we know today are much more modern. New Year's Day was St. Sylvester's Day in the Roman church (and St. Basil's Day in the Orthodox church in much of eastern Europe) and a special mass or celebration marking the eve of St. Sylvester still survives in many places. For most, however, the idea of gathering in public crowds for a collective and entirely secular celebration of the New Year—whether in Trafalgar Square in London, the Champs Élysées in Paris, the Ringstrasse in Vienna, the Puerta del Sol in Madrid, or St. Mark's Square in Venice—did not really begin until the end of the nineteenth century. This escalated in special years marking the end of centuries, and New Year's Eve in 1899 saw a significant increase in the festivities. With the end of the millennium in 1999, commercialism

came to dominate the celebrations, as every hotel, restaurant, resort, and tourist attraction competed with one another for the vast sums that were shelled out by a population with more money to spend on entertainment. While pedants pointed out that the *real* millennium would not begin until 1 January 2001, it was nevertheless clear that Europeans could accept the cultural construction of their calendar. What mattered most was that the festivities still had meaning for many that were bound up in building communities of friends and family. The survival of such traditional practices as Hogmanay in Scotland—gifts for small children—or the same country's celebration of the first guest to cross the hearth after the stroke of midnight on New Year's Eve with a convivial drink, for example, demonstrate how many rituals have survived the advent of commercialism.

Indeed, some of the commercial practices associated with contemporary celebrations of the New Year are not only based on much older and more traditional practices, but have sustained them and guaranteed their survival. The sending of special New Year's greeting cards, ubiquitous nearly everywhere in Europe apart from the British Isles (and the United States), where greeting cards are sent to friends and family at Christmas, is one such example. Obviously, it was not until the greeting card industry arose in the late nineteenth century that specially printed greeting cards emerged as a means of wishing someone a prosperous New Year. These cards became immediately popular. The custom was based, however, on the much older custom of exchanging greetings and wishes of prosperity in person or via a handwritten note or letter. And while many Europeans today might question whether a printed greeting card at New Year is as personal or as meaningful an expression as a handwritten note, it is nevertheless true that these cards continue to maintain ties of community and sociability in their own way. The same can be said of many of the other ways contemporary Europeans celebrate the New Year. Even though wine merchants might make up to a quarter of their annual profits from champagne sales at New Year, and while hoteliers and restaurateurs may do likewise, it seems clear that these annual celebration—even the overly hyped millennium celebrations of 31 December 1999—are almost never just individualist expressions of conspicuous consumption. They are almost always observed collectively with friends and family, and even the most commercially explicit of them usually take note of the actual passing of the old year and the beginning of the new year at midnight. And it is this passing of the year, the continual and perpetual clicking over of the calendar, however the calendar year is measured, that ties us to all our an-

cestors and renders us human. In this sense, the celebrations of the New Year have always been festivals of life and the continuity of humanity: ringing out the old and ringing in the new.

BASTILLE DAY: JULY 14

Festivals marking nationalist holidays are a relatively recent phenomenon. Until there were nation-states, as opposed to dynastic states, fully supported by the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, there were no holidays invoking the beginning or creation of a particular nation. One of the first of these new nation-states was France, which was transformed by the French Revolution of 1789–1799 from a dynastic monarchy to a republic. But which particular event of this transformation should be celebrated as the national holiday? The storming of the Bastille (14 July 1789)? The Tennis Court Oath (20 June 1789)? The renunciation of privileges by the nobility and clergy (4 August 1789)? The opening of the first representative assembly (1 October 1791)? The overthrow of the monarchy (10 August 1792)? The beheading of Louis XVI (21 January 1793)? In fact, it was not until nearly a century later, in 1880, that 14 July, was decreed to be the national holiday of France: the date of the capture by a Paris crowd of the Bastille, an old fortress used as a municipal jail that held only a handful of insignificant prisoners. The choice of date itself was a highly politicized one in 1880, as politicians of the Third Republic from both the left and the right sought to use the national holiday as a symbol to confirm their own narratives of the Revolution itself. July 14 was a compromise that privileged neither the Orleanists and Bonapartists on the right nor the militant radicals and heirs of the Jacobins on the left. In 1880 and for a good time thereafter, the national holiday of France and the ways it was celebrated were fraught with political baggage that truly imbued it with a sense of the tensions inherent in the construction of a nation.

The first such celebration of Bastille Day, as it is now commonly known, occurred during the Revolution itself, and indeed, as Mona Ozouf has amply demonstrated, it was part of the Revolution. Kings had used rituals and festivals for political purposes for centuries, usually in an attempt to reinforce their power and authority, so it was only natural that the revolutionaries should do the same. The Festival of Federation in Paris on 14 July 1790 looked back not so much to the humble events of the year before, but ahead to the revolution still to come. It embodied an exhilarating sense of newness and beginning, at the

same time functioning as a means of forging a new community of citizens. The long military parade of troops, including retired veterans as well as young children, formed a major part of the festivities and is still part of Bastille Day rituals. The revolutionaries also took an oath of allegiance and then celebrated with a special meal together to cement their ties of community. What is particularly striking about this commemoration of the events of one year earlier is that it was duplicated in thousands of small towns and villages all over France, with explicit efforts to time the parades, oaths, and celebratory dinners in the provinces to occur simultaneously with their counterparts in the capital. Again, the emphasis was on the togetherness, unity, and cohesion of the body social. The seizure of the Bastille the year before was seen as a sharp break with the past, a watershed that marked a new future of French men and women as citizens rather than royal subjects. And even if the Revolution as it unfolded could not ultimately deliver all that was promised and implied in the Festival of Federation in July 1790, it marked the beginning of a long series of festivals that ultimately came to shape the revolutionary regime: the Festival of Reason (10 November 1793), the Festival of the Supreme Being (8 June 1794), the Festival of Victories (29 May 1796), and the Festival of Liberty (29 July 1798) being only the best known. Like the revolutionary calendar invented by the revolutionaries to replace the Gregorian calendar—renaming the months after the seasons and renumbering the years with the revolutionary Year I marking the abolition of the monarchy and declaration of France as a republic by the Convention in September 1792—the festivals of the French Revolution played a vital political and social role in cementing the break with the Old Regime's values of hierarchy and distinction and helping to forge a new sense of nation around the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. That it took nearly a century to create a national holiday out of Bastille Day only indicates the ambiguities and tensions that remained within the new republic in France as well as the political struggles over how the history of the revolution would be told.

The political battles before 1880, however, were only a foretaste of what was to come. For about a decade thereafter the supporters of the new national holiday continued to use it to forge a sense of nation for the many rural provinces that had remained largely untouched by either industrialization or the republican state. Those on the left also used the national holiday as a means of fighting some of their own political battles, especially the creation of secular public schools, which had political and religious as well as educational implications, since the Catholic Church

had been a staunch opponent of the Revolution since 1789, as well as an outspoken critic of the Third Republic in France. For those on the right the celebration of the new national holiday after 1880 was something entirely different. For them 14 July 1789 was just the prelude to the Terror, and the Revolution as a whole was seen as something destructive that broke down the proper and divinely ordained political and social order of the Old Regime. They mounted a frenzied but ultimately unsuccessful effort to establish 28 June 1689 (the date when a seventeenth-century nun had a vision of the Sacred Heart) as a replacement for 14 July 1789. For many Catholics 1889 marked not the centennial of the detested Revolution, but the bicentennial of the miracle of 1689.

The centennial celebrations of 14 July 1889, however, proved to be a total defeat for the right. The government of the French Third Republic mounted the Universal Exposition in Paris to mark the hundredth anniversary of Bastille Day. And they commissioned a new Paris landmark to replace that symbol of the Old Regime, the Bastille, which had long since been torn down. Although it was immediately denounced by many on the right as modernism gone amok, the Eiffel Tower stood in the minds of its creators as a stark contrast with the former Bastille: one a symbol of the medieval world of superstition and despotism, the other a modern symbol of reason and progress. The events of 14 July 1889 mirrored those of 14 July 1790 all across France: military parades, special meals, followed by public dances and balls in village and town squares throughout the republic. It was clear that the national holiday quickly had become not only public, but also a popular holiday. As long as a republican government remained in power—and the Third Republic lasted until it was replaced in 1940 by the Vichy regime—this would remain the case. While extremists on both sides of the political spectrum would continue to propagate criticisms of the government through attacks on Bastille Day and even some demonstrations against the festivities on 14 July, these never amounted to much.

Celebrations were interrupted during World War II, and the first celebration of Bastille Day in six years on 14 July 1945 was very poignant. On the one hand, it was a celebration of freedom and liberty from occupation, with all parties more or less able to celebrate French liberty. On the other hand, it marked a political struggle between the supporters of General Charles de Gaulle, who had led the Free French government in exile during the war, and the communists and socialists. De Gaulle wanted 14 July to commemorate more a national than a republican holiday, reflecting a mythical and almost eternal France fight-

ing against oppression, symbolized by Joan of Arc, Henry IV, Napoleon, Clemenceau, and de Gaulle himself. And while he managed to dominate electoral politics in France for more than two decades after the war, de Gaulle ultimately lost out in his effort to transform the national holiday into something else. The festivities of 1945 repeated all the rituals as they had been before the war, and there were no monuments to Joan of Arc or Napoleon, a sign that France had returned to normalcy despite nearly six years of foreign occupation.

The old political struggles between left and right were not totally eliminated, however, as the bicentennial of the French Revolution in July 1989 made clear. The political tensions were exacerbated by the fact that the new president of the republic, the socialist François Mitterrand, had just soundly defeated one of the leaders of the right, Jacques Chirac, the mayor of Paris. As the celebrations of the bicentennial were destined to focus on Paris, despite the traditional provincial celebrations, the battleground loomed large as both Mitterrand and Chirac sought to outdo—and outspend—each other on a commercial celebration of the bicentennial. What worked against and ultimately overshadowed this political rivalry between left and right was the crushing of the Chinese student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square by the Chinese government in May 1989. The events in China had a dramatic effect on the celebrations in Paris two months later. First, Chirac's effort to bring some attention to the city of Paris (that is, to his own municipal government in the capital) and to take away some of the attention inevitably showered on the federal government and President Mitterrand fell completely flat. Although he was a solid republican, unlike some on the far right, Chirac's idea was to mark the hundredth anniversary of the Eiffel Tower in June rather than to commemorate the Revolution itself. The resulting spectacle and light show, in which no expense was spared, was both a critical and popular failure. The aging rock stars hired to evoke a sense of Parisian destiny—Johnny Halliday and Stevie Wonder among them—did not help matters. For his part, President Mitterrand felt obliged to invite some of the Chinese students to participate in the grand parade scheduled to march down the Champs Élysées in Paris on the evening of July 14, and they completely stole the show. In the end, it did not matter, as the Chinese student presence only reinforced the notion that the French Revolution was a universal revolution, fought for all humanity rather than just for France. The millions of francs spent on the events were of course another sign that commercialism had played a big role, as was the case in most modern festivals. But despite

all that, a sense of French nation was spelled out in stark relief by the festivities of July 1989, a nation to which both Chirac and Mitterand, as well as their respective supporters, could claim to belong. If anything, the nation had grown to be too inclusive for a few. The National Front Party used the celebrations to demonstrate against the foreigners living in France, and on the morning of 14 July the citizens of Dijon in Burgundy, a region dominated by the right, woke up to find storefronts and shop windows littered with the graffiti “*Bisangtennaire*,” an allusion to the bloody violence of the Revolution that was being celebrated throughout France. For most French men and women, however, their national holiday has remained much more a holiday than a paean to the nation.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that the festival tradition declined in Europe; the forces of industrialization, in particular, added to earlier reform attacks. In early modern Europe (depending on the religion prevalent in an area) festival days could total eighty or more per year, although specific calendars varied from locality to locality. Reform attacks dented the tradition, although even Protestant Britain saw efforts at revival as late as the eighteenth century. With nineteenth-century industrialization, employers and public authorities attempted to institute further discipline. Fes-

tivals cost working time, they assembled potentially menacing crowds, and they inspired a spontaneity that was itself suspect. Urbanization reduced community familiarity, another pillar in the festival tradition. Many festivals shrank in importance, and in the long run the rise of private leisure, including vacations, replaced some of their functions. Important festivals remained, however, including new ones associated with political identity. In Eastern Europe, these included great twentieth-century communist innovations such as May Day. In western Europe, changes in the character of festivals particularly highlighted the growth of commercialization.

Some festivals naturally illustrate the transition from a ritual of sacred community to secularism and commercialism better than others. Perhaps the best example of all is Christmas, the Christian festival celebrating the birth of Christ. Protestants and Catholics alike in the sixteenth century had railed against the pagan practices that had become part of the Christmas celebrations since the Middle Ages: Yule logs, evergreen trees decorated with candles, and decking the halls with holly and ivy had always been part of the ancient festival of light at the celebration marking the winter solstice. Even the date of Christmas was chosen to coincide with these pagan rituals, as no one knew the actual date of Christ's birth. Puritans in seventeenth-century England had attempted to outlaw all such pagan practices during their brief moment in power in the

gland, the practice of exchanging gifts and greeting cards was not generally associated with Christmas at all. And by 1900 a cohort of commercial institutions proudly displaying their own Santa Clauses helped to fuel the market for gift giving that only exacerbated this transition further. By the end of the twentieth century Christmas had become a season rather than a single day of festivities. And with up to a third of all retail sales for the year coming in the Christmas season, it was primarily a season of shopping. Despite the best efforts of Christian churches everywhere across Europe to stem the tide, it was already a battle lost.

Other festivals, such as the Feast of St. John (24 June), have achieved more mixed results. Just as Christmas was assigned a day on the Christian calendar to coincide with the pagan celebration of the winter solstice, the Feast of St. John the Baptist was assigned to coincide with the summer solstice, or midsummer's eve, celebrations. Bonfires have been lit on the eve of St. John's Day since the Middle Ages in towns and villages across Europe. And while modern fireworks have replaced the bonfires in many places, the rituals of these festivities follow a traditional and well-worn path. To be sure, the bonfires are no longer believed to be purifying agents that function to ward off evil spirits as they did in their ancient beginnings, but neither do they have much explicit connection with the Feast of St. John the Baptist. Although no one could claim that this festival has become commercialized, it is now just entertainment and has been shorn of its religious roots.

There are a host of other festivals that could be cited to demonstrate how the ways that Europeans have celebrated important events with feasts and other celebrations have changed over time since the Renaissance. What seems clear, however, is that rituals of feasting and the celebration of holidays of some kind are as much a part of human society as any other aspect of life. That the events that Europeans celebrate and how they have chosen to celebrate them have changed over the last five centuries is hardly a revelation. What is significant is that festivals continue to matter in a variety of ways. That the control of Carnival or of Bastille Day, for example, has been so hotly contested only underscores the continued significance of these rituals. And that many of them have become commercialized almost to excess does not alter the fact that they still function in a variety of ways to delineate boundaries of the community and to promote a sense of connection to the human past. In an information age of the instant and immediate, this matters. Moreover, while contemporary festivals may seem more oriented toward commercial entertainment and leisure

1650s—to no avail. The fact is that Christmas was never a major Christian holiday before the nineteenth century and had always been far overshadowed by Easter. In the nineteenth century in Great Britain a fortuitous series of events not only resurrected the celebration of Christmas, but proceeded to turn it into the commercial excess it has now become. A combination of attempts by several large London department stores to stir up sales in the bleakness of mid-winter, combined with the commercial and popular success of Charles Dickens's novel *A Christmas Carol*, resulted in a series of new rituals that were cloaked in the guise of Christian celebration, but that were above all else a bastion of conspicuous consumption. The invention of Santa Claus, or Father Christmas as he is called in some countries, shows how a relatively obscure medieval Christian saint could be transformed into a jolly old man in a red suit who brought presents to all young children on Christmas Eve (Santa Claus being the Germanic form of Saint Nicolas). Prior to this Victorian invention in nineteenth-century En-

than those in the premodern world, they nevertheless maintain the capacity to tell us much about who we are and how the world we live in got to be the way it is.

See also other articles in this section.

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THE REFORMATION OF POPULAR CULTURE



Ann W. Ramsey

In the 1960s and 1970s, through efforts to understand “social history from below,” historians began to focus on communal rituals and festivities, which from the late Middle Ages forward also became targets of reform or abolition. It appears that early modern secular elites intensified or coopted preexisting clerical campaigns to regulate the sacred and to separate it from popular entertainments. Targets included the Feast of Fools; charivari; confraternal processions; mystery plays; carnivalesque behaviors like feasting, drinking, and masking; and the physical license and magical rites that celebrated saints’ days, holy days, agricultural cycles, and rites of passage like birth, baptism, marriage, and death.

DIFFICULTIES OF DEFINITIONS

No universal definition either of popular culture or of its reformation applies equally satisfactorily to all time periods or regions of Europe. Most broadly the reformation of popular culture refers to the combination of social, political, economic, technological, cultural, and psychological changes that established the disciplining of the body, emotions, and cognition as a desired social norm. From the Renaissance forward new models for piety, manners, sexual modesty, hygiene, and work discipline transformed authority relations between elites and the popular classes. Popular culture is one of the most important domains in which elites and the common people developed and contested new technologies of power.

The concept of a reformation of popular culture is best adapted to the early modern period, for which it was first developed. Within the context of that period historians emphasize that elites increasingly regarded communal festivities as impious, socially and politically subversive, superstitious, and backward. Humanism, new attitudes toward the sacred, increasing social conflict stemming from economically uneven recovery from the Black Death (1347), and the growth

of princely sovereignty created a volatile and socially competitive atmosphere. In the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries the amount of festival license that ruling elites were willing to grant the common people declined. The potential of festival and popular gatherings to lead to revolt was the most important factor in their repression in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period. Sustained periods of warfare, including the wars of religion in France, 1563–1598; the Thirty Years’ War in Germany, 1618–1648; and the Time of Troubles in Russia, 1604–1613, and periods of economic depression throughout the seventeenth century helped destroy the fabric of traditional communities and led to the abandonment of many popular traditions.

In the sixteenth century the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants intensified societal scrutiny and regulation of all ritual behaviors. This occurred because the meanings of ritual and the sacred were subject to unprecedented doctrinal and social debate. Popular public rituals, such as confraternal processions and the bonfires of Saint John’s Eve, mixed the sacred and the profane. Because Catholics and Protestants disagreed about the correct boundaries between the sacred and the profane and about the nature of the sacred itself, popular celebrations of holy days led to civil violence in the streets between Protestants and Catholics. The uses of public space came under increasing scrutiny by officials responsible for public order. In Paris, for example, the Parlement banned masking in 1514 and in 1524 condemned mystery plays because their burlesque admixture of religion and theater appeared newly dangerous and irreverent.

Early modern sovereign princes developed new disciplinary techniques and claimed new rights of taxation and justice. Armed with the new moral authority invested in them by both the Catholic and the Protestant Reformations, governments intervened in the ritual lives of once-isolated rural communities more systematically. Princely and centralized dominance over towns also grew with the increase in trained

officials. In cities the spontaneity of popular celebrations gave way to highly organized spectacles representing princely authority and hierarchical norms of morality.

This first phase of the early modern reformation of popular culture lasted through the seventeenth century or later in eastern Europe and Russia. It was largely prescriptive in that legislation proliferated, replacing custom with government demands for uniformity in language, such as the Edict of Villers-Cotterêts in France in 1539; urban construction; and compliance with tax officials. It was repressive in that it limited the behaviors tolerated both in public spaces, including theater, prostitution, gambling, and drinking, and inside churches, including dancing, banquets, and rowdy processions. In addition it established more patriarchal norms of authority within households and throughout society. The reformation of behaviors added discipline because it created new institutions to reshape the thought and behavior of both elites and the popular classes through schooling, stricter norms for poor relief, and more enforced periods of labor.

Changes in elite attitudes that sparked reforms of popular culture are better documented than the local circumstances explaining the disappearance or transformation of particular rites of popular culture.

A hallmark of the reform process may be the gradual withdrawal of elites from their former participation in rites of popular culture, sharing or supporting carnival, for example. Local studies necessary to measure and date popular adaptation, resistance, or compliance are incomplete and are subject to differing interpretations.

A second and more complex process, better termed the transformation of popular culture, is often considered part of the reformation of popular culture. It is both a second phase and a second type of reformation of popular culture. Although its roots lie in the sixteenth century as well, it is most evident from the eighteenth century forward, when more capitalist relations of production, a decline of the Christian monopoly of cultural values, and political upheavals such as the French Revolution further transformed authority relations. More long-term structural processes of change, including the shift from oral to print culture, industrialization, and the emergence of a class society, were involved. Such changes made culture a commodity, and this altered the possibilities for making meaning, that is, the production of culture itself. Structural changes, through the advent of bourgeois cultural hegemony, working-class political movements, consumer society, and mass culture, thus changed the nature of popular culture in the modern period.

The concept of elite cultural hegemony. Social historians have found the concept of cultural hegemony particularly useful in discussing both phases of the reformation of popular culture. Developed by the Italian revisionist marxist sociologist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), cultural hegemony is the power to define the norms of public order, to determine the content of what constitutes knowledge and rational behavior, and the ability to control the dominant symbols and ritual practices of a society. Hence, one definition of the reformation of popular culture is elites' ongoing efforts to assert and maintain their cultural hegemony. This points to popular culture as a changing set of practices rather than a static repertoire of proscribed behaviors. Accordingly some social historians see popular culture as a "force field of relations," the site of changing power relationships between shifting dominants, subordinates, and subcultures.

Interdisciplinary approaches to the reform of popular culture. Adaptations of Gramsci's approach accord well with tendencies to focus on the cultural dimensions of social conflict. The approaches from semiotics and textual criticism have influenced analysis of discursive practices and the changing mean-

ing of “the popular.” Cultural anthropology, ethnography, ritual studies, and comparative religion have contributed to analyses of nonverbal sources, such as the symbolic forms and behaviors in popular festivities and the cultural artifacts and material culture of the popular classes.

EXPLAINING WHEN, HOW, AND WHY CULTURAL NORMS CHANGE

Regardless of the approaches taken, the dominant issue in analyzing the reformation of popular culture is an explanation of how and why cultural norms change. Four dynamics recur in the reformation of popular culture:

1. the social, psychological, and cultural transformation and acculturation of an elite who legitimize their power by adopting distinctive behaviors that display purportedly superior and more dignified aesthetic or moral values;
2. the subsequent elite pursuit of cultural hegemony, which entails some control of the state or earlier a monopoly of violence in society or aspirations to determine the forms of violence in society;
3. intensified ruling-class control of the socialization of the young, manifested especially in disciplining the behavior of young males and defining gender roles for females that enforce the authority of adult males; and
4. the changing ability of social subordinates to fashion a different culture of their own and thus shape the production of elite cultural hegemony and the meanings within popular culture.

CHRISTIANIZATION AND THE REFORMATION OF POPULAR CULTURE

A persistent Christian moralizing ethic, which condemned so-called pagan superstitions and all undisciplined pleasures of the body and senses, has played a significant and ongoing role in the reformation of popular culture. Nonconformist religious movements, Christian revival movements such as the evangelical movement in England from the 1820s, and Catholic action among the working classes are important examples of the enduring role of the Christian critique of popular culture. At different times secular elites and the state successfully adapted this religiously motivated critique.

The abolition of the Feast of Fools in the twelfth through the sixteenth centuries. Christians had

always inveighed against pagan practices, and Saint Augustine (354–430) left an enduring critique of popular pleasures and human sinfulness. The best documented medieval reform of popular culture that displays all of the four dynamics mentioned above began in the cathedrals of newly urbanized, twelfth-century Europe. The growing differentiation between town and country, first visible in the twelfth century, is an ongoing prerequisite for reformation of popular culture. Hence examining the twelfth-century context of the reformation of popular culture is fundamental.

In 1198 and 1199 Eudes de Sully, bishop of Paris, successfully banished the Feast of Fools from Notre Dame Cathedral although not from all of Paris. His eagerness to enforce a distinctive disciplined behavior among his younger clergy stemmed in part from the eleventh-century church reform movement. That movement enjoined clerical celibacy and, following Pope Gregory VII (c. 1020–1085) in 1077, emphasized the church’s unique right to lead all of society.

In 1445 Eustache de Mesnil, dean of the Paris Theology Faculty, tried to enforce the ban on the Feast of Fools throughout France. The letter he addressed to all French bishops provides a landmark description of the carnivalesque and demonstrates the extent to which the lower clergy did not yet conform to norms for superior clerical morals and conduct:

Priests and clerks may be seen wearing masks and monstrous visages. . . . They dance in the choir dressed as women, panders, and minstrels. They sing wanton songs. They eat black puddings at the horn of the altar while the celebrant is saying mass. They play at dice there. They cense with stinking smoke from the soles of old shoes. They leap through the church without a blush at their own shame. Finally they drive about the town and its theatres in shabby traps and carts; and rouse the laughter of their fellows and the bystanders in infamous performances with indecent gestures and verses scurrilous and unchaste. (Chambers, 1954, vol. 1, p. 294)

Carnival and late-medieval civic consciousness.

Throughout urban Europe in the late Middle Ages, lay elites embraced prohibited carnival behaviors to protest clerical cultural dominance and because they resented the growing success of campaigns against the Feast of Fools. Lay carnival thus could express urban distinctiveness from the clergy, from the rural nobility, and from the peasantry and promote a competition against the theoretical clerical monopoly of the sacred.

In the fragile social peace of the late Middle Ages confraternities, guilds, youth abbeys, and neighborhood and parish associations celebrated particular loyalties. At the local level they simultaneously fos-

tered social integration and competition, and they frequently led to violence between groups. In Lille in 1382 parish processions and street assemblies were prohibited because marches into neighboring parishes or streets led to riots. The so-called evil carnival (*Böse Fastnacht*) in Basel in 1376 led to large-scale bloodshed and was known throughout Europe. In 1378 a famous revolt of Florentine wool carders known as the Ciompi reinforced elite fears of the subversive potential of popular assemblies and festivals. The consolidation of the princely Medici regime followed in Florence in 1433. The church council that gathered in Basel in 1438 issued the most sweeping ban on the Feast of Fools. The juxtaposition of these events strongly suggests the intense competitions for cultural hegemony and political power in Renaissance Europe.

By the sixteenth century municipal officials had a distinct preference for spectacles offered to the city under official auspices. In Arras, France, the joyous companies (youth abbeys) were no longer communal associations of unmarried men as they had been in the countryside, and they were increasingly subject to municipal supervision. At the last-known meeting of the Pleasure Abbey (*Abbaye de Liesse*) of Arras, members marched with their neighbors from Cambrai to hear mass on the Monday of carnival week. The association's functions had shifted from organizing popular festivals to enforcing religious discipline and fostering good economic relations with neighboring cities such as Cambrai.

As the opportunities for venting local rivalries decreased and as more spontaneous processions, play-acting, feasting, and drinking were circumscribed, emergent market relations and state sovereignty transformed the structures of authority in communities. The nature of the popular was altered by destruction of the social and cultural context in which local common people could control the production of culture. Vertical loyalties and bonds of obedience replaced horizontal, traditional loyalties of kinship and locality.

The proliferation of festivals and competition to control the sacred carnival.

In 1404 the chancellor of the University of Paris, Jean Charlier de Gerson (1363–1429), appealed to the French king to enforce a reduction of all festival days so artisans would not squander their resources and lead immoral lives. Well before Martin Luther (1483–1546) rejected the sacramental structure of Roman Catholicism in 1520, lay Christians and clerical elites expressed a growing reserve about the nature and workings of the sacred in the world.

German religious reformers, such as Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), and preachers, such as Johann

Geiler von Kaysersberg (1445–1510) in Strasbourg, increasingly sought to separate the sacred from the profane and to limit carnival. Objections to carnival increased in part because the number of days of revelry had grown and encroached on the Lenten season. The Flemish painter Pieter Brueghel (c. 1525–1569) captured this clash of worldviews in his painting *The Battle between Carnival and Lent* (1559).

In Florence the Dominican penitential preacher Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498) controlled the public life of the city from 1490 to 1498 and organized young boys (*fanciulli*), who were the most active participants in carnival, to perform moralizing religious theater. Instead of electing carnival “kings” and “queens,” young boys under Savonarola’s direction chose Jesus Christ as their king. Savonarola urged them to avoid all spectacles through frequent confession and communion. Bishop Carlo Borromeo (1538–1584) helped transform the public life of Milan through a more sober and institutionalized form of antitheater. The Forty Hours Eucharist Devotion in churches attracted crowds away from carnival with displays of lights accompanying the penitential rituals of fasting, confession, and extended prayer. The policing of eucharistic devotion through reform of Corpus Christi festivals was a powerful instrument of reform of popular culture, as were reforms in the veneration of saints and the Virgin Mary.

In Florence the popular and participatory nature of carnival declined when festivities began to celebrate the glory of Medici princely authority and patronage of the fine arts. The Florentine carnival of 1513 was organized with floats of classical Roman motifs in honor of the election of Giovanni de’ Medici (1475–1521) to the papacy. This secular cooptation of carnival was more effective than the moralizing reforms of Savonarola. In Venice the growing commercialization of carnival and its staging for the benefit of tourism also transformed the popular character of the event.

THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION OF HUMANISM

The social and cultural role of humanists begins to explain how the burlesque spontaneity of popular carnival was reformed into a stylized, intellectualized, and moralizing spectacle. In the sixteenth century the written word acquired an authority it had not previously possessed. The more spontaneous secular and religious popular culture of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance became vulnerable to written critique and written rules that took precedence over customs and oral traditions.

As humanist scholars such as Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457) collected and compared ancient classical and early Christian manuscripts to accepted church texts, they challenged the authenticity of documents that had supported the traditional authority of the papacy within Latin Christendom. Language analysis (historical etymology) became the basis for a new approach to historical and sacred truth. A new form of authority developed that prioritized ratiocination, critical inquiry, and self-observation as well as norms of standardization, uniformity, and disciplining the self.

Besides the humanist approach to language, the advent of the printing press created a new community of scholars who could debate the meaning of words based on standardized texts in a way that had been impossible in the world of manuscript culture. Printing elevated standardization to a new cultural norm and made books a commodity. Liturgical standardization, enjoined at the Council of Trent (1545–1563) and in the campaign against the Old Believers in Rus-

sia, indicates the similar paths reform of popular culture might take in highly varied settings.

New attitudes toward standardization and critical observation also played a role in the scientific revolution and in industrialization. Standardization and uniformity as cultural norms stood in direct conflict with the concepts of time, rationality, work, leisure, and consumption characteristic of late-medieval popular culture.

The “civilizing process.” In Italy in the early sixteenth century republican regimes gave way to principalities in Milan, Genoa, and Florence. As service at a princely court became the path for social mobility, ambitious individuals vied for the favor of the prince. People distinguished themselves by training both body and intellect in skills of politeness, eloquence, physical grace, and the appreciation of beauty in varied art forms. A more formal, refined court aristocracy replaced the increasingly archaic warrior nobility of the

Middle Ages. Sociologists like Norbert Elias have argued that the distinctiveness of Western civilization derives from a special “courtly rationality” that accompanied princely state formation with its ethics of self-discipline and control of affect.

The number of printed editions of books of manners and conduct, such as *The Book of the Courtier* (c. 1518) by Baldassare Castiglione (1478–1529), provides some of the best evidence for this “civilizing process” (Elias, 1982). The Latin writings of Desiderius Erasmus (1466?–1536), including *De civilitate morum puerillum*, (Civilizing the manners of boys, 1529), introduced schoolboys to the conscious cultivation of manners by stressing the importance of subtle observations of the behavior of oneself and others.

As the authority of a multiplicity of lesser and greater regional nobles was rationalized by the consolidation of effective sovereignty in emerging territorial states and a few urban republics, the social circulation of ascending and descending groups and individuals increased. Elias observed:

Slowly, in the course of the sixteenth century, earlier here and later there and almost everywhere with numerous reverses until well into the seventeenth century, a more rigid social hierarchy [began] to establish itself once more, and from elements of diverse social origins a new upper class, a new aristocracy [formed]. For this reason the question of uniform good behavior [became] increasingly acute, particularly as the changed structure of the upper class [exposed] each individual member to an unprecedented extent to the pressure of others and of social control. (Elias, 1982, vol. 1)

Complexities in the transition from oral to print culture. The radical effects of the humanists’ way of thinking about language and the sacred had many unintended consequences. Luther used Erasmus’s 1516 translation of the Greek New Testament to challenge the authority of the church’s only authorized version of the Bible, the Latin Vulgate prepared by Saint Jerome (c. 347–419 or 420). Comparing the texts, Luther argued that Jerome’s rendering of “inward change” (Greek *metanoia*) into the Latin “to do penance” (*poenitentiam agere*) created a false foundation for proper relations between humans and God. Luther’s belief in the incontrovertible truth of original texts and confidence in his power to interpret these texts impelled him ultimately to challenge the entire edifice of Roman Catholicism. The Protestant Reformations, building on the epochal change in the way humanists read texts, increased the authority attributed to sacred Scripture and increased lay Bible reading among Protestants. In this way the Protestant Reformations added to the authority of the written word

over popular custom. Luther was more tolerant of some carnival practices than was Lutheranism. In Nürnberg the Lutheran reformer Andreas Osiander (1498–1552) abolished the traditional parades of wild men (*Schembartläufer*) in the city’s carnival in 1539. These hairy figures who ran through the streets during carnival celebrated animals’ emergence from winter hibernation and thus the return of spring and light. Reformers throughout the sixteenth century sought to eliminate such popular pagan substructures in carnival. This was a tool of Christianization and a limitation on ritual violence as the run of wild men frequently led to fighting.

REFORM OF POPULAR CULTURE AND THE REFORMATION AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Throughout most of the sixteenth century, however, literacy remained a minority phenomenon in the general population. The ideas of Protestant reformers were transmitted to the popular classes in printed images and broadsheets that combined satiric depictions of the traditional church with simple texts that could be read aloud.

In the early stages of the Lutheran Reformation broadsheets presented the pope as an Antichrist and depicted priests wearing masks to hide their true iniquity. In its popular phase the Reformation drew on the conventions of carnival, carnivalesque “antirituals” that permitted the popular classes and youths to enact the truth of Luther’s written criticisms. Rituals of popular culture thus transformed the larger culture and shaped the Reformation as a movement of popular protest.

The popular enactment of new doctrinal truths produced new forms of highly ritualized violence in the sixteenth century. In Germany on Maundy Thursday, when altars were usually washed with holy water, youths instead broke into the church and scrubbed the altars with lye. The scale of the challenge to established authority grew in popular iconoclastic riots throughout the German-speaking lands, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and France, and the ritualized violence gave antirituals a heightened ideological content that made popular violence and all popular festivities even more threatening to authorities.

The conflict of worldviews about the sacred during the Reformation introduced an ideological content in sixteenth-century popular and ritualized violence. This increased the elites’ fears of the potentially subversive character of festivities. Ritual inversions create alternate states of mind that can release

participants from the constraints of ordinary time and place. The resulting license is not so much disorder as the defense of alternative visions of order. This enduring characteristic of ritual means that radical efforts to transform power relations and cultural norms return to ritual practices that once supported the traditional ways of life among the popular classes, for example, celebrations of the summer solstice, Saint John's Eve, by ecological groups in Europe.

The disciplining of enactment: confessionalization. The first phase of the Reformation in the 1520s was a popular movement. In a second phase of the Reformation associated with confessionalization, Protestant reformers increasingly looked askance at the carnivalesque images and behaviors that had initially fueled popular critique of the Roman church. In the 1530s and especially in the 1540s church reformers needed to instill adherence to standardized, written confessions of faith and distinctive patterns of worship and behavior that would set them off from traditional ritual practices. This creation, by Catholics and Protestants alike, of unmistakable confessional identities is termed "confessionalization." In the era of confessionalization the revolution of the written word, set in motion by humanists, bore fruit in the intensified use of printed catechisms. Church and state also cooperated in suppressing wedding and baptismal feasting. For example, detailed Lutheran regulation of wedding and baptismal feasting in Brandenburg Ansbach limited the number of participants allowed to assemble in the peasant countryside in the 1570s. Such measures not only eliminated occasions for waste and license but eroded the ties of kinship celebrated in popular festivities by godparents, confraternities, relatives. Such measures in Lutheran Scandinavia as well eroded horizontal and local bonds of loyalties that stood between subjects and their pastors, priests, and rulers.

Calvinism and the reform of morals. Of all the Protestant reformers John Calvin (1509–1564) expressed the strongest critique of popular culture, including dancing, drinking, sexual indulgence, and of traditional Catholic religious practices, including relics, shrines, pilgrimages, and the mass. Explanations of the resulting Protestant work ethic focus on Calvinism's emphasis on individual responsibility for a clean, healthy, and cognitively controlled body freed of all sensuality and devoted only to scripturally justifiable activities. Calvinist hostility to ritual body movements, witchcraft, magic, miracles, and altered states of consciousness derived from a fundamental

anxiety about bodily movement and accompanying emotional release. This anxiety created a fundamental hostility to traditional popular culture.

The puritan revolution of popular culture. Calvinism contributed to the reform of popular culture wherever its consistory system for policing social morals functioned, including Geneva, southern France, Scotland, and the Netherlands. No form of Protestantism, however, was more hostile to popular rituals than English Puritanism. The interregnum of 1649–1660 was a watershed for abolition of the rituals of popular culture in England. Under the government of Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658), Puritans outlawed public ceremonies, such as maypoles, dancing, and drinking matches. A popular ballad of 1648 lamented, "Christmas was killed at Naseby fight" along with "charity" and "good fellowship." The Battle of Naseby, 14 June 1645, marked Cromwell's decisive defeat of King Charles I (1600–1649) of England. While Christmas recovered, the fires of Saint John's Eve vanished along with a culture of sociability and a treatment of marginality perceived as generous and less criminalizing.

THE INDUSTRIAL ERA

The culture of working class associations. The ability of church, state, and social elites to dominate working-class culture should not be overemphasized. Sixteenth-century royal legislation to outlaw guilds was not highly effective. Guilds and journeymen's associations were neither simple stepping-stones to modern democracy nor disorderly defenders of traditionalism or local backwaters of resistance to market competition. Journeymen especially perpetuated rituals of worker solidarity and sociability that fostered organizing skills and sustained the emotional bonds necessary to nineteenth-century collective action. This occurred despite policing of work sites by proponents of industrialization, such as Josiah Wedgwood (1730–1795) and Samuel Bentham (1757–1831) in England and Joseph Montgolfier (1740–1810) and Étienne Montgolfier (1745–1799) in France. The workers of the *faubourg* (suburb) Saint-Antoine in Paris and young journeymen (*compagnons*) had traditions of violent behaviors that were interwoven with associational rituals. As Victor Hugo (1802–1885), however, wrote of worker protest in *Les Misérables* (1862), the men "terrible, half-naked, cudgel in fist . . . were savages . . . but the savages of civilization" in their violent efforts to end oppression. While such views validate the goals of working-class political ac-

tion, they ignore the workers' cultural traditions that adapted to the industrial world.

The rise of bourgeois cultural norms. The timing and ultimate success of middle-class and upper-middle-class efforts to create a social identity distinct from that of both the traditional landed elites and the growing working class was closely allied with the pace of industrialization and the ability of the middle classes to control the terms of political participation in their respective national contexts. Most advanced in England and in France from the 1830s onward and clearly less successful in areas of slowed national unification, delayed industrialization, and persistent autocratic political regimes, the elevation of middle-class notions of order and morality had decisive effects on the reformation of popular culture in the nineteenth century. At the same time the ability of the working classes to develop a culture of their own in the process of organizing social and political movements must be taken into account.

Revolutions in the means of communication and the growing commercialization of culture mean that the simple schema of repressed practices and required new behaviors become even less useful in analyzing the reformation of popular culture. From the eighteenth century forward the impact of printing and the mass production of illustrated material for audiences that cut across class lines was quantitatively and qualitatively different from the effects seen in the Reformation. The way historians evaluate the maturing of "mass culture" and its relation to "popular culture" and class conflict adds more complexity to discussions of the reformation of popular culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

POLITICAL APPROPRIATIONS OF CARNIVAL AS TRANSFORMATIONS OF POPULAR CULTURE

In the nascent political activism that led to the revolutions of 1848, the German middle classes, especially in the Rhineland, appropriated and transformed the carnival celebrations that, in Catholic regions, had survived the Reformation only to be banned during the Napoleonic invasion of central Europe in the early nineteenth century. After their incorporation into the Prussian state in 1815, carnival festivities provided the middle classes of the Rhineland with opportunities for assembly, use of public space, printed self-expression, and commerce that were otherwise suppressed by the Prussian regime. Political appropriation of carnival tradition continued into the twentieth century. In

France, for example, in the 1920s and 1930s socialists revived festival practices in many localities to assert a populist political identity and to attempt mass political organizing.

Early industrialization in England. The most informative studies of the reformation of popular culture in nineteenth-century Britain differentiate clearly between ongoing reforms of the remnants of traditional popular festive practices in the countryside and the new set of forces affecting the growing urban populations. In treating the reformation of popular culture in urban industrial society, three factors come to the forefront:

1. the growing effect of a new concept of time emphasizing worker productivity and the control of workers' bodies and workers' use of public space,
2. "the culture that working people were making for themselves in their organized social movements" (Yeo and Yeo, 1981), and
3. "the rise of respectable society" (F. M. K. Thompson, 1988), a theme that organizes the social history of Victorian Britain, 1830–1900.

Ongoing cultural reforms in the countryside. In Great Britain attacks on traditional holidays intensified from the 1760s onward as the capitalist revolution in agriculture brought about the enclosure movement, engrossing, and increasing proletarianization of the rural workforce. The case study "The Taming of Whitsun" in Oxfordshire, England, from 1800 to 1900 by Alun Howkins (in Yeo and Yeo, 1988, pp. 187–208) elucidates a new stage in the reformation of popular culture.

Before 1830 the celebration of Whitsun began with the erecting of maypoles, an ancient gesture marking agricultural fertility. Evergreen-bedecked bowers served as a "court" for "my lord and my lady" of the feast. Often called Whit Ales, up to thirteen days of drinking, hunting (the Whit Hunt), morris dancing, cockfighting, bullbaiting, badger baiting, revelry, and fistfighting followed, with local variations. A combination of factors gradually extinguished Whitsun celebrations and replaced them with the one-day bank holiday of the 1900s. The development of scientific farming, including the use of artificial fertilizers from the 1820s, undercut the quasi-magical attempts to procure fertility through the raising of maypoles. Further rationalization of the agricultural process created regular monthly cattle sales, and the more spontaneous sale of livestock at Whitsun fairs lost significance. The collapse of the paternalistic ethic of the gentry,

who had supported the celebrations and the Whit Hunt in the spirit of traditional elites' obligation occasionally to entertain the poor, providing a source of cheer and outlet for frustrations, collapsed. Finally a "reformation of manners" affected the poor and the gentry alike.

REFORMATION OF MANNERS AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF LEISURE

A refinement of manners was sparked by the effects of science on quasi-magical practices and beliefs. Heightened class conflict increased the distance between masters and servants, and the informal violence of Whitsuntide became less attractive to the gentry. At the same time the evangelical revival encouraged sectarian preaching among the poor. The chief target of this religious moral reform was drink. Methodism took the lead, followed by evangelical bishops from the Established (Anglican) Church, such as Samuel Wilberforce (1805–1873) who was appointed bishop of Oxford in the 1840s.

Historians have debated how to view the rationalization of entertainment that was a major part of the overall reformation of popular culture. Malcolmson (1973) argued that growing class divisions caused the gentry to withdraw themselves and their material support from traditional revelry. Howkins's study of Whitsuntide suggests a different dynamic of growing involvement by the gentry in the leisure of the poor after 1840, albeit in a changed role of informal policing and moral mentoring that paralleled the

formal government intervention in sanitary reforms in cities in the 1840s. The outlawing of cockfighting, bullbaiting, and badger baiting in the 1830s did not end those blood sports. Real change came not by legal prohibition but by the process Raymond Williams (1973) called "incorporation." Throughout Europe the repression of working-class blood sports reflected fundamentally new attitudes toward animals and animal cruelty. This change in elite consciousness about the natural world is a complex modern phenomenon with relevance to animal rights movements. The changing attitudes toward nature and animals as factors in the reformation of popular culture deserve more investigation.

The rise of respectable society. The success of the middle-class and upper-middle-class demands for political participation, especially from the 1830s onward, expressed a social and cultural identity distinct from that of traditional landed elites and that of the growing working class. The success of these demands promoted middle-class cultural hegemony and increased supervision of the morality of the growing working class. Attention focused on regulation of behaviors in public. With the further growth of urbanization and the concentration of working-class populations, the middle-class perception that industrial laboring classes were necessarily dangerous classes grew.

Modern gender roles: separate spheres as a norm not a reality. The paradoxes and class conflicts inherent in the reformation of popular culture are es-

pecially evident in the transformations of women's social roles and particular subcultures. Women were a special repository of oral traditions and specialized forms of knowledge in midwifery, popular medicine, magic, witchcraft, gossip, and informal networks of information, such as spinning bees or *veillés* (vigils) in France. The policing of bodies and the pursuit of hygiene, both central to the reformation and transformation of popular culture, brought multiple systems of domination to bear on the lives of women. Upper-middle-class and upper-class women often found their spheres of public influence extended as they attempted to impose their religious and behavioral norms on working-class women. At the same time the acquisition of literacy by women, the appearance of female writers, and the creation of new professions and new patterns of consumption for women eventually cut across class lines and further expanded spheres of influence. The creation of "separate spheres" applies to both American and European experiences, but as a norm it is always contested in reality.

CONCLUSION

The reformation of popular culture has not been a purely repressive process. Discipline and empowerment affect all social classes and women as well as men, as the transformation of popular culture shows. It is also deceptive to view the reformation and transformation of popular culture simply as an evolutionary process facilitating the integration of localized social units into more universal social structures. While the suppression of popular festival life transformed traditional communities in the early modern period, the rituals of popular culture, altered in their meanings, in the modern period can serve as the basis for

a radical critique of the centralized bureaucratic state. In Europe the revival of popular rituals has served ethnic autonomy movements in areas as diverse as Spain, France, the Netherlands, and the former Soviet Union.

The influence of the Green political movement in Europe also has led to the renewal of rites associated with the peasant agricultural cycle. Such protest against the pervasive destruction of the environment by contemporary modes of production and consumption links ancient forms of popular culture with a redefined notion of universal values, that is, planetary health. It may be questionable whether or not such appropriations represent any effective historical agency by the popular classes. Radical ecological movements have not forged effective ties with labor movements, but the joint demonstrations against the development programs of the World Bank in 2000 suggested efforts to build such coalitions of workers and intellectual activists. This presents possibilities for the transformation of popular culture in the twenty-first century.

Reappropriations of popular celebrations call the values and rationality of mass culture and narcissistic individualism into question. The ideal of the village as the core unit for human socialization can be viewed as an attempt to learn from what social historians have discovered about the human costs involved in the reformation of popular culture. However, a potential exists to distort what has been learned in studying the reformation of popular culture through idealization of a lost golden age of popular culture in which body and emotions were unfettered and human expression and creativity were more authentic. Such a view in part implies that a once-autonomous popular culture existed but ignores the social construction of all realities.

See also other articles in this section.

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LANGUAGE



Peter Burke

If social history is defined to include the history of everyday practices as well as social structures, the history of language is necessarily an important part of the enterprise. It is no accident that the shift toward the history of the everyday and the history of practices in the 1970s and 1980s—not to mention the so-called linguistic turn—was accompanied by a growing interest in what some of its practitioners described as the “social history of language.” Such topics as gossip, proverbs, conversation, and public speaking, once considered peripheral to social history if not imperious to change, began to attract the attention of historians. Some scholars analyzed the uses of language in the shaping of political movements such as the French Revolution and English Chartism, emphasizing the connections between the invention of a new vocabulary or a new type of discourse and a new political culture, a new political consciousness, or a more acute awareness of possible alternatives to old regimes.

In their pursuit of a social history of language, some historians turned to the linguists, especially the sociolinguists, for assistance, often adopting their vocabulary (“speech community,” “speech domain,” “code-switching,” and so on), and sometimes collaborating with them, as in the case of Geraint Jenkins’s *Social History of Welsh*. Linguists had of course long been interested in history—indeed, an international conference on historical linguistics took place in 1973—but not so much in social history, preferring to produce either an extremely precise and self-contained account of linguistic changes over time or an extremely general discussion of the relation between language and national history. As for the sociolinguists, for whom the relation between language and society was of paramount importance, with few exceptions (Dell Hymes, for instance), they focused on the present and neglected history. A few historians of earlier generations, among them Lucien Febvre, had taken more than a passing interest in linguistic forms, writing essays on language and nationality in eighteenth-century France, for example, or the language of the law in England, or the language of diplomacy in Sweden. However,

the new social history of language differs from the scattered studies that preceded it by being more systematic, more self-conscious, and concerned with “society” in a more precise sense of that ambiguous term.

One obvious focus for the new interest was the language of class, or more generally the ways in which differences in social status were expressed or constructed in everyday language. Another was the slang, jargon, or semiprivate languages of particular social groups, from beggars to bureaucrats. A third was the study of the forms of language considered appropriate for particular social situations or contexts, the language of insult, the language of compliment, and so on. A fourth was the study of changes in language over the long term considered in relation to changes in a given society—nation-building, the spread of literacy, and so on. These four themes will be considered in order in the following pages, in which it should become clear how much linguistic territory still awaits exploration by historians.

LANGUAGE AND STATUS

Throughout the history of postmedieval Europe, if not before, differences in language at the level of grammar, vocabulary, or accent have been associated with differences in social status. Some scholars in sixteenth-century Italy were already aware of this point and drew attention, for instance, to the archaic language of the peasants of Tuscany. These linguistic differences are sometimes unconscious, but they have often served as a means for certain individuals and groups to distinguish themselves from others. In some parts of Europe, the upper classes or status groups have literally spoken a different language from their social inferiors. Thanks to Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*, it is easy to remember that Russian nobles of the early nineteenth century often spoke to one another in French. So did the upper classes in the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century and in parts of the

German-speaking world in the eighteenth, while the Danes of the period used German as a status symbol and the Norwegians used Danish. French in Languedoc, Provence, and Brittany, like English in Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, and Castilian in Catalonia, served a similar function.

More common as a means of distinction was the adoption by the upper classes of what they considered to be a “purer” or more rational form of speech, a form closer to the written language. They showed their civilization and their connections with the wider world by abandoning the local dialect, or patois, a symbol of the popular culture from which they were gradually distancing themselves (in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in western Europe, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries farther east). In similar fashion, the habit of speaking in proverbs was gradually abandoned by the upper classes at this time. Proverbs became associated with the archaic world of the peasantry, while the employment of a pure form of language was taken as a sign that the speaker too was refined and rational. In 1690 the dictionary-maker Antoine Furetière defined patois as “corrupt and crude language, such as that of the lower orders” (*langage corrompu et grossier, tel que celui du*

menu peuple). In the mid-eighteenth century, the *Encyclopédie* offered a similar definition, “a corrupted language which is spoken in almost all the provinces.”

Some speakers went still farther in this direction and adopted a vocabulary so refined that it was scarcely intelligible outside their own circle, like the seventeenth-century French bluestockings, or *précieuses*, ridiculed in the plays of Molière, who distanced themselves from ordinary language by employing euphemisms and other circumlocutions such as *un nécessaire* for a servant. The language of the *précieuses* was an aspect of the culture of the salons in which women led the way in polishing the language of upper-class males, while the Académie Française, with its famous dictionary, continued and institutionalized the process. In Italy the Florentine Accademia della Crusca had a similar function, compiling a dictionary of acceptable words as a way of sorting the wheat from the “chaff” (*crusca*). In Spain the motto of the eighteenth-century Royal Academy, which had a similar function, was “it purifies, it fixes, and it dignifies” (*limpia, fija y da esplendor*). Generally speaking, the criterion of acceptability was that words or phrases should not be associated with the common people, with the provinces, or with particular occupations. The rejection of technical terms is a reminder that the upper classes defined themselves as ladies and gentlemen of leisure.

In England in the late seventeenth century, where there was no academy, a sense of distance from common speech was produced in fashionable circles by introducing French phrases into ordinary conversation. John Dryden’s *Marriage à la Mode* (1673) mocked fashionable people who peppered their English with French terms such as *grande monde*, *risque*, *épuisée*, or *à la mode* itself. In similar fashion, Germans with social pretensions introduced such words as *galanterie*, *goût*, and *politesse* into their everyday speech.

Accent too carried a social message. In the Jesuit college of Milan, teachers were already trying in the 1590s to eliminate provincial accents from the language of their pupils. In France in the early eighteenth century, a duke criticized a duchess for speaking with the accent (*ton*) as well the vocabulary of the common people. In England the accent of the southeast was becoming associated with the court in the time of Queen Elizabeth, although Sir Walter Raleigh apparently never lost his West Country accent. The painter Sir Joshua Reynolds also spoke with a Devonshire accent, although it had become more of an embarrassment by his time, when a “Yorkshire tone,” for example, was condemned in handbooks on good English. The rise of what would be known as “received pronunciation,” and the habit of using accent to place

acquaintances socially was already noticeable at that time. By the nineteenth century, schools in England, France, and elsewhere were inculcating standard forms of speech as well as writing and stigmatizing dialect as an inferior form of language.

As some of these examples suggest, the concern with the linguistic signs of social class is not—as it is often thought to be—a peculiarly English obsession. All the same, England in the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries does offer a particularly rich field of observation in this respect. The English novel of the period is also a wonderful source, provided that representations of speech in novels are used with caution, in other words, that novels are not assumed to be a simple reflection of linguistic practice but are read with awareness of the process of literary stylization. Like the guides used to correct language, they illustrate contemporary concern with avoiding a provincial ac-

cent, as well as vulgarisms such as “I had no call” or “I’ll tell you for why,” the use of proverbs, and above all, “dropping one’s Hs” and speaking of “ouse,” “appen,” and so on.

Certain forms of language were also associated with gender. “Talking like a lady,” as the nineteenth-century phrase went, meant distinguishing oneself at once from men and from “common” women, who were supposed to speak and especially to swear like men. Talking like a lady meant using a particular vocabulary, including modes of address such as “Papa” and, in the mid-nineteenth century, euphemisms such as “bosom” for breast and “limbs” for legs. These turns of speech are so often described as Victorian that it may be worth emphasizing that they had their equivalents in other European languages, as the example of the *précieuses* has already suggested.

JARGONS

The language of the *précieuses* might be described as a kind of jargon, a pejorative term rescued by linguists and used to refer to a virtually private language used by a particular social group. The classic case of jargon in modern Europe is the language of beggars and thieves, whether it was adopted as a way of keeping their affairs hidden from prying outsiders, as a way of creating solidarity, or both. This language was not exactly international, but there were significant features in common between the German *Rotwelsch*, as it was called, the French *argot*, the Italian *gergo* or *furbesco*, the Spanish *gringo*, and the English cant. These secret languages became much better known from the sixteenth century onward because they attracted the attention of both magistrates and professional writers, and dictionaries of various jargons became available in print. Less well known, but equally widespread, were the technical or semiprivate languages of other occupational groups such as students, soldiers, and masons—itinerant occupations all three, giving their jargons an international flavor.

Awareness of these jargons encouraged some men of letters to stigmatize the language of professors, lawyers, physicians, and officials in similar terms. In England from the late seventeenth century, for instance, the phrase “the jargon of the schools” came into use to refer to academic language, which was still laced with technical terms of medieval Scholastic philosophy such as “quiddity” and “entity.” In France, Italy, Spain, and elsewhere there was a similar rejection of pedantic language, which was increasingly considered to be out of place in polite discourse, a speech genre that the writers of the many books on “the art

of conversation” (especially common in France and England in the eighteenth century) attempted to regulate.

A similar point might be made about the “lawyer’s dialect” or “court gibberish,” as nonlawyers called it. Doctors too liked to blind their clients with science or at least with “hard words,” whether in Latin or the vernacular. We should not forget the language of bureaucracy, a jargon that appears to have been particularly elaborate and formidable in Vienna and Berlin from the eighteenth century. The jargon of the clergy should not be forgotten either. Still more striking, however, is the special language of religious movements or sects, including German and Scandinavian Pietists, English Quakers, and French Jansenists. The Society of Friends, for example, expressed their spiritual egalitarianism by their rejection of deferential forms of speech, replacing them with what they called the “plain” language of “Thee,” “Thou,” “Friend,” and so on. They were also distinctive in their rejection of oaths in their vocabulary (in which “church,” for example, was replaced by “steeple-house”), and in their emphasis on the religious value of silence.

The particular speech forms of religious groups should not be confused with religion as a special domain in which ordinary speakers of ordinary language “switch codes,” as the linguists say, to a higher or more formal variety of speech, the linguistic equivalent of wearing their Sunday best to church.

SPEECH DOMAINS

After they had distanced themselves from ordinary people in the ways described above, the upper classes in Italy, France, and elsewhere continued to use dialect in certain situations, or “domains.” That they needed to do so in order to speak to their servants or their tenants will be obvious enough. More significant culturally, because it is less utilitarian in motive, is the upper-class use of dialect on festive occasions as a symbol or marker of relaxation. They did this at Carnival, for example (a practice that continues in Switzerland to this day), or during the proceedings of festive societies such as the Accademia della Valle di Bregno in sixteenth-century Milan, a group of townspeople who imitated the language of the local peasants for fun. In similar fashion, or perhaps to distance himself from what he was saying, the poet Alfred Tennyson adopted a rustic Lincolnshire accent whenever he told bawdy stories. Conversely, a peasant in nineteenth-century France might use standard language as a sign of formality or emphasis, to invite a girl to dance, to talk about national politics, or even to swear.

These examples illustrate the way in which the same people often use different varieties of language—and sometimes completely different languages—according to the situation they find themselves in. The use of Latin in the Catholic liturgy before Vatican II is an obvious example, while the use of German on the Stock Exchange at St. Petersburg until the end of the nineteenth century is a striking one.

In the sixteenth century, King John III of Sweden is said to have rebuked a fellow ruler who had written to him in French by replying in Finnish. However, French gradually became established as the language of diplomacy in the course of the eighteenth century, replacing Latin, Italian, and German (although the chancery of the Holy Roman Empire insisted on Latin until the early 1700s). Frederick the Great was supposed to have spoken French everywhere except in the stables, a story that surely refers to the celebrated if apocryphal saying of the polyglot emperor Charles V that one should speak French to ladies, German to horses, and Spanish to God. In contrast, the French Renaissance princess Margaret of Navarre considered Spanish the language of love.

One of the most distinctive linguistic domains all over Europe was that of the law. What was sometimes described by contemporaries as the jargon of lawyers might be more objectively described as the language of the law courts, full of Latinisms, pleonasm, and technical terms. In England the lawyers quite literally spoke and wrote a different language, “law French.” Archbishop Thomas Cranmer remarked that he had “heard suitors murmur at the bar because their attorney pleaded their causes in the French tongue, which they understood not.” The standard work on landholding was known as *Les tenures de Monsieur Littleton*, written, according to the title page of a seventeenth-century edition, “al request des Gentilhommes, Students en la ley Dangleterre.” Not until the eighteenth century did the vernacular become the exclusive language of the English law. Even when lawyers spoke English, contemporary critics suggested that the function of their jargon was to exclude the client and thus make them more dependent on professionals.

Linked to the language of the courts, but increasingly distinct from it, was the language of public administration in chanceries and elsewhere. In the case of German, for example, a distinctive “chancery language” (*Kanzleisprache*) developed relatively early, in the later Middle Ages, in order to make imperial decrees intelligible to the laity all over the empire, whatever dialect they spoke. This administrative language, or *Curialstyl*, developed characteristics of its own. It was pompous, probably deliberately so, and

drew on Latin and on the languages of the law and sometimes of finance for terms that were lacking in everyday forms of the vernacular. Sometimes assumed to be a German peculiarity, this “bureaucratic” had its equivalents in other parts of Europe: in Italy (where Spanish rule encouraged the adoption of Hispanisms), in the Swedish empire (where Germanisms as well as Latinisms are noticeable), and in Russia, where it was known as *prikazni jazyk* (“departmental language”). Common characteristics of these official languages are circumlocutions and euphemisms, for example, the notorious euphemism of the Third Reich “special handling” (*Sonderbehandlung*) as a way of describing official violence.

One speech domain that has attracted a good deal of interest from social historians in the last few years is that of insult. There are several reasons for this interest. Judicial records offer rich sources, while the confrontations leading to insult make latent tensions manifest and reveal something of the attitudes and prejudices of ordinary people whom other sources do not reach. For example, insult is gendered. Women are most often attacked through their supposed sexual behavior and described as whores, while insults to males are more various, ranging from “spy” through “cuckold” to “idler” or “bankrupt.” Forms of politeness, on the other hand, have attracted less attention and are sometimes thought to be essentially unchanging. However, recent work on Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries emphasizes changing ideas of politeness, or “civility,” linking them to political and social changes such as the rise of the middle classes or the reaction against the bitterness of the conflicts between the Whig and Tory parties.

Writing is a domain of its own, and in many cultures there is a difference, lesser or greater, between spoken and written forms of language. However, the written language like the spoken may be subdivided into smaller domains in some of which a foreign language might be thought appropriate for a variety of reasons. In nineteenth-century Finland, for example, the language of bookkeeping was German, probably because German had long been in use as a commercial lingua franca in the multilingual Baltic region in which the German merchants of the Hanse played an important role. In eighteenth-century Germany, some of the bourgeoisie (including the fiancée of the writer Johann Christoph Gottsched) thought it “pebeian” to write letters in German, preferring to use French for the purpose. For the last five hundred years or so, however, this linguistic separation of spheres has been gradually but steadily undermined by the rise of many vernaculars, a process closely linked to the processes of state- and nation-building.

LANGUAGES, STATES, AND NATIONS

One of the major long-term trends in the history of the languages of Europe since the end of the Middle Ages is the decline of Latin, particularly as a written language, and its replacement by vernaculars. The decline of Latin must not be dated too early. Translations from vernacular into Latin were common, and they reached their peak in the first half of the seventeenth century. All the same, the increasing importance of written Italian, French, Spanish, English, German, Dutch, Portuguese, Czech, Polish, and Hungarian is particularly obvious by the sixteenth century, and it was accompanied by statements of the “dignity” of those vernaculars as well as by decrees like that of 1539 in which the king of France ordered legal documents to be drawn up in French. The increasing employment of vernacular for literary purposes was accompanied by their standardization and codification, making them distinct from spoken languages as well as from Latin. The trend to standardization was assisted by the spread of printing, especially when the new medium was consciously exploited for this purpose, as it was, for example, by Martin Luther.

Luther’s problem was he wanted to appeal to ordinary people as well as scholars, so that he could not confine himself to Latin. For the same reason, both in his own writings and in his translation of the Bible, he needed to employ a form of German that would be intelligible from Alsace to Saxony. Luther based his German to some extent on the chancery language that, as we have seen, was already current throughout the empire, but in order to reach as many people as possible, he simplified it. In turn, Luther’s Bible helped create literary German, just as the Kralice Bible (1579–1594) contributed to the development of literary Czech and the Authorized Version of 1611 contributed to the development of literary English.

In Catholic countries in particular, an alternative to the Bible as a means of linguistic codification was the academy. Academies were discussion groups of men of letters, some of which acquired official status and prepared dictionaries from which inappropriate words were carefully excluded, whether the selection was made on moral or social grounds. The Florentines had their Accademia della Crusca, the French their Académie Française, which had the task of cleaning up the language (*nettoyer la langue des ordures*), and the Spaniards their Real Academia Española. In Russia the first important linguistic reformer was the polymath academician Mikhail Lomonosov (1711–1765), whose Russian grammar played an important role in the secularization of Russian culture, helping to create a new written language that could

compete with the traditional one, church Slavonic, the function of which in the Eastern or Orthodox Church had been comparable to that of Latin in the West.

Language and politics. Governments not infrequently lent their support to these enterprises. In the sixteenth century the grand duke of Tuscany, Cosimo de’ Medici, tried to turn Florentine cultural capital into political capital by associating himself with dictionary-making and the Accademia Fiorentina. In the seventeenth century Cardinal Richelieu was involved in the foundation of the Académie Française. There were good pragmatic reasons for statesmen to concern themselves with language. The political theorist Giovanni Botero noted in his *Reason of State* (1589) that conquerors “will do well to introduce their own tongue into the countries they have conquered.” As if following his advice, the emperor Ferdinand II made German the official language of Bohemia at the expense of Czech in 1627, six years after his victory at the Battle of White Mountain. Continuing this policy of linguistic centralization, the emperor Joseph II attempted to replace Latin with German in the Hungarian Diet (1784) and made German obligatory in the schools of the empire in 1790. In the Swedish empire, the government encouraged the spread of the Swedish language at the expense of Finnish.

For a dramatic and well-documented case study of the relation between language and politics, we may turn to the French Revolution. The revolutionaries faced a problem not unlike that of Martin Luther in the early years of the Reformation. They needed to broadcast their message as widely as possible in a country in which the majority of the population did not speak standard French, while minorities—Occitan, Breton, German, Flemish, and Basque—did not speak French at all. An early solution to the problem, reached in 1790, was to translate government decrees into patois. However, it was argued that French was the language of the revolution and that speakers of patois, let alone speakers of other languages, were at best unenlightened and at worst counterrevolutionary. The revolution’s specialist on language, the abbé Henri Grégoire, claimed that it was necessary “to destroy patois” (*anéantir les patois*) and make French universal (*universaliser l’usage de la langue française*). The language policy followed by the French government from 1794 onward thus resembled that of Joseph II discussed above. The Third Republic took that policy a stage further, through the educational reforms of 1880 and the prohibition of Breton in the religious domain (sermons and catechism classes) in 1902.

Linguistic revivals. Competition between languages ensured that the emergence of the vernacular languages of Europe was no simple success story. We should not forget the losers, especially in the domain of writing. The decline of written Czech after the Battle of White Mountain is one well-known example, a decline lamented later in the century in a treatise by the Jesuit Bohuslav Balbín. Literary Catalan was declining at much the same time, as Madrid tightened its grasp on the rest of Spain. In the British Isles, Scottish, Irish, and Welsh were all retreating as English was advancing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, first as a written language and later as a spoken one. In France, Occitan and Breton were in retreat. No wonder that in the eighteenth century the less literate half of the hexagon (southwest of an imaginary diagonal line from Saint-Malo to Geneva) included not only the poorer part of the country but also the principal regions (Brittany, Languedoc, and Provence) in which French was not the mother tongue. The competition between dominant and dominated languages is not a new phenomenon.

In all these regions, the choice whether to speak the local or the metropolitan language both expressed and contributed to the increasing cultural distance between different social groups. In Scotland, Gaelic became, in the words of the eighteenth-century social theorist Adam Ferguson, “a language spoken in the cottage, but not in the parlour.” In Wales the gentry of Glamorgan switched to English in their everyday speech in the eighteenth century, thus expressing their identification with the values of the metropolis and their withdrawal from local popular culture. By the nineteenth century, Scottish, Irish and Welsh parents who wanted their children to rise socially were encouraging them to express themselves in English, while Breton parents were taking a similar attitude toward French. In the nineteenth century, the great agent of linguistic acculturation was the school. In late nineteenth century France, for example, it was forbidden to speak Breton in the schools of the region, although the teachers themselves often spoke Breton at home. Whether the teachers were aware of this or not, a major function of the school at this time was to un-

dermine dominated languages and replace them with dominant ones.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the decline and even extinction of the minority languages already appeared virtually inevitable. All the same, the nineteenth century was to be an age not only of the spread of dominant languages in official domains but also of revivals of dominated languages in unofficial or informal settings. In the Austrian Empire, for instance, as if in reaction against the germanization favored by Joseph II, four Slav languages were revived from the late eighteenth century onward, Czech, Slovak, Serbo-Croatian, and Slovene. In the case of Czech, there was a conscious return to the usage of the sixteenth-century “golden age,” while in the other cases a new written language was shaped by standardizing spoken forms. In all these cases, a linguistic movement, complete with societies, journals, meetings, and so on became associated with a movement for political autonomy. Modern Greek developed in a similar way at the time of the independence movement of the early nineteenth century. In similar fashion in Provence, the poet Frédéric Mistral (1830–1914) was one of the leaders of the *Félibrige*, a movement founded in 1854 to revive literary Occitan. There was a similar movement in Catalonia at about the same time. The two groups were in contact, and both revived the medieval poetry competitions known as the floral games (*jocs florals*).

Gaelic too enjoyed a revival. Welsh, which had declined least, was also the first to be revived. The *Eisteddfod*, a poetry competition associated with the days of the Druids, increased in popularity during the late eighteenth century and was held on a national basis from 1858 onward. Dictionaries of Welsh were compiled and an attempt was made (as was the case with Czech) to return to a sixteenth-century golden age. In Ireland, on the other hand, it was only in 1876 that the Society for the Preservation of the Irish Language was founded, followed in 1893 by the Gaelic League. Children were taught Irish in school from 1878 in small doses and from 1922 onward in larger ones. A demand for the preservation of the Breton language was demanded by one wing of the Breton national movement.

In England and Italy, by contrast, there was competition not between languages but between varieties, between the standard form of the language and dialects. In Italy the dialect tradition was of course much stronger; it has been calculated that only 2.5 percent of the population spoke Italian at the time of the unification of Italy in 1861. However, urbanization and emigration weakened the hold of dialect, and the rise of Italian in the twentieth century, like that

of other standard national languages, was assisted by a variety of institutions, notably the school, newspapers, the cinema, radio, television, and (thanks to compulsory military service) the army. In England this process of linguistic unification took place much earlier. Even in England, however, it is possible to discern a revival of dialect in the nineteenth century, notably the rise of printed poetry in the Yorkshire and Lancashire dialects from the 1840s onward. Once the agent of linguistic standardization, by the nineteenth century the printing press was also serving the causes of regional resistance and revival.

Linguistic purification. Dominant and dominated languages alike were subjected to purification from foreign words, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In France postwar governments struggled against *franglais*, the contamination of the French language by contact with English, especially American English. In Greece and Germany, purification also became a political issue. In Greece the movement for pure speech (*katharevousa*) aimed at deleting foreign words and restoring classical elements to the Greek language. The reformer Adamantios Koraïs, for example, denounced “borrowing from strangers . . . words and phrases amply available in one’s own language.” In place of the foreign, the reformers suggested learned, archaic, and pseudo-archaic words. Thus the potato, traditionally *patata*, became *gèomèlon*, a rendering into classical Greek of *pomme de terre*. The new Greek state founded in 1830 officially adopted *katharevousa*. In the late nineteenth century, however, there was what might be called an antipurist campaign in favor of the language of the people, *demotike* (demotic Greek). In the twentieth century the Left has championed *demotike*, while right-wing governments in 1921–1923, 1935–1936, and 1967–1974 all restored *katharevousa*.

In Germany following unification, there was a movement to remove French, English, and other alien terms from the language, a movement linked to the return to the Gothic script, another symbol of national identity, and institutionalized in the form of a society, the *Allgemein Deutsche Sprachverein* (founded in 1885), and a journal, *Muttersprache*. The 1930s were the high point of the society’s attempts to hunt down and replace foreign words, the so-called *Fremdwortjagd*. Thus *Universität* became “Althochschule,” *Student* “Hochschüler,” *Rationalismus* “Vernunftum,” and so on. The Nazis supported the movement at first but put an official end to the hunt in 1940 after Hitler’s speeches were criticized by purists.

The links between linguistic revivals and politics are well known, particularly for their place in a

more general reaction against centralization. On the other hand, the social composition of these movements remains to be studied. In the precise sense of the term "social," the social history of linguistic nationalism remains largely unexplored territory. Much

work also remains to be done on the place of language in the construction or presentation of the self and of the emotions in letters and other personal documents in different places, periods, and social groups.

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SECTION 19: CULTURE AND POPULAR CULTURE

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CONSUMERISM



Gary Cross

Consumerism commonly refers to the unlimited and general desire for purchased goods and services that define self and social position in advanced market societies. Consumerism can also refer to a movement in the defense of the economic and personal needs of buyers of goods and services against dishonest, manipulative, or overly powerful manufacturing, retailing, and financial interests. This second meaning of the word emerged early in the twentieth century and was often associated with the cooperative movement that attempted in Europe to challenge the economic power of conservative retail chains and banks. This essay will concern itself with the first definition.

PRECURSORS OF MODERN CONSUMERISM

Europeans have tended to identify consumerism with the Americanization of European economies and culture (for example, the penetration of American soft drink and fast food companies since World War II). This perspective, however, tends to overlook the roots of consumerist attitudes in the longer history of European capitalism and culture. Some modern cultural critics influenced by Theodor Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt School of Social Research understand consumerism as a product of twentieth-century mass production capitalism. According to this theory, manufacturers and retailers with a surfeit of goods in inventory due to new mass production techniques created consumer demand for their wares by manipulating the masses through advertising and display. Insecurities, originating in feelings of cultural inferiority or the traumas of increasingly intense and meaningless work, made the working and lower middle classes especially susceptible to these merchandising appeals.

Increasingly, this view is challenged by historical analysis of earlier expressions of consumerism. While a tiny minority of the rich and powerful have pursued comforts and pleasures and hoarded luxury goods for

millennia, the advent of consumerism required sustained and eventually widespread economic growth that occurred only in modern history. The aristocracy in Renaissance Italy and France congregated in the bustling life of urban centers such as Florence, Milan, Lyon, and Paris, where they abandoned warrior values. Following, for example, the dictates of Baldassare Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier* (1528), some cultivated reputation through the purchase and use of luxuries in the fine arts, dress, and household furnishings. Castiglione's model for "polite society" fit an age when the military prowess of the nobility was growing irrelevant with the development of modern military monarchies and the new gunpowder weapons of cannon and musket. Castiglione's *Courtier* taught aristocrats and aspiring bourgeois how dress and appearance could define and display individuality within socially acceptable norms. Moreover, close and frequent interaction in court and urban life led to imitation or emulation in the display of wealth and status.

Fashion in clothing and domestic furnishings played a key role. Whereas garment styles were relatively static in the Middle Ages and often marked the social function of the wearer, Renaissance fashion changed more quickly and gave vent to individual expression. Fashion stimulated the clothing industries in Italy and the Low Countries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and later encouraged the fur trade in North America. While comfort, even in the dwellings of the aristocracy, was minimal and even discouraged by the ascetic tradition in the medieval Catholic Church, Renaissance upper-class home furnishings included such innovations as upholstered chairs, wallpaper, and carpets. Stimulating this new taste for innovative goods was the widening contact of Europeans with the luxuries and products of Asia and the Americas through exploration and trade. European collection of this exotica in "wonder cabinets" and reading about it in "wonder books" helped to create a taste for novelty.

In late-seventeenth-century Netherlands, wealth created by overseas trade, agricultural innovation, and

a culture that favored self-restraint and investment led to an “embarrassment of riches” in the words of Simon Schama. Dutch burghers cultivated not only the arts (a form of elite consumerism) but also refined and fashionable domestic furnishings that displayed their social position and wealth. Another preindustrial center for nascent consumerism was in eighteenth-century London. The English capital was noted for its extraordinary size and wealth as a major center for trade and crafts. A “consumer revolution” in fashionable clothing and home furnishings preceded and paralleled the better-known industrial revolution in England. Indeed, demand for status goods stimulated industrialization at least as much as increased output encouraged new consumption.

A nascent consumerism resulted from the trickling down of a wide range of consumer goods and services from the aristocracy to the middle class. Some even touched the upper ranks of working people. Fashion and social emulation moved out of court society and into coffeehouses and pleasure gardens. There, money rather than birth gave the individual an opportunity to participate. Mass distribution of tea and fashionable crockery (through Wedgwood and

others) redefined family life, and the cultivation of fashion in women’s clothing created an identification of the feminine with the fashionable. Modern ideas about the desirability of the new and the attraction to the “star” performer, which many associate with modern mass marketing, were established in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century commercial cities. Actors, lion tamers, and even healers became well known because they worked in a socially open market like London where information flowed freely. In this context, honor and fame could be obtained by the lowborn, earned by turning themselves into a commodity. The English pleasure gardens located in the London suburbs offered an aspiring middle class access (for a fee) to an experience similar to the private aristocratic gardens. In addition, aristocratic traditions of traveling to inland spas and seaside resorts trickled down to the middle, and eventually working, classes, beginning in the late eighteenth century. These watering places, like the pleasure gardens, offered those with the price of admission a packaged experience and an opportunity to interact with others, discover innovative fashions and products, and emulate trendsetters. Cost and rules of dress and decorum segregated the wealthy from plebeians, but many of the basic features of upper-class seaside resorts filtered down to the less respectable sea spots, like Blackpool, by 1860. A pattern was repeated: aristocratic pleasures and social practices formed a core of a broader consumer culture characterized by personal display and social emulation.

The British cultural historian Colin Campbell has argued that the social origins of consumerism in social imitation and emulation have been overstressed. He finds instead that new romantic attitudes emerged in the late eighteenth century that encouraged an imaginative anticipation of the pleasures and enhancements that new goods would bring the individual. When a new coat or hat, for example, did not produce the expected personal happiness, this disappointment did not temper desire, but only created the need for still more and different goods. For Campbell, a central factor in the development of consumerism is the transition from the desire for more necessities (food and drink, especially) and physical sensation (as in the gluttonous or avaricious sinner of medieval Europe) to the longing for emotional fulfillment in the symbolic meanings of goods.

Probably most important to the explanation of consumerism was simply increased wealth and its distribution. Constraint made sense in a time when the unlimited desire of the rich and powerful led to the exploitation of the many and the horrors of war and conquest. But even a partial and temporary liberation from the fears of food shortages and uncertain hous-

ing quickly removed this limit on desire, as can be seen in the often-noted attraction of the poor for luxury—be it in ostentatious clothing or in the form of the new consumer pleasures like tea or chocolate that the London poor adopted instead of more nutritious food or healthful lodgings.

The history of sumptuary laws is particularly revealing. Political and religious authorities found many of the nascent forms of consumerism a threat to social stability and traditional values. Indeed, sumptuary laws restricting luxurious spending peaked during upsurges in fashion in the sixteenth century, when, for example, Venetians and Genoans were prohibited from having extravagant weddings or ordering lavish clothing. The French were allowed only three courses at meals. These laws were intended to rein in desire and display among the rich. Other sumptuary laws were designed to dictate what each social class or occupational group could wear (for example, finding tailors who made lavish dresses for commoners or restricting the use of fur and velvet to the elite). Such laws were supposed to impede another purpose of consumerism—the use of goods to define the social position of their owners (in this case illegitimately, as when the commoner tried to “look” like the aristocracy). Inevitably, consumers circumvented these laws through such tactics as wearing outlawed fabrics in linings or embroidering plain cloth to make it look elegant. The decline of sumptuary laws in the eighteenth century coincided with the softening of religious scruples against luxury, a rejection of privilege (as in the abolition of these laws during the French Revolution), and more positive views of the impact of luxury and consumption upon economic growth.

teenth century coincided with the softening of religious scruples against luxury, a rejection of privilege (as in the abolition of these laws during the French Revolution), and more positive views of the impact of luxury and consumption upon economic growth.

CONSUMERISM AND ITS CRITIQUES, 1700–1850

The nascent consumerism that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the richest and socially most open corners of Europe produced a wide variety of responses. Bernard de Mandeville’s notorious *Fable of the Bees* (1714) argued that pursuit of luxury was essential to the creation of wealth. Far from condemning materialist desire, Mandeville maintained that individuals should be encouraged to want things so as to create demand and thus expand the work of craftspeople and merchants. This frank embrace of the selfish pursuit of material goods was certainly consistent with an emerging doctrine of unimpeded markets and was, in more subdued terms, embraced by Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, published in 1776. The linkage between the demand for luxury and the expansion of markets, on the one hand, and the growth of capitalist production, on the other, was identified as the foundation of modern capitalism by the twentieth-century German historian Werner Sombart.

Yet Mandeville's ideas contradicted long-held concerns that stimulating desire undermined social stability, economic prudence, and traditional ascetic religious values. Eighteenth-century political economists Arthur Young and Restif de la Bretonne assumed that increased wealth reduced the motivation to work. In particular, when employers paid more than subsistence wages, working people would toil less. In their view, the desire for leisure was greater than the longing for more goods. Moreover, the stoic distinction between natural needs and unnatural wants remained powerful, especially because luxurious consumption seemed to undermine community and rational use of free time. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was only the best known of eighteenth-century thinkers fearful of releasing materialist desire. Misery and inequality, he claimed, came not from deprivation but from the need for things. His ideal republic was an alternative to the endless expansion of the market, offering a timeless community of self-sufficiency and self-imposed simplicity.

By the mid-nineteenth century, after the first wave of industrialization was well underway, a longer view of the problem of expanding needs and economic development was developed. John Stuart Mill anticipated a "stationary state," when economic growth and striving would culminate in a new leisure society. Then a learned class of educators could counteract the egoistic commercial spirit, and time could be devoted to noneconomic pursuits and social solidarity. Karl Marx, like Mill, rejected the utopian primitivism of Rousseau and dreamed of a society of abundance created by industrialization. The revolutionary movement that would end capitalism would also eliminate the profit-driven creation of false needs. It would guarantee instead a rational allocation of material goods for life and the social conditions for self-development. Marx shared with Mill's liberalism a dream of a society of limited and realizable material needs.

PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MASS CONSUMERISM, 1860–1930

The rise of consumerism was not a steady upward climb. Especially in the troubling years of the 1840s, food supplies failed to keep up with population increases, and wages lagged behind productivity in new industries, thus slowing the expansion of consumer demand. Especially during frequent economic crises, the standard of living of the European wage-earning and farming masses declined. However, from the 1860s, consumer desire became more a practical than

a theoretical issue as rural incomes rose. Decreasing cost and increased variety of goods introduced a broader population to the attractions of spending. New venues of consumption emerged in shopping districts and department stores in major cities. These retail spaces created crowds and a new intensity of consumer emulation. Shops made goods more accessible by placing them on open shelves and displays (abandoning the need for an appointment to enter a shop or the requirement to seek a clerk's assistance to see and touch goods that formerly were kept out of sight). Department stores, like Bon Marché in Paris (opened in 1852), used visual appeals in display windows and especially luxurious presentations and store furnishings to create longings for new and exciting goods that approximated sexual desire, especially for women.

Like the department store, the great exhibitions also legitimized novelty and desire. London's Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851 pulled together the world's luxuries and technological innovations in a magnificent, often theatrical display that drew millions in a kind of consumerist pilgrimage. The 1851 fair was followed by many others in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Paris, Barcelona, and Brussels (as well as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco). New consumer products and brand names were introduced at these fairs, teaching the crowd to associate progress and the future with consumer goods like bicycles, cars, and domestic appliances.

As important were emerging entertainment centers in the form of music and dance halls. From the 1850s, music halls in the major cities of Europe sold drinks to large crowds while entertaining them with well-advertised singing and dancing acts. London music halls accommodated fifteen hundred customers, and chains of music halls signed popular troupes of can-can dancers, comedians, and singers to tour. In the 1870s the modern spectator sport emerged with the enclosed stadium and turnstile (1871) for paying customers. Although only 2,000 watched the English football (or soccer) Cup Finals in 1872, by 1885 the crowd reached 10,000; it increased to nearly 101,000 by 1901 and at least 200,000 at the Wembley Cup Final in 1923. Cheap excursion trains made seaside resorts accessible to wage earners by the 1860s, especially in England. More affluent holiday makers withdrew to exclusive resorts like Eastbourne or found refuge from "day trippers" in hotels distinctly separated from the crowd; still more wealthy English went to the pricier seaside towns on the French and Italian Riviera to join the continental elite.

Even if affluence replicated in consumption the class structure of Europe, it still created a dynamic

mass entertainment audience. By the 1890s mechanized amusement parks and films captured the coins of the common crowds. Such parks appeared almost simultaneously in Copenhagen, Vienna, and Blackpool. Vastly easing the flow of the plebeian crowd was the introduction of the cheap electric streetcar in the 1890s. The tram freed working-class consumers from exclusive reliance on the neighborhood pub or ethnic fraternal society for leisure and opened their lives to the anonymous pleasures of mass entertainments.

In this context, the endless expansion of mass consumption had become problematic. Did growing affluence mean an endlessly widening desire? What would be the consequences of pleasure “trickling down” to the masses? Neoclassical economic (marginalist) theory was highly ambivalent about the idea of unlimited consumer desire. Developed in the 1870s by William Stanley Jevons of Britain and Léon Walras of France, marginalism shifted the focus of economics from production to consumption. It defined economic value as subjective utility with no necessary ceilings on the quantity of goods that could be desired by anyone. Still, utility shifted from basic biological needs to higher, less immediate ones when primary needs were satisfied. Jevons and others also retained the old idea that higher wages led to new desires not only for goods but also for freedom from work. Even John Maynard Keynes, the economist who taught the twentieth century to stimulate consumer demand in order to create economic growth, also reasserted Mill’s vision when he predicted that affluence would bring the satisfaction of absolute needs and thus allow the full flowering of noneconomic interests and passions in leisure.

If late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century educated elites resisted the consumerist notion of limitless material desire, they also were reluctant to accept consumer goods as defining social relationships and personal aspirations. Conservatives were especially concerned about the impact of mass markets on high culture and social stability. Fears of the unrestrained mob had intensified after the French Revolution. Gustave Le Bon’s *The Crowd* (1895) perpetuated these anxieties by insisting that the masses were suggestible and thus susceptible to the manipulation of would-be dictators. While Le Bon anticipated fascism, he also expressed a common fear that mass consumption would unleash undisciplined and frustrating desire. The French sociologist Émile Durkheim believed that ordinary people were incapable of sorting through choices and controlling their longings when tempted by the growing array of goods so tantalizingly showcased in stores. Moral confusion was the inevitable result. For Durkheim, the only solution was to impose

constraint on the masses by organizing the consuming crowd into occupational groups and religious communities. The Spanish intellectual José Ortega y Gasset’s *Revolt of the Masses* (1930) argued that new shopping and amusement sections of cities amassed crowds of uneducated but no longer impoverished people. Uprooted from their traditional folk cultures and the control of village clergy and gentry, and yet unprepared to embrace the high culture of the urban elite, these crowds were supposedly lured by the promise of immediate pleasure onto the street. The crowd’s economic power swamped cultivated values and institutions, leading to a general decline of the arts and learning. Ortega y Gasset and others, like the English critic F. R. Leavis in his *Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture* (1930), saw consumer culture as ephemeral, rooted neither in the permanence and conservatism of folk culture nor in the timeless value of high culture.

Early twentieth-century Marxists often shared these conservative understandings of consumerism. The leftist concept of “false consciousness” was similar to the notion of false needs. The Left saw false consciousness as originating in the traumas of industrial work rather than in the cultural inferiority of the masses. But both Left and Right agreed that the wage earner could not resist the passive if sometimes exciting entertainments mass produced by the “culture industry” in movie houses, dance halls, and amusement parks. With theories developed by the Frankfurt school and other Marxist cultural critics from the 1920s, the Left saw the mass consumer market as undermining the potential of individuals and society. It destroyed class consciousness by luring workers into the pursuit of personal comforts and pleasures and by tying them emotionally to bourgeois and nationalist values. One example is the English embrace of chauvinistic themes promoted in popular newspapers and music halls between 1900 and 1914. To the Left, the essential passivity of consumer culture also seemed to eliminate the will of workers to organize and fight for socialism. The direct authority and discipline of the rural lord or industrial employer was no longer necessary in a consumer culture to keep workers subdued. Bourgeois control was maintained indirectly over consciousness through the appeals of consumption. Finally, according to this view, the need to work for the capitalist in order to gain a “false” freedom in consumption disciplined the wage earner to accept the status quo and alienating work.

A few early commentators on mass consumption offered more positive assessments of the emerging age of affluence, even if they continued to recognize a distinction between natural needs and unnatural wants. The French economist Charles Gide (1847–

1932) argued that abundance would bring cultural refinement. But he also stressed the need for consumer education and cooperative control over distribution. In sharp contrast to Durkheim, the French sociologist Jean Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904) believed that when working people purchased fashionable clothes or home furnishings, they were expanding their cultural horizons. Tarde agreed with the American economist Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) that mass consumption originated in common envy and the desire to buy into the lifestyle of trendsetting elites. But this was more than simple emulation, for it gave the masses a feeling of personal freedom. More important still, this spending resulted in the gradual reduction of the social distance between elites and the common people. Eventually, the rich would even imitate the taste and culture of the masses, leading to a society of shared values. In the long run, the exchange of fashions between social classes and regions would decrease social tensions. The localized and rare pleasures of the traditional village festival would be replaced by the widespread and frequent enjoyment of the night on the town or the Sunday excursion. The new dynamic world of mass consumption might be chaotic, but over time Tarde expected that it would lead to a new, higher civilization.

The German sociologist Georg Simmel (1858–1918) acknowledged that money and the things that it could buy increased personal freedom because consumption freed the individual from constant dependence on employers and an often oppressive folk culture. Keeping up with shifting styles of adornment, display, and entertainment did more than fill empty lives with fleeting pleasures. Such spending met the social as well as ego needs of the individual. Fashion, Simmel argued, combined individuality and conformity, maximizing one's membership in a group while distinguishing oneself from others. Still, Simmel saw a price for this freedom in that consumer society created impersonal social relationships and encouraged egotistical and calculating attitudes toward others, reducing them to what they owned. The only way that one could preserve individuality was to participate in fashion. In this system, the individual could never catch up and never find a stable identity. The quest for individuality was always frustrating in the fashionable crowd. The only solution for Simmel was to cultivate personal friendship and to develop individualistic taste.

For many Europeans in the interwar years, consumerism was identical with American culture and its threat to European values and economic life. America was the barbarian future of democratic and mechanical conformity and rootless superficiality, a worry

reinforced by American dominance of phonograph music and film. Particularly influential was Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932), an attack on American mass culture with its passive amusements. Even Henry Ford's promise of inexpensive cars seemed to many Europeans to threaten native craft traditions and standards of quality.

CONSUMERISM AND ALTERNATIVES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In the interwar years, many Europeans believed that mass production would eventually liberate humanity from the scarcity of "necessities," leading not to the endless expansion of symbolic or luxury consumption but rather to the reduction of work time. One seeming sign of this trend was the introduction of the eight-hour day in 1919. For many this prospect was worrisome. Conservatives feared that the assembly line undermined work incentives by diminishing the necessity of long hours to meet basic needs. Moreover, cheap mass-produced goods and pleasures seemed to threaten the value of hard work. This thinking created a seemingly insurmountable dilemma: how to stimulate and profit from mass consumption while also maintaining and fostering work discipline.

At the same time, conservatives feared that increased affluence eroded cultural standards by providing the masses the free time and money that gave them access to cultural goods. This thinking suggested that cultural standards had to be protected from mass consumption through elite domination of the mass media (as in the founding of the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1927) or through adopting educational standards that imposed a canon of literary, musical, and artistic classics on students. Conservatives were concerned about the impact of consumerism on the young, especially insofar as the influence of parents seemed to have declined and, with it, family solidarities and respect for authority. One common solution to the threat of the temptations of public amusements was industry and church sponsorship of youth camps, sports clubs, and playground centers. Throughout Europe, these organized youth activities provided pleasurable alternatives to commercial leisure in a controlled setting that also encouraged loyalty to the company or religious body. A striking example of this paternalism was the Duke of York's Camp, which brought together equal numbers of public (elite) school and industrial boys in shared games and bonfires in the interwar years. Italian and German fascists also found that noncommercial leisure was an excellent vehicle for fostering political loyalty. The *dopo*

lavoro and *Kraft durch Freude* organized tours and youth summer camps, using methods that were scarcely distinguishable from those employed by company and church organizations to instill a “politics of consent.”

Much of the Left shared a similar disapproval of consumerism in the interwar years. And thus labor and leftist political groups tried to organize their own noncommercial leisure to foster loyalty to union and party. Since the 1880s in Britain, organized workers’ leisure had been built around cooperative societies, trade unions, socialist Sunday schools, and leftist hiking and bicycle clubs. In the 1920s European socialist sports leagues won support from sympathetic local governments and competed openly with conservative nationalist and church sports organizations. Workers’ Olympic Games were played in Frankfurt (1925) and Vienna (1931). Communists and their trade unions often used sports and cultural groups to create loyalty to union and party beyond the workplace. Especially important were efforts to link the whole family and not just the union member to the cause. In the 1920s and 1930s British adult educationists encouraged pleasurable hobbies rather than didactic lessons in high culture as an alternative to the crowd pleasures of drinking, gambling, dance halls, and amusement parks. Nonprofit groups like the Holiday Fellowship

and Workers’ Travel Association built guesthouses and organized vacation tours. The French Popular Front of 1936 continued the effort of the Left to organize loyalty through noncommercial leisure. Communist youth festivals and sports and leisure clubs were common. Large unions even had camps in an attempt to channel members away from consumer culture. French teachers’ and other unions organized youth hostels and inexpensive vacation packages for members. The Popular Front official Léo Lagrange encouraged these noncommercial leisure and vacation programs both to foster political solidarity and to provide uplifting and healthy uses of free time by countering the allures of consumerism.

WHY CONSUMERISM WON

In the interwar years, both the Right and Left shared two assumptions—that mass production meant a shift from work to leisure values and that leisure time absorbed by consumer goods and services was a threat to social and political goals. The belief that affluence meant an expansion of leisure time (and for conservatives an undermining of the work ethic) assumed that consumer needs were satiable and that people

preferred time to more goods. This essential assumption was wrong. Expanding opportunities to consume proved to be a more effective way of disciplining labor than long hours of toil. The key was the realization that psychological needs were not finite, as were most physiological needs. Higher wages could not only stimulate mass consumption but also create an open-ended desire for new goods and thus motivate wage earners to seek work rather than leisure. While the economist Lujo Brentano introduced this idea into his analysis in 1894, only in the 1920s did even a small group of industrial employers embrace this doctrine. This seemingly counterintuitive idea that expanding desire disciplined workforces has often been identified with Fordism, named after Henry Ford, the American automaker who introduced a high wage in 1914 to create a market for his cars and a disciplined consumer workforce.

The labor movement generally reinforced this idea of limitless consumption when unions tried to link productivity to wage increases. For example, the French socialist and head of the International Labor Organization Albert Thomas argued in the 1920s that workers should accept more of the intense and mechanized work of scientific management for higher wages. Labor embraced the “Fordist” ideal of mass production as a solution to the traditional dual economy divided between luxury and subsistence and as an opening to a consumer’s democracy. This attitude reflects a shift from an emotional and social focus on the workplace to an embrace of the social and personal meanings of consumption off the job. It was simultaneously a recognition that conditions of mechanized industry made irrelevant the older ideals of workers’ control over the job and a vision of the possibilities raised by a mass consumption economy for individual freedom to make consumer choices. Although this trade-off was rarely embraced by European industry between the world wars, it did become the implicit basis for economic growth in the postwar era.

The Great Depression experience of joblessness also encouraged this trend. Especially because unemployment was uneven across regions and occupations, sociologists and observers like George Orwell found that those without sufficient work often felt left out and humiliated. The jobless dreamed of the respect and freedom that came from the ability to consume. Even in hard times, European workers tended to hold on to luxuries. While labor leaders favored shortening the workday as a job-sharing measure in the depression, free time became relatively less important than higher income and freedom to consume for those with “time on their hands.” Even when the system did not deliver the goods during the depression and World

War II, the response was not massive resentment or revolution but quiet personal humiliation at being excluded from the consumers’ feast and a longing to rejoin it when the opportunity came again after 1945.

Also during the depression of the 1930s, economists and politically active business leaders in France and England, especially, began to recognize that an expanding consumer economy was a politically feasible alternative to what they saw as the “stagnation” of reduced work weeks (as in the proposal for the forty-hour week). Eventually, the tapping of new and unlimited needs (through Keynesianism especially) not only would overcome the threat to the work ethic but guaranteed growth. Growth through mass consumption also meant more jobs (in new sectors like services rather than mining and basic industry), rather than a sharing of work through the reduction of work time. This new thinking had a profound impact on public policy that continues to the present.

A consumerist consensus emerged after 1945. It was built upon mass production and balanced with high wages, but it was also buttressed by governmental management of demand and business manipulation of needs through advertising. Neither work sharing nor expanded noncommercial leisure (based on a theory of limited consumer desire) had any serious role in the postwar recovery. The obvious explanation is that pressing demand for reconstruction and fulfilling pent-up material needs had long been deferred by the depression and war and that this precluded any choice but expanded production and consumption. A political consensus quickly emerged around expectations of “full employment” and unlimited consumption. The nearly universal commitment to higher levels of personal consumption was broadly shared by the left-wing British welfare statisticians and French economic planners, as well as more conservative Italian and German Christian Democrats. The American model of mass consumption was an alternative to the social rigidity of European culture, which still showed sharp distinctions between the lifestyles of the working and middle classes. Pro-American politicians favored “growth” rather than “protest” over the shares of the economic pie. The identification of liberty with consumer choice and democracy with mass access to goods became the ideal if not always the reality.

Despite critiques of consumerism as a threat to social stability and cultural values, consumption became the principal means of defining self and social relationships for many Europeans in the second half of the twentieth century. Although thinkers, social organizers, and even at times politicians struggled against it, none produced effective alternatives.

Consumer-culture critics like Simmel or Durkheim set up an illusory contrast between the acquiscent and impulsive consumption of the street crowd, on the one hand, and the sober and uplifting cultivation of self and family in the home, on the other. The twentieth century has shown that crowd pleasures were not nearly so self-destructive as once presumed. Critics of modern consumer desire failed to recognize how commodities met psychological and social needs in a transient and increasingly impersonal social world. Goods and purchased experiences provided ways of marking time throughout the year. This became a major role of developments such as the commercialization of Christmas and the packaged vacation that became an important part of European consumer culture after World War II. Consumer products helped identify stages in personal life and communicate status, aspirations, and complaints to others. The distinctive clothing, music, and social pleasures of youth that emerged after the war illustrate this kind of personal expression. Consumption was much more about reading and being read through the goods that one drove, wore, and ate than about unleashing dangerous desires. Rather than creating a frustrated, aggressive crowd that sought unattainable fulfillment in unrestrained longing, mass consumption fostered a relatively passive population quite easily satisfied with the latest fashions, novelties, and “new and improved” gadgets. Anthropologists like Mary Douglas have shown how mass consumption allowed the fulfillment of contradictory longings, the wearing of many roles, and endless experimenting—even if experiences were manufactured to meet consumer expectations and business profitability. Far from developing obsessions and addictions or slipping into the confusion of overchoice as predicted by Durkheim, modern Europeans generally have responded quickly and often happily to the latest display window. What is striking about consumer society is how well adjusted to affluence modern Europeans have become.

Moreover, home and individual “integrity” were not nearly so free of consumerist allures as expected by critics of consumerism. Instead, much of the social meaning of goods was organized around domesticity and the sexual division of labor. A middle-class ideal of male providing and female domestic spending had emerged in the nineteenth century and became in varying degrees an ideal of working families early in the twentieth century. For many, the depression solidified the gender order by revealing its stress points: the wife’s domain of domestic spending and the husband’s role of provider were undermined during the crisis. The slump showed that neither women nor men wished to abandon these roles, which after the

war were reconfirmed (at least for another generation) in the male ideal of breadwinner and the female status as domestic consumer. By the 1960s this sexual division of labor was being replaced by a two-income household, but this too was an adaptation to the economic demands of rising standards of domestic consumption.

Moreover, reinforcing the trend toward domestic and private consumption was the coming of the radio (and later television) and the access of the working classes to cars. Although these goods were slower to penetrate European households than in the United States, in the 1960s and 1970s much of that gap was overcome. For example, in the 1960s television sets in British households increased from 66 percent to 90 percent, and a BBC study in 1974 found that half of leisure time was spent watching the screen. Even more dramatic was the coming of cars: ownership in France rose from 10 percent of households in 1950 to 75 percent by 1980.

A further sign of privatized consumerism was the rise in the share of family income devoted to housing costs. While planners in 1945 hoped for a more open community based on new public housing, Britons largely rejected the tower blocks. Instead, they longed for the suburban comforts of the semidetached houses that provided such opportunities for self-expressive and private consumption. While the French and other continental Europeans had long favored urban apartment living and had been indifferent to Anglo-American lawn and garden culture, during the 1970s new housing was increasingly suburban and detached, and home ownership rose also. Modern consumerism was less a social or cultural challenge to social stability than an affirmation of domestic and intrafamily values.

Consumer society has become a substitute for civil society. The disappointing results of nonprofit religious, political, or simply voluntary leisure organizations are one illustration of this claim. Consumerism met real needs of personal identity and individual distinction from the group in a society where primary groups had largely disappeared. The utopian idea of a culture of free time beyond the market could not satisfy those needs nearly as effectively as could the consumer culture. Ironically, social groups organized around ideas or even leisure activities may be less flexible and more threatening to members than consumer markets. Because noncommercial holiday clubs that appeared early in the twentieth century were dominated by their members, they often unintentionally excluded others, became fractionalized, and were slow to adapt to change. It has been much easier for commercial impresarios like the Butlin Holiday

Camps of the 1930s or the Club Meds from the 1950s, which stand outside the markets they organize, to get people to join in. There was less personal risk in disclosing oneself as a “member” of a society of Porsche owners than to risk humiliation by joining a group that demanded personal interaction. It was relatively easy to buy one’s way into a community of shoppers, and there were so many from which to choose.

The collapse of European communism in 1989 is a good example of the success of consumerism. For all of its claims of producing full employment and meeting everyone’s basic needs for health, education, food, and other necessities, the Marxist system in the 1970s and 1980s was unable either to increase productivity or to meet the widening horizons of desire. The lack of consumer incentives for hard work created a society in permanent slow motion, which consequently could never meet the demand for consumer goods. In the West, the simultaneous discipline and freedom built into the consumer economy was able to do both.

However, consumerism did not eliminate frustration as Jean Gabriel Tarde and other optimists predicted. Through emulative spending, the poor and marginal population might have become more like the rich. But then the elite moved on to new “inventions,” creating a new social distance from the masses. When the people had cars, the rich needed second homes. Frustration was inevitable and unrelenting even when the majority enjoyed material security and participated in the consumer culture directed by the rich. They could never catch up, and the closer they seemed to get to the prize, the more humiliating was their inability to grasp it. Resentment hardly declined because of greater material security. The significance of goods that define status (cars, education, vacations, and houses) increased as basic needs were met and with them the increased frustrations of status seeking.

LIMITS AND CHALLENGES TO MODERN CONSUMERISM

Diversity in the history, society, and economic development of European countries produced somewhat different degrees and varieties of consumerism in the second half of the twentieth century. Relative to the more mobile and market-oriented United States, European bonds to community and family have countered consumerist predilections. In countries like Spain, relatively slower rates of economic development limited discretionary spending, at least until the 1990s. Political traditions restricting markets (like prohibi-

ing Sunday shopping) have impeded the spread of consumption as a leisure time activity. Attempts in the 1990s to extend shopping hours in Germany and England, for example, were rebuffed by social conservatives as well as labor unions. Allocations of economic surpluses to public culture (for example, municipal orchestras) and other nonmarket leisure and recreational purposes have also countered the growth of consumerism. Moreover, cultural and historical differences have channeled consumer desire in western Europe in somewhat different directions than in the United States. One prominent example is the greater emphasis on vacation spending, due to four or more weeks of holiday time in most European countries as compared with the common two-week or less vacation of Americans. This difference has its roots in the paid holiday that came to many European countries in the 1920s and especially the 1930s. Another example is the still greater tendency of Europeans to spend discretionary income on public leisure like social dining and drinking.

Since the 1960s European opponents of consumerism have rallied around movements for environmental protection, noncommercial leisure, reduction of work time, and consumer education. According to the political scientist Ronald Inglehart, in the 1960s a “postmaterialist” cohort began to emerge in Europe. The gradual disappearance of those age groups which had been shaped by the economic insecurity of the depression signaled a “cultural shift” toward the post-scarcity values. In the 1960s and 1970s New Left advocates of postmaterialist values expected a political shift from questions of distribution, growth, and security and toward quality of life and consumer rights issues. These groups attacked the compromise of the traditional Left (Labor, Communist, and Social Democratic parties) for its support of the unrestrained growth of a consumer culture.

In particular, the environmental, or green, movement opposed the impact that unrestrained consumption had upon land use (for roads, for example) and pollution of the ecosphere. In the 1970s new leftists associated with the labor movement argued that the linkage between economic growth and jobs was no longer valid. Technological and business change would no longer create sufficient jobs for full employment (as had previous economic upheavals). The computer was eliminating both white collar and blue collar jobs even as it increased productivity, and the older pattern of technological advance, shifting jobs from one sector (like industry) into another (like service), no longer applied. An expanding mass consumption economy would not produce sufficient jobs. For this group, the solution was reduced work time rather than simply

increased output and demand for goods. As important, these advocates of reduced work time saw expanded time away from market work as an alternative to the spread of consumerist values.

Still others supported noncommercial uses of leisure time, perpetuating activities dating from before the commercialization of free time and actually expanding alternatives to consumerism. Surveys found that up to 39 percent of Britons participated in a sport in 1977, and in 1980 there were roughly thirty-six thousand football clubs and fifty thousand other sporting clubs. Numbers of sports clubs rose 3.6 times in France in the 1960s and 1970s. During the same period, cultural clubs increased even more dramatically from 600 to 4,116. An active cultural education policy, encouraged first by André Malraux's famous tenure as cultural minister from 1959 to 1969, bore fruit in rising attendance at artistic and educational events. French promoters of popular arts and recreation may have sought to perpetuate loyalty to church or political party, but all stressed wide participation and many eventually lost

their political or religious character. Government facilities and educators have contributed to the growth of amateurism in music and the other arts. Sociologists found in the mid-1980s that middle-class people especially still readily joined groups around a wide variety of enthusiasms (caving, morris dancing, lace making, and lapidary, for example). Such organizations stressed their distinction from others but also their solidarity within, and often did so with a militant opposition to commercialization as if in protest of the profit motive of sellers and the passivity of buyers.

Despite these protests against consumerism, there does not appear to be any systematic alternative to its value of limitless material innovation and social and self-definition in and through goods. While many Europeans question the long-term viability of the consumerist ethic for the environment and the seemingly corrosive effect of consumerism on social relations and political commitments, few have seriously questioned the benefits of growth or have found ways of effectively articulating a form of postmaterialism.

See also America, Americanization, and Anti-Americanism (volume 1); Capitalism and Commercialization; Communications, the Media and Propaganda; Shops and Stores (volume 2); Sports; Consumer Leisure; Vacations; Travel and Tourism; the section Everyday Life (all in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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DRINKING AND DRUGS



Thomas Brennan

The history of drink since the Renaissance consists of profound continuities and abrupt changes. The consumption of alcohol is as old as civilization and has provided a reliable backdrop in every age to ritual, festival, commensality, and sociability. Every European culture has long-standing drinking customs. In addition each culture has had its own traditional drinks, determined by climate and reinforced by prejudice, that remained remarkably unchanged despite the new kinds of alcohol made available through the commercial and industrial revolutions of the last two centuries. Public drinking places have enhanced the social impact of drinking, even as they have focused much of the opposition to drinking. At the same time the details of what, where, when, and how people drank could change a good deal, and the consideration of drugs introduces a further element of innovation. Both continuity and change demand attention, for they are equally essential to understanding the roles of alcohol and drugs.

Historians study drink as a food, a commodity, a social ritual, and a social problem. As an aseptic beverage delivering crucial vitamins and calories, alcohol in some form has long been a dietary staple. Thus alcohol was an important commodity—probably the single most important commercial item in medieval and early modern France, for example—and contributes to the growing interest in the history of trade and markets. The economics of producing and distributing wine, beer, or spirits put alcohol at the forefront of commercial and financial innovations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Above and beyond its dietary significance, alcohol teaches us about taste and fashion, about self-expression and social identity through consumption.

Although historians study drink as an important element in the history of diet, it is the cultural significance of drink that draws most interest. Whether people drink champagne at celebrations, the right wine with foods, a beer with buddies, brandy to warm up, a cocktail to relax, or gin to drown their sorrows, the alcohol consumed has always been laden with

symbolism. Alcohol conveys precise messages about mood, intention, and expectations both to ourselves and to others. Alcohol sanctions specific behavior, including revel, riot, and altercation, of course, but also trust and reconciliation. As such alcohol has been a fundamental element in popular culture, but as popular culture came under increasing criticism in early modern history, alcohol was condemned. With the rise of living standards and the increasing access to markets in the nineteenth century, the lower classes consumed more alcohol, and the authorities became increasingly concerned about the alcohol “problem.”

EARLY PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION

Europe inherited an economy of local alcohol production and consumption from the Middle Ages. Most medieval communities produced some form of alcohol by fermenting grapes, fruit, or grain and drank the results themselves. Brewing was a domestic task throughout northern Europe, often performed by housewives. Historians of medieval England argue for large consumption levels of a weakly alcoholic ale. As a drink or a soup, it was a staple. In northern Germany and, more gradually, across the Netherlands and England, wholesale brewers in the late Middle Ages made a beer with hops that contained more alcohol and stood up to storage and travel better than the ale it increasingly replaced. Beer making, an essentially artisanal and male occupation, replaced the largely feminine ale making with a more commercial product and more commercial consumption.

Vineyards proliferated throughout medieval France, Italy, and southern Germany, though in most cases their wine was quite mediocre and was meant for local consumption. Widespread demand and inadequate transportation encouraged communities to produce for themselves. But wine was also a commercial commodity where it had access to waterborne transportation, and it supplied a large market of urban

and rural elites in the northern countries. England's control of southwestern France helped establish a massive export of wine through Bordeaux in the Middle Ages. After losing France in the Hundred Years' War, England helped create new supplies in Spain and the Canaries. The Dutch replaced English merchants looking for wine along the west coast of France in the sixteenth century and shipped the wine throughout northern Europe. Improvements in commercial practices and transportation by 1600 led many areas, particularly in the north, to give up their vineyards. Wine production became specialized, and a sophisticated wine trade made wine available for elite consumption and supplied towns throughout Europe.

The evidence for consumption levels is not readily available before the modern era except occasionally for some towns. Levels of consumption in beer-drinking countries may have reached as much as a liter a day by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the estimates for England and Germany are 250 to 400 liters per year. The inhabitants of certain medieval towns in France, Spain, and the Netherlands may have already reached that level, consuming nearly as much alcohol in one hundred liters of wine, but residents of towns generally drank more than people living in the countryside. Residents of Hamburg in the sixteenth century are credited with drinking seven hundred liters of beer annually. By the eighteenth century many towns in France were consuming as much as two hundred liters of wine per year. Drinking habits in the countryside are much debated, but clearly rural people

drank less than people in towns. English and German peasants continued to brew much of their own beer until the nineteenth century, and those in the vine-growing regions of France drank their own wine or a mildly alcoholic *piquette* (thin wine) made by adding water to pressed grapes. Peasants elsewhere in France are routinely described as drinking nothing but water.

Of course, the overall amounts of alcohol consumed tell only a part of the story. The manner of consumption is equally important to understanding the cultural significance of alcohol. In many societies alcohol joined other foods as a regular part of meals. Drinking often punctuated the rhythms of work in shops and at work sites, and employers frequently provided drink to agricultural workers. Drink also had ritual significance as a "social marker" that set festive times apart from daily rhythms and united drinkers in fellowship. Many villages maintained the custom of church ales into the seventeenth century, and urban revelries of carnival or formal entries always featured alcohol. In many northern cultures a common practice was toasting or pledging (*zutrinken*) then draining glasses in round after round, which encouraged binge drinking. A culture of binge drinking usually consumes less alcohol overall than a culture that consumes alcohol frequently in modest quantities, yet binge drinking is more obvious and troubling to observers. The Germans and to a lesser extent the English gained a bad reputation for their drinking customs.

Attacks on intemperance have a long and distinguished place in European literature, but they took

on a sharper tone in the Reformation with religious efforts to instill moral and social discipline. Writers like Martin Luther, Desiderius Erasmus, and Michel Eyquem de Montaigne in the sixteenth century condemned drunkenness while praising wine taken in moderation. The critics at this stage made little distinction between the excesses of upper or lower classes, though Germans as a culture were generally singled out for particular opprobrium. The Germans themselves produced an elaborate and extensive literature of censure, denouncing the drinking that led to violence, loss of self-control, suffering for the wife and children, and a variety of excesses in their efforts to impose moral discipline. Criticism in following centuries became increasingly class based, as much of the popular culture was subjected to growing condemnation and criminalization. An additional theme in this literature directed particular disapproval at taverns as the focus of dissolute behavior.

The place in which alcohol is consumed is even more important to its cultural impact than the manner of its consumption. Thus the spread of public drinking places in the Renaissance shaped and magnified the social impact of alcohol. Although inns and taverns existed in medieval England, mostly selling wine and catering to an elite clientele, ale was generally sold off the premises, usually by small-scale brewers who produced only intermittently. The simple drink sellers of the Middle Ages, whether an alewife selling out of her home or a vine grower with a bush over his door, were increasingly replaced with more elaborate retail shops by the Renaissance. Most obvious in towns, change was in part due to the growing commercialization of beer making and the wine trade. But alehouses and taverns also provided a particular kind of public space and the sociability of public drinking. Thus even in villages a tavern offered a room and some chairs for those assembling to drink. Although public drinking places came in many different forms, all played important social and cultural roles.

Public drinking places are the best though not the only setting for studying the culture of drink. Drinking in taverns and alehouses was particularly ritualized, and public drinking places established an identity that transcended the mere fact of drink. Across Europe they became a haven for masculine sociability, an extension as well as an alternative to work, and a theater of honor and competition. Drinking rituals emphasized belonging and sharing; drinks offered and reciprocated conveyed important information about social relations. The money spent on drinking in groups has been identified as a form of investment in sociocultural reproduction, the creation of social capital in the bonds of work and neighbor-

hood. The drinking group formed around tavern tables, whose appearance in taverns during the Renaissance was thus crucial to expressing and maintaining this dynamic. Some historians have identified tavern sociability as more “fragmented” than traditional village festivals and community because it formed around small groups. Yet towns offered little alternative to such groups, which could grow quite large when guild members assembled.

Studies of public drinking across time and cultures find numerous similarities in the basic patterns of sociability and reciprocity. People drank in groups, mostly of men who knew each other and shared the identities of work or neighborhood. Women in taverns were rare. The drinking group was carefully defined, and admission or rejection from the group was often the most important currency of tavern society. A drink offered was repaid, though the redistribution of drink was sometimes accomplished by games of chance. Gaming, eating, occasionally dancing—though less often in the cramped space of a neighborhood tavern than in the holiday atmosphere of a country *guinguette* or large tavern—might accompany drinking, but the essence of public drinking was communication. The drink offered or refused spoke volumes, but around all the drinking, although rarely preserved, was the talking. Complaints to the police immortalized some of the talk. The insults, slanders, and verbal aggression that violated norms of *honnêteté* (honesty and decency) were public offenses that had to be protested for the sake of one’s reputation.

Insults were not uncommon, for the tavern encouraged competitive, even violent behavior. The disinhibiting effects of alcohol, inspired by a combination of chemistry and cultural expectations, clearly

contributed to the “disorderly” behavior that figures prominently in both contemporary depictions and modern studies of taverns. The conundrum of masculine violence transcended the tavern, of course, but public drinking was repeatedly connected to this violence. Yet it is important to recognize the fundamental order that shaped violence and contestation; over and over the sources reveal the obsessive challenges to and defense of masculine honor. As a public commodity given shape and substance by public reputation and recognition, honor had particular urgency in a public forum. Whether honor represented the sexual features of patriarchal authority and control of womenfolk or the economic imperatives of paying debts and keeping one’s word, it depended on the demonstration and approbation of the community. The rituals of drinking lent themselves to the communication of honor endorsed or undercut. The ironic toasts, the “drunken” if quite deliberate slanders, and the refusals to recognize or extend an invitation were more likely to be conscious expressions of social and communal relations than accidents of the drink. If fights escalated more rapidly into murderous rages under the influence of alcohol, they obeyed careful rules of primitive duels.

It is not hard to see why the authorities harbored deep reservations about public drinking places. In addition to the violence that erupted in masculine assemblies, public drinking places were semantically linked to the “public women” and floating poor who lacked private, domestic space. Every society attempted to regulate access, setting a curfew and closing drink shops during the Sabbath. French ordinances from the Middle Ages through the sixteenth century attempted, with obvious lack of success, to exclude local residents from using taverns. They finally gave up the effort in the seventeenth century. Owners were pressured to exclude criminals, prostitutes, drunkards, and other undesirables. Police records contain little evidence of the underworld tavern or its criminal denizens, yet the tavern still enjoyed a poor reputation. Even its respectable clients threatened the social order with their expenditures on leisure and consumption. Religious institutions castigated taverns as counterchurches, “devil’s altars” that took men from their Sunday obligations, deprived them of their sense of decorum, and exposed them to lewd behavior. Church and state were not alone in distrusting public drinking; even popular culture demanded a careful balance in the use of taverns. Honor and basic sociability required the laboring classes to spend some time in taverns with their peers, yet wives and artisans alike joined the police in condemning those who wasted their time and money there.

At the same time the revenue brought in from taxing alcohol sold wholesale to merchants or retailed in taverns represented a major part of a community’s budget. For that reason towns rarely matched practice to rhetoric and did nothing significant to reduce drinking in taverns. Similarly in early modern France taxes on the sale of wine at every stage of the wine trade made up a significant proportion of the state’s income, a fact that ultimately persuaded the state to accept a surprisingly *laissez-faire* attitude toward wine merchants. Throughout modern Europe the economic interests of beer, wine, and spirits producers resisted attempts to regulate drinking. The official and elite rhetoric condemning drinking and taverns, which has remained the staple of so many histories of alcohol, must be balanced by the far more complex realities of competing interests.

TRANSFORMATIONS

The culture of drinking underwent an abrupt transformation in the seventeenth century with the rapid proliferation of different drinking options. In a startling coincidence of innovations, the range of drink choices suddenly multiplied and with it the places in which one could drink. The newcomers included new types of wine, such as sparkling champagne and aged or fortified wines, and a new type of alcohol, that is, distilled alcohol, or spirits. The most popular of these new drinks, coffee, tea, and chocolate, were neither alcoholic nor indigenous. Indeed they are not usually considered under the rubric of “drinking,” and writers concerned about temperance often suggested them as alternatives to alcohol. Each is a mild drug with effects identified variously as sobering, desiccating, destimulating, and eroticizing. To their number should be added that most successful drug of all, tobacco. In England the consumption of tobacco rose rapidly to a level of two pounds per person by the end of the seventeenth century, a rate at which most people could smoke a pipeful a day. It remained at that level through most of the eighteenth century. Tea and coffee became items of daily consumption in much of Europe during the eighteenth century.

The reasons for this bonanza are not too complicated. The late seventeenth century was also a period of commercial revival and the spread of commercial wealth. Countries like England, Holland, and France began to draw upon the goods available in non-European markets. Just as important, their societies experienced an influx of commercial wealth that helped create a powerful, self-conscious mercantile class that defined itself in part through its consump-

tion patterns. Coffee and chocolate became the drinks of the middle and upper classes, who were equally eager to consume the expensive paraphernalia that went with domestic preparation. Many contemporaries saw the contrast between the sobriety of the new commodities and the drunkenness produced by alcohol as metaphors for the growing gap between the elite and popular cultures. Yet the same elites helped to transform the wine trade. Their desire for luxuries propelled the creation of sparkling champagne and the development of aging in bottles. The British elites played a disproportionate role in stimulating the development of port and madeira in Iberian markets as well as brandy in France.

Along with new kinds of drink came new places to drink them. Cafés and coffeehouses appearing throughout Europe in the second half of the seventeenth century served many of these new drinks. Presenting themselves through their furnishings as more refined and sedate than taverns, these establishments consciously appealed to a more respectable clientele. In England, France, and Holland they became assemblies for discussing news and business; the English turned some of them into semiofficial business addresses. The English coffeehouses in particular have been identified by historians as the epicenter of a “public sphere,” where the communication and identity necessary for civil society found its roots. The Parisian café developed its business and political identity rather more timidly. Cafés certainly had a more elite, literate clientele than did taverns, and the Parisian police spent some energy spying on the political sedition and subversive speech heard in them. But civil society in Old Regime France remained tied largely to domestic salons and to a “public” that existed more in the imaginations of writers than in any public places.

The premodern history of these new substances repeats and reinforces certain interesting patterns. As exotic and originally quite expensive commodities, they appealed to elite consumers who were aware of a wider world of goods and wished to demonstrate their refinement. The new stimulants were initially controversial but soon enjoyed strong support as healthful and medically useful agents. They were rapidly incorporated into domestic consumption and spread from there to public places and public consumption, at which point they began to undergo a process of gendering. Coffee and tobacco became largely male stimulants associated with public drinking places and male sociability, whereas chocolate remained domestic and largely feminine. Men smoked in taverns and coffeehouses; in elite houses men and some women gathered in smoking rooms. The rituals

of snuff taking that emerged in the eighteenth century were even more elaborate, with expensive paraphernalia that allowed the elites to turn snuff into an upper-class alternative to smoking. Through much of the eighteenth century coffee was identified by the male, bourgeois qualities of reason and sobriety and chocolate by the female, aristocratic qualities of indolence and sensuality. Tea ultimately transcended gender and class and became in England a commodity of universal demand.

Among the popular classes the experience of drinking began to change at more or less the same time. The urban populace, particularly in the major cities, was not far behind the elites in adopting coffee, tea, and tobacco and probably preceded them in the widespread use of spirits. Spirits had been distilled from wine and grain since the Middle Ages and were consumed as medicinal treatments for a variety of physical and emotional ills. In addition to warming and fortifying, spirits served as an anesthetic. It is impossible to determine the amount of spirits consumed before the modern era, but the history of opium in England indicates that drugs were a regular part of popular medicine yet were limited to the purpose of self-medication. Spirits apparently were not drunk socially in the Middle Ages.

Opium had been known and used in Europe since antiquity but never in much quantity. Identified overwhelmingly with its medicinal qualities, the drug offered little more than analgesic aid until almost the nineteenth century. In various forms, but most often as laudanum, opium dulled pain, quieted coughs and children, calmed nerves, and improved digestion. Cheap and easily accessible through the early modern period, it became a staple of popular self-medication. Seemingly it was rarely taken recreationally and was not thought of as addictive. Some evidence indicates that opium consumption was increasing during the first half of the nineteenth century in England, but only a small core of bohemian society used the drug recreationally and articulated a new aesthetic of drug taking.

Clear evidence exists, however, that the medicinal model of spirit consumption was breaking down in sixteenth-century Germany and was replaced by recreational use. The growing number of distilleries in many German and later Dutch towns was matched by increasing complaints of alcohol abuse—less an indication of quantities consumed than of cognitive dissonance over the manner of its use. The process was gradual, and for a long time spirits were consumed in different places and in different ways than was beer or wine. People bought brandy in the morning from sellers who offered no seating, and they did

not drink it socially. By the late seventeenth century, however, the populations of northern Europe were consuming spirits on a regular basis and, perhaps more important, they were drinking it in taverns and treating it like other drinks. Yet as spirits were assimilated into the culture of public drinking, they threatened to disrupt it.

The first sign of crisis came in England with the phenomenon known as “mother gin.” The statistics for alcohol consumption reveal a clear surge in the consumption of gin through the first half of the eighteenth century from less than a liter per capita to nearly five liters, much of it concentrated in London. Yet the meaning of this occurrence has been wrapped in polemics since it was first observed. Famous prints by William Hogarth capture the horror induced among the elite by the spread of gin drinking among the London poor. His images of infanticide, debauchery, and decay summarize all too effectively the respectable view of popular drinking. Yet the historian of drink learns quickly to question the perceptions of drinking behavior. Although some historians point to the elevated levels of gin consumption to support Hogarth’s depiction, others suggest that the new liquor’s novelty, its appearance in new forms of drink shops, and its

popularity among the lowest classes because it was cheap account for much of the opprobrium.

Mother Gin offers a useful example of changes in drink culture, many of whose elements were repeated in the following century. The increasing consumption of gin apparently was tied to rising income rather than misery. Gin retailers, many of them women, belonged to a lower class of sellers, who were unable to set up an alehouse with its increasingly expensive license, furnishings, and commercial requirements. Gin shops, differing from alehouses or taverns, seem a throwback in some ways to the medieval drink shop with little or no interior, sociable space. Some evidence suggests that women figured prominently among gin drinkers, a function both of gin’s origins in popular self-medication and of the sex of so many retailers. Thus gin made alcohol consumption available to a wider clientele; even women and the poor could drink alcohol for a modest outlay. But a new beverage drunk in a new setting without familiar rituals by women and a social level that enjoyed little but contempt was a recipe for the elites’ moral panic as well as perhaps the immoral behavior of the populace.

Elsewhere the changes in popular drinking patterns were more subtle and less threatening. Within

Paris new shops selling spirits to a popular clientele slowly appeared, but the amount of spirits brought into Paris during the eighteenth century was still quite modest. Wine overwhelmingly remained the drink of the populace. In the late seventeenth century many Parisian wine merchants moved outside of the city's boundaries and created the *guinguette*—a large, boisterous country tavern where city people came to play on holidays. Guinguettes aimed at a popular clientele but provided a more commercialized, anonymous form of entertainment than did the neighborhood tavern. In France, as in Britain and the German states, the increasing variegation of drinking places accompanied a growing segregation of classes and cultures and soon led to conflict over drinking culture.

Industrialization in the nineteenth century brought new and sometimes disturbing changes to drinking patterns, but to exaggerate the impact of modernization is dangerous. Some of the changes were largely a matter of perception, many of them built on continuities with the past. The consumption of alcohol, particularly of spirits, increased, in some cases dramatically, due to more disposable income, the prevalence of cheaper "industrial" spirits, and the modernization of the countryside. Patterns of drinking in public may also have changed with the introduction of "bar" counters and the spread of solitary drinking. Some argued that such changes in quantity and manners of drinking spelled the death of tradi-

tional forms and the rise of a new and brutal sort of alcohol consumption. The idea of "alcoholism," invented in the middle of the nineteenth century, became a specter haunting Europe. With the concurrent criminalization and medicalization of drinking abuses came the emergence of temperance movements to combat the new evil. The recreational use of other drugs also increased, but this phenomenon could hardly compete with alcohol for the attention of social reformers and critics.

Alcohol became readily available to all as a revolution in transportation, beginning with canals at the turn of the century and rapidly augmented by railroads, created national markets across the Continent. Wine produced in the south of France was shipped north and sold for less than many of the local wines, like those of lower Burgundy, which rapidly disappeared in the face of competition. Regions that never before produced or consumed wine could buy it cheaply, and wine became as much a part of peasants' diets as of city dwellers'. At the same time, the industrial revolution made newer forms of alcohol vastly cheaper and more available. The price of grain declined steadily through the century, driving farmers to look for alternative uses. They distilled their grain or planted their grain fields with potatoes and sugar beets, which they also distilled. The prices of such "industrial" spirits, in the form of schnapps, gin, vodka, or whiskey dropped sharply through the cen-

tury, making a powerful alcohol available to the working classes.

Industrial spirits became remarkably popular within a short time. Workers found warmth, stimulation, and calories from an affordable luxury at a time, in the early nineteenth century, when their diets were poor and even deteriorating. When standards of living improved, the producers found ways to give their spirits interesting flavors and spent equal energy creating an interesting aura through advertising. They mixed alcohol made from grain or sugar beets with various herbs like juniper, gentian, quinine, anise, and mint and fruits like orange and cherry, and sugar. To the distinctive flavors producers added a distinctive look and elaborate claims of health-giving properties. Advertising insisted on the “digestive” and “tonic” effects of these drinks and suggested the time, place, and style of their consumption.

One of the most successful examples of the marketing of new spirits is the infamous case of absinthe. A green liquid with flavors of anise and wormwood, absinthe became the favorite drink of the bohemian middle class in the mid-nineteenth century. The drink, known as the “green fairy,” was quickly surrounded with rituals and a whole culture of consumption. Only with the worst of the phylloxera crisis in the 1880s, when wine was rare and expensive, did absinthe become a drink for the working class, and its sales tripled within a decade. Suddenly the middle class became alarmed at “absinthism.” Once in the hands of the lower classes, the drink was seen as a pernicious and poisonous substance capable of unbalancing the weaker constitutions and morals of an already degenerate populace. That absinthe was particularly popular among women only enhanced the fear of its attractions and ravages. But absinthe and the response to absinthism are simply a model, somewhat exaggerated, of the nineteenth-century careers of alcohol and alcoholism.

The usual assumption is that the century that invented alcoholism was a time of historically high rates of consumption, and the statistics in many European countries seem to show an increase in the consumption of alcohol through most of the nineteenth century. The French offer a dramatic example of this trend. Between the 1830s and the end of the century, they doubled the amount of wine and beer they drank per year from roughly 80 and 12 liters, respectively, to 160 and 28 liters. In the same period, their consumption of spirits more than doubled to the equivalent of four liters of pure (proof) alcohol. Total consumption of pure alcohol reached a peak of some twenty-one liters in the first decade of the twentieth century. The British and Germans peaked in their al-

cohol consumption earlier, in the 1870s, and at lower levels, perhaps fourteen liters of total alcohol in Britain and ten liters in Germany, but roughly half of that was in the form of spirits. Yet the trends in these two countries suggest that their nineteenth-century drinking levels were less of a break with their own histories than is often assumed.

Beer drinking in Germany and Britain rose in the second half of the century but had already declined through the first half. In Britain the high point of some 150 liters per capita was probably no higher than at the beginning of the century and well below the estimates for early-eighteenth-century consumption of three or four hundred liters. Germans, too, probably consumed less beer at the height of the nineteenth century than they had in earlier centuries, though the consumption of spirits, which reached a peak in the 1870s, may have made up for it. The per capita consumption of spirits in Britain rose in the first half of the century to more than five liters (proof), but this merely returned consumption to what it had been in the middle of the eighteenth century before the authorities clamped down on the gin “epidemic.” Moreover the trend in British drinking was distorted by the impact of Scottish and Irish drinking. Irish and Scottish production of spirits, which must have reflected local consumption, nearly doubled and tripled through the first half of the century to six and eleven liters per capita respectively, though much of this increase was probably due to illicit stills that agreed to pay a more moderate tax. In contrast, per capita production of spirits in England and Wales rose slowly through the century from roughly two liters to three.

Even the figures for France, which seem to indicate a spectacular rise in per capita consumption of alcohol through the nineteenth century, hide a more complicated reality and, when examined in greater detail, reveal continuity with the past. Urban consumption in France, for example, had increased relatively little since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In particular the consumption of wine remained at roughly two hundred liters per person until the late nineteenth century. If urban consumption remained relatively unchanged, urbanization and a basic shift in the consumption patterns in the countryside apparently drove the growth in per capita drinking of the nation as a whole. People in towns had long imbibed far more wine than those in the countryside. As peasants left the villages for the cities, they learned to drink like city dwellers. Those peasants who remained in the villages became part of an increasingly commercial economy that gave them easier access to alcohol, though the level of rural con-

sumption was still roughly half the urban level by the end of the century.

Although urban consumption of traditional fermented drink remained largely unchanged between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the consumption of spirits in French cities rose dramatically in the nineteenth century. Parisians consumed only 1.5 liters (proof) of brandy at the time of the Revolution but reached 5 liters by mid-century and more than 7 liters by the end of the century. The other major cities of France lagged behind this trend only slightly. Here, then, is most of the increase in urban consumption of alcohol, though even with the increased consumption of spirits, the total alcohol drunk by the average adult city dweller rose by little more than a third between the 1820s and 1890s. The consumption of spirits was largely confined to the north of France, which neither produced nor generally consumed wine. Northern France drank three and four times more than the rest of the country throughout the nineteenth century. The same disparity between wine-making regions and those that consumed spirits existed in Britain and in the northern regions of Germany, areas too cold to grow wine grapes, that accounted for the bulk of spirits consumption.

TEMPERANCE

In the end the changes in drinking patterns were to a large extent more apparent than real. But what was apparent to much of respectable society was the sharp increase in the consumption of spirits. Spirits became the source of much consternation and provided the primary impetus to most of the temperance agitation throughout the century. The gin panic was repeated across Europe with the same visions of depravity, family breakdown, and physical and social deterioration, particularly among the working class. The loudest cries of alarm were initially religious. In many Protestant countries religious groups formed movements in the 1830s and 1840s to combat the rise of spirits consumption and to rescue the working classes from what was seen as a particularly noxious evil. The movement against alcohol in France came later and, initially, from medical practitioners. With these movements the discourse about alcohol shifted from that of the premodern period. Drunkenness had always been condemned, of course, but public drunkenness and, even more, public drinking places drew the greatest ire. By the nineteenth century spirits—and in some eyes any alcohol—had become a poison regardless of when or where they were taken. Drink was destroying the moral fiber, the health, and the house-

hold economy of the working class. It also seemed to harm the work process now that employers revered a more regular pace and workers operated more dangerous machinery. The workers' private vices turned out to have very public disadvantages.

The rhetoric of physical and moral toxicity found an echo in the labeling of drug abuse as a medical problem. That reaction occurred nearly simultaneously with the invention of alcoholism and for similar reasons. Although opiates had not become a serious problem among the working classes, the same combination of medicalization and moral crusade that produced a temperance movement yielded a movement against drugs in the second half of the nineteenth century. The moral crusade drew much of its fervor from the recognition of the injustices of the opium trade with China. But the language of the movement expressed the same condemnation of working-class culture—of its lack of thrift, self-discipline, and sobriety—that shaped temperance movements. The mid-century proliferation of morphine, a stronger derivative of opium, provoked medical concerns regarding toxicity and addiction, much as the rise of spirits consumption gave birth to the idea of alcoholism, even though morphine was particularly associated with an elite and feminine clientele. The model of drug addiction, once employed to characterize morphine use, was then gradually extended to all drugs.

Temperance movements aimed first at abstinence from spirits, sometimes by promoting traditional forms of alcohol in their stead. Indeed the French understood alcoholism as a problem of "alcohol," which for them meant only spirits, whereas Germany and Britain wrestled with the question of whether to extend abstinence to all forms of alcohol or just spirits. Britain moved wholeheartedly beyond an antispirits position in the mid-nineteenth century. After a brief phase of anti-spirits agitation, the temperance movement swung sharply toward teetotalism and prohibition.

All these movements aimed at an alcohol problem whose dimensions in the nineteenth century are still much debated. The temperance movements founded in the 1830s in Germany and Britain coincided with a period of considerable misery for the working class. But that misery was caused more by industrialization and urbanization than by alcohol consumption, which was actually stagnating or even declining. The evidence cited by temperance movements for growing public drunkenness and alcohol-induced madness were largely artifacts of greater police repression and medical attention. Their objections to popular drinking practices reflected the fundamental clash between respectable middle-class values of

thrift and discipline and the demands of popular sociability. Undoubtedly elevated alcohol consumption had health consequences, particularly cirrhosis of the liver, and some lives were ruined by drink in a complex interaction with economic and cultural deprivation. But drink was demonized in so systematic and pervasive a fashion and it so rapidly came to represent all society's ills that clearly more drove the temperance movements than simply the unhappy fate of alcohol abusers.

Controversies over where people drank continued to fuel the urgency of the drink question. In Britain public drinking places became the targets of the temperance movements when they shifted toward prohibition. After an early surge of enthusiasm, the temperance movements reached a plateau of popular support and turned, in the second half of the century, to legal means of restricting access to drink. The number of drinking places grew considerably through the middle of the century, though that increase did not keep pace with the population's growth. Therefore, proportionately fewer pubs operated than had in the seventeenth century. Nationally and locally teetotal agitation focused on efforts to close drink sellers on Sundays and to reduce the number of licensed sellers altogether. The declining social status of the average pub patron certainly made this strategy more attractive.

In the early modern world religious criticism depicted public drinking places as opposed to churches and the Sabbath and distinguishing the saints and the

sinners. Public drinking places became a symbol of class divisions in the modern world. The number of French drink sellers quintupled during the nineteenth century, and the number in Paris rose tenfold. The proliferation of public drinking places and of the exuberant, sometimes drunken behavior of the working classes who drank there heightened the concerns of the social elite about an alcoholic populace. The fact that women were more likely to drink in public in the nineteenth century than in earlier centuries added to the scandal. Drinking in public was also increasingly politicized during the nineteenth century as drinking places became a focus and rallying point for popular political activity.

Cafés inherited the mantle of Enlightenment dissent but were gradually democratized in their decor, their clientele, and their politics. Now workers came there to read newspapers and draft petitions, and workers formed political clubs in the back rooms of cafés. In the French cafés called *goguettes*, workers found a place to sing radical songs. Many German taverns offered meeting space to Socialist groups who had few alternative places to congregate. Tavern keepers were prominent in the elected leadership of the Socialist Party. Through a succession of revolutions, cafés served as rallying points, field stations, and headquarters. Not surprisingly, a succession of regimes took measures against cafés.

The state's traditional distrust of public drinking places was vindicated, and the state responded

harshly. Police units devoted specifically to keeping a close eye on cafés looked not only for drunken and disreputable behavior but also for signs of political radicalism. Granted power to shut down subversive cafés by Napoleon III and again following the Commune, the French police duly closed tens of thousands of establishments. Their reports of cafés closed for “bad morals,” for being “frequented by drunkards,” or as a “meeting place of radicals” reveal the layering and ultimate blending of the traditional language of drink and debauchery with the language of political dissent.

The failure or at best very limited success of the temperance movements reveals the complexity of the social challenge they faced. Their greatest successes usually came early, when they preached temperance to private, usually religious forums. There they found middle-class and some working-class enthusiasm for a message of personal discipline and reform, but the message had little impact on the society or the drink problem as a whole. As each temperance movement turned toward legislative reform, it ran into the political resistance of wealthy, often aristocratic distillers, small shopkeepers and retailers, and the working-class parties. In the crisis atmosphere of World War I, French reformers achieved a few notable successes against absinthe and the proliferation of drink sellers. But the impact of temperance movements throughout Europe was more gradual, less through legislation

than through example. Slowly the discussion of the drink question raised people’s awareness and promoted at least a more moderate use of alcohol if not abstinence.

In much of Europe alcohol consumption fell sharply in the first half of the twentieth century. Spirits had reached a peak in the 1870s in Britain and Germany, and they filled fewer glasses in France as well after the turn of the century. British and German beer consumption had increased toward the end of the nineteenth century but declined in the first half of the twentieth. By the 1970s, however, Germans had essentially doubled the amount of beer they drank and were consuming unprecedented amounts of wine. In the second half of the twentieth century the British, too, reversed the decline, though levels remained below those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By historical standards, this was still moderate drinking. At the same time the French drank ever more wine, except when they were at war or recovering from it. They continued to drink at elevated levels until the 1970s, when they began to taper off. But in France as elsewhere a more momentous change in the culture of drink was the decline of the public drinking place. Facing increasing competition from home entertainment, pubs and cafés began closing. Whether public drinking places were a public nuisance or a prop of popular culture, Europe ended the twentieth century with fewer of them.

See also Alcohol and Temperance (volume 3); Food and Diet (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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HONOR AND SHAME



Robert A. Nye

Honor and shame have been typically yoked together in a binary form by ethnologists, anthropologists, and other students of so-called “honor cultures” in which much of public behavior is determined by considerations of personal or collective honor. In modern usage shame is a sentiment one feels following disgrace, while honor is a distinction that is conferred on individuals for actions that bring renown or that somehow adheres to groups as a kind of pride in collective achievements. Although it might thus appear that shame is the opposite or inverse of honor, in fact the old French etymology reveals that honor (*honneur*) and shame (*honte*) come from the same root, a usage preserved in the motto of the Order of the Garter, “*honi soit qui mal y pense*” (shame on him who thinks badly of it).

INTRODUCTION

Even in the Mediterranean cultures, where honor flourished as nowhere else, shame has become detached discursively and practically from its connection to honor. One might feel shame, or attribute it to persons, in instances where honor never appeared to be in question: financial embarrassment, a bad case of acne, an unkempt lawn, or a tastelessly dressed relative. But we should not be encouraged by the apparent atrophy of honor in modern social practice and usage to forget the original and historic connections of honor and shame in Western societies. In these societies, honor and shame were essentially different sentiments or social assessments made about action (or inaction) in particular instances relating to kin, marriage, wealth, military reputation, and precedence in public life. Such judgments and feelings were made and felt on the same continuum: shame was not so much the opposite of honor as its lack.

Shame, therefore, was the experience, or the fate, of someone who had suffered dishonor by failing adequately to protect honor. For the social historian or the anthropologist, it is of far greater interest to

investigate the behavior and the values that motivated the quest for honor. The effort to attain and retain honor was invariably a salient and persistent aspect of masculine comportment; while shaming rituals are sometimes poignant, dramatic, or violent, the shamed individual experiences the full weight of his shame in relative isolation. Ironically, though honor has no ontological status apart from the unceasing efforts to retain it, in honor cultures shame exists as a menacingly permanent threat.

In the earliest definitions of honor, a man’s honor consisted of his land, possessions, and family. In western Europe in the early medieval period, only aristocratic men met these criteria. Eventually, as land and goods were held by a larger and more diverse population, honor became a quality that inhered in individuals. Honorability became a quality of persons that was natural to them but that required continuous assertion and demonstration; ultimately, no man of honor could rest on his laurels without danger of derogation. Moral goodness or other forms of virtue like chastity, asceticism, or a reputation for wisdom might maintain themselves in the absence of action. Honor, however, was born within a military service class that lived in an atmosphere of constant warfare where demonstrations of personal courage or bravery possessed a certain selective advantage for the group. Honor was therefore also a collective ethos of groups of fighting men for whom honorability was a judgment about the reliability and the skill of fellow warriors. From the beginning of its long history, honor was thus both individual and corporate.

The close association with the military virtues of loyalty, prowess in weaponry, and physical courage did not mean that honor lacked a spiritual dimension. Indeed, though it has always had a certain intangible quality, honor has been asserted as an ideal, which, depending on the time and the place, has assumed various mythic forms. The examples of certain “mirrors of chivalry,” such as King Arthur or Richard the Lionheart, or the heroic behavior of particular battle units whose valor “won the day” have always served

to encourage emulation and sacrifice. There is a sense, in other words, in which the discourses of honor may become collective representations against which honorable actions are measured in all matters great and small.

In historical investigations of the role of honor in society, the social historian must not expect to find the discourses of honor inscribed openly as rules or easily to identify the honorable standards to which individuals were held. The effort to attain and retain honor may be traced in social practices of various

sorts, but such transactions were not calculated with some preconceived ideal in mind. One of the foremost students of honor, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, has likened the pursuit of honor to the accumulation of symbolic capital that is measured only approximately by individuals and their peers. Honor, he says, is a game played by players with a tacit "feel" for the game that allows them to build their own capital and assess the capital of others. Indeed, the metaphor of the game is appropriate for the history of honor in that games have no transcendent aim except

winning or performance but may evolve into rule-bound activities in which an officious legalism replaces creative spontaneity.

Bourdieu also suggests that the participants in the game of honor do not precisely calculate their behavior so much as strategize in choosing among a range of possibilities. In his work on marital and kinship strategies in the Béarn region of France and among the Kabyle people in North Africa, Bourdieu studied the way in which matrimonial strategies could be understood as part of the larger game of the accumulation of honor. An individual hoped to add to his assets by marrying well, endowing his children, and thus “reproducing” himself transgenerationally, handing down his wealth and honor to his heirs. In making particular decisions (whom to marry, how many children to have, how to endow them), the patriarch certainly made calculations, but always as part of a larger, more tacit “feel” for how honor might best be gained and preserved for himself and his family.

Historically, honor is essentially a masculine phenomenon. Even outside the West only men could win and defend their honor or that of their family or group. The sphere of a man’s honor included the minors, women, or dependents who were under his protection. Women and children thus possessed no honor of their own, though they could share the shame of a dishonor that befell the kinship unit. Women did have a kind of sexual honor that consisted of their purity or their sexual loyalty to the patriarch; they forfeited it as a result of both rape and consensual relations and were powerless to regain it. Only the patriarch, through an act of vengeance or confrontation in a *point d’honneur* (point of honor), could remove the stain. In the classical systems of honor, women and children were like pawns in chess games played by patriarchs, assets that could be lost or gained, sacrificed or “crowned” in strategies of honor. A wife who produced another man’s bastard exposed a man to outside claims on his property; a wayward daughter was damaged goods as a player in her father’s strategies for marital alliances; a son’s indiscretions might dishonor his father and call into question his own ability as a future manager of the family’s assets.

In attempting to understand the role honor and shame have played in certain historical societies, the historian must consider various social practices. These can be grouped into four categories: marriage and inheritance strategies; class and the evolution of honor; the duel and the *point d’honneur*; and honor and sociability. There is nothing sacred about these categories; they illuminate the terrain of honor unusually well but are by no means exhaustive.

MARRIAGE AND INHERITANCE STRATEGIES

Marriage and the production of children was the only way a man could be assured that the assets he himself had inherited and defended would survive him. His honor was subsumed both in his property and his children and in his actions as a manager of these assets. A man’s marriage was the foundation of his own stake in the game of honor. The number and sex of his children and his marital strategies for them could either augment or disperse his fortune. Customs respecting exogamy and endogamy, and other issues of time, place, and circumstance are the things that a man had to consider before beginning marriage negotiations for a male or female child. Local dowry customs and the liquidity of land and other forms of family property had to be considered, and these decisions were always made after considering the number and sex of children who had survived the first five years of life.

Inheritance laws and customs varied widely throughout Europe. The partitive inheritance that settled a man’s wealth proportionately on all his children prevailed in much of northern Europe; it required strategies that minimized fragmentation of his resources such as a child’s voluntary disinheritance and celibacy. In the parts of Europe governed by Roman law, and in Britain, primogeniture was the rule, giving title and most assets typically to the eldest son. There were threats to the honor and wealth of the patriarch in both systems, but he could minimize them by managing the size of his family and exercising as much control as possible over the education and movements of his children, even from the grave. It seems likely that child-rearing practices, courtship practices, and family history in general were marked by these strategic considerations of patriarchal honor in Europe and elsewhere until relatively recent times.

In light of the way the patriarch attempted to control all his assets, it is easy to see how the techniques and restraints he and his wife initiated to control the number of births became incorporated into the domain of honor and shame. Much less is known about what those techniques actually were, but it seems logical to assume that if a large number of children would fragment the inheritance while giving none of them an adequate start in life, couples might employ various forms of birth control, resort to abortion, or practice celibacy. Having children out of wedlock, or having too many in wedlock, could possibly be regarded as a shameful surrender to lust; popular attitudes toward birth control might thus have been favorable. By contrast, in certain parts of Europe until

modern times, pregnancy constituted a definitive proof of fertility that brought many a girl to the altar, fostering a relaxed attitude toward premarital sex in general. The threshold of shame with respect to pregnancy, abortion, contraception, and the frequenting of prostitutes has certainly varied depending on inheritance customs, family size, and ages of marriage and conception.

HONOR AND SOCIAL CLASS

One of the most fruitful and largely unexplored aspects of the history of honor and shame cultures concerns the way they differ according to class. We know more about honor within the aristocracy than in any other class. As we have seen, the rituals and values of honor cultures evolved first in noble milieus. However, there is reason to think that wherever forms of individual landownership developed, or where there were strong bonds of corporate loyalty in urban craft guilds or in military fellowships such as the Knights of Malta, mechanisms arose in which the use of masculine and family honor bore a definite resemblance to the principal forms of noble honor. In addition to the independent genesis of honor cultures, social mimesis became an increasingly important explanation for the spread of honor and shame to aristocratizing bourgeois engaged in upward mobility, especially after the seventeenth century.

For the European aristocracy, honor was synonymous with personal courage and reputation for valor. Social derogation for cowardice—the avoidance of military service or evasiveness on the *point d'honneur*—was ruthless, devaluing a man's property and reputation simultaneously. The slightest suspicion that a nobleman was hiding behind his wife's skirts, some higher moral or religious injunction, or even a monarch's ban on dueling was enough to taint his reputation. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the public comportment of noblemen was attuned to a verbal culture where insults, vows of loyalty, oaths, and other forms of personal alliance provided an unstable foundation for political life. In the absence of specific contractual agreements, appearances, assertions, bluff, and counter-bluff were the chief elements of political discourse.

In England, Spain, and France, state-building monarchs followed a strategy of reducing the fractiousness of honor-hungry noblemen by reducing their independence, tying them closer to court culture, and transforming the sometimes violent and disruptive rituals of shame avoidance into brilliant competitive rituals of courtiership. Demonstrations of rage

or prowess at weapons were converted into spectacles of style, wit, and elegance without, after all, abandoning an ultimate resort to the point of honor. As Norbert Elias has theorized in his great study of the civilizing process, the phrase “shame at his estate” originates in a court culture that had substituted censorious standards of refinement for the crude ruses of combat.

In the parts of western Europe where economic development had produced a wealthy and ambitious bourgeoisie, a strategy of marital alliances with aristocratic families and the purchase of offices and titles testified to a widespread middle-class desire to assimilate the most attractive aspects of the noble ethos, including the wearing of the sword and the right to engage in the *point d'honneur*. But middle-class men had also cultivated forms of honor and honorability that were unique to them, particularly forms of behavior that had ensured the survival or prosperity of their ancestors. These included the virtues of thrift and financial independence, sexual self-restraint, and the capacity to work productively, all of which stood apart from noble values. Like the noble traits of courage, loyalty, and prowess at arms, which were *naturalized* as qualities innate to the noble man of honor, sexual “respectability” and the drive to work and save became natural qualities of bourgeois honorability. A middle-class man felt shame at the prospect of financial failure or at accusations of sexual impropriety and strove to live his life honorably according to the values of his class.

It is accepted that the forms of upper-class honor that emerged at the end of the eighteenth century throughout Europe were a synthesis of noble and bourgeois varieties. Aristocratic men found they could serve bourgeois regimes as administrators or diplomats without dishonor, and middle-class men assimilated the reflexive temerity and the readiness to defend a reputation for courage that had once been a wholly noble trait. On the frontiers of Europe, cultural and social cleavages other than those of class determined which men would be stimulated to action from a dread of shame. In Ireland, Protestant gentlemen enthusiastically embraced the ethos of the duel as a way of asserting their identity as a political and religious elite. The usual distinctions between noble and commoner were overlooked in a development that expressed its solidarity behind a screen of chivalric querulousness. Likewise, in the course of the Napoleonic Wars and subsequent military occupations, French, Italian, German, and Russian officers were moved by national cleavages far more than by class distinctions in a veritable epidemic of nationalistic affairs of honor.

Scholars have shown that important forms of honor and honorability were also a part of rural and

urban milieus in the old regime. The forms and usages of honor were different, but it seems certain that honor and shame worked in similar ways in nonelite strata of society. In parts of the rural southern Mediterranean, affronts to a man's honor might range from physical confrontation, to insults to or even attacks on his womenfolk, to simple rudeness. Rich peasants, small-town merchants, or other local notables might find it suddenly necessary to defend their honor with force. This was often done by direct violence against the offender or his family, for which the genteel rituals of upper-class duels provided no inspiration whatever. On the contrary, there was a tendency for such affairs of honor to enlist all the members of a clan and for bitterness to carry on for more than a generation.

In late-eighteenth-century Paris, skilled craftsmen might be provoked by other members of the popular classes to defend the honor of their guild or that of their family. In some of these conflicts, brawls broke out almost immediately after an insult was delivered, and bottles, fists, or whatever came to hand were used in self-defense. Occasionally more refined forms were followed that at least resembled upper-class duels. In such cases an interval was observed to allow tempers

to cool, and the subsequent fight observed an equality of weaponry and conditions. Conflicts of this sort almost invariably occurred in public places, most generally in cafes or places of recreation, and arose from direct verbal exchange involving real or imagined slights. It is likely that the notorious rivalries that existed between urban guilds throughout Europe were, in their essence, expressions of corporate honor and solidarity in which men felt obliged to defend the territory or the reputation of their craft.

Other historians have found compelling evidence for the existence of honor conflicts among the popular classes in early modern and modern cities. We know that in both Amsterdam and Rome knife fighting enjoyed a ritual status as a way of resolving conflicts between lower-class men. Most men carried knives, and these became the weapon of choice when fights resulted from barroom arguments. There was a standard pattern to such encounters. The men left the premises and fought outside in the presence of their friends, who did not intervene. The conflict usually ended when one of the combatants was disabled, though death was the occasional result. Men prided themselves on their scars or fighting reputations, and

especially skilled knife fighters were given a wide berth. Certainly the masculinity of these men, if not some more refined sense of honor, was at stake in such conflicts. Middle-class men in Amsterdam did not carry knives and would not “duel” with men from the popular classes, thinking this beneath them. Instead they wielded sticks or clubs in self-defense, testifying to a desire to indicate that their antagonist did not possess the quality of honor of a man of their stamp.

A class analysis of honor reveals that individuals and groups from all levels of society possessed some rudimentary notion of honor and were capable of experiencing shame at its loss. The constituent elements of honor varied according to class: reputations for courage, generosity, financial probity, sexual respectability, physical strength, or corporate or clan loyalty were central features of class conceptions of honor. These differential values appear to have evolved within classes and met the sense of pride or reputation particular to the group. At the same time, at least at the upper levels of honor cultures, there appears to have been a percolation of honor downward that was the product of social diversification and mobility. By the end of the nineteenth century, the values of an eclectic upper-class system of honor had spread throughout middle-class society, qualifying a man of property or education to participate in affairs of honor and to feel himself slighted or insulted as a result of a number of potential offenses against his person, his family, or his group.

THE DUEL AND THE *POINT D'HONNEUR*

The duel evolved from various medieval forms of knightly encounters and from the judicial duel that determined, until the fifteenth century, certain cases of guilt or innocence. At some point in the sixteenth century the duel became a private matter to be decided between two gentlemen and their friends. The private duel flourished throughout early modern Europe, despite the efforts of state-building monarchs to outlaw it. Although the events that precipitated an affair of honor might have seemed trivial or incidental, differences between men of honor were always potentially dangerous because the courage and determination of each man was immediately engaged and put in question. A man or his friends could make a disproportionately vigorous effort to resolve these differences at the risk of appearing afraid to risk his life. In the long and hoary traditions of the *point d'honneur*, life without honor was not worth living; a public retreat from an affair of honor was usually an instantaneous sentence of social death.

The *point d'honneur* was thus the final court of appeal in a series of potential differences that could erupt between men. In the largely verbal culture of early modern Europe, a gentleman could react to even mildly worded insults or accusations by “giving the lie” to his antagonist, accusing him in effect of lying, which was an imputation on his personal honor and a *casus belli* for a duel. The man so accused had the right to choose weapons and conditions in the subsequent duel. By the late eighteenth century, higher rates of literacy among gentlemen of honor meant that written insults, slanders, or simply unfriendly characterizations could appear in print and serve as grounds for duels. These occasions were greatly magnified in the course of the nineteenth century with the rise of a mass newspaper culture, modern political culture, and a genuine public sphere.

It is difficult to generalize beyond this point. National and regional variations in the sensitivity to the *point d'honneur* varied from place to place and over time; the national and temporal variations of the duel and its rituals provide an anatomy of honor that is more accurate and more revealing than any other documentary source. It is a public record of the depth and the limits of private and personal sentiments and the judgments made about them. These sentiments were probably not experienced by the principals in every affair of honor until the event actually transpired. Dueling narratives may be found in personal memoirs, in the transcripts of trials, in compendia of duels gathered by enthusiasts of the practice, and particularly in newspaper accounts published from the summaries of witnesses. These latter accounts are likely at least to contain no grave exaggerations owing to the fact that they were drawn up by each man's seconds in a version agreed upon by all.

The variations are worth summarizing briefly. The duel was violent though infrequent in Great Britain and consisted mostly of pistol duels, usually by members of the gentry who had military experience or a sporting familiarity with weapons; serious wounds and even death were frequent. However, the duel disappeared rather suddenly in the 1850s thanks to initiatives from the crown, a refusal to pay pension benefits to the widows of military men deceased in a duel, and the existence of libel and slander laws with some teeth.

In France the duel was far more frequent, more bourgeois and civilian in nature, and since the preferred weapon was the *épée* (rapier), wounds and death were far less frequent. The duel increased in popularity in France throughout the 1870s and 1880s, cresting with the political turmoil of the Boulanger affair in the late 1880s and the Dreyfus affair between 1894

and 1899 and subsiding only slightly thereafter. There may have been as many as three hundred duels in any year at the high-water mark of the practice. Although the duel ebbed and flowed with the conflicts of political life, attracting politicians and journalists in particular, personal and family honor were also frequent causes of affairs. It was common for a cuckold to attempt to repair his wounded vanity (and perhaps exact

some revenge) by issuing a challenge to his rival; fathers, sons, and brothers regularly called out men who had insulted their womenfolk or other relatives, living or dead, who could not defend themselves. The duel was discouraged by the police but was not illegal in France, and weak slander laws often obliged men to obtain satisfaction in person that they could not obtain at law or did not want to publicly reveal.

The Italian duel was probably more frequent than anywhere else, though, as in France, not particularly dangerous. The journalist Iacopo Gelli chronicled most of the duels that took place between the 1860s until after World War I. He found evidence of over 3,500 duels for the period 1879–1894 alone; if one considers the many duels that were not reported for reasons of privacy, there may have been as many as nine hundred duels in some years prior to 1914. Unlike the French version, the Italian duel was heavily influenced by military forms and participation. The saber was the overwhelming weapon of choice, and even men with no prior experience were obliged to learn the appropriate techniques of the saber duel. The duel in Austria-Hungary was also overwhelmingly military in participation and form, though far less frequent and somewhat more dangerous. Widespread political and journalistic participation was common to both the French and the Italian duel; the latter was driven in greater measure by matters of personal (read sexual) honor.

The German duel was unique in its deadliness. German duelers favored the dueling pistol, a smooth-bore version of the old single-shot flintlock, and particularly dangerous conditions of combat: in a “bar-

rier” duel two men approached one another until they reached a barrier at murderously close range, at which point they both discharged their pistols. Bourgeois men who had passed as reserve officers through the regular army felt themselves the equals of even exalted Junker officers and therefore *satisfaktionfähig* (capable of giving satisfaction). Thus in a large number of interclass duels both bourgeois and aristocratic participants had something particular to prove about the quality of their honor and the extent of their courage. Since the German duel was illegal (despite a high level of official tolerance), it was often conducted in private; duels that came to trial often did so because one of the participants was either seriously wounded or killed, so that the legal record is replete with evidence of the seriousness of Teutonic affairs of honor. Historians of the German duel differ as to whether this surviving relic of the medieval past is an instance of the continuing influence of the old military aristocracy in German life or, given the widespread evidence of nonaristocratic duelers, confirms the similarity of Germany to the other western European powers.

In Europe as a whole, the duel, despite its illegality and its ultimately violent nature, reflected the complexities of masculine honor to a degree that was

in fact sometimes excruciatingly legalistic. A case reported by Ute Frevert in her *Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel* (pp. 182–183) from Germany in 1904 illustrates this point. A married army officer, Captain Levetzow, had a brief affair with an unmarried young woman that ended with her subsequent marriage. The affair was discovered soon after, and both her brother and her husband considered their honor to have been affronted. The brother's sense of family honor was outraged by the theft of his sister's virginity by a man who had no intention of marrying her, and the personal honor of the husband was affronted by the fact that the woman who became his wife had been seduced by a third party. Because the liaison took place *before* the marriage, only after which the husband assumed responsibility for her conduct, it was the brother who ultimately demanded satisfaction. This incident also points to how the honor system refused to women (and minors and other outsiders) the possibility of full and independent participation in public life. If someone could not defend with force a conviction they expressed in public, how could they demonstrate the sincerity or defend the accuracy of their remarks?

Excepting brief efflorescences in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, the duel died in the bloody trench fighting of World War I. The high mortality rates and the grievous injuries of many of the survivors made the relatively safer risks of the duel seem absurd and empty. After such a war who was not *satisfaktionfähig*? Dueling techniques live on in the German fraternity *Mensur*, a highly stylized ritual whose aim is to scar but not hurt and where courage but no longer honor is at stake.

HONOR AND SOCIABILITY

In the modern era honor and shame assumed gentler forms. Corporate or collective honor had provided an important part of the solidarity of craft guilds and the liberal professions from the late Middle Ages. The motto “All for one and one for all” ensured such groups’ independence, trade secrets, and reputation for integrity. Good intracorporate relations were assured among men if they managed to observe a common unwritten code of frank intercourse that respected individual sensibilities and yet allowed each man to express his independence. Differences sometimes arose between colleagues, and these could erupt into full-scale affairs of honor, to the shame of the individuals involved and the collective reputation of the group. In the course of the modern period, forms of politeness gradually evolved that permitted guilds and professional groups and later clubs and voluntary

organizations of all sorts to police their members and assure their good order and reputation.

The forms of etiquette or civility that evolved to maintain good relations between men were modeled in their essence on the elaborate dueling handbooks that had circulated in gentlemanly society since the seventeenth century. These forms defined in a progressively legalistic way levels of offense, modes of negotiation and reconciliation, and, by the mid-nineteenth century, “honor courts” that heard and decided on differences between members. It is important to understand that even in scientific and scholarly societies, the personal reputations of individuals counted heavily in discussions about the facts or interpretations they advanced. An honorable man could be assured that the sincerity if not the truth of his utterances would be taken seriously; a man whose honor was in doubt could expect contradiction and resistance at every step. In these settings, as in other public venues in the nineteenth century, the use of arms was still the court of last resort for a man whose honor or integrity was openly doubted.

The wholly masculine nature of club, professional, and political life persisted into the late twentieth century. The social, cultural, or religious exclusiveness of such groups has been due in no small part to the effort to keep out the “wrong kind of man,” whether Catholics, Jews, or ethnic or racial minorities who were not believed to possess by nature or breeding the requisite qualities of honor. Although not designed to exclude women in particular, the honor test effectively excluded women for decades from professional, civic, or social groups for which they were in every other way fully qualified. The wholly masculine nature of the culture, discourse, and modes of conflict resolutions in such groups seemed alien to female pioneers on these social frontiers, who often decided to form all-female auxiliary organizations instead.

The gender integration of public life has meant the progressive dismantling of the masculine honor culture that once served as the chief guarantor of civility in the public sphere. It is an open question whether historians will find evidence of forms of honor particular to women and to female sociability over the last few hundred years that have served to guide and regulate social interaction. Women's gossip networks, labor organizations, and clubs might have been guided by rules of conduct that differed from parallel groups of men in important ways. The same might be said for women who fought in national and civil wars or were prominent in resistance movements, particularly in the twentieth century. It may be, in other words, that women took their cues from a distinctly female form of honor that transcended the

mere safeguarding of their sexual honor, which was their sole duty under the aegis of masculine honorability.

The decline of honor has followed apace the gender integration of all-male organizations in the late twentieth century: the military, clubs, the professions, sports teams, government agencies, and the diplomatic corps. Though it is still possible to speak of a “man of honor” in public life, or for a former German chancellor to defend secret financial arrangements ac-

ording to a personal honor code, these forms of discourse are increasingly infrequent in modern societies. All-male bastions still persist in various places, and, where women have colonized occupations and activities formerly reserved for men, they occasionally make use of the masculine forms of honorific titles and procedures. Laws punishing personal and corporate insult—modeled on affronts to honor—are still on the books in France, Germany, and other European countries, but are seldom enforced.

See also **Social Class; The Military** (*volume 3*); **Men and Masculinity; Gestures; Manners** (*volume 4*); *and other articles in this section.*

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MEMORY AND THE INVENTION OF TRADITIONS



Tamara L. Hunt and Scott Hughes Myerly

The study of memory can take several forms. This essay begins with the impressive intellectual history of ideas about memory. The social history of memory focuses more on ways that memory has been used to bolster loyalties, to the state and to a religion, and to identify outsiders. In the late twentieth century social and cultural historians devoted a great deal of attention to the uses of memory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly around conservative and nationalist causes amid rapid change and new forms of protest. Memory in these uses might be selective but also might be invented outright, surrounded with the trappings of age and ceremony while in fact quite new. Invented traditions included governments and political units as well as ideas about the family, which often mixed desires for family stability with myths about family cohesion and ritual in the past. Finally, historical memory and invention were further tested with reactions to the great wars of twentieth-century Europe that called forth a variety of ceremonies of commemoration but also some efforts at deliberate forgetting.

THEORIES OF MEMORY

For the ancient Greeks memory was the precondition of human thought. Mnemosyne, the goddess of both wisdom and memory, was mother to the Muses, among them Clio, the muse of history. Despite mythological explanations, the Greeks disagreed about what memory actually was, how it functioned, and its role in understanding human history, a debate that has continued ever since. Plato (c. 428–348 or 347 B.C.) argued that memory reveals eternal truth, while Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) thought that it is the way humans understand reality through consciously arranging sensory impressions into a coherent order. Nevertheless, both agreed it is a vital component of human understanding, as did the Roman writers Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 B.C.) and St. Augustine (A.D. 354–430), who believed that memory underlies all thought and education.

In the early modern period (c. 1500–1750) the memory debate focused on questioning human understanding but continued along the division between Plato and Aristotle. René Descartes (1596–1650) asserted that knowledge is independent of sensory information and comes from immortal, pure truths, innate to human reason. Memory, the recollection of past sensory events, could never bring true knowledge. Similarly Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) argued that memories do not actually reflect events, which come to the mind through the senses and can be confused, but rather are innate, inborn ideas. Conversely, John Locke (1632–1704) argued that the human mind at birth is a *tabula rasa*, a “blank slate,” that receives sense impressions. These sensations not only allow people to understand their present reality but form the basis for both memory and personal identity, which he defined as a present consciousness of thought and experience that extend back in time.

By the eighteenth century the debate broadened to include the relationship between memory, history, and tradition. David Hume (1711–1776) argued that the human mind creates causality. When certain events are seen to go together frequently or uniformly, the mind forges links not extant in reality that connect thoughts. This suggests that memory and tradition, as based almost entirely on recollections of past events, are not necessarily rooted in what actually happened but in what people perceived to have happened.

This emphasis on human memory’s unreliability brought both memory and tradition into disrepute among some of the philosophes, who believed that the medieval world was guided by superstition rather than reason. They concluded that, as “tradition,” its culture, events, and ideas were backward, negative, and inhibited “progress,” which they considered positive, innovative, and superior. This bias influenced concepts of memory and history, as many scholars argued in favor of a more rational historical approach purged of superstition and myth. One exception was the great Neopolitan historian Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), who suggested that historical analysis

should be based on “the history of human ideas” or a society’s commonly held assumptions, whether factual or not, that were vital to understanding its history.

The reaction of the romantic era (c. 1760–1840) against the rational historical approach generated modern concepts of memory, particularly through works that attempted to incorporate folk speech and folkways into historical works, for example, those of the Scottish author Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832) and the French historian Jules Michelet (1798–1874). Many scholars and folklorists celebrated the concept of “nation” as expressed in popular culture and vernacular speech, and they also thought national memories and traditions improved understandings of nineteenth-century problems, including urbanization, industrialization, population migration and displacement, and intensifying political centralization. While many such scholars focused on the creation and use of history, their work also theoretically addressed memory and the invention of tradition.

Karl Marx (1818–1883) distrusted “official” histories and most traditions, customs, and institutions, viewing them as legitimizing a social “superstructure” of mentalities that serve elites by justifying and legitimizing their domination over the masses and promoting the latter’s compliance with elite rule, the fundamental aim of which is to maximize elite wealth and power. Any society’s beliefs, customs, and traditions are thus actually founded on the particular economic relations that exist in any time or place and are essentially determined by how work is organized and how property is distributed or owned.

Marx took only limited interest in individuals’ memories, but scholarship informed by nationalism took a different view. The Swiss historian Jakob Burckhardt (1818–1897) believed that individual human choice, not impersonal economic or political forces, causes historical change. He viewed tradition as cultural history’s central focus and felt that peoples’ views of the world are shaped by meaningful historical “fictions” that help them cope with the chaos of modern life. This spiritual cultural history, *Bildung* (civilization or culture), differs substantially from more static political history, *Wissenschaft*, which is based strictly on factual evidence.

The French philosopher Ernest Renan (1823–1892) went further and declared that memory and tradition are the basis for the nation that society attempts to pass on unchanged to future generations. Renan believed that the idea of the nation could transcend divisions based on race, religion, or language by forcing people to abdicate their individual goals and adopt a collective moral conscience. Although Renan suggested that national unification through memory

and tradition is deliberate, his idea resembles the “collective memory” concept introduced by the art historian Aby Warburg (1866–1929). Warburg’s concept involves a process far more subtle than the one outlined by Renan. Collective memory is transmitted through cultural artifacts bearing symbols that can be traced back through time, and Warburg proposed that scholars not only study these memory symbols but also the larger *mentalité* (mentality) of the culture that produces them.

Some scholars, however, wondered whether it is possible to recapture fully the *mentalité* of past cultures. Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) proposed that, since elements of memories appear in dreams, memories are actually fragmented and recollection and perception are given structure only by the emotions. This suggests an enormous difference between individual memories and academic history, a view explored by the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945). Bergson believed that “duration,” or lifespan, is the essence of the human condition and that memory allows a true understanding of reality through subjective, intuitive understanding of the past. He differentiated duration based on intuitive memory from spatialized and institutionalized concepts of time (as in academic history) that is created for specific public or scholarly purposes. Similarly Halbwachs argued that individual and collective memory is subjective and multilayered because it was formed through membership in a variety of groups (family, profession, community, church, nation) that remember from different perspectives and whose views of the past are transformed as the groups change. These “social frames” (*cadres sociaux*) use memory to reconfigure the present, not to reclaim or reconstruct the past. By contrast, Halbwachs argued that academic history presents a more standardized periodization, focusing on subjects not directly experienced by people of an era, and is often linear and teleological (having a distinct purpose).

Thus by the early twentieth century scholars recognized that memory and tradition could play significant roles in how humans understand history, but skepticism about memory’s ability to provide an accurate understanding of the past was increasing. The German philosopher Hans Georg Gadamer (b. 1900), who transformed hermeneutics from a study of biblical texts into a philosophical approach to human understanding and knowledge, argued that individuals attempt to understand the unfamiliar by placing it within their own “horizon” of reality. Thus all new phenomena and ideas—including traditions and historical data that differ from present experience—are

constantly subject to reinterpretation, a process that keeps tradition alive. According to Gadamer, “The historical life of a tradition depends on constantly new assimilation and interpretation” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 358).

The social anthropologist Ernest Gellner argued that in modern mass society, collective amnesia is as important as collective memory and that “both memory and forgetfulness have deep social roots; neither springs from historical accident.” He believed that industrial societies create a “shared, homogeneous, literacy-carried, and school-inculcated culture” (Gellner, 1987, p. 68), meaning that people have to possess knowledge of the dominant culture to succeed, for instance in knowing which fork to use at a formal dinner or understanding the allusions made by co-workers. But in addition to such formal learning, people also have to forget their origins in the “other”—those suspect or unacceptable traditions that deviate from the dominant culture.

To some degree the historian Benedict Anderson’s work on “imagined communities” is related to Gellner’s thesis. Even though it does not address collective memory or amnesia, Anderson’s concept of the nation as an imagined community reflects on both. According to Anderson, although a nation’s citizens will never meet or know the vast majority of their fellow citizens, they nonetheless feel bonded with them. This makes community possible, by encouraging people to overlook such inequalities, divisions, and oppressions as actually beset a nation in their de-

sire to embrace the ideal of a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 1991, p. 7).

The influential Pierre Nora argued that history and memory are “in fundamental opposition” and introduced the concept of *lieux de mémoires* or “sites of memory.” He claimed these sites are “resting places” of memory that can be geographical locations, events, or ideas and that such memories are necessarily selective, rather than complete records of what occurred (Nora, 1989, p. 8). Modern society’s relationship with the past is inherently different from that of earlier societies. While past societies lived in memory and saw no significant difference between the present and past, modern societies are self-consciously separated from that past, which is perceived to no longer exist. Nora also differentiated between official memory promoted by the state or establishment historians and popular memory, which is virtually an organic part of the present that is constantly changing through the process of remembering and forgetting.

Other scholars, such as Natalie Zemon Davis, Randolph Starn, and Raphael Samuel, agreed that history and memory differ but suggested that they exist in a beneficial relationship to each other, not in opposition. Davis and Starn concluded that history and memory are actually interdependent and that tensions and conflicts between them constitute a productive force for generating useful knowledge as scholars attempt to “adjust the fit” between them. Similarly Samuel argued that social memories reflected in contemporary media show that collective memory is dy-

namic, specifically remembering and forgetting elements of the past, and is also historically conditioned, changing with immediate needs. Therefore those collective memories that claim to hand down “traditions” from past generations have been shaped by the crises and evolving perspectives of intervening generations. Nevertheless, Samuel viewed memory and history in a dialectical (interactive) relationship—both are eternally revisionist, each borrowing from the other to fill in gaps or to forge new meanings.

USES OF MEMORY

These twentieth-century theories on the relationship between history and memory are somewhat abstract, but the concepts of tradition and the invention of tradition are rooted in historical analysis. Eric Hobsbawm defined the invention of tradition as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983, p. 1). Certainly not all forms of memory are purposely and consciously invented to influence the present, but the invention of tradition cannot exist without a real or implied link with past memories.

Implied in the concept is that the purpose, conscious or not, of invented traditions is to reinforce a desirable sense of continuity with a real or mythical past whenever a real cohesion does not exist in the present or appears to be threatened or faltering. Thus tradition is most likely to be invented in periods of upheaval or uncertainty, when individuals and groups are searching for stability or legitimacy amid troubling religious, ideological, economic, political, or social changes. The Renaissance in Europe was such a period, as new ideas about art, literature, religion, and science challenged established traditions and concepts.

Central to the Renaissance was an awareness of links with the past, as artists, authors, and architects attempted to emulate the classical world. The beginning of modern European historical thought was also affected by the classics. Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444) modeled his history of Florence on that of Titus Livy (59 B.C.–A.D. 17) and other Roman historians. He criticized earlier scholars for failing to write adequate histories of their times, a failure which he believed had contributed to the ignorance he saw in his own era. Bruni’s criticism reflects Renaissance historians’ utilitarian goal of drawing practical lessons from the past about politics, ethics, and law. History likewise became important for the resolution of religious contro-

versies; the establishment of the first history university professorships was spurred by the need to investigate troubling, fundamental questions about the Catholic church’s origins. In 1440 Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457) used textual analysis to prove that the *Donation of Constantine*, a document reputedly written by the fourth-century emperor Constantine (d. A.D. 337) that gave the bishops of Rome temporal and spiritual control over western Europe and was used to legitimize papal authority, was a forgery. Such investigations continued and spread dramatically after Martin Luther’s 1517 challenge to the church, as Catholic and Protestant scholars searched for documentation that legitimized their claims.

Martin Luther (1483–1546) and Philip Melancthon (1497–1560), in their thirteen-volume study *Magdeburg Centuries*, used historical analysis to argue that the Catholic church had perverted Christianity. The church responded with Cesare Baronio’s *Ecclesiastical Annals*, which argued that the seeming innovations introduced by the postapostolic church were not changes but simply interpretations and clarifications inspired by the Holy Spirit to “purify” it, an approach often used to strengthen tradition and the establishment. Protestants likewise used research to charge that many saints’ days, rituals, and festivals were actually adopted Roman pagan cults. Protestants also made substitutions, however, inventing new rituals to replace those they had denounced as heretical innovations. After 1560 the Kirk leadership in Calvinist Scotland tried to repress all public festivals and displays as popish and undesirable, but the rituals they introduced were suspiciously close to earlier Catholic ones in timing if not in format. While the days of fasting and humiliation regularly called during the Catholic season of Lent did not include the same rituals, they nevertheless continued the tradition of providing a holy day of relaxation that broke up the cycle of agricultural labor. The Catholic Counter-Reformation also modified some rituals and introduced new ones in an effort to keep followers loyal and to reform the church. New seventeenth-century saints’ cults, including those of St. Ignatius Loyola (1491–1556) and St. Teresa of Ávila (1515–1582), emphasized personal devotion while retaining secular features, including processions, bonfires, and playacting. Both sides attempted to reform popular culture and produced ideological pamphlets, rewrote or adapted popular ballads into hymns, censored popular works by removing suspect references, and attacked all plays, bonfires, and festivals that were not sanctioned by church authorities.

But even the threat of force could not eradicate or change such observances overnight, and many pro-



REINVENTING POPULAR RELIGIOUS TRADITION UNDER HENRY VIII

Henry VIII (1491–1547) was central to the establishment of the Church of England. Initiating the break from Rome, he then named himself supreme head of the church, dissolved religious foundations, authorized the printing of an English Bible, and turned his church into a hybrid of Catholicism and Protestant doctrine. His role in changing popular religious tradition has not been acknowledged often, but it was part of his larger policy to secure the throne by emphasizing the Crown's commanding political power.

Inventing religious tradition was one way that Henry VIII and other secular leaders secured their sovereignty during the Reformation. When the king became supreme head of the newly created Church of England in the 1530s, his advisers used new biblical interpretations to justify his political position. They claimed that since he was both prince and father to his people, the commandment that ordered Christians to obey and honor their parents included the monarch as well. This implied that Henry's claim to be the head of the English church was based on the holy word of God through the Ten Commandments, which was a return to the original meaning, through a wondrous rediscovery of a text "lost for centuries," and therefore not some arrogant, greedy pretension to despotism.

In addition to learned argument, some suggested that the monarchy also emphasize its position through more popular means. One adviser suggested that Henry create a new annual holiday, complete with bonfires and processions, that would commemorate his break with Rome, while another proposed replacing traditional Robin Hood plays with new ones that condemned the pope rather than celebrated an outlaw. While neither of these proposals was adopted, the king did make changes that emphasized the national character of the church and his

own authority over it, such as combining all festivals celebrating the founding of local churches into a national holiday to be celebrated on the first Sunday in October. Such changes that distorted local festivals aroused resentment that increased when the king declared that saints were only to be respected, not venerated, and ordered the destruction of all images and relics of saints, especially those of Thomas à Becket (1118–1170), who was martyred for opposing his king. Local officials in Canterbury had to quickly find a substitute figure as the centerpiece for their local celebration, since even their statue of St. George, patron saint of England, was destroyed.

Henry VIII was not opposed to Catholic traditions if he could interpret them in a useful way. Thus in 1539, against the advice of some counselors, he declared his support for a variety of Catholic traditions, including Ash Wednesday ashes, Palm Sunday palms, and festivals that included "creeping to the cross" on Good Friday, not because they were sacred but because they either honored Christ directly or were educational for illustrating the scriptures. He later specifically ordered that Rogation ceremonies (the blessing of the fields) be held with special care that year because of ongoing drought and disease. Near the end of Henry's reign Archbishop Thomas Cranmer attempted to convince the king to ban several of the more important church rituals, including creeping to the cross, but the king refused. His grounds were apparently political rather than religious, as that action would have undermined his efforts to reach political agreements with the Catholic states of France and the Holy Roman Empire.

When Henry VIII died in 1547 his church remained a hybrid, somewhere between Catholic and Protestant. The reform of tradition that had taken place under its first supreme head had not defined it as either one, and both traditions continued into the twenty-first century.

hibited festivals and rites continued beyond the seventeenth century. In eighteenth-century Languedoc clergy still complained about boisterous local festivals, plays, and other events formally condemned more than a century earlier by the Catholic Church. In Wales, despite Anglican prohibitions, villagers continued to celebrate saints' days by carrying relics in processions and held fairs with sporting contests, folk healers, plays, and other officially proscribed acts and

events. In some cases repressed or supplanted traditions helped generate challenges to local or national authority. In 1744 Romanian peasants in Transylvania rebelled when Orthodox customs were replaced by Catholic ones in local parishes. This was not a rejection of the new doctrines but rather a defense of traditions and cultural heritage, which the peasants saw as under attack by ecclesiastical innovations. Thus peasant societies in early modern Europe guarded

their traditions jealously, not out of attachment to abstract, remote ideologies that supposedly structured their beliefs but because change was itself viewed as dangerous from their rigidly conservative mentality. Hence, “tradition” as a principle of opposition to change was regarded by the majority of Europeans as a fundamental ethical principle.

Monarchs might also face substantial opposition when attempting to alter long-held customs or beliefs. Some Protestant princes turned to reinterpreting old traditions to strengthen their interests but with additional elements that seemed, like invented church traditions, to reaffirm a venerable past and to revitalize it in new, appealing ways. Swedes asserted a glorious past by claiming that their Gothic ancestors were heroes who respected knowledge, challenging antiquity’s view that they were merely destructive barbarians. When Karl IX (r. 1604–1611) toured the country, he constantly told subjects that their Gothic forebears had conquered Rome. His successor Gustav II Adolph (r. 1611–1632) appeared at a jousting tournament dressed as Berik, the legendary conqueror of southern Europe, and later reminded members of the Swedish estates that their forefathers had once ruled the world.

Other monarchs also used tradition to enhance royal glory and claim more political power. The ceremony of touching for the “king’s evil” (that is, scrofula)—an old rite whereby sufferers were believed cured when touched by the monarch—emphasized the status of the king as regal and as a magical, semi-divinity as well. This medieval custom was renewed in seventeenth-century England and France. Whereas Louis XII (1462–1515) touched about five hundred people per year in the early sixteenth century, Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715) touched almost six times that number following his coronation. The Sun King also invented a number of royal traditions by which virtually every aspect of his daily life was rigidly structured and solemnized into weighty ritual. The daily repetition of ceremonies, such as the *lever* (rising in each morning) and *coucher* (retiring at night), made the smallest details of Louis’s life the court’s focus, suggesting that ancient, time-honored rites were being faithfully maintained. The venerability of such rituals enhanced the monarchy’s status at a time when its increased political power was still challenged by the nobility.

But some rulers discovered that traditions connected with a previous monarch could be used against them. Throughout the early modern period Norwegian peasants opposed unwelcome innovations and ordinances from their overlord Danish kings by declaring that the laws of the celebrated eleventh-

century Norwegian martyr-king St. Olaf (r. 1016–1028) were being violated. In England, although James I (1566–1625) and Charles I (1600–1649) introduced their own holidays celebrating everything from royal birthdays and christenings to the government’s escape from Guy Fawkes’ attempt to blow up the king and Parliament, some churches revived the anniversary of Elizabeth I’s accession day. Through this unauthorized holiday for the Protestant queen who saved the nation from Catholicism, participants thus implicitly criticized the court’s flirtation with Catholicism.

But monarchs and churches were not alone in using history to invent traditions to attain their goals. The nobility, lesser gentry, and rich commoners likewise sought to glorify their lineages to enhance family status. In early modern England the College of Heralds began registering pedigrees, but the length and luster of the family tree usually depended on the fee paid. Wealthy commoners who wanted to establish a stake in the rapidly changing aristocracy of Tudor and Stuart England could pay for “research” by the heralds, who to collect the fee had to “find” eminent ancestors, which in many cases included lineages stretching back to the Norman conquerors of 1066. Such “discoveries” entitled the holder to a coat of arms or, for nobles, a better one. Sometimes people fabricated their own evidence to support such claims. The eighteenth-century Italian scholar Carlo Garibaldi forged inscriptions on stone tablets to prove that his ancestor was a seventh-century Lombard king.

In late-eighteenth-century France aristocrats also claimed long traditions, but one instance emphasized innocence and pastoral simplicity rather than nobility and elite culture. Nobles were charmed by the discovery of a local peasant festival, the *fête de la rose* (festival of the rose) in Salency, whose rural simplicity and virtue contrasted greatly with the jaded, artificial world of the court and salon. Allegedly begun by a sixth-century local bishop who was later canonized, the festival centered on a village maiden as the *rosière*, or queen of virtue, with a procession, mass, and banquet. After the festival was publicized by the countess of Genlis, nobles who liked its virtuous associations established imitations throughout France. New elements allowed nobles direct participation. For example, the local lord presented the *rosière* with a small dowry and gave the banquet, or aristocratic children wore peasant dress and marched in the procession.

On a much larger scale, minorities that were long subject to discrimination were also dignified with invented histories of phony “rediscovered” works of literature. In the late eighteenth century James Mac-

pherson (1736–1796) and the Reverend John Macpherson (1710–1765) fabricated ancient Highland Scottish history. The former wrote an epic history of Celtic Scotland, based mostly from Irish history, and attributed it to “Ossian,” a “Celtic Homer.” John Macpherson then wrote a spurious Highland history that validated this text and explained away its discrepancies. So convincing was their work that it was accepted by such eminent authors as Edward Gibbon (1737–1794) and Sir Walter Scott, and it was over a century before new scholarship discredited these fabrications. Likewise, Scottish noblemen forged a more famous “ancient tradition” for Scottish history by claiming that natives wore a forerunner of the modern tartan kilt in the third century A.D. But this costume seems to have been invented in 1770 by an English iron founder who needed a less-dangerous dress for his Highland workers while tending sawmills in the Western Highlands. In other instances long-ignored but genuine works fostered new identities for minorities. In late-eighteenth-century Bohemia, Czech national identity was supported by new histories based on documents linked to the medieval religious reformer Jan Hus (1372 or 1373–1415) that showed the Czech people were historically anti-German, anti-Catholic, and anti-absolutist. This Czech identity challenged official interpretations based on Catholic Counter-Reformation portrayals of the rebel Hussites as an evil memory.

Religious traditions in rapidly industrializing, commercial Britain took a different form. Puritans emphasized order and rational behavior, which influenced the outlook of the commercial and trading classes. Ministers used phrases such as “casting up accounts” to God or asking whether an action was “profitable to the soul,” and the “middling ranks” saw no contradiction between faith and commerce. By the late eighteenth century the middle classes asserted that the virtues common to both were actually the essence of the English character, which included sobriety, thrift, duty, hard work, self-denial, and Christian belief. Thus they distrusted aristocrats’ luxurious, licentious ways, and scorned the boisterous festivals, games, and pastimes of “inferiors” as irrational and self-indulgent. Instead, the middle classes developed new traditions about home, family, and work. They concluded that women’s supposed greater sexuality meant that they were irrational and unsuited to work outside the home or to make important decisions on their own. This strengthened patriarchy in the family and society, which was justified with biblical and historical examples, and created stereotypes about home life, gender, status, and work that became firmly embedded in Western society.

These traditions were further encouraged by British fears about the spread of the French Revolution after 1789, which seemed to challenge established traditions, beliefs, and order. The revolutionary regime swept away ceremonies, such as royal birthdays and formal entrances into Paris, as well as the customary, local saints’ days, Corpus Christi festivals, and May Day celebrations, replacing them with a host of new festivals to commemorate important days in the revolution and to remind people of their progress against an oppressive monarchy. The fall of the Bastille, the establishment of the National Assembly, and revolutionary military victories were commemorated along with new festivals celebrating such revolutionary ideals as “the Supreme Being,” Youth, Old Age, Spouses, Agriculture, the Law, Liberty, Virtue, and Reason.

European conservatives and moderates in turn appealed to an idealized past to counter French egalitarian ideology. In Russia, Catherine the Great (1729–1796) increased her support for authors who praised rural village life as the historical basis of the Russian character and condemned towns as the breeding ground for unstable thinking that created unrest. In Britain the monarchy was the focus of public celebrations that emphasized its connections to a glorious past. Newspapers stressed that George III’s fiftieth jubilee in 1809 fell on the anniversary of Agincourt, and in 1814 London’s chief peace celebration following Napoleon’s defeat was specifically planned for 1 August, the centenary of the Hanoverian dynasty’s succession.

Appealing to an idealized past was also a means of building morale in the face of losses. After their crushing defeat by Britain in the Napoleonic Wars, Danes rediscovered the ancient Icelandic sagas, *Beowulf*, and other works that they saw as the true basis for the Danish character. In the German states romantic authors built on distrust of French influence expressed in the earlier Sturm und Drang movement of the 1770s, when authors such as Johann von Goethe (1749–1832) and Johann Herder (1744–1803) contemptuously rejected the elites who had been strongly influenced by French literature. Herder encouraged the development of a specifically German literature based on folktales, ballads, and other traditional lore. Later romantics built on this idea, publishing collections of folksongs, chapbooks, ballads, folktales, and fairy stories. The most famous, *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* (1812–1815) by Jakob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, emphasizes the timeless nature of the nation’s spirit. All of this morale building occurred in the context of Napoleon’s stunning conquest of Germany and the later Wars of Liberation that pushed the French out by 1814.



THE LIBERTY TREE

The Liberty Tree is an enduring symbol of the French Revolution, a tradition that developed as the amalgamation of this revolutionary symbol with the much older tradition of the maypole and with an ancient celebration of the birth of spring. Ceremonial Liberty Tree plantings often incorporated familiar folk elements drawn from May Day, which helped make the notion of revolution more appealing to conservative peasants. Both rites emphasized village solidarity and corporate action, as young men selected and planted the tree and young women decorated it with ribbons and other emblems.

The Liberty Tree's popularity continued in post-1815 France but with new twists. Immediately after the 1830 revolution Liberty Trees were planted by a number of newly elected, hard-line revolutionary officials specifically to replace crosses erected by priests who were thought to support the monarchy. Anticlericalism was so strongly associated with Liberty Trees that they were an embarrassment for the moderate constitutional monarchy of the 1830s. But by 1848 the tradition had further evolved with the changing times, and many Liberty Trees planted throughout France were openly associated with reconciling the church and the republican state. Clergymen were honored guests at many planting ceremonies, and in one instance, after the local priest referred to parishioners as "citizens and brothers," he told them that the Liberty Tree symbolized the cross with Christ's hands outstretched seeking liberty, a compromise that illustrates how much traditions can change in just sixty years.

The French Revolution and Napoleonic memories and symbols were also later shaped to support many political perspectives and ideologies. This provides a striking example of Halbwachs' theory that "history begins where memory ends," for while many in 1830 and 1848 personally remembered the 1789 revolution, the historians created memories and counter-memories about revolutionary traditions and their meanings that served various agendas. While the restored monarchy sought legitimacy by building an antirepublican collective memory through histories emphasizing the bloodshed and destruction of the 1790s, a small group of historians defied this approach with an alternative interpretation or counter-memory

of republicanism as the embodiment of political liberty. The historians Jules Michelet and Alphonse de Lamartine (1790–1869) attempted to infuse the zeal of 1789 into the new generation of republicans in 1830 and 1848. Many symbols of 1789 were revived. In addition to the widespread appeal of the Liberty Tree, old songs, slogans, and names reappeared. In 1848 radicals in Nîmes held celebrations that invoked Robespierre, the Jacobins, and the sansculottes. In 1871 these traditions were still empowering. Because both the collective memory and the counter-memories of 1789 lauded male contributions almost exclusively, Parisian women's groups legitimized their political participation by invoking the 1789 women's March to Versailles.

Yet despite such historical and popular references to the past, some contemporaries charged that they undermined any real understanding of the revolution and simply continued empty traditions that had no real meaning. Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), who wrote a history of the 1848 revolution that stressed continuities with the past, noted in dismay that republicans "were engaged in acting the French Revolution rather than in continuing it" (Tocqueville, 1949, p. 54). In *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852), Karl Marx (1818–1883) pointedly condemned the revolutionaries, declaring, "Precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, and borrow from them names, battle-cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language" (Marx, 1977, p. 300).

The spread of literacy and the development of a mass reading public made it easier for political groups and governments to create and foster traditions for the collective memory. In Britain the increasingly anachronistic London government successfully fought off challenges by democratic reformers through the promotion of ceremonies and rituals—some traditional, some invented—that linked it with an idealized past, and while Oxford University defended its classical education against charges of anachronism by reemphasizing its colleges' long hallowed traditions. After German unification in 1871, the state likewise encouraged the concept of *Heimat* (homeland) that stressed the supposedly unified history of all Germans in a distant, rural past through nationalist literature, plays, and histories. In Austria-Hungary, as internal strife proliferated between subject nationalities, the fiftieth jubilee anniversary of the Habsburg emperor Francis Joseph (r. 1848–1916) in 1898 emphasized traditions that portrayed the Habsburg dynasty as divinely ordained and more specifically showed Francis

Joseph as a redeemerlike figure who overcame ethnic and national divisions.

Although increasing literacy, national educational systems, and mass media facilitated efforts to promote the status quo by creating channels for the dissemination of official ideologies and traditions, by the same token these developments also served the new ideologies of socialism, nationalism, feminism, and ethnic identity. With improved access to an increasingly literate and uniformly educated public, proponents of opposing views were able to mount a stiff challenge to the existing order. By 1875 British and French socialists and trade unionists used the media to reject many aspects of middle-class culture. The French socialist Paul Lafargue (1842–1911) argued that bourgeois education and literature should be replaced by an alternative workers' culture that would be inculcated through pamphlets, articles, and lectures. Socialist organizations and trade unions created alternative traditions of worker solidarity by organizing dances, benefits, and other social events in union halls decorated with symbolic banners and regalia and ultimately by organizing political parties.

Yet one aspect of bourgeois culture many workers approved was the idea that women should stay in the home. Workingmen plainly saw workingwomen as a threat to their jobs, a situation that became more acute during a deep recession in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Since women legally could be paid less than men, industries used them to cut costs.

For many feminists this situation simply reflected their inequality. Using rhetoric and traditions drawn from women's earlier participation in antislavery movements, socialist organizing, and social reform campaigns, women's movements emerged, most notably in Britain. Just like the trade unions, women organized petition drives, fund-raising campaigns, and educational programs. They founded newspapers, women's schools and colleges, and developed their own rituals, banners, and insignias to promote solidarity within their cause.

Oppressed ethnic minorities also used media and education to campaign against imperialism. In late-nineteenth-century Ireland nationalist leaders pushed for Home Rule and to restore Ireland's own Parliament. Yet in addition to political organizing, the newly founded Gaelic League encouraged the recovery of Irish culture by promoting Gaelic language instruction, literature, and drama. Ethnic minorities elsewhere also sought to revive their cultures through language and folklore. This was particularly a problem in the Austria-Hungarian Empire. Emperor Francis Joseph agreed to allow the use of Czech as well as German in the imperial bureaucracy of Bohemia as a measure of appeasement to Czech nationalism, but Bohemian Germans were outraged at what they viewed as an attack on their national identity. By 1898 this conflict paralyzed Parliament and fueled pan-German attacks on the Habsburg state and the Catholic Church, further destabilizing the empire.



INVENTED TRADITION AS MODERNIZATION IN THE OTTOMAN TURKISH EMPIRE

In the sixteenth century the Ottoman Turkish state was at the pinnacle of its prestige, as the greatest, most illustrious power in both Europe and the Middle East. But by the mid- to late nineteenth century its luster had faded, and a series of humiliating military defeats by Austria-Hungary and imperial Russia raised the threat of conquest and overthrow. The need for the Ottoman state to prop up its prestige at home and abroad resulted in the creation of “neotraditions” with a number of significant innovations.

To give the state a more modern and Western image, an Italian artist was hired to devise a coat of arms, previously unknown in the empire, for Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839). It included both old and new symbols balancing each other. An arrow and quiver set off a modern rifle and bayonet, and a scimitar appeared opposite a modern cavalry saber, arranged to emphasize the continuity of the old and the new. Likewise the apparently Moroccan-derived *fes* (fez), which was subsequently understood as a distinctly Turkish symbol by Westerners, was adopted as the official headgear for male subjects because it looked more European than the old turban, being similar to the top hat and military shako, minus the brim or bill. The state also commissioned an official national anthem (a Western creation) from the Italian composer Gaetano Donizetti (1797–1848), as well as military marches from famous European composers such as Franz Liszt (1811–1886) and Johann Strauss (1804–1849). This is an even greater irony, since the military marching band had originally been borrowed by Euro-

peans from the Ottoman Janissary army in the early eighteenth century.

These changes were accompanied by an increased emphasis on martial spectacle, which was further enhanced by the sultan’s personal appearance before the people (another innovation). Military elements also became a part of new ceremonies, sometimes forced upon minorities, of “conversion” to Islam. These ceremonies were staged to compete with the activities of aggressive European missionaries, who occasionally paid money to converts’ families. Also to counter the missionaries, a new Islamic religious office, the *misyoner*, was created in another neotradition.

Some of these actions reflected the monarchs’ desires for their subjects to acquire more discipline and to compete better with the West. In addition neotraditions attracted the political loyalty of the empire’s numerous minorities. The historian Selim Deringil noted, “What the Ottoman elite . . . were trying to foster from the mid-nineteenth century onwards was . . . [a] transition from passive obedience [by subjects] to active and conscious subscription to the new normative order” (Deringil, 1993, p. 29). The Ottomans even tried to enhance the sanctity of their six-century tradition by officially claiming in 1885 that experts had discovered that they actually originated from Adam and Eve and that the dynasty was “one of the oldest in the world, and will live forever.” The fact that it lasted only thirty-four years more underscores the importance the Ottoman state placed on the invention of tradition as a political tactic.

WAR AND MEMORY

Although conflicts between states, aggravated by nationalism, helped fuel the outbreak of World War I, the war created divisions within countries that by 1918 were still unresolved. Consequently many governments encouraged collective memories that served to heal this division and support their regimes, but they often were challenged by alternative interpretations. When France’s Tomb of the Unknown soldier was dedicated in 1920, the official memorial committee used religious symbolism to imply that France had redeemed its honor by taking back Alsace-Lorraine, which had been lost to Germany in 1871.

French Socialists, however, argued that this was not the monument of a hero but the grave of an unfortunate soldier who died in a conflict fought to benefit industrialists and government officials.

Circumstances were far more difficult in postwar Germany. The Weimar government and some of its nationalist rivals attempted to forge a heroic picture of the struggle. Stressing the soldiers’ faithfulness to Germany and willingness to sacrifice themselves, they emphasized the positive aspects of the wartime experience, such as camaraderie in the trenches, adherence to military virtues, and in particular dutiful loyalty. This official attempt to deal with the defeat and humiliating peace did not accurately reflect the memories of most



INVENTING MILITARY TRADITION

The military invention of tradition is essentially about managing armies. It is important for the state to keep this instrument of violence under firm control, lest it be used to overthrow the state, as has often happened in history. Much of martial tradition concerns the regiment, and this form of tradition is most developed in the British army, which benefits from the state having avoided political rupture with the past since the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

In the military subculture memorable incidents often generate appealing customs that frequently develop over time into a venerable encrustation of tradition. These customs are often based on fact, but sometimes are invented, as is the case with the traditions associated with Royal Horse Artillery full-dress uniform, a Hungarian-derived, light cavalry hussar uniform with lavish amounts of yellow braid (gold bullion for officers), worn on special occasions. Recruits are taught that the reason for this gaudy dress was that, if the artillery caisson reins break, the braid can be used as a makeshift substitute. This suggests that the dress was deliberately designed for a practical reason in a modern sense of combat utility rather than as gaudy decoration, which has long been banished from the battlefield. The history and evolution of this dress, however, has nothing to do with harnesses. It was adopted in the late eighteenth century, when this “flying” artillery was developed, to link the image of the gunner with the speed of light cavalry, swiftness being its primary tactical advantage. That the braid was ever used as substitute reins is possible, but the notion that this was the reason for the design is nonsense, since the overwhelming priority in late-eighteenth-century British military design was how the uniform looked, not modern practicality. But

the story is useful to discourage soldiers from thinking that the fancy outfit is absurd, which would diminish the glorious and venerable associations the uniform must embody.

Other purely decorative uniform elements have also been embellished with meanings invented later. The tradition of a black stripe running through the lace of officers’ uniforms in some regiments is asserted to be a mark of mourning for a general killed in battle, most often one who had commanded the unit. This custom is especially associated with General James Wolfe’s death at Quebec in 1759. Yet the old Forty-first Regiment wore such lace without such an association, as did other late-eighteenth-century units.

Rich traditions mystify regimental memories, which are most useful for recruiting, morale, and discipline. The idea of mutiny is also rendered to some degree more unthinkable, because it runs counter to the service’s sublime traditions. Regimental tradition, like the duty, is not voluntary but enforced, and it permeates every aspect of army life. The psychological effect of such richness is thus a means of mind control that is both obvious and subtle. Even a soldier who hated the army could not help but feel the deep, emotional glow of pride and belonging when the band played stirring martial music as he and his comrades marched through cheering crowds on some venerable anniversary of victory. Any allusions to cowardice, officer incompetence, or the army’s inadequate provisions of weapons, food, or shelter (as sometimes happened) seem most inappropriate and in bad taste. Tradition as a martial management principle thus maximizes an army’s utility for the state.

soldiers and ignored the desertions, absenteeism, and voluntary surrenders that brought the army to the verge of collapse. Most published personal accounts, including those of private soldiers, omitted such details to avoid harming their comrades’ memories.

Growing fascist organizations also played on memories of the “good” things about the war, such as camaraderie and unity, a sense of purpose and power, and the freedom from responsibility for decision making inherent in armies, in their creation of political paramilitary organizations. After attaining power fascist leaders forged new traditions that allegedly came

from a glorious national past. Benito Mussolini’s government drew on imperial Rome as an inspiration for Italian glory. For example, he proclaimed 21 April a national holiday in honor of the birth of ancient Rome as part of the new regime’s ideology.

Adolf Hitler’s German fascists also used history to promote their concept of an organic German people, or *Volk*. This concept transcended nationalism by embodying a mystical historical racism intended to bind people together, and Nazi political and social inventions affected everything from family life to public service. To increase the birthrate the Nazis emphasized

the “traditional” domestic role of wife and mother, publicly discouraging women from working outside the home. The Nazis encouraged rural festivals and folk costumes to emphasize links with the mystical past. But primary emphasis went to traditions that legitimized Nazi power and the central role of Hitler as leader. Nowhere was this more clearly reflected than in the massive party rallies at Nürnberg. Begun in the 1920s, these party days were annual events from 1933 to 1938 with speeches, torchlight parades, fireworks, martial songs, flags, and a host of ceremonies.

The National Socialists also defined the concept of Germanic-Aryan *Volk* by contrasting it with “degenerate” Jewish culture. Posters, news accounts, literature, films, and radio programs proclaimed that Jews were responsible for a variety of ills, including the humiliating Versailles peace treaty, the Bolshevik revolution, oppression of German factory workers, and the 1929 economic collapse. By the mid-1930s the regime had already stripped German Jews of most rights, including citizenship. This was followed by the industrialized mass extermination of Jews and other “undesirables,” such as Sinti and Roma (Gypsies), homosexuals, and political enemies.

The Nazis enforced these racist and genocidal policies in conquered territories and encouraged their allies to adopt them. Later media reports on Nazi genocide were reinforced at the Nürnberg trials, where

German leaders were tried for “crimes against humanity.” Yet after the war ended many attempted to obliterate its memory. To distance themselves from the Holocaust and to justify their wartime actions, collaborators across Europe cultivated “collective amnesia,” claiming either to have been in the resistance or avoiding the subject altogether. Austrians quickly embraced the myth that their nation was Hitler’s earliest victim, a distortion that even allowed the country to build memorials to Austrian soldiers who had fought in the *Wehrmacht*, claiming they had defended the homeland from further oppression. Liberated countries adopted a similar national amnesia. In Norway memories of World War II formed an important source of national identity for decades to come. Some Norwegian Nazis later claimed they were not really collaborators but had offered subtle resistance. Only one Norwegian out of thousands of traitors, Vidkun Quisling (1887–1945), was executed for high treason, while the many light sentences for collaboration were later reduced or commuted. In France after 1945 the government tried to obliterate the collaboration of Vichy government officials by literally banning these memories, passing legislation making it illegal to mention that anyone collaborated. In Italy the Christian Democrats attempted to reforge a Catholic democratic state linking the church to the resistance. This position ignored the Vatican’s complicity with

the fascists and its refusal to criticize the Nazi regime as Jews were rounded up on its very doorstep.

Jewish Holocaust survivors made perhaps the greatest effort to build a collective memory with the publication of numerous memorial books and autobiographies. David Patterson argued that the recovery of memory played an important role in their lives, allowing them to rediscover traditions nearly obliterated

by Hitler's "Final Solution" and providing a means of coming to terms with the world's seeming indifference to their fate. Finally, reliving the memories through memorials, ceremonies, and other rituals contributed to the ongoing process of recovery from the horrors they suffered. Ironically, Hitler's victimization of Europe's Jews forged stronger feelings of Jewish unity, as even non-European Jews personally un-

touched by the Holocaust incorporated it as a part of their cultural heritage.

Inside Germany the problem was not one of remembering but rather of forgetting. Suffering another devastating defeat that left the country in ruins, Germans came face-to-face with the crimes committed by their state. Allied troops forced civilians and officials to witness the death camp horrors by making them walk past the piles of corpses and bury the bodies. In the face of overwhelming condemnation, many Germans intentionally “forgot.” East Germans denied all responsibility and blamed West Germans. West Germans adopted the concept of *Stunde Null*, or zero hour, in which their remembered history began only with the end of the war, and tried to break completely with the past. Such obliterations let West Germany as well as the United States, France, and Britain employ former Nazi officials in high positions in the new regimes. As militant anticommunists, they were considered politically safe. For more than twenty years this collective amnesia predominated. Even by the 1980s, when publications and films began to discuss modern German history more, schools, museums, and events celebrating the reunion of West Germany and East Germany in 1989 avoided reminders of this past, focusing almost solely on the cold war.

In the twenty-first century political and social traditions appear easier to invent than at any time in the past. Modern currency and coinage regularly depict political and cultural heroes, sporting events glorify nationalism, and advertising regularly draws on real or mythic memories to sell products. Even more pervasive are those media that purport to tell the “truth,” such as television documentaries, newscasts, radio commentaries, newspaper and magazine articles. Yet they are all products that must suit the audience as well as the owners of these business operations. While historical films have potentially an even greater appeal, they do not re-create the past but do forge a new version of it. They must necessarily include invented dialogue and situations within story-line structures that omit much in order to work. In a different way Internet sites artificially display an equality among images of the past. Anyone with access to the Internet can create a web page that may appear to have as much validity as any other. This aspect of Internet technology plays a particularly important role in conflicts such as that in Northern Ireland, where sites that seek to promote republican or loyalist traditions based on differing interpretations have multiplied. Amid so many electronic options, the use and manipulation of memory and the invention of tradition are thus even more prevalent than ever.

See also other articles in this section.

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HUMOR



Benjamin Roberts

While boating on the Rhine River near Leiden in the seventeenth century, a man on board notices a young woman in a garden house along the banks watching the river. He walks to the stern of the ship, starts to urinate in full view of the woman, and yells, “‘You don’t have this.’” Without giving much thought to the matter she snaps back, “‘I’ve seen better’” (Roodenburg, 1997, p. 120). This is one of the many humorous anecdotes recorded in a book of jokes by the Dutch lawyer Aernout van Overbeke (1632–1674). The humor of the past reveals much about society, culture, sexuality, and male-female relations. Overbeke’s anecdote suggests that Dutch women in the seventeenth century were quick-witted, that the young man (who like Overbeke belonged to the urban elite of the Dutch Republic) exposing himself was not ashamed of his jest, and that the Dutch of the seventeenth century apparently enjoyed a good dirty joke. This joke was probably told only in the company of men but in all social groups; as humor is not appropriate in all circumstances, the teller of this joke, like any modern counterpart, most likely saved it for the proper occasion. Although humor is just as much a part of human life as eating and drinking, it has constantly been influenced by religious, pedagogical, and political factors in Europe since the beginning of the Renaissance. Examination of a wide range of sources—iconographic images, literary works, moralistic writings, personal documents, satires, film, and television—reveals the development of European humor.

THE MEDIEVAL BACKGROUND

Humor as a social phenomenon is as old as the hills, but studying it is a relatively new research terrain for social and cultural historians. For the history of humor, the Russian medievalist Mikhail Bakhtin fulfilled a role comparable to that of Philippe Ariès in the history of childhood. Bakhtin’s *Rabelais and His World*, published in 1965 after a twenty-five year ban in Russia, was the first study in which humor was illumi-

nated as an essential element of the culture of carnival: carnival, which ritualized winter turning into spring, was celebrated by turning the world upside down, the pauper becoming a prince, the king a jester for a day. The culture of the Middle Ages, as Bakhtin saw it, was distinctly polarized: the official culture of the church and the educated spurned laughter, whereas the popular culture was dominated by the tradition of carnival and laughter. Aaron Gurevich, a cultural historian of the Middle Ages, found this view of medieval society an inadequate simplification of its complex cultural levels, arguing that the church and the educated were not against laughter. In his novel *The Name of the Rose* (1982), the Italian author Umberto Eco portrays a polarization within the medieval church. In Eco’s book the monk of the Benedictine order, Jorge de Burgos, is appalled by laughter, whereas William of Baskerville, of the Franciscan order, is more mundane. As the medievalist Jacques Le Goff argues, ecclesiastical writers in the Middle Ages struggled with two viewpoints: that laughter was natural and idiosyncratic to man, and that laughter was unnatural. The latter view derived from the belief that if “Jesus, the great model for humanity, . . . never once laughed in his human life, then laughter becomes alien to man, at least to a Christian man” (Le Goff, 1997, p. 43). Petrus Cantor, a twelfth-century scholar, argued that, since Christ was born a human and was capable of laughing, his refusal to laugh must be a virtue (Verberckmoes, 1998, p. 80). Throughout the Middle Ages and early modern period, this debate was a recurrent theme for theologians and moralists.

Le Goff divides the Middle Ages into two broad periods, one of repressed laughter and one of tolerance of laughter. From the fourth century to the tenth century, for monks especially, laughter was a vice akin to idleness. To laugh was a particularly abrupt way of breaking an almost celestial silence. With the second half of the Middle Ages came greater freedom to laugh, but the church tried to control it. A parallel development was an increase in vernacular literature, an element of which was self-reflection; this self-

reflection partly consisted of satire and parody. The royal courts were the first to embrace and domesticate new modes of laughter.

MODERN PERIODS: RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION

A lack of sources limits the theoretical debate among historians on laughter in the Middle Ages. This is not true of the Renaissance and early modern period. A prominent source and character in the history of humor in the late Middle Ages and early modern period is the court jester. One might say that this “stand-up comedian” in his silly attire was the court’s substitute for Prozac. During carnival even friars, monks, and nuns liked to imitate these clowns. Some Italian fools at the time received interregional and international fame, such as Dolcibene, the two Gonellas, Beatrice d’Este’s Diodato in Milan, Isabella d’Este’s Fritella at Mantua, and Borso d’Este’s Scocola at Ferrara, the last immortalized in the frescoes at Schifanoia. A primary source for humor, in addition to the many literary and iconographic references to court jesters in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance are the numerous *beffa* or jest books. These trick or practical joke books were especially popular around the Mediterranean region, with Florence “*la capitale de la beffa*” (Burke, 1997, p. 64). Some of these books included plays in which a character was made a fool of, such as Niccolò Machiavelli’s *La mandragola* (1518) and Pietro Are­tino’s *Il marescalco*. A common setting was at the court of the duke of Mantua, where the duke requests that the master of the horse get married. The master of the horse is not attracted to women, but he pursues the wedding anyway, only to find out that his bride is a page. The *beffe* also included instructions for pranks, “such as making someone fall asleep at the dining table, . . . recipes for dyeing one’s hair or cures for impotence” (Burke, 1997, p. 64).

Laughter came under religious scrutiny during the Counter-Reformation, when reformers tried to change the Catholic Church from within rather than break with it as the Protestants had. Many clergy and writers of conduct books criticized the *beffes* on moral grounds. New printed *beffes* became embedded in a moral story, using metaphors signifying cures, lessons, and punishments, and lost their practical-joke quality. Children had to be taught to control their laughter; the elderly often lost their control. Writers of conduct books preferred verbal jokes to pranks, as did the upper echelons in society. Peter Burke detects at the end of the sixteenth century a general restriction from partaking in humor by the clergy, women, and gentle-

men, which corroborates Bakhtin’s idea of the polarization of humor, as does northern European art of the sixteenth century. Depictions of laughing faces on people of lower means often served as examples of unacceptable behavior. “Jesters, satyrs, peasants, drunks, bagpipe-players were all presumed to be the opposite of what a civilized person was supposed to be” (Verberckmoes, 1998, p. 47).

Northern European moralist writers of the Counter-Reformation also participated in suppressing verbal humor. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the pedagogical and moralistic writings by the humanists Desiderius Erasmus (1466?–1536), Laurent Joubert, and Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540) were influential in determining how laughter was regarded for the rest of the early modern period. Especially for Erasmus, laughter was no laughing matter. It had serious purposes, such as relieving pain caused by sickness, and he advised that it was good to laugh occasionally while in the company of others. But for other than medicinal uses, laughter was denounced. Humanistic writers understood that laughter is an exceptional form of human expression, yet at the same time were pressured to restrain it by pedagogical means. Faced with this dilemma, they tried to distinguish the real laugh from the false by categorizing the various forms of laughter. Vives described the unstoppable laugh of the Greek philosopher Democritus (c. 460–370 B.C.) as fake and unreal, a forced sardonic laugh, and Erasmus labeled it false, bitter, and foolish. Erasmus classified laughter as follows: the ionic laugh,

that of the bon vivant with a taste for luxury and pleasure-seeking; the megarcic laugh, or laughter at the wrong moment; the chrionic laugh, or laughter that bursts forth; and the synchronous laugh, a laughter expressing shock that is difficult for the body to control. According to Erasmus these laughs were inappropriate for respectable people because they implied a wild spirit.

In *De anima et vita* (1538), Vives theorized about the effects of laughter on the body, drawing on the humor theory developed by Galen, the second-century Greek physician. According to that theory, bodily fluids—the humors—determine a person's health and temperament. Vives wrote that those with yellow bile were inclined to laugh more easily because their hearts gave off warmth, whereas those having a phlegmatic temperament and thus troubled with black bile laughed less due to their slow circulation. For Vives laughter was a natural human condition that nevertheless people should not give into easily. Conduct books advised a controlled laugh and only in appropriate situations. Laughter had a social dimension: the naive, such as peasants, children, and women, were likely to lose their self-control if laughter caught them off guard, whereas intelligent people could control themselves and not burst into laughter.

In *Traité du ris* (Treatise on laughter, 1579), Joubert studied the physical aspects of laughter, distinguishing real laughs from fake ones. According to Joubert's anthropological description, laughter manifested itself physically: "The face goes into motion, the mouth and lips widened, the chin extended, the eyes glistened and teared, the cheeks blushed, the chest shuck, the voice trembled." The situation became worse as the laugh continued:

The throat widens, the lips stretch even further, the face wrinkles especially the cheeks and corner of the eyes, the teeth become exposed, the eyes tear and swell as if they are going to jump out of their sockets, the veins in the forehead and neck swell, the arms, shoulders, and buttocks tremble, and one starts to stamp with their feet . . . so that one begins to cough, throw up, and the nose spits out what someone has drank, one starts to piss, shit, and to sweat. (Verberckmoes, 1998, p. 61)

In some cases, he noted, a laugh could last so long that a person must lean on something to brace himself or herself or fall down. According to Joubert, in the worst-case scenario a person could faint but not die. Damasceno, an Italian priest and astrologer in the seventeenth century, wrote a pamphlet in which he drew an interesting conclusion from humoral theory: a person's temperament could be determined by the way that person laughed. A hee-hee-hee laugh indicated a

melancholic temperament, a heh-heh-heh laugh a choleric temperament, a ha-ha-ha laugh a phlegmatic temperament, and a ho-ho-ho laugh a sanguine temperament. Of course, this view of temperament was not taken too seriously, although humoral theory retained medical currency into the nineteenth century.

During the religious and political upheavals in the northern and southern Netherlands in the sixteenth century, moralistic writers of the Counter-Reformation tried to constrain laughter. Pieter Croon of Mechelen (in present-day Belgium) echoed the church's old conviction regarding laughter, writing, " 'Now is the time for weeping and in heaven will be the time for laughter' " (Verberckmoes, 1997, p. 80). Despite this stern disapproval of laughter, Croon's contemporaries were aware that laughing was part of human nature, thus it was important to restrain and control laughter as much as possible. Spiritual writers consoled their audiences with the assurance that "earthly tears would be followed by heavenly laughter" (Verberckmoes, 1997, p. 81). Reformers distinguished between sacred and profane humor, creating a whole new comic terrain. Those who made fun and folly of the church, such as "the puppet players Jacob Cobbeniers and his wife Elisabeth Lauwers, who around 1600 in a puppet play let St Peter and St Paul kiss and feel a woman, Margite, and even let the two saints embrace each other," could be tried before an ecclesiastic or secular court (Verberckmoes, 1997, pp. 84–85). Mockery of the Catholic Church was not taken lightly.

Early modern society was also aware of the psychological effects of laughter. Depressive bouts known as melancholy were a common plight of the wealthy and the idle. Toward the end of the sixteenth century melancholy was a household term. In *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621) the Oxford clergyman and scholar Robert Burton (1577–1640) made a scientific study of the causes and effects of melancholy, and laughter as an important remedy. Various reports claimed people died of melancholy, and numerous pamphlets were published on how to cure it. The physician known as Paracelsus (1493–1541) advised the victims of melancholy to battle it with its opposite. A melancholy patient should be treated with laughter, while a clown, on the other hand, should be handled with melancholy. The idea behind both therapies was to normalize the person's temperament. For those with severe cases of melancholy, some cures called for such unusual remedies as liquid gold or venereal ecstasy (Verberckmoes, 1998, p. 68). More commonly, doctors and others concerned were apt to recommend a good laugh now and then. The letters of the prominent Amsterdam lawyer Willem Backer (1656–1731) urged his daughter, who was plagued with melan-

choly, to read, paint, take walks, and see a comedy at the theater.

THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Not surprisingly the elites, who were likely to fall prey to melancholy, were also the first to abide by the numerous domestic conduct books and theological treatises restraining laughter. In the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, the humor of the urban elite shifted to a more cultivated wit and punning. In Amsterdam in the late seventeenth century, for example, the society for the reform of theater rewrote comedies, purging them of their vulgar elements. This was a stark contrast to the scenes depicted by the painter Jan Steen (1626–1679), a keen observer of the human comedy. Steen's themes were everyday situations, such as seduction, lovesickness, marriage, and childbirth, as well as historical episodes from which he culled humor and wit. About *Doctor's Visit* (c. 1667–1670), which portrays a young, lovesick girl, the art historian Mariët Westermann writes:

The young woman perks up at the sight of the lover entering. Her accelerating pulse confounds the doctor, who signals his incompetence with his costume, outmoded for the 1660s, and with his bewildered expression. The smiling girl at the virginals and the grinning character at far right, who sports Steen's features, enhance the comic flavour. Letting us in on the joke, Steen suspends a herring [a phallic metaphor] and two onions in a farcical simile for the cure. (Westermann, 1997, p. 143)

How could Steen hope to sell his canvases, candidly depicting smoking, drinking, disorderly behavior, and sexual illicitness, to the urban elite with their high moral standards? According to Westermann, the elites saw no resemblance between themselves and Steen's round-bodied characters, nor between their own moral lifestyles and the situations he represented. Thus they could enjoy the humor without feeling morally implicated.

The sense of humor of the seventeenth-century urban elite is more clearly revealed by Overbeke's *Anecdota*, his book of jokes. Overbeke, who was well educated and friends with many prominent people in the Dutch Republic, recorded some 2,440 jokes and anecdotes, whose subjects included physical handicaps, women, permissive parenting, capital punishment, sex, and bathroom humor. In contrast with the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, it was acceptable to laugh at those who were physically impaired. Many jokes popular among all strata of Dutch society were childlike, with their emphasis on bodily excretions and sexual attributes. The comical situation

was also popular, and some jokes along these lines were circulated into the twentieth century. For example, a dimwit ties a rope around his waist. When someone asks why, he replies, "I want to hang myself." The other remarks, "Then you have to tie the rope around your neck and not your waist." The dimwit retorts, "I already tried that but it makes me choke."

Punishment of adults in the early modern period took place in public (juveniles were often spared public humiliation) and was a form of entertainment for the masses. Overbeke's collection includes a joke about a public execution. The sentenced man has to climb the ladder to the gallows backward, to the delight of the spectators, who roar with laughter. The condemned man pardons himself to the executioner, saying, "Excuse me, this is my first time." In another, a man condemned to death by the courts is given the choice of death by hanging or by beheading. (Death by hanging was less honorable.) The man replies, "Hanging, I can't stand the sight of blood."

Many jokes Overbeke recorded were about sex, impotence, and the sex organs. People of his day freely discussed sexuality; such discussions were more restricted later in the seventeenth century. He alluded to the female genitals as "c . . .," "stocking," or "slit," and to the penis as "clown," "glodhopper," "finch," "instrument," and "middle knee." Lusting women figured in many jokes. For example, after returning home following an absence a woman complains that her dog was more polite to her than her husband. When asked what she means, she replies, "At least my dog jumped on top of me." Overbeke's contemporaries were not surprised that many women became prostitutes, reasoning that such women longed for sex.

What motivated Overbeke to record the jokes of his day? His father had died from "morbo melancholico" or depression, for which humor was a well-known remedy. Another reason might have been his social background. His forefathers were from the southern Netherlands and had fled to the Dutch Republic during the revolt against Spain. Although they worked themselves up to the higher strata of Dutch society in the seventeenth century, they never belonged to the very top. Overbeke studied law at the University of Leiden, went on the grand tour, and became a lawyer in the Hague, where he was close to many high officials and members of the stadtholder's court. With his sense of humor and love of writing poetry, Overbeke was somewhat of a bohemian. He probably benefited from his sense of humor especially in high circles, where humor had an important social function. As everybody enjoys a good joke, humor serves as a good social lubricant, enlivening all sorts of gatherings. Civilized people released their physical

fury through humor. Instead of fighting duels, urban society solved differences in a sophisticated fashion, replacing the sword with the tongue in contests of wit. Lawyers such as Overbeke were especially suitable for this type of linguistic warfare because they honed their wit and dry humor at trials.

In early modern France humor played an important part in the shift from physical violence to verbal retort in the civilization process. Norbert Elias (1897–1990), the father of the theory of the civilization process, never said a word about humor; nevertheless it is a fact that physical violence decreased throughout the early modern period, replaced by sophisticated humor. According to the Dutch historian Rudolf Dekker, who stumbled upon Overbeke's *Anecdota* in the Dutch national archives, Overbeke's record of humor and anecdotes endorses the image of the seventeenth-century Dutch as a humorous folk and illustrates a shift in the national character by the nineteenth century, when the Dutch no longer were known for their boisterous humor but rather for their sedate soberness. What happened to the image of the boisterous Dutchman slapping his knee? Beginning in the late seventeenth and continuing into the eighteenth, conduct book writers, moralists, and theologians, all influential in the Dutch bourgeois culture, condemned immoderate laughter, especially laughing at the expense of another person. In the course of two centuries the Dutch became heavy-handed Calvinists.

For early modern England Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621) and the diary of Samuel Pepys (1633–1703) are important sources. Both men owned large collections of jest books, a genre popular among Italian humanists in the Renaissance; as they were translated they became popular throughout the rest of Europe. Stories in these books depicted a scene of daily life, ending with a smart reply intended to make the listener burst out laughing. Indeed, telling jokes was an amusing pastime. On 9 October 1660 Pepys wrote that he and his friends "were very merry at table, telling of tales," and a month later he wrote, "And did tell many merry stories, and in good humours were we all." Many times the affair of telling jokes was accompanied by drinking. Pepys recorded many practical jokes he played, even on William Penn. He noted ludicrous accounts, such as on 1 July 1663, "Sir Charles Sedley stripping himself naked on the balcony of a cook's shop in Covent Garden, before 1000 people, then engaging in various obscene acts, 'abusing scripture', and preaching an obscene 'Mountebank sermon'" (Brewer, 1997, p. 95). In general the educated frowned upon jest books, but apparently Pepys did not. He classified his "merry books" as "vulgaria." Because reprints were often

cheaply produced, jest books were literally read to pieces by his contemporaries.

In the seventeenth century little difference existed between the humor of the gentry and of the populace. As elsewhere in Europe this changed in the eighteenth century, mainly because humanist thinkers embraced the French classicism manifested in conduct books. In 1748 Lord Chesterfield (1694–1773) condemned laughter in a letter to his son: "Loud laughter is the mirth of the mob, who are only pleased with silly things; for true wit or good sense never excited a laugh" (Brewer, 1997, p. 103). Apparently Lord Chesterfield was not one to invite to a party. Toward the end of the seventeenth century the court jester died out as well. The English king William III of Orange (1650–1702) was the last king to appoint a jester to the court in 1694. During the eighteenth century humor joined French culture, literature, language, fashion, and court in the esteem of the European elites. Especially in urban areas, people came to prefer sophisticated humor over the traditional boorish humor of rural society with its practical jokes and pranks.

THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

In the early nineteenth century Berliners were well known for their wit. The city was acclaimed by guidebooks as the "mother city of wit," and its inhabitants were applauded for their "mockery, ridicule, bluntness and cheek." Dry wit was reputedly "natural phenomenon, an inborn characteristic of Berlin's lower classes" (Townsend, 1997, pp. 200–201). In 1844 the German author Theodor Mundt noted that Berlin's popular humor had two qualities: it could either ignite or still the frustrations of the people regarding Prussia's political situation in the 1830s and 1840s. Apparently it had a soothing effect on the populace until 1848.

According to the historian Mary Lee Townsend, Berlin humor of the early nineteenth century profoundly influenced the establishment of a public sphere with a sense of community. In that sphere laughter was an important ingredient of public debate. A comic strip figure, Eckensteher Nante, was a significant symbol. *Eckensteher*, literally one who stands on a street corner, first appeared in the Berlin press in 1832 to denote a lower-class worker, and by the 1848 revolution the character by that name was a major political icon. On some occasions he was even suggested as a candidate for emperor of a united Germany. Eckensteher's popularity can be credited to his wide circulation through an inexpensive medium. His social background as a menial laborer in Berlin ap-

pealed to many of the other Berliners who were drawn to the city for work. The strip addressed and satirized many social issues of early nineteenth-century society, such as poverty, drinking, and the political repression of Prussian citizens. A recurring theme concerned the Prussian state's poor care of veterans of the Napoleonic Wars. In a strip in an 1845 booklet, "an ex-soldier remarks to his friend, 'It is nice to die for the Fatherland . . . because then you don't have to live as a disabled veteran'" (Townsend, 1997, p. 212). All social strata read the strip, but each group probably found something different in it. The bourgeoisie most likely laughed at the stupidity, passiveness, and harshness displayed, while the poor probably laughed at the situations with which they identified. The strip's effect on politics was probably marginal in the long run, but it kept the political groups of Berlin on their toes up to the 1848 revolution.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, caricatures became popular in the English magazine *Punch*, which first appeared in 1841. The editors marketed humor that the English bourgeois middle class could appreciate. During the first nineteen years of *Punch's* publication, its satire poked fun at the government, the propertied classes, the Catholic Church, and the English royal family. In 1860 the editor Mark Lemon (1809–1870) decided it would be more lucrative to humor than to offend the bourgeoisie, and *Punch* became a polite weekly that exhibited many characteristics of the English temperament. From 1860 to after the World War II the jokes in *Punch* fit

into a typically English pattern. In his penetrating look at English humor, Harold Nicolson describes the jokes in *Punch* as childish (with a naive delight in the play on words) and self-protective (ridiculing the unfamiliar, foreigners, surprising events, and intellectual superiority); they required minimal mental effort (whether appreciation of the unfamiliar, of poking fun at knowledge, or of inspired nonsense), aiming instead to comfort (by comparing dilemmas of the present with the past and thus rationalizing them). Nicolson argues that the English are not less sensitive than other nationalities when it comes to making fun of their "institutions, climate, cooking, habits and foibles" (Nicolson, 1956, p. 43). Rather, the core of the English sense of humor is a high self-regard masquerading as self-ridicule: for example, if the English were truly ashamed of their cuisine, they would not be inclined to poke fun at it.

While *Punch* catered to the English bourgeoisie, Oscar Wilde (1854–1900) constantly made fun of them from above. His plays, such as *The Importance of Being Earnest* (1895), mocked middle-class norms and values and therefore Victorian society. All the prized merits of the English bourgeoisie, such as hard work, honesty, marriage, good morals, and proper behavior, faced ridicule in Wilde's one-liners. To wit: "Any preoccupation with ideas of what is right or wrong in conduct shows an arrested intellectual development" (Wilde, 1987, p. 1113). In fact self-ridicule became the main ingredient for humor in the film industry and later for television in twentieth-

century America. Classics such as Charlie Chaplin's *Modern Times* (1936), which derided industrial society, and *The Great Dictator* (1940), which ridiculed Hitler, who had risen to power in Nazi Germany, made audiences on both sides of the Atlantic roar with laughter. Hitler, however, failed to see the humor and banned Chaplin's films. By the 1950s American situation comedies such as *I Love Lucy* brought American culture and the American sense of humor into European households. Europeans produced their own sitcoms, incorporating their own national identities and jokes. Most American sitcoms more or less portrayed American family values with a moralistic message and dealt with matters like sex in an indirect Victorian fashion. The popular 1990s British sitcom *Absolutely Fabulous* had viewers in Britain and on the Continent gasping for air at the quick-witted humor of its stars, Jennifer Saunders and Joanna Lumley. The duo portrayed two forty-something women of the baby boom still living in a version of the hedonistic 1960s world of sex, drugs, and rock and roll. The candor fired off in high-speed dialogue was a refreshing element in British humor. While most viewers laughed at the mockery of the 1960s, the real butt of the humor was the no-nonsense 1990s and its New Age overtones.

CONCLUSION

From the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, moralists, theologians, and the church attempted to restrain laughter. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries attitudes toward laughter shifted. By replacing physical violence with verbal wit, the elites first initiated this social intercourse, and the bourgeoisie and the lower strata of society adopted it. Propelled by humanist pedagogical writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as Erasmus, Vives, and Joubert, the change was more apparent during the eighteenth century, when the bourgeoisie incorporated humor in their lives on a broad scale. However, the personal documents of Overbeke and Pepys, both of high social status, are closer to the humor of daily life in the seventeenth century and illustrate that people continued to laugh about commonplace matters despite finger-pointing by moralists. Sources from the Renaissance and the early modern period demonstrate that the history of humor is a dichotomy between the humor portrayed in secondary sources and the humor of daily life in personal sources. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the influence of moralists and theologians on the suppressing of humor declined. By the end of the twentieth cen-

tury, a sense of humor was considered a particular asset, with employers seeking not only skills and commitment in their prospective workers but also the ability to laugh. The old adage, “Laugh and the world laughs with you, cry and you cry alone,” survived. Another modern variable involved political regimes and uses of humor to release political tension amid censorship, a key theme for many communist countries in the twentieth century.

The social and cultural history of European humor remains a fertile topic. Specific explorations, such as examinations of early modern Holland, have been revealing and suggest important adjustments of established views. But many periods and regions have not been studied, and systematic accounts have not been developed. The difficulty of the topic lies not in discussing written efforts at humor but in deciphering

what humor meant to different people and how it was used. Many studies, such as those concerning the role of political humor and satire amid censorship efforts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, are specific. Analysis of new forms of popular theater, such as music halls, in the late nineteenth century inevitably deal with earthy humor and how it was received when the middle class patronized working-class establishments. Other studies refer to humor in passing. Works on changing European manners in the eighteenth century—among them Lord Chesterfield’s popular treatise—note a hostility to humor, perceived as suggesting poor breeding and lack of self-control. How much this attitude actually affected humor is another question. Clearly, ample room exists for additional research in a branch of social-historical inquiry fed by the growing interest in cultural evidence and issues.

See also other articles in this section.

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MUSIC AND DANCE



William Weber

History books usually place music among the sister arts, incorporating its history into style periods such as the baroque, the romantic, or the realist. Yet an argument can be made that music has been related much more closely with politics and the social life of its publics than with painting, poetry, or the novel. While broad artistic communities existed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for the most part a European musician had far more to do with his patron than with painters or writers. Much the same can be said of the dance, for it evolved in close relationship to music in the grand festivals put on at courts to honor births, marriages, or visiting dignitaries. In such contexts we can profitably study the history of music, dance, and indeed society itself.

Music is the most social of the arts. As a performing art governed by ritual, it is much less an individual experience than reading books or viewing artworks. Music is involved in a great variety of social contexts: the home and the school; the tavern and clubs; public institutions such as the church and municipalities; and events in parks and arenas. Most important of all, musical performance has been central to the social life of middle and upper classes, and in some places the working classes as well. Music therefore offers the historian an unusually good context within which to study some of the most important social groups and movements in modern European history. It also helps us understand European politics from what the British call “out of doors,” outside formal institutions. Commentators have often discussed musical life in civic terms—Charles Burney, for example, spoke of the “Republic of Music” in his music history published in 1776.

Scholars from both history and musicology have viewed the musical life as an integral community with its own traditions and discourse, which also contributed significantly to the functioning of larger society and politics. To see how music related to larger social or cultural frameworks, we do best to start not with categories such as the Enlightenment or the middle class, but rather with musical practices and the social

framework with which they were linked. Musicologists are very much attuned to this problem; in many cases their interests bear a much closer relationship to the methods of Roger Chartier, a leader in French thinking on mentalities, than to those of traditional intellectual historians. They start from social contexts in attempting to re-create musical practices in the musical life of a cathedral, court, or city. Jeffrey Kallberg has contributed the most important ideas about how musician and public worked within a contract that laid down both musical and social expectations for a musical genre, and within which they negotiated change in both composition and performance. Neal Zaslaw has shown that we cannot understand fully how W. A. Mozart approached writing a work unless we know precisely for whom and in what context he intended it. Jane Fulcher has demonstrated how deeply politics, as it is broadly conceived today, interpenetrated musical life in discourse and in musicians’ careers. The social history of music, in other words, involves more than audience studies: it goes to the heart of music itself as an interactive art.

It is important to see that music had a distant and ambiguous relationship with the mainstream of European intellectual and cultural life from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth century. The learned tradition of scientific and philosophical theory on music— notions of the “harmony of the spheres,” specifically—became much less important in the universities and in European thought generally, and written discourse on composition or performance of music remained limited, usually appearing only in pedagogical form. Polyphonic music, based chiefly in the church, served as the main area of higher learning among musicians but had weak links with literary life; indeed, humanistic thinkers tended to be hostile to it as a scholastic exercise. It was only during the middle of the eighteenth century that commentary on music shifted from aural into printed form and became part of a larger cultural discourse—philosophy, history, criticism, and journalism. The arrival of music within these spheres marked a major milestone in the

art's history, giving it a lofty role in secular cultural life such as it had not possessed before.

Music historians studying the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance have contributed a particular amount to social historians, most importantly on the nature of patronage and court life. Iain Fenlon has argued for discontinuity in patronage, showing how the dukes of Mantua reshaped the music of their court, both sacred and secular, in idiosyncratic ways. By contrast, Kristine Forney has stressed long-standing traditions in the ways music was performed and works commissioned within confraternities of sixteenth-century Antwerp. Study of musical performances at court can tell us a great deal about the larger nature of sociability, gender roles, and political meanings, and about how people listened. Christopher Page has done such a study on the late medieval *trouvères*, and Tess Knighton, on the court of Castile in the fifteenth century; they show how textual, musical, and social needs interacted in the ways music was presented. Musicologists and historians have raised questions about the validity of speaking about the Renaissance as an epoch in the sweeping terms that are so common. Nino Pirrotta has argued that Claudio Monteverdi was not directly influenced by the intellectual life of Florence; rather, he took advantage of its interest in drama in order to explore new ways to set music and dramatic text. Honey Meconi has likewise asked musicologists to reconsider the extent to which humanism affected the sixteenth-century practice of *imitatio*.

The very roles musicians played within the courts of the fifteenth through the eighteenth century can help us see that the old society was not as bound to a rigid corporate structure as is often claimed. High-level musicians were extremely mobile and independent in their careers, moving frequently from one place to another as opportunities presented themselves. New genres and styles in fact spread around Europe in large part through the journeys of monarchs and their agents. The career moves made by Josquin des Prez, Monteverdi, or G. F. Handel, who reshaped musical practices significantly as they went, illustrate the individualism that Jonathan Dewald has shown among aristocrats of the time. Many musicians of this sort served as secretaries and political advisers to monarchs or noblemen. Handel, for example, took his first trip to London in 1708 chiefly to send back reports on the unsteady condition of English politics as the King of Hanover awaited the succession. Thus, let us not say that musicians were always banished to eat with the kitchen staff.

The rise of opera in the seventeenth century offers a useful perspective on the varieties of absolutism and society. Lorenzo Bianconi and Thomas Walker

demonstrate that operas grew up variously in courts and cities, and as court institutions within cities. In some cases one could find larger audiences in courts than in urban theaters. Bianconi and Walker see opera emerging within a small elite that served the political and social purposes of monarchs or of the patriciate. Robert Isherwood likewise shows that the operas Jean-Baptiste Lully produced for Louis XIV brought a new scale to the traditional festivals for visiting dignitaries and interacted textually with court gossip and politics. Opera then shifted from court to municipal contexts, at a time when the cosmopolitan public began to take on political authority, forming what is usually called the "public sphere." The Académie Royale de Musique, for example, became established in Paris well before the death of Louis XIV and demonstrated how the public had succeeded the king as the principal source of authority over taste. By the middle of the eighteenth century such a shift away from royal courts and into city centers had taken place in the great majority of countries.

MUSICAL CULTURE WITHIN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PUBLIC LIFE

Musical culture provides an excellent context within which to study the emergence of the new forms of public life that related closely to development of the public sphere during the eighteenth century. Between about 1700 and 1870, London, Paris, and to varying extents the capital cities of Europe generally played host to a particular elite social life, bringing together wealthy and influential people, generally in greater numbers than had been the case at the courts. The cities indeed robbed the courts of their former central role in politics and culture. The social world of the new urban elites was not as intimate as that of the courtiers; nonetheless, individuals did not experience nearly the degree of anonymity that was to characterize urban life by the end of the nineteenth century, as a result of population growth and the rise of mass politics. The urban elites most commonly referred to themselves as part of the *beau monde*, or simply as "the World." Musical, theatrical, and political issues—*querelles*, as the French termed them—were debated within a tightly knit network of institutions and personal relationships. Letters of the period move back and forth between personal gossip, party politics, and opera news with a naturalness that seems quaint in our day. One can argue that members of the *beau monde* learned how to participate in a political community by participating in opera disputes. The best-known of these disputes arose over the Italian style in London and Paris shortly after the turn of the century,

and again in Paris in the late 1730s, early 1750s, and late 1770s. Jean-Jacques Rousseau put himself on the public stage through musical discourse, first publishing an extravagant treatise on musical notation and then denouncing the French language as an operatic vehicle—in effect, an attack on the court, coming as it did in the midst of the intense constitutional crisis of the 1750s.

London led Europe in establishing public musical activities during the eighteenth century. Public spaces became central to the capital city and its cultural life. Concerts held in York Buildings—the first public room in London designed specially for music—have a history leading up to the construction of the Royal Festival Hall in the South Bank arts complex in 1951. The growing concentration of the elites, together with the professionals and artisans who worked for them, reshaped both the institutions and the discourse of musical life in profound ways. Indeed, the modern concert originated in early-eighteenth-century London. Professional musicians became unusually independent in their relationships with wealthy families, establishing fee-for-service relationships much more consistently than was done elsewhere. Public concerts became far more numerous and specialized there than anywhere else in Europe partly because the loose, postrevolutionary state of political authority in Britain

meant that licenses were not required for such events, as they were almost everywhere else. The petty capitalism that evolved among musicians was nonetheless still based upon patronal relationships within a tiny elite. As Simon McVeigh has shown in *London Concert Life from Mozart to Haydn*, few concerts were held outside the West End, and musicians did not widely develop publics among the middle classes until the 1830s.

London's Italian opera company, established in 1708, was the only example in a monarchical system of an opera founded on a commercial basis, legally independent of the court. The high fees given to singers there came to set the standard throughout Europe. The King's Theatre became the most important meeting place for the peerage and indeed the British elite as a whole; it in effect became its main resort outside Parliament. Though opera librettos made only muted political implications, the theater made a powerful statement about the unity and consolidation of the Hanoverian succession.

Throughout Europe public theaters, especially opera, stood at the center of the elite public world. Going in order “to be seen” should not be construed necessarily as an opportunistic act of attempted upward mobility; since being in public was so basic to elite life, attendance was assumed to be a normal social

act for anyone presumed part of the *beau monde*. Opera became considerably more of an obligation than the spoken theater, since it was linked to international elites. Many of the manners and mores of the *beau monde* seem quite foreign and sometimes downright offensive to us today. The etiquette of the *beau monde* in theaters was rather more multifaceted and tolerant than ours today. Attendance at a theater was a social act; to go was by definition to mingle with the assembled company as much as to see a production, and as a result a diarist usually saw no need to mention what he or she saw on a given night.

In fact, an individual would often attend several theaters in an evening, arranging to see favorite scenes, players, or singers, or meeting with people in different halls and boxes. The idea that musical pieces might comprise integral, permanent works of art was weak as yet; most operas were patchworks—*pasticcii*—of arias from different works by various composers. But that should not impugn the seriousness of the public. Since many people saw an opera production often within a season, it was not thought obligatory to sit through it all. Social behaviors—talking, moving about, some sources say playing cards—were tolerated to an extent not normally seen today, but that does not mean that no one cared about what went on stage. People liked to say that nobody listened to the opera, or that nobody knew much about it, but such a statement was a trope, a gentlemanly irony. The English man of letters Horace Walpole, one of the leading connoisseurs of singers in his time, several times said in his letters that he was not going to listen that night at the King's Theatre, since nothing interested him about the production. Least of all should we think that composers such as Mozart, J.-B. Rameau, or C. W. Gluck were not respected in their time; the controversies that broke out over their music were testimony to their great significance in public life.

Public display of sexual license was another trait basic to the *beau monde* and, by that token, to the musical world of the cosmopolitan elite. While freedom from moral codes had long been something of a privilege of the uppermost social orders, sexual intrigue became far more open and more competitive within this milieu than it had been before. The opera was the focal point for sexual gossip; Lady Mary Coke, a divorcée from the Argyll family, always kept her Paris-based sister well informed on such matters in her letters. The French playwright P.-A. Beaumarchais became famous all over Europe for the critique of the new elite mores in his legendary dramatic triad, which librettists then toned down for the less adventurous audiences in other capitals. Lorenzo da Ponte, for instance, made the Count in Mozart's *Marriage of Figaro*

much less licentious than in the play. People read Beaumarchais avidly in Vienna but were not ready to see discourse on sexual morality approached so bluntly on stage. Indeed, in Vienna the public took on cultural authority more slowly than in London or Paris. Emperor Joseph II severely limited the role of ballet at the opera—an act that would have risked an aristocratic uprising in the two other cities.

Musical culture is invaluable as a context within which to think about the evolving relations between areas of what we call high and popular culture. In the eighteenth century there was much less stratification than we may presume among listeners by levels of learning and taste. Songs based on well-known popular tunes were thought mundane and were distinguished from works done with greater craftsmanship and called artful, but it would not be unusual to perform them together. *Opera seria* was not thought “serious” in anything like the sense in which we use the term and by the 1780s *opera buffa* rivaled the other genre for leadership in musical style. Indeed, the best-known melodies from Lully's *tragédies lyriques* were soon set as hymns and drinking songs. Opera was assumed to be accessible, indeed attractive, to all members of the elites and to the people from other social levels who formed part of the elites' world; both aficionados and less serious listeners went to the same productions in the same halls. From the founding of public opera halls in Venice in the 1630s such productions were for what one might call “general taste.”

Concerts also followed practices that seem foreign to the musical world of today, in which popular and classical tastes are carefully segregated. Programs were often called “miscellaneous” in the sense that had originated in poetry—meaning that a variety of idioms and tastes would be provided. One would almost always hear both vocal and instrumental music: after opening with an overture, a program might offer an operatic number, a solo virtuosic piece, an Irish melody set to a sentimental text, and it might close the first half with an opera finale. In the provinces one might in fact see a juggling act or a trained dog. The norm at most concerts was an experience comparable to what we might hear at a pops concert today: a program that included works thought to demand quite different levels of learning. Connoisseurs accepted such practices; they themselves wrote the texts of the popular songs and were the main judges of vocal talent.

Yet musical life began to develop a much more learned avenue of taste during the eighteenth century: the performance of revered “ancient” music. By tradition it had been unusual, though not unknown, for works more than a generation old to remain in per-

formance. Britain led in the performance of old music, and by 1780 one could hear concerts all over Britain that offered music by such composers as William Byrd, Henry Purcell, Arcangelo Corelli, and Handel. Charles Burney and John Hawkins published the first music histories in 1776, and the Concert of Antient Music was established in London that same year under aristocratic auspices. France saw an even more remarkable innovation: the continuing performance of works by Lully and some of his successors, yielding an operatic repertory far older than that found anywhere else in Europe. While these works were all dropped from the repertory by the early 1780s, the idea of a French canon—Lully, Rameau, and the frenchified Gluck—was firmly established.

Germany and Austria also began to take leadership within musical life at this time. While only a few old works remained in performance there (chiefly ones on religious texts by Carl Heinrich Graun and Handel), a field of highly learned musicians and amateurs emerged to lead Europe in the redefinition of musical taste in the nineteenth century. The first major such figure was Johann Forkel, the music director at the University of Göttingen. A music historian as well as performer and journalist, Forkel was the first to focus university musical training upon historical study. Honoring Johann Sebastian Bach with the greatest reverence, he and his successors mounted a moral critique of contemporary musical taste, arguing that it suited parlor conversation more than serious listening, bringing what we now might call the “commodification” of music. Their idealism can be seen to have had roots in the new discourse on freedom and equality in late-eighteenth-century Germany. Ironically, while their thinking grew up within bourgeois emancipation, it early on developed an ideology antagonistic to the music business.

THE EXPANSION OF PUBLICS AND CLASSICAL REPERTORIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Musical life of the nineteenth century offers an important context within which to study the leadership of different social classes and the interaction among them. One central change in class structure in the period was the agglomeration of aristocracy and high bourgeoisie into a new upper class; another came in the growing social and cultural leadership of the middle classes. The first change was reflected early within musical life, as members of the two elites began to mingle more closely than had been the custom before. If in the eighteenth century articles on high-ranking concerts spoke of the *beau monde* being in attendance,

now they told repeatedly how the aristocracies of birth, wealth, and talent were represented, elites that were beginning to have a common, if quite loose, identity. Leadership came from each of these groups in different ways: in France, for example, noblemen formed societies to present music before Haydn, while bankers such as the Rothschilds served as patrons of the most famous virtuosos, and intellectuals turned out in force at the concerts of the orchestra that played the classical repertory at the Conservatoire. Ultimately, however, leadership came mostly from the upper middle class through its links with an expanding middle-class public. The foundation for the new musical world of the nineteenth century lay in emergence of musical training for both children and adults, represented by a piano in every parlor and the performance of music there at family gatherings. The economic power of the domestic market transformed the musical world fundamentally, stimulating the sale of sheet music with new marketing techniques and the rise of what the British called “popular music” by the end of the century. This does not mean, however, that the middle classes had a more or a less serious musical taste than other classes. As Nicholas Temperley argued in the introduction to *The Romantic Age* (1981), it is impossible to discern significant differences on the whole between them and the nobility.

With the disappearance of the *beau monde* around 1850, musical life began to separate out into a diverse set of publics and activities. In demographic terms there simply had become too many people within the upper classes for a unitary elite world to exist, and the opening of politics to new groups made the upper classes feel threatened and wary of public life. In London, for example, by about 1860 significantly fewer members of the peerage took boxes at the opera, and its performances clearly had become less central to their social life. The public life of the World, formerly focused on the opera, now became much more private than it had been before. Politico-musical *querelles* of the sort that had been the highlight of public life all but disappeared. The last major such affair in England was the attempt to found a competing theater at Covent Garden in 1847; in France it was the visit of Richard Wagner for a production of *Tannhäuser* in 1859.

After the middle of the nineteenth century concerts began separating out into separate locales for different kinds of tastes. The diversified (“miscellaneous”) programs that had been standard since the early eighteenth century gave way to a separation between what were thought to be lighter or more serious repertories. Canonically defined “classical” works moved into the forefront of concert life, as symphony or-

chestras and string quartets came to rival the opera, and levels of artistic worth established a new aesthetic and ideological frame of reference. Listening habits became much more strict at such concerts than had been the case before, with talking or moving about condemned as disrespectful to the great works. Still, new kinds of informal “promenade” concerts became just as prominent in public life as those of symphony orchestras. The players at such events—either as bands or orchestras—were often just as good as those at the serious concerts, and sometimes in fact were the same people.

The rise of classical-music concerts came in large part as a reaction to what came to be called popular music. We can find its origins in virtuosic and vocal music dominant in the 1830s that was termed “salon music.” While music had been published for amateurs for performance since the sixteenth century, the sale of music increased dramatically with the invention of lithography and the expansion of marketing techniques. The main products, medleys of tunes from the best-known operas, were usually composed by famous virtuosos and then rewritten to be played by amateur singers, pianists, and instrumentalists. A wide-ranging commercial world evolved linking domestic music, the opera, the concert hall, and outdoor performances, with publics ranging from bands in poor mining towns to the most aristocratic salons. Thus, the term “popular” is appropriate by at least 1850: everyone was presumed to know this music, and its dissemination lay in a mass-market industry.

The market for this music expanded many times over what it had been in the eighteenth century. It came about as a joint effort of piano companies, publishers, virtuosos, periodicals, and most of all entrepreneurial musicians such as the Paris-based Henri Herz, who started companies to do these things.

During the second half of the century another major component of popular music emerged in performances of songs in music halls and cabarets. While a good deal of singing had gone on in taverns, it had not developed far at all commercially and in many cases might still be called folk music. By 1900 this kind of music, having developed a broadly inclusive public, rivaled formal concerts in prominence and in the size of the public, even though such taste was condemned ideologically by the traditional musical community that had emerged out of the court. Indeed, the rise first of salon music and then of music halls helped pressure that older world into an increasing focus upon a classical repertory and self-consciously serious, learned taste. By the end of the nineteenth century it had become difficult for composers to write for both worlds. A new aesthetic hierarchy had emerged that posed an overarching dichotomy between “light” and “serious” music, of a sort that had not existed in the eighteenth century.

Women took on important new roles within musical life during this period, most strikingly as composers. During the early nineteenth century female singers increasingly composed songs or did virtuosic improvisations upon well-known arias. Clara Schu-

mann emerged as the most prominent woman composer, as well as serving as a powerful performer and teacher; Augusta Holmès had operas produced in Paris, and Ethel Smyth in London. The musical conservatories founded all over Europe were attended chiefly by women and offered what amounted to education on the secondary to graduate levels, leading to employment in a wide variety of contexts. Women were particularly successful in publishing songs for both domestic and concert performance, writing in a variety of light and serious idioms. Still, by World War I the division in taste between popular and serious music made it difficult to compose for both markets, and that hurt women much more than men. And there is evidence that during most of the twentieth century women were excluded from the composing profession as it underwent fundamental changes in both the popular and classical areas.

Equally remarkable was the growth in concert life among the lower middle and working classes. During the eighteenth century a few members of these groups had participated in local music societies, but they had to play a highly deferential role to the gentlemen in charge. Beginning in the 1830s entrepreneurial musicians began to set up choral societies for a broad spectrum of social groups, constituted variously in public and private contexts. Mass concerts by organizations such as the Orphéon in France and the Tonic Sol Fa organization in Britain brought the larger population into public musical life in unprecedented ways. With the development of cheap brass instruments, bands proliferated in Britain, Germany, and France among poor miners and industrial workers, and such ensembles competed for prizes and concert performances on a national basis. Though in some cases an owner might use such activities to blunt the influence of unions, the musical societies contributed significantly to the unity and pride of workers' communities.

MUSICAL LIFE SINCE 1945

A period of particular greatness in concert life arose between the revolutions of 1848 and World War II. During this time there was a relative continuity in repertory, taste, and social locales within which some remarkable music-making occurred in a context of public vitality. Geography helped: cities tended to be close-knit and easily accessible, integral communities within which musical life served as one of the citizens' main pleasures. The vital links between domestic and public music undergirded all this; many people played at home what they had heard in halls. And new music, though beginning to be controversial, was found on

most programs and entered into creative relationships with the classics. Much of this changed after 1945. Air travel, television, motorways, and the opening up of new cultural distractions dispersed urban social and cultural life in ways harmful to music. Many of the small communities that had sustained bands, choruses, and orchestras disappeared or lost their unity and the focus of their lives upon music. Indeed, fewer people learned to play or to sing; the piano ceased to be a universal domestic object in middle- or upper-class households. If working-class amateur participation weakened to a particular extent, so did classical-music institutions, hurt by the decline of the amateur public and by competition from popular music.

Yet musical life benefited from some of these same changes. New technology made it possible for far more people to hear music performed on a professional level, which, also thanks to better pay earned by unionized musicians, led to higher levels of performing standards overall. Governments and foundations replaced the individual patron in the support of ensembles, a development which particularly benefited repertories with a limited commercial base such as avant-garde music and early music. In fact, in some areas music became one of the more learned of the arts, a vast change compared to its nature in the seventeenth century. Music history became a standard discipline in most universities. While early conservatories served chiefly to educate local players and teachers, after 1945 they became the places where the most important performers were trained.

One of the most significant changes dating from the start of the twentieth century was the separation of new and classical music into increasingly separate performing contexts. Before that time most programs offered a relatively balanced fare of new and old works, with pianists and violinists playing their own works alongside the classics. But by World War I orchestras and chamber-music ensembles had become musical museums, and the public found itself suspicious of anything new, whether conservative or avant-garde. Repertories of classical music that began with Handel and Bach ended with Wagner and Johannes Brahms; the musical clock stopped, and Richard Strauss and Claude Debussy were honored on a wholly new basis. At the same time composers, publishers, and patrons began staging concerts and establishing organizations devoted specifically to the performance of new music. This can be seen as early as the 1860s in the concerts put on by supporters of Wagner; it culminated in the founding of the International Society for Contemporary Music in 1922. After 1945 funding by governments, radio stations, and universities established the world of new music on a firm

and social practices. But by the 1960s jazz had developed a sophisticated public that grew large enough for concerts. Rock went much further in that direction soon after its rise in the early 1950s, since early stars such as the Beatles became so popular that they began putting on concerts not only in large halls but also in sports stadiums. In the 1970s new sound systems made possible new theatrical dimensions to the rock concert. And in the 1980s “crossover” composers and performing groups began to present combinations of jazz, classical, and avant-garde works in interesting new ways. Some concert series also began attempting to lighten their social atmosphere in order to attract a younger public. Avant-garde musicians influenced by Karlheinz Stockhausen and John Cage formulated new ideas of the concert independent of tradition, devising music performed in a space rather than a formal hall, usually with performers given improvisatory roles.

DANCE

The history of dance poses the intricate task of analyzing how related segments of social structure have interacted—that is, how dance functioned within opera but became a separate artistic world during the twentieth century. In the early modern period the same performers served, depending on the context, as singers, dancers, and actors, but these several roles eventually grew increasingly separate. Dance history is now its own field, whose publications historians of music must get to know. Music historians likewise need to recognize how important dance was for the opera-going public during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and not simply treat it as a distraction from the music. As we saw above, variety served as the central principle behind performance of almost all kinds prior to the late nineteenth century. To deride dance unless it plays an organic or dramatic role within an opera is to impose anachronistic assumptions upon an earlier and very different culture. A dance number could variously emphasize an operatic mood, advance the plot or drama, or offer a quite different artistic experience. What made a good theatrical director was his ability to splice segments together to form a sequence that would prove pleasing and perhaps provocative to his audience.

The competitive nature of Renaissance states brought a new scale and intellectual focus to the tradition of holding grand festivals involving a variety of arts. In 1489, for example, the duke of Milan gave a dinner in which the entrées were accompanied by performers acting out the mythological meanings of the food—characters danced as either the fruits of Po-

basis. The major concert centers that emerged were the Darmstadt Festival in the Rhineland, the Donaueschingen Festival in Baden Baden, the Domaine Musicale in Paris, and the League of Composers in New York.

Popular music in its increasingly diverse forms inspired the chief public interest in new musical trends after 1945. Young people increasingly left classical-music concerts to their elders. In France the *chanson* took a distinctive path independent of American pop. In Britain the Beatles and other groups established a new area of sophisticated music with large publics. In Germany rock groups contributed significantly to the evolution of new sonorities and the use of electrified instruments. Jazz became a powerful movement throughout Europe, in many ways independent of its American origins. In all these countries popular music moved from the cabaret into the concert hall. While both jazz and rock began in dance halls, neither seemed at first appropriate to the concert hall due to the seemingly functional role of the music and the casual manner of popular musicians’ musical

mona or the lamb of Jason was brought in. By the early sixteenth century these dances were called *balletti*, meaning a figured dance understood as a composition of sequential movements. These works were semistaged versions of the social dances of the time, originating in the protocol of court etiquette or in practices of a more popular nature. Treatises appeared to instruct dancers how best to perform these numbers; those of Fabritio Caroso and Cesare Negri at the turn of the seventeenth century specified movements of the feet in detail. Dance was still principally done by members of a court, an amateur activity performed under the instruction of a choreographer. Emphasis was less upon difficult movements than upon the spelling out of elaborate patterns throughout a space, with the audience usually looking down from galleries. The shows were imbued with allusions to individuals and events; sources exist to tell us who danced which parts, and that can have major implications for a political climate. It was conventional for the head of state—Louis XIV himself at the start of his personal reign, for example—to perform before his or her court. The events took different forms in France, where figured dancing was most prominent; in Italy, where the masquerade served as the context for dance; and in Britain, where the masque merged the two traditions with the audience dancing in the “revels.”

The focus in dance upon professionals had already begun when Louis XIV last danced in 1670. The Académie Royale de Musique developed the most important company of both male and female dancers to perform in public in Paris. The individual dancer, increasingly women more than men, now came to the fore. The hall was larger and the audience at a somewhat greater distance than at court, though boxes looked down directly upon the stage and at some performances women of the high nobility sat on stage in a semicircle. Basic aspects of ballet technique evolved at this time, most important of all the “turnout” to form a right angle. Marie Carmargo, who made her Paris debut in 1726, then shortened her skirt, to gain freedom for the jump with quick beating of the feet called the *entrechat quatre*, and danced in heelless slippers to gain greater elevation from the *plié* done upon the floor. Commentary on dance evolved separately from that on music; Louis Cahusac, for example, became a leading interpreter of how dancers expressed a great variety of emotions. Jean Georges Noverre, the best-known choreographer of the eighteenth century, made a critique of ballet done simply for show and called for dancers to speak to the heart, representing character and feeling. Noverre changed dance composition at the Opéra from formal symmetry to evolving dramatic movements, and he had a powerful in-

fluence in London as well as Paris, partly through his work with David Garrick. At the same time, dance became a major accomplishment among the upper classes. Musicians often taught it as well, and dance schools became attached to many universities, especially in Germany.

Ballet as we know it came into place around the 1830s, chiefly in the systemization of dance instruction and the increasing focus on dancing *en pointe*. The ballet class, best seen in the *Code of Terpsichore* by Carlo Blasis (1830), became codified into a set of exercises helping a dancer progress from the simpler to the more difficult movements. A whole new way of moving evolved at this time, based upon extension of the back leg and the use of short running steps featuring speed and lightness. Marie Taglioni presented it most prominently in 1831–1832 in the opera *Robert le Diable* and the dance work *La Sylphide*. Plot and set design of romantic opera played an important role in the new manner of dancing. Neoclassical mythology gave way to historical plots, focused on richly exotic moods and sets. Popular theaters on the boulevards of Paris led in this change, offering

productions on the Incas in Peru and Captain Cook in Tahiti that were made into successful ballets. The ability to lower lighting thanks to the use of gas brought a new sense of mystery and an unearthly quality to the drama. A star system evolved, even larger in scale than had been the case in the eighteenth century.

The social historian needs to pay close attention to the process by which dance began to move away from opera in this period. During the seventeenth century a single act of dance occurred between the acts of an opera, and in the eighteenth it became less common and less important under the influence of the librettists Apostolo Zeno and Pietro Metastasio. But in France it took on increasing importance within the *tragédies lyriques*, especially those of Jean-Philippe Rameau, and within the growing number of two-act *opéras-ballets*, which themselves might have vocal music. An evening at the Paris Opéra would usually have two or three parts, one or two of them focused on ballet. Noverre's leadership brought ballet's role to the fore, making some commentators complain that dance was replacing opera in the public's attention. But in the middle decades of the century the best-known dance works took on a life of their own—*Sylphide*, then *Giselle* (1842) and *Copélia* (1870)—even though they were still produced under the auspices of the opera company.

It was in Russia that ballet first became functionally independent of opera. Not only did the tsars give far more funding to dance than any other court or municipal theater, but also from early in the nineteenth century the state theater in St. Petersburg put on full-length works of dance alone. Everywhere else in Europe prior to around 1900 a ballet was rarely given without an opera on the same program. The French dancer Marius Petipa, who arrived in St. Petersburg as *premier danseur* in 1847, was the chief leader in building the quality of the dance company to rival that of Paris. The works of Peter Ilyich Tchaikovsky, from *Swan Lake* in 1877 to the *Nutcracker* in

1892, were the culmination of Petipa's work in making ballet equal if not greater in prominence compared to opera.

The powerful impact of modernism brought dance to the fore as a separate art just after the turn of the twentieth century. No other movement has cut across the arts as rapidly and deeply as this one. Sergey Diaghilev, born in a highly cultured gentry family, first had interests chiefly in music and art, but went on to direct Europe's leading dance company between 1909 and 1929 and in so doing reshaped the field fundamentally. Under his influence and that of Michel Fokine, character dancing in folk idioms took on a new intellectual stature, and a new manner of dancing arose, most prominently in Diaghilev's productions of *Firebird*, *Petroushka*, and *Rite of Spring* with the music of Igor Stravinsky. Diaghilev and Fokine turned ballet away from female leadership, not only with a focus on male dancers but also with the primacy of the male choreographer as *auteur*. Though overshadowed within the writing of cultural history, women dancers—chiefly Isadora Duncan, Ruth St. Denis, Loie Fuller, and Maud Allen—were pioneers in the field of modern dance. Duncan rejected balletic tradition directly at the start of her career, abandoning tights, shoes, and classical technique, and built a new kind of solo dance aimed at expression and the pursuit of a new philosophical direction. This became a highly international movement, gaining leaders from the United States, strong public support from Britain, and the support of a variety of movements concerned with rethinking the body in Germany. One could argue that modern dance seriously rivaled modern music within the public, for it was more successful in overcoming the weight of tradition and attracting audiences to new kinds of performing contexts. While musicians, dancers, and painters worked together in establishing the principle of the self-defining artist, in the course of the twentieth century the latter two groups put their works on public display much more successfully than the former.

See also other articles in this section.

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Section 20



MODERN RECREATION AND LEISURE

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POLICING LEISURE



John K. Walton

Leisure is a problem for governments and employers because the time and space it occupies and the activities or idleness it entails exist beyond the disciplines imposed by the need to make a living. Leisure activities are capable of invading or otherwise affecting the workplace in ways that disrupt production and threaten output. In addition they can take on guises that threaten basic aspects of state power, breaking or challenging the law by attacking property, attacking a person or the official version of consensual morality, and disturbing the peace or outraging the sensibilities of influential citizens. But leisure is also capable of shoring up the established order, whether by distracting people from grievances that might otherwise politicize them in radical ways or at least give rise to riot and disorder or by promoting thrift, domesticity, the respectable pursuit of approved knowledge (put another way, the acquisition of “cultural capital” of acceptable kinds), attachment to unthreatening religious organizations, or patriotism, discipline, and other acceptable qualities. Leisure can also provide investment outlets and returns on capital for entrepreneurs and investors whose interests are bound up with meeting popular demand in ways acceptable to authority and consensual state-endorsed morality. This last point, in particular, draws attention to important conflicts and paradoxes inherent in the relationship between the modern state and the development of leisure. As leisure provision is drawn into the marketplace, it develops its own propertied interests, who have a stake in what is provided and whose efforts to allure or satisfy customers may lead them into conflict with the state (national or local) as guardian of order, morality, and other kinds of property. Their attempts to meet the state’s conditions for continuing operation, for example, by accepting censorship, may affect the nature of their own output. This theme is particularly evident and contentious when sex and intoxicating substances are at issue or when popular commercial entertainment also has radical political content. The theme recurs throughout this article alongside questions relating to class, gender, ethnicity, and the construction of identities.

These themes worked themselves out in contrasting ways in different parts of Europe, with differing patterns of change over time. The pretensions of the state to intervene in the private sphere, the role of religion and its relationship with the state, the extent of governmental tolerance of organized oppositional culture, the level of urbanization and the pace and nature of industrial development and agrarian change, the timing and nature of the emergence of leisure industries, and the extent of governmental willingness to expend resources on the policing of leisure all affected outcomes. Moreover patterns varied in different kinds of places within countries or economic regions. Leisure was policed in different ways according to the degree of threat activities posed to the lifestyles and property of the influential, to the dignity and ceremony of centers of government, and to the productivity of industrial workforces. Some popular or disreputable districts were just too difficult to police from without in direct, formal ways that might seem oppressive and provoke resistance. There surveillance might be confined to policing boundaries and keeping incompatible lifestyles apart. As specialized resort towns emerged, conflicts over appropriate or preferred uses of desirable spaces became particularly pressing. Residential suburbs had to be guarded more straightforwardly against plebeian incursion. Account has to be taken of these differences and developments.

ORGANS OF POLICING LEISURE

Who might be said to have policed leisure, how, on whose behalf, and with what success? Police forces, in the sense of bodies of men and later women charged with the duty of maintaining order in public and some private places and with power to inflict penalties on those who defy or ignore the laws they enforce, are only part of this story. They are far from a simple or straightforward part, even when the extent of their ambitions or those of their paymasters has been so extensive as to attract the label “police state,” whether

retrospectively or at the time. Consider, for example, the elaborate structures of control that already existed in the eighteenth-century Grand Duchy of Württemberg, now in Germany. Parallel local hierarchies existed, the Lutheran Church and the state, with the pastor, schoolmaster, and church consistory ranged alongside local court, council, bailiff and *Bürgermeister* (mayor) in each village. The district ducal commissioner or *Amtmann* held regular courts of heads of households in every settlement. Church pastors were required to appoint “secret censors” to report moral failings, and they offered rewards for prosecuting neighbors for “immorality, laziness, idleness or general disorderliness,” under which headings much disreputable leisure activity could be gathered. But despite all efforts to encourage Württemberg villagers in self-control and mutual denunciation and to persuade them to internalize “official” values, a whole range of proscribed leisure activities and illicit beliefs flourished, helped by the tensions between the different arms of the surveillance machinery. For example, pastors and schoolmasters fell out, and mutual denunciations canceled each other out.

Ambitious aspirations to control also flourished in the contrasting setting of eighteenth-century Paris. François Jacques Guillaudé remarked in 1750, “The policing of a city . . . is the surveillance of an infinite accumulation of little items.” Guillaudé’s efforts to supervise work, leisure, and supplies led him to a proto-Benthamite or Foucauldian plan to divide the city into “twenty districts, of twenty sections, of twenty houses numbered street by street, each storey designated by a number, each lodging by a letter,” an apparatus of *commissaires* (commissioners), *inspecteurs* (inspectors), and *syndics*, and an identification card system with a view to setting up a complete regulatory system to record all comings and goings. Such aspirations generated wonderful archives but understandably fell far short of their goal. One failing was the propensity of the police to be corruptible by gamblers and brothel-keepers. Policing leisure in the eighteenth-century metropolis was even more difficult than in the countryside.

At the other end of this period the better-known totalitarianism of Eastern Europe under Stalinism and its successor regimes similarly had its limitations, despite fearsomely holistic aspirations and an extensive commitment of resources. Even during the 1930s, after the militants of the cultural revolution had “destroyed the mechanisms of commercial culture” (Stites, 1992) and tried to impose a state-sponsored culture of high-minded improvement whose populist rhetoric failed to disguise its prescriptive puritanical aspirations, Soviet citizens still had a measure of agency

and choice within a mass culture that found room for “what some people would call simple, common or vulgar entertainments.” The state had to adjust its goals to take account of popular tastes and preferences. In the post-Stalin era this became increasingly obvious, as the Houses of Culture, which were supposed to provide culture and entertainment for all and socialize them into an approved socialist frame of mind, were infiltrated by hobbyists, interest groups, and enthusiasts who might pay lip service to orthodoxy but derived their satisfactions elsewhere, regarding their particular pleasures as ends in themselves rather than means toward what the authorities called “cultural enlightenment.” After 1953 consumer needs received growing attention, and Western fashions increasingly infiltrated. Leisure reverted overtly to the private sphere, and the state cultural apparatus became depoliticized. State bureaucrats’ ambitions to impose a unified set of officially approved leisure and cultural preferences were frustrated, and popular culture never lost its pluralism. This held good in Hungary and Poland as well as the USSR.

This was the case even in states with ambitions to police leisure by suppressing alternatives and winning hearts and minds through active provision of approved facilities and activities while backing their efforts up with coercion and terror and warrening society with informers. Other European settings established much narrower limits to the successful policing of pleasures. Leisure aspirations could be repressed, discouraged, channeled, or controlled in many ways. But as some historians’ successful challenges to the simplistic social control literature of the 1970s demonstrated, the play (in both senses) in social systems kept the technologies of control, formal or informal, from making the desired or posited impact. This was especially the case where, as in Britain, the direct role of the state in policing leisure was limited to banning specific activities that shocked influential sensibilities, licensing and surveillance of commercially run gathering places that involved the consumption of intoxicants and perceived threats to order and morality, and preservation of a sense of security in the streets and other public places. Levels of involvement in these spheres changed over time, especially in an interventionist direction in response to novel levels of urbanization and social dislocation, most obviously associated with the industrial revolution and the two world wars.

A strong de facto economic dimension of the most basic kind figured in the policing of leisure. The spread of industrial work discipline from the late eighteenth century accentuated the demarcation between work and leisure time. Working hours expanded and

were policed more effectively until the mid- or late nineteenth century. In the twentieth century the rise of Fordism and Taylorism tightened the screws on industrial workforces again. The increasing importance of precise clock time as opposed to more traditional, less precise measurements contributed to these changes. However, in rural France and some other rural areas the working day had long been punctuated by the bells of the parish church announcing meal breaks and the conventional times for starting and ending work. In many industrial settings, too, leisure was smuggled into the workplace, often lubricated by drink. The successful importing of drink was an important part of an apprentice's skills in engineering as late as the 1870s. When workers took pride in craft and workforces lived in close proximity, the skills and techniques of work might be discussed sociably afterward over a few drinks. This pattern apparently declined in late-nineteenth-century London but persisted long afterward in other settings, especially those associated with coal mining. The pressures and de-skilling of "machinofecture," assembly lines, and other routinized workplaces brought about the separation of work and leisure, which entailed the effective policing of leisure at the workplace.

Real wage levels exerted their own policing function regarding what kind of leisure and how much could be afforded, especially if defiance of labor discipline might prejudice future employment. Underemployment and unemployment generated unwanted leisure for those who lacked the resources to enjoy it. At higher social levels middle-class orthodoxy believed that the work-leisure boundary was patrolled by a work ethic that required long, committed hours of managing resources and markets. But the extensive evidence of high spending and pleasure preferences among the industrial and commercial middle classes, even in the mid-nineteenth century, undermines the moral force of such pretensions outside the ranks of a few well-documented eccentrics. The aristocracy and its associates in the so-called "leisure class" had to work at their leisure because they were required to follow a strict timetable of formal events, where they displayed themselves with all the formality of a rigid system of etiquette. These issues defy easy categorization.

INDIRECT REGULATION

Much of the regulation of popular leisure arose indirectly, through school and religious influences, through voluntary organizations acting as pressure groups, and elusively but importantly through the restraining influence of widely shared values that were

not necessarily those fostered by the government or churches, though they might look like them from a distance. Formal schooling, whatever the relationship between voluntary bodies (usually religious) and the state in its provision, entailed the imposition of discipline in punctuality, cleanliness, and classroom behavior. These values were expected to have an impact on both work and leisure. Bodies like the English Sunday Schools were among the organizers of counter attractions to lure children and adults away from the temptations of fairs, festivals, and drinking places. Churches, temperance organizations, mutual insurance societies, and other voluntary bodies also offered alternatives, which might involve tea parties, picnics, or excursions to the countryside or the coast. These options, particularly evident from the 1830s onward, survived strongly through the nineteenth century before beginning to decay in the twentieth century. Such provisions often failed to meet the expectations of promoters, as the recipients took the opportunities and rejected aspects of the message, going to the picnic in the afternoon, to the fairground in the evening, or on railway excursions organized by the temperance movement and getting drunk at the seaside.

Churches and moral reform organizations also formed pressure groups to change the laws regarding leisure activities in more restrictive directions. In the nineteenth century and early twentieth century they worked toward tighter regulation of, for example, Sunday observance, permitted drinking hours, gambling in public places, and sexual immorality in various guises. In the twentieth century, especially after World War I, the external influences on government worked in the opposite direction. Pressure groups fought rearguard actions against liberated social practices. Sunday observance became less widely enforced, even in Protestant northern Europe. The Catholic "continental Sunday" had long been a source of complaint among English advocates of restriction. Constraints on the open hours of drinking and dancing establishments fell away sharply across Western Europe in the last quarter of the twentieth century. In the industrial Ruhr district of Germany, for example, where Catholics and Protestants lived side by side, the spread of commercially run Sunday dancing was such a strong trend in the late nineteenth century that the police, despite ineffectual aspirations, were quite unable to control it.

Everywhere most of the intervention was directed at the working class, as in the ineffectual prohibition of street betting on horse races in England between 1853 and the legalization of betting shops in 1961. Yet the leisure practices of the comfortable were not immune from censure and legislative interference.

Casino gambling, especially roulette and baccarat, was the object of periodic moral panics and campaigns for intervention across most of Europe. In Britain, significantly, its legal existence was unthinkable between the mid-eighteenth century and the late twentieth century. Gambling was banned successively but temporarily in France, the German states, and Belgium at various points in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and in Spain definitively in 1924 after many years of de facto toleration while the law was ignored. The fashion for tanning, which spread across the European beach haunts of the wealthy after World War I, called forth outraged campaigns about the immorality of bodily exposure in several Catholic countries. It reached a climax of outrage with efforts at legislative intervention in Belgium and Spain in the mid-1930s, and the Spanish Civil War settled the outcome in that country in favor of extreme restrictions for more than a generation.

These interventions were only part of the story and rarely the most important or effective part. More important was the policing that operated hegemonically, as people restricted their own leisure choices according to versions of propriety and suitability that became enshrined as common sense. Submission to prescribed regimes of exercise or self-presentation might fall into this broad category, as leisure was adjusted to meet the dictates of fashion or the medical prescriptions that governed when and how to bathe at a spa or the seaside.

Generally more significant was the tyranny of respectability in its various guises, restraining leisure behavior on the basis of concern for what peers, workmates, neighbors, and employers might think. This was the most pervasive and diffuse vector for policing leisure, all the more effective when it was genuinely self-policing. But these constraints had to come from within, and Peter Bailey rightly emphasized that for many people respectable behavior was contingent on external circumstances. Not only might the boundaries of acceptability vary for individuals according to context and company, but claims to respectability might be proffered or abandoned at will. Consequently for most people it was more like a garment that was donned or discarded according to circumstances than like a consistent, articulated, internalized identity. Shani D'Cruze's work on women, leisure, and the circumstances of sexual assault in the Lancashire cotton manufacturing district in the late nineteenth century shows that working-class communities and different groups within them had their own ideas about what constituted acceptable or reprehensible behavior, and the lines between them shaded according to circumstances. The ideas were no less real to

the actors involved than the stricter definitions that prevailed among those who made or enforced the law. The "rough" working class, so labeled by outsiders, had its own internalized respectabilities that amounted to a significant degree of self-policing.

The external policing of leisure by the national or local state, featuring laws to legitimize the coercive restraint of controversial activities, was nevertheless important. However, its impact never matched its aspirations or those of the moral reform pressure groups who tried to extend and tighten its grasp. Over much of Europe the changes associated with industrialization, urbanization, and swelling migration flows coincided with an evangelical religious revival in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The fears of authority facing novel agglomerations of people with an obvious potential for subversion of all kinds were augmented by influential pressures for control from well-connected religious groups. This applied in Catholic as well as Protestant Europe. In the late nineteenth century, as these voices became somewhat less clamorous and carried less conviction, their place was taken by a social Darwinist and eugenicist agenda concerned that overindulgence in popular pleasures would not only plunge families into the secondary poverty that arose from the misuse of otherwise adequate resources but would also further the degeneration of the race. Both the religious and the eugenicist concerns still made impacts in the 1920s and 1930s, and their voices were far from stilled in the late twentieth century.

In the interwar years, however, it was increasingly acceptable for even the working classes to enjoy pleasure for its own sake, without the overt addition of a legitimizing agenda of moral or physical recreation. The leisure revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, when a new generation of hedonistic working- and middle-class consumers began to break the bounds that had constrained their forebears, definitively changed these expectations, as, for example, restrictions on open hours began to crumble and licensing hours were relaxed. Even then, however, policing leisure remained important or even more so, as problems associated with newly popular drugs, with hooliganism at spectator sporting events, and with urban violence attained a higher profile in the eyes of the media and the government.

POLICING FESTIVALS

What kinds of leisure were perceived to need policing, and how did this perception change over time? Above all, large-scale popular festive gatherings of any kind

attracted the paternal and disciplinary attention of authority, whether their ostensible bases were religious or secular. So did all activities involving the consumption of alcohol, gambling, violence, close contact between the sexes, or any rowdy liveliness that encroached on the public street, disrupted traffic and trade, or appeared to threaten the property, security, and dignity of the comfortable. Under the first heading came, most obviously, fairs, carnival, wakes, or other local feast days. Fairs, as trading events with entertainments grafted on to reap the opportunities offered by large crowds with money in their pockets, were already boisterous and potentially dangerous events in the London of Ben Jonson's *Bartholomew Fair* (1614). Over time the balance between commerce and amusement steadily tilted to the latter, even in the provinces. These were calendar customs, mark-

ing out the passage of the year and underpinned by custom. When the calendar changed in 1752, the English had to make decisions about whether to observe the new date or the old.

Over much of Catholic Europe religious observances gathered crowds for traditional, evolving ceremonies. Carnival, a feast of excess and misrule at the approach to the lean times prescribed by Lent, was overtly an occasion for the subversion of authority, disguises involving challenges to status and gender boundaries, excess, and the upending, temporarily and symbolically, of the usual social and moral order. Even England had its petty carnivals. On 5 November the saving of a Protestant Parliament through the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 was commemorated with bonfires, blazing tar barrels, and sometimes the burning in effigy of unpopular con-

temporary figures. In a minor echo of carnival, too, Shrove Tuesday celebrations often included mass football games involving most of the male inhabitants of a parish, following conventions rather than rules and entailing systematic horseplay and conventionalized violence. Right across Europe, too, local festivals commemorating the patron saint of the parish were celebrated with drinking and dancing as well as formal religious services, drawing in people from surrounding settlements along with the locals.

These big traditional gatherings were policed mainly by convention and consent during the eighteenth century. The local festivals suffered increasingly from the withdrawal of elite patronage, as landed society withdrew into its own select institutions, disappeared for long periods to the new leisure towns or to the metropolis, and lost touch with local popular culture. Festivals did not come under direct attack until the beginning of the nineteenth century, and then the criticisms were usually the economic disruptions of industrialization and a widespread decline of rural laborers' incomes rather than directly coercive. Much the same applied to the fairs, which gradually came under pressure from the rise of new patterns of trade, especially through the growth of fixed-site retailing alongside the regular weekly markets. As fairs lost the commercial functions that gave them legitimacy, they were more vulnerable to suppression at the behest of the upholders of order and morality. Hiring fairs for farm servants, where young people who had been confined in service for several months might enjoy a few liberated days of drinking and dancing while they looked for a new employer, were particularly worrying in the eyes of reformers. But in the parts of England where this mode of employment remained strong the fairs survived well beyond World War I.

Carnival, with a much stronger purchase among the urban elites of Catholic Europe, was more resilient. These large-scale annual events were difficult to police in the formal, bureaucratic manner that emerged, at least on paper, in much of Europe by the early nineteenth century. The scale of carnival's turbulence was beyond the intervention of small numbers of ill-paid police forces, whose members were part of the culture they were policing. The only way to control carnival in the short run was to suppress it. This became an option, as the fairs and parish feasts came under economic pressure anyway. Attempts at closure were invariably resisted in urban settings, and the pattern of suppression in England before 1870 was overwhelmingly weighted toward small agricultural villages in the south and east. In many urban settings and settings that were becoming urban, local festivals adapted to new economic circumstances and some-

times gained a new vitality by attracting commercial patronage from publicans and other entertainment entrepreneurs. Pleasure fairs circulated with increasingly sophisticated amusement technology. This in turn brought renewed pressure for suppression from religious interests with allies among local residents and property owners whose lives were disrupted, whose sensibilities were affronted, and who did not benefit from the extra trade generated. When attempts were made to ban urban fairgrounds from municipal property, fairs merely migrated to new sites on private land and continued to flourish. The urban pleasure fair was tamed in the late nineteenth century more by regulating the propertied interests associated with it through licensing and associated surveillance than from coercive suppression, which was rarely practical politics. Especially in parts of northern England, local popular holidays were increasingly associated with excursions to the seaside and the countryside, leaving the local festivities increasingly etiolated.

POLICING SPECIFIC PRACTICES

Those who sought to police popular morality along the lines of the evangelical revival of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, echoing the moral panic evoked by the rise of the urban working class, were more successful in intervening against specific practices than in suppressing whole festivals. In this role formal, disciplined police forces eventually came into their own. Some specific intervention came earlier with attempts to police prostitution in eighteenth-century London and Paris. Aspirations to suppress foundered on the ubiquity of the services and the market for them and the impossibility of preventing the police from being seduced into protecting many they were supposed to be arresting. In England it was easier to target popular blood sports, which were more disruptive, less consensual, and more appealing to a masculine cult of violence and cruelty that attracted censure both from evangelicals and from secular advocates of gentlemanly civility and moderation. In the early nineteenth century cockfighting, bull-baiting, and the Stamford custom of bull running were abolished officially. The last Stamford bull-running ended in a celebrated standoff between troops, police, and traditionalist locals during the late 1820s. Cockfighting survived as a disreputable clandestine activity, along with dogfighting and human pugilism. These pursuits were targets for the new police forces. Peel's Metropolitan Police of 1829 provided a model that rapidly disseminated through the counties and boroughs in the 1830s. Success in dealing with pugilism

was limited by promoters, who chose sites on county boundaries, where fights could easily be relocated out of reach of interfering local policemen. Significantly foxhunting and hare coursing, which retained not only aristocratic and genteel patronage but were also rural activities with a strong following among farmers, remained unscathed. The rural police did become active in conjunction with the gamekeepers who acted as the landowners' private estate police forces in pursuing poachers. The status of pheasants and similar creatures as property was disputable because they were reared by estate owners but were wild in their freedom to roam. Efforts to catch pheasants clearly combined pleasure with profit and an element of challenge to the rural social order. This theme runs right through the period. Even among blood sports in England, what was policed and how it was policed depended on whose leisure was at issue in explicitly class terms.

Something similar applied to the popular village and small town football games, many of which survived into the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in England. Survivals were confined to small, stagnating towns and villages that were slow to develop formal local government institutions and the corresponding local police presence and whose commercial interests were neither assertive nor influential enough to require intervention to protect their property and trade. Workington, the largest town to keep a mass football game, an Easter calendar custom in

this case, did so after losing it for several years. In Workington survival was assisted when the game became a curiosity that attracted trainloads of lucrative spectators from the surrounding area. The outcome may also have been affected by the town's distance from higher-order centers of government. Usually this kind of activity was a prime candidate for police intervention and suppression, as were other popular sports that used public spaces, such as road racing, proscribed because of the competitors' preferred state of undress and because the crowds blocked the streets, and stone bowling, a Lancashire pastime suppressed in the 1860s as a hazard to other road users.

Football in England was policed by another route. The public schools and their associated cult of "muscular Christianity" imposed rules limiting time, space, numbers, and acceptable behavior, which were available nationally from 1863. Rules formed part of a wider pattern of taming popular sports through the formal codification of regulations imposed on the competitors, thereby making games more acceptable in the new, more disciplined urban societies. Football's expansion on this new basis as soccer and rugby meant that aspects of it were self-policing through the voluntary organizations that oversaw its development and disciplined offenders and recalcitrants. This became the norm elsewhere in Europe. Where clubs remained amateur, their finances were policed, often ineffectively, by the ruling bodies. Even where the

professional game came in, travel expenses and wage payments were limited and regulated. In Britain professional soccer players were subjected to a maximum wage until the early 1960s, and illegal payments to players were severely punished. As the varieties of football developed into spectator sports across Europe, the formal police forces of town, county, and province also needed to keep order among the watching throng. Debates continue about the origins of football hooliganism and when crowd misbehavior reached a level to deserve that label. While disorder was not absent in the early days of large-scale spec-

tatorship in the late nineteenth century, the sheer scale and violence of the last quarter of the twentieth century was completely unprecedented and all the more alarming for that.

Policing by regimes of rule and administration imposed and enforced by the voluntary bodies, which ran the sports and could cast dissenters into a sporting wilderness, was echoed in other sports that emerged or were remodeled in the late nineteenth century. Many ruling bodies, as in athletics and rowing, cleaved to an amateur ideal that excluded, marginalized, or disadvantaged the working class, which was developing its

own separate sports federations by the interwar years. Other sports also followed football in excluding women. Women's bodies at leisure were policed by rule and convention in the sporting sphere as in others, as expectations about passivity and the dangers of vigorous exercise continued to dominate medical orthodoxies until well after World War II.

POLICING PRIVATE BEHAVIOR

Formal intervention by the policing regimes of national and local government was particularly associated with the regulation of relations between the sexes, especially where alcohol was also involved. This was central to the concerns over fairs and other calendar customs, but it was increasingly sustained regarding the daily and weekly routines of popular pleasure, where along with the regulation of gambling pastimes, the intervention of police forces in everyday life was perhaps most resented and controversial. Attempts to corral commercial sex into licensed brothels were unthinkable in Britain but were common over long periods in southern Europe. In Spain at the beginning of the twentieth century it was an acknowledged but seldom discussed reality. Prostitutes walking the streets, where their importunities annoyed passersby and their presence might create embarrassing situations for "respectable" women, posed problems of police regulation everywhere, especially in resorts and the developing shopping and theater districts of larger towns.

Working-class courting customs in the public street also aroused complaint in England, although it proved impossible to suppress the so-called "monkey parades" on Sunday evenings, in which young women and young men made contact and arranged assignations. Elsewhere in Europe, for example, in the Spanish institution of the *paseo* (walk), this seems to have been less worrisome. Outdoor courting customs in urban back alleys and entries, well documented in autobiographies and by the Mass-Observation team who investigated working-class life in Bolton, England, in the late 1930s, apparently were passively tolerated by authorities. What mattered was to keep the main public thoroughfares clear and comfortable for "respectable" passersby. Obvious prostitutes apart, this was more a matter of the police breaking up groups of men who gathered to gossip on street corners, especially when they abused or even committed minor assaults on their "betters." This was a major function of the British police from their introduction, especially in London and in the manufacturing towns of the 1840s.

Private leisure premises were even more difficult to regulate through formal policing. Licensing proved an effective tool up to a point, as establishments became more elaborate and entrepreneurs had more to lose if their activities were legally suppressed. Commercialization of leisure outlets carried its own commitment to self-policing in pursuing an extensive consumer market. Providers could not afford to alienate potential customers by shocking their sensibilities. Eighteenth-century spa resorts employed masters of ceremonies to police "the company," imposing dress codes and shared expectations of politeness and etiquette on potentially overbearing aristocrats as well as on their socially insecure inferiors from the new middle ranks. When an external regulatory regime also had to be satisfied, a certain amount of self-censorship crept in to anticipate and evade problems. Thus by licensing public houses, where beer and spirits were retailed in a sociable atmosphere, English justices of the peace discouraged working-class radical political organizations and trade unions from using them as meeting places because it threatened the livelihoods of the licensees. The Beer Act of 1830 put free trade principles before regulation and allowed beer houses to proliferate outside the magistrates' control, generating moral fears of prostitution, gambling, uncontrolled drunkenness, and political subversion.

Small establishments served well-defined local clienteles, however, and the bigger pleasure palaces that developed in the second half of the nineteenth century were more vulnerable to external pressures. Thus the London music halls of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were inspected for audience composition, with special attention to evidence of prostitution, and program content, with a view to excising sexual innuendos, the undermining of constituted authority, or the ridiculing of clergymen. If they transgressed, the proprietors might suffer indirectly through particularly expensive and demanding interpretations of the fire regulations, for example.

CENSORSHIP OF MEDIA

Performers were difficult to police, especially when they departed from their submitted scripts or when they used idioms impenetrable to would-be censors. The contents of cinema, radio, and eventually television programs were also subjected to censorship. The British cinema in particular faced absurdly specific and restrictive codes that reflected the anxieties of authorities in the interwar years. While the British Broadcasting Corporation exercised monopoly powers over broadcasts, seeking to reconstruct a common

DIFFICULTIES IN POLICING LEISURE

Official censorship was equally difficult to enforce in eighteenth-century Paris. Censorship before the French Revolution was erratic, and a great deal of scurrilous and “indecent” material was disseminated through vaudevilles or the extensive market in cheap street literature. Robert Isherwood pointed out, “No doubt, censorship was lax because the police had no desire to stifle a form of entertainment that kept the public diverted” (Isherwood, 1986, pp. 254–255). He cited Alexandre-Jacques Du Coudray’s writing in 1775 as an explicit justification for loosely policing popular entertainments, which distract the populace from factionalism and revolt. The relationship between the need to restrain and control and the need to allow a measure of self-expression on the safety valve principle, was always difficult to negotiate.

The perception was, however, that the leisure of the populace above all needed policing. Within that broad category, specific groups or locations aroused disproportionate attention, among them the young of both sexes; sexual nonconformists, including homosexuals as well as prostitutes; concentrated areas identified with poverty and crime, like slums and rookeries; and stigmatized ethnic and religious minorities, for example, the Irish, Jews, or gypsies. The organized public order and defense forces of the state sometimes provided cause for alarm, as when soldiers’ training camps or sailors on leave detached from the forces of order. In England during the 1860s, panic about the spread of venereal disease among the armed forces led to passage of the controversial Contagious Diseases Acts, which identified the prostitutes rather than their customers as the source of the problem but still put garrison districts under a distinctive form of martial law for several years.

Above all the leisure subjected to the most sustained policing was that of the lower orders and later the working class, especially when they concentrated in public spaces in large cities. This was particularly true of the centers of government, where disorder of any kind might and sometimes did take on political and revolutionary overtones. The pleasures of the poor constituted one of the most significant specters that haunted the national and the local authorities throughout the period under review, and the official technologies of surveillance were never sufficient. Police methods had to interact with economic, cultural, and psychological systems of control. From the eighteenth century to the twentieth self-policing was at least as important as external restraints in controlling popular leisure in modern Europe.

culture according to what later became known as “establishment” values, censorship occurred effectively within the organization. World War II precipitated a more populist and inclusive broadcasting culture, and the popularity of rival stations like Radio Luxembourg grew. Breaking out, the radio series *Round the Horne*, broadcast during the 1960s on the *Light Programme* to families enjoying Sunday lunch, might include a range of camp homosexual references that the management either failed to understand or gleefully allowed to go through.

Rarely did censorship block up all potential loopholes, and in practice it included negotiations. In Munich, for example, the folk singers who performed on a host of little stages, often in Bavarian dialect and with a strong propensity toward caustic political comment, had long been subjected to censorship of both the political and moral content of their work. In response to protests against censorship in the early twentieth century, the Munich police in 1908 formed an advisory committee of established writers, at one time including Thomas Mann, to pronounce on the artistic merit of controversial items. Nevertheless, comments critical of the regime still had to be couched in coded language. In Belgium and Spain public decency leagues restrained what could be said explicitly, but as elsewhere unscripted innuendos conveyed much. Even after the Weimar Republic abolished censorship, performers still had to carefully consider their output. At this time the effective censors were the ascendant National Socialists, whose reputation for power through direct action was more threatening than were the previous official governments.

See also other articles in this section.

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SPORTS



Allen Guttman

Sports had a place during the Renaissance, but a relatively small one compared to their place at the end of the twentieth century. Sports are so important a part of modernity that more than one Marxist scholar has glumly concluded that they, and not religion, are “the opiate of the masses.”

Modern sports are, however, vastly different from those of the Renaissance. In theory, if not always in practice, they are national and international rather than local. They are open to all on the basis of athletic ability rather than restricted to a few on the basis of social class. In their formal-structural characteristics, modern sports differ from those of the Renaissance in a number of ways. They are highly specialized, in that many of them (like rugby and soccer) have evolved from earlier, less differentiated games; it is increasingly rare for anyone to excel at more than one sport. Modern sports are rationalized, in that the rules are constantly revised from a means-ends point of view; the equipment and facilities are standardized; and the players train scientifically, employ technologically advanced equipment, and strive for the most efficient use of their skills. They are quantified, in that achievement is defined by points scored or by the precise measurement of times and distances. Finally, they are characterized by the quest for an unsurpassed quantified achievement, which is what we mean by the “sports record” in this uniquely modern usage. A number of traditional sports have survived into the twenty-first century, but they have been pushed to the margins of modernity. While the Frenchman of the *pays Nantais* still enjoys his traditional game of *boule*, tens of millions of Europeans play soccer football and hundreds of millions watch the World Cup on television.

THE RENAISSANCE

For the Renaissance aristocrat celebrated by Baldassare Castiglione in *The Courtier* (1528), a much-mocked adage might actually have been true: it was not

whether one won or lost but how one played the game. There has rarely been as much emphasis on decorum and good form in the practice of sports.

Tournaments. This attitude can be seen in the evolution of the tournament from the bloody melee of twelfth-century armed combat to the allegorical pageantry of sixteenth-century spectacle. Early tournaments involved a crowd of knights energetically engaged in a free-for-all the purpose of which was to capture and to avoid captivity. Spectators were rare, rules were minimal, and bloodshed was an accepted part of the game. At a tournament held near the German town of Neuss, in 1240, scores of knights were killed. Deadly violence was so characteristic of medieval tournaments that the Roman Catholic Church attempted in vain to ban them.

In contrast to medieval mayhem, the tournament held by René d’Anjou at Tarascon in 1449 was a model of chivalry, a symbolic statement of political authority rather than a visible proof of martial prowess. René’s account of the event is a compulsively detailed etiquette book regulating exits and entrances, proper verbal formulas, and appropriate dress. The jousting pairs that replaced the mob of medieval combatants are scarcely mentioned.

The tournament staged by Henry VIII in 1511 to mark the birth of his son by Katharine of Aragon was an occasion for Henry and his court to appear as *Ceur loyall* (Loyal Heart) and other allegorical characters. Of the thirty-six vellum membranes of the Great Tournament Roll of Westminster, only three show Henry tilting before the pavilion from which his queen observes and admires him. Thirty membranes picture the gorgeously colorful entry and exit processions.

Despite the shift of emphasis from combat to spectacle, there was always the possibility of mishap. At a tournament held in Paris in 1559, Henry II carelessly failed to close the visor of his helmet and was killed by a splintered lance. To eliminate totally the possibility of accident, “ring tournaments” were introduced. Galloping knights aimed their lances not at



THE COURTIER

If [the courtier] happens to engage in arms in some public show—such as jousts, tourneys, stick-throwing, or in any other bodily exercises—mindful of the place where he is and in whose presence, he will strive to be as elegant and handsome in the exercise of arms as he is adroit, and to feed his spectators' eyes with all those things that he thinks may give him added grace; and he will take care to have a horse gaily caparisoned, to wear a becoming attire, to have appropriate mottoes and ingenious devices that will attract the eyes of the spectators even as the lodestone attracts iron.

— *Baldassare Castiglione, Il cortegiano (1528), translated by Charles Singleton (New York, 1959), pp. 99–100.* —

one another but at a set of rings dangling from cords. The symbolism, sexual rather than martial, was appropriate for an age in which wars were no longer decided by knights on horseback.

Fencing. By the sixteenth century swordplay had become a prized sport in its own right. The substitution of the rapier for the heavy two-handed sword signaled a shift from brute strength to agility and finesse. Ambitious fencing masters perfected their art in Italy and France and then gave lessons to the young nobleman of England, Germany, and Poland.

Fencing became highly rationalized, with rules to govern every aspect of the sport. Treatises on the sport emphasized its aesthetic appeal. At the court of Louis XIV, correct performance of the ceremonial bow, the *révérence*, seemed as important as the proper way to execute a thrust. Fencers' manuals like Camillo Agrippa's *Trattato di scientia d'arme* (Treatise on the science of arms; 1553) and Girard Thibault's *L'académie de l'espée* (The academy of the foil; 1628) were illustrated by diagrams of the appropriate positions to take before, during, and after the match. Such manuals resembled textbooks in geometry.

Football. Renaissance gentlemen were not content just to refine the sports traditionally associated with a bellicose nobility; they also borrowed from the peas-

antry. While various versions of folk football, which European serfs had played for centuries, continued to be popular in the countryside, young Italian noblemen transformed rustic play into urbane entertainment.

Folk football was typically a violent confrontation in which men, women, and children struggled furiously to kick, throw, or carry a ball across fields and streams and through the streets of their neighbors' village. The final goal was the portal of the parish church, but rival parishioners were seldom treated with Christian charity. Writing in *The Boke Named the Governour* (1531), Sir Thomas Elyot condemned—to no avail—the “beastely fury, and extreme violence” of the game.

Folk football had little resemblance to its descendant, the game played on the Piazza di Santa Croce in Florence and depicted by Jacques Callot in a set of prints dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici in 1617. This sport was particularly popular in the sixteenth century, when Giovanni Bardi wrote his *Discorso sopra il gioco del calcio fiorentino* (Discourse on the game of Florentine football; 1580). In its classic form, the game was a highly regulated contest played by teams of twenty-seven on a rectangular field exactly twice as long as it was wide.

The contestants, wrote Bardi, should be “gentlemen from eighteen years of age to forty-five, beautiful and vigorous, of gallant bearing and of good report.” He urged also that every gentleman player should wear “goodly raiment and seemly, well fitting and handsome.” The emphasis upon the aesthetic aspect of the game is precisely what one expects of Renaissance sports, but there were also political ramifications. The ball was associated with the six golden balls of the Medici coat of arms and the game was frequently staged as a symbolic statement of that family's political power. There were, for instance, two games of *calcio* played in the summer of 1558 to celebrate the marriage of Lucrezia de' Medici and Alfonso II d'Este.

Archery. In Gubbio and other Italian cities, the middle class competed in crossbow contests, but archery's center of gravity lay north of the Alps, in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Crossbow guilds, whose patron was frequently St. George, recruited members of relatively high status. They were government officials, wealthy merchants, and occasionally members of the nobility. Under the dubious patronage of St. Sebastian, whom Roman archers martyred, the longbowmen tended to come from somewhat less affluent circumstances.

Crossbow guilds spread in the fourteenth century from Artois, Brabant, Flanders, and Picardy to

northern France and to all of German-speaking Europe. Entry into an archery guild was usually restricted. Abbeville's guild was typical. The bourgeoisie of that French town limited membership to fifty. Women were generally excluded from archery guilds, but there were exceptions to the rule. The guild of St. Sebastian at Kappelen in Flanders had guild sisters who competed for the title of queen.

The annual archery meet, the *Schützenfest*, was a major civic festival, scheduled many months in advance, that might last a week or longer. Contestants were attracted from hundreds of miles away and matches like that held in Augsburg in 1509 attracted thousands of spectators. With a complicated instrument like the crossbow, it was unlikely that many of these spectators really understood the fine points of the sport, but the difference between a hit and a miss was obvious to everyone. When the mimetic target (a bird, a deer) evolved into an abstract configuration of concentric rings, each with a different quantified value, everyone was able to tell the winners from the losers.

If spectators flocked to archery contests, it was not simply to admire toxophilic prowess. Annual festivals were accompanied by pageantry and revelry. There were banquets with rich food and high-minded speeches; there was also drunkenness, buffoonery, and sexual promiscuity.

“Blood sports.” Football games and archery matches were not the only sports events to threaten Renaissance notions of measure and decorum. Joseph Strutt, an early-nineteenth-century historian of British sports, asserted that “blood sports” attracted only “the lowest and most despicable part of the people,” but, in fact, lords and ladies were passionate foxhunters and Tudor royalty led the way to the bear pits. Elizabeth I was so fond of animal baiting that she prohibited London's theaters from performing plays on Thursdays because they interfered with “the game of bear-baiting, and like pastimes, which are maintained for her Majesty's pleasure.” Henry VIII was fond enough of cockfights to add a pit to Whitehall. More than a century later, on 13 March 1683, *The Loyal Protestant* reported that Charles II had taken most of the court “to see the sport of cock-fighting; where they received great satisfaction.”

Renaissance Italy, too, had its share of violent sport. While dandies in silken uniforms entertained the Medici court with exhibitions of skill at *calcio*, hardier Italians pummeled one another while playing *gioco della pugna* (game of the fist). In the Venetian version of the sport, hundreds of men, representing different sections of the city, fought pitched battles for the control of the bridges that linked their neighborhoods. After witnessing the *gioco della pugna* in 1574,

Henry III of France remarked that the event was “too small to be a real war and too cruel to be a game.” In Florence in 1611 twenty-six men were killed in a grand *gioco*.

EARLY MODERN TIMES

At the risk of simplification, one can say that the cultural difference between the Renaissance and modern times can be read from the changing meaning of a single word: “measure.” To the readers of Henry Peacham’s popular handbook, *The Compleat Gentleman* (1622), measure implied balance and moderation. A century later, the same term implied quantified measurement. It was clearly associated more with arithmetic than with geometry. This semantic shift can be observed in the ways that Europeans conceptualized their sports. The vocabulary of aesthetic response gave way, although never completely, to the language of quantified achievement. This conceptual transition took place in England much earlier than in the rest of Europe.

The passion for quantified results seems to have been driven as much by the gambler’s desire for clarity as by the empirical scientist’s demand for exactitude. Gambling was, in fact, the impetus for a great deal of early modern sport. As Robert Burton noted in the 1621 edition of *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, the impulse to wager impelled men to “gallop quite out of their fortunes.”

Races. Foot races are probably a human universal, but the English seem to have developed a mania for them after 1660 when Charles II returned from exile. *The Loyal Protestant* of 3 March 1683 reported the king’s presence when a hardy citizen managed to walk five times around St. James’s Park in two hours. James Pellor Malcolm’s compendium of odd events included a mention of a poulterer who walked 202 times around Upper Moorfields “to the infinite improvement of his business, and great edification of hundreds of spectators.” The passion for contests of this sort grew to the point where *The Sporting Magazine* for April 1822 reported that some fifteen thousand spectators had come to cheer fifty-six-year-old George Wilson as he successfully walked ninety miles in twenty-four hours.

These races, which foreign travelers like Jean-Bernard Le Blanc and Zacharias Konrad von Uffenbach saw as typically English, were not limited to men. In 1667 Samuel Pepys watched girls race across a bowling green. In May 1749 an eighteen-month-old girl earned her backers a considerable sum of



A BOXER OF BILLINGSGATE

I, Elisabeth Stokes, of the City of London, have not fought . . . since I fought the famous boxing woman of Billingsgate 9 minutes, and gained a complete victory, which is six years ago; but as the famous Stoke Newington ass woman [that is, ass-driver] dares me to fight her for 10 pounds, I do assure her I will not fail meeting her for the said sum, and doubt not that the blows which I shall present her with will be more difficult for her to digest than any she ever gave her asses.

— London Daily Post, 7 October 1728 —

money when she toddled the half-mile length of Pall Mall in twenty-three minutes, seven minutes faster than required.

When sportsmen turned their attention from humans to horses, times measured to the minute were not good enough. In 1731, stopwatches were used to time winners to the second. The “sport of kings” was modernized in other ways as well. In 1750 gentlemen meeting informally at Richard Tattersall’s tavern began to think of themselves as the Jockey Club. They set about rationalizing England’s horse races. In 1769 the first racing calendar appeared. A little more than a decade later, the English had established a series of annual events that are still high points of the sporting season: the St. Leger (1778), the Oaks (1779), and the Derby at Epsom (1780). A few years later, in an effort to rationalize breeding, the first stud book was published (1791). During the Renaissance, English sports were likely to imitate French sports, but now it was upper-class anglophile Frenchmen who established Le Jockey-Club (1833) and inaugurated thoroughbred races like the Derby at Chantilly (1836).

Pugilism. Illegal but nonetheless cherished as a convincing manifestation of John Bull’s envied virility, pugilism flourished in eighteenth-century London. *The True Protestant Mercury* for 12 January 1681 reported a bout between a butcher and a footman in service to the duke of Albemarle, but it was not until after 1743, when Jack Broughton’s rules were published, that London newspapers paid serious attention to “the manly art” (and not until 1822 that *Bell’s Life*

in London began its run as the world's first sports weekly—with pugilism as a feature). Visitors from the continent expressed amazement that noblemen stripped to the waist and avenged insults with their fists instead of with their swords, and the British responded with scorn for the effeminate foreigners who relied on metal instead of mettle. Champion boxers like Broughton in the 1740s and Daniel Mendoza in the 1790s were patronized by the aristocracy, lionized by the masses, and immortalized by Thomas Rowlandson and other artists. In 1810 Tom Cribb became something of a national hero when he defeated Tom Molineaux, an African American challenger. That pugilists were shunned by the respectable middle classes mattered little to the “fancy.”

Throughout the eighteenth century lower-class women flocked to ringside to see the fights at popular venues like James Figg's Amphitheatre, which opened in 1743. Women were relatively rare *in* the ring, but Uffenbach encountered a rowdy female spectator who claimed that she herself “had fought another female in this play without stays and in nothing but a shift.”

Golf and cricket. At the other end of the social scale, golf was played by Scottish royalty as early as the sixteenth century. (Queen Mary was a noted enthusiast.) The game began to assume its modern form after the founding of the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews in 1754. The Royal Musselburgh Golf Club offered prizes to female golfers in 1810, but it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that a significant number of women took to the links.

Although the game of cricket can be traced with certainty as far back as the sixteenth century—when John Derrick of Guildford recalled that “he and diverse of his fellowes [at school] did runne and play there at creckett”—cricket, too, attained its modern form in the mid-eighteenth century. The first complete set of rules was published in 1744, a year after Broughton's rules brought a modicum of order to the prize ring. Cricket's first recorded gate money, collected at the Finsbury Artillery Ground, also dates from 1744. In 1787 Thomas Lord and a number of other enthusiasts formed the Marylebone Cricket Club, the game's most authoritative institution.

Cricket was popular among eighteenth-century Englishmen of every social class. The game was played on country estates, where the squire bowled and his tenants batted, and on village greens, where parsons bowled to peasants. Cricket was also popular at the public schools to which noblemen and wealthy merchants sent their sons. The women's game has never been as widely played as the men's, but its history is nearly as long. On 14 July 1743 the *London General Advertiser* referred to a tournament at the Finsbury Artillery Ground to which women's teams from several Sussex villages were invited. Two years later, in Surrey, eleven maids from Bramley, with blue ribbons in their hair, succumbed to the superior play of eleven red-ribboned maids from Hambleton.

By the end of the nineteenth century, cricket was everywhere perceived as the archetypal English game. For many Englishmen, spring meant not the resurrection of Jesus Christ but the return to action of the game's greatest player, William Gilbert Grace. He was probably the century's most famous (and richest) amateur athlete. Between 1870 and 1910, benefit matches and reimbursements for expenses brought him approximately 120,000 pounds.

Cricket was played in colonial Virginia as early as 1710, but eighteenth-century Europeans resisted imports from the British Isles. From Abruzzi in the south of Italy to the Polish forest of Bialowieza, hunting was the favored pastime of the aristocracy (and draconian game laws were passed in an attempt to preserve their monopoly). The length and breadth of Europe, every region had its own distinctive way to wrestle and to play folk football. Ubiquitous also was some form of bowling—*boule* in France, *Kegeln* in Germany, *trou-madame* in Flanders.

Traditional sport. Just as cricket came gradually to be perceived as characteristically English, the bullfight—the *corrida de toros*—was thought to represent the Spanish soul. The eighteenth-century matador was not yet a national icon, but a number of men

(and a handful of women) won a modicum of fame with cape and *spada*. Germans were known for their passion for shooting clubs; every town from Königsberg in the east to Freiburg in the west had at least one *Schützenverein* where burghers gathered to shoot, drink the local beer, and play a game of cards. The winter scenes painted by Henrik Averkamp document Dutch hibernal enthusiasm for ice skating, sledding, and playing *kolf* (the ancestor of golf). At the other end of the continent, Russian peasants played *gorodki*, a game in which wooden balls were thrown at small wooden figures.

None of these traditional sports has entirely disappeared, and there are now several European organizations devoted to their preservation, but all of them, even bullfighting, have been supplanted in popularity by modern sports invented, for the most part, in Great Britain or the United States.

MODERN TIMES: INVENTION AND DIFFUSION

From the eighteenth century until the middle of the twentieth, Great Britain's role in the development and diffusion of modern sports was more important than that of any other nation. Even the French, who can claim credit for the Tour de France (1903) and its many imitations, acknowledge that the British led the way to modern sports. Although basketball (1891) and volleyball (1895) were American inventions, it was not until after World War II that the United States finally supplanted Great Britain as the primary agents in the invention and diffusion of modern sports.

Through most of the nineteenth century rowing, which is now perceived as a relatively minor sport, attracted huge crowds of spectators. There were boat races at Eton as early as 1793, but the modern version of the sport received its strongest impetus on 10 June 1829 when students from Oxford and Cambridge competed against one another on the Thames. The Henley Regatta began ten years later. In 1845 its course was fixed at 4 miles, 374 yards—the distance from Putney Bridge to Chiswick Bridge. The rationalization of the sport can be dated from 1828 when Anthony Brown of Ouseburn-on-Tyne designed a pair of iron outriggers to increase the oarsman's leverage. In 1865 Robert Chambers, champion of the Tyne, used a sliding seat when he rowed against Harry Kelley, champion of the Thames. By the 1870s the clumsy boats of the previous century had been lightened and streamlined to the point where they were useless for any purpose other than racing.

In 1879 the Henley Regatta promulgated an amateur rule that revealed its purpose in the crassest terms. The definition of an amateur excluded not only anyone who rowed for money but also anyone who had ever been employed in manual labor of any sort whatsoever. The *Times* of London approved: "The outsiders, artisans, mechanics, and such like troublesome persons can have no place found for them [in amateur sports]" (26 April 1880). Four years later, the upper-middle-class oarsmen who founded the Amateur Rowing Association (1882) adopted a similar set of exclusionary rules designed to restrict the sport to men (and women) of the leisure class. Although challenged by other national organizations with more egalitarian principles, the leaders of the Amateur Rowing Association insisted that the lower orders had no sense of fair play.

On the continent, the Germans were the first to show real enthusiasm for amateur rowing. In 1836 six years after Britons resident in Hamburg had formed a rowing club, German merchants founded the Hamburger Ruderclub. They held their first regatta on the Alster in 1844. The Deutscher Ruderverband (German Rowing Federation) was born at Cologne in 1883. Emulation of the English included adoption of the amateur rule and the fairly unproblematical acceptance of female rowers. Berlin's women formed their first rowing club in 1901.

In 1869 four intrepid women competed in a bicycle race from Paris to Rouen. In the 1880s and 1890s, millions more took to the road on chain-driven safety bicycles, which had front and rear wheels of the same size (unlike the dangerous penny-farthing model with a huge front wheel). Unescorted (and uncorseted) female cyclists became a symbol of women's emancipation.

Women were also among the first players of lawn tennis. Apart from the fact that both games require the players to propel a ball across a net by means of a strung racket, modern lawn tennis has very little in common with royal or court tennis, an indoor game popular among Renaissance aristocrats. Credit for the invention of lawn tennis can be given to Major Walter Wingfield, who received a patent for his portable hourglass-shaped court on 23 February 1874. A mere three years later the All-England Croquet Club of Wimbledon staged its first tennis tournament (men only). Spencer Gore won. Seven years later, Maud Watson defeated her sister Lilian to become the first women's champion.

In 1877 Britons in Paris began to play tennis at Le Decimal-Club. In the 1880s the game became immensely popular in Bad Homburg, in Deauville, and in other venues frequented by the European leisure

class. In the 1920s the French displaced the British as the leading players. Between 1924 and 1929, Jean Borotra, René Lacoste, and Henri Cochet dominated the men's game as Suzanne Lenglen did the women's. Lenglen, famed for exotic attire and flamboyant behavior as well as for athletic skill, was the first sports-woman to become an international celebrity.

Lawn tennis began as an upper-class sport and has never quite lost the aura of exclusivity. Runners, on the other hand, have had their social ups and downs. Early in the nineteenth century, runners like the famed Robert Barclay Allardice ran or walked incredible distances to win equally incredible sums of money, but the presence of gamblers and the circuslike atmosphere of pedestrianism probably inhibited rather than encouraged the evolution of modern track-and-field sports. It was not until 1864 that Oxford met Cambridge in "athletics" (the preferred British term for track-and-field sports), a full generation after the collegiate rowers met at Henley. The collegiate runners, jumpers, and throwers shared the amateur status and the social prestige of the rowers. The Mincing Lane Athletic Club (1863), which became the London AC (1866), and the Amateur Athletic Association (1880) were both dominated by graduates of the two great universities.

Continental Europeans certainly did not need anyone to teach them how to run and jump, but British influence determined which of a thousand different kinds of athletic contests became standard. This can be seen quite clearly in the units of measurement.

For decades, runners who lived in an otherwise metric world ran 100-yard dashes and set records for the mile. Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympic Games (1896), was French and Sigfrid Edström, the force behind the creation of the International Amateur Athletic Federation (1913), was Swedish, but the track-and-field disciplines sanctioned by the International Olympic Committee and by the IAAF were based—with the exception of the discus and the javelin—on British custom.

Soccer football. The stamp of British culture can be seen even more clearly in soccer football. The first set of rules for soccer, which is by far the most widely played of the many games derived from folk football, was devised by fourteen English collegians in 1848 on the basis of the various rules for a number of different games played at Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Winchester, and several other public schools. The first football club was founded in Sheffield in 1855 by graduates of Sheffield Collegiate School. The Old Harrovians, who established their club in 1860, were obviously another group with public-school ties. The name "soccer" (from "association") derives from the fact that the sport was nationally organized by the Football Association (FA) founded in London on 26 October 1863, a day that must rank as the most important in the modern history of the game. The FA became the model for the national organization of innumerable other sports throughout Europe and beyond.



THE FOUR-MINUTE MILE

My body had long since exhausted all its energy, but it went on running just the same. . . . With five yards to go the tape seemed almost to recede. Would I ever reach it?

Those last few seconds seemed never-ending. The faint line of the finishing tape stood ahead as a haven of peace, after the struggle. . . . I leapt at the tape like a man taking his last spring to save himself from the chasm that threatens to engulf him.

My effort was over and I collapsed almost unconscious, with an arm on either side of me. It was only then that real pain overtook me. I felt like an exploded flash-light with no will to live. . . . It was as if all my limbs were caught in an ever-tightening vice. I knew that I had done it before I even heard the time. . . . The stop-watches held the answer. The announcement came—“Result of the one mile . . . time, 3 minutes”—the rest lost in the roar of excitement. I grabbed [Christopher] Brasher and [Christopher] Chataway, and together we scampered round the track in a burst of spontaneous joy. We had done it—the three of us!

— Roger Bannister on the 3:59.4 mile run on 6 May 1954. *The Four Minute Mile* (New York, 1955), pp. 214–215. —

The “old boys” wanted to keep the game for themselves, but soccer was quickly diffused downward through the social strata. Aston Villa Football Club and the Bolton Wanderers, both founded in 1874, were typical of the many clubs that recruited their first members from the congregations of churches and chapels. Within a few years other clubs destined to figure grandly in the annals of English sports were organized by the employees of industrial enterprises. Manchester United, for instance, was begun by a group of railroad workers and Coventry City had its start as a club for the workers at Singer’s bicycle factory. In most cases the initiative came from the workers; it was not until the twentieth century that companies like Rowntree’s (chocolates) and Peugeot (automobiles) began to sponsor sports clubs.

Soccer spread rapidly. Birmingham had its first club in 1874; six years later it had 155. Delighted by the game’s popularity, the FA in 1872 inaugurated an

annual tournament, the Football Association Cup. The day of the cup final quickly became for working-class Britons the equivalent of Derby Day at Epsom for the nation’s ruling class. When a team of Lancashire workmen—Blackburn Olympic Football Club—defeated the Old Etonians in the cup final of 1883, it was clear that soccer was destined to become “the people’s game.”

By the late nineteenth century, there was an economic basis for soccer’s working-class popularity. The second half of the nineteenth century saw a significant rise in real wages. The Factory Act (1850) and subsequent legislation shortened Saturday hours for industrial workers. There was more time and more money for soccer and other forms of amusement and recreation. In time, workers elsewhere demanded and received similar relief from the onerous conditions of early industrialization.

The creation of Britain’s railroad network made it possible for teams to play distant opponents, but games away from home raised financial problems for clubs with working-class players. The Football Association agreed that clubs might reimburse needy players for their travel expenses, but believers in amateurism drew the line at payments for “broken-time” (time lost from work). In 1888, however, the FA’s middle-class directors reluctantly accepted the establishment of openly professional teams. The strongest teams of the Football League came from the Midlands or the north of England, the country’s most industrialized areas. By the early twentieth century, the connection between “the people’s game” and the British working class was so strong that the football grounds of England and Scotland were said to host “the Labour Party at prayer.” The religious metaphor was applied to the increasingly capacious stadia erected in the early twentieth century; they were dubbed “modernity’s cathedrals.”

The first continental football club seems to have been established by British schoolboys at Geneva’s La Châtelaine school in 1869, but the first game was played in 1863 at the Maison de Melle near Ghent. The ball and the rules were introduced by an Irish pupil, Cyril Bernard Morrogh. Boys with British connections were among the principal diffusers of the game. Eighteen-year-old Konrad Koch, who learned the game at Rugby, brought soccer to Braunschweig’s Gymnasium Martino-Katharineum in 1874. Fourteen-year-old Pim Mulier, who had also studied at an English boarding school, formed the Haarlemsche Football Club (1879). Although Britons resident in Le Havre had played soccer as early as 1872, the game’s takeoff can be dated from 1888, when boys from l’École Monge returned from a visit to Eton.

The date of soccer's arrival, soon or late, depended on the strength or weakness of commercial ties with Britain and on an area's geographical distance from the British Isles. Edoardo Bosio, a businessman in the industrial city of Turin, is considered to be the father of Italian football. Returning from an 1887 visit to England, he recruited a team from the employees of his firm. In 1893 British engineers working in Spain introduced the game in Bilbao. The following year British engineers working in Russia brought soccer to the employees of the Morozov textile mill. Hungarians did not play their first game until 1896, when Charles Löwenrosen, a schoolboy whose parents had migrated to England, returned to Budapest for a visit. That year, Scots employed in Sweden organized a team in Göteborg.

Between 1889 and 1901, Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary all established national football federations (in that order). Between 1924 and 1932, openly professional leagues began to operate in Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Spain, and France. The French were relatively slow because soccer had to vie for popularity with rugby, especially in southwest France. When the Fédération Française de Football (1919) finally accepted professional soccer, in 1932, many of the sport's star players were recruited from eastern Europe. The belated establishment of Ger-

many's Bundesliga (1963) can be explained by a nationalistic commitment to *Turnen* (German-style gymnastics) and by the Nazi regime's abolition of professional soccer.

Modern skiers pay homage to the Norwegians as well as to the English. Races on skis certainly pre-date recorded history, but the oldest known organized ski competition occurred among Norwegian soldiers in 1767 and the famed Holmenkollen ski jump can be traced back to 1879. Cross-country skiing became popular throughout northern Europe in the 1890s, after the Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen published a dramatic account of his 1888 trek across Greenland. In 1901 Norwegian and Swedish skiers met in Stockholm for the first Nordic Games. The evolution of downhill skiing owes more to the English than to the Scandinavians. Arnold Lunn, an Englishman living in Mürren, Switzerland, invented the slalom on 6 January 1922 and promoted downhill skiing at the famed Kandahar Ski Club, which he founded in 1924. That same winter, the first Winter Olympics were celebrated at Chamonix in France. The skiers' *Wunderjahr* also saw the foundation of the Fédération Internationale de Ski, in which Lunn played a major role.

While the French lagged far behind the British in the invention and diffusion of modern sports, they were unquestionably the leaders when it came to the

creation of international sports organizations. One reason for the French lead in this matter was the British assumption that *their* national federations were all that modern sports needed in the way of bureaucratic organization. When the French formed the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in 1904, the Football Association initially hesitated to join. The FA joined but then dropped its membership in FIFA in 1920 to protest the readmission of Germany. The British rejoined in 1924 and withdrew again in 1928 to protest what the FA saw as FIFA's violations of strict amateurism. The FA's quarrels with FIFA meant that the English boycotted the first three World Cup competitions sponsored by FIFA. When the European Cup was begun in 1955, the FA refused to allow Chelsea, the English champion, to enter the competition.

RESISTANCE TO MODERNITY

Devotees of traditional games, such as Basque pelota and Swiss *Hornuss*, have spurned the appeals of modern sports. In 1884 Thomas Croke condemned the Irish penchant for cricket and tennis and defended "hurling, football kicking according to the Irish rules, 'casting,' leaping various ways, wrestling, handy-grips," and other Hibernian sports. That year Michael Cusack and Maurice Davin founded the Gaelic Athletic Association, which counted Charles Stewart Parnell among its patriotic sponsors. The most vigorous and sustained resistance to modernity, however, was mounted by the German gymnastics movement.

German gymnastics had its immediate origins in the innovative forms of physical education devised in the late eighteenth century by schoolmasters such as Johann Friedrich GutsMuths. Putting into practice some of the thoughts articulated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in *Émile* (1762), German pedagogues allowed their pupils an unprecedented freedom to do sports, but—they were, after all, German—they carefully measured and recorded the children's athletic achievements. A generation later, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn transformed the program for health and hygiene into a nationalistic political movement. Inspired by Johann Gottfried von Herder and Ernst Moritz Arndt, Jahn replaced the Greek term *Gymnastik* with a suitably German word of his own invention: *Turnen*. The essence of *Turnen* was the combination of noncompetitive physical exercises and patriotic sentiment. The *Turnplatz* that Jahn built for his pupils on the outskirts of Berlin in the spring of 1811 soon began to attract students from the university. Students and other young middle-class men formed *Turnvereine*

(gymnastics clubs) and within a few years, the *Turnbewegung* (gymnastics movement) had spread throughout Germany, inspiring such nationalistic fervor that thousands of gymnasts volunteered to fight against the Napoleonic army that then occupied most of their fatherland.

Jahn was an anti-Semitic xenophobe, but most of his followers were liberals and many played an important role in the failed revolution of 1848, after which thousands of them emigrated to the United States and Latin America. Those who remained became increasingly conservative. After the formation of the Reich in 1871, the members of the Deutsche Turnerschaft (1868) proclaimed themselves to be Kaiser Wilhelm's most loyal subjects.

Adolf Spiess and other German educators transformed Jahn's gymnastic exercises, which had included running, jumping, vaulting, tumbling, climbing, and swinging from ropes, into a series of formalized, rationalized, repetitive drills. Physical-education classes, where rows and columns of children moved in synchronized response to barked commands, became a means for the authorities to inculcate the virtues of discipline and unquestioning obedience.

Working-class gymnasts who found the chauvinism and authoritarianism of the *Turner* movement unpalatable formed the Arbeiter Turnerbund (Workers' Gymnastics Union) in 1893. The ATB had close ties to Germany's socialist party. Similar organizations, with similar links to socialism, were established throughout western Europe. By 1920, when these organizations joined to create the Socialist Workers Sports International, all of them had accepted modern sports (played, they proclaimed, with fraternal goodwill). In the 1920s and 1930s, the SWSI sponsored a series of highly successful Workers' Olympics. It is noteworthy, however, that nearly 90 percent of the SWSI's membership of 1.3 million came from German-speaking areas.

Early in the nineteenth century, Scandinavian educators like Per Henryk Ling created an alternative gymnastic tradition which they maintained was more scientific (and less xenophobic) than *Turnen*. In 1814 he established his Central Institute in Stockholm as a place to train proponents of his system. Although they were rivals, the *Turner* and the Lingians both saw themselves as proponents of an alternative to modern sports.

In opposition to competition and the "egoistic" individualism of sports, the *Turner* dedicated themselves to the creation of a *Volksgemeinschaft* (national community). The instrumental rationality of sports was judged to be no better than "Taylorism" (a reference to the American efficiency expert Frederick W.

Taylor). The quantification characteristic of modern sports enticed athletes to quest for records and this, too, was an occasion for ire. Writing in 1897, Ferdinand Schmidt condemned “records made possible by one-sided . . . preparation aimed exclusively at lowering times by fractions of a second or lengthening distances by a centimeter.” Soccer football was described as a barbaric pastime whose most characteristic physical motion resembled *der Hundstritt* (kicking the dog). When Pierre de Coubertin invited German athletes to compete in the Olympic Games of 1896, the Deutsche Turnerschaft ordered its members to decline the invitation. The strength of the DT can be seen in the numbers. In 1910 it had over a million members while the Deutscher Fussballbund (German Soccer Federation) had a mere 82,000.

From the 1860s to the outbreak of World War I, German gymnastics flourished throughout eastern Europe as a vehicle for nationalism and as an alternative to modern sports. In Prague, in February 1862, two middle-class Czechs, Jindrich Fügner and Miroslav Tyrš, founded the first Sokol (“Falcon”) club. By

the end of the century, the movement had won the fealty of the Czech working class. By 1914 the Prague “nest,” which had begun with seventy-three members, had 128,000 “falcons,” one of whom, Tomáš Masaryk, became president of Czechoslovakia when liberation from Austrian rule was finally achieved in the aftermath of the war.

By the turn of the century, the Slovenes of Ljubljana, the Croats of Zagreb, the Serbs of Belgrade, and the Bosnians of Sarajevo had all founded Sokol clubs that combined gymnastic exercises with a fervent demand for independence from Austrian rule. On the whole, Slavic gymnasts were less likely than the *Turner* to fight tooth and nail against modern sports, but Budapest’s first athletic club, founded in 1875 by Miksa Esterházy, split apart in a bitter quarrel over the two modes of physical culture.

In the long run, the gymnasts lost their struggle against modern sports. By the 1930s Hungary was known more for its soccer players than for its gymnasts and Germany’s *Turner* had to admit that they were far outnumbered by enthusiasts for football and

other British imports. Gymnasts were, of course, included in the Olympic Games, but by the 1940s the quantified individual contests of modern gymnastics bore little resemblance to the activities promoted by Jahn.

Gymnastics was not the only alternative to modern sports. During the early 1920s, there was a movement within the Soviet Union to create a socialist alternative to modern sports, which were seen by many as the product of “bourgeois” capitalism. This drive for some kind of noncompetitive physical education appropriate to “proletarian culture” more or less ended in 1925, when A. A. Zigmund was removed from his post at Moscow’s State Institute of Physical Culture (and subsequently executed). Three years later, the USSR staged the first of its Spartakiads. These quadrennial competitions, whose preliminary rounds were meant to involve the entire able-bodied adult population of the Soviet Union, were originally conceived as a socialist response to the “bourgeois” challenge of the Olympic Games, but they continued even after the USSR decided to participate in the international system of “bourgeois” sports.

TRANSFORMATIONS

The early history of modern sports is closely linked to the history of private sports clubs because most European sports participants—unlike their counterparts in the United States—were (and still are) club members. Europeans who yearn to participate in sports join clubs, which form the basis of national sports federations that are joined together in international sports federations, most of which are recognized by the International Olympic Committee. In 1921, when Alice Milliat, a member of the Parisian club *Fémina Sport*, decided that the IOC had done too little to promote women’s sports, she used her position as president of the *Fédération des Sociétés Féminines Sportives de France* to organize the *Fédération Sportive Féminine Internationale*. A year later the FSFI sponsored the first of its quadrennial Women’s Olympics.

Nineteenth-century liberalism was the ideology behind the IOC, the FSFI, and other nongovernmental sports organizations. Sports are thought to be a matter of individual choice free from interference by the state. In 1920s and 1930s, communist and fascist dictatorships rejected this liberal-democratic ideology and replaced the existing networks of independent sports organizations with a rigid system of centralized state control.

In the Soviet Union, in line with Marxist principles, local branches of national sports clubs were cre-

ated at the workplace. Railway workers, for instance, were expected to join *Lokomotiv* while members of the secret police competed for *Dynamo*. Bureaucratic structures changed frequently, but the system established in 1936 was typical. An All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport Affairs, attached to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, was charged with the administration of Soviet sports. One of its first actions was to establish a soccer league.

The system created by Italy’s Fascist regime was quite similar except that the state-run organizations established were differentiated by the age of their members rather than by the nature of their work. Adults, for instance, were expected to enroll in the *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro* (The National After-Work Association). During most of the Fascist era, administration of the sports system was entrusted either to the National Olympic Committee or to the Ministry of Education.

When Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, the leaders of many of Germany’s sports federations welcomed Nazi rule. (Edmund Neuendorff, head of the *Deutsche Turnerschaft* was particularly enthusiastic.) Despite their many avowals of fealty and allegiance, the leaders of the various sports federations were ousted and the entire system was reorganized and placed under the rigid control of *Reichssportführer* Hans von Tschammer und Osten. In addition to reorganizing the existing sports federations, the regime included sports programs in its organizations for children (the Hitler Youth and the League of German Maidens) and for workers (Strength through Health).

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, liberal-democratic governments remained relatively indifferent to the success or failure of their athletes in international competition, but fascist regimes instrumentalized sports as a means of demonstrating national revitalization and to symbolize ideological superiority. Benito Mussolini, who was often depicted as an athlete, made sports an instrument of foreign policy. Large sums of money were invested in training elite athletes. Fascist Italy came in second to the United States at the 1932 Olympics in Los Angeles; the Italian soccer team won the 1934 World Cup and the 1936 Olympic gold medal; in 1938, Gino Bartali won the Tour de France.

Nazi Germany was even more successful, hosting and winning the 1936 Olympics. The “Nazi Olympics,” brilliantly documented in Leni Riefenstahl’s film, *Olympia*, were such an organizational triumph that Pierre de Coubertin marveled at their “Hitlerian efficiency.” The prestige acquired by such triumphs was the lure that enticed the Soviet Union to join the Olympic movement in 1952.

SPORTS

Motivated by eugenics as well as by the desire for national prestige, Italy's Fascists brushed aside the objections of the Roman Catholic Church and extended the benefits and pleasures of sports to female as well as to male youth. Similarly, the Nazi regime was willing to compromise its belief that women should devote

themselves to *Kinder, Küche, Kirche* (children, the kitchen, and church.) Sports were seen after 1933 as a prerequisite if women were to bear healthy sons. In addition, Olympic gold medals won by outstanding female athletes like Gisela Mauermayer, in the discus, enhanced the myth of Aryan superiority.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, the sports policies of Europe's liberal democracies began in some respects to resemble those of the totalitarian powers. In one form or another, a ministry of sport was established. The number of medals won (or not won) at the Olympics became a vital matter of national prestige and, therefore, of governmental concern. Elite athletes were subsidized, training centers were constructed, coaches were hired, institutes for the scientific study of sports were founded.

Concerned about fitness and health as well as world-class achievement, governments also invested in facilities designed to promote Sport for All. Western European critics complained, often with justice, that the funds spent on elite athletes were disproportionately large. Ironically, however, the disproportion was far greater in the communist societies of eastern Europe, where the rhetoric of equality masked enormous investments in the production of a tiny cohort of world champions. While athletes from the German Democratic Republic trounced those from the United States (with a population roughly sixteen times as large as the GDR's), the recreational needs of ordinary citizens were neglected.

SPECTATORSHIP AND THE MASS MEDIA

Throughout European history, from antiquity to the present, sports spectators have tended to boisterous behavior and acts of violence. Disasters like that which occurred at Brussels' Heysel Stadium in 1985, when English hooligans supporting Liverpool attacked Italian fans of Turin's Juventus club, seem minor when compared to the catastrophe that occurred in 532 when thirty thousand people perished in one of Constantinople's sports-related riots. Renaissance tournaments were grand occasions for pomp and pageantry, but they too were liable to disruption by what Henry Goldwel in 1581 called "the too forward unruliness of many disordered people."

Between the 1890s and the 1950s, crowd disorders like those characteristic of nineteenth-century soccer matches became less frequent as working-class sports fans internalized middle-class notions of proper decorum. Although the average crowd for the Football Association's Cup Finals in the decade before World War I was 79,300, there were very few disturbances of any magnitude. In the 1920s and 1930s even larger crowds displayed remarkable self-restraint. In the 1960s, however, a segment of young working-class male fans began to use soccer pitches as a site where they were able to indulge in "aggro" (aggression) and act out their alienation from British society. In the

1980s the Germans and Dutch became almost as notorious as the British. The 1990s brought a kind of convergence in spectator behavior in which working-class soccer fans became somewhat less disorderly while upper-middle-class tennis and cricket spectators became more boisterous and verbally aggressive. Whether or not the decline in football hooliganism can be attributed to governmental countermeasures, such as the drastic increase in the extent and the celerity of police intervention, is uncertain.

In any event, Italian rather than British fans may have established the pattern for the future. In regional rivalries like those between wealthy Milan and impoverished Naples, Italian *tifosi* ("those infected with typhoid") have created a relatively non-violent secular carnival in which physically nonviolent supporters vie in chanting comic insults and displaying colorful (and frequently obscene) banners and placards.

The sports fans who paint their faces orange for Holland or parade about in kilts to demonstrate their Scottish loyalties perform as much for the television cameras as for the morale of the players. The evolution of the mass media has drastically altered the world of sports. Sports journalism, which began in the eighteenth century with periodicals like *The Sporting Magazine* (1792), now offers thousands of specialized publications. The *London Morning Herald* introduced a regular sports page in 1817 and conventional newspapers now devote some 15 percent of their space to sports coverage, but they cannot sate the demand for statistics and trivia. Sports dailies like the *Gazzetto dello Sport* (Milano) and *L'Équipe* (Paris) sell millions of copies. Moscow's *Sovetsky Sport* and *Futbol* (and a host of similar journals published in Warsaw, Budapest, and other capitals of the now-defunct Warsaw Pact) were replaced by an active sports press driven by economic rather than ideological motives.

Radio sportscasting began in the 1920s. German radio broadcast coverage of the Münster Regatta in 1925. In 1927, when Britons owned some two million radios, the British Broadcasting Corporation covered the Oxford-Cambridge boat race, the Grand National Steeplechase, Wimbledon, and the Football Association's Cup Final. Radio reinforced the public perception of these fixtures as annual celebrations of nationhood. In 1929 French fans were able to follow the Tour de France on radio.

The boom in televised sports did not occur until the 1950s, but the Olympic Games of 1936 were televised in twenty-seven television locales scattered throughout Berlin and the BBC carried the 1938 Cup Final. Eurovision began in 1954. Forty-five stations in eight countries telecast the 1954 World Cup. Sat-

elite transmission, which began in the 1960s, eventually transformed the Olympic Games and the World Cup into spectacles witnessed “live” by more than a billion viewers. The spread of cable television in the 1980s and 1990s intensified the competition among media magnates like Rupert Murdoch, Silvio Berlusconi, and Bernard Tapie to control the transmission of sports throughout Europe.

By the 1990s competition for the right to telecast sports events had completely transformed European sports. In 1980 television provided French soccer teams with 1 percent of their income; in 1990, the figure was 23 percent. While a handful of successful soccer clubs focus on international matches and vie for huge sums of television-generated money, thousands of smaller clubs have been deserted by fans who prefer to watch Real Madrid or Bayern München on television rather than support the local team.

Lucrative television contracts have also contributed to the Europeanization of European sports in the sense that teams like Olympique Marseilles can win a national title by acquiring stars from less wealthy foreign clubs. The collapse of communism was followed by a mass westward migration of soccer players. In 1990, for instance, seventeen of the twenty-two players on the Czech national team departed for greener fields. The process of Europeanization was accelerated in December 1995 when the European Court ruled that professional athletes like Belgium’s Jean-Luc Bosman were workers who had a right to unrestricted movement within the European Union.

Europeanization is, in fact, too narrow a term to describe the social changes in sports. Most sports sociologists now speak of “globalization.” Easy access to telecasts of the United States’ National Basketball Association games contributed to basketball’s unprecedented popularity in Europe. By the early 1990s, for instance, Michael Jordan of the Chicago Bulls was a hero to Roman boys (and girls) and basketball was Italy’s second most popular spectator sport. Britain’s Channel 4 began to telecast National Football League games in 1982. One reason that American sports appeared on European television in the late 1990s is that the American Broadcasting Company owned a major share of Canal Plus (UK), Sport Kanal (Germany), TV Sport (France), and Sportnet (Netherlands).

Globalization has had other effects. Americans now play in Italy’s thirty-two-team professional basketball league and American gridiron football has

made gains even in the homeland of soccer and rugby. A thirty-eight-team British American Football League was created in 1985. Six years later, the NFL launched a World Football League with teams in Barcelona, Frankfurt, London, and seven North American cities.

Another result of globalization has been a change in the racial mix of European sports. Initially, the appearance of black athletes on European teams incited outbursts of racist rhetoric. In 1987, when Jamaican-born John Barnes became Liverpool FC’s first black player, fans from nearby Everton taunted their rivals with cries of “Niggerpool, niggerpool!” Although athletes of African descent are no longer an oddity on European teams, including those sent to the Olympic Games, an undercurrent of racism continues to flow. Many observers of the 1998 World Cup saw the victorious French team as a symbol of French multiculturalism, but it is certainly too early to celebrate the demise of racism.

POSTMODERN SPORTS?

Although modern sports like soccer have attracted unprecedented numbers of participants and spectators, many young Europeans prefer what the French refer to as *les sports californiens*. Tourists traversing the square between Cologne’s cathedral and its Römisch-Germanisches Museum are imperiled by teenage Germans on skateboards. Austrian skiers have to share Alpine slopes with snowboarders and windsurfers have flocked to Baltic beaches. If hang gliders have not yet been spotted in the vicinity of Mount Olympus, they can probably be expected early in the twenty-first century.

What all these sports have in common is that they rely on new technologies, attract young people of both sexes, offer an element of risk, and resist formal organization in clubs and national and international federations. Will these sports continue to symbolize “the postmodern pastiche” or will they eventually, like others before them, become “modern”? Will they remain largely informal activities practiced in a natural or an urban landscape or will they be rationalized to the point where they too have elaborate rules and regulations, specialized venues, bureaucratic organizations, world championships, and a plethora of quantified records? To both questions, history suggests the latter alternative.

See also other articles in this section.

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HOLIDAYS AND PUBLIC RITUALS



Scott Hughes Myerly and Tamara L. Hunt

Rituals are easy to recognize. Some are performed alone or by a private group, such as family and friends or members of social clubs. These rituals include meditation and prayer; rites of passage, such as baptisms, weddings, and funerals; or club initiations and commemorations. But public rituals, such as royal coronations, protest demonstrations, the Olympics' opening ceremonies, or mass rallies, are meant to be seen by everyone, and as such they are essentially a form of theater. Just what social and cultural purposes or functions do public rituals have? For more than one hundred years scholars have disagreed about defining ritual, what it is, and what it does.

THEORIES AND DEFINITIONS

Ritual first became a scholarly issue in the nineteenth-century debate over the origins of religion. William Robertson Smith (1846–1894) believed that preancient religions consisted of beliefs (dogma) and ritual (practices) and that, of the two, ritual developed first. He thought religion cemented community bonds and that ritual was actually a way of venerating the social order through worship of divine representations that the community had itself collectively created. Similarly Jane Ellen Harrison (1850–1928) argued that primitive humans reenact whatever moves them spiritually and that ritual magically dramatizes everyday life. For her ritual was the origin of drama, and theater emerged as a secular variation of ritual. The sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) believed that reality is divided between two domains, the sacred (religion) and the profane (everything else). Religious practices, or rites, were rules of correct conduct in the presence of symbolic sacred objects, and conversely, negative rites were observances commonly viewed as taboo.

Somewhat later Arnold van Gennep (1873–1957) characterized ritual as a means of coping with crises and critical life transitions, such as birth, death, puberty, or marriage. All of these, as well as special

days, such as New Year's Day or Easter, he termed "rites of passage." The pioneer psychologist Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) also believed that ritual is a powerful yet subconscious factor shaping social behavior. His analysis of human behavior stresses the central role of repressed, forbidden sexual desires and suggests that ritual has hidden functions and larger social purposes of which its participants are normally unaware. Religious ritual helps people cope with distressing inner conflicts of which they are not conscious, so they can continue to function in society. Thus early scholars viewed ritual as forging social bonds that unified communities through shared practices and beliefs.

Functionalism and other models. Influenced by these debates, the anthropologists A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) combined insights from sociology, theology, and theater to advocate "functionalism," in which ritual is viewed as a social mechanism that stabilizes and regulates societies' interactions. They agreed with their predecessors that ritual essentially maintains the bonds of community. However, they preferred anthropological fieldwork as a means to garner solid data about ritual rather than earlier approaches that relied heavily on conjecture and inference.

But functionalism's drawback is that it views societies as static and unchanging, and in the tumultuous post–World War II era scholars looked for a model of ritual that would account for the social changes they were witnessing. Many had difficulty accepting the functionalist model that seemed to overlook or downplay the importance of individuals and dissidents. For example, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz agreed that rituals were part of "cultural performances" that shaped the "spiritual consciousness of a people," but he disagreed with earlier scholars, such as Malinowski and Durkheim, who argued that rituals symbolized underlying shared values in society. Geertz pointed out that their approach inherently favors those aspects of ritual that promote harmony over



RITUAL AND THE SYMBOLIC BODY

A fundamental shift in European ritual emphasis occurred with the transformation from medieval to modern society. Earlier ritual concentrated on emotional fulfillment and on the sensual, the gratification of the emotions associated with the symbolic “lower body” (that is, the physical and emotional side) in Catholic ritual and in the sensual release of carnival. However, during the Reformation, Protestantism led the way in emphasizing the symbolic “upper body” (that is, the intellectual and rational side), as intellect, self-regulation, and restraint were stressed and the churches tried to repress carnival. Strict rules and rationality became the focus of mentality, and a new personality type emerged that was emotionally repressed and disciplined. Individuals internalized the external coercive regulations of the church and the state. In the twentieth century the symbolic lower body experienced a renewal in ritual, as people sought greater gratification and spiritual fulfillment. This trend generated greater interest in ritualized public entertainment events, such as celebrations, festivals, televised religious services, and mass spectator sports, usually managed by professional promoters and image consultants. Emotionally satisfying versions of Christianity, including the evangelical and charismatic movements, accented a personal relationship with its supreme deity. The quest also led many Christians toward Buddhism, Islam, and the renewal of the neopagan religion of Wicca, which revered the female deities, mainly symbolized by Nature or Mother Earth, of pre-ancient European societies.

those that suggest conflict. He further argued that functionalism could not be used to explain social change since it emphasizes stability and group consensus. Geertz developed a model that could be used by anthropologists and social historians to understand the role of cultural-religious drama in social change, arguing that three forces are at work in ritual: (1) “social structure,” or the framework and context in which ritual takes place; (2) “culture,” or the fabric of meaning within which humans interpret their experience; and (3) “personality systems” of participants, or the personal motivational patterns with which participants approach the ritual. An alteration in any one of

these is a harbinger of social change, even if the other elements remain the same.

Social and cultural historians were also attracted by the model proposed by Victor Turner, one of Geertz’s contemporaries. Turner’s model explained ritual as an element in social change that takes place within a conflict-resolution setting he called the “social drama.” According to Turner, these dramas occur within a group that shares a similar history and social values, and they begin when a dissident individual or group makes a deliberate breach with the norm to challenge authority. Tension rises as other individuals choose sides, and the resulting division reveals the fragility of the existing social consensus. At this point, according to Turner, leaders of the dissident group step in to keep the crisis from spreading uncontrollably, and their intervention may take the form of public rituals, such as parades or ceremonies, that symbolically promote a resolution of the conflict through castigation of a scapegoat or praise of an individual or idea honored by both sides. Once the crisis is defused, a reintegration of the disaffected occurs, but only after social changes have been adopted as a part of the new status quo.

Both of these models emphasize the importance of the actions of individuals or groups in ritual as a part of social change, but for some social historians these concepts did not go far enough. Despite their critiques of earlier scholars, both Geertz and Turner implicitly advocated the notion that a dominant ideology exists in society and is shared by its vast majority. Those who dissent will ultimately be reincorporated into the mainstream through “cultural performances” or “social dramas.” But this seemed to ignore the power relationships often revealed in the rituals adopted by oppressed or dissident groups, and many social historians of the 1960s and 1970s turned to the ideas of Karl Marx (1818–1883), who interpreted ritual as expressing the relations of economic power. He argued that ritual operated to maintain elites in power to the disadvantage of working people. Most rituals, especially those of church and state, thus help delude people with nonrational, mystical charismatic flimflam designed to aid the powerful at the expense of the masses by instilling values and notions within the latter that keep them passive and compliant to the politico-economic system while being abused by its very operations.

Eric Hobsbawm was perhaps the most notable of the historians who took this view of public holiday and ritual, arguing that such manipulation was at the heart of both colonial and nationalistic ceremonies and holidays in the late nineteenth century. He posited that the emergence of mass society encouraged

the development of powerful political forces that demanded more democracy, while the traditional elite and other conservatives resisted such demands. Thus European regimes faced conflicting political, economic, and social claims that had to be placated, but they also had to maintain and promote the state's power. One way to achieve these goals was through the creation of national holidays that used symbols and allegories to promote unity of the people under the supremacy of the state.

Still other historians portrayed ritual as a means by which otherwise voiceless Europeans in marginal groups were able to express and empower themselves, albeit in a limited and brief manner. As E. P. Thompson demonstrated in his study of English charivari (shivaree), or public shaming processions, public rituals often have different and frequently inconsistent layers of meaning. Throughout the early modern period and into the early nineteenth century in France, the British Isles, Scandinavia, Hungary, Portugal, Italy, and elsewhere, traditional community standards, especially in regard to marriage, were expressed and enforced through charivari, targeting anyone who dared to violate local values. This traditional ritual especially targeted adulterers, those who abused or neglected their spouses, or outsiders who married local wealthy widows. Villagers who staged charivaris sometimes dressed up in fantastic costumes at night and "serenaded" offenders by banging on pots and making obnoxious noises. These were not just adolescent pranks but often included sober, respectable people. They had no legal sanction, and similar dress-up and noisemaking activities sometimes were used to challenge injustice by the authorities. In this way the collective values of ordinary people were demonstrated by proving that the law is not always sovereign and that perceived wrongs the law did not address could be successfully opposed through group action when the majority so desired.

Specific groups could also be empowered by ritualized public behavior. Robert Darnton's examination of the "great cat massacre" in eighteenth-century France shows that apprentices used public ritual to protest their working conditions and to ridicule the existing legal and social system by staging mock trials of cats belonging to their bourgeois employers to express discontent. Yet not all groups that used ritual to their advantage were disaffected. Leonore Davidoff has shown that middle- and upper-class women in Victorian England used the rituals surrounding the "rites of passage"—birth, coming of age, marriage, and death—as well as those governing social interactions to enforce the clear distinctions between the classes. These social rituals were an effective barrier

that limited the entry of individuals and families into the higher social circles that enjoyed exclusive access to greater economic, political, and marriage opportunities. Ignorance of these rituals of "proper" behavior often resulted in social disaster and disgrace.

Refining the definitions. Social history's approach to the study of ritual and public holidays emphasizes the role of individuals, dissidents, and subcultures in such ceremonies, and it highlights the view that ritual is not only used by the powerful to regulate the masses but also can empower and unify for the disaffected and those excluded from power. While many scholars contributed to a larger understanding of ritual, subsequent work followed along the lines of the basic approaches described above, combining, developing, and refining them in various ways and prompting in more complicated debates.

One factor is that rituals are often ambiguous or their meanings change over time while retaining the same outward ceremonial forms. It is most significant that few languages have a single word that equates to "ritual" in English. This is partly because rituals are laden with symbols and trappings whose various meanings are not clear. For example, a piece of cloth—a nation's flag—can symbolize pride or oppression, depending on one's perspective and identity, and it can thus simultaneously symbolize both unity and exclusion. But symbolic ritual is also powerfully appealing because it functions as a shorthand version of reality, a quick, easy means to identify and categorize life's endless complexities.

Ritual's intricate, multifaceted meanings render a complete and thorough definition most difficult. When approaching this subject, each person's understanding highlights priorities and perspectives that reflect their economic interests and social status and thus their fundamental assumptions about the nature of the social order. Ritual can thus become an intellectual labyrinth in which analysis actually leads away from a comprehensive definition. Nevertheless, ritual may be broadly defined as any scripted (often rigidly) program of stylized performance that seeks to render appealing and often compelling those values and beliefs that it overtly represents or that constitute its underlying theme, and it normally marks some sort of transition, such as commemorations, institutional transitions, or a change in status, age, or occupation for individuals. Rituals are thus a medium of communication and are usually aimed at reaffirming values and beliefs or, within their context of meanings, addressing and solving some problem, such as absolving someone of his or her sins (ritual purification). In either case rituals benefit the interests of their spon-

sors, who are oftentimes associated with an institution or institutionalized beliefs that are deemed true and even sovereign by a majority associated with that society or subculture. Ritual is emblematic of power relationships, even when they express sharply conflicting values and beliefs.

Rituals have particular psychological and emotional effects on the participants, both performers and observers, by evoking, consciously or subconsciously, an underlying cultural story or theme that is more complex or deep-seated than the performance itself. Ritual is often rendered more venerable through formality or more potent as a form of mockery through comedy. It is frequently sanctioned through tradition by invoking the past, especially when its staging is periodically or regularly repeated, and it thus appears to be normal, natural, and authoritative. Ritual can also mediate between tradition and change to ease transitions into the unknown.

Rituals may be brief, as with a formal greeting, or may last for days, marking a symbolically meaningful occasion. They may require distinctive or unique locations, such as a church or other symbolic

place, and special trappings, such as costumes, particular objects used in the show, and accompanying sounds (aside from spoken words), such as music, singing, chanting, or poetry. Frequently an essential aspect is that a suitably theatrical atmosphere be created from all these elements to evoke the proper setting, akin to the special effects of the lights, sounds, and sets in video productions. An occult magic ritual, such as a *séance*, performed in bright sunshine amid crowds dressed in swimsuits at the beach with a background of pop music seems incongruous.

Ritual is akin to routine and custom, but it normally has a substantially more profound wealth of meaning and emotional content than either routine or custom. It is akin to theater or drama but in an abridged form. Like commercial theater it can be entertaining and even riveting, but it can also exert a control over conduct and belief that is both obvious and subtle. Because ritual defines how something can be expressed, it controls what can be expressed and promotes acquiescence to its fundamental meanings while eliminating alternative perspectives. In a discussion someone may challenge specific ideas or values,

but that person is far less likely to question a ritual formula. Anyone who mars a ritual performance seems rude or ignorant.

Nevertheless, a ritual must seem appropriate to its audience, which ultimately decides by acceptance or rejection if it will take the performance seriously. When the majority of participants or spectators either ignore or mock a ritual, the result is worse than a failure, since it shows a loss of prestige and authority for those who stage it. Thus a delicate balance often exists between manipulation and integration, between those sponsoring a ritual and its wider audience. The elements that constitute a ritual at any given time can represent a consensus of the cultural opinion and mentality of its voluntary participants, although rituals staged by dominant elites may be contrary to the wishes of the majority.

RITUAL IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE

Public rituals exist in all societies, and in Europe they long predate written records. In the Middle Ages ritual was extremely important for religion, which was itself fundamental to each community's sense of unity. But scholars disagree about whether rituals functioned primarily to buttress feudalism's power hierarchy or to cement community bonds. By the sixteenth century Roman Catholic Christianity and Eastern Orthodox Christianity were the primary European faiths. Islam in southeastern Europe, Judaism, and the remnants of ancient, prehistoric Nature religions, are important exceptions. The rarity of literacy, even among the rich and powerful, was a decisive factor that encouraged a heavy emphasis on the dramatic, emotionally laden special effects of church ritual to sanctify religious belief. This was especially significant for the Catholic Church, with its quasi-monopoly as the dominant faith and as the wealthiest and most politically powerful state in Europe. Its rituals were usually staged in richly decorated churches, which served as awe-inspiring settings for these medieval rites.

The most important religious rituals for ordinary people were the sacraments. These had a specific criteria, combining matter, such as the "host," or the bread of the Eucharist, with verbal forms recited according to an exact Latin formula. Receivers of the sacraments must also have the correct intentions, which means to truly repent their sins, and in return they receive renewed grace. The seven sacraments, fixed in 1439, included infant baptism, communion (eating the host, or the wafer, which has mysteriously been transformed by the priest into the body of Christ), confirmation (attaining adult status), mar-

riage (not a sacrament in the early medieval period), penance (confession of sins), the ordination of priests, and extreme unction (essential last rites preparing the soul for death).

These rites punctuated the life cycles of believers, but time was marked in other ritual ways. The "holy day," from which derives the word "holiday," was of three sorts. The Easter cycle of feasts, "movable" because their lunar calendar basis gave them different dates from year to year, celebrated the crucifixion and ascension of Jesus Christ into heaven. The Christmas cycle of fixed feasts celebrated events in the life of Christ. Based on the solar calendar, it lasted from November to March. By 1500 hundreds of fixed saints' days were also noted. Each village or district had a local patron saint whom it particularly honored, but additional saints' days were also kept with a reduced emphasis.

Momentous holy days meant a rest from normal work routines, preparation of a special meal, and other distinctive activities, including a mass, festivities, and processions. Saints were ranked according to their overall importance. Among the most significant were Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, Anthony, Patrick, Olav, Anne, Paul, Joan, and Francis. Saints' days fell mainly during winter, when the agricultural work cycle was reduced.

Holy days often overlay special days observed long before Christianity existed, and they stressed the need to reaffirm the wisdom that was embedded in the collectively derived meanings of noteworthy events. They also marked the passage of the work year, which was vital for regulating the work rhythms of traditional agricultural societies. The closer Catholic rituals resembled the practices of beliefs already held, the easier it was for the church to encourage conversion, the leap of faith from one belief system to another. In such borrowings the trappings of ritual are important, since they are easily copied but always with the requirement that they be appropriate in the new role.

Easter began as rites marking the return of spring, Christmas was originally the winter solstice in Europe and later the birthdate of the Indo-Persian god Mithras, and St. John's Eve replaced Midsummer Day, the year's longest day. Such occasions were observed with bonfires or ritual bathing, fire and water symbolizing purification. In agricultural communities the planting season often began with a procession bearing the local saint's image followed by a blessing of the fields.

While holy days are ranked according to their importance, the observance of any form of special day or holiday is distinctive, and holidays exert subtle ef-

fects on belief and mentality. People subscribe to a holiday whose saint or other focus they might not even honor simply to enjoy a day of rest from the normal work routine. This enhances the symbolic importance of a holiday for all of a society, and its oftentimes multiple meanings obscure its promotion of an agenda.

But as a critique and modification of Catholicism, saints' days were largely eliminated in those countries that embraced Protestantism in the sixteenth century. Some traditional saints' days continued, however, evolving into more modern forms. In England, Saint George survived while other saints disappeared, partly because he was not actually associated with any particular place in that country. Apparently this symbol of one of Europe's earliest nationalisms was thus easier to elevate into a modern, national symbol.

Protestantism also stressed that each believer must read the Bible, a mandate aided by the invention

of the printing press, which made books cheaper. The former Catholic emphasis upon elaborate rites was modified by eliminating some rituals and simplifying others in a more austere approach to faith intended to restore early Christian practices. "Ritual" thus came to be used as an abusive term by Protestants, but only in the sense that their rites were fewer and less elaborate than Catholic ones, not that they rejected them entirely.

SECULAR RITUALS IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE

As religious ritual diminished in importance from the sixteenth century onward, secular rituals proliferated, a trend that illuminated major shifts in the centers of power and in group identity. Some rituals had social functions for certain elites, such as of table manners and related forms of courtly etiquette. The decline of

crude behavior among the medieval nobility was seen as virtuous by most, but it also instilled self-control and tamed the traditionally independent, elite warrior class. This aided the growth of royal state power and benefited the growing merchant class, whose interests frequently were allied with those of the monarchs, by turning the aristocracy away from seeking wealth through predatory violence to cultivating “courtly” behavior that would secure royal favor.

For centuries monarchs’ and noblemen’s courts had required a heavily ritualistic style of proceedings to sanctify and solemnize their weighty powers in the eyes of the masses they wished to dominate. Law courts came somewhat later, with similarly heavy responsibilities to settle serious conflicts. Judges and to a lesser extent lawyers wore special clothes that evoked dignity and wisdom—a practice that continued through the twentieth century. Judges constituted the central focus of the courtroom, seated above those who pleaded their cases.

By the seventeenth century more European monarchs held powerful sway over increasingly centralized states, and spectacular rituals underscored their greater power. These might dramatize important transitions in monarchs’ lives by celebrating or marking events such as coronations, marriages, funerals, birthdays, and the birth of an heir. Nobles were mere supporting players. Such state-sponsored display

reached its pinnacle in seventeenth-century absolutist regimes, in which monarchs held unprecedented power. The most vivid example was the French “Sun King,” Louis XIV, whose court was Europe’s most brilliant. He literally made his entire daily routine into an endless series of elaborate rituals, and to seek the royal favor, nobles vied with each other for such lofty honors as holding the king’s coat when he got dressed each morning. These rituals kept the aristocrats busy at the royal palace of Versailles, with their attentions safely focused on the ceremonial glories of Louis’s domestic life. The nobles were thus kept away from their provincial strongholds, where they might plot rebellion as their ancestors had done, and they came more to resemble trained poodles than men of the sword.

Despite this subordination to monarchs, the ritual of the duel symbolized continued noble pretensions to private feuding, an unofficial right to settle disputes among themselves outside the law with ritualized combat. Duels reaffirmed their claims to monopolize bravery and honor, while holding themselves aloof and apart from wealthy merchants who might try to imitate their betters.

But the growing power of merchants and cities was also marked by ritual, which emphasized the commercial methods of self-enrichment by celebrating urban prosperity, often in conjunction with local defense, trade guilds, transitions in urban government



THE MOCK MAYOR OF GARRAT

Over time people's attitudes toward holidays and festivals change, which challenges the historians who study rituals. A case in point is the mock mayoral elections of Garrat. An eighteenth-century burlesque pageant held in a hamlet south of London on the occasion of local or national elections, the event was originally a parody of English electoral politics that embraced many elements of carnival, including satirizing religious authority, electing a man of low standing as "mayor" to preside over the festivities, parodies of social customs, drinking, dancing, and other boisterous activities. John Brewer interpreted this seeming disorder as both a "safety valve" for defusing social tensions and a reinforcement of the existing social order by emphasizing its importance. He noted that gentry and aristocrats patronized the celebration and regularly attended it as spectators.

However, like Clifford Geertz, Brewer emphasized the importance of the way spectators and participants view public holidays. If either the plebeians or the patricians perceive it as something other than a licensed festival, the significance of the event is transformed, and this is what happened to the mock mayoral elections of Garrat. In 1763 the playwright Samuel Foote wrote and produced a comedy entitled *The Mayor of Garret* [sic], which turned the tables on the festival and savagely mocked plebeians who claimed to have political knowledge or power. Staged 167 times between 1763 and 1776, the play was enormously popular not only because of its quality but also because it provided a view of plebeian political action that London audiences found comforting in light of the ongoing popular discontent

surrounding John Wilkes, whose defiance of the government in the 1760s in the name of British liberty stirred volatile public conflict about the nature of power, citizenship, and civil rights.

While Foote depicted popular politics as ridiculous to his patrician audiences, thereby defusing its threat, he also suggested to political radicals that the real mock mayoral elections at Garrat could be rendered useful for their political agenda. Consequently, although the festival continued to use many of the same forms and rituals, it came to have disparate meanings to its various audiences. To radicals and working-class supporters the Garrat processions were a desirable allegory for political change, but for patricians they were a burlesque that portrayed the aspirations of plebeian politicians as ridiculous. Moreover, many local people continued to view the event simply as a festive occasion that provided an opportunity for revelry and free food and drink.

The mock mayor spectacle at Garrat disappeared in the 1790s, and Brewer speculated that the adoption of French revolutionary ideology by British artisans and workers made it impossible for the patrician sponsors to ridicule the danger of plebeian politics any longer. Radicals probably withdrew their support from the festival as well, as its reputation for riotous behavior was not in keeping with the emerging emphasis on plebeian education, self-restraint, and order. The changing political backdrop to the festival imbued it with new meanings, even while it kept much of the same outward show. Those meanings rather than the rituals themselves led to the demise of this popular holiday.

officials, and occasions when rulers made elaborate, symbolic entries into a city. The entertainment of such events was enhanced by exotic elements that celebrated trade. According to Johann Deitz, "militia revels" in late-seventeenth-century Lübeck, Germany, included characters costumed as "Indians, Moors, and Turks," thus emphasizing the city's exotic, far-flung trade connections and its prestige as an economic power.

Such ritualistic holiday celebrations were often significant sources of knowledge about a country's or a city's history for most commoners. They stressed

the venerable antiquity, whether real, exaggerated, or imagined, of the political establishment and portrayed its rule as both just and impossible to oppose. This was especially true when monarchs faced an uncertain succession. In England, as part of their coronation processions, both Elizabeth I and Charles II displayed painted arches or *tableaux vivant* (striking poses to form living pictures) that depicted their venerable heritage. Likewise, when states' armed forces (now state-paid armies and navies) won major victories in battle, celebrations and thanksgiving rituals encouraged subjects to feel that they had a vital stake in

the outcome, which promoted the emergence of nationalism.

But public rituals were not only shaped by the powerful; ordinary people also created and observed rituals that reflected their immediate concerns. For example, carnival was a traditional, popular event that included ritualized rebellion. It was strongest in southern Europe, but aspects also appeared in Scandinavia, Britain, and elsewhere. Held in cities, carnival was an interval of indulgence during the days preceding the penitence and fasting of Catholic Lent. Everyone participated in this “world turned upside down” festival, when the status quo was mocked. The poor in particular indulged in normally restricted pleasures. They ate richer food than usual, and sexual prohibitions were loosened. Revelers wore bizarre costumes, humiliated pompous people, and ridiculed the church and the state. They selected a “king” and “queen,” who symbolically reigned over this celebration of disorder and inversion. Conservative, rigid people often abhorred carnival as threatening the social order, and in times of severe economic stress—always most destructive for the poor—the festivities could develop into rebellion. Such ritualized ventings of hostility normally made the establishment more stable in the long run, yet the simple fact that the masses could take over the streets showed their latent power to seriously challenge the status quo.

RITUAL IN MODERN EUROPE

By the late eighteenth century ritual challenges to authority developed into more modern modes of political opposition, especially for those who expressed solidarity by resisting what they considered injustices. Proposing toasts and taking oaths at meetings were typical of western European ritual political expression in the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century. These were dramatic declarations of commitment, especially early on, when such activities were deemed as borderline treason. Related forms of political visual symbolism with significant ritual overtones were also especially important in this era. Symbolic dress and hairstyles publicly proclaimed political opinions. Militant radical signs, such as trousers; “round hats,” forerunners of modern brimmed hats; and short hair fundamentally changed the trend of European male fashion and opened a new era.

These fashions coincided with the French Revolution of the late 1780s, which heralded the eventual transformation of old regime Europe. Festivals with processions became a major means of asserting political legitimacy, and both counterrevolutionaries and

revolutionaries sponsored them to promote their respective agendas. Revolutionary rituals emphasized the idealized notions of “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” and participation by all classes reduced social barriers and promoted a sense of solidarity. These rituals borrowed their forms from the old saints’ days, and other Catholic ritual practices were likewise adapted because people were used to them. Maximilien Robespierre’s *Fête de l’Unité* (festival of unity) borrowed heavily from church rituals to commemorate the monarchy’s fall, including baptizing the ground in the name of liberty. Mona Ozouf, one of the foremost scholars of French revolutionary festivals, argued that these rituals involved a “transfer of sacrality” (Ozouf, 1988, p. 267) from the church to the revolution, which claimed to embody a more righteous ideology than either the corrupt church or the decadent monarchy. As a part of this transfer, the revolutionaries set about changing societal elements related to religion, including the marking of time. They introduced a calendar with ten days per week, new names for the months, and renumbered years, starting with the year one in 1792 to show that history had begun anew. Yet old ways of thinking persisted, and Napoleon scrapped this calendar in 1806.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY NATIONALISM AND PUBLIC RITUAL

As the festivals of the French Revolution suggest, politicized public holidays were one means by which new political regimes attempted to assert their legitimacy. During the nineteenth century this became a standard tool of governments that sought to promote unity through nationalistic fervor. Yet these ceremonies had to be managed in such a way that only the state’s message was promoted, leaving no room for political opponents to turn the occasion to their own purposes. This was a constant concern during the reign of Napoleon III. For example, in 1849, early in his presidency, he banned celebrations in Lille commemorating the beginning of the revolution of 1848, which ultimately had brought him to power, due to worker unrest and criticism of the government. In addition he criminalized singing the revolutionary song, the “Marseillaise,” even though Louis Napoleon’s electoral campaign had courted people’s identification of him with the first French Revolution.

The potential for dissidents to use French history to justify their opposition to government was so great that Napoleon III and later the Third Republic avoided holidays connected with France’s revolutionary past. The notable exception was Bastille Day,

which was made a formal holiday in 1880. Although this festival ran the risk of giving workers, socialists, and other dissidents a public platform, the emphasis on state pomp and popular holiday defused the event's inherent radicalism. As in virtually every other European state, French celebrations became larger and more grandiose throughout the nineteenth century, reminding their audiences of the grandeur of the nation and the power of the state. Thus nationalistic holidays functioned on a number of different levels, as entertainment, as a unifying force, and as a threat.

The newly unified German state faced similar problems in creating a national identity, given the disparate religions, histories, and interests of Germans scattered across central and eastern Europe. Because war was central to the forging of modern Germany, many of the new state ceremonies introduced after 1871 commemorated battles and events connected with the Franco-Prussian War. The kaiser also became a focus of national unity, and as in other monarchical states, such as Britain, the royal birthday was a national holiday, celebrated with elaborate state and military pomp.

The enthusiasm people exhibited at such celebrations highlights the close similarity between the awe and veneration people feel for religion and what they feel for the modern state as a sacred entity—as a secular religion. This development was due to changing conditions. Industrialization and urbanization eroded the ancient supporting and sustaining bonds of family, extended family, and community. Powerful institutions and states displayed in appealing ways appear as safe and even fascinating havens of power and strength to those who feel insecure. The sense of unity and belonging that a state or political party offers may provide such a feeling, for which allegiance is an intrinsic aspect.

Yet leaders tend to use state power to their own best advantage. They serve those interests within the polity that wield the most political influence, often while treating individual citizens high-handedly or with brutality, directly in proportion to a person's wealth. States vary widely in the degree to which ordinary people are protected from government abuse, but the more oppressive the government, the greater its need to convince the public that it actually serves them. Ritual and related trappings can work as a form of advertising by partially masking oppression, and they manufacture consent and popular approval by overwhelming and obliterating all negative impressions to the maximum extent. Mass communications elevated ancient techniques of political flimflam to a sophisticated level as images and sounds began broad-

casting daily into hundreds of millions of homes throughout the world.

One tactic for achieving a public goal is to enhance the scale, duration, and quantity of ritual to impress and overawe the public with charismatic, entertaining ceremonies. This is not done solely to encourage people to feel that the state is the only true protector that always serves their best interests. Its purpose is to convince the public that it is vital and essential to their very existence, and without the state they would perish or be enslaved by malevolent enemies. Not everyone is persuaded by such means, but if the senses and emotions are manipulated skillfully enough, a high percentage of the public will be influenced, swayed, or convinced by these shows. Ritual can be a critical factor in modern politics, for an oppressive state can continue to hold power only when it enjoys the support of enough people, of a "critical mass" of the population, which may be only a minority.

Yet states were not the only entities that created new holidays in the nineteenth century. Politicized religious groups, such as the Protestant Orange Order in Ireland, regularly used parades and ceremonials to symbolically assert their domination over Catholics by marching through their neighborhoods. Those parades often commemorated seventeenth-century Protestant military victories over Catholics and provoked unrest or riots. On a larger scale socialists were responsible for the founding of an international May Day holiday when the Socialist International of 1889 called for a one-day strike on 1 May 1890 to press for an eight-hour workday. Although they specifically denied that this was a worker's holiday or celebration, socialist leaders did not take into account the appeal to the rank and file of the long-standing, widespread folk celebrations traditionally associated with May Day. While the political content of the event survived in the slogans, banners, speeches, and the abstention from work, May Day celebrations became popular family holidays for workers, replete with parades, parties, and goodwill.

Nevertheless, May Day's appeal to workers as an expression of symbolic unity was great, so much so that in 1917 the Russian revolutionaries adopted the Western calendar so they would celebrate May Day on the same day as the rest of the world. But to appeal to a broader public, the Bolsheviks also adapted traditional rituals drawn primarily from the Russian Orthodox Church. Leon Trotsky believed that rational appeals to the masses were not sufficient to emotionally attach their loyalty to the state. Therefore church saints became the model for revolutionary martyrs, and the icon, so culturally significant in the

Orthodox Church, reemerged in a new form. On the death of Vladimir Lenin, his preserved body was put on public display in a mausoleum-monument, and this shrine was visited by millions of pilgrims. Joseph Stalin's portrait was later displayed everywhere to keep him in the public eye, compensating for his dislike of public appearances.

RITUAL AND FASCISM

The foregoing examples illustrate a prominent feature of ritual: in dramatic changes of a regime or faith, familiar figures are often retained in a modified form or with new meanings because people prefer what they know and mistrust change. Among the most vivid examples of state ceremony as quasi-religious ritual are those of the German Nazis, who never won a national election but built a powerful regime that delicately balanced coercion and consensus. Their rituals and to a lesser extent those of similar fascist parties in Italy, Spain, Finland, and elsewhere promoted various messages of national, racial, and ethnic unity and superiority. The Nazis were particularly adept at this game. Their rituals borrowed heavily from Christianity, refurbished with new symbols and ideologies and starring Adolf Hitler as a protective, wise, powerful father figure.

The Nazis probably staged more sensational rituals than any other twentieth-century European state. They were on a grander scale with longer parades, some over four hours, and extremely eye-catching uniforms. The Nürenberg nighttime rallies were staged with a breathtaking theatricality. These elaborate, colorful, dramatically torchlit displays included enormous masses of participants, a backdrop of monumental civic buildings, hundreds of swastika banners, and sensational lighting effects, and they were filmed to reach a wider public. No detail was overlooked in instilling the desired sensations of unity and unquestioned loyalty within the participants and audience while advertising the Nazi virtues of mass unity, bravery, and aggression. The emotions were further reinforced by omnipresent trappings, such as the formation of uniformed, regimented organizations; the use of birds of prey, especially eagles, on badges and other symbols; and the frequent, ornamental display of weaponry, including some that were traditionally venerable but obsolete, such as swords and daggers.

Nazi displays emphasized an irrational, emotional, and mystical content to conceal fundamental social, political, and economic conflicts between the rich (wealthy businesspeople who backed Hitler's rise to power) and ordinary Germans. The emphasis on powerful emotional impressions also was intended to



SPORTS AND RITUAL

Pleasure and entertainment became increasingly vital aspects of modern European life, and sports were noteworthy for ritual. Traditional peasant games in western Europe involved rites of local significance, displaying honor, pride, and solidarity among village men. With ever-expanding urbanization and wealth, these games acquired an institutional emphasis on obedience to regulations, such as rigid boundaries, precise measurements, and codified rules strictly enforced by officials. A greater degree of hierarchy, specialist players, team captains, coaches, winners and losers, and the idolizing of elites harmonized with and reflected integral values of industrial capitalism, and victory was analogous to the almost sacred goal of profits in business.

The largest supposedly nonprofit sports event, the International Olympic Games, emerged in Athens, Greece, in 1896, and its ritual aspects continually proliferated. Victory award ceremonies were enhanced, and gold medals were first awarded in 1904. The parade of nations was introduced at the opening ceremonies of the 1912 games in Stockholm, Sweden, and the five interlocking rings logo appeared in 1920 along with the first "Olympic oath."

In 1936 Adolf Hitler further enhanced Olympic ceremonies, using the games to promote Nazism at home and German prestige abroad. With no ancient nor modern precedent, the Olympic Torch run was added, a dramatic event with runners dressed as ancient Greeks bearing the torch from Athens to Berlin, and concluding with an attractive, blond German runner followed by six black-clad runners who lit the Olympic flame brazier. The winter games likewise included torchlight ski runs, which like

similar rites recalled a glorious, pagan Germanic past that the Nazis freely invented as a racist and nationalist self-promotion. All this advertised the idea that the Nazis were capable, respectable, tolerant (black athletes were allowed to compete), and peace-loving, and widespread media coverage made the Olympics more popular than ever. Subsequent games included more events and ceremonies and larger expenditures as corporate sponsors competed for profits through the idealized games.

Twentieth-century sports included strong ritual elements, especially in the spectator sports that were outlets for national or local pride, such as football (soccer) or rugby. Singing team songs or national anthems before or during the match was a standard feature of organized sports, and victories in national or international championships prompted parades and organized celebrations. Other ritual trappings included team colors, flags, and pennants that reinforced identification with the team and allowed people from different social and economic backgrounds, even those living in cities or countries other than where the team was based, to feel a sense of unity by rooting for a team. Widely diverse events, such as rock concerts, cult film events, and New Year's Eve celebrations shared similar elements. Some corporations adopted some of the ritual of sports, organizing "teams" of workers, dressing them in special uniforms, and staging "competitions" to achieve greater profits.

Sports rituals, like all other rituals, play a variety of roles in society. Sports provide entertainment, forge a feeling of unity and belonging among the participants, and embody cultural values and social ideologies dominant in society.

obscure the fact that they offered no genuinely comprehensive explanatory narrative or "myth." Germans increasingly were expected to believe in Nazi symbols as such, though they lacked a deeper content beyond vague, shallow simplicities. Perhaps at no other time in human history were so many expected to accept an ideology founded on a purely symbolic and impressionistic content with little actual substance. One ideologue wrote: "Flag! Führer! Volk [folk]! Eternal Germany! Who can interpret their meaning? . . . We sense

it, and therefore we believe it and trust in the word of our fellow believers" (Taylor, 1981, p. 518).

The scripting and staging of the Nazi shows functioned, like many rituals, as a psychological conditioning by carefully excluding any other perspective or viewpoint. In this appeal to religious emotions, human existence was simplified into an eternal struggle between good and evil, somewhat analogous to that between the Christian deity and devil. The swastika flag replaced the Christian cross as a holy symbol, and

words like “holy,” “sacred,” and “eternal” were endlessly repeated.

These shows were designed to satisfy, reassure, entertain, and make people feel good about a regime that destroyed both individual rights and anyone who dared to question orders. Ritual offered a sense of belonging and security to people who felt alone, weak, or lost, especially after the twenty years of World War I, its harsh peace settlement, and the worst inflation followed by the most destructive economic depression in German history. As with revolutionary France and Russia, traditional holidays were pressed into Nazi state service, including those associated with the harvest and labor, Mother’s Day, Easter, and Christmas, which were recast as “authentic” German folk traditions.

MILITARY RITUAL

Nazi ritual constantly celebrated war, strength, and aggression and was saturated with militarism. But martial ritual is notable in virtually every modern state. Military life is an intensely ritualized modern subculture. It is rooted in the absolute necessity to effectively coordinate and command masses of young men, whose duty is to fight and risk death when many would rather be anywhere else than on a battlefield. Military ritual developed as a technique of control in battle, especially through military drill, but also from the simple need to efficiently move large numbers of men from one place to another.

Military daily routines are punctuated with ongoing rituals, such as changing the guard and inspections. Rules ritualize a host of ordinary, mundane activities, including the manner of addressing others and the body’s motions and movements. All this conditions soldiers, rendering them into efficient tools for enforcing the will of the state on its enemies, foreign and domestic. Compulsory participation in military ceremonies establishes esprit de corps, even when it is directly contrary to the soldiers’ own desires. As “whole” institutions that rigidly manage all aspects of the soldiers’ lives, armies can forge literally anyone into cannon fodder.

Ritual powerfully reinforces discipline, but it is a major component of a larger military management process, for which the psychological conditioning of strict rules, wearing uniforms, and drills are basic components. Military life exerts a particular form of mind control, in ways that are both subtle and obvious, over young men who as civilians never seriously considered killing anyone. The military ideals of power, honor, bravery, national defense, brotherhood, solidarity, self-sacrifice, harmony, and efficiency are communicated through virtually every aspect of martial display. “Our troops” exert a strong emotional appeal to civilians, who are often fascinated by this sublime vision. Martial ritual display has served as an idealized, inspirational model for the civilian world in a wide variety of organizational and personal contexts, where such values are deemed important, useful, or profitable.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY RITUALS AND HOLIDAYS

By the twentieth century, independence days, often with a military component, became a focus for nationalism, especially in those smaller countries long subservient to foreign rule. The phenomenon evolved in eastern Europe in the nineteenth century, starting with Greece. Later a host of new nations emerged, including Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, Albania, Finland, and the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. National independence days were celebrated with the solemn rituals of parades, speeches and wreath laying. Only Iceland, which received its independence from Denmark in 1944, did not fit the pattern of a ceremonial connection between the military and independence since it had no military institutions and it alone among European countries had not been involved in major warfare since the Middle Ages.

Holidays and rituals have played a vital role in building a national community in lands that had not existed previously as independent states and that included people from different linguistic, ethnic, or religious groups. In Germany after 1871 ceremonies frequently emphasized the defeat of France rather than praising any qualities of the new state or its people.

What happens to national holidays when the perceived threat from external enemies fades and unity is asserted through education, legislation, economic ties, or other social and cultural interactions? Nor-

way's national holiday, 17 May, while asserting local and national pride, became an occasion for family outings and pleasure. The other four holidays in May were revived saints' days. Since Norway was predominantly Lutheran, these spring holidays were not a return to Catholicism but additional days of spring-time leisure immediately following the end of the long, severe Norwegian winter. Norway boasted more legal holidays in May than any other country.

One holiday with a self-indulgent emphasis is Christmas, which declined as a Christian celebration and became an American-style occasion for consumers. Even Communist Russia generated a version of Santa Claus as a distributor of gifts. Easter was especially important in eastern and southern Europe. While these commercialized holidays were viewed increasingly as time off from work rather than religious celebrations, they maintained many traditional ritual elements attached to them in past centuries. Those examples reflect what social historians have discovered about earlier rituals and holidays. While the ceremonies appear unchanged over time, participants attach different meanings to them to serve other purposes or to meet new needs. Ritual in modern Europe became more secular than ever. Europeans considered themselves far more sophisticated than their medieval ancestors, but they continued to adopt rituals and modify them to meet the changing needs and desires of states, corporations, religions, and ordinary people. This form of communication and social bonding appeared no less fundamental to human expression than in the past.

See also other articles in this section.

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CONSUMER LEISURE



Charles Rearick

Until the beginning of the eighteenth century, Europeans did not conceive of a portion of their time as leisure; they had neither our modern concept nor the kind of experience it denotes. The word itself existed in English and French (*loisir*) in the medieval and the Renaissance eras, but it meant “opportunity” or “occasion.” Monks and nobles might appear leisured to a modern eye—they abstained from common labors and business—but they did not view their lives that way. For monks the absence of work meant time for contemplation and prayer. For nobles daily life was filled with honorable activities—hunting, fencing, and jousting, for example. Common people’s lives included some playful periods of festivity and rest scattered through the year, but their ordinary days lacked set times that were distinct from work. People routinely mixed singing, conversing, drinking, and rest into their workdays, varying the proportions of the mix according to their own inclinations at and the demands of their tasks.

RHYTHMS OF EARLY MODERN LIFE

For ordinary people especially, what we would call leisure was missing. When spring plowing and summer harvesting had to be done, peasants toiled to exhaustion with virtually no time left over. In other periods of the year, principally in winter, they experienced dead time, more than a hundred days of it; but still they worked, making tools and household goods. And they participated in fairs, festivals (mostly holy days) or saint’s day celebrations, and occasional pilgrimages (the only socially sanctioned travel for ordinary women). On feast days, common people engaged in the same kinds of collective play that they enjoyed whenever they found time for respite: various ball games, card games, and dancing. Those times of revelry took place at irregular intervals closely tied to nature and weather—the pattern not only for the farming population but also for miners, sailors, shipping workers, and many others.

Although people did not pay admission to participate in customary festivals and recreations, often they did spend some money—the beginnings of consumer leisure are visible as early as the blossoming of market economies in Renaissance Europe. On almost every festive occasion, people paid small sums to see entertainments offered by traveling showmen: acrobats and jugglers, dancing bears and learned pigs, puppets, magicians, ventriloquists, fire-eaters, dwarfs and giants, singers, dancers, and actors. During religious feast days and pilgrimages, celebrants found occasions for pleasure and purchases of wine, sweets, and images, for example, from peddlers and local shopkeepers. From the sixteenth century on, ordinary Europeans increasingly consumed recreation and entertainment along with goods, and commercial recreation occupied a growing place in the early modern economies and in daily life—particularly of urban dwellers.

The possibilities for consumption proliferated in each successive century. From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, more and more entrepreneurs ventured into business as theater and opera impresarios, booksellers, painting and print dealers, and proprietors of taverns and coffeehouses. Fundamentally, what the leisure merchants provided was pleasure, or at least the possibilities for fun, unburdened by moral or political ideals and purposes. Their establishments made powerful appeals to common desires and appetites—for drink, food, sex, sociability, dreams and illusions. In contrast to the traditional cycle of periodic festivities, the new establishments invited people to indulge and to enjoy themselves on a regular basis. They served up whatever the entrepreneurs thought pleased the audience—with little regard for discriminating dictates of good taste. The distinction between popular and high culture was not yet clear or firmly established. On the same London stage in the seventeenth century, spectators could find juggling and ballet, high tragedy and low comedy. Theatrical and fairground spectacles catered to all manner of dreams and fantasies; they merchandised the imaginary, giving customers a chance to see the marvelous

and the magical, to experience life in distant times and places, and to share in the joys and sorrows of bigger-than-life characters.

The core public for the emergent leisure was an urban population that did not have access to court and noble entertainments yet did have some disposable income; these were principally middle-class people at first, especially men, who had more opportunity to spend time and money in public places than did women. The working people of towns and villages were a large potential clientele whose participation was held back by a relative lack of time and money. Some entertainers and businessmen even in the early modern era, however, began to tap that potential. Street and fairground performers, such as the Italian *commedia dell'arte* players, lived off small coins collected from assembled commoners. To partake of coffeehouse or café life, customers had to pay only the price of a drink. Entry to pleasure gardens was often free. For poor people who were minimally literate, publishers offered small, cheap booklets—almanacs, devotional tracts, and entertaining tales—of miracles, spectacular crimes, and great deeds.

As the country with the most advanced market economy and largest urban population, England was a leader in developing consumer leisure from the sixteenth through the eighteenth century. Many societies on the continent approached England's level of commercialization only much later. As late as the nineteenth century, such eastern European countries as Poland and Russia were still predominantly agrarian and attached to traditional patterns of leisure. By then in western Europe, entertainments and pastimes that were once the preserve of the patrician elite had opened up to a more diverse public. The royal courts still served as patrons to theater and opera companies, musicians, and painters, but a paying public was also supporting performances outside the palaces and noble mansions. Commercial entertainment halls and theaters were in the forefront of an expanding public sphere, open to all those who could pay.

SOCIAL DISTINCTION AND CONFLICT

As customers bought admission to new entertainments and pastimes, they made choices about their own self-images. In their leisure activities more than in work time, people found opportunities to adopt and assert social identities that they themselves chose. To participate in the emergent consumer culture was to engage in a social performance. The well-to-do middle classes, for example, displayed their status and wealth publicly by sitting prominently in the best seats

in the theaters. They also enhanced their prestige by using their money to engage in leisure activities that were traditionally associated with established elites. And they did all that choosing and self-fashioning as individuals, now acting independently of community customs.

The pastimes and recreation preferences of Renaissance elites exercised a profound long-term influence on others in European society. Renaissance nobles in urban centers (Florence, Venice, and Mantua, for example) had conspicuously devoted much of their time to self-cultivation and the arts along with more basic enjoyments such as drinking and feasting. Their tastes marked certain recreations with the cachet of high status, which guided many marketers of leisure in subsequent centuries. Entrepreneurs grasping the dynamics of social emulation produced innumerable commercial imitations of the elite's pleasures. Merchants, for example, provided moneyed but common-born men and women with the opportunity to buy and collect art and expensive curiosities. Other businessmen created public pleasure gardens (Vauxhall in the mid-seventeenth century and Ranelagh in the eighteenth century) reminiscent of noble gardens. More fundamentally, the nobles served as models for middle-class people wanting to break away, at least part of the time, from the work ethic and the stigmas attached to pleasure seeking.

The middle strata of society also kept an eye on the pastimes of people below, and most often they disapproved of what they saw. Opponents of common people's recreations were numerous and powerful long before commercial offerings expanded. They had barely tolerated the excesses of popular festivals, during which participants threw over the normal rules and constraints. What too often ensued, critics charged, was unbridled indecency, sexual license, and blasphemy. Critics had also long condemned the drunkenness and brawling associated with taverns and alehouses. The expanding commercial establishments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries aroused the same alarms as those most pastimes had. Thus clergy and reforming middle-class leaders condemned new places of drink and recreation as dens of immorality and idleness and associated them with all manner of debauchery. In fact, they assailed everything popular in which they found coarseness and brutality—from blood sports to drunken unruliness. These moral spokesmen, enemies of popular culture, were champions of politeness, manners, refinement, and self-improvement. Some simply advocated work. The rising valuation of work, particularly among the middle classes, left leisure activities more suspect than ever. In the advanced commercial society of seventeenth- and

eighteenth-century England, Puritan spokesmen took the lead in the campaigns against play, fighting especially hard against all Sunday recreations, judged to be violations of the sanctity of the Sabbath. In Poland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where the Reformation had only a weak impact and where the

middle class was small, some Roman Catholic preachers and writers took a similar stand. They decried the large number of holidays (altogether about a third of the year) as openings to sin, while also attacking lords who forced peasants to work on holidays. For them, as for the Puritans, leisure was to be devoted primarily

to religious practices. Other objections to popular recreations came from educational advocates—especially those following classical and noble models of honorable or superior activities.

Despite such opposition, the supply of commercial recreations increased through the early modern era with only an occasional setback—like the one in Puritan England, for example, from 1642 to 1660. The theater became one of the most important entertainments for all levels of society. A flourishing commercial theater developed particularly early—in the sixteenth century—in Italy, Spain, and England. In Elizabethan England, for example, companies of actors that had long performed for noble patrons increasingly played in public venues for anyone willing to pay admission. Those early professionals, traveling from town to town, were men and boys, as women were not allowed to act in England (unlike Italy, Spain, and France); female roles were played by boys until the mid-seventeenth century. All across Europe the social status of the actor was low, as it was for vagabonds and others not fixed in the established social order. Actresses were placed on virtually the same level as prostitutes.

Playwrights and performers in England enjoyed greater political freedom than in France or Italy, but the London city fathers nonetheless maintained restrictions on the theater, allowing only a small number of plays to be performed and those only in certain places such as open-air inn yards. In the last decades of the sixteenth century, new theaters—notably, the Rose, the Swan, and the Globe—were built outside the city walls, thus escaping the control of the London councilors. Besides the relative freedom, other favorable conditions in England were the strong commercial economy and the large population of London (more than 160,000 inhabitants in 1600), many of whom were ready and willing to pay for professional drama. By 1600 the city boasted five theaters offering plays every day of the week and a dozen notable dramatists who were able to earn their living from playwriting. Professional playwrights such as William Shakespeare and Ben Jonson delved into distant history and literature for stories of political power struggles and family life, subjects untouched in the medieval mystery plays. The lines and plots they crafted were vigorous and rich yet entertaining to largely uneducated popular audiences. London's theater took on great importance for England's national identity and social life, and it exercised strong long-term influence abroad. In the late sixteenth century, for example, troupes of English actors traveled to Germany and introduced a new level of professional acting skill and stage effects, bringing new vitality to German theater.

Public performances took place on stages surrounded by audiences of socially diverse men and women—wealthy and poor, masters and servants, merchants, artisans, and apprentices. The show onstage was not the only one taking place. Spectators watched others in the audience and engaged in social performances, putting themselves on display and interacting with others—in prominent seats and in the foyers. The public space of the theater (as of other new leisure establishments) brought together a mix of people, strangers who responded to the actors on stage and to each other. And like commercial venues of all sorts, theaters served as a meeting ground for prostitutes and clients.

The plays themselves interest social historians not primarily as literary texts but as mirrors held up to society, reflecting not simply an author's views but also audience tastes and values as organized and filtered through a culture's systems of representation. The shows over time also registered changes in the social composition of audiences. In seventeenth-century France, for example, the classical theater of high tragedies and public formalities was tailored to aristocratic milieus. As the bourgeoisie grew and strengthened in the eighteenth century, domestic comedies became prominent, and critiques of the traditional order began to appear. The status of actors also changed. As theaters became a more accepted part of social life and organized on a more permanent and financially stable basis, actors, both men and women, gained better pay and respect—the beginnings of their ascent to the special prestigious status that some stars of the stage attained in the nineteenth century.

Church authorities attacked and opposed the theater for centuries, viewing it as a public source of immorality. Protestants, from English Puritans to German Pietists, were particularly hostile, and when they gained access to civil power, they were often effectively repressive. Civil authorities harbored their own fears of the stage with its enactments of deception and impersonation, satirical and subversive texts, and footloose performers, and governments restricted the theater in cities across Europe. In Old Regime Paris, only two companies of actors obtained the king's authorization to perform: the *Comédiens-Français* and the *Comédiens-Italiens*, forcing other theatrical companies to establish themselves outside the city limits. To be as close as possible to their urban patrons, numerous theaters were established outside the old city boundary on the boulevards extending west from the Bastille. At the same time, performers in fairground theaters were not allowed to speak, sing, or dance onstage, so they mimed, performed on tightropes, and presented marionettes and

big visual spectacles—to the delight of large popular audiences.

In the summertime, city people often preferred the outdoor diversions offered by pleasure gardens, suburban parks chock-full of commercial amusements. At London's Vauxhall (1660–1859) and Ranelagh (1742–1803), for example, patrons dined and drank and attended performances of songs, overtures, and concertos; they also watched juggling, dancing, and fireworks. Renovations of Vauxhall Gardens in 1732 turned the simple park into an elegant resort filled with buildings ranging from Gothic to Chinese, fountains, waterfalls, domed pavilions, statuary, concert platforms, tea shops, and restaurants. Access to all those attractions cost a modest one shilling in the eighteenth century, allowing the lowly to enter and mingle with the upper classes—servants and soldiers relaxing alongside rich merchants and the nobility. Similar pleasure gardens sprang up around continental cities. In nineteenth-century Vienna, the Prater (formerly a hunting preserve for the emperor) developed into a lively amusement park and exhibition ground for people from all over the capital.

NEW LEISURE INSTITUTIONS

An important new place of leisure in the seventeenth century was the coffeehouse or café, a relatively sedate alternative (despite the caffeine) to the traditional alehouse and tavern. Shops offering the new beverage spread from the Middle East to Europe early in the century, appearing, first in Italy and after mid-century in France, Germany, and England. They quickly became important centers of conversation, politics, business, journalism, and literature in the cities. In the early decades their patrons were mostly of the middle classes, men who were prosperous enough to afford the relatively costly drink and just beginning to develop social institutions of their own. Over coffee customers exchanged the latest information about business and politics. In the early eighteenth century, they also read newspapers that enterprising writers created for the coffeehouses, weekly and then daily papers reflecting the interests, critical moral tone, and literary tastes of the gentlemanly clientele. By making periodicals available, coffeehouses served as a special kind of public reading room, one where the private act of individual reading was accompanied by ongoing discussion of literature and politics.

By the early 1700s London's coffeehouses, now numbering over two thousand, became more socially segregated, as patrons congregated according to their occupational, cultural, and political interests. Some

regulars concentrated on business, bought and sold stock, and created new commercial ventures (Lloyd's of London insurance company was one). Other customers came together in pursuit of shared literary interests. Some of the social groups that coalesced there eventually moved away from the public premises to form private clubs—for men only. Also by the eighteenth century, coffeehouses and cafes were attracting consumers who were less well-off; some clients were drinking not coffee but alcoholic drinks that were sold on the same premises. Critics escalated their attacks, saying such places were the haunts of riffraff (rakes, robbers, and idlers) and dens of excessive smoking, arguing, and subversive politicking. Not long after the first café opened in Paris, Louis XIV ordered the police to monitor discussions there, and police reports confirmed the presence of malcontents discussing politics. In France and England of the eighteenth century, coffeehouses did become prime centers of political dissent. Parisian cafés in the last decades of the century were indeed places where revolutionaries gathered to discuss radical ideas and organize political action.

In England the heyday of coffeehouses stretched over more than a century—from 1652 to 1780. They then went into relative decline, while tea, imported by the British East India Company, became more plentiful and popular than coffee. Many coffeehouses converted or reconverted to taverns and alehouses.

In continental cities cafés served the middle classes and, increasingly, the working classes. They also became the haunts of the alienated and marginal—writers and artists, Bohemians of all sorts, and revolutionaries of many stripes. In the capitals they flourished as cultural and social havens for artists and intellectuals through the nineteenth century. In Berlin, where the first café opened in 1818, and in cities of the Habsburg Empire, critics of the conservative regimes met in coffeehouses to exchange ideas and give mutual support in the years leading to the revolutions of 1848. Through the rest of the century, the coffeehouses of Vienna, Berlin, and Paris were vital centers of sociability and discussion for the middle and upper classes who wanted to see and be seen in the most fashionable places of leisure.

But many cafés also drew the poor and working people whose lodgings lacked adequate heat and light. For workers the café was a precious semipublic space, outside the private space of the cramped, uncomfortable apartment but also away from the public openness of the street. Women and children were often habitués alongside men in Vienna, Paris, and other continental cities, and in the late nineteenth century the family café was commonplace. Parisian cafés, so famous as sites of sociability and conversation, also

harbored the lonely and the isolated—silent, sad, detached spectators, as we can see in paintings by Edgar Degas and Henri Toulouse-Lautrec. In the twentieth century that kind of customer was still in evidence, but many were no longer habitués. As housing for the working class improved, people tended to spend more of their free time at home, and the cafés steadily declined in number.

Consumer leisure grew most dramatically in Europe's biggest cities of the eighteenth century, London and Paris, where fashions were set for other places. There the ways of spending time and money proliferated. Many entertainments were now more formally organized than before and housed in facilities that required greater investment. Public billiard rooms, cafés, concert halls, assembly rooms, and theaters multiplied. The world's first permanent circus, installed in its own building, appeared in London in 1770, organizing in one big show an array of traditional acts—clowns, acrobats, and equestrian routines. Professional sporting events emerged as regular spectacles—boxing matches in London and horse races, for example. Gambling reached new heights of popularity—bets were placed on card games in men's clubs, on cock-fights, boxers, and horses. Shopping for fashionable

clothing, prints, and paintings occupied a growing place in the leisure of the well-off—shopping as entertainment, distinct from basic provisioning in neighborhood markets that even the poor frequented. Middle-class women in particular became shoppers in luxury boutiques, following a path blazed earlier by aristocratic males. Buying and reading novels, attending ballad operas, and viewing exhibitions of all sorts were new recreations for many. Crowds in search of curiosities paid to see collections of natural history specimens, paintings (public art museums did not yet exist), waxworks, menageries, various magic lanterns, peepshows, and shadow plays (*Schattenspiel*, Italian shows, and *ombres chinoises*), automaton figures, trained-flea circuses, and freak shows. The uneducated lower ranks and the most cultivated alike shared an insatiable curiosity and appetite for novelty—for wonder-inspiring displays of the unusual not yet cleanly categorized as magical or scientific, instructional or entertaining.

Spending on commercial amusements increased even though many free spectacles were still available—attending public hangings, for example, and looking at lunatics in insane asylums. Rising quantities of advertising raised consumer consciousness of

all the entertainment choices. From the seventeenth century on, guidebooks to the available bounty found a steady market among city visitors and natives alike. In late-eighteenth-century Paris, for example, an inexpensive, regularly updated *Almanach des Loisirs* provided information about places of pleasure, including their hours and prices.

THE RISE OF FREE TIME

In the eighteenth century factory owners seeking higher productivity adopted the practice of imposing precisely measured work hours on their employees, leaving small periods of the day and week (principally Sunday) to be called “free time.” That sense of leftover time is the core of the modern concept of leisure, defined in opposition to work and to the clocked hours spent working. English manufacturers took the lead in imposing steady work regulated by strict clock time—even before the invention of steam engines and the creation of steam-powered mills and factories. In the early stages of industrialization, the time that was free was scant indeed, but it was distinctly separate from work and workplace. Workers in the new industrial conditions were not members of long-established communities with time-honored celebrations. Hence they were open to new opportunities for ease and pleasure, but they had little disposable income or time.

In the process of imposing, a steadier rhythm on labor time, employers fought against leisure traditions that workers still practiced—taking off Monday (“Saint Monday”) after a Sunday of hard drinking, for example, and skipping work during parish holidays. Factory owners in the textile trades worked their employees—children as well as adults, at least until factory reform acts of the 1830s and 1840s—unremittingly twelve or more hours a day, Monday through Saturday. By 1834 the English manufacturers had succeeded in reducing the year’s legal holidays to four—down from eighteen in 1830 and forty-seven in the mid-eighteenth century. With the spread of industrialization across Europe through the rest of the century, the English pattern of long intense labor and little free time became an international model for factory workers. In late-nineteenth-century Russia, for example, the work schedule in factories was twelve hours or more, 308 days a year.

The new labor intensity and loss of autonomy seem to have had an impact that carried over even into the realm of leisure. Workers subject to the new industrial conditions showed preferences for recreations that allowed for a large measure of passivity

and a lack of solidarity. Industrial-era leisure became merely time for the most minimal and functional physical and psychological renewal so as again to meet the demands of work.

Workers and their unions agitated for shorter working hours—or more free time—and made gains in the second half of the nineteenth century. As workers gained that time, middle-class reformers—first in England—worked to establish “rational recreation,” meaning self-improving kinds of leisure, mostly noncommercial—brass bands and choral societies, for example, and especially the singing of religious music. Employers, whom some would characterize as philanthropic and others as paternalistic, often served as sponsors. From about 1830 to 1900 the reform forces succeeded in suppressing most animal blood sports (inexpensive commercial entertainment such as cockfighting, bear-baiting, and ratting), and municipal authorities in London (as in Paris and other cities) suppressed many urban fairs, now deemed too noisy and rowdy.

NEW COMMERCIAL LEISURE, 1850–1914

While some favorite amusements of long standing were being eliminated, entertainment overall mushroomed and became almost omnipresent in the fast-growing cities of the second half of the nineteenth century. A multitude of new cafés and restaurants, theaters, concert and music halls, opera houses, cabarets, wax museums, panoramas, skating rinks, and dance halls sprang up and flourished. Leisure-time shopping was raised to a new level by innovative emporia now known as department stores, which featured abundant displays of merchandise, cafés and tearooms, concerts and other entertainment (early movies, for example). In the last years of the century, a technologically new spectacle of moving pictures appeared in the crowded marketplace of amusements and drew a fast-growing clientele. Outside the capitals, traveling theaters and circuses periodically added to the usual local offerings.

Demand for entertainment was strong from all classes, but the greatest rise in leisure consumption is traceable to workers and a new lower-middle class—people in clerical and other service-sector jobs who led lives outside work-based and religious organizations and customary community recreations. These customers eager for leisure businesses were city dwellers who now enjoyed greater disposable income and more free time than before. In the decades after 1848, commercial forms of leisure became the dominant ones in many people’s lives, eclipsing recreations under noble, church, and municipal patronage.

The most common place of popular leisure was still the café, pub, cabaret, or tavern. Nowhere were they more numerous than in Paris. Drinking establishments there increased from some three thousand in 1789 to about twenty-two thousand in 1870. Then in the following decades under the Third Republic, especially after restrictions on café commerce were eased in 1885, the number of cafés soared to thirty thousand. In 1909, when London had 5,860 drinking places, Paris still had thirty thousand. No other city had more cafés than the French capital, or more in relation to its population—11.5 per thousand inhabitants in Paris compared with one per thousand in London.

Some drinking places provided space for dancing and drew customers primarily for that activity; these evolved into dance halls. Some charged admission at the door; others charged each time a customer danced. Now a form of play that had been a part of almost every popular festivity was merchandised in a specialized place of business on a nightly basis. Usually a particular dance hall was associated with certain strata of society—high, middling, or low—but some crossover and mixing occurred. Upper-class people in nineteenth-century Paris, for example, enjoyed going to the *bals* of poor and working people, slumming or mixing with the rabble for frissons of adventure, sexual excitement, and even dancer. All across Europe the upper layers of society regularly picked up dances from the people below. The waltz, for example, began as a German peasant dance. Nobles and the middle classes adopted it at the end of the eighteenth century. Other dances of the lower classes became spectacles for the rest of society. A prime example is the cancan, which brazen lowborn Parisian women danced in popular *bals* for decades before it became a stage act for elite spectators at expensive night spots like the Moulin Rouge.

Participation in public dancing is difficult for historians to measure, but contemporary testimony and the number of dance halls in business from period to period give some indication of its extent. In general the number of dance halls and size of the clientele appear to have been greater in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth, with some notable exceptions. One exception is the period between the two world wars; another is the flourishing of night spots catering to youth in the second half of the twentieth century.

Theater in the nineteenth century continued to be a major entertainment for all classes and developed some new forms that had special appeal for the fastest-growing parts of the urban population. Some of those forms were particularly suited to patrons from the middle classes, who composed the majority of the au-

diences in large commercial theaters (the boulevard theaters of Paris, for example). Such spectators favored amusing plays featuring vaguely middle-class characters and conventional values. The same prospering classes also patronized and enjoyed a new kind of light musical play, the operetta, a cheery entertainment with catchy melodies, dance, and a comic or sentimental plot. Meanwhile the aristocratic elite maintained a conspicuous presence at traditional grand operas.

In the late nineteenth century, writers such as Émile Zola, Gerhart Hauptmann, and Henrik Ibsen broke with the century's theatrical conventions, challenged bourgeois values, and put the spotlight on workers, the poor, and social rebels. Their naturalist dramas disturbed the satisfied or insecure middle classes with such provocative subjects as class conflict, urban squalor, and the oppression of women. Depictions of strong, norm-defying women were particularly provocative, coming at the end of a century marked by strict gender divisions and an ethos directing women to remain subordinate and quiet in the domestic and private sphere. It was also an era in which almost all public entertainment was fashioned with men in mind as the primary spectators.

Plebeian theatergoers, meanwhile, flocked to see melodrama—sentimental, tear-provoking tales of good ultimately triumphing over evil (popular ideals and hopes realized, at least onstage). Commoners also enjoyed seeing big spectacles featuring thundering horses, elephants, and a large cast of human performers—forerunners of blockbuster action movies. Also popular were sensationalist, gory tales—theatrical versions of eighteenth-century Gothic novels and even older broadsides depicting bloody crimes. Murder and mayhem were the specialties of the house at Le Grand Guignol in Paris, which opened in 1897. There spectators watched realistic blood-drenched scenes of slashing stabbing, torture, rape, and killing. Audiences for such dramas not only played out their fears and fantasies but also took pleasure in seeing taboos shattered and good taste flouted—all under the controlled conditions of the stage. This theatrical genre did not spread widely across Europe, but it did endure in popular literature and prospered in film a few decades later.

Drinking-cum-entertainment places featuring singers and variety acts emerged before the middle of the nineteenth century as music halls in England and *cafés-concerts* in France. They grew in the decades after 1850 to be a leading form of commercial popular entertainment in London, Paris, and other cities great and small. Some leading music halls, like the Folies-Bergère, charged a steep admission price and catered

to customers wanting to be part of a social elite. Others appealed to large, socially diverse audiences by charging little or no admission and making money simply from selling drinks and food.

The music hall played important roles in the social life of its public and in the cultural formation of class—roles that social historians are still working to clarify. The leisure experience there fell somewhere between that of the theater and that of the coffee-house—between spectatorship and performance on the one hand and participatory socializing on the other. Music hall customers often chatted during the show while smoking and drinking, and they shouted out to the performers and joined in singing favorite songs. The acts onstage did not require the audience's full attention nor did they proceed according to any narrative or logical sequence; spectators came and went informally.

Music hall song and humor, it seems clear, played mostly to males and particularly those of the working classes—or rather, to workers as conceived by performers playing to socially mixed audiences. A

favorite genre of the usual crowds was comic songs about everyday life—especially about drinking and romantic pursuits. Sung by singers who seemingly personified the little guy, those songs expressed clichéd views of common life that nourished a sense of shared identity and experience in the audience. That is, spectators and performers assumed the perspective of modest working-class people or, more vaguely, a populist spirit. Audience members who were not workers joined in as good-natured sympathizers. Enjoying a convivial social atmosphere, they played along with the pretense that everyone present constituted a popular collectivity or class. Many of the most applauded performers, for their part, projected a plebeian identity through their lyrics, jokes, and accents.

In the early decades of their existence, music hall songs and stories often expressed working people's grievances. A playful show of social antagonism, the mocking of authority figures, and the flouting of social norms had long been a part of customary revels—Guy Fawkes' Night in England, charivari, and carnival—and the *commedia dell'arte* as well. Such prac-

tices served as safety valves for traditional society. The music hall carried on some of that same function through ritualized joking and songs, venting, common people's resentments of landlords, tax collectors, the rich and haughty, and meddlesome mothers-in-law. Turn-of-the-century cabaret performances in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin offered even more political and social satire and mocking than did the music halls, but the audiences there were small by comparison, limited to artistic circles and the well-off.

By the late nineteenth century, the edgy political and social material was toned down or eliminated from the large popular halls. Censorship was not the main reason. As the music hall evolved and spread, it was not simply an amusement attuned to its popular audience; it was also a commercial enterprise increasingly under the control of big businessmen who were conservative, socially and politically. Music hall entertainment became less critical of established society and less "vulgar" as the owners of the halls and performers alike aspired to respectability and reached out to larger audiences, including whole families. Performers under that new regime passed over social antagonisms lightly and cleansed away vulgar language and gestures. These changes were particularly marked in England, an influential leader in variety entertainment. By the turn of the century control of most major English music halls had passed into the hands of large syndicates. Among them was the largest syndicate in the world, Moss Empires, whose centralized management oversaw nearly forty "theatres of variety," dictating their programming and performers and even the time allotted to each act.

After 1895 the music halls had to compete with a new entertainment—moving pictures, shown on a new kind of projector invented by the Lumière brothers of Lyon. Their invention was the latest in a string of magic lanterns reproducing sights and movement for viewers who enjoyed seeing the illusion of real-life scenes and stories. The Lumières' new device enjoyed several advantages over its predecessors. It used images that were not laboriously crafted by hand but were mechanically reproduced by a photographic process. And unlike Thomas Edison's Kinetoscope (a kind of peep box), the Lumières' machine was a projector that allowed not just one viewer but many, assembled as an audience, to watch the moving images and to share the storytelling.

Movies immediately attracted audiences who relished the novel visual sensations that the early short comic films and news clips provided. The new spectacle moved into city music halls, wax museums, and department stores. For about the first decade after its invention, cinema was a cheap amusement largely for

working-class spectators in city centers and on fairgrounds. Then over the next decade, with the construction of new halls built for the cinema and the production of longer, high-toned films, spectators from the middle classes embraced the new entertainment. Cinema became so popular with urban audiences that it drove numerous older competitors out of business in the years before World War I; notable casualties included music halls and *cafés-concerts*, wax museums, and panoramas.

Even with all the new kinds of entertainment available, the city was a crowded, dirty, and noisy place for the many. Getting away from it was a pleasure, and in the second half of the nineteenth century, new public transport systems gave the masses the opportunity to do so. Working people toward the end of the century enjoyed day trips by railroad to seaside resorts, versions of New York's Coney Island such as Blackpool in England. On Sundays city people took tramways and railways for an outing to the country. Parisians, for example, made excursions to riverside cafés and restaurants along the Marne and the Seine. From the 1880s on, growing numbers of city dwellers (even of modest circumstances) bought bicycles and pedaled out to explore the countryside, to fish, and to picnic alongside streams and rivers.

THE AGE OF MASS MEDIA

In the late nineteenth century, cinema joined a series of new inventions—the phonograph and the cheap illustrated newspaper and magazine—that made possible the mechanical mass reproduction of sights, voice, and music for the entertainment of the masses. These centrally produced, one-way means of communication afforded to a relatively few business and entertainment leaders the power to influence or manipulate masses of ordinary people by selected messages about life at that time and about commodities for sale. The new media also extended a democratization of culture already under way. The new technology of cinema, for example, brought reproductions of performances to many places simultaneously at low cost to the consumer. People of modest means, scattered rural inhabitants, and residents of small towns were now able to see the same stars and productions that moneyed spectators in big city venues did.

After World War I, companies that had developed the "wireless" for military and maritime uses extended it into broadcasting for everyday civilian audiences. Radio stations sprang up in major cities in the early 1920s, transmitting news, music, and some advertising (though nowhere as much as in the United

States). State-run, university, and religious stations (for example, Radio catholique belge) came into being in the same decade. One leader in noncommercial radio was the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), which was funded by the sale of radio licenses. The BBC provided entertainment—including popular music and plays—but above all it made itself a force bespeaking social distinction with its serious, high-culture offerings as well as the elite accent of its announcers. Although it was state controlled and enjoyed a monopoly from its origins in 1922, it maintained independent self-governance in programming and news reporting. Meanwhile, radio in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany served as a prime medium of political propaganda.

In the 1930s radio became a common household fixture, delivering mass-produced entertainment and news in the home. Radio was a watershed in the shift of leisure from public space to the private domain. By early 1936 there were 27.5 million receivers in Europe (56.7 million in the entire world; 22.9 million in the United States). Men, women, and children separately followed programs addressing their distinct interests, but at times entire families came together to hear entertainment with broad appeal. Neighbors and friends who did not own a set joined the audience by paying social visits to someone who did. Silent listening usually prevailed during the programs, in contrast to the lively talk that marked pub and church gatherings. But this new leisure practice, unlike moviegoing, was often not wholly free from work—women, for example, sewed, knitted, or cooked while giving some attention to the wireless.

Through the new medium, distant celebrities became intimates of the audience at home, or so it seemed, as the relationship was decidedly one-sided.

The disembodied voices often conveyed the sense of being family members reaching out to include the unseen listener. For many the radio served as a connection to a larger world of information and entertainment, a function perhaps particularly important to women who were homemakers. Radio was also a new instrument of political persuasion and propaganda, and it was a powerful advertising tool and promoter of consumption.

Governments in Europe limited the number of stations, the kind of programming, and advertising for many decades. The state monopoly on radio broadcasting lasted in France until reforms permitting the licensing of private radio were carried out under the Fifth Republic's first Socialist president, François Mitterrand, in the early 1980s. Hundreds of new stations then emerged, giving listeners an unprecedented range of political opinion and advertising along with heavy doses of American and English popular music.

Radios became smaller and more portable after World War II with the development of transistors, and listeners stayed tuned to their favorite programs in their cars and on beaches. In 1979 Sony introduced the Walkman, and in the 1980s this new type of small radio and cassette player became extremely popular. Listeners could now take their favorite music almost everywhere—on subways, buses, and trains and in streets and parks. Youth especially took to the new earphones, entertaining themselves in solitude even amid crowds. Here was one more step taken in the long historical shift toward private, individualistic, more technologically mediated leisure.

Despite the entertainment available at home, masses of Europeans still went out to the movies regularly—once a week or even more frequently—in the 1920s and 1930s. In fact the practice of moviegoing grew steadily, while attendance at plays and musical performances declined except among a classically cultivated minority. Factory workers and clerical employees commonly went to cinemas more frequently than other social groups. In the 1930s children also went weekly to see productions specially designed for them. Increasing numbers from the middle classes, too, joined movie audiences over the decade. Husbands and wives usually attended together, a leisure practice in contrast to the customary one of males going out alone to pubs and taverns.

Movie theaters were commonplace in urban working-class neighborhoods and were particularly numerous in industrial workers' quarters of cities like Birmingham, England. Many of the cinemas were converted former theaters and music halls, but in city centers between the world wars, lavish new movie halls were built in the style of vast dream palaces with

Egyptian, Assyrian, and Moorish decors. Yet even these showy places provided cheap seats that permitted the lowly of society to enjoy access alongside the better-off.

Some people were willing to pay to see only newsreels and documentary films; for them there were city-center halls specializing in such programs. But the biggest draws were films of fiction—the mainstay of most movie theaters. Throughout Europe, Hollywood movies became audience favorites from World War I on. So many American exports moved onto European screens and won such favor that many French, British, and other film companies found it difficult to survive. Appealing to nationalist sentiments, European filmmakers turned to their governments for legislative protection and financial aid, measures that were almost always inadequate.

The images and stories shown by the movies not only entertained but also conveyed new styles, attitudes, and ways of living. Ordinary women across Europe styled their hair as Greta Garbo did, for example, and tried to smoke cigarettes and kiss as the stars did on the big screen. Many screenplays conveyed a franker acceptance of sex than the norms in most European (and American) societies authorized. Hollywood productions after World War I established the vamp as a familiar feminine type and generalized what even the French quickly came to call sex appeal (using the English phrase). Reinforcing these anti-Victorian models were movie magazines, with their accounts of the glamorous off-screen lives of the stars—lives of romance, luxurious ease, and seaside vacations. Movies also depicted class differences: they especially showed to the masses the lifestyles of the rich and the social elite. Yet story lines in mainstream films almost always ended with social reconciliation. Socialist and communist militants perceived the cinema as an opiate, while censors and conservatives worried about its power of moral subversion. Cinema has had a strong impact on cultural values and morals; the nature and extent of it have been the subjects of unending debate.

AT HOME WITH THE SMALL SCREEN

In the 1950s television took root in European everyday life. Although television broadcasting had begun with the BBC in 1936, TV did not become a part of most households until after 1945. For several decades as television spread across Europe, one or two government-run channels provided limited programming with little or no advertising; plays, concerts, variety shows, and news filled out the schedule. These were produced and controlled by the public service companies, which

pursued a mission of safeguarding cultural standards from pressures of low, popular tastes. National systems beamed programs to all citizens simultaneously. Small countries went further, moving into the airwaves well beyond their national boundaries. Luxembourg's television station, like Radio-Luxembourg from its outset in 1933, reached out to large audiences in neighboring states with programs that catered more to popular tastes than government-controlled channels generally did. Luxembourg radio and television also mixed in profitable commercial advertising before the national stations of large countries did. In Britain it was not until 1955 that a commercial TV channel began to operate, ending the BBC monopoly. Responding to the appeal of commercial programming, the BBC's directors introduced some more popular, more current music and comedy—including the widely watched satirical program *That Was the Week That Was* in the 1960s.

The social rebellions that peaked in 1968 led to new openings for independent TV producers and filmmakers, who chafed at the old elite conceptions of culture. Private, for-profit stations took off in the 1980s in France, Germany, Norway, and elsewhere. Their hallmark was programming that derived from many old forms of entertainment—variety shows rooted in music hall traditions, drama and comedy adapted from theater, and soap operas and newscasts carried over from radio. In the communist-bloc countries, government-run television served as an important vehicle of political propaganda, as radio had been for fascist states of the 1930s. The result, however, was far from a brainwashing of the society. Many viewers found the ideological programming heavy-handed and sought news and entertainment from nonofficial sources, mostly from Western Europe.

When the small screen entered the home, it commonly altered family life, first by becoming a new center of attention and the main source of entertainment. TV viewing quickly took over many of the hours hitherto spent listening to radio, moviegoing, and reading, although it did not supplant those older practices. Viewers spending the highest number of hours in front of the tube were the very young, the old, and the unemployed. Surveys in Britain revealed that lower-income people watched more hours than did those with higher incomes. Children have been among the most assiduous and regular of viewers, choosing programs designed for them as well as general programming.

What effects has TV watching had on society? From a historical point of view, it seems clear that the medium itself has been a prime instrument for the promotion of consumption—not just through com-

mercial spots but also through the images of attractive automobiles and kitchens shown in program after program. Further, as critics have emphasized, the medium seems to foster passivity (even addiction) in its viewers. Observers also worry that children who spend many hours watching TV come to accept the programmers' version of what the world is and should be. The possible influence of violent scenes on viewers' behavior has been of particular concern. Some studies suggest that the effects depend on whether the young viewers watch alone or watch and interact with their parents and others. While research on these matters has been inconclusive, public opinion about violence, sex, and foul language on TV has long been strong and polarized.

For historians the question of how media representations of life relate to real life in society has been particularly important. Some TV fare seems at first glance to be purely escapist or divorced from everyday life—game shows, for example, though many of them play on consumer desires. Much on the small screen, however, clearly reflects social questions and anxieties and is an articulation of them. Comedy is especially attuned to such issues. Situation comedies and satire have often mocked and questioned dominant values and authority figures, from fathers to politicians. Yet often they have also reinforced stereotypes and well-entrenched views about class, gender, and nationalist identity, for example. Serialized shows portraying families, which have always been among the most popular programs, have presented media versions of ideals and social realities marking a period of history. They have served up what producers thought would please large audiences—often idealizing and seldom departing from well-established systems of social representation, including dominant constructions of gender. Most domestic sitcoms in the early decades of TV depicted middle-class, nuclear, patriarchal families in a sentimental and humorous way; in the 1960s and 1970s they began to depict less conventionally mainstream households, breaking with some taboos—showing prejudice, for example, in working-class British males. Viewers following the TV family's problems and resolutions derive a sense of sharing in the familial life unfolding in the programs, as fans of soap operas vicariously live the enacted moments of passion and disappointment. Compared with the sociability known to theater and music hall audiences in previous eras, television viewing seems to resemble isolated voyeurism, though it provides some compensatory experience for the lonely.

Live reporting worldwide also results in a kind of shared experience for far-flung individuals—viewers everywhere receive instant information and vicar-

iously participate in events or happenings as they are still occurring. Viewers in every corner of Europe also share a familiarity with images of one highly developed consumerist culture—that is, images of American society, its consumer goods, and its leisure. Since the end of World War II, American programs have not only been staples on European TV, they have also been viewers' favorites. In the 1960s and 1970s, the shows drawing the biggest audiences in Europe were the same ones that were hits with Americans of the time: *Bonanza*, *Hawaii Five-O*, and *Kojak*. In the 1980s it was *Dallas*, in the 1990s *Baywatch* (which beat the record set by *Dallas*).

By the 1990s television sets were in about 98 percent of homes in the industrialized world. At the end of the twentieth century, the introduction of satellite and cable transmission greatly expanded the programming to dozens or even hundreds of channels. Audiences became more segmented into discrete groups formed around shared interests, tastes, and age. The specter of state control was drastically reduced, and the threat of the media's homogenizing effects diminished, even though commercial advertisers still enjoyed plenty of opportunity to influence sensibilities and minds. Entertainment and shopping possibilities in the home continue to expand with the integration of television and computer and the development of more interactive media.

PROBLEMATIC LEISURE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

For much of the later nineteenth century and the twentieth, social theorists and labor leaders anticipated an increase of free time, continuing a pattern known after the early stages of industrialization. Yet a sense of ease taking and plentiful free time seems to have eluded many people in the late twentieth century. With all their labor-saving devices and officially limited work hours, they were left with a nagging question: where did all the leisure go? Even in their hours away from work, people felt harried, in need of renewal and too infrequently finding it. One reason for this trend is that much so-called free time went into buying and maintaining leisure goods. The far-reaching leisure industry of the late-twentieth-century world both stimulated as well as catered to consumer desires. Increased free time was accompanied by increased consumption of such leisure products as sports equipment, televisions, VCRs, computers, and the services of tourism and travel personnel. Those with higher incomes spent a greater part of their household budget and greater sums of money on such items, but

they did not necessarily have more leisure. In the second half of the twentieth century, high-salary earners (business executives and professionals, for example) typically worked longer hours than did service and manufacturing workers, whose workdays tended to be more strictly set by clock time.

The market extended into the leisure of virtually every social group, developing forms appealing to just about every desire and interest. After 1945 a commercialized leisure identified with youth emerged as an important part of society and the economy. One distinctive part of that youth culture took shape around 1960 when European teenagers discovered rock music imported from the United States. By the late 1950s and 1960s, young people were not only more numerous than ever, they were also wielders of unprecedented consumer power in large part stemming from their parents' prosperity. Embracing rock with relish, many young Europeans bought records, listened to the new tunes on the radio and television, and paid admission to rock concerts, participating in sometimes frenzied celebrations led by new young stars radiating youthful energy, rebellious high spirits, and sexuality. This vigorous subculture was also a counterculture, reacting against norms and conventions set by adult authorities and the respectable. Youthful protesters in the late 1960s denounced the mind-numbing conformist entertainment and government-controlled news of mainstream media, and they disparaged the soulless consumerism of the modernizing and prosperous Western European societies. Yet much of that very same counterculture was soon harnessed by commercial forces and transformed into commodities—records, big-ticket concerts, clothing—marketed to the young.

Leisure-business giants consolidated their economic power on a world scale in the late twentieth century. In the 1980s and 1990s international media corporations bought up entertainment conglomerates and built vast empires dominating the diversified communications industry—newspapers and magazines, film companies, television channels, and recording companies. Rupert Murdoch's British Sky Broadcasting, Luxembourg CLT, and Silvio Berlusconi's Fininvest, to name a few, spread their operations across Europe. Their products and the marketing, of them pervaded contemporary European societies. Giants of the industry fashioned extensive webs of related products and commercial tie-ins, linking the marketing of a movie, for example, to the selling of the same as a video, book, and soundtrack music CD. Cartoon characters on television or in movies reappeared in stores as toys, games, books, and clothing. Large amusement parks, where customers would spend an

entire day or more, recreated the characters and stories already popularized in the entertainment media.

Walt Disney's theme parks led the way. The hugely successful Disneyland in California (1955) and Disney World in Florida (1971) and in Tokyo (1983) offered pop-culture themes that most people knew to be preeminently American, but the models and predecessors included European attractions that had developed in nineteenth-century world's fairs (the Paris Universal Expositions of 1889 and 1900, for example) and Copenhagen's Tivoli Garden, which pioneered the genteel, whole-family atmosphere that Disney was after. A Disneyland in Europe opened in 1992 twenty miles outside Paris, offering a mix of American and European fantasy—Mickey Mouse and the German Snow White, Star Wars and the British Peter Pan. Initially Europeans did not flock to the place as expected, and the first three years were financially disastrous, with losses of \$1.5 billion. After making accommodations to European culture (allowing the sale of wine and beer, adding more European-themed attractions, and reducing admission prices), Disneyland Paris began to flourish. In fact, it has become France's top tourist attraction with 11.8 million visitors in 1997 (compared with 5.6 million for the Eiffel Tower). Before Euro Disney (later renamed Disneyland Paris), European competitors had already entered the market, most of them with success. The Danish manufacturers of toy building blocks opened a Legoland theme park (featuring toy building blocks) in 1968, and in 1989 Parc Asterix in Senlis near Paris began offering customers a visit to the illusory world of the French historical hero of comic-strip fame. Other parks in Europe feature still other European cartoon characters, visits to the future, an entire country in miniature, or the Wild West, along with roller coasters and other rides and strolling performers.

A lament heard at the end of the twentieth century was that free time had been colonized by powerful commercial forces inimical to true leisure, the essence of which is playfulness. Social manipulation—even control—by mass media supplants fantasy and individual freedom. Consuming overrides creativity. Media entertainment, overwhelmingly popular and pervasive, relentlessly sells commodities and promotes consuming as the key to a good life. In a consumer culture built on commodities and exchange values, free time becomes something that is spent shopping in malls or on the Internet. The culturewide promotion of consumption blights the potential of leisure as a time for rest, personal renewal, and self-development.

Many critics lambasted the entertainment industry, too, for pumping out formulaic, standardized, and often sensationalist fare that catered to the lowest

common denominator. To attract audiences and promote consumption, TV producers tended to make everything entertainment—including real-life conflicts among intimates (“reality” TV) and news reports. Media representations themselves became real life for many, particularly the young, who spent a substantial part of the evening or day tuned in. Corporate power in the realm of leisure was all the more worrisome to those who saw it as one piece in a growing system of conditioning, surveillance, and control made possible by omnipresent computerized record keeping, surveys, polls, reportage, and advertising.

Ownership of the media by international corporations and cartels only heightened concern about the effects of such power. Among Europeans, that concern centered on the powerful appeal of American mass culture. American productions occupied such a large place in late-twentieth-century European leisure that they seemed to threaten the vitality of Europeans’ own popular music, movies, and television programs. In the view of alarmed critics, a global homogenization of popular culture and leisure threatened the very survival of national and regional cultures.

Other observers took the brighter view that the media’s role has been to carry forward a long-running process of democratization of—or increasing access to—the means of communication and sources of information. In this view community television and local radio provide some expression from below, and local and regional identities and media coexist with media voices from the national and international level. In addition, the Internet made possible the free exchange of news and information from the many to the many. Cultural studies scholars noted that not all

mass-media viewers necessarily take in the same message from a given program; the spectators’ readings or decodings can be quite varied and multiple, though they can generally be correlated with such social parameters as occupational or class status, gender, and ethnicity. The receiver of media messages is not just passive or manipulated; each person selects and molds meanings (each has some agency).

Going beyond aesthetic judgments, social historians of the end of the century looked especially into consumer leisure’s effects on social life and individual potential. Was the merchandised leisure stultifying and repressive or emancipatory and fulfilling? How did the impact differ for different social groups? Employing a historical perspective, observers debated whether contemporary practices were more or less liberating than what went before. Understanding the historical richness of possibilities might itself have a liberating effect on notions of free time.

While observers and historians carried on their debates, ordinary people voted with their money and time. Demand for commercially produced leisure was strong and growing almost everywhere in western Europe. Historically, the market for consumer leisure has expanded as disposable income has increased and work hours have decreased. Technology, too, played a part, yielding ever more novel diversions and spectacular simulations. Entrepreneurs pressed forward almost everywhere, expanding operations that proved profitable and taking them to less-developed areas. Continuing long-term patterns, millions in formerly communist eastern Europe have become consumers of the commercialized forms of leisure already flourishing in the West.

See also America, Americanization, and Anti-Americanism (volume 1); Consumerism; Festivals; Popular Culture; The Reformation of Popular Culture (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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VACATIONS



John K. Walton

In British English the word “vacation” normally has a restricted and rather technical sense, applying to the periods when the universities are closed or the law courts out of session. The word “holiday” occupies the space that “vacation” occupies in North America, although it does not necessarily involve geographical mobility in search of health, recreation, or sheer enjoyment: the same word is used for a work-free day or days spent at home as for a period of rest, recuperation, or fun in a different environment. The notion of taking a holiday overlaps with that of tourism, although this latter word, more respectable administratively and academically—television programs advertise or evaluate holidays while local governments provide tourist offices and universities offer degrees in Tourism Studies but never Holiday Studies—tends now to have more up-market connotations involving longer, more ambitious journeys and a less sedentary holiday experience. It was not always thus, however, and in some circles (especially up-market literary ones) the nineteenth-century contempt for the mere “tourist,” led by the nose by mentors and guidebooks and incapable of independent cultural judgment, remains as a contrast to the more adventurous, culturally aware “traveller,” willing to “rough it” off the “beaten track” and eager to sample other cultures on their own terms.

By the 1840s complaints were proliferating in England about the contamination, expedited by the new railways and steamers, of the chosen destinations of elite travelers by the presence of inferior tourists. This social distinction justified itself in cultural and even moral terms. In John Urry’s terminology, the “romantic gaze,” which emphasized solitary individuals in direct, sensitized, and informed exchanges with landscape and culture, was being threatened by the “collective gaze,” which derived satisfaction from experiencing sites and sensations in company according to shared values that were communicated by mass media and were therefore inferior in the eyes of romantics. Worst of all from this elevated perspective is the “package tourist,” perceived as incapable of escaping from the values and practices imposed by the provider

of holiday services and as preferring to be insulated from all troubling contact with the host culture—wanting, in fact, all the reassuring cultural landmarks of home in a setting that guarantees sunshine, bathing amenities, and cheap drink. From the 1960s on, working-class holidaymakers in Mediterranean resorts have inherited all the opprobrium that was heaped on Thomas Cook’s original package tourists of a century earlier. Those who fancied themselves cultured travelers decried the interruption of their solitary contemplation of cathedrals or Roman amphitheaters by bands of lower-middle-class Cook’s Tourists, Baedeker in hand and shepherded by guides.

Elsewhere in Europe similar problems of terminology crop up. The word in Spanish is *vacaciones*; but an older variant, the verb *veranear* (to pass the summer), conjures up a more leisured style of holidaymaking in which aristocratic or bourgeois families would spend two or three months at a spa or seaside resort. *Turismo* is also in use there, with a similar shade of meaning to “tourism” in English. In French, holidays are *vacances*, but *cong * overlaps with this concept, meaning “leave from work” and extending to the idea of a holiday away from home; in practice the words are used almost interchangeably. The kind of holiday taken by an *estivant* (summer visitor), is similar to that of a Spanish *veraneante*. There are also *hivernants*, passing the winter in favored climatic locations, above all the Riviera. The slipperiness of the terminology is obvious, as is the sense that the differing shades of meaning can also carry connotations of status and claims to cultural capital.

The notion of a holiday in the sense implied by “vacations” entails an extended trip, more than just an excursion to a local beauty spot or even a day’s outing involving a journey of several hours. The holidaymaker makes more of an investment of time and money than the “excursionist” or “day-tripper,” those particular bogeys of self-consciously respectable middle-class families looking for sedate pleasures. The emergent discipline of Tourism Studies has prompted extensive but sterile discussion over how long a stay away

from home is necessary for the perpetrator to qualify as a tourist; but these efforts notwithstanding, the statistical computations that a standard definition is intended to facilitate remain visibly flawed and approximate and become less plausible the farther back in time inquiry goes. The statistics of holidaymaking are notoriously “soft,” and for present purposes it matters little if a vacation is said to be anything from a long weekend to an extended stay of several months.

Here, however, a problem arises in that the notion of holiday depends on an “other,” the idea of necessary work. Those privileged people whose life entailed a circuit of high-class resorts in their fashionable seasons were members (or hangers-on) of a leisure class for whom the concept of a vacation was scarcely relevant. Indeed, the observance of the dictates of international fashion was at the core of their construction and presentation of self, and thus resort life might almost be regarded as work rather than leisure, the remuneration being psychic and coming as the reward for suitably directed expenditure of time, money, and expertise, but no less important for that. Crucial to the idea of a vacation, anyway, is that it involves physical displacement, whether to a single destination or to several: change of scene, if not of culture, in pursuit of pleasure and (in some sense) relaxation. Recreational travel can also be in the mind, of course, and travel books have long provided for the armchair tourist. Across Europe in the nineteenth century, shows and spectacles represented the exotic through giant pictures, transparencies, models, and magic lanterns at fairgrounds and theaters before the cinema, television, and then the computer made their own contributions in the twentieth. But over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the desirability of a physical break from quotidian routine became broadly generalized across industrial societies in Europe, though at differing rates in different countries and regions, and with varying and changing destinations and degrees of commercialization. What are the roots of this important set of developments?

ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN VACATION

It is tempting to regard medieval pilgrims as the first European tourists, though we might find a more directly commercialized ancestry for the phenomenon in ancient Rome, at Baiae (especially, and for several centuries), Ostia, and around Naples, as extensive tracts of shoreline were thickly sown with the villas of the wealthy. Pilgrims ostensibly traveled for spiritual reasons, rather than pursuing pleasure and reinvigoration through change of scene and break from rou-

tine in the style of a modern vacationer; but they followed recognized routes with commercial infrastructures of guides and services, whether their goal was Canterbury, Compostela, or Rome. Geoffrey Chaucer in the fourteenth century shows us that individual participants’ concerns might be decidedly worldly, even hedonistic. But the roots of the modern vacation can be more securely traced to two other phenomena: the rise of the Grand Tour and of the European spa system from the later sixteenth century.

In its mid-sixteenth-century origins, the Grand Tour was a device for encouraging young aristocrats to experience life and culture at courts and in cities throughout Europe, broadening its horizons in the late eighteenth century under the spur of romantic fashion to include mountain scenery and natural curiosities such as glaciers. The practice came into wider vogue during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, extending its social range through the gentry to the middle ranks of professionals and merchants (who might take the Tour later in life) and including growing numbers of Americans in the nineteenth century, before new time pressures and means of transport made the old leisurely patterns obsolete. The goal of the Tour was the cultural centers of northern and central Italy, with their classical remains and treasures of art and architecture. The seventeenth-century tendency to pass through various German states in a roundabout journey had given way by the early nineteenth century to a more single-minded direct route through Paris, Dijon, and Switzerland. Perhaps 15,000 to 20,000 people at a time followed the Tour in any year of the later eighteenth century, and, as befitted this small (but not numerically insignificant) elite, the tourist infrastructure was limited and exclusive, featuring special road transport arrangements, lodgings, guides, vendors of works of art (and manufacturers of fakes), and a growing volume of travel advice literature. What these pioneer tourists sought can be summed up, in the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s telling phrase, as cultural capital: in this case, an ability to claim first-hand knowledge of places, cultures, scenes, languages, and classical allusions that was supposed to mark out the cultivated gentleman and set him and his circle apart from those who did not share his experiences. Individuals might follow their own bent, in pursuit of anything from diplomatic and political expertise to sexual adventures; but above all the Grand Tour gave a valued distinction to participants, setting them apart from social inferiors. This is a recurring theme in the history of tourism and vacations.

The other precursor of modern tourism was the spa resort, which came to offer something more closely resembling a modern vacation. Across Europe

the rise of the spa followed a similar trajectory to that of the Grand Tour; but the ostensible motive for spending time taking the waters was, in the first instance, health, as the doctors took over the holy wells and elaborate medical discourses crystallized around the ascribed curative qualities of chalybeate, ferruginous, or sulfurous springs. Spa itself, in Belgium, was one of the first such resorts to attract an international clientele, including a visit from Tsar Peter the Great, while Bath and Wiesbaden were among the substantial towns that grew up around mineral springs. Sociable attractions and fashionable amenities developed in the larger spas to entertain the invalids and their relatives, and to attract the hale and hearty to what were often attractive little upland settlements. The band, the assembly rooms, the public walks, and in some cases the brothel and the roulette wheel provided a range of diversions for those who could afford them, while in many cases inferior accommodation catered to a regional clientele and to paupers sent in hopes of revitalization. The elite social institutions of the spa were easily policed, by subscriptions and dress codes, although masters of ceremonies intervened to preserve politeness in the exchanges between the nobility and the marginal middle ranks. This polite holiday regime, with its daily routines and rituals, reached its heyday in the early nineteenth century over much of Europe. In England the larger spa towns evolved from vacation destinations into retirement and commuter centers, mainly in the second half of the nineteenth century. In Germany and eastern Europe, and over much of Spain and Italy, the spa sustained its popularity through the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, although individual resorts generally remained small and their social amenities exclusive.

THE SEASIDE AESTHETIC

From the late eighteenth century, however, new destinations came to the fore. The vogue for the seaside was the most enduringly important across Europe, mutating over time with the growing popularity of the Mediterranean and of sunbathing, but, except where transport problems and limited disposable incomes sustained the dominance of spas with local clienteles, coming to hold sway as the dominant holiday form. The seaside holiday was boosted by two eighteenth-century developments. First, the medical fashion for sea bathing in cold, boisterous northern waters helped turn something dangerous, forbidding, and frightening into a healthy activity. The medical vogue for sea bathing is an example of cultural preferences rising through the social strata rather than

trickling down through emulation, for the doctors who began to prescribe cold bathing and (in some cases) seawater drinking regimes, in England in the first half of the eighteenth century and then across western Europe, were giving a “scientific” veneer to already popular practices. Right across western Europe, from northwest England through the Netherlands, France, and the Iberian Peninsula to Corsica, there is evidence of popular sea-bathing rituals that celebrate the health-giving properties of the sea at certain times of year. The medical profession recast and formalized these beliefs, imposing its own medical rituals that prescribed the number and duration of baths to be taken for specific ailments and the precautions that had to be adopted. This in turn necessitated a prolonged stay at the seaside to fulfill the requirements of the “cure,” just as in the case of the spas. Thus the health seekers and their friends created a critical mass of demand that encouraged speculation in accommodation, entertainment, and amenities, promoting the rise of that distinctive but versatile kind of town, the seaside resort.

The second development was the new aesthetic of the maritime landscape and of the sea itself. The romantic reevaluation of the later eighteenth century brought the untamed sea and the untidy shoreline within the canons of the picturesque and the sublime, rendering maritime landscapes fit subjects for the painter and enabling wind, tempest, storm-surge, and wreck to be appreciated and enjoyed as noble spectacles and with a suitable frisson of horror. The sea was fecund and full of reminders of creation and its vestiges. Those who braved its perils were also ennobled and romanticized, and they and their boats gradually became fitting additions to the composition of marine paintings. All this made the seaside an attractive destination and encouraged the building of houses for visitors facing the waves, in contrast with seafaring settlements that tried to shelter from their fury. A similar cultural reassessment of mountain scenery made upland areas from the English Lake District to the Alps into tourist destinations in their own right, with evangelical dimensions of proximity to God and romantic anthropologies of the stalwart and unassuming virtues of mountain peasantries (though these might coexist with fears of brigands, just as brave fishermen might otherwise be presented as lazy, untrustworthy, and of doubtful morals).

On these twin foundations the seaside holiday based itself, beginning in England in the 1730s, spreading to France, the Low Countries, and north Germany toward the end of the century, and gravitating outward to (for example) Sweden by the early nineteenth century and Spain by the 1820s. The resorts soon

attracted pleasure seekers who required the amenities of polite society, just as at the spas; and such visitors soon turned the vocabularies of the picturesque and sublime into lazy cliché in ways that caught the satirical ear of Jane Austen. In Britain especially the seaside competed effectively with the spa to become the dominant vacation destination by the early nineteenth century. In northern Spain the two kinds of resort were often complementary, with wealthy health seekers taking a cure in an upland spa and following up with a stint of sea bathing, while in Germany most of the North Sea and Baltic resorts were distant from population centers, enduringly hard to reach, and less dynamic in their growth. But everywhere the seaside, like the spa, became a bourgeois as well as an aristocratic destination. It was, however, open to a wider range of people, as it was more difficult to regulate access to and use of the beach, which lent itself to a wider range of activities than the pump room and assembly rooms; it also provided a much more child-friendly environment, thus ensuring the growing popularity of the family holiday, complete with buckets and spades, in the early nineteenth century.

THE RAILWAY AGE

The special status of the seaside, especially in England, was confirmed in the railway age. For a century from the 1840s the railway journey became an almost inevitable introduction and conclusion to a vacation, as well as linking the different stages of a tour and making possible day excursions from the holiday base.

Railway companies might also provide steamboats, piers, and hotel services. The railways built on existing patterns of holidaymaking, extending them to new social groups and broadening their geographical range rather than starting something entirely new, in England at least. Brighton had attained an off-season population of 40,000 using road transport before the railway arrived from London in September 1841, and Margate's visiting season had prospered in the eighteenth century using sailing vessels to carry Londoners down the Thames estuary. By the same token railways to the French Riviera and in parts of the Swiss Alps augmented established tourist flows rather than initiating them, while San Sebastian, which became Spain's premier seaside resort in the later nineteenth century, was already attracting visitors by road from Madrid (despite the strenuous nature of the two-day journey) before it began to benefit from its strategic position on the Madrid-Paris rail route after 1864. But the journey was emphatically part of even the most sedentary holiday, as the process of packing and booking tickets conjured up anticipations of the pleasures that awaited at the other end, and a whole literature of travel nostalgia emerged later to celebrate first the stagecoach and the diligence, then the steam railway itself.

The economies in time and money that the railways and steamers brought, and their greater convenience and (eventually) safety, opened vacations out to a widening public in the second half of the nineteenth century, especially in England; and demand was channeled disproportionately into the seaside. New resorts

blossomed on hitherto neglected shores, although the railways that fed them had almost always been constructed for other purposes, and larger resorts spread and subdivided, developing distinctive areas for different social groups as the working classes began to join their social betters at the beach. On the European mainland this came much later than in England, where brief but conspicuous working-class seaside holidays within London's orbit or wherever industrial areas had easy access to the coast were older than railways. A full-scale working-class holiday season emerged in the northwest in the 1870s, fueled by the rising family incomes of (especially) the cotton factory workers and the attractions of Blackpool, the first working-class seaside resort. The petty bourgeoisie might have their week at the seaside, traveling from Madrid to San Sebastian by special cheap trains and economizing on everything except the basics of a presentable turnout; small farmers from the Castilian plains might travel to Santander by the mixed train to follow a medically prescribed bathing regime, sleeping in fifth-rate *fondas* and gawking obtrusively at sea, ships, and city sights. Parisian shopkeepers and small traders might find their way to Normandy outside the fashionable season; but there as in Germany the working class proper was excluded. The scale of French middle-class outrage when the Popular Front government introduced paid holidays in 1936, promising a wage earners' ex-

odus to coast and country, indicated the limited nature of what had gone before; and even then, most beneficiaries of the new legislation stayed at home and relaxed rather than invading the holiday preserves of their betters.

It was not just a matter of resources; people had to *want* vacations away from home, and to be prepared to save for them rather than spending spare cash locally on daily or weekly pleasures, or insisting on accumulating savings as a hedge against disaster or a route to property ownership or a small business. Seekers after health, tranquillity, scenic beauty, spiritual uplift (associated especially with mountains), status and cultural capital, in varying mixtures and combinations, were joined in growing numbers by those who wanted commercial pleasures in a setting that offered relief from the constraints of everyday life. The seaside came to cater to this preference very effectively, alongside the others. The abundance of coastal sites ensured that all tastes could be satisfied, from those who wanted exclusive quiet in ruggedly romantic surroundings to those who preferred formal classical architecture and fashionable promenades, to those in turn who wanted cheap amusements, from Punch and Judy to the music hall, and someone else to cook and clean up. The seaside resorts of the railway age offered a distinctive range of entertainments for those who wanted them. The pleasure pier was an English in-

novation (seldom exported) that linked land and sea, provided access to steamer excursions, and offered promenades and bands above the waves in surroundings enlivened by wrought-iron Gothic and Oriental architecture. It was also one of the homes of the minstrel show (which involved putting on blackface and singing “plantation” songs to the banjo) and the Pierrots (comedians and songsters with whitened faces). These entertainers also accompanied the Punch-and-Judy puppet show on the beach, alongside, in the more popular English resorts, a variety of stallholders who might use a knife to remove corns, sell medical recipes or horoscopes, or read character from the bumps on the head, a popular version of phrenology that long outlasted its pretensions to medical science. Fringe and officially discredited beliefs flourished alongside donkey rides and later fairground amusements, which offered strange sensations and threatened dignity and seamliness by exposing hidden parts of the body in unpredictable ways.

From the 1870s the larger English resorts also acquired Winter Gardens, which provided indoor promenades and decorous music but soon moved down-market wherever working-class demand pressed strongly. As the seaside vacation market became visibly lucrative and attracted investors in syndicates and limited companies, a range of other entertainment complexes were built that offered dancing, shows, exhibitions, and even zoos and circuses. As in the United States, the popular resorts (and more pretentious ones such as Southport and even Spain’s San Sebastian) found room for large-scale fairgrounds on dedicated sites, and these introduced their customers to an exciting range of up-to-the-minute technologies, stirring the senses in novel ways. Resorts on the western European mainland experienced fewer pressures to go down-market, and the casino (whether privately or municipally owned) tended to be the main entertainment center, sometimes offering roulette, chemin de fer and the full gambling menu, but more usually—and more noticeably—presenting innocuous fare of concerts, dancing, and special events for children. At the French resorts in Biarritz and Deauville, and in Monte Carlo and San Sebastian, casino nightlife carried an atmosphere of the demimonde, and resort entertainment for the elite was distinctively daring.

These distinctive forms of seaside entertainment augmented the peculiar attractions of the beach itself, where children played in the sand and all ages bathed according to regulations that were strict on paper but often loosely interpreted in practice. This was especially the case in England, where into the twentieth century the lumbering, wooden bathing machine, which provided changing space and protection for

modesty, and was backed into the water by a horse, demanded substantial sums from would-be bathers, segregating the sexes and imposing body-concealing costumes. The regulations were often flouted by those who preferred the freedom of recreational nude bathing, or, more respectably, wanted to bathe in costume *en famille*. In the new century disrobing in public on the beach became more widely tolerated; the practice was controversial, however, because it offended the prudish and those with vested interests in controls. Elsewhere in Europe customs varied: the French beaches were carefully monitored for safety but permitted mixed bathing and revealing costumes that shocked some English visitors; the Spanish used bathing machines and policed morality in almost English style; the northern Europeans were much more relaxed by the early twentieth century.

The growing popularity of sunbathing, alongside the continuing transition from the medicinal and regulated to the recreational and liberated use of the sea, brought conflicts over the morality of bodily exposure further to the fore. The myth that the fashion designer Coco Chanel invented sunbathing, making a tanned skin chic and enabling the French Riviera to develop a summer season in the mid-1920s, survives tenaciously. In fact the fashion for what was now seen as a healthy brown skin was well established before World War I in places as far apart as San Sebastian and the Baltic, although the prevailing nudity that amazed and delighted the British trade unionist Harry Pollitt at Libau in 1921 was confined to northern European beaches. As with sea bathing earlier, the vogue for sunshine and fresh air as prescriptions for good health was promoted by a rising tide of medical opinion. Likewise, fashionable cures for tuberculosis had called for mountain air and beginning in the 1860s had helped to boost the Swiss Alps as a destination. This trend coincided with a fashion for the freedom of the open air and the abandonment of restrictive clothing conventions. The Mediterranean, hitherto shunned as enervating and malarial, was now seen as a potential destination for beach holidays, although the international popularity of its shores, the French and Italian Rivas apart, was a phenomenon of the 1950s onward. In Spain a backlash was beginning on the eve of the civil war in the mid-1930s, as Catholic campaigners against bodily exposure and sexual temptation claimed a connection (at that point speculative) between sunburn and skin cancer; but this was swimming against a very powerful tide.

By the interwar years the seaside holiday was well established as an annual institution across Europe, from the Irish Sea to the Black Sea (in Romania and the Crimea) and from Norway to Andalucía in

Spain. The English working class most especially adopted the practice, helped by cheap transport and the development of specialized, popular resort districts on accessible coastlines. Its social range (and the number and variety of bathing resorts) decreased as an observer moved from west to east, but a spell at the seaside, from a weekend to a full summer, was the dominant mode of vacationing.

BETWEEN THE WARS AND AFTER

The interwar years also saw the proliferation of new types of holidays, whether developed for profit or by voluntary organizations. Some of them intended to provide cheaper, healthier, less pretentious alternatives to the commercialized formality of the urban seaside resort. As part of the interwar trend toward relaxation and informality, the holiday camp made headway. In reaction against the restrictions of boardinghouses and lodgings, with their curfews and regulations, the holiday camp offered cheap accommodation in tents or chalets, with self-made entertainment on site (in contrast with the urban commercial theaters and music halls of established resorts), and celebrated freedom and the outdoor life. It had ancestors in turn-of-the-century England, both in the clusters of shacks and converted tramcars that colonized cheap seaside land and offered bohemian escape from convention for people of limited means, creating an alternative aesthetic scandalizing to the planners of the 1940s, and in the tented encampments that provided cheap, mor-

ally regulated, alcohol-free seaside accommodation for young men. The camps of the 1930s, and especially those of the more commercialized 1950s, gained a reputation for sexual adventure but also (increasingly) for a new kind of mass-market regimentation. Their French counterparts remained less commercial in their organization, usually run by voluntary bodies aiming to make unpretentious, natural holidays accessible to workers who were entitled to them as citizens; but Club Méditerranée, which started life in 1950, attracted a more up-market clientele and a reputation for sensual pleasures in simple surroundings whose essential artificiality was carefully masked. Hitler's enormous holiday barracks on the Baltic Coast in the late 1930s offered a very different vision of the purpose of vacations, precisely targeted at industrial efficiency and the physical development of the "master race."

Another strong interwar trend across western Europe was the outdoor holiday in a mountain or forest setting, which emphasized the virtues of walking and climbing in groups in terms of health, fitness, and closeness to nature and sometimes God. Again, this type of holiday built on earlier developments like England's Holiday Fellowship, which sought to divert working people from the fleshpots of the popular resorts, where holiday savings were said to be dissipated in a debilitating round of commercial pleasures, and to encourage them to improve body, mind, and spirit in healthy and uplifting communal endeavor. Such initiatives were undertaken by socialists and religious

life while providing brief, controlled contact with prescribed sights and experiences at ports of call. Other enjoyments included the winter sports holiday, especially in Switzerland. The great city as tourist destination, as exemplified especially by Paris with its shops, museums, and nightlife, combined three major holiday priorities in varying proportions according to individual preference and amply allowed for the ubiquitous anthropological tourism of people-watching. At the other end of the spectrum was the rustic holiday, with a tent or farmhouse for accommodations and its celebration of the simple life. In this last, especially, the traveler-tourist distinction came into play, and in the 1930s, even more so than a century earlier, there was a lively market for travelers' tales describing voyages on foot and by local transport to places off the beaten track in Europe as well as farther afield. Contempt for mere tourists was often explicit in this literature.

Such contempt, as has been noted, had a long history and did not abate as travel agencies proliferated and incomes and aspirations rose from the second half of the nineteenth century. In the 1950s and 1960s it reached a sustained peak of vitriol with the rise of a new kind of airborne package holiday industry, which increasingly took working-class people from northern Europe to the sunny beaches of the Mediterranean. The package tour put together by a travel company that contracted to provide transport, hotels, food, and guidance was well-established before World War II. By the 1930s many British firms were producing thick books (no mere brochures these) describing tours down the Rhine or single-destination holidays at the Belgian seaside, priced in guineas. Many postwar offerings followed this pattern, with travel by coach (tour bus) initially more common than by air.

Then international tour operators began booking acres of bed space in new purpose-built hotels on Mediterranean coastlines, offering lowest-common-denominator catering (but with much better facilities than prevailed in the popular British resorts), and focusing on beaches, sunshine, and relaxation while striving to insulate holidaymakers from the shock of parachuting straight into novel cultures. This seemed to some observers to add up to a new form of "mass tourism" that exploited its customers, creating a narrow range of holiday experiences that met existing expectations without broadening horizons. This was a patronizing view, denying the agency of holidaymakers, who were reduced to mere ciphers and whose preferences, as expressed in spectacular growth in demand, were discounted. It rested on more than a century of prejudice, which embraced (for example) the ways in which working-class holidaymakers in England's Black-

enthusiasts alike, with overlapping agendas. In Germany the antagonisms between young Nazis and socialists were fought out in youth hostels and through hiking songs. As was indicated by the controversy over paid holidays in France, it is an error to imagine that vacations are necessarily detached from politics.

Building on developments from the later nineteenth century, growth areas in interwar vacationing included visits to historic and literary landscapes; these entailed pretensions to deploying and enhancing cultural capital and might be regarded as a legacy of the Grand Tour, extending its range to hitherto neglected areas such as southern Spain. The motor tour took advantage of the flexibility of a new mode of transport and diversified demand away from existing "honeypots" while necessitating interaction with host cultures, if only in seeking directions, refueling, and repairs. The cruise offered an insulated, on-board social

pool created their own vacation culture by shaping the supply of entertainment to their preferences. What it increasingly ignored was the proliferation of niche markets within the complex world of the travel trade, the variety of uses to which the package holiday might be put, and the access it gave to new commodities and cultural practices. Meanwhile, the state as entrepreneur was setting up resorts of a similar kind in eastern Europe, especially on Romania's Black Sea coast, which attracted East German visitors in growing numbers, and also in France at Languedoc, where Gaullist technocrats promoted futuristic complexes aimed at diverting demand from the Riviera. Moreover, the advent of mass car ownership across Europe opened up the prospect of increasing flexibility through touring holidays while disrupting the routines of older resorts accustomed to captive, sedentary families using amenities clustered around railway stations, and generating all the new problems of parking and traffic management. The older form of mass tourism, the railborne seaside holiday in one's home country with children, fell into decline but not yet terminal collapse, except in the case of ill-endowed provincial resorts that had grown only for want of accessible alternatives.

Overall, the explosion of vacations in Europe after World War II, though prepared by developments between the wars, was a major social phenomenon. The time set aside for vacations increased dramatically, rising to five to six weeks in places like Germany. Class differences remained. Many working-class people did not in fact travel during vacations. The wealthier middle classes sought steadily more exotic destinations. But the importance of the vacation took on unprecedented contours, and also differentiated Western Europe from other advanced industrial societies such as the United States and Japan, where vacation time remained more limited.

The historiography of these phenomena has developed in interesting ways. As the content of this essay suggests, historians have focused more on destinations, technologies, and processes in the tourist industry than on vacations themselves. Serious narratives of the vacation experience, grounding theories in evidence, are in short supply, although Alain Cor-

bin's work on changing ideas about desirable environments to visit has been helpful as an approach to eighteenth-century developments, particularly in France. As the inventor of the seaside holiday and of many aspects of tourism in the modern world, England has been the focus of the most developed historiography. Pimlott's *The Englishman's Holiday*, a remarkable book by a civil servant first published in 1946, eventually helped to encourage studies of seaside resorts from an urban history perspective, comparing and contrasting towns and coastlines as holiday destinations. The other dominant genre in Britain has been the study of elite tourism in relation to perceptions of landscape and literature, with a strong bias toward the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. France is the other European country with a developed historiography, with more emphasis on the social and political values surrounding the development of vacations and the perceptions and expectations of holidaymakers, themes that are not neglected in the excellent regional studies of holiday destinations by Gabriel Désert and Michel Chadefaud.

As for twentieth-century topics, retrospective glances by sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, and planners have been more influential than the scant work by historians, with conspicuous exceptions like Ellen Furlough on France and Nigel Morgan on England. The vacation as a historical theme in its own right would benefit by borrowing and testing insights from the work of John Urry, Jean-Didier Urbain, Rob Shields, and others in sociology, cultural studies, and related disciplines. A social and cultural history of the vacation and its meanings for the vacationers themselves must take due account of race, class, gender, and the sense of self. Vacation genres, such as the honeymoon, cry out for historical analysis, as work on Niagara Falls has shown in the United States, and the themes of liminality and carnival need further exploration in relation to vacations, particularly for eastern and southern Europe. John Pemble's *The Mediterranean Passion* has shown how subtly and accessibly they might be pursued even within a conventional historical methodology. A strong platform has been built for the vacation as a theme of social history.

See also other articles in this section.

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TRAVEL AND TOURISM



Stephen L. Harp

Until the late twentieth century the history of travel and tourism was not a serious subject for historical inquiry. Before the advent of social history, political historians duly noted where decisions and pronouncements were made, and the place of leisure travel became obvious in retrospect. King William of Prussia had, of course, been taking the waters and enjoying the social scene at Ems when the Ems dispatch was issued in 1870, provoking the French to declare war. General Philippe Pétain's World War II government, Vichy, is named for the southern French spa town that possessed abundant hotel rooms to accommodate a government forced out of Paris. Even the emergent field of social history initially left the study of tourism at the margins. Gradually, the careful analysis of workers, peasants, the bourgeoisie, and eventually women, that is, specific social groups, was extended to cover cultural practices besides work. The neglect of travel and tourism has been an unfortunate missed opportunity. The history of travel and the increasing participation in leisure travel of various social groups reveals the degree to which those groups used it to set themselves off from others and thus to construct, mentally and materially, differences of class and gender as "natural" social divides. In modern Europe travel was as much a defining characteristic of social position as the work with which it was so often contrasted.


EMERGENCE OF THE GRAND TOUR

Europeans, particularly but not exclusively social and political elites, had long traveled for purposes of trade, migration, and warfare. In the Middle Ages religious pilgrimage, such as the physical journey to Santiago de Compostela in Spain and other sites, mirrored the spiritual journey of the pilgrim. During the Renaissance, as artists and writers in northern Europe placed yet more emphasis on their classical forebears, trips to the sites of ancient Rome were in many respects a secular form of this ongoing cultural enrichment. Although such travel affected a very small number of

Europeans, it served as an important precedent in that it gave excursions to Italy a certain cultural imprimatur useful within upper circles of northern European society.

In the seventeenth and especially eighteenth centuries, aristocratic and wealthy British families increasingly sent their sons on a Grand Tour of Europe. Experiencing a Grand Tour set a young Englishman apart from his contemporaries, not to mention his social inferiors. For the growing upper-middle class, a tour of classical ruins was construed as cultural training not unlike attending university. Lasting for several months, a tour usually included Paris and other major European capitals and was almost always dominated by the Italian cities. Despite intermittent political conflict and religious differences between France and Britain in the eighteenth century, the political and military importance of France, a cause of its linguistic and cultural importance in ancien régime Europe, made Paris and Versailles necessary stops. On the Italian Peninsula, Venice, Florence, Rome (including the digs at Pompeii), and sometimes Naples were must-sees, and Genoa and Turin usually figured as stopping points en route from the Alpine crossing to the south. Although young and sometimes older men, and more rarely women, from other European countries also made the journey to Italy—among them Johann Wolfgang von Goethe—contemporary reports point out that the British, bankrolled by profits from growing trade, were the most likely to go on tour. Art collections, architecture, classical ruins, and brothels apparently were the main attractions.

Dominated by the wealthy and the noble, the Grand Tour in the eighteenth century was in many respects personal, and connections governed access. Before the French Revolution collections of European paintings were in private residences, not museums, so letters of introduction were often necessary to gain admittance. The opportunity to meet the leading writers of the eighteenth century depended as well on admittance to a salon or the granting of a private audience. As a young man on tour, James Boswell, a



Grand Tour Routes in Europe, 1661–1700. Adapted from John Towner, *An Historical Geography of Recreation and Tourism in the Western World, 1540–1940* (Chichester and New York: John Wiley, 1996), page 108.

lawyer and later the biographer of Samuel Johnson, obtained audiences with leading European literary lights, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Voltaire, as well as the royalty and nobility of Europe by judiciously using letters of introduction from other important personages (Withey, 1997).

Logistical difficulties precluded large numbers of people from going on tour in the eighteenth century. Even the aristocracy and the emerging upper middle class had estates to manage and professions to practice. While it is true that in the eighteenth century well-developed roads and reliable coach service were available, particularly in France, a Grand Tour still required months of travel. The costs in transportation, accommodation, and time were substantial. The highest estimates are that at most 15,000 to 20,000 Britons—less than 1 percent of the total population—went abroad each year in the mid-eighteenth century (Towner, 1996). Never involving many Europeans,

the Grand Tour bestowed a relatively exclusive social distinction on travelers when they returned home.

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars interrupted travel, particularly by the British, until 1815. In the nineteenth century the idea of the Grand Tour remained an important image as the numbers of Europeans with the time and financial resources to travel grew. Napoleon's road building across France and through the Alps facilitated access and reduced travel times. Following the example of the Louvre, which became public during the French Revolution, museums opened their doors. The populations that could afford to tour grew. The number of traveling women, escorted by family members, servants, and friends in addition to husbands and fathers, steadily increased. In fact the growing ranks of the bourgeoisie coincided with longer tours by women, sometimes joined for parts of the trip by husbands, fathers, and brothers otherwise practicing their trades.

Both evolving aesthetics and accessibility changed the destinations and the perceptions of early-nineteenth-century tourists. Whereas the agricultural productivity of plains had been of some interest to earlier tourists, who considered their trips an education in economics as well as art, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries literary and artistic interest in romanticism brought seascapes and mountains into the



The Grand Tour. *Englishmen Viewing Pictures on the Grand Tour* by Thomas Rowlandson (1756–1827); ink on paper, c. 1790. PRIVATE COLLECTION/THE BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY

forefront of interesting sights in many tourists' estimations. The Alps, long considered a mere untamed obstacle en route to Italy, became a destination in their own right and an important stop on many a Grand Tour. Mountain climbing for the few and hiking for the many became primary attractions. In Italy romantic sensibilities led to interest in Gothic cathedrals along with the classical monuments. Gothic cathedrals in France and the German states became destinations rather than examples of medieval backwardness before the Renaissance. In the nineteenth century the few travelers to Greece, which became more accessible after its independence from the Ottoman Empire, were in search of classical ruins overrun by vegetation and partially destroyed by time. Lord Byron's poetry was an obvious inspiration. During the period 1792–1815, the heyday of early romanticism, the British Lake District so dear to William Wordsworth became a primary alternative for wealthy British tourists unable to tour the Continent. With a volume of Wordsworth in hand, visitors sought the uncontrolled nature he described. Ironically, in a pattern that became familiar to twentieth-century tourism. Wordsworth's descriptions of such places led to their exploitation as tourist sights; travelers in search of a wild nature undisturbed by human presence were met with people just like themselves.


TAKING THE WATERS: SPAS AND SEASIDES

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the British and then the continental European aristocracy and bourgeoisie "discovered" both the spa and the seaside. In both cases the relatively unfettered access to and use of the waters in the old regime ended abruptly as middle-class usage grew in the early nineteenth century. Bourgeois notions of social propriety and medical doctors' attempts to assert their professional credentials led to the strict regulation of bathing in both spas and at seaside resorts.

Named for Spa, a well-known spring of mineral water in what came to be known as Belgium after 1830, spas had long existed in Europe. The Romans established baths filled with spring water, and some of those same baths remained in operation throughout the Middle Ages. They attracted local inhabitants and the infirm from farther away long before the aristocracy and then the bourgeoisie began to patronize them in larger numbers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In Hungary the Roman baths experienced a boom in the eighteenth century (Towner, 1996). Improved roads and coach service made baths across

Europe more accessible, and towns such as Bath in western England, Vichy in south-central France, and Baden-Baden in the southwestern German state of Baden became important destinations.

Into the eighteenth century baths remained large pools in the open air, situated within the towns and open without charge to all who wished to bathe. Although only scattered evidence has survived, it appears that in the early modern period bathers of both sexes and from all social groups wore little clothing while frolicking in the baths. Doctors directed patients to take the waters either by drinking from the spring or by bathing, but the amount imbibed and length of bathing time varied greatly, left above all to the discretion of the patient. By the early nineteenth century, however, as bourgeois usage grew dramatically, so too did the expectations for regulation of access. In France the open-air pools largely disappeared, replaced by individual bathing compartments in which a bather



Grand Tour Routes in Europe, 1814–1820. Adapted from John Towner, *An Historical Geography of Recreation and Tourism in the Western World, 1540–1940* (Chichester and New York: John Wiley, 1996), page 109.

would not come into contact with anyone but the spa staff. At least in France, the strict separation of the sexes and careful attention to appropriate attire resulted in part from women's complaints of men's behavior at the baths; the institution of new norms of propriety may have resulted as much from women's increased presence as from a desire for social control on the part of the bourgeoisie in general. Nevertheless, segmentation by social class was clearly instituted. The poor and working poor were excluded from many of the baths, and an array of new hospitals for the poor requiring hydrotherapy segregated them from the wealthy bathers (Mackaman, 1998).

In the first half of the eighteenth century, doctors largely controlled access to the baths. In France a patient needed a medical certificate issued by a doctor to enter the waters. Doctors also quickly developed a complement of hydrotherapeutic techniques, including hot and cold pressurized showers, hot mud packs

for the body, and individualized boxes for prescribed steam baths. During an average three-week course of treatment, only a minor portion of a patient's time was spent in the bathing pools. Even when patients were in the baths, the length of daily treatments was closely controlled by the spa's staff (Mackaman, 1998).

Social stratification was a defining characteristic of spa towns. Locals worked in the baths, hotels, and the newly organized casinos. In towns such as Vichy and Aix-les-Bains (in the Savoy), service to wealthy travelers was the primary employment for local residents. Those travelers registered their names, addresses, professions, and the number of accompanying servants—all markers of social station in the nineteenth century—before going to the baths for their cures; meanwhile locals lost their earlier, nonmedical access to the baths. Spa employees and larger municipal police forces kept the homeless and begging poor out of the casinos and off the important promenades, where their presence was assumed to damage the appeal of the spa town (Towner, 1996).

After 1750, first in Britain and then on the Continent, the aristocracy and increasingly the bourgeoisie began to flock to the seaside also, spurring the development of resorts. In many parts of Europe, though sources are comparatively scarce, evidence indicates that people swam or played in the waters of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Fishermen and local peasants of both sexes apparently took to the water, often without the benefit of clothing. As bourgeois interest in the seaside grew, so too did municipal regulations governing use of the beaches. By the early nineteenth century nude bathing, apparently practiced more by men than women, was banned on most beaches, which also were usually segregated by sex (Corbin, 1994). Although access to the sea remained open to people of all social classes, the primary beachfronts connected to resort towns were largely reserved for wealthy travelers, whose expenditures supported local economies.

Although romantic interest in the sea as untamed nature was not unlike the "discovery" of the Alps, the motivation for travel to the seaside, as in the case of spas, was also medical. For skin and pulmonary ailments, especially tuberculosis, doctors often advised an extended stay on the coast. By the early nineteenth century doctors also began to regulate immersion in seawater, offering careful instructions as to the preparation, duration, and necessary movements during daily bathing sessions.

Doctors and bathers made an important distinction between men and women. While women in particular were prescribed strict guidelines, carried out by attendants at the individual bathing boxes who os-


tensibly preserved female modesty, doctors exercised comparatively little control over men, who customarily treated jumping into the waves as a sort of male rite of passage, a proof of virility. The medical control at the seaside was thus inseparable from a broader social control of women's movements and their bodies in the nineteenth century (Corbin, 1994).

THE RAILROADS AND MIDDLE-CLASS TOURISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Although the network of European roads and coach services improved steadily, facilitating tourism among wealthy Europeans in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, railroads allowed faster, considerably cheaper transportation and dramatically increased the number of people who could afford to travel. By the middle of the nineteenth century, middle-class professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, and moder-

ately successful businesspeople could take or send their families on vacation. The middle class could thus enjoy a holiday of travel and use it for social distinction, much as the wealthy bourgeoisie had before the advent of the railroad. Interestingly the greater accessibility made possible by the railroad did not erase social distinctions but rather altered their contours. Just as the railroad had first-class, second-class, third-class, and occasionally fourth-class carriage, tourist destinations changed to accommodate greater social diversity and to satisfy the desire of those who could afford better for social differentiation.

The railroad thus had an ironic effect on established tourist destinations. For example, on the southern coast of England, Brighton had been a favored destination of the English nobility and royalty in the eighteenth century. However, when the railroad connected Brighton to nearby London, the middle and lower middle classes of the city began to make day trips to the seaside town. The royal family and the



English Spa Development to 1815. Adapted from John Towner, *An Historical Geography of Recreation and Tourism in the Western World, 1540–1940* (Chichester and New York: John Wiley, 1996), page 63.

social elite relocated their social season to the north, placing themselves outside the logistical and financial reach of these new tourists. In France, where the warm and more desirable seashores were in the south, the railroad made it easy for the wealthy of Paris and of Europe to make a journey that was impractical for those of limited means. Empress Eugénie, wife of Napoleon III of France, made Biarritz on the southwestern French coast a sought-after resort town once the railroad line was established. On the Riviera the French annexation of Nice in 1860 facilitated the development of a French railway line from Paris. Nice expanded rapidly, and in wintertime, the social season on the Riviera, its population exploded as the international social elite swarmed in. The British expatriot community installed a *promenade des Anglais* (English boardwalk), and the Russian nobles in nearby Villefranche successfully argued for improvements in the

municipal infrastructure for their use (Haug, 1982). Wealthy Americans also went to Europe in droves.

The convenience and speed of the railroad made it possible for tourists to visit an array of provincial destinations in addition to the northern capital cities and important Italian cities of the Grand Tour and the established spas and seaside resorts. More tourists with more destinations sought information about where to go, what to see, and how to get there most easily. Guidebooks became increasingly widespread in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. But whereas early guidebooks were very personal accounts, guidebooks in the age of the railroad emphasized objectivity, eventually eliminating authors' subjective comments. Because tourists on land were by mid-century traveling almost exclusively by railroad, guidebooks adopted railway itineraries as their organizational framework. In Britain, John Murray published

little red guides to sights and hotels of Europe in a format quickly adopted by Karl Baedeker in Germany (Buzard, 1993). Publishing guides in several European languages covering western, northern, and southern Europe by 1914, Baedeker and his successors built a veritable empire of guidebooks that told tourists where to go and what to see (Koshar, 1998; Hinrichsen, 1988). In France, Adolphe Joanne launched a similar series, published by Hachette, that had a monopolistic control of bookstores in French rail stations. The importance of railway lines in the *Guides-Joanne* was obvious; several guidebooks traced a single line across France, with the first portion covering the journey outward from Paris and the second the trip back to the French capital (Nordman, 1997).

The Murray, Baedeker, and Joanne guidebooks, like their eventual competitors, offered practical information about the quality and prices of hotels, admission prices to museums, train schedules, details about the sights a dutiful tourist should not miss, and even advice about appropriate behavior. In short, the guidebooks attempted to instruct the novice tourist in how to travel. By providing abundant information updated in successive editions, guidebooks took some of the uncertainty out of travel. But arrangements remained entirely in the hands of individual tourists, who needed to negotiate not only with hotels but also

with the multitude of train companies within a given country.

For the lower middle class and skilled workers with limited means, less time, and little familiarity with the profusion of train schedules and fares, Thomas Cook offered both greater certainty and moderate prices. A British cabinetmaker and minister, Cook organized his first tour by railroad for workingmen and workingwomen attending a temperance meeting in 1841. In 1851 he negotiated prices with the railroads and lined up accommodations for some 165,000 British men and women who traveled to see the Great Exhibition in London, accounting for some 3 percent of the visitors (Withey, 1997). By the 1860s, as railroad fares declined within Britain, often obviating the need for his services, Cook focused on tours of the Continent, beginning with Paris (1861), Switzerland (1863), Italy (1864), and Spain (1872) (Towner, 1996; Withey, 1997). Even more visitors used Cook's coupon books for railway travel and hotels, accepting his itinerary but seeing the sights on their own. Travelers' checks, a further reduction of the risks of travel, eventually evolved out of this practice.

In several respects Cook and his competitors opened up touring to social groups that had not traveled in the past. Without abandoning his initial base—usually skilled artisans or lower-middle-class

tradespeople on day trips—as the destination increasingly became the Continent, Cook also served a broad spectrum of the middle class, including doctors, lawyers, salaried employees, teachers, and ministers. The last two groups, who had time but limited incomes, were a primary constituency. Although Cook had less luck organizing tours of Britons to the United States, he successfully recruited wealthier Americans seeking the cultural cachet and the social capital that a tour conferred (Levenstein, 1998).

Cook's tour came to embody the increased access to travel in nineteenth-century Europe. As a result those travelers who could afford longer, slower, and more costly trips ridiculed Cook's month-long tours to Europe as offering no time for a real appreciation of the monuments, museums, and landscapes seen in a blur. The perceptions of social distinction shifted. For those of modest means, touring offered status, but for the wealthy, the fact of touring the Continent became less important than in what manner and in whose company (Withey, 1997; Levenstein, 1998).

The most obvious social change among travelers in the nineteenth century was the increased presence of women. Although a few women had done the Grand Tour or taken the waters in the eighteenth century, in the course of the nineteenth century tourism by women unaccompanied by men became standard. The railroads and guidebooks (which were often, as in the case of the Baedeker, downright sexist, even by nineteenth-century standards) facilitated travel and hence travel by women not in the company of men. In Cook's tours both single women and women traveling in groups were more heavily represented than men (Withey, 1997). One reason for this was clearly ease of transport, but another was the broader cultural changes in nineteenth-century Europe. Whereas men had been the primary collectors of art early in the century, women increasingly became connoisseurs of art, music, and culture generally, though the remunerated professions of artist, curator, or academic remained the preserve of men. Bourgeois women's predominance in the church was also a factor. In largely Protestant Britain women took an important role in the temperance movement, sometimes necessitating travel by train, and in Catholic areas women were proportionately better represented in the organized group tours to pilgrimage sites, such as the spring at Lourdes in the Pyrenees Mountains.

By the end of the nineteenth century, growing nationalist and imperialist sentiment, laced with social Darwinism, was also reflected in well-off Europeans' travel. Guidebooks could be quite nationalistic. In the 1860s the Baedeker guides in the German language fervently claimed that the French-held Alsace-Lorraine

should in fact be part of united Germany. British guides frequently deplored the supposedly inadequate hygiene on the Continent, especially the absence of toilets flushed with water. In countries with expanding empires, most notably Britain and France, trips to the colonies gained in popularity among the wealthy. Although the numbers remained small, Britons and to a lesser extent other Europeans, very often under the auspices of a Cook's tour down the Nile, traveled to Egypt in search of cultural exoticism. By the 1880s they were reassured by the British protectorate. Britons also went to Palestine to visit the Holy Land. The colonies of Algeria and Morocco were sometimes destinations for the French. While traveling outside Europe, Europeans could congratulate themselves on their own national superiority in having a grander empire than other Europeans and their racial superiority, presumably manifest in the vast material divide between themselves and indigenous peoples.

BICYCLE AND AUTOMOBILE TOURISM IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

While the overwhelming majority of travelers in the early twentieth century continued to use the railroad, technological innovations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries renewed the emphasis on traveling by road as well. In the 1890s the "safety" bicycle with two wheels of the same size became the sporting rage for those rich enough to buy one. In an era when male doctors and commentators attacked the bicycle as a potential agent of the moral corruption and of the loss of virginity among women, with few exceptions these early cyclists were above all wealthy, usually bourgeois men.

In the first decade of the century, the automobile began to rival the bicycle as a sport vehicle, and it quickly became a means of tourist transportation for aristocrats and bourgeois Europeans. The automobile's price and extremely high maintenance costs made it a socially exclusive mode of transportation. (In France in 1901 a single automobile tire, with a projected life of no more than a thousand miles, cost ninety-nine francs. At that time a provincial male laborer earned approximately three francs daily.) An automobile allowed wealthy men, accompanied by women and usually a mechanic-driver, to make long trips, veritable adventures given the unreliability of automobiles as compared to trains.

Both bicycle and especially automobile tourism necessitated an infrastructure eventually provided by local and national authorities. Well-maintained, eventually paved roads with road signs became the subject

of important lobbying efforts by tourists enamored of the new forms of transport. An array of nonprofit organizations emerged across Europe to advocate the interests of cyclists and then motorists. Inspired by the British Cyclist Touring Club, "touring clubs" funded by members' contributions and often public subsidies worked with local and national governments to provide an infrastructure for all forms of tourism. Cycling received pride of place in the 1890s, when touring clubs frequently organized one-way cycling excursions on Sunday mornings capped off with a large noon dinner; wives and less athletic members joined the group for the meal, and all returned home by train. After 1900 touring clubs, working alongside the more

socially exclusive automobile clubs, also argued for roadway improvements necessary for automobiles.

In several countries the touring clubs, while overwhelmingly bourgeois, were among the largest of associations. The Touring Club de France, founded in 1890, had nearly 100,000 members in 1914 and 400,000 in 1939 (Rauch, 1996). The Touring Club Ciclistico Italiano, founded in 1894, dropped "cycling" from its name in 1900 and grew to 450,000 members in the interwar years (Bosworth, 1997). In various countries the groups fervently embraced a positive notion of progress arguing for greater expenditure of state monies to benefit their bourgeois members' interests in travel by road; they often used strong

nationalist language that became downright virulent during World War I.

Automobile and tire companies also promoted tourism by car. The example of the Michelin Tire Company in France and across Europe is instructive. Beginning in 1900 Michelin produced guidebooks offering advice about tires and a list of mechanics, Mich-

elin dealers, and hotels, first for France but by 1914 for central and western Europe generally. In 1908 Michelin established its own tourist office to provide precise itineraries of the most passable and scenic roads. In 1910 the company began to offer a series of maps of the road network designed for the needs of motorists and provided French towns with free signs

so that tourists could figure out which town they were entering. Michelin also joined forces with the Touring Club de France to pressure the French government to number all French roads and place signs along them directing motorists. By the interwar years Michelin produced an array of guidebooks to French regions that assumed readers were traveling by car. Baedeker and other guides altered their own guides to make them useful to motorists as well as to train travelers. While Michelin and other companies catered solely to the bourgeoisie before World War II, after the war their efforts on behalf of the wealthy created an infrastructure for automobile tourism open to the European masses.

MASS TOURISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Before the twentieth century workers and peasants, the overwhelming majority of Europeans, traveled very little for pleasure as opposed to work, migration,

or army service. Employers, particularly in Britain, began to give lower-level white-collar workers paid vacations in the middle and late nineteenth century. However, the first documented touring by blue-collar workers dates from the 1880s, when textile workers from Lancashire and Yorkshire took the train for day trips to the western coast of England. Blackpool became a favored beach destination as the numbers of both day-trippers and longer-term travelers grew; in 1937 some 7 million tourists visited the town (Cross, 1993).

Across Europe the interwar years saw a significant expansion of working-class tourism, even, in the eyes of some historians, the emergence of mass tourism. In Weimar Germany, paid vacations of up to two weeks slowly expanded to include some industrial workers, and at least some of those workers traveled. The German Social Democratic Party sponsored a series of subsidized tours designed as political and cultural education, and meant to be socialist alternatives to the commercial trips offered by and for the capitalist bourgeoisie. Yet clearly most German workers



BATTLEFIELD TOURISM AFTER WORLD WAR I

Just as tourism provides an alternative angle for considering social distinctions in modern Europe, so too it reveals the political context in which it took place. The example of World War I is instructive. As early as 1916, while witnessing the wholesale destruction of the battlefields of northeastern France, advocates for tourism envisaged postwar “pilgrimages” to the battlefields that would redress France’s balance of payments with the United States. In cooperation with the Touring Club de France, the Michelin Company in the spring of 1917 introduced the first battlefield guidebook, which was followed by twenty-eight additional volumes by 1921. Michelin became the most important interwar producer of such guides, which had a combined circulation of more than 1.5 million copies.

The guidebooks, designed for French people wealthy enough to have a car in the early 1920s, claimed to tell the “whole history” of the war. Interestingly, they told only the history of the western front and offered no analysis of the network of alliances that erupted in war in

1914. That is, Germany was the clear aggressor; the French government or army had no responsibility in causing the war. Moreover, the guidebooks featured leading French generals with abundant photographs and words of praise, even for those, such as Robert-Georges Nivelle, who were not known for their strengths in the field. Ordinary French foot soldiers received credit for following orders; the mutinies of 1917 were conveniently glossed over. Overall, the guidebooks made it clear that World War I was an inevitable, defensive war won by larger-than-life generals (of the social and political elite) who commanded working-class and peasant soldiers with alacrity. The message for the postwar era was clear: not only were socialist and communist interpretations of the war discredited, but the “natural” leaders in France also survived the war with their credibility intact. The French bourgeoisie, in the form of generals and politicians of centrist and right-wing parties, knew how best to govern France. They could do it successfully if the civilian masses managed to follow orders much as the soldiers had.


did not travel as tourists in the 1920s. Similarly “proletarian tourism,” organized and subsidized by the Communist Party, emerged in the newly formed Soviet Union. In France the Popular Front government of 1936, a coalition of socialist, communist, and radical parties, implemented paid two-week holidays for all French workers. Before the outbreak of war in 1939 most French workers did not go on vacation, apparently for lack of money, but the legislation created a fundamental social entitlement. As in most of postwar Europe but in direct contrast with the United States, vacation allowing time for travel became a right of French citizens guaranteed by the state rather than a revocable privilege granted by employers. In 1937 the Communist trade union, the CGT, founded a tourism bureau to facilitate workers’ travel (Furlough, 1998).

Fascist states, sensing the popularity of tourism for the masses, claimed to sponsor working-class tourism; but historical evidence indicates that, at least on longer tours, the middle classes were better represented numerically. According to Fascist ideologues in Italy, properly packaged tourism for the people would show Italian masses the geographical, cultural, and historical wonders of their country. But Italian workers could afford the longer-distance “popular trains” for tours, such as to Rome, only when they received subsidies from employers. Local day trips, some under the auspices of the national government, became much more frequent in the 1920s and 1930s among both industrial workers and peasants (de Grazia, 1981). In Germany, Hitler’s vast *Kraft durch Freude* (strength through joy) program organized an array of tourist options, including extended train trips and cruises. Much as Nazi propaganda trumpeted workers’ participation, actual travelers on the train trips were most often lower-level salaried employees from the private sector. On cruises just over 20 percent of those traveling were workers, despite their much larger proportion of society at large (Keitz, 1997). *Kraft durch Freude* vacations were fundamentally tied to the regime’s racial ideology. Trips within Germany were supposed to allow German workers to appreciate the superiority of their racial heritage. Cruises with calls in Scandinavia reminded German tourists of their Aryan origins; posters advertising such tours featured young, blond-haired people wondering at fjords and other natural wonders of the north (Baranowski and Furlough, forthcoming).

After World War II and the penury of the early postwar years, tourism grew to include the European masses. Increased standards of living and paid vacations financed travel across the Continent. In the Soviet Union (for which scholarship on travel and tour-

ism is scant), trips, usually by train, to the resorts of the Black Sea became more frequent. In Western Europe the growth of incomes combined with lower costs of production led to the development of a mass market in automobiles. The German Volkswagen, the French Citroën 2CV, and the Italian Fiat were among the best-known small cars within the financial reach of the vast majority of workers and farmers after the war. As had been the case for wealthy Europeans earlier in the century, the expansion of automobile ownership was strongly linked with tourism. Cars allowed more tourists of modest means to go farther, search for inexpensive accommodations, bring along their own camping gear, and access affordable transportation once they reached the desired destination. In 1964, 65 percent of French tourists took a car on vacation, only 25 percent took the train, and 10 percent took an airplane, bus, or other alternative. Within France, however, those most likely to go on vacation were still overwhelmingly urban; in 1964, 73 percent of Parisians left the city on vacation, whereas only 16 percent of the rural population took traveling vacations. Workers from greater Paris may not have had the means of the bourgeoisie, but they took vacations that rural folk could not or would not undertake (Furlough, 1998).

The European masses very often traveled to the same destinations as did the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie. Tour buses hauled people across European borders to visit the cities and other long-standing tourist sights, and the spas of Europe witnessed a huge influx of new users. In Germany, Bad Reichenhall received 11,320 visitors in 1900, 26,880 in 1939, and 75,287 in 1975. The beaches in resort towns, once reserved primarily for the elite, exploded with new bathers. As in the 1920s, when wealthy Americans flocked to the Riviera during the summer to sun themselves, postwar tourists often spent their summer vacations at the beach. Postwar fascination with youth and the body, created or at least fed by the consumer culture developing at the same time, led to significant changes in social comportment at the beach. The nineteenth-century distinction of social class between the clothed and the unclothed quickly transformed into a divide between the young and the old. While social distinctions by no means disappeared, a new cult of the body changed sartorial norms (at least among those other than Scandinavians and northern Germans, for whom nudity had never become taboo in the first place). Men and boys increasingly wore abbreviated, tight-fitting swim trunks, while women often wore bikinis. Topless and nude beaches proliferated. Interestingly the entrance of the masses at the beach as users rather than servants coincided with the



Important Spas in Western Europe, c. 1914. Adapted from John Towner, *An Historical Geography of Recreation and Tourism in the Western World, 1540–1940* (Chichester and New York: John Wiley, 1996), page 55.

erosion of nineteenth-century bourgeois notions of beachfront propriety.

The declining cost of air travel made Europe a popular destination for middle-class Americans and made the world more accessible to middle-class Europeans. For Americans after World War II, as for nineteenth-century Americans on the Grand Tour, a trip to Europe—whatever one actually did there—offered a certain cachet useful at home. Western Europeans traveled less frequently to North America, and a vacation in the United States offered a rather different form of social distinction at home. Although in the late 1950s and 1960s European countries lost many of the colonies that had been elite tourist destinations in the heyday of the empires, resorts in former colonies offered a sort of neocolonialism, in which Europeans could be pampered by non-Europeans while enjoying exotic sights and sounds. The French firm Club Méditerranée was an early sponsor of such non-Western tourism in its creation of exotic villages

in Polynesia and other warm locales. In a sign of the times, Club Med purported to erase social distinctions among participants by mandating the use of first names and the informal second-person *tu* rather than the formal *vous*, as well as by discouraging mention of participants' professions or social standings in "civilization." Paradoxically, the new equal Europeans, almost always white, were served in the villages by local people of color who desperately needed work because of their countries' impoverished economies (Furlough, 1993).

CONCLUSION: TRAVEL, TOURISM, AND SOCIAL DISTINCTIONS


Before the 1790s, when the term "tourist," derived from the French term *tour* (trip), first emerged in the English language, "traveler" was the primary designation for one engaged in leisure travel. In the course

of the nineteenth century, most European languages acquired a term equivalent to the English “tourist,” and tourists and social observers since then have often distinguished between “travelers” and “tourists.” Late-nineteenth-century “travelers” condemned Cook’s “tourists” as superficial. “Travelers” supposedly appreciated what they saw and experienced, whereas “tourists” completed a list of things that needed to be seen.

Until the late twentieth century, historians and other writers often accepted the distinction at face value. Daniel Boorstin, Paul Fussell, and André Siegfried, though by no means isolated examples, have been most articulate in stressing the difference between the old bourgeois, aristocratic, educated travelers and the twentieth-century hordes who supposedly understood little besides how to have a good time.

By using the terms interchangeably, this essay has implicitly argued that no objective difference exists between “travelers” and “tourists.” Clearly the wealthy young British men on the Grand Tour of Europe were as interested in pleasure as in art and ideas. The historian Harvey Levenstein showed that many middle-class travelers in the nineteenth century, even Cook’s tourists, were far more interested in European art and architecture—which also offered them the possibility of a sort of cultural capital upon returning home—than were the fabulously wealthy who spent much of their time simply enjoying themselves in the company of their compatriots. In short, the distinction between travelers and tourists, like the distinctions that post–World War II tourists often made between themselves and other, presumably less-knowledgeable and culturally sensitive tourists, are not “real,” measurable differences. That does not mean, of course, that they were any less important to contemporaries.

From the early modern era on, social distinctions made between those who could and those who could not afford to take the tour, take the waters in a spa, or go to the beach mirrored the social segmentation of European society as a whole. The prescribed roles for women and men further reflected widespread—and from a later perspective erroneous—assumptions about the “natural” differences between the sexes. Consequently the history of tourism, like other aspects of life that may at first appear somewhat superficial, provides an opportunity to consider social history more generally. Moreover, as social history has intertwined with cultural history, historians have maintained that the “real” social distinctions within Europe resulted in large part from their being seen as real by contemporaries. Tourism, one of many means by which people drew distinctions between themselves and others, provides a glimpse at how the hierarchies that long characterized European society evolved over time.



Seaside Resort Growth in England and Wales, 1750–1911. Adapted from John Towner, *An Historical Geography of Recreation and Tourism in the Western World, 1540–1940* (Chichester and New York: John Wiley, 1996), page 179.

See also **Explorers, Missionaries, Traders** (volume 1); **Migration** (volume 2); and other articles in this section.

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Section 21



RELIGION

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BELIEF AND POPULAR RELIGION



Keith P. Luria

Social historians have found their best approach to understanding the cultural lives of Europe's vast majority in the study of popular religion. Their interest in the subject derives from various sources. One was the influence of Durkheimian sociology, which considered religion an inherent part of society's self-perception rather than a spiritual, otherworldly phenomenon. Another was the development beginning in the 1930s of a quantitative sociology of religion, pioneered in France by the work of Gabriel Le Bras. Concerned with the causes and extent of modern dechristianization, sociologists sought to measure the depth and character of religious commitment by counting repetitive, ritual actions. Antonio Gramsci's writings contributed by sparking interest in the culture of subaltern classes, and the impact of marxist historiography and the French *Annales* school of social history focused historians' attention on the activities of people who were not part of the elite. The work of cultural anthropologists on the religious activities of "primitive" peoples also inspired historians, as an ethnographic approach seemed readily applicable to the study of the supposedly "primitive" people of Europe's past. In addition to cultural anthropology and sociology, historians have also borrowed from folklore, literary studies, psychology, and semiotics. Thus the study of popular religion has broadened the methodology of social history as well as its subject material.

While the study of popular religion is a relatively recent concern of social historians, its origins lie in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The religious reformers of that time, such as Desiderius Erasmus or John Calvin, who first singled out the religion of the people for special examination, saw those beliefs and practices as superstition or profanity. They opposed that form of religion to their supposedly more refined or spiritually elevated faith. In so doing early modern Protestant and Catholic critics of customary beliefs and religious practices made a formerly unrecognized distinction between the acceptable and the unacceptable in religious life. They created the realm of religion later called "popular."

Modern social historians have remade the early modern religious reformers' categories. Historians' concerns are not with uprooting superstition but with enlarging the field of religious history beyond the study of church leaders, doctrinal development, or ecclesiastical politics. They study religion as people practiced and understood it, in particular, those people who were not literate and whose beliefs therefore have to be interpreted from their religious behavior. Historians of popular religion have focused on examining rituals, religious organizations, cults of divine figures, and the daily instrumental uses to which people put their religious beliefs.

Even if modern historians have not shared the reforming goals of early modern clerics, all too often they have adopted those reformers' division of religion into that which was elite, official, and focused on spiritual concerns and that which was popular, unofficial, and preoccupied with this-worldly matters, such as illness or poverty. Not all historians have treated popular religion thus defined in a negative manner. For some it represents an organic cultural formation resistant to repressive churches and states, though inevitably fated to disappear under their combined weight. Others, however, have perceived the historical bifurcation in terms that oppose a true elite religion to a popular one based on irrational or essentially non-Christian beliefs.

PROBLEMS WITH THE ELITE-POPULAR MODEL

The bipartite division of religion into elite and popular has shown that the religious past is far richer and more complex than a focus on ecclesiastical institutions and doctrines can reveal. But the dichotomous model also poses problems. For one, it has led European historians to concentrate primarily on popular religion within Catholicism, since, it is assumed, a rationalized or deritualized Protestantism eliminated popular religious customs and practices. Although

Keith Thomas's classic *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (1971) demonstrates the contrary for England and studies of Germany have shown the persistence of popular beliefs among Protestants there, historians of Protestantism generally have been slower than those of Catholicism to realize that Protestant churches also contended with unofficial beliefs and practices, which were not always just Catholic survivals.

Second, the elite-popular schema characterizes popular religion as the cultural expression of only certain social groups—the lower orders, the illiterate, or the unsophisticated. While historical work of the last decades of the twentieth century has shown that social differences are undoubtedly important in understanding religious variety and change, distinct religious styles are not assignable to specific social levels or groups. Much of the European Catholic elite participated in the religious practices later considered popular, such as festivals, confraternities, processions, and pilgrimages. Just like their social inferiors, they flocked to shrines and asked saints for divine protection or miraculous cures. People of all social levels, from royalty to peasants, as well as both clergy and laity participated in such practices. Scholars cannot simply categorize one form of religion as spiritual and the other as instrumental. People of the lower social orders have not seen religion just as a resource for solving mundane problems. For peasants, artisans, and industrial workers religion also has been an expression

of their deepest ethical and spiritual concerns. Indeed they often have seen themselves as the guardians of true religion in opposition to a clergy they may mistrust or reformers who seem to be undermining the traditional basis of the faith.

Drawing too strict a line between the religious attitudes of the elite and those of the people risks turning those people into passive observers in the remaking of their religious lives. Religious change has always been a two-way street. People adopted new ideas and practices from the church but adapted them to their own purposes. The church adopted religious innovations from below, for example, in new shrines and saints' cults, and adapted them to its aims. The church was no monolith. Religious orders, for example, could vary in their responses to official policies and popular initiatives. Rather than establish artificial boundaries between artificial groups, it is better to assess religious variation and change by recognizing widespread religious creativity and the multiplicity of meanings that widely shared religious practices could have for those who participated in them.

CLERICAL CONTROL AND LAY AUTONOMY

The elite-popular model has often misconstrued the Catholic Church's attitude toward the people's reli-

gion, seeing it from the Counter-Reformation on as only repressive. However, the church has never opposed all the purposes to which people put religion, nor has it ever mounted an all-out attack on popular religion. Catholic reformers wanted to establish more clerical discipline over observances such as confraternity celebrations, processions, pilgrimages, and saints' day festivities, which they felt were too independent of priestly surveillance. They sought to bring greater decorum and uniformity to religious observances, and they wanted to instill in the faithful a greater understanding of doctrine as well as a spirituality that emphasized individualized examination of conscience over collective activities.

Summarizing the church's program in these bold terms, however, can exaggerate the desire of clerics to rid religious observance of many elements that were central to it and not in any way contrary to proper doctrine. It also ignores historical variations in the church's attitude toward popular beliefs. The reform program took shape and bishops first put it into action during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But many of the new rituals and devotions that the church promoted at that time did more to revitalize than to undermine popular religion, as people across Catholic Europe put them to their own uses. The distance between the clergy's attitudes and people's practices probably grew during the eighteenth century, as Enlightenment rationalism found adherents within the church's hierarchy who were more likely than their predecessors to treat popular beliefs as superstition. Following the French Revolution, however, the church came to embrace many aspects of popular practice, notably great pilgrimage centers such as Lourdes, as a means of rallying the faithful against nineteenth-century liberalism, scientific rationalism, and state encroachment. In the aftermath of the Vatican II Council (1962–1965), many of the faithful felt once again that the church was abandoning practices central to their religious lives. But even this gap between institutional program and popular belief has not always been great, as illustrated by Pope John Paul II's devotion, after his survival of an assassination attempt, to the miraculous shrine at Fátima in Portugal.

Just as the church's response to the people's religion is complicated, so too is the people's response to the institution and its clergy. Within the doctrinal framework the church has constructed, people seek to order their religious practice creatively in keeping with their own needs and the circumstances of their lives. To do so they often have carved out a sphere of local religious activity over which they can exercise a control, if necessary, independently from the clergy. They might have resisted a Counter-Reformation bishop's

orders to halt devotion to a local saint of questionable official status by continuing annual processions to that saint's shrine to insure protection of their crops. Or they might have accepted a new cult the bishop was promoting, such as that of a Counter-Reformation saint like Carlo Borromeo, but honored him not as a figure of ascetic spirituality but as a protector against the plague.

The most striking example of the autonomy of local religious life from clerical supervision occurred in revolutionary France. During the government's dechristianization campaigns of 1793–1794 and 1797–1799, churches were closed, and priests were outlawed, arrested, deported, or forced into exile. Catholic religious life was left without the clergy necessary for its functioning. In certain areas, such as the famous Vendée in western France, these policies provoked counterrevolutionary uprisings and efforts to protect priests and continue worship. But Catholic observances did not die out even in progovernment areas. Instead, in between dechristianization campaigns, worship revived, directed by laypeople. The educated, often local schoolteachers, performed marriages and burials. They led "white masses," which followed much of the traditional form but in which the communion elements were not consecrated because no priests were available to preside over transubstantiation. The worshipers invented rituals to take the consecration's place or left time for private veneration of the host. In a display of autonomy from the church as well as from the government, people resuscitated local saints' cults that the Counter-Reformation clergy had thought suppressed a century before. The activities women led also illustrate the extent of people's religious creativity. They organized saints' festivals, directed processions, and conducted female worship services—all unprecedented leadership roles for women. Local activists were not necessarily opposed to the Revolution. They made direct use of its political repertoire to advance their religious revival. They wrote petitions, organized demonstrations, held votes, and if necessary participated in riots to force authorities to reopen churches or to allow religious observances. Indeed their religious style borrowed much from the Revolution's ideology. It was antihierarchical, egalitarian, activist, and anticlerical or at least nonclerical.

LAY ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CLERGY

The French Revolution was an extraordinary circumstance in which people were forced to create new forms or re-create old forms of religion independently of the church. More often popular religion is con-

structed by means of a negotiation between the laity and clergy. The church may seek to supervise religious practice and belief, but it must contend with the attitudes of people who do not necessarily feel subordinate to their priests. Scholars often refer to such attitudes as anticlericalism, a distrust of if not an outright rebellion against any attempt by the clergy to control the people's religious life. But depicting the laity's perspective with such a term does not do justice to the variety of attitudes possible or to the way cooperation as much as tension can mark lay-clerical relations. It is undeniable that parishioners have often treated their priests with suspicion. But this feeling is not encountered everywhere, and not everyone shares it.

For example, a gender division is often evident. Scholars of modern European popular religion, especially in Mediterranean areas, have repeatedly described formal religious practice as "feminized." The phenomenon has been noticeable since the French Revolution. Attendance at church has increasingly become a form of female sociability, while men have found theirs elsewhere, such as in the café or in other secular leisure activities. The increased availability of lay education, first for men, and differentiation in gendered patterns of labor, have drawn men away from formal religious practice. Men participating in left-wing politics have resented the church's frequent alliance with conservatism.

Clerical celibacy also provokes suspicion. Are priests not men like any others and therefore unlikely to live up to strict standards of sexual renunciation? If they cannot maintain celibacy, can they be trusted to exercise priestly authority over women? Jokes about the sexual behavior of priests reveal another anxiety. Since priests are not "normal" men, what right do they have to subject men to their clerical control?

But anticlericalism cannot simply be equated with irreligion. That men do not participate in regular, formal church worship does not mean they avoid all religious activity. They might, for example, still participate in parish saints' day celebrations but do so to express religious identification with their community rather than with the institution of the church. Moreover those who express anticlerical attitudes do not necessarily spurn the church's teachings. People have often criticized priests for not living up to the ethical or spiritual standards the church has set. When seventeenth-century Counter-Reformation bishops toured dioceses in their efforts to reform religious life, they were often inundated with villagers' complaints about parish priests who were incompetent or neglectful of their duties. There was a pious anticlericalism. The laity saw themselves as better Christians than

their clergy. People did not reject the necessity of the clergy in a proper religious practice; they wanted better priests. In Spain under Francisco Franco or in Portugal under Antonio Salazar, anticlerical criticism of the clergy targeted priests because of the church's close ties to the conservative political regimes. In the wake of the Vatican II reforms of the 1960s, the clergy in Spain and Portugal tried to distance itself from the repressive states. But priests also tried to reform religious life by suppressing religious practices to which many Iberian villagers remained closely attached. They came under fire for repudiating what many of their parishioners considered true religion. In such a case the anticlerical critique extends to the church as a whole. Can the institution, which has rejected pre-Vatican II rituals, provide the means for a proper and true practice of the faith? This attitude is not mere blind traditionalism. It is deeply influenced by its modern political context. The political freedoms of newly democratic societies, even the religious freedom Vatican II fostered, has encouraged a questioning attitude among the faithful. Such a democratization can lead to doubts even about basic doctrinal understandings of sin, confession, and communion. Priests are no longer among the few with access to education, and mass communication has rendered unnecessary their historical role as intermediaries between villages and the outside world. Their traditional status and influence has been undermined. As people negotiate the form of their religious lives with the church, they can treat their local priests not as authority figures but as functionaries whose role is to serve parishioners and their religious requirements.

RELIGIOUS NEGOTIATIONS

The scope of religion as people practiced it is too vast for a comprehensive description. But examples drawn from works on religious change between early modern and twentieth-century Europe can illustrate two central issues in understanding how people lived their religion, that is, their relations with the sacred and their use of religious practices to construct meaningful collective lives in the face of political, economic, and social changes.

The negotiations between religion as the church prescribed it and religion as people practiced it is best witnessed in the transactions of the faithful with the sacred figures from whom they sought protection, healing, and redemption. People asked for divine aid in churches, chapels, and pilgrimage shrines; at sacred fountains or springs; and through relics, images, festivals, processions, and saints' cults. Catholic reform-

ers have not always felt equally comfortable with all these manifestations of sacrality. The church has tried to exercise supervision over them and to rid them of customs deemed profane or superstitious. Meanwhile the faithful have remade their own religious practices by inventing new sources of sacrality and by appropriating the church's reforms for their own purposes.

The cult of saints was central to all of these practices. Saints took on a variety of meanings within Catholicism. They were advocates before God as patrons of communities, groups, and individuals. In the quest for miracles of healing or protection, they served as intermediaries of divine grace. As moral and spiritual exemplars, they taught people how to live properly. Locally they symbolized the historical identity of villages, cities, regions, or nations. Universally they represented the institution of the church that canonized them. It was precisely their malleability that made them important to Catholics of all social and cultural levels.

In certain respects the cult of saints seems to have changed little over time. In the seventeenth-century diocese of Grenoble in France, villagers venerated Saint Anthony the Hermit at pilgrimage shrines and local chapels for a number of reasons. He was called upon to cure ergotism, to safeguard crops, and to preserve people from the plague. But above all Saint Anthony protected livestock, and he was often depicted with his iconographical symbol of a pig. People prayed to him and left offerings at his chapels seeking divine support for their livelihoods. Twentieth-century Cantabrian villagers in Spain would have recognized these concerns immediately because they too asked Saint Anthony to protect their animals. They said prayers to him and made offerings at his chapels, and no one missed mass on his feast day.

The impression of an unchanging form of worship this example provides can be misleading. While certain elements of the cult of saints have remained largely constant over the centuries, the meanings of the cult have changed as a result of negotiations between the church and its faithful. In the early modern period the church faced criticisms of the cult of saints from both Protestants and its own reformers, who felt that many of the practices and beliefs associated with the cult were too superstitious and were based on misunderstandings of doctrine. Catholic reformers tried to disabuse people of the idea that saints worked miracles themselves rather than mediating God's grace for the petitioners. They targeted disorderly festivities on saints' days and processions to shrines not led by priests. Because many figures of local veneration had never been officially canonized, the church insisted on its prerogative over determining true saints from false

by reforming canonization procedures in the 1630s and 1740s. Ecclesiastical authorities also insisted on more stringent verification of miracles, but the church never repudiated the belief that the faithful could receive them by venerating sacred figures.

Indeed the Counter-Reformation church encouraged the cult of saints through promotion of its own heroes, such as Saints Ignatius of Loyola or Teresa of Avila. It championed cults that fostered Counter-Reformation spirituality, such as that of the Blessed Sacrament, focused on the church's central cultic object, or that of the rosary with its meditative prayers. The church encouraged the honoring of sacred figures shared by all Catholics—Christ, Mary, Anne, Joseph, and the Apostles—as a means of both increasing uniformity in devotional practice and emphasizing the church's institutional authority. The attention the church paid to the cult of saints did nothing to undermine it but rather contributed to its immense renewal. The seventeenth century witnessed a “veritable explosion” of sacrality (Sallmann, 1994, pp. 14, 110) as the church beatified and canonized new saints, while people, encouraged by the church's attention to new holy figures, sought out others the institution did not officially recognize.

In many regions, such as the Castilian diocese of Cuenca, people abandoned old, local, and formerly popular saints for more universally known figures. So Saint Quiteria gave way to Saint Anne, but not just because the church promoted Anne as a member of the Holy Family. People expected her healing powers to be superior to those of the discarded Quiteria. In the mountains of the diocese of Grenoble, Anne protected villagers from avalanches, and along the coasts of the Kingdom of Naples, she looked after sailors and fishermen.

THE VIRGIN MARY AND CENTRALIZATION WITHIN POPULAR RELIGION

The same variability of meaning was evident in the veneration of the Virgin Mary, the church's most successful cult. More chapels were dedicated to her and more vows made to her than to any saint. Mary was the perfect vehicle for the forms of spirituality the Catholic Reform encouraged. But she was also the most capable of divine intercessors, one to whom people could turn for help with all sorts of problems. Much devotion to the Virgin was localized, focused on Mary as tied to a particular city, village, chapel, or shrine. In such places she was named not for doctrines of the church but for the local site at which people

venerated her. These places were sanctified by visions or miracles, and people honored Mary at them because they knew that there she would be especially receptive to their pleas. The national and international pilgrimage shrines to which people flocked were overwhelmingly Marian in their dedications, such as those at Altötting in Bavaria, Wagheusel in the Rhineland, Montserrat in Catalonia, or Guadalupe in Mexico. These shrines flourished because of both the peoples' quest for miracles and the church's efforts in encouraging devotion to Mary.

The church promoted forms of Mary's cult that referred to central doctrinal or spiritual concerns, such as Our Lady of the Conception, Assumption, Incarnation, the Rosary, and in the nineteenth century the Immaculate Conception. In the seventeenth century Our Lady of the Rosary was particularly successful. Parish churches throughout southern France, Spain, southern Italy, and elsewhere had more chapels dedicated to Our Lady of the Rosary than to any other devotion, and they were often associated with rosary confraternities. These groups were well suited to the Counter-Reformation's goals. By means of devotion to Mary, the church encouraged a disciplined form of prayer recitation—praying the rosary—that fostered an interiorized and individualized spirituality. Members of the confraternities said the rosary prayers, confessed and took Communion regularly, and submitted themselves to the clergy's direction. In other respects,

however, the new organizations continued to fulfill the time-honored requirements of local religious life. The rosary devotees celebrated Marian festivals together with processions. They took over the funerary duties of the older confraternities they were supplanting, burying their confraternal brothers and sisters and saying masses for their souls.

Thus rosary confraternities were not simply tools of the Catholic Reformation. People who joined them did so for their own reasons of piety, sociability, and social competition. The local elite families, which established the groups, saw them as expressions of their piety but also as a means of building prestige and exercising their control over their communities' religious activities. Women joined them because they were attracted to rosary-style prayer and Marian devotion but also to promote their families' interests and to gain roles in an important communal institution. Poorer members shared in the religious enthusiasm for the rosary and also sought the groups' charitable aid and assistance for funerals. Even the rosary's devotional practices could be put to other uses. In southern Italy rosary beads became miracle-working objects when touched by holy people, like Jesuit missionaries.

The same mixture of the church's institutional goals with the people's religious and social preoccupations occurred in new, urban, Jesuit congregations or sodalities. These associations were first established in the 1560s, and within two decades a network ex-

isted in Catholic cities across the Low Countries, Germany, France, and southern Italy. The Jesuits envisioned the sodalities as the vanguard of a hierarchically ordered and Jesuit-guided Catholic society. The congregations were dedicated to the Virgin, and they inculcated in their members new habits of piety based on individual examination of conscience, Ignatius of Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises* (1548), and frequent confessions. The congregants were expected to lead lives of perfect harmony with their fellows and to set moral examples for their neighbors. They practiced good works assiduously, and they acted as pressure groups, coercing local Protestants to convert and pushing civic authorities to ban carnival celebrations. But like the rosary groups the Jesuit sodalities combined a new style of piety with more traditional confraternal activities. The congregants engaged in urban processions, and they undertook pilgrimages to regional shrines. They were devoted to Mary but also to locally important saints, whom they petitioned for traditional needs, such as healing or good weather.

As thousands joined the new sodalities, which at first included members of both sexes and a range of social groups, the Jesuits came face to face with problems they had not initially considered. Segregated congregations for men of different social groups and for women developed quickly. Nobles did not want to associate with bourgeois members, who in turn did not want to worship with artisans. The Jesuit Society did not want its priests ministering directly to women, and women could not be easily accepted with men into congregations that stressed the brotherly equality of their members. The sodalities came to serve not only the Jesuit program but also the goals of the various groups that belonged to them. Rulers saw them as a means of consolidating power; the nobles and bourgeoisie as a means of gaining prestige within their social circles; and craftspeople as a means of combining religious devotion with artisanal sociability. In other words, those manifestations of Marian piety associated with the church's institutional concerns were not separate from those that grew out of the people's creative social and cultural practices.

This interchange between popular piety and the goals of the church is especially apparent in the most spectacular manifestation of the Marian cult, the nineteenth- and twentieth-century apparitions of the Virgin that led to the development of internationally important pilgrimage shrines. After the eighteenth century, during which few apparitions were reported, and after the church's crisis during the French Revolution, Europe experienced a resurgence in apparitions and visions that continued periodically into the twenty-first century. Indeed as David Blackbourn reported in

Marpingen, thousands of cases occurred from the second half of the nineteenth century through the twentieth (Blackbourn, 1995, p. xxiv). That these have been almost exclusively visions of the Virgin Mary suggests that they were the result not just of popular religious sentiment but also of the church's efforts to promote the Marian cult. Devotion to Mary strengthened during the Counter-Reformation, but in the nineteenth century the church preached the arrival of a Marian age that would precede the Second Coming. Some members of the clergy treated these miraculous occurrences with suspicion if not outright disdain, much as had Catholic reformers of previous centuries. But the church as an institution did not. Although most of the reported apparitions failed to pass the test of ecclesiastical investigation, the church promoted heavily those that did. The enthusiasm for Mary and for her new shrines served the church as a means to rally the faithful to a Catholicism that felt embattled by liberal political ideas and scientific rationalism. Workers' movements, secular education systems, and nonreligious pastimes competed with a church formerly accustomed to dominating European cultural life at higher and lower social levels. In the twentieth century the rise of communism provided a new challenge that shrines were called upon to combat.

That the apparitions and shrines were overwhelmingly Marian in character illustrates the influence of the church's institutional preoccupations over popular piety and also the continuation of a centralizing tendency in devotional life that had started with the Counter-Reformation. The church's message found a receptive audience and combined easily with an already fervent popular devotion to the Virgin. For the visionaries and pilgrims Mary's power was tied to particular locations in local landscapes. At the Lourdes grotto in the French Pyrenees or at the Marpingen sacred spring in the German Saarland, Mary's charisma was strong, and the people who came to venerate her at these spots asked for cures or divine protection in much the same way their ancestors had petitioned saints. Thus the church's official piety was infused with the popular enthusiasm of the thousands of pilgrims who flocked to the new shrines.

The church also sought to shape the meaning of the new apparitions and shrines. In 1847 the two shepherd children who witnessed visions of Mary at La Salette (in the French Alps near Grenoble) carried messages from her criticizing, in a thoroughly traditional way, the religious behavior of local people. Mary said that their sinfulness was responsible for crop failures and food shortages, but the Virgin also sent secret messages, revealed in the 1860s, that criti-

cized the French government's religious policies and urged closer relations between Paris and Rome. It is difficult not to see the hand of the French clergy in shaping this part of the Virgin's message at La Salette. At Lourdes the church's doctrinal interests were even clearer. When Mary appeared to the shepherd girl Bernadette Soubirous in 1858, she announced, "I am the Immaculate Conception." The church had promulgated the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception only four years earlier, and support for it within the church was not universal. The Lourdes visions helped greatly in cementing its acceptance. There too, however, official and popular concerns merged, since the declaration of the Immaculate Conception doctrine was an attempt by the church to promote a cult that would fit with traditional, popular religious sentiment (Kselman, 1983, p. 94).

The nineteenth century's cultural, technical, and commercial developments made possible the wide impact of the visions and the success of the new shrines. Increased literacy provided a vast audience for the reports on the Lourdes miracles and those of other shrines published in widely distributed Catholic periodicals. The construction of national railroad networks brought large numbers of pilgrims from distant areas. The developing travel industry insured that the pilgrims were housed and fed, just as it provided for the growing numbers of visitors to secular tourist attractions. The pilgrimage to a miracle-working shrine, that most ancient of popular religious phenomena, became very much a part of the modern age.

Lourdes's success, in particular, made it the model for Marian apparitions and shrines around Europe. In 1876 three village girls told of seeing the Virgin near a spring in Marpingen in Germany. They had likely heard a great deal about Soubirous and Lourdes from their parish priest and their schoolteacher. The first Marpingen apparitions occurred on the same day as a major celebration at Lourdes, the crowning of a statue of the Virgin, which drew 100,000 pilgrims. As the Marpingen visionaries and the village's adults retold their story, it came to resemble that of Lourdes. When the girls saw the vision a second time, they asked Mary, as one of their parents had instructed them to do, if she was the Immaculate Conception. The "woman in white" replied that she was. As at Lourdes and other shrines, the Virgin ordered the building of a chapel, and miraculous healings started to occur, though here the spring rather than a grotto marked the sacred site. Marpingen quickly drew thousands of pilgrims from throughout Germany. Although the church never formally approved the Marpingen miracles as it had those of Lourdes and La Salette, many thousands visited the

site during the rest of the nineteenth century and on into the twentieth.

These and the other new Marian pilgrimage sites were also notably different from early modern shrines in that the visionaries who reported the apparitions were poor children or women and more pilgrims were women than men. Women pilgrims often traveled to the new shrines together, independently of their husbands and priests. The gender imbalance is both a sign of and a contributor to the feminization of modern Catholic religious practice. The role of visionary enabled women and poor children to serve as privileged intermediaries in bringing divine aid to their often sorely distressed or impoverished areas. It brought them enormous public attention and established for them a position of prominence and even community leadership that they otherwise rarely enjoyed.

Despite the preponderance of female visionaries and pilgrims, the Marian shrines were not simply a woman's world. The Virgin was an ambivalent symbol of female religious autonomy and leadership. She was a figure of female power but also one of female submission and chastity. Women could approach her for help with reproductive or marital problems, but men too sought her aid. The initial acceptance of the seers' reports in villages depended considerably on the communities' male notables. Their approval of the visionaries' stories made the apparitions credible to the wider world, and building chapels or organizing communities to receive pilgrims was their responsibility. Critics of shrines were quick to point out that these local men acted as much out of commercial interest as piety, but the two motivations were difficult to separate.

The clergy's participation was also essential to the positive reception of visionaries. Although priests were often more skeptical than enthusiastic about the apparitions, unless they played a role the miracles would never have been widely publicized, and the church would never have approved them. Indeed Pope Pius IX's support for La Salette and Lourdes, his granting of privileges to the shrines, and his belief that the Lourdes apparitions vindicated his promulgation of the Immaculate Conception doctrine did much to insure those shrines' success.

It was precisely the malleability of Mary's meanings that made her shrines so attractive a destination for pilgrims of both sexes and of high as well as low social classes. The political tensions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries added another level of meaning to the Virgin's appearances, as her shrines became identified not only with the popular religious need for miraculous help and with the church's battle against secularization but also with the programs of political

groups. Lourdes quickly became associated with the legitimist Bourbon cause against the Second Empire and later against the Third Republic. Marpingen became a weapon in the battle of German Catholic political parties against their liberal rivals and Otto von Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* (cultural struggle). Visions in the northern Spanish town of Limpas in 1919, not of Mary but of a moving statue of Christ, were publicized as supporting right-wing politicians and as a divine warning against the liberal government.

The shrines also quickly became involved in national rivalries. Lourdes came to be seen as the French national shrine, and French Catholics took pride that Mary had appeared in their country to establish the truth of the Immaculate Conception. After the defeat by Prussia and the crisis of the Commune, thousands gathered there proclaiming Mary a symbol of national regeneration. German Catholics hoped that Marpingen would become a rival to Lourdes. They regretted that the Virgin had not previously appeared in their country but had been seen so frequently in their rivals'. Promoters of the Limpas visions sought to make their site a shrine that would attract Spanish pilgrims who were otherwise flocking over the Pyrenees to Lourdes.

The combination of the popular desire for divine aid, the anxiety over political and economic distress, the interest of political elites in divine approbation, and the church's promotion of the Marian cult to mobilize popular support was also evident in the twentieth-century development of Marian apparitions and pilgrimage centers. The most successful twentieth-century European shrines began with a series of apparitions of the Virgin at Fátima in Portugal in 1917, during a time of war shortages and bread riots. The apparitions were interpreted as a divine criticism of the anticlerical Portuguese government. In the 1950s the Catholic-authoritarian leader Salazar identified his regime with the shrine and promoted it as a bulwark against communism. He sponsored a tour of the shrine's image around the country, and in subsequent years it toured the world. Popes, including John Paul II, also expressed their devotion to the Virgin of Fátima. The fervent anti-Communist Pius XII was particularly attached to Fátima and to the Marian cult more generally. In 1950 he proclaimed the dogma of the Assumption, and he declared 1954, the centenary of the proclamation of the Immaculate Conception, a "Marian year." His enthusiasm sparked new apparitions and miracles. As Lourdes did in the nineteenth century, Fátima became a model for shrines in the twentieth. It spawned numerous subsidiaries around the world that took their names from Fátima, and older Marian shrines sponsored "Fátima Day" pil-

grimages to share in the devotion to the Portuguese shrine.

Other appearances of the Virgin closely tracked the most difficult periods of twentieth-century European history. The economic problems of the 1930s led to an outburst of apparitions at Ezquioga in the Spanish Pyrenees (1931) and at Beauraing (1932) and Banneux (1933) in Belgium. In economically depressed regions such as these, people sought the Virgin's help, but the local and international political situations also fed Marian devotion at these sites. The apparitions at Ezquioga occurred following a left-wing election victory. It is possible to see (perhaps it is impossible not to see) the Virgin's appearance in 1933 at fifteen different European locations as linked to the rise of nazism in Germany. The difficulties of the immediate postwar years and the tensions of the cold war led to another resurgence in visions of Mary. Between 1947 and 1954, 112 cases were reported, some outside of Europe, such as at Lipa in the Philippines,

but most in Italy, Spain, France, Ireland, Britain, Austria, Poland, Romania, and Hungary. As previously, these new visions were given a political meaning. Communism was denounced as a punishment for a lack of faith among Catholics, and stories from the shrines told of former communists converted by the Virgin's ministrations.

In 1961 young girls at San Sebastián de Garabandal in northern Spain claimed to have seen the

Virgin, and over two thousand apparitions were recorded there over the next two years. The church, however, did not officially recognize the visions. In 1964 an Italian woman known as Mama Rosa declared that the Virgin had appeared to her in the sun at San Damiano near Piacenza. The apparitions continued for almost two decades, but the church did not authorize Mama Rosa's visions either. In this instance the church's hostility might have come from a partic-

ular tension between the institution and the visionary. Among the conservative messages Mama Rosa conveyed from Mary were criticisms of the church's Vatican II liberal reforms. Presumably, however, the eighty thousand pilgrims who, by the 1980s, arrived each year at Mama Rosa's farmhouse were not attracted by disputes within the church (Nolan and Nolan, 1989, p. 308). Water from a well at the sacred site has reportedly worked miracles of healing. Pilgrims brew dried flowers from the site of the visions with the water, and the concoction is said to make an especially effective cure. The same might be said for Fátima or any of the other modern shrines, both those few the church has approved and the many more the church has not. People do not come to them just because the apparitions have been interpreted in ways that offer solace from political strife. Likewise they do not come only because the Virgin assures them of refuge in a world and a church that seem to have left old religious certainties behind. They travel to shrines for much the same reason that Catholics have for centuries, seeking divine help with the perplexing if mundane problems of life.

This mixture of motivations remained true in spectacular manifestations of the Marian cult's popularity in the late twentieth century. In 1981 six youngsters reported visions of the Virgin near the village of Medjugorje in Herzegovina, in an area that Croatia

claimed. The apparitions continued into the twenty-first century. In the political context of the former Yugoslavia, the apparitions easily took on an anticommunist connotation. In the ethnically and religiously mixed region, where tensions exploded into war in the 1990s, Medjugorje became a rallying point for the local Croatian Catholic population. Again the clergy's response has been divided, but the heavily publicized apparitions have provoked a popular response similar to that of Lourdes or Fátima. Millions of pilgrims from around the world have visited the site, attracted less by the shrine's role in local political and religious conflicts than by its miracles and the possibility of contact with Mary's divine power.

It is impossible to separate the supposedly "elite" from the supposedly "popular" religious motivations at Medjugorje. The success of shrines and indeed of all collective religious phenomena depends on a combination of impulses shared among a variety of social and cultural groups, including both the laity and the clergy. The meanings of the phenomena are negotiated between the church, with its institutional aims, and the faithful, with their particular purposes. These meanings combine the age-old need for recourse to divine power with more current and often more worldly concerns. It is precisely because of this combination that popular religious belief and practice demand the attention of social historians.

See also other articles in this section.

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CHURCH AND SOCIETY



Andrew E. Barnes

Change in the relationship between church and society in Europe is best examined by trying to get a sense of why and in what ways the European understanding of the word “church” has changed. From the sixteenth century to the twentieth century, the social face of the Christian church underwent four significant transformations. First, the unitary international church of the Middle Ages gave way to what in the twentieth century was a plurality of national and purely denominational churches. Second, the personality of the clergy became more distinctly pastoral. Third, in most European states religious life came to be centered around the parish church. Fourth, Christian churches implemented and perfected two overlapping strategies for social outreach.

These religious transformations did not take place in a political vacuum. The political face of Europe changed even more radically than did the social face of Christianity during the centuries in question. These political changes in turn shaped the nature of religious change. To recount the transformations in the institutional character of Christian life, it is helpful to think of processes of change that occurred over three time periods, those periods determined by the general thrust of political evolution. During the first period, the Middle Ages (850–1500), national governments were nonexistent or relatively small and weak, with little ability to directly influence the lives of their subjects. The international church was independent of and often antagonistic toward these governments. During the early modern centuries (1500–1800), the centuries of the old regime, national governments grew powerful and successfully asserted their right to regulate every aspect of their subjects’ lives. Early modern governments were monarchical and officially Christian, and they used national churches as vehicles through which to monitor and regulate social and cultural behavior. The French Revolution issued in the modern centuries (1800–2000), bringing into existence the “new regime” governments that continued into the twenty-first century. Modern governments were “republican,” that is, they were directed by duly

elected representative assemblies, and they were “secular,” that is, they were officially disassociated from all religious organizations. Modern governments went beyond regulating existing social and cultural behaviors to attempting to instill new ones, an example being patriotic behavior. For this reason modern governments sought to perform many of the functions early modern governments assigned to churches. While national churches no longer received government support, they still functioned as community churches in much the same way that they always had.

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONAL CHURCHES

Of the four ways in which the social face of Christianity changed, the most important was the multiplication of churches. Until the end of the Middle Ages, Europeans everywhere recognized the authority of the pope in Rome, and in theory if not in practice every church everywhere was understood to be a branch office of a single firm. During the early modern age every European state developed a national church. In the modern era those national churches competed with other Christian denominations as well as other religious creeds for adherents.

The medieval Christian church was recognized by contemporaries as catholic and universal, meaning that they saw it as a single, all-encompassing entity. To a certain extent this image was deceptive. Within the church were many religious orders that had nothing in common except obedience to Rome. Also, as demonstrated in England by the Lollard movement and in Bohemia (Czech Republic) by the Hussite movement, by the end of the Middle Ages it was possible to see, beneath the Latin-speaking hierarchy at the top of the church, the emergence of nationalist clergies concerned with the communication of the gospel in the vernacular.

During the early modern centuries, in the context of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation,

national churches became the order of the day. Protestant churches were explicitly under the authority of territorial rulers, whether the latter were royal, princely, or municipal. These national churches may have followed the reforms of Christian worship mandated by reformers such as Martin Luther, Huldrych Zwingli, or John Calvin, but in every instance, even in Geneva, the city personally reformed by Calvin, eventually ultimate authority in church matters came to rest in the hands of civil governments.

The European states that remained Catholic and went through the Counter-Reformation continued to acknowledge the authority of the pope in Rome, but in these states also control over most aspects of religious life was claimed by state governments. In kingdoms such as France and Spain, royal governments took the initiative in proposing replacements when positions for bishops and abbots became vacant. Royal governments also took over church institutions and made them serve royal purposes. This process is seen most spectacularly in the Spanish monarchy's creation of its own version of the Roman Inquisition. The more important example, however, was the governmental appropriation of parochial institutions discussed below. As for the effort of Rome to direct church reform, this happened on the national level only at the discretion of rulers. The Council of Trent (1545–1563) was the key event of the Counter-Reformation. It produced a series of reform decrees aimed at addressing most of the major complaints about Catholic church practices. Yet these decrees were only officially proclaimed in France, for example, at the discretion of King Louis XIII in 1614.

One legacy of the emergence of national churches was an increase in the readiness of Europeans to demonize their neighbors. The appearance of national churches made the question of spiritual uniformity an important issue for rulers and their peoples, both of which shared two assumptions. One was that social nonconformity was inspired by Satan. The other was that religious beliefs dictated political allegiances; thus subjects who maintained a set of beliefs different from those of the ruler were predisposed toward treason.

The first assumption led to the witch craze of the early modern centuries. During the Middle Ages the Roman Inquisition had been developed to suppress heresy or heterodox religious beliefs, and then had evolved to claim an expertise in the detection and eradication of *maleficarum*, or witchcraft. The medieval Roman Inquisition was an elite, international institution that intervened in local situations with relatively little local support. Still it provided Europeans with a vocabulary for representing those perceived as

different as a threat to family and state. In early modern Europe local agents both of the government and of the church made use of this vocabulary to explain the threat to the community posed by social deviants. That label might be applied to anyone whose behavior did not conform to communal mores, but sadly it was mostly applied to solitary, poor, and, because of these two conditions, cantankerous old women. The actions of these women, especially when they invoked their rights as members of the community to a share of local charity, triggered social discord, which was understood to anger God. Motivation for such divisive behavior could only come from Satan. In fact the manuals on witch finding that early modern European officials inherited from the Inquisition taught that Satan had launched a campaign to conquer the world and that women were prime recruits for his army. Determined to take the battle to Satan, local officials prosecuted female malcontents with an enthusiasm that occasionally bordered on the maniacal.

The witch craze ended quite abruptly in the second half of the seventeenth century. A variety of developments contributed to its end. Mostly, though, skepticism on the part of government officials about the reality of Satan's conspiracy for world conquest brought the trials to a halt. Beginning in the eighteenth century, belief in witchcraft was dismissed by Europe's educated elite as superstition. Among some of the common folk, however, the belief remained alive into the twenty-first century.

The second shared assumption among the rulers and the ruled led to religious persecution. Just as the medieval Inquisition identified the dangers posed by social diversity, it also identified the dangers posed by cultural diversity. Religious beliefs contrary to those of the state church were heretical. In inquisitorial

manuals heresy was a sin of pride that, through its repudiation of the true faith, angered God. For early modern European governments it was equally important that heresy provided a justification for political resistance to authority, even political collaboration with enemy states. The demonization of those who followed another confession or version of Christianity helps explain why, even though from the sixteenth century onward many states had religious minorities who declined to participate in the national church, it took so long for governments to accept or tolerate religious diversity. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries most major European states fought wars over religion. Significantly, these wars were treated by contemporaries as both civil wars and wars against foreign aggression. The Peace of Augsburg (1555), which brought an end to the first series of religious wars fought in the Holy Roman Empire (Germany), introduced the political principle that each ruler had the right to dictate the version of Christianity practiced in his or her realm. Wars continued to be fought, but this principle remained the compromise most often adopted at the end of the fighting.

Catholic subjects of Protestant princes could always relocate to a Catholic land, and Protestant subjects of Catholic princes could go to a Protestant land. During the early modern centuries one group of Christians had nowhere to turn. Most early modern Christians accepted the idea that the church and the community were synonymous. Baptism for them was simultaneously the religious act of becoming a Christian and the social act of joining the community. Because it served both these functions, they supported the baptism of babies, even though it was recognized that babies could not consciously embrace Christianity. Believers in adult baptism only, known collectively as Anabaptists, rejected the connection between the church and the community. Anabaptists argued that the only true way to be a Christian was to leave the community and the rest of the world behind, and that only an adult could reach such a decision. Implicit in their arguments was the idea that Christians owed no loyalty to the community or the state. For this reason both Protestant and Catholic governments hunted down Anabaptists and burned them. Anabaptist groups found some refuge in eastern European enclaves. Most, however, found space to thrive and grow only when they moved to North America, where they had a tremendous impact on New World Protestantism.

It was not until most wars over religion ceased, toward the end of the seventeenth century, that the principle of religious toleration, the idea that it was possible for participants in more than one creed to live in the same state, gained political support. It

gained support primarily in commercial states, like Britain and the Dutch Republic, where mercantile middle classes exerted real political influence. Even in these states religious toleration was selective. In Britain, for example, Protestant dissenters were permitted to maintain their own churches though they were prohibited from participating in the political process or from attending church schools or national universities. Catholics, or “papists” as they were labeled, continued to suffer persecution.

During the eighteenth century national churches were a favorite target of Enlightenment thinkers, especially French philosophes. They did not so much celebrate toleration as condemn the idea of a national church as chauvinistic. Still they questioned the notion that followers of a creed different from that of the ruler would necessarily be disloyal. In France, during the Revolution, legislation stripped away all civil penalties for worshiping outside the state church. Napoleon and his troops applied the idea of religious toleration implicit in this legislation in all the states they conquered. By the start of the modern age, freedom of religion was regarded by liberal Europeans as a civil liberty that every individual had a right to demand.

Few individuals demanded it, however. The secularization of governments did not prompt religious diversity. Unlike in the New World, where competing Christian churches thrived in the same locale, in Europe, with some notable exceptions, the typical pattern of worship remained that of a national church with almost a monopoly of local believers and a group of smaller churches competing on the local social fringe. When national churches were suppressed, such as occurred in states that underwent communist revolutions, all religion was banned. When these communist regimes collapsed at the end of the 1980s, the dominant pattern was reestablished. For the most part government harassment of religious minorities disappeared in Europe in the twentieth century. There were few states, however, where the hold of the national church over the churchgoing population was threatened by competing creeds.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CLERGY

The historian John Bossy has insisted that a distinction be made between “medieval Christianity” on one side of the Reformation and “post-Reformation Protestantism” and “post-Reformation Catholicism” on the other, arguing that the two post-Reformation creeds are discrete religious experiences that emerged from the common core of medieval Christianity. Con-

cerning dogmatic and doctrinal issues, his point is well taken. But from the social, institutional perspective, the involvement of government made the evolutions of both Protestant and Catholic national churches remarkably similar. The Catholic retention of the sacraments and religious orders and the Protestant reliance on the Bible should not camouflage the parallels in institutional development. The national churches created in the sixteenth century were ecclesiastical organizations that were simultaneously government agencies. Their first order of business was ensuring religious orthodoxy; their second was linking local communities with the nation-state; and their third was assisting the state in providing goods and services to local populations. These shared concerns shaped the way both Protestant and Catholic national churches evolved and ensured that they evolved in the same direction.

The similarity is seen most obviously in the second way in which the social, institutional face of Christianity changed. At the close of the Middle Ages, most clerics continued to aspire to the ancient ideals of spiritual athleticism. By the modern age, the clergy had become primarily pastoral in inclination as well as occupation. At the end of the medieval period anger and disillusionment with the behavior of the clergy was widespread in European society. Beginning with the Gregorian reform movement in the eleventh century, the clergy claimed that it was engaged in a spiritual contest from which the laity, that is, all ordinary Christians, were excluded. This idea supported the development of a special set of laws, applicable only to members of the clergy, that placed the clergy outside the authority of royal, princely, and civil courts. Many clerics abused the special status the laws created for them by committing crimes and then invoking clerical privilege to escape punishment. Broad popular skepticism about the commitment of clerics to the spiritual contest in which they were supposedly engaged was fueled by the not uncommon disregard among the clergy for the clerical vow of celibacy.

Medieval Christians recognized two categories of clerics. First was the secular clergy, so called because they lived “in the world” or *saeculum* so as to maintain pastoral care of the laity. Clergy associated with parish churches, such as parish priests and their vicars, and clergy associated with episcopal churches or cathedrals, such as canons, vicar generals, and bishops, were members of the secular clergy. Second was the regular clergy, the clergy who lived according to some rule or order (*regula*). Members of religious orders all lived by a rule and thus were designated as regular clergy. The rule provided followers with a guide or pathway toward spiritual perfection or, to continue the meta-

phor from above, a set of weapons with which to win the spiritual contest in which they were engaged. Monks and nuns all were members of the regular clergy. Friars and members of mendicant or begging orders, such as the Franciscans and the Dominicans, likewise were regulars.

Most of the complaints about clerical behavior were directed at regulars. Members of religious orders made up the majority of the clergy at the end of the Middle Ages. Monasteries dotted the European countryside, and most towns and cities had at least two or three convents. Most of the students who attended universities claimed to be members of religious orders. Many rural monasteries were the major landlords in the vicinity, and their members often maintained a luxurious lifestyle that challenged any notion of sanctity. Inhabitants of urban convents were often notorious for their loose living. Students were perceived by the communities surrounding the universities as overindulged, overprotected hell-raisers, much given to alcohol and prostitution.

Yet many were also disappointed with the secular clergy, particularly the parish clergy who likewise were castigated as immoral and alcoholic but were uneducated. More important, parish clergy were condemned as woefully incompetent and woefully negligent as pastors. The shortcomings of the parish clergy had become obvious as early as the twelfth century, when Europe’s first “commercial revolution” had triggered both a rise in population and a clustering of people in towns and cities. These towns and cities needed pastors, but instead of supplying the need with parish clergy, Rome opted instead to create new religious orders such as the Franciscans and the Dominicans.

Both the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation sought to regulate the behavior of the regular clergy. Protestant and Catholic reformers differed in their approaches to the problem, however. Protestant reformers responded by suppressing both religious orders and the special set of laws for clerics. Monastic communities were dissolved, and monastic lands were sold. Monks and nuns were sent out into the world to live as ordinary people, and ecclesiastical courts were abolished. Catholic reformers responded in the traditional way of Roman Christianity by supporting the establishment of new religious orders and the reform of old ones. Among the masculine orders the most important new one was the Society of Jesus, better known as the Jesuits, while the most important of the reformed was the Capuchins, who were a reformed branch of the Franciscan order. Among the feminine orders the most important new one was the Daughters of Charity founded by St. Vin-

cent de Paul and St. Louise Marillac, while the most important reformed order was the Carmelites, reformed by the spirituality of St. Teresa of Ávila. These new and reformed religious orders attracted the best and brightest of the individuals drawn to religious life, leaving the older religious orders to decline owing to the lack of new recruits.

More important than the solutions adopted for the problems of decadence among the regular clergy in the long term were the solutions adopted to address the problem of an inadequate supply of pastors. Here Protestant and Catholic reformers followed the same strategy. Seminaries, special schools for training pastors, were set up and made mandatory for men who aspired to the cure of souls, that is, to pastoral authority over laypeople. The training in these seminaries was different. The expectation that Protestant ministers were to marry and live as ordinary citizens oriented Protestant training toward involvement in the civil life of the communities in which Protestant ministers were to serve as pastors. The requirement that Catholic priests remain unmarried and limit their involvement in the personal lives of their parishioners dictated that their training emphasize learning to live in isolation away from social allurements. As the focus of Catholic seminary training suggests, with the insistence that pastors be trained came a determination that they comport themselves in public with probity. In both Protestant and Catholic lands from the sixteenth century onward, clerical social behavior came under greater scrutiny. Church and political officials worked together to identify and remove from office clerics who did not behave according to public expectations.

The reform of the clergy was the greatest and most durable achievement of the sixteenth-century religious reformations. Few significant developments in the evolution of the clergy occurred after that time. In the twentieth century the parish clergy remained the point of contact between the church and the community in both Protestant and Catholic Europe. Other types of clergy did not disappear, but their interactions with the laity declined.

Still a space remained in both Protestantism and Catholicism for clerical evangelists. Pastoral clergy help laypeople maintain and deepen their faith, but they are not as good as evangelists at firing up religious enthusiasm or prompting religious conversions. In both forms of Christianity evangelists stimulated the emergence of fringe movements, sectarian groups among Protestants and new religious orders among Catholics. These groups never succeeded in pulling in more than a minority of the devout laity, but their activities had a ripple effect, enlivening and giving

meaning to the faith of ever-broadening circles of laypeople. In Britain this phenomenon was seen in the Methodist break from the Church of England in the eighteenth century and in the Oxford movement in the nineteenth century. An excellent example from the Catholic world is the devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. The devotion first gained a following, primarily among nuns, in the seventeenth century, but it soon became popular among elite women. Initially Rome, skeptical about the theology upon which the devotion was framed, refused the many requests for official acknowledgment of the devotion. In 1720 the future St. Paul of the Cross had a vision in which he saw the Virgin Mary holding a version of the sacred heart. He dedicated his life to preaching the devotion to the Passion of Jesus Christ. In 1741 his male followers were organized into a religious order, the Passionist Fathers, and in 1771 his female followers were organized into a religious order, the Passionist Nuns. In 1765 Pope Clement XIII granted Catholics the right to celebrate the feast of the Sacred Heart.

THE GROWTH OF PARISH-CENTERED CHRISTIANITY

The new pastors needed new churches in which to pastor. The third way in which the social, institutional face of Christianity changed was the vitalization of the parish church and parish life. Medieval Christians did not expect to receive much spiritual edification at their parish churches, and most were not disappointed. The Christian church of the Middle Ages inherited from the Roman Empire an organizational structure that grouped the inhabitants of local communities into parishes and the regional populations in those parishes into dioceses. The official church of the community, the parish church, was where all local Christians were expected to worship and receive spiritual instruction. Even if they worshiped somewhere else, parish members were expected to pay tithes, that is, church dues, at the parish church. Parish priests were responsible for the spiritual salvation of every member of their flocks.

In the Middle Ages parish churches were often decrepit and run down. Behind this sad state of affairs was the economic fact that most of the money from tithes and from land owned by the parish was often claimed by the local landlord, the effective owner and operator of the church, who gave back a portion too small to maintain the church in good repair.

Another factor contributing to the sorry condition of parish churches was that for most medieval Christians the parish church was important solely as

the location of official rites and rituals. Children were baptized there, families were joined in marriage there, and neighbors were reconciled through the rite of communion there. If they desired a more spiritual religious experience, medieval Christians looked elsewhere, to shrines, to the churches of religious orders, or to the open-air gathering places where revivals were preached.

Both the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation made the renovation of parish churches a top priority, and the involvement of state governments was the key. In Protestant lands churches became explicit extensions of the state. In Catholic lands the connection was more indirect but still present. In both situations the state made parish churches the smallest, most local administrative unit. Thus parish records of births and deaths were a form of census, while government announcements were made from the pulpit on Sunday mornings. Since the church was

an arm of the state, governments measured loyalty by attendance at Sunday services.

The parish church took on more than just political functions. During the early modern centuries it emerged as the first locus of modern Christian communal life. As the strongest, best-constructed local building, the parish church was the place of refuge during war or times of natural disasters. In the moments before or after services on Sunday mornings, official proclamations and news were read out. New devotions and religious ideas usually were introduced locally at the parish. The first schools were usually attached to parish churches, which meant the parish church also was where most people learned to read and write. Paupers came there on feast days to receive handouts, and the plaza or place in front of the church never ceased to be the venue for local markets and festivals. The parish church continued to serve as the locale for rites of passage for parish members.

The high point for the parish church as a social and political institution was probably reached in the eighteenth century, when old regime governments also reached their height. Subsequently the role and influence of the parish church in local communities progressively diminished to the point that the church retained significance only for the faithful. Especially during the nineteenth century, new venues rivaled the place of the parish church in village life. The café appeared, where villagers could get not just coffee, tea, wine, and spirits but information from newspapers and gossip. During the French Revolution the official connection between church and state was dissolved in most nations. Even though the connection was reestablished in most places, in the nineteenth century governments took over more and more of the activities once performed at the parish church. In the twentieth century, most Europeans who still attended church did so at their local parish. The parish remained at the core of the European Christian experience but with minimal impact on the lives of local nonbelievers.

CHRISTIAN SOCIAL OUTREACH

The fourth way in which the institutional face of Christianity changed was less apparent. Two sets of developments progressively shifted the spotlight away from the churches and toward the social and political movements the churches spawned. The social influence of parish churches declined in part because the social services the parishes once provided, that is, health care, education, and poor relief, were taken over by governments. Christian churches perfected these services as vehicles for social outreach. Helping the poor became the preferred way to channel the energies of pious laypeople and also the chief means of keeping the poor within the faith. The government's appropriation of social services forced churches to devise a new strategy for influencing social behavior. The most effective strategy proved to be Christian lobbying organizations.

Social service. During the Middle Ages neither the church nor the state dedicated any funds to social services. Social institutions such as hospitals, schools, and poorhouses existed, but in general they were built by wealthy patrons and maintained by pious lay brotherhoods known as confraternities. As a result the early modern centuries inherited from the Middle Ages a social welfare system based on what would much later be called volunteerism.

The Reformation and Counter-Reformation appropriated the system and changed it in two ways. Both Protestants and Catholics started distinguishing between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor. The deserving were those who demonstrated a willingness to work and fidelity to the local church. In addition both Protestants and Catholics used lay charity to reinforce the authority of the local church. They did so in different ways, but the social impact was the same. Both used funds from lay charity to develop new social service professionals, such as nurses, teachers, and social workers.

Medieval Christians were rewarded with indulgences for their acts of charity. Indulgences were grants from the treasury of spiritual grace maintained by the church that might be applied toward the remission of the spiritual penalties sinners had incurred in the act of sinning, grants popularly misunderstood to offer sinners a way out of spending decades or even centuries in purgatory.

Protestantism rejected the validity of indulgences and shifted the theological focus of acts of charity from the benefit for the soul of the giver to the benefit for the soul of the receiver. Nevertheless, Protestantism integrated the act of giving into parish life. Collections for the parish poor took place after the sermon every Sunday. Church deacons, usually the most prosperous and influential members of the congregation who presumably gave most of the funds for the poor, were entrusted with the task of visiting the houses of the poverty-stricken to distribute the money. Significantly, Protestant congregations also began to pay “visitors of the sick,” men with some medical training, to make weekly rounds providing medical advice to the poor. Congregations also came to expect able-bodied poor women to perform nursing duties in exchange for their weekly handouts.

From the point of view of early modern European Christianity, it is difficult to make a distinction between illness and poverty since the two sources of suffering were perceived as different species of the same divine punishment. By the same token it is hard to differentiate between medicine and poor relief. During the early modern age the former had little to do with curing disease. Rather, medicine, like poor relief, was mostly concerned with easing the earthly pain of a heavenly judgment. With these points in mind it is possible to appreciate the office of visitor of the sick as the forerunner to the modern occupation of social worker. “Visitors” did not and could not offer much medical advice, but they could and did serve as intermediaries between the community and the underclass, assessing for the former the poor person's state of health and facilitating for the latter their

claims to the goods and services offered by the community. Visitors of the sick investigated and validated claims of illness. Healthy or able-bodied poor people were expected to work to improve their lots. Refusal to work pushed healthy paupers into the undeserving poor category, which cut them off from community charity. Visitors also articulated the needs of those they certified as both poor and sick. Based on their professional expertise, visitors were expected to determine whether the sick poor person needed a greater share of charitable funds, some nursing assistance, or more specialized medical advice. Replace the early modern idea of illness with the twentieth-century notion of indigence and it is possible to view the visitors' tasks as having become those of the modern social worker.

Catholicism affirmed the validity of indulgences, maintaining charity as an avenue down which sinners might proceed toward spiritual redemption. It also reaffirmed the validity of confraternities as dispensers of social welfare. But the majority of medieval lay confraternities were attached to the churches of the religious orders and thus were extraparochial. The Counter-Reformation confraternities that administered poor relief operated out of parish churches. Further, the funds these confraternities collected went less toward paying for specific acts of charity for specific individuals, such as dowries for local poor girls, and more toward paying for the upkeep of hospitals and schools.

These hospitals and schools were staffed by professionals. While the Protestant churches can be credited with creating the prototype for the social worker, Catholicism provided the models for twentieth-century nurses and teachers. Protestantism offered little spiritual reward for the physically taxing, poorly compensated labors associated with nursing. The Catholic idea of charity, however, imbued such labors with the highest spiritual rewards. Nursing became the vocation of new orders of religious women, of which the Daughters of Charity was the most influential example. While in no way as demanding an occupation as nursing, teaching, especially at the lowest level, was mentally exhausting and rarely well paid. Catholicism made this tedious task a pathway to spiritual perfection. The Society of Jesus was the first and most successful of the teaching orders.

By the middle of the seventeenth century the Christian churches had established intraconnecting networks of social services funded and directed by Christian volunteerism. By the end of that century, however, most governments realized that these networks could not meet the need for social services. Throughout the eighteenth century governments appropriated poor-relief systems, transforming hospitals

and workhouses from the hostels and halfway houses they had been under the churches into the forerunners of the modern medical hospital, the modern mental asylum, and the modern prison. The nationalization of school systems occurred in the nineteenth century; governments replaced church schools with state versions of primary and secondary schools. Government control of social work was primarily a twentieth-century development. As governments attempted to provide citizens with social services "from the cradle to the grave," state-trained and state-employed social workers emerged as the point of contact between service providers and service consumers.

Through the twentieth century churches continued to operate their own networks of social services based on the idea of Christian volunteerism. But only practicing Christians used those networks, and they rarely depended on them exclusively. Heirs to the government support that previously went to church hospitals and schools, government institutions provided the bulk of social services in most European states. Their access to the population at large curtailed, churches found themselves battling to retain their social influence. In the struggle to maintain a Christian say over the cultural values communicated in government social institutions, churches discovered that the most effective way to sway government policy was through the mobilization of the Christian portion of the populace. Eventually both Protestant and Catholic churches came to appreciate that lobbying organizations were the most efficient way to mobilize the Christian population.

Lobbying organizations. The Christian lobbying organization had at least two predecessors. Missions—that is, arranged tours of traveling evangelists—were a part of European Christianity from the start. They lost some of their importance during the medieval centuries owing to the sense that the population was already Christianized and thus more in need of pastors than evangelists. Beginning in the early modern centuries, however, missions recaptured much of their importance. Churches depended on itinerant preachers, who moved across the countryside staging revivals, to shore up the faith of portions of the population perceived as leaning toward other confessions or toward religious indifference. Missions also proved the most economical way (in material if not human terms) to introduce Christianity into non-European lands. This last factor further enhanced the importance of missions during the modern centuries. European imperial conquests in Africa and Asia created stiff competition between European churches to promote their version of the creed among the conquered popula-

tions. Reliance on missions was not an innovation, however, but a rediscovered means toward an institutional end. The goal of churches in sponsoring missions remained the reinforcement of or creation of a parish church or its equivalent.

The second predecessor was the crusade, a military mobilization of a Christian population with the aim of achieving a religious objective. The Crusades of the eleventh century to the fourteenth century, sponsored by Western Christendom, aimed at freeing Jerusalem from Muslim control. By the start of the thirteenth century crusades also had become a means to force religious change within Europe. In southern France a crusade wiped out a religious heresy. Along the coast of the Baltic Sea a crusade forced the conversion of the non-Christian population. The *reconquista* in Spain, the centuries-long effort to retake the Iberian Peninsula from the Muslims, was a form of crusade. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the age of religious warfare, many European states witnessed the development of movements that could be characterized as crusades. Masses of armed sectaries moved about, offering their opponents a

choice between (re)conversion to the true faith or death.

The Christian lobbying organizations that emerged from the late eighteenth century onward built on the legacies of these Christian organizational structures, but in one essential way they were different. The earlier organizations were concerned first and foremost with effecting religious change. The new organizations and the political and social movements they fostered sought to realize political agendas through political processes. In a republican age the ambition of these organizations was to influence public opinion, and through public opinion the voting public, and through the voting public government decision making. That these organizations provided practicing Christians with moral vantage points from which to view the secularism of the age is not immaterial. That they made governments reluctant to further curb the activities of Christian social institutions or to place obstacles in the path of Christian evangelical movements is important also. But their prime historical significance was the influence over public policy making they provided to church people.

The Company of the Holy Sacrament, a secret network of Catholic elites who promoted the Counter-Reformation in France, may be considered a forerunner of the type of Christian lobbying organization that appeared in the eighteenth century. The actual prototype was the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade established at the end of the eighteenth century by the “Clapham sect” of Protestant ministers in London. Using mass meetings, the news media, and church visitations in conjunction with lobbying the British Parliament, the society rallied the Christian population of Britain behind the proposition that slavery was un-Christian. The society persuaded the British government to abolish the slave trade in 1807 and to declare slavery illegal in 1834. It provided a model for cooperation on social issues for Protestant Christians of different denominations. In that sense it was the ancestor of the Protestant ecumenical movement that produced the 1910 World Missionary Conference held in Edinburgh, Scotland, which in turn sired the World Council of Churches, founded in 1948.

Increasingly during the nineteenth century the Catholic Church found itself in conflict with the secular republican governments of the states in which Catholicism was once the state religion. Complicating the conflict was the repudiation by many Catholic clerics of the very idea of a republic. These men and women called for the return of monarchies and rejected the legitimacy of representative government and democratic assemblies. It was only during the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII (1878–1903) that European Catholics embraced the use of lobbying organizations to effect political change. In Germany the Catholic Church fought the *Kulturkampf*, cultural war, with the government of Prince Otto von Bismarck. At issue was the right of government officials to demand expressions of loyalty from members of the clergy. After more than a decade of stalemate, Leo brokered a solution, making significant use of the Catholic Center Party in the German Reichstag as a tool to force favorable terms for the church from the government. Leo pressured French Catholics into acknowledging the legitimacy of republican government,

then directed them, through his program of *ralliement* (rallying to the French Third Republic), to the use of lobbying organizations to promote the church’s program. These two efforts were only a prelude to his most ambitious initiative, a plan, announced in the papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891), to build a network of Catholic labor unions and worker’s co-operatives to stand as a bulwark against the spread of international socialism. Leo’s plan did not yield the desired harvest, but following his pontificate Catholic Europeans used a range of lobbying organizations to influence the political processes in their home societies.

After the end of the early modern age very few of the institutional features of European churches changed. European Christianity remained structured within the context of national churches. The vast majority of Christians experienced their faith at parish churches under the direction of parish priests. Christians wanting to do more than just participate in parish life were directed toward a spectrum of volunteer activities, from helping the poor in Europe to preaching to the unconverted outside Europe to maintaining a Christian influence over government decision making. The social message Christian churches communicated certainly evolved. The language with which the churches communicated their message, like the churches themselves, became nationalized. But the institutional context in which these changes occurred remained constant after the early modern centuries. That the portion of the European population participating in this institutional life was probably lower at the end of the twentieth century than at any other time since the fourth century, when Constantine made Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire, should not be read as a negative comment upon European churches as institutions. In late-twentieth-century Europe, there were no political penalties and few social and cultural incentives for being a Christian. That so many Europeans continued to embrace that identity is testament to the ongoing appeal of Christianity’s doctrines and beliefs and the appeal of the institutional context in which those ideas were shared.

See also Witchcraft; Charity and Poor Relief: The Modern Period; Charity and Poor Relief: The Early Modern Period (volume 3).

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JUDAISM



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Owing to the rich textual and hermeneutical legacy of Judaism, Jewish historical research has, until the latter part of the twentieth century, been dominated by an overwhelming concern with intellectual development. This emphasis reflects continuity with central elements of the Jewish religious tradition, on the one hand, and a modern cultural-political response to the increasing participation of Jews in European society, on the other. Aiming to enhance the literary and philosophical prestige of Judaism, and thereby advance the cause of civic and social emancipation, nineteenth-century practitioners of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* devoted much of their energies to documenting and highlighting contributions that Jews had made to human civilization. Only since the 1980s has the study of Jewish history expanded to include social institutions and the experiences of ordinary people. Employing quantified data drawn from notarial documents, censuses, tax rolls, and birth, marriage, and death records, the new historiography has been able to reconstruct demographic trends, migration patterns, and occupational distributions of European Jewry. More descriptive accounts furnished by memoirs, personal correspondence, and oral testimonies have also been used to balance the picture that emerged from quantified sources. These methodological approaches, shared both by Jewish and general social historians, have been applied to the dynamics of acculturation, assimilation, and the shaping of modern Jewish political, cultural, and religious identities. However, in contrast to general trends in the field of social history, where the focus has only recently shifted from the working classes, the study of Jewish modernization has included the entire Jewish community.

The modern history of Judaism, with its rich variety of geographical, ethnic, cultural, and religious expressions, traces its foundation to the Hebrew scriptures and the Pharisaic articulation of Israelite traditions. Initially preserved and transmitted orally, the authoritative rabbinic interpretation of biblical Judaism was recorded in the Mishnah, elaborated upon in the Talmud, and expanded further in biblical and tal-

ludic commentaries, philosophical tracts, mystical compositions, legal codes, and responsa literature. Medieval interpretations and embellishments of earlier teachings were frequently novel, even far-reaching in character, but remained faithful to the ancient traditions. Even movements that deviated more radically from normative Judaism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nonetheless continued to derive much of their authority and core ideas from the very same Jewish tradition from which they diverged, albeit each in accordance with its own reading and emphases. Together, these diverse strands constitute a largely unbroken continuity to the Judaism of today and find expression through the corporate life of the Jewish people. Owing to the interdependence of these elements, this article examines the social impact of modernity on Judaism and Jewish culture, and therefore integrates social and intellectual history.

RELIGIOUS TRADITION AND SOCIAL HISTORY

Public discussions concerning the status of the Jews, occasioned first by the prospect of their readmission into western and central Europe in the seventeenth century and later by the need to ascertain their suitability for citizenship, invariably centered on the social dimension of the Jewish religion. As the likelihood for entrance into modern society improved, the challenges it presented seized the attention of the Jewish community and remained the main topic of internal debate for most of the modern era. At issue was the corpus of social teachings that determined the ethical obligations toward non-Jews and the relationship of Jews to general society, its institutions and culture. Various reformulations of Judaism were a product of the encounter with general culture and were made in direct response to demands for social and political accommodation. Equally significant are modes of piety and ritual behavior that, while governed by internal traditions and hermeneutics, were influenced by larger

social and cultural forces as well. Thus historians have discovered that even mystical and pietistic expressions of Judaism, such as Kabbalah and Hasidism, though not a direct product of overtly modernizing trends, offer equally fruitful subjects for social historical analysis.

Traditional Judaism is rooted in a set of beliefs and values that are discernible in its distinctive patterns of social organization, ritual, and religious concepts. Outlined in the Torah (the Pentateuch), its fundamental teachings draw upon an ethical-monotheistic faith that combines religious universalism and particularism. In contrast to other ancient religions, Judaism emphasized that the divine presence is encountered mainly within history rather than in nature. The doctrine of the election of Israel implied a responsibility to live an exceptionally moral and religious life, to serve as “a light unto the nations” by exemplifying a heightened awareness of God’s presence, sovereignty, and ultimate purpose in the world. The conviction that Israel’s relationship to God is unique has shaped the lifestyle and mode of existence of Jews since ancient times. This special relationship, known by the term *berit* (covenant), required obedience to the ethical, moral, and ritual imperatives of the Torah. Formalized at Sinai, the covenant centered on the attainment of holiness as the ultimate purpose of Judaism and coupled the ideal of faithfulness to the God of Israel with the emphatic denial of the legitimacy of idolatry. Based on the numerous biblical admonitions warning of the harsh consequences that would befall Israel should it fail to live up to the ideals of the Torah, a rabbinic theology of history came to view exile from the land, the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple, and suffering at the hands of other nations as divinely ordained. Ultimately, divine retribution was intended to restore Israel’s commitment to the terms of the covenant, to facilitate its spiritual and political redemption, and to pave the way for the establishment of divine sovereignty on earth.

Jewish law and social separation. The system of law known as halakhah (from the Hebrew root “to go”) supplied the essential structure for the pursuit of holiness. It consists of traditions either rooted explicitly in biblical legislation or believed to have been transmitted orally to Moses. Halakhah and aggadah (nonlegal teachings) together constitute the Oral Law, which, according to rabbinic tradition, was revealed with the Written Law. The power of the rabbis to enact legislation beyond the areas set forth in the classical literature rests on their authority as interpreters of the oral tradition. Over the centuries, the detailed norms of halakhah have come to regulate virtually every area of life, including personal status, family re-

lations, ritual, torts, purity laws, and communal affairs. The attainment of holiness has remained a central objective of this massive legal framework and, owing to the interconnectedness of the moral, ritual, and ethical spheres, has had important social implications. Biblically, it entailed both a separation from the immoral influences of idolatrous nations and a dedication to the service of God. Social segregation was mandated by the prohibition against following “in their ways” (Leviticus 18:3) and was amplified in the Talmud and by medieval rabbinic literature to include restrictions on the consumption of food and wine prepared by gentiles, the appropriation of non-Jewish folkways and rituals, and the emulation of gentile dress. The extent to which these laws succeeded in limiting the interaction of Jews and non-Jews has varied considerably over the course of history. How restrictively these limitations were applied normally depended on the intensity of social and economic relations in a particular locale, and frequently corresponded to the concerns of rabbinic and communal leaders about the dangers of extensive social intermingling and acculturation that modernity posed.

Ritual observances have also contributed to the ethos of separation, although this may not have been their intended purpose. The elaborate dietary laws are a case in point. A detailed classification system specifying which quadrupeds, fish, and fowl may be consumed (Leviticus 11:1–47), rigorous requirements concerning ritual slaughter, prohibitions against the consumption of blood and certain kinds of fat, and the strict separation of meat and milk products were legislated for the expressed purpose of establishing Israel as a holy nation. Although in the course of discussions concerning the aim of these laws various medical, philosophical, religious, and psychological benefits have been proposed, the social role of the dietary restrictions as markers of Jewish distinctiveness, and their implications for a separate Jewish economy, have remained paramount. These regulations, like many other ritual requirements such as the observance of the Sabbath and festivals, public prayer, religious education, and care for the dead, not only encouraged the formation of separate Jewish communities but also reveal the common interest shared with ecclesiastical and lay authorities that were intent on keeping Jews socially apart.

Divine service. No less than its role in distinguishing the Jews as a separate nation, the ritual system of classical Judaism provided a highly structured framework for divine service, falling under three main headings: worship, the study of the Torah, and the performance of acts of kindness. Worship is broadly defined

to include a spectrum of divinely ordained rites known as mitzvot that are designed to hallow the mundane aspects of daily life; using symbolism and ceremony, they seek to cultivate human consciousness of the divine presence, and to place human nature, needs, and instincts in a religiously meaningful context. Some assume the form of blessings recited upon the performance of bodily functions in the morning, before eating, and in advance of any obligatory act, such as the affixing of a mezuzah upon the doorpost, recitation of kiddush (sanctification) over wine at the onset of the Sabbath, or the performance of the rite of *habdalah* (separation) at its close. Each of the aforementioned rites, like most Jewish ceremonies, is performed in the home, the principal arena for the realization of the *vita religiosa* alongside the synagogue. Though from the standpoint of talmudic law women are exempt from most affirmative precepts limited as to time, such as wearing phylacteries (*tefilin*) and ritual fringes (*tzitzit*), they traditionally enjoyed a central role in the private rituals of the home.

Public ritual, including formal prayer and rites of passage such as circumcision, bar mitzvah, naming of children, and weddings, were generally conducted in the synagogue, not because of its inherent sanctity but because of its communal character; hence the original Hebrew term *bet-knesset* (house of assembly). Technically, each of the ceremonies marking a life-cycle event could be performed in private, but it became customary to conduct these in a public forum. By its presence the community acknowledged and affirmed the passage to the new status. This was also the case for death and burial rites: beginning with the sixteenth century, preparations of the body for burial were performed by the *Hebra Kadishah* (sacred society) of the community. Even mourning rites, including condolence visitations during the week of intensive bereavement and the gathering of a minyan (a quorum of ten men) in the home, reflected a public dimension of an otherwise private experience. The central elements of synagogue worship included ancient liturgical compositions that positioned the biblical declaration of faith in the God of Israel, the conception of reward and punishment, and the centrality of mitzvot within a framework devoted to the theme of redemptive history; petitionary prayers; and the public reading of the Torah. In contrast to the domain of the home, where women were vitally involved in private family rituals, active participation in the public ritual of the synagogue was limited to men. Historically, so long as the home remained central in the ritual life of Judaism, this imbalance only mirrored the generally distinct roles performed by men and women in Jewish life.

The annual cycle of major and minor festivals played a crucial role in the life of the community. In addition to the Sabbath, the calendar listed the three pilgrimage holidays (Passover, Shavuot, and Sukkot), the days of repentance (Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur), Hannukah, the carnival-style Purim celebration, Rosh Hodesh (new moon), and several fasts marking the destruction of the ancient Temples in Jerusalem or other catastrophes. The pilgrimage holidays were originally agricultural festivals signifying the beginning of spring (Passover), the summer harvest (Shavuot), and the conclusion of the harvest season (Sukkot). In talmudic times they assumed a primarily historical meaning, commemorating crucial moments in Israel's early history: the exodus from Egypt, the giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai, and the divine protection accorded to the Israelites during their sojourn in the desert. The Passover seder and narration of the exodus is a particularly paradigmatic rite of memory. Festivals and fasts provided a framework both for understanding contemporary developments in a national-historical

perspective and for reassessing the significance of earlier events in light of the present. Ritualized remembering forged and sustained the national character of the Jewish people and its religious ideals. At the social level, Jewish festivals fostered shared values and a strong collective identity by bringing ordinary people and elites together regularly in common rituals.

While the study of Jewish ritual can tend to emphasize both separation and timelessness, social historians have contributed some correctives. For example, until the seventeenth century in central Europe, many Jewish rituals were accompanied by considerable spontaneity and even rowdiness, much like popular celebrations by non-Jews in Europe. But religious leaders began to attack these elements, much as their Catholic and Protestant counterparts were doing, and gradually Jewish ceremonies became more consistently somber and serious.

The study of the Torah, according to rabbinic tradition, is a devotional act that stands above all other meritorious activities. Early sources prescribed an equal allotment of time for the study of scripture, Mishnah, and Talmud, but medieval Franco-German practice modified this injunction in favor of the virtually exclusive study of Talmud, said to contain the others. Medieval authorities also debated whether Torah study should be the exclusive preoccupation of the elite and whether it ought to be combined with engagement in either philosophical inquiry or mystical speculation. The debate, which subsequently broadened to include the status of other branches of knowledge such as the natural sciences and humanistic studies, continued into modern times. The ideal of Torah study as a lifelong pursuit was incumbent upon all Jews. According

to the majority view among talmudic authorities, however, women were exempt from Torah study. Nevertheless, there is abundant historical evidence of women's involvement in the study of the Bible and those sections of the oral law that applied to them.

Conceived in significantly broader terms than the obligation to give charity, the performance of acts of kindness (*gemilut hasadim*) encompasses the entire range of duties of consideration toward one's fellow human beings. Rabbinic tradition derived its theoretical and practical dimensions from an interpretation of several biblical narrative passages, concluding that one is enjoined to imitate God's moral attributes. Providing clothing for the needy, visiting the sick, and comforting the mourner, for example, are viewed as acts of divine worship, and such acts are understood, especially according to kabbalistic teaching, as a crucial human-divine partnership in the perfection of the world. The mandate to be holy thus expressed itself in efforts devoted to the needy and, at the communal level, in an array of confraternities and societies for free loans, needy brides, visitation of the sick, burial, and consolation of the bereaved. Occasionally, religious and moral idealism was compromised by financial strain, interethnic tensions, and an antialien and antipoor bias that intensified in response to the growing number of beggars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

TRANSFORMATIONS OF JUDAISM IN MODERN EUROPE

Scholarly opinion remains divided on how the essential feature of modernity ought to be defined and pre-

cisely when its impact was first felt in Jewish history. Debate centers on whether the period between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, an era of momentous political, economic, social, and cultural transformation, left an enduring mark on Jewish society and culture as well.

Influence of the 1492 expulsion and the Renaissance. The expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, which completed a pattern begun by earlier expulsions from England (1290) and France (1394), offers an example of an event that, according to the standard view, set in motion a monumental rippling effect on Jewish life and culture. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, much of the European Jewish population had shifted eastward to Poland-Lithuania, while centers of Jewish life in the Protestant Netherlands, northwestern Germany, England, and Italy were reinforced by the arrival of the Iberian émigrés. As a result of these migratory patterns, and owing to the pronounced political, social, and cultural dissimilarities between east and west, the Jewish experience of modernity varied widely from region to region. Variability is also reflected in the vastly different patterns of modernization that Ashkenazic and Sephardic Jews experienced, owing to their distinctive cultural traditions and histories. These dichotomies emerged boldly in the early modern period and, owing to their comparative dimension, offer social historians numerous opportunities to study European Jewry's dynamic encounter with modernity.

According to the pioneering view advanced by Gershom Scholem, the expulsion of the Jews from Spain set in motion a three-stage process that unfolded over the ensuing several centuries and precipitated the decline of rabbinic hegemony. Initially, the Spanish expulsion aroused acute messianic longings and produced a novel interest in the kabbalistic (mystical) doctrine of redemption. The central force in this development was the system of Kabbalah devised by Isaac Luria, with its strong emphasis on the myth of primeval catastrophe and the conception of *tikkun* as the mystical essence of salvation. Over the next century, according to Scholem, the revival of Kabbalah produced a wave of ascetic piety, new rituals, liturgical compositions, and mystical meditations that prepared the way for the popular embrace of the pseudomessiah Shabbetai Tzevi in 1666. The expectation of immediate redemption entailed halakhic aberrations, signaling a breakdown of rabbinic authority. The third stage in the process was the emergence of eighteenth-century Hasidism, a movement that attempted to make the world of Kabbalah accessible to the masses. Hasidism preserved those elements of Kabbalah that

were capable of evoking a popular response, but it removed the messianic component in the hope of neutralizing the redemptive theology believed to be the cause of the Shabbetai Tzevi debacle. The implications of Scholem's explanation are very far-reaching, especially in relation to the history and phenomenology of mysticism. In constructing his theory of historical causality, Scholem posited a direct linkage between the expulsion, its imputed theological meaning, and movements that would later break with orthodox tradition. Accordingly, Lurianic Kabbalah and the aftermath of Shabbetai Tzevi's apostasy prepared the way for the modernization of Jewish life and the emergence of modern deviant and reformist movements. This interpretation gained wide acceptance among a full generation of historians.

In the 1990s the Scholem thesis underwent thorough reconsideration. Moshe Idel has shown that Lurianic Kabbalah was not an innovative response to the trauma of expulsion but an extension of older mystical trends, some of which even originated in ancient rabbinic Judaism. He has also demonstrated that Lurianic Kabbalah was not the dominant form of Jewish mysticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and, further, that it failed to infiltrate the masses as Scholem claimed. Where it was disseminated, as in Italy, it was nonmessianic. This refutation of the Scholem thesis, drawing on modes of analysis used in the fields of religion and intellectual history, has recently received additional substantiation from the realm of social history. The publishing history of early modern kabbalistic conduct literature has shown that Lurianism spread much later than has been assumed and that its influence can be documented only *after* the Shabbetai Tzevi movement. In fact, even the laws and customs contained in the Zohar, the thirteenth-century kabbalistic commentary to the Torah, failed to penetrate ritual life until the emergence of Hasidism. Demonstrating that the eighteenth-century revival of mystical piety did not draw upon Lurianic Kabbalah, which had already weakened by the time the movement appeared, but bore a closer connection to the nonmessianic Cordoveran Kabbalah, Idel has proven that Hasidism was not a reaction to crisis. Far from having become the adversary of rabbinic Judaism, Kabbalah evinced an affinity with patterns of classical rabbinic thought and had firmly permeated normative rabbinic culture before the breakdown of traditional society.

Italy offers an equally instructive case study of vastly differing assessments of the influence of the Renaissance on Jewish life. All agree that the rise of humanism and the emergence of modern science stimulated Jewish scholarly interest in classical philosophy,

science, and rhetoric, as well as participation in the arts. Likewise, works of Hebrew poetry and grammar, biblical commentary, historical writing, and systematization of talmudic and halakhic learning reflected the unmistakable imprint of Italian humanism. David Ruderman, for one, cited collaboration between leading Italian humanists and Jewish scholars as proof of the widespread tolerance enjoyed by Jews. Accordingly, the Renaissance is commonly characterized as an era in which Jewish culture and thought was thoroughly transformed, as evidenced by the emergence of new terms of reference, literary sources, and modes of expression, while Judaism was accepted as intrinsically valid by Christians. Others, led by Robert Bonfil, argue that the various indications of acculturation do not represent adaptation to the majority culture, nor do they suggest that Jews came to view their own religion as inferior to that of others, but only that they maintained an openness toward general culture. In spite of noteworthy instances of scholarly cooperation, the social barriers separating Jews and non-Jews were still in force. Jews continued to be an insecure minority threatened with expulsion and forced conversion, and amidst the penetration of humanist ideals and the considerable evidence of cross-cultural exchange, they nonetheless continued to assert their spiritual superiority and uniqueness over their Chris-

tian neighbors. Most importantly, there is no evidence of appreciable improvement in the social relations between Jews and non-Jews. The social and political status of the Jews in Renaissance Italy remained virtually unchanged from medieval times.

The example of Italy reveals that the main features of medieval Jewish life—segregation, discriminatory legislation, public assaults on Judaism, and the centrality of rabbinic authority and law—were strongly resistant to the forces that had transformed European society and culture. In fact it was in Venice in 1516 that the term “ghetto” was first used to designate the section of the city where Jews were required to settle; the term was subsequently applied to Jewish quarters in major cities on the continent. European Jewry was largely unaffected by the rise of humanism, the emergence of modern science, and the advent of capitalism, insofar as most could only settle in eastern Europe or in the eastern Mediterranean, far from the centers of economic growth and cultural advancement. As a result, the largest number remained outside the mainstream of society, while medieval social structures and *mentalités* persisted until the late eighteenth century. One exception to this pattern was the converso diaspora, where there was an encounter of Jewish and Western culture in the seventeenth century. We have also seen a connection between attacks on ceremonial spontaneity and wider currents in European popular culture.

Patterns of modernization. Dissimilarities between the Ashkenazic and Sephardic models of transformation in early modern Europe reflect the divergent historical experiences of the two main ethnic branches of the Jewish people. “Ashkenaz” and “Sepharad” are biblical terms identified with Germany and Spain respectively; each subsequently evolved into a religious and cultural tradition connoting distinctive pronunciation of Hebrew, liturgical rites, religious customs, and approaches to general culture. Ashkenazic Jews traced their lineage to the Land of Israel, from there to Italy, and in the High Middle ages were concentrated in the Rhineland. By the beginning of the early modern period, when the largest concentration was in Poland and smaller numbers resided in central Europe, opportunities for contact with Christian society and culture were severely restricted. Their communities, known as *kehillot*, were recognized as legally autonomous by the secular governments, and the lay and rabbinic leadership was empowered to govern in accordance with Jewish law. Rabbinic jurisdiction over civil cases, and the right to punish those who failed to abide by communal regulations, evinced their cultural self-containment. Their literary produc-

tion echoed this social reality, insofar as the language of learned culture was mainly Hebrew and its focus was limited to the religious sphere. With the rapid expansion of printing, rabbinic literature was widely disseminated, and in the seventeenth century numerous communities imposed obligatory participation in a study group or study on one's own. Study assumed its most intensive form in the large concentration of yeshivot of Poland-Lithuania, where professional students were supported by the local community. After the 1648–1649 Chmielnicki massacres, the yeshivot declined, but they were still attended by students from western Europe.

Tracing its religious traditions to Babylonia, Sephardic Jewry was a product of the unique political and cultural forces that shaped Andalusian society of medieval Spain. In contrast to the Ashkenazim, the Sephardim were involved in governmental affairs and in extensive social and intellectual intercourse with the elite of the Muslim population. Their secular poetry and scientific works were inspired by the Arabic literati, and they used Arabic in their prose works. They took keen interest in philosophy, ascribed greater importance to Bible study, and developed systematic approaches to biblical exegesis and the codification of Jewish law. This rich medieval legacy under Islam, as well as the experience of crypto-Judaism engendered by Christian intolerance, predisposed Sephardic Jews historically to successful integration in public life and culture. Moreover, their subsequent resettlement in areas of western Europe where tolerance reigned, and the fact that their reconstituted communities did not possess the range of social and religious controls available to Ashkenazic *kehillot*, accelerated the Sephardic encounter with modernity. Their extensive participation in European society and culture, as well as a variety of modern religious expressions that included voluntary Jewish identity and individualism, were attained without the concomitant breakdown of traditional Jewish society.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, historians of European Jewry have expanded our understanding of the transformation of traditional Jewish society, some after investigating Levantine Jewry and Sephardic communities of the West, and others on the basis of an examination of individual Ashkenazic communities in western and central Europe. Having detected signs of a break from traditional patterns in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, they agree that the process of acculturation had begun before the onset of ideological and political efforts to ease the acceptance of Jews in general society. In their view, resettlement in the West, not enlightenment and emancipation, marked the beginning of social and

cultural reintegration. Communities of Sephardim in France, Holland, Germany, and England exhibited evidence of advanced acculturation, but their integration into general society did not require emancipation from the patterns of social and cultural segregation typical of Ashkenazic Jews.

The argument that sectors of western Ashkenazic Jewry began departing from the traditional lifestyle at the turn of the eighteenth century rests on evidence of growing laxity in ritual observance, increased social interaction between Jews and Christians, imitation of gentile dress and appearance—including shaving the beard and adopting gentile hairstyles—an increasing preoccupation with luxury, the cultivation of secular branches of knowledge such as philosophy and science, and a decline in sexual morality. Many of these changes found expression in contemporary iconography as well, especially in the depiction of Christian interest in Jewish rites and the harmonious relations between Jews and non-Jews. The new tendencies met with an intensification of efforts on the part of leaders of Ashkenazic communities such as Metz and Frankfurt to regulate public morality in the late seventeenth century. Growing social control in communities of western and central Europe corresponds to Peter Burke's theory that after 1650 the struggle to suppress deviant behavior passed from ecclesiastical to lay powers. Lay leaders sought to delineate the boundaries between the sacred and the profane and keep the two domains distinct in order to prevent the incipient dissolution of traditional society. In some instances, class affiliation determined the type of accommodation made by Jews to modernity. Signs of acculturation among the middle and lower classes in England, for example, resemble those changes that had been limited elsewhere to elites, and suggest that Jews imitated the behavior of their economic peers in gentile society while discarding much of Jewish tradition.

Whether the aforementioned indications of acculturation were elements of a new process or were only variations on the traditional pattern is still fiercely contested. According to Jacob Katz, a genuine break from tradition is indicated when nonnormative acts are justified by a new value system; this occurred in the last third of the eighteenth century when the authority of the rabbinic tradition came under attack and a new vision of the future was first formulated. For Katz, it was the era of Enlightenment and Jewish emancipation that launched the process leading to both acculturation and acceptance within European society as citizens. Gentile advocates of Jewish emancipation expected the bestowal of citizenship to bring the Jews' social and cultural isolation to a close. Liberal thinkers envisioned a society open to all persons,

irrespective of class, national origin, or religious affiliation. The Jews were invited to participate in this new undertaking, provided they were willing to accept the conditions set by discussants of the Jewish question in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Concretely, this involved the surrender of communal autonomy and rabbinic jurisdiction in civil affairs, and was predicated on the envisioned transformation of Jewish social and economic life.

The Haskalah movement. A cultural revolution from within accompanied the external forces leading to the curtailment of communal autonomy. The promise of a “neutral society” founded upon secular, humanistic, and rational principles, together with a growing frustration with the cultural limitations imposed by ghetto life, inspired the emergence of the Haskalah movement (from the Hebrew root *sekhel*, which means intellect or reason), a Jewish variant of the European Enlightenment. Its chief proponents, known as *maskilim*, worked mainly as teachers, writers, employees in Hebrew printing presses, and tutors to the rich. As they became acquainted with the major writings of the philosophes, they subjected traditional Jewish society to a critical reevaluation according to new criteria drawn from the Enlightenment, such as the primacy of reason, the aesthetic ideal, the universal brotherhood of man, and economic productivity. In their writings and through their activism on behalf of educational and communal reform, they constructed a new vision of the ideal Jew and of the relationship of Jews to non-Jewish society.

The Haskalah movement undermined the theological, halakhic, and cultural foundations of social separatism. Conscious of the alleged liabilities presented by traditional Judaism, Jewish intellectuals developed strategies to advance the process of cultural and social integration by adjusting Jewish religious and social teachings to the cultural norms of European society. In the realm of education, the *maskilim* distinguished between two categories of knowledge, one pertaining to human affairs and another relating to more narrowly conceived religious subjects. The former, humanistic and scientific studies, was an autonomous sphere that was accessible through human reason and empirical observation. Viewed as absolutely crucial for citizens of the modern state, instruction in secular subjects became the highest educational priority in Jewish schools, while the religious curriculum was recast to reflect an emphasis on Hebrew language and grammar, Bible, ethical obligations, and morality. The new schools that were formed under the influence of the Haskalah aimed to produce a generation of Jews capable of taking their place in the new order

as productive and loyal citizens. To accomplish this goal, a new Judaism was substituted for the old, one that was refashioned to correspond to the social, cultural, and political underpinnings of emancipation. Restrictions on social intercourse with non-Jews were deemed incompatible with the concrete demands of citizenship and its wider implications; halakhic constraints on the consumption of gentile wine and the emulation of gentile customs were cited as the most egregious examples of the outmoded character of traditional Judaism. Emphasizing the central elements of the Sephardic legacy, particularly its rationalist tradition and integrationist ethos, the *maskilim* mounted energetic efforts against the rabbinic establishment, which they viewed as the embodiment of cultural obscurantism and excessive political power. Critical of religious and social traditions that were purportedly the product of superstition and persecution, radical *maskilim* distinguished, as did deism, the divine core of religion from variable customs.

Emancipation and reform. In contrast to the common core of ideological positions to which *maskilim* in most areas of central and western Europe subscribed, the process of Jewish emancipation varied significantly from state to state, and even from region to region within states. Insofar as emancipation was the product of complex local political forces, the bestowal of civic equality in Europe tended to be uneven. Historically, the era began with the admission of the Sephardic Jews of France to citizenship in 1790 and ended more than a century later with the formal extension of equality in Russia in 1917. Whether granted immediately or only after a prolonged battle, “emancipation” has come to signify the extended process of Jewish acculturation and integration in modern society. The range of its manifold effects is discernible not only in diverse political frameworks but also in various social contexts pertaining to urban or rural populations, class, and gender.

On the basis of these considerations, recent studies have debunked the older view that emancipation led inexorably to rampant assimilation and the rupture of tradition. In the case of the Jews of rural Alsace, occupational patterns, family life, and religious observance were resistant to change because social and economic conditions in the region remained relatively stable for much of the nineteenth century. The conservatism of the rural population is evident in the persistence of folk customs, the use of Yiddish, fertility patterns, opposition to religious reform, use of Jewish names, sentiments of ethnic solidarity, and in the slow pace of assimilation to bourgeois standards of behavior. The city, by contrast, facilitated economic trans-

formation, acculturation to bourgeois lifestyle, and accommodation to the norms of non-Jewish society; as a result, traditional loyalties and affiliations waned, while assimilation accelerated in larger cities such as Paris, Berlin, Prague, and Vienna. Economic and intellectual urban elites active in communal institutions typically labored to “regenerate” the lower classes in accordance with ideals expounded by the Haskalah, and their efforts found expression both in the creation of philanthropic schools for the Jewish urban poor and in broader activities directed at the transformation of Jews in rural areas.

These developments obviously call attention to links between social and religious history in modern Judaism. Divergences emerged within the Jewish community based in part on social class. Many Jews took advantage of opportunities in higher education, and their religious outlook tended to differ from that of other social groups within Judaism. The rural-urban split was pronounced. Patterns of emigration of Jews within Europe by the later nineteenth century added to the complex mix. Many Russian and Polish Jews moved west, interacting with more assimilated coreligionists in places like Britain, and even internal movements, as from Alsace to Paris, had implications for religious outlook and relationships with the wider society.

Barriers to social integration were in the forefront of internal Jewish discussions concerning adaptation to modern society. Concerns about the compatibility of Jewish ritual with the demands of social integration and patriotic loyalty were exacerbated by the acknowledgment that emancipation had shattered the theological assumptions about exile, the return to the Land of Israel, and social separation from non-Jews. For many, citizenship required the removal of problematic aspects of the Jewish religion, and therefore proponents of modernization, including the majority of delegates to the Napoleonic Sanhedrin, repudiated its social and political dimensions. Various factors, including growing indifference to religious observance and the assimilation of bourgeois values, led some to conclude that moderate ritual reform was in order. Typically, efforts to enhance the aesthetic appeal of the synagogue included recitation of prayers in the vernacular, the regularization of the modern sermon, the use of the organ, and the insistence on greater decorum. In Germany, disappointment with the slow progress of legal emancipation, the decline in Jewish observance, the increasing wave of conversion to Christianity, and rising anti-Semitism induced more radical views. As the prospects of civic emancipation grew dimmer, German reformers intensified their efforts to eliminate traces of the political from

Judaism. They removed references to the Land of Israel and the Messiah from the prayer book for fear that these might weaken their claim to equal rights, and sought to blur the ethnic and national features of traditional Judaism by eradicating the dietary laws, traditional Sabbath observance, the prohibition of intermarriage, and circumcision.

Despite the vast differences and bitter struggles between reformers and staunch defenders of the normative tradition, all sectors of the Jewish community acknowledged the debilitating effects of modernity. Strongly rejecting the efforts of radical reformers, Neo-Orthodoxy and Positive-Historical Judaism—later to be known as Modern Orthodoxy and Conservative Judaism—offered solutions to the challenges of rampant assimilation and the erosion of rabbinic authority that reflected their respective conceptions of halakhah and Jewish peoplehood, while upholding an unswerving commitment to emancipation and social integration. Ultra-Orthodox opponents of religious reform, on the other hand, resisted any and all compromises to the integrity of the ancestral faith, urging a greater degree of separation from general society.

As in western and central Europe, growing numbers believed that the Russian Haskalah would facilitate acceptance within general society. Education was regarded as the vehicle that would accelerate the acculturation process by encouraging students to reject patterns of traditional behavior and thought believed to be irrational, retrograde, and divisive. As a result of state involvement in the creation of modern Jewish schools in the 1840s and 1850s, together with the policy of liberalization under Alexander II and the example of modernization in the West, the Russian Haskalah flourished. Although it stressed values similar to those of the German Haskalah, it was less inclined to surrender the distinctive social or religious ideals of traditional Judaism, and the idea of religious reform was only rarely considered. Owing to the stagnant economy, lack of liberalism, and discriminatory legislation, the process of modernization in the East was exceedingly slow. Within this context, the response to modernity in eastern Europe assumed several distinct forms: the creation of communal yeshivot to fight off assimilation; the emergence of the pietistic Musar movement; the Jewish socialist movement; the emergence of secular Jewish culture, particularly through the advocacy of national cultural autonomy in the multi-ethnic society of Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and the creation of the Zionist movement.

Zionism. Influenced by nineteenth-century nationalism, Zionist leaders viewed emancipation in the West as an enormous political disappointment

and argued that cultural autonomy would ultimately fail to preserve Jewish identity, although the latter claim proved to be exaggerated. Ethnic identity remained strong, as evidenced by continued Hebrew literacy, Jewish folkways, and the vigor of Yiddish literature and theater. Whether Zionism viewed its goal of national resettlement in the Land of Israel as the solution to the problem of anti-Semitism or to the problem of Judaism in the modern world, its program was a positive, though secularized, assertion of the belief in messianic redemption and the historic destiny of the Jewish people. For Zionism, as for other modern Jewish movements, modernity marked the end of the traditional concept of exile and the passive waiting for divine redemption, and signified the beginning of an active pursuit of personal or national fulfillment. Differences between cultural and political Zionism reflected the contrasting historic experiences of east and west European Jews. In the east, where ethnic identity was strong and anti-Semitism physically brutal, Zionism struck deep roots. In the west, Zionism appeared to contradict the social and political premises of emancipation, and therefore remained a largely philanthropic movement until the advent of Nazism. Known as the “Final Solution,” the Nazi policy of extermination tragically confirmed Zionism’s analysis of the nineteenth-century Jewish question.

Gender. Emphasizing the different ways that Jewish men and women experienced acculturation and assimilation, recent scholarship has shown that emancipation was a highly gendered process. Limited mainly to the domestic scene, women did not have the same opportunities as men to encounter general society and culture in the workplace or in institutions of higher education; this difference would persist as long as the boundaries between domestic and public realms remained in force. Consequently, among most Jewish women the incidence of conversion to Christianity was far less than for men, as long as women’s entrance to the workforce was limited. On the positive side, it has been shown that Jewish women in imperial Germany were more traditionally minded than their assimilated husbands. Because bourgeois culture understood religious sentiment as an expression of family values, religion was believed to fall naturally within the private sphere dominated by women. In eastern Europe, where traditional Jewish society did not discourage women from participating in the public realm, Jewish women were more vulnerable to the allure of modern society than men, as evidenced by the fact that more women than men converted to Christianity. It is also noteworthy that in east European Jewish society, where the cult of domesticity was not adopted, responsibility for the in-

culcation of Jewish religious values was not entrusted to women only. Owing to the progressive relegation of the home and home-based rituals to a less important status, and the concomitant prominence attached to the public sphere, as well as the broad social movement of feminism in the latter decades of the twentieth century, the participation of women in

ritual life has increased, even in areas considered halakhically nonobligatory. This has produced numerous new ritual expressions, mainly in the Reform and Conservative movements, and more recently, the proliferation of women's prayer groups and women's Torah institutes, including the rigorous study of Talmud among the Modern Orthodox.

See also The Jews and Anti-Semitism (volume 1) and other articles in this section.

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CATHOLICISM



Keith P. Luria

Catholicism's social history cannot be separated from its political or intellectual histories. But social historians have brought to the study of Catholicism questions and methodologies different from those found in older "church history." They are less concerned with the evolution of doctrine and more with the interaction between what the church taught and the way people practiced their faith. And rather than study the internal institutional development of the church, they have turned their attention to its relations with Europe's political entities.

The interest in subjecting Catholicism to social historical analysis has stemmed largely from the growing prestige of social science approaches evident throughout the historical discipline in recent decades. Historians influenced by sociology, such as Gabriel Le Bras and the school of religious sociology he founded in France, assessed people's commitment to Catholicism through quantifying their participation in ritual activities, such as Easter communion or attending mass. Others, drew their inspiration from anthropological theories, such as Émile Durkheim's idea of religion as a reflection of group's self-conception. Scholars like John Bossy and Natalie Zemon Davis have examined how religious rituals and beliefs could bind people together and could set them against those with different conceptions of religion or society.

The sociological and the anthropological do not exhaust the ways social historians study Catholicism. But they do represent two poles: the quantitative, which emphasizes the church and its varying ability to impose practices and beliefs on the faithful, and the ethnographic, which emphasizes the meanings people derive from their religion and the uses to which they put it. Keeping both of these approaches in mind, the social history of Catholicism must assess the impact the church had in shaping society, and it must also be aware of how the church was inevitably shaped by social and political concerns of the laity.

The integration of western European society and Catholicism, both as an institution and as a practiced faith was most complete in premodern Europe,

apparent in the daily lives of families and individuals, the organization of groups and communities, and the functioning of states. The Protestant Reformation challenged this fusion between church and society, but, in Catholic countries, it did not disintegrate. Indeed it was strengthened. Beginning in the eighteenth century and continuing through the twentieth, the pressures of increased secularization and competing beliefs adversely affected the church's dominant role in creating national unity and communal identity. The social history of Catholicism between the early modern period and today traces this long transformation.

CATHOLICISM AND THE "SOCIAL MIRACLE"

Catholic rituals in premodern Europe had a dual purpose. Not only did they fulfill doctrinal requirements enabling the faithful to strive for salvation, they also worked what John Bossy has called the "social miracle" (Bossy, 1985, p. 57). Rituals created social bonds and harmony where rivalries and enmity could otherwise prevail. The sacrament of baptism provides an example of this dual purpose. For the church, baptism incorporated an infant into the community of Christians, washed him or her of original sin, and, through exorcism, protected him or her from diabolical influences. But for the family, baptism also incorporated the child into the earthly community of which he or she was a part. The rite also created a bond of affinity between the child's family and the godparents. Baptism thus satisfied doctrinal concerns and reinforced social bonds. Marriage did the same. The church's blessing of spouses conferred grace upon them and signaled the creation of a new Christian household. But the church also encouraged marriage's role as a means of allying families, ending feuds, and establishing peace.

Religious practices similarly established social bonds in groups such as confraternities. In small villages, confraternities could include all the adult inhabitants. In cities, they brought together members

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of particular neighborhoods, crafts, professions, or social classes. While most were organizations for men, some had both men and women, and others, such as Rosary confraternities in France, became primarily women's organizations. Initiation rituals, common religious observances, and periodic feasting bound the members to each other. The confraternities' rules, moreover, strove to insure brotherhood and charity among the membership. Disputes were submitted to arbitration to prevent lawsuits and ill feeling. Wealthier members helped the poorer through loans or alms. And the group aided its members even in death, arranging funerals, accompanying bodies to burial, and paying for memorial masses.

Rituals also cemented the social bonds of communities. Processions, for instance, were held on important civic and religious holidays—the festival of a city's patron saint or the feast of Corpus Christi. And they were staged at moments of crisis—during military threats or epidemics. Urban processions usually included representatives from the city's clergy, its governing body, and its various craft guilds and/or confraternities. These groups marched in a hierarchical order that reflected their status in the community. Thereby, through Catholic ritual, the social body was created and displayed in pageant form.

The most potent means of creating the “social miracle” was Catholicism's central ritual act, the Mass and its eucharistic service. The Eucharist brought about reconciliation of social conflict through its symbolism of many parts united in a never divisible unity, the body of Christ. Confession, the repenting of sins, and the making of restitution for them, including those committed against one's neighbors, was the necessary preparation for partaking of communion.

Thus Catholic belief and ceremony both mirrored and created the social structure, ensuring citizens a place within a divinely ordained system, and establishing social harmony. However, we should be careful in assuming that religion's role was entirely efficacious. Religious practices could provoke disputes or provide the occasions for them. Members of social elites competed for prestige through their patronage of religious devotions or establishments. A community's poor might use the annual Carnival, the time prior to Lent when normal social rules and order were suspended or inverted, to riot and seek redress for the un-Christian inequities under which they suffered. Therefore, we must not simplify Catholicism's reinforcement of a traditional European social order; its powerful effect could work in quite the opposite direction.

Much the same is evident in Catholicism's role in states. European monarchies were sacral political systems. Catholic teaching legitimated monarchy as a

divinely ordained means of maintaining social order and justice. Kings drew authority from ceremonies derived from Catholic ritual, such as the French royal coronation during which new monarchs swore to defend the true faith and took communion in both kinds, the body and the blood, a privilege usually reserved for priests. The ceremony lent rulers a semi-divine status, which was evident in the belief that they could cure scrofula by touching the afflicted.

But the political role of Catholic belief and ritual did not function perfectly. We cannot assume that subjects were convinced by the claims kings made in ceremonies and political propaganda. Certainly the sacred character of the French monarchy did not prevent revolts. In another sense also, the fit between Catholicism and royal authority was not seamless. Kings and popes frequently found themselves in conflict. Furthermore, kings could find themselves beset by quarrels within the church that weakened their power. The Jansenist controversy, for example, helped undermine the French monarchy in the decades before the Revolution (see below). Nonetheless, as long as Catholicism remained a country's largely unanimous faith, it would continue to buttress its social and political systems.

THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION

The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century challenged this unanimity. Protestant countries broke the web of connections between Catholicism, society, and the state. In Catholic societies these connections were, if anything, renewed and strengthened by the vast Catholic reform movement extending from the sixteenth century into the first half of the eighteenth. The church convened the Council of Trent between 1545 and 1563, to set an agenda for combatting the spread of Protestantism, improving the quality of its clergy, and transforming the religious and social lives of the Catholic faithful. Bishops ensured these goals by frequent episcopal visits to their dioceses' communities to investigate the ritual practices, beliefs, and moral behavior of their flocks. They targeted many customs of traditional local religion and tried to suppress those they found indecent or too independent of clerical control, such as confraternity banquets, nocturnal pilgrimages, or overly enthusiastic devotion to miracle-working relics and images. Reformers sought instead to encourage a piety based on the individual's examination of conscience, proper attention to the church's sacraments, and reverence for approved devotions. On their visits, bishops also investigated illicit sexual behavior, drunkenness, familial conflicts, and a host of other social sins.

Together governments and the church worked to create confessionalized Catholic states in which people were subjected to more political control and more religious discipline than ever before. With the political appointment of reform-minded bishops in countries like Spain and France, the Catholic Reformation advanced jointly with the extension of government control over autonomous regions and unruly subjects.

So described, the Catholic-Reformation church can easily appear as a modernizing institution in European society, one that rationalized its own internal structure, allied itself with states doing the same, imposed social discipline, and sought conformity and control. But the description exaggerates the repressive tendencies in the Tridentine program. Catholic reformers did seek to establish greater clerical control over religious practices and to focus them on the church's central doctrinal concerns, such as the Eucharist or the cult of Mary. They did insist on greater decorum in festivals, processions, pilgrimages, and confraternal celebrations. And they did want to instruct the faithful in a better understanding of church doctrine. But Catholic reformers never opposed all popular religious practices; they permitted the cult of saints and relics, confraternities, and the belief in miracles. Indeed, many of the church's efforts revitalized religion's traditional local purposes. Authorized saints may have been substituted for unauthorized ones, but the faithful could still seek miraculous intervention to help with life's problems. And even if stern bishops disapproved of what people believed, nothing pre-

vented these people from taking what the bishops offered and adapting it to their own purposes. Hence the widespread Rosary devotion, with its individualized and meditative prayers, may have been a Catholic-Reformation style of worship, but Rosary confraternities also provided a new means to accomplish an old end by establishing bonds of affinity between their members.

The church did not seek to create a modern society based on disciplined, isolated individuals. Such an idea was entirely foreign to its social conceptions and would remain so for a long time to come. Insofar as efforts at increasing social discipline were successful, and success was partial at best, the Catholic Reformation reinforced the sense of a divinely ordained, and church-guided, society of estates or orders. In this way, the church was still congruent with the Catholic society around it. One can see this congruence at work, for example, in new religious groups established for laypeople, most notably Jesuit sodalities, which organized their members into the traditional corporate groups of European society, with separate associations for nobles, bourgeois, and artisans. But as European society changed in the early modern period, these old means of maintaining Christian charity and brotherhood would seem increasingly outmoded.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

As long as the church maintained the allegiance of rulers and their people, Catholicism would remain the

essential unifying principle of social order and monarchical political systems. The first disassociation of Catholicism and society, in what had been heretofore Catholic countries, appeared in the eighteenth century as certain social groups fell away from Catholic observance. Royal governments, which had long seen the church as providing legitimacy for monarchs and stability for the social order, now looked to other ways of justifying their authority and of controlling their subjects. The impact of this development varied from country to country, and its reasons remain in some ways poorly understood. But they included disputes within the church, the impact of Enlightenment attacks on the church, and a process of dechristianization starting to take hold in certain places, notably France.

That the church's clergy had deep socioeconomic divisions was hardly a phenomenon new to the eighteenth century; however, it became at this time a source of growing conflict. In France, high-ranking aristocrats dominated the upper clergy. Parish priests, generally of middling social origins, were better trained and more conscientious in their duties than before the Tridentine reforms. They resented their inferior position in the church more than ever before, and their relations with their superiors became increasingly embittered. One result of the spread of Enlightenment rationality in France was the demand for more socially responsible and useful priests. The Enlightenment *bon curé* (good parish priest) who labored in his parish to provide religious, educational, and welfare services, fit this demand well; the wealthy, worldly, aristocratic upper clergy, who appeared little concerned with pastoral cares, did not. Antagonism between the lower and upper clergy resulted in their split in the 1789 Estates-General, which led to the formation of the revolutionary National Assembly. The priests had in no way sought to undermine the church's position in society, but as the Revolution progressed, their challenge to the institution's hierarchical order would have that effect.

In Spain, Italy, and elsewhere, the upper clergy was less aristocratic than that of France, but the rural clergy was also less well trained and supported. The fall in religious vocations throughout western Europe in the second half of the century left the church seriously understaffed and unable to carry out its spiritual functions in some rural areas—the Alentejo in Portugal, the Mezzogiorno in Italy. And as a large landowner in these regions, it was the target of local resentment. In certain places, such as the Mezzogiorno, the problem was somewhat offset by the missionary work of Jesuits, Redemptorists, and Lazarists. But male orders too suffered from the fall in vocations.

Women's orders, especially those engaged in charitable, hospital, or educational work, survived on much better terms, but in cities more than the countryside.

During the eighteenth century, the church was also beset by doctrinal controversies that embroiled it in political conflicts and contributed further to its loss of public esteem. The most important of these disputes was over Jansenism, especially acute in France, though it had echoes elsewhere. The rigorist theology of the Jansenists found strong support among the French clergy despite its being declared heretical. Efforts to suppress the movement, such as the 1713 papal bull *Unigenitus*, backfired and made Jansenist priests appear the victims of papal and royal despotism. Jansenists set themselves up as opponents of heavy-handed political authority and helped turn public opinion against the royal government and the Jesuits, allies in the persecution of Jansenists. The Jesuit-Jansenist confrontation also furthered a decline in respect for the French church and led to the dissolution of the Jesuits in France in 1764. The Jesuits had problems in other countries as well. Portugal expelled the order from its possessions in 1759, and they were ejected from Spanish possessions in 1767. Finally, in 1773 under pressure from Catholic monarchs, Pope Clement XIV (reigned 1769–1774) dissolved the order.

Contemplative orders that did not seem involved in useful work were also under fire. In 1781 the Austrian Emperor Joseph II (reigned 1765–1790) closed monasteries and convents not engaged in teaching or nursing. Joseph used much of their former property to fund schools and hospitals. The reasons behind these government policies against the Jesuits or contemplative orders were different in each case, but they indicate that the monarchies of Europe were disengaging themselves from their traditional close connections to the church.

Historians of French religious life in the eighteenth century have also explored a wider disaffection with the church that they call "dechristianization." The phenomenon is not well understood and attempts to measure it have been questionable, but in France if not elsewhere it seems undeniable that at least some of the social elite were turning away from religious practices the church had tried to inculcate since the Council of Trent. The quantitative study of wills in Paris and in Provence has shown that after 1730 testators' requests for memorial masses fell dramatically. The evidence suggests that the belief in purgatory, central to the church's scheme of salvation, was exercising less and less hold over Catholic minds. Whether this development means society was becoming dechristianized, or perhaps just turning its reli-

gious concerns in other directions, has been a much harder question to answer.

Other indications suggest, however, that adherence to the church's teachings and moral strictures was falling off. One sign was the fall in vocations. Another was the decreasing share of the bookselling market that religious publications commanded. Confraternities were losing members to more secular forms of sociability: the elite to Masonic lodges and others to cafés. Demographic studies of French localities have demonstrated a marked late-eighteenth century increase in prenuptial pregnancies and illegitimate births. In general, however, birthrates fell, suggesting that people were using contraception and thus rejecting the church's rules on sexual activity.

Historians have offered various reasons for dechristianization. One is that the rigorous demands of the Catholic-Reformation church drove people away from strict observance. Another is that politicized and irreconcilable disputes, such as that between the Jansenists and their opponents, called into question Catholic doctrine's absoluteness. Belief began to seem less a matter of truth than of opinion, and thus it could be rejected. Presumably contributing to this development were the secularizing ideas of the Enlightenment, but its role was complex. Throughout Europe, an enlightened Catholicism did not entirely

reject the church but called on it to play a more useful role in society, helping to promote social welfare, education, and public morals, all part of enlightened, absolute monarchs' programs in Austria, Prussia, and Portugal, as well as in France. Finally, changing economies were leading to the migration of people from rural areas to rapidly growing cities, disrupting the parish life that the Tridentine church had seen as essential to social and religious discipline. Urbanization and increased literacy also meant the wider circulation of ideas inimical to Catholicism. Beset by internal disputes, a decline in vocations, and a poor distribution of its resources, the church was ill prepared to cope with these changes in European society. Religious conformity and the complete fit between Catholicism and society became impossible to maintain. The revolutionary upheaval of the late-eighteenth century would make this disengagement permanent.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEONIC WARS

In France, criticism of the church as a wealthy and unbeneficial institution, combined with the effects of dechristianization, culminated first in the revolutionary government's takeover of the church and later in

its attempt to abolish Christian worship entirely. In November 1789, the Assembly nationalized church property. In July 1790, it passed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which made clerics into salaried civil servants and applied the Revolution's democratic ideals to the church's administration. Voters would henceforth elect their parish priests and bishops. The French Catholic church became completely dependent on the state, but Catholicism was no longer the country's single legal religion. Toleration was established and citizenship offered to Protestants and Jews. The refusal of the papacy to respond positively to these developments led to a further and even more fateful decision in November 1790, when the Assembly voted the Ecclesiastical Oath that required each member of the clergy to swear loyalty to the nation and the constitution. The oath split the French church and provoked widespread resentment and resistance. Most bishops refused it, as did about half of the lower clergy. The divisions were deep and lasted far beyond the Revolution. Those regions where oath-taking priests predominated—Paris, the southeast, and parts of the southwest—would later be known for anticlericalism and low rates of Catholic observance. Regions where priests who refused the oath were numerous—the west, the east, northeast, and the Massif Central—would remain areas of strong Catholic piety well into the twentieth century. In such areas opposition to the Revolution was bitter, leading in the Vendée and Brittany to bloody counterrevolutionary revolts.

The Civil Constitution was short-lived; the Revolution's radicalization led to a government-sponsored campaign in 1793 to 1794 in which churches were closed, vandalized, or converted into revolutionary temples. Priests were outlawed, forced into exile, arrested, and sometimes executed. Catholic worship was replaced by revolutionary festivals, such as the cult of reason. Resistance to the campaign was widespread, even in prorevolutionary areas, but open Catholic practice largely ceased until the fall of Maximilien Robespierre (1758–1794) in 1794. Under the Directorial regime after 1795, Catholic worship once again became legal. But with much of the clergy dispersed and now without government financing of the church, Catholicism in France depended largely on lay initiative as townspeople or villagers undertook to lead worship themselves, reopen churches, and reestablish devotional life.

The church's position in France was not regularized until Napoleon (1769–1821) negotiated the Concordat with the papacy in 1801. Although Catholicism was recognized as the "religion of the majority of the French people," the church did not return

to its prerevolutionary status as the only established faith (Desan, 1990, p. 24). All religions were legally equal. The church, moreover, was firmly under Napoleon's control. He ensured stipends for the clergy and appointed the bishops. All priests were to swear an oath of loyalty to the state, and prayers for the government were recited in all churches. Former church property would not be returned.

In no other country was the religious upheaval of the revolutionary years as traumatic as it was in France. But in every place touched by warfare, Catholic practice was disrupted and the church's relations with government and society affected. In regions where revolutionary or Napoleonic regimes were established, the church surrendered property; monasteries and convents were closed and parish priests lost positions. Confraternities, previously so important for lay-involvement in religion, declined or disappeared in much of Italy, and in Spain their role in parish life diminished. The Revolution also deeply politicized the question of religious choice. Adherence to Catholicism was no longer universal in nominally Catholic countries. Henceforth, it involved a conscious decision and that decision was not only a matter of faith it was also a statement about one's political stance and outlook on the modernization of Europe in the nineteenth century.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

After the revolutionary trauma, the church could no longer assume dominance over the spiritual lives of people in Catholic countries. Catholicism increasingly competed with other religions guaranteed toleration in liberal states. It also competed with the growth of religious indifference and with political ideologies that were suspicious of the church or rejected it altogether. The church saw itself as embattled with rapidly triumphing forces of secularization, materialism, scientific advances, liberalism, and eventually socialism. Historians too have long considered the nineteenth century a time of prevailing secularization. However, recent work in the social history of religion suggests a more complex situation.

The picture of Catholic practice in the nineteenth century presents striking geographic and class differences. Rural areas maintained high levels of compliance with Catholic observances. But in a time of rapid urbanization, fewer and fewer city inhabitants took the church's prescriptions seriously. The evidence for this conclusion comes from quantitative studies of participation in life-cycle rituals, such as baptisms, marriages, and funerals, or other Catholic obligations,

such as attendance at mass and the taking of Easter communion. Available statistics show that in Paris almost 90 percent of families sought out priests to perform baptisms for their children in 1865; by 1908 the number had dropped to under 59 percent. Wealthier quarters often had much higher participation rates than working-class districts, where rates were particularly low. In Paris's working-class twentieth arrondissement between 1909 and 1914, only 6 percent of the population took Easter communion (Kselman, 1995, pp. 169–170). In the Spanish city of Logrono, over 90 percent of the inhabitants took Easter communion in 1860, but by 1890 that figure had fallen to 40 percent. Only 6 percent of the eighty thousand people in Madrid's working-class district of San Ramon took Easter communion in the 1930s and only 7 percent attended mass (Callahan, 1995, p. 51).

The numbers reflect a serious decline from the near-universal participation of the early modern period, and they suggest why ecclesiastics viewed cities as cesspools of immorality, political radicalism, and atheism. The Parisian priest François Courtade complained in 1871, that the “laboring population of Paris are without faith and without God. The notion and feeling of the divine seem to have entirely withdrawn from them” (Kselman, 1995, p. 165). Of course, he wrote this in the year of the Commune, but the sentiment was common among the Catholic clergy. In 1855, the Spanish bishop Antonio Palau wrote: “Who can doubt that people from all parts of the world, of all religions . . . flow to the great centers of manufacturing and commerce, and communicate . . . their religious indifference. . . . Faith has grown languid, charity has become cold [and] religious sentiment has grown weak” (Callahan, 1995, p. 43).

But we must be careful in drawing the conclusion that urbanization necessarily led to religious indifference. Research in the later decades of the twentieth century has shown that much depended on where the people flocking to urban centers came from. Cities located in regions with observant rural populations had much higher rates of participation in Catholic ceremonies than those that were not. For example, Quimper in Brittany and Metz in Lorraine—both areas of strong Catholic piety—had relatively high rates of taking Easter communion. Limoges—located in the Limousin, long known for religious indifference—had rates that were much lower.

The overall statistics on observance also hide a large gender imbalance. Women were more observant than men. The trend, already apparent in the eighteenth century, accelerated during the nineteenth and continued into the twentieth. Church attendance increasingly became a form of female sociability; men

met in the café or in political groups, often those with strong anticlerical views. Some have suggested that the predominance of women in Catholic worship developed from a particularly feminized Catholic piety, of which popular shrines, such as Lourdes, associated with visions of the Virgin are one example. Such feminized piety is described as sentimental or saccharine with an emphasis on the need for quiet suffering, as found for instance in the cult of Saint Thérèse of Lisieux (1873–1897). Compared with the more austere piety of the Catholic Reformation or the eighteenth century, that of the nineteenth century, especially in its popular devotions, does seem more emotional, if not to say insipid. However, to describe such characteristics as especially feminine is to impose an already heavily gendered language on the phenomenon. Men were also involved in popular religious observances, and priests promoted and led them. It is equally possible that Catholic worship attracted women because it stressed their role, or that of saintly figures like Thérèse of Lisieux and Bernadette Soubirous (1844–1879), the Lourdes visionary, or that of a female sacred figure like Mary in the future of the church and the salvation of countries turning toward secularism. The questions that feminization of religious practice poses remain one of the most pressing areas for future research.

The overall decline in Catholic observance stemmed in part from the church's own shortcomings. The church failed to adapt its network of pastoral care to a rapidly urbanizing society. European cities grew enormously across the nineteenth century and the provision priests and parish churches did not keep pace. The ratio of priests to urban inhabitants declined steadily. In Vienna it was 1 priest to every 1,641 people in 1783, 1 to 4,290 in 1842, and 1 to 5,949 in 1910. Paris had 1 priest for every 3,056 inhabitants in 1861 and 1 for every 4,790 in 1914. Marseilles had 1 for every 2,450 in 1861 and 1 for every 4,550 in 1921. And the shortfall was particularly evident in the working-class areas into which rural immigrants flooded. In Paris in 1906, the priest-to-inhabitant ratio was 1 to 3,681 in the central, wealthy arrondissements and 1 to 5,760 in the working-class surrounding districts (McLeod, 1995, p. 16; Kselman, 1995, p. 170). Presumably some of the strong anticlericalism of urban workers derived from their sense that the clergy had deserted them.

The growth of belief systems hostile to Catholicism also contributed to the decline in religious practice. Middle-class liberals and working-class socialists often saw the church as an enemy. Liberals could, at times, reach accommodations with the church, as did Spanish Moderates in negotiating a concordat with

Rome in 1851. And after the upheaval of the 1848 Revolution, bourgeois Frenchmen found a new appreciation of the church as an instrument of social control. But as heirs to eighteenth-century rationalism, many liberals found themselves at odds with Catholicism. The church opposed certain basic liberal beliefs, for example, religious toleration. Liberals deplored the church's ownership of large amounts of property, its influence within educational systems, and its alliance with right-wing politics. Liberal governments moved to curtail the church's role and power in society. In 1836, the Spanish government suppressed male religious orders, and over the next twenty-five years liberal regimes sold much ecclesiastical property. In Prussia, Otto von Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*, the decade-long campaign against the church in the 1870s, included expulsion of the Jesuits, prohibition of using pulpits for political uses, state approval of clerical appointments, and establishment of state control over religious schools and instructors. Education was also a source of conflict in France, where, in the 1880s, the Third Republic laicized the school system.

The antipathy between the church and political radicals was even stronger. The church saw socialism as godless. Workers were suspicious of the church's alliance with social elites, employers, and political conservatism. Although the church was not an inveterate defender of capitalism—unconstrained economic development seemed egotistical, and unrestrained competition for wealth seemed sinful—its view of society was steeped in an idealized understanding of the past in which rich and poor were tied together by the bonds of Christian charity. Political radicals saw conflict between classes as inevitable, and workers had no use for clerics who preached resignation rather than political action. Mutual hostility erupted in serious outbreaks of violence, most notably during the Paris Commune of 1871, when priests held hostage were killed.

The social and political conflicts in which Catholicism was engaged in the nineteenth century can easily make it appear that the church was in constant retreat before the onslaught of the modern world. And the complaints of clerics, especially Pope Pius IX (reigned 1846–1878), who issued the Syllabus of Errors in 1864 to combat modernity, can give the same impression. However, the church could also make use of what modern life offered. Cities, so often derided as spiritual wastelands, were also places where new Catholic groups could organize. Catholic leaders established schools, youth groups, women's clubs, sports associations, credit unions, cooperatives, and unions in their effort to reclaim the religious loyalty of urban populations. The success of these efforts was limited,

particularly when workers were targeted. In the aftermath of the Commune, the French aristocrat Albert de Mun founded Catholic workers' discussion circles and recreational societies. In Spain, church leaders sponsored associations of workers and employers. Workers were suspicious of such organizations, which were more concerned with regaining them for the faith and fighting socialism than with improving their economic situation. In the spirit of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum novarum* (1891), some of the clergy sought to open the church to science, political democracy, and worker's rights. Leo (reigned 1878–1903) had insisted on including in the document the statement that workers had a right to organize independent unions. But the church could not shed its paternalism, and when such ideas were put into practice they still involved clerics leading laypeople whom they expected to be obedient.

The church had more success when it could combine opportunities available in modern society with its more traditional undertakings. The most spectacular development in nineteenth-century Catholic piety were the apparitions of the Virgin Mary that led to the development of popular pilgrimage shrines. The church preached the imminent arrival of a Marian age that would precede the Second Coming, and the message found a receptive audience among a laity with an already fervent popular devotion to the Virgin. Although not all the apparitions and pilgrimages gained ecclesiastical approval, the church promoted those that did energetically, and it used the means the modern world provided to do so.

The most successful of the nineteenth-century shrines was that of Lourdes in the French Pyrénées, where the Virgin appeared to Bernadette Soubirous in 1858. Lourdes quickly became a magnet for pilgrims from all over Europe, who came to the sacred grotto seeking miraculous cures. The church's promotion of such a miracle shrine might seem a retreat from the modern world into the popular religion that the Catholic-Reformation church had tried to discourage. Indeed, the church hierarchy, faced with a European culture it no longer dominated, now found strength in the deep well of popular devotion and practices, which rallied the faithful to an embattled religion.

However, the church's investment in popular shrines did not represent a turning away from the modern world. It was precisely the cultural, technical, and commercial developments of the nineteenth century that made the shrines' success possible. Increased literacy provided a large audience for the reports of miracles published in widely-read Catholic periodicals. *La Croix*, produced by the Assumptionist order

tacular manifestations of popular devotion. Rather than being a primary determinant of European society and culture, the church was and would continue to be subject to problems that divisions in society provoked.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The church's problematic reconciliation with the modern world continued through the first half of the twentieth century. In multiconfessional societies, and in those with growing religious indifference, the church remained on the defensive. In liberal democracies, even in those with nominally Catholic majorities, the church increasingly operated in a self-contained sphere with its own associations, school systems, welfare institutions, and political parties. In Spain and Portugal, the church was closely allied with fascist regimes, which enforced the conservative morality Catholicism condoned. The church's relations with Italian Fascism and Nazism were much more problematic. And under post-World War II communist regimes, the church provided a rallying point for political resistance and was an important component of national identity against Soviet domination. Thus for much of the century, the church's relation to society depended largely on the political system of individual countries. At the end of the twentieth century, however, the trend toward political liberalism and democracy seemed to be leading to the compartmentalization of Catholicism throughout all of Europe.

In France the separation of state and society from the church proceeded the farthest. In the first decade of the century, the anticlerical Third Republic applied harsh laws against Catholic religious orders, and in 1905 it enacted a complete separation of state and church. Relations between the two remained embittered. In 1925, an assembly of French cardinals and archbishops issued a declaration condemning laicity and urging the faithful to disobey the law. This resistance seemed precisely the sort of disloyalty that secularists feared from ultramontane Catholics. The French clergy, as was the case with the church as a whole, was intransigent in the belief that no well-ordered society could exist unless its laws conformed to Catholic teachings. The church's relations with the Vichy government, which enforced a conservative moral regime, were much better. But under the post-war republics the church once again had to contend with governments that disassociated themselves from religious institutions and with a population that was increasingly nonobservant.

In Spain the conflict between the church and liberal governments as well as that between the clergy

in the 1880s and 1890s, was one of France's most popular newspapers. New national railroad networks made it feasible for large numbers of pilgrims to travel to remote locations like Lourdes. The newly developing travel industry saw to the housing and feeding of the pilgrims. These miracle-working shrines were very much a part of the modern world.

The shrines also became embroiled in the modern world's political conflicts. Lourdes served the cause of the Bourbon legitimists against the Second Empire and later against the Third Republic. But eventually it also became identified with French nationalism; French Catholics took pride in Mary's appearance in their country. And after the defeat by Prussia and the crisis of the Commune, the shrine was declared a symbol of national regeneration. Lourdes's success sparked imitations. At Marpingen in the German Saarland in 1876, village girls had visions of the Virgin near a spring. A pilgrimage quickly developed that boosted German Catholic morale in the struggle against Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*. The Marpingen apparitions also raised the possibility that Germany would now have a shrine to rival the French Lourdes.

Thus the church at the end of the nineteenth century was not in complete retreat from the modern world but was painfully coming to grips with it. Catholicism's sources of strength lay no longer in the universality of Catholic practice, but in sometimes spec-

and left-wing workers provoked great conflict, culminating in the Civil War of 1936–1939, during which seven thousand members of the clergy were executed, churches were sacked, and the bodies of clerics were exhumed from their graves. The Civil War's violence convinced many that it was necessary to organize society around the church's moral, social, and political teachings. Francisco Franco's regime overturned the liberalizing policies of the republican government. It repealed the divorce law and made religious marriages compulsory for all. It also decreed Catholic religious teaching mandatory in schools, and gave ecclesiastical authorities oversight of educational curricula. Hence, the segregation of Catholicism and society was, in principle, reversed; Catholic observance became a sign of social respectability and political orthodoxy. But the church-state alliance also worked to limit Catholicism's impact. Regions and social groups resistant to the regime were also strongly anticlerical.

In Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, the situations were different. As was the case in Spain and Portugal, a church that had long opposed liberal ideas had no problem at first in seeing authoritarian regimes suppress them. However, in neither country would the church-state alliance endure. The nationalization of the Papal States at the time of Italian unification had set off a long church-state conflict that Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) and Pope Pius XI (reigned 1922–1939) brought to an end with the signing of the Lateran Treaty of 1929. However, conflict arose over church autonomy and fascist ideology. The papal encyclical *Non abbiamo bisogno* ("We have no need") of 1931 denounced the pagan worship of the fascist state and declared its conception of society to be incompatible with Catholic doctrine. In Germany, Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli (the future Pope Pius XII, 1939–1958) signed a concordat with Hitler in 1933. Disputes between the state and the Vatican quickly resumed. In 1937, when the Vatican issued the encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* ("With burning anguish") condemning racism (though without specifically mentioning Nazism), the regime reacted with a fierce antichurch campaign that sent many priests to concentration camps. Thus although the church and these totalitarian regimes shared common enemies in democratic liberalism and socialism, they were not capable of, nor even inclined to, re-create the integration of Catholicism and European society that had long since disappeared. Nonetheless, the willingness of the church to come to agreements with these regimes disillusioned many, and the disillusionment was accentuated by the sorry and controversial record of Pius XII's refusal to speak out against the Holocaust.

The church's encounter with conservative, totalitarian regimes would finally bring about its long overdue reconciliation with liberal democracy and eventually with religious toleration. But this would occur in a post-World War II Europe in which the church as an institution was increasingly isolated from much of society, and its teachings increasingly out of step with social mores.

Ironically, only where the church was persecuted, as in Poland, would its integration with society remain strong. The Polish church provided political leadership as well as a rallying point during the centuries-long struggle for national unity and independence. Catholic symbols, such as the shrine of the Black Madonna at Czestochowa, were also national symbols. In the twentieth century, the great variety of Catholic educational, cultural, welfare, and labor organizations constituted much of Polish civil society. However, before the war Poland was an ethnically and religiously diverse country; Catholics accounted for 65 percent of the population. It was only after the war, especially with the extermination of the Jewish community, that the church could claim the religious allegiance of 95 percent of Poles. The church's hostility to communism made it the center—and its primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński (1901–1981) the leader—of resistance to the postwar regime. And the church's alliance with Solidarity helped bring about the downfall of that regime. However, since the establishment of the post-communist government, splits between church and society have appeared. Catholic leaders see their faith as central to Polish identity and seek to have the church exercise a tight control over society. The primate Cardinal Józef Glemp encouraged Catholic political candidates to run against those of other religious, specifically Jewish, backgrounds. The church has opposed the liberalization of divorce and abortion laws. The disputes these policies have provoked, even in strongly Catholic Poland, are replaying the sorts of church-society conflicts found throughout Europe as modernization increasingly has marginalized the church's role in European society.

The church has had two very different responses to the problem modernization poses. One has been to continue to draw strength from some of its most ancient practices, for example, miracle-working shrines. Miracles at Fatima in Portugal, which started in 1917, have continued to this day, and Pope John Paul II has expressed his personal attachment to the devotion. Pilgrims also flock to Medjugorje in Croatia where apparitions of the Virgin started in 1981.

The church's major institutional response was the Second Vatican Council, which Pope John XXIII (reigned 1958–1963) convened between 1962 and

1965. The impact of the Council's work on liberalizing Catholic doctrine, ritual practice, and openness to the world, especially the non-European world, has been profound. The Council greatly reduced the church's traditional hostility toward modern society. Henceforth, an ecumenical institution would respect other Christian faiths and promote religious freedom and tolerance. It would devote new energy to improving the earthly lot of the poor as well as their salvation. The laity would gain a greater role in worship, a democratization of traditional clerical-directed devotional life. The Council thus reformed many of the policies that had guided the church since the sixteenth-century Council of Trent.

But manifestations of popular piety and the liberalization begun at Vatican II have not reversed the separation of the church and European society nor the decreasing importance of Catholicism as a source of individual identity. Regular church attendance has continued to fall, especially among the young. According to a survey done in France in the early 1990s, only 12 percent of those who consider themselves Catholic attend mass regularly (down from 20 percent

in the mid-1980s). And only 2.5 percent of those under twenty-five attend (Hervieu-Léger, 1995, p. 155). The church has lost battles over divorce, homosexual rights, and abortion as European electorates have ratified liberal laws on all these issues in most European countries. A more conservative papacy under John Paul II exacerbated some tensions during the 1990s, though the pope roused great popular enthusiasm during his frequent travels, particularly in eastern Europe.

Although Catholicism no longer holds the place it once did in organizing social life and determining social attitudes, it has by no means disappeared from public life in Europe. Fierce political conflicts over such issues as abortion demonstrate the church's continuing ability to interject itself into debates on social morality. And even in France with its long history of secularized public education, attempts by the government to alter the funding of religious schools led to huge protest demonstrations in the 1980s and 1990s. Clearly, even though Catholicism is no longer a dominant element in European society, its impact is still considerable, and social historians will continue to assess its impact.

See also **Secularization** (*volume 2*); **Charity and Poor Relief: The Early Modern Period**; **Charity and Poor Relief: The Modern Period** (*volume 3*); **Schools and Schooling** (*in this volume*); and other articles in this section.

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PROTESTANTISM



Andrew Pettegree

Protestantism takes its name from the petition presented by certain German towns and princely states at the Imperial Diet of 1529. It signified their formal adherence to the doctrinal principles of the movement of evangelical protest that had raged in Germany surrounding the controversial teachings of the dissident Catholic monk Martin Luther (1483–1546). In 1529 the Imperial Diet attempted to bring an end to the controversy by reaffirming a strict prohibition of Luther's teaching, first banned by the Edict of Worms in 1521. The evangelical states entered their "protestation." This association was formalized by the presentation the following year of an evangelical confession of faith, the Confession of Augsburg (1530), and the formation in 1531 of a defensive alliance, the Schmalkaldic League, to guard the new faith.

The emergence of formal Protestant churches crowned a decade of evangelical ferment sparked by the teachings of Luther and attempts by the church to silence his followers. The Reformation is traditionally deemed to have begun in 1517, the year Luther published his Ninety-five Theses against indulgences. But the pressure for reform within the Catholic Church was of long standing. Luther, in this sense, followed a long line of distinguished churchmen and thinkers who criticized abuse within the church. Much of this criticism focused on the poor morals and low educational standards of the clergy and the venality and worldliness of the clerical hierarchy. But this dissatisfaction also reflected a fundamental long-term shift in the relationship between clergy and laypeople since the High Middle Ages. By the sixteenth century laypeople were eager to exercise more direct control over parts of civic culture that previously had been largely in the clerical domain, such as schools and hospitals. With the rise of lay literacy, education and even the skills of reading and writing were less wholly a clerical preserve, and laypeople judged their clergy by more demanding standards. The century around the Reformation witnessed a significant increase in the amount of money laypeople were channeling into the church through donations, the re-

modeling of their parish churches, and the founding of chantries, altars, and special masses.

Luther's teaching made such a powerful impact because it effectively provided an outlet for both of these strands of criticism. The first ten years of the Reformation movement were marked by the publication of a steady stream of Luther's writings denouncing clerical abuse and calling for reform. In the process he developed a radical theology of reform that found little place for the mediating role of the priesthood. Luther's criticisms initially found their strongest resonance among intellectuals and fellow members of the clerical orders. Humanists, who had their own criticisms of clerical laxity, were at first broadly supportive, as were many within the clerical estate who shared Luther's disillusionment with the clerical leadership. As his attack on the church broadened, Luther's views found increasing resonance in the German imperial cities, sophisticated communities that allowed a broad scope for the expression of lay opinion.

THEOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FOUNDATIONS

The core of Luther's new theological system was less a critique of clerical morals than a fundamental reevaluation of his understanding of grace and salvation. Justification by faith—by God's grace alone and not through works—was a liberating theological concept for those who, like Luther, had labored under an overwhelming burden of their own sinful natures and the impossibility of conciliating a pitiless God through propitiatory works. But quite apart from the emotional release, evidently as powerful for many of Luther's followers as for the reformer himself, the doctrine of justification also had significant implications for the life of the church. If good works were of no effect, then many of the church's institutions and vocations, including memorial masses, monasteries, and purgatory, lost their purpose. Through justification Luther also placed new emphasis on the relationship between God

and the individual Christian, and this, rather dangerously expressed as “the priesthood of all believers,” did much to undermine the spiritual vocation of the priesthood. Luther’s confidence in the laity may have been short-lived, but it provided the motivation for his greatest literary achievement, the German vernacular translation of the Bible (New Testament, 1522; complete Bible, 1534).

Vernacular scripture provided the crucial bridge between Luther the theologian and a wider popular movement. Many who could not comprehend the implications of justification could grasp the potency of the reformers’ demand for “pure scripture,” with its implicit criticism of late medieval theology and the authority of tradition. According to studies of the popular response to Luther, “pure scripture” (*rein evangelium*) became the slogan of the German urban Reformation in the years of its most rapid growth (1521–1524). From this point forward the commitment to vernacular scripture and to a generalized knowledge of the Bible among the Christian population was a leitmotiv of all Protestant churches.

Luther’s preaching was characterized by a strong apocalyptic sense. Luther clearly believed that he was a preacher of the last days, and his struggle with the papacy was for him the final climactic battle with the Antichrist. In this respect it is hardly surprising that he at first gave little attention to church building. His whole being was bound up in the call to repentance, not the creation of a counterchurch. But as the new churches took shape, the need for order became obvious. In 1529 Luther responded to this pressure with

two catechisms, one for adults (*Large Catechism*) and one for children (*Small Catechism*), which set the tone for the strong educational impulse that became a leading characteristic of the Protestant movement. Philipp Melancthon (1497–1560), Luther’s friend and disciple, provided a systematic theology for the new movement with his *Loci communes* (1521). Another follower, Johannes Bugenhagen (1485–1558), revealed a talent for church organization reflected in the drafting of published church orders for the new churches of north Germany and Scandinavia.

These developments were a recognition that the movement of reform had become an independent church. Beginning in 1525 a wave of important cities, including Nuremberg, Strasbourg, and Augsburg, formally adhered to the Reformation and were followed by a number of the most important German princely states, including Hesse, Saxony, and Brandenburg. In 1557 Denmark adopted a Protestant church order, followed by Sweden in 1539. In a parallel process, the last efforts at a formal reconciliation with the Catholic Church, the Colloquy of Regensburg in 1540, failed. The establishment of Protestantism was complete.

With the establishment of formal Protestant churches, reformers acknowledged that the gulf between Protestantism and the Catholic hierarchy was now unbridgeable. But church building was also a defense of Protestant orthodoxy against challenge from within. Luther’s movement was characterized from the beginning by an emotional contradiction. On the one hand, the movement in its early years was fueled by

an enormous sense of release. Liberation from the weight of traditional Catholic devotional practice was the emotional heart of Luther's doctrine of grace. In addition the incautious formulation of the priesthood of all believers seemed to validate a large lay role in the interpretation of scripture but in fact revealed more starkly a fundamental problem of authority. If the power of the church hierarchy to arbitrate on matters of doctrine was denied, who then was to exercise this authority? Luther's response, that scripture was the final source of authority, invited a mass of conflicting interpretations, particularly in a movement that eagerly promoted free access to the words of scripture through vernacular translation.

It was soon apparent that these fundamental problems would not easily be resolved. Luther was alarmed by evidence of radicalism in the Wittenberg movement on the part of colleagues, such as Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt (1480–1541), and the self-taught laymen known as the Zwickau prophets. Luther's personal authority was enough to crush these local critics, but he could only watch, powerless, when in 1525 a wide swath of south Germany rose in revolt, claiming Luther's gospel as its inspiration for its program of social reform. The reaction to the Peasants' War (1524–1525) revealed the conservatism of the magisterial reformers. Luther urged the German princes to crush the rebels, and obedience to the established secular authority was henceforth a fundamental cornerstone of the creed of Lutheran churches. But the ending of the Peasants' War did not lead to the destruction of the sectarian instinct. The radical wing of the Reformation reconfigured as Anabaptism, a broad-ranging movement that encompassed a wealth of congregations and prophetic leaders, many of them self-educated laypeople from outside the normal clerical structure. The movement reached its first apogee in their "kingdom of a thousand years" in Münster, a north German city that fell into radical hands through the normal political process. Once in control the Anabaptist leadership declared Münster the new Jerusalem, where the saints might await the imminent end time. The incident attracted huge publicity among both the adepts, who flocked to Münster, and the increasingly appalled mainstream church leaders. In 1535 an army supported by both Catholics and Protestants suppressed the kingdom with great barbarity, a first indication that the established churches might have more in common than divisions over doctrine implied. Anabaptism, in fact, proved surprisingly resilient, particularly in the Netherlands, where the Friesian priest Menno Simons (1496–1561) revived a movement shorn of its more violent apocalypticism. Other groups, such as the Antitrinitarians, found ref-

uge in the more confessionally diverse lands of eastern Europe.

The horror of sectarianism was only one aspect of the disappointment that confronted leaders of the evangelical movement in the decades after the establishment of Protestant churches. Luther endured the progressive alienation of many who had initially welcomed his call for reform. The Peasants' War signaled the limits of the movement's appeal to the rural population, and 1525 also witnessed a decisive break with the Dutch humanist scholar Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536), though many of the younger humanists remained faithful to Luther. By the end of the decade Luther was also embroiled in a damaging dispute with the leader of the Swiss Reformation, Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531). In the longer term reformers also were forced to contemplate disappointment on a more fundamental level, a recognition that the Reformation had not achieved the wholesale reform of morals and that the effort to bring laypeople to an informed understanding of faith would be long and arduous. Surveys of the condition of the churches, or visitations, conducted in the Lutheran lands found that in the 1580s most inhabitants lacked even the most rudimentary understanding of the essentials of doctrine. Consideration of this evidence has led some historians to talk of the failure of the Reformation, though this seems overdrawn. The movement for renewal within the Catholic Church experienced similar problems in overcoming ingrained habits of belief and practice.

The real shortcoming of Luther's movement was its failure to put down deep roots outside of the German Empire or neighboring lands susceptible to German cultural influences, such as Scandinavia and parts of eastern Europe like Hungary and Bohemia. Promising beginnings in the lands of western Europe, such as France and the Netherlands, had by the 1540s been erased by determined opposition from the local lay powers, and even in England the Protestant settlement introduced under Henry VIII and Edward VI seemed successfully reversed in the reign of Mary Tudor. By the time of Luther's death in 1546 it was clear that Protestantism would not, as had once seemed possible, carry all before it.

Zwingli was an independent thinker of the first rank. Appointed to the position of people's priest in Zurich in 1518, Zwingli seized the opportunity to introduce root and branch reform. By 1525 Zurich had carried through a civic Reformation, the first city to do so, expelling Catholic priests and abolishing the Mass. The impact of Zurich's radical Reformation was initially profound in Germany as well as in the Swiss Confederation, but it was limited by a damaging



THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF PROTESTANTISM

The question of which groups within society were most attracted to Protestantism and why has long divided scholars. Undoubtedly Luther's movement initially found its most profound resonance among the populations of towns, though precisely which groups embraced the new movement varied according to local circumstances. The urban elites, sensible to the wider political implications of confronting conservative political neighbors or superiors, were not normally the prime movers, though often, when pressure for reform became irresistible, they would assert control of the movement to preserve their own authority. In some German towns the Reformation became a vehicle for prosperous but politically excluded groups within the citizenry to break the power of an entrenched oligarchy.

Much research on different case studies has sought to establish whether the Reformation appealed disproportionately to different trade groups. In aggregate this work has hardly improved on the contemporary verdict of the shrewd sixteenth-century Catholic writer Florimond de Raemon. The first "victims" of the new faith were in his observation "painters, clock-makers, draughtsmen, jewellers, booksellers, printers—all those whose crafts demand a certain degree of superior discernment" (Duke, Lewis, and Pettegree, 1992, p. 35) Printers and booksellers were especially important early converts to Protestantism, and in general the evangelical doctrines made deeper inroads among trades characterized by a high degree of literacy or mobility. Trade groups whose skills were relatively portable, such as goldsmiths or weavers, provided a disproportionate number of converts, whereas those with a low degree of product innovation, such as butchers and others in the food production process or coopers, proved disproportionately resistant to the new doctrines. In this sense the venerable "Weber thesis" may have expressed an essential truth. Max Weber (1864–1920) argued that an essential aspect of Calvinism that he called the Protestant work ethic created a climate particularly conducive to the growth of capitalism. In its purest sense the Weber thesis failed to command support. It may be that Weber indeed identified a real connection but inverted the causal relationship. The Reformation, and perhaps especially Calvinism, proved most alluring to groups that were already socially and economically mobile.

The importance of highly skilled members of new trades in the movement also explains why so many towns and cities were willing to open their gates to large groups

of religious refugees and protect them against the resentment of indigenous guilds and tradesmen. The value of such newcomers to the local economy, particularly in towns experiencing stagnation, was widely recognized at the time. Indeed the Reformation, by stimulating an enormous movement of peoples between European lands of different confessions, played as important a role in stimulating protoindustrial development as any other aspect of economic change during the early modern period.

The Reformation also played an important role in recasting social relationships within the community. The role of women in society was drastically reordered, many have argued to their disadvantage. The denigration of the female religious vocation certainly cut independent career opportunities, and the end of the cult of saints removed many female role models. Against these outcomes Protestant societies often successfully articulated a new vision of the dignity of female roles within the family and tenaciously defended the rights of women within this context. Calvinist consistories, for instance, devoted considerable attention to upholding the dignity of marriage and protecting women from brutality, abandonment, or ill-treatment. Many women benefited from the legitimation of clerical marriage, which gave clerical families for the first time the legal protections of a legitimate relationship. Indeed, clergy families became a powerful new social force in most Protestant cultures, a phenomenon linked to the increased professionalization of the Protestant ministry. By the end of the sixteenth century an increasing proportion, in many areas a majority, of clergy in post were university educated, and the increased desirability and social prestige attached to their work was reflected in the emergence of recognizable clerical dynasties.

The Protestant emphasis on the family as the natural unit of social organization had a profound and persistent impact on the social culture of Protestant lands. In the first Reformation century Protestantism placed an obligation on the family to function as a sort of small church community, the head of the family instructing both children and servants in the rudiments of the faith. Such an emphasis gave full rein to the puritan instinct, by which families and groups of households dissatisfied with the morals of society practiced a culture of reinforcement and greater austerity within the privacy of their own homes. At its best this was a support to the wider community; applied with too critical an eye to the failings of others, it easily reinforced the sectarian instinct.

quarrel between Zwingli and Luther. The more conservative Luther was appalled by Zurich's radical "cleansing" of the local churches to remove all physical vestiges of Catholicism. The two men soon clashed over eucharistic doctrine, Zwingli again favoring a more radical solution, and after a failed attempt at reconciliation at the Colloquy of Marburg (1529), the gap between the two was unbridgeable. Inside the Swiss Confederation the appeal of the reform movement was retarded by suspicion of Zurich's motives. Although the two most powerful German-speaking urban cantons, Bern and Basel, eventually adopted the reform, the rural mountain cantons decisively rejected Protestantism and with it Zurich's imperial pretensions. Open confrontation in the Battle of Kappel wars left Zurich defeated and Zwingli dead on the field of battle. The Zurich Reformation was ultimately rescued by the leadership of Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575), but its capacity for expansion was decisively checked.

As Zurich retreated into introspection, a new leadership force emerged from the unlikely quarter of French-speaking Geneva. The small independent city was a late convert to reform, but in the 1530s it was a beacon for evangelical refugees from France, among them the young scholar John Calvin (1509–1564). After an uncertain beginning to a ministry that led to his expulsion and exile from 1538 to 1541, Calvin gradually imposed his personal stamp on the Geneva

Reformation. By the time of his death Geneva had become a model Christian commonwealth and the center of a growing international movement.

Even more than Luther, Calvin was the spirit that underpinned the long-term survival of Protestantism. Calvin was a writer and thinker of exceptional clarity. Sharing Luther's gift for excoriating polemic, he also synthesized Reformation thought into a coherent systematic theology. His *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1536; final expanded version 1560) was a work of genius that functioned equally effectively as a handbook for the individual Christian and for the Christian community. Along with Luther's vernacular translation of the Bible, it was among the most important literary products of the Reformation.

Guided by Calvin's preaching and supervised by the consistory, a joint morals commission staffed by clergy and lay elders, Geneva became the archetypal godly community. In the process the Reformation shed much of the apocalypticism that characterized the first generation. Calvinism, the least apocalyptic of the major Protestant schools, gave much greater attention to building the church in the community.

THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WAR

The peaceful construction of the church in Geneva contrasted strongly with Calvinism's disruptive influ-

ence elsewhere in Europe. Calvin's strong emphasis on the sanctity of suffering together with the movement's sophisticated organizational structure provided the basis for church building even where the state power remained hostile. Calvin's followers (if not Calvin himself) were also far more willing than Luther to contemplate defiance of the state power. Early Calvinist congregations in France and the Netherlands were characterized above all by a remarkable sense of providentialism, which allowed them to survive and even grow despite intense persecution.

A midcentury crisis in the affairs of several northern European states allowed Calvinist congregations the chance to seize power. While a Calvinist church swiftly established supremacy in Scotland—the consequence of a political revolution of which the Calvinist congregations were the beneficiaries rather than the cause—the emergence of churches in France and the Netherlands led to prolonged conflict. The French Wars of Religion (1562–1598) were a sustained struggle to prevent the Calvinist insurrection from undermining the Catholic character of the kingdom. Although Calvinists remained a decided minority, the Edict of Nantes in 1598 nevertheless guaranteed French Calvinist (Huguenot) churches important freedoms. In the Netherlands the Dutch revolt (1566–1609) led to the creation of a free Calvinist state in the northern provinces with the Union of Utrecht in 1579. In England the restoration of a Protestant settlement under Elizabeth I, who ruled from 1558 to 1603, completed a decisive shift in the balance of religious power in northern Europe.

The century of conflict unleashed by Luther's teachings achieved some sort of resolution in the first half of the seventeenth century. In Germany the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) permitted local autonomy for Catholic and Protestant principalities and bought the empire a half-century of uneasy peace. But tensions always simmered beneath the surface, not least because Calvinism, which had begun to make inroads into the German lands in the 1560s, was not included in the terms of the peace. A particular element of unpredictability was provided by successive electors of the Rhineland Palatinate, who after converting their lands to Calvinism in 1562 aspired to an aggressive leadership role. Toward the end of the century the Habsburg imperial family embarked upon a more active policy of recatholicization in their patrimony, and conflict loomed. The spark was provided by a rebellion in 1618 in Bohemia, one of the most integral yet most thoroughly protestantized parts of the Habsburg dominions. Fearing that the accession of the new emperor, Ferdinand II, would spell the end of Protestant liberties, Bohemians in 1619 offered

their crown instead to the elector palatine, Frederick V. He foolishly accepted, preparing the way for the Habsburg reconquest of Bohemia and the investiture of his own territories. These events initiated the Thirty Years' War, a conflict that gradually involved most of the powers of Europe. Although the religious configuration was not straightforward—the German Lutheran princes initially refused to support the Palatinate, and France later joined the anti-Habsburg struggle for straightforward political reasons—religious issues underpinned the conflict and made it more bitter, more destructive, and more difficult to resolve. In particular the intervention of the Lutheran king of Sweden, Gustavus II Adolph, was essential in turning back the tide of Habsburg success and preserving the Protestant cause in central Europe.

In 1648 the Peace of Westphalia finally permitted the warring parties to extricate themselves from the conflict and brought to an end the period of European relations primarily governed by religious loyalties. The peace also effectively confirmed the *de facto* division of Europe between Protestant and Catholic. Henceforth Protestantism was the majority creed of Germany, Scandinavia, Britain, the Dutch Republic, and more isolated outposts in eastern Europe, such as Hungary. Missionary efforts by Protestants and Catholics alike concentrated more on sustaining isolated minorities than on attempts to upset this balance. The focus of conversion also shifted to the non-Christian world opened up by colonial expansion and, nearer home, to the Christianization of populations still mired in ignorance and unbelief among the numerically dominant rural populations and the newly emerging urban proletariat. The challenge these groups posed to formal religion was a constant theme of religious life during the next two hundred years, stimulating repeated attempts to revive the original evangelical fervor of the Reformation era.

THE CHURCH IN THE AGE OF REASON

The move away from religious warfare reinforced other social changes that gradually over the next century would have a profound impact on attitudes toward religion and the place of the church in society. This profound shift in attitudes toward intellectual and scientific questions led historians to dub this period the Age of Reason, though the effect of questioning historic certainties was often uncomfortable for official religion. This was an age characterized above all by new developments in the world of ideas. With the scientific revolution, experimental science came of age as a discipline and seized the imaginations



THE CULTURAL WORLD OF PROTESTANTISM

It is easy to assume that the relationship between Protestantism and artistic culture was antagonistic. Protestants certainly took a highly critical view of the artistic manifestations of Catholic devotional culture. Although Luther reproved the violent removal of images, hostility to pictures and sculptures of saints, particularly when they were the focus of devotion, often led to destruction. Such iconoclastic episodes characterized the first wave of the Reformation in many Lutheran and Swiss cities, such as Wittenberg in 1521 and Basel, with its *Kirchensturm* (church storm), in 1527. Churches influenced by Calvin took a still more radical position. Iconoclasm was a feature of the early stages of the religious conflict in France and the Netherlands, and England and Scotland experienced the violent, unauthorized removal of images.

The cleansing of the churches did allow for the preservation of some masterpieces, such as Jan van Eyck's *Lamb of God* altar in Ghent, which was removed to safety elsewhere. The collapse of the Catholic devotional tradition did not spell the end of religious art in Protestant countries. In Germany Lucas Cranach (1472–1553) gave artistic expression to the new Reformation doctrines. Cranach and his followers designed and produced highly influential images expressing both the polemical and anti-papal rhetoric of the Reformation, such as *Passional Christi und Antichristi* (1521), and its new core doctrines, such as *Law and the Gospel* (1529). In the process they developed a wholly new artistic medium, the didactic woodcut, which played an important public role both as a means of book illustration and as single-page broadsheets. Mature Lutheran art also developed a distinctive pictorial form, the memorial picture (fine examples may be seen in the Wittenberg Stadtkirche).

In Calvinist cultures artistic hostility to religious pictorial art was more intense and enduring. Artistic energies were therefore often redeployed into other media, notably music. Calvin himself quickly grasped the value of music. Communal singing became a crucial part of the German service, specifically versions of the psalms set to music and sung unaccompanied in unison. These metrical psalms quickly became an identifying characteristic of Calvinist communities and were sung wherever congregations gathered, in church, in the fields, or even, during the religious wars, as armies went into battle. In more settled times distinguished composers provided harmonized versions for domestic entertainment, and it is in this form that they have continued to be most frequently performed.

The success of the metrical psalms opened the way for the Protestant rediscovery of religious music. Deprived

of the Mass, Protestant composers developed the chorale, a musical form that reached its apogee in the music of the German Lutheran Johann Sebastian Bach (1685–1750). Protestantism found its most characteristic musical expression in congregational singing, not least the tradition of hymnody bequeathed by Luther to the German churches. Luther himself wrote hymns and firmly believed in their capacity to instruct and inspire. The tradition was renewed and continued by the English Nonconformist churches, notably the Methodist movement of the Wesleys. Hymn-singing has remained one of the most fondly maintained aspects of the Protestant tradition.

Protestantism also left its mark on the physical appearance of the church. In countries where it was not possible to appropriate former Catholic churches, Protestants erected new structures that reflected architecturally their greater emphasis on preaching and participation. Round, oblong, or hexagonal structures made the pulpit the focal point and eliminated the long choir leading to the high altar. Such structures were common in France, though few survived the destruction that followed the ban on Huguenot churches in 1685. Examples survived in Leiden, in the Netherlands, and Burtisland, Scotland. The rise of Nonconformist churches in the eighteenth century led to a new wave of building that followed these Protestant architectural principles even more rigidly, providing many of the best examples of church structures that make an elevated pulpit the focal point.

One cultural field in which the influence of Protestantism was profound is the novel. Protestants played a significant part in the development of the narrative form. The influence of the puritan conscience, obvious in the religious allegories of John Bunyan (1628–1688) and the poetry and prose works of John Milton (1608–1674), is equally present in Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), whose hero, in the context of an adventure story of enduring appeal, struggles in the thrall of an all-powerful Providence. The power and appeal of nineteenth-century Nonconformity were echoed in the Victorian "industrial novels," notably Elizabeth Gaskell's *Mary Barton* (1848) and the works of George Eliot (1819–1880). Finally, Samuel Butler (1835–1902), in *The Way of All Flesh* (1903), draws an enormously powerful vision of the suffocating respectability of clerical life in the last era during which the church provided a unique path to respectability. Butler's work is infinitely more acute in its psychological perceptions than Anthony Trollope's popular novels of ecclesiastical politics and cathedral life.

of the thinkers of all nations. The world of ideas found a newly confident philosophy, leading to the pleasing rational certainties of the Enlightenment.

The effects of these developments on organized religion were not straightforward. Most leading figures in the world of science strongly affirmed the existence of a divine being. Indeed many affirmed that science “proved” the existence of God. In this period the new science, the discoveries of the German Lutheran Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) and of Isaac Newton (1642–1727), was widely regarded as a bulwark against atheism. According to John Locke (1632–1704), the most influential thinker of the day, the conviction that there is a God “is the most obvious truth that reason discovers”; its evidence is “equal to mathematical certainty.” The effect on belief was more subtle. The growing understanding of natural phenomena as capable of scientific explanation restricted the areas of the unknown in which God’s power was seen to be at work. In the medical field this period experienced a sea change in attitudes toward epidemics from the conviction that plague was a heaven-sent punishment (in Dutch it was known as *de gave Gods*, God’s gift) to a search for medical causes. The trial and execution of witches, still ferocious in the early seventeenth century, dwindled away by the end of the century. While most humans continued to believe in God, the belief in the Devil as a ceaselessly active force receded. The growing fixity in religious boundaries in Europe also led to a gradual increase in religious tol-

eration. This was more a matter of fact than principle, a weary acceptance that differences between the religious confessions were too deep-seated to be eliminated. But toleration was also assisted by a more profound revulsion against persecution for religious belief.

This development was certainly halting and not without setbacks. During this period formal toleration was revoked in Hungary, and in Poland the Roman Catholic minority found relief from the frustrations of the country’s endemic political turmoil by treating both Lutheran and Orthodox minorities with increasing severity. In England the resolution of the bitter legacy of the Civil War led, after the Restoration in 1660, to a switchback of vindictiveness interspersed by self-serving partial toleration until coexistence was finally embedded in the Toleration Act of 1689. In France, Louis XIV repudiated the privileges formerly granted the Huguenot minority. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 ordered the forcible closure of all Protestant churches and provoked the last major religious emigration of the Reformation era. But Louis’s policy was widely perceived by contemporaries as anachronistic, and those countries that opened their doors to the refugees benefited greatly from the injection of the new economic skills brought by the Huguenots.

With the eighteenth century the Protestant churches of Europe were generally entering calmer waters—but at a price. Some of the established churches had reached too comfortable an accommodation with the state. In England the power of pre-

ferment created a subservient and venal clerical class, eager for advancement, uncritical of the status quo, while bitterly divided over inequalities of wealth. With curates existing on as little as £20 per year, pluralism was rife. Yet few protested against a system in which the only hope of advancement lay in dutiful and patient obedience to lay patrons. In Germany, too, Lutheran churches had drifted into a relationship of easy and unreflective obedience to the state, initiating a tradition of Erastian complacency that had disastrous results in later centuries.

This increasing ossification of established Protestant churches inevitably provoked a reaction. Within the churches there arose new and challenging movements of spiritual renewal. The frustration of hopes of reform led in turn to the rise of nonconformity and dissent.

Within the Protestant establishment the most serious spiritual challenge was posed by Pietism, which sought to supplement the emphasis on institutions and dogma by promoting the practice of piety. It found its chief inspiration in the writings of Johann Arnd (1555–1621), a Lutheran theologian in whose work mysticism played a profound role. In Pietism the emphasis on inner experience and the life of the spirit was balanced by the insistence that belief should be reflected by a deeper and active commitment to the Christian life. In this respect Pietism drew heavily on the inspiration of the English Puritan movement, many of whose leading writings were at this point translated into other European vernaculars, including German and Hungarian. English Puritans, weary of the partial Reformation of the English church, were also the original inspiration behind a tradition of dissent that had a profound impact on the development of Protestantism in North America. From the time of the first settlers in Massachusetts, the Pilgrims in 1620, a succession of nonconformist groups sought sanctity in separation in the virgin lands of the New World. Among the most successful were the Quakers, who like the German Pietists dedicated themselves to living in accordance with the inner light. Inspired by the preaching of George Fox (1624–1691), the Quakers believed that ordained ministers and consecrated buildings were unnecessary for a church, teachings that brought them into conflict with successive seventeenth-century English governments. In 1682 William Penn (1644–1718) founded Pennsylvania as a holy experiment based on Quaker principles.

THE CHURCH IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE

The greatest of the dissenting traditions was the Methodist movement founded by John Wesley (1703–

1791). Methodism to some extent grew from the same impatience with established churches that had spawned earlier dissenting movements, but it also tapped into the new frustrations that were a consequence of industrial growth. In particular the English parochial system was slow to adapt to the rapid growth of urban populations that followed the birth of industrialization. As a result large swaths of the urban population were effectively unchurched. Wesley's ministry attempted to reverse what he saw as the inexorable growth of ignorance and atheism.

Wesley, the product of both a conventional Anglican education and a failed colonial venture in Georgia in 1735, began his preaching ministry after a conversion experience led him to embrace practical religion. As the churches were closed to him, Wesley took to the fields, where in an astonishing fifty-year ministry he attracted huge crowds and a growing following. Wesley always opposed separation from the Church of England, which had denied him a pulpit, but the real distinctiveness of his movement was formally recognized soon after his death in the Plan of Pacification of 1795. Methodism was by then a distinct and vital force in English life characterized by a lack of hierarchy and devotion to the inspirational hymns of John Wesley and his brother Charles Wesley

(1707–1788). Evangelical Christianity also made itself felt in the established church and in secular politics through the twenty-year campaign, from 1787 to 1807, led by William Wilberforce for the abolition of the slave trade.

The growth of an industrial proletariat was only one of a number of related challenges posed to Protestantism during the nineteenth century. New systems of belief of a secular nature posed an implicit challenge to organized religion that became a direct challenge with socialism and marxism. The rise of secular concepts of social organization, influenced by the teachings of Voltaire (1694–1778) and Rousseau (1712–1778), was often directly hostile to the power of the church in government. These ideas found their purest echo in the U.S. Constitution and their most violent expression in the French Revolution. Even though the Protestant nations of Europe avoided the worst excesses of revolutionary France, the spirit of the age proved increasingly impatient with the established churches' pretensions to a monopoly of religious truth. In a gradual process governments across Europe enacted formal toleration and thus extended full civil rights to previously marginal groups, including Roman Catholics, Jews, and finally even atheists. The rise of the secular urge in politics also led to considerable conflict in areas where church-state relations had previously been essentially harmonious, such as education and ecclesiastical patronage.

European Protestant churches reacted to these diverse challenges in different ways. In several of the dominant Protestant confessions, state encroachment or the rise of Liberalism—the political insistence on individual freedom and constitutional government and the economic doctrine of *laissez-faire*—led to painful divisions within the church. In 1843 almost half the ministers of the established Presbyterian Church of Scotland left the church to found a new Free Church in a dispute over ecclesiastical patronage known as the Great Disruption. The new political circumstances prompted two major splits in the dominant Dutch Reformed Church, the *Afscheiding* of 1834 and the *Doleantie* of 1887. In England the Oxford movement (1833–1845) was also largely inspired by a sense of the moral corrosiveness of Liberalism, although there the leading figures eschewed separation, at least until their spokesman John Henry Newman (1801–1890) defected to Roman Catholicism.

In Germany the major challenge was posed by the rise of biblical criticism in an age in which scholarly discoveries for the first time called into question the literal truth of parts of the biblical canon. German universities found an impressively dispassionate response, arguing that reasoned criticism should be met

by refutation rather than authority. With the German example, the Protestant churches of the mainstream adapted themselves relatively easily to the advance of science. In time churchmen learned to live with and even embrace the new climate of an age of mass political activism. In the Netherlands the towering figure of Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920) presided over an explicitly confessional political party, the first mass membership party of the Netherlands, committed to upholding orthodox Calvinist values against the secular tide. This, indeed, was the era that saw the emergence of several explicitly religious parties in Europe, usually broadly in the conservative, Christian Democratic tradition.

The nineteenth century also saw a rapid expansion of Protestant missionary activity in Africa and Asia. This was a relatively new interest (compared to Catholicism's), and it had a complex relationship with the problems encountered in Europe itself.

THE CHURCH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The twentieth century was a period of almost unprecedented political turmoil in Europe. Coupled with social changes of bewildering rapidity, the turmoil confronted Protestant churches with challenges that they struggled, often unsuccessfully, to meet. For the first time large sections of the population repudiated any formal belief. Protestant countries also for the first time faced the challenge of absorbing significant immigrant communities strongly committed to non-Christian belief systems. Even the Protestant confessions in the modern era shifted the balance of influence from Europe to the New World, which accurately reflected the shifting political and economic balance. To some extent this was anticipated in the nineteenth century by the proliferation of new religious movements rooted in a tradition of American revivalism. The Mormons (1830), Seventh-Day Adventists (1863), and Christian Scientists (1879) are the three most prominent examples. The American Great Awakening also transformed the Baptists from a small, rather marginal group into a huge church that by the end of the twentieth century had over 35 million members worldwide (mostly in the United States). In the twentieth century the most important movements of revivalism—Pentecostalism (1901), Fundamentalism, and (closely related to Fundamentalism) Evangelicalism—emerged from an American, conservative tradition.

For the more staid and decidedly uncharismatic European Protestant churches, the twentieth century

threw up difficult challenges that often found them wanting. Faced with the discordant but powerful forces of nationalism, socialism, and class conflict, the churches were sometimes driven into positions that left an enduring stain on their reputations. During World War I (1914–1918), established Protestant churches on both sides enrolled as cheerleaders for a rampant militarism that at war's end left millions dead. Twenty years later the German Lutheran Church willingly embraced the nationalism and racial policies of the Nazi movement. The small dissident group that left the church over the issue of Nazi racial policies, the Confessing Church (*Bekennende Kirche*), has too often served as a fig leaf for the complacency or enthusiasm of the vast majority. Two centuries of Erastian subservience to the power of the state left the German church with few intellectual weapons to resist the lure of a regime antithetical to Christian principles.

The horrors of World War II accelerated the church's retreat from the front line in public affairs. Scarred by the experiences of the war era, European Protestant churches withdrew increasingly from any politically sensitive role in an age when church membership continued on an apparently inexorable decline. The postwar period also saw a significant detachment of Christian values, still generally regarded

as a touchstone of decent behavior in most countries of the Protestant tradition, from formal church membership. In this curiously ambivalent yet not unaffectionate relationship, Protestant churches were valued still as a social institution, primarily as a purveyor of the sacraments of passage, such as baptism, marriage, and burial, by a far wider community than those who regularly attended church. The churches were for the most part happy to subsist in this curious netherworld between habit and redundancy. In the parts of Protestant Europe where the faith was still passionately upheld, such as Northern Ireland, sectarian passion was often seen more as an embarrassment than as a vindication of faith.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, most European Protestant traditions had rejected such a distortion of their role as much as they had by then repulsed the wilder excesses of American Protestant evangelism, a rejection all the more striking given the otherwise all-pervasive influence of American culture on Europe. This movement depended heavily on the new media of television evangelism and on charismatic fundamentalism. These developments find their most significant echo in the nondenominational "house churches," which emerged at the end of the twentieth century as a significant force alongside the mainstream Protestant denominations.

See also Secularization (volume 2); and other articles in this section.

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EASTERN ORTHODOXY



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The Eastern Orthodox Church, distinct from the Roman Catholic Church since the Great Schism of 1054, includes more than a dozen autocephalous churches in Europe, each autonomous in its administrative structure but all united by ecumenical councils, common dogma, and tradition. They range from the Russian Orthodox Church to much smaller churches in east central and southeastern Europe. In modern times these European churches developed along national state lines, as in the Balkans, where the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century led to the formation of autocephalous churches in Greece (1833), Romania (1864), Bulgaria (1871), and Serbia (1879). Some sees acquired formal independent status still later, as in Poland (1924) and Albania (1937). In pre-communist regimes the Orthodox Church was often the dominant if not the official church and had sizable flocks. In 1897 Russia had nearly 87.1 million believers, or 69.4 percent of the population, and majorities also prevailed in Romania (17 million), Greece (9 million), Serbia (8 million), Bulgaria (8 million), and Georgia (5 million). Many other countries, not only former parts of the Russian Empire such as Finland and Poland, had small but devoted contingents of Orthodox observers.

Following the example of European historiography, social historians have given increasing attention to Eastern Orthodoxy, especially in the lands of the former Soviet Union. This research has focused on five main issues. The first concerns the church's status in the political order, from privileged to persecuted—a key determinant of its capacity to act independently with respect to social and political questions. A second issue is institutional development. To what degree did this medieval institution internalize the features of modern social organization, and how did this internal growth affect its role in society and culture? The third question is the clergy—size, distribution, status, role, composition, education, and other characteristics—and its capacity and willingness to join and shape social and national movements. A fourth issue is the church's social mission, that is, its engagement in so-

cial problems such as alcoholism, divorce, social justice, and revolution. The final issue is “popular Orthodoxy,” the patterns and meanings of lay observance as well as forms of deviance and dissent. Whatever the church might have taught, the central question is how the folk received, modified, or rejected the norms of official institutional Orthodoxy.

This article focuses on the Russian Orthodox Church, by far the largest and most influential see in Europe. It has also been the target of intensive research and scholarship, a windfall of the demise of the USSR, which effectively liberated scholarship from the shackles of Soviet archival restrictions. The Moscow Patriarchate wielded considerable influence in the twentieth century, especially after World War II, playing a salient if not dominating role over Orthodox Churches elsewhere within the Soviet bloc.

CAESAROPAPISM AND AGENCY

In contrast to traditional historiography, which portrayed the Orthodox Churches as docile handmaidens of the state and hence devoid of agency, scholarship has demonstrated a far more complex, even conflicting relationship between the Orthodox Church and the secular state. Most important, as Orthodox canonists have emphasized, Eastern Orthodoxy did not adumbrate any so-called caesaropapism, whereby the emperor, in contrast to the medieval papacy, purportedly “ruled” the church. Rather, the operative conception is “symphony,” that is, a harmonious cooperation between the temporal and sacred spheres with clear limits on the ruler's authority over purely spiritual matters.

In Russia and elsewhere individual rulers sometimes transgressed these boundaries. In the Muscovite period (1450–1689), such intrusion was uncommon and personal, primarily directed at an individual prelate. In the subsequent imperial period (1689–1917), the intrusion intensified, especially from the early nineteenth century, when the emperor's official rep-

representative, the chief procurator, assumed a more active role in church administration. However, traditional accounts tended to exaggerate this role and failed to recognize that intervention—most notoriously by K. P. Pobedonostsev (chief procurator, 1880–1905)—only succeeded in provoking episcopal resentment. Indeed this intrusion, when coupled with

a transparent determination by government officials to act in the interests of the state and not the church, impelled even archconservative prelates to demand a radical change in the status and rights of the church.

Given these tensions and diverging interests, Eastern Orthodoxy played a more important role in nation building than in state building. In Russia, Or-

thodoxy not only left a deep imprint on the dominant political culture but also provided a primary referent for Russian national identity, especially in the late imperial period. During that period the centripetal forces of a multinational and multiconfessional state impelled Russians and other East Slavs to define ethnicity at least partly in religious terms. The church's role in nation building was still more pronounced in the Balkans, where Orthodox clergy and confession were key factors in nationalist movements against the Ottoman Empire, providing support, legitimacy, and leadership in Greece, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Precisely because Eastern Orthodoxy admitted a division along nation-state lines, with inevitable if begrudging recognition of autocephaly from the ecumenical patriarch in Constantinople, it tended to provide a critical religious dimension to nationalist identity and to liberation movements.

THE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Given Russia's vast geographical expanse, population dispersion, and marginal resources, both human and material, the medieval Russian Church had only a minimal capacity to exercise control over popular religious practices or even over its own clergy. Armed with only a handful of far-flung dioceses and preoc-

cupied with administering a vast empire of church-owned properties and peasant inhabitants, bishops had neither the means nor the time for more than episodic, nominal supervision of parishes and priests. Not until the Church Council (*Stoglav*) of 1551 did prelates even attempt to adumbrate new norms and regulations. That effort received a further impulse in 1589 with the establishment of the patriarchate, which provided the first foundations for ecclesiastical centralization. Thus the seventeenth-century church, like the state, began to construct a more elaborate administration, primarily to regularize the collection of dues and tithes but also to supervise religious matters, such as the appointment of clergy and other dimensions of spiritual life.

Peter the Great, tsar from 1689 to 1725, introduced far-reaching reforms to improve ecclesiastical administration. Emblematic was his demand that the church establish seminaries to educate candidates for the priesthood. Although bishops had earlier complained about the low educational level of priests, the church did not erect a new system of ecclesiastical education until the eighteenth century, and it took several decades to achieve even modest results. By the 1760s the church operated two academies and 26 seminaries with approximately six thousand students, but growth accelerated thereafter. By 1914 this network consisted of four academies, 57 seminaries, and

185 elementary schools with more than fifty thousand students. This system revolutionized the educational standards of parish priests; beginning in the early nineteenth century, virtually all new ordinands had seminary diplomas. The academies, though small in size, likewise had a profound impact on the church, supplying the great majority of recruits for the episcopate, the “learned monasticism” that dominated the hierarchy.

No less important was the process of institution building in central and diocesan administration. Although later derided by critics as bureaucratization, this organizational development gave the church a new capacity to exercise influence in rural parishes, not merely elite palaces. The critical impulse again came from the reforms engineered by Peter the Great, who applied the principles of secular governance to the church. His reforms replaced the patriarch, head of the church, with a governing Holy Synod made up of ranking prelates and subject to oversight by a secular official, the chief procurator. He also constructed a regularized diocesan administration with explicit norms to direct the clergy, parishes, and popular religious practices. Peter’s prescriptions gradually took effect after his death in 1725, and by the late eighteenth century the church had an elaborate structure that enabled it to establish and enforce uniform policies. For the balance of the imperial period the church continued to expand its administration. For example, it divided dioceses into smaller, more manageable units. It also developed important adjuncts, such as the ecclesiastical press. Although the church had a press earlier, chiefly to publish liturgical books, in the mid–nineteenth century it produced a vast complex of printed literature, including catechisms, sermon collections, official newspapers, academic journals, diocesan gazettes, and popular spiritual literature for the lay reader.

Institutionalization of Orthodoxy was not without negative dimensions. Contemporaries, whether lay or clerical, complained loudly about a bureaucratization that, in the idiom of prerevolutionary Russia, was synonymous with corruption and venality. The lay clerical staffs, underpaid and overworked, routinely succumbed to the temptation of bribes to expedite petitions and to circumvent canons. These problems, while endemic to the ancien régime as a whole, were especially acute in the church, for its minuscule, inelastic budget failed to keep pace with the explosion in the volume of administrative duties. As a further aggravation, hypercentralization mandated synodal review and approval of even the most trivial diocesan matters, from the divorce of individuals to the construction of a new parish church. This episcopal



TABLE 1
PARISHIONER-PARISH RATIOS

<i>Year</i>	<i>Average number of parishioners per church</i>
1740	647
1780	1,030
1840	1,403
1890	1,793
1904	2,305
1914	2,414

preoccupation with compiling vast, often unutilized documentation alienated priests and parishioners, who castigated bishops as bureaucrats, and it distracted the church administration from essential, urgent spiritual matters.

Bureaucratization also had a profound impact on that nuclear unit of church, the parish. In medieval Russia the parish *was* the church. It functioned as a self-governing unit, built and maintained the local church, and selected and supported the parish priest. That autonomy gradually receded in the eighteenth century. One change concerned the appointment of parish clergy. Previously selected by parishioners and subjected to a perfunctory review by the bishop, the local clergy in the eighteenth century were chosen by the bishop, increasingly from select students in the seminary. Diocesan authorities asserted control over parish finances, especially income from the sale of votive candles. Bishops restricted the formation of new parishes and encouraged mergers. Although the purpose was to eliminate a profusion of small, uneconomic parishes, the net effect was to increase the average size of parishes nearly fourfold between 1740 and 1914 (see table 1). As in Western churches, the situation was most acute in cities and industrial areas.

In the mid–nineteenth century, however, the church made a concerted effort to resuscitate parish life as one means to bolster popular piety and observance. In 1864, for example, the church, with state collaboration, promulgated a statute for parish trusteeships (*prikhodskie popechitel'stva*), which were essentially parish committees to raise funds for church repairs, parish schools, charity, and support for the local

clergy. That reform was not successful because the funds generated were usually minimal and were used mainly for renovation of church buildings, but it did signal a growing recognition of the need to involve the laity in parish affairs. From the 1890s to 1917 the church considered far-reaching proposals for parish reform, while the laity became increasingly assertive, chiefly with respect to the parish treasury and the appointment of local clergy. This process culminated in the parish revolution of 1917, when the church finally recognized the laity's prerogatives. In January 1918 the Bolshevik decree on the separation of the church from the state, which denied the church juridical status and conferred all operational power on the parish, completed and legitimized the new status quo in Russian Orthodoxy.

THE CLERGY

The clergy has its own social history—origins, training, recruitment, career patterns, and public role. Regardless of the specific national church, Orthodox canon provided for two distinct subgroups: a married parish clergy and a celibate monastic clergy from which all bishops were to come. That universal structure acquired a specific coloration in imperial Russia, where central authorities came increasingly to regu-

late the training, recruitment, and assignment of clergy. In contrast to medieval Muscovy, where monasteries and parishes had chosen new clergy, the church in imperial Russia had a system of diocesan and central controls and a formal table of organization (*shtat*) specifying the number and rank of monks and parish clergy. This centralized regulation, moreover, incorporated an emerging government policy of estate building, whereby the state restricted social movement and endeavored to engineer social composition and identity by aggregating amorphous, complex social groups into larger, more homogeneous estate categories (*sosloviia*).

Parish clergy. The parish clergy in pre-Petrine Muscovy were a motley group. Elected by the parish and formally ordained by the bishop, they had a modicum of education and remained largely exempt from effective supervision by diocesan superiors. They served at the will and expense of the parishioners, whether serf-owning nobles or communities of peasants and townspeople. In that sense the secular clergy were intimately bound to this world and barely distinguishable in culture or economy from peasant or urban parishioners. Although fathers naturally preferred for sons to follow their crafts and succeed them, neither the church nor the state imposed barriers to

recruitment of nonclerical young men or to the pursuit of a secular career by the clergy's offspring.

That all changed in the eighteenth century, when several factors coalesced to transform the parish clergy into a hereditary caste estate. One factor was state policy. After Peter the Great in 1718 established a capitation tax, freezing the status and residency of nonprivileged groups, it gradually became virtually impossible for peasants and townsmen, those most likely to seek the lowly status of priest, to enter the clergy. Another factor that steadily gained in importance was the educational requirement. Because the seminaries served only the clergy's offspring, outsiders could not acquire the seminary degree that, after 1800, became a prerequisite for ordination to the priesthood. Finally, the clergy blocked access by outsiders. That natural hereditary instinct gained new momentum when the Petrine table of organization (*shtat*) limited the number of clergy in each parish and left few openings for clerical progeny, let alone outsiders. Moreover, a priest needed to have a kinsman inherit his position. Since the church had no pension system, an "heir," such as a son, son-in-law, or other kinsman, was the priest's only assurance of material support in his old age. As a result, by the late eighteenth century almost all priests came from the clerical estate, a pattern that prevailed until the end of the ancien régime in 1917. That process of social exclusion ran contrary to the democratization tendencies in contemporary European churches, in which Protestant pastors came decreasingly from clergy families and Catholic priests came increasingly from lower-status groups. In the Russian Empire, however, where the nineteenth-century state had belatedly raised new estate barriers, the social exclusivity of the clergy was part of a larger system that sought to ensure sufficient and trained manpower for basic professions and to avoid the mobility and instability characteristic of contemporary western European societies.

But this caste-like system was also fraught with serious dysfunctions. The first, the most obvious by the mid-nineteenth century, was a surfeit of candidates. The clerical caste simply produced too many seminary graduates for an inelastic service structure. In addition they were not necessarily inclined toward church service. Family circumstance and necessity rather than vocation and religious zeal were the main forces channeling clerical progeny to careers in the church. Moreover, by excluding potential recruits from the lower-status groups, this caste order eroded the bonds between the clergy and the laity and reinforced a distinctive, alienating clerical subculture. The caste walls also forced pious laymen to pursue religious ca-

reers outside the church in schismatic and sectarian movements.

To overcome these deficiencies, a reform commission of the 1860s attempted to engineer changes in the church's social and educational policies. The principal goal was to improve the status and service of parish clergy, chiefly by enhancing the opportunities for the clergy's sons to pursue secular careers and for outsiders to gain admittance to the seminary and parish service. The result was a series of reforms adopted between 1867 and 1871 that abolished the "inheritance" of clerical positions, gave the priests' sons a nonclerical social status, and opened the seminary to matriculation by nonclerical children.

Like many of the other great reforms, these well-intentioned changes worked far better on paper than in reality. They mainly facilitated a mass exodus of clerical sons into lay careers without a compensatory influx of candidates from other social groups. In the 1870s the number of candidates for the priesthood dropped sharply, along with their educational qualifications. For the remaining decades of the ancien régime, the church experienced a decline in the educational standards of the parish clergy as bishops were driven to ordain candidates with poor seminary performance and incomplete education. According to data on those ordained between 1906 and 1912, nearly half (49.3 percent) lacked a seminary degree or its equivalent. The reforms did not democratize this contingent of candidates, for the seminaries continued to serve primarily the sons of clergy, not other social groups. In the last seminary class before World War I, for example, 83 percent of the seminarians came from the clerical estate and the rest from sundry social categories.

Monastic clergy. The monastery was traditionally the dominant force in the church, claiming a monopoly over appointments to the hierarchy and possessing enormous wealth in land and church peasants. In medieval Muscovy the proliferation of monasteries reflected the strong monastic, contemplative impulse in Orthodoxy and resulted in the accumulation of much land, estimated at a third of all land, and other resources. Such expansionist power and pretensions reached a zenith after the establishment in 1589 of the patriarchate, as its occupant constructed his own set of administrative and financial institutions to mimic those of the state.

Not surprisingly the resource-starved early modern Russian state became increasingly envious, especially as it struggled to finance its armies and civil service. It therefore attempted to restrict church landholding and, from the mid-seventeenth century, re-



TABLE 2
RUSSIAN MONASTICISM, 1764–1914

Year	Male				Female			
	Monasteries	Inhabitants			Convents	Inhabitants		
		Monks	Novices	Total		Nuns	Novices	Total
1764	319			7,659	68			6,453
1796	307			4,190	81			1,671
1823	336	3,939	1,197	5,136	98	1,950	1,229	3,179
1840	435	5,122	3,259	8,381	112	2,287	4,583	6,870
1850	464	4,978	5,019	9,997	123	2,303	6,230	8,533
1894	511	7,582	6,696	14,278	263	8,319	21,957	30,276
1914	550	11,845	9,485	21,330	475	17,283	56,016	73,299

peatedly sought to divert church resources for its own needs. Peter the Great went much farther, transferring a substantial portion of monastic estates to state control and exploitation, though without formally sequestering the property. His vacillating successors hesitated to take the final step and left it to Catherine the Great to confiscate church estates and peasants in 1764. The prize was indeed immense: 816,736 male peasants, who provided an annual income of 293,848 rubles along with vast quantities of dues in kind, including 167,375 bushels of grain. Although in exchange the state provided a budget to support the monasteries and ecclesiastical administration, that budget was exceedingly niggardly, worth far less than the revenues the church received from its lands and peasants before confiscation.

The secularization of church property was fraught with momentous consequences for the church. Most important was the impact on the church's economic independence and its capacity to attend to strictly ecclesiastical needs, let alone undertake a broader social mission. Secularization dramatically and immediately affected monasticism, triggering a contraction in the number of monasteries and those who lived in them. Whereas the church had started the century with 1,201 monasteries, secularization reduced the number to a mere 400, one-quarter of which were convents. The number of monks and nuns decreased as well, falling from about 25,000 in 1724 to 5,861 in 1796.

That contraction was not permanent, however, as the nineteenth century witnessed a renaissance of monastic life, especially for women. Altogether the number of monasteries increased nearly 2.7 times between 1796 and 1914, and the increase in the number of monks, nuns, and novices was even larger (see table 2). Significantly, female monasticism accounted for most of the growth in the number of monasteries (64 percent) and their inhabitants (80.1 percent). Expressed most dramatically, male monastics increased 5.1 times, but nuns and female novices multiplied 43.9 times during this same period. As in the Catholic states of western Europe, Russian monasticism underwent a feminization, and the convent provided an attractive and ever-expanding alternative to marriage and secular careers. In contrast to the men, the majority of whom came from the clerical estate, female monastics came predominantly from the lower social orders of townspeople and peasants. Although secular society regarded monasticism with unveiled hostility, monasteries, often the sites of relics and miracle-working icons, remained a powerful force in popular religion and exercised a considerable influence over the more conservative elements of the educated classes.

POPULAR ORTHODOXY

Although Russia had been nominally Christianized in 988, Christianization remained a slow process that

had to eradicate paganism and overcome the vast dispersion and high mobility of the medieval Russian population. The church, especially through the role of colonizing monasteries, had made substantial progress in converting the populace, but by the sixteenth century Russian Orthodox beliefs and practices remained profoundly local with only a modicum of control and uniformity. At the council of 1551 the church began defining an orthodox Orthodoxy—free of pagan customs, with one standard for the newly and self-consciously Orthodox realm. In the mid-seventeenth century Patriarch Nikon instituted dramatic liturgical reforms, but given the backwardness of the ecclesiastical administration and its preoccupation with the management of huge landholdings and church peasants, attention to purely spiritual, sacramental, and liturgical matters remained marginal and episodic. Hence religious practices, especially in the multitude of dispersed rural parishes, remained localized and diverse, free from external control, and permeated with superstition and magic that had little to do with the norms of hieratic Orthodoxy.

Nevertheless, the church continued its attempts to make popular Orthodoxy “orthodox,” most explicitly in the *Spiritual Regulation* (1721) and later in a steady stream of synodal decrees. The goals were to regularize religious practices and to instruct the flock in the rudiments of the faith. Such instruction, however, proved difficult, especially in rural areas, where the seasonality of church attendance, driven by weather conditions and the agrarian production cycle, and

nearly total illiteracy hindered catechization. The church made headway in urban parishes, particularly in the early nineteenth century, and expanded its role by teaching religion in the emerging network of schools. By the late nineteenth century local diocesan authorities generally could boast that many parishioners, chiefly younger ones, had learned to recite the Ten Commandments, the creed, basic prayers, and other rudiments of the faith. Diocesan authorities took strict measures to protect the sanctity of the church by restricting religious processions, combating suspicious miracles, regulating icon production, resisting appeals to canonize local saints, and dissuading laity from observing pagan traditions and rites.

In the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Russian Church, like its peers in the West, began to take a less negative attitude toward popular Orthodoxy. While consistent with the populist ethos current in secular culture, this new posture primarily derived from a desire to rekindle religious fervor and popular commitment to the Orthodoxy. To be sure the church continued its efforts to enlighten the believers through religious instruction in schools and at services, but it began to respond more favorably to manifestations of popular Orthodoxy. For example, whereas it had earlier severely restricted public icon processions, it now perceived them as a valuable demonstration of piety and an effective tool in raising religious consciousness. Church authorities also displayed a greater receptivity toward canonization of local saints. Although still insisting on observance of canonical requirements,

namely formal investigations to demonstrate the veracity of purported miracles, the church proceeded with several canonizations and had several others under consideration in the last two decades of the ancien régime.

The willingness to accommodate popular Orthodoxy derived from anxieties about Russian piety. The official statistics appeared to demonstrate an extraordinarily high level of observance. Despite vast social and economic change, official statistics on the proportion of believers who confessed and received communion at Easter did not suggest de-Christianization. Those figures actually rose in the second half of the nineteenth century (see table 3). These data are all the more striking when compared with the far lower rates of communicants reported in contemporary European churches, for example, 43 percent in Prussia and 18 percent in Paris. Nevertheless, these statistics show an overall rise in the number of people who participated in neither communion nor confession, chiefly because of the decline in semicompliance, that is, those who made confession but did not receive communion either because they deemed themselves unworthy or because the priest withheld this rite. Moreover these official data understate the number of noncommunicants, for they often failed to record the large number of migrants to the factories and cities, precisely the areas most affected by religious indifference. The revolution of 1905–1907, in the view of many bishops, had a still more unsettling effect, es-

pecially on the younger generation, and bequeathed a new level of religious indifference and immoral conduct.

Significantly, the Orthodox Church experienced a feminization in religious observance and piety as well as in monastic life. The most direct evidence comes from the statistics on Easter Communion. In 1900, for example, the rate of participation was 91 percent for women compared to 87 percent for men, a gap that increased steadily in the last years of the ancien régime. A patriarchal institution, the church increasingly recognized women as its bastion and sought ways to accommodate and tap their piety. The most striking measure was the decision in 1912 to establish a female theological institute, in effect a form of higher theological education, to train women for spiritual and other service in the church. Despite the masculine bias in tradition and canon, the church recruited women for missionary activities, reestablished the ancient office of deaconess, gave women franchise in parish assemblies and councils, and in 1918 permitted them to serve as sacristans and parish elders.

DISSENT: OLD BELIEVERS AND SECTARIANISM

The Orthodox Church's campaigns to purify popular beliefs and practices alienated a large segment of believers, creating a population of "Old Believers," or "Old Ritualists," who repudiated the liturgical reforms of the seventeenth century and the subsequent attempts to impose them on parish religious life. Their rebellion had multiple causes, some purely religious, such as fears of deviating from traditional (therefore "true") Orthodoxy; some broadly cultural, such as a widespread apocalyptic spirit of the seventeenth century; some social, such as reactions to enserfment and the degradation of the popular status; and others political, such as the rise of the secular, absolutist state. Such sentiments found their most dramatic expression in the wave of self-immolations of the late seventeenth century, when resolute Old Believers sought to evade Antichrist and save their souls by committing mass suicide.

Whatever the particular mix of motives for the initial rebellion, the subsequent growth of the Old Belief had other dynamics. One was the imposition of a standardized Orthodoxy in lieu of local, popular religion, a process that removed the immanent sacred and extirpated other icons of popular veneration. Another factor increasingly important in the nineteenth century was the secular meaning of Old Belief. Namely,




TABLE 3
CONFESSION AND COMMUNION
OBSERVANCE AT EASTER:
PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION

<i>Year</i>	<i>Both confession and communion</i>	<i>Confession only</i>	<i>Neither confession nor communion</i>
1784	92.80	5.69	1.51
1797	85.80	8.60	2.70
1818	85.96	7.70	5.32
1835	84.98	6.50	8.53
1850	85.04	6.02	8.94
1900	89.06	0.49	10.46

CHURCH AND SOCIETY



TABLE 4
OLD BELIEVERS IN RUSSIA, 1740–1897

Year	Males	Females	Total
1740	4,379	5,515	9,894
1797	6,687	7,155	13,842
1802	44,772	47,870	92,642
1815	112,570	128,707	241,277
1835	216,962	262,908	479,870
1860	326,498	384,900	711,398
1897	1,029,030	1,175,573	2,204,603

it provided a transcommunity network, facilitated business dealings, and provided a safety net for fellow believers. The Old Belief protected its adherents from invasive church policies, above all those directed toward the sacrament of marriage, including canonical restrictions on minimum age and kinship.

The result was an incessant growth in the number of registered Old Believers. Because the Old Believers were subjected to various forms of discrimination and disabilities, the official figures were notoriously unreliable. State authorities estimated that their numbers were severalfold higher than those reported by the church. The church's statistics, for all their incompleteness, register a steady increase in Old Believers from fewer than 10,000 in 1740 to 2.2 million in 1897 (see table 4). These impressive numbers still fail to capture the influence and appeal of the Old Belief or the number of Orthodox who in some degree also observed the Old Belief and bore the label of "semischismatics" (*poluraskol'niki*).

Sectarian movements had deep roots in medieval and early modern Russia but gained momentum only in the late nineteenth century, chiefly because of Western influence and the emergence of more private, individualized religious practices. These movements included a plethora of mystical or rationalist sects, some with ties to Orthodoxy and claiming membership in the church. Many Orthodox prelates regarded them as even more menacing than the Old Belief. As the church convened its first missionary councils in the 1880s, sectarianism loomed as the fastest growing, most menacing threat to its supremacy.

The rise of the secular state paralleled a decline in the church's role and status in society. Earlier, in the particularistic society of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Muscovy, the parish church formed the epicenter of community life. The local church was the site for sacraments and rites of passage and the locus of sociability, official business, and trade. After 1700, however, the parish gradually surrendered this central role, with power devolving from the clergy to the civil service, and the parish failed to acquire legal status as a juridical entity in state law. Although the church retained some secular power, including the authority to impose penance for crimes and sins, its authority gradually receded in the imperial period. The marginalization was in part deliberate. To prevent peasant disorders, the state in 1767 specifically forbade priests to pen petitions for peasants or to become embroiled in serf-squire disputes. Priests did become entangled, especially in borderlands, where non-Orthodox squires were involved, but they did so at their own peril. By the first half of the nineteenth century, in theory if not always in fact, the church and clergy had been confined to the spiritual domain.

However, in one important sphere, marriage and divorce, the church actually expanded its role. The medieval church had claimed exclusive competence over the sacrament of marriage, but its skeletal administration was hardly able to regulate the formation or dissolution of families. Bishops assessed a fee for wedding certificates, but they did not mandate verification of age, kinship, and the like. In fact, before 1700 the church did not even compile parish registers to expose uncanonical marriages, bigamy, or other violations of canon law. Marital dissolution, whether for divorce or for entry into a monastery, was virtually unregulated. At most the laity required a letter of divorce from the local priest.

That all changed after the mid-eighteenth century. As the church developed its new bureaucracy and documentation, including parish registers of births, marriages, and deaths, it could determine and verify such matters as age, kinship, and marital status. Although the initial goal was to combat uncanonical marriages, after 1800 the church was increasingly concerned with preventing marital dissolution, whether through separation or divorce. Responding to the post-Napoleonic restoration's revulsion against the liberal divorces of the French Revolution, considered synonymous with an assault on social and political stability, and reflecting a new sacramentalism in teachings emphasizing the indelibility of sacraments, the church strictly banned separation and made divorce all

but impossible. It formally recognized several grounds for annulment and divorce, such as bigamy, exile to Siberia, premarital impotence and insanity, adultery, and disappearance for more than five years, but in practice it made such proceedings extremely protracted and seized every opportunity to cavil, stall, and reject. The church granted no separations whatsoever and approved only 32.8 annulments and 58.3 divorces per year between 1836 and 1860.

In the final decades of the *ancien régime*, however, the church began to retreat from this strict application of canon law. It did so partly in response to growing criticism from elites, who looked jealously at the more liberal separation and divorce practices in western Europe, but also in response to complaints from the lower social orders, who resisted this modern intrusion into their private lives and envied the relative freedom of sectarians and Old Believers. The church became more liberal and expeditious in processing divorce cases, the number of which rose from a few score at midcentury to nearly four thousand by the eve of World War I. Although the church was much less eager to modify canon law, in 1904 it agreed to allow the guilty party in adultery cases to remarry after a relatively brief penance.

The Orthodox Church reoriented toward greater involvement in worldly matters. The church intensely desired to secure a prominent role in public education, partly to help prepare former serfs for citizenship and also to ensure religious instruction (*zakon bozhii*) in the curriculum. Although the church had evidenced interest before by participating in schools established for state peasants in the late 1830s, the approach of emancipation in the late 1850s triggered a furious attempt to establish parish schools all across the empire. This effort abated in the 1860s and 1870s, when state and public schools took precedence, but the church intensified its educational activities in the 1880s. The butt of much criticism by professional pedagogues and anticlerical intellectuals, the resulting network of parish schools functioned more effectively than once thought and substantially augmented the network of state and public schools.

The church's social engagement went beyond divorce and education to include a host of other critical social issues. The medieval church had taught the need for charity and alms, especially for the orphaned, and eighteenth-century bishops developed a social theology of mutual reciprocity between husband and wife, elites and commoners, each expected to perform his or her duties toward the other. But in the mid-nineteenth century some clergy adumbrated a new, this-worldly Christology that enjoined the church to enter into the world and its problems as Christ had

done and explicitly rejected a one-sided, otherworldly focus and indifference to temporal problems. In addition some clergy believed that, to hold the flock's loyalty, the church had to become meaningful in the people's everyday lives. Such ideas were particularly attractive after midcentury to the seminarians, many of whom had been exposed to the radical subculture of Russia's emerging intelligentsia.

As a result, clerical participation and sometimes leadership in movements to address social issues steadily expanded. Priests preached frequently about various social ills, such as abuse of wives and children and inhumane treatment of animals. But the church did more than just preach. To address poverty, for example, the Russian Empire had little in the way of institutionalized, formal welfare. Although the church had few means to alleviate this evil, it promoted the duty of the rich to aid the indigent and attempted, through the parish trusteeships, to organize parish assistance for the poor, sick, and orphaned. It also gave attention to the problem of alcoholism because of its ruinous effect on the peasant household economy and its pernicious impact on morality and spiritual life. The church addressed other issues, such as prostitution, and played a key role in raising funds (through special collections during the liturgy) for social causes.

This social engagement reached a peak during the revolutionary turbulence of the early twentieth century, when liberal and radical segments of the clergy became deeply embroiled in their parishioners' battle for social justice. In the revolution of 1905–1907 many clergy not only urged reforms to improve their own lot but also expressed support for the “liberation movement” and the demands of peasants and workers. Those sentiments were crushed during the years of reaction (1907–1914), when state authorities and church hierarchs joined forces to eliminate radical aspirations, but social discontent continued to run deep in the ranks of the parish clergy. The February Revolution of 1917 demolished inhibitions entirely, impelling clergy, often in joint assemblies with the laity, to endorse radical programs for ecclesiastical, political, and social reform. Many priests soon had second thoughts about radicalism, however, as it took on new and destructive forms and was sometimes directed against the clergy.

FROM SOVIET DE-CHRISTIANIZATION TO POST-SOVIET RENEWAL

The troubles and travails the clergy experienced in the aftermath of the February Revolution paled in comparison with what ensued after the October Rev-

olution of 1917. The Bolshevik leadership disestablished the institutional church, expropriating its assets and dismantling its administration, but also sought to avoid antagonizing the country's huge rural population of believers. Local radicals, however, were less circumspect. They attacked the clergy, executing some 5,000 to 10,000 of them, and destroyed monasteries, relics, and icons. The radical leadership engineered a campaign in the early 1920s to seize church valuables to feed the starving during the Volga famine, but in fact they aimed at demolishing the church and its hold on the laity. That campaign resulted in numerous arrests and executions but did not shake the church's influence with the laity. While the regime ruthlessly closed monasteries and removed religious symbols from public spaces, dismantling chapels in schools and icons in railway stations, it remained cautious in its dealings with parishioners. Consequently of the 41,000 parishes that existed in 1914, approximately 37,000 were still operating in the late 1920s. To the consternation of party stal-

warts, in the second half of the 1920s popular piety experienced a revival not only in villages but in some urban and factory districts.

The Bolsheviks perceived the religious revival through a strictly class perspective, claiming that the bourgeoisie, whether rural kulaks or urban entrepreneurs, was using the parish church to mobilize political opposition. Their fears were all the more intense since they coincided with a deepening crisis of the New Economic Policy, perceived as a growing contradiction between the regime's industrialization imperative and the resistance from peasants and workers. By the late 1920s, as the regime grew alarmed over an apparent religious revival, it redoubled the efforts of its propaganda organs and voluntary antireligious associations such as the League of Militant Godless.

These efforts presaged a great turn in religious policy in 1929 and 1930 that inaugurated a decade of de-Christianization by the government. The clergy was persecuted, and many were arrested, imprisoned, and executed. The repressions destroyed the few remnants of the institutional church. In 1937 alone the regime closed seventy dioceses and executed sixty bishops. By 1939 only four bishops remained at large, and the former diocesan administration was effectively gone. No less devastating was the assault on the parishes. In 1937 the regime closed some 8,000 parishes, turning their churches into clubs, theaters, and warehouses or leaving them idle and in disrepair. By 1941 the parish, like the church, had virtually disappeared. Of the 41,000 parishes in operation in 1914, fewer than 400 remained. The repression of the 1930s also pummeled lay believers, now labeled "churchmen" (*tserkovniki*). Of the 150,000 believers arrested, 60 percent were laymen and laywomen, and 80,000 were executed.

Repression failed, however, to extirpate belief. In the 1937 census 45.1 percent of the population admitted that they were believers, and police reports from the late 1930s confirm the tenacity of belief. The traumas of World War II provided a new impulse for religious revival in occupied territories, where religious repression ceased, and in the Soviet-controlled areas as well. In 1943 the regime accepted a new accommodation with the Orthodox Church that restored the patriarchate. By 1946 Soviet authorities reported the presence of some 10,243 churches, 41 bishops, and 104 monasteries. The great majority of them were in areas newly annexed or previously under German occupation, accounting for approximately seven or eight times as many parishes and clergy as the rest of the USSR. In the waning years of Stalinist rule, the regime made some attempt to combat religious sen-

timents but made no concerted attacks. It even approved some applications to reopen churches.

Joseph Stalin's death in 1953 hardly meant an end to persecution of the church, clergy, and popular believers. Nikita Khrushchev, despite his innovations and flexibility in other spheres, proved a zealous antireligion activist and launched successive campaigns to tame the church that Stalin had partially rehabilitated in the 1940s. Between 1950 and 1965 the number of monasteries contracted from seventy-five to sixteen, churches from 14,273 to 7,551, and ordained clergy from 11,571 to 6,694. The next two decades of stagnation, between 1965 and 1985, did not bring large-scale antireligious campaigns, but the number of parishes slightly decreased to 6,806.

The end of Communism followed by the dissolution of the USSR enabled the Russian Orthodox Church to recover much property and influence. By 1998, for example, the church had 151 bishops in 121 dioceses overseeing some 478 monasteries and 19,000 parishes. The church asserted a new political and social role, participating in the new Russian parliament and organizing relief for the poor. Nevertheless, the decades of official antireligious campaigns took their toll. Given the decades of repression of religious tradition and belief and the scant resources of a transition economy, the church has encountered great difficulty in resuscitating the Orthodoxy, popular and institutional, that shaped the long prerevolutionary history of Russia.

See also Russia and the Eastern Slavs (volume 1); Secularization; Communism (volume 2); and other articles in this section.

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Section 22



EDUCATION AND LITERACY

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SCHOOLS AND SCHOOLING



Paul F. Grendler

Schools are intimately linked to European society because almost every schooling decision has had social consequences. Schooling divides the population into the educated elite and the unschooled or less-schooled mass. Education also creates new social distinctions. Different groups have received more or less schooling or distinctive schooling according to their economic condition, intended occupation, religion, and gender. Education has enabled a limited number of academically gifted individuals to rise from the ranks of workers, peasants, and the lower middle class into the professional elite and sometimes higher. European schooling has gradually been extended to include a larger proportion of the population and to give the majority of the population more years of schooling. On the other hand, curricula have remained remarkably stable. Italian Renaissance humanists created a classical curriculum that from then on served to educate most of Europe's elite. Finally, almost all the political, religious, and private authorities who created schools intended to impart civic, cultural, linguistic, moral, religious, and social values as well as academic skills. Because the results have seldom satisfied the founders and because values change, every century has seen attempts to reform European schooling.

THE RENAISSANCE

Renaissance Europe inherited from the Middle Ages an uncoordinated and diverse school structure. Different kinds of schools competed with or complemented each other.

The organization of schooling, 1400–1500. One way to understand schools is to note their sponsors, that is, the institutions, entities, or persons who governed or paid the expenses for schools. A single schoolmaster wishing to create an independent school—the equivalent of an American private school in the twentieth century—typically opened a one-room school in his home or in rented quarters, and neighborhood

parents paid him fees to teach their sons. His only qualifications were his teaching skill and his ability to persuade parents to send their children. The teacher might possess a university degree, which meant facility in Latin and acquaintance with higher learning in rhetoric, philosophy, law, or theology, or he might be little more learned than his pupils.

The tutor was another independent schoolmaster. He lived and taught in the home of a noble or wealthy merchant, or he visited the household daily. In both cases he taught only the children of the household or of two adjacent households. On occasion a tutor was the constant guide and companion, at home or in travel, to a single boy or youth of considerable wealth and social standing.

Other independent masters presided over their own boarding schools that housed, fed, and instructed children sent to them. A master of this kind became a substitute father to his charges. He taught boys in the classroom, chided their manners at table, and improved their morals throughout—at least parents hoped that this happened. Some of the most notable humanistic schools of the Italian Renaissance, operated by famous pedagogues such as Vittorino Rambaldoni da Feltre (1373/1378–1446/1447) and Guarino Guarini of Verona (1374–1460), were independent boarding schools.

The endowed school was an independent school that endured beyond the lifetime of a single teacher or founder. A wealthy individual left a sum of money for a school; endowment income paid the master's salary and rent for a schoolroom or building, where boys learned for free. In England before the Reformation, the master of an endowed school often had to be a priest so he could celebrate daily a mass for the repose of the donor's soul. Schoolboys learned reading, Latin, and sometimes chant. A very large endowment could create a boarding school, in which boys both studied and lived. An inadequate endowment might mean that boys had to pay supplementary fees. Sometimes endowed schools became municipal schools when the town council paid additional ex-

authority or institution, such as a bishop, a cathedral chapter of canons, a monastery, or even the parish priest, were not numerous. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries church schools dominated the educational landscape.

Regardless of their sponsorship, actual schools were usually modest. Normally a single teacher instructed a group of boys of varying ages and abilities, anywhere from a half dozen to thirty, in a single room. If the teacher had forty pupils or more, he might have an assistant who drilled the younger boys in their lessons, such as Latin conjugations and declensions. The schoolroom might be in the teacher's home or in a separate rented room. It is unlikely that the school had an outdoor area for play or physical exercises. Drinking water and food had to be brought in. If the schoolroom had a stove, each pupil might be required to bring a stick of wood on cold days.

Only a minority of boys and a tiny minority of girls aged six to fifteen attended school. Probably about 28 percent of boys attended formal schools in Florence, Italy, in 1480, and 26 percent of boys attended formal schools in Venice in 1587. The girls' percentage was very low, probably less than 1 percent. About 20 to 25 percent of boys in England attended school in the sixteenth century and less than 5 percent of girls. About 40 percent of boys received enough schooling to become literate in the town of Cuenca (in Castile, Spain) in the sixteenth century, and perhaps 12 percent of Polish males attended school in the 1560s.

School attendance closely followed the hierarchies of wealth, occupation, and social status. Sons of nobles, wealthy merchants, and professionals, such as lawyers, physicians, notaries, high civil servants, university professors, and preuniversity teachers, were more likely to attend school than sons of craftsmen, artisans, small shopkeepers, wool workers, laborers, and servants. The primary reason for the different schooling rates was that schooling almost always cost money. The social and occupational expectations of parents were an additional factor.

Boys needed schooling, especially in Latin, in order to qualify for positions of leadership in society. But those positions and all the learned professions were barred to women. Hence few parents believed that daughters needed formal education. Some girls received informal teaching at home, but the number is impossible to estimate.

Urban dwellers were more likely to attend school than those who lived in the countryside or in farming villages because more teachers were available in towns and cities. Rural areas had few resources to dedicate to schooling and few available teachers. The distances

penses and took over direction. Some English endowed schools founded in the late Middle Ages or the Renaissance are still teaching boys and girls. Different kinds of independent schools existed all over Europe and probably made up a large majority of schools.

The local civil authority, such as the town council, might sponsor a school. The town government chose and paid the master, occasionally imposed curricular directives, and sent a visitor to see that teacher and pupils performed satisfactorily. Sometimes municipal schools were free; but they never enrolled all the school-age boys of the town and very seldom taught girls. The town government typically supported only one or two municipal teachers, who taught a small number, perhaps fifty or sixty, of the town's school-age boys. Often the town permitted the municipal teacher to collect fees from the students to augment his modest salary. Universal public education, with or without fees, did not arrive until the nineteenth century and only gradually won acceptance.

A third kind of school was the church school. Until the Protestant and Catholic Reformations of the sixteenth century, schools opened by an ecclesiastical

that students might have to walk to get to school and the exposure of the schoolroom to the elements, a serious consideration in northern Europe, help explain the lower schooling rate of rural children. Although in theory schools taught all year, numerous saints' days and civic holidays, long vacations at Christmas and Easter, and carnival before Lent broke up the schedule. The need to work in the fields during harvest interrupted classes. And extremes of summer heat and winter cold closed schools or kept children home.

The classical Latin curriculum of the Renaissance. The most significant event in modern European schooling was the Renaissance adoption of a classical curriculum for the Latin schools in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Medieval Latin schools taught a mixture of manufactured verse texts of pious sentiments, grammar manuals and glossaries, and limited material from ancient classical texts. Renaissance humanists discarded the medieval curriculum in favor of the works of Virgil, Cicero, Terence, Caesar, and other ancient authors. These authors taught grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy—together the humanistic studies that imparted virtue and eloquence to the free man, or so the Renaissance believed. Students learned to write Latin in the ornate and highly rhetorical style of the *Epistolae ad familiares*

(Familiar letters) of Cicero (106–43 B.C.), which was very different from the clear, functional, and sometimes graceless medieval Latin. They studied Virgil and Terence and read Caesar and Valerius Maximus for history. Humanist pedagogues sought guidance on Latin rhetoric and ancient pedagogy generally from the *Institutio oratoria* (Institutes of oratory) of the ancient Roman teacher of rhetoric Quintilian (c. 35–after 95). Italy adapted the classical Latin curriculum in the first half of the fifteenth century, and the rest of Europe followed in the early sixteenth century.

Because Latin was the language of law, medicine, science, and theology into the eighteenth century and beyond, attendance at a Latin school to learn classical Latin was the prerequisite for every professional career; all university lectures, texts, disputations, and examinations were conducted in Latin. To mention one scientific work among many, Isaac Newton (1642–1727) wrote his masterpiece, *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* (Mathematical principles of natural philosophy; 1687) in Latin. Even after Latin ceased to be the universal language for learning, pedagogues and parents believed that the study of Latin and Greek grammar prepared the mind for any intellectual endeavor. Latin and Greek literature also conveyed the high purpose and lofty moral sen-

timents that society and parents wanted its leaders to emulate.

The adoption of a classical humanistic curriculum had profound social consequences. The division of European education into a classical Latin curriculum for the leaders of society and professionals, and a vernacular education for the rest (see below), made schooling the key to social hierarchy. Certainly social divisions existed before the adoption of the classical curriculum and would have continued without it. But at the time a Latin classical education was crucial for anyone who wished to obtain or hold a certain position in society. Even a bright child could not learn Latin without long and difficult study. Only parents possessing a certain amount of income could afford the fees to send a son and occasionally a daughter to Latin schools for many years, and to forgo the assistance and income that a working child brought to the family. From the Renaissance to the late twentieth century, the classical curriculum defined the academic secondary school, which divided the upper and middle classes from the working class. Using a classical education as the gateway to advancement also meant that boys, and later girls, of poor and humble origins might advance through merit if they could obtain a Latin education. Free Latin schools eventually became available to some children.

The remarkable but strange decision to adopt a curriculum based on the ancient works had far-reaching intellectual consequences as well. Ancient civilization, culturally Greek, spiritually pagan, and politically united under a militaristic Rome, differed greatly from contemporary European civilization, which was deeply Christian and politically divided into numerous states. Yet Europe's intellectuals and political leaders decided it was the study of the classics of ancient Rome and Greece that would render future leaders of society eloquent and morally upright. That decision held until the late twentieth century.

The classical curriculum also imparted a secular spirit to European schooling. Even though western European civilization was profoundly otherworldly in its ultimate goal, the Latin classical curriculum emphasized education for this life. Cicero, Virgil, and the other ancient pagan authors did not urge men and women to do what was morally right so as to enjoy union with the Christian God in the next world. Of course Renaissance educators were convinced that Christianity and the classics taught an identical morality of honesty, self-sacrifice for the common good, and perseverance. But the classics did not teach one to love either enemy or neighbor. Even though Catholic religious orders and Protestant divines added considerable religious content to the classical curriculum,

its secular spirit remained a significant part of European education far beyond the Renaissance.

Vernacular schools. Vernacular schools also existed in every region of Europe. For example, in the major commercial city of Venice, half the boys in school attended vernacular schools in 1587 and 1588. The schools taught reading and writing in the vernacular, and often commercial mathematics to boys (and a small number of girls) destined for the world of work. This curriculum emerged from the practical experience and lay culture of the merchant community. Vernacular schools probably underwent little change during the Renaissance and beyond. Since church and state authorities did not hand down directives for vernacular schools, the teachers, who were almost always modest independent masters, taught what they pleased. Hence the children learned to read from the same adult books of popular culture that their parents enjoyed. Indeed Venetian boys sometimes brought to school from home popular vernacular books that parents wanted them to learn to read. The vernacular texts were a diverse lot, ranging from medieval saints' lives to Renaissance chivalric romances. Obviously they imparted conflicting moral values. Students would read about heroic saints who endured martyrdom for Christ, then read about knights who killed for revenge and ladies who committed adultery for love. Italian vernacular schools also taught advanced commercial mathematical skills and elementary bookkeeping. Vernacular schools in other parts of Renaissance Europe taught arithmetic, but not the rest of the commercial curriculum of Italian vernacular schools.

German vernacular schools were called *Winkelschulen* (backstreet schools) because they lacked official sponsors and might be found in humble locations. There male and female teachers of modest backgrounds taught boys and some girls basic literacy and elementary education as quickly as possible for small fees. Other European countries had similar vernacular schools.

Printing and the expansion of schooling. Printing aided schooling by making available multiple copies of textbooks. The use of movable type began about 1450, and by the 1480s and 1490s publishers were producing significant numbers of reading primers and manuals of Latin syntax (the construction of sentences according to the rules governing the use of verbs) and morphology (the inflected forms of words). No longer would students have to rely on handwritten manuscripts available only to the teacher or to wealthy students. As the cost of printed books declined in the

sixteenth century, all pupils could own a grammar manual and primer. Whether or not they did is impossible to determine.

Historians often assume that greater availability of inexpensive printed books accounts for the increase in schooling and literacy in the Renaissance. Rather, it was most likely this factor in combination with three others—greater availability of free or nearly free schooling, the desire of students and parents for more education, and society’s willingness to reward those who took the trouble to learn—that increased the amount of schooling by 1600.

THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION

Martin Luther (1483–1546) argued for universal compulsory education, at least at the elementary level. When German princes accepted Protestantism, Lutheran clergymen drafted new arrangements for the church and state that almost always included a *Schulordnung* (school order). Protestant school orders firmly placed the state (prince or city council) in charge of the schools. By the 1560s and 1570s Protestant school orders created a relatively integrated set of schools, beginning with an elementary school to teach reading and writing. Able students advanced to a higher school that taught Latin; the most gifted and socially more privileged went to an advanced secondary school that led to university. The goals were twofold: (1) to train future clergymen and administrators of the state and (2) to impart to a larger fraction of the male population enough reading and writing to function in an appropriate station in life. The students studied the same classical curriculum taught in Catholic lands along with a great deal of catechetical instruction in Lutheran Christianity. Protestant Germany and nearby border regions, such as Strasbourg, had a number of excellent secondary-level Latin schools.

It appears that the number and possibly the quality of schools increased during the age of the Protestant Reformation in Germany. But the Protestant Reformation did not mark the beginning of modern schooling. The goals were high, but the results were often modest, and the level of instruction was not always elevated. The schools still frequently charged fees, which poor parents could not afford. Sometimes parents could not even provide the stick of wood that a child was expected to bring for the school fire in winter. A school seldom enrolled all the boys in the village, and enrollments waxed and waned according to the work seasons. Even though the state was supposed to organize and direct schools, humble private schools, *Winkelschulen*, continued. Finally, because

Protestantism abolished religious orders, it did not enjoy the new schools that religious orders of the Catholic Reformation provided. It seems unlikely that the Protestant Reformation produced more schooling than that available in Catholic Europe.

The thesis that Protestantism created a permanent expansion of schooling and literacy so that every individual could read the Bible cannot be proven on the basis of current research. The only example in which the Protestant Reformation achieved almost total reading literacy occurred in Sweden in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. There the state Reformed (Lutheran) Church undertook to teach the entire population, male and female, how to read. Thanks to great effort and governmental threats, such as refusing permission to marry to those who failed to learn to read, the effort succeeded. It was an impressive achievement but unique: nothing comparable occurred anywhere else in Protestant or Catholic Europe.

RELIGIOUS ORDER SCHOOLS IN CATHOLIC EUROPE

The Catholic Reformation religious orders of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries altered the educational landscape of Catholic Europe. The Society of Jesus (founded in 1540) and other religious orders who followed their pedagogical example created new schools and sometimes took control of existing municipal schools. Because they did not charge fees, the schools of the Jesuits, Piarists, and other orders expanded educational opportunities and dominated education in Catholic countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The Jesuits. The Jesuits had not intended to become educators. In December 1547 the city government of Messina, firmly nudged by the Spanish viceroy who ruled Sicily for the Spanish Crown, petitioned Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits, to send ten Jesuits to the Italian city, five to teach and the rest to undertake spiritual and charitable activities. The city government promised food, clothing, and a building. Recognizing this as an intriguing opportunity and understanding that one did not refuse a viceroy, Loyola managed to send seven Jesuits, including some of the ablest scholars of the young order. According to the agreement with the city, the Jesuit fathers would teach nine classes. In effect, they created a classical Latin elementary and secondary school, along with higher studies in philosophy. The city erected a building, the people of Messina supported the Jesuits through free-

will offerings, and the viceroy also helped. The school formally opened in October 1548. It was an immediate success, as two hundred boys enrolled by December. The school averaged an enrollment of about three hundred boys in the next two decades.

Free instruction largely explained the instant success of the Messina school. The Jesuits inaugurated the first systematic effort to provide free education for several hundred boys in a town, something entirely new for Italy and Europe. The opportunity must have seemed heaven-sent to the boys and their parents. In addition the Jesuit fathers were learned scholars and teachers. Many other Jesuit schools followed.

The Jesuit schools offered the same Latin curriculum that the Italian humanists of the fifteenth century had created and that Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536) and other northern humanists promoted. But they made several additions: prayers, religious training, and insistence that the boys attend mass, confess, and communicate; better pedagogical organization, including imaginative teaching techniques; and higher subjects such as philosophy, mathematics, Hebrew, and theology.

The Jesuit schools soon refined their goals. Beginning in 1551 they phased out the introductory class that taught beginning reading and writing and the rudiments of Latin grammar; a boy had to learn these before entering a Jesuit school. The Jesuits decided to concentrate their energies on those likely to stay in school for many years. With this decision, partly provoked by a shortage of teachers, the Jesuits narrowed their educational mission chronologically and socially: they taught the Latin humanities to upper- and middle-class boys aged ten to sixteen. Since the Jesuits followed the policy of free education until the nineteenth century, they sought and received financial support from wealthy lay or ecclesiastical leaders of the community, and sometimes from the local town government.

A handful of Jesuit schools in large Italian cities, such as Rome and Milan, taught several hundred boys between the ages of ten and sixteen and a few older students. Jesuit schools in France, Germany, and Portugal often taught five hundred to fifteen hundred students. The large, famous Jesuit schools taught university-level philosophy, mathematics, and physics

to the older and brighter students. At the same time the vast majority of Jesuit schools enrolled only one hundred to two hundred students, who studied the Latin humanities curriculum and religious instruction under four or five teachers.

The Jesuit schools appealed to the community at large with their public programs. Students at Jesuit schools in Spain and Portugal began to give public performances of Latin tragedies with scenery, stagecraft, and music. They also presented what might be called achievement days, in which students orated, recited, and debated before parents and dignitaries of the city. The schools of other Catholic Reformation teaching orders, such as the Barnabites (Clerics Regular of St. Paul) and Somaschans (Clerics Regular of Somascha), did the same.

Schools for nobles. Boarding schools limited to boys of verified noble lineage were a feature of the stratified society of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Princes and other nobles founded boarding schools for noble boys, who mixed with their peers from different parts of Europe. Entering between the

ages of eleven and fourteen, they might stay until the age of twenty. The schools for nobles supplemented the standard Latin curriculum with lessons in singing, dancing, designing fortifications, French, and above all, horsemanship. These schools cost a great deal. Ranuccio Farnese (1569–1622; ruled 1592–1622), duke of Parma and Piacenza, founded a famous school for nobles in Parma in 1601 and gave the Jesuits direction of the school in 1604. It had a peak enrollment of 550 to 600 boys between 1670 and 1700, then began to decline. The Jesuits were the teachers in many noble schools and boarding schools with upper-class boys. Other religious orders followed their lead but to a lesser extent.

France. In the early sixteenth century many French towns established Latin classical schools that were open to the boys of the town and were staffed by teachers who had imbibed the Renaissance humanistic curriculum in Paris. Then the Crown in the early seventeenth century encouraged the Jesuits and other orders to establish schools in the kingdom. Through financial subsidies or royal commands, King Henry

IV (ruled 1589–1610) persuaded the religious orders to take direction of the town schools. Sometimes the towns agreed because the schools were going poorly. The town could not provide enough funding, teachers were in short supply, enrollments were declining, academic standards were falling, and the students were disorderly. Under the protection of the Crown, the new religious orders of the Catholic Reformation became the schoolmasters of France.

Numerous towns across France replaced their secular schoolmasters with the Jesuits, the French Congregation of the Oratory, and the Doctrinaires (Secular Priests of the Christian Doctrine), all of whom established some remarkable schools. In 1603 Henry IV gave to the Jesuits a château in the town of La Flèche on the Loir River. The College Henri IV at La Flèche (usually referred to as La Flèche) began with that gift. The king provided additional financial support in the following years and encouraged members of his court to send their sons there. The school was an instant success, boasting an enrollment of 1,200 to 1,400 students, of whom 300 were boarders, in a few years. Among La Flèche's most famous pupils was René

Descartes (1596–1650). Entering in 1606, Descartes spent nine years at the school. He devoted the first six to studying Latin grammar, humanities, and rhetoric and the last three to studying philosophy, which included mathematics, physics, and Galileo's telescope discoveries. Although he eventually rejected the philosophy he learned there, Descartes in 1641 endorsed La Flèche for the excellence of its instruction, its lively students who came from all over France, and the spirit of student equality that the Jesuits fostered.

The Collège de Clermont (1560–1762), renamed the Collège Louis-le-Grand in 1682, was a Jesuit school in Paris that enrolled boys ages twelve to twenty. The number of students steadily rose from 1,500 (including 300 boarders) in 1619 to 2,500 to 3,000 students (including 500 to 600 boarders) in the late seventeenth century.

Students in the Jesuit schools and probably in most Latin schools in both Catholic and Protestant Europe were placed and promoted according to their achievement, not their ages. This meant that boys of many ages might be in a single class. For example, in 1677 the rhetoric class at the Collège de Clermont in



TABLE 1
JESUIT SCHOOLS WORLDWIDE,
1556–1749

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total Number of Schools</i>
1556	c. 35 (18 in Italy)
1575	121 (35 in Italy)
1599	245 (49 in Italy)
1607	293
1626	444 (80 in Italy)
1679	578
1710	612 (111 in Italy in 1700)
1749	669 (105 in France in 1762)

(Farrell, 1938, pp. 365, 431–435; Brizzi, 1976, pp. 20, 22; Brizzi, 1982, p. 919; and Palmer, 1985, p. 15)

Paris had 160 pupils (obviously taught by more than one teacher). One student was ten years old, three were eleven, eight were twelve, fifteen were thirteen, thirty-four were fourteen, thirty-seven were fifteen, twenty-five were sixteen, twenty-eight were seventeen, six were eighteen, two were nineteen, and one was twenty. While the rhetoric class normally took two years to complete, some pupils may have required more time.

Jesuit schools in Europe, Asia, and the Americas followed the program of studies minutely organized in the Society's *Ratio studiorum* (Plan of studies) of 1599. It prescribed texts, classroom procedures, rules, and discipline. The *Ratio* frowned on corporal punishment; if its use was unavoidable, a non-Jesuit should administer it. Other Catholic religious order schools offering Latin education copied Jesuit educational procedures to greater or lesser degrees.

Piarist schools. Not all schools of the religious orders taught a Latin curriculum to middle-class and upper-class boys. The Basque priest José Calasanz (1557–1646) had the revolutionary idea of offering comprehensive free schooling to poor boys, and he opened his first Pious School in the working-class area of Trastevere, Rome, in 1597. The first Pious School accepted only pupils presenting certificates of poverty issued by parish priests. It aimed to educate poor and working-class boys so they might earn a living in this

life and attain salvation in the next. The school offered free instruction in vernacular reading, writing, and arithmetic plus some Latin to bright boys, an early attempt to combine the vernacular and Latin curricula. It also furnished books, paper, pens, ink, and on occasion food, to needy pupils. In 1621 Calasanz established a religious order, the Poor Clerics Regular of the Mother of God of the Pious Schools, usually called the Piarists, to carry on his work. In time the Piarists dropped the certificate of poverty as a prerequisite for enrollment and accepted students from the middle and upper classes. Nevertheless, they continued to see the poor as their primary student constituency. Their schools enabled poor boys to move up the social ladder, those who learned Latin into professional positions. In 1784 the Piarists ran over two hundred schools, the majority in Italy and Spain and a smaller number in central Europe.

Education for girls. Boys and girls almost always attended separate schools in both Catholic and Protestant Europe. A large number of female religious convents educated Catholic girls as long-term boarders. Parents sent a girl to a convent for several years to be educated and to learn sewing and manners. She emerged educated, virtuous, and ready to marry. Some girls decided to remain as nuns. Indeed, professed nuns living in convents had a higher literacy rate and were consistently better educated than laywomen.

Church organizations also offered charity schools for poor girls. For example, in 1655 the papacy contributed funding to hire numerous female teachers to staff free neighborhood schools for girls in Rome. Each schoolmistress taught vernacular reading and writing to classes ranging from a few to more than seventy girls. These schools lasted until the Kingdom of Italy seized Rome in 1870. Catholic Europe also had an abundance of catechism schools, called Schools of Christian Doctrine, which taught the rudiments of Catholicism and a limited amount of reading on Sundays and numerous religious holidays to boys and girls in separate classes. Protestant Europe also had catechism classes or Sunday schools, about which less is known. Numerous clergymen who lacked benefices, livings, or parishes in both Protestant and Catholic Europe supported themselves as schoolmasters.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT

To this point central governments played no direct role in schooling, with the partial exception of state-church collaboration in some small German Protestant states. In the 1750s educational reformers argued

that the state should become the directing force in education and that the church should be displaced.

Beginning of state schooling and attacks against church schools. Enlightenment reformers, who always came from the upper ranks of society, believed that the absolutist state could and should improve humankind through reform from above. They accepted the psychology of John Locke (1632–1704), who held that the child was a *tabula rasa* (blank slate) on which anything could be written. Thus the right early education would impart useful skills to the child and instill the proper values, which included good manners and deference to authority. Children so formed would become useful and loyal citizens. Hence the central government, rather than local authorities, should control schools and choose the teachers. Church schools, which taught useless spiritual doctrine, in the opinion of the reformers, had to be eliminated.

The attack on church education occurred in Catholic countries just as the ruling classes were finding the most famous of the church schools, those of the Jesuits, less attractive. For example, enrollment at La Flèche dropped to four hundred, of whom two hundred were boarders, by 1760. The Society of Jesus was expelled from Portugal in 1759, France in 1764, and Spain in 1767; its schools (105 of them in France) were closed or assigned to other religious congregations. Bowing to pressure from governments, the papacy suppressed the Jesuits in 1773. But, needing to maintain educational institutions for their Catholic subjects, Frederick the Great of Prussia and Catherine the Great of Russia refused to publish the papal bull and maintained the Society's institutions in their domains. State authorities across Europe also confiscated numerous church buildings and properties during the last years of the eighteenth century and through much of the nineteenth century, further weakening the capacity of church groups to support schools. Governments seldom succeeded in eliminating church schools in either Catholic or Protestant lands, but they seriously weakened churches as rivals to the central state governments as the chief force in schooling.

Enlightenment reformers further believed that state schooling should be free for lower-class boys but limited to elementary education, ending at the ages of ten to twelve. Otherwise these boys would aspire to rise above their stations, thus depriving society of their labor and upsetting the right order of things. By contrast, the sons of the ruling classes seldom attended state elementary schools but continued to study with tutors or attended elite schools. They went on to secondary schools, including boarding schools, with the

classical Latin and Greek curriculum. Despite its limited vision, the central governmental control of education fostered over the course of the next 250 years the slow expansion of free, compulsory elementary and secondary state education to a growing percentage of the population.

Prussia and France, 1750–1850. Both Prussia and France were leaders in education. The Prussian government, the pioneer in state education, asserted state control over schools in several ways in the late eighteenth century. It reorganized the finances of local schools, established inspections, and organized some teacher training. Other German states followed the Prussian example in the first half of the nineteenth century.

France did the same. The different factions that ruled France during the French Revolution of 1789 to 1799 shared one belief about education, that is, the state should control the schools. Napoleon Bonaparte came to power in 1799 and in 1802 brought all education, from primary schools through the universities, under the control of the state by law. Although the immediate results were limited, he established the principle that every French government subsequently followed, that state control and uniformity of the schools is essential. In 1808 Napoleon established new secondary schools called lycées with a curriculum of Latin and Greek, French literature, logic, and mathematics. In a revolutionary precedent, entrance to the lycée became dependent on passing a rigorous examination that required considerable preparation beyond what a student could learn at an elementary school. Although the vast majority of pupils in lycées came from the upper-middle class and the aristocracy, a few students from other groups entered. Napoleon also established a state engineering school, *École Polytechnique*, and a state professional school, *École Normale Supérieure*.

Some German states established teacher training schools, the first of them in Berlin in 1756. The first French government *écoles normales* (normal schools) to train elementary teachers opened in the 1820s, and by 1863 half of the elementary teachers in France came from these schools. Teacher training schools also began in England in the 1840s. Although the normal schools mostly taught future teachers the same skills that they would teach their pupils, including orderliness and respect for the hierarchy of society, these schools helped men and women rise from peasant and working-class ranks to become teachers, especially at the elementary level. The graduates of French teacher training schools were often militantly antireligious and supporters of state education.

Teachers commanded some respect in a society in which not everyone could read and write and few people did so well. But a large social gulf separated teachers from the representative of the state or the local aristocrat who gave them orders. Moreover, the teacher was greatly enmeshed in the society of his or her local community and its values. Often teachers were required to perform other duties. For example, in Germany teachers were obliged to ring church bells, to assist at church services, and generally to help the local Protestant pastor or parish priest. They had to be pious according to the precepts of the local religion.

Another step in the process of creating state education was erecting buildings. Governments increasingly constructed either a building with multiple classrooms for several hundred students in large towns or a one-room schoolhouse in the country. The expression “go to school” began to have a physical meaning.

Individual classes, especially at the primary levels, still had many pupils, sometimes a hundred or more. State schools had more students per teacher than the Latin schools of the religious orders or the independent vernacular schools of previous centuries. The large classes meant that much learning consisted of simultaneous rote learning: students shouted letters and words in unison or did simple arithmetical calculations together.

CONSOLIDATION OF STATE EDUCATION, 1850–1918

As the national governments of England, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and Austria-Hungary grew stronger, they expanded centralized, compulsory, lay state education.

France. Because some 38,000 towns and villages in France lacked elementary schools, the 1833 Guizot law, named for the minister of education François Guizot (1787–1874), obliged every town to establish a public elementary school. But it did not order all students to attend them. Free primary education grew but was not universal. In the 1850s and 1860s Catholic religious organizations, again assuming an important position in French education, often operated local public schools under contract with towns. Between 1879 and 1886 the Ferry laws, named for the minister of education Jules Ferry (1832–1893), made public primary education free, tax-supported, and thoroughly secular. A law in 1882 required schooling for all boys and girls between the ages of six and thir-



TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF MALE CHILDREN
AGED 6 TO 14 ENROLLED IN
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

Country	1820	1850	1870	1883	1900
Prussia	59	81	93		97
Bavaria		83	84		96
France		60	88		94
England and Wales		66			90
Scotland			80		99
Sweden		59			90
Italy			34		57
Russia					29
Austria			57	83	97*

* Estimate

The Russian figure is adult male literacy in 1897, and the Austrian figures include boys and girls. (Maynes, 1985, p. 134; Florinsky, 1964, p. 315; Zeps, 1987, p. 11)

teen. As a result, literacy rates for the whole population, men and women, grew from 60 percent in 1870 to 95 percent in 1900.

Various Ferry laws practically eliminated Catholic schools in France and prohibited priests, brothers, and nuns from teaching, even in private schools, although Catholic schools returned in later decades as private schools. Other laws vastly expanded the ranks of teachers, especially female teachers, who replaced teaching nuns. The curriculum emphasized civil history and ignored France’s religious past. For example, geographies passed over the great medieval cathedrals and paid little attention to Joan of Arc. In place of religious instruction, the public schools taught thrift, obedience to authority, and orderliness. The government in Paris dictated every aspect of French public education. Supposedly a minister of education looked at his watch at three o’clock on a Monday afternoon and said, “At this minute every pupil in every fifth-year class in France is studying Racine,” referring to the dramatic poet Jean Racine (1639–1699). True or not, the story expressed the goal of the French educational system, the most centralized in Europe.

The standardization of schools and the establishment of links among primary, secondary, and higher

schools probably had the most enduring effect on French society. Primary schools served the lower classes, while lycées were for the children of the upper and middle classes. Indeed lycées had their own preparatory schools, which began teaching Latin as early as age nine. In the 1860s and 1870s a new kind of secondary school developed, offering more practical instruction than the severely classical lycée. The new school provided what was called a “modern” education, consisting of general education in French, science, and history as well as commercial courses and manual training. Members of the lower-middle classes found them particularly attractive. In 1902 the French government placed the “modern” curriculum on an equal basis with that of the classics-oriented lycée.

At the age of eleven, the French pupil began a seven-year secondary school program divided into two parts. In the first four years the student followed either a classical or a modern curriculum. For the next three years a student chose more intense study of either Latin and modern languages or science or the other secondary school program of modern languages and science. In the second year of the second cycle (the sixth year overall), students took the first part of the *baccalauréat* (school-leaving certificate) examination. More than half of the students failed the first part of the examination and had to repeat the previous year. Those who passed spent another year preparing for the second part of the *baccalauréat* examination. Only those who successfully completed both parts of the *baccalauréat* were eligible for higher training at universities or other schools, such as the *École Normale Supérieure*. The fortunate graduates ruled France and became especially prominent in the civil service and the university professoriate—a fact of French life that remained constant through the end of the twentieth century.

France simultaneously created an inclusive, broad primary school system for the working and peasant classes and a rigorous, socially exclusive form of elite secondary education. A few talented children from the working and peasant classes, with financial assistance, made the transition from the standard primary schools to the secondary schools at the age of eleven. A somewhat larger number of lycée students came from the lower-middle class, the ranks of clerks and shopkeepers. But the majority of students in the elite schools came from the upper-middle and elite classes.

The rest of continental Europe. Every other country in continental Europe developed a similar structure of state schools. All forced children to make a choice among three different secondary schools at the ages of ten, eleven, and occasionally twelve. A fortunate few, usually the offspring of upper and upper-

middle class and professional parents, went on to the secondary school with the classical curriculum, modern language training, and a limited amount of mathematics and science. Called *Gymnasium* in Germany, Austria, and Russia, *gimnázium* in Hungary, and *liceo* in Italy, the classical academic secondary school was the same everywhere.

From the Renaissance onward the classical secondary school was at the center of European elite education, even though classical Latin no longer had a practical use, except to some scholars, after the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, educational leaders, and probably the majority of society, believed that learning ancient languages and literature best enabled a boy and (later) a girl to realize his or her potential. The concept was called *Bildung* (cultivation) in German, *culture générale* in French, and liberal education in English. According to this view, the study of Latin and Greek grammar developed mental discipline, while ancient Latin and Greek literature offered examples of the highest human culture in the original language. The classical curriculum benefited the student regardless of future career because it developed the individual—but only a few. In 1883 the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke justified the classical secondary school and its social exclusiveness with the statement, “Millions must plow and forge and dig in order that a few thousands may write and paint and study.”

Graduates of the classical secondary school went on to universities; took civil service positions; joined the professions of law, medicine, and theology; and became leaders of the nation. For example, until 1902 German students had to attend the *Gymnasium* to obtain the *Abitur*, the school-leaving examination certificate that permitted them to attend university. Only university graduates were allowed to sit state examinations for the civil service, the ministry, the medical and legal professions, and secondary school teaching. In 1902 Germany began to allow graduates of the other secondary schools to attend university under strict limitations, and other countries followed the German example.

The secondary technical school also developed in the nineteenth century. It combined a lesser amount of theoretical training and some ancient-language training with more scientific and technical education. Its graduates normally did not go on to the university, but they could attend advanced technical schools. Students from this stream often became managers and technicians in commerce and industry. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries some countries developed nonselective secondary modern schools, offering vocational and practical training. They educated workers for occupations in which they would

follow instructions. Finally, most countries added an additional three years or more of elementary school after the age of ten. Students who continued in elementary schools ended their schooling at the ages of thirteen, which was slowly raised to fourteen, fifteen, or sixteen. Some entered apprenticeships that might include limited additional schooling.

Only a few students attended a secondary school of any sort in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the majority of students entering secondary school at the ages of ten or eleven did not finish. In 1911 only 2.6 percent of students up to age seventeen attended secondary schools in France, and 3.2 percent of students up to age nineteen attended secondary schools in Prussia. Poorer countries, such as Italy, Spain, and particularly Russia, had fewer schools and a smaller percentage of the population in school, especially in secondary schools.

Neither the curricular streams nor the social exclusiveness of secondary education changed much from the late nineteenth century through the 1950s. For example, in one state of the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1950s, two-thirds of the students left elementary school by the ages of fourteen or fifteen. No more than 20 percent of German children tried one of the secondary schools. Of the age group ten to fourteen, 10 percent studied in an academic secondary school (*Gymnasium*), but only 3.3 percent graduated. Of *Gymnasium* graduates, 97 percent went on to higher education, normally university training. Only 5 to 6 percent of the students in all three secondary schools combined were the children of laborers, though laborers made up about half of the population. At the other extreme, 25 percent of the children in secondary schools had academically trained parents, usually *Gymnasium* or secondary technical school graduates, but the academically trained made up only 2.5 percent of the population.

Nineteenth-century governments across Europe decreed that all children must go to school to a certain age, which was gradually raised. An increasing number of boys and girls attended elementary schools, although the elementary curriculum was not extensive: reading, writing, arithmetic, and outside of France, religion. Governments provided more but never enough schools and teachers. Nevertheless, the expansion of schooling for the children of the working classes and peasantry across western Europe in the nineteenth century was impressive.

SCHOOLS AS BEARERS OF CULTURAL AND SOCIAL VALUES

European schooling in the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries pursued cultural, national, and social goals

considered as important as academic skills and knowledge. The results were often tumultuous.

The nation and its minorities. Every national school system resolved the linguistic issue of multiple dialects by teaching one version of the national language, that of its most accomplished authors. For example, Italian schools taught Tuscan Italian, the language of the Florentine Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), instead of Milanese, Neapolitan, Roman, Venetian, or another regional dialect. In practice this meant that students, especially those in elementary school, learned the national language in school but spoke the regional language at home, in the street, and in the shop. Every national school system also taught a minority of children whose mother tongue was completely different from the national language. School systems sometimes permitted extensive bilingual education and other times imposed schooling in the national language on children of another mother tongue.

School officials and national leaders saw education, especially at the elementary level, as a means of creating national unity. For example, Italian schools, after Italian unification in 1870, taught a relentless patriotism emphasizing the exploits of Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882), the attractive military hero of the battle for unification. Students wrote essays on such topics as “Why I love Italy.” In 1886 Michele Coppino, the Italian minister of education, justifying this policy, issued a circular that stated, “We must not forget that the primary school aims at rearing a population as instructed as possible, but principally honest, hardworking, useful to the family and devoted to the Country and to the King.” Other European governments made similar statements.

The desire to produce honest, hardworking, and loyal subjects led all governments outside France to allow religious instruction in state schools and often to permit the existence of religious schools, despite official anticlerical policies and rhetoric. For example, the Prussian state within united Germany wished to integrate both Catholic and Protestant children into the same schools, which would be nonconfessional. But strong opposition from both Catholic and Protestant church leaders caused the government to retreat. Successive governments found that maintaining good relations with the two religions through confessional primary schools was necessary to preserve the state’s monopoly over education. By the early twentieth century almost all Protestant children in Prussia attended Protestant schools, while almost all Catholic children attended Catholic schools. Even in the Weimar government period, 1919–1933, 92 percent of Catholic school children attended Catholic schools,

and 95 percent of Protestant children attended Protestant schools. Jewish children attended Jewish schools or Protestant schools where they had separate classes for religion.

When a minority both practiced a different religion and spoke a different language, toleration sometimes evaporated. The schooling of the Polish Catholic minority in the German state between 1870 and 1918 involved linguistic, national, and religious issues. Prussia, the largest state in united Germany, had a substantial number of Catholic Poles. It was reasonably tolerant of this minority and had permitted extensive bilingual education before unification of the German state in 1870. However, beginning in the 1880s the central German government, dominated by Prussia, increasingly imposed German language instruction on Polish children, with one concession. Bowing to the argument, advanced by both Polish Catholic and German Protestant clergies, that only religious instruction in the mother tongue could reach a child's heart and soul, it permitted Catholic religious instruction of Polish children in Polish.

Otherwise the German government increasingly attempted to germanize its Polish school population. It reduced Polish language instruction and teachers. It spent so little money on schools in Polish-speaking areas, whose population was expanding rapidly, that some elementary schools in Polish areas had three shifts a day, giving each child only about two hours of instruction, often in classes of well over one hundred students. When the government finally insisted that Catholic religious instruction should be delivered in German to Polish-speaking children, the children and their parents resisted. In 1901 a teacher caned pupils who refused to recite a psalm in German. In October and November 1906 up to 46,000 Polish-speaking school children refused to speak German during Catholic religious lessons. The government imposed fines on the parents and broke the strike by May and June 1907 without solving the dispute. This example and many other others demonstrate that governments often suppressed the religious rights and the languages of minorities in the schools or were forced into uneasy compromises. The creation of a Polish state in 1919 out of territories formerly ruled by Germany and Russia moved most of the Polish-speaking children out of Germany. Then it was Poland that had linguistic and religious minorities.

Fascist and Nazi schooling. Neither the Fascist government of Italy (1922–1943) nor the Nazi regime in Germany (1933–1945) made significant changes to the structure of schooling. Instead they added ideological themes to the curriculum. The schools stressed

militarism, nationalism, and service to the country (*patria* or *Vaterland*) more strongly than before. They added material in the secondary schools that explained and promoted Fascism and National Socialism. Both governments taught an ideology that emphasized the leader (*duce* or *führer*) who embodied the will of the people and should be obeyed without question. Both promoted a conservative and traditional view of women's role, embodied in the Nazi slogan "*Kirche, Kinder, und Küche*" (church, children, and kitchen). But both regimes relied on youth organizations and a general indoctrination of the populace more than the classroom to propagate their views.

Italy expelled all Jewish teachers and students from elementary and secondary schools, some five thousand students and two hundred teachers, in October 1938. However, the government immediately established and financially supported Jewish elementary and secondary schools. With excellent teachers, some of the lowest teacher-pupil ratios in Italy, and dedicated students, they were among the best schools in Italy.

England. England followed the general European pattern, with the major exception of the English public school. England emerged from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the educational mix, found all across Europe, of limited elementary schools, called "petty schools," teaching basic literacy in English, and grammar schools, which boys normally entered between the ages of nine and twelve, teaching Latin. In towns a host of endowed schools existed, usually founded through the modest bequest of a local patron and sometimes operated by a clergyman as part of the village church. England probably lagged behind the rest of western Europe in the percentage of children of school age who attended school in 1800.

The late-eighteenth-century industrial revolution created factories filled with working children, whose plight caught the attention of social reformers. The reformers set up Sunday schools, to which working children could go on Sunday or after working hours on other days, to teach elementary literacy skills and a catechism, usually that of the Church of England but sometimes that of other Protestant churches. The Sunday schools employed techniques of mass education, such as using older children to instruct the ablest younger children, who in turn instructed their peers, and recitation in unison.

Slowly the notion grew that the state should provide a limited amount of schooling to those without funds to pay fees or provide a school where one was lacking. But the question of the role of the Church of England, which wanted a strong voice,



ENGLISH PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Despite the name, English public schools were in fact expensive private schools. Seven boarding schools, Winchester (1382), Eton (1440), Shrewsbury (1552), Westminster (late sixteenth century), Harrow (1571), Rugby (1576), and Charterhouse (1611), were held in the highest esteem. Two day schools, St. Paul's, founded by the English humanist John Colet (1467–1519) in 1508, and Merchant Taylors (1561), completed the highest group. But England had many other boarding and day public schools of varying quality and prestige. All were independent, expensive, and filled with boys from the highest ranks of society. They taught a traditional Latin and Greek curriculum and maintained close ties with Oxford and Cambridge.

By the time the nineteenth century opened, the public schools had fallen into numerous abuses and difficulties. Thomas Arnold (1795–1842), headmaster of Rugby from 1828 to 1842, led a reform movement. He had three goals, listed in descending order: (1) he wished to imbue boys with Christian religious and moral principles, (2) he wanted them to conduct themselves as gentlemen, and (3) he wanted to train them intellectually. To achieve these ends, he emphasized Christian, specifically Church of England, religious training through the master's sermon and good example, and he gave the older boys a share in the governance of the school. They served as examples of leadership and good morality to younger boys. Arnold also emphasized sports as a means of fostering sportsmanship and loyalty, an emphasis that expanded greatly later in the century. He moderated but did not eliminate physical hazing and the faggot system, a form of bullying servitude imposed by the older boys on the younger ones.

Thomas Hughes (1822–1896), who began at Rugby at age thirteen, when Arnold was still headmaster, wrote *Tom Brown's School-days* (1857), which presents a wonderfully appealing picture of public school life. Thanks to the publicity generated by Hughes and others and an economic boom, which created a wealthy middle class that wanted its children to rise socially, the public schools enjoyed a golden age from 1860 to 1918 as more public schools, including some for girls, were founded. They spawned continental imitations, which never were as numerous or important as the English originals.

Boys went off to board at public schools as early as seven years of age, more often at ten to twelve, and remained there until they finished at eighteen. At their best the schools socialized boys into the habits of subservience and fellowship as younger students and of leadership and responsibility as older students. They also created lifetime bonds that had enormous practical benefits and social consequences. Old boys, graduates of a particular public school, helped one another throughout their lives. The public school ethos, including the view that gentlemanly behavior and loyalty were more important than intellectual achievement, permeated the higher ranks of English civil service, army, government, and society. Public school graduates comprised two-thirds to three-quarters of the judges, ambassadors, lieutenant generals and higher military officers, bishops, chief executives in the one hundred largest firms, and Conservative members of Parliament as late as the 1950s and 1960s. Public schools played a major role in perpetuating class distinctions and slowing the development of a merit-based society.

blocked massive state intervention and led to a series of partial measures. In the first, in 1833, the government made available funds to build more schools. An increasing number of reformers argued for greater state intervention in education on the grounds that the country needed a more educated citizenry to compete industrially with France and Germany, which already had state schooling. The Education Act of 1870 established that, where schooling was inadequate, a local school board of five to fifteen members elected

by the local taxpayers would create and run schools, which would be financed by taxes, government grants, and pupil fees. It also permitted elementary schools operated by the Church of England. The overall result was much more elementary schooling. England had 1 million pupils in state elementary schools in 1870 and 6 million children in elementary schools, evenly split between board (that is, state) and church schools, in 1900. Thereafter the number of children in board schools increased.

Unlike school boards on the Continent, where complete authority over the schools resided with the central government, the English local school boards had extensive powers. Nevertheless in 1880 the central government obliged all children to attend school to the age of ten, the first compulsory school law in England. Elementary schools were still not free, but in the 1890s the central government began to grant schools small amounts of money to replace the fees previously paid by parents.

A series of reports followed that documented the inadequacies of secondary education, and the Education Act of 1902 abolished the school boards. In their place, the law made local county and borough governments responsible for both elementary and secondary education by constituting them as local educational authorities with all the legal powers of the former school boards and additional new powers. They were expected to coordinate primary and secondary education and to offer scholarships for poor children to attend secondary schools, which charged fees, and eventually to enter university. Local governments were obliged to provide scholarships (that is, free places) for a quarter of the students in the state secondary schools. They also provided partial financing to church schools operated by the Church of England, other Protestant churches, and the Catholic Church.

The English government slightly modified and extended educational benefits in the twentieth century. Scholarships were awarded on the basis of a competitive examination given to children at the age of eleven (the so-called eleven-plus), and the successful students studied at a grammar school for free. This became the English equivalent of the qualifying examinations for secondary school in continental Europe, the examination that determined a child's future educational career and life prospects. The grammar school remained classical in its curriculum; technical and vocational secondary education developed slowly.

The Butler Act of 1944 abolished fees for state secondary schools, provided more financial support for church schools, and proclaimed the principle that every child should receive both primary and secondary schooling. In recognition of the last, the government raised the school-leaving age to fifteen in 1947 and to sixteen in 1972. But only 20 percent of the children successfully passed the eleven-plus examination to enter the grammar (Latin) schools, which led to the university at that time. The others attended technical schools or modern secondary schools, which had a mixed curriculum. Many parents considered them inferior to the grammar schools. The failure to advance to the grammar school through the eleven-plus examination often left a legacy of bitterness among chil-

dren and their parents. The Butler Act also made religion classes compulsory in state schools for the first time in English history, although almost all state and church schools already had some religious education.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s England moved toward comprehensive secondary schools intended to replace partially the grammar schools, still seen as the place for students of economic and social privilege as well as academic excellence. At the conclusion of secondary education, the General Certificate of Education, begun in 1951, was earned through examination and offered admission to the universities. The Certificate of Secondary Education, begun in 1965, was awarded to students of lesser achievement.

Scotland Although ruled by the English Crown, Scotland followed a different educational path from England by more quickly developing a centralized state educational system.

In 1560 the Scottish Protestant leader John Knox (1513–1572) called for a system of parish schools; such a system developed over the next two hundred years. Legislation required landowners to appoint a schoolmaster for each parish, to pay him a small salary, and to build a schoolhouse. Parish schools enrolled both boys and girls, although girls' education emphasized reading and sewing rather than the broader range of academic skills imparted to boys. All children had to pay small fees, but the church or community paid the fees of poor children. Although parish schools were less numerous in remote and poorer regions of Scotland than in the affluent lowlands, it was a national system of elementary education, supplemented by a limited number of other schools. By the eighteenth century Scotland had one of the highest schooling rates, especially for girls, in Europe.

The parish schools provided the model for a national system of education. In the early nineteenth century secular leaders influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment, and clergymen of the Church of Scotland, agreed that the state should take the lead in education. Their efforts culminated in the Education (Scotland) Act of 1872, passed by the British Parliament, which transformed Presbyterian parish schools into state schools. The Act of 1872 established school boards to take direction of parish schools, to levy taxes, and to take other measures for the schools. It also decreed compulsory education for all Scottish children from the ages of five through twelve. The new state schools still provided Presbyterian religious instruction, but a conscience clause allowed children of other religions to absent themselves.

State-directed Scottish schools provided more elementary education than did the decentralized En-

glish system. In 1871 approximately 80 percent of Scottish boys and girls aged six through twelve attended school. But because schooling was not compulsory beyond age twelve, school attendance dropped to about one-third for boys and girls aged thirteen and fourteen. In 1901, 99 percent of Scottish boys and girls aged six through twelve attended school. The number dropped to 85 percent for boys and girls aged thirteen and to 35 percent for those aged fourteen. In the twentieth century Scottish education conformed more closely to the English system.

The Soviet Union, 1917–1989. Russia lagged behind other nations in the percentage of children attending schools of any kind or level. In addition to the country's problems of vast distances and poverty, some tsarist governments feared extending education on the grounds that learning led to sedition, hence schooling was allocated according to class. Count Ivan Delianov, the minister for education in 1887, wanted the children of "coachmen, footmen, cooks . . . and other similar people . . . who should not be led to break away from the milieu to which they belong" barred from the classical *gymnasias*. Although this did not happen, in 1913 less than 40 percent of the population over the age of eight could read and write. Literacy was lower in the countryside and the vast Asiatic part of the Russian Empire.

After the 1917 Russian Revolution, the Communist government determined to change the schools and to provide free, compulsory state education for all. The educational ministry created a new unified school called the Free Labor School, which provided nine years of schooling for ages eight to seventeen, divided into five lower grades and four upper grades, for all. The schools were free and provided materials and lunches. The Free Labor School eliminated Latin, Greek, and religious education and attempted to integrate learning and life. The goal was for children to learn actively about farming and trades by caring for plants and animals and operating tools; about society by visiting institutions and organizations; and about the arts by drawing and singing. Subjects would lose their specificity. The schools also taught a considerable amount of Marxist-Leninist theory.

In reality, Russia had few schools, and those often lacked blackboards, pens, and paper. Despite the government's wish to open schools to all social classes, few children of workers and peasants remained the whole nine years. Sons and daughters of the middle and upper classes dominated the upper grades in the mid-1920s. In the 1930s, in a reversal of policy, the government forced some children of middle- and upper-class parents out of school. In that decade the

Stalinist purges, some of whose victims were teachers, and the extermination of the kulaks (free peasants) further disrupted the schools. Yet despite the lack of resources and the political and human disruptions, the Soviet Union did succeed in building more schools, educating more children, and sending more sons and daughters of the working class and peasantry into the secondary grades by the 1930s.

After 1931 Soviet education became less revolutionary and more traditional. The school system was oriented toward creating the workers, engineers, and technicians needed by the state for heavy industrialization. Examinations, stricter grading, and subject content were emphasized. Tuition fees for the upper grades of the secondary school were introduced in 1940, then abolished in 1956. Free boarding schools for boys and girls were established in 1956. On the other hand, the government in 1958 mandated that all applicants for higher education work for two years in industry or agriculture. They also needed the approval of organizations, such as trade unions and the Young Communist League. In the last decades before the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the social result of Soviet schooling was a contradictory mix. Soviet education attempted to create a classless society, but the sons and daughters of Communist Party officials, members of the government, and the professional classes enjoyed more educational benefits than the rest.

Eastern Europe. Before 1945 the countries of eastern Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia (later divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (later divided into several states), and Albania—had the same basic school structure, characterized by the same sharp social divisions, as western and central Europe. The major difference was that eastern Europe was poorer and, therefore, offered fewer schools and less opportunity, especially in the countryside. World War II had a devastating effect on education in eastern Europe. German special forces shot an estimated 27,000 Polish teachers. An estimated 10,000 teachers lost their lives in Yugoslavia, either in the struggle against the Germans or in the brutal fighting between ethnic and political factions. An unknown number of schools were destroyed. Immediately after World War II, Communist governments, supported by the Soviet Union and its conquering army, took control of all of Eastern Europe and part of Germany. The new Communist governments effected an educational revolution.

All education became state education, with the exception of a few remaining private schools in Poland. The eastern bloc countries often provided state

preschools, nursery schools, and kindergartens for children from one to six. These served as instruments of socialization as much as learning centers.

The fundamental unit was the basic school, which followed the Soviet model. The basic school had seven to ten (most often eight) years of compulsory schooling that was the same for all pupils from six or seven to fifteen or sixteen. In addition to reading and writing in the national language and mathematics, the basic school taught history and economics according to Marxist-Leninist principles; a foreign language, usually Russian instead of the French or German taught in pre-Communist years; and a considerable amount of biology, physics, chemistry, and polytechnical training. Latin and religious training were eliminated.

At the age of fifteen or sixteen the student either left school or entered one of three different kinds of secondary schools. If the student passed the appropriate examination, he or she entered the general secondary school, which concentrated on academic studies. Similar to the *lycée* or *Gymnasium*, it lasted three or four years and concluded with a certificate, like the French *baccalauréat* or the German *Abitur*. The certificate was a prerequisite for university entrance but not a guarantee of admission because places were limited. The second form of advanced secondary school was the vocational secondary school, also three to four years, which prepared students for a particular occupation, anything from engineering to kindergarten

teaching. Those who finished might also apply to enter universities. Third were trade schools, lasting one to three years, which offered both classroom and factory instruction, amounting to apprentice training, for particular trades.

Advancement also depended on ideological and political conformity. In the German Democratic Republic students had to participate in the *Jugendweihe* (youth consecration), a Communist ceremony that replaced the Christian religious rite of confirmation. School children had to be enthusiastic members of Communist youth organizations, such as the Young Pioneers and Free German Youth, whose leadership exercised veto power over a student's chances of entering a university.

The schools of the Communist bloc eliminated illiteracy and the social stratification characteristic of eastern European education before World War II. But they also developed their own social and political divisions. Sons and daughters of high Communist Party officials received educational preference, especially for coveted spots in universities. Higher education remained limited to a few. For example, the German Democratic Republic sent a smaller percentage of its university-age population to universities than did the Federal Republic of Germany. On 3 October 1990 the two Germanies legally reunited, and the five new states (*Länder*) of the former German Democratic Republic adopted the educational system of the German Federal Republic.

Western Europe. A series of educational changes swept across Europe in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The school-leaving age was raised even before this, along with the expansion of state support for universities. The French government provided nursery school education to practically every child between the ages of three and five. Other French changes were designed to give all students some kind of secondary school graduation certificate and to increase greatly the number of university or university-level students. By the late twentieth century over a third of all French students went on to postsecondary institutions. France even gave local authorities some control over schools and involved parents in their operation. In Germany parents and the child, not the teacher or an examination, decided if the twelve-year-old child continued to the *Gymnasium* or another secondary school. Students more easily moved from one secondary school to another, and the classical secondary school lost some of its importance as the gateway to leadership positions in the state. Graduates of both the *Gymnasium* and the secondary technical school had the option to attend a university, but not the graduates of the secondary modern school. Similar changes were implemented in Italy and Spain, but slowly in the latter because of a shortage of state funding. Most

state school systems offered optional religion classes, and central governments provided complete or limited funding to private and religious schools. Religion ceased to be an area of controversy.

Overall, the systems established by the late nineteenth century were modified but not undone. The social exclusivity of European education lessened, but did not disappear. The children of immigrant guest workers from outside the European Community presented a new area of concern because they usually landed in the secondary vocational school with little or no opportunity for further academic training.

CONCLUSION

The social history of European education after the Renaissance saw the extension of schooling to the entire population and the gradual lowering but not elimination of class barriers. The state assumed the commanding position in education that individuals, local authorities, and church organizations formerly held. Several features did not change a great deal over the centuries, notably the classical curriculum, religious training, and the belief that schools should also teach cultural and social values.

See also Secularization (volume 2); Social Class; Students (volume 3); Youth and Adolescence (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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HIGHER EDUCATION



Charles R. Day

Universities have gone through several major phases in European history: a period of readjustment and then substantial decline in the early modern centuries, followed by revival and redefinition in the nineteenth century under the spurs of greater need for advanced training (particularly for expanding bureaucracies and professions) and the rise of specialized research. The twentieth century saw increasing enrollments, ultimately including significant numbers of women and some students of lower-class origin. The century was punctuated by the university-based protests of the 1960s, which led, though haltingly, to a diverse set of reforms.

THE MIDDLE AGES

European universities originated in the intellectual revival of the high Middle Ages. With the increasing order and security of the eleventh and twelfth centuries came the rise of towns and the development of cathedral schools. Originally intended for the instruction of the clergy, these schools broadened their curriculum during the twelfth century to meet the needs of a secular clientele training in law, Latin grammar, and the Roman classics. In Italy a school of medicine appears to have been established at Salerno as early as the tenth century, and a school of law at Bologna in the eleventh. In 1218 a school of law was founded at Salamanca in Spain. In France the University of Paris became a leader of northern intellectual life, especially in theology. A group of dissident students from Paris founded Oxford University in 1167, which produced another group of dissidents who established Cambridge a few years later. The first university in Germany was established at Heidelberg in 1386. By 1500 there were almost a hundred universities in Europe.

A university was originally a community of scholars and students interested in learning and organized as a corporation or guild possessing a charter guaranteeing its right to self-government and the ownership of property. Normally organized into four fac-

ulties—arts, theology, law, and medicine (with arts usually preparing for the other three)—universities were permanent institutions of learning possessing many of the characteristics of their modern counterparts: they had faculties of professors offering regular courses of instruction, holding periodical examinations, and awarding diplomas recognized throughout the Latin West. The bachelor of arts degree involved about four years of study, mainly in Latin grammar, rhetoric, and logic. The master of arts involved several more years of work in mathematics, natural science, and philosophy, and the doctorate required specialized training in theology, law, or medicine. Latin was the common language, so that students and professors could move freely from one university to another throughout Europe.

As centers of scholarly inquiry, the universities facilitated the rediscovery of the heritage of ancient Greece through the translation of Greek and Islamic texts into Latin. They were thus at the center of the high medieval synthesis of Greek and Arabic philosophy and the Christian philosophy known as scholasticism, which saw the beginnings of critical thought. Distinguished men of learning such as the French theologian Peter Abelard (1079–1142), the English scientist and Bishop of Lincoln Robert Grosseteste (1168–1253), and the Italian Dominican philosopher Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), were all associated with universities. The universities also played a vocational role, training administrators, lawyers, notaries, physicians, and ecclesiastics in response to growing demand.

FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: REDEFINITION AND DECLINE

The new humanism, in contrast to scholasticism, was forged under the influence of Greek and Latin models, a development that aroused the opposition of many universities, notably the University of Paris. Al-

though the new ideas did not alter the organization of the university, they did gradually penetrate the curriculum as human-centered studies based on Greek literature, rhetoric, poetry, history, and Platonic philosophy. It became fashionable for young men of good family to attend university in pursuit of polite learning, while others, of more modest origin, prepared for the clergy. Indeed, many religious reformers had studied the humanities in universities: Martin Luther and Philipp Melancthon were professors at the University of Wittenberg, John Calvin had studied at the University of Paris, Huldrych Zwingli at Vienna and Basel, and various English reformers at Oxford and Cambridge. Many new universities were founded during the sixteenth century to train clergy, Protestant or Catholic, and to provide administrators for the growing territorial states; these included nine universities in Germany, Leiden in Holland, and seventeen universities in Castile founded from 1474 to 1620. Oxford and Cambridge, their statutes reformed, grew rapidly under the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I, from 1560 to 1625, and emerged as defenders of the monarchy and the Church of England. Many upper-class Englishmen attended Oxford or Cambridge, so much so that the Long Parliament of 1640 is said to have been the best educated in English history.

The Enlightenment of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as with the rise of humanism, took place outside of and often in opposition to the universities, many of which had become pillars of religious orthodoxy, both Protestant and Catholic. A minority of reformers argued that the function of the university was the advancement of knowledge through discovery and research, while traditionalists saw it as affirming and teaching truth. The latter generally prevailed, and intellectual and scientific work took place largely outside the universities, in royal societies and scientific academies under royal or aristocratic patronage. Advances in mathematics, optics, and statics were linked to the rise of new crafts and professions. Inventors and amateur scientists experimented in their own workshops and had little or no contact with the universities.

The upper classes gradually lost interest in higher education, and the lower were squeezed out. University students were reputed for bad behavior, drinking, rioting, and whoring. Consequently, enrollments fell in most European countries over the eighteenth century, declining, for example, in the twenty-eight German universities from nine thousand to six thousand students, mainly because of the excessive number of universities created in various German states, the poor quality of secondary education, and the shift of intellectual interest to learned academies and societies. In

England, Oxford and Cambridge enrollments fell by one-half during the same period. In Spain they declined by the same percentage as universities withered as a result of strict government control, overemphasis on legal studies, and the increasing prominence of monks among students. The modernizing reforms of Charles III and Charles IV from the 1770s through the 1790s partially redressed the situation, but the long crisis of the Napoleonic years, which saw the closure of the universities, was only gradually compensated by reforms during the nineteenth century.

In England, Oxford and Cambridge trained clergymen and teachers, not lawyers, and the faculty was composed of clergymen rather than professors. Ninety percent of students were the sons of gentry, clergy, or military. In the later eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth, over one-half of Cambridge graduates and two-thirds of those from Oxford took holy orders. Teaching was done by college tutors, who taught all subjects, rather than by university professors, and so there was little academic specialization and scholarship languished. Religious dissenters were excluded from Oxford and Cambridge until the revocation of the Test Acts in 1854 and 1856.

The Dutch, the Scottish, and, in two cases anyway, the German universities were an exception to the downward trend. In Holland the Universities of Leiden and Utrecht pioneered in scientific research. In Scotland the universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh were nonresidential civic institutions, based partially on the model of the University of Leiden. Unlike Oxford and Cambridge, the Scottish universities employed professors for each discipline, modernized the curriculum to include the latest scientific advances, and accepted about a third of their students from the working classes. The broad range of subjects of study, the lecture system, the freedom of course selection and residence, the absence of religious tests, and the democratic character of the institutions influenced American universities. Finally, the reformed universities of Halle in Prussia (1694) and Göttingen in Hanover (1737) emphasized research and the advancement of knowledge in the social as well as natural sciences. Reforms were also introduced at Vienna in the Austrian Empire and at Uppsala in Sweden. The impulsion behind reform came from the emerging territorial monarchies, Austria, Prussia, Spain, and Sweden, which utilized the university for the training of state officials by endowing them with a monopoly over examinations leading to administrative posts.

In France the twenty-two universities fell into decline; the faculties of arts were gradually transformed into independent lower schools, or *collèges*, run by the Jesuits and other teaching orders, which were loosely connected to the universities. Only the law and medical faculties remained as independent professional schools, and their programs were often outdated. As a result the royal government began to open special higher schools during the eighteenth century in order to meet the demand for well-trained civil servants, military officers, and technical experts for the departments of mining, roads and bridges, and the military services, a trend that continued into the revolutionary period with the creation of the École Polytechnique in 1794 and the École Normale Supérieure in 1795. The Revolution suppressed the universities and closed most of the colleges. Revolutionary leaders talked of building a national system of schools but, diverted by war and unrest, they did little in practice to replace the old institutions.

Napoleon created a national system of secondary lycées and the state *baccalauréat* diploma for which they prepared. Anyone in possession of the *baccalauréat* could register in the university faculty of his choice; hence the “bac” was (and is) both the secondary school-leaving credential and the first higher education diploma. Napoleon reorganized the faculties of law and medicine but otherwise neglected the univer-

sities, concentrating instead on the development of specialized higher schools, the *grandes écoles*, as the sources of technical experts, military officers, and professors for his growing civil service, army, and lycées. He organized all secondary and higher educational institutions into a centralized public education corporation called the Université, which possessed a monopoly over education. The secondary and higher schools under its jurisdiction prepared for examinations for state diplomas, the *baccalauréat* and the *licence*, leading to the public services and emphasizing the transmission of knowledge, the memorization of self-evident principles, and stylistic elegance. Lycée professors, trained in the École Normale Supérieure, prepared for the *agrégation* examination instead of doing a thesis. The separation of teaching from research and the emphasis on the formation of competent but obedient civil servants tied education tightly to the needs of the state, impoverished the provinces intellectually, and all but destroyed the faculties of arts and sciences. France was still the leading country in the world in science at the time of Napoleon, but by the end of the century it would lag behind Germany and other countries.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Over the nineteenth century professors in the French faculties of arts and sciences had few students, did little research, and contented themselves mainly with giving public lectures and administering and grading the *baccalauréat* exams. Scientific research was confined largely to the École Polytechnique, the Collège de France, and the Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle, all in Paris. Aware of the decline of research in France, Victor Duruy created the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris in 1868.

With the coming of the Third Republic, reformers such as Louis Liard and Ernest Lavisse sought to create six great university centers of teaching and research but instead had to be content with a weak law in 1896 establishing fifteen “universities” (one in each academy), which amounted to little more than administrative coordination of loosely organized groups of faculties. On the eve of 1914, there were about forty thousand students enrolled in French universities, mostly in law, medicine, and pharmacy, and only seven thousand in the faculties of arts and sciences.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, universities everywhere in Europe turned to the German idea of *Wissenschaft*, or the advancement of learning through research and discovery, as the preferred university model in an age of industrial growth. The or-

igin of the reform of German universities dated to the defeat of the Prussian armies and the Frederickan state by Napoleon at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806. Intent on reform, the Prussian government hesitated between the model of the French specialized higher schools and that of the traditional German university. The decision in favor of the latter was based on the example of the reformed universities of Halle and Göttingen. This opened the way for the humanist ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt and other reformers, for the idea of *Lernfreiheit*, of the internal motivation for study as opposed to external motivation (careers, passing exams, as in France), and of *Bildungsbürgertum*, a humanistic ideal of general culture and intellectual development. Henceforth the German elite, drawn from the aristocracy and bourgeoisie, was to be defined by university education. The introduction of the secondary *Gymnasium* in 1812 and of the *Abitur* diploma (1788, 1834) qualifying for university admission strengthened the philosophical (arts) faculties as institutions training professors and civil servants and brought them equality with the faculties of law, medicine, and theology. Henceforth the universities would be closely tied to the gymnasium preparing for the *Abitur* necessary for university admission. In 1809 the University of Berlin was established as a new, model university.

The Humboldtian university, combining research, teaching, and culture, differed at once from the Oxfordian residential university based on the tutorial system and the French *grande école* model. The German universities were relatively decentralized and flexible and allowed freedom to learn and to teach. They produced an extraordinary series of outstanding scholars. In chemistry, for example, professors like R. W. Bunsen at Heidelberg and Justus von Liebig at Giessen led teams of graduate students in conducting advanced research in their laboratories.

The weakness in the German system lay in the guildlike power of the professors, who dominated the corporate, self-governing structure of the German university and were thus able to prevent change. As each professor covered an entire field, he had a vested interest in keeping research centered in the basic disciplines, avoiding the creation of chairs in new subfields such as bacteriology, physiology, or sociology. As the century progressed, and the states increased their control over universities, professors of the imperial period became more and more conservative, supporting the empire against socialism at home and encirclement abroad.

As was the case among European universities generally, German universities were reluctant to admit fields based on applied knowledge, such as agriculture,

engineering, clinical medicine, and architecture, which continued to be relegated to specialized schools or to apprenticeship. The *Technische Hochschulen*, for example, were engineering schools created on the French model of special higher professional schools beginning in the 1820s. Not until the kaiser's intervention in 1899 did they gain legal equality with the universities and the right to grant the doctorate. This accompanied reforms giving the nine-year programs and diplomas of modern high schools and technical institutions (*Realgymnasien* and *Oberrealschulen*) legal, if not social, equality with the gymnasiums. Finally, research institutes were established in 1887 and 1907 to provide for new scientific fields not covered by the universities. By the beginning of the twentieth century the German universities had lost their monopoly over advanced diplomas and research but had maintained the integrity of their programs and the distinction between pure and applied knowledge. Between 1870 and 1914, the number of university professors doubled but enrollments tripled. Universities became increasingly concerned with defending their superior social-cultural position against the rising lower classes and modern technical schools.

Faced with rapid strides in research and development in Germany during the nineteenth century, other countries reformed their universities. Oxford and Cambridge introduced honors examinations around the turn of the nineteenth century, abolished religious tests in 1854 and 1856, and introduced courses in the sciences, technology, and other modern subjects during the second half of the century, ending the monopoly of the classics. The tutorial system was reformed, celibacy abolished, and a body of professional teachers and researchers created, which helped restore the reputation of the two universities. Meritocratic reforms and examinations in the civil service at mid-century opened careers to university graduates that had hitherto not existed. Increasingly, middle-class families sent their sons to Oxford and Cambridge, and the percentage of students coming from the gentry and clergy declined.

The creation of civic universities, beginning with the University College of London in 1826, followed by Leeds, Sheffield, Manchester, and other schools beginning in the 1830s, made available courses in science, technology, economics, and other modern subjects, and provided access for social and religious groups that had long been excluded from Oxford and Cambridge and the "public" secondary schools that prepared for them. The introduction of secondary school-leaving examinations during the 1850s, the precursors of the O- and A-level exams, encouraged the reform of secondary education and the grammar schools.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

From the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, European universities successfully provided advanced education, fostered research, and contributed to the development of the nation-state. Higher education grew steadily, if not spectacularly, especially among the middle classes, as a result of the growth of white-collar positions in the professions, the civil service, and business and industry. In the first half of the twentieth century growth was limited by two wars and a depression and by the conservative organization of secondary and higher education, which provided access to only about 3 to 5 percent of the age group. European universities were closely tied to secondary schools—the gymnasiums, lycées, and so on—which prepared their students for difficult national examinations in the *Abitur*, the *baccalauréat*, and comparable diplomas in other countries, the possession of which enabled students to register in the university faculty of their choice. The solid general education received in secondary schools made possible specialization in university studies.

The universities, almost all of which were publicly financed, were considered part of a larger, national institution with uniform standards, goals, and requirements designed for a homogeneous upper-class clientele. They were governed from above by ministries of education, the councils of which formulated curricula, admissions standards, national examinations, and credentials. The ministry negotiated collective salary scales and working conditions with large national

professional associations representing professors, non-tenured teachers, and nonacademic staff. University presidents (usually called rectors or, in England, vice-chancellors) and deans were essentially state functionaries taking orders from ministry officials and inspectors and had little leverage against the guildlike power of the senior professors. The latter enjoyed the status of tenured civil servants holding their posts for life, lecturing, researching, and running their departments and research institutes as they saw fit. They defended the right of freedom of inquiry, the pursuit of pure rather than applied research, and the transmission of a general culture that included moral and civic values assumed to be necessary to the formation of elites.

The university faculties were not located on campuses but rather were scattered individually across the cities and prepared their students for examinations, usually after three years of study (the rough equivalent of the bachelor's degree), four years (master's), and eight years (doctorate). The universities provided little or no social life, for neither the administrators nor the professors took much interest in the programs of study or the success, failure, or general well-being of students.

In addition to universities, there were special technical-professional institutes such as the *École Polytechnique* in Paris, the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, the *escuelas técnicas superiores* in Spain, the *Technische Hochschulen* in Germany, the Imperial College of Science, Technology, and Medicine in London, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the United States, plus various kinds of technical and pro-

fessional colleges in Holland and Scandinavia and the land-grant colleges in the United States. In France, Switzerland, and Spain the special higher schools enjoyed more prestige than did the universities, but elsewhere they had equal or less status. The higher technical schools recruited from general secondary schools as well as from technical high schools and occasionally from vocational secondary schools.

The 1960s saw the advent of mass higher education, brought about by the extension in most countries of compulsory education to the age of sixteen and the introduction (with the exception of Germany and Holland) of comprehensive junior secondary schools. Although senior secondary education continued to be tracked into tripartite university-preparatory, technical, and vocational streams, most states eased the requirements for secondary credentials and modernized and professionalized programs. This attracted students of wider social backgrounds and career expectations. Women also began to attend universities in greater numbers, starting from about 20 percent in the 1950s and growing to over half of university students in many Western countries by the 1990s.

As justification for the expense of founding many new universities in the 1960s, proponents pointed to the demand for skills engendered by a rapidly developing technology, a changing workforce, and the need for broader social recruitment. Enrollments grew spectacularly throughout Europe, in France rising from 216,000 in 1960 to 586,000 in 1968, and in West Germany from 304,150 in 1960 to 525,300 in 1970. In England growth was substantial in the 1950s and 1960s (from 50,000 in 1945 to 258,000 in 1971) but slowed thereafter. In Sweden and Spain enrollments doubled in the 1960s and 1970s.

In response to student unrest of the late 1960s, which focused heavily on university issues from elitism to overcrowded classrooms, Italy watered down the requirements for the secondary *maturità* diploma, necessary for university admission; enrollments rose exponentially, from 270,000 in 1960 to around a million in the mid-1980s, before governments introduced stricter standards. The University of Rome had 160,000 students, the medical school alone 23,000. Though many students dropped out of school, the numbers of those obtaining the *laurea*, or bachelor's degree, addressed as "dottore," grew so rapidly that the university credential lost much of its appeal to employers.

Despite extensive building programs, the outdated universities proved unable to keep up with growth, causing severe inconveniences for many students. The dislike of paternalist social structures, the influence of marxist ideas, anxieties about the job market, particularly among those majoring in the liberal arts, and opposition to the war in Vietnam led to widespread student unrest and to the uprisings in Paris of 1968. As a result of student agitation, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Spain, and the Scandinavian countries passed reforms increasing university autonomy, introducing American-style academic departments, and allowing the representation of junior professors and students in university councils. During the 1970s, however, senior professors and university officials reasserted their authority, and some democratic gains in university governance were reduced, notably in France and Germany.

A number of observers in the 1960s had predicted that the transition from elite to mass higher education would result in universal higher education, but the economic difficulties of the 1970s brought this hope to an abrupt end. Since then, public financing has seldom kept pace with enrollments and has sometimes declined. The 1980s and early 1990s saw economic problems, budget cuts, and in some cases slower growth in higher education enrollments. Universities were obliged by governments in several

countries to eliminate departments and areas of study. This usually accompanied professionalization of existing programs to make them more relevant to the economy.

In England in 1980 the newly elected Thatcher government cut higher education budgets by 17 percent. During the following years universities were obliged to submit detailed reports on their activities and projects to the government, to introduce managerial techniques, to compete for funds, and to abolish tenure (after 1989). During the 1990s governments stepped back somewhat, and the universities recovered some of their autonomy.

Germany and France. In theory, the German universities, which come under the jurisdiction of the federal states (*Länder*), are decentralized and should be in a position to introduce changes. In fact there is considerable legal homogeneity and overlapping of functions in the German system (federal and state governments share responsibility for investments in buildings and major equipment), so that serious reform involves intervention at the system level, which is difficult to achieve. Internally, universities have the responsibility for courses of study and their content, research projects, and academic procedures, such as promotion and tenure (*Habilitation*), but beyond that they have little control over performance because professors have the legal status of civil servants with lifetime tenure and considerable freedom in teaching and research. In addition, the fifty-five German universities are obliged to admit students in possession of the *Abitur* and therefore have little control over admissions.

The seven-year German university program, comparatively long, leads to a diploma that is the rough equivalent of a master's degree in North America. About 70 percent of students in higher education study to obtain it; another 30 percent attend the four-year *Fachhochschulen*, which are mainly technical, business, and professional schools. The participation rate in higher education was over 25 percent of the age cohort by the mid-1990s, but the average dropout rate was 25 percent of that figure. About 18 percent of the age group succeeds in graduating from an institution of higher education.

At the end of the twentieth century German higher education was described as understaffed, underfunded, and overcrowded. In the mid-1990s, there were 318 institutions of higher learning, including the *Fachhochschulen*, having a total of 1.8 million students in a system set up for around 821,000. There were 50,000 students at the University of Cologne and 70,000 at the University of Munich. Since 1977 the number of incoming students has risen by 72.8 per-

cent, accompanied by only a 10 percent increase in building and laboratory space. These problems became worse in the 1990s as a result of the high cost of absorbing the East German system into that of the west. This diverted attention from the need for reform of the entire system of higher education in Germany.

In France higher education has been partially decentralized, professionalized, and modernized since the 1970s; however, the system has never been thoroughly reformed and still remains fragmented and segmented. Structural weaknesses were exacerbated by the rapid growth of the 1960s and again in the late 1980s as a result of the socialist government's decision in 1985 to raise the attainment rate of the *baccalauréat* and other secondary credentials from 30 to 80 percent by the year 2000. The growth rate of higher education between 1987 and 1995 averaged 8 percent annually, and attendance reached 1.5 million students in the universities and 2.1 million in higher education generally in 1997. In 1999 about half of the age cohort attended universities or other institutions of higher learning and a third obtained a diploma.

The main problem with the French system is that the universities are second-level institutions. While the universities must accept any *bachelier* who registers (with the partial exception of the medical faculties), the elite *grandes écoles* (*École Polytechnique*, *École Nationale d'Administration*, *Haute École de Commerce*, *écoles normales supérieures*, and others) recruit by very difficult examinations (*concours*) based on rigorous

two- or three-year programs located in special sections (*cours préparatoires*) of select urban lycées. With 5 percent of students, the *cours préparatoires* and *grandes écoles* obtain 30 percent of government funding for higher education. Their graduates monopolize the top positions of the civil service, business, and industry, and their powerful alumni and professional associations manage to block any serious reform of higher education.

Moreover, in the 1960s governments established two-year professional-technical schools, the *instituts universitaires de technologie* in the universities and the *sections de technicien supérieur* in the advanced sections of the lycées. In the early 1990s they also created a network of four-year technical-business schools called the *instituts universitaires professionnalisés* and unified teacher-training schools called the *instituts universitaires de la formation des maîtres* as special institutes within the universities. Together with the *grandes écoles*, these schools possess the right to set entrance examinations and draw about 40 percent of students in higher education. Though each type of school meets a need, such a variety of poorly coordinated institutions adds to the fragmented, segmented, and hierarchical nature of French higher education.

The universities are in theory one big uniform corporation spread across the country and have no control over admissions. As the ministry of education in Paris directs programs and personnel, the universities have few means of raising admission standards, improving their programs of study, or of demanding better performance from their professors. They have benefited, however, from government decisions, beginning in the 1970s, to introduce new professional diplomas and programs, and they have utilized the measure of autonomy accorded to them by the state to establish contacts with local and regional business and industry. The new professional diplomas have had considerable impact, particularly in computer and information sciences, where the universities have managed to outpace the *grandes écoles*. In response, the *grandes écoles* have invaded the domain of the universities by introducing extensive research facilities.

The Faure and Savary reforms of 1968 and 1983 increased the representation of faculty and students on university councils and made the universities more responsive to local concerns. In his bill, Alain Savary, education minister from 1981 to 1984, sought to transfer the *cours préparatoires* from the lycées to the first two-year cycle of the universities. The universities were to be allowed to impose entrance requirements after the first cycle for continuation into the second cycle (preparation for the *licence* and *maîtrise*), placing them at last in a position to compete with the *grandes*

écoles, which now had to select their students from the first university cycle. To complete the unification of higher education, all the *grandes écoles* were to be placed under the Ministry of National Education (almost half came under other ministries: Agriculture, Defense, Public Works, Industry, and Telecommunications).

Had it passed in its entirety, the Savary reform would have solved many of the problems of higher education in France. Unfortunately it came at a time of intense and divisive national debate over the future of private (Catholic) schools in France. Moreover, any possibility of the introduction of admission requirements in the universities arouses enormous hostility among students and many professors. Student riots erupted in the spring of 1983, which played into the hands of the powerful interest groups such as the Conférence des Grandes Écoles, the Société des Agrégés, and various pressure groups opposed to the absorption of the *cours préparatoires* by the universities and the unification of the *grandes écoles* under the Ministry of National Education.

The bill that finally passed in January 1984 broadened membership on academic councils and further decentralized and professionalized the universities, but the provisions unifying higher education were abandoned. Several ministers of education tried to introduce admissions requirements for the universities, but these efforts were met by massive student demonstrations, and they had to back down. During the 1990s every government projected reforms in higher education, but none achieved much.

Diversity and reform. The diverse nature of higher educational systems poses a significant challenge to efforts by the European Union to establish common admission requirements, programs, and diplomas. In a unified European system of higher education, it would be impossible, for example, to accommodate the French *grandes écoles*, the mass *baccalauréat* examinations in June, or the German seven-year undergraduate program. Moreover, some countries automatically admit students in possession of national secondary school credentials (France, Germany, Holland, and Italy), while other countries now recruit on the basis of grades and university admission requirements (Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom) or a preparatory year (Spain). It will be difficult, moreover, to democratize the many secondary systems that have for at least a century routinely tracked young people at an early age into university-preparatory, technical, and vocational sections, so that by the time most students reach sixteen or seventeen their future is already largely determined, frequently on the basis of their social origins.

As the twentieth century came to an end, it appeared that Europeans were contenting themselves mainly with developing exchange programs rather than with genuine unification of higher education; but the problem may not be insuperable, for several countries have attempted serious changes in higher education. In the mid-1990s the Italians launched much-needed reforms of secondary and higher education. The Dutch reduced university programs from seven to four years (in practice five) and promoted secondary vocational programs into higher education, creating the *hogescholen* in 1986, similar to the German *Fachhochschulen*. The Scandinavian countries pioneered in the 1950s and 1960s the granting of increased autonomy to universities and representation to nontenured faculty and students on university councils. In subsequent decades they decentralized their educational systems and successfully integrated various strands of higher education while retaining a diversity of institutions, general and professional.

The Spanish, whose rigid system was based on the French Napoleonic model, after 1970 managed to integrate the higher technical schools (*escuelas técnicas superiores*), the Spanish version of the French *grandes écoles*, into the universities, either directly as faculties

or indirectly in the form of four technological universities. The Spanish thus managed to avoid many of the problems that the French encountered in coordinating special higher schools and universities. Their secondary schools prepare for the *Bachiller*, which opens the way to a preparatory year between secondary and higher education that determines university admission. The preparatory year avoids the dilemma of French, Dutch, German, and Italian universities of having to accept any student who has the *Abitur*, *baccalauréat*, or the equivalent. Finally, the Spanish began to decentralize higher education in order to accommodate regional demands (Catalonia, the Basque provinces). Such reforms exemplify the trend away from rigid centralized systems that could make European coordination easier in future years.

In response to rapid changes in the workforce, the universities began in the 1970s to add departments or programs of business education, computer studies, communications, criminology, environmental studies, microbiology, and other scientific specialties. But many established universities and higher schools have found it difficult to meet the steeply rising demand of students for access to these fields, especially to computer, information, and business programs, and

this has stimulated the rise of competing private schools to fill the demand.

Since the 1960s governments have also attempted to diversify higher education by introducing short-course professional and technical schools outside the university: the polytechnics in England (1970s) and the former Soviet Union, the *instituts universitaires de technologie* (1966) and the *sections de technicien supérieur* (1962) in France, and the junior colleges in the United States and Canada, all two-year programs, plus the *escuelas universitarias* in Spain (three years), the *hogescholen* in the Netherlands (three to four years), and the *Fachhochschulen* in Germany (four years). Continuing education, distance learning, and other part-time programs have also been introduced in most countries, sometimes within and sometimes separately from the universities. Finally, public research institutes have been established (the Conseil National de la Recherche Scientifique in France, for example) that conduct research but do not teach. Thus during the twentieth century the university lost its monopoly over teaching and research almost everywhere in Europe.

CONCLUSION

Universities are among the oldest continuously existing institutions in Europe. Originally established to reaffirm and expound upon Christian certainties, they gradually evolved into institutions concerned with the discovery and advancement of knowledge through intellectual development and research, using scientific methods. They have also had a vocational function since the late Middle Ages, training professionals and higher civil servants for the state services. During the nineteenth century they played an important role in the development of national economies and the nation-state. During the twentieth century they increasingly educated specialists for business and industry and received augmented state support to advance knowledge and to achieve economic and technological goals.

Despite tremendous growth in enrollments and considerable efforts to achieve a greater measure of social justice in the recruitment of students, including scholarship payments, universities continue to be attended mainly by the children of the middle and upper classes, the vocational schools mainly by the children of workers. The University of Zurich was the first to admit women, in 1867, and since then women have become quite prominent in universities, often constituting the majority of students, though they are less numerous in industrial and technological fields. In the late 1990s an average of around a third to 40

percent of young people of university age (eighteen to twenty-four) in Europe reached higher education (though not all obtained diplomas), a percentage that is rising in most countries as European youth attempts to get as much education as possible as a guarantee against future changes in the workplace. The unemployment of young people aged twenty to twenty-four continues to be high, varying from around 15 percent in Germany to 25 percent in Italy and Spain, with England, France, and Scandinavia falling in between. Aside from certain sought-after fields, a university diploma no longer guarantees a good job.

The information revolution of the last several decades of the twentieth century is rapidly changing the nature of the university from the participatory model of the 1960s to a more managerial one. The explosion of knowledge outruns the capacity of universities to respond and creates competing sources of information. The modern mass university must deal with new and varying clienteles demanding ever more specialized occupational training. Business and industry provide much-needed subsidies and grants but at the same time seek increased influence. Governments expect more to be done at less cost. They have provided universities with more autonomy and self-government but retain their influence over programs, examinations, and personnel, while the professors and their well-entrenched associations are frequently opposed to change. This poses many problems for university administrators. Long used to taking orders from above, they are now asked to become innovative leaders reaching out to the community in quest of new sources of income, but they do not always have the experience or the means to do so.

In Great Britain and Scandinavia, particularly, some institutions have modernized and prospered, successfully establishing research parks, knowledge centers, alumni associations, and other forms of community outreach, partially liberating the institution from dependence on the state; but these tend to be smaller, newer institutions, created in the 1960s and frequently having a technical-professional bent, making outreach easier. The larger, comprehensive universities, in Germany and Italy, for example, have found it more difficult to adapt to change.

Because a knowledge-driven society requires substantial numbers of knowledge-trained people, the university, the existing institution capable of training such talent, is likely to survive. But it is difficult to predict the precise nature of the institution in the future. In an increasingly pluralistic and international setting, the university may not be able to define and transmit national culture and values. Social and professional advancement through higher education, never

very marked, may suffer from increasing selectivity in sought-after fields; that selectivity tends to benefit young people from the educated upper classes. With continuing state intervention in university affairs, plus the growing activity of the private sector in research and development, freedom of research and teaching could be more difficult to assure. But there is little doubt that the research and development function, as well as the education of professionals for the public

and private sectors, will continue in some form in the future.

Over the past eight hundred years universities have gone through many changes and endured many challenges, but none will test their ingenuity and capacity for survival as Europe's oldest institutions so much as the information age. The stakes are great, for the survival of European civilization and culture may well be linked to the survival of the university.

See also Students; Student Movements (volume 3); Gender and Education (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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TEACHERS



Scott J. Seregny

Sociologists of the professions have long recognized teaching as one of the least autonomous of professions, indeed a “semiprofession,” distinct from medicine or law. Much of this has to do with teachers’ ambiguous but decisive relationship to the rise of modern European states and state intervention in popular education, first in many of the German states in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, later in France, and still later and less completely in Great Britain and Russia. The transformation of teaching from a part-time craft lacking formal qualifications to a full-time profession was directly connected to the establishment of state-sponsored mass education systems designed to discipline and integrate populations and maintain political and social order in response to the rapid population growth, economic transformation, and political upheaval (including the dramatic reshaping of state territories) that marked western and central Europe at the end of the eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth century. Teachers’ responses to these developments were complex. Most teachers, when given the chance, identified state initiatives as “progressive” and supported state intervention as a means of emancipation from the local interests that had previously controlled schooling. Most supported and helped implement state projects for national integration. For example, French teachers under the Third Republic helped marginalize Breton and regional dialects in favor of the French language. In multinational states, however, teachers sometimes played significant roles in minority national movements seeking autonomy and language rights in schools. In revolutionary crises—1848 in Germany and 1905 in Russia—teachers often played visible leadership roles in popular movements for reform or revolution, although conservatives vastly exaggerated their participation.

Teachers’ social and professional status was powerfully shaped by governments and the expectations of elites as to the role teachers and schools should play. To free themselves from community and parental control and to escape the uncertainty of local school fi-

nancing, teachers often sought the security and status of inclusion in civil service ranks, even if such bureaucratization prevented them from attaining the professional autonomy won by physicians, lawyers, and other higher-status groups. Nevertheless, teachers had some success in shaping state policies to meet their corporate interests. Although teachers in most of Europe saw autonomy from local officials, clergy, and parents as a *sine qua non* for professional development and the state as a buffer against local pressure, they were not immune to the expectations expressed by local communities and the parents of their pupils. Since most teachers came from the same or similar social milieus, they readily identified with popular aspirations, particularly during revolutionary crises. In such instances, when teachers confronted both official resistance to reasonable professional goals and popular pressure to side with the population they served, they opposed the state.

Teachers’ relationship to the communities they served was just as ambivalent. In training, ambition, and self-image, teachers accepted the mission to “civilize” peasants and workers. Teachers fought to detach schooling from communal control, and this struggle was central to their professionalization. In terms of social status and self-image, teachers distanced themselves from “the people.” While the majority of teachers, especially men, came from humble origins, they aspired to a middle-class or at least a lower-middle-class status, for which their education, lifestyle, and dress supposedly outfitted them. Middle-class respectability, education, and notability, they assumed, would enhance teachers’ authority in the community and facilitate their civilizing mission as role models of modernity, sobriety, and order. Most teachers embraced this professional image. So did states, and teachers’ failure to live up to such respectability by frequenting taverns, playing cards, or engaging in improper sexual liaisons was often punished by school officials. Nevertheless, teachers also identified strongly with popular interests, such as pressures to democratize education by facilitating access for lower-class children to

secondary and higher education. This in turn reflected teachers' resentment over the limitations placed in the way of their own educational advancement and mobility into the upper reaches of the education bureaucracy. The trajectory of teachers' professionalization was guided by their relations—sometimes marked by cooperation, at other times by conflict—with both the state and the people.

BEFORE PROFESSIONALIZATION— TEACHING AS A CRAFT

Before the nineteenth century most governments paid little attention to schooling. Nevertheless, after the Renaissance and the Reformation many children (especially boys) in western and parts of central Europe experienced some instruction. Local communities and religious congregations supported a bewildering variety of “schools.” In terms of training, certification, remuneration, autonomy, and public expectations, few “professionals” taught in the schools of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. Teachers were “schoolmasters,” a term suggesting that both community and teacher considered teaching a craft. Whether teachers were permanent residents in the community or sea-

sonal migrants, teaching was a part-time occupation, and parents sent their children for instruction when they grasped its utility and when economic circumstances allowed.

Teachers' skills varied widely. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Scotland teachers with university training offered instruction in Latin to village boys in church-run parish schools, and a few of these “lads of parts” went on to university. In England and Wales a diversity of charity and voluntary day schools sponsored by religiously affiliated societies, working-class-sponsored private schools, and other schools proliferated by the early nineteenth century. Teachers' qualifications also varied tremendously. By the 1830s, when the British state began offering grants to some of these schools with the requirement that they were subject to a new inspectorate, church organizations began providing teachers with formal training. By contrast, however, as late as 1851 some seven hundred private-school teachers could not sign the census form since they could not write even their own names. Everywhere, teachers were recruited from among marginal men, demobilized soldiers, or artisans who had failed at their chosen occupations.

In France and elsewhere the Catholic revival during the seventeenth century led to a proliferation of religious teaching orders, which offered basic instruction free of charge in communal schools. Removed from education during the revolution, the teaching orders rebounded after 1815. During the 1860s nuns constituted more than a third of all elementary teachers in France. Their formal qualifications often amounted to only a letter of obedience from their superiors, but they provided solid instruction in reading and writing to the increasing numbers of girls attending France's mostly sex-segregated primary schools. In 1870, three-fifths of the girls were taught by sisters who belonged to some five hundred congregations. In most cases teachers' qualifications were even less formal, and educational efforts were less organized. As in other crafts, teachers offered their services at fairs and markets. In the Vaucluse region of southeastern France, teachers from Alpine villages appeared at local markets, where they offered their skills to lowland villages. Migrant teachers sported feathers in their caps advertising their skills. One feather signified their willingness to teach reading and writing, two their ability to offer ciphering, and three their knowledge of Latin. Training, if it occurred, was limited to apprenticeship with a schoolmaster. In England and to some extent in France pupil-monitors worked with groups of younger children under the direction of a master teacher.

Teachers were often hired for a season between harvest and spring planting. Classes and teachers' lodging rotated among peasant homes, and teachers subsisted from the monthly fees they collected from parents, sometimes paid in bread or wine. In Bavaria, Baden, and other German states schools were more formal institutions with their own buildings and formalized financing. Until the mid-nineteenth century, salaries remained low, below those earned by unskilled laborers and petty clerks. In Russia this was still the case fifty years later. Contracts often stipulated that teachers would receive a plot of land that peasants would help work, and such arrangements persisted into the early twentieth century. Many arrangements placed teachers in a dependent and sometimes confrontational relationship with parents and community. Teachers often had to collect the school fees from poor parents, a situation guaranteed to make them unpopular, particularly during a period when peasants did not place a high premium on regular school attendance.

In much of Europe teaching remained a part-time occupation, and those who entered it usually combined it with other work, most commonly as "lay clerics" assisting the local priest or pastor. In France, the German states, and elsewhere teachers served as sacristans or sextons who rang the church bells, lit candles, dug graves, swept the church, and played the organ during services. These duties, enumerated in detail in the contracts local communities offered to teachers, reflected popular expectations. Parents expected teachers to lead their pupils to church, keep them silent during the liturgy, and help prepare them for first Communion. Clergy asserted their prerogative to visit the classroom at any time and report on their observations.

When schools began to proliferate in Russia, especially after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, villages supported communal schools, where retired soldiers, unemployed sons of clergy (in Russia a legal "estate"), and other marginal types offered rudimentary instruction. In this way Russia followed patterns that had long characterized teaching in western Europe. Throughout Europe schools were largely supported and controlled by local communities before the nineteenth century. Teachers' qualifications were informal and uncertified. Where clerical supervision of schools existed, priests were more interested in the moral-religious influence teachers exerted in the classroom and beyond. States were remote from teachers' daily lives, even under Frederick the Great in Prussia, where the government issued decrees on compulsory schooling but lacked the means to implement them effectively. Everywhere teachers remained dependent

on local communities and clergy, neither of which supported an image of teaching as a professional vocation dedicated to a transcendent civilizing mission. Local interests and expectations prevailed in defining the teacher as a craftsman. One teacher recalled his own days as a pupil in early-nineteenth-century Bavaria, remembering that on Shrove Tuesday it was the custom for the teacher to whip all of the children since local peasants believed that such beatings prevented worms in farm animals. Popular attitudes toward schooling, local financial control, and the neglect of schooling by European states meant that teaching remained an occupation of low and uncertain status.

STATE INTERVENTION AND TEACHER TRAINING

Official neglect began to give way at the close of the eighteenth century, and states asserted greater control over schools and teachers during the next century. Ministries of education established staffs of school inspectors who certified teachers' qualifications and supervised their classroom performance. States gradually assumed more of the costs of financing schools and offered teachers minimum salaries, a crucial develop-

ment that lessened teachers' dependence on local communities and eventually supported a more secure, middle-class existence and professional status. To varying degrees and within limits, governments also supported teachers' efforts to form professional associations that fought for educational reforms and professional goals. The pace and extent of state intervention, however, was uneven. Germany led the way, followed by France, where the Guizot Law of 1833 mandated that local communes provide teachers with a minimum salary of two hundred francs and created an inspectorate that supervised schools and certified teachers' qualifications. Under the Second Empire (1852–1870), officials gained effective control over the hiring, transfer, and firing of teachers. Nevertheless, it was only in the 1880s, under the Ferry Laws, that state intervention was fully realized with the government assuming the cost of teachers' salaries, which significantly freed them from local control and raised their status.

In Russia most of these developments were incomplete before 1914. Not until the eve of World War I did the Russian government assume the cost of teachers' salaries. Elsewhere the minimum salaries that the governments of France, Britain, and Germany provided in the 1830s and later were critical to achieving teacher security (support for a teacher with a family), independence, and the respect that was believed inherent in a middle-class lifestyle. As a minor notable, the teacher's lifestyle had to be distinguished from that of the people. Nevertheless, teacher pay rose slowly and unevenly during the nineteenth century, and at mid-century many teachers still lived on the edge of poverty. When unskilled urban workers in France commanded incomes of 645 francs, three-quarters of the teachers earned between 450 and 500 francs. In Germany, France, Italy, and Britain teaching became materially secure only toward the end of the century. In Russia rural teachers with families still found it difficult on the eve of the war to provide their own children with a secondary education, a source of extreme bitterness and frustration.

Nearly everywhere the first effective state intervention in primary schooling occurred in the area of teacher training. The first normal schools were established in Prussia and other parts of Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. After the mid-nineteenth century, most teachers had received such training. Future teachers typically finished the public primary school at age fourteen, then took classes at a preparatory institution that augmented what they had learned at primary school, and finally at age eighteen entered a normal school, where they spent three years concentrating on pedagogy. Victor Cousin's favorable

report on normal schools stimulated their expansion in France. The Guizot Law of 1833 mandated the establishment of a normal school in every department, and their numbers rose from fourteen in 1830 to seventy-four in 1837. Most of these trained men, but beginning in the 1880s a parallel network of women's normal schools was created. By 1869 France had seventy-six normal schools for men and eleven for women; by 1887 ninety and eighty-one respectively. Not all teachers graduated from normal schools. Some passed an examination to receive the teaching certificate that functioned as a kind of advanced degree for those with a primary education and that opened up employment as lower-level bureaucrats for the railroad. Not all normal school graduates remained in teaching, although rates of turnover decreased in the late nineteenth century as teachers' material security improved. Still, state training expanded so rapidly in France that by 1848 some 27 percent of teachers were normal school graduates and by 1863 half were.

In most European countries teachers were recruited from the peasantry, artisans, lower middle class, and working class. When women began to enter teaching in large numbers toward the end of the nineteenth century, they continued to come largely from the families of prosperous peasants, artisans, and minor officials in France, Britain, and other western European countries. In Russia, in light of the much slower development of girls' primary education, women teachers were drawn from the middle class, nobility, and clerical estate, but by the early twentieth century increasing numbers of peasant girls were entering the profession. Nearly everywhere an increasing percentage of teachers, male and female, were children of teachers. For such sons and later daughters of "the people," study in the relatively expensive secondary schools that opened a path to higher education for the children of the bourgeoisie was an unattainable goal. Normal school training, by contrast, offered a more realistic if modest prospect of educational and social advancement, one consistent with the nineteenth-century state's goal of creating schools that would civilize and acculturate the lower classes while maintaining existing social hierarchies. Most normal school students received scholarships covering tuition, room, and board in return for signing a contract that they would teach for a minimum number of years (ten years in France). When they emerged from the normal school, teachers could be counted among the small minority of the population who had received an education through the age of twenty. Nevertheless, in most cases they were not considered part of the educated middle class of nineteenth-century Europe,

those who had passed through elite secondary institutions (often with classical curricula) and institutions of higher education.

When in the 1870s the Russian Ministry of Education and noble-dominated local governments, the *zemstvos*, established “teachers’ seminaries” modeled after the Prussian normal school, preference and tuition stipends were given to peasant sons. The assumption was that these recruits would easily accept rural living conditions and would be less subversive than outsiders to the established social and political order. Normal schools were often established in remote areas, far from the temptations of the city, and students lived a rigidly monitored, almost monastic existence with little free time outside dormitory and classroom. Here Russians hewed closely to the model of teacher training developed in Germany and adopted in France earlier in the century.

In all countries normal school education was carefully limited. This was especially so during the decade following the revolutions of 1848, in which some teachers had played visible roles. Conservatives repeatedly warned against the dangers of overeducating future teachers and creating alienated, marginal men who might exercise a negative influence in classrooms and local communities. In Prussia, for example, the Stiehl Regulations (1854) limited normal school curricula and heavily emphasized religion. In France the conservative Falloux Law (1850) temporarily reinforced clerical supervision of teachers. Conservatives in Germany in the mid-nineteenth century and in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century still proposed recruitment of former noncommissioned officers as teachers in place of trained professionals. However, from the 1860s teacher training began to deemphasize religion and to include subjects like pedagogy, science, history, and geography, in line with an expanded primary school curriculum designed to produce citizens and skilled workers. Such reforms left intact the educational caste-line that separated the closed systems of primary and elite secondary schooling, largely preventing teachers from continuing their education beyond the normal school. Teachers were educated, but within well-defined limits designed to keep them within the social orbit from which they came and to keep them in teaching. Their task remained to enlighten and socialize the children of the lower classes, who were expected to remain in their orbit as well.

Despite the limitations, normal schools offering standardized training, closer regulation of teachers’ credentials, and the common experience of studying under the mentorship of supportive instructors nurtured an esprit de corps and professional identity

among young men who entered teaching during the nineteenth century. A similar development occurred in France and other countries when normal schools were opened in the second half of the century to train women teachers. In both instances the schools instilled a new pride in academic achievement and a sense of mission to enlighten the people. In western and central Europe this professional identity was soon supported by teachers’ associations, regular conferences, summer refresher courses, and a professional press. In Russia, due to the state’s financial weakness and the vast number of teachers required to achieve universal schooling, the state never gained anything like the monopoly over teacher training that was established in the West. The number of normal schools training women teachers in Russia failed to keep up with the huge demand for teachers from this population, with the result that in the early twentieth century female recruits were still drawn from a wide variety of educational backgrounds, including secondary women’s gymnasiums and the diocesan schools (mostly daughters of priests).

As teaching became more “professional,” in the limited sense of becoming a full-time career with recognized qualifications, and as European states promoted teaching as vital to their missions of civilizing the lower classes and nation building, future teachers internalized a new ethos that clashed with the depressed realities of their social status and low pay. Consequently they were less willing to accept traditional arrangements of dependence on local community and clergy that had become codified (literally in some contracts of appointment) when their occupation had been defined as a craft. Steady salary increases in the second half of the nineteenth century freed many teachers of the need to accept subsidiary employment that increasingly was perceived as professionally demeaning, in particular the post of lay assistant to the clergy.

From France to Russia teachers’ professional self-image was powerfully shaped by conflicts with the clergy, who tried to maintain the dominant position churches had previously held in schooling and who perceived teachers as potential rival figures of authority in the community. Teachers’ professional identities included a strong commitment to laicity and a programmatic endorsement of secular education. Professionalization was defined in terms of emancipation from traditional subservience to the clergy, which teachers increasingly considered suffocating and demeaning. Their grievances involved some teachers in protests during the 1848 revolutions, and these resentments continued to smolder in the 1850s, when governments briefly conceded more influence to

churches as an antidote to radicalism. In Germany salary increases helped free teachers from dependence. When German teachers created the most powerful professional associations in Europe in the late nineteenth century, they lobbied forcefully for an end to the clergy's continued role in school inspection, further secularization of the curriculum, and introduction of a ladder system that would permit easier access to secondary and higher education for lower-class children. Throughout Germany clerics continued to play a pervasive role in school inspection into the twentieth century. Teachers deeply resented this vestige of their former subservience, and German teachers' associations lobbied forcefully, but until the Weimar period unsuccessfully, for the removal of pastors and priests from the classrooms of the largely religiously segregated schools.

In France conflict between teachers and priests began in the 1830s, when the church attempted to regain its previous authority over schooling and teachers began to acquire a new sense of identity and competence through state-controlled training, certification, and inspection. Something similar began to occur in Russia at the very end of the century. There an overpopulated clerical estate ensured a ready supply of sacristans and deacons to assist priests, and the teacher-cleric relationship never attained the formal subordination that it did in the West. Nevertheless, Orthodox priests resented teachers' influence, and the competition between church schools and those established by *zemstvos* heightened tensions at the turn of the century. Well-publicized cases of cleric-inspired denunciations of teachers led to dismissals by police and inspectors. Moreover teachers complained that priests often failed to fulfill their obligation to teach the mandatory catechism classes with the result that teachers had to perform this function because pupils were examined in this subject.

Most historians agree that the price of teachers' emancipation was that in many countries teachers became lower-level bureaucrats by the close of the nineteenth century, never attaining the autonomy possessed by the so-called free or full professions. But with support by European states, teachers gradually achieved the status of lower-level or semiprofessionals, a status reinforced by standardized training, examination, improved pay, and full-time commitment. While state policy and teachers' own aspirations were central to this process, changes in popular attitudes toward schooling played an important role. As lower-class parents accepted regular attendance and longer terms of instruction for their children, they were more receptive to teaching as a full-time occupation deserving of respect.

TEACHERS AND THE COMMUNITY

In the long run two developments proved essential to improving teachers' social status in the communities where they served: popular acceptance of the utility of regular schooling for children and attenuation of the financial control—tyranny in teachers' eyes—that local communities had originally exercised. Teachers' authority in the community increased with their independence and with the respectability of middle-class standards of dress and behavior, which states, parents, and teachers themselves had all come to expect of the profession.

However, this does not mean that teachers isolated themselves from community affairs. In villages throughout Europe teachers pursued a clear strategy of transforming themselves into local notables by providing a range of extracurricular services that were vital to rural folk increasingly confronted with the broader world of bureaucracy, markets, and information. In rural France, where male teachers took advantage of salary improvements to abandon the demeaning post of lay cleric, they eagerly accepted the post of town clerk (or secretary to the mayor). Since it placed them at the strategic point where the village interacted with the official world outside, that position considerably raised teachers' prestige and influence. By 1884 over twenty-five thousand teachers held this post (almost 70 percent of teachers and nearly all male teachers in village schools). In France the Third Republic encouraged such activity, and teachers, men and women, helped organize cooperatives, clubs, and countless other village associations. Many sponsored adult classes in a conscious attempt to enhance their own prestige along with that of learning. As notables, they played an important role in sustaining the homefront during the final years of World War I, and the same was doubtless true in other countries. In the well-documented case of France, teaching had become by the turn of the century a materially secure, prestigious semiprofession, offering an avenue of social mobility, or at least status preservation, for the children of farmers, artisans, minor officials, and teachers, a reality reflected in declining rates of turnover and increasing length of service.

In Russia, by contrast, the government remained suspicious of teachers who attempted to carve out a wider role in peasant communities. Official memories of the participation of a minority of teachers in the revolution of 1905 were still fresh, conservative fears about the corrosive effects of schooling and teachers on the rural order were still salient fifty years after they had waned in western and central Europe, and teach-

ers had yet to achieve the gains in professional association won by their colleagues in the West.

THE EXPANSION AND FEMINIZATION OF TEACHING

Nearly everywhere in Europe the number of teachers increased dramatically during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. In England and Wales the number of primary school-teachers increased three times between 1870 and 1880, from 13,729 to 41,426. By 1910 there were 161,804 teachers, ten times the number in 1870, the year Parliament passed the first Education Act that made the British state a substantial actor in the nation's schools. At that date teachers comprised less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the workforce, with eighty-nine teachers for every thousand workers, but by 1911 they accounted for nearly 9 percent. In Italy normal schools enrolled 6,000 students in 1870–1871, 14,200 in 1881–1882, and 20,000 by 1901. In the following decade the number of teachers-in-training more than doubled, with 50,000 attending normal schools by 1912. As was true in other countries, the expansion of schooling and the teaching profession in Italy reflected the liberal government's commitment to nation building, summed up in Massimo d'Azeglio's famous appeal, "Now that we have made Italy, we must make Italians." In Russia the prewar years saw a particularly dramatic expansion of the teaching profes-

sion from 105,355 teachers in ministry schools in 1910 to 146,032 in 1914, an increase of nearly 40 percent in in four years. Most of this expansion occurred in rural areas, where teachers constituted the most numerous representatives of an educated intelligentsia, much more visible than doctors and other medical professionals. In terms of education and potential authority, only the village priest rivaled the teacher.

Young men continued to enter the profession, but by the turn of the century new teachers were more likely to be women. Assumptions about gender roles helped legitimize the seemingly inexorable process of feminization. Some educators argued that women's nurturing role made them natural teachers, particularly in dealing with the tender emotions of children. But feminization was primarily a function of economics. In a period of rapid industrialization and state expansion, men with educations comparable to teachers and even some with normal school degrees were attracted to better-paying and physically less isolated clerical positions in administration and business. Educated women had fewer options and would accept lower salaries. Nearly everywhere before World War I, pay scales for women teachers were considerably lower than those for men. Nevertheless, teaching was more attractive to women than domestic, factory, or agricultural labor. In France only the postal service offered comparable civil service careers to women. Inevitably, with the rapid expansion of school systems and the

increase in the number of teachers during the final decades of the nineteenth century, women came to dominate the profession in most countries. Teaching was perceived as a woman's occupation, which was a factor in its semiprofessional status.

The process of feminization was universal but uneven. In England, Wales, Italy, and Russia, as in North America, by the early twentieth century 60 to 70 percent of teachers were women. In France the proportions were closer to fifty-fifty, and the number of lay women teachers did not surpass that of men until 1909, with 58,396 women. In Germany, however, teaching earlier became a full-time profession, and the state moved aggressively after unification to improve salaries and pensions and to grant teachers the perquisites of civil service ranking and the privilege of serving as reserve officers in the army. There the profession remained overwhelmingly male. Only 21 percent of elementary teachers in Germany were female on the eve of World War I, but the female proportion within the profession was increasing.

The effects of feminization are more difficult to gauge than the numbers. When women first entered the profession, some men resented them as competitors who would work for less and lower the profession's status. In France, where lay women began to move into the profession in the 1880s, male-dominated associations, the *Amicales*, at first prohibited women members. However, the fact that teachers, whether men or women, faced similar problems and similar enemies fostered solidarity and cooperation. In France conservative and clerical attacks on secular education and lay teachers during the Dreyfus affair induced men to accept women teachers as allies. In 1909 the national *Amicale* congress endorsed equal pay for women teachers, which was achieved in 1920. Men continued to dominate leadership posts in professional associations, but women established a more visible presence. In Russia, where teachers faced considerable problems of cultural isolation, clerical rivalry, and less support from the government, cooperation across the sexual divide eventually prevailed. The critical difference was that in Russia teachers found less support from the state, which shared some of the same concerns that the church and conservatives had concerning teachers' role.

Contrary to popular assumptions, most women entered teaching to pursue a career, not for a temporary interlude before marriage. In France by 1900 more than half of the women teachers had served for over fifteen years. Normal school graduates signed a ten-year contract to teach, and if they resigned early they had to repay the cost of training. More than half had married and continued to teach. Marriage was

encouraged by French education officials, who wanted female teachers, like their male counterparts, to civilize peasants and workers and transform them into citizens. Married women teachers in particular would help socialize girls by inculcating middle-class domestic norms of hygiene and child care.

In the early decades of women entering the profession, they often faced difficulty winning popular acceptance, and many, particularly single women, lived lonely, isolated lives. Some contemporaries believed that feminization lowered the status of teaching, and this probably inhibited some men from entering the profession. Feminization also coincided with the increased subordination of teachers within educational bureaucracies, although the relationship was complex. Some scholars have argued that school administrators enforced marriage bans for women teachers as a way to prevent them from advancing to positions of authority and to keep salaries down. However, these bans were far from universal. Nevertheless, it is clear that from Great Britain to Russia men held positions of power and authority, such as principals and inspectors in the larger urban schools. Everywhere the powerful post of state school inspector, a figure of awesome authority over teachers' professional lives and often over their private lives, was held by men. Isolated but well-publicized cases of sexual harassment of teachers by inspectors underscored the fact that, while teaching was becoming increasingly feminized, power in the educational bureaucracies of European states remained firmly in male hands. In the Third Republic in France the inspectorate was opened to women, but their entry was slow. Evidence also shows that the first generation of women teachers faced more difficulty than men in gaining acceptance and authority in local, particularly rural, communities. This was true in France during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when a large percentage of men teachers also held the influential position of secretary to the mayor. Women did not hold this post, nor could they vote. In Russia men were more involved in community affairs, whether in the rural cooperatives that grew dramatically in the early 1900s or in rural politics during moments of upheaval like the revolution of 1905–1906.

TEACHERS, POLITICS, AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION

In many ways teaching was the most politically sensitive of the professions. Governments and elites recruited and trained teachers to integrate the masses into the evolving social and political order. At the

same time they remained wary of teachers' potential to disrupt that order. Given teachers' position as marginal and often poverty-stricken intellectuals whose work placed them in close contact with peasants and workers, official attitudes toward the emerging profession were often ambivalent, and they fluctuated over time.

In Germany, after the 1848 revolution, official discourse characterized the schoolteacher as a subversive pariah, but a mere twenty years later Otto von Bismarck and other architects of German unification extolled the Prussian teacher as the real victor at the Battles of Königgrätz and Sedan. Nevertheless, officials remained wary of teachers' loyalty in subsequent decades, even as they moved aggressively to meet teachers' professional goals to inculcate that loyalty. The same official suspicion existed in France, at least until the 1880s, when the Third Republic embraced lay teachers, men and women, as republican missionaries—the famous “black hussars”—who would civilize the peasantry and combat clerical and conservative political influence in the countryside. However, official suspicion then turned against the large numbers of women in religious teaching orders who still educated a large percentage of children, especially girls, in French primary schools. The Russian government remained extremely suspicious of teachers' potential to radicalize the masses until the very end of

the tsarist regime. An activist minority of teachers had been involved in revolutionary movements from the 1870s through the revolution of 1905. Because of financial constraints and the nature of the Russian autocracy, the government was never willing to adequately meet Russian teachers' demands for the material security, emancipation from local interests, or rights of professional association won by their colleagues in the West. In addition the Russian state failed to achieve the kind of monopoly over teacher training established elsewhere. Active opposition by teachers to the existing order was much less pronounced in western and central Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. However, teachers were not completely coopted by governments, and they were unable to shape state initiatives when these were viewed as inimical to their professional goals.

Imperial Germany provides a case in point. In 1889 Emperor William II issued a cabinet order that called upon teachers to combat the socialist movement in the classroom. Historians of German education once argued that teachers, coopted by civil service status, higher pay and pensions, and privileges like the coveted right to serve as reserve officers in the army, became subalterns, excessively subservient to the state, and helped indoctrinate pupils with a chauvinistic, antidemocratic ethos that contributed to Germany's political course during the twentieth century.

Research has shown, however, that while German teachers were patriotic like most teachers elsewhere by World War I, they resisted the call to struggle against the Social Democrats out of concern about alienating working-class parents. Instead, through their powerful national teachers' association of 125,000 members, they supported a program of education reform designed to democratize schooling (the ladder system), secularize the curriculum, and remove clerics from their traditional role in school inspection.

CONCLUSION

With the spread of schooling in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe, teaching became one of the most numerous professions. With support from states and growing popular acceptance of schooling, teachers' status changed dramatically in the course of the nineteenth century. While some teachers continued to perform supplemental work for economic or

tactical reasons, like the secretary to the mayor in France, the prevailing trend was toward full-time teaching. Improved and standardized qualifications, relative material security, and emancipation from local control enhanced teachers' social and professional status. In a world where states and masses placed increased value on literacy and basic schooling, teaching offered the prospect of social mobility for the ambitious children of the lower class. However, this improvement often came at the the price of incorporation into the lower rungs of the state bureaucracy, and teachers consequently enjoyed considerably less autonomy than higher-status professions. In addition and paradoxically, the very success and spread of schooling ensured that teaching remained a semiprofession. With the rise of mass education, the services provided by teachers lost whatever mystique or esoteric quality they previously had. In contrast to doctors or lawyers, the knowledge and skills teachers possessed were generally within the competency of all who passed through the schools.

See also The Liberal State (volume 2); Church and Society (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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PRINTING AND PUBLISHING



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Johannes Gutenberg's movable-type printing press, invented around 1440, initiated a dramatic change in the communication of ideas throughout Europe. An author's text, though arguably no less subject to interpretation than earlier oral communication, became more enduring and less variable. As Walter Ong has argued, print promoted cognitive skills, especially comparative analysis and categorization that transformed the very nature of thinking. The printing press made book production cheaper and made books more plentiful. Long before most Europeans could afford a book, however, printers flooded Europe with cheap pamphlets, posters, and almanacs that spread the practice of reading with all its effects. Few innovations significantly altered printing mechanics between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, yet despite technological stasis, the printing trade played a crucial role in the dramatic social revolutions of the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, and French Revolution. Significant technological and business changes of the nineteenth century turned printing and publishing into modern industries, educating, entertaining, and informing a majority of Europeans. While technological and business advances continued to modernize the press and to diversify its forms and functions in the twentieth century, new media undermined its significance.

EARLY MODERN PRINTING AND BOOKSELLING

In the middle of the fifteenth century Johannes Gensfleisch, called Gutenberg, began a printing revolution with his invention of a movable-type printing press. His press combined the existing technology of woodblock printing, in which an engraved image is inked and pressed onto paper, with movable type, small metal blocks with a character or sign carved into one end and arranged together in a frame to form words. Gutenberg's printing press allowed printers to make hundreds of copies of books and thousands of copies of shorter prints at a time.

The success of Gutenberg's printing press depended on the earlier invention of paper and the dramatic growth in the demand for print. The significant growth of trade after the twelfth century offered substantial advantages to literate merchants, bankers, master artisans, and shopkeepers. The church also expanded the number of readers eager for the press's products by promoting clerical education. Finally, princes promoted the spread of reading by establishing in their territories new universities that educated the bureaucracy for their expanding administrations. A century before the invention of the printing press this growing demand for the written word inspired the invention of paper in Europe. Previously book manuscripts were written on animal-skin parchment. Bookmakers required countless sheepskins to produce a single manuscript, limiting production and commanding a high price. The papermakers of Fabriano, Italy, developed a series of innovations that facilitated papermaking, and imitators soon sprang up in cities in Italy, France, and Germany. Although paper remained the most expensive single element in manuscript and book production, it cost far less than parchment and was more plentiful, facilitating a dramatic increase in book production.

By 1480 twenty printshops operated in southern Germany, nearly thirty in northern Italy, fifteen in the Low Countries, and new ones sprang up in Breslau, Budapest, Copenhagen, London, Prague, and Seville. By the beginning of the sixteenth century printing establishments had spread to over 250 cities and towns across Europe. Most of these cities and towns were important sea and river ports concentrated in central and southern Germany, northern Italy, and southeast France. From these ports publishers exported prints to most European cities. Venice built its crucial importance to printing on its overseas trade and became Europe's printing capital in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Despite the concentration of publishing in urban centers and the distribution of prints to other cities, printers made most of their products for local markets.

Printers quickly put Gutenberg's press to use in the production of pictorial images from woodblock engravings. At the same time printing changed the meaning and significance of pictorial images. Printed pictures ceased to be the focal point of a text's meaning and interpretation and instead became transparent illustrations of themes centered in the written text. Though they lost a great deal of their significance, illustrations remained important to sales. Engraving was time consuming and expensive, however. Fortunately an engraved plate lasted a long time, yielding tens of thousands of prints. A printer reused popular woodcuts by fitting new texts around them. Rivals in the trade often copied each other's popular woodcuts. Once the woodcut began to lose its popularity, however, the printer sold, rented, or traded it to a printer in another area. Merchants, clergy, and artisans decorated their walls with woodcuts. Copperplate engravings further revolutionized the trade in the fifteenth century because of their greater delicacy of detail. More expensive, copperplate engraved illustrations originally sold almost exclusively to the aristocracy. But by the end of the sixteenth century copperplate engravings had largely supplanted woodcuts except in the production of cheap prints for a mass audience. Printers that specialized in popular printing used worn-out woodcuts and fonts to print tens and even

hundreds of thousands of small pamphlets and large posters on cheap paper. Printers in England, France, Italy, and Germany produced this literature in cities and towns for peddlers to distribute to urban and rural readers.

For more than four centuries printing was the business of skilled master printers like Gutenberg and the artisans who lived and worked in their small shops. As the publishers of the learned, printers occupied a unique middle ground among their intellectually elite authors, their socially elite buyers, and their own origins as urban commoners. After the Reformation most printers received formal educations, often a year or two at a college that included study of Latin and Greek, the language of most books until the seventeenth century. Printers were, therefore, the most literate of skilled craftspeople, commanding particular respect. By the sixteenth century some printer-publishers had become so renowned that their names lent authority to the authors they published. Often politicized, they played significant roles in urban politics. But as artisans who worked with their hands, they were firmly planted among commoners, rarely able to rise above the status and position of a burgher. Gutenberg's ennoblement by the archbishop of Mainz was the exception that proved the rule.

Printers worked long hours, typically fourteen-hour days, printing two to three thousand sheets a day. Because paper was their biggest cost and labor their lowest, they refrained from printing too many copies of any book-length work. If more copies could be sold, these artisans remade the blocks for every page of the book and printed another limited edition. Because the cost of printing a book was so high, printers usually printed only works that had been contracted by a bookseller or book merchant who put up most of the money. In this sense booksellers operated as both sellers and publishers.

Until the nineteenth century the cost of setting up a print shop was relatively low. The printing presses and type were not inexpensive, but they represented a one-time cost since they did not wear out quickly and could be inexpensively repaired when they did. So while printing was at first dominated by a few large print shops, many small shops were in business by the sixteenth century.

In contrast to establishing a print shop, the high cost of books made the opening of a bookshop tremendously expensive. Booksellers worked closely with local printers, investing in the publication of a few books. To diversify their holdings without expending excessive capital on printing, booksellers traded books with one another throughout Europe. Because they often were published in Latin, books could be sold in

any part of western and central Europe regardless of their point of origin. To keep track of each other's publications, booksellers corresponded regularly and soon began to coordinate their prices, distribution, and publication investments. Each bookseller-printer eventually published a catalog of his or her inventory. Bookseller-printers traveled a great deal to meet other booksellers, establish business exchanges, collect bills, and assess the market, especially by visiting book fairs. Through the networks that developed, booksellers attempted to reduce competition and redundancy. The rising demand for a greater variety of books for a growing legal bureaucracy, an increasingly academic church, and a professionalizing bourgeoisie encouraged booksellers to specialize their production for only one of these markets. Each sold his or her genre, be it legal, theological, medical, or business, through the networks of the European book trade.

Book production and sales began to make their marks on the urban landscape in the sixteenth century. Booksellers set up their shops and stalls near the working and living quarters of their target audiences. They sold scholarly and religious books from shops near colleges, universities, seminaries, and cathedrals. Booksellers sold legal texts from stalls and shops located near the law courts. In Paris they set up their stalls along the walls of the Palais de Justice, in London around the Hall of Westminster, at the Hague around the Palais des États, in Prague near the Royal Palace. Peddlers sold cheap prints throughout many

parts of cities but especially at its most congested points, especially bridges and major intersections. Printing, whether secular, religious, or popular, came to dominate the city during the sixteenth century.

THE RENAISSANCE

The Renaissance's emphasis on learning greatly expanded publishing in the first century of print. Humanists advocated the extension of literacy to a greater portion of the society and demanded the translation of Latin works so they could be read in the vernacular languages. Inspired by these goals, religious and secular institutions amassed large libraries of handwritten manuscripts, especially classical works, many in the vernacular. When printing spread across Europe in the middle of the fifteenth century, a larger literate public snapped up cheaper print versions of these manuscripts.

Though classical and medieval texts dominated Renaissance publishing, printers published new works during the Renaissance, and many of those in turn spurred the expansion of publishing. Baldassare Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier* (written between 1513 and 1518) and works like it convinced the nobility that their success at court depended on a humanistic education based on extensive reading of history, poetry, and philosophy. To make works like these available throughout Europe, printers hired "rewrite men"

to translate them from the language of the author's court into emerging national languages, spoken and read by a growing elite. Few well-known Renaissance works reached a truly large audience, however, because most printers published books, and few but the elite could afford them.

The majority of early prints were religious, though a historical understanding is skewed by the survival of clerical and aristocratic libraries and the disappearance of commoners' collections. The most notable products of early printing were vernacular Bibles. Gutenberg won fame for his. Printers also printed large numbers of pamphlets that taught litanies and commandments. Pictorial prints provided images of saints, the last judgment and the afterlife, and allegories of death. These prints not only constituted texts for use in the practice of religion but were considered sacred themselves. Hung on walls in homes and shops, they inspired awe but also stimulated

greater consideration of religion. Printers also catered to the special needs of priests by publishing guides to pilgrimages and instructions for confessors. Religious, such as the Brethren of the Common Life, an organization of Catholic humanists, set up their own printing presses to produce grammars so that the laity could read the Bible and other religious works in the vernacular.

Jewish communities quickly embraced printing as a means to expand the circulation of religious works. Jewish printers, many of whom were trained in Germany, reproduced a great number of religious works from their print shops in the Iberian Peninsula and Italy during the first century of European printing. In Venice, Jewish printers published the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud. The common use of Hebrew by Jews throughout Europe made possible the greater circulation of these works to diverse communities.

THE REFORMATION

Religious prints outnumbered all others long before the Reformation. But both the Protestant and the Catholic Reformations expanded printing on an unprecedented scale, and their conflict altered the dynamics of the book trade. Though similar heresies preceded Martin Luther's movement, the Protestant Reformation was the first to spread by print and arguably owed its success to the press. No wonder Luther described printing as "God's highest and extremest act of grace, whereby the business of the Gospel is driven forward." Indeed the massive distribution of his cheap broadsides and pamphlets made Luther one of Germany's best-known authors even before he broke with the Catholic Church.

Protestant printers and booksellers worked together to spread Protestant religious propaganda, published in the vernacular for the widest possible readership. German printers also produced Protestant works in Latin for French audiences and in the Glagolitic alphabet for Slavic Croatians. Protestant Transylvanians, too, printed a great deal of religious literature in Slavic and Romanian languages. The Protestants' propaganda campaigns and their efforts to spread the practice of reading and religious study promoted the growth of literacy and greatly increased print's influence on East and West Europeans.

The Catholic Reformation also encouraged the printing and sale of religious works. Most important for its impact on the greatest number of readers was the massive Counter-Reformation propaganda, counterpart to the Protestants' religious broadsides and chapbooks. In particular Catholic printers produced hundreds of thousands of devotionals, often written by priests for their parishioners. The church also encouraged Catholic presses to print schoolbooks for use in Catholic seminaries in for the expanding education of priests and monks and pamphlets that outlined popular sermons, simplified doctrinal complexities and contradictions to answer the challenges posed by Reformationists, and classified sins and their penalties and pardons.

The Reformation created great rifts in the European book trade. Printers of differing faiths worked at cross-purposes in the production of rival propagandas and pirated each other's nonreligious books on a rapidly expanding scale. The European book market was also splintered by increasing linguistic divisions. The Reformation ended the preeminence of Latin as the main language in which books were published, spreading instead the use of the vernacular. French emerged as the most important of vernacular languages, replacing Latin as the language in which elites

throughout much of Europe read and wrote. Vernacular book fairs flourished and produced bibliographies of books for sale by diverse printers in a single language. At the same time the print trade popularized national languages, reducing elites' use of diverse dialects. Increasingly printers and booksellers divided Europeans along national lines.

In an effort to exert greater control over publishing, Reformation era kings granted monopolies to printers and booksellers that limited the number of shops the Crown had to watch. The policy also made licensed printers and booksellers who enjoyed royal monopolies into allies of the Crown and the church. In England printer-booksellers united behind Henry VIII's effort to prevent the importation of foreign (heretical) prints and the immigration of foreign printers. The Crown formalized the association of English publishers in 1557, when it granted the great printers that made up the Stationers' Company nearly complete

control of printing and bookselling. By 1605 the king shifted the monopolies, previously granted to a few privileged printers, to all the members of the company, benefiting small booksellers and printers. By doing so he extended London publishers' influence and therefore his own throughout Britain and Europe. To prevent pirating, publishers registered a new book's title with the company, which granted and protected the publisher's copyright. Copyrights also were sold by one publisher to another. During the sixteenth century the kings of France granted similar monopolies to Parisian booksellers and printers, putting their competitors in the rest of France at a great disadvantage. Over the next two centuries these privileges caused the formation of large, specialized bookseller-printer companies and the disappearance of their weaker rivals. In 1644 Paris had seventy-six print shops, each with an average of only two printing presses, three journeymen, and one apprentice. By 1770, however, Paris had far fewer print shops, roughly forty, but each employed an

average of nine printing presses operated by twenty-four journeymen and apprentices.

Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century monarchs established new organizations within their governments to control of the press. Governments stepped up the prosecution of printers who pirated others' books, and most monarchs issued lists of banned books and punished those who printed or sold them. Inversely, kings rewarded printers and booksellers for publishing of works favorable to church and state. Most licensed printers and booksellers supported royal controls, since royal enforcement of their monopolies and copyrights increased their profits. By the beginning of the eighteenth century they had amassed considerable fortunes. When they could, however, even licensed printers and booksellers bent the rules to their advantage.

The impact of church and state on the control and development of printing was not limited to Catholic and Protestant lands. The Russian Orthodox Church also promoted the spread of printing, though on a far more limited scale than that seen in western and central Europe. Tsar Ivan the Terrible set up the first official printing house, or *pechatnyy dvor*, in 1563. Nearly all the works printed in Cyrillic were religious, and the press was controlled in large part by the Russian Orthodox Church.

Print also preserved religious and ethnic minority cultures against the power of kings and dominant religions within states, as in eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Greeks, struggling to maintain their own press under Ottoman domination, turned to Venetian printers. Venetians printed nearly all Greek-language publications between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Western European publishers also printed religious and secular works for Armenian readers throughout the world. These prints, like those for the Greeks, were critical to the survival of their faith and culture.

Reformation prints had tremendous social effects throughout Europe. They split the church and initiated an age of religious wars. For this reason, Elizabeth Eisenstein asserted that the printing press "contributed more to destroying Christian concord and inflaming religious warfare than any of the so-called arts of war ever did." Aside from its immediate religious and political impacts, however, the Reformation also spread print culture throughout Europe, gradually diminishing illiteracy. The English Stationers' Company records from 1587 suggest that, while the numbers of copies of ordinary works were no more voluminous in England than in Catholic countries, the company doubled its production of grammars and catechisms. Literacy grew rapidly and



The Spread of Printing. Adapted from Elizabeth Eisenstein, *The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 15.

with it the impact of print and the influence of writers.

THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT

The dramatic growth of printing and publishing initiated by the Reformation accelerated during the eighteenth century. Printers produced and book dealers sold a growing number of expensive books to elite readers and cheaper books and ephemera to the middle and lower classes. Parisian booksellers offered more

than 100,000 books for sale along the rue Saint-Jacques and tens of thousands at the Palais de Justice. Estate records in western Europe, made at the death of independent peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, and merchants, suggest that most owned at least a few books, particularly religious works. For every book accountants noted, many pamphlets and other ephemeral works of too little value for notaries to mention probably existed.

In part the growing importance of the press is attributable to the economic growth of the eighteenth

century. In fact the geographical shifts of the centers of the book trade closely mirrored the geography of economic power. In the seventeenth century the center of European book printing moved from Venice and Antwerp to Amsterdam, reflecting the shift of mercantile power from the Venetians to the Dutch. In the eighteenth century London printers outpaced their rivals in Amsterdam, mirroring the shift from Dutch to English mercantile supremacy.

More important than mercantile power, however, was the proliferation of clandestine printing that dramatically accelerated competition and lowered book prices. Since it was not illegal to pirate foreign books, publishers near borders flooded neighboring countries with pirated editions of new books. Book piracy was greatest across borders without linguistic barriers, as among the rival states in Italy and Germany. Many publishers, however, hired expatriate printers to produce pirated editions of their former country's books. Hiring French Protestant printers expelled from France by Louis XIV, printers in Geneva, London, Amsterdam, and Berlin pirated books for sale in France. Many of these clandestine networks began as a means to circulate Protestant books in Catholic lands but soon grew beyond their religious purposes. Genevan printers, originally Protestant propagandists, expanded into the publication of medical and legal texts, outpacing their Lyonnaise competitors. Ironically, Genevan printers eventually moved into the production of Catholic theological works, marketed throughout Catholic Europe and the Americas.

The book became more significant because it challenged the social, political, and cultural order. Governments' best efforts seemed powerless to prevent book piracy or to curtail the sales of banned books critical of church and state. By the mid-eighteenth century a government ban or clerical condemnation of an author's work actually promoted its sales. Inversely, the public often viewed permission to publish a work as proof of the author's duplicity with a corrupt government, diminishing sales. The spread of new publishing strategies also radicalized the press. By the mid-seventeenth century publishers began to free some authors from their dependency on wealthy patrons by giving advances on expected profits. Such independence freed writers to criticize their society and polity. The popularity of such daring works during the eighteenth century encouraged publishers to reward authors who penned them.

Printers and booksellers had to adapt their trade to cope with the competition posed by foreign, pirated editions. Knowing they would sell few copies once their books were pirated, many licensed publishers sold the first editions at the highest possible price,

narrowing the audience to the wealthy elite. Only one out of every ten such books sold in numbers sufficient to cover the losses incurred by the other nine. By encouraging licensed booksellers to raise prices and restrict sales, clandestine publishing and peddling diminished the circulation of the legitimate press and its significance. Banned books, meanwhile, proliferated. Later in the eighteenth century even licensed printers, unable or unwilling to narrow their target audiences, began publishing and selling pirated and banned books.

In the face of such widespread piracy, some monarchs took steps to better safeguard authors' and publishers' rights by extending copyright protection and expanding trade licensing. Britain's copyright law of 1709 gave greater protection to publishers that greatly stimulated the book trade. More printers appeared in London, and booksellers lined Grub Street, making it the center of the British book trade. A similar law passed by Louis XVI in 1777 initiated comparable changes in France on the eve of the French Revolution. During the eighteenth century old established booksellers and printers were overwhelmed by the vast numbers of newcomers to the trade.

Some kings encouraged the radical press to promote reform. Peter the Great, tsar of Russia in the early eighteenth century, encouraged the printing of scientific and philosophical works that challenged the rival authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. The nobility of Europe, too, encouraged the publication of hundreds of thousands of books, many radical works of the Enlightenment, that were housed in the private libraries of their estates and urban apartments. Ironically, elites' sponsorship of the radical press spread ideas that ultimately undermined their social and political power.

THE INDUSTRIAL AGE

Printers and publishers played a critical role in promoting social and political revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. Triggered by political publications like Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* (1776) in the American colonies and Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès's *What is the Third Estate?* (1789) in France, liberal revolutions spread across Europe. The most dramatic and long-lasting result of the French Revolution was its destruction of privilege. By ending privileges the revolution swept away the guild system that had restricted the printing trade. The number of printers in Paris alone increased sevenfold in just a few months. Not only did the printing industry expand with the dismantling of government controls, it became far

more politicized. In fact printers assumed roles as leaders and shapers of popular radicalism throughout the revolution.

After the French Revolution governments struggled to impose restrictions on the press. To forestall the politicization of the public, governments reimposed the licensing of printers and booksellers to restrict their numbers and reestablished the taxation of print to reduce its scale. Despite more intense efforts to enforce press censorship, the press became an increasingly significant tool of radical politics. The liberal revolutions of 1830 and 1848 rolled back these restrictions, which were finally eliminated in the late nineteenth century. In part the spread of the political press was the result of the growth of printing and publishing during the nineteenth century.

While printing technology changed little in its first three and a half centuries, technological innovations in the nineteenth century facilitated a dramatic proliferation of print. Improvements to the printing press in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries accelerated the speed of printing while reducing its costs. More durable iron presses replaced their wooden counterparts in the late eighteenth century. Iron construction simplified the application of other innovations that sped production but increased the pressures exerted on the machine. The new application of rollers and cylinders that inked pages and pressed the image, for example, greatly improved and accelerated production. Innovations in papermaking were equally important in the dramatic changes to the printing industry. Inventors patented new machines in the early nineteenth century that produced paper in continuous sheets rolled onto a large drum that was then fed through a high-speed mechanical printing press. By the 1830s dozens of these machines produced vast quantities of paper. The development and spread of chemically processed wood-pulp paper in the second half of the century further increased paper production. Rising wages inspired the invention of labor-saving machines for typesetting that decreased the time and cost of putting a text into print. Not any one of these innovations but their combination triggered the dramatic revolution in printing and publishing. The rotary press combined the latest printing inventions with innovations in paper production. Powered by steam, the rotary presses of the *London Times* produced seven thousand sheets an hour in 1827. While thousands of small print shops survived in Europe at the end of the century, many still using human power, the majority of printing was done by large print shops operating enormous rotary presses.

The revolution in printing resulted from the dramatic increase in the number of those employed

in publishing at the same time that labor-saving innovations made each worker more productive. In Germany, the number of employees in the printing trade increased 150 percent between 1849 and 1875 and 600 percent by 1895. Over the course of the century the paper mills of Saxony increased their workforce 1,500 percent. New printing technologies made each worker far more productive. In Saxony innovations in papermaking made each worker fourteen times as productive. The vast increases in the numbers of more productive workers, therefore, created an explosion of print. Moreover technological innovations and economies of scale decreased the cost of raw materials from well over 50 percent of the total cost of making a book at the beginning of the century to about 15 percent at the century's end. As a result the cost of books fell dramatically throughout the century as their numbers increased.

Technological innovations also altered the appearance of prints. Developments in engraving and lithography facilitated the greater production of more accurate visual images. Photoengraving proved the most important among these innovations, allowing rapid reproduction of images for publication in newspapers.

The focus of printing changed as dramatically as its quantity and appearance. In the first four centuries of printing the bulk of printers' time was devoted to book production for an elite audience. Censorship records in early-nineteenth-century France suggest that publishers rarely printed more than a few thousand copies of most books and usually only a few hundred. Throughout Europe book publishers unable to sell to the wealthy usually went bankrupt in hard times. Even in England, where the innovations of printing were most advanced, books remained the

preserve of elites with high prices. But the technological changes that made printing so much less expensive in the nineteenth century shifted printers' efforts from book publishing to printing for a larger market.

Commercial and political advertising, government publications, and newspapers became the main products of the press. Advertisements marketed products ranging from inexpensive patent medicines to bicycles and automobiles. Their proliferation reflected the growth of disposable incomes but also promoted the development of a consumer culture, in which sellers created popular desire for their products. Political prints, too, became increasingly important during the nineteenth century. Political parties distributed tracts and posterized cities and towns with their candidates' names and slogans. Governments employed printers in the production of state propaganda to rival their opponents' prints. Mass politics fueled political printing and led governments to purchase primers and other textbooks in vast numbers for millions of European children, who were required to attend school. The spread of education had a reciprocal influence on the book market, as a larger literate public demanded more publications. In Russia, for example, the government mandated primary education in the 1880s. Consequently the number of copies of each published book doubled between 1887 and 1895 and tripled in the two decades that followed. Most important of all to the influence of print over daily life in Europe, newspapers became cheaper and more interesting to millions of readers during the century. Newspapers formed a bond that tied people of diverse social classes and regions to a nation, political party, and culture.

The mid-nineteenth century also witnessed a dramatic growth in book publishing, beginning in Britain, where a number of publishers issued cheap paperback reprints at less than half the normal book price. While these paperbacks sold to a larger middle-class audience, even at five shillings they remained out of reach of the lower middle classes. However, books began to reach lower-middle-class and upper-working-class readers throughout Europe with the gradual spread of lending libraries and subscription libraries. But these did little to stimulate the publishing industry. More significant to readers and publishers were the serialized novels, sold in installments. In the second half of the century publishers began to print cheaper paperbacks. First sold in railroad stations by pioneering booksellers such as W. H. Smith, they set a fashion among middle-class readers and soon became known throughout Europe as railroad novels. By 1856 Havard had published six thousand cheap paperback novels, each with press runs of around ten thousand. Once a single French publisher claimed to

have sold 60 million copies, the book was no longer considered the preserve of elites or even the middle classes.

MODERN PUBLISHING

In the second half of the nineteenth century publishing became a large and complex industry. For centuries publishing was the business of booksellers and printers. Formerly the business of two partners, usually father and son, it became the business of great publishing houses in the late nineteenth century. English publishers led Europe in innovative business practices. The great publishers of the eighteenth century, such as Longman, Blackwood, and Macmillan, grew significantly and remained important into the twenty-first century. These emerging publishing companies were a business distinct from both printing and bookselling. The publisher recruited and guided authors, managed typesetters and printers, promoted specific books and periodicals, garnered government and industrial contracts, and engineered distribution to retailers.

Publishers became immensely powerful and influential. Their managerial skills and salesmanship determined success. In France, Lévy excelled at picking bestsellers such as Edgar Allan Poe, and L.-C.-F. Hachette was renowned for his ability to win lucrative government contracts for textbooks. The death of one of these great publishers could destroy the business and often did. Publishers' influence, however, extended far beyond these business concerns. Many determined to publish works they felt had particular merit despite their potential unpopularity. Eugen Diederichs and Julius Lehmann in Germany, for example, attempted to publish fine works of literature that they believed would ennoble German culture. In Russia publishers tried to create a better-quality "people's literature" to replace the sensational pamphlets and serialized novels popular at the turn of the century. While more publishers throughout Europe remained concerned about the bottom line, many still refused to profit from the publication of works contrary to contemporary morals. The English publisher Mills and Boon, for example, published light romantic novels for women but refused to publish anything that pushed the boundaries of Victorian morality. Publishers wielded considerable editorial power over manuscripts. Herman Melville and Charles Dickens complained of editors' changes, and even where relationships between authors and editors were unstrained, manuscripts were greatly changed before publication.

The large British and French publishing companies were models for the rest of Europe in the late

nineteenth century. Though German publishing remained decentralized and its major publishers did not grow to the size of their British and French rivals for many decades, German companies operated in a similar manner. By the end of the century modern publishing methods were well under way in western and central Europe. At the same time the competition posed by the pirating of foreign books declined as publishers honored international copyrights.

At the close of the nineteenth century more advanced technologies and industrial organization greatly increased the scale of publishing enterprises. The costs of printing technology escalated, especially because of the complexity of reproducing photographs for print and the use of diverse fonts. Photomechanical polychrome printing, photogravure, and offset printing allowed simpler and faster production of works combining text with image. As a result of the rising costs of printing technologies, the great multitude of presses was reduced and concentrated in the hands of a few large corporations. The status of the mechanical skills of an experienced printer fell dramatically. Even the skills of the owner of great publishing houses, though still important, moved away from acquisition, editing, production, distribution, and sale as owners delegated supervision of these tasks among large staffs. Publishing houses eventually further divided these tasks among branches, each responsible for a different kind of publication.

Publishing, like any other industry, became increasingly routinized. Publishers placed more importance on their editors' abilities to generate a successful list and less on editors' identification of artistic writers. Profits were more the editor's concern in the postwar period, as publishing joined the many businesses controlled by enormous multinational corporations. In West Germany, for example, a dramatic transformation in the 1960s took traditional publishers' emphasis away from great authors and their books and gave it to media conglomerates' mass marketing of diverse genres. Throughout Europe editors' relationships with authors became more distant and more formal in the twentieth century. Editors encouraged authors to conform to standardized plots and characters to insure the success of novels and short stories. Newspaper and magazine journalists, too, adopted standard formulas for their articles.

The growing scale of publishing decreased the unit cost of each print. As a result of declining sales and falling costs in the early twentieth century, publishers marketed books at radically reduced prices. In 1905 slumping sales encouraged the French publishing house Fayard to offer novels for less than one franc with press runs of more than 100,000 copies each.

Their success greatly expanded novel reading in France. At about the same time British publishers introduced the pulp magazines that sold for a few cents. Pulp offered comics and adventure stories to children, fashion and beauty to women, and a variety of other specialized subjects to diverse reading interests. Magazine reading expanded greatly and further accelerated after World War I.

The severe economic collapse of the postwar period and the Great Depression and the simultaneous development of radio led postwar publishers to create cheap photographic magazines. They offered the visual stimulation that radio lacked to a public eager for sights and texts describing the luxuries of an affluent elite. Though the cheap novel and photomagazine revived publishers' profits in times of general economic decline, reading was losing its place as Europeans' principal means of entertainment. In the late twentieth century television and Internet communication greatly accelerated this trend.

While western European publishers faced falling demand and struggled to market new, cheaper prints at the dawn of the twentieth century, southern, northern, and eastern European printers and publishers experienced dramatic growth. Italian, Spanish, and northern European publishers rapidly expanded publishing at the turn of the century and after. Even in Russia popular book production increased nine times between 1887 and 1912.

Russian publishing was further transformed by the 1917 revolution. Between 1918 and 1919 the Soviet government nationalized and centralized the printing and publishing industries, forming the largest Russian publishers into a single State Publishing House. Publishing in the Soviet Union accelerated rapidly in the 1920s and 1930s but never kept pace with demand. The most significant changes in Soviet publishing came in the 1920s with expansion of publishing for non-Russian nationalities and in the 1930s with the Stalinization of publishing. By further centralizing and increasing the scale of publishing, Stalinization fostered the mass production of books and journals on an unprecedented scale.

East European publishers were unable to expand and modernize their presses until postwar Communist rule. Hungarian publishing, for example, remained small in scale until the postwar period. The nationalization of printing in 1946 and its expansion afterward finally produced a wider availability of newspapers and literary journals in the 1950s. Book production, too, increased notably, including the publication of international best-sellers. By 1984 book production exceeded 100 million copies.

The Stalinization of publishing in East Europe not only increased production but narrowed its titles and reduced its responsiveness to demand. East European publishers promoted works consistent with party ideology rather than those with the greatest appeal. Political censorship was considerable and moral

censorship even more so. From the 1960s to the fall of the Communist state, Soviet and East European publishers failed to provide the variety and quantity of publications that their readers demanded.

Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* significantly reduced censorship, while his policy of *perestroika* promoted privatization. Together they began a process in the Soviet Union that quickly spread across East Europe. Accelerated by the fall of the Communist government, a more commercialized publishing industry emerged. However, the early transition to a competitive market proved ruinous for publishers who continued to print millions of unwanted books and journals. Falling standards of living further restricted the market, delaying the recovery of East European publishing.

Throughout Europe, as the century progressed, cheap books and serials became less significant to publishing profits, and three other sources of income became more important. Textbook production continued as a source of sizable earnings, especially as public education attendance was enforced more extensively, its duration lengthened, and its quality increased. Libraries generated profits for publishers, especially with the phenomenal growth of free public libraries. Publishers produced a growing number of academic books, printed in smaller numbers and sold at higher prices to private and public libraries. In turn education and libraries promoted the practice of reading that furthered publishers' sales of newspapers, magazines, and books. Finally, publishers looked to printed advertisements as their greatest source of income.

The future of publishing, still a major industry, is an open question in the twenty-first century. With great advancements in computer memory storage and the development of the Internet, many experts have predicted the disappearance of most prints in their twentieth-century forms. The impact this will have on the industry remains uncertain.

See also other articles in this section.

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LITERACY



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At the end of the fifteenth century in Europe literacy of any kind was rare. Among the laity, the ability to read, write, and count was restricted to a small minority of wealthy, town-dwelling men. As late as 1800 no European country could claim that half its population could read and write. In most regions complete, if basic, literacy was still confined to town-dwelling men of middling status or above. Around 1900, however, many parts of Europe had achieved mass literacy. Perhaps 85–90 percent of adults were deemed to be literate in Britain, France, Germany, and much of Scandinavia. That success created an enormous cultural gulf in Europe, for in huge tracts of the east and south even the rudiments of reading and writing were denied to a majority of the population. Figure 1 and the map below show this development in different ways.

By the start of the twenty-first century literacy was regarded as a birthright, while illiteracy was seen as a personal shame and a national disgrace. This chapter looks at the timing, location, and social distribution of this change from restricted to mass literacy. It also explores more qualitative dimensions such as the reasons for and uses of literacy. Throughout, the acquisition and exercise of literacy in its different forms is understood in its social context, for the spread of literacy across space and time was determined by a complex interaction of factors such as wealth and social status, residence, cultural assumptions about gender roles, language, and religion.

Literacy is made up of several communication skills, which are best seen as bands in a spectrum rather than discrete categories. *Reading* of print or writing was possible at two levels. Some people could decipher texts, read them aloud, and memorize them in a mechanical or ritual way—although their personal understanding may have been questionable. We should not exaggerate the understanding and facility of those who possessed this intermediate or semiliteracy. Those with better education and a deeper immersion in printed and written culture could com-

prehend the text with greater precision, reading and thinking silently to themselves. They could understand new texts as well as familiar ones. However, “reading” was not restricted to written or printed words alone. People could gather information and ideas from *looking*: interpreting pictures and prints in broadsheets and pamphlets or watching and participating in plays and processions. Gesture remained a subtle and important form of nonverbal communication.

If they wanted to transmit their own thoughts other than through speech, people had to learn to *write*, or rather compose—an advanced skill that required considerable training and practice, and which effectively marked “full” literacy for most people. The other, more common, level of writing was in fact copying: writing without necessarily understanding. It was at this stage that people learned to sign their names on documents, and this ability is commonly used as an indicator that someone could read and understand printed and written texts in the vernacular, the language of everyday life. In other words, he or she was well along the road to “full” literacy. A small minority of men could also copy or compose in Latin, the international language of learning throughout the Middle Ages and the early modern period, or in another (later) pan-European language like French. Even those who had none of these skills were not culturally isolated for they could *listen*—hear a priest’s sermons or a friend reading aloud, participate actively or passively in discussions with their peers. Associated with literacy is *numeracy*, which again covers a spectrum of skills from simple counting of objects to sophisticated accounting and complex mathematical calculations.

Since 1500, both reading and writing have increased in significance, sometimes simultaneously, sometimes independently; sometimes at the expense of oral and visual forms of communication, sometimes in tandem with them. The way to understand literacy in historic Europe is to assess the changing access which people had to the different bands in the spectrum and the ways they used them.



Map 1.

PATTERNS

It was as late as 1995 that the first generally accepted comparison of international adult literacy attainments was published by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The European countries included were Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Based on rigorous, direct, and standardized observations and tests, the study distinguished prose, document, and quantitative literacy, dividing each category into five levels of attainment. Social historians can touch on prose literacy (reports on, or summaries of, tests of

reading ability) or elements of document literacy (signing), but quantitative historical studies of numeracy are absent. The social and geographical distribution of historic literacy is relatively easy to demonstrate using the “universal, standard, and direct” measure of ability to sign one’s name in full on a document such as a court deposition, a contract, or a marriage certificate. Before the nineteenth century, reading is much harder to measure directly, but various indirect measures such as school provision or book production and ownership can be used. Until then, virtually all sources cover adults rather than children. Uniquely, the Lutheran churches of Scandinavia kept

registers of reading and religious knowledge from the end of the seventeenth century. The Scandinavian example is a warning that comparison over time and place is rendered problematic by the many different sources and criteria of historic “literacy” used by churches, governments, social scientists, and historians. The figures given below may appear precise, but they are sometimes no more than broad indicators of different cultural achievements.

Fortunately, both direct and indirect indicators of literacy generally point in the same direction. Male achievements were superior to female, those of the rich to those of the poor; urban dwellers were almost invariably better able to write than peasants; Protestant areas of Europe tended to have higher literacy than Catholic. Expansion occurred first among the middling and upper classes, among men, and in towns. In northern England the illiteracy of the gentry fell from about 30 percent in 1530 to almost nil in 1600, but that of day laborers stayed well above 90 percent and did not fall substantially until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Classified by economic activity, agricultural workers come lowest in the European hierarchy, industrial workers next, slightly inferior to commercial and service occupations, followed by professionals and landowners. Differences between the sexes were pronounced and enduring. A quarter of Amsterdam grooms marrying around 1730 could not sign the register compared with half of brides. In southern Europe sex was more important than status or residence in determining

achievements. Between 1540 and 1600 in the Spanish archdiocese of Toledo, 30 percent of town-dwelling men could not sign compared with 93 percent of women; the rural figures were 48 percent and 98 percent. In areas such as southern France, where the faiths coexisted after the Reformation, Protestant literacy was generally higher than Catholic until the eighteenth century. In other parts of Europe it remained so. Catholic illiteracy in Ireland fell from 46 percent in 1861 to 16 percent in 1901, but it remained higher than Protestant. Even among other apparently homogeneous social groups there were pronounced variations across Europe. Convicted criminals are an example. One English prisoner in three was wholly illiterate in the early 1840s. In contrast, “the intelligentsia of the criminal world” were the Germans, with fewer than one in fifty unable to read and write around 1860.

To these gradients can be added a bold geographical summary. If Europe was homogeneous in terms of its restricted literacy at the end of the Middle Ages, it had three massive cultural zones by the end of the nineteenth century: a literate, economically developed (and largely Protestant) north; a center with pronounced regional variations, notably France; and a less literate, underdeveloped (Catholic and Orthodox) south and east. The 1900 distribution was itself the result of four centuries of more robust advances in literacy in the northern parts of Europe than elsewhere. Within this broad-brush picture lay numerous local variations. A single English county at



TABLE 1
PERCENT UNABLE TO SIGN BY ESTATE
(REGION)

Date	<i>Fraugdegård</i> (<i>Funen</i>)	<i>Fussing</i> (<i>Jutland</i>)	<i>Lindenberg</i> (<i>Jutland</i>)
1719–1725	92	88	78
1726–1750	88	62	57
1751–1775	90	24	31
1776–1800	87	7	11
1801–1825	65	26	32
1856–1850	33	29	26

the time of the mid-seventeenth-century Civil Wars might contain villages with proportions of literate men four times higher than others. Pronounced regional variations were reduced during the eighteenth and nineteenth century in some parts of Europe. However, this long-term trend disguises some astounding differences in the timing of change. Table 1 shows the percentage of Danish manorial peasants unable to sign their copyhold documents, 1719–1850. The dramatic improvement in signing ability on the northern, Jutland estates during the eighteenth century created a huge gulf in literacy between them and the Fraugdegård estate near Odense, which was not bridged until the middle of the nineteenth century. Similarly pronounced regional variations are found across northern Germany around 1800.

The pace of change was everywhere hesitant and irregular. At the time of Italian unification, analysis of the *censimento* or national census shows that 81 percent of females aged six years or older were illiterate, as were 68 percent of males. In absolute numbers that meant 17 out of 23 million inhabitants. Illiteracy was similarly prevalent in Spain at that date with figures of 81 percent and 63 percent respectively. Even in countries like Italy, where literacy did not advance rapidly before 1800, achievements since 1850 have been considerable. For every 100 illiterate females in 1861 there were just 5 in 1981. However, change has also generated some unexpected side effects. Whereas in 1861 illiteracy was evenly divided between males and females in Italy, by 1981 there were two illiterate women for every man.

The painfully slow pace of change and the late arrival of mass literacy finds its most extreme example in Portugal. Of those over seven years of age in 1890, 76 percent were illiterate, falling only slightly to 74 percent in 1900 and 70 percent in 1911. The figure was still 68 percent in 1930 and it was not until the 1940s that more than half of Portugal's population could read and write: two centuries after the most favored areas had passed that threshold. Portugal's 30 percent illiteracy in 1968 was the highest in Europe. Other peripheral zones were deeply illiterate well into the twentieth century. Greek men were 71 percent illiterate in 1870 compared with 36 percent in 1928; the respective figures for women are 94 percent and 64 percent. Levels of literacy were similarly low throughout the Balkans. In 1880, 90 percent of Dalmatia's people were illiterate and, as in southern Italy, towns were little better in this respect than the countryside.

The patterns outlined above are sometimes complex and varied, but the overall distribution and progress of writing ability is clear. Yet in many parts of Europe before the late nineteenth century reading was taught before writing. Given the discontinuous and brief training most children received (spending no more than two or three years in usually part-time schooling), it would be surprising if reading were not more widespread than the easily measurable ability to sign. For example, a case has been made that Lowland Scotland had near-universal reading by the mid-eighteenth century. The only convincing statistics are based on the Swedish *hustavla*, or registers of the Lutheran church's household literacy campaign. By c.1780 in Sweden and Iceland, male and female, young and old, rich and poor alike were almost all able to pass the Lutheran churches' tests. Signing ability was confined to less than 10 percent: largely town-dwelling males. As late as 1921, 30 percent of Finland's people could not read *and* write—an achievement inferior to Italy's. It is argued that the "Scandinavian pattern" may be more extensive, and that between c.1500 and c.1900 Europe comprised two zones: one where reading and writing were taught together; the other where reading alone was taught, this including many areas of Germany and a large part of southern and northwestern France as well as Scandinavia.

Tacitly or overtly, studies that show apparently extensive reading suggest that the breadth of cultural access in early-modern Europe was much broader than the signing statistics imply. The problem here lies with the nature of the reading that people did. It was normally religious and based principally on rote learning and recognition of well-known passages. In-

deed, as late as 1750 one authority assigns critical reading ability in the German lands to just 10 percent of the population. Another reports that fewer than 5 percent of the men in the region of Arras and St. Omer in northern France were reckoned “well educated” in surveys conducted in 1802 and 1804. Subjective as such assessments are, they indicate the restricted impact that literate media could have had on ordinary people who were ostensibly “readers.” Nevertheless, we must be alert to the possibility that reading was more widespread than writing, especially in certain parts of Europe and among certain social groups: poorer men and most women.

Females generally had less chance to learn writing than males. An investigation of 3,036 women aged above 20 years living in part of northern Italy in 1854 showed that just 410 could read and write though 1,103 could only read. It was not till the 1860s and 1870s that women began to approach complete literacy in this part of Italy. The existence of social forms that privileged visual, spoken, and sung communication (such as the French *veillée* or evening gathering), and which were dominated by ordinary women, suggests that their cultural lives continued to be cast in an oral/aural and visual framework.

There are prominent exceptions. Women of the eighteenth-century French and English upper-bourgeois and landed classes (and especially unmarried ones it seems) read periodicals and novels; used circulating libraries; joined reading societies; attended the theater and concerts; collected prints and bought paintings. Women seem to have been a crucial component of the anticipated audience for Enlightenment literature. Yet we should not exaggerate the social penetration of extensive female literacy. Book ownership of the kind recorded in *post mortem* inventories was growing during the eighteenth century (notably in France, Germany, and England), but it remained principally the preserve of middling and upper-class males.

If reading was almost certainly much more extensive than writing, elementary numeracy was probably ubiquitous. Even in the Middle Ages, one test of basic mental capacity was the ability to count to ten. However, formal accounting skills were much more restricted. Though written numeration had been known in the Latin west for several centuries, and paper was in general use, the abacus with counters was still often used in the seventeenth and even in the eighteenth centuries. The celebrated mathematician Leibniz used one. Roman and Arabic numerals co-existed (as did Gothic and Latin type or script), but there is also evidence across Europe of “peasant numerals”—symbols which represented numbers that

may derive from roman numerals, but which are distinctive. As an advanced skill in the school curriculum and one more often learned as an adult for economic purposes, higher-grade numeracy probably progressed at the same rate as writing. There are no quantitative studies, but age reporting in documents shows growing precision and reliability in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a fact which may indicate populations who were increasingly conversant with numbers.

EXPLANATIONS

Explaining these patterns and trends requires analysis of the central social, political, and economic relationships in historic Europe. The chances of being educated and of acquiring literacy depended on a wide variety of factors: wealth, sex, projected job opportunities and work experience, school provision and costs, community structures, employments for children, the power of landowners, access to literate media and the opportunities to use them, and even the language a person spoke in everyday life.

Schooling. Literacy and schooling naturally went hand in hand. For example, the German duchy of Württemberg had 89 schools in 1520 compared with over 400 by 1600, and across Germany in this period many rulers issued ordinances providing for or regulating elementary education. Catholics too expanded education. The first “school of Christian doctrine” was opened at Milan in 1536 to teach children the essentials of the Catholic faith. There were 28 such schools by 1564 and more than 120 in 1599. Post-elementary education also expanded. Perhaps 1,000 new grammar schools were established in England, 1480–1660. Thus we find rapidly expanding literacy for some social groups in late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century England, the German lands, and in the towns of northern Italy. Much of early-modern Europe truly experienced an “educational revolution.”

The case of Italy shows the importance of schools in a later age. In the mid-nineteenth century 80 percent of children aged 6 to 12 years were at school in Savoy (later annexed by France) compared with just 9 percent in Sardinia. Small wonder that illiteracy among adult males was just 50 percent in the former provinces compared with 90 percent in the latter. In one southern province, Nuoro, only 337 of 61,479 women above the age of 20 years could read and write. Using broadly defined regions, proportions in school in the north of Italy grew from 67 percent in 1863 to 85 percent in 1901; figures for the central provinces are 28 percent and 50 per-

cent respectively (incidentally, almost identical to Greece between these dates); for the south 22 percent and 44 percent.

Yet, until well into the twentieth century the vast majority of children anywhere in Europe could expect to receive only a few years of training in the rudiments of reading and writing. Children were contributors to the family budget from an early age in northwestern Europe until the nineteenth century, and until the twentieth century in the south and east. For them, leaving school might as easily mark the start of learning functional literacy rather than its culmination, for literacy has to be practiced as well as learned. As we chart the development of mass literacy we should also recall that schools became central to the acquisition of skills only by 1850 at the earliest. In Sweden, until 1858 the authorities assumed that children would have been taught to read at home; only after this did junior schools take over the tasks of basic education. The Nordic countries (notably Iceland and Norway) and some of the more thinly populated mountain and steppe regions of Europe relied on mobile teachers following a circuit until well into the twentieth century. As early as the eighteenth century, mountain regions of Austria like Tyrol or Vorarlberg seem to have had high literacy, but few schools. Fixed schools began to be common in the rural villages of Russia only in the decades following the emancipation of the peasantry in 1861. The total number of primary schools grew from 8 thousand in 1856 to 25 thousand in 1879 and then 100 thousand by 1911, the initiative coming from *zemstvos* (local authorities), the church, and the education ministry equally. The number of pupils rose from 450 thousand to 6.6 million between 1856 and 1911.

For all its importance, schooling was neither the only nor always the most significant cause of changes in literacy. Modern readers who live in states with powerful governments will be struck by how the progress of literacy in the nineteenth century was largely independent of major political events or, for that matter, educational legislation. From the sixteenth to the twentieth century, educational legislation was normally designed to consolidate, standardize, and enable rather than to innovate. Before the nineteenth century no European country had a school “system,” but instead dozens of sometimes competing, sometimes complementary schools, which were organized and funded in different ways. Even major political upheavals like the French Revolution did little in the short term to change institutions or alter trends in literacy. By the time the republican statesman Jules Ferry realized the Revolutionary aspiration for free,

secular, and compulsory education in 1882, France was already a literate nation.

Religion and wealth. However slowly and hesitantly, literacy was increasing. Did the expansion favor Protestants more than Catholics? Protestantism is commonly described as “the religion of the book.” Indeed, a glance at map 1 shows the enduring legacy of the sixteenth-century Reformation. The extensive literacy of the Dutch and Lowland Scots in the eighteenth century stands alongside their commitment to Calvinism. The Catholic conservatism of rural France, Poland, or Spain cannot be divorced from deep illiteracy. Was it simply a question of faith? In the north of Ireland during the seventeenth century Protestant farmers were better able to sign their names than Catholic ones, but they were also richer and lived in less remote areas. The point here is that Protestants and Catholics were not distributed equally among all sections of society. In seventeenth-century Poland virtually all the Calvinist minority were either nobles or town-dwellers. Crude divisions between faiths often break down under examination. Ability to sign was as common in staunchly Catholic northeastern France as it was in strongly Protestant England at the end of the seventeenth century. In France and Germany the differences between Protestant and Catholic were less in 1750 than in 1650.

Despite the hothouse atmosphere surrounding it, the early years of the Reformation saw only gradual improvements in literacy, which followed on from fifteenth-century developments and which were not unique to Protestantism. Seventeenth-century achievements were more substantial. The campaign to promote religious literacy in Sweden produced remarkable results in less than a century, widespread literacy being used to consolidate rather than cause religious change. In Denmark and Prussia, on the other hand, it was not the Lutheran Reformation of the sixteenth or seventeenth century that brought about widespread literacy, but the early-eighteenth-century campaign waged by the Pietists with the help of the new “absolutist” rulers.

No more than schools did the competing churches work in a cultural vacuum. Powerful economic, social, and political forces continued to influence literacy levels. The Protestant Vaucluse had lower literacy in the early nineteenth century than the Catholic province of Baden, the reason being that the German region had more communal property and could thus subsidize schooling. Indeed, on closer inspection, it is plain that across Europe factors other than religion entered into the equation. In the 1870s German Catholics were more accomplished than those of Ire-

land, who were in turn more literate than Italians. High Italian illiteracy cannot be divorced from its economic performance, for not until the 1930s were more than half the population employed outside agriculture. Religion was only one of many social, economic, and political forces that influenced the distribution of literacy.

The Italian and Irish examples just cited point to a connection between wealth and literacy at both an individual and a communal level. The most literate *départements* of nineteenth-century France were the prosperous open-field ones to the north and east of an imaginary line drawn between St. Malo and Geneva. Townspeople were more literate than rural dwellers because they were wealthier and followed occupations that required reading, writing, and counting. Illiteracy had been almost eradicated by 1700 among London's male merchants and artisans: a remarkable achievement.

Urbanization. There is a connection between urbanization and literacy, but some cities were much more literate than others. Paris in 1850 was far superior to Naples, as London was to Madrid. Furthermore, some rapidly industrializing cities of northern England, northeastern France and northern Germany in the early nineteenth century saw literacy rates decline as overcrowding stretched the social fabric. The more general relationship between economy and literacy also involved positive and negative feedbacks. Literacy may serve to enhance a nation's economic performance, but it is also clear that growth (and political will) is needed to create and distribute the resources to fund the cost and opportunity cost of educating children, especially at the elementary level.

Urban children were likely to attend school longer than their rural cousins. When education was not compulsory, girls were taken away from school earlier than boys. The Russian school census of 1911 allows us to calculate the likelihood of a child attending school for a given period. Some 88 percent of boys would attend for a year compared with 52 percent of girls. But the chance that a boy would complete three years in school was just 39 percent and only 8 percent for a girl. In these circumstances, most functional literacy and other skills were picked up later in life. It was only in the late nineteenth century that regular and extended school attendance became a central part of growing up for British children and not until after 1945 in Eastern and southern Europe. A principal effect of this development was to fix childhood as a definable stage of life and as a social concept. Similarly, in the West, the expansion of secondary and tertiary provision after the World Wars respectively

has helped to create modern notions of "youth" and "youth culture" with, among other attributes, distinctive tastes in printed media.

Gender. The Russian case is an extreme example of a common pattern. Males were educated to participate in the public sphere, females in the private or domestic one. This usually meant that girls gained religious knowledge, learned to read, and were given practical instruction in home-focused skills. In the Mediterranean lands, where gender roles were firmly delineated, it was long held to be positively undesirable to train girls in more than the rudiments of religion, reading, and housewifery. The legacy of such negative attitudes toward female education in those areas is clear in women's deep illiteracy well into the twentieth century. Such views are summed up in a French peasant's comment that girls in his canton (Quercy) had been taught to read, but not write, because the nuns did not want them penning love letters to their sweethearts. Reading was seen by educators as a passive skill. Writing enabled (among other things) unsupervised, long-distance communication and gave access to a different cultural world independent of teachers, pastors, family, and neighbors. Little wonder that secondary education for girls was not a serious subject of debate, let alone action, anywhere in Europe until the mid-nineteenth century—after 1868 in Spain, for example. Postelementary education for girls was only formalized in Britain from the 1850s. Previously, the daughters of the rich had been educated at home by governesses. Writing ability among women began to take off at the end of the nineteenth century in Scandinavia as they were drawn into teaching, clerical, postal, and service jobs. Even then, censorious attitudes toward educated women persisted among some sections of public opinion. Simply being literate was not always enough to transcend social conventions.

Because many women could only read, they did not have direct access to the full spectrum of literate culture. Worse, the growing dominance of written and printed forms in late-nineteenth-century Europe involved simultaneously devaluing the oral traditions of women and the elderly of both sexes, social groups who were commonly left behind in periods of rapidly advancing literacy. However, the presence of informal cultural intermediaries meant illiterates were never wholly isolated from the world of print and writing. Inability to decipher letters and words did not preclude access to the products of literacy. In the city factories and in the squares of small towns and villages of early-twentieth-century Spain and Portugal, newspapers might be read aloud by one person to anyone who cared to listen. Varieties of oral tradition survive

in the mainstream until today, complementing rather than substituting for these traditions.

Linguistic variety. Intermediaries might bridge the gap between literate and oral culture, but the possibilities that literacy could open up usually depended on an individual possessing it for him or her self. In assessing why some areas or populations were less accomplished than others, it is hard to exaggerate how important linguistic variety could be. If education and writing or publishing were conducted in a language different from that of everyday life, literacy tended to suffer. Italy had had a relatively uniform written lan-

guage since the late Middle Ages, but a great diversity of spoken tongues: just 2.5 percent of Italy's population spoke "Italian" (Tuscan) with any fluency in 1861. Four-fifths of the inhabitants of Wales were habitual Welsh speakers as late as the 1880s, while at least a fifth of the population of France did not speak "French" (*langue d'oeil*) in 1863. It is no accident that the corners of France where Breton, Basque, and Occitan (*langue d'oc*) were the languages of everyday life were also the least literate in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Gaelic-speaking parts of the British Isles generally lagged far behind the advancing literacy of

English-speaking areas. The west of Ireland is an example. Roughly 55–60 percent of Ireland's people born in the 1770s spoke only Irish. Three quarters of those in the 12 counties of Munster, Connacht, and Donegal (with 45 percent of the population) were Irish speakers at the end of the eighteenth century compared with just 10 percent in the remaining 20 counties with 55 percent of Ireland's people. Irish speaking was low and literacy probably high in north-east Ireland even in the early eighteenth century because of the prevalence of English-speaking Presbyterians, many of them of Scots origin or descent. This example reminds us that language is not the whole explanation of literacy trends. Different religious priorities, a more balanced wealth distribution and greater aggregate prosperity in this region also contributed.

Irish was an oral and manuscript language, writing being confined to a very small learned class (almost a caste) in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. English possessed these attributes, but it was also a printed language and the medium of education. During the eighteenth century printed literature for Irish speakers was developed (albeit slowly) by Dublin publishers using a phonetic spelling based on English language orthography. This helped bring about growing English language literacy, but it also contributed to the decline of spoken and written Irish because print-literacy in Irish was secured through English, even for Irish speakers. There were almost no secular works printed in Irish during the eighteenth century and very few religious ones. Other parts of the so-called "Celtic fringe" experienced different fortunes. From the mid-seventeenth century, northwestern French Catholics used printed religious literature in Breton to further the Counter-Reformation, thus fueling the development of reading and writing in the language of everyday speech. Breton was not the language of education, but it was part of everyday religious life and this helped secure higher levels of literacy. Welsh became more deeply embedded as a literate language for this reason too, and because there was more literature available. There was a full Welsh Bible in 1588 and three thousand works printed prior to 1820 compared with fewer than two hundred in Irish. In the southern Low Countries at the end of the eighteenth century illiteracy was higher along linguistic frontiers and in mixed areas. However, the context here was also created by a legacy of ecclesiastical conflict and political fracture, which made education and literacy a weapon as much as a prize.

The state. Since 1500 Europe has seen the retreat of dialects and of separate languages like Gaelic, turning some from majority into minority tongues. Even

in the late twentieth century, Europe had a sort of "fault line" between the speakers of Romance languages like French and Italian, and Teutonic ones like German (or its dialects like Alsatian). The influence over time of the state and of printed and later electronic media has been to standardize language as, say, French or German, leaving only the older generation speaking dialect variations. Attempts to revive regional dialects, suppressed or surrendered through political and economic change between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, began in the early nineteenth century. A Provençal revival led to the foundation in 1854 of the *Félibrige*—a society of regional poets who sought to codify and purify Occitan and to restore its usage by promoting it in literary works. Such movements remained uncommon compared with the late twentieth century. Gaelic was the first language of perhaps 50 percent of Scots around 1400, 30 percent in 1689, but just 20 percent in 1806. Gaelic-speaking

in the Highlands of Scotland continued to decline throughout the nineteenth century as monoglots recognized the powerful advantages to be gained from literacy in English. At the end of the twentieth century, Gaelic in modern Scotland was spoken by just two percent of the population (most of them in the urbanized region of Strathclyde), having being artificially resuscitated in the guise of an independent “national” language—although it was never spoken by all Scots, even in the Middle Ages.

In the historical case of the *Félibrige*, language was used to assert particularism, in the modern case of Gaelic, nationalism. Historically, it was more often an alien imposition designed to create a “national” identity. For example, German was forcibly reintroduced as the language of government and teaching in the Hungarian lands from 1849–1867 following earlier efforts to Magyarize the country. From the 1880s a revived campaign used Magyar in elementary schools while secondary schools taught “national consciousness.” The country’s 92 teacher-training colleges used Magyar exclusively. However, this was not just against the German-speaking Austrian empire, but was also done at the expense of Rumanians, Ruthenes, and Slovaks. The effect was slow to be felt. Around 1880, 14 percent of Hungarians spoke Magyar and 23 percent in 1910 but, significantly, 90 percent of university students. Modern Swiss cantons allow the local majority the right to dictate the language used in courts and schools, but it is harder to learn in a language that is not used in everyday discourse. Both the modern Swiss example and the Hungarian one of the late nineteenth century were seen by some minorities as not only hindering literacy, but also as an unwelcome form of “linguistic cleansing.”

However robust the generalizations about language and literacy, neither linguistic pluralism nor the spread of a dominant tongue necessarily meant low or only slowly improving literacy. German was the vernacular in the Alagna region north of Turin (near the modern Swiss frontier) until relegated to the home by the spread of Italian during the nineteenth century. The region also suffered other apparent disadvantages such as few settled schools and a dispersed, largely agricultural population. Yet, more than four-fifths of confraternity members, albeit from a privileged section of society, who subscribed a document in 1781 did so with their full names. The need of inhabitants of the Alpine foothills to migrate seasonally in order to find work and their location in an interstitial zone helped foster demand for multilingual literacy. In contested regions that frequently changed hands between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries—northern Italy is one example, Lithuania another—the lan-

guages of public affairs and education might change more than once in a generation. Overlying this were more enduring cultural relations with a single culture such as German. Ecclesiastical visitations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries revealed extensive possession of books in German and of manuscript (heretical) religious works. A long, heretically based tradition of vernacular literacy in manuscript and print may also help to explain the phenomenon, notably in the former Waldensian areas of northern Italy. Certainly, the Alagna district seems to have been unusually literate in the eighteenth century, the statistics backed up by contemporary comment. However, the advantages were selective, for high male literacy could coexist with low female, even in an area so apparently well-favored. In subscribed marriage registers, beginning in the 1840s, nearly all grooms could sign, but less than half of brides.

USES AND IMPLICATIONS

Being able to use a pen or decipher letters and words on a page opens up new possibilities. Literacy has economic and cultural uses, the latter including recreational and religious dimensions. The quantity of books grew from the Renaissance onward, and qualitative changes in their uses occurred, notably in the eighteenth century. Until the latter period, reading involved an intensive perusal of a small number of texts; thereafter readers sought out multiple titles and novel subjects. However, mass literacy does not necessarily mean the widespread functional use of literacy. For the majority of early-nineteenth-century Europeans, the literacy they possessed was a blunt tool, quite insufficient to reshape their lives. In western Europe as late as 1900 the ability to read and write fluently was confined to town-dwelling men of middle class status or above. Furthermore, while literacy potentially offered a singular commodity, the ways in which people related to its products were emphatically plural. Reading, as much as writing, was a creative process which involved selective appropriation.

Germany had businesses that typeset, printed, and sold books and pamphlets in most major towns by 1520, producing an unprecedented outpouring—perhaps 300 thousand copies of Luther’s writings, 1517–1520. From the dawn of the Reformation new religious ideas were available to the reading public. By 1530 perhaps 4 thousand pamphlet titles had been produced in Germany and over the sixteenth century as many as 200 million copies may have been turned out Europe-wide. They could be bought from publishers or shops and stalls in towns, from itinerant

peddlers in the countryside. For all faiths religious titles made up the bulk of books owned until the Enlightenment. Across southwest Germany, works of modern literature were largely to be found in the libraries of the upper classes. Even in the closing decades of the eighteenth century, no more than a fifth of books owned by people from Tübingen had an obviously secular tone and in the Württemberg village of Laichingen the figure was close to zero; more than a half of books owned were spiritually oriented. Book ownership was largely informed by the Lutheran revivalist movement called Pietism rather than by Enlightenment precepts. This does not mean that change was not occurring, for it may be that eighteenth-century people were more interested in devotions and meditations on practical morality rather than on old-style divinity.

More obvious changes, like secularization, that were associated with new developments in thought can nevertheless be detected in book collections. Pious books made up nearly half those owned at death in nine western French towns around 1700, compared with less than 30 percent in 1789. Another aspect of changing tastes was the new value placed on originality and novelty. The real growth area in reading material was not the staple texts, which people perused closely, but the more varied, ephemeral, and entertaining fare that was becoming available. Between 1700 and 1789 there were published 1,200 French-language periodicals of at least one year's duration. History and travel books became more popular. Also in France, pornography became a mature genre.

While the fully literate indulged themselves in its novelties, the semiliterate remained within their traditional mental world. In his autobiography, Goethe recounted childhood memories of enjoying a chapbook literature of magic, chivalry, and saints, which had changed little for centuries. Educational reformers were not slow to condemn the youthful preferences exemplified by Goethe. Whatever their faith in literacy (some argued that the poor should not be educated lest they got ideas above their station), its advocates from Luther onward can be found bemoaning the uses to which people put its products. It was cheap recreational pamphlets of perhaps thirty pages, known collectively as the *bibliothèque bleue* after the blue paper used as binding, which provided mass reading in France between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Russian peasants who read newspapers in the 1890s were interested mainly in sensational events like wars or natural curiosities. The poet Matvei Ivanovich Ozhegov (1860–1933) wrote of peasant readers being interested only in “the news of the evils of the day or about the birth of a dog with

twenty heads.” Saints’ lives remained the most popular mass-commercially-produced reading in early-twentieth-century Russia, long after more secular items had taken their place in the west. Yet, reading tastes were changing, as shown by the explosion in detective and adventure stories after the 1905 Revolution and of “women’s novels” from the 1910s. The lesson here is that making people literate is one thing, controlling what they do with their abilities is quite another. Most people used their literacy primarily for recreation. In the 1970s a tenth of Russia’s population never read a newspaper and a fifth hardly ever read books. For those who did, the focus on practical and escapist literature of a century ago remains, a pattern replicated in the west.

By the end of the Napoleonic wars the population of the urbanized provinces of Holland had come within easy reach of books and newspapers, even if most readers still preferred almanacs, chapbooks, and broadsheets. In contrast, rapid growth in the volume of novels and newspapers did not begin in Finland until the 1880s and 1890s. Norwegian postal subscriptions to such materials grew from 11 million items a year in 1880 to 56 million by 1900—this in a country where reading had supposedly been universal for over a century. Even then, the reading public for serious literature and current affairs was restricted to the prosperous urban middle and upper classes. Norway had 185 public libraries in 1837, but roughly 300 by 1860, almost all in small towns. In late-nineteenth-century France and Germany too, most subscribers to books and periodicals were townspeople and it is unlikely that most rural dwellers saw reading and writing as central parts of their economic, social, or cultural lives before the twentieth century. Literacy surely created the potential for increased cultural participation, but it could take a long time to be realized.

People were using their literacy more extensively as the nineteenth century progressed. All the journals printed in Paris in 1840 amounted to 3 million copies, but by 1882 44 million were being produced. Table 2, based on the *Statistique Générale du Service Postal*, gives the number of stamped letters and postcards sent per head of population in selected European countries in 1886 and 1900. This is not purely an indicator of the use of literacy because the density and reliability of the postal network also played its part. The German imperial postal service had already developed quite extensively by the mid-seventeenth century, but competition from the posts of individual states produced an increasingly dense and frequent (if no quicker) network thereafter. Two points are clear, however: first, in almost all of Europe, increased letter sending; second, the marked differences between the “core” coun-



TABLE 2
NUMBER OF STAMPED LETTERS AND
POSTCARDS SENT PER HEAD OF
POPULATION

	1886	1900
Belgium	17	26
France	15	22
Germany	20	44
Great Britain	45	67
Greece	2	2
Italy	6	12
Netherlands	18	26
Portugal	4	7
Russia	1	3
Switzerland	26	49

tries of western Europe and those on its eastern and southern fringes.

What was in the correspondence? Dictionaries were not widely used among the population at large until the nineteenth century. While copying was a central part of writing instruction, only the best-educated used standard spelling in their composition anywhere in Europe until the twentieth century. A careful study of writing among Danish soldiers was carried out by the Reverend J. L. Bang in 1882. He found that 32 percent could write well and 47 percent adequately, but only a fifth had good spelling and 44 percent were unsatisfactory. Of course, as long as what was written was understood, few letter writers worried about correct forms. Denmark was the first Scandinavian country to institute compulsory writing instruction in schools (1814), followed by Norway in 1827, Sweden in 1842, Finland in 1866, and Iceland in 1907. Most children were taught “passive” skills like reading. For example, a survey of over a thousand Danish rural schools in 1848, the year of revolutions across Europe, showed that 99 percent taught reading and 92 percent the rudiments of spelling (needed for writing). However, composition was taught in only a handful of schools and then only to the gifted few. This is reflected in the restricted use of writing among the population at large. For example, Danish rural diaries (*Bondedagbøger*) prior to 1850 record simple facts and were almost all written by affluent peasants.

Thereafter, these writings become more abstract and reflective (especially about religion). More cottagers and artisans, and for the first time women began to keep such personal records in the second half of the nineteenth century. Extensive use of literacy was spreading rapidly among more social groups in late-nineteenth-century northern Europe.

Religion. Issues of grammar and orthography illustrate that, even among the literate, the ways people related to writing could differ. We can also identify qualitative differences in the uses and importance of literacy that distinguished, for example, Protestants from Catholics. Reading the Scriptures was central to the reformed faith. Religious books were probably read more frequently among Protestants and the very status of reading was special. Studies of eastern France in the seventeenth century have shown that, despite having comparable basic literacy, Protestants tended to own more books on a wider variety of religious topics than their Catholic neighbors and to use them differently. Protestants accepted the overwhelming authority of what they knew or thought was in a religious book.

This does not mean that we should condemn Catholicism as obscurantist and antireading. Catholic leaders wanted literacy to spread, but in a controlled way, with the priest as intermediary in the process of understanding. They regarded some types of reading as a threat, rather than an invitation, to sound beliefs. An Italian priest, writing around 1530, could claim that “all literate people are heretics.” Indeed, it is plain that being unable to read was construed by authorities in, for example, eighteenth-century Spain and Bohemia as a sign of Catholic orthodoxy, immunizing from contamination by this powerful force. Simply possessing a book was a sign of heresy. In short, there is no conclusive proof of the direction of the relationship between Protestantism and literacy, but the bond was stronger than that between Catholicism and literacy.

Limited literacy was not necessarily an obstacle to Catholic religious instruction. Illiteracy may have been an increasing disadvantage in everyday life, but the extent of any handicap was not uniform in all contexts or in all parts of Europe. Generally only the church imposed direct penalties on those without the rudiments of reading and religious knowledge. Illiterates might be refused religious rites such as communion or marriage in church—as in Sweden from 1686 and in Saxony from 1802. Literacy was not formally required for political participation and even in highly literate countries the franchise remained in any case highly restricted. One percent of

adult males in Scotland could vote in parliamentary elections in the 1780s and 13 percent after the Reform Bill of 1832; just one Dutchman in ten could vote in 1853.

Advantages of literacy. In the course of the nineteenth century the practical, civil disadvantages of illiteracy became more apparent. After 1874 Russian conscripts who could prove they had been to school and had basic literacy were allowed to leave the military sooner than illiterates. Other countries used recruitment to foster literacy. The French army favored literate conscripts after 1872 and provided further training for soldiers. The rate of illiteracy among recruits to the Italian army fell much more rapidly than among the population at large: from 59 percent in 1870 to just 10 percent in 1913. For comparison, Swiss recruits had illiteracy as low as 6 percent in 1879 and 1 percent in 1900.

Access to the written or printed word could open up new horizons. Until the 1870s emigrants to North America came from Europe's most literate and economically developed countries. Within Europe, migrants to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century cities were generally more literate than those who remained in the countryside. Was it literacy that made them move or was this desire to learn part of a wider set of

dynamic personality traits? French, Spanish, and Greek people who arrived in North America in the 1890s were much more literate than those who stayed in the old country. In contrast, Austrian, Belgian, German, and Italian emigrants mirrored the abilities of their former compatriots. Irish who emigrated to North America showed above-average literacy, but those who went across to Britain were indistinguishable in this respect from those in the counties they had left. Contemporary migrants toward Europe's eastern limits seem to have depended less on literacy (almost all were illiterate peasants) than on possessing an independent and pioneering spirit.

Those who stayed behind in Europe were not blind to the value of education and literacy. A marginal annotation made in a Bulgarian liturgical book in 1834 reads: "You should care for education not money, for education brings money." By the end of the nineteenth century in western Europe simply being able to read and write made little difference to a person's chances of being upwardly socially mobile. However, basic literacy may have helped to prevent those from the lower classes being adversely affected by a changing job market. The most pronounced benefits came increasingly from higher-quality literacy associated with prolonged schooling and the possession of certification to that effect.

Education. During the nineteenth century education was also increasingly seen as a pathway to political participation, for example among the Norwegian workmen's associations who founded schools from the 1850s. Like workers all over Europe after the Revolutions of 1848, they recognized that education was one way of winning knowledge and freedom, of creating a sense of collective "class" identity while maximizing their potential as individuals. Optimism was tempered by experience. In the first flush of Italian revolutionary fervor during the 1790s and 1800s radicals advocated mass education in the principles of democracy. Later revolutionaries like Giuseppe Mazzini recognized that only the urban classes would be likely to pick up his propaganda. He was pessimistic about the opportunities to use literacy in the cause of political reform. He wrote: "As for speaking to the people . . . I would speak: but the paths are lacking, and we wander around in a circle . . . The people cannot read." Sicilian radicals of the mid-nineteenth century advocated extending the franchise to all men, but only those who could read and write.

The connection between politics and literacy is shown in twentieth-century Russia, but so too is the politicization of literacy. Lenin, the son of a school inspector, believed that "the illiterate person stands outside politics." Postrevolutionary Russia built on an existing liberal drive to promote learning and a growing mass desire for literacy and its products. Under Stalin, education made strong advances, but this was in the context of tight censorship and an obsession with the inculcation of political orthodoxy, including a vigorous attack on religion. Against a background of forced collectivization of the peasantry, rising literacy in 1930s Russia did not imply an invitation to understand and change the world in which the Soviets lived or to emancipate self and society, but a demand that they approve of an existing system.

There are other examples of literacy and education acting for stability rather than change. Take the example of the "fertility transition," which affected all parts of Europe between roughly 1870 and 1910. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, contraception was not widely practiced among the population at large. Couples could not, or did not, limit the number of children a woman would bear during her fertile years. The age at which a woman married for the first time was the primary determinant of fertility. The adoption of modern birth-control methods brought about a drastic reduction in fertility within marriage, couples had fewer children, and their standard of living improved as a result.

In some parts of Europe the relationship we might assume between education and modern attitudes

is borne out. Regions of Italy and Spain with high basic literacy had low marital fertility by the early twentieth century, but in Germany the low illiteracy of adult males was only one precondition of an early and large reduction of marital fertility. In Brabant prior to 1920 it was in general only literate couples whose parents and grandparents had been literate who adopted new ways of limiting family size. In Portugal the expected relationship is reversed: marital fertility in 1930 and 1960 was lower in the less literate southern provinces than in the north. Indeed, we can turn the relationship between literacy and modernity on its head. Ron Lesthaeghe's *The Decline of Belgian Fertility* (Princeton, 1977, p. 194) concludes that: "the eradication of illiteracy through the development of primary-school education contributed more to the continuity of the existing moral norms than to their change . . . the degree of literacy in Belgium could be a better indicator of traditionalism than of modernization." Education and the literacy it brings is almost never value-free.

The Belgian example reminds us that education by itself may do little to alter the way people think. It can liberate an individual or society, but it can also be used to police attitudes and behavior. Its effect depends on whether the prevailing ideology supports continuity or change. The Belgian Catholic church effectively monopolized education in rural areas as late as 1900. Educational provision was excellent and illiteracy among adults under age 55 years was almost unknown by 1910. But the church was able to damp down changes in the moral climate that might have encouraged greater use of contraception.

At the same time, people may think or rationalize in a way that is "modern" thanks to their education, but behave traditionally because of the way they were socialized outside school. Literacy's growth may therefore sometimes have had limited effects. A further example is the continued dominance of middle-aged and older males in periods when their juniors were rapidly becoming literate. Reading ability was nearly universal among the under-fifties in mid-eighteenth-century Finland, but half the over-sixties could not read from the Bible. Illiteracy among Belgian men aged under 30 years was a fifth in 1880 compared with over a half for those aged over 80 years. But age brought wealth, status, and power in patriarchal families and communities, which illiteracy did little to diminish. It is the overall context of a society that makes literacy important or otherwise.

CONCLUSION

The areas and social groups that saw early and deep penetration of literacy were wealthier, more commer-

cialized, and Protestant. Literacy became embedded in the society and culture of these regions and peoples, with the result that reading and writing were practiced more extensively and a “virtuous circle” was created. At different periods for different groups in different parts of Europe, the ability to read and write became a component of important areas of economic, social, political, and cultural life. In the seventeenth century, literacy was an integral part of Calvinist faith; in the eighteenth century it became central to the bourgeois and elite sociability that was a keynote of the Enlightenment; in the nineteenth century it was an agency both of political centralization and of particularism; in the twentieth century a firm connection with economic betterment became established as education and certification became synonymous.

Explaining the social and geographical distribution of literacy in historic Europe involves understanding failures as well as successes. Of the structural features of historic literacy, sex-specific differences have been all but ironed out in European countries covered by the OECD survey. The differences that remain reflect the other two historic givens, class and residence, which determine that in some countries, most obviously Poland, the population clusters into a much narrower (and lower) band of proficiency than others. Another international body, UNESCO, estimated that perhaps 15–20 percent of the population of late-twentieth-century France has some sort of literacy shortfall and perhaps 15–30 percent of Portu-

guese. “Residual” or “latent” illiteracy may exist even in nations with complete basic literacy. These figures are remarkably similar to the 10–15 percent illiteracy obtained in the more “advanced” European states of the late nineteenth century or in Russia in 1939. Perhaps at any given stage in social development after the introduction of mass education there is always a core of adults who are judged “illiterate.” The reason is clear enough for some modern groups. For example, some Turkish *Gastarbeiter* in Germany run Koranic schools for their children as a way of preserving Islamic culture, but, since the same children are legally obliged to attend German state schools, a linguistic and cultural conflict arises, which inhibits learning. Elsewhere in Europe, older generations tend to be dialect speakers (or to use archaic Gothic or “black letter” script), and European educators perceive adult illiteracy to be their greatest remaining challenge. Any group left behind by mainstream cultural change, or which is socially or geographically marginalized may be so affected. Gypsies or “traveling folk” are another example.

Many of the positive implications of changing literacy are still with us. Scandinavia’s early-modern reading campaign may be associated with the very high levels of book production there in the late twentieth century. Iceland had the largest number of published titles per capita of any Scandinavian country in the late 1980s and the highest average per capita book purchasing in Europe. Scotland’s past literacy superi-

ority may be exaggerated, but the very fact that people believe in it makes this vision of history a potent force for both continuity and change. In both tangible and intangible ways, the changing patterns of historic literacy have powerful legacies.

In the early twenty-first century, technological advances are said to be rendering obsolete the different literacies outlined above. Those with a calculator possess an electronic alternative to counting. Having access to a word processor may help us to dispense with all but a few uses of writing (including the need to authenticate by signature—and even that is being rendered unnecessary). However, television, radio, and electronic communication provide only imperfect

substitutes for the ability to read. In some cases they actually require it. Indeed, economic and technological change may require the acquisition of new literacies to compliment rather than replace traditional skills. Two or three centuries ago being able to read and write marked a person out and gave him (rarely her) many opportunities denied to the illiterate. Simultaneously, the disadvantages of illiteracy were less pronounced. Since then, there has been an inflation of qualifications required of those wishing to use education to distinguish and advance themselves. The types of literacies and the levels of achievement needed to function in a modern society and economy have increased rather than decreased.

See also other articles in this section.

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READING



Daniel P. Resnick and Jason Martinek

The ability to make sense of signs and images has been within the range of human capacity for close to five millennia, since the appearance of written scripts around 3000 to 4000 B.C. Yet for most of its history the combination of visual perception and brain processing that we call reading has been the practice and habit of elites. For Europeans, it is only since about 1500 that reading started to become the practice of substantial numbers of ordinary people.

Social historians have understood reading as an interaction between reader and text in specific social contexts. In arguing for this position, they deviate from narrower theories of context-free cognitive processing advanced by cognitivists. Historians have argued, for example, that the understanding of biblical texts of a voracious reader like the mid-sixteenth century miller Menocchio can be explained only by a careful examination of both his own life experience and the other books that he had read (Ginzburg, 1976). Less idiosyncratic readers in other times and settings have also brought to their texts lived experiences that have affected their way of referencing oral and written traditions.

But why read? Reading was a choice that increasing numbers of Europeans made to engage themselves in particular communities, real and imagined. Women and men, churchmen and nobles, clerks and secular administrators, merchants and artisans, and rural villagers and vagabonds did so for many different reasons. For some it was a necessary skill to make a livelihood, for others a way to challenge authority, but for many, largely among the young, it was a demand imposed upon them, intended to legitimate and uphold clerical and later secular authority. Nevertheless, reading had the potential to offer escape from the isolation of individual experience and to bind readers to a larger social body. To a real extent, the languages in which reading took place were binding readers to linguistic, national, religious, and economic communities (Anderson, 1991).

Despite advances in the accessibility of texts and the growth of opportunities for schooling over the last

five hundred years, reading has persisted as a bounded “low literacy” experience for most of the European population, associated with the decoding of relatively simple and familiar texts. At the same time, a “high literacy” tradition—associated with unfamiliar texts, complex construction, inferential reasoning, and solitary reflection—has persisted for elites.

GROWING ACCESSIBILITY OF TEXT BEFORE 1500

Since the time of the first Sumerian tablets, reading had been understood as a vocal, difficult, and time-consuming exercise in which readers sounded out the text (Mangrue, 1997). Although some scholarly readers in the late Roman and medieval periods had been silent readers thanks to their familiarity with linguistic constructions and specific texts, most readers had had to turn written language into spoken words before they could understand it. No “take-off” for reading could take place without a more rapid and silent processing. The first steps in this direction were taken for Latin by the twelfth century and for the vernaculars of Europe in the three centuries that followed.

The vernacular languages became accessible to the reader through changes in the appearance of text. In the interest of more readers and easier reading, publishers of manuscripts copied by commissioned scribes changed the shapes and forms of letters, making them simpler and more distinct. The reader was helped along not only by the clean look of the letters, but by spaces between words, punctuation, and separations between paragraphs.

The alphabets of the European languages distinguished between vowels and consonants and made a place for both. The inclusion of vowel sounds made it possible for written languages and dialects to capture the vocabulary and usage of oral exchanges. At the same time, the accessibility of script was also advanced by changes in the appearance of text. Scripts were standardized and simplified, words were sepa-

rated, spaces appeared between sentences and paragraphs. In this way written text became very accessible to novice readers. By the mid-fifteenth century, it was possible to read vernacular texts—French, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, and German, high and low, and in many dialects—as a silent reader (Saenger, 1989).

Silent reading, in turn, gave readers the possibility of moving through text discreetly, without alerting others to what they were encountering. In an age preoccupied with challenges to orthodoxy and rife with real and perceived heresies, this was very important. But silent reading did not bring about the demise of oral tradition or a wave of independent and critical challenge to received orthodoxies. Reading aloud to others continued to be a popular practice, whether in the home or the church, for instruction, entertainment, and information. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France and Germany, for example, men and women would listen to readers of stories as they worked evenings in homes and workrooms.

In the age of radio and then television, paid readers and broadcasters have continued the oral tradition so important to the spread of a rudimentary basic literacy. Religious programming, human interest stories, tales of heroic feats, and gossip about the well-to-do have remained the staples in the new media, relaying information that passes at the same time through newspapers and workplace conversations. The fears of early modern clerics and nineteenth-century social elites that the spread of reading would introduce novel and challenging ideas to a large public and thereby undermine authority has not been confirmed, although the spread of literacy has been associated with modernization, democracy, and economic growth.

READING IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

Communication in sixteenth-century Europe remained largely oral. Estimates of those who could read are low and tell us little about the kinds of reading ability people had. Such estimates are based largely on the ability to sign one's name, an indicator of the ability to read that is useful in charting poorly mapped waters but not a reliable indicator. Perhaps only 3 to 4 percent of the population in German-speaking rural areas and 10 percent in towns could read (Engelsing, 1974). In England, we can estimate that possible readers were no more than 10 percent of the male population and a much smaller portion of women (Cressy, 1980). In Italian cities like Venice, which had enjoyed considerable commercial growth in preceding centu-

ries, reading rates were higher but did not embrace more than 25 percent of the male population.

Reformation and counter-reformation. Gutenberg's invention of the printing press in 1450, which in fact built on earlier European work and the Chinese precedent, began to increase the amount of reading material available in ways that would ultimately expand potential readership. Most initial printed material was religious, and it was the change in Europe's religious map, more than the new technology, that really launched a new stage in the social history of reading. The first movements to extend reading practice in northern Europe were led by religious reformers and their state backers in the first decades of the sixteenth century, when large portions of northern Europe rejected the hegemony of the Roman church in matters of creed, sacrament, and religious organization. Reformers made sermons, distributed flyers designed for public discussion, and argued for a revival of the early church practice of catechism, linking orality to the reading of text.

Catechism (to teach by word of mouth) had its origins in the effort to enlist recruits to Christianity in the early church and is referenced in the patristic writings. As oral instruction, it took on forms that were appropriate to the absence of written text: memorization, drill, and repetition of a set of beliefs. Later on, manuals for confessors developed the practice of defining what was to be learned by sets of questions and answers, which were also to be memorized.

Catechetical instruction in some form was maintained as a priestly obligation throughout the medieval period, and it served as the principal form of primary education. Manuscript texts were useful to priests and clerks engaged in teaching, and the extant copies of catechisms, songbooks, prayers, and lives of saints are evidence of this. Instruction clearly varied in quality and form from parish to parish, but in general it had limited aims.

Martin Luther's (1483–1546) own visits to parishes in Saxony in the 1520's had convinced him that religious instruction was moribund and that a new set of written guides to instruction was necessary for both pastors and laity. In the ferment of the sixteenth century, many reformers adopted the same strategy, among them John Calvin (1509–1564) and Johann Agricola (1494?–1566). In 1529, Luther published a "Little Catechism" along with an expanded one to assist in proselytizing for his movement.

The Little Catechism had a major role in guiding household reading habits in the areas of Lutheran influence. It began with the Ten Commandments, which was followed by the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's

Prayer (the Twenty-Third Psalm), and the sacraments. Reading of the text was designed to move the reader from fear of God to faith, prayer, and the promise of grace. Luther, who had demanded instruction and examination through catechism and developed texts that could guide both pastoral instruction and household reading, had many competitors in German areas that had broken with Rome (Strauss, 1978). More than a thousand catechisms have been catalogued in the holdings of the Weimar library (Reu), not counting the many that have disappeared.

Catechisms would be read on Sundays in churches and practiced in homes throughout the year, while schoolmasters used them as texts for their classes. Examinations of the young on their catechisms became a regular Lenten spring ritual for public authorities in the lands where Lutheranism was a state religion. The texts of these recitations were extended in some cases to embrace information about rulers, governments, and systems of justice. Public examinations on catechism thus served as civic exercises. The practice of examinations and home visitations was carried on into the eighteenth century in Lutheran Sweden, as confirmed by parish registers (Johansson, 1977).

Instruction in catechism had its own particular forms, associated with oral repetition, familiar text, and a set of memorized questions and answers. The blinders placed on reading by the outlook of catechetical instruction are well expressed in the observations of Tettelbach, a pastor and teacher in Saxony, in 1568:

I have been noticing that schoolboys and other children merely memorize this precious book. This is a praiseworthy thing to do, to be sure. But they remember it without having thought or reflected on what it means, and they parrot the words with so little feeling that when one asks them a question about it, they can't explain even the simplest thing. (Strauss, p. 174)

Roman Catholic authorities, responding to the wave of challenges to orthodox belief and practice, developed and encouraged use of specially prepared digests of religious material and continued to limit the access of the laity to the Bible in the vernacular (Julia, in Cavallo and Chartier, 1999). Both Catholic and Protestant communities relied on guided reading of printed catechisms along with inspirational lives, prayers, and hymns. Direct access to the Bible itself, which Luther had at first promoted, was for some time opposed by both Catholic and Lutheran authorities and promoted only by those who were willing to leave interpretation of the texts open to the lay reader.

Vernacular translations of the Bible remained on the Index for two hundred years. Pius IV's (1499–

1565) Index of Prohibited Books (1559) permitted reading of the Bible in translation by only two categories of readers. The first to receive this exemption were those who had the permission of their bishop and the support of their parish priest and confessor. The second group was the scholarly community—“learned and pious men” who were said to be “able to draw from that reading not harm but some increase of faith and piety.”

Humanist elites. Humanists were a major part of the book buying market in these two centuries. They were noblemen, clerics, rulers, scholars, and civil administrators, people of some means who fostered the revival of respect for the contributions of Greece and Rome to later European values and institutions. As readers they identified with the Greek and Roman tradition in literature, history, and public administration. They were part of a movement to promote access to Greek and Roman texts in largely vernacular languages, a movement that began in the Italian city-states and spread throughout Europe. Although some, like Erasmus (1466?–1536) played a role in religious reform, many had markedly secular tastes.

Humanists called for major changes in the format of the book, the appearance of the page, and the variety of published texts, even before the introduction of the printing press (Grafton, 1997). They wanted and got small portable books, pleasing fonts, and a long list of titles. They promoted the habit and practice of reading in ways that affected the availability of varied reading material for all social classes. The genres of non-religious texts that they demanded, particularly romances and picaresque fiction, appeared in inexpensive editions for regional urban markets in the seventeenth century and then circulated more widely by the end of next century.

Humanist readers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, before and after the introduction of the printing press, had an interactive and dynamic relationship with the publishers, middlemen, and printers who invested in the production and inventory of codex manuscripts and then printed books. As humanists reviving an interest in antiquity, their tastes ran predominantly to ancient Greek and Roman histories, literature, poetry, plays, biography, and autobiography of writers of antiquity, but they also read medieval Christian writers. They wanted to read the texts without the mediating apparatus of glosses on the page prescribing interpretation and the barriers to accessibility created by large, dark Gothic typefaces.

Reading had five characteristic features for the humanists. First, it was a social practice. They liked to discuss what they had read, hold symposia, and entertain one another with debates and readings. In succeeding centuries the practices they cultivated found their way into political discourse, entertainment, and the practices of book clubs and debating societies. Second, reading was used to shape and train memory. It was often simply the first step in a process that led to the memorization of a particular text. The recall and recitation skills of Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540–1609) and other sixteenth-century humanists were a source of celebrity among contemporaries.

Reading was also a step in the growth of personal knowledge, to be cemented by note-taking, copying, and paraphrasing. The personal libraries of humanists indicate their pride in creating their own comments and glosses on texts. “Whatever you read,” wrote Guarino of Verona (1374?–1460) to a pupil, “have a notebook ready.” Fourth, reading was an act of veneration. Just as the reading of lives of saints had shown consideration for Christian holiness, so did the reading of Greek and Roman literature and history indicate a reverence for the wisdom of pre-Christian antiquity. Readers of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) on Livy, like those who read Erasmus’s *Adages*

(1500), were brought to deference by the act of reading.

Finally, reading was very often the occasion for tasteful and showy investment. Readers were eager to display to contemporaries and posterity the evidence of their personal reading tastes. The ornate covers and bindings of texts in humanist libraries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, like the reader’s comments on the pages, served as evidence of the association of reading and artful display. Jean Grolier de Servières (1479–1565), a leading French collector of the sixteenth century, inscribed in Latin on the cover of handsomely bound leather volumes that they were intended for the use of Grolier and his friends (British Museum, 1965).

The pedagogy of catechism heavily influenced the secular schools that were set up in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The German school system in Prussia, Bavaria, and other states established in the second half of the nineteenth century and greatly admired by the other European states was deeply rooted in the relationship between religious bodies and state power in the period of the Reformation.

READING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: 1600–1900

Reading was not simply a solitary transaction between a reader and a text; the relationship between reading and social change was complex. On the one hand there were the interactions between readers, authors, and texts. Printed texts allowed authors who would have had a limited impact as individuals in preliterate societies to broadcast ideas widely. Texts could also provide political movements with a thread of ideological cohesion by providing individual readers with a shared set of beliefs and understanding of what was wrong with society and how to change it.

On the other hand there were interactions between readers, lived experience, and censorship. Reading could only lead to action if readers made a connection between the ideas contained in printed texts and their own experience. The viability of political tracts depended on readers’ ability to believe what authors told them. Viability also depended on readers’ access to printed material, which the state, because it had the most to lose from wide dissemination, tried to limit through strict censorship. When the state’s ability to control what got printed and read was compromised, as occurred in England between 1640 and 1660, the world, as Christopher Hill has noted, could be turned upside down (Hill, 1972).

Prior to the English Revolution, the state's activities were shrouded under a veil of secrecy and privilege. Although newsbooks, the precursors to the modern newspaper, began appearing in the 1620s, readers learned little about domestic affairs from them because it was illegal to report on such matters. Instead, readers found information about events in other countries, in which merchants, the major consumers of the early newsbooks, had a great interest because their livelihoods depended on foreign trade. In the 1640s, however, the content of the newsbooks changed with the failure of the state, despite its own best efforts, to control what got into print.

Thus, what had previously been the private deliberations of the state became a matter of public discourse. This emergence of what historians have called the public sphere (Zaret, 2000) was due to the breakdown of censorship in the 1640s and 1650s, the wider availability of printed materials of an overtly political nature, increased literacy rates, and a heightened interest in political issues. In the public sphere, readers came together to discuss and debate arguments presented in journals, periodicals, and books. Collectively, these readers became the target for competing groups vying for power during the English Revolution.

The war between Parliamentarians and Royalists and among the factions in the Parliament was as much a war in print as a physical one. The war in print took two distinct forms. The first was a battle of righteousness and citation. Both sides tried to win over readers by using the Bible and religious imagery. "In the turmoil of the seventeenth century," wrote Hill, "the Bible became a sword to divide, or rather an armoury from which all parties selected weapons to meet their needs" (Hill, 1993, p. 6).

In a second arena, factions fought to win over readers through gossip, innuendo, and occasionally pornography. In the process, they borrowed deeply from oral traditions of gossip, bawdiness, and defamation. Printed gossip was passed on predominantly through newsbooks. In these newsbooks readers found detailed descriptions of the other side's transgressions and a view of events that reflected their prejudices, beliefs, and interests. The Parliamentarians' *Mercurius Britannicus* and the Royalists' *Mercurius Aulicus* carried on this war in the 1640s, at the same time that their troops took their arguments to the battlefield.

The use of the printed word to mobilize readers took place at the periphery as well as the political center. Levellers, Diggers, Ranters, and millenarian sects such as the Fifth Monarchy Men, who called for the abolition of the monarchy, the established church, and class distinctions, all used the printed word to

attract supporters. Like the Parliamentarians and Royalists, they looked to the Bible for validation. In Acts 4:32, Gerrard Winstanley (1609?–1660?), a leading Digger, found support for his attack on private property: "All the believers were one in heart and mind. No one claimed that any of his possessions was his own, but they shared everything they had."

Reading clearly helped to fuel the French Revolution. Individuals have long noted the significance of reading to the revolutionary fervor of the late eighteenth century. The revolutionary texts in France were the great texts of the Enlightenment, authored by such men of letters as Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet, 1694–1778) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), but influenced by Roman republican texts and classical example. Their texts criticized the absolutist state on what they saw as rational, not religious grounds. Readers found in these authors' texts an alternative way to construct society.

Voltaire's *Letters Concerning the English Nation* (1733, known in French as *Lettres philosophiques*), written during his exile to England, praised English customs, institutions, and intellectual life. The book's major implication was not lost on French readers; French customs, institutions, and intellectual life were, it suggested, far inferior to their English counterparts. French authorities suppressed the book and Voltaire was forced to flee Paris. Rousseau's work raised similar questions about the foundation upon which French society rested. In *The Social Contract* (1762), Rousseau argued that a legitimate government was one that rested on common consent, not oppression. Maximilien Robespierre (1758–1794) and other leaders of the French Revolution acknowledged a debt to Rousseau.

That such texts shaped readers' minds is clear by the lengths to which the state worked to suppress them. They were placed in the same category as pornography and censored as "bad books." Reading was dangerous precisely because it could lead readers to challenge the status quo.

Once the revolution started, the number of newspapers read and circulated increased dramatically. Readers found in these newspapers reports on the activities of the legislative body. Although politician publicists like Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville (1754–1793) envisioned newspapers as a means of establishing political legitimacy—"One can teach the same truth at the same moment to millions of men"—quite the opposite was actually the case. Newspapers presented a government being torn apart by internecine strife. Hence, just as reading could help inspire revolution, it could also work to undermine it (Popkin, 1990).

In the nineteenth century leaders of social movements continued to turn to readers for support and legitimacy, whether through newspapers, pamphlets, flyers, or books. Books such as August Bebel's (1840–1913) *Woman under Socialism* (1883) went through dozens of editions and reached many thousands of readers. Many leaders of the German Social Democratic party were also editors of newspapers. In Britain in the 1890s Robert Blatchford, who claimed to have been converted to socialism through reading, published one of the most popular socialist newspapers of the day, *The Clarion*. Reading never completely replaced the more traditional way of transmitting ideas—conversations in the market and workplace, political meetings, strikes, and demonstrations. But it raised the distinct possibility of reaching more dispersed populations over a more extended area than any speech ever could.

READING IN LIBRARIES

Until the nineteenth century, books were too expensive for all but wealthy individuals and institutions to purchase in great number. Most Europeans, if they owned books at all, had a collection limited to a catechism or book of hours, the life of a saint, a Bible, and perhaps an almanac. Martin's examination of 400 estate inventories in Paris in the seventeenth century indicates that merchants and artisans were rarely buyers of books, and when they did own books, they

owned very few. Circulating libraries and reading cabinets appear in the eighteenth century to meet the demand for access to books without the requirement of purchase.

In the mid-eighteenth century the emergence of lending libraries and reading societies helped give readers access to a large number of texts. Middle-class readers often belonged to reading societies. In these societies, readers would have access to the latest books and journals, mostly of a political nature, which they would then discuss and debate. Unlike lending libraries, private reading societies were geared to the interests of their members. By the nineteenth century, however, reading societies were largely superseded by commercial lending libraries, which served a more heterogeneous population. (Wittmann, in Cavallo and Chartier, 1999).

In the nineteenth century municipal governments created municipal libraries, first in England and then on the continent. These libraries were aimed particularly at working-class readers and had a strong moral component. Reformers and employers hoped to elevate the moral sensibilities of the working classes, shape character, and ease social tensions. They saw the library as an uplifting alternative to the pub or alehouse, the traditional sites for male working-class leisure. Reformers discouraged workers from reading pulp fiction, urging them instead to read edifying literature. Despite these attempts, working-class reading continued to consist mostly of pulp fiction.

Even in non-capitalist countries, libraries served as a means to shape working-class minds. In the wake of the Russian Revolution, revolutionary leaders hoped to use libraries as a means to lift up workers, both morally and intellectually. One Party activist, for example, urged the citizens of Petrograd two years after the Revolution, “As the proletarian revolution wants you to be sober and clear minded you should not fail to obtain a book at your local library.” (Lerner, 1998, p. 150). As this suggests, libraries were not value-free institutions.

Finland and Iceland, known for the high literacy of their adult populations, have had active circulating libraries and reading societies since about 1800. In Finland, where the public literacy of adults is among the highest in the world and where school-age children show the highest reading performance in international comparisons, circulating and public libraries seem to have contributed to this success. With strong financial backing from the Finnish government in the twentieth century and attention to community needs, Finnish library administrators have greatly expanded their holdings for children. They work closely with schools to stimulate children to read and teach children how to use the library. They have also offered on-site services for hospital patients and residents of nursing homes. To enrich the holdings of small rural libraries they started bookmobiles. Finnish libraries may be the most patronized in Europe, registering a full 25 percent of the population in a count made thirty years ago (Hatch, 1971).

READING FOR PLEASURE AND ESCAPE: THE NOVEL 1700–1900

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there are many examples of readers who followed Luther’s counsel and focused on a religious text with great intensity. They can be considered “intensive” readers, like the character Christian in John Bunyan’s (1628–1688) *The Pilgrim’s Progress* (1678). Christian’s reading of apocalyptic portions of the Bible leads him to a catharsis of emotions and an affirmation of faith. Bunyan wanted his own readers to read his work with that same intensity, and he hoped that it would help them to find their own routes to salvation. Intensive reading involved a highly intimate relationship for readers, authors, and texts. It gave an individual reader the sense that the author’s words were spoken directly to him. The trust bound up in this relationship could lead the reader to find in the author someone who could answer his deepest and most provoking questions or even completely redirect the trajectory of his life.

Some historians, such as Engelsing, have argued that reading changed in the eighteenth century. Not only did reading matter become more varied and secular, but the way of approaching a text changed for readers. Adapting to the more abundant literature, they turned to sampling, critical engagement with many different works, and perhaps a cursory examination of some of that material. Others, such as Darn-ton and Chartier, have disputed this argument, pointing to evidence of intensive engagement with novels

in the eighteenth century and some examples of extensive reading by humanists in the two preceding centuries. One historian has even called the eighteenth century, because of its taste for the novel, a “‘revolution’ in reverse—far more ‘intensive’ than before and not in the least ‘extensive’” (Wittmann, in Cavallo and Chartier, 1999, p. 296).

Although the reading of religious texts remained an important staple of eighteenth century life, a shift had begun whereby readers increasingly turned from reading primarily for salvation to reading for information and pleasure. The growing popularity of novels, periodicals such as the *Spectator* (1711–1712), and newspapers over the course of the century demonstrates that readers’ tastes were indeed changing.

That readers had begun approaching texts more superficially is evident in the emergence of the term “skim” in the English language to refer to a practice of readers. Only in the mid-eighteenth century did the term come to mean, “to glance over, without reading closely.” According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the earliest record of the term used in this way dates to 1738 when Mary Granville Pendarves Delaney (1700–1788) described the practice in a letter to a friend: “I skimmed over [Your last letter] . . . to satisfy myself of your health.” Three years later, Isaac Watts (1674–1748) used the term in a published work titled *The Improvements of the Mind*. “Plumeo,” he wrote, “skimmed over the pages, like a swallow over the flowery meads.”

Although extensive reading certainly gained ground in the eighteenth century, intensive reading persisted, particularly in the way readers approached novels like Samuel Richardson’s (1689–1761) *Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded* (1740), Rousseau’s *La nouvelle Heloise* (1761), and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1749–1832) *The Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774). Historians have documented well the sentimental or empathetic responses these novels elicited from readers, particularly women, who were well represented among their readers.

Watt has noted the role of English women in ensuring the success of Richardson’s *Pamela*. He attributed this appeal in part to the author’s ability to write about women and their experiences with sensitivity and accuracy, far more so than any author before him. He also attributed it to the intimacy Richardson created between his readers and the text, which allowed for the “complete engrossment of their inner feelings, and the same welcome withdrawal into an imaginary world vibrant with more intimately satisfying personal relationships than ordinary life provided” (p. 196).

Darnton has shown how Rousseau’s *La Nouvelle Heloise*, which went through at least seventy printings

between 1761 and 1800, evoked a similarly strong emotional response among readers, male and female. In Germany, the emotional intensity with which readers read Goethe’s *The Sorrows of Young Werther* is widely believed to have resulted in a wave of suicides. Thus, although what readers read had changed in the eighteenth century, how they read necessarily had not; they continued to have a passionate engagement with their texts. That novels aroused readers’ emotions, however, made them a prime target for criticism. Critics also lambasted them for fostering unrealistic notions of romantic love and potentially compromising female chastity through their erotic suggestions. Novels were also imbued with the power to corrupt impressionable readers. Samuel Johnson (1709–1784) wrote that novels were “written chiefly to the young, the ignorant, and the idle, to whom they serve as lectures of conduct, and introductions into life. They are entertainment of minds unfurnished with ideas, and therefore easily susceptible of impressions.” According to Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) the long-term effects of novel reading on the mind were catastrophic. Novel reading, he believed, “occasions in time the entire destruction of the power of the mind” because it encouraged “no improvement of the intellect, but fills the mind with a mawkish and morbid sensibility which is directly hostile to the cultivation, invigoration, and enlargement of the nobler power of understanding.”

Despite critics’ best efforts, novel reading continued to be a popular leisure activity. Novels offered readers psychological mobility, opening up for them portals to other worlds. From the privacy of their own homes, individual readers could travel to the Swiss Alps, meet people from other classes, witness a bar-room brawl, or attend a fancy ball. Novels also had the power to excite, scare, titillate, or depress. In short, they provided readers with a diversion from otherwise mundane ordinary lives.

By the second half of the nineteenth century extensive reading had become the dominant mode. For the sake of bourgeois propriety, readers were expected to read not only in silence, but with greater restraint and control. A text’s success, therefore, was measured less by the feelings it evoked than its aesthetic qualities. The taming of readers’ emotions occurred simultaneously with the taming of the novel itself, a process spearheaded by writers like Jane Austen (1775–1817) and Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832). No novel better illustrates the shift that took place than Austen’s 1811 work, *Sense and Sensibility*. In this novel, sense reigns over sensibility. Even Marianne, a paragon of excessive emotionalism, settles down in the end.

The preeminent literary critic Matthew Arnold (1822–1888) codified the more restrained approach

to reading in “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time” (1864): “Everything was long seen, by the young and ardent amongst us, in inseparable connection with politics and practical life. We have pretty well exhausted the benefits of seeing things in this connection, we have got all that can be got by so seeing them. Let us try a more disinterested mode of seeing them; let us betake ourselves more to the serener life of the mind and spirit.” For Arnold, reason, not emotion, was to guide the reader.

The taste for novels was shared by urban workers who were who were emerging as readers of printed

matter of all kinds in urban centers in Europe. Their tastes did differ from those of the bourgeoisie, ranging from the sensationalistic literature of the pulp press to moral and didactic literature generated by both socialist and evangelical movements. That said, clerks, office workers, shop assistants, workers, and laborers made up almost half of the borrowers in municipal libraries in Paris in the 1880s and 1890s, and more than half of the books that circulated were novels (Lyons, p. 336). The sheer proliferation of printed materials made it impossible to go back to the heyday of intensive reading.

READING FOR UTILITY AND INFORMATION

By the eighteenth century Europeans received so much information by way of the printed word that it had become an integral part of everyday life. It would have been hard to imagine a world without it. Since the seventeenth century and particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the amount of printed information Europeans had to process increased dramatically and made the ability to read even more necessary to function in European society. Europeans had to be able to make sense of the information found in such items as schedules and timetables, menus, advertisements, product labels, telephone books, recipes, how-to manuals, bills, and road signs.

The twin processes of state bureaucratization and the commercial revolution made reading an increasingly invaluable skill for Europeans to have at all levels of society. Even before the invention of the printing press, European states, which had previously relied predominantly on oral testimony, had become ever more dependent on written records. In the Middle Ages, the ability to read was not a prerequisite for holding office. That changed in the early modern period. The mid-sixteenth century witnessed the last illiterate high-ranking government officials in northern Europe—the first earl of Rutland in England and Constable Montmorency in France (Stone, 1968). Reading was required to process legislative initiatives, petitions, and other matters of state, particularly those relating to the military and taxation.

Similarly, the commercial revolution helped make reading a necessity of life. Merchants had long relied on written bills of exchange in their international trade. The printed word also impinged on the lives of farmers, shopkeepers, and artisans in the form of promissory notes, wills, and apprenticeship contracts. In addition, farmers and artisans increasingly relied on the printed word to provide them information about their occupations.

Since the early sixteenth century, Europeans had disseminated knowledge about agriculture in print. Humanists discovered Virgil's *Georgics* and further developed the genre. In Sir Anthony Fitzherbert's *Book of Husbandry* (1523) and other works that followed, readers found information on agricultural practices in different parts of England and recommendations on how to best raise crops and animals. In the eighteenth century, when agricultural improvement was of great concern to landowners, Arthur Young's (1741–1820) *Travels in France* (1792) was able to show a comparable concern with agricultural practices across the Channel.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries manuals written by master craftsmen appeared for those already practicing the same craft. Manuals provided illustrations, patterns, and models. Although few sixteenth-century French artisans owned books, those who did were most likely, after religious texts, to own craft manuals or books of “*pourtraicture*” (Chartier, 1987, p. 150). These manuals were not intended for the general public because of the need for craftsmen to protect the secrets of their trades.

The dissemination of information about crafts could be a double-edged sword. At the same time that it could improve the quality of the end product, it could undermine the legitimacy of a craft's traditional practitioners. In the dairy industry in England before the eighteenth century, women played a leading role producing cheese for the family and perhaps a small surplus for sale. Dairywomen had learned the craft from other women, not from manuals or recipes. The process often lacked exactness, which meant that the product could differ greatly from batch to batch. In the eighteenth century, due to the commercialization of the dairy industry, men began to rationalize the process of cheesemaking by applying scientific knowledge to the craft. They published texts on the science of cheesemaking with recipes that encouraged product standardization. This led to the demise of dairywomen's control over the process (Valenze, 1995, p. 48–67).

In these two areas and in others, readers in the eighteenth century found that reading books offered an alternative to on-site apprenticeship for the development of skills and knowledge that were useful in the workplace. The genre grew again at the end of the nineteenth century with the decline of apprenticeship and became important to industrial education in schools and post-secondary institutes in the twentieth century. In the latter half of that century, this genre migrated in part to the television medium, where printed materials were a tie-in to demonstrations on screen. How-to manuals, however, persisted as an autonomous genre, responding to the demands of readers who wanted utility in their texts, and not simply pleasure and recreation.

THE FUTURE OF READING

By the late nineteenth century, nearly universal education in Europe had produced official literacy rates of 90 percent or more in countries like Belgium and Germany. Eastern Europe lagged, but both literacy rates and popular reading were growing there as well. Traveling book salesmen in rural areas throughout Europe complemented more organized bookstores and libraries found in urban areas.

The advent of mass reading raises several questions. Mass taste often differed from the reading matter recommended by social reformers. Trade union and socialist libraries, for example, urged working-class readers to consult serious works of philosophy and economics but found marked preferences for escapist novels. Children's books were divided between worthy, educational tracts, preferred by many parents,

and more exciting fare sold directly to children, such as cowboy novels set in the American West, available in many languages. Mass-circulation newspapers offered large type and a simple vocabulary, as well as a sensationalist style that many social critics found repellent. Mass reading did not mean uniformity in the approach to reading.

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JOURNALISM



Thomas Cragin

Europe did not see anything resembling modern journalism, the serial publication of news, until the seventeenth century. However, if the definition of journalism is expanded to include the regular printing of news and political, religious, and philosophical opinion, then journalism was born with the printing press in the middle of the fifteenth century. From the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries most printed news catered to religious and sensational interests rooted in the popular oral culture that preceded print. After the invention of the printing press, journalists introduced radically new ideas and challenged the growing numbers of readers to rethink old assumptions. Religious dogma, the organization of the universe, and the legitimacy of constituted authority became issues for debate. Early journalists improved the communication of news and had a momentous impact on European society through their diffusion of the ideas of the Protestant and Catholic Reformation, the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution.

However, until the nineteenth century in western Europe and the twentieth century in eastern Europe illiteracy, poverty, and geographic isolation kept most Europeans from regular access to print journalism. All that changed in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, the newspaper's golden age. In that era mass-circulation dailies popularized the modern newspaper's blend of political, business, sports, and sensational news with special interest sections, reviews, and advertising. Accuracy, detail, speed, and investigation became ideals for the new professional journalist. In the twentieth century electronic media simplified journalistic style and greatly expanded its audience.

THE COMING OF PRINT

Before the invention of the printing press, most Europeans received news verbally from peddlers, travel-

ers, soldiers, and beggars wandering through villages and towns. News of important international events could take years to reach peasant ears and would be greatly distorted when it arrived. False news could have serious effects, as when false reports of new taxes caused peasant revolts in the fourteenth century. Distortions of oral communication invested the written word with greater respect both for its authenticity and for its authority since it was the product of the learned elite.

In the mid-fifteenth century monarchs were among the first to use the printing press to communicate news. By the end of the fifteenth century kings often employed printers to publish their decrees for distribution to officials throughout their kingdoms. Especially in times of crisis, rulers used print to gain popular support. At the end of the War of the Roses, a struggle between rival factions for the English throne, the victorious king Henry VII printed and circulated the papal bull confirming his claim to the throne. Similarly King Charles VIII of France launched a major press campaign in the late fifteenth century to garner support for his invasion of Italy. Monarchs' use of print was quickly imitated by judicial, city, town, and church authorities. These publications usually were written by servants of the king, bishop, or mayor and were printed by royal or ecclesiastical printing houses or printers with royal privileges. Royal or ecclesiastical patrons exercised enormous direct influence over these writers and publishers. However, not all journalists wrote in the service of the church or the Crown.

Before the end of the Renaissance new kinds of journalism developed to serve the needs of commoners. The most important to the development of modern journalism were news books. Merchants' livelihoods depended on quick and accurate news of wars, plagues, famines, shipping disasters, and weather that would greatly increase or contract competition in the market. By the sixteenth century a number of individuals in Italy, Germany, and Holland capitalized on bankers' and merchants' need for quick and reliable news by selling handwritten newssheets reporting im-

portant business, military, and political events. These newsheets were destined for only a small readership, however, since the high costs of maintaining correspondents and couriers to collect and carry the latest

news kept subscriptions beyond the means of most of the middle classes. But in the sixteenth century the printing press enabled news to reach a much larger audience.

THE REFORMATION AND THE POPULAR PRESS

By the early sixteenth century a popular printed journalism flourished throughout Europe. A great variety of popular prints circulated in urban Europe at the end of the fifteenth century, and they were increasingly available to peasants in the countryside during the next century. Four hundred years before the advent of the mass newspaper press, these prints were produced by the tens and hundreds of thousands.

The popular journalists of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries ranged from great poets to lowly peddlers who produced and sold a broad range of literature to rich and poor alike. Their prints appeared in several sizes and formats, most combining text, song, and picture. Poster-sized broadsheets or broadsides, printed on one side for mounting on walls, were very popular in urban settings. More portable, small pamphlets were sold widely in cities and villages. The broadsides and pamphlets most commonly contained sensationalist news and information on religious debates and changes taking place in sixteenth-century Europe.

The Protestant Reformation initiated a war of words that greatly expanded the circulation of vernacular literature. Broadsides and pamphlets spread the ideas of the Protestant and Catholic Reformation in their most abbreviated forms. Martin Luther became one of Germany's best-selling authors through the circulation of hundreds of thousands of copies of his devotionals. While Luther's publications urged readers to decide theological questions for themselves, papal defenders circulated treatises demanding the complacency of "the ignorant and rebellious commoners." By 1521 official Catholic prints had done as much as Luther's to promote popular dissatisfaction with Catholic authorities, turning Luther's revolt into a mass movement. Though he was the most read Protestant journalist in Reformation Germany, Luther was by no means alone. Many of his followers published prints for mass audiences, sometimes in conflict with his views. In central and southern Germany, Protestant propagandists turned Luther's message into a call for social equality and political freedom, initiating the German Peasants' War of 1525. Afterward Luther, his princes, and their Catholic counterparts became increasingly aware of the dangers as well as the advantages of popular journalism.

Most of the Reformation broadsides and pamphlets were published in the vernacular language to reach the widest possible readership. In 1534 French Protestants touched off a dramatic conflict in Paris, known as the "affaire des placards," by posting anti-

Catholic propaganda throughout the city. Millions of religious prints were circulated by both Protestants and Catholics in their struggle against one another. More than merely communicating the controversial issues relating to church doctrine, these prints reported miracles, detailed the stories of local saints, and described the actions of witches and demons. During the wars of religion spanning the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they heightened Europeans' fears of heresy, contributing to the violence of religious conflict and the persecution of so-called witches. Popular journalists in mid-seventeenth-century England, for example, reported miracles, monstrosities, and omens that fostered support for the reestablishment of monarchy.

Since church and state were united in Europe at this time, the religious conflict of the Reformation era was very much a conflict of states. Martin Luther won crucial support for his revolt against the Catholic Church through his printed appeals to the German princes. In England, Henry VIII distributed prints throughout Britain justifying his break with the Catholic Church. In France, Francis I issued prints defending the alliance he made between Catholic France and the Protestants in wars against the Spanish Catholics. In addition to using print to promote their interests, both Protestant and Catholic states fought the war of words by banning and burning their opponents' prints. This action, however, could have the opposite effect. As Elizabeth Eisenstein points out, inclusion in the Index of Forbidden Books often promoted the sale of a work that otherwise might have garnered little attention. Thus, to identify and prevent the circulation of banned works, nearly every government instituted elaborate controls over the press. Over time states made political and religious censorship more thorough and more repressive.

However, these controls were unnecessary for most popular journalism. Popular political news nearly always promoted the interests of the state and its established church. When reporting politics, journalists most often announced new laws and regulations, alliances, wars, battles, and peace treaties. They also made regular reports on the major political figures of the day, noting all royal births, deaths, processions, and weddings. Coercion by the state was seldom applied and usually unnecessary to gain good press for the government. In fact most popular political news was adamantly xenophobic and patriotic.

The vast majority of popular news, however, ignored government and politics in favor of sensational news stories. Lacking a loyal clientele, each print had to sell itself with attention-grabbing news. Violence sold best, especially reports of murders, trials, and ex-

ecutions. News of natural disasters was also popular, especially when detailing mass fatalities. Reports of ghosts and monsters did not merely serve to inspire fiction, as they would in the nineteenth century, since early modern readers considered such reports to be

factual. In addition to sensational reports, a large part of popular news related practical information. In town and country, newssheets announced the dates and locations of local fairs, festivals, and pilgrimages. Peasants prized the almanac above all other prints since

they found so much use for its calendars, forecasts, horoscopes, and religious iconography. Such contents might be used to time planting and harvesting and to secure the protection of the saints for the year's crops.

Social historians look at the early modern popular press to expose the era's values and beliefs. Popular religious prints provide invaluable insight into the nature of religious belief and the early modern worldview. Miraculous divine interventions and satanic rites were not only reported as factual but were also pointed to as explanations for crime and injustice, acts of state, and natural calamities. Early modern journalism suggests that Europeans saw their world as the plaything of supernatural forces. Reports of violent crimes and punishments reveal the consistent affirmation of paternal authority, the vilification of independence in women and servants, and a widespread fascination with the grotesque. Read by elites as well as by the lower classes, these reports, especially those describing fantastical beasts and satanic monsters, suggest the distance between early modern and modern readers' acceptance of and belief in the marvelous.

Until the nineteenth century, broadsides and pamphlets were the most plentiful forms of printed news. But in the seventeenth century many of these prints lost their appeal for rich and poor alike. The upper classes began to disparage many popular genres as beneath their dignity. Scholars are uncertain as to how widespread this rejection of popular literature by elites was. A number of studies suggest that elites continued to buy certain popular pamphlets in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, a new periodical journalism aimed at elite readers emerged in the seventeenth century.

THE BIRTH OF THE PERIODICAL PRESS IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT

The first printed periodical appeared in Europe during the seventeenth century. In 1605 Abraham Berhoeven introduced *Nieuwe Tindinghe*, the first periodical newssheet. The Antwerp paper began as a weekly, but demand soon prompted three printings a week. By the middle of the seventeenth century weekly newssheets were printed in Holland, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and Spain. While they had neither the format nor the content of the modern newspaper, these weeklies did provide subscribers with a regular source of news. The historian Henri-Jean Martin describes their proliferation as the birth of modern journalism. The speedier collection and publication of news in the early eighteenth century facilitated the introduction of dailies in Europe. The *Daily Courant*,

Europe's first daily, appeared in London in 1702, building its initial success on its updates on the progress of the War of Spanish Succession. England's first professional newspaper editor, Thomas Gainsford, adopted the popular pamphlets' narrative style to make newspaper reporting more engaging for the reader. The result was a hybrid journalism, more factual than before but still sensational.

While popular newssheets were notorious for distorting and falsifying information, newspapers achieved a better reputation among elites in the seventeenth century. Newspaper publishers earned a measure of respect by occasionally correcting errors from an earlier issue, creating the impression that journalists strove for accuracy. The Spanish *Gaceta de Zaragoza* (Gazette of Zaragoza) explained in a May 1688 report that it was "impossible always to satisfy quickly the public curiosity without sometimes making mistakes" but assured readers that its use of diverse sources that confirmed one another would guarantee accuracy. Yet the impressions these techniques gave were deceiving. Most reports were based on second- and third-hand information relayed from witnesses to foreign correspondents and then from couriers to the papers' publishers, distorted in each transmission. In the eighteenth century some newspapers addressed this problem by offering readers more direct information. The *Spectator*, a successful London daily, took its name from its reporters' and correspondents' first-hand accounts. Nevertheless, journalism was not yet investigative.

Early newspaper readers subscribed to the new weeklies and dailies to gain access to news critical for business, especially international news that they could not easily obtain otherwise. These texts provided readers with the latest details of European wars and equally important news on trade and conflict in America, Africa, and Asia. Though they reported on the great political and economic events of their day, the weeklies were by no means a medium for the spread of the most important ideas of their time. Few of them printed the scientific discoveries of the seventeenth century that revolutionized astronomy and physics. When discoveries were occasionally described, they were presented in the briefest and most simplistic terms. The early newspapers, like the news pamphlets, gave far more attention to sensations. The seventeenth-century newspaper subscriber could read more about strange births and monsters than about the scientific breakthroughs of Galileo and Johannes Kepler.

To read about the latest ideas relating to science, philosophy, and politics, readers could turn to periodical literary reviews that appeared in Europe in the late seventeenth century. Two of the most important, *Journal des savants* and *Philosophical Transactions*, ap-

peared in Paris and London respectively in 1665. *Philosophical Transactions* published numerous articles on Isaac Newton's breakthroughs in physics, and both journals reviewed his *Philosophiae naturalis Principia mathematica* (1687). By the mid-eighteenth century dozens of new scientific, philosophical, literary, and professional journals spread the ideas of the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment. The dramatic change in Europeans' worldview during the eighteenth century is reflected in journalists' new explanations of events, attributing them to human and natural causes rather than to supernatural forces.

Journalists had established their influence over politics in the Reformation but wielded even greater power as a political force in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Factions in the English government mobilized political writers to win popular support for their causes during the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Party leaders issued regular statements to their followers through printed pamphlets. By the early eighteenth century Grubb Street, the booksellers' street in London, was a center for the creation of political pamphlet propaganda purchased by rival factions in Parliament, and by the second half of the eighteenth century printers set up press shops in many of the smaller cities and towns of Britain. As a result the political pamphlet press made thousands of readers aware of the great debates of political philosophy and public policy.

While some early journalists, such as Jonathan Swift (1667–1745), enjoyed stable and profitable careers through service to the Crown, many were critical of their governments in a manner that appealed to a growing number of readers. As patronage shifted from the courts to the aristocratic salon, journalists became the tools of the nobility's attacks on absolutism. Moreover, coffeehouses and cafés provided these authors with a growing audience of middle-class readers, many of whom favored a more open society and polity. Pornographic *libelles* (lampoons) describing lurid details of the private lives of well-known personages, especially in royal courts, became the mid-eighteenth-century's best-sellers in many parts of Europe. Dressed up as philosophical treatises, they gave rise to a vast number of authors whom the historian Robert Darnton describes as “gutter Rousseaus.” Throughout eighteenth-century Europe philosophes, radicals, and politically minded pornographers posed serious challenges to the authority and respect commanded by governments, earning those writers the reputation of constituting a separate and dangerous “republic of letters.”

European monarchs attempted to counteract the threat by increasing controls over the press. Cardinal

Richelieu, chief minister of French King Louis XIII, attempted to promote the development of royal absolutism in France by establishing in 1634 the Académie Française (French Academy), a formal body of writers with control of French printing. Governments throughout Europe attempted to buy off influential journalists with pensions and sinecures. Richelieu rewarded Théophraste Renaudot, editor of France's most important weekly newspaper, *La Gazette de France*, with a handsome salary, the exclusive privilege to print weekly news in Paris, and news updates from royal dispatches. In turn, *La Gazette de France* remained a firm ally of church and state, supporting, for example, the church's condemnation of Galileo for his heretical assertion that the earth revolved around the sun. Since newspapers and journals had to meet their subscribers' expectations for regular and timely installments, the threat of imprisonment kept most periodical journalists loyal to the Crown.

Though the periodical press grew throughout the eighteenth century and exerted great influence over its readers, it catered mainly to an elite audience of aristocrats and the upper-middle classes. Stamp taxes and censorship kept newspapers from reaching middle- and lower-class readers, who continued to depend on the cheaper broadsides and pamphlets instead. Journalism was deeply influenced by this situation. In describing the effects of censorship under the Old Regime, Martin asserts that the press was denied “the margin of liberty indispensable for it to flourish and treat the weightier topics” (Martin, 1994, p. 414). But in 1789 the Old Regime and its controls over the press came crashing down, granting the press a whole new political freedom and power.

THE RISE OF THE POLITICAL PRESS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTIONS

Britain was among the first of the European states to grant the press limited political freedom. In 1771 Parliament granted the press the right to report parliamentary debates. In the two decades preceding the French Revolution, Britain was a refuge for Europe's most liberal critics of the church and absolutist monarchies. The English press became the most radical in Europe. The political power of the British press prompted the English statesman Edmund Burke to describe the journalists present in Parliament as “the fourth estate.” America's war for independence, the radicalism of John Wilkes and his followers at home, and the French Revolution and its wars fueled the dramatic growth of newspaper and pamphlet circulation. The annual circulation of London papers alone

grew from nearly 10 million copies in 1760 to over 25 million in 1815. At the same time the provincial papers throughout urban Britain grew and exercised increasing influence on elections.

A great variety of political journalists, defenders and critics of the government alike, competed for the reading public's attention. By the early nineteenth century nearly every political party published its own newspaper. In Spain many newspapers were founded by *sociedades patrióticas*, political groups growing out of the informal discussion groups of Madrid cafés. Though no more numerous than conservative and nonpolitical writers, radical journalists inspired by Enlightenment ideas played a crucial role in bringing about a series of liberal revolutions in Europe, none more important than the French Revolution of 1789.

The French Revolution diminished censorship and generated a flood of new newspapers, pamphlets, broadsides, and almanacs. The power and radicalism of French revolutionary journalism surpassed mon-

archs' worst fears. Liberal nobles used the press in 1788 to undermine absolute monarchy in France, and the nobles' revolt was itself undermined by an even larger pamphlet campaign. Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès wrote *What Is the Third Estate?* in 1789 and inspired the French to create a liberal constitutional and representative government. Politicians became journalists, and journalists such as Camille Desmoulins, Jean-Paul Marat, and Jacques Hébert became politicians who radicalized the revolution. Their role was significant because Parisian workers looked to them for insight and information. Because of the power they exercised and the fear they inspired in their political opponents, many journalists were murdered or executed at the height of the Revolution.

After 1793 French governments imposed strict censorship on political printing. Throughout Europe censorship was redoubled in the early nineteenth century to silence the political and social radicalism of journalists. Even Spain's brief moderate constitutional

monarchy passed a law in 1822 that outlawed subversive prints that “injure the sacred and inviolable person of the King,” warned against any attempt to stir rebellion, and even banned political allegory. But such strategies did not long stave off European liberals’ demand for a free press. Increased censorship touched off revolution in France again in 1830, and journalists were crucial in the creation of a liberal monarchy. Journalists played an equally important role in the Chartist movement in England and in the 1848 revolutions on the Continent. While these were mainly urban revolutions in which journalists mobilized workers, democratic socialist pamphleteers created a peasant movement in France between 1849 and 1851 that demanded the liberalization of France’s Second Republic. These peasants rose in revolt against Louis Napoleon’s coup d’etat at the end of 1851, prompting his brutal repression of their democratic socialist movement and his reintroduction of severe press censorship. Though none of these revolutions succeeded in creating a lasting radical republic, the power of the press to mobilize the lower classes toward political ends encouraged journalists and politicians to expand the political press while governments made greater efforts to suppress it.

Among political periodicals, the socialist press has been of particular interest to social historians. Political repression and weak demand curtailed its success until nearly the beginning of the nineteenth century. Karl Marx’s paper *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (1848) could be considered exceptionally successful with only six thousand subscribers during the 1848 revolution, when the Prussian press was freed of political repression. By the end of the century, however, socialist editors such as Jean Jaurès, theorists such as Jules Guesde, and writers such as Anatole France reached a large and sympathetic audience through socialist newspapers. Studies of the socialist press suggest the gradual development of working-class consciousness and illustrate the transformation of socialist thinking over time.

The nature of journalism changed in the era of European revolutions. In the last decade of the eighteenth century three London papers, the nonpartisan *Times*, the Whig *Morning Chronicle*, and the Tory *Morning Post*, began a fierce competition to be the first to print the latest news during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Couriers rushed the news, collected by domestic reporters and foreign correspondents, to waiting editors. The *Times* owners also invested in new techniques that decreased the time required to print a new edition. These papers assigned reporters to specific “beats,” where they gained greater expertise and connections, enabling regular and more extensive reports. By the mid-nine-

teenth century readers showed a growing preference for fact over polemic, promoting a more factual journalistic style. Newspapers also encouraged reporters to move beyond mere description to investigate cause and effect. Taking advantage of the growing number of newspapers demanding the latest news, enterprising businesspeople, such as Charles Havas in Paris, Bernard Wolff in Berlin, and Paul Julius von Reuter in London, created agencies that collected news from foreign papers and correspondents and communicated it to their subscribers by courier, carrier pigeons, and eventually telegraph.

Although the speed of communicating news accelerated, the effect in Europe was limited to the few who could afford high subscription prices. Fearful of the political challenges of printed matter, governments prevented public sales and imposed stamp taxes sufficient to preclude middle- and lower-class subscriptions. In the early nineteenth century lower-middle-class readers accessed political papers by purchasing memberships in private libraries. Both middle- and working-class readers also found newspapers at subscribing bars and cafés. Few workers, however, read the political press through any means.

A few journalistic pioneers attempted to expand readership through three innovations. First, a number of French and British newspapers reduced the price of subscriptions by selling advertising space to the consumer industries of the industrial revolution. But even in 1846, after a decade of this practice, all the Parisian dailies combined could claim less than 200,000 subscribers throughout France. Though advertising did not create a mass audience for most European journals, it became a staple feature that manufacturers and sellers used to reach potential customers and that influenced marketing, business, and consumerism. Second, newspapers serialized popular novels. French newspapers printed great works by Victor Hugo, Honoré de Balzac, Alexandre Dumas, Alphonse-Marie-Louis de Prat de Lamartine, and Eugène Sue. Literature did indeed expand circulation among those who could afford subscriptions, but, more importantly, when newspapers eventually reached much larger audiences, the serialized novel greatly expanded fiction reading. Last, a number of magazine and newspaper editors applied new techniques of lithography to illustrate their serials. The English *Penny Magazine*, founded in 1830, and the German *Pfennig Magazin* (Penny magazine), begun in 1833, both featured woodcut illustrations. By mid-century more European publishers adopted the modern form of newspapers, offering the latest news, illustrations, and serial novels at prices reduced by extensive advertising.

Before the advent of mass circulation newspapers, journalism's greatest expansion resulted from the creation of countless professional journals, illustrated magazines, political newspapers, and provincial dailies that met the specialized interests of smaller readerships. While most of these publications remained prohibitively expensive for lower- and middle-class readers and none reached a large market, globally they brought variety to journalism. A truly mass newspaper press soon appeared.

THE MASS-CIRCULATION PRESS

After the mid-nineteenth century on the Continent, but earlier in Britain, a number of changes in the newspaper business converged with socioeconomic transformations to create a mass press in Europe. Growing disposable incomes and literacy in turn increased demand for the press. An important relationship existed between the expansion of literacy and the reciprocal growth of the press. Literacy rates from 60 to 80 percent in Britain, Germany, and France spurred the development of mass-circulation newspapers at mid-century, while low literacy postponed the expansion of the press until the late nineteenth century in southern and eastern Europe and the early twentieth century in Russia.

The development of mass presses also derived from changes in the newspaper business that increased supply and augmented demand. New printing technologies developed at mid-century made giant press-runs possible. More importantly mass-circulation newspapers increased consumer demand by downplaying politics and emphasizing sensationalism. After 1815 the *Times* of London outstripped its competitors in a climate of heavy censorship by remaining nonpartisan. John Walter, its founder, argued that a newspaper "should contain something suited to every palate . . . and by steering clear of extremes, hit the happy medium." The English "pauper press" began a newspaper revolution in the 1830s in part by de-emphasizing politics and refusing to pay the stamp tax. Halfhearted attempts to enforce the tax only generated publicity that boosted sales. In 1836 Parliament reduced the stamp tax to one penny and in 1855 abolished it, facilitating the dramatic rise in newspaper circulation. The "pauper press" also owed its success to its sensationalism. Henry Hetherington, publisher of *The Twopenny Dispatch*, emphasized crimes, fires, spectacles, and sports to make his paper one of the most popular in London by the mid-1830s.

In 1863 Polydore Milhaud's *Petit journal* (Small journal) touched off a similar newspaper explosion in

France. The nonpolitical daily escaped the tax on political prints and sold at one-third the price of its competitors. Like its English counterparts, it published serialized novels and sensational news. By the 1880s *Petit journal* boasted over a million subscribers and soon had imitators. The illustrated mass-circulation dailies eventually replaced the news broadsides and pamphlets as the principal source of news for the lower classes.

Many social historians, anthropologists, folklorists, and sociologists have viewed the transition from the popular pamphlet and broadsheet press to the mass-circulation newspaper as a veritable cultural revolution. Eugen Weber describes it as the replacement of an oral culture in rural France with an urban-based written culture. While some historians have argued that these assertions overstate the differences between newspapers and their pamphlet and broadside predecessors, the mass-circulation newspaper did place newsmaking in the hands of more educated writers and editors and commercially oriented publishers. As popular news became the product of urban elites, their ideas gained broader acceptance. In dramatic reports of foreign massacres, vicious battles, heinous crimes, sensational trials, and executions, the newspapers addressed the topics traditional to broadside and pamphlet presses. Yet they did so in a manner that promoted new bourgeois ideas about nationalism and imperialism, social justice, moral order, masculinity, and femininity. The modern newspapers adopted traditional foci to gain a mass audience and spread elite ideas.

As newspapers reached a larger audience, journalists became more powerful. Reporters and editors gained notoriety through controversial press campaigns. William Howard Russell, a foreign correspondent for the *Times*, was famous for his scathing criticism of the mismanagement of the Crimean War. In the 1870s the passion and satire of two editors at *Petit journal* made their pseudonym, Timothy Trimm, a household word in Paris and provincial cities. French and German journalists fueled public support for the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, and western European journalists significantly promoted empire building in subsequent decades. Without doubt the most dramatic journalistic act of the century was Émile Zola's 1898 editorial "J'accuse!" decrying the army's scandalous injustice against Captain Alfred Dreyfus, who was falsely accused of passing military secrets to the Germans. Affirming what Edmund Burke had said a century before about the power of journalists, Zola and journalists like him brought down the French government. Moreover, Georges Clemenceau, who published Zola's article in *L'Aurore*, used the press to

build his own political career and eventually became France's president.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA

In the first decades of the twentieth century the sales of many mass-circulation dailies began to plateau in western Europe but continued to spread throughout southern and eastern Europe. Such dailies had already appeared in Italy at the end of the previous century, in Russia before World War I, and in Spain soon after

the war. In content newspapers continued to appeal to the largest possible audience by emphasizing sensational news and avoiding political partisanship. Even as the press increasingly escaped from government censorship in western and central Europe, political content undermined sales if the editors took a stance unpopular with a portion of their readers. This is not to say that newspapers ignored important political issues. On the contrary, they emphasized domestic and international politics heavily, but papers toned down their partisanship, even those papers serving as the mouthpieces of specific parties and political organi-

zations. As they spread throughout Europe, mass-circulation dailies more than ever before shaped public responses to major issues, political and otherwise. As a result, businessmen and politicians hired professional “public relations” specialists to win them favorable press coverage.

In the twentieth century many dailies adopted new forms and content that improved sales and altered modern journalism. Editors added large headlines to front page articles to attract buyers and titled each story to facilitate selective reading. In content they won additional readers by covering sports, greatly extending that coverage after World War I. Indeed sports journalism became so important to working-class readers that Socialist and Communist Party papers featured it as well. Though satirical drawings had been a staple of many newspapers since the mid-nineteenth century, twentieth-century papers gave greater attention to comic drawings that eventually became comic strips. Also in the early twentieth century newspapers began to replace illustrations with photographic images, and those quick to adopt the new technology, such as *Paris-Soir*, won larger readerships. Moreover the photograph gave rise to an entirely new medium, the photomagazine. Photojournalism in the first half of the twentieth century shifted the attention of its largely middle-class readers away from the harsh realities of the post–World War I and Great Depression era to a glamorous material culture.

Journalism also changed as a business. Newspapers employed large staffs of editors, reporters, photographers, and correspondents, who pursued journalism educations. During the interwar years many journalists formed organizations to promote professional interests and standards. Expanding news agencies, such as Havas and Reuters, provided their subscribers with fully written news stories, background material, photographs, and illustrations. A complex variety of distribution agencies that circulated papers through retailers, wholesalers, and delivery services replaced postal subscriptions and street peddlers.

State control greatly altered journalism in many parts of Europe. The Russian tsar Nicholas II tried to increase state influence over the press by making the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, a government authority, a major source of information for Russian newspapers. After the Russian Revolution the Communist government successfully put all periodicals under state control.

At the same time it increased newspaper circulation to over three times that of the pre-Revolution level. Through the press the Soviet government promoted the spread of literacy, which jumped from 20 percent at the end of the nineteenth century to over

80 percent on the eve of World War II. The professionalism of early Soviet journalists gave way under Joseph Stalin to a political cadre that made the major media, such as the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*, into propaganda disseminators. Scholars debate whether Stalinist journalists exercised a degree of autonomy in the construction of state journalism or were merely puppets of the government. The willing duplicity of Nazi and Fascist journalists is debated less. The Nazis effectively used newspapers, magazines, radio, and films to promote state propaganda both in and outside of Germany. In the Stalinist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany thousands of journalists were willing government tools, hiding atrocities, promoting government policies, and distorting the public’s perception of their state and society. So significant was their role in bringing about a world war that between 1944 and 1945 the victorious Allies abolished many of Europe’s fascist and collaborationist newspapers and replaced them with new ones more suited to postwar politics. The war, however, did not end governments’ control over the press. In Spain, Francisco Franco’s government maintained strict controls over the press for thirty years. Even the more democratic states of postwar Western

Europe applied numerous controls, especially on new media. Swedish political parties, for example, controlled radio and television news until the late 1960s.

Not only a tool of government, journalism also continued to play a decisive role in the changing of governments. Polish journalists promoted the Solidarity movement's opposition to Communist rule in the 1980s. After 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of glasnost allowed journalists to criticize Communist governments in the USSR and Eastern Europe and undermined the governments' popular support.

The new electronic media of the twentieth century transformed journalism. In 1922 *Radiola*, France's first radio station, initiated a partial return to the tradition of spoken news. Subscribing to Havas news agency and reading reports from national daily newspapers, radio did not at first challenge the preeminence of the newspaper. Within a decade, however, radio stations throughout Europe employed their own reporters and correspondents and subscribed to news services catering exclusively to radio, making them the most up-to-the-minute news source. Realizing the importance of radio, both Stalin and Adolf Hitler used it effectively in the 1930s to extend their control over their states and their neighbors. Radio altered the style of news writing. As radio news reporting became simpler and more concise, newspapers also adopted the style, which quickly became the norm for modern journalism. To compete with radio, newspapers became larger and diversified their content to satisfy more tastes, producing the modern comic strip, weather forecast, and horoscope.

Journalists also communicated the news through film and television. The interwar years were the golden age of newsreel photography in Europe. Newsreels featured films of significant events and personalities and after 1927 included a narrator explaining the images. Shown in movie theaters, they made moviegoers witnesses to events, but weeks and months afterward. In this capacity newsreels played a crucial role in exposing Nazi atrocities in images that words could not. In the 1950s television further revolutionized journalism by adding video to the up-to-the-minute reporting offered by radio. Constrained at first by its own novelty and by the weight and bulk of cameras, television initially relied on newsreels for its images. However, television stations soon employed their own staffs of reporters and foreign correspondents. In 1949 France's first television news program aired coverage of a balloon race that ended with the destruction of the television cameramen's balloon and created an immediate sensation. In 1951 television news began to air twice a day in France, and by 1961 these telecasts reached nearly every part of the country. In contrast

to the United States, European television stations have been under the direct control of the government. In England, the British Broadcasting Corporation controlled television in the postwar period. Italian political parties directed all of Italy's national television networks until the late twentieth century. After the 1970s the proliferation of private cable and satellite stations distanced television from government control and promoted the development of stations specializing in television journalism.

Television accelerated the changes in journalism initiated by early twentieth-century media, continuing the trend toward shortened length and simplified content of reports. These techniques have influenced political campaigning, as politicians endeavor to present a pleasing image and to adopt an intimate tone for viewers. By adding the visual to radio's audio communication, television in a sense restored the audiovisual communication of news that preceded the spread of print. Yet television also continued the trend of the modern media to make news less interactive and less responsive to individual and small community needs and interests. By serving national publics, television, radio, and national newspapers have increased the distance between the event and the public.

The twentieth century closed with the spread of computer communications throughout Europe. Europeans began to rely on computer networks for communication and news in the late 1970s. Between 1978 and 1981 the French introduced TRANSPAC and TELETEL, public computer communication networks. Computer communications were not used widely because computers remained very expensive, however, Western European governments began to provide every home with access to national computer networks in

the early 1980s. News, weather, transportation information, and a variety of other services became available through television sets or through small computer terminals, such as the French Minitel introduced in the 1980s. By 1988, 4 million French homes used Minitel, and computer communications increased fivefold. The Internet initiated the most dramatic transition by empowering the “Web surfer” to find news of particular interest. News agencies, television news networks, governments, corporations, and millions of other World Wide Web users offer a dizzying array of information. Print, audio, and video formats have be-

come available at once, and the user can print a hard copy in seconds. The Internet has given Europeans a means to interact with news makers. While modern communications create easier access to more kinds of information, the overwhelming volume of available data gives greater significance than ever to the subjects chosen and judgments drawn by journalists. In the twenty-first century, journalists continue to shape public opinion and public policy. Despite the greater variety of information available to journalists, however, their foci and assessments remain very much informed by professional traditions.

See also Professionals and Professionalization; Revolutions; New Social Movements (volume 3); Pornography (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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Section 23



EVERYDAY LIFE

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MATERIAL CULTURE



Whitney Walton

Social historians define material culture as the objects of daily life and the meanings that possessors, users, and observers invest in them. On one level the objects of daily life are stable over time. Food, shelter, furnishings, and clothes are common to all Europeans from the Renaissance to the present. On another level such objects vary enormously across different time periods, among different groups, and in different locations. They change drastically in terms of quantity, content, variety, and what their different forms signify to users and observers. For example, certain items of clothing have existed for centuries, like shirts, hats, skirts, and cloaks or coats. But new apparel articles, like long trousers for men, shirtwaist dresses for women, and underwear for everyone, and modifications of old ones, along with styles that change with increasing rapidity, make clothing highly variable. Moreover the connotations of clothing in terms of social standing, political positioning, and personal identity also vary greatly. Europeans have been drinking beer and wine and other fermented beverages since before the Renaissance. However, by the eighteenth century tea and coffee were becoming integral to the European diet, and the locations and manners of their consumption separated the sexes and gave rise to new utensils and social practices. Thus scholars find in material culture a rich source of information on the physical, daily existence of Europeans and how it changed. They also look to material culture for insights into the exercise of power, social relations, group values, and people's sense of themselves as individuals.

The influential historian Fernand Braudel drew attention to what he termed "material life" in his broadly conceived studies of Europe and the world from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries. In his works Braudel described in detail and in comparative perspective the objects of everyday existence, including food and drink, housing, furnishings, and clothing, in Europe, Asia, and Latin America during the Renaissance and early modern eras. Using a variety of texts and images he charted developments like the

gradual introduction of the fork for eating food or the evolution of household furnishings from simple, carpentered storage boxes or trunks to elaborately decorated and variegated wooden chests of drawers, highboys, sideboards, stands, and desks. Such developments are significant because they reveal a refinement in manners and greater valuation of civility in the first case and more stable residences and an increased sense of security in the second. Braudel's interest was in delineating structures through this inspection of minute daily practices and objects. For Braudel material life, or the deeply internalized habits and implements of routine survival, was the dominant feature of preindustrial European society. He discerned the fundamental rhythms of human existence through close observation of things.

Numerous scholars are indebted to Braudel for his massive research and innovative analysis of everyday objects, and they have furthered the study of material culture by practicing new methodologies, introducing new analytical frameworks, focusing on particular geographic areas or social groups, and extending the time frame both backward and forward. One approach to material culture that several historians have employed fruitfully is to analyze the goods of rulers, aristocrats, and wealthy elites as reflecting certain cultural values and social and political power.

THE POSSESSIONS OF ELITES

The Italian Renaissance commonly is associated with great cultural achievements in the arts and in scholarship. These achievements were closely connected with extensive commercial networks and the accumulation of goods by wealthy Italian merchants, prelates, and princes. In addition to being works of art that represent innovations in perspective, color, and the treatment of the human figure, paintings of the Renaissance portray the settings and objects of everyday life and the values of their owners and patrons. They render in precise and beautiful detail the archi-

ecture of houses, the colors and designs of clothing fabrics and wall hangings, and the decorative carving on furniture and in household interiors. Painters represented few items of furniture—storage chests, tables, chairs, and beds—in domestic settings, but these were often skillfully carved and made of fine, polished wood. Plush fabrics, such as velvet, silk, brocade, and fine wool, appear frequently in dazzling colors—scarlet, green, ultramarine blue, russet, and lavender. Typical and opulent interior furnishings in fifteenth-century paintings include brass or silver-gilt candlesticks, tasseled cushions, embroidered cloths, and illuminated manuscripts bound in leather with jeweled clasps. The backgrounds of even religious paintings show rugs from Turkey, porcelain and silk from China, leather bookbindings from Spain, fur-trimmed, brocaded robes of the Ottoman style, and glass from Venice, reflecting the dynamism of the Levantine trade in the Renaissance and its contribution to the material culture of the rich.

The content of many paintings suggests that owners and patrons valued their material possessions and took pride in the prosperity and cultivation that accrued from successful commercial activity. Indeed paintings were commodities and furnishings whose value lay in the cost of the paint and the skill and reputation of the artist. Renaissance princes collected paintings and books as much to assert their status and influence as to promote fine art and humanist learning. The material culture of Renaissance elites reflects a daily practice of acquisitiveness and commercialism as well as erudition and art appreciation.

Patrons and collectors particularly prized antique artifacts because they provided an association between the present and a desirable past. The Renaissance poet Francesco Petrarch (1304–1374), for example, claimed that his possession of a book by Cicero (106–43 B.C.) made him feel like he possessed Cicero himself. In this case a material object embodied the knowledge of one of the ancients. Wealthy and cultivated persons of the Renaissance sought to tie their existence to ancient history through the acquisition of antique artifacts. When the supply of antique objects diminished or disappeared, collectors turned to artifacts of the Renaissance. Thus the private accumulation of historical goods became the foundation of public institutions to display the culture of the present and started a new, Western sensibility about the importance of preserving the past.

Material objects reflected power and wealth in other ways and in other contexts. Queen Elizabeth I (r. 1558–1603) of England spent lavishly in her court to impress the population with her authority and power and to coerce the nobility to spend extrava-

gantly as well. Paintings show the queen dressed in gorgeous silks and fine lace and covered with jewels. She filled her many palatial residences with elegant furnishings and entertained her guests with hunts, dances, performances, and huge banquets consisting of numerous courses and rare dishes. These practices required expensive objects for ritual proceedings that made visible the magnificence and hence the power of the monarchy, and these practices forced the nobility to do the same. Elizabeth wanted the nobles, the chief rivals to her authority, to spend their money and their time at court seeking her favors. This developed into a cycle whereby nobles who wished for royal beneficence spent large amounts to maintain their appearance and status at court. The more they spent, the more they depended on Elizabeth's largesse, and hence the more time and money they were required to spend at court. In this case, then, luxurious objects served as an instrument of power.

King Louis XIV, who ruled France from 1643 to 1715, exercised this technique notably, and his impressive material surroundings subsequently became the model for other rulers in Europe. Louis XIV built the magnificent palace of Versailles outside of Paris and furnished it with tapestries that recounted his glorious deeds on the battlefield. Paintings and sculptures portray the king as imposing, attractive, and effective, and to further enhance his self-image as absolute ruler he constructed the famous hall of mirrors to reflect and multiply his greatness. Surrounding the palace are extensive, carefully trimmed gardens and fountains with sculptures, refreshing and beautiful settings for parties, masquerades, and fireworks displays. Louis and his successors also constructed separate buildings on the royal grounds for more intimate gatherings and pleasures. Louis XIV claimed that he was the state, and his possessions were the visible manifestation of France's power.

In contrast to the absolute monarchies of France, Prussia, and Austria that attempted to construct national unity around royal splendor, the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries suggests an alternative interpretation of material culture. Lacking an individual monarch to display publicly his or her power as representative of the state, the Dutch nonetheless placed and used material objects in a manner to assert an emerging national identity. Dutch people were intensely conscious of their Protestant faith and religious morality and sought to endow consumption and goods with moral meaning. They were no strangers to luxurious and exotic goods, since their efficient farming practices and growing trade networks provided them with abundant food, furnishings, and pleasures, even for successful artisans and modest

tradespeople. Dutch persons of the middling sort enjoyed satisfying meals of salads, stewed meat, vegetables, fish, and buttered bread with cheese or meat slices. They drank their favorite beverage, beer, out of pewter or silver tankards, some highly decorated. A room in a great merchant's house had walls hung with gold-stamped leather, fifteen paintings, and one ebony-framed mirror. The furniture consisted of an East Indian cabinet, a round nutwood table covered with a Turkish rug, a nutwood buffet, twelve chairs, a cupboard, and a harpsichord.

Yet the Dutch feared that excesses of materialism might lead them astray from a righteous and godly life. One solution was to encourage consumption in moderation. That is, goods in themselves, like alcohol and tobacco, were not inherently evil, but immoderate indulgence in them might hinder an individual from fulfilling a patriotic or civic responsibility. Another solution was discretion. The Dutch enjoyed food, furnishings, and clothing in the privacy of their homes, in contrast to the more public activities of the aristocracies of other European states. Yet another means of legitimizing private wealth was the Dutch valuation of cleanliness. Keeping their persons, homes, and cities clean was a sign of moral rectitude no matter how many possessions the Dutch had. Moreover cleanli-

ness connoted civic-mindedness for it distinguished the Dutch from less fastidious Europeans, and it was a prophylactic against disease that threatened to weaken the country.

ORDINARY PEOPLE

The paintings of princes, lace and jewels of royalty, and domestic comforts of merchants are fascinating in their sumptuousness and as manifestations of culture, power, and national identity. But in the early modern era the vast majority of Europeans did not have access to such goods. Indeed the poverty and simplicity of most people's existence contrasted sharply with the wealth and opulence of a minority. Yet the material culture of ordinary persons was no less significant than that of the privileged few during this period, and certainly the changes in daily life of the majority were slower but ultimately of far greater consequence.

Housing throughout Europe from 1400 to 1800 frequently consisted of wood. Peasant dwellings were simple, sometimes constructed of earthen materials along with wood. Their function was to provide shelter for humans and animals, and they often comprised

only one room. Furnishings were also simple and might include a bench, a table, possibly some bed planks and sacks of straw, and basic cooking utensils, such as a pot, a pothook, and a pan. In some urban areas stone or brick replaced wood over time as the most common element in housing construction. Floors at the ground level, especially in poor dwellings, were of earth. Various types of tile floors appeared in the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, and by the eighteenth century parquet floors were popular among the rich. Until the sixteenth century Europeans laid straw or flowers and herbs in ground-floor rooms; eventually this was replaced with woven mats and carpets. Walls were painted or covered with tapestry, though wallpaper became common in the seventeenth century. More expensive coverings, like leather or carved wood paneling, adorned the houses of wealthy families.

The staple food of Europeans was wheat, which they consumed, along with other cereals, in bread and gruel. In addition wealthy Europeans enjoyed plentiful and various meat dishes, like roasted and boiled fowl, beef, mutton, and pork. The poor settled for vegetables and some salt meat as accompaniments to bread and, more often, gruel. Eating practices in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were crude by modern standards. People ate off a wooden board or trencher instead of a plate. In many parts of Europe guests were expected to provide their own knives and cups or goblets. A common plate piled high with varieties of meat occupied the center of the table, and diners picked out what they desired with their fingers. Servants presented and removed dishes and filled cups with wine or water. Knives were essential eating utensils. Spoons became common in the sixteenth century, and individual forks spread slowly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Peasant clothing changed little from 1400 to 1800. The most common fabrics were homespun linen or wool, and shoes were often a luxury. However the clothes of the rich changed rapidly during the same period, with distinctive regional variations. Women of the Italian Renaissance wore square-necked garments with wide sleeves and elaborate hairnets and head-dresses. In the sixteenth century the black clothes of the Spanish court became popular throughout Europe, succeeded by clothing in brilliant colors from the French style in the seventeenth century. Although fashion trends affected all of Europe, regional variations were rife. Linen or lace neck ruffs could be huge and elaborate or small and modest. Face paint was popular in some places and frowned upon in others. The three-piece suit for men made its appearance in seventeenth-century England as the outward sign of

masculine disdain for fashion and focus on serious matters like politics.

NEW PRODUCTS

In the seventeenth century and especially the eighteenth century material culture in Europe reflected the increased availability of goods from Asia, Africa, and the Americas. European trade with the Middle East, other southwestern portions of Asia, and northern Africa never entirely ceased after relations were established in ancient times. Europeans obtained silks, spices, and slaves from these areas throughout the late Middle Ages and early modern periods. Yet certain Renaissance princes, eager to bypass Muslim middlemen and acquire access to or a monopoly over larger quantities of highly valued goods, like spices and precious metals, subsidized sea voyages of exploration to other parts of the world. In terms of material culture, the long-term results of these voyages included the introduction of new products and larger quantities of known products and the subsequent transformation of daily European practices.

Tobacco from North America enjoyed immediate success among European men in the seventeenth century. Commentators believed that tobacco had a calming effect on the consumer while simultaneously stimulating intellectual activity. Pipe smoking was the most common form of tobacco consumption until the nineteenth century, though inhaling it into the nose in the form of snuff was also popular among certain eighteenth-century elites. Tobacco consumers acquired pipes and snuff boxes, new objects of pleasure. Additionally tobacco fostered public, largely masculine, taverns and coffeehouses, where men gathered to drink, smoke, and share news.

Coffee became an extremely popular beverage in Europe during the eighteenth century. Like tobacco coffee was initially consumed by men in public places, and coffeehouses became centers of information, business transactions, and, some governments feared, political subversion. Tea and chocolate were also drinks of choice among Europeans. Unlike coffee, they were often consumed in the home with new, largely feminine rituals, especially surrounding tea consumption. Ladies of the aristocracy and the middle classes bought pewter, silver, and porcelain tea services. A “public” ritual performed in the home, tea drinking became a social activity that ideally required comfortable and elegant tables and chairs and fashionable dress. These products and social practices have helped historians understand the meaning of material goods in the everyday lives of ordinary Europeans.

An extensive sampling and analysis of probate records in London and provincial England for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reveals both traditional and new patterns of domestic existence and sense of personal identity. Lorna Weatherill has maintained that the numerous cooking utensils in the homes of the comfortable classes were both traditional and reflective of the importance of food in this group's everyday life. While utensils were functional and unadorned, items for serving and eating food—dishes and cutlery—became more decorated and refined from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century. Wooden trenchers and bowls gradually were replaced by pewter dishes. Forks and knives were new in the list of personal and family possessions, as were tea services. These developments, according to Weatherill, indicated a new layout of table settings and a new habit of food consumption as a social activity. Additionally Weatherill noted an increase in mirrors in private homes, suggesting both a greater importance of the self and a desire to enhance the appearance of the home.

Similarly the diaries of Elizabeth Shackleton from 1751 to 1781 reveal a bourgeois Lancashire homemaker for whom the care and upkeep of house-

hold goods was a major source of identity and self-worth. According to the diaries Shackleton spent a considerable amount of her time ordering, mending, and maintaining household linens, clothes, dishes, and the like. She divided her domestic possessions into the categories of either “best” or “common,” indicating her profound sense of distinction between private, family events, and social rituals. Although she was well aware of fashion trends and style changes in china and clothes on a national level, Shackleton was no giddy pursuer of novelty. She was a discriminating consumer who exercised a standard of tastefulness, beauty, and longevity in the items she bought. Regarding items of furniture in particular, Shackleton valued durability and recognized that quality pieces would outlast her own lifetime.

Poorer consumers also responded to the availability of new and more affordable goods, notably sugar. An expensive and highly prized item for several centuries, sugar became more widely available and cheaper in the eighteenth century with the establishment of sugar plantations in the Caribbean Islands. Owned by Europeans and worked by slave labor, these plantations produced sufficient quantities of sugar so that almost all Europeans could afford to buy some.

Over the course of the nineteenth century sugar became a mainstay of working-class diets in Britain. Combined with tea, it provided a quick, cheap, warm, and psychologically satisfying food for laboring men, women, and children with little time to spend cooking or consuming a more elaborate meal. The anthropologist Sidney Mintz suggested that sugar made possible the industrial revolution in Britain because workers in factories, sweatshops, and other operations regarded tea (almost always drunk with sugar), jam, and other sweets as convenience foods and compensation for long and difficult days or nights of continuous labor.

CONSUMER BEHAVIOR

An issue of great importance in the history of material culture and a subject of intense debate among historians has to do with changes in consumer behavior and the meaning of goods during the early modern period. Was there ever a consumer revolution, a dramatic and broad-based transformation in European attitudes toward things and in Europeans' daily practices involving material objects? If so, when did it occur, and how did it happen? Neil McKendrick and several other scholars have asserted that a consumer revolution did occur in the eighteenth century. They maintain that early industrialization was accompanied by increased domestic consumption in England. Working people acquired many possessions, like dishes, household adornments, ribbons, buckles, and trinkets, which were more affordable due to changes in production methods. Thus the laboring poor desired and enjoyed more material goods than ever before. McKendrick also discerned a revolutionary change in material culture among wealthier consumers. Enticed by innovative entrepreneurs, like the pottery maker Josiah Wedgwood, middle-class consumers wanted earthenware decorated with classical designs, which Wedgwood successfully marketed as fashionable among the elites.

By contrast, some scholars have maintained that the extravagant spending of Renaissance rulers and the somewhat more restrained acquisition of goods by wealthy commoners laid the foundation for the modern acceptance of consumerism as an integral part of daily life and personal identity. From this perspective, instead of a consumer revolution, a gradual "trickle-down effect" occurred over a few centuries. The purchasing of numerous household and personal items spread from the elite strata of society down to the less wealthy. Some research supports a bottom-up approach, indicating that working people, even the la-

boring poor, in early modern Europe made joint decisions at the household level about the allocation of their resources into production and consumption. Thus Jan de Vries posited "an industrious revolution" in the early modern period, referring to an increase in labor productivity stimulated by families' desires for more consumer goods. This interpretation challenges the idea of a consumer revolution because working people started to acquire more goods long before technology changed the manner of production and prices of goods. Moreover the desire for goods was internally generated at the family level and was not an imitation of elite behavior or the result of manipulative marketing.

Whether or not the increase in consumption was revolutionary or gradual and whatever the motives behind Europeans' desire for various furnishings and clothes, by the eighteenth century more goods were available and were consumed. Studies of notarial inventories of household possessions at the time of the owners' deaths in eighteenth-century Paris show a trend toward greater comfort, efficiency, and privacy in home life compared with earlier centuries. Room arrangements in apartments shifted away from a vertical organization, usually with the kitchen on the ground floor and other rooms serving multiple or separate functions in different levels above. A horizontal arrangement of rooms on one or two floors in the eighteenth century was more convenient for general movement and for hauling water and fuel to different parts of the home. Parisians at this time created more privacy in their homes with separate rooms for separate functions and the use of screens or partitions. Whereas in the early modern era a single room might serve for sociability, working, eating, and sleeping, by the eighteenth century urban dwellers were inclined to separate spatially these different activities. Lighting improved with more and better candles and lamps, clearer window glass, and less obstruction from closely packed, tall buildings. Mirrors were more common than ever before, suggesting both more sophisticated home furnishings and greater concern for personal appearance. Even the clothing of poor residents changed as the century progressed. Men had several changes of shirts and more variously colored clothes, while women added dresses, aprons, and even corsets to the standard petticoats.

The political significance of eighteenth-century consumption was apparent during the French Revolution of 1789–1799. An important contributing factor to the revolution was the inability of producers and distributors to satisfy popular demand for cheap knickknacks that imitated articles worn and used by the aristocracy, for example, stockings, umbrellas, and

fans. The French Revolution eradicated the guild laws and other restrictions on production characteristic of the Old Regime.

Moreover the French Revolution imbued ordinary domestic products and clothes with political meaning. Dishes and wallpaper decorated with blue, white, and red and patriotic symbols became popular as consumers wished or felt compelled to communicate their revolutionary sympathies. Supporters of the revolution and the new republic abandoned the elaborate dress and powdered wigs of the Old Regime in favor of simpler styles of clothing and more natural hair arrangements. During this period male fashion shifted from silk knee breeches and stockings to long trousers worn with boots. Embroidered waistcoats and cutaway jackets gave way to more humble fabrics and long frock coats. Indeed English styles became the model in men's clothing, and the three-piece suit symbolized responsibility, masculinity, and the ascension of bourgeois men to political power. Dark, sober colors became popular among middle-class men in Europe in the nineteenth century. Unpowdered hair cut fairly short or arranged in falling curls hearkened back to classical antiquity. Such styles were named "à la Titus" and were worn, with some differences, by women and men alike. Women's dress also became simpler though more varied. Under the Directory (1795–1799) and during the Napoleonic era (1799–1814) fashionable women sported pale, diaphanous gowns with low necklines and high waists that revealed more natural figures than the corseted ones of the Old Regime. Eventually styles returned to a fitted look and tight-laced corsets, but the changes wrought in clothing by the French Revolution spread throughout Europe, fostered by the industrial revolution in manufacturing.

READY-MADE GOODS

For several centuries Europeans produced and dressed in woolens, linens, and occasionally silks. Sturdy wool or hemp fabrics were the foundation of the majority of Europeans' clothes, manufactured from the local indigenous sheep or grown in fields of flax. Wealthier persons also wore silk fabrics, lace, and embroidery produced in Europe from raw materials native to Europe. Cotton textiles, however, transformed Europeans' dress and way of life. Europeans came into contact with cotton fabrics through trade with Asia. In the eighteenth century Europeans were enamored with cotton calicoes from India with their brilliant colors and intricate designs. English producers of wool and silk objected to the importation of fabrics that

cut into sales of their own goods, and the government placed high tariffs and prohibitions on the calicoes. Recognizing the market for cotton textiles, ambitious craftspeople and entrepreneurs figured out a way to produce cotton textiles in England with a succession of spinning and then weaving machines. These methods of mechanical production and increased output were a significant part of the industrial revolution that started in England and spread to Europe. They also contributed to a dramatic change in the material culture of Europeans in the nineteenth century.

Plentiful and cheap cotton cloth constituted new and popular forms of clothing. Rarely worn in earlier times, underwear became a fundamental part of European dress as a result of the domestic manufacture of cotton textiles. Handkerchiefs, stockings, and other knitwear also were available to more consumers. The number of clothing items a person owned, even a relatively poor person, increased noticeably in the nineteenth century, though this trend was apparent earlier as well. Mass production methods required an agglomeration of workers, and migration from the countryside to urban areas proceeded apace. City dwellers were largely unable to produce goods for themselves, so increasing numbers of persons purchased larger proportions of household goods, clothing, and food. This demand for manufactured goods in turn fueled the quest for increased production. How did the mass-production methods of the industrial revolution affect the material existence of Europeans in the nineteenth century?

Wealthy Europeans could still obtain fine, handcrafted furnishings and tailor-made clothing throughout the nineteenth century. They might request a chest of drawers or a desk in a particular historical style, and craftspeople skilled in woodworking, veneering, design, and sculpting could produce an original and beautiful piece of furniture made out of valuable or attractive woods. Fashionable women and men also had many of their clothes custom-made, selecting a fabric and style. A dressmaker or tailor fit the garment to the customer's body and taste. Yet new items produced in new ways and ready-made goods offered a wider array of choices to consumers in the nineteenth century than in earlier times.

For example, a good bed was still constructed of wood, but box spring mattresses were an innovation in bedding brought about by more efficient methods of metal production. Beds made of metal were introduced and usually used by children, servants, the poor, or in hospitals. Knives, forks, spoons, and other tableware were fundamental items for many Europeans, but electroplating silver or gold on top of flatware made of baser metals enhanced their appearance. Rich

and poor families liked to decorate their homes with art, and new alternatives were available to those who could not afford original paintings or sculptures. Print reproductions of varying quality adorned the walls of the comfortable as well as the working poor. For the middle class three-dimensional reproductive technology produced affordable versions of antique and contemporary statues and figurines.

A significant innovation of the industrial era was the manufacture of ready-made clothing. In earlier times many Europeans produced cloth and clothing for themselves and their families. An adult's worn-out jacket often provided suitable fabric for a child's trousers. Itinerant peddlers transported lengths of cloth throughout the countryside for purchase by rural inhabitants. Additionally a lively trade in old, used clothing was another source for the working poor, and employers passed on their old clothes to servants. New clothes were constructed for the most part for the wealthy, who selected fabric at a draper's shop, then proceeded to a tailor or dressmaker who fitted and stitched the garment for the individual customer. All of these methods of obtaining clothing continued into the nineteenth century, but a new method added a new array of cheap clothing choices, especially for male consumers of the working class.

In the years of economic slowdown cloth merchants could hire out-of-work clothing makers to cut simple patterns in men's trousers and jackets. The cut pieces were distributed to stitchers, usually female, who worked out of their homes. Merchants then offered for sale completed articles of clothing at low prices to working people. Gradually during the nineteenth century, with more and cheaper fabrics produced in textile factories and the patenting of the sewing machine in 1846, the ready-made process effectively produced more fitted, finer garments for sale in the department stores that appeared in France and England in the 1850s. In the nineteenth century urban dwellers in Europe had access to more goods than did their ancestors, though the middle classes were by far the greatest beneficiaries of this new abundance.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Housing, the setting for these new goods, was also a significant aspect of material culture for nineteenth-century Europeans. Income from successful enterprises expanded housing options for the middle class from urban apartments above or behind shops to detached houses in the suburbs. In England the middle class invented suburbs in the early nineteenth century as a means to escape the dirt, noise, and crime of

densely populated urban centers. Building houses in the countryside surrounding cities, successful middle-class families enjoyed peaceful, healthy, and comfortable surroundings while men continued to operate family businesses or to work in other positions in the city. Removed from the site of trade and manufacturing, women and children became more home-centered, and domestic decoration and upkeep and child rearing became the primary functions of middle-class wives and mothers. To be sure many middle-class women had for a long time gained a sense of identity and self-worth through housekeeping, but in the nineteenth century this function assumed a new intensity. A flood of published housekeeping manuals testifies that more women were focusing on household cares and that they felt a need for professional assistance in the appropriate means of cooking, furnishing, maintaining, decorating, and entertaining in the home. Whether they lived in urban apartments or houses in towns, suburbs, or villages, middle-class women felt compelled to maintain comfortable surroundings for their families and suitable households for their status. The housekeeping manuals kept them abreast of changing styles in home furnishings and the manners and accoutrements appropriate for sociability.

While middle-class women fretted over the upholstery fabrics of their sofas and the carpet patterns on their floors, working people experienced a different material environment. Housing for the poor was usually makeshift, cramped, and overcrowded. A few rooms for a large family and simple, sparse furniture were luxuries indeed throughout much of the nineteenth century. In the cities workingmen especially sought warmth, light, companionship, and escape from dismal, cold, and uninviting living quarters in cafés or pubs. Women socialized on the front stoops and at the public laundering sites, where they washed their families' clothes and household linens. A vibrant public or street life compensated somewhat for the inadequacies of individual housing units. Urban renewal in major cities like London, Paris, and Vienna in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made some improvements in working-class housing by razing areas of dark and hazardous buildings and erecting apartment buildings with uniform designs, more lighting, and modern conveniences like plumbing and later electricity.

New inventions of the nineteenth century also led to new items of material culture. Photography, invented and developed in France in the 1830s and 1840s, quickly affected European lives, especially those of the middle classes. Around midcentury stereoscopic viewers—decorative holders that put photographs side by side so a viewer could see an image that ap-

proximated three dimensions or “real life”—were popular in comfortable Victorian homes. Visiting cards, made of photographic portraits reduced in size and mounted on a card, were exchanged and collected ubiquitously in both England and France. Family portraits became central items of home decoration. Picture postcards offered a means for people to communicate through the postal service that was less time consuming than writing an entire letter and that conveyed images to family and friends of, for example, a vacation site. Photography and travel increasingly were connected after the invention of small, cheap cameras at the turn of the century. Instead of relying on professional photographers, ordinary people could buy a portable camera, take pictures of scenery on holiday trips or informal snapshots of family members, and either develop the film themselves or send it to the manufacturer to be made into prints. People collected photographs in albums or put them in frames set atop a fireplace mantel or a piano. Pianos became common household furnishings in middle-class and eventually in working-class homes in the nineteenth century. Other new articles that made life easier, more pleasant, or more mobile during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries included matches, typewriters, electric lighting, telephones, gramophones, bicycles, and, for the very rich, automobiles.

Although urban populations grew steadily during the nineteenth century, the majority of Europeans still lived in the countryside, where traditional, re-

gional objects and rituals persisted. Rural people still slept in box beds, and women wore high, starched, white lace coifs in Brittany until World War II. Farmers and agricultural workers were not likely to use many candles or oil lamps, following the pattern of working in daylight and sleeping when darkness prevailed. The mass-manufactured goods that characterized urban life arrived slowly in the countryside. Yet even in Russia, a predominantly agricultural society at the beginning of the twentieth century, material culture became more urban and modern. Elegant, fixed-price shops competed with open markets in cities, and fashionable, Western clothing replaced traditional Russian shirts and shawls.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Although material culture is experienced by most people in the form of everyday activities and surroundings, it is inseparable from international relations and domestic politics. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries European imperialism affected material culture in Europe itself in ways different from foreign trade and earlier forms of colonialism. Europeans continued to enjoy tea, coffee, chocolate, and tobacco from Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Art and artifacts from these continents contributed to Europeans’ sense of themselves as distinct from other

cultures and in most cases superior to them. In the nineteenth century European artists integrated a flat, two-dimensional Japanese aesthetic into paintings and decorative objects. Appreciation for Chinese art and Indian design also affected European porcelain, textiles, woodworking, and other goods. Cashmere shawls, originally imported from Asia but increasingly produced in England or France, were fashionable articles of clothing for middle-class women. English women who had lived in India returned to Europe with tastes and recipes for curry dishes. Although Europeans admired arts and crafts from other parts of the world, they represented these accomplishments as something less than the products of their own culture. By the late nineteenth century museums and exhibitions displayed textiles, furnishings, and decorative objects from Asia and Africa as exotic items produced by peoples whose inferiority to Europeans was obvious in Europeans' military conquests and domination over them. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that Europeans only "knew" the peoples of Asia and Africa through the artifacts they produced. Through museums, exhibitions, mass manufacturing, and department stores, many Europeans were exposed to non-European products or motifs and purchased them for use or decoration in their homes.

Material culture involved governments in other ways as well. By the nineteenth century the era of an absolute monarch associated with a particular furnishing or clothing style was over. Nonetheless, rulers and democratic governments patronized the arts and crafts and cultivated styles and designs that might promote a popular sense of national identity and state power. Following the Great Exhibition of 1851 in London, the first international gathering of products and machines, the British were gratified that the efficiency and output of their mechanized methods of manufacturing were unsurpassed. However, the men in charge of the exhibition were dismayed at the poor design and quality of British products in comparison with those from other parts of Europe and Asia. With the proceeds of the exhibition and selected items purchased from it, they established a museum of industrial design that later became the Victoria and Albert Museum. The purpose of the museum was to inspire British producers and consumers with examples of good taste in design and style. Although limited to an elite of intellectuals and artists, the arts and crafts movement in Britain was another systematic effort to manufacture objects of beauty and utility that defied the standardization and poor quality associated with mass-production methods.

French officials felt vindicated after the Great Exhibition that French goods were more beautiful

than those produced in Britain, but they also were concerned about national manufacturing. All the more reason then for subsequent French governments to seek ways to maintain a competitive advantage. The government of the Third Republic (1870–1940) promoted both an ideal standard of good taste and an artistic style of art nouveau in the interests of economic prosperity and national unity. Cultivating the tastes of middle-class women was a major component of this effort. Through a reformed public education program for girls and in support of taste professionals who wrote books and articles, the Third Republic emphasized the importance of women's role as tasteful consumers for the home. A woman's civic function, according to the schools and the manuals, was to exercise good taste in furnishing her home. Similarly women were identified as major propagators of art nouveau, a graceful and fluid artistic style reminiscent of the rococo style from the eighteenth century. The Third Republic's intention in sponsoring the international exhibitions of 1889 and 1900 was, among other things, to encourage women as producers and consumers to revitalize handicraft production in France along with a distinctive French style of art nouveau.

Several scholars have deemed western Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a mass consumer society. More goods were available to more people than ever before, and even workingpeople had choices about the appearance and style of clothes and furnishings they purchased. Advertising in the popular press, on streetcars, and through pamphlets or catalogs urged people to buy particular products at particular stores. Women, especially of the middle class, were the primary architects of material culture in the home and were thus the main target of advertising and of advice on tasteful consumption. This function had alarming effects when wives purchased more than their husbands could afford, and in England legal authorities reduced men's liability for their wives' spending, setting back women's ability to obtain credit and hence individual autonomy. Even working-class women, in certain regions and depending on local manufacturing industries, assumed responsibility for feeding and clothing their families and furnishing the home. Historians have debated, however, to what extent this was an era of mass consumption, given the limited participation of the working poor in the world of department stores, leisure travel, national identity, and as the target of advertisers.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The material culture of all Europeans changed dramatically during World War I. As national resources

were increasingly channeled toward the war effort, even the wealthy experienced a variety of shortages. Following two or three years of murderous fighting, governments in England, France, and Germany restricted civilian consumption of fats, textiles, meat, bread, and other essentials, and imported goods of all kinds were limited or prohibited. Even before the first year of the war ended, bread and other foodstuffs were scarce in Germany, and authorities called on women in particular to exercise restraint in consumption. Although many Europeans made do with coarse-grained bread, margarine, and other food substitutes, frustration and discontent exploded in Berlin in October 1915, when women demonstrated against the high prices merchants charged for butter. As a result the government attempted to impose systematic rationing of goods in acknowledgment of consumers' legitimate concerns about the capacity of the regime to provide for its citizens during wartime. Germany's failure to effectively address the shortages was a significant part of its failure to prosecute the war itself. By contrast, Britons as a whole actually ate better in spite of wartime rationing and prohibitions.

Shortages of textiles and the new tasks women performed during the war in industry, agriculture, and the service sector led to long-term changes in feminine apparel. Even after the war ended more practical clothing remained, leaving behind the pre-war long skirts, elaborate bustles, and extravagant hats. Women's dress in the 1920s and 1930s was less fitted and confining and increasingly presented a vertical, androgynous silhouette. Daring, fashion-conscious women wore their hair bobbed, contributing further to the boyish look. Short hemlines, slim styling, and small cloches allowed women greater freedom of movement.

After the war the promotion of electric household appliances altered material culture in Europe. Electric irons, sewing machines, and vacuum cleaners were available for household consumption before the war, and clothes washers and water heaters appeared in the 1930s. Such appliances were touted as labor-saving devices, compensating middle-class women for the loss of servants at the war's end and promising modernity to households equipped with the latest appliances. However, research on both France and Britain reveals that diffusion of these machines was slow, taking decades to reach even half of British households. In addition to income and price, gender and leisure significantly affected who bought which appliances for what purpose. By and large families chose leisure products over those that would relieve women of some household labor. Working-class British households were more likely to have better interior electric

lighting and radios than electric cookers in the inter-war years. The main reasons were economic. The cost of appliances, their installation, and their operation was more than most working-class families could afford. Consumers spent more on household furnishings, including bed and bath linens, curtains, cooking utensils, and dishes, and on clothing than on appliances, to say nothing of expenditures on food and leisure activities, including travel by train or motor vehicle, pubs, and movies. Producers of electricity and electrical appliances appealed to middle-class women to improve the cleanliness of their homes with these products. Although middle-class families were more likely than working-class families to own electric appliances, these devices actually confined women to the home more by raising standards of cleanliness. If appliances did not confine middle-class women, then working-class women who worked part-time for the middle class used the appliances in another person's home.

While electrical appliances and various forms of leisure and entertainment slowly permeated western Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, the inhabitants of the new Soviet Union experienced a drastic change in material life with the transition to a state-controlled economy in the 1930s. Severe shortages and deprivation were the common characteristics of the Stalinist experiment. Famine in the countryside in 1932 and 1933 along with collectivization forced millions of rural inhabitants to migrate to the cities, where they found little food and housing. Bread was scarce and adulterated, and people waited in line for hours at bakeshops, sometimes returning home with nothing. Bread and other hard-to-obtain necessities, including meat, milk, butter, vegetables, salt, soap, kerosene, and matches, were referred to as "deficit goods." As the government concentrated most of its resources in capital goods production, clothes were hard to come by, and shoes were sometimes unobtainable. Even persons with the skills to make and repair clothes and utensils could not ease the situation because thread, needles, and buttons were scarce and the state prohibited the private consumption of paint, nails, boards, or other raw materials. State ownership of housing meant the conversion of old buildings into communal apartments and the construction of barracks in new, industrial outposts. A typical communal apartment consisted of one room for an entire family with sheets or curtains dividing the space in which several people lived. Running water was not available, food was stored in sacks hung out the window, and building residents shared sinks, toilets, washtubs, and cooking facilities. Although more goods became available after rationing ended

in 1935, the practice of urban foraging never really ceased, and severe housing shortages persisted until the 1950s.

Shortages caused by war and the policies of totalitarian states fluctuated or contrasted with steady, sometimes astonishing, growth in the production and consumption of goods in Europe. In the two decades

following World War II unprecedented economic growth and welfare states led to extraordinarily high levels of material satisfaction if not abundance. Refrigerators, washing machines, telephones, television sets, and cars became common possessions for all Europeans, even urban workers and rural farmers. People spent less of their incomes on food and housing and

more on luxuries and leisure. Although the vast majority of Europeans gained access to the same objects of material culture, differences persisted in terms of style and quality and the meanings of objects for different social groups and individuals. The construction of diverse personal and group identities through the

objects of everyday life requires more investigation. Scholars have begun to write the history of material culture in twentieth-century Europe and to examine the effects of wars, revolutions, changing capitalist and socialist economies, new media, and state policies on material culture.

See also other articles in this section.

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STANDARDS OF LIVING



Norman J. G. Pounds

A century ago a Polish peasant, who had been born a serf under Russian rule, wrote an account of his life. "About 1870," he wrote, "the peasants began to build proper brick chimneys, when the iron cooking stove came in, which [is] used everywhere in the kitchens." This simple innovation clearly made a great impression on him. It facilitated cooking, made his kitchen more comfortable, and marked a sharp improvement in his standard of living. Thus it has always been. Small increments, resulting from innovations made by unknown people, have been adopted and diffused. Individually they have been small; in the aggregate they have amounted to a series of revolutions.

The concept of standard of living is difficult to define and impossible to measure with any degree of precision. So many factors influence it, and those which seem favorable or unfavorable to one person might have the opposite effect on another. Standards of living are relative; they admit of no absolute measure, and comparisons between those of one society or community and those of another are always difficult and sometimes impossible. For any one person a satisfactory standard of living is that which he or she has come to expect. It is generally recognized that some people enjoy a higher and some a lower standard of living. There was a time when people were urged to be content with the lot which God had ordained for them. Now most people expect, or at least hope, that the human condition will, with or without their efforts, improve in the course of time.

The level of one's disposable income sets an upper limit to one's standard of living, and within the limits thus set there is an immense range of choices, so that, in effect, one "good" may be exchanged for another. The smaller the disposable income, the more restricted is this range of choice, and, at the very lowest levels, income covers only the barest necessities. An income below this level would, theoretically at least, fail to sustain life.

Standards of living are generally conceived or measured in terms of material things which one uses or enjoys. These range from things which are essen-

tial to maintain life to those which, however desirable they might appear, can nevertheless be dispensed with. Briefly stated, they can be said to fall into five categories: food and drink; housing; tools, appliances, and domestic equipment; entertainment and intellectual pursuits, including art; and, lastly, the satisfaction derived from parks and gardens and public buildings. Some of these "goods" are measurable. The possession of a television or a dishwasher or a bathroom is thus used to measure and compare standards of living, and for this reason questions are often asked about them in the decennial censuses. They measure current improvements. Lastly, the level of education, as well as physical and mental health and all the factors which influence bodily fitness, must be considered. In these spheres the progress made during the last century dwarfs all that had been accomplished during the whole preceding period of human history.

A key confusion about standards of living in early modern Europe involves the concept of a subsistence economy. Most peasants, who made up the bulk of the population, did produce most of what they consumed locally. But this did not mean, except for years of harvest failure, that all were confined to the barest survival. Some peasants had a wider margin, in terms of foods, festival clothing, and the like. Indeed, festivals themselves involved considerable village expenditure, and they were frequent occasions in many parts of Europe.

Further, standards of living clearly improved for many rural and urban west Europeans in the early modern centuries. Although a minority of propertyless people may have suffered deteriorating standards. This showed in better furnishings, new diet items like sugar and tea, and so on. By the eighteenth century, a full-fledged consumer society began to emerge, with eager attention to new clothing styles, manufactured china and other home items, clocks and watches, and so on. The definition of an appropriate standard of living was changing before the onset of industrialization throughout western Europe.

HEALTH AND LIFE EXPECTANCY

Health and life expectancy are major factors considered by historians in discussing standards of living. Both underwent a profound change during the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Life expectancy has increased, and certain causes of death have been virtually eliminated in the more developed countries. At the beginning of the modern period life expectancy at birth varied but averaged little more than thirty years. The death rate was especially high among children, and all ages suffered high rates of death from epidemic diseases, many of them induced by environmental conditions.

The plague, which had first appeared in Europe in the mid-fourteenth century, remained virulent for more than three centuries. Its last appearance in England was in 1665 and in France in 1720, but it remained endemic in the Balkans into the nineteenth century, and the Habsburg empire did not terminate its quarantine regulations against the Ottomans until the 1870s. The vector of the plague was the symbiotic relationship of the flea and the black rat. This nexus could be broken only by an improvement in living conditions which destroyed or at least reduced the rat

population. It is a measure of relative living standards within Europe that the plague disappeared from the west more than a century before it vanished in eastern Europe.

Other epidemic diseases which were environmentally determined were typhus and cholera, both of which ravaged society, especially in the crowded environments of congested cities. The vector of typhus was the body louse, which was able to multiply in the crowded, insanitary conditions of prisons and barracks—hence its alternative names, “jail” and “trench” fever. Both were eliminated only by more sanitary conditions and a liberal use of soap in personal hygiene and the laundering of clothes. Cholera was a latecomer on the European scene, though it had long been endemic in Asia. It was spread through polluted drinking water. It probably reached Europe first in the ships of Asian traders, but did not spread widely before the 1830s. Its spread was closely linked with the practice of taking water from underground sources which had been contaminated by sewage overflowing from cesspits. It was not wholly eliminated until a piped water supply, drawn from rural reservoirs, became available and a more effective system of sewers had been constructed.

Because the nature and source of disease were not understood before the later nineteenth century, there was little inducement to separate sewage disposal from the domestic water. Recurring epidemics of waterborne diseases were a fact of life. It was not until 1854 that John Snow, a London physician, plotted occurrences of cholera on a map and found that they clustered around a well in Soho, which supplied the neighborhood with water for drinking. The well was closed and the miniepidemic ceased. It was thus learned empirically that polluted water was likely to spread disease. But improvements came very slowly because the nature of pathogens was not determined until late in the century. The last severe outbreak of cholera from polluted water was in Hamburg, Germany, in 1890.

Other diseases both impaired the quality and reduced the duration of life, among them smallpox and a range of intestinal disorders. These have, at least in the more developed countries, been reduced to insignificance by developments in medical science and improvements in the environment. The medical advances of the last century and a half, which include the development of hospital design and management and the use of antiseptics and anesthetics, have together revolutionized both surgery and medical practice.

FOOD AND DRINK

Nothing illustrates better than diet the components of a standard of living. The level of calorie and protein intake essential for the performance of bodily functions varies between individuals and also depends to some extent on climate and the type of work to which a person is accustomed. Great physical exertion and a cold climate both demand a greater food intake. A good or high standard of living demands a diet considerably above the physiological minimum. In most developed countries a consumption of at least two thousand calories a day can be considered adequate, but a truly satisfactory diet also requires a certain volume of protein and specific vitamins. An adequate diet might consist of tasteless or unpalatable foods, but a good standard requires that more appetizing foods be substituted for those that merely satisfy one's biological needs. Eating becomes more than a physiological necessity; it is a pleasurable pursuit. A high-standard diet is marked by the consumption of a higher quality of food, inevitably at a greater cost. If the means are present to pay for them, the consumption of meat and other high-order proteins is likely to increase beyond one's physiological needs—sometimes with deleterious medical consequences.

In most societies there are occasions during the year when people indulge in excessive feasting. These convivial occasions can be regarded as part of the entertainment in which society at large participates. Some are celebratory, even religious, but among them are those which have an economic basis. In earlier European societies one year's harvest was expected to supply sufficient food to last until the next. As supplies one by one became exhausted, so a final, ceremonial eating marked the exhaustion of a particular comestible. Simnel cakes, a traditional Easter or spring-time food in parts of Europe, marked the exhaustion of the supply of wheat of the highest quality. In similar fashion, the Christmas or midwinter feast followed the slaughter of the farm animals which could not be fed through the lean months of winter. The long-distance transport of foodstuffs, refrigeration, and other methods of preservation have, at least in the developed world, ended such seasonal periods of scarcity and made their accompanying feasts redundant. Some have, however, retained their importance in the social calendar, though they no longer possess any economic or dietary purpose.

Standards of living have sometimes been raised by the introduction of a new and particularly prolific crop. The potato, introduced into Europe from the New World, is an example. In some countries, notably Ireland, it quickly became a basic foodstuff and contributed to a sharp increase in population. Its failure

in 1848 owing to a plant virus led to famine and severe mortality. Corn, or maize, has played a similar role, though more as animal feed than human. The development of refrigeration and the import of exotic and tropical foods from distant parts of the world has further extended the range of available foodstuffs, though usually at a high monetary cost, without any commensurate increase in the nutritional value of the diet.

HOUSING

Shelter from the elements has always been the second essential of human existence, and there is good archaeological evidence for some form of shelter from a very early date in human prehistory. The development of housing can be traced in considerable detail since structures have survived from the Middle Ages and earlier relatively intact. As a general rule, local materials were used, and, as far as Europe was concerned, the commonest and most widespread has always been timber. Good constructional timber was abundant everywhere except in a few arid regions, such as parts of Spain. Hardwoods, chiefly oak, were used for a framework, and the spaces were filled in with wickerwork and plastered with clay. Such homes have continued to be built until the present, and villages in much of central and eastern Europe remain mainly of wood. The rival to timber construction has been building in stone and brick and, in a few areas, of adobe, clay "lump," or "cob." The last has been important only in the absence of quality timber. Stone and brick construction represent a higher and more expensive mode of construction, even when the materials could be obtained locally. Broadly speaking, stone construction prevails in areas where a good quality of stone, usually limestone of Jurassic age, occurs. In England, for example, there is a "Stone Belt," within which masonry construction has prevailed. Brick making requires clay of a particular quality, and this is also highly localized. Brick building characterizes the historic cities of northern Europe, where good stone is scarce and clay relatively abundant.

From the Middle Ages most rural construction has been in timber, but urban building has been increasingly in stone or brick. The reason lies not so much in the greater wealth of cities as in their liability to disastrous fires. As early as the late twelfth century the city of London, for example, prescribed stone walls and slate or tile roofs as a precaution against its frequent conflagrations.

Standards of housing have risen during the past five centuries by countless small increments, achieved

slowly and diffused gradually throughout the continent. Most innovations were made in the west, especially in France, the Low Countries, and Great Britain, and in the homes of the rich. The diffusion of these innovations took two forms, spatial and social. Most were adopted first by the well-to-do, who were able to afford the initial investment. Gradually they spread socially downward until, usually in simplified form, they were adopted in the homes of the poor. The downward diffusion of the masonry-built chimney, mentioned at the beginning of this article, was such an innovation. It called for capital rather than skill. A hearth could be built against an external wall, instead of being placed in the middle of the floor, and the smoke could pass upward through what was effectively a stone-built tunnel. Few innovations could have been more simple and few could have contributed more to the comfort of the home.

Glazed windows were a comparable innovation. They first made their appearance in the home during the Middle Ages, but remained very small and admitted little light. Then, in the sixteenth century, advancing technology permitted the manufacture of larger sheets of glass. This in turn encouraged architects to construct homes with large windows. The consequence was the well-lighted interior. The use of windows which could be opened and shut—casement or sash—spread socially downward and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries began to appear in the homes of the lower classes.

Another feature of daily life which underwent a gradual improvement throughout modern times was domestic illumination. One forgets how dark it was after the sun had set, how difficult to read or perform domestic tasks indoors, or to walk about outside. The importance of spinning as a domestic occupation was due in part to the fact that it was a simple manipulative task and could be performed in the glow of the fire smoldering on the hearth. Any more effective lightning had to be supplied by candles, usually of tallow and smelling abominably, waxed tapers, or oil-burning lamps. These gave way to gas lighting in the cities in the later nineteenth century, but it was costly since it required a network of iron pipes. It spread slowly to poorer homes and eventually to street lights. This was a development of great social importance, since it facilitated movement in greater security after dark.

A feature of homes from the sixteenth century onward has been greater attention to hygiene and privacy. The number of bedrooms increased, and they came to be better furnished with closets and beds. The indoor toilet first appeared in castles and fortified houses, where it might have been difficult or even

dangerous to go far afield. In the grander homes they began to appear in in early modern times, and there were even attempts—with little success—to construct a flushing system. This called for a piped water supply, which was nowhere available before the late eighteenth or nineteenth century. Water was obtained from wells and springs or from the nearest river, and it was often polluted and always unreliable.

The lack of adequate provision for disposing of sewage before the middle or even the later years of the nineteenth century meant that the water supply was often severely contaminated. Conditions were always worse in cities than in the countryside because it was more difficult to separate wells from the cesspits in which human waste was collected. Where possible the latter was discharged into a river, but this only removed the source of infection to other communities farther downstream. In some cities, such as London, cesspits were even dug beneath the basements of houses. The medieval coroners' rolls, which recorded the causes of accidental death, even noted a case of drowning in such a subterranean but nonetheless domestic cesspit. In no sphere of human activity did the improvements of modern times do more to raise standards of living than in the provision of sewers, either of masonry or of glazed pipes, to carry away domestic effluent.

A piped water supply complemented a sewage system and brought about comparable improvements in the living standards of all classes. It required, however, a reservoir to collect and hold water and, all too often, a pumping mechanism to lift the water to a level from which it could flow downhill to the homes in which it was to be used. The city of Bath, England, had such a system late in the eighteenth century, but the lack of pumps limited the supply to the low-lying homes, and these often found it more convenient—and certainly cheaper—to continue to dip their water

from the river. The revolution in sanitation and water supply did not take place in much of Europe until the early twentieth century, and there remain areas, notably in eastern Europe, where even today it has barely begun.

GOODS AND CHATTELS

The evidence for rising living standards is most apparent in items of domestic and daily use. Within living memory they have increased in number and sophistication, and what had once been available only for the wealthy and privileged have now become necessities for the masses. This has resulted, on the one hand, from expanding real incomes and, on the other, from economies achieved in the mass production of goods. New items are constantly being fed into the body of consumer goods, while others pass out of fashion, become obsolete, and cease to be made. The types of goods with which people have furnished their homes and which they have chosen to enjoy or display have changed greatly over five centuries.

Fortunately, individual collections of durables can be studied, not so much from surviving homes, furnished and equipped, for there are few, but from inventories of personal possessions made at the time of death. The making of a will and the "proving" of it after death fell within the jurisdiction of the medieval church. It was the duty of the ecclesiastical authorities to supervise the implementation of a will, and this involved preparing a list, with their valuation, of the chattels or movable possessions of the deceased. These have survived in large numbers in England, but less adequately in continental Europe. In each instance they listed the possessions of the deceased from clothing and bedding to domestic fittings and furni-

ture. Such household goods as pots and pans and the wrought ironwork used to suspend pots and cuts of meat before the fire were all listed, together with the tools of whatever trade the deceased pursued. In using these probate inventories one must be aware of the fact that they may not be complete; occasionally a will bequeaths an item which is not mentioned in the accompanying inventory. Moreover, the poor were not required to make a will. In England the cutoff point was the possession of chattels to the value of £5. Difficult though it may be to conceive of worldly goods of a lower total value, it is clear that a majority of the population possessed no more. An unusual Norfolk will of 1758 recorded a widow whose total assets were worth only £1 8s. 9d. (\$2.20). Of this her bed made up £1 1s. In effect, she had no property beyond her clothes and a cooking pot. Table 1 illustrates how great was the spread between the rich and well-off and the mass of the impoverished population.

Among the categories of worldly goods, clothing is the least dispensable, although it performs obviously nonessential functions as well. Because it varies in style and quality and is subject to changes of fashion, clothing has become a status symbol, indicating a certain level of wealth or social importance. Hence some people have dressed above their station in life, leading authorities to prohibit excesses of dress for

certain classes. Such sumptuary legislation has a long history. Control of both clothing and food was not unusual during the Middle Ages, but laws became increasingly difficult to enforce and were mostly abandoned during early modern times. Thereafter the question of dress tended to be influenced by fashion but controlled by the ability to pay for it. The regular laundering of clothes is a fairly modern development, as are many aspects of personal hygiene. It was restricted by the fact that soap was not generally available even in western Europe much before the nineteenth century and also by the fact that not everyone possessed a change of clothing. The prevalence of typhus was due in part to the prolonged wearing of soiled clothing infested with the body louse. Underclothes were rarely worn before a light fabric—at first linen and then, from the mid-eighteenth century, cotton—had become widely available. Such light fabrics lent themselves to more frequent washing, with consequent improvements in both health and comfort.

Historians have debated the standard of living under early industrial conditions, particularly in Britain. Optimists claim that wages went up, and point to signs of greater consumption of meat, purchase of cotton clothing, use of other new popular items like forks. Pessimists highlight high housing costs and frequent slum conditions, and some evidence of deteriorating health standards. The debate has been inconclusive overall, and is no longer active. There is general agreement that by the later nineteenth century, in western Europe, material standards of living were improving for most groups.

There was an underclass in most parts of Europe, and in some places it made up a majority of the population. It was undernourished, lived in cramped, unhygienic homes, and scarcely possessed the bare necessities for civilized living. Despite the progress in the material conditions of life between the Middle Ages and the twentieth century, this underclass scarcely benefited. At most, it can be said that it became numerically smaller until only small islands of extreme deprivation remained. The gap between the material conditions of the middle and upper classes and those of the humblest began to widen in the later seventeenth century, became wider still in the eighteenth, and in the nineteenth opened into the yawning gulf which did much to inspire the writings of Friedrich Engels and others.

MEASURING STANDARDS OF LIVING

While the fact of progress in material standards of living cannot be doubted, this advance is extraordinarily difficult to measure. It varies from place to place

and from one class to another. Furthermore, it cannot be disputed that there have been times when standards declined, usually for a restricted period and often over a limited area. There is no effective measure of anything as subjective as a standard of living. The Bureau of the Census and comparable bodies in Europe make it a practice to inquire into living standards. Questions may range from the possession of a bathroom to domestic appliances. But these are only surrogates. It is assumed that a person who possesses them is likely also to have a certain range of other goods and, in material terms, to belong to a particular class. On this basis one might claim that people in one area enjoy a higher standard than those in another. But this is only a rough measure of material backwardness or well-being. It does not take into consideration the fact that people usually have a range of choice between the various "goods" available, and it cannot measure the levels of satisfaction they offer. In the last resort, the only objective measure other than life expectancy and stature is the disposable real income available to the family or individual, and even this is often very difficult to evaluate, especially where there is some degree of self-sufficiency.

A key question about standards of living involves how much one should go beyond material living conditions—food, shelter, consumer items—to different, sometimes less tangible aspects like health or even quality of work. In the industrial revolution debate, for example, it is more likely that workers suffered from a sense that their work life was becoming harsher and stranger than that their food standards were deteriorating.

If it is difficult to measure the degree of satisfaction afforded by material things, it is almost impossible to extend quantifiable comparisons to non-material things. The length of the working day or week is a good example. We do not have to go back many centuries before we reach a time when the working day was as long as the human constitution could tolerate. During the early phases of the industrial revolution it could be ten to twelve hours for factory workers, and these would have been filled with hard, monotonous toil. After allowing eight hours for sleep, there was little or no time left for social or recreational activities. Such conditions, sometimes excused by the need to accumulate the fixed capital present in factories and machines, were described in horrifying and only slightly exaggerated detail by Engels in *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1845) and by Charles Dickens in *Hard Times* (1854). In the course of time these conditions provoked a feeling of revulsion, and statutory limits were placed on the length of the working day. First its length was reduced in

stages of an hour or half hour, and then a half day off became the rule, at least in Western, industrialized societies. Without these reductions there could have been no organized sport, for there would have been no time during the daylight hours for a game of football (soccer). Organized football, as distinct from the unorganized brawls which took place between villages at certain seasons, dates from the second half of the nineteenth century, when for the first time working men had the leisure to play or to watch. The slow reduction in the length of the working day is the chief incentive in the development of those leisure activities which must be seen as major components of the standard of living. These developments represent an improvement in the standard of living which is both obvious and difficult to quantify.

Overall, the issue of standards of living looms less large in twentieth-century European history, although the pace at which consumer expectations rose was unprecedented and the pressure to keep up with innovations weighed upon many individuals and families. An important body of scholarship has assessed the impact of twentieth-century wars (especially World War I) on standards of living, particularly in Germany and Russia. Developments in eastern Europe after the

Russian Revolution and then again during the decline of communism in the 1980s and 1990s also raise important questions. In Russia, living conditions, as evidenced by mortality rates, seemed to drop dramatically among some groups over the last two decades of the twentieth century.

But during the span of half a millennium human life has been transformed for the majority of the population. For most it has ceased to be, in Thomas Hobbes's words, "nasty, brutish, and short," and has become long, filled with interest, and freed from the prospect of imminent death from epidemic disease or medical ignorance. The gap between those best endowed with worldly goods and the rest has been narrowing. Life has also become fuller and more enjoyable in less material ways. Compulsory schooling has become the rule in all European countries, and illiteracy, even in the least-developed countries, has been reduced to a very small minority of the oldest of the population. This has opened up the pleasures of reading to a vast number, even if many do not take full advantage of their opportunity. Related to this rising level of education is increased interest in the arts, literature, music, and the theater. But underlying all these developments have been the reduction in the length of the working day, the increase in leisure, the rising gross national product, and the increase in real wages in even the least advanced of European societies. Without these underlying factors the truly revolutionary changes in Europe's living standards could not have been achieved.

But is there any kind of measure which can be used to appraise the chronology and extent of this improvement? It is possible to trace improvements in housing because enough early structures have survived, and in comfort because inventories tell us how they were furnished. But how well were people fed,

and were improvements in this respect commensurate with improvements in material things? Records are highly selective. They tell of gargantuan feasts, but these were almost by definition only occasional, and for most people and certainly for all the poorer classes diet was usually coarse and at times unappetizing and nutritionally inadequate. If it were possible to throw all these components together, and thus to come up with a series of indices showing the overall improvement in standards of living, we should find, first, that the graph for the poorer classes would be much flatter than that for the better-off and, second, that growth was far from continuous; there were times when standards stagnated or even fell. Continental Europe was ravaged by intermittent warfare, in the course of which crops and farm animals were seized and homes and other buildings destroyed. The Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) was such a period, and it was continued in eastern Europe by the no less devastating *Potop* or "Deluge," when Russian, Swedish, and other armies lived for years at the expense of the land which they ravaged. Every decade or so the accumulated resources of parts of Europe were consumed or destroyed by marching armies. Bismarck claimed that there was evidence in the Germany of the late nineteenth century of the destruction wrought during the Thirty Years' War of two and a half centuries earlier. The longest period of peace ever known in western and central Europe was from 1815 to 1864, and this was also a period of significant growth in living standards.

Just as the chronology of progress was interrupted by periods of decline, so there were areas where the overall pace of progress was slower than elsewhere. Warfare, poor administration, and an oppressive class structure have sometimes caused this backwardness. The most backward area of Europe in these respects was without question the Balkans. It had suffered from an inefficient and shortsighted rule from the time of the Ottoman invasions in the fourteenth century, and to these factors were added the conservative attitudes and unwillingness to innovate or change which characterized Turkish rule. Not until the Ottomans were driven from most of the Balkans did attitudes begin to change. Rapid progress has been made in some parts, but areas remain where earlier attitudes to society and progress linger, where feuding and civil war are endemic, and living standards remain far below the European average.

Standards are also often below those of Europe as a whole in areas where physical conditions are harsh and the accumulation of capital assets slow and difficult. Such conditions occur in the far north of the continent, where climatic conditions are adverse and agriculture difficult and unrewarding. It costs more merely to live

in such environments, leaving less for discretionary uses. A dense rural population, with cultivated plots too small for economic exploitation, can also depress living standards. Before the land reforms of the twentieth century, there was an impoverished peasantry in much of eastern Europe, especially in Galicia, as well as in other overpopulated areas of Europe, such as southern Italy and Sicily. The situation has to a considerable extent been relieved by the breakup of large estates, thus making more land available for the peasantry, and also by mi-

gration to the cities and employment in manufacturing. In the perception of most of the rural population urban living offered advantages denied to them in the countryside. The city became the “Promised Land,” as it is called in the title of a novel by Wladyslaw Reymont (1867–1925) about the industrial city of Łódź, Poland. But it is doubtful whether all migrants from the countryside could afford to enjoy the amenities offered by the city. All too often the delights of the “Promised Land” have proved illusory.

See also Cliometrics and Quantification (volume 1); Modernization (volume 2); The Population of Europe: The Demographic Transition and After (volume 2); Public Health (volume 3); Consumerism (in this volume); Literacy (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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HOUSING



Craig Keating

Housing is of interest to social historians mainly to the extent that access to housing and to housing of a certain quality have long been important measures and determinants of social standing. Houses are capital and reflect a certain economic status. Tenancy, by contrast, often betrays a lack of economic wherewithal. More tellingly, tenancy tends to perpetuate socioeconomic divisions insofar as the percent of income spent on housing varies inversely with the amount of income. Yet housing is also interesting because many of the material aspects of the house (from its internal spatial arrangements to its proximity to the built human environment to its relation to the natural environment) play important roles in the cultural construction of class, gender, and individual identities, and in defining the boundary between public and private. Indeed, no discussion of the history of housing would be complete if it did not recognize that the ownership of a house or access to housing of different kinds and quality are not merely material facts of social existence but have symbolic and ideological values that have been important in the structuring of European society in the past.

EARLY MODERN EUROPE

Peasant houses in early modern Europe reflected the divisions in that omnibus social class, which included freeholders, farmers, tenants of a lord, sharecroppers, and day laborers. Houses reflected these divisions most importantly in their size. Houses of freeholders and farmers tended to be the most substantial. So-called long houses excavated in England and northern France and dating from around 1500 were from 40 to 90 feet long and 15 to 20 feet wide with steeply pitched timber beam thatched roofs and rock walls. While these houses may have had sleeping areas in the loft, the main floor was divided into two main areas: one for human habitation, the other for livestock. Often humans and livestock would share the same entrance. These houses were almost always enclosed be-

hind a fence or hedge and they tended to incorporate the yard area as an external extension of the house, an area where a variety of domestic chores were completed in the privacy that fence or hedge provided. For more marginal peasants (such as agricultural laborers or widows without family) houses were no more than huts, often comprising no more than one room.

The materials used in the construction of peasant households also varied. In part this was because of regional variations in materials available. Sod or wood and cob houses were commonly used in northern Europe, where large forests were common and readily accessible. In the south, stone of varying sorts was more common. But the materials used were also a matter of economics. Stone or brick were comparatively expensive, as were roofing tiles. Furthermore, the investment of a significant amount of labor and capital in the construction of a substantial house of wood or stone was a luxury not open to all.

As the foregoing indicates, peasant houses were functional, useful largely as aids to agricultural production. The cohabitation of humans and livestock as well as the very basic character of the human portions of peasant houses attests to this. So, too, does the evidence of an excavation at Wharram Percy in Yorkshire, where archaeologists have found that over three centuries nine different houses were built on the same site. Peasant houses were tools, and house and work were not distinguished as separate realms of everyday existence.

Nonetheless, the peasant house was not completely without cultural importance. However rudimentary, the physical form of the peasant house was intimately linked to certain social and cultural functions, especially to the notion of family. Indeed, as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie has pointed out in his study of Montaignou, peasants made no important distinction between physical house and family. The house embodied the family and was a symbol of stability and prosperity that distinguished substantial peasants from agricultural laborers, who were often

excluded from the compact of village society. It also formed the basis of possible future consolidation of wealth, standing, and privilege in the bringing together of goods, lands, and hearths through conjugal alliance. Also, the walls of both the house and its enclosure offered a measure of security, both real and imagined, against an uncertain world of war, beggars, and, often, wild animals.

By the 1600s, the houses of freeholding peasants and more substantial farmers were being built in two stories with stone foundations, wood construction, and, where available, slate or tile roofs (which posed less of a threat from fire). The cohabitation of animals and humans became less tolerated. Indeed, this commonplace of rural life (which persisted even into the twentieth century in some regions) came to be viewed as impossibly rustic and uncivilized by social observers as early as the 1600s. Increasingly, farm houses were separated from a variety of outbuildings, which served as barns and granaries. The houses of more substantial farms were built in two stories with clearly defined rooms for eating, sleeping, entertaining, and so forth. But if the traditional peasant cottage came to be viewed with disdain over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it ought to be remarked that rural peasants were all too well aware that there were other less savory alternatives: the one- or two-room

huts of agricultural laborers, just big enough for their family; or, to lose one's purchase on any house at all and become part of a mass (of indeterminate but clearly large numbers) of beggars who populated the countryside and who, if apprehended within the bounds of a city, would be imprisoned.

Equally notable both as a reflection of economic standing and cultural importance were the chateaux, manor houses, and seigneurial homes of rural Europe. In economic terms, the very size of these houses displayed the socioeconomic standing of their occupants. Owned by a single person, they housed, in some cases, hundreds of domestic servants. While the interior space of the peasant house in its sparseness and the melange of human and animal occupants manifested its functionality, the interior space of manor houses was clearly defined and divided. Different rooms were devoted not only to different daily functions (such as dining and sleeping), but some were clearly ceremonial in character. Nobles' houses, too, had exterior enclosures. Yet in the case of nobility these enclosures served as gardens or parks, created both for pleasure and as symbols of the refinement and culture of the owner.

As the very fact of the aristocratic garden implies, the houses of aristocrats and gentry were cultural entities rather than mere shelter. Accordingly, their

function derived in part from their very aspect. They were meant to be seen. They were symbols of power and, to this extent, mechanisms of power. This specular function is manifested in countless contemporary prints in which castles are an almost omnipresent feature of the background. The symbolic presence of these houses also developed over the course of the early modern period, as the blank walls and stern towers of the fortified medieval castle gave way to the architectural flourish of the exteriors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The highpoint of this transformation was Louis XIV's construction of the palace of Versailles. Yet this palace, which set the standard for royal homes throughout Europe, differed only in size and scale from the kinds of houses that were constructed by the wealthiest aristocrats of this period. The important point for social historians in these developments is that houses were becoming cultural and ideological variables. Indeed, it seems that certain aristocratic ideas about houses developed in the early modern period (such as the relationship between house and nature, in the guise of the park) informed later, bourgeois notions of housing.

Urban housing in the early modern period reflects both similarities and differences with rural housing. Cities were distinct from the countryside in several respects. One of the most important differences was the very durability of cities and consequently of the houses within them. Construction was more often of stone with tile roofs and many of these kinds of houses (along with some of timber and mortar) survived into the twenty-first century. Early modern cities also had a distinct legal and political status that permitted a certain degree of land-use planning that sometimes limited the size and character of houses. But these powers were haphazardly enforced, leading to the housing densities and mazelike streets that virtually define the medieval and early modern city.

Cities were also unique because of their mixture of classes. Perhaps the largest single group in the city was artisans and shopkeepers. Most of these people would have occupied a single house that they also likely would have owned. As with peasant houses, there was no important distinction between the house as a place of residence and a place of work. The lower floors (including an enclosed courtyard) that opened onto city streets served as the location of workshops and offices as well as the kitchen, the larder, and the hearth. In other words, there was a thorough intermingling of what we would call the "domestic" sphere with the workplace. This blurring of the distinction between houses as homes and places of work was most advanced in the houses of master artisans, where the master and his family would sleep on the second story

and the journeymen and apprentices on the floors above, and all would share a common table.

A variety of other groups in society were housed in the city with an equal variation in the kinds of houses to be found. At the top of the social scale were aristocrats and wealthy merchants, whose houses were correspondingly grand. At the other end of the scale were day laborers, students, the aged, vagabonds, and others who had no position within a household. For these groups housing was defined by its scarcity, its consequent expense and its very poor condition. Merchants and artisans would rent out unused rooms in the uppermost floors of their buildings. These were dirty, pestilent, cold (by dint of their distance from the hearth) and hard to access. One family often occupied just one room. In periods of demographic crisis, cellars, *appentis* (lean-tos attached to the sides of buildings), and stables were pushed into service as housing. Rude huts were constructed in courtyards. The construction of speculative rental housing began in the eighteenth century in larger centers like Paris. But, here, too, the desire of landlords to extract profit from every possible inch of floor space merely added to the available stock of deplorable housing available to the poorest elements of society. Increasingly these included the bulk of the working population, as the

guild structure that had in part supported the cohabitation of masters, apprentices, and other servants slowly faded. This also reflected the phenomenon, which emerged more clearly in the nineteenth century, of the literal social disintegration of cities as neighborhoods came to be divided along class lines.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Throughout the early modern period, demographic changes played an important role in the social history of housing. Because houses were relatively expensive to build, the expansion and contraction of the European population directly affected the numbers of people who had to occupy them. In the eighteenth century, the expansion of the population of cities in particular (a function of the commercial revolutions of that century) was the chief demographic fact that affected housing. Population density per house increased significantly. Entire families living in just one or two rooms were common. In the nineteenth century, as the commercial revolution gave way to the industrial revolution, the steady growth of cities became an explosion. The scale of this growth in selected European cities is reflected in Table 1. Under these demographic conditions urban housing rapidly deteriorated in quality and became much scarcer. By the end of the century, housing was broadly recognized as a major social problem.

The declining condition of urban housing was documented and denounced as a social evil by social revolutionaries, social reformers, and social conservatives alike. The chief problem was the simple paucity of housing in urban centers. Migration from the countryside to cities was rapid and unplanned and easily outpaced the ability of already saturated housing markets to meet demand. For example, while the population of Paris grew by 500,000 between 1801 and 1851, only 4,000 new houses were built between 1817 and 1851. A variety of expedients to accommodate demand emerged. Among the forms of working-class housing that developed in industrial towns in England were cellars (the most degraded of urban housing, home to the city's most marginal elements), lodging-houses (intended for short-term stays by "tramp" labor, they were eventually pressed into service to house whole families on a permanent or semi-permanent basis), tenements (preexisting houses subdivided into separate apartments), and the "back-to-back" or "one-up, one-down" (purpose-built speculative housing constructed in double rows where the front wall was the only nonparty wall). Shantytowns became common on the outskirts of industrial cities,

and huts and other makeshift constructions such as wagons housed the most marginalized of the urban poor, such as ragpickers.

A second major problem with worker housing in the industrial city was sanitation. Clean water and adequate sewage disposal were especially wanting in non-purpose-built housing such as tenements and cellars, although these were problems of far wider scope in cities lacking sufficient infrastructure in these areas. Once again taking Paris as an example, in 1851 only 82 miles of sewers serviced 250 miles of streets. Therefore, the streets themselves, as well as rivers, were open sewers. As a result, deaths outpaced births in many major cities in the first half of the nineteenth century. Also dangerous to the sanitary condition of working-class housing was its proximity to industrial enterprises, major sources of air- and waterborne pollutants.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the conditions of cities and housing in particular had captured the attention of national governments. These conditions, it was believed, were the breeding ground of not only disease but also other vices such as crime and, more worrisome in the wake of the revolutions of 1848, social discontent. In 1850 the government of the French Second Republic passed the Melun Law, which gave municipal government the power to investigate and improve substandard housing. Subsequently the government of Paris established the Commission on Unhealthful Dwellings in 1851. Similar public health bodies with powers to investigate housing conditions of the poor were established in Britain and Belgium around the same time. These bodies were empowered to condemn houses as unfit for human habitation in the enforcement of public health standards.

While some have argued that these developments set the stage for a later, larger role for the state in matters relevant to housing and health, most European governments in the nineteenth century were reluctant to intervene in the question of housing. Indeed, many policies merely exacerbated what remained the central housing problem of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: availability. Probably the most important outcome of the cultural construction of the problem of housing as one of social hygiene was the rebuilding of Paris begun in 1853 under Georges Haussmann, the prefect of Paris. Emperor Napoleon III gave Haussmann wide powers of expropriation, overriding the rights of individual property owners. The broad boulevards that Haussmann created using these powers were purposely planned to eliminate as much of the working-class slums of central Paris as possible. It is estimated that during his

tenure as prefect, 27,000 residences were destroyed and their 350,000 occupants were forced to the outskirts of Paris. Industry, too, was cajoled into setting up on the fringes of Paris. Central Paris became a zone of apartment buildings of varying degrees of luxury inaccessible to all but the respectable middle classes. No plans were made to house the displaced poor and working classes, and the new working-class districts north and east of Paris merely replicated the grim realities of urban housing as they had been prior to Haussmann's reforms.

Haussmann's work in Paris inspired similar reforms of varying scope in Brussels, Rome, and Vienna. In all cases, cities became more socially distinct. Whereas the pre-nineteenth-century response to population pressure had been to build up, adding more floors to preexisting buildings (with the social class of occupants declining as one went up), later developments led to distinct and more socially homogeneous neighborhoods. In these cities the urban center became a bourgeois enclave, but in others such as London and Amsterdam, different political cultures that placed a greater emphasis on the rights of individual property owners impeded Haussmannian programs of social hygiene through slum clearance. In England, for instance, municipalities like London lacked the powers of expropriation given Haussmann. Indeed, each expropriation required a separate act of Parliament, making wholesale urban reforms almost impossible. Most housing improvements were left to the owners of individual properties, giving them a patch-

work character. The only exception to this role was Parliament's aid to railway companies in the purchase of five percent of the buildings in central London by the century's end. This displaced 100,000 occupants with no plans for their rehousing.

This is not to say, however, that ideas about urban reform were absent in England. On the contrary, the concept of the garden city advocated by the social reformer Ebenezer Howard launched a housing movement that spread to many places in Europe in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Howard advocated the creation of estates of detached or semidetached houses separated from the city proper by the green spaces he deemed necessary for the physical and moral improvement of the lower classes. In so doing he was advocating for the less fortunate a mode of living that the English middle classes, having turned their back on housing in the city center, had already begun to practice.

The single-family, owner-occupied, suburban home, which the garden city epitomized, was at a cultural level arguably the most important housing development of the nineteenth century. For it incarnated a host of peculiarly modern ideas about housing, ideas that informed housing-reform initiatives well into the twentieth century. Perhaps the most important was the new separation of home and work, a separation daily ritualized in that peculiarly modern phenomenon of the commute. In part this was inspired by a desire to escape the urban conditions of industrial cities outlined above. But it cannot be understood with-

out also taking into consideration ideas about gender and family that had become prevalent by mid-century. In many countries women's political and civil rights were officially limited. Laws restricted hours of work for women and children, justified by notions of the distinct physical and mental capabilities of women and men. The idea of a house physically separated from the hurly-burly of the industrial city was merely an extension at the cultural level of these developments. The very feminine nature of women (and, as some like Ferdinand Tönnies argued, of youth as well) demanded the separate space that the suburban house provided. Francis Place, secretary in the 1820s of the radical London Corresponding Society, spoke out against the morally degrading effects of the intermingling of men's work and women's work within the space of a single house, arguing for a separate study in which men might conduct their labor. The suburban house, proximate to nature through its garden, further recommended itself because of the perceived moral and physical benefits of that relationship. Also, home ownership, which the suburban house further embodied, was conceived by socially conservative paternalists as a great social stabilizer, endowing the owner with a greater sense of responsibility. And this house was above all a private space, the ground on which the family confronted society and public authority. Ideals of privacy further stipulated bedrooms clearly separating children and adults and, ultimately, individual bedrooms for children themselves.

However much this middle-class suburban house remained an ideal (it was hardly common in Europe as a whole and the middle classes of Paris, even as they espoused its virtues, betrayed in practice their preference for rental apartments), it was a powerful one. Beyond the garden-city movement, it formed the basis, in England at least, of working-class demands for housing. And it arguably informed the preference of government throughout much of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries for housing policies that promoted private home ownership over government-owned and managed social housing.

The cultural construction of housing and the ideological commitment of governments to private enterprise solutions to the problem of housing supply help explain why, at the end of the nineteenth century, this problem still had not been adequately addressed. Nonetheless, all across Europe at this time, central governments undertook very modest interventions in the housing market. In 1890 the British government passed a Housing Act that empowered municipal governments to collect taxes for the construction of low-cost housing. The Belgian Housing Act of 1889, passed by a paternalist Catholic majority in parlia-

ment, offered low-cost loans to working-class families interested in buying or building a home. A home owning working class, it was believed, would be a respectable and politically stable working class. Elsewhere, tax incentives were used to encourage private-sector house construction. Ireland is exceptional in that some 48,000 rural laborers' cottages were constructed at the expense of the public purse between 1883 and 1926. Almost everywhere else the trend was to allow the private sector to take the lead in building houses and to encourage workers, either individually or through cooperative building societies, to find their own solutions to the general housing shortage.

Not surprisingly, attempts to address housing shortages by these means were far from successful. Given the wage rates of the urban working class and the relative expense of land and developments in the city, what private sector speculative house construction there was served an almost entirely middle-class market. Other private sector initiatives included company housing. Some company housing was on the military model, with dormitory accommodation and correspondingly martial discipline and regimentation of workers. Often it was simply exploitative, as in the case of coal miners' housing in the English Midlands which, despite its very low quality, was exorbitantly priced. Some employers, though, were of a philanthropic bent (a philanthropy bolstered by the economic necessity of retaining skilled workers in underhoused regions) and sought to create well planned colonies on the garden city model. The *Cité Ouvrière* created by the Mulhouse industrialist Jean Dollfus was a well laid out community of single-family homes that a worker, after fifteen years of payments, could own (though recent work suggests that this was only possible so long as wives and children also worked). It was a model copied by many large industrial concerns in Germany.

BETWEEN THE WARS

At the outbreak of war in 1914, neither the modest initiatives of the state, nor company housing, nor other, more honestly philanthropic plans, nor workers cooperatives had even come close to meeting housing needs in Europe. In Germany, where the proportion of the population living in towns of 100,000 or more had gone from 4.8 percent in 1871 to 21 percent in 1910, there was a need for 800,000 apartments for working families in 1914. By 1919 this figure was 1.4 million. Nor was Germany exceptional. But by the end of World War I, in the context of social revolution, real (as in Russia) or imagined (everywhere else),

demands for housing could no longer be ignored. Britain's prime minister, David Lloyd George, fanned expectations by promising, with direct reference to the housing that returning soldiers might expect, "a country fit for heroes to live in." At the same time and for many of the same reasons, housing was further politicized by modernist architects like Le Corbusier, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, and others associated with the Bauhaus movement, who believed that mass-produced, functional dwellings could not only house workers but could also aid in the transformation of society and culture at the dawn of what appeared to be a new age.

Both postwar political tensions and the utopian visions of modernist architects played a role in housing between the two world wars. So changed was the political and ideological balance of European society between the two wars that in the major industrialized nations there was bound to be some further move away from liberal solutions to the housing question. In Britain, no less than four Housing Acts were passed between 1919 and 1924 (eleven were passed between 1919 and 1945). These acts either provided national funds to local authorities to build what came to be called council houses, or paid out lump sums or ongoing payments to private interests building low-cost housing. Even in countries such as France, where politics shifted to the right after World War I, policymakers realized that the national state would have to assume a far larger role in the provision of housing. In France, Loucheur's Act of 1928 provided state funding for the construction of 200,000 low-cost dwellings and 60,000 medium-cost ones. Similar developments occurred in Germany, where the Weimar Constitution of 1919 gave the new Republic wider powers in the area of housing. In Scandinavia, where Social Democratic governments undertook reforms that set the stage for the modern welfare state, private house building and housing cooperatives far outstripped public housing.

The net result of all these initiatives was to radically increase the pool of affordable housing. In France, 300,000 new low-cost housing units were built between 1919 and 1931. In England the figure was a staggering 1.785 million. Yet even this level of construction failed to fill the need for low-cost housing. In some jurisdictions the failings of public housing initiatives were functions of ill-considered government intervention. For instance, in France wartime rent controls remained in force throughout much of the 1920s. This policy, which was supposed to make housing more affordable, deprived private builders of any incentive to construct low-cost housing at a time when the French government was relying

almost exclusively on the private sector to add to housing stock, thereby making housing scarcer and more expensive.

Perhaps the boldest experiment in public housing occurred in Vienna under the municipal administration of the Social Democratic Party elected after World War I. Here, too, rent controls severely depressed private house construction and augmented the need for new housing. To address these problems the Viennese government launched an ambitious plan of public housing funded by a steeply progressive income tax (which further depressed the private market). Eventually 64,000 new dwellings, mostly in large tenement blocks, were built under this program. But the initiative was distinct as well because of its broader social goals. Turning bourgeois notions about the social and cultural functions of housing on their heads, the architects of the "Red Vienna" experiment, as it came to be called, believed that the new communal housing would play a part in the constitution of a "new man" for a new, socialist age. Even though the socialist government rejected the designs of the architectural modernists, it embraced the modernists' utopianism as regards housing.

Utopian housing designs were given a fuller airing in the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Throughout the 1920s plans were proposed for the rebuilding of Russian cities and the provision of housing for the working classes. Here, too, the garden-city model had a certain currency. Indeed, the anarchist Pyotr Kropotkin, was a devotee of Howard's ideas, and the garden-city movement in Russia persisted into the 1920s and found its way into official plans (though without Kropotkin's involvement). Plans for communal housing were also advanced. Here, as in Vienna, the culturally

and socially transformative potential of communal living was viewed by its proponents as integral to the transition to socialist society. By the 1930s, however, when the Soviet Union's industrial needs had emerged as the most pressing concern, experimentation in housing lost out to grim necessity. At Magnitogorsk, a new industrial town in central Russia, communal housing persisted as a preferred option for local communist authorities largely because of its efficacy in meeting the needs of the hundreds of thousands of workers who were coming to work there. While it was justified in local Party publications in terms of a collectivist social vision, when the preference of workers for independent living (manifested in the repeated erection of mud huts despite ordinances against them) became apparent, the construction of bungalows by workers was not only tolerated but eventually encouraged. In fact, as in Western Europe, the Communist authorities extended credit to workers for this purpose. Nonetheless, such houses remained a dream rather than a reality for most Russian workers.

POST-WORLD WAR II

The destructiveness of World War II increased the need for housing everywhere, although the response to this need varied from state to state. The war left 1.5 million dwellings in France uninhabitable. Added to preexisting housing needs, this meant that something like 2 million housing units were needed immediately and 14 million were thought to be needed over the following twenty years. By 1950, however, only 90,000 new dwellings had been erected. This feeble effort led to new measures, one of the most important of which in France was the creation of *zones à urbanisation prioritaire*, or ZUPs, which allowed governments to acquire land and to extend easy credit for the construction of large-scale housing projects. Some 140 ZUPs were established, mostly around Paris, and it was in these developments that the modernist architectural ideas of LeCorbusier, for instance, had their greatest effect. (Although only involved in four projects, he was an important influence on younger architects.) The average size of each development was 5,300 dwelling units, adding up to a total of three-quarters of a million.

Of course the ZUP projects, aided by public funds, were not the only source of new housing stock. Private sources contributed a great deal as well, such that between 1945 and 1990 French housing stock doubled with the addition of 14 million units, of which only 17 percent were social housing units. There was a significant increase in home ownership and an even

bigger increase in rental social housing, both to the detriment of private rentals. Similar patterns prevailed in West Germany, where 16.5 million new dwellings were added to the national stock between 1945 and 1986, with a significant rise in home ownership. In Britain, only 9 million new dwellings were added between 1939 and 1989, but home ownership more than doubled, rising from 33 to 68 percent.

One of the important consequences of postwar housing developments was to offer an unprecedented degree of interior space. This is a function both of the raw increase in numbers of available dwellings (which by no means completely resolved the need for housing) and of the regulation of new housing stock when it was built. Governments around Europe established minimum size requirements for rooms, and in some cases also specified the kind and number of rooms that had to be built in dwellings. New regulations also required that amenities such as running water, toilets, baths, and central heating be installed. These regulations revolutionized housing in its material aspect. They also revolutionized the individual's relation to himself and others by providing a far greater degree of personal and private space than ever before. Earlier, the exile of children to corridors was often a necessary prequel to many couples' conjugal relations. The sharing of beds by two or more siblings (and sometimes even parents and children) had been the norm throughout European history. But by the mid-1970s, the average French home had 3.5 rooms, and there was a ratio of more than 200 square feet per person. This increase in individual private space is entirely consistent with the emergence of a consumer society that emphasizes as a chief marketing tool the fulfillment of personal needs through consumption. Space is not the only factor in housing's role in individualizing social experience. Running water, in-house laundry facilities, and the omnipresent radio and, later, television allowed tasks that were formerly done in a public space (such as a neighborhood pub, in the case of the communication of news) to be conducted in private. Detached housing estates integrated into broader transportation networks through the automobile served similar functions.

It is unclear, however, whether home ownership, which state policies continued to support throughout the postwar period, works in exactly the ways its original paternalist sponsors wanted. It has been assumed that the sale of over one million council housing units to their tenants under Margaret Thatcher's Right to Buy program (which was merely an expanded form of the selling of council flats that both Labour and Conservative administrations had pushed for decades) altered the political attitudes of their new owners and

could account, at least in part, for the success of the Conservatives in the 1980s. Quantitative research suggests that new owners of council housing were no more or less likely to vote Conservative than any other voter. Qualitative evidence further suggests, against popular perceptions, that few of these new owners wanted to use the capital embodied in their homes as a means to escape their old neighborhood for a better one.

CONCLUSION

If housing emerged since 1800 as an important question for both the state and individuals, it is because of the linked demographic and economic changes that made it increasingly a scarce commodity. Yet as this essay has shown, it is not only in its simple material form that housing is important for social historians.

The efforts of the state, of individuals, and of other organizations to access and provide safe and affordable housing surveyed here were undertaken at a time when the house became an important cultural construct. Housing is indissociably linked to ideas about the family, gender, the environment, privacy, and respectability. Thus the efforts referred to above cannot be understood outside these cultural associations. Indeed, it may well be asked whether the general preference of both states and individuals to develop housing solutions based on private ownership is not a function of the fact that housing emerged as a social problem as it also came to be defined in cultural terms. It may well be asked whether the possibility of addressing the remaining major deficiencies in the available housing stock in Europe does not reside in moving beyond this particular cultural construct.

See also *The City: The Early Modern Period*; *The City: The Modern Period (volume 2)*; *Peasants and Rural Laborers*; *Public Health (volume 3)*; *The Household (volume 4)*; and other articles in this section.

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DOMESTIC INTERIORS



Rineke van Daalen

Houses and their interiors provide a rich picture of the lifestyles of their inhabitants. They also represent and objectify the social relations of the people that designed them, built them, and used them. At the French court in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, typically the king and his wife each had separate sleeping apartments, an arrangement suggestive of their affective relationship. Nineteenth-century Londoners built their family residences away from business and pleasure, aspiring to privacy and safety from the cares and worries of the outside world within the impregnable castle of the home. Parisians on the contrary felt more attracted to life outside the home, in the streets, gardens, theaters, and restaurants. Viennese townspeople were more engaged in consumption than production. Both bourgeois and aristocrats relied on their luxurious houses as public representations of their status.

Houses, as the examples suggest, reflect the means of subsistence of their inhabitants, their affective relations and power relations, their family systems, marriage customs, laws of succession, and the composition of their households. Changes in these respects, such as the death of a parent or the formation of a new household, are reflected in changes in dwelling spaces. Houses also reveal the social relations between their inhabitants and the outside world. In small-scale, traditional societies there is no distinction between a public and a private domain and houses are more accessible than in differentiated societies. This contrast roughly corresponds to the dichotomy between countryside and city.

The social history of houses and domestic interiors may be told as a story of increasing differentiation: between home and work, between life in the household and in the extended family, between the community and the neighborhood, between different generations and sexes. During the Middle Ages, all-purpose rooms were characteristic of aristocratic, peasant, and artisan dwellings alike, but as people's daily pursuits became more varied and differences between people increased, the configurations of their houses

also changed. The function of domestic interiors as a display of status became more important as affluence increased, differences in power decreased, and status rivalry intensified.

Emulation and competition are driving forces in the development and spread of styles and fashions. Those to whom it mattered lost no time in acquiring the most up-to-date designs and fashions, and the rest followed slowly. Architects, designers, upholsterers, and later professional decorators were unfettered by national boundaries. Nevertheless, within Europe enduring regional building styles evolved as expressions of national and local qualities. General developments that affected Europe as a whole, such as industrialization, urbanization, and population growth, offer only a limited perspective on building styles. Local traditions, including those affecting homes and their design and decor, remained embedded in regional and national patterns of stratification and political organization. Taste in domestic interiors reveals not only people's actual social position, as notions of taste are usually acquired early and subconsciously, they also reveal people's deep-rooted dispositions. Thus the study of housing and domestic interiors opens the door on several areas of social-historical interest. This article, relying on several studies, sketches the history of housing in western European countries. More research on other parts of Europe is necessary, especially from a comparative perspective combining social history, sociology, and the history of art.

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY AND THE SUBDIVISION OF DOMESTIC SPACE

In his landmark work *The World We Have Lost* (1971), Peter Laslett drew attention to the scale of life in the preindustrial world. Nearly all people spent all their lives in small groups. Apart from going to church, people attended only gatherings that could assemble in ordinary houses, which were also the scenes of la-

bor. The mean size of households was related to the status of their inhabitants: the laboring poor had few children, their life expectancy was low, and they sent their children at the age of ten as working servants to richer people. In England this group, the poor laborers, accounted for as many as two-thirds of the population. They lived in humble cottages whose construction cost less than three years' income. By contrast, members of the English gentry often had more than one mansion—some had as many as twelve seats—in various spots in the countryside; in their absence the houses were maintained by tenants. At the end of the preindustrial era, roughly three-quarters of the English still lived in villages and hamlets.

Although they do not supplant written materials, paintings and pictures offer glimpses of the simple lodgings of the majority, their interiors and uses. In *Visit to the Farmstead*, the Flemish painter Jan Brueghel the Elder (1568–1625) depicts a Flemish farmhouse consisting of only one room, with an open fire for cooking and heating in the center and a smoke hole above it. The room is dimly lit by small apertures. Of the peasants and children seen in the room, one woman is breast-feeding her newborn infant, two people are making butter in a churn, and another is entertaining three well-to-do visitors. The table has been laid for a meal, with a white tablecloth and several bowls of porridge, and someone is already eating. A cradle with a sleeping dog inside stands in a corner; a large box serves as storage space. Although the painting shows no bed, in reality one bed, which accommodated the whole family, always stood in the multipurpose living room of the houses of villagers in this period. The farmsteads functioned simultaneously as residence and economic unit of production. The dwelling provided shelter for the family and other inhabitants, the food provisions, harvested crops, tools, and even the cattle. Day laborers also lived in one-room dwellings. Within such a dwelling all human activities took place in the same space, and no boundaries delineated different pastimes or basic functions such as breast-feeding or sleeping. For centuries this spatial model was standard for the majority of the population, both in the countryside and the cities.

Gradually however, as social differentiation and stratification increased, the geography and the interior of the houses became more complicated. Among artisans and master artisans, growing commercial property translated into more elaborate interiors. According to an inventory drawn up in 1647 somewhere on the outskirts of Paris, the layout of the house of an artisan consisted of a downstairs kitchen giving onto the street, a living room behind the kitchen, and two rooms upstairs with a small attic. Up to the eighteenth

century, and in some remote regions even into the nineteenth, beds stood in the heated living room, where people also stayed during the day. Even in the larger houses of farmers and burghers, people slept where they had fires—in the same place where they prepared and ate their meals.

The trend toward complexity and privacy. Members of the gentry, the court nobility, and the merchant elite were among the forerunners in the trend toward more elaborate and complex houses. In their households the first provisions for privacy were created, and rooms became intended for specific purposes. The dwellings of the nobility of the ancien régime in France, called *hôtel* or *palais* depending on the owner's status, also housed a motley crowd of servants. The staff, from the coachman to the kitchen maid and the footman, lived behind the scenes, separated from the quarters devoted to the social life of the owners by one or more antechambers, in which servants waited for their masters and received orders. The German sociologist Norbert Elias observed that these rooms manifested the “co-existence of constant spatial proximity and constant social distance, of intimate contact in one stratum and the strictest aloofness in the other.” (Elias, 1983, pp. 47–49). The same pattern is evident in the palace of the king. Noblemen and noblewomen took their humble place in the antechamber to await the king's orders.

The separate sleeping apartments for the king and his wife illustrate both their relationship in their marriage and their relations to their “houses” of descent. Husband and wife were primarily related as representatives of their lineage to the world outside. They had common social obligations to their families, but for the rest they were relatively free in their movement. They did not have what one might call a family life, and each had their own social circle and led their own social life. To allow them to perform their representative functions, the society rooms of their places were divided into two parts. Among the nobility the large salon was the heart of court society. In this *appartement de société* the master and lady of the house received a small circle of visitors and engaged in their more intimate social intercourse. Public and official visits took place in the *appartement de parade*, where the owners of the house arranged the affairs of court life as scions of a noble family, always endeavoring to live up to the demands of their social status.

Among these absolutist court circles, houses were built to meet the representative social obligations of their owners. Through their choice of materials, design, and decoration, architects tried to express the social status of the inhabitants. The cost was attuned

to the demands of their ranks. “A duke must build his house in such a way as to tell the world: I am a duke and not merely a count” (Elias, 1983, p. 63). In European absolutist societies, houses of the haute bourgeoisie and middle-class families were small-scale imitations of the houses of the nobility, with some significant differences. Sleeping arrangements of husbands and wives reflected their greater affective attachment. The bourgeois elite was not geared to social intercourse with many people but rather pursued contacts primarily related to business—hence the small size of their “society,” or reception, rooms. Their homes had no *appartement de parade*, and their salon, or reception room, was less impressive than that of the nobility. Nevertheless, their houses were also built to display social status and prestige. In matters of interior design the French set the standard for civilized taste. It became fashionable for architects in the Netherlands and England to decorate interiors, window panels, doors, chimneypieces, ceilings, and vases in the French style. This style was transmitted by “advice books,” illustrated with genre scenes and engravings of interiors that depicted the current good taste.

Family life and interiors. In the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic, the wealthy ruling families in the city demonstrated their status by way of the comfort and luxury of the interiors of their houses. In addition to serving as living accommodations, these

houses had separate areas for the use of business. Simon Schama (1987) has written of such homes as symbolic centers of decency, where morality was upheld. In the Dutch Republic family households were seen as the origin of authority and held a central place within the state. The special significance of the family is reflected in well-kept and carefully arranged dwellings. The Dutch attached great significance to tidy and well-kept interiors, and indeed exhibited a ritual cleaning mania. Wives and mothers had a pivotal function in fitting out and protecting hearth and home. They used their cleaning utensils to ward off the wickedness of the outside world and more generally to shield the house from evil. Careful tending and meticulous cleaning of the interior of houses demonstrated the solidity of family life and expressed at the same time feelings of patriotism and commitment to liberty and purity. A filthy and unattended house was seen as a breeding place for disease, creating opportunities for the spread of evil. Inventories of the houses of the elite attest to an array of carefully chosen furniture, cooking utensils, paintings, and household articles. All the accoutrements of domestic life were chosen to create a comfortable and well-maintained home and to express the social status and moral solidity of its owners.

As compared to earlier European housing arrangements, the houses of the Dutch elite showed a greater concern for privacy. This separation from the

world outside is one aspect of broader processes of the modernization and growing intimacy of family life. In the Netherlands the modern family came into being relatively early. The seventeenth-century urban elite gave special attention to an intimate family event like childbirth by arranging *kraamkamers*, or lying-in rooms, to lodge mother and infant after delivery. The interior of these *kraamkamers* would be fitted up in accordance with fixed patterns and provided with special furniture for mothers and children. Objects like the *bakermat* (a rush basket for the dry nurse), the *kraamscherm* (a screen to protect mother and child from drafts and the inquisitive gaze of bystanders), the baby-linen basket, baby clothes, blankets, cradle, and pincushion were all meant to show the care and competence of mothers and to express the social status of

the family. Drawings of *kraamkamers* show the increasing value placed on privacy, with mothers and infants screened from outsiders. Whereas images from earlier in the seventeenth century depict visits from neighbors, relatives, and acquaintances to see mother and child, over the course of the century the childbed moved increasingly into the private sphere. As the number of visitors decreased, such scenes ceased to be community gatherings but rather became intimate, private moments within the nuclear family circle, concentrated in carefully arranged rooms.

This and other arrangements within the home correspond to changes analyzed by Norbert Elias in his landmark work of 1939, *The Civilizing Process* (2000). Elias showed that from the Middle Ages onward western Europeans became more sensitive and

more reserved in their own behavior as well as in their behavior toward others. Bodily functions such as defecating, urinating, sleeping, and copulating began to arouse feelings of shame and embarrassment in the presence of other people. These feelings were reflected in the geography of houses and in the objects within the rooms. Houses became divided by more walls and gained more floors. Rooms acquired special functions for public and private behaviors and became accessible only from corridors and halls. Houses were adapted to these new needs, such as the replacement of one central, free-standing fireplace by several fireplaces built into the walls. The elite more and more put their beds behind the scenes and equipped them with curtains and hangings. People who were not familiar to each other less often slept in the same bed or the same room.

An important development in the trend toward privacy concerned defecating. In the countryside people continued to relieve themselves outdoors, but in the cities of the sixteenth century public conveniences were arranged and municipal ordinances forbade defecating outside these facilities. During the seventeenth century more and more well-to-do people acquired chamberpots, or *chaises percées*, for their own houses. These conveniences, formerly placed in the middle of dining rooms and salons, later were kept only in bedrooms; over time they were gradually ostracized to special nooks and crannies within the house, to cellars or under the doorsteps. Pots were also placed in bedside cabinets and cupboards or disguised as something else, for example as a pile of books. Conveniences for servants were still built in gardens and outdoor courtyards.

URBANIZATION, INDUSTRIALIZATION, AND THE INCREASED NEED FOR PRIVACY

During the nineteenth and in particular the twentieth century, houses underwent important changes, with urban dwellings leading the way. Two parallel processes, both characteristic of the breakdown of older social hierarchies, were significant: The social distance between family and servants lost its former clarity, prompting employers to increase physical distance between themselves and their staff. At the same time, relations between husband and wife, and between parents and children, became more egalitarian. These processes promoted further differentiation of the geography of houses and increased the individual need for privacy. Rooms and sections of the house were strictly divided on the basis of social, functional, and

moral criteria. The interior decoration of the house now received more attention, and decorating the home became a profession.

Among the bourgeoisie, rooms acquired specific functions earliest and with greatest effect in England. Already in the sixteenth century a yeoman's house had a specialized geography, and in nineteenth-century country houses this specialization became elaborate. The preparation of the (quite simple) English meals was dispersed over specialized rooms: the larder, divided into store rooms; separate rooms for different kinds of cleaning; a scullery; and areas for cooking, baking, and washing up. By the middle of the century the medium-sized houses of the middle classes, small-scale imitations of Georgian houses, were also becoming elaborate. Masters and servants, men and women, visitors and family members had separate staircases and specialized spaces. Women gained their boudoirs, men their gentleman's room, and children their nurseries. The dining room was equipped with massive, simple furniture, expressing masculinity, while the drawing room showed feminine charm and elegance. In the planning of the house is evident the middle-class conviction that the private sphere belonged to women. Children were raised apart from their parents, tended by the nanny and governess. Rooms were preferably not connected by doors but rather separated by corridors and halls built at the expense of the size of the rooms themselves.

These houses allowed for a high degree of personal privacy, in particular for the adult owners, less so for children, adolescents, and servants. The layout of the house allowed English parents to avoid too much contact with their children. In contrast to customs on the Continent, English ladies never set foot in their kitchen domains. When the first English flats were built, architects tried to make the horizontal subdivision of the houses match the vertical subdivision in standard townhouses. But by the 1870s, in reaction to the elaborate Victorian houses, the suburban houses of the new middle class acquired a simpler layout. These houses had no basement, while the kitchen and reception rooms were arranged on the ground floor and the bedrooms were placed above.

The banning of beds to rooms that acquired the specific name of "bedroom" and their clear separation from the rest of the house became characteristic of the sleeping habits of much of the middle class. Hygienists of the nineteenth century recommended fresh air in the bedrooms and specified ideal sizes for the rooms. Curtains around the bed were preferably kept open. Gradually the idea became accepted that single beds for one person were preferable to cupboard beds and that spacious bedrooms were preferable to alcove

bedrooms. A feathery eiderdown and pillow and too many blankets came to be seen as the breeding places of unpleasant odors and as an incitement to masturbation. Rooms for sleeping were to be kept free of odors of any kind—flowers, servants, animals, or foul laundry. Isolated houses were preferred, remote from the emanations of bustling crowds. In cities, windows were not to be opened for too long lest the polluted evaporations of the streets enter.

Although ideas about the desirability of privacy were similar in other western European countries, they varied in their realization. These differences were a consequence partly of the available economic resources and partly of traditions in family and societal life. French cities, for example, were more crowded than English, partly because of greater preference for urban over suburban life. The Parisian apartments that were built in the nineteenth century consisted of several ingeniously arranged, specialized one-purpose rooms, but their scale was very small and they did not offer as much privacy as English apartments. The French made the most of the available space and were less sensitive to the mingling of different atmospheres. Their bedrooms had a more open character and were seen as a comfortable extension of the drawing room; the kitchen and dining room were sometimes connected. English critics found such habits shocking. They saw the houses of the Parisians as uncomfortable, crowded, and even indecent. But compared to the dwellings of the *ancien régime*, these houses were not so bad, and compared to the houses in Vienna the new Parisian flats were paragons of compact and ingenious architecture.

The function of home as a display of status and wealth also varied among countries. English Victorians and Edwardians saw their houses primarily as a place for the family and eschewed ostentation, while the French home combined family uses with those of maintaining social relations, business, reception, and entertainment. The cultivation of this public side of life demanded more luxury, and thus the Parisian flats were lavishly furnished, with marble chimneypieces, velvet upholstery, embossed wallpaper, and abundant mirrors. In nineteenth-century Vienna, the continued social and political dominance of the aristocracy left the bourgeoisie in a subordinate position also in matters of culture and taste. The impressive lodgings of aristocrats came to epitomize good architectural taste and thus became models for bourgeois homes. Imitation of aristocratic styles often entailed a sacrifice of interior comfort in favor of external display and its suggestion of status. The *petit bourgeoisie* paid less attention to practical needs, such as places for sleeping, and sacrificed domestic comfort to create a salon

for receptions, where they exhibited their volumes of literature and poetry. They were rather slow to give their rooms differentiated and variable designations and late in introducing corridors.

Taking bodily functions backstage. Sanitary provisions are a special chapter in the social history of privacy in the home. Until the introduction of running water, people washed themselves with water from pitchers and washbowls placed on tables. In the houses of the rich, these tables would be elegantly tiled amenities, with towel rails, framed mirrors, and wooden or marble surfaces. Initially they were not placed in special bathrooms but were pieces of loose furniture that could easily be moved. In 1837 even Buckingham Palace lacked a bathroom. For a long time the ownership of baths and washbasins was a luxury. Water sellers served well-to-do customers without a bathtub of their own by carrying baths into their apartments. The first specialized bathrooms were spacious, in accordance with the recommendations of hygienists; they featured heavy furniture and walls covered with absorbent material. Alain Corbin (1986) has argued that the relatively late appearance of bathrooms was the most important event in the history of living accommodations in the nineteenth century and a decisive step in the specification of rooms for intimate purposes.

Great Britain was the first to implement the layout of houses according to the new sanitary norms, which were thought not only to be healthful but, in a more general way, civilized. Piped water supplies and the use of baths spread there earlier than on the Continent. As the custom of performing bodily functions in private became increasingly the norm and the ideas of the nineteenth century hygienists gained acceptance, people paid more attention to the interior of their bathrooms and toilets. Closet pots were made of vitreous china, often with elaborate floral decorations; seat, cover, and floor were made of oak and were neatly waxed. Water closets appeared as soon as running water was introduced in the nineteenth century, earlier for the rich than for the poor, and earlier in cities than in the countryside. But the majority of the population continued to lack such provisions. The pail-and-tub system, cesspools, and dunghills remained common. In France, where tolerance of bodily emanations was greater, the introduction of piped water took place later.

The new standards of privacy and sanitation depended on connecting houses to the public utilities of water pipes and sewers. And constructing these networks depended on two factors: The public needed to recognize that the living conditions of the poor

increased the risk for both rich and poor of contracting contagious diseases. And they had to accept the notion that improvements in living conditions, sanitary amenities, and the removal of garbage and excrement from houses were issues that required municipal action in the construction of public works. Changing the behavior of individual poor people would not be sufficient. Houses in newly built districts, where residents were willing to pay for sanitary facilities, were the first into which fresh water was pumped via a branching network of pipes. The waste water and excrement was then drained away in a parallel but separate network of sewers. These public networks had far-reaching consequences for domestic facilities and conditioned the way people urinated, defecated, and washed themselves. Other innovations like gas, electricity, and the telephone had equally important implications for homes and domestic life in industrialized, urbanized societies.

The bourgeois home as a model for working-class dwellings.

Until well into the twentieth century, the majority of the working class lived in overcrowded houses of poor quality and without sanitary facilities. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the urban bourgeoisie began to see the houses of the poor as something to be ashamed of, a deficiency they were responsible for. Figures from the municipality of Amsterdam show that poor dwellings still commonly contained one or two multipurpose rooms: in 1899, 28.5 percent of the inhabitants lived in a one-room dwelling, 30.5 percent in dwellings with two rooms. The bourgeoisie was concerned that such dwellings would encourage men to frequent the pubs, while children would be prompted to roam the streets without adult supervision. The development of public housing, often organized by housing associations, was intended to provide affordable, functional, hygienic, and decent homes, and thus create the necessary conditions for a healthy and respectable family life. Rental regulations were drawn up, housing laws established norms for living accommodations, and model dwellings were built. Philanthropic female housing inspectors, who also collected the rent, instructed working-class mothers in proper living conditions.

Norms for good housing were attuned in particular to the family relations within the bourgeoisie, which in those days were taken as a model. Civilizing campaigns promoted a family life in which mothers and children were at the center, with a clear-cut division of tasks for husbands and wives and an inward-looking character. According to this model the necessary condition for a sound and decent family life was a house, preferably detached, with several one-

purpose rooms: a living room, a kitchen for cooking only and not for socializing, bedrooms for parents, separate bedrooms for girls and boys, a separate toilet, and a special place for washing. Fresh air and sunlight were recommended as conditions for hygiene and good health, but only the well-to-do could afford such airy, light abodes. The design of houses was meant to allow the inhabitants to perform as many functions as possible—going to the toilet, cleansing the body, and doing the laundry—inside their homes. Collective spaces where members of different families met each other, like corridors and porches, were rejected as likely to promote gossip and indecent behavior. So as to ensure this introverted character, architects of the Dutch expressionist Amsterdam School (roughly 1920 to 1940) placed the windows in houses so high that the occupants were unable to look out.

As real wages rose, members of the working class could afford separate houses with several rooms, and they adopted some of these attitudes toward public space and domestic privacy. However, mapping the house according to existing family norms did not ensure that all people used their houses in the way the designers had intended. Many working-class families persisted in their old habits. They ate meals in their small kitchens, and some of them opposed hygienic campaigns directed at making feces both invisible and unsmellable in the house as well as outside it. Because of the popular belief that physical smells, including that of excrement, had a therapeutic and vitalizing effect, many families distrusted the bourgeois attitude toward bodily functions and saw it as a kind of conspiracy.

In addition to the normalization of specialized rooms, the circulation of fresh air, and the construction of sanitary facilities, efficiency and functionality came to be prized attributes of the home. The idea that a rational household needed a rational division of the house was proposed in the first decades of the twentieth century by women advocates of labor-saving technology to lighten the housewife's workload, such as Christine Frederick in the United States, who was inspired by the American efficiency engineer Frederick W. Taylor; Paulette Bergère in France; and Erna Meyer in Germany. Feminist oriented, they saw housewives as managers running a business; their kitchens had to be efficient workrooms attuned to their professional activities. For modern housekeeping, housewives were to be guided by scientific principles and should have at their disposal the most practical kitchen furniture and household effects, preferably designed by professionals. Special exhibitions were organized to advertise such modern, rationally equipped kitchens.

The working class was also instructed in the choice of furniture and general taste in interior furnishings. Exhibitions showing model interiors demonstrated what was "good" and "bad" taste. Rooms were not to be filled with impractical furniture or ornamental trumpery. The "good" interior contained solid, functional objects that gave the inhabitants plenty

of room for movement. Wallpaper and floor coverings were preferably simple and understated. Tasteful design was seen as symbolic of the "right" way to live, of being truly civilized. Industrially produced design furniture could provide tasteful, decent, and "correct" articles affordable to all.

This style of functional interior design was associated with the German Bauhaus school of architecture and design and the Dutch De Stijl movement, both influential in the 1920s. Bauhaus and De Stijl rejected what was seen as a bourgeois aesthetic, eschewing, for example, pillars, elaborate ornamentation, and pointed roofs. Modern architecture—represented by Walter Gropius, founder and director of the Bauhaus; Mies van der Rohe, who became Bauhaus director in 1928; Gerrit Rietveld, associated with De Stijl; and Le Corbusier, the highly influential Swiss-born architect and proponent of functionalism—may also be seen as a protest against the privacy of the bourgeois dwelling. These architects rejected conventional divisions between rooms and tried to diminish the distance between the inside and the outside of the house by the use of glass. The counterpart to the functional style in early-twentieth-century architecture and design was the Art Nouveau, or, in German, Jugendstil, movement, with variants all over Europe. This style, which flourished from 1890 to 1910, combined ideals of modernity with the tradi-

tion of handicraft and was characterized by a sinuous, organic ornamentation.

VARIATION IN LIFESTYLES AND DOMESTIC INTERIORS

It was only after World War II that economic conditions permitted the widespread application of prewar ideas about housing and family life. In western European countries housing policies were still aimed at constructing small, standardized, functional family units, but over the years architects became less patronizing. Economic growth gave people the opportunity to arrange their own houses according to their own wishes, and “do-it-yourself” enthusiasts intent on renovating their houses and changing their layouts became common. In the twentieth century social inequality between men and women, between parents and children, and between different social classes gradually narrowed; as a result, in a process of informalization, manners became less rigid and a greater range of social behaviors and expressions became acceptable. Domestic interiors of ever greater variety reflected this trend. The geography of houses and the designation of rooms became more open and dependent on individual preferences. A strictly functional division of

houses was abandoned and multipurpose rooms adopted, although the bathroom and the toilet remained inviolate. The bedrooms of adolescents were used for study, listening to or playing music, and socializing. Kitchens were joined with living rooms to become “great rooms.” In many houses televisions became fixtures in several if not all of the rooms.

Domestic design has become an important domain for cultural consumption and for expressing taste and, by extension, social identity. Everyday life has become aestheticized, not least in the way people arrange and decorate their homes. A range of magazines and stores addresses their desire to create the “house beautiful” and their ability to spend an increasing portion of their household budget to achieve that goal.

In the late twentieth century the Internet offered a new collective network linking people in their homes all over the world. Although the consequences remain uncertain, clearly the Internet allows people to carry out more functions within the confines of the home. At the same time, it brings the vast spaces out there into the private home, blurring far more than did radio and television the boundaries between inside and outside, and to a greater degree dissolving the line between work and home.

See also The Urban Infrastructure (volume 2); Social Class; Public Health (volume 3); The Household; Cleanliness; Manners (volume 4); Consumerism (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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CLOTHING AND FASHION



Beverly Lemire

STRUCTURE AND HIERARCHY IN DRESS

The European Renaissance flowered among a small but dynamic social elite who signaled their status through the cut and color of their clothes, as well as through the sumptuous fabrics from which their garments were made. Conscious of their rank, they gloried in their ambitions and their accomplishments. The symbolic use of dress to designate social or political status was ancient by the dawn of the Renaissance. However, in the fifteenth century the wealth at the disposal of the doges of Venice or the Medici of Florence eclipsed that of the preceding medieval period. Elite fashion and dress reflected that new affluence. Riches poured into Italy's trading cities. Local production of the highest quality silks and velvets supplied stunning displays of grandeur and privilege.

From the ancient world through the medieval period, dress signaled social status. Rank was accorded the monopoly of certain colors. As well, items of formalized attire were associated with specific social and political positions. Although apparel varied from region to region, the function of certain garments as social markers remained consistent. For example, in Venice men who held the rank of patrician or citizen upon attaining adulthood assumed a characteristic loose-fitting gown that they wore over their everyday clothes. This gown, called a toga, plus the long stole worn over the shoulders and a distinctive cap known as a *beretta* constituted the formal costume that set the gentleman and citizen apart from the artisan. These loose gowns remained signals of status. But from the fourteenth century on, clothing styles began to change rapidly, and following fashion became a mark of status. Dress followed new imperatives, becoming more revealing both for men and women. Patrician Italian youths sported waist-length jackets, revealing legs sheathed in close-fitting hose. Women of this rank wore gowns cut low across the breast, with a tighter fit around the body. The fashion cycle was set in motion, to the dismay of moralists. After 1400

it spread with growing speed from one corner of Europe to the other.

But even as fashion picked up momentum, some materials remained emblems of authority. Throughout Europe cloth of gold was the signal fabric of leadership. Woven in intricate brocaded patterns from gold and silk threads, it represented the apogee of material display. Indeed, in 1520 it formed the backdrop for one of the best known diplomatic rituals involving the Renaissance kings of France and England, Francis I and Henry VIII. The pageantry of costume and setting associated with the meeting was so magnificent that it became known thereafter as the Field of the Cloth of Gold. In a pavilion constructed of cloth of gold ranged people dressed in velvets, brocades, silks, and wools, with colors ranked from white, scarlet, and purples through blues, black, and browns. These colors, in combination with the textiles, communicated the standing of the wearer.

During the Renaissance, no region produced more lavish elaborations of dress than did Italy. Moreover, the modes of Renaissance Italy inspired nobles and royals of northern Europe, who looked to Italy for new kinds of social occasions suited to dramatic displays. One such event, the masquerade or masque, offered the frisson of sexual adventure in a formalized setting designed to exhibit the most elaborate costumes of court. In 1512 the first masque was held at the court of Henry VIII, to the great excitement of the lords and ladies, who were quick to see the opportunities presented by masked revels with anonymous suitors.

As trade and diplomacy carried trends from one court to another, the Renaissance brought a more intense preoccupation with fashion among the social elites and a gradual acceleration in the transformation of styles. High fashion flourished at the seats of political power. In this period fashion was the almost exclusive preserve of the mighty. Indeed, in court society ambitions and competing rivalries found expression through competitive expenditure on clothing. All over Europe luxurious apparel was the medium

through which the great and would-be-great of both sexes, from aspiring royal mistresses to enterprising noblemen, jostled for preeminence. Their enormous collective expenditures were legitimized by their rank. Fashion and political power were inextricably linked.

Distinction in dress also preoccupied governments. The authorities asserted that an orderly society could not function without clear distinctions in ornamentation and dress within each social order. Sumptuary legislation ascribed specific colors, fabrics, and fashions to various social orders. In fifteenth-century England none but a lord was permitted to wear “any gown, jacket or coat, unless it be of such length that the same may cover his privy members and buttocks” (3 Edward IV, c.4, 1463). Lawmakers prized the rights that came with noble birth. Sumptuary laws were passed most vigorously from the fourteenth century onward, codifying the appropriate dress for each degree, with penalties assigned to transgressors. The fixed orders of society were to be visible. Thus, in seventeenth-century France one’s position on the king’s council was confirmed through the cut and color of the ceremonial gown: the chancellor wore a long gown of crimson velvet; the councillors wore long violet gowns; the comptrollers wore short violet gowns; and the secretaries wore short black gowns. The intent was to differentiate social groups and give a stable, recognizable appearance to each segment of society. Ambiguity was to be avoided; presumption was to be squashed. In defense of this order the French government issued eighteen sumptuary decrees between 1485 and 1660; in England, seven acts and ten proclamations were issued between 1450 and 1600. This legislation was a response to insubordination, for a transformation in dress was under way, with or without official sanction.

Silk was one of the most hotly contested commodities. The nobility claimed a monopoly over the wearing of silk in most of Europe. However, silk did not remain the preserve of the aristocracy. Its attractions proved irresistible to ambitious bourgeois wherever silk novelties appeared. Stylish knitted silk stockings were brought as gifts from the Spanish to the English court early in the sixteenth century. By the 1560s informers were stationed at London’s gates to hunt for commoners wearing these novel garments. Sumptuary legislation lapsed in England in 1604 and in France in the early eighteenth century. But with or without legislated prohibitions, European society was torn by competing desires. Growing numbers of men and women wanted new types of clothes made with new fabrics and designs. At the same time, representatives of the *ancien régime* struggled to limit fashions to the elite.

COMMERCIAL EXPANSION AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

From the late Middle Ages, trade in the Mediterranean and Levant catapulted Italy to the forefront of Renaissance Europe, pouring undreamed-of wealth into state and private coffers. The riches that sustained noble families also brought new pressures to bear on the old order. Newly wealthy commoners and flourishing traders represented a threat to medieval regimes founded on hereditary feudal relations and inherited privileges. Growing cities attracted people from many backgrounds with less to gain from deference and loyalty to traditional authorities and more to gain through innovation, risk, and self-promotion. As the commercial momentum swept western and northern Europe, overseas trade with Asia, Africa, and the Americas created a growing cast of traders, merchants, and professionals who did not accept prescribed limits on their choice of clothing. Indeed, they rejected the very premise of sumptuary laws.

As expanding trade created a larger middling social order, so too did the development of European manufacturing. In addition, imported Asian textiles and new European-made fabrics increased the variety of materials available to a widening cross section of women and men.

Medieval Italy was the first European region to produce cotton and fustian textiles in quantity. Manufacturers realized that cottons were well suited to supply both domestic and export markets with low-priced goods. Spain soon followed suit. Throughout Europe popular tastes were changing. From the sixteenth century onward, the traditional heavy, durable woolen fabrics gradually lost their appeal. Middling and artisan customers wanted lighter textiles, known as the new draperies. Woolen-making regions in the Low Countries, France, and England were transformed under the pressure of these new consumer tastes. The new draperies offered mixed fabrics in wool, silk, linen, or cotton, as well as lightweight worsted wools. Modeled initially on light Italian wools, imitations proliferated. Italian cottons, fustians, and wools were copied by manufacturers in southern Germany, France, and the Low Countries; Flemish fabrics were adapted in England and imitated in Spain and Venice. For a growing number of Europeans, everyday clothing began to change. Whereas before a suit of clothing was expected to last a lifetime and even be handed down to heirs, now the selection of a coat, jacket, waistcoat, or cape became more a matter of personal choice than an investment for future generations. Less costly, more ephemeral commodities could reflect individual visions of appropriate dress.



FUSTIANS

Fustians (a blend of cotton and linen or just cotton) were made in ever greater quantities from the sixteenth century onward. They were produced in a great variety of styles, weights, and textures and included corduroys, moleskin, heavy twills, and velveteen. Some regions gave their name to fabrics that went on to be made in many other parts of Europe. Jean, for example, was known as coming initially from the city of Genoa; denim came from the French city of Nîmes, hence *de Nîmes*. Fustians were extremely popular fabrics, initially used by working people who needed sturdy clothing. The benefit of making garments from these fabrics was that they cost less than clothing made from heavy woolens and were easily washable. By the eighteenth century fustians were being substituted for a whole range of goods, including leather. For example, soft slippers could be made out of jean. And by this period, genteel and common consumers chose fustians for their daily apparel.

Lighter fabrics cost less and could be replaced more often. They were part of a revolution in dress, a revolution in self-presentation. The new fabrics enabled a greater preoccupation with personal display among the lower classes. Inevitably, the choices made by artisans and urban servants more closely mirrored prevailing upper-class modes. Their clothes did not replicate elite tastes. However, common clothing was being transformed and nowhere more dramatically than in northwestern Europe. From the 1500s plebeian dress began evolving from unchangingly drab coverings to a more varied range of apparel.

Dramatic alterations in dress continued during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A proliferation of European textiles encouraged the wearing of body linens as an intermediary layer between the skin and outer garments. Shifts and shirts for men and women became commonplace; stockings were almost as ubiquitous. By 1700 linen shirts were a staple of the wardrobes of poor Parisian workingmen; workingwomen owned even greater numbers. Cleanliness, as well as display, was more readily attainable with the growing ownership of linen shirts and shifts. Shirts with lace at the cuffs and neck were well within the means of the bourgeoisie. Shirts, shifts, aprons, hand-

kerchiefs, and stockings came in many qualities and at many prices. Accessories modified pedestrian garments. Textile wholesalers and retailers, peddlers and shopkeepers, offered an ever-widening range of choice to their patrons. In all social ranks garments and accessories made from these fabrics were more numerous than ever before, permitting a greater involvement with temporal modes.

Asian textiles also contributed to the refashioning of European dress. Brought in the 1500s to the Iberian peninsula, the floral-patterned fabrics caught the fancy of the Spanish royal family and moved gradually into wider markets. By the last quarter of the 1600s, trading companies from every major European country imported shiploads of calicoes and chintzes. For example, in 1684 over one million pieces of Indian cloth were landed at English docks. The brightly colored, washable East Indian textiles were unlike anything previously seen in Europe. Their richly colored botanical prints were a fraction of the cost of European silk brocades; printed chintzes inaugurated an era of even greater plebeian ornamentation. In the rural districts of the Netherlands, calicoes and chintzes were incorporated into everyday folk dress. Although the rate of diffusion varied among European nations, consumers could be found in every social rank, with England and the Netherlands providing the earliest and broadest markets. Even the laboring population of Paris owned quantities of the brightly patterned goods by the end of the eighteenth century.

East Indian textiles, with their vibrant floral designs, attracted legions of buyers—but also critics, who feared the contagion of social disorder for, as one English pamphleteer noted in 1719, “all the mean People, the Maid Servants, and indifferently poor Persons . . . are now clothed in Callicoe, or printed Linen; moved to it as well for the Cheapness, as the Lightness of the Cloth, and the Gaity of the Colours . . . let any one but cast their Eyes among the meaner Sort playing in the Street, or of the better Sort at Boarding School” (*The Just Complaints of the poor Weavers truly represented*, 1719). The calico craze sparked the first public panic over plebeian luxury. In London wool weavers destroyed shops selling calicoes and attacked women on the street dressed in floral printed gowns. Most European governments banned printed cottons in an attempt to shore up the old order and the old distinctions in dress. But legal restrictions could not hold back consumer demand.

For one thing, men and women in eighteenth-century France, England, and Prussia found it thrilling to wear prohibited goods. The demand for contraband fabrics persisted through the eighteenth century. Increasingly those looking for light, bright



LAUNDRESSES

As the ownership of linens rose, so too did the number of women working as laundresses. In major cities thousands of women hired themselves out to wash, dry, and iron clothes and household linens. Usually these were poor women with few employment opportunities. For married women and widows with families this trade meant they could earn a living without having to live in as a domestic servant; they fit this work around their own family duties. As with most occupations, there were variations in the skills of laundresses, especially with regard to ironing. Complex lace ruffs, pristine cravats, and complex draperies on women's gowns required competent ironing with hot irons that came in a variety of shapes. The wealthy would employ their own laundresses, with a laundry room on the premises. But the majority of city

dwellers depended on neighborhood laundresses. Improvements in urban housing in the nineteenth century meant that more middling and working women washed their family's laundry at home. Middle-class households typically hired extra help by the day to tackle soiled clothing and household linen. Washing and ironing was always heavy, tedious, and occasionally dangerous work, involving heavy cauldrons of boiling water, mountains of wet garments, and hot irons.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, laundry work employed great numbers of female and immigrant labor, even as city laundries assumed a more capital-intensive pattern. Only with the widespread sale of washing machines after the Second World War did laundresses slowly disappear from the urban scene.

fabrics could find European-made equivalents. The ban placed on East India textiles throughout much of Europe stimulated the growth of indigenous linen and cotton industries, most particularly in Britain. By the second half of the century, Lancashire manufacturers could offer a wide range of substitutes for prohibited Asian textiles. As a result, customers, from court clerks to maidservants, wheelwrights to gentlewomen, owned a wider array of garments than ever before. Garments made from these new fabrics showed a sense of style, not that of the formality of the court, but a relative fashionability. Indeed, one regional study suggests that workingmen were willing and able to pay a premium for quality items of clothing that would reinforce their standing in the wider world. Even rural groups—particularly rural industrial workers—began to buy or make urban-style clothing rather than traditional garb. These patterns of expenditure concerned moralists, particularly when it came to young working females. Eighteenth-century commentators decried the priority given to the purchase of pretty gowns, hats, aprons, and shawls. And yet more young working women could be seen wearing stylish garb. In the nineteenth century, legislators and clergymen, dismayed at the independence and self-indulgence of workingwomen, suggested that an excessive material vanity could lead directly to prostitution. Restraint, self-denial, and moral control were recommended for all laboring people, but especially females. But the dynamics of production and the expansion of consumer culture made fashion a matter of general inter-

est, with or without the acquiescence of court or clergy. Clothing changes reflected the decline of uniforms, such as guild attire for artisans. They came to serve new needs of self-expression.

From the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, popular fashions challenged the social hierarchy. Thus, young men and women from the middling and laboring classes denied the elites a monopoly of the social stage. The defenders of the waning status quo responded with a combination of derision and lectures on morality. Newspapers and magazines sneered at the “second-hand beaux,” the red-armed belles and jumped-up apprentices who wore genteel costumes, confusing the social order in a masquerade. What would be the results, demanded the editorialists, if one could not distinguish a lady from her maid, or a master from his servant? Even more distressing was the sight of noble youths aping the appearance of coachmen, sporting fustian coats with handkerchiefs around their necks. From the eighteenth century onward, social boundaries were blurring; visible distinctions in dress were no longer absolute guides to social standing. The widening of the consumer base and the more elaborate displays arising from the lower social ranks heralded the transformation of European society.

Personal contacts with high society were not the only source of information on the latest styles of dress. Engraved prints of exquisitely gowned figures had been produced for a limited market intermittently throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The more formalized reporting on fashion began in France with the appearance of the first fashion journal, *Le Mercure Galant*, in the 1670s. New trends were memorialized in illustrations, from which sharp-eyed readers could extract information on cut and finishings. News circulated with growing speed over the eighteenth century. In formally designated fashion journals, as well as through miscellaneous prints, literate customers found new sources of information, bringing them glimpses of the world of high fashion. *The Lady's Magazine* was the first English publication to produce regular fashion plates for its readers, from 1759 onward. Between 1786 and 1826, *Journal der Luxus und der Moden*, published in Weimar, brought German readers the latest fashion intelligence. Fashion journals multiplied throughout Europe, with ambitious publishers feeding the insatiable public interest in the latest vogue: *Cabinet des Modes* (1785–1792), *Gallery of Fashion* (1794–1804), *The Magazine of the Female Fashions of London and Paris* (1798–1806), *Journal für Fabrik, Manufaktur und Handlung und Mode* (1791–1808), *Repository of Arts, Literature, Commerce, Manufactures, Fashion and Politics* (1809–1828). Thereafter, publishers responded to the growing market for information with a range of magazines and catalogs rich in detail.

Beginning in the late seventeenth century, France claimed a unique place in Europe as the center of high fashion. The resplendence of the Sun King, Louis XIV, had elevated French creations to a peerless position. The preeminence of fashion was never in question in the Sun King's court. Indeed, Louis XIV's minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert asserted that he intended to make high fashion to France what the gold mines of Peru had been to Spain. French silks were synonymous with luxury; news of recent Parisian trends was eagerly awaited from Moscow to Dublin. During the intermittent wars of the early eighteenth century, French fashion dolls were permitted to pass between enemy nations. Blockades during the Napoleonic Wars interrupted, but did not reverse, French standing as the fashion Mecca, a status that was again unrivaled by the 1830s. Haute couture became synonymous with Parisian fashion house. Charles Frederick Worth (1828–1895), English born but French inspired, built the first great house of design and couture in the 1850s. La Maison Worth set the pattern for couturiers' houses, a pattern that would continue into the twentieth century. After 1850 one of the many profitable French exports was an immensely popular magazine, published in more than ten languages. All editions featured outstanding fashion

plates produced in Paris. Called *Die Madenwelt* or *Le Follett*, it set the standard for fashion news throughout Europe. War once again interrupted communications during the siege of Paris in 1870. Silence from Paris induced panic in English editors, who were obliged to substitute Belgian and English fashion plates. Readers of *Le Follett* were congratulated for their patient stoicism when fashion news flowed again with the end of the conflict. French influence remained unrivaled for the rest of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries.

The proliferation of fashion news was matched by changes in retailing over the same period. Up to 1800 most of the distribution of clothing fabrics and apparel relied on the traditional hierarchy of trades: mercers, linen drapers, and wool drapers. Each trade had a long ancestry, and practitioners were organized in guilds in most European cities. However, other patterns of retailing challenged their monopoly. Peddlers began appearing in increasing numbers from the sixteenth century onward, carrying necessities and humble luxuries to every quarter, encouraging trade, and generating wealth. General retail shops also multiplied, as did specialist shops that sold a range of clothing goods. As retailing became more complex, the traditional trade divisions began to break down. By the 1850s modern retail systems were in place, permitting consumers to buy a wider range of goods even outside the capital cities. Though elite fashions persisted, the meaning was altered. A well-developed trade in second-hand garments was also in place by the seventeenth century throughout Europe, changing the culture of fashion for elites and nonelites. Sumptuary laws were dead letters in the face of the vigorous market for silk gowns, wool jackets, and embroidered aprons, worn but still relatively stylish. Before the mass production of fashions, there was a mass trade in second-hand cloths that redefined fashion in the street. Popular fashions found a legitimate expression among the middle class and a growing portion of the working class of Europe.

THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF DRESS

The dress of ordinary Europeans was transformed by broad social and economic changes that took place over centuries. However, within this evolutionary process, dramatic episodes of political and religious upheaval inspired distinctive changes. Religious and secular revolts heightened the symbolic meaning of many material goods. From the beginnings of the Reformation, radical Protestants redefined their relations with other Christians and solidified group cohesion

through symbolic forms of dress. For the Mennonites and Amish of northern and central Europe, the Quakers of Britain, and the Doukhobors of Russia, clothing reflected their relationship with God, their links with their coreligionists, and their distinctiveness from the wider society.

The perceived corruption of the Catholic and established Protestant churches produced a critique of luxury and personal adornment among many radical Protestant sects. Mennonites expressed their distaste for sixteenth-century Netherlands society through displays of public nakedness and used the destruction of clothing as a means of purification. Protestants in general were concerned to present a modest appearance, with no visible signs of opulence. Dress was often employed as a conscious mechanism to separate a religious community from the broader society, to exclude outsiders and enforce solidarity. In the 1690s the Mennonites of Switzerland, Alsace, and southern Germany divided on religious issues. Elements of dress became flashpoints for theological disputes. All subscribed to the ideal of simple, dark, utilitarian dress—worldly fashions were anathema to them. However, the leader of the new Amish sect broke with the rest of the Mennonite community and the Amish could not support the use of buttons. In their words, the Amish became the “hook and eye” people and the Mennonites were the “button people.” In the succeeding centuries, including the twentieth, the size of men’s hat brims, the cut of a jacket, and the kind of women’s headgear were emblematic of one’s position within the Amish and Old Order Mennonite communities, their dark archaic clothing setting them off from their neighbors.

As norms of dress altered in tandem with shifting social, economic, and political movements, men's clothing exhibited perhaps the most striking adaptations. During the eighteenth century, middle-class men and even noblemen abandoned the rich decoration and lush colors that had characterized attire in the previous centuries. Gradually, they metamorphosed from the splendor of the butterfly to the utility of the moth. Clothes became darker and more restrained in cut. The standard components of male dress became trousers, waistcoat, and jacket, with the shirt visible beneath, the neck covered with a cravat or tie. This pattern of dress was an adaptation of work-

ingmen's trousers and jacket, an example of the trickle-up effect in fashion.

This renunciation of excess is associated most strongly with the Netherlands and England. By 1600 dark, simple garb was a hallmark of the merchant class and nobility in the Netherlands. Sober garb suited the masculine culture of public probity; inspired by Protestant morality and commerce, this self-consciously sober look distinguished the Dutch from their more elaborate French and Spanish neighbors. The sober elegance of the Dutch elite traveled to England in the entourage of William of Orange and Queen Mary, following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. This style

of dress was already entrenched among the nonconformist sects in England. By 1700 nationalist sentiment among the men of affairs, the Protestant stewards of English government and business, found expression in fashions distinct from those of autocratic France. Englishmen's coats became plainer, less ostentatious. Opulent apparel was deemed a corrupt, effeminate indulgence. Unadorned coats of dark wool cloth became the mark of a gentleman, of authentic public leadership. And in continental Europe England's liberalism and constitutional monarchy became synonymous with dark coats of unadorned fabric. Anglomania flourished in eighteenth-century France, inspired by a political critique of the *ancien régime*; these political sentiments were expressed in some circles by dressing in English modes. Enlightenment sentiments prescribed a modest attire.

The two late-eighteenth-century revolutions further eroded the old norms of elite fashions. As a representative of the new American republic, Benjamin Franklin wore undressed hair and plain attire to the French court, charming the assembled company. More dramatic still were the shock waves of the French Revolution. Throughout these complex events, clothing was often a political marker. Thus, the members of the Third Estate were authorized to wear only the plainest dark apparel. This unpretentious garb became part of the explosive critique of royal opulence and corruption. Dress frequently symbolized political positions through the tumult of early reforms, through revolution, the Reign of Terror, the reaction, and military dictatorship. Trousers, as worn by the laboring *sans-culottes* (those who did not wear *culottes*, the knee breeches worn by aristo-



HATS

Practical and fashionable, headgear was overlaid by a complex web of social meanings. For most of the period under study, soft caps and hats covered women's hair or decorated their heads. These coverings typically denoted life-cycle stages: the passage from childhood to adulthood, newly married to widowed. Among rural women distinctive caps or hats reflected regional folk styles. For many centuries religious dicta ensured that women's hair was covered in public. Only with the fashion for wigs in the eighteenth century did the public display of hair alter somewhat for those who followed this style. However, the utility and fashion potential of head coverings ensured their survival. The revolutions of the late eighteenth century marked the return to natural hair. But hats and head coverings remained an essential accessory for men and women, especially when in public. Throughout the nineteenth century the constraints imposed on women eased marginally. But women continued to wear hats for all formal public occasions well into the second half of the twentieth century, keeping their heads covered for ceremonies when men typically bared theirs.

For men as well as women, hats distinguished social rank and occupational standing. Hats also signaled defiance, camaraderie, or respect. Christian services required that men bare their heads as a sign of respect. In

the seventeenth century Quakers were the best known of religious egalitarians who refused to remove their hats, claiming a right to dispense with gestures of social deference. In their view equality before God made such gestures unnecessary. For this defiance before magistrates and nobles, Quakers suffered imprisonment and sometimes torture. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, social status would be determined by the use of a hat, as opposed to a shawl, for workingwomen. Among men, the raising of one's hat was a masculine mark of courtesy offered to a social superior or an equal, male or female. But the niceties between relative equals were more problematic in cities where the social position of the person so honored was not guaranteed. Nonetheless, the doffing of a hat as a mark of respect was a courtesy expected by the elites from their social inferiors. Its daily or hourly repetition reinforced the social hierarchy. The erosion of these traditional displays happened slowly. Through much of the twentieth century, hats and hat honor resonated with social meaning, as did the particular types of hats worn by different social groups. However, with the gradual democratization of the West, hat use faded; outside an institutional context, it altered decisively in the second half of the twentieth century. Formal hats, and the customs associated with them, all but vanished from common usage.

crats and the well-to-do), certified adherence to Jacobinism, Maximilien Robespierre being a prominent exception to that rule. Plain caps worn by laboring men were reborn as liberty caps, powerful symbols of revolutionary authority for Jacobin men. Even amid the turmoil of revolution, however, they would not share this authority with female revolutionaries, who were forbidden to wear this cap. From shoes to buckles, hats to handkerchiefs, each refinement carried political overtones; during the Reign of Terror every citizen was required by law to wear a red, white, and blue cockade as a symbol of patriotism. When the political fury of the Jacobins was quashed, there were reactions in more than just the formal political sense. An explosion of highly stylized fashions worn by young men and women shocked visitors and older residents of Paris. *Les Incroyables* some were called, others *les Merveilleux*; the dress of these golden youth was characterized by outrageous extremes. Such excesses were short lived; thereafter, simplicity became the prevailing trend. Inside France and out, war accelerated the simplification of dress. For example, powdered wigs lost favor throughout Europe, more as a consequence of high wheat prices than as a reflection of generalized republicanism—finely milled flour being used as the powder for wigs. With the coming of peace, an aesthetic of restraint spread throughout the west.

Middle-class men adopted a more austere manner of dress well before the nineteenth century. After 1815 they continued their rhetorical claim to equality under the law and political responsibility by wearing identical black suits. Their bourgeois rectitude reinforced claims to political participation. In 1832 the debate in Britain was resolved with the extension of the franchise to middle-class men. Continental Europe enfranchised middle-class men less readily. However, throughout the nineteenth century, respectable apparel for men in business and government was the uniformly tailored, dark three-piece suit. Social rank could be determined through cut and quality and accessories. The suit remained a mark of authority and respectability for all classes. By the later nineteenth century, various types of suits were worn even by working-class men and radical trade union organizers, so general was the acceptance of this pattern of clothing. Mass production made suits easily available at an affordable price. And, though necessity demanded that poor men pawn their suits each Monday morning, they would be redeemed for Saturday night. Until the third quarter of the twentieth century, men from virtually every social rank displayed an extraordinary homogeneity in dress, all wedded to the respectable imperative of the suit.

If bourgeois masculinity was defined in attire by restraint, bourgeois femininity was defined by a prescribed indulgence. In the eighteenth century, women replaced the aristocracy as the group expected to define standards of beauty and fashion. In turn, fashion began to change frequently. The republican simplicity and physical liberation of the neoclassical styles of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods were short lived. The uncorseted female form did not survive for long. Social penalties were more severe for women who infringed the gender norms of dress than for men. In response, the advent of the "Woman Question" in the nineteenth century coincided with various movements for dress reform. In the mid-nineteenth century, the American reformer Amelia Bloomer proposed the wearing of long Turkish-type trousers under a skirt to free women for greater physical activity. Bloomers attracted legions of critics and were denounced in pulpits and editorials as dangerously unfeminine. However, the dress reform movement revived later in the century in most parts of Europe. Campaigns were inspired in equal parts by the feminist campaign for legal and social equality and a wish to promote healthier, more natural lifestyles. "Aesthetic" dress, developed by the British Pre-Raphaelite community, was marketed successfully from the 1860s onward. The dress for women consisted of loose-fitting gowns worn without corsets; men wore collarless shirts, soft felt hats, and flowing ties. By the turn of the century, Aesthetic dress had become an accepted alternative to styles that relied for their structure on confining corsets and petticoats.

The greatest transformation in women's clothing came with the new century. The First World War intensified the debates about women's place in society. Postwar changes in hair and clothing signaled the rebellion of a new generation of women, raised amid public campaigns for women's legal and political equality. Bobbed hair, short shiftlike dresses, and even trousers were their emblems in the 1920s. To French authorities these fashions were antimaternal and a threat to the state. Parents were urged to restrain their daughters; husbands were cautioned to control their wives, and many tried. However, these fashions were embraced by young women, for whom bobbed hair and shorter dresses represented the throwing off of shackles.

This critique of the gender status quo was matched later in the twentieth century by a rebellion of the young against the Paris-dictated "fashion" of their elders. In the mid-1950s young designers like Mary Quant produced affordable but dramatic clothes linking popular fashion with social rebellion. High fashion lost its defining authority. No longer restricted

to the factory and farmyard, jeans became mainstream dress over the next quarter century. New haircuts and clothes were linked to social and feminist critiques of the status quo, with particular emphasis on distinctive styles for youth. But here too, commercialization and mass production defused the initial political inspiration. Jeans stores and unisex boutiques opened in almost every community in Europe. Well-developed industrial and distribution industries responded to changes in taste, meeting the decisive shifts in fashion.

FROM MADE-TO-MEASURE TO MASS PRODUCTION

Just as clothing evolved for lord and laborer, so too did the process of production. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, people of almost all social classes relied on the tailors, hatters, and shoemakers resident in their communities to make clothes to order. Guilds controlled training and entry into the trades; the hierarchy within the trades offered opportunity for advancement for talented journeymen and a few journeywomen. At the same time, many thousands of artisans were employed making utilitarian articles under the direction of great and small masters. These trades made up a vital part of the corporate

foundation of Renaissance society. And the purchase of clothing by Europeans represented one of the most important areas of expenditure in that period. In England the total annual consumption of clothing accounted for about one quarter of all national expenditure at the end of the seventeenth century.

However, the seventeenth century also saw the beginning of decisive changes in the production and distribution of clothing. In France needlewomen received approval for the distinctly female occupation of mantuamaker or dressmaker, ending the monopoly of the tailors' guild. This division of labor was replicated in other parts of Europe. Furthermore, there were other pivotal pressures transforming the production of apparel. The seventeenth-century growth of national armies and navies required the creation of bureaucracies to support and provision these fighting forces. Large stocks of apparel were essential. Although we know more about England in this period, the economic momentum thus engendered was almost certainly a pan-European phenomenon. To ensure that soldiers and sailors were supplied with coats, breeches, shirts, stockings, and handkerchiefs, investors contracted out the process of production. Cost was a key factor; so too was the speed of production.

Inevitably, the growing infusion of merchant capital undercut traditional guild structures.

No new technology was available to speed up manufacturing during the eighteenth century. Therefore, contractors reorganized labor, using women workers outside the guild systems. England's guilds were among the weakest in Europe, and in this context military ambition and fiscal innovation resulted in a new pattern of clothes production. Contractors competed for government contracts, employing hundreds and then thousands of needlewomen in an elaborate system of sweated labor. From 1700 onward this became one of the largest sectors of employment for urban women; but it was a largely hidden trade, a trade of attic and garret workshops. Journeymen tailors, in turn, found themselves becoming wage laborers when they had to compete with cheaper nonguild workers. Gender antagonism flared between tailors and seamstresses, with periodic public campaigns to bar women from all needle trades from 1700 through the 1800s. This process was replicated throughout Europe as capital and labor were reorganized in the clothing trades.

The development of ready-to-wear clothing transformed the types and cost of garments available. And there was a large and growing assortment of second-hand clothing traded from one corner of Europe to the other. People became accustomed to the convenience of ready-made clothes as a result of the used clothes market. The second-hand trade brought dated garments, worn but useful, to consumers in the middle and laboring classes. It flourished in most parts of Europe, recognized as an essential facet of the clothing trade. Garments outmoded in one country for one social group could be sold profitably in other markets. The used clothing trade persisted as a significant element in the garment industry until such time as mass production offered a sufficiently wide choice for all consumers. Thereafter it served niche markets only.

Ready-made clothing became commonplace during the eighteenth century, and by the nineteenth century specialist manufacturers expanded. With the advent of the sewing machine, after 1850 production networks integrated factory, workshop, and sweated home labor. The latter type of work was the particular resort of poor women and immigrants. The domestic use of sewing machines opened another method for the home production of garments from the late nineteenth century onward, with the aid of the latest patterns available through magazines and retailers. However, the enterprising women who set themselves up as dressmakers served a niche market only and offered no real challenge to manufacturers. Indeed, as mass production grew, high-quality, made-to-measure cloth-

ing became less common, more the preserve of the affluent.

Menswear and women's accessories were the first mass-produced garments. By the late nineteenth century, virtually every article of clothing was made in the tens of thousands, through interrelated systems of factories and sweatshops. In the 1900s production became even larger and more diversified. The first historical examination of sweated labor, in the 1970s, was based on the assumption that government regulation had at last eliminated sweatshops. However, in the last two decades of the twentieth century, poorly paid piecework, in homes and workshops, was revived in response to the foundering of European textile and clothing companies faced with cheap Asian imports. As in previous eras, employers discovered no substitute for the flexible, low-paid work of women. From the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries, the gender division of labor remained a consistent com-

ponent of the clothing trade as the market for ready-made grew.

Fashion was a more amorphous concept at the end than at the beginning of the twentieth century, yet some aspects of the clothing trade remained unchanged. Low-paid female labor was as much the organizational solution to economic challenges in the twentieth as it was in the seventeenth century. In addition, the constituents of clothing underwent changes as dramatic as those that began in the 1600s. High-tech apparel like anoraks and running shoes, plus the diffusion of artificial fibers, marked further alterations in common clothing that began first with the popularization of cottons. Simplification of dress continued with the erosion of age-specific garments and the emergence of unisex styles. As in earlier periods, economic structures, political priorities, and social signals were reflected in patterns of dress and the structure of clothing trades.

See also Shops and Stores (volume 2); The Body and Its Representations (volume 4); Consumerism (in this volume); and other articles in this section.

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FOOD AND DIET



Kolleen M. Guy

Historians recognize food and diet as significant aspects of social history, providing important insight into the material and cultural conditions of everyday life. Serious scholarly investigation of diet, ingredients, and rituals of consumption progressed rapidly over the last decades of the twentieth century. The founders of the influential *Annales* (1886–1944) school of historical analysis, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre (1878–1956), encouraged academicians to use archival documents, such as wills, household accounts, notarial records, and institutional inventories to study the diet and food habits of the past. Historians took up the challenge. By the 1960s and 1970s, research on European diet and food habits from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century focused on alimentation: food and drink production (planting and harvesting), distribution, and consumption. Quantitative studies dealt with a variety of specific historical questions from determining caloric intake to calculating per capita meat consumption. Despite a variety of criticisms about the incomplete or imprecise nature of the archival sources, notable *Annalistes*, such as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Fernand Braudel, went on to establish the study of food and diet as a legitimate means to better understand the structures of everyday life in European history.

Concurrently, other historians, influenced by the work of cultural anthropologists and ethnographers, began to explore the social importance of food and rituals of food consumption. Historians recognized food's symbolic importance and examined the production and consumption of food as expressions of social solidarity and stratification. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, those interested in the history of food and diet employed a variety of different approaches. Purely quantitative methods, favored by some early practitioners, gave way to looking at cultural contexts. Building on knowledge of the history of the family and women's work, historians made the family meal, including the preservation and preparation of food, a new focal point of study. Cookbooks, recipes, menus, etiquette books, and other gastronomic texts offered

new avenues of research. Culinary history, with its focus on food culture, exposed the layers of social production behind food choices and added to the rich documentation on alimentation.

New perspectives continue to proliferate. Given the centrality of food to most societies, historians turned their attention in the 1980s and early 1990s to researching the construction of social identity through dietary choices and culinary techniques in different countries and among different classes. Food and culinary techniques, as distinct expressions of ethnic or cultural identity, have a long and complex history that has only begun to be examined. Historians have also focused much new research on sites of consumption, such as restaurants, cafés, and public banquets. Research by social historians—past and present—on food, diet, and rituals of consumption continues to enrich our understanding of the history of everyday life.

Eating, with its quotidian repetition, may appear insignificant when placed next to the great deeds and events of history. Yet, historically, food has been a central preoccupation in most European societies where undernourishment and starvation were basic components of social life before the mid-nineteenth century. Proverbs from throughout Europe reflected the preoccupation with a full belly and exhorted listeners to stretch meager resources. From the urban beggar to the court nobility, it was understood that the fate of individuals and, according to French gastronome Anthelme Brillat-Savarin (1755–1826) in his *Physiologie du goût* (1825), the fate of nations intimately “depend[ed] on how they are fed.”

How Europeans were fed historically hinged on a variety of factors that defy facile generalization. Shifts in food production and consumption in Europe were linked to the uneven pace of industrialization, urbanization, expansion of arable land, commercialization and transport, and agricultural specialization. Adding to the complexity, these factors were inextricably entangled with questions of political and social organization. Social historians, without minimizing

regional and national differences, however, have located a number of important trends in Europe's food and dietary history since 1400.

ISSUES IN FOOD HISTORY IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

Food was a central preoccupation for most Europeans in the early modern period (1400–1800) as demographic growth, halted by the devastation of the Black Death, resumed across the Continent. Despite a brief slowing of population growth in the 1600s, the population of Europe increased from an estimated 61 million in the 1500s to 123 million by 1800. With demographic expansion came a surge in agricultural production. Historians generally agree that the amount of land under cultivation increased throughout Europe during this period, often at the expense of land reserved for grazing animals or hunting. In England the enclosure of common lands was under way and would pick up after 1530. Pastures were converted into arable land and in many places vineyards were destroyed to make way for more lucrative cereal crops. There was a decline in specialized production, particularly animal husbandry. As a consequence of changes in supply and demand, a large portion of the urban and rural population reduced meat consumption. Average annual meat consumption per capita in Germany, for example, plummeted from a high of 100 kilograms in 1500 to only 14 kilograms in the early 1800s. Similar patterns emerged across Europe.

Cereals became the primary source of nutrition for most Europeans; bread replaced meat in the popular diet. Despite the increase in cultivated land, agricultural production did not keep pace with population expansion. The price of grain in Europe climbed

by 386 percent between 1500 and 1650 while purchasing power lagged behind. Statistical evidence reveals that cultivation of industrial crops, horticulture, and viticulture were highly dependent on the price and consumption levels of grain. The meager statistical data available suggests that many families changed their eating habits by further curbing meat consumption and increasing reliance on other plant products. Dried and salted fish might be added to the common diet as a surrogate for meat, particularly in urban areas, although generally it was not considered filling. Salaried workers, whose wages did not keep pace with prices, shifted a larger portion of their incomes to purchasing bread and other foodstuffs. In the countryside, even the peasants with a surplus to sell in the market reserved their best produce (including wheat and rye) for sale and subsisted on a diet of lesser grains (barley, millet, and so on), legumes, and chestnuts.

Between 1650 and 1750, the supply of daily bread for the bulk of Europe's population was affected by an agricultural depression. Although this depression was not as prolonged or severe as those that took place during the Middle Ages, the chief features were important to the bulk of Europe's inhabitants: decline in cereal prices, little land reclamation activity, expansion of animal husbandry and reduction of arable land, cultivation of fodder crops, and few agricultural innovations. The combination of the depression with the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and a series of epidemics brought fundamental changes to European agriculture and, subsequently, the European diet.

One change of particular importance was the upheaval in rural land ownership throughout western Europe as nobles, bourgeois, and royal officeholders gained possession of large expanses of farmland. Large-scale farms with regular access to markets prospered by experimenting with new crops and techniques. Land-poor peasants introduced potatoes to their gardens as their overall living standards declined. Similarly in eastern Europe, the nobility increased their control over agriculture and lucrative markets by subjugating the peasantry and increasing compulsory labor service. The process was complex and varied according to regions. With increases in the amount of labor and capital invested in farming, however, grain from the Baltic littoral created not only a flourishing internal trade but also flowed into Amsterdam to feed the hungry urban population of Europe.

As the proportion of grain in the popular diet increased, the crises provoked by grain shortages became more severe. There was a series of major grain shortages in France, Germany, England, Spain, Italy, and throughout northern Europe in 1555, 1597, 1630–1632, 1693–1694, and 1709. Shortages typi-

cally began with a harvest failure, which created a surge in prices. In some areas, there was a deterioration of bread quality as mixtures of grain (rye, wheat, and other grains) or substitutes (barley, oats, legumes, or, in severe cases, chestnuts) were used in bread making. The “hierarchy of bread”—white bread for the wealthy, brownish breads for those with some resources, dark bread for the least well-off—was a daily reminder of social distinctions. Lesser grains were better than no grains. Shortages resulted in malnutrition, vulnerability to disease, reduced fertility, and, at times, death. Rising grain prices (seen as unjust by the lower classes), adulteration of flour by millers, or the hoarding of wheat and bread often led to protests or bread “riots.” Between the seventeenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth century, food conflicts—the possibility of popular disorders or rebellions due to bread shortages—resulted in greater state investment in stimulating grain production and trade, distributing bread or grain in times of shortage, and regulating markets. Famished crowds demanded that public authorities, particularly the mythical “baker king,” feed the masses of hungry subjects. Responses such as the Elizabethan Poor Laws (1598 and 1601), for example, although known for their harsh treatment of the poor, did make English villages less vulnerable to famine. German principalities, similarly, administered prices, regulated market relations, and worked to relieve local shortages. As cereals came to

dominate the popular diet, the bread question became a major political issue.

The consumption of food and the social context for that activity was a clear expression of the opposition between the ruler and the ruled in early modern Europe. Abundance and variety characterized the table of the social elites; elaborate social rituals of consumption were an expression of their power. The contrast between the daily abundance on the dinner table of the wealthy and the daily dearth on the dinner table of the poor was striking. While the poor might have occasions of excess during important holidays or as markers of certain rites of passage, these were rare moments to be remembered. Elites and masses differed not only in the quantity regularly consumed, but the quality and variety of food consumed as well. Historians have concluded from the evidence in kitchen accounts and cookbooks of the wealthy that overall grain consumption decreased among the social elites in the early modern period in sharp contrast to growing popular consumption of cereal-based foods. Both the quantity and quality of prepared food available on a daily basis to the dominant classes represented and confirmed their social, economic, and political status.

Consumption of elaborate, expensive, refined foods, which were outside of the budget of the mass of Europeans, were deemed intrinsically appropriate for those with high social rank. Scientific and literary

theories of nutritional privilege, whereby social class implied a certain type of “natural order” to food consumption, created a hierarchy of both food and people. Vegetables, particularly bulbs and roots, were believed to be among the lowest rank of the natural world and, therefore, most suitable for those of the lowest ranks of society. Fruits and fowl, by virtue of their distance from the element earth, were seen as the most appropriate food for the highest classes. Pheasant, partridge, and other “light” meats were seen as reflections of the refined character of those who consumed them. Spices, which were increasingly within reach of those outside of noble circles, were replaced with delicate flavorings such as chives, shallots, and capers, first used by French chefs. Where spices remained a luxury, such as in Germany, Poland, and Russia, their strong flavors continued to be part of the cuisine of the elite. Throughout Europe the wealthy table with its emphasis on quality food, elaborate presentation, and complex rituals acted as a daily reminder of the gulf between the ruling classes and the bulk of the population. Power was expressed through food.

PATTERNS OF DIETARY REGIMES

As power shifted in the waning days of the ancien régime so, too, did elite dietary preferences. By the

eighteenth century, health considerations and issues of food hygiene became a part of the discourse of Enlightenment philosophers, encyclopedists, and technicians who turned their attention to the “science” of food, dining, and drink. The science of gastronomy created new taste professionals who enumerated some of the fundamental truths of the new food culture. Strong flavors of wild game and heavy meals with multiple courses of meat became symbols of old social and political regimes. The “enlightened” bourgeoisie and nobility adopted a more delicate, refined cuisine with mild cream sauces, more “white” meats, and increased varieties of vegetable foods. Restaurants featuring fine cooking opened in places like Paris in the late eighteenth century, and the idea of dining out not simply when traveling gained ground. The new attitude toward diet softened earlier rhetoric that had advocated the exclusive consumption of “quality” food by people of “quality.” This changing ideological framework made proper nutrition and freedom of food choice an ideal; actual food consumption, however, continued to be a visible sign of rank and class membership.

Over the course of these centuries, changes in supply and demand and the introduction of new crops slowly altered the European diet. Rice, once an exotic import reserved for the wealthy, became a part of the

European diet from Spain to the Low Countries. Sugar, a dominant commodity of the European colonial trade, was consumed in vast quantities. A historian-anthropologist has argued that sugar became the first mass-consumption food, eagerly sought out and widely purchased, though not really necessary. As European long-distance trade became more sophisticated, new beverages, such as coffee and tea, were also introduced. While coffee, consumed in urban coffeehouses, became popular among European elites, tea became a basic beverage throughout European society. Hot, sweet tea was popular among the lower orders, particularly in England, where it was said to provide a quick burst of energy. Crops from the Americas, such as the tomato, potato, and maize (corn), were gradually assimilated as well. By the late eighteenth century, the nutrient-dense potato, which could feed more people per acre than grain, was an important staple of the popular diet. In the predominantly industrial countries north of the Alps, potatoes became a major crop in the gardens of peasant and wage-earning households. The lowly potato, believed to be fit only for peasants and animals when first introduced, gradually made its way into the recipes of the elite by 1800. Scholars attribute the variations in assimilation of new foods to climate and standard of living, as well as to differences in food cultures.

European dietary regimes underwent a perceptible shift starting in the eighteenth century (although there are significant differences in character and timing of change from region to region). One of the most remarkable things about the eighteenth century, compared to earlier periods, was that individual food consumption remained constant, while agricultural production was regulated to match. It is even likely that, for some classes, individual consumption went up, in spite of the great growth of population. Cities often demanded not only grain but also specialized produce, such as dairy products and fresh fruits and vegetables. The profit motive in agriculture worked against the practice of reserving certain foods for a select group of consumers. Between 1761–1790 and 1821–1850, high prices for agricultural products, which resulted from a combination of changes in consumption patterns, population growth, and demand for fodder crops (which reduced the amount of arable for cultivating grains for human consumption), led to an expansion of the area cultivated, increased animal husbandry, the introduction of new methods and inventions, and a renewed interest in agriculture. All of these factors stimulated development. But what was unique during this period was that the usual plowing under of grasslands for arable, which traditionally took place during periods of high cereal prices, was

not undertaken. With the growth of demand for manure, the increase in the number of horses for transport, and changes in consumption patterns, animal husbandry did not decline in profitability in relation to cereal cultivation. Agricultural changes meant a greater variety of resources of food to sustain the population.

Desire for a variety of foods became increasingly more “democratic” in the modern period as old dietary hierarchies of exclusion were discarded. Greater food choices for a broader group of consumers did not necessarily result in more “democratic” diets. Despite enhanced agricultural productivity and progress in food supply by the eighteenth century, the mass of the European population had enough to eat only when harvests were good. Subsistence problems for both the urban and rural populations of Europe persisted well into the nineteenth century. Continued population growth, particularly in the later half of the eighteenth century, further exacerbated nutritional deficiencies. High cereal prices meant that food was the most important part of the budget of most working-class families; half of the family budget could be spent on bread alone. The poorer the family, the less varied the diet. This was also true of some members of the rural laboring classes who were hit by rising rents and food prices. For many, particularly among the lower classes, rising agricultural prices meant a diet that was monotonous (with the reliance on plant foods and cereals) and generally inadequate.

THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

Historians note that there was an increase in demand for meat and dairy products early in the nineteenth century. This led to the spread of innovations pioneered in the Netherlands and in new crop rotations and livestock breeding and, according to some historians, a slow, perceptible improvement in the daily diet of the masses. Innovations were adopted slowly throughout Europe during the nineteenth century. The new husbandry, which generally meant a decrease in fallow, did not always, by itself, produce higher crop yields. But often the reduction of fallow was combined with new crop rotations that included fodder crops and growing herds of livestock—all of which provided more nitrogen to the soil through nitrogen-enriching crops and manuring. Greater demand and higher prices coupled with concomitant improvements in agricultural technology and technique stimulated European agricultural production between 1821 and 1850.

Whether this agricultural change resulted in an improvement in the diet of the growing number of

working-class families in Europe has been part of an intense debate among social historians about the early effects of industrialization on the standard of living. Regardless of their conclusions, most historians agree that food remained a central part of the family budget, and a mother’s role as a consumer was key to the family’s well-being. Expenditures for food could take up between half and three-quarters of a working family’s income even among the most skilled (and highly paid) workers. One estimate, based on calculations from a variety of different types of working families, showed that, between 1823 and 1835, the proportion of wages of the male head of the household that was spent on grains decreased. Nonetheless, grain and bread still absorbed around 55 percent of the man’s wages. The last widespread European famine in 1846–1847, which had its most devastating effects in Ireland, attests to the extent to which the bulk of the populace continued to rely on grains and potatoes for nourishment.

For many working-class Europeans, any earnings above subsistence were dedicated first to modest improvements in diet. A bit of fat or, even better, butter on bread could be a cherished luxury. At times, the caloric needs of certain family members prompted difficult eating arrangements within working-class households. Mothers and children would often practice restraint in eating, in order to allow the male breadwinner to eat meat.

Around the middle of the nineteenth century there was a dramatic change in agricultural supply—due to intensive application of early nineteenth-century innovations—and demand—as an increasing industrial population wanted, and could afford, more meat and dairy products, and industry created new markets. Dearth, which had ruled everyday life for centuries, increasingly became an exceptional event. Nutritional standards improved as the century passed. Various studies of working families demonstrate that food continued to constitute the largest yearly expenditure. Aggregate figures for the French working class reveal that up to 60 percent of the family budget was dedicated to food; figures for England show no substantial difference. Bread remained a major item in the budget, but lower cereal prices made it possible for families to shift their spending to other food items, such as eggs, cheese, noodles, sugar, jam, and coffee. All but the poorest families consumed some meat. Even the bread consumed by the masses of Europeans changed. The long coveted white bread of wealthy consumers became the norm by the end of the century. Throughout Europe, consumption of wine, beer, and spirits, in both public and private drinking rituals, increased.

A greater variety of food items in the family budget can be seen among the rural classes as well. At mid-century, peasants in some regions of France, for example, prepared daily meals that were a meager combination of black bread and *la soupe* (gruel, porridge, or, in some cases, just water with salt or fat added). Improved conditions by the end of the century might mean rye bread, potatoes, milk and cheese, soup with some fat, and, on Sundays, a bit of beef in the stew. A good meal, which everywhere included meat and wine, remained, however, an event to be remembered. Consumption of meat remained pitifully low outside of cities. The average city dweller consumed about 60 kilograms of meat per year while their rural counterpart was limited to about 22 kilograms per year. Continued reliance on grains could still bring disastrous results for rural residents as the harvest failures and horrifying famine of 1891–1892 in Russia attests.

Above all it was the increased consumption of meat that was revolutionary during these years with the floor on per capita consumption varying between

14 and 20 kilograms per year in places like France and Germany. Improvements in diet for both the rural and urban classes before World War I, however, were relative, judged from a low standard of evaluation. The consumption of milk and fresh fruits and vegetables among working families remained low. One study in 1904 found that 33 percent of English children were undernourished. While the bulk of Europeans consumed a greater variety of foods, malnutrition remained a common problem, particularly among women and children. Women often deprived themselves of nutrition when there was not enough food for the family. Shortages and high food prices, as in earlier times, could still lead to protest. In urban areas these disturbances were frequently incorporated into trade union activity and seen as a more general protest against the high cost of living.

Continued technological advances increased yields and led to a marked, although uneven, improvement in the European diet by the twentieth century. The combination of agricultural change, improvements in transportation, and the cultivation of new land put

an end to the cycles of famine that ravaged Europe in earlier periods. Shortages were not, however, a thing of the past. Hunger was widespread once again during World War I and World War II. During World War I, for example, near starvation conditions were reached in many countries by 1917, and food riots became a recurring event throughout the war years. These were man-made disasters: the result of wartime inflation, inefficient government policy, shortages of fertilizer, and hoarding of agricultural commodities.

Other developments affected European eating patterns in the twentieth century. The variety and number of restaurants increased. In Britain, fish-and-chips outlets provided new eating opportunities for the working class from the 1920s onward, a sign of new consumerism in the area of food. Beginning among the middle classes, particularly among women, there was an increased preoccupation with dieting or restraint in eating. In France this concern began to emerge in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Warnings about overeating and the need to discipline children's appetites proliferated. The decline of corsetry and the adoption of more revealing fashions made discipline of the body more and more desirable. Although rural regions and the working classes were somewhat exempt from these intense concerns, hostility to obesity ran high.

Dwindling numbers of traditional peasant farms in the West, the tragic results of Soviet collectivized farming, and the potential problems of genetically engineered crops have generated new discussions among

historians, economists, and policy makers over the relationship between economic modernization and nutritional choices in Europe. Without a doubt, the shift to an industrial economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries dramatically altered the history of food in Europe. Fast food, frozen dinners, and American soft drinks—all industrial food products—are now ubiquitous. Twenty-six percent of all restaurant meals in France were taken at fast-food outlets by 1990. Widespread, too, is a rich regional diversity in cooking techniques and gastronomic traditions that has developed in response to culinary homogenization. Uniformity at some levels of food production has not destroyed a rich tradition of diversity in food consumption. While speed of eating probably increased—the two-hour lunch began to decline in places like France and Spain, in favor of greater efficiency at work—Europeans resisted some American patterns. EuroDisney (opened in 1992 and later renamed Disneyland Paris) near Paris initially expected American-style willingness to snack at all hours, but the assumption proved wrong: European visitors wanted set meal hours, with wine and beer, and the Disney approach had to be adapted for their preferences. In a more serious vein, strong protests in the 1990s directed against American and other imports and against genetically altered foods demonstrated Europeans' fear of losing control over what they ate. Social historians have only begun to chronicle the unfolding story of culinary "traditions" and dietary transmutations of an ever-changing Europe.

See also other articles in this section.

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ANIMALS AND PETS



Kathleen J. Kete

In 1974 the *Journal of Social History* published a spoof on the history of pet keeping. “Household Pets and Urban Alienation” by “Charles Phineas” was a satire of the kinds of subjects Ph.D. programs were producing in the 1970s when social historians began to pay attention to the history of everyday life. In the same decade, however, a number of books and articles appeared which established the importance of attitudes toward animals in European, especially British and French, social history.

These studies make it clear that attitudes toward animals played an important part in the building of a sense of social identity in modernizing Europe. The history of Europeans’ relationship to animals can be placed at times within a “left,” and at times within a “right” political narrative of history. What is significant is the constancy of the role of these attitudes in charting a shifting line between an “us” and a “them”—a line of exclusion that runs through the Puritan, bourgeois, feminist, nationalist, and even Nazi revolutions.

ANIMALS IN MODERNIZING EUROPE

Europeans had a greater acquaintance with animals in early modern times than had been the case in the Middle Ages. A rise in the numbers of domesticated animals went along with the agricultural revolution that began in Holland and England in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Enclosure allowed for sheep farming and experimentation with new crops, some of which like alfalfa fixed nitrogen in the soil, some of which like turnips and clover provided fodder for animals. For the first time, it was no longer necessary to slaughter pigs and cows in the autumn. A motif of medieval art and culture was becoming obsolete.

Economic modernization initially shifted the ratio of animals to people in favor of animals. As Keith Thomas points out in *Man and the Natural World*, in the early 1500s there were three sheep for every one person in England. Animals and people lived in close

proximity whether in the archaic longhouse, which contained humans and large domestic animals under one roof, or the increasingly common farmhouse. Although farmhouses primarily sheltered humans, they also warmed hens, lambs, calves, and goats. Jonas Frykman and Orvar Löfgren in *Culture Builders* present the observations of a sixteenth-century German merchant who visits a Swedish peasant farm. He bedded down on the farmhouse floor, and what seems to have bothered him most was being licked in the face during the night by hungry juvenile pigs. Young adults and family servants typically slept in barns in some rural areas into the twentieth century.

Urbanization in modernizing Europe also brought animals and people together. Authorities throughout early modern Europe legislated uselessly against the keeping of pigs within town walls. Alexander Cowan in *Urban Europe, 1500–1700* describes the failure of Philip II’s administration to do so in Valladolid in the 1560s. In *Man and the Natural World*, Thomas explains how pigs caused fires and attacked children in English towns into the nineteenth century. Many sources note how cows were kept for milk and fowl were raised for eggs and meat. As cities grew so did the presence of the horse in the city. The waste products of all these animals joined with that of humans to foul the streets. So, too, did offal from the carcasses of animals slaughtered for meat.

Animals figured in the recreations of both urban and rural people. The so-called blood sports of modernizing Europe include cock throwing, cockfighting, dogfighting, bull baiting, and bull running which were conducted in villages, towns, fairgrounds—sites associated with festivities and drinking. They also include hunting, which was reserved by law for the elite and which will be discussed below. In Europe these sports triggered the first conflict between social groups over the treatment of animals, resulting in Europe’s first animal protection law, the Protectorate Ordinance of 1654, promulgated during the radical Puritan stage of the English Civil War. The Ordinance of 1654 banned cockfighting and cock throwing. It also

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set the terms for continued debate on the proper treatment of animals in England.

Cock throwing was a game that traditionally took place on Shrove Tuesday and at other festive occasions. The game began with tethering a cock to a stake with about a foot or two of slack in the tether. Contestants took turns throwing clubs at the cock until it was dead. Bull baiting was much like cock throwing. The bull was tethered with a rope long enough to provide mobility. Dogs were set upon the bull until it was weakened and bloodied from fighting. The bull then was slaughtered.

Bull baiting was said to tenderize the meat of these male animals, as did bull running, it was believed. Bull running took an entire day and was a townwide event. A bull was set loose, then was beaten by people, and chased by dogs through the streets of the town. At the end of the day, it was slaughtered for meat. Traditional recreations merged with the ritual slaughter of animals in the case of cock throwing, bull baiting, and bull running. In each case, these practices began to appear in the historical record as they were about to disappear from daily life.

An argument against these practices had been forwarded by the Puritans as early as the mid-sixteenth century, as Puritanism resonated with a more generally developing middle-class view. Blood sports and other popular recreations were associated with idleness and drunkenness. They profaned the Sabbath. They turned people away from their duties to God and society. Moreover, the Puritan reading of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden led to a recognition that humans owed it to animals not to enjoy or increase their suffering, a suffering which had become their lot after Adam's sin. In their sense of being lords of creation as revealed in Genesis 1 ("you will have dominion over the earth and the animals in it"), the European West began, with the Puritans, to develop notions of good stewardship over the earth and animals in it.

The Puritan argument was countered by the early Stuarts. James I issued the King's Declaration of Sports in 1618, which was reissued by Charles I in 1633. The *Book of Sports* was a defense of traditional recreations, and its insistence that these lay outside the purview of reform continued as the argument of some gentry and some rural poor into the nineteenth century and, with respect to hunting, throughout the twentieth century. The *Book of Sports* helped trigger a Puritan revolt against the state while Puritan interference in everyday life became a leitmotif of resistance to Puritan revolution.

The Ordinance of 1654 was overturned in the Restoration. Middle-class opinion in the next century,

however, continued to form against blood sports. The valorization of happiness and benevolence expressed in latitudinarianism and more generally in Enlightenment thought was helping to shape middle-class attitudes toward animals in England. Robert Malcolmson in *Popular Recreations in English Society* shows how repulsion to these sports was expressed in the municipal press. By the end of the eighteenth century many towns were enforcing ordinances against cock throwing and bull baiting. Municipal ordinances were followed in 1835 with the Cruelty to Animals Act, which outlawed the "running, baiting, or fighting" of any animal.

One important shift in the pattern suggested by the mobilization of middle-class reformism against elite and popular conservatism in modernizing England occurred in Stamford in the 1830s. There middle-class opinion turned against the abolition of bull running when the London-based Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) backed by the royal army forces mounted an attack on Stamford's bull running. The formation and the history of the RSPCA in the nineteenth century will be discussed below. Here it is seen that in England lines of conflict over the treatment of animals could be shaped not only by class but by a divide between the state and local traditions in ways that echo the conflict between London and the counties in the age of civil war and revolution.

On the Continent animal pain was also a part of traditional celebrations. Robert Darnton explains in *The Great Cat Massacre* how the "rough music" of a charivari could be produced by skinning a live cat. Cats also fared poorly in May Day and summer solstice festivities. Because they were associated with witchcraft, they were burned alive on maypoles or bonfires, their dying cries part of the fun. When it came to the problem of animals, however, the focus of reformers within the French elite and those surrounding the enlightened despots of Prussia, Russia, and Austria was to effect an agricultural revolution on the model of England's, that is, to improve the progress of animal husbandry and increase yields of grain. It was not until the nineteenth century that middle- and upper-class distance from lower-class cruelty to animals was institutionalized along British lines in animal protection societies. Meanwhile, early Enlightenment thought in France had produced two lines of argument about the relationship of humans to animals whose effects would linger in modern European culture. For followers of Montaigne, a lover of cats, animals were feeling creatures, akin in this way to humans. For followers of Descartes, animals could also be understood as living machines, sensate but unfeeling, whose secrets could be discovered through experimentation.

HUNTING IN MODERNIZING EUROPE

The patterns of social conflict associated with hunting in early modern Europe are distinct from those formed over the practice of popular blood sports. In England and on the continent hunting was reserved for the landed elites. The rural poor were allied in this issue with urban elites, not in opposition to hunting but in resentment of their exclusion from the sport. By the end of the eighteenth century, the romantic movement was developing an argument against hunting based on empathy with animal pain but, for the most part, notions of cruelty to animals were absent from the conflicts over hunting in early modern Europe.

Hunting and aristocracy. In the Middle Ages hunting was a type of practice warfare for the nobility. By the twelfth century forests were being reserved by important nobles and royalty for hunting. Although game could be a precious source of protein in the premodern economy, it is the political and cultural function of hunting that historians stress. In an age that depended on increasing the amount of arable land to expand the production of grain, the preservation of forests, or fragments of forests in deer parks,

was an exercise of power. The Robin Hood legends indicate the resentments that the royal forest law in England could trigger among those excluded from its benefits.

Hunting as an enduring attribute of monarchy is made clear in the biographies of the early modern monarchs of England and France. Even in old age Elizabeth I would go shooting. James I liked to bathe his arms in the steaming blood of a dying deer then anoint the faces of his entourage with its hot blood. Louis XIV's hunting parties appear frequently in the memoirs of the duc de Saint-Simon. It is in this context that Louis XVI's journal entry for 14 July 1789 makes sense. Simon Schama explains in *Citizens* that his entry, "rien" ("nothing") tells us not that the king was out of touch with one of the most important revolutionary events but that he was disappointed at not being able to hunt that day. His comment passes for premonition, for three weeks later, on the night of 4 August 1789, the hunting privileges of the noble elite were abolished along with all other aspects of feudalism.

Hunting had been a privilege of the ruling class since the establishment of manorialism. In France the exclusive right of the lord of the manor to hunt on peasant's land was one of the remnants of a system

that economic modernity was making obsolete. Tocqueville points out in *The Old Régime and the French Revolution* that the right of the lord of the manor to hunt on peasants' fields was like the *banalité*—which included the obligations of peasants to use the lord's ovens and mills—less punishing in and of itself than as a reminder of an anachronistic system of power relations. Hunting's importance in defining social relations in rural France is indicated by the fact that it was both closely guarded by the nobility and contested by the peasantry. Isser Woloch in *Eighteenth-Century Europe* points to the prevalence throughout eighteenth-century Europe of poaching as a form of social protest. He also explains that complaints against the hunting privileges of the nobility were among the most frequent in the *cahiers de doléances*, the list of grievances solicited by the king on the eve of the French Revolution.

Poaching continued in France after the Revolution when it was redefined as a property crime. A permit system in the 1830s was designed by the state to combat the problem. But as Eugen Weber notes in *Peasants into Frenchmen*, hunting offenses remained more common than theft in rural areas through much of the century. At the same time, however, the romantic tide was turning some of the great landowners against hunting. Witness the romantic poet and revolutionary Alphonse de Lamartine's lament for a dying deer in his poem, "*Mon dernier coup de fusil*" ("My last shot").

In the German states and in Russia where serfdom hardened during the eighteenth century, hunting also marked power relations. The obligations of serfs included the beating of game, that is the obligation to process en masse through fields, woods, and underbrush driving game forward into clearings to be slaughtered by nobles. Readers of *War and Peace* will remember its wolf-hunting scene. David Blackburn suggests in *The Long Nineteenth Century* that even in areas where the ties of serfdom were loosest, the hunting rights of the nobility were tightly held on to.

For the most part, early modern hunting on the Continent was a male pursuit although, as W. H. Bruford relates in *Germany in the Eighteenth Century*, German ladies were sometimes invited along to pigstickings.

Hunting in early modern England. In England conflicts over hunting were more complicated. Rural capitalism was destroying the medieval manor as urban capitalism was the guilds. By the eighteenth century London was the center of a commercial empire poised to dominate the globe. It is in this context of emerging capitalism that the game laws of early mod-

ern England and the opposition they generated can be understood. Though all English game laws were oppressive to the lower classes, it is the Game Law of 1671 that historians see as introducing class conflict into the arena of hunting.

The Game Law of 1671 followed the political logic of the seventeenth century in that it displaced the monarch as sole owner and protector of game by including in that definition the landed gentry. The gentry could hunt freely throughout the countryside (subject to a weak law of trespass) and they were charged with protecting game through the employment of gamekeepers and the enforcing of the game law through their offices of justices of the peace.

For P. B. Munsche, writing in *Gentlemen and Poachers: The English Game Laws, 1671–1831*, it is significant that urban elites—those merchant capitalist investors in the East and West India Companies who had previously joined with the gentry in resisting absolutism—were excluded by the game law from hunting. The game law qualified only large landowners, not those wealthy from mobile wealth. Munsche argues that the new law must be aimed at this group as the status of the lower classes with respect to hunting remained untouched by the law—that is, the penalties for poaching remained the same, a fine of about a day's wages for rural workers.

In Munsche's view the function of the game law was to enhance the social position of the gentry at the expense of the urban bourgeoisie, held to be responsible for the excesses of the revolution. Merchants were often Dissenters. More vaguely, but importantly, city life was associated with modernity, newness, rootlessness, and change. The importance of hunting in early modern England is that it allowed country gentlemen to build a positive social identity. Their exclusive association with hunting let them assert themselves as simple, natural, and English, a political move that shaped the divide between Tory and Whig in the Hanoverian century.

For Douglas Hay, whose "Poaching and the Game Laws on Cannock Chase" appears in *Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England*, the meaning of the game law lies in its enforcement, especially after the mid-eighteenth century when amendments made penalties for poaching harsher. Whipping, hard labor for night poaching in lieu of stiff fines, and by 1800 transportation for this offense were possible. The killing of deer in a park, that is, in an enclosed area, was punishable by death. Hay analyzed the application of the game laws on Cannock Chase, a great estate belonging to the Paget family. The laws were aggressively enforced through gamekeepers. They were also universally resisted by

villagers. Unlike a crime of property which could alienate the perpetrator from the community, the hunting of game on land once viewed as commons was understood as morally right though legally wrong. Hay shows how villagers protected poachers from Paget's gamekeepers. Poaching, Hay shows, was—like wrecking, smuggling, arson, and rioting—a community crime, a form of protest, a way of building social identity among rural wage workers who were no longer feudal but not yet fully modern and class conscious.

In rural England one defined oneself in terms of one's relationship to hunting. Hay and Munsche would both agree. For Hay, unlike Munsche, the defining divide was between patricians—gentry and merchants—and plebeians, the working poor of rural and urban England. The game laws were part of a criminal code, a theater of power, based on the strategic deployment of penalties of capital punishment and transportation, which throughout England maintained the dominance of the propertied over the poor.

In any case, capitalism helped destroy the Game Law of 1671 and its amendments. Poaching was found to be fueled by the demand for game on the part of the urban elite; that is, game poached from the gentry found its way to the urban gullet. The status of game was such that it had become a necessary part of a gentleman's table and of a tavern menu by the early nineteenth century. The Game Reform Law of 1831, which opened hunting to anyone with a permit, was promulgated in part to increase the legal supply of game and make poaching less attractive and lucrative. In this it failed. In its other purpose, however, the law was more successful. Equalizing access to hunting by including professionals, doctors, lawyers, civil servants—nineteenth-century young professionals, such as one finds in the pages of Anthony Trollope novels—encouraged the adoption of Tory attitudes toward animals as the national attitude.

In a theme that strengthens as the nineteenth century wears on, Englishness comes to be set apart from other cultures by its special relationship toward nature. The democratization of hunting also results in the gentry finding new ways to express their status with respect to animals. The raising of prize pigs and cows is satirized in the endearing figures of Lord Empworth and his pig in the novels of P. G. Wodehouse and analyzed in the *The Animal Estate* by Harriet Ritvo.

ANIMAL PROTECTION IN MODERN EUROPE

In the nineteenth century attitudes toward animals took on unprecedented political importance. This is

true for England especially, where the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals shaped both public opinion and public policy. Tocqueville indirectly signaled the importance of animal protection societies in *Democracy in America* when he spoke to the importance to liberal democracy of intermediate bodies between state and people. The RSPCA stands out as one of the most successful of European voluntary associations. Brian Harrison notes in *Peaceable Kingdom* that its legislative achievements both “reflected and enhanced their influence” (p. 84).

Animal protection societies were formed throughout Europe and the United States along the model of the British. The most important European society after the British was the French Société Protectrice des Animaux, founded in 1845. Societies were also formed in the German states and in Switzerland in the late 1830s and 1840s. The German cities of Dresden, Nürnberg, Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich, and Hanover established societies. In Switzerland, Berne, Basle, Zurich, Lausanne, Lucerne, and Geneva did so, too. According to Ulrich Tröhler and Andreas-Holger Maehle in “Anti-vivisection in Nineteenth-Century Germany and Switzerland,” a German national organization, the Verband der Tierschutzvereine des Deutschen Reiches, in the early 1880s included more than 150 local animal protection societies. The Swedish national society was founded in 1875.

Marx specifically noted the role of animal protection societies within bourgeois Europe. In *The Communist Manifesto* he grouped them with other humanitarian organizations under the rubric of “Conservative, or Bourgeois Socialism.” Marx saw the universalism of bourgeois culture at work in organizations whose object was the reform of lower-class behavior. “Members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals . . . like temperance fanatics, . . . organizers of charity, . . . improvers of the condition of the working class,” Marx wrote, “wish for a bourgeoisie without a proletariat. The bourgeoisie naturally conceives the world in which it is supreme to be the best.”

The transmission of bourgeois values was openly a goal of legislation prohibiting public violence to animals on the streets of urban Europe. To be kind to animals came to stand high in the index of civilization. It formed part of the project of civilization. The barbarian other—the urban working classes, continental peasants, southern Europeans, Catholic Ireland, Russians, Asians, and Turks—was defined in part by its brutality to beasts.

Animal protection in England and France. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was

founded in 1824 in London. Its founders and early members included evangelical humanitarians but also Anglican ministers, Irish M.P.s, utilitarian radicals, and socially prominent Jews. One of the most important of these was William Wilberforce, otherwise famous for leading the campaign for the abolition of slavery in the British empire.

Throughout the century the society attracted royal and aristocratic patrons including Queen Victoria whose support explains its name change to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in 1840. Members of Parliament could be called upon for advice and information. Its members included a large number of women from among the social elite. Harrison in *Peaceable Kingdom* credits its informal manipulation of the political system with its success in effecting legislation and changing attitudes toward animals. The RSPCA also developed a force of lower-class, paid constables who were highly disciplined and uniformed. Inspectors, whose job it was to discover and prosecute infractions of the animal protection law, wore badges from 1838, armbands from 1853, and hats and capes from 1856.

The first major achievement of the animal protection movement in England, however, preceded the formation of the SPCA. Martin's Act of 1822 was sponsored by Wilberforce, Thomas Fowell Buxton, and Richard Martin. Buxton, like Wilberforce, was an evangelical. Martin was an M.P. for Galway—"high-living" and "hard-drinking" according to James Turner's description in *Reckoning with the Beast*. The disparity in temperament and political orientation among the sponsors of the bill is an indication of how broadly shared among the British elite the new attitude toward animals had become. Martin's Act prohibited public cruelty toward horses and cows and most other farm and draft animals (though not bulls). Its significance lay in the fact that the law looked at animal cruelty from the point of view of animal pain, not the harm to or destruction of property.

Some observers noted that animals were protected by law in England before slavery was abolished and before children were protected from the worst exploitations of the factory system. The SPCA was accused of humanitarian inconsistency. It is true that only in 1833 were children under nine prohibited from working in factories and the work hours of older children regulated. Although the slave trade was abolished in 1807, slavery itself throughout the empire was abolished only in 1833. It is clear, however, that the protection of animals against public cruelty was part of an expansive process of reform. Martin's Act of 1822 and the more inclusive Animal Protection Act of 1835, which included dogs and cats—and like the

temperance movement, the ragged school movement, the first suffrage reform act of 1833—were responses to the advance of capitalism. In a more general way they were a part of that modernization of state and society that characterizes English culture in the first half of the nineteenth century.

It would be a mistake, however, to see the origins of the animal protection movement in industrialization per se. Not only did the movement to protect animals from cruelty begin in the seventeenth century but industrialization itself did not distance the English from animals. Ponies were used in mines, horses along canals and for the building of railroads. Horses provided transportation in cities for most of the century, and dogs pulled carts in London until 1839 and until 1854 elsewhere. The cavalry remained a basic unit of armies until World War I. Veterinary schools were founded to train people to treat horse and livestock diseases.

The animal protection movement in the nineteenth century is a chapter in the history of violence. It is only indirectly related to a romantic view of nature. It had an obvious though not exclusive class dimension. An outburst of anger, for instance, on the part of a London cabdriver that results in his beating to death an old weak horse on a London street is a recurring image of animal protection literature. From the point of view of the RSPCA and its sympathizers, it was a dangerously irrational act. Beating a dying horse will not make it work. Those who are vicious to animals will be murderous to others. From the point of view of workers and their advocates, however, the attempt to get a cab moving again is desperately rational, as Anna Sewall made clear in *Black Beauty* (1877). Fares were needed for survival.

The RSPCA attacked the recreations as well as the livelihoods of the London poor. Dogfights as well as dogcarts were objects of attacks, but foxhunting by the professional and landed classes was left alone. Violence was sequestered, hidden away from the view of those susceptible to its pernicious influence. This explains the attempt in the first part of the nineteenth century to move London slaughterhouses to the periphery of the city, so the sights and sounds of dying animals would not disturb neighborhood life. Two principles informed the animal protection movement in the nineteenth century. The first was familiar to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century reformers: We have a duty to God to treat well each of his creatures who are dependent upon us. People should not cause animals unnecessary pain. The second was the need to quarantine violence, because like disease, it "communicates an immoral contagion of the worst and most virulent kind among those who witness it." Here

Harrison in *Peaceable Kingdom* (page 120) is quoting the Bishop of St. David's at the 1846 annual meeting of the RSPCA.

In France a similar constellation of socialites, enthusiasts, middle-class reformers, and members of the political left as well as the right formed the Société Protectrice des Animaux. Its targets were similar to those of the British society—vicious cabbies and carters, slaughterhouses, and the treatment of animals by the rural poor. The target in peasant France was less the recreational use of animals than more pragmatic practices—the snaring of many little birds for food, the beating to death of unwanted dogs.

The first major achievement of the SPA was the Grammont Law of 1850, which prohibited public cruelty toward animals. In the aftermath of the Revolution of 1848, the National Assembly could be counted on to be receptive to arguments linking familiarity with violence to animals to criminal and radical political behavior among the *misérables* of Paris.

The second major success of the SPA was the integration of its principles within the national school system. Under the Second Empire, the Ministry of Education was persuaded to present a medal and prize money each year to the schoolteacher who best taught kindness to animals to students. This practice was continued under the Third Republic, an indication of how mainstream these attitudes toward animals were

among the political elite. Effectiveness was demonstrated by student essays on the subject of kindness to animals—"I used to destroy birds' nests but now know birds are mothers too"—that were forwarded to prefects and then to the minister of education in Paris. The National Archives retains copies of some of these essays, showing how love of animals became part of the catechism of the Third Republic and the Grammont law part of the Ferry reform of education.

In France as in England kindness to animals was equated with Atlantic civilization. Both the SPA and the RSPCA conducted crusades against Spanish bullfighting and inquiries into Arab disdain for dogs. As we will see in the discussion on antivivisection, however, this moral high ground was maintained by the British in their attack on French methods of physiology from the 1870s on.

PET KEEPING

New attitudes toward animals were focused by many people on pets. During the early modern period small dogs, cats, and monkeys had been kept as pets by members of the prosperous classes. This practice became obvious in the seventeenth century when Charles II was shown being openly demonstrative to his spaniels and Dutch genre painters depicted small animals as part of the material and symbolic apparatus

of everyday life. Pets in this period, however, were considered luxury objects. Ladies' lap dogs (spaniels and pugs) had sometimes negative connotations of indolence and sexuality, and an association with aristocratic excess.

Most canine types were only roughly distinguished in terms of function. Johannus Caius's list of Tudor dogs, translated from Latin in 1576 as *Of English Dogges*, discussed seventeen varieties, which were divided into three categories according to their function: hunting and ladies' dogs, shepherds and guard dogs, and menial working dogs like spit turners. Hunting dogs included ordinary hounds and royal greyhounds in France. On the eve of the nineteenth century, very few breeds were distinguished as such. Ritvo in *The Animal Estate* notes the foxhound as an exception in England and points out that other breeds familiar to eighteenth-century people, such as the bulldog and collie, were transformed by nineteenth-century breeders. By the end of the century French experts could describe two hundred varieties of dogs. The British, more prudent here, recognized sixty

breeds, described and monitored by the newly formed British Kennel Club.

It was not until the eighteenth century in England, and the nineteenth century in France, that dogs began to take on their modern aspect of emotional necessities. Sources for the development of pet keeping include a tax on dogs in eighteenth-century London that chart an increase in the numbers of non-working dogs—that is, dogs kept for pleasure and not for spit-turning, or for use in dogcarts, or as watchdogs. In France a tax on dogs in 1855 provoked middle-class protest indicative of the new attitude toward pets. Nonworking dogs, or pets, were to be taxed at a higher rate than working, useful dogs, like shepherds and guide dogs. In the law's eyes, pets were luxury objects. Like hunting dogs, they were for the rich. The tax was a sumptuary law meant to discourage pet ownership by the poor. Criticism of the tax in Second Empire Paris, however, centered, as Kathleen Kete shows in *The Beast in the Boudoir*, on the usefulness of pets. Pets were seen by the bourgeoisie as being integral to family life. They protected the home emotionally and physically. They were friends in need to the desolate.

Pet keeping in the form that became known in the twentieth century was established in France and Britain in the nineteenth century. There the dog became a cliché of family life. The rituals of pet keeping were also formed. Pet care books were written, dog and cat shows were established, and dog food companies formed. Spratt's Patent was the first commercial dog food. Boarding kennels, dog hospitals, and shops specializing in collars, leashes, and clothes were advertised to the middle classes. So, too, were stories about faithful family pets. Lord Byron's epitaph to his Newfoundland, "All the virtues of Man, without his vices" (1808) was reproduced on gravestones at the Parisian pet cemetery and at other final resting places. Pets by this point had clearly entered the history of the family, including changes in emotional emphases and, probably, the declining birthrate.

In this area, too, we find the nineteenth-century middle and upper classes monopolizing the virtue of kindness to animals. As Kete explains in *The Beast in the Boudoir*, dog care books imagined the pet as middle class. Clean, virtuous, and devoted, middle-class pets were contrasted with the dogs of workers, which, it was claimed, were abused, dirty, violent, and promiscuous. Animal refuges were in part established to rescue dogs from working-class violence.

Cats were less popular than dogs in the nineteenth century, though they attracted some enthusiastic admirers. In France their association with bohemian life set them in contrast to dogs, who were solidly bourgeois. In middle-class homes, birds were kept in cages, and plants in greenhouses and terrariums. The aquarium was invented and became wildly popular in the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s.

By the twentieth century pet keeping was commonplace. At the turn of the twenty-first century, class biases no longer shape its practices as pets have become firmly a part of everyday life.

ANTIVIVISECTION

The issues of animal protection and the nineteenth century's love of pets come together in the antivivisection movement of the last third of the century. Vivisection—that is, experimenting on live animals to understand the mechanisms of the liver, the pancreas, the spleen, and other organs—was developed particularly by French and German physiologists. One of the most important in France was Claude Bernard, whose *Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine* was widely influential. Vivisectionists operated mainly on small animals, though sometimes horses were used in veterinary schools. Because of the availability and size of dogs, they were favored animals of vivisectionists.

The image of the faithful and loving family dog begging for his life in the laboratory of the vivisectionist was favored in antivivisectionist propaganda. The fear that the family pet, when lost, would end up on the vivisection table frightened children well into the twentieth century.

The antivivisection movement was important in western Europe from the 1870s to World War I. It was, first of all, an expression of conflict within the elite over the purpose of science and possibilities of its regulation. The question of whether scientists should be regulated was debated in Britain, France, and Germany. In Bismarckian Germany, antivivisectionists from the conservative and center opposition repeatedly petitioned the Reichstag in the 1880s and 1890s to abolish vivisection, but to no avail. The practice was left to the discretion of German scientists until the Nazi takeover. In Britain the Act to Amend the Law Relating to Cruelty to Animals in 1876 was the world's first restriction of vivisection by establishing a licensing requirement. Hostile public opinion forced the reopening of debate on vivisection, however. Both sides maintained a very active propaganda war until 1912, when the Royal Commission on Vivisection's final report upheld the practice of vivisection but subjected it to legal control. In France the question of whether to restrict vivisection was studied by the Academy of Medicine and by a committee of the SPA. As in Germany, and unlike in Britain, vivisection remained self-regulated in France in the nineteenth century.

In England and France within the established animal protection societies, there was a consensus that vivisection could be allowed if animals were caused no unnecessary pain and the use of anesthesia was urged. French scientists were dependent on vivisection to an extent that the British refused to be. Protests against visits of French physiologists to Britain became debates over the costs of modernity with British public opinion granting the English once again superiority in the realm of kindness to animals.

Vivisection stimulated an examination of the relationship between scientists and the state. More dramatically, it raised questions about women's roles and about the meaning of being female. Antivivisection is linked, therefore, to the development of feminism in the late nineteenth century. Some historians suggest that the antivivisection movement empowered women by providing them with leadership positions in volunteer organizations and a voice in the public sphere. Within the RSPCA and the SPA women played a largely decorative or behind-the-scenes role. But the leadership of antivivisection societies included very effective women. The Victoria Street Society for

the Protection of Animals from Vivisection (established in 1876) was led by Frances Power Cobbe—already famous for her propaganda war in Florence against the German physiologist Moritz Schiff. Marie Huot and Maria Deraismes in France led the Ligue Populaire Contre les Abus de la Vivisection. Within the SPA the issue of vivisection moved ordinarily demure female members to speak out in opposition to it. Marie-Espérance von Schwartz, an ally of Ernst von Weber who founded the Internationale Gesellschaft zur Bekämpfung der Wissenschaftlichen Thierfolter (International Society for Combat against Scientific Torture of Animals) in 1879, was a member of its directing committee.

Mary Ann Elston, in “Women and Antivivisection in Victorian England, 1870–1900,” points to the influence of women within the RSPCA, however. By establishing animal refuges, they saved dogs from hardhearted workers in mid-century and from evil scientists in the last part of the century. And, of course, men were leaders in the antivivisection movement, too. Its strongest supporters in England included men on both sides of the question of woman suffrage. In Germany its most famous supporter may have been Richard Wagner, who, as Tröhler and Maehle note, famously claimed not to want to live in a world “in which ‘no dog would wish to live any longer.’”

Some women claimed an identification with animals mistreated by scientists, an identification that galvanized feminist consciousness. Women, like animals, were at the mercy of male rationalism. As Coral Lansbury asserts in *The Old Brown Dog*, Claude Bernard himself had “described nature as a woman who must be forced to unveil herself when she is attacked by the experimenter, who must be put to the question and subdued” (p. 163). In antivivisection imagery as well, the vivisector appears as a sexual predator, sadistically enjoying a perverse pleasure in causing prostrate animals pain. This is the image that appears in *Gemma or: Virtue and Vice* by Marie-Espérance von Schwartz, in *The Beth Book* by Sarah Grand, and in other works which Coral Lansbury, in *The Old Brown Dog*, compares with pornography.

The antivivisection movement emphasized the importance of feeling, rather than the use of scientific method, as a guide to understanding. It thus could serve as an interrogation of materialism, a rethinking of the aims and means of science. But the identification of women with animals abused by male science drew upon essentialist notions of female identity. It spoke to conventional binaries—woman and nature, men and culture, feminine emotion and masculine reason—and to an important degree served a conser-

vative role. The antivivisection movement included suffragists in England, but also antisuffragists and conservatives in Bismarckian Germany.

For those involved in either promoting or opposing the antivivisection movement, society could seem divided into ruthless men of science and women, whose maternal roles of childbearing and nurturing gave them a special affinity with the world of nature and allowed them to critique the experimental method. In Germany, especially, this critique of materialism came to focus on Jews as well. In the minds of German and Swiss antivivisectionists, it was Jewish doctors who practiced vivisection and “Jewish” attitudes toward animals that allowed it. Arthur Schopenhauer had argued earlier in the century that, as Tröhler and Maehle put it, “it was time that the ‘Jewish’ view regarding animals came to an end” (p. 151). For anti-Semites like Wagner, this “Jewish” attitude was expressed in both vivisection and kosher butchering. (Its reverse, vegetarianism, was strongly promoted in Bayreuth.) The journal of the German antivivisection movement, *Their- und Menschenfreund*, as Tröhler and Maehle note, strongly supported the abolition of kosher butchering—which was achieved in Switzerland in 1893 and by the Nazis in 1933. The image of the kosher butcher practicing a private, bloody, orgiastic rite was much like the image of the vivisector, as a viewing of the Nazi propaganda film *The Eternal Jew* makes clear.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRENDS IN ANIMAL PROTECTION

Keith Thomas speaks in *Man and the Natural World* of the dethronement of humans, a process that begins in early modern Europe and continues through the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century the abandonment of the principle of the sanctity of human life and the hierarchy it presumes led to a radical right and a radical left rethinking of the relationship between humans and animals.

In “Understanding Nazi Animal Protection and the Holocaust,” Arnold Arluke and Boria Sax discuss Nazi animal protection legislation in the context of the Nazi revolution of state and society. One of the first laws passed by the Nazis in April 1933 prohibited kosher butchering. Soon afterward, vivisection was first abolished, then restricted. Nazi animal protection extended far beyond these two overtly anti-Semitic acts, however. Laws covered the treatment of lobster and shellfish by cooks. To reduce their suffering, lobsters were to be thrown only one by one into rapidly boiling water. Another provision protected horses that

were being shoed. Endangered species such as bears, bison, and wild horses were protected.

Nazi animal protection legislation was not much more comprehensive than the British, Arluke and Sax point out, but clearly the Nazi understanding of the relationship between humans and animals was profoundly distinct from traditional European beliefs. Nazism “obliterated . . . moral distinctions” between animals and people, Arluke and Sax explain, a principle that allowed for a reordering of the chain of being. Some animal species rested above some human “races.” So Aryans, German shepherds—“deliberately bred to represent and embody the spirit of National Socialism” (p. 14)—beasts of prey, and Teutonic acorn-eating pigs were far superior to subhuman “races.” Jews were vermin that needed to be killed, as 6 million were in the death camps and in the German-invaded villages of eastern Europe.

The Nazi understanding of the natural world stands in contrast to that of the Soviets, who maintained Marx’s nineteenth-century understanding of humans as being distinct from other animals by their control of the environment. The Soviet destruction of the environment of large parts of eastern Europe, made apparent after the fall of communism, warns against a naive celebration of this view as well.

The Animal Liberation movement of the 1970s renewed debate about the social meaning of the human relationship to animals. Peter Singer’s *Animal Liberation* compared speciesism (a neologism) to racism and sexism. In each case, he argued, arbitrary characteristics were the signal for discrimination. In the case of the human species our ability to reason is our excuse to oppress other species. In the animal liberation movement of the 1970s and 1980s in Europe, antivivisection again became a cause. Protestors in-

vestigated animal research at university and private laboratories. Older causes, such as the transportation of animals to slaughter, were taken up in England by the Compassion in World Farming (CIWF) group.

The most important development of the late twentieth century may have been the global dimension of the environmental movement, which recognized the importance of consumer pressure on international trading practices and was captured in media images of demonstrators (in Oxford in 1997, for example) dressed as trees, skunks, butterflies, and squirrels.

But older themes as well as older issues prevailed in the late-twentieth-century animal protection movement. Hilda Kean notes in *Animal Rights* that in the CIWF campaign against Parisian Muslims’ slaughter of sheep for the festival of Eid el Kebir, the British provenance of the sheep figured strongly. Kean notes, too, that recent campaigns against vivisection in England highlighted the fact that the animals used in British laboratories were imported from southern Europe, southeast Asia, and the Caribbean, speaking to an earlier British sense of themselves as uniquely civilized in the care of nature. In England, as well, the fight to abolish foxhunting seems likely to continue along not only class, but also rural-urban lines.

It seems clear from other late-twentieth-century events such as the outbreak of mad cow disease and the ensuing British-French enmity that Europeans will continue to find meaning in their relationship with animals along the lines of earlier structures of thought established since the Renaissance. Regional enmities as well as a sense of human guardianship of nature will likely prevail. Whether the logic of “de-thronement” will also have social consequences in the twenty-first century is far more difficult to know.

See also other articles in this section.

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TOYS AND GAMES



Gary S. Cross

Toys and games are the tools of play, and play is a large part of social life. Playthings have helped the small and powerless child overcome the frustrations and conflicts of adult life through imagination. Still, toys and games have never been exclusively for children. Playthings also convey messages from the older generation to the younger. Changes in toys and other playthings thus can reveal much about changes in the experience and meaning of childhood and how the broader cultural and material world has shaped youth. Because the historical record concerning toys is richer than that of games, the former will be stressed and the term “games” will refer to play objects rather than organized activities.

Before modern industrialization, childhood was brief and play not encouraged by parents. Especially for children of peasants and craftspeople, toys were rare. Adults gave them to children during festival times, and the young made toys for themselves in moments of freedom from control or work out of gourds, bits of wood, or animal parts.

Play was not especially associated with childhood and neither were toys and games. The word “toy” was associated with a child’s plaything only at the end of the sixteenth century. Still, in Shakespeare’s time, “toy” continued to mean anything frivolous or even simply a funny story. Adult and children’s playthings were often not sharply distinguished until the eighteenth century. Sometimes it is hard to tell whether an object is a toy or an adult ritual object. Wide-ranging groups (including Hopi Indians and the medieval Japanese) passed on devotional images to their children for play after religious use. And in medieval Europe adult novelties were given later to children almost as an afterthought.

The French anthropologist Roger Caillois suggests that playthings vent four distinct needs: mimicry, vertigo (or giddiness), competition, and the excitement of chance. The toy has often allowed the individual to imitate the powerful and grown-up while

also expressing the thrill of abandoning oneself (as in riding a roller coaster). Board games have rewarded personal skill in competition while requiring that players accept luck and thus the unpredictability of life. Cultures can be distinguished by their relative stress on competition or vertigo, for example, in their games and toys. Playthings have taught the young and reminded the old of the values and customs of their culture.

But in modern times, Europeans abandoned certain elements of play. They gradually gave up mimicking the gods with masks and dolls. For the most part, dolls have passed to children. Doll historians may exaggerate when they equate children’s dolls with modern civilization, but clearly a mark of modernity is the turning of adult idols into children’s play figures. Modern adults also gradually rejected vertigo—the ecstatic worship so common in ancient cultures that gave people the feeling of participating in a supernatural world. Instead, adult play slowly came to stress competition and chance in games of calculation and rules. Most modern adults have ceased toying with the dangerous and ecstatic and passed the objects they associated with this play to the young in harmless forms. This has been a long process involving basic changes in material and cultural life, affecting adult and child alike.

PLAYTHINGS IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE

Most early modern Europeans viewed play as a periodic catharsis, often associated with fairs or feast days but not specifically with childhood. Many modern playthings have origins in Mardi Gras or other quasi-religious festivals that were shared by adults and children alike. Some children’s toys had origins as miniature souvenirs of late medieval religious pageantry. Churches displayed life-size manger scenes at Christ-

mas to delight and edify the congregation. Following a general cultural trend away from the community spectacle in the sixteenth century, these images were brought into the family circle when Italian and German craftspeople sold miniatures of these scenes for home display. From about 1470, engravings of secular scenes including battles and animals in natural settings were mounted on pasteboard for the amusement and edification of families. In the eighteenth century such miniature scenes were used as backdrops for home peep shows or toy theaters in Germany, Britain, and France. Toy theaters introduced the idea of the toy as a form of storytelling. Still, these miniatures were not children's toys as such, but festive and edifying household decorations.

However, miniature scenes eventually became children's play sets. Perhaps the earliest of these was the wooden Noah's Ark. This late-sixteenth-century German innovation offered religious training while allowing children to play with toy animals in a self-contained setting. Another example is the jumping jack, which had origins in the fourteenth century as a mechanical wooden figure that struck bells in church towers. By the sixteenth century, the jack of communal pleasure was miniaturized into a string-pulled jumping jack and was sold widely as a toy in central European fairs. Again, the jumping jack was a novelty as pleasing to adults at festive times as to children.

Some modern toys originated as diversions of adult aristocrats. Wealthy men had long been fascinated with mechanical movement. Automata, mechanical figures or animals powered by water and even steam, dated from the ancient world. By 1672 skilled craftspeople constructed automata powered by clockworks for Louis XIV of France. The eighteenth-century French artisans Jacques de Vaucanson and Pierre Jaquet-Droz made mechanical angels, pecking birds, and even models of children capable of writing. In the nineteenth century, with mass production, these novelties trickled down to children as toys. By 1836 walking dolls were perfected in Paris toy shops and survive today in remote control robots. Toy soldiers may have begun as pendants used by adults as charms rather than as children's playthings. The doll historian Karl Grober notes that miniature soldiers served as children's toys only from 1578 and that this was very rare. Kings and aristocrats collected handcrafted metal or wood soldiers to "play" war. Toys had little to do with the "innocence" of childhood. Amusements celebrating the macabre also have found expression as playthings. Toy guillotines were sold during the French Revolution, one of which was reportedly bought by the cultivated Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.

Similarly, fashion dolls originated as an effective way of displaying adult women's clothing. In 1309 the French royal court sent the English queen a miniature female mannequin dressed in the latest French style. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries clothing designers used these dolls to advertise Parisian fashion throughout Europe. They were a major reason for French success in dominating women's fashion. Mothers gave these dolls to their girls when no longer useful for displaying clothes. The history of dollhouses follows a similar course. First made in the form of a cabinet to include miniature furniture, dollhouses date from 1558 in Bavaria. But these replicas of exquisite domestic furnishings were models commissioned by wealthy women for their amusement and to display their taste and wealth. They were very expensive pieces of furniture, not toys for children. Aristocratic English women similarly collected dolls and doll furnishings in the eighteenth century. Only at the end of the eighteenth century did manufacturers build dollhouses specifically as toys designed to instruct girls in the arts of housekeeping. And even in Victorian England, dollhouses were commissioned objects d'art. Sometimes miniature upholstered chairs and doll dresses were made by adult members of the family to display craft skill. When the first hot air balloon ascended in 1783, French adults bought miniatures for souvenirs. Only later did the balloon become a child's toy. And hoops, tops, and ball games, which had traditionally been enjoyed by all ages, were only gradually abandoned by adults as childish.

Playthings were often miniatures of symbols of elite prestige and power. Thus most of the toys before the eighteenth century that have survived were made for the children of the aristocracy or wealthy merchants. In 1572 the king of Saxony gave his son a wooden play set depicting a hunting scene (complete with hounds, stags, wild boars, foxes, wolves, and hares) that allowed him to create minidramas of the leisure that he would enjoy when he grew up. By contrast, the princess received a doll's kitchen complete with 71 dishes, 40 meat plates, 36 spoons, and doll's furniture. Many toys were novelties that displayed wealth and taste.

Poor children, of course, enjoyed roughly made rag-and-straw stuffed dolls, and animal wastes provided materials for balls and knucklebones. Children made their own playthings. They improvised, creating fantasy worlds with whittled sticks and castaway bits of cloth. Traditional toys like hoops (from discarded wheels) pushed along the street with a stick survived until the end of the nineteenth century. And, of course, children played without toys or board or card games in a wide variety of chasing, racing, hiding, and role-playing activities in unsupervised groups.

MATERIAL CHANGES IN PLAYTHINGS, c. 1700–1850

The technological and economic revolutions that transformed general material conditions of European society also revolutionized the toy box. The modern European toy industry has its roots in Germany, where specialized craft production of playthings appeared in the sixteenth century. A key to their success was that they imitated both aristocratic and folk styles. In and around the small towns of Sonneberg, Erzebirge, and Berchtesgaden, as well as in Oberammergau in the Groeden Valley in South Tirol, families carved wooden animals and dolls in their cottages during the winter months, often to replicate local wildlife and people. From 1578 craftspeople from Nürnberg produced toy animals from tin. Later, about 1760, Andreas Hilpert of Nürnberg offered middle-class parents cheap tin adaptations of expensive silver or lead toy armies. Thereafter, Nürnberg set the standard for toy soldiers in Europe. This town also became famous for the Nürnberg Kitchen, a standardized play set for training girls in the essentials of domestic work in the nineteenth century. Gradually, German toy-making became a well-organized business. At first, peddlers sold handcrafted toys at fairs and door-to-door. Later, merchants centered in Nürnberg gained control over these traveling salesmen and forced village artisans to adopt uniform designs and to specialize.

In the nineteenth century especially, European toy makers also found new, cheaper materials. By 1850 papier-mâché, India rubber, and simple molding machines cheapened the cost of dolls. Porcelain doll heads were mass-produced from the 1840s and bisque (unglazed porcelain) from 1870. Simple mechanical contrivances also made dolls more lifelike. As early as 1823, dolls could say “mamma” when children squeezed simple bellows implanted in the doll’s body. Technical improvements, including weight-activated eyes and ball-jointed limbs in dolls, became common by 1850. Paper dolls appeared in England and Germany in the 1790s, offering a cheap version of the three-dimensional fashion doll. In the 1840s and 1850s paper dolls featured the likenesses of celebrities (royalty but also ballerinas and famous singers like Jenny Lind). New materials were introduced to make dollhouses cheaper, including lithographed paper on wood and tin to simulate fancy wall coverings, doors, and other furnishings.

New manufacturing technologies also made playthings cheaper. By the eighteenth century simple wooden toys were fashioned from a ring of pinewood, turned on a lathe to form the outline of a figure or animal along the length of the ring, and then sliced

into multiple flat figures. About five thousand molds for casting lead figures were used around Nürnberg by 1840. By the 1890s chromolithography allowed mechanical printing to replace much hand painting on tin-plated toys. Cheap spring-work (windup) toys supplanted expensive clockworks, and hollow-cast toy soldiers put war toys in the hands of a broad middle class. Composition (a mixture mostly of wood fiber, bran, and glue) began to replace china and other clay materials for dolls’ heads in 1895. These innovations not only introduced more playthings into a wider group of European children’s lives, but they made it possible for manufacturers to produce more variety and to change their lines of toys and games, thus turning playthings into a fashion industry.

Deep into the nineteenth century, craft methods prevailed and families still made toys at home or in small shops. Children’s goods were often mixed with adult trinkets in the packs of peddlers and in general stores. Toy manufacturing was often a sideline of “se-

rious” industry (for example, common woodworkers made miniatures of carpenter and garden tools and toy horses and coaches with scraps, and cabinet makers produced dollhouses on special order). The Brio toy company of Sweden, for example, had its roots in basket making in the 1880s. Machines and factories were introduced only at the end of the nineteenth century.

Toy makers could be found throughout nineteenth-century Europe. By 1800, for example, small-scale English manufacturers from the Black Country were producing a variety of tin and wood drums, trumpets, whistles, soldiers, and farm and exotic animals. Paris became a center for high-quality handcrafted automata and porcelain dolls in the nineteenth century. But after 1860 larger, more sophisticated German toy manufacturers like Bing and later Maerklin and Lehmann offered distinct trademarked windup and military toys. German manufacturers bested British and French competitors with aggressive marketing that targeted regional cultural differences and appealed to a broad middle class. For example, Bing manufactured tin English battleships complete with English flags. By 1900 Germany was by far the world’s greatest producer of toys, producing two-thirds of the dolls for Europe and exporting 75 percent of its output.

PLAYTHINGS AND CHANGING MEANINGS OF CHILDHOOD, c. 1700–1900

From the late seventeenth century, changes in the meaning and experience of childhood were reflected in new toy and game concepts. Historians of childhood stress the role of the Enlightenment on new attitudes about child rearing and playthings. John Locke’s *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693) asserted that play was not the “devil’s workshop” but essential for the child’s rational and occupational development. Children should have a variety of toys (but not all at once). In play children revealed those aptitudes that parents ought to encourage. Locke’s ideas were passed on to nineteenth-century parents via popular child-rearing manuals. These books encouraged parents to protect their children from harmful influences and to find games and toys to guide the child’s “progress” or training. The eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau stressed how parents should encourage spontaneity in their young children and provide an education that rewarded individual expression and personal development. Children were no longer seen as miniature adults; they were to go through developmental stages rather than be prematurely introduced to adult life.

These Enlightenment figures were hardly promoting permissive parenting. Advocates of children’s toys and games throughout the nineteenth century stressed not undirected play and imagination but moral and intellectual training. The historian John Brewer argues that toys in the late eighteenth century were to teach children to value and care for property. A key figure in toys for learning was the German educator Friedrich Froebel, who founded the first kindergarten in 1837. Like other reformers of this period, he denounced rote memorization and argued that play should become a central part of early learning. According to these reformers, play was the young child’s work and mode of learning. But it should not be left to chance. Froebel had a detailed program of play that prescribed step-by-step the child’s activities. While later generations of kindergarten teachers would abandon Froebel’s mystical views and rigid program, they stuck to the idea of managed play.

Accompanying this intellectual revolution in education was the transformation of the social context of childhood, especially for the middle classes. With the gradual removal of production from the home and from the training of children, toys and games became substitutes for preparing the young for adult roles. Moreover, play gradually replaced shared domestic work to create family loyalties and to train the child in the values of honesty and competition. In the home increasingly bereft of productive tasks and sometimes even baby siblings, toys became a way to imitate adult roles. They also served to help middle-class and socially aspiring parents isolate their young from an often unruly “child society” that might teach values inappropriate for upstanding families or social advancement. Toys then could protect the child in the sheltered environment of the bourgeois home while also providing antidotes for loneliness. Children were expected to learn the rational culture of self-control in the isolation of the nursery. Yet, with greater affluence in the course of the nineteenth century, the young were increasingly encouraged to enjoy spontaneity and the pleasures of their freedom from work and responsibility. Playthings were both vehicles to introduce the “real world” and fantasy objects that shut the child off from that world in a “secret garden.” This contradiction became more evident as the century wore on and toys designed to please parents gave way to child-centered playthings.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY TOYS AND GAMES

Early-nineteenth-century toys were made mostly for the very young. Rattles, for example, were as much

for the benefit of parents as children (and were sometimes called “child quieters”). The few toys available for older children were to distract them in that brief time before they could be put to work. Adults brought out miniatures only on special holidays. Into the nineteenth century, religious parents allowed their young to play with Noah’s Arks only on Sundays or holidays. Didactic toys had roots in the seventeenth century. As early as 1656, we find the *Scholars Praticall Cards*, a teaching game for English children. Paralleling the publication of children’s books in the mid-eighteenth century were a variety of information cards that taught geography, zoology, and even grammar. In the early nineteenth century French children learned about the prefectures of France and Austrians about exotic animals with card games. Moralistic themes predominated in English board games. For example, in the early Victorian *Mansion of Happiness*, children advanced a piece on a board by way of squares marked with character traits (Piety and Honesty, for example), moving toward the goal of Happiness. Landing, however, on Passion meant that you lost a turn.

The classic educational toy was, of course, the unadorned building block. It dates back to the time of John Locke in the late seventeenth century but was manufactured widely for the middle-class nursery in the mid-nineteenth century. A related, but predominately female, item was the sewing cards that appeared about 1880, often with improving mottos like “Waste Not, Want Not.” Other improving toys were less moralistic, but they too were to be “worked on.” Froebel’s kindergarten play objects (called “gifts”) were to awaken the mind and imagination of the child. The set was contained in six boxes and each successive box would be opened only as the child progressed in self-understanding. The first, for example, was filled with colored worsted balls. They were to teach the principle of “unity.” Later the child would advance to more complex objects like cubes and cylinders and eventually a three-inch cube, divided to form twenty-seven solid oblongs, of which three were divided into halves to form four-sided prisms, and six into halves to form square half-cubes. Fourteen “occupations” activities prescribed proper use of the gifts, including paper folding, drawing, sewing, paper weaving, stringing peas, and clay modeling. A similar, if less abstract, ethos produced the notion that children should construct their own playthings. In 1859 and 1860 Ebenezer Landells published two primers on the construction of “useful things” like kites, bows and arrows, and cardboard fox-hunting scenes for boys and homemade cutouts of dancing dolls and paper bookmarks for girls. The former were to prepare boys for inventing and the latter to instruct girls on domestic crafts

and benevolence. So-called scientific toys emerged in the 1830s that taught children principles of optics, for example, with toy-sized magic lanterns.

Toys reflected conventional gendered work roles and the tools that went with them. A toy catalog from Nürnberg in about 1860 featured toy storefronts appealing to boys and tin dollhouses designed for girls. Military miniatures in tin plate, mostly produced by Bing and Maerklin, were common in the two generations before World War I, keeping boys up-to-date on the latest battleship in the European arms race and familiar with the armies of potential enemies.

Girls’ playthings were mostly dolls, often semi-manufactured, to be finished or assembled later. Thus dolls were sold in parts (heads, bodies, legs, and arms), and the customer was expected to make or purchase separately the clothes, doll furniture, and dollhouses. Handmade extras made toys affordable to many parents and allowed them and other relatives to contribute personally to the child’s play. Doll accessories abounded. They included an amazing array of toy household tools, including washing boards, coal hods and shovels, and irons. Natural looking bisque-headed dolls, highly realistic with glass eyes, human hair, and ball joints, were made in Paris. Dolls manufactured by Jumeau were especially successful on the international market. Between 1860 and 1900 fashionably dressed “lady dolls” became a central part of the middle-class girl’s life. Newly affluent mothers increasingly encouraged their daughters to play out the rituals of high society (from tea parties to funerals) with their dolls. The fashion doll also developed a girl’s skill at identifying quality fabric and appropriate dress.

These talents were very important in a new age where middle-class women were expected to create a decorous home and become knowledgeable consumers. Dolls were used to instruct girls on the “proper” handling of objects and on the exercise of self-control.

Although these toys were utilitarian or (as in the case of porcelain dolls) for display, toys gradually became more playful and childlike, especially for younger children. Illustrative of this change is how didactic tales gave way to children’s fantasy. Lewis Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland* (1865) abandons the dull world of adults for the comic literalness of Unbirthday Parties and Queens of Hearts while subtly parodying adult hypocrisies. Escapism from industrial society was projected onto children in Rudyard Kipling’s *Jungle Book* (1894). And J. M. Barrie’s *Peter Pan* (1904) treats the Darling siblings to Neverland, where nobody ever grows up, and spares Wendy of the fate of having to vacate the nursery until she is finally ready. As important, parents embraced these fantasies and the idea of purposeless play that they expressed. Late-nineteenth-century indulgence of children is shown in clothing, furniture, and medicines made especially for the young. The transformation of the communal festival of Christmas into a day featuring gifts for children is also part of this process. The Bon Marché in Liverpool, for example, introduced the first Christmas fairyland (toy department) in the 1870s, and by the 1890s Father Christmas was a regular visitor in December in British department stores. The late-Victorian poor may not have been able to afford toys at birthdays, but they saved and spent as lavishly as possible on their children at Christmas.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRENDS

Toys derived from popular characters in children’s fiction became common after 1900. These playthings expressed parental indulgence for childish play while drawing on new and faddish elements from the wider popular culture. The British Golliwog, derived from a child’s short story, became a fad doll from 1900. The Golliwog was a version of the black dandy and minstrel, dressed in blue swallow-tail coat and red bow tie—but with paws, not feet and hands, and with exaggerated eyes and lips. “Exotic” racial images were nearly as common in Europe as in the United States. Other popular dolls were the Katzenjammer Kids, who in comics endlessly played pranks on grown-ups, even if they got thrashed for it. These were images of a gentle rebellion from adult authority, a rebellion tolerated by parents, even embraced in the innocence of a plaything. Similarly, German windup toys often fea-

tured whimsical adult characters in ridiculous situations in the 1900s.

Even more expressive of a new indulgence of childhood was the doll reform movement. Shortly after 1900, artists in Munich and Berlin designed dolls in the image of children. In opposition to the adult fashion doll with its detailed and realistic facial features and body, the doll reformers asked children what they wanted in a doll. This led to soft figures, sometimes with “unbreakable heads,” that a child could hug and play with. Early examples of the doll reform were simple folk designs with abstract facial features and childlike in their construction. Most important, these dolls were to evoke the emotions of the child rather than to teach adult roles. The fact that most of these dolls looked like the child who played with them suggested that they were intended to be companions in childish play. The new doll’s image also implied a growing toleration for the foibles of children. Some, for example, had impish looks on their faces with eyes askance. Common also was the wholesome and energetic look of the “Dutch boy” doll. Other doll reformers like Kaethe Kruse designed realistic baby dolls (often with the face and body of a newborn) with the hope of arousing maternal feeling in the child.

Another part of this trend toward more child-centered play was the plush or stuffed toy animal and figure. Unlike the wood or even cloth toy, these soft-centered toys with raised nap exteriors were ideal for young children seeking security and warmth. The German toy maker Margarete Steiff, who made stuffed elephants from 1880, claimed to have invented the soft and furry teddy bear (named for the American president Theodore Roosevelt) in 1902. Her company shifted production from cottage craftspeople to a modern factory in 1905, shortly after she gained

access to an international network of buyers and had perfected her jointed plush doll design. The stuffed bear swept the “civilized” world in 1906–1907 (and was as popular in Europe as it was in the United States. Steiff sold one million in 1907 alone. So successful were Steiff’s bears that other toy makers quickly copied them. In an effort to create an emblem of “authenticity,” Steiff sewed a “button in the ear” of each plush bear that the company manufactured, thus creating a distinctive trademark. By 1911 Steiff was making cartoon characters and caricature dolls and advertising them through colorful postcards. These toys conveyed the message that children had the right to self-expression and fantasy. But they also attracted adults with the opportunity to join their offspring in a nostalgia for a “timeless” childhood free from the competition and change of the modern world.

The Victorian training toy had hardly disappeared. For older boys, it survived in the lead soldier that was given in complete and often expensive sets by parents as a rite of passage into robust boyhood. Electric trains offered a more positive image of growing up. They dated from 1884 in Germany, and Maerklin exported them by 1898. Electric trains combined accurate detail of the latest technology with a play setting that allowed boys to imagine themselves as powerful participants in an adult world of commerce and transportation. Construction toys, like Frank Hornby’s Meccano of Britain, delivered boys to worlds of technological progress and business success. More than perforated metal strips that could be bolted together, Meccano showed boys how to construct the “world’s mechanical wonders” as models. According to a popular biography, Hornby, as a boy, had dreamed of building a “perpetual motion machine,” and his work on bridges inspired his Meccano toy. Hornby himself was to be a model for boys to emulate just as his toys were to prepare them to be engineers, scientists, and businessmen.

By contrast, early-twentieth-century girls’ play included few miniatures of modern technology. Pet’s Toy Grocery Stores, an English invention of 1909, was an update of the grocer’s store play set common in the nineteenth century except that it included miniature trademark brands of packaged goods, teaching the girl “modern” shopping. But the doll remained central to girls’ play. With it, girls learned to play expected roles by making their dolls into actors in domestic dramas of modern caregiving, conviviality, and consumption. The increasing tendency of dolls in the early twentieth century to look like children or babies may have reflected a trend toward smaller families. When girls lacked siblings to play with or babies to care for, they substituted dolls. As mothers bore fewer

children, they took on more nurturing responsibilities. These mothers would rather have their young daughters play with baby dolls than risk their caring for their baby siblings. And baby dolls were intended to train girls into a maternal instinct that many social conservatives saw in decline early in the twentieth century.

AMERICANIZATION OF PLAYTHINGS IN EUROPE

Toys and games remained relatively static after 1920 in Europe. As in many areas of popular culture, American toy innovations penetrated European childhood. German toys lost their dominance in the United States during World War I, and after Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, military priorities further weakened the German playthings industry. Radical change came from Walt Disney’s aggressive marketing of character licenses to doll and toy makers in 1935. Mickey Mouse was as popular in Europe as in the United States, and Disney films like the feature-length *Snow White* introduced a new way of making story characters into playthings. The Americanization of toys meant a shift of play away from an adult world of training and toward an international culture of childhood created by linking children’s movies and other media to toys.

Of course, older forms of toys survived after World War II. British Meccano and Hornby electric trains enjoyed a revival, and the Lesney “Matchbox” cars updated a tradition of play based on realistic miniatures of adult life. The Swedish Brio company perpetuated high-quality nonrepresentational wooden toys (simple trains, cars, animals, and blocks) and promoted them as an educational alternative to licensed character toys. Their “open-ended toys” were expensive, but they stimulated imagination and were advertised as a good investment in a child’s development. Brio appealed to the relatively affluent parent who was eager for playthings that met a child’s developmental needs. The German Playmobil company thrived by offering sturdy plastic updates of traditional wooden play sets. German toy makers abandoned war toys and specialized in electric trains and fine character dolls.

Nevertheless, despite the relative absence of TV advertising in Europe for children (as compared with the United States), European toy companies survived by imitating or becoming subsidiaries of aggressive American toy makers. In 1962 the venerable Lines Brothers of Britain made an obvious copy of Mattel’s Barbie doll called Sindy. In 1966 Britain’s Palitoy became the distributor for Hasbro’s G. I. Joe (called Ac-

rapid change and an emphasis upon “blockbuster” hit toys. This plus the close integration of toy makers with an aggressive children’s entertainment industry (comic books, movies, and TV cartoons) led to toy lines that served as props for playing a fantasy narrative. When American toy giants licensed the images of *Star Wars* characters for toys in 1977, European companies could not compete. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the independent British toy industry long used to a stable product line, nearly disappeared.

The most dramatic exception was Lego. In the 1970s and early 1980s, this Danish company built a toy empire against the trend toward action-figure fantasy. Instead, it perpetuated the construction-toy tradition with its interlocking blocks. Lego used museum and mall displays and its Legoland theme park to retain a reputation for quality and creativity. By the late 1980s, however, Lego compromised with the American fantasy-toy industry by introducing kits, or “systems,” designed to construct a single model. While Lego did not provide a violent “back story,” many of these systems came with exotic weaponry. Lego’s construction-toy tradition adapted to many of the marketing techniques of the novelty makers.

Niche markets remained for educational and construction toys. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s Early Learning Centres in Britain sold Meccano, Brio, and other quality toys to parents of young children who opposed the commercialization of the young by international fashion toy makers. But the older child has become part of a global consumer culture through satellite TV, movies, comics, and, after 1991 especially, video games. By the 1980s the toy in Europe had become part of a global play culture. Toys are increasingly designed and marketed through American and Japanese companies and manufactured in south China adjacent to the international commercial center of Hong Kong. European parents, like affluent parents elsewhere, look to their children for emotional gratification and buy toys to please their offspring. Reduced family size and divorce probably have also accelerated this trend. The growth of satellite TV and privatization of the mass media have eroded the European’s isolation from the power of the United States and the global children’s fashion and fantasy industry.

tion Man in Europe). Even Brio distributed Mattel and Hasbro toys in the 1950s and 1960s. By 1985 the American warehouse retailer Toys “R” Us arrived in Britain and soon thereafter on the Continent, selling Barbie dolls and action figures similar to those offered in the United States.

The Americanization of toys was more than an economic fact. It also meant a new kind of plaything and experience of play that Europeans were unable to match. Especially from the 1960s, American toys were sold directly to children via TV ads on Saturday morning cartoon shows, bypassing the parent’s values and memories of play. Intense competition made for

See also America, Americanization, and Anti-Americanism (volume 1); Gender and Education and Child Rearing and Childhood (volume 4); and other articles in this section.

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL HISTORY

FROM 1350 TO 2000



VOLUME 6

Peter N. Stearns

Editor in Chief

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BIOGRAPHIES



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SOURCES: CA = *Contemporary Authors*; DAA = *International Dictionary of Architects and Architecture*; EOP = *Encyclopedia of Occultism and Parapsychology*; EWB = *Encyclopedia of World Biography*; HWL = *Historical World Leaders*; NWS = *Notable Women Scientists*

A

Adorno, Theodor (1903–1969), German philosopher. Retaining his intellectual roots in Hegel and Marx, the German philosopher Theodor W. Adorno moved freely across diverse academic disciplines to probe into the nature of contemporary European culture and the predicament of modern man. He was a leading member of the influential intellectual movement known as the Frankfurt School.

Adorno was born in Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, on September 11, 1903, as the only son of an upper middle class family. His father, Oskar Wiesengrund, was an assimilated Jewish merchant, and his mother, Maria Calvalli-Adorno, was a musically gifted person of Italian-Catholic descent. He adopted his mother's patronomic Adorno in the late 1930s.

Adorno became associated with the Institute for Social Research, which was established in 1923 as an affiliated body of the Frankfurt, but it was personal rather than formal because of his youth and student status. It was Max Horkheimer, eight years Adorno's senior, who introduced Adorno to other senior scholars there who were embarked on a variety of projects aimed at determining the social conditions of Europe. Although Marxist and progressive in outlook, the researchers at the Institute were concerned with intellectual work rather than direct political action. Together they constituted what came to be known as the Frankfurt School credited with the creation of the Critical Theory.

Adorno began teaching philosophy at his alma mater in 1931 but the seizure of political power by Hitler disrupted his academic career and eventually forced him into exile. He took refuge first at Oxford, England, between 1934 and 1937 and thereafter in the United States until his return to Germany in 1949 to resume teaching at the Frankfurt University. The

sufferings of the Jews and the crimes of the Third Reich became two of the major concerns in his philosophical reflections to the end of his life.

During his stay in the United States between 1937 and 1949 Adorno was engaged in a number of projects which the members of the Institute for Social Research conducted individually or collectively. Although Adorno was disappointed by the quantitative analysis of cultural phenomena which he undertook at Princeton, he played a leading role in a large collaborative project which resulted in the publication of the influential book *Authoritarian Personality*.

Toward the end of the war Adorno and Horkheimer wrote *Dialectic of Enlightenment* published in Amsterdam in 1947. Defining enlightenment as demythologizing, the authors trace the process of taming of nature in Western civilization. The main thrust of the argument is that in the name of enlightenment a technological civilization which sets humans apart from nature has been developed and that such a civilization has become a cause of dehumanization and regimentation in modern society. They contend that the notion of reason is accepted in that civilization mainly in the sense of instrument for controlling nature, and subsequently people, rather than in the sense of enhancing human dignity and originality. In the new edition of the book published in 1969, shortly before Adorno's death, the authors declare that the enlightenment led to positivism and the identification of intelligence with what is hostile to spirit (*Geistfeindschaft*).

After World War II many members of the Frankfurt School remained in the United States or in Great Britain, but Horkheimer and Adorno returned to Germany. They were expected to provide intellectual leadership for postwar Germany. Horkheimer ac-

cepted the position of the Rector of the Frankfurt University and invited Adorno to join him. Adorno returned to Germany in 1949 although he spent a year in the United States in 1952.

Adorno lived up to what was expected of him by pouring out articles and books and by training a new generation of German scholars. His writings, voluminous as they were, however, did not contain many innovative ideas but rather restatement, in more elaborate forms and in a somewhat extravagant writing style, of the ideas which he had presented in his previous articles and books. But the true extent of his originality cannot be determined until the projected 23 volumes of his complete works are available.

In 1951 he published *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life* consisting of articles which he wrote during the war. The most personal of his writings, the short essays in this book were written in an aphoristic style reminiscent of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. The purpose of the book is to examine how "objective forces" determine even the most intimate and immediate experience of an individual in contemporary society.

The *Negative Dialectics*, published in 1966, is a sustained polemic against the dream of philosophers from Aristotle to Hegel to construct philosophical systems enclosing coherently arranged propositions and proofs. One of the most terse statements in the book is "Bluntly put, closed systems are bound to fail." As this statement indicates, his aim in this book is to vindicate the vitality and intractability of reason.

Prisms, another major work published in 1967, contains essays on a wide range of topics from Thorstein Veblen to Franz Kafka. However, the main theme running throughout the book is the gradual decomposition of culture under the impact of instrumental reason. In this book and in *Aesthetic Theory*, his last major work unfinished at the time of his death in 1969 but edited and published posthumously, Adorno advances the thesis that the integrity of creative works lies in the autonomous acts of the artists who are at once submerged under and yet triumphant over social forces.

A persistent critic of positivism in philosophy and sociology and a bitter foe of commercialism and dehumanization promoted by the culture industry, Adorno championed individual dignity and creativity in an age increasingly menaced by what he regarded as mindless standardization and abject conformity. At a time when many academic philosophers were weary of dealing with large questions for fear of violating the canon of rigorous philosophical reasoning, Adorno boldly asserted that the function of philosophy is to make sense out of the totality of human experience.

Adorno, who was hailed as one of the ideological godfathers of the New Left Movement in the 1960s because of his indictment of both capitalism and communism, was criticized and humiliated by his former followers for his opposition to violent social activism. He was once forced out of his lecture room by female students at the Frankfurt University.

EWB

Alberti, Leon Battista (1414–1472), Italian writer, humanist, and architect. Through his theoretical writings on painting, sculpture, and architecture, Alberti raised them from the level of the mechanical arts to that of the liberal arts.

Alberti, as a scholar and philosopher who moved in humanist circles in Florence and the papal court in Rome, was involved in all the central concepts of the Renaissance. He was concerned with reforming his society and the arts in the image of ancient Roman culture. Throughout most of his writings the problem of man's relation to society is fundamental.

Alberti was born in Genoa on Feb. 14, 1404. He was the illegitimate son of Lorenzo Alberti, who belonged to one of the most prominent and oldest Florentine families but had been banished in 1401 from his native city. As a young boy, Leon Battista attended the famous school of the humanist Gasparino Barzizza in Padua, probably at the time Lorenzo Alberti was in Venice (1414). By 1421 Leon Battista was at the University of Bologna; while there he wrote a Latin comedy, *Philodoxeus* (ca. 1424). He received a degree in canon law prior to 1428, and it is probable that after earning his degree in Bologna he went to Rome. Sometime before 1431 Alberti was appointed prior of S. Martino in Gangalandi, Tuscany, which benefice he held until his death. In 1431 and early 1432 he accompanied Cardinal Albergati on a tour of northern Europe. On his return to Rome, Alberti became secretary to the patriarch of Grado and in October 1432 abbreviator at the papal court.

Soon after this Alberti wrote *Descriptio urbis Romae* as an index for an archeological map of Rome and in 3 months composed the first three books of *Della famiglia*, which is concerned with domestic life and the education of children. The fourth book of the treatise on the family, dealing with friendship, was written in Florence in 1437, and the entire work was revised in 1443. The sociological approach of this treatise remained central to his later writings.

The Treatises. In June 1434 Alberti accompanied the court of Pope Eugenius IV to Florence when it fled from the unrest in Rome. Florence, under the leadership of artists such as Donatello, Masaccio,

and Filippo Brunelleschi, was then the art capital of Europe. Here Alberti composed his theoretical treatises on the visual arts. His treatise in Latin on painting, *De pictura*, was completed in 1435; the following year he prepared in Italian a briefer, more popular version, *Della pittura*. The Latin edition, dedicated to Gianfrancesco Gonzaga of Mantua, was written to persuade patrons that the art of painting was not merely a mechanical craft. The treatise explained for the first time in writing the mathematical foundations of one-point linear perspective as it was developed by the architect Brunelleschi, to whom the Italian version was dedicated; it also discussed antique themes and their appropriate expression. A Latin treatise on sculpture, *De sculptura*, may have originated at this time, although there is much uncertainty about its date.

As a member of the papal court, Alberti accompanied the Pope to Bologna in April 1436, and in January 1438 he was at Ferrara for the convocation of the council of the Latin and Greek churches. During this period Alberti wrote a work on law, *De iure* (1437), and another on the priest, *Pontifex* (1437). In 1442 Leonello d'Este, the ruler of Ferrara, recalled Alberti to advise him on a memorial equestrian statue of his father, Niccolo d'Este. Alberti's treatise on the horse, *De equo animante*, is related to this commission. His philosophical dialogue on peace of mind, *Della tranquillità dell'animo*, probably dates from the same period.

Alberti followed the papal court back to Rome in September 1443 and, probably at the instigation of Leonello d'Este, began to write the first five books of his important Latin treatise on architecture, *De re aedificatoria*. After Nicholas V was elected pope in 1447, Alberti finished the remaining five books, and the complete work was presented to the Pope in 1452 (first printed in 1485). The treatise not only relates architecture to the classical principles enunciated by the ancient Roman writer Vitruvius but, inspired by Alberti's previous concern for the family and society, studies architecture as a sociological phenomenon. For the remainder of his life, however, Alberti was more involved with the design and execution of architecture than with theoretical treatises.

Widespread Influence. Alberti's treatises on painting and architecture exerted a great influence on 16th- and 17th-century artistic thought. The teachings of the French 17th-century academies of painting and architecture represent a codification of artistic principles first formulated less rigidly by Alberti.

Of his architecture, the plan of S. Andrea, through its impact on Giacomo da Vignola's design for the Jesuit church, the Gesù, at Rome, was impor-

tant for two centuries of church architecture. In the same way, the facade of S. Maria Novella, with its great scrolls, became the model for classicizing church facades, as seen also in the Gesù. In both his architecture and architectural theory Alberti paved the way for the High Renaissance architecture of Rome, exemplified in Donato Bramante's work of the early 16th century.

EWB

Alembert, Jean Le Rond d' (1717–1783), French mathematician and philosophe. The chief contribution by the French mathematician and physicist Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1717–1783) is D'Alembert's principle, in mechanics. He was also a pioneer in the study of partial differential equations.

Jean le Rond d'Alembert was born on Nov. 16, 1717, and abandoned on the steps of the church of St-Jean-le-Rond in Paris. He was christened Jean Baptiste le Rond. The infant was given into the care of foster parents named Rousseau. Jean was the illegitimate son of Madame de Tencin, a famous salon hostess, and Chevalier Destouches, an artillery officer, who provided for his education. At the age of 12, Jean entered the Collège Mazarin and shortly afterward adopted the name d'Alembert. He became a barrister but was drawn irresistibly toward mathematics.

Two memoirs, one on the motion of solid bodies in a fluid and the other on integral calculus, secured d'Alembert's election in 1742 as a member of the Paris Academy of Sciences. A prize essay on the theory of winds in 1746 led to membership in the Berlin Academy of Sciences. D'Alembert wrote the introduction and a large number of the articles on mathematics and philosophy for Denis Diderot's *Encyclopédie*. He entered the Académie Française as secretary in 1755.

D'Alembert had a generous nature and performed many acts of charity. Two people especially claimed his affection; his foster mother, with whom he lived until he was 50, and the writer Julie de Lespinasse, whose friendship was terminated only by her death. D'Alembert died in Paris on Oct. 29, 1783.

D'Alembert's principle appeared in his *Traité de dynamique* (1743). It concerns the problem of the motion of a rigid body. Treating the body as a system of particles, d'Alembert resolved the impressed forces into a set of effective forces, which would produce the actual motion if the particles were not connected, and a second set. The principle states that, owing to the connections, this second set is in equilibrium. An outstanding result achieved by d'Alembert with the aid of his principle was the solution of the problem of the precession of the equinoxes, which he presented to the

Berlin Academy in 1749. Another form of d'Alembert's principle states that the effective forces and the impressed forces are equivalent. In this form the principle had been applied earlier to the problem of the compound pendulum, but these anticipations in no way approach the clarity and generality achieved by d'Alembert.

In his *Traité de l'équilibre et du mouvement des fluides* (1744), d'Alembert applied his principle to the problems of fluid motion, some of which had already been solved by Daniel Bernoulli. d'Alembert recognized that the principles of fluid motion were not well established, for although he regarded mechanics as purely rational, he supposed that the theory of fluid motion required an experimental basis. A good example of a theoretical result which did not seem to correspond with reality was that known as d'Alembert's paradox. Applying his principle, d'Alembert deduced that a fluid flowing past a solid obstacle exerted no resultant force on it. The paradox disappears when it is remembered that the inviscid fluid envisaged by d'Alembert was a pure fiction.

Applying calculus to the problem of vibrating strings in a memoir presented to the Berlin Academy in 1747, he showed that the condition that the ends of the string were fixed reduced the solution to a single arbitrary function. D'Alembert also deserves credit for the derivation of what are now known as the Cauchy-Riemann equations, satisfied by any holomorphic function of a complex variable.

Research on vibrating strings reflected only one aspect of d'Alembert's interest in music. He wrote a few of the musical articles for the *Encyclopédie*.

He favored the views of the composer Jean Philippe Rameau and expounded them in his popular *Éléments de musique théorique et pratique* (1752).

EWB

Alexander II (1818–1881), tsar of Russia (1855–1881). Alexander II is called the “tsar liberator” because he emancipated the serfs in 1861. His reign is famous in Russian history as the “era of great reforms.”

Eldest son of Nicholas I, Alexander was born in Moscow on April 17, 1818. Vasili Zhukovski, the poet and courtier, was his principal tutor. Alexander spoke Russian, German, French, English, and Polish. He acquired a knowledge of military arts, finance, and diplomacy. From an early age he traveled extensively in Russia and abroad; in 1837, for example, he visited 30 Russian provinces, including Siberia, where no member of the royal family had ever been. Unlike his father, Alexander had experience in government before he acceded to the throne. He held various military commands and was a member of the state council

(from 1840) and of the committee of the ministers (from 1842); during Nicholas's absence Alexander acted as his deputy.

Alexander's political philosophy eludes precise definition. However, there is ample evidence to indicate that he was an admirer of Nicholas's autocracy and bureaucratic methods.

Emancipation of the Serfs. Before he became tsar, Alexander was not sympathetic to emancipation. He changed his mind because of Russia's technological and military backwardness in the Crimean War and because he believed that the liberation of the serfs was the only way to prevent a peasant uprising. Through a burdensome arrangement in which local commissions made studies and reported their findings to the government, an emancipation law was eventually formulated and proclaimed in 1861.

The new law stated that serfs were free to marry, acquire property, engage in trades, and bring suits in courts. Each estate proprietor had to prepare within a year an inventory determining the area of land actually in the possession of the peasants and defining the annual payment or services due from the liberated serfs. Each peasant household received its homestead and a certain amount of land (generally the same amount the family had cultivated for its own use in the past). The land usually became the property of the village commune, which had the power to redistribute it periodically among the households. The government bought the land from the owners, but the peasants had to redeem it by payments extending over 49 years. The proprietor kept only the portion of his estate that had been farmed for his own purposes.

The emancipation law of 1861, which liberated more than 40 million serfs, has been called the greatest single legislative act in history. It was a moral stimulus to peasant self-dignity. Yet there were many problems. The peasants had to accept the allotments, and generally they did not receive enough land and were overcharged for it. Since they became obligated for the payment of taxes and redemption reimbursements, their mobility was greatly limited. The commune replaced the proprietor as master over the peasants. The settlement, however, was on the whole liberal, despite some unsolved problems and the agrarian crises that emerged in part from its inadequacies.

Because the emancipation of the serfs ended the landlords' rights of justice and police on their estates, it was necessary to reform the entire local administrations. The statute of 1864 created provincial and district assemblies, which handled local finances, education, scientific agriculture, medical care, and main-

tenance of the roads. The elaborate electoral system dividing voters into categories by class provided substantial representation to the peasants in the assemblies. Peasant and proprietor were brought together in order to work out local problems.

During Alexander's reign other reforms were initiated. The cities were granted municipal assemblies with functions similar to those of the provincial assemblies. The Russian judicial system and legal procedures, which were riddled with inequities, were reformed. For the first time in Russian history, juries were permitted, cases were debated publicly and orally, all classes were made equal before the law, and the court system was completely overhauled. Censorship was relaxed, and the universities were freed from the restrictions imposed on them by Nicholas I. The army, too, was reformed by Gen. Dimitri Miliutin, military schools were reorganized along liberal lines, and conscription was borne equally by all social groups.

Despite all these reforms, Alexander II became the target of revolutionaries in 1866. Terrorist activity continued throughout the 1870s. The underlying reasons were the lack of far-reaching social and constitutional reforms; the bloody suppression of the peasant uprisings, especially the slaughter of Bezna; the Polish insurrection of 1863 and its bloody defeat; and the general ultrareactionary trend of official policies. Conservatives and nationalists were welcomed by the tsar, but the liberals were alienated. The radicals went underground and espoused the cause of political and social revolution. A member of a terrorist group murdered Alexander II on March 1, 1881.

EWB

Aretino, Pietro (1492–1556), Italian playwright and poet. Aretino rose from very humble origins in Arezzo to fame and eminence, simply by the calculated use of his pen. He operated mainly at the papal court in Rome until 1525; then, after a brief stay with the Duke of Mantua, he settled in Venice. He flattered and cajoled his chosen patrons, attacked their current adversaries, wrote outspoken letters to popes, kings and emperors, and earned from Ariosto the title of Scourge of Princes which has stuck with him ever since. His output ranged from Counter-Reformation devotional literature to outright pornography, everything being tackled, perplexingly, with equal apparent conviction and verbal skill.

His *Letters* tend to be seen as his crowning glory, but his comic drama is also of great significance. (He produced one tragedy, *Orazia*, printed in 1546.) He opened in 1525 with the absurd scurrilous *Cortigiana* (The Courtier's Play), combining two plots of elaborate practical jokes. The play was clearly written for a

specific audience at a specific time, and its vigorous verbal by-play is larded with topical jokes. It was not printed in its first version before 1970, and the edition which appeared in 1534 is toned down in its aspects of vaudeville performance, and re-written to fit the topicalities and preoccupations of Aretino and his readers at that later date. Meanwhile *Il marescalco* (*The Stablemaster*) was written for the court of Mantua, probably in 1527, and published in 1533.

Both these early plays appear un-classical in structure, and owe little to Roman comedy in terms of plot. They seem to draw their inspiration more from the *beffa* tradition of practical joke in the medieval novella on the one hand; and from the harangues, dramatized dialogues, and sketches of street and court entertainment on the other. In fact a large part of both texts consists of one or two characters making speeches, to the audience or to each other: the content can be moralistic, satirical, sarcastic, celebratory, or just verbally fanciful, always supported by a level of language which is more dense and creative than that of most *commedia erudita*, though whether one would call it poetic is more debatable.

La Talanta and *Lo ipocrito* were both published in 1542, the former certainly being staged in Venice in the same year. The plays are named after a central character in each, Talanta being a rapacious prostitute, and the Hypocrite remaining named only by his principal characteristic. Both comedies have the surface function of detailing, in complex fictional plots, the dangers which prostitutes and religious hypocrites respectively pose to society and to individuals. But mixed in with these satirical aims, which continue to some extent the aggressive mockery of the first two plays, we find other elements sitting uneasily together for a modern reader, but foreshadowing quite separate developments in Italian theatre of the late 16th century. On the one hand, there are plots relating to marriages and family unity, traditional to classical comedy, but stretched by Aretino to such mannered lengths that one does not know whether they are to be taken at face value or as caricatures. The moral rhetoric is so stylized, the romantic misunderstandings and errors of identity so tortuous and implausible and yet a couple of decades later plots very similar to these were to become the norm. On the other hand, Aretino cannot renounce (or knows that his audience cannot renounce) more scurrilous low-life scenes involving backchat and practical jokes. What is more, in *Talanta* in particular, there are clear hints of the nascent *commedia dell'arte*, both in certain stereotyped characters and in the dialogue structure of some scenes, which may well have been played by professional buffoons

alongside the gentlemen amateurs who took the more dignified roles.

Aretino's personal reputation was so bad by 1600 that his comedies were issued in a slightly rewritten form, under altered titles and authorship. That they were reprinted at all at that period attests to their enduring influence. On the surface they are aimed firmly at a specific audience, and thus tend to date rapidly; their plots are fragmentary, and their structure over-leisurely; but their merciless satirical vein and their verbal creativity (the latter sadly rare in Italian, as opposed to English Renaissance comedy) seem to have made them hard to forget.

International Dictionary of Theatre,
volume 2: *Playwrights*. St. James Press, 1993.

Ariès, Philippe (1914–1984), French historian. Though an agronomic researcher by profession, Philippe Ariès avocationally studied the evolution of social attitudes, a hobby that brought him international renown. For his research on social attitudes, Ariès developed a system of demographic study based on emotions and reactions to birth and death. His first major work, published in translation as *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life*, explores attitudes toward children. The book, stated a *Newsweek* writer, “has never been surpassed,” having held its appeal not only for historians and history buffs, but also for militant feminists in the United States. The latter are attracted to the book, *Newsweek* said, as “an ideological weapon against the idea of cohesive family.” Ariès's own comment was, “each generation asks something new of history.”

Ariès is best known, however, for his historical studies of death in the West, including *Western Attitudes Toward Death*, *The Hour of Our Death*, and the award-winning *Man Facing Death*. With the publication of *Western Attitudes Toward Death*, he “has enriched history with a supply of hypotheses that will reorient research,” Robert Darnton pointed out, “even if many of them prove to be false.”

Ariès's writings also include *History of French People* and his autobiography *Sunday Historian*. *Newsweek* described Philippe Ariès as “a maverick social historian whose pioneering studies of nonevents . . . have helped to create a new kind of history.” He has explored “those elusive dimensions of social consciousness that once were considered static and too inaccessible for historical investigation.” Ariès was completing a history of private life at the time of his death.

CA

Arkwright, Richard (1732–1792), English inventor and industrialist. Richard Arkwright developed

several inventions which mechanized the making of yarn and thread for the textile industry. He also helped to create the factory system of manufacture.

Arkwright was born on Dec. 23, 1732, in Preston, Lancashire, England. Little is known of his early life except that he was from a large family of humble origin and obtained only the rudiments of an education. He was apprenticed to a barber in Preston, and when about 18 he set up on his own in Bolton, a textile town in Lancashire.

Sometime in the 1760s Arkwright began working on a mechanical device for spinning cotton thread, the spinning frame, which he patented in 1769. Problems still remained: the raw cotton had to be prepared for the invention by a hand process, and the invention had to be made practical and commercially successful. For this he needed funds and a mill where he could install the frame.

Probably for this reason in 1771 he moved to Nottingham, where a highly specialized kind of weaving, that of stockings, had already been fairly well mechanized. There Arkwright, whose inventions had reduced him to poverty, found a partner who supported his work and backed the construction of a mill run by waterpower (hence the later name of water frame).

Arkwright found that he could successfully use his thread for stockings and also as the warp, or longitudinal threads, in an ordinary loom onto which the weft, or cross threads, were woven. Heretofore, cotton thread had been used for the weft, but only linen threads had been strong enough for the warp. Now a textile made solely of cotton could be produced in England, and it eventually became one of the country's chief exports.

The production of thread was further improved in 1775 by Arkwright's patenting a practically continuous method which prepared the raw cotton for spinning. Apart from a completely mechanical loom, Arkwright had thus eliminated all the major obstacles to producing cotton cloth by machine.

Because thread production was now completely mechanized, all the hitherto separate operations could be coordinated and carried out under one roof, in a mill, or, as it was increasingly called, a factory. Arkwright paid as careful attention to the mill's operation as he did to his inventions. It was typical of his aggressive entrepreneurship that he was one of the first to apply the steam engine to his mills. While such a concentration of machines, driven by a prime mover, was not a new invention, Arkwright's rationalization of the factory system was nevertheless to become one of the most characteristic features of the industrial revolution.

Wealth and honors, including the bestowal of knighthood, came to him in the 1780s. He died in Nottingham on Aug. 3, 1792.

EWB

Arnold, Thomas (1795–1842), English educator. Thomas Arnold was a headmaster of Rugby School, and through his efforts it became the model for other English public schools and for boarding schools throughout the Western world.

Arnold was born in West Cowes, Isle of Wight, England, on June 13, 1795, the seventh child of William and Martha Arnold. His father was the postmaster and customs agent for the Isle of Wight. Arnold received his early education from his mother and an aunt. He attended the preparatory schools Warminster and Winchester from 1803 to 1811, prior to his admittance to Corpus Christi College of Oxford University. He graduated first class in classics in 1814. Through the influence of a friend he became a fellow of Oriel College, Oxford University, in 1814 a position he held until 1819. While there, he was ordained a deacon in the Church of England in 1818.

Arnold married Mary Penrose in 1820. He taught in several preparatory schools until 1827, when he became headmaster of Rugby School. He retained this post until his sudden death on June 12, 1842. Arnold also held a position in the senate of the University of London during 1836–1838 and was appointed a lecturer in history at Oxford in 1841.

Arnold was very much interested in Church reform. A radical in terms of religious thought of the day, he sought a simplified base on which to build a reunited Christian Church. He entered into a well-publicized dialogue with John Henry (later Cardinal) Newman over the nature of the Christian Church and what it ought to be. Arnold's religious ideas influenced the way in which he approached his job as headmaster of Rugby. He assumed the duties of the chaplain when the post became vacant, and he was noted for his sermons to the student body, later published. He emphasized the "Christian scholar" and "good character."

Social reform also interested Arnold. Although he maintained that the class structure of England was essentially natural and unchangeable, he actively sought to improve the lot of the lower and emerging middle classes. His convictions regarding the aristocracy centered on its responsibility and duty to do what was "right." In short, he wanted a useful aristocracy and a polished middle class. During the height of Parliament's debate over the reform bills of the early 1830s, Arnold published the *Englishman's Register*, a weekly journal supporting reform; it lasted only 3 months.

It is as headmaster of Rugby that Arnold is primarily remembered, however. The whole tone of the school was improved during his tenure. He is credited with broadening its curriculum, improving living conditions, raising the status of the masters, and inaugurating administrative reforms (for example, masters' conferences and student involvement in school affairs). What was once regarded as one of England's worst schools was, by the time of his death, famous for its successful graduates.

EWB

Atatürk, Ghazi Mustapha Kemal (1881–1938), was a Turkish nationalist and political leader who was instrumental in the fall of the Ottoman sultanate and in the creation of modern Turkey.

Mustapha Kemal devoted his life to freeing Turkey from foreign domination. Under his benevolent dictatorship as president of the republic, he instituted lasting reforms that earned him the name Atatürk (the father of the Turks).

Mustapha was born in Salonika (now Greece, but then part of Turkish Macedonia), the son of a lower-middle-class Turkish customs official. He received a military education, and a teacher dubbed him Kemal (perfection) because of the youth's demand for quality performance. Kemal graduated from the military academy in Monastir in 1899 and then attended the war and staff colleges in Istanbul.

Military Career. In 1905, on the day Kemal was commissioned a lieutenant at the General Staff Academy in Istanbul, he was arrested for political agitation. Banishment to Syria failed to dampen his revolutionary ardor. He organized some officers of the 5th Army Corps in Damascus into a secret society, Vatan (fatherland). Kemal established branches during a secret visit to Salonika, where the organization became Fatherland and Liberty, then the Ottoman Society of Liberty, and subsequently part of the Committee of Union and Progress. Despite this political activity and narrow escape from a second arrest, Kemal was not active in the 1908 coup or in the Young Turk movement which toppled Abdul Hamid.

In 1911 Kemal secretly went to Libya to organize Senussi resistance against the invading Italians. A major in the Second Balkan War, he served as chief of staff to the army on Gallipoli. When World War I broke out, Col. Mustapha Kemal was serving in Bulgaria as the Ottoman military attaché. During the war he commanded armies on every one of the several Ottoman fronts. He gained national recognition during the defense of Gallipoli. Promoted to pasha and given command of the 2d Army Corps, he led his

troops and 3d Army forces in the Caucasus campaigns of 1916 and then was sent to the Hejaz. Correctly predicting the reverses to be expected in the Iraq campaign, he resigned but returned to service in 1918. Kemal was in command of the 7th Army withstanding the assault on Aleppo at war's end.

Reunification of Turkey. Peace was restored by the Mudros armistice of Oct. 30, 1918. The following May, 4 days after the Greeks landed troops in Turkey, Kemal was appointed inspector general of the 3d Army in Anatolia. From here he launched an anti-foreign movement that was to unify the Turkish elements in the empire against partition. At two conferences, at Erzerum on July 23 and at Sivas on September 11, he organized the Committee for the Defense of Eastern Asia Minor.

The Ferid Pasha government fell under this pressure, and new elections returned a Nationalist parliament. Its program, however, was sufficiently independent to prompt British occupation of the capital ostensibly to protect the Sultan. On March 20, 1920, the Ottoman parliament was dissolved. Some deputies fled to Ankara, where Kemal's committee convoked the first session of a new Grand National Assembly on April 23. It undertook both legislative and executive functions, with Kemal as president. Two governments were now functioning: the Sultan's in occupied Istanbul and Kemal's in Anatolia. This anomalous condition continued until the Allies forced the Sultan's assent to the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, which established foreign control over large parts of the Turkish Empire. Thereupon the last vestige of the Sultan's power disappeared in Anatolia.

Opposition to foreign occupation was the keystone of Turkish nationalism, but dissension among the Allies was to be of major benefit to the Kemalists. Kemal's first success was peace with Russia in December. This border settlement was followed by a friendship treaty in March 1921. The Italians and the French, apparently anticipating an eventual Nationalist victory, were enticed into exchanging territorial claims for economic concessions. The result was that by mid-1921 only the Greeks and British occupied Turkish territory.

Greek troops moved through Anatolia in 1921 with considerable success to enforce the rule of the Sultan. As generalissimo of Turkish forces, Kemal had unlimited power during this campaign, and he was supplied by Russia, Italy, and France. The Greeks were stopped at Sakarya in September 1921 and driven out in a big campaign the following year. The Nationalists made Kemal a marshal and designated him Ghazi

(victorious). The British concluded an armistice with the Turks at Mundanya on Oct. 11, 1922.

An international gathering at Lausanne in November 1920 set about revising the Treaty of Sèvres. The concurrent invitations issued the Nationalists and the Sultan's government precipitated the Grand National Assembly's dissolution of the sultanate of Mehmed VI on Nov. 1, 1922. On Oct. 29, 1923, Mustapha Kemal was elected president of the newly proclaimed Turkish Republic.

The interim period had been filled with the difficult task of negotiating the new treaty. The final document, signed July 24, 1923, established the compact, homogeneous entity known today as Turkey, freed of the onerous capitulations the Allies had expected to reimpose.

Turkish Republic. It had been Kemal's image as a national military hero which had assured the Nationalists a following in 1919. It was Kemal's determined leadership which assured the victory of 1923. It was to be Kemal's dictatorial guidance which subsequently defined the new Turkey.

Throughout the 1920s reform followed reform as the Turks undertook a shift from an Eastern to a Western orientation. President Kemal and his colleagues were Western-educated; the constitution of April 20, 1924, established in the republic a democratic state with elected representatives and all the typical popular guarantees. Yet Turkey remained a dictatorship throughout Kemal's time; he was a paternalistic ruler, convinced that he knew the nation's needs and how to satisfy them. Although democratic institutions were in existence, it was not the legislature which dominated but the Peoples' (in 1923 Republican Peoples') party, an outgrowth of the 1919 national group founded at Erzerum-Sivas. Kemal was party president. Policy was made in party caucus and then enacted as legislation by the Assembly. The party also selected and placed candidates, and there was no opposition slate. Kemal was reelected president of Turkey in 1927, 1931, and 1935 by the Assembly.

Kemal's Reforms. The haphazard reforms of the late 1920s were systematized by President Kemal in 1931 under six topics termed collectively "Kemalism": (1) republicanism, marked by the ending of the sultanate, the new republican constitution, and adoption of Western law codes in 1926; (2) secularism, eliminating the all-pervasive aspects of Islam from daily life, including polygamy, the Moslem calendar, and dervish religious orders; (3) populism, ending special privileges characterized formerly by religious exemptions, minority distinctions, and capit-

ulations; the ancient Turkish peasant's democratic past was rediscovered and reemphasized, education fostered, the language purified, and the script romanized; (4) nationalism, concentrating on building Turkish pride through rewritten patriotic histories, emphasis on vernacular studies, and adoption of family names; (5) statism, introducing a form of state enterprise freed from outside manipulation and the foreign concessions of the past; it provided for the development of tariff-protected industries and increased government concern over agricultural output; (6) reformism, the continual revitalization of the movement to avoid its leadership's turning conservative and stagnating.

These Kemalist principles became the party platform in the 1935 elections and were added to the constitution in 1937. Kemal was an active president. Noted for his oratorical skill while in military school, he now utilized this asset to considerable advantage, moving readily about the country, eagerly explaining new laws. In one famous speech the President spoke over a period of 6 days.

Kemalist Turkey's foreign relations involved territorial settlements on Mosul and Alexandretta, an active role in the League of Nations after admission in 1932, and neighborly alliances in the Balkan Entente (1934) and the Saadabad Pact (1937). The most notable achievement was the Montreux Convention of 1936, by which Turkey regained control of the Straits.

Despite his posts as chief of state and party leader, Kemal was not a glory-grabber. He abhorred shallow ceremony and scorned pomp. In public life he was an incorruptible dynamo, but his riotous private life confounded many. Cirrhosis killed Atatürk on Nov. 10, 1938, his death accelerated by wild living and too much drinking.

EWB

B

Bacon, Francis (1561–1626), English philosopher, statesman, and author. Bacon was the chief figure of the English Renaissance. His advocacy of “active science” influenced the culture of the English-speaking world.

Francis Bacon was born in London on Jan. 22, 1561, the younger son of Sir Nicholas Bacon and his second wife, Lady Anne Bacon. Through the families of both parents he had important connections with the political and cultural life of Tudor England. His father was lord keeper of the great seal under Elizabeth I, and his maternal grandfather had been tutor to Edward VI.

Bacon entered Trinity College, Cambridge, in April 1573 and completed his studies there in Decem-

ber 1575. He began to study law at Gray's Inn, but his studies were interrupted for 2½ years while he served with Sir Amyas Paulet, the English ambassador to France. Upon his father's death Bacon returned to England, reentered Gray's Inn, and became a barrister in June 1592.

Bacon's literary work was accomplished, for the most part, during a life taken up with affairs of state. His public career began with his first election to Parliament in 1584. He early sought a position at court and Elizabeth I did make him Queen's counsel, but his ambitions for higher positions, supported by the Earl of Essex, were frustrated.

In 1592, on the anniversary of the Queen's coronation, Essex presented an entertainment composed by Bacon. In the speech in praise of knowledge he states his lifelong theme: “the sovereignty of man lieth hid in knowledge . . . now we govern nature in opinions, but are thrall to her in necessities; but if we would be led by her in invention, we should command her in action.” Bacon tied himself closely to Essex and received many favors from him but later helped prosecute him for treason. While his part in the fate of Essex has been criticized as an ungrateful betrayal, it has also been defended as a duty painfully performed.

His Publications. Bacon's first publication, in 1597, was a collection of 10 essays mainly devoted to aphorisms on political behavior. These were expanded and 29 new essays published with them in 1612. A still further enlarged edition, including 58 essays, appeared in 1625.

Bacon was knighted 4 months after the accession of James I in 1603, and in 1607 he was appointed solicitor general. In the meantime he had published *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), hoping to move James to support science. *De sapientia veterum* (*On the Wisdom of the Ancients*), an interpretation of ancient myths, was published in 1609. In the next dozen years Bacon's fortunes soared. In 1613 he was appointed attorney general; in 1616 to the Privy Council; in 1617 lord keeper; and in 1618 lord chancellor and Baron Verulam.

In 1620 *Novum organum* (*New Method*), was published as Part II of *The Great Instauration*. The entire project was never completed, and this part is not complete itself, but Bacon's reputation as a philosopher of science rests mainly upon it. The plan for the renewal of the sciences had six parts: a survey of existing knowledge, Bacon's inductive logic, an encyclopedia of all natural phenomena, examples of the New Method's application, Bacon's discoveries, and

an exposition of the New Philosophy that would finally emerge.

Last Years. In 1621, on his sixtieth birthday, Bacon was at the height of his career. He celebrated the occasion with a party at York House on the Strand, his birthplace. Among the guests was Ben Jonson. Five days later Bacon was created Viscount St. Albans. Disaster struck soon after. He was convicted by the High Court of Parliament for accepting bribes, sentenced to a fine and imprisonment, and banned from public office and Parliament. Here again, the degree of Bacon's guilt, which he admitted, and its moral evaluation have raised controversy.

The last 4 years of his life he devoted to writing *History of Henry VII*, *De augmentis scientiarum* (1623), *The New Atlantis* (1624), *Sylva sylvarum* (1627), and a number of other pieces.

He died on April 9, 1626, appropriately, however unfortunately, as the combined result of a scientific experiment and a political gesture. Leaving London, he decided to try the effect of cold in inhibiting putrefaction, and he stuffed with snow a hen he purchased from a woman along the way. He caught a chill and went to the nearby house of Lord Arundel, where the servants, in deference to his importance, made available the best bed. It, disastrously, was in a room that had not been adequately warmed or aired out, and Bacon contracted the bronchitis that brought about his death a week later.

Bacon's Philosophy. Bacon developed a dislike for Aristotelian philosophy at Trinity College, and he also opposed Platonism. He felt that Aristotle's system was more suited to disputation than to discovery of new truth and that Plato's doctrine of innate knowledge turned the mind inward upon itself, "away from observation and away from things." Bacon's new method emphasized "the commerce of the mind with things." Science was to be experimental, to take note of how human activity produces changes in things and not merely to record what happens independently of what men do. This is part of what Bacon means by "active science." Still more fundamental is an ethical component. Science should be a practical instrument for human betterment. Bacon's attitude is best summed up in a passage from "Plan of the Work" in *The Great Instauration*, describing the sixth part, on "The New Philosophy or Active Science." "Man is the helper and interpreter of Nature. He can only act and understand insofar as by working upon her he has come to perceive her order. Beyond this he has neither knowledge nor power. For there is no strength that can break the causal chain. Accordingly these twin goals, human sci-

ence and human power, come in the end to one. To be ignorant of causes is to be frustrated in action."

In the aphorism which concludes Book I of *Novum organum*, two rules of scientific procedure are emphasized: "to drop all preconceived notions and make a fresh start; and . . . to refrain for a while from trying to rise to the most general conclusions or even near to them." The fresh start requires the mind to overcome the influence of four "Idols," tendencies that inhibit the search for truth. The Idols of the Tribe are common to mankind generally. The Idols of the Cave are the tendencies of each man to see truth in relation to his own particular interests and disposition. The Idols of the Theater are the traditional philosophical systems. The Idols of the Market Place are errors that arise from language.

Science should start with what Bacon called Tables of Investigation. The Table of Presence lists instances in which the phenomenon being studied occurs. The Table of Absence in Proximity includes the important negative instances; these are the ones most like the positive instances. The Table of Comparison compares the degrees of the phenomenon.

Interpretation begins with a brief survey which will suggest the correct explanation of the phenomenon. Although this "anticipation" resembles a hypothesis, there is in Bacon's discussions no clear indication that he recognized the central scientific importance of devising and testing hypotheses. He goes on to consider "prerogative instances," those most likely to facilitate interpretation, of which he classifies 27 different types. By following the method outlined, scientific investigation is supposed to produce, almost mechanically, a gradually increasing generality of understanding, a "ladder of axioms" upon which the mind can climb up or down.

Bacon's program was too ambitious and in its particulars it has been of little influence. His approach did serve, however, to encourage detailed, concrete observation and experimentation and a system of scientific theory tied to them. His identification as the Moses of modern science or the Columbus of the mind is therefore not entirely inapt.

EWB

Baden-Powell, Robert (1857–1941), British military officer, administrator, author and the founder of the Boy Scouts and the Girl Guides. Baden-Powell served with the British Army for thirty-four years beginning in 1876. Early in his career he displayed an aptitude for military scouting and in 1876 wrote a handbook entitled *Reconnaissance and Scouting*. Baden-Powell distinguished himself as a leader with his participation in the defense of Mafeking during the Boer

War. In 1900 he organized the South African Constabulary and acted as its inspector general until 1903, when he was named inspector general of cavalry.

Baden-Powell is said to have conceived of the idea of Boy Scouting in 1908 while on a camping trip with a group of English schoolboys. Later that year his book *Scouting for Boys: A Handbook for Instruction in Good Citizenship* elicited public enthusiasm for a scouting organization. At the urging of King Edward VII, Baden-Powell retired from the Army in 1910 to develop the Boy Scout and Girl Guide movements. A knight commander of the Royal Victorian Order and a conferee of the Grand Cross of St. Michael and St. George, Baden-Powell was named chief scout of the world at the first Boy Scout Jamboree, held in London in 1920. He was a prolific author whose books included *Sport in War* (1900), *An Old Wolf's Favourites: Animals I Have Known* (1921), and an autobiography titled *Lessons of a Lifetime* (1933). He also founded *The Scout* magazine.

CA

Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich (1895–1975), Russian philosopher and literary critic. Mikhail Bakhtin was the central figure of an intellectual circle that focused on the social nature of language, literature, and meaning in the years between World War I and World War II. Though his major works were not widely read until after the 1960s, his ideas were later adopted by many academic spheres and have contributed to new directions in philosophy, linguistics, and literary theory.

Although relatively unknown outside Soviet intellectual circles during his lifetime, the writings of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin have had a significant influence in the fields of literary theory, linguistics, and philosophy. In works such as *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (1929, 1963), *Rabelais and His World* (1965), and *The Dialogic Imagination* (1975), Bakhtin outlined theories on the social nature of language, literature, and meaning. With the spread of his ideas in the Western academic world, Bakhtin has become one of the major figures of twentieth-century literary theory.

Bakhtin was born on November 16, 1895, in the city of Orel in the southern part of Russia. He was the third of five children in a family that had been part of the nobility since the Middle Ages, but no longer held land or title. His father was a state bank official, as his grandfather had been. Although the family relocated at various times throughout Bakhtin's childhood, he was provided with a thorough education. At home, he and his older brother, Nikolai, received lessons in Greek poetry from a German gov-

erness. After the family moved to Vilnius, Lithuania, when he was nine, he attended schools in the Russian-ruled city. At the age of 15, Bakhtin traveled with his family to Odessa in the Ukraine, where he graduated from the First Gymnasium and then studied philology (the study of literature and language) at the University of Odessa for a year.

Attracted by Philosophical Ideas. In his early adolescent years, Bakhtin began to develop an interest in radical philosophical ideas. He immersed himself in a wide range of books, including the works of German philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He was encouraged in his pursuits and exposed to a developing spirit of revolutionary change by his brother and a circle of friends, with whom he would hold discussions and debates about new concepts. This early habit of questioning established ideas would become a lifelong practice for Bakhtin. Another important theme of his life first appeared during these years. At the age of 16, he was stricken with osteomyelitis, a disease that causes inflammation and destruction of bone tissue. This chronic condition and other bouts of poor health affected his work and activities for the rest of his life.

Bakhtin entered the University of St. Petersburg in Russia in 1914. There he studied philosophy and literature with a number of professors while sharing living quarters with his older brother. When the political turmoil of the Russian Revolution broke out in 1917, Nikolai joined the White Army, the military group supporting Russian royal rule against the Bolshevik revolutionary forces. With the defeat of the royal forces, Nikolai left for England. Bakhtin, however, stayed in school throughout this time and graduated in 1918.

Bakhtin Circle Established. Over the next ten years, Bakhtin began to develop the ideas that would lead to his major writings. Having moved with his family to the Belorussian town of Nevel in 1918, Bakhtin began meeting with a group of intellectuals that would become known as the "Bakhtin Circle." The members of the group discussed such topics as the effects of the Russian Revolution on the social and cultural lives of Soviet citizens and the role of social reality in the meaning of artistic works and language. Bakhtin published his first paper the following year in a local journal. The two-page article was titled, "Art and Responsibility." He would not publish again for another decade.

In 1920, he moved to the town of Vitebsk, where he held a number of jobs, including a teaching position at the Vitebsk Higher Institute of Education.

His intellectual work from this time included a number of unpublished writings, including the notebooks he kept. At Vitebsk, Bakhtin was joined by his friends from his circle in Nevel, including Lev Vasilyevich Pumpiansky and Valentin Nikolayevich Voloshinov. In addition, new people such as Ivan Ivanovich Solertinsky and Pavel Nikolayevich Medvedev joined the group. In 1921, Bakhtin formed another important relationship. Suffering from his continued battle with osteomyelitis, his health declined even further when he contracted typhoid. A woman who nursed him through this period of illness, Elena Aleksandrova Okolovich, became his wife later in the same year.

From 1924 to 1929, Bakhtin lived in Leningrad (the name given to St. Petersburg after the Revolution). Prevented from working because of his poor health, his only income was a small medical pension. He did, however, continue to meet with the members of the Bakhtin Circle in their homes, where he would occasionally give lectures. Papers published by his associates during this time reflect many of Bakhtin's ideas; whether the critic was the sole author, co-author, or simply the philosophical inspiration for these writings is a matter of debate. Some of the works in question include the book *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship*, published in 1928 by Medvedev and the 1929 work *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* by Voloshinov. These works reflect the basic idea of the Bakhtin Circle that language is fundamentally a sociological force. Just as society, or popular culture, is continually changing and growing with the exchange of experiences and ideas, so does the meaning of language take on new dimensions with every act of reading, listening, or responding. In this way, Bakhtin and his colleagues established the concept of the "dialogic," or social nature of language, which was also extended to all artistic acts and utterances. These works by Medvedev and Voloshinov were couched in the language and themes of Marxism, making them acceptable for publication in the young communist state.

In 1929, Bakhtin and several members of his circle were arrested. The official reasons for Bakhtin's arrest included his religious practices: he had retained his Christian practices and beliefs even after all expressions of religion had been banned in the Soviet Union. He was sentenced, without a trial, to ten years of exile in the northern Soviet region of Siberia. With his health problems, such a severe sentence was a serious threat to Bakhtin's life. Several prominent political and cultural figures sympathized with the author's plight and lobbied for a reduced sentence. Due perhaps in large part to a favorable review of his Dostoevsky book by the Commissar of Enlightenment,

Bakhtin's sentence was eventually reduced to six years in Kazakhstan. In 1930 he received permission to travel to the city of Kustani and find work himself, rather than being assigned a job by the government. He secured a position as an accountant in a local government office; he also helped train workers in the area in clerical skills. Although his exile officially ended in 1934, Bakhtin opted to remain in Kustani for another two years.

He returned to Russia in 1936, settling in Saransk and taking a teaching job at the Mordovian Pedagogical Institute. In 1937, he moved to the town of Savelovo; being only a hundred kilometers outside Moscow, he was able to once again appear in intellectual and academic gatherings. But the coming years were filled with a number of frustrations and disappointments. His physical health suffered another blow in 1938 when his right leg was amputated. Professionally, he seemed assured of success when a number of his papers were accepted for publication. But with the start of World War II, these works were not printed.

Carnival Theory Applied to Literature. This adversity seemed to spark a period of great productivity in Bakhtin. He gave lectures on the novel at Moscow's Gorky Institute and completed a dissertation on sixteenth-century French satirist Francois Rabelais for the institute in 1940. This work, which was expanded and published in 1965 as *Rabelais and His World*, stands alongside *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* as one of Bakhtin's most important writings. In this work, Bakhtin examines the cultural and political hierarchies that existed in European society in the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance period. He postulated that popular culture embraced an earlier way of life that stressed communal living and working that directly clashed with the increasing power of central governments and noble classes. The tension between the "official" world of power, government, and religion and the unacknowledged world of popular culture was only free to be expressed, according to Bakhtin, in the environment of the carnival—a holiday atmosphere in which all things held sacred and mighty were free to be subjected to laughter and satire, a time when all boundaries were temporarily dissolved. Bakhtin finds this kind of carnivalesque subversion in the novels of Rabelais, whom he credits with heralding the modern era and a new philosophy of history.

Although he began working as a German instructor in the schools of Savelovo in 1941, Bakhtin continued to concentrate on his writing, turning out articles on the novel that were later collected in *The Dialogic Imagination*, published in 1975. Bakhtin

worked in Savelovo from 1942 to 1945 as an instructor in Russian. He returned to the Mordovian Pedagogical Institute in Saransk in 1945, where he attained the rank of department chair. After submitting and defending his dissertation in the late 1940s, he was finally awarded a degree of candidate in 1951. When the institute became a university six years later, Bakhtin's scholarship and reputation as a teacher earned him the position of head of the department of Russian and foreign literatures.

Reputation Increased in Later Years. Despite these advancements, Bakhtin's ideas were little known outside his academic and intellectual circles of friends. Beginning in the mid-1950s, his work began to earn a limited amount of recognition elsewhere.

At this time of rising acclaim, Bakhtin continued to publish, but once again ill health limited his activities. He and his wife—who was also unwell—moved to Moscow in 1967 and then to Grevno in 1970 for medical care. After his wife's death in 1971 from a heart condition, Bakhtin settled in an apartment in Moscow. He spent his last years fighting both emphysema and his osteomyelitis, but he did not abandon his writing. He died in Moscow on March 7, 1975. After his death, more of his works were published and his influence gradually spread throughout the world, due in great part to the interest of Western academics. In this way, his own work took on a life of ongoing growth and interpretation the kind of existence that Bakhtin had claimed for all acts of language. Long after the moment of writing and years after the death of the author, the works of Bakhtin have been the subject of numerous readings and responses that have added new dimensions to fields concerned with language and the nature of meaning, including linguistics, philosophy, and literary criticism.

EWB

Bakunin, Mikhail Aleksandrovich (1814–1876), Russian revolutionary agitator was the leading spirit of 19th-century anarchism. Mikhail Bakunin viewed revolution as the necessary means of destroying the political domination of individuals by the state.

Mikhail Bakunin was born on May 18, 1814, in Premukhino in the Tver Province to a retired diplomat and landowner. After finishing his studies at the artillery school, he received a commission as an officer in the Guards. It is said that his father was angry with him and asked that Mikhail be transferred to the regular army. Stranded in a desolate village of White Russia with his battery, Bakunin became depressed and unsociable. He neglected his duties and would lie for days wrapped in a sheepskin. The battery commander

felt sorry for him; he had no alternative, however, but to remind Bakunin that he must either perform his duties or be discharged. Bakunin chose to take the latter course and asked to be relieved of his commission.

Bakunin went to Moscow in 1836, and from that date life began in earnest for him. He had studied nothing before, he had read nothing, and his knowledge of German was very poor. But he was blessed with a gift for dialectics and for constant, persistent thinking. He mastered German to study the philosophies of Immanuel Kant, Johann Fichte, and G. W. F. Hegel. In 1842, while living in Berlin, Bakunin published an impassioned essay declaring Hegelianism a revolutionary tool and ending with the dictum that was to become the motto of international anarchism: "The passion for destruction is also a creative passion." Bakunin participated in the Paris Revolution of 1848, made a fruitless attempt to organize a secret revolutionary international campaign for a Czech revolt, and participated in the Dresden rebellion of 1849. He was imprisoned in Russia until 1857 and then exiled to Siberia. In 1861 he escaped from Siberia to Japan, and on his way to Europe he stopped off in the United States. He declared his intention of becoming an American citizen. The poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow portrayed the Russian in his diary as "a giant of a man with a most ardent, seething temperament."

Mission in Life. In 1862 Bakunin joined the revolutionary leaders Aleksandr Herzen and Nicholas Ogarev in London. Bakunin's intention was to devote all his energies to fighting for the freedom of the Russians and all the Slavs. He had not yet devised his anarchist doctrines, and he found himself advocating some of Herzen's views. Temperamentally the two men were so incompatible that they could not be comrades-in-arms, though they remained good friends. Bakunin's instincts were all against moderation, and conspiratorial intrigue was his goal. He embraced the cause of land and liberty and plunged into plotting with immense zest. He had plans for agitating in the army and among the peasantry, and he played with the idea of a vast revolutionary organization ringing Russia with a network of agents at strategic points on the border. Siberia was to be served by a branch located on the western coast of the United States.

Concept of Revolution. Bakunin reached the conclusion that revolution is necessary, regardless of the point of the critique of society from which it starts. He frequently attempted to give a philosophical foundation to revolution. The whole history of mankind appeared to him as "the revolutionary negation

of the past. . . . Man has liberated himself (by breaking the divine commandment not to eat of the tree of knowledge); he has divided himself from animal and made himself man; he began his history and his human development with his act of disobedience and knowledge, that is, with rebellion and thought.”

Bakunin held that there are principles which are the moving force of both the individual and the historical process. These are human animality, thought, and revolt. Social and private economy correspond to the first, science to the second, and freedom to the third. Man has an innate instinct for revolt, therefore, man’s perpetual rebellion, which may lead to self-sacrifice and self-destruction, does not depend on either right or obligation but is immediately bestowed along with his humanity. Revolution can be looked upon as a theoretically perpetual situation or as an almost-infinite process. In theory, revolution may at some time cease and be replaced by a new order; in practice, it lasts so long that it must claim the attention of at least a whole generation. According to Bakunin, the goal of his generation was to destroy; the reconstruction would be done by others who would be better, fresher, and wiser. Bakunin never abandoned this view.

Exponent of Anarchism. The failure of the Polish insurrection in 1863 was a big disappointment to Bakunin, who henceforth became absorbed in a campaign of universal anarchy. Anarchism called for the replacement of the state with a loose confederation of autonomous units that would both end the injustices of private property and assure individual freedom. The millennium was to be achieved through an international rebellion set off by small groups of anarchist conspirators. Bakunin’s anarchism, in theory, meant not disorder but lack of domination, a system without political power. Bakunin was also a militant atheist and thought religion was as great an enemy of freedom as the state was. At the end he appears to have lost his confidence in spontaneous popular uprising as the only sure method of destroying state governments.

Bakunin died in Bern, Switzerland, on July 1, 1876. His lifelong friend Herzen once remarked about Bakunin: “This man was born not under an ordinary star, but under a comet.”

EWB

Barthes, Roland (1919–1980), French critic. Roland Barthes was a leading figure in semiology, a critical method that analyzes expression—from the artistic to the merely communicative—as a system of signs. His principal subject was, inevitably, language

itself, and his principal theme was the imprecision of language as a means of communicating a fixed idea. For Barthes, any literary work yields a multiplicity of interpretations, and even literary interpretations of a given work are open to varied readings. Therefore, a reduction of Barthes’s own work is somewhat paradoxical: His basic premise is that there is no such thing as one basic premise.

The development of Barthes’s critique of language was influenced by several schools of thought: first by Marxism and the work of Jean-Paul Sartre; second by structuralism; third by such post-structuralist thinkers as Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva; and fourth by aesthetic introspection. Of the first phase, Barthes’s most significant work is *Le Degre zero de l’écriture* (*Writing Degree Zero*), in which he considers both language and literature within historical contexts. Prior to the class upheavals of the mid-nineteenth century, Barthes claims, all literature adhered to basic premises of logic and continuity. In the alienating, chaotic twentieth century, however, literature fragmented into various dissimilar styles. For Barthes, the only response to this confusing state, in which a work’s style becomes its content, is to promote a colorless, “objective” literature—what he called “writing degree zero”—as exemplified by such writers as Albert Camus and Alain Robbe-Grillet. With *Writing Degree Zero* Barthes showed himself to be a provocative critical theorist.

Another among Barthes’s early works is the essay collection *Mythologies*. Included in this volume is “Myth Today,” in which Barthes explicates and elaborates his notion of myth as a form of expression within an historical context. He sees such phenomena as professional wrestling and the fashion industry as contemporary myths, and he finds these myths consistent with the increasing prevalence of bourgeois ideology, which, as a Marxist, he disdains as benefiting only the ruling class. But the political left, he laments, offers little alternative, wedded as it is to socio-political issues.

In *Mythologies* Barthes discusses a wide range of topics, and in subsequent books he continues to apply himself broadly. In *Elements de semiologie* (*Elements of Semiology*), first published in France in 1964, he moves into his second, structuralist, phase, outlining semiology as a method for perceiving virtually anything—even physical movements or noises—as systems. Beginning with an overview of the concepts of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), whose groundbreaking work in the theoretical foundation of the study of language resulted in the consideration of language as a social phenomenon, Barthes expands them into such areas as food selection and clothing.

After entering into an explication of such semiological relationships as signifier- signified-signification, he then takes up the consideration of the dual “axes” of language—syntagmas (individual “utterances”) and the entire language system taken as a whole—and illustrates their application.

In a related work, *Systeme de la mode* (*The Fashion System*), Barthes examines fashion magazines for their semiological content. He maintains that “discourse” through the language of clothing occurs on two levels—denotation and connotation—and that the significance of such discourse is valued independently of the wearer.

Among Barthes’s other works devoted to the visual forms of language are *The Eiffel Tower and Other Mythologies*, first published in France in 1964, and his controversial *The Empire of Signs*. Written as a sequel to *Mythologies*, *The Eiffel Tower* comprises a series of twenty-nine essays devoted to the continued examination of the many layers of “language” structures that underlie modern culture and social interaction.

In the radical *S/Z* Barthes devotes himself to an exhaustive post-structuralist semiological analysis of Honore de Balzac’s story “Sarrasine.” Barthes further explores reading in *Le Plaisir du texte* (*The Pleasure of the Text*), a relatively accessible work that characterizes reading as a sensual, nearly hedonistic activity. Reading, Barthes charges, is a deliberate, contemplative means of obtaining pleasure and satisfaction, and as such it is far more than mere intellectual process.

When *The Pleasure of the Text* appeared in French in 1973 (and in English in 1975), Barthes was recognized as a leading figure in French critical thought. With other intellectuals, ranging from radical psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan to controversial socio-historical theorist Michel Foucault, Barthes enjoyed immense influence in both Europe and the United States. Throughout the remainder of the 1970s, with works such as *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes* (*Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes*) and *Fragments d’un discours amoureux* (*A Lover’s Discourse*), Barthes added to his stature as a provocative, engaging thinker. *A Lover’s Discourse* proved a particularly intriguing work, for in it Barthes presents uncharacteristically poignant ruminations on love, its expression, and its articulations. Despite its subject, however, *A Lover’s Discourse* is hardly an uplifting work. Barthes views love as an exhausting, enslaving emotion, one that often seems masochistic.

In 1980, only a few years after publishing *A Lover’s Discourse*, Barthes was fatally struck by an automobile while crossing a Paris street; one month later he died from the massive chest injuries incurred during the accident. But with the *Barthes Reader* anthol-

ogy—edited by Sontag—and several posthumous volumes, Barthes continues to hold high standing in academia as one of his country’s most important contemporary thinkers.

Barthes died of chest injuries sustained in an automobile accident, March 25, 1980, in Paris.

CA

Beauvoir, Simone de (1908–1986), French writer. Simone Beauvoir first articulated what has since become the basis of the modern feminist movement. She was the author of novels, autobiographies, and non-fiction analysis dealing with women’s position in a male-dominated world.

Simone Beauvoir set out to live her life as an example to her contemporaries and chronicled that life for those who followed. Fiercely independent, an ardent feminist before there was such a movement, her life was her legacy and her work was to memorialize that life.

“I was born at four o’clock in the morning on the ninth of January 1908, in a room fitted with white-enameled furniture and overlooking the Boulevard Raspail.” Thus begins the first of four memoirs written by Beauvoir. It is through these autobiographies that Beauvoir’s readers best know her, and it is in her book *The Second Sex*, an early feminist manifesto, that Beauvoir synthesized that life into the context of the historical condition of women.

The first child of a vaguely noble couple, Beauvoir was a willful girl, prone to temper tantrums. Her sister, Poupette, was born when Beauvoir was two and a half, and the two had a warm relationship. After World War I her father never fully recovered his financial security and the family moved to a more modest home; the daughters were told they had lost their dowries. Forced to choose a profession, Beauvoir entered the Sorbonne and began to take courses in philosophy to become a teacher. She also began keeping a journal—which became a lifetime habit—and writing some stories.

Link with Sartre. When Beauvoir was 21 she joined a group of philosophy students including Jean-Paul Sartre. Her relationship with Sartre intellectually, emotionally, and romantically was to continue throughout most of their lives. Sartre, the father of existentialism a school of thought that holds man is on his own, “condemned to be free,” as Sartre says in *Being and Nothingness* was the single most important influence on Beauvoir’s life.

In 1929 Sartre suggested that, rather than be married, the two sign a conjugal pact which could be renewed or cancelled after two years. When the pact

came due, Sartre was offered a job teaching philosophy in Le Havre and Beauvoir was offered a similar job in Marseilles. He suggested they get married, but they both rejected the idea for fear of forcing their free relationship into the confines of an outer-defined bond. It is indeed ironic that de Beauvoir, whose independence marked her life at every juncture, was perhaps best known as Sartre's lover.

The first installment of Beauvoir's autobiography, *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter*, is the story of the author's rejection of the bourgeois values of her parents' lives. The second volume, *The Prime of Life*, covers the years 1929 through 1944. Written in the post-war years, she separated the events taking place in Europe that led to the war from her own, isolated life. By 1939, however, the two strands were inseparable. Both Beauvoir and Sartre were teaching in Paris when the war broke out. Earlier she had written two novels that she never submitted for publication and one collection of short stories that was rejected for publication. She was, she said, too happy to write.

That happiness ended in the 1940s with the outbreak of World War II and the interruption of her relationship with Sartre. The introduction of another woman into Sartre's life, and then the anxiety and loneliness Beauvoir felt while Sartre was a prisoner for more than a year led to her first significant novel, *She Came to Stay*, published in 1943. *She Came to Stay* is a study of the effects of love and jealousy. In the next four years she published *The Blood of Others*, *Pyrrhus et Cinéas*, *Les Bouches Inutiles*, and *All Men Are Mortal*.

America Day By Day, a chronicle of Beauvoir's 1947 trip to the United States, and the third installment of her autobiography, *Force of Circumstances*, cover the period during which the author was formulating and writing *The Second Sex*, her feminist tract.

The Second Sex. Written in 1949, *The Second Sex* is blunt and inelegant like her other writing. Its power comes from its content. Her themes and method of attack in *The Second Sex* are also the reoccurring issues of her work. The book rests on two theses: that man, who views himself as the essential being, has made woman into the inessential being, "the Other," and that femininity as a trait is an artificial posture. Both theses derive from Sartre's existentialism.

The Second Sex was perhaps the most important treatise on women's rights through the 1980s. When it first appeared, however, the reception was less than overwhelming. The lesson of her own life—that womanhood is not a condition one is born to but rather a posture one takes on—was fully realized here. Beauvoir's personal frustrations were placed in terms of the

general, dependent condition of women. Historical, psychological, sociological, and philosophical, *The Second Sex* does not offer any concrete solutions except "that men and women rise above their natural differentiation and unequivocally affirm their brotherhood."

If *The Second Sex* bemoans the female condition, Beauvoir's portrayal of her own life revealed the possibilities available to the woman who can escape enslavement. Hers was a life of equality, yet Beauvoir remained a voice and a model for those women whose lives were not liberated.

The fourth installment of her autobiography, *All Said and Done*, was written when Beauvoir was 63. It portrays a person who has always been secure in an imperfect world. She writes: "Since I was 21, I have never been lonely. The opportunities granted to me at the beginning helped me not only to lead a happy life but to be happy in the life I led. I have been aware of my shortcomings and my limits, but I have made the best of them. When I was tormented by what was happening in the world, it was the world I wanted to change, not my place in it."

Beauvoir died of a circulatory ailment in a Parisian hospital April 14, 1986. Sartre had died six years earlier.

EWB

Behn, Aphra (ca. 1640–1689), English poet, novelist, and playwright. Aphra Behn was the first of her gender to earn a living as a writer in the English language.

Aphra Behn was a successful author at a time when few writers, especially if they were women, could support themselves solely through their writing. For the flourishing London stage she penned numerous plays, and found success as a novelist and poet as well and through much of her work ran a decidedly feminist strain that challenged society's restrictions upon women of her day. For this she was scorned, and she endured criticism and even arrest at times. Another similarly free-thinking female novelist of a more recent era, Virginia Woolf, declared that "all women together ought to let flowers fall upon the tomb of Aphra Behn," according to Carol Howard's essay on Behn in the *Dictionary of Literary Biography*, "... for it was she who earned them the right to speak their minds."

A Childhood in Kent. It is likely that Behn was the infant girl Eaffry Johnson, born in late 1640 according to baptismal records from the church of St. Michael's in Harbledown, a small village near Canterbury, England. This region of England, Kent, was a conservative, insular county during Behn's youth,

but the English realm itself was anything but calm during her era; Behn's fortunes and alliances would be tied to the series of political crises that occurred during the seventeenth century, and her literary output drew from and even satirized the vying factions. First came a Civil War that pitted Puritans against King Charles I; the monarchy was abolished with the king's beheading in 1649. Until 1658 England was ruled by Puritan revolt leader Oliver Cromwell, and upon his death in 1658 the monarchy was restored; hence the term for the era in which Behn wrote, Restoration England.

Behn was likely the daughter of a barber and a wet-nurse, and through her mother's care for the children of local landed gentry, the Colepeppers, Behn probably had access to some educational opportunities. Literary scholars agree that Behn most likely left England as a young woman with her family in 1663 when her father was appointed to a military post in Surinam, on the northeast coast of South America. It was an arduous journey, and some evidence suggests that Behn's father did not survive the trip. In any event, Behn, her mother, and sister stayed on at the English settlement for a time until a return trip home was possible, and the experience provided the basis for her most famous literary work, *Oroonoko; or, The Royal Slave*.

***Oroonoko* in the Annals of English Literature.** This novel, published only near the end of Behn's career in 1688, chronicles the tale of a cultivated, intelligent West African prince who speaks several European languages. Literary historians trace the development of realism in the novel back to this 1688 volume. Realism is a literary style that uses real life as the basis for fiction, without idealizing it or imbuing it with a romantic bias, and it became prevalent in the nineteenth century. Behn's *Oroonoko* has also been termed groundbreaking for its depiction of the institution of slavery as cruel and inhumane, making it one of literary history's first abolitionist proclamations. Behn has been praised for her characterization of Oroonoko, a just and decent man who encounters some very cruel traits among his white enemies; critics point to him as European literature's first portrayal of the "noble savage."

Astrea the Spy. England's troubles with Holland played a decisive part in Behn's fortunes as a young woman. Following her return to England in 1664, she met and married a Dutch merchant by the name of Hans Behn. Though it has been hinted that her brief marriage may have been her own fiction—widows were more socially respectable than single

women during her era—other sources indicate the unfortunate Hans Behn died in an outbreak of the bubonic plague that swept through London in 1665. Later, many of Behn's works satirized Dutch merchants, the cultural icons of the era when Holland was growing rich from trade and giving birth to the first class of savvy capitalists. Behn may have been well-off herself for a time, and became a favorite at the Court of Charles II for her ebullient personality and witty repartee.

But then Behn's fortunes took a turn for the worse. It appears that she suddenly became destitute—perhaps after her husband died—and in 1666 was summoned into the service of the King as an agent in the war against Holland. She went to Antwerp to renew contact with a former lover, William Scot, who was a spy in the city; Scot was an Englishman who was involved in an expatriate group who once again wanted to abolish the monarchy. Behn's mission was to get him to switch sides, and to send reports on behalf of Charles II back to England in invisible ink using the code name "Astrea." During her work as an infiltrator Behn learned of plans to annihilate the English fleet in the Thames and, in June of 1667, Dutch naval forces did so. Yet her English spymasters left her virtually abandoned in a foreign enemy nation with no money—for a woman in the seventeenth century, this necessitated a very distressing and extreme crisis. She probably borrowed a sum, managed to return to England, and still was unremunerated by Charles II. Her numerous pleading letters, which still survive, were met with silence. She landed in debtor's prison in 1668, but at this point someone paid her debt and she was released.

Writing as a Profession. It was at this juncture that Behn resolved to support herself. She moved to London, and took up writing in earnest—not a revolutionary act at the time for a woman, but to expect to make a living at it certainly was. In Behn's day, a woman possessed no assets, could not enter into contracts herself, and was essentially powerless. Financial support came from a woman's father, and then her husband. Some well-born women escaped such strictures by becoming mistresses; others did so by entering a convent. The Restoration was a somewhat debauched period in English history, however, and its libertine ways were well-documented. Behn's ambitions coincided with the revival of the London stage; the Civil War had darkened the city's already-famed theaters in the 1640s and the London plague further shuttered them, but as England regained stability Charles II re-instituted the two main companies. Behn began writing for one of them, Duke's Company at

Dorset Garden, and her first play was produced in September of 1670. *The Forc'd Marriage; or, The Jealous Bridegroom* ran for six nights, a successful run, since playwrights usually went unpaid until the third evening's box-office take. The plot concerned a romantic comedy of errors, which was standard fare for the day.

Behn would pen a number of works for the stage over the next dozen years. Most were light-hearted tales of thwarted love and cavalier seduction.

Found Fodder in Restoration Foibles. One of her final plays, *The Roundheads; or, The Good Old Cause*, was produced in 1682 and achieved notoriety for the way in which Behn's pen ridiculed a faction of republican parliamentarians. But Behn's strong opinions landed her in trouble that same year when she was arrested for writing a polemic on the Duke of Monmouth, Charles II's illegitimate son and claimant to the throne. This also coincided with a merging of London's two main theaters and a subsequent decline of the medium. Behn then turned to writing novels. One of her best-known works was published in three volumes between 1684 and 1687, and was based on an actual scandal of the time. *Love-Letters Between a Nobleman and His Sister* was a thinly-disguised fictional treatment of the antics of one Lord Grey, who in 1682 eloped with his wife's sister; Grey was a Whig, or anti-monarchist, and would go on to play a real-life role in other political machinations between the throne and Parliament.

In the twilight years of her brief career, Behn earned a living from Latin and French translations, and also penned versions of *Aesop's Fables* and poetry some of which was quite racy. Yet she still struggled financially, and historians surmise that her lack of funds forced her to submit to substandard medical care when her health began to decline, which only worsened the situation. During the winter of 1683–1684, she was involved in a carriage accident, and also may have been plagued by arthritic joints; from some of her letters it can be inferred that she was also suffering from some sort of serious illness that may have been syphilis.

Behn died on April 16, 1689. She was buried in the cloisters at Westminster Abbey, and her admirers paid for a tombstone with an epitaph that read: "Here lies a proof that wit can never be/Defence enough against mortality," which she probably penned herself. Behn's literary reputation then sunk into obscurity for the next few centuries, and in England's Victorian era she was vilified. In 1871 a collection of her works, *Plays, Histories, and Novels of the Ingenious Mrs. Aphra Behn*, appeared in print, and the *Saturday*

Review, a leading London periodical of the time, condemned it as a sordid assemblage. The reviewer noted that any person curious about the forgotten Behn and her infamous works will "find it all here, as rank and feculent as when first produced." It was not until well into the twentieth century that literary scholarship restored Behn's contribution to English letters.

EWB

Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940), German-born Jewish philosopher and critic. Walter Benjamin published widely on such topics as technology, language, literature, the arts, and society during the years between the world wars. When Benjamin committed suicide in 1940, he left behind a large body of mostly unfinished work that has been slowly published in his native Germany and translated into English and other European languages. Since the 1980s, this fragmented oeuvre has elicited much commentary and become the focus of steady scholarly activity, including several thousand studies. Some of his most noted works include *Illuminations, Essay, and Reflections, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, and *The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin*.

The son of well-to-do Jewish parents, Benjamin was privately schooled, entering the University of Freiburg in 1912. Seven years later, he completed a doctorate at the University of Bern, for which he wrote a dissertation on German Romantic art and literature. Although he decried the bourgeoisie existence he was a part of, he aspired to a university position. In order to procure one, he wrote a second study, this time on German tragic drama of the seventeenth century. This work was incomprehensible to the faculty at the University of Frankfurt, and his application was rejected. Without the sponsorship of a university, Benjamin was forced to become a freelance translator, journalist, and critic. He contributed to many influential journals of his day. He espoused Marxism, yet declined to become an "official" member of any political party. He admired the work of Bertolt Brecht, an avant-garde German dramatist whose plays reflected the communism of the time, and in 1927 Benjamin traveled to Moscow to view communism firsthand.

As a Jew, Benjamin saw the danger of Adolf Hitler's rise to power, and in 1933 he left Germany permanently. In Paris and in Denmark, Benjamin eked out a living by writing radio scripts and reviews and essays for various periodicals. In 1935 he accepted a stipend from the Institute for Social Research to write essays for their *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*. Benjamin and the editors of the review, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, often disputed the

content of the essays and they required him to rework them endlessly. Despite the pleas of friends to relocate to Palestine, Benjamin settled in Paris in 1939, where he soon found himself in German-occupied territory. Benjamin and a group of refugees managed to escape from an increasingly hostile Paris and travel to Spain en route to the United States. When the group was not allowed to board a boat, and were instead turned over to the Gestapo, Benjamin took an overdose of morphine, feigned illness so no one would suspect what he had done, and refused medical attention, dying a short while later.

Benjamin is best known in the United States for his literary and cultural criticism, though his political, philosophical, and religious essays have been studied in greater detail by European commentators. Benjamin was first introduced to the American public in 1968 by Hannah Arendt in a long article in the *New Yorker*. In his literary and cultural analyses, Benjamin employed many different methodologies, including modernist, structuralist, and materialist approaches.

In approaching Benjamin, commentators have focused on his literary works. Among his essays are seminal works on Czech author Franz Kafka, French poet Charles Baudelaire, French novelist Marcel Proust, German playwright Bertolt Brecht, as well as on photography and the mechanical reproduction of artwork. Critics have debated heatedly the depth of Benjamin's conversion and commitment to communism. Several commentators purported that Benjamin chose Marxism as the "lesser of two evils," when compared with fascism.

For many years, Benjamin wrote letters that combined his latest philosophical and critical concerns with personal news, often of his struggles to earn a living. Among his correspondents were Gershom Scholem, a longtime friend and scholar who established the modern study of Jewish mysticism, Theodor Adorno, a Marxist and editor for whom Benjamin wrote important essays, Austrian theologian and philosopher Martin Buber, Christian theologian Florens Christian Rang, and dramatist Bertold Brecht. In the 1980s and 1990s several selections of Benjamin's translated letters were published; however, all were flawed by faulty translations or omissions due to stipulations made by the German publisher.

The slow publication and translation of Benjamin's works, some as many as fifty years after their original publication, have made it difficult for non-German-speaking scholars to appreciate the scope and significance of Benjamin's efforts. Even basing their judgments on an incomplete body of work, however, many commentators have declared Benjamin to be among the brightest intellectuals of his generation.

CA

Bentham, Jeremy (1748–1832), English philosopher, political theorist, and jurist. Jeremy Bentham expounded the ethical doctrine known as utilitarianism. Partly through his work many political, legal, and penal reforms were enacted by Parliament.

Jeremy Bentham, the son of a lawyer, was born on Feb. 15, 1748, in Houndsditch, near London. A precocious child, he learned Latin, Greek, and French before he was 10. The "philosopher," as he was known to his family, was an avid reader. After attending the famous Westminster school (1755–1760), he went to Queen's College, Oxford, and took his degree in 1763 at the age of 15. He studied at Lincoln's Inn, receiving a master of arts degree in 1766. The following year he was called to the bar.

Bentham cared little for his formal education, insisting that "mendacity and insincerity . . . are the only sure effects of an English university education," and he cared even less about succeeding as a practicing lawyer. He preferred to read and write papers on legal reform and to study physical science, especially chemistry. His father, who had amassed a considerable fortune in real estate speculations, died in 1792, and from that time on Bentham retired from public life and devoted himself to writing. In 1814 he purchased a mansion, and his home became a center of English intellectual life.

Bentham's Utilitarianism. In 1776 Bentham published *Fragment on Government*, which criticized the interpretations of English common law by Sir William Blackstone. Bentham attacked the notion that a social contract or compact had a legal basis. He continued to write on jurisprudence throughout his career: *Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence* (1812), edited by James Mill, and the five-volume *Rationale of Juridical Evidence* (1827), edited by John Stuart Mill. In these criticisms of law, evidence, and even language (anticipating the "definition in use" theory of linguistic philosophy), Bentham was a consistent nominalist and instinctive utilitarian. Words and laws, men and institutions must be judged solely in terms of their actual usage and consequences.

Utilitarianism may be defined as the thesis that an act is right or good if it produces pleasure, and evil if it leads to pain. Although this doctrine is almost as old as philosophy itself, the principle of utility received its classic expression in Bentham's *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789). Bentham had a talent for simplification; he reduced all ethical considerations to an immediate source. "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure." Utilitarianism aims to make morals and politics an exact science

based on these objective criteria and to offer a quantitative method for evaluating both individual and institutional actions.

Men are often unhappy or are deprived of happiness by governments because they fail to perceive that the terms value, ought, good, and right are meaningless unless identical with utility, which is understood as pleasure or happiness. Bentham avoided the subjectivism of most hedonistic theories by acknowledging altruistic as well as egoistic pleasures and recognizing that pleasure often consists primarily in avoiding pain. He defined the community as “the sum of the interests of its members” and stated that utilitarianism aims at the “greatest happiness of the greatest number.”

To determine the specific utility of actions, Bentham proposed a “felicific calculus” by which one can balance the pleasures and pains consequent upon one’s acts. The value of an action will be greater or less in terms of the intensity and duration of pleasure and its certainty and possibility. One should also consider how an act will affect other people. In addition, the circumstances should be taken into account but not the motives, which do not matter.

Bentham’s Personality. Bentham was a man of considerable irony and personal eccentricity. Given honorary citizenship by the new Republic of France in 1792, he scorned the French Revolution’s “Declaration of the Rights of Man,” commenting that all talk of rights was “nonsense” and talk of absolute rights was “nonsense on stilts.” Although he spent 7 or 8 hours daily on his writing for more than 50 years, virtually all his published books are the product of editors. He habitually worked on several projects simultaneously without finishing them, and often there were several incomplete versions of the same topic. Bentham was fortunate in having editors of dedication and genius such as Étienne Dumont, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill. Bentham gave the editors total freedom; consequently some of the works bearing his name were thoroughly rewritten by others from conflicting versions or even scraps and notes.

Bentham’s eccentricity took the form of obsession with certain ideas. Prison reform was a central concern of his for several years, and he solicited and received charters and money from the King for a model prison, the “Panopticon.” Bentham attributed the failure of this project to royal envy and added to his thousands of written pages on the subject a treatise on the conflict between Jeremy Bentham and George III “by one of the disputants.” Throughout his life Bentham conducted a lengthy, and largely unsolicited, correspondence with various heads of state suggesting

methods of legal and constitutional reform. Late in life he became concerned with how the dead could be of use to the living; in the work *Auto Icon* he suggested that, with proper embalming, every man could become his own monument and that notables might be interspersed with trees in public parks. In his will, which contributed to establishing University College, London, he stipulated that his clothed skeleton and wax head be preserved. He died on June 6, 1832.

EWB

Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932), German socialist. Eduard Bernstein was a leader of the revisionist, or evolutionary, wing of the German Social Democratic party.

Eduard Bernstein was born in Berlin on Jan. 6, 1850. As the family’s financial resources were limited, his educational opportunities were restricted, and at 16 he became an apprentice in a bank. Within a few years he had risen to the position of bank clerk. In 1872 he joined the Social Democratic party (SPD) and became an active member of the party’s Berlin organization. In 1878, shortly prior to the adoption of Chancellor Bismarck’s antisocialist legislation, Bernstein traveled to Switzerland.

As a consequence of Bismarck’s continued hostility toward the socialists, Bernstein remained in Switzerland and became the editor of the official SPD newspaper. After Bismarck brought pressure to bear in order to halt the smuggling of the newspaper into Germany, the Swiss government forced Bernstein to leave in 1880. He then went to London, where he met the German socialist Friedrich Engels, eventually becoming one of his close associates. Bernstein was also able to study the British labor movement and associate with the recently organized Fabian Society, an organization of socialists. Early Fabians such as George Bernard Shaw and Sidney and Beatrice Webb rejected revolutionary Marxism and advocated what they termed “the inevitability of gradualness.” This idea was to form a central part of Bernstein’s mature “revisionist” position.

During the 1890s Bernstein began to make his break with orthodox Marxism clear. His revisionist position emerged in a series of articles in an official party publication, *Die neue Zeit*, in 1898. The reaction to these articles by groups within the SPD caused him to write a defense, *Evolutionary Socialism* (1899). In this classic statement of the revisionist position, Bernstein used scientific analysis to attack the premises of revolutionary Marxism. He demonstrated through statistics that workers were not becoming more impoverished and that capitalism was not becoming less stable and thus its collapse was not imminent. He

rejected revolutionary tactics as self-defeating and advocated achieving reforms through moderate and constitutional methods. He also urged that the SPD, a working-class party, should attempt to win over the middle classes. Revisionism was officially condemned by the SPD in 1903, and the polarization of the party's revolutionary and evolutionary wings existed until after World War II.

By his death in 1932 Bernstein had long since ceased to be regarded as a leader or major theorist of the SPD. But when the party was reorganized in West Germany after World War II, many of Bernstein's ideas were incorporated in its programs. The new party gave up its revolutionary theory, emphasized action and reform, and attempted to broaden its political base by cutting across ideological and class lines.

EWB

Binet, Alfred (1857–1911), French psychologist and the founder of French experimental psychology. Alfred Binet devised tests for measuring intelligence that have been widely used in schools.

Alfred Binet was born in Nice on July 11, 1857. He studied law and medicine in Paris and then obtained a doctorate in natural science. He became interested in hysteria and hypnosis and frequented Jean Martin Charcot's neurological clinic at the Sâlpêtrière Hospital. During this time Binet wrote *La Psychologie du raisonnement* (1886; *The Psychology of Reasoning*), *Le Magnétisme animal* (1887; *Animal Magnetism*), and *On Double Consciousness* (1889).

In 1891 Binet joined the Laboratory of Physiological Psychology of the École Pratique des Hautes Études; the following year he became assistant director and in 1895 director. He held this post for the rest of his life. In 1895 he founded the experimental journal *L'Année psychologique*, in which he published articles on emotion, memory, attention, and problem solving, which contained a considerable number of methodological innovations.

Although trained in abnormal psychology, Binet never ceased to be interested in the psychology of intelligence and individual differences. After publishing *Les Altérations de la personnalité* (1892; *The Alterations of the Personality*) with C. Féré, Binet studied complex calculators, chess players, and literary creativity by the survey method. In 1900 he also became interested in suggestibility, a normal continuation of his work on hysteria.

Binet's major interest, however, was the development of intelligence, and in 1899 he established a laboratory at the École de la Rue de la Grange aux Belles. Here he devised a series of tests to study intellectual development in his daughters Armande and

Marguerite. His wellknown work, *L'Étude expérimentale de l'intelligence* (1903; *The Experimental Study of Intelligence*), in which he showed that there could be imageless thought, was based on these studies with his daughters.

Two years later, in response to the request of the minister of public instruction to find a means for enabling learning disabled children to benefit from some kind of schooling, Binet, in collaboration with Théodore Simon, created "new methods for the diagnosis of retarded children's mental level," which were partly based on his earlier work. His scale for measuring intelligence was widely adopted. In 1908 the American psychologist Lewis M. Terman revised it (Stanford Revision). Binet himself improved his test in 1908 and 1911. He also continued to be interested in psychological applications to pedagogical problems: *Les Enfants anormaux* (1907; *Abnormal Children*), written with Simon; and *Less Idées modernes sur les enfants* (1909; *Modern Ideas on Children*). Binet died on Oct. 8, 1911.

EWB

Bismarck, Otto von (1815–1898), German statesman. Otto von Bismarck was largely responsible for the creation of the German Empire in 1871. A leading diplomat of the late 19th century, he was known as the Iron Chancellor.

Otto von Bismarck, born at Schönhausen on April 1, 1815, to Ferdinand von Bismarck-Schönhausen and Wilhelmine Mencken, displayed a willful temperament from childhood. He studied at the University of Göttingen and by 1836 had qualified as a lawyer. But during the following decade he failed to make a career of this or anything else. Tall, slender, and bearded, the young squire was characterized by extravagance, laziness, excessive drinking, needlessly belligerent atheism, and rudeness. In 1847, however, Bismarck made a number of significant changes in his life. He became religious, entered politics as a substitute member of the upper house of the Prussian parliament, and married Johanna von Puttkamer.

In 1851 Frederick William IV appointed Bismarck as Prussian representative to the Frankfurt Diet of the German Confederation. An ingenious but cautious obstructionist of Austria's presidency, Bismarck described Frankfurt diplomacy as "mutually distasteful espionage." He performed well enough, however, to gain advancement to ambassadorial positions at Vienna in 1854, St. Petersburg in 1859, and Paris in 1862. He was astute in his judgment of international affairs and often acid in his comments on foreign leaders; he spoke of Napoleon III as "a sphinx without a riddle," of the Austrian Count Rechberg as "the little

bottle of poison,” and of the Russian Prince Gorchakov as “the fox in wooden shoes.”

Minister-President of Prussia. In 1862 Frederick William’s successor, William I, faced a crisis. He sought a larger standing army as a foundation for Prussian foreign policy; but he could not get parliamentary support for this plan, and he needed a strong minister-president who was willing to persist against opposition majorities. War Minister Roon persuaded the King to entrust the government to Bismarck. William attempted to condition the Sept. 22, 1862, appointment by a written agreement limiting the chief minister’s part in foreign affairs, but Bismarck easily talked this restriction to shreds.

Bismarck’s attempt to conciliate the budget committee foundered on his September 29 remark, “The great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and resolutions of majorities that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849 but by iron and blood.” Bismarck complained that the words were misunderstood, but “blood and iron” became an unshakable popular label for his policies.

Bismarck soon turned to foreign affairs. He was determined to achieve Prussian annexation of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein at the expense of Denmark. The history of Schleswig-Holstein during the preceding two decades had been stormy, and there were a number of conflicting claims of sovereignty over the territories. Bismarck let the Hohenzollerns, the Prussian ruling family, encourage the Duke of Augustenburg in his claim for Holstein, and the duke established a court at Kiel in Holstein in December 1863. Bismarck then, however, persuaded Austria’s Count Rechberg to join in military intervention against the Hohenzollern protégé. This ability to take opposite sides at the same time in a political quarrel for motives ulterior to the issue itself was a Bismarckian quality not always appreciated by his contemporaries. Austro-Prussian forces occupied Holstein and invaded Schleswig in February 1864. The Danes resisted, largely because of a mistaken hope of English help, which Bismarck reportedly assessed with the comment, “If Lord Palmerston sends the British army to Germany, I shall have the police arrest them.”

Denmark’s 1864 defeat by Austro-Prussian forces led to the 1865 Austro-Prussian Gastein Convention, which exposed Rechberg’s folly in committing Austrian troops to an adventure from which only Prussia could profit. Prussia occupied Schleswig, and Austria occupied Holstein, with Prussia to construct, own, and operate a naval base at Kiel and a Kiel-Brunsbüttel canal, both in Holstein. King William made Bismarck a count.

Austro-Prussian War. Bismarck gave Austria a number of opportunities to retreat from its Holstein predicament; when Austria turned to the German Confederation and France for anti-Prussian support, however, Bismarck allied Prussia to Italy. In 1866 Austria mobilized Confederation forces against Prussia, whose Frankfurt representative declared this to be an act of war dissolving the Confederation. The resulting Seven Weeks War led to the defeat of Austria at Königgrätz (July 3) by the Prussian general Moltke. Bismarck persuaded king William to accept the lenient Truce of Nikolsburg (July 26) and Treaty of Prague (August 23).

Prussia’s victory enabled Bismarck to achieve Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Frankfurt. The newly formed North German Confederation, headed by Prussia and excluding Austria, provided a popularly elected assembly; the Prussian king, however, held veto power on all political issues. The victory over Austria increased Bismarck’s power, and he was able to obtain parliamentary approval of an indemnity budget for 4 years of unconstitutional government. Bismarck was also voted a large grant, with which he bought an estate in Farther Pomerania.

Franco-Prussian War. As payment for its neutrality during the Austro-Prussian War, France claimed Belgium. Bismarck held that the 1839 European treaty prevented this annexation, and instead he agreed to neutralize Luxembourg as a concession to the government of Napoleon III. The French were, however, antagonized by Bismarck’s actions. In 1870 he heightened French hostility by supporting the claim of Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen to the Spanish throne. The French government demanded Leopold’s withdrawal, and Vincent Benedetti, the French ambassador to Prussia, requested formal assurance that no Hohenzollern would ever occupy the Spanish throne. William, who was staying at Bad Ems, declined the request and telegraphed Bismarck an account of the interview. Bismarck edited this “Ems Dispatch” and published an abrupt version that suggested that discussions were over and the guns loaded. His action precipitated the French declaration of war against Prussia on July 19, 1870.

Bismarck’s treaties with the South German states brought them into the war against France, and his work at field headquarters transformed these wartime partnerships into a lasting federation. Within 6 weeks the German army had moved through Alsace-Lorraine and forced the surrender of Napoleon III and his army at Sedan (Sept. 2, 1870). But Paris defiantly proclaimed a republic and refused to capitulate. The

annexation of occupied Alsace-Lorraine became Bismarck's territorial justification for continuing the war, and the siege of Paris ended in French surrender (Jan. 28, 1871). Alsace-Lorraine became a German imperial territory by the Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10, 1871). The Prussian victory led to the formation of the Reich, a unified German empire under Prussian leadership. William was proclaimed kaiser, or emperor, and Bismarck became chancellor of the empire. Bismarck was also elevated to the rank of prince and given a Friedrichsruh estate.

Chancellor of the Reich (1871–1890). Bismarck modernized German administration, law, and education in harmony with the economic and technological revolution which was transforming Germany into an industrial society. However, he developed no political system, party, or set of issues to support and succeed him. His *Kulturkampf*, or vehement opposition to the Catholic Church, was unsuccessful, and his anti-Socialist policies contributed to the wreckage of the Bismarckian parties in the 1890 election.

Among Bismarck's major diplomatic achievements of this period were the establishment of the Dreikaiserbund, or Three Emperors' League (Germany, Russia, Austria), of 1872–1878 and 1881–1887 and the negotiation of the 1879 Austro-German Duplice, the 1882 Austro-German-Italian Triplice, and the secret 1887 Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty. He served as chairman of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, and he also guided the German acquisition of overseas colonies.

The alliances that Bismarck established were not so much instruments of diplomacy as the visible evidence of his comprehensive effort to postpone a hostile coalition of the powers surrounding Germany. Restraining Russia, the strongest of these powers, required the greatest diplomatic effort. Bismarck's diplomacy is sometimes described as aimed at isolating France, but this is a misleadingly simplistic description of the complicated and deceptive methods he employed to lend substance to his statement, "We Germans fear God, but nothing else in the world."

Fall from Power. William I died March 9, 1888, but Bismarck remained as chancellor for Frederick III (who died June 15, 1888) and for 21 months of the reign of William II, last of the Hohenzollern monarchs. Court, press, and political parties discovered in the 29-year-old William an obvious successor to the power of the 73-year-old chancellor. William was intelligent and glib, with a singular capacity as a

phrase maker, and his instability was as yet not widely recognized.

On March 15, 1890, William asked either for the right to consult ministers or for Bismarck's resignation; Bismarck's March 18 letter gave the Kaiser a choice between following Bismarck's Russian policy or accepting his resignation. Suppressing this letter, the Kaiser published an acceptance of Bismarck's retirement because of ill health and created him Duke of Lauenburg. Bismarck referred to this title as one he might use for traveling incognito.

Bismarck did not retire gracefully. Domestically he was happy at Friedrichsruh with Johanna, whom he outlived; and their children, Herbert, William, and Marie, frequently visited them there. Bismarck, however, used the press to harass his political successors, and he briefly stumped the country calling for more power to the parliament, of which he was an absent member from 1891 to 1893. Despite charades of reconciliation, he remained, to his death on July 30, 1898, thoroughly opposed to William II.

Historical estimates of Otto von Bismarck remain contradictory. The later political failure of the state he created has led some to argue that by his own standards Bismarck was himself a failure. He is, however, widely regarded as an extraordinarily astute statesman who understood that to wield power successfully a leader must assess not only its strength but also the circumstances of its application. In his analysis and management of these circumstances, Bismarck showed himself the master of *realpolitik*.

EWB

Blanc, Louis (1811–1882), French journalist, historian, and socialist politician. Louis Blanc greatly influenced the evolution of French socialism and modern social democracy.

Louis Blanc was born on Oct. 29, 1811, in Madrid, where his father was comptroller of finance for King Joseph, Napoleon's brother. Financially ruined by the fall of the French Empire, the Blanc family returned to Paris, and Louis managed to earn enough from his writings to study law.

In 1839 Blanc published his most famous essay, *L'Organisation du travail* ("The Organization of Labor"). He outlined his social thought, which was based on the principle, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." His theories were based on solid research and expressed in vivid language. He argued that unequal distribution of wealth, unjust wages, and unemployment all stemmed from competition. Unlike his predecessors, Blanc looked to the state to redress social injustice, but he believed that only a democratic republic could achieve

an egalitarian commonwealth. Since every man has a “right to work,” the state must provide employment and aid the aged and sick. It would accomplish these aims through establishing “social workshops”—producers’ cooperatives, organized on a craft basis. The workers would manage these workshops, share in the profits, and repay the government loan. Eventually, the worker-owned factories, farms, and shops would replace those that were privately owned. Thus the whole process of production would become cooperative.

Though Marx criticized Blanc’s ideas as utopian, French workers of the 1840s were intrigued by them. In 1846 there was a widespread demand for national workshops, and by 1848 “the organization of labor” had become a popular slogan. Articles in *La Réforme*, a radical newspaper, popularized Blanc’s proposals among the workers, who adopted them as a practical reform program.

Blanc supported the cause of liberals throughout Europe. In 1841 in *Histoire de dix ans, 1830–1840* (*History of Ten Years, 1830–1840*), he denounced King Louis Philippe’s foreign policy as pusillanimous. France, he thought, had missed a golden opportunity in 1830 to give Europe liberal institutions.

A member of the provisional government formed on Feb. 24, 1848 (after the fall of the July Monarchy), Blanc persuaded his colleagues to guarantee the right to work, to create national workshops, and to establish the Luxembourg Commission to study and propose social experiments. But the national workshops became a makeshift relief program, a mockery of Blanc’s ideas, and the government rejected his proposal for a ministry of labor.

By the middle of May, the coalition of right- and left-wing republicans, which had overthrown the Orleanist regime, collapsed. Though Blanc had been elected to the conservative National Assembly, that body expelled him from the government in May. It also abolished the Luxembourg Commission and on June 21 closed the workshops. These actions provoked a workers’ revolt, which General Cavaignac suppressed during the bloody June Days, and the ensuing reaction forced Blanc to seek asylum in England. While in exile he wrote a 12-volume history of the French Revolution to 1795 and a history of the Revolution of 1848. Blanc returned to France in 1871 and entered the Chamber of Deputies. There he led a futile fight for a radical constitution, opposing the one that was eventually adopted in 1875. In January 1879 he climaxed his long career by persuading the Assembly to grant amnesty to the Communards of 1871. Blanc died at Cannes on Dec. 6, 1882.

EWB

Bloch, Marc (1886–1944), French historian. Marc Bloch was the leading French medievalist of the 20th century. He inspired two generations of historians through his teaching and writing.

Marc Bloch was born at Lyons on July 6, 1886, the son of Gustave Bloch, a professor of ancient history. Marc studied in Paris at the École Normale and the Fondation Thiers, in Berlin, and in Leipzig. During World War I he served in the infantry, winning four citations and the Legion of Honor. When the French University at Strasbourg was revived in 1919, Bloch went there to organize the seminar on medieval history. He remained until 1936, when he was called to the Sorbonne to succeed Henri Hauser in the chair of economic history.

In 1920 Bloch presented his thesis *Kings and Serfs*, in which he tried to discover what freedom and servitude meant in the Middle Ages. It was a question he pondered throughout his career, continuing his investigations in major articles of 1921, 1928, and 1933 and in the pages of his *Feudal Society*. The thesis was symptomatic of Bloch’s interests and sympathies. He saw the problem of liberty and servitude as one involving economic structures and systems of belief as well as legal norms and institutional practices. From then until his death he continued to affirm that history must concern itself with the whole man, that the economic or legal historian must be first of all a historian of civilization.

Bloch’s interest in men and their beliefs inspired his second major work, *The Royal Touch* (1924), a study of the supernatural character attributed to kings in the Middle Ages, in particular the belief in their miraculous powers of healing. His interest in men and their works inspired a series of articles on the spread of labor-saving inventions in the Middle Ages, medieval monetary problems, rural land distribution, and many other topics. In all of these, as in a series of lectures, *The Original Characteristics of French Rural History* (1931), he insisted that the economic and technical questions he was discussing were also questions of “collective psychology.”

In 1929 Bloch and Lucien Febvre founded the *Annales d’histoire économique et sociale* to provide a place for innovative historians to express their views. The two editors made themselves the champions of “history as one of the sciences of man” which the resources of sociology, psychology, economics, medicine, and all other disciplines that study man should be used to serve. Bloch also contributed to the *Revue de synthèse*, whose objective was to overcome the barriers between academic disciplines. His last historical work was *Feudal Society* (2 vols., 1939–1940), in

which he described the legal institutions of feudalism in their broad cultural setting.

In 1939 Bloch was called back to the army. Avoiding capture in the defeat, he found refuge at Guéret, where he wrote a memoir of his war experiences, *The Strange Defeat* (1946). In this time of forced repose he also set down his reflections on his vocation, *The Historian's Craft*. The anti-Semitic laws soon forced him to leave the University of Paris for Clermont-Ferrand and then for Montpellier. When persecutions increased, he disappeared into the Resistance. In 1943 he reappeared briefly as "Blanchard," then as "Arpajon," "Chevreuse," and "Narbonne." Captured by the Germans in 1944, he was tortured and, on June 16, shot by a firing squad at Saint-Didier-de-Formans, near Lyons.

EWB

Bloomer, Amelia (1818–1894), American advocate of woman's rights in the early days of the feminist movement. Amelia Bloomer spent most of her life working for the cause. She was also a reformer of women's clothing and helped promote "bloomers."

Amelia Jenks was born into a family of modest means in Homer, N.Y., on May 27, 1818. Her formal education was negligible, consisting of only a few years in grammar school. At the age of 22 she married Dexter Bloomer, a lawyer and part owner of the *Seneca Falls County Courier*. A man of Quaker background and progressive social principles, he encouraged his wife to write articles on temperance and other social issues for his newspaper and for other periodicals.

In 1848, at the age of 30, Bloomer attended the first public Woman's Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, N.Y., but she took no part in the proceedings. A few months later she began to publish her own temperance newspaper, *The Lily*, which was immensely successful, gaining a circulation of 4,000 within a few years. At this time in her career Amelia Bloomer was a small, slight, dark-haired woman with good features and a pleasant expression. Timid and retiring by nature, she was a sternly serious person, seemingly lacking in any sense of humor.

Prodded by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who also lived in Seneca Falls, Bloomer devoted increasing space in *The Lily* to questions concerning woman's rights, such as unequal educational opportunities, discriminatory marriage and property laws, and suffrage. In 1851 *The Lily* supported the reform in women's dress which came to bear Bloomer's name. Female fashion in the 1850s consisted of unhealthy, tightly laced corsets, layers of petticoats that could weigh well over 10 pounds, and floor-length dresses that dragged in the filth of the era's unpaved and unswept streets.

The bloomer costume dispensed with corsets in favor of loose bodices, substituted baggy ankle-length pantaloons for petticoats, and cut the gowns to above the knee. Such a costume had been worn at the utopian New Harmony colony in Indiana in the 1820s and as resort wear during the 1830s, and Mrs. Bloomer was by no means the originator of the revival in 1851. But her promotion of it attached her name to the sensation. Woman's-rights advocates, such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, wore the reform dress for a year or so but abandoned it when they concluded that the ridicule it frequently elicited was preventing a fair hearing of their views. Mrs. Bloomer continued to wear the dress until the late 1850s, but, conservative by nature (she never shared the liberal religious views or abolitionist sentiments of her sisters in the movement), even she eventually opposed bloomers as inexpedient.

Bloomer moved to Council Bluffs, Iowa, in 1855, where she abandoned *The Lily* but continued to work actively in the woman's-suffrage movement of that state. She lectured and wrote widely, served as president of the state Woman Suffrage Association between 1871 and 1873, and corresponded with and arranged lectures for Lucy Stone, Susan B. Anthony, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton in Iowa. She retired increasingly into private life in the 1870s, troubled by poor health. She died at Council Bluffs on the last day of 1894.

Amelia Bloomer's work never matched the incessant and selfless activity of some of her contemporaries, but she contributed to the suffrage movement far more profoundly than the generally facetious use of her name would indicate.

EWB

Bodin, Jean (1529–1596), French political philosopher. Jean Bodin influenced European intellectual history through his formulation of economic theories and of principles of good government and through his advocacy of religious tolerance in an intolerant age.

Jean Bodin was born in Angers, the son of a tailor. He received his early education in Angers and Paris as a member of the religious order of Carmelites. After leaving the monastic life, he studied and later taught law at the University of Toulouse. In 1561 he began to practice law in Paris and at about the same time published two significant books. In *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (A Method for the Easy Learning of History), Bodin attempted to determine the principles of universal law through a study of history; in *Response aux paradoxes de M. Malestroit* (1568; Response to the Paradoxes of Monsieur Malestroit), he contended that the revolutionary rise in

prices in the 16th century was caused by the great influx of gold and silver analysis which has earned him a distinguished position among early modern European economists.

Bodin won the favor of King Henry III of France and of his brother, the Duke of Alençon. In 1571 he became counselor to the duke and was appointed king's attorney at Laon in 1576. In the same year he served as a delegate of the Third Estate (commoners) at the Estates General of Blois. There Bodin antagonized the clergy and nobility by favoring negotiation instead of war with the French Protestants. He also opposed the King's demand to gain additional revenue by selling public lands and royal demesnes. Because of his stand, Bodin lost favor with the King, but he continued to serve the duke.

Bodin's most famous work, *Six livres de la république* (1576; *Six Books of the Republic*), reflects his distress over the chaos in France during the Wars of Religion. The principles Bodin proposes for a well-ordered state are based on the doctrine of sovereignty. He believed the state needed one supreme authority to make and enforce law, an authority whose power was limited only by natural and divine law and by the "fundamental laws" of the land. Although he conceded that there could be different types of government, he thought monarchy the most stable because its sovereignty was not divided.

In 1583 Bodin returned to Laon as procurator to the presidial court and spent the rest of his life there. Bodin's interest turned from politics to religion, and his writings reflect this change. In *La Demonomanie des sorciers* (1580; *The Demonomania of Witches*), he advocated the burning of witches. In the *Heptaplomeres* (1588)—a colloquy between a Jew, a Moslem, a Calvinist, a Lutheran, a Catholic, a theist, and an epicurean—his characters eventually decide that since one religion is as good as another, they should live together in charity. In 1596 Bodin died of plague in Laon.

EWB

Borromeo, St. Charles (1538–1584), Italian prelate. Charles Borromeo was a leading reformer in the Roman Catholic Church.

Charles Borromeo was born into a family of means in the town of Rocca d'Arona in northern Italy on Oct. 2, 1538. He was a bright and personable boy of 12 when he received tonsure, the official initiation into the ranks of the clergy. After studying with tutors, he enrolled at the University of Padua, where in 1559 he received the degree of doctor of laws. That same year his mother's brother was elected Pope Pius IV. Within a few months the new pope had called Charles,

then 21, to Rome to help in administering the affairs of the Church.

Charles was given the rank of cardinal to go with his position as personal assistant to the Pope. Pius IV made his talented and dedicated nephew secretary of state and relied heavily on his energy in directing the third session of the Council of Trent (1562–1563), as well as in handling the practical, political affairs of the city of Rome. In 1563 Charles was ordained a priest and consecrated archbishop of Milan, but he continued to live in Rome and work with his uncle. When he was given responsibility in Rome for the Church reform commanded by the Council of Trent, he brought about proper religious instructions in the parishes, saw that the elaborate worship rituals were toned down in the interest of devotion, and built a new seminary for the proper training of the clergy.

From 1566 Charles directed the Church in Milan, since his services in Rome had come to an end with his uncle's death in 1565. Over the years he was a remarkably effective bishop. The diocese of Milan was split among five diplomatic fronts on which he had to operate simultaneously. His popularity with the people disturbed the Milanese senate, and his disciplinary directives antagonized several religious groups. At one point an assassin was hired to kill him but failed.

Almost all of the people of Milan respected Charles's courage and tireless concern. When the plague of 1576–1578 struck Milan, Charles spent much of his time nursing the sick. The catechetical centers he established were so effective that Protestantism made no headway in Milan. He died on Nov. 3, 1584, and was canonized in 1610.

EWB

Broca, Pierre Paul (1824–1880), French surgeon and anthropologist. Pierre Paul Broca was born near Bordeaux, France, in 1824. After studying mathematics and physical science at the local university, he entered medical school at the University of Paris in 1841. He received his M.D. in 1849. Though trained as a pathologist, anatomist, and surgeon, Broca's interests were not limited to the medical profession. His versatility and tireless dedication to science permitted him to make significant contributions to other fields, most notably to anthropology.

The application of his expertise in anatomy outside the field of medicine began in 1847 as a member of a commission charged with reporting on archaeological excavations of a cemetery. The project permitted Broca to combine his anatomical and mathematical skills with his interests in anthropology.

The discovery in 1856 of Neanderthal Man once again drew Broca into anthropology. Controversy surrounded the interpretation of Neanderthal. It was clearly a human skull, but more primitive and apelike than a modern skull and the soil stratum in which it was found indicated a very early date. Neanderthal's implications for evolutionary theory demanded thorough examination of the evidence to determine decisively whether it was simply a congenitally deformed *Homo sapiens* or a primitive human form. Both as an early supporter of Charles Darwin and as an expert in human anatomy, Broca supported the latter view. Broca's view eventually prevailed, though not until the discovery of the much more primitive Java Man (then known as *Pithecanthropus*, but later *Homo erectus*).

Broca is best known for his role in the discovery of specialized functions in different areas of the brain. In 1861, he was able to show, using post-mortem analysis of patients who had lost the ability to speak, that such loss was associated with damage to a specific area of the brain. The area, located toward the front of the brain's left hemisphere, became known as Broca's convolution. Aside from its importance to the understanding of human physiology, Broca's findings addressed questions concerning the evolution of language.

All animals living in groups communicate with one another. Non-human primates have the most complex communication system other than human language. They use a wide range of gestures, facial expressions, postures, and vocalizations, but are limited in the variety of expressions and are unable to generate new signals under changing circumstances. Humans alone possess the capacity for language rather than relying on a body language vocabulary. Language permits humans to generate an infinite number of messages and ultimately allows the transmission of information—the learned and shared patterns of behavior characteristic of human social groups, which anthropologists call culture—from generation to generation. The development of language spurred human evolution by permitting new ways of social interaction, organization, and thought.

Given the importance assigned to human speech in human evolution, scientists began to look for the physical preconditions of speech. The fact that apes have the minimal parts necessary for speech indicated that the shape and arrangement of the vocal apparatus was insufficient for the development of speech. The vocalizations produced by other animals are involuntary and incapable of conscious alteration. However, human speech requires codifying thought and transmitting it in patterned strings of sound. The area of the brain isolated by Broca sends the code to an-

other part of the brain that controls the muscles of the face, jaw, tongue, palate, and larynx, setting the speech apparatus in motion. This area and a companion area that controls the understanding of language, known as Wernicke's area, are detectable in early fossil skulls of the genus *Homo*. The brain of *Homo* was evolving toward the use of language, although the vocal chamber was still inadequate to articulate speech. Broca discovered one piece in the puzzle of human communication and speech, which permits the transmission of culture.

Equally important, Broca contributed to the development of physical anthropology, one of the four subfields of anthropology. Craniology, the scientific measurement of the skull, was a major focus of physical anthropology during this period. Mistakenly considering contemporary human groups as if they were living fossils, anthropologists became interested in the nature of human variability and attempted to explain the varying levels of technological development observed worldwide by looking for a correspondence between cultural level and physical characteristics. Broca furthered these studies by inventing at least twenty-seven instruments for making measurements of the human body, and by developing standardized techniques of measurement.

Broca's many contributions to anthropology helped to establish its firm scientific foundation at a time when the study of nature was considered a somewhat sinister science.

World of Scientific Discovery

Bruno, Giordano (1548–1600) Italian philosopher and poet. Giordano Bruno attempted to deal with the implications of the Copernican universe. Although he made no scientific discoveries, his ideas had much influence on later scientists and philosophers.

Giordano Bruno was born at Nola in southern Italy. His baptismal name was Filippo, but he took the name Giordano when he entered a Dominican monastery in Naples in 1565. During his stay in different monastic houses in southern Italy, he acquired a vast knowledge of philosophy, theology, and science. Because he developed unorthodox views on some Catholic teachings, Bruno was suspected of heresy and finally fled the monastic life in 1576. This experience reveals much about Bruno's personality. His love for knowledge and hatred of ignorance led him to become a rebel, unwilling to accept traditional authority. The price he paid for this independence was persecution and condemnation in many countries.

After making his way through northern Italy, Bruno sought refuge at Geneva in 1579. His criticism of a Genevan professor, however, forced his with-

drawal from that city. The next two years were spent in Toulouse, where he was granted a master's degree and lectured on Aristotle. In 1581–1582 he stayed in Paris and published his first significant set of writings, in which he explained a new method for memory training and commented on the logical system of Raymond Lully.

In 1583 Bruno traveled to England, where he lived for 2 years. While there, he became friendly with some prominent Englishmen, publicly praised Queen Elizabeth I, and held a disputation at Oxford on the Copernican and Aristotelian conceptions of the universe. Most important, he published some of his best works in England during 1584–1585, namely, *La Cena de le Ceneri* (*The Ash Wednesday Supper*); *De l'infinito universo et mundi* (*On the Infinite Universe and Worlds*); and *De la causa, principio et uno* (*Concerning the Cause, Principle, and One*). In these works Bruno attempted to come to grips with the meaning of the new conception of the universe that Copernicus had developed. Bruno conceived of the universe as infinite, composed of a plurality of worlds. For him the universe has a unity that signifies a prevailing order—individual things are not isolated but are animated by a common life and a common cause. This cause is immanent, not transcendent, and the soul which gives life to the whole is God. It is God who “is not above, and not outside, but within and through, all things.” It is not surprising that later examiners of Bruno's system described it as pantheistic. Bruno also published an Italian dialogue, *De gli eroici furori* (1585; *The Heroic Furies*), in which he presents the Renaissance conception of Platonic love.

Returning to France in 1585, Bruno was forced to leave that country in 1586 because of his attacks on Aristotelian philosophy. He then went to Germany, where he achieved some acclaim as a result of his lectures at the University of Wittenberg and published some works centered primarily on logic. After further travels he settled briefly in Frankfurt am Main, where he wrote a series of poems in Latin. In the three most important ones (all 1591), *De minimo* (*On the Minimum*), *De monade* (*On the Monad*), and *De immenso* (*On the Immense*), he examined what is infinitely small and infinitely great in the universe.

In 1592 Bruno went to Venice on the invitation of a Venetian nobleman who later betrayed him to the Catholic Inquisition. Bruno was arrested and imprisoned in Rome, where after a lengthy confinement and a trial for heresy he was burned at the stake on Feb. 17, 1600.

EWB

Braudel, Fernand (1902–1985), French sociologist. Fernand Braudel was the leading exponent of the

so-called “*Annales*” school of history, which emphasizes total history over long historical periods and large geographical space.

Fernand Braudel was born August 24, 1902, in the small town of Luneville in eastern France. His father was an academic administrator. As a young *agrégé* in history, he went to Algeria in 1923 to teach in a lycée and to work on his *thèse d'état*, which was to be on Philip II of Spain and the Mediterranean. His thesis director, Lucien Febvre, made the fateful suggestion that Braudel invert the emphasis—the Mediterranean and Philip II. In 1935 he went to Brazil to teach in the university in São Paulo, Brazil, returning two and a half years later to France just before World War II, with an appointment in the IVe Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (E.P.H.E.) in Paris. He spent the war in German prison camps in Mainz and Lübeck. During this time he wrote from memory his thesis, which has come to be considered the classic exemplary work of the *Annales* school of history. It was titled *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (two volumes, 1949).

Elected in 1946 to the Collège de France, he joined his mentor, Febvre, as one of the founders in 1947 of the new VIe Section (economic and social sciences) of the E.P.H.E. He created the Centre de Recherches Historiques. On Febvre's death in 1956, he succeeded him as president of the VIe Section and editor of the journal *Annales E. S. C.* In 1963 he founded the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, a structure housing national and international research groups, and became its administrator. From 1971 to 1984 he served as the president of the Scientific Commission of the annual Study Weeks sponsored by the Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica ‘Francesco Datini’ in Prato, Italy. These were major meetings of economic historians of Europe (both east and west) specializing in the period between the 12th and the 18th centuries. In 1985 he was received in the Académie Française. He was awarded a long list of honorary degrees, memberships in national academies of science, and similar honors. He was widely read and influential in southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Turkey), Eastern Europe (Poland and Hungary), Germany and the Low Countries, Britain, Quebec, and, since the 1970s, the United States, where a research center named after him was established at the State University of New York, Binghamton.

What was the nature of his accomplishment that he achieved so many honors, so much prestige and influence? Obviously he was a great organizer of scientific activity, as the list of his successive activities

attests. But more important than that, he symbolized, incarnated, and promulgated an approach to history which responded to and was of great help in interpreting the long-term structures and middle-run cyclical shifts of the real social world.

There are three central themes which one may associate with Braudel as the culminating figure of the so-called *Annales* school of history. The roots of the *Annales* school itself, often traced to the work of French historian Henri Berr at the turn of the 20th century, was the creation in a formal sense of the collaboration of Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch at the University of Strasbourg in 1929, where they founded the journal *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*. The very title of the journal indicates the initial concern, the enormous neglect of both economic and social history in the standard kind of political history that had prevailed in France, Germany, and Britain since the mid-19th century. The *Annales* school was determined to get at the long-term economic and social structures beneath the surface “events” which Braudel was later to describe as “dust.” They turned toward the neglected arenas of rural life, demography, social ecology, everyday life, commerce, and mentalities and away from princes, generals, civil servants, and diplomats.

They were pushed by their subject matter to the work of sociologists, anthropologists, and economists for one fundamental reason. It was not only that the subject matter of *Annales* history was concerned with explaining, as opposed to merely describing, history. It was also that history was no longer seen as a mere collection of “facts.” Facts “existed” only as responses to historical “problems.” Intellectually, and therefore organizationally as well, the quest became the “totality” of human experience, and therefore the close collaboration of history and the social sciences.

Secondly, and this became Braudel’s own great contribution, the *Annales* school saw time as a social—more than as a physical—phenomenon, whence the idea of a plurality of social times. The great trinity that Braudel constructed and used as the framework for his book on the Mediterranean was *structure, conjoncture, événement*: long-term, very slowly evolving structures; medium-term, fluctuating cyclical processes; and short-term, ephemeral, highly visible events. Braudel downplayed the time of events and rejected a fourth time, the universal very long-term, as mythical. History was consequently the story of the interweaving of the long-term structures and the cyclical movements (*conjonctures*).

Finally, 30 years after *The Mediterranean*, his second great work appeared in 1979, the three-volume *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*. In it he developed the theme of the three layers of eco-

nomic life, the bottom layer of everyday life, the middle layer of exchange (the arena of freedom), and the top layer of capitalist monopolies and constraints. This metaphor served to reorganize all of modern history into a constant struggle between the two bottom layers and the top layer of monopoly.

The contribution of Braudel was his sweep and therefore his relevance to the fundamental assessment of large-scale, long-term social change. His intellectual voice was stentorian, a firm line but one uncluttered by dogmatism. His was a unifying influence, respectful of many strains but impatient of pomposity or foolishness. Above all, Braudel and the *Annales* school stood as a challenge to the narrow, the petty, the arrogance of power in the name of enduring realities, and the social change that is slow but inexorable.

EWB

Bunyan, John (1628–1688), English author and Baptist preacher. John Bunyan wrote *The Pilgrim’s Progress* and some 60 other pious works. The sincere evangelical urgency of his religious thought and the vivid clarity of his prose have won wide admiration.

John Bunyan, born in Elstow near Bedford, was baptized on Nov. 30, 1628. His father, the brazier-tinker “Thomas Bonnion,” derived from an old Bedfordshire family which had declined in fortune and status. Bunyan had a rudimentary education and at an early age became a tinker. From 1644 to 1647 he served with the parliamentary army during the Puritan Revolution, but he saw little or no fighting.

Religious Development. About 1649 Bunyan married a pious Anglican who introduced him to Arthur Dent’s *The Plain Man’s Pathway to Heaven*. Under their combined influence Bunyan became an attentive churchgoer and delighted in Anglican ceremonial and bell ringing. But he soon recognized that he was desperately bound by sin and that only Christ could provide redemption. He turned for guidance to John Gifford; once a roistering Cavalier, Gifford had been rescued from debauchery by the Gospel and was pastor of the Congregational Church in Bedford. “Mr. Gifford’s doctrine,” wrote Bunyan, “was much for my stability.” Like Joan of Arc and St. Theresa, Bunyan heard voices, and like William Blake, he had visions. He saw Jesus looking “through the tiles on the roof” and felt Satan pluck his clothes to stop him from praying.

Bunyan was no fornicator, drunkard, or thief; but so urgent was his religion, so passionate his nature, that any sin, however small, was an enormous burden. With Gifford’s guidance he made a spiritual pilgrimage and in 1653 was baptized in the Ouse River. Two

years later, induced by his Baptist coreligionists, he started “the mighty work of preaching the Gospel.” Soon his pen became as active as his tongue, and in 1658–1659 he published *Sighs from Hell* and other tracts.

Triumph in Adversity. The restoration of monarchy and Anglicanism in 1660 meant that Bunyan could no longer preach freely as he had under the Puritan Commonwealth. In January 1661 he was jailed for “pertinaciously abstaining” from Anglican services and for holding “unlawful meetings.” Because he was unwilling to promise silence, his 3-month sentence stretched to 12 years with a few respites. After his wife’s death he had remarried, and he worked while in prison to support his second wife and children. He also preached to his fellow sufferers and wrote a variety of religious works, including *Grace Abounding* published in 1666—one of the world’s most poignant spiritual autobiographies. During this period he also wrote most of Part I of *The Pilgrim’s Progress*, but he hesitated to release it because of its fictional structure.

After the Declaration of Indulgence (1672), Bunyan was freed and licensed as a preacher. He built a Nonconformist congregation of 3,000 or 4,000 souls in Bedfordshire; he ministered assiduously to his flock and helped to found about 30 other congregations. But in 1673 the edict of toleration was repealed. When Bunyan was imprisoned for about 6 months in 1675, he again worked on his masterpiece, and Part I of *The Pilgrim’s Progress* was published in 1678. It won immediate popularity, and before Bunyan’s death there were 13 editions, with some additions. Since then it has been continuously in print and has been translated into well over a hundred languages.

Bunyan’s own experience and the language of the Bible were the sources of *The Pilgrim’s Progress*. Unlike *Grace Abounding*, this work reveals his spiritual development through allegory. The countryside through which the hero, Christian, progresses is a blend of the English countryside, the world of the Bible, and the land of dreams. Despite his assertion that “manner and matter too was all my own,” Bunyan owed a good deal to oral tradition and wide reading—folk tales, books of emblems and characters, sermons, homilies in dialogue form, and traditional allegories.

Bunyan’s last decade was fertile. Like *The Pilgrim’s Progress*, *The Life and Death of Mr. Badman* (1680) made a significant advance toward the English novel. *The Holy War* (1682) is a dramatic, allegorical account of siege warfare against the town of Mansoul. Although, like all his works, it is based on Calvinist

theology, Bunyan should not be considered a rigid determinist but should be viewed as a Christian humanist who assigned personal responsibility to his characters. Part II of *The Pilgrim’s Progress* (1684) emphasizes human relationships and the sanctification of the world, especially through marriage and family life. Bunyan produced 14 more books before he died at the age of 60 on Aug. 31, 1688. He was buried in Bunhill Fields, where he lies near other great Nonconformists William Blake, George Fox, and Daniel Defoe.

Despite the Protestant evangelical cast of his mind, Bunyan transcended Puritanism and remains relevant in an age of ecumenism. Nor was he a pessimistic prophet: if his Pilgrim knew the Hill of Difficulty and the Slough of Despair, he also enjoyed the Delectable Mountains and reached the Celestial City.
EWB

Burckhardt, Jacob (1818–1897), Swiss historian. Jacob Burckhardt was a philosophical historian whose books dealt with cultural and artistic history and whose lectures examined the forces that had shaped European history.

Through the use of eyewitness accounts, diplomatic documents, and the contents of government archives, the teachers and contemporaries of Jacob Christoph Burckhardt sought to reconstruct political events “as they had really happened.” Burckhardt, however, viewed history as the record of the achievement of the human spirit. Politics was only part of that record. The highest expression of any age was to be found in its poetry, art, literature, and philosophy. The historian’s task was to seek the spirit these works expressed, so the reader might be “not smarter for the next time but wiser forever.”

Burckhardt was born in Basel on May 25, 1818. His father, a pastor at the Basel Minster, was elected administrative head of the Reformed Church in the canton in 1838. The year before, Jacob had begun theological studies at the University of Basel. Within 18 months, however, he lost his orthodox religious beliefs and turned from theology to history. He studied in Berlin for 4 years, attending the lectures of Johann Droysen, August Boeckh, and Franz Kugler, and Leopold von Ranke’s seminar. Burckhardt formed close friendships with a group of poets and students of revolutionary liberal political views.

In 1843 Burckhardt returned to Basel, where he took a post as political correspondent with the conservative *Basler Zeitung*, and lectured at the university on art history. He immersed himself in the political crisis then shaking Switzerland, a crisis brought on by the return of the Jesuits to the Catholic canton of

Lucerne. Then in 1846, disgusted by what he had seen, he left for Italy. His political views had turned to cultural and aristocratic conservatism. During the next 12 years he taught and wrote in Berlin, Basel, and Zurich, with lengthy trips to Italy in 1847, 1848, and again in 1853 to prepare the *Cicerone*.

“The Age of Constantine” and “Cicerone.”

During the winter of 1847–1848 Burckhardt planned a series of cultural histories, beginning with the age of Pericles and ending with the age of Raphael. The first to appear was *The Age of Constantine the Great* (1852). The structure of this work was one that Burckhardt would use again in his later cultural histories and analyze in detail in his *Reflections on World History*: the “three great powers”—state, religion, and culture—and the ways in which they determine each other. The book is thus concerned as much with art and literature as with politics and religion.

Burckhardt’s *Cicerone* (1854) was “a guide for the enjoyment of art in Italy.” In form a traveler’s guidebook, it was in reality a history of Italian art. In it Burckhardt first tried to solve the problem of systematic art history, tried, as he later put it, to get away from “the mess of art history as the history of artists,” to go beyond biography to the analysis of historical and geographical styles.

“The Civilization of the Renaissance.” While still a student in Berlin, Burckhardt had come to the conclusion that the French Revolution had “pulled the historical ground from under the feet” of all European peoples. Just as in art the styles of every age now coexisted, “one beside the other,” with no single tradition dominating, so with the state “the nineteenth century began with a clean slate.” The individual now had free choice in politics, and nothing to fall back on but his own “inner truth.” The application of this insight to the culture of Renaissance Italy resulted in Burckhardt’s masterpiece, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860).

In this work Burckhardt proposed that the conflict between popes and emperors had deprived 13th-century Italy of legitimate political rule, had left it with that “clean slate” he saw in his own times. This climate allowed political units to appear “whose existence was founded simply on their power to maintain it.” But it also freed the individual of all traditional constraints, whether political, religious, or social. Expressed through artistic and literary forms revived from antiquity, this freed and self-conscious individualism, this “genius of the Italian people . . . achieved the conquest of the western world.” In the Italian Re-

naissance, Burckhardt saw the major characteristics of the modern world, its evil as well as its good.

Later Years. Burckhardt explained his thesis in his lectures of 1868–1869, “On the Study of History,” in the course of a wideranging analysis of the “three powers” at the heart of his historical vision. Culture, in contrast to the constants, state and religion, “is the sum of those spiritual developments that appear spontaneously.” Its form and its vehicle—language—are the product of societies and epochs, but its source is always the individual. To study culture is thus to study the individual giving expression to his place and his age as well as himself.

After publishing his notes on Italian architecture in 1867, Burckhardt prepared nothing more for the press but devoted himself until his retirement in 1893 to lecturing at the university. His series of cultural histories was never completed, but his lectures covered the entire sweep of European history from the ancient Greeks to the European crisis of 1870. In an age of ever-narrower nationalisms, Burckhardt reached back to the universal humanism of Goethe.

After 1870 Burckhardt became increasingly pessimistic about the future of European culture. Though he hoped for another Renaissance, he feared the arrival of the “fearful simplifiers,” the demagogues who would lead the “masses” to tyranny and destroy the European culture he loved. “The world is moving toward the alternative of complete democracy or absolute, ruthless despotism,” he wrote to a friend in 1882. The day would come when “the military state will turn industrialist.” He withdrew to two sparsely furnished rooms above a bakery shop and devoted himself to his work on Italian art, which he never completed. He died on Aug. 8, 1897.

EWB

Burke, Edmund (1729–1797), British statesman and noted political theorist and philosophical writer. Edmund Burke was born in Ireland, spent most of his active life in English politics, and died the political oracle of conservative Europe.

Edmund Burke’s view of society was hierarchical and authoritarian, yet one of his noblest characteristics was his repeated defense of those who were too weak to defend themselves. Outstanding in 18th-century British politics for intellect, oratory, and drive, he lacked the ability either to lead or to conciliate men and never exerted an influence commensurate with his capabilities. His career as a practical politician was a failure; his political theories found favor only with posterity.

Burke was born on Jan. 12, 1729, in Dublin of middle—class parents. His mother suffered from what Burke called “a cruel nervous disorder,” and his relations with his authoritarian father, a Dublin attorney, were unhappy. After attending Trinity College, Dublin, Burke in 1750 crossed to England to study law at the Middle Temple. But he unconsciously resisted his father’s plans for him and made little progress in the law. Indecision marked his life at this time: he described himself as “a runaway son” and his “manner of life” as “chequered with various designs.” In 1755 he considered applying for a post in the Colonies but dropped the idea when his father objected.

In 1756 Burke published two philosophical treatises, *A Vindication of Natural Society* and *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*. In the *Vindication* Burke exposed the futility of demanding a reason for moral and social institutions and, with the foresight which was one of the most remarkable of his gifts, distinguished the coming attack of rationalistic criticism on the established order. The *Enquiry*, which he had begun when only 19, was considered by Samuel Johnson to be “an example of true criticism.” These works were followed in 1757 by *An Account of the European Settlement in America*, to which Burke, although he denied authorship, clearly contributed a great deal. The early sheets of *The Abridgement of the History of England* were also printed in 1757, although the book itself was not published until after Burke’s death. These works introduced Burke’s name into London literary circles and seemed to open up a reputable career.

Family unity, which he had never known as a boy, became an article of Burke’s adult philosophy. In 1757 he married the daughter of his physician and settled into family life with his father-in-law, his brother Richard, and his so-called cousin William. With them he found a domestic harmony he had never known in his father’s home.

Early Political Career. Financial security, however, was elusive, and Burke was forced to take a minor secretarial post in the government establishment in Ireland. But contact with the depressed and persecuted Irish Catholics unsettled him, and early in 1765 he resigned his position. Necessity now led Burke into politics. In July 1765, when the Whig administration of Lord Rockingham was being formed, he was recommended to Rockingham, who took him on as his private secretary. In December, Burke entered Parliament as member for the Buckinghamshire constituency of Wendover.

Burke’s subsequent political career was bound inextricably to the fortunes of the Rockingham group. Emotional and hysterical by nature, without a profession or a secure income, he found stability and independence through his attachment to the Whig aristocrats. When Rockingham lost the premiership in 1766, Burke, though offered employment under the new administration, followed him into opposition. “I believe in any body of men in England I should have been in the minority,” he later said. “I have always been in the minority.” Certainly the dominant characteristic of his political career was an overwhelming impulse to argue and oppose; to that was added enormous persistence, courage, concentration, and energy. Endowed with many of the qualities of leadership, he lacked the sensitivity to gauge and respect the feelings and opinions of others. Hence his political life was a series of negative crusades against the American war, Warren Hastings, and the French Revolution and his reputation as a statesman rests on his wisdom in opposition, not on his achievements in office.

Burke’s theory of government was essentially conservative. He profoundly distrusted the people and believed in the divine right of the aristocracy to govern. “All direction of public humour and opinion must originate in a few,” he wrote in 1775. “God and nature never meant [the people] to think or act without guidance or direction.” Yet all Burke’s writings, despite their rather narrow propaganda purpose, include valuable generalizations on human conduct.

Views on America and Ireland. Burke found difficulty in applying his political philosophy to practical issues. He was one of the first to realize the implications of Britain’s problems with colonial America. He saw the British Empire as a family, with the parent exercising a benevolent authority over the children. Perhaps influenced by his own upbringing, he believed the British government to have been harsh and tyrannical when it should have been lenient. “When any community is subordinately connected with another,” he wrote, “the great danger of the connexion is the extreme pride and self-complacency of the superior.”

In 1774 Burke argued against retaining the tea duty on the Colonies in his celebrated *Speech on American Taxation*, and twice in 1775 he proposed conciliation with the Colonies. His conception of the British Empire as an “aggregate of many states under one common head” came as near as was possible in the 18th century to reconciling British authority with colonial autonomy. Yet at the same time he repeatedly declared his belief in the legislative supremacy of the British Parliament. Thus the American war split Burke

in two. He could face neither American independence nor the prospect of a British victory. "I do not know," he wrote in August 1776, "how to wish success to those whose victory is to separate us from a large and noble part of our empire. Still less do I wish success to injustice, oppression, and absurdity . . . No good can come of any event in this war to any virtuous interest."

In Ireland, Burke's sympathies were with the persecuted Roman Catholics, who were "reduced to beasts of burden" and asked only for that elementary justice all subjects had a right to expect from their government. He preferred their cause to that of the Protestant Anglo-Irish, who were striving to throw off the authority of the British Parliament. With Irish nationalism and its constitutional grievances he had little sympathy. "I am sure the people ought to eat whether they have septennial Parliaments or not," he wrote in 1766. As on the American problem, Burke always counseled moderation in Ireland. "I believe," he said only 2 months before his death, "there are very few cases which will justify a revolt against the established government of a country, let its constitution be what it will."

Hastings Incident. On the formation of the short-lived Rockingham ministry in March 1782, Burke was appointed paymaster general. But now, when he seemed on the threshold of political achievement, everything seemed to go wrong for Burke. In particular, his conduct at this time showed signs of mental disturbance, a tendency aggravated by the death of Rockingham in July 1782. James Boswell told Samuel Johnson in 1783 that Burke had been represented as "actually mad"; to which Johnson replied, "If a man will appear extravagant as he does, and cry, can he wonder that he is represented as mad?" A series of intemperate speeches in the Commons branded Burke as politically unreliable, an impression confirmed by his conduct in the impeachment of Warren Hastings, the governor general of Bengal, in 1790.

Ever since Rockingham had taken office, the punishment of those accused of corruption in India had been uppermost in Burke's mind. His strong aggressive instincts, sharpened by public and private disappointments, needed an enemy against which they could concentrate. Always inclined to favor the unfortunate, he became convinced that Hastings was the principal source of misrule in India and that one striking example of retribution would deter other potential offenders. In Burke's disordered mind, Hastings appeared as a monster of iniquity; he listened uncritically to any complaint against him; and the vehemence

with which he prosecuted the impeachment indicates the depth of his emotions. His violent language and intemperate charges alienated independent men and convinced his own party that he was a political liability.

Last Years. Disappointment and nostalgia colored Burke's later years. He was the first to appreciate the significance of the French Revolution and to apply it to English conditions. In February 1790 he warned the Commons: "In France a cruel, blind, and ferocious democracy had carried all before them; their conduct, marked with the most savage and unfeeling barbarity, had manifested no other system than a determination to destroy all order, subvert all arrangement, and reduce every rank and description of men to one common level."

Burke had England and his own disappointments in mind when he published *Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings of Certain Societies in London* in 1790. "You seem in everything to have strayed out of the high road of nature," he wrote. "The property of France does not govern it"; and in the *Letters on a Regicide Peace* (1796) he defined Jacobinism as "the revolt of the enterprising talents of a country against its property." If England, following the French example, was not to be governed by property, what would become of Burke's most cherished principles? In part the *Reflections* is also Burke's apologia for his devotion to Rockingham. For Rockingham's cause Burke had sacrificed his material interests through 16 long years of profitless opposition, and when his party at last came to power he failed to obtain any lasting advantage for himself or his family. In the famous passage on Marie Antoinette in the *Reflections*, Burke, lamenting the passing of the "age of chivalry," perhaps unconsciously described his own relations with the Whig aristocrats: "Never, never more, shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom."

For the last 5 years of his life Burke occupied a unique position. "He is," remarked a contemporary, "a sort of power in Europe, though totally without any of those means . . . which give or maintain power in other men." He corresponded with Louis XVIII and the French royalists and counseled Stanislaus of Poland to pursue a liberal policy. The Irish Catholics regarded him as their champion. As each succeeding act of revolution became more bloody, his foresight was praised more widely. He urged the necessity of war with France, and the declaration of hostilities further increased his prestige. On the last day of his life

he spoke of his hatred for the revolutionary spirit in France and of his belief that the war was for the good of humanity. He died on July 9, 1797, and in accordance with his wishes was buried in the parish church of Beaconsfield in Buckinghamshire.

EWB

Byron, George Gordon, known as Lord Byron (1788–1824), English poet. Byron was one of the most important figures of the romantic movement. Because of his works, active life, and physical beauty he came to be considered the personification of the romantic poet-hero.

George Gordon Noel Byron was born on Jan. 22, 1788, into a family of fast-decaying nobility. His lame foot, the absence of any fatherly authority in the household after Captain "Mad Jack" Byron's death in 1791, the contempt of his aristocratic relatives for the impoverished widow and her son, his Calvinistic upbringing at the hands of a Scottish nurse, the fickleness and stupidity of his mother all conspired to hurt the pride and sensitiveness of the boy. This roused in him a need for self-assertion which he soon sought to gratify in three main directions: love, poetry, and action.

On the death of his grand-uncle in 1798, Byron inherited the title and estate. After 4 years at Harrow (1801–1805), he went to Trinity College, Cambridge, where he became conscious for the first time of the discrepancy between the lofty aspirations of idealism and the petty realities of experience. "I took my gradations in the vices with great promptitude," he later reminisced, "but they were not to my taste." His obstinate quest for some genuine passion among the frail women of this world accounts for the crowded catalog of his amours.

Early Works. In 1807 Byron's juvenilia were collected under the title *Hours of Idleness*; although the little book exhibited only the milder forms of romantic *Weltschmerz*, it was harshly criticized by the *Edinburgh Review*. The irate author counterattacked in *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers* (1809), the first manifestation of a gift for satire and a sarcastic wit which single him out among the major English romantics, and which he may have owed to his aristocratic outlook and his classical education.

In 1809 a 2-year trip to the Mediterranean countries provided material for the first two cantos of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*. Their publication in 1812 earned Byron instant glory, as they combined the more popular features of the late-18th-century romanticism: colorful descriptions of exotic nature, disillusioned meditations on the vanity of earthly things,

a lyrical exaltation of freedom, and above all, the new hero, handsome and lonely, somberly mysterious, yet strongly impassioned for all his weariness with life.

Social Life. While his fame was spreading, Byron was busy shocking London high society. After his affairs with Lady Caroline Lamb and Lady Oxford, his incestuous and adulterous love for his half sister Augusta not only made him a reprobate, but also crystallized the sense of guilt and doom to which he had always been prone. From then on, the theme of incest was to figure prominently in his writings, starting with the epic tales that he published between 1812 and 1816: *The Giaour*, *The Bride of Abydos*, *The Corsair*, *Lara*, *The Siege of Corinth*, and *Parisina*. Incestuous love, criminal although genuine and irresistible, was a suitable metaphor for the tragic condition of man, who is cursed by God, rebuked by society, and hated by himself because of sins for which he is not responsible. The tales, therefore, add a new dimension of depth to the Byronic hero: in his total alienation he now actively assumes the tragic fatality which turns natural instinct into unforgivable sin, and he deliberately takes his rebellious stance as an outcast against all accepted notions of the right order of things.

While thus seeking relief in imaginative exploration of his own tortured mind, Byron had been half hoping to find peace and reconciliation in a more settled life. But his marriage to Anna Isabella Milbanke (Jan. 1, 1815) soon proved a complete failure, and she left him after a year. London society could have ignored the peculiarities of Byron's private life, but a satire against the Prince Regent, "Stanzas to a Lady Weeping," which he had appended to *The Corsair*, aroused hysterical abuse from the Tories, in whose hands his separation from his wife became an efficient weapon. On April 25, 1816, Byron had to leave his native country, never to return.

His Travels. In Switzerland, Byron spent several months in the company of the poet Shelley, resuming an agitated and unenthusiastic affair with the latter's sister-in-law, Clare Clairmont. Under Shelley's influence he read Wordsworth and imbibed the high-flown but uncongenial spirituality which permeates the third canto of *Childe Harold*. But *The Prisoner of Chillon* and Byron's first drama, *Manfred*, took the Byronic hero to a new level of inwardness: his greatness now lies in the steadfast refusal to bow to the hostile powers that oppress him, whether he discovers new selfhood in his very dereliction or seeks in self-destruction the fulfillment of his assertiveness.

In October 1816 Byron left for Italy and settled in Venice, where he spent many days and nights in

unprecedented debauchery. His compositions of 1817, however, show signs of a new outlook. The fourth canto of *Childe Harold* does not reject the cosmic pessimism of *Manfred*, but the mood of shrill revolt is superseded by a tone of resigned acceptance, and sizable sections of the poem are devoted to the theme of political freedom and national independence. Equally significant of Byron's renewed ability to face the world in laughter rather than in anger is the witty, good-humored satire of *Beppo*, which should be considered a preparation for *Don Juan*, begun in September 1818.

Spontaneous maturation had thus paved the way for the healing influence of Teresa Guiccioli, Byron's last love, whom he met in April 1819. The poet had at last begun to come to terms with his desperate conception of life, to the extent of being able to debunk all shams and to parody all posturing, including his own, in *Don Juan*, the unfinished masterpiece on which he was to work till the end of his life. But this new balance also found serious utterance in *Cain*, the best of the plays that he wrote in 1821. It is a closely argued dramatic restatement of Byron's lasting creed that as the universe is swayed by a loveless God, the only greatness to which man can aspire lies in his foredoomed struggle for reason and justice. *Marino Faliero* illustrates the same pattern in the field of action, exalting the selflessness of the man who sacrifices his life in the service of popular freedom.

It is characteristic of Byron's integrity that he increasingly sought to translate his ideas into action, repeatedly voicing the more radical Whig viewpoint in the House of Lords in 1812–1813, running real risks to help the Italian Carbonari in 1820–1821, and collaborating with Leigh Hunt in launching the *Liberal* in 1822. His early poetry had contributed to sensitizing the European mind to the plight of Greece under the Turkish yoke. In 1824 Byron joined the Greek liberation fighters at Missolonghi, where he died of malarial fever on April 19.

EWB

C

Calvin, John (1509–1564), French Protestant reformer. John Calvin is best known for his doctrine of predestination and his theocratic view of the state.

John Calvin was born at Noyon in Picardy on July 10, 1509. He was the second son of Gérard Cauvin, who was secretary to the bishop of Noyon and fiscal procurator for the province. The family name was spelled several ways, but John showed preference while still a young man for "Calvin."

An ecclesiastical career was chosen for John, and at the age of 12, through his father's influence, he received a small benefice, a chaplaincy in the Cathedral of Noyon. Two years later, in August 1523, he went to Paris in the company of the noble Hangest family. He entered the Collège de la Marche at the University of Paris, where he soon became highly skilled in Latin. Subsequently he attended the Collège de Montaigu, where the humanist Erasmus had studied before him and where the Catholic reformer Ignatius of Loyola would study after him. Calvin remained in the profoundly ecclesiastical environment of this college until 1528. Then at the behest of his father he moved to Orléans to study law. He devoted himself assiduously to this field, drawing from it the clarity, logic, and precision that would later be the distinguishing marks of his theology.

In 1531, armed with his bachelor of laws degree, Calvin returned to Paris and took up the study of classical literature. At this time Martin Luther's ideas concerning salvation by faith alone were circulating in the city, and Calvin was affected by the new Protestant notions and by pleas for Church reform. He became a friend of Nicholas Cop, who, upon becoming rector of the university in 1533, made an inaugural speech which immediately branded him as a heretic. Calvin suffered the penalties of guilt by association and would certainly have been arrested had he not been warned to flee. In January 1534 he hastily left Paris and went to Angoulême, where he began work on his theological masterpiece, the *Institutes of the Christian Religion*.

Several turbulent months later, after a secret journey and two brief periods of arrest, Calvin was forced to flee from France when King Francis I instituted a general persecution of heretics. In December 1534 he found his way to Basel, where Cop had gone before him.

Calvin's Theology. Sometime during his last 3 years in France, Calvin experienced what he called his sudden conversion and mentally parted company with Rome. He proceeded to develop his theological position and in 1536 to expound it in the most severe, logical, and terrifying book of all Protestantism, the *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. Calvin followed this first Latin edition with an enlarged version in 1539 and a French translation in 1540, a book that has been called a masterpiece of French prose. The reformer continued to revise and develop the *Institutes* until his death.

Its theme is the majesty of God. There is an unbridgeable chasm between man and his maker. Man is thoroughly corrupt, so base that it is unthinkable

able that he could lift a finger to participate in his own salvation. God is glorious and magnificent beyond man's highest capacity to comprehend; He is both omnipotent and omniscient, and He has, merely by His knowing, foreordained all things that ever will come to pass. Man is helpless in the face of God's will. He is predestined either to eternal glory or eternal damnation, and he can do nothing, even if he is the best of saints in his fellow's eyes, to alter the intention of God. To suggest that he could would be to imply that the Creator did not fore-know precisely and thus diminish His majesty. To Calvin there could be no greater sacrilege. This doctrine of predestination did not originate with Calvin, but no one ever expressed it more clearly and uncompromisingly. He did not flinch from the terrible consequences of God's omniscience.

To those few whom God has chosen to save, He has granted the precious gift of faith, which is undeserved. All are unworthy of salvation, and most are damned because God's justice demands it. But God is infinitely merciful as well as just, and it is this mercy, freely given, that opens the door to heaven for the elect.

Calvin knew that this doctrine was terrifying, that it seemed to make God hateful and arbitrary, but he submitted that human reason is too feeble to scrutinize or judge the will of God. The Creator's decision on who shall be damned is immutable. No purgatory exists to cleanse man of his sins and prepare him for heaven. Yet Calvin counsels prayer, even though it will not change God's will, because prayer too is decreed and men must worship even though they may be among the damned. The prayer should be simple, and all elaborate ceremony should be rejected. The Catholic Mass is sacrilegious, because the priest claims that in it he changes the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. Calvin held that Christ is present whenever believers gather prayerfully, but in spirit only and not because of any act undertaken by priests, who have no special powers and are in no way different from other Christians. There are only two Sacraments: Baptism and the Lord's Supper. Like Luther, Calvin rejects all other "sacraments" as not based on Holy Scripture.

Calvin makes a distinction between the visible Church and the true Church. The former is composed of those who participate in the Sacraments and profess their faith in Christ; the latter, invisible and unknown to all save God, is the community of the elect—dead, living, and yet unborn. One must belong to the visible Church in order to be saved, but belonging to it is no guarantee of salvation. Church and state are both ordained by God. The task of the former is to teach and prescribe faith and morals, while

the latter preserves order and enforces the laws set forth by the Church. There is no separation of Church and state. Both must work in harmony to preserve the word of God, and to this end the state is enjoined to use force if necessary to suppress false teachings, such as Catholicism, Anabaptism, or Lutheranism.

That these ideas, particularly with their cornerstone of predestination, soon conquered much of the Christian world is baffling at first examination. But Calvin's followers were encouraged by hope of election rather than enervated by fear of damnation. It seems to be an essential part of human nature to see oneself as just, and Calvin himself, while he firmly maintained that no one is certain of salvation, always acted with confidence and trust in his own election.

Geneva Reformer. While publication of the *Institutes* was in progress, Calvin made preparations to leave his homeland permanently. He returned briefly to France early in 1536 to settle personal business, then set out for Strasbourg. Because of the war between France and the Holy Roman Empire, he was forced to take a circuitous route which brought him to Geneva. He intended to continue on to Strasbourg but was persuaded to remain by Guillaume Farel, who had begun a Protestant movement in Geneva. Except for one brief interruption he spent the remaining years of his life in Geneva, spreading the word of God as he understood it and creating a theocratic state unique in the annals of Christendom.

In 1537 Calvin was elected to the preaching office by the city fathers, who had thrown off obedience to Rome along with their old political ruler, the Duke of Savoy. A council, now operating as the government, issued decrees in July 1537 against all manifestations of Catholicism as well as all forms of immorality. Rosaries and relics were banished along with adulterers. Gamblers were punished and so were people who wore improper, that is, luxurious, clothing. The austere hand of Calvin was behind these regulations.

The new rules were too severe for many citizens, and in February 1538 a combination of *Libertines* (freedom lovers) and suppressed Catholics captured a majority of the council. This body then banished Calvin and Farel; Calvin went to Strasbourg and Farel to Neuchâtel, where he remained for the rest of his life.

At Strasbourg, Calvin ministered to a small congregation of French Protestants and in 1540 married Idelette de Bure. She bore him one child, who died in infancy, and she herself died in 1549. While Calvin was establishing himself at Strasbourg, things were going badly for the new Protestantism in Geneva. Strong pressure was being exerted on the council from within and without the city to return to Catholicism. Fearing

that they might be removed from office and disgusted with the trend toward flagrant immorality among the citizenry, the councilors revoked the ban on Calvin on May 1, 1541. A deputation was sent immediately to Strasbourg to persuade the reformer to return, and he did so reluctantly, on Sept. 13, 1541, after being promised total cooperation in restoring discipline.

Rule of God. The law of a Christian state, according to Calvin, is the Bible. The task of the clergy is to interpret and teach that law, while the task of the state is to enforce it. Under this principle, while the clergy, including Calvin, were not civil magistrates, they held enormous authority over the government and all aspects of civil as well as religious life.

Immediately on his return to Geneva, Calvin set about organizing the Reformed Church. On Jan. 2, 1542, the city council ratified the *Ordonnances ecclésiastiques*, the new regulations governing the Church, formulated by a committee led by Calvin. The *Ordonnances* divided the ministry into four categories: pastors, teachers, lay elders, and deacons. The pastors governed the Church and trained aspirants to the ministry. No one could preach henceforth in Geneva without permission of the pastors.

The conduct of all citizens was examined and regulated by a consistory of 5 pastors and 12 lay elders elected by the council. The consistory had the right to visit every family annually and search its home; to summon any citizen before it; to excommunicate, which meant virtually automatic banishment from the city by the council; to force attendance at weekly sermons; to prohibit gambling, drunkenness, dancing, profane songs, and immodest dress; and to forbid all forms of the theater. The colors of clothing, hair styles, and amounts of food permissible at the table were regulated. It was forbidden to name children after saints, and it was a criminal offense to speak ill of Calvin or the rest of the clergy. The press was severely censored, with writings judged to be immoral and books devoted to Catholicism or other false teaching forbidden. Punishment for first offenses was usually a fine and for repetition of minor crimes, banishment. Fornication was punishable by exile, and adultery, blasphemy, and idolatry by death. Education, which Calvin regarded as inseparable from religion, was very carefully regulated, and new schools were established. Charity was placed under municipal administration to eliminate begging. Thus the whole life of Geneva was placed under a rigid discipline and a single Church from which no deviation was permitted.

The consistory and the city council worked hand in hand in enforcing the laws, but the moving spirit of all was Calvin, who acted as a virtual dictator from

1541 until his death. Calvin did not look the part of a dictator. He was a small, thin, and fragile man with an unsmiling ruthless austerity in his face. He was pale under a black beard and a high forehead. A poet would perhaps see these physical details as signs of enormous, orderly intellect and of little human warmth or appetite, a being all mind and spirit with almost no body at all. There were some ugly moments in theocratic Geneva. During these years 58 people were executed and 76 banished in order to preserve morals and discipline. Like most men of his century, the reformer was convinced that believing wrongly about God was so heinous a crime that not even death could expiate it.

Last Years. The last years of Calvin's life were spent in elaborating Geneva's laws, writing controversial works against spiritual enemies, and laboring prodigiously on the theology of the *Institutes*. Geneva became a model of discipline, order and cleanliness, the admiration of all who visited there.

Men trained to the ministry by Calvin carried his doctrines to every corner of Europe. The reformer lived to see his followers growing in numbers in the Netherlands, Scotland, Germany, and even France, the homeland he had been forced to leave. The impetus he gave to austerity, frugality, and hard, uncomplaining work may have had some influence in forming a capitalist mentality devoted to the acquisition but not the enjoyment of wealth. In any case his teachings have been carried to the present day and live on in the churches which descended from him, modified from their early severity by time but still vigorous in some of the more puritan aspects of modern life.

On May 27, 1564, after a long illness Calvin died. He left an indelible mark on the Christian world.

EWB

Carlyle, Thomas (1795–1881), British essayist and historian and the leading social critic of early Victorian England. Disseminating German idealist thought in his country, with Calvinist zeal Thomas Carlyle preached against materialism and mechanism during the industrial revolution.

Thomas Carlyle was born at Ecclefechan in Dumfriesshire, Scotland, on Dec. 4, 1795. His father, a stonemason, was an intelligent man and a pious Calvinist. Carlyle was educated at Annan Grammar School and Edinburgh University, where he read voraciously and distinguished himself in mathematics. He abandoned his original intention to enter the ministry and turned instead first to schoolteaching and then to literary hackwork, dreaming all the while of greatness as a writer. A reading of Madame de Staël's *Germany*

introduced him to German thought and literature, and in 1823–1824 he published a *Life of Schiller* in the *London Magazine* and in 1824 a translation of Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*.

Meanwhile Carlyle had passed through a religious crisis similar to the one he was to describe in *Sartor Resartus* and had met Jane Baillie Welsh, a brilliant and charming girl, who recognized his genius and gave him encouragement and love. Through a tutorship in the Buller family Carlyle made his first trip to London, where he met Samuel Taylor Coleridge and other leading literary figures. He returned to Scotland, married Jane Welsh on Oct. 17, 1826, and settled first in Edinburgh and subsequently at Craigenputtock, an isolated farmhouse belonging to his wife's family. It was during this period that he wrote a series of essays for the *Edinburgh Review* and the *Foreign Review* which were later grouped as *Miscellaneous and Critical Essays*. Among these were essays on Burns, Goethe, and Richter and the important "Signs of the Times," his first essay on contemporary social problems.

"Sartor Resartus." It was at Craigenputtock that Carlyle wrote *Sartor Resartus*, his most characteristic work. Originally rejected by London editors, it was first published in *Fraser's Magazine* in 1833–1834 and did not attain book form in England until 1838, after Ralph Waldo Emerson had introduced it in America and after the success of Carlyle's *The French Revolution*. The first appearance of *Sartor Resartus* was greeted with "universal disapprobation," in part because of its wild, grotesque, and rambling mixture of serious and comic styles. This picturesque and knotted prose was to become Carlyle's hallmark.

Career in London. Carlyle came into his maturity with *Sartor* and longed to abandon short articles in favor of a substantial work. Accordingly, he turned to a study of the French Revolution, encouraged in the project by John Stuart Mill, who gave him his own notes and materials. As a help in his researches he moved to London, settling in Chelsea. The publication of *The French Revolution* in 1837 established Carlyle as one of the leading writers of the day. The book demonstrates his belief in the Divine Spirit's working in man's affairs. Carlyle rejected the "dry-as-dust" method of factual history writing in favor of immersing himself in his subject and capturing its spirit and movement hence the focus on the drama and scenic quality of events and on the mounting impact of detail. His ability to animate history is Carlyle's triumph, but his personal reading of the significance of a great event lays him open to charges of

subjectivity and ignorance of the careful study of economic and political detail so admired by later schools of historical research.

Carlyle's great popularity led him to give several series of public lectures on German literature, the history of literature, modern European revolutions, and finally, and most significantly, on heroes and hero worship. These lectures were published in 1841 as *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in Literature*. This work reflects his increasing hostility to modern egalitarian democracy and his stress upon the inequality of men's wisdom and the incorporation, as it were, of divine purpose. Carlyle's insistence upon the need for heroic leadership is the reason why he was attacked, often mistakenly, as an apostle of force or dictatorial rule.

Late Works. Carlyle's hero worship is responsible for the two largest projects of his later career. He first intended to rehabilitate Oliver Cromwell by means of a history of the Puritan Revolution but later narrowed his project to a collection of Cromwell's letters and speeches connected by narrative and commentary (1845). And from 1852 to 1865 he labored on a biography of Frederick the Great (1865) against the mounting uncongeniality and intractability of the subject. During these years Carlyle exerted a great influence on younger contemporaries such as Alfred Tennyson, Robert Browning, Charles Kingsley, John Ruskin, and James Froude. He published a number of criticisms of the economic and social conditions of industrial England, among them *Chartism* (1839), "Latter-Day" Pamphlets (1850), and *Shooting Niagara, and After?* (1867). His most significant social criticism, *Past and Present* (1843), contrasted the organic, hierarchical society of the medieval abbey of Bury St. Edmunds with the fragmented world of modern parliamentary democracy. It hoped for a recognition of moral leadership among the new "captains of industry."

In 1865 Carlyle was elected lord rector of Edinburgh University, but in his last years he was more than ever a lonely, isolated prophet of doom. He died on Feb. 5, 1881, and was buried in Ecclefechan Churchyard.

EWB

Castiglione, Baldassare (1478–1529), Italian author, courtier, and diplomat. Baldassare Castiglione is known primarily for his "Book of the Courtier." This work, which portrays the ideal courtier, was a chief vehicle in spreading Italian humanism into England and France.

Baldassare Castiglione was born on Dec. 6, 1478, in Casatico in the province of Mantua of an illustrious Lombard family. After receiving a classical education in Mantua and in Milan, he served at the court of the Milanese duke Lodovico Sforza from 1496 to 1499. Castiglione then entered the service of Francesco Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua. In 1503 he fought with Gonzaga's forces against the Spanish in Naples. On his way north he visited Rome and Urbino; both cities fascinated him. His request to transfer to the court of Guidobaldo da Montefeltro at Urbino was grudgingly granted in 1504 by Gonzaga.

At Urbino, Guidobaldo's wife, Elizabetta, presided over the noble company depicted in the *Libro del cortegiano* (*Book of the Courtier*). Castiglione's service there gave him an entree into the court of Pope Julius II, where he became a friend of the artist Raphael. He was sent as ambassador to Henry VII of England and in 1513 was made Count of Nuvolara by Guidobaldo's successor, Francesco Maria della Rovere. Castiglione married in 1516 but became a cleric in 1521 after the death of his wife. In 1524 he was sent by Pope Clement VII as ambassador to Charles V in Spain, an unfortunate mission in that Castiglione reported wrongly the Emperor's intentions in the period leading up to the sack of Rome in 1527. Castiglione died in Toledo, Spain, on Feb. 7, 1529.

"Book of the Courtier." Published in 1528, though it was begun in 1507 and written mainly from 1513 to 1516, Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier* was a huge and immediate success. His idealized picture of society at the court of Urbino quickly became a book of etiquette for both the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy even beyond the confines of Italy. Translated into Spanish (1534), French (1537), English (1561), and German (1566), *The Courtier* saw some 40 editions in the 16th century alone and a hundred more by 1900. Through it, the broad values of Italian humanism the ideal of the fully developed, well-rounded man, itself the rebirth of a classical ideal were helped to spread throughout western Europe. Yet it must be admitted that in *The Courtier* the high qualities of *humanitas* culture and virtue are exalted not for themselves but as tools of self-advancement.

Dignified, melancholy, and idealistic (qualities that Raphael captured in his famous portrait), Castiglione tended not only to soften society's rough edges but also to avoid thorny practical and moral issues. For instance, he says of the Italians' recent poor reputation in arms, "It is better to pass in silence that which cannot be recalled without pain." As to the question of what a courtier should do when ordered by his prince to commit an immoral act such as mur-

der, he states, "There would be too much to say; it must all be left to your discretion." Nevertheless, there is much that is positive in *The Courtier*; there is a lofty concept of human personality and dignity and of man's creative possibilities.

Castiglione's classical learning is deftly blended into the polite conversation of the courtiers and their ladies. His arguments in favor of literature are derived from those of Cicero in *Pro Archia*, and his description of the ideal courtier is strongly influenced by Cicero's *De oratore*. The courtier should be noble, witty, pleasant, agile, a horseman and a warrior (his principal profession), and devoted to his prince. He should know Greek, Latin, French, and Spanish, and he should be skilled, though not ostentatiously so, in literature, music, painting, and dancing. The courtier's behavior should be characterized by grace and nonchalance (*sprezzatura*), and he should carefully avoid any affectation. As in Machiavelli and Guicciardini, there is a certain moral relativism: seeming is frequently more important than being.

EWB

Catherine II (1729–1796), Russian empress, known as Catherine the Great. Catherine II reigned from 1762 to 1796. She expanded the Russian Empire, improved administration, and vigorously pursued the policy of Westernization. Her reputation as an "enlightened despot," however, is not wholly supported by her deeds.

Born in the German city of Stettin on April 21, 1729, Catherine was the daughter of Prince Christian August of Anhalt-Zerbst and Princess Johanna Elizabeth of Holstein-Gottorp. Her education emphasized the subjects considered proper for one of her station: religion (Lutheranism), history, French, German, and music.

When Catherine was 15, she went to Russia at the invitation of Empress Elizabeth to meet and perhaps marry the heir to the throne, the Grand Duke Peter, an immature and disagreeable youth of 16. As the Empress had hoped, the two proved amenable to a marriage plan; but Catherine later wrote that she was more attracted to the "Crown of Russia," which Peter would eventually wear, than to "his person." When Catherine had met the important condition imposed upon her as a prospective royal consort, that she be converted to the Russian Orthodox faith, she and the young Grand Duke were married in 1745.

The marriage turned out to be an unhappy one in which there was little evidence of love or even affection. Peter was soon unfaithful to Catherine, and after a time she became unfaithful to him. Whether

Peter was the father of Paul and Anna, the two children recorded as their offspring, remains a moot question.

Although amorous interests were important in Catherine's personal life, they did not overshadow her intellectual and political interests. A sharp-witted and cultivated young woman, she read widely, particularly in French, at that time the first language of educated Europeans. She liked novels, plays, and verse but was particularly interested in the writings of the major figures of the French Enlightenment, such as Diderot, Voltaire, and Montesquieu.

Catherine was ambitious as well as intelligent. She always looked ahead to the time when Peter would succeed to the throne and she, as his empress, would be able to exercise great political influence. In anticipation of her future status she sought the reputation of being a true Russian. She worked diligently at mastering the Russian language and took care to demonstrate devotion to the Russian Orthodox faith and the Russian state. Thus she gave prominence to a significant difference between her attitude and that of her husband, who displayed open contempt for the country he was to rule. She assured herself of further advantage by the studied use of her charm and vivacity in cultivating the goodwill of important personages.

Ascent to Power. When Empress Elizabeth died on Dec. 25, 1761, Peter was proclaimed Emperor Peter III, and Catherine became empress. Friends warned that she might not enjoy her status for long since Peter was planning to divorce her, and she was advised to flee. She decided to ignore the warning, and the wisdom of her decision was soon demonstrated. Within a few months after coming to the throne, Peter had aroused so much hostility among government, military, and church leaders that a group of them began plotting a coup to remove him, place his 7-year-old son, Paul, on the throne, and name Catherine as regent until the boy should come of age. But they had underestimated Catherine's ambition she aimed at a more exalted role for herself. On June 28, 1762, with the aid of her lover Gregory Orlov, she rallied the troops of St. Petersburg to her support and declared herself Catherine II, the sovereign ruler of Russia (she later named Paul as her heir). She had Peter arrested and required him to sign an act of abdication. When he sought permission to leave the country, she refused it, intending to hold him prisoner for life. But his remaining days proved few; shortly after his arrest he was killed in a brawl with his captors.

Early Reign (1762–1764). Catherine had ambitious plans regarding both domestic and foreign

affairs, but during the first years of her reign her attention was directed toward securing her position. She knew that a number of influential persons considered her a usurper and her son, Paul, the rightful ruler; she also realized that without the goodwill of the nobility and the military she could be overthrown by a coup as readily as she had been elevated by one. Her reaction to this situation was to take every opportunity for conciliating the nobility and the military and at the same time striking sharply at those who sought to replace her with Paul.

As for general policy, Catherine understood that Russia needed an extended period of peace during which to concentrate on domestic affairs and that peace required a cautious foreign policy. The able Count Nikita Panin, whom she placed in charge of foreign affairs, was well chosen to carry out such a policy.

Attempts at Reform (1764–1768). By 1764 Catherine felt sufficiently secure to begin work on reform. In her thinking about the problems of reform, she belonged to the group of 18th-century rulers known as "enlightened despots." Influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment, these monarchs believed that a wise and benevolent ruler, acting according to the dictates of reason, could ensure the well-being of his or her subjects.

It was in the spirit of the Enlightenment that Catherine undertook her first major reform, that of Russia's legal system, which was based on the antiquated, inequitable, and inefficient Code of Laws, dating from 1649. For more than 2 years, inspired by the writings of Montesquieu and the Italian jurist Beccaria, she worked on the composition of the "Instruction," a document to guide those to whom she would entrust the work of reforming the legal system. This work was widely distributed in Europe and caused a sensation because it called for a legal system far in advance of the times. It proposed a system providing equal protection under law for all persons and emphasized prevention of criminal acts rather than harsh punishment for them.

In June 1767 the Empress created the Legislative Commission to revise the old laws in accordance with the "Instruction." For the time and place, the Commission was a remarkable body, consisting of delegates from almost all levels of society except the lowest, the serfs. Like many others, Catherine had great hopes about what the Commission might accomplish, but unfortunately, the delegates devoted most of their time to the exposition of their own grievances, rather than to their assigned task. Consequently, though their meetings continued for more than a year, they

made no progress, and Catherine suspended the meetings at the end of 1768. The fact that she never reconvened the Commission has been interpreted by some historians as an indication that she had lost faith in the delegates; others feel, however, that she was more interested in having the reputation of being an “enlightened” ruler than in actually being one.

War and Revolt (1768–1774). Foreign affairs now began to demand Catherine’s major attention. She had sent troops to help the Polish king Stanislas (a former lover) in suppressing a nationalist revolt aimed at reducing Russia’s influence in Poland. In 1768 the Polish rebels appealed to Turkey for aid, and the Turkish sultan, grateful for an opportunity to weaken a traditional enemy, declared war on Russia. But his act was based on serious miscalculation, and his forces were soundly beaten by the Russians. This turn of events led Austria to threaten intervention on Turkey’s behalf unless Catherine agreed not to take full advantage of her victory. Faced by this dangerous alternative, she agreed to show restraint in return for a portion of Polish territory. Thus in 1772 Austria and Russia annexed Polish territory in the First Partition of Poland. Two years later, after lengthy negotiations, Catherine concluded peace with Turkey, restricting herself to relatively modest but nonetheless important gains. Russia received as a territorial concession its first foothold on the Black Sea coast, and Russian merchant ships were allowed the right of sailing on the Black Sea and through the Dardanelles.

Even before the conclusion of peace with the Turks, Catherine had to concern herself with a revolt led by the Cossack Yemelyan Pugachev. It proved to be the most ominous internal threat she ever had to face. The rebel leader claimed that reports of Peter III’s death were false and that he himself was the deposed emperor. He convinced many serfs, Cossacks, and members of other dissatisfied groups that when Catherine II was deposed and “Peter III” was returned to the throne their oppression would be ended. Soon tens of thousands were following him, and the uprising, which started in the south and spread up the Volga River, was within threatening range of Moscow. Pugachev’s defeat required several major expeditions by the imperial forces, and a feeling of security returned to the government only after his capture late in 1774. The revolt was a major landmark in Catherine’s reign. Deeply alarmed by it, she concluded, along with most of the aristocracy, that the best safeguard against rebellion would be the strengthening of the local administrative authority of the nobility rather than measures to ameliorate the condition of the lower classes.

Domestic Affairs (1775–1787). Much of Catherine’s fame rests on what she accomplished during the dozen years following the Pugachev uprising, when she directed her time and talent to domestic affairs, particularly those concerned with the administrative operations of government. Her reorganization in 1775 of provincial administration, in such a way as to favor the nobility, stood the test of time; but her reorganization of municipal government 10 years later was less successful.

Catherine attached high importance to expanding the country’s educational facilities. She gave serious consideration to various plans and in 1786 adopted one providing for a large-scale educational system. Unfortunately she was unable to carry out the entire plan; but she did add to the number of the country’s elementary and secondary schools, and some of the remaining parts of her plan were carried out during succeeding reigns.

Another of Catherine’s chief domestic concerns was the enhancement of Russia’s economic strength. To this end she encouraged trade by ending various restrictions on commerce, and she promoted the development of underpopulated areas by attracting both Russians and foreigners to them as settlers.

The arts and sciences received much attention during Catherine’s reign not only because she believed them to be important in themselves, but also because she saw them as a means by which Russia could attain a reputation as a center of civilization. Under her direction St. Petersburg was beautified and made one of the world’s most dazzling capitals. With her encouragement, theater, music, and painting flourished; stimulated by her patronage, the Academy of Sciences reached new heights. Indeed, during her reign St. Petersburg became one of the major cultural centers of Europe.

Foreign Affairs (1787–1795). Catherine gradually came to believe that it would be possible to strip Turkey of both Constantinople and its European possessions if only Austria would join Russia in the undertaking. And, having gained Austria’s lukewarm support, she began the deliberate pursuit of a policy so intolerably aggressive toward Turkey that in 1787 the Sultan finally declared war on Russia. As in past encounters, the Russian forces proved superior to the Turks, but they required 4 years to achieve victory. By the Treaty of Jassy (1792) Catherine won from Turkey a large area on the Black Sea coast and gained Turkish agreement to Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. But she was not able to carry out her original plan of annexing Constantinople and Turkey’s Euro-

pean territory, since Austria had withdrawn its support of this action and other powers vigorously opposed it.

While the Russo-Turkish War was in progress, Polish nationalists again tried to strengthen the Polish state and end Russian influence within it. As before, their efforts were futile, leading only to unqualified disaster for their unfortunate country—the Second Partition of Poland (1793), in which Russia and Prussia annexed Polish territory; and the Third Partition (1795), in which Russia, Austria, and Prussia divided what remained of an independent Poland.

Problem of Succession. As she grew older, Catherine became greatly troubled because her heir, Paul, who had long been given to violent and unpredictable extremes of emotion, was becoming so unsettled and erratic that she doubted his fitness to rule. She considered disclaiming him as heir and naming his oldest son, Alexander, as her successor. But before she was able to alter her original arrangement, she died of a stroke on Nov. 6, 1796.

EWB

Cavendish, Margaret (1623–1673), of the first prolific female science writers. As the author of approximately 14 scientific or quasi-scientific books, Margaret Cavendish helped to popularize some of the most important ideas of the scientific revolution, including the competing vitalistic and mechanistic natural philosophies and atomism. A flamboyant and eccentric woman, Cavendish was the most visible of the “scientific ladies” of the seventeenth century.

Margaret Lucas was born into a life of luxury near Colchester, England, in 1623, the youngest of eight children of Sir Thomas Lucas. She was educated informally at home. At the age of eighteen, she left her sheltered life to become Maid of Honor to Queen Henrietta Maria, wife of Charles I, accompanying the queen into exile in France following the defeat of the royalists in the civil war. There she fell in love with and married William Cavendish, the Duke of Newcastle, a 52 year-old widower, who had been commander of the royalist forces in the north of England. Joining other exiled royalists in Antwerp, the couple rented the mansion of the artist Rubens. Margaret Cavendish was first exposed to science in their informal salon society, “The Newcastle Circle,” which included the philosophers Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes and Pierre Gassendi. She visited England in 1651—52 to try to collect revenues from the Newcastle estate to satisfy their foreign creditors. It was at this time that Cavendish first gained her reputation for extravagant dress and manners, as well as for her beauty and her bizarre poetry.

Publishes Original Natural Philosophy. Cavendish prided herself on her originality and boasted that her ideas were the products of her own imagination, not derived from the writings of others. Cavendish’s first anthology, *Poems, and Fancies*, included the earliest version of her natural philosophy. Although English atomic theory in the seventeenth century attempted to explain all natural phenomena as matter in motion, in Cavendish’s philosophy all atoms contained the same amount of matter but differed in size and shape; thus, earth atoms were square, water particles were round, atoms of air were long, and fire atoms were sharp. This led to her humoral theory of disease, wherein illness was due to fighting between atoms or an overabundance of one atomic shape. However in her second volume, *Philosophical Fancies*, published later in the same year, Cavendish already had disavowed her own atomic theory. By 1663, when she published *Philosophical and Physical Opinions*, she had decided that if atoms were “Animated Matter,” then they would have “Free-will and Liberty” and thus would always be at war with one another and unable to cooperate in the creation of complex organisms and minerals. Nevertheless, Cavendish continued to view all matter as composed of one material, animate and intelligent, in contrast to the Cartesian view of a mechanistic universe.

Challenges Other Scientists. Cavendish and her husband returned to England with the restoration of the monarchy in 1660 and, for the first time, she began to study the works of other scientists. Finding herself in disagreement with most of them, she wrote *Philosophical Letters: or, Modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy, maintained by several Famous and Learned Authors of this Age, Expressed by way of Letters* in 1664. Cavendish sent copies of this work, along with *Philosophical and Physical Opinions*, by special messenger to the most famous scientists and celebrities of the day. In 1666 and again in 1668, she published *Observations upon Experimental Philosophy*, a response to Robert Hooke’s *Micrographia*, in which she attacked the use of recently-developed microscopes and telescopes as leading to false observations and interpretations of the natural world. Included in the same volume with *Observations* was *The Blazing World* was a semi-scientific utopian romance, in which Cavendish declared herself “Margaret the First.”

Invited to the Royal Society. More than anything else, Cavendish yearned for the recognition of the scientific community. She presented the universities of Oxford and Cambridge with each of her publications and she ordered a Latin index to accompany

the writings she presented to the University of Leyden, hoping thereby that her work would be utilized by European scholars.

After much debate among the membership of the Royal Society of London, Cavendish became the first woman invited to visit the prestigious institution, although the controversy had more to do with her notoriety than with her sex. On May 30, 1667, Cavendish arrived with a large retinue of attendants and watched as Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke weighed air, dissolved mutton in sulfuric acid and conducted various other experiments. It was a major advance for the scientific lady and a personal triumph for Cavendish.

Cavendish published the final revision of her *Philosophical and Physical Opinions*, entitled *Grounds of Natural Philosophy*, in 1668. Significantly more modest than her previous works, in this volume Cavendish presented her views somewhat tentatively and retracted some of her earlier, more extravagant claims. Cavendish acted as her own physician, and her self-inflicted prescriptions, purgings and bleedings resulted in the rapid deterioration of her health. She died in 1673 and was buried in Westminster Abbey.

Although her writings remained well outside the mainstream of seventeenth-century science, Cavendish's efforts were of major significance. She helped popularize many of the ideas of the scientific revolution and she was one of the first natural philosophers to argue that theology was outside the parameters of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, her work and her prominence as England's first recognized woman scientist argued strongly for the education of women and for their involvement in scientific pursuits. In addition to her scientific writings, Cavendish published a book of speeches, a volume of poetry, and a large number of plays. Several of the latter, particularly *The Female Academy*, included learned women and arguments in favor of female education. Her most enduring work, a biography of her husband, included as an appendix to her 24 page memoir, was first published in 1656 as a part of *Nature's Pictures*. This memoir is regarded as the first major secular autobiography written by a woman.

NWS

Cavour, Camillo Benso, conte di (1810–1861), Italian statesman. Cavour devoted himself to the liberation of northern Italy from Austrian domination. A brilliant and steadfast diplomat, he played a leading role in the unification of Italy.

Camillo Benso di Cavour was born on Aug. 1, 1810, at Turin. As a younger son in a noble family, he was trained to be an officer in the army. But moved

by a restless dissatisfaction with Italian social and political conditions, he resigned his commission in 1831, when he was only 21 years old. He applied himself to the agricultural improvement of his family estate. Then, widening his sphere of activity, he founded the Piedmontese Agricultural Society and became one of the chief promoters of railroads and steamships in Italy. The liberal Cavour grew ever more distrustful of the reactionary politics in force throughout Europe, particularly their manifestation in the repressive rule of Austria over a large area of Italy.

The Journalist. Cavour believed that liberalism and love of country could be combined to cause a revolt against Austrian dominion in the north and then to establish an Italian constitutional monarchy. To spread his views, in 1847 at Turin he established the newspaper *Il Risorgimento* (the resurgence, the name given to the Italian movement for unification and freedom).

In January 1848 revolution did break out, but in Sicily, against the ancient and decadent Bourbon regime, rather than in the north. Cavour, however, saw this as an opportunity to press in public speeches and in *Il Risorgimento* for a constitution for the Piedmont. Charles Albert, King of the Piedmont, yielded to this pressure and on February 8 granted a charter of liberties to his kingdom. Within 6 weeks of this memorable day Cavour's principal hope was realized when the Milanese rose against the Austrians. He then threw all his journalistic power into persuading the King to enter the war. Cavour, more than anyone else, was responsible for Piedmont's March 25 declaration of war on Austria.

Elections were held during the hostilities, and Cavour became a member of Parliament, beginning a career of public service that would end only with his death. On March 23, 1849, almost exactly a year after the war had begun, the Piedmontese were decisively defeated. King Charles Albert abdicated in favor of his son Victor Emmanuel II, who had no recourse but to make a loser's peace with Austria. Although the effort to throw off the foreign yoke had failed, Cavour did not slacken his efforts to achieve Italian independence.

Diplomatic Activity. By 1851 Cavour was serving as minister of agriculture, industry, commerce, and finance. On November 4 he became prime minister. He brooded over the Austrian repression of Lombardy in retribution for the abortive revolt of that possession. He waited for a situation in which he could successfully oppose Austria, and his opportunity came with the Crimean War (1853–1856). This conflict allowed the Piedmontese statesman to use diplo-

macy on a broad international scale and thus force the Great Powers to take cognizance of Italy's plight. He decided to enter the war against Russia, and on Jan. 10, 1855, over serious objections within the Piedmontese government, a treaty with France and England was signed. A contingent of Piedmontese soldiers was sent to the Crimea, and the distinguished combat record of these troops enabled Cavour to assume a prominent position at the Congress of Paris after the war. Through his diplomatic skill at this meeting he succeeded in making the Italian question a chief topic of discussion and in making Austria appear in an unfavorable light.

Anticipating war with Austria, Cavour began strengthening the Piedmontese army and negotiating an alliance with the French emperor, Napoleon III. He agreed to cede Nice and Savoy to France in return for French help in ousting Austria from northern Italy. By 1859 the plans had been completed, and volunteers under the guidance of Cavour and Giuseppe Garibaldi were ready to spring into action throughout Italy. But Napoleon III then threw Cavour into despair by accepting a Russian proposal to convene a congress to settle the Italian question.

The Austrians, however, made the mistake of rejecting this plan and on April 23, 1859, sent an ultimatum to Piedmont. This had the effect of sealing the alliance between that state and France, and Cavour delightedly led the Piedmontese into war. When the French unexpectedly signed an armistice with Austria on July 8, Victor Emmanuel II, over the objections of Cavour, ended Piedmontese hostilities after only a partial victory. Lombardy was to be ceded to the Piedmont and Venetia to remain Austrian.

Unwilling to see such a good beginning go to waste, Cavour secretly encouraged revolutions against the petty tyrants of central Italy. He also remained in communication with Garibaldi. In May 1860, acting in the name of King Victor Emmanuel, whom Cavour had persuaded to cooperate, Garibaldi and his force of "Red Shirts" sailed to Sicily and in a few days demolished the tottering structure of the Bourbon government. When Garibaldi crossed to the mainland and took Naples, Cavour feared that the Red Shirts might complicate matters by attacking the Papal States. To avoid this action, he sent troops to annex the papal holdings. Cavour believed in a free Church but not in one whose territories cut Italy in half.

Cavour lived to see Victor Emmanuel II proclaimed king of a united Italy in 1861. But the statesman's strength was waning, and on June 6, 1861, he died. There were many problems in Italy still unsolved, but Cavour's brilliance had transformed his coun-

try from a collection of feudal principalities into a modern state.

EWB

Chamberlain, Houston Stewart (1855–1927), English-born German writer. Houston Chamberlain formulated the most important theory of Teutonic superiority in pre-Hitlerian German thought.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain was born in Southsea, England, on Sept. 9, 1855. He was the son of an English captain, later admiral. Two of his uncles were generals, and a third was a field marshal. Educated in England and France, he suffered from poor health throughout his life. This prevented him from entering the British military service and led him to take cures in Germany, where he became an ardent admirer of the composer Richard Wagner. In 1882 Chamberlain met Wagner at the Bayreuth Festival, and he later became a close friend of Wagner's widow.

During the 1880s Chamberlain studied natural sciences in Geneva and Vienna. He wrote a dissertation on plant structure, which was accepted by the University of Vienna in 1889, but he never sought an academic position. In 1908 Wagner's daughter Eva became Chamberlain's second wife. Thereafter he lived at Bayreuth, the "home of his soul." He became a German citizen in 1916 and died on Jan. 9, 1927.

Literary Works. Chamberlain preferred to write in German, and his major works were composed in that language. His first published books were studies of Wagner: *The Wagnerian Drama* (1892) and the biography *Richard Wagner* (1896).

Chamberlain's most significant work is *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1899), which demonstrates his thesis that the history of a people or race is determined by its racial character and abilities. He conceives of race in terms of attitudes and abilities rather than physical characteristics. In general he views abilities and attributes of personality as inherited.

Unlike Joseph Arthur Gobineau, Chamberlain applies the term "Aryan" only to a language group and doubts the existence of an elite Aryan race. Instead he views the Teutons as the superior European race. For him the Teutons include most importantly the Germanic peoples, but also the Celts and certain Slavic groups. He holds that the Jews are fundamentally alien in spirit to the Teutons and believes that they should be allowed no role in German history.

Foundations, despite its scientific underpinnings, is essentially an eloquent, even poetic, vision of the German people. The modern reader may justly criticize this work as self-contradictory and sometimes nonsensical, but it had deep meaning for the Germans

of Chamberlain's day. By 1942 *Foundations* had gone through 28 editions.

During World War I Chamberlain advocated the German cause, and his pro-German, anti-English writings were published in English as *The Ravings of a Renegade* (1916). Chamberlain met the young Hitler in 1923 and wrote several articles favorable to him.

EWB

Chamberlain, Joseph (1836–1914), English politician. Joseph Chamberlain influenced the fate of the Liberal party and then of the Conservative party. He has been described as one of Britain's first "professional" politicians.

Born in London on July 8, 1836, of a middle-class family, Joseph Chamberlain moved to Birmingham when he was 18 to join his uncle's engineering firm. He was so successful in business that he was able to retire with a large and assured income at the age of 38 and devote the rest of his life to politics. His first political position (1873–1876) was as the reforming Liberal lord mayor of Birmingham, where he promoted a "civic gospel." The city acquired new municipally owned services along with new buildings and roads, and it became a mecca for urban reformers. Chamberlain worked through a Liberal caucus, a more sophisticated form of party organization than existed anywhere else in Britain. When Chamberlain was elected to Parliament in 1876, his stated object was to do for the nation what he had already done for his local community.

Liberal Party. Chamberlain's liberalism was different in tone and in content from that of his party leaders, particularly William Gladstone. Chamberlain was a radical in sympathy, with a Unitarian religious background, and he systematically set out to attract support not only from religious dissenters but also from workingmen. His proposals for social reform, entailing increased government intervention and expenditure, were attacked by old-fashioned radicals as well as by Conservatives and moderate Liberals.

When the Liberals were returned to power in 1880, Chamberlain became president of the Board of Trade and a member of the Cabinet. However, he was never at ease personally or politically with Gladstone, his prime minister. After pressing for his unauthorized radical program in the 1885 election, Chamberlain broke with Gladstone in 1886 over the issue of home rule for Ireland. Because of Chamberlain's vigorous opposition to Gladstone's Home Rule Bill, the Liberal party split and was unable to regain office, except for one brief interlude, for 20 years.

The nature of the Liberal split was important. There had always been an internal division between Whigs and radicals, and it had seemed on more than one occasion that the party would divide into a right and a left wing. Instead, as a result of the home rule crisis, many Whigs and radicals found themselves in league against Gladstone, who represented the middle. After 1886 there was little hope for accommodation between Gladstone and Chamberlain, and Chamberlain became the effective leader of a third force, the Liberal Unionists, of which the Whig S. C. C. Hartington (later the Duke of Devonshire) was titular leader. Chamberlain's position throughout the rest of his political life was greatly strengthened by the fact that Birmingham remained loyal to him. Indeed, many of the policies which he advocated had their origins in the politics of the city.

Colonial Secretary. In 1895 Chamberlain became colonial secretary in a predominantly Conservative government led by Lord Salisbury. In his new position Chamberlain pursued forceful policies promoting imperial development. Although he was interested in the development of the tropics and in the transformation of the empire into a partnership of self-governing equals, his colonial secretaryship is associated mainly with the Boer War (1899–1902). His critics called this conflict "Chamberlain's war"; this description was a drastic oversimplification, despite Chamberlain's belief that British "existence as a great Power" was at stake. After the Peace of Vereeniging ended the war, he visited South Africa and supported measures of conciliation between South Africans of British and Boer descent. Throughout this period he was keenly interested in wider questions of foreign policy and argued for closer relations with Germany and the United States.

In May 1903 Chamberlain once again disturbed the pattern of British domestic politics by announcing his support of tariffs favoring imperial products and his abandonment of belief in free trade. His motives were mixed, but the effect of his conversion was to split the Conservatives as well as the Liberal Unionists. In September 1903 he resigned from the Cabinet and began a campaign to educate the British public. The leading Conservative free traders resigned with him, but his influence was perpetuated by the appointment of his son Austen as chancellor of the Exchequer. Chamberlain himself never held office again, and his protectionist campaign failed. The Liberals were returned to power in 1906, the year Chamberlain became 70. Immediately after the birthday celebrations in Birmingham, Chamberlain had a stroke, which prostrated him for the rest of his life. He died on July

2, 1914, a few weeks before the outbreak of World War I. It was left to his son Neville to lead Britain away from free trade in 1932.

Despite Chamberlain's switches of party alignment, his political career was more consistent than it seemed on the surface. He preferred deeds to talk and candor to equivocation. He looked for issues with extraparliamentary appeal and never lost his belief in active government.

EWB

Chaplin, Charles (1889–1977), film actor, director, and writer and one of the most original creators in the history of the cinema. Charlie Chaplin's remarkable portrayal of "the tramp"—a sympathetic comic character in ill-fitting clothes and a trademark mustache—won admiration from international audiences.

Charles Chaplin was born in a poor district of London on April 16, 1889. His mother, a talented singer, spent most of her life in and out of mental hospitals; his father was a fairly successful vaudevillian until he began drinking. After his parents separated, Charlie and his half brother, Sidney, spent most of their childhood in the Lambeth Workhouse. Barely able to read and write, Chaplin left school to tour with a group of clog dancers. Later he had the lead in a comedy act; by the age of 19 he had become one of the most popular music-hall performers in England.

Arrival in the United States. In 1910 Chaplin went to the United States to tour in *A Night in an English Music Hall* and was chosen by film maker Mack Sennett to appear in the silent Keystone comedy series. In these early movies (*Making a Living*, *Tillie's Punctured Romance*), Chaplin made the transition from a comedian of overdrawn theatrics to one of cinematic delicacy and choreographic precision. He created the role of the tramp, a masterful comic conception, notable, as George Bernard Shaw remarked, for its combination of "noble melancholy and impish humour."

Appearing in over 30 short films, Chaplin realized that the breakneck speed of Sennett's productions was hindering his personal talents. He left to work at the Essanay Studios. Outstanding during this period were *His New Job*, *The Tramp*, and *The Champion*, notable for their comic pathos and leisurely exploration of character. More realistic and satiric were his 1917 films for the Mutual Company: *One A.M.*, *The Pilgrim*, *The Cure*, *Easy Street*, and *The Immigrant*. In 1918 Chaplin built his own studio and signed a \$1,000,000 contract with National Films, producing such silent-screen classics as *A Dog's Life*,

comparing the life of a dog with that of a tramp, *Shoulder Arms*, a satire on World War I, and *The Kid*, a touching vignette of slum life.

In 1923 Chaplin, D. W. Griffith, Douglas Fairbanks, and Mary Pickford formed United Artists to produce feature-length movies of high quality. *A Woman of Paris* (1923), a psychological drama, was followed by two of Chaplin's funniest films, *The Gold Rush* (1925) and *The Circus* (1928). Chaplin directed *City Lights* (1931), a beautifully lyrical, Depression tale about the tramp's friendship with a drunken millionaire and a blind flower girl, considered by many critics his finest work. *Modern Times* (1936), a savagely hilarious farce on the cruelty, hypocrisy, and greed of modern industrialism, contains some of the funniest sight gags and comic sequences in film history, the most famous being the tramp's battle with an eating machine gone berserk. Chaplin's burlesque of Hitler (as the character Hynkel) in *The Great Dictator* (1940), although a devastating satire, loses impact in retrospect. The last film using the tramp, it contains an epilogue in which Chaplin pleads for love and freedom.

It was with these more complex productions of the 1930s and 1940s that Chaplin achieved true greatness as film director and satirist. *Monsieur Verdoux*, brilliantly directed by Chaplin in 1947 (and subsequently condemned by the American Legion of Decency), is one of the subtlest and most compelling moral statements ever put on the screen. Long before European film makers taught audiences to appreciate the role of the writer-director, Chaplin revealed the astonishing breadth of his talents by functioning as such in his productions.

The love showered upon Chaplin in the early years of his career was more than equaled by the vilification directed toward him during the 1940s and early 1950s. The American public was outraged by the outspoken quality of his political views, the turbulence of his personal life, and the sarcastic, often bitter, element expressed in his art. An avowed socialist and atheist, Chaplin expressed a hatred for right-wing dictatorship which made him politically suspect during the early days of the cold war. This hostility was compounded when he released his version of the Bluebeard theme, *Monsieur Verdoux*.

During the next 5 years Chaplin devoted himself to *Limelight* (1952), a strongly autobiographical work with a gentle lyricism and sad dignity, in sharp contrast to the mordant pessimism of *Monsieur Verdoux*. On vacation in Europe in 1952, Chaplin was notified by the U.S. attorney general that his reentry into the United States would be challenged. The charge was moral turpitude and political unreliability.

Chaplin, who had never become a United States citizen, sold all his American possessions and settled in Geneva, Switzerland, with his fourth wife, Oona O'Neill, daughter of the American playwright Eugene O'Neill, and their children.

In 1957 Chaplin visited England to direct *The King in New York* a satire on American institutions, which was never shown in the United States. *My Autobiography*, published in 1964, is a long, detailed account that descends from a vivid, Dickensian mode to endless self—apologies and name-dropping.

By the 1970s times had changed, and Chaplin was again recognized for his rich contribution to film making. He returned to the United States in 1972, where he was honored by major tributes in New York City and Hollywood, including receiving an honorary Academy Award. In 1975, he became Sir Charles Chaplin after being knighted by Queen Elizabeth II. Two years later, on December 25, 1977, Chaplin died in his sleep in Switzerland.

In all his work Chaplin consistently displayed emotional expressiveness, physical grace, and intellectual vision characteristic of the finest actors. The classical austerity and deceptive simplicity of his directorial style (emulated by Ingmar Bergman and others) has not been surpassed.

EWB

Charles I (1600–1649), King of England from 1625 to 1649. Charles I was to witness and take part in the English civil war, or Puritan Revolution, which ultimately cost him his life.

The second son of James VI of Scotland (later James I of England) and Anne of Denmark, Charles I was born in Dunfermline, Scotland, on Nov. 19, 1600. He did not become heir apparent to the English throne until the death of his elder brother, Henry, in 1612. Whether it was his early physical infirmities or the stress caused by the antipathy between his parents, the future king showed signs of personality disturbance in childhood. He did not speak as a young child and later always stuttered. He betrayed deep feelings of inadequacy both in his formal silences and in his overdependence on self-confident favorites. From very early life he lied. This was to be the King's ultimate weakness.

Charles received a good education with tutors. His first emergence into public affairs came with the loss of the crown of Bohemia by his brother-in-law, Frederick V, in 1618. That loss and the subsequent occupation of Frederick's inheritance in the Palatinate by Spanish troops deeply shocked Charles. He conceived that if he were to marry the Spanish Infanta, the King of Spain would restore the Palatinate to Fred-

erick. Charles went to Spain in 1623 with the 1st Duke of Buckingham, who abetted the scheme. In Madrid it took Charles 5 months to comprehend that the Spanish would never agree to marriage with a heretic, much less to the restoration of the Palatinate.

Early Reign. When Charles perceived the truth, he and Buckingham went to the opposite extreme and stamped an unwilling King James and an eager Parliament into war with Spain. At the same time a marriage treaty with Louis XIII of France was arranged for the hand of Louis's sister, Henrietta Maria. Charles became king on March 27, 1625. His marriage occurred by proxy in Paris on May 1. The union was accompanied by an alliance between England and France against Spain. From the first, however, there were misunderstandings. The English believed that the French were not active enough in helping to expel the Spanish from the Palatinate. The French did not believe that Charles had lived up to the religious promises of the marriage contract to allow freedom to the English Catholics. It is not surprising under these circumstances that Charles found the gawky adolescent princess less than compatible. Relations with the Queen's brother deteriorated until Charles declared war on France as well as Spain in 1627.

These wars necessitated the frequent summonses of Parliament during the first years of Charles's reign. Differences over supplies, religion, and economic policy were frequent and led to the Petition of Right in 1628, in which the Commons condemned the King's policy of arbitrary taxation and imprisonment. But the chief cause of the King's difficulties with Parliament was the resentment of the English aristocracy over the continued ascendancy of the Duke of Buckingham. His ill-managed expedition against Cadiz, Spain, in 1625 and his disastrous attack in 1627 on the French forces besieging La Rochelle completely discredited the King's government in the eyes of the aristocracy.

Buckingham's assassination in 1628, although it was a bitter personal blow to the King, opened up a period of constructive rule, known as the period of personal government. An aftermath of constitutional disputes rocked Parliament in 1629, but many of the peers and their allies in the Commons such as Thomas Wentworth and Dudley Digges had thrown in their lot with the King. The earls of Arundel and Pembroke, Clifford, and Weston divided up administrative patronage. The wars against France and Spain were terminated, and so long as no new foreign crisis arose, royal finances were sufficient to conduct government without calling Parliament and reviving con-

stitutional and religious opposition. After Buckingham's death, too, Charles fell in love with Henrietta Maria, and they were ever after a devoted couple.

Charles spent his time hunting and acquiring perhaps the greatest art collection in Europe. The quintessence of the King's royal policy during these years was the enforcement of order and a decorous service in the English Church by William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury. The attempt to extend this religious order to Scotland in 1637, however, brought down the edifice of personal government. Parliament again had to be summoned in 1640, and to the residue of constitutional resentment from the earlier parliaments was joined the fear that the Earl of Strafford, the King's deputy in Ireland, would be an even more powerful and dangerous minister than the Duke of Buckingham had been. Until Strafford's execution for treason in 1641, the King faced a united aristocracy; and he was forced to relinquish most of his ministers, abolish the Star Chamber (councilors and judges who sat as a court) and High Commission, agree to triennial parliaments, and promise that no customs would be raised in the future without specific parliamentary grant.

Civil War. Following Strafford's death, the King's untrustworthiness still barred a stable settlement with the leaders of Parliament. His attempt to get evidence against them in Scotland during the autumn of 1641 coincided with the Irish rebellion. The parliamentary leaders could not trust him with an army. Their fears were confirmed when he entered the House of Commons on Jan. 4, 1642, in order to arrest five of their leading members for treason. Parliament then began on their own authority to make military provision to suppress the Irish and to defend themselves. Charles could not allow the heart of his prerogative to be thus torn from him, and so on August 14 the King raised his standard at Nottingham and called upon all his loyal subjects to defend his right. The civil war had begun.

Charles attracted a majority of the peers and many of the gentry to his side, and he commanded the military populace of Wales and the North. Under the generalship of his nephew Prince Rupert, the royal cavalry in particular bore down the parliamentary forces during 1642 and 1643. But Charles again fell victim to incompetent courtiers, as a whole the King's cause was ill-managed. By contrast the few but important peers who remained to command Parliament proved masters at gaining popular support, money, control of the navy, and a sufficient military response. On July 2, 1644, they won a surprise victory over Rupert at Marston Moor; in the following year they

professionalized their military force as the New Model Army and decisively defeated Charles and Rupert at Naseby. In 1646 Charles surrendered to the Scots allies of Parliament.

During the succeeding years the King's main effort was to restore his royal authority. The means he chose were contradictory deals with various political groups, now the political Presbyterians in Parliament, now Oliver Cromwell and the Independent army generals, and at all times the Scots. Just as his letter commissioning an Irish army to land in England and requesting French troops during the civil war had discredited him after their discovery on the field of Naseby, so these incompatible negotiations from 1646 to 1648 destroyed his moral position in the eyes of many Englishmen. His negotiations with the Scots led to their intervention in the second civil war, of 1648, and this sealed Charles's fate in the minds of the army generals. On Dec. 6–7, 1648, the generals purged Parliament of all who were negotiating for the King's restoration to power and prepared to bring the "Man of Blood" to trial.

The Trial. There was in England no legal method to try a king. But Henry Ireton and the other officers devised a High Court of Justice, consisting of members of the purged Commons and other public officials, to try Charles Stuart for high treason. The King refused to recognize their jurisdiction and would not plead. During the trial he gave his finest defense of his kingship: "I do stand more for the liberty of my people, than any here that come to be my pretended judges." "I am sworn to keep the peace, by that duty I owe to God and my country, and I will do it to the last breath of my body; and therefore ye shall do well to satisfy first God, and then the country, by what authority you [try me]." By such words, when the court condemned him to death, he created the myth that he died for liberty under the law. On Jan. 30, 1649, he was led onto a scaffold, where he prayed with Bishop Juxon, and was beheaded. Thereby he also became the sanctified champion of the Anglican Church, despite his many promises to Catholics, Presbyterians, and Independents during the days of his adversity. After a decade under Puritan military dictatorship, the King executed that day became the foundation for restored monarchy, established church, free Parliament, and the conservative rule of law in England.

EWB

Chmielnicki, Bogdan (1595–1657), Cossack leader. Bogdan Chmielnicki led the Dnieper Cossacks

in the Ukrainian war of liberation against Polish rule in 1648.

Bogdan Chmielnicki, or Khmel'nitskii, was born in Pereyaslav in the Polish-controlled Ukraine. His father was a registered Cossack and proprietor of a small farm and flour mill at Czehrin near the Dnieper River. Bogdan was educated in the school of one of the Orthodox brotherhoods and also studied at the Jesuit school in Yaroslav.

When his father died, Chmielnicki assumed management of the small family estate. He ran into difficulty, however, when a Polish lord claimed ownership of the land. Chmielnicki was summoned before a tribunal and dispossessed of his small estate. He eventually fled to the south, where he joined the Zaporozhan Cossacks. Anxious for revenge, Chmielnicki raised an army from among the Cossacks, and he also gained wide support from the Crimean Tatars and the oppressed Russian peasantry of the Ukraine. In the spring of 1648, with a force of about 300,000 men, he defeated two Polish armies sent against him.

The rather limited character of Chmielnicki's ambitions enabled a peace treaty to be concluded with the Polish king in August 1649. Chmielnicki was recognized as hetman, or Cossack leader, and allowed to retain an armed force of 40,000 Cossacks, but no provision was made for the peasantry, thousands of whom had immigrated to the Donets Basin under Russian protection. War broke out again in 1650, and Chmielnicki, now deserted by the Crimean Tatars, was compelled to accept a peace which reduced the number of registered Cossacks to 20,000.

At this point Chmielnicki sent an urgent appeal to Alexis, the Russian tsar, for support. Although he had ignored earlier appeals, Alexis agreed to take Hetman Chmielnicki and his entire army, "with their towns and lands," under his protection. The final agreement was made at Pereyaslav in January 1654. Although there is some debate over its meaning, the agreement seems to have represented unconditional Ukrainian acceptance of Moscow's authority. It should be noted, however, that in later years the Ukrainians acquired good reason to complain of the Russian government, which eventually abrogated entirely the considerable autonomy granted to the Ukrainians after they had sworn allegiance to the Muscovite tsar.

Chmielnicki died on Aug. 6, 1657. His death opened the way for a succession of hetmans, who thought of Poland as a lesser danger than their Russian protectors. Their policy split the Ukraine; the left bank of the Dnieper tended to support Muscovy and carried on a civil war with the Polish sympathizers on the right bank. The Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667 confirmed this division.

Cobb, Richard (1917–), British historian. Richard Cobb has built a reputation for himself as one of the leading British historians of the French Revolution, but he has made his niche by writing his history from the viewpoint of the common person.

Fascinated by French culture since he was sent to France at the age of eighteen to study the language, Cobb has spent much time in his adopted second country, writing his first historical works in French. One of them, a two-volume work first published in the early 1960s, was translated in 1987 by Marianne Elliott as *The People's Armies*. The title refers to the volunteer forces used in 1793 during the French Revolution to enforce the will of the Republic's government among the general population. Their duties included taking grain from the peasants for the use of the military, harassing counterrevolutionaries, and robbing and vandalizing churches.

Cobb's 1969 effort, *A Second Identity*, combines previously published book reviews with an introductory explanation of how his love for France has etched itself deeply into his personality.

Cobb exhibits his preference for the history of the lower classes in one of his more unusual volumes, the 1978 *Death in Paris*. The book examines the records of the Basse-Geole de la Seine, the precursor of the Paris morgue, concerning sudden or violent deaths during the French Revolution between 1795 and 1801. Of the 404 cases listed for those years, almost all were poor and most were suicides, the majority of which drowned themselves in the river Seine. There were only nine murder victims. From the detailed records of personal effects found on the bodies—often suicides wore every piece of clothing they owned when they did away with themselves, even if it meant wearing several pairs of pants or many skirts in the heat of summer—Cobb pieces together what kind of lives these people might have led.

In 1980 Cobb produced two books, *Promenades: A Historian's Appreciation of Modern French Literature* and *The Streets of Paris*. Both are guided tours of a sort; in *Promenades* Cobb shows his readers around various French regions, including Burgundy, Lyons, Marseilles, and Paris, through the eyes of French authors such as Henri Beraud, Marcel Pagnol, and—Cobb's favorite—Raymond Queneau. *The Streets of Paris*, with photographs by Nicholas Breach, however, focuses on just one city, specifically the less prominent features of that city—a vanishing Paris.

French and Germans, Germans and French compares two periods when German soldiers occupied France: World War I and World War II. Cobb takes into account regional differences during the second occupation by examining Paris and northern France

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in the area of Lille near the Belgian border, both directly administered by Hitler's Third Reich, and the puppet government of Vichy in southern France.

Though usually interspersing incidents from his own life with history in his work, Cobb turned to more straightforward autobiography in his *Still Life: Sketches From a Tunbridge Wells Childhood*. Published in 1983, *Still Life* presents a picture of the neighborhood Cobb lived in as a child. In its pages the reader meets personages such as R. Septimus Gardiner, a taxidermist with a shop full of stuffed squirrels, fish, hummingbirds, and badgers; Dr. Footner, who made housecalls on Cobb's mother in a carriage; and the Limbury-Buses—the mother never went outdoors, the son never spoke, and the whole family followed precisely the same routine each day. Overall it is a quiet, unchangeable Tunbridge Wells that Cobb records, though he recounts his youthful fears about the flats his family lived in.

People and Places, which explores some of the various locales Cobb has lived in, and *A Classical Education*, in which Cobb recounts his teenage friendship with a youth who murdered his own mother, both saw publication in 1985. A collection of articles and reviews, *People and Places* ranges in its observations from Aberystwyth, Wales, where Cobb was a lecturer in history during the 1950s, to Oxford, and to Parisian department stores.

Cobb's third autobiographical venture appeared in 1988 as *Something to Hold Onto*. In the book Cobb conveys his childhood relationships with relatives. Re-creating life with his grandparents—as well as with such characters as Daisy, whose room was piled with thousands of copies of the *Daily Mail*, and his Uncle Primus, whose only occupation was to wind the clocks, bang the gong for meals, and take two walks each day—Cobb focuses on life's rituals and routines, somehow important and enjoyable in their pure banality.

CA

Cohn-Bendit, Daniel (1946–), French radical. Daniel Cohn-Bendit only occupied center stage in French politics for a few weeks in 1968. Still, more than anyone else, Cohn-Bendit came to personify the new left that swept Western Europe and North America in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In early 1968, Daniel Cohn-Bendit was a little known leader of a tiny student movement at the brand new Nanterre campus of the University of Paris. He was only 22, having been born in France of German Jewish parents in 1946. Because he held dual citizenship he had chosen to pursue his studies in sociology at the newly opened campus in one of the grimmer industrial suburbs of Paris.

That campus represented everything that was troubling the overcrowded French university system. It had been built without planning for the social lives of the students. The educational system suffered from the same problems as the rest of the huge university centered at the Sorbonne.

Gradually the students' discontent with the university merged with more general opposition to the Gaullist regime, which seemed to run everything in a heavy-handed manner. In March 1968 those resentments began to surface. On March 22 a ceremony was held to open officially the Nanterre campus's swimming pool, which Cohn-Bendit and a small group of his fellow students disrupted. They were summoned to a disciplinary hearing which, given the centralization of the university, was to be held at the Sorbonne on May 3.

That hearing marked the beginning of the "events" of May and June 1968, the largest protest movement in the history of the new left. While the accused students were inside, a small group of supporters held a sympathy demonstration in the courtyard. To everyone's surprise, for the first time in centuries the police entered the courtyard to break up a demonstration. That fact, plus the brutality of the police action, rippled throughout Paris.

Students, whose anger had been building and repressed for months, reacted quickly. Throughout the next week demonstrations occurred in the streets of the Latin Quarter. As the police grew more violent, sympathy for the students and their seemingly modest demands grew. Finally, on the night of May 10–11, things truly got out of hand. The police became more violent, and the students and other demonstrators responded by erecting barricades. The police moved in with armored personnel carriers, tear gas, and billy clubs. Echoes of past revolutions could be heard throughout Paris.

In the meantime, Daniel Cohn-Bendit had emerged as the informal leader of the protests. No organization had called or could control what was happening. And, even though Danny the Red—as Cohn-Bendit was called—was by no means in charge, his role at Nanterre thrust him onto the front line.

After the "night of the barricades" support for the students spread, especially into the trade unions who had their own grievances with the government, the same enemy the students were attacking. They called for a sympathy protest the following Monday. The students marched behind the workers, and afterward Cohn-Bendit led them down a few blocks to begin occupying the Sorbonne.

Within hours the occupations spread as workers began taking over factories, newspapers, even the ra-

dio and television system. Within days the country was at a virtual standstill.

At first, Danny the Red seemed even more important, especially after a senior government official referred to him as “that German Jew,” prompting thousands of people to march through Paris chanting “we are all German Jews.” Then Cohn-Bendit was forced into the background. On May 24 he was expelled from France. De Gaulle seized that opportunity to deny him permission to reenter France, even though he did have joint French-German citizenship. He was not able to legally reenter the country for more than a decade.

Within another week President de Gaulle had reassumed control and dissolved the National Assembly. The Gaullists, not the left, won an overwhelming victory in the parliamentary elections held in June.

For many years, Danny the Red receded from the public eye. After his exile, he settled in Frankfurt, Germany, where he held a variety of jobs while remaining active in politics. In the 1970s he founded RK, a German group which encouraged common action between students and workers, and took part in various housing-related protests and reforms. For employment, he taught at an “anti-authoritarian kindergarten,” and worked as a salesperson in the Karl-Marx Bookstore near the city’s main university. In the 1980s, Cohn-Bendit founded a radical city magazine, *Pflasterstand*, whose name referred to a slogan of the 1968 revolts: “Underneath the surface structures of cement [*das Pflaster*] and steel lies the beach [*der Strand*].” He also worked as publicist for a number of books and publications, and wrote extensively on radical issues.

In 1984, Cohn-Bendit became a member of the Green Party, which changed its name to the Alliance Green Party in 1989. The Greens made common cause with the German Socialist Party (SPD) in the so-called “Red-Green Coalition,” which elected Cohn-Bendit to the honorary position of Commissioner for Multicultural Affairs in July 1989.

In 1994, Cohn-Bendit reemerged onto the world, or at least the Continental, stage with his election to the European Parliament as a member of the Alliance Green Party. Sitting on the Committees for External Affairs, Security, and Defense, he opposed nationalism and promoted a globalist agenda. (Because of his Franco-German background, Cohn-Bendit has often humorously referred to himself as a “bastard,” someone who is not tied to a specific national identity.) He also served on the Committee for Basic Freedoms and Internal Affairs, and on the “Delegation Maghreb,” which is concerned with issues relating to the nations of the Maghreb region of north Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. He has also

been an active figure behind the European Forum for Active Conflict Avoidance (FEPAC.)

Cohn-Bendit was chosen to lead the Green party in the European parliamentary general election in 1999. French workers at the Cogema nuclear reprocessing plant in La Hague, France, protested the choice as many believed the environmental activist would continue to prompt the closure of nuclear plants, thus threatening their jobs. But phasing out nuclear power isn’t the only controversial effort Cohn-Bendit has made. Legalizing soft drugs and allowing residency permits for illegal immigrants who ask are other issues that continue to keep him in the midst of controversy.

When he was only 22, Daniel Cohn-Bendit left an indelible mark on the history of the 1960s. The movement he helped spawn led to many improvements in the lives of students and workers in the short run; even more importantly, the events set the agenda for French politics for many years, culminating in the 1981 election of President Francois Mitterrand’s socialist government. But Cohn-Bendit himself remained modest about his achievements. In his brief autobiography on the World Wide Web in the 1990s, he made scant reference to his role in the 1968 events, and concentrated more on his current activities in the European Parliament. Summing up his interests, he said, “In any event I remain: a wanderer through the worlds, cultures, languages, occupations, generations, and classes, and last but not least: still an active soccer nut, as player and fan.”

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Colbert, Jean Baptiste (1619–1683), French statesman. Jean Baptiste Colbert was one of the greatest ministers of Louis XIV and is generally regarded as the creator of the economic system of prerevolutionary France.

Jean Baptiste Colbert was born at Reims on Aug. 29, 1619, of a family of prosperous businessmen and officials. He entered the service of the French monarchy under Michel le Tellier, the father of the Marquis de Louvois. In 1651 he became the agent of Cardinal Mazarin, whom he served so well that the cardinal bequeathed him to King Louis XIV in 1661. Almost immediately Colbert became the most important minister in France. He was made intendant of finances in 1661 and in the next few years assumed responsibility for public buildings, commerce, and the administration of the royal household, the navy, and the merchant marine. His only serious rival was the war minister, Louvois. The two men intrigued against each other for royal favor, with Louvois, especially af-

ter 1679, gradually winning the upper hand. Colbert, however, remained immensely powerful until his death.

Colbert's most successful years were from 1661 to 1672. The neglect and corruption of the Mazarin period were replaced by a time of prosperity with expanding industry and mounting employment. The tax system was made slightly fairer and much more efficient, thereby greatly increasing Louis XIV's revenues.

In a mercantilist age Colbert was the supreme mercantilist. His program was to build up the economic strength of France by creating and protecting French industries, encouraging exports, and restricting imports (especially of luxury goods). By endless regulation and supervision, he tried to make French industry, particularly in luxury items, first in Europe; he was partially successful, for the French tradition of high quality in certain fields (for example, tapestry and porcelain) dates from his time.

Colbert organized royal trading companies to compete with the English and the Dutch for the trade of the Far East and the Americas. Although these companies were almost all failures, he was successful in building up one of the strongest European navies and a more than respectable merchant marine. At the same time he laid the foundations of the French overseas empire in Canada, the West Indies, and the Far East. The great expansion of French commerce and industry in the next century was largely due to his groundwork.

Colbert carried through a series of legal codifications of enormous importance, and the Code Napoleon was partly inspired by, and based on, his monumental work. He also made himself responsible for the artistic and cultural life of France. He encouraged, patronized, and regimented artists and writers, and the magnificent building program of Louis XIV was primarily his work.

Colbert was not an innovator. His ideas came from other men, particularly Cardinal Richelieu, and his interpretation of them was often mistaken. But for 22 years he controlled the economic fortunes of France, and he did so with an all-embracing scope and an incredible capacity for work. Some of his projects, however, were unsuccessful. He was unable to unify the diverse systems of weights and measures in France or to secure free trade within the country. His regulation of industry by constant inspection was largely ineffective, as his orders were often disregarded.

The major failure of Colbert stemmed from his determination to end Dutch domination of Far Eastern and European trade. Unable to damage the Dutch by a vindictive tariff war, he supported Louis XIV's unprovoked invasion of Holland in 1672 in the hope that the Dutch would be overrun in a few weeks. But

the resultant war lasted until 1679, and the strain on the French economy undid many of the good results of Colbert's work.

Colbert died on Sept. 6, 1683, to the great relief of the general public, with whom he was (for the most part undeservedly) very unpopular. The immense concentration of responsibilities in one minister was never repeated under the monarchy.

EWB

Cole, George Douglas Howard (1889–1959), English historian, economist, and guild socialist. G. D. H. Cole's teaching, writing, and commitment to political activism affected three generations of Englishmen.

The son of a builder in West London, G. D. H. Cole went from St. Paul's School to Balliol College, Oxford. He coedited the *Oxford Reformer*, acted in social causes, and joined the Fabian Society. He attempted to reconcile syndicalism and socialism in *World of Labour* (1913), a plea for public ownership of major industries under the democratic control of unions modeled upon medieval guilds. With a first class in classical moderns and greats, he was awarded a fellowship at Magdalen College. Elected to the Fabian executive in 1915, he rebelled against the old guard to head the quasi-independent Fabian Research Bureau.

During the next decade Cole was away from Oxford writing, often with his wife and fellow Fabian rebel, Margaret Postgate Cole; directing tutorial classes at the University of London; and organizing professional trade unions. He returned to Oxford in 1925 as fellow of University College and university reader in economics and was to have compelling influence upon students such as Hugh Gaitskell. From 1944 until his retirement in 1957 Cole was at All Souls College as first Chichele professor of social and political theory.

Cole was for many years chairman of the Fabian weekly, the *New Statesman*, contributing to almost every issue during his lifetime. In 1931 he formed the Society for Socialist Information and Propaganda but broke with the society when it moved toward communism. That year he formed the New Fabian Research Bureau as a politically neutral agency for accumulating objective information. This group formed the basis for union in 1938 with the older, badly splintered Fabian Society. Collectivization was omitted from the new rules as a concession to Cole.

Cole's prodigious writings (over 130 works) may be divided into five broad and overlapping categories: guild socialism; history; biography; economic, political, and social analysis; and fiction. His strongest treat-

ment of guild socialism, *Self-government in Industry* (1917), was an appeal for the pluralistic and romantic socialism which moved Cole all his life. In *Case for Industrial Partnership* (1957) he tried to adjust the earlier plea to new times.

Cole's historical and biographical work provided the evidence against which he tested his socialist faith and reliance upon the individual. This was especially true in his classic five-volume *History of Socialist Thought* (1953–1960).

Of Cole's perceptive biographies, the two best are *The Life of William Cobbett* (1924) and *The Life of Robert Owen* (1925). The analytical writings, intended to influence or explain, include *Principles of Economic Planning* (1935) and *An Intelligent Man's Guide to the Post-war World* (1947). For recreation he wrote, largely with his wife, more than 15 detective novels.

EWB

Columbus, Christopher (1451–1506), Italian navigator and the discoverer of America. Though Columbus had set out to find a westward route to Asia, his explorations proved to be as important as any alternate way to the riches of Cathay and India.

The archives of Genoa show that the famous discoverer was born Cristoforo Colombo (Spanish, Cristóbal Colón) there between August and October 1451. His father, Domenico Colombo, followed the weaver's craft, and his mother, Suzanna Fontanarossa, came of equally humble stock. Christopher was the eldest child, and two brothers make some appearance in history under their Hispanicized names, Bartolomé and Diego.

Columbus had a meager education and only later learned to read Latin and write Castilian. He evidently helped his father at work when he was a boy and went to sea early in a humble capacity. Since he aged early in appearance and contemporaries commonly took him for older than he really was, he was able to claim to have taken part in events before his time.

In 1475 Columbus made his first considerable voyage to the Aegean island of Chios, and in 1476 he sailed on a Genoese ship through the Strait of Gibraltar. Off Cape St. Vincent they were attacked by a French fleet, and the vessel in which Columbus sailed sank. He swam ashore and went to Lisbon, where his brother Bartolomé already lived. Columbus also visited Galway, in Ireland, and an English port, probably Bristol. If he ever sailed to Iceland, as he afterward claimed to have done, it must have been as a part of this voyage. He made his presumably last visit to Genoa in 1479 and there gave testimony in a lawsuit.

Court procedure required him to tell his age, which he gave as "past 27," furnishing reasonable evidence of 1451 as his birth year.

Columbus returned to Portugal, where he married Felipa Perestrelo e Monis, daughter of Bartolomeu Perestrelo, deceased proprietor of the island of Porto Santo. The couple lived first in Lisbon, where Perestrelo's widow showed documents her husband had written or collected regarding possible western lands in the Atlantic, and these probably started Columbus thinking of a voyage of investigation. Later they moved to Porto Santo, where his wife died soon after the birth of Diego, the discoverer's only legitimate child.

Formation of an Idea. After his wife's death, Columbus turned wholly to discovery plans and theories, among them the hope to discover a westward route to Asia. He learned of the legendary Irish St. Brendan and his marvelous adventures in the Atlantic and of the equally legendary island of Antilia. Seamen venturing west of Madeira and the Azores reported signs of land, and ancient authors, notably Seneca and Pliny, had theorized about the nearness of eastern Asia to western Europe, though it is not known just when Columbus read them. He acquired incunabular editions of Ptolemy, Marco Polo, and Pierre d'Ailly, but again it is uncertain how early he read them. He possibly first depended on what others said of their contents.

From Marco Polo, Columbus learned the names of Cathay (north China) and Cipango (Japan). The Venetian traveler had never visited Japan and erroneously placed it 1,500 miles east of China, thus bringing it closer to Europe. Furthermore, Columbus accepted two bad guesses by Ptolemy: his underestimate of the earth's circumference and his overestimate of Asia's eastward extension. With the earth's sphericity taken for granted, all Columbus's mistaken beliefs combined to make his idea seem feasible.

In 1474 the Florentine scientist Paolo dal Pozzo Toscanelli sent a letter and map to Fernao Martins of Lisbon, telling Martins that a western voyage in the Atlantic would be a shorter way of reaching the Orient than circumnavigation of Africa. Columbus obtained a copy of the letter and used it to clarify his own ideas.

In 1484 Columbus asked John II of Portugal for backing in the proposed voyage. Rejected, Columbus went to Spain with young Diego in 1485, and for nearly 7 years he sought the aid of Isabella of Castile and her husband, Ferdinand of Aragon. The sovereigns took no action but gave Columbus a small annuity that enabled him to live modestly. He found influential

friends, including the powerful Duke of Medinaceli and Juan Pérez, prior of La Rábida monastery.

While waiting, the widowed Columbus had an affair with young Beatriz Enriquez de Harana of Cordova, who in 1488 bore his other son, Ferdinand, out of wedlock. He never married her, though he provided for her in his will and legitimized the boy, as Castilian law permitted.

First Voyage. In 1492 Columbus resumed negotiations with the rulers. The discussions soon broke down, apparently because of the heavy demands by Columbus, who now prepared to abandon Spain and try Charles VIII of France. Father Pérez saved Columbus from this probably fruitless endeavor by an eloquent appeal to the Queen. Columbus was called back, and in April he and the rulers agreed to the Capitulations of Santa Fe, by which they guaranteed him more than half the future profits and promised his family the hereditary governorship of all lands annexed to Castile.

Financing proved difficult, but three ships were prepared in the harbor of Palos. The largest, the 100-ton *Santa Maria*, was a round-bottomed nao with both square and lateen sails; the caravel *Pinta* was square-rigged; and the small *Niña*, also a caravel, had lateen sails. Recruitment proved hard, and sailing might have been delayed had not the Pinzón brothers, mariners and leading citizens of Palos, come to Columbus's aid and persuaded seamen to enlist. The eldest brother, Martin Alonso, took command of the *Pinta*, and a younger brother, Vicente Yañez, commanded the *Niña*.

The fleet left Palos on Aug. 3, 1492, and, visiting the Canaries, followed the parallel of Gomera westward. Weather remained good during the entire crossing, "like April in Andalusia," as Columbus wrote in his diary, and contrary to popular tales, there was no serious threat of mutiny.

By mid-Atlantic, Columbus evidently concluded he had missed Antilia, so Cipango became his next goal. Landfall came at dawn of October 12, at the Bahama island of Guanahani, straightway renamed San Salvador by Columbus (probably modern San Salvador, or Watlings Island). Arawak natives flocked to the shore and made friends with the Spaniards as they landed. Believing himself in the East Indies, Columbus called them "Indians," a name ultimately applied to all New World aborigines.

The ships next passed among other Bahamas to Colba (Cuba), where the gold available proved disappointing. Turning eastward, Columbus crossed to Quisqueya, renamed Española (Hispaniola), where on Christmas Eve the *Santa Maria* ran aground near

Cap-Haitien. No lives were lost and most of the equipment was salvaged. As relations with the local Taino Arawaks seemed good and Columbus wished to return to Spain immediately, he built a settlement named Navidad for the *Santa Maria's* crew and left, promising to return in a few months.

Columbus recrossed the Atlantic by a more northerly route than on his outward passage and reached Europe safely. He had an interview with John II of Portugal, who, by a farfetched interpretation of an old treaty with Castile, claimed the new western islands for himself. Columbus then sailed to Palos and crossed Spain to the court at Barcelona, bearing the artifacts he had brought from Hispaniola and conducting several natives he had induced or forced to accompany him. Strong evidence also suggests that his crew brought syphilis, apparently never reported in Europe before and known to have been endemic in mild form among the Arawaks.

Regarding John II's territorial claims, Isabella and Ferdinand appealed to Pope Alexander VI, an Aragonese Spaniard, for confirmation of their rights, and in 1493 the Pope obliged, granting Castile complete rights west of a line from pole to pole in the Atlantic. But the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) established a new line, from pole to pole, 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. Spain was entitled to claim and occupy all non-Christian lands west of the line, and Portugal all those to the east.

Second Voyage. Following an enthusiastic reception by Ferdinand and Isabella, "Admiral" Columbus prepared for a second voyage. He sailed from Cadiz with 17 ships and about 1,200 men in September 1493. Columbus entered the West Indies near Dominica, which he discovered and named. Passing westward and touching Marie Galante, Guadeloupe, and other Lesser Antilles, the fleet came to large Borinquén (modern Puerto Rico).

On reaching the Navidad settlement on Hispaniola, Columbus found the place destroyed. The Spaniards had made themselves so hated in their quest of gold and women that Chief Caonabo, more warlike than the others, had exterminated them. Another settlement, Isabela, proved an equally unfortunate location, and in 1495 or 1496 Bartolomé Columbus founded Santo Domingo on the south side of Hispaniola.

From Isabela the Admiral sent home most of the ships, though retaining the bulk of the men. He dispatched expeditions into the center of the island in search of gold and accompanied one in person. Meanwhile, he installed himself as governor of Hispaniola,

intending it to be a trading post for commerce with the rich Oriental empires he expected soon to discover.

Columbus now decided to explore Cuba further by tracing the island's southern coast. With three ships, including his favorite *Niña*, he left Isabela in the spring of 1494 and followed the Cuban coast nearly to its western end. Indians told him of Jamaica not far to the south, and the Admiral turned that way, discovered the island, and had several fights with hostile natives. Returning to the Cuban shore, Columbus sailed to Bahía Cortés, where leaky ships and sailors' complaints forced him to put back.

Back in Hispaniola, Columbus found the Spanish settlers unruly and nearly impossible to govern. Complaints against Columbus reached the Castilian court in such numbers that he at last decided to go to Spain to clear his name. He left in the *Niña* in March 1496 and reached Cadiz in June. Bartolomé, with the rank of *adelantado*, remained to govern the colony in his absence.

Third Voyage. The Admiral's reception at court was visibly cooler, but Vasco da Gama's departure from Portugal for India in 1497 caused the Spanish rulers to dispatch Columbus again the following year. There were reports of a great continent south of the Admiral's previous discoveries, and Columbus left Sanlúcar de Barrameda with six ships late in May 1498.

The first land sighted had three hills in view, which suggested the Holy Trinity, and Columbus promptly named the island Trinidad. Since it lies by the Gulf of Paria and the Venezuelan mainland, the Admiral became the discoverer of South America on Aug. 1, 1498. The welcome discovery of pearls from oysters in the shallow waters of offshore islands caused the name "Pearl Coast" to be applied for a time to Venezuela, which Columbus even then recognized as a land of continental proportions because of the volume of water flowing from one of its rivers.

Rebellion and Arrest. The Admiral had left Hispaniolan affairs in bad condition 2 years earlier and now hastened to return there and relieve his hard-pressed brother. On arrival he succeeded in partially quieting by compromise a revolt headed by Francisco Roldán, an officeholder, and resumed his governorship. But so many letters of complaint had gone back to Castile regarding the Columbus brothers that the rulers sent out a royal commissioner, Francisco de Bobadilla, with full powers to act as he saw best.

Bobadilla was honest and meant well, but he had already formed a bad opinion of the Columbus family. He put the Admiral and the *adelantado* in

chains and sent them to Spain. Andrés Martín, commanding the ship in which they sailed, offered to remove the shackles, but the Admiral refused permission, as he meant to appear fettered before the sovereigns. On arrival in Cadiz in late November 1500, Columbus went to court to receive a kind welcome and assurance by the monarchs that the chains and imprisonment had not been by their orders.

In 1501 the Admiral began preparing for a fourth voyage. The fleet, consisting of four ships, left Cadiz on May 9, 1502, arriving in Santo Domingo on June 29. The Admiral next sailed to Guanaja Island off Honduras, then down the coast of Central America. When Columbus learned from the natives about another saltwater body, the Pacific, not far away, he felt certain that he was coasting the Malay Peninsula, of which he had learned through the writings of Ptolemy. A strait or open water should permit entry to the Indian Ocean. Although Columbus followed the coast nearly to the Gulf of Darien, he found no strait.

In April 1503 the ships left the mainland, but the hulls were thoroughly bored by teredos and had to be abandoned as unseaworthy in Jamaica. The Admiral and his crews were marooned in Jamaica for a year, during which time Diego Mendez and Bartolomeo Fieschi fetched a small caravel from Hispaniola. Columbus finally reached Sanlúcar de Barrameda, Spain, on Nov. 7, 1504.

Columbus had 18 months of life remaining, and they were unhappy. Though only 53 he was physically an aged man, a sufferer from arthritis and the effects of a bout of malaria. But financially his position was good, as he had brought considerable gold from America and had a claim to much more in Hispaniola. He died in Valladolid on May 20, 1506.

EWB

Comte, Auguste (1798–1857), French philosopher. Auguste Comte developed a system of positive philosophy. He held that science and history culminate in a new science of humanity, to which he gave the name "sociology."

Born in Montpellier, Auguste Comte abandoned the devout Catholicism and royalism of his family while in his teens. He entered the École Polytechnique in 1814 and proved himself a brilliant mathematician and scientist. Comte was expelled in 1816 for participating in a student rebellion. Remaining in Paris, he managed to do immense research in mathematics, science, economics, history, and philosophy.

At 19 Comte met Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon, and as a "spiritually adopted son," he became secretary and collaborator to the older man

until 1824. The relationship between Saint-Simon and Comte grew increasingly strained for both theoretical and personal reasons and finally degenerated into an acrimonious break over disputed authorship. Saint-Simon was an intuitive thinker interested in immediate, albeit utopian, social reform. Comte was a scientific thinker, in the sense of systematically reviewing all available data, with a conviction that only after science was reorganized in its totality could men hope to resolve their social problems.

In 1824 Comte began a common-law marriage with Caroline Massin when she was threatened with arrest because of prostitution, and he later referred to this disastrous 18-year union as “the only error of my life.” During this period Comte supported himself as a tutor. In 1826 he proposed to offer a series of 72 lectures on his philosophy to a subscription list of distinguished intellectuals. After the third lecture Comte suffered a complete breakdown, replete with psychotic episodes. At his mother’s insistence he was remarried in a religious ceremony and signed the contract “Brutus Napoleon Comte.” Despite periodic hospitalization for mental illness during the following 15 years, Comte was able to discipline himself to produce his major work, the six-volume *Course of Positive Philosophy* (1830–1842).

Positivist Thought. Positivism as a term is usually understood as a particular way of thinking. For Comte, additionally, the methodology is a product of a systematic reclassification of the sciences and a general conception of the development of man in history: the law of the three stages. Comte, like the Marquis de Condorcet whom he acknowledged as a predecessor and G. W. F. Hegel whom he met in Paris, was convinced that no data can be adequately understood except in the historical context. Phenomena are intelligible only in terms of their origin, function, and significance in the relative course of human history.

But unlike Hegel, Comte held that there is no *Geist*, or spirit, above and beyond history which objectifies itself through the vagaries of time. Comte represents a radical relativism: “Everything is relative; there is the only absolute thing.” Positivism absolutizes relativity as a principle which makes all previous ideas and systems a result of historical conditions. The only unity that the system of positivism affords in its pronounced antimetaphysical bias is the inherent order of human thought. Thus the law of the three stages, which he discovered as early as 1820, attempts to show that the history of the human mind and the development of the sciences follow a determinant pattern which parallels the growth of social and political institutions. According to Comte, the system of pos-

itivism is grounded on the natural and historical law that “by the very nature of the human mind, every branch of our knowledge is necessarily obliged to pass successively in its course through three different theoretical states: the theological or fictitious state; the metaphysical or abstract state; finally, the scientific or positive state.”

These stages represent different and opposed types of human conception. The most primitive type is theological thinking, which rests on the “empathetic fallacy” of reading subjective experience into the operations of nature. The theological perspective develops dialectically through fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism as events are understood as animated by their own will, that of several deities, or the decree of one supreme being. Politically the theological state provides stability under kings imbued with divine rights and supported by military power. As civilization progresses, the metaphysical stage begins as a criticism of these conceptions in the name of a new order. Supernatural entities are gradually transformed into abstract forces just as political rights are codified into systems of law. In the final stage of positive science the search for absolute knowledge is abandoned in favor of a modest but precise inquiry into the relative laws of nature. The absolutist and feudal social orders are replaced gradually by increasing social progress achieved through the application of scientific knowledge.

From this survey of the development of humanity Comte was able to generalize a specific positive methodology. Like René Descartes, Comte acknowledged a unity of the sciences. It was, however, not that of a univocal method of thinking but the successive development of man’s ability to deal with the complexities of experience. Each science possesses a specific mode of inquiry. Mathematics and astronomy were sciences that men developed early because of their simplicity, generality, and abstractness. But observation and the framing of hypotheses had to be expanded through the method of experimentation in order to deal with the physical sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology. A comparative method is required also to study the natural sciences, man, and social institutions. Thus even the history of science and methodology supports the law of the three stages by revealing a hierarchy of sciences and methodological direction from general to particular, and simple to complex. Sociology studies particular societies in a complex way since man is both the subject and the object of this discipline. One can consider social groups from the standpoint of “social statics,” which comprises the elements of cohesion and order such as family and institutions, or from the perspective of “so-

cial dynamics,” which analyzes the stage of continuous development that a given society has achieved.

Later Years. By 1842 Comte’s marriage had dissolved, and he was supported by contributions from various intellectuals, including the English philosopher J. S. Mill. In 1844 he met Clothilde de Vaux, and they fell deeply in love. Although the affair was never consummated because Madame de Vaux died in the next year, this intense love influenced Comte in his later work toward a new religion of humanity. He proposed replacing priests with a new class of scientists and industrialists and offered a catechism based on the cult of reason and humanity, and a new calendar replete with positivist saints. While this line of thought was implicit in the aim of sociology to synthesize order and progress in the service of humanity, the farcical elements of Comte’s mysticism has damaged his philosophical reputation. He died in obscurity in 1857.

EWB

Condorcet, Marquis de (1743–1794), French thinker. Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, expressed the spirit of the Enlightenment in reform proposals and writings on progress. He was the only philosophe to participate in the French Revolution.

Born in Ribemont in Picardy on Sept. 17, 1743, Condorcet was educated at the Jesuit college in Reims and later at the College of Navarre in Paris. He excelled in mathematics and in 1765 wrote the *Essay on Integral Calculus*. In 1769 he became a member of the Academy of Science, later becoming its perpetual secretary, and in 1782 was elected to the French Academy. He married Sophie de Grouchy in 1786, and their home became one of the famous salons of the period.

Prior to the French Revolution, Condorcet wrote biographies of A. R. J. Turgot and Voltaire and essays on the application of the theory of probabilities to popular voting, on the American Revolution and the Constitutional Convention, and on the abolition of the slave trade and slavery. In 1791 he was elected to the Legislative Assembly and later to the National Convention, where he continued to manifest his liberal and egalitarian sentiments.

In the report of the Committee on Public Education, Condorcet advocated universal primary school education and the establishment of a self-regulating educational system under the control of a National Society of Sciences and Arts to protect education from political pressures. However, the Legislative Assembly was hostile to all autonomous corporate structures and

ignored Condorcet’s plan. His proposal for a new constitution, establishing universal male suffrage, proportional representation, and local self-government, was similarly set aside by the Jacobin-dominated National Convention, which considered it too moderate.

Condorcet’s moderate democratic leanings and his vote against the death penalty for Louis XVI led to his being outlawed by the Jacobin government on July 8, 1793. He went into hiding in the home of a close friend, Madame Varnet, where he wrote the *Sketch of an Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*, his most famous and most optimistic work. This capsulized history of progress presented a set of intellectual and moral goals toward which men ought to work, and it was based on the utilitarian conviction that invention and progressive thought arise out of social need. According to Condorcet, the future progress of reason had become inevitable with the invention of the printing press and the advances in science and criticism. Rather than emphasizing the role of the solitary genius as the agent of progress, the *Sketch* stressed the dissemination of useful knowledge among the masses.

After 8 months of hiding, Condorcet fled Paris but was arrested on March 27, 1794, and imprisoned in Bourg-la-Reine. On March 29 he was found dead in his cell. His identity was unknown, and it is ironic that this critic of classical education was eventually identified by a copy of Horace’s *Epistles* that he had been carrying at the time of his arrest.

EWB

Copernicus, Nicolaus (1473–1543), Polish astronomer. Copernicus was the founder of the heliocentric ordering of the planets.

Nicolaus Copernicus was born on Feb. 19, 1473, in Torun about 100 miles south of Danzig. He belonged to a family of merchants. His uncle, the bishop and ruler of Ermland, was the person to whom Copernicus owed his education, career, and security.

Copernicus studied at the University of Cracow from 1491 to 1494. While he did not attend any classes in astronomy, it was during his student years there that Copernicus began to collect books on astronomy and mathematics. Some of these contain marginal notes by him dating back to that period, but it remains conjectural whether Copernicus had already made at that time a systematic study of the heliocentric theory.

Copernicus returned to Torun in 1494, and in 1496, through the efforts of his uncle, he became a canon at Frauenburg, remaining in that office for the remainder of his life. Almost immediately Copernicus set out for Bologna to study canon law. In Bologna,

Copernicus came under the influence of Domenico Maria de Novara, an astronomer known for his admiration of Pythagorean lore. There Copernicus also recorded some planetary positions, and he did the same in Rome, where he spent the Jubilee Year of 1500.

In 1501 there followed a brief visit at home. His first official act as canon there was to apply for permission to spend 3 more years in Italy, which was granted him on his promise that he would study medicine. Copernicus settled in Padua, but later he moved to the University of Ferrara, where he obtained in 1503 the degree of doctor in canon law. Only then did he take up the study of medicine in Padua, prolonging his leave of absence until 1506.

Upon returning to Ermland, Copernicus stayed in his uncle's castle at Heilsberg as his personal physician and secretary. During that time he translated from Greek into Latin the 85 poems of Theophylactus Simacotta, the 7th-century Byzantine poet. The work, printed in Cracow in 1509, evidenced Copernicus's humanistic leanings. At this time Copernicus was also mulling over the problems of astronomy, and the heliocentric system in particular. The system is outlined in a short manuscript known as the *Commentariolus*, or small commentary, which he completed about 1512. Copies of it circulated among his friends eager to know the "Sketch of Hypotheses Made by Nicolaus Copernicus on the Heavenly Motions," as Copernicus referred to his work. In it, right at the outset, there was a list of seven axioms, all of which stated a feature specific to the heliocentric system. The third stated in particular: "All the spheres revolve about the sun as their midpoint, and therefore the sun is the center of the universe." The rest of the work was devoted to the elaboration of the proposition that in the new system only 34 circles were needed to explain the motion of planets.

The *Commentariolus* produced no reaction, either in print or in letters, but Copernicus's fame began to spread. Two years later he received an invitation to be present as an astronomer at the Lateran Council, which had as one of its aims the reform of the calendar; he did not attend. His secretiveness only seemed to further his reputation. In 1522 the secretary to the King of Poland asked Copernicus to pass an opinion on *De motu octavae sphaerae* (On the Motion of the Eighth Sphere), just published by Johann Werner, a mathematician of some repute. This time he granted the request in the form of a letter in which he took a rather low opinion of Werner's work. More important was the concluding remark of the letter, in which Copernicus stated that he intended to set forth elsewhere his own opinion about the motion of the

sphere of stars. He referred to the extensive study of which parts and drafts were already very likely extant at that time.

Copernicus could pursue his study only in his spare time. As a canon, he was involved in various affairs, including legal and medical, but especially administrative and financial matters. In fact, he composed a booklet in 1522 on the remedies of inflation, which then largely meant the preservation of the same amount of gold and silver in coins. For all his failure to publish anything in astronomy, to have his manuscript studies circulate, or to communicate with other astronomers, more and more was rumored about his theory, still on the basis of the *Commentariolus*.

Not all the comments were flattering. Luther denounced Copernicus as "the fool who will turn the whole science of astronomy upside down." In 1531 a satirical play was produced about him in Elbing, Prussia, by a local schoolmaster. In Rome things went better, for the time being at least. In 1533 John Widmanstad, a papal secretary, lectured on Copernicus's theory before Pope Clement VII and several cardinals. Widmanstad's hand was behind the letter which Cardinal Schönberg sent in 1536 from Rome to Copernicus, urging him to publish his thoughts, or at least to share them with him.

It was a futile request. Probably nobody knew exactly how far Copernicus had progressed with his work until Georg Joachim (Rheticus), a young scholar from Wittenberg, arrived in Frauenburg in the spring of 1539. When he returned to Wittenberg, he had already printed an account, known as the *Narratio prima*, of Copernicus's almost ready book. Rheticus was also instrumental in securing the printing of Copernicus's book in Nuremberg, although the final supervision remained in the care of Andrew Osiander, a Lutheran clergyman. He might have been the one who gave the work its title, *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium*, which is not found in the manuscript. But Osiander certainly had written the anonymous preface, in which Copernicus's ideas were claimed to be meant by their author as mere hypotheses, or convenient mathematical formalism, that had nothing to do with the physical reality.

The printed copy of his work, in six books, reached Copernicus only a few hours before his death on May 24, 1543. The physics of Copernicus was still Aristotelian and could not, of course, cope with the twofold motion attributed to the earth. But Copernicus could have done a better job as an observer. He added only 27 observations, an exceedingly meager amount, to the data he took over uncritically from Ptolemy and from more recent astronomical tables. The accuracy of predicting celestial phenomena on

the basis of his system did not exceed the accuracy achieved by Ptolemy. Nor could Copernicus provide proof for the phases of Mercury and Venus that had to occur if his theory was true. The telescope was still more than half a century away. Again, Copernicus could only say that the stars were immensely far away to explain the absence of stellar parallax due to the orbital motion of the earth. Here, the observational evidence was not forthcoming for another 300 years. Also, while Ptolemy actually used only 40 epicycles, their total number in Copernicus's system was 84, hardly a convincing proof of its greater simplicity.

Still, the undeniable strength of Copernicus's work lay in its appeal to simplicity. The rotation of the earth made unnecessary the daily revolution of thousands of stars. The orbital motion of the earth fitted perfectly with its period of 365 days into the sequence set by the periods of other planets. Most importantly, the heliocentric ordering of planets eliminated the need to think of the retrograde motion of the planets as a physical reality. In the tenth chapter of the first book Copernicus made the straightforward statement: "In the center rests the sun. For who would place this lamp of a very beautiful temple in another or better place than this wherefrom it can illuminate everything at the same time."

The thousand copies of the first edition of the book did not sell out, and the work was reprinted only three times prior to the 20th century. No "great book" of Western intellectual history circulated less widely and was read by fewer people than Copernicus's *Revolutions*. Still, it not only instructed man about the revolution of the planets but also brought about a revolution in human thought by serving as the cornerstone of modern astronomy.

EWB

Cortés, Hernán (ca. 1485–1547), Spanish conquistadore. Hernán Cortés conquered the Aztec empire in Mexico and became the most famous of the Spanish conquistadores.

Hernán Cortés was born in Medellin. His parents were of the small landed gentry of the region. As a youth, he studied Latin for 2 years at the University of Salamanca, but lured by tales of new discoveries in America, he abandoned student life and in 1504 sailed for the New World.

Cortés settled initially on the island of Santo Domingo (Hispaniola) but in 1511 joined an expedition to Cuba, where he became a municipal official and an intimate friend of Diego Velázquez, the governor of the island. When Velázquez determined to dispatch an expedition to Mexico, he named Cortés for the command, but Velázquez soon came to suspect

Cortés of excessive ambition and determined to relieve him. Cortés, aware of this danger, managed to slip away with part of his followers before the governor could formally confront him. After meeting with other recruits, on Feb. 18, 1519, Cortés departed for Mexico with over 600 Spanish soldiers, sailors, and captains, some 200 Indian auxiliaries, and 16 horses.

Cortés's route took him first to Yucatán and thence up the Mexican coast to the vicinity of the modern city of Veracruz, where he founded a town, Villa Rica de Veracruz, which became the base for the conquest. There he arranged to have the municipal council which he had appointed name him captain general and principal judge, an act which gave him at least quasi-legal status. He also negotiated alliances with adjacent Indian tribes and gathered intelligence about the Aztecs.

In August 1519 Cortés struck inland for Tenochtitlán, an island city in Lake Texcoco and the capital of the Aztec confederation ruled by Montezuma II. The most consequential episode in the march was an alliance which Cortés negotiated with the Tlascalala, an Indian nation hostile to the Aztecs. In early November the expedition reached the shores of Lake Texcoco. Montezuma, unsure of the intentions of the Spaniards and, indeed, of whether they were gods or men, had offered no overt resistance to their approach and now invited them into Tenochtitlán.

The Spaniards were treated as not entirely welcome guests, and Cortés responded by seizing Montezuma as hostage. At this time Cortés was faced with the arrival of an expedition sent by Governor Velázquez to chastise him. Cortés hastened to the coast to meet the newcomers and, after a surprise attack on them, induced them to join his forces. Upon returning to Tenochtitlán, however, he found the inhabitants in arms and his forces beleaguered in their quarters. Judging the situation to be hopeless, on the night of June 30, 1520, he led his forces from the city to refuge with his Tlascalala allies.

In Tlascalala, Cortés rebuilt his forces with newly arrived Spaniards and Indian auxiliaries. In May 1521 he began an attack on Tenochtitlán supported by a small navy which had been built in Tlascalala, transported to Lake Texcoco, and reassembled. After 75 days of bitter street fighting, on August 13 the city fell to the Spaniards.

Success won legal status for Cortés. On Oct. 15, 1522, Emperor Charles V appointed him governor and captain general of New Spain, the name applied by the Spaniards to the conquered region. It also provided Cortés with an opportunity to display new dimensions of his abilities. He rebuilt Tenochtitlán as the Spanish city of Mexico and dispatched his lieu-

tenants in all directions to subdue other Indian groups. Within a short time most of what is now central and southern Mexico was brought under Spanish rule. Cortés encouraged the introduction of European plants and animals. He vigorously supported the conversion of the native population to Christianity, and his government was marked by consideration for the physical welfare of the Indians.

The great conqueror's days of glory, however, were short. The Emperor was jealous of powerful and popular captains beyond his immediate control and soon began to withdraw or undermine the governmental powers conceded to Cortés. Royal officials were appointed to oversee the treasury of New Spain, royal judges arrived to dispense justice, and in 1526 he was deprived of the governorship. Cortés spent 2 years (1528–1530) in Spain defending himself against his enemies and attempting unsuccessfully to recover his administrative authority. He returned, retaining only the honorific military office of captain general but with the title of marquis of the valley of Oaxaca, which conferred on him a vast estate in southern Mexico.

Cortés remained in Mexico for the next 10 years, managing his estate and undertaking new expeditions which he hoped would recoup his power. His efforts were unsuccessful and in 1540 he returned to Spain, where he lived as a wealthy, honored, but disappointed man until his death in 1547. In compliance with his will, his remains were returned to Mexico, where they repose today in the church of the Hospital of Jesus in Mexico City, an institution which he himself had founded.

Cortés was unquestionably a man of immense abilities. As a conquistador, he displayed an exceptional combination of leadership, audacity, tenacity, diplomacy, and tactical skill. But he was more than a conqueror. He had a vision of a "New Spain" overseas and his statesmanship was instrumental in laying its foundations.

EWB

Cousin, Victor (1792–1867), French educator and philosopher. Victor Cousin helped to reorganize the French primary school system. He also established the study of philosophy as a major intellectual pursuit of the French secondary and higher schools.

Victor Cousin was born in Paris in the midst of the Revolution on Nov. 28, 1792, the son of a poor watchmaker. Like most boys of humble birth at that time, Cousin languished in the streets awaiting the appropriate age to enter an apprenticeship. When he was 11, a fateful event altered the course of his life: in a street fight between schoolboys Cousin came to

the rescue of the underdog, whose mother was looking on. A woman of means, she gratefully paid for Cousin's schooling at the Lycée Charlemagne, where he became one of the most brilliant students in the school's history. He continued his successful scholarly career first as a student at the prestigious École Normale, where he decided on a career in philosophy, and then as a teacher of philosophy and in several schools, and finally as a professor at the Sorbonne.

Development of Eclecticism. In 1817 and again in 1818 Cousin traveled to Germany to meet the leading lights of German letters, J. W. von Goethe, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Friedrich von Schelling, and, most important of all, G. W. F. Hegel. According to Cousin's "eclecticism," as he called his approach, the human mind can accept all carefully thought-out and moderate interpretations of the world. No system of thought is seen to be false, merely incomplete. By studying the history of philosophy, and Cousin directed his students to choose from each system what is true in it and in so doing to arrive at a complete philosophy. The introduction of the history of philosophy and as a major discipline in higher schools in France is a lasting accomplishment of Cousin. He organized the history of philosophy in two major works: *Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie* (Course of the History of Philosophy), written and revised between 1815 and 1841, portions of which have been translated into English; and the widely read *Du vrai, du beau, et du bien* (1836), which has been translated into English under the title *Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good*, and which came out in 31 editions over 90 years.

Political Pressures. During the repressive years of the Bourbon restoration (1820–1830), Cousin, considered too liberal, was fired from the Sorbonne. While traveling in Germany during that time, he was jailed for 6 months for being a liberal agitator, a charge that was wholly unfounded.

In the government of the July Monarchy (1830–1848) Cousin rose to the heights of power and success as an educator and statesman. As a member of the Council of State and later as a peer, he exercised the major influence over French schools and universities. Because of his knowledge of Germany, Cousin was sent to study the successful primary school systems of several German states, especially Prussia. His book *Report of the State of Public Instruction in Prussia* (1833), recommending reforms to the French, was read abroad and stirred many Americans, Horace Mann and Calvin Stowe among other, to visit Prussia to learn how the budding American common school could best be

guided in its development. The Guizot Law of 1833, which was a constitution for the French primary school system, was written by Cousin and based on his *Report*.

The Revolution of 1848 left Cousin without a job. Yet his influence continued to be felt into the next two generations, since the leaders of the French nation were the graduates of the schools that for 18 years had felt the imprint of Cousin's dynamic style, thought, and personality. Cousin never married. His voluminous correspondence, which continued steadily until his death, attests to close friendships with many leaders in Europe and North America.

EWB

Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658), English statesman and general. Oliver Cromwell won decisive battles in the English civil war. He then established himself and his army as the ruling force in England and later took the title Lord Protector of Great Britain and Ireland.

Oliver Cromwell was born on April 25, 1599, at Huntingdon. His father, Richard Cromwell, was a younger son of one of the richest men in the district, Sir Henry Cromwell of Hinchinbrook, known as the "Golden Knight." Cromwell's mother was the daughter of Sir William Steward, who managed the tithe revenues of Ely Cathedral. Little is known of Cromwell's childhood, except that his circumstances were modest and he was sent to the local school. His schoolmaster, Dr. Beard, was a devout Calvinist; most of Cromwell's intense religious convictions were derived from Beard, whom he venerated throughout his life.

In 1616 Cromwell entered Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge. He left the following year on the death of his father. For the next few years he lived in London, where in 1620 he married Elizabeth, the daughter of Sir James Burchier, a wealthy leather merchant. Cromwell then returned to his small estate in Huntingdon, where he farmed his land and played a modest part in local affairs, acquiring a reputation as a champion of the poor and dispossessed. During these years Cromwell experienced periods of deep melancholy, suffused with religious doubt, but after much spiritual torment he became convinced that he was the instrument of God.

Political Situation in 1640. When Cromwell entered Parliament for Cambridge in 1640, England had been ruled personally by Charles I for 11 years. The King had pursued an authoritarian policy in religion and finance which had distressed many country gentlemen, including Cromwell. Furthermore, Charles

had plunged into war with Scotland, which had risen in revolt when Archbishop William Laud had persuaded him to impose the English Prayer Book on the Scottish Church. The Scots rapidly defeated the King; destitute of money and at the mercy of the Scots, Charles I was forced to call Parliament.

The mood of Parliament was highly critical, and there was a closely knit body of Puritan country gentlemen and lawyers who were determined that the power of the King and the Anglican Church should be limited by Parliament. Several of Cromwell's relatives, particularly the influential John Hampden and Oliver St. John, belonged to this group, which was led by John Pym. Cromwell threw in his lot with these men. A middle-aged man without parliamentary experience, he spoke rarely, but when he did it was usually in support of extreme measures. Cromwell soon established his reputation as a firm upholder of the parliamentary cause; he was dedicated to the reform of the Church and of the court and was highly critical of the King.

Civil War. By 1642 the King and Parliament had become so antagonistic that armed conflict was inevitable. At the outbreak of war in August 1642, Cromwell headed a regiment whose prime duty was to defend East Anglia. He rapidly demonstrated not only his skill as a military leader by rapid raids into royalist territory combined with skillful retreat, but also his capacity to mold an effective army from his force of raw recruits.

Under the leadership of the Earl of Manchester, Cromwell's commander, regiments from other counties were brought together in a formidable body, known as the Eastern Association. In 1643 Cromwell's cavalry worsted the royalists in a number of sharp engagements—Grantham (May 13), Gainsborough (July 18), and Wincaby (October 13). These successes helped to create parliamentary supremacy in East Anglia and the Midlands. Cromwell's reputation as Parliament's most forceful general was made the next year, however, at the battle of Marston Moor (July 2, 1644), when his Ironsides routed the cavalry of Prince Rupert, the most successful royalist general. To Cromwell, whose religious convictions strengthened with every victory that he won, Marston Moor was God's work, and he wrote, "God made them stumble to our swords."

The victories in eastern England, however, were not matched by success elsewhere. After 2 years of war the King was still in the field, and there was a growing rift between Parliament and the army. Many disliked the price paid for alliance with the Scots (acceptance of the Presbyterian form of church government), and

most longed for peace. Cromwell, however, yearned for victory. He bitterly attacked the Earl of Manchester, and after complex political maneuvering he emerged as the effective leader of the parliamentary armies. He proved his exceptional capacities as a general on June 14, 1645, when he smashed the royalists' army at Naseby in Northamptonshire. Within 12 months the royalist armies had capitulated.

In 5 years Cromwell had risen from obscurity to renown. A large man with a long, red face studded with warts, he nevertheless possessed considerable presence. His mood was usually somber, thoughtful, and deeply religious. His soldiers sang psalms as they went into battle, and every regiment had its preacher.

The next 3 years taxed Cromwell's skill and faith. His army became riddled with Levellers, whose radical doctrines called for a far more democratic social structure than Cromwell and his fellow generals would tolerate. Parliament and the Scots inclined not only to peace with the King but also to a rigid form of Presbyterianism, which Cromwell disliked. He claimed to believe in toleration, but excepted always Catholics and atheists.

In 1648 the royalists rose again, sided by the Scots, but in a lightning campaign Cromwell smashed both. The republicans were then determined to bring Charles I to trial, and Cromwell did nothing to stop them. At last agreeing that the King was "a man of blood" and should be executed, he signed Charles I's death warrant.

Further Campaigns. The execution of the King settled nothing. Legally, the House of Commons, purged to such an extent that it was called the Rump, ruled. But the army, Scotland, and Ireland were soon in rebellion. The Scottish Presbyterians proclaimed Charles II (Charles I's son) their lawful monarch, and the Irish Catholics did likewise. In England the radicals were a rampant minority, the royalists a stunned majority, but neither had any respect for the Rump.

Cromwell suppressed the Levellers by force and then set about subduing first Ireland and then Scotland. In the former Cromwell fought a tough, bloody campaign in which the butchery of thousands of soldiers at Drogheda (Sept. 11, 1649) and hundreds of civilians at Wexford (Oct. 11) caused his name to be execrated in Ireland for centuries.

On June 26, 1650, Cromwell finally became commander in chief of the parliamentary armies. He moved against the Scots and got into grievous difficulties. At Dunbar in August 1650 he was pressed between the hills and the sea and was surrounded by an army of 20,000 men. But the folly of the Scottish

commander, Leslie, enabled Cromwell to snatch a victory, he thought by divine help, on September 3. The next year Charles II and his Scottish army made a spirited dash into England, but Cromwell smashed them at Worcester on Sept. 3, 1651. At long last the war was over and Cromwell realized that God's humble instrument had been given, for better or worse, supreme power.

Cromwell's Rule: 1653–1658. For 5 years after the execution of the King, Parliament tried to formulate a new constitution. Its failure to do this so exasperated Cromwell that on April 20, 1653, he went with a handful of soldiers to the House of Commons, where he shouted at the members, "The Lord be done with you," and ordered them out.

Until his death Cromwell tried to create a firm new constitutional base for his power. His first attempt to establish a constitution by means of a nominated Parliament in 1653 ended in disaster, so the Council of Army Officers promulgated the Instrument of Government, by which Cromwell became Protector in December 1653. He was assisted by a Council of State on whose advice he acted, for Cromwell believed sincerely in the delegation and sharing of power. For 8 months Cromwell and his Council ruled most effectively, sweeping away ancient feudal jurisdictions in Scotland and Ireland and uniting those countries with England under one Parliament, which was itself reformed. When the Parliament met in 1654, however, it soon quarreled with Cromwell over the constitution. He once more took power into his own hands and dissolved Parliament on June 22, 1655.

Cromwell's government became more authoritarian. Local government was brought under major generals, soldiers whom he could trust. This infuriated the radical left as well as the traditionalists. Again attempting to give his authority a formal parliamentary base and also needing additional revenue, Cromwell reconvened Parliament. His successes abroad and his suppression of revolts at home had greatly increased his popularity; thus when Parliament met, he was pressed to accept the crown, but after much soul-searching he refused. He took instead the title Lord Protector under a new constitution—the Humble Petition and Advice (May 25, 1657). This constitution also reestablished the House of Lords and made Cromwell king in all but name. But Cromwell was no Napoleon; there were definite limits to his personal ambition. He did not train his son Richard to be his successor, nor did he try to establish his family as a ruling dynasty. And at the height of his power he re-

tained his deep religious conviction that he was merely an instrument of God's purpose.

Cromwell pursued an effective foreign policy. His navy enjoyed substantial success, and the foundation of British power in the West Indies was laid by its capture of Jamaica (1655). He allied himself with France against Spain, and his army carried the day at the battles of the Dunes in 1658. These victories, combined with his dexterous handling of Scotland and brutal suppression of Ireland, made his personal ascendancy unassailable, in spite of failures in his domestic policy. But shortly after his death on Sept. 3, 1658, Cromwell's regime collapsed, and the restoration of the monarchy followed in 1660.

Critical Assessment. Cromwell's greatness will always be questioned. As a general, he was gifted yet lucky; as a statesman, he had some success but was unable to bring his plans to complete fruition. Although his religious conviction often appears to be a hypocritical cloak for personal ambition, his positive qualities are unmistakable. He believed in representative government (limited to men of property, however). He encouraged reform, and much of it was humane. He brought to the executive side of government a great degree of professionalism, particularly in the army and navy. Britain emerged from the Commonwealth stronger, more efficient, and more secure. Perhaps the most remarkable qualities of Cromwell were his sobriety and his self-control. Few men have enjoyed such supreme power and abused it less.

EWB

D

Danton, Georges Jacques (1759–1794), French statesman. Georges Jacques Danton was a leader during the French Revolution. Called the "orator of the streets," he was the most prominent early defender of popular liberties and the republican spirit.

Born in Arcis-sur-Aube in Champagne on Oct. 26, 1759, Georges Jacques Danton was the son of a lawyer and minor court official. He was educated by the Oratorians at Troyes and in 1785 earned a degree in law at the University of Reims. He was employed in the office of public prosecutor in Paris and in 1787 purchased the office of advocate to the King's Council.

Danton's massive stature, ready wit (which did much to overcome his physical ugliness), stentorian voice, and impromptu and fiery speeches made the public accept him as its champion of liberty. Danton was a pragmatist who believed that the Revolution could only succeed if it limited its program to the

possible, which meant upholding the rights of property, ending the war as quickly as possible by negotiation, and restoring order through a strong central government.

Danton had tendencies toward laziness and the dissolute life, which often blunted the force of his actions and made him appear capricious and unreliable to many of his contemporaries. There seems to be little doubt that he was implicated in financial corruption, but this appears more the result of thoughtlessness than a deliberate attempt to profit from the Revolution. At heart Danton appears to have been less a radical than an energetic and undisciplined individualist whose personality and the force of circumstances enabled him to become a great popular leader.

Danton's part in founding the Cordeliers Club, which became the advance guard of popular revolutionary activity, suggests that from the beginning of the Revolution he inclined toward the "people's cause." He was involved in the fall of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, and was the most outspoken critic of the commune and the Marquis de Lafayette. Following King Louis XVI's unsuccessful flight in June 1791, Danton was among those who called for the creation of a republic, and his speeches were considered responsible for the popular agitation that culminated in the massacre of the Champ de Mars.

In December 1791 Danton was elected first deputy prosecutor of the Paris Commune. Following the invasion of the Tuileries on June 20, 1792, he was elected president of the Théâtre Française Electoral District. He spoke out against the distinction between active and passive citizens and thus became one of the first to espouse the modern conception of the legal equality of all citizens. At the same time he began to play the primary role in the conspiracy that led to the overthrow of the monarchy on Aug. 10, 1792. He had become convinced, as had others, that as long as the monarchy continued to exist the Revolution would be endangered.

Danton was subsequently named minister of justice and became the predominant member of the Executive Committee. In this capacity he rallied the nation against the invading Prussians. It appears that he could have done little to prevent the September Massacres (1792), but his silent complicity in them deepened the split between himself and the Rolandists, which did much to force the trial of the King. Although Danton opposed this trial since it would make a negotiated peace impossible, he eventually voted in favor of execution of the King.

During this period Danton delivered his famous speech to the National Convention, which stated that to protect the Revolution it was necessary for France

to secure its natural boundaries, although this might mean a perpetuation of the war. On April 6, 1793, he was elected to the newly established Committee of Public Safety and to the Revolutionary Tribunal; he was thus enabled to act as an emergency dictator. Although Danton believed that it was necessary to destroy internal dissent, his diplomatic policies continued to be moderate. He thus alienated the Commune, which began to look to Robespierre and more radical Jacobins for leadership. Setbacks in the Vendée and his attempted protection of the Girondists, even after their exclusion from the National Convention, resulted in Danton's not being reelected to the Committee on July 10, 1793. The leadership of the Revolution passed to Robespierre.

In October Danton retired to his home in Arcis; he returned to Paris the following month at the insistence of his friends, who feared Robespierre's terrorist policies. The increasingly radical demands of the Hébertists, however, were more frightening to Danton, and he lent his support to Robespierre. After the Hébertists had been suppressed, Robespierre moved against Danton, who had called for an end to the Terror. Danton and his followers were arrested and tried for antirevolutionary activity. On April 5, 1794, Danton went to the guillotine, which he had vowed to either pull down or die beneath.

EWB

Darwin, Charles Robert (1809–1882), English naturalist. Charles Darwin discovered that natural selection was the agent for the transmutation of organisms during evolution, as did Alfred Russel Wallace independently. Darwin presented his theory in *Origin of Species*.

The concept of evolution by descent dates at least from classical Greek philosophers. In the 18th century Carl Linnaeus postulated limited mutability of species by descent and hybridization. Charles Darwin's grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, and the Chevalier de Lamarck were the chief proponents of evolution about 1800. Such advocacy had little impact on the majority of naturalists, concerned to identify species, the stability of which was considered essential for their work. Natural theology regarded the perfection of adaptation between structure and mode of life in organisms as evidence for a beneficent, all-seeing, all-planning Creator. Organic structure, planned in advance for a preordained niche, was unchanged from the moment of creation. Variations in structure in these earthly imperfect versions of the Creator's idea were minor and impermanent.

In 1815 William Smith had demonstrated a sequence of fossil populations in time. Charles Lyell,

adopting James Hutton's uniformitarian view that present conditions and processes were clues to the past history of the earth, wrote his *Principles of Geology* (1830–1833), which Darwin on his *Beagle* circumnavigation found most apt for his own geological observations. Fossils in South America and apparent anomalies of animal distribution triggered the task for Darwin of assembling a vast range of material. A reading of Thomas Malthus's *Essay on the Principle of Population* in 1838 completed Darwin's conceptual scheme.

Critics, for whom the *Origin* is paramount among Darwin's considerable output, have accused him of vacillation and procrastination. But recent study of unpublished manuscripts and his entire works reveal a continuity of purpose and integrity of effort to establish the high probability of the genetic relationship through descent in all forms of life. Man is dethroned as the summit of creation and as the especial concern of the Creator. This revolution in thought has had an effect on every kind of human activity.

Darwin was born on Feb. 12, 1809, at Shrewsbury, the fifth child of Robert and Susannah Darwin. His mother, who was the daughter of the famous potter Josiah Wedgwood, died when Charles was 8, and he was reared by his sisters. At the age of 9 Charles entered Shrewsbury School. His record was not outstanding, but he did learn to use English with precision and to delight in Shakespeare and Milton.

In 1825 Darwin went to Edinburgh University to study medicine. He found anatomy and *materia medica* dull and surgery unendurable. In 1828 he entered Christ's College, Cambridge, with the idea of taking Anglican orders. He attended John Stevens Henslow's course in botany, started a collection of beetles that became famous, and read widely. William Paley's *Natural Theology* (1802) delighted Darwin by its clear logical presentation, and he later regarded this study as the most worthwhile benefit from Cambridge. He received his bachelor's degree in 1831.

Voyage of the *Beagle*. On Henslow's recommendation Darwin was offered the position of naturalist for the second voyage of H.M.S. *Beagle* to survey the coast of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego and complete observations of longitude by circumnavigation with a formidable array of chronometers. The *Beagle* left on Dec. 27, 1831, and returned on Oct. 2, 1836. During the voyage Darwin spent 535 days at sea and roughly 1,200 on land. Enough identification of strata could be done on the spot, but sufficiently accurate identification of living organisms required systematists accessible only in London and Paris.

Darwin kept his field observations in notebooks with the specimens listed serially and their place and time of collection documented. Toward the end of the voyage, when sea passages were long, he copied his notes and arranged them to accord with systematics, concentrating on range and habits.

During the trip Darwin discovered the relevance of Lyell's uniformitarian views to the structure of St. Jago (Cape Verde Islands). He found that small locally living forms closely resembled large terrestrial fossil mammals embedded between marine shell layers and that the local sea was populated with living occupants of similar shells. He also observed the overlapping distribution on the continuous Patagonian plain of two closely related but distinct species of ostrich. An excursion along the Santa Cruz river revealed a section of strata across South America. He observed the differences between species of birds and animals on the Galápagos Islands.

Publications Resulting from Voyage. Darwin's *Journal of Researches* was published in 1839. With the help of a government grant toward the cost of the illustrations, the *Zoology of the Voyage of the Beagle* was published, in five quarto volumes, from 1839 to 1843. Specialist systematists wrote on fossil and living mammals, birds, fish, and reptiles. Darwin edited the work and contributed habits and ranges of the animals and geological notes on the fossils. Two themes run through his valuable and mostly neglected notes: distribution in space and time and observations of behavior as an aid to species diagnosis. He also published *The Structure and Distribution of Coral Reefs* (1842); he had studied the coral reefs in the Cocos Islands during the *Beagle* voyage.

Darwin abandoned the idea of fixity of species in 1837 while writing his *Journal*. A second edition, in 1845, had a stronger tinge of transmutation, but there was still no public avowal of the new faith. This delightful volume is his most popular and accessible work.

Darwin's Transmutation (Species) Notebooks (1837–1839) have been reconstructed. The notion of "selection owing to struggle" derived from his reading of Malthus in 1838. Earlier Darwin had read Pyrame de Candolle's works on plant geography, so his mind was receptive. The breadth of interest and profusion of hypotheses characteristic of Darwin, who could carry several topics in his mind at the same time, inform the whole. From this medley of facts allegedly assembled on Baconian principles all his later works derive.

It was not until Darwin's geological observations of South America were published in 1846 that

he started a paper on his "first Cirripede," a shell-boring aberrant barnacle, no bigger than a pin's head, he had found at Chonos Island in 1835. This was watched while living, then dissected, and drawn while the *Beagle* sheltered from a week of severe storms. The working out of the relationship to other barnacles forced him to study all barnacles, a task that occupied him until 1854 and resulted in two volumes on living forms and two on fossil forms.

Darwin married Emma Wedgwood, his first cousin, in 1839. They lived in London until 1842, when ill health drove him to Down House, where he passed the rest of his life in seclusion. Four of their sons became prominent scientists: George was an astronomer and mathematician, Francis a botanist, Leonard a eugenicist, and Horace a civil engineer.

Development of Ideas on Evolution. In 1842 and 1844 Darwin wrote short accounts of his transmutation views. The 1844 sketch in corrected fair copy was a testament accompanied by a letter to his wife to secure publication should he die. Late in 1844 Robert Chambers's *Vestiges of Creation* appeared advocating universal development by descent. A great scandal ensued, and criticism of the amateur pretensions of the author was savage. Darwin decided to bide his time and become more proficient as a biologist.

In 1855 Darwin began to study the practices of poultry and pigeon fanciers and worldwide domesticated breeds, conducted experiments on plant and animal variation and its hereditary transmission, and worried about the problem of plant and animal transport across land and water barriers, for he was persuaded of the importance of isolation for speciation. The last step in his conceptual scheme had already occurred to him in 1852 while pondering Henri Milne-Edwards's concept of diversification into specialized organs for separation of physiological functions in higher organisms and the relevance of these considerations for classification when related to the facts of embryological development. Darwin's "principle of divergence" recognizes that the dominant species must make more effective use of the territory it invades than a competing species and accordingly it becomes adapted to more diversified environments.

In May 1856 Lyell heard of Darwin's transmutation hypothesis and urged him to write an account with full references. Darwin sent the chapter on distribution to Lyell and Sir Joseph Hooker, who were deeply impressed. Darwin continued his writing, and on June 14, 1858, when he was halfway through, he received an essay from Alfred Russel Wallace containing the theory of evolution by natural selection, the same theory Darwin was working on. Lyell and

Hooker arranged for a reading of a joint paper by Wallace and Darwin, and it was presented at a meeting of the Linnaean Society on July 1. The paper had little effect.

Origin of Species. On Nov. 24, 1859, Darwin published *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*. The analogy of natural selection was prone to misunderstanding by readers, since it carried for them an implied purpose on the part of a “deified” Nature. Herbert Spencer’s phrase “survival of the fittest” was equally misleading because the essence of Darwin’s theory is that, unlike natural theology, adaptation must not be too perfect and rigid. A mutable store of variation must be available to any viable population in nature.

The publication of Darwin’s book secured worldwide attention for his hypothesis and aroused impassioned controversy. His main champion was T. H. Huxley. Darwin, remote in his retreat at Down House, took painstaking note of criticism and endeavored to answer points of detail in the five more editions of *Origin* produced during his lifetime. He avoided trouble and made several unfortunate concessions which weakened his presentation and made his views seem vague and hesitant. The first edition is easily the best.

Later Works. In *On the Various Contrivances by Which British and Foreign Orchids Are Fertilised by Insects* (1862) Darwin showed how the welfare of an organism may be hidden in apparently unimportant peculiarities. It became hard to say what is “useless” in nature. His *The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication* (1868; rev. ed. 1875) expanded on a topic he had introduced in *Origin*. A chapter in *Origin* on man as the most domesticated of animals grew into the book *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871). *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872) developed from material squeezed out of the *Descent*.

Plants became an increasing preoccupation, the more so since Darwin had his son Francis as collaborator and amanuensis. Papers Darwin had published in 1864 were collected into *The Movements and Habits of Climbing Plants* (1875), and these ideas were further generalized on uniformitarian lines and published as *The Power of Movement in Plants* (1880). All plants, not merely climbing ones, were shown to execute to some degree exploratory “circumnutation” movements. Studies on fertilization of plants by insects recorded as early as 1840 led to *The Effects of Cross and Self-Fertilisation in the Vegetable Kingdom* (1876) and *The Different Forms of Flowers on Plants of the Same Species*

(1877). *Insectivorous Plants* (1873) pursued the reactions of plants to stimuli. Darwin’s last work returned to observations he had made in 1837: *The Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Worms, with Observations on Their Habits* (1881). He died on April 19, 1882, and was buried in Westminster Abbey.

EWB

David, Jacques Louis (1748–1825), French painter. Jacques Louis David was the leader of the neoclassic movement. His style set the artistic standards for many of his contemporaries and determined the direction of numerous 19th-century painters.

Jacques Louis David early turned his back on the frivolous rococo manner, looking instead to antiquity for inspiration. Following the ideals of Nicolas Poussin, to whom the artist candidly admitted he owed everything, David sought to reduce classical principles to their barest, unencumbered essentials. In this endeavor he observed with avid interest the neoclassicism propounded by Johann Winckelmann and the illustrations of antiquity found in the paintings of Anton Raphael Mengs. An outspoken political firebrand, David espoused the cause of the French Revolution and under the Convention held sway as the virtual dictator of the arts; later when Napoleon came to power, he acted willingly as his artistic spokesman.

David was born in Paris on August 30, 1748. His well-to-do bourgeois family placed him in the studio of that arch-practitioner of the rococo manner, the eminent painter François Boucher, to whom David was apparently distantly related. Perhaps because of his own advanced years, Boucher encouraged David to study under Joseph Marie Vien, a painter who had been attracted by the new wave of interest in antiquity while studying in Rome. In 1771 David won second prize in the Prix de Rome competition, but it was not until 3 years later and after severe mental frustration that he won the first prize with his painting *Antiochus Dying for the Love of Stratonice*.

Early Works. David went to Rome in 1775 in the company of Vien, who had just been named the director of the French Academy there. David studied the ancient architectural monuments, marble reliefs, and freestanding statues. In addition, he strove for a clearer understanding of the classical principles underlying the styles of the Renaissance and baroque masters Raphael, the Carracci, Domenichino, and Guido Reni. The effects of David’s Romanization were first witnessed in his *Belisarius Asking for Alms*, exhibited in Paris in 1781. When he returned to Paris in 1780, he was an artist already thoroughly imbued with the tenets of classicism. He was admitted to the

French Academy in 1783 with his painting *Andromache by the Body of Hector*.

The following year David returned to Rome in order to paint the *Oath of the Horatii*, a work which was immediately acclaimed a masterpiece both in Italy and in France at its showing at the Parisian Salon of 1785. The painting reflected a strong interest in archeological exactitude in the depiction of figures and settings. Its carefully calculated severity of composition and its emphasis on a sculptural hardness of precise drawing, which David saw as more important than color, contributed to the forceful moralistic tone of the subject: the oath being administered to the Horatii by their father, who demanded their sacrifice for the good of the state. In this single work, with its strong republican implications, those aspiring to do so could find a call to revolution, a revolution which was in fact only five years distant. The *Oath* was followed by other moralizing canvases such as the *Death of Socrates* (1787) and *Brutus and the Lictors Bringing Home to Brutus the Bodies of His Sons* (1789), both extolling the classical virtues.

French Revolution. With the Revolution in full swing, David for a time abandoned his classical approach and began to paint scenes describing contemporary events, among them the unfinished *Oath of the Tennis Court* (1791), glorifying the first challenge to royal authority by the parliamentarians of the period. He also concentrated on portraits of the martyred heroes of the fight for freedom, including the *Death of Marat* (1793), the *Death of Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau* (1793) and the *Death of Joseph Bara* (1794), all executed with an unvarnished realism. The artist was deeply involved with the political scene; elected to the National Convention in 1792, he served as a deputy to that all-powerful body and was one of those who voted for the execution of King Louis XVI.

David had apparently long harbored great animosity toward the French Academy, perhaps because it had failed to fully recognize his talents when he had first submitted works for the Grand Prix competition. Though an honored member by the time of the Revolution, in 1793 he hastened its dissolution, forming a group called the Commune of the Arts; this group was almost immediately supplanted by the Popular and Republican Society of the Arts, from whose ranks the Institute ultimately would be formed.

A friend of Robespierre, David nearly accompanied him to the guillotine when the Jacobin fell from power in 1794. Imprisoned for seven months, first at Fresnes and then in the Luxembourg, the artist emerged a politically wiser man. It was while in prison that David executed one of his rare landscapes: the

Gardens of the Luxembourg (1794), a view from his prison window. By 1798 he was busy on what he proclaimed his masterpiece, the *Rape of the Sabine Women*. The subject matter, derived from the classical legend described by Livy in which the Sabine women intervened in the battle between their fathers and brothers and their Roman husbands, represented a calculated appeal by David to end the internecine conflict that had ripped France asunder; further, the vast canvas was planned as a sort of manifesto proclaiming the validity of the antique.

David and Napoleon. It was at this time that David met Napoleon Bonaparte, in whose person he recognized a worthy new hero whom he promptly proceeded to glorify. The Emperor in turn realized the rich potential of David as a propagandist born to champion his imperial regime, and it was probably with this in mind that he invited the artist to accompany him on his Egyptian campaign; that David declined to go was surely due only to the fact that he was then deeply absorbed in the creation of his avowed masterpiece, the *Sabine Women*. Named "first painter," David executed a number of portraits of the Emperor, the most notable of which is probably that entitled *Bonaparte Crossing the St. Bernard Pass* (1800), in which the subject was idealized in physical stature and romanticized as the effortless man of action. Among the major commissions granted David by the Emperor were the colossal scenes treating specific episodes of his reign. The best-known of these are the *Coronation of Napoleon and Josephine* (1805–1807), containing over 100 portraits, and the *Distribution of the Eagles* (1810).

Though David would have preferred to be remembered for his history painting, he was at his best as a portraitist. Certain of his portraits, such as *Madame Sériziat and Her Daughter* and *Monsieur Sériziat* (1795), are done with an incredible directness and thus retain a freshness and vivacity not often encountered in David's more serious works. His unfinished portrait *Madame Récamier* (1800), with the subject shown in long, loosely flowing robes, vaguely reminiscent of the antique, summarizes the studied elegance of the neoclassic age.

With Bonaparte's defeat at Waterloo and the subsequent restoration of the Bourbons, David tried to retreat into quiet seclusion, but his earlier political affiliation and, more particularly, his actions during the heat of the Revolution were not calculated to warm his relations with the new rulers. He was declared persona non grata and fled to Switzerland. A short time later he settled in Brussels, where he continued to paint until his death on December 29,

1825. His family's urgent request that his ashes be returned to France was denied. He was buried amidst great pomp and circumstance in the church of Ste-Gudule in Brussels.

David's Influence. There was scarcely a young painter of the following generation who was not influenced by David's style, a style which had within it such diverse aspects as classicism, realism, and romanticism. Among his foremost pupils, each of whom developed various different facets of his style, were Antoine Jean, Baron Gros; Pierre Narcisse Guérin; François Gérard; Girodet de Roucy-Trioson; and perhaps most important, J. A. D. Ingres.

EWB

Dee, John (1527–1608), mathematician and astrologer. John Dee is most remembered for his numerous experiments with crystal gazing. He was also a scholar, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, England, and the author of 49 books on scientific subjects. His delving into the occult made him a person of strange reputation and career.

Born in London July 13, 1527, Dee is said to have descended from a noble old Welsh family, the Dees of Nant y Groes in Radnorshire. He claimed that one of his direct ancestors was Roderick the Great, Prince of Wales. Dee's father appears to have been a gentleman server at the court of Henry VIII and therefore affluent and able to give his son a good education. So at age 15, John Dee went to Cambridge University and after two years there took his bachelor of arts. Soon afterward he became intensely interested in astronomy and decided to leave England to study abroad. In 1547 he went to the Low Countries (modern Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), where he consorted with numerous scholars. He returned to England with the first astronomer's staff of brass and also with two globes constructed by geographer Gerard Mercator (famed for his cartographic projection).

In 1548 he traveled to France, living for some time at Louvain. In 1550 he spent several months in Paris, lecturing on the principles of geometry. He was offered a permanent post at the Sorbonne, but declined, returning in 1551 to England, where on the recommendation of Edward VI he was granted the rectory of Upton-upon-Severn, Worcestershire.

Dee was now in a delightful and enviable position, having a comfortable home and assured income, and was able to devote himself exclusively to the studies he loved. But he had hardly begun to enjoy these benefits when, on the accession of Queen Mary in 1553, he was accused of trying to take the new

sovereign's life by means of magic and was imprisoned at Hampton Court.

He gained his liberty soon afterward, but he felt that many people looked at him with distrust because of his scientific predilections. In a preface he wrote for an English translation of Euclid, he complains bitterly of being regarded as "a companion of the hellhounds, a caller and a conjuror of wicked and damned spirits."

During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I his fortune began to improve again, and after making another long tour abroad (going on as far as St. Helena), he returned and took a house at Mortlake on the Thames.

While staying there he rapidly became famous for his intimate knowledge of astronomy. In 1572—on the advent of a new star—people flocked to hear Dee speak on the subject; when a mysterious comet appeared five years later, the scholar was again granted ample opportunity to display his learning. Queen Elizabeth herself was among those who came to ask him what this addition to the stellar bodies might portend.

First Crystal Visions. The most interesting circumstances in Dee's life are those dealing with his experiments in crystallo-mancy. Living in comparative solitude, practicing astrology for bread, but studying alchemy for pleasure, brooding over Talmudic mysteries and Rosicrucian theories, immersed in constant contemplation of wonders he longed to penetrate, and dazzled by visions of the elixir of life and the philosophers' stone, Dee soon reached such a condition of mystic exaltation that his visions seemed real, and he persuaded himself that he was the favored of the invisible world. In his *Diary* he recorded that he first saw spirits in his crystal globe on May 25, 1581.

One day in November 1582, while on his knees and fervently praying, Dee became aware of a sudden glory that filled the west window of his laboratory and in the midst of which shone the bright angel Uriel. It was impossible for Dee to speak. Uriel smiled benignly upon him, gave him a convex piece of crystal, and told him that when he wished to communicate with the beings of another world he had but to examine it intently, and they would immediately appear and reveal the mysteries of the future. Then the angel vanished.

Dee used the crystal but discovered that it was necessary to concentrate all his faculties upon it before the spirits would obey him. Also, he could never remember what the spirits said in their frequent conversations with him. He resolved to find a fellow worker, or a neophyte, who would converse with the

spirits while he recorded the interesting dialogue. He found the assistant he sought in Edward Kelley, who unfortunately possessed the boldness and cunning for making a dupe of the amiable and credulous enthusiast.

Kelley was a native of Lancashire, born, according to Dee, in 1555. Nothing is known of his early years, but after having been convicted at Lancaster of coining, he was punished by having his ears cropped. He concealed the loss of his ears by a black skullcap. He later moved to Worcester and established himself as a druggist. Carnal, ambitious, and self-indulgent, he longed for wealth; and despairing of getting it through honest work, he began to seek the philosophers' stone and to employ what secrets he picked up in taking advantage of the ignorant and extravagant.

The Visions of Edward Kelley. In his work with Kelley, Dee saw nothing. The visions seemed to exist solely in Kelley's fertile imagination. The entities who reportedly communicated through Kelley bore names such as Madini, Gabriel, Uriel, Nalvage, Il, Morvorgran, and Jubanladace. Some of them were said to be angels.

A record of the séances held in 1582–87 was published in Meric Casaubon's *A True and Faithful Relation of What Passed between Dr. Dee and Some Spirits; Tending, Had it Succeeded, to a General Alteration of Most States and Kingdoms in the World* (1659). The spirits offered occult instruction—how to make the elixir of life, how to search for the philosophers' stone, how to involve the spirits. They also gave information on the hierarchy of spiritual beings and disclosed the secrets of the primeval tongue that the angels and Adam spoke, which was corrupted into Hebrew after the Fall. This original speech bore an organic relation to the outer world. Each name expressed the properties of the thing spoken of, and the utterance of that name had a compelling power over that creature. Dee was supposed to write a book in this tongue under spirit influence. He was later relieved of the task, however. The prophecies that were given through the crystal mostly failed. The physical phenomena were few—occasional movements of objects, direct writing, and direct voice.

Dee and Kelley acquired a considerable reputation for the occult, which spread from Mortlake to continental Europe. Dee declared that he possessed the elixir of life, which he claimed to have found among the ruins of Glastonbury Abbey, so the curious were drawn to his house by a double attraction. Gold flowed into his coffers, but his experiments in the transmutation of metals absorbed a great portion of his money.

At that time the court of England was visited by a Polish nobleman named Albert Laski, Count Palatine of Siradz, who wanted to see the famous "Gloriana." Queen Elizabeth received him with the flattering welcome she always accorded to distinguished strangers and placed him in the charge of the earl of Leicester. Leicester promised to introduce him to the learned philosopher on their return to London, and so soothed his discontent.

A few days afterward Laski and the earl of Leicester were waiting in the antechamber at Whitehall for an audience with the queen when Dee arrived. Leicester embraced the opportunity and introduced him to Laski. The interview between two genial spirits was interesting and led to frequent visits from Laski to Dee's house at Mortlake. Kelley consulted the "great crystalline globe" and began to reveal hints and predictions that excited Laski's fancy. A careful perusal of Dee's *Diary* suggests that he was duped by Kelley and that he accepted all his revelations as the actual utterances of the spirits. It seems that Kelley not only knew something of the optical delusions then practiced by pretended necromancers, but also may have possessed considerable ventriloquial powers, which assisted him in deceptions.

It did not serve Kelley's purposes to bring matters too suddenly to an end, and hoping to show the value of his services, he renewed his complaints about the wickedness of dealing with spirit and his fear of the perilous enterprises they might enjoin. He threatened to abandon his task, which greatly disturbed Dee. Where indeed could he hope to meet with another scryer of such infinite ability?

Kelley then returned to Dee's crystal and his visions and soon persuaded Laski that he was destined by the spirits to achieve great victories over the Saracens and win enduring glory. To do he needed to return to Poland.

Adventures in Europe. Laski returned to Poland, taking with him Dee and Kelley and their wives and families. The spirits continued to respond to their inquiries even while at sea. They landed at the Brill on July 30, 1583, and traversed Holland and Friesland to the wealthy town of Lubeck. There they lived sumptuously for a few weeks, and with new strength set out for Poland. On Christmas Day they arrived at Stettin, where they stayed until the middle of January 1584. They reached Lasco, Laski's estate, early in February.

Immediately work began for the transmutation of iron into gold, since boundless wealth was obviously needed for so grand an enterprise as the regeneration of Europe. Laski liberally supplied them with

means, but the alchemists always failed on the very threshold of success.

It became apparent to the swindlers that Laski's fortune was nearly exhausted. At the same time, ironically, the angels Madini, Uriel, and their comrades in the crystal began to doubt whether Laski was, after all, the great regenerator intended to revolutionize Europe.

The whole party lived at Cracow from March 1584 until the end of July and made daily appeals to the spirits in reference to the Polish prince. They grew more and more discouraging in their replies, and Laski began to suspect that he had been duped. He proposed to furnish the alchemists with sufficient funds for a journey to Prague and letters of introduction to Emperor Rudolph. At that very moment the spirits revealed that Dee should bear a divine message to the emperor, and so Laski's proposal was gladly accepted.

At Prague the two alchemists were well received by the emperor. They found him willing to believe in the existence of the famous philosophers' stone. He was courteous to Dee, a man of European celebrity, but was very suspicious of Kelley. They stayed several months at Prague, living on the funds Laski had supplied and hoping to be drafted into the imperial service.

At last the papal nuncio complained about the tolerance afforded to heretical magicians, and the emperor was obliged to order them to leave within 24 hours. They complied, and so escaped prison or the stake, to which the nuncio had received orders from Rome to consign them in May 1586.

Dee's enthusiasm and credulity had made him utterly dependent on Kelley, but the trickster was nevertheless jealous of the superior respect that Dee enjoyed as a man of remarkable scholarship and considerable ability. Frequent quarrels broke out between them, aggravated by the passion Kelley had developed for the doctor's young and beautiful wife, which he was determined to gratify.

Soon afterward, Dee requested permission from Queen Elizabeth to return to England and left the castle of Trebona after finally separating from Kelley. The latter, who had been knighted at Prague, proceeded to the Bohemian capital, taking with him the elixir found at Glastonbury Abbey. He was immediately arrested by order of the emperor and imprisoned.

Kelley was later released and wandered throughout Germany, telling fortunes and propagating the cause of magic. He was again arrested as a heretic and sorcerer. In a desperate attempt to avoid imprisonment he tried to escape, but fell from the dungeon wall and broke two ribs and both his legs. He died of his injuries in February 1593.

Dee's Final Years. Dee set out from Trebona with a splendid train, the expenses of his journey defrayed by the generous Bohemian noble Count Rosenberg. In England he was well received by the queen and settled again at Mortlake, resuming his chemical studies and his pursuit of the philosophers' stone.

But nothing went well with the unfortunate enthusiast. He employed two scryers—a rogue named Bartholomew and a charlatan named Heckman—but neither could discover anything satisfactory in the “great crystalline globe.” He grew poorer and poorer; he sank into indigence and wearied the queen with his importunity. At length he obtained a small appointment as chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral, which in 1595 he exchanged for the wardenship of Manchester College. He served in this position until age and failing intellect compelled him to resign it about 1602 or 1603. He then retired to his old house at Mortlake, where he practiced as a fortune-teller, gaining little in return but an unenviable reputation as a wizard, “a conjuror, a caller, or invocator of devils.”

Dee was an exceptionally interesting figure, and he must have been a man of rare intellectual activity. His calculations facilitated the adoption of the Gregorian calendar in England, and he foresaw the formation of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, addressing to the Crown a petition on the desirability of preserving the old, unpublished records of England's past, many of which were kept in the archives of monasteries. He was a voluminous writer on science, his works including *Monas Hieroglyphica* (1564), *De Trigonon* (1565), *Testamentum Johannis Dee Philosophi Summi ad Johannem Guryun Transmissum* (1568) and *An Account of the Manner in which a Certayn Copper-smith in the Land of Moores, and a Certayn Moore Transmuted Copper to Gold* (1576).

It is usual to dismiss Kelley as a rogue and Dee as his dupe, but if the angelic visions were purely for money, they both could have done better for themselves. Dee seemed to be an honest man of unusual talents, devoting his life to science and the pursuit of mystical knowledge. The angelic language called Enochian, which Dee and Kelley used when invoking spirits in the crystal, is a construction of great intricacy, far beyond the capacity or the requirements of simple fraud. It combines magic, mathematics, astrology, and cryptography. An intriguing suggestion is that the angelic conversations were a system of codes to convey secrets, and that Dee and Kelley's visits in Europe were for purposes of espionage. In later times, Enochian rituals were revived by the magical Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn and became a common element in ceremonial magic. Some Enochian

rituals were adapted by Anton LaVey and the Church of Satan, which he founded.

Dee was miserably poor in his last years and was even obliged to sell his precious books in order to sustain himself. He was planning a journey to Germany when he died in December 1608; he was buried in the chancel of Mortlake Church.

EOP

Defoe, Daniel (1660–1731), English novelist, journalist, poet, and government agent. Daniel Defoe wrote more than 500 books, pamphlets, articles, and poems. Among the most productive authors of the Augustan Age, he was the first of the great 18th-century English novelists.

Daniel Defoe was the son of a dissenting London tallow chandler or butcher. He early thought of becoming a Presbyterian minister, and in the 1670s he attended the Reverend Charles Morton's famous academy near London. In 1684 he married Mary Tuffley, who brought him the handsome dowry of £3,700. They had seven children. Defoe participated briefly in the abortive Monmouth Rebellion of 1685 but escaped capture and punishment. From 1685 through 1692 he engaged in trade in London as a wholesale hosier, importer of wine and tobacco, and part owner and insurer of ships. In later life he also dealt in real estate and manufactured bricks.

Defoe evidently knew King William III; indeed, his bankruptcy in 1692 for the enormous sum of £17,000 was primarily because of losses suffered from underwriting marine insurance for the King. Although he settled with his creditors in 1693, he was plagued by the threat of bankruptcy throughout his life and faced imprisonment for debt and libel seven times.

Arrested in 1703 for having published *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters* in 1702, Defoe was tried and sentenced to stand in the pillory for 3 days in July. He languished in Newgate Prison, however, until Robert Walpole released him in November and offered him a post as a government agent. Defoe continued to serve the government as journalist, pamphleteer, and secret agent for the remainder of his life. The most long-lived of his 27 periodicals, the *Review* (1704–1713), was especially influential in promoting the union between England and Scotland in 1706–1707 and in supporting the controversial Peace of Utrecht (1713).

Defoe published hundreds of political and social tracts between 1704 and 1719. During the 1720s he contributed to such weekly journals as *Mist's* and *Applebee's*, wrote criminal biographies, and studied economics and geography as well as producing his major works of fiction. He died in a comatose lethargy in

Ropemaker's Alley on April 24, 1731, while hiding from a creditor who had commenced proceedings against him.

Defoe's interests and activities reflect the major social, political, economic, and literary trends of his age. He supported the policies of William III and Mary after the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689, and analyzed England's emergence as the major sea and mercantile power in the Western world. He pleaded for leniency for debtors and bankrupts and defended the rights of Protestant dissenters. Effectively utilizing newspapers and journals to make his points, he also experimented with the novel form, which was still in its infancy.

His Nonfiction. No brief account of Defoe's works can do more than hint at the range, variety, and scope of his hundreds of publications. His first major work, *An Essay upon Projects* (1697), which introduced many topics that would reappear in his later works, proposed ways of providing better roads, insurance, and education, and even planned a house for fools to be supported by "a Tax upon Learning, to be paid by the Authors of Books."

In 1701 Defoe published *The True-Born Englishman*, the most widely sold poem in English up to that time. He estimated that more than 80,000 copies of this defense of William III against the attacks of John Tutchin were sold. Although Defoe's prose satire against the tyranny of the Church of England, *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters* (1702), led to his arrest, the popularity of his *Hymn to the Pillory* (1703) indicated the favor that he had found with the London public. From 1704 to 1713 in his monumental *Review*, Defoe discussed almost every aspect of the political, economic, and social life of Augustan England.

Defoe's allegorical moon voyage, *The Consolidator: Or Memoirs of Sundry Transactions from the World in the Moon* (1705), reviews the political history of the previous century, defends his political activities, and describes the ingenious machine which lifts the narrator to Terra Luna: a chariot powered by 513 feathers, one for each member of the British Parliament. His *Appeal to Honour and Justice* (1715) is perhaps his most moving and personal account of his services to the English crown.

Robinson Crusoe. At the age of 59, after a full career as businessman, government servant, political pamphleteer, and journalist, Defoe embarked upon a career as novelist and within 6 years produced the half-dozen novels which have given him his greatest fame.

In April 1719 Defoe published his most enduring work, *The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe*. The immediate success of the story of the shipwrecked Crusoe's solitary existence on a desert island for more than 20 years, of his encounter with the native Friday, and of his eventual rescue inspired Defoe to write *The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe* later in 1719 and *Serious Reflections during the Life and Surprising Adventures* in 1720. That year he published another travel novel, *The Life, Adventures, and Pyracies of the Famous Captain Singleton*.

The greatness of *Robinson Crusoe* lies not only in Defoe's marvelously realistic descriptive passages but in the fact that the novel recounts one of the great myths of Western civilization: man's ability to endure, survive, and conquer a hostile environment. As a fictional adaptation of the story of Alexander Selkirk, who had been stranded on an island near Chile early in the century, the novel shows Augustan England's interest in travel literature, religious allegory, and mercantilist economics.

Other Major Fiction. Defoe published comparatively little in 1721 because he was hard at work on the three major books that were to appear the following year. In January 1722 he published *The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders*, probably the most successful of his novels. Its irony, vivid details, and psychologically valid individual scenes more than compensate for its structural weaknesses. The elderly Moll writes of her early life, of her five husbands, of her life as a prostitute, and of her adventures as a thief.

A Journal of the Plague Year, issued in March 1722, presents a stunning picture of life in London during the Great Plague of 1665, and it was thought to be history rather than fiction for more than a hundred years. The third important novel to appear in 1722, *The History and Remarkable Life of the Truly Honourable Col. Jacques*, was published in December. In this study of a young man's rise to gentility, Defoe characteristically combined a brilliant command of detail and individual scene with an interesting but awkwardly plotted story.

Defoe published *The Fortunate Mistress; or, . . . Roxana* early in 1724. Though Roxana moves in a more fashionable world than did Moll Flanders, she shares with Moll native cunning and an instinct for self-preservation. Like *Moll Flanders*, *Roxana* juxtaposes moral homilies with titillating narrative passages. In 1724 Defoe also published *A Tour Thro' the Whole Island of Great Britain*, one of the most thorough and fascinating guide-books of the period.

The History of the Remarkable Life of John Sheppard (1724), one of Defoe's finest criminal biographies, was followed in 1725 by *The True and Genuine Account of the Life and Actions of the Late Jonathan Wild*. Defoe's intimate knowledge of London's underworld and of its prisons explains the vitality and accuracy of these hastily written criminal lives. These works also display his characteristically clear, strong, idiomatic English prose.

Although he continued to write until his death in 1731, only a few of Defoe's later works are worthy of note: *The Complete English Tradesman* (1725), *The Political History of the Devil* (1726), *A New Family Instructor* (1727), and *Augusta Triumphans* (1728), which was Defoe's plan to make "London the most flourishing City in the Universe."

EWB

Derrida, Jacques (1930–), French philosopher. Jacques Derrida, by developing a strategy of reading called "deconstruction," challenged assumptions about metaphysics and the character of language and written texts.

Jacques Derrida was born in El Biar, Algiers, in 1930. He went to France for his military service and stayed on to study at the Ecole Normale with the eminent Hegel scholar Jean Hyppolite. Derrida taught at the Sorbonne (1960–1964) and after 1965 he taught the history of philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. He was also a visiting professor in the United States at Johns Hopkins University and at Yale. His scholarly contribution included work with GREPH (Groupe de recherches sur l'enseignement philosophique), an association concerned about the teaching of philosophy in France.

Derrida gained recognition for his first book, a translation with lengthy introduction of Husserl's *Origin of Geometry* (1962), which won him the Prix Cavailles. His analysis of Husserl's phenomenology became the starting point for the criticism of Western philosophy developed in his numerous other works. Derrida was suspicious of all systematic metaphysical thought and sought to illuminate the assumptions and riddles found in language.

Metaphysics of Presence. Derrida depicted Western thought, from Plato onward, as a "metaphysics of presence." By this he meant the desire to guarantee the certainty of thought claims by finding an ultimate foundation or source of meaning and truth. This quest was seen in the Western preoccupation with such concepts as substance, essence, origin, identity, truth, and, of course, "Being." Moreover, he explored the way metaphysics is linked to a

specific view of language. The assumption, Derrida contended, is that the spoken word is free of the paradoxes and possibilities of multiple meanings characteristic of written texts. He called this assumed primacy of the spoken word over text “logocentrism,” seeing it closely linked to the desire for certainty. His task was to undo metaphysics and its logocentrism. Yet Derrida was also clear that we cannot easily escape metaphysical thought, since to think outside it is to be determined by it, and so he did not affirm or oppose metaphysics, but sought to resist it.

Derrida developed a strategy of reading texts called “deconstruction.” The term does not mean “destruction” but “analysis” in the etymological sense of “to undo.” Deconstructive reading attempts to uncover and undo tensions within a text showing how basic ideas and concepts fail to ever express only one meaning. Derrida’s point was that language always defers any single reference to the world because it is a system of signs that are intelligible only because of their differences. He called this dual character of language “difference” linking deferral and difference. Traditional metaphysics, as the quest for a unequivocal mystery of meaning, is deconstructed by exposing the “difference” internal to metaphysical discourse.

Nothing outside the Text. Derrida’s famous phrase, stated in *Of Grammatology* (1976), that “there is nothing outside the text” sums up his approach. What texts refer to, what is “outside” them, is nothing but another text. “Textuality” means that reference is not to external reality, the assumption of much Western thought, but to other texts, to “intertextuality.” Thus Derrida’s criticism of logocentrism also entails an attack on the assumption that words refer to or represent the world. If texts do not refer to the world then it is impossible to secure through language a foundation for meaning and truth. This requires a revision of what we mean by philosophical thinking. It can no longer be seen as the search for foundations, but as the critical play with texts to resist any metaphysical drive of thought.

Derrida applied deconstructive reading to a variety of texts, literary and philosophical. In *Dissemination* (1972) he offered subtle and complex readings of Plato and Mallarmé. In works such as *Margins of Philosophy* (1972) and *Writing and Difference* (1978) he wrote on topics ranging from metaphor to theater. He refused, in a way similar to Nietzsche, to accept simple distinctions between philosophical and literary uses of language. Interestingly, his challenge to philosophy and his affirmation of the ambiguity of texts meant that his own work called for deconstruction.

Derrida’s deconstructive strategy has implications for the study of literature. His contention was that the search for meaning, ideas, the author’s intention, or truth *in* a text are misguided. What must be explored is the meanings that words have because of linguistic relations in the text. This opens up an infinite play of meaning possible with any text. Put differently, there is no one meaning to a text, its meaning is always open and strictly undecidable. Deconstruction requires the close readings of texts that highlight linguistic relations, particularly etymological ones, and relations between a text and other texts found in our culture without seeking to determine “the” meaning of the work. In short, it requires taking seriously “difference” and intertextuality.

Not Without Detractors. Derrida’s work provoked the reconsideration of traditional problems and texts and suggested a strategy for reading. However, he did not offer a positive position but debunked metaphysical strains of thought found throughout Western philosophy and literature. His work had significant impact on philosophical and literary circles, particularly in France and the United States. Derrida and his ideas were not always accepted. Critics argued his philosophy undermines the rational dialogue essential to academic pursuits. Indeed, in 1992 a proposal to give Derrida an honorary degree from Cambridge University met with opposition.

Derrida’s 1996 book *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, explored the relationship between technologies of inscription and psychic processes. Because of the complexity of his writing, the need to deconstruct his texts, and the limitless potential of deconstructive reading, the influence and importance of his work is still in question.

EWB

Descartes, René (1596–1650), French thinker. René Descartes is called the father of modern philosophy. He initiated the movement generally termed rationalism, and his *Discourse on Method* and *Meditations* defined the basic problems of philosophy for at least a century.

To appreciate the novelty of the thought of René Descartes, one must understand what modern philosophy, or rationalism, means in contrast to medieval, or scholastic, philosophy. The great European thinkers of the 9th to 14th century were not incapable of logical reasoning, but they differed in philosophic interests and aims from the rationalists. Just as the moderns, from Descartes on, usually identified philosophy with the natural and pure sciences, so the

medievals made little distinction between philosophical and theological concerns.

The medieval doctors, like St. Thomas Aquinas, wanted to demonstrate that the revelations of faith and the dictates of reason were not incompatible. Their universe was that outlined by Aristotle in his *Physics*, a universe in which everything was ordered and classified according to the end that it served. During the Renaissance, however, men began exploring scientific alternatives to Aristotle's hierarchical universe. Further, new instruments, especially Galileo's telescope, added precision to scientific generalizations.

By the beginning of the 17th century the medieval tradition had lost its creative impetus. But the schoolmen, so called because they dominated the European universities, continued to adhere dogmatically to the traditional philosophy because of its association with Catholic theology. The rationalists, however, persistently refused professorships in order to preserve their intellectual integrity or to avoid persecution. They rejected the medieval practice of composing commentaries on standard works in favor of writing original, usually anonymous, treatises on topics suggested by their own scientific or speculative interests. Thus the contrast is between a moribund tradition of professorial disputes over trivialities and a new philosophy inspired by original, scientific research.

Descartes participated in this conflict between the scholastic and rationalist approaches. He spent a great part of his intellectual effort, even to the extent of suppressing some of his writings, attempting to convince ecclesiastical authorities of the compatibility of the new science with theology and of its superiority as a foundation for philosophy.

Early Life. Descartes was born on March 31, 1596, in La Haye, in the Touraine region, between the cities of Tours and Poitiers. His father, Joachim, a member of the minor nobility, served in the Parliament of Brittany. Jeanne Brochard Descartes, his mother, died in May 1597. Although his father remarried, Descartes and his older brother and sister were raised by their maternal grandmother and by a nurse for whom he retained a deep affection.

In 1606 Descartes entered La Flèche, a Jesuit college established by the king for the instruction of the young nobility. In the *Discourse* Descartes tells of the 8-year course of studies at La Flèche, which he considered "one of the most celebrated schools in Europe." According to his account, which is one of the best contemporary descriptions of 17th-century education, his studies left him feeling embarrassed at the extent of his own ignorance.

The young Descartes came to feel that languages, literature, and history relate only fables which incline man to imaginative exaggerations. Poetry and eloquence persuade man, but they do not tell the truth. Mathematics does grasp the truth, but the certainty and evidence of its reasoning seemed to Descartes to have only practical applications. Upon examination, the revelations of religion and morals seem as mysterious to the learned as to the ignorant. Philosophy had been studied by the best minds throughout the centuries, and yet "no single thing is to be found in it which is not subject to dispute." Descartes says that he came to suspect that even science, which depends upon philosophy for its principles, "could have built nothing solid on foundations so far from firm."

Travel and First Writings. The 18-year-old Descartes left college with a reputation for extreme brilliance. In the next years he rounded out the education befitting a young noble. He learned fencing, horsemanship, and dancing and took a law degree from Poitiers.

From 1618 to 1628 Descartes traveled extensively throughout Europe while attached to various military units. Although a devout Catholic, he served in the army of the Protestant prince Maurice of Nassau but later enlisted in the Catholic army of Maximilian I of Bavaria. Living on income from inherited properties, Descartes served without pay and seems to have seen little action; he was present, however, at the Battle of Prague, one of the major engagements of the Thirty Years' War. Descartes was reticent about this period of his life, saying only that he left the study of letters in order to travel in "the great book of the world."

This period of travel was not without intellectual effort. Descartes sought out eminent mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers wherever he traveled. The most significant of these friendships was with Isaac Beeckman, the Dutch mathematician, at whose suggestion Descartes began writing scientific treatises on mathematics and music. He perfected a means of describing geometrical figures in algebraic formulas, a process that served as the foundation for his invention of analytic geometry. He became increasingly impressed with the extent to which material reality could be understood mathematically.

During this period Descartes was profoundly influenced by three dreams which he had on Nov. 10, 1619, in Ulm, Germany. He interpreted their symbols as a divine sign that all science is one and that its mastery is universal wisdom. This notion of the unity of all science was a revolutionary concept which con-

tradicted the Aristotelian notion that the sciences were distinguished by their different objects of study. Descartes did not deny the multiplicity of objects, but rather he emphasized that only one mind could know all these diverse things. He felt that if one could generalize man's correct method of knowing, then one would be able to know everything. Descartes devoted the majority of his effort and work to proving that he had, in fact, discovered this correct method of reasoning.

From 1626 to 1629 Descartes resided mainly in Paris. He acquired a wide and notable set of friends but soon felt that the pressures of social life kept him from his work. He then moved to Holland, where he lived, primarily near Amsterdam, for the next 20 years. Descartes cherished the solitude of his life in Holland, and he described himself to a friend as awakening happily after 10 hours of sleep with the memory of charming dreams. He said his life in Holland was peaceful because he was "the only man not engaged in merchandise." There Descartes studied and wrote. He carried on an enormous correspondence throughout Europe, and in Holland he acquired a small, but dedicated, set of friends and disciples. Although he never married, Descartes fathered a natural daughter who was baptized Francine. She died in 1640, when she was 5.

First Works. Descartes's research in mathematics and physics led him to see the need for a new methodology, or way of thinking. His first major work, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, was written by 1629. Although circulated widely in manuscript form, this incomplete treatise was not published until 1701. The work begins with the assumption that man's knowledge has been limited by the erroneous belief that science is determined by the various objects of experience. The first rule therefore states that all true judgment depends on reason alone for its validity. For example, the truths of mathematics are valid independently of observation and experiment. Thus the second rule argues that the standard for any true knowledge should be the certitude demanded of demonstrations in arithmetic and geometry. The third rule begins to specify what this standard of true knowledge entails. The mind should be directed not by tradition, authority, or the history of the problem, but only by what can clearly be observed and deduced.

There are only two mental operations that are permissible in the pure use of reason. The first is intuition, which Descartes defines as "the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind"; the second is deduction, which consists of "all necessary inference from other facts that are known with cer-

tainty. "The basic assumption underlying these definitions is that all first principles are known by way of self-evident intuitions and that the conclusions of this "seeing into" are derived by deduction. The clarity and distinctness of ideas are for Descartes the conceptual counterpart of human vision. (For example, man can know the geometry of a square just as distinctly as he can see a square table in front of him.)

Many philosophers recognized the ideal character of mathematical reasoning, but no one before Descartes had abstracted the conditions of such thinking and applied it generally to all knowledge. If all science is unified by man's reason and if the proper functioning of the mind is identified with mathematical thinking, then the problem of knowledge is reduced to a question of methodology. The end of knowledge is true judgment, but true judgment is equivalent to mathematical demonstrations that are based on intuition and deduction. Thus the method for finding truth in all matters is merely to restrict oneself to these two operations.

According to the fourth rule, "By method I mean certain and simple rules, such that if a man observe them accurately, he shall never assume what is false as true . . . but will always gradually increase his knowledge and so arrive at a true understanding of all that does not surpass his powers." The remaining sixteen rules are devoted to the elaboration of these principles or to showing their application to mathematical problems. In Descartes's later works he refines these methodological principles, and in the *Meditations* he attempts a metaphysical justification of this type of reasoning.

By 1634 Descartes had written his speculative physics in a work entitled *The World*. Unfortunately, only fragments survive because he suppressed the book when he heard that Galileo's *Dialogue on the Two Great Systems of the Universe* had been condemned by the Catholic Church because of its advocacy of Copernican rather than Ptolemaic astronomy. Descartes also espoused the Copernican theory that the earth is not the center of the universe but revolves about the sun. His fear of censure, however, led him to withdraw his work. In 1634 he also wrote the brief *Treatise on Man*, which attempted to explain human physiology on mechanistic principles.

Discourse and Meditations. In 1637 Descartes finished *Discourse on Method*, which was published together with three minor works on geometry, dioptrics, and meteors. This work is significant for several reasons. It is written in French and directed to men of good sense rather than professional philosophers. It is autobiographical and begins with a per-

sonal account of his education as an example of the need for a new method of conducting inquiry.

The work contains Descartes's vision of a unity of science based on a common methodology, and it shows that this method can be applied to general philosophical questions. In brief, the method is a sophistication of the earlier *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*. In the *Discourse* Descartes presents four general rules for reducing any problem to its fundamentals by analysis and then constructing solutions by general synthesis.

Meditations on First Philosophy appeared in 1641–1642 together with six (later seven) sets of objections by distinguished thinkers including Thomas Hobbes, Antoine Arnauld, and Pierre Gassendi and the author's replies. The *Meditations* is Descartes's major work and is one of the seminal books in the history of philosophy. While his former works were concerned with elaborating a methodology, this work represents the systematic application of those rules to the principal problems of philosophy: the refutation of skepticism, the existence of the human soul, the nature of God, the metaphysical basis of truth, the extent of man's knowledge of the external world, and the relation between body and soul.

The first meditation is an exercise in methodological skepticism. Descartes states that doubt is a positive means of ascertaining whether there is any certain foundation for knowledge. All knowledge originates either from the senses or from the mind. Examples of color blindness, objects seen in perspective, and so on testify to the distortions inherent in vague sense perception. The recognition of these phenomena as distorted suggests a class of clear perceptions which are more difficult to doubt. But Descartes then points out that such images appear as clear to man in dreams as in an awakened state. Therefore all sensory experience is doubtful because sense data in itself does not indicate whether an object is seen or imagined, true or false.

What about the realm of pure ideas? Descartes simplifies the argument by asking whether it is possible to doubt the fundamental propositions of arithmetic and geometry. Man cannot doubt that two plus two equals four, but he may suspect that this statement has no reality apart from his mind. The standard of truth is the self-evidence of clear and distinct ideas, but the question remains of the correspondence of such ideas to reality. Descartes imagines the existence of an all-powerful "evil genius" who deceives man as to the content of his ideas, so that in reality two plus two equals five.

The second meditation resolves these skeptical issues in a deceptively simple manner by arguing that

even if it is doubtful whether sense images or ideas have objects, it is absolutely true that man's mind exists. The famous formula "I think, therefore, I am" is true even if everything else is false. Descartes's solution is known as subjectivism, and it is a radical reversal of previous theories of knowledge. Whereas nature had been assumed to be the cause of man's images and ideas, Descartes states that man is a "thinking thing" whose subjective images and ideas are the sole evidence for the existence of a world.

The third meditation demonstrates that God is "no deceiver," and hence clear and distinct ideas must have objects that exactly and actually correspond to them. Descartes argues that the idea of God is an effect. But an effect gets its reality from its cause, and a cause can only produce what it possesses. Hence either Descartes is a perfect being or God exists as the cause of the idea of God.

The fourth meditation deals with the problem of human error; insofar as man restricts himself to clear and distinct ideas, he will never err. With this connection between ideas and objects Descartes can emerge from his doubts about knowledge. The external world can be known with absolute certainty insofar as it is reducible to clear and distinct ideas. Thus the fifth meditation shows the application of methodology to material reality in its quantifiable dimensions, that is, to the extent to which material reality can be "the object of pure mathematics."

The sixth, and final, meditation attempts to explain the relation between the human soul and the body. Since Descartes believed in mechanism, there could be no absolute connection between a free soul and a bodily machine. After considerable hesitation he expresses the relation between mind and matter as a "felt union." The body is the active faculty that produces the passive images and imaginings man finds in his mind. Actually Descartes's explanation is logically impossible in terms of the "subjective" separation of mind; similarly, the unresolved dualism of the "felt union" violates the principle of assenting only to clear and distinct ideas.

The remainder of Descartes's career was spent in defending his controversial positions. In 1644 he published the *Principles of Philosophy*, which breaks down the arguments of the *Meditations* into propositional form and presents extra arguments dealing with their scientific application. In 1649 Descartes accepted an invitation from Queen Christina of Sweden to become her teacher. There he wrote *The Passions of the Soul*, which is a defense of the mind-body dualism and a mechanistic explanation of the passions. But Descartes's health was undermined by the

severity of the northern climate, and after a brief illness he died in Stockholm in 1650.

EWB

Dickens, Charles (1812–1870), English author. Charles Dickens was, and probably still is, the most widely read Victorian novelist. He is now appreciated more for his “dark” novels than for his humorous works.

Charles Dickens was born on Feb. 7, 1812, at Port-sea (later part of Portsmouth) on the southern coast of England. He was the son of a lower-middle-class but impecunious father whose improvidence he was later to satirize in the character of Micawber in *David Copperfield*. The family’s financial difficulties caused them to move about until they settled in Camden Town, a poor neighborhood of London. At the age of 12 Charles was set to work in a warehouse that handled “blacking,” or shoe polish; there he mingled with men and boys of the working class. For a period of months he was also forced to live apart from his family when they moved in with his father, who had been imprisoned in the Marshalsea debtors’ prison. This experience of lonely hardship was the most significant formative event of his life; it colored his view of the world in profound and varied ways and is directly or indirectly described in a number of his novels, including *The Pickwick Papers*, *Oliver Twist*, and *Little Dorrit*, as well as *David Copperfield*.

These early events of Dicken’s life left both psychological and sociological effects. The sociological effect of the blacking factory on Dickens was to give him a firsthand acquaintance with poverty and to make him the most vigorous and influential voice of the lower classes in his age. Despite the fact that many of England’s legal and social abuses were in the process of being removed by the time Dickens published his exposés of them, it remains true that he was the most widely heard spokesman of the need to alleviate the miseries of the poor.

Dickens returned to school after an inheritance (as in the fairy-tale endings of some of his novels) relieved his father from debt, but he was forced to become an office boy at the age of 15. In the following year he became a free-lance reporter or stenographer at the law courts of London. By 1832 he had become a reporter for two London newspapers and, in the following year, began to contribute a series of impressions and sketches to other newspapers and magazines, signing some of them “Boz.” These scenes of London life went far to establish his reputation and were published in 1836 as *Sketches by Boz*, his first book. On the strength of this success he married; his

wife, Catherine Hogarth, was eventually to bear him 10 children.

Early Works. In 1836 Dickens also began to publish in monthly installments *The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club*. This form of serial publication became a standard method of writing and producing fiction in the Victorian period and affected the literary methods of Dickens and other novelists. So great was Dickens’s success with the procedursummed up in the formula, “Make them laugh; make them cry; make them wait,” that *Pickwick* became one of the most popular works of the time, continuing to be so after it was published in book form in 1837. The comic heroes of the novel, the antiquarian members of the Pickwick Club, scour the English countryside for local points of interest and are involved in a variety of humorous adventures which reveal the characteristics of English social life. At a later stage of the novel, the chairman of the club, Samuel Pickwick, is involved in a lawsuit which lands him in the Fleet debtors’ prison. Here the lighthearted atmosphere of the novel changes, and the reader is given intimations of the gloom and sympathy with which Dickens was to imbue his later works.

During the years of *Pickwick*’s serialization, Dickens became editor of a new monthly, *Bentley’s Miscellany*. When *Pickwick* was completed, he began publishing his new novel, *Oliver Twist*, in this magazine, a practice he continued in his later magazines, *Household Worlds* and *All the Year Round*. *Oliver* expresses Dickens’s interest in the life of the slums to the fullest, as it traces the fortunes of an innocent orphan through the London streets. It seems remarkable today that this novel’s fairly frank treatment of criminals like Bill Sikes, prostitutes like Nancy, and “fences” like Fagin could have been acceptable to the Victorian reading public. But so powerful was Dickens’s portrayal of the “little boy lost” amid the lowlife of the East End that the limits of his audience’s tolerance were gradually stretched.

Dickens was now embarked on the most consistently successful career of any 19th-century author after Sir Walter Scott. He could do no wrong as far as his faithful readership was concerned; yet his books for the next decade were not to achieve the standard of his early triumphs. These works include: *Nicholas Nickleby* (1838–1839), still cited for its exposé of brutality at an English boys’ school, Dotheboys Hall; *The Old Curiosity Shop* (1840–1841), still remembered for reaching a high (or low) point of sentimentality in its portrayal of the sufferings of Little Nell; and *Barnaby Rudge* (1841), still read for its interest as a historical

novel, set amid the anti-Catholic Gordon Riots of 1780.

In 1842 Dickens, who was as popular in America as he was in England, went on a 5-month lecture tour of the United States, speaking out strongly for the abolition of slavery and other reforms. On his return he wrote *American Notes*, sharply critical of the cultural backwardness and aggressive materialism of American life. He made further capital of these observations in his next novel, *Martin Chuzzlewit* (1843–1844), in which the hero retreats from the difficulties of making his way in England only to find that survival is even more trying on the American frontier. During the years in which *Chuzzlewit* appeared, Dickens also published two Christmas stories, *A Christmas Carol* and *The Chimes*, which became as much part of the season as plum pudding.

First Major Novels. After a year abroad in Italy, in response to which he wrote *Pictures from Italy* (1846), Dickens began to publish *Dombey and Son*, which continued till 1848. This novel established a new standard in the Dickensian novel and may be said to mark the turning point in his career. If Dickens had remained the author of *Pickwick*, *Oliver Twist*, and *The Old Curiosity Shop*, he might have deserved a lasting reputation only as an author of cheerful comedy and bathetic sentiment. But *Dombey*, while it includes these elements, is a realistic novel of human life in a society which had assumed more or less its modern form. As its full title indicates, *Dealings with the Firm of Dombey and Son* is a study of the influence of the values of a business society on the personal fortunes of the members of the Dombey family and those with whom they come in contact. It takes a somber view of England at mid-century, and its elegiac tone becomes characteristic of Dickens's novels for the rest of his life.

Dickens's next novel, *David Copperfield* (1849–1850), combined broad social perspective with a very strenuous effort to take stock of himself at the midpoint of his literary career. This autobiographical novel fictionalized elements of Dickens's childhood degradation, pursuit of a journalistic and literary vocation, and love life. Its achievement is to offer the first comprehensive record of the typical course of a young man's life in Victorian England. *Copperfield* is not Dickens's greatest novel, but it was his own favorite among his works, probably because of his personal engagement with the subject matter.

In 1850 Dickens began to "conduct" (his word for edit) a new periodical, *Household Words*. His editorials and articles for this magazine, running to two volumes, cover the entire span of English politics, so-

cial institutions, and family life and are an invaluable complement to the fictional treatment of these subjects in Dickens's novels. The weekly magazine was a great success and ran to 1859, when Dickens began to conduct a new weekly, *All the Year Round*. In both these periodicals he published some of his major novels.

"Dark" Novels. In 1851 Dickens was struck by the death of his father and one of his daughters within 2 weeks. Partly in response to these losses, he embarked on a series of works which have come to be called his "dark" novels and which rank among the greatest triumphs of the art of fiction. The first of these, *Bleak House* (1852–1853), has perhaps the most complicated plot of any English novel, but the narrative twists serve to create a sense of the interrelationship of all segments of English society. Indeed, it has been maintained that this network of interrelations is the true subject of the novel, designed to express Thomas Carlyle's view that "organic filaments" connect every member of society with every other member of whatever class. The novel provides, then, a chastening lesson to social snobbery and personal selfishness.

Dickens's next novel is even more didactic in its moral indictment of selfishness. *Hard Times* (1854) was written specifically to challenge the prevailing view of his society that practicality and facts were of greater importance and value than feelings and persons. In his indignation at callousness in business and public educational systems, Dickens laid part of the charge for the heartlessness of Englishmen at the door of the utilitarian philosophy then much in vogue. But the lasting applicability of the novel lies in its intensely focused picture of an English industrial town in the heyday of capitalist expansion and in its keen view of the limitations of both employers and reformers.

Little Dorrit (1855–1857) has some claim to be regarded as Dickens's greatest novel. In it he provides the same range of social observation that he had developed in previous major works. But the outstanding feature of this novel is the creation of two striking symbols of his views, which operate throughout the story as the focal points of all the characters' lives. The condition of England, as he saw it, Dickens sums up in the symbol of the prison: specifically the Marshalsea debtors' prison, in which the heroine's father is entombed, but generally the many forms of personal bondage and confinement that are exhibited in the course of the plot. For his counterweight, Dickens raises to symbolic stature his traditional figure of the child as innocent sufferer of the world's abuses. By making his heroine not a child but a childlike figure

of Christian loving-kindness, Dickens poses the central burden of his work—the conflict between the world's harshness and human values in its most impressive artistic form.

The year 1857 saw the beginnings of a personal crisis for Dickens when he fell in love with an actress named Ellen Ternan. He separated from his wife in the following year, after many years of marital incompatibility. In this period Dickens also began to give much of his time and energies to public readings from his novels, which became even more popular than his lectures on topical questions.

Later Works. In 1859 Dickens published *A Tale of Two Cities*, a historical novel of the French Revolution, which is read today most often as a school text. It is, while below the standard of the long and comprehensive “dark” novels, a fine evocation of the historical period and a moving tale of a surprisingly modern hero's self-sacrifice. Besides publishing this novel in the newly founded *All the Year Round*, Dickens also published 17 articles, which appeared as a book in 1860 entitled *The Uncommercial Traveller*.

Dickens's next novel, *Great Expectations* (1860–1861), must rank as his most perfectly executed work of art. It tells the story of a young man's moral development in the course of his life from childhood in the provinces to gentleman's status in London. Not an autobiographical novel like *David Copperfield*, *Great Expectations* belongs to the type of fiction called, in German, *Bildungsroman* (the novel of a man's education or formation by experience) and is one of the finest examples of the type.

The next work in the Dickens canon had to wait for the (for him) unusual time of 3 years, but in 1864–1865 he produced *Our Mutual Friend*, which challenges *Little Dorrit* and *Bleak House* for consideration as his masterpiece. Here the vision of English society in all its classes and institutions is presented most thoroughly and devastatingly, while two symbols are developed which resemble those of *Little Dorrit* in credibility and interest. These symbols are the mounds of rubbish which rose to become features of the landscape in rapidly expanding London, and the river which flows through the city and provides a point of contact for all its members besides suggesting the course of human life from birth to death.

In the closing years of his life Dickens worsened his declining health by giving numerous readings from his works. He never fully recovered from a railroad accident in which he had been involved in 1865 and yet insisted on traveling throughout the British Isles and America to read before tumultuous audiences. He broke down in 1869 and gave only a final series of

readings in London in the following year. He also began *The Mystery of Edwin Drood* but died in 1870, leaving it unfinished. His burial in Westminster Abbey was an occasion of national mourning.

EWB

Diderot, Denis (1713–1784), French philosopher, playwright, and novelist. Denis Diderot is best known as the editor of the *Encyclopédie*.

On Oct. 15, 1713, Denis Diderot was born in Langres, Compagne, into a family of cutlers, whose bourgeois traditions went back to the late Middle Ages. As a child, Denis was considered a brilliant student by his Jesuit teachers, and it was decided that he should enter the clergy. In 1726 he enrolled in the Jesuit college of Louis-le-Grand and probably later attended the Jansenist Collège d'Harcourt. In 1732 he earned a master of arts degree in philosophy. He then abandoned the clergy as a career and decided to study law. His legal training, however, was short-lived. In 1734 Diderot decided to seek his fortune by writing. He broke with his family and for the next 10 years lived a rather bohemian existence. He earned his living by translating English works and tutoring the children of wealthy families and spent his leisure time studying. In 1743 he further alienated his father by marrying Anne Toinette Champoin.

The *Encyclopédie*. On Jan. 21, 1746, André François le Breton and his partners were granted permission to publish a 10-volume encyclopedia. On the advice of the distinguished mathematician Jean d'Alembert and with the consent of Chancellor d'Aguesseau, Diderot was named general editor of the project.

For more than 26 years Diderot devoted the bulk of his energies and his genius to the writing, editing, and publishing of the *Encyclopédie*. For Diderot, the aim of the work was “to assemble the knowledge scattered over the face of the earth; to explain its general plan to the men with whom we live . . . so that we may not die without having deserved well of the human race.” Such was the plan and the purpose of the *Encyclopédie*, and it was also the credo of the Enlightenment. But the project was more than just the compilation of all available knowledge; it was also a learning experience for all those regularly connected with it. It introduced Diderot to technology, the crafts, the fine arts, and many other areas of learning. It was an outlet for his curiosity, his scholarly interests, and his creativity.

In 1751 d'Alembert's *Preliminary Discourse* and the first volume were published. In January 1752 the second volume appeared, but the opposition of the Jesuits and other orthodox critics forced a temporary

suspension. Publication was soon resumed and continued at the rate of one volume a year until 1759, when the Royal Council forbade further operations. Diderot and Le Breton, however, continued to write and publish the *Encyclopédie* secretly until 1765, when official sanction was resumed. In 1772 the completed work was published in 17 volumes of text and 11 volumes of plates under the title *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts, et des métiers*.

Other Writings. Throughout the period of his association with the *Encyclopédie*, Diderot continued to devote himself to other writing. In 1746 he published *Philosophical Thoughts*, which was concerned with the question of the relationship between nature and religion. He viewed life as self-sufficient and held that virtue could be sustained without religious beliefs. In *Sceptics Walk* (1747) and *Letters on the Blind* (1749) Diderot slowly turned from theism to atheism. Religion became a central theme in his writings, and he aroused the hostility of public officials who considered him a leader of the radicals, “a clever fellow, but extremely dangerous.”

In 1749 Diderot was imprisoned for 3 months because of his opinions in *Philosophical Thoughts*. Although he had stated, “If you impose silence on me about religion and government, I shall have nothing to talk about,” after his release he reduced the controversial character of his published works. Therefore most of his materialistic and antireligious works and several of his novels were not published during his lifetime.

During his long literary career Diderot moved away from the mechanical approach to nature, which was characteristic of the Enlightenment’s use of the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton. Such works as *D’Alembert’s Dream*, *Conversation between d’Alembert and Diderot*, *Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature*, *Elements of Physiology*, and *Essay on Seneca* vividly point to the evolution of his thought and to its modernity.

In his mature writings Diderot tends to see man as an integral part of an organic and vitalistic nature, governed by laws that are incomprehensible to him. Nature, according to Diderot, is a continually unfolding process, which reveals itself, rather than being revealed by man. Forms in nature develop from earlier forms in a continually evolving process, in which all elements, animate and inanimate, are related to one another. Man can know nature only through experience; thus rationalistic speculation is useless to him in understanding nature.

Diderot is one of the pre-19th-century leaders in the movement away from mathematics and physics, as a source of certain knowledge, to biological prob-

ability and historical insight. As one modern scholar has stated, Diderot’s approach to nature and philosophy was that of mystical naturalism.

Later Years. Following the completion of the *Encyclopédie*, Diderot went into semiretirement; he wrote but infrequently published his works. His earnings as editor of the *Encyclopédie* guaranteed him a modest income, which he supplemented by writing literary criticism. In addition, he sold his library to Empress Catherine of Russia, who allowed him to keep it while he lived and paid him an annual salary as its librarian. On July 30, 1784, Diderot died in the home of his daughter, only 5 months after the death of his beloved mistress and intellectual companion, Sophie Voland.

The great paradox of Diderot’s life is found in the tensions that existed between his basically bourgeois nature and his bohemian tendencies. This struggle was mirrored in his novel *Rameau’s Nephew*, in which the staid Rameau and his bohemian nephew represent aspects of Diderot’s personality. Fittingly, Diderot’s last words, “The first step toward philosophy is incredulity,” are an adequate measure of the man.

EWB

Disney, Walt (1901–1966), American filmmaker and entrepreneur. Walt Disney created a new kind of popular culture in feature-length animated cartoons and live-action “family” films.

Walter Elias Disney was born in Chicago, Illinois, on December 5, 1901, the fourth of five children born to a Canadian farmer father and a mother from Ohio. He was raised on a Midwestern farm in Marceline, Missouri, and in Kansas City, where he was able to acquire some rudimentary art instruction from correspondence courses and Saturday museum classes. He would later use many of the animals and characters that he knew from that Missouri farm in his cartoons.

He dropped out of high school at 17 to serve in World War I. After serving briefly overseas as an ambulance driver, Disney returned in 1919 to Kansas City for an apprenticeship as a commercial illustrator and later made primitive animated advertising cartoons. By 1922, he had set up his own shop in association with Ub Iwerks, whose drawing ability and technical inventiveness were prime factors in Disney’s eventual success.

Initial failure sent Disney to Hollywood in 1923, where in partnership with his loyal elder brother Roy, he managed to resume cartoon production. His first success came with the creation of Mickey Mouse in *Steamboat Willie*. *Steamboat Willie* was the first fully

synchronized sound cartoon and featured Disney as the voice of a character first called "Mortimer Mouse." Disney's wife, Lillian, suggested that Mickey sounded better and Disney agreed.

Living frugally, he reinvested profits to make better pictures. His insistence on technical perfection and his unsurpassed gifts as story editor quickly pushed his firm ahead. The invention of such cartoon characters as Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, Minnie, and Goofy combined with the daring and innovative use of music, sound, and folk material (as in *The Three Little Pigs*) made the Disney shorts of the 1930s a phenomenon of worldwide success. This success led to the establishment of immensely profitable, Disney-controlled sidelines in advertising, publishing, and franchised goods, which helped shape popular taste for nearly 40 years.

Disney rapidly expanded his studio facilities to include a training school where a whole new generation of animators developed and made possible the production of the first feature-length cartoon, *Snow White* (1937). Other costly animated features followed, including *Pinocchio*, *Bambi*, and the celebrated musical experiment *Fantasia*. With *Seal Island* (1948), wildlife films became an additional source of income, and in 1950 his use of blocked funds in England to make pictures like *Treasure Island* led to what became the studio's major product, live-action films, which practically cornered the traditional "family" market. Eventually the Disney formula emphasized slick production techniques. It included, as in his biggest hit, *Mary Poppins*, occasional animation to project wholesome, exciting stories heavily laced with sentiment and, often, music.

In 1954, Disney successfully invaded television, and by the time of his death, the Disney studio's output amounted to 21 full-length animated films, 493 short subjects, 47 live-action films, seven True-Life Adventure features, 330 hours of Mickey Mouse Club television programs, 78 half-hour *Zorro* television adventures, and 280 other television shows.

On July 18, 1957, Disney opened Disneyland, a gigantic projection of his personal fantasies in Anaheim, California, which has proved the most successful amusement park in history with 6.7 million people visiting it by 1966. The idea for the park came to him after taking his children to other amusement parks and watching them have fun on amusement rides. He decided to build a park where the entire family could have fun together. In 1971, Disney World, in Orlando, Florida, opened. Since then, Disney theme parks have opened in Tokyo and Paris.

Disney had also dreamed of developing a city of the future, a dream realized in 1982 with the open-

ing of EPCOT, which stands for Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow. EPCOT, which cost an initial \$900 million, was conceived of as a real-life community of the future with the very latest in high technology. The two principle areas of EPCOT are Future World and World Showcase, both of which were designed to appeal to adults rather than children.

In addition to his theme parks, Disney created and endowed a new university, the California Institute of the Arts, known as Cal Arts. He thought of this as the ultimate in education for the arts, where people in many different disciplines could work together, dream and develop, and create the mixture of arts needed for the future. Disney once commented: "It's the principle thing I hope to leave when I move on to greener pastures. If I can help provide a place to develop the talent of the future, I think I will have accomplished something."

Disney's parks continue to grow with the creation of the Disney-MGM Studios, Animal Kingdom, and an extensive sports complex in Orlando. The Disney Corporation has also branched out into other types of films with the creation of Touchstone Films, into music with Hollywood Records, and even vacationing with its Disney Cruise Lines. In all, the Disney name now lends itself to a multi-billion dollar enterprise, with multiple undertakings all over the world.

In 1939, Disney received an honorary Academy Award and in 1954 he received four Academy Awards. In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson presented Disney with the Presidential Medal of Freedom and in the same year Disney was awarded the Freedom Foundation Award.

Happily married for 41 years, this moody, deliberately "ordinary" man was moving ahead with his plans for gigantic new outdoor recreational facilities when he died of circulatory problems on December 15, 1966, at St. Joseph's Hospital in Los Angeles, California. At the time of his death, his enterprises had garnered him respect, admiration, and a business empire worth over \$100 million-a-year, but Disney was still remembered primarily as the man who had created Mickey Mouse over two decades before.

EWB

Douglas, Mary (1921–), British anthropologist and social thinker. Mary Tew Douglas was born in San Remo, Italy, to Phyllis Twomey and Gilbert Charles Tew, and was the eldest of two daughters. She was educated as a Catholic at the Sacred Heart Convent, Roehampton, in England, and she was keenly interested in religion all her life. As an anthropologist she kept on with her faith. At Oxford (where she did

a B.A. degree in 1943) she fell under the influence of the famous social anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard, who was also interested in comparative religion; he died a Catholic. Douglas wrote a biography of her mentor in 1980.

She interrupted her graduate study at Oxford to be a volunteer in World War II in the British Colonial Office working on penal reform. Afterwards she earned a bachelor of science degree in 1948 in anthropology and went to Africa, to the Belgian Congo (now Republic of Congo), to study the folkways of a tribe, the Lele of the Kasai, for her Ph.D. under Professor Evans-Pritchard (1951). Also in 1951, Mary Tew married the economist James A. T. Douglas. They had one daughter and two sons. She lived in London and was associated with University College, London, from that time onwards (lecturer in anthropology, 1951–1962; reader, 1963–1970; professor, 1971 until her retirement in 1978). She was the 1994 Bernal prize recipient.

Subsequently she went to the United States. Douglas was in New York City at the Russell Sage Foundation as director of research on human culture from 1977 to 1981; in Chicago at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, as Avalon Foundation professor in anthropology and religion, 1981–1985; and at Princeton University as visiting professor of religion and anthropology beginning in 1985. She maintained her residence in London.

Doctoral Dissertation. Her doctoral dissertation, published as *The Lele of the Kasai* in 1963, studied the Lele tribe “as they cooked, divided food, talked about illness, babies and proper care of the body” and examined how taboos operated within tribal society and the way in which polygamous male elders of the tribe manipulated raffia cloth debts in order to restrict the access of younger men to Lele women. This field investigation led Douglas on to other studies in what she called “social accountability” and “classification schemes” of human relations, applied equally to “primitive” societies (pre-industrial, pre-modern) and to modern industrial society. She wrote books on a variety of subjects including pollution, the consumer society, and religion.

The anthropology of Douglas was derived partly from the work of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858–1917). Douglas rejected his determinism, but accepted what Durkheim realized: the *social* basis for human thought. She used the Durkheimian method of drawing on “primitive” cultures to illuminate problems in modern society. For Douglas, rituals dramatize moral order in the human universe. “Culture” is rooted in daily social relations: the most

mundane and concrete things of daily life. From childhood on, the drama of life is constructed: the self concept; the linguistic code, which the individual learns as a child; the individual as a moral actor; the collective nature of human existence. Comparative studies have to be made of such things as dirt and pollution, food and meals, the biological body, speech, jokes, and material possessions. The biological body is a perfect metaphor or symbol for the social body or the tribe or nation.

Douglas’ view of “culture” was of it being created afresh each day. Hers was a world of ordinary symbols, rituals, and activities, all of which dramatized the “construction of social life.” Everyday life was *itself* the focus of interest. Every mundane activity carried ritual and ceremonial significance. Symbolic order reflected social order as she looked at the ritual dramatization of social patterns.

Pollution and Taboo. Douglas was perhaps noted for her writings on pollution and taboo. Dirt in “primitive” (as in modern) society is relative to location: dirty shoes are dirty on the table, not dirty on the floor; cooking utensils are dirty in the bedroom; earth is dirty on chairs. Pollution *behavior* is the reaction of our cherished classifications: dirt takes us straight to the field of symbolism, to symbols of purity. In *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (1966) she stated that modern notions express basically the same idea as “primitive” notions of pollution: “Our practices are solidly based on hygiene; theirs are symbolic; we kill germs; they ward off spirits.”

It was *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* and *Natural Symbols* (1970), the two early books, that had such an impact on the emerging sociology of scientific knowledge.

Four related themes were presented in that early work. First, she invited attention to culture, to knowledge of nature, and specifically to cosmological and taxonomic notions, as embedded within systems of accountability. Culture is maintained and it is modified as people use it: it is a tool in everyday social action. There is no fundamental “problem” of “the relationship between culture and social action” because culture is the means by which social action is accomplished, by which members say “good” and “bad” about each other’s actions, and by which they recognize them as actions of a certain sort. Second, knowledge, including natural knowledge, is treated as constitutively social. As we bring up our children, and as we talk to each other, so we build, maintain, and modify the categories of perception, thought, and language: “The colonisation of each other’s minds is the

price we pay for thought.” For Douglas, anything but a fully general social epistemology followed from a misunderstanding of the sort of thing knowledge was.

Third, beliefs and representations become knowledge—a collective good—by successfully making the transition from the individual to the communal, the private to the public. The achievement of credibility is a practical problem attached to all beliefs: no belief or representation shines by its own lights, carries its credibility with it. “Credibility,” she says, “depends so much on the consensus of a moral community that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that a given community lays on for itself the sum of the physical conditions which it experiences.”

Finally in the years between *Purity and Danger* and *Natural Symbols*, she developed a set of techniques for the systematic comparative study of “cultural bias.” “The Great Divide” between the “modern” and the “scientific,” on the one hand, and the “primitive” and “magical,” on the other, was rejected. “We “ are forms of “them.” There is a finite range of predicaments faced and principles available for the maintenance of order. A specific form of these predicaments and principles might be as well devised by Sepik River tribes, by the Big Men of Conservative Party Central Office, or by a community of high-energy physicists. Cultural diversity has finite forms, and, because these forms do not map onto existing Great Divide theories, the comparative study of cultural bias has the capacity to join up the conversations of those who study the “primitive” and those who study the “modern”: anthropologists and students of modern science.

But when Douglas attempted to write about the contemporary environmental protection movement of the 1960s and 1970s in *Risk and Culture*, written with Aaron Wildavsky (1982), she was less sure of the material. Half the book is an attack on the beliefs of the environmentalists. She portrayed the antinuclear and environmental movements as freakish, quasireligious cults. She did not uncover anything about the actual physical environment, or nuclear plants, or offshore oil-drilling, or industrial pollution of rivers and lakes. Douglas was best when she was talking about the Lele and pollution and food taboos.

The World of Goods. *The World of Goods: An Anthropological Theory of Consumption*, written with Baron Isherwood (1979), is partly an attempt to explore the social context of modern consumer society. Goods are social markers and a means of communicating. Individuals attain and keep power in society by acts of consumption, which ritually reaffirm their status. The Douglas argument is very generalized and takes us not much further than the old (and much

more informative) notion of Thorstein Veblen of “conspicuous consumption” in his book *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899). Modern culture is supposedly a *secular* world, in which science replaces religion and ritual. Douglas as a scholar delved into comparative religion. She disagreed with the idea that religion and science could not coexist. There would be no demise of religion in the world, whatever science discovers, because religion originates in human social relations. Modernity changes the shape of society; but there are still human social relations and religion will survive. Douglas was of the opinion that so long as there is collective life, there will be religion, ritual, myths, ceremonies, and rites.

Modernity has three allegedly negative effects on the survival of religion: Douglas dismissed all three. Science is supposed to reduce the explanatory power of religion; for Douglas, religion and science pose no tension with each other—their explanations apply to different kinds of problems. Modern life is undergoing bureaucratization, and this reduces the sense of the unknown and sacred; but Douglas thought that bureaucracy existed in the Vatican in the 15th century, and so did religion. And modern life has little direct experience of nature; but Mary Douglas felt that the discoveries of modern science itself created a new sense of awe and religion. Thus, religion does not disappear in modern society, it just reappears in new forms.

Looking back on her life as a young anthropologist in Africa in *Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology* (1976), she commented: “The central task of anthropology was to explore the effects of the social dimensions on behaviour. The task was grand, but the methods were humble . . . We had to stay with a remote tribe, patiently let events unfold and let people reveal the categories of their thought.” From a fundamental Durkheimian belief in the role of ritual and symbol in the construction of social life and social relations, Douglas explained the rituals of meals and food, cleaning and tidying, material possessions, speech, and numerous other concrete things of daily life in modern as well as “primitive” society.

EWB

Dreyfus, Alfred (1859–1935), French army officer. Alfred Dreyfus was unjustly convicted of treason. The effort, eventually successful, to clear his name divided French society and had important political repercussions.

Alfred Dreyfus was born at Mulhouse on Oct. 9, 1859, into a Jewish textile-manufacturing family. After the Franco-Prussian War his family left Alsace in order to remain French citizens. Choosing a mili-

tary career, Dreyfus entered the *École Polytechnique* in 1878. After further study, during which he attained the rank of captain in 1889, he was assigned as a trainee to the general staff. Dreyfus was a competent and hardworking, though not brilliant or popular, young officer. His ordeal was to prove that he was a man of great courage but limited vision: his whole life was devoted to the army, and he never lost confidence that it would recognize and remedy the wrong done him.

Arrest and Conviction. The Dreyfus case began in September 1894, when French Army Intelligence found among some papers taken from the office of the German military attaché in Paris, a list (*bordereau*) of secret documents given to the Germans by someone in the French army. A hasty and inadequate investigation convinced the anti-Semitic Intelligence chief, Col. Sandherr, that Dreyfus was the traitor. Apart from a certain resemblance between his handwriting and that of the *bordereau*, no very convincing evidence against Dreyfus could be discovered. He was arrested, however, on October 15.

Dreyfus's court-martial was held behind closed doors during December 19–21. A unanimous court found him guilty and imposed the highest legal penalty: perpetual imprisonment, loss of rank, and degradation. He was sent to the infamous Devil's Island, where he was to spend almost 5 years under the most inhumane conditions. Still protesting his innocence, Dreyfus was unaware that he had been convicted with the aid of a secret dossier prepared by Army Intelligence. Communication of the dossier to the judges without the knowledge of the defense violated due process and was the first of many actions that would bring discredit on the army and ruin the careers of the officers involved.

Convinced of his innocence, the Dreyfus family, led by his brother Mathieu, sought new evidence which would persuade the army to reopen its investigation. Aside from a few individuals such as the brilliant young writer Bernard Lazare and the respected Alsatian life-senator Scheurer-Kestner, they found few supporters, and their efforts stirred the anti-Semitic press to raise the bogey of a "Jewish syndicate" trying to corrupt the army.

Fortune came to Dreyfus's aid for the first time in July 1895, when the new Intelligence chief, Lt. Col. Marie Georges Picquart, became convinced of Dreyfus's innocence and discovered a Maj. Walsin-Esterhazy to be the real author of the *bordereau*. Although Picquart was unable to convince his superiors to reexamine the verdict, he remained determined to help free Dreyfus.

Still unable to persuade the government to act, the supporters of Dreyfus—the Dreyfusards—now took their case to the public, charging Esterhazy with the crime for which Dreyfus was being punished. The anti-Semitic press counterattacked, and the Dreyfus case began to turn into the Dreyfus Affair, as public passions were raised against the few who dared to challenge the verdict of the court-martial. Supported by friends within the command, Esterhazy demanded a court-martial to prove his innocence; he received a triumphant acquittal in January 1898. The evidence against Esterhazy was little better than that which had convicted Dreyfus, but his acquittal dashed the hopes of the Dreyfusards, who had expected his conviction to prove Dreyfus innocent.

Retrial and Exoneration. The controversial novelist Émile Zola, however, found a way to reopen the case: he charged in an open letter to the President of the Republic entitled *J'accuse* that the military court had acquitted Esterhazy although they knew him to be guilty. Zola hoped to bring the facts of Dreyfus's case before a civil court, where it would be more difficult for the army to conceal what had happened; he was only partially successful, but increased public concern and violence in the streets forced the authorities to take further action.

The minister of war, Godefroy Cavaignac, aiming to quiet criticism, publicly revealed much of the evidence against Dreyfus. But the Dreyfusards, headed by socialist leader Jean Jaurès, charged that forgery was obvious. Cavaignac's further investigation led to the confession and suicide (Aug. 31, 1898) of an Intelligence officer, Lt. Col. Joseph Henry, who had been manufacturing evidence to strengthen the case against Dreyfus. This was the turning point of the Affair. The government brought the case before the highest appeals court, which declared (June 3, 1899) Dreyfus entitled to a new trial.

Dreyfus was brought back to France to face a new court-martial at Rennes in September 1899. It returned, by a vote of 5 to 2, the incredible verdict of guilty with extenuating circumstances and sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment. The honor of the army had been made such an issue by the anti-Dreyfusards that no military court could ever find him innocent. No one believed in the honor of the army more than Dreyfus, and only with difficulty could he be persuaded to accept the pardon offered by President Émile Loubet.

Dreyfus continued to seek exoneration, and his record was finally cleared by the civil courts in July 1906. He was returned to service, promoted, and decorated, but he soon retired. Returning to active

duty during World War I, he then spent his retirement in complete obscurity, and his death on July 11, 1935, passed almost unnoticed.

Political Consequences. Dreyfus understood little of the battle that raged in his name. The question of his innocence became a secondary matter beside the public issue of individual human rights versus the demands of state policy. Political issues also played a part in the Affair: to many conservatives the army and the Church seemed the last bulwarks of social stability; both would be undermined by the victory of the Dreyfusards. On the left many welcomed the opportunity to strike at the monarchist and clerical forces, which they saw as enemies of the Republic. Last but not least was the question of anti-Semitism. The Affair saw the first outpouring of modern political anti-Semitism, which proved a harbinger of the Nazi terror.

The immediate political consequence of the Affair was to bring the Radicals to power; they made the Church the scapegoat for the sins of the anti-Dreyfusards, taking a number of anticlerical measures culminating in the separation of Church and state in 1905. The passions exposed by the Affair were submerged in World War I but reappeared in the defeat of 1940 and under the Vichy regime.

EWB

Dubcek, Alexander (1921–1992), Czechoslovakian politician. Alexander Dubcek served briefly as head of his country's Communist party. His attempts to liberalize political life led to the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet army and his dismissal from office, only to be vindicated years later when the Communist regime fell.

Alexander Dubcek was born on Nov. 27, 1921, the son of a cabinetmaker who had just returned from the United States. His family lived in the U.S.S.R. from 1925 to 1938, and it was there that he received his education. During World War II he was an active member of the underground resistance to the Germans in Slovakia.

After the war Dubcek made his career as a functionary of the Communist party. He was elected to the Presidium of the Slovakian and then of the Czechoslovakian Communist party in 1962, and in the following year he became first secretary of the Slovakian party's Central Committee. Yet when he succeeded Antonin Novotny in January 1968 as first secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist party, he was not well known in his own country and was hardly known at all outside it.

Pressure for the relaxation of the rigid dogma prevailing in political life had been mounting in

Czechoslovakia for a considerable time and had been strengthened by economic discontent. Dubcek became the personification of this movement and promised to introduce "socialism with a human face." After coming to power, censorship was relaxed and plans were made for a new federal constitution, for new legislation to provide for a greater degree of civil liberty, and for a new electoral law to give greater freedom to non-Communist parties.

The Soviet government became increasingly alarmed by these developments and throughout the spring and summer of 1968 issued a series of warnings to Dubcek and his colleagues. Dubcek had attempted to steer a middle course between liberal and conservative extremes, and at a midsummer confrontation with the Soviet leaders he stood firm against their demands for a reversal of his policies.

It was thought that Dubcek had won his point on this occasion, but on August 20 armies of the U.S.S.R. and the other Warsaw Pact countries occupied Czechoslovakia. Some historians believe that the immediate cause of the Soviet invasion was the Action Program, initiated by Dubcek the previous year. Mass demonstrations of support for Dubcek kept him in power for the time being, but his liberal political program was abandoned.

Over the next 2 years Dubcek was gradually removed from power. In April 1969 he resigned as first secretary of the party, to be replaced by the orthodox Dr. Gustav Husak. That September he was dismissed from the Presidium, and in January 1970 from the Central Committee. In December 1969 he was sent to Turkey as ambassador. The final blow came on June 27, 1970, when he was expelled from the Communist party, and shortly afterward he was dismissed from his ambassadorial post. From there he was confined for almost twenty years to a forestry camp in Bratislava, with little contact with the outside world and constant and intense supervision by the secret police.

Meanwhile, the attitudes that Dubcek had set in motion continued under their own power. A small underground movement known as Charter 77, named after its inaugural declaration on January 1, 1977, grew to 2,000 members over the next twelve years. Influenced by the movement in neighboring Poland for greater openness and human rights, Charter 77 was created by a broad spectrum of leaders, including former Communists and religious activists. They were constantly hounded and persecuted by the Communist government, but did not relent. Police arrested ten of the group's leaders, including Vaclav Havel and Jiri Dienstbier, who became, respectively, President and Foreign Minister of the new Czechoslovak gov-

ernment in 1989. Charter 77 continued until 1995, when it became apparent it had fulfilled its function.

Dubcek highly approved of Russian prime minister Mikhail Gorbachev's progressive policy of *glasnost*, and eventually its successor of *perestroika*. While he noted there were some fundamental differences, he believed it came from the same ethic he had tried to promote in the Prague Spring. After Gorbachev visited Czechoslovakia in 1987, the secret police started leaving Dubcek alone.

On November 17, 1989, a student commemoration of a Nazi atrocity in 1939 was brutally assaulted by riot police with little provocation. The factionalized oppositions to the government became united to a single purpose by the event, and formed the Civic Forum, led by Havel. He obtained video of the riot, interviewed victims, and had thousands of copies distributed across the country that were surreptitiously played on available televisions. The people became inflamed, and larger and larger demonstrating crowds filled Wenceslas Square. This rapid yet peaceful movement came to be known as the Velvet Revolution. Just a week after the riot, Havel and Dubcek appeared together to the throng, who in one voice demanded the latter's restoration.

At first, Havel, the playwright, insisted on standing in the shadow of Dubcek; by the time of the federal elections in 1990, it had been decided that Dubcek would become chairman of the federal parliament. Dubcek then proposed Havel for the presidency, which was accepted unanimously.

In his last years, Dubcek aligned himself with the ideas of European Social Democracy and especially with German chancellor Willy Brandt. In 1992, Dubcek became leader of the Social Democratic party in Slovakia. By that time he was already sick, having worked virtually around the clock for over two years as chairman of the Czechoslovak assembly. A huge shock, one he did not get over, was the death of his wife, Anna, in September 1991. A year later, Dubcek was in a car accident, and barely escaped immediate death. Physicians diagnosed him with a broken spine, as well as other serious illnesses. He passed away on November 1, 1992. Shortly thereafter, Czechoslovakia peacefully separated into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, an event known as the Velvet Divorce.

EWB

Duby, Georges (1919–), French scholar and author. Georges Durby has gained renown both as a medieval scholar and author. Duby's research led him to write several books on the middle ages. Notable among these was *Le Temps des cathedrales: L'Art et la société, 980–1420*.

Translated in 1981 as *The Age of the Cathedrals: Art and Society, 980–1420*, the work had also served as the basis for the series of television films Duby produced for Antenne 2 in Paris in 1980. A comprehensive study of the early Gothic cathedrals of France, *The Age of the Cathedrals* discusses the various building plans of the churches and explains the social and religious milieu that gave rise to their construction.

Other works by Duby include *The Knight, the Lady and the Priest: The Making of Modern Marriage in Medieval France*, which traces the evolution of marriage and societal attitudes toward it through an examination of medieval romance literature, religious drama, and early church records, and *William Marshal: The Flower of Chivalry*, in which Duby examines a manuscript from the thirteenth century which contains a long poem by a French trouvère about the life of Guillaume Marechal, a knight-errant who rose to greatness and wealth in the service of kings before his death in 1219. Duby continued to write books on medieval subjects in coming years, and in 1986 he collaborated with several scholars to produce *Historie de la vie privée*. The work comprises an anticipated five volumes, the first three of which were directed by Duby and the late Philippe Aries.

CA

Durkheim, Émile (1858–1917), French philosopher and sociologist. Émile Durkheim was one of the founders of 20th-century sociology.

Émile Durkheim was born at Épinal, Lorraine, on April 15, 1858. Following a long family tradition, he began as a young man to prepare himself for the rabbinate. While still in secondary school, however, he discovered his vocation for teaching and left Épinal for Paris to prepare for the École Normale, which he entered in 1879. Although Durkheim found the literary nature of instruction there a great disappointment, he was lastingly inspired by two of his teachers: the classicist Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges and the philosopher Émile Boutroux. From Fustel he learned the importance of religion in the formation of social institutions and discovered that the sacred could be studied rationally and objectively. From Boutroux he learned that atomism, the reduction of phenomena to their smallest constituent parts, was a fallacious methodological procedure and that each science must explain phenomena in terms of its own specific principles. These ideas eventually formed the philosophical foundations of Durkheim's sociological method.

From 1882 to 1885 Durkheim taught philosophy in several provincial lycées. A leave of absence in 1885–1886 allowed him to study under the psy-

chologist Wilhelm Wundt in Germany. In 1887 he was named lecturer in education and sociology at the University of Bordeaux, a position raised to a professorship in 1896, the first professorship of sociology in France.

On his return from Germany, Durkheim had begun to prepare review articles for the *Revue philosophique* on current work in sociology. In 1896, realizing that the task was too much for a single person to do adequately, he founded the *Année sociologique*. His purpose, he announced, was to bring the social sciences together, to promote specialization within the field of sociology, and to make evident that sociology was a collective, not a personal, enterprise. In 1902 Durkheim was named to a professorship in sociology and education at the Sorbonne. There he remained for the rest of his career.

Achieving Consensus. *The Division of Labor*, Durkheim's doctoral thesis, appeared in 1893. The theme of the book was how individuals achieve the prerequisite of all social existence: consensus. Durkheim began by distinguishing two types of "solidarities," mechanical and organic. In the first, individuals differ little from each other; they harbor the same emotions, hold the same values, and believe the same religion. Society draws its coherence from this similarity. In the second, coherence is achieved by differentiation. Free individuals pursuing different functions are united by their complementary roles. For Durkheim these were both conceptual and historical distinctions. Primitive societies and European society in earlier periods were mechanical solidarities; modern European society was organic. In analyzing the nature of contractual relationships, however, Durkheim came to realize that organic solidarity could be maintained only if certain aspects of mechanical solidarity remained, only if the members of society held certain beliefs and sentiments in common. Without such collective beliefs, he argued, no contractual relationship based purely on self-interest could have any force.

Collective Beliefs. At the end of the 19th century, social theory was dominated by methodological individualism, the belief that all social phenomena should be reduced to individual psychological or biological phenomena in order to be explained. Durkheim therefore had to explain and justify his emphasis on collective beliefs, on "collective consciousness" and "collective representations." This he did theoretically in *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895) and empirically in *Suicide* (1897). In the first, he argued that the social environment was a reality and therefore an object of study in its own right. "Sociological method,"

he wrote, "rests wholly on the basic principle that social facts must be studied as things; that is, as realities external to the individual." The central methodological problem was therefore the nature of these realities and their relationship to the individuals who compose society.

In *Suicide* Durkheim demonstrated his sociological method by applying it to a phenomenon that appeared quintessentially individual. How does society cause individuals to commit suicide? To answer this question, he analyzed statistical data on suicide rates, comparing them to religious beliefs, age, sex, marital status, and economic changes, and then sought to explain the systematic differences he had discovered. The suicide rate, he argued, depends upon the social context. More frequently than others, those who are ill-integrated into social groups and those whose individuality has disappeared in the social group will kill themselves. Likewise, when social values break down, when men find themselves without norms, in a state of "anomie" as Durkheim called it, suicide increases.

From what source do collective beliefs draw their force? In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912) Durkheim argued that the binding character of the social bond, indeed the very categories of the human mind, are to be found in religion. Behind religion, however, is society itself, for religion is communal participation, and its authority is the authority of society intensified by being endowed with sacredness. It is the transcendent image of the collective consciousness.

During his lifetime Durkheim was severely criticized for claiming that social facts were irreducible, that they had a reality of their own. His ideas, however, are now accepted as the common foundations for empirical work in sociology. His concept of the collective consciousness, renamed "culture," has become part of the theoretical foundations of modern ethnography. His voice was one of the most powerful in breaking the hold of Enlightenment ideas of individualism on modern social sciences.

Durkheim died in Paris on Nov. 15, 1917.

EWB

E

Eichmann, Adolf (1906–1962), German Nazi leader. Adolf Eichmann was responsible for the persecution and murder of millions of Jews in the death camps in Europe during World War II.

On May 13, 1960, Adolf Eichmann was seized by Israeli agents in Argentina and smuggled back to

Jerusalem to stand trial for his role in the murder of one-third of Europe's Jewish people during World War II. The Eichmann trial of April through August 1961 gained world wide attention as the most important trial of Nazi criminality since the Nuremberg trial of 1945–1946. For the first time a Jewish court convened in judgment upon a former persecutor. Eichmann was that SS (Schutzstaffel) officer responsible for transporting Jews and other victims to the extermination camps. What motivated him? The trial testimony showed him to be the ultimate conformist in a criminal state. As he said to an interrogator, "If they told me that my own father was a traitor and I had to kill him, I'd have done it. At that time I obeyed my orders without thinking, I just did as I was told. That's where I found my how shall I say? my fulfillment. It made no difference what the orders were."

Karl Adolf Eichmann was born into a religious middle-class Protestant family in Solingen in western Germany near the Rhine river on March 19, 1906. His father, an accountant for an electrical company, moved his family to Linz, Austria, in 1914. Eichmann's mother died when he was ten. Unlike his three brothers and one sister he was a poor student. Because of his dark looks he was apparently chided as "the little Jew." In Linz Eichmann went to the same secondary school Hitler had attended some 15 years before.

The resentment in Germany and Austria after defeat in World War I twisted an already inflamed nationalism, fed a lie that Germany had been "stabbed in the back" by the Jews. In 1919, amidst this new wave of anti-Semitism, the 13-year-old Eichmann was named in a newspaper as a member of a gang of youths who had tormented a Jewish classmate. Eichmann kept a precise record of each gang member's turn in beating up the victim (who died 20 years later in a death camp).

In the 1920s Eichmann drifted. He studied electrical engineering without success until his father decided that he should become an apprentice in an electrical appliance company, but his father wasn't satisfied with his son's progress there either. In 1928 Eichmann became a traveling salesman for an oil company through the help of Jewish relatives of his stepmother. He enjoyed his independence and his sporty car and became a joiner. As a member of the youth section of the Austro-German Veterans' Organization, he marched through the streets of Linz challenging the social democrats and cheering German nationalism. In 1932 the fanatical young Ernst Kaltenbrunner recruited Eichmann for the Austrian Nazi party and the SS. The Nazis promised that Austria would become part of a powerful German nation-state, and

being a member of the SS gave Eichmann the chance to act superior after years of feeling inferior. Kaltenbrunner's father and Eichmann's father had been friends; their sons would make careers together in the SS. Kaltenbrunner became chief of the Security Service of the SS, second to Heinrich Himmler (and was hung as a war criminal in 1946).

When the Austrian government banned the Nazi Party in 1933, Eichmann, who did not have a job at the time, moved to Nazi Germany and joined the SS "Austrian Legion in exile." After a year he transferred to the Security Service where he found a niche for himself as an "expert" on Jewish affairs. He learned about Zionism and even briefly visited Palestine. When Austria was annexed by the Third Reich in 1938 Eichmann efficiently organized the expulsion of 45,000 Austrian Jews, first stripping them of their possessions. He became known in SS circles as the expert on forced emigration. When Germany invaded Poland, Hitler decided to exterminate the Polish Jews, and Eichmann's organizing ability turned towards mass murder. In the summer of 1941 he was among the first to be told of the "Final Solution," and on January 20, 1942, he was one of 15 who attended the Wannsee Conference where the formal pact was drawn between the political leadership and the bureaucracy to send European Jewry to the death camps. Jews were forced to wear the yellow star of David for easy identification; they were assembled for easy transport to their doom. Eichmann's principal concern was to maintain the killing capacity of the camps by maintaining a steady flow of victims. All the principles of civilization were turned on their head. First into the gas chambers were children, mothers, and the old. About 25 percent of each train load, the strongest men and women, were spared for slave labor. Very many died of starvation, sickness, and overwork. In 1944 Eichmann reported to Himmler that some four million Jews were killed in the camps and some two million more had been shot or killed by mobile units.

Eichmann was a bureaucratic mass murderer; he avoided the extermination sites and shielded himself from his acts through a bureaucratic language that deadened his conscience. Eichmann was limited, compartmentalized in mind and spirit. "Officialese is my only language," he said at his trial. Eichmann exemplified the terrifying discrepancy between the unparalleled and monstrous crime and the colorless official who carried out the evil. He viewed his victims as objects to be transported to their deaths as if they were nuts and bolts, and in 1944 he unsuccessfully sought to trade the lives of one million Jews for 10,000 trucks.

At the end of the war Eichmann was rounded up, but he managed to disguise his identity and escaped detection. ODESSA, the secret SS organization, arranged his flight to Argentina in 1952. Under the alias of Ricardo Klement, Eichmann created a new identity as the unassuming employee of the Mercedes-Benz car factory in Buenos Aires. His wife and two sons joined him.

On December 15, 1961, the Israeli court sentenced Eichmann to hang. His last words on June 1, 1962, were that he would not forget Austria, Germany, and Argentina. He was 56; his corpse was cremated, and his ashes scattered over the sea. Eichmann's inhuman acts in the name of Germany seemingly confirmed one 19th-century Austrian's fear that Europe was moving from humanity through nationality to beastiality.

EWB

Elias, Norbert (1897–1990), German sociologist. Born in Breslau (now Wrocław, Poland), Norbert Elias was the only child of Hermann and Sophie Elias. His father was a small clothes manufacturer, who devoted his life to his family and business. His Jewish family lived in a spacious apartment, with a cook and a nanny. Though Elias himself escaped Hitler's Germany in 1933, his parents remained, with disastrous consequences: his mother died at Auschwitz in 1941. His failure to convince his parents to escape, and his mother's horrible death, left him devastated.

After World War I, Elias studied medicine and philosophy at the University of Breslau. He earned his doctorate in philosophy in 1924, after opting out of medicine, under Richard Honigswald (1875–1947), one of the great neo-Kantian philosophers in early 20th century. In 1925 Elias moved to Heidelberg to study sociology under Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), earning his habilitation in 1933, which was published thirty years later as *The Court Society*. Escaping Germany in 1933, Elias sought employment as a professor first in Switzerland then in France, without much luck in either country. Finally, he moved to London in 1935.

Receiving financial help from a committee who assisted Jewish refugees from Germany, Elias found the reading room of the British Museum an ideal place for his research. It was during his early years in London when Elias began writing what eventually became his most famous book, *The Civilizing Process*, which was published in 1939 in German as *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation*. Publishing a book written by a Jew in German during that time, however, was problematic. Nonetheless, it was well received by a few prominent German and Dutch sociologists. But it did

not reach its fame until many years later when it was translated to several languages, with the English version being published in 1978.

In *The Civilizing Process*, Elias argued that what Westerners today perceive as Western civilization, with emphasis on "civilized" personal manners, was a result of a long historical process, where the movement away from barbarity to civilization could be traced through examining books on manners. The internalization of this civility by the Western individual, Elias argued, demonstrated his basic theory that the individual was not a static, self-contained unit, but a process, effected by society at large, that begins with birth and ends with death.

In 1954, at age 57, Elias was finally offered a position at Leicester University in England. With his colleague Ilya Neustadt, Elias established the Department of Sociology at Leicester, which eventually became the largest and most respected in England. Elias retired in 1962 and spent the next two years in Ghana, teaching sociology to African students.

About 1968, when student protests were staged in many European universities, sociologists were looking for a different approach to sociology from the dominant American one, with its emphasis on statistics and empirical analysis. Elias's book, *The Civilizing Process*, offered that new approach, by its redefinition of the individual in relation to society. Overnight thousands of copies were pirated by students, who could not afford the hardback version. The international recognition of Elias catapulted him into the limelight and made him an intellectual celebrity, with television interviews and lectures to eager students at various universities.

Elias lived mostly in Holland after 1979. His theories found fertile ground among Dutch sociologists, such as Cas Wouters, who built upon Elias's theory about the civilization process to question whether the permissive society was a trend in decivilization. In 1988 the Dutch government awarded Elias the insignia of the Commander of the Order of Orange-Nassau in the name of Queen Beatrix of Holland.

Recognizing his intellectual achievements and its debt to him for Hitler's crimes against him and his people, the German Federal Republic conferred on Elias many awards and pensions, crowned in 1986 by its highest decoration, the *Grosskreuz der Bundesdienstorden*.

Though Norbert Elias may not have answered all the questions that he had raised, his positive contribution to sociology is beyond question. Some very basic sociological assumptions had to be reassessed as a result of his new theories. The redefinition of the

individual as a social process, which cannot be understood outside of its social context, has profound implications not only for the study of sociology, but also for history and politics. His research and resulting theories on sports, community relations, violence, and civilization help us understand our past and prepare for the future.

Mohammed Arkawi

Elizabeth I (1533–1603), queen of England and Ireland from 1558 to 1603. Elizabeth I preserved stability in a nation rent by political and religious dissension and maintained the authority of the Crown against the growing pressures of Parliament.

Born at Greenwich, on Sept. 7, 1533, Elizabeth I was the daughter of Henry VIII and his second wife, Anne Boleyn. Because of her father's continuing search for a male heir, Elizabeth's early life was precarious. In May 1536 her mother was beheaded to clear the way for Henry's third marriage, and on July 1 Parliament declared that Elizabeth and her older sister, Mary, the daughter of Henry's first queen, were illegitimate and that the succession should pass to the issue of his third wife, Jane Seymour. Jane did produce a male heir, Edward, but even though Elizabeth had been declared illegitimate, she was brought up in the royal household. She received an excellent education and was reputed to be remarkably precocious, notably in languages (of which she learned Latin, French, and Italian) and music.

Edward VI and Mary. During the short reign of her brother, Edward VI, Elizabeth survived precariously, especially in 1549 when the principal persons in her household were arrested and she was to all practical purposes a prisoner at Hatfield. In this period she experienced ill health but pursued her studies under her tutor, Roger Ascham.

In 1553, following the death of Edward VI, her sister Mary I came to the throne with the intention of leading the country back to Catholicism. The young Elizabeth found herself involved in the complicated intrigue that accompanied these changes. Without her knowledge the Protestant Sir Thomas Wyatt plotted to put her on the throne by overthrowing Mary. The rebellion failed, and though Elizabeth maintained her innocence, she was sent to the Tower. After 2 months she was released against the wishes of Mary's advisers and was removed to an old royal palace at Woodstock. In 1555 she was brought to Hampton Court, still in custody, but on October 18 was allowed to take up residence at Hatfield, where she resumed her studies with Ascham.

On Nov. 17, 1558, Mary died, and Elizabeth succeeded to the throne. Elizabeth's reign was to be looked back on as a golden age, when England began to assert itself internationally through the mastery of sea power. The condition of the country seemed far different, however, when she came to the throne. A contemporary noted: "The Queen poor. The realm exhausted. The nobility poor and decayed. Want of good captains and soldiers. The people out of order. Justice not executed." Both internationally and internally, the condition of the country was far from stable.

At the age of 25 Elizabeth was a rather tall and well-poised woman; what she lacked in feminine warmth, she made up for in the worldly wisdom she had gained from a difficult and unhappy youth. It is significant that one of her first actions as queen was to appoint Sir William Cecil (later Lord Burghley) as her chief secretary. Cecil was to remain her closest adviser; like Elizabeth, he was a political pragmatist, cautious and essentially conservative. They both appreciated England's limited position in the face of France and Spain, and both knew that the key to England's success lay in balancing the two great Continental powers off against each other, so that neither could bring its full force to bear against England.

The Succession. Since Elizabeth was unmarried, the question of the succession and the actions of other claimants to the throne bulked large. She toyed with a large number of suitors, including Philip II of Spain; Eric of Sweden; Adolphus, Duke of Holstein; and the Archduke Charles. From her first Parliament she received a petition concerning her marriage. Her answer was, in effect, her final one: "this shall be for me sufficient, that a marble stone shall declare that a Queen, having reigned such a time died a virgin." But it would be many years before the search for a suitable husband ended, and the Parliament reconciled itself to the fact that the Queen would not marry.

Elizabeth maintained what many thought were dangerously close relations with her favorite, Robert Dudley, whom she raised to the earldom of Leicester. She abandoned this flirtation when scandal arising from the mysterious death of Dudley's wife in 1560 made the connection politically disadvantageous. In the late 1570s and early 1580s she was courted in turn by the French Duke of Anjou and the Duke of Alençon. But by the mid-1580s it was clear she would not marry.

Many have praised Elizabeth for her skillful handling of the courtships. To be sure, her hand was perhaps her greatest diplomatic weapon, and any one of the proposed marriages, if carried out, would have had strong repercussions on English foreign relations.

By refusing to marry, Elizabeth could further her general policy of balancing the Continental powers. Against this must be set the realization that it was a very dangerous policy. Had Elizabeth succumbed to illness, as she nearly did early in her reign, or had any one of the many assassination plots against her succeeded, the country would have been plunged into the chaos of a disputed succession. That the accession of James I on her death was peaceful was due as much to the luck of her survival as it was to the wisdom of her policy.

Religious Settlement. England had experienced both a sharp swing to Protestantism under Edward VI and a Catholic reaction under Mary. The question of the nature of the Church needed to be settled immediately, and it was hammered out in Elizabeth's first Parliament in 1559. A retention of Catholicism was not politically feasible, as the events of Mary's reign showed, but the settlement achieved in 1559 represented something more of a Puritan victory than the Queen desired. The settlement enshrined in the Acts of Supremacy and Conformity may in the long run have worked out as a compromise, but in 1559 it indicated to Elizabeth that her control of Parliament was not complete.

Though the settlement achieved in 1559 remained essentially unchanged throughout Elizabeth's reign, the conflict over religion was not stilled. The Church of England, of which Elizabeth stood as supreme governor, was attacked by both Catholics and Puritans. Estimates of Catholic strength in Elizabethan England are difficult to make, but it is clear that a number of Englishmen remained at least residual Catholics. Because of the danger of a Catholic rising against the Crown on behalf of the rival claimant, Mary, Queen of Scots, who was in custody in England from 1568 until her execution in 1587, Parliament pressed the Queen repeatedly for harsher legislation to control the recusants. It is apparent that the Queen resisted, on the whole successfully, these pressures for political repression of the English Catholics. While the legislation against the Catholics did become progressively sterner, the Queen was able to mitigate the severity of its enforcement and retain the patriotic loyalty of many Englishmen who were Catholic in sympathy.

For their part the Puritans waged a long battle in the Church, in Parliament, and in the country at large to make the religious settlement more radical. Under the influence of leaders like Thomas Cartwright and John Field, and supported in Parliament by the brothers Paul and Peter Wentworth, the Puri-

tans subjected the Elizabethan religious settlement to great stress.

The Queen found that she could control Parliament through the agency of her privy councilors and the force of her own personality. It was, however, some time before she could control the Church and the countryside as effectively. It was only with the promotion of John Whitgift to the archbishopric of Canterbury that she found her most effective clerical weapon against the Puritans. With apparent royal support but some criticism from Burghley, Whitgift was able to use the machinery of the Church courts to curb the Puritans. By the 1590s the Puritan movement was in some considerable disarray. Many of its prominent patrons were dead, and by the publication of the bitterly satirical *Marpreflate Tracts*, some Puritan leaders brought the movement into general disfavor.

Foreign Relations. At Elizabeth's accession England was not strong enough, either in men or money, to oppose vigorously either of the Continental powers, France or Spain. England was, however, at war with France. Elizabeth quickly brought this conflict to a close on more favorable terms than might have been expected.

Throughout the early years of the reign, France appeared to be the chief foreign threat to England because of the French connections of Mary, Queen of Scots. By the Treaty of Edinburgh in 1560, Elizabeth was able to close off a good part of the French threat as posed through Scotland. The internal religious disorders of France also aided the English cause. Equally crucial was the fact that Philip II of Spain was not anxious to further the Catholic cause in England so long as its chief beneficiary would be Mary, Queen of Scots, and through her, his own French rivals.

In the 1580s Spain emerged as the chief threat to England. The years from 1570 to 1585 were ones of neither war nor peace, but Elizabeth found herself under increasing pressure from Protestant activists to take a firmer line against Catholic Spain. Increasingly she connived in privateering voyages against Spanish shipping; her decision in 1585 to intervene on behalf of the Netherlands in its revolt against Spain by sending an expeditionary force under the Earl of Leicester meant the temporary end of the Queen's policy of balance and peace.

The struggle against Spain culminated in the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. The Queen showed a considerable ability to rally the people around herself. At Tilbury, where the English army massed in preparation for the threatened invasion, the Queen herself appeared to deliver one of her most stirring speeches: "I am come amongst you . . . re-

solved in the midst and heat of battle, to live and die amongst you all. . . . I know I have the body but of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart and stomach of a king and of a King of England too.”

That the Armada was dispersed owed as much to luck and Spanish incapacity as it did to English skill. In some ways it marked the high point of Elizabeth's reign, for the years which followed have properly been called “the darker years.” The Spanish threat did not immediately subside, and English counteroffensives proved ineffectual because of poor leadership and insufficient funds. Under the strain of war expenditure, the country suffered in the 1590s prolonged economic crisis. Moreover, the atmosphere of the court seemed to decline in the closing stages of the reign; evident corruption and sordid struggling for patronage became more common.

Difficulties in Ireland. The latter years of Elizabeth's reign were marked by increasing difficulties in Ireland. The English had never effectively controlled Ireland, and under Elizabeth the situation became acute. Given Ireland's position on England's flank and its potential use by the Spanish, it seemed essential for England to control the island. It was no easy task; four major rebellions (the rebellion of Shane O'Neill, 1559–1566; the Fitzmaurice confederacy, 1569–1572; the Desmond rebellion, 1579–1583; and Tyrone's rebellion, 1594–1603) tell the story of Ireland in this period. Fortunately, the Spaniards were slow to take advantage of Tyrone's rebellion. The 2d Earl of Essex was incapable of coping with this revolt and returned to England to lead a futile rebellion against the Queen (1601). But Lord Mountjoy, one of the few great Elizabethan land commanders, was able to break the back of the rising and bring peace in the same month in which the Queen died (March 1603).

Internal Decline. The latter years of Elizabeth also saw tensions emerge in domestic politics. The long-term dominance of the house of Cecil, perpetuated after Burghley's death by his son, Sir Robert Cecil, was strongly contested by others, like the Earl of Essex, who sought the Queen's patronage. The Parliament of 1601 saw Elizabeth involved in a considerable fight over the granting of monopolies. Elizabeth was able to head off the conflict by promising that she herself would institute reforms. Her famous “Golden Speech” delivered to this, her last Parliament, indicated that even in old age she had the power to win her people to her side: “Though God hath raised me high, yet this I count the glory of my crown, that I have reigned with your loves. . . . It is my desire to

live nor reign no longer than my life and reign shall be for your good. And though you have had, and may have, many princes more mighty and wise sitting in this seat, yet you never had, nor shall have, any that will be more careful and loving.”

The words concealed the reality of the end of Elizabeth's reign. It is apparent, on retrospect, that severe tensions existed. The finances of the Crown, exhausted by war since the 1580s, were in sorry condition; the economic plight of the country was not much better. The Parliament was already sensing its power to contest issues with the monarchy, though they now held back, perhaps out of respect for their elderly queen. Religious tensions were hidden rather than removed. For all the greatness of her reign, the reign that witnessed the naval feats of Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkins and the literary accomplishments of Sir Philip Sidney, Edmund Spenser, William Shakespeare, and Christopher Marlowe, it was a shaky inheritance that Elizabeth would pass on to her successor, the son of her rival claimant, Mary, Queen of Scots. On March 24, 1603, the Queen died; as one contemporary noted, she “departed this life, mildly like a lamb, easily like a ripe apple from the tree.”

EWB

Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895), German revolutionist and social theorist. Friedrich Engels was the cofounder with Karl Marx of modern socialism.

Friedrich Engels was born on Nov. 28, 1820, in Barmen, Rhenish Prussia, a small industrial town in the Wupper valley. He was the oldest of the six children of Friedrich and Elisabeth Franziska Mauritia Engels. The senior Engels, a textile manufacturer, was a Christian Pietist and religious fanatic. After attending elementary school at Barmen, young Friedrich entered the gymnasium in nearby Elberfeld at the age of 14, but he left it 3 years later. Although he became one of the most learned men of his time, he had no further formal schooling.

Under pressure from his tyrannical father, Friedrich became a business apprentice in Barmen and Barmen, but he soon called it a “dog's life.” He left business at the age of 20, in rebellion against both his joyless home and the “penny-pinching” world of commerce. Henceforth, Engels was a lifelong enemy of organized religion and of capitalism, although he was again forced into business for a number of years.

While doing his one-year compulsory military service (artillery) in Berlin, Engels came into contact with the radical Young Hegelians and embraced their ideas, particularly the materialist philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach. After some free-lance journalism, part

of it under the pseudonym of F. Oswald, in November 1842 Engels went to Manchester, England, to work in the office of Engels and Ermens, a spinning factory in which his father was a partner. In Manchester, the manufacturing center of the world's foremost capitalist country, Engels had the opportunity of observing capitalism's operations, and its distressing effects on the workers, at first hand. He also studied the leading economic writers, among them Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Robert Owen in English, and Jean Baptiste Say, Charles Fourier, and Pierre Joseph Proudhon in French. He left Manchester in August 1844.

On his way back to Germany, Engels stopped in Paris, where he met Karl Marx for a second time. On this occasion a lifelong intellectual rapport was established between them. Finding they were of the same opinion about nearly everything, Marx and Engels decided to collaborate on their writing.

Engels spent the next 5 years in Germany, Belgium, and France, writing and participating in revolutionary activities. He fought in the 1849 revolutionary uprising in Baden and the Palatinate, seeing action in four military engagements. After the defeat of the revolution, he escaped to Switzerland. In October 1849, using the sea route via Genoa, he sailed to England, which became his permanent home.

In November 1850, unable to make a living as a writer in London and anxious to help support the penniless Marx, Engels reluctantly returned to his father's business in Manchester. In 1864, after his father's death, he became a partner in the firm, and by early 1869 he felt that he had enough capital to support himself and to provide Marx with a regular annuity of £350. On July 1, 1869, Engels sold his share of the business to his partner. He exulted in a letter to Marx: "Hurrah! Today I finished with sweet commerce, and I am a free man!" Marx's daughter, Eleanor, who saw Engels on that day, wrote: "I shall never forget the triumphant 'For the last time,' which he shouted as he drew on his top-boots in the morning to make his last journey to business. Some hours later, when we were standing at the door waiting for him, we saw him coming across the little field opposite his home. He was flourishing his walking stick in the air and singing, and laughing all over his face."

In September 1870 Engels moved to London, settling near the home of Marx, whom he saw daily. A generous friend and gay host, the fun-loving Engels spent the remaining 25 years of his life in London, enjoying good food, good wine, and good company. He also worked hard, doing the things he loved: writing, maintaining contact and a voluminous correspondence with radicals everywhere, and, after Marx's death in 1883, laboring over the latter's notes and

manuscripts, bringing out volumes 2 and 3 of *Das Kapital* in 1885 and 1894, respectively. Engels died of cancer on Aug. 5, 1895. Following his instructions, his body was cremated and his ashes strewn over the ocean at Eastbourne, his favorite holiday resort.

Personality and Character. Engels was medium-height, slender, and athletic. His body was disciplined by swimming, fencing, and riding. He dressed and acted like an elegant English gentleman. In Manchester, where he maintained two homes for appearances, as befitted a member of the local stock exchange, and another for his Irish mistress he rode to hounds with the English gentry, whom he despised as capitalists but by whose antic behavior he was sardonically amused.

Engels had a brilliant mind and was quick, sharp, and unerring in his judgments. His versatility was astonishing. A successful businessman, he also had a grasp of virtually every branch of the natural sciences, biology, chemistry, botany, and physics. He was a widely respected specialist on military affairs. He mastered numerous languages, including all the Slavic ones, on which he planned to write a comparative grammar. He also knew Gothic, Old Nordic, and Old Saxon, studied Arabic, and in 3 weeks learned Persian, which he said was "mere child's play." His English, both spoken and written, was impeccable. It was said of him that he "stutters in 20 languages."

Engels apparently never married. He loved, and lived with successively, two Irish sisters, Mary (who died in 1863) and Lydia (Lizzy) Burns (1827–1878). After he moved to London, he referred to Lizzy as "my wife." The Burns sisters, ardent Irish patriots, stirred in Engels a deep sympathy for the Irish cause.

His Writings. Engels published hundreds of articles, a number of prefaces (mostly to Marx's works), and about half a dozen books during his lifetime. His first important book, written when he was 24 years old, was *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, based on observations made when he lived in Manchester. It was published in German in 1845 and in English in 1892. His next publication was the *Manifesto of the Communist Party (Communist Manifesto)*, which he wrote in collaboration with Marx between December 1847 and January 1848, and which was published in London in German a month later. An anonymous English edition came out in London in 1850.

Engels also collaborated with Marx on *The Holy Family*, an attack on the Young Hegelian philosopher Bruno Bauer, which was published in Germany in 1845. Another collaboration with Marx, *The German*

Ideology, was written in 1845–1846, but it was not published in full until 1932.

In 1870 Engels published *The Peasant War in Germany*, which consisted of a number of articles he had written in 1850; an English translation appeared in 1956. In 1878 he published perhaps his most important book, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, known in an English translation as *Anti-Dühring* (1959). This work ranks, together with Marx's *Das Kapital*, as the most comprehensive study of socialist (Marxist) theory. In it, Engels wrote, he treated "every possible subject, from the concepts of time and space to bimetalism; from the eternity of matter and motion to the perishable nature of moral ideas; from Darwin's natural selection to the education of youth in a future society."

Engels's *Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science* was published in German in 1882 and in English, under the title *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, in 1892. In 1884 he brought out *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State*, an indispensable work for understanding Marxist political theory. His last work, published in 1888, was *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. Both of these last books are available in English. Two works by Engels were published posthumously: *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (German, 1896; English, 1933) and *Dialectics of Nature*, begun in 1895 but never completed, of which an English translation appeared in 1964.

Engels's Ideas. In his articles and books Engels elaborated and developed, both historically and logically, basic ideas that go under the name of Marxism. His work was not an limitation of Marx but constituted a consistent philosophy at which both men had arrived independently and had shared in common. Engels refined the concept of dialectical materialism, which Marx had never fully worked out, to include not only matter but also form. He stressed that the materialist conception takes into consideration the whole cultural process, including tradition, religion, and ideology, which goes through constant historical evolution. Each stage of development, containing also what Engels called "thought material," builds upon the totality of previous developments. Thus every man is a product both of his own time and of the past. Similarly, he elaborated his view of the state, which he regarded as "nothing less than a machine for the oppression of one class by another," as evolving, through class struggles, into the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

EWB

Erasmus, Desiderius (1466–1536), Dutch scholar. Erasmus was the dominant figure of the early-16th-century humanist movement. The intellectual arbiter during the last years of Christian unity, he remains one of European culture's most controversial giants.

The evidence about the youth and adolescence of Erasmus is hard to evaluate. A major source of knowledge is autobiographical, a product of his middle age when international fame made him most sensitive about his illegitimate birth at Rotterdam, probably in October 1466, the second son of a priest, Roger Gerard, and a physician's daughter. School life, rather than a household environment, shaped Erasmus from his fifth year onward. He later disparaged the effort of his teachers and the guardians established after the parents' deaths about 1484; in fact, his father provided Erasmus a solid education with the Brethren of the Common Life from 1475 to 1484. From this religious community, which for a century had deflected education in the Low Countries from scholastic rigidity and had relieved its discipline of the strictest monastic severity, Erasmus obtained a firm grounding in classical Latin and an appreciation of a spirit of Christianity beyond its doctrinal basis.

From Steyn to Cambridge. His unpromising birth and his guardians' business sense gave the monastic cloister an obvious, if grim, place in Erasmus' future. He entered the Augustinian monastery at Steyn in 1487 and took monastic vows in 1488; he was ordained a priest in 1492. His reading in classical literature and Christian sources matured, but Erasmus found Steyn crude and rustic. Scholarship offered the first step out, when the bishop of Cambrai employed Erasmus as his secretary in 1493 and rewarded his work with a stipend for study at Paris in 1495.

Paris provided a diverse environment which Erasmus cultivated between recalls to the Low Countries in the late 1490s. He moved in literary circles, writing poetry and dedications and experimenting with styles of educational writing which bore fruit in the later publications *Adagia* and *Colloquia*. He sought students and patrons until, in 1499, his student Lord Mountjoy took him to England.

The visit was decisive to Erasmus. English humanists were studying Scripture and the early Church fathers and advocating reform of the Church and the educational process that served it. Friendships with John Colet, Sir Thomas More, and others restored Erasmus' interest in devotional studies and turned him to the Greek language as the key for his research. *Enchiridion militis Christiani* (*Handbook of the Militant Christian*, published 1503, though begun a decade before) outlined conduct which would foster

man's spiritual capacities and usher in the ethics and piety of what Erasmus' group called the "philosophy of Christ." It gave these scholars an international audience and steady patronage among educated laymen.

In 1506 Erasmus fulfilled a long-standing ambition by traveling to Italy. He watched Pope Julius II conquer Bologna that year; the sharpest edge of his wit can be discerned in a tract, *Julius exclusus* (published anonymously in 1517; he never admitted authorship), in which St. Peter bars Julius from heaven and scathingly damns his wars and treasure. Erasmus polished his Greek in Italy and formed, with Aldus Manutius's press in Venice, the first of the crucial links to publishing enterprises that secured his financial and professional independence.

Back in England by 1509, disillusioned with the Church's wars and its clergy's shortcomings, Erasmus wrote *Encomium moriae* (*The Praise of Folly*), a satirical exposition of the obstacles restricting the fulfillment of Christ's teaching. Though not formally released from monastic vows until 1517, Erasmus was now effectively freed of Steyn by his mounting reputation. He held a professorship at Cambridge (1511–1514) and settled into the vocation for which his study and travel had prepared him.

Major Publications. Erasmus' *Novum instrumentum*, a heavily annotated edition of the New Testament placing texts in Greek and revised Latin side by side, appeared in 1516 from the Basel press of Johannes Froben. As the first published Greek text and a basis for further clarification of the New Testament, it was a landmark for scholars and reformers. It attuned educated Europeans more closely to Erasmus' early works, which were now widely translated from the Latin of his originals, and paved the way for the literary and educational classics of the Christian humanist fellowship.

Erasmus had now returned to the Continent to the manuscripts and printing houses on which his massive efforts relied. Froben published his nine-volume edition of St. Jerome in 1516 and in the next two decades issued Erasmus' comprehensive editions of early Christian authors, including St. Cyprian (1520), St. Ambrose (1527), and St. Augustine (1529); he also circulated commentaries and treatises on divinity and revised editions of the literary works.

Another dimension to Erasmus' writing appeared in 1516, while he briefly served the future emperor Charles V as councilor. Following current humanist practice, he prepared a guide for educating princes to rule justly, *Institutio principis Christiani*, and in 1517 composed *Querela pacis* (*The Complaint of Peace*), condemning war as an instrument of tyranny and

warning temporal rulers to fulfill their obligation to preserve Christian harmony. Erasmus thus demonstrated, before Luther's impact was clear, his sensitivity to Europe's impending fragmentation.

Erasmus and Reformation Europe. Erasmus' influence could not realize the vision of Christian renovation expressed in his New Testament dedication and preface, which urged Pope Leo X to make Rome the center of reform and to make Christ's words available to every plowboy in the field. Following Luther's lead, many intellectuals, impatient for action, rejected humanism's "halfway house" and used presses and pulpits to move Europe's masses as Erasmus never had. The Erasmians' style of persuasion was countered by simpler, vernacular tracts on theology, the Sacraments, and Church structure, sometimes linked with social and political issues. In 1516 Erasmus had foreseen a golden age, but by 1521, dismayed by the partisan tone and substance of the reformers' appeals, he was calling his own times the worst since Christianity began.

Erasmus' eventual response, after an important exchange with Luther in 1524–1525 about the role of human will in salvation to which he contributed *De libero arbitrio* (*On the Freedom of the Will*), was a gradual disengagement from the disputing theologians and their secular sponsors. He avoided Europe's major courts and capitals, and he left congenial intellectual homes in Catholic Louvain in 1521 and Protestant Basel in 1529, when denominational advocacy invaded their scholarship and governance. Printing presses continued to hold his audience: they were the lifelines of this complex man, rootless at birth, whose temperament, circumstances, and dislike of permanent commitments consistently separated him from friends and institutions eager to harness his talents.

He died on July 12, 1536. The embattled Catholic Church, which he never left, condemned some of Erasmus' work for its critical attitude and moderation against heretics, while much modern opinion based on Protestant, nationalist viewpoints has judged him harshly.

EWB

Evans-Pritchard, Sir Edward (1902–1973), English social anthropologist. Edward Evans-Pritchard did pioneer research in the social structure, history, and religion of African and Arab peoples.

Edward Evans-Pritchard was one of the foremost anthropologists of the mid-twentieth century. The son of an Anglican clergyman, Evans-Pritchard read history at Exeter College, Oxford, and received a doctorate in anthropology at the London School of

Economics. His first research was from 1926 to 1932 with the Azande of the southern Sudan and the Congo. He did further fieldwork in 1935–1936 and in 1938, mainly with the Nuer and other Nilotic peoples of the southern Sudan.

Acclaimed Scholar. Before World War II Evans-Pritchard served on the faculties of the London School of Economics, the Egyptian University in Cairo, and Cambridge University. During this period he produced his two most famous works: *Witchcraft: Oracles and Magic among the Azande* (1937) and *The Nuer* (1940). The first is a brilliant exposition of the internal logic of a preliterate philosophy, indicating how such ideas may reasonably persist in the face of what, to an outsider, may appear to be damning discrepancies and disproofs. The second volume examines the mode of political organization of the Nuer, a society lacking any formal government. It served as a model for much of the subsequent anthropological research in the social organization of African societies. In its analysis of the blood feud, conflict, and limits set by environment on a seminomadic society, it owes much to the earlier work of William Robertson Smith.

During World War II Evans-Pritchard served as an officer in military intelligence in East Africa, Ethiopia, Libya, and the Middle East, and he was able to do some anthropological fieldwork in these areas. He converted to Roman Catholicism in 1944, which may have influenced his subsequent attempts to reconcile the purported differences between social science and religious faith. In 1946 he was appointed to the chair of social anthropology at All Souls College at Oxford, which he held until his retirement in 1970. Twice he journeyed to the United States for scholarly pursuits: in 1950 he was a visiting professor at the University of Chicago, and seven years later he spent a year at Stanford University's Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

Set a Standard for Anthropology Writing.

An extraordinarily prolific writer, Evans-Pritchard produced works that touch upon nearly every facet of social anthropology. In general his writings exhibit a blend of rich ethnographic detail with subtle and suggestive theoretical insights. Among his better-known books are *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (1949), *Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer* (1951), *Social Anthropology* (1951), *Nuer Religion* (1956), and *Theories of Primitive Religion* (1965).

A year following his retirement, Evans-Pritchard was knighted for his contributions to science. He was father to five children with Ioma Nicholls, whom he married in 1939. Even after he retired from Oxford,

he continued to teach and to produce influential publications in his field, including *Man and Woman Among the Azande* (1971). He was one of the strongest proponents of the value of historical perspective in anthropology and of recording African oral literature. Evans-Pritchard died in Oxford on September 11, 1973.

EWB

F

Fénelon, François de Salignac de la Mothe (1651–1715), French prelate, theologian, and preacher. Born on Aug. 6, 1651, François Fénelon was educated by the Jesuits. He became a priest at the famous Seminary of St. Sulpice and spent 3 years preaching to Protestants. He became an ardent disciple and friend of Jacques Bossuet. Fénelon produced his *Treatise on the Existence of God* as well as his *Treatise on the Education of Young Girls* at this time. Both were highly successful.

In 1688 Fénelon met Madame Guyon, who claimed to have mystical experiences and to have the secret of loving God. She had been imprisoned by the archbishop of Paris in a convent because he feared that she was in error. Fénelon believed in her stoutly; he visited her infrequently but corresponded with her voluminously. He was suffering at this time from an intense aridity of mind in regard to God. Intellectually he could prove God's existence, but emotionally he felt little or nothing toward God. Guyon seemed to him to have discovered or received the secret of such "feeling" in her childlike surrender to God and the simplicity of her approach to divine things.

About this time there was a controversy in the French Church about a heresy called quietism, a teaching according to which progress in virtue and in the love of God was achieved by submitting to God's action and grace. Its opponents maintained that quietists made no positive effort at being virtuous, that they depended passively on God's grace, and even neglected basic rules of Christian virtue and behavior. Fénelon was involved in this unpleasant controversy through his association with Guyon. She used to visit, on Fénelon's suggestion, a school for girls run by Madame de Maintenon. The latter disliked Guyon and reported her to the authorities. Guyon also submitted her doctrine for approval to Bossuet on Fénelon's suggestion. Bossuet, although fundamentally ignorant of theology, attacked both Guyon and Fénelon in 1697.

Hate now replaced friendship for Fénelon in Bossuet's mind. He saw him as a rival in public speaking and as the nation's foremost theologian and

religious counselor. He sought to have Fénelon discredited. The teaching of Fénelon and Guyon was condemned by Pope Innocent XII on the insistence of Louis XIV under Bossuet's constant prodding. Fénelon submitted and then set out to outline his teaching on Catholic mysticism on a scale never before attempted.

In February 1695 Fénelon was made archbishop of Cambrai and from then until his death he spent his time in writing, teaching, and preaching. He was appointed tutor to Louis XIV's eldest grandson, the Duc de Bourgogne. For the duke he composed his *Dialogues* and *Telemachus*, together with other minor works. His ideas on politics were based on the universal brotherhood of man, an unpopular idea in the 18th century. He proved himself a first-rate literary judge in his *Letter* to the French Academy in 1714. He spent his last years writing against Jansenism. In his writings he explained the love of God and the simplicity of heart required in man in order to be able to practice that love. Fénelon died on Jan. 7, 1715.

EWB

Ferry, Jules François Camille (1832–1893), French statesman. Jules Ferry was a major political leader during the first 2 decades of the Third Republic. He played a key role in expanding public education and in developing France's colonial empire.

Jules Ferry was born at Saint-Dié, Vosges Department, on April 5, 1832. On receiving his law degree in 1851, he was admitted to the Paris bar, but he first made his name in journalism as one of the most vigorous critics of the Second Empire. His successes led him into more active politics, and in 1869 he was elected to the legislature from Paris.

Entering the Government of National Defense after the fall of the Empire, Ferry became the top civil administrator for Paris and had to struggle with the difficult problems caused by the siege. His stringent but necessary measures earned him an unpopularity in the capital that lasted throughout his career.

Ferry became minister of public instruction in 1879 and initiated a number of reforms, the most controversial being those aimed at reducing the influence of the Church on education. The state recovered its monopoly in the awarding of degrees, but his proposal to prohibit teaching by members of religious orders (the famous Article 7) was defeated in the Senate. In 1880 he took administrative measures to dissolve unauthorized religious orders. More important was his introduction of legislation to make elementary education compulsory, free, and laic. In September 1880 he became premier and was able to further his program by decrees, but lack of funds and personnel

prevented his ambitious plans from being implemented at once.

An ardent colonial expansionist when most republican politicians saw foreign questions only in terms of Alsace-Lorraine and the German menace, Ferry was charged with diverting attention and troops—away from the Continent. His first ministry ended in November 1881 as a result of criticism of the Tunisian expedition which led to the French protectorate.

Ferry returned to the Ministry of Public Instruction in January 1882. In February 1883 he was again premier and carried out a purge of antirepublican elements in the judiciary. Although his power and prestige seemed as great as ever, this time the opposition to his foreign policy proved fatal to Ferry's career. He supported French involvement in Indochina, but news of a minor defeat there, much exaggerated in the first report, compelled his resignation on March 30, 1885. He was an unsuccessful candidate for the presidency in 1887 and never again played a leading role in government. Shot by an Alsatian fanatic on Dec. 10, 1892, Ferry died in Paris on March 17, 1893.

EWB

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762–1814), German philosopher of ethical idealism. Johann Gottlieb Fichte posited the spiritual activity of an "infinite ego" as the ground of self and world. He believed that human life must be guided by the practical maxims of philosophy.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte was born Rammenau on May 19, 1762, the son of a Saxon peasant. As a child, he impressed a visiting nobleman, Baron Miltitz, who adopted him and had him schooled at Pforta. In 1780 he became a student of theology at the University of Jena and later studied at Wittenberg and Leipzig. He soon assimilated three major ideas that became the foundations of his own philosophy: Spinoza's pantheism, Lessing's concept of striving, and Kant's concept of duty.

Fichte's patron died in 1788, leaving him destitute and jobless, but Fichte was able to obtain a position as tutor in Zurich, where he met Johanna Rahn, whom he would marry in 1794. Having unsuccessfully tried to make his mark in the world of letters, he finally succeeded in 1792, when he wrote his *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung* (*Critique of All Revelation*), an application of Kant's ethical principle of duty to religion. Since this work was published anonymously, it was believed to be Kant's; but Kant publicly praised Fichte as the author, earning him the attention of Goethe and the other great minds at the court of Weimar.

In 1794, through the influence of Goethe, Fichte was offered a professorship at Jena, where he proved an impassioned, dynamic teacher. He was a short, strongly built man with sharp, commanding features. His language had a cryptic ring; to Madame de Staël he once remarked, “Grasp my metaphysics, Madame; you will then understand my ethics.”

Fichte displayed a strong moral concern for the lives of his students; he criticized the fraternities and gave public lectures on university life, which were published as *Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten* (1794; *The Vocation of the Scholar*). Despite all this extracurricular activity, Fichte developed his basic system, the *Wissenschaftslehre*, the doctrine of knowledge and metaphysics, in two works, *Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre* and *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (both 1794). Since he was obsessively concerned with the clarity of his writings, these works were later revised and published in several different versions in his lifetime (the English translation was entitled *The Science of Knowledge*).

Fichte’s metaphysics is called subjective idealism because it bases the reality of the self and the empirical world on the spiritual activity of an infinite ego. From the principle of the infinite ego, Fichte deduced the finite ego, or subject, and the non-ego, or object. This split, or “opposing,” between subject and object cannot be overcome through knowledge. Only through moral striving and the creation of a moral order can the self be reunited with the infinite ego. The *System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre* (1798; *The Science of Ethics as Based on the Science of Knowledge*) expresses the necessity of moral striving in the formula, “If I ought I can.” Even God is identified with the moral order in the essay “On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine World Order” (1798). Fichte was wont to claim that in his own life “he created God every day.”

Because of his radical political ideas and his intense moral earnestness, Fichte attracted the hostility of several groups: fraternity students, monarchists, and the clergy. The last group charged Fichte with atheism, since he had stated that “there can be no doubt that the notion of God as a separate substance is impossible and contradictory.” He refused to compromise with his critics, even publicly attacking their idolatry of a personal God, and was forced to leave Jena in 1799.

These years of professional insecurity did not diminish Fichte’s philosophical activity. He produced a popular account of his philosophy in *Die Bestimmung des Menschen* (1800; *The Vocation of Man*). In *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat* (1800; *The Closed Commercial State*) he argued for state socialism, and in

Grundzüge der gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (1806; *Characteristics of the Present Age*) he presented his philosophy of history. Fichte’s metaphysics became more theologically oriented in *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben, oder Religionslehre* (1806; *The Way towards the Blessed Life*). But his most memorable accomplishment during the time of the siege of Napoleon was his *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (*Addresses to the German Nation*), given in the winter of 1807–1808. These speeches rallied the German people on the cultural and educational “leadership of humanity.”

In 1810, after teaching two terms at the universities of Erlangen and Königsberg, Fichte was appointed dean of the philosophy faculty and later rector of the University of Berlin. But Napoleon’s siege of Berlin was to cut short his new teaching career. Johanna, his wife, nursing the wounded, fell ill with typhus and recovered; Fichte, however, succumbed to the disease and died on Jan. 27, 1814. His philosophy was quickly superseded by the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel.

EWB

Filmer, Sir Robert (c.1588–1653), English political theorist. Robert Filmer was influential in the development of English conservative thought. His treatises formed the basis for a royalist or Tory theory of kingship and government.

The eldest son of Sir Edward Filmer, Robert Filmer was born in the last decade of Elizabeth I’s reign. After being educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, he retreated to his country estates in Kent, where he devoted himself to scholarly pursuits and to winning the hand of Anne, daughter of the bishop of Ely. At the beginning of Charles I’s reign Filmer was knighted, but he appears to have played no major role either in local government or in Parliament.

As the conflict between Crown and Parliament deepened, Filmer took a strong royalist stand. When civil war erupted in 1641, Filmer’s response was to write his *Patriarcha or the Natural Powers of Kings*, which, though not published, was circulated in manuscript form. His writings earned him the active hostility of Charles’s parliamentary opponents. His house was looted by a parliamentary force in 1643, and the next year he was temporarily imprisoned in Leeds Castle.

With the end of the first civil war, Filmer regained his freedom and apparently played no part in the second internecine struggle, which broke out soon after. He did, however, return to his writing, and before the execution of Charles I he authored his most thoughtful treatise, *The Anarchy of Limited or Mixed Monarchy*, in which he argued for the establishment

of a “pure” monarchy such as existed in France. Like his earlier work, this was not published at the time.

After the establishment of the Commonwealth, Filmer retreated into deeper obscurity. He continued to write, but as his ideas were anathema to England’s new rulers, publication was impossible. After an appeal to the landed classes to restore traditional government in *The Free-holders’ Grand Inquest*, he undertook an analysis of Aristotle’s *Politics* which dealt with the question of “mixt” as opposed to “pure” forms of government, and Filmer argued, as did the French writer Jean Bodin, for the superiority of the latter type.

In 1652 Filmer wrote *Observations Concerning the Original of Governments*, in which he enunciated a theory of absolutism that not only opposed the more liberal ideas of John Milton and Hugo Grotius, but that also differed with the more (to him) congenial ideas of his other contemporary Thomas Hobbes. Filmer rejected any sort of “social compact” whether stemming from man’s “natural goodness” as Milton would have had it or from his depravity as Hobbes averred, as the original basis for government. He also rejected extreme mechanism and thus alienated many contemporaries. Filmer was, however, a rationalist; before his death in 1653 he wrote two works which cast doubt on the validity of witchcraft, *An Advertisement to the Jurymen of England Touching Witches* and *The Difference between a Hebrew and an English Witch*.

After the Restoration a genuine wave of pro-monarchical sentiment existed, and Filmer’s once unpopular ideas were gradually resurrected. In 1679 his treatises (except the *Patriarcha*) were published. The remaining work appeared in print the following year.

EWB

Foucault, Michel (1926–1984), French philosopher, critic, and historian. Michel Foucault was an original and creative thinker who made contributions to historiography and to understanding the forces that make history.

Michel Foucault was born on October 15, 1926, in Pottiers, France, the son of Paul (a doctor) and Anne (Malapert) Foucault. He studied at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and at the University of Paris, Sorbonne, where he received his diploma in 1952. He served as director of the Institut Français in Hamburg and held academic posts at the Universities of Clermont-Ferrand and Paris-Vincennes. In 1970 he became professor and chairman of the History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France. A creative thinker, Foucault made substantial contributions to philosophy, history, literary criticism, and, specifically, to theoretical work in the human sciences. Often de-

picted as a “structuralist,” a designation he disavowed, Foucault had something of a following among French intellectuals. He died from a neurological disorder on June 25, 1984, cutting short a brilliant career.

Foucault was known for tracing the development of Western civilization, particularly in its attitudes toward sexuality, madness, illness, and knowledge. His late works insisted that forms of discourse and institutional practices are implicated in the exercise of power. His works can be read as a new interpretation of power placing emphasis on what happens or is done and not on human agency, that is, he sought to explore the conditions that give rise to forms of discourse and knowledge. Foucault was particularly concerned with the rise of the modern stress on human self-consciousness and the image of the human as maker of history. He argued that the 20th century is marked by “the disappearance of man” because history is now seen as the product of objective forces and power relations limiting the need to make the human the focus of historical causation.

Throughout his studies Foucault developed and used what he called an “archaeological method.” This approach to history tries to uncover strata of relations and traces of culture in order to reconstruct the civilization in question. Foucault assumed that there were characteristic mechanisms throughout historical events, and therefore he developed his analysis by drawing on seemingly random sources. This gives Foucault’s work an eclecticism rarely seen in modern historiography. His concern, however, was to isolate the defining characteristics of a period. In the *Order of Things* (1971) he claimed that “in any given culture and at any given moment there is only one *episteme* (system of knowledge) that defines the conditions of the possibility of all knowledge.” The archaeological method seeks to “dig up and display the archeological form or forms which would be common to all mental activity.” These forms can then be traced throughout a culture and warrant the eclectic use of historical materials.

Foucault’s archaeological method entails a reconception of historical study by seeking to isolate the forms that are common to all mental activity in a period. Rather than seeking historical origins, continuities, and explanations for a historical period, Foucault constantly sought the epistemological gap or space unique to a particular period. He then tried to uncover the structures that render understandable the continuities of history. His form of social analysis challenged other thinkers to look at institutions, ideas, and events in new ways.

Foucault claimed that his interest was “to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” By this he

meant the way in which human beings are made the subjects of objectifying study and practices through knowledge, social norms, and sexuality. Thus he applied his archeological method to sexuality, insanity, history, and punishment. Just prior to his death, *Concern for the Self*, the third of his projected five-volume *History of Sexuality*, was published in France. The first two volumes, *The Will to Know* (published in English as *The History of Sexuality Volume I*, 1981) and *The Use of Pleasure* (1985), explored the relation between morality and sexuality. *Concern for the Self* addresses the oppression of women by men. In these studies, as in his *Discipline and Punish* (1977) about the rise of penal institutions, Foucault isolated the institutions that are images of the *episteme* of modernity. His conclusion was that modernity is marked not by liberalization and freedom, but by the repression of sexuality and the “totalitarianism of the norm” in mass culture.

Foucault’s work continues to have significance for historical, literary, and philosophical study. In his later years Foucault wrote and spoke extensively on varying topics ranging from language to the relations of knowledge and power. In the span of a short career Foucault had considerable impact on the intellectual world. Yet given the complexity, subtlety, and eclecticism of his style, the full impact of his work has yet to be realized.

EWB

Fox, George (1624–1691), English spiritual reformer. George Fox was the chief inspirer of the Society of Friends, or Quakers.

The son of a weaver, George Fox was born in July 1624 at Fenny Drayton, Leicestershire. He became a cobbler with little book learning beyond the Bible. When he was 19, a voice told him to “forsake all”; so he became a dropout, wandering about England in a solitary quest for religious truth. Gradually he clarified his beliefs, convinced that he derived them from direct experiences of God’s light within him, “without the help of any man, book, or writing.”

Holding that every man and woman could be similarly enlightened by Christ, Fox began “declaring truth” in public and developed into a dynamic, fanatically sincere speaker. He preached in barns, houses, and fields and in churches “after the priest had done”; but because his zeal sometimes led him to interrupt services, he was imprisoned as a disturber of public order. Inspired by the “Inner Voice,” he became spiritual leader of some Nottinghamshire former Baptists but then went to the north of England, preaching, praying, and protesting at every opportunity. In 1652 he trudged about Yorkshire, a sturdy figure in leather

breeches wearing a broad-brimmed hat over the ringlets of hair which fell to his shoulders.

Though Fox denounced creeds, forms, rites, external sacraments, and a “man-made” ministry, he became something of a negative formalist, refusing to doff his hat to anyone or to call months and days by their pagan names; and he used “thee” and “thou” instead of “you.” Such flouting of conventions provoked intense opposition. Fox was repeatedly beaten by rowdies and persecuted by the pious, and the forces of law and order imprisoned him eight times for not conforming to the establishment. But his indomitable courage and his emphasis on the spirit rather than the letter of religion won him converts, even among his persecutors.

Paradoxically, this opponent of institutional religion showed a genius for organizing fellowships of Friends complete with unpaid officers, regular meetings, and funding arrangements. As a result, though his message was universal, individualistic, and spiritual, Fox founded what, by 1700, became the largest Nonconformist sect in England. In 1654 he organized a team of some 60 men and women as a mission to southern England. After converting many there, he extended his own preaching to Scotland (1657–1658), Wales (1657), Ireland (1669), the West Indies and America (1671–1673), the Netherlands (1677 and 1684), and Germany (1677). By 1660 he was issuing epistles to the Pope, the Turkish Sultan, and the Emperor of China. He was a strange mixture of fanaticism and common sense, selflessness and exhibitionism, liberalism and literalism.

In 1669 Fox married the outstanding female leader in the Quaker movement, Margaret, widow of his friend and patron Thomas Fell. But God’s service took priority over their partnership, which was interrupted by his missions, his imprisonments in 1673–1675, and his supervision of the movement. He died in London on Jan. 13, 1691.

Fox composed hundreds of tracts for his times, defending principles of the Friends and exposing other men as sinners and ministers of the Great Whore of Babylon; but it is by his *Journal*, a record of his day-to-day activities and thoughts, that he is best remembered.

EWB

France, Anatole (1844–1924), French novelist and essayist. The works of Anatole France combine classical purity of style with penetrating flashes of irony. He is a major figure in the tradition of liberal humanism in French literature.

Jacques Anatole François Thibault, who was to take the literary name of Anatole France, was born in

Paris on April 16, 1844, the son of a self-educated bookseller. He attended the Collège Stanislas, a Catholic school, but was far from a brilliant pupil and emerged with a lasting dislike of the Church. Greater intellectual profit came to him from browsing among his father's books and from friendships with influential customers, which led to work for a publisher. France's first book was a study of the poet Alfred de Vigny and was followed by poetry and a verse drama, politely received but not particularly successful. At the same time he was pursuing a career in literary journalism, and in 1877 he married Valérie Guéin, the daughter of a well-to-do family, with whom he had a daughter, Suzanne, in 1881.

Early Career. France's first great literary success came in 1881 with *Le Crime de Sylvestre Bonnard* (*The Crime of Sylvester Bonnard*). This story of an aging scholar betrays to the present-day reader an excessive sentimentality, but its optimistic theme and kindly irony were welcomed as a reaction against the brutal realism of the prevailing school of Émile Zola. The novel which followed, *Les Désirs de Jean Servien* (1882; *The Aspirations of Jean Servien*), was less well received. By the close of the 1880s France had established himself as a literary figure and had also begun a liaison with Madame Arman de Caillavet, who had a celebrated literary salon. Their relationship ended only with her death in 1910. France's marriage was dissolved in 1893.

In 1890 appeared *Thaïs*, set in Egypt in the early Christian era, treating the story of the courtesan Thaïs and the monk Paphnuce with tolerant irony and skepticism. It was followed in 1893 by *La Rôtisserie de la Reine Pédauque* (*At the Sign of the Reine Pédauque*), another tale with philosophical implications, this time set in the 18th century; and in 1894 by *Le Lys rouge* (*The Red Lily*), a more conventional novel of love in the wealthier classes, set largely in Italy. *Le Jardin d'Épicure* (1884; *The Garden of Epicurus*) consists of reprinted articles but contains the essence of France's attitude to the world at that point: a weary skepticism redeemed by an appreciation of the delicate pleasures of the mind.

Elected to the French Academy in 1896, France was at the height of a successful career. But his journalistic articles had begun to include social as well as literary criticism, and when the Dreyfus case came to a head in 1897, he felt obliged to take sides with the Jewish officer, whom he considered to have been wrongly condemned. For the rest of his life France was to abandon the political skepticism of his earlier years, while the irony in his books turned sharply critical of the contemporary world. This becomes increas-

ingly evident in four books of *L'Histoire contemporaine* (1897–1901; *Contemporary History*), in which the figure of Monsieur Bergeret acts as the representative of France's own views on the Dreyfus case and other social problems, and in the story *Crainquebille* (1901), in which the case was transposed into a parable of the unjust prosecution of a harmless and innocent street peddler.

Later Works. The book in which France's political irony reached its height was, however, *L'Île des Pingouins* (1908; *Penguin Island*), a penetrating glance at French history and life and perhaps the only satire in French literature which can be compared to Voltaire's *Candide*. The novel generally regarded as France's finest came out 4 years later: *Les Dieux ont soif* (*The Gods Are Athirst*). Set during the French Revolution, the book portrays the gradual development of a young artist, Évariste Gamelin, from his initial idealism and good nature to a point at which, through membership in a Revolutionary tribunal, his virtues have been transformed into a bloodthirsty and merciless fanaticism. France's own attitude is made clear through the character of Brotteaux, a formerly wealthy tax collector whose only possession is now his edition of Epicurus. Brotteaux, unjustly condemned by Gamelin's tribunal, meets the guillotine with stoic resolution. The novel ends with the overthrow of Robespierre and Gamelin's own execution.

France's last major work was *La Révolte des anges* (1914; *The Revolt of the Angels*), another satire, in which a group of angels attempt to free themselves from divine despotism. Less bitter than *L'Île des Pingouins* the book is also less successful. In France's later years he was increasingly involved politically with the extreme left and for a time became a supporter of the French Communist party. In 1921 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature; a year later his works were put on the papal Index. France, who had married again in 1920, died 6 months after his eightieth birthday, in 1924.

The many other books by France include collected articles on literary and social topics, volumes of autobiography, and a life of Joan of Arc. Regarded at the turn of the century as probably the most important French writer of his age, France lived too long for his reputation not to be viewed with impatience by a younger generation of writers who had little time for either his clarity of style or his polished irony. He himself had said, "People will reproach me for my audacity until they start reproaching me for my timidity." But if overvalued earlier, looked at in perspective, France's achievement as a novelist and satirist

and his stand for the principles of justice and tolerance mark him as a major writer.

EWB

Franco, Francisco (1892–1975), Spanish general and dictator. Francisco Franco played a major role in the Spanish Civil War and became head of state of Spain in 1939.

Born at El Ferrol, a town in the northeastern Spanish province of Galicia, on December 4, 1892, Francisco Franco was the second of five children born to Maria del Pilar Bahamonde y Pardo de Andrade and Don Nicolas Franco, who had continued the Franco family tradition by serving in the Naval Administrative Corp. The young Franco was rather active; he swam, went hunting, and played football. At 12, he was admitted to the Naval Preparatory Academy whose graduates were destined for the Spanish navy. However, international events conspired to cut short his anticipated naval career. In 1898, much of the navy had been sunk by the United States in the Spanish-American War. Spain was slow to rebuild, therefore many ports which had relied on naval contracts were plunged into an economic recession. El Ferrol was hit hard, and entrance examinations for the navy were cancelled, but not before Franco passed for entrance to the Toledo Infantry Academy in 1907. Franco inherited the nicknames “Franquito” or “Frankie Boy,” since he would not participate in the same activities as his fellow students. He became the object of malicious bullying and initiations, and graduated in the middle of his class in 1910. Until 1912, Franco served as a second lieutenant. He was first posted to El Ferrol but in 1912 saw service in Spanish Morocco, where Spain had become involved in a stubborn colonial war. By 1915, at age 22, he had become the youngest captain in the Spanish army. In 1916, he was severely wounded while leading a charge. He was decorated, promoted to major and transferred to Oviedo, Spain. During the next three years, he romanced Carmen Polo y Martinez Valdes, and delayed his plans for the Spanish Foreign Legion for marriage until 1923. Franco became commander in 1922 and rose to the rank of brigadier general (at the age of 33) by war’s end in 1926.

During the next few years, Franco commanded the prestigious General Military Academy in Saragossa. In 1928 a daughter, Carmen, his only child, was born. He maintained friendships with the dictator, Miguel Primo de Rivera, and King Alfonso XIII, but when both were overthrown and the Second Republic began a radical reconstruction of Spanish society, Franco surprisingly remained neutral and avoided military conspiracies.

Military governorships in Corunna and the Balearic Islands were followed by promotion to major general in reward for his neutrality, but with the advent of a more conservative Cabinet Franco commanded the Foreign Legion in the suppression of the Asturias revolt (October 1934). Now identified with the right, in 1935 he was made commander in chief of the army.

The Spanish Civil War. In February 1936 the leftist government of the Spanish republic exiled Franco to an obscure command in the Canary Islands. The following July he joined other right-wing officers in a revolt against the republic which is when the Spanish Civil War began. In October they made him commander in chief and head of state of their new Nationalist regime. During the three years of the ensuing civil war against the republic, Franco proved an unimaginative but careful and competent leader, whose forces advanced slowly but steadily to complete victory on April 1, 1939. On July 18 Franco pronounced in the Nationalists’ favor and was flown to Tetuán, Spanish Morocco. Shortly afterward he led the army into Spain. The tide was already turning against the Republicans (or Loyalists), and Franco was able to move steadily northward toward Madrid, becoming, on September 29, generalissimo of the rebel forces and head of state.

Franco kept Spain out of World War II, but after the Axis defeat he was labeled the “last of the Fascist dictators” and ostracized by the United Nations. Strong connections with the Axis powers and the use of the fascist Falange (“Phalanx”) organization as an official party soon identified Franco’s Spain as a typical antidemocratic state of the 1930s, but El Caudillo (the leader) himself insisted his regime represented the monarchy and the Church. This attracted a wide coalition linked to Franco, who, with the death of General Sanjurjo in 1936 and General Mola the next year, remained the only Nationalist leader of importance. By the end of the Civil War in March 1939, he ruled a victorious movement which was nevertheless hopelessly divided among Carlists, Requetés, monarchists, Falangists, and the army. Foreign opposition to Franco decreased and in 1953 the signing of a military assistance pact with the United States marked the return of Spain to international society.

The need to avoid immediate Axis involvement in order to begin recovery temporarily maintained the tenuous coalition. Franco’s statement, “War was my job; I was sure of that,” showed his hesitant attitude toward the prospect of civilian statecraft. Yet he maneuvered with finesse through World War II, begin-

ning with his famous rebuff of Hitler at Hendaye on October 23, 1940.

Except for sending the Blue Division to the Russian front, Franco resisted paying off his obligations to Germany and Italy. Instead he allied with Antonio Salazar, the Portuguese dictator, who counseled neutrality. Negotiations with the United States solidified this stand, and in October 1943 relations with the Axis powers were broken. But Allied antagonism was only somewhat mollified by this belated effort, and on December 13, 1946, the United Nations recommended diplomatic isolation of Spain.

Peacetime Government. Franco met this new threat by dismissing Serrano Suñer from office, removing the overtly fascist content from the Falange, and limiting all factional political activity. In 1946 the newly created United Nations declared that all countries should remove their ambassadors from Madrid. He also issued a constitution in 1947 which declared Spain to be a monarchy with himself as head of state possessing the power to name his successor. This successor might be either king or regent, thus leaving the future unresolved, a tactic which Franco capitalized on throughout most of the postwar period to prevent any group or individual from making strong claims upon his government. Cabinet ministers were chosen with an eye to national balance, and so slowly Spain moved away from sectarianism.

The economic and diplomatic situation remained difficult. In 1948 France closed its border with Spain, and exile groups, sometimes supported by the U.S.S.R., maintained extensive propaganda campaigns. Flying the banner of anticommunism during the emerging Cold War served him well. In 1950, the United States returned its ambassador and three years later the Americans were allowed four military bases in Spain. President Dwight D. Eisenhower personally greeted Franco in Madrid in 1959. Indeed, considering his Concordat with the pope in 1953, Franco can be said to "have arrived." Franco's regime became somewhat more liberal during the 1950s and 1960s. It depended for support not on the Falange, renamed the National Movement. Almost as if this signaled the end of isolation, tourist trade began picking up until within a few short years Spain had a substantial surplus in international payments. Spain enjoyed rapid economic growth in the 1960s and by the end of the century, its previously agricultural economy had been industrialized.

This upsurge permitted Franco to engage in a slow process of modernization that contained a few liberal elements. In May 1958 he issued the principles of the National movement, which contained a new

series of fundamental freedoms still dominated, however, by an absolute prohibition on political opposition or criticism of the government. On several later occasions control of the press was temporarily relaxed, and in 1966 the Cortes, up to then a purely appointive body, was made partially elective.

In matters of economic planning, however, Franco demonstrated more consistent liberal intent. He led a belated industrial recovery that raised the standard of living and decreased social unrest. Many of his later Cabinet technocrats, however, were members of Opus Dei, a relatively unknown Catholic laymen's organization reputed to have enormous economic power. Franco's reliance upon this group became obvious in 1969, when the Falange lost its official status.

Franco's health declined during the 1960s. In 1969 he designated Prince Juan Carlos, grandson of Spain's former king, Alfonso XIII, as his official successor. In 1973 Franco relinquished his position as premier but continued to be head of state. Such was the character of Franco's regime that the choice was rumored to have been made by the army, still the most important institution in Spanish society. In July 1974, Franco suffered an attack of thrombophlebitis, an attack that signaled a host of successive afflictions over the following 16 months: partial kidney failure, bronchial pneumonia, coagulated blood in his pharynx, pulmonary edema, bacterial peritonitis, gastric hemorrhage, endotoxic shock and finally, cardiac arrest. At one point, Franco exclaimed, "My God, what a struggle it is to die." On November 20, 1975, when relatives asked doctors to remove his support systems, the 82-year-old Franco passed away. After Franco's death in Madrid, Juan Carlos became king.

EWB

Frederick II, known as Frederick the Great (1712–1786), king of Prussia from 1740 to 1786. Frederick II combined the qualities of a warrior king with those of an enlightened despot.

The eldest son of Frederick William I of Prussia and of Princess Sophie Dorothea of Hanover, Frederick II was born in Berlin on Jan. 24, 1712. His father was a hardworking, unimaginative soldier-king, with no outward pretensions and no time to waste on superfluous niceties. Even as an adolescent Frederick, with the tacit support of his mother, rebelled against this mold. He preferred French literature to German and the company of young fops to that of old soldiers.

In 1730 Frederick and a young friend, Lieutenant Katte, planned a romantic escape to England, but their plot was discovered. The would-be escapees were arrested and condemned to death for desertion, and

Katte was executed in Frederick's presence. The crown prince was spared upon the entreaties of Emperor Charles VI, although it is doubtful that his father ever intended to go through with the execution. Frederick, however, was imprisoned in the fortress of Küstrin in the most rigorous conditions until, after some 6 months, he voluntarily approached Frederick William with a request for pardon. For the next 2 years, although still nominally a prisoner, Frederick was employed in a subsidiary position of the local administration of Küstrin, thus learning the intricacies of the Prussian administrative system.

In 1732 Frederick was appointed commandant of an infantry regiment and, having decided to obey his father, he learned soldiering with all the thoroughness with which he had previously avoided it. In 1733, at his father's insistence, he married Elisabeth Christine of Braunschweig, but his aversion to women was so pronounced that the marriage was, over the many years it lasted, never consummated.

Between 1733 and 1740 Frederick, who had grown into a young man whose unimposing stature was balanced by piercing blue eyes, an aquiline nose, and a good chin, exceeded even the expectations of his father in his dedication to hard, dull routine. But he also found time to devote himself further to French literature, to begin a lifelong correspondence with a number of French *philosophes*, and to try writing himself. One product of this period was the *Anti-Machiavel* (1739), a work in which he argued that the Italian's ruthlessly practical maxims for princes were no longer compatible with the more advanced ethics of a new age. He was soon given the opportunity to test his own conduct against these views.

War of the Austrian Succession. On May 31, 1740, Frederick William died, and Frederick became king of Prussia as Frederick II. Before he had time to accustom himself to his new position, the death of Emperor Charles VI on October 20 created a political crisis and presented Frederick with a unique opportunity. Like all the other leading powers of Europe, Prussia had subscribed to the Pragmatic Sanction, guaranteeing the succession of Charles's daughter Maria Theresa and the integrity of her dominions. But it was an open secret that at least France and Bavaria intended to make demands upon Austria as soon as the Emperor was dead, and Frederick saw no reason to stand by while others enriched themselves at Austria's expense. He offered to assist Austria in the maintenance of its possessions in exchange for the cession of the rich province of Silesia to Prussia. When this outrageous piece of blackmail was indignantly rejected, in December Frederick marched his troops

into Silesia, thus launching the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748).

In the first phase of this struggle the combined onslaught of Prussian, French, and Bavarian forces threatened to overwhelm Austria. Not wishing to bring about a situation more favorable to his potential rivals than to himself, Frederick withdrew from the war in 1742 with most of Silesia as his price. When Austria, relieved of the necessity of fighting the Prussians, threatened to crush its remaining enemies, Frederick reentered the war in 1744. The conflict was finally ended in 1748 with Silesia still firmly in Prussian hands.

Seven Years' War. Since the Austrians were antagonistic over the loss of Silesia, Frederick had reason to fear a renewal of the struggle. In the aftermath of the war both sides engaged in complicated diplomatic maneuvers. Austria, which had enjoyed a tentative alliance with Russia since 1746, tried to strengthen this while making overtures toward its old enemy France. Frederick in turn concluded the Treaty of Westminster (1755) with Great Britain, promising Prussian neutrality in the war that had just broken out between France and England. These maneuvers led directly to the Diplomatic Revolution, which in 1756 left Prussia facing an overwhelming Continental alliance of Austria, Russia, France, and Saxony. Rather than await inevitable death by constriction, Frederick attacked Austria, which he regarded as the weakest among the great powers facing him. Thus began the Seven Years' War (1756–1763).

In this conflict Frederick distinguished himself by continually keeping at bay much more powerful antagonists. He took advantage of the natural lack of cohesion of coalitions and fought his enemies, so far as possible, one at a time. The superior discipline of the Prussian army allowed Frederick to march it to the theater of war in small detachments, from various directions, uniting only shortly before a battle was to be fought. He also made the most of the oblique order of battle which he had inculcated in the Prussian army and which allowed him to concentrate his forces against emerging weak spots in his enemies' more ponderous formations.

In spite of these advantages, by 1762 Prussia was on the verge of bankruptcy, its army was in no condition to continue the war, and Russian troops had occupied Berlin. At this juncture Empress Elizabeth of Russia died; her successor, the mad Peter III, an admirer of Frederick, pulled Russia out of the war. Thus saved, Frederick was able to conclude the Peace of Hubertusberg (1763), which restored the prewar status quo.

The Seven Years' War taught Frederick that, while Prussia's recently acquired position as a great power had been successfully defended, any further adventures in foreign policy had to be avoided at all costs. Hereafter his policy was a strictly defensive one, bent primarily on preventing changes in the balance of power. This became evident when, in 1772, it appeared as if Austria and Russia were about to succeed in partitioning the Ottoman Empire. As there was no chance of securing reasonable compensation for Prussia, Frederick blustered and threatened until the principals agreed on a three-way partition of Poland. In 1778, when Joseph II of Austria attempted to acquire Bavaria, Frederick reluctantly went to war but engaged in no more than a half-hearted war of maneuver of which the Austrians at last tired; and in 1784, when Joseph tried to trade the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria, Frederick organized the League of German Princes to preserve the status of Germany.

Domestic Policies. Frederick had inherited a well-run state from his father, a circumstance that allowed him to fight his major wars. But he worked as hard at internal administration as at military leadership. He very reluctantly delegated authority, took all important decisions himself, and ruled through ministers responsible only to him. His ruthless insistence on hard work and honesty resulted in a doubling of the revenues of the state in his reign and a tripling of the available reserve fund, this last in spite of the devastation associated with the Seven Years War.

Frederick continued the traditional Prussian policy of encouraging immigration of economically productive elements, particularly peasants, into the more backward and underpopulated areas of the state. In contrast, his policy toward the established peasantry tended to be restrictive. In spite of the spirit of the times, he refused to abolish serfdom where it existed, fearing that such a measure would weaken the landed nobility, which produced both officers for his army and officials for his civil service.

In economics Frederick was a strict mercantilist, fostering the rather backward domestic industry with high tariffs wherever he could. He did not, however, extend these notions to the building of a fleet, so that Prussia did not participate in the great expansion of European overseas trade of the second half of the 18th century.

Apart from purely pragmatic measures, Frederick's reign was not a time of considerable reform. The one exception is the area of judicial procedure, where the efforts of his minister of justice, Cocceji, resulted not merely in a more extensive codification of the law

but in the acceptance of the principle that the law is foremost the protector of the poor and the weak.

During his reign Frederick continued to concern himself with literature and music. He became, in a sense, the host of the most famous salon in Europe. Voltaire was only the best known of the *philosophes* to take advantage of his hospitality. The Prussian Academy of Sciences, which had long languished and which he renewed in 1744, provided much-needed subsidies for both major and minor luminaries of the French Enlightenment. At the same time Frederick had no use for those obstinate enough to persist in writing in "barbaric" German, and the young Goethe was not the only German author deprived of royal assistance for this reason.

But Frederick was not content to be merely a patron of literature. He found time to produce, besides *Anti-Machiavel*, the *Mirror of Princes* and a series of histories dealing with his own affairs that at his death filled 15 volumes.

An Assessment. Frederick was both lionized and vilified long after his death. In Germany his more nationally minded admirers produced a cult of Frederick the Great, the precursor of the all-German hero. In other countries he was blamed as the inventor of an implacable German militarism let loose upon the world. Both these views are gross distortions. Frederick was always a Prussian nationalist, never a German one. And while he was a soldier-king, his pervasive interests throughout his life were nonmilitary. The latter part of his reign was unquestionably pacific and in some cases even propitiatory in nature.

Frederick did not have a first-rate analytical mind, but Voltaire's denunciations of him after their famous quarrel do not sound much more convincing than his panegyrics when he still hoped to get some of the royal money. Frederick was parsimonious, perhaps to a fault, but his funds were in fact severely limited. His treatment of his queen, whom he refused even the right to reside near him, was perhaps unforgivable. Frederick II died at his beloved summer residence, Sans-Souci, near Potsdam on Aug. 17, 1786, and was followed on the throne by his nephew Frederick William II.

EWB

Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939), Austrian founder of psychoanalysis. The work of Sigmund Freud marked the beginning of a modern, dynamic psychology by providing the first systematic explanation of the inner mental forces determining human behavior.

Early in his career Sigmund Freud distinguished himself as a histologist, neuropathologist, and clinical

neurologist, and in his later life he was acclaimed as a talented writer and essayist. However, his fame is based on his work in expanding man's knowledge of himself through clinical researches and corresponding development of theories to explain the new data. He laid the foundations for modern understanding of unconscious mental processes (processes excluded from awareness), neurosis (a type of mental disorder), the sexual life of infants, and the interpretation of dreams. Under his guidance, psychoanalysis became the dominant modern theory of human psychology and a major tool of research, as well as an important method of psychiatric treatment which currently has thousands of practitioners all over the world. The application of psychoanalytic thinking to the studies of history, anthropology, religion, art, sociology, and education has greatly changed these fields.

Sigmund Freud was born on May 6, 1856, in Freiberg, Moravia (now a part of the Czech Republic). Sigmund was the first child of his twice-widowed father's third marriage. His mother, Amalia Nathanson, was 19 years old when she married Jacob Freud, aged 39. Sigmund's two stepbrothers from his father's first marriage were approximately the same age as his mother, and his older stepbrother's son, Sigmund's nephew, was his earliest playmate. Thus the boy grew up in an unusual family structure, his mother halfway in age between himself and his father. Though seven younger children were born, Sigmund always remained his mother's favorite. When he was 4, the family moved to Vienna, the capital of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and one of the great cultural, scientific, and medical centers of Europe. Freud lived in Vienna until a year before his death.

Youth in Vienna. Because the Freuds were Jewish, Sigmund's early experience was that of an outsider in an overwhelmingly Catholic community. However, Emperor Francis Joseph had emancipated the Jews of Austria, giving them equal rights and permitting them to settle anywhere in the monarchy. Many Jewish families came to Vienna, where the standard of living was higher and educational and professional opportunities better than in the provinces. The Jewish people have always had a strong interest in cultural and intellectual pursuits; this, along with Austria's remaining barriers to social acceptance and progress in academic careers, was influential in Freud's early vocational interests. Had it been easier for him to gain academic success, it might have been more difficult for the young scientist to develop and, later, to defend his unpopular theories.

Although as he grew older Freud never practiced Judaism as a religion, his Jewish cultural background

and tradition were important influences on his thinking. He considered himself Jewish and maintained contact with Jewish organizations; one of his last works was a study of Moses and the Jewish people. However, at times Freud was unhappy that the psychoanalytic movement was so closely tied to Jewish intellectualism.

Freud went to the local elementary school and attended the humanistic high school (or gymnasium) from 1866 to 1873. He studied Greek and Latin, mathematics, history, and the natural sciences, and was a superior student. He passed his final examination with flying colors, qualifying to enter the University of Vienna at the age of 17. His family had recognized his special scholarly gifts from the beginning, and although they had only four bedrooms for eight people, Sigmund had his own room throughout his school days. He lived with his parents until he was 27, as was the custom at that time.

Prepsychoanalytic Work. Freud first considered studying law but then enrolled in medical school. Vienna had become the world capital of medicine, and the young student was initially attracted to the laboratory and the scientific side of medicine rather than clinical practice. He spent 7 instead of the usual 5 years acquiring his doctorate, taking time to work in the zoological and anatomical laboratories of the famous Ernst Brucke. At 19 he conducted his first independent research project while on a field trip, and at 20 he published his first scientific paper.

Freud received his doctor of medicine degree at the age of 24. An episode at about this time reveals that he was not simply the "good boy" his academic career might suggest: he spent his twenty-fourth birthday in prison, having gone AWOL from his military training. For the next few years he pursued his laboratory work, but several factors shifted his interest from microscopic studies to living patients. Opportunities for advancement in academic medicine were rare at best, and his Jewish background was a decided disadvantage. More important, he fell in love and wanted to marry, but the stipends available to a young scientist could not support a wife and family. He had met Martha Bernays, the daughter of a well-known Hamburg family, when he was 26; they were engaged two months later. They were separated during most of the four years which preceded their marriage, and Freud's over 900 letters to his fiancée provide a good deal of information about his life and personality. They were married in 1887. Of their six children, a daughter, Anna, became one of her father's most famous followers.

Freud spent 3 years as a resident physician in the famous Allgemeine Krankenhaus, a general hospital that was the medical center of Vienna. He rotated through a number of clinical services and spent 5 months in the psychiatry department headed by Theodor Meynert. Psychiatry at this time was static and descriptive. A patient's signs and symptoms were carefully observed and recorded in the hope that they would lead to a correct diagnosis of the organic disease of the brain, which was assumed to be the basis of all psychopathology (mental disorder). The psychological meaning of behavior was not itself considered important; behavior was only a set of symptoms to be studied in order to understand the structures of the brain. Freud's later work revolutionized this attitude; yet like all scientific revolutions, this one grew from a thorough understanding and acknowledged expertise in the traditional methods. He later published widely respected papers on neurology and brain functioning, including works on cerebral palsy in children and aphasia (disturbances in understanding and using words).

Another of Freud's early medical interests brought him to the brink of international acclaim. During his residency he became interested in the effect of an alkaloid extract on the nervous system. He experimented on himself and others and found that small doses of the drug, cocaine, were effective against fatigue. He published a paper describing his findings and also participated in the discovery of cocaine's effect as a local anesthetic. However, he took a trip to visit his fiancée before he could publish the later findings, and during his absence a colleague reported the use of cocaine as an anesthetic for surgery on the eye. Freud's earlier findings were overshadowed, and later fell into disrepute when the addictive properties of cocaine became known.

During the last part of his residency Freud received a grant to pursue his neurological studies abroad. He spent 4 months at the Salpêtrière clinic in Paris, studying under the neurologist Jean Martin Charcot. Here Freud first became interested in hysteria and Charcot's demonstration of its psychological origins. Thus, in fact, Freud's development of a psychoanalytic approach to mental disorders was rooted in 19th-century neurology rather than in the psychiatry of the era.

Beginning of Psychoanalysis. Freud returned to Vienna, established himself in the private practice of neurology, and married. He soon devoted his efforts to the treatment of hysterical patients with the help of hypnosis, a technique he had studied under Charcot. Joseph Breuer, an older colleague who had be-

come Freud's friend and mentor, told Freud about a hysterical patient whom he had treated successfully by hypnotizing her and then tracing her symptoms back to traumatic (emotionally stressful) events she had experienced at her father's deathbed. Breuer called his treatment "catharsis" and attributed its effectiveness to the release of "pent-up emotions." Freud's experiments with Breuer's technique were successful, demonstrating that hysterical symptoms could consistently be traced to highly emotional experiences which had been "repressed," that is, excluded from conscious memory. Together with Breuer he published *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), which included several theoretical chapters, a series of Freud's cases, and Breuer's initial case. At the age of 39 Freud first used the term "psychoanalysis," and his major lifework was well under way.

At about this time Freud began a unique undertaking, his own self-analysis, which he pursued primarily by analyzing his dreams. As he proceeded, his personality changed. He developed a greater inner security while his at times impulsive emotional responses decreased. A major scientific result was *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1901). In this book he demonstrated that the dreams of every man, just like the symptoms of a hysterical or an otherwise neurotic person, serve as a "royal road" to the understanding of unconscious mental processes, which have great importance in determining behavior. By the turn of the century Freud had increased his knowledge of the formation of neurotic symptoms to include conditions and reactions other than hysteria. He had also developed his therapeutic technique, dropping the use of hypnosis and shifting to the more effective and more widely applicable method of "free association."

Development of Psychoanalysis. Following his work on dreams Freud wrote a series of papers in which he explored the influence of unconscious mental processes on virtually every aspect of human behavior: slips of the tongue and simple errors of memory (*The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, 1901); humor (*Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*, 1905); artistic creativity (*Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood*, 1910); and cultural institutions (*Totem and Taboo*, 1912). He recognized that predominant among the unconscious forces which lead to neuroses are the sexual desires of early childhood that have been excluded from conscious awareness, yet have preserved their dynamic force within the personality. He described his highly controversial views concerning infantile sexuality in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), a work which initially met violent protest but was gradually accepted by

practically all schools of psychology. During this period he also published a number of case histories and a series of articles dealing with psychoanalysis as a therapy.

After 1902 Freud gathered a small group of interested people on Wednesday evenings for presentation of psychoanalytic papers and discussion. This was the beginning of the psychoanalytic movement. Swiss psychiatrists Eugen Bleuler and Carl Jung formed a study group in Zurich in 1907, and the first International Psychoanalytic Congress was held in Salzburg in 1908. In 1909 Freud was invited to give five lectures at Clark University in Worcester, Mass. He considered this invitation the first official recognition to be extended to his new science.

The new science was not without its difficulties. Earlier, Freud and Breuer had differed concerning their findings with regard to the role of sexual wishes in neurosis. Breuer left psychoanalysis, and the two men parted scientific company, not without some personal animosity. Ironically, Breuer saved his reputation at the time, only to be remembered by later generations because of his brief collaboration with Freud. During his self-analysis Freud developed a strong personal attachment to a philosophically inclined German otolaryngological physician, Wilhelm Fliess. From their letters one observes a gradual cooling of the friendship as Freud's self-analysis progressed.

At the same time Freud faced a major scientific reversal. He first thought that his neurotic patients had actually experienced sexual seductions in childhood, but he then realized that his patients were usually describing childhood fantasies (wishes) rather than actual events. He retracted his earlier statement on infantile sexuality, yet demonstrated his scientific genius when he rejected neither the data nor the theory but reformulated both. He now saw that the universal sexual fantasies of children were scientifically far more important than an occasional actual seduction by an adult. Later, as psychoanalysis became better established, several of Freud's closest colleagues broke with him and established splinter groups of their own, some of which continue to this day. Of such workers in the field, Jung, Alfred Adler, Otto Rank, and Wilhelm Reich are the best known.

Later Years. In 1923 Freud developed a cancerous growth in his mouth that led to his death 16 years and 33 operations later. In spite of this, these were years of great scientific productivity. He published findings on the importance of aggressive as well as sexual drives (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 1920); developed a new theoretical framework in order to organize his new data concerning the structure of the

mind (*The Ego and the Id*, 1923); revised his theory of anxiety to show it as the signal of danger emanating from unconscious fantasies, rather than the result of repressed sexual feelings (*Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, 1926); and discussed religion, civilized society, and further questions of theory and technique.

In March 1938 Austria was occupied by German troops, and that month Freud and his family were put under house arrest. Through the combined efforts of Marie Bonaparte, Princess of Greece, British psychoanalyst Ernest Jones, and W. C. Bullitt, the American ambassador to France (who obtained assistance from President Franklin D. Roosevelt), the Freuds were permitted to leave Austria in June. Freud's keen mind and ironic sense of humor were evident when, forced to flee his home at the age of 82, suffering from cancer, and in mortal danger, he was asked to sign a document attesting that he had been treated well by the Nazi authorities; he added in his own handwriting, "I can most warmly recommend the Gestapo to anyone." Freud spent his last year in London, undergoing surgery. He died on Sept. 23, 1939. The influence of his discoveries on the science and culture of the 20th century is incalculable.

Personal Life. Freud's personal life has been a subject of interest to admirers and critics. When it seemed necessary to advance his science, he exposed himself mercilessly, and, particularly in the early years, his own mental functioning was the major subject matter of psychoanalysis. Still, he was an intensely private man, and he made several attempts to thwart future biographers by destroying personal papers. However, his scientific work, his friends, and his extensive correspondence allow historians to paint a vivid picture.

Freud was an imposing man, although physically small. He read extensively, loved to travel, and was an avid collector of archaeological curiosities. Though interested in painting, the musical charms of Vienna had little attraction for him. He collected mushrooms and was an expert on them. Devoted to his family, he always practiced in a consultation room attached to his home. He valued a small circle of close friends and enjoyed a weekly game of cards with them. He was intensely loyal to his friends and inspired loyalty in a circle of disciples that persists to this day.

EWB

Froebel, Friedrich Wilhelm August (1782–1852), German educator and psychologist. Friedrich Froebel was a pioneer of the kindergarten system and influenced the growth of the manual training movement in education.

Friedrich Froebel was born on April 21, 1782, in Oberweissbach, a small village in Thuringia. His father was a Lutheran minister. His mother died 9 months after his birth. In 1797 Froebel was apprenticed to a forester in Thuringia. Two years later, while visiting his brother, Froebel took some courses at the University of Jena.

In 1801 Froebel returned home to be with his ailing father. After his father's death the following year he became a clerk in the forestry department of the state of Bamberg. From 1804 to 1805 he served as a private secretary to several noblemen.

Teaching Career. The year 1805 marked a turning point in Froebel's life. He went to Frankfurt intending to become an architect but instead ended up teaching in a preparatory school. The effect of this teaching experience on Froebel was such that he decided to make education his life's work. In 1808 he went to Yverdon, Switzerland, where he tutored boys attending Johann Pestalozzi's institute. Feeling somewhat lacking in his own educational background, he left Yverdon in 1811 and studied at the universities of Göttingen and Berlin until 1816. During this period he briefly served in the army raised by the German states to oppose Napoleon.

In 1816 Froebel opened the Universal German Educational Institute at Keilhau, a school based on his own educational theories. Its curriculum was comprehensive in nature, covering all aspects of the student's growth and development both physical and mental. In 1818 he married Henrietta Hoffmeister.

In Froebel's major educational work, *The Education of Man* (1826), he explained the basic philosophy which guided his educational undertakings: the unity of all things in God. This doctrine is evident in his work in the area of early-childhood education, to which he turned his attention in 1836. This culminated in the development of his famous kindergarten in 1840. That same year Froebel began to instruct teachers in the principles and methods of the kindergarten. His *Mutter- und Koselieder* (1843) is a song and picture book for children. He spent the remainder of his life elaborating, propagandizing, and defending the principles and practices embodied in the kindergarten.

In 1849, after spending approximately 5 years touring Germany and spreading the idea of the kindergarten, Froebel settled in Liebenstein. He spent the remainder of his life combating conservative forces critical of his educational theories. These forces managed in 1851 to get the Prussian government to ban the kindergarten on the grounds that it was an atheistic and socialistic threat to the state. This action was based not so much on what Froebel had done but

rather on his followers' misrepresentation of his educational ideas. He did what he could to restore confidence in his kindergarten but died on June 21, 1852, some 8 years before the ban was lifted by the Prussian government.

The Kindergarten. This preschool experience for children grew out of Froebel's belief that man is essentially part of the total universe that is God. He felt that the only way for one to become one's real self, as God intended, was through the natural unfolding of the innate qualities that made up the whole person. This process should begin as soon as possible and under as natural conditions as possible. The program encouraged free activity, so that forces within the child could be released; creativeness, since man, being part of the creative God, should also create; social participation, since man must by nature act in society (a departure from Rousseau); and motor expression, which is related to activity and learning by doing.

Analysis of Educational Theories. The favorable aspects of his view of the kindergarten lie in Froebel's emphasis on the child, the view that education is growth, the recognition of the importance of activity in education, and the position that knowledge is not the end of education. Less favorable in terms of modern thought is the heavy emphasis he placed on object teaching. Froebel believed in an almost mystical way that an object could in some way create *symbolic* meaning for a child (for example, association with a ball teaches the meaning of unity). In later years the use of objects was to become a formalized and fixed part of the kindergarten curriculum. The "unfolding of innate qualities" in a mystical manner has also been criticized as being unscientific.

EWB

Fry, Elizabeth (1780–1845), British reformer and Quaker lay evangelist. Elizabeth Fry worked for prison reform, particularly to relieve the physical misery and moral degradation of women prisoners.

An evangelist who relied on prayer and Bible-reading to inculcate virtue, Elizabeth Fry epitomized the reformer inspired by religious motives. She also relied on her access to the politically powerful, an advantage she enjoyed as a member of a well-connected Quaker family and enhanced by the celebrity status that she quickly attained through her prison visits. Her work on behalf of women prisoners caught the popular fancy, and she enjoyed a prestige in her country and in other European countries that few women in a society ruled by men could match. On the other

hand, England soon rejected her approach to prison reform.

People worried about the increase in crime that had started with the Industrial Revolution; it had increased even more after the end of the long wars with France brought extensive unemployment. A combination of the 18th-century Enlightenment critique of traditional institutions and a humanitarianism largely rooted in Evangelical (and Quaker) religion encouraged a fresh look at crime and punishment.

Fry inspired confidence as a devout, motherly woman of unquestionable sincerity. Her prison visits belonged to a tradition of well-off, benevolent women visiting the unfortunate, a kind of unpaid social work. Helping women prisoners appeared to be a respectable philanthropy for pious women with time, energy, and money to spare. Although the Society of Friends had an English membership of less than 20,000 during Fry's lifetime, Quaker women took a disproportionate role in charity and reform.

Elizabeth Fry was born into a happy, prosperous family, the Gurneys, at Norwich in eastern England, blighted only by the early death of her mother. Her father's relaxed Quakerism abandoned many of the restrictions identified with that religion, such as the requirement to wear only simple clothing and to avoid worldly society. She grew up enjoying fashionable parties and dances that earlier Quakers would have avoided. Some of her sisters would eventually withdraw from Quakerism to join the state Anglican Church, and her banker brothers would greatly add to the family riches.

Fry was in her teens in 1798 when an American member of the Society of Friends attacked the luxurious "gayness" of the local Quakers and awakened in Fry a sense of God that began her conversion to a strict Quakerism. This was not the common Evangelical conversion experience—a realization of guilt, followed by a sense of God's forgiveness—but instead a mystical communion with God. She never desired religious ceremonies or theology or a highly organized church. Her religion was a very personal one, founded on silent meditation, aided by the reading of the Bible, that sometimes led to informal but eloquent sermons. Virtually alone among religious denominations of the early 19th century, the small Society of Friends allowed women and men an equal right to speak at religious services because of the Quaker principle of direct inspiration.

Fry gradually adopted the strict Quaker policies on dress and Quaker peculiarities of speech (such as saying "thee" and "thou" instead of "you"). She became what contemporaries called a plain Friend. By 1799, she rejected singing as a distraction from true

piety. (Her younger brother Joseph John Gurney followed her in reviving many of the old distinctive practices of the Quakers that separated them from other people; although as the leader of the Evangelical Quakers, he encouraged good relations with all Evangelical Protestants.)

After her father's death in 1809, Fry began to speak at Quaker meetings and was recognized officially as a full minister two years later. Her marriage in 1800 to a London Quaker, Joseph Fry, delayed her wider public career; she bore ten children between 1801 and 1816 (and an 11th in 1822).

Prison Ministry Begins. Although at the urging of an American Quaker she had visited Newgate Gaol (jail) in London during 1813, it was at the end of 1816 that Elizabeth Fry began her systematic work as a prison reformer. She visited many prisons in the British Isles during the following years, but she made her special mission the reform of the women imprisoned in Newgate. Approximately 300 women and children were crowded in a women's ward comprising 190 square yards. Hardened criminals guilty of serious crimes were mixed with those jailed for minor offenses. Children lived in the prison with their mothers, in rags, filth, and idleness. As the prison furnished no uniforms, many poverty-stricken women existed half-naked. Prison policy combined occasional brutality with a permissiveness that allowed inmates considerable freedom tolerating drinking and fighting and made no attempt at rehabilitation, such as training the women for jobs outside prison walls.

In 1817, Fry organized the Association for the Improvement of Female Prisoners in Newgate. Two members visited the prisoners every day to read the Scriptures aloud. When Fry read from the Bible (and preached) at Newgate, so many people wanted to attend that the London magistrates authorized her to issue tickets. Association members adopted a personal approach toward women prisoners and tried to gain their active cooperation through kindness and persuasion. Fry's association put the women prisoners to work, sewing and knitting, under the supervision of prisoner monitors. With a prisoner as the instructor, it also organized a school for the women (and their children) to teach them to read the Bible. One of Fry's rules for the Newgate women declared "that there be no begging, swearing, gaming, card-playing, quarrelling, or immoral conversation."

Fry's work was not confined to Newgate. In 1818, she made a tour of prisons in northern England and Scotland with her brother Joseph John Gurney, described in a book published under his name, *Notes on a Visit Made to Some of the Prisons in Scotland and*

the North of England in Company with Elizabeth Fry. Middle-class ladies' committees sprang up to visit prisons all over the country. In 1821, they joined together as the British Ladies' Society for Promoting the Reformation of Female Prisoners.

Fry was an activist, not in most respects an original thinker. Ironically, most of her ideas resembled those of Jeremy Bentham, an earlier prison reformer who often is contrasted with Fry because he despised religion. Like Bentham, Fry favored classifying prisoners (in contrast to the prevalent mixing of all types), providing productive work for them, and establishing healthful living conditions. Her more distinctive opinions favored the employment of matrons to supervise women prisoners, rejected capital punishment (and flogging) in principle, minimized the role of unproductive hard labor such as working the treadmill, and repudiated bread-and-water diets. She tried, with modest success, to mitigate the sufferings of the women sentenced to transportation to Australia, a form of penal exile. Above all, she insisted that women criminals could be redeemed.

Her Influence Wanes. For a few years, Fry had the ear of Cabinet ministers and parliamentary committees, but she soon lost her influence. Overestimating what she could do, she offended those whom she wanted to persuade. This was the case in 1818 when she lobbied the Home Secretary, Lord Sidmouth, to stop the execution of a Newgate prisoner.

By 1827, when she published the short book *Observations on the Visiting, Superintendence and Government of Female Prisoners*, based on her practical experience, her time of importance had already passed. She continued to argue for the importance of local ladies' committees; the influence of public-spirited women was needed to supplement and correct the laws and regulations established by men. For the prisoners themselves, she urged the women visitors to show a spirit of mercy: "Great pity is due from us even to the greatest transgressors among our fellow-creatures."

Fry lost prestige (and money for her prison charities) when her husband's businesses failed in 1828. As a bankrupt, he was excluded from the Society of Friends, and the Fry family became dependent on the financial generosity of the wealthy Gurneys.

By the mid-1820s, other prison reformers increasingly advocated policies contrary to Elizabeth Fry's. Many Quakers (including two of her brothers-in-law) were prominent in the Society for the Improvement of Prison Discipline and the Reformation of Juvenile Reformers (founded in 1818), but after a brief period when it supported her, the Society lob-

bied for a centralized professional prison administration and detailed bureaucratic rules that left no place for the visits of "meddlesome" ladies' committees. Fry's rivals campaigned for the harsh prison policies pioneered in the United States in Philadelphia, such as solitary confinement and exhausting hard labor. These principles became law when Parliament adopted the Prison Act of 1835.

Although lacking any practical influence, Fry remained a celebrity, particularly on the continent of Europe. Acclaimed in 1838 and 1841 when she visited France and the German states, she was also honored in 1842 by the king of Prussia who visited her Bible-reading at Newgate and lunched at her home.

Two years after Elizabeth Fry died in 1845, two of her daughters published a *Memoir of the Life of Elizabeth Fry with Extracts from her Journal and Letters*, an abridgment in two volumes of her 44 volumes of handwritten journals. The *Memoir* sought to make Fry a saint and left out whatever the daughters regarded as not fitting that image. Until 1980, Fry's biographers failed to read the original journals.

Fry was not the perfect woman that her daughters presented. She embodied many contradictions. She adhered to a strict Quakerism that required plain living and the rejection of worldly vanities; yet, as some fellow Quakers grumbled, her simple clothes were cut from expensive fabrics, and she rejoiced in her opportunities to mingle with politicians, aristocrats, and royalty. Nothing was more important for her than her religion, yet, to her great anguish, she failed to nurture a commitment to Quakerism among her children, nearly all of whom left the Society of Friends when they grew up.

Despite her limitations, Elizabeth Fry deserves to be remembered as a genuinely good woman, as her contemporaries acknowledged, and a much wiser one than the men who belittled her as a naive amateur realized. In the early 19th century, women reformers were loved more often than they were respected. Although far from perfect, Fry's philosophy of prison reform avoided numbing bureaucracy and dehumanizing brutality and encouraged the participation of members of the general public in the conduct of prison life.

EWB

G

Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), Italian scientist. Galileo is renowned for his epoch-making contributions to astronomy, physics, and scientific philosophy.

Galileo was born in Pisa on Feb. 15, 1564, the first child of Vincenzo Galilei, a merchant and musician and an abrasive champion of advanced musical theories of the day. The family moved to Florence in 1574, and that year Galileo started his formal education in the nearby monastery of Vallombrosa. Seven years later he matriculated as a student of medicine at the University of Pisa.

In 1583, while Galileo was at home on vacation, he began to study mathematics and the physical sciences. His zeal astonished Ostilio Ricci, a family friend and professor at the Academy of Design. Ricci was a student of Nicolò Tartaglia, the famed algebraist and translator into Latin of several of Archimedes' works. Galileo's life-long admiration for Archimedes started, therefore, as his scientific studies got under way.

Galileo's new interest brought to an end his medical studies, but in Pisa at that time there was only one notable science teacher, Francisco Buonamico, and he was an Aristotelian. Galileo seems, however, to have been an eager disciple of his, as shown by Galileo's *Juvenilia*, dating from 1584, mostly paraphrases of Aristotelian physics and cosmology. Because of financial difficulties Galileo had to leave the University of Pisa in 1585 before he got his degree.

Early Work. Back in Florence, Galileo spent 3 years vainly searching for a suitable teaching position. He was more successful in furthering his grasp of mathematics and physics. He produced two treatises which, although circulated in manuscript form only, made his name well known. One was *La bilancetta* (The Little Balance), describing the hydrostatic principles of balancing; the other was a study on the center of gravity of various solids. These topics, obviously demanding a geometrical approach, were not the only evidence of his devotion to geometry and Archimedes. In a lecture given in 1588 before the Florentine Academy on the topography of Dante's *Inferno*, Galileo seized on details that readily lent themselves to a display of his prowess in geometry. He showed himself a perfect master both of the poet's text and of the incisiveness and sweep of geometrical lore.

Galileo's rising reputation as a mathematician and natural philosopher (physicist) gained him a teaching post at the University of Pisa in 1589. The 3 years he spent there are memorable for two things. First, he became exposed through reading a work of Giovanni Battista Benedetti to the "Parisian tradition" of physics, which originated during the 14th century with the speculations of Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme at the University of Paris. This meant the break-away point in Galileo's thought from Aristotelian

physics and the start of his preoccupation with a truly satisfactory formulation of the impetus theory. Second, right at the beginning of his academic career, he showed himself an eager participant in disputes and controversies. With biting sarcasm he lampooned the custom of wearing academic gowns. The most he was willing to condone was the use of ordinary clothes, but only after pointing out that the best thing was to go naked.

The death of Galileo's father in 1591 put on his shoulders the care of his mother, brothers, and sisters. He had to look for a better position, which he found in 1592 at the University of Padua, part of the Venetian Republic. The 18 years he spent there were, according to his own admission, the happiest of his life. He often visited Venice and made many influential friends, among them Giovanfrancesco Sagredo, whom he later immortalized in the *Dialogue* as the representative of judiciousness and good sense.

In 1604 Galileo publicly declared that he was a Copernican. In three public lectures given in Venice, before an overflow audience, he argued that the new star which appeared earlier that year was major evidence in support of the doctrine of Copernicus. (Actually the new star merely proved that there was something seriously wrong with the Aristotelian doctrine of the heavens.) More important was a letter Galileo wrote that year to Father Paolo Sarpi, in which he stated that "the distances covered in natural motion are proportional to the squares of the number of time intervals, and therefore, the distances covered in equal times are as the odd numbers beginning from one." By natural motion, Galileo meant the unimpeded fall of a body, and what he proposed was the law of free fall, later written as $s = 1/2(gt^2)$, where s is distance, t is time, and g is the acceleration due to gravity at sea level.

In 1606 came the publication of *The Operations of the Geometrical and Military Compass*, which reveals the experimentalist and craftsman in Galileo. In this booklet he went overboard in defending his originality against charges from rather insignificant sources. It was craftsmanship, not theorizing, which put the crowning touch on his stay in Padua. In mid-1609 he learned about the success of some Dutch spectacle makers in combining lenses into what later came to be called a telescope. He feverishly set to work, and on August 25 he presented to the Venetian Senate a telescope as his own invention. The success was tremendous. He obtained a lifelong contract at the University of Padua, but he also stirred up just resentment when it was learned that he was not the original inventor.

Astronomical Works. Galileo's success in making a workable and sufficiently powerful telescope with a magnifying power of about 40 was due to intuition rather than to rigorous reasoning in optics. It was also the intuitive stroke of a genius that made him turn the telescope toward the sky sometime in the fall of 1609, a feat which a dozen other people could very well have done during the previous 4 to 5 years. Science had few luckier moments. Within a few months he gathered astonishing evidence about mountains on the moon, about moons circling Jupiter, and about an incredibly large number of stars, especially in the belt of the Milky Way. On March 12, 1610, all these sensational items were printed in Venice under the title *Sidereus nuncius* (*The Starry Messenger*), a booklet which took the world of science by storm. The view of the heavens drastically changed, and so did Galileo's life.

Historians agree that Galileo's decision to secure for himself the position of court mathematician in Florence at the court of Cosimo II (the job also included the casting of horoscopes for his princely patron) reveals a heavy strain of selfishness in his character. He wanted nothing, not even a modest amount of teaching, to impede him in pursuing his ambition to become the founder of new physics and new astronomy. In 1610 he left behind in Padua his common-law wife, Marina Gamba, and his young son, Vincenzo, and placed his two daughters, aged 12 and 13, in the convent of S. Matteo in Arcetri. The older, Sister Maria Celeste as nun, was later a great comfort to her father.

Galileo's move to Florence turned out to be highly unwise, as events soon showed. In the beginning, however, everything was pure bliss. He made a triumphal visit to Rome in 1611. The next year saw the publication of his *Discourse on Bodies in Water*. There he disclosed his discovery of the phases of Venus (a most important proof of the truth of the Copernican theory), but the work was also the source of heated controversies. In 1613 Galileo published his observations of sunspots, which embroiled him for many years in bitter disputes with the German Jesuit Christopher Scheiner of the University of Ingolstadt, whose observations of sunspots had already been published in January 1612 under the pseudonym Apelles.

First Condemnation. But Galileo's real aim was to make a sweeping account of the Copernican universe and of the new physics it necessitated. A major obstacle was the generally shared, though officially never sanctioned, belief that the biblical revelation imposed geocentrism in general and the motionlessness of the earth in particular. To counter the scriptural

difficulties, he waded deep into theology. With the help of some enlightened ecclesiastics, such as Monsignor Piero Dini and Father Benedetto Castelli, a Benedictine from Monte Cassino and his best scientific pupil, Galileo produced essays in the form of letters, which now rank among the best writings of biblical theology of those times. As the letters (the longest one was addressed to Grand Duchess Christina of Tuscany) circulated widely, a confrontation with the Church authorities became inevitable. The disciplinary instruction handed down in 1616 by Cardinal Robert Bellarmine forbade Galileo to "hold, teach and defend in any manner whatsoever, in words or in print" the Copernican doctrine of the motion of the earth.

Galileo knew, of course, both the force and the limits of what in substance was a disciplinary measure. It could be reversed, and he eagerly looked for any evidence indicating precisely that. He obeyed partly out of prudence, partly because he remained to the end a devout and loyal Catholic. Although his yearning for fame was powerful, there can be no doubt about the sincerity of his often-voiced claim that by his advocacy of Copernicanism he wanted to serve the long-range interest of the Church in a world of science. The first favorable sign came in 1620, when Cardinal Maffeo Barberini composed a poem in honor of Galileo. Three years later the cardinal became Pope Urban VIII. How encouraged Galileo must have felt can be seen from the fact that he dedicated to the new pope his freshly composed *Assayer*, one of the finest pieces of polemics ever produced in the philosophy of science.

The next year Galileo had six audiences with Urban VIII, who promised a pension for Galileo's son, Vincenzo, but gave Galileo no firm assurance about changing the injunction of 1616. But before departing for Florence, Galileo was informed that the Pope had remarked that "the Holy Church had never, and would never, condemn it [Copernicanism] as heretical but only as rash, though there was no danger that anyone would ever demonstrate it to be necessarily true." This was more than enough to give Galileo the necessary encouragement to go ahead with the great undertaking of his life.

The Dialogue. Galileo spent 6 years writing his *Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems*. When the final manuscript copy was being made in March 1630, Father Castelli dispatched the news to Galileo that Urban VIII insisted in a private conversation with him that, had he been the pope in 1616, the censuring of Copernicanism would have never taken place. Galileo also learned about the benevolent

attitude of the Pope's official theologian, Father Niccolò Riccardi, Master of the Sacred Palace. The book was published with ecclesiastical approbation on Feb. 21, 1632.

Second Condemnation. The *Dialogue* certainly proved that for all his rhetorical provisos Galileo held, taught, and defended the doctrine of Copernicus. It did not help Galileo either that he put into the mouth of the discredited Simplicius an argument which was a favorite with Urban VIII. Galileo was summoned to Rome to appear before the Inquisition. Legally speaking, his prosecutors were justified. Galileo did not speak the truth when he claimed before his judges that he did not hold Copernicanism since the precept was given to him in 1616 to abandon it. The justices had their point, but it was the letter of the law, not its spirit, that they vindicated. More importantly, they miscarried justice, aborted philosophical truth, and gravely compromised sound theology. In that misguided defense of orthodoxy the only sad solace for Galileo's supporters consisted in the fact that the highest authority of the Church did not become implicated, as the Catholic René Descartes, the Protestant Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, and others were quick to point out during the coming decades.

The proceedings dragged on from the fall of 1632 to the summer of 1633. During that time Galileo was allowed to stay at the home of the Florentine ambassador in Rome and was detained by the Holy Office only from June 21, the day preceding his abjuration, until the end of the month. He was never subjected to physical coercion. However, he had to inflict the supreme torture upon himself by abjuring the doctrine that the earth moved. One hundred years later a writer with vivid imagination dramatized the event by claiming that following his abjuration Galileo muttered the words "Eppur si muove (And yet it does move)."

On his way back to Florence, Galileo enjoyed the hospitality of the archbishop of Siena for some 5 months and then received permission in December to live in his own villa at Arcetri. He was not supposed to have any visitors, but this injunction was not obeyed. Nor was ecclesiastical prohibition a serious obstacle to the printing of his works outside Italy. In 1634 Father Marin Mersenne published in French translation a manuscript of Galileo on mechanics composed during his Paduan period. In Holland the Elzeviers brought out his *Dialogue* in Latin in 1635 and shortly afterward his great theological letter to Grand Duchess Christina. But the most important event in this connection took place in 1638, when Galileo's *Two New Sciences* saw print in Leiden.

Two New Sciences. The first draft of the work went back to Galileo's professorship at Padua. But cosmology replaced pure physics as the center of his attention until 1633. His condemnation was in a sense a gain for physics. He had no sooner regained his composure in Siena than he was at work preparing for publication old, long-neglected manuscripts. The *Two New Sciences*, like the *Dialogue*, is in the dialogue form and the discussions are divided into Four Days.

Galileo found the justification for such a geometrical analysis of motion partly because it led to a striking correspondence with factual data. More importantly, he believed that the universe was structured along the patterns of geometry. In 1604 he could have had experimental verification of the law of free fall, which he derived on a purely theoretical basis, but it is not known that he sought at that time such an experimental proof. He was a Christian Platonist as far as scientific method was concerned. This is why he praised Copernicus repeatedly in the *Dialogue* for his belief in the voice of reason, although it contradicted sense experience. Such a faith rested on the conviction that the world was a product of a personal, rational Creator who disposed everything according to weight, measure, and number.

This biblically inspired faith was stated by Galileo most eloquently in the closing pages of the First Day of the *Dialogue*. There he described the human mind as the most excellent product of the Creator, precisely because it could recognize mathematical truths. This faith is possibly the most precious bequest of the great Florentine, who spent his last years partially blind. His disciple Vincenzo Viviani sensed this well as he described the last hours of Galileo: "On the night of Jan. 8, 1642, with philosophical and Christian firmness he rendered up his soul to its Creator, sending it, as he liked to believe, to enjoy and to watch from a closer vantage point those eternal and immutable marvels which he, by means of a fragile device, had brought closer to our mortal eyes with such eagerness and impatience."

EWB

Galton, Sir Francis (1822–1911), English scientist, biometrician, and explorer. Francis Galton founded the science of eugenics and introduced the theory of the anticyclone in meteorology.

Francis Galton was born on Feb. 16, 1822, at Birmingham, the son of Samuel Galton, a businessman, and Violetta Galton. After schooling in Boulogne and privately, he began to study medicine in 1838 but also read mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge.

The death of Galton's father in 1844 left him with considerable independent means, and he abandoned further medical study to travel in Syria, Egypt, and South-West Africa. As a result, he published *Tropical South Africa* (1853) and *The Art of Travel* (1855). His travels brought him fame as an explorer, and in 1854 he was awarded the Gold Medal of the Geographical Society. He was elected fellow of the Royal Society in 1856.

Turning his attention to meteorology, Galton published *Meteorographica* (1863), in which he described weather mapping, pointing out for the first time the importance of an anticyclone, in which air circulates clockwise round a center of high barometric pressure in the Northern Hemisphere. Cyclones, on the other hand, are low-pressure centers from which air rushes upward and moves counterclockwise.

Meanwhile, Galton had developed an interest in heredity, and the publication of *The Origin of Species* (1859) by Charles Darwin won Galton's immediate support. Impressed by evidence that distinction of any kind is apt to run in families, Galton made detailed studies of families conspicuous for inherited ability over several generations. He then advocated the application of scientific breeding to human populations. These studies laid the foundation for the science of eugenics (a term he invented), or race improvement, and led to the publication of *Hereditary Genius* (1869) and *English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture* (1874).

Finding that advances in the study of heredity were being hampered by the lack of quantitative information, Galton started anthropometric research, devising instruments for the exact measurement of every quantifiable faculty of body or mind. In 1884 he finally set up and equipped a laboratory, the Biometric Laboratory at University College, London, where the public were tested. He measured such traits as keenness of sight and hearing, color sense, reaction time, strength of pull and of squeeze, and height and weight. The system of fingerprints in universal use today derived from this work.

Galton's application of exact quantitative methods gave results which, processed mathematically, developed a numerical factor he called correlation and defined thus: "Two variable organs are said to be correlated when the variation of the one is accompanied on the average by more or less variation of the other, and in the same direction. Co-relation must be the consequence of the variations of the two organs being partly due to common causes. If wholly due . . . the co-relation would be perfect." Co-relation specified the degree of relationship between any pair of individuals or any two attributes.

The developed presentation of Galton's views on heredity is *Natural Inheritance* (1889). A difficult work, with mathematics not beyond criticism, it sets out the "law of 1885," which attempts to quantify the influence of former generations in the hereditary makeup of the individual. Parents contribute each one-quarter, grandparents each one-sixteenth, and so on for earlier generations. Claims that Galton anticipated Mendel's ratios seem without foundation. For Galton, evolution ensured the survival of those members of the race with most physical and mental vigor, and he desired to see this come about in human society more speedily and with less pain to the individual through applying eugenics. Evolution was an unrelenting progression, the nature of the average individual being essentially unprogressive.

Galton used his considerable fortune to promote his scientific interests. He founded the journal *Biometrika* in 1901, and in 1903 the Eugenics Laboratory in the University of London. He died at Haslemere, Surrey, on Jan. 17, 1911, after several years of frail health. He bequeathed £45,000 to found a professorship in eugenics in the hope that his disciple and pupil Karl Pearson might become its first occupant. This hope was realized.

EWB

Gama, Vasco da (ca. 1460–1524), Portuguese navigator. Vasco da Gama was the first to travel by sea from Portugal to India. The term "Da Gama epoch" is used to describe the era of European commercial and imperial expansion launched by his navigational enterprise.

Little is known of the early life of Vasco da Gama; his father was governor of Sines, Portugal, where Vasco was born. He first comes to historical notice in 1492, when he seized French ships in Portuguese ports as reprisal for piratical raids. When he was commissioned for his famous voyage, he was a gentleman at the court of King Manuel I.

Manuel, against the advice of a majority of his counselors, had decided to follow up Bartolomeu Dias's triumphal voyage round the Cape of Good Hope (1487–1488) with a well-planned attempt to reach all the way to the Malabar Coast of India, the ports of which were the major entrepôts for the Western spice trade with southeastern Asia. This trade had fallen under the control of Moslem merchants; the Venetians were only the final distributors to Europe of these valuable commodities.

Manuel hoped to displace the Moslem (and thus the Venetian) middlemen and to establish Portuguese hegemony over the Oriental oceanic trades. He also hoped to join with Eastern Christian forces

(symbolized to medieval Europeans by the legend of the powerful priest-king, Prester John) and thus carry on a worldwide crusade against Islam. Da Gama's voyage was to be the first complete step toward the realization of these ambitions.

Da Gama, supplied with letters of introduction to Prester John and to the ruler of the Malabar city of Calicut, set sail from the Tagus River in Lisbon on July 8, 1497. He commanded the flagship *St. Gabriel*, accompanied by the *St. Raphael* and *Berrio* (commanded, respectively, by his brother Paulo and Nicolas Coelho) and a large supply ship. After a landfall in the Cape Verde Islands, he stood well out to sea, rounding the Cape of Good Hope on November 22. Sailing past the port of Sofala, the expedition landed at Kilimane, the second in a string of East African coastal cities. These towns were under Moslem control and gained their wealth largely through trade in gold and ivory. Proceeding to Mozambique, where they were at first mistaken for Moslems, the Portuguese were kindly received by the sultan. A subsequent dispute, however, led da Gama to order a naval bombardment of the city.

Traveling northward to Mombasa, the Portuguese escaped a Moslem attempt to destroy the small fleet and hurriedly sailed for the nearby port of Malindi. Its sultan, learning of the bombardment to the south, decided to cooperate with da Gama and lent him the services of the famous Indian pilot Ibn Majid for the next leg of the journey. On May 20, 1498, the Portuguese anchored off Calicut, then the most important trading center in southern India, well prepared to tap the fabulous riches of India.

Their expectations, however, were soon to be deflated. The Portuguese at first thought the Hindu inhabitants of the city to be Christians, although a visit to a local temple where they were permitted to worship "Our Lady"—Devaki, mother of the god Krishna—made them question the purity of the faith as locally practiced. The zamorin, the ruler of Calicut, warmly welcomed the newcomers until his treasurers appraised the inexpensive items sent as gifts by King Manuel. In fact, the potentates of the East were at that time wealthier than the financially embarrassed Western kings, and the zamorin quite naturally had looked for a standard tribute in gold. The Portuguese merchandise did not sell well in the port, and the Moslem merchants who dominated the city's trade convinced the zamorin that he stood to gain nothing by concluding a commercial agreement with the intruders.

Amid rumors of plots against his life but with his ships stocked with samples of precious jewels and spices, da Gama sailed from Calicut at the end of

August 1498. The trip back to Portugal proved far more difficult than the voyage out, and many men died of scurvy during the 3-month journey across the Arabian Sea. The *St. Raphael* was burned and its complement distributed among the other ships. The remaining vessels became separated in a storm off the West African coast, and Coelho was the first to reach home (July 10, 1499). The da Gamas had gone to the Azores, where Paulo died, and Vasco arrived in Lisbon on September 9.

Da Gama returned twice to India: in 1502, when he bombarded Calicut in revenge for an attack on a previous Portuguese expedition; and in 1524, when he was appointed viceroy. On Dec. 24, 1524, Vasco da Gama died in the southwestern Indian city of Cochin. He was richly rewarded for his services by his sovereign, being made Count of Vidiguerira and Admiral of the Indian Seas and receiving pensions and a lucrative slice of the Eastern trade.

Da Gama's first voyage deserves to be compared with Columbus's more celebrated "discovery" of the New World. Neither man actually "discovered" unoccupied territories; rather, both linked anciently settled and developed parts of the world with Europe. The Spaniards subsequently conquered the "Indians" of the West, living in settler societies off their labor and natural resources; the Portuguese founded a sea-borne commercial empire from which they tried to drain middlemen's profits from a trade still on the whole unfavorably balanced against Europe.

EWB

Gaulle, Charles André Joseph Marie de (1890–1970), French general and statesman. Charles de Gaulle led the Free French forces during World War II. A talented writer and eloquent orator, he served as president of France from 1958 to 1969.

Charles de Gaulle was born on Nov. 23, 1890, in the northern industrial city of Lille. His father, Henri, was a teacher of philosophy and mathematics and a veteran of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, in which the Prussians humiliatingly defeated what the French thought was the greatest army in the world. This loss colored the life of the elder de Gaulle, a patriot who vowed he would live to avenge the defeat and win back the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. His attitude deeply influenced the lives of his sons, whom he raised to be the instruments of his revenge and of the restoration of France as the greatest European power.

From his earliest years Charles de Gaulle was immersed in French history by both his father and mother. For many centuries de Gaulle's forebears had played a role in French history, almost always as pa-

triotis defending France from invaders. In the 14th century a Chevalier de Gaulle defeated an invading English army in defense of the city of Vire, and Jean de Gaulle is cited in the Battle of Agincourt (1415).

Charles's great-great-grandfather, Jean Baptiste de Gaulle, was a king's counselor. His grandfather, Julien Philippe de Gaulle, wrote a popular history of Paris; Charles received this book on his tenth birthday and, as a young boy, read and reread it. He was also devoted to the literary works of his gifted grandmother, Julien Philippe's wife, Josephine Marie, whose name gave him two of his baptismal names. One of her greatest influences upon him was her impassioned, romantic history, *The Liberator of Ireland, or the Life of Daniel O'Connell*. It always remained for him an illustration of man's resistance to persecution, religious or political, and an inspiring example he emulated in his own life.

Perhaps the major influence on De Gaulle's formation came from his uncle, also named Charles de Gaulle, who wrote a book about the Celts which called for union of the Breton, Scots, Irish, and Welsh peoples. The young de Gaulle wrote in his copybook a sentence from his uncle's book, which proved to be a prophecy of his own life: "In a camp, surprised by enemy attack under cover of night, where each man is fighting alone, in dark confusion, no one asks for the grade or rank of the man who lifts up the standard and makes the first call to rally for resistance."

Military Career. De Gaulle's career as defender of France began in the summer of 1909, when he was admitted to the elite military academy of Saint-Cyr. Among his classmates was the future marshal of France Alphonse Juin, who later recalled de Gaulle's nicknames in school, "The Grand Constable," "The Fighting Cock," and "The Big Asparagus."

After graduation Second Lieutenant de Gaulle reported in October 1912 to Henri Philippe Pétain, who first became his idol and then his most hated enemy. (In World War I Pétain was the hero of Verdun, but during World War II he capitulated to Hitler and collaborated with the Germans while de Gaulle was leading the French forces of liberation.) De Gaulle led a frontline company as captain in World War I and was cited three times for valor. Severely wounded, he was left for dead on the battlefield of Verdun and then imprisoned by the Germans when he revived in a graveyard cart. After he had escaped and been recaptured several times, the Germans put him in a maximum security prison-fortress.

After the war de Gaulle went to general-staff school, where he hurt his career by constant criticism of his superiors. He denounced the static concept of

trench warfare and wrote a series of essays calling for a strategy of movement with armored tanks and planes. The French hierarchy ignored his works, but the Germans read him and adapted his theories to develop their triumphant strategy of blitzkrieg, or lightning war, with which they defeated the French in 1940.

When France fell, de Gaulle, then an obscure brigadier general, refused to capitulate. He fled to London, convinced that the British would never surrender and that American power, once committed, would win the war. On June 18, 1940, on BBC radio, he insisted that France had only lost a battle, not the war, and called upon patriotic Frenchmen to resist the Germans. This inspiring broadcast won him worldwide acclaim.

Early Political Activity. When the Germans were driven back, de Gaulle had no rivals for leadership in France. Therefore in the fall of 1944 the French Parliament unanimously elected him premier. De Gaulle had fiercely opposed the German enemy, and now he vigorously defended France against the influence of his powerful allies Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Franklin Roosevelt. De Gaulle once stated that he never feared Adolf Hitler, who, he knew, was doomed to defeat, but did fear that his allies would dominate France and Europe in the postwar period.

By the fall of 1945, only a year after assuming power, de Gaulle was quarreling with all the political leaders of France. He saw himself as the unique savior of France, the only disinterested champion of French honor, grandeur, and independence. He despised all politicians as petty, corrupt, and self-interested muddlers, and, chafing under his autocratic rule, they banded against him. In January 1946, disgusted by politics, he resigned and retreated into a sulking silence to brood upon the future of France.

In 1947 de Gaulle reemerged as leader of the opposition. He headed what he termed "The Rally of the French People," which he insisted was not a political party but a national movement. The Rally became the largest single political force in France but never achieved majority status. Although de Gaulle continued to despise the political system, he refused to lead a coup d'état, as some of his followers urged, and again retired in 1955.

Years as President. In May 1958 a combination of French colonials and militarists seized power in Algeria and threatened to invade France. The weakened Fourth Republic collapsed, and the victorious rebels called de Gaulle back to power as president of

the Fifth Republic of France. From June 1958 to April 1969 he reigned as the dominant force in France. But he was not a dictator, as many have charged; he was elected first by Parliament and then in a direct election by the people.

As president, de Gaulle fought every plan to involve France deeply in alliances. He opposed the formation of a United States of Europe and British entry into the Common Market. He stopped paying part of France's dues to the United Nations, forced the NATO headquarters to leave France, and pulled French forces out of the Atlantic Alliance integrated armies. Denouncing Soviet oppression of Eastern Europe, he also warned of the Chinese threat to the world. He liberated France's colonies, supported the Vietnamese "liberation movement" against the United States, and called for a "free Quebec" in Canada.

De Gaulle had an early success in stimulating pride in Frenchmen and in increasing French gold reserves and strengthening the economy. By the end of his reign, however, France was almost friendless, and his economic gains had been all but wiped out by the student and workers protest movement in spring 1968.

De Gaulle ruled supreme for 11 years, but his firm hand began to choke and then to infuriate many citizens. In April 1969 the French voted against his program for reorganizing the Senate and the regions of France. He had threatened to resign if his plan was rejected and, true to his word, he promptly renounced all power. Thereafter de Gaulle remained silent on political issues. Georges Pompidou, one of his favorite lieutenants, was elected to succeed him as president. Charles de Gaulle died at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises on Nov. 9, 1970.

EWB

Garbo, Greta (1905–1990), Swedish-born American film star. Greta Garbo became one of Hollywood's legendary personalities.

Born Greta Louisa Gustafsson on September 18, 1905, in Stockholm, Sweden, Greta Garbo grew up in respectable poverty—inhibited, self-conscious, and oddly mature. She was one of three children and became a legendary actress and one of the most fascinating women of all time. Garbo was a woman of remarkable beauty, intelligence, and independent spirit. Despite her beauty, Garbo was somewhat reclusive and photophobic. She once told a gossip columnist in France, "I feel like a criminal who is hunted . . . when photographers come, they draw crowds. I am frightened beyond control. When so many people stare, I feel almost ashamed."

She was a stagestruck girl of 14 when her job as a clerk in a department store led to photographic modeling for her employer's catalog. This in turn brought parts in two short advertising films and, at 16, a bathing beauty role in E. A. Petschler's film *The Vagabond Baron*. In 1923 Garbo was one of only seven students admitted to Sweden's prestigious Royal Dramatic Theatre Academy. While attending the training school, she chose her stage name and worked to develop her voice. Her studies at the academy served as both the foundation for her acting career and a source of several lifelong friendships with other actors and artists.

Within a year, one of Sweden's foremost film directors, Mauritz Stiller, recognized Garbo's unique beauty and immense talent. Stiller selected Garbo to play the role of Countess Elizabeth Dohna in the Swedish film *The Atonement of Gosta Berling* (1924). The film was considered a silent screen masterpiece and was a huge success throughout Europe. Garbo was soon cast in the leading role of *Joyless Street*, the definitive masterpiece of German realistic cinema, directed by G. W. Pabst. The film received international acclaim for its depth of feeling and technical innovations. The film and Garbo's performance were a critical success, shattering box office records.

Driving her unmercifully, Stiller molded her into an actress and insisted on bringing her with him to the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) studio in Hollywood in the summer of 1925. Through Stiller, she won an assignment in her first American film *The Torrent* (1926). Garbo quickly became the reigning star of Hollywood, due to both the box office success of her films and her captivating performances. She starred in eleven silent films. Her dramatic presence on the screen redefined acting. Garbo's aura created a unique balance between femininity and independence, proving that these qualities were not mutually exclusive. While many of her silent film contemporaries failed in making the transition to sound films, Garbo found artistic expression and thrived in this breakthrough medium. Her voice added a wonderful new dimension to her characters. She then starred in *The Temptress* (1926) and *Flesh and the Devil* (1927), which not only made her famous but introduced her to John Gilbert, with whom she conducted (both on and off the screen) a flaming romance which lasted several years. On the day they were to be married, Garbo left Gilbert standing at the altar.

Garbo's first sound picture was *Anna Christie* (1930), based on a play by American dramatist Eugene O'Neill. The sound scene was a tour de force, the longest, continuous sound take of the time. Because of the film's extraordinary success, MGM cre-

ated a German language version with Garbo and an entirely new cast. Garbo's ability to act successfully in two languages demonstrates her remarkable range and linguistic talent.

Garbo's career continued to flourish. She starred in 15 sound films including such classics as *Mata Hari* (1932), *As You Desire Me* (1932), and *Queen Christina* (1933), one of her first classic roles. Director Rouben Mamoulian used Garbo's mask-like visage as a canvas upon which the audience ascribed an array of intense emotions. This use of her face as an expressive conduit became Garbo's signature style, and she created magic with it in her starring roles in *Susan Lennox: Her Fall and Rise* (1931 with Clark Gable), *Grand Hotel* (1932), *Anna Karenina* (1935), *Camille* (1936), *Conquest* (1937), and *Ninotchka* (1939).

Garbo gradually withdrew into an isolated retirement in 1941 after the failure of *Two-Faced Woman*, a domestic comedy. Her retirement was also partly because of World War II. She was tempted by a number of very interesting acting possibilities, but, unfortunately, none of the projects came to fruition.

Her twenty years of brilliant film portrayals created a cinematic legend characterized by financial success. During the mid-1930's she was America's highest paid female. Garbo's retirement from films did not mark the end of a very busy, independent life. Without the pressures of filmmaking, Garbo had the opportunity to turn to other creative pursuits such as painting, poetry, creative design of clothing and furnishings, gardening, and a rigorous daily exercise routine. In 1950 Garbo was chosen the best actress of the half-century in a poll conducted by the theatrical newspaper *Variety*. She became a U.S. citizen in 1951, and in 1954 she received (in absentia) a special Academy Award for "her unforgettable screen performances." Garbo moved to New York City in 1953 and traveled extensively. She died at her home in New York on April 15, 1990.

EWB

Geertz, Clifford (1926–), American cultural anthropologist. Clifford Geertz did ethnographic field work in Indonesia and Morocco, wrote influential essays on central theoretical issues in the social sciences, and advocated a distinctive "interpretive" approach to anthropology.

Clifford Geertz was born in San Francisco on August 23, 1926. After serving in the U.S. Navy during World War II, he received a B.A. from Antioch College in 1950 and a Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1956. Having held a number of brief appointments early in his career, he took a position at the University of Chicago in 1960, where he was rapidly promoted

to associate and then full professor. In 1970 he joined the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, as professor of social science, a position of rare distinction which he still occupied in 1999. Over the years Geertz received a considerable number of honors and awards, including honorary degrees from several institutions. In 1958 and 1959 he was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Stanford) and in 1978–1979 he served as Eastman Professor at Oxford University. His books won major prizes, including the prestigious 1988 National Book Critics Circle Award for Criticism for *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author*.

In 1952 Geertz first went to Indonesia with a team of investigators to study Modjokuto, a small town in east central Java, where he and his wife lived for more than a year. On the basis of his research there Geertz wrote his dissertation, later published in 1960 as *The Religion of Java*. A comprehensive analysis of Javanese religion in its social context, this book presents a picture of a highly religious culture composed of at least three main strands (related to different population groups). These include a traditional kind of animism, Islam (itself internally diverse), and a Hindu-influenced refined mysticism.

In later years Geertz returned to Java but also spent extensive periods in Tabanan, a small town in Bali. Initially treated with complete indifference by the Balinese, Geertz and his wife gained significant access to their community. He presented his interpretation of his time there in a classic essay on the Balinese cockfight. Both in the matching of the cocks and in the bets surrounding the fight, the Balinese dramatized their concern with maintaining a definite hierarchy of rivalries and groups in which everyone had his or her fixed place.

Geertz carried out field work in Sefrou, a town in north central Morocco, in the 1960s and early 1970s, enabling him to compare two "extremes" of Islamic civilization: homogeneous and morally severe in Morocco and blended with other traditions and less concerned with scriptural doctrine in Indonesia. In both countries he found traditional religion affected by the process of secularization; whereas people used to "be held" by taken-for-granted beliefs, in modern societies they increasingly have to "hold" their beliefs in a much more conscious (and anxious) fashion. Geertz published *Islam Observed* in 1968.

In his early work Geertz investigated why certain communities achieved greater economic growth and modernization than others. For example, he found that the "ego-focused" market peddlers of Modjokuto, who only looked out for their own and their families' gain, were in a less favorable position

than the “group-focused” Tabanan aristocrats. The latter group could use their traditional prestige to mobilize communal resources for new investments, even though they had to temper their modern entrepreneurial drive with concern for the well-being of their community.

Geertz also authored a number of essays which elaborate on his theories, including *The Interpretation of Cultures* in 1973 and *Local Knowledge* in 1983.

In 1995, Geertz published *After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist*. In the book, he charted the transformation of cultural anthropology from a study of primitive people to a multidisciplinary investigation of a culture’s symbolic systems and its interactions with the larger forces of history and modernization. Geertz used the greatest strength of anthropology (the ability to compare cultures). His periods of extended fieldwork in Indonesia and Morocco enabled him to view each through the lens of the other. He also used anecdotes in the book of non-western countries tackling the same social questions as Western countries: national identity, moral order, and competing values.

Throughout his career Geertz tried to make sense of the ways people live their lives by interpreting cultural symbols such as ceremonies, political gestures, and literary texts. Geertz was also interested in the role of thought (especially religious thought) in society. Analyzing this role properly, he argued, requires “thick description,” a probing appraisal of the meanings people’s actions have for them in their own circumstances. Geertz tried to demonstrate in his own work. Skeptical of attempts to develop abstract theories of human behavior but sensitive to issues of universal human concern, he emphasized that anthropologists should focus on the rich texture of the lives of real human beings. Yet he showed that in writing about others one necessarily transforms “their” world; the very style in which social scientists write conveys their distinctive interpretation. Geertz’ own highly sophisticated, but dense and occasionally convoluted writing style exemplifies his influential “interpretive” approach to cultural anthropology.

EWB

Goebbels, Joseph Paul (1897–1945), German politician. Joseph Goebbels directed the extensive system of propaganda in Nazi Germany.

Joseph Goebbels was born on Oct. 29, 1897, in the Rhenish textile city of Rheydt, the son of a pious Catholic bookkeeper of modest means. With the support of stipends granted by Catholic organizations, the young Goebbels attended the university and earned a doctorate in literature in 1922.

After a number of unsuccessful attempts as writer, journalist, and speaker, Goebbels joined the National Socialist organization in northern Germany under Gregor Strasser in 1924 and edited various publications of this group from 1924 to 1926. In the late summer of 1925 Goebbels first met Hitler, was immediately enamored with the Führer, and broke with Strasser in November 1926 to go to Berlin as *Gauleiter* (district leader) upon Hitler’s request. Here he founded and edited the party weekly, *Der Angriff* (The Attack). He took over the propaganda machine of the party in 1928 and became minister of popular enlightenment and propaganda with Hitler’s rise to power in 1933.

From this position Goebbels built a machinery of thought control, which not only served as an effective support for the Nazi regime and later the war effort, but also actively limited and shaped all forms of artistic and intellectual expression to conform to the ideals of National Socialism and, most particularly, racist anti-Semitism. This involved the control of the press through censorship and removal of Jewish and non-Nazi editors and the establishment of government-sponsored radio stations, newspapers, and magazines. Jewish artists, musicians, writers, and even natural scientists, many of Germany’s ablest men and women, were removed and often sent to concentration camps. Works by Jewish composers and writers were burned and outlawed. “Decadent” modern art was replaced by a Nazi standard of pseudoromantic, sentimental art. Education on all levels was similarly controlled.

Mass rallies, ever-present loudspeaker systems, and the mass production and distribution of “people’s radios” ensured wide dissemination of Hitler’s demagogic appeals to the nation. Goebbels, who had an unusually appealing speaking voice, increasingly became the Führer’s channel of communication with the population. Most notorious was Goebbels’s speech in August 1944 in the Sports Palace of Berlin, in which he fanatically called for total war. His fanaticism lasted to the end. In 1945 Goebbels called for the destruction of the German people since they had not been able to win victory. He stayed with Hitler even after Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler had sought contacts with the Allies. Goebbels killed himself and his entire family in Berlin on May 1, 1945, only hours after Hitler’s suicide.

EWB

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749–1832), German poet, dramatist, novelist, and scientist. Goethe, who embraced many fields of human endeavor, ranks

as the greatest of all German poets. Of all modern men of genius, Goethe is the most universal.

The many-sided activities of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe stand as a tribute to the greatness of his mind and his personality. Napoleon I's oft-quoted remark about Goethe, made after their meeting at Erfurt—"Voilà un homme!" (There's a man!) reflects later humanity's judgment of Goethe's genius. Not only, however, does Goethe rank with Homer, Dante Alighieri, and William Shakespeare as a supreme creator, but also in his life itself incredibly long, rich, and filled with a calm optimism Goethe perhaps created his greatest work, surpassing even his *Faust*, Germany's most national drama.

Goethe was born in Frankfurt am Main on Aug. 28, 1749. He was the eldest son of Johann Kaspar Goethe and Katharina Elisabeth Textor Goethe. Goethe's father, of Thuringian stock, had studied law at the University of Leipzig. He did not practice his profession, but in 1742 he acquired the title of *kaiserlicher Rat* (imperial councilor). In 1748 he married the daughter of Frankfurt's burgomaster. Of the children born to Goethe's parents only Johann and his sister Cornelia survived to maturity. She married Goethe's friend J. G. Schlosser in 1773. Goethe's lively and impulsive disposition and his remarkable imaginative powers probably came to him from his mother, and he likely inherited his reserved manner and his stability of character from his stern and often pedantic father.

Early Life. Goethe has left a memorable picture of his childhood, spent in a large patrician house on the Grosse Hirschgraben in Frankfurt, in his autobiography *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. He and Cornelia were educated at home by private tutors. Books, pictures, and a marionette theater kindled the young Goethe's quick intellect and imagination.

During the Seven Years War the French occupied Frankfurt. A French theatrical troupe established itself, and Goethe, through his grandfather's influence, was allowed free access to its performances. He much improved his knowledge of French by attending the performances and by his contact with the actors. Meantime, his literary proclivities had begun to manifest themselves in religious poems, a novel, and a prose epic.

In October 1765 Goethe, then 16 years old, left Frankfurt for the University of Leipzig. He remained in Leipzig until 1768, pursuing his legal studies with zeal. During this period he also took lessons in drawing from A. F. Oeser, the director of the Leipzig Academy of Painting. Art always remained an abiding interest throughout Goethe's life.

During his Leipzig years Goethe began writing light Anacreontic verses. Much of his poetry of these years was inspired by his passionate love for Anna Katharina Schönkopf, the daughter of a wine merchant in whose tavern he dined. She was the "Annette" for whom the collection of lyrics discovered in 1895 was named.

The rupture of a blood vessel in one of his lungs put an end to Goethe's Leipzig years. From 1768 to the spring of 1770 Goethe lay ill, first in Leipzig and later at home.

It was a period of serious introspection. The Anacreontic playfulness of verse and the rococo manner of his Leipzig period were soon swept away as Goethe grew in stature as a human being and as a poet.

Study in Strasbourg. Goethe's father was determined his son should continue his legal studies. Upon his recovery, therefore, Goethe was sent to Strasbourg, the capital of Alsace and a city that lay outside the German Empire. There his true Promethean self and his poetic genius were fully awakened. One of the most important events of Goethe's Strasbourg period was his meeting with Johann Gottfried von Herder. Herder taught Goethe the significance of Gothic architecture, as exemplified by the Strasbourg Minster, and he kindled Goethe's love of Homer, Pindar, Ossian, Shakespeare, and the *Volkslied*. Without neglecting his legal studies, Goethe also studied medicine.

Perhaps the most important occurrence of this period was Goethe's love for Friederike Brion, the daughter of the pastor of the nearby village of Sesenheim. Later Goethe immortalized Friederike as Gretchen in *Faust*. She also inspired the *Friederike Songs* and many beautiful lyrics. *Kleine Blumen, kleine Blätter* and *Wie herrlich leuchtet mir die Natur!* heralded a new era in German lyric poetry.

During this Strasbourg period Goethe also reshaped his Alsatian *Heidenröslein*. His lyrical response to the Gothic architecture of Strasbourg Minster appeared in his essay *Von deutscher Baukunst* (1772). Goethe also probably planned his first important drama, *Götz von Berlichingen*, while in Strasbourg. In August 1771 Goethe obtained a licentiate in law, though not a doctor's degree. He returned to Frankfurt in September and remained there until early 1772.

"Sturm und Drang" Period. From spring to September 1772 Goethe spent 4 months in Wetzlar in order to gain experience in the legal profession at the supreme courts of the empire. However, Goethe

found a more genial society in a local inn among the “Knights of the Round Table,” calling himself “Götz von Berlichingen.”

Goethe's passionate love for Charlotte Buff, who was the daughter of the Wetzlar *Amtmann* (bailiff) and was engaged to Johann Christian Kestner, the secretary of legation and a member of the Round Table, created a crisis. Out of its agony—Goethe's obsession with Charlotte led him almost to suicide—the poet created the world-famous novel *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers* (1774). A Rhine journey in the autumn of 1772 and intense preoccupation with his literary projects on his return to Frankfurt brought partial recovery to Goethe.

Goethe remained in Frankfurt until the autumn of 1775, and these were years of fantastic productivity. *Götz von Berlichingen* was finished in 1773. This play established the Shakespearean type of drama on the German stage and inaugurated the *Sturm und Drang* movement. Another play, *Clavigo*, soon followed. A tragedy, *Clavigo* marked considerable advancement in Goethe's art. *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers* appeared in 1774. This novel, written in the epistolary style, brought Goethe international fame and spread “Werther fever” throughout Europe and even into Asia. A sentimental story of love and suicide, *Werther* utilized the private and social experiences of its author's months in Wetzlar, molding them into one of the most powerful introspective novels of all time. Its psychological impact upon Goethe's contemporaries and its influence on German literature can scarcely be exaggerated.

Many unfinished fragments, some of them magnificent, also date from these years. Goethe worked on the dramas *Caesar* and *Mahomet* and the epic *Der ewige Jude*. A fragment of *Prometheus*, a tragedy, ranks among the poet's masterpieces. Perhaps the greatest work from these years was Goethe's first dramatization of the Faust legend.

During these years Goethe's poetic genius found its own unique self. The masterpieces of this great *Sturm und Drang* period include *Wanderers Sturmlied* (1771); *Mahomets Gesang* (1772–1773); *An Schwager Kronos* (1774); *Prometheus* (1774), a symbol of the self-confident genius; and *Ganymed* (1774), the embodiment of man's abandonment to the mysteries of the universe.

In 1775 Goethe fell in love with Lili Schöne-mann, the daughter of a Frankfurt banker. Goethe became formally betrothed to her, and Lili inspired many beautiful lyrics. However, the worldly society Lili thrived in was not congenial to the poet. A visit to Switzerland in the summer of 1775 helped Goethe realize that this marriage might be unwise, and the engagement lapsed that autumn. *Neue Liebe, Neues*

Leben and *An Belinden* (both 1775) are poetic expressions of Goethe's happiest hours with Lili, while *Auf dem See*, written on June 15, 1775, reflects his mood after he broke the spell that his love for Lili had cast upon him. Goethe also conceived another drama during these Frankfurt years and actually wrote a great part of it. However, he did not publish *Egmont* until 1788. Graf Egmont, its protagonist, is endowed with a demonic power over the sympathies of both men and women, and he represents the lighter side of Goethe's visionary foil to Faust, and his more optimistic outlook.

Career in Weimar. On Oct. 12, 1775, the young prince of Weimar, Duke Karl August, arrived in Frankfurt and extended an invitation to Goethe to accompany him to Weimar. On November 7 Goethe arrived in the capital of the little Saxon duchy that was to remain his home for the rest of his life. The young duke soon enlisted Goethe's services in the government of his duchy, and before long Goethe had been entrusted with responsible state duties.

As minister of state, Goethe interested himself in agriculture, horticulture, and mining, all fields of economic importance to the duchy's welfare. Eventually his many state offices in Weimar and his social and political commitments became a burden and a hindrance to his creative writing. Perhaps Goethe's most irksome responsibility was the office of president of the Treasury after 1782.

Goethe made his first long stay at Weimar from November 1775 until the summer of 1786. In 1782 Emperor Joseph II conferred a knighthood on him. During these 12 years Goethe's attachment for Charlotte von Stein, the wife of a Weimar official and the mother of seven children, dominated his emotional life. A woman of refined taste and culture, Frau von Stein was 7 years Goethe's senior and was perhaps the most intellectual of the poet's many loves.

The literary output of the first Weimar period included a number of lyrics (*Wanderers Nachtlied*, *An den Mond*, and *Gesang der Geister über den Wassern*), ballads (*Der Erlkönig*), a short drama (*Die Geschwister*), a dramatic satire (*Der Triumph der Empfindsamkeit*), and several *Singspiele* (*Lila*; *Die Fischerin*; *Scherz*; *List und Rache*; and *Jery und Bätely*). Goethe also planned a religious epic (*Die Geheimnisse*) and a tragedy (*Elpenor*). In 1777 Goethe began to write a theatrical novel, *Wilhelm Meisters theatralische Sendung*. In 1779 the prose version of his drama *Iphigenie auf Tauris* was performed.

Under Frau von Stein's influence Goethe matured as an artist as well as a personality. His course toward artistic and human harmony and renunciation

was mirrored in several poems written during this period: *Harzreise im Winter* (1777); *Ein Gleiches* (1780), *Ilmenau* (1783), and *Zueignung* (1784).

Italian Journey. In September 1786 Goethe set out from Karlsbad on his memorable and intensely longed-for journey to Italy. He traveled by way of Munich, the Brenner Pass, and Lago di Garda to Verona and Venice. He arrived in Rome on Oct. 29, 1786, and soon established friendships in the circle of German artists. In the spring of 1787 Goethe traveled to Naples and Sicily, returning to Rome in June 1787. He departed for Weimar on April 2, 1788.

It would be almost impossible to overstate the importance of Goethe's Italian journey. Goethe regarded it as the high point of his life, feeling it had helped him attain a deep understanding of his poetic genius and his mission as a poet. No longer in sympathy with *Sturm und Drang* even before his departure from Weimar, Goethe was initiated into neoclassicism by his vision of the antique in Italy. Goethe returned to Weimar not only with a new artistic vision but also with a freer attitude toward life. He recorded this journey in his *Italienische Reise* at the time of his trip, but he did not publish this volume until 1816–1817.

Return to Weimar. Goethe returned from Italy unsettled and restless. Shortly afterward, his ties with Frau von Stein having been weakened by his extended stay in Italy and by lighter pleasures he had known there, Goethe took the daughter of a town official into his house as his mistress. Christiane Vulpius, although she could offer no intellectual companionship, provided the comforts of a home. Gradually, she became indispensable as a helpmate, although she was ignored by Goethe's friends and unwelcome at court. Their son August was born in 1789, and Goethe married her in 1806, when the French invasion of Weimar endangered her position.

Goethe had finished *Egmont* in Italy. Additional literary fruits of his trip were the *Römische Elegien*, which reflected Italy's pagan influences, written in 1788–1789; the iambic version of *Iphigenie auf Tauris* (1787); and a Renaissance drama, *Torquato Tasso* (1790). Goethe also planned an epic *Nausikaa* and a drama *Iphigenie auf Delphos*. *Faust* was brought an additional step forward, part of it being published in 1790 as *Faust, Ein Fragment*.

Meanwhile, two new interests engrossed Goethe and renewed his Weimar ties. In 1791 he was appointed director of the ducal theater, a position he held for 22 years; and he became increasingly absorbed in scientific pursuits. From his scientific studies in anatomy, botany, optics, meteorology, and mineralogy, he

gradually reached a vision of the unity of the outward and inward worlds. Not only nature and art but also science were, in his view, governed by one organic force that rules all metamorphoses of appearances.

It is absolutely misleading, however, to suggest as some critics have that after his Italian journeys Goethe became a scientist and ceased to be a poet. In 1793 Goethe composed *Reineke Fuchs*, a profane "World Bible" in hexameters. He also took up his abandoned novel of the theater. His projected study of a young man's theatrical apprenticeship was transformed into an apprenticeship to life. *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, varying between realism and poetic romanticism, became the archetypal *Bildungsroman*. Its influence on German literature was profound and enduring after its publication in 1795–1796.

Goethe's unique literary friendship with Friedrich von Schiller began in 1794. To it Goethe owed in great degree his renewed dedication to poetry. Goethe contributed to Schiller's new periodical *Die Horen*, composed *Xenien* with him in 1795–1796, received Schiller's encouragement to finish *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, and undertook at his urging the studies that resulted in the epic *Hermann und Dorothea* and the fragment *Achilleis*. Schiller's urging also induced Goethe to return once more to *Faust* and to conclude the first part of it. *Xenien*, a collection of distichs, contains several masterpieces, and *Hermann und Dorothea* (1797) ranks as one of the poet's most perfect creations.

From Goethe's friendly rivalry with Schiller issued a number of ballad masterpieces: *Der Zauberlehrling*, *Der Gott und die Bajadere*, *Die Braut von Korinth*, *Alexis und Dora*, *Der neue Pausias*, and the cycle of four *Müller-Lieder*.

Goethe's classicism brought him into eventual conflict with the developing romantic movement. To present his theories, he published, in conjunction with Heinrich Meyer, from 1798 to 1800 an art review entitled *Die Propyläen*. Goethe also defended his ideals of classical beauty in 1805 in *Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert*. But the triumphant publication of the first part of *Faust* in 1808 defeated Goethe's own classical ideals. It was received as a landmark of romantic art.

Last Years. The last period of Goethe's life began with Schiller's death in 1805. In 1806 he published his magnificent tribute to Schiller *Epilog zu Schillers Glocke*. In 1807 Bettina von Arnim became the latest (but not the last) of Goethe's loves, for the poet soon developed a more intense interest in Minna Herzlieb, the foster daughter of a Jena publisher.

The publication of the first part of *Faust* in 1808 was followed by the issuance the next year of a novel,

Die Wahlverwandtschaften, an intimate psychological study of four minds. The most classical and allegorical of Goethe's works, *Pandora*, was published in 1808. The scientific treatise *Zur Farbenlehre* appeared in 1810.

In 1811 Goethe published the first volume of his autobiography, *Aus meinem Leben, Dichtung und Wahrheit*. Volumes 2 and 3 followed in 1812 and 1814. The fourth, ending with Goethe's departure from Frankfurt in 1775 for Weimar, appeared in 1833, after his death. Additional materials for a continuation of *Dichtung und Wahrheit* into the Weimar years were collected in *Tag und Jahreshefte* (1830).

Increasingly aloof from national, political, and literary partisanship in his last period, Goethe became more and more an Olympian divinity to whose shrine at Weimar all Europe made pilgrimage. In 1819 Goethe published another masterpiece, this one a collection of lyrics inspired by his young friend Marianne von Willemer, who figures as Sulieka in the cycle. Suggested by his reading of the Persian poet Hafiz, the poems that constitute *Westöstlicher Diwan* struck another new note in German poetry with their introduction of Eastern elements.

Meanwhile, death was thinning the ranks of Goethe's acquaintances: Wieland, the last of Goethe's great literary contemporaries, died in 1813; Christiane in 1816; Charlotte von Stein in 1827; Duke Karl August in 1828; and Goethe's son August died of scarlet fever in Rome in 1830.

In 1822 still another passion for a beautiful young girl, Ulrike von Levetzow, inspired Goethe's *Trilogie der Leidenschaft: An Werther, Marienbader Elegie, and Aussöhnung*. The trilogy is a passionate and unique work of art written in 1823–1824, when Goethe was approaching the age of 75. Between 1821 and 1829 Goethe published the long-promised continuation of *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, a loose series of episodes in novel form. His *Novelle* appeared in 1828.

However, the crowning achievement of Goethe's literary career was the completion of the second part of *Faust*. This work had accompanied Goethe since his early 20s and constitutes a full "confession" of his life. The second part, not published until after Goethe's death, exhibited the poet's ripe wisdom and his philosophy of life. In his *Faust* Goethe recast the old legend and made it into one of Western literature's greatest and noblest poetic creations. The salvation of Faust was Goethe's main departure from the original legend, and he handled it nobly in the impressively mystical closing scene of the second part.

Goethe died in Weimar on March 22, 1832. He was buried in the ducal crypt at Weimar beside Schiller.

EWB

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich (1931–), Russian politician. Mikhail Gorbachev was a member of the Communist Party who rose through a series of local and regional positions to national prominence. In March 1985 the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party elected him general secretary of the party and leader of the U.S.S.R. He resigned in 1991.

Mikhail Gorbachev was born into a peasant family in the village of Privolnoe, near Stavropol, on March 2, 1931, and grew up in the countryside. As a teenager, he worked driving farm machinery at a local machine-tractor station. These stations served regional state and collective farms, but were also centers of police control in the countryside. Gorbachev's experience here undoubtedly educated him well about the serious problems of food production and political administration in the countryside, as well as the practices of the KGB (the Soviet secret police) control, knowledge which would serve him well in his future career.

In 1952 Gorbachev joined the Communist Party and began studies at the Moscow State University, where he graduated from the law division in 1955. Student acquaintances from these years describe him as bright, hard working, and careful to establish good contacts with people of importance. He also met and married fellow student Raisa Titorenko, in 1953.

With Stalin's death in 1953 the Soviet Union began a period of political and intellectual ferment. In 1956 Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and paved the way for a major restructuring of the Soviet Union's political system and economic administration. For young party activists like Gorbachev this was a period of exciting innovations and challenges.

Gorbachev returned after his graduation to Stavropol as an organizer for the Komsomol (Young Communist League) and began a successful career as a party administrator and regional leader. In 1962 he was promoted to the post of party organizer for collective and state farms in the Stavropol region and soon took on major responsibilities for the Stavropol city committee as well. Leonid Brezhnev rewarded his ability by appointing him Stavropol first secretary in 1966, roughly equivalent to mayor.

Climbing the Party Ladder. Soon afterwards, as part of the party's new campaign to assure that its best career administrators were thoroughly trained in economic administration, Gorbachev completed an advanced program at the Stavropol Agricultural Institute and received a degree in agrarian economics. With this additional training he moved quickly to assume direction of the party in the entire Stavropol region, assuming in 1970 the important

post of first secretary for the Stavropol Territorial Party Committee. This position, roughly equivalent to a governor in the United States, proved a stepping stone to Central Committee membership and national prominence.

Gorbachev was assisted in his rise to national power by close associations with Yuri Andropov, who was also from the Stavropol region, and Mikhail Suslov, the party's principal ideologist and a confidant of Leonid Brezhnev, who had once worked in the Stavropol area as well. Gorbachev also proved himself a shrewd and intelligent administrator, however, with an extensive knowledge of agricultural affairs, and it was largely on this basis that Brezhnev brought him to Moscow in 1978 as a party secretary responsible for agricultural administration. His performance in this capacity was not particularly distinguished. The Soviet Union suffered several poor harvests in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and its dependency on foreign grain imports increased. Yet Gorbachev gained a solid reputation, despite these problems, as an energetic and informed politician, with an activist style contrasting rather sharply with that of most aging Kremlin leaders.

The ascension of Yuri Andropov to power after the death of Leonid Brezhnev in January 1980 greatly strengthened the position of his protégé Gorbachev. Both men showed impatience with outmoded administrative practices and with the inefficiencies of the Soviet Union's economy. Andropov's death returned the U.S.S.R. briefly to a period of drift under the weak and ailing Konstantin Chernenko, but Gorbachev continued to impress his colleagues with his loyal and energetic party service. Beginning in October 1980 he was a member of the ruling Politburo.

A New Type of Russian Leader? As he took power in March 1985, Gorbachev brought a fresh new spirit to the Kremlin. Young, vigorous, married to an attractive and stylish woman with a Ph.D., he represented a new generation of Soviet leaders, educated and trained in the post-Stalin era and free from the direct experiences of Stalin's terror which so hardened and corrupted many of his elders. His first steps as head of the party were designed to improve economic productivity. He began an energetic campaign against inefficiency and waste and indicated his intention to "shake up" lazy and ineffective workers in every area of Soviet life, including the party. He also revealed an unusual affability. Britons found him and his wife Raisa "charming" when he visited England in December 1984, and he showed a ready wit, "blaming" the British Museum, where Karl Marx studied and wrote, for Communism's success. Shortly after taking power Gorbachev also moved to develop greater

rapprochement with ordinary citizens, taking to the streets on several occasions to discuss his views and making a number of well-publicized appearances at factories and other industrial institutions. In addition, he began strengthening his position within the party with a number of new appointments at the important regional level.

A charismatic personality, Gorbachev also had the youthfulness, training, intelligence, and political strength to become one of the Soviet Union's most popular leaders. Upon assuming power in 1985, he was faced with the need to make significant improvements in the Soviet Union's troubled economy—an extremely difficult task—and to establish better relations with the United States, which might allow some reduction in Soviet defense expenditures in favor of consumer goods. In November 1985 he met with President Reagan in Geneva to discuss national and international problems. Little progress was made but both leaders agreed to hold another "summit" meeting in the United States in 1986.

When new tensions developed between the two superpowers, the leaders agreed to hold a preliminary meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, October 11–12, 1986. But the clearest signs of improving Soviet-American relations came in 1988. Gorbachev made a positive impression when he entered a crowd of spectators in New York City to shake hands with people. In May and June of the same year, President Reagan visited Moscow.

Within the Soviet Union, Gorbachev promoted spectacular political changes. His most important measure came in 1989 when he set up elections in which members of the Communist Party had to compete against opponents who were not Party members. Later that same year, he called for an end to the special status of the Communist party guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution and ended the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan.

Two issues, however, caused growing difficulty for Gorbachev. First, there was the problem of nationalities, as the Soviet Union consisted of nearly 100 different ethnic groups. As the political dictatorship began to disappear, many of these groups began to engage in open warfare against each other. Such bloodshed came from longstanding local quarrels that had been suppressed under Moscow's earlier control. Even more serious, some ethnic groups, like the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians began to call for outright independence. Second, the country's economy was sinking deeper into crisis. Both industrial and agricultural production were declining, and the old system, in which the economy ran under centralized control of the government, no longer seemed to work.

Yet, Gorbachev was apparently more willing to make changes in government and international affairs than to focus on the problems associated with ethnic diversity and the economy. Perhaps influenced by more conservative rivals, he cracked down on the Lithuanians when they declared their independence in the summer of 1990. Also, he gradually tried to move toward a private system of farming and privately owned industry.

At the same time, a powerful rival began to emerge: once considered an ally, Boris Yeltsin became the country's leading advocate of radical economic reform. Although forced from the Politburo, the small group at the top of the Communist Party, in 1987, Yeltsin soon established his own political base. He formally left the Communist Party in 1990, something Gorbachev refused to do, and was elected president of the Russian Republic in June 1991. Gorbachev, on the other hand, had been made president of the Soviet Union without having to win a national election. Thus, Yeltsin could claim a greater degree of popular support.

Fall From Power. In August 1991, a group of Communist Party conservatives captured Gorbachev while he was on vacation in the Crimea and moved to seize power. Some of these men, like Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, were individuals Gorbachev had put in power to balance the liberal and conservative political forces. But Yeltsin, not Gorbachev, led the successful resistance to the coup, which collapsed within a few days. When Gorbachev returned to Moscow, he was overshadowed by Yeltsin, and there were rumors that Gorbachev himself had been involved in the coup.

By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had fallen apart. When most of its major components like the Ukraine and the Baltic states declared themselves as independent, real power began to rest with the leaders of those components, among them Yeltsin, hero of the attempted coup and president of the Russian Republic. Gorbachev formally resigned his remaining political office on Christmas Day 1991.

Private Citizen. As a private citizen, Gorbachev faded from public view, but continued to write and travel. On one occasion, his travels struck an important symbolic note. On May 6, 1992, he spoke at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. There, in 1946, Winston Churchill had given his classic speech coining the term "the Cold War." Gorbachev's appearance was a vivid reminder of the changes he had helped bring about during his seven years in power.

In the spring of 1995, Gorbachev began touring factories in Russia, spoke to university students, and denounced President Yeltsin. He stopped just short of formally announcing his candidacy for the presidency in 1996. He wrote an autobiography, which was released in 1995 in Germany and 1997 in the United States.

Like many historical figures, Gorbachev's role will be interpreted in varying ways. While a Russian factory worker stated in *Newsweek*, "He destroyed a great state . . . the collapse of the Soviet Union started with Gorbachev . . .," some critics in the West saw the fall of Communism as "altogether a victory for common sense, reason, democracy and common human values."

EWB

Gouges, Olympe de (d. 1793), French writer.

Feminists such as Benoîte Groult assert that Olympe de Gouges' absence from the historical record was caused by a single factor: she was a woman. It appears, however, that in the case of Olympe de Gouges, there were additional reasons. She was legally low-born, denied any formal education, married at 16, a mother and widow at 17, and too proud and too independent to use either her late husband's name or to remarry. Her temperament, politics, and primarily her gender put off possible supporters and employers in the literary world, making it enormously difficult for her to find publishers. The works she did manage to get printed were largely ignored and are only now being collected and published.

Beyond the obstacles associated with meddling in the 18th-century world of male politics and of asserting that woman had rights and responsibilities equal to those of man, de Gouges had three strikes against her. First, like her contemporary Count Mirabeau, she supported King Louis XVI but, unlike Mirabeau, she lived long enough to meddle in his trial. Second, she supported the losing political party in 1792, the Girondins. Third, in 1793 she attacked the leader of the victorious Jacobin political party, Maximilien Robespierre. He targeted her and she—like so many Girondin leaders, like the king and the queen, and like Robespierre himself less than a year later—was guillotined, lost in a crowd. De Gouges's one monument, her *Déclaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen*, was covered up, neglected until recently.

The only source for de Gouges's early life is her autobiographical novel *Mémoire de Mme Valmont*, and what of the novel is factual remains a question for debate. The Jean-Jacques of the novel was Jean-Jacques Le Franc de Pomignan (d. 1784), a magistrate

and writer of local fame. Was de Pomignan her biological father, and did De Gouges inherit her intellect and creativity from him? Or did the fiction of a noble birth leaven the rough baker's dough so that it rose beyond itself? De Pomignan was correct about legitimate birth. There are witnesses to a birth certificate showing Marie Gouze born to Pierre Gouze, a butcher at Montauban, and Olympe Mouisset, a trinket seller. De Gouges wrote nothing, however, about these two, and there is no record of any formal education. Of her marriage at 16 to Louis-Yves Aubry, a restaurateur and caterer at Montauban, she wrote little, later calling him an old man she never loved, who was neither rich nor well-born. He died soon after the birth of their son Pierre, leaving a small pension.

In widowhood at Montauban, de Gouges developed a friendship with Jacques Biérix de Rozières, a contractor in military transport, and he took her to Paris. Her biographers believe that she refused to marry de Rozières because she viewed marriage as “the tomb of faith and love.”

She Begins Extensive Writing. In Paris from 1767 or 1768, de Gouges developed the reputation of a *femme galante*—an attractive, free-spirited, unattached female with an active social and cultural life replete with many friends, many of them respectable. She may have learned to write during this period, but most of her works seem to have been dictated to secretaries/friends. (In fact, many well-known writers of the day employed assistants.) Even with their assistance, her lack of formal education is reflected in her works. “Si j’écris mal,” she once wrote, “je pense bien.” (“I write bad, but I think good.”) Her biographer Olivier Blanc has identified 135 writings of de Gouges plus seven articles in six different newspapers—four of which are antislavery pieces. Twenty-nine are novels and short stories, 45 are theater pieces, and 64 are political pamphlets, tracts, brochures, and placards.

De Gouges's first play is considered her best dramatic work. She called it, “the first effort of my feeble talent.” “Zamour and Mirza, or the Happy Shipwreck” (happy because two slaves were liberated) was written in 1784 and submitted anonymously to the selection committee of the Comédie Française, which accepted it the following year. Performance of the play was long delayed. Powerful colonial interests feared that sympathetic portrayal of blacks might threaten the profitability of French colonies. De Gouges was threatened with a *lettre de cachet* (arrest order signed by the king) and actors refused to blacken their faces. In 1789, the play was retitled “Slavery of Negroes” and was performed by the Comédie Française. Uproar

ensued. The mayor of Paris condemned it as an incendiary piece which would cause revolt in the colonies. One critic reviewed the play in only one sentence: “We can only say that in order to write a good dramatic work, one must have hair on the chin.” The production closed after three performances.

During the five years between the writing and the performance of this first play, de Gouges wrote many dramas, of which only a few texts survive.

Early in 1787, Finance Minister Calonne persuaded King Louis XVI to assemble a blue-ribbon panel called the assembly of Notables to consider Calonne's reform package to rescue finances. Calonne hoped that the assembly would endorse his reforms, thus influencing the law courts to enregister them. Enthralled by the constant news reports of the Assembly's proceedings, de Gouges turned her imagination to politics.

In 1788, de Gouges published *Letter to the People, or Project for a Patriotic Bank by a Female Citizen*. She called for a voluntary tax to fund a bank which “would be the envy of all the courts of Europe and shame the law courts” which had refused the king's tax edict. Also in 1788, De Gouges published *Reflections on Blacks*. She used this work to urge performances of her play *Zamour and Myrza* (which would be performed the following year), but also made this argument: everywhere in nature one sees variety—different kinds of trees, different kinds of flowers, different kinds of birds, fish, and so forth. Likewise one sees different kinds of human beings. Every kind of human is as precious as trees and other parts of nature are precious. Soon, the Revolution would abolish slavery. Whether or not her work influenced this progress, she was—as in the case of a national bank—in advance of such change.

She Presents Her Declaration of Women's Rights. In the summer of 1791, de Gouges authored her *Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne* (Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen) patterned after the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* and *The Citizen* decreed as the first part of the Constitution by the National Assembly in August 1789. De Gouges sent a copy to the National Assembly then ending its term and a copy with a cover letter to Queen Marie Antoinette. No one has found evidence that the queen, or the National Assembly, or its successor the Legislative Assembly, ever admitted to having received it. The Legislative Assembly once voted *hommage* to de Gouges for “patriotic acts” (not mentioning the *Déclaration*) and, in its closing days, even received her. The preamble to the *Déclaration* began with characteristic directness and lack of diplo-

macy: "Man, are you capable of being just? It is a woman who asks you this question. Who has given you the authority to oppress my sex?" Unspeakably radical then, the *Déclaration* is still radical today (in it, De Gouges insisted on exact equality, including combat roles in the military).

In 1792 de Gouges enthusiastically endorsed the proclamation of the Republic, but attempted to defend King Louis whom the Jacobins insisted on trying for treason. Having overthrown the constitution, the Jacobins now demanded the king's death for violating that same constitution. De Gouges and the Girondins opposed the death sentence and few still argue that they were wrong to do so. The execution of King Louis XVI on January 21, 1793, was followed by the entrance of England into the War of the First Coalition and by a bloodbath in France. The Girondin leadership was arrested in the early summer of 1793 and guillotined in the fall.

Increasingly, de Gouges viewed Robespierre as a dictator violating liberty and the Republic. In a public letter, "*Response to the Justification by Maximilien Robespierre, addressed to Jerome Petion, President of the Convention,*" she asked, "Do you know how far you are from Cato?" Then, continuing the comparison of Mirabeau to the virtuous Roman senator who opposed Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar, she added, "As far as Marat from Mirabeau, as far as the mosquito from the eagle, and as far as the eagle from the sun." That did it, of course. It was de Gouges or Robespierre. De Gouges recognized this. Arrested July 20, 1793, De Gouges was accused before the Paris Tribunal on November 2. The next day she was guillotined. Eight months later, in the Revolutionary month of Thermidor (July), the majority of Robespierre's Jacobin party surprised and guillotined him. Once again, De Gouges had been ahead of events.

Historic World Leaders

Goya y Lucientes, Francisco de Paula José de (1746–1828), Spanish painter and printmaker. Francisco Goya was Spain's greatest painter and printmaker during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a wayward genius who prefigured in his art the romantic, impressionist, and expressionist movements.

Born in Fuendetodos near Saragossa on March 30, 1746, Francisco Goya died a voluntary expatriate in Bordeaux, France. Tradition has it that a priest discovered talent in the boy upon seeing him draw a hog on a wall. Oddly enough, a testament submitted for the process of beatification of Father José Pignatelli disclosed (not detected until 1962) that he taught Goya, who "instead of paying attention, kept his head down so that his teacher couldn't see him and occu-

pied himself in sketching. . . ." Pignatelli ordered him to the front of the class but recognized an artistic gift in the sketches. The priest called upon José Goya, the boy's father, and advised him to dedicate his son to painting. Perhaps owing to this same priest's influence, Goya at 12 years of age painted three works (destroyed 1936) for the church in Fuendetodos.

Two years later, Goya was apprenticed to José Luzán y Martínez, a mediocre, Neapolitan-trained painter who set his pupil to copying the best prints he possessed. After 4 years of this training, Goya left. He went to Madrid in 1763 to compete unsuccessfully for a scholarship to San Fernando Academy. The tests ended on Jan. 15, 1764, and nothing is known of the artist until 2 years later, when he entered another academic competition calling for a painting of the following subject: Empress Martha presents herself to King Alphonse the Wise in Burgos to petition a third of the ransom required by the sultan of Egypt for the rescue of her husband, Emperor Valduin; the Spanish king orders the full sum to be given her. The competitors were granted 6 months to execute this theme; Goya failed again. On July 22 he entered a competition to sketch another complicated historical scene and lost for the third time.

Early Works. Little is known of Goya's subsequent activities until April 1771, when he was in Rome. Two small paintings, both dated 1771 and one signed "Goya," have been discovered: *Sacrifice to Pan* and *Sacrifice to Vesta*. The monumental figures are classical but executed with sketchy brushstrokes and bathed in theatrical lighting. From Rome he sent to the Academy of Parma for an open competition another painting, *Hannibal in the Alps Contemplating the Italian Lands*, and signed himself as a pupil of Francisco Bayeu in his accompanying letter. Although he was not the winner, he did receive six of the votes and laudatory mention. Immediately after he had received this news, Goya departed for Saragossa.

The aforementioned works, and a handful more, are all that is known of Goya's art between 1766 and 1771. Sánchez Cantón (1964) pointed out that there are no concrete incidents to document the usual explanation, adduced from his known temperament, that he was otherwise occupied in womanizing, bullfighting, and brawling.

In Saragossa, Goya received important commissions, which he executed with success. On July 25, 1775, he married Josefa Bayeu, Francisco's sister. Bayeu, who was a director of the San Fernando Academy, used his influence to help his brother-in-law. Goya was commissioned to paint cartoons of contemporary customs and holiday activities for the Royal

Tapestry Factory of Santa Barbara. This work, well suited to his nature, lasted from 1774 to 1792. He completed 54 cartoons in a rococo style that mingled influences from Michel Ange Houasse, Louis Michel Van Loo, Giovanni Battista Tiepolo, and Anton Raphael Mengs.

Following an illness in 1778, Goya passed his convalescence executing his first series of engravings from 16 paintings by Diego Velázquez. Goya began to enjoy signs of recognition: he was praised by Mengs, named as a court painter by Charles III in 1779, and elected to membership in San Fernando Academy after he presented a small, classical painting, the *Crucified Christ*, in 1780. On the crest of this wave of approval, a quarrel with his important brother-in-law had serious consequences upon his career: in 1780 he was commissioned to paint a dome and its pendentives for the Cathedral of El Pilar in Saragossa. Bayeu suggested certain corrections in the domical composition, which Goya rejected. Then the council of the Cathedral took objection to certain nudities in his preparatory sketches for the pendentives and ordered him to submit his designs to Bayeu for correction and final approval. Goya accepted this condition, but afterward he declared he would “take it to court first.” Later he wrote to a friend that, just to think about the incident, “I burn alive.” This affair seems to have caused a hiatus (1780–1786) in his cartoons for the royal factory.

The Portraits. The King commissioned Goya in 1780 to paint an altarpiece for the church of S. Francisco el Grande, Madrid; this work, the *Preaching of St. Bernardino*, was completed in 1784. No works by Goya are known for the year 1782 and only portraits for 1783, among which is one of the Count of Floridablanca, First Secretary of State. Other portraits of this period include those of the members of the family of the infante Don Luis (1783–1784) and the brilliant portrait of the Duke of Osuna (1785).

The artist was back in favor sometime before May 11, 1785, when he was appointed lieutenant director of painting (under Bayeu) in the Academy of San Fernando. The following year he was again working on the tapestry cartoons, and in June he was named painter to the king. Bayeu, clearly reconciled, sat for his portrait in 1786. Goya also executed many portraits of the royal family and members of the nobility, including the very appealing picture of the little Manuel Osorio de Zuñiga (1788).

Goya fell gravely ill in Seville at the end of 1792. He was left totally deaf and underwent a personality change from extrovert to introvert with an intense interest in evil spirits, a temporary avoidance of large

canvases, and a preference for sketches in preparation for prints. He was back at work in Madrid by July 1793, and that year he produced a series of panels which he presented to the Academy of San Fernando. They include a scene in a madhouse, a bullfight, and an Inquisition scene.

Duchess of Alba. Goya received a commission from the noble house of Alba in 1795. Since he moved in aristocratic circles, it is clear that he must have known the duchess for some time before this. At any rate, after the duke's death in July 1796, she retired to her villa in Sanlucar, and Goya was one of her guests. Upon his return to Madrid in 1797, he painted the duchess in black but with a wide colored belt (therefore not a mourning garment), wearing two rings, one imprinted “Alba” and the other “Goya.” He signed the work “Goya, always.”

Whatever their relationship was, it is clear that Goya had high hopes. It is also true that in the spring following the duke's death the duchess's servants were gossiping in correspondence about her possible remarriage. Nevertheless, Señora Goya was still living, and Goya could not be the unnamed swain. In any event, the duchess never did remarry. At best, Goya's painting was a brazen flaunting of illicit hopes; at worst, a vulgar display of kiss-and-tell.

Goya's first great series of etchings, *Los caprichos* (1796–1798), were based on drawings from his *Madrid Sketchbook*. They include scenes of witchcraft, popular traditions, bullfights, and society balls. In the *Caprichos* Goya mercilessly and vindictively lampooned the duchess. The duchess died in 1802, following a long illness. Goya painted the *Nude Maja* and the *Clothed Maja* later (usually dated between 1805 and 1807). The heads in both appear to float, neckless, above the shoulders.

Inquisition and the Peninsular War. By the first years of the 19th century Goya was a wealthy man able to purchase an impressive home in 1803 and marry his son to an heiress in 1805. Simultaneously he was attracting the attention of the Holy Office of the Inquisition owing to the anticlerical satire in the *Caprichos* as well as his salacious subject matter. He donated all the *Caprichos* plates and the 240 unsold sets of the edition to the King under the pretext of seeking a pension for his son to travel; once the donation was accepted, the Holy Office perforce withdrew. The inquisitors did not forget, however; they investigated him again in 1814 concerning the nude and dressed *Majas*. Incomplete documentation leaves this incident obscure.

During the Napoleonic usurpation of the Spanish throne and the consequent War of Independence (1808–1813) Goya had an enigmatic record. With 3,000 other heads of families in Madrid on Dec. 10, 1808, he swore “love and fidelity” to the invader. In 1810 he attended the Academy to greet its new protector appointed by Joseph Bonaparte, but that same year he began work on his series of 80 etchings, *Los desastres de la guerra* (*The Disasters of War*), which, in many cases, is a specific condemnation of the Napoleonic war, although the expressionistic rendering makes the series a universal protest against the horrors of war. He finished the *Desastres* in 1814, the same year he painted the *Executions of May 3, 1808*, a grim depiction of a brutal massacre.

Goya applauded, understandably, the French suppression of the Inquisition and the secularization of religious orders. Yet in the joint will he made with his wife in 1811, he requested that he be buried in the Franciscan habit and have Masses offered and prayers said for his soul, and he made grants to holy places. His wife died in 1812, the year in which Goya painted the *Assumption of the Virgin* for the parish church of Chinchón, where his brother, Camilo, was the priest.

Goya executed two more series of etchings. *Los proverbios* (1813–1815; 1817–1818), or *Disparates*, as he himself called the series, are monstrous in mood and subject. The *Tauromachia* (1815–1816) is a series devoted to the art of bullfighting.

Last Years. In 1819 Goya purchased a villa, La Quinta del Sordo (Villa of the Deaf Man), at a time when his son and daughter-in-law were estranged from him, perhaps owing to another affair. His housekeeper was Leocadia Zorrilla de Weiss, a distant relative who was separated from her German husband, by whom she had had a son and daughter. Goya was so fond of the latter, Rosario, born in 1814, that some believe he was her father. Goya frescoed two rooms of the villa with his “black paintings.” These profoundly moving works are a strange mixture of the horrendous (*Saturn Devouring His Son*), the diabolic (*Witches’ Sabbath*), the salacious (*The Jesters*), the devout (*Pilgrimage of San Isidro*), and the ordinary (*Portrait of Leocadia Zorrilla*, previously called *Una manola*). These subjects and the others in the series make an ensemble that is as puzzling to interpret psychologically as it is emotionally overpowering.

In 1823 political events greatly affected Goya’s life: Ferdinand VII, discontented with the constitution that had been forced upon him, left his palace in Madrid and went to Seville. Two months later the Duke of Angoulême with “one hundred thousand

sons of St. Louis” invaded Spain to help Ferdinand VII. Goya, a liberal, immediately turned over the title to his villa to his grandson Mariano and took refuge in a friend’s house. The following year Goya sought permission to spend 6 months enjoying the waters of Plombières “to mitigate the sickness and attacks that molested him in his advanced age.” All this time Goya was receiving his royal salaries (and continued to do so up to his death) even though he had ceased to create works as First Court Painter or to teach in the Academy of San Fernando.

When the King granted his request, Goya immediately went to Bordeaux with Leocadia and her children. He went back to Spain in 1825 to ask to be retired and was granted permission to return to France “with all the salary.” His paintings in Bordeaux, especially the *Milkmaid of Bordeaux*, indicate a release from his dark emotions. He died of a stroke on April 15, 1828, in Bordeaux.

EWB

Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937), Italian Communist leader. Antonio Gramsci was a highly original Marxist who, working from Leninist principles, developed a new and controversial conception of hegemony in Marxist theory.

Antonio Gramsci was born in Ales in Sardinia on January 22, 1891. As the fourth son of Francesco Gramsci, a clerk in the registrar’s office at Ghilarza, Gramsci was brought up in poverty and hardship, particularly during the five years his father was in prison for alleged embezzlement. As a child Antonio was constantly ill and withdrawn, and his anguish was compounded by physical deformity.

He was compelled to leave school at the age of 12 but following his father’s release he was able to resume his education at Santa Lussurgia and Cagliari. On winning a scholarship to the University of Turin in 1911 he came into contact with future Communist leader and fellow Sardinian Palmiro Togliatti. During the elections of 1913 the first to be held in Sardinia with universal male suffrage—Gramsci became convinced that Sardinia’s acute problems of underdevelopment could only be solved in the context of socialist policies for Italy as a whole. (Gramsci retained a lively interest in his native Sardinia throughout his life and wrote a major essay on *The Southern Question* in 1926.)

Like many of his generation at the university in Turin, Gramsci was deeply influenced by the liberal idealism of Benedetto Croce. Gramsci’s hostility to positivism made him a fierce critic of all fatalistic versions of Marxism. By 1915 he was writing regularly for the socialist *Il Grido del Popolo* (*The Cry of the*

People) and *Avanti* (Forward), often on cultural questions in which he stressed the importance of educating the workers for revolution.

Following a four-day insurrection in August 1917 Gramsci became a leading figure in the Turin workers' movement. He welcomed the Russian Revolution (although in Crocean style he presented it as a "Revolution against *Das Kapital*") and in May 1919 he collaborated with Togliatti, Angelo Tasca, and Umberto Terracini to found *L'Ordine Nuovo* (The New Order) as an organ of "proletarian culture." The paper saw the factory committees in Turin as Soviets in embryo and the nuclei of a future socialist state. Thousands responded to the call to establish workers' councils in the Turin area, and during the "red years" of 1919 and 1920 there was a general strike and factories were occupied. *L'Ordine Nuovo's* critique of the passivity and reformism of the Italian Socialist Party won the approval of Soviet leader Lenin, and although Gramsci would have preferred to continue working within the Socialist Party at a time of rising fascist reaction, a separate Communist Party of Italy was formed at Livorno in 1921.

Gramsci was on the Communist Party's central committee, but the newly formed party was dominated by Amadeo Bordiga, a powerful figure whose purist elitism brought him into increasing conflict with the Third Communist International (Comintern). Gramsci became his party's representative on the Comintern, and it was while recovering from acute depression in a clinic in Moscow that Gramsci met his future wife Julia in 1922. They had two children, Delio and a younger boy, Giuliano, whom Gramsci never actually saw. Despite some happy moments, particularly when the two were together in Rome in 1925 and 1926, the relationship between Gramsci and Julia was a fraught one. Julia was in poor mental health, and later with Gramsci's imprisonment all communication between them more or less ceased. It was with Julia's sister, Tatiana, who was devoted to Gramsci's well-being during the torturing years of incarceration, that he found real companionship.

In October 1922 Mussolini seized power. The head of the Communist Party was arrested, and Gramsci found himself party leader. He was elected parliamentary deputy in 1924 and by 1926, when the party held its third congress in Lyons, Gramsci had won wide membership support for a Leninist strategy of an alliance with the peasants under proletarian hegemony. In his one and only speech to the Chamber of Deputies Gramsci brilliantly analyzed the distinctive and lethal character of fascism and in 1926 he was arrested. Two years later he was brought to trial—"we must prevent this brain from functioning for twenty

years," declared the prosecutor—and Gramsci spent the first five years of his sentence in the harsh penal prison at Turi. He was able to start work on his famous *Prison Notebooks* early in 1929, but by the middle of 1932 his health was beginning to deteriorate rapidly. Suffering from (among other ailments) Potts disease and arterio-sclerosis, he was eventually moved as a result of pressure from an international campaign for his release to a prison hospital in Formia, but by August 1935 he was too ill to work. Transferred to a clinic in Rome, he died on April 27, 1937, after a cerebral hemorrhage.

Tatiana had his 33 notebooks smuggled out of Italy and taken to Moscow via the diplomatic bag. These notebooks, despite the often rudimentary state of their drafts, are undeniably Gramsci's masterpiece. They contain sharply perceptive analyses of Italian history, Marxist philosophy, political strategy, literature, linguistics, and the theater. At their core stands Gramsci's over-riding preoccupation with the need to develop critical ideas rooted in the everyday life of the people so that the Communist cause acquires irresistible momentum. Opposed both to Bordiga's elitism and the sectarian policies of the Comintern between 1929 and 1934, Gramsci's stress on the moral and intellectual element in political movements offers a challenge not only to Marxists but to all seeking to change the world radically.

EWB

Grimm, Jakob Karl (1785–1863) and **Wilhelm Karl** (1786–1859), German scholars. The Grimm brothers were known for their Fairy Tales and for their work in comparative linguistics, which included the formulation of Grimm's law.

The romantic movement in Germany awakened the Germans' interest in the past of their own country, especially its cultural origins, early language, and folklore. Although some work in the rediscovery and edition of medieval German literature had already been undertaken in the 18th century, it was the first generation of romantic poets and theorists about the beginning of the next century, especially Ludwig Tieck, Novalis, and the Schlegel brothers, who first focused national attention on the origins of German culture and literature. While most of the poets viewed medieval literature chiefly as an inspiration for their own writings, others turned their attention to the methodical investigation of the past. The Grimm brothers were the most important of these romantic historians of early medieval language and folklore.

Jakob Grimm was born on Jan. 4, 1785, in Hanau. His brother, Wilhelm, was born on February 24 of the following year. As small children, they were

inseparable and, aside from a brief period of living apart, they were to remain together for the rest of their lives. Their even-tempered dispositions assured cooperation on all the projects they undertook together. The main difference in their personalities seems to be that Jakob, the more robust of the two, had more taste for grueling research work, and it was he who worked out most of their grammatical and linguistic theories. Wilhelm was physically weaker but had a somewhat warmer temperament and more taste for music and literature. His literary talent was responsible for the pleasant style of their collection of fairy tales.

The brothers first attended school in Kassel, then began legal studies at the University of Marburg. While there, however, the inspiration of Friedrich von Savigny awakened in them an interest in past cultures. In 1808 Jakob was named court librarian to the King of Westphalia in Wilhelmshöhe, and in 1816 he became librarian in Kassel, where Wilhelm had been employed since 1814. They were to remain there until 1830, when they obtained positions at the University of Göttingen.

Grimm's Fairy Tales. For some years the brothers had been in contact with the romantic poets Clemens Brentano and Achim von Arnim, who in Heidelberg were preparing a collection of German folk songs. Following their own interests in folklore and legends, the brothers brought out their first collection of tales, *Kinder—und Hausmärchen* (*Tales of Children and the Home*), in 1812. These tales were collected by recording stories told by peasants and villagers. Wilhelm put them into literary form and gave them a pleasant, childlike style. The brothers added many scholarly footnotes on the tales' sources and analogs.

In addition, the Grimms worked on editing remnants of other folklore and primitive literature. Between 1816 and 1818 they published two volumes of *Deutsche Sagen* (*German Legends*), and about the same time they published a volume of studies in early literary history, *Altdeutsche Wälder* (*Old German Forests*).

Linguistic Research. In later years their interest in older literature led the Grimm brothers increasingly to a study of older languages and their relationship to modern German. Jakob, especially, began to specialize in the history and structure of the German language. The first edition of his *Deutsche Grammatik* (*German Grammar*) was published in 1819. Later editions show increasing development of a scientific method in linguistics.

The brothers, and especially Jakob, were also working to codify the relationship between similar words of related languages, such as English *apple* and German *Apfel*. Their formulation of the rules for such relationships became known as Grimm's law. It was later elaborated to account for all word relationships in the Indo-European group of languages. The Grimm brothers were not the first to take note of such similarities, but they can be credited with amassing the bulk of linguistic data and working out the details of the rules.

Later Years. In 1830 the brothers moved to the University of Göttingen, where Jakob was named professor and head librarian and Wilhelm was appointed assistant librarian. As professor, Jakob held lectures on linguistics and cultural history. Wilhelm also attained the rank of professor in 1835. Both were dismissed in 1835 for political reasons: they had joined in signing a protest against the King's decision to abolish the Hanover constitution. They first moved back to Kassel but later obtained professorships at Berlin, where they were to remain until their deaths.

Their last years were spent in preparing the definitive dictionary of the German language, tracing the etymological derivation of every word. The first volume, published in 1854, has 1,824 pages and gets only as far as the word *Biermolke*. Four pages are devoted to the letter A alone, which is termed the most noble and primeval of all sounds. The Grimms' dictionary was carried on by generations of scholars after the brothers' deaths, and it was finished in 1960. Its completed form consists of 16 weighty volumes.

Wilhelm died in Berlin on Dec. 16, 1859. Jakob continued the work on the dictionary and related projects until his death in Berlin on Sept. 20, 1863.

EWB

Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume (1787–1874), French statesman and historian. François Guizot was a cold and clever politician whose refusal to grant electoral reforms precipitated the February Revolution of 1848. His scholarly publications, however, have been widely praised.

Though born at Nîmes on Oct. 4, 1787, François Guizot was educated in Geneva, where his mother had emigrated after his father's execution in 1794. Returning to Paris in 1805, Guizot studied law but soon forsook it for a literary career. The publication of a critical edition of Edward Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* established his reputation as a historian and secured his appointment (1812) to the chair of modern history in the University of Paris.

There he became a disciple of the moderate royalist philosopher Pierre Paul Royer-Collard.

Guizot took no active part in politics under the Empire, but during the first Bourbon restoration he held the post of secretary general of the Ministry of the Interior. After the Hundred Days he twice held office: secretary general of the Ministry of Justice (1815–1816) and director in the Ministry of the Interior (1819–1820). But the assassination of the Duke of Berry in February 1820 produced a reactionary backlash that swept Guizot and the moderates from office.

Out of office for most of the next decade, Guizot concentrated on historical research and writing. From his productive pen came the *History of the Origin of Representative Government* (2 vols., 1821–1822); *History of the English Revolution from Charles I to Charles II* (2 vols., 1826–1827); *General History of Civilization in Europe* (3 vols., 1828); and *Histoire de la civilisation en France* (4 vols., 1830). Guizot's histories have been justly praised for their excellent scholarship, lucid and succinct style, judicious analysis, and impartiality.

Returning to active politics in January 1830, Guizot entered the Chamber as a deputy for Lisieux and immediately joined the opposition to the Polignac ministry. Since 1815 Guizot had shared with Royer-Collard the leadership of the Doctrinaires, who considered the Charter of 1814 the epitome of political wisdom since it established a balance between the power of the Crown, the nobility, and the upper middle classes. As right-wing liberals, they supported the restoration monarchy so long as it governed according to the Charter, but when Charles X attempted to rule by decree, they turned from the Bourbon to the Orleanist dynasty. During the July Revolution of 1830, they helped to elevate Louis Philippe, Duke of Orléans, to the throne.

In August 1830 Guizot became minister of the interior. For the next 2 years he gradually became more conservative as a series of Paris disorders instilled in him a fear of anarchy. But his conservatism had deeper roots. A devout Calvinist, he identified the sanctified elect with the political elite, who, he believed, had a divine mission to govern the masses.

By October 1832, when he became minister of public instruction, Guizot had assumed leadership of the right-center. His one great legislative act was the law of June 28, 1833, the charter of France's elementary school system, which required every commune to maintain a public primary school. Always the champion of the academic community, he reestablished the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, which Napoleon had suppressed, founded the Société de

l'Histoire de France, and published at state expense huge collections of medieval documents and diplomatic dispatches.

In February 1840 Guizot went to London as ambassador, but in October he became foreign minister and the dominant personality in the Soult ministry. The tenets of his foreign policy were nonintervention, friendship with Britain, and cooperation with Austria. In 1847 Guizot became premier. But overthrown by the February Revolution of 1848, he went into exile in England. After a year in London, devoted primarily to research in the British archives, he retired to his estate at Val Richer near Lisieux in Normandy.

Though Guizot survived the Orleanist monarchy by 26 years, he never reentered the political arena but focused his energy on academic activities and writing historical works. Between 1854 and his death on Sept. 12, 1874, he published the *Histoire de la république d'Angleterre et de Cromwell* (2 vols., 1854); *Histoire du protectorat de Cromwell et du rétablissement des Stuarts* (2 vols., 1856); *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps* (9 vols., 1858–1868); and the *Histoire parlementaire de la France* (5 vols., 1863), which included his speeches.

EWB

Gutenberg, Johann (ca. 1398–1468), German inventor and printer. Johann Gutenberg was the inventor of movable-type mechanical printing in Europe.

Johann Gutenberg was born Johann Gensfleisch zur Laden, in Mainz. He was the third child of Freile zum Gensfleisch and his second wife, Else Wirick zum Gutenberg, whose name Johann adopted. Nothing is known of Gutenberg's studies or apprenticeship except that he learned the trade of a goldsmith while living in Mainz. About 1428 his family was exiled as a result of a revolt of the craftsmen against the noble class ruling the town, and in 1430 Gutenberg established himself in Strasbourg, where he remained until 1444.

Gutenberg's experiments in printing began during his years in Strasbourg. He was already familiar with the techniques of xylography, the process used to make books and other printed matter in Europe since the 14th century, and in the Far East much earlier. Then came the transition from xylography to typography, infinitely more practical for text printing since, instead of reproduction by means of wood carving, a small separate block (type) was used for each sign or character. The idea of movable type may have occurred to many people independently; Gutenberg may have worked in this field about 1436.

Business of Printing. There is no record of Gutenberg's whereabouts after 1444, but he appears

again in Mainz according to a document dated October 1448. By 1450 he is known to have had a printing plant, for which he borrowed 800 guilders from the rich financier Johann Fust to enable him to manufacture certain tools and equipment. In December 1452 Gutenberg had to pay off his debt. Being unable to do so, he and Fust concluded a new agreement, under which Gutenberg received another similar loan and the financier became a partner in the enterprise. At that time Gutenberg already printed with movable type, thus making the idea conceived in Strasbourg a reality in Mainz. A very valuable assistant to Gutenberg was his young employee and disciple Peter Schoeffer, who joined the firm in 1452. In spite of their successes, the relationship between Gutenberg and Fust took a bad turn, Fust sued Gutenberg for 2,000 guilders, and in 1455 the partnership was dissolved. Fust won the court action and thereby acquired Gutenberg's materials and tools and went into partnership with Schoeffer.

Provenance of printed works of this period is therefore difficult, especially since there are no printed works surviving with Gutenberg's name on them. From that period dates the monumental and extremely beautiful 42-Line Bible, also called the Gutenberg Bible and Mazarin Bible, a work in big folio which is the crowning of many years of collaboration by the Gutenberg-Fust-Schoeffer team. However, when the first finished copies were turned out in early 1456, Gutenberg, undoubtedly the main creator of the work, no longer belonged to the partnership. Fust continued printing successfully with Gutenberg's equipment and also with machinery improved by Schoeffer. In the meantime Gutenberg, not at all favored by fortune in his various undertakings, had to start all over again. It is believed that the fruit of his work in these years is the 36-Line Bible and the famous *Catholicon*, a kind of encyclopedia. Again, as Gutenberg never put his name on any of his works, all ascriptions are hypothetical.

Later Years. In 1462 Mainz was sacked by the troops of Adolph II. Fust's printing office was set on fire and Gutenberg suffered losses as well, the same as other craftsmen. In consequence of this disaster many typographers left Mainz, and through their dispersion they also scattered their until now so jealously protected know-how. Gutenberg remained in Mainz, but he was again reduced to poverty, and he requested the archiepiscopal court for a sinecure, which he obtained on Jan. 17, 1465, including salary and privileges "for services rendered . . . and to be rendered in the future." Gutenberg's post at the court allowed him some economic relief, but nevertheless he carried on with his

printing activities. The works from this final period in his life are unknown because of lack of identification.

Reportedly, Gutenberg became blind in the last months of his life, living partly in Mainz and partly in the neighboring village of Eltville. He died in St. Victor's parish in Mainz on Feb. 3, 1468, and was buried in the church of the Franciscan convent in that town. His physical appearance is unknown, though there are many imaginary depictions of his face and figure, including statues erected in Mainz and Strassburg. In 1900 the Gutenberg Museum was founded in Mainz with a library annexed to it to which all the objects and documents related to the invention of typography were entrusted.

EWB

H

Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich Philipp August (1834–1919), German biologist and natural philosopher. Ernst Haeckel was famous for his work in evolutionary theory, especially the construction of phylogenetic trees. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries he was as famous as Charles Darwin, whom he admired, though his views were closer to those of Jean Baptiste Lamarck.

Ernst Haeckel was born in Potsdam, Germany, on February 16, 1834, to Carl and Charlotte (Sethe) Haeckel. His father was the chief administrator for religious and educational affairs in Merseburg, while his mother was the daughter of a privy councillor in Berlin. Haeckel thus had the social advantage of growing up in an educated and cultured family. He was publicly educated at the *Domgymnasium* in Merseburg, graduating in 1852. He then, on the advice of his parents, studied medicine at Berlin, later at Würzburg and Vienna, before returning to Berlin to earn his medical degree in 1857.

In 1858 he passed the state medical examination, but he did not practice medicine. In fact, he had never been truly interested in being a physician, only pursuing that degree for his parents' sake. Yet he discovered, after initial reluctance, that medical school would provide him with the most solid foundation on which to build a scientific career. It was in this medical training that Haeckel met many of the most important biologists of his day. At Würzburg he studied under Albert von Kölliker and Franz Leydig, learning embryological and comparative anatomy as well as perfecting his skills in microscopical investigations—later to prove essential for his research in ontogeny and phylogeny.

It was also at Würzburg that Haeckel's philosophical views began to develop, confronted as he was by mechanistic and materialistic views of life developed by Rudolf Virchow and Carl Vogt and expressed by young scientists and physicians with whom he came into contact. In response to such strongly asserted materialism Haeckel's own Christian beliefs began to be transformed, and though he never relinquished the idea of god, his own god was eventually so radically changed that it seemed scarcely personal, perhaps nothing more than the principle of causality in the universe. Meanwhile, his medical education continued. At Berlin in 1854–1855 Haeckel studied under Johannes Müller, whom he greatly respected as the paradigm of the great scientist. Under Müller, he increased his understanding of comparative anatomy and he was introduced to marine zoology, one of Müller's specialties.

In 1858, after finishing his medical studies and final examination, Karl Gegenbaur offered him the chance of a future professorship in zoology at Jena if he would first undertake a zoological research expedition in the Mediterranean. This research occupied his time from 1859 to 1860 and resulted in the publication in 1862 of *The Radiolarians*, in which he announced his support of Darwinism. Haeckel determined to reinterpret all of morphology (study and comparison of animal forms) in terms of the theory of evolution, which meant the linking of animal species phylogenetically through "geneological" trees. He argued that all processes could be reduced to mechanical-materialistic causes, that evolution was driven by such causality, and that the true philosophy of nature should be Monism, a system stressing the unity of mind and matter, in contrast to all vitalistic or teleological dualism stressing the separation of mind and matter. He differed from Darwin in two fundamental ways: Haeckel's was the more speculative mind, and he relied much more upon the Lamarckian principle of the inheritance of acquired characteristics than Darwin ever did.

Also in 1862, Haeckel married his cousin, Anna Sethe, who died in 1864, at which time he married Agnes Huschke, daughter of anatomist Emil Huschke. They had three children. In 1861, upon his return from his research expedition, Haeckel had been given the post of *Privatdozent* at the University of Jena. In 1862 he was named professor extraordinary in comparative anatomy and was made director of the Zoological Institute. And in 1865 a chair in zoology was established for him, which he held until 1909. During that more than 40 year period Haeckel continued his herculean labors on behalf of his science, going on four major scientific expeditions (Canary Islands,

1866–1867; Red Sea, 1873; Ceylon, 1881–1882; Java, 1900–1901) and further elaborating on his evolutionary schemes.

In 1901 he was the recipient of the Turin Bressa Prize for his outstanding work in biology. Throughout his life he received many honors and was elected to many scientific societies, among them the Imperial Academy of Sciences at Vienna (1872), the American Philosophical Society (1885), and the Royal Society of Edinburgh (1888). His most characteristic ideas and tendencies are evident in his early work of 1886, *General Morphology*; all his subsequent efforts were reworkings of this book. He retired in 1909 and still lived in Jena when he died in 1919.

EWB

Hall, Marguerite Radclyffe (1886–1943), British writer. Radclyffe Hall, the name under which British literary figure Marguerite Radclyffe-Hall wrote, is perhaps best known for her 1928 novel, *The Well of Loneliness*, one of the first modern literary works whose plot concerned a same-sex relationship between women. Despite its laudatory critical reception, Hall's book was the subject of a ban under Britain's Obscene Libel Act, but scholars today consider it one of the premiere fictional portrayals of contemporary gay and lesbian life, a sensitive work that helped open doors of cultural acceptance for later writers.

Hall was born into a wealthy family in Hampshire, England, in 1886. Raised as a boy by her emotionally unstable parents, she was known as "John" to her friends and found security and support in her maternal grandmother, who encouraged the young girl's creative gifts. After receiving a large inheritance at the age of seventeen, Hall attended King's College in London and spent a year abroad in Germany. An accomplished amateur musician, she often wrote lyrics to accompany her compositions, and at the urging of her grandmother published some of this writing as a volume of verse entitled *Twixt Earth and Stars* in 1906.

Around this time Hall became acquainted with Ladye Mabel Batten, a literary figure who became her companion and mentor for several years to follow. In these early years preceding World War I, Hall produced several other volumes of poetry, including *A Sheaf of Verses* and *Songs of Three Counties, and Other Poems*, works noteworthy for their frank expressions of passion between women. During this period Hall had become a Catholic, like Batten, and her new faith was to become an integral element in her later works of fiction. Batten encouraged Hall to branch out into fiction, and the writer's first foray into this genre came with the 1924 publication of *The Forge*. However, Batten had passed away in 1916, and the grieving Hall

felt in part responsible, since the writer had developed a romantic interest in Batten's niece, Una Troubridge.

The Unlit Lamp, Hall's second novel, was also published in 1924 and is seen by scholars as a thematic precursor to *The Well of Loneliness*. Much more subtle in its addressing of same-sex romance, the work's possibly scandalous subject matter was so restrained that little was mentioned of it in reviews.

Hall's 1926 novel, *Adam's Breed*, is the story of a young man besieged by a collective guilt about the excess consumption of modern society, and is a reflection of her compassion for the plight of animals. By this time Hall and Troubridge, the wife of a naval officer, had become involved in a long-term relationship. Hall had originally wished to title *Adam's Breed* "Food," but her publisher feared that it would be mistaken for a cookbook.

Hall's landmark novel, *The Well of Loneliness*, appeared in print in 1928. The proclivities of its protagonist are explicit, and the passions depicted toward other female characters in the novel are also frank. Some details are autobiographical: the heroine's parents wished for a boy while the mother was expecting, and thus named the baby girl Stephen. Hall herself was raised as a boy and went by the nickname John for much of her life. As a young girl, Stephen develops a crush on one of the maids of the household, an incident which the scholar Dickson noted had also taken place in Hall's own youth. As a young girl, Stephen feels that she is not like other young girls, and finds herself more drawn to masculine pursuits; like Hall, the protagonist is an accomplished equestrienne.

After its publication in 1928, *The Well of Loneliness* was publicly condemned by a writer for the *Sunday Express* and a trial soon followed. Hall lost the case and the novel was banned in England; in a later case in a New York court the obscenity charges were dropped. Critical reaction to the novel was mixed, and was often tied in with a defense of it due to the controversy. Leonard Woolf, part of the influential British literary circle known as the Bloomsbury Group and husband to novelist Virginia, commented in *The Nation and The Athenaeum* that Hall's novel "is written with understanding and frankness, with sympathy and feeling," but charged that as a work of literary merit, it fell short.

Hall penned two other novels before ill health curtailed her writing in the years before her death. In 1932, she published *The Master of the House*, the story of a man whose life paralleled that of Jesus Christ. The critic Lawrence, writing in *The School of Femininity*, deemed it an appropriate companion to *The Well of Loneliness*. "While the heroine in the one book lives the life of a man within the body of a woman,

the man in the other book lives the life of a Christ within the body of a mortal," Lawrence wrote. "Neither of them has any concern with normal experience. They should be kept together and read together. They are part of the same mysterious saga." Many elements of *The Master of the House* correspond to the life of Christ as presented in the Bible: Christophe is the son of a carpenter and his wife, Jouse and Marie; his cousin Jan, like John the Baptist, will remain a close confidant through adulthood. Hall set her updated version of the Biblical tale shortly before the outbreak of World War I, and the two men are sent to Palestine to defend it against the Turkish army. There Christophe is ambushed and his journey to death closely follows Christ's procession to the cross.

Hall's seventh and final novel, *The Sixth Beatitude*, appeared in 1936. It is the story of a poor woman, Hannah Bullen, whose somewhat unconventional life (she is unmarried, but mother to two) in a small English seaside town is marked by poverty and strife within her immediate family. The title of the work refers to the Roman Catholic notion of purity of mind and chastity of heart, and Hall attempts to portray the goodness of her protagonist despite the squalor of her surroundings.

Hall died of cancer in 1943. Although *The Well of Loneliness* is often cited as seminal to modern gay and lesbian fiction, the rest of her novels and poetry have often been overshadowed by the scandal that is associated with her best-known title—yet they also evince many of the same themes and convictions important to her.

CA

Hammond, John Lawrence Le Breton (1872–1952) and **Lucy Barbara** (1873–1961), English historians. The Hammonds were joint authors of a number of histories of the English working class.

Lawrence Hammond was born at Drighlington, Yorkshire, on July 18, 1872. His future wife, Lucy Barbara Bradby, was born in London in July 1873. Both were children of Anglican clergymen with working-class parishes, Lawrence's in the industrial north, Barbara's among the London docks. Both Lawrence and Barbara attended Oxford University, he at St. John's College, where he studied classics, and she at Lady Margaret Hall, where she was known as one of the most brilliant students of her time. They were married in 1901.

In 1897 Lawrence Hammond entered a career in journalism as a writer for the *Leeds Mercury* and the *Liverpool Post*. Two years later he became editor of the new liberal weekly, the *Spectator*, which had been launched to oppose British imperialism in South

Africa. In 1907 he left journalism to become secretary of the Civil Service Commission for six years. He returned to journalism after the war as correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* and remained with this newspaper for the rest of his life.

After their marriage, the Hammonds began work on a series of social histories of the British labor class, extending from the later 18th to the mid-19th century. *The Village Labourer, 1760–1832* (1911) was the first to appear. In it they describe the changes that 18th-century parliamentary enclosures brought about in the villagers' way of life, the gradual isolation of the poor, and the laborers' revolts of the early 1830s. The book, wrote Gilbert Murray, had on its readers almost the effect of a revelation. Enclosures and the transformation of the laboring class had been looked upon as the necessary requisites for Britain's industrialization. Historians had emphasized the way these had contributed to Britain's progress in the 19th century. Here, however, the Hammonds assessed the cost of industrialization to its victims. They showed the suffering and degradation of the dispossessed amid the material success and the idealism of the early 19th century. Their next work, *The Town Labourer, 1760–1832*, appeared in 1917, and the last volume in the trilogy, *The Skilled Labourer, 1760–1832*, in 1919. They also wrote *Lord Shaftesbury* (1923), *The Rise of Modern Industry* (1925), *The Age of the Chartists* (1930), *The Bleak Age* (1934), and *C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian* (1934).

The Hammonds spent most of their later lives at Piccott's End outside London. Here, wrote Arnold Toynbee, they lived in Desert-Father austerity, surrounded by dogs, cats, and a permanent congregation of birds, standing as expectantly as the birds in Giotto's picture of St. Francis.

Lawrence Hammond died on April 7, 1952. Barbara Hammond, grieving, went into a slow and irreversible decline. She died, after prolonged illness, on Nov. 14, 1961.

EWB

Hargreaves, James (d.1786), English inventor. Early in the eighteenth century John Kay (1704–1764) invented the flying shuttle, allowing weavers to produce material much faster than ever before. While this solved one problem, it created another: the spinning of yarn was still done by hand on the "Great Wheel," one thread at a time, and could not keep up with the demand brought on by Kay's new loom. To help increase the supply of yarn, the Royal Society of Arts offered cash prizes to anyone who invented a faster spinning machine. The first one to do so was James Hargreaves.

Hargreaves grew up in Lancashire, England, learning the trades of carpentry and weaving. He did not become an inventor until 1740, when he was employed by a local businessman to construct a better carding machine. A few years later, it is said, Hargreaves accidentally toppled the spinning wheel in his home. As it lay on its side, Hargreaves noticed the wheel and the spindle were still in motion, even though they had been tipped ninety degrees. It occurred to him that a mechanical spinner could be designed in which many spindles, set vertically and side-by-side, could spin a number of threads from just one horizontal wheel.

Hargreaves began constructing just such a machine in 1754; fourteen years and many prototypes later, the spinning jenny was complete. The spinning jenny was the first machine that accurately simulated the drafting motion of human fingers. This was vitally important to the success of the spinner, for it eliminated the need to draw cotton fibers out by hand. The jenny had one large wheel playing out cotton roving to eight different spindles, thus spinning eight threads at once.

Because the design was essentially the same as a spinning wheel (only eightfold) the yarn produced was still lumpy and uneven in places; however, it was sufficient for the weaving of many different fabrics, particularly when woven together with threads of linen. It was also ideal for the spinning of wool thread and yarn. Unlike many inventors who would follow him, Hargreaves did not plan to become wealthy from his invention—in fact, the first U jennies were used only in his home. Soon, however, the Hargreaves family suffered some financial setbacks, and he was forced to sell a few of his machines to mills.

His neighbors feared the new machine, thinking it would soon replace them all, and in 1768 they formed a mob that gutted the Hargreaves home and destroyed his jenny. Understandably upset, Hargreaves and his family moved to Nottingham. There he entered a partnership with Thomas James, and the two men opened their own cotton mill.

In 1769, Richard Arkwright successfully patented his water frame spinning machine (along with most of the machines associated with the spinning process, not all of which were of Arkwright's design). Inspired, Hargreaves enlisted legal aid to help him patent the jenny. By that time, many Lancashire mills had copied the jenny design illegally, an infringement for which Hargreaves sought restitution. His case was dismissed, however, when the court discovered that he had sold jennies in Lancashire a few years earlier.

By 1777 the water frame had almost completely replaced the jenny as England's most popular spin-

ning machine: the yarn it produced was stronger and smoother, much more suited to the needs of the now-dominant hosiery industry. (Both the jenny and the water frame would ultimately be replaced by Samuel Crompton's spinning mule.) Hargreaves was never awarded the patent or the restitution he fought for; he died poor (compared, at least, to Arkwright) in 1778.

World of Invention

Hausmann, Baron Georges Eugène (1809–1891), French administrator. As French prefect of the Seine, Baron Hausmann carried out under Napoleon III a huge urban renewal program for the city of Paris.

During the administration of Baron Hausmann, 71 miles of new roads, 400 miles of pavement, and 320 miles of sewers were added to Paris; 100,000 trees were planted, and housing, bridges, and public buildings were constructed. Elected a member of the Académie des Beaux-Arts in 1867, the year of the International Exhibition in Paris, Hausmann stated, "My qualification? I was chosen as demolition artist" (*Memoires*, 3 vols., 1890–1893).

Admittedly Hausmann destroyed a considerable portion of the historic city, but the purpose was to tear down the worst slums and discourage riots, make the city more accessible, accommodate the new railroads, and beautify Paris. Long, straight boulevards for parades and for the circulation of traffic could also foil would-be rioters, since the mob could not defend boulevards as readily as barricaded slum alleyways.

Georges Eugène Hausmann was born in Paris. Exceedingly ambitious, he studied law solely with the aim of becoming an administrator within the prefectorial corps. He was appointed prefect of the Seine in 1853.

The instigator of the beautification of Paris was Napoleon III, who admired London, especially its squares. Such a program of beautification would in addition stimulate the banks and solve the problems of unemployment. Hausmann spent a total of 2,115,000,000 francs, the equivalent of \$1.5 billion in today's currency.

Hausmann began by continuing the Rue de Rivoli as a great east-west link across Paris and by developing the areas of the Louvre and the Halles. He brought a competent engineer named Alphand from Bordeaux to continue the development of the Bois de Boulogne. Other acquaintances were introduced into the administration, notably in the construction of the famous sewers. The sewers, although underground, did not go unnoticed; Hausmann ensured that they became showplaces and even provided transportation for their viewing. One critic cynically considered the

sewers "so fine that something really great should happen in them" (*Memoires*).

Three-quarters of the Île de la Cité was destroyed to create a central area for the Palais de Justice and police headquarters and barracks. The Boulevard de Sebastopol, beginning at the Gare de l'Est, was extended across the Île to provide a north-south route across Paris. The Gare du Nord was linked to the business district by the Rue La Fayette. Radial roads linked the core of the city to the suburbs. A green belt around the fortifications linking the Bois de Boulogne in the west to the Bois de Vincennes in the east did not materialize.

Hausmann was forced to retire in 1869, having succumbed to his critics, who accused him of "Hausmannomania," heavy spending, and disrespect for the laws governing finance. One of his last acts for Napoleon III was the drafting of a proclamation for the siege of Paris in 1870.

EWB

Hébert, Jacques René (1757–1794), French journalist and revolutionist. Jacques René Hébert published the journal "Le Père Duchesne" and was a spokesman for the sans-culottes, the extreme republicans of revolutionary France.

Like other popular leaders of the French Revolution, Jacques René Hébert was a member of the bourgeoisie. He was born in Alençon, the son of a successful master jeweler who was a member of the municipal nobility. At the beginning of the French Revolution he was a destitute in Paris, but by 1790 he had established himself as a successful pamphleteer of political satires, appealing to popular antagonisms toward the nobility and the clergy. After the flight of the King, he attacked the Crown as the enemy of the Revolution.

In June 1792 Hébert founded the Revolutionary journal *Le Père Duchesne*, which became his vehicle for expounding his conception of proletarian interests and for venting his own frustrations. Its symbol was the caricature of a well-known braggart sinister-looking man, a pistol in one hand and a hatchet in the other, standing over a kneeling priest, continually calling for the death of the enemies of the people. On Dec. 22, 1792, Hébert was elected assistant prosecutor of the Paris Commune.

During 1793 Hébert became the advocate of sans-culottism, which demanded all-out war against the enemies of the people. These enemies included the Church, counterrevolutionaries, profiteers, and political moderates. Although he has been associated with the dechristianization movement, Hébert claimed

he was not an atheist. He maintained that all good Jacobins ought to see Christ as the first Jacobin.

Hébertists were closely linked to the program of the Terror. Their fierce hatred of those classified as “enemies of the people” was influential in the Law of the Suspects, which made official their demands for justice. Their demands for price-fixing and enforced consumer protection led to the Laws of the Maximum of September and December 1793. Hébertists were also fanatical terrorists, and their influence was great in the police apparatus of the Committee of General Security. As such, they were deeply implicated not only in the Reign of Terror in Paris but also in the massacres of Lyons, Nantes, and the Vendée.

Hébert’s base of power was the Commune and the influence it wielded on the Committee of Public Safety. The Committee’s actions in December 1793 in suppressing the Commune did much to arouse the ire of Hébert and the sans-culottes. They began to attack the Committee, blaming it for the failure of price controls and for complicity with war profiteers. Finally, on March 4, 1794, Hébert—egged on by his supporters—called for an insurrection of the Commune. His call met with little success, but it served as a reason for his proscription as a counterrevolutionary. He was arrested on March 14, 1794, and was executed on March 24.

All historians have agreed that Hébert was an opportunist, but recently social historians have suggested that his opinions were widely held by the people. In particular, he seems to have been representative in his belief that by 1794 a conspiracy of sellers against consumers did exist.

EWB

Henry VIII (1491–1547), king of England from 1509 to 1547. As a consequence of the Pope’s refusal to nullify his first marriage, Henry VIII withdrew from the Roman Church and created the Church of England.

The second son of Henry VII, Henry VIII was born on June 28, 1491, at Greenwich Palace. He was a precocious student; he learned Latin, Spanish, French, and Italian and studied mathematics, music, and theology. He became an accomplished musician and played the lute, organ, and harpsichord. He composed hymns, ballads, and two Masses. He also liked to hunt, wrestle, and joust and drew “the bow with greater strength than any man in England.”

On his father’s death on April 21, 1509, Henry succeeded to a peaceful kingdom. He married Catherine of Aragon, widow of his brother Arthur, on June 11, and 13 days later they were crowned at Westminster Abbey. He enthused to his father-in-law, Ferdi-

nand, that “the love he bears to Catherine is such, that if he were still free he would choose her in preference to all others.”

Foreign Policy. In short order Henry set course on a pro-Spanish and anti-French policy. In 1511 he joined Spain, the papacy, and Venice in the Holy League, directed against France. He claimed the French crown and sent troops to aid the Spanish in 1512 and determined to invade France. The bulk of the preparatory work fell to Thomas Wolsey, the royal almoner, who became Henry’s war minister. Despite the objections of councilors like Thomas Howard, the Earl of Surrey, Henry went ahead. He was rewarded by a smashing victory at Guinegate (Battle of the Spurs, Aug. 13, 1513) and the capture of Tournai and Théorouanne.

Peace was made in 1514 with the Scots, who had invaded England and been defeated at Flodden (Sept. 9, 1513), as well as with France. The marriage of Henry’s sister Mary to Louis XII sealed the French treaty. This diplomatic revolution resulted from Henry’s anger at the Hapsburg rejection of Mary, who was to have married Charles, the heir to both Ferdinand and Maximilian I, the Holy Roman emperor. Soon the new French king, Francis I, decisively defeated the Swiss at Marignano (Sept. 13–14, 1515). When Henry heard about Francis’s victory, he burst into tears of rage. Increasingly, Wolsey handled state affairs; he became archbishop of York in 1514, chancellor and papal legate in 1515. Not even his genius, however, could win Henry the coveted crown of the Holy Roman Empire. With deep disappointment he saw it bestowed in 1519 on Charles, the Spanish king. During 1520 Henry met Emperor Charles V at Dover and Calais, and Francis at the Field of Cloth of Gold, near Calais, where Francis mortified Henry by throwing him in an impromptu wrestling match. In 1521 Henry joyfully received the papally bestowed title “Defender of the Faith” as a reward for writing the *Assertion of the Seven Sacraments*, a criticism of Lutheran doctrine. He tried to secure Wolsey’s election as pope in 1523 but failed.

English Reformation. Catherine was 40 in 1525. Her seven pregnancies produced but one healthy child, Mary, born May 18, 1516. Despairing of having a legitimate male heir, Henry created Henry Fitzroy, his natural son by Elizabeth Blount, Duke of Richmond and Somerset. More and more, he conceived Catherine’s misfortunes as a judgment from God. Did not Leviticus say that if a brother marry his brother’s widow, it is an unclean thing and they shall

be childless? Since Catherine was Arthur's widow, the matter was apparent.

The Reformation proceeded haphazardly from Henry's negotiations to nullify his marriage. Catherine would not retire to a nunnery, nor would Anne Boleyn consent to be Henry's mistress as had her sister Mary; she grimly demanded marriage. A court sitting in June 1529 under Wolsey and Cardinal Campeggio heard the case. Pope Clement VII instructed Campeggio to delay. When the Peace of Cambrai was declared between Spain and France in August 1529, leaving Charles V, Catherine's nephew, still powerful in Italy, Clement revoked the case to Rome. He dared not antagonize Charles, whose troops had sacked Rome in 1527 and briefly held him prisoner.

Henry removed Wolsey from office. Actually, Wolsey's diplomacy had been undermined by Henry's sending emissaries with different proposals to Clement. Catherine had a valid dispensation for her marriage to Henry from Pope Julius II; furthermore, she claimed that she came a virgin to Henry. She was a popular queen, deeply hurt by Henry's forsaking her bed in 1526. Henry's strategy matured when Thomas Cromwell became a privy councilor and his chief minister. Cromwell forced the clergy in convocation in 1531 to accept Henry's headship of the Church "as far as the law of Christ allows."

Anne's pregnancy in January 1533 brought matters to a head. In a fever of activity Henry married her on Jan. 25, 1533, secured papal approval to Thomas Cranmer's election as archbishop of Canterbury in March, had a court convened under Cranmer declare his marriage to Catherine invalid in May, and waited triumphantly for the birth of a son. His waiting was for naught. On Sept. 7, 1533, Elizabeth was born. Henry was so disappointed that he did not attend her christening. By the Act of Succession (1534) his issue by Anne was declared legitimate and his daughter Mary illegitimate. The Act of Supremacy (1534) required an oath affirming Henry's headship of the Church and, with other acts preventing appeals to Rome and cutting off the flow of annates and Peter's Pence, completed the break. Individuals unwilling to subscribe to the Acts of Succession and Supremacy suffered, the two most notable victims being John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, and Thomas More (1535). Their executions led to the publication of the papal bull excommunicating Henry.

Although Henry allowed the publication of an English Bible (1538), the Henrician Reformation was basically conservative. Major liturgical and theological revisions came under his son, Edward VI. Henry's financial need, however, made him receptive to Cromwell's plan for monastic dissolutions via parliamentary

acts in 1536 and 1539, in which the Crown became proprietor of the dissolved monasteries. The scale of monastic properties led to important social and economic consequences.

Later Marriages. Anne's haughty demeanor and moody temperament suited Henry ill, and her failure to produce a male heir rankled. She miscarried of a baby boy on Jan. 27, 1536, 6 days after fainting at the news that Henry had been knocked unconscious in a jousting accident in which the king fell under his mailed horse. It was a costly miscarriage, for Henry was already interested in Jane Seymour. He determined on a second divorce. He brought charges of treason against Anne for alleged adultery and incest; she was executed on May 19. The following day Henry betrothed himself to Jane and married her 10 days later. Jane brought a measure of comfort to Henry's personal life; she also produced a son and heir, Edward, on Oct. 12, 1537, but survived his birth a scant 12 days.

Henry was deeply grieved, and he did not remarry for 3 years. He was not in good health. Headaches plagued him intermittently; they may have originated from a jousting accident of 1524, in which Charles Brandon's lance splintered on striking Henry's open helmet. Moreover his ulcerated leg, which first afflicted him in 1528, occasionally troubled. Both legs were infected in 1537. In May 1538 he had a clot blockage in his lungs which made him speechless, but he recovered.

The course of diplomatic events, particularly the fear that Charles V might attempt an invasion of England, led Henry to seek an alliance with Continental Protestant powers; hence, his marriage to the Protestant princess Anne of Cleves on Jan. 12, 1540. His realization that Charles did not intend to attack, coupled with his distaste for Anne, led to Cromwell's dismissal and execution in June 1540 and to the annulment of his marriage to Anne on July 9, 1540.

Cromwell's fall was engineered by the conservative leaders of his Council, Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, and Bishop Gardiner. They thrust forward the 19-year-old niece of Norfolk, Catherine Howard, and Henry found her pleasing. He married Catherine within 3 weeks of his annulment and entered into the Indian summer of his life. He bore his by now tremendous girth lightly and was completely captivated, but his happiness was short-lived. Catherine's indiscretions as queen consort combined with her sexual misdemeanors as a protégé of the old dowager Duchess of Norfolk ensured her ruin. Inquiry into her behavior in October 1541 led to house arrest and her

execution on Feb. 13, 1542, by means of a bill of attainder.

Henry's disillusionment with Catherine plus preoccupation with the Scottish war, begun in 1542, and plans for renewal of hostilities with France delayed remarriage. The French war commenced in 1543 and dragged on for 3 years, achieving a solitary triumph before Boulogne (1545). Henry married the twice-widowed Catherine Parr on July 12, 1543. Though she bore him no children, she made him happy. Her religious views were somewhat more radical than those of Henry, who had revised the conservative Six Articles (1539) with his own hand. During his last years he attempted to stem the radical religious impulses unleashed by the formal break with Rome.

No minister during Henry's last 7 years approached the power of Wolsey or Cromwell. Henry bitterly reflected that Cromwell was the most faithful servant that he had ever had. He ruled by dividing his Council into conservative and radical factions. When Norfolk's faction became too powerful, he imprisoned him and executed his son the poet Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey. The King was unwell in late 1546 and early 1547, suffering from a fever brought on by his ulcerated leg. Before he died on Jan. 28, 1547, Henry reflected that "the mercy of Christ [is] able to pardon me all my sins, though they were greater than they be."

Assessment. Henry came to the throne with great gifts and high hopes. Ministers like Wolsey and Cromwell freed him from the burdensome chores of government and made policy, but only with Henry's approval. His relentless search for an heir led him into an accidental reformation of the Church not entirely to his liking. Ironically, had he waited until Catherine of Aragon died in 1536, he would have been free to pursue a solution to the succession problem without recourse to a reformation. His desire to cut a figure on the European battlefields led him into costly wars. To pay the piper, it was necessary to debase the coinage, thus increasing inflationary pressures already stimulated by the influx of Spanish silver, and to use the tremendous revenues from the sale of monastic properties. Had the properties been kept in the royal hand, the revenue could have made the Crown self-sufficient, perhaps so self-sufficient that it could have achieved an absolutism comparable to that of Louis XIV.

Though personally interested in education, Henry sponsored no far-reaching educational statutes. However, his avid interest in naval matters resulted in a larger navy and a modernization of naval administration. He brought Wales more fully into union with

the English by the Statute of Wales (1536) and made Ireland a kingdom (1542). Through the Statute of Uses (1536) he attempted to close off his subjects' attempts to deny him his feudal dues, but this was resisted and modified in 1540. The great innovations came out of the Reformation Statutes, not the least of which was the Act in Restraint of Appeals, in which England was declared an empire, and the Act of Supremacy, in which Henry became supreme head of the Anglican Church. The politically inspired Henrician Reformation became a religiously inspired one under his son, Edward VI, and thus Henry's reign became the first step in the forging of the Anglican Church.

Henry ruled ruthlessly in a ruthless age; he cut down the enemies of the Crown, like the Duke of Buckingham in 1521 and the Earl of Surrey. He stamped out the Pilgrimage of Grace (1536–1537), which issued from economic discontent, and set up a council in the north to ensure that there would be no more disorder. Though he had political gifts of a high order, he was neither Machiavelli's prince in action nor Bismarck's man of blood and iron. He was a king who wished to be succeeded by a son, and for this cause he bravely and rashly risked the anger of his fellow sovereigns. That he did what he did is a testament to his will, personal gifts, and good fortune.

EWB

Henry IV (1553–1610), king of France from 1589 to 1610. The first Bourbon monarch, Henry IV, he faced internal discord caused by the Wars of Religion and the economic disasters of the late 16th century and external danger posed by the powerful Hapsburg monarchy of Spain.

Born at Pau in Béarn on Dec. 14, 1553, Henry IV was the son of Antoine, Duc de Bourbon, and Jeanne d'Albret, daughter of the king of Navarre. Henry's parents were sympathetic to the Huguenot (Calvinist) faith, and Henry was raised a Huguenot. Through his father, Henry was a descendant of King Louis IX of France and hence a prince of the blood royal, next in succession to the French throne should the children of Henry II and Catherine de Médicis have no issue.

Henry's early childhood was supervised by his grandfather, Henri d'Albret, the king of Navarre, and, after his grandfather's death in 1555, by his mother, now queen of Navarre. He was trained in physical as well as intellectual disciplines, and his later career showed the results of both aspects of his early life. His physical endurance and vigor were matched by a quick and tolerant mind, his skill as a soldier matched by

his diplomatic and political astuteness in the course of his reign.

Historical Background. From 1559 to 1590 France was the scene of internal political and religious conflicts exacerbated by the constant threat of military intervention by Spain, the greatest military power in Europe. During this period France was ruled by the three children of Henry II and Catherine de Médicis in succession: Francis II (1559–1560), Charles IX (1560–1574), and Henry III (1574–1589). All three were weak-willed, and the first two had political minorities, thus making political power a prize to be controlled either by the queen mother, Catherine, or by one of the rival aristocratic factions, whose dynastic rivalry was further embittered by their religious differences.

The greatest of these rival clans were the ducal house of Lorraine, the family of Guise, and the house of Bourbon, led by Antoine of Navarre, Henry's father, and Antoine's brother, Louis, Prince of Condé. The Guise faction was the champion of orthodox Roman Catholicism, while the Bourbon faction spoke for French Protestantism. During the reign of Francis II the Guise faction acquired greater influence. Catherine's regency during the minority of Charles IX, however, favored playing off one faction against the other, and the French Wars of Religion began in 1562 and continued until 1598. The rival aristocratic houses used warfare or the threat of warfare to increase their own political power, calling for aid from their coreligionists outside France—Spain, the papacy, England, or the Protestant princes of Germany. Warfare, religious hatred, economic disorder, and the continual threat of outside intervention dominated the late 16th century in France.

The Reformation and its ensuing political complications thus struck France in a different way from that in which it had affected Germany and England. Exacerbating political rivalries, playing upon the instability and minority of French kings, and affording all dissident social elements the opportunity of evening old scores, the Reformation in France was not so much the arguing of theological points (as in Germany) or the vehicle of increasing royal authority (as in England), but the unleashing of political forces which the French monarchy was unable to contain. It was to be the task of Henry IV to create a monarchical state out of political and religious anarchy.

King of Navarre. Henry was brought into the center of political infighting before he was 20. Catherine de Médicis arranged for a marriage between Henry and her daughter, Margaret of France. Henry's

mother, Jeanne, was in Paris to be persuaded that her son should marry the Catholic princess but died in 1572. Henry then became King Henry III of Navarre. He and Margaret were married in August 1572, a week before Catherine, fearful of Huguenot influence over Charles IX, ordered the execution of Huguenots in Paris and other French cities. Henry himself was spared, but he was kept a prisoner in various degrees of security from 1572 to 1576, when he escaped to his own kingdom.

Henry's appearance and personality in these years made him a favorite not only of his own subjects but even of many people at court who had every reason to wish him dead. Between his amorous adventures (which continued all his life) and his new role as king of Navarre and leader of French Huguenots, Henry's life moved out of Navarre exclusively and out of the choking world of the court into France itself. From 1576 to his conversion to Catholicism in 1594, Henry was the center of opposition both to Catholic persecution of Huguenots and to the powerful political League, which the Duke of Guise had created to control the crown of France under the semblance of defending it from Protestants.

King of France. In 1584 the Duke of Anjou, the youngest son of Catherine de Médicis, died, thus making Henry of Navarre the heir apparent to the reigning king, Henry III. The League immediately became more powerful, fearing a Protestant king. The League, allied with Philip II of Spain, exceeded in power even Henry III, who in despair arranged the assassination of the Duke of Guise and allied himself with Henry of Navarre.

When Henry III was assassinated in 1589, France faced the prospect of a Protestant king, kept from most of his kingdoms by a League of Catholics backed by the power of Spain. Henry had to fight his way to his own throne. But Henry IV refused to fight in the way his predecessors had done. Although he agreed to be instructed in the Catholic faith, he promised his coreligionists that he would end persecution on both sides, and from the death of Henry III to his own death, Henry IV had to create a political state over the skepticism of both Catholics and Protestants and in the presence of bitter memories of a kind that few states have been able to survive.

Between 1589 and 1594 Henry fought his way to the throne. He slowly wore down the Catholic front, declared war on Philip II of Spain in 1595, and guaranteed his earlier promises of religious toleration with the Edict of Nantes in 1598, the first successful attempt in modern European history to reconcile the presence of two religions within a single kingdom.

Henry's actions were dictated by political necessity as well as personal conviction. France was in dire economic straits and in the midst of a social crisis. He was aided by a strong civil service and by a minister of exceptional talents, Maximilien de Bethune, Duc de Sully, his director of finance. In 1599 Henry IV divorced his wife and in 1600 married Marie de Médicis, who in 1601 bore him a son, his successor Louis XIII.

In the course of his reign Henry turned his attention vigorously to those aspects of the kingdom which had virtually been ignored during the period of the civil wars: justice, finance, agriculture, the exploitation of foreign acquisitions in Canada, the calming of old religious and social hatreds, and the perennial task of the 16th-century French monarchy, the control of Spain and Hapsburg Austria through alliances with England and the United Provinces. In the case of Hapsburg power, Henry devised a general program for checking the ambitions of this great imperial house. Whether or not Henry was responsible for the famous "Grand Design" which Sully later attributed to him is doubtful, but his last act in the area of foreign affairs was to launch an invasion of the Spanish Netherlands.

As he left Paris for the new war, Henry IV was stabbed by the assassin Ravallac on May 14, 1610. He died before he could be brought back to the Louvre. Henry's reign had witnessed the worst of the civil wars which had been fought in many parts of Europe in the name of religion. It had witnessed the immense threat of Spanish power as well as the fire of internal rebellion. It had begun the slow political, social, and economic reconstruction of France. Much of the success of the reign was directly the result of Henry's personality and political and military ability. In an age when monarchy is no longer considered a viable form of government, it is well to be aware of a point in European history when a victory for absolute monarchy meant social and political reform on a scale that no other form of government could provide—and meant, too, a victory for a monarch who was as personally appealing as any other figure in those 2 centuries his life touched.

EWB

Henry the Navigator (1394–1460), Portuguese prince. Henry launched the first great European voyages of exploration. He sought new lands and sources of revenue for his kingdom and dynasty and searched for eastern Christian allies against Islam.

Born at Oporto on March 4, 1394, Henry was the third son of John I of Portugal and Philippa of Lancaster. He grew to maturity at a time when John

I was bringing to a close a confused period of civil strife and war with Castile and securing Portugal's independence. The conflicts of this period had left the nobility decimated and impoverished and the monarchy's revenues greatly depreciated. Thus the ruling families began to look abroad for new worlds of wealth, land, and honors to conquer.

John and his sons became involved in a three-fold movement of Portuguese expansion, comprising the campaign to conquer Moorish North Africa; the movement to explore and conquer the Atlantic island groups to the west and south; and the exploring, trading, and slaving expeditions down the West African coast. These ventures were united not by geographical curiosity but by Henry's overreaching desire to continue abroad the traditional Portuguese crusade against Moors and Berbers in the peninsula itself. He hoped also to catch Islam in a gigantic pincers movement by joining forces with the mythical "Indies" Christian kingdom of Prester John, the wealthy and powerful priest-king of medieval legend. The Prester's domains had been variously located in present-day India and in East Africa (Ethiopia).

North Africa and the Atlantic Islands. King John wished to satisfy the avarice and lust for battle of his warriors; Prince Henry and his brothers wanted to prove their manhood and strike a blow for the faith on the battlefield. A campaign launched in July 1415 during a civil war in North Africa left the port of Ceuta stripped of its navy. Henry was knighted and made Duke of Viseu. With the fall of Ceuta the Portuguese learned of the long-established gold trade with black Africa conducted by caravan across the Sahara. Gold hunger had been growing in late medieval Europe in response to the growth of commerce, but Portugal had lacked gold coinage since 1383. Prince Henry may thus have sought to tap the supply at its source by venturing down the West African coast.

Henry's first sponsored voyages of exploration were to the Atlantic islands of Madeira and Porto Santo (1418–1419); colonization followed. These islands, as well as the Azores and Canaries, had been known to the earlier Middle Ages; they were now rediscovered and exploited by the Portuguese (the Azores ca. 1439), except the Canaries, which fell under the control of Castile. The Cape Verde Islands, much farther to the south, were discovered and settled in 1455–1460. Colonization of these islands was important for the entire subsequent history of Iberian expansion: they provided bases for voyages to the New World and for the development of practices used later in American colonization. More immediately, they

brought in returns on capital loans extended by Prince Henry to island settlers.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese involvement in North Africa was proving to be a costly and dangerous undertaking. During Henry's disastrous attempt in 1437 to conquer Tangier, the Moslems roundly defeated the Portuguese and took Prince Henry's younger brother, Fernando, as a hostage against the return of Ceuta. Over the objections of Henry and his eldest brother, Duarte (then king), the royal council refused to make the trade, and Fernando lived out the rest of his days in a dungeon at Fez.

African Voyages. The repeated probes made down the West African coast at Henry's behest constitute the most significant achievement of his career. Only the most important of these expeditions will be mentioned here.

After many unsuccessful attempts Gil Eannes in 1434 rounded Cape Bojador on the North African coast. This point was the southernmost limit of previous European exploration, and Eannes's feat in sailing beyond it—and returning—constitutes the most important navigational achievement of the early Portuguese maritime enterprise. Further voyages under Nuno Tristão led to the rounding of Cape Blanco (1442), the occupation of Arguin Island (1443), and the discovery of the mouths of the Senegal (1444) and Gambia (1446) rivers. Cape Verde was attained by Dinas Dias in 1444, and the islands of that name were first visited by Alvise da Cadamosto in 1555. The mouths of the Geba and Casamance rivers were discovered by Diogo Gomes in 1456, and in 1460 Pedro da Sintra reached Sierra Leone. A total of about 1,500 miles of African coast had been explored by these expeditions.

The economic and political consequences of African "discovery" were momentous. The Portuguese obtained an ever-increasing flow of gold through trade with inhabitants of the coastal regions and in 1457 resumed minting gold coins. With a coarse African red pepper (*malagueta*) the Portuguese made their first incursion into the Italian monopoly of the spice trade. However, the most important long-range economic development was the beginnings of the African slave trade, which became significant after 1442. The Portuguese obtained slaves through raids on coastal villages and trade with the inhabitants of Gambia and Upper Guinea. In this way the Portuguese, at the very beginning of Europe's overseas expansion, provided the "woeful solution" for the problem of colonial labor power.

Equally important for future patterns of colonization were developments in economic, religious,

and political policy. At this time the papacy commenced to issue its long series of bulls defining the rights of the colonizing powers. The Portuguese crown was awarded an exclusive monopoly over both present and future exploration, commerce, and conquest all the way to South Africa and the "Indies," as well as a spiritual monopoly over these same regions.

Henry supported and defined the missions of his captains and patronized map makers and others who could make practical contributions to the progress of discovery. But he sponsored no "school" of pure science and mathematics, and his reputation as a patron of learning has been grossly inflated. Henry died at Vila do Infante near Sagres on Nov. 13, 1460.

EWB

Herder, Johann Gottfried von (1744–1803), German philosopher, theologian, and critic. Johann Gottfried von Herder is best known for his contribution to the philosophy of history.

Johann Gottfried von Herder was born into a religious middle-class family in East Prussia on Aug. 25, 1744, and was raised in the town of Mohrungen, where his father was the schoolmaster. A surgeon in the occupying Russian army offered to be young Herder's patron and finance his university education in the capital city of Königsberg. In 1762 Herder enrolled as a medical student only to discover that he was unable to attend dissections or operations without fainting. He transferred to theology, and during this period he met Immanuel Kant and Johann George Hamann. Despite their later disagreements, Herder wrote a moving description of Kant, then a young teacher, and Kant, equally impressed, remitted his usual lecture fees. In Hamann, Herder discovered a kindred spirit who wished to preserve the integrity of faith by exposing the limitations of "enlightened" rationalism. Their lifelong friendship and correspondence reinforced the interests of both philosophers in literature, language, translation, and esthetics.

Between 1764 and 1769 Herder lived in Riga, where he worked as a teacher and minister and wrote a number of reviews and essays. His first important works *Fragments concerning Recent German Literature* (1767) and *Critical Forests* (1769) display an early tendency to treat problems of esthetics and language historically.

In the following years Herder traveled throughout Europe and held a minor pastorate. In Paris he met the *encyclopédistes* Denis Diderot and Jean d'Alembert, and in Strasbourg he began his lifelong association with the poet J. W. von Goethe. Through Goethe's intervention, Herder eventually secured a permanent appointment as superintendent of the Lu-

theran clergy at Weimar in 1776. Herder worked conscientiously at his considerable administrative and clerical career in order to provide for his family of four children. Nonetheless, his prolific writings run to 33 volumes and include *Letters for the Advancement of Humanity*, *Christian Writings*, two works criticizing Kant (*Metakritik* and *Kalligone*), as well as collections of folk literature, translations, and poetry. He died in Weimar on Dec. 18, 1803.

His Thought. The speculative dimension of history is concerned with the search for philosophic intelligibility or meaning in the study of human events. Ancient historians saw the repetitive pattern of history, and in this *cyclical* perspective the justification for studying the past was to anticipate the future. Christianity introduced a linear conception of time and the notion of *Providence* by dating history from a specific event and envisioning a definite end. Beginning with the late 17th century, philosophers secularized Providence: God's story was replaced by a belief in human *progress* and man's future perfectibility. By and large, professional historians and philosophers have discarded such theories in favor of a position known as *historicism*. In this view there are no general patterns, and each historical epoch is unique in its individual character and culture.

Herder's work is the first to incorporate elements of historicism. In an early work, ironically entitled *Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Mankind* (1774), and his later four-volume *Idea for a Philosophy of History for Mankind* (1784–1791), he displays an ambivalence toward the goals of rationalism and the Enlightenment. In the *Idea* Herder's Protestant pessimism about the perfectibility of human nature is reinforced by physical-cultural relativism: on a star among stars, man, as a creature among creatures, plays out his unique destiny in proportion to the "force" or "power" resulting from the interaction between individual, institution, and environment. Like Kant, Herder was among the first to strike upon the ingenious solution, later favored by G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx, of locating progress in the species rather than in the individual. Thus humanity progresses, through God's mysterious ways, in spite of the individuals who compose it. History offers a synthesis of Providence, progress, and individuality since "whatever could be has been, according to the situation and wants of the place, the circumstances and occasions of the times, and the native or generated character of the people."

EWB

Herzen, Aleksandr Ivanovich (1812–1870), Russian author and political agitator. Aleksandr Her-

zen developed a socialist philosophy that was the ideological basis for much of the revolutionary activity in Russia.

Aleksandr Herzen, whose real surname was Yakovlev, was born on March 25, 1812, in Moscow. He was the illegitimate son of a wealthy Moscow aristocrat, Ivan Alexeevich Yakovlev, and a German woman of humble birth. Herzen was 13 when the Decembrist rising took place, and he was present at the thanksgiving service in the Kremlin after the hangings. The scene made a lasting impression on him. His foreign tutors exposed him to radical ideas, and in his early teens he dedicated himself to the fight for freedom. In 1829 Herzen entered the University of Moscow to study natural sciences and became the leader of a small group of like-minded students. The news of the fighting on the barricades in Paris in July 1830 and the November rebellion in Warsaw profoundly moved them.

Influence of Saint-Simon. During his university years Herzen and his friends discovered the writings of the Comte de Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier. Socialist teachings were just beginning to take root in Russia. What impressed Herzen most was Saint-Simon's vision of mankind totally regenerated by a new Christianity, a faith that exalted both the individual and the community. He was fascinated by Saint-Simon's doctrines that denounced the failings of the existing order and promised to stop the exploitation of man by man. He was somewhat repelled by Saint-Simon's emphasis on the role of government and was inclined to accept Fourier's plan for phalansteries that relied on private initiative and the free cooperation of the workers. The French Revolution, the Polish uprising, and the teachings of Saint-Simon made him feel that the time was ripe for change.

Arrest and Deportation. Herzen completed his studies in 1833, and his circle broke up the following year, when he and his lifelong friend Nikolai Ogarev were arrested. The charge against them was that they sang songs containing "vile and ill-intentioned expressions against the oath of allegiance to the monarch." The official investigators considered Herzen to be "a bold free thinker, very dangerous to society." Herzen and Ogarev were suspected of having founded a secret organization aiming to overthrow the existing order through the propagation of revolutionary ideas permeated with Saint-Simon's pernicious doctrine. The two friends were deported to the provinces, where Herzen remained until 1842.

Toward the end of his confinement and afterward Herzen studied the works of G. W. F. Hegel.

He perceived in the Hegelian dialectical conception of history a sanction for political and social change. If, as Hegel maintained, everything real is rational, Herzen then thought that rebellion against the order of things grown oppressive is also justified by reason. Herzen concluded that the “philosophy of Hegel is the algebra of revolution.”

Protagonist of Westernism. Moscow was the Slavophile center, and Herzen participated in the endless disputations that raged in the literary salons there. He found Slavophile theories extremely dangerous, seeing in them “fresh oil for anointing the Czar, new claims laid upon thought.” By 1845 the relations between the Slavophiles and the Westerners were severed. Nevertheless, Herzen retained a certain predilection for some ideas of the Slavophiles. He shared the Slavophiles’ partiality for everything Russian and their faith in the common people, and he was impressed by the Slavophile emphasis on the collectivist spirit of the Russian folk, as it was embodied in the *obshchina* (village commune).

Travel Abroad. Herzen went abroad with his family in 1847 to escape the suffocating atmosphere of despotism of Nicholas I. He never returned to Russia. His first experience with life in western Europe was disheartening. Herzen discovered that France was dominated by the bourgeoisie, the segment of the population that had appropriated all the gains of the Revolution. He thought the bourgeoisie had all the vices of the nobleman and the plebeian and none of the virtues, and he rarely wavered in his dislike of the European middle class.

As Herzen’s disillusionment with the West deepened, his country appeared to him in a different light. He came to believe that the Slavophiles were right: unlike effete Europe, Russia was full of vigor, self-confidence, and courage. Like most Slavs, Russians “belonged to geography, rather than to history.” Above all, Russia possessed the village commune, “the life-giving principle of the Russian people.” Herzen argued that the commune was in effect the seed of a socialist society because of its tradition of equality, collective ownership of land, and communal self-government. The Russian *muzhik* (peasant) was the man of destiny. Since the Russian *muzhik’s* whole existence was keyed to a collective way of life, Russia, or rather Slavdom, was in a position to assure the triumph of socialism. Taking advantage of Russian backwardness and European experience, Russia might indeed bypass capitalism and middle-class culture on its way to socialism.

In 1852 Herzen arrived in London. He was a bereaved and heartbroken man; one of his small sons and his mother had been drowned, and his wife had died in childbirth afterward. He desperately needed work in which he could submerge himself, and he used a portion of his considerable inheritance to set up the Free Russian Press in 1853.

The first pages produced were an appeal to the gentry to take the initiative in liberating the serfs. Otherwise, Herzen held that the serfs would be emancipated by the Tsar, strengthening his despotism, or else abolition would come as the result of the popular uprising. He went on to tell the landlords that Russia was on the eve of an overturn, which would be close to the heart of the people living out their lives within the commune. Herzen concluded, “Russia will have its rendezvous with revolution in socialism.”

The “Bell.” On July 1, 1857, Herzen with Ogarev’s help launched *Kolokol* (the *Bell*), first as a monthly, then as a biweekly. The *Bell* summoned the living to bury the past and work for the glorious future. It spoke for freedom and against oppression, for reason and against prejudice, for science and against fanaticism, for progressive peoples and against backward governments. Specifically, the *Bell* was dedicated to the “liberation of Russia.”

Since Herzen had the privilege of freedom from censorship, his office at the *Bell* was flooded with communications from Russia, and there was a constant stream of Russian visitors. With their help and that of scores of correspondents scattered through Russia, the *Bell* conducted a most successful muck-raking campaign. It cited particulars and named names. Minutes of secret sessions of the highest bodies appeared in its columns. The journal was read by all literate Russia. Fear of exposure in the *Bell* became a deterrent to administrative corruption, and there was talk in high government places of buying Herzen off, perhaps with an important post.

After the failure of the Polish rebellion of 1863 Herzen continued to berate the administration and to preach “Russian socialism,” stemming from the *muzhik’s* way of life and reaching out for that “economic justice” which is a universal goal sanctioned by science. But the *Bell* was now reduced in readership and influence. Herzen antagonized the many who had drifted to the right, as well as the few who had moved to the left. In 1868 the *Bell* was silenced for good, and on Jan. 9, 1870, Aleksandr Herzen, a crusading journalist possessed of a powerful pen, died in Paris.

EWB

Herzl, Theodor (1860–1904), Hungarian-born Austrian Jewish author. Theodor Herzl founded the

World Zionist Organization and served as its first president.

Theodor Herzl, son of Jacob and Jeanette Herzl, was born on May 2, 1860, in Budapest, Hungary, where he attended elementary and secondary schools. In 1878 he was admitted as a law student to the University of Vienna, but after a year of legal studies he switched to journalism. He worked for the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of Vienna until 1892, when he took an assignment in Paris as correspondent for the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*. In this capacity he reported on the Dreyfus Affair in 1894, and he was greatly troubled by the anti-Semitism he saw in France at the time. In 1896 Herzl started his political career with the publication of his pamphlet *The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question*.

According to *The Jewish State*, persecution could not destroy the Jewish people but would accomplish the opposite: it would strengthen Jewish identification. In Herzl's view, effective assimilation of the Jews would be impossible because of the long history of prejudice and the competition between the non-Jewish and Jewish middle classes. Because of conditions in the Jewish Diaspora, some communities might disintegrate, but the people as a whole would always survive. Herzl believed that the Jews had little choice but to begin the concentration of the Jewish people in one land under its own sovereign authority. To achieve this purpose, he organized the First Zionist Congress, which met in Basel, Switzerland, in August 1897. This meeting marked the establishment of the World Zionist Organization, whose executives were to be the diplomatic and administrative representatives of the Zionist movement. Herzl became president of the organization, a post he held until his death.

The official goal of the World Zionist Organization was the establishment of "a secured homeland in Palestine for the Jewish people." Because Palestine was part of Turkey and because Germany enjoyed a special relationship with Turkey, in 1898 Herzl met with Kaiser William II in an unsuccessful effort to win his support. In May 1901 Herzl was received by the sultan of Turkey, Abdul-Hamid II. But this meeting too had no positive results, since Turkey was not willing to allow mass immigration without restrictions to Palestine.

In view of the deteriorating situation of eastern European Jewry, Herzl considered other territorial solutions for the Jewish problem. The British government suggested Uganda for the Jewish mass immigration, but this plan was rejected by the Fourth Zionist Congress in 1903, which again stated the ultimate

goal of Zionism as the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

During the Uganda polemics Theodor Herzl showed signs of grave illness. On July 3, 1904, he died and was buried in Vienna. According to his wishes, his remains were transferred by the government of the independent state of Israel to Jerusalem in 1949 and buried on Mt. Herzl, the national cemetery of Israel.

EWB

Hill, Christopher (1910–), British historian. Christopher Hill is recognized in Great Britain as the foremost historian of the English Revolution (1640–1660), its origins and its aftermath. Hill's numerous books and essay collections examine the Revolution not only from the perspectives of those who engineered it, but also from the position of common citizens, radical religious fringe groups, the expanding mercantile class, and seminal writers such as John Milton and Gerrard Winstanley.

Although *New York Review of Books* correspondent J. P. Kenyon claims that Hill made "a spectacular leap to the very apex of the academic establishment," the more common view of Hill's career holds that the historian achieved prominence through his more than forty years of contributions to his field. John Brewer recalls that Hill was "an early member of what was to become the most important and influential group of historians in Britain after World War II," an association that "emanated not from an academic institution but a political party." Brewer refers to the Historians' Study Group of the British Communist Party, an organization that encouraged socialist and Marxist writing within the universities. When the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in 1956, Hill and many of his colleagues withdrew from the British Communist Party, expressing their dissatisfaction with Soviet policy. Hill did not abandon the task of writing socialist history, however. According to David Underdown, the scholar "has always emphasized that two distinct groups were central in transforming early modern English society: the 'industrious sort of people' or 'middling sort,' . . . and the radical intellectuals. . . . The period of Hill's greatest influence was probably during the late 1960s and early 1970s, when university students (and many of their elders) on both sides of the Atlantic found in his work inspiring echoes of their visions of a freer cultural and social order, and a sense of being sustained by a tradition of radical criticism stretching back over the centuries."

"The age of the Puritan Revolution must now be regarded as 'Hill's half-century,'" writes *New York Review of Books* contributor Lawrence Stone, "and for years to come students will be testing, confirming,

modifying, or rejecting his hypotheses. It is given to few historians to achieve such intellectual dominance over their chosen field, for it requires sustained capacity for taking pains in the drudgery of research, a fertile and facile pen, and tremendous imaginative powers. Together, these are the marks of the great historian." Philip Rosenberg feels that with so many scholars "tending to treat their subjects as grist for their intellectual mills," Christopher Hill's "more humanistic approach is a valuable asset in no small part responsible for his preeminence among contemporary historians." Having retired as master of Balliol in 1978, Hill continues to write and lecture on aspects of the English Revolution and its ramifications for the history of modern Europe. According to Kenyon in the *Washington Post Book World*, Hill's "feel for the English language, the great breadth of his reading, and his patient and compassionate understanding of human eccentricity, make it possible for us to understand through him something of the feelings and emotions of these extraordinary men and women who peopled 'the Puritan Revolution.'"

CA

Himmler, Heinrich (1900–1945), German National Socialist politician. Heinrich Himmler commanded the SS, Hitler's elite troops, and was head of the Gestapo. He was perhaps the most powerful and ruthless man in Nazi Germany next to Hitler himself.

Born in Munich, Bavaria, on Oct. 7, 1900, Heinrich Himmler was the son of the former tutor of one of the Bavarian princes. In World War I he took his first opportunity to join the army (1917), but owing to his frail health he never reached the front. Yet he continued soldiering in veterans' bands after the war while a student at the university in Munich, and in November 1923 he marched in Hitler's ill-fated Beer Hall Putsch. After a brief flirt with the leftist Strasser faction of the Nazis, the young anti-Semitic fanatic joined Hitler in 1926 as deputy propaganda chief.

In January 1929 Himmler found his "calling" with his appointment as commander of the blackshirt SS (*Schutzstaffel*), then still a small, untrained bodyguard. With characteristic drive and pedantic precision he rapidly turned this organization into an elite army of 50,000, including its own espionage system (SD). After the Nazis came to power in 1933, Himmler took over and expanded the Gestapo (*Geheime Staatspolizei*, secret police). In 1934 he liquidated Ernst Roehm, chief of the SA (storm troopers), and thus gained autonomy for the SS, which took charge of all concentration camps.

From this power base, to which he added the position of chief of all German police forces in June 1936 and that of minister of the interior in August 1943, Himmler coordinated the entire Nazi machinery of political suppression and racial "purification." From 1937 on, the entire German population was screened for "Aryan" racial purity by Himmler's mammoth bureaucratic apparatus. After the invasion of eastern Europe it became Himmler's task to "Germanize" the occupied areas and to deport the native populations to concentration camps.

After the plot of July 1944 against Hitler, Himmler also became supreme commander of all home armies. In 1943 he made contacts with the Western Allies in an attempt to preserve his own position and to barter Jewish prisoners for his own safety, an action which caused his expulsion from the party shortly before Hitler's death. On May 21, 1945, Heinrich Himmler was captured while fleeing from the British at Bremervoerde. Two days later he took poison and died.

EWB

Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945)

The German dictator led the extreme nationalist and racist Nazi party and served as chancellor-president of Germany from 1933 to 1945. Probably the most effective and powerful demagogue of the 20th century, his leadership led to the extermination of approximately 6 million Jews.

Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist movement belong among the many irrationally nationalistic, racist, and fundamentally nihilist political mass movements that sprang from the ground of political, economic, and social desperation following World War I and the deeply upsetting economic dislocations of the interwar period. Taking their name from the first such movement to gain power—Mussolini's fascism in Italy (1922)—fascist-type movements reached the peak of their popular appeal and political power in the widespread panic and mass psychosis that spread to all levels of the traditional industrial and semi-industrial societies of Europe with the world depression of the 1930s. Always deeply chauvinistic, antiliberal and antirational, and violently anti-Semitic, these movements varied in form from the outright atheistic and industrialist German national socialism to the lesser-known mystical-religious and peasant-oriented movements of eastern Europe.

Early Life. Adolf Hitler was born on April 20, 1889, in the small Austrian town of Braunau on the Inn River along the Bavarian-German border, son of an Austrian customs official of moderate means.

His early youth in Linz on the Danube seems to have been under the repressive influence of an authoritarian and, after retirement in 1895, increasingly short-tempered and domineering father until the latter's death in 1903. After an initially fine performance in elementary school, Adolf soon became rebellious and began failing in the *Realschule* (college preparatory school). Following transfer to another school, he finally left formal education altogether in 1905 and, refusing to bow to the discipline of a regular job, began his long years of dilettante, aimless existence, reading, painting, wandering in the woods, and dreaming of becoming a famous artist. In 1907, when his mother died, he moved to Vienna in an attempt to enroll in the famed Academy of Fine Arts. His failure to gain admission that year and the next led him into a period of deep depression and seclusion from his friends. Wandering through the streets of Vienna, he lived on a modest orphan's pension and the money he could earn by painting and selling picture postcards. It was during this time of his vagabond existence among the rootless, displaced elements of the old Hapsburg capital, that he first became fascinated by the immense potential of mass political manipulation. He was particularly impressed by the successes of the anti-Semitic, nationalist Christian-Socialist party of Vienna Mayor Karl Lueger and his efficient machine of propaganda and mass organization. Under Lueger's influence and that of former Catholic monk and race theorist Lanz von Liebenfels, Hitler first developed the fanatical anti-Semitism and racial mythology that were to remain central to his own "ideology" and that of the Nazi party.

In May 1913, apparently in an attempt to avoid induction into the Austrian military service after he had failed to register for conscription, Hitler slipped across the German border to Munich, only to be arrested and turned over to the Austrian police. He was able to persuade the authorities not to detain him for draft evasion and duly presented himself for the draft physical examination, which he failed to pass. He returned to Munich, and after the outbreak of World War I a year later, he volunteered for action in the German army. During the war he fought on Germany's Western front with distinction but gained no promotion beyond the rank of corporal. Injured twice, he won several awards for bravery, among them the highly respected Iron Cross First Class. Although isolated in his troop, he seems to have thoroughly enjoyed his success on the front and continued to look back fondly upon his war experience.

Early Nazi Years. The end of the war suddenly left Hitler without a place or goal and drove

him to join the many disillusioned veterans who continued to fight in the streets of Germany. In the spring of 1919 he found employment as a political officer in the army in Munich with the help of an adventurer-soldier by the name of Ernst Roehm, later head of Hitler's storm troopers (SA). In this capacity Hitler attended a meeting of the so-called German Workers' party, a nationalist, anti-Semitic, and socialist group, in September 1919. He quickly distinguished himself as this party's most popular and impressive speaker and propagandist, helped to increase its membership dramatically to some 6,000 by 1921, and in April that year became Führer (leader) of the now-renamed National Socialist German Workers' party (NSDAP), the official name of the Nazi party.

The worsening economic conditions of the two following years, which included a runaway inflation that wiped out the savings of great numbers of middle-income citizens, massive unemployment, and finally foreign occupation of the economically crucial Ruhr Valley, contributed to the continued rapid growth of the party. By the end of 1923 Hitler could count on a following of some 56,000 members and many more sympathizers and regarded himself as a significant force in Bavarian and German politics. Inspired by Mussolini's "March on Rome," he hoped to use the crisis conditions accompanying the end of the Ruhr occupation in the fall of 1923 to stage his own coup against the Berlin government. For this purpose he staged the well-known Nazi Beer Hall Putsch of Nov. 8–9, 1923, by which he hoped—in coalition with right-wingers around World War I general Erich Ludendorff—to force the conservative-nationalist Bavarian government of Gustav von Kahr to cooperate with him in a rightist "March on Berlin." The attempt failed, however. Hitler was tried for treason and given the rather mild sentence of a year's imprisonment in the old fort of Landsberg.

It was during this prison term that many of Hitler's basic ideas of political strategy and tactics matured. Here he outlined his major plans and beliefs in *Mein Kampf*, which he dictated to his loyal confidant Rudolf Hess. He planned the reorganization of his party, which had been outlawed and which, with the return of prosperity, had lost much of its appeal. After his release Hitler reconstituted the party around a group of loyal followers who were to remain the cadre of the Nazi movement and state. Progress was slow in the prosperous 1920s, however, and on the eve of the Depression, the NSDAP still was able to attract only some 2.5 percent of the electoral vote.

Rise to Power. With the outbreak of world depression, the fortunes of Hitler's movement rose

rapidly. In the elections of September 1930 the Nazis polled almost 6.5 million votes and increased their parliamentary representation from 12 to 107. In the presidential elections of the spring of 1932, Hitler ran an impressive second to the popular World War I hero Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, and in July he outpolled all other parties with some 14 million votes and 230 seats in the Reichstag (parliament). Although the party lost 2 million of its voters in another election, in November 1932, President Hindenburg on Jan. 30, 1933, reluctantly called Hitler to the chancellorship to head a coalition government of Nazis, conservative German nationalists, and several prominent independents.

Consolidation of Power. The first 2 years in office were almost wholly dedicated to the consolidation of power. With several prominent Nazis in key positions (Hermann Göring, as minister of interior in Prussia, and Wilhelm Frick, as minister of interior of the central government, controlled the police forces) and his military ally Werner von Blomberg in the Defense Ministry, he quickly gained practical control. He persuaded the aging president and the Reichstag to invest him with emergency powers suspending the constitution in the so-called Enabling Act of Feb. 28, 1933. Under this act and with the help of a mysterious fire in the Reichstag building, he rapidly eliminated his political rivals and brought all levels of government and major political institutions under his control. By means of the Roehm purge of the summer of 1934 he assured himself of the loyalty of the army by the subordination of the Nazi storm troopers and the murder of its chief together with the liquidation of major rivals within the army. The death of President Hindenburg in August 1934 cleared the way for the abolition of the presidential title by plebiscite. Hitler became officially Führer of Germany and thereby head of state as well as commander in chief of the armed forces. Joseph Goebbels's extensive propaganda machine and Heinrich Himmler's police system simultaneously perfected totalitarian control of Germany, as demonstrated most impressively in the great Nazi mass rally of 1934 in Nuremberg, where millions marched in unison and saluted Hitler's theatrical appeals.

Preparation for War. Once internal control was assured, Hitler began mobilizing Germany's resources for military conquest and racial domination of the land masses of central and eastern Europe. He put Germany's 6 million unemployed to work on a vast rearmament and building program, coupled with a propaganda campaign to prepare the nation for war.

Germany's mythical enemy, world Jewry—which was associated with all internal and external obstacles in the way of total power—was systematically and ruthlessly attacked in anti-Semitic mass propaganda, with economic sanctions, and in the end by the “final solution” of physical destruction of Jewish men, women, and children in Himmler's concentration camps.

Foreign relations were similarly directed toward preparation for war: the improvement of Germany's military position, the acquisition of strong allies or the establishment of convenient neutrals, and the division of Germany's enemies. Playing on the weaknesses of the Versailles Peace Treaty and the general fear of war, this policy was initially most successful in the face of appeasement-minded governments in England and France. After an unsuccessful coup attempt in Austria in 1934, Hitler gained Mussolini's alliance and dependence as a result of Italy's Ethiopian war in 1935, illegally marched into the Rhineland in 1936 (demilitarized at Versailles), and successfully intervened in cooperation with Mussolini in the Spanish Civil War. Under the popular banner of national self-determination, he annexed Austria and the German-speaking Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia with the concurrence of the West in 1938 (Munich Agreement), only to occupy all of Czechoslovakia early in 1939. Finally, through threats and promises of territory, he was able to gain the benevolent neutrality of the Soviet Union for the coming war (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, August 1939). Alliances with Italy (Pact of Steel) and Japan followed.

The War. On Sept. 1, 1939, Hitler began World War II which he hoped would lead to his control of most of the Eurasian heartland with the lightning invasion of Poland, which he immediately followed with the liquidation of Jews and the Polish intelligentsia, the enslavement of the local “subhuman” population, and the beginnings of a German colonization. Following the declaration of war by France and England, he temporarily turned his military machine west, where the lightning, mobile attacks of the German forces quickly triumphed. In April 1940 Denmark surrendered, and Norway was taken by an amphibious operation. In May-June the rapidly advancing tank forces defeated France and the Low Countries.

The major goal of Hitler's conquest lay in the East, however, and already in the middle of 1940 German war production was preparing for an eastern campaign. The Air Battle of Britain, which Hitler had hoped would permit either German invasion or (this continued to be his dream) an alliance with “Germanic” England, was broken off, and Germany's naval

operations collapsed for lack of reinforcements and matériel.

On June 22, 1941, the German army advanced on Russia in the so-called Operation Barbarossa, which Hitler regarded as Germany's final struggle for existence and "living space" (*Lebensraum*) and for the creation of the "new order" of German racial domination. After initial rapid advances, the German troops were stopped by the severe Russian winter, however, and failed to reach any of their three major goals: Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad. The following year's advances were again slower than expected, and with the first major setback at Stalingrad (1943) the long retreat from Russia began. A year later, the Western Allies, too, started advancing on Germany.

German Defeat. With the waning fortunes of the German war effort, Hitler withdrew almost entirely from the public; his orders became increasingly erratic and pedantic; and recalling his earlier triumphs over the generals, he refused to listen to advice from his military counselors. He dreamed of miracle bombs and suspected treason everywhere. Under the slogan of "total victory or total ruin," the entire German nation from young boys to old men, often barely equipped or trained, was mobilized and sent to the front. After an unsuccessful assassination attempt by a group of former leading politicians and military men on July 20, 1944, the regime of terror further tightened.

In the last days of the Third Reich, with the Russian troops in the suburbs of Berlin, Hitler entered into a last stage of desperation in his underground bunker in Berlin. He ordered Germany destroyed since it was not worthy of him; he expelled his trusted lieutenants Himmler and Göring from the party; and made a last, theatrical appeal to the German nation. Adolf Hitler committed suicide on April 30, 1945, leaving the last bits of unconquered German territory to the administration of non-Nazi Adm. Karl Doenitz.

EWB

Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679), English philosopher and political theorist. Thomas Hobbes was one of the central figures of British empiricism. His major work, "Leviathan," published in 1651, expressed his principle of materialism and his concept of a social contract forming the basis of society.

Born prematurely on April 5, 1588, when his mother heard of the impending invasion of the Spanish Armada, Thomas Hobbes later reported that "my mother gave birth to twins, myself and fear." His father was the vicar of Westport near Malmesbury in Gloucestershire. He abandoned his family to escape

punishment for fighting with another clergyman "at the church door." Thereafter Thomas was raised and educated by an uncle. At local schools he became a proficient classicist, translating a Greek tragedy into Latin iambics by the time he was 14. From 1603 to 1608 he studied at Magdalen College, Oxford, where he was bored by the prevailing philosophy of Aristotelianism.

The 20-year-old future philosopher became a tutor to the Cavendish family. This virtually lifelong association with the successive earls of Devonshire provided him with an extensive private library, foreign travel, and introductions to influential people. Hobbes, however, was slow in developing his thought; his first work, a translation of Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*, did not appear until 1629. Thucydides held that knowledge of the past was useful for determining correct action, and Hobbes said that he offered the translation during a period of civil unrest as a reminder that the ancients believed democracy to be the least effective form of government.

According to his own estimate the crucial intellectual event of Hobbes's life occurred when he was 40. While waiting for a friend he wandered into a library and chanced to find a copy of Euclid's geometry. Opening the book, he read a random proposition and exclaimed, "By God that is impossible!" Fascinated by the interconnections between axioms, postulates, and premises, he adopted the ideal of demonstrating certainty by way of deductive reasoning. His interest in mathematics is reflected in his second work, *A Short Treatise on First Principles*, which presents a mechanical interpretation of sensation, as well as in his brief stint as mathematics tutor to Charles II. His generally royalist sympathy as expressed in *The Elements of Law* (1640) caused Hobbes to leave England during the "Long Parliament." This was the first of many trips back and forth between England and the Continent during periods of civil strife since he was, in his own words, "the first of all that fled." For the rest of his long life Hobbes traveled extensively and published prolifically. In France he met René Descartes and the anti-Cartesian Pierre Gassendi. In 1640 he wrote one of the sets of objections to Descartes's *Meditations*.

Although born into the Elizabethan Age, Hobbes out-lived all of the major 17th-century thinkers. He became a sort of English institution and continued writing, offering new translations of Homer in his 80s because he had "nothing else to do." When he was past 90, he became embroiled in controversies with the Royal Society. He invited friends to suggest appropriate epitaphs and favored one that read "this is

the true philosopher's stone." He died on December 4, 1679, at the age of 91.

His Philosophy. The diverse intellectual currents of the 17th century, which are generically called modern classical philosophy, began with a unanimous repudiation of the authorities of the past, especially Aristotle and the scholastic tradition. Descartes, who founded the rationalist tradition, and his contemporary Sir Francis Bacon, who is considered the originator of modern empiricism, both sought new methodologies for achieving scientific knowledge and a systematic conception of reality. Hobbes knew both of these thinkers, and his system encompassed the advantages of both rationalism and empiricism. As a logician, he believed too strongly in the power of deductive reasoning from definitions to share Bacon's exclusive enthusiasm for inductive generalizations from experience. Yet Hobbes was a more consistent empiricist and nominalist, and his attacks on the misuse of language exceed even those of Bacon. And unlike Descartes, Hobbes viewed reason as summation of consequences rather than an innate, originative source of new knowledge.

Psychology, as the mechanics of knowing, rather than epistemology is the source of Hobbes's singularity. He was fascinated by the problem of sense perception, and he extended Galileo's mechanical physics into an explanation of human cognition. The origin of all thought is sensation which consists of mental images produced by the pressure of motion of external objects. Thus Hobbes anticipates later thought by distinguishing between the external object and the internal image. These sense images are extended by the power of memory and imagination. Understanding and reason, which distinguish men from other animals, consist entirely in the ability to use speech.

Speech is the power to transform images into words or names. Words serve as the marks of remembrance, signification, conception, or self-expression. For example, to speak of a cause-and-effect relation is merely to impose names and define their connection. When two names are so joined that the definition of one contains the other, then the proposition is true. The implications of Hobbes's analysis are quite modern. First, there is an implicit distinction between objects and their appearance to man's senses. Consequently knowledge is discourse about appearances. Universals are merely names understood as class concepts, and they have no real status, for everything which appears "is individual and singular." Since "true and false are attributes of speech and not of things," scientific and philosophic thinking consists in using names correctly. Reason is calculation or "reckoning

the consequences of general laws agreed upon for either marking or signifying." The power of the mind is the capacity to reduce consequences to general laws or theorems either by deducing consequences from principles or by inductively reasoning from particular perceptions to general principles. The privilege of mind is subject to unfortunate abuse because, in Hobbes's pithy phrase, men turn from summarizing the consequences of things "into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations," that is, using faulty definitions, inventing terms which stand for nothing, and assuming that universals are real.

The material and mechanical model of nature offered Hobbes a consistent analogy. Man is a conditioned part of nature, and reason is neither an innate faculty nor the summation of random experience but is acquired through slow cultivation and industry. Science is the cumulative knowledge of syllogistic reasoning which gradually reveals the dependence of one fact upon another. Such knowledge is conditionally valid and enables the mind to move progressively from abstract and simple to more particular and complex sciences: geometry, mechanics, physics, morals (the nature of mind and desire), politics.

Political Thought. Hobbes explains the connection between nature, man, and society through the law of inertia. A moving object continues to move until impeded by another force, and "trains of imagination" or speculation are abated only by logical demonstrations. So also man's liberty or desire to do what he wants is checked only by an equal and opposite need for security. A society or commonwealth "is but an artificial man" invented by man, and to understand polity one should merely read himself as part of nature.

Such a reading is cold comfort because presocial life is characterized by Hobbes, in a famous quotation, as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." The equality of human desire is matched by an economy of natural satisfactions. Men are addicted to power because its acquisition is the only guarantee of living well. Such men live in "a state of perpetual war" driven by competition and desire for the same goods. The important consequence of this view is man's natural right and liberty to seek self-preservation by any means. In this state of nature there is no value above self-interest because where there is no common, coercive power there is no law and no justice. But there is a second and derivative law of nature that men may surrender or transfer their individual will to the state. This "social contract" binds the individual to treat others as he expects to be treated by them. Only a constituted civil power commands sufficient force to

compel everyone to fulfill this original compact by which men exchange liberty for security.

In Hobbes's view the sovereign power of a commonwealth is absolute and not subject to the laws and obligations of citizens. Obedience remains as long as the sovereign fulfills the social compact by protecting the rights of the individual. Consequently rebellion is unjust, by definition, but should the cause of revolution prevail, a new absolute sovereignty is created.

EWB

Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1917–), British historian. Eric Hobsbawm has long been considered one of the leading European experts on the history of working classes.

Despite his reputation as a historian of revolution and the lower classes, one of Hobsbawm's most popular works is a study of jazz. *The Jazz Scene*, which was originally published in 1959 under a pseudonym (the author felt that a work on popular culture would hurt his professional reputation), is the work of "an abject jazz fan who sees his subject, good and bad, in the full economic, social, and political perspective of a historian," declares Roderick Nordell in the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Working-class issues and revolution are major themes throughout Hobsbawm's work. In *Politics for a Rational Left: Political Writing, 1977–1988*, the historian argues against the Conservatism of British politics during the 1980s. One of Hobsbawm's early works, *Captain Swing* (co-written with fellow historian George Rude), looks at nineteenth-century English working-class issues. It tells of a series of uprisings by agricultural laborers in rural England during the 1830s. The bands gathered together under the leadership of a mythical captain "Swing," whose name was signed to threatening letters addressed to local landowners. When the uprisings were suppressed, the convicted rebels were deported to Australia and Tasmania.

Hobsbawm looks at the question of revolution and its relationship to the development of the nation-state in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. The existence of a nation is something that developed only in the recent past, the historian concludes, and nationalism developed to its greatest extent (in one direction) in Nazi Germany during the 1930s and early 1940s.

So influential have Hobsbawm's writings been in the field of historical study, Tony Judt points out in the *New York Review of Books*, that "among historians in the English-speaking world there is a discernible 'Hobsbawm generation.' It consists of men and women who took up the study of the past at some point in the 'long nineteen-sixties,' between . . . 1959

and 1975, and whose interest in the recent past was irrevocably shaped by Eric Hobsbawm's writings, however much they now dissent from many of his conclusions." "But Hobsbawm's most enduring imprint on our historical consciousness," Judt continues, "has come through his great trilogy on the 'long nineteenth century,' from 1789 to 1914, the first volume of which, *The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848*, appeared in 1962." The interpretation put forth by Hobsbawm in this volume was that a single social class from northern Europe—the bourgeoisie—rose to power in a time of great social upheaval.

The Age of Revolution was followed by *The Age of Capital, 1848–1875*, a study that begins with another series of revolutions—the series of uprisings that shook Europe in 1878—and ends with an economic catastrophe: an economic depression that stretched across the world in 1875. Hobsbawm relates many events in world history during this time to the influence of capitalism: the collapse of black slavery in the United States, the urbanization of Western Europe, the massive emigration of agricultural and light industrial workers to the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand, and, David Brion Davis concludes, "the realization that no corner of the globe could escape the irresistible impact of Western capitalism and Western culture."

The Age of Empire, 1875–1914 continues Hobsbawm's examination of the expansion of capitalism into the twentieth century. Hobsbawm continues his examination of the twentieth century with *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991*, which won the Lionel Gelber Prize in 1995.

EWB

Hugo, Victor (1802–1885), French author. Victor Hugo was the supreme poet of French romanticism. He is noted for the breadth of his creation, the versatility that made him as much at ease in the novel as in the short lyric, and the mystical grandeur of his vision.

Victor Hugo had a nomadic and anxious childhood. He was erratically schooled, a fact which accounts in part for the eclectic and unsystematic aspect of his poetic thought. At age 14 he wrote, "I want to be Chateaubriand or nothing." He had begun to write in every poetic genre—odes, satires, elegies, riddles, epics, madrigals, and to receive recognition while still in his adolescence, never having to face the long years of obscurity and struggle that are the lot of most poets.

In 1822 Hugo married his childhood sweetheart, Adèle Foucher, one and a half years after the death of his mother, who opposed the match. They later had four children, and their apartment, on the

rue Cherche-midi in Paris, became the meeting place for the avant-garde of the romantic movement. In 1822 Hugo also published his first signed book, *Odes et poésies diverses*. In the preface to this book, which contains many poems celebrating his love for Adèle, the poet wrote, "Poetry is the most intimate of all things."

Hugo's work may be roughly divided into three periods. First in time is the intimate lyrical vein typical of the odes. Second is an involved or committed poetry speaking directly to political and social conditions. The epic novel *Les Misérables*, for example, fits into this group. (But this vein is also present in the very first volume, where a number of poems praise the throne and the altar; Hugo, who was to end as a staunch republican, began as a royalist.) In the last phase of his career Hugo rose to the heights of mysticism and poetic vision, as in *La Fin de Satan*.

Development of Romanticism. In 1824 some of Hugo's friends founded a review called *Muse française* which claimed as its contributors Alfred de Musset, Charles Nodier, and Hugo himself. All were young writers who were beginning to break with neoclassicism. After his visit to Alphonse de Lamartine and his discovery of German balladry, in 1826 Hugo published *Odes et ballades*, in which his rejection of neoclassicism became increasingly clear.

The years 1826 and 1827 were triumphant ones for the *Cénacle*, the name given to the young romantics who recognized Hugo as their chief and called him the "prince of poets." What Lamartine and the Vicomte de Chateaubriand had begun, Hugo was dedicated to complete. He ceased writing complimentary odes to King Charles X and began praising Napoleon I instead. With critics like Nodier and Charles Sainte-Beuve to advise him and with the support of geniuses such as the painter Eugène Delacroix and the poets Musset and Gerard de Nerval, Hugo formulated the doctrine of romanticism. This doctrine was expressed in the preface to his unproduced play, *Cromwell*, published in October 1827. Where classics and neoclassics had repudiated the Middle Ages as "barbaric," Hugo saw richness and beauty in this period, and he called for a new poetry inspired by medieval Christianity. He vindicated the ugly and grotesque as elements of the "new beauty." Poetry, he said, should do as nature does, "mixing in its creations yet without confusion shadow with light, the grotesque with the sublime, in other words, the body with the soul, the bestial with the spiritual." The vivifying sources of this new literature were to be the Bible, Homer, and Shakespeare.

Convinced that the new vision must prove itself in the theater, Hugo followed *Cromwell* with a number of other plays. On Feb. 25, 1830, the famous "battle of *Hernani*" took place, with Hugo's supporters outshouting the neoclassicists and antiromantics who had come to hiss the play. *Hernani* was performed 45 times (an unusual success for those days) and brought Hugo the friendship of such notable figures as Dumas *père* and George Sand.

But Hugo did not confine himself to the drama. In 1831 he published his magnificent novel *Notre Dame de Paris*, the work for which he is best known in the United States. He was originally inspired by Sir Walter Scott, on whom he hoped to improve by adding "sentiment" and "poetry" to the historical novel. In addition, he wished to convey the true spirit of the late Middle Ages through his evocation of the Cathedral of Notre Dame and his characters: Frollo the archdeacon, Quasimodo the hunchback, and Esmeralda the gypsy girl. Hugo wrote the novel nonstop during the fall and early winter of 1830 in order to meet his publisher's deadline. Although some readers were shocked that Frollo (who had taken holy orders) should fall in love with Esmeralda, the tale was an immense success. Théophile Gautier compared it to Homer's *Iliad*.

Also in 1831 Hugo published one of his most beautiful collections of poetry, *Les Feuilles d'automne*. Once again, Hugo wrote in the intimate vein: "Poetry speaks to man, to man as a whole. . . . Revolution changes all things, except the human heart." This volume expressed the sadness of things past as the poet approached his significant thirtieth birthday. The tone was personal and elegiac, sometimes sentimental.

It was not merely the passage of time that accounted for Hugo's melancholy. His wife, tired of bearing children and frustrated by the poet's immense egoism (*Ego Hugo* was his motto), turned for consolation to the poet's intimate friend, the waspish critic Sainte-Beuve. The sadness of this double betrayal is felt in *Feuilles d'automne*.

Tormented by his wife's coldness and his own inordinate sexual cravings, Hugo fell in love with the young actress and courtesan Juliette Drouet and took it upon himself to "redeem" her. He paid her debts and forced her to live in poverty, with her whole being focused entirely upon him. For the next 50 years Juliette followed the poet wherever he went. She lived in his shadow, unable to take a step without his permission, confined to a room here, a mere hovel there, but always near the magnificent houses where Hugo settled with his family. She lived henceforth solely for the poet and spent her time writing him letters, of which many thousands are extant.

With the advent of the July Monarchy, which ended the Bourbon succession and brought Louis Philippe of the house of Orléans to power, Hugo achieved wealth and recognition, and for 15 years he was the official poet of France. During this period a host of new works appeared in rapid sequence, including three plays: *Le Roi s'amuse* (1832), *Lucrezia Borgia* (1833), and the triumph, *Ruy Blas* (1838).

In 1835 came *Chants du crépuscule*, which included many love lyrics to Juliette, and in 1837 *Les Voix intérieures*, an offering to the memory of his father, who had been a Napoleonic general. *Les Rayons et les ombres* (1840) showed the same variety of inspiration, the same sonorous harmony, the same brilliance of contrasting images. His devotion to Juliette here found its deepest poetic expression in the beautiful poem entitled *Tristesse d'Olympio*, which directly rivals Lamartine's *Le Lac* and Alfred de Vigny's *Maison du berger*. Like these famous poets, Hugo evoked the past, searching for permanence of love; but unlike the pantheistic Lamartine or the skeptical Vigny, Hugo found permanence in memory.

Political Involvement. Hugo published no more lyric poetry until 1853. He was now seized with a new ambition: he wished to become a statesman. At first a royalist, then a moderate, Hugo moved steadily toward liberalism. After the July Revolution he wrote in a more stirring vein than he ever had before: "I hate oppression with a profound hatred. . . . I curse those kings who ride in blood up to the bridle!" Hugo claimed that he had a "crystal soul" that reflected the same evolution as that the French people had gone through: from royalism to opposition to royalism, from the cult of Bonaparte to republicanism.

When Louis Philippe was deposed in the Revolution of 1848, Hugo at first found it hard to identify himself with the provisional government of Lamartine, for he still believed that a constitutional monarchy was the best form of government for France. Nevertheless, he allowed himself to be elected a deputy to the Assembly.

When Louis Napoleon, the nephew of the great man Hugo had always idolized, began to achieve notoriety, Hugo supported him. But his enthusiasm for the new president was short-lived. He wrote: "Upon the barricades I defended order. Before dictatorship I defended liberty." He made a stirring plea for freedom of the press and clemency to the rebel elements; at last, in 1849, he broke with Napoleon III with the words, "Because we have had a Great Napoleon must we now have a Little one?"

Louis Napoleon seized power by a coup d'état on the night of Dec. 2, 1850, and proclaimed himself

emperor. Hugo called for armed resistance and, witnessing the ensuing slaughter, Hugo believed the "Little Napoleon" to be a murderer. At great peril to her own life, Juliette saved the poet, found him shelter, and organized his escape to Brussels. From there he went to the British Channel islands of Jersey and Guernsey.

In November 1853 Hugo's fiercely anti-Napoleonic verse volume, *Les Châtiments*, was published in Belgium. Two different editions were published under a false name with rows of dots in place of the individuals attacked, and the other, which was complete, with only "Geneva and New York" in place of the author's name were culled from the 6,000 verses of the original manuscript. Though banned in France, the books were smuggled in (a favorite trick being to stuff them into hollow busts of the Emperor) and widely circulated.

His Mysticism. During his exile Hugo gave vent to the mystical side of his personality. There were many séances in his home, first on Jersey, then in his splendid Hauteville House overlooking the coast of Guernsey. For Hugo, the supernatural was merely the natural. He had always felt premonitions, always heard premonitory sounds and messages during the night. Now, under the influence of a female voyante, he believed that he was communicating with spirits, among them Dante, Shakespeare, Racine, and even Jesus. But the "visit" that touched him most was that of his favorite daughter, Léopoldine, tragically drowned in the Seine with her young husband in 1843.

Indeed, Hugo's family was stricken with multiple tragedies. While exile refreshed and nourished his poetry, his wife and children languished. They longed for their friends and the familiar surroundings of Paris. His daughter, Adèle, retreated into a fantasy world, till at last she ran away in pursuit of an English officer who was already married. Hugo's wife left him to live in Brussels, where she died in 1868. Only Juliette remained loyal during the 17 years the poet spent in Hauteville House.

Hugo continued his experiments with the supernatural until stopped by the threatened insanity of his son, Charles. He never abandoned, however, the syncretic and magical religious views that he reached at this time. He believed that all matter was in progress toward a higher state of being, and that this progress was achieved through suffering, knowledge, and the love that emanates from God. Evil was not absolute but rather a necessary stage toward the Good. Through suffering and the experience of evil, man made progress toward higher states of being.

In 1856 Hugo published *Les Contemplations*. Many of these poems anticipate Hugo's next major work, the epic cycle *La Légende des siècles* (1859), conceived as part of an enormous uncompleted work whose mission was to "express humanity." Like his heroes Homer, Shakespeare, Dante, and his own contemporary Honoré de Balzac, Hugo dreamed of an all-inclusive cosmic poem. It would show the ascent of the universal soul toward the Good, and the emergence of Spirit from Matter.

In 1862 Hugo published *Les Misérables*, an immense novel, the work of many years. His guiding interest was similar to that of Charles Dickens, a social and humanitarian concern for the downtrodden. The book was meant to show the "threefold problem of the century": the degradation of proletarian man, the fall of woman through hunger, and the destruction of children. The sympathetic portrayal of the waif, Gavroche, and the escaped convict, Jean Valjean, won a vast readership for Hugo. The book was not merely an adventure story but a love story and a mystery as well. It crystallized Hugo's concern for social injustice and once again astounded the reading public with the scope of his literary powers.

When Victor Hugo died on May 22, 1885, it was as a venerable man, crowned with worldwide glory, still robust and emotionally ardent to the last.

EWB

Humboldt, Wilhelm von (1767–1835), German educator, statesman, political theorist, and philologist. Wilhelm von Humboldt reformed the Prussian school system and founded the University of Berlin. He was influential in developing the science of comparative philology.

Wilhelm von Humboldt was born in Potsdam on June 22, 1767. He studied law in Berlin and Göttingen. In his essay *Über das Studium des Klassischen Altertums* (1793) he summarized his program for educational reform, which was basically the program of German neohumanism. In Jena (1794–1797) he was a member of Friedrich von Schiller's circle. After traveling through Spain and France, during which Humboldt became interested in philology, he was appointed Prussian resident minister in Rome (1802–1808).

Humboldt was influenced by the educational principles of Johann Pestalozzi. As Prussian minister of education (1809–1810), he sent teachers to Switzerland to study Pestalozzi's methods, and he founded the University of Berlin (1809). Humboldt's ideas profoundly influenced European and American elementary education.

From 1810 to 1819 Humboldt served the government as minister in Vienna, London, and Berlin. He resigned from the ministry in protest against the reactionary policies of the government. His philological works on the Basque language (1821) and on Kavi, the ancient language of Java, published posthumously (1836–1840), were landmarks in their field. He died at Tegel on April 8, 1835.

Political Theory. In *The Sphere and Duties of Government* (published in part in 1792 and completely in 1851) Humboldt held that although the nation-state is a growing body, government is only one of the means aiding its welfare, a means whose sole aim should be to provide security for social development. As in biological evolution, all growth is good, as it brings forth an organism more complex, more diverse, and richer, and government—while a major agent in fostering this development—is not the only one. If it tries to do too much, it interferes with and retards the beneficial effects of other agencies.

Under the influence of romanticism Humboldt became almost mystical as he placed more stress on supra-individual and historically conditioned nationality and viewed individual nationality in turn as part of the universal spiritual and divine life which was the characteristic expression of humanity. In essays on the German (1813) and Prussian (1819) constitutions he advocated a liberalism which would preserve the unique character and traditions of individual states, provinces, and regions, with the constitution of any state adapted to the particular genius of its national character. He rejected both the artificial and atomistic liberalism of the French Revolution, which derived the state from the isolated and arbitrary wills of individuals, and the ultraconservative program to revive the old feudal estates. He advocated a liberalism grounded in tradition with regional self-governing bodies participating in governing a monarchical civil service state.

EWB

Hume, David (1711–1776), Scottish philosopher. David Hume developed a philosophy of "mitigated skepticism," which remains a viable alternative to the systems of rationalism, empiricism, and idealism.

If one was to judge a philosopher by a gauge of relevance—the quantity of issues and arguments raised by him that remain central to contemporary thought—David Hume would be rated among the most important figures in philosophy. Ironically, his philosophical writings went unnoticed during his lifetime, and the considerable fame he achieved derived from his work as an essayist and historian. Immanuel

Kant's acknowledgment that Hume roused him from his "dogmatic slumbers" stimulated interest in Hume's thought.

With respect to Hume's life there is no better source than the succinct autobiography, *My Own Life*, written 4 months before his death. He was born on April 26, 1711, on the family estate, Ninewells, near Edinburgh. According to Hume, the "ruling passion" of his life was literature, and thus his story contains "little more than the History of my writings." As a second son, he was not entitled to a large inheritance, and he failed in two family-sponsored careers in law and business because of his "unsurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of Philosophy and general learning." Until he was past 40, Hume was employed only twice. He spent a year in England as a tutor to a mentally ill nobleman, and from 1745 to 1747 Hume was an officer and aide-de-camp to Gen. James Sinclair and attended him on an expedition to the coast of France and military embassies in Vienna and Turin.

Major Works. During an earlier stay in France (1734–1737) Hume had written his major philosophic work, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. The first two volumes were published in 1739 and the third appeared in the following year. The critical reception of the work was singularly unfortunate. In Hume's own words, the *Treatise* "fell dead born from the press." Book I of the *Treatise* was recast as *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* and published in 1748. The third volume with minor revisions appeared in 1751 as *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. The second volume of the *Treatise* was republished as Part 2 of *Four Dissertations* in 1757. Two sections of this work dealing with liberty and necessity had been incorporated in the first *Enquiry*. Hume's other important work, *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, was substantially complete by the mid-1750s, but because of its controversial nature it was published posthumously.

During his lifetime Hume's reputation derived from the publication of his *Political Discourses* (1751) and six-volume *History of England* (1754–1762). When he went to France in 1763 as secretary to the English ambassador, Hume discovered that he was a literary celebrity and a revered figure among the *philosophes*. He led a very happy and active social life even after his retirement to Edinburgh in 1769. He died there on Aug. 25, 1776. He specified in his will that the gravestone be marked only with his name and dates, "leaving it to Posterity to add the rest."

"Mitigated Skepticism." Skepticism is concerned with the truthfulness of human perceptions

and ideas. On the level of perception, Hume was the first thinker to consistently point out the disastrous implications of the "representative theory of perception," which he had inherited from both his rationalist and empiricist predecessors. According to this view, when I say that I perceive something such as an elephant, what I actually mean is that I have in my mind a mental idea or image or impression. Such a datum is an internal, mental, subjective *representation* of something that I assume to be an external, physical, objective fact. But there are, at least, two difficulties inherent in ascribing any truth to such perceptions. If truth is understood as the conformity or adequacy between the image and the object, then it is impossible to establish that there is a true world of objects since the only evidence I have of an external world consists of internal images. Further, it is impossible to judge how faithfully mental impressions or ideas represent physical objects.

Hume is aware, however, that this sort of skepticism with regard to the senses does violence to common sense. He suggests that a position of complete skepticism is neither serious nor useful. Academic skepticism (the name derives from a late branch of Plato's school) states that one can never know the truth or falsity of any statement (except, of course, this one). It is, however, a self-refuting theory and is confounded by life itself because "we make inferences on the basis of our impressions whether they be true or false, real or imaginary." Total skepticism is unlivable since "nature is always too strong for principle." Hume therefore advances what he calls "mitigated skepticism." In addition to the exercise of caution in reasoning, this approach attempts to limit philosophical inquiries to topics that are adapted to the capacities of human intelligence. It thus excludes all metaphysical questions concerning the origin of either mind or object as being incapable of demonstration.

Theory of Knowledge. Even though an ultimate explanation of both the subject or object of knowledge is impossible, Hume provides a description of how man senses and understands. He emphasizes the utility of knowledge as opposed to its correctness and suggests that experience begins with feeling rather than thought. He uses the term "perception" in its traditional sense that is, whatever can be present to the mind from the senses, passions, thought, or reflection. Nonetheless he distinguishes between impressions which are felt and ideas which are thought. In this he stresses the difference between feeling a toothache and thinking about such a pain, which had been obscured by both rationalists and empiricists. Both impressions and ideas are subdivided further into sim-

ple and complex; for example, the idea of heat is simple, while the idea of combustion is complex.

These simple divisions are the basis for Hume's "phenomenalism" (that is, knowledge consists of "appearances" in the mind). Hume distinguishes the various operations of the mind in a descriptive psychology, or "mental geography." Impressions are described as vivacious and lively, whereas ideas are less vivid and, in fact, derived from original impressions. This thesis leads to the conclusion that "we can never think of any thing which we have not seen without us or felt in our own minds." Hume often overestimates the importance of this discovery with the suggestion that the sole criterion for judging ideas is to remove every philosophical ambiguity by asking "from what impression is that supposed idea derived." If there is no corresponding impression, the idea may be dismissed as meaningless. This assumption that all ideas are reducible, in principle, to some impression is a primary commitment of Hume's empiricism. Hume did admit that there are complex ideas, such as the idea of a city, that are not traceable to any single impression. These complex ideas are produced by the freedom of the imagination to transform and relate ideas independently of impressions; such ideas are not susceptible to empirical verification. This represents the major paradox of Hume's philosophy—the imagination which produces every idea beyond sensible immediacy also denies the truth of ideas.

Theory of Ideas. Hume accepts the Cartesian doctrine of the distinct idea—conceivability subject only to the principle of contradiction—as both the unit of reasoning and the criterion of truth. But the doctrine of the distinct idea means that every non-contradictory idea expresses an a priori logical possibility. And the speculative freedom of the imagination to conceive opposites without contradiction makes it impossible to demonstrate any matter of fact or existence. This argument leads to a distinction between relations of ideas (demonstrations which are true a priori) and matters of fact (the opposite of which is distinctly conceivable). And this distinction excludes from the domain of rational determination every factual event, future contingent proposition, and causal relation. For Hume, since truth is posterior to fact, the ideas of reason only express what the mind thinks about reality.

Distinct ideas, or imaginative concepts, are pure antinomies apart from experience as every factual proposition is equally valid a priori. But Hume does acknowledge that such propositions are not equally meaningful either to thought or action. On the level of ideas, Hume offers a conceptual correlative to the

exemption of sensation as a form of cognition by his recognition that the meaning of ideas is more important than their truth. What separates meaningful propositions from mere concepts is the subjective impression of belief.

Belief, or the vivacity with which the mind conceives certain ideas and associations, results from the reciprocal relationship between experience and imagination. The cumulative experience of the past and present—for example, the relational factors of constancy, conjunction, and resemblance—gives a bias to the imagination. But it is man's imaginative anticipations of the future that give meaning to his experience. Neither the relational elements of experience nor the propensiveness function of the imagination, from the viewpoint of the criterion of truth, possesses the slightest rational justification. Hence the interplay between the criterion of truth and the logic of the imagination explains both Hume's skepticism and his conception of sensation and intellection.

Because of his skeptical attitude toward the truths of reason Hume attempted to ground his moral theory on the bedrock of feeling, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions." In this, Hume followed the "moral sense" school and, especially, the thought of Francis Hutcheson. The notion that virtue and vice are to be derived ultimately from impressions of approbation and blame or pleasure and pain shows that Hume anticipated Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism, a debt which the latter acknowledged. Although Hume considered himself to be primarily a moralist, this doctrine is the least original part of his philosophical writings.

EWB

I

Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556), Spanish soldier and ecclesiastic. Ignatius of Loyola was the founder of the Society of Jesus, or Jesuit order.

Ignatius was born in the castle of Loyola in the Basque province of Guipúzcoa. His real name was Íñigo de Oñaz y Loyola, but from 1537 on he also used the more widely known Ignatius, especially in official documents. From the age of about 15 to 26 he lived at the fortress town of Arévalo as a page of Juan Velázquez de Cuéllar, a treasurer general for Ferdinand the Catholic. After 1516 he participated in military expeditions for the Duke of Nájera. On May 20, 1521, he was wounded in the defense of Pamplona.

During convalescence at Loyola, Ignatius read from the *Life of Christ* by Ludolph of Saxony and from the short lives of saints by Jacobus de Voragine enti-

tled *Legenda aurea*. This resulted in a conversion, whereby he resolved to live as a knight wholly devoted to Christ and to go to the Holy Land. He abandoned Loyola in 1522 and lived for 11 months in austerity and prayer at Manresa. Here he had religious experiences which rank him among the greatest mystics of Christianity, and he composed at least the core of his famous *Spiritual Exercises* (published in 1548).

Through the intensive experiences of Manresa and later, Ignatius gradually developed a world view centered on cooperation with Christ and the pope as His vicar in efforts to achieve God's plan in creating and redeeming men. His constant endeavor was to lead men to give greater praise to God through both prayer and apostolic service. Hence arose his phrase, reiterated so often that it became a motto, "For the greater glory of God."

Ignatius reached Jerusalem in 1523 but could not remain because of the enmity between Christians and Turks. He returned to Barcelona and began studies (1524–1526) toward the priesthood. He then studied at the universities of Alcalá (1526–1527), Salamanca (1527), and Paris (1528–1535), where he received the degree of master of arts in April 1534. On the following August 15 he and six companions vowed to live in poverty and chastity and to go to the Holy Land or, should this prove impossible, to put themselves at the apostolic service of the pope. When war prevented passage to Jerusalem in 1537, they accepted a suggestion of Pope Paul III to find their apostolate in Italy.

Ignatius was ordained a priest on June 24, 1537. In Rome in 1539 he and nine companions drew up a "First Sketch" of a new religious order devoted to apostolic service anywhere in the world by means of preaching and any other ministry. On Sept. 27, 1540, Paul III approved this new order and its title, the Society of Jesus. In April 1541 Ignatius was elected its general for a lifelong term.

Chiefly between 1547 and 1550 Ignatius composed his *Constitutions of the Society of Jesus*, a classic both of spiritual doctrine and of religious law. This work reveals Ignatius's genius as an organizer and administrator. To secure better cooperation in charity, he stressed obedience, but he placed many democratic procedures within the monarchical structure of his order.

From 1537 on Ignatius lived in Rome, engaging in various forms of priestly work. Twelve volumes of his correspondence have been preserved. He founded a chain of schools for the Christian education of youth. Between 1546 and 1556 he opened 33 colleges (3 of them universities) and approved 6 more. He was the first founder of a religious order to make the con-

ducting of schools for lay students a major work prescribed by the Constitutions.

At his death on July 31, 1556, the Society of Jesus had some 1,000 members distributed in 12 provinces. He was declared a saint by Pope Gregory XV on March 12, 1622.

EWB

Ivan IV (1530–1584), tsar of Russia, 1533–1584. Known as Ivan the Terrible, Ivan IV was the first Russian sovereign to be crowned tsar and to hold tsar as his official title in addition to the traditional title of grand duke of Moscow.

The reign of Ivan IV was the culmination of Russian historical developments that began with the rise of Moscow in the early 14th century. The results of these developments were the growth of a unified centralized state governed by an autocracy and the formation of a dominant class of serving gentry, the *pomeshchiki*.

Very little is actually known about Ivan. None of his papers, notes, or correspondence has survived. It is not possible to establish a precise chronology or to give a trustworthy factual account of Ivan's personal life. There are whole successions of years without a single reference to Ivan himself. All that is possible under these circumstances is to make surmises that are more or less in accord with the evidence of the scanty material that has survived.

One of the biggest stumbling blocks to contemporary students of Russian history in understanding Ivan is the epithet accorded him "the Terrible" or "the Dread." This epithet indicates sadistic and irrational traits in his character, and there is sufficient evidence to make Ivan's reign a study in abnormal psychology. It is said that as a boy he took delight in throwing young animals to their death from high rooftops. He also formed the habit of robbing and beating the people of his capital. There is also the terrible event in 1581, when Ivan, in a fit of anger, lashed out at his 27-year-old son, Ivan Ivanovich, and struck him dead with an iron-pointed staff.

It would, therefore, be foolish to argue that the personality of Ivan IV is irrelevant to an understanding of his reign. It has been shown, in fact, that there was a very real cause for the monstrous aspects of Ivan's personality. A contemporary study of Ivan's skeleton showed that he must have suffered horribly for many years from osteophytes, which virtually fused his spine.

Regency Period. Ivan was born on Aug. 25, 1530, in Moscow. His father was Basil III and his mother Helen Glinsky, a Russian of Lithuanian ori-

gin. Ivan was only 3 years old when his father died in 1533. His mother became regent, and the throne rapidly degenerated into a center of wild violence, intrigue, and denunciation as rival boyar families disputed the Glinksy regency. At times they brought their feuds into the Kremlin itself.

Evidence indicates that Ivan was a sensitive, intelligent boy with a remarkably quick and intuitive mind. He became quite aware of all the intrigues around him and of the precariousness of his own position. He was neglected and at times treated with scorn. Apparently, he was even short of food and clothes. This environment, therefore, nourished a hatred for the boyars that revealed itself in Ivan's later policies toward them.

Early Rule. In 1538 his mother died suddenly, and years of strife and misrule ensued. In 1547, however, Ivan decided, much to the astonishment of those around him, to be crowned, not as grand prince, but as tsar (God's anointed). In the same year Ivan married Anastasia Romanov. The marriage seems to have been a happy one, and when Anastasia died in 1560, deep grief overcame Ivan. Although he married four more times, he was never able to recapture the happiness he had enjoyed with Anastasia.

In 1547 Ivan also appointed the Selected Council, largely dominated by men of modest social standing. He allowed himself to be both directed and restrained by this Council, even agreeing to do nothing without its approval. The period following the Council's creation is generally considered the constructive period of Ivan's reign.

In 1550 Ivan called the first of two *zemskii sobors* (consultative assemblies) to meet during his reign. Although knowledge of the assemblies is fragmentary (some historians even deny that there was an assembly in 1550), they appear not to have been elected but appointed by Ivan himself and to have served in a purely advisory capacity. Approval was given, however, to several of Ivan's projected reforms. In 1552 a reform in local government was instituted. In those areas where the local population could guarantee a fixed amount of state dues to the treasury, officials elected from and by the local inhabitants were given the right to collect taxes in lieu of the old governors, who were abolished in such areas.

The Law Code of 1550 was another important reform of the early part of Ivan's reign. It was concerned primarily with discouraging the use of customary law in the courts, and it introduced the principle of statutory law.

Ivan, a devout churchman, called a church council in 1551. Among other matters, the council consid-

ered liturgical questions and passed reforms which tightened and perfected the organization of the Church. Ivan was also concerned with standardizing and organizing the responsibilities and duties of the service class. In 1556 he issued a decree which provided new regulations concerning the length, nature, and form of service which a member of the nobility was expected to render.

Foreign Policy. Among Ivan's military accomplishments was the destruction of the Tatar khanates of Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1556. Thus, of the three Tatar states in the region of Russia, only the Crimean Tatars remained unconquered by Muscovy. With the addition of Kazan and Astrakhan, Muscovy now extended to the Urals in the east and to the Caspian Sea in the south. Russia also began its expansion to the east beyond the Urals at this time and before Ivan's death had established itself in Siberia. Ivan's ambition to restore to Muscovy the western territories which had been annexed by Lithuania in the 16th century, however, was unrealized.

Another of Ivan's ambitions, contact with the West, was achieved. In 1553 an English sea captain, Richard Chancellor, landed on the Russian shore near the mouth of the Northern Dvina River and made his way to Moscow. Upon his return to England, Chancellor became one of the founders of the Muscovy Company, to which Ivan gave special trade privileges. Although traders of other nations, Dutch and French, began to appear, the English dominated the Russian trade with centers in many Russian towns.

Later Years. Despite governmental improvements at home and successes abroad, the constructive or early period of Ivan's rule was not to endure. He broke with his Selected Council, turned against many of his former advisers, and introduced a reign of terror against the boyars. The major turning point came in 1560, when Anastasia died quite suddenly. Convinced that his advisers, backed by the boyars, had caused her death, Ivan condemned them and turned against the nobility. In 1564 he abandoned Moscow. What his intentions were is not clear, although he threatened to abdicate and denounced the boyars for their greed and treachery. Confused and frightened, the people of Moscow begged the Tsar to return and rule over them. His eventual agreement to return was dependent upon two basic conditions: the creation of a territorial and political subdivision the *oprichnina* to be managed entirely at the discretion of the Tsar; and Ivan's right to punish traitors and wrongdoers, executing them when necessary and confiscating their possessions.

The area encompassed by the *oprichnina* was a large one, constituting about one-half of the existing Muscovite state. It also included most of the wealthy towns, trading routes, and cultivated areas and was, therefore, a stronghold of wealthy old boyar families. Ivan's establishment of his rule over the area necessarily involved, then, displacement (and destruction) of the major boyar families in Russia. This task fell to his special bodyguards, a select group known as the *oprichniki*.

In 1584 Ivan's health began to fail. As portents of death came to obsess him, he called on witches and soothsayers to aid him, but to no avail. The end came on March 18, 1584. In a final testament he willed his kingdom to Feodor, his oldest surviving son. Although the transition from Ivan to Feodor was relatively easy and quiet, Muscovy itself was, according to most observers, on the verge of anarchy.

EWB

J

James I (1566–1625), king of England from 1603 to 1625. As James VI, he was king of Scotland from 1567 to 1625.

The son of Mary Stuart, reigning queen of Scotland, and (presumably) her husband, Lord Darnley, James I was born in Edinburgh Castle on June 19, 1566. His mother's subsequent indiscretions forced her to renounce her title in her son's favor in 1567.

The infant king was placed in the trust of the Earl of Mar, a zealous Protestant, who was a firm believer in the value of education and discipline. The King's tutors, George Buchanan and Peter Young, were stern taskmasters, but James proved an apt pupil. By the age of 8 he was fluent in French, Latin, and reasonably conversant in English. But he received no instruction in the "courtly arts." James's sense of humor never outgrew the primitive, his language was coarse and vulgar, and his manner was most distinctly unregal.

In 1571 the regent, Lennox (James's paternal grandfather), was killed by the Marians, and he was then succeeded by the harsh Earl of Morton. In 1578 James was kidnapped by two of the Marians, Atholl and Argyle, only to be rescued within the month.

The two Catholic superpowers, France and Spain, both sought to influence developments in Scotland. From France came James's cousin, the corrupt Esmé Stuart, ostensibly to win James to the side of the house of Guise and the Catholic faith. The young king was completely smitten by this adventurer, and he gave

him lands, income, and the title of Earl and then Duke of Lennox.

The new duke soon encompassed the downfall and execution of the regent, Morton. His influence over the King seemed paramount, and James's Protestant subjects vented their fears for the King's moral and religious state. In fact, the influence of Lennox and his equally corrupt accomplices seems to have been greatest in the field of politics: James completely turned from the basically democratic ideas espoused by his early tutors and began to think in terms of absolute monarchy.

In 1582 James was taken into custody at Ruthven Castle, and Lennox was driven from the country. Within a year the King had escaped from his new captors, but he succeeded merely in placing himself under the tutelage of Lennox's most aggressive companion, the Earl of Arran, who soon took over the actual running of the state.

Personal Rule. Egged on by Arran, James attacked the Presbyterian Church, and in 1584 he forced himself to be recognized as head of the Church. James's ambition to be king of England was matched by his need for English money; despite the attack on his favorite, Arran, the alliance with England was maintained. When his mother let herself be drawn into outright treason, James did little to prevent her execution in 1587.

James then turned his attention to dynastic (and romantic) matters, and he began his courtship of Anne of Denmark. The King, newly come of age, sailed after his bride, to the joy of his subjects. He married her in Norway, where severe weather had compelled her to remain. Six months later the royal couple returned to Scotland.

By 1592 the feuds between Lord Bothwell and the Catholic lords had reduced James to a virtual fugitive, pursued by one side and then the other. By 1593 Bothwell had made James his captive to the praise of the Presbyterians and Elizabeth, who both feared the influence of the Catholic Earl of Huntly. Bothwell, however, had overplayed his hand, James talked his way to freedom, and with the aid of the middle classes he proceeded against the man who had not merely held him a prisoner but had also sought his life through witchcraft and the black arts.

Bothwell, now desperate, allied himself with Huntly, Errol, and Angus. The result was the destruction of the Catholic earls as well as Bothwell. By the end of 1594 the position of the monarchy seemed exceptionally secure.

James's sense of security was heightened by another event of 1594—the birth of a son and heir, Henry

Frederick. Entrusted to the care of the Dowager Countess of Mar, the young prince symbolized James's coming of age.

During the next 4 years James continued to consolidate his position. His finances were restored by the efforts of the "Octavians," and when the Catholic earls returned to Scotland they seemed a much chastened lot. Their return led to an excess of emotion on the part of the most zealous of the Presbyterians, and this in turn allowed the King to proceed against them and to further advance the episcopal form of ecclesiastical polity. His ideas on church-state relations, on the attitude of subjects toward their king, and on the nature of divine right appeared in print in 1598 in *The Trew Law of Free Monarchies*. Within 2 years James had further refined his ideas in his most important work, *Basilikon Doron* (written for the edification of the young Henry).

King of England. James also accepted the advice offered by Robert Cecil, Elizabeth's most astute minister, to abandon his harebrained plots with Catholics and Protestants alike and to adopt a respectful and calm tone toward the aging queen. On Mar. 24, 1603, only 8 hours after Elizabeth's death, James was proclaimed king in London.

In a sense, the events of the first 2 years of James's reign in England serve to "set the stage" for the growing conflicts that marked the remainder of his 22 years on the throne. James had decisions to make in the areas of foreign policy, domestic religion, finance, and, in the broadest sense, in the field of governmental theory. In each of these areas, and in the matter of his northern kingdom and his royal favorites, he came into conflict with the English Parliament, especially with the House of Commons. James's great failure as an English king stemmed from his inability at first to perceive wherein the English assembly differed from the Scottish Parliament, and from his unwillingness to accept the differences when at last he became aware of them.

Especially in matters of secular domestic policies, James's first year on the English throne led to his asserting what he considered to be his "rightful" role in the government and in the constitution. Thus, in the first session of his first Parliament (1604), the King's speeches about his prerogative and the privileges that he had granted Parliament led that body to draft the "Apology of the Commons," in which the Commons equated their rights with those of all Englishmen. The Commons had suddenly assumed a new role. During James's first Parliament, which lasted until 1610, the opposition to him was sporadic and relatively uncoordinated. It tended to center on the

figure of James's heir, Henry, who was given his own household at the age of 9.

Affairs of Church and State. The harsh treatment to which he had been subjected by some of his ministers of the Presbyterian Church as a youth, and the disruptive, highly anti-monarchical bias of the Church, led James to support an episcopal church—a church that moreover acknowledged him as its head. Indeed, James's instincts seemed to incline him toward a very highly ritualized form of worship, and he seemed at first disposed to move toward a more lenient position regarding Roman Catholicism. Whatever his real feelings on this issue might have been, the discovery of a Catholic conspiracy led by Guy Fawkes to blow up the royal family—and Parliament as well—robbed him of any initiative in dealing with the Catholics as a group. He was forced to bow to the harsh measures adopted by Parliament; his subsequent efforts to relieve the disabilities imposed on Catholics only made Parliament suspect his motives.

Suspicion clouded James's relations with Parliament over several other issues as well. His attempts to unite England and Scotland as one kingdom were thwarted; his meddling in the dealings of his common-law courts led him to quarrel with his own chief justice, Sir Edward Coke, and to espouse a more extreme view of his own prerogative; his arbitrary raising of customs duties further outraged the Commons; finally, his untoward fondness for a succession of worthless favorites (Scottish and English alike) annoyed Parliament, irked Prince Henry, and irritated Queen Anne.

Always impecunious, and without a trace of thrift, James maintained finances that were a source of embarrassment and of weakness. By 1610, amidst mutual recriminations and with the financial crisis unabated, James's first Parliament came to an end.

With Parliament in abeyance, government rested in the hands of James's favorite of the moment, Robert Carr, Earl of Somerset, and Carr's pro-Spanish in-laws, the Howards. Carr's implication in a scandalous murder trial, the death of Henry Howard, leader of the Spanish faction, and the emergence of a new favorite, George Villiers, seemed to undercut the Spanish party, but this eclipse was only temporary; the more the King seemed to incline toward Spain, the more he alienated his more substantial subjects. This mutual mistrust found expression in the "Addled Parliament" of 1614. For 2 months neither Commons nor King would concede a point to the other, and finally, despite his growing need for money, James dissolved his unruly legislature.

In his desperation, James now turned for help to Don Diego Sarmiento, the Spanish ambassador. His poverty really afforded him no choice, but his subjects saw this as further proof of duplicity. James began to consider a Spanish bride for Prince Charles, who had succeeded his late brother as Prince of Wales a most unpopular project, but one which endured for more than a decade. Sarmiento encouraged the King but demanded substantial concessions that would have been impossible for James to meet.

Thirty Years' War. The year 1616 saw the new favorite, Villiers (raised to the peerage as Baron, Viscount, Earl, Marquis, and finally, Duke of Buckingham), secure his position at court and become the focus of royal government. By 1618 he had destroyed the Howard family, and his power seemed to be complete. Buckingham's rise and his arrogance led to a quarrel with Prince Charles. James reconciled the two young men, and they soon became the best of friends.

By 1618, too, James's health was failing. He was badly crippled by gout and by attacks of kidney stones, and he clearly was no longer as alert mentally as he had been. It was precisely at this unfortunate moment that he was called upon to meet the greatest challenge of his reign: the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War.

James's potential reasons for action were immediate, urgent, personal, and obvious—the conflict revolved around his son-in-law, daughter, and grandchildren. On a broader level, the very existence of the reformed faith was in danger. Despite the virtually unanimous urging of his subjects, favorite, and son for an aggressive foreign policy, James vacillated, hesitated, and ultimately to his disgrace appeared to abandon his own family and to attempt an alliance with their enemies. That James sought to use Spanish friendship to aid his son-in-law's cause was neither apparent nor sensible to his subjects. When, in 1620, Spain invaded the Palatinate itself, even James was roused to anger.

Royal anger, to be effective, needed money, and money could only come from a Parliament. Reluctantly, against the advice of Buckingham (who had become pro-Spanish), James summoned Parliament in 1621. At first, despite James's habitual sermonizing to the Commons, things seemed to go well. Money was voted, and while the King refused to allow Parliament to discuss matters of foreign policy, he made no overt move to keep them from overhauling domestic affairs. By the end of the first session, Commons and King were closer together than they had been for years.

Spanish blandishments dissipated this goodwill, and when, during November and December 1620, the Commons refused to vote supplies blindly but insisted on presenting their views on foreign policy, the King was furious. He denied virtually all of Parliament's privileges, and when the Commons responded with a mild protestation, he dissolved Parliament.

Final Years and Death. The gulf between James and his subjects, indeed between the Crown and the nation, was now total. Morally as well as financially, James was bankrupt. He was also wholly dependent upon the goodwill of Spain, or so he thought.

As James grew senile, he lost control not only over his country but over his son and his favorite as well. Charles and Buckingham exposed themselves, their King, and their country to ridicule by their hasty and futile pursuit of the Spanish Infanta.

James's last Parliament was no more peaceful than his first had been. Again King and Commons clashed over prerogative and privilege, but now the Commons was joined by the Lords, and the King's harsh strictures were explained away by his own chief minister and his heir. In the end, the King, and not Parliament, gave way, and England's long flirtation with Spain was at an end.

James's end came soon after; always in poor health, he died on March 27, 1625. He left behind an empty treasury, a malcontented Parliament, and a son who would succeed him peaceably for a while.

EWB

Jaurès, Jean (1859–1914), French socialist. The greatest of the modern French Socialists, Jean Jaurès played a key role in the unification of the Socialist movement and in the struggle to prevent World War I.

On Sept. 3, 1859, Jean Jaurès was born at Castres, Tarn, into a lower-middle-class family. After studies there, he attended the lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris. His intellect and articulateness won him first place in the 1878 entrance competition for the prestigious École Normale Supérieure, from which he graduated with a philosophy degree in 1881. While teaching at the lycée of Albi and then at the University of Toulouse, he became involved in politics.

In 1885 Jaurès was elected to the Chamber of Deputies from the Tarn as a moderate, unaffiliated republican. In the Chamber he worked for social welfare legislation and spoke vigorously against Gen. Boulanger. Defeated in 1889, he returned to teaching at Toulouse. His studies and his contact with the workers,

especially the miners of Carmaux, whom he aided during the strike of 1892, led Jaurès to socialism.

Running on the platform of the Marxist French Workers' party, Jaurès was returned to the Chamber in January 1893, principally through the support of the Carmaux miners. Both within and without the Chamber he now emerged as one of the most effective spokesmen for the Socialist cause. His appeal was not limited to the working class; indeed, he was particularly effective with the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, who were impressed by his stand during the Dreyfus Affair, when he insisted that socialism stood for justice for every individual, regardless of class.

At the same time Jaurès was working to unify the Socialist movement, a role for which his eclectic formation, moralism, preference for synthesis over doctrinal purity, and conciliatory temperament well fitted him. The dogmatists, like Marxist leader Jules Guesde, distrusted him; but because he was the Socialists' most effective parliamentarian and most widely respected figure, they needed him. The first effort at federation (1899) broke down, largely over the entry of Socialist Alexandre Millerand into the ministry.

Jaurès defended ministerial participation under certain circumstances in a democratic regime, but this view was definitively rejected by the Second International (International Working Men's Association) in 1904. His decision to yield the point made possible the unification of French socialism in 1905, and his newspaper, *Humanité*, became the principal organ of the new party. Unification also forced him to abandon his leading role in the coalition which sustained the anticlerical ministry of J. L. E. Combes and to remain for the rest of his career an opposition leader.

The shadow of the coming war brought forth his greatest effort, to prevent France from causing conflict, to use the International to dissuade the powers, and to appeal to the common sense of mankind, but the forces for war were much stronger. His effort, mistakenly construed as unpatriotic, aroused bitter hatred that led to his assassination on July 31, 1914.

EWB

Jenner, Edward (1749–1823), English physician. Edward Jenner introduced vaccination against smallpox and thus laid the foundation of modern concepts of immunology.

Edward Jenner was born on May 17, 1749, in the village of Berkeley in Gloucestershire. At 8 his schooling began at Wooton-under-Edge and was continued in Cirencester. At 13 he was apprenticed to Daniel Ludlow, a surgeon, in Sodbury. In 1770 Jenner went to London to study with the renowned surgeon,

anatomist, and naturalist John Hunter, returning to his native Berkeley in 1773.

Jenner had been interested in nature as a child, and this interest expanded under Hunter's guidance. For example, in 1771 the young physician arranged the zoological specimens gathered during Capt. James Cook's voyage of discovery to the Pacific. His thorough work led to his being recommended for the position of naturalist on the second Cook voyage, but he declined in favor of a medical career. Jenner aided in Hunter's zoological studies in many ways during his few years in London and then from Berkeley. Hunter's experimental methods, insistence on exact observation, and general encouragement are reflected in this work in natural history but are especially apparent in Jenner's introduction of vaccination.

In Eastern countries the practice of inoculation against smallpox with matter taken from a smallpox pustule was common. This practice was introduced into England in the early 18th century. Although such inoculation aided in the prevention of the dreaded and widespread disease, it was dangerous. There was a common story among farmers that if a person contracted a relatively mild and harmless disease of cattle called cowpox, immunity to smallpox would result. Jenner first heard this story while apprenticed to Ludlow, and when he went to London he discussed the possibilities of such immunity at length with Hunter. Hunter encouraged him to make further observations and experiments, and when Jenner returned to Berkeley he continued his observations for many years until he was fully convinced that cowpox did, in fact, confer immunity to smallpox. On May 14, 1796, he vaccinated a young boy with cowpox material taken from a pustule on the hand of a dairymaid who had contracted the disease from a cow. The boy suffered the usual mild symptoms of cowpox and quickly recovered. A few weeks later the boy was inoculated with smallpox matter and suffered no ill effects.

In June 1798 Jenner published *An Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Variolae Vaccinae, a Disease Discovered in Some of the Western Counties of England, Particularly in Gloucestershire, and Known by the Name of the Cowpox*. In 1799 *Further Observations on the Variolae Vaccinae or Cowpox* appeared and, in 1800, *A Continuation of Facts and Observations Relative to the Variolae Vaccinae, or Cowpox*. The reception of Jenner's ideas was a little slow, but official recognition came from the British government in 1800. For the rest of his life Jenner worked consistently for the establishment of vaccination. These years were marred only by the death in 1815 of his wife, Catherine Kingscote Jenner, whom he had married in 1788. Jen-

ner died of a cerebral hemorrhage in Berkeley on Jan. 26, 1823.

EWB

Johnson, Samuel (1709–1784)

The writings of the English author and lexicographer express a profound reverence for the past modified by an energetic independence of mind. The mid-18th century in England is often called the Age of Johnson.

Samuel Johnson was born in Litchfield, Staffordshire, on September 18, 1709. His father was a bookseller—first successful, later a failure—and Johnson, whom Adam Smith described as the best-read man he had ever known, owed much of his education to the fact that he grew up in a bookstore. Though he lived to old age, from infancy Johnson was plagued by illness. He was afflicted with scrofula, smallpox, and partial deafness and blindness. One of his first memories was of being taken to London, where he was touched by Queen Anne, the touch of the sovereign then thought to be a cure for scrofula.

Johnson was educated at the Litchfield Grammar School, where he learned Latin and Greek under the threat of the rod. He later studied with a clergyman in a nearby village from whom he learned a lesson always central to his thinking that, if one is to master any subject, one must first discover its general principles, or, as Johnson put it, “but grasp the Trunk hard only, and you will shake all the Branches.” In 1728–29 Johnson spent 14 months at Pembroke College, Oxford. He was poor, embarrassed by his poverty, and he could not complete the work for a degree. While at Oxford, Johnson became confirmed in his belief in Christianity and the Anglican Church, a belief to which he held throughout a life often troubled by religious doubts. His father died in 1731, and Johnson halfheartedly supported himself with academic odd jobs. In 1735 he married Mrs. Elizabeth Porter, a widow some 20 years older than he. Though Johnson’s references to his “Tetty” were affectionate, the 17 years of their childless marriage were probably not very happy. Still casting about for a way to make a living, Johnson opened a boarding school. He had only three pupils, one of them being David Garrick—eventually to become the greatest actor of his day. In 1737 Johnson went to London to make a career as a man of letters.

Making His Name. Once in London, Johnson began to work for Edward Cave, the editor of the *Gentleman’s Magazine*. Parliament did not then permit stenographic reports of its debates, and Cave published a column called “Debates in the Senate of Lil-

liput”—the name is taken, of course, from the first book of Jonathan Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels*—for which Johnson, among others, wrote re-creations of actual parliamentary speeches. Years later, when someone quoted to him from a speech by William Pitt the Elder, Johnson remarked, “That speech I wrote in a garret in Exeter Street.”

Johnson worked at a variety of other literary tasks. He published two “imitations” of the Roman satirist Juvenal, *London, a Poem* (1738) and *The Vanity of Human Wishes* (1749), transposing the language and situations of the classical originals into those of his own day. In 1744 Johnson published a biography of his friend Richard Savage. A neurotic liar and sponger and a failed writer, Savage had been one of Johnson’s friends when they were both down and out, and to such early friends Johnson was always loyal. The *Life of Savage* is a sympathetic study of a complex and initially unsympathetic man. In 1749 Johnson completed his rather lifeless tragedy in blank verse *Irene*; it was produced by Garrick and earned Johnson £300.

In the early 1750s Johnson, writing usually at the rate of two essays a week, published two series of periodical essays *The Rambler* (1750–1752) and *The Adventurer* (1753–1754). The essays take various forms—allegories, sketches of representative human types, literary criticism, lay sermons. Johnson constantly lived in the presence of the literature of the past, and his essays refer to the classics as if they were the work of his contemporaries. He has a satirist’s eye for discrepancies and contradictions in human life, yet he is always in search of the central and universal, for whatever is unchanging in man’s experience. His prose is elaborate and richly orchestrated, and he seems to have tried to enlarge the language of moral philosophy by using scientific and technical terms.

Johnson’s interest in specialized vocabularies can be easily explained. In 1746 he had, with the help of six assistants, begun work on a dictionary of the English language. The project was finally completed in 1755. Johnson had originally tried to interest Lord Chesterfield in becoming patron for this vast project, but he did little to help Johnson until help was no longer needed. Johnson wrote Chesterfield a public letter in which he declared the author’s independence of noble patronage. Johnson’s *Dictionary* is probably the most personal work of its kind that will ever be compiled; though Johnson received help from others, it was not the work of a committee. His own definition of *lexicographer* was a “writer of dictionaries; a harmless drudge,” yet the work bears his personal stamp: it is notable for the precision of its definitions, for its appreciation of the paramount importance of

metaphor in use of language, and for its examples, which draw on Johnson's reading in 200 years of English literature.

Johnson's *Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia* appeared in 1759, the year of the publication of Voltaire's *Candide*, a work which it somewhat resembles. Both are moral fables concerned with an innocent young man's search for the secret of happiness. The young Prince Rasselas, accompanied by his sister and the philosopher Imlac, leaves his home in the Happy Valley and interviews men of different kinds in the hope of discovering how life may best be lived. Disillusioned at last, Rasselas returns to his old home. Though Johnson was given to fits of idleness, he could at other times work with great facility; he wrote *Rasselas* in the evenings of one week to pay for the expenses of his mother's funeral. The work was immediately successful; six editions appeared during Johnson's lifetime and also a number of translations.

Years of Success and Fame. In 1762 Johnson, though he had been anti-Hanoverian in his politics, accepted a pension of £300 a year from George III. A year later he met James Boswell, the 22-year-old son of a Scottish judge. Boswell became Johnson's devoted companion; he observed him closely, made notes on his conversation, and eventually wrote the great biography of his hero. Boswell's Johnson is a formidable and yet endearing figure: bulky, personally untidy, given to many eccentricities and compulsions, in conversation often contentious and even pugnacious, a man of great kindness who delighted in society but was also the victim of frequent black moods and periods of religious disquiet. In 1773 Boswell persuaded Johnson, who pretended a stronger dislike of the Scots than he actually felt, to join him in a tour of Scotland, and there are records of the trip made by both men—Johnson's *A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland* (1775) and Boswell's journal.

In 1764 Johnson and the painter Joshua Reynolds founded a club whose members eventually numbered some of the most eminent men of the time; they included the writer Oliver Goldsmith, Johnson's old pupil David Garrick, the economist Adam Smith, the historian Edward Gibbon, and the politicians Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox. In 1765 Johnson met Mr. and Mrs. Henry Thrale. He was a well-to-do brewer, and in the Thrales home Johnson found a refuge from the solitude which had oppressed him since his wife's death in 1752. In 1765 Johnson published an eight-volume edition of the works of Shakespeare; in his "Preface" Johnson praises Shakespeare for his fidelity to nature and defends him against the

charge that his failure to observe the three classical unities was a limitation on his achievement.

Last Years. Johnson's last great literary enterprise, a work in 10 volumes, was completed in his seventy-second year; it is the *Prefaces, Biographical and Critical, to the Works of the English Poets*, better known as the *Lives of the Poets*. It is a series of biographical and critical studies of 52 English poets, the earliest being Abraham Cowley; it is a magisterial reevaluation of the course of English poetry from the early 17th century until his own time by a man whose taste had been formed by the poetry of John Dryden and Alexander Pope and who was thus in varying degrees out of sympathy with the metaphysicals and John Milton, as he was with the more "advanced" writers of his own time. Even when he deals with writers whom he does not much like, Johnson shows his genius for precise definition and for laying down fairly the terms of a critical argument.

Johnson's last years were saddened by the death of his old friend Dr. Robert Levett (to whom he addressed a beautiful short elegy), by the death of Thrale, and by a quarrel with Mrs. Thrale, who had remarried with what seemed to Johnson indecorous haste. In his last illness Johnson, always an amateur physician, made notes on the progress of his own disease. He died on December 13, 1784, in his house in London, and he was buried in Westminster Abbey.

EWB

Jones, Inigo (1573–1652), English architect and designer. Inigo Jones was the most talented native artist in England in the first half of the 17th century. He was responsible for introducing Italian Renaissance architecture into England.

Inigo Jones was born in London on July 15, 1573. Little is known of his early life and education, but between 1596/1597 and 1605 he traveled on the Continent and spent some years in Italy. In and around Venice and Vicenza he observed the buildings of Andrea Palladio, one of the major architects of the Late Renaissance, whose theories and designs had a profound effect on him.

During this period Jones may have worked for a time for King Christian of Denmark. In 1609 Jones traveled in France, and in 1613–1614 he toured the Continent, spending most of the time in Italy. During this Italian sojourn Jones undertook a professional study of Palladio's architecture and architectural theories.

In 1615 James I appointed Jones surveyor of the King's works, an important position, which was essentially that of chief architect to the Crown. He also

held this position under Charles I until 1642, when the outbreak of the civil war disrupted court life.

Court Masques. During the reigns of both monarchs Jones designed and produced court masques, elaborate theatrical festivals which were common at courts on the Continent, especially in Italy. Ben Jonson often wrote scripts for the masques, and between 1605 and 1640 Jones worked on at least 25 of these productions. James I's queen, Anne of Denmark, was devoted to lavish entertainment and to the masques, and the tradition was continued in the reign of Charles I.

The masques, in which the sovereigns and courtiers participated, were dazzling spectacles organized around allegorical or mythological themes; they involved music, ballet, and spoken parts and required fantastic costumes, complex stage machinery, and brilliant stage settings. Hundreds of Jones's drawings for the costumes and stage designs are extant, none of which would have been possible without his knowledge of Italian art and draftsmanship. The masques allowed him to exercise an imaginative fantasy which rarely appears in the sobriety of his architectural designs.

His Architecture. Jones was the first professional architect in England in the modern sense of the term, and he turned English architecture from its essentially medieval Gothic and Tudor traditions into the mainstream of the Italian Renaissance manner. He designed many architectural projects, some of them vast in scale; but of the buildings actually executed from his designs only seven remain, most of them in an altered or restored state.

The earliest of Jones's surviving buildings is the Queen's House at Greenwich, a project he undertook for Queen Anne in 1616. The lower floor was completed at the time the Queen died in 1619. Work then stopped but was resumed in 1630 for Queen Henrietta Maria, Charles I's wife, and was completed in 1635. The building is marked by a symmetrical plan, simplicity of classical detail, harmonious proportions, and severe purity of line, all elements that reflected Italian Renaissance sources and constituted an architectural revelation to the English.

The building now most associated with Jones is the Banqueting House at Whitehall (1619–1622). Intended to serve as a setting for state functions, it is a sophisticated manipulation of Italian classical elements and owes much to Palladio. The main facade consists of seven bays and two stories gracefully unified in an elegant, rational pattern of classical columns and pilasters, lightly rusticated stone, discreetly carved

ornamentation, and a delicate contrast of textures. The interior is one large double-cube room; its classical severity contrasts dramatically with the richly baroque ceiling containing paintings by Peter Paul Rubens that were installed in 1635.

The Queen's Chapel, Marlborough Gate, completed in 1627, has a coffered barrel vault derived from imperial Roman architecture; it was Jones's first design for a church and the first church structure in England in the classical style. In 1631 he became associated with a city planning project in the Covent Garden district of London and designed St. Paul's Church there. The church, which still exists in a restored condition, is in the form of an austere classical temple with a deep portico and severe Tuscan columns. Between 1634 and 1642 Jones was occupied with extensive restoration of the old St. Paul's Cathedral (now destroyed), which he fronted with a giant classical portico of 10 Corinthian columns. From about 1638 Jones was involved in preparing designs for a vast baroque palace projected by Charles I, but it was not realized.

In 1642 the conflict between Parliament and King erupted in open warfare which swept away the elegant Cavalier court of Charles I, and Jones's world disappeared with it. His last important work was undertaken in 1649, when he and John Webb, who had been his assistant for many years, provided designs for the Double- and Single-Cube Rooms at Wilton House. The architectural decoration of this splendidly proportioned suite of rooms is essentially French in character; the cream-colored walls are decorated with a rich variety of carved and gilded moldings and ornaments to create an effect both opulent and disciplined. Jones died in London on June 21, 1652, the same year that Wilton House was completed.

EWB

Joseph II (1741–1790), Holy Roman emperor from 1765 to 1790. He is one of the best examples of Europe's enlightened despots.

Born in Vienna on March 13, 1741, the first son of Maria Theresa, Archduchess of Austria, and Francis Stephen of Lorraine, Grand Duke of Tuscany, Joseph achieved his first triumph merely by being born a boy. A year earlier, as Joseph's grandfather Charles VI left no male heirs, Maria Theresa had succeeded to the hereditary dominions of the house of Hapsburg. Her succession, challenged by Frederick II of Prussia, had unleashed a general European war (War of the Austrian Succession), and the fact that Maria Theresa had previously given birth to three daughters had raised further questions about the succession.

The War of the Austrian Succession cost the house of Austria one of its richest provinces, Silesia, a loss confirmed in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). Maria Theresa and her chief ministers were determined first to recover that province and later to compensate themselves somehow for its loss. Both of these aims required a general overhaul of the monarchy's inadequate armed forces, which in turn would require a general overhaul of the machinery of state in order to raise the necessary funds. Joseph was educated with these considerations in mind.

By the time he had reached the age of 20, with a high forehead, piercing blue eyes, a Roman nose, pouting lips, and a somewhat receding chin, Joseph had learned his lessons rather too well. In 1761 he submitted to his mother a memorandum proposing a general reform of the state that suggested a general centralization so pervasive that it not only would have done away with all of the remaining powers of the provincial estates but also would have overridden most of the national differences of the widespread dominions of the house of Austria. He was politely told to tend to his business. Meanwhile, he had married Isabella of Bourbon Parma in 1760; in 1762 she gave birth to a daughter, Maria Theresa; a year later Isabella died, a blow from which Joseph was never to recover. Although, for reasons of state, he entered into a second marriage, with Josepha of Bavaria, he treated her with disdain, and when she died in 1767, he refused to consider a third marriage. The death of his daughter in 1768 confirmed him in his growing misanthropy and finished the job of making him a compulsive worker.

Early Reign. In 1765 Joseph's father, who had with his wife's backing been elected Holy Roman emperor in 1742, died. Joseph was duly elected to succeed him in that dignity. His position was now an anomaly. His father, in spite of his high-sounding title, had been essentially a prince consort; Maria Theresa had given him no share in the administration of her dominions. Joseph was unwilling to play such a passive role. His mother now granted him the title of coregent, but it soon became clear that it too was an empty one. For the next 15 years Joseph would complain that he was unable to initiate what he regarded as necessary reforms.

The Empress did turn over to Joseph prime responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. In 1772, in the wake of a joint Prussian-Russian initiative, the kingdom of Poland was partitioned. Maria Theresa was reluctant to participate in what she regarded as a blatantly immoral action, but Joseph insisted and Austria received the southern Polish province of Galicia.

In 1778 Joseph attempted to take advantage of the fact that the ruling family of Bavaria, the house of Wittelsbach, had died out. Pressing some rather doubtful Hapsburg claims to the succession, he sent in Austrian troops. This action provided an opportunity for Frederick II of Prussia to pose as the defender of German liberties by declaring war on Austria. As neither side was anxious for a major war, operations soon degenerated into a desultory war of maneuver, contemptuously dubbed the "Potato War" by participants, who spent more time in digging up fields for food than in fighting. The Treaty of Teschen (1779) gave Austria insignificant territorial gains.

Enactment of Reforms. In 1780 Maria Theresa died, and Joseph, who now became sole ruler of all the Hapsburg dominions as well as emperor, was in the position of implementing the program of changes he had long desired. The reforms that Joseph now introduced had, with few exceptions, been under consideration in his mother's reign and were organically related to policies formulated under her. At any rate, the Josephinian reforms addressed themselves broadly to the inequities of the old regime.

In 1781 Joseph abolished serfdom, although the Austrian peasantry still was left with serious financial and work obligations. In the same year an edict of toleration lifted the Protestant and Greek Orthodox subjects of the monarchy to a condition of near equality. The next year the Jews of Austria also were granted a measure of toleration. The dominant position of the Catholic Church was further undermined by the creation of the Commission on Spiritual Affairs, which came perilously close to establishing secular control over the Church. At the same time Joseph ordered the dissolution of the majority of the monasteries in Austria. These events moved Pope Pius VI to take the unprecedented step of traveling to Vienna, but Joseph refused to give way on any question of substance, and Pius returned to Rome empty-handed.

In 1783 Joseph commuted the robot, the work obligation owed by the Austrian peasants to the noble owners of the land, to money payments, an action that led to untold difficulties. In order to assess the amount due by the peasants accurately, it was necessary to survey and register all land holdings. But, as the nobility had traditionally concealed a portion of its holdings in order to escape taxation, it now began to oppose Joseph in earnest and could do so more easily, for the Emperor had all but abolished censorship. In 1786 he did away with the restrictive craft guilds, a reform which was designed to create a distinct economic advantage but which added considerably to the number

of Joseph's enemies. Finally, in 1789, Joseph abolished the robot entirely.

These reforms, striking as they did at the economic advantage enjoyed by the privileged orders, would have been difficult to enforce under ideal circumstances. As it was, Joseph's peculiar conduct of foreign policy in the 1780s did not contribute to the strength of his position. In 1784 he had tried to acquire Bavaria once more, this time in exchange for the Austrian Netherlands. Frederick II managed to block the scheme once more, this time by representing himself as the leader of the League of German Princes, dedicated to the maintenance of the status quo. Far worse, in 1787, as the result of an alliance recently concluded with Russia, Joseph involved Austria in a war with the Ottoman Empire. It was meant to be a joint venture with the Russians, but they were involved in a separate campaign against Sweden and left him to his own devices. The result was a military fiasco that brought on painful losses of territory and ruined Joseph's health. Concurrently his subjects in the Netherlands, resenting his attempts to enforce his ecclesiastical reforms there, rose in rebellion. Hungary, with the support of Prussian agents, was threatening secession. In 1790 Joseph was forced to repeal his reforms for Hungary. On Feb. 20, 1790, he died.

EWB

Jung, Carl Gustav (1875–1961), Swiss psychologist and psychiatrist. Carl Jung was a founder of modern depth psychology.

Carl Jung was born on July 26, 1875, in Kesswil, the son of a Protestant clergyman. When he was four, the family moved to Basel. As he grew older, his keen interest in biology, zoology, paleontology, philosophy, and the history of religion made the choice of a career quite difficult. However, he finally decided on medicine, which he studied at the University of Basel (1895–1900). He received his medical degree from the University of Zurich in 1902. Later he studied psychology in Paris.

In 1903 Jung married Emma Rauschenbach, his loyal companion and scientific collaborator until her death in 1955. The couple had five children. They lived in Küsnacht on the Lake of Zurich, where Jung died on June 6, 1961.

Jung began his professional career in 1900 as an assistant to Eugen Bleuler at the psychiatric clinic of the University of Zurich. During these years of his internship, Jung, with a few associates, worked out the so-called association experiment. This is a method of testing used to reveal affectively significant groups of ideas in the unconscious region of the psyche. They usually have a disturbing influence, promoting anxi-

eties and unadapted emotions which are not under the control of the person concerned. Jung coined the term "complexes" for their designation.

Association with Freud. When Jung read Sigmund Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*, he found his own ideas and observations to be essentially confirmed and furthered. He sent his publication *Studies in Word Association* (1904) to Freud, and this was the beginning of their collaboration and friendship, which lasted from 1907 to 1913. Jung was eager to explore the secrets of the unconscious psyche expressed by dreaming, fantasies, myths, fairy tales, superstition, and occultism. But Freud had already worked out his theories about the underlying cause of every psychoneurosis and also his doctrine that all the expressions of the unconscious are hidden wish fulfillments. Jung felt more and more that these theories were scientific presumptions which did not do full justice to the rich expressions of unconscious psychic life. For him the unconscious not only is a disturbing factor causing psychic illnesses but also is fundamentally the seed of man's creativeness and the roots of human consciousness. With such ideas Jung came increasingly into conflict with Freud, who regarded Jung's ideas as unscientific. Jung accused Freud of dogmatism; Freud and his followers reproached Jung for mysticism.

Topology and Archetypes. His break with Freud caused Jung much distress. Thrown back upon himself, he began a deepened self-analysis in order to gain all the integrity and firmness for his own quest into the dark labyrinth of the unconscious psyche. During the years from 1913 to 1921 Jung published only three important papers: "Two Essays on Analytical Psychology" (1916, 1917) and "Psychological Types" (1921). The "Two Essays" provided the basic ideas from which his later work sprang. He described his research on psychological typology (extro- and introversion, thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition as psychic functions) and expressed the idea that it is the "personal equation" which, often unconsciously but in accordance with one's own typology, influences the approach of an individual toward the outer and inner world. Especially in psychology, it is impossible for an observer to be completely objective, because his observation depends on subjective, personal presuppositions. This insight made Jung suspicious of any dogmatism.

Next to his typology, Jung's main contribution was his discovery that man's fantasy life, like the instincts, has a certain structure. There must be imperceptible energetic centers in the unconscious which regulate instinctual behavior and spontaneous imagi-

nation. Thus emerge the dominants of the collective unconscious, or the archetypes. Spontaneous dreams exist which show an astonishing resemblance to ancient mythological or fairy-tale motifs that are usually unknown to the dreamer. To Jung this meant that archetypal manifestations belong to man in all ages; they are the expression of man's basic psychic nature. Modern civilized man has built a rational superstructure and repressed his dependence on his archetypal nature hence the feeling of self-estrangement, which is the cause of many neurotic sufferings.

In order to study archetypal patterns and processes, Jung visited so-called primitive tribes. He lived among the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and Arizona in 1924–1925 and among the inhabitants of Mt. Elgon in Kenya during 1925–1926. He later visited Egypt and India. To Jung, the religious symbols and phenomenology of Buddhism and Hinduism and the teachings of Zen Buddhism and Confucianism all expressed differentiated experiences on the way to man's inner world, a world which was badly neglected by Western civilization. Jung also searched for traditions in Western culture which compensated for its one-sided extroverted development toward rationalism and technology. He found these traditions in Gnosticism, Christian mysticism, and, above all, alchemy. For Jung, the weird alchemical texts were astonishing symbolic expressions for the human experience of the processes in the unconscious. Some of his major works are deep and lucid psychological interpretations of alchemical writings, showing their living significance for understanding dreams and the hidden motifs of neurotic and mental disorders.

Process of Individuation. Of prime importance to Jung was the biography of the stages of inner development and of the maturation of the personality, which he termed the "process of individuation." He described a strong impulse from the unconscious to guide the individual toward its specific, most complete uniqueness. This achievement is a lifelong task of trial and error and of confronting and integrating contents of the unconscious. It consists in an ever-increasing self-knowledge and in "becoming what you are." But individuation also includes social responsibility, which is a great step on the way to self-realization.

Jung lived for his explorations, his writings, and his psychological practice, which he had to give up in 1944 due to a severe heart attack. His academic appointments during the course of his career included the professorship of medical psychology at the University of Basel and the titular professorship of philosophy from 1933 until 1942 on the faculty of phil-

osophical and political sciences of the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. In 1948 he founded the C. G. Jung Institute in Zurich. Honorary doctorates were conferred on him by many important universities all over the world.

EWB

K

Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804), German philosopher. The major works of Immanuel Kant offer an analysis of speculative and moral reason and the faculty of human judgment. He exerted an immense influence on the intellectual movements of the 19th and 20th centuries.

The fourth of nine children of Johann Georg and Anna Regina Kant, Immanuel Kant was born in the town of Königsberg on April 22, 1724. Johann Kant was a harness maker, and the large family lived in modest circumstances. The family belonged to a Protestant sect of Pietists, and a concern for religion touched every aspect of their lives. Although Kant became critical of formal religion, he continued to admire the "praiseworthy conduct" of Pietists. Kant's elementary education was taken at Saint George's Hospital School and then at the Collegium Fredericianum, a Pietist school, where he remained from 1732 until 1740.

In 1740 Kant entered the University of Königsberg. Under the influence of a young instructor, Martin Knutzen, Kant became interested in philosophy, mathematics, and the natural sciences. Through the use of Knutzen's private library, Kant grew familiar with the philosophy of Christian Wolff, who had systematized the rationalism of Leibniz. Kant accepted the rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff and the natural philosophy of Newton until a chance reading of David Hume aroused him from his "dogmatic slumbers."

The death of Kant's father in 1746 left him without income. He became a private tutor for 7 years in order to acquire the means and leisure to begin an academic career. During this period Kant published several papers dealing with scientific questions. The most important was the "General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens" in 1755. In this work Kant postulated the origin of the solar system as a result of the gravitational interaction of atoms. This theory anticipated Laplace's hypothesis (1796) by more than 40 years. In the same year Kant presented a Latin treatise, "On Fire", to qualify for the doctoral degree.

Kant spent the next 15 years (1755–1770) as a nonsalaried lecturer whose fees were derived entirely from the students who attended his lectures. In order

to live he lectured between 26 and 28 hours a week on metaphysics, logic, mathematics, physics, and physical geography. Despite this enormous teaching burden, Kant continued to publish papers on various topics. He finally achieved a professorship at Königsberg in 1770.

Critique of Pure Reason. For the next decade Kant published almost nothing. But at the age of 57 he published the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781; 2d ed. 1787). This enormous work, one of the most important and difficult books in Western thought, attempts to resolve the contradictions inherent in perception and conception as explained by the rationalists and empiricists.

On the level of experience, Kant saw the inherent difficulties in the “representative theory of perception.” Our percepts, or intuitions of things, are not themselves objects but rather images or representations. Since these perceptual images are the only evidence for an external, physical world, it can be asked how faithfully mental images represent physical objects. On the level of conception, mathematical, scientific, and metaphysical judgments make predictions about the connections and consequences of events. As these judgments tell us about the past, present, and future, they cannot be derived from our immediate experience. Some events, however, can be experienced as conforming to these universal and necessary laws; hence, these judgments are more than mere definitions. The aim of the critique is to explain how experience and reason interact in perception and understanding.

Philosophers had long recognized two kinds of judgment. The first is *analytic*, which is the product of the analysis or definition of concepts. All analytic propositions are reducible to statements of identity, that is, they define what a thing is. For example, a triangle is a three-sided figure universally (always) and necessarily (could not be otherwise) by definition. As such, all analytic judgments are true a priori, or independent of experience. The content and form of the second type of judgment is exactly the reverse. *Synthetic* propositions expand or amplify our knowledge, but these judgments are a posteriori, or derived from experience.

Kant’s position is that of the first thinker to posit the problem of pure reason correctly by isolating a third order of judgment. Consider the following propositions: 10 times 2 is 20; every event has a cause; the universe is created. As universal and necessary, all three judgments are a priori but also, according to Kant, synthetic, in that they extend our knowledge of reality. Thus the fundamental propositions of mathe-

matics, science, and metaphysics are synthetic a priori, and the question that the *Critique of Pure Reason* poses is not an analysis of whether there is such knowledge but a methodology of *how* “understanding and reason can know apart from experience.”

The solution to this problem is Kant’s “Copernican Revolution.” Until Copernicus hypothesized that the sun was the center of the universe and the earth in its rotation, science had assumed the earth was the center of the universe. Just so, argues Kant, philosophers have attempted and failed to prove that our perceptions and judgments are true because they correspond to objects. “We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success . . . if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.” This radical proposal means that the mind constitutes the way the world appears and the way in which the world is thought about.

But, unlike later idealists, Kant does not say that the mind creates objects but only the conditions under which objects are perceived and understood. According to Kant, “we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them.” The attempt to preserve a realist orientation leads Kant to distinguish between the appearances of things (*phenomena*), as conditioned by the subjective forms of intuition, and the categories of the understanding and things-in-themselves (*noumena*). In brief, mathematics and science are true because they are derived from the ways in which the mind conditions its percepts and concepts, and metaphysics is an illusion because it claims to tell us about things as they really are. But since the mind constitutes the appearances and their intelligibility, we can never know noumenal reality (as it exists apart from mind) with any certainty. Although Kant considers the denial of metaphysics inconsequential because it has consisted only of “mock combats” in which no victory was ever gained, he is at some pains to establish that the restriction of pure reason to the limits of sensibility does not preclude a practical knowledge of morality and religion. In fact, the limitation of pure reason makes such faith more positive.

Later Works. In 1783 Kant restated the main outlines of his first critique in a brief, analytic form in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. In 1785 he presented an early view of the practical aspects of reason in *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*. In 1788 he published the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

While theoretical reason is concerned with cognition, practical reason is concerned with will, or self-determination. There is only one human reason, but after it decides what it can know, it must determine

how it shall act. In the analytic of practical reason Kant attempts to isolate the a priori element in morality. The notion that happiness is the end of life is purely subjective, and every empirical morality is arbitrary.

Thus the freedom of the will, which is only a speculative possibility for pure reason, becomes the practical necessity of determining how one shall lead his life. And the fundamental, rational principle of a free morality is some universal and necessary law to which a man commits himself. This principle is called by Kant the “Categorical Imperative,” which states that a man should obligate himself to act so that any one of his actions could be made into a universal law binding all mankind. The dignity of man consists in the freedom to overcome inclination and private interest in order to obligate oneself to the duty of performing the good for its own sake. In examining the consequences of man’s freedom, Kant insists that practical reason postulates the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as the conditions for true freedom.

In 1790 Kant completed his third critique, which attempts to draw these conflicting tensions together. In pure reason the mind produces constitutive principles of *phenomena*, and in practical reason the mind produces regulative principles of noumenal reality. The *Critique of Judgment* attempts to connect the concepts of nature with the concepts of freedom. The reflective or teleological judgment of finality, which is derived from our esthetic feelings about the fittingness of things, mediates between our cognition and our will. This judgment neither constitutes nature like the understanding nor legislates action like practical reason, but it does enable us to think of the “purposiveness” of nature as a realm of ends that are in harmony with universal laws.

Although Kant continued writing until shortly before his death, the “critical works” are the source of his influence. Only a life of extraordinary self-discipline enabled him to accomplish his task. He was barely 5 feet tall and extremely thin, and his health was never robust. He attributed his longevity to an invariable routine. Rising at five, he drank tea and smoked his daily pipe and meditated for an hour. From six to seven he prepared his lectures and taught from seven to nine in his own home. He worked in his study until one. He invited friends for long dinners, which lasted often until four. After his one daily meal he walked between four and five so punctually that people were said to set their watches on his passing. He continued to write or read until he retired at ten. Toward the end of his life he became increasingly antisocial and bitter over the growing loss of his mem-

ory and capacity for work. Kant became totally blind and finally died on Feb. 12, 1804.

EWB

Kautsky, Karl Johann (1854–1938), German-Austrian socialist. Karl Kautsky was the major theoretician of German Social Democracy before World War I and one of the principal figures in the history of the international Socialist movement.

Born in Prague, Karl Kautsky was the son of a Czech painter and his actress wife. His studies at the University of Vienna were mainly scientific, however, rather than artistic. Although he considered himself a Socialist by 1875, it was his encounter with Wilhelm Liebknecht and Eduard Bernstein about 1880 that brought him to Marxism, and in 1883 he became editor of *Die neue Zeit*, which soon became the leading Marxist theoretical journal in Germany and perhaps the world. In 1887 he published *The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx*, which did much to popularize Marxist ideas.

Ideologically, Kautsky (along with August Bebel) represented the Socialist “center” which retained its belief in the inevitable—indeed imminent—collapse of capitalism, but which differed from the radical left in holding that socialism was possible only through political democracy. Unlike the Socialist right, however, Kautsky maintained that imperial Germany was too undemocratic for Socialists to participate in governmental coalitions and that therefore they must remain in the opposition. Kautsky was the author of much of the Erfurt program of 1891, strongly Marxist and revolutionary in tone, which was to remain the official program of the party throughout the imperial period, and he strongly resisted the revisionist tendencies associated with Bernstein that subsequently challenged many of the basic assumptions laid down at Erfurt.

Kautsky broke with the majority of the Social Democrats during World War I. Convinced of the war guilt of Germany and Austria, he joined the pacifist Independent Socialists (USPD), which cost him the editorship of *Die neue Zeit*. Though most of the Independent Socialists came from the radical wing of the prewar party, Kautsky did not share their enthusiasm for the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, and he became one of its most vocal Socialist opponents (especially in his *Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, 1918).

After the German revolution of 1918 Kautsky served briefly in the republican government in the Foreign Office and on the Socialization Commission. In 1919 he helped edit a collection of documents on the outbreak of the war, tending to show the guilt of the Kaiser. But in general Kautsky was without much influence in the post-war Social Democratic party or

in the Weimar regime. He moved to Vienna, which he had to flee at the time of the Anschluss, just before his death in 1938.

EWB

Kepler, Johannes (1571–1630), German astronomer. Johannes Kepler was one of the chief founders of modern astronomy because of his discovery of three basic laws underlying the motion of planets.

Johannes Kepler was born on Dec. 27, 1571, in the Swabian town of Weil. His father, Heinrich Kepler, was a mercenary; although a Protestant, he enlisted in the troops of the Duke of Alba fighting the Reformed insurgents in the Low Countries. Kepler's grandmother brought him up; for years he was a sickly child. At 13 he was accepted at a theological seminary at Adelberg.

Kepler wanted to become a theologian, and following his graduation from the University of Tübingen, as bachelor of arts in 1591, he enrolled in its theological faculty. But he was also interested in French literature and astronomy. His poor health and proclivity to morbidness singled him out no less than did his precocious advocacy of the doctrine of Copernicus.

It seems that the University of Tübingen gladly presented Kepler for the post of the "mathematician of the province" when request for a candidate came from Graz. He arrived there in April 1594 and set himself to work on one of his duties, the composition of the almanac, in which the main events of the coming year were to be duly predicted. His first almanac was a signal success. The occurrence of two not too unlikely events, an invasion by the Turks and a severe winter, which he had predicted, established his reputation.

Far more important for astronomy was the idea that seized Kepler on July 9, 1595. It appeared to him that the respective radii of the orbits of the planets corresponded to the lengths determined by a specific sequence in which the five regular solids were placed within one another, with a sphere separating each solid from the other. The sphere (orbit) of Saturn enveloped a cube which in turn enveloped another sphere, the orbit of Jupiter. This circumscribed a tetrahedron, a sphere (the orbit of Mars), a dodecahedron, a sphere (the orbit of earth), an icosahedron, a sphere (the orbit of Venus), an octahedron, and the smallest sphere (the orbit of Mercury). The idea was the main theme of his *Mysterium cosmographicum* (1596).

The next year Kepler married Barbara Muehleck, already twice widowed, "under an ominous sky," according to Kepler's own horoscope. Of their five

children only one boy and one girl reached adulthood. It was with reluctance that Kepler, a convinced Copernican, first sought the job of assistant to Tycho Brahe, the astrologer-mathematician of Rudolph II in Prague. He took his new position in 1600. On the death of Tycho the following year, Kepler was appointed his successor.

His Three Laws. Kepler's immediate duty was to prepare for publication Tycho's collection of astronomical studies, *Astronomiae instauratae progymnasmata* (1601–1602). Kepler fell heir to Tycho's immensely valuable records. Their outstanding feature lay in the precision by which Tycho surpassed all astronomers before him in observing the position of stars and planets. Kepler tried to utilize Tycho's data in support of his own layout of the circular planetary orbits. The facts, that is, Tycho's observations, forced him to make one of the most revolutionary assumptions in the history of astronomy. A difference of 8 minutes of arc between his theory and Tycho's data could be explained only if the orbit of Mars was not circular but elliptical. In a generalized form this meant that the orbits of all planets were elliptical (Kepler's first law). On this basis a proper meaning could be given to another statement of his which he had already made in the same context. It is known as Kepler's second law, according to which the line joining the planet to the sun sweeps over equal areas in equal times in its elliptical orbit.

Kepler published these laws in his lengthy discussion of the orbit of the planet Mars, the *Astronomia nova* (1609). The two laws were clearly spelled out also in the book's detailed table of contents. Thus they must have struck the eyes of any careful reader sensitive to an astronomical novelty of such major proportion. Still, Galileo failed to take cognizance of them in his printed works, although he could have used them to great advantage to buttress his advocacy of the Copernican system.

The relations between Galileo and Kepler were rather strange. Although Galileo remained distinctly unappreciative of Kepler's achievements, the latter wrote a booklet to celebrate Galileo's *Starry Messenger* immediately upon its publication in 1610. On the other hand, Kepler argued rather vainly in his *Conversation with the Starry Messenger* (1610) that in his *Astronomiae pars optica* (1604), or *Optics*, which he presented as a commentary to Witelo's 13th-century work, one could find all the principles needed to construct a telescope.

In 1611 came Rudolph's abdication, and Kepler immediately looked for a new job. He obtained in Linz the post of provincial mathematician. By the

time he moved to Linz in 1612 with his two children, his wife and his favorite son, Friedrich, were dead. Kepler's 14 years in Linz were marked, as far as his personal life was concerned, with his marriage in 1613 to Suzanna Reuttinger and by his repeated efforts to save his aged mother from being tried as a witch.

As for Kepler the scientist, he published two important works while he was in Linz. One was the *Harmonice mundi* (1618), in which his third law was announced. According to it the squares of the sidereal periods of any two planets are to each other as the cubes of their mean distances from the sun. The law was, however, derived not from celestial mechanics (Newton's *Principia* was still 6 decades away) but from Kepler's conviction that nature had to be patterned along quantitative relationships since God created it according to "weight, measure and number." Shortly after his first book appeared, he wrote in a letter: "Since God established everything in the universe along quantitative norms, he endowed man with a mind to comprehend them. For just as the eye is fitted for the perception of colors, the ear for sounds, so is man's mind created not for anything but for the grasping of quantities." In the *Harmonice mundi* he wrote merely a variation on the same theme as he spoke of geometry which "supplied God with a model for the creation of the world. Geometry was implanted into human nature along with God's image and not through man's visual perception and experience." The second work was the *Epitome astronomiae Copernicanae*, published in parts between 1618 and 1621. It was the first astronomical treatise in which the doctrine of circles really or hypothetically carrying the various planets was completely abandoned in favor of a physical explanation of planetary motions. It consisted in "magnetic arms" emanating from the sun.

Kepler was already in Ulm, the first stopover of the wanderings of the last 3 years of his life, when his *Tabulae Rudolphinae* (1628) was published. It not only added the carefully determined position of 223 stars to the 777 contained in Tycho's *Astronomiae instauratae progymnasmata* but also provided planetary tables which became the standard for the next century. Kepler died on Nov. 15, 1630. He was a unique embodiment of the transition from the old to the new spirit of science.

EWB

Kerensky, Aleksandr Fedorovich (1881–1970), Russian revolutionary and politician. Aleksandr Kerensky was the central figure around whom the fate of representative government and socialism revolved in Russia during the Revolution of 1917.

Aleksandr Kerensky was born on April 22, 1881, in Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk), the son of a teacher who also served as a middle-ranked provincial official. He entered St. Petersburg University (1899), where he studied jurisprudence, philology, and history. By 1904 he had completed his formal training and joined the St. Petersburg bar. He gained a reputation for public controversy and civil liberty; among other things, he worked with a legal-aid society and served as a defense lawyer in several celebrated political cases.

Kerensky's formal political career began when he stood successfully for election to the Fourth Duma (legislative assembly) in 1912. As a candidate of the Labor (Trudovik) party, he continued to champion civil rights. By 1914 he had been imprisoned twice for acts considered unfriendly or seditious by the government.

With the outbreak of World War I (1914), Kerensky was one of the few Duma members to speak against it, denouncing, in a public speech, the "devouring, fratricidal war." As Russian defeat followed defeat, support for the government dwindled and then disappeared, setting the stage for the Revolution of 1917 that swept Kerensky to power for a brief time.

During the revolutionary months of 1917, power in the major cities of Russia and at many points of military concentration was effectively divided between the provisional government, which derived its authority from the Duma, and the soviets—or representative councils—of workers' and soldiers' deputies. Among the members of the provisional government, Kerensky had a unique position because, for a time, he bridged the gap between these competing agencies of the revolution. Although a well-known member of the Duma, he was an articulate spokesman for the left and a member of the executive committee of the Petrograd soviet.

Kerensky was minister of justice in the first provisional government, organized by a liberal, Prince Lvov. This government's policy of honoring the war aims and obligations of the tsarist government proved sufficiently unpopular that the minister of foreign affairs (Pavel Miliukov) and the minister of war and navy (Aleksandr Guchkov) were forced to resign; Kerensky succeeded to the latter position. He fared little better in this position than had Guchkov, however. In spite of initial successes, a major offensive, which Kerensky inspired, resulted in fresh military disasters (June 1917). Thus, amidst military failure and broadly based, disruptive demonstrations, Lvov resigned as prime minister in July and Kerensky succeeded him.

Kerensky's own view was that in the succeeding weeks the Russian political situation was tending toward stability. Radical leftist agitators (including Lenin

and Trotsky) had been imprisoned or forced to flee the country, and Kerensky himself enjoyed a certain amount of popularity. Moreover, the time was thought to be drawing closer when it would be possible to convene a constituent assembly that would formally establish a democratic regime. The stroke that destroyed these hopes came unexpectedly from the right in the form of the Kornilov uprising (September 9–14), which was an attempt to establish a conservatively backed military government. Kerensky managed to halt the attempted coup only by calling upon the radical left for support. Similarly, he was unable from this time forward to count on the military leadership for support against this same radical left. Soon after, Lenin and Trotsky, at large again, planned their own coup, the Bolshevik Revolution of November. When the blow fell, Kerensky was out of Petrograd searching for troops loyal enough to defend the government against the Bolsheviks. Failing in this, he returned to Petrograd and then Moscow, futilely attempting to organize opposition against the revolution.

In the spring of 1918 Kerensky finally fled Russia, and, for a short time thereafter, he strove to rally international opposition against the Bolshevik government. Failing this, he began to write and lecture in Europe on the affairs of his native land. In 1940 he moved to the United States, writing, lecturing, and teaching at Stanford University. He died on June 11, 1970, in New York City.

EWB

Keynes, John Maynard (1883–1946), English economist. John Maynard Keynes revolutionized economic theory and policy by linking employment and income to public and private expenditure. He is also known for his role in the creation of new international monetary institutions in World War II.

John Maynard Keynes was born on June 5, 1883, the son of John Neville Keynes, registrar of the University of Cambridge and eminent logician and economist. John Maynard's mother, a charming and talented woman, was onetime mayor of Cambridge. He was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge, and began a career in the civil service, where he was assigned to the India Office from 1906 to 1909. There he acquired an intimate knowledge of the government service and an interest in Indian currency and finance that was to bear fruit a few years later.

His Writings. In 1909 Keynes was elected fellow of King's College and returned to Cambridge. In 1911 he was chosen, in spite of his youth and inexperience, as editor of the *Economic Journal*, the pub-

lication of the Royal Economic Society and one of the leading professional journals. From that time until 1945 his duties were carried out with outstanding promptness and efficiency. In 1913 his first book, *Indian Currency and Finance*, was published shortly after he was appointed to the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance. His book has been referred to as the best in the English language on the gold exchange standard.

With the outbreak of World War I Keynes entered the Treasury, first as an unofficial and unpaid assistant. Before the end of the war he held a position equivalent to an assistant secretary and was largely responsible for handling Interallied finances.

At the conclusion of the war Keynes went to the Paris Conference as principal representative of the Treasury and deputy for the chancellor of the Exchequer on the Supreme Economic Council. It soon became apparent to him that the economic terms of the treaty and particularly the reparations settlement were impossible of fulfillment. He resigned in June 1919 and set forth his case in *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919). Although the book aroused tremendous controversy, subsequent events have demonstrated the substantial correctness of his position.

Having left the public service, Keynes returned to Cambridge as second bursar of King's College. In 1921 he assumed the first of a number of important company directorships. Also that year, he published *A Treatise on Probability* and, a year later, *A Revision of the Treaty*, a sequel to *The Economic Consequences*. In 1923 his *Tract on Monetary Reform* appeared. From 1924 until his death he was first bursar of King's College and through his expert management made King's what a contemporary has described as "indecently rich."

In 1925 Keynes married Lydia Lopokova, a Russian ballerina, who was as outstanding a person in her own way as he was in his. Although he had for many years been a collector of rare books and fine art, he now became an active patron of the theater, helping in later years (1932) as treasurer of the Camargo Society to bring about a union of the resources of the Camargo, the Vic-Wells, the Rambert Ballet, and others. In 1936 he founded and generously financed the Cambridge Arts Theatre.

Keynes's *Treatise on Money*, a two-volume work that generations of students have found full of brilliant insights but incomprehensible as a whole, was published in 1930. In it Keynes attempted with little success to break free of the shortcomings and limitations of the Cambridge version of the quantity theory of money. In retrospect, one can see the germ of many

of the ideas that distinguish his later work, but as isolated flashes of insight lacking the proper framework and, as a result, not leading to any very useful or interesting conclusions.

Finally, in 1936, came Keynes's *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, a book that not only revolutionized economic theory but also had a direct impact on the lives of a large proportion of the world's population. Here Keynes took issue with the classical theory which found in a competitive capitalist economy a set of mechanisms that automatically move the economy toward a state of full employment. (The term "classical" is used here to mean the mainstream of orthodox economic theory beginning with Adam Smith and running through the work of Ricardo, Mill, Marshall, and others.) These mechanisms functioned in the labor market and in the market for goods and services.

Return to Public Service. With the beginning of World War II, Keynes again entered the public service. In July 1940 he was asked to serve as adviser to the chancellor of the Exchequer, and he was soon after elected to the Court of the Bank of England and was raised to the peerage as Lord Tilton in 1942. Through his work, national income and expenditure accounts were developed and utilized in the preparation of wartime budgets. In addition to internal finance, he had special responsibility for intergovernmental finance, lend-lease, and mutual aid. This work required that he become a sort of special envoy to Washington and Ottawa in particular.

In the closing days of the war, Keynes played a major role in negotiating the United States loan to Great Britain and in the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Keynes died of a heart attack on Easter Sunday, April 21, 1946, shortly after having returned from the inaugural meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Savannah, Ga.

EWB

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971), Soviet political leader. Nikita Khrushchev was a major force in world politics in the post-Stalin period.

Nikita Khrushchev was born in Kalinovka in southern Russia on April 17, 1894. At 15 he became an apprentice mechanic in Yuzovka, where his father was working as a miner. When his apprenticeship ended, he was employed as a machine repairman in coal mines and coke plants of the region.

In 1918 Khrushchev joined the Communist party, and he enrolled in the Red Army to fight in the

civil war then in progress. After nearly 3 years of service, he returned to Yuzovka and was appointed assistant manager of a mine. Soon thereafter, he entered the Donets Industrial Institute, from which he graduated in 1925. He then took up his career as a full-time party official, beginning as secretary of a district party committee near Yuzovka.

Four years later Khrushchev attended the Industrial Academy in Moscow for training in industrial administration, leaving in 1931 to become secretary of a district party committee in Moscow. Within 4 years he became head of the party organization of Moscow and its environs, thus joining the highest ranks of party officialdom. In Moscow he used his industrial training as he helped to supervise the construction of the city's subway system.

When Stalin began purging the Communist party's leadership of those he mistrusted, Khrushchev was fortunate to be one of the trusted. In 1938, when most of the chief party leaders in the Ukraine were purged, he was made first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party and at the same time was named to the Politburo, the ruling body of the Soviet Communist party. As first secretary, he was in fact, though not in name, the chief executive of the Ukraine. Except for a short interval in 1947, he retained his authority in that area until 1949.

During World War II, while still first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party, Khrushchev served in the Red Army both in the Ukraine and in other southern parts of the former U.S.S.R., finally advancing to the rank of lieutenant general.

In 1949 Khrushchev was summoned to Moscow to serve in the party's Secretariat, directed by Stalin. Then, after Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev was among the eight men in whose hands power became concentrated. In the allocation of the various spheres of power, the party was recognized as his sphere; within a few months he became first secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party that is, its chief official.

By installing his supporters in important party positions and making some shrewd political alliances, Khrushchev gained ascendancy over the seven who shared power with him; by 1955 he was clearly the foremost political figure in the Soviet Union. Even that prestigious status was enhanced 3 years later, when he became chairman of the Council of Ministers, succeeding Nikolai Bulganin. With that, he became the most powerful man in the country: as chairman of the Council of Ministers, he was head of the government; and, as first secretary of the Soviet Communist party's Central Committee, he was head of the party.

Instead of emulating Stalin by becoming a dictator, Khrushchev encouraged the policy of de-Stalinization, which the government had been following since 1953, for the purpose of ending the worst practices of the Stalin dictatorship. Although the Soviet Union under Khrushchev continued to be a one-party totalitarian state, its citizens enjoyed conditions more favorable than had been possible under Stalin. The standard of living rose, intellectual and artistic life became somewhat freer, and the authority of the political police was reduced. In addition, relations with the outside world were generally improved, and Soviet prestige rose.

Khrushchev's fortunes eventually began to take a downward turn, however. Some of his ambitious economic projects failed; his handling of foreign affairs resulted in a number of setbacks; and de-Stalinization produced discord in the Communist ranks of other countries. These developments caused concern among party leaders in the U.S.S.R., many of them already fearful that Khrushchev might be planning to extend his power. In October 1964, while Khrushchev was away from Moscow, they united in an effort whereby they managed to deprive him of his office and require his retirement. He died on Sept. 11, 1971, in Moscow.

EWB

Kipling, Joseph Rudyard (1865–1936), British poet and story writer. Rudyard Kipling was one of the first masters of the short story in English and the first to use Cockney dialect in serious poetry.

Rudyard Kipling's early stories and poems about life in colonial India made him a great favorite with English readers. His support of English imperialism at first contributed to this popularity but caused a reaction against him in the 20th century. Today he is best known for his *Jungle Books* and *Kim*, a story of India.

Kipling was born on December 30, 1865, in Bombay, India, where his father was professor of architectural sculpture in the School of Art. In 1871 he was sent to England for his education. In 1878 Rudyard entered the United Services College at "Westward Ho!," a boarding school in Devon. There young "Gigger" endured bullying and harsh discipline but also enjoyed the close friendships, practical jokes, and merry pranks he later recorded in *Stalky & Co.* (1899). Kipling's closest friend at Westward Ho!, George Beresford, described him as a short, but "cheery, capering, podgy, little fellow" with a thick pair of spectacles over "a broad smile." His eyes were brilliant blue, and over them his heavy black eyebrows moved up and down as he talked. Another close friend was the head-

master, "Crom" Price, who encouraged Kipling's literary ambitions by having him edit the school paper and praising the poems which he wrote for it. When Kipling sent some of these to India, his father had them privately printed as *Schoolboy Lyrics* (1881), Kipling's first published work.

In 1882 Kipling rejoined his parents in Lahore and became a subeditor for the *Civil and Military Gazette*. In 1887 he moved to the *Allahabad Pioneer*, a better paper which gave him greater liberty in his writing. The result was a flood of satiric verses, published as *Departmental Ditties* in 1886, and over 70 short stories published in 1888 in seven paperback volumes. In style, the stories showed the influence of Edgar Allan Poe, Bret Harte, and Guy de Maupassant; but the subjects were Kipling's own: Anglo-Indian society, which he readily criticized with an acid pen, and the life of the common British soldier and the Indian native, which he portrayed accurately and sympathetically.

Fame in England and America. In 1889 Kipling took a long voyage through China, Japan, and the United States. When he reached London, he found that his stories had preceded him and established him as a brilliant new author. He was readily accepted into the circle of leading writers, including William Ernest Henley, Thomas Hardy, George Saintsbury, and Andrew Lang. For Henley's *Scots Observer*, he wrote a number of stories and some of his best-remembered poems: "A Ballad of East and West," "Mandalay," and "The English Flag." He also introduced English readers to a "new genre" of serious poems in Cockney dialect: "Danny Deever," "Tommy," "Fuzzy-Wuzzy," and "Gunga Din." Kipling's first novel, *The Light That Failed* (1891), was unsuccessful. But when his stories were collected as *Life's Handicap* (1891) and poems as *Barrackroom Ballads* (1892), Kipling replaced Tennyson as the most popular English author.

In 1892 Kipling married Caroline Balestier. They settled on the Balestier estate near Brattleboro, Vt., and began four of the happiest years of Kipling's life, during which he wrote some of his best work—*Many Inventions* (1893), perhaps his best volume of short stories; *The Jungle Book* (1894) and *The Second Jungle Book* (1895), two books of animal fables which attract readers of all ages by illustrating the larger truths of life; *The Seven Seas* (1896), a new collection of poems in experimental rhythms; and *Captains Courageous* (1897), a novel-length sea story. These works not only assured Kipling's lasting fame as a serious writer but also made him a rich man.

His Imperialism. In 1897 the Kiplings settled in Rottingdean, a village on the British coast near Brighton. The outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898 and the Boer War in 1899 turned Kipling's attention to colonial affairs. He began to publish a number of solemn poems in standard English in the *London Times*. The most famous of these, "Recessional" (July 17, 1897), issued a warning to Englishmen to consider their accomplishments in the Diamond Jubilee year of Queen Victoria's reign with humility and awe rather than pride and arrogance. The equally well-known "White Man's Burden" (February 4, 1899) clearly expressed the attitudes toward empire implicit in the stories in *The Day's Work* (1898) and *A Fleet in Being* (1898). He referred to less highly developed peoples as "lesser breeds" and considered order, discipline, sacrifice, and humility to be the essential qualities of colonial rulers. These views have been denounced as racist, elitist, and jingoistic. But for Kipling, the term "white man" indicated citizens of the more highly developed nations, whose duty it was to spread law, literacy, and morality throughout the world.

During the Boer War, Kipling spent several months in South Africa, where he raised funds for soldiers' relief and worked on an army newspaper, the *Friend*. In 1901 Kipling published *Kim*, the last and most charming of his portrayals of Indian life. But anti-imperialist reaction following the end of the Boer War caused a decline in Kipling's popularity. When he published *The Five Nations*, a book of South African verse, in 1903, he was attacked in parodies, caricatures, and serious protests as the opponent of a growing spirit of peace and democratic equality. Kipling retired to "Bateman's," a house near Burwash, a secluded village in Essex.

Later Works. Kipling now turned from the wide empire as subject to England itself. In 1902 he published *Just So Stories for Little Children*. He also issued two books of stories of England's past, intended, like the *Jungle Books*, for young readers but suitable for adults as well: *Puck of Pook's Hill* (1906) and *Rewards and Fairies* (1910). But his most significant work was a number of volumes of short stories written in a new style: *Traffics and Discoveries* (1904), *Actions and Reactions* (1904), *A Diversity of Creatures* (1917), *Debts and Credits* (1926), and *Limits and Renewals* (1932). These later stories treat more complex, subtle, and somber subjects in a style more compressed, allusive, and elliptical. Consequently, these stories have never been as popular as his earlier work. But modern critics, in reevaluating Kipling, have found

a greater power and depth that make them his best work.

In 1907 Kipling became the first English writer to receive the Nobel Prize for literature. He died on January 18, 1936, and is buried in Westminster Abbey. His autobiography, *Something of Myself*, was published posthumously in 1937.

EWB

Knox, John (ca. 1505–1572), Scottish reformer. John Knox was one of the most celebrated followers of John Calvin and became the chief force in the introduction and establishment of the Presbyterian form of Calvinism in Scotland.

The Scotland of John Knox's time was used to reform movements. Long before Martin Luther's theses of 1517, men were executed for importing the doctrines of John Wyclif and John Hus. During Knox's adolescence he could not but be aware of the agitation for an evangelical Christianity abroad in the land.

The day and even the year of Knox's birth is disputed. The best estimate is probably 1505. His prosperous peasant father, William Knox, sought to prepare him for the priesthood. His autobiographical writings leave doubt over his early education. It is certain that Knox attended a university, either Glasgow or St. Andrews, but did not earn a degree. After ordination in 1532 he returned to Haddington, the region of his birth.

Conversion to Protestantism. Knox's conversion to Protestantism seemingly occurred between 1543 and 1546. In 1543 he was loyally serving the Catholic Church under the archbishop of St. Andrews. He styled himself "minister of the sacred altar." By 1546 he was vigorously defending the reformer George Wishart, who had introduced Swiss Protestantism into Scotland with his translation of the First Helvetic Confession in 1543 and impressed many before being executed for heresy in 1546.

The following year David Beaton, the cardinal responsible for Wishart's arrest, was murdered. Knox, hearing of the deed, eagerly joined the murderers in the castle of St. Andrews and, after protesting his unworthiness, became their preacher, thereby making his revolt from Rome complete and courting death. Curiously enough, his voluminous writings give no clue as to what transformed him in such a short time from a Catholic priest to a fiery, sword-bearing Protestant.

For fiery Knox was, denouncing the Catholic Church as a "synagogue of Satan" and the beast of the Apocalypse. While the castle trembled with spiritual thunder, the French laid siege, eventually capturing the occupants and making them galley slaves.

After 19 months Knox emerged in February 1549, his body intact, his spirit unbroken, and his Protestantism strengthened.

The release of Knox and his comrades may have been engineered by the new Protestant regency in England. In any case Knox took a paid position as preacher there. His popularity grew rapidly. In 1551 he was made chaplain to the king and in 1552 declined a bishopric. He worked to rid the religious services of all vestiges of Catholic ritual and to fix austerity of worship firmly in English Protestant doctrine. This made his life precarious when the fanatically Catholic Mary Tudor acceded to the throne in 1553. The following year Knox left England, wandered for a time, and unknowingly took the most important step of his career by moving to Geneva.

Calvin's Influence. In the "Bible Commonwealth," Knox came to believe fully in Calvinism, in the right of the true church to impose strict rules of conduct and belief on the individual, and in the right of the people to rebel against a civil authority that attempts to enforce adherence to a false doctrine. He called Calvin's Geneva "the most perfect school of Christ that ever was on earth since the days of the apostles."

On a trip to Scotland in 1555, then under a regency in preparation for the reign of Mary Stuart, Knox organized Protestant congregations and preached quietly. After he left under pressure, in 1556, an ecclesiastical court burned him in effigy. Back in Geneva he worked effectively as pastor of an English congregation.

Calvinism suited his austerity, and Knox preached with certitude that those not of his and Calvin's church were damned for eternity and that no Christian love was due them. Since they were sons of Satan, one could take joy in hating them, reveling over the prospect of their damnation, and even cheating and deceiving them. Knox saw himself as the prophet of a biblical society in which virtuous priests would guide men, and statesmen would be bound by the precepts of the Bible.

Knox's Writings. While he was at Geneva, Knox's pen was busy. His admonitions and letters to followers in England and Scotland are filled with burning condemnations of the Roman Church, a "harlot . . . polluted with all kinds of spiritual fornication," and of its priests, who were "pestilent papists" and "bloody wolves." His best-known work, *History of the Reformation of Religion within the Realm of Scotland*, is more polemic than history.

Preaching in the Reformed manner was forbidden in Scotland in 1559, and on May 2 Knox arrived in Edinburgh. Pursued as a criminal, he managed to remain free and become the architect of a new Scottish church. Under his guidance, Catholicism, the regency, and French influence were repudiated, and in 1560 a democratic form of church structure in which congregations elected their ministers and elders was adopted.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that Mary, Queen of Scots, a Catholic reared in France, found Scotland uncongenial soon after her arrival in 1561. Since Catholic worship was forbidden, Mary's private Masses had to be defended with the sword. In 1568 she was driven from Scotland in the midst of a scandal; Knox was in the forefront of her pursuers.

Death took the reformer on Nov. 24, 1572. Knox was a small man but of immense physical and moral strength. He was not without contradictions in his work and his life. Although an authoritarian, he did more to stimulate the growth of democracy than any man of his age. He left an independent Scotland under a severe but democratically elected church.

EWB

Kropotkin, Peter Alekseevich (1842–1921), Russian scientist and anarchist. Peter Kropotkin combined biological and historical fact to derive a theory of "mutual aid" to support his belief in the superiority of an anarchist society.

Peter Kropotkin was born in Moscow on Dec. 12, 1842, to an ancient and noble Russian family. At 15 he entered the aristocratic Corps des Pages of St. Petersburg, and at 19 he became personal page to Czar Alexander II. A precocious and widely read youth, he rejected the opportunity for a fashionable military career in the Imperial Guards and volunteered to help implement the Alexandrian reforms in Siberia. Disappointed by the results after 5 years, he undertook geographical exploration in East Siberia, and his theory on the mountain structure of Siberia brought him fame and an offer of the position of secretary to the Imperial Geographical Society. However, Kropotkin was aware of the gulf between the educated elite and the impoverished masses, and he decided to enter the Russian revolutionary movement. He was arrested in 1874 but managed to escape from Russia in 1876.

Anarchist and Writer. In Switzerland, Kropotkin developed his ideas on anarchism, which were later published as *Paroles d'un révolté* (1885). In 1881 Kropotkin was expelled from Switzerland and settled in France. But in 1883 the French government arrested Kropotkin for belonging to the First Interna-

tional. His observations on prison life were later published as *In Russian and French Prisons* (1887).

Released in 1886 after much political agitation on his behalf, Kropotkin moved to England, where he became very active in the international socialist movement. There he also began a series of articles against social Darwinism and its emphasis on the benefits of competition. Kropotkin tried to prove that sociability existed among animals, and that cooperation rather than struggle accounted for the evolution of man and human intelligence. The publication of *Mutual Aid* (1902), following his *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (1899), brought Kropotkin worldwide fame. He elaborated on the economic and social implications of mutual aid for society in *Conquest of Bread* (1892) and *Fields, Factories and Workshops* (1901).

After the failure of the Russian Revolution of 1905, Kropotkin tried to find its significance for anarchists by studying the French Revolution. In *The Great French Revolution, 1789–1793* (1909) he interpreted the Revolution as a joining together of ideas from the upper class with action from the masses.

Although, as an anarchist, Kropotkin opposed war, the outbreak of World War I in 1914 brought him to the side of Russia. He saw in Germany the major support of reaction in Russia and Europe. After the collapse of the Russian autocracy in 1917, Kropotkin returned home to a warm welcome. Although he refused a Cabinet post in the provisional government, Kropotkin supported it against the Bolsheviks, whom he called “state socialists.” After the Bolshevik coup d’état in October 1917, Kropotkin found himself as strongly opposed to Western intervention as he was to the Bolsheviks, for he feared that intervention would only poison future Russian-European relations. In ill health, he moved from Moscow to Dmitrov and returned to his work on ethics, which he never completed. It was published posthumously from his notes as *Ethics, Origin and Development* (1922). Peter Kropotkin died of pneumonia on Feb. 8, 1921.

Kropotkin is a prototype of the non-Marxist Russian revolutionary thinker of the 19th century. In him were combined the major themes of the revolutionary socialists: populism, materialism, communalism, anarchism, and scientism. Kropotkin’s distinctive contribution was to combine these themes into an original philosophy of anarchism based on mutual aid.

EWB

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Lacan, Jacques (1901–1981), French psychoanalyst. After World War II Jacques Lacan became a cult

hero, a formidable intellectual superstar whose “structural psychoanalysis,” first in France and later at American elite universities, dominated much of intellectual life.

Jacques Lacan was born in Paris on April 13, 1901, the eldest child of Emilie and Alfred Lacan, a *representant de commerce* dealing in soap and oils. The family belonged to the prosperous middle bourgeoisie, and Lacan went to the Collège Stanislas, a well-known Jesuit establishment. Too thin to be accepted into military service, he went straight to the study of medicine and then to psychiatry. He took his clinical training at Sainte-Anne, the major psychiatric hospital in central Paris.

In 1931 he received his license as a forensic psychiatrist, and in 1932 was awarded his Doctorat d’état for his thesis, *De la psychose paranoïaque dans les rapports avec la personnalité*. While this thesis drew considerable acclaim outside psychoanalytic circles, particularly among the surrealist artists, it seems to have been ignored by psychoanalysts. But in 1934 he became a candidate for the Société Psychanalytique de Paris. During this period he is said to have befriended the surrealists André Breton and Georges Bataille. Because Lacan, like Freud, apparently destroyed most of the records of his past, and unlike Freud did not reveal much of it later on, it is difficult to distinguish between the many myths, anecdotes, and rumors that have surrounded him. There are, for instance, many contradictory tales about his romantic life with Sylvia Bataille in southern France during World War II and of his attachment to her daughter Laurance. He married Sylvia in 1953 and had another daughter, Judith, whose husband Jacques-Alain Miller served as Lacan’s literary executor.

In 1934 Lacan developed the first version of his “mirror stage,” which was to become the cornerstone of his theory when presented at the meetings of the International Psychoanalytic Association two years later in Marienbad. Due to World War II and the decimation of psychoanalysis on the Continent, Lacan’s ideas lay dormant until 1949. Then he presented a more complex and complete variant of his “mirror stage” theory. Extrapolating from his work with patients, he maintained that the child’s first perception of itself in the mirror, how it becomes aware of itself as a biological organism, sets the stage for its future psychic development. During this stage (from about six to eighteen months) the child realizes that its parents are not totally responsive to inarticulate demands, that it has to acquire language. And what happens during this process determines psychic development.

Lacan’s Freudian peers did not appreciate his contributions. In fact, the so-called American ego psy-

chologists, who held that infantile experiences are being resolved during the oedipal period, could not accept Lacan's "rereading of Freud." They mandated different types of interactions between analyst and patient, different assumptions about human growth and about the structure of the unconscious.

Lacan and his peers in the International Psychoanalytic Association eventually split up, in 1953, because they could not agree on how best to help patients reach and then overcome early unconscious trauma. Classical psychoanalysts were agreed that, optimally, this could happen only by means of regular sessions, four to five times a week, for at least 45 minutes, and over a period of around four years. Lacan was seeing his patients once or twice a week, for five to 25 minutes, and attacking his American and Parisian adversaries as authoritarian. However, a part of these attacks was incorporated in his theories when he played on, for instance, such terms as the *nom du père* and the *non du père* to accuse the "sons of Freud"—that is, the leaders in the psychoanalytic movement—of paternalism and of domination counterproductive to the relationship between psychoanalyst and analysand.

Lacanian psychoanalytic theory differentiated itself also by underpinning it with Ferdinand de Saussure's structural linguistics which in the 1960s was inspiring the other leading "structuralists," Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, and Claude Lévi-Strauss. They all set out to uncover systematically the deep universal mental structures that manifest themselves in language. And they expected to find them by unveiling the relationships between *signs* (concepts) and *signifiers* (acoustic images); between language and words; and by studying their changing meanings. Lacan concentrated on "the language of the unconscious," not only in his work with patients but in the public seminars which certainly helped make him central to Parisian intellectual life, along with psychoanalysis, from the late 1960s until long after he died in 1981.

Lacan's analysis of literary texts as well used Saussurean means of "rereading." Whereas Freud and his followers (both literary figures and psychoanalysts) in a way were "diagnosing" artists and their works, Lacan's technique introduced a new dimension. His own imagination coupled to the linguistic method allowed him to make all sorts of jumps, in both metaphoric and metonymic directions. His famous seminar on Poe's "Purloined Letter" particularly intrigued American literary critics.

Lacan always deemed the psychoanalytic relationship central to everything he did. When he stated, for instance, that psychoanalysis is "structured like a

language," he referred to the interaction between the analyst's and his patient's unconscious. His American followers, however, primarily were located in universities and, for the most part, ignored the therapeutic realm. Consequently, his Parisian adherents tended to be therapists working with patients who disregarded American textual analyses.

Urbane, brilliant, and provocative, Lacan continued to influence French intellectual life even while his ideas were questioned and debated.

EWB

Lamennais, Hugues Félicité Robert de (1782–1854), French political writer. Félicité de Lamennais was a priest whose liberal political and religious ideas greatly agitated 19th-century France.

Félicité de Lamennais was born on June 19, 1782, into a well-to-do family in the town of Saint-Malo in Brittany. As a bright, sensitive young man, he was deeply impressed by the ideals as well as the horrors of the French Revolution. He gradually became convinced that social revolution must be accompanied by a firm religious faith. In 1816 he was ordained a Roman Catholic priest. Over the next 6 years Lamennais became widely known in Europe for his *Essay on Indifference in Matters of Religion*, in which he argued that a genuine improvement in man's social condition must be based on religious truth. Since the Roman Catholic Church possessed the fullest expression of religious truth, Europe's hope for a better future lay in accepting that Church's beliefs and structure.

Pope Leo XII invited Lamennais to Rome and offered to make him a cardinal. The passionate and dedicated young priest refused and returned to France, where, with a group of talented and equally dedicated disciples, including the Comte de Montalembert and Jean Baptiste Lacordaire, he started the journal *L'Avenir* (The Future) in 1830. The group pressed the Church's officials to renounce its connections with the government and take up instead the cause of the people. Lamennais wrote that the Church should support democratic and revolutionary movements wherever they appeared. Most of the French bishops, who owed their positions to an agreement the Pope had made with Napoleon, reacted strongly against Lamennais. His ideas were labeled subversive by the governments of both France and Austria, which joined with the bishops in pressuring the Pope to silence *L'Avenir*.

In 1832 Pope Gregory XVI issued an encyclical letter, *Mirari vos*, calling the ideas advocated in *L'Avenir* "absurd, and supremely dangerous for the Church." Lamennais, bitterly disappointed, submitted. But a year later, after the Pope had publicly sup-

ported the Russian Tsar in suppressing the Polish peasants, he left the Church. In 1834 he wrote a short, biting book, *Words of a Believer*, in which he denounced all authority, civil as well as ecclesiastical. In the next decade his thinking moved further and further to the left. He believed in the moral superiority of the working class and foresaw a time when governments would be overthrown and the workers would rule. During his last years he spent time in prison and was also elected to the Chamber of Deputies. After his death in Paris on Feb. 27, 1854, Lamennais was buried without funeral rites, mourned by thousands of intellectual and political sympathizers around the world.

EWB

Lamprecht, Karl (1856–1915), German historian. The highly original and combative Karl Lamprecht stirred up a violent controversy over the nature, methods, and purposes of history.

Karl Lamprecht was born in Jessen in Saxony on Feb. 25, 1856, the son of a liberal Lutheran pastor. He studied at the universities of Göttingen, Leipzig, and Munich, taking his doctorate at Munich in 1879. After a year of private tutoring, he qualified as lecturer at Bonn; he was promoted to assistant professor in 1885. Lamprecht's first major work, *German Economic Life in the Middle Ages* (3 vols.), came out in 1886. In 1890 he accepted a full professorship at Marburg but removed the following year to Leipzig, where he remained until his death on May 10, 1915.

In 1891 appeared the first volume (of the eventual 21 volumes) of what was to be Lamprecht's life-work, the *German History*. Controversy broke out immediately, reaching its climax with volume 6 in 1897. History, he explained in later articles and books, has

been a discipline that explores useless individual facts and concentrates too narrowly on politics. It should deal with the whole life of human society and, like the natural sciences, generalize and seek causal laws that will provide a few basic principles that will enable one to explain the whole human past.

Lamprecht thought that he had discovered such general principles in the sociopsychological realm. Once one has discovered the thought and behavior patterns of a people for a given period, one has the key by which to explain the whole society, its economic and social life, its art and thought, and its politics. Art, he thought, was particularly revealing about such thought and behavior patterns. Furthermore, such patterns of thinking and acting never completely disappear but live on into the next age, so that, as new ones come along, they tend to accumulate, leading to a progressive complexity and intensity of social life.

These theories of history hit the historical profession at a very sensitive time, when nature, methods, and purposes of history were being painfully examined. Men such as Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber were seeking to give history a rationale distinct from, but equally as reputable as, that of natural science. Others were seeking ways to treat history in all its aspects, even to find a universal history. What was lacking was a way to deal with these things within a single discipline. They were being treated as separate subjects, often collaboratively, and without any integrating principle. To this extent, Lamprecht found a sympathetic hearing. But his own solution the "psychogenetic" met with universal rejection as being too vague and not amenable to rigorous, disciplined study. The literature of controversy grew enormously after 1900, but the controversy quickly became tiresome, even for those engaged in it. Lamprecht's influence, therefore, was slight, not to say negative, but he was a symptom and child of his age.

In 1909 he founded, with private funds, the Institute for Cultural and Universal History at Leipzig in order to train scholars to carry on his work. It produced many admirers but few followers.

EWB

Las Casas, Bartolomé de (1474–1566), Spanish priest, social reformer, and historian. Bartolomé de Las Casas was the principal organizer and champion of the 16th-century movement in Spain and Spanish America in defense of the Indians.

Bartolomé de Las Casas, the son of a merchant, was born in Seville. Apparently he did not graduate from a university, although he studied Latin and the humanities in Seville. The facts of his life after 1502 are well known. In that year Las Casas sailed for Española in the expedition of Governor Nicolás de Ovando. In the West Indies he participated in Indian wars, acquired land and slaves, and felt no serious qualms about his actions, although he had been ordained a priest.

Not until his fortieth year did Las Casas experience a moral conversion, perhaps the awakening of a dormant sensitivity as a result of the horrors he saw about him. His early efforts at the Spanish court were largely directed at securing approval for the establishment of model colonies in which Spanish farmers would live and labor side by side with Indians in a peaceful coexistence that would gently lead the natives to Christianity and Christian civilization. The disastrous failure of one such project on the coast of Venezuela (1521) caused Las Casas to retire for 10 years to a monastery and to enter the Dominican order. He had greater success with an experiment in peaceful

conversion of the Indians in the province of Tezulutlán—called by the Spaniards the Land of War—in Guatemala (1537–1540).

Las Casas appeared to have won a brilliant victory with the promulgation of the New Laws of 1542. These laws banned Indian slavery, prohibited Indian forced labor, and provided for gradual abolition of the *encomienda* system, which held the Indians living on agricultural lands in serfdom. Faced with revolt by the *encomenderos* in Peru and the threat of revolt elsewhere, however, the Crown made a partial retreat, repealing the provisions most objectionable to the colonists. It was against this background that Las Casas met Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, defender of the *encomienda* and of Indian wars, in a famous debate at Valladolid in 1550. Sepúlveda, a disciple of Aristotle, invoked his theory that some men are slaves by nature in order to show that the Indians must be made to serve the Spaniards for their own good as well as for that of their masters. The highest point of Las Casas' argument was an eloquent affirmation of the equality of all races, the essential oneness of mankind.

To the end of a long life Las Casas fought passionately for justice for his beloved Indians. As part of his campaign in their defense, he wrote numerous tracts and books. The world generally knows him best for his flaming indictment of Spanish cruelty to the Indians, *Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies* (1552), a work based largely on official reports to the Crown and soon translated into the major European languages. Historians regard most highly his *Historia de las Indias*, which is indispensable to every student of the first phase of the Spanish conquest. His *Apologetica historia de las Indias* is an immense accumulation of ethnographic data designed to demonstrate that the Indians fully met the requirements laid down by Aristotle for the good life.

EWB

Lassalle, Ferdinand (1825–1864), German socialist leader. Ferdinand Lassalle is considered the founder of the German Social Democratic party and a major theoretician of “scientific” socialism.

Ferdinand Lassalle, whose real name was Lasal, was born in Breslau on April 11, 1825, the only son of a wealthy Jewish silk merchant. While still a boy, he rejected both Judaism and a career in the family business for what he felt was the freedom of secular thought and demanded an academic career.

Lassalle changed his last name purportedly to give it a French (that is revolutionary) sound, an action that has been described as characteristic and symptomatic of his posturing personality. Virtually all commentators, including those most sympathetic to

Lassalle and his program, agree that, while he was one of the most romantic and colorful figures in modern politics, he was also a rather foppish and quixotic person of colossal vanity and arrogance.

Lassalle studied at the universities of Breslau and Berlin where he became enthralled with the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel and was convinced that the Hegelian “World Spirit” was realizing itself in the current age through himself.

As the prosecutor in a lengthy and much-publicized divorce suit (1846–1854), which Lassalle entered out of his hatred of aristocratic and male privilege, he became famous. During this period he acquainted himself with Karl Marx's writings and developed his own theory of socialism, which is sometimes described as “state socialism,” although many of his followers deny that he was an adherent of that brand of socialism. Nevertheless, he denied in contrast to Marx that the bourgeoisie must be totally destroyed and also emphasized the positive role of nationalism. He thus generally advocated state action rather than revolution, that is, a take-over, not destruction of the bourgeois state by a workers' party, and favored a state system of workers' cooperatives.

At the conclusion of the lawsuit, Lassalle became the teacher and political leader of the emerging German labor movement. He advocated universal suffrage as the means by which the workers could force the bourgeois state to turn over to them the entire fruit of their labor and not just a percentage of it. Trade union activity, as he saw it, would be of little or no use in itself. The working class embodied the spirit of the people, whose higher will was manifest in the state. Labor could emancipate itself only through capturing the concentrated political power found in the machinery of the state.

Lassalle's chief significance, however, was in the realm of practical politics rather than in theory. He laid the groundwork for the modern German Social Democratic party. In 1862 he drew up the Program for the Workingman, a document similar to Marx and Engels's Communist Manifesto. The following year his General Association of German Workers was formed, the lineal ancestor of the Social Democratic party.

In 1864, however, before the party had grown beyond a few thousand members, Lassalle became involved in a dispute over a girl half his age, which led to a duel. He was killed before he managed to draw his pistol, on Aug. 28.

EWB

Lavisse, Ernest (1842–1922), French historian. Ernest Lavisse was active in educational reform and edited two multivolume histories of France.

Ernest Lavisse was born on Dec. 17, 1842, in the village of Nouvion-en-Thiérache. He retained a lifelong fondness for his native town and even as professor at the Sorbonne returned each year to address the school's graduating class. After secondary school in the nearby city of Laon, Lavisse continued his education at the Lycée Charlemagne in Paris and the École Normale Supérieure.

After a short student flirtation with republican politics, Lavisse returned to the Bonapartist sympathies he had learned from his family and in 1868 became secretary to Napoleon III's minister of education. Soon afterward he was named private tutor to the prince imperial, with whom he maintained a correspondence for many years after his teaching job was ended by the War of 1870.

Convinced by the defeat of 1870 that France had something to learn from Germany, Lavisse left for Berlin in 1873. There he remained for 3 years, studying with Georg Waitz and observing the structure of German education. When he was appointed lecturer at the École Normale in 1878, he entered the campaign to reform the French educational system, a campaign he pushed even more vigorously when named to the Sorbonne, first as assistant in 1883 and finally as professor of modern history in 1888. To the Sorbonne he introduced the Rankean method of seminar instruction in historical research. His untiring advocacy was largely responsible for the law of 1896 that united the various faculties of law, medicine, letters, and science into a single university. He also campaigned for changes in primary and secondary education. The history textbooks he wrote for the public schools went through many editions and, for almost two generations, made his name a household word even in the remotest corner of the French countryside.

Lavisse's historical writing was devoted largely to Germany, the most important being *The Youth of Frederick the Great* (1891) and *Frederick the Great before His Accession* (1893). His great work, however, was editing a *History of France from the Beginnings to the Revolution* (9 vols., 1900–1911), to which he attracted the greatest French historians of the day. His careful editing and his inspiration gave an unusual unity to a work composed by a number of strong-minded individuals. To the work he himself contributed a two-volume history of Louis XIV, painting brilliant portraits of the men and women of the reign but also depriving Louis of the heroic structure that Voltaire and Michelet had given him and fastening on the aging king the responsibility for the miseries of the end of his reign.

During World War I Lavisse was an active propagandist, writing numerous anti-German articles for

the *Revue de Paris*. After the war he edited a second collection, *History of Contemporary France* (10 vols., 1920–1922), which he concluded with a remarkable statement of hope in the future of republican institutions. He died on Aug. 18, 1922.

EWB

Le Bon, Gustave (1841–1931), French social scientist and philosopher. Although Gustave Le Bon was originally trained as a physician, Le Bon's primary contribution was in sociology, where he developed major theories on crowd behavior.

The electric interests and abilities of Gustave Le Bon led to a full and productive life. Studies ranging from components of tobacco smoke, through physical anthropology, to atomic energy and structure describe the broad range of scholarly interests Le Bon maintained until his death. Because of this wide range, many have thought of Le Bon's work as shallow and dilettantish. No one in the course of a lifetime could possibly master all the disciplines observed in Le Bon's scholarly work. Nevertheless, men such as Sigmund Freud and Gordon Allport acknowledged the vital importance of Le Bon's work.

While Le Bon made contributions to theories of social evolution and political revolution, probably his most widely known work concerned the psychology of crowd behavior. He stated that crowds maintained a collective mind and that the group mind was not simply a summary of the individual persons. Instead, a new distillation of traits emerged, primarily unconscious in nature, which reflected racially inherited characteristics.

The consequence of these innate traits was a regression in the direction of more primitive, instinctual determinants of behavior, in contrast to more rational intellectual determinants. Le Bon also believed in the contagion of ideas in a crowd such that individual members, in a heightened state of suggestibility and with feelings of omnipotence, are subjugated to the will and emotion of the crowd mind. He also indicated that crowds are capable of engaging in positive social actions as well.

Le Bon's ideas about social evolution and political revolution were related again to racial stock. History, for Le Bon, is a consequence of racial temperament; to understand the history of a people, one must look to the soul of the people. Just as a people cannot choose its appearance, it cannot freely opt for its cultural institutions.

Le Bon's beliefs with respect to political behavior consistently revealed a basic mistrust of the masses. On the last day of his life he repeated the theme that where the common people continue to maintain, or

gain, control of government, civilization is moved in the direction of barbarism. It was this view that earned Le Bon the occasional label of antidemocrat and elitist.

An interesting incident attributed to Le Bon concerns his return in 1884 from an anthropological expedition to India, where he was commissioned by France to study Buddhist monuments. Marie François Sadi Carnot, then the minister of public works, was given an opportunity to choose for himself an artifact from a group Le Bon had brought back. Carnot chose a statuette which Le Bon quickly indicated was not appropriate because it carried a curse. Le Bon told Carnot that the owner of the statuette would be killed upon reaching the highest office in France. The warning was disregarded, and on June 24, 1894, Carnot, the fourth president of the French Republic, was assassinated by an Italian anarchist at Lyons.

Le Bon was a physician, anthropologist in the field, and finally professor of psychology and allied sciences at the University of Paris. His best-known book is *La Psychologie des foules* (1895; translated as *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, 1897). He died on Dec. 13, 1931, at Marne-la-Coquette near Paris.

EWB

Le Corbusier (1887–1965), Swiss architect, city planner, and painter. Le Corbusier practiced in France and was one of the most influential architects of the 20th century.

Le Corbusier, the pseudonym for Charles Édouard Jeanneret-Gris, was born on October 6, 1887, at La-Chaux-de-Fonds, where he attended the School of Fine Art until the age of 18 and was then apprenticed to an engraver. He studied architecture in Vienna with Josef Hoffmann (1908), in Paris with Auguste Perret (1908–1909), and in Berlin with Peter Behrens (1910–1911). In 1911 Le Corbusier traveled in the Balkans, Greece, Asia Minor, and Italy. The Acropolis in Athens and the sculpture of the 5th century B.C. by Phidias on the Parthenon made a great impression on him, as did Michelangelo's contributions to St. Peter's in Rome.

In 1904 Le Corbusier designed and built a small house at La-Chaux-de-Fonds, a building so picturesque that it would have fitted into the 18th-century hamlet at Versailles. Of the half-dozen villas that he built in his native town, one (1916) is as playful as any 16th-century mannerist structure by Sebastiano Serlio or Andrea Palladio. The dominating blank panel of the main facade of Le Corbusier's villa of 1916 relates to a similar motif that Palladio used on his own house in Vicenza, Italy, of 1572. Such a par-

allel between architects of the 16th and 20th centuries is relevant to an understanding of Le Corbusier. His system of geometric proportion, first used in the 1916 villa and expounded in two books, *Le Modulor I* (1950) and *Le Modulor II* (1955), follows in the tradition of Vitruvius, Leon Battista Alberti, and Palladio, and his concept of "modulor man" is an extension of Leonardo da Vinci's "Vitruvian man."

His Purism. The influence of Perret, Tony Garnier, and other architects became evident in Le Corbusier's 1915 Domino project for prefabricated houses, a solution to spatial construction consisting of columns, floor slabs, and stair-cases for vertical circulation. To reduce a building to such simple elements was cubistic, and it was perhaps a preview of things to come in Paris, where Le Corbusier settled in 1917. Architectural commissions were slow in coming, and he turned to painting. He and Amédée Ozenfant evolved a form of cubism known as purism, in which they attempted to restore to ordinary objects their basic architectonic simplicity. Le Corbusier's *Still Life* (1920) depicts a bottle and other everyday objects; the bottle is seen from the side, above, and below. By fragmenting the bottle in such a manner, the viewer has a greater understanding of the bottle than a photograph or a realistic painting would provide. From 1920 to 1925 Ozenfant and Le Corbusier published the magazine *L'Esprit nouveau*, which preached purist theories.

This painterly expression of Le Corbusier influenced his architecture. The clean-cut planes and their relationships to the volume of a space of the Domino house and the *Still Life* bottle were combined in the Pavillon de l'Esprit Nouveau at the 1925 Paris International Exposition of Decorative Arts. Even the interior of the Chapel of Notre-Dame-du-Haut at Ronchamp (1950–1955) is cubist, since, like the bottle, it expresses more than what the eye can actually see. The 6-inch slit between the top of the walls and the roof suggests a continuation of the billowing ceiling shape beyond the external walls, and the undulating shapes of the walls suggest spaces which exist but which are cut off from the viewer.

Machine for Living. Le Corbusier's most influential book, *Towards a New Architecture* (1923), is illustrated with his sketches of the Acropolis in Athens and other sites, the architecture of Michelangelo, the "industrial city" of Tony Garnier, American grain silos, ships, airplanes, and automobiles. Under the diagram of a "Delage Front-Wheel Brake" is the caption: "This precision, this cleanness in execution go further back than our reborn mechanical sense. Phid-

ias felt in this way: the entablature of the Parthenon is a witness.” The perfection to be found in Phidias’s sculpture on the Parthenon and in the front-wheel brake design for a Delage car was demanded by Le Corbusier for 20th-century architecture. A house would be a “machine for living,” not reducing man to the level of an automaton but uplifting him by as precise an environment in totality as the precision of an automobile brake. Ventilation, sound insulation, sun-traps in winter, and sun shields (*brises-soleil*) in summer were all a part of this precision and of Le Corbusier’s ideals for a total environment.

Collaboration with Jeanneret. From 1922 to 1940 Le Corbusier was in partnership with his cousin Pierre Jeanneret, and they collaborated on the project for the League of Nations Palace in Geneva (1927; not executed). The houses in the Weissenhof quarter of Stuttgart that they designed for the Deutsche Werkbund exposition (1927) were “perhaps the most imaginative structures at the Weissenhof” (Peter Blake, 1964). Le Corbusier’s Centrosoyus (Palace of Light Industry) in Moscow (1929–1935) was one of the last major structures of post-World War I modern architecture in the Soviet Union.

Two notable villas designed by Le Corbusier are the Villa Maillat at Garches (1927), which derives its proportions, plan, and volumetric elements from Palladio’s Villa Malcontenta of 1560, and the Villa Savoye at Poissy (1930), which incorporates the five tenets of his architecture: the *piloti* (freestanding structural column), the independence of the structural frame from the external skin, the free plan of the interior accommodation, the free elevation, and the roof garden.

City Planning. The Swiss Hostel (1931–1933) and the Brazilian Pavilion (1956–1959) at University City in Paris and the Unité d’Habitation in Marseilles (1947–1952) were designed as though they were part of Le Corbusier’s projected Radiant City, just as Frank Lloyd Wright’s post-1932 projects were for Broadacre City. The Unité d’Habitation, which is an enormous housing block, has a wide variety of apartments, lead-encased for sound insulation, with east-west ventilation, sun-trap balconies which let in the winter sun but exclude the summer sun, and access streets at every third floor. *Pilotis* raise the building off the ground to maximize open space for pedestrian use, which, in the Radiant City of 3 million people, would amount to 85 percent of the total area.

In the Voisin Plan for Paris (1925) Le Corbusier developed his urbanistic concepts, and thereafter he projected a score of plans for cities on four continents.

Only one was realized, that for Chandigarh, the capital of the Punjab, India (begun 1953). Geometrically classical, Chandigarh is divided into different sectors: the Capital, consisting of the governor’s palace (not built), the Parliament, the High Courts of Justice, and a ministries building; a commercial area; an industrial area; and a cultural center. Le Corbusier also designed the Open Hand monument, the democratic symbol of giving (that is, elected representatives are granted the privilege of giving good government in return).

Last Works and Influence. Le Corbusier’s last major buildings were the Chapel at Ronchamp, one of the most personal and expressive statements by the architect, and the Dominican monastery of Ste-Marie-de-la-Tourette at Eveux-sur-Arbresle (1957–1959). On August 27, 1965, Le Corbusier died of a heart attack at Cap-Martin.

The Ministry of Education and Health building in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (1936–1945), by Lúcio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer, for which Le Corbusier was the consultant, gave impetus to a slowly emerging modern movement in South America. His Maison Jaoul at Neuilly (1952–1956) spawned a movement termed the “new brutalism” in England, a country which had already accepted Le Corbusier’s philosophy in spirit and had developed upon it. Kunio Mayekawa and Junzo Sakakura, who worked for Le Corbusier in Paris, returned to Japan to glorify the master. Le Corbusier’s buildings have been an inspiration in whatever country they have been constructed, including his Carpenter Visual Arts Center (1961–1963) at Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. He was the principal founder of the International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM) in 1928, which propagated the objectives of the new architecture; it was disbanded in 1959. He was also a prolific writer, and his books have been extremely influential.

EWB

Lefebvre, Georges (1874–1959), French historian. Georges Lefebvre was one of the major 20th-century historians of the French Revolution.

Georges Lefebvre was born at Lille on Aug. 6, 1874. His father had little money to spend on his son’s education. Young Lefebvre attended the local public school, followed the “special curriculum” in the local lycéewhich emphasized modern languages, mathematics, and economics instead of the classical languagesand graduated from the University of Lille. This education, he later wrote, “opened my mind to economic and social realities, and gave me the air of an independent, self-taught individual among my colleagues later on.” He began research on his doctoral

thesis in 1904, but as a provincial school-teacher, preoccupied by supporting a family and his aged parents, he did not complete it until 1924, when he was 50 years old.

Lefebvre's doctoral thesis, "The Peasants of the Nord Department and the French Revolution," was a detailed statistical study of the effect of the Revolution on the countryside. It was based on a thorough analysis of thousands of tax rolls, notarial records, and the registers of rural municipalities, whose materials he used to trace the effects of the abolition of feudalism and ecclesiastical tithes, the consequences of property transfers, the movement of the bourgeoisie into the countryside, and the destruction of collective rights in the peasant villages. He argued that the Revolution completed the breakdown of peasant solidarity and transformed the village community. It created a class of peasant proprietors attached to the gains of the Revolution and to the principle of private property.

After his thesis appeared, Lefebvre was named professor at Clermont-Ferrand. In 1928 Marc Bloch succeeded in having him brought to Strasbourg, and in 1935 he was named to Paris. He reached retirement age in 1941 but was invited by his colleagues to remain until the Liberation.

Lefebvre was a man of the left and called himself a Marxist. He considered Jules Guesde and Jean Jaurès to have had the greatest influence on his intellectual life. He had seen Jaurès only twice, from a distance, but the latter's *Socialist History of the Revolution* determined the direction of Lefebvre's research. Lefebvre's Marxism, however, was thoroughly tempered: "Marx clarified the dominant influence of the mode of production, but it was never his intention to exclude other factors, especially man . . . It is man who makes history."

Lefebvre showed the breadth of his views when he turned from statistical social history to social psychology. In *The Great Fear of 1789* (1932) he sought the causes of this movement in the peasant mind: the fear of "brigands," poverty, and unemployment, to which 1789 added a political crisis and fear of an "aristocratic plot." He also wrote several general histories of the Revolution, integrating the social and economic history of the period with the political. The most famous are *Napoleon* (1935), *1789* (1939), and *The French Revolution* (1951). He died in Paris on Aug. 28, 1959.

EWB

Lenin, Vladimir Ilich (1870–1924), Russian statesman. Vladimir Lenin was the creator of the Bolshevik party, the Soviet state, and the Third International. He was a successful revolutionary leader and

an important contributor to revolutionary socialist theory.

Few events have shaped contemporary history as profoundly as the Russian Revolution and the Communist revolutions that followed it. Each one of them was made in the name of V. I. Lenin, his doctrines, and his political practices. Contemporary thinking about world affairs has been greatly influenced by Lenin's impetus and contributions. From Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points to today's preoccupation with wars of national liberation, imperialism, and decolonization, many important issues of contemporary social science were first raised or disseminated by Lenin; even some of the terms he used have entered into everyone's vocabulary. The very opposition to Lenin often takes Leninist forms.

Formative Years. V. I. Lenin was born in Simbirsk (today Ulianovsk) on April 10 (Old Style), 1870. His real family name was Ulianov, and his father, Iliia Nikolaevich Ulianov, was a high official in the tsarist educational bureaucracy who had risen into the nobility. Vladimir received the conventional education given to the sons of the Russian upper class but turned into a radical dissenter. One impetus to his conversion doubtless was the execution by hanging of his older brother Alexander in 1887; Alexander and a few associates had conspired to assassinate the Emperor. Lenin graduated from secondary school with high honors, enrolled at Kazan University, but was expelled after participating in a demonstration. He retired to the family estate but was permitted to continue his studies in absentia. He obtained a law degree in 1891.

When, in 1893, he moved to St. Petersburg, Lenin was already a Marxist and a revolutionary by profession, joining like-minded intellectuals in study groups, writing polemical pamphlets and articles, and seeking to organize workers. The St. Petersburg Union for the Struggle for the Liberation of Labor, which Lenin helped create, was one of the important nuclei of the Russian Marxist movement. The most important work from this period is a lengthy pamphlet, "What Are the 'Friends of the People,' and How Do They Fight against Social-Democracy?" In it Lenin presents the essentials of his entire outlook.

In 1897 Lenin was arrested, spent some months in jail, and was finally sentenced to 3 years of exile in the Siberian village of Shushenskoe. He was joined there by a fellow Marxist, Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, whom he married in 1898. In his Siberian exile he produced a major study of the Russian economy, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, in which he sought to demonstrate that, despite its back-

wardness, the economy of his country had definitely transformed itself into a capitalist one. If Lenin had produced nothing else than this learned though controversial work, he would today be known as one of the leading Russian economists of his period.

Emigration to Europe. Not long after his release from Siberia in the summer of 1900, Lenin moved to Europe, where he spent most of the next 17 years, moving from one country to another at frequent intervals, periods of feverish activity alternating with those of total frustration. His first step was to join the editorial board of *Iskra* (*The Spark*), then the central newspaper of Russian Marxism, where he served together with the top leaders of the movement. After parting from *Iskra*, he edited a succession of papers of his own and contributed to other socialist journals. His journalistic activity was closely linked with organizational work, partly because the underground organizational network within Russia to some extent revolved around the distribution of clandestine literature.

Organizational activity, in turn, was linked with the selection and training of personnel. For some time Lenin conducted a training school for Russian revolutionaries at Longjumeau, a suburb of Paris. A perennial problem was that of financing the movement and its leaders' activities in their European exile. Lenin personally could usually depend on financial support from his mother; but her pension could not pay for his political activities. Much of the early history of Russian Marxism can be understood only in the light of these pressing money problems.

His Thought. A Marxist movement had developed in Russia only during the last decade of the 19th century as a response to the rapid growth of industry, urban centers, and a proletariat. Its first intellectual spokesmen were people who had turned away from populism (*narodnichestvo*), which they regarded as a failure. Instead of relying on the peasantry, they placed their hopes on the workers as the revolutionary class. Rejecting the village socialism preached by the Narodniks, they opted for industrialization, modernization, and Westernization. Their immediate aim they declared to be a bourgeois revolution which would transform Russia into a democratic republic.

In accepting this revolutionary scenario, Lenin added the important proviso that hegemony in the coming bourgeois revolution should remain with the proletariat as the most consistently revolutionary of all classes.

At the same time, Lenin, more than most Marxists, made a clear distinction between the workers'

movement, on the one hand, and the theoretical contribution to be made by intellectuals, on the other. Of the two, he considered the theoretical contribution the more important, the workers' movement being a merely spontaneous reaction to capitalist exploitation, whereas theory was an expression of consciousness, meaning science and rationality. Throughout his life Lenin insisted that consciousness must maintain leadership over spontaneity for revolutionary Marxism to succeed. This implies that the intellectual leaders must prepare the proletariat for its political tasks and must guide it in its action. Leadership and hierarchy thus become key concepts in the Leninist vocabulary, and the role and structure of the party must conform to this conception. The party is seen as the institutionalization of true consciousness. It must turn into the general staff of the revolution, subjecting the working class and indeed all its own members to command and discipline.

Lenin expressed these ideas in his important book *What's To Be Done?* (1902), the title of the work expressing his indebtedness to Nikolai Chernyshevsky. When, in 1903, the leaders of Russian Marxism met for the first important party congress, formally the Second Congress, these ideas clashed head on with the conception of a looser, more democratic workers' party advanced by Lenin's old friend Luli Martov. This disagreement over the nature and organization of the party was complicated by numerous other conflicts of view, and from its first important congress Russian Marxism emerged split into two factions. The one led by Lenin called itself the majority faction (*bolsheviki*); the other got stuck with the name of minority faction (*mensheviki*). Lenin's reaction to the split was expressed in his pamphlet "One Step Forward Two Steps Back," published in 1904.

Mensheviks and Bolsheviks disagreed not only over organizational questions but also over most other political problems, including the entire conception of a Marxist program for Russia and the methods to be employed by the party. Bolshevism, in general, stresses the need for revolution and the futility of incremental reforms; it emphasizes the goals of Marxism rather than the process, with its timetable, by which Marx thought the new order was to be reached; in comparison to menshevism it is impatient, pragmatic, and tough-minded.

The Revolution of 1905 surprised all Russian revolutionary leaders, including the Bolsheviks. Lenin managed to return to Russia only in November, when the defeat of the revolution was a virtual certainty. But he was among the last to give up. For many more months he urged his followers to renew their revolutionary enthusiasm and activities and to prepare for

an armed uprising. For some time afterward the technology of revolutionary warfare became the focus of his interest. His militancy was expressed in an anti-Menshevik pamphlet published in 1905, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution."

The major impact of the aborted revolution and its aftermath was a decided change in Lenin's attitude toward the peasantry. Lenin came to recognize it as a class in its own right—not just as a rural proletariat—with its own interests, and as a valuable ally for the revolutionary proletariat. His pamphlet "The Agrarian Question in the Russian Revolution of 1905–7" presents these new views in systematic fashion.

Bolshevism as an Independent Faction. In the 12 years between the Revolution of 1905 and that of 1917, bolshevism, which had begun as a faction within the Russian Social-Democratic Workers party, gradually emerged as an independent party that had cut its ties with all other Russian Marxists. The process entailed prolonged and bitter polemics against Mensheviks as well as against all those who worked for a reconciliation of the factions. It involved fights over funds, struggles for control of newspapers, the development of rival organizations, and meetings of rival congresses. Disputes concerned many questions about the goals and strategies of the movement, the role of national liberation movements within the Marxist party, and also philosophic controversies. Lenin's contribution to this last topic was published in 1909, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*.

Since about 1905 the international socialist movement had begun also to discuss the possibility of a major war breaking out. In its congresses of 1907 and 1912, resolutions were passed which condemned such wars in advance and pledged the parties of the proletariat not to support them. Lenin had wanted to go further than that. He had urged active opposition to the war effort and a transformation of any war into a proletarian revolution. He called his policy "revolutionary defeatism." When World War I broke out, most socialist leaders in the countries involved supported the war effort. For Lenin, this was proof that he and they shared no aims or views. The break between the two schools of Marxism had become irreconcilable.

During the war Lenin lived in Switzerland. He attended several conferences of radical socialists opposed to the war or even agreeing with Lenin's revolutionary defeatism. He read extensively on the Marxist theory of state and wrote a first draft for a book on the subject, *The State and Revolution*. He also immersed himself in literature dealing with contemporary world politics and wrote a book which may, in

the long run, be his most important one, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916), in which Marxism is effectively made applicable to the 20th century. By the beginning of 1917 he had fits of despondency and wrote to a close friend that he despaired of ever witnessing another revolution. This was about a month before the fall of tsarism.

Lenin in 1917. It took a good deal of negotiation and courage for Lenin and a group of like-minded Russian revolutionaries to travel from Switzerland back to Russia through enemy country (Germany). Much has been made of Lenin's negotiations with an enemy power and of the fact that some Bolshevik activities were supported financially by German intelligence agencies. There is no convincing evidence, however, which might show that acceptance of funds from objectionable sources made Lenin an agent of these sources in any way. And from his point of view the source of aid was immaterial; what counted was the use to which it was put.

The man who returned to Russia in the famed "sealed train" in the spring of 1917 was of medium height, quite bald, except for the back of his head, with a reddish beard. The features of his face were arresting slanted eyes that looked piercingly at others, and high cheekbones under a towering forehead. The rest of his appearance was deceptively ordinary: a man of resolute movements clad quite conservatively in a middle-class suit.

Versed in many languages, Lenin spoke Russian with a slight speech defect but was a powerful orator in small groups as well as before mass audiences. A tireless worker, he made others work tirelessly. Self-effacing, he sought to compel his collaborators to devote every ounce of their energy to the revolutionary task at hand. He was impatient with any extraneous activities, including small talk and abstract theoretical discussions. Indeed, he was suspicious of intellectuals and felt most at home in the company of simple folk. Having been brought up in the tradition of the Russian nobility, Lenin loved hunting, hiking, horseback riding, boating, mushrooming, and the outdoor life in general. He sought to steel himself by systematic physical exercise and generally forbade himself those hobbies which he considered time-wasting or corrupting: chess, music, and companionship. While his life-style was that of a dedicated professional revolutionary, his tastes in art, morals, and manners were rather conventional.

Once he had returned to Russia, Lenin worked feverishly and relentlessly to utilize the revolutionary situation that had been created by the fall of tsarism so as to convert it into a proletarian revolution which

would bring his own party into power. These were the crucial 6 months of his life, but space does not permit a detailed account of his activities in the period. The result of his activities is well known: Opinions in Russia quickly became more and more polarized. Moderate forces found themselves less and less able to maintain even the pretense of control. In the end, the so-called provisional government, then headed by Kerensky, simply melted away, and power literally fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks. As a result of this so-called October Revolution, Lenin found himself not only the leader of his party but also the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (equivalent to prime minister) of the newly proclaimed Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

Ruler of Russia. During the first years of Lenin's rule as dictator of Russia, the major task he faced was that of establishing his and his party's authority in the country. Most of his policies can be understood in this light, even though he alienated some elements in the population while satisfying others. Examples are the expropriation of landholdings for distribution to the peasants, the separate peace treaty with Germany, and the nationalization of banks and industrial establishments.

From 1918 to 1921 a fierce civil war raged which the Bolsheviks finally won against seemingly overwhelming odds. During the civil war Lenin tightened his party's dictatorship and eventually eliminated all rival parties from the political arena. A spirited defense of his dictatorship can be found in his "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky" (1918), in which he answers criticism from some more moderate Marxists. Lenin had to create an entirely new political system with the help of inexperienced personnel; he was heading a totally exhausted economy and had to devise desperate means for mobilizing people for work. Simultaneously he created the Third (Communist) International and vigorously promoted the spread of the revolution to other countries; and meanwhile he had to cope with dissent among his own party comrades, some of whom criticized him from the left. The pamphlet "Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder" is a response to this criticism.

When the civil war had been won and the regime established firmly, the economy was ruined, and much of the population was bitterly opposed to the regime. At this point Lenin reversed many of his policies and instituted a trenchant reform, called the New Economic Policy. It signified a temporary retreat from the goal of establishing communism at once and a resolve to make do with the social forces available: the

Communist party declared itself ready to coexist and cooperate with features of the past, such as free enterprise, capitalist institutions, and capitalist states across the borders. For the time being, the Soviet economy would be a mixture of capitalist and socialist features. The stress of the party's policies would be on economic reconstruction and on the education of a peasant population for life in the 20th century. In the long run, Lenin hoped that both these policies would make the blessings of socialism obvious to all, so that the country would gradually grow into socialism. The wariness, the caution, the fear of excessive haste and impatience which Lenin showed in the years 1921–1923 are expressed only inadequately in the last few articles he wrote, such as "On Cooperation," "How We Must Reorganize the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate," and "Better Less but Better."

In 1918 an assassin wounded Lenin; he recovered but may have suffered some lasting damage. On May 26, 1922, he suffered a serious stroke from which he recovered after some weeks, only to suffer a second stroke on December 16. He was so seriously incapacitated that he could participate in political matters only intermittently and feebly. An invalid, he lived in a country home at Gorki, near Moscow, where he died on Jan. 21, 1924. His body was preserved and is on view in the Lenin Mausoleum outside the walls of the Moscow Kremlin.

EWB

Leo XIII (1810–1903), pope from 1878–1903. Leo XIII is known for his social reforms and his recognition of the rights of the worker. During his reign the Roman Catholic Church achieved an international prestige it had not enjoyed since the Middle Ages.

Vincenzo Gioacchino Pecci, who became Pope Leo XIII, was born on March 2, 1810, in Carpineto, Italy. He was educated by the Jesuits at Viterbo and in Rome. After becoming a priest on Dec. 31, 1837, he was named apostolic delegate to Benevento. After a period as delegate to Perugia, he was appointed apostolic nuncio to Brussels in January 1843 and became an archbishop. Already at Perugia he had shown himself to be a social reformer. At Louvain he mediated in the bitter controversy between the Jesuits and the university. Reappointed to Perugia in 1846, he was made cardinal in 1853 by Pius IX. He spent the next 25 years restoring churches, promoting education of the clergy, and advocating social reform.

Political Revival. Leo became pope at a low ebb in the prestige of the papacy. The Pope had been a "prisoner" in the Vatican since 1870. Tension ex-

isted between the Vatican and most European governments. There were no strong Catholic political parties in Europe. The democracies and the Vatican traded no friendship. Within the Church there existed a polarization because of the authoritarian rule of Pius IX. Between the Italian state and the Vatican there were the utmost frigidity and ill feeling.

Elected pope at the age of 68, Leo was not expected to hold the post long or to make any great changes. His pontificate, however, lasted 25 years. One of his first undertakings was to offset the secularizing philosophies of governments imbued with anticlerical, antipapal, and anti-Church policies. It was the age of the *Kulturkampf* in Germany and of governmental anticlericalism in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Leo's methods were in the main conciliatory and quite simple in intent. His strength lay in his obvious and proven enthusiasm for learning, for scientific achievement, and for a relatively open-minded discussion with all comers. As part of his program he set out to strengthen the Catholic political parties in Europe. His policies bore fruits within his lifetime, and their acceptance was aided mightily by the ever-growing threat of socialism and an early form of communism which had started with the Communist Manifesto of Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx in 1848. Thus Germany's chancellor Otto von Bismarck came to see the newly revived Catholic Center party as a bulwark against socialism. Extreme anticlerical legislation was repealed by his government by 1887. In 1881 the Prussian government had reappointed an envoy to the Vatican (the first since 1874). Similarly, in Belgium, Catholics gained political power and helped mitigate anticlericalism and secularizing policies. In France, Leo was less successful. His appeal was laced with too political a motivation, which divided Catholic supporters and created antagonism lasting well beyond Leo's death.

Italian Policy. For Italy, Leo adopted a policy marked by an intransigence which produced more or less the same bitter fruits as in France. Leo hoped Germany would force a solution of the "Roman question" and restore the papacy to a position of temporal power. But the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy dashed these aspirations. Leo could expect no help from France, where his policies had, rather, fomented antipapal feeling. When Mariano Rampolla became secretary of state for Italy in 1887, he sought the friendship of the democracies, the United States, and France particularly. Leo was much more in favor of a monarchical paternalism than of a democratic form of government; he feared the latter

as an open door to anticlerical and secular policies. In Italy, Leo allowed Catholics to participate in municipal politics, but he maintained the traditional ban on all Catholic participation in national politics almost to the end of his life. In his encyclical letter *Immortale Dei* (Nov. 1, 1885) Leo denounced democracy as irreconcilable with the authority of the Church, although he did allow that with proper conditions Catholics could work within such a democratic framework. In *Libertas praestantissimum* (June 20, 1888) he declared personal liberty and freedom to be a legitimate political goal, but he tied the success of such a goal to adherence to Roman Catholicism. Leo sought, in other words, to reconcile the liberalism of his day with traditional Roman Catholic teaching. Although he did not succeed, he laid the foundations for a later development in the mid-20th century. The policies of John XXIII, for instance, reflected Leo's thoughts but took some essential steps forward.

Diplomatic Relations. On the general plane of diplomatic relations, Leo was successful. He established cordial relations with Spain, Austria, Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, the United States, and many South American countries. The tension between the Vatican and Russia was relaxed. His centralization policies included a new organization of pilgrimages to Rome, more frequent audiences for the visiting faithful as well as for non-Catholics, an expanding panache of papal ceremonial and glory, and the encouragement of cordial ties of collaboration and mutual respect between Catholic academic institutions and corresponding institutions in Europe and the Americas.

Social Reform. Leo is remembered more for his encyclical letter *Rerum novarum* (May 15, 1891) than for many other acts. The letter was part of his attempt to halt the drift of working people and industrial labor away from his Church. In part a rather dramatic departure from traditional policies of the Vatican and the Roman Catholic Church's outlook, the letter vindicated for workers and poor people the rights which never before had received such papal or ecclesiastical sanction.

The minimum standards Leo demanded for workers, such as a means of frugal sustenance and a minimum wage, now seem to be grossly underestimated. But in Leo's day, they represented violent if well-timed departures from the traditional norms. The letter's value lay much more in its accurate prediction of social reforms which, if implemented, might have averted such later developments as the Russian Revolution and the rise of Soviet bolshevism.

In *Rerum novarum* Leo also defended the rights of the family and the right to private property, themes which later became acute when communism spread throughout Europe and these rights were attacked and encroached upon by a dictatorial statism. His recommendations for effective legislation, his approval of labor unions and cooperative organizations, and his lauding of labor and its fruits as worthwhile and as dignified human elements helped shape the policies of many labor movements throughout the world. Concretely, *Rerum novarum* strongly influenced the formation of Catholic political parties and labor syndicates outside Italy and Spain, thus combating the spread of Marxism.

Leo also strengthened Rome's ties with Eastern-rite churches and carried the centralization policies of his predecessors to a considerable length. He relaxed the intransigence of his predecessor, Pius IX, by opening the Vatican archives and library to qualified historians of all faiths.

It would be a mistake, however, to assess Leo's pontificate as a radical or even a strong departure from that of his predecessors. He built on the strong centralization of Pius IX, who, although he failed in international politics, left Leo a strongly united Church and a store of spiritual resources. When Leo died on July 20, 1903, he enjoyed a vast personal prestige; his Church was enthusiastic for the papacy; but Leo, like his predecessor, had not been able to adapt Church structure and thought to the new realities of the emergent 20th century.

EWB

Leopold II (1835–1909), king of the Belgians from 1865–1909. Leopold II founded the Congo Free State.

Leopold was born in Brussels on April 9, 1835. He was the second child of the reigning Belgian monarch, Leopold I, and his second wife, Louise, the daughter of King Louis Philippe of France. His elder brother had died a few months after his birth in 1834, and thus Leopold was heir to the throne. When he was 9 years old, Leopold received the title of Duke of Brabant.

Leopold's public career began in 1855, when he became a member of the Belgian Senate. That same year Leopold began to urge Belgium's acquisition of colonies. In 1853 he married Marie Henriette, daughter of the Austrian archduke Joseph. Four children were born of this marriage; three were daughters, and the only son, Leopold, died when he was 9 years old.

In 1865 Leopold became king. His reign was marked by a number of major political developments. The Liberals governed Belgium from 1857 to 1880

and during their final year in power legislated the Frère-Orban Law of 1879. This law created free, secular, compulsory primary schools supported by the state and withdrew all state support from Roman Catholic primary schools. In 1880 the Catholic party obtained a parliamentary majority and 4 years later restored state support to Catholic schools. In 1885 various socialist and social democratic groups drew together and formed the Labor party. Increasing social unrest and the rise of the Labor party forced the adoption of universal male suffrage in 1893.

In 1876 Leopold organized, with the help of Henry Stanley, the International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of the Congo. The Congo Free State was established under Leopold II's personal rule at a European conference on African affairs held in Berlin in 1884–1885. Leopold then amassed a huge personal fortune by exploiting the Congo. His rule there, however, was subject to severe criticism, especially from British sources. Criticism from both Social Catholics and the Labor party at home forced Leopold to give the Congo to the Belgian nation. The Congo Free State was transformed into a Belgian colony under parliamentary control in 1908.

On Dec. 17, 1909, Leopold II died at Laeken, and the Belgian crown passed to Albert, the son of Leopold's brother, Philip, Count of Flanders.

EWB

Lévi-Strauss, Claude Gustave (1908–), French social anthropologist. Claude Lévi-Strauss became a leading scholar in the structural approach to social anthropology.

Claude Lévi-Strauss was born on November 28, 1908, in Brussels, Belgium, of a cultured Jewish family. He grew up in France, attended a lycée in Paris, and studied philosophy at the Sorbonne, University of Paris. After holding several provincial teaching posts, he became interested in anthropology and accepted an appointment as professor of sociology at São Paulo University, Brazil (1935–1939), which enabled him to do field research among Brazil's Indian tribes.

Lévi-Strauss returned to wartime France and served in the army (1939–1941). He taught in New York City at the New School for Social Research and at the École Libre des Hautes Études (1942–1945). He was also cultural attaché in the French embassy (1946–1947).

Back in France, Lévi-Strauss was associate director of the Musée de l'Homme, director of the École Pratique des Hautes Études, and editor of *Man: Review of French Anthropology*. From 1960 he was professor of social anthropology, professor of comparative

religions of nonliterate people, and director of the Laboratory of Social Anthropology at the College of France.

Lévi-Strauss's fame began with his book *Tristes Tropiques* (*A World on the Wane*, 1961). It is partly biographical, partly a philosophical reflection on travel, and mainly a systematic account of four primitive South American Indian tribes. In this and his next influential book, *The Savage Mind* (1966), he expressed his belief that in their potential all men are intellectually equal. Instead of primitive man's being frozen in his culture, he wrote, "A primitive people is not a backward or retarded people; indeed it may possess a genius for invention or action that leaves the achievements of civilized peoples far behind."

Citing examples, Lévi-Strauss argued that primitive man's conceptual mental structures, though of a different order from those of advanced man, are just as rich, utilitarian, theoretical, complex, and scientific. There is no primitive mind or modern mind but "mind-as-such," in which is locked a structural way of thinking that brings order out of chaos and enables man to develop social systems to suit his needs. Man's mental structures and ways of achieving order are derived as much from primitive magic as from Western science, as much from primitive myth as from Western literature, and as much from primitive totemism as from Western morality and religion.

Lévi-Strauss's thesis, which excited world attention, is that if social scientists can understand man's mental structures, they can then build a study of man which is as scientific as the laws of gravity. If order exists anywhere, says Lévi-Strauss as a structuralist, then order exists everywhere, even in the brain.

Lévi-Strauss's search for the common denominator of human thought derives from structural linguistics, a 20th-century science which set out to uncover the possible relationships between the origins of human speech and the origins of culture. He goes beyond language in adding as concepts for social order such activities as music, art, ritual, myth, religion, literature, cooking, tattooing, intermarriage, the kinship system, and the barter of goods and services. He sees each as another related way by which a society maintains itself. Man's mental structures in bringing order out of chaos, no matter how divergent his patterns may seem in old and new cultures, may derive from a common mental code.

The work of Lévi-Strauss seeks to stimulate thinking and research on breaking the mystery of this code. His popularity rests on his belief that there are no superior cultures, that man acts according to a logical structure in his brain, and that once the code of

this logical structure can be discovered, the human sciences can be as scientific as the natural sciences.

Lévi-Strauss was awarded the Wenner-Gren Foundation's Viking Fund Medal for 1966 and the Erasmus Prize in 1975. He has been awarded several honorary doctorate degrees from prestigious institutions such as Oxford, Yale, Harvard, and Columbia. He has also held several academic memberships including the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy and Institute of Arts and Letters, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Philosophical Society.

EWB

Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien (1857–1939), French philosopher, sociologist, and anthropologist. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl concerned himself primarily with the nonrational belief systems of primitive man.

Lucien Lévy-Bruhl was born in Paris on April 10, 1857. He attended the Lycée Charlemagne, pursuing studies in music, philosophy, and natural science, and graduated from the École Normale Supérieure in philosophy in 1879. He taught philosophy at Poitiers and Amiens before he attended the University of Paris to pursue his doctorate in 1884. He taught in Paris until his appointment to the Sorbonne in 1896 as titular professor of the history of modern philosophy. Lévy-Bruhl's scholarly work began with a history of modern French philosophy in 1889; a book on German philosophy (since Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz) appeared in 1890, one on Jacobean philosophy in 1894, and one on Comtean philosophy in 1900. *Ethics and Moral Science* (1902) marked the beginning of Lévy-Bruhl's anthropological interests. He recognized the impossibility of an absolute ethic because of the incommensurability of thought systems in different cultures, and he called for scientific study of the known range of moral systems, including the primitive. This book was probably influential in the appointment of Lévy-Bruhl to a chair in the history of modern philosophy at the Sorbonne in 1904.

Although Lévy-Bruhl remained more interested in primitive thought than in social institutions, his work moved from philosophy toward sociology under the influence of the Durkheimian sociologists. In 1925 he, along with Marcel Mauss and Paul Rivet, founded the Institute of Ethnology at the Sorbonne, dedicated to the memory of Émile Durkheim, who had died in 1917. Lévy-Bruhl, however, disagreed with some tenets of Durkheim's methodology, particularly the rationality of primitive man. He thus resigned from the institute and the Sorbonne in 1927 to devote himself to writing and travel.

Lévy-Bruhl wrote six books elaborating his concept of the nature of the primitive mind: *Mental Functions in Primitive Societies* (1910), *Primitive Mentality* (1922), *The Soul of the Primitive* (1928), *The Supernatural and the Nature of the Primitive Mind* (1931), *Primitive Mythology* (1935), and *The Mystic Experience and Primitive Symbolism* (1938). Never a fieldworker, he had access to more adequate descriptions of primitive cultures at the end of his life. He rejected some evolutionary implications of his earlier formulation of civilized and “primitive,” or “prelogical,” mentalities as polar and irreconcilable types. Later books dealt more fully with intermediate types. Posthumously published notebooks (1949) indicated his willingness to compromise even on the term “prelogical.”

Lévy-Bruhl was aware of similarities between primitive and civilized thought but, in response to previous attributions of extreme rationality to primitive man, preferred to stress differences. Although postulation of a “primitive mentality” at first glance relegates primitive man to an inferior cultural status, Lévy-Bruhl was more concerned to demonstrate that primitive cultures must be studied in terms of their own categories. Though this view should encourage extensive fieldwork, his equation of all primitive thought patterns in practice minimized descriptive efforts.

After his retirement Lévy-Bruhl lectured at Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and the University of California. He died in Paris on March 13, 1939.

EWB

Livingstone, David (1813–1873), Scottish physician and explorer. David Livingstone was possibly the greatest of all African missionaries, explorers, and antislavery advocates.

Before Livingstone, Africa’s interior was almost entirely unknown to the outside world. Vague notions prevailed about its geography, fauna, flora, and human life. Livingstone dispelled much of this ignorance and opened up Africa’s interior to further exploration.

David Livingstone was born on March 19, 1813, in Blantyre, coming from Highlanders on his father’s side and Lowlanders on his mother’s. The Livingstones were poor, so at the age of 10 David worked in the textile mills 14 hours a day, studying at night and on weekends. After some hesitation he joined the Congregational Church of his father. In 1836 he entered the University of Glasgow to study medicine and theology, working during holidays to support himself. In 1840 he received his medical degree, was ordained, and was accepted by the London Missionary Society. He had been influenced by Robert Moffat and the first Niger expedition to apply for service in Africa.

After a 98-day voyage Livingstone arrived in Cape Town on March 15, 1841. He reached Moffat’s station, Kuruman, at the time the outpost of European penetration in southern Africa, on July 31.

But Livingstone soon moved north to the Khatla people. It was here he permanently injured his left shoulder in an encounter with a lion. In 1845 he married Mary Moffat and settled farther north at Kolobeng. From here he set out with two friends, Oswell and Murray, to cross the Kalahari Desert, discovering Lake Ngami on Aug. 1, 1849. On another journey, in 1851, Livingstone and Oswell discovered the Zambezi River.

Crossing the Continent. In April 1852 at Cape Town, Livingstone saw his wife and four children off to England. Returning to Kolobeng, he found that some Boers had destroyed his station, the last settled home he ever had. In December he set out to walk to the west coast. He reached Linyanti, in Barotseland, where Chief Sekeletu of the Makololo gave him 27 men to go with him. They walked through hostile, unknown country, and after incredible hardship he reached Luanda on May 31, 1854.

The British consul there nursed him back to health, but Livingstone refused passage back to England. He had not found the hoped-for waterway, and he wanted to return the Makololo to their chief. Having been reequipped by the British and Portuguese in Luanda, he left on Sept. 19, 1854, but reached Linyanti only on Sept. 11, 1855. Sickness, rain, flooded rivers, and hostile tribes delayed him and forced him to spend all his equipment. He was given fresh supplies and men by Sekeletu. On November 15 he reached the spectacular falls on the Zambezi, which the Africans called the “Smoke which Thunders” but which Livingstone named Victoria Falls in honor of the queen of England. He finally reached Quelimane on the east coast on May 20, 1856. For the first time Africa had been crossed from coast to coast. He waited 6 months for a ship which returned him to England.

Livingstone was now a famous man. In 1855 the Royal Geographical Society had awarded him the Gold Medal; now at a special meeting they made him a fellow of the society. The London Missionary Society honored him; he was received by Queen Victoria; and the universities of Glasgow and Oxford conferred upon him honorary doctorates. In November 1857 his first book, the tremendously successful *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa*, was published.

Livingstone caught the imagination not only of England but the world. He opened the eyes of the world to the tremendous potentialities of Africa for

human development, trade, and Christian missions; he also disclosed the horrors of the East African slave trade.

Zambezi Expeditions. With mutual regrets he severed his ties with the London Missionary Society, but the British government agreed to support an expedition to explore the Zambezi River led by Livingstone, who was made a British consul for the purpose. He sailed for Africa in March 1858.

The Zambezi expedition met with many difficulties. It was marred by friction among the Europeans, mainly caused by Livingstone's brother Charles. The steam launch *Ma Robert* proved unsuitable, and the Kebrabasa Rapids killed the dream of Zambezi as an inland waterway. The *Ma Robert* was taken into the Shire River but was blocked by the Murchison Falls.

The explorers learned of the existence of two lakes to the north, and on a second journey they discovered Lake Chilwa on April 16, 1859. On a third journey up the Shire they left the boat, walked 3 weeks overland, and discovered Lake Nyasa on Sept. 17, 1859. A new steamer, the *Pioneer*, arrived in 1861, by which they explored the Ruvuma River in an effort to bypass the Portuguese. Later they managed to get the *Pioneer* to Lake Nyasa, which they explored but did not circumnavigate.

In January 1862 a third boat, the *Lady Nyassa*, arrived together with Mrs. Livingstone, giving him fresh hope. But Mary Livingstone died from fever at the end of April. The *Lady Nyassa* never reached the lake, and finally the British government recalled the expedition. The Royal Navy took over the *Pioneer* at Quelimane, but Livingstone took the *Lady Nyassa* on a daring voyage to Bombay, India, where it was sold. In July 1864 Livingstone reached England.

In 1865 Livingstone published his second successful book, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and Its Tributaries*, and the Royal Geographical Society equipped him for another expedition to explore the watersheds of Africa. He reached Zanzibar in January 1866 and began exploring the territory near Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika. On Nov. 8, 1867, he discovered Lake Mweru and the source of the Lualaba River. On July 18, 1868, he found Lake Bangweulu. In March 1869 he reached Ujiji only to discover that there was no mail and that his supplies had been stolen. He was sick, depressed, and exhausted, but in September he set out again, witnessing at Nyangwe the horrors of the Arab slave trade. He returned to Ujiji in October 1871.

Search for Livingstone. Europe and America thought that the lonely man was lost, so the *London*

Daily Telegraph and the *New York Herald* sent Henry Stanley to search for him. Stanley found Livingstone at Ujiji and stayed 4 months. Unable to persuade Livingstone to return to England, Stanley reequipped him and departed from him near Tabora on March 14, 1872. In August, Livingstone was on his way again. Near Bangweulu he got bogged down in swamps but finally reached Chitambo's village. On May 1, 1873, his servants found him in his tent kneeling in prayer at the bedside. He was dead. His men buried his heart but embalmed the body and carried it to the mission of the Holy Ghost fathers at Bagamoyo. It reached England, where it was identified by the lion wound in the left shoulder. On April 18, 1874, Livingstone was buried in great honor in London's Westminster Abbey.

Livingstone's Influence. No one made as many geographical discoveries in Africa as Livingstone, and his numerous scientific observations were quickly recognized. He was right in using quinine as an ingredient for the cure of malaria.

Regarding himself as a missionary to the end, Livingstone inspired many new enterprises such as the Makololo, Ndebele, and Tanganyika missions of his own society, the Universities' Mission to Central Africa, and the Livingstonia Mission of the Church of Scotland. His life caught the imagination of the Christian world.

Livingstone drew the world's attention to the great evil of the African slave traffic. He taught the world to see the African as "wronged" rather than depraved, and the world did not rest until slavery was outlawed. He saw the cure for it in Christianity and commerce and also inspired enterprises such as the African Lakes Company. But in his wake came also European settlement and the colonial scramble for Africa with all its ambiguities.

Although the Zambezi expedition proved that Livingstone was no ideal leader for white men, he nevertheless greatly influenced men who knew him, such as Stanley, John Kirk, and James Stewart. He made a lasting impression on the Africans he met, which was amply attested to by those who followed him. His peaceful intentions and moral courage were immediately recognized.

EWB

Lloyd George, David (1863–1945), English statesman. The 1st Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor, David Lloyd George, was prime minister from 1916 to 1922. Although he was one of Britain's most successful wartime leaders, he contributed greatly to the decline of the Liberal party.

It has been said of David Lloyd George that he “was the first son of the people to reach supreme power.” His life is representative of the transition in leadership from the landed aristocracy of the 19th century to the mass democracy of the 20th. But his career is almost unique in the manner in which he attained power and held it by his indifference to tradition and precedent, by his reliance on instinct rather than on reason, and by the force of his will and of his capacity despite personal unpopularity.

Lloyd George, as in later days he would have his surname, was born on Jan. 17, 1863, in Manchester, the son of William George, a schoolmaster of Welsh background, and of Elizabeth Lloyd. William George died in 1864, and Richard Lloyd, brother of the widow, took his sister and the three children into the family home at Llanystumdwy, Wales. From his uncle, a shoemaker by trade, a Baptist preacher, and an active Liberal in politics, young David absorbed much of the evangelical ethic and the radical ideal. He went to the village school. Barred from the Non-conformist ministry because it was unpaid, and excluded from teaching because that would have required joining the Church of England, he was articled, at age 16, to a firm of solicitors in Portmadoc. He soon began writing articles and making speeches on land reform, temperance, and religion. He often preached in the chapel. In 1884 he passed the Law Society examinations. He opened his office at Criccieth, helped organize the farmers’ union, and was active in anti-tithe agitation. In 1888 he married Margaret Owen, the daughter of a well-to-do farmer; they had five children.

Early Political Career. Lloyd George’s activity in the politics of the new county council (created 1888) led to his election in 1890 as the member of Parliament for Caernarvon Borough, which he was to represent for the next 55 years. His maiden speech was on temperance, but his primary interest was in home rule for Wales. He led a revolt within the Liberal party against Lord Rosebery in 1894–1895 and successfully carried through its second reading a bill for the disestablishment of the Church of England in Wales. The Conservatives returned in 1895, and the bill could go no further. But his reputation was made by his bitter and uncompromising opposition to the Boer War as morally and politically unjustified. The Liberals were badly split, but in the reconstruction of the party after the war, the “center point of power,” declared a Liberal journalist, was in Lloyd George and other young radicals.

In the strong Liberal Cabinet formed in 1905, Lloyd George became president of the Board of Trade.

He pushed through legislation on the merchant marine, patents, and copyrights. A chaos of private dock companies in London was replaced by a unified Port of London Authority. The Welsh agitator had become the responsible minister and brilliant administrator.

Chancellor of the Exchequer. When Herbert Asquith became prime minister in 1908, Lloyd George was promoted to chancellor of the Exchequer. To pay for old-age pensions as well as for dreadnoughts, he presented in April 1909 a revolutionary “People’s Budget” with an innovative tax on unearned increment in land values and a sharp rise in income tax and death duties. He lashed out, in his celebrated Limehouse speech, against landlords waxing rich on rising land values. When the Lords obstructed, spurred on by Arthur Balfour, the Conservative leader, he said that the House of Lords was not the watchdog of the Constitution; it was only “Mr. Balfour’s poodle.” The Lords’ delay in accepting the budget precipitated the controversy with the Commons over the Lords’ veto. At a secret conference of party leaders Lloyd George suggested a nonpartisan Cabinet, interesting in view of his later reliance on coalition.

Eventually the Lords’ veto was limited, and Lloyd George proceeded with the National Insurance Act, providing protection against sickness, disability, and unemployment in certain trades. But in so doing he encountered charges of “demagoguery.” His future was unclear. His popularity was undoubtedly increased by his Mansion House speech in 1911. Germany had sent a gunboat to Agadir in French-controlled Morocco, and Britain was committed to supporting the French interest. Lloyd George, the man of peace, startled the world by warning Germany that Britain would not harbor interference with its legitimate interests. In the next year came the Marconi scandal, involving Lloyd George and other ministers who had invested in the American Marconi Company just when its British associate was contracting with the government for development of radiotelegraph. Though a motion of censure was defeated, Lloyd George and the others remained suspect.

Prime Minister. In August 1914 the Cabinet was divided on the war issues. Lloyd George at first wavered but with violation of Belgian neutrality aligned himself against Germany. His reputation soared in the newly created Ministry of Munitions, to which he was appointed in the coalition government organized by Asquith in May 1915. Lloyd George settled labor disputes, constructed factories, and soon replaced serious shortages with an output exceeding demand. When Lord Kitchener was lost at sea in June

1916, Lloyd George became minister of war. "The fight must be to the finish to a knockout blow," he declared. In such direction, however, Asquith's rather aimless leadership did not seem to be moving.

In December 1916 Asquith, faced by a revolt from Conservatives along with Lloyd George, resigned. Lloyd George succeeded. In the new War Cabinet of five, the "Welsh Wizard" was the only Liberal, but he "towered like a giant." His role is controversial, but he galvanized the war effort, and it is generally accepted that without him England could hardly have emerged from the conflict so successfully.

At the end of the war, despite the defection of Asquith and his Liberal following, Lloyd George, with strong Conservative support, decided to continue the coalition. He received overwhelming endorsement in the election of 1918. At the peace conference he mediated successfully between the idealism of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson and the punitive terms sought by French premier Georges Clemenceau. And he led in the formation of the Irish Free State in 1921, though losing Conservative support in the process.

But at home Lloyd George's oratory about constructing "a new society" came to naught; he did not have Conservative backing for reform, and his own efforts were equivocal. Conservative disenchantment reached the breaking point in the Turkish crisis of 1922—he was pro-Greek, the Conservatives pro-Turk. The Conservatives in the Commons voted, more than 2 to 1, to sever ties. Lloyd George was only 59, but his ministerial career was over. He never re-established himself in the Liberal party, which, now divided between his supporters and those of Asquith, and suffering defection to Labor of its leadership and its rank and file, disintegrated beyond recovery. Lloyd George attempted a personal comeback in 1929, espousing massive programs of state action in the economy. His popular vote (25 percent) was respectable, but in the Commons the Liberals remained a poor third. He relinquished party leadership, and his power in the Commons was reduced to his family party of four.

Later Years. Lloyd George's influence in the 1930s was peripheral. Distrusted in many quarters, he was listened to but little heeded. He attacked the Hoare-Laval bargain over Abyssinia. But his misgivings over Versailles led to his respect for Hitler's Germany; in 1936 he visited the Führer at Berchtesgaden. As the crisis deepened, Lloyd George urged an unequivocal statement of Britain's intentions. In his last important intervention in the Commons, in May 1939, he called for the resignation of Neville Chamberlain, who did give way to Winston Churchill.

Lloyd George had urged serious consideration of the peace feelers Hitler had broadcast in October 1939, after his conquest of Poland. In July 1940, while preparing for an invasion of England, Hitler made further overtures of peace and toyed with the idea of restoring the Duke of Windsor to the throne and Lloyd George to 10 Downing Street.

Lloyd George's last years were largely spent in his home at Churt in Surrey. His wife died in 1941, and 2 years later he married Frances Louise Stevenson, his personal secretary for 30 years. In 1944 they left Churt to reside in Wales near his boyhood home. On Dec. 31, 1944, he was elevated to the peerage. He died on March 26, 1945.

EWB

Locke, John (1632–1704), English philosopher and political theorist. John Locke began the empiricist tradition and thus initiated the greatest age of British philosophy. He attempted to center philosophy on an analysis of the extent and capabilities of the human mind.

John Locke was born on Aug. 29, 1632, in Wrington, in Somerset, where his mother's family resided. She died during his infancy, and Locke was raised by his father, who was an attorney in the small town of Pensford near Bristol. John was tutored at home because of his always delicate health and the outbreak of civil war in 1642. When he was 14, he entered Westminster School, where he remained for 6 years. He then went to Christ Church, Oxford. In 1658 he was elected a senior student at his college. In this capacity he taught Greek and moral philosophy. Under conditions at the time he would have had to be ordained to retain his fellowship. Instead he changed to another faculty, medicine, and eventually received a license to practice. During the same period Locke made the acquaintance of Robert Boyle, the distinguished scientist and one of the founders of the Royal Society, and, under Boyle's direction, took up study of natural science. Finally, in 1668, Locke was made a fellow of the Royal Society.

In 1665 Locke traveled to the Continent as secretary to the English ambassador to the Brandenburg court. Upon his return to England he chanced to medically attend Lord Ashley, 1st Earl of Shaftesbury, and later lord chancellor of England. Their friendship and lifelong association drew Locke into political affairs. He attended Shaftesbury as physician and adviser, and in this latter capacity Locke drafted *The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina* and served as secretary to the Board of Trade. In 1676 Locke went to France for his health. An inheritance from his father

made him financially independent, and he remained in Montpellier for 3 years.

Locke rejoined Shaftesbury's service, and when the latter fled to Holland, the philosopher followed. He remained in exile from 1683 to 1689, and during these years he was deprived of his studentship by express order of Charles III. Most of his important writings were composed during this period. After the Glorious Revolution of 1689 Locke returned to England and later served with distinction as a commissioner of trade until 1700. He spent his retirement at Oates in Essex as the guest of the Mashams. Lady Masham was the daughter of Ralph Cudworth, the philosopher. Locke died there on Oct. 28, 1704.

Major Works. Locke, by virtue of his temperament and mode of existence, was a man of great circumspection. None of his major writings was published until he was nearly 60. In 1690 he brought out his major works: *Two Treatises* and the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. But the four books of the *Essay* were the culmination of 20 years of intellectual labor. He relates that, together with a few friends, probably in 1670, a discussion arose concerning the basis of morality and religion. The conclusion was that they were unable to resolve the question until an investigation had been made to see "what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with." Thus the aim of this work is "to inquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds of belief, opinion, and assent."

The procedure employed is what he called the "historical, plain method," which consists of observations derived from external sensations and the internal processes of reflection or introspection. This psychological definition of experience as sensation and reflection shifted the focus of philosophy from an analysis of reality to an exploration of the mind. The new perspective was Locke's major contribution, and it dominated European thought for at least 2 centuries. But if knowledge consists entirely of experience, then the objects of cognition are ideas. The term "idea" was ambiguously defined by Locke as "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks." This broad use means that sensations, memories, imaginings, and feelings as well as concepts are ideas insofar as they are mental. The danger of Locke's epistemology is the inherent skepticism contained in a technique which describes what is "in" the mind. For if everything is an idea, then it is difficult to distinguish between true and false, real and imaginary, impressed sensations and expressed concepts. Thus Locke, and the subsequent history of philosophy, had to wrestle with the dilemma that a psychological de-

scription of the origin of ideas seriously undermines the extent of their objective validity.

Nonetheless the intention of the *Essay* was positive in that Locke wished to establish the dependence of all human knowledge upon everyday experience or sensation. The alternative theory of innate ideas is vigorously attacked. Although it is not historically certain whether anyone seriously maintained such a doctrine, Locke's general criticism lends indirect support to an experiential view of knowledge. Innatism can be understood in a naive way to mean that there are ideas of which we are fully conscious at birth or which are universally acknowledged, so that the mind possesses a disposition to think in terms of certain ideas. The first position is refuted by observation of children, and the second by the fact that there are no acknowledged universal ideas to which everyone agrees. The sophisticated version falls into contradiction by maintaining that we are conscious of an unconscious disposition.

Theory of Knowledge. Having refuted the a priori, or nonexperiential, account of knowledge, Locke devotes the first two books of the *Essay* to developing a deceptively simple empirical theory of knowledge. Knowing originates in external and internal sources of sensation and reflection. The objects or ideas present to consciousness are divided into simple and complex.

In this view the actual extent of man's knowledge is less than his ideas because he does not know the real connections between simple ideas, or primary and secondary qualities. Also, an intuitive knowledge of existence is limited to the self, and the only demonstrable existence is that of God as an eternal, omnipotent being. With the exception of the self and God, all knowledge of existing things is dependent upon sensation, whose cognitive status is "a little bit better than probability." The poverty of real knowledge is compensated to some extent by human judgment, which presumes things to be true without actually perceiving the connections. And, according to Locke's commonsense attitude, the severe restrictions placed upon knowledge merely reflect that man's mental capacity is suitable for his nature and condition.

EWB

Lombroso, Cesare (1835–1909), Italian criminologist. Cesare Lombroso devised the now-outmoded theory that criminality is determined by physiological traits. Called the father of modern criminology, he concentrated attention on the study of the individual offender.

Born in Verona on Nov. 6, 1835, Cesare Lombroso studied medicine at the universities of Pavia,

Padua, Vienna, and Genoa. His interests in psychology and psychiatry merged with his study of the physiology and anatomy of the brain and ultimately led to his anthropometric analysis of criminals. While he was in charge of the insane at hospitals in Pavia, Pesaro, and Reggio Emilia (1863–1872), his interest in physiognomical characteristics of the mentally disturbed increased.

In 1876 Lombroso became professor of legal medicine and public hygiene at the University of Turin. That year he wrote his most important and influential work, *Uomo delinquente*, which went through five editions in Italian and was published in various European languages but never in English. A deep and lasting friendship developed between Lombroso and his chief student, Enrico Ferri, who became Italy's leading criminologist.

Concept of Atavism. Lombroso's general theory suggested that criminals are distinguished from noncriminals by multiple physical anomalies. He postulated that criminals represented a reversion to a primitive or subhuman type of man characterized by physical features reminiscent of apes, lower primates, and early man and to some extent preserved, he said, in modern "savages." The behavior of these biological "throwbacks" will inevitably be contrary to the rules and expectations of modern civilized society.

Through years of postmortem examinations and anthropometric studies of criminals, the insane, and normal individuals, Lombroso became convinced that the "born criminal" (*reo nato*, a term given by Ferri) could be anatomically identified by such items as a sloping forehead, ears of unusual size, asymmetry of the face, prognathism, excessive length of arms, asymmetry of the cranium, and other "physical stigmata." Specific criminals, such as thieves, rapists, and murderers, could be distinguished by specific characteristics, he believed. Lombroso also maintained that criminals had less sensibility to pain and touch; more acute sight; a lack of moral sense, including an absence of remorse; more vanity, impulsiveness, vindictiveness, and cruelty; and other manifestations, such as a special criminal argot and the excessive use of tattooing.

Besides the "born criminal," Lombroso also described "criminaloids," or occasional criminals, criminals by passion, moral imbeciles, and criminal epileptics. He recognized the diminished role of organic factors in many habitual offenders and referred to the delicate balance between predisposing factors (organic, genetic) and precipitating factors (environment, opportunity, poverty).

Lombroso's research methods were clinical and descriptive, with precise details of skull dimension and

other measurements. But he did not enjoy the benefits of rigorous statistical comparisons of criminals and noncriminals. Adequate control groups, which he lacked, might have altered his general conclusions. Although he gave some recognition in his later years to psychological and sociological factors in the etiology of crime, he remained convinced of, and identified with, criminal anthropometry. He died in Turin on Oct. 19, 1909.

Lombroso's theories were influential throughout Europe, especially in schools of medicine, but not in the United States, where sociological studies of crime and the criminal predominated. His notions of physical differentiation between criminals and noncriminals were seriously challenged by Charles Goring (*The English Convict*, 1913), who made elaborate comparisons and found insignificant statistical differences.

EWB

Louis XIV (1638–1715), king of France from 1643–1715. Louis XIV brought the French monarchy to its peak of absolute power and made France the dominant power in Europe. His reign is also associated with the greatest age of French culture and art.

After the chaos of the Wars of Religion, the French monarchy had been reestablished by Louis XIV's grandfather, Henry IV. Successive rulers and ministers (Henry himself, Louis XIII, Cardinal Richelieu, and Cardinal Mazarin) had done all in their power to make the king absolute ruler within France and to make France, instead of the Hapsburg coalition of Spain and the empire, the dominant power in Europe. By the time Louis assumed personal control, the groundwork for final success had been laid. It was Louis who brought the work to completion, enforcing his will over France and Europe to an unprecedented extent and establishing the administrative machinery that made France a modern state.

Louis was born at Saint-Germain on Sept. 5, 1638, the son of Louis XIII and his wife, Anne of Austria. His birth was greeted with immense national rejoicing, and he was hailed as *le Dieudonné*, "the God-given." On May 16, 1643, his father died, and Louis became king. As he was only 4, the country was governed by his mother as regent; this meant, in effect, by Cardinal Mazarin, with whom Anne was in love. The successive rebellions known as the Fronde failed to dislodge Mazarin, although they left the boy king with a lifelong horror of rebellion and a resentment of Paris, where the uprising had started. Mazarin remained in power for the rest of his life, and only when he died, on March 9, 1661, did Louis astonish the court by announcing that henceforward he would

direct his government himself. He meant what he said. The government remained under Louis's personal control for the next 54 years.

His Character. Unlike his father, Louis enjoyed excellent health almost all his life. His appetites for food, hunting, and sex were enormous, and he had a passion, unusual in those days, for fresh air and walking. Though not tall, he was extremely impressive in appearance due to his great dignity and royal presence, particularly as he grew older and left his youthful exuberance behind. While he frequently displayed gross and even brutal selfishness, he was courteous, considerate, and good-natured, and he showed great loyalty to his friends and his servants. His concept of his royal position was undoubtedly arrogant, but he was always conscious of his duty as king and sincerely believed that he was devoting himself to the well-being of his subjects. He detested inefficiency, corruption, and the abuse of privilege and stamped them out wherever he encountered them. However, his own passion for personal glory led him to drag France into a series of wars, ultimately at appalling cost to his people. On his deathbed he confessed to having loved war too much, but there are no signs that he really understood what his passion had cost his country.

Louis began with a team of excellent ministers inherited from Mazarin, but only now put to full and proper use. The most important were Michel Le Tellier, in charge of military affairs (assisted, and ultimately succeeded, by his son the Marquis de Louvois), and Jean Baptiste Colbert, whose immense sphere included the navy, the royal household, religion, cultural activities, colonies, and the whole direction of the economy. Nicolas Fouquet, who as superintendent of finances had been Mazarin's most important lieutenant, was regarded by Louis as dangerous. He was charged with peculation, found guilty, and imprisoned; Louis intervened to change his sentence from banishment to imprisonment for life. This uncharacteristic act of injustice reveals Louis's fear of another Fronde.

There was no first minister. Louis had resolved to allow no minister primacy after Mazarin, and in fact he preferred to keep his ministers divided into mutually hostile groups. He himself supported his ministers without reservation if he thought them right and never yielded to pressure to get rid of them; but he never allowed them to become presumptuous. Always suspicious of any subject who might grow too powerful, he would not allow any great nobles, even his own brother, onto the council.

Military Activities. For the next 11 years Louis's primary commitment was the restoration of

the French economy to health and vigor after the neglect of Mazarin's time. In 1672, however, exasperated at his failure to destroy the economic supremacy of the Dutch, he invaded their country, assisted by England whose king, Charles II, was on his payroll. Instead of the easy triumph he had expected, he found himself faced by dogged Dutch resistance, resolutely led by William of Orange and supported by a growing number of allies. The war lasted for 6 years and ended with Dutch economic ascendancy as strong as ever. France had acquired Franche-Comté from Spain and useful gains in the Spanish Netherlands, but at the cost of permanently abandoning the economic and fiscal progress made by Colbert down to 1672. For the rest of the reign the economic progress of France was first halted and then reversed.

Louis then pursued a policy of deliberate, though limited, aggression, bullying his neighbors and encroaching on their territory. This aroused increasing fear and resentment in Europe, and Louis was finally confronted by a coalition which plunged him into the War of the League of Augsburg. This war, which lasted from 1689 till 1697, left France in possession of Strasbourg, which Louis had seized in 1681, but exhausted and in no shape to meet the still greater war that was about to break out.

This was the War of the Spanish Succession. The last Spanish Hapsburg, Charles II, was certain to die without children and would leave a vast inheritance. To avoid conflict, the two claimants to the inheritance, Louis and the Emperor, had already reached an agreement to divide this inheritance between them. Just before his death, however, Charles offered to make Louis's grandson Philip his sole heir, with the stipulation that if Louis refused, the inheritance was to pass undivided to the Emperor's younger son. Louis considered that this offer made his previous agreement invalid and against the advice of his council accepted it. This inevitably meant war with Austria, but it was owing to Louis's greed and tactlessness that Britain and Holland were brought in as well. Once again France found itself facing an immense coalition, and this time it had only begun to recover from the last war.

This final war lasted from 1701 to 1714 and did France incalculable damage. Thanks to the courage and determination of Louis and his people, the fighting did not end in disaster. Philip retained the Spanish throne, and the only losses of territory France suffered were overseas. But the country had suffered years of appalling hardship; the population was sharply reduced by famine; industry and commerce were at a standstill; and the peasantry was crushed by an unprecedented load of taxation. The King's death the

next year was greeted with a relief almost as great as the joy that had welcomed his birth.

Domestic Policy. Louis's religion was a rather unintelligent and bigoted Catholicism. At the same time he regarded himself as God's deputy in France and would allow no challenge to his authority, from the Pope or anyone else. As a result, he was involved in a series of unedifying quarrels with successive popes, which dragged on for years of futile stalemate and gave rise to the probably baseless suspicion that he might be contemplating a break with the Church on the lines of Henry VIII.

To reassure Catholic opinion as to his orthodoxy, Louis kept up a steady pressure against the Protestants in France. Finally, in 1685, he revoked the Edict of Nantes (by which Protestants had been granted toleration in 1598), forbade the practice of the Calvinist religion in France (he was less concerned about Lutherans), expelled all Calvinist pastors, and forbade lay Protestants, under savage penalties, to emigrate. There was great indignation abroad, even in Catholic circles, but in the intolerant atmosphere then prevailing in Catholic France, Louis's action was very popular.

At intervals throughout his reign Louis mounted a campaign against the Jansenists, a rigorist sect within the Catholic Church. He became so bitter toward them that he ended by reversing his antipapal policy in the hope of enlisting the Pope's support. This was forthcoming, and the Jansenists were condemned by the bull *Unigenitus* in 1713; but this interference outraged French national feeling, and the Jansenist cause gained considerably in popularity as a result.

Neither the government of France by a group of overlapping councils nor the administration of the provinces by intendants (royal agents equipped with full powers in every field) originated with Louis, but he took over these systems, making them more comprehensive and efficient, and extending the system of intendants for the first time to the whole of France. Government became much more efficient in his day, but much of this efficiency was lost after his death. It also became more bureaucratic, and this change was permanent. Increasingly, the affairs of provincial France came to be decided by the council, and local initiative was discouraged. Remembering the Fronde, Louis no doubt believed that anything was better than the semianarchy of the old days; but it can be argued that he carried the spirit of regimentation a good deal too far. Governmental overcentralization is a source of endless friction in France to this day. Louis neither initiated this centralization nor carried it to its final completion, but he certainly accelerated it.

The basic factor in the Fronde had been noble anarchy, and Louis was determined to keep the nobility in line. All through his reign he did his best to undercut the independent position of the nobles and turn them, particularly the richer and more powerful of them, into courtiers. In this he was largely successful. Versailles, which became the seat of government in 1682 (although the palace was still far from completion), became the magnet to which the nobility were attracted. No nobleman could hope for appointment to any important position without paying assiduous court at Versailles. The cult of monarchy, which Louis deliberately strengthened to the utmost of his ability, made them in any case flock to Versailles of their own free will; exclusion from the charmed circle of the court came to be regarded as social death. Louis has been criticized by some historians for turning the French nobility into gilded parasites, but it may be doubted, as the Fronde demonstrated, whether they were fit to play any more constructive role. Although he preferred to select his generals, his bishops, and (contrary to legend) his ministers from the nobility, Louis did not make the mistake of his successors and exclude the Third Estate from all the best positions. He made some of his appointments from the bourgeoisie.

Culture and Art. The reign of Louis XIV is often equated with the great age of French culture. In fact, this age began under Richelieu and was clearly over some years before Louis died. Nor did he do very much to help it. In the 1660s he indulged in some patronage of writers, but his benevolence was capriciously bestowed, frequently on second-rate men, and it dried up almost entirely when economic conditions worsened after 1672. Nevertheless, Jean Racine and Molière were substantially helped by Louis, and it was largely thanks to the king that Molière's plays were performed in spite of conservative opposition. The King's enthusiasm for building (Versailles, Marly, Trianon, and others), while costing the country more than it could afford, certainly furnished artists and architects with valuable commissions, and the King's love of musical spectacles offered a golden opportunity for composers. The flowering of painting, architecture, music, and landscape gardening in France at this time must be largely credited to Louis.

Personal Life. Louis was married to Maria Theresa, daughter of Philip IV of Spain, as part of the settlement by which Mazarin ended the Spanish war. He married her reluctantly (he was in love with Mazarin's own niece at the time) and made no pretense of being faithful to her; but he was fond of her after his fashion, and at her death observed, "This is the first

sorrow she has ever caused me. “ Overcharged with sexual energy practically all his life, he had a number of mistresses, whose jealousy of each other was a principal topic of court gossip. By the two best-known, Louise de La Vallière and Athénaïs de Montespan, he had a number of illegitimate children, of whom he was very fond; his fatherly attempts to secure for them, after his death, a position above their station caused a good deal of trouble. His attention was finally caught by Françoise Scarron, who had become the governess of these children; he made her Marquise de Maintenon and settled down in domestic respectability with her. In later life he became very puritanical, and Madame de Maintenon has sometimes been blamed for this, but it seems likely that the change was inherent in Louis’s own nature.

Louis did not allow the pursuit of pleasure to interfere with his professional duties; all his life he worked indefatigably at the business of government. He also fancied himself, without justification, as a soldier and derived much pleasure from conducting lengthy sieges of towns that were bound to surrender in any case and giving his generals unsought and unwelcome advice as to how to conduct their campaigns.

The King’s last years were darkened not only by the successive disasters of the war and the desperate condition of his people but by a series of personal tragedies. In quick succession his son, the two grandsons still with him, and one of his two infant great-grandsons died. With them died his grandson’s wife, the young Duchess of Burgundy, whom Louis adored. Only his other great-grandson survived, to succeed him at the age of 5 as Louis XV. When Louis died, France had long been sick of him, and his funeral procession was insulted in the streets.

History can see him in a fairer perspective. He was not “Louis the Great,” as he was sycophantically hailed in his lifetime; he was a man of average intelligence and human failings who committed many blunders and several crimes. Nevertheless, he did his duty as he saw it, with a quite exceptional conscientiousness and devotion. He saw himself as responsible to God for the well-being of his people, and though his interpretation of this responsibility was often strange, it was always sincere. More than any other man except Richelieu, he was the architect of the French national state. The greatness which France achieved in his lifetime was largely his doing.

EWB

Louis XVI (1754–1793), king of France from 1774–1792. Louis XVI failed to understand the revolutionary forces at work in France and thus contributed to the fall of the monarchy.

Louis XVI had the virtues of an admirable private individual but few of those required for a successful ruler, particularly during a turbulent period. He was a devoted father and husband, uncommon virtues for royalty in his day (in 1770 he married Marie Antoinette, daughter of Emperor Francis I and Maria Theresa). His chief vices were a tendency to overeat and a love of hunting. Although historians often cite with some condescension his skill as a locksmith, Louis was not entirely devoid of intellectual interests, particularly in the area of the sciences and geography. However, although sincerely interested in the well-being of his people, he was indecisive, was easily influenced, and lacked the strength to support reforming ministers against the hostility of the Queen, his family, the court, and the privileged classes whose position was threatened by change.

At the beginning of his reign Louis XVI restored the powers of the Parlement, for long the main obstacle to reform, thus reversing the actions of Louis XV, who had drastically curtailed its authority. However, at the same time he appointed as controller general (actually first minister) A. R. J. Turgot, a friend of the *philosophes* and advocate of reform. At first Louis supported the attempts of his minister to accomplish such reforms as abolition of the monopoly of the guilds, the royal *corvée* (required labor on roads and bridges), and the elimination of internal barriers to the circulation of grain. However, he was unable to resist the pressure of those opposed to reform and in 1776 reluctantly dismissed the minister, saying, “You and I, M. Turgot, are the only ones who really love the people.”

Turgot was succeeded by the Genevan banker Jacques Necker, who acquired a reputation as a financial genius for his skill in negotiating loans; he financed French aid to the American colonies in their struggle against England without raising taxes. Necker’s popularity became even greater when the King yielded to pressure from the court and privileged groups and also dismissed Necker.

After several brief ministries C. A. de Calonne was named controller general in 1783. In 1787, after attempting various expedients, Calonne, like several of his predecessors, concluded that the only solution for the growing deficit was to tax the privileged groups. Once more Louis XVI failed to support his minister, who had to resign. By 1788, however, as it became clear that France was on the verge of bankruptcy, pressure mounted on Louis XVI to convoke the Estates General, which had not met for 175 years, to deal with the fiscal crisis. In the summer of 1788 the King yielded to the popular outcry, and the fol-

lowing year (May 1789) the Estates General met at Versailles, opening the era of the French Revolution.

French Revolution. From the outset Louis XVI's actions and failure to act pushed the French people (as of May 1789 almost all accepted the institution of monarchy) along the path to revolution. Before the meeting of the Estates General he had agreed at the urging of Necker, who had been recalled to office, to allow the Third Estate representation equal to that of the other two Estates combined. The King was vague, however, on whether each Estate would meet and vote separately, in which case the privileged Estates could outvote the Third, or whether the vote would be by "head." On June 23 the King finally ordered the three Estates to meet separately, but when the Third Estate refused to obey, Louis XVI, characteristically, yielded. Before this the Estates General had adopted the title National Constituent Assembly, sign of its determination to give France a written constitution.

The response of the King, under the influence of reactionary court circles, was to summon troops to Versailles and to dismiss Necker, who had urged cooperation with the Third Estate. This was the immediate cause for the taking of the royal fortress, the Bastille, by the Parisian crowd (July 14).

Such acts as the refusal of the King to approve the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the decrees of Aug. 4–5, 1789, abolishing the remnants of the seigneurial regime, as well as a severe inflation, led to the Revolutionary days of Oct. 5–6, 1789, when a Parisian crowd forced the court to move from Versailles to Paris, where it could be controlled more easily. On June 20–21, 1791, Louis XVI sought to escape from Paris to eastern France, in the hope that with the aid of loyal troops he could return to Paris and reestablish his authority. However, at Varennes the royal party was recognized and forced to return to Paris, where the Revolutionaries had lost all confidence in the monarchy.

In September 1791 the National Assembly adjourned and was succeeded by the Legislative Assembly. By now Louis believed that the only hope for the monarchy was foreign intervention. He anticipated that the French armies, severely weakened by the desertion of royalist officers, would be quickly defeated and that the country would then turn to him to obtain more favorable terms. For reasons of their own some of the Revolutionaries, the Girondists, also wanted war. On April 20, 1792, France declared war on Austria, which was soon joined by Prussia.

From the outbreak of the war, events moved rapidly. Revolutionary France was incensed by the

manifesto of the Prussian commander, the Duke of Brunswick, threatening dire punishment on Paris if the royal family were harmed. On Aug. 10, 1792, the crowd forced the Legislative Assembly to suspend the King, who, with the royal family, became prisoner of the Commune of Paris. The National Convention, which succeeded the Legislative Assembly, abolished the monarchy and decided to try "Citizen Capet," as Louis XVI was now called, for treason. He was found guilty, sentenced to death, and on Jan. 21, 1793, guillotined.

EWB

Lukács, Gyorgy (1885–1971), Hungarian literary critic and philosopher. Gyorgy Lukács was one of the foremost Marxist literary critics and theorists. His influence on criticism has been considerable in both Western and Eastern Europe.

Gyorgy Lukács was born April 13, 1885, in Budapest, into a wealthy, intellectual, Jewish banking family. He was a brilliant student and was given a cosmopolitan education in Hungary and Germany. Until 1917 he devoted himself to art and esthetics and was not interested in politics. Writing primarily in German, he achieved his first fame as a literary critic with *The Soul and the Forms* (Hungarian, 1910; German, 1911) and *The Theory of the Novel* (1916 as an article; 1920 as a book), a study of the spiritual aspects of the novel. During World War I he taught in a German university.

Because of the shock of the war and the impressions made on him by the Russian Revolution, Lukács completed a move from Neo-Kantianism through Hegelianism to Marxism and joined the Hungarian Communist party. Despite the party's often official displeasure with his intellectual work, he remained faithful to it. In 1919 he served as deputy commissar of culture in the revolutionary Béla Kun Communist government in Hungary. After the government was overthrown, he had to emigrate to Vienna and for about a decade participated actively in party affairs and disputes.

In 1923 he wrote *History and Class Consciousness*. This complex, theoretical, sociological work explored important but, until then, little-emphasized aspects of Marx's work: the strong connection with Hegel, the importance of the dialectic, and the concept of alienation. He also examined the nature of the working class's own self-consciousness. Lukács argued that genuine Marxism was not a body of rigid economic truths but a method of analysis which could enable the revolution to be created. His interpretation of Marxism influenced many European intellectuals but was attacked as dangerously revisionist by Soviet

dogmatists, and his career in party politics was over by the late 1920s.

With the danger of fascism growing in Europe, Lukács emigrated to the Soviet Union in 1933. He worked as a literary editor and critic, emphasizing the relationship between a work of art and its sociohistorical period. Several times he publicly repudiated all his previous work and occasionally shifted his views to conform to the official party line and paid lip service to official Soviet socialist realism, but he later regarded this as a tactical necessity to survive physically in Stalin's Russia and still get his ideas heard. Despite occasional Marxist-Leninist dogmatism, he wrote perceptive criticism and concentrated on realistic 19th-century literature. Whether through personal predilection or the exigencies of the Communist party line, he became cold to almost the entire modernist movement in literature.

Returning to Hungary in 1945, Lukács was active in cultural affairs and as a professor of esthetics and cultural philosophy, but he was again stigmatized for his heterodox views. Deeply affected by Nikita Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's crimes, he spoke out publicly against Stalinist dogmatism in Hungary, and in 1956, joined the short-lived Imré Nagy government. After the Soviet invasion of Hungary, he was exiled to Romania, allowed to return in 1957, and forced to retire and go into seclusion. However, after 1965 he was again publicly honored in Hungary. Lukács died on June 4, 1971, in Budapest.

EWB

Lumière, Auguste (1862–1954) and *Louis* (1864–1948), French inventors. The Lumière brothers were responsible for a number of practical improvements in photography and motion pictures. Their work on color photography resulted in the Autochrome process, which remained the preferred method of creating color prints until the 1930s. They also applied their technological talents to the new idea of motion picture photography, creating the first projection system that allowed a film to be seen by more than one person at a time.

Auguste and Louis Lumière were pioneers in the improvement of photographic materials and processes in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Using their scientific abilities and business talents, they were responsible for developing existing ideas in still photography and motion pictures to produce higher quality products that were practical enough to be of commercial value. Their initial business success was manufacturing a "dry" photographic plate that provided a new level of convenience to photographers. The brothers later turned to less viable experiments with color pho-

tography, producing a more refined, but expensive, method known as the Autochrome process. The best-known of the Lumières' achievements, however, was the Cinematograph system of projected motion pictures. Their 1895 screening of a series of short films created with the Cinematograph at a Paris café is considered the first public cinema performance in history.

Auguste Marie Louis Lumière was born on October 19, 1862, in Besançon, France. His younger brother and future collaborator, Louis Jean Lumière, was born October 5, 1864, in the same town. The brothers also had two other siblings, a sister, Jeanne, and a brother, Édouard, who was killed while serving as a pilot in World War I. The Lumière children were influenced by the artistic and technological interests of their father, Claude-Antoine (known as Antoine) Lumière, a painter and award-winning photographer. In 1860, Antoine had established his own studio in Besançon, where he met and married Jeanne-Joséphine Costille. He entered into a partnership with another photographer in Lyons in 1871, and over the coming years won medals in places such as Paris and Vienna for his photographs. His sons Auguste and Louis would also be avid photographers throughout their lives.

Produced New Photographic Plates. Antoine Lumière encouraged the scientific interests of his sons, and over the years the brothers developed their own specialities. Both had a firm grasp of organic chemistry, an asset that would become valuable in their later photographic work. But while Auguste had a preference for topics in biochemistry and medicine, Louis was more interested in the subject of physics. While attending Martinière Technical School, Louis distinguished himself as the top student in his class in 1880. It was during his school years that Louis began working on an improved photographic plate. Originally, "wet" photographic plates had been the only available medium for photography; these were very inconvenient, however, because they required treatment in a dark room immediately before and after the exposure of the plate. A new, more convenient, "dry" plate had been developed and marketed in the 1870s. Louis developed a better version of the dry plate that became known as the "blue label" plate.

The Lumière brothers and their father saw the potential for marketing such a product, and so, with financial backing from Antoine Lumière, the brothers began producing the plates in 1882. The following year, the venture opened a manufacturing facility in Lyons as the Antoine Lumière and Sons company. As the "blue label" plate became more popular among photographers, production increased from a few thou-

sand a year to more than one million a year by 1886 and 15 million a year by 1894. The contributions of each brother to the success of the company and its products are difficult to isolate, because throughout their careers, the brothers both engaged in refining scientific techniques and they shared all credit on their works and patents. Although their interests varied as the focus of the company changed, a profound professional respect was always obvious between the two and certainly played a major role in their fruitful research and business partnership.

The Problem of Color Photography. The financial security the Lumière brothers enjoyed, from their booming sales of the dry plate, allowed them to carry out experiments in other aspects of photography. In the early 1890s, they turned to the problem of color photography. Since the advent of photography in the 1830s, numerous attempts had been made to create color photographs, with mixed success. The British scientist James Clerk Maxwell had devised a method in which a color reproduction could be created by using variously colored filters to photograph a subject; the resulting picture, however, could only be viewed by projecting the image—no prints were possible. This obstacle was overcome in the 1860s by the French researcher Louis Ducos du Hauron, who produced a color image by superimposing positive and negative shots taken through colored filters. While a print could be produced in this way, it was a complicated and time-consuming process that never gained much popularity. The Lumières set themselves to the task of creating a more practical application of color photography, but they eventually set the topic aside in favor of pursuing the exciting new field of motion pictures. Their early experiments in color photography, however, provided the groundwork for later innovations.

The interest in film technology had begun as a sort of hobby for the brothers, but soon they realized that work in this area could have great commercial value. Beginning in the summer of 1894, they began to look for a way to project motion pictures. The moving picture had been pioneered more than a decade earlier by the English photographer and bookseller Eadweard Muybridge. In an attempt to find a way to analyze the movement of a horse, around 1880 Muybridge had taken a series of photos of a horse in motion and placed the images on a glass disc that allowed him to project the images in quick succession. The result was a moving image, but one that was limited by the number of pictures that could fit on the disc. The idea was taken up later in the 1880s by French physiologist Étienne-Jules Marey and U.S. in-

ventor Thomas Edison. Edison led experiments that resulted in the 1889 creation of his kinetograph, a machine that used strips of photographic paper to take motion pictures. In 1893 Edison and his researchers produced the kinoscope, a device also known as a “peep box,” which allowed a single person to view the moving image. The Lumière brothers’ goal was to improve on Edison’s ideas by finding a way to project motion picture films for a larger audience.

Created First Projected Motion Pictures.

Louis realized that the main obstacle to their goal of projection was finding a way to automatically create a continuous movement of the film containing the images. Part of the answer to the problem was found by Louis, who suddenly was inspired while lying awake one night. He realized that the same “presser foot” mechanism that drives a sewing machine could be adapted to move small sections, or frames, of film across the lens in quick succession, allowing a short period of time for each frame to be stationary to allow for exposure. Louis drew up the plans for a prototype camera, which was constructed by one of his technicians at the family factory. This machine, known as the Cinématograph, underwent a number of further developments that made it an extremely versatile tool. Not only could it create the negatives of an image on film, but it could also print a positive image as well as project the results at a speed of 12 frames per second.

Louis made the first use of his new camera in the summer of 1894, filming workers leaving the Lumière plant. He presented the film to the Société d’Encouragement pour l’Industrie Nationale on March 22, 1895. He and Auguste then made arrangements to bring a series of short films to a public audience. They rented a room at the Grand Café in Paris, and on December 28, 1895, held the first public show of projected moving pictures. The audience wasn’t quite sure what to make of the new technology. Louis’s creative use of the camera had led him to photograph an approaching train from a head-on perspective; some people in the audience were frightened at the image on the oncoming locomotive and in a panic tried to escape—others simply fainted. Despite their surprise, even shock, at the sight of moving pictures, audiences flocked to the Lumières’ demonstrations and the Cinématograph was soon in high demand all around the world.

Autochrome Process Invented. Both Auguste and Louis created films for a while, but eventually they handed this work over to others so they could pursue other interests. Louis returned to re-

search on color photography, developing the Autochrome process in 1904. His method, although still fairly expensive, provided a level of convenience similar to the dry plate. Autochrome achieved recognition as the best means of producing color images at that time and remained the favored means of color photography for the next 30 years. In later years, Louis would continue his interest in visual reproduction by developing a photographic method for measuring objects in 1920 and inventing relief cinematography techniques in 1935. Auguste spent the early 1900s investigating medical topics such as tuberculosis, cancer, and pharmacology. He joined the medical profession in 1914 as the director of a hospital radiology department. In 1928, Auguste published a medical book entitled *Life, Illness, and Death: Colloidal Phenomena*.

The Lumière brothers were each recognized for their numerous technological and scientific achievements: Auguste was named a member of the Legion of Honor, and Louis was elected to the French Academy of Sciences. At the age of 83, Louis Lumière died in Bandol, France, on June 6, 1948. His older brother lived to the age of 91 and died in his longtime home of Lyons, France, on April 10, 1954. For their work together in creating improvements in both photography and motion pictures, the Lumière brothers are recognized as symbols of an age of technological creativity and growth. They are also remembered for their lifelong aims of bringing such technology to a wider marketplace, a value seen most clearly in their contributions to the motion picture industry, which has become a popular form of entertainment in countries around the world.

EWB

Luther, Martin (1483–1546, German reformer. Martin Luther was the first and greatest figure in the 16th-century Reformation. A composer of commentaries on Scripture, theology, and ecclesiastical abuses, a hymnologist, and a preacher, from his own time to the present he has been a symbol of Protestantism.

Martin Luther was born at Eisleben in Saxony on Nov. 10, 1483, the son of Hans and Margaret Luther. Luther's parents were of peasant stock, but his father had worked hard to raise the family's status, first as a miner and later as the owner of several small mines, to become a small-scale entrepreneur. In 1490 Martin was sent to the Latin school at Mansfeld, in 1497 to Magdeburg, and in 1498 to Eisenach. His early education was typical of late-15th-century practice. To a young man in Martin's circumstances, only the law and the church offered likely avenues of success, and Hans Luther's anticlericalism probably influenced his decision that his son should become a lawyer

and increase the Luther family's prosperity, which Hans had begun. Martin was enrolled at the University of Erfurt in 1501. He received a bachelor of arts degree in 1502 and a master of arts in 1505. In the same year he enrolled in the faculty of law, giving every sign of being a dutiful and, likely, a very successful son.

Religious Conversion. Between 1503 and 1505, however, Martin experienced a religious crisis which would take him from the study of law forever. His own personal piety, fervently and sometimes grimly instilled by his parents and early teachers, and his awareness of a world in which the supernatural was perilously close to everyday life were sharpened by a series of events whose exact character has yet to be precisely determined. A dangerous accident in 1503, the death of a friend a little later, and Martin's own personal religious development had by 1505 started other concerns in him.

Then, on July 2, 1505, returning to Erfurt after visiting home, Martin was caught in a severe thunderstorm in which he was flung to the ground in terror, and he suddenly vowed to become a monk if he survived. This episode, as important in Christian history as the equally famous (and parallel) scene of St. Paul's conversion, changed the course of Luther's life. Two weeks later, against the opposition of his father and to the dismay of his friends, Martin Luther entered the Reformed Congregation of the Eremitical Order of St. Augustine at Erfurt. Luther himself saw this decision as sudden and based upon fear: "I had been called by heavenly terrors, for not freely or desirously did I become a monk, much less to gratify my belly, but walled around with the terror and agony of sudden death I vowed a constrained and necessary vow."

Luther's early life as a monk reflected his precipitate reasons for entering a monastery: "I was a good monk, and kept strictly to my order, so that I could say that if the monastic life could get a man to heaven, I should have entered." Monastic life at Erfurt was hard. Monks had long become (with the friars and many of the secular clergy) the targets of anticlerical feeling. Charged with having forsaken their true mission and having fallen into greed and ignorance, monastic orders made many attempts at reform in the 15th and 16th centuries. The congregation at Erfurt had been reformed in 1473. The year before Luther entered the Augustinian order at Erfurt, the vicar general Johann Staupitz (later Luther's friend) had revised further the constitution of the order.

Luther made his vows in 1506 and was ordained a priest in 1507. Reconciled with his father, he was

then selected for advanced theological study at the University of Erfurt, with which his house had several connections.

Luther at Wittenberg. In 1508 Luther was sent to the newer University of Wittenberg to lecture in arts. Like a modern graduate student, he was also preparing for his doctorate of theology while he taught. He lectured on the standard medieval texts, for example, Peter Lombard's *Book of Sentences*; and he read for the first time the works of St. Augustine. In 1510 Luther was sent to Rome on business of the order and in 1512 received his doctorate in theology. Then came the second significant turn in Luther's career: he was appointed to succeed Staupitz as professor of theology at Wittenberg. Luther was to teach throughout the rest of his life. Whatever fame and notoriety his later writings and statements were to bring him, his work was teaching, which he fulfilled diligently until his death.

Wittenberg was a new university, founded in 1502–1503, strongly supported by the elector Frederick the Wise. By 1550, thanks to the efforts of Luther and his colleague Philip Melancthon, it was to become the most popular university in Germany. In 1512, however, it lacked the prestige of Erfurt and Leipzig and was insignificant in the eyes of the greatest of the old universities, that of Paris. It was not a good place for an ambitious academic, but Luther was not ambitious in this sense. His rapid rise was due to his native ability, his boundless energy, his dedication to the religious life, and his high conception of his calling as a teacher.

The intellectual climate which shaped Luther's thought is difficult to analyze precisely. The two competing philosophic systems of the late Middle Ages—scholasticism (derived from the Aristotelianism of St. Thomas Aquinas) and nominalism (derived from the skepticism of William of Ockham and his successors)—both appear to have influenced Luther, particularly in their insistence on rigorous formal logic as the basis of philosophic and theological inquiry. From Ockhamism, Luther probably derived his awareness of the infinite remoteness and majesty of God and of the limitation of the human intellect in its efforts to apprehend that majesty.

Luther's professional work forced him further to develop the religious sensibility which had drawn him to monasticism in 1505. In the monastery and later in the university Luther experienced other religious crises, all of which were based upon his acute awareness of the need for spiritual perfection and his equally strong conviction of his own human frailty, which caused him almost to despair before the overwhelming

majesty and wrath of God. In 1509 Luther published his lectures on Peter Lombard; in 1513–1515 those on the Psalms; in 1515–1516 on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans; and in 1516–1518 on the epistles to the Galatians and Hebrews. Like all other Christians, Luther read the Bible, and in these years his biblical studies became more and more important to him. Besides teaching and study, however, Luther had other duties. From 1514 he preached in the parish church; he was regent of the monastery school; and in 1515 he became the supervisor of 11 other monasteries.

Righteousness of God. Luther's crisis of conscience centered upon the question of his old monastic fears concerning the insufficiency of his personal efforts to placate a wrathful God. In his own person, these fears came to a head in 1519, when he began to interpret the passage in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans which says that the justice of God is revealed in the Gospels.

Luther, the energetic monk and young theologian, felt himself to be "a sinner with an unquiet conscience." After an intense period of crisis, Luther discovered another interpretation of St. Paul's text: "I began to understand that Justice of God . . . to be understood passively as that whereby the merciful God justifies us by faith. . . . At this I felt myself to be born anew, and to enter through open gates into paradise itself." Only faith in God's mercy, according to Luther, can effect the saving righteousness of God in man. "Works," the term which Luther used to designate both formal, ecclesiastically authorized liturgy and the more general sense of "doing good," became infinitely less important to him than faith.

The doctrine of justification, taking shape in Luther's thought between 1515 and 1519, drew him into further theological speculation as well as into certain positions of practical ecclesiastical life. The most famous of these is the controversy over indulgences. In 1513 a great effort to dispense indulgences was proclaimed throughout Germany. In spite of the careful theological reservations surrounding them, indulgences appeared to the preachers who sold them and to the public who bought them as a means of escaping punishment in the afterlife for a sum of money. In 1517 Luther posted the 95 Theses for an academic debate on indulgences on the door of the castle church at Wittenberg. Both the place and the event were customary events in an academic year, and they might have gone unnoticed had not someone translated Luther's Latin theses into German and printed them, thus giving them widespread fame and calling them to the attention of both theologians and the public.

News of Dr. Luther's theses spread, and in 1518 Luther was called before Cardinal Cajetan, the papal legate at Augsburg, to renounce his theses. Refusing to do so, Luther returned to Wittenberg, where, in the next year, he agreed to a debate with the theologian Johann Eck. The debate, originally scheduled to be held between Eck and Luther's colleague Karlstadt, soon became a struggle between Eck and Luther in which Luther was driven by his opponent to taking even more radical theological positions, thus laying himself open to the charge of heresy. By 1521 Eck secured a papal bull (decree) condemning Luther, and Luther was summoned to the Imperial Diet at Worms in 1521 to answer the charges against him.

Diet of Worms. Luther throughout his life always revealed a great common sense, and he always retained his humorous understanding of practical life. He reflected an awareness of both the material and spiritual worlds, and his flights of poetic theology went hand in hand with the occasional coarseness of his polemics. His wit and thought were spontaneous, his interest in people of all sorts genuine and intense, his power of inspiring affection in his students and colleagues never failing. He was always remarkably frank, and although he became first the center of the Reform movement and later one of many controversial figures in it, he retained a sense of self-criticism, attributing his impact to God.

Great personal attraction, absolute dedication to his theological principles, kindness and loyalty to his friends, and an acute understanding of his own human weakness—these were the characteristics of Luther when he came face to face with the power of the papacy and empire at Worms in 1521. He was led to a room in which his collected writings were piled on a table and ordered to repudiate them. He asked for time to consider and returned the next day and answered: "Unless I am proved wrong by the testimony of Scripture or by evident reason I am bound in conscience and held fast to the Word of God. Therefore I cannot and will not retract anything, for it is neither safe nor salutary to act against one's conscience. God help me. Amen." Luther left Worms and was taken, for his own safety, to the castle of Wartburg, where he spent some months in seclusion, beginning his great translation of the Bible into German and writing numerous tracts.

Return to Wittenberg. In 1522 Luther returned to Wittenberg, where he succeeded in cooling the radical reforming efforts of his colleague Karlstadt and continued the incessant writing which would fill the rest of his life. In 1520 he had written three of his

most famous tracts: *To The Christian Nobility of the German Nation*, which enunciates a social program of religious reform; *On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, on Sacraments, the Mass, and papal power; and *Of the Liberty of a Christian Man*, a treatise on faith and on the inner liberty which faith affords those who possess it.

The Lutheran Bible, which was "a vehicle of proletarian education" as well as a monument in the spiritual history of Europe, not only gave Luther's name and views wider currency but revealed the translator as a great master of German prose, an evaluation which Luther's other writings justify.

Besides these works, Luther had other matters at hand. His name was used now by many people, including many with whom he disagreed. The Reformation had touched society and its institutions as well as religion, and Luther was drawn into conflicts, such as the Peasants' Rebellion of 1524–1525 and the affairs of the German princes, which drew from him new ideas on the necessary social and political order of Christian Germany. Luther's violent antipeasant writings from this period have often been criticized. His fears of the dangerous role of extreme reformers like Karlstadt and Thomas Münzer, however, were greater than his hope for social reform through revolution. Luther came to rely heavily upon the princes to carry out his program of reform. In 1525 Luther married Katherine von Bora, a nun who had left her convent. From that date until his death, Luther's family life became not only a model of the Christian home but a source of psychological support to him.

Luther's theological writings continued to flow steadily. Often they were written in response to his critics or in the intense heat of debate with Protestant rivals. Among those great works not brought about by conflict should be numbered the *Great Catechism* and the *Small Catechism* of 1529 and his collection of sermons and hymns, many of the latter, like *Ein Feste Burg*, still sung today.

Debates with Theologians. In 1524–1525 Luther entered into a discussion of free will with the great Erasmus. Luther's *On the Will in Bondage* (1525) remained his definitive statement on the question. In 1528 Luther turned to the question of Christ's presence in the Eucharist in his *Confession concerning the Lord's Supper*, which attracted the hostility of a number of reformers, notably Ulrich Zwingli. In 1529 Luther's ally Melancthon arranged a discussion between the two, and the Marburg Colloquy, as the debate is known, helped to close one of the early breaches in Protestant agreement.

In 1530, when Charles V was once again able to turn to the problems of the Reformation in Germany, Luther supervised, although he did not entirely agree with, the writing of Melancthon's Augsburg Confession, one of the foundations of later Protestant thought. From 1530 on Luther spent as much time arguing with other Reformation leaders on matters of theology as with his Catholic opponents.

Luther's disputes with other theologians were carried out with the same intensity he applied to his other work: he longed for Christian unity, but he could not accept the theological positions which many others had advanced. He was also fearful of the question of a general council in the Church. In 1539 he wrote his *On Councils and Churches* and witnessed in the following years the failure of German attempts to heal the wounds of Christianity. On the eve of his death he watched with great concern the calling of the Council of Trent, the Catholic response to the Reformation.

In the 1540s Luther was stricken with diseases a number of times, drawing great comfort from his family and from the lyrical, plain devotional exercises which he had written for children. In 1546 he was called from a sickbed to settle the disputes of two German noblemen. On the return trip he fell sick and died at Eisleben, the town of his birth, on Feb. 18, 1546.

EWB

Luxemburg, Rosa (1871–1919), Polish revolutionary and theorist. Rosa Luxemburg led the German workers' uprisings which followed World War I and is considered one of the pioneer activists and foremost martyrs of the international Communist movement.

Rosa Luxemburg was born in Zamo in Russian Poland and brought up in Warsaw. She was the daughter of a middle-class, Polish-speaking Jewish merchant. Dainty, almost tiny, she walked with a limp as the result of a childhood disease.

From her earliest years Rosa possessed "one of the most penetrating analytical minds of her age." In a period when the czarist government was increasing its religious and political oppression in Poland, especially of the Jews, she gained admission to the best girls' high school in Warsaw, usually reserved for Russians. There she joined a revolutionary cell and began a lifelong association with the socialist movement. When she was 18, her activities came to the attention of the Russian secret police, and she fled to Switzerland to avoid arrest.

Luxemburg continued her interests in socialist and revolutionary activities there. She earned a doctorate of laws at the University of Zurich in 1898.

Her thesis on industrial development in Poland later served as a basis for the program of the Social Democratic party of Poland. She decided to go to Germany and attach herself to the large, vital, and well-organized Social Democratic party (SPD). In Berlin she obtained German citizenship through a fictitious marriage and quickly became one of the most effective, respected, and even beloved leaders of the international socialist movement.

With Karl Kautsky, Luxemburg headed the revisionist wing of the SPD in opposition to its major theorist, Eduard Bernstein. She wrote articles in socialist newspapers increasingly critical of Bernstein's political and economic theories. Gradually, in a series of works published before the outbreak of World War I, she drifted apart from Kautsky and established herself as the acknowledged leader of the left, or revolutionary, wing of the SPD. She gave new life and theoretical form to the revolutionary goals of the party in a period when most factions were oriented toward parliamentary reform.

During World War I Luxemburg, now dubbed the "Red Rose" by police, was imprisoned for her revolutionary activities. Released for a short time in 1916, she helped to found the revolutionary Spartacus Union with Karl Liebknecht. When she again emerged from prison, in 1918, dissatisfied with the failure to effect a thoroughgoing socialist revolution in Germany, she helped to found the German Communist party (KPD) and its newspaper, the *Rote Fahne*, and drafted its program. She and Liebknecht urged revolution against the Ebert government, which came to power after the armistice, and were largely responsible for the wave of strikes, riots, and violence which swept across Germany from the end of 1918 until June 1919.

In January 1919 one of the most violent outbreaks occurred in Berlin. Luxemburg and Liebknecht, in spite of their doubts as to the timing, supported the Berlin workers in their call for revolution. The troops that were called in acted with extreme violence and brutality, crushing the revolt in a few days. On January 15 Liebknecht and Luxemburg were caught and murdered by the soldiers who held them prisoner.

EWB

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Machiavelli, Niccolò (1469–1527), Italian author and statesman. Niccolò Machiavelli is best known for *The Prince*, in which he enunciated his political philosophy.

Niccolò Machiavelli was born in Florence of an aristocratic, though by no means wealthy, family. Little is known of the first half of his life, prior to his first appointment to public office. His writings prove him to have been a very assiduous sifter of the classics, especially the historical works of Livy and Tacitus; in all probability he knew the Greek classics only in translation.

In 1498 Machiavelli was named chancellor and secretary of the second (and less important) chancellery of the Florentine Republic. His duties consisted chiefly of executing the policy decisions of others, carrying on diplomatic correspondence, digesting and composing reports, and compiling minutes; he also undertook some 23 missions to foreign states. His embassies included four to the French king and two to the court of Rome. His most memorable mission is described in a report of 1503 entitled "Description of the Manner Employed by Duke Valentino [Cesare Borgia] in Slaying Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Signor Pagolo and the Duke of Gravina, Orsini"; with surgical precision he details Borgia's series of political murders, implicitly as a lesson in the art of politics for Florence's indecisive and timorous gonfalonier, Pier Soderini.

In 1502 Machiavelli married Marietta Corsini, who bore him four sons and two daughters. To his grandson Giovanni Ricci we owe the preservation of many of his letters and minor works.

In 1510 Machiavelli, inspired by his reading of Roman history, was instrumental in organizing a citizen militia of the Florentine Republic. In August 1512 a Spanish army entered Tuscany and sacked Prato. The Florentines in terror deposed Soderini, whom Machiavelli characterized as "good, but weak," and allowed the Medici to return to power. On November 7 Machiavelli was dismissed; soon afterward he was arrested, imprisoned, and subjected to torture as a suspected conspirator against the Medici. Though innocent, he remained suspect for years to come; unable to secure an appointment from the reinstated Medici, he turned to writing.

In all likelihood Machiavelli interrupted the writing of his *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius* to write the brief treatise on which his fame rests, *Il Principe* (1513; *The Prince*). Other works followed: *The Art of War* and *The Life of Castruccio Castracani* (1520); three extant plays, *Mandragola* (1518; *The Mandrake*), *Clizia*, and *Andria*; the *Istorie fiorentine* (1526; *History of Florence*); a short story, *Bel-fagor*; and several minor works in verse and prose.

In 1526 Machiavelli was commissioned by Pope Clement VII to inspect the fortifications of Florence. Later that year and the following year his friend and

critic Francesco Guicciardini, Papal Commissary of War in Lombardy, employed him in two minor diplomatic missions. He died in Florence in June 1527, receiving the last rites of the Church that he had bitterly criticized.

The Prince. Machiavelli shared with Renaissance humanists a passion for classical antiquity. To their wish for a literary and spiritual revival of ancient values, guided by such authors as Plato, Cicero, and St. Augustine, he added a fierce desire for a political and moral renewal on the model of the Roman Republic as depicted by Livy and Tacitus. Though a republican at heart, he saw as the crying need of his day a strong political and military leader who could forge a unitary state in northern Italy to eliminate French and Spanish hegemony from Italian soil. At the moment that he wrote *The Prince* he envisioned such a possibility while the restored Medici ruled both Florence and the papacy. He had taken to heart Cesare Borgia's energetic creation of a new state in Romagna in the few brief years while Borgia's father, Alexander VI, occupied the papal throne. The final chapter of *The Prince* is a ringing plea to his Medici patrons to set Italy free from the "barbarians." It concludes with a quotation from Petrarch's patriotic poem *Italia mia*: "Virtue will take arms against fury, and the battle will be brief; for the ancient valor in Italian hearts is not yet dead." This exhortation fell on deaf ears in 1513 but was to play a role 3 centuries later in the Risorgimento.

Other Works. Certain passages in the *Discourses* (I, 11 and 12; II, 2) set forth Machiavelli's quarrel with the Church: by the bad example of the court of Rome, Italy has lost its devotion and religion; the Italian states are weak and divided because the Church, too feeble politically to dominate them, has nevertheless prevented any one state from uniting them. He suggests that the Church might have been destroyed by its own corruption had not St. Francis and St. Dominic restored it to its original principles by founding new orders. However, in an unusual if not unique departure from traditional anticlericalism, Machiavelli contrasts favorably the fiercely civil and militaristic pagan religion of ancient Rome with the humble and otherworldly Christian religion.

The *Mandragola*, the finest comedy of the Italian Renaissance, is not unrelated to Machiavelli's political writings in its comic indictment of contemporary Florentine society. In a well-knit intrigue the simpleton Nicia contributes to his own cuckolding. Nicia's beautiful and virtuous wife, Lucrezia (so named by the author with an eye to Roman history), is cor-

rupted by those who should be her closest protectors: her mother, her husband, and her unscrupulous confessor, Fra Timoteo, all pawns in the skillful hands of the manipulator Ligurio.

Although not equaling Guicciardini as a historian, Machiavelli in his *History of Florence* nevertheless marks an advance over earlier histories in his attention to underlying causes rather than the mere succession of events as he tells the history of the Florentines from the death of Lorenzo de' Medici in 1492.

Machiavelli closely adhered to his maxim that a servant of government must be loyal and self-sacrificing. He nowhere suggests that the political morality of princes is a model for day-to-day dealings between ordinary citizens. His reputation as a sinister and perfidious counselor of fraud is largely undeserved; it began not long after his death. His works were banned in the first printed Index (1559). In Elizabethan England, Machiavelli was represented on the stage and in literature as diabolically evil. The primary source of this misrepresentation was the translation into English by Simon Patericke in 1577 of a work popularly called *Contre-Machiavel*, by the French Huguenot Gentillet, who distorted Machiavelli and blamed his teachings for the St. Bartholomew Night massacre of 1572. A poem by Gabriel Harvey the following year falsely attributed four principal crimes to Machiavelli: poison, murder, fraud, and violence. Christopher Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta* (1588) introduces "Machiavel" as the speaker of an atrocious prologue; Machiavellian villains followed in works by other playwrights.

Many of Machiavelli's authentic values are incorporated into 19th-century liberalism: the supremacy of civil over religious power; the conscription of citizen armies; the preference for republican rather than monarchical government; and the republican Roman ideals of honesty, work, and the people's collective responsibility for values that transcend those of the individual.

EWB

Malraux, André (1901–1976), French writer and politician. André Malraux was generally regarded as one of the most distinguished novelists of the 20th century. Malraux holds the distinction of having been France's first minister of culture, serving from 1959–69. In addition, his wartime activities and adventures were legendary and well-documented. Malraux was a Communist supporter until World War II, and principal themes in his writing were revolution and its philosophical implications. He was an existentialist, believing that man determines his own fate by the choices he makes.

The novels of André Malraux depart sharply from the traditional form, with their middle-class settings, careful plot development and concentration on psychological analysis. His heroes and protagonists are adventurers determined to "leave a scar on the map," and violent action, usually in a revolutionary setting, is mixed with punctuated dialogue and passages containing philosophical reflection.

Malraux was born in Paris on Nov. 3, 1901, the son of a wealthy banker, and was educated in Paris. He attended the Lycée Condorcet and the School of Oriental Languages and would eventually develop a serious interest in China. Malraux began to move on the fringes of the surrealist movement, publishing criticism and poems. He married Clara Goldschmidt in 1921, and in 1923 the couple set off for Indochina (a former French colony consisting of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) to search for buried temples. After removing sculpture from the temples, Malraux and his wife were arrested by the French authorities and narrowly avoided prison.

It was during this period that Malraux, now hostile to the French colonial regime, came into contact with Vietnamese and Chinese Nationalists, many with Communist sympathies. He became a supporter of the international Communist movement, and during a stay in Saigon he organized a subversive newspaper.

Malraux's first novel, *Les Conquérants* (*The Conquerors*), was published in 1928. Set in Canton in 1925, it deals with the attempts of Chinese Nationalists and their Communist advisers to destroy imperialist influence and economic domination. The hero of the book provides a vigorously drawn portrait of the professional revolutionary. Malraux lamented the potential influences of Western culture, using China as an example, with *The Temptation of the West* (1926). In this work, the character of Ling says that many Chinese thought they could retain their cultural identities after being exposed to European influence and technology. Instead, that influence results in the "disintegrating soul" of China, a country newly "seduced" by music and movies.

Malraux's next novel, *La Voie Royale* (*The Royal Way*, 1930), was less successful; it had an autobiographical basis in the search for buried treasures, but treated the search as a kind of metaphysical adventure.

In 1933 appeared Malraux's most celebrated novel, *La Condition humaine* (*Man's Estate, Man's Fate*). Set in Shanghai, the novel describes the 1927 Communist uprising there, its initial success and ultimate failure. The novel continues to illustrate Malraux's favorite theme: that all men will attempt to escape, or to transcend, the human condition and that

revolutionary action is one way of accomplishing this. In the end there is failure, but man attains dignity in making the attempt and by his very failure achieves tragic greatness.

Malraux's next novel, *Days of Wrath* (1936), a short account of a German Communist's imprisonment by the Nazis, was poorly received, considered more propaganda than art. But after Malraux assisted the Republican forces by organizing an air corps during the Spanish Civil War in 1936–1937, his inspiration was renewed. He then published *L'Espoir* (*Man's Hope*, 1938). In this book, the Republican forces gradually organize to meet the Fascist threat, and the novel ends at a point where the "hope" of the title might have been realized.

Following the Soviet Union's signing of a non-aggression pact with Germany, Malraux broke with the Communist cause. He was captured twice while fighting with the French army and underground resistance movement, but he escaped and would become a military leader. In 1943 he published his last novel, *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* (*The Walnut Trees of Altenburg*).

The feel of this book is very different from that of Malraux's earlier novels. The narrator, captured by the Germans in 1940, reflects on his father's experiences before and during World War I—as an agent in central Asia, at a meeting of intellectuals in Germany, and while fighting on the Russian front. Malraux explores the fundamental problem of whether men are essentially the same in different epochs and different civilizations. Intellectually the answer seems to be negative, but emotionally it is positive, and human solidarity is maintained. Political action is seen as an illusion, and the traditional values of European humanism are affirmed.

Following the liberation of France in 1944, Malraux served in the reconstituted army as a colonel, and would later work to subvert the French Communist party. He was a supporter of General Charles de Gaulle. He and de Gaulle became friends and, as president of France, de Gaulle appointed Malraux to the position of minister of information a job Malraux held from 1945–46. After leaving the post, he remained a de Gaulle intimate and one of the leading members of the Gaullist political movement. He contributed to *The Case for de Gaulle; a Dialogue between André Malraux and James Burnham*.

Beset by marital tensions, André and Clara Malraux divorced in January 1946. Two years later, Malraux married his sister-in-law.

In the years that followed, Malraux wrote mainly on the subject of art. One highly philosophical volume on this subject was *The Psychology of Art* (1950),

in which Malraux writes of an "imaginary museum"—a "museum without walls"—in which objects of art are important for their own intrinsic value rather than for their collective underlying meanings.

In *Les Voix du silence* (*The Voices of Silence*, 1951), Malraux develops the idea that in the modern world, where religion is of little importance, art has taken its place as man's triumphant response to his ultimate destiny and his means of transcending death. Also on the subject of art, Malraux penned "Saturn: an Essay on (Francisco de) Goya" (1957, translated by C. W. Chilton). Malraux also wrote *Picasso's Mask* (1976).

In 1958, after de Gaulle's return to power, Malraux became minister of cultural affairs where he remained until de Gaulle's resignation in 1969. In 1967 he published the first volume of his *Antimémoires* (*Antimemoirs*). These were not memoirs of the usual type, failing to mention the accidental deaths of his two sons and the murder of his half-brother by the Nazis. Instead, they contained reflections on various aspects of his experiences and adventures.

Malraux paid two visits to the White House; in 1972, he conferred with President Richard Nixon prior to Nixon's visit to China. That same year he also suffered a near-fatal heart attack.

Malraux died in Paris on Nov. 23, 1976. Exactly 20 years later, his ashes were moved to the Pantheon necropolis in Paris. His namesake, the André Malraux Cultural Center, is in Chambéry (France).

EWB

Malthus, Thomas Robert (1766–1834), English economist. Thomas Malthus was of the classical school and was the first to direct attention to the danger of overpopulation in the modern world.

Thomas Malthus was born at the Rookery near Guilford, Surrey, a small estate owned by his father, Daniel Malthus. After being privately educated, Malthus entered Jesus College, Cambridge, where he was elected to a fellowship at the age of 27. He took religious orders at the age of 31 and held a curacy for a short period.

In 1798 Malthus published his *Essay on the Principle of Population*. This pamphlet was turned into a full-scale book in 1803 with the aid of demographic data drawn from a number of European countries.

In 1805 Malthus married, and shortly thereafter he was appointed professor of modern history and political economy at the East India Company's College at Haileybury, the first appointment of its kind in England. Much to the amusement of his critics, since he advocated controlling the birthrate, he fathered five children. He died at Haileybury on Dec.

23, 1834, the year that saw the passage of a new Poor Law inspired by his writings.

Debates concerning Malthusian Theory.

Few thinkers in the history of social science have aroused as much controversy as Malthus. It is not difficult to find reasons for the furor: he consistently opposed all methods of reforming society which did not act directly to reduce the birthrate, and his own remedies for bringing that about were impractical; he reduced all human suffering to the single principle of the pressure of population on the food supply, and all popular proposals for political or economic reform were exposed as irrelevant and immaterial; and he drove home his theme in one harsh passage after another, suggesting that literally every other possible social order was even worse than the existing one. Those on the left hated him because he seemed to be defending the society they hoped to change, and those on the right disliked him for defending that society as merely a necessary evil.

Toward the end of the 19th century, the discussion died down as the rise in living standards and the decline in fertility, at least in Western countries, took the sting out of the fear of overpopulation. But after World War II the problem of the underdeveloped countries brought Malthus back in favor. Most of the emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America combine the high birthrates typical of agrarian economies with the low death rates typical of industrialized economies, and there is the danger of too many mouths to feed. It is not surprising, therefore, that Malthus's name crops up repeatedly in debates on population policy in underdeveloped countries. The arguments are very different from those employed in Malthus's own day, but the participants of the debate still line up as for or against the Malthusian theory of population.

From Malthus's writings, one receives the impression of an inflexible fanatic and possibly a misanthrope, but everyone who met Malthus found him kind and benevolent. In terms of the politics of that age, he was almost, but not quite, a "liberal," and his professions of concern over the conditions of the poor must be regarded as perfectly genuine. He had unpleasant truths to tell but he told them, as it were, "for their own good."

His Theory of Population. Malthus's theory of population is baldly stated in the first two chapters of the *Essay*. The argument begins with two postulates: "that food is necessary to the existence of man" and "that the passion between the sexes is necessary, and will remain nearly in its present state." The "prin-

ciple of population" followed from these with the force of deductive logic: "Assuming, then, my postulata as granted, I say, that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in comparison with the second. By that law of nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal. This implies a strong and constantly operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence."

In 1798 Malthus described all the checks, such as infanticide, abortion, wars, plagues, and death from disease or starvation, as resolvable into "misery and vice." In 1803 he added a third pigeonhole, moral restraint, defined as "that restraint from marriage which was not followed by irregular gratification." It should be noted that he did not include birth control achieved by artificial devices. In his view, man was naturally lazy and would not work to provide a livelihood for himself and his family except under the threat of starvation. Birth control, even if it could be adopted, would only remove the incentive to work and would, therefore, amount to more "misery and vice." Moral restraint was something else: it implied postponement of marriage and strict chastity until marriage. He doubted that moral restraint would ever become a common practice, and it is precisely this that gave his doctrine a pessimistic hue: there were remedies against the pressure of population, but they were unlikely to be adopted.

The Malthusian law of population has some resemblance to Newtonian mechanics in assuming tendencies which are never observed as such in the real world: the arithmetical ratio is simply a loose generalization about things as they are, whereas the geometrical ratio is a calculation of things as they might be but never are. The saving clause in the theory is the check of moral restraint, which permits the food supply to increase without a corresponding increase in population. But how shall we know that it is in operation, as distinct from the practice of birth control? By virtue of the fact that the food supply is outstripping the growth of numbers, Malthus would answer. In short, the Malthusian theory explains everything by explaining nothing. No wonder that Malthus's critics bitterly complained that the Malthusian theory could not be disproved, because it was always true on its own terms.

EWB

Mandeville, Bernard (ca. 1670–1733), English satirist and moral philosopher. Bernard Mandeville is famous as the author of *The Fable of the Bees*.

Bernard Mandeville was probably born in Rotterdam, Holland, the son of a prominent doctor. In 1685 he entered the University of Rotterdam and in 1689 went on to study medicine at the University of Leiden, where he received his medical degree in 1691. Afterward he went to England to “learn the language” and set up practice as a physician. However, he had very few patients and after a short time virtually gave up medicine to devote himself exclusively to his writings.

Mandeville’s best-known work is *The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Publick Benefits* (1714), originally published as a poem, “The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves Turned Honest” (1705). This was intended at first to be a political satire on the state of England in 1705, when the Tories accused the ministry of favoring the French war for their own personal gains. In the later version, however, enlarged to two volumes, Mandeville, in agreement with Thomas Hobbes, declares that men act essentially in terms of egoistical interests, in contrast to the easy optimism and idealism of Shaftesbury. The material concerns of individuals are the basic force behind all social progress, while what rulers and clergymen call virtues are simply fictions that those in power employ to maintain their control. Francis Hutcheson and Bishop Berkeley wrote treatises opposing Mandeville’s views. Others, including Adam Smith, as some interpreters claim, were affected in a more positive way by Mandeville’s ideas.

In some of his other works Mandeville shows an intelligent and open interest in controversial and, for the time, scandalous subjects, such as whoring and the execution of criminals. On some issues, however, Mandeville seems strangely callous. In “An Essay on Charity and Charity Schools” he objects to educating the poor because the acquisition of knowledge has the effect of increasing desires and thereby making it more difficult to meet the needs of the poor. Moreover, he seems to regard even wars as valuable to the economic development of a nation since by destroying houses and property laborers are provided an opportunity to replace the destroyed goods.

On the basis of his views Mandeville is usually placed in the moral-sense school. Some interpreters insist that he is the forerunner of the doctrine of utilitarianism.

EWB

Manet, Édouard (1832–1883), French painter. The art of Édouard Manet broke with 19th-century

academic precepts and marks the beginning of modern painting.

Édouard Manet was born in Paris on January 23, 1832, to Auguste Édouard Manet, an official at the Ministry of Justice, and Eugénie Désirée Manet. The father, who had expected to study law, vigorously opposed his wish to become a painter. The career of naval officer was decided upon as a compromise, and at the age of 16 Édouard sailed to Rio de Janeiro on a training vessel. Upon his return he failed to pass the entrance examination of the naval academy. His father relented, and in 1850 Manet entered the studio of Thomas Couture, where, in spite of many disagreements with his teacher, he remained until 1856. During this period Manet traveled abroad and made numerous copies after the Old Masters in both foreign and French public collections.

Early Works. Manet’s entry for the Salon of 1859, the *Absinthe Drinker*, a thematically romantic but conceptually already daring work, was rejected. At the Salon of 1861, his *Spanish Singer*, one of a number of works of Spanish character painted in this period, not only was admitted to the Salon but won an honorable mention and the acclaim of the poet Théophile Gautier. This was to be Manet’s last success for many years.

In 1863 Manet married Suzanne Leenhoff, a Dutch pianist. That year he showed 14 paintings at the Martinet Gallery; one of them, *Music in the Tuileries*, remarkable for its freshness in the handling of a contemporary scene, was greeted with considerable hostility. Also in 1863 the Salon rejected Manet’s large painting *Luncheon on the Grass*, and the artist elected to have it shown at the now famous Salon des Refusés, created by the Emperor under the pressure of the exceptionally large number of painters whose work had been turned away. Here, Manet’s picture attracted the most attention and brought forth a kind of abusive criticism which was to set a pattern for years to come. Although this painting is a paraphrase of Giorgione’s *Concert champêtre*, the combination of clothed men and a nude woman in a modern context was found offensive.

In 1865 Manet’s *Olympia* produced a still more violent reaction at the official Salon, and his reputation as a renegade became widespread. Upset by the criticism, Manet made a brief trip to Spain, where he admired many works by Diego Velázquez, to whom he referred as “the painter of painters.”

Support of Baudelaire and Zola. Manet’s close friend and supporter during the early years was Charles Baudelaire, who, in 1862, had written a quat-

rain to accompany one of Manet's Spanish subjects, *Lola de Valence*, and the public, largely as a result of the strange atmosphere of the *Olympia*, linked the two men readily. In 1866, after the Salon jury had rejected two of Manet's works, Émile Zola came to his defense with a series of articles filled with strongly expressed, uncompromising praise. In 1867 he published a book which contains the prediction, "Manet's place is destined to be in the Louvre." This book appears on Zola's desk in Manet's portrait of the writer (1868). In May of that year the Paris World's Fair opened its doors, and Manet, at his own expense, exhibited 50 of his works in a temporary structure, not far from Gustave Courbet's private exhibition. This was in keeping with Manet's view, expressed years later to his friend Antonin Proust, that his paintings must be seen together in order to be fully understood.

Although Manet insisted that a painter be "resolutely of his own time" and that he paint what he sees, he nevertheless produced two important religious works, the *Dead Christ with Angels* and *Christ Mocked by the Soldiers*, which were shown at the Salons of 1864 and 1865, respectively, and ridiculed. Only Zola could defend the former work on the grounds of its vigorous realism while playing down its alleged lack of piety. It is also true that although Manet despised the academic category of "history painting" he did paint the contemporary *Naval Battle between the Kearsarge and the Alabama* (1864) and the *Execution of Maximilian* (1867). The latter is based upon a careful gathering of the facts surrounding the incident and composed, largely, after Francisco Goya's *Executions of the Third of May*, resulting in a curious amalgam of the particular and the universal. Manet's use of older works of art in elaborating his own major compositions has long been, and continues to be, a problematic subject, since the old view that this procedure was needed to compensate for the artist's own inadequate imagination is rapidly being discarded.

Late Works. Although the impressionists were influenced by Manet during the 1860s, during the next decade it appears that it was he who learned from them. His palette became lighter; his stroke, without ever achieving the analytical intensity of Claude Monet's, was shorter and more rapid. Nevertheless, Manet never cultivated pleinairism seriously, and he remained essentially a figure and studio painter. Also, despite his sympathy for most of the impressionists with whom the public associated him, he never exhibited with them at their series of private exhibitions which began in 1874.

Manet had his first resounding success since the *Spanish Singer* at the Salon of 1873 with his *Bon Bock*,

which radiates a touch and joviality of expression reminiscent of Frans Hals, in contrast to Manet's usually austere figures. In spite of the popularity of this painting, his success was not to extend to the following season. About this time he met the poet Stéphane Mallarmé, with whom he remained on intimate terms for the remainder of his life. After Manet's rejection by the jury in 1876, Mallarmé took up his defense.

Toward the end of the 1870s, although Manet retained the bright palette and the touch of his impressionist works, he returned to the figure problems of the early years. The undeniable sense of mystery is found again in several bar scenes, notably the *Brasserie Reichshoffen*, in which the relationships of the figures recall those of the *Luncheon on the Grass*. Perhaps the apotheosis of his lifelong endeavors is to be found in his last major work, *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère*. Here, in the expression of the barmaid, is all the starkness of the great confrontations of the 1860s, but bathed in a profusion of colors. While we are drawn to the brilliantly painted accessories, it is the girl, placed at the center before a mirror, who dominates the composition and ultimately demands our attention. Although her reflected image, showing her to be in conversation with a man, is absorbed into the brilliant atmosphere of the setting, she remains enigmatic and aloof. Manet produced two aspects of the same personality, combined the fleeting with the eternal, and, by "misplacing" the reflected image, took a step toward abstraction as a solution to certain lifelong philosophical and technical problems.

In 1881 Manet was finally admitted to membership in the Legion of Honor, an award he had long coveted. By then he was seriously ill. Therapy at the sanatorium at Bellevue failed to improve his health, and walking became increasingly difficult for him. In his weakened condition he found it easier to handle pastels than oils, and he produced a great many flower pieces and portraits in that medium. In the spring of 1883 his left leg was amputated, but this did not prolong his life. He died peacefully in Paris on April 30.

Manet was short, unusually handsome, and witty. His biographers stress his kindness and unaffected generosity toward his friends. The paradoxical elements in his art are an extension of the man: although a revolutionary in art, he craved official honors; while fashionably dressed, he affected a Parisian slang at odds with his appearance and impeccable manners; and although he espoused the style of life of the conservative classes, his political sentiments were those of the republican liberal.

EWB

Marat, Jean Paul (1743–1793), French journalist and political leader. Jean Paul Marat was an influential advocate of extreme revolutionary views and measures.

Jean Paul Marat was born in Boudry, Neuchâtel, Switzerland, on May 24, 1743, the son of lower-middle-class parents. Of his early years very little is known. He acquired a medical education and for some years was a successful physician in both England and France. He also conducted scientific experiments in the fields of optics and electricity. But failure to achieve what he considered to be proper recognition for this work left him with a feeling of persecution.

Marat also published several books on philosophical and political themes, the most important of which was *The Chains of Slavery*, in which he voiced an uncompromising denunciation of royal despotism, a defense of the sovereignty of the people, and a sympathy for the poor and downtrodden which he never abandoned. The coming of the French Revolution in 1789 gave him his opportunity to pursue these themes, and before the year was out, he had begun to publish his journal, *Ami du peuple* (*Friend of the People*). In his opinion the moderate Revolution of 1789, although it had ended royal despotism, had left a new aristocracy of the rich in control, with the grievances of the poor still unsatisfied. Thus a radical revolutionary uprising was necessary, in his opinion, and he bluntly called time and again for popular executions and a temporary dictatorship to save the Revolution and bring about a regime of social justice.

Marat's radical views and the ferocity with which he voiced them won him great popularity among the lower classes in Paris and the provinces. But he was the object of particular fear and hatred to those who supported the moderate revolution that had produced the limited monarchy. The authorities frequently tried to silence him, but he avoided arrest by hiding with the aid of his supporters and published his journal at least intermittently.

When the moderate experiment with limited monarchy failed in the midst of disastrous military reverses, the King was deposed in August 1792, and less than a month later the September massacres, an outbreak of popular executions such as Marat had been urging, took place in Paris. These events inaugurated the radical phase of the French Revolution. The Paris voters elected Marat to the Convention, which was to serve France as a legislature for the next 3 years, and he sat and voted with the "Mountain," the left-wing Jacobin faction. But he was blamed by many for the September massacres, and his continued incitement to direct action and purges, plus his advocacy of an extensive program of social legislation, kept all but the most radical aloof from him. His extreme ideas and language were matched by his informality of dress and unkempt appearance, which was heightened by the evidence of a chronic skin disease.

Marat concentrated his invective during the early months of 1793 against the moderate Girondin party, and they responded in kind. They tried to silence him and persuaded the Convention to decree his arrest and trial. But he emerged from hiding and by a brilliant speech won a triumphant acquittal in April 1793. His Girondin opponents now came under attack from the Jacobin Mountain, and Marat reached the height of his influence as he led the attack in his journal. With the decisive aid of the Paris masses, the Convention was forced to unseat and then order the arrest of the Girondin leaders (June 2, 1793).

Marat's triumph led ironically to his own death. Charlotte Corday, an idealistic young girl of Girondin sympathies from the provinces, came to Paris to seek revenge and to rid her country of the monster Marat. By this time his health had so deteriorated that he was living and working in seclusion in his apartment under a regimen of medicinal baths. On July 13, 1793, she managed to gain admittance to his apartment, under the pretense of bringing information to aid him in his continued campaign against the Girondins, and stabbed him to death in his bath.

EWB

Maria Theresa (1717–1780) was Holy Roman empress from 1740 to 1780. Ruling in the most difficult period of Austrian history, she modernized her dominions and saved them from dissolution.

The eldest daughter of the emperor Charles VI, Maria Theresa was born in Vienna on May 13, 1717. Her education did not differ in the main from that given any imperial princess, being both clerical and superficial, even though by the time she was an adolescent it was becoming increasingly probable that Charles would produce no male heir and that one day Maria Theresa would succeed to all his dominions. Charles did not act upon the insistent advice of his most capable adviser, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and marry his daughter off to a prince powerful and influential enough himself to protect her dominions in time of need. Instead he chose to rely upon the fanciful diplomatic guarantees offered by the Pragmatic Sanction. Thus, in 1736 Maria Theresa was permitted to marry for love. Her choice was Duke Francis Stephen of Lorraine. So that France might not object to the prospect of an eventual incorporation of Lorraine into the empire, Francis Stephen was forced to exchange his beloved province for the rather less valuable Tuscany.

In spite of this, and even though the marriage in its first 3 years produced three daughters, Maria Theresa was boundlessly happy. Then suddenly, in October 1740, her father died. At the age of 23, with-

out anything in the way of formal preparation, without the least acquaintance with affairs of state, Maria Theresa had supreme responsibility thrust upon her.

War of the Austrian Succession. Francis Stephen was designated coregent and put in charge of restoring the finances of the empire, a task to which he brought considerable ability but for which he was not to have the requisite time. The treasury was empty, the army had been badly neglected, and as Prince Eugene had warned, Austria's neighbors now engaged in a contest to establish which of them could repudiate most completely the obligations they had subscribed to in the Pragmatic Sanction. Bavaria advanced claims to a considerable portion of the Hapsburg lands and was supported in this venture by France. Spain demanded the empire's Italian territories. Frederick II of Prussia, himself very recently come to the throne of his country, now offered to support Maria Theresa against these importunities if Austria would pay for this service by turning over to Prussia the province of Silesia. When this cynical offer was indignantly rejected in Vienna, Frederick sent his troops into Silesia in December 1740. Bavaria and France soon joined in this attack, thus launching the 8-year War of the Austrian Succession.

At first it seemed as if the young Maria Theresa could quickly be overwhelmed. The elector Charles of Bavaria secured his election as Emperor Charles VII and with German and French troops captured Prague. If his army had achieved a juncture with the Prussians, the Austrians would no longer have been in a position to defend themselves. But Frederick II had not launched his attack on Silesia to introduce a French hegemony in central Europe. He now concluded an armistice with the Austrians, who were, in 1742, able to concentrate their forces against the French and Bavarians, whom they threw out of Bohemia. Frederick came back into the war in 1744, withdrew again the next year, in which, the Bavarian Charles VII having died, Francis Stephen was elected emperor. The war was ended at last in 1748, Austria being forced to acquiesce in the Prussian retention of Silesia and losing also the Italian districts of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla to France. The loss of Silesia was very painful indeed, as it was perhaps the richest of all the Hapsburg provinces.

Domestic Reform. Maria Theresa had learned her job under the most difficult conditions during the war. But she had soon found that, among the members of the high court aristocracy, the only class from which, traditionally, important servants of the Crown could be drawn, there was no dearth of able men will-

ing to unite their fate with that of the house of Hapsburg. Although she had never, in the course of the war, found a really satisfactory general, she had recognized the talents of, and placed in responsible positions, a number of able administrators, men such as counts Sinzendorf, Sylva-Tarouca, and Kaunitz. Thus, at the end of the war, the basis for a reform of the governmental apparatus already existed.

The actual work of reform, with the explicit end of strengthening Austria so that one day in the not too distant future Silesia might be recovered, was turned over to a Silesian exile, Count Frederick William Haugwitz. The key to Haugwitz's reform program was centralization. Bohemia and Austria were placed under a combined ministry, and the Provincial Estates were, insofar as possible, deprived of their authority or at least circumvented. At the same time industry was encouraged as a producer of wealth that could most readily be tapped by the state. In the provinces to which it was applied, the system produced dramatic results: on the average, the military contributions of the districts in question rose by 150 percent. Unfortunately, the concerted opposition of the nobility in Hungary prevented it from being applied there. Moreover, Haugwitz's position was being continually undermined by his colleague Kaunitz, who himself wished to play the role of Austria's savior.

Foreign Policy. In 1753 Kaunitz was given the title of state chancellor with unrestricted powers in the realm of foreign policy. While serving as Austrian ambassador to France, he had convinced himself that Austria's defeat in the recent war had been due largely to an unfortunate choice of allies. In particular, he thought, the empire had been badly let down by England. He now set about forging a new alliance whose chief aim was to surround Prussia with an insurmountable coalition. Saxony, Sweden, and Russia became Austria's allies. In 1755 Kaunitz's diplomatic efforts were crowned with the conclusion of an alliance with Austria's old enemy France, a circumstance that led to the conclusion of an alliance between Prussia and England. This diplomatic revolution seemed to leave the Prussians at a hopeless disadvantage, but Frederick II was not the man to await his own funeral, and in 1756 he opened hostilities, thus launching what was to become the Seven Years War.

Maria Theresa, although no lover of warfare for its own sake, welcomed the war as the only practical means of at last recovering Silesia. It was not to be. In spite of a much more energetic conduct of the war on the part of Austria, Frederick was for the most part able to fight his enemies one at a time. And when, in 1762, his situation at last appeared desperate, the

death of Empress Elisabeth brought about a Russian withdrawal from the war, which now could no longer be won by the allies. In 1763 peace was concluded, and Silesia remained firmly in Prussian hands.

In the course of this second war, Maria Theresa developed the habit of governing autocratically, excluding Francis Stephen from all participation in the affairs of state. In spite of this the marriage was a happy one. From the dynastic point of view, the birth of Archduke Joseph in 1741 had assured the male succession. His birth was followed by numerous others, the imperial couple producing 16 children in all. Then suddenly, in 1765, the Emperor died of a stroke. Maria Theresa was inconsolable. For a time she thought of withdrawing to a cloister and turning the government over to Joseph, who was then 24. It was only with great difficulty that her ministers, with Kaunitz in the lead, managed to dissuade her from this course. And when she did return to public life, it was as a different woman. For the rest of her days she wore only black; she never again appeared at the gay diversions of what had been a very lighthearted court; and if she had all her life been a pious Catholic, her devotion to religion now came to border on both fanaticism and bigotry.

Later Reign. At his father's death Joseph had been appointed coregent. Unlike his father, the archduke meant in fact to share in the governance of the realm. But this Maria Theresa was unwilling to let him do. After many recriminations, a compromise was arrived at: Joseph was to take charge of army reform and to share with Kaunitz the responsibility of making foreign policy. This arrangement was unfortunate not only because it deprived Joseph of any real influence on the internal affairs of Austria, the sector in which his ideas were most promising, but also because he had no talent whatever either for diplomacy or for warfare.

The 15 years of the coregency were a time of continual struggle between mother and son, but it would be a mistake to construe them as an unrelenting struggle between the forces of progress, as represented by Joseph, and those of reaction, led by Maria Theresa. Although the archduke vigorously defended the principle of religious toleration, anathema to his mother, and once threatened to resign when she proposed to expel some Protestants from Bohemia, on the equally important question of peasant emancipation, Maria Theresa took a stand distinctly more favorable to the peasants than Joseph. In foreign affairs, she opposed Joseph's adventurous attempt to acquire Bavaria, which, as she had feared, led to war with Prussia in 1778; and when Joseph lost his nerve in

the midst of the struggle, she took matters into her own hands and negotiated a by no means disadvantageous peace that resulted in the acquisition of the Innviertel.

These last events, incidentally, confirm that after the unsatisfactory conclusion of the Seven Years War the main Austrian objective was no longer a redress of balance against Prussia. If political and social reforms continued, it was in part because reform had become a way of life, in part because Maria Theresa recognized that a more centralized and effective government was an end worth pursuing for itself. Although it is true that throughout the coregency Joseph kept up a clamor for various changes, some of the major reforms of the period can nevertheless be attributed chiefly to the desires of the Empress. This is particularly true of the new penal code of 1768 and of the abolition of judicial torture in 1776. The penal code, although objected to as still unduly harsh, nevertheless had the virtue of standardizing both judicial proceedings and punishments. In spite of her devotion to the Catholic Church, Maria Theresa insisted on defending with great vigor the rights of the state vis-à-vis the Church.

In her reign, neither papal bulls nor the pastoral letters of bishops could circulate in her dominions without her prior permission, and in 1777 Maria Theresa joined a number of other European monarchs in banishing the Society of Jesus from her lands. In the course of 1780 Maria Theresa's health deteriorated rapidly. She died on November 29 of that year, probably of a heart condition.

EWB

Marie Antoinette (1755–1793), queen of France. Marie Antoinette was queen of France at the outbreak of the Revolution. Her activities and reputation contributed to the decline of the prestige of the French monarchy.

Marie Antoinette was the daughter of the Holy Roman emperor Francis I and the empress Maria Theresa. In 1770 she was married to the French Dauphin, who 4 years later ascended the throne as Louis XVI. The personalities of the two rulers were very different: while Louis XVI was phlegmatic and withdrawn, Marie Antoinette was gay, frivolous, and imprudent in her actions and choice of friends. She soon became unpopular in the court and the country, antagonizing many of the nobles, including the King's brothers and those Frenchmen who regretted the recently concluded alliance with Austria, long regarded as the traditional enemy; for the population as a whole she became the symbol for the extravagance of the court.

Although Marie Antoinette did not intervene in foreign affairs as frequently as has been asserted, she soon forgot her statement on first entering France, when she interrupted an official greeting in German, "Speak French, Monsieur. From now on I hear no language other than French." She sometimes sought, usually without great success, to obtain French support for Austrian objectives, for example, against Prussia and the Low Countries.

The Queen's influence on domestic policy before 1789 has also been exaggerated. Her interventions in politics were usually in order to obtain positions and subsidies for her friends. It is true, however, that she usually opposed the efforts of reforming ministers such as A. R. J. Turgot and became involved in court intrigues against them. Such activities, as well as her associates and personal life, particularly the "diamond necklace affair," when it appeared that the Queen had yielded herself to a wealthy cardinal for an expensive diamond necklace, increased her unpopularity and led to a stream of pamphlets and satires against her. The fact that after the birth of her children Marie Antoinette's way of life became more restrained did not alter the popular image of an immoral and extravagant woman.

In the summer of 1788, when Louis XVI yielded to pressure and convoked the Estates General to deal with the fiscal crisis, Marie Antoinette agreed, or appeared to agree, to the return of Jacques Necker as chief minister and to granting the Third Estate as many representatives as the other two combined. However, after the meeting of the Estates General in May 1789 and such events as the taking of the Bastille (July 14, 1789), Marie Antoinette supported the conservative court faction most insistent upon maintaining the Old Regime.

On Oct. 1, 1789, the Queen was received enthusiastically at a royalist banquet at Versailles during which the Revolution was denounced and its symbols insulted. A few days later (October 4–5) a Parisian crowd forced the court to move to Paris, where it could be controlled more readily. Marie Antoinette's role in the efforts of the monarchy to work with such moderates as the Comte de Mirabeau and later with the constitutional monarchist A. P. Barnave is unclear, but it appears that she lacked confidence in them. After the attempt of the royal couple to escape was thwarted at Varennes (June 21, 1791), the Queen, convinced that only foreign intervention could save the monarchy, sought the aid of her brother, the Holy Roman emperor Leopold II. Convinced that France, in its weakened condition, with many officers already émigrés, would be easily defeated, she favored the declaration of war on Austria in April 1792. On

Aug. 10, 1792, the Paris crowd stormed the Tuileries Palace and ended the monarchy (the following month the National Convention established the First French Republic).

On August 13 Marie Antoinette began a captivity that was to end only with her death. She was first imprisoned in the Temple with her family and, after Aug. 1, 1793, in the Conciergerie. After a number of unsuccessful attempts to obtain her escape failed, Marie Antoinette appeared before the Revolutionary Tribunal, charged with aiding the enemy and inciting civil war within France. The Tribunal found her guilty and condemned her to death. On Oct. 16, 1793, she went to the guillotine. As did Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette aroused sympathy by her dignity and courage in prison and before the executioner.

EWB

Mathiez, Albert (1874–1932), French historian. Albert Mathiez was one of the major 20th-century historians of the French Revolution.

Albert Mathiez was born to an innkeeper's family at La Bruyère in eastern France on Jan. 10, 1874. He graduated from the École Normale in 1897. After teaching for a short time in the provinces, he returned to Paris to prepare a doctoral thesis under the direction of Alphonse Aulard. The thesis, on Revolutionary religious cults (1904), marked him as a historian of independent mind. Mathiez argued that these cults were profoundly related to the Revolutionaries' views of the role of religion in society. Though the thesis derived much of its argument from the work of the sociologist Émile Durkheim, Mathiez later became dubious about the use of sociology in historical writing.

Three years after presenting his thesis Mathiez broke with Aulard, beginning a feud that continued for the rest of his life. Whether the feud was caused by personal pique, psychological conflict, or scholarly ambition, it took public form as a dispute over the characters and historical roles of Georges Jacques Danton and Maximilien de Robespierre. Danton, whom Aulard admired as a patriot, was to Mathiez a corrupt demagogue; Robespierre, a tyrant to Aulard, became for Mathiez the champion of social democracy. To prove his point Mathiez, in 1908, founded a new journal, the *Annales révolutionnaires*, and the Society for Robespierre Studies. In a series of articles and books—*Robespierre Studies* (2 vols., 1917–1918); *Danton and the Peace* (1919); and *The India Company* (1920) he exposed Danton's graft and his "defeatist" attempts to negotiate with the enemies of the Revolution. In *Danton* (1926) he covered his subject's entire career. At the same time he explored Robespierre's career and promoted an edition of his writings. In

these articles and books Mathiez demonstrated his mastery of critical history, illuminating with his forceful imagination the new evidence he had found in the archives.

Strongly influenced by Jean Jaurès, Mathiez also wrote on the economic history of the Revolution. He had early come to see the Revolution as a class conflict, and the Russian Revolution confirmed his view that political events had to be related to economic and social movements.

Mathiez wrote one narrative of the Revolution (3 vols., 1922–1927). Writing for the general public, and confined to a short text by the publisher, Mathiez here showed his mastery of French style and his ability to convince his readers. He continued this narrative in a much more detailed manner in *The Thermidorian Reaction* (1929) and *The Directorate* (1934).

Mathiez's dispute with Aulard, his brusque manner toward those who were not his friends, his criticism of the government during World War I, and his defense of bolshevism left him few supporters in the Parisian academic world. Professor at Dijon (1919–1926), he was finally called to Paris in 1926 as a substitute and then as a lecturer. On Feb. 25, 1932, while delivering a lecture, he suffered a stroke and died.

EWB

Marx, Karl (1818–1883), German philosopher, radical economist, and revolutionary leader. Karl Marx founded modern “scientific” socialism. His basic ideas known as Marxism form the foundation of socialist and communist movements throughout the world.

Karl Marx spent most of his life in exile. He was exiled from his native Prussia in 1849 and went to Paris, from which he was expelled a few months later. He then settled in London, where he spent the rest of his life in dire poverty and relative obscurity. He was hardly known to the English public in his lifetime. His reputation as a radical thinker began to spread only after the emergence of the socialist parties in Europe, especially in Germany and France, in the 1870s and 1880s. From then on, Marx's theories continued to be hotly debated in the growing labor and socialist movements everywhere, including Tsarist Russia.

By the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, socialist parties everywhere had by and large accepted a considerable measure of Marxism, even though with modifications. This was especially true of the idea of the class struggle and the establishment of a socialist society, in which economic exploitation and social inequality would be abolished. Marxism achieved its first great triumph in the Russian Revolution of 1917, when its successful leader, V. I. Lenin, a lifelong disciple of Marx, organized the So-

viet Union as a proletarian dictatorship based on Marx's philosophy, as Lenin interpreted it. Henceforth, Marx became a world figure and his theories a subject of universal attention and controversy.

Early Life. Marx was born in Trier, Rhenish Prussia, on May 5, 1818, the son of Heinrich Marx, a lawyer, and Henriette Presburg Marx, a Dutchwoman. Both Heinrich and Henriette were descendants of a long line of rabbis. Barred from the practice of law as a Jew, Heinrich Marx became converted to Lutheranism about 1817, and Karl was baptized in the same church in 1824, at the age of 6. Karl attended a Lutheran elementary school but later became an atheist and materialist, rejecting both the Christian and Jewish religions. It was he who coined the aphorism “Religion is the opium of the people,” a cardinal principle in modern communism.

Karl attended the Friedrich Wilhelm Gymnasium in Trier for 5 years, graduating in 1835, at the age of 17. The gymnasium curriculum was the usual classical one: history, mathematics, literature, and languages, particularly Greek and Latin. Karl became proficient in French and Latin, both of which he learned to read and write fluently. In later years he taught himself other languages, so that as a mature scholar he could also read Spanish, Italian, Dutch, Russian, and English. As his articles in the *New York Daily Tribune* show, he came to handle the English language masterfully (he loved Shakespeare, whose works he knew by heart), although he never lost his heavy Teutonic accent in speaking.

In October 1835 Marx matriculated in Bonn University, where he attended courses primarily in jurisprudence, as it was his father's ardent wish that he become a lawyer. Marx, however, was more interested in philosophy and literature than in law. He wanted to be a poet and dramatist, and in his student days he wrote a great deal of poetry—most of it preserved—which in his mature years he rightly recognized as imitative and mediocre. He spent a year at Bonn, studying little but roistering and drinking. He spent a day in jail for disturbing the peace and fought one duel, in which he was wounded in the right eye. He also piled up heavy debts.

Marx's dismayed father took him out of Bonn and had him enter the University of Berlin, then a hub of intellectual ferment. In Berlin a galaxy of brilliant thinkers was challenging existing institutions and ideas, including religion, philosophy, ethics, and politics. The spirit of the great philosopher G. W. F. Hegel was still palpable there. A group known as the Young Hegelians, which included teachers such as Bruno Bauer and bright, philosophically oriented students,

met frequently to debate and interpret the subtle ideas of the master. Young Marx soon became a member of the Young Hegelian circle and was deeply influenced by its prevailing ideas.

Marx spent more than 4 years in Berlin, completing his studies there in March 1841. He had given up jurisprudence and devoted himself primarily to philosophy. On April 15, 1841, the University of Jena awarded "Carolo Henrico Marx" the degree of doctor of philosophy on the strength of his abstruse and learned dissertation, *Difference between Democritean and Epicurean Natural Philosophy*, which was based on Greek-language sources.

His Exile. Marx's hopes of teaching philosophy at Bonn University were frustrated by the reactionary policy of the Prussian government. He then turned to writing and journalism for his livelihood. In 1842 he became editor of the liberal Cologne newspaper *Rheinische Zeitung*, but it was suppressed by the Berlin government the following year. Marx then moved to Paris. There he first came in contact with the working class, gave up philosophy as a life goal, and undertook his serious study of economics.

In January 1845 Marx was expelled from France "at the instigation of the Prussian government," as he said. He moved to Brussels, where he lived until 1848 and where he founded the German Workers' party and was active in the Communist League. It was for the latter that he, with his friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels, published, in 1848, the famous Manifesto of the Communist Party (known as the Communist Manifesto). Expelled by the Belgian government for his radicalism, Marx moved back to Cologne, where he became editor of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in June 1848. Less than a year later, in May 1849, the paper was suppressed by the Prussian government, and Marx himself was exiled. He returned to Paris, but in September the French government expelled him again. Hounded from the Continent, Marx finally settled in London, where he lived as a stateless exile (Britain denied him citizenship and Prussia refused to renaturalize him) for the rest of his life.

In London, Marx's sole means of support was journalism. He wrote for both German- and English-language publications. From August 1852 to March 1862 he was correspondent for the *New York Daily Tribune*, contributing a total of about 355 articles, many of which were used by that paper as leading (unsigned) editorials. Journalism, however, paid wretchedly (£2 per article); Marx was literally saved from starvation by the continuous financial support of Engels. In 1864 Marx helped to found in London the

International Workingmen's Association (known as the First International), for which he wrote the inaugural address. In 1872 he dissolved the International, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the anarchists under the leadership of Mikhail Bakunin. Thereafter, Marx's political activities were confined mainly to correspondence with radicals in Europe and America, offering advice and helping to shape the socialist and labor movements.

Marx was married to his childhood sweetheart, Jenny von Westphalen, who was known as the "most beautiful girl in Trier," on June 19, 1843. She was totally devoted to him. She died of cancer on Dec. 2, 1881, at the age of 67. For Marx it was a blow from which he never recovered.

Marx spent most of his working time in the British Museum, doing research both for his newspaper articles and his books. He was a most conscientious scholar, never satisfied with secondhand information but tracing facts and figures to their original sources. In preparation for *Das Kapital*, he read virtually every available work in economic and financial theory and practice in the major languages of Europe.

In the last two decades of his life Marx was tormented by a mounting succession of ailments that would have tried the patience of Job. He suffered from hereditary liver derangement (of which, he claimed, his father died); frequent outbreaks of carbuncles and furuncles on his neck, chest, back, and buttocks (often he could not sit); toothaches; eye inflammations; lung abscesses; hemorrhoids; pleurisy; and persistent headaches and coughs that made sleep impossible without drugs. In the final dozen or so years of his life, he could no longer do any sustained intellectual work. He died in his armchair in London on March 14, 1883, about two months before his sixty-fifth birthday. He lies buried in London's Highgate Cemetery, where the grave is marked by a bust of him.

His Works. Marx's writings fall into two general categories, the polemical-philosophical and the economic-political. The first reflected his Hegelian-idealistic period; the second, his revolutionary-political interests.

Marx wrote hundreds of articles, brochures, and reports but few books as such. He published only five books during his lifetime. Two of them were polemical, and three were political-economic. The first, *The Holy Family* (1845), written in collaboration with Engels, was a polemic against Marx's former teacher and Young Hegelian philosopher Bruno Bauer. The second was *Misère de la philosophie* (The Poverty of Philosophy), written by Marx himself in French and published in Paris and Brussels in 1847. As its subtitle

indicates, this polemical work was “An Answer to the *Philosophy of Poverty* by M. Proudhon.”

Marx’s third book, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, published serially in a German publication in New York City in 1852, is a brilliant historical-political analysis of the rise and intrigues of the Bonaparte who became Napoleon III. The remaining two books, both on economics, are the ones on which Marx’s worldwide reputation rests: *Critique of Political Economy* and, more particularly, *Das Kapital* (Capital).

Critique was published in 1859, after about 14 years of intermittent research. Marx considered it merely a first installment, expecting to bring out additional volumes, but he scrapped his plan in favor of another approach. The result was *Das Kapital*, subtitled *Critique of Political Economy*, of which only the first volume appeared, in 1867, in Marx’s lifetime. After his death, two other volumes were brought out by Engels on the basis of the materials Marx left behind. Volumes 2 (1885) and 3 (1894) can be properly regarded as works by Marx and Engels, rather than by Marx himself. Indeed, without Engels, as Marx admitted, the whole monumental enterprise might not have been produced at all. On the night of Aug. 16, 1867, when Marx completed correcting the proof sheets of volume 1, he wrote to Engels in Manchester: “I have YOU alone to thank that this has been made possible. Without your sacrifices for me I could never possibly have done the enormous work for the three volumes. I embrace you, full of thanks!”

A fourth volume of *Das Kapital* was brought together by Karl Kautsky after Engels’s death. It was based on Marx’s notes and materials from *Critique of Political Economy* and was published in three parts, under the title *Theories of Surplus Value*, between 1905 and 1910. A Russian edition, also in three parts, came out between 1954 and 1961, and an English translation in 1968.

Two of Marx’s books were published posthumously. *The Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850*, written in 1871, appeared in 1895. It was, Engels wrote in his introduction, “Marx’s first attempt, with the aid of his materialist conception, to explain a section of contemporary history from the given economic situation.” The second posthumous work, *The German Ideology*, which Marx wrote in collaboration with Engels in 1845–1846, was not published in full until 1932. The book is an attack on the philosophers Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach and Max Stirner and on the so-called true socialists.

The rest of Marx’s publications, mostly printed posthumously, consist of brochures. *Herr Vogt* (1860) is a furious polemic against a man named Karl Vogt,

whom Marx accused of being a police spy. *Wage-Labor and Capital* (1884) is a reprint of newspaper articles. *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1891) consists of notes which Marx sent to the German Socialist party congress in 1875. *Wages, Price and Profit* (1898) is an address that Marx delivered at the General Council of the International in 1865.

His Ideas. Marx’s world importance does not lie in his economic system, which, as critics point out, was not original but was derived from the classical economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo. *Das Kapital*, indeed, is not primarily a technical work on economics but one that uses economic materials to establish a moral-philosophical-sociological structure. Marx’s universal appeal lies in his moral approach to social-economic problems, in his insights into the relationships between institutions and values, and in his conception of the salvation of mankind. Hence Marx is best understood if one studies, not his economics, but his theory of history and politics.

The central idea in Marx’s thought is the materialistic conception of history. This involves two basic notions: that the economic system at any given time determines the prevailing ideas; and that history is an ongoing process regulated/predetermined by the economic institutions which evolve in regular stages.

The first notion turned Hegel upside down. In Hegel’s view, history is determined by the universal idea (God), which shapes worldly institutions. Marx formulated the reverse: that institutions shape ideas. This is known as the materialistic interpretation of history. Marx’s second notion, that of historical evolution, is connected with his concept of dialectics. He saw in history a continuing dialectical process, each stage of development being the product of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

Thus thesis corresponds to the ancient, precapitalist period, when there were no classes or exploitation. Antithesis corresponds to the era of capitalism and labor exploitation. Synthesis is the final product—communism, under which capital would be owned in common and there would be no exploitation.

To Marx, capitalism is the last stage of historical development before communism. The proletariat, produced by capitalism, is the last historical class. The two are fated to be in conflict—the class struggle, which Marx proclaimed so eloquently in the Communist Manifesto—until the proletariat is inevitably victorious and establishes a transitional order, the proletarian dictatorship, a political system which Marx did not elaborate or explain. The proletarian dictatorship, in turn, evolves into communism, or the classless society, the final stage of historical develop-

ment, when there are no classes, no exploitation, and no inequalities. The logical implication is that with the final establishment of communism, history comes to a sudden end. The dialectical process then presumably ceases, and there are no more historical evolutions or social struggles. This Marxist interpretation of history, with its final utopian-apocalyptic vision, has been criticized in the noncommunist world as historically inaccurate, scientifically untenable, and logically absurd.

Nevertheless, Marx's message of an earthly paradise has provided millions with hope and new meaning of life. From this point of view, one may agree with the Austrian economist Joseph A. Schumpeter that "Marxism is a religion" and Marx is its "prophet."

EWB

Maurras, Charles Marie Photius (1868–1952), French political writer and reactionary. Moving spirit and principal spokesman of Action Française, Charles Maurras was an antidemocrat, racist, monarchist, and worshiper of tradition and of the organic nation-state.

Charles Maurras was born in Martigues near Marseilles. He studied philosophy in Paris, where he was influenced by Auguste Comte, George Sorel, Henri Bergson, Maurice Barrès, and the racist journalist Édouard Drumont.

With Jean Moreas, in 1891 Maurras helped found the *École Romane*, and in 1892, with Frederico Amouretti, successfully took over the *Felibrige de Paris*, both movements dedicated to the purification of the French language and culture.

In both literature and politics Maurras sought to identify in history, especially in 17th-century classical traditions, all these concepts, ideals, institutions, and attributes of character which seemingly had succeeded. He considered his historical approach empirical and from this data sought to distill or induce a method for correcting evils and solving problems. He was committed to rescuing France from supposed literary and political degradation and corruption brought on by the Revolution, individualistic materialism, and predisposition toward relativism, eclecticism, and nihilism.

Believing the liberal individualism of the Revolution had opened the floodgates to degrading foreign forces—especially Jews—Maurras was clearly racist. Though nominally a man of letters, by 1899 his interests inclined toward politics, and he carried both his ideas and energies into the Ligue d'Action Française, which he and Barrès quickly appropriated and converted into the still-existing Action Française. Maurras's reverence for the past remained, and applying his literary methods to political analysis, he coined

in 1900 the term "integral nationalism"—"the exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity, and the steady increase of national power"—a concept remarkably paralleling Barrès's "collective egotism." Then, combining the classical ideals of order, hierarchy, and discipline with attitudes of authoritarianism and the spirit of romantic patriotism, he sought to lay the foundations of an effective political movement.

Having conceived the principle, Maurras then developed his method—"organizing empiricism"—the use of historical experience as a model and guide for programs of action. Application of the method, in his hands, indicated that a return to monarchy alone could save France. This movement, too, was perhaps as much literary as political, despite Maurras's fanatic insistence upon the latter orientation. His insistence brought him imprisonment. In 1926 five of his works were put on the Index, and the Action Française was banned by the Church.

Though against collaboration, following the German invasion, Maurras strongly supported Marshal Pétain. His efforts were in vain. His anachronistic ideas could not effectively be written into Vichy legislation. In 1945, for his part in the Vichy regime, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and deprived of his civil rights by Liberation leaders. Simultaneously, he was condemned and dismissed from the French Academy, to which he had been elected in 1938. Because of illness, in 1952 he was released to a clinic in Tours, where he died a few months later. Throughout these years, except for reconciliation with the Church, he remained intransigent and wrote prodigiously, both literary works (reminiscences) and political polemics. Maurras provided footnotes for French rightists—so long as such remain. The Action Française still exists, is admired by some, and lists a few members in the French Academy.

EWB

Mazarin, Jules (1602–1661), French statesman. Jules Mazarin was the chosen successor of Richelieu. He governed France from 1643 until his death and laid the foundations for the monarchy of Louis XIV.

Jules Mazarin was born Giulio Mazarin on July 14, 1602, at Pescina, a village in the Abruzzi, Italy. He began his career as a soldier and diplomat in the service of the Pope. In this capacity he met Cardinal Richelieu in 1629 and decided to transfer his allegiance to him. He earned Richelieu's regard by acting in the French interest rather than the Pope's in certain treaty negotiations. He went to France as papal nuncio in 1636 and was naturalized as a French subject

in 1639. In 1641 Richelieu persuaded the Pope to make Mazarin a cardinal, though he was not a priest.

Before Richelieu died in December 1642, he recommended Mazarin to Louis XIII as his successor, and the king accepted. Louis XIII died in May 1643, and the regent for the 5-year-old Louis XIV was his widow, Anne of Austria. The nobility welcomed the change. Anne was known to have been Richelieu's enemy, and Mazarin, though acknowledged as his nominee, was universally regarded as soft, ingratiating, and harmless. To everyone's utter astonishment, Anne confirmed Mazarin as first minister, and it soon became clear that she was in love with him. It is possible, though there is no proof, that later they were secretly married. They remained intimate friends and allies to the end of Mazarin's life.

Mazarin's task was to maintain the royal authority established by Richelieu and to win the war against France and Spain that he had started. Austria was humbled at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648; the war with Spain dragged on until 1659. The maintenance of royal authority was the most difficult task. Nobles who had reluctantly given way to Richelieu would not accept his successor, who was despised as a lowborn foreigner and thought to be weak-willed. The country was bitter at the taxes imposed by Richelieu to support the war, and its mounting resentment found dangerous expression in the Parliament of Paris, whose opposition was supported by all classes in the city.

To suppress the defiance that immediately arose in Paris, Mazarin had to call on the Prince de Condé, a cousin of the King and a very successful general. Finding himself indispensable, Condé became intolerably greedy and arrogant, and Mazarin finally had him and his friends arrested. The result was that the civil war that had already broken out became much worse, and several times it appeared as if Mazarin could not survive.

This war was called the Fronde, a name used to this day in France to denote irresponsible opposition. Paris, led by its Parliament, had rebelled in 1648. When this revolt was settled a year later, it was soon followed by the break with Condé. More humane than Richelieu, Mazarin imprisoned his enemies but did not put them to death, and as a result he could not make himself feared. The Fronde dragged on until 1653, but in the end, thanks to his own cleverness, the Queen's loyalty, and the mistakes of his enemies, Mazarin was completely victorious.

For the rest of his life Mazarin was the unchallenged master of France. His final triumph came with the Peace of the Pyrenees in November 1659. France had finally defeated Spain and was rewarded with ter-

ritorial acquisitions and the fateful marriage of Louis XIV to a Spanish princess. When Mazarin died on March 9, 1661, he had accomplished his task as he saw it. He had also accumulated a colossal fortune for himself.

In some ways Mazarin was a worthy successor to Richelieu. Behind a mask of affability, he was equally resolved to tolerate no opposition; his method of eliminating it was more devious and much less bloody but equally effective. As far as any man could have done, he fulfilled Richelieu's declared purpose of making "the king supreme in France, and France supreme in Europe." But, unlike Richelieu, he took no interest in the economic or cultural development of France. Once the Fronde was over, the country simply stagnated. The recovery that came in the 1660s was essentially the work of Jean Baptiste Colbert, whom Mazarin had picked out and recommended to the King.

EWB

Mérimée, Prosper (1803–1870), French author. Prosper Mérimée was a prose writer of the romantic period in France, important for his short stories, which mark the transition from romanticism toward the more objective works of the second half of the century.

Prosper Mérimée, a Parisian born and bred, grew up with the other French romantics. Although he shared some of their traits—a love of the exotic and the violent, for instance—his skeptical, pessimistic temperament kept him from their emotional excesses. He hid his emotional sensitivity beneath a cover of ironic objectivity. As restraint and ironic objectivity were among the principal goals of the later French realists, he stands as their precursor.

Mérimée's initial writings were entertaining frauds, published as alleged translations. A more important work under his own name, *Chronique du règne de Charles IX*, brought him to serious public attention in 1829. The *Chronique* is a historical novel, but it differs from the contemporary romantic ones in its impartial stance in recounting the Protestant and Catholic positions during the Wars of Religion in 16th-century France. True to form, Mérimée refused to provide an ending and mockingly invited his readers to invent one for themselves. Like his friend Stendhal, he feared being mocked himself and never allowed himself to appear to take any of his writings seriously, posing usually as an amateur who happened for the moment to be writing a story.

A very learned man, Mérimée was appointed inspector general of historical monuments in 1831. He performed major services by saving many ancient

monuments from destruction, among others the church of St-Savin with its important 12th-century frescoes. He traveled widely through France, southern Europe, and the Near East, finding there the settings for many of his short stories (*nouvelles*).

Mateo Falcone (1829) and the longer *Colomba* (1841) and *Carmen* (1845) are the principal works for which Mérimée is now remembered, typical in their settings in Spain or Corsica, their portrayal of primitive passions, and their clear, concise style. Each story is a new experiment in form. The author's position remains distant, and Mérimée usually prefers the concrete to the abstract, giving a character life by a gesture or pose alone. *Carmen* is the source for Georges Bizet's opera (1875).

Mérimée ended his career as a writer in 1848, but he was a familiar figure at the court of the Second Empire, in part owing to his long prior acquaintance with the empress Eugénie. He was also among the first in France to appreciate Russian literature, translating Aleksandr Pushkin, Ivan Turgenev, and Nikolai Gogol.

EWB

Mesmer, Franz Anton (1734–1815), German physician. Franz Mesmer developed a healing technique called mesmerism that is the historical antecedent of hypnosis.

Franz Mesmer was born on May 23, 1734, in the village of Itznang, Switzerland. At age 15 he entered the Jesuit College at Dillingen in Bavaria, and from there he went in 1752 to the University of Ingolstadt, where he studied philosophy, theology, music, and mathematics. Eventually he decided on a medical career. In 1759 he entered the University of Vienna, receiving a medical degree in 1766.

Mesmer then settled in Vienna and began to develop his concept of an invisible fluid in the body that affected health. At first he used magnets to manipulate this fluid but gradually came to believe these were unnecessary, that, in fact, anything he touched became magnetized and that a health-giving fluid emanated from his own body. Mesmer believed a rapport with his patients was essential for cure and achieved it with diverse trappings. His treatment rooms were heavily draped, music was played, and Mesmer appeared in long, violet robes.

Mesmer's methods were frowned upon by the medical establishment in Vienna, so in 1778 he moved to Paris, hoping for a better reception for his ideas. In France he achieved overwhelming popularity, except among physicians. On the basis of medical opinion, repeated efforts were made by the French government to discredit Mesmer. At a time of political turmoil and revolution, such efforts were viewed as

attempts to prevent the majority's enjoyment of health, and the popularity of mesmerism continued unabated. However, under continued pressure Mesmer retired to Switzerland at the beginning of the French Revolution, where he spent the remaining years of his life.

Critics focused attention of Mesmer's methods and insisted that cures existed only in the patient's mind. The 19th-century studies of Mesmer's work by James Braid and others in England demonstrated that the important aspect of Mesmer's treatment was the patient's reaction. Braid introduced the term "hypnotism" and insisted that hypnotic phenomena were essentially physiological and not associated with a fluid. Still later studies in France by A. A. Liebeault and Hippolyte Bernheim attributed hypnotic phenomena to psychological forces, particularly suggestion. While undergoing this scientific transformation in the 19th century, mesmerism, in other quarters, became more closely associated with occultism, spiritualism, and faith healing, providing in the last instance the basis for Christian Science.

EWB

Michelet, Jules (1798–1874), French historian. Jules Michelet wrote the *Histoire de France* and *Histoire de la Révolution française*, which established him as one of France's greatest 19th-century historians.

Jules Michelet was born on Aug. 21, 1798, in Paris. His father was a printer by trade, and his mother's family was from peasant stock. The family was poor, especially after Napoleon ordered the closing of his father's press. This family background prompted Michelet's initial sympathy with the French Revolution.

In 1822 Michelet began his long and devoted career as a teacher, becoming professor of history and philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure in 1827. In one of his earliest works, a translation of Giovanni Battista Vico's *Scienza nuova*, Michelet introduced such ideas as the importance of myth and language in historical understanding and the ability of man to forge his own history. His first volumes of French history treated the Middle Ages; already he revealed a passionate adherence to the role of the common people in history.

When Michelet joined the faculty at the Collège de France in 1838, his writing became more liberal and more oriented toward contemporary issues. Collaboration with a colleague, Edgar Quinet, on a book against the Jesuits raised the Church's suspicions. In addition, Michelet was waking up to the *esclavage* (slavery) of classes in an industrial society, a concern he expressed in his moving book *Le Peuple* (1846).

Thus Michelet and other writers of the period, encouraged by the revolutionary spirit growing since 1830, were attracted to the French Revolution. Michelet's seven-volume *Histoire de la Révolution française* illustrates his famous concept of history as a resurrection of the past in its spontaneous entirety. Although in this immense achievement the portraits of certain revolutionaries are masterfully drawn, Michelet is more sympathetic when narrating crowd scenes, for example, the fall of the Bastille.

The failure of the 1848 revolutions, Louis Napoleon's coup d'état of 1851, and the proclamation of the Second Empire in 1852 profoundly disturbed Michelet. Although he was not exiled, he spent the following year in Italy.

Worn by arduous work and depressing historical events, Michelet discovered new life in his second marriage with 20-year-old Atanaïs Mialaret. Inspired by her love of nature, he wrote four poetical studies: *The Bird* (1856), *The Insect* (1857), *The Sea* (1861), and *The Mountain* (1867). These fecund later years saw two other outstanding books: one on the medieval witch (*La Sorcière*, 1862) and the other on world religions, including an attack on Christianity (*La Bible de l'humanité*, 1864). Michelet finally completed his history of France in 1867. Working continuously, he had written three volumes on 19th-century France up to the time of his death on Feb. 9, 1874, when he suffered a heart attack at Hyères.

EWB

Mill, John Stuart (1806–1873), English philosopher and economist. John Stuart Mill was the most influential British thinker of the 19th century. He is known for his writings on logic and scientific methodology and his voluminous essays on social and political life.

John Stuart Mill was born on May 20, 1806, in London to James and Harriet Burrow Mill, the eldest of their nine children. His father, originally trained as a minister, had emigrated from Scotland to take up a career as a freelance journalist. In 1808 James Mill began his lifelong association with Jeremy Bentham, the utilitarian philosopher and legalist. Mill shared the common belief of 19th-century psychologists that the mind is at birth a *tabula rasa* and that character and performance are the result of experienced associations. With this view, he attempted to make his son into a philosopher by exclusively supervising his education. John Stuart Mill never attended a school or university.

Early Years and Education. The success of this experiment is recorded in John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography* (written 1853–1856). He began the study

of Greek at the age of 3 and took up Latin between his seventh and eighth years. From six to ten each morning the boy recited his lessons, and by the age of 12 he had mastered material that was the equivalent of a university degree in classics. He then took up the study of logic, mathematics, and political economy with the same rigor. In addition to his own studies, John also tutored his brothers and sisters for 3 hours daily. Throughout his early years, John was treated as a younger equal by his father's associates, who were among the preeminent intellectuals in England. They included George Grote, the historian; John Austin, the jurist; David Ricardo, the economist; and Bentham.

Only later did Mill realize that he never had a childhood. The only tempering experiences he recalled from his boyhood were walks, music, reading *Robinson Crusoe*, and a year he spent in France. Before going abroad John had never associated with anyone his own age. The year with Bentham's relatives in France gave young Mill a taste of normal family life and a mastery of another language, which made him well informed on French intellectual and political ideas.

When he was 16, Mill began a debating society of utilitarians to examine and promote the ideas of his father, Bentham, Ricardo, and Thomas Malthus. He also began to publish on various issues, and he had written nearly 50 articles and reviews before he was 20. His speaking, writing, and political activity contributed to the passage of the Parliamentary Reform Bill in 1830, which culminated the efforts of the first generation of utilitarians, especially Bentham and James Mill. But in 1823, at his father's insistence, Mill abandoned his interest in a political career and accepted a position at India House, where he remained for 35 years.

The external events of Mill's life were so prosaic that Thomas Carlyle once disparagingly described their written account as "the autobiography of a steam engine." Nonetheless in 1826 Mill underwent a mental crisis. He perceived that the realization of all the social reforms for which he had been trained and for which he had worked would bring him no personal satisfaction. He thought that his intellectual training had left him emotionally starved and feared that he lacked any capacity for feeling or caring deeply. Mill eventually overcame his melancholia by opening himself to the romantic reaction against rationalism on both an intellectual and personal level. He assimilated the ideas and poetry of English, French, and German thought. When he was 25 he met Harriet Taylor, and she became the dominant influence of his life. Although she was married, they maintained a close association for 20 years, eventually marrying in 1851, a

few years after her husband's death. In his *Autobiography* Mill maintained that Harriet's intellectual ability was superior to his own and that she should be understood as the joint author of many of his major works.

“System of Logic.” The main purpose of Mill's philosophic works was to rehabilitate the British empirical tradition extending from John Locke. He argued for the constructive dimension of experience as an antidote to the negative and skeptical aspects emphasized by David Hume and also as an alternative to rationalistic dogmatism. His *System of Logic* (1843) was well received both as a university text and by the general public. Assuming that all propositions are of a subject-predicate form, Mill began with an analysis of words that constitute statements. He overcame much of the confusion of Locke's similar and earlier analysis by distinguishing between the connotation, or real meaning, of terms and the denotation, or attributive function. From this Mill described propositions as either “verbal” and analytic or “real” and synthetic. With these preliminaries in hand, Mill began a rather traditional attack on pure mathematics and deductive reasoning. A consistent empiricism demanded that all knowledge be derived from experience. Thus, no appeal to universal principles or a priori intuitions was allowable. In effect, Mill reduced pure to applied mathematics and deductive reasoning to “apparent” inferences or premises which, in reality, are generalizations from previous experience. The utility of syllogistic reasoning is found to be a training in logical consistency—that is, a correct method for deciding if a particular instance fits under a general rule—but not to be a source of discovering new knowledge.

By elimination, then, logic was understood by Mill as induction, or knowledge by inference. His famous canons of induction were an attempt to show that general knowledge is derived from the observation of particular instances. Causal laws are established by observations of agreement and difference, residues and concomitant variations of the relations between A as the cause of B. The law of causation is merely a generalization of the truths reached by these experimental methods. By the strict application of these methods man is justified in extending his inferences beyond his immediate experience to discover highly probable, though not demonstrable, empirical and scientific laws.

Mill's logic culminates with an analysis of the methodology of the social sciences since neither individual men nor patterns of social life are exceptions to the laws of general causality. However, the variety

of conditioning factors and the lack of control and repeatability of experiments weaken the effectiveness of both the experimental method and deductive attempts, such as Bentham's hedonistic calculus, which attempted to derive conclusions from the single premise of man's self-interest. The proper method of the social sciences is a mixture: deductions from the inferential generalizations provided by psychology and sociology. In several works Mill attempted without great success to trace connections between the generalizations derived from associationist psychology and the social and historical law of three stages (theological, metaphysical, and positivist or scientific) established by Auguste Comte.

Mill's Reasonableness. The mark of Mill's genius in metaphysics, ethics, and political theory rests in the tenacity of his attitude of consistent reasonableness. He denied the necessity and scientific validity of positing transcendent realities except as an object of belief or guide for conduct. He avoided the abstruse difficulties of the metaphysical status of the external world and the self by defining matter, as it is experienced, as “a permanent possibility of sensation,” and the mind as the series of affective and cognitive activities that is aware of itself as a conscious unity of past and future through memory and imagination. His own mental crises led Mill to modify the calculative aspect of utilitarianism. In theory he maintained that men are determined by their expectation of the pleasure and pain produced by action. But his conception of the range of personal motives and institutional attempts to ensure the good are much broader than those suggested by Bentham. For example, Mill explained that he overcame a mechanical notion of determinism when he realized that men are capable of being the cause of their own conduct through motives of self-improvement. In a more important sense, he attempted to introduce a qualitative dimension to utility.

Mill suggested that there are higher pleasures and that men should be educated to these higher aspirations. For a democratic government based on consensus is only as good as the education and tolerance of its citizenry. This argument received its classic formulation in the justly famous essay, “On Liberty.” Therein the classic formula of liberalism is stated: the state exists for man, and hence the only warrantable imposition upon personal liberty is “self-protection.” In later life, Mill moved from a *laissez-faire* economic theory toward socialism as he realized that government must take a more active role in guaranteeing the interests of all of its citizens.

The great sadness of Mill's later years was the unexpected death of his wife in 1858. He took a house in Avignon, France, in order to be near her grave and divided his time between there and London. He won election to the House of Commons in 1865, although he refused to campaign. He died on May 8, 1873.

EWB

Mitterrand, François (1916–1996), French politician and statesman. François Mitterrand served in different governments under the Fourth Republic (1946–1958) and became a major opponent of Charles de Gaulle under the Fifth Republic beginning in 1958. In 1981 he was elected president of France and served for 14 years, longer than any other head of state in the five Republics since the Revolution of 1789.

François Maurice Adrien Marie Mitterrand was born into a middle-class Catholic family on October 26, 1916, in Jarnac, a small town in southwestern France near Cognac. During his childhood Mitterrand was influenced by his parents' concern for the plight of the poor. In 1934 he traveled to Paris where he entered the University of Paris and pursued degrees in political science and law. The rise of European fascism in the 1930s during his university years attracted Mitterrand to attend demonstrations organized by the pro-fascists in 1935 and 1936. After obtaining his degree in law and letters and a diploma from the Ecole Libre des Science Politiques, Mitterrand began his mandatory military service in 1938.

Serving as a sergeant in the war, he was wounded and captured near Verdun in May of 1940 by the Germans. After three escape attempts, he fled his Nazi captors and returned to France. There he worked as a minor government official in Marshal Pétain's Vichy government which collaborated with the Nazis. In 1943 he enlisted in the French Resistance movement when it became clear that the Nazis would lose the war. He used his position with the government for the Resistance while he headed the National Movement of War Prisoners and Deportees to forge the necessary papers needed in the resistance. Mitterrand claimed that his government job had been a cover for his Resistance activities all along. He was awarded the Rosette de la Resistance for his efforts.

At the end of the war he became secretary general for war prisoners and deportees in the provisional government of Gen. Charles de Gaulle. In 1945 Mitterrand was one of the founders of the Democratic and Socialist Resistance Union, a moderate political party with a strong anti-Communist bent.

Legislative and Executive Positions. With the founding of the Fourth Republic, Mitterrand ac-

tively entered politics and gained valuable parliamentary experience, being elected a deputy to the National Assembly (1946–1958) and serving in 11 different governments. Under the Fourth Republic his ministerial appointments included minister of war veterans (1947–1948), minister for information (1948–1949), minister for overseas territories (1950–1951), minister of state (1952), minister for the Council of Europe (1953), minister of the interior (1954–1955), and minister of justice (1956–1957).

The founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958 by de Gaulle in the midst of the Algerian independence movement pushed Mitterrand into the opposition and, subsequently, his political thought and leanings gravitated toward the left. He opposed de Gaulle's founding of the Fifth Republic and charged that the general's "new republic" represented a permanent *coup d'état*. During the first 23 years of the Fifth Republic, Mitterrand dedicated himself to opposing de Gaulle and his heirs. While no longer holding a ministerial post, he was elected to the Senate (1959–1962) and to the Chamber of Deputies (beginning in 1962). (He was also mayor of Château-Chinon beginning in 1959.) In time Mitterrand came to realize that to defeat de Gaulle the non-Communist left needed to be revitalized and an alliance established with the French Communist Party (PCF).

In the presidential election of 1965 Mitterrand opposed de Gaulle and ran as the candidate of the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS), an alliance of non-Communist leftist parties. Realizing the advantages of electoral cooperation, the Communists backed Mitterrand in this election. Though he was defeated by de Gaulle, in the final round of the presidential contest Mitterrand obtained 44.8 percent of the vote.

Rise of the "Red Rose" Party. The popular appeal of the left, however, was set back by the momentous student-worker revolt of 1968 (the Events of May) and de Gaulle's manipulation of the crisis. Then, partially as a result of the disastrous outcome of the June 1968 legislative elections for the left, Mitterrand resigned as chairman of the FGDS and decided not to run in the 1969 presidential elections. From 1970 to 1971 he headed a political grouping known as the Convention of Republican Institutions. In 1971 he was chosen first secretary of a new Socialist Party (PS) founded in the aftermath of the 1968 revolt and created to replace the old bankrupt Socialist Party (SFIO). The PS, symbolized by a clenched fist holding a red rose, eventually catapulted Mitterrand and his Socialist colleagues to power in 1981.

Shortly after assuming the leadership of the PS, Mitterrand and the Socialists agreed to support the Common Program (1972), an electoral alliance and program comprised of the Socialists, the Communists, and the left radicals (MRG). After signing the Common Program, the membership of Mitterrand's new party increased from 75,000 in 1972 to 200,000 in 1981. These numbers encouraged Mitterrand's hope of constructing a large non-Communist left in France. Several days after signing the Common Program, in fact, he declared at an international Socialist congress in Vienna that he wanted "to reconquer an important part of the communist electorate." This bold statement foreshadowed the competition that would develop between the PS and the PCF.

In addition to the competition with the PCF, Mitterrand also had to deal with rivalries developing within the PS itself, a catch-all party that cut across class lines and had three major tendencies or groupings: the radical tradition represented by Mitterrand, the revolutionary socialism of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, and the social democracy of Michel Rocard. After the founding of the PS, Mitterrand adroitly played one tendency against another to maintain his leadership of the party.

Third Try for Presidency Succeeds. After 1972 the rising popularity of Mitterrand's PS encouraged the Socialists but worried the PCF and the majority in power. In the 1973 legislative election the Socialists captured a respectable 18.9 percent of the vote, while the PCF garnered 21.4 percent. Then, in the 1974 presidential elections Mitterrand ran as the standard bearer of the left and almost defeated Valéry Giscard d'Estaing by winning 49.19 percent of the vote in the final round. In the cantonal elections of 1976 the PS became the first party of the French left by capturing 30.8 percent of the vote, while the PCF received only 17.3 percent. Fearing that the Socialists would make even further gains in the 1978 legislative elections at the expense of the PCF, the Communists sabotaged the Common Program on the eve of the elections. Consequently, instead of taking a majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies as predicted earlier, the leftist parties suffered a setback due to their own disunity.

Between 1978 and 1981 the discord between the Socialists and Communists continued, revolving around both domestic and international issues (for example, the crisis in Poland and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). As a result of this breakdown of leftist unity, the PS and the PCF ran separate candidates in the 1981 presidential elections: the Socialists backed Mitterrand and the Communists supported Georges

Marchais, head of the PCF. However, Marchais' poor showing in the first round of the elections convinced the PCF to back Mitterrand in the second round. Aided by Communist support and disunity now on the right, Mitterrand toppled Giscard by winning 51.75 percent of the vote. Mitterrand was aided, however, by a number of other factors: Giscard's so-called imperial image, the need for economic and social reform, and the twin problems of unemployment and inflation.

The April/May presidential elections were hailed as historic in France because they ended 23 years of right-wing government under the Fifth Republic. The elections also proved that *alternance*, or a change in government, was possible under the institutions of the Fifth Republic, a republic that Mitterrand had rejected earlier. The legislative elections held in June of 1981 constituted another historic dimension. In these elections Mitterrand's Socialist Party won an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly. The year 1981 marked the first time since the French Revolution of 1789 that the left had captured the executive and the legislative branches of government.

An Administration of Reforms. In forming his new government Mitterrand took some noteworthy steps. He chose Pierre Mauroy, the Socialist mayor of Lille, as prime minister. To reward the Communists for their backing and to maintain leftist unity, Mitterrand included four Communist ministers in his government. He also created a Ministry for the Rights of Women and staffed his new ministry with Yvette Roudy, a long-time feminist activist.

Now in power, Mitterrand's government launched a series of reforms designed to change France. A nationalization program was carried out that extended state control over nine industrial groups, including electronics, chemical, steel, and arms industries. Social reforms were also made: the work week was reduced to 39 hours; workers received more rights at their workplace; the retirement age was reduced to 60; the vacation period was extended to five weeks of paid vacation instead of four; allocations for the elderly, for women who live alone, and for the handicapped were increased; the minimum wage was substantially increased; reimbursement for abortions was provided; a wealth tax was imposed; and approximately 100,000 jobs were created in the public sector.

The Mitterrand government also adopted a number of reforms to strengthen justice for its citizens and residents by abolishing the death penalty, striking down the old *ad hoc* state security court, amending laws against homosexuals, and trying to regularize the status of France's four million immigrant workers. In

addition, the government launched a decentralization program designed to transfer some of the power and decision making from Paris to local regions. Year One of Mitterrand's Socialist experiment was a year of reforms, but an expensive one.

During the first year in power the Mitterrand government pursued a neo-Keynesian reflationary economic policy, believing that "pump priming" would help pull France out of the recession so troubling to the Western world. Yet this policy, coupled with the expensive reforms of the first year, only exacerbated the economic problems in France. Consequently, in June of 1982 Mitterrand was forced to announce that his government would pursue an austerity program. This program involved a second devaluation of the franc, a four-month-long wage and price freeze, an attempt to hold down the public debt, and a cap placed on state expenses. Such a change in economic policy meant that France was now focusing on reducing inflation instead of unemployment. The June 1982 austerity program was followed by even more rigorous austerity measures in March of 1983.

Trouble for the Socialist Government.

While Mitterrand and his government enjoyed a "state of grace" during their first year, the austerity programs of 1982 and 1983, accompanied by rising unemployment, contributed to growing opposition in France and decline in the popularity of Mitterrand and his government. The Socialist government also sparked opposition with its educational policy, namely its attempt to gain more control over the 10,000 private, mainly religious, schools in France. Concerns over educational reform as well as a climate of general discontent led to a massive demonstration on June 24, 1984, by more than one million protesters at the Bastille in Paris, constituting the largest public demonstration in France since liberation.

Facing this mounting opposition, plus a setback in the European Parliament elections of June 17, 1984, Mitterrand began to move his government toward the center. The French president made a major television address on July 12, 1984, announcing that he would renegotiate the proposed reform for private schools and that he wished henceforth to consult the French on questions of public liberties through referendums. Then, only six days later the Mitterrand government announced several key resignations from the cabinet. Mitterrand picked Laurent Fabius, a young loyal *Mitterrandiste*, as his new prime minister. Shortly thereafter, Fabius announced that the government would continue the austerity program in an effort to redress the economic crisis and to modernize France. More austerity, coupled with declining popularity at

the polls, led the Communists to refuse to participate in Fabius's cabinet. Mitterrand hoped that these changes would help to defuse the opposition and also prepare the PS for the upcoming 1986 legislative elections and the 1988 presidential elections.

In foreign policy, where the French president exercises enormous power, Mitterrand was both pragmatic and Gaullist in his approach. Strongly anti-Soviet, Mitterrand supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision to begin the deployment of almost 600 new Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Western Europe in 1983. While Mitterrand tried to promote solidarity with members of the NATO alliance, especially West Germany, he closely guarded French autonomy on foreign policy matters. At the same time, Mitterrand supported the idea of a strong and more independent Europe. He, too, tried to encourage a North-South dialogue between the rich and the poor nations and attempted to develop and to strengthen French spheres of influence in the Third World.

The 1986 legislative elections were a blow to the Socialists. They lost their majority in the National Assembly to the rebuilt Gaullist Party, now called the Rally for the Republic (RPR). As a result Mitterrand had to give the office of prime minister to the RPR leader, Jacques Chirac. It was the Fifth Republic's first government divided between a Socialist president and a conservative legislature (called "co-habitation" in France).

Mitterrand's most ambitious and visible projects were to order the construction of \$6 billion of public buildings and in 1986 to work with Great Britain to build the Channel Tunnel ("Chunnel") linking Europe's mainland with Great Britain. Scandal and accusations of corruption plagued the Mitterrand presidency. His private presidential police force was accused of illegally tapping the phones of judges, journalists, senior officials, and even the prime minister. A 1994 biography *Une Jeunesse Française (Youth of a Frenchman)* brought his early career back to haunt him. In particular he was criticized for maintaining his friendship with Rene Bousquet, the Vichy police chief who deported thousands of French Jews to Germany's death camps.

Although he married Danielle Gouze, whom he had met while working for the Resistance, in 1944, Mitterrand was rumored to have several mistresses. The Mitterrands had two sons. In 1994 it was revealed that Mitterrand's mistress and their daughter had been living at state expense in an annex to the Elysee Palace.

In 1992 Mitterrand discovered he had prostate cancer. After undergoing chemotherapy, he managed

to complete his term in office, but decided not to seek a third term. He died on January 8, 1996 at age 79.

EWB

Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de (1533–1592), French author. Michel Eyquem de Montaigne created a new literary genre, the essay, in which he used self-portrayal as a mirror of humanity in general.

Michel Eyquem de Montaigne was born on Feb. 23, 1533, at the family estate called Montaigne in Périgord near Bordeaux. His father, Pierre Eyquem, was a Bordeaux merchant and municipal official whose grandfather was the first nobleman of the line. His mother, Antoinette de Louppes (Lopez), was descended from a line of Spanish Jews, the Marranos, long converted to Catholicism. Michel, their third son, was privately tutored and spoke only Latin until the age of 6. From 1539 until 1546 he studied at the Collège de Guyenne, in Bordeaux, where the Scottish humanist George Buchanan was one of his teachers, as was the less-known French poet and scholar Marc Antoine Muret. Very little is known of Montaigne's life from age 13 to 24, but he may have spent some time in Paris, probably studied law in Toulouse, and certainly indulged in the pleasures of youth.

In 1557 Montaigne obtained the position of councilor in the Bordeaux Parlement, and it was there that he met his closest friend and strongest influence, Étienne de la Boétie. La Boétie and Montaigne shared many interests, especially in classical antiquity, but this friendship was ended by La Boétie's death from dysentery in August 1563. Montaigne was with him through the 9 days of his illness. The loss of his friend was a serious emotional blow that Montaigne later described in his essay "On Friendship." In 1571 Montaigne published his friend's collected works.

Two years after La Boétie's death, after a number of diversionary affairs, Montaigne married Françoise de la Chassaingne, daughter of a cocouncilor in the Bordeaux Parlement. She bore him six daughters, of whom only one survived to adulthood. The marriage was apparently amiable but sometimes cool—Montaigne believed that marriage was of a somewhat lower order than friendship.

In 1568 the elder Montaigne died, thus making Michel lord of Montaigne. Before his death, Pierre Eyquem had persuaded his son to translate into French the *Book of Creatures or Natural Theology* by the 15th-century Spanish theologian Raymond Sebond. The work was an apologia for the Christian religion based on proofs from the natural world. The translation was published early in 1569 and gave clear indication of Montaigne's ability both as translator and as author in his own right. From his work on this

translation Montaigne later developed the longest of his many essays, "The Apology for Raymond Sebond." In this pivotal essay, Montaigne presented his skeptical philosophy of doubt, attacked human knowledge as presumptuous and arrogant, and suggested that self-knowledge could result only from awareness of ignorance.

In April 1570 Montaigne resigned from the Bordeaux Parlement, sold his position to a friend, and as lord of Montaigne formally retired to his country estate, his horses, and his beautiful and isolated third-floor library. He carefully recorded his retirement on his thirty-eighth birthday and soon began work on his *Essais*. Ten years later (1580) the first edition, containing books I and II, was published in Bordeaux.

Late in 1580 Montaigne began a 15-month trip through Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Italy. He visited many mineral baths and watering spas in hopes of finding relief from a chronic kidney stone condition. His journal of these travels, though not intended for publication, was published in 1774. Toward the end of his trip Montaigne learned of his election in August 1580 to the mayoralty of Bordeaux, an office in which he then spent two 2-year terms. By all accounts he served the city with conscientious distinction during a troubled period, although public service was clearly not his aspiration at that time. He himself obliquely defended his regime in the essay "Of Husbanding Your Will."

At the end of his term of office Montaigne spent the best part of a year revising the first two books of the *Essais* and preparing book III for inclusion in the 1588 Paris edition, the fifth edition of the work. In 1586 both war and plague reached his district, and he fled with his household in search of peace and healthier air, receiving at best reluctant hospitality from his neighboring squires. When he returned 6 months later, he found the castle pillaged but still habitable.

Montaigne's last years were brightened by his friendship and correspondence with his so-called adoptive daughter, Marie de Gournay (1565–1645), an ardent young admirer who edited the expanded 1595 edition of his works (mainly from annotations made by Montaigne) and, in its preface, defended his memory to posterity. (It was from her edition that John Florio produced the 1603 English-language edition, which was a source for Shakespeare's *Tempest* and other playwrights' work.)

After 2 years of illness and decline Montaigne died peacefully in his bed while hearing Mass on Sept. 13, 1592. He died a loyal Catholic, but he was always tolerant of other religious views.

The "Essais." It is difficult if not impossible to summarize the ideas of Montaigne's *Essais*. He was

not a systematic thinker and defied all attempts to be pinned down to any single point of view. He preferred to show the randomness of his own thought as representative of the self-contradiction to which all men are prone. His characteristic motto was “*Que sais-je?*” (“What do I know?”) He was skeptical about the power of human reason, yet argued that each man must first know himself in order to live happily. The *Essais* constitute Montaigne’s own attempt at self-knowledge and self-portrayal—in effect, they are autobiography. Since he argued that “each man bears the complete stamp of the human condition” (“*chaque homme porte la forme entière de l’humaine condition*”), these autobiographical exercises can also be seen as portraits of mankind in all its diversity. Although he constantly attacked man’s presumption, arrogance, and pride, he nonetheless held the highest view of the dignity of man, in keeping with the dignity of nature.

As a skeptic, Montaigne opposed intolerance and fanaticism, believing truth never to be one-sided. He championed individual freedom but held that even repressive laws should be obeyed. He feared violence and anarchy and was suspicious of any radical proposals that might jeopardize the existing order in hopes of childish panaceas. Acceptance and detachment were for him the keys to happiness. In both the form and content of his *Essais*, Montaigne achieved a remarkable combination of inner tranquility and detachment, together with the independence and freedom of an unfettered mind.

EWB

More, Sir Thomas (1478–1535), English humanist and statesman.

The life of Thomas More exemplifies the political and spiritual upheaval of the Reformation. The author of *Utopia*, he was beheaded for opposing the religious policy of Henry VIII.

Thomas More was born in London on Feb. 6, 1478, to parents whose families were connected with the city’s legal community. His education began at a prominent London school, St. Anthony’s. In 1490 Thomas entered the household of Archbishop John Morton, Henry VII’s closest adviser. Service to Morton brought experience of the world, then preferment in 1492 to Oxford, where More first encountered Greek studies. Two years later he returned to London, where legal and political careers were forged. By 1498 More had gained membership in Lincoln’s Inn, an influential lawyers’ fraternity.

Christian Humanism. A broader perspective then opened. The impact of humanism in England was greatly intensified about 1500, partly by Eras-

mus’s first visit. His biblical interests spurred the work of Englishmen recently back from Italy; they had studied Greek intensively and thus were eager for fresh scrutiny of the Gospel texts and the writings of the early Church Fathers. John Colet’s Oxford lectures on the Pauline epistles, and his move in 1504 to London as dean of St. Paul’s Cathedral and founder of its famous humanist school, epitomized this reformist, educational activity among English churchmen. Lay patronage of the movement quickly made Cambridge, where Erasmus periodically taught, a focus of biblical scholarship and made London a favored meeting ground for Europe’s men of letters.

England thus shed its cultural provincialism, and More, while pursuing his legal career and entering Parliament in 1504, was drawn to the Christian humanist circle. He spent his mid-20s in close touch with London’s austere Carthusian monks and almost adopted their vocation. His thinking at this stage is represented by his interest in the Italian philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who had also become increasingly pious when approaching the age of 30 a decade before; More’s 1505 translation of Pico’s first biography stressed that development.

But More then decided that he could fulfill a Christian vocation while remaining a layman. Both his subsequent family life and public career document the humanist persuasion that Christian service could be done, indeed should be pursued, in the world at large. He first married Jane Colt, who bore three sons and a daughter before dying in 1511, and then Alice Middleton. His household at Bucklersbury, London, until 1524 and then at Chelsea teemed with visitors, such as his great friend Erasmus, and formed a model educational community for the children and servants; More corresponded with his daughters in Latin. His legal career flourished and led to appointment as London’s undersheriff in 1511. This meant additional work and revenue as civic counsel at Henry VIII’s court and as negotiator with foreign merchants.

More’s first official trip abroad, on embassy at Antwerp in 1515, gave him leisure time in which he began his greatest work, *Utopia*. Modeled on Plato’s *Republic*, written in Latin, finished and published in 1516, it describes an imaginary land, purged of the ostentation, greed, and violence of the English and European scenes that More surveyed. Interpretations of *Utopia* vary greatly. The dialogue form of book I and *Utopia*’s continual irony suggest More’s deliberate ambiguity about his intent. Whatever vision More really professed, *Utopia* persists and delights as the model for an important literary genre.

Service under Henry VIII. *Utopia*’s book I and More’s history of Richard III, written during the

same period, contain reflections about politics and the problems of counseling princes. They represent More's uncertainty about how to handle frequent invitations to serve Henry VIII, whose policies included many facets distasteful to the humanists. More had written in *Utopia*: "So it is in the deliberations of monarchs. If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the root . . . yet you must not on that account desert the commonwealth. You must not abandon the ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds." He finally accepted Henry's fee late in 1517 and fashioned a solid career in diplomacy, legal service, and finance, crowned in 1529 by succession to Cardinal Wolsey as chancellor of England.

More's early doubts, however, proved justified. Under Wolsey's direction More as Speaker of the House of Commons in 1523 promoted a war levy so unpopular that its collection was discontinued. In European negotiations, Henry's belligerence and Wolsey's ambition frustrated More's desire to stop the wars of Christendom so that its faith and culture could be preserved.

By the time that Wolsey's inability to obtain the annulment of Henry's marriage to Catherine of Aragon had raised More to highest office and placed him in the increasingly distressing role of Henry's chief agent in the maneuvering that began to sever England from Rome, More was deeply engaged in writings against Lutherans, defending the fundamental tenets of the Church whose serious flaws he knew. More cannot justly be held responsible for the increased number of Protestants burned during his last months in office, but this was the gloomiest phase of his career. The polemics, in English after 1528, including the *Dialogue Concernynge Heresydes* (1529) and *Apologye* (1533), were his bulkiest works but not his best, for they were defensive in nature and required detailed rebuttal of specific charges, not the light and allusive touch of the humanist imagination. He continued writing until a year after his resignation from office, tendered May 16, 1532, and caused by illness and distress over England's course of separation from the Catholic Church.

Break with the King. More recognized the dangers that his Catholic apologetics entailed in the upside-down world of Henry's break with Rome and tried to avoid political controversy. But Henry pressed him for a public acknowledgment of the succession to the throne established in 1534. More refused the accompanying oath that repudiated papal jurisdiction in England, and the Christian unity thereby manifest, in favor of royal supremacy.

More's last dramatic year—from the first summons for interrogation on April 12, 1534, through imprisonment, trial for treason, defiance of his perjured accusers, and finally execution on July 6, 1535—should not be allowed to overshadow his entire life's experience. Its significance extends beyond the realm of English history. For many of Europe's most critical years, More worked to revitalize Christendom. He attacked those who most clearly threatened its unity; once convinced that Henry VIII was among their number, More withdrew his service and resisted to his death the effort to extract his allegiance. His life, like *Utopia*, offers fundamental insights about private virtues and their relationship to the politics of human community.

EWB

Mosley, Oswald (1896–1980), British politician and author. Oswald Mosley was a member of Parliament from 1918 to 1931, during which time he served alternately as a Conservative, Independent, and Labour representative. In the mid-1930s, though, Mosley became a follower of Hitler, Mussolini, and the fascists, and organized the British Union of Fascists. He led his fellow fascist "blackshirts," armed with rubber hoses, pipes, and brass knuckles, on raids of London's Jewish areas. Hitler himself attended Mosley's wedding in 1936. When war with Germany erupted, Mosley was imprisoned by the British as a security risk. After the Allied victory, Mosley went into voluntary exile in France.

Lord Boothby wrote of Mosley: "I discerned in him . . . this kind of quality of leadership that I discerned in only two other men during all my period of political life. One is Lloyd George and the other is Churchill." Michael Foot equally admired Mosley: "[*My Life*] could cast a dazzling gleam across the whole century. . . . Within a few years of joining the Labour Party, he came near to diverting the whole course of British history. More surely than any other comparable figure of the time, Mosley had grasped the reality of Britain's economic plight. Vigour, intelligence, dramatic gesture and coruscating wit combined to give to this would-be Caesar a touch of Cicero as well. . . . What Mosley so valiantly stood for could have saved his country from the Hungry Thirties and the Second World War . . . the deep-laid middle-class love of mediocrity and safety-first which consigned political genius to the wilderness and the nation to the valley of the shadow of death."

CA

Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus (1756–1791), Austrian composer. Mozart's mastery of the whole range

of contemporary instrumental and vocal forms—including the symphony, concerto, chamber music, and especially the opera—was unrivaled in his own time and perhaps in any other.

Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart was born on Jan. 27, 1756, in Salzburg. His father, Leopold Mozart, a noted composer and pedagogue and the author of a famous treatise on violin playing, was then in the service of the archbishop of Salzburg. Together with his sister, Nannerl, Wolfgang received such intensive musical training that by the age of 6 he was a budding composer and an accomplished keyboard performer. In 1762 Leopold presented his son as performer at the imperial court in Vienna, and from 1763 to 1766 he escorted both children on a continuous musical tour across Europe, which included long stays in Paris and London as well as visits to many other cities, with appearances before the French and English royal families.

Mozart was the most celebrated child prodigy of this time as a keyboard performer and made a great impression, too, as composer and improviser. In London he won the admiration of so eminent a musician as Johann Christian Bach, and he was exposed from an early age to an unusual variety of musical styles and tastes across the Continent.

Salzburg and Italy, 1766–1773. From his tenth to his seventeenth year Mozart grew in stature as a composer to a degree of maturity equal to that of his most eminent older contemporaries; as he continued to expand his conquest of current musical styles, he outstripped them. He spent the years 1766–1769 at Salzburg writing instrumental works and music for school dramas in German and Latin, and in 1768 he produced his first real operas: the German *Singspiel* (that is, with spoken dialogue) *Bastien und Bastienne* and the opera buffa *La finta semplice*. Artless and naive as *La finta semplice* is when compared to his later Italian operas, it nevertheless shows a latent sense of character portrayal and fine accuracy of Italian text setting. Despite his reputation as a prodigy, Mozart found no suitable post open to him; and with his father once more as escort Mozart at age 14 (1769) set off for Italy to try to make his way as an opera composer, the field in which he openly declared his ambition to succeed and which offered higher financial rewards than other forms of composition at this time.

In Italy, Mozart was well received: at Milan he obtained a commission for an opera; at Rome he was made a member of an honorary knightly order by the Pope; and at Bologna the Accademia Filarmonica awarded him membership despite a rule normally requiring candidates to be 20 years old. During these years of travel in Italy and returns to Salzburg between

journeys, he produced his first large-scale settings of opera seria (that is, court opera on serious subjects): *Mitridate* (1770), *Ascanio in Alba* (1771), and *Lucio Silla* (1772), as well as his first String Quartets. At Salzburg in late 1771 he renewed his writing of Symphonies (Nos. 14–21).

In these operatic works Mozart displays a complete mastery of the varied styles of aria required for the great virtuoso singers of the day (especially large-scale da capo arias), this being the sole authentic requirement of this type of opera. The strong leaning of these works toward the singers' virtuosity rather than toward dramatic content made the opera seria a rapidly dying form by Mozart's time, but in *Lucio Silla* he nonetheless shows clear evidence of his power of dramatic expression within individual scenes.

Salzburg, 1773–1777. In this period Mozart remained primarily in Salzburg, employed as concertmaster of the archbishop's court musicians. In 1773 a new archbishop took office, Hieronymus Colloredo, who was a newcomer to Salzburg and its provincial ways. Unwilling to countenance the frequent absences of the Mozarts, he declined to promote Leopold to the post of chapel master that he had long coveted. The archbishop showed equally little understanding of young Mozart's special gifts. In turn Mozart abhorred Salzburg, but he could find no better post. In 1775 he went off to Munich, where he produced the opera buffa *La finta giardiniera* with great success but without tangible consequences. In this period at Salzburg he wrote nine Symphonies (Nos. 22–30), including the excellent No. 29 in A Major; a large number of divertimenti, including the *Haffner Serenade*; all of his six Concertos for violin, several other concertos, and church music for use at Salzburg.

Mannheim and Paris, 1777–1779. Despite his continued productivity, Mozart was wholly dissatisfied with provincial Austria, and in 1777 he set off for new destinations: Munich, Augsburg, and prolonged stays in Mannheim and Paris. Mannheim was the seat of a famous court orchestra, along with a fine opera house. He wrote a number of attractive works while there (including his three Flute Quartets and five of his Violin Sonatas), but he was not offered a post.

Paris was a vastly larger theater for Mozart's talents (his father urged him to go there, for "from Paris the fame of a man of great talent echoes through the whole world," he wrote his son). But after 9 difficult months in Paris, from March 1778 to January 1779, Mozart returned once more to Salzburg, having been unable to secure a foothold and depressed by the en-

tire experience, which had included the death of his mother in the midst of his stay in Paris. Unable to get a commission for an opera (still his chief ambition), he wrote music to order in Paris, again mainly for wind instruments: the *Sinfonia Concertante* for four solo wind instruments and orchestra, the *Concerto* for flute and harp, other chamber music, and the ballet music *Les Petits riens*. In addition, he was compelled to give lessons to make money. In his poignant letters from Paris, Mozart described his life in detail, but he also told his father (letter of July 31, 1778), "You know that I am, so to speak, soaked in music, that I am immersed in it all day long, and that I love to plan works, study, and meditate." This was the way in which the real Mozart saw himself; it far better reflects the actualities of his life than the fictional image of the carefree spirit who dashed off his works without premeditation, an image that was largely invented in the 19th century.

Salzburg, 1779–1781. Returning to Salzburg once more, Mozart took up a post as court conductor and violinist. He chafed again at the constraints of local life and his menial role under the archbishop. In Salzburg, as he wrote in a letter, "one hears nothing, there is no theater, no opera." During these years he concentrated on instrumental music (Symphony Nos. 32–34), the *Symphonie Concertante* for violin and viola, several orchestral divertimenti, and (despite the lack of a theater) an unfinished German opera, later called *Zaide*.

In 1780 Mozart received a long-awaited commission from Munich for the opera seria *Idomeneo*, musically one of the greatest of his works despite its unwieldy libretto and one of the great turning points in his musical development as he moved from his peregrinations of the 1770s to his Vienna sojourn in the 1780s. *Idomeneo* is, effectively, the last and greatest work in the entire tradition of dynastic opera seria, an art form that was decaying at the same time that the great European courts, which had for decades spent their substance on it as entertainment, were themselves beginning to sense the winds of social and political revolution. Mozart's only other work in this genre, the opera seria *La clemenza di Tito* (1791), was a hurriedly written work composed on demand for a coronation at Prague, and it is significantly not cast in the traditional large dimensions of old-fashioned opera seria, with its long arias, but is cut to two acts like an opera buffa and has many features of the new operatic design Mozart evolved after *Idomeneo*.

Vienna, 1781–1791. Mozart's years in Vienna, from age 25 to his death at 35, encompass one

of the most prodigious developments in so short a span in the history of music. While up to now he had demonstrated a complete and fertile grasp of the techniques of his time, his music had been largely within the range of the higher levels of the common language of the time. But in these 10 years Mozart's music grew rapidly beyond the comprehension of many of his contemporaries; it exhibited both ideas and methods of elaboration that few could follow, and to many the late Mozart seemed a difficult composer. Franz Joseph Haydn's constant praise of him came from his only true peer, and Haydn harped again and again on the problem of Mozart's obtaining a good and secure position, a problem no doubt compounded by the jealousy of Viennese rivals.

This decade also saw the composition of the last 17 of Mozart's Piano Concertos, almost all written for his own performance. They represent the high point in the literature of the classical concerto, and in the following generation only Ludwig van Beethoven was able to match them.

A considerable influence upon Mozart's music during this decade was his increasing acquaintance with the music of Johann Sebastian Bach and George Frederick Handel, which in Vienna of the 1780s was scarcely known or appreciated. Through the private intermediacy of an enthusiast for Bach and Handel, Baron Gottfried van Swieten, Mozart came to know Bach's *Well-tempered Clavier*, from which he made arrangements of several fugues for strings with new preludes of his own. He also made arrangements of works by Handel, including *Acis and Galatea*, the *Messiah*, and *Alexander's Feast*.

In a number of late works—especially the *Jupiter* Symphony, *Die Zauberflöte* (*The Magic Flute*), and the *Requiem*—one sees an overt use of contrapuntal procedures, which reflects Mozart's awakened interest in contrapuntal techniques at this period. But in a more subtle sense much of his late work, even where it does not make direct use of fugal textures, reveals a subtlety of contrapuntal organization that doubtless owed something to his deepened experience of the music of Bach and Handel.

Operas of the Vienna Years. Mozart's evolution as an opera composer between 1781 and his death is even more remarkable, perhaps, since the problems of opera were more far-ranging than those of the larger instrumental forms and provided less adequate models. In opera Mozart instinctively set about raising the perfunctory dramatic and musical conventions of his time to the status of genuine art forms. A reform of opera from triviality had been successfully achieved by Christoph Willibald Gluck, but Gluck

cannot stand comparison with Mozart in pure musical invention. Although *Idomeneo* may indeed owe a good deal to Gluck, Mozart was immediately thereafter to turn away entirely from opera seria. Instead he sought German or Italian librettos that would provide stage material adequate to stimulate his powers of dramatic expression and dramatic timing through music.

The first important result was the German *Singspiel* entitled *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* (1782; Abduction from the Seraglio). Not only does it have an immense variety of expressive portrayals through its arias, but what is new in the work are its moments of authentic dramatic interaction between characters in ensembles. Following this bent, Mozart turned to Italian opera, and he was fortunate enough to find a librettist of genuine ability, a true literary craftsman, Lorenzo da Ponte. Working with da Ponte, Mozart produced his three greatest Italian operas: *Le nozze di Figaro* (1786; The Marriage of Figaro), *Don Giovanni* (1787, for Prague), and *Così fan tutte* (1790).

Figaro is based on a play by Pierre Caron de Beaumarchais, adapted skillfully by da Ponte to the requirements of opera. In *Figaro* the ensembles become even more important than the arias, and the considerable profusion of action in the plot is managed with a skill beyond even the best of Mozart's competitors. Not only is every character convincingly portrayed, but the work shows a blending of dramatic action and musical articulation that is probably unprecedented in opera, at least of these dimensions. In *Figaro* and other late Mozart operas the singers cannot help enacting the roles conceived by the composer, since the means of characterization and dramatic expression have been built into the arias and ensembles. This principle, grasped by only a few composers in the history of music, was evolved by Mozart in these years, and, like everything he touched, totally mastered as a technique. It is this that gives these works the quality of perfection that opera audiences have attributed to them, together with their absolute mastery of musical design.

In *Don Giovanni* elements of wit and pathos are blended with the representation of the supernatural onstage, a rare occurrence at this time. In *Così fan tutte* the very idea of "operatic" expression—including the exaggerated venting of sentiment—is itself made the subject of an ironic comedy on fidelity between two pairs of lovers, aided by two manipulators.

In his last opera, *The Magic Flute* (1791), Mozart turned back to German opera, and he produced a work combining many strands of popular theater but with means of musical expression ranging from quasi-folk song to Italianate coloratura. The plot, put together by the actor and impresario Emanuel Schi-

kaneder, is partly based on a fairy tale but is heavily impregnated with elements of Freemasonry and possibly with contemporary political overtones.

On concluding *The Magic Flute*, Mozart turned to work on what was to be his last project, the *Requiem*. This Mass had been commissioned by a benefactor said to have been unknown to Mozart, and he is supposed to have become obsessed with the belief that he was, in effect, writing it for himself. Ill and exhausted, he managed to finish the first two movements and sketches for several more, but the last three sections were entirely lacking when he died. It was completed by his pupil Franz Süssmayer after his death, which came on Dec. 5, 1791. He was given a third-class funeral.

EWB

Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945), Italian dictator. Benito Mussolini was head of the Italian government from 1922 to 1943. A Fascist dictator, he led Italy into three successive wars, the last of which overturned his regime.

Benito Mussolini was born at Dovia di Predappio in Forlì province on July 29, 1883. His father was a blacksmith and an ardent Socialist; his mother taught elementary school. His family belonged to the impoverished middle classes. Benito, with a sharp and lively intelligence, early demonstrated a powerful ego. Violent and undisciplined, he learned little at school. In 1901, at the age of 18, he took his *diploma di maestro* and then taught secondary school briefly. Voluntarily exiling himself to Switzerland (1902–1904), he formed a dilettante's culture notable only for its philistinism. Not surprisingly, Mussolini based it on Friedrich Nietzsche, Georges Sorel, and Max Stirner, on the advocates of force, will, and the superego. Culturally armed, Mussolini returned to Italy in 1904, rendered military service, and engaged in politics full time thereafter.

Early Career and Politics. Mussolini became a member of the Socialist party in 1900, and his politics, like his culture, were exquisitely bohemian. He crossed anarchism with syndicalism, matched Peter Kropotkin and Louis Blanqui with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. More Nietzschean than Marxist, Mussolini's socialism was *sui generis*, a concoction created entirely by himself. In Socialist circles, nonetheless, he first attracted attention, then applause, and soon widespread admiration. He "specialized" in attacking clericalism, militarism, and reformism. Mussolini urged revolution at any cost. In each attack he was extremist and violent. But he was also eloquent and forceful.

Mussolini occupied several provincial posts as editor and labor leader until he suddenly emerged in the 1912 Socialist Party Congress. Shattering all precedent, he became editor of the party's daily paper, *Avanti*, at a youthful 29. His editorial tenure during 1913–1914 abundantly confirmed his promise. He wrote a new journalism, pungent and polemical, hammered his readership, and injected a new excitement into Socialist ranks. On the Socialist platform, he spoke sharply and well, deft in phrase and savage in irony.

The young Mussolini proved a formidable opponent. In a party long inert, bureaucratic, and burdened with mediocrity, he capitalized on his youth, offered modernity with dynamism, and decried the need for revolution in a moment when revolutionary ferment was sweeping the country. An opportunist to his bones, Mussolini early mastered the direction of the winds and learned quickly to turn full sail into them.

From Socialist to Fascist. This much-envied talent led Mussolini to desert the Socialist party in 1914 and to cross over to the enemy camp, the Italian bourgeoisie. He rightly understood that World War I would bury the old Europe. Upheaval would follow its wake. He determined to prepare for “the unknown.” In late 1914 he founded an independent newspaper, *Popolo d'Italia*, and backed it up with his own independent movement (Autonomous Fascists). He drew close to the new forces in Italian politics, the radicalized middle-class youth, and made himself their national spokesman.

Mussolini developed a new program, substituting nationalism for internationalism, militarism for antimilitarism, and the aggressive restoration of the bourgeois state instead of its revolutionary destruction. He had thus completely reversed himself. The Italian working classes called him “Judas” and “traitor.” Drafted into the trenches in 1915, Mussolini was wounded during training exercises in 1917, but he managed to return to active politics that same year. His newspaper, which he now reinforced with a second political movement (Revolutionary Fascists), was his main card; his talents and his reputation guaranteed him a hand in the game.

After the end of the war, Mussolini's career, so promising at the outset, slumped badly. He organized his third movement (Constituent Fascists) in 1918, but it was stillborn. Mussolini ran for office in the 1919 parliamentary elections but was defeated. Nonetheless, he persisted.

Head of the Government. In March 1919 Mussolini founded another movement (Fighting Fas-

cists), courted the militant Italian youth, and waited for events to favor him. The tide turned in 1921. The elections that year sent him victoriously to Parliament at the head of 35 Fascist deputies; the third assembly of his fledgling movement gave birth to a national party, the National Fascist party (PNF), with more than 250,000 followers and Mussolini as its uncontested leader, its *duce*.

The following year, in October 1922, Mussolini successfully “marched” on Rome. But, in fact, the back door to power had been opened by key ruling groups (industry and agriculture, military, monarchy, and Church), whose support Mussolini now enjoyed. These groups, economically desperate and politically threatened, accepted Mussolini's solution to their crisis: mobilize middle-class youth, repress the workers violently, and set up a tough central government to restore “law and order.” Accordingly, with the youth as his “flying wedge,” Mussolini attacked the workers, spilled their blood liberally over the Italian peninsula, and completed triumphantly the betrayal of his early socialism. Without scruple or remorse, Mussolini now showed the extent to which ambition, opportunism, and utter amorality constituted his very core. He was in fact eminently a product of a particular crisis, World War I, and a special social class, the petty bourgeoisie. Mussolini's capture of power was classic: he was the right national leader at the right historical moment.

Fascist State. Once in power, Mussolini attacked the problem of survival. With accomplished tact, he set general elections, violated their constitutional norms freely, and concluded them in 1924 with an absolute majority in Parliament. But the assassination immediately thereafter of the Socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti, a noted opponent, by Fascist hirelings suddenly reversed his fortunes, threw his regime into crisis, and nearly toppled him. Mussolini, however, recouped and with his pivotal speech of Jan. 3, 1925, took the offensive. He suppressed civil liberties, annihilated the opposition, and imposed open dictatorship. Between 1926 and 1929 Mussolini moved to consolidate his regime through the enactment of “the most Fascist laws” (*le leggi fascistissime*). He concluded the decade on a high note: his Concordat with the Vatican in 1929 settled the historic differences between the Italian state and the Roman Catholic Church. Awed by a generosity that multiplied his annual income fourfold, Pope Pius XI confirmed to the world that Mussolini had been sent “by Divine Providence.”

As the 1930s opened, Mussolini, seated safely in power and enjoying wide support from the middle

classes, undertook to shape his regime and fix its image. Italy, he announced, had commenced the epoch of the "Third Rome." The "Fascist Revolution," after the French original, would itself date civilized progress anew: 1922 became "Year I of the New Era"; 1932, Year X. The regime called itself the "Corporate State" and offered Italy a bewildering brood of institutions, all splendidly titled but sparsely endowed. For if the rhetoric impressed, the reality denied.

The strongest economic groups remained entrenched. They had put Mussolini into power, and they now reaped their fruits. While they accumulated unprecedented economic control and vast personal fortunes, while a class of nouveau riche attached itself to the regime and parasitically sucked the nation's blood, the living standard of the working majority fell to subsistence. The daily consumption of calories per capita placed Italy near the bottom among European nations; the average Italian worker's income amounted to one-half his French counterpart's, one-third his English, and one-fourth his American. As national leader, Mussolini offered neither solutions nor analyses for Italy's fundamental problems, preferring slogans to facts and propaganda to hard results. The face of the state he indeed refashioned; its substance he left intact. The "new order" was coating only.

Il Duce ruled from the top of this hollow pyramid. A consummate poseur, he approached government as a drama to be enacted, every scene an opportunity to display ample but superficial talents. Cynical and arrogant, he despised men in the same measure that he manipulated them. Without inspired or noble sentiments himself, he instinctively sought the defects in others, their weaknesses, and mastered the craft of corrupting them. He surrounded himself with ambitious opportunists and allowed full rein to their greed and to their other, unnameable vices while his secret agents compiled incriminating dossiers. Count Galeatto Ciano, his son-in-law and successor-designate, defined Mussolini's entourage as "that coterie of old prostitutes." Such was Mussolini's "new governing class."

Mussolini's Three Wars. In 1930 the worldwide economic depression arrived in Italy. The middle classes succumbed to discontent; the working people suffered aggravated misery. Mussolini initially reacted with a public works program but soon shifted to foreign adventure. The 1935 Ethiopian War, a classic diversionary exercise, was planned to direct attention away from internal discontent and to the myth of imperial grandeur. The "Italian Empire," Mussolini's creation, was announced in 1936. It pushed his star to new heights. But it also exacted its price. The man

of destiny lost his balance, and with it that elementary talent that measures real against acclaimed success. No ruler confuses the two and remains in power long. Mussolini thus began his precipitous slide.

The 1936 Spanish intervention, in which Mussolini aided Francisco Franco in the Civil War, followed hard on Ethiopia but returned none of its anticipated gains. Mussolini compounded this error with a headlong rush into Adolf Hitler's embrace. The Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936 and the Tripartite Pact in 1937 were succeeded by the ill-fated Steel Pact in 1939. Meanwhile, Mussolini's pro-Hitlerism struck internally. Having declared earlier that the racial problem did not exist for Italy, Mussolini in 1938 unleashed his own anti-Semitic blows against Italian Jewry. As the 1930s closed, Mussolini had nearly exhausted all toleration for himself and his regime within Italy.

World War II's surprise outbreak in 1939 left Mussolini standing on the margins of world politics, and he saw Hitler redrawing the map of Europe without him. Impelled by the prospect of easy victory, Mussolini determined "to make war at any cost." The cost was clear: modern industry, modern armies, and popular support. Mussolini unfortunately lacked all of these. Nonetheless, in 1940 he pushed a reluctant Italy into war on Hitler's side. He thus ignored the only meaningful lesson of World War I: the United States alone had decided that conflict, and consequently America, not Germany, was the key hegemonic power.

Disaster and Death. In 1940–1941 Mussolini's armies, badly supplied and impossibly led, strung their defeats from Europe across the Mediterranean to the African continent. These defeats constituted the full measure of Mussolini's bankruptcy. Italy lost its war in 1942; Mussolini collapsed 6 months later. Restored as Hitler's puppet in northern Italy in 1943, he drove Italy deeper into the tragedy of invasion, occupation, and civil war during 1944–1945. The end approached, but Mussolini struggled vainly to survive, unwilling to pay the price for folly. The debt was discharged by a partisan firing squad on April 28, 1945, at Dongo in Como province.

In the end Mussolini failed where he had believed himself most successful: he was not a *modern* statesman. His politics and culture had been formed before World War I, and they had remained rooted there. After that war, though land empire had become ossified and increasingly superfluous, Mussolini had embarked on territorial expansion in the grand manner. In a moment when the European nation-state had passed its apogee and entered decline (the economic

depression had underscored it), Mussolini had pursued ultranationalism abroad and an iron state within. He had never grasped the lines of the new world already emerging. He had gone to war for more territory and greater influence when he needed new markets and more capital. Tied to a decaying world about to disappear forever, Mussolini was anachronistic, a man of the past, not the future. His Fascist slogan served as his own epitaph: *Non si torna indietro* (There is no turning back). A 19th-century statesman could not survive long in the 20th-century world, and history swept him brutally but rightly aside.

EWB

N

Nagy, Imre (1896–1958), Hungarian politician. Imre Nagy served as prime minister of Hungary between 1953 and 1955, then again in 1956 during the revolution. He was tried and executed in 1958.

Imre Nagy was born into a peasant family at Kaposvar on July 6, 1896. As a young man he was an engineering apprentice, then a worker in Budapest. He was sent to the Russian front during World War I. Taken prisoner, he joined the Red Army in 1917 and the Bolshevik Party in 1918. He returned to Hungary in the early 1920s and joined the then illegal Communist Party. He organized the peasants in a movement calling for agrarian reform. He was in charge of Communist Party work in the countryside, concentrating on agrarian questions. Politically very active, he was tried and sentenced several times by the Hungarian government.

In 1928 Nagy left the country and settled in Vienna. In March 1930 he joined the staff of the International Agronomy Institute in Moscow. He published several articles in the Hungarian emigre journal *Sarló es Kalapács* (Sickle and Hammer). In 1932, commissioned by the Comintern, he drafted the Communist program of action on agrarian problems. He never joined any of the emigre Hungarian Communist factions, which may be one of the reasons why he escaped the Stalinist purges of the 1930s.

In 1941 he became assistant editor, then editor-in-chief, of Radio Kossuth, which broadcast programs directed to Hungary. In 1944 Nagy drew up a plan for Hungarian agrarian reform. At the end of the year he returned to Hungary and was appointed minister for agriculture in the provisional government at Debrecen. In April 1945, following the World War II liberation of the country by the Red Army, the government moved to Budapest, where life began to resume its normal course. The agrarian reform imple-

mented in Hungary was based on Nagy's plan and carried out under his direction. This made him very popular among the peasants.

In the elections held on November 4, 1945, the conservative Smallholders Party won 57.7 percent of the votes, the Social Democratic Party 17.4 percent, the Communist Party 17 percent, and the National Peasant Party 8 percent. These parties formed a coalition government. Imre Nagy became minister of the interior. On March 12, 1946, the Communist, Social Democrat, and National Peasant parties formed a "left block" inside the government coalition and organized demonstrations against the deputies from the right wing of the Smallholders Party. Under pressure, the Smallholders Party expelled 23 deputies. Later in March 1946 the Communist Party charged Imre Nagy with "lack of vigor" and relieved him of his post. It appointed Laszlo Rajk as his successor.

In order to force further nationalization, the Communist Party in February 1947 launched fresh attacks on the Smallholders Party. The secretary general of the party was arrested by the Soviet Control Commission and charged with anti-Soviet activities. He was tried and condemned to death, together with other party leaders.

In May the three largest banks were nationalized. New elections were held in August, in which 60 percent of the votes were won by the government coalition. Imre Nagy was elected president of the Parliament, a largely ceremonial office.

In March 1948, under pressure from the Communist Party, which was seeking a merger with the Social Democrats, the latter expelled some of its leading members who were opposed to such a union. Later that month businesses with more than 100 employees were nationalized. In June the Communist and Social Democratic parties decided to unite; for all practical purposes, the Social Democratic Party was absorbed by the Communists. A large-scale purge began in September, leading to the expulsion of some 100,000 members from the Communist Party: "former Social Democrats or unreliable elements."

Nagy had serious disputes with Matyas Rákosi, the Communist Party leader, from 1948. Nagy disagreed with the "personality cult" and the forced pace of collectivization, pointing out the dangers of this policy. In 1949 he was forced to withdraw from political life, having been removed from the politboro. He became director of the University of Agronomy and devoted himself to the study of agrarian questions.

A show trial of Rajk took place in September 1949; it was designed to justify the attacks on Yugoslavia. Rajk was sentenced to death. By December the nationalization of industry was completed. In the be-

ginning of 1950 the first Five Year Plan took effect. It concentrated on the development of heavy industry and on intensified collectivization.

In 1951 Nagy was allowed to return to political life. He was again elected to the politboro and was made a member of the secretariat. In 1952 he was made minister for farm deliveries, and later, when Rákosi became president of the council, he was appointed as his second deputy.

In 1953, three months after Stalin's death, the new leaders of the Soviet Communist Party made a vigorous attack on the Hungarian party leaders and forced them to adopt a new line and to appoint Imre Nagy as prime minister. In his new post he introduced a series of measures. In addition to a reorganization of the economy, he announced measures of political liberalization. The peasants were allowed to withdraw from the cooperatives and were promised tax relief. Agricultural credit was eased. The deportations were ended. A new Patriotic People's Front was formed. In October 1954 Nagy announced intensified democratization. In December Rákosi attacked the line of policy adopted by Nagy. New instructions from Moscow strengthened Rákosi's position. In March 1955 the Central Committee condemned Imre Nagy's course, and in April he was expelled from the Central Committee and relieved of all his offices. At the end of 1955 he was expelled from the party.

After the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 it was important to rehabilitate Nagy's policy. In July Rákosi was removed; in October Nagy was readmitted to the party. On October 23 and 24 workers went on strike; there were demonstrations in the streets against occupying Soviet troops; and the demand was raised for the return to power of Nagy. Nagy delivered a radio address calling for an end to the fighting. On October 26 delegations from all over the country urged Nagy to take new measures to liberate the country. During the following days a new government was formed and discussions began concerning the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops. But more Soviet troops entered the country. The Hungarian government denounced the Warsaw Pact and declared the country neutral. Soviet forces launched a general offensive against Hungary, crushing the uprising. Nagy took refuge at the Yugoslav embassy (some 200,000 Hungarians fled the country).

Nagy remained under the protection of the embassy until November 22, when he was duped into leaving it. On his way home he was captured. He was tried, sentenced to death, and executed in 1958.

EWB

Namier, Sir Lewis Bernstein (1888–1960), English historian. Lewis Namier was a major force in

introducing stronger empirical methods and social analysis into the study of 18th-century politics.

Lewis Namier was born Ludvik Bernstein near Warsaw on June 22, 1888. He studied briefly at Lausanne and the London School of Economics before entering Balliol College, Oxford. The Oxford years, from 1908 to 1912, were crucial in his development. There he acquired a British self-identity, changing his name to Namier (derived from his family's older name, Niemirowski); there he also acquired a deep and permanent interest in British history of the 18th century.

Throughout his life Namier was strongly attracted to the world of power and policy making. At the start of World War I, he enlisted in the British army but was discharged in 1915 because of poor eyesight. As a civilian, he served in the Propaganda Department (1915–1917), the Department of Information (1917–1918), and the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office (1918–1920). He attended the Versailles Peace Conference as a technical expert on eastern European affairs.

Namier started his serious work on the "imperial problem during the American Revolution" while a postgraduate student at Oxford in 1912 and continued these researches while in business in New York in 1913–1914. In 1920 he returned to academic life at Balliol College. Finding that this did not allow him sufficient time for research, he resigned to go into business during 1921–1923, hoping to save enough to support his serious studies. Without any regular income, living on grants, loans, and savings, he devoted the years 1924 through 1929 entirely to research and writing. From these fruitful years came his two great works on 18th-century politics.

During the 1920s Namier became active in the Zionist movement and in 1929 accepted the position of political secretary of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Finding that he lacked the personal political skills necessary for such a delicate job, he resigned after 2 years. From 1931 until his retirement in 1953, Namier was professor of modern history at Manchester University. He was knighted in 1952 and received many academic honors during the 1950s. Sir Lewis died in London Aug. 19, 1960.

Historical Work: 18th Century. Namier's scholarly reputation is based primarily on his two related works on 18th-century politics. In *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (1929), he attempted a static analysis of political society and the political process as it existed from 1754 until 1762, during the ascendancy of the Duke of Newcastle. In this great work he broke forever the remnants of the

“Whig myth,” deriving ultimately from Horace Walpole and Edmund Burke, which saw the politics of the first 2 decades of the reign of George III as adhering to the two-party model of the 19th century. He showed parliamentary politics to be based not upon coherent parties but, rather, on a congeries of familial-personal factions and interests, with a significant element supporting the government of the day regardless of its composition and another congenitally but unstably “independent.” In most constituencies, family favor and personal dependency best explained voting patterns.

In *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (1930), Namier moved from static analysis to narrative history, in which he was less masterful. He intended to follow volume 1, which covered only 1760–1762, with other volumes but was deflected by teaching, other scholarly interests, and international events.

In his work on 18th-century parliaments, Namier collected data on hundreds of members of Parliament. He realized that the work of all scholars doing such work would be immensely aided by the compilation of a biographical dictionary of all members of the House of Commons, with collective analysis where possible. As early as 1928 he helped publicize the project for such a history of Parliament, and after World War II, when the reorganized project obtained government support, Namier joined the new editorial board and devoted the years after his retirement in 1953 to editing the volumes on the period 1754–1790. His *History of Parliament* (3 vols., 1964) is a tool of inestimable value for students of pre-Victorian politics.

Historical Work: 19th and 20th Centuries.

Namier was deeply interested in European history, particularly central and east-central Europe, in the years since 1815. Starting with a propaganda piece, *Germany and Eastern Europe* (1915), he published a number of short interpretive essays (many republished in *Vanished Supremacies*, 1962) rich in insight and fresh interpretation. On a somewhat larger scale was his *1848: Revolution of the Intellectuals* (1946), which measured the formal liberal ideology of the central European revolutionaries against their class and national prejudices.

After 1940 Namier became involved in the problem of the diplomatic origins of World War II. Using government publications, early memoirs, and interviews with exiled officials in London, he published a series of articles, starting in 1943, on the diplomatic origins of the war. These were republished in 1948 as *Diplomatic Prelude 1938–1939*. He continued to publish articles and review essays in this area,

subsequently republished in *Europe in Decay* (1950) and *In the Nazi Era* (1952). These were important for the rigorous scrutiny he gave to the dubious evidence and arguments advanced by some self or national apologists.

Though he did not produce a major work on the 19th century, Namier had considerable influence on A. J. P. Taylor and others working since 1945 on central European history. His work on the diplomatic origins of World War II has stood up well and is still the starting point for all students in the field. The influence of his 18th-century studies is likely to last, for it has given us a whole new way of approaching the historical study of political behavior.

EWB

Napoleon I (1769–1821), emperor of the French. Napoleon ranks as one of the greatest military conquerors in history. Through his conquests he remade the map of Europe, and through his valuable administrative and legal reforms he promoted the growth of liberalism.

Napoleon Bonaparte was born Napoleon Buonaparte (the spelling change was made after 1796) on Aug. 15, 1769, in the Corsican city of Ajaccio. He was the fourth of 11 children of Carlo Buonaparte and Letizia Romolino. His father derived from the lesser Corsican nobility. Following the annexation of Corsica by France in 1769, Carlo was granted the same rights and privileges as the French nobility. After an elementary education at a boys' school in Ajaccio, young Napoleon was sent in January 1779 with his older brother Joseph to the College of Autun in the duchy of Burgundy. In May of the same year he was transferred to the more fashionable College of Brienne, another military school, while his brother remained at Autun. Here Napoleon's small stature earned him the nickname of the “Little Corporal.”

At Brienne, Napoleon received an excellent military and academic education, and in October 1784 he earned an appointment to the École Militaire of Paris. The royal military school of Paris was the finest in Europe in the years before the Revolution, and Napoleon entered the service of Louis XVI in 1785 with a formal education that had prepared him for his future role in French history. Napoleon joined an artillery unit at Valence, where he again received superior training.

First Military Assignments. Now a second lieutenant, Napoleon continued his education on his own, but he was distracted by Corsica. Until 1793 his thoughts, desires, and ambitions centered on the island of his birth. Following the death of his father, he

received an extended leave (1786) to return to Corsica to settle his family's affairs. After rejoining his regiment at Auxonne, he again spent more than a year on his native island (1789–1790), during which time he was influential in introducing the changes brought about by the Revolution. Returning to France, Napoleon was transferred to Valence in June 1791. But by October he had returned to Corsica, where he remained for 7 months. He spent the critical summer of 1792 in Paris and then returned to Corsica for one last episode in October. On this visit he took part in the power struggle between the forces supporting Pasquale Paoli and those supported by the French Republic. After Paoli was victorious, Napoleon and the Bonaparte family were forced to flee to the mainland, and the young officer then turned his attention to a career in the French army.

The Revolution of 1789 did not have a major effect upon Bonaparte in its early years. He did not sympathize with the royalists. Nor did he take an active part in French politics, as his thoughts were still taken up with affairs in Corsica. Napoleon was in Paris when the monarchy was overthrown in August 1792, but no evidence indicates that he was a republican. Upon his return from Corsica in the spring of 1793, Capt. Bonaparte was given a command with the republican army that was attempting to regain control of southern France from the proroyalist forces. He took part in the siege of Avignon, and then while on his way to join the French Army of Italy Napoleon was offered command of the artillery besieging the port of Toulon.

National Acclaim. The siege of Toulon provided Napoleon with his first opportunity to display his ability as an artillery officer and brought him national recognition. France had gone to war with Prussia and Austria in 1792. England, having joined the struggle in 1793, had gained control of Toulon. After his distinguished part in dislodging the British, Napoleon was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. He also made the acquaintance of Augustin Robespierre, the younger brother of the powerful Maximilien, and though Napoleon was not politically a Jacobin, he derived benefits from his association with influential party members. The overthrow of the Jacobin regime on 9 Thermidor (July 1794) led to Napoleon's imprisonment in Fort Carré on August 9. When no evidence could be found linking him to the British, Napoleon was released after 10 days of confinement.

Throughout the winter of 1794–1795 Napoleon was employed in the defense of the Mediterranean coast. Then, in April 1795, he was ordered to

Paris, and in June he was assigned to the Army of the West. He refused this position, pleading poor health. This refusal almost brought an end to his military career, and he was assigned to the Bureau of Topography of the Committee of Public Safety. While serving in this capacity, he sought unsuccessfully to have himself transferred to Constantinople. Thus Napoleon was in Paris when the royalists attempted to overthrow the Directory on Oct. 5, 1795.

Gen. Paul Barras had been placed in command of the defense of Paris by the government, and he called upon Gen. Bonaparte to defend the Tuileries. Napoleon put down the uprising of 13 Vendémiaire by unhesitatingly turning his artillery on the attackers, dispersing the mob with what he called "a whiff of grapeshot." In gratitude he was appointed commander of the Army of the Interior and instructed to disarm Paris.

Marriage and Italian Campaign. In the winter of 1795 Napoleon met Josephine de Beauharnais, the former Mademoiselle Tascher de La Pagerie. Born on the island of Martinique, she had been married to Alexandre de Beauharnais at the age of 16 and had borne him two children, Eugène and Hortense, before separating from him. Alexandre, a nobleman from Orléans, was executed in the last days of the Terror in 1794, leaving Josephine free to marry Napoleon. Their civil ceremony took place on March 9, 1796. Within a few days Napoleon left his bride behind in Paris and took up his new command at the head of the Army of Italy.

On March 26 Napoleon reached his headquarters at Nice, and on March 31 he issued the first orders for the invasion of Italy. The campaign opened on April 12, and within several weeks he had forced Piedmont out of the war. In May, Napoleon marched across northern Italy, reaching Verona on June 3. The campaign was then bogged down by the Austrian defense of Mantua, which lasted 18 months. During this period Napoleon beat back Austrian attempts to relieve the fortified city at Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli. Finally, in the spring of 1797, Napoleon advanced on Vienna and forced the Austrians to sign the Treaty of Campoformio (Oct. 17, 1797). The treaty gave France the territory west of the Rhine and control of Italy.

After spending the summer and fall at the palace of Monbello, where he established with Josephine what in reality was the court of Italy, Napoleon returned to Paris the hero of the hour. He was the man who could make war and peace. Napoleon was given command of the Army of England after drawing up a plan to invade that island. However, after a brief

visit to the English Channel he abandoned any hope of crossing that turbulent body of water with the available French fleet. Returning to Paris, he gave up his command.

Egyptian Campaign. Napoleon did not wish to remain idle in Paris; nor did the government wish to see a popular general in the capital without a command to occupy him. Thus, when an expedition to Egypt was proposed, probably by Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, both the general and his government gave it their support. Strategically, the expedition would extend French influence into the Mediterranean and threaten British control in India. Napoleon sailed from Toulon on May 19, 1798, with an army of 35,000 men. On June 11–12 he captured Malta, and on June 30 the task force reached Alexandria, Egypt. The city was taken, and Napoleon's army marched up the west branch of the Nile to Cairo. In sight of the city and of the Pyramids, the first major battle took place. With minimal losses the French drove the Mamluks back into the desert in the Battle of the Pyramids, and all of lower Egypt came under Napoleon's control.

Napoleon reorganized the government, the postal service, and the system for collecting taxes; introduced the first printing presses; created a health department; built new hospitals for the poor in Cairo; and founded the Institut d'Égypte. During the French occupation the Rosetta Stone was discovered, and the Nile was explored as far south as Aswan. But the military aspect of Napoleon's Egyptian venture was not so rewarding. On Aug. 1, 1798, Horatio Nelson destroyed the French fleet in Aboukir Bay, leaving the French army cut off from France. Then Napoleon's Syrian campaign ended in the unsuccessful siege of Acre (April 1799) and a return to the Nile. After throwing a Turkish army back into the sea at Aboukir (July 1799), Napoleon left the army under the command of Gen. Jean Baptiste Kléber and returned to France with a handful of officers.

The Consulate. Landing at Fréjus on Oct. 9, 1799, Napoleon went directly to Paris, where the political situation was ripe for a coup d'état. France had become weary of the Directory, and in collaboration with Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Joseph Fouché, and Talleyrand, Napoleon overthrew the government on 18 Brumaire (Nov. 9–10, 1799). The Constitution of the Year VIII provided for the Consulate. Napoleon was named first consul and given virtually dictatorial powers. The trappings of the republic remained—there were two legislative bodies, the Tribune and

the Corps Legislatif—but real power rested in the hands of the first consul.

Napoleon began at once to solve the problems that faced France at the turn of the century. With mailed fist and velvet glove he ended the civil war in the Vendée. He then personally led an army over the Grand-Saint-Bernard Pass into Italy and defeated the Austrians, who had declared war on France while Napoleon was in Egypt, at the Battle of Marengo (June 14, 1800). This victory, which Napoleon always considered one of his greatest, again brought Italy under French control. After a truce that lasted into December, French armies forced Austria out of the war for the second time. The Treaty of Lunéville (Feb. 9, 1801) reconfirmed the Treaty of Campoformio. It was followed on March 25, 1802, by the Treaty of Amiens, which ended, or at least interrupted, the war with England. The Concordat that Napoleon signed with Pope Pius VII in 1801 restored harmony between Rome and Paris, and it ended the internal religious split that had originated in the Revolution. Napoleon also reformed France's legal system with the Code Napoleon.

The Empire. By 1802 Napoleon was the most popular dictator France had ever known, and he was given the position of first consul for life with the right to name his successor. The establishment of the Empire on May 18, 1804, thus changed little except the name of the government. The Constitution of the Year VIII was altered only to provide for an imperial government; its spirit was not changed. The Emperor of the French created a new nobility, set up a court, and changed the titles of government officials; but the average Frenchman noticed little difference.

The Treaty of Amiens proved to be no more than a truce, and in May 1803 the war with England was renewed. The Emperor planned to invade the island kingdom in the summer of 1805, but his naval operations went amiss. In September, Napoleon turned his back on the Channel and marched against Austria, who together with Russia had formed the Third Coalition. At Ulm (October 14) and Austerlitz (December 2) Napoleon inflicted disastrous defeats upon the Allies, forcing Alexander I of Russia to retreat behind the Neman and compelling Austria to make peace. At the Battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon reached the height of his military career. The Treaty of Pressburg (Dec. 27, 1805) deprived Austria of additional lands and further humiliated the once mighty Hapsburg state.

Victory throughout the Continent. The year 1806 was marked by war with Prussia over increased French influence in Germany. The overcon-

fidant Prussian army sang as it marched to total destruction at the battles of Jena and Auerstädt (Oct. 14, 1806), and Napoleon entered Berlin in triumph. Prussia was reduced to a second-rate power, and the fighting moved eastward into Poland as the Russians belatedly came to the aid of their defeated ally. Although at the Battle of Eylau (Feb. 8, 1807) the French were brought to a standstill, on June 14 at Friedland the Emperor drove the Russian army from the field. Alexander I made peace at Tilsit on June 25, 1807. This understanding between the two emperors divided Europe. Alexander was to have a free hand in the east to take Finland and Bessarabia, while Napoleon was free to reshape western and central Europe as he pleased. The most significant result was the creation of the grand duchy of Warsaw (1807). Sweden was defeated in 1808 with Russia's help. Napoleon was now master of the Continent. Only England remained in the field.

Problems with England and Spain. On Oct. 21, 1805, Adm. Horatio Nelson had destroyed the combined Franco-Spanish fleet off Cape Trafalgar, Spain. This loss made it virtually impossible for Napoleon to invade England. He, therefore, introduced the Continental system, or blockade, designed to exclude all British goods from Europe. In this manner he hoped to ruin the British economy and to force the "nation of shopkeepers" to make peace on French terms. His plan did not work, and it led Napoleon into conflicts with Spain, the papacy, and Russia, and it undoubtedly formed a major cause for the downfall of the Empire.

In Spain in 1808 French interference led to the removal of the Bourbon dynasty and to the placement of Joseph Bonaparte as king. But the Spanish people refused to accept this Napoleonic dictate and, with aid from Great Britain, kept 250,000 French troops occupied in the Peninsular War (1808–1814). The refusal of Pope Pius VII to cooperate with Napoleon and the blockade led to the Pope's imprisonment and a French takeover of the Papal States. In the case of Russia refusal proved even more serious. Alexander's refusal to close Russian ports to British ships led to Napoleon's Russian campaign of 1812, which was highlighted by the Battle of Borodino (September 7) and the occupation of Moscow (September 14–October 19). However, the ultimate result of this Russian campaign was the destruction of the Grand Army of 500,000 troops.

Fall from Glory. The Napoleonic system now began to break up rapidly. At its height three of the Emperor's brothers and his brother-in-law sat on

European thrones. Napoleon had also secured an annulment of his marriage to Josephine and then married Marie Louise, the daughter of Emperor Francis II of Austria, in March 1810. Despite this union, Napoleon's father-in-law declared war on him in 1813. Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig (Oct. 16–18, 1813) forced him behind the Rhine, where he waged a brilliant, but futile, campaign during the first 3 months of 1814. Paris fell to the Allies on March 31, 1814, and the hopelessness of the military situation led the Emperor to abdicate at Fontainebleau (April 4, 1814) in favor of his son Napoleon II. However, the Allies refused to recognize the 3-year-old boy, and Louis XVIII was placed on the French throne.

Napoleon was exiled to the island of Elba, where he was sovereign ruler for 10 months. But as the alliance of the Great Powers broke down during the Congress of Vienna and the French people became dissatisfied with the restored royalists, Napoleon made plans to return to power. Sailing from Elba on Feb. 26, 1815, with 1,050 soldiers, Napoleon landed in southern France and marched unopposed to Paris, where he reinstated himself on March 21. Louis XVIII fled, and thus began Napoleon's new reign: the Hundred Days. The French did not wish to renew their struggle against Europe. Nevertheless, as the Allies closed ranks, Napoleon was forced to renew the war if he was to remain on the throne of France.

The Waterloo campaign (June 12–18) was short and decisive. After a victory over the Prussian army at Ligny, Napoleon was defeated by the combined British and Prussian armies under the Duke of Wellington and Gebhard von Blücher at Waterloo on June 18, 1815. He returned to Paris and abdicated for a second time, on June 22. Napoleon at first hoped to reach America; however, he surrendered to the commander of the British blockade at Rochefort on July 3, hoping to obtain asylum in England. Instead, he was sent into exile on the island of St. Helena. There he spent his remaining years, quarreling with the British governor, Sir Hudson Lowe, and dictating his memoirs. He died on St. Helena, after long suffering from cancer, on May 5, 1821.

EWB

Napoleon III (1808–1873), emperor of France from 1852 to 1870. Elected president of the Second French Republic in 1848, Napoleon III staged a coup d'état in 1851 and reestablished the Empire.

Between 1848 and 1870 France underwent rapid economic growth as a result of the industrial revolution, and Napoleon III's government fostered this development. These years were also the period of the

Crimean War and the unifications of Italy and Germany, and France played a pivotal role in these affairs.

Napoleon was born in Paris on April 20, 1808, the youngest son of Louis Bonaparte, the king of Holland and brother of Napoleon, I, and of Hortense de Beauharnais, daughter of Josephine. His full name was Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, but he was generally known as Louis Napoleon. After 1815 Louis Napoleon lived with his mother in exile in Augsburg, Bavaria, where he attended the Augsburg gymnasium, and at Arenburg Castle in Switzerland. In 1831 he and his brother joined rebels against papal rule in Romagna.

The Pretender. The death of his brother during this rebellion, followed by the death of Napoleon I's son, made Louis Napoleon the Bonaparte pretender. He took this position seriously, beginning his career as propagandist and pamphleteer in 1832 with *Rêveries politiques*. He also joined the Swiss militia, becoming an artillery captain in 1834 and publishing an artillery manual in 1836. Louis Napoleon attempted a military coup d'état at Strasbourg on Oct. 30, 1836, but the ludicrous venture failed. Louis Philippe deported him to America, but Louis Napoleon returned to Arenburg to attend his mother, who died in October 1837.

France threatened invasion when the Swiss government refused to expel him, but Louis Napoleon withdrew voluntarily to England. There he produced his most famous pamphlet, *Des Idées napoléoniennes* (Napoleonic Ideas), effectively stating his political program, which combined the ideas of liberty and authority, social reform and order, and glory and peace. Louis Napoleon attempted a second coup d'état on Aug. 6, 1840, at Boulogne-sur-Mer, but failed again. He was tried by the Chamber of Peers, condemned to perpetual imprisonment, and interned in the fortress of Ham (Somme). There he studied, and he wrote, among other things, *L'Extinction du paupérisme*, which increased his reputation as a social reformer. In 1846 he escaped to England.

Second Republic. Louis Napoleon hastened to Paris when he received news of the Revolution of 1848, but he withdrew on request of the provisional government. He declined to be a candidate in the April elections and resigned his seat when elected in four constituencies in June. In September 1848 he was again chosen by five districts and took his seat in the Assembly.

Louis Napoleon was not a particularly impressive figure. Nonetheless, the appeal of the Bonaparte name, strengthened by the spread of the Napoleonic

legend, and a general demand for order following the workers' uprising of June 1848 won him overwhelming election as president of the Second French Republic on Dec. 10, 1848.

Louis Napoleon used a French expeditionary force to restore, and then to protect, papal supremacy in Rome, thus winning Roman Catholic support at home. In 1850 the legislature established residence requirements that disenfranchised nearly 3 million workers. The next year it rejected a constitutional amendment permitting re-election to the presidency. Louis Napoleon used these actions to justify his overthrow of the republic by a coup d'état on Dec. 2, 1851. His action was endorsed by nearly 7,500,000 votes, with fewer than 650,000 negative votes. A year later more than 7,800,000 Frenchmen approved re-establishment of the Empire, which was inaugurated on Dec. 2, 1852.

Domestic Policies of the Emperor. Napoleon III governed by the principle of direct, or Caesarean, democracy, through which power was transferred directly from the people to an absolute ruler who was responsible to them and whose acts were confirmed by plebiscite. Although he established a senate and a legislative assembly chosen by universal suffrage, they had little power. Elections were carefully manipulated, and political activities and the press were closely controlled. The Emperor's ideal was to serve as representative of the whole nation, and hence he never organized a true Bonapartist party. In 1853 he married the Spanish beauty Eugénie de Montijo, and in 1856 she bore him an heir, thus providing for the succession.

In economic affairs Napoleon III considered himself a socialist, and he believed that government should control and increase national wealth. His ideals resembled those of the Saint-Simonians, emphasizing communications, public works, and credit. The imperial government built canals, promoted railroad development, and fostered the extension of banking and credit institutions. The Emperor inaugurated great public works programs in Paris and in leading provincial cities, sponsored trade expositions, and in 1860 introduced free trade, which was unpopular with industrial leaders but ultimately strengthened French industry.

Foreign Policy. In policy statements Napoleon III consistently asserted that the Empire stood for peace, but in practice Bonapartism demanded glory. Napoleon III believed in national self-determination, and he wished to assume leadership in redrawing European frontiers in accordance with his "principle of

nationalities.” Thus he hoped to restore France to the position of arbiter of Europe that it had enjoyed under Napoleon I. In practice, Napoleon III vacillated between his principles and promotion of France’s self-interest, and he involved France in three European wars and several colonial expeditions.

The first European conflict, the Crimean War (1854–1856), brought little material gain, but Napoleon III defended France’s protectorate of the holy places and joined the British to avenge Russia’s defeat of Napoleon I. In the Congress of Paris, Napoleon III came close to his ideal of serving as arbiter of Europe. Among other things, he championed Romanian nationalism, gaining autonomy for Moldavia and Wallachia and later aiding those provinces to achieve unification.

Napoleon III’s second war was fought in 1859 for the Italian nationalist cause. Shortly after Felice Orsini’s attempt to assassinate him in 1858, Napoleon III planned the liberation of Italy with Camillo di Cavour at Plombières. He envisaged the creation of a federation of four states under the presidency of the pope. Although French battles against Austria were successful, Napoleon III was unable to control the Italian nationalist movement, was threatened on the Rhine by Prussia, and lost support from proclerical elements in France, who saw Italian unification as a threat to the papacy. Napoleon III therefore made peace at Villafranca di Verona without freeing Venetia, thus disappointing the Italians and alienating French liberals. Although he had not fully honored his commitment, Napoleon III later received Nice and Savoy, and this brought an end to the British alliance that had been a cornerstone of his early diplomacy.

In 1862 Napoleon III became involved in an attempt to establish a friendly, pro-Catholic regime in Mexico under the Austrian prince Maximilian. Mexican resistance proved stronger than expected; the United States concluded its Civil War and exerted pressure; and Napoleon III withdrew his forces in 1866–1867. This fiasco provoked powerful criticism in France, which was intensified by the subsequent execution of Maximilian in Mexico. Meanwhile, the Emperor had also failed in his attempt to gain compensation for France in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866.

Liberal Empire. Growing opposition after 1859 encouraged Napoleon III to make concessions to liberalism. In 1860–1861 he gave the legislature additional freedom and authority, and in 1868 he granted freedom of press and assembly. The elections of 1869, fought with virulence, brought more than 3 million votes for opposition deputies. The results in-

duced Napoleon III to appoint the former Republican Émile Ollivier to form a responsible ministry. After further turbulence following a Bonaparte scandal, the Emperor resorted to plebiscite, and on May 8, 1870, more than 7,300,000 Frenchmen voted to accept all liberal reforms introduced by Napoleon III since 1860.

Franco-Prussian War. In 1870, when the Spanish invited Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen to become their king, French protests induced Prussia’s William I to have the candidacy withdrawn. The ambassador to Prussia was then instructed to demand a Prussian promise that no Hohenzollern would ever become king of Spain. William’s refusal to consider this enabled Otto von Bismarck to provoke war by publishing William’s dispatch from Ems in slightly altered form, making it appear that insults had been exchanged. France declared war on July 19, 1870, and Napoleon III took command of his troops although he was so ill from bladder stones, which had long troubled him, that he could scarcely ride his horse. The Emperor’s troops were surrounded at Sedan, and Napoleon III surrendered with 80,000 men on Sept. 2, 1870. Two days later the Third Republic was proclaimed in Paris.

When the Germans released him in 1871, Napoleon III joined his wife and son at Chislehurst in England. He still hoped to regain the throne for his son, but he died on Jan. 9, 1873, following a series of bladder operations. His son was killed in South Africa in 1879 while serving in the British army.

EWB

Nerval, Gérard de (1808–1855), French poet. Gérard de Nerval was an early romantic. His prose and poetry mark him as a precursor of the many movements, from symbolism to surrealism, that shaped modern French literature.

Gérard de Nerval was born Gérard Labrunie on May 22, 1808, in Paris. Because of his parents’ immediate departure for Silesia, where his mother died, Nerval was taken to the home of maternal relatives in the Valois. This region played a prominent part in many of his works. The fact that his early years were bereft of parental care probably contributed to his subsequent lack of mental equilibrium.

Upon his father’s return from the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, Nerval returned to Paris. As a day pupil at the Lycée Charlemagne, he distinguished himself by his precocious literary gifts and made the acquaintance of a lifelong friend, the poet Théophile Gautier.

Nerval’s translation in 1827 of J. W. von Goethe’s *Faust (Part I)* earned him the praise of Goethe and opened influential Parisian literary circles to him.

His admiration for Victor Hugo converted him to the romantic movement. In the 1830s Nerval belonged to the *petit cénacle*, a group of minor artistic figures that gravitated around Gautier.

In 1834 Nerval received an inheritance from his maternal grandparents that enabled him to pursue exclusively the literary career of which his father disapproved. Nerval gave up his nominal study of medicine and made a brief trip to Italy, a tour that had a powerful and lasting effect on his imagination.

Meanwhile, Nerval fell in love with Jenny Colon, an actress, for whom he founded a theatrical review, *Le Monde dramatique*. It failed after 2 years. The brilliant and gay life that Nerval led during this brief period of prosperity was succeeded by a lifetime of financial difficulties and personal sadness. The poet lost both his small patrimony and Jenny Colon, who married another. During this period Nerval centered his main literary efforts on the theater, a genre basically uncongenial to his talents. In spite of an occasional success, such as *Piquillo* (1837), his efforts in the theater generally met with failure.

The years 1839–1841 were ones of growing eccentricities and depression for Nerval. His translation of *Faust (Part II)*, which appeared in 1840, culminated in a mental breakdown that caused him to be hospitalized in 1841. His mental stability thus shattered, Nerval's life became more precarious and difficult because he depended upon his pen for his living. In order to mend his health, Nerval made a trip to the Orient in 1843. His health regained, he published articles dealing with his travels in serial form in various periodicals. During these years of remission from mental breakdown, he also published chronicles, essays, poems, and novellas in many magazines, all the time trying unsuccessfully to establish himself in the theater. He also traveled in foreign countries and in the Valois. Wandering had become a temperamental necessity, and it is an important theme in his major works.

In 1848 Nerval published his translation of Heinrich Heine's poetry. In 1851 *Le Voyage en Orient* appeared. Under the guise of a travelog, it concerned itself with the pilgrimage of a soul, being more revealing of the inner geography of Nerval than of Egypt, Lebanon, or Turkey.

Nerval's major works were all written in the last few years of his life under the threat of incurable insanity. A serious relapse in 1851 marked him irrevocably. In 1852 he published *Les Illuminés*, a series of biographical sketches of unorthodox and original figures. In 1853 *Les Petits châteaux de Bohême* appeared. It was a nostalgic recounting of his happy years. It also contained the *Odelettes*, early poems in the manner of

Pierre de Ronsard. Nerval then published his best and most famous story, *Sylvie*, in the *Revue des deux mondes*. In this tale he explored the sources of memory and transfigured the Valois of his childhood. It was included in *Les Filles du feu* in 1854. That same year *Les Chimères*, a series of 12 hermetic sonnets, also appeared.

During this period Nerval was also writing an autobiographical work, *Les Nuits d'Octobre*, and *Aurélia*, his last and most occult work. In *Aurélia* Nerval described the experience of madness and his attempt to overcome it by means of the written word.

In January 1855, destitute and desperate, Nerval committed suicide by hanging himself in a Parisian alley.

EWB

Newton, Sir Isaac (1642–1727), English scientist and mathematician. Isaac Newton made major contributions in mathematics and theoretical and experimental physics and achieved a remarkable synthesis of the work of his predecessors on the laws of motion, especially the law of universal gravitation.

Isaac Newton was born on Christmas Day, 1642, at Woolsthorpe, a hamlet in southwestern Lincolnshire. In his early years Lincolnshire was a battleground of the civil wars, in which the challenging of authority in government and religion was dividing England's population. Also of significance for his early development were circumstances within his family. He was born after the death of his father, and in his third year his mother married the rector of a neighboring parish, leaving Isaac at Woolsthorpe in the care of his grandmother.

After a rudimentary education in local schools, he was sent at the age of 12 to the King's School in Grantham, where he lived in the home of an apothecary named Clark. It was from Clark's stepdaughter that Newton's biographer William Stukeley learned many years later of the boy's interest in her father's chemical library and laboratory and of the windmill run by a live mouse, the floating lanterns, sundials, and other mechanical contrivances Newton built to amuse her. Although she married someone else and he never married, she was the one person for whom Newton seems to have had a romantic attachment.

At birth Newton was heir to the modest estate which, when he came of age, he was expected to manage. But during a trial period midway in his course at King's School, it became apparent that farming was not his métier. In 1661, at the age of 19, he entered Trinity College, Cambridge. There the questioning of long-accepted beliefs was beginning to be apparent in

new attitudes toward man's environment, expressed in the attention given to mathematics and science.

After receiving his bachelor's degree in 1665, apparently without special distinction, Newton stayed on for his master's; but an epidemic of the plague caused the university to close. Newton was back at Woolsthorpe for 18 months in 1666 and 1667. During this brief period he performed the basic experiments and apparently did the fundamental thinking for all his subsequent work on gravitation and optics and developed for his own use his system of calculus. The story that the idea of universal gravitation was suggested to him by the falling of an apple seems to be authentic: Stukeley reports that he heard it from Newton himself.

Returning to Cambridge in 1667, Newton quickly completed the requirements for his master's degree and then entered upon a period of elaboration of the work begun at Woolsthorpe. His mathematics professor, Isaac Barrow, was the first to recognize Newton's unusual ability, and when, in 1669, Barrow resigned to devote himself to theology, he recommended Newton as his successor. Newton became Lucasian professor of mathematics at 27 and stayed at Trinity in that capacity for 27 years.

Experiments in Optics. Newton's main interest at the time of his appointment was optics, and for several years the lectures required of him by the professorship were devoted to this subject. In a letter of 1672 to the secretary of the Royal Society, he says that in 1666 he had bought a prism "to try therewith the celebrated phenomena of colours." He continues, "In order thereto having darkened the room and made a small hole in my window-shuts to let in a convenient quantity of the Sun's light, I placed my prism at its entrance, that it might be thereby refracted to the opposite wall." He had been surprised to see the various colors appear on the wall in an oblong arrangement (the vertical being the greater dimension), "which according to the received laws of refraction should have been circular." Proceeding from this experiment through several stages to the "crucial" one, in which he had isolated a single ray and found it unchanging in color and refrangibility, he had drawn the revolutionary conclusion that "Light itself is a heterogeneous mixture of differently refrangible rays."

These experiments had grown out of Newton's interest in improving the effectiveness of telescopes, and his discoveries about the nature and composition of light had led him to believe that greater accuracy could not be achieved in instruments based on the refractive principle. He had turned, consequently, to suggestions for a reflecting telescope made by earlier

investigators but never tested in an actual instrument. Being manually dexterous, he built several models in which the image was viewed in a concave mirror through an eyepiece in the side of the tube. In 1672 he sent one of these to the Royal Society.

Newton felt honored when the members were favorably impressed by the efficiency of his small reflecting telescope and when on the basis of it they elected him to their membership. But when this warm reception induced him to send the society a paper describing his experiments on light and his conclusions drawn from them, the results were almost disastrous for him and for posterity. The paper was published in the society's *Philosophical Transactions*, and the reactions of English and Continental scientists, led by Robert Hooke and Christiaan Huygens, ranged from skepticism to bitter opposition to conclusions which seemed to invalidate the prevalent wave theory of light.

At first Newton patiently answered objections with further explanations, but when these produced only more negative responses, he finally became irritated and vowed he would never publish again, even threatening to give up scientific investigation altogether. Several years later, and only through the tireless efforts of the astronomer Edmund Halley, Newton was persuaded to put together the results of his work on the laws of motion, which became the great *Principia*.

His Major Work. Newton's *magnum opus*, *Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica*, to give it its full title, was completed in 18 months a prodigious accomplishment. It was first published in Latin in 1687, when Newton was 45. Its appearance established him as the leading scientist of his time, not only in England but in the entire Western world.

In the *Principia* Newton demonstrated for the first time that celestial bodies follow the laws of dynamics and, formulating the law of universal gravitation, gave mathematical solutions to most of the problems concerning motion which had engaged the attention of earlier and contemporary scientists. Book 1 treats the motion of bodies in purely mathematical terms. Book 2 deals with motion in resistant mediums, that is, in physical reality. In Book 3, Newton describes a cosmos based on the laws he has established. He demonstrates the use of these laws in determining the density of the earth, the masses of the sun and of planets having satellites, and the trajectory of a comet; and he explains the variations in the moon's motion, the precession of the equinoxes, the variation in gravitational acceleration with latitude, and the motion of the tides. What seems to have been

an early version of book 3, published posthumously as *The System of the World*, contains Newton's calculation, with illustrative diagram, of the manner in which, according to the law of centripetal force, a projectile could be made to go into orbit around the earth.

In the years after Newton's election to the Royal Society, the thinking of his colleagues and of scholars generally had been developing along lines similar to those which he had taken, and they were more receptive to his explanations of the behavior of bodies moving according to the laws of motion than they had been to his theories about the nature of light. Yet the *Principia* presented a stumbling block: its extremely condensed mathematical form made it difficult for even the most acute minds to follow. Those who did understand it saw that it needed simplification and interpretation. As a result, in the 40 years from 1687 to Newton's death the *Principia* was the basis of numerous books and articles. These included a few peevish attacks, but by far the greater number were explanations and elaborations of what had subtly evolved in the minds of his contemporaries from "Mr. Newton's theories" to the "Newtonian philosophy."

London Years. The publication of the *Principia* was the climax of Newton's professional life. It was followed by a period of depression and lack of interest in scientific matters. He became interested in university politics and was elected a representative of the university in Parliament. Later he asked friends in London to help him obtain a government appointment. The result was that in 1696, at the age of 54, he left Cambridge to become warden and then master of the Mint. The position was intended to be something of a sinecure, but he took it just as seriously as he had his scientific pursuits and made changes in the English monetary system that were effective for 150 years.

Newton's London life lasted as long as his Lucasian professorship. During that time he received many honors, including the first knighthood conferred for scientific achievement and election to life presidency of the Royal Society. In 1704, when Huygens and Hooke were no longer living, he published the *Opticks*, mainly a compilation of earlier research, and subsequently revised it three times; he supervised the two revisions of the *Principia*; he engaged in the regrettable controversy with G. W. von Leibniz over the invention of the calculus; he carried on a correspondence with scientists all over Great Britain and Europe; he continued his study and investigation in various fields; and, until his very last years, he conscientiously performed his duties at the Mint.

His "Opticks." In the interval between publication of the *Principia* in 1687 and the appearance of the *Opticks* in 1704, the trend was away from the use of Latin for all scholarly writing. The *Opticks* was written and originally published in English (a Latin translation appeared 2 years later) and was consequently accessible to a wide range of readers in England. The reputation which the *Principia* had established for its author of course prepared the way for acceptance of his second published work. Furthermore, its content and manner of presentation made the *Opticks* more approachable. It was essentially an account of experiments performed by Newton himself and his conclusions drawn from them, and it had greater appeal for the experimental temper of the educated public of the time than the more theoretical and mathematical *Principia*.

Of great interest for scientists generally were the queries with which Newton concluded the text of the *Opticks*, for example, "Do not Bodies act upon Light at a distance, and by their action bend its rays?" These queries (16 in the first edition, subsequently increased to 31) constitute a unique expression of Newton's philosophy; posing them as negative questions made it possible for him to suggest ideas which he could not support by experimental evidence or mathematical proof but which gave stimulus and direction to further research for many generations of scientists. "Of the Species and Magnitude of Curvilinear Figures," two treatises included with the original edition of the *Opticks*, was the first purely mathematical work Newton had published.

Mathematical Works. Newton's mathematical genius had been stimulated in his early years at Cambridge by his work under Barrow, which included a thorough grounding in Greek mathematics as well as in the recent work of René Descartes and of John Wallis. During his undergraduate years Newton had discovered what is known as the binomial theorem; invention of the calculus had followed; mathematical questions had been treated at length in correspondence with scientists in England and abroad; and his contributions to optics and celestial mechanics could be said to be his mathematical formulation of their principles.

But it was not until the controversy over the discovery of the calculus that Newton published mathematical work as such. The controversy, begun in 1699, when Fatio de Duillier made the first accusation of plagiarism against Leibniz, continued sporadically for nearly 20 years, not completely subsiding even with Leibniz's death in 1716.

The inclusion of the two tracts in the first edition of the *Opticks* was certainly related to the controversy, then in progress, and the appearance of other tracts in 1707 and 1711 under the editorship of younger colleagues suggests Newton's release of this material under pressure from his supporters. These tracts were for the most part revisions of the results of early research long since incorporated in Newton's working equipment. In the second edition of the *Principia*, of 1713, the four "Regulae Philosophandi" and the four-page "Scholium Generale" added to book 3 were apparently also designed to answer critics on the Continent who were expressing their partisanship for Leibniz by attacking any statement of Newton's that could not be confirmed by mathematical proof; the "Scholium" is of special interest in that it gives an insight into Newton's way of thought which the more austere style of the main text precludes.

Other Writings and Research. Two other areas to which Newton devoted much attention were chronology and theology. A shortened form of his *Chronology of Ancient Kingdoms* appeared without his consent in 1725, inducing him to prepare the longer work for publication; it did not actually appear until after his death. In it Newton attempted to correlate Egyptian, Greek, and Hebrew history and mythology and for the first time made use of astronomical references in ancient texts to establish dates of historical events. In his *Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel and the Apocalypse of St. John*, also posthumously published, his aim was to show that the prophecies of the Old and New Testaments had so far been fulfilled.

Another of Newton's continuing interests was the area in which alchemy was evolving into chemistry. His laboratory assistant during his years at Cambridge wrote of his chemical experiments as being a major occupation of these years, and Newton's manuscripts reflect the importance he attached to this phase of his research. His Mint papers show that he made use of chemical knowledge in connection with the metallic composition of the coinage. Among the vast body of his manuscripts are notes indicating that his *Chronology* and *Prophecy* and also his alchemical work were parts of a larger design that would embrace cosmology, history, and theology in a single synthesis.

The mass of Newton's papers, manuscripts, and correspondence which survives reveals a person with qualities of mind, physique, and personality extraordinarily favorable for the making of a great scientist: tremendous powers of concentration, ability to stand long periods of intense mental exertion, and objectivity uncomplicated by frivolous interests. The many portraits of Newton (he was painted by nearly all the

leading artists of his time) range from the fashionable, somewhat idealized, treatment to a more convincing realism. All present the natural dignity, the serious mien, and the large searching eyes mentioned by his contemporaries.

When Newton came to maturity, circumstances were auspiciously combined to make possible a major change in men's ways of thought and endeavor. The uniqueness of Newton's achievement could be said to lie in his exploitation of these unusual circumstances. He alone among his gifted contemporaries fully recognized the implications of recent scientific discoveries. With these as a point of departure, he developed a unified mathematical interpretation of the cosmos, in the expounding of which he demonstrated method and direction for future elaboration. In shifting the emphasis from quality to quantity, from pursuit of answers to the question "Why?" to focus upon "What?" and "How?" he effectively prepared the way for the age of technology. He died on March 20, 1727.

EWB

Nicholas I (1796–1855), Russian tsar, statesman, and autocrat. Nicholas I reigned from 1825 to 1855. During his reign Russian 19th-century autocracy reached its greatest power.

The third son of Tsar Paul I, Nicholas was tutored in political economy, government, constitutional law, jurisprudence, and public finance. He learned to speak Russian, French, German, and English, and he studied Greek and Latin. Nicholas showed great aptitude for the science of warfare, especially military engineering, and became an expert drillmaster. His education ended in the middle of 1813. In 1814 Nicholas joined the army, for which he retained a strong affection throughout his life. On July 1, 1817, he married Charlotte of Prussia, daughter of King Frederick William III. Nicholas took no part in the administration of public affairs during the reign of his brother Alexander I. He was put in charge of a brigade of the guards and was inspector general of army engineers.

Paul I's second son had renounced his right to the throne, and on Alexander's death in 1825 Nicholas became tsar. But the confusion over the succession led to the Decembrist Rebellion of 1825. This uprising was a shock to Nicholas, for it involved the army, especially the guards, whom the Tsar regarded as the backbone of the throne. Nicholas supervised the investigation of the conspiracy. He labeled the Decembrists "a handful of monsters." In spite of numerous secret committees and proposals, no significant reforms were enacted. The general attitude of Nicholas is pointed out by his remarks on the emancipation of serfs. "There is no doubt that serfdom, in

its present form, is a flagrant evil which everyone realizes," Nicholas proclaimed in the state council on March 20, 1842, "yet to attempt to remedy it now would be, of course, an evil even more disastrous."

Nicholas's rigid conservatism, his fear of the masses, and his desire to preserve autocracy and to protect the interests of the nobility hindered reforms. Thus, his regime became a dictatorship.

Nicholas's conservative views determined Russian foreign policy, over which he exercised personal control. His opposition to the principle of national self-determination, which spread throughout Europe, caused him to come into conflict with every democratic and liberal movement in England and on the Continent. His aggressive and unpredictable foreign policy in Asia and the Near East annoyed the European powers and caused suspicion. His bloody suppression of the Polish insurrection of 1830–1831 and the destruction of Polish autonomy enhanced Nicholas's unpopularity.

Under Nicholas I the first railway between St. Petersburg and Tsarskoe Selo (Pushkin), 17 miles long, was opened to the public in 1837. By the end of his reign Russia had 650 miles of railways. Some progress was also made with river shipping.

It is a paradox that during the absolutism of Nicholas I the golden age of Russian literature occurred. Of the authors whose work does not extend beyond the chronological limits of Nicholas's rule, the most prominent were Aleksandr Pushkin, Mikhail Lermontov, Aleksei Koltsov, and Nikolai Gogol. In addition, intellectual movements emerged to debate the destiny and the contributions to civilization of Russia. The two best-known movements were the Westerners and the Slavophiles. The Westerners were primarily Russian humanitarians. They admired European science and wanted constitutional government, freedom of thought and of the press, and emancipation of the serfs.

Slavophilism of the 1840s was a romantic nationalism that praised Russian virtues as superior to those of the decadent West. The Orthodox Church, according to this movement, was the source of strength in the past and Russia's hope for the future. The Slavophiles criticized the Westernization of Peter the Great as an interruption in the harmonious course of Russian history.

Certainly, Nicholas's defeat in the Crimean War exposed the military and technological backwardness of Russia to the world. He was aware of the failure of his reign, and whatever illusions he might have cherished were dispelled by the Crimean War. He died in St. Petersburg on March 2, 1855.

Nicholas II (1868–1918), Tsar of Russia from 1894 to 1917. Nicholas II was a staunch defender of autocracy. A weak monarch, he was forced to abdicate, thus ending more than 300 years of Romanov rule in Russia.

The son of Alexander III, Nicholas was born on May 6, 1868. He studied under private tutors, was an accomplished linguist, and traveled extensively in Russia and abroad. In 1890–1891 he made a voyage around the world. Nicholas held customary commissions in the guards, rising, while heir apparent, to the rank of colonel. His participation in affairs of state prior to the death of his father was limited to attendance at meetings of the committee of ministers and of the state council.

His Personality. Throughout his life Nicholas kept with remarkable regularity a diary that throws much light on his character and interests. Hardly a day passed without a record of what Nicholas regarded as its most noteworthy events. These entries, comprising merely a few lines each, noted official visits; dwelt with affection on the doings of his wife and children; and listed his recreational activities. In his relations with courtiers and officials, Nicholas was considerate and kind, but his ministers could never be certain that the policies seemingly agreed upon would actually receive his assent or that a gracious audience would not be followed by a curt dismissal from office.

Nicholas became emperor on the death of his father on Oct. 20, 1894. Less than a month after his coronation, he married Princess Alix of Hesse-Darmstadt. It was a marriage of love, and he remained to the end an exemplary husband and devoted father. His son Alexis, born in 1904, suffered from hemophilia. Desperate efforts to save Alexis's life later led to the incredible episode of Rasputin, a monk who employed hypnotic power to stop Alexis's bleeding. In this manner Rasputin became a dominating influence at the royal court. The deeper cause of Rasputin's influence, as well as of many of Nicholas's difficulties, lay in the Tsar's refusal to concern himself with political questions and his staunch conviction that he must maintain the autocracy of his father.

Reaction and Oppression. Nicholas carried on his father's nationalism, his curtailment of the rights of minority nationalities, and his restrictions on nonorthodox religious groups. He limited Finnish autonomy, which had been honored by Russian monarchs since 1809. The Tsar's manifesto of February 1899 abolished the Finnish constitution and placed

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the function of making laws for Finland under the Russian imperial council.

Nicholas pursued a strongly anti-Semitic policy. Jews could enroll in higher schools only under quota limits and were excluded from law practice, zemstvos (local district and provincial assemblies), and city councils. Christian dissenters also were persecuted.

The industrial boom of the early 1890s led to Russia's first important strike movement between 1895 and 1897. In 1897 the government passed legislation curtailing the workday to 11½ hours, but it also ordered the capture and punishment of all strike leaders. University students had also begun to organize demonstrations and strikes. The students' confrontations with the officials of St. Petersburg University led to a general strike in Russian higher education. Nicholas unsuccessfully tried both leniency and harshness as methods of alleviating student disturbances.

The Socialist Revolutionary Battle Organization undertook a terrorist campaign with a series of political murders or attempted murders of provincial governors and other officials. The revolutionary movement was spreading widely. Nicholas and his government lacked a policy to deal effectively with the situation.

Imperialism in the Far East. In form, Nicholas's foreign policy was similar to, and shaped after, that of the other eastern European monarchies: Germany and Austria-Hungary. Nor was it so different from the foreign policy of the western European democracies: France and Great Britain. The main effort of all the Great Powers was not so much to win control over new territories as to preserve the European status quo. However, mutual distrust and the suspicion of one power that another sought to change the status quo often provoked a crisis. In the last quarter of the 19th century, most of the European Great Powers were active in extending their influence and possessions into Africa and Asia. As a result, there was much concern as to whether "imperialist gains, losses, or transfers abroad might upset the balance of interests in Europe itself."

Nicholas's Russia began to challenge Japan in Manchuria and in Korea. An adventurer named Bezobrazov convinced Nicholas to finance a timber concession on the Yalu River on the northern border of Korea. When Tokyo concluded that Bezobrazov had won the support of the Tsar, the Japanese attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in January 1904 without declaring war.

Russia suffered a series of defeats on land and sea in the war with Japan. The main factors for the Japanese victory over the Russians were the inade-

quate supply route of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the outnumbering of the Russian forces in the Far East by Japan, and Russian mismanagement in the field. A peace treaty, negotiated between Russia and Japan on Sept. 5, 1905, called for Russia's recognition of Japanese hegemony in Korea, annexation of southern Sakhalin by Japan, and Japan's lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway. The war had ended without forcing too excessive a price for peace.

Revolution of 1905. In 1905 Father George Gapon, leader of a workers' group, led a procession of workers to Nicholas II in order to seek relief for their grievances. The procession was fired upon, and the incident—known as "Bloody Sunday"—may be considered the beginning of the Revolution of 1905. Millions of people participated in this mass movement. The primary goal of the rebellion was a "four-tail constituent assembly"—that is, universal, secret, equal, and direct suffrage to decide the country's future form of government. Other demands included civil liberties, especially freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and the enactment of an 8-hour workday.

When the general strike of October materialized, Minister of Finance Sergei Witte advised Nicholas to choose between a constitutional regime and a military dictatorship, but he added that he would participate only in the former. On Oct. 5, 1905, Nicholas promulgated the October Manifesto. It was drafted by Witte, who became Russia's first prime minister. The manifesto promised: "(1) To grant to the population the inviolable right of free citizenship, based on the principles of freedom of person, conscience, speech, assembly, and union. (2) Without postponing the intended elections for the State Duma and insofar as possible . . . to include in the participation of the work of the Duma those classes of the population that have been until now entirely deprived of the right to vote, and to extend in the future, by the newly created legislative way, the principles of the general right of election. (3) To establish as an unbreakable rule that without its confirmation by the State Duma, no law shall go into force and that the persons elected by the people shall have the opportunity for actual participation in supervising the legality of the acts of authorities appointed by it." Nicholas ended with an appeal to "all the true sons of Russia" to help reestablish law and order.

Fall of the Monarchy. At the beginning of February 1917 Nicholas left the capital and went to supreme headquarters at Mogilev. On March 8 demonstrations were held to celebrate International

Women's Day, and these throngs merged with rioting crowds protesting the scarcity of bread in Petrograd. As the riots continued, Nicholas could do nothing but prorogue the Duma, which he did on March 11. The next day the Duma gathered in defiance of his order and chose a provisional committee, composed of members of the progressive bloc and two representatives of parties to the left of it. On March 15, 1917, Nicholas decided to abdicate in favor of his brother Michael. A delegation from the provisional committee, which by now had become the provisional government, waited on the Grand Duke Michael, who refused to be crowned tsar of Russia. The monarchy "thus perished without a murmur from either the dynasty or its supporters."

Nicholas abdicated his throne peacefully. On his train the next day he wrote in his diary: "I had a long and sound sleep. Woke up beyond Dvinsk. Sunshine and frost . . . I read much of Julius Caesar." Nicholas and the entire imperial family were forced to depart for Siberia in the summer of 1917. They were murdered by the Communists in July 1918. The Bolshevik zealots who carried out the killings then tried to erase all traces of the corpses.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bodies were finally unearthed from a forest outside Yekaterinburg in 1991, and years of tests were conducted to confirm their identification. On July 17, 1998, Nicholas II, his wife, three of their daughters, and four faithful retainers received a formal burial ceremony in St. Petersburg, Russia.

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O

Ortega y Gasset, José (1883–1955), Spanish philosopher and essayist. Jose Ortega y Gasset is best known for his analyses of history and modern culture, especially his penetrating examination of the uniquely modern phenomenon "mass man."

Ortega y Gasset was born in Madrid on May 9, 1883. He studied with the Jesuits at the Colegio de Jesuítas de Miraflores del Palo, near Málaga, and from 1898 to 1902 he studied at the University of Madrid, from which he received the degree of *licenciado en filosofía y letras*. From 1905 to 1907 he did postgraduate studies at the universities of Leipzig, Berlin, and Marburg in Germany. Deeply influenced by German philosophy, especially the thought of Hermann Cohen, Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger, as well as by the French philosopher Henri Bergson, Ortega sought to overcome the traditional

provincialism and isolation of philosophical study in his native Spain.

From 1910 to 1936 Ortega taught philosophy at the University of Madrid. Early in his career he gained a reputation through his numerous philosophical and cultural essays, not only in literary journals but also in newspapers, which were a peculiar and important medium of education and culture in pre-Civil War Spain. Ortega's most famous book, *The Revolt of the Masses* (1930), first appeared in the form of newspaper articles. Throughout his career he was generally active in the cultural and political life of his country, both in monarchist and in republican Spain. In 1923 Ortega founded the journal *Revista de Occidente*, which flourished until 1936.

After the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, Ortega left Spain and lived abroad, dwelling in France, Holland, Argentina, and Portugal until the end of World War II. He returned to Spain in 1945, living there and in Portugal, with frequent trips and stays abroad, until his death. In 1948, together with Julián Marías, Ortega founded the Instituto de Humanidades, a cultural and scholarly institution, in Madrid. In 1949 Ortega lectured in the United States, followed by lectures in Germany and in Switzerland in 1950 and 1951. He received various honorary degrees, including a doctorate *honoris causa* from the University of Glasgow. Ortega died in Madrid on Oct. 18, 1955.

Ortega's numerous and varied writings, in addition to *The Revolt of the Masses*, include *The Modern Theme* (1923), *The Mission of the University* (1930), *On Love* (1940), *History as System* (1941), *Man and People* (1957), *Man and Crisis* (1958), and *What Is Philosophy?* (1958). Often mentioned, as is Miguel de Unamuno, with the existentialists, Ortega expounded a philosophy that has been called "ratiovitalism" or "vital reason," in which he sought to do justice to both the intellectual and passional dimensions of man as manifestations of the fundamental reality, "human life."

Ortega's philosophy is closest to that of Heidegger. He described human life as the "radical reality" to which everything else in the universe appears, in terms of which everything else has meaning, and which is therefore the central preoccupation of philosophy. Man is related to the world in terms of the "concerns" to which he attends. The individual human being is decisively free in his inner self, and his life and destiny are what he makes of them within the "given" of his heredity, environment, society, and culture. Thus man does not so much *have* a history; he *is* his history, since history is uniquely the manifestation of human freedom.

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Orwell, George (1903–1950), British novelist and essayist. George Orwell is best known for his satirical novels *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-four*.

George Orwell was born Eric Arthur Blair at Motihari, Bengal, India. His father, Richard Walmesley Blair, was a minor customs official in the opium department of the Indian Civil Service. When Orwell was four years old, his family returned to England, where they settled at Henley, a village near London. His father soon returned to India. When Orwell was eight years old, he was sent to a private preparatory school in Sussex. He later claimed that his experiences there determined his views on the English class system. From there he went by scholarship to two private secondary schools: Wellington for one term and Eton for four and a half years.

Orwell then joined the Indian Imperial Police, receiving his training in Burma, where he served from 1922 to 1927. While home on leave in England, Orwell made the important decision not to return to Burma. His resignation from the Indian Imperial Police became effective on Jan. 1, 1928. He had wanted to become a writer since his adolescence, and he had come to believe that the Imperial Police was in this respect an unsuitable profession. Later evidence also suggests that he had come to understand the imperialism which he was serving and had rejected it.

Establishment as a Writer. In the first 6 months after his decision, Orwell went on what he thought of as an expedition to the East End of London to become acquainted with the poor people of England. As a base, he rented a room in Notting Hill. In the spring he rented a room in a working-class district of Paris. It seems clear that his main objective was to establish himself as a writer, and the choice of Paris was characteristic of the period. Orwell wrote two novels, both lost, during his stay in Paris, and he published a few articles in French and English. After stints as a kitchen porter and dishwasher and a bout with pneumonia, he returned to England toward the end of 1929.

Orwell used his parents' home in Suffolk as a base, still attempting to establish himself as a writer. He earned his living by teaching and by writing occasional articles, while he completed several versions of his first book, *Down and Out in London and Paris*. This novel recorded his experiences in the East End and in Paris, and as he was earning his living as a teacher when it was scheduled for publication, he preferred to publish it under a pseudonym. From a list of four possible names submitted to his publisher, he chose "George Orwell." The Orwell is a Suffolk river.

First Novels. Orwell's *Down and Out* was issued in 1933. During the next three years he supported himself by teaching, reviewing, and clerking in a bookshop and began spending longer periods away from his parents' Suffolk home. In 1934 he published *Burmese Days*. The plot of this novel concerns personal intrigue among an isolated group of Europeans in an Eastern station. Two more novels followed: *A Clergyman's Daughter* (1935) and *Keep the Aspidochelone Flying* (1936).

In the spring of 1936 Orwell moved to Wellington, Hertfordshire, and several months later married Eileen O'Shaughnessy, a teacher and journalist. His reputation up to this time, as writer and journalist, was based mainly on his accounts of poverty and hard times. His next book was a commission in this direction. The Left Book Club authorized him to write an inquiry into the life of the poor and unemployed. *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1937) was divided into two parts. The first was typical reporting, but the second part was an essay on class and socialism. It marked Orwell's birth as a political writer, an identity that lasted for the rest of his life.

Political Commitments and Essays. In July 1936 the Spanish Civil War broke out. By the end of that autumn, Orwell was readying himself to go to Spain to gather material for articles and perhaps to take part in the war. After his arrival in Barcelona, he joined the militia of the POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista) and served with them in action in January 1937. Transferring to the British Independent Labour party contingent serving with the POUM militia, Orwell was promoted first to corporal and then to lieutenant before being wounded in the middle of May. During his convalescence, the POUM was declared illegal, and he fled into France in June. His experiences in Spain had made him into a revolutionary socialist.

After his return to England, Orwell began writing *Homage to Catalonia* (1938), which completed his disengagement from the orthodox left. He then wished to return to India to write a book, but he became ill with tuberculosis. He entered a sanatorium where he remained until late in the summer of 1938. Orwell spent the following winter in Morocco, where he wrote *Coming Up for Air* (1939). After he returned to England, Orwell authored several of his best-known essays. These include the essays on Dickens and on boys' weeklies and "Inside the Whale."

After World War II began, Orwell believed that "now we are in this bloody war we have got to win it and I would like to lend a hand." The army, however, rejected him as physically unfit, but later he served for

a period in the home guard and as a fire watcher. The Orwells moved to London in May 1940. In early 1941 he commenced writing "London Letters" for *Partisan Review*, and in August he joined the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) as a producer in the Indian section. He remained in this position until 1943.

First Masterpiece. The year 1943 was an important one in Orwell's life for several reasons. His mother died in March; he left the BBC to become literary editor of the *Tribune*; and he began book reviewing on a more regular basis. But the most important event occurred late that year, when he commenced the writing of *Animal Farm*. Orwell had completed this satire by February 1944, but several publishers rejected it on political grounds. It finally appeared in August 1945. This fantasy relates what happens to animals who free themselves and then are again enslaved through violence and fraud.

Toward the end of World War II, Orwell traveled to France, Germany, and Austria as a reporter. His wife died in March 1945. The next year he settled on Jura off the coast of Scotland, with his youngest sister as his housekeeper.

Crowning Achievement. By now, Orwell's health was steadily deteriorating. Renewed tuberculosis early in 1947 did not prevent the composition of the first draft of his masterpiece, *Nineteen Eighty-four*. The second draft was written in 1948 during several attacks of the disease. By the end of 1948 Orwell was seriously ill. *Nineteen Eighty-four* (1949) is an elaborate satire on modern politics, prophesying a world perpetually laid waste by warring dictators.

Orwell entered a London hospital in September 1949 and the next month married Sonia Brownell. He died in London on Jan. 21, 1950.

Orwell's singleness of purpose in pursuit of his material and the uncompromising honesty that defined him both as a man and as a writer made him critical of intellectuals whose political viewpoints struck him as dilettante. Thus, though a writer of the left, he wrote the most savage criticism of his generation against left-wing authors, and his strong stand against communism resulted from his experience of its methods gained as a fighter in the Spanish Civil War.

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Owen, Robert (1771–1858), British socialist pioneer. The attempts of Robert Owen to reconstruct society widely influenced social experimentation and the cooperative movement.

Robert Owen was born in Newtown, Wales, on May 14, 1771, the son of a shopkeeper. Though he left school at the age of 9, he was precocious and learned business principles rapidly in London and Manchester. By 18 he was manager of one of Manchester's largest cotton mills. In 1799 he purchased the mills at New Lanark, Scotland; they became famous for fine work produced with high regard for the well-being of the approximately 2,000 employees, of whom several hundred were poor children.

A reader and thinker, Owen counted among his acquaintances Robert Fulton, Jeremy Bentham, and the poet Samuel Coleridge. Owen's reforms emphasized cleanliness, happiness, liberal schooling without recourse to punishment, and wages in hard times. As his fame spread, he considered implementing ideas that would increasingly negate competitive economics. His attack on religion at a London meeting in 1817 lost him some admirers. His pioneer papers of the time, including "Two Memorials on Behalf of the Working Classes" (1818) and "Report to the County of Lanark" (1821), held that environment determined human development.

Owen learned of the religious Rapp colony in America at New Harmony, Ind., and determined to prove his principles in action there. In 1825 he purchased New Harmony and drew some 900 individuals to the community for his experiment. Despite the work of talented individuals, New Harmony did not prosper. By 1828 Owen had lost the bulk of his fortune in New Harmony, and he left it.

Following an unsuccessful attempt to institute a comparable experiment in Mexico that year, Owen returned to England to write and lecture. He propagated ideas first developed in 1826 in *Book of the New Moral World*. A kind, selfless man, he failed to perceive that the industry and responsibility that had made New Lanark great were not present in New Harmony and in other experiments he sponsored. Nevertheless, his views created theoretical bases for developing socialist and cooperative thought.

In *The Crisis* (1832) Owen advocated exchanging commodities for labor rather than money to relieve unemployment. The Equitable Labour Exchange founded that year failed but led to the Chartist and Rochdale movements. Labor unrest further fed on Owenite tenets, and in 1833 the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union was formed. It rallied half a million workers and fostered such new tactics as the general strike but fell apart within a few months, owing to opposition by employers and the government.

Owen continued to write and propagandize. Such experiments as Harmony Hall, in Hampshire, England (1839–45), derived from his theories. But

new revolutionary forces and leaders put him out of the main current. His conversion to spiritualism in 1854 and his *New Existence of Man upon the Earth* (1854–1855) seemed to him a broadening of reality, rather than a retreat. His *Autobiography* (1857–1858) is one of the great documents of early socialist experience. He died in Newtown, Wales, on Nov. 17, 1858.

EWB

Oxenstierna, Count Axel Gustafsson (1583–1654), Swedish statesman. Axel Oxenstierna was a major architect of his country's brief rise to greatness among the powers of 17th-century Europe.

Axel Oxenstierna was born at Uppsala on June 16, 1583. His was among the most influential families of the Swedish nobility. His social background, as well as a quick intelligence honed by education in German universities, enabled Oxenstierna to enter top government circles at an early age. He received his first appointment in 1605; by the decade's end he was the leader of the nobility in the Royal Council.

As in other states of eastern and central Europe, the relative weakness of the local bourgeoisie had enhanced the standing of the Swedish nobility. This enabled the aristocracy to wrest concessions from the monarchy, the better to be able to exploit the peasantry. Nevertheless, a dispute within the reigning Vasa dynasty during the 1590s had split the nobility along religious lines, thus shifting the balance of forces back in the King's favor.

King Sigismund Vasa III, a Catholic who had also been elected King of Poland, tried to bring Lutheran Sweden back into the Roman fold. The result was a coup (1598) which put his uncle into power as Charles IX and led to a purge of the aristocratic minority loyal to Sigismund. Such a purge could only strengthen the incoming King. However, Charles IX had to contend with Sweden's relatively weak power position with respect to other Baltic states, especially Denmark. Too weak to challenge Denmark's hold over the Baltic Sound (and thus over revenues from the wealthy Baltic commerce), he attacked Muscovy. He was in Moscow in 1610 and was planning to add the Tsar's domains to his own, when death cut short further expansion.

His youthful heir, Gustavus Adolphus (Gustavus II), now had to face the power of a reunited nobility under Oxenstierna's leadership. A first round of concessions was granted in the charter of 1611; in 1612 Oxenstierna was made the King's chancellor, and a noble monopoly of higher state offices was secured by the formal coronation oath of 1617. Yet, for all this, Sweden did not suffer the fate of Poland and

other countries where the nobility ran unchecked. The chancellor and the king found it more convenient to collaborate than quarrel. The pressure to bolster Sweden's security by territorial expansion and to augment its wealth by exploiting its mineral resources and metallurgical industries (chiefly gun manufactures) made for sufficient cooperation among the country's leaders to thrust Sweden dramatically on the stage of European Great Power politics.

At home, succeeding years brought administrative measures similar to those applied by centralizing monarchies to the West. Central and local government, the Estates (Riksdag), and the judiciary were all affected. Oxenstierna played a key role in all decisions taken. Particularly significant was his reorganization of the nobility itself. By the Riddarhusordning of 1626 it was restructured according to criteria for membership in one of three newly formed aristocratic subclasses.

When Gustavus came to power, Sweden was at war with Denmark. Oxenstierna was instructed to conclude the 1613 Peace of Knäred with that country. This removed the Danish threat and gave some concessions to Sweden with respect to Baltic commerce. Gustavus now resumed the Swedish march to the east. By the time Oxenstierna negotiated the Treaty of Altmark with Poland (1629), his country was in effective command of eastern Baltic commerce. The impetus provided by this aggressive policy, coupled with the outbreak of the Thirty Years War in 1618, sufficed to draw Sweden into the broader conflict in Germany. Oxenstierna now added the duties of war leader to those of administrator and diplomat. In 1630, with financial support from Russia, France, and the Dutch, Gustavus marched into Germany; in 1631 he called Oxenstierna to his side; and when the King was slain at the battle of Lützen (November 1632), his chancellor assumed control of the Swedish war effort.

By that date, Sweden had become the strongest power inside Germany. After Gustavus's death, however, Sweden's position began to slip. Oxenstierna's armies were badly defeated at Nördlingen (1634), and his German allies made their separate Peace of Prague with the emperor in 1635. But the war went on, with France playing a role on the "Protestant" (anti-Hapsburg) side equal to Sweden's. Denmark took Austria's side in 1643 but was handily defeated by the Swedes. In the same year (1645) in which the two countries signed the Treaty of Brömsebro, Swedish armies marched all the way to Vienna. Oxenstierna now retired from the war with profit and honor. After 1648, strengthened by acquisitions from Denmark and the German princes, Sweden emerged as the greatest Baltic power.

Gustavus was succeeded by his daughter, Queen Christina, and Oxenstierna remained the dominant figure in the regime throughout her reign. He died in Stockholm on Aug. 28, 1654.

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P

Palladio, Andrea (1508–1580), Italian architect. The buildings of Andrea Palladio were the most refined of the Renaissance period. Through them and his book on architectural theory he became the most influential architect in the history of Western art.

Roman architecture of the early 16th century had developed a mature classicism in the work of Donato Bramante and his followers. With the sack of Rome in 1527 young architects, such as Michele Sanmicheli and Jacopo Sansovino, brought the style to northern Italy. Andrea Palladio with further study of ancient Roman architecture, refined the classical mode to produce an elegant architecture befitting the opulent culture of the Veneto in the third quarter of the century. The aristocratic, mercantile society of Venice desired a splendid and sumptuous art to express pride in its accomplishments.

Andrea di Pietro dalla Gondola, called Andrea Palladio, was born in Padua on Nov. 30, 1508. In 1521 he was apprenticed for 6 years to a local stonecutter; 3 years later he broke the contract and moved to Vicenza, where he was immediately enrolled in the guild of masons and stonecutters. His first opportunity came about 1538 while he was working as a stone carver on the reconstruction of the Villa Cricoli, near Vicenza, owned by the local humanist Giangiorgio Trissino, who had a classical school for young Vicenzan nobility. Trissino recognized Andrea's ability and took him into his home and educated him. Trissino gave Andrea his humanist name Palladio as a reference to the wisdom of the Greek goddess Pallas Athene.

Early Architecture. Probably Palladio's first independent design was the Villa Godi (ca. 1538–1542) at Lonedo. Its simplified, stripped-down style reveals very little influence of ancient architecture, but its emphasis on clean-cut cubical masses foreshadows his mature style. The Casa Civena (1540–1546) in Vicenza, with its paired Corinthian pilasters above the ground-floor arcade, is more in the Roman High Renaissance manner, perhaps inspired by the publications of Sebastiano Serlio.

In 1541 Trissino took Palladio to Rome to study the ancient monuments. At this time Palladio began a magnificent series of drawings of ancient buildings.

The incomplete Palazzo Thiene (commissioned 1542, constructed ca. 1545–1550) in Vicenza is in the style of Giulio Romano, particularly in its heavy rustication of the ground floor and the massive stone blocks superimposed on the window frames of the main story. As Giulio Romano was in Vicenza in 1542, it is possible that he contributed to the design, since Palladio was still designated as a mason in the contract. The grandiose project, never completed, for the Villa Thiene (before 1550) at Quinto was influenced by Palladio's study of ancient Roman sanctuaries and baths. The only completed pavilion has a temple front facade, his first use of a temple front to decorate a villa, which became a hallmark of his style.

For many years the city of Vicenza had been considering how to refurbish its Gothic law court, the Palazzo della Ragione. In 1546 Palladio's project to surround the old building with loggias was approved, and he was commissioned to erect one bay in wood as a model. In 1547 and 1549 Palladio made further trips to Rome. In 1549 he began to construct two superimposed, arcaded loggias around the Palazzo della Ragione (completed 1617), known ever since as the Basilica Palladiana. Each bay of the loggias is composed of an arch flanked by lintels supported by columns. The motif of the arch flanked by lintels, although it was first used by Bramante and was popularized in Serlio's book, has been called in English the Palladian motif since Palladio used it on the Basilica.

Mature Style. Palladio created on the mainland around Venice a magnificent series of villas for the Venetian and Vicenzan nobility. The most renowned is the Villa Capra, or the Rotonda (1550–1551, with later revisions), near Vicenza. It is a simplified, cubelike mass capped by a dome over the central, round salon and has identical temple front porches on the four sides of the block. The absolute symmetry of the design was unusual in Palladian villas; the architect explained that it permitted equal views over the countryside around the hill on which the villa sits.

The city of Vicenza was almost completely rebuilt with edifices after Palladio's designs. The Palazzo Chiericati (now the Museo Civico) is a two-story structure facing on the square with a continuous Doric colonnade on the ground floor after the idea of an ancient Roman forum; the walled and fenestrated central section of the upper floor is flanked by Ionic colonnades. The facade of the Palazzo Iseppo Porto (ca. 1550–1552) is based on Bramante's Palazzo Caprini in Rome, but the plan is Palladio's version of an ancient Roman house with an entrance atrium and a

large peristyle, or court, on the central axis behind the building block.

In 1554 Palladio made his last trip to Rome and in the same year published a fine guidebook to the antiquities of Rome, *Le antichità di Roma*. During the next year a group of Vicenzans, including Palladio, founded the Accademia Olimpica for the furthering of arts and sciences. In 1556 Daniele Barbaro, a Venetian humanist, published a commentary on the architectural treatise of the ancient Roman writer Vitruvius for which Palladio made the illustrations. At the same time Palladio designed for Barbaro and his brother at Maser (ca. 1555–1559) one of the loveliest of all villas. The Villa Barbaro (now Volpi) is set into a gentle hillside. The central, two-storied casino with a temple front of Ionic half-columns and pediment is flanked by single-story arcades connecting it to the service buildings, for the villa also served as a farm. In the 16th century the nobility of the Veneto attempted to improve the agricultural productivity of the land, and their villas served as residences during the periods when they supervised the farming.

Palladio's first architecture in the city of Venice was the commencement of the monastery of S. Giorgio Maggiore, whose refectory he completed (1560–1562). This was followed by the church of S. Giorgio Maggiore (1565–1610), which has a basilical plan with apsidal transept arms and a deep choir. The facade (designed 1565, executed 1607–1610), with its temple front on four giant half columns flanked by two half temple fronts on smaller pilasters, is Palladio's solution to the translation of a Christian church design into the classical mode. He applied a similar facade to the older church of S. Francesco della Vigna (ca. 1565). The Palazzo Valmarana (1565–1566) in Vicenza uses giant Corinthian pilasters, except at the ends, to emphasize the planar aspect of the facade adapted to its urban location.

Late Style. Palladio's treatise on architecture, *I quattro libri dell'architettura* (1570), consists of four books. The first is devoted to technical questions and the classical orders, the second to domestic architecture, the third to civic architecture, and the fourth to ecclesiastical architecture. It is illustrated by ancient architecture and the works of Bramante and Palladio himself.

The truncated Loggia del Capitaniato (1571–1572) in Vicenza has giant half columns with an arched loggia below. In many of its details this design reveals an unclassical spirit. The short side, however, is modeled on an ancient triumphal arch and commemorates the victory of Lepanto in October 1571, which occurred while the loggia was being executed.

As the chief architect of Venice, Palladio designed the festival triumphal arch and the decorations to welcome the entry of King Henry III of France to Venice in July 1574.

To fulfill a vow of salvation from the disastrous plague of 1575–1576 the Venetian Senate commissioned Palladio to build the Church of the Redentore (1576–1592). Perhaps influenced by the Church of the Gesù in Rome, it is a wide basilica with side chapels and a trilobed crossing with deep choir. The facade, approached by monumental stairs, is a more unified version of his earlier church facades. For the Villa Barbaro at Maser he designed a separate chapel, the Tempietto (1579–1580), modeled on the ancient Roman Pantheon.

Palladio executed a theater, the Teatro Olimpico (1580), in Vicenza for the Accademia Olimpica. Based on the design of an ancient Roman theater, the auditorium is segmental in plan, facing a stage modeled on a Roman *scaenae frons*. The perspective stage scenery in wood and stucco was added by Vincenzo Scamozzi after Palladio's design. On Aug. 19, 1580, Palladio died in Vicenza.

His Influence. Through his treatise Palladio exerted a dominant influence on architecture for over 2 centuries, particularly in northern Europe. There were two major periods of Palladianism in England. In the first half of the 17th century Inigo Jones converted English architecture to the Italianate Renaissance by introducing Palladio's style, seen best in the Banqueting Hall, Whitehall, London, and the Queen's House, Greenwich. The second wave of Palladianism was fostered in the early 18th century by the Earl of Burlington. Palladio's treatise was published in 1715 in an English translation by Giacomo Leoni. American architecture felt the impact in the late 18th and early 19th century, as seen in Thomas Jefferson's Monticello.

EWB

Pareto, Vilfredo (1848–1923), Italian sociologist, political theorist, and economist. Vilfredo Pareto is chiefly known for his influential theory of ruling elites and for his equally influential theory that political behavior is essentially irrational.

Vilfredo Pareto was born in Paris on July 15, 1848. His father, an aristocratic Genoese, had gone into political exile in France about 1835 because he supported the Mazzinian republican movement. He returned to Piedmont in 1855, where he worked as a civil engineer for the government. Vilfredo followed his father's profession after graduating from the Polytechnic Institute at Turin in 1869. He worked as di-

rector of the Rome Railway Company until 1874, when he secured an appointment as managing director of an iron-producing company with offices in Florence.

In 1889 Pareto married a Russian girl, Dina Bakunin, resigned his post with the iron company for a consultancy, and for the next 3 years wrote and spoke against the protectionist policy of the Italian government domestically and its military policies abroad. His reputation as a rebellious activist led to an intimate acquaintance with the economist Maffeo Pantaleoni. This association led to Pareto's interest in pure economics, a field in which he quickly became proficient and well known. His reputation gained him an appointment in 1893 to the prestigious post of professor of political economy at Lausanne University.

In 1894 Pareto published his first noted work, *Cours d'économie politique*, which evoked a great deal of commentary from other economists. Two years later he inherited a small fortune from an uncle, a windfall which caused him to think of retiring to pursue research. At this point he began to develop the theories for which he is most famous, elitism and irrationalism in politics.

In his own earlier political career Pareto had been an ardent activist in behalf of democracy and free trade, as had been his father before him. The reasons for the marked change in his political outlook have been much disputed, ranging from the Neo-Freudian analytical account, to the interpretation which stresses certain developments in his own career, to the explanation which maintains that, quite simply, he changed because of the results of his own vast studies. By the time his next book, *The Manual of Political Economy*, was published in 1906, his ideas on elites and irrationalism were already well developed. The following year he resigned from his chair of political economy at Lausanne to devote all his energies to researching his theories.

Pareto retired to his villa at Celigny, where he lived a solitary existence except for his 18 Angora cats (the villa was named "Villa Angora") and his friend Jane Régis, a woman 30 years younger than he who had joined his household in 1901, when his wife left him. In 1907 he began writing his most famous and quite influential work, *The Treatise on Sociology*; he completed it in 1912 and published it in 1916. (The work was published in English translation as *The Mind and Society* in 1935 in a four-volume edition.) In 1923 he secured a divorce from his wife and married Jane Régis. Later the same year he died.

Pareto's theory of elitism is sometimes simplistically explained on the basis of his aristocratic heritage. However, as recent scholarship has shown,

throughout his life and in his published works he often expressed extreme distaste with the titled Italian aristocracy, just as he was anti-socialist, anti-government-interventionist, anti-colonialist, anti-militarist, anti-racialist, and "anti-anti-Semitic." Attracted to fascism when it first came to power in Italy, he later opposed it. He is perhaps best described as an iconoclastic individualist.

The Mind and Society is at one and the same time a debunking of Marxism and of the bourgeois state. Pareto's method of investigation is inductive or positivistic, contemptuously rejecting natural law, metaphysics, and deductive reasoning. On the basis of very extensive historical and empirical studies, Pareto maintained that in reality and inevitably the true form of government in any state is never a monarchy, hereditary aristocracy, or democracy but that always all social organizations, including states, are governed by a ruling elite. This ruling elite, which has greater vitality and usefulness than other elites, dominates them until it in turn is overturned by a more powerful elite—Pareto's theory of "the circulation of elites." Political behavior itself, both of the masses and of the elites, is basically emotional and nonrational. The function of reason is to justify past behavior or to show the way to future goals, which are determined not by reason but by emotional wants.

EWB

Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846–1891), Irish nationalist leader. Charles Parnell made home rule for Ireland a major factor in Irish nationalism and British politics.

Charles Parnell's County Wicklow, Anglo-Irish, Protestant-gentry family had earned a patriotic reputation in Ireland by opposing the Act of Union with Britain and by supporting Catholic emancipation. His American mother was a passionate Anglophobe. Although Parnell was educated in England, used English speech patterns, and possessed the aloof manner associated with the English establishment, he inherited his family's devotion to Irish interests.

His Obstructionist Tactics. In 1875 Parnell entered the House of Commons, lending his Protestant-gentry respectability to home rule. Two years later he joined Joseph Biggar in systematic obstruction of British legislation. Described by Parnell as an active parliamentary policy, obstruction was a reaction to British indifference to Irish problems, to the cautious and conciliatory parliamentary tactics and leadership of Isaac Butt—father of home rule and chairman of the Irish party—and to the growing cynicism of Irish opinion toward nationalist politics.

Butt joined outraged British politicians and journalists in denouncing the “barbarian” tactics of Parnell and Biggar, claiming they had damaged home rule by alienating British opinion. Parnell insisted that the achievement of home rule depended on the determination of Irish nationalist members of Parliament to demonstrate that the union could be as unpleasant for the British as it was for the Irish.

Avoiding a direct challenge to Butt’s control over the moribund Irish party or the impoverished Home Rule League, Parnell awaited the next general election. He used obstruction to attract notice and favor, courting Irish opinion at home and in the ghettos of Britain and the United States. In 1879 Parnell accepted the presidency of the National Land League, a New Departure instrument designed by Irish-Americans to bring republicans into contact with the Irish peasant masses. Financed by Irish-American dollars, the Land League demanded the end of landlordism, but it was prepared to accept agrarian reform along the way.

Leader of the Irish Party. The results of the general elections of 1880 gave Parnell the votes to command the Irish party. William Gladstone, the prime minister, responded to the near-revolutionary Land League agitation with a mixed coercion-conciliation policy. The 1881 Land Act gave Irish tenant farmers secure tenures at fair rents, freeing them from serfdom. But Parnell rejected the act as inadequate, and the government imprisoned him for encouraging agrarian disturbances. He was released in 1882 after promising to accept government improvements in the Land Act in exchange for Irish party support of future Liberal efforts to solve the Irish question. The truce was known as the Kilmainham Treaty.

After 1882 Parnell concentrated on building an effective Irish party to promote home rule. Instead of reviving the outlawed Land League, he used Irish-American money to pay the expenses of talented and sincere nationalists prepared to stand for Parliament. Parnell’s genius, Irish-American dollars, and the Reform Bill of 1884 gave the Irish party more than 80 members in the House of Commons.

Irish-Liberal Alliance. With an effective party behind him, Parnell in 1885 played balance-of-power politics in the House of Commons, forcing both Liberals and Conservatives to bid for Irish votes. Gladstone made the highest offer: home rule. The Irish then turned the Conservatives out of office and installed the Liberals. In 1886 Gladstone introduced a home-rule bill which was defeated by defections in Liberal ranks. The Irish-Liberal alliance lasted for 30

years, limiting the freedom of the Irish party and pushing British anti-Irish, no-popey, imperialistic opinion in a conservative direction. Home rule became the most emotional issue in British politics.

At the beginning of December 1889, Parnell was the unchallenged master of Irish nationalism. He dominated Irish opinion, bringing extremist types into the mainstream of constitutional nationalism. He commanded Irish-American financial resources, and he had captured the Liberal party for home rule. But that month the tides of Parnell’s fortune began to recede when Capt. William O’Shea submitted a petition suing his wife, Katherine, for divorce, naming Parnell as correspondent.

Downfall and Death. Irish nationalists assumed that Parnell would emerge from the courtroom an honorable man. Parnell, however, anxious to marry Katherine O’Shea who had been his mistress since 1880, decided not to contest William O’Shea’s charges, and his image was tarnished by the captain’s testimony. Although the Irish party reelected Parnell its chairman in November 1890—just after the divorce—British Nonconformists demanded that Gladstone separate the Liberals from a public sinner. Gladstone insisted that the Irish party drop Parnell as its leader. On Dec. 6, 1890, after days of bitter debate, a majority of home-rule members of Parliament decided that the fate of Irish freedom was more important than the position of one man. Parnell, a supreme egotist, refused to accept the realities of the Liberal alliance. He appealed to the Irish people in three by-election

contests. Opposed by the Catholic hierarchy and clergy, Parnell lost the by-elections and his health in the process. He died of rheumatic fever at Brighton on Oct. 6, 1891.

Parnell bequeathed a shattered parliamentary party, a bitter and divided nationalist opinion, and the myth of a martyred messiah. He became a symbol of resistance to British dictation, clericalism, and inhibiting Victorian and Irish Catholic moralities.

EWB

Pascal, Blaise (1623–1662), French scientist and philosopher. Blaise Pascal was a precocious and influential mathematical writer, a master of the French language, and a great religious philosopher.

Blaise Pascal was born at Clermont-Ferrand on June 19, 1623. He was the son of Étienne Pascal, king’s counselor and later president of the Court of Aids at Clermont. Blaise’s mother died in 1626, and he was left with his two sisters, Gilberte and Jacqueline. In 1631 the family moved to Paris.

Young Geometer. When Pascal was 12, he began attending meetings of a mathematical academy. His father taught him languages, especially Latin and Greek, but not mathematics. This ban on mathematics merely served to whet the boy's curiosity. He experimented with geometrical figures, inventing his own names for standard geometrical terms.

In 1640 the Pascal family moved to Rouen. There, still taught mainly by his father, Blaise worked with such intensity that his health deteriorated. Nevertheless, he had arrived at one of the most beautiful theorems in geometry. Sometimes called by him his "mystic hexagram," it is a theorem concerned with the collinearity of intersections of lines. It does not concern metrical properties of figures but is, in fact, at the very foundation of an important, and at the time almost entirely undeveloped, branch of mathematics—projective geometry. Pascal then set to work on a book, *Essay on Conics*, finished in 1640, in which the mystic hexagram was given central importance. It contained several hundred propositions on conic sections, bringing in the work of Apollonius and his successors, and was remarkable not only because of the writer's age (16) but also because of its treatment of tangency, among other things.

Jansenists and Port Royal. In 1646 Pascal's father had an accident and was confined to his house. He was visited by some neighbors who were Jansenists, a group formed by Cornelis Jansen, a Dutch-born professor of theology at Louvain. Their beliefs were contrary to the teachings of the Jesuits. The Pascals came under the influence of the Jansenists, with resultant fierce opposition to, and from, the Jesuits. Jacqueline wished to join the Jansenist convent at Port Royal. Étienne Pascal disliked the idea and took the family away to Paris, but after his death in 1651 Jacqueline joined Port Royal. Pascal still enjoyed a more worldly life, having a number of aristocratic friends and a little more money to spend from his patrimony. In 1654, however, he was completely converted to Jansenism, and he commenced an austere life at Port Royal.

Provincial Letters. In 1655 Antoine Arnauld, a prolific writer in defense of Jansen, was formally condemned by the Sorbonne for heretical teaching, and Pascal took up his defense in the first part of the famous *Provincial Letters*. Their framework is that of a correspondence between a Parisian and a friend in the provinces from Jan. 13, 1656, to March 24, 1657. They were circulated in the thousands through Paris under a pseudonym (Louis de Montalte), and the Jes-

uits tried to discover the author, whose wit, reason, eloquence, and humor made the order a laughingstock.

The *Pensées*. Knowledge of Pascal's personal life is slight after his entry to Port Royal. His sister Gilberte tells of his asceticism, of his dislike of seeing her caress her children, and of his apparent revulsion from talk of feminine beauty. He suffered increasingly after 1658 from head pains, and he died on Aug. 19, 1662.

At his death Pascal left an unfinished theological work, the *Pensées*, an apology for Christianity, in effect, which was published 8 years later by the Port Royal community in a thoroughly garbled and incoherent form. A reasonably authentic version first appeared in 1844. It deals with the great problems of Christian thought, faith versus reason, free will, and preknowledge. Pascal explains the contradictions and problems of the moral life in terms of the doctrine of the Fall and makes faith and revelation alone sufficient for their mutual justification.

The *Pensées*, unlike the *Provincial Letters*, were not worked over and over by their author, and in style they would not, perhaps, mark him out as a great literary figure. The *Letters*, however, give Pascal a place in literary history as the first of several great French writers practicing the polite irony to which the language lends itself. The *Pensées* could almost have been written by another man, for in them reason is ostensibly made to take second place to religion. But they are both, in their different ways, among the great books in the history of religious thought.

Later Mathematical and Scientific Work. Pascal's writings on hydrostatics, relating his experiments with the barometer to his theoretical ideas on the equilibrium of fluids, were not published until a year after his death. His *Treatise on the Equilibrium of Liquids* extends Simon Stevin's analysis of the hydrostatic paradox and enunciates what may be called the final law of hydrostatics: in a fluid at rest the pressure is transmitted equally in all directions (Pascal's principle). Pascal is important as having forged links between the theories of liquids and gases, and between the dynamics of rigid bodies and hydrodynamics.

Pascal's principal contribution to mathematics after his entry to Port Royal related to problems associated with the cycloida curve, with the area of which the best mathematicians of the day were occupied. He published many of his theorems without proof, as a challenge to other mathematicians. Solutions were found by John Wallis, Christopher Wren, Christian Huygens, and others. Pascal published his own solutions under the assumed name of Amos Det-

tonville (an anagram of Louis de Montalte), and contemporary mathematicians often referred to him by this name.

The mathematical theory of probability made its first great step forward when a correspondence between Pascal and Pierre de Fermat revealed that both had come to similar conclusions independently. Pascal planned a treatise on the subject, but again only a fragment survived, to be published after his death. He never wrote at great length on mathematics, but the many short pieces which survive are almost always concise and incisive.

EWB

Paul, St. Vincent de (1581–1660), French priest. Vincent de Paul organized works of charity, founded hospitals, and started two Roman Catholic religious orders.

Vincent de Paul was born into a peasant family on April 24, 1581, in the village of Pouy in southwestern France. He studied theology at the University of Toulouse, was ordained a priest at 19, and completed his theological studies 4 years later. Using his status as a priest to escape the dull village life of southern France, Vincent went to Paris in 1608. He wrote a curious letter to some friends at this time, telling in detail how he had been captured by Barbary pirates and taken as a slave to Tunisia. This story is not supported by any other evidence, and Vincent never referred to it later in his life.

In Paris, Vincent came under the influence of a wise spiritual guide who gradually caused him to see that helping others was more important than helping himself. For a few years he worked as a parish priest in Clichy near Paris. In 1613 he tutored the children of the general of the French galleys and in 1617 became chaplain to the galley slaves. He was concerned for all the peasants on the general's properties because of the terrible conditions in which they lived. By 1625 he had influenced a number of young men, some of them priests, to join him in forming a religious group to be called the Congregation of the Mission. Vincent and his friends worked with the poor people of the countryside near Paris, helping them obtain food and clothing and teaching them about Christ.

Vincent formed associations of wealthy lay people in Paris, persuading them to dedicate some of their time and money to helping the poor. He started several hospitals, including one in Marseilles for convicts sentenced to the galleys. Several times he was asked to act as a mediator in the wars of religion that were tearing France apart. With Louise de Marillac, a talented and sensitive friend, he started the first religious group of women dedicated entirely to works of charity

outside the cloister, a group called the Daughters of Charity.

Vincent was a man of action rather than of theory. The religious spirit he communicated was simple, practical, and straightforward. He looked to Christ as his leader and tried to translate the Gospel message into concrete results. He died on Sept. 27, 1660, and was canonized a saint in the Roman Catholic Church in 1737. The religious groups he founded continue to carry on his work.

EWB

Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich (1849–1936), Russian physiologist. Ivan Pavlov pioneered in the study of circulation, digestion, and conditioned reflexes. He believed that he clearly established the physiological nature of psychological phenomena.

Ivan Pavlov was born in Ryazan on Sept. 26, 1849, the son of a poor parish priest, from whom Pavlov acquired a lifelong love for physical labor and for learning. At the age of 9 or 10, Pavlov suffered from a fall which affected his general health and delayed his formal education. When he was 11, he entered the second grade of the church school at Ryazan. In 1864 he went to the Theological Seminary of Ryazan, studying religion, classical languages, and philosophy and developing an interest in science.

Making of a Physiologist. In 1870 Pavlov gained admission to the University of St. Petersburg, electing animal physiology as his major field and chemistry as his minor. There he studied inorganic chemistry under Dmitrii Mendeleev and organic chemistry under Aleksandr Butlerov, but the deepest impression was made by the lectures and the skilled experimental techniques of Ilya Tsiou. It was in Tsiou's laboratory that Pavlov was exposed to scientific investigations, resulting in his paper "On the Nerves Controlling the Pancreatic Gland."

After graduating, Pavlov entered the third course of the Medico-Chirurgical Academy (renamed in 1881 the Military Medical Academy), working as a laboratory assistant (1876–1878). In 1877 he published his first work, *Experimental Data Concerning the Accommodating Mechanism of the Blood Vessels*, dealing with the reflex regulation of the circulation of blood. Two years later he completed his course at the academy, and on the basis of a competitive examination he was awarded a scholarship for postgraduate study at the academy.

Pavlov spent the next decade in Sergei Botkins laboratory at the academy. In 1883 Pavlov completed his thesis, *The Centrifugal Nerves of the Heart*, and received the degree of doctor of medicine. The fol-

lowing year he was appointed lecturer in physiology at the academy, won the Wylie fellowship, and then spent the next 2 years in Germany. During the 1880s Pavlov perfected his experimental techniques which made possible his later important discoveries.

In 1881 Pavlov married Serafima Karchevskaia, a woman with profound spiritual feeling, a deep love for literature, and strong affection for her husband. In 1890 he was appointed to the vacant chair of pharmacology at the academy, and a year later he assumed the directorship of the department of physiology of the Institute of Experimental Medicine. Five years later he accepted the chair of physiology at the academy, which he held until 1925. For the next 45 years Pavlov pursued his studies on the digestive glands and conditioned reflexes.

Scientific Contributions. During the first phase of his scientific activity (1874–1888), Pavlov developed operative-surgical techniques that enabled him to perform experiments on unanesthetized animals without inflicting much pain. He studied the circulatory system, particularly the oscillation of blood pressure under various controlled conditions and the regulation of cardiac activity. He noted that the blood pressure of his dogs hardly varied despite the feeding of dry food or excessive amounts of meat broth. In his examination of cardiac activity he was able to observe the special nerve fibers that controlled the rhythm and the strength of the heartbeat. His theory was that the heart is regulated by four specific nerve fibers; it is now generally accepted that the vagus and sympathetic nerves produce the effects on the heart that Pavlov noticed.

In the course of his second phase of scientific work (1888–1902), Pavlov concentrated on the nerves directing the digestive glands and the functions of the alimentary canal under normal conditions. He discovered the secretory nerves of the pancreas in 1888 and the following year the nerves controlling the secretory activity of the gastric glands. Pavlov and his pupils also produced a considerable amount of accurate data on the workings of the gastrointestinal tract, which served as a basis for Pavlov's *Lectures on the Work of the Principal Digestive Glands* (published in Russia in 1897). For this work Pavlov received in 1904 the Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine.

The final phase of Pavlov's scientific career (1902–1936) was primarily concerned with ascertaining the functions of the cerebral cortex by means of conditioned reflexes. Prior to 1900, Pavlov observed that his dogs would secrete saliva and gastric juices before the meat was actually given to them. The sight, odor, or even the footsteps of the attendant were suf-

ficient to trigger the flow of saliva. Pavlov realized that the dogs were responding to activity associated with their feeding, and in 1901 he termed such a response a "conditioned reflex," which was acquired, or learned, as opposed to the unconditioned, or inherited, reflex. He faced a dilemma: could he embark on the study of conditioned reflexes by applying physiological methods to what was generally viewed as psychic phenomena? He opted to follow Ivan Sechenov, who considered that, in theory, psychic phenomena are essentially reflexes and therefore subject to physiological analysis.

The important lectures, papers, and speeches of Pavlov dealing with conditioned reflexes and the cerebral cortex are presented in *Twenty Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity (Behavior) of Animals: Conditioned Reflexes* (1923) and *Lectures on the Work of the Cerebral Hemispheres* (1927). He not only concerned himself with the formation of conditioned responses but noted that they were subject to various kinds of manipulation. He discovered that conditioned responses can be extinguished—at least temporarily—if not reinforced; that one conditioned stimulus can replace another and yet produce identical conditioned responses; and that there are several orders of conditioning. In time Pavlov developed a purely physiological theory of cortical excitation and inhibition which considered, among other things, the process of sleep identical with internal inhibition. However magnificent his experiments were in revealing the responses of animals to conditioning stimuli, he encountered difficulty in experimentally proving his assertion that conditioned responses are due to temporary neuronal connections in the cortex.

In 1918 Pavlov had an opportunity to study several cases of mental illness and thought that a physiological approach to psychiatric phenomena might prove useful. He noted that he could induce "experimental neuroses" in animals by overstraining the excitatory process or the inhibitory process, or by quickly alternating excitation and inhibition. Pavlov then drew an analogy between the functional disorders in animals with those observed in humans. In examining the catatonic manifestations of schizophrenia, he characterized this psychopathological state as actually being "chronic hypnosis"—chiefly as a consequence of weak cortical cells—which functions as a protective mechanism, preserving the nerve cells from further weakening or destruction.

In Pavlov's last scientific article, "The Conditioned Reflex" (1934), written for the *Great Medical Encyclopedia*, he discussed his theory of the two signaling systems which differentiated the animal nervous system from that of man. The first signaling system, possessed both by humans and animals, receives

stimulations and impressions of the external world through sense organs. The second signaling system in man deals with the signals of the first system, involving words, thoughts, abstractions, and generalizations. Conditioned reflexes play a significant role in both signal systems. Pavlov declared that “the conditioned reflex has become the central phenomenon in physiology”; he saw in the conditioned reflex the principal mechanism of adaptation to the environment by the living organism.

Philosophy and Outlook. Pavlov’s endeavor to give the conditioned reflex widest application in animal and human behavior tended to color his philosophical view of psychology. Although he did not go so far as to deny psychology the right to exist, in his own work and in his demands upon his collaborators he insisted that the language of physiology be employed exclusively to describe psychic activity. Ultimately he envisioned a time when psychology would be completely subsumed into physiology. Respecting the Cartesian duality of mind and matter, Pavlov saw no need for it inasmuch as he believed all mental processes can be explained physiologically.

Politically, most of his life Pavlov was opposed to the extremist positions of the right and left. He did not welcome the Russian February Revolution of 1917 with any enthusiasm. As for the Bolshevik program for creating a Communist society, Pavlov publicly stated, “If that which the Bolsheviks are doing with Russia is an experiment, for such an experiment I should regret giving even a frog.” Despite his early hostility to the Communist regime, in 1921 a decree of the Soviet of People’s Commissars, signed by Lenin himself, assured Pavlov of continuing support for his scientific work and special privileges. Undoubtedly, Soviet authorities viewed Pavlov’s approach to psychology as confirmation of Marxist materialism as well as a method of restructuring society. By 1935 Pavlov became reconciled to the Soviet Communist system, declaring that the “government, too, is an experimenter but in an immeasurably higher category.”

Pavlov became seriously ill in 1935 but recovered sufficiently to participate at the Fifteenth International Physiological Congress, and later he attended the Neurological Congress at London. On Feb. 27, 1936, he died.

EWB

Penn, William (1644–1718), English religious reformer and colonist. William Penn founded Pennsylvania and played a leading role in the history of New Jersey and Delaware.

The heritage of William Penn was his part in the growth of the Society of Friends (Quakers) and role in the settlement of North America. Penn’s influence with the British royal family and his pamphlets on behalf of religious toleration were important factors in the consolidation of the Quaker movement. He gave witness in America to the liberal faith and social conscience he had propounded in England in a career committed to religious and political values that have become inseparable from the American way of life.

William Penn was born in London on Oct. 14, 1644, the son of Adm. William Penn and Margaret Jasper. Adm. Penn served in the parliamentary navy during the Puritan Revolution. Although rewarded by Cromwell and given estates in Ireland, he fell into disfavor and took part in the restoration of Charles II. An intimate of the Duke of York, Adm. Penn was knighted by Charles II. With so influential a father, there seemed little doubt that William’s prospects were attractive.

Early Manhood. Nothing better demonstrates how young Penn represented his period than his early religious enthusiasm. At the age of 13 he was profoundly moved by the Quaker Thomas Loe. Afterward, at Oxford, he came under Puritan influences. When he refused to conform to Anglican practices, the university expelled him in 1662.

At his father’s request Penn attended the Inns of Court, gaining knowledge of the law. A portrait of this time shows him dressed in armor, with handsome, strong features, and the air of confidence of a fledgling aristocrat.

Quaker Advocate. Appearances, in Penn’s case, were deceiving. While supervising his father’s Irish estates, Penn was drawn into the Quaker fold. His conversion was inspired by the simple piety of the Quakers and the need to provide relief for victims of persecution. At the age of 22, much to his father’s distress, Penn became a Quaker advocate. His marriage in 1672 to Gulielma Maria Springett, of a well-known Quaker family, completed his religious commitment.

Penn’s prominence and political connections were important resources for the persecuted Quakers. A major theme of his voluminous writings was the inhumanity and futility of persecution. One remarkable achievement during this period was Penn’s handling of the “Bushell Case.” Penn managed to persuade a jury not to subject a Quaker to imprisonment only for his faith. When the magistrate demanded that the jury change its verdict, Penn maintained successfully that a jury must not be coerced by the bench.

This landmark case established the freedom of English juries.

Colonial Proprietor. Religious persecution and colonization went hand in hand as the Quakers looked to America for a haven. Various problems invited Penn's association with the Quaker interests in New Jersey. Apart from his influence in England, Penn was active in mediating quarrels among the trustees. Doubtless, too, Penn contributed to the "Concessions and Agreements" (1677) offered to settlers, although he was not its principal author. This document gave the settlers virtual control over this colony through an elected assembly. It also offered a forthright guarantee of personal liberties, especially religious toleration and trial by jury, which the Quakers could not obtain in England.

The manifest liabilities of New Jersey formed a prelude to the founding of Pennsylvania. Of major importance, however, was Penn's Quaker faith and unyielding devotion to religious and political freedom; this underlaid his conception of Pennsylvania as a "Holy Experiment." In addition, Penn thought the colony could become a profitable enterprise to be inherited by his family.

Penn's proprietary charter contained many elements of previous grants. Penn and his heirs were given control over the land and extensive powers of government. The document reflected the period in which it was written: in keeping with new imperial regulations, Penn was made personally responsible for the enforcement of the Navigation Acts and had to keep an agent in London; he was required to send laws to England for royal approval.

In several ways Pennsylvania was the most successful English colony. Penn's initial treaties with the Indians, signed in 1683 and 1684, were based on an acceptance of Indian equality and resulted in an unprecedented era of peace. Penn also wrote promotional tracts for Pennsylvania and arranged circulation of these materials abroad. The response was one of the largest and most varied ethnic migrations in the history of colonization. Moreover, Pennsylvania's economic beginnings were usually successful. A fertile country, the commercial advantages of Philadelphia, and substantial investments by Quaker merchants produced rapid economic growth.

Despite this success Pennsylvania was not without problems. An immediate concern was its borders, especially those with Maryland. Because of anomalies in Penn's charter, an area along the southern border, including Philadelphia, was claimed by Lord Baltimore. This problem was only partly ameliorated when Penn secured control over what later became Dela-

ware from the Duke of York. Just as troublesome were political controversies within the colony. Although Penn's liberal spirit was evident in the political life of Pennsylvania, and he believed that the people should be offered self-government and that the rights of every citizen should be guaranteed, he did not think the colonists should have full power. In order to provide a balance in government, and partly to protect his own rights, he sought a key role in running the colony. What Penn envisaged in his famous "Frame of Government" (1682) was a system in which he would offer leadership and the elected assembly would follow his pattern.

Almost from the start there were challenges to Penn's conception. Controversies developed among the respective branches of government, with the representatives trying to restrict the authority of the proprietor and the council. Disputes centered on taxation, land policy, Penn's appointments, and defense. "For the love of God, me, and the poor country," Penn wrote to the colonists, "be not so governmentish, so noisy, and open in your disaffection." Other difficulties included Penn's identification with James II, which brought him imprisonment and a temporary loss of the proprietorship in 1692–1694. No less burdensome was his indebtedness. Penn's liabilities in the founding of Pennsylvania led to his imprisonment for debt, a humiliating blow.

Final Years. After the Glorious Revolution in England, Penn and his family went to live in Pennsylvania. Arriving in 1699, he reestablished friendly contacts with the Indians and worked hard to heal a religious schism among the Quakers. He also labored to suppress piracy and tried to secure expenditures for colonial self-defense, demanded by the Crown but resisted by pacifist Quakers.

Penn's major achievement was the new charter of 1701. Under its terms the council was eliminated, and Pennsylvania became the only colony governed by a unicameral legislature of elected representatives. This system, which lasted until 1776, permitted the Delaware settlers to have their own legislature. Penn was obliged to return to England late in 1701 to fight a proposal in Parliament which would have abrogated all proprietary grants. He never saw Pennsylvania again.

Penn's last years were filled with disappointment. His heir, William, Jr., was a special tribulation because of his dissolute lifestyle. After the death of his first wife in 1694, Penn married Hannah Callowhill in 1696. Perplexed by debts, colonial disaffection, and the general antipathy of the King's ministers toward private colonies, Penn almost completed the sale of

Pennsylvania to the Crown in 1712 before he suffered his first disabling stroke. He died at Ruscombe, Berkshire, on July 30, 1718.

EWB

Pepys, Samuel (1633–1703), English diarist and public official. Samuel Pepys kept a diary that provides a graphic account of English social life and conditions during the early period of the Restoration.

Samuel Pepys was born on Feb. 23, 1633, in London. His father was a tailor. Pepys was sent to school first at Huntingdon and later to St. Paul's in London. In June 1650 he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, but he transferred to Magdalene College the following October and graduated in 1653.

In 1655 Pepys married Elizabeth St. Michel, the young daughter of a Huguenot exile. The couple was apparently supported at first by Pepys's cousin Sir Edward Montagu, later the Earl of Sandwich, whose service Pepys entered. In 1660 Pepys accompanied Montagu as secretary on the voyage that returned Charles II to England. That same year Pepys was appointed clerk of the acts at the Navy Office. This appointment was significant because Pepys was to serve the navy in some capacity for the greater part of his life, working to improve its efficiency and to ensure its integrity.

In 1662 Pepys was appointed one of the commissioners for Tangier, which was then occupied by the English; 3 years later he was named treasurer. When the Dutch War broke out in 1665, he was appointed surveyor general of the Victualing Office in addition to his regular duties for the navy, and he remained at his post throughout the Great Plague of 1665 although most inhabitants left London. Pepys saved the Navy Office from the Great Fire of 1666 by having the buildings around it destroyed. When the Dutch War ended in 1668, the Duke of York entrusted Pepys with the task of acquitting the navy of mismanagement.

Pepys's appearance before Parliament evidently whetted his own aspirations for a seat. He was elected to Parliament in 1673 and again in 1679. In 1673 the King transferred Pepys from the Navy Office to the secretaryship of the Admiralty. At the time of the Popish Plot in 1678, Whig opponents of the Duke of York accused Pepys of giving naval secrets to the French. Pepys resigned his office and was imprisoned in the Tower in 1679, but the charges against him were unfounded, and Pepys was vindicated and freed in 1680.

Pepys's wife had died in 1669. His principal companions since then had been such men of taste and knowledge as John Evelyn, Christopher Wren, and John Dryden. In 1684 Pepys was elected presi-

dent of the Royal Society. That same year he was also restored to the secretaryship of the Admiralty, retaining the post until the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

After Pepys retired from public life in 1689, he led a relatively quiet life. He published his *Memoirs . . . of the Royal Navy* in 1690. He corresponded with friends and acted as consultant to the navy. He died on May 26, 1703.

Pepys is remembered today for the diary he kept for 9½ years in the 1660s. In his diary, written in cipher, Pepys recorded both the significant and trivial events of his public and private worlds. Together with his impressions of his own domestic situation, he recorded his thoughts about Charles II, the Great Plague of 1665, the Great Fire of 1666, the Restoration theater, the King's mistresses, the Dutch War, and the Duke of York. Failing eyesight caused him to discontinue the diary while still a young man, but its intimate record of his daily life and of the early Restoration remains both interesting and historically valuable.

Pepys's diary was not transcribed and published until 1825. The first virtually complete edition was issued between 1893 and 1899, edited by H. B. Wheatley.

EWB

Perrault, Charles (1628–1703), Children's story writer. Though the stories of *Cinderella*, *Little Red Riding Hood*, *Puss in Boots*, and *Sleeping Beauty* are among the best known and most popular works of literature in the world, few people recognize the name of Charles Perrault, the man who is generally believed to be their author. Because his collection of stories, *Histoires; or, Tales of Times Past*, was published under the name of Perrault's son, Pierre d'Armancoeur, there has always been some debate even about the authorship. Glenn S. Burne noted in *Writers for Children* that, according to the best evidence, "the stories were the work of Perrault in probable collaboration with the talented teenage boy, with whom he had a close relationship." Burne went on to say that Perrault published these tales near the end of his career, when his interests were elsewhere, and he probably had no idea that they would become so important.

Born on January 12, 1628, in Paris, France, Perrault was the youngest son of an eminent Parisian lawyer. Both his parents took an active part in educating their children and, when Perrault was sent to a private school at the age of eight, he was one of the top students in his class. Several years later his brilliance led him to argue with a teacher and leave school to study independently with a friend named Beaurain. In his autobiography, *Memoires de Charles Perrault*, Perrault described how the two boys got together mornings

and afternoons for three or four years, reading in the course of that time most of the Bible and the classic authors. Perrault first tried his hand at writing when he, his older brother Claude (a medical student who became both a physician and an architect), and Beau-rain adapted the sixth book of the *Aeneid* into comic verse, a popular literary practice of the time. Later the brothers collaborated on the first volume of *Les Murs de troie* (“The Walls of Troy”).

In 1651 Perrault took the bar exam and was admitted to the practice of law. He soon became disillusioned with it, however, and left in 1654 to serve as a clerk to Claude, who had bought the post of Receiver General of Finances for the city of Paris—buying positions in the government and army was a common practice at the time. During this period Perrault was also continuing his studies and writing poetry, some of which was published and translated into Italian. In the mid-1660s he was appointed by Jean Baptiste Colbert, then Minister of Finance under King Louis XIV, to an advisory council that supervised the making of monuments, medals, and other works glorifying the king. Perrault became secretary to the council, which later became the French Academy, created “for the advancement and perfection of all sciences.” When Colbert was appointed Superintendent of the Royal Buildings, he made Perrault his chief clerk. In this capacity Perrault had the pleasure of helping get his brother Claude’s design chosen for the forefront of the Louvre Museum. In 1671 Perrault was formally admitted to the French Academy; in 1672 he became its chancellor and, in 1681, its director.

Perrault married Marie Guichon in 1672, and the couple had three sons and a daughter. Several years after his wife’s death in 1678, Perrault decided to devote all of his time to writing and educating his children. As he stated in his autobiography, “With this in mind I went to live in the St. Jacques district [of Paris], which being near to the schools, gave me the great facility to send my children there, having always thought that it was best for children to come home to sleep in their father’s house when it was possible rather than sending them to board in the school. . . . I gave them a tutor and I myself took great care to watch over their studies.” Burne pointed out in *Writers for Children* that his wife’s death may have been a factor in Perrault’s writing the fairy tales, “since he maintained that such literature was an effective means of instilling values.”

Though it is the fairy tales that are generally remembered, Perrault gained prominence as a literary figure with his poem “Le Siecle de Louis XIV,” which he read to the Academy. In this poem he praised the superiority of modern letters as opposed to the clas-

sics, thus raising an argument that lasted for many years and brought his name into prominence.

Perrault died on May 16, 1703, at the age of seventy-five. Many critics believe that his now-familiar stories were half-forgotten folk tales that the author merely set down in a simple, readable form. In *Contes* Perrault said of them, “These sorts of tales have the gift of pleasing . . . great minds as well as lesser folk, the old as well as young folk; these idle fancies amuse and lull reason, although contrary to the same reason, and can charm reason better than all imaginable probability.”

Major Authors and Illustrators
for Children and Young Adults

Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich (1746–1827), Swiss educator. Johann Pestalozzi envisioned a science of education based on the psychology of child development. He laid the foundation of the modern primary school.

Johann Pestalozzi was born in Zurich on Jan. 12, 1746. His father died shortly afterward, and Pestalozzi was raised in poverty. This early experience with the life of degradation of the poor developed in him an acute sense of justice and a determination to help the underprivileged. He chose to enter the ministry, but his studies in theology at the University of Zurich were without distinction. He tried law and politics, but his humanitarianism was mistaken for radicalism and he became very unpopular even with those he sought most to help. In 1769 he settled on his farm, “Neuhof,” at Birr, Switzerland, where he planned to fight poverty by developing improved methods of agriculture.

At Neuhof, Pestalozzi realized that schoolteaching was his true vocation and that as a schoolmaster he could fulfill his desire to improve society by helping the individual to help himself. In 1775 he turned his farm into an orphanage and began to test his ideas on child rearing. In 1780 he wrote *The Hours of a Hermit*, a series of generally sad maxims reflecting his view of man’s somber plight in the world and the failure of his own attempts at reform at Neuhof. He first experienced success with *Leonard and Gertrude* (1783), which was widely acclaimed and read as a novel and not, as it was intended to be, as an exposition of his pedagogical ideas.

His newfound fame brought Pestalozzi to Stanz, where he took over an orphanage in 1798, and then to Burgdorf, where he ran a boarding school for boys from 1800 to 1804. In 1801 he published *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children*, a sequel to his earlier novel and an expansion of his educational thought. But it was at Yverdun, where he was the director for the next

20 years of a boarding school for boys of many nationalities, that Pestalozzian principles of education were applied and observed by world leaders.

According to Pestalozzi, “the full and fruitful development” of the child according to his own nature is the goal of education. The school and teachers provide only the environment and guidance, respectively, most appropriate to free expression that allows the natural powers of the child to develop. Instruction should be adapted to each individual according to his particular changing, unfolding nature. Rather than from books, the child should learn by observing objects of the real world. Sense perceptions are of supreme importance in the development of the child’s mind. Pestalozzi described such a detailed methodology both for child development and for the study of the child that a definite system of teacher training evolved also.

Honors flowed in; Yverduin became a showplace. These were two causes of the ultimate collapse of the school. Pestalozzi’s fame brought out some of his more disagreeable characteristics, and the original atmosphere of fellowship disappeared in the influx of visitors to the school. The school closed amid disputes and lawsuits; Pestalozzi died an embittered man on Feb. 17, 1827, in Brugg. But his ideas were used in establishing national school systems during the 19th century, and his influence among educators continues to be great to this day.

EWB

Pétain, Henri Philippe (1856–1951), French general and statesman. Philippe Pétain a military hero in World War I, headed the collaborationist Vichy regime during World War II. Officially considered a traitor, he is admired by many of his countrymen as a supreme patriot.

Philippe Pétain was born to peasant parents on April 24, 1856, at Cauchy-à-la-Tour. After a private boarding-school education, he entered Saint-Cyr in 1876 and graduated 2 years later. An advocate of defensive rather than offensive strategies, he became an instructor at the École de Guerre in 1888. Nearly 60 years old and without active-duty experience in 1914, Pétain had had a far from brilliant career. World War I changed that radically.

Hero of Verdun. Promoted to brigadier general on Aug. 31, 1914, Pétain distinguished himself at the Battle of the Marne (1914) and in June 1915 was named a full general and given command of the 11th Army. When the Germans decided in 1916 to end the war with a massive concentrated attack on the French line at Verdun, Pétain was ordered to stop the

offensive at all costs. Promising that “they shall not pass,” he held Verdun but at the enormous cost of 350,000 men. Subsequently a great popular hero, he became chief of the general staff in April 1917, and a month later he succeeded Gen. Robert Nivelle as commander in chief.

Pétain assumed his command over a French army near disintegration. Years of indecisive war had sapped morale, and mutinies were endemic. Combining harsh disciplinary measures with humane redress of grievances, he very quickly reestablished order. Without these reforms the French army would not have withstood the final German offensives of 1918.

Between the World Wars. Named marshal of France on Nov. 21, 1918, Pétain emerged from the war second only to Ferdinand Foch in prestige. It was only natural that Pétain was regarded as a high military authority, but the consequences later proved catastrophic. Vice president of the Supreme War Council after 1920 and inspector general of the army after 1922, Pétain used his influence to orient French military planning along defensive lines. He favored the construction of heavily armed fortifications along the Franco-German frontier. Against the protests of such young rebels as Charles De Gaulle, who urged a strategy of mobile mechanized warfare, Pétain’s influence was decisive, and the Maginot Line was constructed on the Franco-German border. French government and military leaders were determined to prepare France for any future war.

Retiring from the army in 1931, Pétain entered politics in 1934 as minister of war in the short-lived authoritarian government of Gaston Doumergue. Increasingly contemptuous of parliamentary politics and such Socialist experiments as the Popular Front, and a known partisan of dictatorial regimes, Pétain provided a figure in the late 1930s around which right-wing opponents of the Third Republic could rally.

Vichy Regime. Ambassador to Spain at the outbreak of World War II, Pétain was recalled and appointed vice-premier in May 1940 by Premier Paul Reynaud in an attempt to bolster his foundering government. With the fall of France imminent, Reynaud resigned on June 16, 1940, and President Albert Lebrun asked the 84-year-old Pétain to form a new government whose first task would be to negotiate an armistice with the Germans. No one seemed to care that the rapid collapse of the French army in 1940 had been largely due to the outdated principles on which Pétain had organized it and to its lack of mechanized equipment, whose supply he had opposed.

On June 22 Pétain concluded an armistice with the Nazis that divided France into two zones: the north and the Atlantic coastline under German military occupation, and the rest of France under the direct administration of Pétain's government. Militarily, France retained control of its fleet, but its army was drastically reduced to 100,000 men.

Meeting in national assembly at Vichy on July 10, 1940, a rump parliament voted full constituent powers to Pétain. The next day he was named chief of state, and with Pierre Laval he then began the task of constructing a hierarchical and authoritarian regime under the formula of his so-called National Revolution. Little more than empty rhetoric ("Work-Family-Fatherland") and the cult of Pétain, his Vichy regime was a scarcely disguised client state of Nazi Germany.

Of necessity, Pétain's central principle in foreign policy was collaboration with the Third Reich. Above all, he wanted to keep France out of the war and to keep Germany as faithful to the armistice terms as possible. Opposed, however, to the all-out collaboration urged by Laval, Pétain replaced him with Adm. Jean Darlan in 1941. Under pressure from Berlin, Laval returned to office in April 1942.

The crisis of the Vichy regime occurred in November 1942 following the Allied landings in North Africa and the German occupation of Vichy France. Urged to flee, Pétain refused, believing that it was his duty to share the fate of his countrymen. He still refused even after ultracollaborationists were imposed upon him by the Germans, and thus he implicated himself in their treason. Arrested by the retreating Nazis on Aug. 20, 1944, and sent to Germany, Pétain voluntarily returned to France in April 1945. Immediately arrested and brought to trial by the provisional government of his onetime protégé Charles De Gaulle, Pétain was convicted of treason, militarily degraded, and sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by De Gaulle, and Pétain died 6 years later, on July 23, 1951, on the Île d'Yeu.

Estimates of Pétain's Career. Pétain remains an acutely controversial figure in recent French history. He is the object of an as yet unsuccessful effort at rehabilitation, his right-wing admirers depicting him as the "crucified savior of France" and claiming that his self-sacrifice after 1940 "will one day count more for his glory than the victory of Verdun." Not only did Pétain save France from the fate of Poland, they insist, but by playing a double game he tricked Adolf Hitler into staying out of North Africa, which made possible the eventual Allied victory in 1945. Preposterous as these claims are, the impression they

give of Pétain is only slightly more misleading than that given by official Resistance historiography, which unfailingly portrays him as an arch-villain and as a criminal traitor to France.

EWB

Peter I (1672–1725), tsar of Russia (1682–1725). Peter the Great's reign was marked by a program of extensive reform known as Westernization and by the establishment of Russia as a major European power.

Contemporaries abroad tended to admire Peter I for his reforms and to fear him because of his country's growing power, but his reforms were generally unpopular with his subjects, not only because they entailed higher taxes and harder work for almost everyone but also because they disturbed ancient religious and cultural traditions. After his death, Russians soon came to realize that Peter had been the country's greatest ruler and that his reign had indeed been a high point in their history. That evaluation is still generally accepted by historians.

Peter was born in Moscow on May 30, 1672, the only son of Tsar Alexis and his second wife, Natalia Naryshkin. The 13 children of Alexis' previous marriage included 3 who became prominent during Peter's youth: able and ambitious Sophia, half-blind and half-witted Ivan, and amiable Feodor, who succeeded Alexis in 1676.

Peter's formal education, entrusted to private tutors, began when he was 7 but was interrupted 3 years later, when Tsar Feodor died without having named an heir. Sophia and a small group of supporters favored the frail Ivan, her 15-year-old brother, to succeed Feodor. Another group favored the robust and intelligent Peter and at once proclaimed him tsar, planning that his mother serve as regent. That arrangement was quickly upset, however, when Sophia received the help of the Moscow troops and compelled the installation of Ivan as "First Tsar," Peter as "Second Tsar," and herself as regent.

Formative Years. During the next 7 years little was required of Peter except that he take part in formal ceremonies. Fascinated by military activities, he spent much time at games involving arms practice and battle maneuvers, at first with young friends and later with two regiments of soldiers that he was permitted to recruit and train. His curiosity and abundant energy led him also to the study and practice of the skills involved in navigation and such crafts as carpentry, stonecutting, and printing. In the course of these pursuits, he came into contact with a number of foreign residents and gained from them knowledge of the world outside Russia.

Disturbed by the trend of his development, Peter's mother mistakenly decided that she could change it by arranging for his marriage; at her direction, he was married to Eudoxia Lopukhin in January 1689. Still, he showed no inclination to forgo his first interests or his unconventional activities.

Political opposition to Sophia's regency came to a head during Peter's 17th year, and, impressed by the assurance of strong support if he would assert himself, Peter declared her office vacant and sent her away to a convent. That done, he returned to his habitual pursuits and continued to neglect personal responsibilities, even after Eudoxia had borne him a son, Alexis, in 1690. By that time he was a striking figure, impressive as a potential ruler but with scant interest in the duties involved.

It was not until 1695, when he had his first taste of actual fighting, against the Turkish forces at Azov, that Peter began to give serious thought to the problems he faced as czar. The death of "First Tsar" Ivan during the following year finally brought him close to the full import of his position.

First Steps. Having been impressed at Azov by his country's lack of adequate fighting ships, Peter began with characteristic zeal to plan for an efficient navy. He sent groups of young men to western European countries to study navigation and shipbuilding; then, in 1697, he himself followed—an unprecedented step for a Russian tsar—to acquire firsthand information and to hire shipwrights for service in Russia. He visited Holland, England, Germany, and Austria. In those countries he was impressed not only by their technological superiority over Russia but also by what seemed to him a superior style of life. When he returned to Russia in 1698, he was ready to make many changes.

One of Peter's first acts was to order that men shave off their beards, and when he met stubborn resistance, he modified his order only to the extent of imposing a tax on those who chose to keep their beards. He also shattered tradition by requiring that the old Russian calendar (which reckoned time from the creation of the world) be abandoned in favor of the Julian calendar used in the West. At the same time, he was dealing with two other matters, a revolt among the Moscow troops and the annoying presence of his unwanted wife, Eudoxia; he speedily quelled the revolt with savage executions and terminated his marriage by forcing Eudoxia into a convent.

Great Northern War. The handling of some of his problems, Peter soon learned, required more than his usual imperious tactics. During his European

tour, he had obtained assurances of Western cooperation in forcing Sweden to cede the territory that Russia needed as an outlet to the Baltic Sea. He began the undertaking by a declaration of war on Sweden in 1700.

Peter led his forces in their first major encounter with the Swedes at Narva in November 1700 and was severely defeated by inferior numbers. Resorting to the means he had used with the navy—remodeling by Western patterns—he began at once to whip into shape a better organized, equipped, and trained army. In 1703 he led it to a redeeming victory and took from Sweden the mouth of the Neva River. He designated the site for a city to be named St. Petersburg and to become the imperial capital. A year later he captured Narva.

Taking advantage of a few years of respite while the Swedes were engaged with other enemies, Peter worked purposefully to strengthen Russian arms and to keep under control the domestic discontent that was breaking into open revolt in many areas, particularly along the Don and the Volga rivers. He was obliged to return to the war in mid-1709, however, to meet a Swedish invasion led by Charles XII. The opposing forces met at Poltava, where the Russians won a decisive victory. The battle did not end the war, but it marked a turning point and vindicated Peter's belief in his methods. Moreover, it had a profound psychological effect on the western European states, who now saw Russia as a formidable power.

Twelve years of indecisive hostilities followed the Poltava victory. In 1711 Peter had to divert some of his troops to the south, where the Turks, encouraged by Sweden, had attacked Russia. After a year of unsuccessful fighting, he had to cede the port of Azov, Russia's only point of access to the Black Sea. Meanwhile, intermittent fighting kept the main war going, and it was not until 1718 that Sweden reluctantly agreed to a consideration of peace terms. By the resulting Treaty of Nystad, signed in September 1721, Sweden ceded Ingria, Estonia, Livonia, and a portion of Karelia, thus giving Russia a firm foothold on the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea. Since Peter had already established Russian influence in Courland, his country was now a major Baltic power, having been provided with "a window to Europe" by the new acquisitions. In recognition of what he had achieved, the Russian Senate, a body created by Peter, conferred upon him the titles of "the Great" and "Emperor."

Personal Problems. After he freed himself of Eudoxia, Peter became attracted to Catherine Skavrenska, a Lithuanian girl of humble origin, and married her secretly, delaying until 1712 the public rec-

ognition of her as his consort. When Catherine bore a son, the Tsar had him christened Peter Petrovich and anticipated his succession to the throne. Alexis, the son by his first marriage, had become a lazy, weak-willed, and hostile young man who resisted being molded to his father's standards. In the belief that Alexis was actually plotting against the throne, Peter ordered that he be taken to prison; and there, after being questioned under torture, Alexis died. Yet the Tsar's problem was not solved: in 1719 Peter Petrovich died, leaving him no son as successor. Alexis had left a son, Peter Alekseyevich; but the Czar chose to bypass him and to decree, in 1722, that thereafter each ruler of Russia was free to name his heir. It is probable that Peter intended to name his wife, Catherine, as his heir, but he continued to postpone the formality.

Domestic Reforms. Although Peter carried out many reforms in his early years as tsar, his major work as a reformer was done in the last decade of his reign. His goal was to create a powerful and prosperous state, efficiently and honestly administered, to which every subject could contribute. To achieve that goal, he refashioned many existing institutions and initiated new policies, generally guided by what he had learned of western Europe. He reorganized the country's entire administrative structure and promulgated the Table of Ranks, classifying civil service, military, and naval positions and providing for advancement on the basis of merit from lower to higher positions. He encouraged industry and commerce, spurred the development of science, and laid the foundations of the Academy of Sciences, which was established soon after his death. He instituted Russia's secular schools, eliminated the obsolete characters from the Russian alphabet, and established the country's first newspaper.

Even the Church felt the force of Peter's great energy. Although a religious man, he had no respect for the privileges accorded to the Church, was critical of many of its policies, and resented its resistance to his reforms. When Patriarch Adrian, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, died in 1700, Peter did not permit the vacancy to be filled. Finally, in 1721, he abolished the post of patriarch, substituting for it the Holy Synod, a board of prelates who were to direct the affairs of the Church under the supervision of a layman appointed by the tsar.

Apparently, Peter found his greatest satisfaction in the development of St. Petersburg. He intended that this modern city become the center of the new Russia as Moscow had been the center of the old. He declared it to be the country's new capital and gradually transferred to it the central administrative of-

fices. Built in Western style rather than the traditional Russian, it provided a visible symbol of his reforms.

Last Years. After the war with Sweden, Peter began to think seriously of his country's interests in Asia. At his direction, Russian forces conquered Kamchatka on the Pacific, and a Russian expedition explored the area now known as the Bering Strait. With prospects of more immediate value, he successfully pursued a war against Persia to strengthen Russia's position on the Caspian.

The treaty ending the war with Persia had yet to be ratified in 1724, when Peter's health began to fail rapidly. Characteristically, he continued to drive himself to the very limit of his strength, still postponing the designation of an heir. He died on Jan. 28, 1725, in the city that he had founded.

EWB

Petrarch (1304–1374), Italian poet. Francesco Petrarca is best known for the lyric poetry of his *Canzoniere* and is considered one of the greatest love poets of world literature. A scholar of classical antiquity, he was the founder of humanism.

Petrarch has been called the first modern man. He observed the external world and analyzed his own interior life with a new awareness of values. Painfully conscious of human transience, he felt it his mission to bridge the ages and to save the classical authors from the ravages of time for posterity. He also longed for fame and for permanence in the future. Petrarch attained a vast direct knowledge of classical texts, subjecting them to critical evaluation and prizing them as an expression of the living human spirit. His attitude provided the first great stimulus to the cultural movement that culminated in the Renaissance.

Petrarch's life was marked by restlessness, yet one of its constant motives was his devotion to cherished friends. Equally constant was an unresolved interior conflict between the attractions of earthly life, particularly love and glory, and his aspirations toward higher religious goals.

Early Years and Education. Petrarch was born on July 20, 1304, in Arezzo, where his family was living in political exile. His parents were the Florentine notary Ser Petracco and Eletta Canigiani. His childhood was spent at Incisa and Pisa until 1312, when his family moved to Avignon, then the papal residence. A housing shortage there obliged Petrarch, his younger brother Gherardo, and their mother to settle in nearby Carpentras, where he began to study grammar and rhetoric. Beginning in 1316, Petrarch pursued legal studies at the University of Montpellier.

But already he preferred classical poets to the study of law. During one surprise visit Petrarch's father discovered some hidden books and began to burn them; however, moved by his son's pleading, he spared Cicero's *Rhetoric* and a copy of Virgil from the fire. About this time Petrarch's mother died.

In 1320 Petrarch and Gherardo went to Bologna to attend the law schools. They remained in Bologna—with two interruptions caused by student riots—until their father's death in 1326. Free to pursue his own interests, Petrarch then abandoned law and participated in the fashionable social life of Avignon.

Laura and the *Canzoniere*. On April 6, 1327, in the church of St. Clare, Petrarch saw and fell in love with the young woman whom he called Laura. She did not return his love. The true identity of Laura is not known; there is, however, no doubt regarding her reality or the intensity of the poet's passion, which endured after her death as a melancholy longing. Petrarch composed and revised the love lyrics inspired by Laura until his very last years. The *Canzoniere*, or *Rerum vulgarum fragmenta*, contains 366 poems (mostly sonnets, with a few canzoni and compositions in other meters) and is divided into two sections: the first is devoted to Laura in life (1–263) and the second to Laura in death (264–366). Petrarch became a model for Italian poets. The influence of his art and introspective sensibility was felt for more than 3 centuries in all European literatures.

When the income of Petrarch's family was depleted, he took the four Minor Orders required for an ecclesiastical career, and in the fall of 1330 he entered the service of Cardinal Giovanni Colonna. In 1333, motivated by intellectual curiosity, Petrarch traveled to Paris, Flanders (where he discovered two of Cicero's unknown orations), and Germany. Upon returning to Avignon, he met the Augustinian scholar Dionigi di Borgo San Sepolcro, who directed him toward a greater awareness of the importance of Christian patristic literature. Until the end of his life, Petrarch carried with him a tiny copy of St. Augustine's *Confessions*, a gift from Dionigi. In 1336 Petrarch climbed Mt. Ventoux in Provence; on the summit, opening the *Confessions* at random, he read that men admire mountains and rivers and seas and stars, yet neglect themselves. He described this experience in spiritual terms in a letter that he wrote to Dionigi (*Familiars* IV, 1).

Major Works in Latin. Petrarch's reputation as a man of letters and the canonries to which he was appointed at various times assured him the ease and freedom necessary for his studies and writing. He par-

ticipated during this period in the polemic concerning the papal residence, expressing in two *Epistolae metricae* his conviction that the papacy must return to Rome. Early in 1337 Petrarch visited Rome for the first time. The ancient ruins of the city deepened his admiration for the classical age. In the summer he returned to Avignon, where his son, Giovanni, had been born, and then went to live at Vacluse (Fontaine-de-Vacluse) near the source of the Sorgue River. There he led a life of solitude and simplicity, and he also conceived his major Latin works. In 1338 Petrarch began his *De viris illustribus*, and about that time he also started his Latin epic on Scipio Africanus, the *Africa*. In Vacluse, Petrarch probably also worked on his *Triumphus Cupidinis*, a poetic "procession," written in Italian, in which Cupid leads his captive lovers. In 1340 Petrarch received invitations simultaneously from Paris and Rome to be crowned as poet. He chose Rome. His coronation on April 8, 1341, was a personal victory and a triumph for art and knowledge as well.

Middle Years. On returning from Rome, Petrarch stopped at Parma. There, on the wooded plateau of Selvapiana, he continued his *Africa* with renewed inspiration. In April 1343, shortly after Petrarch had returned to Avignon, Gherardo became a Carthusian monk. That same year Petrarch's daughter, Francesca, was born. Gherardo's decision to become a monk deeply moved Petrarch, leading him to reexamine his own spiritual state. Though his Christian faith was unquestionably sincere, he felt incapable of his brother's renunciation. His inner conflict inspired the *Secretum* a dialogue in three books between St. Augustine and Petrarch. In it Petrarch expressed his awareness of his failure to realize his religious ideal and his inability to renounce the temporal values that motivated his life. That year Petrarch also began a treatise on the cardinal virtues, *Rerum memorandarum libri*.

In the fall of 1343 Petrarch went to Naples on a diplomatic mission for Cardinal Colonna. He recorded his travel impressions in several letters (*Familiars* V, 3, 6). Upon his return he stopped at Parma, hoping to settle at Selvapiana. But a siege of Parma by Milanese and Mantuan troops forced him to flee to Verona in February 1345. There, in the cathedral library, he discovered the first 16 books of Cicero's letters to Atticus and his letters to Quintus and Brutus. Petrarch personally transcribed them, and these letters of Cicero stimulated Petrarch to plan a formal collection of his own letters.

From 1345 to 1347 Petrarch lived at Vacluse and undertook his *De vita solitaria* and the *Bucolicum*

carmen the latter a collection of 12 Latin eclogues. Early in 1347 a visit to Gherardo's monastery inspired Petrarch to write his *De otio religioso*. In May of that year an event occurred in Rome that aroused his greatest enthusiasm. Cola di Rienzi, who shared Petrarch's fervent desire for the rebirth of Rome, gained control of the Roman government through a successful revolution. Petrarch encouraged Cola with his pen, exhorting him to persevere in his task of restoring Rome to its universal political and cultural missions. Petrarch then started out for Rome. But Cola's dictatorial acts soon brought down upon himself the hostility of the Pope and the antagonism of the Roman nobles. News of Cola's downfall, before the year was over, prompted Petrarch to write his famous letter of reproach (*Familiars VII, 7*), which tells of his bitter disillusionment.

The Black Death and Milanese Period.

Rather than proceed to Rome, Petrarch remained in Parma, where in May 1348 news of Laura's death reached him. The Black Death deprived Petrarch of several of his close friends that year, among them Cardinal Colonna. His grief is reflected in the poems he then wrote to Laura and in his letters of this period, one of the most desolate letters being addressed to himself (*Ad se ipsum*). Three eclogues and the *Triumphus mortis* (following the *Triumph of Love* and the *Triumph of Chastity*) were also inspired by the pestilence.

Because of the losses Petrarch had suffered, a period of his life seemed to have ended. In 1350 he began to make the formal collection of his Latin prose letters called *Familiars*. Since 1350 was a Year of Jubilee, Petrarch also made a pilgrimage to Rome. On his way he stopped in Florence, where he made new friends, among whom was Giovanni Boccaccio. After a brief stay in Rome, Petrarch returned northward and arrived in Parma in January 1351. In the meantime, Pope Clement VI was soliciting Petrarch's return to Avignon, and Florence sent Boccaccio with a letter of invitation promising Petrarch a professorship at the university and the restitution of his father's property. Petrarch chose Provence, where he hoped to complete some of his major works. He arrived in Vaucluse in June 1351, accompanied by his son. In Avignon that August he refused a papal secretaryship and a bishopric offered to him. Petrarch was impatient to leave the papal "Babylon" and wrote a series of violent letters against the Curia (*Epistolae sine nomine*).

In the spring of 1352, Petrarch returned to Vaucluse, resolved to leave Provence. The following spring, after visiting Gherardo, he crossed the Alps and greeted Italy (*Epistolae metricae III, 24*). For 8 years he stayed in Milan under the patronage of Gio-

vanni Visconti and later Galeazzo II Visconti, enjoying seclusion and freedom for study while using his pen to urge peace among Italian cities and states. He worked on the *Canzoniere*, took up old works (*De viris illustribus*), and began the treatise *De remediis utriusque fortunae*. Petrarch was also entrusted with diplomatic missions that brought him into direct relationship with heads of state, including the emperor Charles IV.

Padua, Venice, and Arquà. In June 1361 Petrarch went to Padua because the plague (which took the life of his son and the lives of several friends) had broken out in Milan. In Padua he terminated the *Familiars* and initiated a new collection, *Seniles*. In the fall of 1362 Petrarch settled in Venice, where he had been given a house in exchange for the bequest of his library to the city. From Venice he made numerous trips until his definitive return to Padua in 1368. During this period a controversy with several Averroists gave rise to an *Invective* on his own ignorance.

Petrarch's Paduan patron, Francesco da Carrara, gave him some land at Arquà in the Euganean Hills near Padua. There Petrarch built a house to which he retired in 1370. He received friends, studied, and wrote, and there his daughter, Francesca, now married, joined him with her family. Despite poor health, Petrarch attempted a trip to Rome in 1370, but he had to turn back at Ferrara. Except for a few brief absences, Petrarch spent his last years at Arquà, working on the *Seniles* and on the *Canzoniere*, for the latter of which he wrote a concluding canzone to the Virgin Mary. The *Posteritati*, a biographical letter intended to terminate the *Seniles*, remained incomplete at Petrarch's death. He revised his four *Triumphs* (of Love, Chastity, Death, and Fame), adding two more (of Time and of Eternity). Petrarch died on the night of July 18/19, 1374, and he was ceremonially buried beside the church of Arquà.

EWB

Philip II (1527–1598), king of Spain from 1556 to 1598. During Philip II's reign the Spanish Empire was severely challenged and its economic, social, and political institutions strained almost to the breaking point.

The son of Emperor Charles V, Philip II inherited the larger portion of his father's dominions: Spain, the Low Countries (basically the Netherlands and Belgium of today), Franche-Comté, Sicily and southern Italy, the duchy of Milan, and Spain's colonies in the New World, including Mexico and much of South America. But the inheritance inevitably included the host of problems which his father had left

unsolved or which were incapable of being solved. The other part of Charles's dominions, the Holy Roman Empire, was bequeathed to his brother Ferdinand, Philip's uncle.

Philip was born in Valladolid on May 21, 1527, at the outset of the religious and political wars that divided Europe and drained the resources of every major European country. France, the principal opponent of Emperor Charles's ambition, was likewise the chief rival of Philip's Spain. When he acceded to the throne in 1556, the two countries were still at war; peace was concluded at Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559, largely because both states were financially exhausted.

The need to find money and enforce order in his territories led to Philip's clash with his Dutch subjects, a clash that produced the first war for national independence in modern European history and eventually drew Philip into the ill-fated Armada expedition. Spain's resources, including its commercial and military lifeline to northern and southern Italy, were meanwhile threatened in the Mediterranean by the Turkish fleet and the incursions of pirates, largely operating out of North African ports.

On the one side combating rebellious Protestant subjects and on the other confronting the advance of Islam, Philip II has often been depicted as the secular arm of the Catholic Church, a religious zealot who sought to erase heresy and infidelity through military conquest. This, however, is a simplification and is misleading. He was indeed a devout Catholic and vitally concerned with the suppression of "heresy" in all the territory over which he ruled. But his policies and choices must also be viewed in the light of what he considered to be Spanish national interests.

Early Life. Philip's first marriage (1543) was to his cousin Maria of Portugal, who lived but 2 years, leaving a son, Don Carlos. To consolidate his empire and afford protection for his holdings in the Low Countries, Charles then married Philip to Mary Tudor of England, the Catholic queen of a basically Protestant country. Philip's stay in England was not a happy one, and Mary died in 1558 to be succeeded by her half sister, Elizabeth. His ties with England broken, Philip returned to Spain via Flanders in 1559. In that year the peace treaty with France was signed. The temporary harmony between the two powers was symbolized by Philip's marriage with Elizabeth of Valois, the daughter of the king of France, who proved to be his favorite wife.

Philip had succeeded his father as king of Spain in 1556. Unlike Charles V, Philip was to be a "national" monarch instead of a ruler who traveled from one kingdom to another. Though he was to travel

widely throughout the Iberian Peninsula, he would never leave it again.

Personally, Philip was fair, spoke softly, and had an icy self-mastery; in the words of one of his ministers, he had a smile that cut like a sword. He immersed himself in an ocean of paperwork, studying dispatches and documents and adding marginal comments on them while scores of other documents and dispatches piled up on tables and in anterooms.

With the problems of communication in Philip's far-flung empire, once a decision was made it could not be undone. As king, he preferred to reserve all final decisions to himself; he mistrusted powerful and independent personalities and rarely reposed much confidence in aides. This personal stamp of authority during Philip's reign was in sharp contrast to the era of minister-favorites in 17th-century Spain. His private life included a delight in art, in the cultivation of flowers, in religious reading (his reign coincided with the great age of Spanish mysticism), and above all in the conception and building of the Escorial, the royal palace outside Madrid whose completion was perhaps the greatest joy of his life.

A combination palace, monastery, and mausoleum, the Escorial was Philip's preferred place for working. In a complex that included a place for his own tomb, naturally the thought of his successor concerned Philip greatly. His son Don Carlos was abnormal, mentally and physically, and on no account fit to become a responsible ruler. Philip was aware that contacts had been made between his son and political enemies. He had Don Carlos arrested, and what followed is one of the great historical enigmas: Don Carlos died on July 25, 1568, under mysterious circumstances that have never been explained satisfactorily. Did Philip have his son executed or did he die of natural causes? There is no persuasive proof on one side or the other. This incident was one of the most publicized in Philip's reign and one which naturally served to blacken his reputation. In any event, his fourth marriage, to Anne of Austria, produced five children, one of whom survived to succeed as Philip III.

Relations with Rome. During the Council of Trent (1545–1563) there was usually strong doctrinal accord between the papacy and Spanish bishops. The major difference lay in varying interpretations of the rights of Spanish bishops and their king vis-à-vis the Holy See. The King had almost total control over the Spanish Catholic Church, and although Spanish arms could advance Catholic interests, if Philip's Spain were to become supreme in Europe the Pope risked being reduced to a chaplain. One momentous

occasion when they worked together came in the joint venture of Spain, the Vatican, and Venice against the Turkish navy. At Lepanto, in 1571, the Catholic forces devastated the enemy fleet. It was the most signal victory of Philip's career. Although the Turks soon rebounded, Philip was never again to ally himself so strongly with Rome. The relations between Spain and the Vatican illustrate how senseless it is to speak of the "monolithic nature" of Catholicism in this era.

Dutch Revolt. In an attempt to shore up his depleted treasury and instill more centralization into his dominions, Philip disregarded the prerogatives and local traditions in the Low Countries, the most prosperous of the territories under his rule. In the 1560s he sought to exact more taxes, to impose more bishops, and to reshuffle the administration, thus provoking an increasingly militant opposition.

Protestant attacks upon Catholic churches, coupled with increasing resistance from the predominantly Catholic population, were followed by a severe response from Spain. A Spanish army moved against the rebels, executed several of their leaders, and opened the way to a broader war which lasted throughout Philip's reign. It was truly a war for national independence, with brutality and heroism on both sides and a growing identification of Protestantism (especially Calvinism) with opposition to Spain's political, religious, and economic policies. The rebels, entrenched in the north, declared themselves independent under the name of the United Provinces. The southern part (roughly the area comprising Belgium) remained under Spanish control.

Since the Dutch were subsidized by the English, and since Spanish supply ships could not safely move through the English Channel, Philip concluded that a conquest of England was necessary for the pacification of the Netherlands. But at the same time that the Dutch were in revolt, there were repeated clashes between the French royal armies and French Calvinists. The ups and downs of the warfare in France and in the Netherlands were viewed as barometers of the fortunes of European Protestantism versus Catholicism. After Philip's death, a truce with the Dutch was arranged in 1609. Though war was to break out again, the independence of the United Provinces was recognized in 1648.

The Armada. The need to cut off English subsidies and control the English Channel so as to throttle the Dutch revolt led Philip to undertake the Armada, the most famous event of his reign. The plan was for a huge fleet to rendezvous with Spanish troops in the Netherlands and then proceed to the military

conquest of England, serving Philip's military and political ends and immeasurably injuring the Protestant cause. The skill of the English navy and adverse weather conditions led to a total fiasco. Though most of his ships eventually returned home to port and though Philip still dreamed of a future campaign, the expense of the expedition and the psychological shock of failure resulted in the "invincible" Armada's becoming the symbol of Philip's failure to achieve a Spanish predominance in Europe.

French Relations. As Philip sought to put down the rebellion in the Netherlands, he fomented dissension in France. French Protestants were sometimes subsidized by Spanish agents to ensure confusion in the enemy camp. Philip tried (unsuccessfully) to install his own candidate on the French throne, and Spanish troops became embroiled in the French wars. The struggle with France drew Spanish strength away from the Netherlands and so eased the pressure on the Dutch rebels. Peace was reached at the Treaty of Verbins in 1598, several months before Philip's death.

Domestic Affairs. The complexity and extent of these foreign ventures had, of course, a tremendous impact on the economy and life of Spain. There was a constant need for money and in a country where only careers in the Church and the army carried prestige and where commerce and manual labor in general were frowned upon, the already-staggering economy was crippled by a series of disasters. The costly adventures abroad were punctuated by abrasive relations between Philip and his Spanish domains over taxation and jurisdiction; a diminishing flow of silver from the American mines; a decreasing market for Spanish goods; a severe inflation; several declarations of government bankruptcy; and an agricultural crisis that sent thousands into the cities and left vast areas uncultivated. All these, together with plagues and the defeat of the Armada, were crushing blows—economically, socially, and psychologically.

Any one of these myriad problems and crises would have taxed the ingenuity of a government. Taken together and exacerbated by the strain of incessant warfare, they shook Spain to its roots. The union of Portugal to Spain in 1580 may have given Philip satisfaction but hardly lightened his burdens. He worked methodically, even fatalistically, puzzled by the workings of a God who would permit such calamities to occur. Spain had already entered into a period of sharp decline at his death on Sept. 13, 1598, at El Escorial.

EWB

Philip IV (1605–1665), king of Spain from 1621 to 1665. During Philip IV's reign Spain was engaged in foreign wars and torn by internal revolt.

Born on April 8, 1605, Philip IV succeeded his father, Philip III, in 1621. He was more intelligent than his father but like him allowed his government to be run by minister-favorites. Philip's principal minister, Gaspar de Guzmán, Count of Olivares, dominated his councils and was the effective ruler of Spain for more than 20 years. In 1627 the ruinous expenses of Spain's involvement in the Thirty Years War forced the government to declare itself bankrupt; the war effort continued, however, and the Mantuan campaign (1628–1631) led to an open conflict with France, which became intensified in 1635.

Spanish troops at first came close to Paris, but the situation rapidly deteriorated. Olivares's desperate attempts to raise funds for the prosecution of the war provoked dissent and rebellion, and in 1640 Catalonia went into open revolt, murdered the king's agent there, and welcomed French aid in its struggle against the government of Castile. Soon afterward, Portugal rebelled and declared itself independent from Spain. Olivares's counterpart in France, Cardinal Richelieu, supplied money to both Catalonia and Portugal as French troops occupied Catalonia.

In January 1643, after visiting the war front in Aragon, Philip dismissed Olivares and declared that he would rule without a favorite. However, he soon employed one in the person of Don Luis de Haro, a nephew of Olivares. On May 19, 1643, the Spanish infantry was vanquished by the French at Rocroi. Since the beginning of the 16th century, the Spanish infantry had been regarded as the best in Europe; its defeat symbolized the downfall of Spain as a military power.

A dreary succession of setbacks marked the second half of Philip's reign. Another bankruptcy was declared in 1647, and in the same year unsuccessful revolts against Spanish rule erupted in Sicily and Naples. These events convinced Richelieu and his successor, Cardinal Mazarin, that, by pursuing an all-out war against Spain, France could gain considerable land and power in the European theater. Thus the war between the two countries continued after the Peace of Westphalia (by which Spain officially recognized the independence of the United Provinces) had concluded the Thirty Years War in 1648. Although civil war in France (the Fronde) gave the Spanish some slight respite, it could not stave off the inevitable. For although Catalonia was won back in 1652, bankruptcy was again declared in 1653.

The union of Cromwell's England with France in the war against Spain proved to be the coup de

grace. Spain lost both Dunkerque and Jamaica to the English. In the Peace of the Pyrenees, concluded with France in 1659, Spain gave up Artois and territories in the Spanish Netherlands, together with Rosellón and part of Cerdaña. As part of the "peace package," a marriage was arranged between Philip IV's daughter, Maria Theresa, and the young Louis XIV. The waiver of the Infanta's inheritance rights to Spanish territory was contingent on the payment of a dowry of 500,000 escudos, which the French as well as the Spanish knew could never be paid. After Philip's death this clause was used as a pretext for the seizure of still more Spanish territory in the Low Countries during the War of Devolution.

Philip IV died on Sept. 17, 1665, just before Portugal's independence was recognized. In the course of his reign he had married twice. His first wife, Elizabeth of Bourbon, died in 1644; their only child died 2 years later. His second wife, Maria Anna of Austria, gave birth to one son who survived, the hapless Charles II, who was destined to be the last Hapsburg monarch of Spain.

EWB

Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni (1463–1494), Italian philosopher and humanist. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola was a brilliant exemplar of the Renaissance ideal of man.

The youngest son of a princely Lombard house, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola received a Church benefice when he was 10 years old. However, Pico quickly surpassed the routine expectation of a career in Church or state. At the University of Padua from 1480 to 1482, when the city and its university enjoyed the liberal patronage of Venice, welcomed Eastern scholars, and offered one of Europe's richest civic cultures, he studied Aristotelianism and Hebrew and Arabic religion, philosophy, and science. By 1487 his travels and education, broadened to include Florence and Paris, had steeped Pico in a unique variety of languages and traditions. Committed to no exclusive source of wisdom and disappointed by the philosophic weakness of the Italian humanists' study of classical culture, he sought a core of truth common to this vast knowledge.

The young man's first and most famous venture was a challenge to Europe's scholars for public disputation at Rome in 1487. Pico prepared to defend 900 *conclusiones*—402 drawn from other philosophers (most heavily from scholastic, Platonic, and Arabic thinkers) and 498 his own. However, a papal commission, suspicious of such diversity, condemned 13 of Pico's theses. The assembly was canceled, and he fled to Paris, suffering brief imprisonment before set-

ting in Florence late in 1487. His writings for the disputation were banned until 1493.

At Florence, Pico joined Lorenzo de' Medici's Platonic Academy in its effort to formulate a doctrine of the soul that would reconcile Platonic and Christian beliefs. Pico's ambition, which many critics attribute to youthful confusion, can be measured by his plan to harmonize Plato and Aristotle and to link their philosophies with revelations proclaimed by the major religions. Preparatory treatises included the *Heptaplus* of 1489, a commentary on Genesis stressing its correspondence with sacred Jewish texts, and the work *De ente et uno* of 1492, on the nature of God and creation.

Pico gradually renounced Medicean splendor, embraced the piety of the reforming friar Girolamo Savonarola, and began writing in defense of the Church. Pico's philanthropy kept pace with his purchase of manuscripts, as he built one of Europe's great private scholarly collections. He died of fever on Nov. 17, 1494, as French soldiers occupied Florence.

Described as being "of feature and shape seemly and beautiful," Pico combined physique, intellect, and spirituality in a way that captivated both the lovers of *virtù* and Christian reformers. In his *De hominis dignitate*, written to introduce his abortive Roman congress, Pico had God endow Adam with "what abode, what form, and what functions thou thyself shalt desire . . . so that with freedom of choice and with honor, thou mayest fashion thyself." This early tract asserted the philosophy that Pico's later and more complex works stressed: the active intellect can discern right from wrong, truth from illusion, and is free to guide the soul, indeed to bind all men, to union with a common creator. Pico's late work *Disputationes in astrologiam*, an unfinished attack on astrology, rejected occult thought which subordinated human will to deterministic forces.

EWB

Pisan, Christine de (ca. 1364–ca. 1430), French author. Christine de Pisan wrote lyric poetry and also prose and verse works on a great variety of philosophical, social, and historical subjects.

Thomas de Pisan, father of Christine de Pisan, was an astrologer and medical doctor in the service of the republic of Venice when he accepted a similar appointment at the court of Charles V of France. Born in Venice, Christine was taken to Paris in 1368, where she was brought up in courtly surroundings and enjoyed a comfortable and studious childhood and adolescence. At 15 she married Étienne de Castel. In 1380 Charles V died, thereby dissolving the royal appointment of her father, who died 5 years later. Chris-

tine's husband, secretary of Charles VI, died in 1390, leaving her a widow at 25, with three children, considerable debts, and impatient creditors. Two years later Charles VI became insane, leaving the nation open prey.

Impoverished by multiple blows of adversity, Christine determined to earn her living by writing, composing her first ballades in 1393. Her works were successful, and richly illuminated copies of some of them were presented to noted patrons of letters. Thirty major titles followed until she retired to the convent at Poissy, where her only daughter had been a religious for 22 years. She wrote no more except one religious work and a eulogy on Joan of Arc after the victory at Orléans.

In verse, Christine's first work appears to be her *Hundred Ballades*, followed by 26 *virelays*, 2 *lays*, 69 *rondeaux*, 70 framed poems, 66 more ballades, and 2 complaints. In her *Epistle to the God of Love* (1399) she begins her battle for feminism, reproaching Ovid and Jean de Meun for their misogyny; a second attack appears in her *Tale of the Rose* (1402). Of her 15 other long poems the best is the *Changes of Fortune* (1403), in the 23,636 lines of which she traces changing "fortune" from the time of the Jews down to her own time.

In prose, after her allegorical *Epistle from Othea* (1400), Christine vigorously continues her feminism in the *City of Ladies* and the *Book of the Three Virtues* (both 1405). Other works in prose include the *Deeds and Good Morals of Wise King Charles V* (1404), a book on arms and knighthood (1410), and the *Book of Peace* (1414), which holds up Charles V as a model for the Dauphin. Her *Hours of Contemplation on the Passion*, containing lessons on patience and humility, was written during her last retreat.

EWB

Pius V (1504–1572), was pope from 1566 to 1572. An austere man, Pius V put the decrees of the Council of Trent into effect and thus occupies a central position in the Catholic Reformation.

Antonio Ghislieri, who became Pius V, was born on Jan. 17, 1504, at Bosco Marengo near Alessandria in northern Italy. He was from a poor family. At 14 years of age Ghislieri entered the Order of Preachers and took the name Michele. He received his higher education as a friar at Bologna. In 1528 he was ordained at Genoa.

For more than 20 years Ghislieri gained a wide breadth of experience as professor of theology, superior in his order, and member of the Inquisition in Pavia, Como, and Bergamo. His dedication to the work of the Inquisition brought him to the attention

of officials in Rome, including Giampietro Carafa, the future Pope Paul IV. In 1551 Pope Julius III appointed Ghislieri commissary general of the Roman Inquisition. Under Paul IV, Ghislieri was given greater responsibilities: in 1556 the bishopric of Sutri and Nepi, in 1557 the cardinalate, and in 1558 the post of grand inquisitor of the Roman Church. Pope Pius IV assigned him to the see of Mondovi in 1560. On Jan. 7, 1566, Ghislieri was elected pope and took the name Pius V.

Pius V had a twofold preoccupation: the preservation of the purity of the faith and the advancement of Church reform. He used the Inquisition, although more moderately than Paul IV; severely punished bishops who remained absent from their sees; examined the spiritual tenor of religious orders; implemented the decrees of the Council of Trent; and simplified to the point of austerity the style of life of the papal household. In 1566 Pius V issued the Roman Catechism.

Pius V influenced the liturgical life of the Church in a monumental way. In 1568 he issued the *Breviarium Romanum* and in 1570 the *Missale Romanum*, thereby removing the multiplicity of forms in the breviary and in the Mass and creating, with minor exceptions, a liturgical uniformity throughout the Church. In 1567 he made the greatest theologian of his order, St. Thomas Aquinas, a Doctor of the Church.

In his foreign policies Pius V experienced both failure and success. Misjudging the situation in England, he seriously blundered in 1570, when he announced that English Catholics no longer owed allegiance to Queen Elizabeth. His action worsened the situation of England's persecuted Catholics. Against the Turks he was successful. He built up the Holy League and on Oct. 7, 1571, a fleet of Spanish, Venetian, and papal ships defeated the Turkish fleet at Lepanto in the Gulf of Corinth. Pius V died on May 1, 1572. He was canonized in 1712 by the Church.

EWB

Pius IX (1792–1878), was pope from 1846 to 1878. Pius IX began his reign devoted to liberal ideals but, embittered by the anticlericalism of Italian liberals and by the assault on papal territories by the new kingdom of Italy, became an important foe of progress and change.

Pius IX was born Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti on May 13, 1792, at Senigallia, Italy. He became archbishop of Spoleto in 1827 and bishop of Imola in 1832. He was already recognized as a liberal when he was created a cardinal in 1840. On the death of Gregory XVI a conclave divided between progressive and conservative prelates chose, on June 16, 1846,

Mastai-Ferretti as pope in preference to the reactionary Luigi Lambruschini.

The new pope began his pontificate—the longest in history—by initiating badly needed reforms. Improvements in financial administration and in the treatment of criminals in the Papal States were followed by an easing of the censorship. The political innovations of 1847 decreed that only the secretary of state had to be a priest and that the council of advisers to the pope and his ministers would be elected officials. A municipal government was established for Rome, part of which was made up of elected representatives. While presiding over these specific liberal changes in his own territories, Pius IX lent encouragement to Italian nationalism.

But that he was always a reformer and never a revolutionary Pius IX quickly proved after the revolutions of 1848. His enforced departure from Rome to Gaeta and the establishment of a Roman Republic cooled his ardor for Italian nationalism. Devoted first and always to the welfare of the Church, he had been willing to support the introduction into it of democratic elements, but he would never agree to the loss of the Pope's temporal power.

When the movement for Italian unity broke out into war in 1859, Pius IX attempted to remain neutral, but he could not keep the papal territories from being dismembered. His refusal to yield any part of these dominions in negotiations with the victorious Piedmontese caused him to lose them all. On Sept. 18, 1860, the Papal States were overrun, and only the presence of French troops protected Rome. The liberal kingdom of Italy was established, and to his dying breath Pius IX remained its bitterest enemy.

As long as the French garrisoned Rome, Pius IX was able to hold his capital, and from it he fired all the spiritual weapons in his arsenal. The famous *Syllabus of Errors* of 1864, a list of erroneous modernistic statements, specifically repudiated the notion that the Pope would ever ally himself with progress or modern civilization. The Vatican Council on July 18, 1870, made the ancient doctrine of papal infallibility into a dogma of the Church. Pius IX had made it his unremitting task to reimpose on the faithful the Ultramontane authority of the medieval Church.

The French withdrew their troops from Rome in 1870 upon the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. Italian soldiers took the city on September 20 of that year, and in October a plebiscite was held in which an overwhelming majority voted to make Rome a part of the Italian kingdom. Pius IX spent the rest of his life in the Vatican. He refused to negotiate with the new kingdom, whose Parliament unilaterally declared that the Pope still retained his sovereignty and

absolute control over the Vatican. He could conduct diplomatic relations with other states and was compensated for the loss of his territories. These arrangements did not placate him, and he died unreconciled on Feb. 7, 1878.

EWB

Pius XII (1876–1958), was Pope from 1939 to 1958. Pius XII guided the Roman Catholic Church through the difficult years of World War II and the postwar period, when much of the eastern Catholic Church was heavily persecuted by Soviet communism.

Pius XII was born Eugenio Maria Giuseppe Pacelli in Rome on March 2, 1876. Because of poor health he was allowed to study for the priesthood at his home. Ordained a priest in 1899, he took up work in the Vatican Secretariat of State in 1901, working there until 1917. In that year he became archbishop of Sardis and was sent to Munich as apostolic nuncio to Bavaria. In 1918 he became nuncio in Berlin to the new Weimar Republic. During his German years Pacelli acquired a love of the German people and a knowledge of German affairs. He was a close observer and on a few occasions an eyewitness of Bolshevik riots in Germany, which developed a strong fear in him that Soviet Marxism was the prime enemy of Christendom. This fear, together with his love of Germany, influenced his judgments during World War II. Pius XI recalled Pacelli to Rome in 1929 and named him a cardinal. In 1930 he became secretary of state, remaining at this post until his election as pope on March 2, 1939.

Pius XII's main determination, upon the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, was to preserve cordial relations with all belligerents. He had concluded from his years in Germany that the Vatican should engage in the role of international peacemaker. He therefore refused, in spite of Anglo-American pressures, clearly to declare against the Axis Powers or publicly to describe the German invasion of Soviet Russia as a crusade against communism, as the Axis Powers wished him to do. His attempted neutrality in word and action led Pius XII into an extreme form of abstention from all effective moral protest in the war. He consequently did not intervene to denounce or to halt the Nazi campaign against the Jews or the genocidal acts of the Hitler regime.

This lack of action brought much public criticism of Pius after the war. The Pope, it was argued, had a moral obligation to speak out specifically against all and every kind of injustice. In his defense, it has been alleged—accurately—that any such denunciation might have brought the full wrath of Hitler upon the Church in all the occupied countries as well as in

Germany. Privately, Pius organized shelters and other places of refuge for Jews. He also organized the highly effective Work of St. Raphael, which aided in locating and resettling war refugees. The Vatican itself and many Vatican buildings were used, with Pius's tacit approval, for sheltering war refugees, downed pilots, and Allied military personnel.

Toward the end of the war, when Communist partisans appeared in northern Italy, Pius XII communicated his fears to President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States, and in postwar Italy Pius organized Catholic Action groups, which played a great part in bringing the Christian Democrats to power in 1948, thus keeping Italy within the western orbit. Pius continued to battle against Italian communism to the end of his life, issuing a formal excommunication decree against all Catholics who joined the Communist party. At the end of Pius XII's reign, the status of the Church was high on the international scene; his popularity had waned among the intellectuals of the Church; and Pius had placed the Vatican in intransigent positions regarding both non-Catholics and non-Christians.

Role in the Church. Within the Roman Church, Pius XII exercised an authoritarian influence on all developments. In spite of his dogmatic intransigence regarding the ecumenical movement and his refusal to meet with leaders of Eastern Orthodox churches, many of Pius's provisions and reforms laid the ground for the more radical reforms achieved by the Second Vatican Council (called by his successor, John XXIII) and for the participation of Roman Catholics in the ecumenical movement. Pius introduced evening Mass, relaxed the laws on fasting, encouraged the indigenous hierarchies of Africa and Asia, permitted the use of the vernacular in certain Church ceremonies, and reformed the ancient liturgy of the Easter celebration. In doctrine and in theology, Pius was extremely conservative and fomented in the Roman government of the Church a repressive and reactionary spirit. The various offices and ministries of the Vatican, under his rule, exercised great control over the teachings and writings of Roman Catholic scholars and thinkers. This state of affairs provoked the counterreactions characteristic of John XXIII's reign and facilitated the work of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council.

Pius ruled autocratically, imposed his views, and expected exact obedience from all. But not all of his directives concerning the teaching of the Church on dogmatic matters were repressive in their final effect. His *Divino afflante Spiritu* (1943) gave fresh life to Roman Catholic biblical studies by admitting that the

Bible as a book had been influenced in its literary forms by the cultures in which its various parts had been composed. His *Humani generis* (1950), although repressive in many ways, did not completely block all scientific inquiry into the natural truths underlying the facts of religion and religious territory.

Pius XII was the first pope to make use of the radio on an extensive scale. Indeed, he took every suitable occasion to address both Catholics and non-Catholics on a variety of subjects. During his pontificate the prestige of the Church rose enormously, and his presence in Rome attracted more pilgrims and visitors from varying faiths and countries than ever before in the history of the Vatican. Pius XII died at Castel Gandolfo, the summer residence of the popes, on Oct. 9, 1958.

EWB

Pizarro, Francisco (ca. 1474–1541), Spanish conquistador. Atahualpa, Pizarro was the obscure adventurer and ruffian who discovered and overthrew the Inca empire of Peru. Assassin of the Inca Atahualpa, Pizarro was assassinated in turn by his own countrymen.

Francisco Pizarro was born at Trujillo in Estremadura. The illegitimate son of a poor *hidalgo* (small landholder of the petty nobility), he never learned to read and may have earned his keep herding his father's swine. This allegation is often cited by Pizarro's detractors in terms of a comparison with Hernán Cortés the better-born conqueror of Mexico. But the destruction wreaked by Cortés upon Aztec civilization was no less far-reaching than Pizarro's impact upon the society of Peru.

Pizarro left Spain for the New World in the wake of the early discoveries. He joined Alonso de Ojeda on the latter's disastrous expedition to Colombia and subsequently accompanied Vasco Núñez de Balboa on his march to the South Sea (Pacific Ocean). It was Pizarro who later arrested the condemned Balboa on orders from the great explorer's rival, Pedrarias de Ávila. He then settled down as an *encomendero* (lord of Indian serfs) in Panama.

Yet Pizarro remained a conquistador without a conquest. Emboldened by tales of fabulous kingdoms to the south, he went into partnership with another adventurer, Diego de Almagro, and a priest, Luque. This combination financed and led several voyages of reconnaissance. Pizarro then journeyed to Spain, where the Emperor commissioned him to undertake the southern conquest and to establish a province of New Castile. So empowered, he returned to the New World, accompanied by his half brothers Gonzalo, Hernando, and Juan Pizarro, his cousin Pedro Pizarro,

and Martin de Alcántara. At the end of 1530 Pizarro set sail with 180 men for Peru.

Conquest of Peru. Pizarro arrived at a time most favorable for his designs. Atahualpa, brother of the Inca Huáscar, had usurped the throne and moved the seat of government from the traditional Andean stronghold of Cuzco to Cajamarca in the north. It was on the northern coast, at Tumbes, that Pizarro's forces landed; and after consolidating his position, the conqueror marched on the new capital in 1532. Tricked into capture under cover of false negotiations, Atahualpa sought to buy his freedom with his gold. The loot delivered, the monarch was slain. Meanwhile, reinforced by troops under Almagro, the Spanish had captured and sacked Cuzco itself. In 1535 Pizarro founded his own capital of Lima near the coast, thus originating the troublesome later-day distinction between the Indian society of the mountains and the Hispanicized civilization of the seaboard.

The Spanish conquest has shed some of its glamour in the light of modern research. Peruvians under Manco Capac, successor to the deposed Huáscar, held out against the Spanish for 40 years more; Indian revolts recurred for another 200. The question persists: why was this great civilization mortally wounded, if not instantly overthrown, by the Estremaduran adventurer? The immediate answer lies in the outbreak of civil war within the Peruvian ruling class, a division which gave Pizarro his opportunity. Atahualpa's rivals rejoiced in his downfall, just as enemies of the Aztecs had at first welcomed and abetted the invasion of Cortés. Yet the explanation for the Spanish success must be sought deeper in the structure of society, where it can be grasped in the relation between the social divisions within these native American empires and the level of technology.

Like the leaders of the splendid civilizations of the ancient Near East, the priestly and military ruling classes of the Incas and Aztecs employed the surplus appropriated from producers to subsidize irrigation and flood-control projects, to build large cities and road networks, and to underwrite the production of craftsmen-artists. But unlike the agrarian producers of those earlier civilizations, the peasants lacked suitable draft animals, wheeled vehicles, and plows. Under these conditions the productivity of labor was extremely low, and it required a stern labor discipline, upheld by a powerful religiopolitical orthodoxy, to extract a level of surplus product sufficient to the requirements of the ruling classes. Divided among themselves, such rulers were further weakened by the hostility of subject peoples and the passivity of agrarian producers. Faced with a determined neo-feudal

enemy skilled in the art of conquest from the center outward, they were less able to mobilize resistance, and to sustain it, than the primitive peoples of the north, the far south, and the east. In the final analysis, writes a historian of European expansion, J. H. Parry, these civilizations' "combination of wealth and technical weakness was their undoing."

His Death. Cortés had been able to overcome immediate challenges from Spanish competitors; Pizarro was not so fortunate. Tensions between original invaders and latecomers divided the conquistadors into two parties, respectively led by Pizarro and his sometime associate Almagro. The situation was only briefly eased by an Almagro expedition to Chile. Upon his return he seized Cuzco and confronted the Pizarros in the Las Salinas War. Captured by Hernando Pizarro in 1538, Almagro was executed; but his shade haunted Francisco until his own murder in Lima (June 26, 1541) by members of the defeated faction. Civil war persisted until 1548, when the Spanish government finally asserted its authority over the new colony. Of the band of marauding brothers, only Hernando survived the Pizarro "victory" over the Incan empire.

EWB

Plumb, J. H. (1911–), British historian. Though an historian by profession, J. H. Plumb nevertheless holds the rather unusual notion that history, or as he prefers to call it, The Past, deserves to be put to rest once and for all. In his book on the subject, *The Death of the Past*, Plumb argues that not only has technological innovation diminished the past's ability to provide guidance to modern industrial societies, but, more significantly, that people have always tended to rewrite the past to suit their own ends—be it a priest who seeks to confirm a particular religious belief, a king who needs to justify his rule, or a mere "commoner" who wants to add a few illustrious members to an otherwise undistinguished family tree. This "created ideology with a purpose," as the author defines conventional history, is what has made freedom and economic prosperity such rare commodities, for those in power have always manipulated the past at the expense of the "little guy."

Of course, Plumb does not advocate doing away with history and historians altogether. According to William Appleman Williams of the *Nation*, Plumb believes the modern historian should attempt to "defuse" the power of the past "by removing the ideology of the historian and thereby transform what has been an instrument of social control into a tool of human improvement." In order to "cleans[e] the story of man-

kind," as Plumb himself states, the historian must "try and understand what happened, purely in its own terms. . . . [He must] see things as they really were, and from this study. . . . attempt to formulate processes of social change which are acceptable on historical grounds and none other." But the ideal historian has to do more than just uncover and explain historical events; Williams reports that Plumb also expects him to make "positive statements about human life" while developing "principles about social living" with the ultimate goal of demonstrating that "the condition of mankind has improved" throughout history.

Few observers criticize the spirit behind such a cause, but most doubt that what Plumb proposes is possible. Though a *Times Literary Supplement* critic, for example, calls *The Death of the Past* a "stimulating, courageous, and frequently learned book" which "deserves to be pondered by all who teach or value history," William H. McNeill, himself a historian, comments in the *Saturday Review* that the distinction Plumb makes between "history" (what *really* happened) and "The Past" (what the chroniclers *say* happened) "strikes me as completely false. What Professor Plumb hails as a new genus, history, is merely the onset of a climate of opinion in which he feels at home. Older uses of the past he analyzes, often wittily and well, as self-serving, erroneous, naive. . . . [But Plumb's] view of man's past . . . seems quite as self-serving. . . . To claim that modern historians have a unique talisman that allows us to know things as they really were—apart, apparently, from the questions we ask and the conceptions we bring to the past—obscures rather than clarifies the real, indisputable advances that have occurred and are occurring in our understanding of mankind's history.

This little book . . . is briskly written, and abounds in arresting turns of phrase. But Plumb's brilliant style cannot really salvage a faculty idea."

The *New Statesman* reviewer agrees, remarking that "there is not much one can do with [such] a confession of faith except sign it, and with a good deal of mental reservation I should be prepared to sign this one. . . . [But] I have the impression that Plumb is skating on pretty thin ice." The *Nation's* Williams also sees "much truth in [Plumb's] analysis" but ultimately decides that following his advice "is to start down a path that will change the historian into a kind of superheated lay minister. At best, and by Plumb's own formulation, the historian becomes an advocate who offers one general answer to the questions he has raised. Plumb is trying to keep the crown on Clio's head even as he tells us that the old regime has collapsed."

Melvin Maddocks of the *Christian Science Monitor*, responding to Plumb's question, "Can man face the future with hope and with resolution without a sense of the past?" concludes that this "is not the final question. The final question must go beyond the morale problem to ask: Can man even function without a sense of the past? . . . Are not the very standards by which historians think bound to be a conscious and subconscious heritage of the past? . . . The Futurist is born with a love of the vacuum. He longs for a brave, new, empty world. What he hates most is the sight of footprints in the sand. But the question-to-end-all-questions he may have to ask himself is: Would I want to live in the kind of world where footprints were not at least a possibility?"

CA

Pobedonostsev, Konstantin Petrovich (1827–1907), Russian statesman and jurist. As director general of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Pobedonostsev became a champion of tsarist autocracy, orthodoxy, and Russian nationalism.

Konstantin Pobedonostsev was born on May 21, 1827, in Moscow. His father, Peter V. Pobedonostsev, a professor at the University of Moscow, educated Konstantin at home until he enrolled at the St. Petersburg School of Jurisprudence in 1841. From his father, he learned to read Old Church Slavonic, French, Latin, and German. He also studied the Bible, the writings of the Russian Orthodox Church Fathers, Greek and Roman classics, Russian history, and Russian literature. He graduated from the School of Jurisprudence with a wide knowledge of Western judicial institutions, laws, and literatures.

Pobedonostsev first won acclaim as a historian of Russian judicial institutions and as a specialist in Russian civil law. In 1846 Pobedonostsev was assigned to the eighth department of the Senate in Moscow. In 1853 he became secretary of the seventh department. In 1859 he was named lecturer in Russian civil law at Moscow University.

In 1861 Pobedonostsev was appointed tutor in Russian history and law to the heir to the throne, the future Alexander III, and was named executive secretary of the Senate. He moved to St. Petersburg into a life of great influence in the central governmental bureaucracy and the court. He employed his tutorial position to mold the views of the imperial heir. Pobedonostsev emphasized the ties between Russian Orthodoxy and Russian national history. By the late 1870s his influence on Alexander had become overwhelming.

In 1872 Pobedonostsev became a member of the State Council, a body that advised the Tsar concerning projected laws. Most of the significant legis-

lation and decrees of the 19th century received their final review and drafting in this Council. Pobedonostsev's main responsibility as a Council member was civil and ecclesiastical matters. His work in the Council contributed to his appointment in 1880 as director general of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church. For the remainder of his life he was a member of both the Council and the Senate. His service in the highest organs of the tsarist government naturally gave him power in shaping Russia's domestic policies.

Pobedonostsev's reputation in Russian history rests largely upon his accomplishments as director general of the Holy Synod. For 25 years his influence on the religious and political life of Russia was enormous as a result of his official positions and his relations with the czars, their wives, the imperial family, and the court.

In 1881 Pobedonostsev advised Alexander III concerning the selection of his ministers, most of whom were named upon his recommendation. The Tsar consented to Pobedonostsev's policy of the Russification of minority groups, particularly Jews and dissenters. As director general, Pobedonostsev attempted to restrict the number and the rights of other religious groups in Russia. Under his influence Alexander III opposed any limitation of his autocratic powers, tightened censorship, tried to suppress all opposition opinion, and persecuted religious nonconformists.

Pobedonostsev also tutored the future Nicholas II and was one of his most influential advisers until the Revolution of 1905. In his writing Pobedonostsev strongly attacked Western rationalism and liberalism. He died in St. Petersburg on March 23, 1907.

EWB

Pope, Alexander (1688–1744), English poet and satirist. Alexander Pope was the greatest poet and verse satirist of the Augustan period. No other poet in the history of English literature has handled the heroic couplet with comparable flexibility and brilliance.

Alexander Pope inherited from John Dryden the verse form that he chose to perfect. He polished his work with meticulous care and, like all great poets, used language with genuine inventiveness. His qualities of imagination are seen in the originality with which he handled traditional forms, in his satiric vision of the contemporary world, and in his inspired use of classical models.

Pope was born on May 21, 1688, in London, where his Roman Catholic father was a linen merchant. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688 his family moved out of London and settled about 1700 at Binfield in Windsor Forest. Pope had little formal schooling, largely educating himself through extensive

reading. Sir William Trumbull, a retired statesman of literary interests who lived nearby, did much to encourage the young poet. So did the dramatist and poet William Wycherley and the poet-critic William Walsh, with whom Pope became acquainted when he was about 17 and whose advice to aim at “correctness” contributed to the flawless texture and concentrated brilliance of Pope’s verse.

A sweet-tempered child with a fresh, plump face, Pope contracted a tubercular infection in his later childhood and never grew taller than 4 feet 6 inches. He suffered curvature of the spine (necessitating the wearing of a stiff canvas brace) and constant headaches. His features, however, were striking, and the young Joshua Reynolds noticed in his “sharp, keen countenance . . . something grand, like Cicero’s.” His physical appearance, frequently ridiculed by his enemies, undoubtedly gave an edge to Pope’s satire; but he was always warmhearted and generous in his affection for his many friends.

Early Poems. Precocious as a poet, Pope attracted the notice of the eminent bookseller Jacob Tonson, who solicited the publication of his *Pastorals* (1709). By this time Pope was already at work on his more ambitious *Essay on Criticism* (1711), an illuminating synthesis of critical precepts designed to expose the evils and to effect a regeneration of the contemporary literary scene.

The *Rape of the Lock* (1712, two cantos) immediately made Pope famous as a poet. The cutting off of a lock of Miss Arabella Fermor’s hair by Robert, Lord Petre, had caused an estrangement between these prominent Catholic families; and Pope’s friend John Caryll had suggested that he write a poem “to make a jest of it, and laugh them together again.” In the poem Fermor is represented as Belinda and Lord Petre as the Baron. Adopting a mock-heroic style in the manner of Nicholas Boileau’s *Le Lutrin*, Pope showed how disproportionate it was to treat the event over-seriously, at the same time glancing good-humoredly at vanity and at the rococo-like glitter of the *beau monde*. Rejecting Joseph Addison’s advice not to enlarge his design, Pope published an extended version (1714, five cantos) containing the “machinery” of the sylphs (adopted from the Rosicrucian system) and various other epic motifs and allusions. These not only heightened the brilliance of the poem’s world but also helped to place its significance and that of the “rape” in proper perspective.

Several other poems published by 1717, the date of the first collected edition of Pope’s works, deserve a brief mention. “Windsor Forest” (1713), written in the tradition of Sir John Denham’s “Cooper’s

Hill,” celebrated the peace confirmed by the Treaty of Utrecht. A rich tapestry of historical and poetic allusions, it showed the Stuarts, and especially Queen Anne, in a quasi-mythical light. In 1717 appeared the sophisticated yet moving “Elegy to the Memory of an Unfortunate Lady” and “Eloisa to Abelard,” an example in the Ovidian manner of the currently popular form of heroic epistle. The representation of the cloistered Eloisa’s conflicting emotions toward her former lover (the scholar Peter Abelard), the denouement, and the concluding epilogue make this poem, in effect, a drama in miniature.

Translations of Homer. Pope also engaged in poetic imitations and translations. His *Messiah* (1712), published by Sir Richard Steele in the *Spectator*, was an imitation of Virgil’s fourth Eclogue, based on passages from Isaiah; and his early “translations” of Chaucer included the *Temple of Fame* (1715). In later life Pope published reworkings of several of John Donne’s satires. But Pope’s versions of Homer were his greatest achievement as a translator.

From an early age a frequenter of Will’s Coffee-house, Pope was for a time friendly with men of both political parties. He wrote the prologue for Joseph Addison’s *Cato* (1713), and the Whigs naturally hoped to secure his talents for their party. But growing opposition between him and Addison’s followers (who met at Button’s) made inevitable Pope’s adherence to his other and more congenial group of literary friends—Jonathan Swift, Dr. John Arbuthnot, John Gay, and Thomas Parnell. Together they combined to form the Scriblerus Club, which aimed at a burlesque treatment of all forms of pedantry and which indirectly contributed to the creation of such works as *Gulliver’s Travels* and the *Dunciad*. In 1715 Addison tried to forestall the success of Pope’s translation of the *Iliad* by encouraging Thomas Tickell to publish a rival version, and this caused Pope a great deal of anxiety until the superiority of his own translation was acclaimed.

Pope undertook the translation because he needed money—the result of a sharp drop in the interest from his father’s French annuities. The translation occupied him until 1720, and it was a great financial success, making Pope independent of the customary forms of literary patronage. Parnell and William Broome were among those who assisted with the notes, but the translation was entirely Pope’s own. It has been highly praised by subsequent critics.

From the time his *Iliad* began to appear, Pope became the victim of numerous pamphlet attacks on his person, politics, and religion, many of them instigated by the infamous publisher Edmund Curll. In 1716 an increased land tax on Roman Catholics

forced the Popes to sell their place at Binfield and to settle near the Earl of Burlington's villa at Chiswick. The next year Pope's father died, and in 1719 the poet's increased wealth enabled him to move with his mother to a semirural villa at Twickenham. There he improved house and gardens, making a special feature of the grotto, which connected house and gardens beneath the intervening road. At Twickenham, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu soon became Pope's neighbor. Several years earlier she had rivaled Martha Blount as an object of Pope's affection, but later a good deal of enmity existed between her and Pope, and she joined Lord (John) Hervey in attacking him.

During the 1720s Pope was engaged on a version of the *Odyssey* (1725–1726). Broome and Elijah Fenton were his collaborators, completing half of the translation between them. It was Pope's name, however, that sold the work, and he naturally received the lion's share of the profits (Pope earned about £9,000 from his translations of Homer). It was this translation that led to Pope's association with the young Joseph Spence, who wrote a judicious and engaging criticism of it and who later recorded his valuable *Anecdotes* of Pope.

Editorial Work. Pope also undertook several editorial projects. Parnell's *Poems* (1721) was followed by an edition of the late Duke of Buckingham's *Works* (1723), subsequently suppressed on account of its Jacobite tendencies. The trial of his friend Francis Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester, for complicity in a Jacobite plot also caused Pope a good deal of concern. Then, in 1725, Pope's edition of William Shakespeare appeared. Pope's emendations and explanatory notes were notoriously capricious, and his edition was attacked by Lewis Theobald in *Shakespeare Restored* (1726), a work that revealed a superior knowledge of editorial technique and that gained for its author the unenviable distinction of becoming the original hero of the *Dunciad*.

The *Dunciad*. In 1726–1727 Swift was in England and a guest of Pope. Together they published three volumes of *Miscellanies* in 1727–1728, in the last of which the *Peri Bathous; or the Art of Sinking in Poetry* was included. Renewed contact with Swift must have given a great impetus to Pope's poem on "Dulness," which appeared as the three-book *Dunciad* (1728). Theobald was the prime dunce, and the next year the poem was enlarged by a ponderous apparatus (including "Notes Variorum") intended as a burlesque on the learned lumber of commentators and textual critics.

Clearly Pope used the *Dunciad* as personal satire to pay off many old scores. But it was also prompted by his distaste for that whole process by which worthless writers gained undue literary prominence. "Martinus Scriblerus" summarized the action of the poem as "the removal of the imperial seat of Dulness from the city to the polite world," and this parody of Virgil's epic was accompanied by further mock-heroic elements—the intervention of the goddess, the epic games of the second book, and the visit to the underworld and the vision of future "glories," with the former city-poet Elkanah Settle acting the part of the sybil. Indeed, despite its devastating satire, the *Dunciad* was essentially a phantasmagoric treatment of the forces of anticulture by a great comic genius.

In 1742 Pope published a fourth book to the *Dunciad* separately, and his last published work was the four-book *Dunciad* (1743), which incorporated the new material and enthroned the brazen laureate Colley Cibber as prime dunce in place of Theobald. This revenge on Cibber, who had recently exposed a ridiculous escapade of the poet's youth, provided the poem with a more considerable hero. It also gained in artistic completeness, since the action of the fourth book depicted the fulfillment of Settle's prophecy.

Epistles and *An Essay on Man*. "The Epistle to Burlington" (1731), reminiscent of the *Dunciad* in its vivaciously satiric portrait of "Timon," was designed as part of a "system of ethics in the Horatian way" of which *An Essay on Man* (1733–1734) was to constitute the first book. Though this plan was never realized, the poem illustrates, along with its companion, "Epistle to Bathurst" (1733), antithetical vices in the use of riches. These two epistles were subsequently placed after those "To Cobham" (1734) and "To a Lady" (1735), which were thus intended to provide the projected *magnum opus* with an introductory section on the characters of men and women. "To Cobham" fits easily into this scheme, but "To a Lady" is rather a deliciously witty portrait gallery in Pope's best satiric manner.

"To Burlington" also compliments a nobleman friend of long standing who influenced Pope's appreciation of architecture as did Allen Bathurst his appreciation of landscape gardening. To these pursuits Pope devoted much of his time, being disposed to regard a cultivated esthetic taste as inseparable from a refined moral sense.

Pope's friendship with the former statesman Henry St. John Bolingbroke, who on his return from exile had settled a few miles from Twickenham, stimulated his interest in philosophy and led to the composition of *An Essay on Man*. Some ideas were doubt-

less suggested by Bolingbroke; certainly the argument advanced in Epistle 4—that terrestrial happiness is adequate to justify the ways of God to man—was consonant with his thinking. But Pope’s sources were predominately commonplaces with a long history in Western thought, the most central being the doctrine of plenitude (expressed through the metaphors of a “chain” or “scale” of being) and the assertion that the discordant whole is bound harmoniously together. Even Pope’s doctrine of the “ruling passion” was not original, though he gave it its most extended treatment. In essence, however, the *Essay* is not philosophy but a poet’s apprehension of unity despite diversity, of an order embracing the whole multifarious creation.

The Correspondence. In 1733 Pope’s mother died. The same year he engaged in a cat-and-mouse game with Curll to have his letters published in the guise of a pirated edition. Appearing in 1735, this edition allowed him to publish an authoritative edition in 1737. Such maneuvers are not easy to justify. Nor is the careful rewriting and fabrication, designed to reflect the author in the best possible light. But at least Pope’s letters suggest the extent of his many friendships and something of the hospitality he enjoyed whenever he indulged his love of traveling.

Imitations of Horace. The 1730s were also the years of the *Imitations of Horace* (1733–1738), pungent and endearing by turns. How congenial to Pope were the conversational framework and Horatian independence of tone is evident from the fact that they read not like “imitations” but have the freshness of originals. Indeed, the best of them—the “Epistle to Arbuthnot” (1735) and the “Dialogues” (1738)—have no precise source. The “Epistle,” with its famous portrait of Addison (“Atticus”) and searing indictment of Hervey (“Sporus”), was both the satirist’s *apologia pro vita sua* and his vindication of personally oriented satire. The two “Dialogues” continued this theme, introducing an additional element of political satire.

As Pope grew older, he came to rely more and more on the faithful Martha Blount, and to her he left most of his possessions. He described his life as a “long disease,” and asthma increased his sufferings in his later years. At times during the last month of his life he became delirious. He died on May 30, 1744, and was buried in Twickenham Church.

EWB

Popper, Karl (1902–1994), Austrian philosopher. Karl Popper offered an original analysis of scientific

research that he also applied to research in history and philosophy.

Karl Popper was born in Vienna on July 28, 1902, the son of a barrister. He studied mathematics, physics, and philosophy at the University of Vienna. Though not a member of the Vienna Circle, he was in sympathy with some, if not all, of its aims. His first book, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1935), was published in a series sponsored by the Circle. In 1937 Popper accepted a post in New Zealand as senior lecturer in philosophy at Canterbury University College in Christchurch.

At the end of World War II, Popper was invited to the London School of Economics as a reader, and in 1949 he was made professor of logic and scientific method. Popper then made numerous visits to the United States as visiting professor and guest lecturer. In 1950 he gave the William James Lectures at Harvard University. In 1965 Popper was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II.

Foundations of Popper’s Theory. Popper’s first book laid the foundations for all the rest of his work. It offered an analysis of the procedure to be used in scientific work and a criterion for the meaning of the statements produced in such work. According to Popper, the researcher should begin by proposing hypotheses. The collection of data is guided by a theoretical preconception concerning what is relevant or important. The examination of causal connections between phenomena is also guided by leading hypotheses. Such a hypothesis is scientific only if one can derive from it particular observation statements that, if falsified by the facts, would refute the hypothesis. A statement is meaningful, therefore, if and only if there is a way it can be falsified. Hence the researcher should strive to refute rather than to confirm his hypotheses. Refutation is real advancement because it clears the field of a likely hypothesis.

Understanding History and Society. Popper later applied his analysis of knowledge to theories of society and history. In *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945) he attacked Plato, G. W. F. Hegel, and Karl Marx as offering untenable totalitarian theories that are easily falsifiable. *The Open Society* is often considered one of Popper’s most influential books of this century. It also was responsible for the prevalent use of the term “open society.” Critics argue that Popper succeeded in this book and in its sequel, *The Poverty of Historicism* (1957), in formulating a deterministic theory about general laws of historical development and then refuting it. A lively controversy ensued on the issue of which philosophers, if any, held the doc-

trine Popper refuted. Popper found himself embroiled in a decade of polemics, particularly with partisans of Plato. Popper was thus credited with a convincing logical refutation but one misdirected in its targets.

Popper's later works *Objective Knowledge* (1972) and *The Self and Its Brain* (1977) combined his scientific theory with a theory of evolution. In the 1980s, Popper continued to lecture, focusing mainly on questions of evolution and the role of consciousness. Karl Popper died of complications from cancer, pneumonia, and kidney failure on September 17, 1994 at the age of 92.

EWB

Power, Eileen (1889–1940), British educator and historian. Noted for her academic work in the area of medieval history in the years after World War I, Eileen Power's informative books on women's history were considered pioneering in their day. While not the first woman to undertake the study of medieval social and economic history, she became the most widely known because of her ability to engage not only an academic audience but the general reader as well. Power believed that the broad study of history was crucial to reducing and eliminating nationalism and provincialism. To that end she contributed to popular magazines, gave radio talks on historical topics, and wrote books on history for young readers.

Like many of her colleagues, Power was attracted to the Middle Ages because of its contrasts with the industrial age; unlike others she did not harbor any illusions about what life was like during this period. Her style of historical writing was unique in that she used individuals to represent historic "types" as a means of making the distant past easier for the average reader to relate to. This technique can be seen in her *Medieval People*, published in 1924. Ignoring high-profile individuals, the work presents the era through the lives of six "average" individuals, including a peasant, a prioress, and two men engaged in the wool trade. In engaging sketches Power includes a great deal of background information gleaned from various documents of the period.

At her untimely death in 1940, Power would leave, among other works, an unfinished world history for young people. Several of her lectures would be edited by her husband, Michael M. Postan, in 1975 and published as *Medieval Women*.

CA

Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja, Miguel (1870–1930), Spanish general. Miguel Primo de Rivera ruled Spain as a dictator from 1923 to 1930.

Miguel Primo de Rivera was born in Cadiz on Jan. 8, 1870, of a middle-class family that later became landowners in the Andalusian town of Jerez. He entered the General Military Academy in Toledo in 1884 and first saw service in Africa in 1893, where he won the Cross of San Fernando. Two years later he went to Cuba as an aide to Gen. Martinez de Campos. When his uncle, Gen. Fernando Primo de Rivera, was named captain general of the Philippines in 1897, Miguel went to Manila as an aide. A major in 1898, he was prevented by the collapse of Spanish military power from becoming a lieutenant general until 1919, the interim being filled with campaigns in Morocco, a stormy military governorship of Cadiz (1915), and service as an observer at the western front during World War I.

Public notice did not come Primo's way until 1922, when, as captain general of Barcelona, he attempted to reestablish law and order at just the moment that antiwar sentiment and social unrest were pointing toward revolution. Almost by chance Primo was selected as the chief figure in the military coup d'état that on Sept. 12, 1923, overthrew parliamentary government (possibly with the aid of King Alfonso XIII) and imposed a military dictatorship. Overnight Primo became the most important political figure in Spain.

Primo has been described as a "glorified café politician" who, though he had made no preparation for rule, nevertheless aspired to political greatness. Order was restored by suspending constitutional guarantees, dissolving the Parliament, and imposing martial law. A new party, the Patriotic Union, became Primo's political vehicle and the only legal party in the country. Aside from the King's support of it, however, it had been put together so fast that it never developed great strength. Only because Primo was able to concentrate resources and to rally the army and defeat Abd el-Krim and the Moroccans did the new regime gain some respite from political dissension. The ending of the Moroccan War in December 1925 became Primo's one solid triumph.

Internal problems, surprisingly, continued to mount. Liberals rejected Primo's local government reforms and anticentralism, and radicals, despite the addition of a Socialist, Largo Cabellero, to his Cabinet, did not feel that the regime was moving fast enough in making social reforms. University students and intellectuals, fearing that Primo was another Benito Mussolini, led the opposition from 1925 on, and one of Spain's most distinguished intellectuals, Miguel de Unamuno, went into exile. Primo in fact was far from being a Fascist like Mussolini; if anything he had a paternalistic view of the state that unfortunately was

out of step with the growing ideological sensitivities of the Spaniards.

By 1928, as the revolt of the cadets at the Academy of Segovia showed, even the army was dissatisfied with Primo, mainly because law and order were breaking down. The next 2 years witnessed one act of rebellion after the other, but King Alfonso XIII delayed replacing Primo because the monarchy had used the regime to hide its involvement in a series of disastrous political and military setbacks just prior to the dictatorship. Finally, however, Primo had no other recourse than to resign on Jan. 28, 1930, when he left for exile in Paris. He died in Paris on March 16, 1930.

Primo's son, José Antonio, frequently defended his father during the next few years of growing political bitterness, and many aspects of his father's paternalism could be found in José Antonio Primo de Rivera's much more overtly fascist philosophy. José Antonio founded the Falange party and became the martyr of the nationalist movement.

EWB

Proust, Marcel (1871–1922), French novelist. Marcel Proust ranks as one of the greatest literary figures of the 20th century. He abandoned plot and traditional dramatic action for the vision of the first-person narrator confronting his world.

Marcel Proust was born to wealthy bourgeois parents on July 10, 1871, in Auteuil, a suburb of Paris. The first son of Dr. Adrien Proust and Jeanne Weil, the daughter of a wealthy Jewish financier, he was hypersensitive, nervous, and frail. When he was 9 years old, his first attack of asthma, a disease that greatly influenced his life, nearly suffocated him. In 1882 Proust enrolled in the Lycée Condorcet. Only during his last two years of study there did he distinguish himself as a student, attracting the interest of his philosophy professor, Marie-Alphonse Daru. After a year of military service, Proust studied law and then philosophy.

In the meantime, Proust was creating a name for himself in high society as a brilliant conversationalist with an ear for speech patterns that enabled him to mimic others with devastating ease and accuracy. His verve, dark features, pale complexion, and elegant taste fascinated the hosts of the smart Parisian set that he eagerly courted. Although he soon earned the reputation of a snob and social climber, Proust's intimate friends saw him as generous, extremely intelligent, capable of serious thinking, and as an excellent intellectual companion. But he irritated through his eagerness to please, his intensity of emotion, and his indecisiveness. Proust was not indecisive, however, about his commitment to writing.

Early Works. In 1892 and 1893 Proust contributed a number of critical notes and sketches and two short stories to the ephemeral journal *Le Banquet* and to *La Revue blanche*. He published his first work in 1896, a collection of short stories, short verse portraits of artists and musicians, and incidental pieces written during the preceding six years. *Les Plaisirs et les jours* (*Pleasures and Days*) received cursory notice in the press despite its preface by Anatole France. The book did little to dispel the prevalent notion of Proust as an effete dandy. His interest in analysis of rare and exquisite feelings, his preoccupation with high society, and his refined style were all too familiar to allow his readers to see a talented and serious writer groping for eternal truths and a personal style.

In 1895, even before he published *Les Plaisirs et les jours*, Proust had made a first attempt at a major work. Unable to handle his material satisfactorily, unsure of himself, and unclear about the manner of achieving the goals he had set, Proust abandoned the work in 1899. It appeared, under the title of *Jean Santeuil*, only in 1952; from thousands of notebook pages, Bernard de Fallois had culled and organized the novel according to a sketchy plan he found among them. As a consequence the novel is uneven; many passages announce, duplicate, or are variations of passages in Proust's masterpiece, and others are incoherent or apparently irrelevant. Some, however, are beautifully lyric or analytic. *Jean Santeuil* is Proust's first attempt to come to grips with material that later yielded so much in *À la recherche du temps perdu*. *Jean Santeuil* is the biography of an imaginary character who struggles with himself, his family, and his environment in order to discover, justify, and affirm his artistic vocation. Through episodes and sketches Proust traced Jean Santeuil's progress toward maturity, touching upon many of the themes he later developed more fully: the impact of nature upon the sensibility; the silent work of the imagination in involuntary memory; memory bridging gaps in time; the effects of events such as the Alfred Dreyfus case upon society; the snobbery of social intercourse; the self-oriented nature of love; and the liberating power of art.

After abandoning *Jean Santeuil*, Proust returned to his studies. Although he read widely in other literatures, he was limited to translations. During 1899 he became interested in the works of John Ruskin, and after Ruskin's death (Jan. 20, 1900), Proust published an obituary of the English critic in *La Chronique des arts et de la curiosité* (Jan. 27, 1900) that established him as a Ruskin scholar. Proust's *Pélerinages ruskiniens en France* appeared in *Le Figaro* in February and was followed by several more articles on Ruskin in *Le Mercure de France* and in *La Gazette des*

beaux-arts. With the help of an English-speaking friend, Marie Nordlinger, and his mother, Proust translated Ruskin's *The Bible of Amiens* (1904) and *Sesame and Lilies* (1906). Grappling with Ruskin's ideas on art and its relationship to ethics helped him clarify his own esthetic ideas and move beyond the impasse of *Jean Santeuil*.

In 1903 Proust's father died. His own health, deteriorating since 1899, suffered an even greater shock following the death of his mother in September 1905. These setbacks forced Proust into the sanatorium of Dr. Paul Sollier (in December 1905), where he entertained hopes of curing his asthma. Undoubtedly preferring his illness to any cure, Proust left, "fantastically ill," in less than 2 months. After more than 2 years of seclusion, he emerged once again into society and into print with a series of articles and pastiches published in *Le Figaro* during 1907 and 1908. From 1905 to 1908 Proust had been mysteriously working on a novel; he abandoned it, too, in favor of a new one he had begun to plan when he realized the necessity of still another dress rehearsal. He wrote pastiches of Honoré de Balzac, Gustave Flaubert, Edmond de Goncourt, Charles Sainte-Beuve, and others (February-March 1908), and this activity led Proust inadvertently to problems of literary criticism and to a clearer formulation of a literary work as an art object. By November 1908 Proust was planning his *Contre Sainte-Beuve* (published in 1954; *On Art and Literature*), a rebuttal of Sainte-Beuve, the recognized master of historical literary criticism. The true writer expresses a self, Proust felt, that is completely hidden beneath the one manifested "in our habits, in society, in our vices. If we want to try to understand that self, it is only by trying to re-create it deep in ourselves, that we can succeed." By reacting to Sainte-Beuve, Proust formulated, in terms applicable to the artist as well as to the reader, the notion that lies at the heart of *À la recherche du temps perdu*. Proust finished *Contre Sainte-Beuve* during the summer of 1909 and began almost immediately to compose his great novel.

Remembrance of Things Past. Although Proust had, by 1909, accumulated and reworked most of the material that was to become *À la recherche du temps perdu* (*Remembrance of Things Past*), he still had not fully grasped the focal point that would enable him to structure and to orchestrate his vast material. In January 1909 he had a series of experiences that bore belated fruit during the early summer of that year. The sudden conjunction of flavors in a cup of tea and toast evoked in him sensations that recalled his youth in his grandfather's garden at Auteuil. Although he had had similar experiences in the past and

had considered them important, he had not realized that not only were these experiences a key element in an artist's work but also they could serve as the organizing principle of his novel. They revealed the hidden self that Proust had spoken of in *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, a present self identical to the one in various moments of past time. This process of artistic resurrection and the gradual discovery of its effectiveness, he realized, was the focal point his novel required. *À la recherche du temps perdu*, like Balzac's *La Comédie humaine*, depicts the many facets of a whole society in a specific period of history. Political events, such as the Dreyfus case; social transformations, such as the rise of the bourgeoisie and the decline of the nobility; artistic events; evaluations in music, art, and literature; and different social milieus from the working class to bohemian circles all found their place in Proust's panorama of French life during the decades around the turn of the century. But Proust was primarily concerned with portraying not reality but its perception by his narrator, Marcel, and its capacity to provoke and reveal Marcel's permanent self, normally hidden by habit and social intercourse. From the very first words of his predominantly first-person narrative, Marcel traces his evolution through a multiplicity of recalled experiences to the final realization that these experiences, processed and stored in his memory, reflect his inner life more truly than does his outer life, that their resuscitation in their immediacy destroys spans of elapsed time, that their telling answers his long search for an artistic vocation, and that they form, in fact, the substance of his novel. A key event in the resolution of the novel is the narrator's discovery of the powers of involuntary memory.

Proust began his novel in July 1909, and he worked furiously on it until death interrupted his corrections, revisions, and additions. In 1913, after several rejections, he found in Grasset a publisher who would produce, at the author's expense, the first of three projected volumes (*Du Côté de chez Swann*, *Le Côté de Guermantes*, and *Le Temps retrouvé*; *Swann's Way*, *The Guermantes Way*, and *Time Regained*). After the appearance of the first volume, André Gide, who had earlier rejected Proust's manuscript on behalf of Gallimard, changed his mind and in 1916 obtained the rights to publish the subsequent volumes. Meanwhile, World War I interrupted publication but not Proust's continued expansion of his work. *À l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleur* (*Within a Budding Grove*), originally only a chapter title, appeared late in 1918 as the second volume and won the Goncourt Prize the following year. As volumes appeared, Proust continually expanded his material, inserting long sections as close to publication as the galley stage. *Le Côté de*

Guermantes appeared in 1920; *Sodome et Gomorrhe* (*Cities of the Plain*), Part 1, appeared in 1921 and the two volumes of Part 2 in 1922. Feeling his end approaching, Proust finished drafting his novel and began revising and correcting proofs, expanding the text as he went along with what he called “supernourishment.” Proust had completed revisions of *La Prisonnière* (*The Captive*) and had begun reworking *Albertine disparue* (*The Sweet Cheat Gone*) when, on Nov. 18, 1922, he died of bronchitis and pneumonia contracted after a series of violent asthma attacks. The final volumes of his novel appeared owing to the interest of his brother, Robert, and to the editorial supervision of Jacques Rivière: *La Prisonnière*, two volumes, 1923; *Albertine disparue*, two volumes, 1925; and *Le Temps retrouvé*, two volumes, 1927.

EWB

Pugachev, Emelyan Ivanovich (1742–1775), Russian Cossack soldier. Emelyan Pugachev led the peasant rebellion in Russia in 1773–1775.

Emelyan Pugachev, a Don Cossack, was born in the village of Zimoveiskaya. The main course of his life was influenced initially by the fact that, as a Don Cossack, he was subject, when of age, to duty in the Russian army. In 1770, during a Russo-Turkish conflict in which he was serving, he was given a temporary leave and, at its expiration, refused to return to his regiment. Arrested, he managed to escape, thus beginning his life as a strong-willed fugitive.

In the course of his subsequent wanderings Pugachev was struck by the bitter unrest he found among the lower classes in Russia. What he saw convinced him that the time was ripe for revolt, and being a rebel by nature and having a bent toward leadership, he took upon himself the task of directing a revolt. As a basis for appeal, he decided to assume the character of Tsar Peter III, having observed that many credulous people distrusted the official report that Peter had died in 1762.

With about 80 Cossacks committed to his scheme, in September 1773 Pugachev proclaimed himself Peter III and called on the oppressed to follow him in an uprising against Catherine II (the Great). He began his campaign along the Yaik (now called the Ural) River, gathering followers among disgruntled Cossacks, fugitive serfs, released convicts, religious dissenters, Bashkirs, and Tatars. Although the force he assembled was neither well trained nor well disciplined, it was large enough to defeat local military units sent against it. To widen his campaign, Pugachev undertook the capture of Orenburg (Chkalov), the major center of government strength on the Yaik River, setting up headquarters and laying siege to the

city. Meanwhile, news of the revolt prompted bloody uprisings against landlords and government officials along the Volga River and in the region east of it. Thousands left their homes to join the rebel army, and they increased its numbers to about 25,000.

Late in 1773 Catherine II, judging the revolt dangerous enough to warrant her action, sent a large force to suppress it. Pugachev was compelled to end the siege of Orenburg, but he eluded capture by the government forces. Again he marshaled a sizable following and, in July 1774, was able to resume the offensive and capture the city of Kazan. At the same time, serf uprisings took place near Nizhni Novgorod (Gorki) only 275 miles east of Moscow.

Catherine, now deeply alarmed by the nearness of the revolt, sent new contingents against Pugachev. They succeeded in destroying most of his army, near Tsaritsyn (now Volgograd), but he once again evaded efforts to capture him. Still determined, Pugachev made his way to the Yaik Cossack region, hoping that Yaik and Don Cossacks would provide him with a new army. Instead of being given support, however, he was betrayed. A group of Cossacks opposed to his aims seized him and handed him over to the authorities.

Taken in chains to Moscow, Pugachev was tried and sentenced to death. On Jan. 10, 1775, he was beheaded and quartered before a large Moscow crowd.

EWB

Pushkin, Aleksandr Sergeevich (1799–1837), Russian poet and prose writer. Aleksandr Pushkin ranks as the country’s greatest poet. He not only brought Russian poetry to its highest excellence but also had a decisive influence on Russian literature in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Aleksandr Pushkin is Russia’s national poet. He established the norms of classical Russian versification, and he laid the groundwork for much of the development of Russian prose in the 19th century. His work is distinguished by brilliance of language, compactness, terseness, and objectivity. His poetry is supremely untranslatable, and consequently Pushkin has had less influence on world literature than on Russian literature. He may be described as a romantic in subject matter and a classicist in style and form.

Pushkin was born on May 26, 1799, the son of a family of the middle nobility. On his father’s side he was a descendant of one of the oldest lines of Russian nobility, and on his mother’s side he was related to an Abyssinian, Abram Petrovich Hannibal, who had been kidnaped in Africa, brought to Constantinople, and sent as a gift to Peter I (the Great). Pushkin was brought up in an atmosphere that was predominantly French, and at a very early age he became acquainted

with the classic works of 17th- and 18th-century French literature. Several of the important figures of Russian literature including Nikolai Karamzin and Vasily Zhukovsky were visitors to the Pushkin home during Aleksandr's childhood.

Between 1811 and 1817 Pushkin attended a special school established at Tsarskoye Selo (later renamed Pushkin) by Tsar Alexander I for privileged children of the nobility. Pushkin was an indifferent student in most subjects, but he performed brilliantly in French and Russian literature.

Early Works, 1814–1820. After finishing school, Pushkin led the reckless and dissipated life of a typical nobleman. He wrote about 130 poems between 1814 and 1817, while still at school, and these and most of his works written between 1817 and 1820 were not published because of the boldness of his thoughts on political and erotic matters. In 1820 Pushkin completed his first narrative poem, *Ruslan and Ludmilla*. It is a romance composed of fantastic adventures but told with 18th-century humor and irony. Before *Ruslan and Ludmilla* was published in June 1820, Pushkin was exiled to the south of Russia because of the boldness of the political sentiments he had expressed in his poems. His "Ode to Liberty" contained, for example, a reference to the assassination of Paul I, the father of Tsar Alexander I. Pushkin left St. Petersburg on May 6 and he did not return to the capital for more than 6 years.

South of Russia, 1820–1824. Pushkin spent the years 1820–1823 in various places in the Caucasus and in the Crimea, and he was at first charmed by the picturesque settings and relieved to be free of the intoxications and artificialities of the life of the capital. Subsequently, however, he felt bored by the life in small towns and took up again a life of gambling, drinking, and consorting with loose women. He was always short of money, for his salary in the civil service was small and his family refused to support him. He began to earn money with his poetic works, but these sums were seldom sufficient to permit him to compete comfortably with his affluent friends. In 1823 he was transferred to Odessa, where he found the life of a large city more to his liking.

The poet's life in Odessa in 1823–1824 was marked by three strong amorous attachments. First, he fell in love with Carolina Sobansky, a beauty who was 6 years older than he. He broke with her in October 1823 and then fell violently in love with the wife of a Dalmatian merchant, Amalia Riznich. She had many admirers and gave Pushkin ample cause for jealousy. Amalia, however, inspired some of Pushkin's

best poems, such as "Night" and "Beneath the Blue Sky of Her Native Land," and he remembered her to the end of his life. His third love was for the wife of the governor general, the Countess Eliza Vorontsov. She was a charming and beautiful woman. Vorontsov learned of the affair, and having no special liking for Pushkin he resolved to have him transferred from Odessa. He was aided in this endeavor by an unfortunate letter that Pushkin had written to a friend in which he had questioned the immortality of the soul. The letter was intercepted, and because of it Pushkin was expelled from the service on July 18, 1824, by the Tsar and ordered to the family estate of Mikhailovskoye near Pskov.

Pushkin's poetic work during the 4 years that he spent in the south was rich in output and characterized by Lord Byron's influence, which can be seen in "The Caucasian Captive" (1820–1821), "The Fountain of Bakhchisarai" (1822), and "The Gypsies" (1824). These poems are mellifluous in verse and exotic in setting, but they already show the elements of Pushkin's classic style: measure, balance, terseness, and restraint.

Mikhailovskoye, 1824–1826. On Aug. 9, 1824, Pushkin arrived at Mikhailovskoye. His relations with his parents were not good. The father felt angry at his son's rebelliousness and on one occasion spread a story that his son had attempted to beat him. The family left the estate about mid-November, and Pushkin found himself alone with the family nurse, Arina Rodionovna, at Mikhailovskoye. He lived fairly much as a recluse during the next two years, occasionally visiting a neighboring town and infrequently entertaining old Petersburg friends. During this period he fell in love with a Madame Kern, who was married to an old general and who encouraged the attention of many men. Also at this time the nurse told Pushkin many folk tales, and it is generally believed that she imbued him with the feeling for folk life that manifested itself in many of his poems.

Pushkin's two years at Mikhailovskoye were extremely rich in poetic output. He completed "The Gypsies," wrote the first three chapters of *Eugene Onegin*, and composed the tragedy *Boris Godunov*. In addition he composed many important lyrics and a humorous tale in verse entitled *Count Nulin*. *Boris Godunov* is a chronicle play. Pushkin took the subject from Karamzin's history, and it relates the claims of the impostor Demetrius to the throne of the elected monarch Boris Godunov.

Maturity, 1826–1831. After the end of his exile at Mikhailovskoye, Pushkin was received by the

new czar, Nicholas I, who charmed Pushkin by his reasonableness and kindness. The Tsar placed Pushkin under a privileged tyranny by promising him that his works would be censored by the Tsar himself. The practical consequences of this arrangement were that Pushkin was placed under an honorable promise to publish nothing that was injurious to the government; in time this “privileged” censorship became increasingly onerous.

Pushkin continued his dissipated life after 1826 but with less gusto. Although he was still in his 20s, he began to feel the weight of his years, and he longed to settle down. On April 6, 1830, he proposed to Nathalie Goncharova for the second time and was accepted. She came from a noble family that had fallen on hard times financially. The Goncharovs were dissatisfied with Pushkin’s standing with the government and were unimpressed by his reputation as a poet. Pushkin had to ask for economic favors for the Goncharovs from the government, and he persuaded his father to settle an estate on him.

Pushkin’s output in the years 1826–1829 was not so great as in the years 1824–1826, but it was still impressive. He continued to work on *Eugene Onegin*, wrote a number of excellent lyrics, worked on but did not finish a prose novel entitled *The Nigger of Peter the Great*, and wrote *Poltava*, a narrative poem on Peter the Great’s struggle with Charles XII which celebrates the Russian victory over the Swedes. This poem shows the continuing development of Pushkin’s style toward objectivity and austerity.

In the fall of 1830 Pushkin left the capital to visit a small estate by the name of Boldino, which his father had left him, with the intention of spending a few weeks there. However, he was blocked from returning to the capital by measures taken by the authorities because of a cholera epidemic, and he was forced to return to Boldino. During that autumn at Boldino, Pushkin wrote some of his greatest lyrics; *The Tales of Belkin*; a comic poem in octaves, “The Little House in Kolomna”; and four small tragedies; and he virtually finished *Eugene Onegin*.

Eugene Onegin was begun in 1824 and finished in August 1831. This novel in verse is without doubt Pushkin’s most famous work. It shows the influence in theme of Byron’s *Don Juan* and in style of Laurence Sterne’s novels. It is a “novel” about contemporary life, constructed in order to permit digressions and a variety of incidents and tones. The heart of the tale concerns the life of Eugene Onegin, a bored nobleman who rejects the advances of a young girl, Tatiana. He meets her later, greatly changed and now sophisticated, falls in love with her. He is in turn rejected by her because, although she loves him, she is married.

Pushkin’s four little tragedies are models of spare, objective, and compact drama. The plays are short and vary in length from 240 to 550 lines. *The Feast during the Plague* is a translation of a scene from John Wilson’s *The City of the Plague*; *The Stone Guest* is a variation of the Don Juan theme; *Mozart and Salieri* treats the tradition of Antonio Salieri’s envy of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s effortless art and the injustice of Nature in dispensing her gifts; and *The Covetous Knight* has as its theme avariciousness and contains the famous monologue of the baron on his treasures.

The Tales of Belkin consists of five short stories: “The Shot,” “The Snowstorm,” “The Stationmaster,” “The Undertaker,” and “The Peasant Gentlewoman.” The stories are models of swift, unadorned narration.

Marriage, Duel, and Death, 1831–1837.

After 1830 Pushkin wrote less and less poetry. “The Bronze Horseman” (1833) is considered by many to be his greatest poem. The setting is the great flood of 1824, which inundated much of St. Petersburg. The theme of the poem is the irreconcilable demands of the state and the individual.

The Golden Cockerel (1833) is a volume of Russian folktales. Pushkin’s masterpiece in narrative is the short story “The Queen of Spades” (1834), about a gloomy engineer who is ruthless in his efforts to discover the secret of three winning cards. Mention should also be made of his *The History of the Pugachev Rebellion* (1834) and *The Captain’s Daughter* (1837), a short novel about the Pugachev rebellion.

Pushkin married Nathalie Goncharova on Jan. 19, 1831. She bore him three children, but the couple was not happy together. She was beautiful and a favorite at court, but she was also somewhat uneducated and not free of vulgarity. She encouraged the attentions of Baron George d’Anthes, an exiled Alsatian Frenchman and a protégé of the minister of the Netherlands at St. Petersburg. Pushkin provoked D’Anthes to a duel on Jan. 26, 1837, and the duel took place the next day. Pushkin was wounded and died on January 29. There was great popular mourning at his death.

Many of Pushkin’s works provided the basis for operas by Russian composers. They include *Ruslan and Ludmilla* by Mikhail Glinka, *Eugene Onegin* and *The Queen of Spades* by Peter Ilyich Tchaikovsky, *Boris Godunov* by Modest Mussorgsky, *The Stone Guest* by Aleksandr Dargomijzky, and *The Golden Cockerel* by Nicolai Rimsky-Korsakov.

EWB

R

Ranke, Leopold von (1795–1886), German historian. Leopold von Ranke was one of the most prolific and universal modern historians of his time. He imparted his expertise and methodology through the introduction of the seminar as an informal but intensive teaching device.

Leopold von Ranke was born on Dec. 21, 1795, in the rural Thuringian town of Wiehe, which then belonged to electoral Saxony. Although Ranke was born into the era of the French Revolution, his bourgeois, small-town, generally well-ordered, and peaceful background and upbringing did not provide much contact with the violent events of the times. After receiving his early education at local schools in Dondorf and Pforta, he attended the University of Leipzig (1814–1818), where he continued his studies in ancient philology and theology.

In the fall of 1818 Ranke accepted a teaching position at the gymnasium (high school) in Frankfurt an der Oder. His teaching assignments in world history and ancient literature, for which he disdained the use of handbooks and readily available prepared texts, as well as the contemporary events of the period, led him to turn to original sources and to a concern for the empirical understanding of history in its totality.

Making use of materials from the Westermansche Library in Frankfurt and from the Royal Library in Berlin, Ranke produced his first work, *Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker* (1824; *Histories of the Romanic and Germanic Peoples*), which earned him a professorial appointment at the University of Berlin in 1825, where he was to remain for the rest of his life except for extended research trips abroad.

Although this first work was still lacking in style, organization, and mastery of its overflowing detail, it had particular significance because it contained a technical appendix in which Ranke established his program of critical scholarship—“to show what actually happened” by analyzing the sources used, by determining their originality and likely veracity, and by evaluating in the same light the writings of previous historians “who appear to be the most celebrated” and who have been considered “the foundation of all the later works on the beginning of modern history.” His scathing criticism of such historians led him to accept only contemporary documents, such as letters from ambassadors and others immediately involved in the course of historical events, as admissible primary evidence.

With Ranke’s move to Berlin, the manuscripts of Venetian ministerial reports of the Reformation period became available to him and served as the basis for his second work, *Fürsten und Völker von Süd-*

Europa (1827; *Princes and Peoples of Southern Europe*), which was republished in his complete works as *Die Osmanen und die spanische Monarchie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (vols. 35 and 36; *The Ottomans and the Spanish Monarchy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*).

Travels and Research. The limited collection in Berlin whetted Ranke’s appetite to investigate other European libraries and archives, especially those of Italy. Armed with a travel stipend from the Prussian government, he proceeded at first to Vienna, where a large part of the Venetian archives had been housed after the Austrian occupation of Venetia. A letter of introduction brought acquaintance with Friedrich von Gentz, who, through intercession with Prince Metternich, not only opened the Viennese archives to Ranke but also brought him into immediate contact with the day-to-day politics of the Hapsburg court. During his stay in Vienna he wrote *Die serbische Revolution* (1829), republished in an expanded version as *Serbien und die Türkei im 19. Jahrhundert* (1879; *Serbia and Turkey in the 19th Century*).

In 1828 Ranke traveled to Italy, where he spent 3 successful years of study visiting various public and private libraries and archives, although the Vatican Library remained closed to him. During this period he wrote a treatise, *Venice in the Sixteenth Century* (published 1878), and collected material for what is generally considered his masterpiece, *Die römischen Päpste, ihre Kirche und ihr Staat im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (1834–1836; *The Roman Popes, Their Church and State in the 16th and 17th Centuries*).

Returning from Italy in 1831, Ranke soon became involved in the publication of a journal designed to combat French liberal influence, which had alarmed the Prussian government in the aftermath of the revolutionary events of 1830. Although the *Historisch-Politische Zeitschrift*, with Ranke as editor and chief contributor, contained some of the best political thought published in Germany during this time, it lacked the polemical quality and anticipated success of a political fighting journal and was discontinued in 1836. In the same year Ranke was appointed full professor and devoted the rest of his life to the task of teaching and scholarly work. A Protestant counterpart to his *History of the Popes* was published as *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation* (1839–1847; *German History during the Era of the Reformation*), which was largely based on the reports of the Imperial Diet in Frankfurt.

Last Works. With the following works Ranke rounded out his historical treatment of the major

powers: *Neun Bücher preussischer Geschichte* (1847–1848; *Nine Books of Prussian History*); *Französische Geschichte, vornehmlich im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (1852–1861; *French History, Primarily in the 16th and 17th Centuries*); and *Englische Geschichte, vornehmlich im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (1859–1868; *English History, Primarily in the 16th and 17th Centuries*). Other works, dealing mainly with German and Prussian history during the 18th century, followed in the 1870s.

During the last years of his life Ranke, now in his 80s and because of failing sight requiring the services of readers and secretaries, embarked upon the composition of his *Weltgeschichte* (1883–1888; *World History*), published in nine volumes. The last two were published posthumously from manuscripts of his lectures. He died in Berlin on May 23, 1886.

The complete work of Ranke is difficult to assess. Not many of his works achieved the artistic high point of *The Roman Popes* or its appeal for the general reader. Yet there is hardly a chapter in his total enormous production which could be considered without value. His harmonious nature shunned emotion and violent passion, and he can be faulted less for what he wrote than for what he left unwritten. His approach to history emphasized the politics of the courts and of great men but neglected the common people and events of everyday life; he limited his investigation to the political history of the states in their universal setting. Ranke combined, as few others, the qualities of the trailblazing scholar and the devoted, conscientious, and innovative teacher.

EWB

Reed, John Silas (1887–1920), American revolutionist, poet, and journalist. John Reed became a symbol in many American minds of the Communist revolution in Russia.

John Reed was born in the mansion of his maternal grandparents outside Portland, Ore., on Oct. 22, 1887. His father sold agricultural implements and insurance. Reed was a frail youngster and suffered with a kidney ailment. He attended Portland public schools and graduated from Harvard in 1910. Although he felt like an outsider, Reed had been active at the university.

Reed went to work for *American Magazine*, of muckraking fame, and *The Masses*, a radical publication. Journalists Ida Tarbell and Lincoln Steffens awakened his liberal feelings, but he soon bypassed them as a radical. In 1914 *Metropolitan Magazine* sent Reed to Mexico, where he boldly walked within the lines of Pancho Villa's army. Villa reportedly made Reed a staff officer and called the journalist "brigadier general." Reed next gave sympathetic coverage to

striking coal miners in Colorado. He went to Europe for *Metropolitan Magazine* when World War I broke out in 1914. He covered the battle fronts in Germany, Russia, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria.

Reed and his wife, Louise Bryant, were in Russia during the October Revolution. In reporting the Bolshevik effort to gain control, Reed won V. I. Lenin's friendship. Here Reed gathered materials for his most noted work, *Ten Days That Shook the World* (1919). It is generally recognized that the book lacks factual accuracy, but Bertram Wolfe (1960) contends that "as literature Reed's book is the finest piece of eyewitness reporting the revolution produced."

In 1918 Reed was named Russian consul general at New York, a status never recognized by the United States. In 1919, after he had been expelled from the National Socialist Convention, he formed the Communist Labor party in the United States. He was arrested several times for incendiary speeches and finally, after printing articles in the *Voice of Labor*, was indicted for sedition. He fled to the Soviet Union on a forged passport. The thing usually unreported about Reed among the Muscovites was his unrelenting contention that decisions should be made democratically and his opposition to a monolithic society under dictatorial control. Twice he tried to return to the United States but was unsuccessful. Stricken by typhus, he died on Oct. 19, 1920, in Moscow. He was given a state funeral and buried in the Kremlin.

EWB

Renan, Ernest (1823–1892), French author, philologist, archaeologist. Ernest Renan was the founder of comparative religion, and influenced European thought in the second half of the 19th century through his numerous writings.

Ernest Renan grew up in the mystical, Catholic French province of Brittany, where Celtic myths combined with his mother's deeply experienced Catholicism led this sensitive child to believe he was destined for the priesthood. He was educated at the ecclesiastical college at Tréguier, graduating in 1838, and then went to Paris, where he carried on the usual theological studies at St-Nicolas-du-Chardonnet and at St-Sulpice. In his *Recollections of Childhood and Youth* (1883) he recounted the spiritual crisis he went through as his growing interest in scientific studies of the Bible eventually made orthodoxy unacceptable; he was soon won over to the new "religion of science," a conversion fostered by his friendship with the chemist P. E. M. Berthelot.

Renan abandoned the seminary and earned his doctorate in philosophy. At this time (1848) he wrote *The Future of Science* but did not publish it until

1890. In this work he affirmed a faith in the wonders to be brought forth by a science not yet realized, but which he was sure would come.

Archaeological expeditions to the Near East and further studies in Semitics led Renan to a concept of religious studies which would later be known as comparative religion. His was an anthropomorphic view, first publicized in his *Life of Jesus* (1863), in which he portrayed Christ as a historical phenomenon with historical roots and needing a rational, nonmystical explanation. With his characteristic suppleness of intellect, this deeply pious agnostic wrote a profoundly irreligious work which lost him his professorship in the dominantly Catholic atmosphere of the Second Empire in France.

The *Life of Jesus* was the opening volume of Renan's *History of the Origins of Christianity* (1863–1883), his most influential work. His fundamental thesis was that all religions are true and good, for all embody man's noblest aspirations: he invited each man to phrase these truths in his own way. For many, a reading of this work made religion for the first time living truth; for others, it made religious conviction impossible.

The defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 was for Renan, as for many Frenchmen, a deeply disillusioning experience. If Germany, which he revered, could do this to France, which he loved, where did goodness, beauty, or truth lie? He became profoundly skeptical, but with painful honesty he refused to deny what seemed to lie before him, averring instead that “the truth is perhaps sad.” He remained sympathetic to Christianity, perhaps expressing it most movingly in his *Prayer on the Acropolis of Athens* (1876), in which he reaffirmed his abiding faith in the Greek life of the mind but confessed that his was inevitably a larger world, with sorrows unknown to the goddess Athena; hence he could never be a true son of Greece, any more than any other modern.

EWB

Rhodes, Cecil John (1853–1902), English imperialist, financier, and mining magnate. Cecil Rhodes founded and controlled the British South Africa Company, which acquired Rhodesia and Zambia as British territories. He founded the Rhodes scholarships.

Cecil Rhodes was born on July 5, 1853, at Bishop's Stortford, Hertfordshire, one of nine sons of the parish vicar. After attending the local grammar school, his health broke down, and at 16 he was sent to South Africa. Arriving in October 1870, he grew cotton in Natal with his brother Herbert but in

1871 left for the newly developed diamond field at Kimberley.

In the 1870s Rhodes laid the foundation for his later massive fortune by speculating in diamond claims, beginning pumping techniques, and in 1880 forming the De Beers Mining Company. During this time he attended Oxford off and on, starting in 1873, and finally acquired the degree of bachelor of arts in 1881. His extraordinary imperialist ideas were revealed early, after his serious heart attack in 1877, when he made his first will, disposing of his as yet unearned fortune to found a secret society that would extend British rule over the whole world and colonize most parts of it with British settlers, leading to the “ultimate recovery of the United States of America” by the British Empire!

From 1880 to 1895 Rhodes's star rose steadily. Basic to this rise was his successful struggle to take control of the rival diamond interests of Barnie Barnato, with whom he amalgamated in 1888 to form De Beers Consolidated Mines, a company whose trust deed gave extraordinary powers to acquire lands and rule them and extend the British Empire. With his brother Frank he also formed Goldfields of South Africa, with substantial mines in the Transvaal. At the same time Rhodes built a career in politics; elected to the Cape Parliament in 1880, he succeeded in focusing alarm at Transvaal and German expansion so as to secure British control of Bechuanaland by 1885. In 1888 Rhodes agents secured mining concessions from Lobengula, King of the Ndebele, which by highly stretched interpretations gave Rhodes a claim to what became Rhodesia. In 1889 Rhodes persuaded the British government to grant a charter to form the British South Africa Company, which in 1890 put white settlers into Lobengula's territories and founded Salisbury and other towns. This provoked Ndebele hostility, but they were crushed in the war of 1893.

By this time Rhodes controlled the politics of Cape Colony; in July 1890 he became premier of the Cape with the support of the English-speaking white and non-white voters and the Afrikaners of the “Bond” (among whom 25,000 shares in the British South Africa Company had been distributed). His policy was to aim for the creation of a South African federation under the British flag, and he conciliated the Afrikaners by restricting the Africans' franchise with educational and property qualifications (1892) and setting up a new system of “native administration” (1894).

Later Career. At the end of 1895 Rhodes's fortunes took a disastrous turn. In poor health and anxious to hurry his dream of South African federa-

tion, he organized a conspiracy against the Boer government of the Transvaal. Through his mining company, arms and ammunition were smuggled into Johannesburg to be used for a revolution by "outlanders," mainly British. A strip of land on the borders of the Transvaal was ceded to the chartered company by Joseph Chamberlain, British colonial secretary; and Leander Jameson, administrator of Rhodesia, was stationed there with company troops. The Johannesburg conspirators did not rebel; Jameson, however, rode in on Dec. 27, 1895, and was ignominiously captured. As a result, Rhodes had to resign his premiership in January 1896. Thereafter he concentrated on developing Rhodesia and especially in extending the railway, which he dreamed would one day reach Cairo.

When the Anglo-Boer War broke out in October 1899, Rhodes hurried to Kimberley, which the Boers surrounded a few days later. It was not relieved until Feb. 16, 1900, during which time Rhodes had been active in organizing defense and sanitation. His health was worsened by the siege, and after traveling in Europe he returned to the Cape in February 1902, where he died at Muizenberg on March 26.

Rhodes left £6 million, most of which went to Oxford University to establish the Rhodes scholarships to provide places at Oxford for students from the United States, the British colonies, and Germany. Land was also left to provide eventually for a university in Rhodesia.

EWB

Richardson, Samuel (1689–1761), English novelist. Samuel Richardson brought dramatic intensity and psychological insight to the epistolary novel.

Fiction, including the novel told in letters, had become popular in England before Samuel Richardson's time, but he was the first English novelist to have the leisure to perfect the form in which he chose to work. Daniel Defoe's travel adventures and pseudo-biographies contain gripping individual episodes and an astonishing realism, but they lack, finally, the structural unity and cohesiveness characteristic of Richardson's lengthy novels. Unlike his great contemporary Henry Fielding, who satirized every echelon of English society in such panoramic novels as *Tom Jones*, Richardson chose to focus his attention on the limited problems of marriage and of the heart, matters to be treated with seriousness. In so doing, however, he also provided his readers with an unparalleled study of the social and economic forces that were bringing the rising, wealthy English merchant class into conflict with the landed aristocracy.

Born in Derbyshire, Richardson was one of nine children of a joiner, or carpenter. He became an ap-

prentice printer to John Wilde and learned his trade well from that hard master for 7 years. After serving as "Overseer and Corrector" in a printing house, he set up shop for himself in Salisbury Court, Fleet Street, in 1720, where he married, lived for many years, and carried on his business. Within 20 years he had built up one of the largest and most lucrative printing businesses in London. Although he published a wide variety of books, including his own novels, he depended upon the official printing that he did for the House of Commons for an important source of income.

Richardson claimed to have written indexes, prefaces, and dedications early in his career, but his first known work, published in 1733, was *The Apprentice's Vade Mecum; or, Young Man's Pocket Companion*, a conduct book addressed to apprentices. *A Seasonable Examination . . .* (1735) was a pamphlet supporting a parliamentary bill to regulate the London theaters.

Pamela. In 1739, while at work on a book of model letters for social occasions proposed to him as a publishing venture by two booksellers, Richardson decided to put together a series of letters that would narrate the tribulations of a young servant girl in a country house. His first epistolary novel, *Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded*, was published in two volumes in November 1740 and became an instantaneous and enormous success. When its popularity led to the publication of a spurious sequel, Richardson countered by publishing a less interesting and, indeed, less popular continuation of his work in December 1741.

Richardson claimed in a letter to the Reverend Johannes Stinstra in 1753 that the idea for the story of Pamela had been suggested to him 15 years before, a claim he repeated to Aaron Hill. Regardless of the source for the story, however, Richardson's audience accepted and praised his simple tale of a pretty 15-year-old servant girl, the victim of the extraordinarily clumsy attempts at seduction by her young master, Squire B (later named Squire Booby in the novels of Henry Fielding), who sincerely, shrewdly, and successfully holds out for marriage.

Richardson's use of the epistolary form, which made it possible for him to have Pamela writing at the moment, enabled him to give a minutely particular account of his heroine's thoughts, actions, fears, and emotions. Pamela's letters give the reader a continuous and cumulative impression of living through the experience and create a new kind of sympathy with the character whose experiences are being shared. But Richardson's decision to have the entire story told through Pamela's letters to her parents also raised

technical problems that he was not to overcome until his second novel. Because she alone must report compliments about her charms, testify to her virtue, and relate her successful attempts to repulse Squire B's advances, she often seems coy and self-centered rather than innocent.

Richardson's continuation of *Pamela*, which describes her attempts to succeed in "high life" after her marriage to Squire B, is a less interesting story, more pretentiously told and far less moving.

He followed his triumph with *Pamela* in 1741 by publishing the delayed *Letters Written to and for Particular Friends, Directing the Requisite Style and Forms . . . in Writing Familiar Letters*, a collection of little interest to the modern reader.

Clarissa. By the summer of 1742 Richardson had evidently begun work on what was to become his masterpiece. *Clarissa Harlowe* was published in seven volumes in 1747–1748. Although he had finished the first version of the novel by 1744, he continued to revise it, to solicit the opinions of his friends (and disregard most of their advice), and to worry about its excessive length. The massive work, which runs to more than a million words and stands as one of the longest novels in the English language, contains 547 letters, most written by the heroine, Clarissa Harlowe, her friend, Anna Howe, the dashing villain, Lovelace, and his confidant, John Belford. Letters of enormous length and incredible intensity follow Clarissa's struggle with her family to avoid marriage to the odious Mr. Soames, her desperate flight from her unbending and despicable family into the arms of Lovelace, her drugged rape, her attempts to escape from Lovelace by soliciting the aid of her unforgiving family, and her dramatic death. Before the final volumes of the novel were published, many of Richardson's readers had pleaded with him to give the novel a happy ending by allowing Clarissa to live. Richardson, however, had set out to show that in losing her innocence a girl might be ennobled rather than degraded, but that no matter how much of a paragon of virtue and decorum she might be in this world, she would find true reward for her virtue only in the next. The novel shows clearly the influence of the Christian epic, the English stage, and the funereal literature popular in the period. With specific debts to Nicholas Rowe's *Fair Penitent* and John Milton's *Paradise Lost*, it explores the problem of humanity desperately, if futilely, seeking freedom in a society where duty and responsibility are constant limitations upon that search. Although its great length has earned for it the title of "one of the greatest of the unread novels," it maintains a commanding place in the corpus of major English fiction because of its ex-

ploration of property marriages in the shifting social milieu of mid-18th-century England, its dramatic and cumulative power, and its clear tie to such other great Western mythical stories as *Romeo and Juliet* and *Tristan and Isolde*.

Sir Charles Grandison. Richardson toiled for 5 years to depict the perfect Christian gentleman, especially in order to answer criticisms that he had allowed Lovelace to become too attractive a figure in *Clarissa*. His third and final novel, *Sir Charles Grandison*, was published in 1753–1754. Richardson's contemporaries, who had found Lovelace a fascinating and dramatic villain, thought Sir Charles chilly and priggish. Richardson's story of the earnest Christian gentleman who must choose between the English maiden, Harriet Byron, and the more attractive and more interesting Clementina della Porretta pleases few readers. Because Sir Charles is too faultless and too moral, he does not win the reader's sympathies.

After this Richardson wrote no more novels. He died in London on July 4, 1761.

EWB

Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis de (1585–1642), French statesman and cardinal. Richelieu devoted himself to securing French leadership in Europe and royal domination of the existing social order in France.

The policies and personal conduct of Richelieu were distinguished by self-restraint, flexibility in response to changing opportunities, and alertness to remote consequences. His long-range intentions could be achieved only at the expense of Spain abroad and of the King's family and the great noblemen at home.

In the early 17th century a precarious balance existed between reasons of state and religious sectarianism as principles for international action. A similar balance existed in France between the rights of the King and the particular rights of provinces, localities, classes, and persons. Each balance was tipped toward the first alternative during Richelieu's career. The alignments of European states shifted and their relative power changed. The French political system began to define anew the relation of each social group to the monarchy and thus to other social groups. These historical developments eventually went far beyond Richelieu's plans, but he played a significant part in them.

Armand du Plessis was born on Sept. 9, 1585, in Paris, fourth of the five children of François du Plessis, the lord of Richelieu, and Suzanne de La Porte. His father was provost of the King's central administrative establishment and grand provost of

France under Henry III and conducted the investigation of the King's murderer in 1589; he remained in the same post serving Henry IV but in 1590 died of a fever. His mother, the self-effacing daughter of a learned, vain lawyer prominent in the Paris bourgeoisie, was placed in severe financial difficulties by early widowhood. She moved to the old stone manor house of Richelieu, a few miles east of Loudun in Poitou, to reside with her mother-in-law, a proud noblewoman originally of the Rochechouart family. About 4 years later, Armand returned to Paris to study grammar and philosophy at the College de Navarre, from which he went on to a military academy.

The Du Plessis family's plans appeared to be settled. The eldest son, Henri, was seeking to become established in the entourage of the new queen, Maria de' Medici. The second son, Alphonse, was destined to be bishop of Luçon; the mother received the income of the benefice. But Alphonse declined the nomination and became a Carthusian monk. Armand was designated instead, and in 1603 he began serious study of theology. Younger than the canonical age to become a bishop, he went to Rome for a papal dispensation in 1607 and was consecrated there. He returned to Paris, obtained his degree in theology, and lingered to multiply his acquaintances among clergymen and among the associates of his brother Henri.

Career as Bishop. At the end of 1608 Richelieu arrived in Luçon, then little more than a village amid the marshes, a short distance from the Atlantic and north of La Rochelle. He found it "the most ignoble, mud-covered, unpleasant bishopric in France." He was an assiduous bishop, controlling his canons, carefully choosing parish priests, encouraging the preaching missions of the Capucin monks led by Father Joseph of Paris (François Le Clerc du Tremblay), and, while residing at his priory of Coussay between Loudun and Poitiers, cooperating with other active churchmen.

Richelieu's first important political opportunity came with the convocation of the Estates General in 1614. The clergy of Poitou elected him a deputy. At Maria de Medici's suggestion he was chosen to speak for the clergy as a whole at the last session of the Estates (Feb. 23, 1615). He then went back to Poitou but a year later returned to Paris, served her in negotiations with the Prince of Condé, and was appointed secretary of state for foreign affairs and war. He held the post for only 5 months because Louis XIII seized power in April 1617 and dismissed his mother's councilors. Further steps against them followed, and in 1618 the bishop of Luçon was ordered into exile in the papal city of Avignon.

From Poitou, in 1617, Richelieu had joined in a pamphlet controversy between the King's Jesuit confessor and four Protestant ministers. In *Les Principaux points de la foi de l'église Catholique*, he employed moderate terms and rejected force as a means of conversion. He answered the Protestant ministers on several issues and told them, "You give to the people a power much greater than the one you deny to the pope, which is greatly disadvantageous to kings." In Avignon, in 1618, he finished a catechism he had been preparing in his diocese, *L'Instruction du Chrétien*, a calm, simple explanation of dogma and commandments which makes clear the sovereignty of God by comparing it to the sovereignty of the King.

Among Louis XIII's advisers, Father Joseph and others believed that Richelieu would be a moderating influence on the King's mother. Accordingly the King recalled him from Avignon in March 1619 and ordered him to resume serving her. Thereafter Richelieu's biography merges increasingly with the history of the monarchy. Representing the queen mother that spring, he negotiated an agreement with the King's commissioners that she would reside in Anjou. She designated his brother Henri de Richelieu as governor of the provincial capital; but 7 weeks later Henri was killed in a duel at Angoulême. This event, the personal sorrow of Armand de Richelieu's life, deprived him of a valued political ally.

The queen mother aspired to sit in the King's council. She also wanted the King to obtain Richelieu's nomination as a cardinal; for him this would mean undisputed political eminence, a voice in important decisions of state, and greater security than a bishop could expect. She hoped in the end to control royal policy through the influence Richelieu would exercise as a member of the King's council. These motives played an important part in the threat of an armed uprising in the summer of 1620 and in the tangle of duplicity and argument that ensued, with Richelieu in the role of mediator between the queen mother and her opponents. The resistance of the King and his ministers gradually crumbled. The queen mother was invited into the council at the beginning of 1622; in the following September, the Pope appointed Richelieu a cardinal; finally, the King called Richelieu to his council in April 1624 and designated him chief councilor 3½ months later.

Position as Minister. Richelieu remained the King's principal minister until his death, and he was made a duke in 1631. He was never the only royal adviser, but he gradually built up in the council a group of men, his "creatures," loyal to him as well as to the King. He was never free from potential rivals.

He relied on his family, which he extended by carefully arranging marriages of his nieces and cousins into great families. Thus he used intensively the kind of patron-client relation that had assisted his early career. He made clear that the King was his patron, and he made sure that Louis XIII knew that Richelieu was the King's creature.

From the first, Richelieu encountered a strong current of "devout" Catholic opinion that regarded Protestants everywhere as the enemy or as possible converts and insisted on reforms within France. The queen mother, Maria, the queen consort, Anne, and the keeper of the seals, Michel Marillac, shared that opinion. Richelieu partly satisfied it for a time, negotiating the marriage of the King's sister Henriette to Charles I of England, conducting the siege of the Huguenot city of La Rochelle, and cooperating with Marillac on a program of proposed reforms. But he firmly advised Louis XIII to intervene in northern Italy, against the Spanish king and the Emperor, in order to maintain a foothold on the route between Madrid and Vienna. Over this question the queen mother finally broke with Richelieu in 1630. The King eliminated her clientele and influence from his court.

Opposition to Richelieu and his policies arose also from ambitious, dissatisfied noblemen. This led to plots sanctioned by the King's brother Gaston (1626, 1632, 1636, and 1642), Queen Anne (1633), and a second cousin of the King, the Comte de Soissons (1636 and 1641). These all failed. Three scions of great families were beheaded (the Comte de Chalais in 1626, the Duc de Montmorency in 1632, and the Marquis de Cinq-Mars in 1642).

Foreign Policy. Richelieu gave first priority to foreign policy. He concluded, probably very early, that war against Spain in the long run would be unavoidable. He strove to delay it by encouraging German resistance to the Hapsburg emperor in Vienna, thereby diverting into central Europe the resources and attention of the Hapsburg king in Madrid. In his German policy, he relied heavily on Father Joseph. He subsidized the Dutch Republic and the Swedish warrior king Gustavus Adolphus (Gustavus II) and in 1634 was prepared to aid the Bohemian general A. E. W. von Wallenstein against the Emperor.

From 1635 until his death Richelieu was preoccupied by an overt war against Spain and by the diplomacy it entailed. The fighting occurred principally on the northern and eastern frontiers of France, secondarily on the Mediterranean coast and in the Pyrenees. It was complicated by armed revolts of the populace, especially in western provinces. Richelieu negotiated often with emissaries of Spain but insisted

on French control of Lorraine and French garrisons in northern Italy. The negotiations broke down. The war was still going on when Richelieu died on Dec. 4, 1642.

EWB

Riefenstahl, Leni (1902–), German film director. Leni Riefenstahl achieved fame and notoriety for her propaganda film *Triumph of the Will* and her two part rendition of the 1936 Olympic Games, *Olympia*, both made for Adolf Hitler's Third Reich.

Leni Riefenstahl was one of the most controversial figures in the world of film. A talented and ambitious dancer, actress, and director, she had already made a name for herself in her native Germany and abroad when Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933. She admired him, as he did her, and with his friendship and support became the "movie-queen of Nazi Germany," a position she much enjoyed but could not live down after the fall of the Third Reich. In spite of her energetic attempts to continue as a filmmaker and her protestations that she had done nothing but be an unpolitical artist, she never managed to complete another film. Eventually she turned to still photography, producing two books on the African tribe of the Nuba (*The Last of the Nuba*, 1974, and *The People of Kau*, 1976) and one of underwater pictures (*Coral Gardens*, 1978), for which she learned to scuba dive at the age of 73. These photographs continued her life-long fascination with the beauty and strength of the human body, especially the male, and her early interest in natural life away from modern civilization.

Early Career as Dancer and Actress. Helene Berta Amalie Riefenstahl was born in Berlin on August 22, 1902. Her father, Alfred Riefenstahl, owned a plumbing firm and died in World War II, as did her only brother, Heinz. Early on she decided to become a dancer and received thorough training, both in traditional Russian ballet and in modern dance with Mary Wigman. By 1920 Riefenstahl was a successful dancer touring such cities as Munich, Frankfurt, Prague, Zurich, and Dresden.

She became interested in cinema when she saw one of the then popular mountain films of Arnold Fanck. With characteristic decisiveness and energy she set out to meet Fanck and entice him to offer her the role of a dancer in his *Der heilige Berg* (*The Holy Mountain*, 1926). It was well-received and Riefenstahl made up her mind to stay with the relatively new medium of motion pictures. Over the next seven years she made five more films with Fanck: *Der grosse Sprung* (*The Great Leap*, 1927), *Die weisse Hölle vom Piz Palü* (*The White Hell of Piz Palü*, 1929), *Stürme*

über dem Mont Blanc (*Storms over Mont Blanc*, 1930), *Der weisse Rausch* (*The White Frenzy*, 1931), and *S. O. S. Eisberg* (*S. O. S. Iceberg*, 1933). She also tried acting in another type of film with a different director, but *Das Schicksal derer von Habsburg* (*The Fate of the Hapsburgs*, 1929) turned out to be an unsatisfactory venture. In Fanck's films Riefenstahl was often the only woman in a crew of rugged men who were devoted to getting the beauty and the dangers of the still untouched high mountains (and for *S. O. S. Eisberg*, of the Arctic) onto their action-filled adventure films. Not only did she learn to climb and ski well, she also absorbed all she could about camera work, directing, and editing.

The Blue Light. Eventually Riefenstahl conceived of a different kind of mountain film, more romantic and mystical, in which a woman, played by herself, would be the central character and which she herself would direct. *Das blaue Licht* (*The Blue Light*, 1932) was based on a mountain legend and was shot in remote parts of the Tessin and the Dolomites. It demanded and received a great deal of dedication from those involved, many of whom were former associates of Fanck's who continued to work with her on other films. She also obtained the help of the well-known avant-garde author and film theoretician Bela Balazs, a Marxist and Jew, who collaborated on the script and as assistant director. *The Blue Light* won acclaim abroad, where it received the silver medal at the 1932 Biennale in Venice, and at home, where it also attracted the attention of Hitler.

Films for the Third Reich. When Adolf Hitler came to power he asked Riefenstahl to film that year's Nazi party rally in Nuremberg. *Sieg des Glaubens* (*Victory of Faith*, 1933) has been lost; presumably it was destroyed because it showed party members who were soon afterward liquidated by Hitler. With his power consolidated he wanted Riefenstahl to do the 1934 rally as well, a task she claims to have accepted only after a second "invitation" and the promise of total artistic freedom.

Triumph des Willens (*Triumph of the Will*, 1935) is considered by many to be the propaganda film of all times, even if its director later maintained that all she had made was a documentary. Carefully edited from over 60 hours of film by herself, with concern for rhythm and variety rather than chronological accuracy, it emphasizes the solidarity of the Nazi party, the unity of the German people, and the greatness of their leader who, through composition, cutting, and special camera angles, is given mythical dimensions. Filming Albert Speer's architectural spectacle where

the Nazi icons, swastika, and eagle are displayed prominently and, together with flags, lights, flames, and music, made a powerful appeal to the irrational, emotional side of the viewer, particularly the German of the time. Not surprisingly, the film was awarded the German Film Prize for 1935. But it was also given the International Grand Prix at the 1937 Paris World Exhibition, albeit over the protest of French workers.

Riefenstahl's next film, the short *Tag der Freiheit: Unsere Wehrmacht* (*Day of Freedom: Our Armed Forces*, 1935) was in a way a sequel, shot to placate the German Armed Forces, who were not at all pleased about having received little attention in *Triumph of the Will*.

Another major assignment from Hitler followed: to shoot the 1936 Olympic Games held in Germany. *Olympia*, Part 1: *Fest der Völker* (*Festival of Nations*) and Part 2: *Fest der Schönheit* (*Festival of Beauty*) premiered in 1938, again to great German and also international acclaim. Elaborate and meticulous preparation, technical inventiveness, and 18 months of laborious editing helped Riefenstahl elevate sports photography—until then a matter for newsreels only—to a level of art seldom achieved. From the naked dancers in the opening sequence and the emphasis upon the African American athlete Jesse Owens to the striking diving and steeplechase scenes, the film celebrated the beauty of the human form in motion in feats of strength and endurance.

Immediately after completing *The Blue Light* Riefenstahl had made plans to film *Tiefeland* (*Lowlands*), a project that was to be interrupted by illness, Hitler's assignments, and the war. When it was finished in 1954 all fire had gone out of this tale of innocence and corruption, high mountains and lowlands, based on the opera by the Czech Eugene d'Albert. Many of Riefenstahl's other projects, most notably her plan to do a film on Penthisilea, the Amazon queen, were never completed at all. This was due partly to the fact that she was a woman in a man's profession but mostly to the war and the choices she made under the Nazis and for them. Ultimately, all her work, in spite of the great talent and dedication it so clearly demonstrates, is tainted by the readiness and skill with which she put her art at the service of the Third Reich, no matter whether it was from conviction, political naivete, ambition, or, most likely, a combination of all three.

In 1993, when she was 91 years old, German director Ray Mueller made a film biography (*The Wonderful, Horrible Life of Leni Riefenstahl*). The release of the film coincided with the English translation of her autobiography *Leni Riefenstahl: A Biography*. In both the film and the book, Riefenstahl claims her

innocence and mistreatment, never realizing the effect that her films had on promoting the Nazi cause. Ray Muller was quoted in (*Time Magazine*) as declaring “she is still a 30’s diva, after all and not accustomed to being crossed. By the second day, I was asking prickly questions and she was having choleric fits.” In his review of the film, *New York Times* film critic Vincent Canby concluded “Ms. Riefenstahl doesn’t come across as an especially likable character which is to her credit and Mr. Muller’s. She is beyond likability. She is too complex, too particular and too arrogant to be seen as either sympathetic or unsympathetic. There’s the suspicion that she had always had arrogance and that it, backed up by her singular talent, is what helped to shape her wonderful and horrible life.”

EWB

Robespierre, Maximilien François Marie Isidore de (1758–1794), French Revolutionary leader. Maximilien de Robespierre was the spokesman for the policies of the dictatorial government that ruled France during the crisis brought on by civil and foreign war.

Maximilien de Robespierre was an early proponent of political democracy. His advanced ideas concerning the application of the revolutionary principle of equality won for him the fervent support of the lower middle and working classes (the *sans-culottes*) and a firm place later in the 19th century in the pantheon of European radical and revolutionary heroes. These ideas and the repressive methods used to implement and defend them, which came to be called the Reign of Terror, and his role as spokesman for this radical and violent phase of the French Revolution also won for him the opprobrium of conservative opponents of the Revolution ever since.

Career before the Revolution. Robespierre was born on May 6, 1758, in the French provincial city of Arras. He was educated first in that city and then at the Collège Louis-le-Grand in Paris. Upon completing his studies with distinction, he took up his father’s profession of law in Arras and soon had a successful practice. But he had developed a sense of social justice, and as the Revolution of 1789 loomed, he assumed a public role as an advocate of political change, contributing to the pamphlet and *cahier* literature of the day, and being elected at the age of 30 a member of the Third Estate delegation from Arras to the Estates General, where he quickly associated himself with the Patriot party.

Role in Early Revolution. During the first period of the Revolution (1789–1791), in which the Estates General became the National (or Constituent

Assembly, Robespierre spoke frequently in that body. But his extremely democratic ideas, his emphasis on civil liberty and equality, his uncompromising rigidity in applying these ideas to the issues of the moment, and his hostility to all authority won him little support in this moderate legislature. He favored giving the vote to all men, not just property owners, and he opposed slavery in the colonies. On both of these issues he lost, being ahead of his time.

Robespierre found more receptive listeners at the Paris Jacobin Club, where throughout his career he had a devoted following that admired him not only for his radical political views but perhaps even more for his simple Spartan life and high sense of personal morality, which won for him the appellation of “the Incorruptible.” His appearance was unprepossessing, and his old-fashioned, prerevolutionary style of dress seemed out of place. He lacked the warmth of personality usually associated with a popular political figure. Yet his carefully written and traditionally formal speeches, because of his utter sincerity and deep personal conviction, won him a wide following.

When his term as a legislator ended in September 1791, Robespierre remained in Paris, playing an influential role in the Jacobin Club and shortly founding a weekly political journal. During this period (1791–1792) he was an unremitting critic of the King and the moderates who hoped to make the experiment in limited, constitutional monarchy a success. Robespierre, profoundly and rightly suspicious of the King’s intentions, spoke and wrote in opposition to the course of events, until August 1792, when events turned in his favor with the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the First French Republic.

Period in Power. A Convention was quickly elected to perform the task of drafting a constitution, this time for a democratic republic, and to govern the country in the meantime. Robespierre was elected a member for Paris. As a spokesman for the Mountain, the radical Jacobin faction in the Convention, he played a prominent role in the successive controversies that developed. He was an uncompromising antagonist of the deposed king, who was finally placed on trial, convicted, and executed in January 1793.

The moderate Girondin faction had incurred the enmity of Robespierre and the leaders of the Mountain in the process, and for this and other reasons, both personal and political, there followed months of bitter controversy, climaxed by the victory of the Robespierist faction, aided by the intervention of the Parisian *sans-culottes*, with the expulsion from the Convention and arrest of the Girondins (June 2,

1793) and the execution shortly thereafter of their leaders.

The dual crises of foreign war, in which most of Europe was now fighting against the Revolutionary government in France, and civil war, which threatened to overthrow that government, had led to the creation of the crisis machinery of government, the Reign of Terror. The central authority in this government was the Committee of Public Safety. For the crucial months from mid-1793 to mid-1794 Robespierre was one of the dominant members of and the spokesman for this dictatorial body. Under their energetic leadership the crisis was successfully surmounted, and by the spring of 1794 the threat of civil war had been ended and the French army was winning decisive victories.

Political controversy had continued, however, as Robespierre, having prevailed against the moderate Girondins, now faced new opposition on both the left and the right. The Hébertists, a radical faction that controlled the Paris city government and was particularly responsive to the grievances of the *sans-culottes* concerning wartime shortages and inflation, actively campaigned for rigorous economic controls, which Robespierre opposed. Nor could he support their vigorous anti-Christian campaign and atheistic Religion of Reason. Robespierre and his colleagues on the committee saw them as a threat, and in March 1794 the Hébertist leaders and their allies were tried and executed.

Two weeks later came the turn of the Indulgents, or Dantonists, the moderate Jacobins who, now that the military crisis was ended, felt that the Terror should be relaxed. Georges Jacques Danton, a leading Jacobin and once a close associate of Robespierre, was the most prominent of this group. Robespierre was inflexible, and Danton and those accused with him were convicted and guillotined.

Robespierre and his associates, who included his brother Augustin and his young disciple Louis de Saint-Just, were now in complete control of the national government and seemingly of public opinion. He thus could impose his own ideas concerning the ultimate aims of the Revolution. For him the proper government for France was not simply one based on sovereignty of the people with a democratic franchise, which had been achieved. The final goal was a government based on ethical principles, a Republic of Virtue. He and those of his associates who were truly virtuous would impose such a government, using the machinery of the Terror, which had been streamlined, at Robespierre's insistence, for the purpose. Coupled with this was to be an officially established religion of

the Supreme Being, which Robespierre inaugurated in person.

Downfall and Execution. Opposition arose from a variety of sources. There were disaffected Jacobins who had no interest in such a program and had good reason to fear the imposition of such high ethical principles. More and more of the public, now that the military crisis was past, wanted a relaxation, not a heightening, of the Terror. The crisis came in late July 1794. Robespierre spoke in the Convention in vague but threatening terms of the need for another purge in pursuit of his utopian goals. His opponents responded by taking the offensive against him, and on July 27 (9 Thermidor by the Revolutionary calendar) they succeeded in voting his arrest. He and his colleagues were quickly released, however, and they gathered at the city hall to plan a rising of the Parisian *sans-culottes* against the Convention, such as had prevailed on previous occasions. But the opposition leaders rallied their forces and late that night captured Robespierre and his supporters. In the process Robespierre's jaw was fractured by a bullet, probably from his own hand. Having been declared outlaws, they were guillotined the next day. With this event began the period of the Thermidorian Reaction, during which the Terror was ended and France returned to a more moderate government.

EWB

Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1712–1778), Swiss-born philosopher, author, political theorist, and composer. Jean Jacques Rousseau ranks as one of the greatest figures of the French Enlightenment.

Both Jean Jacques Rousseau the man and his writings constitute a problem for anyone who wants to grasp his thought and to understand his life. He claimed that his work presented a coherent outlook; yet many critics have found only contradictions and passionate outbursts of rhetoric.

For Rousseau's biographers the man himself has been as puzzling as his work—a severe moralist who lived a dangerously “relaxed” life, a misanthrope who loved humanity, a cosmopolitan who prided himself on being a “citizen of Geneva,” a writer for the stage who condemned the theater, and a man who became famous by writing essays that denounced culture. In addition to these anomalies, his biographers have had to consider his confessed sexual “peculiarities”—his lifelong habit of masturbation, his exhibitionism, his youthful pleasure in being beaten, his 33-year liaison with a virtual illiterate, and his numerous affairs—and, characteristic of his later years, his persecution suspicions that reached neurotic intensity.

Three major periods characterize Rousseau's life. The first (1712–1750) culminated in the succès de scandale of his *Discours sur les sciences et les arts*. The second (1750–1762) saw the publication of his closely related major works: *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1761), *L'Émile* (1762), and *Du contrat social* (1762). The last period (1762–1778) found Rousseau an outcast, hounded from country to country, his books condemned and burned, and a personage, respected and with influential friends. The *Confessions*, *Dialogues*, and *Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire* date from this period.

Youth, 1712–1750. Rousseau was the second child of a strange marriage. His mother, Suzanne Bernard, had at the age of 33 married Isaac Rousseau, a man less wellborn than she. Isaac, exhausted perhaps by his frequent quarrels over money with his mother-in-law, left his wife in 1705 for Constantinople. He returned to Suzanne in September 1711. Jean Jacques was born on June 28, 1712, at Geneva, Switzerland. Nine days later his mother died.

At the age of 3, Jean Jacques was reading and weeping over French novels with his father. From Isaac's sister the boy acquired his passion for music. His father fled Geneva to avoid imprisonment when Jean Jacques was 10. By the time he was 13, his formal education had ended. Apprenticed to a notary public, he was soon dismissed as fit only for watchmaking. Apprenticed again, this time to an engraver, Rousseau spent 3 wretched years in hateful servitude, which he abandoned when he found himself unexpectedly locked out of the city by its closed gates. He faced the world with no visible assets and no obvious talents.

Rousseau found himself on Palm Sunday, 1728, in Annecy at the house of Louise Eleonore, Baronne de Warens. She sent him to a hospice for catechumens in Turin, where among "the biggest sluts and the most disgusting trollops who ever defiled the fold of the Lord," he embraced the Roman Catholic faith. His return to Madame de Warens in 1729 initiated a strange alliance between a 29-year-old woman of the world and a sensitive 17-year-old youth.

Rousseau lived under her roof off and on for 13 years and was dominated by her influence. He became her *Petit*; she was his *Maman*. Charming and clever, a born speculator, Madame de Warens was a woman who lived by her wits. She supported him; she found him jobs, most of which he regarded as uncongenial. A friend, after examining the lad, informed her that he might aspire to become a village curé but nothing more. Still Rousseau read, studied, and reflected. He pursued music and gave lessons. For a time he was a not too successful tutor.

First Publications and Operas. In 1733, disturbed by the advances made to Rousseau by the mother of one of his music pupils, Madame de Warens offered herself to him. Rousseau became her lover: "I felt as if I had been guilty of incest." The sojourn with Madame de Warens was over by 1742. Though she had taken other lovers and he had enjoyed other escapades, Rousseau was still devoted to her. He thought that the scheme of musical notation he had developed would make his fortune in Paris and thus enable him to save her from financial ruin. But his journey to Paris took Rousseau out of her life. He saw her only once again, in 1754. Reduced to begging and the charity of her neighbors, Madame de Warens died destitute in 1762.

Rousseau's scheme for musical notation, published in 1743 as *Dissertation sur la musique moderne*, brought him neither fame nor fortune only a letter of commendation from the Académie des Sciences. But his interest in music spurred him to write two operas *Les Muses galantes* (1742) and *Le Devin du village* (1752) and permitted him to write articles on music for Denis Diderot's *Encyclopédie*; the *Lettre sur la musique française*, which embroiled him in a quarrel with the Paris Opéra (1753); and the *Dictionnaire de musique*, published in 1767.

From September 1743 until August 1744 Rousseau served as secretary to the French ambassador to Venice. He experienced at firsthand the stupidity of officialdom and began to see how institutions lend their authority to injustice and oppression in the name of peace and order. Rousseau spent the remaining years before his success with his first *Discours* in Paris, where he lived from hand to mouth the life of a struggling intellectual.

In March 1745 Rousseau began a liaison with Thérèse Le Vasseur. She was 24 years old, a maid at Rousseau's lodgings. She remained with him for the rest of his life—as mistress, housekeeper, mother of his children, and finally, in 1768, as his wife. He portrayed her as devoted and unselfish, although many of his friends saw her as a malevolent gossip and troublemaker who exercised a baleful influence on his suspicions and dislikes. Not an educated woman—Rousseau himself cataloged her malapropisms—she nonetheless possessed the uncommon quality of being able to offer stability to a man of volatile intensity. They had five children—though some biographers have questioned whether any of them were Rousseau's. Apparently he regarded them as his own even though he abandoned them to the foundling hospital. Rousseau had no means to educate them, and he reasoned that they would be better raised as workmen and peasants by the state.

By 1749 Diderot had become a sympathetic friend, and Rousseau regarded him as a kindred spirit. The publication of Diderot's *Lettre sur les aveugles* had resulted in his imprisonment at Vincennes. While walking to Vincennes to visit Diderot, Rousseau read an announcement of a prize being offered by the Dijon Academy for the best essay on the question: has progress of the arts and sciences contributed more to the corruption or to the purification of morals?

Years of Fruition, 1750–1762. Rousseau won the prize of the Dijon Academy with his *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* and became "l'homme du jour." His famous rhetorical "attack" on civilization called forth 68 articles defending the arts and sciences. Though he himself regarded this essay as "the weakest in argument and the poorest in harmony and proportion" of all his works, he nonetheless believed that it sounded one of his essential themes; the arts and sciences, instead of liberating men and increasing their happiness, have for the most part shackled men further. "Necessity erected thrones; the arts and sciences consolidated them," he wrote.

The *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité des hommes*, written in response to the essay competition proposed by the Dijon Academy in 1753 (but which did not win the prize), elaborated this theme still further. The social order of civilized society, wrote Rousseau, introduced inequality and unhappiness. This social order rests upon private property. The man who first enclosed a tract of land and called it his own was the true founder of civilized society. "Don't listen to that imposture; you are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to everyone and the earth to no one," he wrote. Man's greatest ills, said Rousseau, are not natural but made by man himself; the remedy lies also within man's power. Heretofore, man has used his wit and art not to alter his wretchedness but only to intensify it.

Three Major Works. Rousseau's novel *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1761) attempted to portray in fiction the sufferings and tragedy that foolish education and arbitrary social conventions work among sensitive creatures. Rousseau's two other major treatises, *L'Émile ou de l'éducation* (1762) and *Du contrat social* (1762) undertook the more difficult task of constructing an education and a social order that would enable men to be natural and free; that is, that would enable men to recognize no bondage except the bondage of natural necessity. To be free in this sense, said Rousseau, was to be happy.

Rousseau brought these three works to completion in somewhat trying circumstances. After having

returned to the Protestant fold in 1755 and having regained his citizenship of Geneva that same year, Rousseau accepted the rather insistent offer of Madame Louise d'Épinay to install Thérèse and himself in the Hermitage, a small cottage on the d'Épinay estate at Montmorency. While Rousseau was working on his novel there, its heroine materialized in the person of Sophie, Comtesse d'Houdetot; and he fell passionately in love with her. He was 44 years old; Sophie was 27, married to a dullard, the mistress of the talented and dashing Marquis Saint-Lambert, and the sister-in-law of Rousseau's hostess. Rousseau was swept off his feet. Their relationship apparently was never consummated; Sophie pitied Rousseau and loved Saint-Lambert. But Madame d'Épinay and her paramour, Melchior Grimm, meddled in the affair; Diderot was drawn into the business. Rousseau felt that his reputation had been blackened, and a bitter estrangement resulted. Madame d'Épinay insulted Rousseau until he left the Hermitage in December 1757. However, he remained in Montmorency until 1762, when the condemnation of *L'Émile* forced him to flee from France.

La Nouvelle Héloïse appeared in Paris in January 1761. Originally entitled *Lettres de deux amants, habitants d'une petite ville au pied des Alpes*, the work was structurally a novel in letters, after the fashion of the English author Samuel Richardson. The originality of the novel won it hostile reviews, but its romantic eroticism made it immensely popular with the public. It remained a best seller until the French Revolution.

The notoriety of *La Nouvelle Héloïse* was nothing compared to the storm produced by *L'Émile* and *Du contrat social*. Even today the ideas promulgated in these works are revolutionary. Their expression, especially in *L'Émile*, in a style both readable and alluring made them dangerous. *L'Émile* was condemned by the Paris Parlement and denounced by the archbishop of Paris. Both of the books were burned by the authorities in Geneva.

L'Émile and Du contrat social. *L'Émile ou de l'éducation* remains one of the world's greatest speculative treatises on education. However, Rousseau wrote to a correspondent who tried to follow *L'Émile* literally, "so much the worse for you!" The work was intended as illustrative of an educational program rather than prescriptive of every practical detail of a proper education. Its overarching spirit is best sensed in opposition to John Locke's essay on education. Locke taught that man should be educated to the station for which he is intended. There should be one education for a prince, another for a physician, and still another for a farmer. Rousseau advocated one education for

all. Man should be educated to be a man, not to be a doctor, lawyer, or priest. Nor is a child merely a little man; he is, rather, a developing creature, with passions and powers that vary according to his stage of development. What must be avoided at all costs is the master-slave mode of instruction, with the pupil as either master or slave, for the medium of instruction is far more influential than any doctrine taught through that medium. Hence, an education resting merely on a play of wills—as when the child learns only to please the instructor or when the teacher “teaches” by threatening the pupil with a future misfortune—produces creatures fit to be only masters or slaves, not free men. Only free men can realize a “natural social order,” wherein men can live happily.

A few of the striking doctrines set forth in *L'Émile* are: the importance of training the body before the mind, learning first through “things” and later through words, teaching first only that for which a child feels a need so as to impress upon him that thought is a tool whereby he can effectively manage things, motivating a child by catering to his ruling passion of greed, refraining from moral instruction until the awakening of the sexual urge, and raising the child outside the doctrines of any church until late adolescence and then instructing him in the religion of conscience. Although Rousseau’s principles have never been fully put into practice, his influence on educational reformers has been tremendous.

L'Émile’s companion master work, *Du contrat social*, attempted to spell out the social relation that a properly educated man—a free man—bears to other free men. This treatise is a difficult and subtle work of a penetrating intellect fired by a great passion for humanity. The liberating fervor of the work, however, is easily caught in the key notions of popular sovereignty and general will. Government is not to be confused with sovereignty of the people or with the social order that is created by the social contract. The government is an intermediary set up between the people as law followers and the people as law creators, the sovereignty. Furthermore, the government is an instrument created by the citizens through their collective action expressed in the general will. The purpose of this instrument is to serve the people by seeing to it that laws expressive of the general will of the citizens are in fact executed. In short, the government is the servant of the people, not their master. And further, the sovereignty of the people—the general will of the people—is to be found not merely in the will of the majority or in the will of all but rather in the will as enlightened by right judgment.

As with *L'Émile*, *Du contrat social* is a work best understood as elaborating the principles of the social

order rather than schematizing the mechanism for those general principles. Rousseau’s political writings more concerned with immediate application include his *Considérations sur le gouvernement de la Pologne* (1772) and his incomplete *Projet de constitution pour la Corse*, published posthumously in 1862.

Other writings from Rousseau’s middle period include the *Encyclopédie* article *Économie politique* (1755); *Lettre sur la Providence* (1756), a reply to Voltaire’s poem on the Lisbon earthquake; *Lettre à d’Alembert sur les spectacles* (1758); *Essai sur l’origine des langues* (1761); and four autobiographical *Lettres à Malesherbes* (1762).

Exile and Apologetics, 1762–1778. Forced to flee from France, Rousseau sought refuge at Yverdon in the territory of Bern. Expelled by the Bernese authorities, he found asylum in Môtiers, a village in the Prussian principality of Neuchâtel. Here in 1763 he renounced his Genevan citizenship. The publication of his *Lettres écrites de la montagne* (1764), in which he defended *L'Émile* and criticized “established” reformed churches, aroused the wrath of the Neuchâtel clergy. His house was stoned, and Rousseau fled to the isle of St. Pierre in the Lake of Biel, but he was again expelled by the Bernese. Finally, through the good offices of the British philosopher David Hume, he settled at Wotton, Derbyshire, England, in 1766. Hume managed to obtain from George III a yearly pension for Rousseau. But Rousseau, falsely believing Hume to be in league with his Parisian and Genevan enemies, not only refused the pension but also openly broke with the philosopher. Henceforth, Rousseau’s sense of persecution became ever more intense, even at times hysterical.

Rousseau returned to France in June 1767 under the protection of the Prince de Conti. Wandering from place to place, he at last settled in 1770 in Paris. There he made a living, as he often had in the past, by copying music. By December 1770 the *Confessions*, upon which he had been working since 1766, was completed, and he gave readings from this work at various private homes. Madame d’Épinay, fearing an unflattering picture of herself and her friends, intervened; the readings were forbidden by the police. Disturbed by the reaction to his readings and determined to justify himself before the world, Rousseau wrote *Dialogues ou Rousseau, Juge de Jean-Jacques* (1772–1776). Fearful lest the manuscript fall into the hands of his enemies, he attempted to place it on the high altar of Notre Dame. Thwarted in this attempt, he left a copy with the philosopher Étienne Condillac and, not wholly trusting him, with an English acquaintance, Brooke Boothby. Finally, in 1778 Rous-

seau entrusted copies of both the *Confessions* and the *Dialogues* to his friend Paul Moulto. His last work, *Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire*, begun in 1776 and unfinished at his death, records how Rousseau, an outcast from society, recaptured “serenity, tranquility, peace, even happiness.”

In May 1778 Rousseau accepted Marquis de Girardin’s hospitality at Ermenonville near Paris. There, with Thérèse at his bedside, he died on July 2, 1778, probably from uremia. From birth he had suffered from a bladder deformation. From 1748 onward his condition had grown worse. His adoption of the Armenian mode of dress was due to the embarrassment caused by this affliction, and it is not unlikely that much of his suspicious irritability can be traced to the same malady. Rousseau was buried on the île des Peupliers at Ermenonville. In October 1794 his remains were transferred to the Panthéon in Paris. Thérèse, surviving him by 22 years, died in 1801 at the age of 80.

EWB

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Sade, Donatien Alphonse François, comte de (1740–1814), French writer of psychological and philosophical works. The Marquis de Sade has been traditionally viewed as the greatest incarnation of evil that ever lived. However, new interpretations of his life and writings have begun to appear. It is now generally agreed that despite his reputation, his works, which were ignored for over a century, must be considered as of the first rank. Sade has been termed the “most absolute writer who has ever lived.”

Born on June 2, 1740, to Marie Elénore de Maille de Carman, lady-in-waiting to and relative of the Princess de Condé, and Jean Baptiste Joseph François, Comte de Sade, who traced his ancestry to the chaste Laura of Petrarch’s poems, the Marquis de Sade may be the most typical and the most unusual representative of the other side of the Enlightenment, the side at which the *philosophes* railed.

Very little is known of Sade’s life. He graduated from the Collège Louis-le-Grand, was commissioned as a coronet in the French army, and later sold his commission. He was forced to marry the eldest daughter of a leading magisterial family, Renée Pélégie de Montreuil, who bore him three children. Because of his libertinage, which included the seduction of and elopement with his wife’s sister, Anne Prospère, he incurred the unending enmity of his mother-in-law, who eventually had him imprisoned in 1781. Sade had tasted imprisonment before for libertinage and

indebtedness, and he spent half of his adult life in prisons and asylums. Only three public scandals can be proved against him, and none of these seems to merit the punishment meted out to him, reinforcing his claim that he was an unjust victim of his reputation and others’ hatreds.

During the Revolution, Sade was released from prison, served as secretary and president of the Piques section of Paris, and represented it at least once before the National Convention, where he addressed a pamphlet calling for the abolition of capital punishment and the enfranchisement of women. His attitudes and actions gained the hatred of Maximilien de Robespierre, who had him imprisoned (1793). He was saved only by the death of the “Incorruptible.” Released in 1794, Sade was arrested in 1801 for being the supposed author of a scandalous pamphlet against Napoleon. He spent the rest of his life at Charenton insane asylum, where he died on Dec. 8, 1814. His best-known books include *Justine; ou, Les Malheurs de la vertu* (1791) and its sequel, *Histoire de Juliette; ou, Les Prospérités du vice* (1797).

Thus the life of the Marquis de Sade. Who was he? Why did he acquire the unique reputation he possesses? There are no simple answers regarding the life of any man. For Sade, there is possibly no answer at all. Works on his life have justly sought answers in his literary works, and because of this most commentators tend to psychoanalyze him. Although many of these works have offered brilliant insights into the character of the man, none of them is definitive and most treat him out of context, as though his life and aberrations were apart from life. Most Sadean scholars tend to agree that his hostility to religion, to the established social and political order, and to the despotism of existing law was similar in many ways to that of the *philosophes*. Some writers believe that he carried the beliefs of the *philosophes* to the rational conclusions, which in the end negated the conclusions and opened for succeeding generations a moral abyss. Others focus on what is termed a philosophy of destruction found in Sade’s writings. Sade’s atheism is viewed as the first element in a dialectic which destroys divinity through sacrilege and blasphemy and raises to preeminence an indifferent and unfolding nature which destroys to create and creates to destroy. Nature itself is then destroyed by being constantly outraged because it takes on the same sovereign character as God. What emerges is the “Unique One,” the man who rises above nature and arrogates to himself the creative and destructive capacities of nature in an extreme form, becoming solitary, alone, unique in the conscious awareness that he is the creative force and all others are but the material through which his energy is expressed.

EWB

Saint-Just, Louis Antoine Léon de (1767–1794), radical political leader during the French Revolution and member of the ruling Jacobin group in Paris during the Reign of Terror.

Louis de Saint-Just was born on Aug. 25, 1767, in Decize, the son of an army officer. After a period of schooling, he ran away from home to Paris, taking with him part of the family silver. He studied law for a time and also published a burlesque epic which was a mixture of the crudely erotic and of sharp criticism of the government and society of his day.

When the Revolution broke out in 1789, the youthful Saint-Just gave it his enthusiastic support, and he published in 1791 *The Spirit of the Revolution and of the Constitution of France*. He was too young to be elected to the Legislative Assembly that year, but in September 1792 he was elected a member of the Convention, whose task it was, now that the King had been deposed, to draft a new constitution and to govern France in the meantime. Saint-Just, handsome, proud, and self-possessed, spoke with the zeal of a dedicated revolutionist. He ruthlessly and brilliantly urged the trial and execution of the King; he participated actively in drafting the Constitution of 1793; and in the feverish atmosphere of foreign and civil war, he became the spokesman for the Jacobins in demanding the death of their moderate opponents, the Girondins.

In June 1793 Saint-Just became a member of the Committee of Public Safety, the executive body that ruled France in dictatorial fashion, using the so-called Reign of Terror as a means of repressing opposition. In October he was sent as a representative to the Army of the Rhine in Strasbourg, where the war was going badly and factionalism and opposition to the government in Paris were at their height. He was twice sent on similar missions to the Army of the North.

Back in Paris, Saint-Just defended the Terror in speeches and proposed a redistribution of the property of the disloyal rich, a plan that was never implemented. As spokesman for the Robespierist faction, he denounced the extremist Hébertists; he also denounced Georges Jacques Danton and the Indulgents; and each time the objects of his scorn were sent to the guillotine.

Although a determined terrorist, Saint-Just was also an idealist. His unpublished *Fragments concerning Republican Institutions* reveals his Rousseauistic and Spartan utopianism. He and Robespierre were determined to fashion a new France, a “Republic of Virtue,” and for that goal the continuation of the Terror was essential. But a moderate trend had begun, prompted in part by the military victory of Fleurus,

to which Saint-Just had contributed during his last mission to the army. For this and other reasons, a fatal split took place.

Saint-Just prepared a report denouncing his and Robespierre’s opponents, to be delivered to the Convention on July 27, 1794. But he was interrupted by the opposition, and he, Robespierre, and their colleagues were arrested. Released by their supporters, they gathered at the city hall, hoping to prevail over their enemies with the aid of the Parisian populace. But shortly after midnight they were captured and executed. Saint-Just’s youthful beauty and his terrible virtue have earned him the sobriquet of “archangel of the Revolution.”

EWB

Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de (1760–1825), French social philosopher and reformer. Saint-Simon was one of the founders of modern industrial socialism and evolutionary sociology.

The Comte de Saint-Simon was born in Paris to the poorer side of a prominent noble family. From childhood on he was filled with great ambitions that took him on many different paths. First commissioned into the army at 17, he served 4 years, during which he fought with some distinction in the American Revolution.

On his return to Europe, Saint-Simon tried a series of bold commercial ventures but had limited success before the French Revolution. During the Terror of 1793–1794 he was imprisoned for a year and barely escaped execution. This experience left him deeply opposed to revolutionary violence. After his release, for a short time he obtained a sizable fortune by speculating in confiscated properties, which he spent on a lavish Paris salon that attracted many intellectual and government leaders. But his funds were soon exhausted, and he lived his remaining years in constant financial difficulties.

In 1802 Saint-Simon turned to a new career as writer and reformer. In numerous essays and brochures written during the chaotic years of Napoleon’s rule and the Bourbon restoration that followed, he developed a broad-ranging program for the reorganization of Europe. Although many of its ideas were commonplace, his program is distinctive for its blending of Enlightenment ideals, the more practical materialism of the rising bourgeoisie, and the emphasis on spiritual unity of restorationists.

All three strands are joined in Saint-Simon’s evolutionary view of history as a determined progression from one stable form of civilization to another, which gave his program a distinctive rationale. Each higher form was thought to be based on more ad-

vanced “spiritual” as well as “temporal” (that is, political-economic) principles, reflecting a more general process of cultural enlightenment. But each in turn also is destined to become obsolete as further cultural progress occurs.

Saint-Simon argued that all of Europe had been in a transitional crisis since the 15th century, when the established medieval order (based on feudalism and Catholicism) began to give way to a new system founded on industry and science. He wrote as the new system’s advocate, urging influential leaders to hasten its inception as the only way to restore stability. In this he was one of the first ameliorators to argue for reform as an evolutionary necessity.

Saint-Simon’s earlier writings, during Napoleon’s reign (*Introduction aux travaux scientifiques du XIX siècle*, 1807–1808; and *Mémoire sur la science de l’homme*, 1813), stress the spiritual side of the transitional crisis. He argued that disorder was rampant because theistic Roman Catholicism, the spiritual basis of medieval society, was being undermined by the rise of science and secular philosophies. Although the trend was inevitable, Saint-Simon was highly critical of many scientists and intellectuals for their “negativism” in breaking down an established creed without providing a replacement. Instead, he called for the creation of an integrative social science, grounded in biology, to help establish a new “positive” credo for secular man in the emerging social order. This “positivistic” notion was developed by his one-time disciple Auguste Comte.

After Napoleon’s downfall Saint-Simon shifted his attention from the ideology of the new system to its temporal structure and policies in a series of periodicals: *L’Industrie* (1816–1818); *La Politique* (1819); *L’Organisateur* (1819–1820); and *Du Système industriel* (1821–1822). These contain his main socialist writings, but his doctrines often are closer to venture capitalism and technocracy than to Marxism or primitive communalism. Saint-Simon’s future society is above all one of productive achievement in which poverty and war are eliminated through large-scale “industrialization” (a word he coined) under planned scientific guidance. It is an open-class society in which caste privileges are abolished, work is provided for all, and rewards are based on merit. Government also changes from a haphazard system of class domination and national rivalries to a planned welfare state run by scientific managers in the public interest.

Saint-Simon’s final work, *Le Nouveau Christianisme* (1825), inspired a Christian socialist movement called the Saint-Simonians, who were devoted to a secular gospel of economic progress and human brotherhood. After his death, his ideas were reworked by

followers into the famous *Doctrine de Saint-Simon* (1829). This was the first systematic exposition of industrial socialism, and it had great influence on the Social Democratic movement, Catholic reforms, and Marxism.

EWB

Salazar, António de Oliveira (1889–1970), Portuguese statesman. The government of António de Oliveira Salazar once was considered to be the very model of a modern authoritarian political system.

António de Oliveira Salazar was born on April 28, 1889, in Vimieiro near Santa Comba Dão in the province of Beira Alta. His parents, owners of several small estates, as well as innkeepers, were António de Oliveira and Maria de Resgate Salazar, who, despite financial problems, saw to it that Salazar was well educated. He entered the seminary of Viseu in 1900, but after 8 years of religious training he decided to teach. In 1910 he began to study economics at the University of Coimbra, spending 4 years there as a student and another 7 as an economics professor. He obtained a chair of political economy in 1918. A knowledge of economics was valuable in underdeveloped Portugal, and soon Salazar was well known by the government for his monetary skills.

The emergence of Salazar as a national figure came at a difficult moment in Portuguese history. After more than a century of economic difficulties tied to imperial decline, political life had degenerated badly. The double assassination of Carlos I and the crown prince in February 1908 and the overthrow of Manuel II in October 1910 had led to creation of a republic which in the 16 years of its existence went from crisis to crisis. The University of Coimbra furnished many republican leaders in the first phase of the period, but spread of a deeper radicalism engendered a conservative reaction led by António Sardinha. He sought an “organic monarchy” that would be traditionalist and antiparliamentary, but chaos prevented any success.

Economic Policies. In the stalemate after 1918 Salazar’s star rose. His economic thought was strongly influenced by Catholic corporatism and Leo XIII’s *Rerum novarum*. He favored joint labor-management industrial commissions, compulsory arbitration, and Catholic trade unions. In January 1921 Salazar was one of three Catholic deputies elected to the Parliament, but turmoil was still so great that he attended only a few sessions before returning to the university. However, in May 1926, when a military dictatorship overthrew the republic, Salazar was offered the Ministry of Economic Affairs. He refused

the position until 1928, when he received great powers which made him the most important figure in the government.

Salazar's reforms brought some national stability by prohibiting the import of foreign goods, cutting the state budget, and developing a new tax system. Soon he turned to a revision of the structure of government itself. "In an administrative system in which lack of sincerity and clarity were evident," he said, "the first requirement is a policy of truth. In a social order in which rights were competitive and unaccompanied by equivalent duties, the crying need is for a policy of sacrifice. And in a nation divided against itself by groups and clashing interests which threatened its unity, the main need is a national policy."

Ruler of Portugal. The national policy emerged during 1929 in the wake of Portugal's new-found stability, when Salazar's reforms stood the test of the Depression. The military leaders of the dictatorship no longer had as much prestige or interest in ruling, and Salazar informally became the strongest man in the regime. He immediately began to write a new constitution which was approved by plebiscite on March 19, 1933. It created a corporative state divided by levels into *sindicatos* (government unions by industry), *gremios* (guilds of employers), and *ordens* (white-collar organizations). Each of these handled welfare arrangements, employment of their members, and vocational training and negotiated national wage agreements. Each was also guided by special government secretariats that dictated policy. A fourth level was made up by the armed forces, although here there was more autonomy in honor of the role played by the services in establishing the new regime. All four levels elected representatives who then chose deputies for the national Parliament, giving the franchise to the corporative institutions rather than to the national electorate, a variation of the indirect franchise. Salazar's motto was "control by stability," which was facilitated further by the provision that only his National Union party had official status. The president of the party became president of the republic with enormous executive powers, not the least being control of the newly established secret police, the PIDE.

Much of this structure had been modeled on Mussolini's Italy, and Salazar remained diplomatically close to Mussolini in the 1930s. He intrigued several times against the Spanish Republic, and when the Civil War broke out in Spain, he recognized Franco's Nationalists in December 1937. Portugal supplied funds and arms to the Burgos government until the end of the war, and on March 17, 1939, a pact of friendship and nonaggression was signed between the

two countries which pledged eternal opposition to communism and created an "Iberian bloc" linking them together against outside attack. For Portugal it was the first time since 1640 that it had cooperated directly with Spain, but even so Salazar was restrained by long-standing treaties with Great Britain, which kept him from closer cooperation with either Franco or Mussolini. Portugal, as a result, remained correctly neutral during World War II until 1943, when Salazar granted the Allies bases in Portuguese territory. His anticommunism brought Portugal into NATO in 1949 and won him backing to join the United Nations at the same time.

Postwar Period. The postwar period, despite these successes, was troubled, first because of domestic economic difficulties and then because of colonial unrest in Angola and Mozambique. Government mismanagement of both problems led to renewal of opposition to Salazar's dictatorship in 1956. Two years later, an opposition candidate, Humberto Delgado, polled a quarter million votes for the presidency, which Salazar had occupied since 1951. The PIDE became more active, but the opposition continued to grow until 1965, when Delgado was assassinated in Spain. By that time draconian measures in the colonies diminished the drive for independence to the point where there was less unrest in metropolitan Portugal, although vestiges of opposition continued to manifest themselves spasmodically until September 1968, when Salazar was incapacitated by a massive brain hemorrhage. His 36-year rule thus came to an end on September 27, when Marcelo Caetano of the National Union replaced him in the premiership. Salazar died on July 27, 1970, in Lisbon.

EWB

Sand, George (1804–1876), French novelist. The most successful woman writer of her century, George Sand's novels present a large fresco of romantic sentiment and 19th-century life, especially in its more pastoral aspects.

George Sand was born Amandine Aurore Lucille Dupin in Paris on July 1, 1804. On her father's side she was related to a line of kings and to the *Maréchal de Saxe*; her mother was the daughter of a professional bird fancier. Aurore's father, Maurice Dupin, was a soldier of the Empire. He died when Aurore was still a child.

At the age of 14, tired of being the "apple of discord" between her mother and grandmother, Aurore went to the convent of the Dames Augustines Anglaises in Paris. Though she did her best to disrupt

the convent's peaceful life, she felt drawn to quiet contemplation and direct communication with God.

To save Aurore from mysticism, her grandmother called her to her home in Nohant. Here Aurore studied nature, practiced medicine on the peasants, read from the philosophers of all ages, and developed a passion for the works of François René Chateaubriand. Her eccentric tutor encouraged her to wear men's clothing while horseback riding, and she galloped through the countryside in trousers and loose shirt, free, wild, and in love with nature.

Marriage and Lovers. When her grandmother died, Aurore became mistress of the estate at Nohant. At 19 she married Casimir Dudevant, the son of a baron and a servant girl. He was good-hearted but coarse and sensual, and he offended her lofty and mystical ideal of love. Aurore soon began to seek her idealized love object elsewhere. For a time she maintained a platonic relationship with Aurélien de Sèze, but eventually this affair languished. She had begun to realize that it was impossible to sustain love without physical passion.

At the age of 27 Aurore moved to Paris in search of independence and love, leaving husband and children behind. She began writing articles to earn her living and met a coterie of writers. Henri de Latouche and Charles Sainte-Beuve became her mentors.

Aurore fell in love with Jules Sandeau, a charming young writer. They collaborated on articles and signed them collectively "J. Sand." When she published her first novel, *Indiana* (1832), she took as her pen name "George Sand."

George Sand made a home for Sandeau and for her daughter, Solange, but eventually she wearied of his jealousy and idle disposition. He, in turn, realized that he could never overcome her essential frigidity. She felt as though she had failed in marriage as well as in adultery. Several novels of disillusioned love were the fruit of this period of her life. Then she met the young poet Alfred de Musset, and they became lovers.

George Sand legally separated from her husband; she gained custody over Solange, while her husband kept the other child, Maurice. She now came to enjoy great renown in Paris both as a writer and as a bold and brilliant woman. She had many admirers and chose new lovers from among them. Her lovers included the Polish composer Frédéric Chopin and the doctor who attended Musset in Venice. Perhaps it was her inability to be aroused to physical passion that drove her from one lover to another. She compensated for this deficiency by the spiritual intensity of her love.

Political Views. George Sand was a democrat; she felt close to the people by birth, and she often

praised the humble virtues of the urban and country poor in her novels. She was a Christian of sorts and advocated a socially conscious religion. Like Jean Jacques Rousseau, she believed that inherently good man was corrupted by civilization and faulty institutions.

Despite her own feminist leanings, George Sand never advocated political equality for women. It was in love that she demanded equality, in the free choice of the love object; the inequality of men and women before the law seemed to her a scandal.

Last Years. As she grew older, George Sand spent more and more time at her beloved Nohant and gave herself up to the intoxications of pastoral life, the entertainment of friends, the staging of puppet shows, and most of all to her grandchildren. Though she had lost none of her vital energy and enthusiasm, she grew less concerned with politics. Her quest for the absolute in love had led her through years of stormy affairs to the attainment of a tolerant and universal love of God, of nature, of children. She died in Nohant on June 9, 1876.

Early Novels. Every night from midnight until dawn, George Sand covered her daily quota of 20 pages with her large, tranquil writing, never crossing out a line. All her novels are love stories in which her romantic idealism unfolds in a realistic setting. The characters are people she knew, although their sentiments are idealized.

The early works by George Sand are novels of passion, written to alleviate the pain of her first love affairs. *Indiana* (1832) has as its central theme woman's search for the absolute in love. *Valentine* (1832) depicts an aristocratic woman, unhappily married, who finds that a farmer's son loves her. *Lélia* (1854) is a lyrical but searching confession of the author's own physical coldness. *Lélia* is a beautiful woman loved by a young poet, but she can show him only maternal affection.

Socialist Novels. During the 1840s George Sand wrote a number of novels in which she exposed her socialist doctrine joined with a humanitarian religion. *Le Compagnon du tour de France* (1840), *Consuelo* (1842–1843), and *Le Pêché de Monsieur Antoine* (1847) are typical novels of this period. Her socialism was of an optimistic, idealistic nature. She sympathized in these novels with the plight of the worker and the farmer. She also wrote a number of novels devoted to country life, most produced during her retreat to Nohant at the time of the 1848 uprising. *La Mare au diable* (1846), *La Petite Fadette* (1849), and *Les Maîtres sonneurs* (1852) are typical novels of

this genre. They celebrate the humble virtues of a simple life and offer idealized portraits of the peasants of Berry.

George Sand's last works show a tendency to moralize; in these novels the characters become incarnated theories rather than human beings.

EWB

Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980), French philosopher and man of letters. Jean-Paul Sartre ranks as the most versatile writer and as the dominant influence in three decades of French intellectual life.

Jean-Paul Sartre was born in Paris on June 21, 1905. His father, a naval officer, died while on a tour of duty in Indochina before Sartre was two years old. His mother belonged to the Alsatian Schweitzer family and was a first cousin to Albert Schweitzer. The young widow returned to her parents' house, where she and her son were treated as "the children." In the first volume of his autobiography, *The Words* (1964), Sartre describes his unnatural childhood as a spoiled and precocious boy. Lacking any companions his own age, the child found "friends" exclusively in books. Reading and writing thus became his twin passions. "It was in books that I encountered the universe."

Sartre entered the *École Normale Supérieure* in 1924 and after one failure received first place in the *agrégation* of philosophy in 1929. The novelist Simone de Beauvoir finished second that year, and the two formed an intimate bond that endured thereafter. After completing compulsory military service, Sartre took a teaching job at a lycée in Le Havre. There he wrote his first novel, *Nausea* (1938), which some critics have called the century's most influential French novel.

From 1933 to 1935 Sartre was a research student at the Institut Français in Berlin and in Freiburg. He discovered the works of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and began to philosophize in the phenomenological vein. A series of works on the modalities of consciousness poured from Sartre's pen: two works on imagination, one on self-consciousness, and one on emotions. He also produced a first-rate volume of short stories, *The Wall* (1939).

Sartre returned to Paris to teach in a lycée and to continue his writing, but World War II intervened. Called up by the army, he served briefly on the Eastern front and was taken prisoner. After nine months he secured his release and returned to teaching in Paris, where he became active in the Resistance. During this period he wrote his first major work in philosophy, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology* (1943).

After the war Sartre abandoned teaching, determined to support himself by writing. He was also determined that his writing and thinking should be *engagé*. Intellectuals, he thought, must take a public stand on every great question of their day. He thus became fundamentally a moralist, both in his philosophical and literary works.

Sartre had turned to playwriting and eventually produced a series of theatrical successes which are essentially dramatizations of ideas, although they contain some finely drawn characters and lively plots. The first two, *The Flies* and *No Exit*, were produced in occupied Paris. They were followed by *Dirty Hands* (1948), usually called his best play; *The Devil and the Good Lord* (1957), a blasphemous, anti-Christian tirade; and *The Prisoners of Altona* (1960), which combined convincing character portrayal with telling social criticism. Sartre also wrote a number of comedies: *The Respectful Prostitute* (1946), *Kean* (1954), and *Nekrassov* (1956), which the critic Henry Peyre claimed "reveals him as the best comic talent of our times."

During this same period Sartre also wrote a three-volume novel, *The Roads to Freedom* (1945–1949); a treatise on committed literature; lengthy studies of Charles Baudelaire and Jean Genet; and a prodigious number of reviews and criticisms. He also edited *Les Temps modernes*.

Though never a member of the Communist party, Sartre usually sympathized with the political views of the far left. Whatever the political issue, he was quick to publish his opinions, often combining them with public acts of protest.

In 1960 Sartre returned to philosophy, publishing the first volume of his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. It represented essentially a modification of his existentialism by Marxist ideas. The drift of Sartre's earlier work was toward a sense of the futility of life. In *Being and Nothingness* he declared man to be "a useless passion," condemned to exercise a meaningless freedom. But after World War II his new interest in social and political questions and his rapprochement with Marxist thought led him to more optimistic and activist views.

Sartre has always been a controversial yet respected individual. In 1964, Sartre was awarded but refused to accept the Nobel Prize in literature. Sartre suffered from detrimental health throughout the 1970s. He died of a lung ailment in 1980.

EWB

Schmoller, Gustav Friedrich von (1838–1917), German economist. Gustav Friedrich von Schmoller broadened the study of economics by insisting that it

be studied dynamically in the context of history and sociology.

Gustav von Schmoller was born on June 24, 1838, in Württemberg-Baden. He was from a family of civil servants and continued in that tradition. His studies in civic administration at the University of Tübingen included public finance, statistics, economics, administration, history, and sociology. He served as professor of civic administration at the universities of Halle (1864–1872), Strasbourg (1872–1882), and Berlin (1882–1913). He was also a member of academies in Berlin, Munich, St. Petersburg, Copenhagen, Vienna, and Rome.

In the early 1860s Schmoller defended the commercial treaty between France and the German Customs Union, negotiated with Prussian leadership. This defense curtailed his career in Württemberg but gained favor for him with Prussian authorities, and he was appointed official historian of Brandenburg and Prussia in 1887. He became a member of the Prussian state council in 1884 and representative of the University of Berlin in the Prussian upper house in 1889. He died at Bad Harzburg on June 27, 1917.

Schmoller was the founder and leader of the Association of German Academic Economists. He was also editor of several publications series, one of which was later known as *Schmoller's Yearbook* (from 1881). One of the first great organizers of research in the social sciences, he dominated for several decades the development of economics and of related social sciences. During this time hardly a chair of economics in German universities was filled without his approval.

In political activities Schmoller was a royalist, favored strong government, and had high regard for the Prussian civil service. He was a conservative social reformer who wanted to improve working-class conditions by means of better education, government regulations, cooperatives, and other reforms.

Schmoller's contribution to economics was to reject its study in a narrow analytical view and to place it in the context of the other social sciences. Opposing a theoretical approach, he preferred to include in economics relevant aspects of history, statistics, sociology, social psychology, social anthropology, geography, and even ethics and philosophy. He was eclectic in assembling these aspects into a panorama of the social sciences. He was challenged as superficial by theoretical economist Carl Menger of Vienna in an 1883 pamphlet, by historian Georg von Below in 1904, and by others. Modern critics view Schmoller's long dominance of German social scientists as unfortunate because its effect was to retard development of economic theory in Germany. Outside Germany his influence

in economics was small, although he did influence American institutional economics.

EWB

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788–1860), German philosopher. Schopenhauer's pessimistic philosophy, widely known in the late 19th century in Europe and the United States, held that ultimate reality was nothing but senseless striving or will, having no divine origin and no historical end.

Arthur Schopenhauer was born in Danzig on Feb. 22, 1788. His father, a successful Dutch businessman, had a taste for urbane living, travel, and bourgeois culture, while his mother aspired to the more exotic culture of writers and nonconformists. When Schopenhauer was 5, Danzig, formerly a free mercantile city, was annexed by Poland. As a consequence, his family moved to Hamburg, Germany, in search of a more congenial setting for his father's business. In 1797 Schopenhauer was sent to stay with a family in France, returning to Hamburg after 2 years to enter a private school. Later he became interested in literature, earning the disapproval of his father, who nonetheless gave him the choice of pursuing serious literary studies or traveling with the family for 2 years. Schopenhauer chose to travel.

His voyages over, Schopenhauer took a job as a clerk in a Hamburg merchant's office. That year, 1805, his father died, apparently a suicide. The mercantile world held only drudgery for young Schopenhauer, whose ambitions and desires were both unfocused and frustrated. Feeling constrained by a promise to his father, Schopenhauer remained at work until 1807, when he joyfully resigned in order to study Greek and Latin in a school at Gotha. Having enraged an unsympathetic instructor, he transferred to a school in Weimar, where his mother had already established herself as mistress of a literary salon frequented by Goethe and other notables. But Schopenhauer had earlier quarreled with his mother, whom he thought too free with her ideas and her favors. He therefore resided with his mentor, the philologist Franz Passow, who paid his tuition. Schopenhauer's studies went well, and in 1809, on acquiring a handsome legacy, he enrolled at the University of Göttingen. He studied mostly the sciences and medicine but eventually turned to philosophy.

Philosophical Studies. Schopenhauer's new passion for philosophy led him to the University of Berlin, where he hoped to cull the wisdom of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, then the foremost philosopher in Germany. He was disappointed in Fichte but remained at the university until 1813, when Prussia mo-

bilized to expel the French after Napoleon's defeat. Seeing the dangers of staying in Berlin and having no heart for nationalistic fervor, Schopenhauer sought refuge in Rudolstadt. There he completed his doctoral dissertation, which he submitted successfully to the University of Jena. He published the dissertation at his own expense and then returned to Weimar. He met Goethe, who seemed sympathetic to his thinking. One fruit of their conversations was Schopenhauer's brief study *Über das Sehn und die Farben* (1816; *On Vision and Colors*).

The World as Will and Idea. Schopenhauer's unhappy relations with his mother finally terminated in open hostility, and he moved to Dresden. By this time the central and simple idea of his philosophy had taken hold in his mind. The principal source of this idea was his own experience and moods, but the expression of it owed much to the philosophies of Plato and Immanuel Kant and the mystical literature of India. He foresaw that his reflections would eventually lift him above the absurd stresses and conflicts of his life, and he thought that ultimately his writings would usher in a new era not only in philosophy but also in human history. Whereas former philosophies had been parceled into schools and special problems, his own, as he envisaged it, would be a single, simple fabric. The simplest expression of this potent idea is probably the very title of the book he wrote at Dresden, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (*The World as Will and Idea*). The world is necessarily present to a subject that perceives it; thus the world is "idea" or "representation." Yet the world is not created or constructed by the subject or the mind; its own nature is will, or blind striving. "My body and my will are one," and in the final analysis one person's will is indistinguishable from every other form of willing.

The book was printed by a reluctant publisher in 1818 and failed to gain a public. Nevertheless, with two books to his credit, Schopenhauer was given a lectureship in philosophy at the University of Berlin. At that time G. W. F. Hegel was the center of attention, and Schopenhauer decided to compete with him by lecturing at the same hour. But he addressed an empty room, and shortly his academic career was over.

Other Writings. In 1831 cholera was epidemic in Berlin, and Schopenhauer fled to Frankfurt, where he stayed for the rest of his life. In 1836 he published a study of contemporary science, *Über den Willen in der Natur* (*On the Will in Nature*), showing that his philosophy was consistent with the sciences. In 1839 he won a prize from the Norwegian Scientific Society for an essay on freedom of the will. To this

essay he added another, publishing them in 1841 as *Die Beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik* (*The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*). During these years he revised and augmented the text of *The World as Will and Idea*, which was republished in 1844 with 50 new chapters. In 1847 he republished his dissertation, *Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde* (*On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*). By now he was attracting some notice, but the fame he had predicted for himself was still only a dream.

Schopenhauer's style of life in his Frankfurt years has always both fascinated and puzzled his admirers. Though he wrote about the ultimate value of negating the will, he displayed unusual willfulness; though he extolled tranquility, he was always energetic; though he wrote savage diatribes against women, he could not forgo female company.

Parerga und Paralipomena. At last, in 1851, Schopenhauer published the book that brought him fame and followers. Titled *Parerga und Paralipomena*, it was a collection of highly polished, insightful essays and aphorisms. Its style was probably the chief reason for the book's immediate success. Yet the ideas were important too, particularly the notion that will was primary over intellect. The pessimism that follows from such a notion was already in vogue, and Schopenhauer became its voice. Another reason for his fame was surely his appeal to the inner experience of moods and feelings, in contrast to the more traditional appeals to history, reason, authority, and objective evidence. His philosophy takes its source in "the selfsame unchangeable being which is before us." Life is all suffering, he said, but it can be reflected upon, and then it will be seen to be "nothing." Schopenhauer died on Sept. 21, 1860. By then he had countless followers, and he was idolized as a kind of savior.

EWB

Shakespeare, William (1564–1616), English playwright, poet, and actor. William Shakespeare is generally acknowledged to be the greatest of English writers and one of the most extraordinary creators in human history.

The most crucial fact about William Shakespeare's career is that he was a popular dramatist. Born six years after Queen Elizabeth I had ascended the throne, contemporary with the high period of the English Renaissance, Shakespeare had the good luck to find in the theater of London a medium just coming into its own and an audience, drawn from a wide range of social classes, eager to reward talents of the sort he possessed. His entire life was committed to the

public theater, and he seems to have written nondramatic poetry only when enforced closings of the theater made writing plays impractical. It is equally remarkable that his days in the theater were almost exactly contemporary with the theater's other outstanding achievements the work, for example, of Christopher Marlowe, Ben Jonson, and John Webster.

Shakespeare was born on or just before April 23, 1564, in the small but then important Warwickshire town of Stratford. His mother, born Mary Arden, was the daughter of a landowner from a neighboring village. His father, John, son of a farmer, was a glove maker and trader in farm produce; he had achieved a position of some eminence in the prosperous market town by the time of his son's birth, holding a number of responsible positions in Stratford's government and serving as mayor in 1569. By 1576, however, John Shakespeare had begun to encounter the financial difficulties which were to plague him until his death in 1601.

Though no personal documents survive from Shakespeare's school years, his literary work shows the mark of the excellent if grueling education offered at the Stratford grammar school (some reminiscences of Stratford school days may have lent amusing touches to scenes in *The Merry Wives of Windsor*). Like other Elizabethan schoolboys, Shakespeare studied Latin grammar during the early years, then progressed to the study of logic, rhetoric, composition, oration, versification, and the monuments of Roman literature. The work was conducted in Latin and relied heavily on rote memorization and the master's rod. A plausible tradition holds that William had to discontinue his education when about 13 in order to help his father. At 18 he married Ann Hathaway, a Stratford girl. They had three children (Susanna, 1583–1649; Hamnet, 1585–1596; and his twin, Judith, 1585–1662) and who was to survive him by 7 years. Shakespeare remained actively involved in Stratford affairs throughout his life, even when living in London, and retired there at the end of his career.

The years between 1585 and 1592, having left no evidence as to Shakespeare's activities, have been the focus of considerable speculation; among other things, conjecture would have him a traveling actor or a country schoolmaster. The earliest surviving notice of his career in London is a jealous attack on the "upstart crow" by Robert Greene, a playwright, professional man of letters, and profligate whose career was at an end in 1592 though he was only 6 years older than Shakespeare. Greene's outcry testifies, both in its passion and in the work it implies Shakespeare had been doing for some time, that the young poet had already established himself in the capital. So does

the quality of Shakespeare's first plays: it is hard to believe that even Shakespeare could have shown such mastery without several years of apprenticeship.

Early Career. Shakespeare's first extant play is probably *The Comedy of Errors* (1590; like most dates for the plays, this is conjectural and may be a year or two off), a brilliant and intricate farce involving two sets of identical twins and based on two already-complicated comedies by the Roman Plautus. Though less fully achieved, his next comedy, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* (1591), is more prophetic of Shakespeare's later comedy, for its plot depends on such devices as a faithful girl who educates her fickle lover, romantic woods, a girl dressed as a boy, sudden reformations, music, and happy marriages at the end. The last of the first comedies, *Love's Labour's Lost* (1593), is romantic again, dealing with the attempt of three young men to withdraw from the world and women for 3 years to study in their king's "little Academe," and their quick surrender to a group of young ladies who come to lodge nearby. If the first of the comedies is most notable for its plotting and the second for its romantic elements, the third is distinguished by its dazzling language and its gallery of comic types. Already Shakespeare had learned to fuse conventional characters with convincing representations of the human life he knew.

Though little read and performed now, Shakespeare's first plays in the popular "chronicle," or history, genre are equally ambitious and impressive. Dealing with the tumultuous events of English history between the death of Henry V in 1422 and the accession of Henry VII in 1485 (which began the period of Tudor stability maintained by Shakespeare's own queen), the three "parts" of *Henry VI* (1592) and *Richard III* (1594) are no tentative experiments in the form: rather they constitute a gigantic tetralogy, in which each part is a superb play individually and an integral part of an epic sequence. Nothing so ambitious had ever been attempted in England in a form hitherto marked by slapdash formlessness.

Shakespeare's first tragedy, *Titus Andronicus* (1593), reveals similar ambition. Though its chamber of horrors, including mutilations and ingenious murders, strikes the modern reader as belonging to a theatrical tradition no longer viable, the play is in fact a brilliant and successful attempt to outdo the efforts of Shakespeare's predecessors in the lurid tradition of the revenge play.

When the theaters were closed because of plague during much of 1593–1594, Shakespeare looked to nondramatic poetry for his support and wrote two narrative masterpieces, the seriocomic *Venus and Adonis*

and the tragic *Rape of Lucrece*, for a wealthy patron, the Earl of Southampton. Both poems carry the sophisticated techniques of Elizabethan narrative verse to their highest point, drawing on the resources of Renaissance mythological and symbolic traditions.

Shakespeare's most famous poems, probably composed in this period but not published until 1609, and then not by the author, are the 154 sonnets, the supreme English examples of the form. Writing at the end of a brief, frenzied vogue for sequences of sonnets, Shakespeare found in the conventional 14-line lyric with its fixed rhyme scheme a vehicle for inexhaustible technical innovations—for Shakespeare even more than for other poets, the restrictive nature of the sonnet generates a paradoxical freedom of invention that is the life of the form—and for the expression of emotions and ideas ranging from the frivolous to the tragic. Though often suggestive of autobiographical revelation, the sonnets cannot be proved to be any the less fictions than the plays. The identity of their dedicatee, “Mr. W. H.,” remains a mystery, as does the question of whether there were real-life counterparts to the famous “dark lady” and the unfaithful friend who are the subject of a number of the poems. But the chief value of these poems is intrinsic: the sonnets alone would have established Shakespeare's preeminence among English poets.

Lord Chamberlain's Men. By 1594 Shakespeare was fully engaged in his career. In that year he became principal writer for the successful Lord Chamberlain's Men, one of the two leading companies of actors; a regular actor in the company; and a “sharer,” or partner, in the group of artist-managers who ran the entire operation and were in 1599 to have the Globe Theater built on the south bank of the Thames. The company performed regularly in unroofed but elaborate theaters. Required by law to be set outside the city limits, these theaters were the pride of London, among the first places shown to visiting foreigners, and seated up to 3,000 people. The actors played on a huge platform stage equipped with additional playing levels and surrounded on three sides by the audience; the absence of scenery made possible a flow of scenes comparable to that of the movies, and music, costumes, and ingenious stage machinery created successful illusions under the afternoon sun.

For this company Shakespeare produced a steady outpouring of plays. The comedies include *The Taming of the Shrew* (1594), fascinating in light of the first comedies since it combines with an Italian-style plot, in which all the action occurs in one day, a more characteristically English and Shakespearean plot, the taming of Kate, in which much more time passes; *A*

Midsummer Night's Dream (1595), in which “rude mechanicals,” artisans without imagination, become entangled with fairies and magic potions in the moonlit woods to which young lovers have fled from a tyrannical adult society; *The Merchant of Venice* (1596), which contributed Shylock and Portia to the English literary tradition; *Much Ado about Nothing* (1598), with a melodramatic main plot whose heroine is maligned and almost driven to death by a conniving villain and a comic subplot whose Beatrice and Benedick remain the archetypal sparring lovers; *The Merry Wives of Windsor* (1599), held by tradition to have been written in response to the Queen's request that Shakespeare write another play about Falstaff (who had appeared in *Henry IV*), this time in love; and in 1600 the pastoral *As You Like It*, a mature return to the woods and conventions of *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, and *Twelfth Night*, perhaps the most perfect of the comedies, a romance of identical twins separated at sea, young love, and the antics of Malvolio and Sir Toby Belch.

Shakespeare's only tragedies of the period are among his most familiar plays: *Romeo and Juliet* (1596), *Julius Caesar* (1599), and *Hamlet* (1601). Different from one another as they are, these three plays share some notable features: the setting of intense personal tragedy in a large world vividly populated by what seems like the whole range of humanity; a refusal, shared by most of Shakespeare's contemporaries in the theater, to separate comic situations and techniques from tragic; the constant presence of politics; and—a personal rather than a conventional phenomenon—a tragic structure in which what is best in the protagonist is what does him in when he finds himself in conflict with the world.

Continuing his interest in the chronicle, Shakespeare wrote *King John* (1596), despite its one strong character a relatively weak play; and the second and greater tetralogy, ranging from *Richard II* (1595), in which the forceful Bolingbroke, with an ambiguous justice on his side, deposes the weak but poetic king, through the two parts of *Henry IV* (1597), in which the wonderfully amoral, fat knight Falstaff accompanies Prince Hal, Bolingbroke's son, to *Henry V* (1599), in which Hal, become king, leads a newly unified England, its civil wars temporarily at an end but sadly deprived of Falstaff and the dissident lowlife who provided so much joy in the earlier plays, to triumph over France. More impressively than the first tetralogy, the second turns history into art. Spanning the poles of comedy and tragedy, alive with a magnificent variety of unforgettable characters, linked to one another as one great play while each is a complete and independent success in its own right, the four plays pose dis-

turbing and unanswerable questions about politics, making one ponder the frequent difference between the man capable of ruling and the man worthy of doing so, the meaning of legitimacy in office, the value of order and stability as against the value of revolutionary change, and the relation of private to public life. The plays are exuberant works of art, but they are not optimistic about man as a political animal, and their unblinking recognition of the dynamics of history has made them increasingly popular and relevant in our own tormented era.

Three plays of the end of Elizabeth's reign are often grouped as Shakespeare's "problem plays," though no definition of that term is able successfully to differentiate them as an exclusive group. *All's Well That Ends Well* (1602) is a romantic comedy with qualities that seem bitter to many critics; like other plays of the period, by Shakespeare and by his contemporaries, it presents sexual relations between men and women in a harsh light. *Troilus and Cressida* (1602), hardest of the plays to classify generically, is a brilliant, sardonic, and disillusioned piece on the Trojan War, unusually philosophical in its language and reminiscent in some ways of *Hamlet*. The tragicomic *Measure for Measure* (1604) focuses more on sexual problems than any other play in the canon; Angelo, the puritanical and repressed man of ice who succumbs to violent sexual urges the moment he is put in temporary authority over Vienna during the duke's absence, and Isabella, the victim of his lust, are two of the most interesting characters in Shakespeare, and the bawdy city in which the action occurs suggests a London on which a new mood of modern urban hopelessness is settling.

King's Men. Promptly upon his accession in 1603, King James I, more ardently attracted to theatrical art than his predecessor, bestowed his patronage upon the Lord Chamberlain's Men, so that the flag of the King's Men now flew over the Globe. During his last decade in the theater Shakespeare was to write fewer but perhaps even finer plays. Almost all the greatest tragedies belong to this period. Though they share the qualities of the earlier tragedies, taken as a group they manifest new tendencies. The heroes are dominated by passions that make their moral status increasingly ambiguous, their freedom increasingly circumscribed; similarly the society, even the cosmos, against which they strive suggests less than ever that all can ever be right in the world. As before, what destroys the hero is what is best about him, yet the best in *Macbeth* or *Othello* cannot so simply be commended as Romeo's impetuous ardor or Brutus's political idealism (fatuous though it is). The late tragedies are each in its own way dramas of alienation, and

their focus, like that of the histories, continues to be felt as intensely relevant to the concerns of modern men.

Othello (1604) is concerned, like other plays of the period, with sexual impurity, with the difference that that impurity is the fantasy of the protagonist about his faithful wife. Iago, the villain who drives Othello to doubt and murder, is the culmination of two distinct traditions, the "Machiavellian" conniver who uses deceit in order to subvert the order of the polity, and the Vice, a schizophrenically tragicomic devil figure from the morality plays going out of fashion as Shakespeare grew up. *King Lear* (1605), to many Shakespeare's masterpiece, is an agonizing tragic version of a comic play (itself based on mythical early English history), in which an aged king who foolishly deprives his only loving daughter of her heritage in order to leave all to her hypocritical and vicious sisters is hounded to death by a malevolent alliance which at times seems to include nature itself. Transformed from its fairy-tale-like origins, the play involves its characters and audience alike in metaphysical questions that are felt rather than thought.

Macbeth (1606), similarly based on English chronicle material, concentrates on the problems of evil and freedom, convincingly mingles the supernatural with a representation of history, and makes a paradoxically sympathetic hero of a murderer who sins against family and state a man in some respects worse than the villain of *Hamlet*.

Dramatizing stories from Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*, *Antony and Cleopatra* and *Coriolanus* (both written in 1607–1608) embody Shakespeare's bitterest images of political life, the former by setting against the call to Roman duty the temptation to liberating sexual passion, the latter by pitting a protagonist who cannot live with hypocrisy against a society built on it. Both of these tragedies present ancient history with a vividness that makes it seem contemporary, though the sensuousness of *Antony and Cleopatra*, the richness of its detail, the ebullience of its language, and the seductive character of its heroine have made it far more popular than the harsh and austere *Coriolanus*. One more tragedy, *Timon of Athens*, similarly based on Plutarch, was written during this period, though its date is obscure. Despite its abundant brilliance, few find it a fully satisfactory play, and some critics have speculated that what we have may be an incomplete draft. The handful of tragedies that Shakespeare wrote between 1604 and 1608 comprises an astonishing series of worlds different from one another, created of language that exceeds anything Shakespeare had done before, some of the most complex and vivid characters

in all the plays, and a variety of new structural techniques.

A final group of plays takes a turn in a new direction. Commonly called the “romances,” *Pericles* (1607), *Cymbeline* (1609), *The Winter’s Tale* (1611), and *The Tempest* (1611) share their conventions with the tragicomedy that had been growing popular since the early years of the century. Particularly they resemble in some respects plays written by Beaumont and Fletcher for the private theatrical company whose operation the King’s Men took over in 1608. While such work in the hands of others, however, tended to reflect the socially and intellectually narrow interests of an elite audience, Shakespeare turned the fashionable mode into a new kind of personal art form. Though less searing than the great tragedies, these plays have a unique power to move and are in the realm of the highest art. *Pericles* and *Cymbeline* seem somewhat tentative and experimental, though both are superb plays. *The Winter’s Tale*, however, is one of Shakespeare’s best plays. Like a rewriting of *Othello* in its first acts, it turns miraculously into pastoral comedy in its last. *The Tempest* is the most popular and perhaps the finest of the group. Prospero, shipwrecked on an island and dominating it with magic which he renounces at the end, may well be intended as an image of Shakespeare himself; in any event, the play is like a retrospective glance over the plays of the two previous decades.

After the composition of *The Tempest*, which many regard as an explicit farewell to art, Shakespeare retired to Stratford, returning to London to compose *Henry VIII* and *The Two Noble Kinsmen* in 1613; neither of these plays seems to have fired his imagination. In 1616, at the age of 52, he was dead. His reputation grew quickly, and his work has continued to seem to each generation like its own most precious discovery. His value to his own age is suggested by the fact that two fellow actors performed the virtually unprecedented act in 1623 of gathering his plays together and publishing them in the Folio edition. Without their efforts, since Shakespeare was apparently not interested in publication, many of the plays would not have survived.

EWB

Shaw, George Bernard (1856–1950), British playwright, critic, and pamphleteer. George Bernard Shaw produced more than 52 plays and playlets, three volumes of music and drama criticism, and one major volume of socialist commentary.

George Bernard Shaw’s theater extended to his personal life. He considered himself a cultural miracle, and a partisan conflict among his readers and play-

goers provoked a massive body of literature for and against him and his work. Much recent criticism concludes that he ranks as the greatest English dramatist since William Shakespeare.

Shaw was born in Dublin, Ireland, on July 16, 1856. At an early age he was tutored in classics by an uncle, and when he was 10 years old, he entered the Wesleyan Connexional School in Dublin. There his academic performance was largely a failure. Shaw later described his own education: “I cannot learn anything that does not interest me. My memory is not indiscriminate, it rejects and selects; and its selections are not academic.” Part of his nonacademic training was handled by his mother, a music teacher and a mezzo-soprano; Shaw studied music and art at the same time. He became a Dublin office boy in 1871 at a monthly salary equivalent to \$4.50. Success in business threatened him: “I made good,” he wrote, “in spite of myself and found, to my dismay, that Business, instead of expelling me as the worthless imposter I was, was fastening upon me with no intention of letting me go. . . . In March, 1876, I broke loose.” Resigning a cashier’s position, Shaw joined his mother and two sisters in London, where they conducted a music school. Shaw had started writing, at the age of 16, criticism and reviews for Irish newspapers and magazines; in 4 years only one piece was accepted. Shaw lived in London for the 9 years after 1876 supported by his parents and continued to write criticism. He also entertained in London society as a singer.

Shaw as a Novelist. Between 1876 and 1885 Shaw wrote five novels. *Immaturity*, the first, remained unpublished, and the other four, after a series of rejections from London publishers, appeared in radical periodicals. *To-Day* published *An Unsocial Socialist* in 1884; it was designed as part of a massive projected work that would cover the entire social reform movement in England. *Cashel Byron’s Profession* (1882) also appeared in *To-Day*; juvenile, nonsensical, at times hilarious, it was produced in 1901 as the drama *The Admirable Bashville; or, Constasy Unrewarded*. *The Irrational Knot*, a portrayal of modern marriage that Shaw asserted anticipated Henrik Ibsen’s *A Doll’s House*, appeared in another radical periodical, *Our Corner*, as did *Love among the Artists* (1887–1888).

Political Activities and Writings. At the age of 23 Shaw had joined a socialist discussion group, of which Sydney Webb was a member, and he joined the Fabian Society in 1884. *Fabian Essays* (1887), edited by Shaw, emphasized the importance of economics and class structure; for him, economics was “the basis of society.” In 1882 Shaw’s conversion to socialism

began when he heard Henry George, the American author of *Progress and Poverty*, address a London meeting. George's message "changed the whole current of my life." His reading of Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* in the same year "made a man of me." For 27 years Shaw served on the Fabian Society's executive committee. In his role as an active polemicist he later published *Common Sense about the War* on Nov. 14, 1914, a criticism of the British government and its policies. *The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Capitalism and Socialism* (1928) supplied a complete summary of his political position. It remains a major volume of socialist commentary. For 6 years Shaw held office on a municipal level in a London suburb.

Shaw's other careers continued. Between 1888 and 1894 he wrote for newspapers and periodicals as a highly successful music critic. At the end of this period, he began writing on a regular basis for Frank Harris's *Saturday Review*; as a critic, he introduced Ibsen and the "new" drama to the British public. Shaw's *Quintessence of Ibsenism* appeared in 1890, *The Sanity of Art* in 1895, and *The Perfect Wagnerite* in 1898. All of them indicate the formation of his esthetics. He married Charlotte Payne-Townshend, an Irish heiress and fellow socialist, in 1898. She died in 1943.

The Plays. Shaw wrote drama between 1892 and 1947, when he completed *Buoyant Billions* at the age of 91. *Widowers' Houses*, his first play, was produced in 1892 at London's Royalty Theater. He identified this and the other early plays as "unpleasant." *Widowers' Houses* was about slum landlordship. Preoccupied by the "new" woman, Shaw wrote *The Philanderers* in 1893. Also written in the same year but not produced until 1902 because of British censorship, *Mrs. Warren's Profession* revealed, he wrote, "the economic basis of modern commercial prostitution." Shaw's first stage successes, *Arms and the Man* and *Candida*, both of them "pleasant" plays, were produced in 1894. *You Never Can Tell*, first produced in 1896 and not often revived, is Shaw's most underrated comedy. The Vedrenne-Barker productions at the Royal Court Theater in London of Shaw, Shakespeare, and Euripides between 1904 and 1907 established Shaw's permanent reputation; 11 of his plays received 701 performances.

Shaw began as a dramatist writing against the mechanical habits of domestic comedy and against the Victorian romanticizing of Shakespeare and drama in general. He wrote that "melodramatic stage illusion is not an illusion of real life, but an illusion of the embodiment of our romantic imaginings."

Shaw's miraculous period began with *Man and Superman* (1901–1903). It was miraculous even for him; in a late play, *Too True to Be Good* (1932), one of the characters speaks for him: "My gift is divine: it is not limited by my petty personal convictions. Lucidity is one of the most precious of gifts: the gift of the teacher: the gift of explanation. I can explain anything to anybody; and I love doing it."

Major Barbara (1905) is a drama of ideas, largely about poverty and capitalism; like most of Shaw's drama, *Major Barbara* poses questions and finally contains messages or arguments. *Androcles and the Lion* (1911) discusses religion. *John Bull's Other Island* (1904), which is the least known of his major plays, concerns political relations between England and Ireland. *Heartbreak House* analyzes the domestic effects of World War I; written between 1913 and 1916, it was first produced in 1920. Most of the plays after *Arms and the Man* carry long prefaces that are often not directly related to the drama itself. Shaw systematically explored such topics as marriage, parenthood, education, and poverty in the prefaces.

Shaw's popular success was coupled with a growing critical success. *Heartbreak House*, *Back to Methuselah* (1921; he called it his "metabiological pentateuch"), *Androcles and the Lion*, and *Saint Joan* (1923) are considered his best plays. They were all written between the ages of 57 and 67.

Shaw Explaining Shaw. The plays of Shaw express, as did his life, a complex range of impulses, ambitions, and beliefs. Reflecting on his life and his work, he explained at 70: "If I am to be entirely communicative on this subject, I must add that the mere rawness which soon rubs off was complicated by a deeper strangeness which has made me all my life a sojourner on this planet rather than a native of it. Whether it be that I was born mad or a little too sane, my kingdom was not of this world: I was at home only in the realm of my imagination, and at ease only with the mighty dead. Therefore I had to become an actor, and create for myself a fantastic personality fit and apt for dealing with men, and adaptable to the various parts I had to play as an author, journalist, orator, politician, committee man, man of the world, and so forth. In all this I succeeded later on only too well."

Shaw was awarded the 1925 Nobel Prize for literature. At the patriarchal age of 94, he died in his home at Ayot St. Lawrence, England, on November 2, 1950.

EWB

Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1748–1836), French statesman and political writer. Emmanuel Joseph Sie-

yès, known as the Abbé Sieyès, upheld the interests of the Third Estate. His effort to consolidate a moderate republican government established Napoleon Bonaparte as the head of state.

Born at Fréjus on May 3, 1748, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès got his primary education from the Jesuits in his hometown and continued into advanced study in theology. Appointment as a canon in the cathedral chapter of Tréguier (1775) brought him the appellation of Abbé (used in France not only for abbots but also for churchmen without a parish), and by the eve of the French Revolution he had been promoted to vicar general of the bishop of Chartres. But his interests in these years of intensive political debate turned from theology and Church administration to public affairs, and when the government called for proposals on ways to hold the elections to the Estates General, one of his three pamphlets on the issue was of critical importance in rallying the Third Estate as a force independent of, and even hostile to, clergy and nobility. This was the famous *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?* (1789; *What Is the Third Estate?*), which proclaimed in phrases of ringing clarity that the commoners had been nothing and should be all, as the essential component of the French nation.

Sieyès was elected a deputy of the Third Estate and not of the First Estate, the clergy, and he played a key role in the events of the first months of the Revolution. He proposed the name National Assembly for the combined single chamber established unilaterally by the Third Estate, with some support from liberal clergy and nobles, on June 17; drew up the "Tennis Court Oath," by which the deputies pledged themselves to the defense of the National Assembly as the embodiment of the sovereignty of the people, on June 20; and took the initiative in the decision of the Constituent Assembly (as the National Assembly was called in its self-assumed task of writing a constitution) to continue its work despite the King's order to disband on June 23. He was also active in the formulation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

Further events showed Sieyès to be a moderate within the Revolutionary movement. He favored the widest personal rights of citizens as against arbitrary government power, limitation of the right to vote to property holders (because the votes of the poor, he argued, would be easily bought by the rich), and extreme economic individualism, without restriction upon the right of persons to amass wealth. He was not elected to the Legislative Assembly but was chosen a deputy to the Convention. As the Revolution swung into its radical phase, he chose the path of caution and avoided a prominent role during the Reign of Terror. Asked afterward what he had done during that

perilous period, he answered tersely, "J'ai vécu" (I stayed alive). To do so, he had voted for the death penalty against Louis XVI; but after Maximilien de Robespierre's fall, he resumed political activity.

As a member of the Thermidorean Committee of Public Safety and then of the Council of Five Hundred, Sieyès favored an annexationist foreign policy and internal consolidation. After serving as ambassador to Berlin in 1798–1799, he returned to Paris to become a member of the Directory, the executive branch of government. When it became clear that the Directory was supported by only a minority in the nation, with both radical republicans and royalists in active opposition, he and a fellow Director sought the support of the army in the person of Gen. Bonaparte in the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire (Nov. 9, 1799). However, in the new government of three consuls conceived by Sieyès, it was Napoleon Bonaparte who took the post of first consul for himself, and Sieyès was sent into innocuous but prestigious posts, especially after Bonaparte became Emperor Napoleon. He was named to the Senate and became its president, was named a count of the empire, and was elected to the French Academy.

However, when the Bourbon monarchy was finally restored in 1815, Sieyès was banned as a regicide and fled to Brussels, where he lived as an exile until the Revolution of 1830. Returning home, he died in Paris on June 20, 1836, remembered in history chiefly for his inflammatory pamphlet of 1789 and his dupe's part in the overthrow of the Directory.

EWB

Simmel, Georg (1858–1918), German sociologist and philosopher. Georg Simmel wrote important studies of urban sociology, social conflict theory, and small-group relationships.

Georg Simmel was born on March 1, 1858, in Berlin, the youngest of seven children. His father was a prosperous Jewish businessman who became a Roman Catholic. His mother, also of Jewish forebears, was a Lutheran. Georg was baptized a Lutheran but later withdrew from that Church, although he always retained a philosophical interest in religion.

His father died when Georg was very young. A family friend and music publisher became his guardian and left him an inheritance when he died which enabled Simmel to pursue a scholarly career for many years without a salaried position. He studied history and philosophy at the University of Berlin, earning a doctoral degree in 1881. He was a lecturer at the University of Berlin from 1885 to 1900 and professor extraordinary until 1914. He then accepted his only

salaried professorship at the provincial University of Strasbourg. There he died on Sept. 26, 1918.

Simmel's wide interests in philosophy, sociology, art, and religion contrasted sharply with those of his more narrowly disciplined colleagues. Eschewing pure philosophy, he preferred to apply it functionally as the philosophy of culture, of money, of the sexes, of religion, and of art. Similarly in sociology, the field of his lasting renown, he favored isolating multiple factors. In 1910 he helped found the German Sociological Association. His sociological writings were on alienation and on urban stresses and strains; his philosophical writings foreshadowed modern existentialism.

Although a popular and even brilliant lecturer, academic advancement eluded Simmel. The reasons for this include prewar Germany's latent anti-Semitism, the unorthodox variety of subjects he pursued rather than following a more acceptable narrow discipline, and perhaps jealousy at his sparkling originality. Ortega y Gasset compared him to a philosophical squirrel, gracefully acrobatic in leaping from one branch of knowledge to another. Unable or unwilling to develop consistent sociological or philosophical systems, Simmel founded no school and left few disciples. "I know that I shall die without intellectual heirs," he wrote in his diary. "My legacy will be, as it were in cash, distributed to many heirs, each transforming his part into use conformed to *his* nature. . . ." This diffusion occurred, and his ideas have since pervaded sociological thought. His insightful writings still stimulate while more systematic contemporaries are less read.

EWB

Smith, Adam (1723–1790), Scottish economist and moral philosopher. Adam Smith believed that in a laissez-faire economy the impulse of self-interest would work toward the public welfare.

Adam Smith was born on June 5, 1723, at Kirkcaldy. His father had died two months before his birth, and a strong and lifelong attachment developed between him and his mother. As an infant, Smith was kidnaped, but he was soon rescued. At the age of 14 he enrolled in the University of Glasgow, where he remained for three years. The lectures of Francis Hutcheson exerted a strong influence on him. In 1740 he transferred to Balliol College, Oxford, where he remained for almost seven years, receiving the bachelor of arts degree in 1744. Returning then to Kirkcaldy, he devoted himself to his studies and gave a series of lectures on English literature. In 1748 he moved to Edinburgh, where he became a friend of David Hume, whose skepticism he did not share.

Theory of Moral Sentiments. In 1751 Smith became professor of logic at the University of Glasgow

and the following year professor of moral philosophy. Eight years later he published his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Smith's central notion in this work is that moral principles have social feeling or sympathy as their basis. Sympathy is a common or analogous feeling that an individual may have with the affections or feelings of another person. The source of this fellow feeling is not so much one's observation of the expressed emotion of another person as one's thought of the situation that the other person confronts. Sympathy usually requires knowledge of the cause of the emotion to be shared. If one approves of another's passions as suitable to their objects, he thereby sympathizes with that person.

Sympathy is the basis for one's judging of the appropriateness and merit of the feelings and actions issuing from these feelings. If the affections of the person involved in a situation are analogous to the emotions of the spectator, then those affections are appropriate. The merit of a feeling or an action flowing from a feeling is its worthiness of reward. If a feeling or an action is worthy of reward, it has moral merit. One's awareness of merit derives from one's sympathy with the gratitude of the person benefited by the action. One's sense of merit, then, is a derivative of the feeling of gratitude which is manifested in the situation by the person who has been helped.

Smith warns that each person must exercise impartiality of judgment in relation to his own feelings and behavior. Well aware of the human tendency to overlook one's own moral failings and the self-deceit in which individuals often engage, Smith argues that each person must scrutinize his own feelings and behavior with the same strictness he employs when considering those of others. Such an impartial appraisal is possible because a person's conscience enables him to compare his own feelings with those of others. Conscience and sympathy, then, working together provide moral guidance for man so that the individual can control his own feelings and have a sensibility for the affections of others.

The Wealth of Nations. In 1764 Smith resigned his professorship to take up duties as a traveling tutor for the young Duke of Buccleuch and his brother. Carrying out this responsibility, he spent 2 years on the Continent. In Toulouse he began writing his best-known work, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. While in Paris he met Denis Diderot, Claude Adrien Helvétius, Baron Paul d'Holbach, François Quesnay, A. R. J. Turgot, and Jacques Necker. These thinkers doubtless had some influence on him. His life abroad came to an abrupt end when one of his charges was killed.

Smith then settled in Kirkcaldy with his mother. He continued to work on *The Wealth of Nations*, which was finally published in 1776. His mother died at the age of 90, and Smith was grief-stricken. In 1778 he was made customs commissioner, and in 1784 he became a fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Smith apparently spent some time in London, where he became a friend of Benjamin Franklin. On his deathbed he demanded that most of his manuscript writings be destroyed. He died on July 17, 1790.

The Wealth of Nations, easily the best known of Smith's writings, is a mixture of descriptions, historical accounts, and recommendations. The wealth of a nation, Smith insists, is to be gauged by the number and variety of consumable goods it can command. Free trade is essential for the maximum development of wealth for any nation because through such trade a variety of goods becomes possible.

Smith assumes that if each person pursues his own interest the general welfare of all will be fostered. He objects to governmental control, although he acknowledges that some restrictions are required. The capitalist invariably produces and sells consumable goods in order to meet the greatest needs of the people. In so fulfilling his own interest, the capitalist automatically promotes the general welfare. In the economic sphere, says Smith, the individual acts in terms of his own interest rather than in terms of sympathy. Thus, Smith made no attempt to bring into harmony his economic and moral theories.

EWB

Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903), English philosopher, scientist, engineer, and political economist. In Herbert Spencer's day his works were important in popularizing the concept of evolution and played an important part in the development of economics, political science, biology, and philosophy.

Herbert Spencer was born in Derby on April 27, 1820. His childhood, described in *An Autobiography* (1904), reflected the attitudes of a family which was known on both sides to include religious non-conformists, social critics, and rebels. His father, a teacher, had been a Wesleyan, but he separated himself from organized religion as he did from political and social authority. Spencer's father and an uncle saw that he received a highly individualized education that emphasized the family traditions of dissent and independence of thought. He was particularly instructed in the study of nature and the fundamentals of science, neglecting such traditional subjects as history.

Spencer initially followed up the scientific interests encouraged by his father and studied engineering. For a few years, until 1841, he practiced the pro-

fession of civil engineer as an employee of the London and Birmingham Railway. His interest in evolution is said to have arisen from the examination of fossils that came from the rail-road cuts.

Spencer left the railroad to take up a literary career and to follow up some of his scientific interests. He began by contributing to *The Non-Conformist*, writing a series of letters called *The Proper Sphere of Government*. This was his first major work and contained his basic concepts of individualism and laissez-faire, which were to be later developed more fully in his *Social Statics* (1850) and other works. Especially stressed were the right of the individual and the ideal of noninterference on the part of the state. He also foreshadowed some of his later ideas on evolution and spoke of society as an individual organism.

A System of Evolution. The concept of organic evolution was elaborated fully for the first time in his famous essay "The Developmental Hypothesis," published in the *Leader* in 1852. In a series of articles and writings Spencer gradually refined his concept of organic and inorganic evolution and popularized the term itself. Particularly in "Progress: Its Law and Cause," an essay published in 1857, he extended the idea of evolutionary progress to human society as well as to the animal and physical worlds. All nature moves from the simple to the complex. This fundamental law is seen in the evolution of human society as it is seen in the geological transformation of the earth and in the origin and development of plant and animal species.

Natural selection, as described by Charles Darwin in the *Origin of Species*, published in 1859, completed Spencer's evolutionary system by providing the mechanism by which organic evolution occurred. Spencer enthusiastically elaborated on Darwin's process of natural selection, applying it to human society, and made his own contribution in the notion of "survival of the fittest." From the beginning Spencer applied his harsh dictum to human society, races, and the state, judging them in the process: "If they are sufficiently complete to live, they do live, and it is well they should live. If they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die."

Spencer systematically tried to establish the basis of a scientific study of education, psychology, sociology, and ethics from an evolutionary point of view. Although many of his specific ideas are no longer fashionable, Spencer went a long way in helping to establish the separate existence of sociology as a social science. His idea of evolutionary progress, from the simple to the complex, provided a conceptual framework that was productive and that justifies granting

to him the title father of comparative sociology. His views concerning a science of sociology are elaborated in two major works, *Descriptive Sociology* (published in 17 volumes, 1873–1934) and *The Study of Sociology* (1873).

Spencer was particularly influential in the United States until the turn of the century. According to William Graham Sumner, who used *The Study of Sociology* as a text in the first sociology course offered in an American university, it was Spencer's work which established sociology as a separate, legitimate field in its own right. Spencer's demand that historians present the "natural history of society," in order to furnish data for a comparative sociology, is also credited with inspiring James Harvey Robinson and the others involved in the writing of the New History in the United States.

Economic Theories. Social philosophy in the latter part of the 19th century in the United States was dominated by Spencer. His ideas of laissez-faire and the survival of the fittest by natural selection fitted very well into an age of rapid expansion and ruthless business competition. Spencer provided businessmen with the reassuring notion that what they were doing was not just ruthless self-interest but was a natural law operating in nature and human society. Not only was competition in harmony with nature, but it was also in the interest of the general welfare and progress. Social Darwinism, or Spencerism, became a total view of life which justified opposition to social reform on the basis that reform interfered with the operation of the natural law of survival of the fittest.

Spencer visited the United States in 1882 and was much impressed by what he observed on a triumphal tour. He prophetically saw in the industrial might of the United States the seeds of world power. He admired the American industrialists and became a close friend of the great industrialist and steel baron Andrew Carnegie.

By the 1880s and 1890s Spencer had become a universally recognized philosopher and scientist. His books were published widely, and his ideas commanded a great deal of respect and attention. His *Principles of Biology* was a standard text at Oxford. At Harvard, William James used his *Principles of Psychology* as a textbook.

Although some of Spencer's more extreme formulations of laissez-faire were abandoned fairly rapidly, even in the United States, he will continue to exert an influence as long as competition, the profit motive, and individualism are held up as positive social values. His indirect influence on psychology, sociology, and history is too strong to be denied, even

when his philosophical system as a whole has been discarded. He is a giant in the intellectual history of the 19th century.

Spencer spent his last years continuing his work and avoiding the honors and positions that were offered to him by a long list of colleges and universities. He died at Brighton on Dec. 8, 1903.

EWB

Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953), Soviet statesman. Joseph Stalin was the supreme ruler of the Soviet Union and the leader of world communism for almost 30 years.

Under Joseph Stalin the Soviet Union greatly enlarged its territory, won a war of unprecedented destructiveness, and transformed itself from a relatively backward country into the second most important industrial nation in the world. For these achievements the Soviet people and the international Communist movement paid a price that many of Stalin's critics consider excessive. The price included the loss of millions of lives; massive material and spiritual deprivation; political repression; an untold waste of resources; and the erection of an inflexible authoritarian system of rule thought by some historians to be one of the most offensive in recent history and one that many Communists consider a hindrance to further progress in the Soviet Union itself.

Formative Years. Stalin was born Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili on Dec. 21, 1879, in Gori, Georgia. He was the only surviving son of Vissarion Dzhugashvili, a cobbler who first practiced his craft in a village shop but later in a shoe factory in the city. Stalin's father died in 1891. His mother, Ekaterina, a pious and illiterate peasant woman, sent her teenage son to the theological seminary in Tbilisi (Tiflis), where Stalin prepared for the ministry. Shortly before his graduation, however, he was expelled in 1899 for spreading subversive views.

Stalin then joined the underground revolutionary Marxist movement in Tbilisi. In 1901 he was elected a member of the Tbilisi committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers party. The following year he was arrested, imprisoned, and subsequently banished to Siberia. Stalin escaped from Siberia in 1904 and rejoined the Marxist underground in Tbilisi. When the Russian Marxist movement split into two factions, Stalin identified himself with the Bolsheviks.

During the time of the 1904–1905 revolution, Stalin made a name as the organizer of daring bank robberies and raids on money transports, an activity that V. I. Lenin considered important in view of the party's need for funds, although many other Marxists

considered this type of highway robbery unworthy of a revolutionary socialist.

Stalin participated in congresses of the Russian Social Democratic Workers party at Tampere, London, and Stockholm in 1905 and 1906, meeting Lenin for the first time at these congresses. In 1912 Stalin spent some time with Lenin and his wife in Crakow and then went to Vienna to study the Marxist literature concerning the nationality problem. This study trip resulted in a book, *Marxism and the National Question*. In the same year Lenin co-opted Stalin into the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party.

Stalin's trips abroad during these years were short episodes in his life. He spent the major portion of the years from 1905 to 1912 in organizational work for the movement, mainly in the city of Baku. The secret police arrested him several times, and several times he escaped. Eventually, after his return from Vienna, the police caught him again, and he was exiled to the faraway village of Turukhansk beyond the Arctic Circle. He remained here until the fall of tsarism. He adopted the name Stalin ("man of steel") about 1913.

First Years of Soviet Rule. After the fall of tsarism, Stalin made his way at once to Petrograd, where until the arrival of Lenin from Switzerland he was the senior Bolshevik and the editor of *Pravda*, the party organ. After Lenin's return, Stalin remained in the high councils of the party, but he played a relatively inconspicuous role in the preparations for the October Revolution, which placed the Bolsheviks in power. In the first Cabinet of the Soviet government, he held the post of people's commissar for nationalities.

During the years of the civil war (1918–1921), Stalin distinguished himself primarily as military commissar during the battle of Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad), in the Polish campaign, and on several other fronts. In 1919 he received another important government assignment by being appointed commissar of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate. Within the party, he rose to the highest ranks, becoming a member of both the Political Bureau and the Organizational Bureau. When the party Secretariat was organized, he became one of its leading members and was appointed its secretary general in 1922. Lenin obviously valued Stalin for his organizational talents, for his ability to knock heads together and to cut through bureaucratic red tape. He appreciated Stalin's capabilities as a machine politician, as a troubleshooter, and as a hatchet man.

The strength of Stalin's position in the government and in the party was anchored probably by his secretary generalship, which gave him control over party personnel administration over admissions, train-

ing, assignments, promotions, and disciplinary matters. Thus, although he was relatively unknown to outsiders and even within the party, Stalin doubtless ranked as the most powerful man in Soviet Russia after Lenin.

During Lenin's last illness and after his death in 1924, Stalin served as a member of the three-man committee that conducted the affairs of the party and the country. The other members of this "troika" arrangement were Grigori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev. The best-known activity of this committee during the years 1923–1925 was its successful attempt to discredit Leon Trotsky and to make it impossible for him to assume party leadership after Lenin's death. After the committee succeeded in this task, Stalin turned against his two associates, who after some hesitation made common cause with Trotsky. The conflict between these two groups can be viewed either as a power struggle or as a clash of personalities, but it also concerned political issues—a dispute between the left wing and the right wing of bolshevism. The former feared a conservative perversion of the revolution, and the latter were confident that socialism could be reached even in an isolated and relatively backward country. In this dispute Stalin represented, for the time being, the right wing of the party. He and his theoretical spokesman, Nikolai Bukharin, warned against revolutionary adventurism and argued in favor of continuing the more cautious and patient policies that Lenin had inaugurated with the NEP (New Economic Policy).

In 1927 Stalin succeeded in defeating the entire left opposition and in eliminating its leaders from the party. He then adopted much of its domestic program by initiating a 5-year plan of industrial development and by executing it with a degree of recklessness and haste that antagonized many of his former supporters, who then formed a right opposition. This opposition, too, was defeated quickly, and by the early 1930s Stalin had gained dictatorial control over the party, the state, and the entire Communist International.

Stalin's Personality. Although always depicted as a towering figure, Stalin, in fact, was of short stature. He possessed the typical features of Transcaucasians: black hair, black eyes, a short skull, and a large nose. His personality was highly controversial, and it remains shrouded in mystery. Stalin was crude and cruel and, in some important ways, a primitive man. His cunning, distrust, and vindictiveness seem to have reached paranoid proportions. In political life he tended to be cautious and slow-moving. His style of speaking and writing was also ponderous and graceless. Some of his speeches and occasional writings read

like a catechism. He was at times, however, a clever orator and a formidable antagonist in debate. Stalin seems to have possessed boundless energy and a phenomenal capacity for absorbing detailed knowledge.

About Stalin's private life, little is known beyond the fact that he seems always to have been a lonely man. His first wife, a Georgian girl named Ekaterina Svanidze, died of tuberculosis. His second wife, Nadezhda Alleluyeva, committed suicide in 1932, presumably in despair over Stalin's dictatorial rule of the party. The only child from his first marriage, Jacob, fell into German hands during World War II and was killed. The two children from his second marriage outlived their father, but they were not always on good terms with him. The son, Vasili, an officer in the Soviet air force, drank himself to death in 1962. The daughter, Svetlana, fled to the United States in the 1960s.

Stalin's Achievements. In successive 5-year plans, the Soviet Union under Stalin industrialized and urbanized with great speed. Although the military needs of the country drained away precious resources and World War II brought total destruction to some of the richest areas of the Soviet Union and death to many millions of citizens, the nation by the end of Stalin's life had become the second most important industrial country in the world.

The price the Soviet Union paid for this great achievement remains staggering. It included the destruction of all remnants of free enterprise in both town and country and the physical destruction of hundreds of thousands of Russian peasants. The transformation of Soviet agriculture in the early 1930s into collectives tremendously damaged the country's food production. Living standards were drastically lowered at first, and more than a million people died of starvation. Meanwhile, Stalin jailed and executed vast numbers of party members, especially the old revolutionaries and the leading figures in all areas of endeavor.

In the process of securing his rule and of mobilizing the country for the industrialization effort, Stalin erected a new kind of political system characterized by unprecedented severity in police control, bureaucratic centralization, and personal dictatorship. Historians consider his regime one of history's most notorious examples of totalitarianism.

Stalin also changed the ideology of communism and of the Soviet Union in a subtle but drastic fashion. While retaining the rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism, and indeed transforming it into an inflexible dogma, Stalin also changed it from a revolutionary system of ideas into a conservative and authoritarian theory of

state, preaching obedience and discipline as well as veneration of the Russian past. In world affairs the Stalinist system became isolationist. While paying lip service to the revolutionary goals of Karl Marx and Lenin, Stalin sought to promote good relations with the capitalist countries and urged Communist parties to ally themselves with moderate and middle-of-the-road parties in a popular front against the radical right.

From the middle of the 1930s onward, Stalin personally managed the vast political and economic system he had established. Formally, he took charge of it only in May 1941, when he assumed the office of chairman of the Council of Ministers. After Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin also assumed formal command over the entire military establishment.

Stalin's conduct of Russian military strategy in the war remains as controversial as most of his activities. Some evidence indicates that he committed serious blunders, but other evidence allows him credit for brilliant achievements. The fact remains that under Stalin the Soviet Union won the war, emerged as one of the major powers in the world, and managed to bargain for a distribution of the spoils of war that enlarged its area of domination significantly, partly by annexation and partly by the transformation of all the lands east of the Oder and Neisse rivers into client states.

Judgments of Stalin. Stalin died of a cerebrovascular accident on March 5, 1953. His body was entombed next to Lenin's in the mausoleum in Red Square, Moscow. After his death Stalin became a controversial figure in the Communist world, where appreciation for his great achievements was offset to a varying degree by harsh criticism of his methods. At the Twentieth All-Union Party Congress in 1956, Premier Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders attacked the cult of Stalin, accusing him of tyranny, terror, falsification of history, and self-glorification.

EWB

Stanley, Sir Henry Morton (1841–1904), British explorer and journalist. Henry Stanley opened Central Africa to exploitation by Western nations.

Henry Stanley was originally named John Rowland. He was born near Denbigh Castle, Wales, to John Rowland, a farmer, and an unmarried woman. The boy lived with his maternal grandfather until he was about 6, when his grandfather died. The youngster was sent to a workhouse, where he remained until the age of 15, when he ran away.

Young Rowland lived on a hand-to-mouth basis with various relatives until he was 18, when he signed on as a cabin boy and shipped to New Orleans. There a cotton broker, Henry Morton Stanley, adopted him and gave him his name. Stanley's adopted father died without providing for him. The young man volunteered as a Confederate soldier and was captured at Shiloh. He was released from prison by changing sides and finished the war in the Union Navy.

After the war Stanley became a newspaper correspondent. He covered Indian campaigns in the American West. In 1868 he went to Abyssinia to cover a British expedition. In 1869 the publisher of the *New York Herald* commissioned Stanley to find Dr. David Livingstone, a Scottish missionary explorer, lost somewhere in Central Africa. Stanley found Livingstone at Ujiji in 1871 after an 8-month search. They did some exploring together, and when Livingstone died in 1873, Stanley stepped into his shoes.

In 1874 Stanley began a 3-year journey to measure the lakes of Central Africa. From 1879 to 1884 he opened the Congo River Basin and laid the groundwork for the Congo Free State after setting up 21 trading posts along the river. Between 1887 and 1890 he led a mission to rescue Emin Pasha, the governor of Equatoria. Stanley settled the question of the source of the Nile and opened a vast territory which accelerated the desire of European countries to control African soil.

On July 12, 1890, Stanley married Dorothy Tennant. In 1895 he became a member of Parliament, and 4 years later he was knighted, receiving the Grand Cross of the Bath. He died on May 10, 1904, in London.

EWB

Stead, William Thomas (1849–1912), British journalist. William Stead was a prolific early practitioner of expose journalism in England. As an editor and writer for such periodicals as the *Pall Mall Gazette* and his *Review of Reviews*, he uncovered social ills and agitated for reform. While his writings are generally criticized for their sensationalism, Stead had a profound effect on turn-of-the-century English politics and journalism.

Stead was born into a large family at Embleton Manse, Northumberland, England. His father, a Congregational minister, educated Stead and his siblings at home, instilling in them a love of literature and a reverence for the Bible. Stead also received two years of formal schooling at Silcoates, a school for clergymen's sons near Wakefield in West Yorkshire. At the age of twenty-one, after briefly working as a clerk to the Russian vice consul in Newcastle, Stead became

the editor of the Darlington *Northern Echo*; he held this position from 1871 to 1880. In that period he succeeded in making the paper a powerful provincial voice of radical political views and Nonconformist religious sentiment.

In 1880 Stead was invited to London to work as assistant editor to John Morley on the *Pall Mall Gazette*. During his nine-year stay with the *Gazette*, Stead launched sensational, successful press campaigns to forge a strong Royal Navy, to repeal the Contagious Diseases Act, to raise the age of consent for girls from thirteen to sixteen years, and to ruin the political careers of Sir Charles W. Dilke and Charles Stewart Parnell, both of whom Stead considered immoral. Stead was also an outspoken proponent of home rule for Ireland, British Imperialism, and women's rights.

Under Stead's editorship the *Pall Mall Gazette* became one of the most powerful dailies in Great Britain. Throughout his career at the *Gazette*, Stead popularized the techniques of what Matthew Arnold would later term "the new journalism," making generous use of illustrations, headlines, and the personal interview, all of which were relatively new to British journalism at that time. In 1889 Stead left the *Gazette* to found his *Review of Reviews*, a monthly that featured summaries of news, essays, and stories drawn from various foreign and domestic periodicals and books. Stead used the *Review*, as he had the *Gazette*, as a personal pulpit from which he preached his numerous social and religious causes.

Stead's most notorious expose was *The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon*, published serially in the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1885 and compiled into pamphlet form later that year. In a four-day series of articles, Stead detailed in explicit terms the widespread and profitable activities of the vice underworld in London, focusing especially on child prostitution and white slavery. The series culminated with Stead's account of the purchase of a girl for five pounds, intended to demonstrate the ease with which children could be obtained by procurers.

The enormous public outcry against the articles intensified when it became apparent that this account was, as George Bernard Shaw later called it, a "put-up job" perpetrated by Stead himself. Enlisting the help of members of the Salvation Army, including the services of a converted procuress, Stead purchased thirteen-year-old Eliza Armstrong from her mother for five pounds, had Armstrong certified a virgin by a midwife, and installed the girl in a bordello. Before any harm could be done to the girl, she was removed from the house and sent to live with Salvationists in Paris. Stead and his cohorts were convicted on kidnapping charges; all received light sentences except

Stead, who was made to serve three months in Cold-bath Prison and Holloway Gaol.

Although his reputation and credibility were somewhat tarnished by the *Maiden Tribute* scandal, Stead continued to be a prominent critic of vice. Journeying to Chicago in 1894, he made a thorough investigation of the city's underworld, publishing a five hundred-page account of his findings titled *If Christ Came to Chicago: A Plea for the Union of All Who Love in the Service of All Who Suffer*. In 1895 Stead began publishing his "Masterpiece Library," a series of volumes aimed at making important literary works accessible to the working class and, especially, children. About one hundred pages each and profusely illustrated, the "Penny Poets," "Penny Novels," and "Books for the Bairns" series presented condensations or retellings of classics and biblical stories. The series sold over fourteen million copies during its more than thirty-year publication run.

In his efforts as a publisher of inexpensive pamphlet editions of his exposes and of the classics, Stead is regarded as a herald of the present era of cheap, accessible paperback books that place a diversity of reading matter within the reach of all classes of people. In later years Stead protested vociferously against the Boer War in South Africa; he also devoted himself increasingly to his interest in spiritualism, editing *Borderland*, a journal devoted to occultism, and publishing *Letter from Julia*, a volume of epistles that he claimed were transmitted to him by a deceased woman named Julia Ames. Stead died in the sinking of the *Titanic* in 1912.

In Stead's time the general public reacted to his journalism with distaste for his methods but appreciation for his sincerity and, usually, the realization that his exposes were truthful despite their often sensational tone. His detractors attacked his lack of regard for Victorian standards of propriety, or, questioned the truthfulness of his work. Although they often deplored his opinions and way of presenting information, Stead's associates agreed that he was a rigorous truth-seeker who thoroughly researched and believed in everything he published. Present-day critics praise Stead for his revitalizing role in British journalism, asserting that his work represented the advent of an aggressive new generation of correspondents who would not only report about political and social issues but would also raise those issues, effectively claiming an active role in revealing corruption and engendering change. Such works as *If Christ Came to Chicago* are recognized as models of journalistic research, requiring months of probing information sources as various as tax rolls, crime-ridden locales, the testimony of relief workers, and the statements of pros-

titutes and street people. While his writings and the political issues he covered have been largely forgotten, Stead's influence continues to be felt by any reader who buys an inexpensive paperback book or picks up an illustrated, headline-punctuated newspaper.

CA

Stolypin, Piotr Arkadevich (1862–1911), Russian statesman and reformer. Piotr Stolypin is known for his victory over anarchist forces, for his attempt to transform the Russian autocratic monarchy into a constitutional one, and for his land reform.

Piotr Stolypin was born in Baden. A country squire and landlord in Kovno, he was named marshal of the nobility of that province from 1887 to 1902. In 1903 he was appointed governor of the adjoining province of Grodno and a year later was transferred in the same capacity to Saratov on the Volga. There he ruthlessly put down the peasants, and his determination and personal courage led to his appointment as minister of the interior in 1906. Later that year he became prime minister.

Stolypin was the most competent and clear-sighted official to serve Tsar Nicholas II. His policy was twofold to bring law and order to society and to institute reform. An enemy of revolution and a conservative, Stolypin tried to break up the revolutionary groups and also to undermine their popular support through social and political reforms. As a monarchist and a constitutionalist, he wished to work harmoniously with the elected Duma in the passage of reform legislation.

An intelligent and well-educated man, Stolypin pondered for some time the poor condition of the Russian villages and concluded that the low level of rural economy was due to the fact that the land did not belong to the peasants. He realized also that Russia could not become a strong power until the majority of the Russian population the peasants became interested in the preservation of individual property. The Revolution of 1905 with its agrarian excesses only strengthened Stolypin's conviction on this point. He came to believe finally that the primary need of Russia was the creation of a class of well-to-do landowners.

Under Stolypin's agrarian reform law peasants made remarkable progress in obtaining private land ownership. Stolypin spared no money in order to consolidate and to increase the peasantry. He encouraged the practice of granting the peasants small credits; he maintained an army of land experts, land surveyors, and agronomists; and he spent large sums of money on public education.

Stolypin's creative efforts in the work of the state were not always within the limits of the constitutional

order at which he aimed. The introduction of local assemblies in the western province aroused the entire Russian people against him. The left wing and the center were indignant at such a flagrant violation of the constitution, and the right wing was indignant at his treatment of its leaders in the State Council. Stolypin was killed in Kiev on Sept. 18, 1911. His assassin was a double agent whose motives remain cloudy to this day.

EWB

Stopes, Marie (1880–1958), English scientist and writer.

Best known for her work as a pioneer in popularizing the use of birth control in the United Kingdom, Marie Stopes was also a prolific writer. While attracting the condemnation of the Catholic Church for her staunch advocacy of contraception and her establishment of Great Britain's first birth control clinic, Stopes's work as a social reformer would also pave the way for an increasing public acceptance of books on the subject of human sexuality.

Marie Stopes was a British scientist and writer who became an active proponent of sexual education and birth control in the early twentieth century. In books such as *Married Love* (1918), Stopes became one of the first people to publicly discuss romantic and sexual happiness in marriage. She also provided information on contraception through her clinics, lectures, and books, including *Wise Parenthood* (1918). While much of Stopes's information and advice was criticized by medical professionals and officials of the Roman Catholic church, her books enjoyed wide sales, demonstrating the public's need for the kind of well-explained practical advice that she offered.

Marie Charlotte Stopes was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, on October 15, 1880. Her parents were both well-educated with successful careers: her father, Henry Stopes, was an architect, and her mother, Charlotte Carmichael Stopes, was a Shakespeare expert who had been the first female graduate of a Scottish university. The family moved to London after Stopes's birth, and there she was educated at home by her mother until the age of 12. She was then sent to Edinburgh to begin classes at St. George's School. After a short period there, she moved to North London Collegiate, where she distinguished herself as a top student. Stopes attended University College, where she focused first on chemistry and later switched to an honors botany program. In 1902, she received her bachelor of science degree with honors in botany and geology.

Continuing to prepare herself for a scientific career, Stopes went to the Botanical Institute of Munich

University in Germany. There, she conducted her doctoral research on the reproduction processes of cycads, a type of tropical plant. She was awarded a doctoral degree with highest honors in 1904. Returning to England, she earned a doctor of science degree from London University, becoming the youngest person in Britain to do so. The same year, she overcame another boundary by becoming the first woman to join the science faculty of Manchester University. Stopes had a very successful scientific career; she conducted well-respected research on the history of angiosperms and she also studied the composition of coal. Her work earned her a grant from the British Royal Society, an organization of leading scientists, which allowed her to travel to Japan to conduct research in 1907 and 1908. This award was another first for a woman.

Returning to her post at Manchester for a time, Stopes published the first of her scientific works, *Ancient Plants*, published in 1910. In 1913, she accepted a position at University College and for the next seven years she lectured in paleobotany and wrote other books in her fields of specialty. These included *The Constitution of Coal*, published in 1918, and *The Four Visible Ingredients in Banded Bituminous Coal: Studies in the Composition of Coal*, published in 1919.

In 1911, Stopes married Reginald Ruggles Gates, a Canadian botanist; she did not take his surname, however, and would retain her maiden name throughout her life. The marriage was not successful, primarily due to Stopes's discovery that her new husband was impotent. She filed for an annulment, which was granted in 1916. The experience apparently left a strong impression on Stopes, who increasingly turned her energies from her scientific research and teaching to writing on the topics of love, marriage, and sex. After completing her first book in this area, *Married Love*, she found that publishers were unwilling to handle a book that engaged in such unabashed discussions of sexual relationships. In order to get her work published, Stopes sought financial backing elsewhere. During this time, she met the wealthy pilot Humphrey Verdon Roe, who shared her interests in promoting birth control. Roe agreed to lend her the money to publish the book, which was finally printed in 1918. Stopes and Roe were married that year in a civil ceremony at a registry office in May and a religious ceremony on June 19. In July of 1919, Stopes delivered a stillborn son, a tragedy for which she held her doctors responsible. This event may have played a role in her strong distrust of doctors for the rest of her life. Roe and Stopes were successful in having a child in 1924, when their son Harry Stopes-Roe was born.

Married Love was a great success. Her marriage manual did not present many new ideas, but was unique in presenting instruction and advice with uncomplicated language that was accessible to a wide audience. Her main contribution was promoting the idea that people should expect and strive for happiness in their personal and sexual relationships, a fairly radical idea for the time. The book drew a substantial amount of letters from readers, most of whom desired information on birth control. Stopes willingly obliged her readers by compiling her ideas on the topic in the book *Wise Parenthood* in 1918. In the book, she suggested that a cervical cap be used for contraception; she felt that this was the best method to use and never supported any other methods despite the criticism she received from medical doctors on the subject. *Wise Parenthood* continued Stopes's practice of providing often unavailable information on reproduction by using detailed drawings of human anatomy to educate readers about the physical facts of sexuality.

Other books on sex, marriage, and birth control by Stopes followed throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, including *A Letter to Working Mothers* (1919), *Radiant Motherhood* (1920), and *Enduring Passion* (1928). In addition, in 1921 she and her husband founded the first birth control clinic in London, the Mother's Clinic. The early 1920s brought a number of attacks on Stopes's work. Doctors criticized her promotion of the cervical cap, arguing that it was one of the most harmful methods of birth control for women. A Roman Catholic doctor, Halliday Sutherland, wrote a treatise accusing Stopes of using poor women for birth control experiments; she vehemently denied the charges and countered by suing Sutherland for libel. The highly publicized trials that followed ultimately resulted in Sutherland being cleared of the charges, but brought Stopes an incredible amount of attention, resulting in her popularity as a public speaker. She also published a formal rebuttal to the Church's attacks on her work in the 1933 book, *Roman Catholic Methods of Birth Control*.

Stopes's later years were marked by a growing sense of frustration and isolation. She and Roe were separated in 1938, at which time she moved into a home in Norbury Park in England. After she expressed disapproval over her son's marriage, she also lost touch with him for a long time. She reportedly became disillusioned with her humanitarian causes and retreated into literary pursuits, producing a number of poorly received collections of love poetry such as *Love Songs for Young Lovers* (1939), *We Burn* (1950), and *Joy and Verity* (1952). The battles that she did take on were obscure and unsuccessful, notably her fight to obtain a state pension for the poet Lord

Alfred Douglas. She held the belief that physical health could be maintained with a regimen of cold baths and drinking a daily glass of sea water; because of this and her distrust of doctors, she did not immediately seek medical attention when signs of illness appeared. She was finally diagnosed with advanced breast cancer, but refused standard treatment. Instead she underwent some holistic therapy in Switzerland before returning to Norbury Park and dying on October 2, 1958.

A flamboyant and often arrogant figure who considered herself the best authority on the topics of love, marriage, sex, and birth control, Stopes was criticized during her lifetime for advancing ideas that were in some cases outdated and not proper for all people. But much of the opposition she encountered also stemmed from the fact that she dared to address topics that were still considered improper for public discussion at that time. Fighting this mentality, which she felt led to ignorance and unhappiness in sexual matters, Stopes provided information that was eagerly sought by the public. Her success in changing attitudes about romantic relationships and parenthood was apparent in the popularity of her books and the enormous public response that they generated.

EWB

T

Taine, Hippolyte Adolphe (1828–1893), French critic and historian. Hippolyte Taine was one of the most prominent intellectual figures of his period in France. His emphasis on scientific methods in criticism formed the basis of contemporary critical techniques.

Hippolyte Taine was born in Vouziers in the Ardennes on April 21, 1828, into a family of civil servants. His childhood was spent in an enlightened cultural atmosphere in which earnest intellectual pursuits mingled with an early exposure to the arts and to nature. By the age of 14, when he moved to Paris with his widowed mother, he had developed an intense intellectuality matched only by his profound love of nature.

Taine's passion for knowledge and especially for philosophy made him highly receptive to the multitude of intellectual and scientific trends of his time. By the time he had completed his university studies at the *École Normale Supérieure*, he had investigated almost every philosophical and scientific concept known. Upon leaving the university he was prepared to formulate his own critical apparatus in order to investigate bodies of knowledge.

Taine's most productive years coincided with the reign of Napoleon III. The Second Empire, beneath its social glitter and economic growth, was highly oppressive to liberal intellectuals. Taine abandoned all hopes of a professorial career at the university. He withdrew from public life and devoted his energies to research in a large variety of fields. All of his studies centered on the problem of the human condition and were underlain by his naive but honest belief in the explicability of human nature by means of scientific inquiry.

The culmination of this belief found its expression in Taine's central work, *De l'intelligence* (1870). It summed up all his previous interests in psychology and philosophy and fused the converging lines of his critical thought. His works preceding *De l'intelligence* encompass a great variety of interests and touch on almost every phase of intellectual and artistic production. His dissertation on the fables of Jean de La Fontaine, completed in 1853 and published in its final form in 1860 (*La Fontaine et ses fables*), was a presentation of Taine's concept of esthetics. It expressed in essence his doctrine of scientific determinism by attributing "racial" distinctions to climatic and geographical differences. His work on the French philosophers of the 19th century (*Les Philosophes français du XIX siècle*, 1857) was a critical evaluation of the major philosophical concepts of the century, and his essays on a wide variety of subjects represented a further elaboration of his critical system. These volumes included *Essais de critique et d'histoire* (1858), *Nouveaux essais* (1865), and *Derniers essais* (1894).

Taine formulated his critical system most clearly in the introduction to the five volumes of one of his major works, *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* (1863). He stated that every reality, psychological, esthetic, or historical, can be reduced to a distinctly definable formula by discovering in each reality a single operative principle. This basic principle is governed by a system of laws that he reduced to his famous triad of race, environment, and time ("la race, le milieu, le moment"). Taine applied this critical system in all of his works, including his analyses of the development of the arts of Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands, presented in a series of lectures spanning more than 20 years at the École des Beaux-Arts and published in two volumes, *Philosophie de l'art* (1865–1869).

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 profoundly disturbed Taine. From then until his death, he applied himself to an analysis of French history in an attempt to uncover the causes of France's defeat and the Commune of 1871 (*Les Origines de la France contemporaine*, 1875–1893). He died in Paris on March 9, 1893.

EWB

Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, duc de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754–1838), French statesman. Talleyrand remains the classic case of a successful turncoat in politics. For half a century he served every French regime except that of the Revolutionary "Terror."

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand was a masterful diplomat of the old school as ambassador and foreign minister. Admired and often distrusted, sometimes even feared by those he served, he was not easily replaced as a negotiator of infinite wiles. Talleyrand has been an extraordinarily difficult figure for historians to understand and appraise. His moral corruption is beyond question: he was an unabashed liar and deceiver; he not only took but sought bribes from those with whom he was negotiating; and he lived with a niece as his mistress for decades. He repeatedly shifted political allegiance without visible compunction and possessed no political principle on which he would stand firm to the last; and he was also at least technically guilty of treason, engaging in secret negotiations with the public enemies of his country while in its service.

Yet closer scrutiny of what Talleyrand did shows an apparent steady purpose beneath the crust of arrogant contempt for the ordinary standards of mankind's judgment, expressed in the comment attributed to him on the kidnaping and execution of the Duc d'Enghien at Napoleon's command: "It was worse than a crime, it was a mistake." Talleyrand had his own vision of the interests of France, which lay in making the transition from the Old Regime to the new as painless as possible, at the same time preserving the territorial interests of the French nation. His fidelity to whichever persons happened to be at the head of the French state lasted at best only as long as their power, but this matchless cynic seems to have possessed genuine devotion for France as a country, and his apparent treasons can be seen as the products of a higher loyalty. Yet this picture of him may be false, for Talleyrand destroyed many of the records by which the truth regarding his career could have been more closely reached. It is easier to decide his guilt than to specify what he was guilty of, easier to affirm his deeper innocence than to prove it. The problem lies both in the man himself and in the eye of the beholder.

Education and Priesthood. Talleyrand was born in Paris on Feb. 13, 1754, into one of the most ancient and distinguished families of the French nobility. As the eldest son of Charles Daniel, Comte de Talleyrand, a lieutenant general in the French army, he was destined to follow his father's career until a

childhood accident caused a permanent injury. His father compelled him to accept a career in the Church over Talleyrand's protests, for he had no vocation as a priest. But he took Holy Orders in 1775 after studies at the Collège d'Harcourt, a secondary school, and at the seminary in Reims. His rapid promotions came to him as an ecclesiastical administrator with powerful backing, not as a shepherd of souls. His first important post was as general agent for the assembly of the French clergy in 1780, negotiating with the government for the "voluntary" payments made by churchmen in lieu of the taxes from which they were exempt. Then, in 1788, he was appointed bishop of Autun and was consecrated the next year, as the French Revolution was about to begin.

Elected to the Estates General as a deputy of the clergy, Talleyrand quickly showed that he wished the First Estate to cooperate in the transformation of the Old Regime into a new order, even at the expense of its own privileges. Passing over into open opposition to the court, he was influential in persuading his fellow ecclesiastics to join the Third Estate in the newly proclaimed National Assembly on June 19, 1789. He proposed on October 10 that the vast properties of the Church be put at the disposal of the state in exchange for salaries to be paid by the state, and in line with this policy he accepted the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and was one of the consecrators of the new bishops established under its provisions. For these violations of Church discipline, Pope Pius VI excommunicated Talleyrand in 1791. His report on public education in September 1791 won wide praise for its principles but was never applied.

Diplomatic Missions and Exile. In 1792 Talleyrand repeatedly went to England as an unofficial envoy with the mission of keeping that country neutral in the war beginning with Austria and Prussia, but the French invasion of the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) as well as the rise of revolutionary extremism, culminating in the execution of Louis XVI, brought England into the war in 1793. Talleyrand, condemned as an émigré by the Revolutionary authorities at home, was expelled by England in 1794, and he went to the United States for 2 years. There he visited many parts of the country and probably engaged in land speculation.

In 1796, after the formation of the Directory, Talleyrand returned to France. He was named to the Institute and became foreign minister in July 1797. He took part in the coup d'état of 18 Fructidor (Sept. 4, 1797), which confirmed the republican regime against royalist conspiracies, and he pocketed a fortune in bribes from those who wanted his favor (al-

though the American negotiators in the "XYZ affair" not only rebuffed his demands for money but made them public on their return home). He was forced to resign the Foreign Ministry in July 1799, when his republicanism fell under suspicion. His destiny then became intertwined with that of Gen. Napoleon Bonaparte, whose expedition to Egypt Talleyrand had sponsored and whom he helped to come to power in the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire (Nov. 9, 1799).

Napoleon's Foreign Minister. Talleyrand served as foreign minister for Napoleon under the Consulate and the Empire until August 1807 and was rewarded in 1804 with the post of grand chamberlain and in 1806 with the title of Prince de Benevento (French, Bénévent). However, his relations with the Emperor became clouded as Napoleon's obsessive aggressiveness became clear to him. Talleyrand wanted to end the exhausting wars against the recurring European coalitions by making peace with England and Russia, the principal foes, on terms that preserved for France its major territorial gains. Remaining in the Emperor's service, he began a perilous game of intrigues designed to thwart his master's ambitions. In 1808 at Erfurt he encouraged Tsar Alexander I to resist Napoleon's demands and was dismissed in 1809 by the suspicious Napoleon but allowed to reside at his country estate. However, after the invasion of Russia in 1812, Talleyrand began a secret correspondence with Louis XVIII and, as head of a provisional government established on April 1, 1814, was a principal figure in the King's first restoration.

Congress of Vienna. Again named foreign minister, Talleyrand skillfully maneuvered to win the full support of the Allies for the Bourbons, obtained relatively favorable terms for France in the first Peace of Paris, then played upon the dissensions of the victors to gain a place for France among the negotiators at the Congress of Vienna, and finally turned the victors against each other to France's advantage. This brilliant feat of diplomacy was partly dimmed by the wrath of the Allies when France welcomed Napoleon back in the Hundred Days, but the final peace terms that emerged from the Vienna negotiations brought France back to its prerevolutionary frontiers.

Upon the second restoration of Louis XVIII, Talleyrand served as prime minister and foreign minister from July until September, but the ultraroyalists who dominated the new government were less forgiving than the king, least of all of an apostate bishop, and Talleyrand lost his office. However, he received the title of Duc de Dino in 1815, in place of the princely title of Benevento, which had been extin-

guished with Napoleon's departure, and in 1817 he became Duc de Talleyrand-Périgord. During the remainder of the reign of Louis XVIII, Talleyrand was a member of the Chamber of Peers, where he often voted against the government.

Final Diplomatic Achievements. After the Revolution of 1830, in which he was a minor participant but encouraged Louis Philippe to take the crown, Talleyrand was sent to London as ambassador. He negotiated an agreement with England, upon recognition of the new independent Belgian state, that was favorable to French interests. The signing of the Quadruple Alliance of 1834 (with England, Spain, and Portugal), which assured Anglo-French collaboration in support of the constitutional government in Spain against the Carlist rebels, was Talleyrand's final achievement as a diplomat. He died in Paris on May 17, 1838, soon after becoming reconciled with the Roman Catholic Church.

EWB

Tawney, Richard Henry (1880–1962), British economic historian and social philosopher. Richard Tawney was an influential Fabian socialist and an adviser to governments.

Richard Tawney was born in Calcutta, India, on Nov. 30, 1880, the son of a distinguished civil servant and Sanskrit scholar. Educated at Rugby and Balliol College, Oxford, he graduated in classics in 1903 and then lived and worked at Toynbee Hall settlement in London. From 1906 to 1908 he lectured in economics at Glasgow University and then was a pioneer teacher for the Oxford University Tutorial Classes Committee until the outbreak of war in 1914. He was wounded at the Battle of the Somme in 1916.

Tawney was an ardent supporter of the Workers' Educational Association, serving as a member of its executive (1905) and president (1928–1944). His adult teaching, especially at Rochdale, is now legendary. His first seminal work of scholarship was *The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century* (1912), dedicated to his tutorial classes, in which he traced the impact of commercialism on English agriculture and society.

In 1918 Tawney became a fellow of Balliol. The following year he was appointed reader in economic history at the London School of Economics; he was professor of economic history there from 1931 to 1949. He was a founder member and later president of the Economic History Society and, for 7 years, joint editor of its *Review*. His editions of economic documents became standard sources for students, as did his two studies of economic morality and practice

in Tudor and Stuart England: his edition of Thomas Wilson's *Discourse upon Usury* (1925) and his classic *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926). Like his other major works, including *The Rise of the Gentry* (1954), *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* was substantially criticized by later scholars, and its conclusions were later modified. Nevertheless, its power and seminal influence were universally recognized, so much so that the 17th century is often described as "Tawney's century." In 1958 he published his long-awaited study *Lionel Cranfield: Business and Politics under James I*, which was generally acclaimed by scholars.

Throughout Tawney's life, scholarship and action were interconnected. His 1914 monograph on wage rates in the chain-making industry led to his presidency of the Chain-Making Trade Board (1919–1922). In 1919 he was a leading figure on the Sankey Coal Commission, and subsequently he served as adviser on educational matters to the Labour party, member of the Consultative Committee of the Board of Education and the Cotton Trade Conciliation Board, and Labour attaché at the British embassy in Washington during World War II. His ideas exerted a profound influence on the philosophy of the British left. His expanded Fabian Society pamphlet *The Acquisitive Society* (1922) and his essay "Equality" (1931) contained severe moral condemnations of the capitalist economic and social system.

Tawney possessed a rare combination of qualities: humility, personal asceticism bordering on eccentricity, exceptional literary skills, deep scholarship, and a rare capacity to inspire his fellowmen with ideals of humanity and social justice. He died in London on Jan. 16, 1962.

EWB

Teresa of Avila (1515–1582), Catholic nun and reformer.

The Protestant Reformation of the early and mid-16th century provoked a crisis for those Christians who remained loyal to the Catholic Church. Aware that it was in many ways corrupt and that spiritual life had become diluted by secular concerns, Catholic reformers tried to recover the integrity of primitive Christianity without violating Catholic tradition and the religious authorities. The effort at an internal Catholic reformation was particularly intense in Spain, where Saint Ignatius Loyola, Saint John of the Cross, and an influential group of Christian humanists created new religious orders and a new form of spirituality. None of these Catholic reformers was more successful than Saint Teresa of Avila, creator of the Discalced Carmelites and an influential spiritual writer.

Spain in the 16th century was an aristocratic society obsessed by the idea of blood purity (*limpieza de sangre*) which in our eyes seems no better than a form of fanatical racism. Recently reunited by the “Catholic Kings”—Ferdinand and Isabella—after a long era of fragmentation and partial Muslim occupation, Spain had a large population of Moors and Jews who had converted to Christianity under threat of expulsion or death. The Spanish Inquisition, doubting the sincerity of some of these conversions, launched periodic investigations of *conversos*; among them, in 1485, was Juan Sanchez, a rich textile trader of Jewish descent and Teresa’s grandfather. After a hearing where he confessed to “many grave crimes and offences against our Holy Catholic Faith,” he was publicly humiliated in the Inquisition’s *auto de fe*, a procession of backsliders bearing extinguished candles in the streets of Toledo (to show that the light of salvation had gone out in their souls). Despite his confession, his “crimes” cannot have been very grave or he would have been put to death.

Surviving the ordeal and working to expunge its memory by dynastic alliances with older Catholic families, Juan Sanchez moved to the nearby city of Avila in Castile; there, his son Alonso, a taxgatherer and financier, lived an ostentatious life, fathering Teresa de Ahumada by his second wife. Teresa grew up in the protected environment of an honor-conscious society and faced the prospect of either marriage or taking the veil; no other alternatives presented themselves to high-born women of her age. As a child, she enjoyed romantic fiction, of the kind which Cervantes later lampooned in *Don Quixote*, and she seems to have had a brief flirtation with a young man connected with her family. They responded by placing her in a nunnery, where—after an early shock at this comparatively spartan life—she came to believe that she had a lifetime’s vocation.

The convent of the Incarnation in Avila was centrally placed in the city and, although the nuns were supposed to be cloistered, there was in fact a good deal of contact between the nuns and the other citizens of the town. The Carmelite nuns had for two centuries deviated from the austere ideals of their founders, and within the convent, social distinctions from the outside were still observed. Wealthier nuns, such as Teresa herself, had to bring a “dowry” to the convent, just as they would have had to take one to a husband; by this means, and by promises of payment from novices’ parents, the convent was sure of a steady income. The more privileged and high-born nuns had private rooms rather than sleeping in the dormitory shared by poor nuns; they had their own servants (even slaves in a few cases); and they continued to

enjoy the honorific name “Doña” inside the convent just as they had outside.

A custom had also developed that if a woman in one of the major families in Avila needed a female companion in times of bereavement or stress she could summon one from the convent to spend time with her; on several occasions, Teresa was thus called away from the Incarnation for periods of months at a time. Thus, she spent two years with Doña Guiomar de Ulloa, an influential widow who became one of Teresa’s principal benefactors in her later experiments in reforming the Carmelite order. In the same way, she would return to her family in times of sickness. During one such sickness, when she was in her early 20s, Teresa was so near death that her family had dropped wax onto her eyes, a local custom with the dead, before she surprised them by reviving. The episodic nature of convent life, along with the free access of outsiders to the residents, made the Carmelite existence a relatively relaxed affair in Teresa’s youth.

Teresa Experiences Revelations, Visions.

Without ever complaining about the convent life, she began to draw attention to herself by an exceptional form of spirituality. Sometimes while praying, she would receive messages from Christ, usually in the form of sudden convictions sown in her mind as she meditated. As her life continued, they became more intense and insistent, giving her at times the radiant assurance that she was in direct contact with God. Fearing nevertheless that she might somehow be under the influence of the devil, like some recently denounced spiritual charlatans, she treated her own revelations guardedly and consulted a succession of confessors about how to proceed. Most of them, similarly afraid of a demonic visitation, and responding to the defensive Spanish religious mood of the times which regarded any novelty as a possible sign of “Lutheranism,” discouraged her. But then a meeting at Doña Guiomar de Ulloa’s house with Peter of Alcantara, a reformer who believed in reviving the early Christian life of heroic austerity, led her to recover confidence. Peter of Alcantara assured her that her visions came from God and that she should heed them.

Her religious development continued through her 20s and 30s and became progressively more intense; at times, she would enter a trancelike state, which local people sought to oversee out of fascination. Particularly embarrassing to her were episodes of involuntary levitation during prayer, which had induced weightlessness, widely reported and seemingly well authenticated at the time.

Whatever our judgment of Teresa's reports of divine visitation it is certain that she was a woman of courage, integrity, and resolve. In response to one confessor's request, she wrote her life history, which now constitutes our best source of information about her experiences; written in a form influenced by Saint Augustine's *Confessions*, which she had read and admired, it speaks of her as a dreadful sinner and attributes all her merits to God.

She Works to Reform Convent. As she advanced into middle age at the Incarnation convent, her sense of dissatisfaction with life there, coupled with the promoting of her visions, led her to attempt a reform of the convent; in this project several of her relatives, also young nuns, were eager to cooperate. Hoping to revive the old simplicity of Carmelite life, she arranged to acquire a house in another part of Avila and to live there with a handful of like-minded disciples. It seemed to her that the only way she as a woman could help to prevent the spread of heresy throughout Europe was to pray more fervently and to live a more devout life, and in its way she saw her reform as a missionary activity, even though it did not require leaving home ground.

The experiment faced many obstacles. First, Teresa wanted to live without the financial security which was enjoyed by the other monastic houses of Avila, but to trust entirely to alms, like Jesus. She would accept "dowries" if they were offered but would not make them a condition of admission; a novice's character alone would be decisive. She would make no distinction between the rich and poor, noble and plebeian, within the house; all titles would be dropped and the nuns would call one another "sister." It may be that as the descendant of *conversos*, even rich ones, she remained sensitive to the disadvantages of those without the coveted degrees of blood purity. In her book *The Way of Perfection*, Teresa explained that this dramatic contrast with the outside world was a way of reminding the sisters that "it is the Lord who provides for all in common" and that they were freed from trying to please their relatives outside the walls.

The city authorities, the local bishop, and many noble families protested against the plan, on the grounds that it would disrupt a convenient way of life (in which convent and city interacted to the convenience of the city) and that it would deny their daughters the honors and dignity they had previously preserved as nuns. Besides, with the way things stood, the twice-yearly payments the families made to a convent guaranteed its continued association with, even dependence on, *them*, a dependence which was now threatened. They also feared that a convent without

regular means of support could easily become a burden on the finances of the city. As the gilt was already peeling off the facade of Spain's "golden age," in the form of bad harvests, inflation, and urban discontent, these were grave matters.

Teresa had sufficient supporters among the clergy and lay nobility, however, that she was able to persist, and she was steadied by a vision of Peter of Alcantara, recently deceased, who urged her not to falter. On the day that her convent opened, it was surrounded by a chanting mob of angry townsmen who tried to break down the door. Teresa's diplomatic gifts, and her capacity to win over once-intractable opponents, ultimately secured for her the right of the Convent of St. Joseph to exist in Avila and a law suit against it was resolved. The small but well-educated and influential religious reform party in Avila was pleased to see this example of discipline and religious humility in the heart of the city as a form of living sermon to the other residents. For Teresa, the simple life of this new convent was much superior to the luxuries of the old; most of her supporters, many of them cousins, agreed, but a few were unable to endure it and returned to the Incarnation with her consent. Sleeping on straw mattresses, without servants, wearing harsh sackcloth robes, the sisters at St. Joseph were soon afflicted by a plague of lice in their clothes and hair, but after intercessory prayers by Teresa she reported that the lice departed once and for all.

She called her reformed sisterhood the "Discalced Carmelites." *Discalced* means that they did not wear shoes but went barefoot, again in tribute to Jesus' simplicity and suffering.

When St. Joseph's was established, Teresa, again prompted by divine visitation, moved to establish another convent, at the market town of Medina del Campo. This and her other houses were usually in market centers (including Toledo, Segovia, and Seville) because urban centers alone seemed likely to be able to provide the money in occasional benefactions which her new rule specified. Later, when rural houses were established, some kind of regular financing became imperative or they would have foundered quickly. The cities also possessed large converso populations, and the merchants and professionals who sympathized with the new spirituality of Catholic reform, rather than the older legalistic form of faith, looked more favorably on Teresa's reforms.

Teresa Establishes More Convents. Despite recurrent illnesses, Teresa lived into her late 60s, the last year being the most active, as she moved from place to place in Spain establishing new convents of the Discalced Carmelites—a total of 17 in her last 20

years. Inspired by her example, Carmelite friars as well as nuns began to organize reforms, the most distinguished of whom was Friar (ultimately Saint) John of the Cross, who for a time was Teresa's confessor. He was many years her junior and admired her greatly but could still rebuke her when necessary. "When you make your confession, Mother," he told her on one occasion, "you have a way of finding the prettiest excuses." Around him gathered many stories of supernatural events and stern dealings with demonic interventions; one of the nuns of St. Joseph's was "lifted bodily from her feet and left suspended upside down in the air until ordered back to her stall by St. John of the Cross" while another was "glued so firmly to the ground that no one could make her budge until she was released by a mere glance from the friar."

As the Discalced Carmelites established themselves, however, the older "Calced" branch became increasingly suspicious and resentful; they used their influence with the authorities to prevent new houses—even when guaranteed an income by wealthy enthusiasts—from being established, so that some of Teresa's long and difficult journeys across Spain were made in vain. They also arranged for the imprisonment of John of the Cross in Toledo where he was flogged and ordered to abandon the Reformers; although he steadfastly refused.

John of the Cross's sufferings ended after eight months when he managed to escape, but he was so sick that Teresa thought he would die in any case.

A papal nuncio to whom Teresa appealed that the Calced and Discalced Carmelites might be officially divided into two separate congregations (the only way she could see to end the conflict) was not at first disposed to listen sympathetically. His attack in turn, however, aroused Teresa's growing body of friends and supporters within Spain who sent reassuring messages to Rome about her good qualities (and those of John of the Cross). Finally, in June 1580, she managed to get a brief from the Pope officially dividing the Carmelites into two distinct provinces and settling most of the points of conflict between the branches.

Teresa traveled extensively right up to the end of her life and endured a long coach ride during her final illness. Neither did death bring an end to her peregrinations. The nuns who attended her in her final illness reported that her sickroom was filled with a delicious aroma, and those who laid her to rest discovered that her body was immune to decay, another sign, in their view, of her exceptional sanctity. Far from decomposing, her body emitted a sweet aroma ("the odor of sanctity") not only at first but for years thereafter as it was repeatedly dug up and examined. Not only was it inspected; the body was also moved

from place to place as rival convents and cities vied to get their hands on what was now a holy relic. And with each exhumation parts of the miraculously preserved body were hacked off to be used as relics: first a finger, next an arm, later the heart (which was said to bear signs of the angels piercing spear) until by the next century the incorruptible body was scarcely more than a fragment. Forty years after her death, in 1622, Teresa of Jesus was named a saint while the order she had founded continued to endure, though it had been forced early to accept permanent endowments as the only viable way of surviving the economic austerities of a Spain which was now entering a long period of decline and senescence.

HWL

Thiers, Louis Adolphe (1797–1877), French journalist, historian, and statesman. Adolphe Thiers was the most gifted of the literary statesmen who were an important feature of 19th-century French political life.

Born at Marseilles on April 16, 1797, Adolphe Thiers attended the local lycée and studied law at Aix. Though admitted to the bar, he forsook the legal profession to become a journalist. Moving to Paris in 1821, Thiers became a contributor to the *Constitutionnel*, a Liberal paper, and began the *History of the French Revolution* (10 vols., 1823–1827; trans., 5 vols., 1895), a sympathetic account which established his reputation as a man of letters. The work suffered from diffuseness, casuistry, bias against those with whom he disagreed, and omission of inconvenient facts, all of which evoked the protest from many participants in the described events that he had treated them and their cause unjustly.

Brilliant but arrogant, energetic but antagonistic, Thiers embarked upon a successful but controversial political career under the July Monarchy. With the financial backing of Jacques Lafitte, in 1830 Thiers joined F. A. M. Mignet and N. A. Carrel in founding the National and launching an editorial campaign to replace the Bourbon with an Orleanist dynasty. A member of the haute bourgeoisie, he played a prominent role in the July Revolution and in the ascendancy of the Duc d'Orléans to the throne. Elected deputy for Aix, he soon became the leader of the Left Center, which wanted to broaden the suffrage to include the lower bourgeoisie and thought that the King should reign but not rule.

After the fall of the Lafitte ministry (March 1831), Thiers became less liberal, and, following the suppression of the Republican insurrection of June 1832, he became minister of the interior in the Soult government. During the next 4 years Thiers advanced

from one portfolio to another until he became premier (February–September 1836). The brevity of his ministry is explained by the opposition of François Guizot, leader of the Right Center, and the hostility of Louis Philippe, who resented his ambition and arrogance. In March 1840 Thiers again became premier but held the post only 6 months before his rash support of Egypt during the second Mohammed Ali crisis brought France to the brink of war with Britain and caused the King to dismiss him (Oct. 29, 1840). He continued to sit in the Chamber but seldom spoke until 1846, when he began a campaign of opposition against the Guizot ministry. When it fell on Feb. 23, 1848, the King again turned to Thiers, but this action came too late. The next day, Thiers, loyal to the end, advised Louis Philippe to leave the capital and besiege it until it could be assaulted. The King, however, rejected the plan and repaired instead to England.

Under the Second Republic, Thiers posed as a conservative republican. The “red scare” created by the June Days so intimidated him that he supported L. E. Cavaignac’s bloody suppression of the workers. He backed Louis Napoleon for president, however, in the belief that, if Louis Napoleon was elected, his presumed ineptitude would pave the way for the restoration of the Orleanist dynasty. Elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1849, Thiers, Voltairean skeptic though he was, even voted for the Falloux Law (1850) because he saw the Church as an ally against the socialists. Arrested at the time of the coup of 1851, the former premier went into English exile, but within a year the Prince President granted him amnesty.

Returning to Paris in 1852, Thiers spent the next decade completing the *History of the Consulate and the Empire* (trans., 20 vols., 1845–1862), a work begun in 1840. So pro-Napoleon as to be panegyric, it suffered, too, from the same faults which marred his first history and provoked the same criticism.

In 1863 Thiers resumed his political career as a deputy for Paris. A severe critic of Napoleon III’s foreign policy, he blamed it for France’s loss of prestige. After 1866 he repeatedly warned the Emperor of the Prussian menace, but few of his countrymen took his Philippic seriously. The consequences of unpreparedness were, of course, the defeat of France and the fall of Napoleon III.

On Sept. 4, 1870, the Third Republic replaced the Second Empire and opened the way for Thiers’s third and greatest ascendancy. Elected provisional executive by the Assembly on Feb. 16, 1871, he at once negotiated with Bismarck the Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10) and soon thereafter (May 21–28) crushed the Paris Commune. On August 30 a grateful France elected him president, and for the next 2 years he gave

the infant republic the stability and direction that it so desperately needed. A strong executive and a skillful parliamentary leader, Thiers earned the sobriquet “Adolphe I.” But on May 24, 1873, a monarchist majority, which regarded him a turncoat, forced him to resign. The “grand old man” continued to sit in the Assembly until his death on Sept. 3, 1877.

EWB

Thomas, Keith (1933–), author and intellectual. The typical Englishman of the period 1500–1800 saw himself as the center of the universe, with the various animals and plants placed on earth to serve his own purposes. With *Man and the Natural World: A History of the Modern Sensibility*, author Keith Thomas examines the evolving relationship between civilized man and his wild environment in a book “alive with the color and charm of nature itself,” according to Michael Kitch in a *Washington Post Book World* article.

As Thomas describes life during this technologically and socially active segment of English history, humans often had whimsical or complicated classifications regarding the animals in their lives: “Hanoverian cows were given names—Gentle, Lovely, Mother-like or Welcome Home—but pigs and sheep were not,” writes London *Times* critic Michael Ratcliff. “Seventeenth-century dogs were allowed in church, even at the communion rail, but were hanged like felons if they had killed or been otherwise ‘wicked’; cats and cocks were fair game for torture, but no creature was eaten which had been a worker or given pleasure as a pet, and horsemeat never took on.” The author, says Ratcliff, “is an historian of infinite curiosity and vast reading, and [*Man and the Natural World*] covers an extraordinary range of subjects, among them gardening, folklore, forestry, cruelty, refinement, fashion, class, battery pig farmers in the sixteenth century, ornamental dogs at the Stuart court, the shift from country to town and the rise of a sentimental nostalgia for the land. In the process he surprises, informs and entertains on every page, and detects a tragic paradox within an inexhaustible comedy of English manners and life.”

“There is a lot to trace,” acknowledges Noel Perrin. Writing about *Man and the Natural World* in the *New York Times Book Review*, Perrin recounts: “At the beginning of the period, nearly all Englishmen took for granted that the sole function of other life-forms was to serve man. Flies served to remind us of the shortness of life. Lobsters were not only good to eat (a 16th-century gentleman remarked), they provided the diner with valuable exercise as he cracked their claws—and their wonderful armor made a good subject for military contemplation. Those plants that

gave us neither food nor medicine often gave us messages from God. So did birds.” Paradoxically, Thomas suggests that we turned our conscience to nature only when its conquest was nearly complete,” states Kitch.” The environmental ethic, he explains, arose with prosperity, but prosperity wrenched from nature itself. His explanation leads him to a dilemma. For man has come to look upon himself as a predator, if a remorseful one, saddled with reconciling the ascendancy over nature that civilization requires with the sensitivity to nature that civilization fosters.”

While Perrin cites some faults with Thomas’s work—the author, he says, “has a tendency to treat all his quotations equally, as if levels of seriousness in speech did not exist and context did not matter”—the reviewer also feels that the book “has two great charms. One is the almost incredible wealth of supporting detail. . . . [The other is the author’s] gift for apt quotation. One hears a thousand or more voices in this book, most of them lively.” As an example Perrin refers to “the voice of an indignant nobleman, Lord Sheffield, who said of his children’s tutor, ‘He would maintain to my face that both hawks and hounds, which I did then and do now moderately delight in, were not ordained by God for man’s recreation, but for adorning the world.’ The tutor failed to gain tenure. The book is full of these delights.”

Concludes Kitch: “[The author] puts history to its highest purpose and achieves it in a style at once pleasing and perceptive. *Man and the Natural World*, like a favored guidebook, is both a reliable guide and a congenial companion.”

CA

Thompson, E. P. (1924–1993), English historian. Edward Palmer Thompson was born in Boar’s Hill in Oxford, England. His American mother, Theodosia Jessup Thompson, the daughter of Henry Jessup, who founded the American Mission in Lebanon, was a Methodist missionary in India. His British father, Edward John Thompson, whose parents were also Methodist missionaries in India, taught Bengali at Oxford, in addition to writing poetry, upon returning to England from India in 1923. Poets and Indian independence agitators, like Nehru, who gave young Edward few lessons in the game of cricket, gravitated to the Thompsons’ home in Boar’s Hill.

Like his father before him, Thompson attended the Methodist Kingswood private school near Bath. Too young to join the British Army in 1941, he enrolled for courses in literature and history at Cambridge University, joining the British Communist Party in the same year. A year after he joined the army in 1942, he was in charge of a tank company as a lieu-

tenant in the British Six Armoured Division, fighting first in North Africa then in Italy. Back in Cambridge, he met Dorothy Towers in 1946. They were married two years later in 1948, after working in Yugoslavia together with a group of young communists to build a 150-mile railroad from Slavonia to Bosnia. They moved to Halifax, Yorkshire, where Thompson taught English to adult education classes in the department of Extra-Mural Studies at Leeds University, during which time he wrote *The Making of the English Working Class*, the book that made him famous.

The book was published in 1963, during a time when the cold war was at its hottest, Stalin’s barbarity had been exposed by Khrushchev in 1956, capitalism was showing impressive growth, contrary to what the communists had predicted, and the English working class was exhibiting alarming apathy. By writing the book, Thompson wanted to rescue the working class from historical oblivion. Rather than being a passive outcome of historical economic change, Thompson argued, the English working class had essentially created itself by 1832. Be that as it may, what is important about Thompson’s book is that it forced a sharp turn to the left in the historical research and writing about the working class. It was no longer possible to dismiss the development of the working class simply as a result of changing economic conditions. The response to *The Making of the English Working Class* was immediate and forceful. Some questioned the theoretical purity of Thompson’s method in interpreting social history within the Marxist model, and feminists pointed to his implicit gendered approach. The book, however impure theoretically and methodologically it was or not, had nonetheless introduced a new approach to writing social history.

In 1965 Thompson moved to Warwick to head Warwick University’s Center of Social Studies. Six years later, in 1971, after his wife had secured a history professorship at Birmingham University, Thompson ended his teaching career to devote himself to the research and writing of history.

When the United States decided to position new nuclear missiles in England in 1979, Thompson joined Ken Coates in creating the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) organization. Thompson called for the de-nuclearization and neutralization of both East and West Europe. Hundreds of thousands would eventually listen to Thompson speak in antinuclear rallies. He believed that global nuclear holocaust was the only possible outcome if the cold war was allowed to continue. Though Thompson may have been justly accused of being naive, he nonetheless believed that ordinary people, in both East and West, could change

the course of history and end the cold war in Europe by their demonstrations.

Through his historical research, his political activism and his teaching, Thompson has indeed rescued the working class from historical oblivion, as he had intended. He clearly demonstrated how individual working men and women, through their daily struggle, had been active agents in the creation of their own working class. Thompson's approach to history from below created doubts about the adequacy of the deterministic historical model, where the individual human agency in shaping history is completely lacking. After his resignation from the British Communist Party in 1956 and his rejection of Louis Althusser's structural-functionalism in his book, *The Poverty of Theory*, Thompson was determined to expose the terrible consequences of historical determinism by demonstrating how Althusser's structural-functionalism could be used to justify Stalin's atrocities.

Mohammed Arkawi

Tocqueville, Alexis Charles Henri Maurice Clérel de (1805–1859), French statesman and writer. Alexis de Tocqueville was the author of *Democracy in America*, the first classic commentary on American government written by a foreigner.

Alexis de Tocqueville was born in Paris on July 29, 1805, of an aristocratic Norman family. He studied law in Paris (1823–1826) and then was appointed an assistant magistrate at Versailles (1827).

The July 1830 Revolution which, with middle-class support, put Louis Philippe on the throne, required a loyalty oath of Tocqueville as a civil servant. He was suspect because his aristocratic family opposed the new order and was demoted to a minor judgeship without pay. Tocqueville and another magistrate, Gustave de Beaumont, asked to study prison reform in America, then an interest of the French government. Granted permission but not funds (their families paid their expenses), Tocqueville and Beaumont spent from May 1831 to February 1832 in the United States. Their travel and interviews resulted in *On the Penitentiary System in the United States and Its Application in France* (1832). Then followed Tocqueville's famous *Democracy in America* (vol. 1, 1835; vol. 2, 1840), an immediate best seller. By 1850 it had run through 13 editions.

Tocqueville was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1839. He opposed King Louis Philippe but after the Revolution of 1848 again served as a deputy. Tocqueville was foreign minister for a few months in 1849 and retired from public affairs at the end of 1851. During his last years he wrote *The Old Regime*

and the French Revolution (1856). He died in Cannes on April 16, 1859.

Democracy in America. Despite his aristocratic upbringing, Tocqueville believed that the spread of democracy was inevitable. By analyzing American democracy, he thought to help France avoid America's faults and emulate its successes. Chief among his many insights was to see equality of social conditions as the heart of American democracy. He noted that although the majority could produce tyranny its wide property distribution and inherent conservatism made for stability. American literature, then still under European influence, he felt would become independent in idiom and deal with plain people rather than the upper classes. The American zeal for change he connected with a restless search for the ideal. Noting the permissiveness of democracy toward religion, he anticipated denominational growth. Discerning natural hostility to the military, he foresaw an adverse effect of prolonged war on American society. He anticipated that democracy would emancipate women and alter the relationship of parents to children. He saw danger in the dominance of American politics by lawyers.

Though his work has been criticized for some biases, errors, omissions, and pessimism, Tocqueville's perceptive insights have been continually quoted. He ranks as a keen observer of American democracy and as a major prophet of modern societies' trends.

EWB

Tolstoy, Leo (1828–1910), Russian novelist and moral philosopher. Leo Tolstoy ranks as one of the world's great writers, and his *War and Peace* has been called the greatest novel ever written.

Leo Tolstoy was one of the great rebels of all time, a man who during a long and stormy life was at odds with Church, government, literary tradition, and his own family. Yet he was a conservative, obsessed by the idea of God in an age of scientific positivism. He brought the art of the realistic novel to its highest development. Tolstoy's brooding concern for death made him one of the precursors of existentialism. Yet the bustling spirit that animates his novels conveys—perhaps—more of life than life itself.

Tolstoy's father, Count Nikolay Ilyich Tolstoy, came of a noble family dating back to the 14th century and prominent from the time of Peter I. Both Tolstoy's father and grandfather had a passion for gambling and had exhausted the family wealth. Nikolay recouped his fortunes, however, by marrying Maria Volkonsky, bearer of a great name and heiress to a fortune that included 800 serfs and the estate of Yasnaya Polyana in Tula Province, where Leo (Lev Ni-

kolayevich) was born on Aug. 28, 1828, the youngest of four sons. His mother died when he was 2 years old, whereupon his father's distant cousin Tatyana Ergolsky took charge of the children. In 1837 Tolstoy's father died, and an aunt, Alexandra Osten-Saken, became legal guardian of the children. Her religious fervor was an important early influence on Tolstoy. When she died in 1840, the children were sent to Kazan to another sister of their father, Pelageya Yushkov.

Tolstoy was educated at home by German and French tutors. He was not a particularly apt pupil, but he was good at games. In 1843 he entered Kazan University; planning on a diplomatic career, he entered the faculty of Oriental languages. Finding these studies too demanding, he switched 2 years later to the notoriously easygoing law faculty. The university, however, had too many second-rate foreigners on its faculty, and Tolstoy left in 1847 without taking his degree.

Tolstoy returned to Yasnaya Polyana, determined to become a model farmer and a "father" to his serfs. His philanthropy failed because of his naiveté in dealing with the peasants and because he spent too much time carousing in Tula and Moscow. During this time he first began making those amazingly honest and self-lacerating diary entries, a practice he maintained until his death. These entries provided much material for his fiction, and in a very real sense his whole oeuvre is one long autobiography. In 1848 Tolstoy attempted to take the law examination, this time in St. Petersburg, but after passing the first two parts he again became disenchanted, returning to the concerts and gambling halls of Moscow when not hunting and drinking at Yasnaya Polyana.

Army Life and Early Literary Career. Nikolay, Tolstoy's eldest brother, visited him at this time in Yasnaya Polyana while on furlough from military service in the Caucasus. Leo greatly loved his brother, and when he asked him to join him in the south, Tolstoy agreed. After a meandering journey, he reached the mountains of the Caucasus, where he sought to join the army as a Junker, or gentleman-volunteer. In the autumn he passed the necessary exams and was assigned to the 4th Battery of the 20th Artillery Brigade, serving on the Terek River against the rebellious mountaineers, Moslem irregulars who had declared a holy war against the encroaching Russians.

Tolstoy's border duty on a lonely Cossack outpost became a kind of pagan idyll, hunting, drinking, sleeping, chasing the girls, and occasionally fighting. During the long lulls he first began to write. In 1852 he sent the autobiographical sketch *Childhood* to the

leading journal of the day, the *Contemporary*. Nikolai Nekrasov, its editor, was ecstatic, and when it was published (under Tolstoy's initials), so was all of Russia. Tolstoy now began *The Cossacks* (finished in 1862), a thinly veiled account of his life in the outpost.

From November 1854 to August 1855 Tolstoy served in the battered fortress at Sevastopol. He had requested transfer to this area, where one of the bloodiest battles of the Crimean War was in process. As he directed fire from the 4th Bastion, the hottest area in the conflict for a long while, Tolstoy managed to write *Youth*, the second part of his autobiographical trilogy. He also wrote the three *Sevastopol Tales* at this time, revealing the distinctive Tolstoyan vision of war as a place of unparalleled confusion, banality, and heroism, a special space where men, viewed from the author's dispassionate, God-like point of view, were at their best and worst. Some of these stories were published while the battle they described still raged. The first story was the talk of Russia, attracting (for almost the last time in Tolstoy's career) the favorable attention of the Tsar.

School for Peasant Children. In 1856 Tolstoy left the service (as a lieutenant) to look after his affairs in Yasnaya Polyana; he also worked on *The Snowstorm* and *Two Hussars*. In the following year he made his first trip abroad. He did not like Western Europe, as his stories of this period, *Lucerne* and *Albert*, show. He was becoming increasingly interested in education, however, and he talked with experts in this field wherever he went. In the summer he returned to Yasnaya Polyana and set up a school for peasant children, where he began his pedagogic experiments. In 1860–1861 Tolstoy went abroad again, seeking to learn more about education; he also gambled heavily. During this trip he witnessed the death of his brother Nikolay in the south of France. More than all the grisly scenes of battle he had witnessed, this event brought home to Tolstoy the fact of death, the specter of which fascinated and terrified him throughout his long career.

After the freeing of the serfs in 1861, Tolstoy became a mediator (*posrednik*), an official who arbitrated land disputes between serfs and their former masters. In April he had a petty quarrel with Turgenev, actually challenging him to a duel. Turgenev declined, but the two men were on bad terms for years.

Tolstoy's school at Yasnaya Polyana went forward, using pioneering techniques that were later adopted by progressive educationists. In 1862 Tolstoy started a journal to propagate his pedagogical ideas, *Yasnaya Polyana*. He also took the first of his koumiss cures, traveling to Samara, living in the open, and

drinking fermented mare's milk. These cures eventually became an almost annual event.

Golden Years. Since 1861 Tolstoy had been trying to write a historical novel about the Decembrist uprising of 1825. But the more he worked, the farther back in time he went. The first portion of *War and Peace* was published in 1865 (in the *Russian Messenger*) as "The Year 1805." In 1868 three more chapters appeared; and in 1869 he completed the novel. Tolstoy had been somewhat neglected by critics in the preceding few years because he had not participated in the bitter literary politics of the time. But his new novel created a fantastic outpouring of popular and critical reaction.

Tolstoy's next 10 years were equally crowded. He published the *Primer* and the first four *Readers* (1872–1875), his attempts to appeal to an audience that would include children and the newly literate peasantry. From 1873 to 1877 he worked on the second of his masterworks, *Anna Karenina*, which also created a sensation upon its publication.

Spiritual Crisis. The ethical quest that had begun when Tolstoy was a child and that had tormented him throughout his younger years now drove him to abandon all else in order to seek an ultimate meaning in life. At first he turned to the Russian Orthodox Church, visiting the Optina-Pustyn monastery in 1877. But he found no answer. He began reading the Gospels, and he found the key to his own moral system in Matthew: "Resist not evil." In 1879–1880 Tolstoy wrote his *Confession* (published 1884) and his *Critique of Dogmatic Theology*. From this point on his life was dominated by a burning desire to achieve social justice and a rationally acceptable ethic.

Tolstoy was a public figure now, and in 1881 he asked Alexander III, in vain, to spare the lives of those who had assassinated the Tsar's father. He visited Optina again, this time disguised as a peasant, but his trip failed to bring him peace. In September the family moved to Moscow in order to further the education of the older sons. The following year Tolstoy participated in the census, visiting the worst slums of Moscow, where he was freshly appalled.

Tolstoy had not gone out of his way to propagate his new convictions, but in 1883 he met V. G. Chertkov, a wealthy guards officer who soon became the moving force behind an attempt to start a movement in Tolstoy's name. In the next few years a new publication was founded (the *Mediator*) in order to spread Tolstoy's word in tract and fiction, as well as to make good reading available to the poor. In 6 years almost 20 million copies were distributed. Tolstoy had

long been under surveillance by the secret police, and in 1884 copies of *What I Believe* were seized from the printer. He now took up cobbling and read deeply in Chinese philosophy. He abstained from cigarettes, meat, white bread, and hunting. His image as a white-bearded patriarch in a peasant's blouse dates from this period.

Tolstoy's relations with his family were becoming increasingly strained. The more of a saint he became in the eyes of the world, the more of a devil he seemed to his wife. He wanted to give his wealth away, but she would not hear of it. An unhappy compromise was reached in 1884, when Tolstoy assigned to his wife the copyright to all his works before 1881.

In 1886 Tolstoy worked on what is possibly his most powerful story, *The Death of Ivan Ilyich*, and his drama of peasant life, *The Power of Darkness* (which could not be produced until 1895). In 1888, when he was 60 years old, his thirteenth child was born. In the same year he finished his sweeping indictment of carnal love, *The Kreutzer Sonata*.

Last Years and Death. In 1892 Tolstoy's estate, valued at the equivalent of \$1.5 million, was divided among his wife and his nine living children. Tolstoy was now perhaps the most famous man in the world; people came from all over the globe to Yasnaya Polyana. His activity was unabated. In 1891 and in 1893 he organized famine relief in Ryazan Province. He also worked on some of his finest stories: *The Devil* (1890, published posthumously) and *Father Sergius* (1890). In order to raise money for transporting a dissenting religious sect (the Doukhobors) to Canada, Tolstoy published the third, and least successful, of his three long novels, *Resurrection* (1899). From 1896 to 1904 he worked on the story that was his personal favorite, *Hadji Murad*, the tale of a Caucasian mountaineer.

Tolstoy's final years were filled with worldwide acclaim and great unhappiness, as he was caught in the strife between his convictions, his followers, and his family. The Holy Synod excommunicated him in 1901. Unable to endure the quarrels at home he set out on his last pilgrimage in October 1910, accompanied by his youngest daughter, Alexandra, and his physician. The trip proved too much, and he died in the home of the stationmaster of the small depot at Astapovo on Nov. 9, 1910. He was buried at Yasnaya Polyana.

EWB

Toulouse-Lautrec, Henri de (1864–1901), French painter. Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec depicted Montmartre's night life of cafés, bars, and brothels,

the world which he inhabited at the height of his career.

Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec, a direct descendant of the counts of Toulouse, was born on Nov. 24, 1864, at Albi. His eccentric father lived in provincial luxury, hunting with falcons and collecting exotic weapons. Henri began to draw at an early age. He suffered a fall in 1878 and broke one femur; in 1879 he fell again and broke the other one. His legs did not heal properly; his torso developed normally, but his legs were permanently deformed.

Encouraged by his first teachers, the animal painters René Princeteau and John Lewis Brown, Toulouse-Lautrec decided in 1882 to devote himself to painting, and that year he left for Paris. Enrolling at the École des Beaux-Arts, he entered the studio of Fernand Cormon. In 1884 Toulouse-Lautrec settled in Montmartre, where he stayed from then on, except for short visits to Spain, where he admired the works of El Greco and Diego Velázquez; Belgium; and England, where he visited Oscar Wilde and James McNeill Whistler. At one point Toulouse-Lautrec lived near Edgar Degas, whom he valued above all other contemporary artists and by whom he was influenced. From 1887 his studio was on the Rue Caulaincourt next to the Goupil printshop, where he could see examples of the Japanese prints of which he was so fond.

Toulouse-Lautrec habitually stayed out most of the night, frequenting the many entertainment spots about Montmartre, especially the Moulin Rouge cabaret, and he drank a great deal. His loose living caught up with him: he suffered a breakdown in 1899, and his mother had him committed to an asylum at Neuilly. He recovered and set to work again. He died on Sept. 9, 1901, at the family estate at Malromé.

Parisian Demimonde. Toulouse-Lautrec moved freely among the dancers, prostitutes, artists, and intellectuals of Montmartre. From 1890 on, his tall, lean cousin, Dr. Tapié de Celeyran, accompanied him, and the two, depicted in *At the Moulin Rouge* (1892), made a colorful pair. Despite his deformity, Toulouse-Lautrec was an extrovert who readily made friends and inspired trust. He came to be regarded as one of the people of Montmartre, for he was an outsider like them, fiercely independent, but with great ability and intellect.

Among the painter's favorite subjects were the cabaret dancers Yvette Guilbert, Jane Avril, and La Goulue and her partner, the contortionist Valentin le Désossé. Toulouse-Lautrec depicted his subjects in a style bordering on but rising above caricature through the seriousness of his intention. He took subjects who

habitually employed disguise and charade as a way of life and stripped away all that was inessential to reveal each as an individual and yet as a prisoner of his destiny.

The two most direct influences on Toulouse-Lautrec's art were the Japanese print, as seen in his oblique viewpoints and flattened forms, and Degas, from whom he derived the tilted perspective, cutting of figures, and use of a railing to separate the spectator from the painted scene, as in *At the Moulin Rouge*. But the authentic feel of a world of depravity and the strident, artificial colors used to create it were Toulouse-Lautrec's own.

Unusual types performing in a grand, contrived spectacle attracted Toulouse-Lautrec. In his painting *In the Circus Fernando: The Ringmaster* (1888) the nearly grotesque, strangely cruel figure of the ringmaster is the pivot around which the horse and bareback rider must revolve. In 1892–1894 Toulouse-Lautrec did a series of interiors of houses of prostitution, where he actually lived for a while, becoming the confidant and companion of the girls. As with his paintings of cabarets, he caught the feel of the brothels and made no attempt to glamorize them. In the *Salon in the Rue des Moulins* (1894) the prostitutes are shown as ugly and bored beneath their makeup; the madame sits demurely in their midst. He neither sensationalized nor drew a moral lesson but presented a certain facet of the periphery of society for what it was—no more and no less.

Color Lithography and the Poster.

Toulouse-Lautrec broadened the range of lithography by treating the tone more freely. His stroke became more summary and the planes more unified. Sometimes the ink was speckled on the surface to bring about a great textural richness. In his posters he combined flat images (again the influence of the Japanese print) with type. He realized that if the posters were to be successful their message had to make an immediate and forceful impact on the passerby, and he designed them with that in mind.

Toulouse-Lautrec's posters of the 1890s establish him as the father of the modern large-scale poster. His best posters were those advertising the appearance of various performers at the Montmartre cabarets, such as the singer May Belfort, the female clown Cha-U-Kao, and Loïe Fuller of the Folies-Bergère.

In a poster of 1893 the dancer Jane Avril, colored partially in bright red and yellow, is pictured kicking her leg. Below her, in gray tones so as not to detract attention, is the diagonally placed hand of the violinist playing his instrument. There is some indication of floorboards but no furniture or other figures.

The legend reads simply “Jane Avril” in white letters and “Jardin de Paris” in black letters.

EWB

Treitschke, Heinrich von (1834–1896), German historian, politician, and political publicist. Heinrich von Treitschke was the most famous and influential member of the Prussian school of history in 19th-century Germany. He advocated a powerful German state under Prussian leadership.

Heinrich von Treitschke was born on Sept. 15, 1834, in Dresden. His father, who rose to general officer's rank in the service of the Saxon monarchy, was of German-Czech descent, had been ennobled in 1821, and maintained his aristocratic conservatism and loyalty to the Saxon royal family throughout his life. Young Heinrich showed early intellectual promise in his schooling, which, however, was interrupted at the age of 8 by a severe case of measles complicated by glandular fever which led to increasing loss of hearing. Thus a career of public service as a soldier or statesman-politician became impossible, and Heinrich decided on a life of scholarship.

His Education. Attending Dresden's Holy Cross Gymnasium (high school) from 1846 to 1851, Treitschke was exposed not only to the traditional classical education but also to liberal ideas critical of the semiabsolutism of the times. The study of German literature under Julius Klee and personal observations of the political events of the revolutionary years 1848–1849 molded Treitschke's tendency toward strong political conviction into an attitude of enthusiastic support for a constitutional, united Germany under Prussian leadership.

From 1851 to 1854 Treitschke studied at the universities of Bonn, Leipzig, Tübingen, and Freiburg, attending classes under F. C. Dahlmann, the political economist Wilhelm Roscher, and the eminent Tübingen philosopher Friedrich Theodor Vischer.

After a brief interlude in Dresden, Treitschke studied at Göttingen and Leipzig. He succeeded in publishing two volumes of poems, *Patriotic Songs* (1856) and *Studies* (1857). In 1858 he finished his habilitation thesis, *Die Gesellschaftswissenschaft* (1859; *The Science of Society*), which earned him an appointment as lecturer at the University of Leipzig in 1859.

The political atmosphere in Leipzig did not prove congenial, and in 1863 Treitschke accepted a professorial appointment at Freiburg. Here he wrote his famous essay *Bundesstaat und Einheitsstaat* (1863–1864; *Federation and Centralization*). In 1866, when Baden joined Austria in war against Prussia, Treitschke resigned his position at Freiburg and demanded in a

pamphlet, *The Future of the North German Middle States*, the annexation of Hanover, Hesse, and Saxony by Prussia.

Political Activities. Although Treitschke was estranged from his father, his fame as a political publicist had now reached national eminence. Positions at Kiel (1866) and Heidelberg (1867–1874) followed before he finally settled in Berlin. His strong Prussian sentiments had earned him appointment as editor of the *Preussische Jahrbücher* (Prussian Annals) in 1866 and election to the German Reichstag (House of Deputies) in 1871. Although originally affiliated with the National Liberal party, he left that party in 1879 to support Bismarck's new commercial policy and held his seat until 1884 as an independent member with conservative leanings.

The period from 1859 to 1871 is important for Treitschke's development. More and more he abandoned his original liberal constitutional attitude and became an ever more ardent advocate of the power state, of war as the noblest activity of man, and of a German expansionist, cultural mission under Prussian leadership which would establish Germany as an equal among the world powers. Although he counted among his close friends a number of Jews, he participated in the anti-Semitic movement of the late 1870s, proclaiming that Jewry could play an important role only if its individual members were to merge themselves with the nationality of their state.

History of Germany. Treitschke had planned to write a history of Germany since 1861; but not until he had settled in Berlin, where the Prussian archives were close at hand, did the work progress. The first volume of his *Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert* (*German History in the 19th Century*) was published in 1879, starting with the Napoleonic period. The fifth volume, published in 1894, brought the narrative only to the beginning of 1848. Although this, the greatest of his works, also suffered from the shortcomings of Treitschke's emotional patriotic nature and was limited to the almost exclusive use of the Prussian archives, it nevertheless constitutes a major contribution to historical writing. Its literary style and power of expression have been likened to Friedrich von Schiller's diction and Johann Gottlieb Fichte's rhetoric. In spite of his tendency to oversimplify complicated events, Treitschke exhibited a grasp of detail and power to synthesize that produced a general cultural historical setting uncommon among the works of historians of his time.

Other important historical and political essays were published in four volumes as *Historische und Pol-*

itische Aufsätze (1896; *Historical and Political Essays*); and his lectures on politics were collected and published in two volumes as *Vorlesungen über Politik* (1898; *Politics*).

Treitschke died on April 28, 1896, in Berlin. His influence during his lifetime was threefold: as teacher, political propagandist, and historian. A generation of students and of the general public was affected by his political lectures and nationalistic journalism, and even abroad he was often regarded as an official mouthpiece of German policy.

Although after his death Treitschke's influence among German historians, who generally preferred to follow the more balanced methodological example of the Ranke school of historical writing, became largely dormant, it was revived in coarsened form by Nazi ideologists, who utilized his unbridled nationalism as a point of departure for their thought and actions.

EWB

Trevelyan, George Macaulay (1876–1962), English historian. George Trevelyan is known for his defense and illustration of history as a literary art.

George Macaulay Trevelyan was born at Welcombe near Stratford-on-Avon on Feb. 16, 1876, the son of Sir George Otto Trevelyan. His maternal granduncle was the historian Thomas Babington Macaulay. Young Trevelyan went to Trinity College, Cambridge, where Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ralph Vaughan Williams were among his friends. In 1898, his imagination caught by what he saw as the first stirring of national consciousness and individual freedom among the 14th century Lollards, he wrote *England in the Age of Wycliffe* as a dissertation for a Trinity fellowship. An immediate success, it remains one of the best books on the subject.

Awarded the fellowship, Trevelyan set out upon an academic career. Cambridge, however, was then dominated by a highly critical mode of historical writing, soon to be epitomized by J. B. Bury in the phrase, "History is a science, nothing more, nothing less." The ethos was not congenial for a writer of Trevelyan's literary and humanistic bent. In 1903 he left Cambridge for London, not to return until his appointment as regius professor in 1927.

Trevelyan's next work, *England under the Stuarts* (1904), showed a deeper historical understanding and more secure craftsmanship, particularly in its portrayal of King Charles I and the Cavaliers. The year of its publication, Trevelyan married Janet Penrose Ward. As a wedding gift, he received a copy of Giuseppe Garibaldi's *Memoirs*, which awakened memories of stories he had heard from his father (who had tried to join Garibaldi in 1867) and of his own walks in the

Umbrian hills. The result was *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic*, written in the heat of inspiration in 1906. It was a perfect match of event and author, giving full play to Trevelyan's poetic imagination. Its success was immediate, and he felt impelled to complete the story with *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (1909) and *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy* (1911).

Trevelyan's *History of England* (1926) quickly became one of the best-selling textbooks of its age. From its pages a generation of Englishmen learned the history of their country. In 1928, having succeeded Bury as regius professor, he began work on his three-volume *England under Queen Anne* (1931–1934), his major contribution to historical scholarship. He had long dreamed of telling the story, he later wrote, attracted by its "dramatic unity"; it was "like a five-act drama, leading up to the climax of the trumpets proclaiming King George." His last major work, *English Social History* (1944), written just before World War II, was his greatest commercial success.

In 1930 Trevelyan received the Order of Merit. He died at Cambridge on July 21, 1962.

EWB

Troeltsch, Ernst (1865–1923), German theologian, historian, and sociologist. Ernst Troeltsch, through his utilization of the objective methods of modern scholarship, contributed to the sociology of religion and the problems of historicism.

Ernst Troeltsch was born in Augsburg. After studying theology at the universities of Erlange, Göttingen, and Berlin from 1883 to 1888, he became a lecturer at Göttingen in 1891, an associate professor at Bonn in 1892, and a professor at Heidelberg in 1894; he remained at Heidelberg for 21 years. For a short time he was a Lutheran curate in Munich. In 1901 he married, and a son, Ernst Eberhard, was born in 1913. In 1915 he came to feel that theology was too confining and transferred to philosophy at the University of Berlin.

A conservative in politics, Troeltsch long served in the Baden upper house. From 1919 to 1921 he was a member of the Prussian Landtag and concurrently secretary of state for public worship. He was moved deeply by the war. Like Max Weber and others, he hailed the "great and wonderful" fervor of the Germans and saw their cause rooted in idealistic values as opposed to the materialism of the Allies. Soon, however, together with Weber and Friedrich Meinecke, he left the conservative majority, opposed annexationist war aims, and advocated increased democratization. After the war he defended the Weimar Republic, decried the "frightful demagoguery" of the right, and advocated a genuine conservatism in articles which

bore the pseudonym of *Spektator* and appeared until 4 months before his death.

In *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (1912) Troeltsch studied the relation between religion and the other elements of society and culture. He found that Christianity was not reducible to displaced social protest, as Karl Kautsky and the Marxists had suggested, but rather was a real and autonomous religious movement with its own immanent implications for development and its own independent effect upon history. Although the forms of belief and organization developed by the Church were historically conditioned, they also represented the unfolding of the implications of Christianity's inner meaning; and once the Church was established, it also in turn affected and influenced other aspects of society and culture.

Troeltsch carried out his study in four contexts—family, economic life, politics, and intellectual life—and found Christianity exhibiting two contrary but complementary tendencies—accommodation and protest. These two tendencies gave rise to two organizational types: the Church, which qualifiedly accepted the world in order to sanctify it, and the sect, which rejected the world and the whole idea of adjustment to it. Troeltsch stated that the Christian ideal could not be “realized within this world apart from compromise” and that consequently Christian history was “the story of a constantly renewed search for this compromise, and a fresh opposition to this spirit of compromise.”

In an earlier work Troeltsch had examined the relationship between Protestantism and modern capitalism. He agreed with Weber that Calvinism had an important early influence upon the development of capitalism, but he saw the Protestant impact upon economic developments as chiefly “indirect and unconsciously produced” and religion as more affected than affecting with respect to modern developments. Despite the Christian derivation of modern civilization, Troeltsch came to see the future of Christianity as “unpredictable” and its survival demanding “very bold and far-reaching changes.”

Historicism was a profound challenge to Troeltsch. If all beliefs and values are products of individual tendencies specific to particular conditions, is there then nothing suprahistorical resulting from man's search for truth and creation of value? He studied this problem in his *Historismus und seine Probleme* (1922), examining the “relation of individual historical facts to standards of value within the entire domain of history in connection with the development of political, social, ethical, esthetic, and scientific ideas.” Earlier he had spoken of “polymorphous truth,”

which though beyond history is apprehended differently in different civilizations and epochs, and he had also sought for an extra-historical basis in morality. Now he concluded that “even the validity of science and logic seemed to exhibit, under different skies and on different soil, strong individual differences present even in their deepest and inner rudiments.”

Troeltsch was concerned with historicism not simply as a scholar but as a deeply religious man as well. Although he failed to solve the problems intellectually, he concluded: “Skepticism and relativism are only an apparent necessary consequence of modern intellectual conditions and of historicism. They may be overcome by way of ethics”; and, “If there is any solution at all to these riddles and problems, with their conflicts and contradictions, that solution certainly is not to be found within their own sphere, but beyond it, in that unknown land, of which there are so many indications in the historic struggle of the spirit upward, but which itself is never revealed to our eyes.”

EWB

Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940), Russian revolutionist. Leon Trotsky was a principal leader in the founding of the Soviet Union. He played an important role in the October Revolution, which brought the Bolsheviks to power; and he organized the Red Army during the ensuing civil war.

Leon Trotsky was born Lev Davidovich Bronstein near Elisavetgrad (later Kirovograd). He derived from an almost completely Russified Jewish family who lived in the province of Kherson, in the small town of Yanovka. His father, David Leontievich Bronstein, had by dint of hard labor grown fairly prosperous as a farmer, but his uncultured middle-class family lived an extremely simple life. At the age of 7 the boy was sent to a Jewish private religious school in the nearby town of Gromokla. Since he knew no Yiddish, his stay was brief and unhappy but nonetheless valuable, for he learned to read and write Russian.

Shortly after his return home, a cousin, Moisey Filippovich Shpenster, arrived at the Bronstein household to recuperate from an illness. He played the role of tutor to Lyova (Lev's nickname) and when it came time for him to return to Odessa, Lyova returned with him.

In Odessa, Lyova attended a preparatory class for an entire year. At St. Paul's Realschule he quickly overcame his early deficiencies and rose to the head of his class. Seven years in Odessa expanded the already existing differences between father and son. For some reason David Bronstein decided to have his son finish his last academic year in the nearby seaport of

Nikolaev instead of in Odessa. Here Lyova had his first contacts with the Russian revolutionary movement.

Revolutionary Activities and First Exile. A relatively large concentration of old exiles of the group called Narodnaia Volia (The People's Will) lived in this small town. Lyova became acquainted with this circle through Franz Shvigovsky, a gardener who played a prominent role in a small discussion club. One member of this Narodnik group, Alexandra Sokolovskaya, considered herself a Marxist and was almost immediately opposed by the 17-year-old Lyova. He knew almost nothing of Marxist doctrine, but his ability as an orator and his intellectual prowess soon made him the focal point of the group. The more involved he became, the more his schoolwork declined, although he graduated in 1897 with first-class honors.

As news of strikes began to grow, Lyova found himself becoming more and more inclined toward Marxism. This period saw the formation of the South Russian Workers' Union. The clandestine activities of its members were for the most part harmless, but police spies successfully infiltrated the group. After an extended period of interrogation, Bronstein was exiled to Siberia for 4 years by administrative verdict. While awaiting deportation, he first heard of V. I. Lenin and his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Before leaving, Bronstein married Alexandra Sokolovskaya.

During his stay in Verkholensk, Bronstein began forming his ideas on national coordination and on centralized party leadership. In a little-known essay he composed his thoughts on the subject, and the result was an organizational scheme that practically paralleled that of the Bolsheviks, of whom he later was so critical. He also turned to literary criticism, but the young revolutionary grew restless. Urged on by his wife, he escaped after 4½ years of prison and exile.

Exile and Formulation of Theory. The name on Bronstein's false passport was Trotsky, a name that remained with him. He joined Lenin in London in October and began writing for *Iskra*. Trotsky shared his quarters with V. I. Zasluchich and J. Martov and drew closer to these two than to Lenin. Only Georgi Plekhanov showed any dislike for Trotsky. The split among the *Iskra* editors was already taking shape, and Trotsky became the special focus of Plekhanov's scorn.

In July 1903 at Brussels the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party produced, instead of one party, two. Trotsky emerged as Lenin's most implacable opponent on the question of

the organization of the party. Despite his early writings favoring a high degree of centralization, Trotsky sided with Martov and the Mensheviks in favoring a broader-based party. Plekhanov had sided with Lenin, but their relationship was a fragile one. When Plekhanov invited the *Iskra* board to return, Lenin broke with the editorial staff completely. Trotsky returned, but Plekhanov's dislike of him only grew. Thus began Trotsky's estrangement from the Menshevik wing of the party. No rapprochement, however, with Lenin was forthcoming.

Suspended between both factions, Trotsky came under the influence of A. L. Helfand, whose pen name was Parvus. Under this influence Trotsky adopted a theory of "permanent revolution" that called for a telescoping of the bourgeois revolution into a socialist one that would carry far beyond Russia's borders. An important basis for this concept was the recognition by Helfand, Trotsky, and Lenin that Russia, far from having been a feudal country, was an Asiatic despotism, with the consequence that Russia's cities, unlike those of the West, had not produced an advanced entrepreneurial bourgeois elite. This made it unlikely, in Trotsky's view, that a sophisticated capitalist development would occur in Russia, and thus it was unprofitable to rely on such development as a basis for revolution. Trotsky argued that the revolution should result in the immediate establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat (meaning power for its vanguard, the Communist elite). The question of whether such a "permanent" or telescoped revolution could be attempted without a great risk of reestablishing the old bureaucratic despotism under Communist leadership preoccupied the Fourth (or Unity) Party Congress in Stockholm in 1906. Lenin offered certain relative guarantees against this Asiatic restoration (no police, no standing army, no bureaucracy, to avoid turning the proletarian dictatorship into a bureaucratic despotism) and an absolute guarantee of a socialist revolution in the West to follow the establishment of Communist power in Russia.

The first news of "Bloody Sunday," the outbreak of the 1905 Revolution, found Trotsky in Geneva. After a brief respite at Parvus's home, Trotsky went to Kiev in February. With the end of those hectic days at the beginning of the year, revolutionary turmoil abated, and Trotsky, under the assumed name of Peter Petrovich, moved in and out of the clandestine circles of St. Petersburg.

October 1905 Revolution and Second Exile. In the middle of October 1905 a general strike broke out in St. Petersburg, and Trotsky hurriedly returned to the capital from Finland. On the first day of his

return he appeared at the Soviet, which had assembled at the Technological Institute. He was elected to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of St. Petersburg as the chief representative of the Menshevik wing and played the dominant role in the brief life of this new type of institution. For his part in the Revolution of 1905 Trotsky was exiled to Siberia in 1907 for life with the loss of all his civil rights. On the trip to Siberia, he decided to escape. His second exile lasted 10 years, until the February Revolution of 1917.

At the London Congress in April 1907, Trotsky maintained his position of aloofness and implored both sides to coalesce in the name of unity. For the next 7 years he lived with his second wife in Vienna, where he made the acquaintance of Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky, Rudolph Hilferding, Eduard Bernstein, Otto Bauer, Max Adler, and Karl Renner. It did not take long for Trotsky to become aware of the differences between "his" Marxism and theirs. He became the editor of a Viennese paper called *Pravda*. In August 1912 he organized in Vienna a conference of all Social Democrats, hoping that this would lead to a reconciliation, but Lenin's refusal to attend was a severe disappointment. An August bloc consisting of Mensheviks, Bolshevik dissenters, the Jewish Bund, and Trotsky's followers was formed.

With the outbreak of World War I Trotsky left Vienna for Zurich in order to avoid internment. The question of the war and the Zimmerwald Conference seemed to draw Lenin and Trotsky closer together, and, conversely, Trotsky and the August bloc seemed to become less and less amicable. Parvus's stand on the war also conflicted with Trotsky's internationalism, and their friendship was ended on Trotsky's initiative.

Return to Russia. In September 1916 Trotsky was deported from France, where he had resided during the previous 2 years. On January 13, 1917, he landed in New York. By mid-March the first news of the Revolution began to arrive. He took a negative view of the new government almost immediately. Certainly his stand was firmer on this issue than Stalin's. Trotsky's differences with Lenin were indeed growing less severe. With his family, Trotsky attempted to return to Russia, but he was removed from his ship at Halifax by British authorities, who forced him to remain in Canada for an entire month. Not until May 4 did he finally arrive in Petrograd.

Trotsky assumed the leadership of the Interborough Organization, a temporary body composed of many prominent personalities opposed to the "war, Prince Lvov, and the social patriots." At the Bolshevik party's Sixth Congress in July-August, Trotsky led the

entire group into Lenin's fold even though at this time he was in prison as the result of the abortive July coup. With the growth of Bolshevik strength in Soviet representation, the Petrograd Soviet elected Trotsky as its chairman on September 23. He had also been raised to Central Committee status during his prison term.

Trotsky and Lenin prodded the Bolsheviks on to revolution over the objections of such men as Lev Kamenev, Trotsky's brother-in-law, and Grigori Zinoviev, and Trotsky alone forged the "machinery of insurrection." He scurried from meeting to meeting agitating whoever would listen. By his own estimate no more than 25,000 or 30,000 (the actual number was probably less) took part in the final coup, a testament to his organizational ability.

People's Commissar. In the Soviet government founded by Lenin after the coup, Trotsky was given the position of people's commissar for foreign affairs. He also led the Soviet delegation at the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference. While he negotiated, Karl Radek distributed pamphlets among German soldiers designed to provoke unrest in the enemy camp.

The German demands were so extensive that the Bolshevik party split over the question of war or peace. Lenin was almost alone in wanting to accept the terms dictated by the Germans. Profound disagreement had existed between Lenin and Trotsky on the question of Brest-Litovsk, but Lenin convinced Trotsky once again to approach the Germans for terms. This time the terms were even more unfavorable, but again Lenin persuaded Trotsky to side with the peace faction. Trotsky cast the deciding vote in favor of signing the highly unfavorable Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Although Trotsky had resigned as commissar of foreign affairs he was immediately appointed to the post of commissar for war. In that capacity he rebuilt the Red Army and directed the campaigns on four fronts during the civil war. Despite wholesale opposition throughout the Bolshevik party, he persisted in the use of former tsarist officers, buttressed by a system of political commissars and terror. From a force of fewer than 10,000 reliable armed soldiers in October 1917, he had built an army numbering more than 5 million 2½ years later. He alone proved capable of imposing centralization upon a highly fragmented force.

Toward the end of the civil war in 1920, Trotsky proposed that the machinery for military mobilization be employed for the organization of civilian labor. Civilian labor was to be subjected to military discipline, and the army was to be reorganized on the basis of productive units. Lenin wholeheartedly supported

Trotsky's suggestions. Trotsky's strong-arm methods in shaping the army and in forcing industrial production created a large number of bitter enemies who were soon to be heard from.

Opposition to Stalin. From Lenin's death in 1924 until Trotsky's exile in 1928, Trotsky fought a long, hard, and losing battle against Stalin, who cultivated the many enemies that Trotsky had made as a revolutionary. Despite the fact that Lenin in his last testament seemed to favor Trotsky over Stalin and even had proposed removing Stalin from power, Trotsky proved no match for Stalin. The plethora of positions that Stalin had attained, some important and some not so important but all with patronage, strengthened his position and undermined the power of his opposition. In the final analysis, Trotsky had only his personal brilliance and the army as bases for power, the latter without its crucial political control apparatus. Stalin not only controlled a variety of organizations, but he skillfully appealed to the class interest of the new bureaucratic elite and decisively asserted his claim to Lenin's mantle at the funeral of the dead founder and in the *Foundations of Leninism*, published in early 1924. Trotsky did not bother to attend Lenin's funeral.

Exile and Assassination. Trotsky allied himself with the so-called left opposition of Kamenev and Zinoviev; but Stalin successfully opposed him by breaking up the alliance, aided by Nikolai Bukharin and the right wing of the party. After his defeat Trotsky was expelled from the party, and in 1928 he was exiled to Alma-Ata in Central Asia. Forced to flee the Soviet Union, he went first to Turkey, then to France and Norway, and finally to Mexico. Throughout his sojourn he continued to attack Stalin, returning to his early critical themes of bureaucratic centralism and one-man dictatorship. Implacable as he was in his criticism, Trotsky did not draw on the most powerful polemical weapon available to him: that the cause of socialism had been lost in an "Asiatic restoration," through the consolidation of a new bureaucratic despotism under Stalin. That would have meant the rejection of Soviet communism and the party. Trotsky, unable to do so, could attack only Stalin and his policies.

On August 20, 1940, Trotsky was mortally wounded in Mexico City by an ice ax wielded by Ramon Mercador, a Soviet assassin talked into this crime, according to one account, by his mother, who held the Order of Lenin for masterminding assassinations for the Soviet secret police.

Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, Baron de l'Aulne (1721–1781), French economist. A. R. J. Turgot was controller general under Louis XVI. His efforts to reform the Old Regime were thwarted by the failure of the King to support him against the opposition of the privileged classes.

Originally A. R. J. Turgot planned to enter the Church but experienced doubts concerning his religious calling and turned to a public career. After holding a number of legal positions he purchased, as was the practice, the office of master of requests, a post that often led to appointment as intendant, the chief administrator of a district. However, Turgot's interests extended beyond the law and administration. He was a friend of the *philosophes* and frequented the intellectual salons of Paris; in 1760 he visited Voltaire, then in exile. He also contributed articles to the *Encyclopédie*, wrote an essay on toleration, and planned an ambitious history of the progress of man which he never completed.

Turgot was, however, particularly interested in economics and knew Adam Smith, the great English economist, and François Quesnay, founder of the Physiocratic school. He shared their distrust of government intervention in the economy and their belief in free trade but disagreed with the Physiocratic view that only agriculture was productive, while commerce and industry were unproductive.

In 1761 the King named Turgot intendant of the *généralité* (district) of Limoges, a poor and backward region. During the 13 years that he spent at Limoges, Turgot attempted, despite local opposition and halfhearted support from the central government, a widespread reform of his district. Historians disagree on how successful he was. He brought tax lists up to date and sought to introduce a more equitable method of collecting taxes. He abolished the *corvée* (forced labor on the roads by peasants) and substituted for it a tax. Consistent with his belief in free trade, he resisted pressure to repeal legislation permitting the free circulation of grain within France during a period of shortages and suppressed riots against the movement of grain. At the same time he opened workshops to provide work for the unemployed which he financed in part by funds that he forced landowners to contribute. He encouraged improvement of agriculture by such means as an agricultural society. While at Limoges, Turgot also continued to study economics and in 1766 published his most important theoretical work on the subject, *Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth*, a book whose ideas anticipated Adam Smith's classic study in 1776.

In July 1774 Turgot was named secretary of the navy and the following month controller general of

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finances (actually prime minister). Although he saw the need for fundamental reforms of the government and society, Turgot also recognized that he must advance cautiously; basic reforms would not only be costly but certain to arouse the opposition of the privileged classes. His first efforts, therefore, emphasized modest reforms and reducing government expenditures by such measures as eliminating useless positions and aid for courtiers. However, even such minor reforms aroused the opposition of the privileged and of financiers whose interests had also been adversely affected. Churchmen, moreover, were suspicious of this friend of the *philosophes* who “did not attend Mass” and was suspected of favoring tolerance for Protestants.

In January 1776 Turgot presented to the King his famous Six Edicts, which went beyond his previous minor reforms and economies. The two most contested edicts were one ending the monopoly of the guilds and another abolishing the *corvée* Turgot implied that a tax would be levied upon the “landowners for whom public roads are useful.” The Six Edicts now became the target of all the opponents of Turgot; the clergy, the nobles, the queen, Marie Antoinette, all clamored and conspired for his dismissal. They even forged a correspondence in which Turgot made offensive remarks about Louis XVI. The latter, who had at first supported his minister, of whom he had said, “Only Monsieur Turgot and I really love the people,” was unable to resist the pressures upon him and in May 1776 requested Turgot’s resignation. The dismissal of Turgot marked the failure of the last attempt to reform the monarchy from within. Turgot, who warned Louis XVI that Charles I of England had lost his head because of his weakness, spent his last years engaged in scholarly and literary work but still sought to influence the King.

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V

Vasari, Giorgio (1511–1574), Italian painter, architect, and writer. Giorgio Vasari was the author of *The Lives of the Most Celebrated Painters, Sculptors, and Architects*. His book is the foundation of modern art historiography and the prototype for all biographies of artists.

Giorgio Vasari was born on July 30, 1511, in Arezzo. According to his own account, he was apprenticed as a boy to Andrea del Sarto in Florence. He apparently suffered at the hands of Andrea’s wife, to judge from the waspish references to her in his life of Andrea. Vasari’s career is well documented, the full-

est source of information being the autobiography added to the 1568 edition of his *Lives*.

Vasari had an extremely active career, but much of his time was spent as an impresario devising decorations for courtly festivals and similar ephemera. He fulsomely praised the Medici family for forwarding his career from childhood, and much of his work was done for Cosimo I, Grand Duke of Tuscany. Vasari was a prolific painter in the mannerist style and was also active as an architect, his talents in the latter profession being superior to those he displayed as a painter. He supervised the building of Pope Julius III’s Villa Giulia near Rome, but his masterpiece is the reconstruction of the Uffizi picture gallery in Florence (from 1560), originally the offices of the grand-ducal administration.

The *Lives*. Vasari’s *Lives* was published in Florence in 1550; it was revised and enlarged in 1568. He venerated Michelangelo to the point of idolatry. In the latter years of Michelangelo’s life Vasari came to know him quite well, and for this reason the two versions of his biography of Michelangelo are of the greatest importance as a contemporary assessment.

The tradition of such biographies goes back to antiquity; technical treatises on the arts were also written in classical times, Pliny the Elder and Vitruvius having produced two celebrated examples. As early as the time of Lorenzo Ghiberti there had been an attempt to imitate classical prototypes by writing on earlier and contemporary artists, and Ghiberti, in his *Commentaries* (ca. 1447–1455), also wrote the earliest autobiography by a modern artist.

During the late 15th and early 16th centuries similar treatises were projected and written, and Vasari knew and used some of these earlier works. What distinguishes the first edition of his *Lives* is the fact that it is far fuller (and better written) than any of its predecessors or potential rivals. As Vasari says himself, he wrote as an artist for other artists, with knowledge of technical matters.

The book opens with long introductions on the history and technique of painting, sculpture, and architecture, as practiced in Italy since the Dark Ages, and then proceeds to a chronological series of lives of the great revivers of painting (Giotto), sculpture (the Pisani), and architecture (Arnolfo di Cambio), reaching a climax in the life of Michelangelo, the master of all three arts, who was then 75 years old. Briefly, the plan of the book was to show how Italian—and specifically Tuscan—artists had revived the glories of classical art late in the 13th century, reaching a crescendo in Michelangelo. Vasari is extremely partisan in that Venetians such as Giorgione and Titian are not

given the prominence they deserve; and he also shows an uneasy awareness that if Michelangelo had reached perfection only decline could follow.

Vasari took great care to gather material on his numerous journeys, and, more than any of his predecessors, he looked at works of art. On the other hand, his reverence for factual truth was less than would be required of a modern historian, and he was unable to resist an amusing anecdote. This gives his book a liveliness and directness which has ensured its continued popularity independent of its historical importance.

In 1568 Vasari produced a second edition, much larger than the original and containing a great many alterations, particularly in the earlier lives. It also has many new biographies of living (or recently dead) artists, so it is an essential source for Vasari's contemporaries. He gives more space to non-Florentine artists and even mentions one or two non-Italians.

The most important changes are in the life of Michelangelo, who had died in 1564. Part of the revision of Vasari's earlier life was occasioned by the publication, in 1553, of the *Life of Michelangelo*, written by Ascanio Condivi, a pupil of Michelangelo, and probably partly dictated by the master. The versions by Vasari and Condivi give us, therefore, a unique contemporary picture of the life and works of the greatest Italian artist of the age.

It is almost impossible to imagine the history of Italian art without Vasari, so fundamental is his *Lives*. It is the first real and autonomous history of art both because of its monumental scope and because of the integration of the individual biographies into a whole.

EWB

Victoria (1819–1901), queen of Great Britain and Ireland from 1837 to 1901 and empress of India from 1876 to 1901. Victoria presided over the expansion of England into an empire of 4 million square miles and 124 million people.

A woman who gave her name to an age, Victoria was a richly contradictory character. Intensely virtuous, at the age of 11 upon learning she was next in succession to the British crown, she reacted by promising "I will be good," a promise which she faithfully kept. With innate good manners and a great love of truth, she was also immensely selfish, keeping aged ministers and ladies-in-waiting out in all weathers and up to all hours, and ruining the life and character of her eldest son (later Edward VII) by refusing to allow him any responsibility. Her prudery was famous, yet her letters reveal her completely unafraid to face unpleasant facts, even about her nearest and dearest. Tremendously personal and partisan in her handling of

her ministers, she never succeeded in understanding the English party system; she considered that her own view of what would best benefit her country gave her the right to oppose any policy and person, and she frankly preferred coalitions, while accepting that the Crown must be above party. Living all her adult life subject to the guidance of wise men, she remained both innocent and devious, arbitrary and simple, courageous and timid, "unconstitutional in action while constitutional by temperament." In fact she was so completely an expression of the dominant views and characteristics of her time that she truly embodied and interpreted her people throughout her reign. As queen, she saw slavery abolished in the colonies, the Reform Bill passed, the Poor Law reformed, the Corn Laws repealed; she saw her country undertake successful wars in the Crimea, Egypt, the Sudan, and South Africa, acquire the Suez Canal, and establish constitutions in Australia and Canada.

Alexandrina Victoria was born in Kensington Palace, London, on May 24, 1819. She was the only child of Edward, Duke of Kent (1767–1820; fourth son of George III), by Mary Louis Victoria (1786–1861; fourth daughter of Francis Frederick Anthony, reigning Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and widow of Edward, Prince of Leiningen). Victoria was baptized on June 24, 1819, Alexander I of Russia being one of her sponsors, and her uncle, the prince regent (later George IV), the other. She grew up under her mother's care and that of Louisa Lehzen, her German governess, and spoke only German until she was 3. From 1832 Victoria's mother took her on extended tours through England. On May 24, 1837, she came of age, and on June 20, on the death of her uncle William IV, she succeeded to the throne, receiving the news of her accession in a cotton dressing gown at 6 A.M. Her chief advisers at first were the prime minister, Lord Melbourne, a Whig (Liberal), and Baron Stockmar, a German sent to London by her uncle King Leopold of the Belgians as adviser to his 18-year-old niece.

First Years of Reign. Victoria's hand was kissed on her accession by members of her council, which included the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, Lord John Russell, and Lord Palmerston, with all of whom she was to be closely associated. She opened her first Parliament on November 20, 1837, and read her own speech; Parliament voted her an annuity of £385,000, plus the revenues of the duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall, another £126,000. Victoria proceeded to pay her father's debts. On June 28, 1838, her coronation took place. Next year her initial popularity waned, resulting from her dependence on Lord Melbourne and from her unjust treatment of

Lady Flora Hastings, one of her ladies-in-waiting. When Lord Melbourne resigned, Victoria sent for the opposition leader, Sir Robert Peel; but when she refused to change her ladies, as was then the custom on a change of government, Peel refused to take office and Victoria recalled Melbourne.

In October her two first cousins, Ernest and Albert Edward (1819–1861) of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, came to London. Albert had written in his diary at 11, “I intend to train myself to be a good and useful man.” Victoria fell in love with him instantly and proposed to him; they were married on February 10, 1840. It was an ideally happy marriage and restored the prestige of the Crown, which had sadly deteriorated during the reigns of Victoria’s three inept predecessors. Prince Albert was granted £30,000 annual income by Parliament, was named regent in the event of the Queen’s death in childbirth, and in 1857 was made Prince Consort by Victoria. Albert described his functions to the Duke of Wellington in April 1850 as: “the husband of the Queen, the tutor of the Royal children, the private secretary of the sovereign and her permanent Minister.”

In June 1842 Victoria made her first railway journey from Slough, the station nearest Windsor Castle, to Paddington, and in that same year she first went to Scotland, traveling by sea. In 1843 Victoria and Albert visited King Louis Philippe. She was the first English monarch to land in France since Henry VIII visited Francis I in 1520. King Louis Philippe’s return visit was the first voluntary visit to England of any French ruler. In 1845 Victoria, with Albert, made the first of many trips to Germany, staying at Albert’s birthplace, Rosenau.

Her Ministers. In 1834, after Lord John Russell had failed to form a ministry (principally owing to Victoria’s opposition to Palmerston as foreign minister), Lord John “handed back the poisoned chalice,” as Disraeli put it, to Peel. But Peel’s ministry fell on a measure for Irish coercion, and by 1847 the Irish famine, in which 1½ million people died and 1 million emigrated, postponed Victoria’s planned visit there, which did not take place until 1849, when she landed at Cove, changing its name to Queenstown. In 1846 Victoria tangled with Palmerston over the marriage of the Spanish queen Isabella, and in 1850 she informed him that he “(1) should inform her of the course of action he proposes, and (2) should not arbitrarily modify or alter a measure once it had received her sanction.” Lord Palmerston “affected pained surprise” at these injunctions but did not alter his ways. In 1851 the Whig government was outvoted and Lord John resigned, but as Lord Derby, the Con-

servative (Tory) leader refused to form a government, Victoria again sent for Lord John Russell. She was at this time so happy and blessed in her homelife that she wrote, “Politics (provided my Country is safe) must take only 2nd place.” In 1844 she had Osborne Palace built for her on the Isle of Wight and in 1848 Balmoral Castle in Scotland; thereafter until the end of her life she spent part of each spring and fall in these residences. In 1851 she and Prince Albert were much occupied with the Great Exhibition, held in London, the first of its kind.

In 1851 Victoria was furious with Palmerston for informing Walewski, the French ambassador to London, that he approved of the coup by which Prince Louis Napoleon made himself Emperor Napoleon III. Victoria was largely instrumental in compelling Lord John Russell to demand Palmerston’s resignation. In 1852 the Whigs finally fell, and Lord Derby led a Tory Government. But in July the Tories were beaten in the general election, and in December Lord Derby resigned. At Victoria’s request, Lord Aberdeen made a coalition government, with Palmerston relegated to the Home Office. In 1853 Victoria and Albert suffered unpopularity for their apparent pro-Russian stand but regained public approval after the British declared war on Russia February 28, 1854. In January 1855 the government was defeated on their conduct of the war, and Palmerston formed an administration. On March 30, 1856, Victoria admitted that she admired Palmerston’s winning of the war. In 1856 Victoria and Albert visited Napoleon III in Paris, and in 1857 the Indian Mutiny against British rule, as represented by the East India Company, led to Victoria’s writing that there now existed in England “a universal feeling that India [should] belong to *me*.” In 1858 the East India Company was abolished. That same year Victoria’s eldest child, Victoria, married Prince (later Emperor) Frederick of Prussia. In March 1861 Victoria’s mother died, and her eldest son, Albert Edward, while in camp in the Curragh in Ireland, had an affair with an actress called Nelly Clifden, distressing Victoria and Albert, who were planning his marriage to Princess Alexandra of Denmark. Prince Albert, already ill, went in icy weather to Cambridge to remonstrate with his son; Albert was suffering from typhoid and died on December 14, 1861, aged 42.

The widowed Victoria held her erring son as partly the cause of his father’s death and never forgave him. She retired into complete seclusion and wore mourning until her death.

In 1862 Victoria’s daughter Alice married Prince Louis of Hesse, and a year later her eldest son, now created Prince of Wales, whom his family called “Bertie,” married Princess Alexandra of Denmark. Victoria

supported Prussia during its war with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein, whereas her daughter-in-law, her ministers, and her people openly upheld Denmark. She approved Russia's brutal suppression of Poland's national uprising in 1863. In 1865 in the Seven Weeks War between Prussia and Austria, which ended in Prussia's victory at Sadowa, Victoria was again pro-Prussian. In 1867 Victoria entertained the Khedive of Egypt and the Sultan of Turkey. In 1868 Benjamin Disraeli became prime minister but was defeated by William Gladstone over the disestablishment of the Irish Church. Disraeli offered to resign, but Victoria kept him in office for six months after his defeat. Victoria, though she thought him "odd" and his wife odder, much appreciated Disraeli because he treated her as a woman. Gladstone, she complained, treated her as though she were a public department. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Victoria was still pro-Prussian, though she welcomed the exiled French empress Eugénie and allowed her and the Emperor to live at Chislehurst. In 1873 Gladstone resigned, and in 1874, to Victoria's delight, Disraeli became prime minister. He called the plump, tiny queen "The Faery" and admitted he loved her—"perhaps the only person left to me in this world that I do love." That same year Victoria's son Prince Alfred married Marie, daughter of the Russian tsar, who insisted she be called Imperial, not Royal, Highness. This encouraged Victoria to make "preliminary enquiries" about officially assuming the title Empress of India, which she did on May 1, 1876. In 1875 Disraeli, with the help of the Rothschilds, bought the majority of the Suez Canal shares from the bankrupt Khedive of Egypt, to Victoria's delight. That same year Gladstone roused the country with stories of "Bulgarian atrocities": 12,000 Bulgarian Christians had been murdered by Turkish irregulars. In 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey; Victoria and Disraeli were pro-Turk, sending a private warning to the Tsar that, were he to advance, Britain would fight. Disraeli complained that Victoria "writes every day and telegraphs every hour." In 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, Disraeli obtained, as he told Victoria, "peace with honour."

In 1879 Victoria visited Italy and Germany. In the fall Gladstone's Midlothian campaign led to the government's defeat in April 1880. In 1882 a third attempt was made on Victoria's life. Africa gave trouble, the Zulu killed Empress Eugénie's son, and the Sudanese killed General Gordon in Khartoum before Lord Wolseley, sent at Victoria's urging to relieve him, arrived. In 1885 Victoria went to Aix-les-Bains; she thought Gladstone a humbug, and "he talks so very much." In June he resigned, but Lord Salisbury, who became prime minister, lost the ensuing general elec-

tion. Gladstone, pledged to Irish home rule, came in again, to Victoria's unconcealed annoyance. When he was defeated on this issue, Lord Salisbury returned to power.

Last Years. In 1887 Victoria's golden jubilee was celebrated, and in 1888 she actually approved of Gladstone when he persuaded Parliament to vote £37,000 annually for the Prince of Wales' children. In 1889 the German Kaiser, Victoria's grandson, visited England; in 1892 Gladstone again became prime minister. His Home Rule Bill was passed in the House of Commons but thrown out by the House of Lords. Gladstone resigned, to be succeeded by Lord Rosebery. In 1897 Victoria's diamond jubilee was magnificently celebrated, the apotheosis of her reign and of her empire. In 1897 the repression of the Sudan culminated in Lord Kitchener's victory at Omdurman on September 2. Victoria was joyful; "Surely Gordon is avenged," she wrote. In 1899 the Boer War broke out, and in 1900 Victoria went to Ireland, where most of the soldiers who fought on the British side were recruited. In August she signed the Australian Commonwealth Bill and in October lost a grandson in the war. On January 22, 1901, she died in the arms of the Kaiser. Her last word was "Bertie." She was the mother of four boys and five girls, all of whom had issue. In her lifetime she had 40 grand-children and 37 great-grandchildren. During her reign the British crown ceased to be powerful but remained influential.

EWB

Virchow, Rudolf Ludwig Carl (1821–1902), German medical scientist, anthropologist, and politician. Rudolf Virchow was the founder of the school of "cellular pathology," which forms the basis of modern pathology.

Rudolf Virchow was born on Oct. 13, 1821, in Schivelbein, the only child of a farmer and city treasurer. In 1839 Virchow entered the Friedrich Wilhelms Institute in Berlin to undertake medical studies in preparation for a career as an army doctor. He came under the strong influence of Johannes Müller, who encouraged many German doctors to use experimental laboratory methods in their medical studies. Virchow received his medical degree in 1843, having already shown a keen interest in pathology.

In 1845, while still working as an intern, Virchow published his first scientific paper. By this year he had committed himself to a research methodology based on a mechanistic understanding of vital phenomena. Medical research, according to Virchow, needed to use clinical observation, experiments on animals, and microscopic examination of human tis-

sues in order to understand how ordinary chemical and physical laws could explain the normal and abnormal phenomena associated with life. He accepted the cell theory as one basic element in this mechanistic understanding of life. In committing himself to this view, he joined a group of radical young medical scientists who were then challenging the dominant vitalism of an older generation.

In 1846 Virchow began to teach courses in pathological anatomy. In 1847 he was appointed to his first academic position with the rank of *privatdozent*. In the same year he and a colleague, Benno Reinhardt, published the first volume of a medical journal, the *Archives for Pathological Anatomy and Physiology and Clinical Medicine*. Virchow continued to edit this journal until his death in 1902.

Virchow's radical political views were clearly shown in 1848, the year of revolution in Germany. Early in the year Virchow presented a report on a typhus epidemic in Upper Silesia in which he recommended that the best way to avoid a repetition of the epidemic would be to introduce democratic forms of government. When the revolution broke out in Berlin, Virchow joined the revolutionaries fighting on the barricades. He threw himself wholeheartedly into the revolution, much to the displeasure of his father. He participated in a number of democratic clubs and helped edit a weekly paper, *Die medizinische Reform*, which promoted revolutionary ideas in relation to the medical profession.

Virchow's political views led to his suspension by the reestablished conservative government in 1849. The suspension was quickly revoked because of the hostile reaction of the medical fraternity. Later the same year Virchow was appointed professor at the University of Würzburg. Shortly after, he married Rose Mayer, the daughter of a leading German gynecologist.

The chair at Würzburg was the first one in Germany to be devoted to pathological anatomy. During Virchow's 7 years there, the medical school became recognized as one of the best in Europe, largely due to his teaching. He developed his concept of "cellular pathology," basing his interpretation of pathological processes on the recently formulated cell theory of Matthias Schleiden and Theodor Schwann. In the same period he became joint editor of an annual publication reviewing the year's progress in medical science. This publication later became known as Virchow's *Jahresbericht*, and he continued to edit it until his death. He also started work in 1854 on his *Handbook of Special Pathology and Therapeutics*, which became the model for later German "handbooks" in various sciences. Although Virchow's main interest at Würzburg was pathology, he also continued to work

in the field of public health and began researches in physical anthropology.

In 1856 Virchow accepted a chair at the University of Berlin on condition that a new building be constructed for a pathological institute. He remained in this position for the rest of his life. From 1859 Virchow renewed his activities in politics. In that year he was elected as a member of the city council, on which he served until his death. On the council he mainly interested himself in matters of public health. In 1861 Virchow was one of the foundation members of the Deutsche Fortschrittspartei and was elected in the same year to the Prussian Diet. He vigorously opposed Bismarck's preparations for war and his "blood and iron" policy of unifying Germany.

In the late 1860s and 1870s Virchow concentrated his attention on anthropology and international medical relations. He was active in numerous international medical congresses during this period and kept a continuing interest in the control and prevention of epidemics.

In 1873 Virchow was elected to the Prussian Academy of Science. All his contributions to this body were in the field of anthropology, mostly concerning physical anthropology and archaeology. In his new field as in others he took up the task of editing a leading journal, the *Zeitschrift fuer Ethnologie*. Virchow's later years continued to be active, especially in relation to his editorial duties. He died on Sept. 5, 1902.

EWB

Voltaire (1694–1778), French poet, dramatist, historian, and philosopher. Voltaire was an outspoken and aggressive enemy of every injustice but especially of religious intolerance. His works are an outstanding embodiment of the principles of the French Enlightenment.

François Marie Arouet rechristened himself Arouet de Voltaire, probably in 1718. A stay in the Bastille had given him time to reflect on his doubts concerning his parentage, on his need for a noble name to befit his growing reputation, and on the coincidence that *Arouet* sounded like both a *rouer* (for beating) and *roué* (a debauchee). In prison Voltaire had access to a book on anagrams, which may have influenced his name choice thus: *arouet, uotare, voltaire* (a winged armchair).

Youth and Early Success, 1694–1728. Voltaire was born, perhaps on Nov. 21, 1694, in Paris. He was ostensibly the youngest of the three surviving children of François Arouet and Marie Marguerite Daumand, although Voltaire claimed to be the "bas-

tard of Rochebrune,” a minor poet and songwriter. Voltaire’s mother died when he was seven years old, and he was then drawn to his sister. She bore a daughter who later became Voltaire’s mistress.

A clever child, Voltaire was educated by the Jesuits at the Collège Louis-le-Grand from 1704 to 1711. He displayed an astonishing talent for poetry, cultivated a love of the theater, and nourished a keen ambition.

When Voltaire was drawn into the circle of the 72-year-old poet the Abbé de Chaulieu, “one of the most complete hedonists of all times,” his father packed him off to Caen. Hoping to squelch his son’s literary aspirations and to turn his mind to the law, Arouet placed the youth as secretary to the French ambassador at The Hague. Voltaire fell in with a jilted French refugee, Catherine Olympe Dunoyer, pretty but barely literate. Their elopement was thwarted. Under the threat of a *lettre de cachet* obtained by his father, Voltaire returned to Paris in 1713 and was articulated to a lawyer. He continued to write, and he renewed his pleasure-loving acquaintances. In 1717 Voltaire was at first exiled and then imprisoned in the Bastille for verses offensive to powerful personages.

As early as 1711, Voltaire, eager to test himself against Sophocles and Pierre Corneille, had written a first draft of *Oedipe*. On Nov. 18, 1718, the revised play opened in Paris to a sensational success. The *Henriade*, begun in the Bastille and published in 1722, was Voltaire’s attempt to rival Virgil and to give France an epic poem. This work sounded in ringing phrases Voltaire’s condemnation of fanaticism and advanced his reputation as the standard-bearer of French literature. However, his growing literary, financial, and social successes only partially reconciled him to his father, who died in 1722.

In 1726 an altercation with the Chevalier de Rohan, an effete but influential aristocrat, darkened Voltaire’s outlook and intensified his sense of injustice. Rohan had mocked Voltaire’s bourgeois origin and his change of name and in response to Voltaire’s witty retort had hired ruffians to beat the poet, as Voltaire’s friend and host, the Duc de Sully, looked on approvingly. When Voltaire demanded satisfaction through a duel, he was thrown into the Bastille through Rohan’s influence and was released only on condition that he leave the country.

England willingly embraced Voltaire as a victim of France’s injustice and infamy. During his stay there (1726–1728) he was feted; Alexander Pope, William Congreve, Horace Walpole, and Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, praised him; and his works earned Voltaire £1,000. Voltaire learned English by attending the theater daily, script in hand. He also imbibed En-

glish thought, especially that of John Locke and Sir Isaac Newton, and he saw the relationship between free government and creative speculation. More importantly, England suggested the relationship of wealth to freedom. The only protection, even for a brilliant poet, was wealth. Henceforth, Voltaire cultivated his Arouet business cunning.

At Cirey and at Court, 1729–1753. Voltaire returned to France in 1729. A tangible product of his English stay was the *Lettres anglaises* (1734), which have been called “the first bomb dropped on the Old Regime.” Their explosive potential included such remarks as, “It has taken centuries to do justice to humanity, to feel it was horrible that the many should sow and the few should reap.” Written in the style of letters to a friend in France, the 24 “letters” were a witty and seductive call for political, religious, and philosophic freedom; for the betterment of earthly life; for employing the method of Sir Francis Bacon, Locke, and Newton; and generally for exploiting the intellect toward social progress. After their publication in France in 1734, copies were seized from Voltaire’s bookseller, and Voltaire was threatened with arrest. He fled to Lorraine and was not permitted to return to Paris until 1735. The work, with an additional letter on Pascal, was circulated as *Lettres philosophiques*.

Prior to 1753 Voltaire did not have a home; but for 15 years following 1733 he had a refuge at Cirey, in a château owned by his “divine Émilie,” Madame du Châtelet. While still living with her patient husband and son, Émilie made generous room for Voltaire. They were lovers; and they worked together intensely on physics and metaphysics. The lovers quarreled in English about trivia and studied the Old and New Testaments. These biblical labors were important as preparation for the antireligious works that Voltaire published in the 1750s and 1760s. At Cirey, Voltaire also wrote his *Éléments de la philosophie de Newton*.

But joining Émilie in studies in physics did not keep him from drama, poetry, metaphysics, history, and polemics. Similarly, Émilie’s affection was not alone enough for Voltaire. From 1739 he required travel and new excitements. Thanks to Émilie’s influence, Voltaire was by 1743 less unwelcome at Versailles than in 1733, but still there was great resentment toward the “lowborn intruder” who “noticed things a good courtier must overlook.” Honored by a respectful correspondence with Frederick II of Prussia, Voltaire was then sent on diplomatic missions to Frederick. But Voltaire’s new diversion was his incipient affair with his widowed niece, Madame Denis. This affair continued its erotic and stormy course to the

last years of his life. Émilie too found solace in other lovers. The idyll of Cirey ended with her death in 1749.

Voltaire then accepted Frederick's repeated invitation to live at court. He arrived at Potsdam with Madame Denis in July 1750. First flattered by Frederick's hospitality, Voltaire then gradually became anxious, quarrelsome, and finally disenchanted. He left, angry, in March 1753, having written in December 1752: "I am going to write for my instruction a little dictionary used by Kings. 'My friend' means 'my slave.'" Frederick was embarrassed by Voltaire's vocal lawsuit with a moneylender and angered by his attempts to ridicule P. L. M. de Maupertuis, the imported head of the Berlin Academy. Voltaire's polemic against Maupertuis, the *Diatrise du docteur Akakia*, angered Frederick. Voltaire's angry response was to return the pension and other honorary trinkets bestowed by the King. Frederick retaliated by delaying permission for Voltaire's return to France, by putting him under a week's house arrest at the German border, and by confiscating his money.

Sage of Ferney, 1753–1778. After leaving Prussia, Voltaire visited Strasbourg, Colmar, and Lorraine, for Paris was again forbidden him. Then he went to Geneva. Even Geneva, however, could not tolerate all of Voltaire's activities of theater, pen, and press. Therefore, he left his property "Les Delices" and bought an estate at Ferney, where he lived out his days as a kingly patriarch. His own and Madame Denis's great extravagances were supported by the tremendous and growing fortune he amassed through shrewd money handling. A borrower even as a schoolboy, Voltaire became a shrewd lender as he grew older. Generous loans to persons in high places paid off well in favors and influence. At Ferney, he mixed in local politics, cultivated his lands, became through his intelligent benevolence beloved of the townspeople, and in general practiced a self-appointed and satisfying kingship. He became known as the "innkeeper of Europe" and entertained widely and well in his rather small but elegant household.

Voltaire's literary productivity did not slacken, although his concerns shifted as the years passed at Ferney. He was best known as a poet until in 1751 *Le Siècle de Louis XIV* marked him also as a historian. Other historical works include *Histoire de Charles XII*; *Histoire de la Russie sous Pierre le Grand*; and the universal history, *Essai sur l'histoire générale et sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations*, published in 1756 but begun at Cirey. An extremely popular dramatist until 1760, when he began to be eclipsed by competition from the plays of Shakespeare that he had introduced

to France, Voltaire wrote in addition to the early *Oedipe* *La Mort de César*, *Ériphyle*, *Zaïre*, *Alzire*, *Méropé*, *Mahomet*, *L'Enfant prodigue*, *Nanine* (a parody of Samuel Richardson's *Pamela*), *L'Orphelin de la Chine*, *Sémiramis*, and *Tancredè*.

The philosophic *conte* was a Voltaire invention. In addition to his famous *Candide* (1759), others of his stories in this genre include *Micromégas*, *Vision de Babouc*, *Memnon*, *Zadig*, and *Jeannot et Colin*. In addition to the *Lettres Philosophiques* and the work on Newton, others of Voltaire's works considered philosophic are *Philosophie de l'histoire*, *Le Philosophe ignorant*, *Tout en Dieu*, *Dictionnaire philosophique portatif*, and *Traité de la métaphysique*. Voltaire's poetry includes in addition to the *Henriad* the philosophic poems *L'Homme*, *La Loi naturelle*, and *Le Désastre de Lisbonne*, as well as the famous *La Pucelle*, a delightfully naughty poem about Joan of Arc.

Always the champion of liberty, Voltaire in his later years became actively involved in securing justice for victims of persecution. He became the "conscience of Europe." His activity in the Calas affair was typical. An unsuccessful and despondent young man had hanged himself in his Protestant father's home in Roman Catholic Toulouse. For 200 years Toulouse had celebrated the massacre of 4,000 of its Huguenot inhabitants. When the rumor spread that the deceased had been about to renounce Protestantism, the family was seized and tried for murder. The father was broken on the rack while protesting his innocence. A son was exiled, the daughters were confined in a convent, and the mother was left destitute. Investigation assured Voltaire of their innocence, and from 1762 to 1765 he worked unceasingly in their behalf. He employed "his friends, his purse, his pen, his credit" to move public opinion to the support of the Calas family.

Voltaire's ingenuity and zeal against injustice were not exhausted by the Calas affair. Similar was his activity in behalf of the Sirven family (1771) and of the victims of the Abbeville judges (1774). Nor was Voltaire's influence exhausted by his death in Paris on May 30, 1778, where he had gone in search of Madame Denis and the glory of being crowned with laurel at a performance of his drama *Irène*.

Assessment of Voltaire. Voltaire was more than a thinker and activist. Style was nearly always nearly all to him in his abode, in his dress, and particularly in his writings. As poet and man of letters, he was demanding, innovative, and fastidious within regulated patterns of expression. Even as thinker and activist, he believed that form was all or at least the best part. As he remarked, "Never will twenty folio volumes bring about a revolution. Little books are the

ones to fear, the pocket-size, portable ones that sell for thirty sous. If the Gospels had cost 1200 sesterces, the Christian religion could never have been established.”

Voltaire's literary focus moved from that of poet to pamphleteer, and his moral sense had as striking a development. In youth a shameless libertine and in middle years a man notorious throughout the literary world, with more discreet but still eccentric attachments, in his later years Voltaire was renowned, whatever his personal habits, as a public defender and as a champion of human liberty. “Time, which alone makes their reputations of men,” he observed, “in the end makes their faults respectable.” In his last days in Paris, he is said to have taken especially to heart a woman's remark: “Do you not know that he is the preserver of the Calas?”

Voltaire's life nearly spanned the 18th century; his writings fill 70 volumes; and his influence is not yet exhausted. He once wrote: “They wanted to bury me. But I outwitted them.”

EWB

W

Wagner, Richard (1813–1883), German operatic composer. Richard Wagner was the most important seminal figure in 19th-century music. He was also a crucial figure in 19th-century cultural history for both his criticism and polemical writing.

Richard Wagner was born on May 22, 1813, in Leipzig into an unassuming family. His father died shortly after Richard's birth, and within the year his mother married Ludwig Geyer. There is still some controversy as to whether or not Geyer, an itinerant actor, was Wagner's real father. Wagner's musical training was largely left to chance until he was 18, when he studied with Theodor Weinlig in Leipzig for a year. He began his career in 1833 as choral director in Würzburg and composed his early works in imitation of German romantic compositions. Beethoven was his major idol at this time.

Wagner wrote his first opera, *Die Feen* (The Fairies), in 1833, but it was not produced until after the composer's death. He was music director of the theater in Magdeburg from 1834 to 1836, where his next work, *Das Liebesverbot* (Forbidden Love), loosely based on Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure* was performed in 1836. That year he married Minna Planner, a singer-actress active in provincial theatrical life.

In 1837 Wagner became the first music director of the theater in Riga, where he remained until 1839. He then set out for Paris, where he hoped to make his fortune. While in Paris, he developed an intense

hatred for French musical culture that lasted the remainder of his life, regardless of how often he attempted to have a Parisian success. It was at this time that Wagner, in financial desperation, sold the scenario for *Der fliegende Holländer* (The Flying Dutchman) to the Paris Opéra for use by another composer. Wagner later set to music another version of this tale.

Disillusioned by his lack of success, Wagner returned to Germany, settling in Dresden in 1842, where he was in charge of the music for the court chapel. *Rienzi*, a grand opera in imitation of the French style, enjoyed a modest success; the Overture is still popular. In 1845 *Tannhäuser* was premiered in Dresden; this proved the first undoubted success of Wagner's career. In November of the same year he finished the poem for *Lohengrin* and began composition early in 1846. While at work on *Lohengrin* he also made plans for his tetralogy, *Der Ring des Nibelungen* (The Ring of the Nibelungen), being captivated by Norse sagas. In 1845 he prepared the scenario for the first drama of the tetralogy to be written, *Siegfried's Tod* (Siegfried's Death), which later became *Die Götterdämmerung* (The Twilight of the Gods).

Years of Exile. Wagner had to flee Dresden in 1849 in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1848. He settled in Switzerland, first in Zurich and then near Lucerne. He remained in Switzerland for the most part for the next 15 years without steady employment, banished from Germany and forbidden access to German theatrical life. During this time he worked on the *Ring*, which dominated his creative life over the next 2 decades.

The first production of *Lohengrin* took place in Weimar under Franz Liszt's direction in 1850 (Wagner was not to see *Lohengrin* until 1861). By this time Wagner was moderately notorious as a polemicist, and his most fundamental work of theory, *Opera and Drama*, dates from 1850–1851. In it he discusses the significance of legend for the theater and how to write singable poetry, and he presents his ideas with regard to the realization of the “total work of art” (*Gesamtkunstwerk*), which would effectively change the course of theatrical life in Germany if not the world.

The year 1850 also saw publication of one of Wagner's most scurrilous tracts, *The Jew in Music*, in which he viciously attacked the very existence of the Jewish composer and musician, particularly in German society. Anti-Semitism remained a hallmark of Wagner's philosophy the rest of his life.

Between 1850 and 1865 Wagner fashioned most of the material to which he owes his reputation. He purposefully turned aside from actual composition to plan an epic cycle of such grandeur and proportion as

had never been created before. In 1851 he wrote the poem for *Der junge Siegfried* (Young Siegfried), the work now known as *Siegfried*, to prepare the way for *Götterdämmerung*. He realized he would need not only this drama to clarify his other work but two additional dramas as well, and he sketched the remaining poems for the *Ring* by the end of 1851. He completed *Das Rheingold* (The Rhinegold) in 1852 after he had revised the poem for *Die Walküre* (The Valkyrie).

In 1853 Wagner formally commenced composition on the *Rheingold*; he completed the scoring the following year and then began serious work on the *Walküre*, which was finished in 1856. At this time he was toying with the notion of writing the drama *Tristan und Isolde*. In 1857 he finished the composition of Act II of *Siegfried* and gave himself over entirely to *Tristan*. This work was completed in 1859, but it was mounted in Munich only in 1865.

Last Years. In 1860 Wagner received permission to reenter Germany except for Saxony. He was granted full amnesty in 1862. That year he began the music for *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg* (The Mastersingers of Nuremberg), which he had first thought of in 1845. He resumed composition on *Siegfried* in 1865 and began sketching what would eventually become *Parsifal*, also a vague possibility since the mid-1840s. He began *Parsifal* at the urging of the Bavarian monarch, Ludwig II, then Wagner's patron. The *Meistersinger* was completed in 1867; the first performance took place in Munich the following year. Only then did he pick up the threads of the *Ring* and resume work on Act III of *Siegfried*, which was finished in September 1869, a month that also saw the first performance of the *Rheingold*. He wrote the music for *Götterdämmerung* from 1869 to 1874.

The first entire *Ring* cycle (*Rheingold*, *Walküre*, *Siegfried*, and *Götterdämmerung*) was given at the Festspielhaus, the shrine Wagner built for himself at Bayreuth, in 1876, over 30 years after the idea for it had first come to mind. He finished *Parsifal*, his final drama, in 1882. Wagner died on Feb. 13, 1883, in Venice and was buried at Bayreuth.

Philosophy of the *Ring*. The *Ring* is central to Wagner's career. Here he wished to present new ideas of morality and human activity that would completely alter the course of history. He envisioned a world made entirely free from subservience to supernatural bondage, which he believed had adversely affected Western civilization from ancient Greece to the present. Wagner also held that at the source of all human activity was fear, which must be purged so that man can live the perfect life. In the *Ring* he attempted

to set forth the standards for superior humans, those beings who would dominate individuals less fortunate; in turn, such lesser mortals would recognize their own inferior status and yield to the radiance offered by the perfect hero. The implications inherent in a quest for moral and racial purity are vital to Wagner's intentions in the *Ring*.

It is interesting to note that Wagner believed it was only by submitting completely to the sensuous experience that man could be liberated from the restraints imposed by rationality. However valuable the intellect might be, the rational life was regarded as a hindrance to achieving the fullest development of human awareness. Only when perfect man and perfect woman came together could a transcendental heroic image be created. Siegfried and Brünnhilde together are invincible after each has submitted to the other; apart they are imperfect.

There is no charity or idealism present in the Wagnerian myth world. The perfect ones exult only in each other. All men must recognize the superiority of certain creatures and then bow to their will. Man may quest for his destiny, but he must submit to the will of the superior one if the two come into conflict. In the *Ring* Wagner wanted to turn his back upon the civility inherent in the Hellenic-Judeo-Christian world. He preferred a realm dominated by the strength and savagery exemplified in the Norse sagas. The implications for the future of Germany were immense.

Philosophy of Other Operas. In *Tristan* Wagner rejected the affirmative way he developed in the *Ring*. Instead, he explored the dark side of love in order to plunge to the depths of negative experience. Tristan and Isolde, liberated and not doomed by a love potion they drink, willingly destroy a kingdom in order to love and to live; the sensual power of love is seen here as a destructive force, and the musical style of devious chromaticism and overwhelming orchestral pulsation is perfect for the messages of the drama.

Wagner's egomania, never tolerable to anyone save those who could blind themselves totally to his flaws, came to the fore in the *Meistersinger*. The tale of the young hero-singer who conquers the old order and forces a new, sensually more exciting style upon the tradition-bound Nuremberg society is the tale of the *Ring* in a slightly different guise. (Wagner openly claimed *Tristan* to be the *Ring* in microcosm.) It is obvious in the *Meistersinger* that Wagner identifies himself with the messianic figure of a young German poet and singer who wins the prize and is finally accepted as the leader of a new society.

In *Parsifal* Wagner identified himself even more intensely with the hero as the savior, the world's re-

deemer. The mysteries celebrated in *Parsifal* are those prepared for the glory of Wagner himself and not for any god.

Musical Language. The scope of Wagner's vision is as breathtaking as his ideas and metaphysics are repugnant. Without the music his dramas would still be milestones in the history of Western thought. With the music, however, Wagner's importance is greatly magnified. He conceived a musical language that would most effectively present his philosophies. He intended to batter down the resistant forces of reason by means of the music. Ideally, there would be an unending melody in which the voice and text are but part of the fabric, united with a magnificent orchestral web which becomes the action at a distinctly musical pace. The verbal language, often very obscure and tortured in syntax, is acceptable only through the music.

For Wagner, music was in no sense additive, tacked onto the dramas after completion, anymore than it was an exercise in formal rhetoric, mere "art for art's sake." Music could bind all life, art, reality, and illusion together into one symbiotic union that would then work its own unique magic upon an audience. It is no accident that Wagner's musical language is intended to dethrone reason and to ask for unquestioning acceptance of the composer's beliefs. In Wagner's reading of Schopenhauer, the musical ideal in his dramas would be not a reflection of the world but would be that very world itself.

Personal Characteristics. Such a summary of Wagner's creative life hardly hints at the extraordinary complications of his personal life which, in turn, affected his dramas. Wagner was that rare individual a truly charismatic figure who overcame all adversities. During the years in Switzerland he managed to live for the most part on charity by means of the most amazing conniving and manipulation of people conceivable. The Wesendonck family in particular contributed to his well-being, and Mathilde Wesendonck, one of Wagner's many mistresses, was credited with partially inspiring *Tristan*.

Wagner's life after leaving Saxony was a constant series of intrigues, harangues, and struggles to overcome the indifference of the world, to find the ideal woman worthy of his love, and to be the worthy recipient of the benefits offered by the perfect patron. Cosima Liszt von Bülow was the answer to his quest for the ideal female, subservient and fanatically devoted to his well-being. Although Wagner and Minna had lived apart for some time, Wagner did not marry Cosima until 1870, almost a decade after Minna's

death. Over 30 years her husband's junior, Cosima was to be the dominating, guiding spirit in the Wagnerian shrine at Bayreuth until her death in 1930.

The perfect patron proved to be Ludwig II, who literally rescued Wagner from debtors' prison and brought the composer to Munich with a near *carte blanche* for life and creativity. Once salvaged, however, Wagner was so offensive to all save the blindly adoring young monarch that he was forced to flee within two years. Ludwig, despite eventually disillusionment, remained a loyal supporter of Wagner. It was his generosity that made possible the first festival performances of the *Ring* in Bayreuth in 1876.

Never one of amenable disposition, Wagner held convictions of his own superiority that developed monomaniacal proportions as he grew older. He was intolerant of any questioning, of any failure to accept him and his creation. His household revolved completely in his orbit, and his demands upon wives, mistresses, friends, musicians, and benefactors were legion. Those who ran afoul of him were pilloried unmercifully, often unscrupulously, such as Eduard Hanslick, the distinguished Viennese music critic who became the model for Beckmesser in the *Meistersinger*.

When the young philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche first met Wagner, he thought he had found his way into the presence of a god, so radiant and powerful did Wagner seem to him. Later Nietzsche realized that the composer was something less than the perfection of the superman incarnate he had imagined him to be and turned away in disgust. Wagner never forgave Nietzsche for his desertion.

Place in History. In retrospect, Wagner's accomplishments outweigh both his personal behavior and his legacy for the 20th century. He has even managed to survive the predictable rejection by later generations of composers. Wagner created such an effective, unique musical language, especially in *Tristan* and *Parsifal*, that the beginnings of modern music are often dated from these scores.

Wagner demonstrated that music was not restricted to being pure formalism and abstract theoretical exploration but was a living, vibrant force capable of changing men's lives. He also proved that the music theater is a proper forum for ideas as opposed to being an arena for only escape and entertainment. And he demonstrated that a composer could rightfully take his place among the great revolutionary thinkers of Western civilization, questioning and attacking what seemed intolerable in traditional modes of behavior, experience, learning, and creation. Together with Karl Marx and Charles Darwin, Wagner must

be given his rightful due as one of the greatest forces in 19th-century cultural history.

EWB

Webb, Beatrice Potter (1858–1943), English social reformer. Beatrice Potter Webb was a leading Fabian socialist and a partner with her husband, Sidney Webb, in their projects for social and educational reform and in their research into the history of political and economic institutions.

Beatrice Potter was born on Jan. 2, 1858, at Standish House near Gloucester. Her father, Richard Potter, was a man with large railroad interests and many contacts among politicians and intellectuals. She was educated at home by governesses and also by extensive travel, wide reading, and direct contact with many of the leading figures of politics, science, and industry. Herbert Spencer in particular gave her the attention and encouragement that she thought denied to her by her family.

Potter's involvement with social problems began in 1883, when she became a rent collector in London. This work, in turn, led to her participation in Charles Booth's survey published as *Life and Labour of the People in London*. In 1887 the results of her inquiries into dock life in the East End of London were published in *Nineteenth Century*, soon followed by other articles and studies of sweated labor.

Increased confidence and deeper study culminated in Potter's *The Co-operative Movement in Great Britain* (1891). It was in connection with this that she met Sidney Webb. They were married in 1892, and their life together became one of single-minded dedication to research and social reform. Together they produced a veritable torrent of books, pamphlets, essays, and memoranda amounting to over a hundred items.

Until 1906 Potter's role in the partnership was primarily that of researcher, writer, and hostess for gatherings of Cabinet ministers and members of Parliament who came to hear the Webb opinion on social legislation. At the end of 1905 Beatrice was appointed a member of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, which sat from 1906 to 1909. The minority report, drafted by the Webbs, played an important role in the dismantling of the old Poor Law and in its replacement by the new systems of social insurance.

In the period after 1910 the Webbs abandoned their nonpartisan stance and became an important force in building the Labour party. Another cornerstone of their earlier philosophy was abandoned with the publication of their *Soviet Communism: A New Society?* (1935). They, who had always held that social change cannot come about by the violent destruction

of existing institutions, endorsed the Russian Revolution in spite of its totalitarianism. Beatrice Webb died at Liphook, Hampshire, on April 30, 1943. In 1947, shortly after Sidney's death, their ashes were buried in Westminster Abbey.

EWB

Webb, Sidney James, Baron Passfield (1859–1947), English social reformer and a leading Fabian Socialist. Sidney Webb a historian of social and economic institutions, founder of the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a Cabinet minister.

Sidney Webb was born in London on July 13, 1859. He was educated in Switzerland, Germany, the Birkbeck Institute, the City of London College, and through his own intensive reading. After a brief period of employment in the office of a firm of colonial brokers, he entered the civil service in 1878. In 1885 he was called to the bar and in the following year received his bachelor of laws degree from London University.

In 1885 Webb joined the Fabian Society and soon became a dominating influence on that organization. In 1891 he resigned from the civil service to run successfully for the London County Council. During most of the next 2 decades he was chairman of the Technical Education Committee of the council and brought about a thoroughgoing reform and centralization of the educational system in London. In 1895 he became the founder of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

In 1892 Webb married Beatrice Potter. From that time on, their work merged so thoroughly that it is impossible to distinguish their individual contributions. Among the earliest and most notable of their works are *The History of Trade Unionism* (1894) and *Industrial Democracy* (1897). Later there were nine massive volumes of the history of *English Local Government*, the first of which appeared in 1906 and the last in 1929.

By 1910 the Webbs decided that the Fabian policy of working through the existing political parties without partisan involvement had outlived its usefulness, and the Fabian Society threw its weight behind the Labour party. From 1915 to 1925 Sidney was a member of the party executive. In 1920 he was elected to Parliament, and in 1924 he was appointed president of the Board of Trade. Although he retired from office in 1928, he was called out of retirement in 1929 to serve (as Baron Passfield) as secretary of state for the colonies.

After the fall of the Labour government in 1932, the Webbs toured the Soviet Union and extolled it in their *Soviet Communism: A New Society?*

(1935). Beatrice died in 1943, and Sidney on Oct. 13, 1947.

EWB

Weber, Max (1864–1920), German social scientist. Max Weber was a founder of modern sociological thought. His historical and comparative studies of the great civilizations are a landmark in the history of sociology.

The work of Max Weber reflects a continued interest in charting the varying paths taken by universal cultural history as reflected in the development of the great world civilizations. In this sense, he wished to attempt a historical and analytical study of the themes sounded so strongly in G. W. F. Hegel's philosophy of history, especially the theme, which Weber took as his own, of the "specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture." Along with this emphasis on universal cultural history, Weber's detailed training as a legal and economic historian led him to reject the overly simplistic formulas of economic base and corresponding cultural superstructure that were so often used to account for cultural development and were a strong part of the intellectual environment of Weber's early years as student and professor. His historical and comparative erudition and analytical awareness required that he go beyond both the Hegelian and Marxian versions of historical development toward a deep historical and comparative study of sociocultural processes in West and East.

Weber was born on April 21, 1864, in Erfurt, Thuringia, the son of a lawyer active in political life. An attack of meningitis at the age of 4 and his mother's consequent overprotectiveness helped contribute to Weber's sedentary yet intellectually precocious youth. He read widely in the classics and was bored with the unchallenging secondary education of his time, which he completed in 1882. He then attended Heidelberg University, where he studied law, along with history, economics, and philosophy.

After three terms at Heidelberg, Weber served a year in the military, which he found to be largely an "incredible waste of time" with its continued attempts to regiment the human intellect. Resuming his studies at the universities of Berlin and Göttingen in 1884, he passed his bar examination in 1886 and would later practice law for a time. He completed his doctoral thesis in 1889 with an essay on the history of the medieval trading companies, which embodied his interests in both legal and economic history. His second major work, a customary "habilitation" thesis that would qualify him to teach at the university level, appeared in 1891 and involved a study of the economic,

cultural, and legal foundations of ancient agrarian history.

In 1893 Weber married Marianne Schnitger. The following year he received an appointment as professor of economics at Freiburg University; in 1896 he accepted a professorship at Heidelberg. Shortly after his father's death in 1897, Weber began to suffer from a psychic disturbance that incapacitated him almost completely until 1902. By the next year he was well enough to join Werner Sombart in editing the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* (Archives for Social Science and Social Policy), the most prominent German social science journal of the period.

Protestantism and Capitalism. Having assumed his full work load again, Weber began to write perhaps his most renowned essays, published in the *Archiv* in 1904–1905 under the title *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. In them he attempted to link the rise of a new sort of distinctly modern capitalism to the religious ethics of Protestantism, especially the Calvinist variety, with its emphasis on work in a calling directed toward the rational ascetic mastery of this world.

Weber argued that, when the asceticism of the medieval Catholic monastery, oriented toward salvation in a world beyond this one through self-denial exercised by a religious few, was brought into the conduct of everyday affairs, it contributed greatly to the systematic rationalization and functional organization of every sphere of existence, especially economic life. He viewed the Reformation as a crucial period in western European history, one that was to see a fundamental reorientation of basic cultural frameworks of spiritual direction and human outlook and destined to have a great impact on economic life as well as other aspects of modern culture. Within the context of his larger questions, Weber tended to view Protestant rationalism as one further step in the series of stages of increasing rationalization of every area of modern society.

In 1904 Weber was invited to attend the St. Louis Exhibition in Missouri and to deliver a popular sociological lecture. While in America, he had substantial opportunity to encounter what he saw as added evidence for his special thesis in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, as well as for his more general philosophic and historical concerns. In the United States the religious foundations of modern economic life had seen perhaps their greatest fruition in the enormous "towers of capital," as Weber called them, of the eastern industrial centers of the country. However, he also recognized that the contemporary American economic life had been stripped of its origi-

nal ethical and religious impulse. Intense economic competition assumed the character almost of sport, and no obvious possibilities appeared for the resuscitation of new spiritual values from what appeared to be the extensive mechanization of social and economic existence.

Employing a method that isolated the similarities and differences between features of sociocultural development in different societies, Weber attempted to weigh the relative importance of economic, religious, juridical, and other factors in contributing to the different historical outcomes seen in any comparative study of world societies. This larger theme formed one of his central intellectual interests throughout the remainder of his life, and it resulted in the publication of *The Religion of China* (1915), *The Religion of India* (1916–1917), and *Ancient Judaism* (1917–1919). Although he also planned comparable works on early Christianity, medieval Catholicism, and Islamic civilization, he died before they could be completed.

Later Work. After the essays of 1904–1905, Weber took on an even heavier burden of activities than before his illness. His break with the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Union for Social Policy), a long-standing German political and social scientific organization, over the question of the relation of social scientific research to social policy led to the establishment in 1910, with the collaboration of other great social scientists of his day, of the new Deutsche Soziologische Gesellschaft (German Sociological Society).

Weber and his collaborators argued that social science could not be simply subordinated to political values and policies. Rather, there was a logical distinction between the realms of fact and value, one which required a firmly grounded distinction between the analyses of the social scientist and the policies of any political order. Social science must develop “objective” frames of reference, ones “neutral” to any particular political policies and ethical values. This ever-renewed tension between particular ethical stances and “objectivity” in the sciences remained a central part of Weber’s concerns in his political activities during and after World War I as well as in his academic writings and lectures.

Economy and Society. In 1909 Weber took over the editorship of a projected multivolume encyclopedic work on the social sciences entitled *Outline of Social Economics*. It was to contain volumes authored by prominent social scientists of the time. Although he was originally to contribute the volume *Economy and Society* to this effort, difficulties in obtaining completed manuscripts from some partici-

pants led Weber to expand his contribution into what became a prodigious attempt at the construction of a systematic sociology in world historical and comparative depth, one which was to occupy a large portion of his time and energies during the remainder of his life. He published his first contributions in 1911–1913, other still unfinished sections being published after his death.

Economy and Society differed in tone and emphasis from Weber’s comparative studies of the cultural foundations of Chinese, Indian, and Western civilizations. This massive work was an attempt at a more systematic sociology, not directed toward any single comparative, historical problem but rather toward an organization of the major areas of sociological inquiry into a single whole. Weber never believed it possible to write a truly systematic sociology that would have separate analytical sections on each area of interest and that would form a general system of theory. Containing large sections on sociological analysis, the economy and social norms, economy and law, domination, and legitimacy, and still unsurpassed sections on religion, the city, and political rulership, *Economy and Society* remains today perhaps the only systematic sociology in world historical and comparative depth.

Last Years. Despite time spent in the medical service during World War I, Weber’s efforts were largely devoted from 1910 to 1919 to the completion of his studies on China, India, and ancient Judaism and to his work on *Economy and Society*. Many younger as well as more established scholars formed part of Weber’s wide intellectual circle during these years. Always desirous of championing the cause of scholars whose work was judged unfairly because of religious, political, or other external criteria, Weber on numerous occasions attempted to aid these young scholars—despite sometimes substantial intellectual differences with them—by securing for them the academic appointments they deserved. Often these attempts were unsuccessful and led Weber into bitter conflicts with many established scholars and political figures over the relation of science to values and the application of extrascientific criteria to the evaluation of a writer’s work.

In 1918 Weber resumed his teaching duties. One result was a series of lectures in 1919–1920, “Universal Economic History,” which was published posthumously from students’ notes as *General Economic History*. Along with this lecture series, Weber delivered two addresses in 1918, “Science as a Vocation” and “Politics as a Vocation,” in which he voiced ethical themes that had occupied him in his scholarly

work and in his numerous discussions of social policy. In these two addresses he contrasted the ethic of unalterable ultimate ends so characteristic of uncompromising religious and political prophets with the ethic of consequences so necessary in political life, in which possible outcomes of actions and policies are agonizingly weighed and the least undesirable course determined in light of a plurality of given goals. Variants of this distinction pervaded much of Weber's own view of political and religious life and formed a central aspect of his ethical philosophy.

Thus, Weber sounded ethical themes that have become a central part of the "existentialist" philosophical orientation of our time. Understanding the dilemma of modern men caught between the older religious systems of the past and the cynical power politics of the present, he gave no simple solutions and was willing neither to wait for new prophets nor to abdicate all ethical responsibility for the conduct of life because of its seeming ultimate "meaninglessness."

Weber died in Munich on June 14, 1920. His work forms a major part of the historical foundation of sociology.

EWB

Wedgwood, Josiah (1730–1795), English potter. Josiah Wedgwood established the Wedgwood pottery factory. His work is most associated with the neoclassic style.

Josiah Wedgwood was born in August 1730 at Burslem, Staffordshire, into a family which had been engaged in the manufacture of pottery since the 17th century. His father owned a factory called the Churchyard Pottery, and Josiah began working in this family enterprise as an apprentice in 1744. He left the factory in the early 1750s and until 1759 was engaged with various partners in the manufacture of standard types of earthenware, including salt-glaze and stoneware products and objects in the popular agate and tortoiseshell glazes. During these years he experimented with improving glazes in color, and he achieved a particularly refined green glaze.

In Staffordshire at Ivy House in Burslem. The Ivy House pottery was so successful that in 1764 he moved his factory to larger quarters nearby; the new factory was first known as the Brick House Works and later as the Bell House. During this period Wedgwood created his first creamware, a pale-colored earthenware frequently decorated with painted or enameled designs. Wedgwood's creamware won the approval of Queen Charlotte and after about 1765 became known as "Queen's ware."

During the first half of the 18th century the prevailing taste was for the rococo, a decorative style

which used sensuous and delicate colors, lavish ornament, and a complex interplay of curved lines and masses. From about the middle of the century, however, the exuberant gaiety of the rococo began gradually to be replaced by neoclassicism and a return to the comparative severity of the art of antiquity. In the early 1760s Wedgwood met Thomas Bentley, a cultivated man devoted to neoclassicism, and in 1769 they opened a factory near Burslem which was called Etruria and dedicated to the creation of ornamental pottery designed in the neoclassic manner. The factory at Bell House was retained for the production of functional tableware until the 1770s, when it was absorbed into Etruria.

The two products of the Etruria factory which became most fashionable were the basalt and the jasperware objects. The basalt were decorative and functional pieces made of a hard black stoneware, often with low-relief decoration, in designs based upon antiquity. The jasperware became the most famous of the Wedgwood products and is still the pottery most associated with the Wedgwood name. Jasperware, which Wedgwood perfected about 1775, is a fine stoneware with a solid body color in blue, soft green, lavender, pink, black, or other colors and generally decorated with delicate low-relief designs in white adapted from Greek vase paintings, Roman relief sculpture, and other antique sources. Jasperware was produced in a great variety of functional and decorative objects ranging from teapots to cameos and including vases, bowls, candlesticks, and portrait reliefs.

Bentley died in 1780, and Wedgwood continued the work at Etruria, producing some of the factory's finest jasper in the late 18th century. He employed many artists to provide designs for his products and to adapt designs from classical antiquity. The most notable of these modelers was John Flaxman, a famous sculptor who supplied designs for the Etruria factory from 1775 to 1800. From 1787 Flaxman was in Rome for several years studying antique sculpture and sending Wedgwood elegant interpretations of ancient art.

Wedgwood died at Etruria on Jan. 3, 1795. His tombstone states that he "converted a rude and inconsiderable Manufactory into an elegant Art and an important part of National Commerce." The factory remains in the family and since 1810 has been known as Josiah Wedgwood and Sons. The modern factory is primarily concerned with the production of dinnerware and functional objects but continues to manufacture the jasper and basalt that Josiah made so popular.

EWB

Wesley, John (1703–1791), English evangelical clergyman, preacher, and writer. John Wesley was the founder of Methodism. One of England's greatest spiritual leaders, he played a major role in the revival of religion in 18th-century English life.

The 18th century found the Church of England out of touch with both the religious and social problems of the day. Its leadership was constituted largely by political appointees, its clergy were riddled with ignorance, and churchmen of genuine concern were rare. The influence of rationalism and deism even among dedicated clergymen caused the Anglican Church to be unaware of the spiritual needs of the masses. John Wesley's great achievement was to recognize the necessity of bringing religion to this wide and neglected audience.

Wesley was born in Epworth, Lincolnshire, on June 17, 1703. He was the fifteenth of the 19 children of Samuel Wesley, an Anglican minister who took his pastoral duties seriously and instilled this idea in his son. John's mother, a woman of great spiritual intensity, molded her children through a code of strict and uncompromising Christian morality, instilling in John a firm conception of religious piety, concern, and duty.

In 1714 Wesley entered Charterhouse School, and in 1720 he became a student at Christ Church, Oxford. Receiving his bachelor of arts degree in 1724, he was ordained a deacon in the Church of England in 1725 and was elected a fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford, in 1726. He became curate to his father in the following year and was ordained a priest in 1728. Returning to Oxford in 1729, Wesley, in addition to the duties of his fellowship at Lincoln, became active in a religious club to which his younger brother Charles belonged. The Holy Club, nicknamed "Methodists" by its critics, met frequently for discussion and study. Its members engaged in prayer, attended church services, visited prisoners, and gave donations to the needy. The Holy Club was one of Wesley's formative influences, and he soon became its acknowledged leader.

Ministry in Georgia. Buoyed by his years at Oxford and desirous of putting the principles of the Holy Club to work elsewhere, Wesley in 1735 accepted the invitation of James Oglethorpe to become a minister in the recently founded colony of Georgia. Accompanied by his brother Charles, Wesley spent two disappointing years in the New World. Despite his zeal to bring them the Gospel, he was rebuffed by the colonists and received unenthusiastically by the Indians. Moreover, he became involved in an unsuccessful love affair, the aftermath of which brought him

the unwanted publicity of a court case. In 1737 Wesley returned to England.

Wesley's stay in Georgia was, however, not without benefit. Both on his trip over and during his two-year stay, he was deeply influenced by Moravian missionaries, whose sense of spiritual confidence and commitment to practical piety impressed him.

Conversion and Preaching. In England, Wesley continued to keep in close touch with the Moravians. At one of their meetings in Aldersgate Street, London, on May 24, 1738, he experienced conversion while listening to a reading of Martin Luther's preface to the Epistle to the Romans. "I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation," Wesley wrote, "and an assurance was given me that He had taken away *my* sins, even *mine*, and saved *me* from the law of sin and death."

Through this personal commitment Wesley, though he later broke with the Moravians, became imbued with the desire to take this message to the rest of England. Finding the bishops unsympathetic or indifferent and most clergymen hostile to the point of closing their churches to him, Wesley, following the example of such preachers as George Whitefield, began an itinerant ministry that lasted more than 50 years. Forced to preach outside the churches, he became adept at open-air preaching and, as a result, began to reach many, especially in the cities, about whom the Church of England had shown little concern.

A small man (he was 5 feet 6 inches in height and weighed about 120 pounds), Wesley always had to perch on a chair or platform when he preached. He averaged 15 sermons a week, and as his *Journal* indicates, he preached more than 40,000 sermons in his career, traveling the length and breadth of England—altogether more than 250,000 miles—many times during an age when roads were often only muddy ruts. A contemporary described him as "the last word . . . in neatness and dress" and "his eye was 'the brightest and most piercing that can be conceived.'"

Preaching was not easy; crowds were often hostile, and once a bull was let loose in an audience he was addressing. Wesley, however, quickly learned the art of speaking and, despite opposition, his sermons began to have a marked effect. Many were converted immediately, frequently exhibiting physical signs, such as fits or trances.

Organization of Methodism. From the beginning Wesley viewed his movement as one within the Church of England and not in opposition to it. As he gained converts around England, however, these men and women grouped themselves together in so-

cieties that Wesley envisioned as playing the same role in Anglicanism as the monastic orders do in the Roman Catholic Church. He took a continual and rather authoritarian part in the life of these societies, visiting them periodically, settling disputes, and expelling the recalcitrant. Yearly conferences of the whole movement presented him with the opportunity to establish policy. Under his leadership each society was broken down into a "class," which dealt with matters of finance, and a "band," which set standards of personal morality. In addition, Wesley wrote numerous theological works and edited 35 volumes of Christian literature for the edification of the societies. A tireless and consummate organizer, he kept his movement prospering despite a variety of defections.

Yet the continual opposition of the Anglican bishops, coupled with their refusal to ordain Methodist clergy, forced Wesley to move closer to actual separation toward the end of his life. In 1784 he took out a deed of declaration, which secured the legal standing of the Methodist Society after his death. In the same year he reluctantly ordained two men to serve as "superintendents" for Methodists in North America. He continued the practice to provide clergymen for England but very sparingly and with great hesitation. Wesley always maintained that he personally adhered to the Church of England.

Methodism had a significant impact on English society. It brought religion to masses of people who, through the shifts of population brought about by the industrial revolution, were not being reached by the Anglican Church. In addition, it had a beneficial effect on many within both the Church of England and dissenting congregations. By emphasizing morality, self-discipline, and thrift to the deprived classes, Wesley has been credited by some historians as being a major force in keeping England free of revolution and widespread social unrest during his day. He himself was politically conservative, a critic of democracy, and a foe of both the American and French revolutions.

Throughout his life Wesley's closest confidant was his brother and coworker Charles, the composer of a number of well-known hymns. Wesley, always extraordinarily healthy, remained active to the end, preaching his final sermon at an open-air meeting just 4 months before his death on March 2, 1791, in London.

EWB

Wilberforce, William (1759–1833), English statesman and humanitarian. William Wilberforce was a prominent antislavery leader. His agitation helped smooth the way for the Act of Abolition of 1833.

William Wilberforce was born to affluence at Hull on Aug. 24, 1759. He attended Hull Grammar School and St. John's College, Cambridge. He was elected to Parliament from Hull in 1780 and from Yorkshire in 1784. In 1812 he moved his constituency to Bramber, Sussex. He retired from the House of Commons in 1825.

Wilberforce was a friend and lifelong supporter of William Pitt the Younger, the great British prime minister and war leader. Like his leader, Wilberforce moved toward a more conservative position following the French Revolution and Britain's involvement in the French Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic Wars. His antislavery ideas arose not out of a background of secular liberalism but out of his religious beliefs. England in the late 18th century experienced a powerful religious revival, and in 1785 Wilberforce was converted to Evangelical Christianity.

In 1787 Wilberforce was approached by the antislavery advocate Thomas Clarkson, who was already in touch with the abolitionist lawyer Granville Sharp. The three formed the nucleus of a group ridiculed as the "Clapham sect" (after the location of the house where they held their meetings). They were joined by such slavery opponents as John Newton, Hannah More, Henry Thornton, Zachary Macaulay, E. J. Elliot, and James Stephen. Clarkson organized a propaganda campaign throughout the country, while Wilberforce represented the group's interests in the House of Commons. Wilberforce created two formal organizations in 1787: the Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade and the Society for the Reformation of Manners.

The Claphams won a growing number of converts to their cause, but they were unable to make any legal headway against the West Indies slave traders and planters. Pitt personally supported the petitions presented to the House by Wilberforce; yet the slave trade was regarded as essential to economic health, and the West Indies interests were an important component of Pitt's Whig coalition. The 1790s witnessed some reform of the worst practices of the slavers and a resolution supporting the gradual abolition of the slave trade.

However, Wilberforce held firm in his views. His persistence was finally rewarded in 1807, when, following Pitt's death, a temporary Radical government coalition led by Charles James Fox united liberals and Evangelicals behind passage of an act prohibiting the slave trade. This act represented the culmination of Wilberforce's active participation in the movement.

In 1823 younger followers of Wilberforce founded the Antislavery Society, of which Wilberforce

became a vice president. Once again a prolonged period of agitation produced results. Wilberforce, however, had been dead for a month when the Emancipation Act became law in August 1833.

EWB

Wilde, Oscar Fingall O'Flahertie Wills (1854–1900), British author. Oscar Wilde was part of the “art for art’s sake” movement in English literature at the end of the 19th century. He is best known for his brilliant, witty comedies.

Oscar Wilde was born in Dublin, Ireland, on Oct. 16, 1854. His father, Sir William Wilde, was a well-known surgeon; his mother, Jane Francisca Elgee Wilde, wrote popular poetry and prose under the pseudonym Speranza. For three years Wilde was educated in the classics at Trinity College, Dublin, where he began to attract public attention through the eccentricity of his writing and his style of life.

At the age of 23 Wilde entered Magdalen College, Oxford. In 1878 he was awarded the Newdigate Prize for his poem “Ravenna.” He attracted a group of followers, and they initiated a personal cult, self-consciously effete and artificial. “The first duty in life,” Wilde wrote in *Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young* (1894), “is to be as artificial as possible.” After leaving Oxford he expanded his cult. His iconoclasm contradicted the Victorian era’s easy pieties, but the contradiction was one of his purposes. Another of his aims was the glorification of youth.

Wilde published his well-received *Poems* in 1881. The next six years were active ones. He spent an entire year lecturing in the United States and then returned to lecture in England. He applied unsuccessfully for a position as a school inspector. In 1884 he married, and his wife bore him children in 1885 and in 1886. He began to publish extensively in the following year. His writing activity became as intense and as erratic as his life had been for the previous six years. From 1887 to 1889 Wilde edited the magazine *Woman’s World*. His first popular success as a prose writer was *The Happy Prince and Other Tales* (1888). *The House of Pomegranates* (1892) was another collection of his fairy tales.

Wilde became a practicing homosexual in 1886. He believed that his subversion of the Victorian moral code was the impulse for his writing. He considered himself a criminal who challenged society by creating scandal. Before his conviction for homosexuality in 1895, the scandal was essentially private. Wilde believed in the criminal mentality. “Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime,” from *Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime and Other Stories* (1891), treated murder and its successful concealment comically. The original version of *The Pic-*

ture of Dorian Gray in *Lippincott’s Magazine* emphasized the murder of the painter Basil Hallward by Dorian as the turning point in Dorian’s disintegration; the criminal tendency became the criminal act.

Dorian Gray was published in book form in 1891. The novel celebrated youth: Dorian, in a gesture typical of Wilde, is parentless. He does not age, and he is a criminal. Like all of Wilde’s work, the novel was a popular success. His only book of formal criticism, *Intentions* (1891), restated many of the esthetic views that *Dorian Gray* had emphasized, and it points toward his later plays and stories. *Intentions* emphasized the importance of criticism in an age that Wilde believed was uncritical. For him, criticism was an independent branch of literature, and its function was vital.

His Dramas. Between 1892 and 1895 Wilde was an active dramatist, writing what he identified as “trivial comedies for serious people.” His plays were popular because their dialogue was baffling, clever, and often epigrammatic, relying on puns and elaborate word games for its effect. *Lady Windermere’s Fan* was produced in 1892, *A Woman of No Importance* in 1893, and *An Ideal Husband* and *The Importance of Being Earnest* in 1895.

On March 2, 1895, Wilde initiated a suit for criminal libel against the Marquess of Queensberry, who had objected to Wilde’s friendship with his son, Lord Alfred Douglas. When his suit failed in April, countercharges followed. After a spectacular court action, Wilde was convicted of homosexual misconduct and sentenced to 2 years in prison at hard labor.

Prison transformed Wilde’s experience as radically as had his 1886 introduction to homosexuality. In a sense he had prepared himself for prison and its transformation of his art. *De Profundis* is a moving letter to a friend and apology that Wilde wrote in prison; it was first published as a whole in 1905. His theme was that he was not unlike other men and was a scapegoat. *The Ballad of Reading Gaol* (1898) was written after his release. In this poem a man has murdered his mistress and is about to be executed, but Wilde considered him only as criminal as the rest of humanity. He wrote: “For each man kills the thing he loves,/ Yet each man does not die.”

After his release from prison Wilde lived in France. He attempted to write a play in his pretrial style, but this effort failed. He died in Paris on Nov. 30, 1900.

EWB

William II (1859–1941), last of the Hohenzollern rulers. William II was emperor of Germany and king

of Prussia from 1888 until his forced abdication in 1918.

In the crucial years before World War I, William II was the most powerful and most controversial figure in Europe. His domineering personality and the comparatively vague political structure of the post-Bismarck state combined to make his reign over the most advanced country in Europe both authoritarian and archaic.

William was born on Jan. 27, 1859. He was the son of Frederick III and Princess Victoria of England. William's views of his prerogatives were strongly influenced by his Prussian military education, amidst the subservience and flattery of his fellow cadets. After completing his studies at the University of Bonn, William entered the army and in 1881 married Princess Augusta Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein.

William was an intelligent, dashing, impulsive young man who loved military display and believed in the divine nature of kingship; his strong personality overcame the serious handicap (for a horseman) of a withered left arm. His father found William immature, but Chancellor Otto von Bismarck considered him a more acceptable successor to his grandfather (and to Frederick the Great) than his liberal father. Conservative circles in Germany breathed a sigh of relief when the death of William I in 1888 was quickly followed by that of Frederick III. William II ascended the throne that year.

Differences between the young kaiser and the aging Bismarck soon were public knowledge. Serious questions of policy separated them, such as whether to renew the anti-Socialist legislation on the books since 1878, and in foreign affairs, whether to keep the alliance with Russia as well as with Austria, as Bismarck insisted. But basically the split was a personal one, the question being which man was to rule Germany. William forced Bismarck to resign in 1890, and thereafter he steered his own course.

It seemed to mark the beginning of a new era. William was the representative of a new generation that had grown up since German unification, and he was at home in the world of technology and of neo-romantic German nationalism. Indeed, William gave the impression of dynamism. He was always in the public eye and caught, for a time, the imagination of his country. But he cared little for the day-to-day problems of government, and his "policies" were often shallow, short-lived, and contradictory. Thus the "Labor Emperor" of the early years of the reign soon became the implacable enemy of the Social Democratic working-class movement. In foreign policy his inconsistencies were even more glaring. England and Russia, in particular, were alternately wooed and rebuffed;

both ultimately ended up as foes. Sometimes the Kaiser's sounder instincts were overridden by his advisers, as in the Morocco crisis of 1905, which William, who was essentially peaceful in intent, had not wished to provoke. But mainly his mistakes were his own.

Foreign opinion concerning the Kaiser was much more hostile than German opinion, and his often bellicose and pompous utterances did much to tarnish Germany's image abroad. Nevertheless, World War I and postwar depictions of him as the incarnation of all that was evil in Germany were grossly unfair. So little was he the martial leader of a militaristic nation that his authority in fact faded during World War I, and the military assumed increasing control. Belatedly, William tried to rally a war-weary nation with promises of democratic reforms, but at the end of the war the German Republic was proclaimed without serious opposition. William abdicated in November 1918.

After his abdication William lived in quiet retirement in Doorn, Holland, not actively involved with the movement for a restoration of the monarchy. He died in Doorn on June 4, 1941.

EWB

Wolff, Baron Christian von (1679–1754), German philosopher. Christian von Wolff systematized the doctrines of Leibniz. He is best known for his broad concept of philosophy.

Christian von Wolff was born in Breslau, Silesia, on Jan. 24, 1679. His father, a tanner, vowed that his son would enter the Lutheran ministry. At the University of Jena, Wolff studied theology but found that he was more interested in mathematics, physics, and philosophy. He took a master of arts degree at the University of Leipzig, where he taught from 1703 to 1706. He wrote a paper on universal practical philosophy, which he submitted to Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, and on the strength of Leibniz's recommendation Wolff was appointed professor of mathematics at Halle in 1706. He remained there until 1723, when Frederick William I expelled him from Prussia for anti-Pietist teachings.

Wolff then taught at the University of Marburg, where he continued to publish various sections of his unified and deductive system of all branches of human knowledge. His productivity can be gauged by the fact that the collected edition of his major works fills 26 volumes. With the accession of Frederick II (the Great) in 1740, Wolff was recalled in triumph to Halle. He was honored as professor, vice-chancellor, and finally chancellor of the university (1743). He died at Halle on April 9, 1754.

Wolff was well acquainted with the major developments of modern science and philosophy. He met and corresponded with Leibniz, and, like his mentor, Wolff knew ancient philosophy as well as the Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions of scholasticism. His aim was to systematically organize all knowledge in terms of logical deductions from first principles.

The metaphysics of this endeavor was Leibnizian in origin: the principles of identity and sufficient reason. Wolff believed that every idea or concept expresses a possibility. That some possibilities are actualized is a matter of historical fact. Thus the role of sensation and experience in general is historical. The transition from historical knowledge to philosophical knowledge is the difference between “the bare knowledge, the fact” and the reason for this fact. Philosophy is “the science of all possible things.” Insofar as things are definite they have quantitative relations, and mathematics is the clearest expression of the demonstrable scientific connections between objects. Therefore the purview of all knowledge is encompassed in the disciplines of history, philosophy, and mathematics. With this plan, which Wolff presented in *Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General* (1728), he was able to offer a complete division of the sciences.

EWB

Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797), British author.

Mary Wollstonecraft was the second of seven children and the eldest daughter of Edward John Wollstonecraft and Elizabeth Dixon Wollstonecraft. Edward came from a prosperous family of weavers in Spitalfields, London, and Elizabeth came from a well-placed family in Ballyshannon, Ireland.

Wollstonecraft was faced in 1782 with the need to support herself and her sisters, Eliza and Everina. With the help of Fanny Blood, the four women opened a boarding school for private pupils. They rented a large house in Newington Green, north of London, and were able to attract enough pupils to make the venture self-supporting. Additionally, Wollstonecraft joined a group of dissenting intellectuals who lived near the Green. Within this group there were discussions of politics, religion, and education led by its founder, Dr. Richard Price. Some of its members included Samuel Rodgers, James Sowerby, the Reverend John Hewlett, and Mrs. James Burgh; the group was often visited by Joseph Priestley. Here Wollstonecraft was to encounter an alternative to the dominant ideology of her childhood and to find support for her developing intellectual curiosity.

Within the Price circle, Wollstonecraft was exposed to the ideas and values that descended from the English empirical tradition in philosophy and English religious dissent. Wollstonecraft would subscribe to the essential elements of that philosophy all her life: experience is the basis of all knowledge; environment shapes character; men and women are innately good and potentially perfectible; and truth is something knowable, both through self-examination and through education in the widening social contexts of family, community, polite society, and ultimately humanity in general.

But her membership in this cohesive group and the educational community she was creating with her sisters was not to last. The school closed in 1786.

The spring of that year was an important period for Wollstonecraft; she spent March and April writing her first book, *Thoughts on the Education of Daughters* (1787), a collection of essays on education for parents, detailing a need for moral, social, and intellectual improvement of their daughters. The book follows existing patterns for such manuals by focusing on Lockean rationalism and Christian morality.

In midsummer of 1786 Wollstonecraft accepted a position as governess to the eldest daughters of Viscount Kingsborough. In the summer of 1787 she wrote her first novel, *Mary, A Fiction* (1788), and by the end of that summer she had received Joseph Johnson's assurance of a position as a reviewer and translator for his new journal, the *Analytical Review*.

From October 1787 to January 1789 Wollstonecraft spent most of her time reviewing fiction and educational works in the *Analytical Review*; translating works from French, Dutch, and German (which she was teaching herself); writing a children's book; and compiling an anthology of educational and inspirational writing for women. These were the months to which Wollstonecraft later referred as of hard labor and relative obscurity; they were her apprenticeship as a reviewer, translator, and political thinker.

In 1788 Wollstonecraft was living alone in London and earning enough from her writing to bring her sisters to the city for holidays, and then to send Everina to Paris to improve her French. During this period Wollstonecraft was also having to prove herself in the home of her publisher, for she was one of the youngest and one of the few women members of the Johnson circle. This group of writers, professionals, painters, and pamphleteers met at Johnson's home for debate, discussion, and dinner.

During 1788 Johnson also asked Wollstonecraft to begin two projects: one was a translation from the German of Joachim Heinrich Campe's *New Robinson Crusoe* (1779–1780), which was abandoned when an-

other translation was published in that year; the second was a more interesting but time-consuming project, the anthology *The Female Reader*. The book was an imitation of one of the most popular elocution manuals of the day, *Enfield's Speaker*. William Enfield, head of Warrington Dissenting Academy, had written a book for his male students that would provide elocutionary models for teaching public speaking and writing. On the title page *The Female Reader* is attributed to a popular writer of conduct books; however, it was Wollstonecraft who wrote the preface and four short entries, and who arranged the other selections from published sources.

In November 1789 Wollstonecraft's old friend from Newington Green Dr. Richard Price delivered the annual address to the Society for Commemorating the Glorious Revolution of 1688 at the Dissenting Meeting House on the Old Jewry. Edmund Burke, a Whig statesman and writer, responded to Price's enthusiasm with a commendation of the man and the events to which he was paying homage. His famous pamphlet *Reflections on the Revolution in France* glorifies hereditary monarchy, aristocracy, and property, and condemns the individualism of French liberalism and dissenting religion. Burke offers a vision of collective English traditions in which eternal immutable laws can be found within the principles of religion and the hierarchy of a paternally controlled family.

Thirty days after the publication of Burke's pamphlet, Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Men* (1790) appeared. It was written as a letter and was the first reply by an English radical writer to the challenge offered by Burke. Her authorship of the pamphlet was not known until the second edition, which appeared within a month. The pamphlet was well received, praised by reviewers for its eager warmth and positiveness. Suddenly Wollstonecraft was the center of attention, both within the Johnson circle and for the British press, who found her bold indignation infectious and her tone representative of a general consternation at Burke's hyperbolic rhetoric and political complacency.

When Johnson published Wollstonecraft's revision of the first edition of *A Vindication of the Rights of Men* on 14 December 1790, political expectations in Britain and France had shifted but so had those of the author. She wrote the second edition in the first person instead of the third, added examples from her family experience, and ended the work with an attack on what she saw as hypocritical liberals who agitated for equality but who had been subservient to British authority. Wollstonecraft sent a copy of the second edition to Price, and he acknowledged his pleasure in such an advocate. During this same period the three

volumes of her translation from German of Christian Gotthilf Salzmann's *Elements of Morality, for the Use of Children* appeared, as did the second edition of *Original Stories*, with the Blake illustrations. Johnson now promoted her to editorial assistant of the *Analytical Review*, which meant she could choose the reviews she wanted to write as well as make assignments to other writers. After years of obscurity, struggles with indebtedness, and personal defeat, the opportunities of a new world of success and acclaim greeted Wollstonecraft. The multitude of possibilities unleashed in France seemed to be mirrored in her own career and in her personal life. She had established her own voice after years of writing anonymously or in forms dictated by others, and she could now openly declare her independence to her sisters, despite their still being a financial burden upon her.

Such freedom from family also had implications for her personal life. She could openly discuss her relationship with a painter and member of the Johnson circle, Henri Fuseli. From 1778 to 1790, Wollstonecraft and Fuseli had been seeing each other at least once a week and often daily. Although he was married, she saw no reason for that to be an impediment to unite herself to his mind. She consistently referred to their relationship as the meeting of two geniuses. Fuseli was the center of her new life, and, as William Godwin states, she made light of any difficulties such a relationship might create for either of them. During this period she also abandoned her shabby rooms for more spacious lodgings in Store Street on Bedford Square, only a few blocks from Fuseli's home, and she gave up her old ascetic habit of wearing black dresses. In 1791 she sat for a portrait commissioned by William Roscoe. Indeed, 1791 and 1792 were to be important years in Wollstonecraft's career.

In 1791 she had written to her good friend William Roscoe Liverpool businessman with radical political leanings that she was beginning a new book. *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* was intended as a two-volume work, with the second volume to focus on the legal and political situations of women. The second volume was never published; however, volume one sold well and was widely read and reviewed.

The book, like *A Vindication of the Rights of Men*, responded to a particular set of social and political events and personalities within Britain and in revolutionary France. In France, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord had just presented his Report on Public Instruction to the National Assembly in September 1791. It made no provision for woman's education. In fact, girls were to be educated with boys only until the age of eight and thereafter were to remain home in domestic employment. The immediate

aim of Wollstonecraft's essay was to point out how little the French revolutionaries were doing to change the subordinate status of women, both in their attempts at political and education reform. Also, Wollstonecraft set out to attack Rousseau's *Emile*, (1762), a book she had previously admired. She now saw his educational schema as an attempt to degrade one half of the human species, and render women pleasing at the expense of every other virtue. Rhetorically, Wollstonecraft uses the essay to critique these two public figures in the same way she critiqued Burke; they become representative of a particular political and ideological position that degrades women.

A Vindication of the Rights of Woman also responded to the changing education of and literature for women in the later decades of the eighteenth century. Throughout the 1780s Wollstonecraft had the opportunity to read the major women novelists of the period, and her critiques for the *Analytical Review* had forced her to read most of the publications devoted to woman's education. She also wanted *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* to add to the growing public debate over the role of education for women. This debate had reached the pages of the *Analytical Review* in a long and enthusiastic reaction Wollstonecraft had written to Catherine Macaulay's *Letters on Education, with Observations on Religious and Metaphysical Subjects* (1783).

With the completion of *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, Wollstonecraft returned to writing for the *Analytical Review* and concentrated her energies on her relationship with Fuseli. In November 1792 she proposed to Henry and Sophia Fuseli a social, but not sexual, menage a trois. She wrote to Sophia that being above deceit, I find that I cannot live without the satisfaction of seeing and conversing with him daily. Her overtures were rejected. She then decided to leave London, to travel to France, and to abandon her plans for a second volume of *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. She had tried to travel to France earlier in the year with Joseph Johnson and the Fuselis; however, they turned back because of the turmoil of revolutionary events. She now decided to go on her own and on 8 December 1792 left for Dover.

Sometime during February or early March of 1793 Mary Wollstonecraft met Gilbert Imlay, an American explorer, writer, and entrepreneur. Imlay was a former army officer in the American Revolutionary army who had written *A Topographical Description of the Western Territory of North America* (1792). He was in Paris on commercial business. Both shared liberal political views and met through connections within the expatriate community in Paris. By

all accounts she was immediately drawn to him; in fact Godwin states that she gave loose to all the sensibilities of her nature. They quickly became lovers, for by May 1793, when the Girondins fell, Wollstonecraft was registered as Imlay's wife at the American embassy. By this time it was becoming unsafe for British citizens to remain in Paris, and in June they moved to the suburban village of Neuilly. Imlay's business plans kept him traveling, and in Wollstonecraft's letters to him during this period one is given a full record of her emotional need for stability and her hopes for happiness. The letters are at once tender, demanding, and lavish in their unabashed sentimentality.

Wollstonecraft had very good reason to distrust Imlay, for as the months at Neuilly passed and her pregnancy confined her to the cottage, she found him spending more and more time traveling. In January 1794 Wollstonecraft pursued Imlay to Le Havre, and she finished her book on the French Revolution there. Her letters to him from this period give a clear indication of her complex feelings: her desire for affection, her confidence in their relationship as a form of sanity in a world gone mad, and her intense fear of abandonment and a growing sense that he embodied all the tensions to be found in her past disappointments with family and friends. On 14 May 1794 Wollstonecraft gave birth to a daughter, Fanny, named after Fanny Blood. Soon after Fanny's birth Imlay moved to Paris, and Wollstonecraft followed, but she was to spend the winter in Paris alone as Imlay had gone to London. She tried to make him return to Paris, and when this failed, she tried to join him in London in April 1795. She found him living with another woman, and in May of that year she attempted suicide, probably by taking laudanum.

Imlay responded, but not by agreeing to live with her. Instead, he suggested a distraction and a chance to reflect on her situation by undertaking a voyage to Scandinavia on his behalf. The shipping business he had embarked on when they were living in Le Havre had run into difficulties, and Imlay suggested Wollstonecraft go as his agent to sort out the problems with his business partner. Elias Backman, who was living in Goteborg, Sweden. Wollstonecraft, Fanny, and a French maid, Marguerite, sailed from Hull to Goteborg in late June and, after traveling along the southern Swedish and Norwegian coasts, crossed to Denmark. They returned to London via Hamburg in early October 1795, at a time when the rest of Europe was at war with France, and most travel was considered dangerous.

Wollstonecraft's mission was to try to recover a ship and its valuable cargo, both belonging to Imlay. This ship was packed with silver and had been appro-

priated and sold by its Norwegian captain, Peder Elfsen, of Risør. The ship and its cargo represented the greater part of Imlay's assets, and to lose it would have meant ruin. The irony of Wollstonecraft's journey would not have been lost on her, for her assignment was to discover the fate of the ship, the attitudes of all parties concerned, and to try to come to a financial settlement that would save Imlay's faltering fortunes and, she thought, their relationship. The delicate negotiations were difficult and finally unsuccessful, but all this is not mentioned in Wollstonecraft's account of the journey, published in *Letters Written During a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark* (1796).

On 4 October 1795 Wollstonecraft returned to London to attempt another reconciliation with Imlay, only to find him living with a young actress. The next day she attempted suicide by walking in the rain until her clothing was sodden and then leaping into the Thames River from Putney Bridge. Two fishermen close by pulled her out and revived her; her friends the Christies then took her to their home to recuperate. For the next few weeks she continued to write to Imlay, but by the spring of 1796 she was able to see that her relationship with him was self-destructive. She may also have come to understand how, in her relationship with Imlay, she was her mother's daughter.

Wollstonecraft again had to find some way to support herself, her daughter, and her French maid, Marguerite. She resumed writing for the *Analytical Review* and moved her family to rooms in Pentonville, a suburb in north London. On 8 January 1796 she renewed her acquaintance with William Godwin at a tea party given by her new friend Mary Hays. Their relationship developed slowly over the next months, but by July, as Godwin writes, friendship was melting into love. Wollstonecraft took new rooms near Godwin's in Somers Town, and by the middle of August they had become lovers. Their letters from this period provide a portrait of Wollstonecraft full of fears and doubts about the choice she had made, while Godwin provides an unquestioning loyalty. The letters show that Wollstonecraft had found a friend who respected her and whom she could respect, providing her with the support and encouragement that she had sought for so long in others. When she found that she was pregnant, Godwin and Wollstonecraft married at St. Pancras Church on 29 March 1797. Godwin agreed to the ceremony despite his own stated opposition to marriage. During the late spring and early summer months of 1797, Wollstonecraft's letters are marked by a calm self-confidence and a pleasure in their widening circle of friends.

At this time she served as Johnson's editorial assistant on the *Analytical Review* and was writing a novel. It was a fictional presentation of the material in the promised second volume of *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, in which the injustices of the British legal system and the tyranny of marriage were to be demonstrated. The novel was to be called *Maria; or, The Wrongs of Woman*. Wollstonecraft began work on it in the spring of 1796, but the novel was only about one-third completed at the time of her death in 1797. Godwin published it in *Posthumous Works of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1798), adding his own preface, notes, and appendix.

During the summer of 1797 Wollstonecraft was planning for the birth of her second child with a sense of expectation and confidence. During her previous pregnancy she had written *Origin and Progress of the French Revolution*; now she sought to complete two projects: *Maria* and a book, in the form of letters or lessons, on pregnancy and the Management of Infants. She and Godwin were expecting a boy and had selected his name, William. At 5 A.M. on Wednesday, 30 August, Wollstonecraft felt the first twinges of labor. At 11:30 A.M. she gave birth to a girl, Mary, the future author of *Frankenstein* (1817). Eleven days after the birth, Wollstonecraft died of septicemia.

Concise Dictionary of British Literary Biography, Vol. 3 (adapted)

Woolf, Virginia Stephen (1882–1941), English novelist, critic, and essayist. Virginia Woolf ranks as one of England's most distinguished writers of the period between World War I and World War II. Her novels can perhaps best be described as impressionistic.

Dissatisfied with the novel based on familiar, factual, and external details, Virginia Woolf followed experimental clues to a more internal, subjective, and in a sense more personal rendering of experience than had been provided by Henry James, Marcel Proust, and James Joyce. In the works of these masters the reality of time and experience had formed the stream of consciousness, a concept that probably originated with William James. Virginia Woolf lived in and responded to a world in which certitudes were collapsing under the stresses of changing knowledge, the civilized savagery of war, and new manners and morals. She drew on her personal, sensitive, poetic awareness without rejecting altogether the heritage of literary culture she derived from her family.

Early Years and Marriage. Virginia Stephen was born in London on Jan. 25, 1882. She was the daughter of Sir Leslie Stephen, a famous scholar and agnostic philosopher who, among many literary oc-

cupations, was at one time editor of *Cornhill Magazine* and the *Dictionary of National Biography*. James Russell Lowell, the American poet, was her godfather. Virginia's mother died when the child was 12 or 13 years old, and she was educated at home in her father's library, where she also met his famous friends.

In 1912, eight years after her father's death, Virginia married Leonard Woolf, a brilliant young writer and critic from Cambridge whose interests in literature as well as in economics and the labor movement were well suited to hers. In 1917, for amusement, they originated the Hogarth Press by setting and hand-printing on an old press *Two Stories* by "L. and V. Woolf." The volume was a success, and over the years they published many important books, including *Prelude* by Katherine Mansfield, then an unknown writer; *Poems* by T. S. Eliot; and *Kew Gardens* by Virginia Woolf. The policy of the Hogarth Press was to publish the best and most original work that came to its attention, and the Woolfs as publishers favored young and obscure writers. Virginia's older sister Vanessa, who married the critic Clive Bell, participated in this venture by designing dust jackets for the books issued by the Hogarth Press.

Quite early in her career Virginia Woolf's home in Tavistock Square, Bloomsbury, became a literary and art center, attracting such diverse intellectuals as E. M. Forster, Lytton Strachey, Arthur Waley, Victoria Sackville-West, John Maynard Keynes, and Roger Fry. These artists, critics, and writers became known as the Bloomsbury group. Roger Fry's theory of art may have influenced Virginia's technique as a novelist. Broadly speaking, the Bloomsbury group drew from the philosophic interests of its members (who had been educated at Cambridge) the values of love and beauty as preeminent in life.

As Critic and Essayist. Virginia Woolf began writing essays for the *Times Literary Supplement* when she was young, and over the years these and other essays were collected in a two-volume series called *The Common Reader* (1925, 1933). These studies range with affection and understanding through all of English literature. Students of fiction have drawn upon these criticisms as a means of understanding Virginia Woolf's own direction as a novelist. One passage frequently studied occurs in "Modern Fiction" in the *First Series*: "Life is not a series of . . . big lamps symmetrically arranged; but a luminous halo, a semitransparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end. Is it not the task of the novelist to convey this varying, this unknown and un-circumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complex-

ity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and external as possible?"

Another essay frequently studied is "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown," written in 1924, in which Virginia Woolf describes the manner in which the older-generation novelist Arnold Bennett would have portrayed Mrs. Brown, a lady casually met in a railway carriage, by giving her a house and furniture and a position in the world. She then contrasts this method with another: one that exhibits a new interest in the subjective Mrs. Brown, the mysteries of her person, her consciousness, and the consciousness of the observer responding to her.

Achievement as Novelist. Two of Virginia Woolf's novels in particular, *Mrs. Dalloway* (1925) and *To the Lighthouse* (1927), follow successfully the latter approach. The first novel covers a day in the life of Mrs. Dalloway in postwar London; it achieves its vision of reality through the reception by Mrs. Dalloway's mind of what Virginia Woolf called those 'myriad impressionstrivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel.' *To the Lighthouse* is, in a sense, a family portrait and history rendered in subjective depth through selected points in time. Part I deals with the time between six o'clock in the evening and dinner. Primarily through the consciousness of Mrs. Ramsay, it presents the clash of the male and female sensibilities in the family; Mrs. Ramsay functions as a means of equipoise and reconciliation. Part II: Time Passes, is a moving evocation of loss during the interval between Mrs. Ramsay's death and the family's revisit to the house. Part III moves toward completion of this intricate and subjective portrait through the adding of a last detail to a painting by an artist guest, Lily Briscoe, and through the final completion of a plan, rejected by the father in Part I, for him and the children to sail out to the lighthouse. The novel is impressionistic, subjectively perceptive, and poignant.

Last Years and Other Books. Virginia Woolf was the author of about 15 books, the last, *A Writer's Diary*, posthumously published in 1953. Her death by drowning in Lewes, Sussex, on March 28, 1941, has often been regarded as a suicide brought on by the unbearable strains of life during World War II. The true explanation seems to be that she had felt symptoms of a recurrence of a mental breakdown and feared that it would be permanent.

Mrs. Dalloway, *To the Lighthouse*, and *Jacob's Room* (1922) constitute Virginia Woolf's major achievement. *The Voyage Out* (1915) first brought her critical attention. *Night and Day* (1919) is traditional in

method. The short stories of *Monday or Tuesday* (1921) brought critical praise. In *The Waves* (1931) she masterfully employed the stream-of-consciousness technique. Other experimental novels include *Orlando* (1928), *The Years* (1937), and *Between the Acts* (1941). Virginia Woolf's championship of woman's rights is reflected in the essays in *A Room of One's Own* (1929) and in *Three Guineas* (1938).

EWB

Wundt, Wilhelm Max (1832–1920), German psychologist and philosopher. Wilhelm Wundt was the founder of experimental psychology. He edited the first journal of experimental psychology and established the first laboratory of experimental psychology.

Wilhelm Wundt was born on Aug. 16, 1832, in Baden, in a suburb of Mannheim called Neckarau. As a child, he was tutored by Friedrich Müller. Wundt attended the gymnasium at Bruschel and at Heidelberg, the University of Tübingen for a year, then Heidelberg for more than 3 years, receiving a medical degree in 1856. He remained at Heidelberg as a lecturer in physiology from 1857 to 1864, then was appointed assistant professor in physiology. The great physiologist, physicist, and physiological psychologist Hermann von Helmholtz came there in 1858, and Wundt for a while was his assistant.

During the period from 1857 to 1874 Wundt evolved from a physiologist to a psychologist. In these years he also wrote *Grundzüge der physiologischen psychologie* (*Principles of Physiological Psychology*). The two-volume work, published in 1873–1874, stressed the relations between psychology and physiology, and it showed how the methods of natural science could be used in psychology. Six revised editions of this work were published, the last completed in 1911.

As a psychologist, Wundt used the method of investigating conscious processes in their own context by “experiment” and introspection. This technique has been referred to as content psychology, reflecting Wundt's belief that psychology should concern itself with the immediate content of experience unmodified by abstraction or reflection.

In 1874 Wundt left Heidelberg for the chair of inductive philosophy at Zurich, staying there only a year. He accepted the chair of philosophy at the University of Leipzig, and in 1879 he founded the first psychological laboratory in the world. To Leipzig, men came from all over the world to study in Wundt's laboratory. In 1879 G. Stanley Hall, Wundt's first American student, arrived, followed by many other Americans. From this first laboratory for experimental psychology a steady stream of psychologists returned to their own countries to teach and to continue their

researches. Some founded psychological laboratories of their own.

In 1881 Wundt founded *Philosophische Studien* as a vehicle for the new experimental psychology, especially as a publication organ for the products of his psychological laboratory. The contents of *Philosophische Studien* (changed to *Psychologische Studien* in 1903) reveal that the experiments fell mainly into four categories: sensation and perception; reaction time; time perception and association; and attention, memory, feeling, and association. Optical phenomena led with 46 articles; audition was second in importance. Sight and hearing, which Helmholtz had already carefully studied, were the main themes of Wundt's laboratory. Some of the contributions to the *Studien* were by Wundt himself. Helmholtz is reported to have said of some of Wundt's experiments that they were *schlampig* (sloppy). Comparing Wundt to Helmholtz, who was a careful experimentalist and productive researcher, one must conclude that Wundt's most important contributions were as a systematizer, organizer, and encyclopedist. William James considered Wundt “only a rather ordinary man who has worked up certain things uncommonly well.”

Wundt's *Grundriss der Psychologie* (1896; *Outline of Psychology*) was a less detailed treatment than his *Principles*, but it contained the new theory of feeling. A popular presentation of his system of psychology was *Einführung in die Psychologie* (1911; *Introduction to Psychology*). His monumental *Völkerpsychologie* (1912; *Folk Psychology*), a natural history of man, attempted to understand man's higher thought processes by studying language, art, mythology, religion, custom, and law. Besides his psychological works he wrote three philosophical texts: *Logic* (1880–1883), *Ethics* (1886), and *System of Philosophy* (1889). Wundt died near Leipzig on Aug. 31, 1920.

EWB

Z

Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933), German political activist. Clara Zetkin was a prominent member of socialist and communist organizations in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As a longtime supporter of the German Social Democratic Party, she argued that equality of women could only be accomplished through a class revolution that overthrew the capitalist system. She later was a founder of the German Communist Party and became a respected political ally of Vladimir Lenin in the Soviet Union.

Clara Zetkin was a distinguished member of Socialist and Communist organizations in Europe in the

late 1800s and early 1900s. Throughout her political career, she focused on the liberation of women in society through Marxist reforms of the capitalist system. For many years she promoted her radical thought as the editor of *Die Gleichheit*, the women's journal of the German Social Democratic Party. In her later years, Zetkin served as both a representative of the German Communist Party in the Reichstag legislative body and as an associate of Vladimir Ilich Lenin in the Soviet Union.

Zetkin was born Clara Eissner on July 5, 1857, in Wiederau, near Leipzig, Germany. She was the oldest of the three children of Gottfried Eissner, a school-teacher and church organist, and Josephine Vitale Eissner, Gottfried's second wife, who was the widow of a local doctor. Josephine Eissner was active in women's education societies and a believer in equal rights and economic power for women. Her work was inspired by feminist organizations, including the German Women's Association and the Federation of German Women's Associations, led by women's rights activists such as Auguste Schmidt and Luise Otto. When Eissner was 15, her father retired and the family moved to Leipzig, where she was enrolled at Schmidt and Otto's Van Steyber Institute in 1875. She studied there until 1878, and her activities during these years included reading socialist newspapers and books and attending meetings of the Leipzig Women's Education Society and the National Association of German Women. These areas of feminist and socialist thought became the focus of her lifelong political activities.

Joined German Social Democrats. In 1878, Zetkin befriended some students from Russia, who introduced her to the political ideals of the German Social Democratic Party, or SPD. One of her new associates was Ossip Zetkin, a native of Odessa, Russia. Ossip Zetkin acted as a political mentor, teaching her about the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and the ideas of scientific socialism. At his suggestion, she began to attend meetings of the Leipzig Workers' Education Society and reject her bourgeois lifestyle, which ultimately led to a split with her family and her feminist mentor, Auguste Schmidt. In 1879, Zetkin traveled to Russia to observe the activities of Marxist groups there.

These experiences gave Zetkin a strong sympathy for the proletariat struggle and she decided to devote her life to the Marxist reform of society. Due to a German law forbidding women to join political parties, she could not become an official member of the SPD, but she spent all her energies supporting its cause. After the passage of the 1878 Anti-Socialist Law in Germany, Ossip Zetkin was forced to leave the

country, and Zetkin decided to leave as well. She first traveled to Linz, Austria, where she worked as a tutor of factory workers. She joined a group of SPD members in Zurich in 1882 to write propaganda to sneak into Germany. In November of that year, she was reunited with Ossip Zetkin in Paris. The two lived together and eventually had two sons, Maxim and Konstantine, but were never officially married because Zetkin did not want to give up her German citizenship. She did, however, adopt his surname, and remained Ossip's companion until the end of his life.

Linked Women's Rights to Social Revolution.

In Paris, Zetkin began to concentrate on combining her interests in socialism and feminism in an attempt to accomplish equality for working women in the proletariat movement. Her return to feminist issues also led her to reestablish ties with her family, who came to her assistance after Zetkin contracted tuberculosis due to her impoverished conditions in Paris. Her family took her into their home at Leipzig while she recovered, and it was in Leipzig that she gave her first public speech on the liberation of women and all workers through a class revolution. She believed that once class equality was established in a Marxist society, the economic and social oppression of women would naturally come to an end. Because of this line of thought, for many years she fought against special provisions and laws to protect women in the workplace; her thought was that becoming satisfied with such measures would detract from the focus on a total restructuring of the class system. After her convalescence, Zetkin returned to Paris to nurse Ossip, who was suffering from spinal tuberculosis. He never recovered and died in January of 1889.

Zetkin overcame her grief at her partner's death by immersing herself in her political work. Her preoccupation with the socialist cause was so great, in fact, that rearing her two sons constituted her only personal considerations for many years. She would later be married to the painter Georg Friedrich Zundel, a man 18 years her junior. The marriage, which began in 1899, began to disintegrate during World War I and ended in divorce in 1927, primarily due to Zetkin's overwhelming commitment to her work. She became one of the leading women in the socialist movement and in July of 1889 served as one of the eight women delegates who attended the Second International Congress in Paris. She was there as a representative of the working class women of Berlin, Germany, and in a speech before the Congress, she clearly outlined the ideas in support of women's equality that she had been developing. Her speech, later published as *Working Women and the Contemporary Women*

Question, reiterated her belief that she and her comrades should not focus on winning specific rights for women, such as education or economic equality, but should instead concentrate on ending the capitalist system that oppressed women and all workers. In a move that foreshadowed her growing differences with her fellow socialists, the Congress did not support her extremism, voting in favor of equal pay for equal work by women and voicing opposition to hazardous labor by women. This stance did not undermine Zetkin's role in the party, however. She was selected during the Congress to help lead recruiting and education efforts for the SPD in Berlin; she and six other women returned to Germany to found the Berlin Agitation Committee.

Edited Socialist Journal for Women. With the expiration of the Anti-Socialist Law in 1890, SPD members were allowed to return to Germany. Zetkin received another assignment from the party at this time, editing an SPD journal for women. The first issue of *Die Gleichheit* appeared in January of 1892, and under Zetkin's guidance, the journal set an agenda reflecting her beliefs in spreading socialist and Marxist thought among women and fighting the kind of feminist legal reforms supported by bourgeois women's groups. Still forbidden by law from direct membership in the SPD, Zetkin became active in a less direct method of advocating socialism and recruiting women's unionism. She helped to link unions in Germany with international organizations and organized strike funds in addition to giving hundreds of speeches. Her involvement with working people helped to moderate some of her views. At an 1896 SPD conference, she gave her support to measures protecting working mothers and advocating women's right to vote.

In general though, Zetkin refused to compromise her rigid adherence to Marxist ideology. After 1900, other members of the SPD were increasingly drawn to a revisionist interpretation of Marx's thought that proposed working within the legal system to accomplish reform. Revisionists saw Zetkin as too theoretical in her journal, and she was instructed to modify *Die Gleichheit* to reach a more general audience, including housewives and children. But although many complained about Zetkin, she was well established in the party and was in no danger of being removed. In 1895 she had become the first woman in the SPD governing body and in 1906 she was named to the central committee on education.

In 1908, women in Germany were given the right to join political parties. Zetkin felt that bringing women into the SPD would result in them being

voiceless in an organization run by men, so she worked to form a separate women's group within the party. To this end, she participated in the first International Women's Conferences in 1907 and 1910 and became secretary of the International Women's Bureau, a group which adopted *Die Gleichheit* as its official publication. But her work in this area did not erase the tensions between her and the revisionists. World War I brought the conflict to the forefront. Zetkin, along with other radicals in the party, such as Rosa Luxemburg, wanted the SPD to condemn the imperialist stance of Germany and its military activities. When the party voted to support the government, Zetkin opposed the move in a series of writings in *Die Gleichheit*, resulting in her removal from the post of editor in 1917. Zetkin left the party to join antiwar socialists in the Independent Social-Democratic Party. Later she and three other radical socialists formed the Gruppe Internationale, also known as the Spartacus League, which became the German Communist Party, or KPD, in November of 1918.

Active in Communist Party. Although her political affiliation had changed, Zetkin's goals remained the same. At the 1919 Third International Congress, she gave a speech emphasizing the importance of having educated women as an active force in the international Communist struggle. In 1920 she was elected the international secretary for Communist women, a post in which she continued to argue that women's issues could only be addressed through reforms for all workers. In the years after World War I, her active role in Communist politics took her to the Soviet Union frequently. There she was an important ally of Soviet Communist leader Vladimir Lenin. She also held a post in the German Reichstag as a member of the KPD. As its oldest member, she was given the honor of convening the legislative body in 1932, and she used to occasion to speak out against Nazi leader Adolf Hitler and his Fascist policies.

Zetkin suffered from poor health in her later years, and she died outside of Moscow in the Soviet Union on June 20, 1933. She was honored with an elaborate funeral and buried in the Kremlin wall. The services were attended by leading Communists from across Europe, including Joseph Stalin and Nadezhda Krupskaya, the widow of Lenin. The presence of such luminaries demonstrated the importance of the life and work of Zetkin to supporters of Communism throughout the world.

EWB

Zola, Émile (1840–1902), French novelist. Émile Zola was the foremost proponent of the doctrine of

naturalism in literature. He illustrated this doctrine chiefly in a series of 20 novels published between 1871 and 1893 under the general title *Les Rougon-Macquart*.

Shortly after his birth in Paris on April 2, 1840, Émile Zola was taken to the south of France by his father, a gifted engineer of Venetian extraction, who had formed a company to supply Aix-en-Provence with a source of fresh water. He died before the project had been completed, leaving his widow to struggle with an increasingly difficult financial situation. Despite this, Émile's boyhood and schooling at Aix were, on the whole, a happy period of his life. He retained a lasting affection for the sunbaked countryside of this part of France. One of his closest friends at school and his companion on many a summer's ramble was Paul Cézanne, the future painter.

Early Years in Paris. In 1858 Zola and his mother moved to Paris, where he completed his rather sketchy education. He never succeeded in passing his *baccalauréat* examinations. For a few years after leaving school, he led a life of poverty verging on destitution. Finally, in 1862, he was given a job in the publishing firm of Hachette, which he kept for 4 years. Here he learned much about the business and promotional sides of publishing and met several distinguished writers, among them the philosopher and literary historian Hippolyte Taine, whose ideas strongly influenced the development of Zola's thought. It was one of Taine's sayings ("Vice and virtue are chemical products like vitriol and sugar") that Zola took as the epigraph of his early novel *Thérèse Raquin* (1867). The formula was well suited to the uncompromising materialism that imbues this macabre story of adultery, murder, and suicide.

Les Rougon-Macquart. About 1868–1869, when Zola was working as a freelance journalist, he conceived the idea of writing a series of interlinked novels tracing the lives of various members of a single family whose fortunes were to counterpoint the rise and fall of the Second Empire (1852–1870). He proposed in particular to demonstrate how the forces of heredity might influence the character and development of each individual descendant of a common ancestress. The scheme enabled him to apportion to each novel the analysis of a particular section of society, ranging from the upper stratum of high finance and ministerial authority down to the suffering masses starving in the slums or toiling in the mines. *Les Rougon-Macquart* was originally planned in ten volumes; but the design was so obviously promising that Zola eventually extended it to twice that number. The volumes were designed as social documents rather

than as pure works of fiction, but his powerfully emotive imagination and primitive symbolism conferred on the best of them, nonetheless, many of the qualities of expressionistic prose poetry.

The first six volumes were largely ignored by the critics, although they included some powerful pieces of social satire. For example, *La Curée* (1872) dealt with real estate speculation; *Le Ventre de Paris* (1873) attacked the pusillanimous conservatism of the small-shopkeeper class; and *Son Excellence Eugène Rougon* (1876) was an exposure of political jobbery. Only with the seventh, *L'Assommoir* (1877), did Zola finally produce a best seller that made him one of the most talked of writers in France and one of the most bitterly assailed. The plot of this novel is almost nonexistent. He contented himself with tracing the life story of a simpleminded, good-hearted laundress who lived in a working-class district in the north of Paris. By dint of hard work she achieves at first a modest prosperity, until her husband's increasing fecklessness and addiction to drink drag her down to utter destitution. For the title of his novel Zola used a contemporary slang word for a liquor store. The problem of alcoholism among the poor looms large in the book, as do the related problems of overcrowded housing conditions, prostitution, and the risk of starvation during the periods of prolonged unemployment. Though in no sense a work of propaganda, *L'Assommoir* succeeded in drawing attention to the wretched conditions in which the urban proletariat had been living throughout the 19th century.

Succeeding volumes of the *Rougon-Macquart* cycle included many others that were universally read, even though savagely condemned by conservative critics. *Nana* (1880) dealt with the lives of the demimondaines and their wealthy, dissipated clients. The heroine's career was modeled on the careers of a number of successful courtesans of the heyday of the Second Empire. *Germinal* (1885), doubtless Zola's masterpiece, narrated the preliminaries, outbreak, and aftermath of a coal miners' strike in northeast France; it was the first novel in which the possibility of a social revolution launched by the proletariat against the middle classes was seriously mooted. In his descriptions of the dangerous daily labor in the pits and of the rioting of the exasperated strikers, Zola achieved effects of agony and terror of a kind never before realized in literature. *La Terre* (1887) represents his attempt to do for the farm laborer what he had done for the miner in *Germinal*. The picture of rural life he offered was anything but idyllic, rape and murder being shown as the inevitable concomitants of the narrowness of the peasant's horizons and his atavistic land hunger. Finally, *La Débâcle* (1892) gave an epic

dignity to the story of France's calamitous defeat at the hands of the Prussians in 1870.

Naturalism in Theory and Practice. The immense sales of his works enabled Zola, by 1878, to purchase a property outside Paris, at Médan, a hamlet where he lived quietly for most of the year, occasionally entertaining the younger writers who made up the vanguard of the short-lived naturalist school. Five of them collaborated with him in the production of a volume of short stories issued in 1880 under the title *Soirées de Médan*. Of these five, the two most talented, Guy de Maupassant and Joris Karl Huysmans, forswore their allegiance shortly afterward. Zola did, however, have important disciples outside France: Giovanni Verga in Italy, Eça de Queiros in Portugal, George Moore in England, and Frank Norris and Stephen Crane in the United States.

Zola set out his fundamental theoretical beliefs in *Le Roman expérimental* (1880), but even he adhered very loosely to them in practice. Naturalism embraced many of the tenets of the older realist movement, such as an interest in average types rather than above-average individuals, the cultivation of a pessimistic and disillusioned outlook, a studious avoidance of surprising incident, and a strict obedience to consequential logic in plot development. The special innovation of naturalism lay in its attempt to fuse science with literature. This meant, in practice, that human behavior had to be interpreted along strictly materialistic or physiological lines ("the soul being absent," as Zola put it) and that the individual was to be shown as totally at the mercy of twin external forces, heredity and environment. The emphasis placed on environment accounts for the immense pains that Zola took to document the setting he proposed to use in any particular novel.

Last Years. Zola's private life was not free of strains. He married in 1870, but this union was childless. Then, in 1888, he set up a second home with a young seamstress, who bore him two children. This unexpected blossoming of domestic happiness probably accounts for the sunnier tone of the books he wrote after the completion of *Les Rougon-Macquart*. They included a trilogy, *Lourdes, Rome, and Paris* (1894–1898), dealing with the conflict between science and religion, and a tetralogy of utopian novels, *Les Quatre Évangiles*, of which only the first three were completed.

Zola's dramatic intervention on behalf of Alfred Dreyfus carried his name even further than had his literary work. Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French army, had been wrongfully condemned for espionage

in 1894, and with much courage and recklessness of consequences Zola challenged the findings of the court-martial in an open letter to the President of the Republic (*J'accuse*, Jan. 13, 1898). Since his statement charged certain high-ranking army officers with falsification of evidence, Zola was put on trial. He lost his case, spent a year in hiding in England, and returned to France on June 5, 1899. His sudden death in Paris on Sept. 29, 1902, from carbon monoxide poisoning may not have been accidental as the inquest found. There is reason to believe that he was the victim of an assassination plot engineered by a few of the more fanatical of his political enemies.

EWB

Zwingli, Huldreich (1484–1531), Swiss Protestant reformer. Huldreich Zwingli paved the way for the Swiss Reformation. His influence on the church-state relations of the cantons that became Protestant was profound and durable.

An exact contemporary of Martin Luther, Huldreich Zwingli experienced and contributed to the profound changes in religious and intellectual life that, arising in the early 1500s, permanently affected Western civilization. He was born on Jan. 1, 1484, in the village of Wildhaus, one of ten children. His experience with ecclesiastical traditions came early, through an uncle who was a priest. Huldreich was destined by his parents for the priesthood.

Early Years and Education. Zwingli's education was markedly humanistic. In 1494 he was sent to school at Basel and in 1498 to Bern, where a famous classicist, Heinrich Wölflin, fired a love in him for ancient writers, including the pagans, that he never lost. In 1500 Zwingli entered the University of Vienna to study philosophy, and there too the ideals of humanism were nurtured and deepened in him, for at that time the university boasted the presence of Conradus Celtis, one of the leading scholars of the humanistic tradition. Zwingli also acquired a deep appreciation and understanding of music and learned to play several instruments.

At the age of 18 Zwingli was again in Basel, where he studied theology. In 1506 he received his master's degree and was ordained a priest by the bishop of Constance. After celebrating his first Mass at Wildhaus, he was elected parish priest of Glarus a few miles away. He spent ten years in Glarus, a decade that in several important respects formed the most decisive period of his life. He developed his character as a reformer, his knowledge and love of Greek, his admiration for the great humanist Erasmus, and his bitterness at the corruption in the Church. Zwingli

became so enamored of Homer, Pindar, Democritus, and Julius Caesar that he refused to believe that they and other great pagans were unredeemed because they had not known Christ.

By 1516, when Zwingli moved to Einsiedeln in the canton of Schwyz, he was already arriving at doctrinal opinions divergent from those of Rome. He not only attacked such abuses as the sale of indulgences and the proliferation of false relics but also began to speak openly of a religion based only on the Bible. Independently of Luther, Zwingli concluded that the papacy was unfounded in Scriptures and that Church tradition did not have equal weight with the Bible as a source of Christian truth.

Reformation in Zurich. Zwingli's preaching was so impressive that he was asked to become the vicar, or people's priest, of the Grossmünster in Zurich. This city bristled with intellectual activity, and on Dec. 10, 1518, he eagerly accepted the offer. At Zurich, under his leadership, the Swiss Reformation began. He preached against the excessive veneration of saints, the celibacy of the priesthood, and fasting. When his parishioners were accused of eating meat during Lent, he defended them before the city council and wrote a forceful tract on the subject. His stand against the celibacy of the clergy brought down the wrath of the bishop of Constance upon him. In 1523 Zwingli admirably defended his position on this topic with 67 theses presented in a public disputation. The city council not only found itself in accord with him but also voted to sever the canton from the bishop's jurisdiction. Thus Zurich adopted the Reformation.

During the 1520s Zwingli wrote much; not all of his writings were theological. Unlike Luther and John Calvin, the Swiss reformer possessed a profound patriotic element, a quality that caused him to inveigh heavily against the pernicious practice of hiring out

soldiers to fight as mercenaries in the wars of other nations. In 1521 he convinced Zurich to abolish this policy.

Zwingli's Theology. The doctrinal matter that set Zwingli apart from Luther on the one hand and Roman Catholicism on the other was that of the Eucharist. Zwingli denied the real presence of Christ in the Host and insisted that the Eucharist was not the repetition of Christ's sacrifice but only a respectful remembrance.

Since Jesus was God as well as man one performance of the act of redemption was enough. Moreover, the Scriptures contain all Christian truth and what cannot be found therein must be ruthlessly cast from the true Church. Thus the concept of purgatory, the hierarchy, the veneration of relics and images, the primacy of the pope, and canon law must all be cast aside. Zwingli expressed these views in the 67 theses of 1523 and in the tract *De vera et falsa religione* of 1525. In general, his theology was absorbed in and superseded by that of Calvin.

Zwingli's disagreement with Luther was fundamental, and after the two reformers met at Marburg in 1529 and had a profitless discussion, it became clear that no unification of their movements could result. Zwingli was also unsuccessful in winning over all of Switzerland to his cause. Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Lucerne, and Zug—the conservative forest cantons—remained faithful to Roman Catholicism and formed a league to fight Protestant movements.

Tensions grew, and civil war threatened in 1529 and then broke out in 1531. Zwingli counseled the war and entered the fray as chaplain at the side of the citizens of Zurich and their allies. He was slain at the battle of Kappel on Oct. 11, 1531. His body was abused by the victorious Catholics, who quartered it and burned it on a heap of manure.

EWB

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READING

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FEMINISMS

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CENTRAL EUROPE

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IRELAND

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THE IBERIAN PENINSULA; SHOPS AND STORES

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HIGH CULTURE

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MIGRATION

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in the Longmans/History Today Book of the Year Competition (1997). His fellowships include the Beatrice, Benjamin and Richard Bader Fellowship in the Visual Arts of the Theatre at Harvard University (1979) and a Fletcher Jones Fellowship in Theatre History at the Henry E. Huntington Library (1996). HOLIDAYS AND PUBLIC RITUALS; MEMORY AND THE INVENTION OF TRADITIONS

Michael Neiberg is Associate Professor of History at the United States Air Force Academy. He is the author of *Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service* (2000). THE MILITARY; MILITARY SERVICE

Emil Niederhauser is full member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Professor Emeritus at the University of Budapest. His many books in Hungarian include: *History of Bulgaria; Serf Emancipation in Eastern Europe; Russian Culture in the Nineteenth Century; The Inflamed Peninsula; National Revival Movements in Eastern Europe; The Habsburgs; and History of Historical Writing in Eastern Europe*. His English and German books are *The Rise of Nationality in Eastern Europe; Die Habsburger; and 1848: Sturm im Habsburgerreich*. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

Kathryn Norberg is Associate Professor in the Department of History, University of California, Los Angeles. She is the author of *Rich and Poor in Grenoble, 1600–1814* (1984) and coeditor of *From the Royal to the Republican Body: Incorporating the Political in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century France* (1998). She is currently coediting *SIGNS: A Journal of Women and Culture*. PROSTITUTION

Robert A. Nye is the Thomas Hart and Mary Jones Horning Professor of the Humanities and Professor of History at Oregon State University. He is the author of *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France* (1998) and *Sexuality* (1999). HONOR AND SHAME

Patrick K. O'Brien, FBA, is Centennial Professor of Economic History at the London School of Economics and Convener of the Programme in Global History at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London. He is the author of four books and editor of twelve, and has written about one hundred articles in academic journals. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS

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Bryan D. Palmer is Professor of History at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. He is the author of *E. P. Thompson: Objections and Oppositions* (1994) and *Cultures of Darkness: Night Travels in the Histories of Transgression* (2000), among other works. He currently edits the Canadian journal of labor studies *Labor/Le Travail*. MARXISM AND RADICAL HISTORY

Panikos Panayi is Professor of European History at De Montfort University, Leicester, England. He has published widely in the history of immigrants and other ethnic minorities in Europe. His most important publications in this area include *Outsiders: A History of European Minorities* (1999), *An Ethnic History of Europe since 1945: Nations, States, and Minorities* (2000), and *Ethnic Minorities in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany: Jews, Gypsies, Poles, Turks, and Others* (2000). IMMIGRANTS

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Andrew Pettegree is Professor of Modern History at the University of St. Andrews and Director of the St. Andrews Reformation Studies Institute. He is the author of several books on the English and European Reformations, including *Emden and the Dutch Revolt: Exile and the Development of Reformed Protestantism* (1992) and *Marian Protestantism* (1996). His most recent published project is a one-volume multiauthor survey of the Reformation, *The Reformation World* (2000). PROTESTANTISM

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Journal of Family History. He has held fellowships in many countries and is the author of numerous books, including *Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society* (1988), *Untying the Knot: A Short History of Divorce* (1991), *State, Society, and Nation in Twentieth-Century Europe* (1996), and *A Short History of Wine* (2000). SEX, LAW, AND THE STATE

Andrejs Plakans is Professor of History at Iowa State University. He is the author of *Kinship in the Past: An Anthropology of European Family Life (1500–1900)* (1984) and *The Latvians: A Short History* (1995). He is coeditor, with Tamara K. Hareven, of *Family History at the Crossroads: Linking Familial and Historical Change* (1987). KINSHIP

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social policies of the Nordic capital cities (Oslo, Stockholm, and Helsinki) after World War II. THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

Matthew Ramsey is Associate Professor of History at Vanderbilt University. He is the author of *Professional and Popular Medicine in France, 1770–1830: The Social World of Medical Practice* (1988). MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS AND MEDICINE

David L. Ransel is Professor of History at Indiana University. He is author of *The Politics of Catherinian Russia: The Panin Party* (1975), *Mothers of Misery: Child Abandonment in Russia* (1988), and *Village Mothers: Three Generations of Change in Russia and Tataria* (2000). He was editor of *Slavic Review* from 1980 to 1985 and editor of *The American Historical Review* from 1985 to 1995. ORPHANS AND FOUNDLINGS

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Priscilla R. Roosevelt is a fellow of the Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University and president of American Friends of the Russian Country Estate, Inc., a non-profit foundation. She is the author of *Apostle of Russian Liberalism: Timofei Granovsky* (1985) and *Life on the Russian Country Estate: A Social and Cultural History* (1995). ESTATES AND COUNTRY HOUSES

Ellen Ross is Professor of History and Women's Studies at Ramapo College of New Jersey, where she is the coordinator of the Women's Studies Program. She is the author of many articles on women and poverty in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century London and *Love and Toil: Motherhood in Working-Class London 1870–1918* (1993). Her current work is on philanthropic donors and recipients in Britain from 1860 to 1940. MOTHERHOOD

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Paul Sant Cassia is Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Durham, England. He is the co-author of *The Making of the Modern Greek Family* (1991) and is working on a book dealing with memory and disappeared persons in Cyprus. He was the Founding Editor of *The Journal of Mediterranean Studies* and is currently editor of *History and Anthropology*. BANDITRY

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Lithuania (1995), and *Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games* (1999). THE BALTIC NATIONS

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Peter Shapely is currently a lecturer at the University of Wales, Bangor. His recent publications include *Charity and Power in Victorian Manchester* (forthcoming), "Status and Parliamentary Candidates in Manchester" (*International Review of Social History*, 1999), "Charity, Status, and Social Leadership" (*Journal of Social History*, 1998), and "Urban Charity, Class Reflections, and Social Cohesion" (*Urban History*, forthcoming) WORK AND THE WORK ETHIC

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Bonnie G. Smith teaches history at Rutgers University. She is the author of *The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical Practice* (1998), *Global Feminisms since 1945* (2000), and *Imperialism* (2000). She is the coauthor of *The Making of the West* (2000). THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER HISTORY; GENDER THEORY; WOMEN AND FEMININITY

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visionally entitled *Cleanliness, c. 300,000 B.C. to A.D. 2000*. CLEANLINESS

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Anne-Marie Sohn is Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Rouen, France. She is a specialist in women's history and the history of private life. She is the author of *Chrysalides: Femmes dans la vie privée (XIX–XX siècles)* (1996), *Du premier baiser à l'alcôve: Les Français et la sexualité au quotidien (1850–1950)* (1996), and *Une histoire sans les femmes est-elle possible?* (1998). ILLEGITIMACY AND CONCUBINAGE

Pieter Spierenburg is Professor of Preindustrial History at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. He is author of a number of works, including *The Spectacle of Suffering* (1984), and the editor of *Men and Violence: Gender, Honor, and Rituals in Modern Europe and America* (1998). CRIME

Peter N. Stearns is Provost at George Mason University and editor of *The Journal of Social History*. He has published widely in social history and in world history, focusing on aspects of human experience such as old age and emotion. He is the editor in chief of the Encyclopedia. ARTISANS; MEN AND MASCULINITY; MIDDLE-CLASS WORK; MODERNIZATION; PERIODIZATION IN SOCIAL HISTORY

Laura Tabili is Associate Professor of Modern European History at the University of Arizona. She is the author of "We Ask for Justice": *Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain* (1994). IMPERIALISM AND DOMESTIC SOCIETY

Charles Tilly is Joseph L. Bottenwieser Professor of Social Science at Columbia University and a student of social change in Europe and North America. COLLECTIVE ACTION; DEMOCRACY; SOCIAL CLASS

Louise A. Tilly is Professor Emerita of History and Sociology at the New School University and Department Associate, History Department, Northwestern University. She is the author of *Politics and Class in Milan* (1992); coauthor of *Women, Work, and Family* (1978); and coeditor of *Women, Politics, and Change* (1990), *The European Experience of Declining Fertility* (1992), and *European Integration in Social Perspective* (1997). She is currently editing and coauthoring a textbook in world history. INTERDISCIPLINARY CONTACTS AND INFLUENCES

Elizabeth Townsend earned her doctorate in modern European intellectual and cultural history from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1998. She is completing a law degree with an emphasis on copyright law at the University of Arizona. Her book in progress, *Reconstructing the First World War Generation: A Comparative Biography*, examines the definitional elements of generation, with particular emphasis on the role of gender. She is also working on issues relating to the cultural materials used by scholars and copyright law. GENERATIONS AND GENERATIONAL CONFLICT

David G. Troyansky is Associate Professor of History at Texas Tech University. He is the author of *Old Age in the Old Regime: Image and Experience in Eighteenth-Century France* (1989) and principal editor of *The French Revolution in Culture and Society* (1991). DEATH; THE ELDERLY

Randolph Trumbach is Professor of History at Baruch College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York. He is the author of *The Rise of the Egalitarian Family* (1978) and *Sex and the Gender Revolution* (volume 1; 1998). HOMOSEXUALITY AND LESBIANISM

Liana Vardi is Associate Professor of History at the State University of New York at Buffalo. She is the author of *The Land and the Loom: Peasants and Profit in Northern France 1680–1800* (1993) and of "Farmers, Gleaners, and Officials in Early Modern France," and "Imagining the Harvest in Early Modern Europe," both of which appeared in *The North American Historical Review*. LAND TENURE; SERFDOM; WESTERN EUROPE

Steven Béla Várdy is McAnulty Distinguished Professor of European History at Duquesne University. He is the author of over a dozen books and several hundred articles and essays. His books include *Modern Hungarian Historiography* (1976), *The Hungarian Americans* (1985), *Clio's Art in Hungary and Hungarian America* (1985), *Baron Joseph Eötvös, 1813–1871: A Literary Biography* (1987), *The Austro-Hungarian Mind at Home and Abroad* (1989), *Historical Dictionary of Hungary* (1997), and *Magyarok az Újvilágban* [Hungarians in the World]. EAST CENTRAL EUROPE

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Keith Vernon is a senior lecturer in social history at the University of Central Lancashire, England. He has written on several aspects of the history of science and education and currently researching the history of British universities from 1850 to 1939. STUDENTS

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Rex Wade is Professor at George Mason University. He is the author of *The Russian Search for Peace, February–October 1917* (1969), *Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution* (1984), *The Russian Revolution, 1917* (2000), and numerous articles. He is the compiler and editor of *Documents of Soviet History* (volumes 1–3; 1991) and coeditor of *State and Society in Provincial Russia: Saratov, 1590–1917* (1989). RUSSIA AND THE EAST SLAVS

Rosemary Wakeman is Visiting Associate Professor at Fordham University. She is the author of *Modernizing the Provincial City: Toulouse, 1945–1975* (1997). THE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE

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idays and Resorts in the Twentieth Century. POLICING LEISURE; VACATIONS

Whitney Walton is Associate Professor of History at Purdue University. She is the author of *France at the Crystal Palace: Bourgeois Taste and Artisan Manufacture in the Nineteenth Century* (1992) and *Eve's Proud Descendants: Four Women Writers and Republican Politics in Nineteenth-Century France*. MATERIAL CULTURE

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Robert Whaples is Associate Professor of Economics at Wake Forest University. He is Associate Director and Book Review Editor for EH.NET (www.eh.net) and winner of the Hughes Prize (for teaching) and Nevins Prize (for dissertation research) from the Economic History Association. His research focuses primarily on the history of American labor markets. He has coedited *Historical Perspectives on the American Economy* (1995) and *Public Choice Interpretations of American Economic History* (2000). ANTHROPOMETRY

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Jay Winter is Reader in Modern History, University of Cambridge, and Fellow of Pembroke College. He is author of *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The*

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Great War in European Cultural History (1995). THE WORLD WARS AND THE DEPRESSION

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David Wright is Hannah Chair in the History of Medicine at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. He has published widely on the history of mental health and disability, including (with Peter Bartlett) *Outside the Walls of the Asylum: The History of Care in the Community, 1750–2000* (1999) and (with Anne Digby) *From Idiocy to Mental Deficiency: Historical Perspectives on People with Learning Disabilities* (1996). DEVELOPMENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITIES: THE “BLIND,” “DEAF AND DUMB,” AND “IDIOT”